Debating the War of Ideas

Debating the War of Ideas

This page intentionally left blank

Debating the War of Ideas Edited by Eric D. Patterson and John Gallagher

DEBATING THE WAR OF IDEAS

Copyright © Eric D. Patterson and John Gallagher, 2009. All rights reserved. First published in 2009 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN® in the United States—a division of St. Martin’s Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010. Where this book is distributed in the UK, Europe and the rest of the world, this is by Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS. Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world. Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries. ISBN: 978–0–230–61936–4 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Debating the war of ideas / edited by Eric D. Patterson and John Gallagher. p. cm. ISBN 978–0–230–61936–4 (alk. paper) 1. War on Terrorism, 2001– 2. Terrorism—Religious aspects—Islam. 3. Jihad. 4. Democracy. I. Patterson, Eric D. II. Gallagher, John. HV6432.D432 2009 355.0201—dc22

2009017836

A catalogue record of the book is available from the British Library. Design by Newgen Imaging Systems (P) Ltd., Chennai, India. First edition: December 2009 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Printed in the United States of America.

CON T E N T S

Foreword

vii

Preface

ix

List of Contributors

xi

One

Approaching the War of Ideas John Gallagher and Eric D. Patterson

1

Two

Jihadism’s War on Democracy Walid Phares

Three

“Dangerous Concepts” and the Struggle Within: Reclaiming State and Politics from the Islamists Maajid Nawaz

Four

Sharing with Equals: Modernity, Fundamentalism, and the Future Karen Armstrong

Five

Taqiyya: War and Deceit in Islam Raymond Ibrahim

Six

Debates over Just War and Jihad: Ideas, Interpretations, and Implications across Cultures James Turner Johnson

21

35

55 67

83

Seven

The War of Ideas: The Role of the “Afterlife” Alan M. Dershowitz

101

Eight

The Clash of Civilizations? Akbar Ahmed

111

vi Nine

Contents Debating Absolutism and Pluralism in Contemporary Islam Asma Afsaruddin

Ten

Democracy, Religion, and the War of Ideas Eric D. Patterson

Eleven

Inter-civilizational Conf lict between Value Systems and Concepts of Order: Exploring the Islamic Humanist Potential for a Peace of Ideas Bassam Tibi

Twelve

The War of Ideas as Therapy: Ref lections on a Eureka Moment in the “War on Terror” Abdelwahab El-Affendi

131 143

157

175

Thirteen

Waging Trans-epistemological Warfare Jarret M. Brachman

Fourteen

Counter-radicalization and Europe’s New Security Dilemma Lorenzo Vidino

209

The Struggle for Islamism in the Levant: The Case of Northern Lebanon Bernard Rougier

221

Dissonance and Denial: U.S. Foreign Policy and the War of Ideas Robert Spencer

239

Fifteen

Sixteen

195

Select Bibliography

255

Index

261

FOR E WOR D

Conf licts to advance political ideas are ever-present throughout history. The twentieth century was marked by “warring ideas” where ideologies associated with blocs of nations collided, producing not only economic and political competition, but also large-scale war and loss of human life. The Cold War victory over totalitarianism and the apparent consensus of the 1990s in favor of political and economic democratization did not last, as the tragedy of September 11, 2001 attests. In fact, as this intriguing volume reveals, the alleged consensus simply never was. Debating the War of Ideas presents an important array of views on core ideological issues affecting millions around the world, particularly the West and the Muslim world (broadly defined). It offers valuable insights into the complex, often highly divergent perspectives of this debate, one that has at times manifested itself through armed conf lict. Policy makers, diplomats, scholars, and military commanders—from all sides—must understand the nature of this debate as the basis for making decisions that will greatly impact the duration and direction of this intense struggle. Understanding the war of ideas is a leadership issue. Released one year after 9/11, the 2002 U.S. National Security Strategy stated, “The great struggles of the twentieth century between liberty and totalitarianism ended with a decisive victory for the forces of freedom—and a single sustainable model for national success: freedom, democracy, and free enterprise.” An important assumption of the U.S.-led invasions of both Afghanistan and Iraq was that people everywhere value “freedom” similarly and will readily embrace the opportunity to increase individual liberty, even if such an opportunity is provided through the military force of an external power. Both the Taliban and Saddam Hussein were brutal oppressors of freedom and dissent, and it was believed that removing them would lead to rapid, widespread popular action in support of democracy, individual rights, and the rule of law. Further, it was thought that the security, governance, and economic development necessary for sustainable self-government would develop mostly uncontested, albeit with help. Yet, events have not unfolded so deliberately in either case. It seems clearer now that a sustainable model for national success whether in the West, the Muslim world or anywhere, must fully account for the deeply held personal and collective beliefs of the

viii

Foreword

people—their ideas about issues like governance, justice, social identity, reform, and so on. Simply put, ideas matter. The apparent differences between the people of the West and the Muslim world are exceeded by the beliefs they have in common about humanity, respect, opportunity, peace, and cooperation. Yet, in the execution of policy and politics, much seems to get lost in translation. As the former commander of Task Force 134 (Camp Bucca theater internment facility in Iraq) from 2007–2008, I had an opportunity to interact firsthand with thousands of Iraqis who had been involved in actively opposing both the Iraqi Security Forces and Coalition forces. Through a program of proper care and custody, family involvement, religious teachings with moderate Islamic clerics, literacy training, and continuing education, we were able to better understand the detainee population as individuals, as Iraqis, and as Muslims. This reintegration program not only achieved remarkably low recidivism, but it helped put citizens committed to stability and reconciliation into Iraqi society. Progress was based on understanding, just as the “Anbar Awakening” in 2007 ref lected a greater understanding of the Coalition among Iraqis. As the late Sheikh Abd al-Sattar Abu Risha stated, “The insurgency occurred because we saw you Americans as invaders. The Awakening occurred because we realized you were our allies.” Those seeking a better understanding of the ideological aspects of this broader conf lict must realize the complexity of how Western and Muslim societies interact. The wide-ranging views presented in these sixteen essays demonstrate this complexity, and are sure to arouse disagreement in every reader. That is the point of this book: to showcase the rival viewpoints present in this debate. Issues discussed within these essays include: How long has this “war” been underway, and how has it changed over time? Is it between the West and the Muslim world, or mostly a struggle within the Muslim world? Do democratization and globalization strengthen Muslim and Western ties, or exacerbate the perception that Islam is threatened? Do the broad freedoms of Western liberalism represent hope, or an extreme individualism that weakens society’s moral foundation? Is Islam peaceful and tolerant, or rigid and violent? Is there a duality in Islam that must be addressed? Does U.S. foreign policy underestimate the importance of sovereignty and self-determination? Is there an inevitable “clash of civilizations?” And how can the various actors and interests in this debate move forward? Of course, one important way to move forward is to learn and try with some humility to understand the competing viewpoints. This is not to say one cannot determine some ideas are better than others and therefore worth fighting for, but understanding the different perspectives is the foundation of constructive dialogue and progress. This understanding is, perhaps, the beginning of the end of the fighting. —Dr. Doug Stone, Major General, United States Marine Corps (Retired)

PR E FAC E

It began on a bus. The coeditors of this book had met just months before, but were entering a one-year period of government service together. The bus was taking us to an orientation retreat and we fell to talking about our studies and teaching and how our intellectual interests were intertwined with our work. In John’s case, he had just finished three years teaching at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, and had brief ly visited Iraq just weeks before. As an Army officer, he had served in the Sinai, Germany, and Kosovo in previous years. Eric, a career political scientist, was just leaving two years as a visiting scholar at the State Department where he had worked on and traveled to Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Eastern Africa. For two hours on that bus ride in September 2007, we applied a very simple notion to U.S. foreign policy, global affairs, and the war on terrorism: “ideas have consequences.” We agreed that U.S. foreign policy was at its best when it refused to back down on its core intellectual commitments: this was the legacy of Truman, JFK, and Reagan. We saw President Bush attempting the same with his “freedom agenda,” but we noted how major elements of the freedom agenda were disregarded by senior administration officials, and that U.S. policies were often contradictory or just ineffective at defining our interests and promoting shared values. That conversation, which tested the patience of other passengers, ranged widely: Bush’s speeches and the National Security Strategies of 2002 and 2006, how different presidential candidates in the forthcoming presidential election might engage the War of Ideas, the original work of West Point’s Combating Terrorism Center, issues of public diplomacy and strategic communications, the unequal role of government agencies, the ambivalence of some government officials about “Western values” as cultural imperialism, the universality of human rights and civil liberties, applying the notion of “warring ideas” to Latin America and the authoritarian regimes in Beijing and Moscow, and the critical matters of culture, religion, and language proficiency (how many U.S. government employees speak Dari or can read Arabic?).

x

Preface

We began with the concept that ideas not only have consequences but genealogies, and envisioned a project wherein those genealogies were presented and their consequences forecasted, both as ideas and as policy. We soon realized that to do this—to map out major contours of the global War of Ideas—was beyond our resources. Consequently, we sought help. We reached out to numerous contemporary voices, some of the very best minds on the issue of a War of Ideas between the West and sectors of the Islamic world. Due to the increasingly targeted nature of journals, opinion pages, book sales, and blogging, many public intellectuals tend to “preach to the choir,” or better, are simply heard by their own choir. Our goal was to break this model. Hence, we sought 10–20 competing voices from across partisan, religious, cultural, and geographic perspectives, to put their voices side by side within one book—and let the reader decide on the most compelling arguments in the War of Ideas. We ended up sending out about three dozen invitations over a seven-month period. The ultimate constitution of the book represents not only a diversity of intellectual viewpoints, but also authors originating from the United States, Europe, North Africa, and Central Asia. All of the contributors, as well as those unable to participate, are animated by the sense that the War of Ideas is entering a new phase: a new president has taken office, the world financial crisis is on everyone’s mind (including Osama bin Laden’s, according to a recent statement), Afghanistan and Pakistan are reeling from political turmoil, and it is unclear how the philosophical confrontation will evolve. President Obama quickly acknowledged there is a War of Ideas; just a few days into his presidency, told the Muslim world via al-Arabiya that the ideas of al Qaeda “are bankrupt.” The result of that bus ride, and many discussions since, is a collaboration between distinguished scholars on the War of Ideas, broadly defined. We are grateful to each chapter contributor for his or her participation in this effort. We appreciate Palgrave-Macmillan for supporting this endeavor, and thank Caryl Tuma for invaluable research assistance and manuscript support. We acknowledge the patient fellow passengers, our White House Fellow colleagues, and all close friends today: Lou Bremer, Anne Neuberger, Julissa Marenco, Stacey Hawkins, Kathy Spletstoser, Andy Smarick, Travis Matheson, Dawn Dunlop, Bobbi Doorenbos, Kristine Singley, Patrick Conway, Jaewon Ryu, and Jaime Areizaga. Finally, we dedicate our work on this volume not only to our families, but also to the many families who have sacrificed and suffered great loss in this struggle. In our youth we witnessed the victory of freedom in the last “war of ideas.” Our hope is that our children—Spencer, Jane, Hannah, and Faith—see a similar triumph of ordered liberty, regard for human life, and equality over the new authoritarians.

CON T R I BU TOR S

Asma Afsaruddin is professor of Islamic studies in the Department of Near Eastern Languages & Cultures at Indiana University, Bloomington. Her research focuses on the religious and political thought of Islam, Quranic hermeneutics and hadith, Islamic intellectual history, and gender. She is the author and/or editor of four books, including The First Muslims: History and Memory (Oxford: OneWorld Publications, 2008) and Excellence and Precedence: Medieval Islamic Discourse on Legitimate Leadership (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 2002). Afsaruddin is currently completing a book manuscript about competing perspectives on jihad and martyrdom in premodern and modern Islamic thought and another on contemporary issues in Islam. Her research has won funding from the Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation and the Carnegie Corporation of New York, among others. Akbar Ahmed is the Ibn Khaldun Chair of Islamic Studies at American University. He is considered “the world’s leading authority on contemporary Islam,” according to the BBC. He is former high commissioner of Pakistan to Great Britain, and has advised Prince Charles and met with President George W. Bush on Islam. His numerous books, films, and documentaries have won prestigious awards and his books have been translated into several languages including Chinese and Indonesian. Ahmed’s most recent book, Journey into Islam: The Crisis of Globalization, is published by the Brookings Institution Press. He is currently a visiting fellow at the Brookings Institution in addition to his tenure appointment at American University. He was nominated as the “Most Inspiring Person of the Year 2005” and was a finalist in the poll conducted by Belief Net. Karen Armstrong is one of the most popular writers on religion today. She has authored twelve books, including the best-seller A History of God (Ballantine, 1994), and created a six-part documentary television series in England on the life of Saint Paul. At age seventeen she took vows of chastity and poverty, and entered the Roman Catholic order of the Society of the Holy Child Jesus. Seven years later she left the convent and in 1982 published

xii

Contributors

her first book, Through the Narrow Gate (St. Martin’s Griffin), which chronicles her life as a nun. Armstrong’s achievements as an independent scholar focusing on the three great monotheistic religions, Christianity, Judaism, and Islam, have earned her a reputation as a major contributor to interfaith understanding and respect. Jarret M. Brachman is an internationally recognized specialist on al Qaeda strategy, media, and ideology. From 2004 to 2008, he served as the director of research at the Combating Terrorism Center, U.S. Military Academy (West Point). Brachman now directs the Center for Transportation Security at North Dakota State University and routinely advises local, state, and federal law enforcement, intelligence, and military agencies and the private sector on counterterrorism matters. He has testified before the House Armed Services Committee and the British House of Lords and his research is regularly cited in the international press. His book Global Jihadism: Theory and Practice was published in 2008 by Routledge Press. Alan M. Dershowitz has been called “the nation’s most peripatetic civil liberties lawyer” and one of its “most distinguished defenders of individual rights,” and “the best-known criminal lawyer in the world.” He is the Felix Frankfurter Professor of Law at Harvard Law School. Dershowitz, a graduate of Brooklyn College and Yale Law School, joined the Harvard Law School faculty at age twenty-five after clerking for Judge David Bazelon and Justice Arthur Goldberg. He has also published more than one hundred articles in magazines and journals such as The New York Times Magazine, The Washington Post, The Wall Street Journal, The New Republic, The Nation, Commentary, Saturday Review, The Harvard Law Review, and the Yale Law Journal, and more than three hundred of his articles have appeared in syndication in fifty national daily newspapers. Professor Dershowitz is the author of twenty-seven fiction and nonfiction works with a worldwide audience. His most recent titles include Rights From Wrong (Basic Books, 2004), The Case For Israel ( John Wiley & Sons Inc, 2003), The Case For Peace ( John Wiley & Sons Inc, 2005), Blasphemy: How the Religious Right is Hijacking the Declaration of Independence ( John Wiley & Sons Inc, 2007), Preemption: A Knife that Cuts Both Ways (W. W. Norton and Co Inc, 2006), Finding Jefferson—A Lost Letter, A Remarkable Discovery ( John Wiley & Sons Inc, 2008), and The First Amendment In An Age of Terrorism ( John Wiley & Sons Inc, 2008). Abdelwahab El-Affendi is a senior research fellow at the Centre for the Study of Democracy, University of Westminster, and coordinator of the Centre’s Democracy and Islam Programme. Educated at the Universities of Khartoum, Wales, and Reading, he is the author of numerous books, including Rethinking Islam and Modernity (Islamic Foundation, 2001) and The Conquest of Muslim Hearts and Minds: Perspectives on U.S. Reform and Public Diplomacy Strategies (Brookings, 2005). Dr El-Affendi was member of the core team of authors of the Arab Human Development Report (2004) and is member of

Contributors

xiii

the advisory board and a contributor to the 2005 report. He is also member of the Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia, a member of the board of directors of Inter-Africa Group, and a trustee of the International Forum for Islamic Dialogue. John Gallagher is a U.S. Army officer and a former director in the Office of Iraq and Afghanistan Affairs at the National Security Council (2007–2009), where he also served as a 2007–2008 White House Fellow. Prior to the fellowship, John was an assistant professor in the Department of Social Sciences at West Point where he taught courses on Western liberalism and political Islam, American politics, and counterterrorism. A recipient of the William F. Murdy Award for teaching excellence, John was the president of the West Point Chapter of the Honor Society of Phi Kappa Phi and the director of West Point’s national-merit scholarship program. An Army infantry officer who has served with the 82nd Airborne Division and 1st Armored Division, John graduated from West Point in 1994 and holds two master’s degrees with distinction from The University of Chicago, one in public policy and another in political theory. John is a term member of the Council on Foreign Relations, was selected as an American Swiss Foundation and French American Foundation young leader, and served as a delegate to the American Academy of Achievement’s International Summit in 2008. Raymond Ibrahim is the associate director of the Middle East Forum and editor/translator of The Al Qaeda Reader. He writes daily for Jihad Watch. A widely published author on radical Islam, Ibrahim regularly discusses that topic with the media. He regularly lectures at universities and briefs governmental agencies, such as U.S. Strategic Command, the Department of State, and the Defense Intelligence Agency. On February 12, 2009, he testified before the U.S. House of Representatives’ House Armed Services Committee regarding the educational/epistemological failures that dominate American discourse concerning Islam. James Turner Johnson is professor of religion and associate of the graduate program in political science at Rutgers—The State University of New Jersey, where he has been on the faculty since 1969. His research and teaching have focused principally on the historical development and application of moral traditions related to war, peace, and the practice of statecraft. Johnson has received Rockefeller, Guggenheim, and National Endowment for the Humanities fellowships and various other research grants and has directed two NEH summer seminars for college teachers. His most recent books are The War To Oust Saddam Hussein (Rowman and Littlefield, 2005), Morality and Contemporary Warfare (Yale, 1999), and The Holy War Idea in Western and Islamic Tradition (Penn State, 1997). Johnson is a trustee, editorial board member, and former general editor of The Journal of Religious Ethics, coeditor of The Journal of Military Ethics, and a member of professional societies in the fields

xiv

Contributors

of religion and political science. He has lectured to academic, military, and general audiences in the United States and abroad. Maajid Nawaz is director and cofounder of the Quilliam Foundation and was formerly on the U.K. national leadership for the global Islamist party Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT). He was involved in HT for almost fourteen years and was a founding member of HT in Denmark and Pakistan, and eventually served four years in an Egyptian prison as an Amnesty International “prisoner of conscience.” In prison, Maajid gradually began changing his views until finally renouncing the Islamist ideology for traditional Islam and inclusive politics. Maajid now engages in counter-Islamist thought-generating, writing, debating, and media appearances. He has spoken at various fora internationally ranging from the grassroots at City Circle London, to addressing the U.S. Senate in Washington D.C., and regularly comments on national and international news and newspapers. Maajid holds a BA (Hons) from SOAS in Arabic and Law and an MSc in political theory from the London School of Economics, with modules in “Religion and Politics” and “Conf lict, Violence and Terrorism.” Eric D. Patterson, PhD was a White House fellow (2007–2008) and now serves as assistant director of the Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs in addition to being a visiting assistant professor of government at Georgetown University. He is also the project director for the Chicago Council on Global Affairs’ Taskforce on Religion and U.S. Foreign Policy. Prior to this he was on faculty at Vanguard University in California. For 2005–2007 he was a foster fellow at the U.S. State Department where he studied and worked on the issue of international illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons, focusing on and traveling to Afghanistan, Pakistan, and numerous African countries. He is the author or editor of five books, including Christianity and Power Politics Today (Palgrave MacMillan, 2008) and Just War Thinking: Morality and Pragmatism in the Struggle Against Contemporary Threats (Lexington Books, 2007). He has also published a dozen scholarly articles in journals such International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, Journal of Political Science, International Politics, Security Studies, and International Relations. He is a term member of the Council on Foreign Relations, a member of numerous scholarly associations, and has been awarded Calihan and Rotary Ambassadorial fellowships. Walid Phares is senior fellow and director for the Future Terrorism Project at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies in Washington (2001–2007). He was professor of Middle East studies, ethnic and religious conf lict at the Department of Political Science at Florida Atlantic University (FAU) from 1993 to 2006. He is a leading expert on the War of Ideas, and his recent books include The Confrontation: Winning the War against Future Jihad (Palgrave MacMillan, 2008) and The War of Ideas Jihadism against Democracy (Palgrave MacMillan, 2007).

Contributors

xv

Bernard Rougier is a lecturer in political science at Clermont-Ferrand University, France, and author of ‘Le Jihad au quotidien’ (Presses Universitaires de France, 2004), recently released in English as Everyday Jihad. Robert Spencer is the director of Jihad Watch, a program of the David Horowitz Freedom Center, and the author of eight books on Islam and jihad, including the New York Times best-sellers The Truth About Muhammad (Regenery Publishing Inc, 2006) and The Politically Incorrect Guide to Islam (and the Crusades) (Regenery Publishing Inc, 2005). Spencer is a weekly columnist for Human Events and FrontPage Magazine, and has led seminars on Islam and jihad for the U.S. Central Command, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, the U.S. Army’s Asymmetric Warfare Group, the FBI, the Joint Terrorism Task Force, and the U.S. intelligence community. Spencer’s books have been translated into many languages, including Spanish, Italian, Finnish, and Bahasa Indonesia. Bassam Tibi was born in Damascus, Syria, and migrated to Germany when he was eighteen to study in Frankfurt. He has been a German citizen since 1967. He is a widely published scholar, and is the author of The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World Disorder (University of California Press, 1998). He has at several universities, most recently at Göttingen University as well as Cornell and Yale in the United States. Lorenzo Vidino is an analyst at the Investigative Project on Terrorism and the Jebsen Center at Tufts University’s Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. He is the author of Al-Qaeda in Europe: The New Battleground of International Jihad (Prometheus Books, 2006).

This page intentionally left blank

CH A P T E R

ON E

Approaching the War of Ideas John Gallag he r and Eric D. Pat te r son

War is political philosophy by other means.1 Politics is merely the process by which institutions—rules—distribute society’s benefits and obligations according to the philosophical ideas upon which people, leading their collective lives, have conferred legitimacy. 2 The War of Ideas is a battle for this perception of legitimacy and accompanying popular support. Simply put, political philosophy is a hypothesis: if condition, then outcome. If a polity is organized according to a particular philosophical narrative and structure, then justice, security, and human f lourishing will result. Plato, for example, advocated a rightly ordered society of philosopher kings, an auxiliary or guardian class, and producers—that is, rulers, those supporting and guided by the rulers, and the ruled. Plato supplemented this social organization with the “Noble Lie” or “Myth of the Metals,” claiming the respective social classes have gold, silver, and brass in their souls. 3 Of course, those on the lower end of society’s benefits and privileges would believe they were not deprived as a result of some political or earthly injustice, just the harsh reality of the condition of their birth. These people are less likely to revolt. Socrates asserted that humanness includes an innate sense of justice. Whenever humans live collectively, a political philosophy narrative necessarily emerges to establish order, legitimacy, and a sense of justice to the social existence. Rulers and their institutions perpetuate the philosophy, distributing benefits and burdens through policy outcomes that are binding on the members of the society. Of course, with every policy outcome, there are winners and losers. As long as the policy “losers” re-engage established institutions (in the hope of someday becoming policy winners), the established order endures.4 But, if policy losers believe themselves to be on the receiving end of injustice (and redress within the rules is perceived as fruitless), over time they will likely “reach for their guns,”5 asserting that resistance (even

2

John Gallagher and Eric D. Patterson

public violence), is in the pursuit of justice. And sometimes it is. Regardless, the struggle is not rooted in differing political institutions or processes; it is rooted in competing philosophical claims over what constitutes justice and, ultimately, political legitimacy. The discussion in this volume represents just such a competition.

Plato to NATO Figures like Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, Montesquieu, Hume, Kant, Adam Smith, De Tocqueville, Nozick, Rawls, and many others all contributed a variation of the same thing to what has become Western Civilization: a narrative and social organization (or refinement of existing dominant ideas) promising a more just society and greater human f lourishing. It is important to note that whenever such a narrative actually delivers on what it promises (or is perceived to have done so), the society believes it has found a superior philosophy and model for governing, and it begins to take a universalist turn. This is understandable and largely unavoidable. Since societies exist collectively in a relative state of anarchy, the presence of neighbors organized according to different political philosophies (and associated political structures) constitute competition and a potential threat. To “export” a system of government beyond one’s borders in order to promote justice and f lourishing is perceived as making others better off while simultaneously reducing a threat. Of course, this has the added benefit of strengthening one’s own standing in the balance-of-power system. This aligning of idealism and self-interest is generally too much for rulers to resist. Even a cursory review of U.S. security policy reveals the clear inf luence of the West’s philosophical heritage on its engagement internationally. Notions of popular sovereignty; equality; the right to decide one’s rulers; and freedom of political participation, conscience, speech, and religion are treated as universal. The importance of grasping and maintaining power is critical as well. These notions are bi-partisan, span administrations, and are perpetually ref lected in the U.S. National Security Strategy. We see Hobbes in the social contract reference, Locke in the limited government and toleration references, Machiavelli in the importance of power, and so on. Of course, many of these ideas were already regarded as legitimate in the colonies by the mid-1600s (Locke’s work on human understanding and toleration would not be published until decades later, in 1689). Coupled with the “rugged individualism” required to survive in the colonies, England’s attempt to bind colonists with policy outcomes resulting from a system of unequal political participation— like the Stamp Act (1765)—fueled a perception of political illegitimacy. The King was still the colonists’ King, but there was no “Noble Lie” that quite legitimized this system or the harsh response from the British upon Colonists who sought redress within (and eventually outside) existing institutions. The colonies had developed a philosophical narrative about what constitutes a just

Approaching the War of Ideas

3

society and were willing to fight, kill, and die for it. That people fight for their conception of political, cultural, and religious legitimacy—and believe the human f lourishing they lack is best obtained through a rightly ordered, just, self-determining society (especially if this social organization and narrative have been previously “validated” historically)—is noteworthy. The West, generally, is characterized by popular sovereignty, representative government, secular political processes, freedom of political participation and speech, and the obligation to obey laws (favorable outcomes or not) because its citizens participate directly in creating them.6 This allows for peaceful adjudication between competing claims—the best chance for more favorable policy outcomes in the future—within this system, which reinforces itself. The Articles of Confederation and the eventual “Miracle at Philadelphia” in 1787 represented the institutionalization of the ideas of liberty, limited government, popular sovereignty, and freedom of religion. The Constitution, separation of powers, and three branches of government are not the ideas; they are the institutions and rules formed to uphold and protect the ideas. America’s claim to be the most just and f lourishing society grew stronger after improvements in equality for women and minorities in the 1960s and 1970s and the subsequent fall of the Soviet Empire in 1991. Swift victory in the Gulf War in 1991 and economic, technological, political, and continued military dominance in the 1990s only strengthened the claim. Of course, the United States’ forward posture associated with containment did not shrink after the disintegration of the Berlin wall in 1989 or the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. The emergence of the United States as the world’s lone superpower only served to increase the opportunity and perceived responsibility to orient outward, to “export,” the social organization and political philosophy that had made it all possible. Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, the emphasis on democracy promotion as a means to defeat impending threats, particularly the threat of terrorism, only intensified. However, after more than two hundred years, Americans—people and policymakers alike—seem to define political legitimacy more by institutions than by its ideas. Yet, ideas tend to give rise to the institutions, not the other way around. Much of the United States’ policy of democratization— since World War II and including the “Freedom Agenda” under President George W. Bush—has emphasized the promotion of democratic institutions on the assumption that the philosophical basis for these institutions would take care of itself. After all, it is thought, freedom is better than oppression, and who does not want popular sovereignty and the freedom to believe and say whatever one wants? It turns out even those who deeply desire these noble ends also want to ensure their beliefs about justice, truth, morality, and faith adequately account for this individualism, these liberal norms, and institutions. In many cultures where democracy is strongly promoted by the West (particularly the United States), this is cause for much public debate, competition, compromise, reform, and concessions—which takes time. Yet, people want to know that as they move in the direction of greater individual liberty,

4

John Gallagher and Eric D. Patterson

secular democratic institutions, freedom of conscience, and the rule of law, they are also moving in the direction of cultural, historical, and religious authenticity7—not away from it. For the diverse peoples of Islam, it is important that a step in the direction of political and religious pluralism not be a step away from devoutness or a right-relationship with God, individually or collectively. Where these steps are perceived to lead in diverging directions, there is reluctance at best and violent resistance at worst, to external efforts to “make others better off.” The distinction between the promotion of ideas and the promotion of institutions is essential to understanding this War of Ideas. Promoting institutions that codify increased freedoms is not the same as the advancement of ideas that legitimize increased freedom and associated institutions. In fact, the former can work at cross-purposes with the latter. America need only look to its own Amish communities to find some who actually prefer to limit individual freedom and narrow their personal behavior out of faithful obedience, submission to God, and in pursuit of greater moral significance.

Ka’bah to Kabul The claim that God saved Ishmael’s life in the desert and later revealed, through his prophet Muhammad, the truth about an ideal society and God’s enduring blessing upon his people was greatly bolstered by Islam’s ascent soon after its founding. The rapid assimilation of this belief by previously factional and disparate tribes, and the spread of Islam after 622 AD throughout and beyond the region serves as validation of the original revelations and confirmation of God’s guiding hand for the faithful. It also suggests Islam’s “universalist turn” was well underway. From 750 to 1258 AD the Abbasid Dynasty, centered in Baghdad, represented one of the most f lourishing societies on earth. Although the Abbasids were defeated by the Mongols in 1258, the Mongols soon converted to Islam. However, Ibn Taymiyyah (1263–1328 AD) asserted through numerous writings that despite the Mongols adopting the pillars of Islam, the presence of customs and beliefs external to Islam meant they were not sufficiently devout and could justifiably be fought. Indeed, Ibn Taymiyyah suggested the Mongols were able to defeat the Abbasids precisely because the Abbasids had so openly embraced customs, thinking, and inf luences external to Islam. Ibn Taymiyyah remains one of the most referenced philosophers in all of Islamic thought,8 and this “devoutness” approach is continually invoked to attempt to justify resistance and violence against those in power who are considered insufficiently pure. As several of the contributors to this volume report, the devoutness test has found its more modern stewards among figures like Al Wahhab, Mawdudi, Hassan al Banna, Sayid Qutb, Faraj, and the modern day writings of Maqdisi, Al Suri, Zawarhiri, and in part, Osama bin Laden. Whether the political philosophies of the Muslim world (lacking a better term for the diverse peoples of Islamic faith, culture, law, and tradition)

Approaching the War of Ideas

5

can, or should, fully embrace popular sovereignty, representative government, equality, rights for women and non-Muslims, and freedom of conscience is an important theme in this book. There are wide differences even among “mainstream” Muslims on these issues. And even when many agree that these “liberal” principles are fully compatible with political Islam, many staunchly oppose their introduction through external intervention and “nationbuilding.” Visitors to the United States from Iraqi, Afghan, and Pakistani communities—usually journalists or local religious leaders9 —often insist that “militancy” and extremism are expanding in their countries because of the presence and actions of “foreign forces.” Yet, they struggle to answer why this extremism has so long been present in the Muslim world or how communities might deal with aggressive insurgents seeking greater power and inf luence in the absence of these international forces. The perception of international forces as invaders explains, in part, the difficulty in Iraq and Afghanistan with strategic communications and inspiring widespread, active popular support.10 Perceptions of the nature of these forces are maligned, intentions are difficult to measure, and behavior can be misinterpreted or distorted. Kinetic [military] actions to defeat insurgents, development efforts, and partnerships with the government and local leaders (who are sometimes viewed as corrupt or as not having the interests of the people in mind) can all be contextualized into an insurgent “script.” For example, in Afghanistan the Taliban routinely distort facts to do this, and the communications infrastructure in Afghanistan and its media consumers have not yet progressed enough so that lies do not pay. This gives the Taliban a clear upper-hand. Part of the War of Ideas is the recognition that in the battle for legitimacy and popular support—whether on a grand strategic scale or an operational scale—every action is itself a communication, generating what one might more accurately call “strategic reputation.” Actions must be understood for the potential they have to communicate, and tactical-level actions can be easily misinterpreted or mischaracterized, with strategic consequences.11 For example, a road constructed through international efforts to better connect two villages for commerce purposes that is instead characterized by insurgents or sympathetic local leaders as a route by which “invaders” will move weapons and ammunition (to bring violence to the Afghan people) will have a very limited positive effect. Or, if international forces detain an individual on legitimate charges, but the local perception is that he was innocent and therefore any person in the community is likely to be detained without justification, the benefit from removing him from the street is entirely offset by the increased distrust and decreased support among the population. The Taliban understand well that inf luencing public perception—controlling this narrative space—is the goal because it drives how the population behaves. International forces are still coming to the recognition that the War of Ideas is the center of gravity in such conf licts, and that public perceptions of legitimacy driving popular action will, ultimately, be decisive in the outcome of the entire effort.

6

John Gallagher and Eric D. Patterson Competing Narratives

In the “global war on terror,” there are two ideological narratives competing for the assent of those who would either support or oppose the violent jihadists. The revolutionary “strict adherence” narrative suggests that if Muslims embrace the most rigid interpretations of Islam and reject modern political institutions and thought, they will be restored to a right relationship with God, Muslim lands will return to the dominance and f lourishing once present in the Muslim world, and the West will be defeated. A “democratization” narrative, currently the West’s only real ideological offering to Muslims, suggests that if Muslims embrace democratic institutions (generally secular political processes, constitutionalism, free markets), they will begin to experience the freedom, well-being, and stability seen in the West (but not present in most of the Muslim world). Unfortunately, the democratization narrative overlooks the fact that the post-enlightenment political philosophy that makes democratic institutions in the West legitimate designates the people as sovereign, whereas in Islam, God is sovereign and the people have a responsibility, as subjects to God, to obey God’s laws—which Eric Patterson and Maajid Nawaz note in their chapters in this volume. Therefore, freedom of conscience and political participation can actually be interpreted as a threat or departure from justice in society. However, there are strains of thought prevalent in Islam that not only allow for liberalization but, according to many scholars, require it.12 Therefore, a third hypothesis that would better compete with the revolutionary Islamic narrative might contend that Islam in its purest form is, in fact, more liberal and pluralistic (qualities associated with Islam’s rapid growth in the first few centuries) suggesting that to embrace true Islam is to embrace “liberal Islam,” which predates Western enlightenment by one thousand years and is therefore the most legitimate way to God’s blessing. Similar arguments are made by Bassam Tibi, and Asma Afsaruddin in the chapters that follow. An essential question then emerges: How should the West shape its political, economic, military, cultural, and technological engagement with the Muslim world to better foster the emergence of these strains of liberal Islamic thought? Karen Armstrong notes in her chapter that it was not always this way; indeed, there was a time when Western ideas were not seen as outlandish or sinister by conservative Muslims in the greater Middle East and Central Asia. Nonetheless, today’s Islamists attempting to manipulate the public narrative against the West have it easy. Writings that attack almost every aspect of Western life and culture are nearly ubiquitous, and as a body of thought constitute a carefully constructed “script” depicting hatred and distrust between the “unbelievers” and the umma. It portrays the West, and the United States in particular, with a corrupt and degenerate nature that its actions repeatedly confirm. American intentions can never be trusted, nor can its words be taken at face value. Even behaviors that are empirically altruistic should be seen as a

Approaching the War of Ideas

7

tactic to further the West’s intent to humiliate Islam and subjugate Muslims. The steady message of revolutionary Islam13 includes a continual claim of the following: (1) Islam is under attack from the jahiliyyah,14 led by the United States; (2) fighting against the jahiliyyah is the duty of every Muslim,15 those who fight will be rewarded richly, and the fight will ultimately end in victory16; and (3) the trials, poverty, hardships (and lack of government capacity and basic services) so common to Muslim lands today are the fault of the West and have continued only because Muslims have not been devout enough.17 Islamists insist that purging the umma of corrupting Western political systems and thought will restore the land to God’s blessing, usher in an end to widespread material deprivation, and serve as a beacon of hope for all true believers. Implicit in these claims is that Muslims face a state of “supreme emergency,”18 that any and all means of warfare are just, and that the ongoing efforts of the West to democratize (promote its way of life politically, economically, and even technologically) are part of a larger scheme to globalize the world into Western beliefs and ways.19 Radicalized elites weave this religious perspective into the very real needs of the population and existing antigovernment grievances20 —and have no shortage of volunteers for acts of violence or suicide terrorism 21 as a result. The vast majority of Muslims are not persuaded by this narrative, but those who are nevertheless constitute a large number of elusive, formidable, and largely undeterable enemies. Advancing the War of Ideas requires recognizing that these enemies are inspired by a philosophy that is a threat to both the West and Muslim societies.

A Religion of Peace? Is Islam inherently a religion of peace? This is a question addressed and debated by several authors in this volume, including Karen Armstrong, Robert Spencer, and Raymond Ibrahim. Hundreds of millions of adherents embrace Islam as a religion of peace and live their entire lives faithfully and accordingly. This sentiment also permeates the highest levels of the U.S. government. President Bush repeatedly asserted that the violent extremists are evil-doers, criminals, and murderers—not followers of a great faith. President Obama has adopted a similar characterization. Yet there are increasingly vocal dissenters who argue Islam’s orthodoxy, properly understood, has no tolerance for unbelievers and calls true adherents to strive to oppose, dominate, harass, and ultimately defeat any who will not submit. They offer as evidence the fact that public criticism of Islam as intolerant and as a “driver of violence” is often met with violence toward those who are publicly critical. This important consideration is a prevalent theme within these pages, ref lecting a galvanizing issue within the broader War of Ideas debate. Indeed, the issue of Islam as peaceful or violent seems to have taken a firm place on the list of public policy issues that align starkly across liberal and conservative lines in

8

John Gallagher and Eric D. Patterson

America. Liberals insist Islam deserves deep respect as a nonviolent religion. Conservatives insist all who value “liberal” freedoms should recognize the nature of this ominous threat. In fact, in February 2009, Democratic members of the U.S. Congress held a hearing on outreach to the Muslim world (extolling Islam as peaceful) while simultaneously Republican members of Congress hosted Dutch parliamentarian Geert Wilders and the International Free Press Society for a viewing of Wilders’ controversial film Fitna. That said, there seems to be another War of Ideas voice emerging on this point: it asserts that settling whether Islam is peaceful or violent doctrinally is not critical. As long as there are adherents who will painstakingly weave Islamic doctrine into a body of political and religious thought that inspires brutal, often gruesome intolerance and violence, this theological-political philosophy must be acknowledged for what it is and its followers directly defeated. Were the president of the United States to assert publicly and repeatedly that America is at war with this particular belief system because it drives attacks against innocent people globally, including Americans, would this circumvent accusations from those who claim America is waging war against Islam (because such accusations would suggest these violent beliefs represent Islam)? Would this not also allow U.S. leaders and policymakers to more easily dedicate resources, policy analysis, and public debate more freely to the defeat of this ideology, without fear of portraying America as attacking a world religion? It might also enable Muslim and other leaders across the globe to say more boldly: “We support the defeat of these violent beliefs (which are not Islamic) and these perpetrators (who are not true Muslims)—and will do more to interdict the promotion of these non-Islamic beliefs wherever they are taught or disseminated.” It is difficult to move the debate or strategy forward in the War of Ideas when there remains so much dissention over the true nature of Islam. Fittingly, almost all of the chapter contributors in this volume speak to this issue.

Debating the War of Ideas: Competing Perspectives Due to the urgent nature of global affairs, and specifically the ongoing conf licts in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as the broader conf lict of ideas and ideologies in international relations, the coeditors of this book invited prominent voices and thought leaders of various disciplines, experiences, and varied perspectives to address questions such as the following: What is the War of Ideas? Is it really a war? Is it analogous to an earlier ideological conf lict such as the Cold War, Samuel Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations,” or something/ nothing else? What “ideas” are being contested? Can there be a “Truce of Ideas” or a “Peace of Ideas?” What would such look like? With a new president in Washington, D.C., what “new thinking” (perestroika) would you recommend to parties in the War of Ideas?

Approaching the War of Ideas

9

Hence, the purpose of this book is to provide the reader—within a single book—a wide range of viewpoints on the War of Ideas. The reader will find a number of key themes emerging. One is the consensus by many of the contributors that part of the War of Ideas is an intra-civilizational war for legitimacy, authority, and authenticity among Muslims themselves. A parallel theme regards the War of Ideas as what Bassam Tibi calls an “intercivilizational conf lict,” and what to do about it. A third theme analyzes the blame laid by both the West as well as its critics as to the genesis, meaning, and stakes of globalization and the War of Ideas. A fourth involves short case studies of what governments are doing, or should be doing, from Washington, D.C. to Berlin to Islamabad. Additionally, many of the authors emphasize the importance of interpretive approaches (hermeneutics) to understanding the philosophical orientation (i.e., epistemology) of the antagonists. Walid Phares provides a history of three waves of the War of Ideas, both within the Muslim world as well as between it and the West. Phares first called our attention to this struggle, but went largely unheard, over two decades ago. In contrast, he has been an important voice in both London and Washington in both the previous and current administrations. Phares terms the first War of Ideas as the struggle within the Muslim world by Islamist organizations for primacy, and the uneasy alliance between conservative regimes and Islamists against Communism in the Cold War. By the 1980s, the Cold War phase was ending with victories by Khomeinists in Iran and later the Salafist mujahedin in Afghanistan. The second War of Ideas was that of the immediate post– Cold War period, in which early al Qaeda and other Islamists proclaimed jihad against the West—despite the West’s inability to come to terms with either the declaration or the reality of war (e.g., the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, attacks on U.S. embassies in Africa, etc.). The events of 9/11 mark the advent of the third War of Ideas, one that has been half-heartedly fought by Western governments, including the United States. Phares provides an important historical overview of the terms of the debate, the historical evolution of different brands of jihadism, as well as policy prescriptions for the West in taking on these threats. Maajid Nawaz is uniquely experienced to weigh in on the War of Ideas: he was formerly a senior leader the global Islamist party Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT) in the United Kingdom and was a founding member of HT in Denmark and Pakistan. He eventually served four years in an Egyptian prison as an Amnesty International “prisoner of conscience,” where his views began to change. He ultimately renounced the Islamist ideology for traditional Islam and inclusive politics. His essay dives into the “internal ideological struggle between Islamists and Muslims,” to refute “Islamists who claim that religiously neutral politics is contrary to Islam.” He focuses specifically on the issue of “sovereignty.” Nawaz demonstrates that sovereignty is a Western political concept, one for which there is no historical parallel or term in Arabic. Thus, when Islamists utilize terminologies of “political sovereignty” based on God’s

10

John Gallagher and Eric D. Patterson

commandments and shariah, they are actually importing colonial artifacts from the same sources that they claim to be warring against. Nawaz provides a vast catalogue of classical and contemporary Muslim sources on issues of politics, sovereignty, law, and faith. He argues that Islamism is not a theology, it is an ideology, and that contemporary Muslims must take it on as such: “Only by reclaiming history and Islam, state and politics, can Muslims reassert the political, moral and theological high-ground over Islamists.” In other words, Muslims can look to the rich religious and historical heritage of classical Islam, as well as its antecedents and interlocutors (e.g., ancient Greece) for examples of pluralism, the rule of law, and representative government consonant with deep Muslim faith. Prominent religion scholar Karen Armstrong considers what has changed the views of many Muslims toward the West over the past one hundred years. She reports that a century ago those Muslims who were able to experience the Western world at first hand found it congenial and deeply in tune with their own traditions. They certainly did not recoil from the new ideals of liberty and democracy instinctively; in Iran, in particular, the mullahs were often in the vanguard of change and development. There was no inherent “clash of civilizations,” no “war of ideas.” She recognizes that there are multiple causes, from the “distortions” and colonial activities of the West (“Western people have cultivated a distorted image of Islam as an inherently violent faith that conquered only by the sword . . . ”) to the radicalism of a tiny group of violent extremists (e.g., al Qaeda). Most importantly, however, she points to differences in how the West and the Muslim world experienced modernization. Western countries were able to modernize gradually and semi-independently based on technical and social innovation. Muslim countries, in contrast, were late developers: “the modern spirit in the Muslim world was characterized by dependence rather than independence and imitation rather than innovation.” Dependence and imitation characterize the colonial and postcolonial relations between most Muslim societies and the West, and this is exacerbated by religious fundamentalisms. In the end this does not mean that mainstream citizens and their governments cannot take responsibility for better relationships in a partnership toward security and mutual respect—there is no preordained War of Ideas. The reader might come to the conclusion that some of the authors in this book hold such different views regarding the ideas of war and peace in the Quran and throughout the Islamic world that no bridging the divide is possible. Yet, Raymond Ibrahim provides an interpretive and historical bridge between those who view Islam as a religion of peace and tolerance and those who see it as likely to be repressive and violent. He argues that the sociopolitical context of Islam vis-à-vis its neighbors provides the crucial conditions for violence or

Approaching the War of Ideas

11

peace, at least for those committed to Islamism. He writes that in Islamic history the “ulema were baff led” because the Quran contains peaceful and tolerant verses, as well as violent and intolerant ones. “To resolve this quandary, the ulema developed the doctrine of abrogation (naskh, supported by Quran 2:106) which essentially maintains that verses ‘revealed’ later in Muhammad’s career take precedence over the earlier ones, whenever there is a contradiction.” How does this help us understand conf lict in the Islamic world? A look at the historical evolution of Islam provides the answer. Because, in the early years . . . Muhammad and his community were far outnumbered by the infidels and idolaters, a message of peace and coexistence was in order. However, after he migrated to Medina and grew in military strength and numbers, the violent and intolerant verses were “revealed,” inciting Muslims to go on the offensive—now that they were capable of doing so. In short, this example has held: when Muslims are weak and in a minority position, they should preach and behave according to the Meccan verses (peace and tolerance); when strong, they should go on the offensive, according to the Medinan verses (war and conquest). The vicissitudes of Islamic history are a testimony to this dichotomy, best captured by the popular Muslim notion that, if possible, jihad should be performed by the hand (force), if not, then with the tongue (propaganda), and if that too is not possible, then with the heart, or one’s intentions. The preeminent Just War scholar James Turner Johnson problematizes the notion of a “war of ideas” between Islam and the West, but concludes that the term is useful in describing two clashes: first, “contemporary radical Islamism has insisted that there is such a fundamental conf lict . . . a fight to the death between the two cultures”; second, one within Islam itself . . . the battle between the radical Islamists and other Muslims to define the meaning of Islam for the contemporary world, and in the conf lict between radical Islamism and Islamic tradition itself. As a result, there is at least a three-way conf lict of ideas here, as radical Islamism defines itself through hostility not only toward Western societies and Western culture but also against understandings of Islam different from the normative constructions of radicals. Johnson compares Western and Muslim traditions of the “just war” and distinguishes them from the positions of violent Islamists, as can be found

12

John Gallagher and Eric D. Patterson

in The Neglected Duty, the so-called creed of Sadat’s assassins; the Charter of Hamas; and Osama bin Laden’s 1998 Declaration on Armed Struggle against Jews and Crusaders. Johnson argues that the reality of Islamic history and jurisprudence is that there are multiple schools of thought and interpretation on many of these issues, so the cassus belli of Islamists (recovering an artificial global caliphate based on a universal shariah) is based on false and doctrinaire historicism. Instead, there are multiple points of contact and possibility for engagement between interpretations of Muslim law and the Western legal tradition. Such an approach does not overlook real differences between Western and Islamic traditions, but it also allows for the exploration of genuine commonalities. Having served as Pakistan’s ambassador to the United Kingdom, Akbar Ahmed is uniquely suited to analyze contemporary international affairs and the War of Ideas. Ahmed, now a professor at American University, notes that many Muslims, and citizens from around the world, are revolted by some of America’s ubiquitous inf luences. Although he approvingly cites U.S. engagement on human rights and democracy, he also points out the failings of contemporary America’s unrestrained individualism, hyper-independence in all its forms, and material self-indulgence—all promoted around the world via globalization. Ahmed rightly notes that the critique of American materialism and exceptionalism is being made not only in the Middle East, but in Europe, Latin America, Africa, and the Far East as well. At the same time, he sadly notes, Islamic “models of moderation and tolerance . . . are falling into disrepair.” He writes, Muslim fury and despair arise not only from the perception that U.S. policies are misguided. There are also inner demons. Muslims today . . . suffer from what I call the “Taj Syndrome.” A building like the Taj Mahal evokes the glittering past for Muslims. Its physical splendor juxtaposed with the painful and wretched present triggers a mixture of emotions—pride, anguish, and anger: pride at the splendor of the past, anguish at the reality of the present, and anger at the uncertainty of the bleak future. Ahmed concludes, “Western and Islamic civilizations are moving further and further away from their cherished ideals of justice, compassion, and wisdom and unless there is universal will to halt the momentum of this clash, the violence may become an unending global nightmare.” Asma Afsaruddin asks, “Can the collective memory of Muslims retrieve past precedents in support of pluralism and respect for diversity today?” Afsaruddin observes that most societies look to their own historical narratives to provide lessons for the present as well as the future. She considers how “absolutist” (hardline, radical) and “pluralist” (modernist, reformist) remember the past and configure the present, specifically with regards to the nature

Approaching the War of Ideas

13

of shariah, the nature of the so-called Islamic state, and definitions of jihad. She asserts that pluralists are the more historically reliable: Modernists typically approach the past in a critical and forensic manner which allows them to strip away the accumulated layers of myth over time and retrieve the more historically credible personas of the earliest Muslims (salaf ) and their variegated beliefs and practices. Such an approach has led them to discover the seeds of democratic governance, gender egalitarianism, and even religious pluralism in the lives of the salaf, seeds they toss into today’s fertile ground in the hope that they will take root among Muslims. In contrast, “the absolutists, who claim fidelity to the practices of the earliest Muslims, have fallen dangerously short of providing a credible platform for reform and renewal in Muslim-majority societies.” She concludes than rather than a World War of Ideas, “This internal struggle between the absolutists and the pluralists for ‘the soul of Islam,’ . . . is the real crisis for Muslims”; it can only be resolved by a widespread commitment to Muslim pluralism overcoming the absolutists within their own societies. The worldviews of the Islamic world and of the West both hold explicit and implicit assumptions about the role of religion and society. Eric Patterson considers three sets of religious assumptions that are the cause of misunderstanding, disagreement, or deadly contest depending on the circumstances. The most controversial is religious freedom, particularly the right of individuals to practice their faith openly and to change religions. This is a nonnegotiable item, or should be, for Western foreign policies but prosecution and persecution occur daily in conservative Muslim societies. Afghanistan is a case in point: despite liberation and massive funding from the West, recent indictments (with the death penalty looming) for apostasy and blasphemy disclose that this is a matter of life and death for minority faiths. Second, a related issue is that of misunderstanding America’s model of “separation of church and state.” Patterson argues that many in Muslim-majority societies are familiar with French separationism (laicite), which radically banishes faith from the public sphere. Consequently, when they hear of Western “secularism” or “separationism” they tend to have the French example in mind, rather than America’s model where the state does not intrude in collective or individual faith, but where religion can and is robustly expressed both privately and in the public square. A third religious dispute in the War of Ideas is disagreement over the notion of sovereignty: Must the Western political conception of the consenting governed (popular sovereignty) always be at odds with the religious notion of God’s sovereignty? Islamists from Sayyid Qutb to Osama bin Laden argue “yes,” although representative governments such as Turkey and Indonesia seem to offer an alternative. Again, Bassam Tibi argues that the War of Ideas is an inter-civilizational conf lict caused by the “return of the sacred” to the political sphere in domestic and

14

John Gallagher and Eric D. Patterson

international relations, and he proposes a solution. More specifically, Tibi argues that the past generation has witnessed a crisis in international relations as well as the discrediting of secularist models of governance (e.g., fascism, Communism, pan-Arabism). To meet the crisis, many parts of the globe—particularly the Muslim world—have experienced the rise of what he calls “religionized politics.” In the Middle East, the Islamist narrative associated with thinkers like Sayyid Qutb and his intellectual descendants saw the fall of the Ottoman caliphate as due to its moral decay; similarly, the failures of secular Arab nationalism— most notably in the 1967 and 1973 wars—as compared to the victories of the mujahedin in Afghanistan in the 1980s, suggest that Islamism is the path not only to virtuous living but to a resurgent Islamic civilization. Tibi points at failures in U.S. foreign policy, such as supporting authoritarian regimes and the “racialization” of politics following 9/11, as lending legitimacy to Islamist narratives of persecution and rivalry with the West. He is also critical of the negative aspects of Western hegemony. For a solution, Tibi observes the long history of Islam and points to its golden era of tolerance, openness, scholarship, and diplomacy as a model for today. More specifically, he calls for an “open Islam” against global jihad to overcome inter-civilizational war. He argues, This position is compatible with the tradition of Averroes who put Islam in harmony with the rational worldview of Hellenism. As much as medieval Islamic rationalists were receptive to the Hellenization of Islam, contemporary Muslims could embrace cultural modernity to give its values an Islamic underpinning. Such an effort would end their predicament with cultural modernity in line with reviving the heritage of Islamic rationalism. How should we understand 9/11 and the events since that momentous date? Abdelwahab El-Affendi observes that the 9/11 Commission Report provided a “Eureka Moment” for Americans, which cleared the confusion and solved the mystery about why the United States was attacked. He argues that 9/11, and what it revealed about America’s place in the world, suggested that the U.S. self-paradigm as a benevolent leader (and servant) of international life was in disrepair. The Report, and the “Letter from America” signed by sixty American intellectuals from across the political spectrum, was a form of therapy to restore confidence in the system and reassure the citizenry. They did so by framing the attack as an assault on humanity (America’s values are universal) at large, and thus justified the U.S. military response. El-Affendi argues that we should see 9/11 as a crisis in American, and Western more generally, self-perception and that the idea of a War of Ideas is problematic. El-Affendi also demonstrates how a similar “complex operation of paradigm salvation” was occurring in parts of the Muslim world, and how “paradigm repair” efforts comfort both the masses and intellectual elites lest their traditional narratives contradict the challenges of new information.

Approaching the War of Ideas

15

Jarret M. Brachman argues that the United States has been “impotent” in waging a war of ideas against al Qaeda. This is because the United States has failed to take into consideration the importance of epistemology (theory of knowledge) and hermeneutics (interpretive approaches). He writes, “the [U.S.] government [is characterized by a] total lack of understanding about the role that epistemology plays in engaging target populations . . . [and] a pervasive inability to think about al Qaeda through hermeneutical lenses.” Brachman explicates the clash of epistemologies as between Western values and modernity versus what he calls “Jihadi-Salafism,” a narrow scriptural positivist/ literalist epistemology that is “a fanatical outgrowth” of mainstream Salafist answers to the question “What is knowledge?” Al Qaeda’s approach is unique in the Muslim world, extremely narrow, and directly contradicts Western theories of knowledge and authority, such as on issues of legitimate authority for government, democracy, and the role of shariah in society. Brachman concludes that only when the United States utilizes hermeneutical tools for interpreting, and then engaging, al Qaeda’s religious and ideological claims, can it be effective in formulating “strategies to discredit the al Qaeda movement.” The security institutions of Western governments have taken different approaches to understanding, engaging, and when appropriate, challenging Islamists in their populations. Lorenzo Vidino provides a case study of how European governments have taken different approaches to the issue. He theorizes that how governments define extremism and radicalization is critical to how their policies develop. For instance, the British government has been open to close partnership with nonviolent Islamist organizations but in Denmark there has been considerably more reluctance. In each case, “soft approaches to counterterrorism” in Europe tend to look for some sort of Muslim “interlocutors,” but there is wide debate as to whether engaging nonviolent Islamists is counterproductive. Vidino evaluates the security environment, the mandate of government institutions, and government assessment strategies as an approach to a comparative understanding of the policies of Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Denmark, and elsewhere. He concludes that governments face a difficult balancing act, particularly if nonviolent Islamists are, as some believe, practicing a “positive radical f lank attack.” This is the idea that more moderate wings of a political movement improve their bargaining position when a radical fringe emerges. This forces governments to “lower the bar” as to who acceptable partners are in the fight against violent extremism. Vidino wonders if short-term gains nonetheless will prove to have negative long-term consequences. A case in point is the United Kingdom’s famous decision to shut down a notorious mosque, with its basement full of weapons and three biochemical warfare suits, and later hand over the establishment to a different Muslim group. Bernard Rougier provides a case study from Northern Lebanon to demonstrate the conf licting trends, ideas, loyalties, and motivations of Islamist actors in the Levant. He asserts that it is necessary also to understand the local and regional context, in this case the struggle among regional powers—Iran,

16

John Gallagher and Eric D. Patterson

Syria, Saudi Arabia—for control over the overall orientation of Islamism in the Middle East. He writes that there are two “systems of crisis”—the Levantine and the Gulf: The two systems are crossed by different sets of issues. The Levant system of crises is overshadowed by the Israeli-Palestinian question, the struggles—both internal and regional—for control over the Palestinian cause, and the extent of Syrian inf luence in Lebanon. The Gulf system of crises is characterized by sectarian tensions between Shias and Sunnis in Iraq, the rejection of U.S. military presence in the Gulf, and the assertion of a Sunni religious identity drawing on the various strands of Salafism. Northern Lebanon, or better Greater Syria (bilâd al-châm) happens to be at the intersection of both systems of conf lict, and thus Islamist militancy takes on three different interpretations of the fight, resulting in three overlapping figures of Islamism in bilâd al-châm: the muqâwim (the resistance fighter), the muqâtil (the defensive fighter), and the mujâhid (the jihad fighter). Robert Spencer disagrees with analyses that suggest the Quran and Islamic tradition generally promote tolerance, pluralism, and peace and thus that “extremists” like al Qaeda are somehow theological mutations. Instead, he offers scriptural and historical references to jihad, pointing to an obligation to make holy war, to notions of universal and ongoing struggle against nonMuslims, and the like. Spencer argues that this tradition is not only in the Quran and the hadiths but also in the mainstream juridical literature of all the four recognized schools of Muslim jurisprudence: the Maliki, Shafi’i, Hanafi, and Hanbali. He reports the many scholars and references on which not only al Qaeda, but other Muslims more generally, rely to justify persecution of non-Muslims, anti-Semitism, dissimulation, and violence. He argues that Western foreign policy suffers from cognitive dissonance and denial: Western leaders like Presidents Clinton, Bush, and Obama assert that Islam is a religion of peace, despite the evidence of widespread violence in the greater Muslim world; and further, that the United States may partner with almost any international actor (e.g., the Muslim Brotherhood) to attempt to advance prosperity within Muslim populations and therefore U.S. interests despite the tarnished recent history of such groups. He writes, Obama appeared to be banking everything on the notion that the ideas that bring one the most material prosperity are the ideas that everyone in every case will choose. Unfortunately for him (and us), this is not always the case . . . they [U.S. leaders] fail to take into account that the jihadists may have beliefs of their own that lead them to hate the West—beliefs that are independent of anything the United States is doing or has the power to change.

Approaching the War of Ideas

17

Conclusion: Are We Safer? In sum, and in light of the massive resources expended in the “war on terror” and the self less sacrifices of those doing the fighting, development work, and diplomacy in harm’s way, the question often posed is: “Is the United States safer today than it was on 9/11?” If measuring safety by attacks on the homeland, one must conclude “yes”—and this is a monumental achievement. However, this way of thinking reveals a weakness in the West’s approach to the War of Ideas and the nature of this violent-extremist enemy. Understanding that a “networked” enemy is one that is affiliated through information sharing and ideology but is not necessarily consolidated territorially (and is therefore capable of migrating if a preferred territory is denied), a better question is: “Are we deeper into conf lict and confrontation today than we were on 9/11? Further, is the number of people identifying themselves in opposition to the West and willing to take action against it (whether physical action, monetary support, ideological support, etc.) greater than on 9/11?” Posed this way, it seems the clear answer is that we are not safer. Of course, there remain those who consider the threat from this network of violent nonstate actors minimal when compared with the specter of great power war or emerging threats from rogue states. But, of these potential threats, only this network of radicalized, nonstate actors can essentially “match” America’s force-projection capability. One of the United States’ greatest strengths relative to other nations is its ability to project and sustain forces nearly anywhere in the world. No other nation comes close to this capability. Yet, because of the Islamists networked nature, they have the ability to reposition leaders and “locally produce” forces. They essentially have the ability to be anywhere America is. Further, only this networked enemy can force project inside the United States. Yes, serious threats exist externally from nations with WMD, and the possibility of a conventional attack on the United States cannot be ruled out entirely, but only this networked enemy can generate a real threat (including a WMD threat) inside America’s borders, on U.S. soil. Understanding the War of Ideas is essential to any strategy to deal with this threat. The threat is not minimal, and it must be taken seriously. Consider a fortress with enemies always seeking new ways to scale or penetrate its walls. The efforts to thwart these intruders are certainly critical, but if these actions play into a narrative that the fortress occupants are at war with the much larger population with which the intruders claim affiliation, the hillside beyond the fortress will continually fill up with would-be intruders. If, after years of killing and capturing these intruders, protectors of the fortress observe a massive increase in the number of people gathered on the hillside, the fortress is not safer. Continuing to kill and capture the intruders is necessary, but without a serious strategy to identify, clearly understand, and de-legitimize the philosophical narrative that is inspiring those gathering on the hillside the fortress may be fighting the radicalized intruders nearly forever.

18

John Gallagher and Eric D. Patterson

Therefore, as many authors in this volume note it is (1) critical to engage the Muslim world politically, economically, militarily, culturally, and technologically in a way that strengthens the shared interests between it and the West, (2) to understand the violent jihadist beliefs and “script” (and how not to exacerbate its resonance), and (3) to enable existing “moderate” voices in Islam (emphasizing ijtihad and shura to promote pluralism, human rights, toleration, and freedom of political participation) to shape ideas and institutions in a way that, in the first place, causes the enemies gathering on the hillside to dissipate,22 and, in the second place, causes those people previously on the hillside to come to regard the attackers not only as their enemies, but to also regard them as the true enemy to justice, human f lourishing, and God’s blessing upon their society. The people deciding to purge themselves of this enemy represent a shared interest with the West and the only real definition of victory in this multigenerational struggle. And it is a struggle in which the War of Ideas is the center of gravity.

Notes 1. Adapted from Clausewitz’s famous dictum, “War is a continuation of politics by other means.” Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, ed. Michael Eliot and Peter Paret (Princeton: University Press, 1989). 2. William Ebenstein and Alan O. Ebenstein, Introduction to Political Thinkers, 2nd ed. (New York: Wadsworth, 2001). Were people not leading collective lives—were there no distribution of scarce resources, division of labor, specialization of function, security in the collective— they would not need a political philosophy to order these conditions. 3. Plato’s Republic, Book III, 415a. 4. Ian Shapiro and Casiano Hacker-Cordon, eds., Democracy’s Values (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, August 1999), p. 4. 5. Ibid, p. 10. (And before they turn to violence, groups usually adopt a name characterizing the justness of their cause—citing liberation, freedom, Godly struggle, etc.) 6. Emphasis on legitimacy, citizenship, and political processes in the West relative to the Muslim world is informed by Roger Scruton, The West and the Rest: Globalization and the Terrorist Threat (Wilmington, DE: ISI Book, 2002). 7. Emphasis on authenticity from the work of Dr. Robert Deutsch, cognitive anthropologist. 8. William McCants and Jarret Brachman, eds, Militant Ideology Atlas (West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center, U.S. Military Academy, 2006), p. 7. “Aside from the Quran and the hadith (records of the Prophet’s words and actions), the fatwas by [Ibn Taymiyyah] are by far the most popular texts for modern Jihadis, particularly his writings about the invading Mongols. These texts are important to the modern Jihadi movement because 1) Ibn Taymiyyah is the most respected scholar among Salafis, 2) he crafted very good arguments to justify fighting a jihad against the foreign invaders, and 3) he argued that Mongol rulers who converted to Islam were not really Muslims. The last two arguments resonate well today with the global Jihadi agenda.” 9. Visiting as part of the U.S. State Department’s International Visitor Leadership Program, through the Bureau of Education and Cultural Affairs. 10. Although preferences for international forces over the Taliban in survey data remain high, the level of popular support that translates into voluntary, risk-accepting behavior on the part

Approaching the War of Ideas

11.

12. 13.

14.

15. 16. 17. 18.

19. 20. 21.

22.

19

of the population to improve their own security, governance, and economic development remains low. Briefing on “Afghanistan: Public Opinion Trends and Strategic Implications” by Craig Charney of Charney Research, June 2008. Part of the kinetic actions to defeat insurgents sometimes results in the tragedy of Afghan civilian casualties, which has a major negative impact on public perception of international forces. Charles Kurzman, ed., Liberal Islam: A Sourcebook (Oxford: Oxford University Press USA, November 1998). Some scholars use “political Islam” or “Islam-ism,” either of which is preferable to “Islamic Fundamentalism.” Portions of this paragraph are adapted from John P. Gallagher and Bradley L. Bowman, “Democratization and U.S. Grand Strategy,” in Choices: An American Government Reader (Boston: Pearson Custom Publishing, June 2005). Sayyid Qutb, Milestones (Damascus, Syria: Dar Al-Islam, 1964), p. 41. Jahiliyyah is an Islamic term for “ignorance” that typically refers to the time prior to the seventh-century emergence of Islam. Sayyid Qutb (1906–1966) used the term to refer to a nation/government that does not recognize the authority of the Sharia, and is therefore illegitimate and an enemy of true Islam. This includes secular Muslim governments, but is more forcefully used by Qutb to describe Western inf luence. Osama Bin Laden, “Text of Fatwah Urging Jihad against Americans” (The International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism, p. 3). Qutb, Milestones, pp. 22, 80. Ibid., pp. 7–10. Winston Churchill’s term to describe the Nazi threat in World War II. He cited a state of supreme emergency to justify the indiscriminate bombing of German cities. According to Michael Walzer ( Just and Unjust Wars), supreme emergency refers to a situation where “danger [is] of an unusual and horrifying kind” (p. 253) as well as “an imminent catastrophe” (p. 232). Islamist leaders do not use this phrase, but they characterize (in fatwahs, declarations of jihad) the “threat” from the West in a similar way, and thus set the conditions for the brutal, indiscriminate attacks so often seen in “political Islam.” Qutb, Milestones, pp. 11, 12, 37, 41, 46, 82. Briefing by Craig Charney of Charney Research on January 29, 2009. Individuals join these organizations based on some combination of three motivations: (1) intrinsic motivation from either being a part of a movement where one’s individual participation will bring a benefit to a group the actor cares about, or from a personal loss or grievance; (2) selective incentives that accrue to the individual like pay, camaraderie, non-falsifiable promises in the afterlife; and (3) increase in social identity for self and family from the participation. Combinations of these motivations are difficult to predict, making “profiling” difficult. Also, once the individual joins (say, mostly for the pay), motivations can shift (say, toward ideology). Karen Armstrong, a well-known British author on world religion, states (paraphrasing) “There is no such thing as a moderate Muslim. Religion is about immoderate love and immoderate belief.” However, this makes no distinction between immoderation of personal belief and what the believer does or does not demand be ref lected in public policy (and therefore binding on others). I submit that a passionate, fully immoderate believer who is willing to express his or her preferences via a political process and who acknowledges the legitimacy of outcomes of this process—even when they differ from the believer’s preferences—is a “moderate.”

This page intentionally left blank

CH A P T E R

T WO

Jihadism’s War on Democracy Wal i d P hare s

The term “War of Ideas” began appearing in the years following the al Qaeda terror attacks against the United States on 9/11. In the days following the massacres, the mainstream media displayed a stunning lack of determination in identifying where aggression was coming from and why. In the hours following the bloodshed in Manhattan, Pennsylvania, and Washington where about three thousand—mostly civilians—were killed, the main question raised by networks, publications, and commentators was, “Why do they hate us?” Incredibly revealing, this slogan told the world and the public at home that America did not know who the “they” (i.e., the attackers, who they represent, and what they wanted) were. It also underlined another stunning revelation: that what mainstream intellectuals understood from 9/11 was that sheer “hate” was the reason, and worse, the roots for this so-called hatred were unknown. Al Qaeda’s onslaught on American soil signaled the start of what was called since, the “War on Terror.” But historical precision tells us that in reality the jihadi war on the United States and other democracies began several years earlier. The sudden post–Cold War rise of combat Salafists (al Qaeda and others) against American and Western targets in the 1990s and the actions taken by Khomeinists (Iran and Hezbollah) since the early 1980s preceded America’s campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq by two decades. Popular and media reactions to the 9/11 attacks in the United States revealed a dramatic reality: The public—let alone the Government—did not know that the jihadists have been at war with America and other democracies for many years before the Twin Towers attacks. During the summer of 2004, the 9/11 Commission asked the tragic question repeatedly: “How come we were at war for years before the attacks and

22

Walid Phares

we did not know it? How come the U.S. government—multiple administrations—did not know it, nor did it inform the people and take action?” The Commission’s hard question was warranted as al Qaeda declared war against the United States, “the infidels, Crusaders and the Jews” at least twice during the 1990s in tandem with terror attacks in 1993, 1998, and 2000. The other major question that sprung from the Commission’s long and painful hearings was: How come Americans and other democracies did not know about the jihadi wars being waged for decades? These two grand lines of inquiry puzzled many citizens since 2001 as they realized that there was indeed a war waged by the jihadists and that for too long the public and most of its representatives did not realize it was happening. As a result, two types of literature expanded in the United States, and later in Europe and the West. One set of books, articles, and panels insists that terrorism is waged by segments of Arab Muslim societies frustrated with Western policies in general and U.S. foreign policy in particular (e.g., economic disenfranchisement and in some cases racism). The second type of literature links the violence performed by the terrorists directly to Islamic theology. The wedge between the two explanations was wide and has grown larger. Both literatures, though, failed to see or explain the jihadi threat as a movement with global strategies, tactics, and rational steps. In 1979, fourteen years before Professor Samuel Huntington published his famous article (turned into a book in 1996) “The Clash of Civilizations” in Foreign Affairs (1993), I published my first book al taadudiya (Pluralism) with a second volume dedicated to the analysis of the “relationship between Civilizations,” focusing in some chapters on the worldwide ramifications of historical jihad. During the 1980s I published more books and articles projecting the rise of jihadism and arguing that its ideologues were camouf laging its strategic intentions. Unluckily, perhaps, the body of my work was mainly in Arabic and went unnoticed in the West, as probably was the case with similar intellectual efforts during the Cold War. During the 1990s, this time from the United States to where I relocated, I published a few pieces, testified to and briefed Congress and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) about the rising and forthcoming threat of jihadi terror. My warnings—as were those of other intellectuals and journalists in this field—were not heeded. Most of the arguments and points I made after 9/11 finally found ears to listen, but had already been made long before the official start of the “War on Terror,” but they had not impacted the debate, let alone the decision-making process back then. In my later findings I established that one major reason why neither the American public was aware of basic realities in the region nor the U.S. government was acting to counter the rising threat was a full-f ledged campaign waged by jihadi forces, both financial and militant, to disable American and Western abilities from perceiving, understanding, and eventually countering the

Jihadism’s War on Democracy

23

expanding menace. In short, what allowed the jihadist campaign to strike surprisingly at Western interest provoking incoherent debates about the so-called war on terror was in fact a “War of Ideas” unleashed by the very ideological forces standing behind the jihadi militant networks and regimes. Not only were the United States and the West targeted by a jihadi war since the 1980s (Khomeinists) and the 1990s (Salafists), but more importantly, democracies were submitted to a War of Ideas since the 1970s at the hands of a bloc of regimes and ideological circles, whose main characteristics were and continue to be sympathizing with the jihadist ideologies and practicing authoritarianism domestically. In 2005 I wrote my first post-9/11 book, Future Jihad: Terrorist Strategies against the West, outlining what I established as past and future strategies by the global jihadist movements. In 2007 I wrote another book titled The War of Ideas: Jihadism against Democracies in which I demonstrated how jihadi forces were able to win their first and second Wars of Ideas against their liberal opponents. Last, I followed up with a third book, The Confrontation: Winning the War against Future Jihad, suggesting how to defeat their totalitarian ideologies and support democratic forces in the Arab and Muslim world. This chapter is an additional contribution to the discussion as to the conditions for success against radicalization. One major condition for advancement in the confrontation is for the public in liberal democracies to understand the actual equation and the essence of the so-called War of Ideas. Indeed, eight years after 9/11 and after successive attempts by the U.S. government, by most European institutions, and by NGOs on both sides of the Atlantic, the definition of this War of Ideas is still unclear, and in many cases, utterly wrong. To most architects of the Western War of Ideas waged as of 2004, the issue has been one of public relations and “American image abroad.” The U.S. government’s various agencies in foreign policy and defense have invested significant time and funds to develop what they deemed “strategic communications” aimed at “swaying hearts and minds” of Arabs and Muslims. More recent efforts in the United States and Europe focused on what they coined “counter radicalization” efforts. But the essence of both campaigns was still short of determining the actual threat in the War of Ideas: it is the ideology that produces radicalization and thus the swaying of opinions. Therefore, I have been arguing, and continue to do so, that first we need to identify the “ideology” and what constitutes a threat within the components of this ideology. Then, we must understand the strategies used by the doctrinaires and followers of this ideology across its various streams and branches, before we design the counter-strategies. Historically, the campaigns by jihadi forces to win their own battle inside the Arab and Muslim world before taking it to the West and beyond can be categorized into three “Wars of Ideas.”

24

Walid Phares The First War of Ideas: 1950s–1990

A historical observation of systematic efforts on behalf of Islamist regimes and networks to spread their ideology shows that while their attempts to expand began with their rise in the 1920s, their strategic expansion took place during the latest part of the Cold War. The Wahabbis, not very inf luential in their first stages, concentrated on rooting their doctrine inside the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia until oil revenues allowed them to begin the process of ideological export in the mid-1950s. The Muslim Brotherhood, founded in Egypt in the late 1920s, also attempted to spread across the region with little success. The penetration by the Ikhwan of Arab societies was slow and suppressed by authoritarian regimes. Taking advantage of the East-West confrontation for decades, the global Salafists (Wahabbis, Ikhwan, and others) focused on expanding Islamist ideology inside the Arab and Muslim world. I term these efforts as the first War of Ideas engaged by the Islamists within their own societies while the West and the Soviets were waging their mutual ideological and propaganda wars at each other. In a sense, the first War of Ideas launched by the world’s jihadists—first the Salafists and followed later by the Khomeinists—profited from the capitalist-Marxist clash of ideas to score advances within Muslim societies and assert the slogan often chanted “la sharqiya, la gharbiya, umma wahda Islamiya” (No East, no West, one and unique Islamic umma). It took the Salafists and Khomeinists the bulk of the twentieth century to organize their movements and rise to inf luence. Sheikh Yussuf Qardawi, leading ideologue of the modern jihadist movement and top commentator on al Jazeera for more than a decade, often asserted that “Islamist awareness” was moving forward and upward after the collapse of the Caliphate, taking advantage of the titanic clashes taking place within the infidel world (kuffar), first during World War II and then during the long Cold War. In his estimate, the spread of the Islamist ideology—at the expense of its liberal and secular competitors—was possible partly because the powers on the other side were destroying each other: fascists versus Allies then democracies versus Communists. Khomeinism had a similar assessment of the success. Ideologues such as Sheikh Hassan Fadlallah, ideological mentor of Hezbollah, often theorized that the Islamist forces were able to surge dramatically in the Muslim and Arab world because of the failure of the West to attract youth and the public to “progressive and liberal ideals.” But this global ideology of Islamism-jihadism, emerging between the two postwar giants, had its own rivalries and difficulties. Sunni-based Salafism and Shia-rooted Khomeinism were at odds on doctrinal, theological, and political levels. Wahabbis and Ikhwan framed Iran’s Islamism as “unorthodox.” The mullahs in turn accused the Sunni Islamists of reinstating the oppressive Muawiya Caliphate at the expense of the Shia. Jihadism’s two branches did not rise to merge; that is a firm finding. But

Jihadism’s War on Democracy

25

both trees developed common grounds, even though not in coordination: the culture of jihadism against all infidels, liberal and progressive Muslims, the West, Communism, Israel, India, Russia, as well as against polytheist Asian and African cultures. Global jihadism had more in common against the rest of humanity than differences within the ranks of the jihadists. Hence the ideological efforts by the Wahabbis, Ikhwan, Deobandis (branches of Salafism), and the Khomeinists converged into the creation of the vastest pool of indoctrinated jihadists in modern times. The radicalization within Muslim societies and its diaspora that the international society began to discover and worry about as of 9/11 began decades ago at the hands of a long-range, patient, and relentless double network of Islamist-jihadists, backed by significant financial resources made available by oil revenues. The first War of Ideas was essentially ideological and educational. The jihadist networks concentrated most of their efforts on widening the pool of indoctrinated youth via madrassas, mosques, Hawzas, orphanages, hospitals, state propaganda, and religious polices, in addition to political movements. The forces of radicalization differed in their strategies of confrontation with the foe. The Salafists designated Communism as the main enemy, relegating Western capitalism to the position of future enemy. Hence Wahabbis and Ikhwan escalated the fight against the Soviet Union and its satellite regimes and parties, culminating in the clash in Afghanistan after 1979. For that purpose the Salafi web accepted a tactical alliance with the United States and the West to achieve the immediate goal. This attitude was explained—wrongly by Western apologists—as a real long-term alliance with the Islamists against the Marxists. The price of such an interpretation was for America and its allies to abandon liberals, human rights activists, and minorities to the advantage of the Islamists. This abandonment was the first strategic failure of the United States to predict the future: scrambling after 9/11 to find the “moderates” is really too late after decades of laissez-faire. However, there was another reason for this abandonment of democratic forces in the region. Indeed, the 1973 oil shock sent a strong message to Western industrialized democracies: hands off domestic affairs of the region’s regimes, which also translated in forbidding the free world from assisting liberal causes under authoritarian regimes as was the case with the Kurds, Berbers, Southern Sudanese, dissidents, Arab democrats, and so on. On their part, the Iranian jihadists condemned both “infidel powers” equally. Ayatollah Khomeini blasted the USSR and the United States simultaneously as “Satan” but his regime and its ally Hezbollah targeted America intensely. The slogan al mawt li amreeka (death to America) was shouted twenty-two years before the planes of al Qaeda blasted the Twin Towers. In short, Western concessions to the Islamists during the Cold War allowed the latter to expand their ideology geometrically and irreversibly.

26

Walid Phares The Second War of Ideas: 1990–2001

With the collapse of the Soviet bloc and the rapid democratization of central and eastern Europe, the fall of the apartheid regime in South Africa, the crumbling of the last militarist regimes in Latin America, and with the signal sent by the Tiananmen Square protest, the earthquake produced by the explosion of democratic revolutions at the end of the Cold War shifted priorities for the global jihadist web. On the one hand, the examples of huge marches in the streets of downtowns formerly ruled by secret polices were too menacing for sister regimes in the Arab and Muslim world. Khomeinists, Wahabbis, Baathists, and other dictatorships in the region felt compelled to preempt potential democratic copycats in their own midst, costing power and wealth of the ruling elites. On the other hand, the Islamist networks, particularly those turned violent jihadists during the war in Afghanistan, realized their calling to replace the discredited authoritarian establishment in the Arab Muslim world. Hence a convergence of strategic interests came to life between traditional Islamists in power and surging jihadists across the region. The new direction of the global web targeted the West and its liberal democracies, but each stream had a different interest. The Wahabbis and other Islamists in power in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Sudan, and other countries, the Iranian regime and the vast network of Muslim Brotherhoods with branches within Europe and North America poured sizeable funds, diplomatic inf luence, media, and cadres into the most powerful battle of ideas in modern history. Their aim was to block the rise of an awareness in the West regarding the necessity of backing the spread of democracy in the Greater Middle East and beyond. The main thrust of the second War of Ideas took place mostly in Europe’s Western democracies, the United States, Canada, and within other democracies. It was embodied by an immense investment of hundreds of millions of petro dollars into the educational, media, and intellectual institutions in the West specializing in foreign policy, national security, and other related academic fields. The goal was to delay the rise of a consciousness vis-à-vis the rise of jihadi ideologies and the severe problems of human rights in the region. After the West intervened on three continents to “back democracy,” toward the end of the Cold War, many of the Muslim world’s regimes feared a similar repeat in their countries. The best strategy employed by these elites was to take refuge under “religious legitimacy,” and the best defense of this legitimacy was to create a barrage within the West obstructing any criticism of jihadism and its derivatives. Accordingly, the chain of financial and lobbying moves in most inf luential liberal democracies was very successful. The petro dollar regimes, forming a consortium closer to cultural imperialism, targeted departments of Middle East studies, international relations, history and other political entities on American, European, and other Western campuses seizing control of setting the curriculum, determining the issues to research and teach,

Jihadism’s War on Democracy

27

and in many cases selecting the instructors and scholars. Oil funding practically eliminated the study of human rights, democratization, minorities, feminism, and jihadist ideologies from Western academia. Graduates of corrupted Middle East studies and its related fields populated the realms of the Foreign Service, mainstream media, and teaching. The 1990s witnessed the eradication of Western capacity to produce an independent knowledge of the region’s multiple dramas and threats. The second War of Ideas, mostly via soft power, subverted national security expertise in America and other democracies and took out its ability of lending support to civil societies south and east of the Mediterranean. While NATO intervened twice in Yugoslavia and the United States exclusively in Panama and Haiti, and East Timor was miraculously saved, the oppressed peoples of Southern Sudan and Lebanon, as well as ethnic communities in jeopardy such as in Darfur, the Kurds, the Berbers of North Africa, and many more were left to their fates. Women were abandoned to gender apartheid in Afghanistan and Iran and students and intellectuals were facing suppression across the region with little interest in Western capitals. The reason behind this general abandonment of the underdogs in the Arab and Muslim world was none other than the victories scored by authoritarian petro powers in America and Europe. Since the only “Middle Eastern conf lict” recognized by the public debate in the international arena was the conf lict between Israel and the Palestinians, all other “tragedies” were dismissed as interference in the region’s affairs. Equally lethal to international investigation into the region’s ideological debate was the more dangerous dismissal by petro lobbying of the nature of jihadism. The latter was framed as a spiritual enterprise, a theological question, and in best conditions, a mere reaction to U.S. policy and past European colonialism. The Western public was deprived of a scientific—even basic— understanding of the jihadi doctrines, movements, and aims. The most efficient success of the second War of Ideas was to take out Western abilities to see the strategic expansion of the ideology at the roots of many terrorist movements and regimes. Any investigation of either the mass human rights abuses of the peoples inside the realm of the “Muslim world” or the nature of jihadism was met by a campaign of demonization and guilt imposition via concepts such as “Islamophobia,” “Zionism,” or “legacy of colonialism.” The push by the petro regimes and their supporters during the 1990s was the shield under which pools of radicalization continued to grow in the East and public opinion was neutralized in the West. However, there were other, even more lethal, consequences of the second War of Ideas. The more radical Jihadists, including al Qaeda, the Taliban, other Salafists, and Hezbollah found the most fertile grounds in their own recruitment not only in the region but also within the West. The short ten years separating the end of the Cold War from the start of the War on Terror were very dense in ideological warfare waged by the global jihadist web. But the latter has morphed into

28

Walid Phares

three large creatures, two of Salafi nature and one Khomeinist. The classical Salafi mainstream continued to include the Wahabbis, Muslim Brotherhood, and the Deobandis. Their strategy was to resume the thrust of the first War of Ideas into the post-Soviet era. Their efforts doubled inside the Muslim world, creating more media networks such as al Jazeera and expanding the madrassas, and also accelerated throughout the West by widening the funding of Middle East studies and backing the apologist lobbies. The essence of this group’s war plans was to delay Western awareness of the ideological threat while seizing the political culture in the region as a permanent fact. However, the classical Salafists had no intentions on clashing openly and violently with liberal democracies, but on taking it from the inside, or at least paralyzing its counter-action for as long as needed until the war was won by ideological penetration. But the second generation Salafists, led by the rise of al Qaeda, broke away from the stealth War managed by the Muslim Brotherhood and the Wahabbis. Bin Laden and his ilk shattered the camouf lage by issuing the two major declarations of jihad in 1996 and 1998 and by disseminating the corresponding fatwas throughout the radicalized pools. Al Qaeda’s priority in the 1990s and beyond was to recruit for the military war and engage in it, not to expand jihadism silently among followers within the West. Hence 9/11 changed the equation.

The Third War of Ideas: 2001–2009 By striking hard and at the heart of American society, al Qaeda shattered the “silent strategies” of the classical Salafists. The U.S. public rose to question the “existence” of a threat and thus demanded to know who that “enemy” is and what it wanted? Hence the debate about the existence of a foe was open in America leading to a debate about what to do about it. The Western War of Ideas began as a result of the shock of 9/11 but that war was not really won in eight years. Across the Atlantic, the jihadists shook off the European public opinions by striking in Madrid and London and rising in France, Belgium, Germany, and the Netherlands. The third War of Ideas was in fact triggered by sensational jihadi actions in the West prompting two schools to clash: on the one hand, analysts explaining the existence of a jihadi threat, and on the other hand, scholars claiming U.S. foreign policy is the trigger of terrorism. Gradually, more citizens were convinced that there was a threat coming from the Arab and Muslim worlds that they did not know enough about but there was a debate about its nature. Some literature focused mostly on the idea of the Islamic religion attempting to link violence to theology. Other research determined that the issue has to do mostly with ideology rather than strict religion. That is the debate inside the West. But the most dramatic dynamics of this third War of Ideas was the explosion of dissidence inside the Arab and

Jihadism’s War on Democracy

29

Muslim world. Gradually since 2001 and increasingly since the campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, counter-jihadi forces and democracy voices expanded. Profiting from the Western debates, seizing opportunities on the battlefields to organize their own democratic agenda, and maximizing the use of alternative media such as Internet chat rooms and blogging, Arab, Middle Eastern, and Muslim dissidents and human rights activists shattered their side of the wall by bringing the story of oppression to the international arena. Former slaves from Sudan, ex-political prisoners, reformists, opposition leaders, exiles, and other figures from democracy activism in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and other parts of the region entered the discussion as to the battle of ideas. The issue was not reduced to being extremist in the Arab and Muslim world or not; it became about being active in the struggle for democracy or being against it. Unlike its two predecessors, the Third War of Ideas widened in multiple directions: First, by means of a campaign by the classical jihadi powers (backed by oil producing regimes) to suppress two narratives in the West—one that jihadism is behind terrorism, and second that democratic dissidence in the Middle East is the response to radicalization. Wahabbi and Khomieinist funding and inf luence have been fiercely attempting to counter the rise of consciousness about these two issues in liberal democracies. One of the main tools used by classical jihadi lobbying is the so-called charge of “Islamophobia.” Any investigation of Islamism—even as an ideology—is being met by attacks accusing the counter-jihadists and the democracy dissidents as anti-Islamic. Second, a campaign by the international jihadists, al Qaeda, and its nebulous allies to further mobilize the body of militants into terror. This campaign runs parallel to the classical jihadi efforts to block the debate about jihadism. Hence, the combat jihadis are profiting from the shield provided by their competitors. In this third War of Ideas, al Qaeda and Hezbollah recruit and radicalize using a lethal ideology, while the Wahabbis, Muslim Brotherhood, and the Iranian Khomeinists secure the protection of this ideology. Third, Western governments have been deploying efforts to de-radicalize the jihadists “after” they have been indoctrinated, which presents tremendous difficulties. The results have been meager and rarely show success, for short of responding to the ideological claims and delegitimizing them, Western efforts are useless and costly. Fourth, counter-jihadist NGOs and intellectuals in the West are attempting to awaken their own societies regarding the mounting threat. They hope to provoke a mass awareness of the menace leading to strategic measures. But the community of experts, commentators, and activists is divided as to the arguments and strategies. While some narrow their focus on theological

30

Walid Phares

debates, others concentrate on single issues. No global strategies in the War of Ideas have been duly set up. Finally, democratic dissidents have continued to be active, but as for the counter-jihadi community, it is very divided and often focused on particular local causes.

The State of the War of Ideas: 2009– Under the Bush administration, the War of Ideas witnessed mutations and changes. While discourse at the level of the president, his main spokespersons, and Congressional leaders from both parties regarding jihadism and democracy was moving in the direction of encouraging pluralism and isolating radicalism, the trickling down within the bureaucracy was not followed through. While the directives from the top levels aimed at encouraging an ideological confrontation with the jihadist ideology and backing of the prodemocracy forces, the body of experts tasked with the mission acted against the aforementioned goals leading to the collapse of U.S.-backed efforts. Most projects, including media production, funded by the American taxpayer deviated from their original aim by pressure groups sympathetic to either Salafi or Khomeinist lobbies. Eight years after 9/11, government expertise in the domain of strategic communications was unable to define the ideology behind the threat and in many cases framed it as a socioeconomical or political reaction to U.S. policy, not a sui generis doctrinal construct. The Bush administration’s push to wage a campaign against the radicals was not followed by its own bureaucracy. Across the layers of the executive branch and agencies, including defense, intelligence, homeland security, and diplomacy, a compromised expertise halted the process of support to democracy forces, blocked public intellectual awareness of the jihadi threat, and moved to partner with Islamist movements at the expense of Muslim democrats. But the Bush administration’s declarations in support of democracy in the region encouraged many NGOs, dissidents, and democracy activists to become bolder and engage in their own struggle on the frontlines against terror and extremism. Even if the Third War of Ideas from 2001 to 2009 did not produce strategic successes due to the inf luence of the oil producing regimes and their inf luence inside the West, the most successful results were ironically achieved by non-supported segments of Middle East societies. In Lebanon, the Cedar Revolution took advantage of Franco-American pressure to engage in a democracy uprising. In Sudan, the Darfur human rights activists pushed for the cause of genocide to be heard. Iraq’s democratic parties, although coming second after the traditional parties in elections, rose again. In Afghanistan, women made strident advances in political integration. Minorities across the region became louder in their quest for cultural rights as the Berbers, Kurds, Assyrian-Chaldeans, and liberals at large

Jihadism’s War on Democracy

31

from the Peninsula to the Maghreb organized. The War of Ideas waged by the U.S. government was stymied by the combined efforts of international jihadi lobbies and hostile bureaucratic circles within the administration. But oddly the “freed” civil society forces in the region moved up and consolidated their gains. In response to the rise of democratic and human rights elements in the Greater Middle East, jihadists and militant Islamists in the region and the diaspora reverted to deterrence against liberal democracies to preempt the most dangerous menace against terror ideologies: an alliance between progressive forces in international society and liberal forces in the Muslim world. Hence a multipronged strategy was developed by regimes affiliated with the OIC and OPEC (mainly Iran, the Wahabbis, Muslim Brotherhoods, Qatar, Syria, Sudan, etc.) to block the realization of the alliance between the West and democrats in the Muslim world. The gist of this campaign is to deter the United States and its allies from backing the liberal forces in the region under the charge of “unilateral intervention in the affairs of other countries” while simultaneously blocking the democracy forces in the Muslim world from reaching out to the international community under the accusation of “serving the interests of imperialism and colonialism.” The ultimate objective of the authoritarian and jihadi forces is to preemptively break the alliance between the free world and the suppressed civil societies in the region. Inside the Arab and Muslim diaspora in the West, the jihadists—both Salafists and Khomeinists—have been winning the battle of political socialization, simply because governments have been seeking the expert advice of an academia sympathetic to the Islamists. Both in Europe and in North America, the jihadophiles do not exceed 12 percent of the communities but they control the “microphone” and relationship with authorities. Hence the representation of the silent majority is hijacked by the radicals. While the counter-jihadists, progressives, liberals, and human rights activists reach around 15 percent, their outreach to the majority is limited because of the failed policies of Western governments, themselves relying heavily on an expertise compromised by the jihadi financial power. With the Obama administration taking over, chances for going in either direction are equal. The first African American presidency should be inclined to assist minorities in jeopardy worldwide and particularly in the Arab world. In principle, an Obama presidency cannot avoid coming to the rescue of Darfur, Mauritania’s slaves, Algeria’s Berbers, as well as assist the Kurds, the Lebanese, women, students, and other suppressed segments of Middle Eastern societies. But the Obama administration’s engagement in dialogue with the Iranian and Syrian regimes and potentially with the Taliban and other jihadists can have significant consequences on the state of democracy forces in the region. In addition, the adoption of a lexicon by the U.S. and European bureaucracies calling for a ban on the use of

32

Walid Phares

terms indicting the jihadists will also strengthen the inf luence of the radicals instead of curbing their appeal. The next few years will better show in which direction the U.S. government and the West will go in terms of the War of Ideas. Most evidence indicates that the authorities will withdraw from this ideological confrontation, leaving the arena to the jihadi lobbies. But there is also evidence that democracy forces in the region, even if abandoned by the West, will continue to struggle in their own War of Ideas against the jihadists and authoritarians.

Conclusion If the U.S. government (both the administration and Congress) would change course from engagement with the authoritarian regimes to engagement with civil societies, and if other liberal democracies would come together in shaping a joint strategy of confronting the radicals by allying themselves with the democrats in the Greater Middle East, I would make the following policy recommendations to win the third War of Ideas. First, identify the counter-jihadi and liberal activists and intellectuals within the Muslim, Arab, and Middle Eastern communities in the West and empower them so that they can present an alternative to their communities in the battle of ideas and let the debate take place naturally. If given equal opportunities, the democratic forces will win these debates. Second, identify the progressive, liberal, and democratic forces as well as human rights activists in the Muslim and Arab world and across the Greater Middle East and extend enough help to enable them to engage in their own battle of arguments and ideas. The most powerful response to radicalization is democratization, not in terms of political process only (election and vote) but in terms of political culture. When individuals choose democratic political culture, they opt for pluralism and the respect of human rights as recognized universally. And when they do so, they reject Salafism and Khomeinism and the latter’s interpretation of conf licts and international relations. Third, engage in mass public education and information of civil societies in the West and throughout liberal democracies about the threat of jihadism as an ideology and the challenge faced by the region’s democrats. Without a full understanding of the confrontation by the public within the United States, Europe, and other democracies, no international support can be sustained to win the War of Ideas. Fourth, address the ideological roots of terror as a prelude to addressing its political grounds. One needs to remove jihadi terrorism from the equation to allow Palestinians and Israelis to reach peace, the Lebanese to reach security, and the Iranians, Syrians, Sudanese, and other societies achieve social peace. But above all, regardless of where government policies will head and the choices to be made by leaders and politicians in the years to come, it is crucial

Jihadism’s War on Democracy

33

to continue the debate and develop platforms for an ongoing discussion of the problem. The ideologically rooted threat cannot be dismissed as a side effect of politics as usual. It has and will continue to have a profound and dramatic effect on human history. The goal of any War of Ideas must be to advance freedom and equality as solid ground for stability and peace.

This page intentionally left blank

CH A P T E R

T H R E E

“Dangerous Concepts” and the Struggle Within: Reclaiming State and Politics from the Islamists M a aj i d Nawaz

In 1996 a global Islamist group proclaimed the intellectual and political battlefield between their Islamist ideology and the West. It was and remains a call primarily to Muslims because the ideological struggle, which in recent years has violently affected America and the world, has in fact been playing out for decades inside Muslim-majority nations among Muslims themselves. Attacks on the United States have “embroiled the United States in [this] intra-Muslim ideological battle . . . ”1 Here is what they said: Dear Muslims . . . you must wake up and realise the reality behind what the infidels and their followers are plotting. You are today called upon to defend your creed, your ideology . . . It is time to distinguish Truth from Falsehood as clear and distinct as life is from death. On one side, the side of Falsehood—are America, the infidel West and your rulers and their supporters . . . allured by Capitalism and seduced by its way of life, together with those who call for democracy, pluralism, human rights and free market policies. And on the other side, the side of Truth—are those carriers of the Islamic call . . . from among the Muslim people who adhere to their ideology. It is indeed a decisive battle in which your destiny is determined . . . there is no room for neutrality in this decisive battle.2 Today, Islamists attempt to monopolize political, intellectual, and cultural discourse by defining the legitimacy of any sociopolitical order based upon its conformity, or lack thereof, to their ideology, an anachronistic

36

Maajid Nawaz

politicization of the faith of Islam. Non-Islamist Muslims, of varying political persuasions, have gradually found themselves on the back-foot. Unable to rebut Islamist assertions without sounding anti-Islamic or prostatus quo, normal Muslims have been accused by Islamists of being agents of Western soft power to advance the infidels’ political ideology against Islamism. They were assisted upon that by agent intellectuals who invite to Western thoughts with passion, defend them, and struggle against the Islamic civilisation, standing with blind sincerity to the side of the Ummah’s3 enemy . . . Thus it is truly considered a violent intellectual struggle between the two civilisations; Islamic and Capitalist. This clash is so clear that it requires no evidence, for we are living it daily no matter how much some intellectuals and the Capitalists inf luencing them attempt to hide it . . .4 The culmination of this ideological struggle has been that Islamists have, by and large, succeeded in capturing not only the imagination of large swathes of Muslims, but frustratingly have also managed to impose upon non-Islamists their own terms of intellectual engagement. This is despite the fact that Islamism itself is a direct by-product of colonialism and the very “Western thought” that Islamists are so critical of. Thus it is with growing frustration that one reads in the literature of contemporary academics and policymakers, Muslims or otherwise, references to Islam as defined through an Islamist frame of reference. This is summarized in the assumption that Islam is indeed a political ideology with its own distinct sociopolitical systems that somehow require reconciliation with modernity. The U.K. government’s most recent counterterrorism strategy, known as Contest 2, explicitly and rather unhelpfully refers to Islam as an ideology, “building our engagement with global centers of Islamic ideology . . .”5 Such a line prematurely surrenders the debate that Muslims have been waging against Islamists from the outset. Rather than asserting Islam as a faith, which like many others once inspired a civilization, such language begins with the assumption that Islam is an ideology, at odds with democracy and at odds with any religiously neutral political order because it possesses its own ideological alternative. Bizarrely, the same U.K. government strategy slips into using language befitting only the Islamist ambition of resurrecting the medieval classification, which was not exclusively Muslim, of defining political identity along exclusively religious lines, rather than on allegiance and citizenship. The policy paper embarrassingly divides the world into Islamic and non-Islamic lands, known respectively as Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Kûfr to Islamists,6 “Veterans of the Afghan war and others from across the Islamic and non-Islamic world travelled to fight in Chechnya.” 7

Reclaiming State & Politics from Islamists

37

It is with regret that one also finds academics falling prey to this entrapment by engaging on the subject through the Islamist prism. Hence, the intellectual debate against Islamism is surrendered, and with it Islam and history are ideologically redefined. Islamists of course receive such intellectual assumptions with glee, for they have been trying to convince the Muslim masses for a long time that Islam is a distinct ideology. Islamist tracts regularly refer to Western statements reinforcing their own Islamist view that it is Islam itself, and not Islamism, that is embroiled in a clash of civilizations with the West. Recently, the following has been mentioned in the book “The End of History” written by the American thinker Fukuyama: “The Capitalist system is the eternal salvation for man on Earth. Islam, despite its weakness and disintegration, threatens this new victorious way of life” . . . The Orientalist Bernard Lewis said about Islam and Capitalism: “They are contradictory. There is no scope for dialogue.”8 In fact, Islamists refer to such commentators as “people (who) know Islam in its reality, rather even better than some Muslims.”9 The surrender of this debate by some non-Islamists is no doubt due to their assumption that Islamists do indeed represent a continuity of medieval Islamic tradition, and that Islam is indeed at odds with any sociopolitical order not engineered exclusively along shariah codes. It is no great leap to recognize how adopting such Islamist terms of engagement immediately marginalizes those Muslims arguing for political pluralism, democracy, and a religiously neutral political order in the name of Islam and against Islamism. It is to reset that balance and to redraw these lines in the aforementioned internal ideological struggle between Islamists and Muslims that this chapter has been written. It is an effort to reclaim state and politics from the Islamist hegemony, and an attempt at breaking the current monopoly of such discourse by Islamists who claim that religiously neutral politics is contrary to Islam. By doing so, this chapter aims to place Islamism on the back-foot, where it firmly belongs, and to empower the mainstream in their decades old struggle against totalitarian ideologies. This aim is illustrated through a case study, perhaps the most central of Islamist political principles that runs contrary to democratic and religiously neutral politics, the question of to whom sovereignty belongs in Islam: God or the people.

Defining the Ideology of Islamism In understanding what the ideology of Islamism is, it would help to begin with the name. The suffix “-ism” has been added to Islam so as to draw attention to the political nature of the subject matter. Islam is a faith. Islamism is

38

Maajid Nawaz

an ideology that anachronistically uses Islam the faith as a justification. The presence of the word Islam in Islamism, like social in socialism, indicates the justificatory claim made by the ideologue rather than an admission of the validity of such a claim. When dealing with this question one must remain cognizant of the fact that the majority of Muslims are not Islamists. The natural question then arises: what is the difference between an Islamist and an ordinary Muslim who may be politically active? Just as there is no one single definition to Communism, it is likewise for Islamism. This, of course, does not mean that Communism does not exist just as it does not mean that there is no such thing as Islamism. Identification will be attempted by considering Islamist’s ideology, law, people, and state. The following four basic indicators can help identify Islamism. The first is the Islamists belief that Islam is not a religion, but a divine political ideology surpassing Communism and Capitalism.10 The second indicator is the Islamist claim that the Muslim personal religious code, known as the shariah, demands implementation at the state level as codified law. In other words, what is legal and what is illegal under state law must be synchronized with Ĥal āl (permissible) and Ĥarām (impermissible) of the religious code. The third indicator is the Islamist notion of the ummah, or Muslim religious community, forming a political rather than simply a religious identity. This has parallels to the Communist idea of the international proletariat. The final indicator is the Islamist dream of having an ideological entity to represent the earlier mentioned three elements in the form of an expansionist Muslim bloc, the ‘Islamic state’, or Caliphate.

State and Sovereignty between Muslim Tradition and Islamist Revisionism Reversing History: The Islamist Attempt at Inversing the European Reformation Al-Im ām Ahmed Ibn Taymiyah,11 the theologian most quoted by Islamists, states: One who says that the question of leadership (Im āmah) is the most important ruling of the D īn (religion) is a liar according to the consensus (Ijm ā’) of Muslims, both the Sunni and the Shia. In fact it is Kûfr (apostasy) since the matter of belief (Im ān) in God and His Messenger is more important than the question of leadership (Im āmah), and this is something known in the D īn by necessity. So the unbeliever does not become a believer until he testifies that there is no god but God,

Reclaiming State & Politics from Islamists

39

and that Muhammad (saw) is a Messenger of God . . . he would never mention leadership (Im āmah) to them . . . So He made them brothers in religion due to repentance. When the non-believers in the time of the Messenger (upon whom be peace) became Muslims, then the rulings of Islam were mandated upon them. The leadership (Im āmah) was never mentioned to them. No one from the people of knowledge reports such a thing from the Messenger of God (upon whom be peace); neither via a singular (Ahad) narration nor a mass transmitted report (Mut āwatir). Rather, we know by necessity, the Prophet (upon whom be peace) never made mention of leadership (Im āmah), neither in general allusions or specifically; so how can it be the most important matter from the religious rulings . . . It would have been obligatory upon the Prophet (saw) to explain to his people (Ummah) remaining after him, just as he explained to them the matters of prayer (Şal āh), alms (Zak āh), fasting (Şawm) and pilgrimage (Ĥajj), and just as he precisely explained the matters of belief (Im ān) . . . and it is known that the question of leadership (Im āmah) is not explained in the Book and the example of the Prophet (Şunnah) as these matters are explained. If someone were to say “it falls under a general text or is arrived at through the principle, what is necessary for the accomplishment of an obligation is an obligation, or something alluded to an indication in a further text.” It would be said; Even if this were correct, then it would at most be considered a part of the braches (Fur ū’) and details not a fundamental aspect of the religion, a pillar of belief (Im ān).12 The notion that political sovereignty belongs to the shariah, or to God, is what many Islamists of varying persuasions generally agree upon.13 To consciously reject this notion, with reasoned argumentation, is judged by many Islamists to be Kûfr (apostasy). Islamists use this principle as an axiom against which the Islamic nature of the law-making process in any given state is judged. If statutes are justified exclusively through the Islamic scriptural reasoning of those who adopt such laws, they are considered Islamic; if they are not, they are considered Kûfr. This further entails that in an “Islamic state” there is no legislature, and no law-makers, as legislation is the attribute of God alone. Rather, there is interpretation, consultation, and adoption of law as performed by the consultative assembly. Any state upholding the people to be sovereign has therefore violated a basic tenet of Islamic faith, that God is the legislator, and has set up a rival to God’s authority in the form of people. In fact, the principle has acquired such importance that Islamists have elevated it to the level of Islamic doctrine, as al-Muwdūdi comments, Its primary basis that as Allah Almighty is the Creator, Master and real Patron of the Universe and Man, He alone is Man’s Ruler, He alone has

40

Maajid Nawaz

the right to give Man Faith (D ī n) and Law and judge the disputes of man and tell what is Truth and what is falsehood. No other being has any right whatever to be man’s lawgiver. In other words, like the natural sovereignty, the sovereignty with regard to lawmaking also is vested only in Allah. No man or creature, apart from Allah, can be the bearer of this sovereignty. And if a person does not recognize and accept this Divine rule of Allah, it is merely futile for him to recognize the natural sovereignty of Allah.14 It is rather telling that the Islamists’ favored theologian Al-Im ā m Ahmed Ibn Taymiyah—as cited at the outset of this section—explicitly declares that political leadership is not at all fundamental to Islamic belief. Al-Muwd ū di’s fascination with raising political sovereignty to a doctrinal level runs in direct contradistinction to the man most accused of being the theological forefather to Islamism, Ibn Taymiyah. Consequently, when considering the matter of sovereignty, there is no “Crisis of Islam” as described by Bernard Lewis.15 Indeed, there is only a crisis of modern revisionist Islamism.

“Sovereignty is for the Shariah”: A Concept Foreign to Islam The concept of political sovereignty (al-Siyādah or al-Ĥākimiyyah) is entirely alien to both Islam and traditional Muslim political discourse, to the extent that there is no word for it in the classical Arabic language. This does not mean however that the concept is abhorrent in itself, but rather that there is nothing intrinsically Islamic about it. Sovereignty is a Western term, introduced into Islam by a process of theo-legal reasoning (Ijtih ād). Islamist literature itself states, “Its reality is that this word is a Western term, which means the one who exercises and controls the will.”16 In any lexicon, the complete absence historically of a word used to describe an abstract notion indicates that the people of that tongue had not yet articulated that particular concept. In modern times, sovereignty in Arabic is rendered Siyādah, derived from a root noun—Sayyid—used to denote mastery. Another modern term used by Islamists is al-Ĥākimiyyah, an abstract noun derived from the Arabic root al-Ĥûkm, “to arbitrate.” The mere fact that a modern derivation was required demonstrates that there is no classical equivalent for the idea; otherwise the preexisting classical word would have sufficed. Furthermore, to claim that the notion of “sovereignty for the shariah” is a pillar of the Muslim creed (‘Aq īdah) is to ignore that classical Muslim manuals are entirely bereft of any references to such an idea. Traditional scholars’ books on creed, jurisprudence, and philosophy consistently fail to mention, by word or meaning, that the legitimacy of a system and its laws is tied to their compatibility with the shariah. Rather, the extent of any discussion in such

Reclaiming State & Politics from Islamists

41

books is restricted to two elements: first, legitimacy of authority vis-à-vis the creed of a ruler as an individual, and not his laws,17 this will be elaborated upon further later. Second, as per his laws, discussion has occurred over the right of Muslims to conscientiously object to a ruler’s edicts if they decisively violate the religious code (shariah). In such cases, however, it has been stressed traditionally that this by no means invalidates the basis of the ruler’s legitimacy.18 The third category, of the state’s legitimacy hinging upon sovereignty belonging to God, is conspicuous only due to its absence. Therefore, the Islamist claim that a Muslim ruler who issues edicts running contrary to the shariah is in violation of God’s sovereignty (Siyādah), and hence invalidates his and his system’s legitimacy is a modern innovation. This does not automatically render the claim illegitimate. It follows though that the introduction of this foreign concept of sovereignty into Islamic discourse is merely an Ijtih ād and hence cannot be held up to be a definitive (Qati’i) matter of creed, with its opposite being apostasy, or Kûfr. On a similar note, by claiming that sovereignty belongs to the shariah Islamists insist, as a matter of doctrine, that all legislation adopted by the state must be derived exclusively from Islam. This view represents a failure to recognize that the state or al-Dawlah (the idea of a separate entity enjoying legal personality), legislation or Tashr ī ’, and drafting and codification of laws or Sann and Taqn īn al-Qaw ān īn are all modern phenomena, not inherent to Islam in the slightest. The words Dawlah (state), Tashr ī ’ (legislation), and Taqn īn (codification) used to describe these three terms are all post-Prophet Arabic derivations. Any attempt at reconciling them with Islam is but an Ijtih ād, not a fixed and preordained matter of creed. This again means that contrary opinions cannot be considered apostasy, or Kûfr. In fact, when discussing legitimacy, medieval Muslim jurisprudence refers to a ruler and his edicts, and not to the modern idea of a “Kûfr” or Dawlah, or to whether Tashr ī ’ is from God. The ruler’s edicts are to be obeyed unless they explicitly command to definitive sin, in which case they are to be disregarded.19 In commanding to sin it was never said that the ruler would be in violation of God’s sovereignty, and his “state” would now be somehow rendered illegitimate. Consequently, one cannot claim that the notion of an Islamic state is fundamental to Islam when the words state and “legislation” are not even present in the Quran or Sunnah. As said previously, early jurists preferred to ask about the person of the ruler, whether he was a Muslim or not, rather than referring to the concept of a state, which they had not yet arrived at. On this matter Islamists are guilty of the very charge they so often lay against others: adopting thought paradigms traceable back to colonialism and then, in a very modern way, calling for political change through the prism of unconsciously adopted Western ideas. There is nothing inherently wrong in doing this, as wisdom is the lost property of the believer,20 but the real colonized mind is the mind that fails to recognize that it has been colonized. Islamism emerged from colonialism by adopting European political

42

Maajid Nawaz

paradigms, from both the Eastern and Western blocs, as a means by which to affirm identity as defined against the other. It is a limited reaction from within the same political prism, like that of a child that detests its own parents.

Deconstructing Nabhāni’s Reasoning in the Sovereignty Principle Nabhā ni, a founding Islamist, has attempted to co-opt this Western term “sovereignty” by trying to reconcile it with Islamic scripture, So if an individual exercised and controlled his own will (Irādah), he would be sovereign over himself, but if his will was controlled and exercised by other than himself he would be a slave. (If ) The Ummah . . . was controlled by herself via some of her individuals, to whom she willingly and freely granted the right of controlling that will, she would be considered sovereign over her own self. Whereas if her will was controlled by others against her wishes she would be considered enslaved. That is why the democratic system states . . . sovereignty belongs to the people i.e. the people exercise their own affairs and elect the delegates they wish and give them the right to control their will. This is the reality of the sovereignty which we want to apply the verdict on. The verdict regarding this sovereignty is that it belongs to the shariah and not to the people (ummah). The will of the individual is not controlled by himself as he pleases but by the commands and prohibitions of God. Similarly, the ummah (people), is not controlled by her own free will where she acts as she pleases but is rather subjected to the commands and prohibitions of God.21 That this reasoning is clearly an Ijtih ād should go without saying. The process of allocating a foreign word within Islamic discourse, as has been done here, cannot but be an Ijtih ād. It is not only possible, but also perfectly reasonable to arrive at a different conclusion. Hence, differing with Nabh ā ni’s conclusion via another Ijtih ād cannot be considered un-Islamic by Islamists. In fact, Nabh ā ni’s view quoted earlier rests upon the notion of human will (Ir ādah) and an assumption that being obliged to adhere to the shariah equates to not possessing one’s own will. On the contrary, it is perfectly plausible to conclude that man is obliged to obey God, yet has the Ir ādah to decide whether or not he wants to. Taken from this angle, man can be said to be sovereign over his own will, yet be religiously obliged to consider God in his decisions. Furthermore, a people can be sovereign over their own will, yet be religiously obliged to being God-conscious when drafting law to determine that will. It must follow for anyone making such an argument that since sovereignty hinges upon controlling will, the people are sovereign. 22

Reclaiming State & Politics from Islamists

43

Moreover, the reasoning given earlier states that a nation, if controlled by others against her wishes, loses her will and hence her sovereignty. It is then elaborated in the extract that the same nation may also choose to grant some individuals from among itself the right to determine her will, thus being sovereign over itself. By accepting in abstract the mere possibility of this happening, it must be accepted that any nation submitting to God’s law also does so by its own free will. It seems that the reasoning here is confusing the de jure duty to adhere to God’s law with the de facto right to choose to do so voluntarily.

Traditional Perspectives in Ascribing Rule to People Contrary to Islamist claims, a scriptural basis exists for the view that rulings should be ascribed to people and not to God. The following hadith (Prophetic tradition) forbids jurists from ascribing their rulings to God. Muslim jurists are commanded to ascribe their rulings to themselves, for they know not God’s true ruling. “If you surround a (defeated) people who asked you to pronounce God’s ruling upon them, then do not pronounce God’s ruling upon them, but rather pronounce your ruling upon them, for you know not God’s ruling.”23 Al-Im ām al-Nawawi’s24 view on the prohibition mentioned in this hadith is that it is cautionary, rather than proscriptive.25 Al-Im ām al-Sarakhsī26 quotes the view of Abu Ĥan ī fah’s students al-Q ādi Abu Yūsuf and al-Im ām Muhammad al-Shaybā ni27 on this hadith: And by it Muhammad (al-Shaybā ni), God have mercy upon him, deduces that it is not permitted to pronounce God’s verdict upon those who are surrounded . . . Muhammad (al-Shaybā ni), may God have mercy upon him, says that it is not permitted to pronounce God’s ruling upon them as is mentioned in the hadith . . . In this wording there is (also) evidence for the people of the Sunnah and majority (Ahl al-Sunnah we al-Jam ā’ah) that a jurist (Mujtahid) is at times correct and at others errs, for he (the Prophet) says “ for you know not what God’s ruling for them is,” and if every jurist (Mujtahid) was correct he would have inescapably known God’s ruling for them via theo-legal reasoning (Ijtih ād). As al-Im ām al-Sarakhsī relates, and contrary to the modern doctrine of political sovereignty belonging to God—where state laws are viewed as nothing less than adopted divine laws—Ĥanafi scholars agreed that ascribing rulings (al-Ĥukm) to God was originally prohibited, with some dispute as to whether it remains prohibited. It follows therefore that it is certainly not apostasy to ascribe rulings (al-Ĥukm) to people. In fact, according to al-Im ām al-Shaybā ni’s stance it is prohibited to ascribe rulings to any thing other than the people who make them.

44

Maajid Nawaz

It is important to note that these jurists who discussed the meaning of this hadith interpreted it in a general sense by widening its application to the classical theological dispute over whether a jurist (Mujtahid) who interprets divine scripture can be said by others to have erred. These theologians, therefore, did not restrict this hadith to its specific cause of revelation but rather accepted its general applicability. In modern times, Muslim jurists such as al-Shaykh ‘Abd Allah bin Bayyah 28 have again used this hadith in its general sense. The Shaykh explains his view that, with the demise of the Prophet (upon whom be peace), this hadith indicates that political authority passed from being entirely religious to a more temporal authority in the hands of religiously inspired Companions of the Prophet (upon whom be peace).29 An important note in this regard is the reason for why the Prophet 30 chose the particular wording ascribed to him in the hadith. This is elucidated by al-Im ām al-Sarakhsī who, after discussing this, comments, The benefit here is that the doubt of scholarly disputation (al-Khil āf ) is avoided by pronouncing upon them our ruling and judging them by our opinion. However, this (doubt) is not avoided by pronouncing upon them God’s ruling, considering that the jurist (Mujtahid—who will derive God’s ruling) may be correct, and may be incorrect. This is the benefit of using such wording.31 Hence, it is al-Im ām al-Sarakhsī ’s view that by simply ascribing rulings to oneself, and then by making them binding as a ruler issuing a temporal judgment, this avoids the theological dispute that may arise. This is because if rulings are pronounced in their capacity as theological rulings (Ijtih ādat), people will be within their remit to have their own theological interpretation, claiming that the ruler’s Ijtih ād may be wrong, and hence not follow it. By naming his ruling as simply his own binding temporal law, the ruler escapes theological disputation. Based upon this, and contrary to Islamist claims of sovereignty belonging to God, there is clear prophetic advice to ascribe political rulings to man, and a cautionary prohibition against ascribing such rulings to God. The debate within Muslim circles over ascribing ruling to people is, as a matter of fact, as old as Islam itself. Al-Shaykh Wahbah Zuhayli32 cites responses of the Prophet’s Companions to Kharijite claims that “the rule is for none but God.” The Kharijites had rebelled against the authority of Islam’s fourth Caliph, al-Im ām Ali. When Ali decided to allow for a compromise on the matter, he called upon a third party to arbitrate between him and the Kharijites based upon principles enshrined in the Quran: “The Kharijites rejected the permissibility of any form of arbitration (al-Ta ĥk īm), for arbitration is for none but Allah, the exalted. They repeated what was said by one of their speakers, ‘No rule but God’s rule’ and ‘We accept not that men rule

Reclaiming State & Politics from Islamists

45

in matters of God’s religion.’ ” Zuhayli then cites Caliph Ali ibn Abī Tā lib’s response to the second of these slogans, He (Caliph Ali) responded to the second of these statements by the words, “We did not delegate arbitration (Ta ĥk īm) to men, rather we delegated arbitration to the Quran, yet this Quran is but lines written between two covers. It does not speak with a tongue, and must necessarily rely upon an interpreter. Hence, men speak on its behalf.”33 Zuhayli continues to quote another of the Prophet’s Companions, ibn ‘Abbā s,34 responding to the Kharijites, When they said “No rule but God’s rule,” he said, “Indeed, you are correct, there is no rule but God’s rule, and it was God who delegated the ruling (Ĥakkama) to people in the case of marital discord, as it was God who delegated ruling (Ĥakkama) to people in disputes over the killing of game. So I ask, is the arbitration of men in marital discord and in the killing of game better, or the arbitration of men in the affair of leaders that will put and end to blood being spilt?” . . . God has delegated His affair to men over a quarter of a Dirham (single unit of currency), and over a rabbit and its like from game, “O you who believe, do not kill game whilst you are in pilgrimage. Whosoever deliberately kills game from amongst you, then he must recompense for the like of what he killed from domestic animals. This is to be judged (Ya ĥ kum) by a just person from amongst you.”35 So I ask you for God’s sake, is the rule of men in a rabbit and its like better, or their rule in matters of blood and reconciliation? Know that if God willed, he would have ruled, and not left it to men. And about women and their husbands God said, “And if you feared that they may separate then send an arbiter (Ĥakam) from his family and an arbiter from yours.”36 Therefore, God has made the rule by men a protected Sunnah (Prophetic example). 37 It is notable from this passage that these Companions had no theoretical qualm with ascribing ruling (al-Ĥukm) to people, rather than God.

The Need for a Political Authority and State It is not the purpose of this work to claim that Muslims need no political authority whatsoever. Rather, it is to say that Islam has not predefined any one single model of political authority, and has certainly not predefined any political theory related to such authority. Past debates have existed between jurists on whether Islam obliges political authority per se. However, it is

46

Maajid Nawaz

important to remember the context of these debates. They were not about whether Islam has defined a specific “Ruling System.” Rather, they were restricted to discussing the need for any form of political authority in general. These discussions addressed whether anarchy was permissible in Islam or whether political authority was foundational (A şl) to religious creed or merely a branch (Far’a). Some Kharijites38 argued that political authority was neither from the foundations of the religion, nor from its branches. The Shia stance was that political authority (Im āmah) was A şl to religion, but was nevertheless postponed till the return of the Messiah. Hence, though politically theocratic in theory, the Shia clergy became largely secular in practice because they were waiting for the return of the Messiah. 39 Sunnis, on the other hand, argued that some sort of political authority was mandatory but was not from the foundations (Us ūl) of religion. Rather it was from its branches (Fur ū’) and devised by people. Theologians devised this distinction in Usūl and Fur ū’ to aid themselves in identifying the core tenets of the faith. This served to delineate where juristic difference (Ikhtil āf ) was tolerable (the Fur ū’) and where it was not acceptable (the Usūl). Regarding political authority and the distinction in religion between Usūl and Fur ū’, al-Im ām al-Ghaz ā li40 states, Know, however, that error regarding the status of the Caliphate, whether or not establishing this office is a (communal) obligation, who qualifies for it, and related matters, cannot serve as grounds for condemning people as Unbelievers. Indeed, Ibn Kaysā n41 denied that there was any religious obligation to have a Caliphate at all; but this does not mean that he must be branded an Unbeliever. Nor do we pay any attention to those who exaggerate the matter of the Imamate (leadership) and equate recognition of the leader (Im ām) with faith in God and His Messenger.42 Nor do we pay any attention to those who oppose these people and brand them Unbelievers simply on the basis of their doctrine on the Imamate. Both of these positions are extreme.43 At this stage it could appear that al-Im ām al-Ghaz ā li and others are arguing that Islam has fixed and mandated a specific Islamic ruling system as part of the branches of religion, due to their usage of the term Caliphate. However, though this mistake is often made by Islamists citing such passages in support of their arguments, it is clear that the context of these words are clearly about something else entirely. What al-Ghaz ā li and others address is the need in Islam for an authority to safeguard the religion. They do not claim that Islam has fixed the shape, form, and structure of this political authority. In other words, all that al-Ghaz ā li is saying is that some jurists believed that Islam could allow for anarchy, while others made authority essential to the creed,

Reclaiming State & Politics from Islamists

47

and hence denying it would be akin to apostasy. Nevertheless, the majority position was in between these two extremes. Islam didn’t predefine authority to the extent that to differ with one model or another is deemed apostasy. Yet also, it did mandate some form of governance and order to society. The subtlety of this context is lost on Islamists when citing such passages. Hence, the immediate assumption is that anyone who argues against Islamism is supporting al-A şamm’s earlier mentioned claim that political authority is not needed at all. On the contrary, what is being claimed is that political authority, though needed to preserve the freedom to practice religion, is not predefined by religion. Hence, people must put their minds to use in defining the best form and model of governance. Islamists may retort here that al-Ghaz ā li and others have used the term Caliphate in such passages to describe the type of political authority needed. This rebuttal makes the mistake of assuming that the Caliphate is a predefined and fixed system of governance. Sadly, such an assumption has been adopted by many a non-Muslim commentator too. However, this assumption fails to recognize that the terms Caliph and Caliphate were merely used to denote political authority. Medieval Muslim jurists had no fixed system in mind when using these terms. Indeed, various Caliphates differed with each other considerably over time and place. This is why jurists and theologians alike used these terms interchangeably with the terms Im ām and Im āmah (leader and Imamate), Şulţā n and Şal ţanah (Sultan and Sultanate), and Am īr and Im ārah (Emir and Emirate). Such usage ref lected the interchangeable way in which these terms were used in the scripture itself. In fact, even a founding Islamist, Nabhā ni, recognized this, As for the title given to him, it is the title of Khalī fah (successor), or Im ām (leader), or Am īr al-Mu’min īn (Prince of the believers) . . . it is not obligatory to adhere to these three alone, rather other titles that indicate the same meaning are permitted to use for he who supervises the affairs of Muslims, such as Ĥākim (ruler) of the believers, Ra’īs (president) of Muslims, Şulţā n of Muslims and others that do not contradict this meaning. As for titles that have a specific meaning that contradict the Islamic rules related to ruling such as King, or President of the Republic, or Emperor, then they are not permitted to be used as they contradict the Islamic rules.44 Nabh ā ni’s only caveat was that the title of the system and leader should not contain specific meanings that contradict the “Islamic rules related to ruling” as defined by him. It should be clear at this stage, however, that by using the term Caliphate in the context that he did, al-Ghaz ā li meant nothing more than political authority and its leader. As such this author wholeheartedly accepts his point. Islam, and indeed any religion for that

48

Maajid Nawaz

matter, would fare better if it existed under a political authority that protected the right of its people to practice their faith. From its inception, therefore, Islam mandated the use of political authority to protect the right to worship God, and to establish justice, where such worship is denied or where injustice prevails. This is a far cry from the predefined divine system of Islamists. With this in mind, it is pertinent to consider here some passages used by Islamists to lend legitimacy to their claims that Islam fixes a certain model of Islamic ruling. For instance, Al-Im ām al- Māwā rdi45 begins his book al-A ĥk ām al- Şul ţāniyyah with this very discussion, There is a consensus of opinion that the person who discharges the responsibilities of this position must take on the contract of Imamate of the Ummah (people)—although A şamm,46 exceptionally, differs in this matter. There is a difference of opinion, however, as to its obligation, that is, as whether it is obligatory for rational reasons or because it is prescribed in the shariah.47 Ibn Hajar al-‘Asqalā ni makes this same point, Al-Nawawi said they (the jurists) were unanimous on the obligation of appointing a Caliph, and that this was a scriptural obligation, not a rational one. Some, like al-Asamm and some Kharijites differed however, by saying that appointing a Caliph was not obligatory. Further, some Mu’tazilites48 differed with this too by their saying that appointing a Caliph was obligatory by ration and not text. Both views are invalid.49 After considering the aforementioned observations about the context of this dispute, it becomes clear to see how these passages—by referring to the obligation of appointing a Caliph—relate merely to the need for an authority to exist. They do not illustrate the need for a predefined and divinely ordained “Islamic Ruling System,” called the Caliphate or the Islamic state by Islamists. These models developed in the context of the debate between the Kharijites on the one hand and the Shias on the other. What is said in these passages, and is accepted by this writer, is that having an authority and leader(s) is both common sense and prescribed by Islam. Islam, like any civilized religion, favors authority to anarchy. This, however, is not the subject of this work. The purpose here is therefore to rebut the Islamist claim that Islam has fixed the type, form, and structure of this political authority and has restricted Muslims to one specific political theory of governance. Islamists are simply wrong in their claim that the specific and defined system is called the Caliphate, and the style of governance adopted by the Caliph must be centralized.50

Reclaiming State & Politics from Islamists

49

Conclusion Rather than dangerously posing this discussion as a War of Ideas between Islam and the West, which would be a true surrender to the Islamist terms of engagement, the key to success is to “convey to Muslims the understanding that they need not make such a choice, because the values cherished by Western civilizations are the same as those embraced by classical Islam.”51 Only by reclaiming history and Islam, state and politics, can Muslims reassert the political, moral, and theological high-ground over Islamists. Only by refusing to engage in this ideological struggle through the Islamist terms of engagement can non-Islamists hope to “Prevail in the longer term over the ideology that gives rise to Islamist terrorism.”52 Islam must not be juxtaposed against Western civilization, as if there are no Western Muslims, or as if the opposite of West is not East but Islam. What have come to be known as Western values today are the culmination of centuries of human heritage, traceable back to Greece through medieval Arabs, translated from Arabic into European languages via Muslim Andalusians. In summary, until it is recognized that Islamism forms a distinct modern political ideology and is not extracted from traditional Muslim theology, little chance exists in successfully addressing the rise of Islamism and its various protagonists. This chapter represents a nascent attempt at distinguishing Islamism from the tradition of Islam. In their desire for an Islamic state, Islamists represent a peculiar blend of modernity, represented in their goal of establishing a state, coupled with a desire to return to medieval Muslim jurisprudence, represented in the law they wish for their modern state. Islamist and jihadist movements are hence modern beasts, not at all traditional in their political ideology, or party organization. Ideologies cannot be defeated by force, as Islamist groups’ continued presence under very hostile conditions demonstrates. Rather, “the U.S. is caught up in a clash within a civilization.”53 Therefore, a serious effort to challenge the core of this ideology through the power of intellectual persuasion and reclaiming traditional Islamic theology, coupled with a real and serious look at policies that facilitate recruitment for ideologues, is a more assured longerterm strategy.54

Notes 1. Michael S. Doran, “Somebody Else’s Civil War,” Foreign Affairs, 81, no. 1 (2002), 23. 2. The American Campaign to Destroy Islam or al- Ĥamlah al-Amrik ī yyah Lil Qad ā’ ‘Ala al-Isl ā m, issued by Ĥizb ut-Ta ĥ r ī r (1996), Arabic original, pp. 17–18; English translation, p. 32. 3. Ummah is used by Islamists in the sense of a global political bloc, rather than as a religious community. See The Roots of Violent Extremism and Efforts to Counter It, Testimony of Maajid Nawaz before the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental

50

4. 5.

6.

7. 8.

9. 10. 11.

12.

13.

14. 15.

16. 17.

Maajid Nawaz Affairs, July 10, 2008, p. 7. Accessed on March 31, 2009: http://www.quilliamfoundation. org/images/stories/pdfs/us-senate-submission-09–2008.pdf. The Inevitability of the Clash of Civilisations, issued by Ĥ izb ut-Ta ĥ r ī r (2002), English, p. 36. Pursue, Prevent, Protect, Prepare: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering International Terrorism, Presented to Parliament by the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for the Home Department by Command of Her Majesty, HMG (March 2009), p. 96. Accessed March 31, 2009, at http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/news-publications/publicationsearch/general/HO_Contest_strategy.pdf ?view=Binary. See, e.g., The Way For Revival, p. 3 (now known as The Method of Ĥizb ut-Ta ĥ r ī r for Change by Hizb ut-Tahrir [al-Khil ā fah Publications] London, no date corresponding to the original Arabic Minh āj Ĥizb ut-Ta ĥ r ī r fi al-Taghy ī r, p. 6. Pursue, Prevent, Protect, Prepare, p. 24. Dangerous Concepts to Attack Islam and Consolidate Western Culture or Maf ā h ī m Khatira Li Darb al-Isl ā m wa Tark īz al-Had ā rah al-Gharbiyya, issued by Ĥizb ut-Ta ĥ r ī r (1998). Arabic original, p. 9, English translation, p. 18. The Inevitability of the Clash of Civilisations, p. 38; emphasis added. “Hizb ut-Tahrir” by Ĥizb ut-Ta ĥ r ī r (no date) al-Khil ā fah Publications, p. 1. Al-Im ā m Taqi al-D ī n A ĥ med Ibn Taymiyyah al-Harr ā ni (1263–1328), a Muslim jurist, theologian, reformer, and warrior originally of the Hanbali school of thought. Heavily criticized by certain orthodox scholars of his time, Ibn Taymiyyah unwittingly inspired, and has been greatly misunderstood by, much of Islamism and Jihadism today. For an academic endeavor in vindication of this scholar see the works of Oxford professor Ya ĥya Michot. Nyazee, Professor Imr ā n A ĥ san Kh ā n, Theories of Islamic Law: The Methodology of Ijtih ā d, Perspective of Islamic Thought Series (International Institute of Islamic Thought and Islamic Research Institute, Isl ā mab ā d, 1994), p. 124, quoting al-Im ā m Taqi al-D ī n A ĥ med Ibn Taymiyyah, in his Minh ā j al-Sunnah, vol. 1, p. 20. Note: though this citation came in the context of ibn Taymiyyah’s criticism of the Shia notion of the Im ā mah (leadership), his words are general and consideration is given to their generality (al-’Ibra bi al-’Um ū m). See al-Nabh ā ni, Taqi al-D ī n: “The Ruling System in Isl ā m” by Ĥizb ut-Ta ĥ r ī r (al-Khil ā fah Publications, London), p. 43, corresponding to the Arabic “Ni źā m al- Ĥukm fi il-Isl ā m,” p. 41. For further reading, see also Sayyid Qutb, Milestones (Chicago: Islamic Book Service, India, 2006) and Abu al-Ĥ asan al-Mawd ūdi, “The Meaning of The Qur’ā n,” Introduction to S ū rah al-Shū ra, chapter 42: “Its primary basis that as Allah Almighty is the Creator, Master and real Patron of the Universe and Man, He alone is Man’s Ruler, He alone has the right to give Man Faith (Din) and Law and judge the disputes of man and tell what is Truth and what is falsehood. No other being has any right whatever to be man’s lawgiver. In other words, like the natural sovereignty, the sovereignty with regard to lawmaking also is vested only in Allah. No man or creature, apart from Allah, can be the bearer of this sovereignty. And if a person does not recognize and accept this Divine rule of Allah, it is merely futile for him to recognize the natural sovereignty of Allah.” Al-Mawd ūdi, “The Meaning of The Qur’ā n” (multiple publishers) Introduction to S ū rah al-Shū ra, chapter 42. For examples of Bernard Lewis’ acceptance of the Islamist paradigm of sovereignty for God, see his “Crisis of Islam—Holy War and Unholy Terror,” (London: Phoenix-Orion Books, 2004), pp. 6, 17, and 23. “The Ruling System in Isl ā m” by Ĥizb ut-Ta ĥ r ī r (al-Khil ā fah Publications, London, p. 43, corresponding to the Arabic “Ni źā m al- Ĥukm fi il-Isl ā m,” p. 41. See, e.g., al-Im ā m Ibn Hajr al-Asqal ā ni’s commentary on the Hadith of ‘Kûfr Buw āĥ’ in his exegesis of the Sah īĥ of al-Bukh ā ri.

Reclaiming State & Politics from Islamists

51

18. See al-Im ā m al-Nawawi’s commentary on the Hadith of ‘Kûfr Buw āĥ’ in his exegesis of the Sah īĥ of Muslim. 19. See al-Im ā m al-Nawawi’s commentary on the Hadith of ‘Kûfr Buw āĥ’ in his exegesis of the Sah īĥ of Muslim. 20. It has been narrated by Abu Hurairah that “wisdom is the lost property of the believer. Wherever he finds it he has more right to it”; see al-Tirmit ħ i (2687) and Ibn M ājah (4169). While this narration is sound in meaning, its direct attribution to the Prophet has been called into question by some. 21. “The Ruling System in Isl ā m” by Ĥizb ut-Ta ĥ r ī r, p. 43, corresponding to the Arabic “Niźā m al- Ĥukm fi il-Isl ā m,” p. 41. 22. Strangely, Nabh ā ni’s argument made here sounds quite fatalistic ( Jabriyy) yet, elsewhere, Nabh ā ni accepts that man controls his own will. See The System of Isl ā m (Ni źā m al-Isl ā m), Qad ā’ wal-Qadr, chapter 2 (al-Khil ā fah Publications, London). 23. Hadith from Sah īĥ Muslim on the authority of Buraydah. 24. He was al-Im ā m Mu ĥ iyy al-D ī n Ya ĥya ibn Sharaf al-Nawawi al-Sh ā fi’i (1234–1278), the arbiter for the Sh ā fi’i school of jurists on matters pertaining to Sh ā fi’i law. 25. Al-Im ā m al-Nawawi in his explanation of Sah īĥ Muslim entitled “al-Minh āj Shar ĥ Sah īĥ Muslim ibn al-Ĥ ajjāj” (Beirut: D ā r al-Ma’rifah, no date), vol. 11–12, p. 267. 26. Al-Im ā m Shams al-D ī n Abū Bakr Muhammad al-Sarakhs ī al-Ĥ anafi (d. ca. 1090). Regarded as the arbiter in matters of Ĥ anafi jurisprudence (Fiqh) and author of the famous thirtyvolume source manual for Ĥ anafi jurisprudence, “al-Mab şūt.” 27. Al-Im ā m Muhammad ibn Ĥ asan al-Shaybā ni (d. ca. 805) was one of the two great students of Abu Ĥ an ī fah that attained the level of being an independent jurist (Mujtahid). Both al-Im ā m al-Sh ā fi’i and al-Im ā m A ĥ med ibn Hanbal, founders of two of the four schools of thought, are reported to have studied under him. 28. Al-Shaykh ‘Abd Allah bin Bayyah, born in 1935 in Mauritania, West Africa, is one of the Muslim ummah’s foremost living jurists (Mujtahid ī n). Formerly vice president to the first president of Mauritania, he currently lectures in King ‘Abd al-’Az ī z University in Saudi Arabia. 29. Al-Shaykh ‘Abd Allah bin Bayyah, “Al āqat al-D ī n bi al-Dawlah, Wijhat al-Na ź r al-Isl ā mi,” p. 9. Sourced from the official site of al-Shaykh ‘Abd Allah bin Bayyah: http://www. binbayyah.net/Pages/research/Projects/religenandstate.htm. 30. Upon whom be peace. 31. Al-Im ā m Shams al-D ī n Abū Bakr Muhammad al-Sarakhs ī, Kit āb al-Mab şūt (Beirut: D ā r al-Fikr, no date), vol. 5, chapter 10, the book of Siyar: 7, p. 1799. 32. Dr. Wahbah Zuhayli (b. 1932) is a Syrian jurist (Mujtahid) and graduate of Cairo’s al-Azhar University. Dr. Zuhayli now serves as the head of Damascus University’s College of Islamic Jurisprudence and Schools of Thought. 33. Al-Im ā m Al ī ibn Abī Ţā lib (599–661), the first male to embrace Isl ā m, Companion, cousin, and son-in-law to the Prophet (upon whom be peace) and fourth Caliph of Isl ā m. 34. ‘Abd Allah ibn ‘Abbā s (618/19–687/88), Companion, cousin to the Prophet (upon whom be peace), and famous exegete of the Qur’ā n. 35. Rendition of the Qur’ā n, al-Mai’da: 95. 36. Rendition of the Qur’ā n, al-Nis ā’: 35. 37. Wahbah Zuhayli, Athar al- Ĥ arb f i al-Fiqh al-Isl ā mi, Dir ā sah Muq ā ranah or “Traditions of War in Islamic Jurisprudence, A Comparative Study” (Beirut: D ā r alFikr no date), pp. 763–764. Sourcing, al- Ĥ akim’s al-Mustadrak vol. 2, p. 150, ibn alQayyim’s I’l ā m al-Muwaqa’ ī n vol. 1, p. 213, ibn al-Jawzi’s Naqd al-’Ilm we al-’Ulem ā , p. 89, and see al-Usta ź Muhammad Sall ā m Madk ū rah’s al-Madkhal li al-Fiqh al-Isl ā mi, p. 390. 38. The Khaw ā rij (s. Kh ā riji) in Islamic theology are commonly known as the group that rebelled against al-Im ā m ‘Ali during his tenure as Caliph. They have been defined as:

52

39.

40.

41.

42.

43.

44.

45.

46. 47.

48.

49. 50.

51.

Maajid Nawaz “those who revolt against the rightful leader (al-Im ā m al- Ĥaq) over whom the majority (al-Jam ā’ah) have consented, regardless of whether the rebellion (Khur ūj) occurred during the time of the Companions against the righteous leaders (al-A’immat al-Rashid ī n), or was after them against those who followed in excellence, or against the leaders in every time. The original rebellion harks back to the time of the Prophet (upon whom be peace), whereby certain hypocrites were not satisfied with his rulings, or that which he used to command and prohibit. Their leader was T ħu al-Khuwysarah al-Tam ī mi.” See al-Milal we al-Nahal al-Shahrast ā ni, vol. 1, pp. 18 and 155. Source: Zuhayli, Ath ā r al-Ĥ arb fi al-Fiqh al-Isl ā mi, Dir ā sah Muqā ranah, p. 762. This remained so until Ayatullah al-Khomeini developed the Wil āyat al-Faq ī h (Guardianship of Jurists) theory and took power in Iran. He argued that religious jurists themselves must guard political authority until the Mahdi (the rightly guided Im ā m) returns. Al-Im ā m Abu Ĥ amid Muhammad ibn Muhammad al-Ghaz ā li al-Sh ā fi’i (1058–1111), jurist, philosopher, and mystic, known as Algazel in the West. A Persian student of the famous Im ā m al-Haramayn al-Juwayni, and author of inf luential works such as “The Incoherence of the Philosophers,” Tah ā fat al-Fal ā sah and “Revival of the Religious Sciences,” I Ĥyā’ ‘Ulū m al-D ī n. Abu Bakr ‘Abd al-Ra Ĥ m ā n ibn Kays ā n al-A ş amm (d. 816/18), a famous Mu’tazilite theologian, exegete, and jurist. See al-Baghd ādi’s Us ū l al-D ī n for a confirmation of al-A ş amm’s rejection of the need for authority. Al-Ghaz ā li is referring here to the Shi’ite position of the Imamate being of creedal importance. In modern times, however, Sunni Islamists have also adopted this mantra in an attempt to lend religious importance to their political mission. Sherman A. Jackson, On the Boundaries of Theological Tolerance in Isl ā m, Studies in Islamic Philosophy Series (Oxford University Press, 2007) being a translation of al-Im ā m Abu Ĥ amid al-Ghaz ā li, Faysal al-Tafriqa Bayna al-Isl ā m we al-Zandiqah, p. 113 . Al-Shaykh Taqi ud-D ī n al-Nabh ā ni, “The Ruling System of Isl ā m,” by Ĥ izb ut-Ta Ĥ r ī r (al-Khil ā fah Publications,,London, no date), corresponding to the original Arabic, “Ni źā m al-Ĥukm fi il-Isl ā m” (D ā r al-Ûmmah), pp. 49–50. Al-Im ā m Abu al-Ĥ asan ‘Ali ibn Muhammad Ĥ abī b al-M āwā rdi (d. 1058), known in Latin as Alboacen, was a Sh ā fi’i judge and jurist based in Abbā sid, Baghdad. His most wellknown work is his book “The Ordinances of Governance and Religious Guardianships” or “al-A Ĥ k ā m al- Şulţā niyyah we al-Wil āyat al-D ī niyyah.” Multiple publishers in Arabic, e.g., Arabic al-A Ĥ k ā m al- Şul ţā niyyah we al-Wil āyat al-D ī niyyah (Beirut: D ā r al-Kutub al-’Arabi, 1990), no page reference. He is the same ibn Kays ā n al-A ş amm referred to in al-Ghaz ā li’s citation. Al-Im ā m Abū’l-Ĥ asan Al-M āwā rdi, A Ĥ k ā m al- Şulţā niyyah, The Laws of Islamic Governance (London: Tā h ā Publishers, 1996), p. 10, corresponding to the Arabic al-A Ĥ k ā m al- Şulţā niyyah we al-Wil āyat al-D ī niyyah (Beirut: D ā r al-Kutub al-’Arabi, 1990), p. 29. The Mu’tazilites were a school of medieval theology. They originated in eighth-century Basra, Iraq, when Wāşil ibn ‘A ţ a (d. 748) is said to have withdrawn from the lessons of al-Ĥ asan al-Ba şri after he disagreed over the issue of categorizing grave sinners as believers, preferring to say that they were between both belief and disbelief. Later, followers of this school called themselves “The People of Divine Unity and Justice” (Hal al-TawĤī d we al-’Adl) due to their zealous attempts to rationalize revelation. Al-Im ā m al-Ĥā fi ź ibn Hajr al-’Asqal ā ni,, Fat Ĥ al-B ā ri SharĤ ‘al ā Sah īĤ al-Bukh ā ri 13/208. See Article 35 of the Draft Constitution adopted by Ĥ izb ut-Ta Ĥ r ī r in The System of Isl ā m, Ni źā m al-Isl ā m (al-Khil ā fah Publications, London, no date) for the centralized nature of the Caliphs powers. Z. Baran, Ĥizb ut-Ta Ĥr ī r: Islam’s Political Insurgency, The War of Ideas (Washington, D.C.: The Nixon Center, 2000), pp. 13–14.

Reclaiming State & Politics from Islamists

53

52. The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report (NewYork: W.W. Norton, 2004), p. 363; emphasis added. 53. Ibid.; emphasis added. 54. The ideas expressed in this chapter are extracted from my forthcoming book entitled Islamism: The Last Man-Made Ideology.

This page intentionally left blank

CH A P T E R

FOU R

Sharing with Equals: Modernity, Fundamentalism, and the Future Kare n A rm strong

At the turn of the twentieth century, almost every single Muslim intellectual, with the notable exception of the Iranian activist Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1839–1897) who had witnessed the more negative effects of colonialism in India, was in love with the West and wanted their countries to emulate Britain and France. Muhammad Abdu (1849–1905), the Grand Mufti of Egypt, hated the British occupation of his country but was well-versed in European culture and felt quite at home with Europeans. After a visit to Paris, he made this famous and deliberately provocative statement. “In Paris I saw Islam but no Muslims; in Cairo I see Muslims but no Islam.” He meant that the modern Western economies produced conditions of justice and equity that came closer to the Quranic ideals than was possible in the unmodernized or partially modernized countries of the Islamic world. In 1906, leading Iranian mullahs campaigned alongside secular intellectuals for representative government, leading a revolution that forced the shah to accept their new constitution. Sadly, the Iranian parliament was not allowed to function freely: two years later the British discovered oil in Iran and had no intention of allowing the Iranians to interfere with their plans to use this oil to fuel the British navy. Nevertheless, most of the Iranian clergy continued to support the parliamentary ideal. In his Admonition to the Nation and Exposition to the People (1909) , Shaykh Muhammad Husain Naini (1850–1936) declared that the new constitution, which would limit the tyranny of the shahs, was the next best thing to the coming of the Hidden Imam, the Shiite Messiah who would inaugurate a rule of justice at the end of time.1 At this point, those Muslims who were able to experience the Western world first hand found it congenial and deeply in tune with their own

56

Karen Armstrong

traditions. They certainly did not recoil from the new ideals of liberty and democracy instinctively; in Iran, in particular, the mullahs were often in the vanguard of change and development. There was no inherent “clash of civilizations,” no “War of Ideas.” Ever since the time of the Crusades, Western people have cultivated a distorted image of Islam as an inherently violent faith that conquered only by the sword, but in fact Islam had a far better record of tolerance than Western Christianity. The Quran recognizes the validity of all the other major faiths, provided that they insist upon justice, equity, and practical compassion; all come from God. It insists that the Prophet Muhammad did not come to cancel out the messages of the other prophets—Adam, Noah, Abraham, Isaac, Ishmael, or Jesus—but to bring their message to the Arabs, who had never had a scripture in their own language.2 It also commands Muslims to speak “in the most kindly manner” to the Jews and Christians, the “people of earlier revelation,” saying: “We believe in that which has been bestowed from on high upon us, as well as that which has been bestowed upon you: for our God and your God is one and the same.”3 Today some Muslim scholars argue that had the Arabs known about the Hindus and Buddhists or the Native Americans or Australian Aborigines, the Quran would have praised and endorsed their message too. It insists in the strongest terms that there must “be no coercion in matters of faith,”4 that everybody had his own din (way of life),5 and that it was not God’s will that all the people of the earth should belong to the same ummah (community).6 God was not the exclusive property of one tradition, but was the source of all human knowledge; the divine light could not be confined to a single faith or locality and was neither of the east nor the west.7 The Quran was, therefore, particularly suited to the realities of our plural world at a time when we are discovering the profound unanimity of the religious systems of humanity. Like the Jewish and Christian scriptures, it insists upon the importance of social justice; its bedrock message is that it is wrong to build a private fortune but good to share your wealth fairly and create a just and decent society where the poor and vulnerable are treated with respect. This also applied to women. The Quran gives women legal rights of inheritance and divorce that Western women would not receive until the nineteenth century. Like the New Testament, its overall message is positive for women, though later, as happened in the Christian world, men hijacked the faith and dragged it back to the old patriarchy. The Quran’s emphasis on equality made Muslim intellectuals enthusiastic about the modern democratic ideal. Like all the world’s religions, Islam traditionally supported monarchy, because that was the form of government best suited to a premodern economy, but there were principles in Islamic law that were essentially compatible with representative rule. Before passing new legislation, Islamic jurisprudence insists on the importance of shurah (“consultation” between the ruler and his subjects), ijmah (community “consensus”), maslahah (public “interest”), and

Modernity, Fundamentalism, & the Future

57

ijtihad (“independent thinking,” the use of reason to reinterpret Islamic values to meet the needs of the day). The Quran also developed a just war ideology. It forbids aggressive warfare and the preemptive strike, and makes it clear that self defense was the only possible justification for hostilities.8 War was always a terrible evil, but it was sometimes necessary in order to preserve decent values, such as freedom of worship. Even here, the Quran did not abandon its pluralism: synagogues and churches as well as mosques should be protected.9 The Quran insists on the importance of mercy and forgiveness, even during armed conf lict.10 While engaged in hostilities, Muslims must fight steadfastly in order to bring the war to a speedy end, but the moment the enemy asked for peace, Muslims must lay down their arms.11 They must accept any truce, even if they suspect the enemy of double-dealing. And it is always better to sit down and solve a problem by rational, courteous discussion.12 True, retaliation was permitted as in the Jewish tradition—eye for eye, tooth for tooth—but it must be strictly confined to those who had actually perpetrated the atrocities and “he who shall forgo it out of charity will atone better for some of his past sins.”13 Later Islamic law developed additional principles of humane warfare. It forbids war against a country where Muslims are permitted to practice their religion freely; it outlaws the killing of civilians, the deliberate destruction of property, and the use of fire in warfare. Holy war was not one of the essential principles of Islam. The word jihad does not refer to armed conf lict but to the “effort” and “struggle” required to implement God’s will in a f lawed and violent world. Muslims are exhorted to strive in this endeavor on all fronts: intellectual, social, economic, spiritual, moral, and domestic. Sometimes they would have to fight, but this was not their chief duty. An oft-quoted tradition recalls Muhammad telling his companions after a battle: “We are returning from the Lesser Jihad (the battle) and going to the Greater Jihad,” the immeasurably more important and difficult struggle to reform their own society and their own hearts. It is true that Muslim rulers often engaged in wars for territorial aggrandizement and personal interest and dignified their military activities by calling it a jihad, but, like other kings and imperialists, they were motivated by political ambition rather than by religion. In the past, their religion had encouraged Muslims to embrace and absorb the shock of the new. They had always been able to adapt the mores and achievements of other civilizations creatively and use this to advance their own religious insights. This is the spirit that inspired the appreciation of Muslim intellectuals like Abdu for Western modernity. But as a result of the vicissitudes of the twentieth century, this early enthusiasm cooled and even soured. Like other peoples, some Muslims developed a defensive piety, popularly known as “fundamentalism.” In every region of the world where a modern, Western style society has been established that separates religion and politics, a countercultural religious movement has grown up alongside it in

58

Karen Armstrong

conscious reaction, so that fundamentalist movements have developed not only in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam but also in Buddhism, Hinduism, Sikhism, and Confucianism. What is it about modernity that has caused such widespread disappointment and dismay?

The Disappointment of Modernity During the sixteenth century, the peoples of Western Europe had started to develop a new kind of civilization, with an entirely different economy. Unlike all previous societies, which depended upon a surplus of agricultural produce that enabled them to fund their cultural enterprises, the economy of the modern West would be based on the technological replication of resources and the constant reinvestment of capital. This freed Europeans and Americans from the constraints of agrarian civilizations. No society before our own could afford the ceaseless replication of the infrastructure that we now take for granted. In all premodern civilizations—including those of the West—original thought was not encouraged, not because of an atavistic timidity but because a project that required massive funding and disruption would probably be shelved. This would lead to social unrest and it was thought more important to preserve what had already been achieved than to risk political instability. Many of the ideals that we now regard as sacred to the Western identity, such as democracy, free speech, toleration, and secularization, were the result rather than the cause of modernization and industrialization. More and more people, for example, had to be brought into the production process, even at a humble level—as clerks, printers, or factory workers—and that meant they had to receive a modicum of education. Once educated, they inevitably demanded a share in the decisions of government. It was found that those countries that did not democratize fell behind in the march of progress. Again, in order to utilize all their human resources, governments found it necessary to bring out-groups, such as the Jews in Europe, into the mainstream, though the events of the 1930s and 1940s showed that this toleration was superficial and that the old bigotry remained under the surface. Modernization in Europe and the United States was a long traumatic process that did not come into fruition until the nineteenth century. It was attended by bloody revolutions (as nations implemented more democratic modes of government), reigns of terror and dictatorships, wars of religion, the despoliation of the countryside, and the alienation and exploitation of workers in the industrializing cities. But at least the peoples of the West were able to modernize according to their own program: not somebody else’s. The modern state had two essential characteristics and without these qualities, however many computers, fighter jets, or skyscrapers a nation might have, it would not have the modern spirit. The first of these characteristics

Modernity, Fundamentalism, & the Future

59

was independence—modernization had proceeded by declarations of independence on all fronts: religious (as Luther declared independence of the Roman Church), political (the American Declaration of Independence was a typical modernizing document), and intellectual (as scientists, inventors, and philosophers demanded the right to develop their new ideas without the supervision of the ecclesiastical hierarchy). The second was innovation. However disturbing the process, it was also dynamic and exciting. Western people were always discovering something new, inventing something fresh, pitting themselves against unprecedented problems, and coming up with wholly novel solutions. In the Muslim world, however, the modern economy did not come with independence but with colonial subjugation. Colonialism actually impeded modernization: those countries that were not subjected to foreign domination, such as Japan, were able to create their own distinctive version of modernity different from the former Western colonies. Further, because the West was so far ahead, the Muslim world could not innovate but only emulate. So the modern spirit in the Muslim world was characterized by dependence rather than independence and imitation rather than innovation. We can compare modernization to baking a cake. If you do not have the correct ingredients or a proper oven, you are unlikely to produce the f luffy cake featured in the cook book; the result could be very nasty indeed. Moreover, the Muslim countries did not have three hundred years to modernize at their own speed. They had to complete the entire process in a mere fifty years or so. As a result, much of the mainstream population, who had not had the benefit of a Western education and did not understand the massive changes taking place in their country, became alienated from a small Westernized elite, who were themselves emotionally and intellectually torn between two different cultural traditions. And because modernization was far too accelerated in the Muslim world, it was often experienced as an assault. When Mustafa Kemal Ataturk (1881–1938) secularized Turkey, he closed down all the madrassas, abolished the Sufi orders, and forced all men and women to wear Western clothes. These rulers wanted their countries to look modern, even though most people felt that they were being forced into fancy dress. In Iran, the shah’s soldiers used to parade through the streets, tearing off the women’s veils with their bayonets and ripping them to pieces. In 1935, Shah Reza Khan Pahlavi (1877–1944) ordered his troops to shoot at a crowd of unarmed demonstrators in the holy shrine of Mashhad who were peacefully protesting against obligatory Western dress; hundreds of Iranians were killed that day. In such circumstances, secularization is not experienced as liberating but as a lethal assault upon religion. Muslims are not alone in this. Every single “fundamentalist” movement that I have studied in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam is rooted in a profound fear of annihilation; each begins with what is perceived to be an assault by secularists or modernizers and is convinced that the liberal or secular

60

Karen Armstrong

establishment is determined to wipe out religion.14 The rapidity of secularization in the Muslim world has made this fear and suspicion especially acute. We see this in the career of Muhammad Ali (1769–1849), an Albanian officer in the Ottoman army, who single-handedly dragged the backward province of Egypt into the modern world in a mere forty years. But he could only achieve this remarkable feat by the most ruthless methods. His method of secularizing Egypt consisted of systematically marginalizing the clergy (the ulama), deposing those sheikhs who defied him, seizing their revenues, and divesting the clergy of any shred of political power. In the face of this onslaught, the Egyptian ulama became cowed and reactionary. Because opposition was impossible, they turned their backs on change, and entrenched themselves in their scholarly traditions. They did not regard modernity as an intellectual challenge, but experienced it instead as a series of odious and destructive regulations, as a theft of their power and wealth, and as an agonizing loss of prestige and inf luence.15 While the Iranian mullahs were frequently in the vanguard of change, the Egyptian clergy would long resist any attempt to force them into the modern world. Even Muhammad Abdu could make little headway with them. Consequently Egyptians got no guidance from their clergy when they came into contact with Western ideas, and for many, secularization remained alien, foreign, and incomprehensible. Because these movements fear annihilation and diminishment, any further assault renders them more extreme. During the 1950s, President Gamal Abdel Nasser (1918–1970), president of Egypt, imprisoned thousands of members of the Muslim Brotherhood without trial, many of whom had done nothing more incriminating than attending meetings or handing out leaf lets. One of them was Sayyid Qutb (1906–1966), a nationalist, scholar of English literature, and devoutly religious man, who was sentenced to fifteen years hard labor and witnessed first hand the brutality of Nasser’s concentration camps, where inmates were routinely subjected to physical and mental torture. In prison Qutb became a fundamentalist. When he heard Nasser vowing to privatize Islam on the Western model, secularism did not seem benign but evil. Muslims, he insisted, had a duty to defy the aggressive barbarism ( jahiliyyah) of their day by fighting so-called Muslim leaders like Nasser. Qutb’s ideology is still followed by Islamists today.16 In making jihad, meaning armed conf lict, central to his vision, Qutb was distorting the tradition he was trying to defend. This is a common feature of fundamentalism in every tradition. Qutb had been inf luenced by the Pakistani ideologue Abu Ala Mawdudi (1903–1979), who feared the effects of Western imperialism in the Muslim world and was convinced that in order to survive Muslims must be prepared for revolutionary struggle. The jihad could take many forms—intellectual, educational, and political—but as the last resort every able-bodied Muslim must be prepared for war. Mawdudi knew that this was a controversial interpretation of the traditional teaching on jihad, but argued that it was justified by the political emergency. Both

Modernity, Fundamentalism, & the Future

61

Qutb and Mawdudi were preaching an Islamic liberation theology, similar to that adopted by Catholics fighting brutal regimes in Latin America during the 1960s. Because God alone was sovereign, no Muslim was obliged to obey any secular power that contravened the Quranic requirement of justice and equity. In rather the same way, in his opposition to the dictatorial Pahlavi monarchy, the Iranian revolutionary leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (1902–1989) preached a modern, third-world theology of liberation: Islam was “the religion of militant individuals who are committed to freedom and independence. It is the school of those who struggle against imperialism.”17 Fundamentalisms are neither traditional nor orthodox movements. Be they Jewish, Christian, Muslim, Hindu, or Sikh, these are radically innovative ideologies that could have taken root in no time other than our own. Far from representing the mainstream, these movements are essentially unorthodox. Qutb and Mawdudi were well aware that they were defying tradition, and Khomeini’s theory that a cleric should be head of state was shocking to the sensibilities of Shiite Islam, which had separated religion and politics as a matter of sacred principle since the eighth century. When people feel that their backs are to the wall, they can become aggressive. This is how we should understand the militant strain that has developed in Islam in modern times. Muslims have felt profoundly under attack by their own rulers and by foreign powers. To be sure, Muslim activists cite scripture to justify atrocities. But Western people must be aware that there is far more violence in both the Jewish scriptures and the New Testament than in the Quran. When extremists use scripture in support of criminal or belligerent activities, they do so selectively— carefully ignoring those texts that preach the importance of forgiveness and compassion. Christian fundamentalists frequently cite the aggressive Book of Revelation but rarely quote the Sermon on the Mount, where Jesus tells his followers to love their enemies, to turn the other cheek when attacked, and to refrain from judging others. When Osama bin Laden cites Quranic passages that urge Muslims to fight steadfastly in battle, he fails to mention the fact that these texts are in nearly every case immediately followed by equally strong directives to forgiveness and the cessation of hostilities.

Improving Understanding and Relations People in the West urgently need to become aware of Muslim history as well as their own. They should recall that far from always being in the vanguard of change, the West had its own difficult transition to modernity. When they witness the revolutions, sectarian strife, dictatorships, and social disruption that they deplore in the Muslim world, they should remember that Europe went through a similar bloody rite of passage during the sixteenth, seventeenth,

62

Karen Armstrong

and eighteenth centuries. They should realize that every culture has extremists and fundamentalists who in no way represent the mainstream. All too often Islam is depicted in the media, in politics, and in popular discourse as inherently violent and atavistically opposed to modernity. But even a cursory familiarity with Muslim history and tradition shows that this assumption is at variance with the facts. It is also dangerous for our security. Bin Laden has certainly been inf luenced by Qutb but he is an ideologue of a very different hue. He is less motivated by religion than by politics. The American scholar Robert Pape has made a careful study of suicide attacks between 1980 and 2004, including the al Qaeda atrocities of 9/11. He concludes: Overwhelmingly suicide-terrorist attacks are not driven by religion as much as they are by a clear strategic objective: to compel modern democracies to withdraw military forces from the territory that the terrorists view as their homeland. From Lebanon to Sri Lanka, to Chechnya to Kashmir, to the West Bank, every major suicide-terrorist campaign— more than 95 percent of all the incidents—has had as its major objective to compel a democratic state to withdraw.18 Bin Laden, for example, cited the presence of American troops in Saudi Arabia and the Israeli occupation of Palestinian land high on his list of complaints against the West. In a recent Gallup poll, only 7 percent of the Muslims interviewed in thirty-five countries believed that the 9/11 attacks were justified by Western foreign policy. They referred to ongoing problems such as Palestine, Kashmir, Chechnya, and Western interference in the internal affairs of Muslim countries but they did not attempt to find a religious validation for these actions. The majority, who condemned the attacks, however, all gave religious reasons for doing so, quoting, for example, the Quranic verse that states that the taking of a single life is equivalent to the destruction of the entire world.19 The same pattern was evident in the suicide videos of the terrorists who attacked London on July 7, 2005, adding to their list of complaints the occupation of Iraq by British and American troops. Western politicians have sometimes maintained that Muslims hate our way of life: our freedom, democracy, and success. But the Gallup poll shows otherwise, finding that politically radicalized as well as moderately inclined Muslims admired Western technology, the Western work ethic, rule of law, and its political systems, including Western democracy, respect for human rights, freedom of speech, and gender equality. And a higher percentage of the politically radicalized (50 percent versus 35 percent of moderates) was convinced that “moving toward greater governmental democracy would foster progress in the Arab Muslim world.”20 Finally, when asked what they resented most about the West, its “disrespect for Islam” ranked high on the list

Modernity, Fundamentalism, & the Future

63

of both radicals and moderates. What could Muslims do to improve relations in the West? Again, both radicals and moderates replied: “improve the presentation of Islam to the West, present Islamic values in a positive manner.”21 And what could Westerners do? In the words of a woman student of engineering in the University of Jordan: “The West must be willing to accept the true picture of Islam and not hold on to the negative picture that serves terrorists.”22 By nurturing a distorted view of Islam as an inherently cruel and violent faith, Western people are playing directly into the hands of extremists, who can argue that the West is incurably Islamophobic and bent on conducting a new crusade.

Sharing with Equals It is poignant these days to recall the early Muslim enthusiasm for Western modernity. After World War I, the European allies dismembered the Ottoman Empire, which had fought on the side of Germany, ignored pledges they had given to grant Arabs independence, and set up mandates and protectorates in the old Ottoman provinces. In 1922, Egypt was granted a measure of independence but Britain retained control of foreign policy and defense. Between 1923 and 1930, the popular Wafd party, which demanded the withdrawal of the British, won three large electoral victories but each time it was forced to resign under pressure from the British.23 There was an obvious double standard. The new democratic structures were only cosmetic and this dependence would not help Egyptians to develop the autonomy that was essential to the modern spirit. Democracy increasingly seemed a bad joke. Western support of dictatorial rulers in Muslim countries to secure a strategic position or a supply of cheap oil, the plight of the Palestinians, and the disreputable Suez Crisis of 1956 all contributed to a widespread distrust of the West. The position of the United States, which had not been involved in the colonial project, is particularly sad. In Iran before World War II, the Americans routinely berated the British for rigging the Iranian elections. After the Suez Crisis, the portrait of Dwight D. Eisenhower, who had forced Britain, France, and Israel to abandon their invasion of Egypt, was carried in triumph through the streets of Cairo alongside Nasser’s. After the demise of the colonial powers, there could have been a new chapter in Islamic/Western relations, but that, alas, was not to be. At the time of the Suez Crisis, the Canadian scholar Wilfred Cantwell Smith wrote that a healthy and functioning Islam was crucial because it had helped Muslim people to cultivate values and ideals that we in the West also share, because they spring from a common tradition. Their political travails during the twentieth century have led some ideologues to develop a fundamentalist, defensive strain that has distorted the Islamic tradition. But it is essential that Western people recognize that the extremism they deplore is

64

Karen Armstrong

also condemned by the majority of Muslims. The West also bears a measure of responsibility for the current tension. As Cantwell Smith pointed out in 1956, unless the Muslim learned to accept the West as a fact of life, it would fail the test of the twentieth century. But, he added, the West also had a problem. The “fundamental weakness” of both Western civilization and Christianity in the modern world is their inability to recognize that they share the planet not with inferiors but with equals. Unless Western civilization intellectually, socially, politically and economically, and the Christian church theologically, can learn to treat other men with fundamental respect, these two in their turn will have failed to come to terms with the actualities of the twentieth century.24 Unless we all—Muslims and Westerners alike—learn to do better, it is unlikely that we will have a viable world to hand on to the next generation.

Notes 1. Hamid Algar, “The Oppositional Role of the Ulama in Twentieth Century Iran,” in Nikki R. Keddie, ed., Scholars, Saints and Sufis: Muslim Religious Institutions in the Middle East Since 1500 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), pp. 238–240; Azar Tabari, “The Role of the Clergy in Modern Iranian Politics,” in Nikki R. Keddie, ed., Religion and Politics in Iran: Shiism from Quietism to Revolution (New Haven: CT: Yale University Press, 1983), pp. 58–59. 2. Quran 3:84; 2:136; 12:111; 5:69. Quotations from the Quran are taken from The Message of the Quran, trans. Muhammad Asad (Gibraltar, 1980). 3. Ibid., 29:46. 4. Quran 2:256 5. Ibid., 109. 6. Ibid., 5:48. 7. Ibid., 24:35. 8. Ibid., 2:190. 9. Ibid., 22:36–40. 10. Ibid., 3:147–148; 8:16–17; 61:5. 11. Ibid., 2:193–194. 12. Ibid., 8:62–63. 13. Ibid., 5:45. 14. I have described the fundamentalist phenomenon in The Battle for God: A History of Fundamentalism (New York and London, 2000). 15. Araf Lufti al-Sayyid Marsot, “The Role of the Ulama in Egypt During the Early Nineteenth Century,” in P.M. Holt, ed., Political and Social Change in Modern Egypt: Historical Studies from the Ottoman Conquest to the United Arab Republic (London, 1968), pp. 278–279; Daniel Crecelius, “Non-Ideological Responses of the Egyptian Ulama to Modernization” in Keddie, Scholars, Saints and Sufis, pp. 180–189. 16. Yvonne Hadad, “Sayyid Qutb: Ideologue of Islamic Revival,” in John L. Esposito, ed., Voices of Resurgent Islam (New York and Oxford, 1970).

Modernity, Fundamentalism, & the Future

65

17. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, Islam and Revolution, trans. Hamid Algar (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1981), p. 28. 18. Interview with Scott McConnell, “The Logic of Suicide Terrorism,” The American Conservative, July 18, 2005; John L. Esposito and Dahlia Mogahed, Who Speaks for Islam? What a Billion Muslims really Think (New York, 2007), p. 77. 19. Quran 5:32. 20. Esposito and Mogahed, Who Speaks for Islam?, p. 80. 21. Ibid., pp. 86–87. 22. Ibid., p. 87. 23. Marshall G.S. Hodgson, The Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in a World Civilization, 3 vols (Chicago and London, 1974), III, p. 171. 24. Wilfred Cantwell Smith, Islam and Modern History (Princeton and London, 1957), p. 305.

This page intentionally left blank

CH A P T E R

F I V E

Taqiyya: War and Deceit in Islam R aymond I brah im

Today, at a time of wars and rumors of wars emanating from the Islamic world—from the perpetual Arab-Israeli conf lict, to the saber-rattling of nuclear-armed Pakistan and soon-to-be Iran, to the myriad and unnamed jihadis who daily promise “infidels” death and destruction—the need for non-Muslims to better understand Islam’s doctrines and objectives concerning war and peace, and everything in between (e.g., treaties) has become pressing. For instance, what does one make of the fact that, after openly and vociferously making it clear time and time again that its ultimate aspiration is to see Israel annihilated, an Islamist organization like Hamas also pursues “peace treaties,” insisting on various forms of concessions from Israel—and receives them? Moreover, even if the “true” nature of Islam were peaceful, that would not change the fact that some Muslims will assume, and therefore act upon the notion, that Islam does preach jihadi violence. In other words, many apologists for Islam concede that the “radical” interpretation is still that, an interpretation, albeit a f lawed one, that “hijacks” the true Islam. And since that is the case, since “radical Islam,” whether the true face of Islam or not, is still nonetheless a viable alternative for some, the West must conclude that it will have violent jihadist enemies for the foreseeable future. Before being in a position to assess the policy ramifications of such issues, one must first appreciate the thoroughly legalistic nature of mainstream Islam.1 For all the talk that Islam is constantly being “misunderstood” or “misinterpreted” by “radicals,” the fact is, relative to most other religions, Islam is a clearly defined faith admitting of little ambiguity: indeed, according to shariah (i.e., “Islam’s way of life,” more commonly translated as “Islamic law”), every conceivable human act is categorized as either forbidden, discouraged, permissible, recommended, or obligatory. “Common sense” and “universal opinion” are of little relevance to Islam’s notions of right and wrong.2

68

Raymond Ibrahim

All that matters is what Allah (via the Quran) and his prophet Muhammad (through the hadith) said about a subject, and how Islam’s greatest theologians and jurists—collectively known as the ulema (the “ones who know”)—have articulated it. Consider the concept of deceit. According to shariah, deception is not only permitted in certain situations but is deemed obligatory. Contrary to early Christian tradition, for instance, Muslims who were forced to choose between recanting Islam or suffering persecution were—and still are—permitted to lie by feigning apostasy. Other jurists have decreed that, according to Quranic verses forbidding Muslims from being instrumental in their own deaths,3 Muslims are obligated to lie in order to preserve themselves.4

The Doctrine of Taqiyya This is the classic definition of the doctrine of taqiyya. Based on an Arabic word denoting “fear,” taqiyya has long been understood, especially by Western academics, as “religious dissimulation” to be resorted to in times of religious persecution, almost exclusively by minority Shi’i groups living among hostile Sunni majorities, wherein the Shi’a constantly dissemble their religious affiliation vis-à-vis the latter. However, a closer examination of the doctrinal justifications of taqiyya reveals a much broader application. Taqiyya’s ubiquity is well demonstrated by the opening words of one of the few authoritative books devoted to the subject, Al-Taqiyya fi’l Islam, written by Professor Sami Mukaram. Taqiyya [“religious dissimulation”] is of fundamental importance in Islam. Practically every Islamic sect agrees to it and practices it . . . We can go so far as to say that the practice of taqiyya is mainstream in Islam, and that those few sects not practicing it diverge from the mainstream . . . Taqiyya is very prevalent in Islamic politics, especially in the modern era.5 Thus just as taqiyya is not limited to self-preservation (as will be delineated later on), so too is it not an exclusively Shi’i phenomenon. Of course, as a minority group often interspersed among a Sunni majority, Shi’a have historically had more reason to dissemble. Due to centuries of this, taqiyya has become “a pattern of behavior permitted by Iranian mores. In Iran it is accordingly not merely a religious principle among the Shi’ites, but it is also a social institution.”6 Revered Shi’i imam Ja’far as-Sadiq is on record as saying, “He is most excellent in the performance of his religious duties in the eyes of Allah who is best at observing taqiyya.” 7 Unlike the Shi’a, the Sunnis have historically had little reason to dissemble. From the start, Sunni Islam, under the “righteous caliphs,” burst out of Arabia subjugating much of southwest Asia, all of north Africa, and parts of Europe,

TAQIYYA: War and Deceit in Islam

69

and, throughout the Middle Ages, threatened to engulf all of Christendom. In a world where might made right, the Sunnis had little to apologize for, and much less to hide from the despised infidel. Ironically, Sunnis living in the West today find themselves in the Shi’a’s place: Now they are a minority surrounded by their traditional enemies—Christian “infidels”—even if the latter rarely act on, let alone acknowledge, this historic enmity. In short, Sunnis are currently experiencing the general circumstances that made taqiyya integral to Shi’ism.

The Articulation of Taqiyya Quranic verse 3:28 is often seen as the primary verse sanctioning deception vis-à-vis non-Muslims: “Let believers [Muslims] not take for friends and allies infidels [non-Muslims] instead of believers. Whoever does this shall have no relationship left with Allah—unless you but guard yourselves against them, taking precautions.”8 Al-Tabari’s (d. 923) famous tafsir (exegesis of the Quran) is a standard and authoritative reference work throughout the entire Muslim world. Regarding 3:28, he writes: If you [Muslims] are under their [infidels’] authority, fearing for yourselves, behave loyally to them, with your tongue, while harboring inner animosity for them . . . Allah has forbidden believers from being friendly or on intimate terms with the infidels in place of believers—except when infidels are above them [in authority]. In such a scenario, let them act friendly towards them while preserving their religion.9 Regarding Quran 3:28, Ibn Kathir (d. 1373, another prime authority) writes, “Whoever at any time or place fears their [infidels’] evil may protect himself through outward show.” As proof of this, he quotes Muhammad’s close companion Abu Darda, who said, “Let us grin to the face of some people [non-Muslims] while our hearts curse them”; another companion, al-Hassan, said, “Doing taqiyya is acceptable till the Day of Judgment [i.e., in perpetuity].”10 Other prominent ulema, such as al-Qurtubi (1214–1273), al-Razi (865–925), and al-Arabi (1165–1240), have extended taqiyya to cover deeds. In other words, if deemed necessary Muslims can behave like infidels—including by bowing down and worshiping idols and crosses, offering false testimony, even exposing fellow Muslims’ weaknesses to the infidel enemy—anything short of actually killing a Muslim: “Taqiyya, even if committed without duress, does not lead to a state of infidelity—even if it leads to sin deserving of hell-fire.”11 Is this why the Muslim American and U.S. Army sergeant Hasan Akbar attacked and killed his fellow service members in Iraq in 2003? Had his sense of ultimate allegiance finally come up against a wall when he realized Muslims

70

Raymond Ibrahim

might die at his hands? He had written in his diary: “I may not have killed any Muslims, but being in the army is the same thing. I may have to make a choice very soon on who to kill.”12

War is Deceit The earliest historical records of Islam (e.g., the Sira) further attest to taqiyya’s prevalence. Muslims are often depicted as lying their way out of predicaments— usually by denying or insulting Islam and/or Muhammad—even with the approval of the latter, his only criterion being whether their intentions (niyya) were pure.13 During the long wars with Christians, whenever the Christians were dominant, the practice of taqiyya became even more integral: “Taqiyya was used as a way to fend off danger from the Christians, especially in critical times and when Muslim borders were exposed to wars with the Byzantines and, afterwards, to the raids of the Franks and others.”14 None of this is surprising considering that Muhammad himself—whose example as the “most perfect human” is to be tenaciously followed—took an expedient view on lying. It is well known, for instance, that Muhammad permitted lying in three situations: to reconcile two or more quarreling parties, to one’s wife, and in war.15 According to one Arabic legal manual devoted to jihad as defined by the four schools of law, “The ulema agree that deception during warfare is legitimate . . . deception is a form of art in war.”16 Moreover, according to Mukaram, this deception is a form of taqiyya: “Taqiyya in order to dupe the enemy is permissible.”17 Several ulema attest to deceit’s integral nature to war: Ibn al-Arabi declares that “in the hadith, practicing deceit in war is well demonstrated. Indeed, its need is more stressed than the need for courage.” Ibn al-Munir writes “War is deceit, i.e., the most complete and perfect war waged by a mujahid is a war of deception, not confrontation, due to the latter’s inherent danger, and the fact that one can attain victory through treachery without harm [to oneself ].” And Ibn Hajar counsels Muslims “to take great caution in war, while [publicly] lamenting and mourning in order to dupe the infidels.”18 This ingrained Muslim notion that war is deceit traces back to the Battle of the Trench (627), which pitted Muhammad and his followers against several non-Muslim tribes known as “the Confederates.” One of these Confederates, Na’im ibn Mas’ud, went to the Muslim camp and converted to Islam. When Muhammad discovered that the Confederates were unaware of their co-tribalist’s conversion, he counseled Mas’ud to return and try to get the Confederates to abandon the siege. It was then that Muhammad memorably declared, “For war is deceit.” Mas’ud returned to the Confederates without their knowing that he had switched sides and began to intentionally give his former kin and allies bad advice. He also went to great lengths to instigate quarrels between the various tribes until, thoroughly distrusting each other,

TAQIYYA: War and Deceit in Islam

71

they disbanded, lifted the siege from the Muslims, and may have saved Islam from destruction in its embryonic stage.19 More demonstrative of the legitimacy of deception toward infidels is the following anecdote. A poet, Ka’b bin Ashraf, offended Muhammad, prompting the latter to exclaim: “Who will kill this man who has hurt Allah and his prophet?” A young Muslim named Muhammad ibn Maslama volunteered but only with the caveat that, in order to get close enough to Ka’b to assassinate him, he be allowed to lie to the poet. Muhammad agreed. Maslama traveled to Ka’b and began to denigrate Islam and Muhammad. He carried on this way till his disaffection became convincing enough that Ka’b took him into his confidences. Soon thereafter, Maslama appeared with another Muslim and, while Ka’b’s guard was down, assaulted and killed him.20 Additional statements from Muhammad that cast deception in a positive light include: “Allah has commanded me to dissemble [mudawara] to the people just as he has commanded me to establish [religious] obligations”; “I have been sent with dissimulation [mudawara]”; and “whoever lives his life in evasion [mudawara] dies a martyr.”21

Taqiyya in Quranic Revelation It also bears mentioning that the entire sequence of Quranic revelations is something of a testimony to taqiyya; and since Allah is believed to be the revealer of these verses, he ultimately is seen as the perpetrator of deceit— which is not surprising since Allah himself is described in the Quran as the best makar, that is, “deceiver” or “schemer” (e.g., 3:54, 8:30, 10:21).22 This phenomenon revolves around the fact that the Quran contains both peaceful and tolerant verses, as well as violent and intolerant ones. The ulema were baff led as to which verses to codify into shariah’s worldview—the one, for instance, that states there is no coercion in religion (2:256), or the ones that command believers to fight all non-Muslims till the latter convert, or at least submit, to Islam (8:39, 9:5, 9:29)? To resolve this quandary, the ulema developed the doctrine of abrogation (naskh, supported by Quran 2:106), which essentially maintains that verses “revealed” later in Muhammad’s life take precedence over the earlier ones, whenever there is a discrepancy. But why the contradiction in the first place? The standard view has been that, since in the early years of Islam, Muhammad and his community were far outnumbered by their infidel competitors, a message of peace and coexistence was in order. However, after the Muslims migrated to Medina and grew in military strength and numbers, verses inciting them to go on the offensive were slowly “revealed,” always commensurate with Islam’s growing capabilities. In juridical texts, these are categorized in stages: passivity vis-àvis aggression; permission to fight back against aggressors; commands to fight aggressors; commands to fight all non-Muslims, whether the latter begin

72

Raymond Ibrahim 23

aggressions or not. Growing Muslim might is the only variable explaining this progressive change in policy. Thus the peaceful Meccan verses “To you your religion, and to me my religion”24 appear to have limited application by virtue of the fact that once Muhammad and his followers were in a position of authority, highly militant verses were issued demanding warfare and the subjugation of non-Muslims. Other ulema argue that the Quran was revealed piecemeal—from passive and spiritual verses to draconian legalism with a premium on conquest—simply to gradually acclimate the first Muslims to the duties of Islam, lest they be discouraged from the outset by the dramatic obligations of the later verses. 25 Verses revealed toward the end of Muhammad’s life—such as “Warfare is prescribed for you though you hate it”26 —may be indicative of this. However interpreted, the standard view on Quranic abrogation concerning war and peace verses is that when Muslims are weak and in a minority position, they should preach and behave according to the Meccan verses (peace and tolerance); when strong, they should go on the offensive, according to the Medinan verses (war and conquest). The vicissitudes of Islamic history are a testimony to this dichotomy, best captured by the popular Muslim notion, based on a hadith, that, if possible, jihad should be performed by the hand (force), if not, then the tongue (propaganda), and if that is not possible, then with the heart, or one’s intentions (niyya).27

War is Eternal That Islam legitimizes deceit during war is of course not all that astonishing; after all, as the Elizabethan writer John Lyly first put it, “All’s fair in love and war.” Other non-Muslim philosophers and strategists—such as Sun Tzu, Machiavelli, and Thomas Hobbes—justified deceit in warfare. Deception against the enemy during war is only common sense. The crucial difference in Islam, however, is that war against the infidel is a perpetual affair—until, in the words of the Quran, “all chaos ceases, and all religion belongs to Allah.”28 In his entry on jihad from the Encyclopaedia of Islam, Emile Tyan succinctly states: The duty of the jihad exists as long as the universal domination of Islam has not been attained. Peace with non-Muslim nations is, therefore, a provisional state of affairs only; the chance of circumstances alone can justify it temporarily. Furthermore there can be no question of genuine peace treaties with these nations; only truces, whose duration ought not, in principle, to exceed ten years, are authorized. But even such truces are precarious, inasmuch as they can, before they expire, be repudiated unilaterally should it appear more profitable for Islam to resume the conf lict.

TAQIYYA: War and Deceit in Islam

73

Moreover, going back to the doctrine of abrogation, the vast majority of the ulema agree that Quran 9:5, famously known as ayat al-saif—the “sword verse”—has abrogated some 124 of the more peaceful Meccan verses.29 Thus, all four schools of Sunni jurisprudence agree that “jihad is when Muslims wage war on infidels, after having called on them to embrace Islam or at least pay tribute [ jizya] and live in submission, and the infidels refuse.”30 Obligatory jihad is best expressed by Islam’s dichotomized worldview that pits Dar al-Islam (the “realm of submission,” i.e., the Islamic world, or, more specifically, the world where shariah governs) against Dar al-Harb (the “realm of war,” i.e., the non-Islamic world) until the former subsumes the latter. Internationally renowned Muslim historian and philosopher Ibn Khaldun (d. 1406 AD) articulates this division thusly: In the Muslim community, holy war [ jihad] is a religious duty, because of the universalism of the Muslim mission and the obligation to convert everybody to Islam either by persuasion or by force. The other religious groups [specifically Christianity and Judaism] did not have a universal mission, and the holy war was not a religious duty for them, save only for purposes of defense . . . But Islam is under obligation to gain power over other nations.31

Treaties and Truces The perpetual nature of the jihad is highlighted by the fact that, based on the ten-year treaty of Hudaibiya (628), ratified between Muhammad and his Quraish opponents in Mecca, most jurists are agreed that ten years is the maximum amount of time Muslims can be at peace with infidels; once the treaty has expired, the situation needs to be reappraised. Based on Muhammad’s example of breaking the treaty after two years (by claiming a Quraish infraction), the sole function of the truce (or hudna)32 is to buy weakened Muslims time to regroup before renewing the offensive: “By their very nature, treaties must be of temporary duration, for in Muslim legal theory the normal relations between Muslim and non-Muslim territories are not peaceful, but warlike.”33 Hence “The fuqaha [ jurists] are agreed that open-ended truces are illegitimate if Muslims have the strength to renew the war against them [non-Muslims].”34 Even though the shariah mandates Muslims to abide by treaties, they have a way out, one obviously open to manipulation: if they believe—even without solid evidence—that their opponents may break the treaty, Muslims can preempt them by breaking it first. Moreover, some schools of law, such as the Hanafi, assert that Muslim leaders may abrogate treaties merely if it seems advantageous for Islam to do so.35 This is reminiscent of the following canonical hadith or saying by Muhammad: “If you ever take an oath to do something and later on you find that something else is better, then you should expiate

74

Raymond Ibrahim

your oath and do what is better.”36 And what is better than making Allah’s word supreme by launching the jihad anew whenever possible? That the sole purpose of peace treaties is to give Muslims time to strengthen their forces even has an etymological pedigree: The term denoting “advantage” (maslaha) is derived from the same root (s-l-h) that forms the word for “reconciliation” (sulh). The prerequisite for peace or reconciliation is therefore Muslim advantage. An authoritative Sunni legal text, al-Misri’s Umdat as-Salik, agrees: “There must be some interest [maslaha] served in making a truce other than the status quo: ‘So do not be fainthearted and call for peace, when it is you who are uppermost [Quran 47:35].’ ”37 One even finds curious anecdotes in the historical record that point to a Muslim proclivity for breaking treaties when advantageous: In Jean de Joinville’s chronicle of the Fourth Crusade, for example, there is a section titled “the Saracens refuse to be bound by truce.”38 In it, de Joinville recounts how, after a truce was agreed upon between the Muslims and Christians, when the former gained an unexpected advantage, their emir immediately abrogated the truce and went on the offensive. (The fact that Joinville’s chronicle does not appear to be biased against Muslims—as he also condemns Christians and praises Muslims—adds to its credibility.) More recently, and of great significance for Western leaders advocating cooperation with Islamists, the late Yasser Arafat, soon after negotiating a peace treaty criticized as conceding too much to Israel, addressed an assembly of Muslims in a mosque, where he justified his actions by saying, “I see this agreement as being no more than the agreement signed between our Prophet Muhammad and the Quraish in Mecca.”39 In other words, like Muhammad, the “moderate” Arafat gave his word only to annul it once, in the words of his Prophet, “something else better” came along—that is, once the Palestinians became strong enough to renew the offensive. Late last year, a new Islamic group associated with Hamas called Jaysh al-Umma (The Army of the Muslim Nation) stated clearly, “Muslims all over the world are obliged to fight the Israelis and the infidels until only Islam rules the earth.” Perhaps realizing their slip, they quickly clarified their position: “We say that the world will not live in peace as long as the blood of Muslims continues to be shed.”40 Which is it: until Muslim blood stops being shed in “Palestine” or “until only Islam rules the earth”? These are all clear instances of Islamists feigning openness to the idea of peace simply in order to buy more time to build up their strength, for “Islam’s ultimate mission, namely, the supremacy of Allah’s word over this world, is carried out by the jihad.”41

Philosophical Observations All of the earlier mentioned facts lead to the following critical question: If Islam must be in a constant state of war with the non-Muslim world—which need

TAQIYYA: War and Deceit in Islam

75

not be physical, as the ulema have classified several nonviolent forms of jihad, such as “jihad-of-the-pen” (propaganda) and “money-jihad” (economic)— and if Muslims waging this kind of warfare are permitted to lie and feign loyalty, amiability, even affection to the infidel, simply to further their war efforts—what does one make of any Muslim overtures of peace, tolerance, or dialogue to the non-Muslim world? This is not a new question and appears to have been on the mind of early legal philosophers, such as the Scottish professor of law James Lorimer (1818–1890), who wrote: “So long as Islam endures, the reconciliation of its adherents, even with Jews and Christians, and still more with the rest of mankind, must continue to be an insoluble problem . . . For an indefinite future, however reluctantly, we must confine our political recognition to the professors of those religions which . . . preach the doctrine of ‘live and let live.’ ”42 Such pessimism is borne out by the fact that every time Muslim nations have “reached out” for peace, it has always been when they have been in a weakened condition vis-à-vis infidels—that is, when they, more than their non-Muslim competitors, benefit from peace. This is the lesson of the last two centuries of Muslim-Western interaction, wherein the former have been militarily inferior and thus beholden to the latter. One wonders if the reverse would hold true. If, for example, the Palestinians suddenly became stronger than Israel and could annihilate it, and if Israel reached out for peace or concessions—would the Palestinians grant it? The answer to this question is evident in all those countries where non-Muslim groups live as minorities among Muslim majorities. While living in constant social subjugation (according to Quran 9:29), they are also sporadically persecuted and killed—such as a congregation of Coptic Christians who, in November 2008, assembled for prayer in Cairo’s Church of St. Mary and Anba Abraam, only to find twenty thousand rioting Muslims surrounding them, screaming “Allahu Akbar” while throwing stones at them.43 Yet one may ask: If Muslims must always wage war, why have there been long periods of relative peace between Muslims and non-Muslims? The problem with this otherwise plausible objection is that most Westerners have a limited understanding of history, and tend to focus on the modern era, when, if anything, Westerners have played a more aggressive role—from Napoleon’s conquest of Egypt in 1798, to the colonial era, to the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Yet this overlooks the fact that, in the last couple centuries, the Islamic world has simply been incapable of going on the offensive, whether it wanted to or not. Therefore, Westerners tend to assume that Muslims do not want to go on the offensive, but rather live in peace with their non-Muslim neighbors—a purely Western, secular worldview. History demonstrates otherwise: whenever and wherever Muslims have been demonstrably stronger than their non-Muslim neighbors, they have always gone on the offensive. Finally, it should be understood that to jihadis, “radicals,” and the like, waging expansionist jihads is deemed an “altruistic” endeavor, not at all hostile or unjust. The logic is that the world, whether under democracy,

76

Raymond Ibrahim

socialism, communism, or any other system of governance, is inevitably living in bondage—a great sin, since humans must be enslaved to Allah alone, not other humans. In this context, Muslim deception can be viewed as a slightly less than noble means to a glorious end—Islamic hegemony under shariah rule, which is seen as good for both Muslims and non-Muslims.44 This view has an ancient pedigree: Soon after the death of Muhammad (634), as the jihad expanded beyond the peninsula, a soon to be conquered Persian commander asked the invading Muslims what they wanted. They memorably replied as follows: Allah has sent us and brought us here so that we may free those who desire from servitude to earthly rulers and make them servants of Allah, that we may change their poverty into wealth and free them from the tyranny and chaos of [false] religions and bring them to the justice of Islam. He has sent us to bring his religion to all his creatures and call them to Islam. Whoever accepts it from us will be safe and we shall leave him alone; but whoever refuses we shall fight until we fulfill the promise of Allah.45 Fourteen hundred years later—in March 2009—Saudi legal expert Basem Alem publicly echoed this view: As a member of the true religion, I have a greater right to invade [others] in order to impose a certain way of life [according to Shari’a], which history has proven to be the best and most just of all civilizations. This is the true meaning of offensive jihad. When we wage jihad, it is not in order to convert people to Islam, but in order to liberate them from the dark slavery in which they live.46

Hostility Disguised as Grievance Radical Islamists such as the leaders of al Qaeda have long maintained that the terrorism they direct against the West (e.g., 9/11) is merely reciprocal treatment for decades of Western/Israeli oppression. Yet their writings to fellow Muslims portray this animus as a product of religious obligation. For instance, when a group of prominent Muslims wrote an open letter to Americans saying that Islam seeks to peacefully coexist with others,47 bin Laden castigated them: As to the relationship between Muslims and infidels, this is summarized by the Most High’s Word: “We [Muslims] renounce you [nonMuslims]. Enmity and hate shall forever reign between us—till you believe in Allah alone” [Quran 60:4]. So there is an enmity, evidenced

TAQIYYA: War and Deceit in Islam

77

by fierce hostility from the heart. And this fierce hostility—that is, battle—ceases only if the infidel submits to the authority of Islam, or if his blood is forbidden from being shed [i.e., a dhimmi], or if Muslims are at that point in time weak and incapable [i.e., taqiyya]. But if the hate at any time extinguishes from the heart, this is great apostasy! . . . Such, then, is the basis and foundation of the relationship between the infidel and the Muslim. Battle, animosity, and hatred—directed from the Muslim to the infidel—is the foundation of our religion. And we consider this a justice and kindness to them.48 It bears repeating that this hostile weltanschauung is well supported by mainstream Islam’s schools of jurisprudence—all “radical-moderate” dichotomies aside. When addressing Western audiences, however, bin Laden’s tone changes; he lists any number of “grievances” for fighting the West—from the oppression of Palestinians, to the Western exploitation of women, and even U.S. failure to sign the Kyoto Protocol (for the environment)—all things intelligible from a Western perspective. Never once does he allude to fighting the United States simply because it is an infidel entity that must be subjugated. Indeed, he often initiates his messages to the West by saying, “Reciprocal treatment is part of justice” or “Peace to whoever follows guidance“—though he means something entirely different than what his Western audience expects by words such as “peace” and “justice.”49 This is of course a clear instance of taqiyya, as bin Laden is not only waging a physical jihad, but one of propaganda. Convincing a secular West (whose epistemology cannot comprehend the notion of religious conquest) that the current conf lict is entirely its fault only garners him and his cause more sympathy; conversely, he also knows that if Americans were to realize that, all political grievances aside—real or imagined—according to Islam’s worldview, nothing short of their submission can ever bring peace, his propaganda campaign would be quickly compromised. Hence the constant need to dissemble, “for war,” as Islam’s prophet asserted, “is deceit.”50

Muslim “Friends” Associated with Hamas, denounced by American politicians for “pursuing an extreme Islamist political agenda,” its members arrested for terrorism-related charges51—the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR)52 is another Muslim group that appears to be less than sincere to its non-Muslim audience53; situated in the United States, it is also much closer to home. When it comes to the issue of jihad, perpetual warfare, even doctrines such as taqiyya— indeed, all that has been delineated in this essay—CAIR has been at the forefront of denying their existence.

78

Raymond Ibrahim

Could CAIR be taking lessons from the Muslim convert Mas’ud, whom Muhammad urged to go and live among the Confederate infidels, solely in order to mislead and betray them, so that Islam might triumph? The most obvious example of taqiyya, however, comes from Saudi Arabia— America’s “friend.”54 If any nation closely follows shariah, it is the Arabian kingdom, which refuses to allow the construction of a single church or synagogue on its land,55 bans and burns bibles,56 arrests, tortures, and sometimes kills Christians engaged in any kind of missionary activity,57 and, according to Islam’s apostasy laws,58 imprisons and executes Muslim converts to Christianity.59 Yet, for all that, in their attempt to portray Islam as a tolerant religion, a religion that merely seeks to coexist peacefully with others, top Saudis have been pushing for more “dialogue” between Muslims and non-Muslims,60 specifically Christians and Jews. Rather tellingly, however, Saudi Arabia refuses to host any of these conferences; after all, Muhammad’s deathbed wish was to expel the Jews and Christians from the Arabian peninsula61—even though they were there centuries before Muhammad arrived on the scene. Moreover, the Saudis may well fear that a real debate—not just the perfunctory talk62 of “dialogue” and “mutual understanding” that typically occurs in interfaith conferences—might finally take place, once the non-Muslim participants discover that they are not free to practice their faiths on Saudi soil. The most recent interfaith conference was held in Madrid, where the Saudi ruler King Abdullah asserted, “Islam is a religion of moderation and tolerance, a message that calls for constructive dialogue among followers of all religions.”63 Mere days later, it was revealed that Saudi children’s textbooks still call Christians and Jews “infidels,” “hated enemies,” and “pigs and swine.”64 A multiple choice test in a fourth-grade book asks Muslim children, “Who is a ‘true’ Muslim?” The correct answer is not the man who prays, fasts, and so on, but rather “A man who worships Allah alone, loves the believers, and hates the infidels”—in other words, the very people with whom the Saudis say they want to engage in dialogue. When the Saudis call for “dialogue,” then, are they merely following the aforementioned advice of Muhammad’s companion Abu Darda: “Let us grin to the face of some people while our hearts curse them”?

Implications There is also a troubling epistemological aspect to taqiyya. Anyone who truly believes that no less an authority than God justifies and, through his prophet’s example, sometimes even encourages deception will not experience any ethical qualms or dilemmas about lying. This is especially true if, as John Locke first said, the human mind is indeed a tabula rasa shaped by environment and education: deception becomes second nature.

TAQIYYA: War and Deceit in Islam

79

Consider the case of Ali Mohammad—bin Laden’s “first trainer” and longtime al Qaeda operative. Despite being entrenched in the highest echelons of the terror network, his confidence at dissembling enabled him to become a CIA agent and FBI informant for years. People who knew him regarded him “with fear and awe for his incredible self-confidence, his inability to be intimidated, absolute ruthless determination to destroy the enemies of Islam, and his zealous belief in the tenets of militant Islamic fundamentalism.”65 Indeed, this sentence sums it all up: for a “zealous belief ” in Islam’s “tenets,” which, as seen, legitimize deception in order to make Allah’s word supreme, will certainly go a long way in creating “incredible self-confidence” when lying. Such is the dilemma: Islamic law unambiguously splits the world into two perpetually warring halves—Islam and infidelity—and obligates the former to subsume the latter. Yet if war with the infidel is a perpetual affair, if war is deceit, and if deeds are justified by intentions (niyya) in Islam, any number of Muslims will naturally conclude that they have a divinely sanctioned right to deceive, so long as they believe their deception serves to aid Islam, “until all chaos ceases, and all religion belongs to Allah.”66 Such deception will further be seen as a means to an altruistic end. All Muslim overtures for peace, dialogue, or even temporary truces must be seen in this light, evoking the practical observations of philosopher James Lorimer, uttered over a century ago: “So long as Islam endures, the reconciliation of its adherents, even with Jews and Christians, and still more with the rest of mankind, must continue to be an insoluble problem.”67

Notes 1. By “mainstream Islam,” I here refer to Sunni Islam, which accounts for some 90 percent of the entire Muslim body. The word “Sunni” is based on the Arabic word “sunna,” which, in context, refers to the habits and practices—the customs—of Muhammad as handed down through traditions (hadiths). 2. In fact, examples exist in Muhammad’s seventh-century statements that seem odd today, such as that women should “breastfeed” strange men whenever they are in each other’s company. In fact, an entire fatwa was recently issued, and then rescinded, from Al Azhar University, Sunni Islam’s most authoritative institution, regarding this: http://memri.org/ bin/latestnews.cgi?ID=IA35507. 3. See Quran 2:195 and 4:29. 4. Fakhr ad-Din ar-Razi, At-Tafsir al-Kabir (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-’Ilmiya, 2000), vol. 10, p. 98 5. Sami Mukaram, At-Taqiyya fi ‘l-Islam (London: Mu’assisat at-Turath ad-Druzi, 2004), p. 7 (author’s translation). 6. Cyrus H. Gordon, “The Substratum of Taqiyya in Iran,” Journal of the American Oriental Society, April–June 1977, p. 192. 7. Etan Kohlberg, “Some Imami Shi’i Views on Taqiyya,” Journal of the American Oriental Society, July–September 1975, p. 396. 8. See also Quran 2:173, 2:185, 4:29, 16:106, 22:78, 40:28, verses cited by the jurisprudents as legitimating taqiyya.

80

Raymond Ibrahim

9. Abu Ja’far Muhammad at-Tabari’s Jami’ al-Bayan ‘an ta’wil ayi ‘l-Quran al-Ma’ruf: Tafsir at-Tabari (Beirut: Dar Ihya’ at-Turath al-’Arabi, 2001), vol. 3, p. 267 (author’s translation). 10. ‘Imad ad-Din Isma’il Ibn Kathir, Tafsir al-Quran al-Karim (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-’Ilmiyya, 2001), vol. 1, p. 350 (author’s translation). Needless to say, radicals such as al Qaeda often stress this hadith; see, e.g., my The Al Qaeda Reader (New York: Doubleday, 2007), p. 73. 11. Mukaram, At-Taqiyya fi ‘l- Islam, pp. 30–37. 12. See http://www.danielpipes.org/blog/2005/04/hasan-akbars-chilling-diary-entries.html. 13. Mukaram, At-Taqiyya fi ‘l- Islam, pp. 11–12. 14. Ibid., pp. 41–42. 15. Sahih Muslim, chapter “Kitab al-Birr wa’s-Salat, Bab Tahrim al-Kidhb wa Bayan al-Mubih Minhu.” 16. Ahmad Mahmud Karima, Al-Jihad Fi’l Islam: Dirasa Fiqhiya Muqarina (Cairo: Al-Azhar, 2003), p. 304. 17. Mukaram, At-Taqiyya fi’l-Islam, p. 32. 18. See Raymond Ibrahim, The Al Qaeda Reader (New York: Doubleday, 2007), pp. 142–143. 19. Mukaram, At-Taqiyya fi ‘l-Islam, pp. 32–33. 20. Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 367–368. 21. Shihab ad-Din Muhammad al-Alusi al-Baghdadi, Ruh al-Ma ‘ani fi Tafsir al-Quran al-’Azim wa’ l-Saba’ al-Mithani (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-’Ilmiyya, 2001), vol. 2, p. 1165 (author’s translation). 22. While some English versions of the Quran euphemize makar as “planner” or “plotter,” the word most generically denotes (and, to Arabic ears, connotes) deception. Moreover, according to the definitive Hans Wehr Arabic-English Dictionary, the trilateral root “m-k-r” means “to deceive, delude, cheat, dupe, gull, double-cross.” One who takes on the attributes of “m-k-r”—such as Allah in the Quran—is described as “sly, crafty, wily, an impostor, a swindler.” In colloquial Arabic, a makar is a sly trickster, something like the Norse Loki. 23. See Ibn Qayyim’s Tafsir, in Abd al-’Aziz bin Nasir al-Jalil, At-Tarbiyya Al-Jihadiyya Fi Daw’ Al-Kitab Wa’l-Sunna (Riyahd: n.p., 2003), pp. 36–43. 24. Quran 109:5. 25. Mukaram, At-Taqiyya fi ‘l-Islam, p. 20 (author’s translation). 26. Quran 2: 216. 27. Yahia bin Sharaful-Deem An-Nawawi, An-Nawawi’s Forty Hadiths, p. 16 (accessed August 1, 2009). 28. Quran 8:39. 29. David Bukay, “Peace or Jihad? Abrogation in Islam,” Middle East Quarterly, Fall 2007, pp. 3–11, f.n. 58. 30. Abd al-’Aziz bin Nasir al-Jalil, At-Tarbiyya Al-Jihadiyya Fi Daw’ al-Kitab Wa’l-Sunna (Riyadh: n.p., 2003), p. 7. 31. Ibn Khaldun, The Muqudimmah. An Introduction to History, translated by Franz Rosenthal (New York, N.Y.: Pantheon, 1958), vol. 1, p. 473; emphasis added. 32. Denis Maceoin, “Tactical Hudna and Islamist Intolerance,” Middle East Quarterly, Summer 2008, pp. 39–48. 33. Majid Khadduri, War and Peace in the Law of Islam (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1955), p. 220. 34. Karima, Al-Jihad fi ‘l-Islam, p. 461 (author’s translation). 35. Ibid., p. 469. 36. Muhammad al-Bukhari, “Judgements (Ahkaam),” Sahih al-Bukhari, book 89, translated by M. Muhsin Khan (accessed July 22, 2009). 37. Ahmad Ibn Naqib al-Misri, Reliance of the Traveller: A Classic Manual of Islamic Sacred Law (Beltsville: Amana Publications, 1994), p. 605.

TAQIYYA: War and Deceit in Islam

81

38. Villehardouin and Joinville, Chronicle of the Crusades (New York: Dover Publications, 2007), pp. 183–184. 39. Daniel Pipes, “Lessons from the Prophet Muhammad’s Diplomacy,” Middle East Quarterly, September 1999, pp. 65–72. 40. Reuters, September 1, 2008. 41. Khadduri, War and Peace in the Law of Islam, p. 152. 42. James Lorimer, Institutes of the Law of Nations (Edinburgh: n.p., 1883), vol. 1, p. 124. 43. Assyrian International News Agency, November 26, 2008. 44. Sayyid Qutb—the “godfather of jihad”—perhaps best articulated this position in the modern era. See his Ma ‘alim Fi Al Tariq, or Milestones (Chicago: Islamic Book Service, India, 2006). 45. Hugh Kennedy, The Great Arab Conquests (Philadelphia: Da Capo, 2007), p. 112. 46. “Saudi Legal Expert Basem Alem: We Have the Right to Wage Offensive Jihad to Impose Our Way of Life,” TV Monitor, clip 2108, Middle East Media Research Institute, trans., March 26, 2009, ur Way of Life. 47. Ibrahim b. Muhammad al-Shahwan, et al., “Correspondence with Saudis: How We Can Coexist,” AmericanValues.org (accessed July 28, 2009). 48. Ibrahim, The Al Qaeda Reader, p. 43. 49. See http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=NWNhNGMxZDk1NmEwZDQxMDdlOWNlZ jczZTEwMWE3ZTc=. 50. For more on the contradictory nature of al-Qaeda’s words, see http://www.meriajournal. com/en/asp/journal/2008/december/ibrahim/6.pdf. 51. http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/14/washington/14cair.html?_r=1. 52. http://www.discoverthenetworks.org/groupProfile.asp?grpid=6176. 53. http://www.meforum.org/916/cair-islamists-fooling-the-establishment 54. Stephen Zunes, “America and its ‘friend’ Saudi Arabia,” Asia Times (Hong Kong), May 23, 2003. 55. Wajiha al-Huweidar, interview, Alhurra television, January 13, 2008, in Middle East Media Research Institute, Special Dispatch, no. 1815, January 18, 2008. 56. The Christian Post (Washington, D.C.), August 10, 2007. 57. Tom White, “A Voice of the Martyrs Special Report,” John Mark Ministries (accessed July 28, 2009). 58. Muhammad al-Bukhari, “Dealing with Apostates,” Sahih al-Bukhari, vol. 9, book 84, hadith 57, translated by M. Muhsin Khan (accessed July 28, 2009). 59. Asia News (Bangkok), December 17, 2004. 60. MSNBC.com, March 25, 2008. 61. Muslim ibn al-Hajjaj, Sahih Muslim, “Evacuation of the Jews from Hijaz,” book 19, chapter 20, no. 4363, translated by Abdul Hamid Siddiqui (accessed July 28, 2009). 62. See, e.g., Agence France-Presse, July 31, 2008. 63. Sami Alrabaa, “Saudis Call for Interfaith Dialogue Hypocritical,” Europe News, August 18, 2008. 64. 2008 Update: Saudi Arabia’s Curriculum of Intolerance (Washington, D.C.: Center for Religious Freedom of the Hudson Institute, 2008), p. 5. 65. http://www.investigativeproject.org/187/osama-bin-ladens-special-operations-man. 66. Quran 8:39. 67. James Lorimer, The Institutes of the Law of Nations: A Treatise of the Jural Relations of Separate Political Communities (Clark, N.J.: The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd., 2005), p. 124.

This page intentionally left blank

CH A P T E R

SI X

Debates over Just War and Jihad: Ideas, Interpretations, and Implications across Cultures Jam e s Turne r Joh n s on

Is there a clash of cultures or civilizations between the West and the world of Islam? When looked at from one perspective, this is a meaningless question, the wrong question to ask. For both cultures are quite complex, including varieties of forms of religion, variations in local or regional attitudes and customs, differing views on the best way to achieve cultural ideals, and many other factors. Moreover, the lines of difference between the two cultures have blurred as they have interacted over history and continue to interact in the present. For example, what does it mean to talk of a clash of civilizations in the contemporary United States, where the number of Muslims is greater than the number of members of some wellestablished Protestant Christian denominations, where Muslims have risen to professional and business prominence, where Muslim immigrants and their children and grandchildren have assimilated into American culture and participate broadly in American life, and where Muslim names have proliferated across the population? There is no necessary or inevitable clash of civilizations or cultures here, and to ask whether there is one seems a misplaced question. Yet from a different perspective there is clearly a clash of civilizations or cultures between the West and the world of Islam, for contemporary radical Islamism has insisted that there is such a fundamental conf lict, rooting this claim in Islam’s normative tradition on warfare. Jihadism directed toward Western presence and inf luence in traditionally Islamic lands, and toward Western culture generally, follows from this interpretation and gives

84

James Turner Johnson

expression to what it implies: a fight to the death between the two cultures. This is the perspective that is given voice in such classic statements of the views of radical Islamism as The Neglected Duty, the so-called creed of Sadat’s assassins; the Charter of Hamas, with its commitment to the utter eradication of the presence of Israel; and the Declaration on Armed Struggle against Jews and Crusaders, the 1998 statement in the form of a fatwa or ruling on Islamic law signed by Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and several other leaders of radical Islamist militant organizations.1 Yet there is another clash brought into being by the claims of radical Islamism: one within Islam itself. Looked at more closely, this presents itself in two different ways: in the battle between the radical Islamists and other Muslims to define the meaning of Islam for the contemporary world, and in the conf lict between radical Islamism and Islamic tradition itself. As a result, there is at least a three-way conf lict of ideas here, as radical Islamism defines itself through hostility not only toward Western societies and Western culture but also against understandings of Islam different from the normative constructions of radicals. As John Kelsay observes in his recent study Arguing the Just War in Islam, these contemporary radicals “stretch” the methods of reasoning associated with shariah, traditional Islamic law, in order to make it come out as they do.2 A more general way to make the same point is that the interpretation of the radical Islamists is not, as it claims to be, the only right interpretation of the normative tradition, and it may not even be a proper interpretation of that tradition. The question of a conf lict of ideas, civilizations, and cultures here, then, is a complicated one. For even between the West and non-radical Muslims, or between Western traditions of value and right behavior and the corresponding traditions that have developed in Islamic history, there are real differences— differences of outlook, of history, of values, and much else. To recognize this, though, does not mean that conf lict, especially armed conf lict, is inevitable. At the same time, not to recognize it is to deny the importance or authenticity of such differences as if they did not have meaning for the lives and decisions of persons from each of these backgrounds, for the structure of their social interactions and institutions, or their expectations regarding interactions between themselves and those different from them. This chapter does not seek to discuss all the dimensions of the issues I have just identified, but approaches the question of these differences and their implications through a particular prism, that of the major normative traditions of each of these cultures on warfare. It engages the meaning of jihad in Islamic tradition on its own terms, as it is defined and developed there, in comparison with the major Western normative tradition on the use of armed force, that of just war, and also in comparison with the understanding of jihad that is part of the core of radical Islamist thought. The discussion moves through three stages: an examination of points of contact and difference between these two historically shaped normative traditions, a critique of the radical Islamist use

Debates over Just War and Jihad

85

of Islamic tradition to show how it misuses that tradition, and an assessment of the possibilities for an interaction that builds on the points of contact and seeks to minimize the implications of the differences.

Two Cultures, Two Traditions: Commonalities and Divergence The cultures of the West and of the world of Islam have produced two traditions of ideas on the justification of the use of armed force and the limitations that apply to such use of force: the traditions of just war and of jihad of the sword, respectively.3 Both traditions took their classic forms as part of the coming together of the cultures they belong to, while both have roots that reach back further in time and both have also continued to develop in later history right up to the present. The classic forms of these two traditions expressed fundamental ideas about the proper shape of society, the purpose of history, and the parameters of human responsibility in regard to both. The coalescence of the just war idea into its classic form over a period from the mid-twelfth to the late thirteenth centuries was thus one aspect of a larger development of ideas, institutions, and consciousness at the beginning of the high Middle Ages that synthesized inf luences from late Roman and Western Christian thought, practices, and institutions. Similarly, the classic form of the idea of jihad of the sword took shape as an element within the crystallization of an idea of Islamic culture in the period of the early Abbasid caliphate, from the late eighth through the early tenth centuries. Substantively, these two traditions in their classic forms share certain core characteristics. Both approach the subject of the use of force through conceptions of political or communal order. In accord with this, both focus the responsibility for the decision to use armed force and the actual employment of such force in the leader of the community in question; both define the justification of that force in terms of punishment of evil and promotion of good, specifically the good of a peace that restores or establishes a just order; and both set limits on conduct in the use of armed force, both by restricting who may rightly authorize it to the head of the community and by setting limiting parameters on who may rightly be targeted and the harm that may rightly be done in war. Beyond these common core characteristics, though, are characteristic differences. At the most fundamental level is divergence over the role of religion. The juristic thinkers who defined the classic idea of jihad of the sword were engaged in an effort to spell out the implications of right religion, Islam, understood as law. Their sources were the Quran, honored as God’s final revelation and as literally God’s word, and the hadith literature, recording important events from the life of the prophet Muhammad, to whom the Quran was revealed. For these jurists, the only law that matters is stated in these sources

86

James Turner Johnson

or derived from them, and right human behavior on all levels is defined by this law, the shariah. One implication the jurists derived from their sources and their way of interpreting them was the division of the world into two spheres, the dar al-islam (literally the “abode of Islam,” more usually translated the “house of Islam”), characterized by peace because submission (islam) to the law of God is the rule, and the rest of the world, which they characterized as the dar al-harb (the “abode” or “house” of war), where strife is endemic because of the disorder in the laws followed there. For the jurists, not only are elements within the dar al-harb empirically not at peace in themselves or with one another, but, the jurists reasoned, they are also the source, implicitly and often actually, of war with the dar al-islam.4 The jurists developed this conception in two directions. Internally, it provided the basis of a political theory of the dar al-islam as the only form of good society, governed according to the law of Islam by a supreme ruler who is heir to both the religious and political authority of the Prophet, the caliph (“deputy” or “successor”). It should be noted that even when this ruler was referred to by other titles, such as the politico-military title of “sultan” or the religious title of “imam,” both political and religious authority were assumed. The internal peace and justice of this society is guaranteed by submission to God’s law, and the caliph’s obligations as ruler follow from the need to protect and extend that submission. Externally, this conception of the world established the basis for the jurists’ doctrine of jihad of the sword, defined in terms of the ruler’s need to protect the dar al-islam against external threats from the dar al-harb and to extend the rule of divine law, and the order, justice, and peace it provides, to the rest of the world by extending the territory and the dominion of the dar al-islam. That striving or struggle ( jihad means “striving”) will be completed only when the entire world has been encompassed in the dar al-islam and the dar al-harb is no more. But while actual warfare was one means toward this end, it could also be accomplished by peaceful interaction. The early jurists’ conception of the world as divided into two “gates” or “houses”—really, two territories under fundamentally different kinds of government—provided a justifying framework for both defensive and offensive warfare against elements of the dar al-harb. It did not, however, describe an empirical state of permanent armed conf lict with all elements of the nonIslamic world; as the jurists knew, there were in practice de facto relations of peace with some parts of the dar al-harb, formal relations guaranteed by truces with others. Indeed, as early juristic thought developed, some jurists, especially within the school of al-Shafi’i, added to the original dichotomy between the dar al-islam and the dar al-harb a conception of a third “abode” or “house,” called variously the dar al-sulh or the dar al-‘ahd, referring to the existence of agreements of peace between the societies in question.5 So is jihad of the sword “holy war,” as it has often been termed? The answer depends on what holy war means, because the Islamic society described in the

Debates over Just War and Jihad

87

early Abbasid jurists’ conception is in fact a special kind of political community, one including people of different religious faiths from that of Islam yet one in which all those in the society submit to the divinely given law. If holy war means warfare to enforce a particular religious belief on everyone or to eliminate everyone who does not accept that belief, then the classical juristic conception of jihad of the sword is not holy war, since its fundamental aim is defined as the extension of the territorial dominion of the dar al-islam, not to convert or kill non-Muslims. This meant that representatives of the dar al-islam could militarily conquer new areas and impose government according to the law of Islam, but tolerate, at least within certain parameters, religious diversity under that governmental umbrella. In the period when the classical idea of jihad came together, this conception of how war and conquest worked was hardly unique; the Islamic jurists’ conception was a particular version of a broader practice of war and conquest, mirroring how the Roman and Sasanian empires also worked. The issue was not religious belief or practice as such but governance by the new authority under the new law imposed by that authority. Viewed from this perspective, the imposition of Islamic law on new territories incorporated into the dar al-islam was functionally much the same as the Roman imperial practice of imposing Roman law in territories incorporated in the Empire, while leaving local law and practice ( jus gentium) intact so long as these did not contradict Roman law. Still, the classic Islamic juristic conception of politics and of warfare was quite different from that which developed in the West in the period when the just war idea coalesced. The reasons are various. Conceptually, just war tradition took shape in an intellectual framework defined theologically by Augustine’s The City of God, whose definition of two worlds or two “cities” was quite different from the Islamic juristic conception of the dar al-islam and the dar al-harb. In Augustine’s conception the City of God stands for heaven itself and the life of the blessed there in the presence of God, while the City of Earth stands for historical human life in political community. The defining goods or perfections of the earthly city are temporal order, justice, and peace, and the responsibility for them lies with the temporal authorities who govern this city. In fact, though Augustine did not dwell on this, the earthly city can take multiple forms, with different levels and arrangements of order, justice, and peace. He thought of Rome, with all its faults, as representing the best achievement of these defining political goods. Within the earthly city the church embodies the potential of the City of God within history, but it is not a rival political entity to the City of Earth. Created by grace, and as yet imperfect and unfulfilled, its defining good is to be achieved not in the temporal frame but outside history, in the heavenly life of eternity. Though temporal societies exist to pursue the goods of order, justice, and peace, and though these societies and their governments may be judged, and ranked, according to how well they bring them into being, there is no possibility of perfection in their achievement. There is, in the terms defined by The City of God, no idea

88

James Turner Johnson

of a perfect human society analogous to the Islamic jurists’ definition of the dar al-islam. At the same time, though, earthly societies on the Augustinian conception are not doomed to a perpetual state of war but can achieve genuine tranquility, internally and in relation to one another; so neither is the City of Earth the Islamic jurists’ dar al-harb. If anything, in the juristic terminology, it appears most like a “territory of peaceful arrangement,” with its internal and external peace secured to the degree its order succeeds in establishing justice. Indeed, on Augustine’s conception it is the responsibility of the temporal ruler to avoid the kind of chaotic, endemic strife the Islamic jurists associated with the dar al-harb. While this was for Augustine the opening to the idea of just use of armed force, force employed by the ruling authority in the political order for the purpose of protecting justice and punishing injustice, with the aim of maintaining, establishing, or restoring peace, the ultimate securing of peace between and among communities rested on the creation of just order within them individually and in their relations with one another. So just as in the case of the juristic conception, the goal of a just and peaceful order could justify the use of armed force, but it did not define such force as necessary. Empirically, apart from a period in the fourth century when the Roman Emperor was himself a Christian and made Christianity the Roman state religion, Western society in Augustine’s time and in the period when just war tradition came together, had developed in such a way that the state and the church were separate entities. In the Eastern part of the Roman Empire, later called the Byzantine Empire because of its capital Byzantium but still called “Rome” (rum) by the Islamic world, a different form of relationship developed, with state and church closely interrelated; the pattern there was not unlike the one the early Abbasid jurists described for the dar al-islam. But in the West, despite efforts by the church at asserting primacy over the secular sphere (such as the institution of the Holy Roman Empire with the papal coronation of Charlemagne in 800), the latter retained its own autonomous character. The church in the West, moreover, had its own internal reasons for remaining institutionally separate from the temporal world, with the powerful and growing institution of monasticism committed to a life of withdrawal from that world. The church also depended for its own temporal well-being on the achievement of the goods of temporal society; so functionally a dialogical relationship developed in which the church and temporal society, or perhaps more particularly the religious and temporal authorities, interacted and cooperated with the common aim of the public good.6 Accordingly, when we examine the process by which the just war idea came together in its classic form, we should not make overmuch of the fact that it was church canon law thinkers (the magisterial Gratian at the middle of the twelfth century and two generations of canonical commentators, the Decretists and the Decretalists) and theologians (most notably Thomas Aquinas in his section “on War” in the Summa Theologiae) who did the intellectual work and formulated the idea of just war in writing. For, working essentially from the late Roman model (also employed by Augustine)

Debates over Just War and Jihad

89

they assumed an overarching natural law, put in place by God and knowable through revelation but also accessible through natural reason, and defined a conception of political life in which the responsibility for order, justice, and peace within the political community belongs to the temporal authorities and is to be established by reference to the natural law and established customs and procedures. The same pattern continues in the later medieval development of just war tradition and, indeed, throughout the history of development of this tradition. The idea of just war is “Christian” not in the sense of its being narrowly grounded in Christian religious principles or imposed on the temporal order through the authority of the church, but rather in the sense that it is a product of broad cultural inf luences in a society that thought of itself as “Christian.” Nor is the idea of just war an idea of war for religion or holy war; it is an idea of war defined by the goods of political life as such. The medieval development of the just war idea depended on specifically religious input, to be sure, but it also was inf luenced by contemporaneous work on Roman conceptions and practices regarding natural law and jus gentium, the law of local peoples and communities, and by the developing chivalric code, whose roots were in the Germanic warrior culture, as well as by developing practices of temporal government and interaction among temporal rulers. The same pattern of interaction between specifically religious and temporal or secular sources has continued throughout the historical development of just war thinking to the present day. One can separate out a narrowly Christian form of just war, but one can also separate out a legal form of this tradition in the law of armed conf lict and a form defined through codes of military discipline, which first began to appear early in the modern period and currently take shape in codes of military conduct and rules of engagement for specific conf licts. Contemporary just war discourse has also produced specifically philosophical versions of the idea of just war. The tradition as a whole includes all these, the Christian, the legal, the military, and the philosophical; none of these elements in itself defines the idea of just war. Returning to the core similarities between the ideas of just war and jihad of the sword, the contents of each of the characteristics noted ref lect the different conceptual bases of these two traditions. Beneath the core similarities lie significant differences. As we have seen, the two traditions proceed from different conceptions of political order, in which religion plays a different role in relation to that order. As for authority to use armed force on behalf of the community, the juristic idea of jihad requires that it be authorized by a ruler in whom religious and temporal authority are united. For just war tradition, on the other hand, the authority necessary for the resort to armed force is that of the temporal ruler who has no temporal superior. Religious authorities may provide advice, and it is a running theme in the history of just war thinking that the ruler is urged to seek such advice, but the responsibility of decision as to the use of armed force is the temporal ruler’s alone.

90

James Turner Johnson

As to the purpose for the right use of armed force, while both traditions understand this in terms of the aims of punishing evil and promoting good, the jihad tradition defines evil in terms of the absence of rule by God’s law and good in terms of rule expressing submission to that law and thus envisions the principal threat as located externally, in societies that do not follow this law; just war tradition, by contrast, identifies evildoing with any threat to the order, justice, and peace of the political community, whether internal or external. The issue for just war tradition is not fealty to a single expression of law but governance in accord with the nature of things, which may express itself differently in terms of the laws of specific communities. For the Islamic juristic tradition of jihad the goal of peace is identified with the imposition of rule by divine law; submission to that law, by definition, produces peace, and where there is no submission to it conf lict inevitably reigns. For the Western tradition of just war the goal of peace is, in Augustine’s phrase, the “tranquility of order,” a form of orderly justice (or just order) that may be different from community to community but is in accord with the natural law, and between political communities it is a relationship that allows all communities to reach their own peace. There is no ideal form of peace for all; this is the consequence of the Augustinian way of thinking laid out in the City of God whereby the ideal is the heavenly city at the end of history, while the earthly city, in all its forms, can at best only approach and approximate that ideal. One can see here an opening to the modern idea of the state as having autonomy in its own affairs and having the right of defense against threats to that autonomy. While the actual history of Islamic societies is one of multiple political entities and diverse governmental forms, the classic juristic theory of a single, universal good society, the dar al-islam, establishes this ideal as the rule, so that such plurality is a falling away from the ideal. The tension between this ideal conception and historical and contemporary experience remains unresolved, and it provides radical Islamists with a tool for criticizing and denouncing not only Western governments but also the governments of present-day Muslim societies. Finally, as regards right conduct in justified uses of armed force, just war tradition historically defined two sorts of limits: first, identification of certain classes of people who do not normally take part in war as not to be directly, intentionally attacked, with the proviso that if any person from one of these classes does join in the force of arms, that immunity is lost; and second, an effort to ban the use of means of war that are inherently indiscriminate in their targeting and tend to be disproportionate in their effects. (Present-day just war thinking typically describes the limits on conduct in war by the moral principles of discrimination and proportionality, which is not quite the same.) Jihad tradition, drawing on the Quran and the words and practices of the Prophet Muhammad, provides a somewhat similar list of classes of persons not to be targeted for death or direct damage in war (women, children, the aged and infirm, some classes of people, such as those in specifically religious occupations, whose occupations remove them from bearing arms). But the

Debates over Just War and Jihad

91

juristic tradition treated all males of fighting age (except for those protected by religious occupation) as subject to attack; there is no provision, as in just war tradition, for distinguishing male noncombatants from combatants. And while those protected are not to be killed, they may be “damaged” (the term used in the tradition) in other ways; specifically, they may be enslaved and their property taken for the benefit of the Islamic community as a whole. As to limits on the means of fighting, the tradition of jihad leaves the matter of means open to what is necessary to prevail, subject to the condition that the damage done should not reduce the benefit to the Muslim community. Today the norm for treatment of defeated enemies, both prisoners of war and the noncombatant population, is effectively set for Muslim societies as well as those of the West by the international law of armed conf lict. In judging the place of the Islamic jurists’ provision for enslavement of subdued enemies, moreover, we should recall Grotius’ observation that, historically, moving from the practice of killing all members of an enemy society to enslaving some or all of them was a step toward moderation of the harm done in war.7 While Grotius was commenting on the example of the early Romans, his comment applies well to what the jurists assumed about warfare: for them the provision for enslavement of noncombatants and of captured male enemies was clearly a step away from the idea that otherwise, it is allowable to kill them all. It was, moreover, an expression of their conception of the aim of jihad, to bring submission to Islamic law to persons who previously had been governed by other laws. In sum, there are fundamental commonalities between these two traditions on the place of the use of force in relation to the political community, its limitation to the authority of those responsible for the community as a whole and its good, the purposes to be sought by the use of force, and the ends aimed at. At the same time, there are notable differences in the underlying conceptions in which these common features are rooted and in their implications for practice. Can a useful interaction between the cultures shaped by these traditions nevertheless take place? In the last part of this chapter I will argue for how it can; first, though, it is important to show why the interpretation of the Islamic juristic tradition by contemporary radical Islamism needs to be rejected, not simply because it promotes never-ending conf lict but because it seriously warps the inherited tradition it claims to seek to follow.

Radical Islamism and the Juristic Tradition on Jihad Three documents named earlier collectively provide a kind of “constitutional” statement of the use of the Islamic juristic tradition on jihad by contemporary radical Islamism: the Egyptian manifesto The Neglected Duty, known as “the creed of Sadat’s assassins”; the Charter of the Palestinian organization Hamas; and the “World Islamic Front Statement Urging Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders” (1998) issued in the form of a fatwa or judgment on Islamic

92

James Turner Johnson

law and signed by Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and other leaders of radical Islamist militant organizations. In his recent book Arguing the Just War in Islam, John Kelsay provides an extended critical analysis of these documents as a group; here I will focus on the third and most recent of these documents, which also offers the most comprehensive account of the relation of necessary conf lict between the cultures of Islam and the West. I have written about this in various ways in other contexts,8 and so my treatment here will be relatively brief. But this position, and the understanding of Islamic tradition it advances, is so pernicious it cannot simply be ignored. The following passage from the “Statement Urging Jihad” summarizes its argument: In compliance with God’s order, we issue the following fatwa to all Muslims: The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies—civilians and military—is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it, in order to liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque [ Jerusalem] and the holy mosque [Mecca] from their grip, and in order for their armies to move out of the lands of Islam . . . This is in accordance with the worlds of Almighty God, “and fight the pagans all together as they fight you all together,” and “fight them until there is no more tumult or oppression, and there prevail justice and faith in God.”9 While other statements by bin Laden, Zawahiri, and others claiming to speak for al Qaeda have since appeared, this one stands as a fundamental laying out of the radical Islamist rationale for a state of global warfare between Islam and the West. It is an appeal to a specific element of the tradition on jihad in Islamic law: that which has to do with the individual duty of jihad in the case of an emergency requiring immediate action. That the statement appeared as a fatwa links it to this legal tradition in another important symbolic way: the function of the fatwa in Islamic law is to provide a specific ruling interpreting the meaning of that law for a given question. Properly a fatwa is an individual or collective ruling from within the circle of scholars trained in fiqh, jurisprudential interpretation, which follows certain stylistic conventions: a question posed, the ruling in answer to the question, supporting references to the Quran, further references to earlier opinions and rulings by other jurisprudential authorities. The 1998 “Statement Urging Jihad” follows the stylistic pattern carefully, with two important exceptions: the authors were not scholars trained in Islamic legal interpretation but leaders of various radical Islamist militant groups linked with terrorist activities and often called “jihadists,” and the references to authorities cited to back up the judgment given and the meaning imputed to the passages cited from the Quran represent an extremely narrow slice of the tradition of interpretation of Islamic law on jihad. Specifically in regard to the latter, the leading authority cited is the late-thirteenth- to early-fourteenth-century Hanbali jurist Ibn Taymiyya,

Debates over Just War and Jihad

93

who wrote in the immediate aftermath of the Mongol invasions that toppled the rule of the Abbasid caliphate. The Neglected Duty argues a close analogy between the Mongol invasions and present-day Western oppression of Islam and gives Ibn Taymiyya the reverential title “Shaykh al-Islam” (religious teacher and leader to all of Islam)10; the 1998 “Statement Urging Jihad” adheres closely to this same line. But Ibn Taymiyya, the favorite authority for radical Islamists, does not hold the same position in Islam more generally, and his school of interpretation, the Hanbali, though the school in which the restrictive Wahhabi form of Islam found in Saudi Arabia is based, is but one of four recognized schools of Islamic legal interpretation, and there are also other forms of Hanbali Islam besides Wahhabism. In short, the “Statement Urging Jihad” works from a narrow, and notably skewed, base in interpretation of Islamic law; and the signatories to the statement are not scholars trained in the law’s interpretation. The “Statement Urging Jihad” also employs the tradition in a way that distorts its substance. The focus of the statement is the concept of the jihad of individual duty in conditions of emergency, which is presented as a settled concept immediately applicable to the situation at hand. But the truth is rather different. The idea of jihad as an individual duty is certainly present in the Islamic tradition on jihad, but it plays a supportive role there. The classical jurists who first defined the legal parameters of the idea of jihad described the normative form of jihad as a “collective” duty, a duty of the dar al-islam as a whole under its legitimate authority, the caliph; he alone could authorize such a military exercise, and he would, in person or through an appointed representative, lead it. This idea of jihad as a collective duty, a duty of the community, implicitly denied the right to declare jihad to anyone else other than the designated leader. In this larger context, the idea of an individual duty to participate in jihad was recognized as the obligation to present oneself to serve in the collective jihad, and the leader then might choose not to accept all who presented themselves. Al-Shaybani, a jurist of the Hanafi school and one of the jurists most responsible for the classic juristic conception of jihad, identifies certain limits on the idea of service in jihad of the sword as an individual duty for all: communities may be asked to send “five, six, or seven” out of every ten men, with the rest helping to support their service; it is “all right” to send a substitute for oneself; married men are not required to take part in war.11 Al-Shafici, the other of the two jurists of the early Abbasid period who first defined the classic conception of jihad of the sword and the founder of the school of interpretation of Islamic law that bears his name, was even more restrictive than this in interpreting the individual’s obligation: the person who presents himself for joining in the collective jihad must be a free adult male, sound of body, who must from his own wealth provide his weapons, equipment, mount, and provisions for the duration of the campaign.12 This is quite different from what is claimed to be the nature of the individual duty in the “Statement Urging Jihad.” John Kelsay, commenting on the position of the twelfth-century Syrian author al-Sulami, who wrote responding to

94

James Turner Johnson

the second Crusade, notes that for al-Sulami the “individual duty” was that of local rulers to raise armed forces to come to the aid of other rulers under attack by the Crusaders; the duty was not that of individual Muslims everywhere.13 Similar positions appear in other significant authors. Ibn Hazm, an eleventh-century jurist who lived and wrote in the western Islamic lands (the Maghreb) and who, like Ibn Taymiyya two centuries later, was a Hanbali, limits the individual obligation as follows: “Gihad is an obligation incumbent on the Muslims. If someone undertakes it who repulses the enemy . . . and protects the borders, the rest are no longer under obligation . . . Whomever the commander [emir] of the gihad commands to go to the House of War [dar alharb], it is incumbent on him to obey . . .” Christopher Melchert, who provides these passages in an article on the Hanbali law of war, cites another Hanbali authority, Qaquni, as follows: “It is not permissible for everyone to undertake raiding on his own, nor for one to enter the House of War without the imam’s permission.”14 Yet another perspective on the duty to wage jihad is provided by Ibn Rushd (known in Western philosophy as Averroes), a twelfth-century jurist of the Maliki school who served as a qadi ( judge) in Seville and Cordoba in the Andalusian caliphate. In his legal handbook Al-Bidaya (literally “the beginning”), an example of ikhtilaf, treatises juxtaposing and discussing the opinions of different schools on the matters treated, Ibn Rushd describes the obligation of jihad as collective, not individual: Scholars agree that the jihad is a collective not a personal obligation. . . . The obligation to participate in jihad applies to adult free men who have the means at their disposal to go to war and are healthy . . . Nearly all scholars agree that this obligation is conditional on permission granted by the parents. Only in the case that the obligation has become a personal one, for instance because there is nobody else to carry it out, can this permission be dispensed with.15 This sampling from the tradition reveals a common idea, found in representatives of all the schools, that the individual obligation is a limited one and that the normal conception is that of a collective obligation. This is very different from the position taken in the “Statement Urging Jihad,” an example of radical Islamist interpretation of the tradition. There are other differences: the emergency cited in the “Statement” appears to have an eschatological duration; it justifies acts of violence that disregard the limits on conduct specified in the tradition; and the notion that one’s other obligations (imposed, e.g., by marriage, the need for parental permission, debt, enslavement, or poor health) do not matter, that the obligation to engage in jihad of the sword overrides all these other obligations. If we had read further in the jurists I have cited, we would find that they took the opposite position on each of these matters: any emergency is treated as a matter of limited duration, and the limits specified in the Quran and hadith literature apply to all persons engaging in jihad, whatever its form, even in cases of emergency. We might ref lect further that

Debates over Just War and Jihad

95

all these jurists assume that the community of Islam is one characterized by a good order, and for an individual to act on his or her own, regardless of obligations to the leader’s authority, to spouses, parents, and persons to whom one is indebted, and so on, fundamentally undermines the structures of order and endangers the community of Islam itself in the name of protecting it. What we learn from this look at the tradition, in short, is that Islamic law as a whole simply does not envision jihad of the sword in the way it is called for by radical Islamism. The radical Islamist movement, as we see exemplified in the “Statement Urging Jihad,” offers a gerrymandered and distorted version of the tradition and what it requires. It should not be regarded as representing Islam as a whole; rather, it establishes a state of conf lict with normative Islam.

Searching for Common Ground: Some Concluding Thoughts A broader lesson from the discussion in this chapter is to be skeptical about any one particular line of interpretation of Islamic law that claims to be the only right one. The examples from the juristic tradition I have cited in refutation of the present-day radical Islamist position, with its strong dependence on Ibn Taymiyya, define a pattern of diversity within a broader unity. These jurists worked in different geographical and historical contexts, and they approached the meaning of the tradition they all accepted through the different perspectives of the four recognized interpretive schools of Islam. When thinking about the possibilities of conversations and interactions between societies rooted in Western culture, including Western traditions of value and behavior, and societies rooted in Islamic culture, it is important for people within both cultural frames to recognize the positive implications of this diversity within Islam and note how far such diversity has been accepted over Islamic history as a whole. The intolerance and rigidity of radical Islamism is not the entire story. It is, I suggest, particularly important that one way this diversity has expressed itself historically is in the different forms governmental authority has taken. The ideal defined by the classical jurists is that of a single Islamic religio-political community, the dar al-islam, governed by Muhammad’s deputy or successor, the caliph (or for the Twelver Shi’a, the Imam). In fact, though, there has never been such a community in reality. Not only have there been plural caliphates and imamates, but Muslim political communities have been governed by a variety of authorities under such titles as king (malik), sultan, or emir. The idea of a ruler holding the summit of both religious and political authority has also been an ideal rather than an empirical reality, as it was even in the Abbasid caliphate classical jurists like Shaybani and Shafici knew and had in mind as their model for the dar al-islam, with the ruler focused on political affairs and religious authority delegated to juristically trained officials. Again, the empirical history of Islamic societies reveals

96

James Turner Johnson

plurality and diversity rather than a kind of monolithic world government. With this background in mind, the plurality and diversity of present-day Muslim states stands as a contemporary expression of a broader historical pattern. The political theory expressed in classical Islamic juristic thought implies a crisis of legitimacy when there is no caliph (as has been the case since the end of the Ottoman caliphate in 1928); yet the political practice of the Islamic world, historically and contemporarily, empirically accepts other forms of government as legitimate. This opens the door to forms of conversation and interaction across cultural divisions that I have elsewhere discussed16 in terms of three models of law described by the widely read scholar of international law Georg Schwarzenberger: community law, based on consensus and cooperation; the law of power or hegemony, based on the domination of one group by another; and the law of “hybrid groups,” based on reciprocity or trade-offs between and among groups within a single social context who find in this way a means of protecting their basic values while nevertheless developing patterns of cooperation.17 In terms of these categories, each of the two traditions I have been discussing, that of just war and that of jihad, represents in itself a form of community law. The Islamic juristic conception of jihad is a form of the law of power, in which the purpose of jihad of the sword is to prevent domination by an alien law and to extend dominion of Islamic law to other areas and peoples of the globe. There is also an element of this in just war tradition, since the idea that evil should be punished implies the assertion of dominion by power on behalf of the community over those whose actions threaten its well-being. Similarly, when international law initially came together in Western Europe its purpose was described in terms of codifying and expressing common ideas, values, and practices (community law), but with reference to societies outside this historical and cultural frame its purpose was described as “civilizing” or “humanizing” (the law of hegemony). But there is at the same time in just war tradition a fundamental strain of respect for reciprocity that shows in various ways, notably in the interaction between religious and secular sources in the formation of the just war idea itself and in the conception of the proper interaction of political communities each of which has its own jus gentium expressing its understanding of natural law. The contemporary development of positive international law has also taken the form of the law of hybrid groups or of reciprocity. That societies rooted in Islamic culture have entered the frame of international law thus constituted provides a model for broader conversation and interaction across cultures. Further, though I have stressed that there are real differences between the cultures of the West and of Islam that ought not to be overlooked or minimized, it is also important to note that there are genuine commonalities. In the same context where I developed more fully the implications of

Debates over Just War and Jihad

97

Schwarzenberger’s three types of law I also gave an example from the field of human rights18: a particular critique of the idea of universal human rights by a Muslim scholar who excoriated the Universal Declaration of Human Rights for being an expression of Western, including Western Christian values, and insisted that Islam has its own conception of human rights rooted in the Quran; then this scholar developed a list of the most basic of these rights, a list that includes basic rights also identified in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The lesson from this is to avoid overdifferentiation. If the two cultures come out saying much the same thing, it does not matter if this comes from different sources, for we all hold these same things in common. Further, the field of conf lict resolution offers an approach to working across cultural divides that focuses on practical outcomes on specific issues, not on that which tends to divide. On one level this looks a bit like the position of contemporary political realism, which holds that political interactions should take place in the realm of interests, transcending the realm of values. But I would put the matter differently. Interests are an expression of values; so if it is possible to develop modes of working together to serve common interests, this is, on a deeper level, an expression of commonality in the realm of values. Finally, some patience is required to discover how the battle of ideas within contemporary Islam will work out. If the radical Islamists win the struggle for the soul of Islam, then the likely recipe for the future is a clash of civilizations or cultures that will involve an armed conf lict in the form of a zero-sum game—a conf lict with only one winner. But if the non-radical forces within Islam prevail in this internal struggle, this offers hope for a different kind of future. I have stressed the empirical plurality that appears in the history of Islamic societies and the acceptance of peaceful modes of interaction across religious and cultural lines that is a part of the normative juristic tradition. These offer genuine openings to mutual interaction including dialogue across the cultural and ideological divisions and practical cooperation and mutual benefit, not hostility and conf lict. As to the former, one may think of the intellectual efforts to think about democracy from an Islamic perspective, such as John Kelsay discusses in the cases of the American Muslim thinkers Abdulaziz Sachedina, Abdullahi an-Na’im, and Khaled Abou El Fadl,19 or to reconcile Islamic law with international law as discussed by Ann Elizabeth Meyer.20 As to the latter, one might think of Saudi King Abdullah’s plan for a practical peace between the Arab states and Israel. Merging ideas and praxis, one might imagine what might result if the f ledgling Iraqi democracy not only holds together but develops positively. But all such positive developments are, fundamentally, dependent on the settlement of the war going on for the soul of Islam. How Western societies will need to relate to the Islamic world in the future will depend on how this conf lict is resolved.

98

James Turner Johnson Notes

1. The Neglected Duty (Al-Faridah al-Ghaibah), by Muhammad al-Faraj, is available in English in Johannes J.G. Jansen, The Neglected Duty: The Creed of Sadat’s Assassins and Islamic Resurgence in the Middle East (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company; London: Collier Macmillan Publishers, 1986). The Charter of Hamas is available in English in a translation by M. Maqdsi (Dallas, Texas: Islamic Association for Palestine, 1990). There are various English translations of the third radical Islamist text under somewhat different titles. The version with the title as cited in the chapter is employed by John Kelsay in his recent book Arguing the Just War in Islam (Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London: Harvard University Press, 2007) in a discussion of these three documents. This version is available at http:// www.fas.org/irp/world/para/docs980223-fatwa.htm. In discussing this third document here, I employ another version with the title “World Islamic Front Statement Urging Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders” available at http://www.library.cornell.edu/colldev/mideast/ wif.htm. 2. Kelsay, Arguing the Just War in Islam, p. 151. 3. I describe in summary form here an analysis I have provided in greater detail elsewhere. For a somewhat fuller version of my understanding of just war tradition as a whole and of its classic form, see my Morality and Contemporary Warfare (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1999), pp. 22–40, 44–51. For my understanding of the tradition of jihad, see my The Holy War Idea in Western and Islamic Traditions (University Park, Pennsylvania, and London: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997). 4. Further on this conception, see Majid Khadduri, The Islamic Law of Nations (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1956), pp. 10–19. 5. Ibid., 12. 6. An outstanding example of this is provided by the history of the Peace of God movement, which originally developed through a series of councils of bishops in certain areas of France beginning in the late tenth century. Responding to bullying, extortion, and thievery by unemployed soldiers and robber bands who lived on the fringes of settled society, the bishops’ councils issued collective statements imposing a “peace of God” to protect church personnel and property as well as the persons and property of laypeople engaged in religious activities, imposing excommunication and anathemas on offenders. Soon after this movement began the Crown recognized its importance and instructed the royal officials in the affected regions to use their military forces to enforce the aims of the “peace” and to extend them more broadly to the persons and property of peasants on the land, townspeople, and travelers. These expanded provisions were later adopted into canon law. For fuller discussion, see my The Quest for Peace (Princeton and Guildford, Surrey: Princeton University Press, 1987), pp. 79–86. 7. Hugo Grotius, The Law of War and Peace (Roslyn, New York: Walter J. Black. Inc.), p. 298 (Book III, Chapter IV, p. 10). 8. See particularly my The War To Oust Saddam Hussein (New York et al.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2005), 12–16. 9. http://www.library.cornell.edu/colldev/mideast.wif.htm (September 29, 2001). 10. Jansen, The Neglected Duty, pp. 172–175 (The Neglected Duty, section 29). 11. Khadduri, The Islamic Law of Nations, pp. 86–86 (Shaybani, Siyar, I.22–26). 12. Michael Bonner, Aristocratic Violence and Holy War (New Haven: American Oriental Society, 1996), p. 39, summarizing al-Shafi’i’s Kitab al-umm. 13. Kelsay, Arguing the Just War in Islam, pp. 115–117. 14. Cited by Christopher Melchert, “The Hanbali Law of Gihad,” The Maghreb Review 29.1–4 (2004), p. 25. Melchert here employs the French convention of transliteration. 15. Cited from Rudolf Peters, Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam (Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 1996), pp. 29–30.

Debates over Just War and Jihad

99

16. “Searching for Common Ground: Ethical Traditions at the Interface with International Law,” Chapter 6 in Don Browning, ed., Universalism vs. Relativism (New York et al.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2006), pp. 99–102. 17. Georg Schwarzenberger, Frontiers of International Law (London: Stevens and Sons, 1967), Chapter I. 18. “Searching for Common Ground,” p. 111. 19. Kelsay, Arguing the Just War in Islam, pp. 166–194. 20. Ann Elizabeth Meyer, “War and Peace in the Islamic Tradition and Natural Law,” chapter 8 in John Kelsay and James Turner Johnson, eds, Just War and Jihad (New York, Westport Connecticut, and London: Greenwood Press, 1991), pp. 198–202.

This page intentionally left blank

CH A P T E R

SE V E N

The War of Ideas: The Role of the “Afterlife” Alan M . D e r sh owitz

The “war of ideas” is actually a war between “ideas,” on the one hand, and “dogmas” on the other. Some groups are more characterized by their ideas; others by their dogmas. It is often dangerous—and always politically incorrect—to generalize about groups, whether they are political, religious, ideological, racial, ethnic, or sexual. Life is lived along a continuum, actually many continua. But the extreme poles of continua ref lect important differences, and such differences may retain their significance even as we move away from the poles. With these caveats in mind, let me offer a perspective on the war of ideas between or among groups roughly defined along one particular continuum: with Islamic fundamentalism at one pole, and Western secularism at the other. The most important difference between these extremes may well be in the very concept of ideas. The word “idea,” comes from the Greek “idein,” to see. In other words, ideas are based on observation, experience, and empirical verifiability. At the extreme pole of Western secularism, ideas are judged on their merits or demerits without regard to the authority behind them or their source. Indeed, to judge an idea based on its authority or source is a variation of the logical fallacy denominated “argumentum ad hominem.” An idea should stand or fall based on several widely accepted criteria. If it is a scientific idea, there are agreed upon rules involving scientific proof, testability, replicability, disprovability, null hypothesis, and so on. No scientific idea is regarded as immutable, regardless of the authority behind it. The ideas of Darwin, Einstein, Newton, and Freud are constantly being challenged, tested, and changed. Every scientific idea is susceptible to being disproved, revised, or abandoned. There is no such thing as scientific heresy. There are

102

Alan M. Dershowitz

no “established” doctrines, as these are established churches. There are no ex-cathedra pronouncements in science. In an open society, no one should be punished for expressing scientific dissent. The marketplace of ideas never closes and is not subject to regulation by the state, by religion, by force, or by any other means, except for the acceptable rules of science—and even those are subject to challenge. To have an idea is to “see” a truth—and to subject it to the rigorous and unforgiving testing mechanisms of the marketplace of ideas. As a Nobel laureate once aptly put it: The scientist has a lot of experience with ignorance and doubt and uncertainty, and this experience is of very great importance, I think. When a scientist doesn’t know the answer to a problem, he is ignorant. When he has a hunch as to what the result is, he is uncertain. And when he is pretty darn sure of what the result is going to be, he is still in some doubt. We have found it of paramount importance that in order to progress we must recognize our ignorance and leave room for doubt. Scientific knowledge is a body of statements of varying degrees of certainty—some most unsure, some nearly sure, but none absolutely certain. Now, we scientists are used to this, and we take it for granted that it is perfectly consistent to be unsure, that it is possible to live and not know. But I don’t know whether everyone realizes this is true. Our freedom to doubt was born out of a struggle against authority in the early days of science. It was a very deep and strong struggle: permit us to question—to doubt—to not be sure. Moral ideas that do not depend on empirical validation are subject to different rules, but they too require a completely open marketplace. We should not strive for the uniformity of one absolutely correct morality, truth, or justice. The active and never-ending processes of moralizing, truth searching, and justice seeking are far superior to the passive acceptance of one truth. The righting process, like the truthing process, is ongoing. Indeed, there are dangers implicit in accepting—and acting upon—any single philosophy of morality. Conf licting moralities serve as checks against the tyranny of singular truth. I would not want to live in a world in which Bentham’s or even Mill’s utilitarianism reigned supreme to the exclusion of all Kantian and neoKantian approaches; nor would I want to live in an entirely Kantian world in which categorical imperatives were always slavishly followed. Bentham serves as a check on Kant and vice versa, just as religion serves as a check on science, science on religion, socialism on capitalism, capitalism on socialism. Rights serve as a check on democracy, and democracy serves as a check on rights. Our constitutional system of checks and balances has an analogue in the marketplace of ideas. We have experienced the disasters produced by singular truths, whether religious, political, ideological, or economic. Those who believe they have discovered the ultimate truth tend to be less tolerant of

The Role of the “Afterlife”

103

dissent. As Hobbes put it: “nothing ought to be regarded but the truth,” and it “belongeth therefore to [the sovereign] to be judge” as to that truth. Put more colloquially, who needs differing—false—views, when you have the one true view? Experience demonstrates we all do! The physicist Richard Feynman understood the lessons of human experience as well as the limitations of human knowledge far better than the philosopher Thomas Hobbes when he emphasized the basic “freedom to doubt”—a freedom that was born out of the “struggle against authority in the early days of science.” That struggle persists and represents the world of ideas. Dogmas, on the other hand, do not qualify as ideas by any meaningful definition of that term. The word “dogma” comes from the Greek “dokein,” to seem. But it has taken on the meaning of a “point of view or tenet put forth as authoritative without adequate grounds” or a “doctrine or body of doctrines concerning faith or morals formally stated and authoritatively proclaimed by a church,” or other authority. It is the essence of the argumentum ad hominem whose acceptance is based on who offered it rather than what it contains. To challenge dogma is to commit heresy and blasphemy. Christians were burned at the stake for rejecting the dogmas of a particular sect. Muslims, even today, are threatened with fatwas of death for challenging the dogmas of the Quran or the shariah—or even for adhering to the “wrong” branch of Islam. A Jewish prime minister was murdered by a Jewish religious fanatic for seeking peace in an “anti-religious” manner. Religious “truths” are determined not by reason, logic, experience, or observation, but rather by source, authority, and the purported word of God—or his “messengers.” Obviously these distinctions surrounding the concepts of ideas and dogmas do not clearly separate Islamic from Western thought. Within the Islamic tradition, broadly defined, there are ideas in the broadest sense of that term— scientific, moral, religious, ideological, and so on. Within the Western tradition, broadly defined, there are ex-cathedra pronouncements, rejection of the scientific method, abdication of logic (“fools for Christ,” Chassidic notions of deliberate abdication of reason to rabbinic fiat, etc.), and acceptance of dogma based entirely on authority and source, but it is fair to say, as an empirical matter, that the closer one comes to the Islamic fundamentalist pole, the further one gets away from any meaningful use of the term idea and the closer one comes to dogma. (One could, of course, create a similar continuum within Western culture on which scientific secularism would be at one pole and Judeo-Christian fundamentalism at the other.) Important consequences f low from this distinction between ideas and dogmas. One such consequence is the difference placed on the values of life and death. Some Islamic extremists, citing religious sources, promote a dogma of death. Listen to their arguments: “We are going to win, because they love life and we love death,” said Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Hezbollah. He has also said: “Each of us lives his days and nights hoping more than anything to be killed for the sake of Allah.” Shortly after 9/11, Osama bin Laden told

104

Alan M. Dershowitz

a reporter: “We love death. The U.S. loves life. That is the big difference between us.” “The Americans love Pepsi-Cola, we love death,” explained Afghani al Qaeda operative Maulana Inyadullah. Sheik Feiz Mohammed, leader of the Global Islamic Youth Center in Sydney, Australia, preached: “We want to have children and offer them as soldiers defending Islam. Teach them this: There is nothing more beloved to me than wanting to die as a mujahid.” Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said in a speech: “It is the zenith of honor for a man, a young person, boy or girl, to be prepared to sacrifice his life in order to serve the interests of his nation and his religion.” Sheikh Ibrahim Madhi, a popular imam in the Palestinian Authority, related a discussion he had with a child! A young man said to me: “I am 14 years old, and I have four years left before I blow myself up.” . . . We, the Muslims on this good and blessed land, are all—each one of us—seekers of Martyrdom . . . The Koran is very clear on this: The greatest enemies of the Islamic nation are the Jews, may Allah fight them . . . Blessings for whoever assaulted a soldier . . . Blessings for whoever has raised his sons on the education of Jihad and Martyrdom . . . Shame and remorse on whoever refrained from raising his children on Jihad . . . Blessings to whoever put a belt of explosives on his body or on his sons’ and plunged into the midst of the Jews, crying “Allahu Akbar, Allah, we strive for martyrdom for your sake.” These dogmas have a powerful impact even on relatively well-educated people. Consider Zahra Maladan. Maladan is an educated woman who edits a women’s magazine in Lebanon. She is also a mother, who undoubtedly loves her son. She has ambitions for him, but they are different from those of most mothers in the West. She wants her son to become a suicide bomber. At the funeral for the assassinated Hezbollah terrorist Imad Mugniyah—the mass murderer responsible for killing 241 marines in 1983 and more than 100 women, children, and men in Buenos Aires in 1992 and 1994—Ms. Maladan was quoted in the New York Times offering the following admonition to her son: “If you’re not going to follow the steps of the Islamic resistance martyrs, then I don’t want you.” Nor is Ms. Maladan alone in urging her children to become suicide murderers. Umm Nidal, who ran for the Palestinian Legislative Council, “prepared all of her sons” for martyrdom. She has ten sons, one of whom already engaged in a suicide operation, which she considered “a blessing, not a tragedy.” She is now preparing to “sacrifice them all.” Even during Israel’s War of Independence in 1948, some Jordanian mothers demanded martyrdom from their sons. The historian Benny Morris recounts what the mother of Ma’an Abu Nowar, a young Jordanian officer, shouted at him as he left to battle the Israelis: “Don’t come back. Martyrdom my son.”

The Role of the “Afterlife”

105

Zahra Maladan and Umm Nidal represent a shift in the way we must fight to protect our citizens against enemies who are sworn to kill their foes by killing themselves. The traditional paradigm was that mothers who love their children want them to live in peace, marry, and produce grandchildren. Women in general, and mothers in particular, were seen as a counterweight to male belligerence. The picture of the mother weeping as her son is led off to battle—even a just battle—has been a constant and powerful image. Now there is a new image of mothers urging their children to die and then celebrating the martyrdom of their suicidal sons and daughters by distributing sweets and singing wedding songs. More and more young women—some married with infant children—are strapping bombs to their (sometimes pregnant) bellies because they have been taught to love death rather than life. There is no rational—idea based—answer to the dogma of death, as Thomas Jefferson learned more than two centuries ago when he tried to argue with the ambassador of the Barbary pirates. He related the following reply to his arguments that the beheading and enslaving of American sailors and passengers must stop: The ambassador answered us that [the right] was founded on the Laws of the Prophet, that it was written in their Koran, that all nations who should not have answered their authority were sinners, that it was their right and duty to make war upon them wherever they could be found, and to make slaves of all they could take as prisoners, and that every Mussulman who should be slain in battle was sure to go to Paradise. These words have a familiar ring to the contemporary world that has also suffered from Islamic extremists who justify and incite terrorism as a religious “duty” and who promise “paradise” to those who die in battle with “sinners.” Ironically, it was an early instance of Islamic terrorism on the high seas that, according to several historians, persuaded many Americans of the need for a strong Constitution to replace the weak Articles of Confederation. Under the latter, it would have been impossible to raise the kind of national Navy and Marine corps deemed necessary to defeat the Barbary pirates. The Federalist Papers stressed the necessary linkage between trading vessels and warships. “If we mean to be a commercial people . . . we must endeavor as soon as possible to have a navy,” Hamilton, the mercantile-minded realist, maintained (The Federalist No. 24), and warned (No. 11) that without a “federal navy . . . of respectable weight . . . the genius of American Merchants and Navigators would be stif led and lost.” Specifically referring to the North African threat, Madison affirmed (No. 41) that union, alone, could preserve the nation’s “maritime strength” from

106

Alan M. Dershowitz

“the rapacious demands of pirates and barbarians.” Jay’s private letters reveal an even more pugnacious approach. Arguing “the more we are ill-treated abroad the more we shall unite and consolidate at home,” the secretary actually welcomed pirate attacks that would compel the states to rally against “the . . . dangers from . . . Algerian Corsairs and the Pirates of Tunis and Tripoli.” How does one use experientially based ideas to argue against the dogma that young people who kill themselves in an effort to kill other young people will be rewarded in paradise with seventy-two virgins? These young people are indoctrinated with that dogma from their earliest days and they hear no conf licting ideas. In the absence of a marketplace, such dogmas become incontrovertible truths. The most successful dogmas are those that are inherently undisprovable such as the afterlife. Consider the history of biblical threats and punishment in the Abrahamic tradition. These threats go through several phases. The first phase involves the threat of immediate and visible consequences here on earth. Among the threats that fit into this category is the first one God made to Adam: “On the day that you eat of the Tree of Knowing of Good and Evil, you will surely die.” Subsequent threats include the following: “I will kiss you with the sword and your wives will be widows and your children fatherless.” “I will appoint terror over you, even consumption and fever,” “bring seven times more plagues,” “send beasts of the field among you, which shall rob you of your children,” “send pestilence,” “make your cities a waste,” “smite you with boils . . . itch . . . madness . . . [T]hy life shall hang in doubt . . . and the Lord shall bring thee back to Egypt in ships.” Among the visible rewards are the following: “[I will[ lengthen your days on the ground that God has given you.” “[I]t will go well for you and lengthen your days.” “I will give you rains . . . , cause evil beasts to cease out of your hands,” “get thee high above all nations,” “cause thy enemies . . . to be smitten,” and “bless thee in thine land.” Pretty specific, both as to where and when they punishments and rewards would be imposed! The “where” is here on earth, “on the ground that god has given you.” The “when” is now, in time to make your wives widows and your children orphans. There is no hint of an afterlife with a postponed punishment and reward. Later commentators argued that the hereafter, with its invisible justice, always existed, despite the Pentateuch’s silence about it. But if God wanted humans to know that we will receive our divine comeuppance in a world to come, why did He keep it a secret from those He intended to be inf luenced by the promise and threat of post-earthly consequences? Surely He knows that here on earth, we see injustice all around us. Indeed, His own Bible places this observation in the mouth of Ecclesiastes: “In the place of justice, wickedness was there . . . I have seen a righteous man perishing in his righteousness and a wicked man living long in his wickedness.” God Himself is often the moving force, as with Job.

The Role of the “Afterlife”

107

Had there been a belief in the afterlife at the time of Job, God could easily have explained Job’s suffering as temporal, to be remedied in the hereafter. Instead the midrash criticizes Job for denying “the resurrection of the dead.” Other concerns about the earthly punishment of the righteous and reward of the unrighteous, which recur throughout the Bible, could have been answered by reference to the hereafter, but they were not. All humans observe earthly injustice all the time. That is precisely why Job is such a powerful and enduring figure. Any observant person will surely notice an imperfect relationship—at best—between the sinner and the threatened death, plagues, beasts, and boils, as well as between the saint and the promises of long life and prosperity. Ecclesiastes tells us not “to be surprised at such things” or to expect otherwise. But human beings do expect more of their God than the randomness described by Ecclesiastes, whereby “all share common destiny—the righteous and the wicked” alike. “All go to the same place: all come from dust and to dust all return.” There must be some reward and punishment—somewhere, sometime. If life is random, why do we need God? God’s first attempt to answer that question fails. He cannot continue to threaten the kind of immediate and visible punishment of the type specified in the Adam story and then not carry it out. People will notice that Adam lived a long life. So God began to issue threats against individual sinners without specific time frames: Your wives will be widows (though not necessarily today). You will get boils and plagues (at some point in your life). But even such postponed punishments didn’t always happen. Not only did great sinner die of old age, they outlived their wives, without ever having experienced boils. So God had to take His system of punishments and rewards to the next level. In God’s second attempt to assure ultimate justice, He postpones the consequences of current actions beyond the life span of any particular generation, but still in this world. God threatens, in the Ten Commandments, to punish “the iniquity of fathers of children, to the third and fourth generation,” and He promises to show “mercy unto the thousandth generation of them that love Me and keep My commandments.” God postpones punishment and reward until after the death of the sinner and saint repeatedly throughout the early books of the Bible, thus making consequences invisible within a given generation. He has learned that by threatening immediate, specific, and visible punishments—such as He did to Adam—He risks a loss of credibility when these consequences do not materialize. By postponing the consequences beyond the life span of one generation, He maintains the deterrent credibility of His threats. The Bible and the midrash struggle mightily to demonstrate that God’s threats and promises are in fact carried out in future generations. Particularly in the stories of Jacob and his children, the Book of Genesis provides numerous examples of people who reap what they sow. The midrash elaborates on this theme with its moralistic stories of descendants who receive payback

108

Alan M. Dershowitz

for the vices and virtues of their ancestors. Cain’s evil “overtook him in the seventh generation,” when a descendant accidentally shot him with an arrow. This generational invisibility can survive only in a world without recorded history (or with the sort of recorded moralistc folktales concocted by the midrashic storytellers). In a world of accurately transmitted accounts, it will soon be seen that dreadful things do not necessarily befall the descendants of sinners, nor do blessings attend the offspring of saints. Indeed, after the Crusades, the Inquisition, and the Holocaust, it was obvious that God could not keep His promise and reward the descendants of saints, for the simple reason that in many instances no descendants were left alive. Entire families, entire villages, entire communities were wiped out—their seed forever crushed—by unrighteous people who went on to become builders of cities and respected leaders. Many Nazi murderers lived untroubled and guilt-free lives of wealth, health, and reward. Their children and grandchildren honor their memories. The victims of genocide and other human horrors crave ultimate justice, insisting that somehow, somewhere, sometime the righteous must be rewarded and the unrighteous punished. This deep yearning for retribution helps to explain why even sixty years after the Holocaust, children and grandchildren of victims persist in their lawsuits against corporations that profited from slave labor. I understand the anger of victims when I occasionally help to free a probably guilty killer, who then goes on to live what appears to be a good life. I have felt that anger myself and continue to feel it when I see a Nazi collaborator like John Demjanjuk living a long and healthy life surrounded by loving family—and joy when Demjanjuk was finally deported to Germany even at the age of nearly ninety. There is rarely perfect justice here on earth. There is no complete answer to the question of theodicy in this world, even if threats and promises are postponed for many generations. Moreover, the concept of punishing and rewarding descendants raises troubling moral questions about individual versus familial or group accountability. It simply isn’t fair to punish an innocent person for another’s sin. Thus, God’s second attempt to assure His followers that there is ultimate justice in this world fails for two reasons, one empirical, the other moral. Empirically it becomes clear, once recorded history is developed, that descendants do not necessarily reap what their ancestors have sown. Morally we are troubled by a system of justice that relies on vicarious accountability. So the theologians of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam had to accept the solution offered by other religions—namely, a world to come in which the righteous are rewarded and the unrighteous punished, Justice would indeed be served, but in a world no human could see and from which no human could return or report. An elegant solution to an otherwise insoluble problem. The discovery of an afterlife, which neatly solves all the problems of theodicy, made it unnecessary for God to continue to threaten or promise consequences in relation to future generations. Punishing and rewarding future

The Role of the “Afterlife”

109

generations may be necessary in a world that includes no intimation of an afterlife, because sometimes it is simply not enough to threaten the life of a sinner, especially when he is old and near death. More severe punishment may be needed. A god who can threaten eternal damnation and promise eternal salvation does not need to threaten a sinner’s children or promise reward for the descendants of the righteous. In one sense, threats and promises to be carried out against future generations are the functional equivalent of threats and promises to be carried out in the hereafter: Both are unseen by the sinner or saint; both provide answers to those who see sinners rewarded and saints punished in their lifetimes. In a world in which punishment and reward are bestowed on future generations, it is possible to believe in divine justice—at least for a while—despite the obvious empirical evidence to the contrary. Maybe this sinner has not been punished, but his descendants will surely be punished for him—if not in the first or second generation, then sometime in the future. Similarly, in a world in which punishment and reward are bestowed on the sinners themselves, but in the invisible hereafter, it is possible to believe, despite evidence that in this world sinners are often rewarded and saints punished. Maybe he has gotten away with it here, but just wait until he reaches the pearly gates. Both the indeterminate future rewards and punishments for descendants here on earth and the promise of salvation and purgatory in the hereafter share an invisibility to the generation witnessing injustice, and invisibility permits faith to overcome empirical doubt. If “justice must be seen to be done”—as a legal principle pronounces— then both God and man fail in the never-ending quest for justice, because justice is too rarely seen here on earth. If justice may be achieved in the next world or in the next generation, then we can continue to have faith in its eventual accomplishment. To turn a phrase, therefore, justice must not be seen to be done, else it will rarely be done, because it is rarely seen. The Book of Proverbs categorically assures its believers to “be sure of this: the wicked will not go unpunished, but those who are righteous will go free.” But anyone with eyes, ears, and mind cannot be sure of that, since they experience its opposite every day. Either the assurance is false (as Ecclesiastes concludes); or it is a reference to future generations (as the Ten Commandments suggest); or it is a promise about the world to come (as most religions assure us). There is no other possibility. Nor can the answer ever be known with certainty. It will be always be a matter of faith, not of proof. It is no accident, therefore, that as the Abrahamic religions move from exclusive reliance on punishment and reward in this world to a belief in the hereafter, there is a parallel movement away from punishing and rewarding descendants for the sins and good deeds of those who are personally responsible. Eventually Judaism is able to accept the important principle of individual accountability precisely because it comes to believe in a world to come in which all scores are personally settled by God. I don’t know whether or not there is a hereafter—no one does. But I must commend its creator—divine or

110

Alan M. Dershowitz

human—for solving the puzzle of how a just and intervening God can permit so much injustice in this world. Regardless of how strongly some people may believe in punishment and reward after death, no society has ever been willing to rely exclusively on this leap of faith to deter earthly misconduct. Every society imposes earthly punishment on criminals, in addition to the purgatory threatened by religion. (No one, it seems, is willing to take Pascal’s wager to the point of leaving it to God alone to punish all sin.) Earthly punishments require earthly rules. But it is the “invention”—“discovery” for those believe—of the afterlife that rewards dogmas over ideas, faith over reason, and in some instances death over life. Without the afterlife, dogma and faith would eventually succumb to ideas and experience, as it already has for many. The battleground over which the war of ideas—or the war between ideas and dogma—has always been fought is the afterlife. Without the premise of an afterlife, there would be no or very few suicide bombers, martyrs, or those willing to kill and die for promises of a better life after death. Nor can this war be resolved by reason, experience, logic, or ideas. Since the afterlife is itself a dogma, it is not subject to rational argumentation. Hence there will never be a truce in the war between ideas and dogma so long as belief in an unseen, unknowable, and unproveable afterlife persists.

CH A P T E R

EIGH T

The Clash of Civilizations? A k bar A h m e d

“The Muslim situation is so desperate. I would gladly give my life for their cause.” These were the chilling words of my dinner companion on a balmy spring evening at an elegant upscale restaurant in Amman. A seasoned diplomat in smart attire, complete with pink silk tie and handkerchief, this former Iraqi ambassador, now head of a major Arab think tank, spoke in measured and quiet tones shaped by years of service, making his message all the more forlorn: “I have nothing to live for. I have lost my culture, my homeland, my honor. I have lost my religion.” Only a few days earlier, on February 22, 2006, explosions had destroyed one of the oldest mosques in Iraq, the Golden Mosque of Samarra. It contained tombs from the ninth century of two of the holiest imams in Shia Islam, one being Imam Hassan Al-Askari, the father of the Hidden Imam. The Iraqi ambassador did not blame the Muslims for what had happened, however. Like President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of Iran, he accused the Americans and Israelis of planting the bombs in the mosque. “No Muslim,” he said indignantly, “Shia or Sunni, would ever think of destroying such a sacred mosque that had withstood some of the world’s bloodiest conquerors— even the Mongols.” Overcome by a sense that the world had spun out of control, the Iraqi ambassador had apparently been moved to talk of suicide to a stranger. This was not an al Qaeda terrorist, a young fanatic, or economically deprived individual—some of the stereotypes of the Muslim suicide bomber. Here was an intelligent human being of the diplomatic world engulfed by despair and anger. When the conversation turned to further humiliations, notably Abu Ghraib, my companions drew a direct link between American policies and Muslim anger and despair in this part of the world. America’s actions led directly to

112

Akbar Ahmed

more violence and talk of revenge among Muslims, which could spiral into more “terror plots” formed and foiled, more distraught families on both sides of the ocean, and more Muslim and American recruits for the war on terror. Even the most optimistic observers would hasten to ask, “Are we finally in the grip of a clash of civilizations?” It was difficult not to believe that political scientist Samuel Huntington may have been right: perhaps a “clash of civilizations” was underway between the West and Islam, from which there was no escape.1 The wounds being inf licted were deep, and it would take sustained work and prolonged compassion to bring the different sides together again. In Iraq and Afghanistan, it seemed that the two civilizations were trapped in quicksand of blood and terror. With each new horror story, people’s most dreadful nightmares had turned into reality. This chapter considers the path that led us to this point and, more specifically, some of the key ideas that cause this clash of civilizations. On the one hand, globalization fuels Americanization, which does not simply mean democracy and human rights—many understand it to connote unrestrained individualism, independence in all its forms, and material self-indulgence. On the other, Islamic models of moderation and tolerance, that I call the Aligarh and Ajmer models, are falling into disrepair as conservative (Deoband model) tendencies take on greater salience. Western and Islamic civilizations are moving further and further away from their cherished ideals of justice, compassion, and wisdom, and unless there is universal will to halt the momentum of this clash, the violence may become an unending global nightmare.

The Dark Side of Americanization Globalizing Unrestrained Individualism This turmoil can only be understood in the context of globalization and Americanization, which are synonymous, according to commentators such as Thomas Friedman.2 While globalization seeks to spread such cherished American ideals as democracy and human rights, it also corrodes values that many people admire about American society, such as individualism. Unrestrained, the American emphasis on individualism can override duty and responsibility toward the family and community, traditional values that Muslims hold in high esteem. Indeed, the overarching message of globalization and the American spirit, also of sociologist Max Weber’s Protestant work ethic, is independence in all its forms, rapid results, and material selfindulgence—all of which can have deleterious effects on the individual and society as a whole. The term “globalization,” though relatively new, encompasses phenomena that have been infiltrating the American psyche and culture for years, particularly the effects of advanced technology with its overnight success stories. Although Americans have always highly valued hard work,

The Clash of Civilizations?

113

today many also seek the “fast track” to success. Emphasis on developing the right experience or skills, which takes time and dedication, has been supplanted by a desire for the “right image.” Qualifications are based on “manufactured” talent, rather than on the more solid traits acquired through experience and education. Politicians of both parties are carefully groomed by public relations firms and political advisers, their speeches based on “a soundbite” formula that is a far cry from the eloquent substance of words by a Lincoln, Jefferson, Franklin, or Washington. Republicans are leading the way in endorsing the value of image in the entertainment world, with its celebrity culture. The success of pop icons such as Britney Spears or Paris Hilton is due to physical appearance, popularity, and public relations; they are products of the two- dimensional world of the television screen more than the real world. Yet many Americans fail to make that distinction and even draw role models from the f lat-screened version.3 In American society, the image of success carries as much weight as actual success and power. Individuals across the United States build multimillion dollar homes and spend large amounts of money on clothes, cars, and jewelry to acquire social recognition. This indulgence and extravagance are glorified by the global media in shows such as Lifestyles of the Rich and Famous of an earlier decade and currently MTV’s ostentatious Cribs, which displays some of the most luxurious and expensive houses in the world. The desire for wealth and overblown consumerism is also the bread and butter of globalization, which needs expanding markets for its vast array of unnecessary and expensive products. While the “me” culture fuels the engine of globalization and keeps it working, it also produces some serious “pollutants.” By encouraging selfcenteredness in the pursuit of economic goals and pleasure, it destroys the capacity to empathize with others. Traditional societies, which are mainly community centered, see the world in a different light, viewing excessive concern with the self as both an aberration and a sign of social breakdown. The rich and powerful in traditional societies usually feel a moral obligation to help care for the poor because the community is defined in holistic terms rather than as a collection of individuals. Some recent scholarship on the sense of entitlement common among Americans indicates that the ethos of hard work and personal independence leads many to argue that those who are less well-off have only themselves to blame and could improve their lives if they changed their attitude. This may well be true in some cases but certainly not all and must not be allowed to bias society against the poor or suppress compassion for the needy. Another adverse effect of globalization is that the gaps between the rich and poor within and among countries are growing, without any sign of slowing down. Already billions are living in poverty and close to starvation while three of the world’s richest individuals are collectively richer than half the earth’s inhabitants combined.4 Globalization and the free market policies of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, meant to alleviate poverty

114

Akbar Ahmed

worldwide, often do not help the disenfranchised in traditional societies. Yet many commentators see no alternative but to accept globalization and compete under its terms: it is a matter of survival, not choice. If some nations are slower to catch up or share in the benefits, their own sluggishness is to blame, not the system. While America’s strong sense of individualism stokes the fires of globalization, the same quality, as already mentioned, discourages responsibility for personal actions, an attitude now spreading around the globe. Americans fail to realize that their rhetoric and actions, particularly consumer behavior, are having a direct impact on the outside world, with increasing criticism. Many observers agree that responsibility and awareness are being abandoned as a result of globalization, even among political leaders. Similarly, few Americans, despite their general wealth, travel outside the United States or possibly Europe and therefore have a very limited perspective on other nations. American news tends to focus on national events interspersed with stories about the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Little is heard of the world outside unless it has a direct impact on the United States.5 Furthermore, little is done to counteract stereotypes of other countries and peoples. Thus Americans tend to have a narrower vision of the world than one might expect from the sole superpower. Where religion should be guiding societies toward a more inclusive understanding of the world, it is further exacerbating the prejudices. In a modern interpretation of the Bible titled Left Behind,6 of which more than sixty-three million copies have been sold, authors Tim LaHaye and Jerry Jenkins describe the apocalypse in a setting like a f lashy action film, prompting many readers to believe that the end is near and thus to support certain political actions both in the United States and abroad. Prejudices are also being fueled by new video games such as “Eternal Forces” in which players fight on behalf of Christ’s army against the anti-Christ’s army in places like New York City. Military-minded video games, in which players, often portraying U.S. soldiers, shoot crazed Muslims with little or no context, have also become popular. These include “Counterstrike,” “Close Combat: First to Fight,” and the free online game “America’s Army” (with more than 7.5 million users), released in 2002 by the U.S. Army to help bolster recruitment. Although Muslims are not the only villains, the games reinforce stereotypes and feed perceptions in the Muslim world that the United States is waging a war against Islam. In response, some companies in Muslim countries are releasing their own games with players killing Americans and Israelis.7 The lack of personal responsibility fostered by dynamic individualism affects the future of the planet. Unaware of these wide-reaching consequences, Americans fail to understand that their culture is drawing critical notice in other parts of the world or that the seemingly casual arrogance of their leaders is only making matters worse. Indifference to arguments about the effects of carbon dioxide gases on global warming, excessive military expenditures, and the tendency to run up debts in the pursuit of short-term gains and hastily

The Clash of Civilizations?

115

planned and clumsily executed military adventures abroad may well prove to be a turning point in the fortunes of America and Americanization itself.

Savage Nation and Islamophobia The tools of globalization, particularly those of media, have been used to exacerbate the situation. Radio and TV talk show hosts have emerged from this cultural milieu to define and drive it, often prattling on about subjects they claim to have knowledge of. Their xenophobic and shrill appeal to the crudest form of patriotism feeds into and from the mood of insecurity. Fear and anxiety permeates the land. Airports and railway stations, so central to globalization because they symbolize travel, trade, and communications, have now become small armed camps where passengers are delayed and frustrated on almost every trip. Muslims are forced to confront the shame of 9/11 every time at these travel points because of the special attention and humiliation reserved for them. They have become victims of the sense of collective responsibility imposed on them by the media for the actions of the hijackers. In other words, Islamophobia is undisguised and loud in the media. A case in point is Michael Savage, the television and radio host of “The Savage Nation.” Savage, a major radio personality with an audience of ten million, espouses blatant hatred against Arabs and Muslims, and has called for the United States to “kill thousands of Iraqi prisoners and nuke a random Arab capital.”8 Nor is he alone in expressing these sentiments or even remotely aware of what he is doing to make the world a more dangerous place. Savage dismisses George W. Bush’s attempt to win Muslim “hearts and minds.” To him, being gentle in dealing with the Muslim world has nothing to do with winning hearts and minds; it is being too “soft.” When the Abu Ghraib scandals emerged, Savage jokingly said, “These are tough interrogations? My father put me through tougher interrogations when I was 16!” Many of this persuasion—Rush Limbaugh, Ann Coulter, and Glenn Beck among others— dismiss the import of what happened at Abu Ghraib. James Inhofe, a senator from Oklahoma, insisted that the prisoners got what they deserved. During hearings on the prisoner abuse scandal in 2004, Inhofe said: “I am probably not the only one up at this table who is more outraged by the outrage than we are by the treatment. These prisoners, they are murderers, terrorists, they are insurgents, many of them probably have blood on their hands. And here we are so concerned about the treatment of those individuals.”9 Senator Inhofe went on to say that it is the U.S. troops who deserve sympathy. “I am also outraged that we have so many humanitarian do-gooders right now crawling all over these prisons looking for human rights violations while our troops, our heroes, are fighting and dying.” This remark came after the Red Cross alleged that 70–90 percent of Iraqi prisoners were “arrested by mistake.”10 Even before the events of 2001, a climate of hostility and intimidation had been building against Muslims in the United States. Hollywood films and

116

Akbar Ahmed

television, most recently like agent Jack Bauer on Fox’s 24, depict Muslims, especially Arabs, as extremists or advocates of violence who were intrinsically hostile to the United States. After 9/11, the hatred and violence grew exponentially. Since the war in Iraq, it has become even worse. Some people even refer to Arabs as “dot-heads,” confusing religion and gender, in that only Hindu women paint dots on their foreheads. Indeed, there is a pattern of anti-Muslim rhetoric in recent American history that has infiltrated the U.S. Army and now translates into action: “You have to understand the Arab mind,” one company commander told the New York Times, displaying all the self-assurance of Douglas Macarthur discoursing on Orientals in 1945. “The only thing they understand is force—force, pride, and saving face.” Far from representing the views of a few underlings, such notions penetrated into the upper echelons of the American command. In their book Cobra II,11 Michael R. Gordon and Bernard Trainor offer this ugly comment from a senior officer: “The only thing these sand niggers understand is force and I’m about to introduce them to it.”12 Similarly, well-known Christian leaders have not been living up to their own statements about love and justice for all. Reverend Franklin Graham, who offered the invocation at President George Bush’s inauguration, called Islam “a very wicked and evil religion.”13 Islam’s God was not the God of Christianity, he said. Reverend Jerry Vines denounced the prophet of Islam as “a demon-possessed pedophile.”14 Jerry Falwell said that the Prophet was a “terrorist.”15 Matching the mood of these statements, U.S. legislation opened the door for the objectification of Muslims and denial of rights afforded to every other American citizen. The Patriot Act has been regularly challenged for trampling over the civil rights of Muslims and Arab immigrants. Intended to fight terrorism, the law is often used to harass Muslims unnecessarily and in far too many cases persecute them with little or no justification. In one instance, investigators are looking into what they call a credible claim in which a guard at an immigrant detention facility held a loaded gun to a detainee’s head. In another case, Muslim prisoners have presented persuasive evidence that they were taunted because of their religion and possibly forced to eat food that Islam prohibits. The base at Guantanamo Bay, too, circumvents U.S. laws to implement illicit policies that the Pentagon and White House feel are necessary. According to the Council on American-Islamic Relations, attacks on Muslim girls wearing the hijab, on mosques, and on Muslims have gone up dramatically since 9/11.16 In this climate of Islamophobia, the appearance of a burning cross outside Prince George’s County Mosque and Islamic School in Maryland in July 2003 was not entirely unexpected. Reminiscent of the Ku Klux Klan’s symbols of hatred toward African Americans in the early part of the twentieth century, the burning three-foot-high wooden cross was not largely KKK standards, but its significance was enormous. In the United States, cross burning and the rhetoric of hate also evoke the struggle for American identity and sense of self. They speak of an ongoing

The Clash of Civilizations?

117

battle for a more just, more tolerant, and more democratic society fought by visionary leaders such as John F. Kennedy and Martin Luther King Jr. The central paradox of the burning cross is that it symbolizes hatred, while the cross itself is an undisputed symbol of Christianity, which by definition carries the message of its founder—Christ. As Muslims know from the high reverence and affection they have for him, Christ embodies love, compassion, and humility. To kill or be violent in Christ’s name is a gross distortion of his teachings. Besides, for American leaders who were trying desperately to win the hearts and minds of the Muslim world, such acts undermine their initiatives and credibility. The symbol of a burning cross at a mosque will play into the hands of those in the Muslim world who are arguing that America is on the warpath against Islam itself. Such acts do not help Americans either at home or abroad.

Irresponsible Action In 2006 I gave a presentation in Amman during which I pointed out that despite American anger after 9/11, this emotion was out of character. Benjamin Franklin, one of the Founding Fathers had warned his nation: “Whatever is begun in anger ends in shame.”17 As for the scandals emerging from the American prisons, I shared the story of George Washington during the Revolutionary War against the British. When American soldiers, who were then “insurgents” to the British, were captured, the British threw them, sick and wounded, into dank prisons with no hope of release or justice. In contrast, the American commander-in-chief, who had everything to fight for and to lose , went out of his way to ensure that captured British soldiers were treated with dignity and fairness in spite of the desire for retribution. “Treat them with humanity,” Washington instructed his lieutenants, “and let them have no reason to complain of our copying the brutal example of the British army.”18 Washington understood that the mistreatment of British soldiers would only lead to moral degradation of his cause and would sully the character of the new nation. It would also lead to repercussions ten times worse than the mistreatment itself. Thus, for Washington the government and those in authority always had to be held to a higher moral standard, as expressed in words widely attributed to him: “Government is not reason, it is not eloquence, it is force; like fire, a troublesome servant and a fearful master. Never for a moment should it be left to irresponsible action.”19 The invasion of Iraq and the subsequent developments provide a good case study of how war is being conducted in the age of globalization. For most Americans, the removal of Saddam Hussein meant an instant change in the way Iraq had been run in the past. Free elections, democracy, and free speech would f lourish and there would be security and justice for all. With much fanfare, President Bush declared, “Mission Accomplished.” In a culture of

118

Akbar Ahmed

instant information, high expectations, and simplistic ways of looking at the world, most Americans took that pronouncement literally. That culture has disconnected thought and consequence, which explains the reckless actions abroad, such as American soldiers indulging in “irresponsible action” with little consideration for the consequences. While many soldiers behave bravely and justly, a few bad apples are staining the name of the army and compromising the ideals of a whole country. President Bush’s own attitude may well have set the tone for his administration. Bob Woodward’s third book dealing with the Bush presidency, State of Denial, has some startling revelations, perhaps none more illuminating than the president’s instructions for the senior general that he was dispatching to Iraq as his chief administrator. When General Jay Garner looked at the list of objectives, he replied that he could not hope to achieve more than four of the items. Presidential clarification came in the form of the crystal-clear response: “Kick ass, Jay.”20 Perhaps never in history has the complexity of tribal, sectarian, and religious identities and politics in one of the most turbulent regions of the world been reduced to one phrase. Bush’s ultimate sound bite is as much a ref lection of his vocabulary and philosophy as it is of the age of globalization, which demands that even the most complex issues be reduced to simplistic and graphic phrases. Clearly, Americanization and globalization, which ref lect each other in so many complex ways, both encourage such reduction. Even if Americans cannot yet see what they have lost in these debacles, other countries have spoken up, noting that the United States has lost its credibility. After President Bush called on him to implement more democratic measures at the G-8 summit in Moscow in July 2006, Russian president Vladimir Putin replied, “We certainly would not want . . . the same kind of democracy as they have in Iraq.”21 Principles like human rights and the rule of law, once compromised, cannot easily be taken up again with any authority. George Washington understood this well, but unfortunately the United States has now lost its virtue in the eyes of the international community. One incident contributed significantly to that loss. Steven Green, of the Army’s 101st Airborne Division, according to an FBI affidavit, is now charged with raping a fourteen-year-old Iraqi girl, then setting her body on fire to eradicate traces of his guilt, in the village of Mahmudiyah south of Baghdad in March 2006. He is also charged with killing three members of her family, including a five-year-old girl. Unlike the Vietnam war’s My Lai incident, an act that came to be recognized as limited to the madness of the moment, Green and three companions from his unit spent several days planning to hunt the girl down and trap her just as a group of hunters in the forest would pursue a prized animal. On March 12, Green, the alleged ringleader, and the other soldiers got drunk, abandoned their checkpoint, and changed clothes to avoid detection, before heading for the victim’s house. Eventually tried back in the United States by military court, the perpetrators appeared unrepentant. When asked why they committed the terrible crime, one of them answered: “I hated

The Clash of Civilizations?

119

22

Iraqis, your honor.” The irresponsible actions of Lynndie England and Steven Green are not the only cases of their kind. Others are emerging, indicating something has changed in American society and its high standards have sunk well below those originally established by the Founding Fathers.

The Other Side of the Same Coin Forsaking Ideals Three short months after the terrible episode in Mahmudiyah, three American soldiers from Green’s unit were on patrol with their guns strapped to their chests, helmets on, walking down a dusty road southwest of Baghdad in the town of Youssifiyah. Suddenly they heard gunshots and ducked for cover but were separated from the rest of their battalion. In the skirmish that ensued, two of the soldiers were taken captive and a third killed. A video later released by the Mujahedeen Shura Council, which is linked to al Qaeda, showed two bloodied bodies lying on the edge of a bridge. An Associated Press report described the 4:39 minute video in gruesome detail: “One of them, partially naked, has been decapitated and his chest cut open. The other’s face is bruised, the jaw apparently broken and his leg has long gashes. Fighters are shown turning the bodies over and lifting the head of the decapitated man.”23 According to the Shura Council statement, the video was released as “revenge for our sister who was dishonored by a soldier of the same brigade.” The fighters were determined to take this brutal action as soon as they heard of the rape-slaying but “kept their anger to themselves and didn’t spread the news. They intended to avenge their sister’s honor.” While their anger was rooted in notions of honor and revenge, their violence represented an abandonment of the core values of Islam. The great Caliph Ali, the Prophet’s son-in-law and cousin, faced a similar dilemma in a fight with an enemy warrior, when he threw him to the ground and raised his sword to finish him. At this point, Ali’s opponent spat on his face, whereupon Ali stood up and walked away, to the amazement of both armies. He later explained that had he killed his foe, he would have done so in anger, rather than in opposition to the forces of tyranny and injustice against which he was fighting. Today’s post-9/11 world—with its revenge, dishonor, and gratuitous violence—is far from the ideals of either Ali or George Washington. It is not only on the battlefield that people are forsaking the ideals. I observed the nuances of the “clash” between Islam and the West from another angle in Cairo in December 2005. Although some leading intellectuals I interviewed in Egypt—Ismail Serageldin at the Alexandria library, Saad Eddin Ibrahim at the Ibn Khaldun Center, and Sallama Shaker at the Foreign Ministry in Cairo—dismissed the idea of a civilizational clash, I saw it manifested in my taxi ride. At one point during the trip, an Egyptian friend had stopped a taxi and explained to the driver in Arabic the name and address of my hotel. As

120

Akbar Ahmed

we drove off, the driver increased the volume of the recitation of the Quran that he was listening to. He himself began reciting the Quran loudly while revolving prayer beads in one hand. Dangling from the mirror were verses from the Quran. Egyptian taxis are small with low ceilings, and the space can become claustrophobic, which the volume accentuates. As a Muslim, I find few things more pleasant than the sound of the recitation of the Quran. The driver saw me, in my Western clothes and speaking English, as someone from the West and therefore probably a non-Muslim. Why should he therefore be playing the Quran so loudly and almost aggressively to a non-Muslim? Was it an attempt to intimidate the passenger? Or to express pride in his identity as a Muslim? Was it cumulative anger at the poverty, hopelessness of life, and vast gap between the lives of the corrupt ruling elite and those of the poor? When the recitation of the Quran reached a crescendo, I punctured the tense atmosphere by repeating some of the Quranic verses that I knew. Seeing the driver staring at me in his rearview mirror, I announced that I was from Pakistan and a Muslim. His attitude changed completely. Pakistanis were good Muslims, he said with a smile and a salaam (greeting of peace), and his hand discreetly moved to the dial and turned down the volume. For me, the taxi ride—and I had several similar experiences in taxis— revealed another side of the complex encounter between the West and Islam. I felt that here was one of the few points of contact in a neutral zone between Muslims and foreigners where the Muslim could express his sentiments away from the security detail and police. If I had been a non-Muslim, the encounter would have left me feeling uncomfortable and even intimidated. The taxi had thus become a front line in the confrontation between Islam and the West. It was the Lynndie England situation in Abu Ghraib in reverse. Like England and her cohorts, the Arab taxi driver was perverting the ideals of his culture and fueling the charged, abrasive, and too often violent encounters between the two civilizations. To understand these developments in the Muslim world, one must look at current society there and the factors that shaped it. On the political front, for example, Muslims are using local elections to respond to what they see as attacks from the West, voting in Islamic parties, which are more critical of the West than any others. This trend can be seen even in the North-West Frontier Province of Pakistan, which for the past century has maintained a fine balance between several political forces. The religious parties—collectively and somewhat contemptuously called the mullahs by others—never got more than 15–20 percent of the seats in the provincial assembly. After 9/11—with the increasing attacks on Islam begun in the United States, led by prominent religious figures such as Franklin Graham, Pat Robertson, Jerry Vines, and Jerry Falwell—the mullahs saw their chance. In the next elections they entered the political fray by declaring that they would fight for the honor of Islam, whereas everyone else had compromised. Anti-American sentiments were so strong that this time the mullahs won almost every seat in the assembly, sweeping away what were once unbeatable tribal chiefs and princely figures. As a result, the critical Tribal Areas of

The Clash of Civilizations?

121

the province, stretching along the Afghan border, began consorting with the Taliban, rumored to be in the area in growing numbers along with Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda. Before long, large parts of the province were directly under the control of those openly sympathetic to the Taliban. With this strategic advantage, the Taliban became a serious threat to Western forces in Afghanistan. These events trail back to insensitive attacks on Islam and its Prophet, which thus may have placed American lives and interests abroad in jeopardy.

Theological Disputes, Respect, and Free Speech One way of thinking about the intra-Muslim debates in this Clash of Civilizations is to symbolically consider my visit to three different schools representing three very different traditions. More specifically, the Islamic debate regarding a moderate versus orthodox Islam can be personified in a very unique way by three places on the Indian subcontinent: Aligarh Muslim University, which was founded under British traditions; Ajmer, a city rich in Sufi tradition 24; and the university in Deoband, which is the center of conservative Islamic thought in India. The real clash, however, is between two styles of leadership (Aligarh and Deoband) that goes back a hundred and fifty years. Sir Sayyid Ahmed Khan, who created the Aligarh University on the model of Oxbridge, was a loyal servant of the Raj and wished to synthesize Islam with modernity; whereas the founders of the madrassa at Deoband near Delhi, fought the British during the uprisings, and their inf luential schools created networks throughout India and now inf luence groups like the Taliban. The schism in Muslim leadership is thus rooted in the indigenous response to modernity and the threatening presence of Western imperialism. At the opposite end of the spectrum from Osama bin Laden stands Mohammed Ali Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan, who died in 1948. He believed in human rights, and the rights of women and minorities. As a lawyer he upheld constitutional rule. Osama, bearded, in his traditional Muslim clothes and speaking in Arabic of jihad; and Jinnah, clean shaven, in his Saville Row suit, English accent, and Lincoln’s Inn legal education—here, neatly, we have the two poles of Islam in direct opposition. The question is which model will prevail in the next century? One of these two models will provide leadership for the more than one billion Muslims into the millennium. Ironically, U.S. action for the past decade—from President Clinton’s attacks to George Bush’s War on Terror—has elevated Osama from one of the many obscure “freedom fighters” (as Americans called these people in the 1980s during their battle with the Soviets) into an international figure. Osama may appear a sinister fanatic to the West, but to the Muslim world, in the cavallas, bazaars, and villages, he became an instant hero for taking on the “Great Satan.” Those who

122

Akbar Ahmed

speak of dialogue and moderation are suddenly under immense pressure to keep quiet and lie low. I recently visited both Aligarh and Deoband. Aligarh has always been dear to me: it provides a very modern education as well as moderate Islamic studies. Deoband is the complete opposite—more like a madrassa education, with all male students wearing traditional Islamic dress. Until very recently, English was banned at Deoband, and only religious studies was offered. Now they do have some non-religious courses, like computer science, and also offer English. Visiting Deoband after Aligarh was quite a revelation because I found the students at Aligarh more frustrated with their situation. With all their modern education, they were having trouble getting jobs. They also felt neither of the Islamic world nor of the Western one. Then in visiting Deoband, I found the students there very comfortable in their conservative setting. They had a positive outlook regarding their future. They were relaxed, secure, and forward-thinking. This may portend how this clash within the Islamic world will find resolution over the next twenty years. One way that this clash occurs, both between the West and Islam but also within the Islamic world, concerns theological aspects of Islam, particularly since the publication of Salman Rushdie’s controversial The Satanic Verses25 in 1988, the depiction of the Prophet in Danish cartoons, and questionable remarks by Pope Benedict XVI. To the West—and those who value free speech and freedom of expression—the right of an individual to say and write what he or she wishes is fundamental to civilization itself. For Muslims, any form of criticism of the Prophet is a serious transgression. Because the Prophet embodies the divine word of God, the Quran, an insult or a perceived insult to the Prophet is an attack both on the faith and on the person. Moreover, because the Prophet is known and loved as a father, husband, and leader in times of hardship, Muslims think of him highly as a person always, even as a part of their own family. It is this intense love and personalization that largely explains the emotional response to perceived attacks, which are thought to indicate that the West is denouncing the core of their religious, cultural, and personal identity, and in turn their notions of honor and pride. While Muslims have desired free speech, they also respect people’s beliefs and traditions. Muslims are aware of limitations to free speech because in their multicultural and multi-religious societies, careless and disrespectful comments would degenerate into confrontation. Hateful remarks remind all of us of the nature of intolerance and prejudice. The African American and Jewish communities have faced terrible suffering and persecution in the past in different ways and in different historical contexts. The compassion, wisdom, dignity, and humor associated with their communities are therefore nothing short of the triumph of the human spirit and its refusal to be crushed. Muslims note that no such outrage follows in the United States when there are equivalent slurs about Islam. The feeling that Muslims are being isolated and victimized has grown and has created resentment in many individuals.

The Clash of Civilizations?

123

The violent response in some parts of the Muslim world is due primarily to a combination of the perception that Islam is under attack from the West and the emergence of the Deoband model, which emphasizes Islamic pride and stimulates Muslim emotions. In contrast, the enfeebled Ajmer model, which advocates calm discussion, and the Aligarh model, which urges the building of modern institutions such as free speech and allegiance to the nationstate, is becoming marginalized. Had the Aligarh model been dominant, the Muslim responses to the Danish cartoons and the Pope’s remarks would have been to engage in debate and write letters. Because the Aligarh model has failed to provide a forum for expression or to represent Muslims, the nationstate and the Aligarh model are not viable alternatives in the Muslim world at present.

The Taj Syndrome Muslim fury and despair arise not only from the perception that U.S. policies are misguided. There are also inner demons. Muslims today, especially those living in what were once the famed capitals of Islam such as Istanbul, Damascus, Cairo, and Delhi, suffer from what I call the “Taj Syndrome.” A building like the Taj Mahal evokes the glittering past for Muslims. Its physical splendor juxtaposed with the painful and wretched present triggers a mixture of emotions—pride, anguish, and anger: pride at the splendor of the past, anguish at the reality of the present, and anger at the uncertainty of the bleak future. This is the Taj Syndrome, and Muslims of every kind are in one way or another affected by it: looking at the Taj Mahal, those of the Ajmer model see a timeless ethereal beauty that confirms for them the universal message of love; followers of the Deoband type are inspired to renew the struggle to revive the past and restore its glory; while those who subscribed to the Aligarh form see the splendor of Islamic civilization, long capable of synthesis and excellence, and hope it can once again be at the cutting edge of art, architecture, and knowledge. The Taj, the very symbol of the power and compassion of Muslim rulers, now sits forlornly amidst a sea of squalid dwellings inhabited by impoverished Muslim artisans claiming descent from its builders. From a historical standpoint, it ref lects the most magnificent synthesis of both the Islamic and the Indic traditions. The Taj evokes the passions that move human beings—love, compassion, and sorrow—yet it also reaches out to concepts of the hereafter and forces visitors to confront themselves. Islam once gave the world a rich civilization that included powerful empires such as the Abbasid, Ottoman, Safavid, and Mughal. Muslim rulers welcomed people of all faiths and were among the most benevolent and enlightened of history. Driven by the spirit of ijtihad, Muslims adapted the traditions of Islam to the changes taking place around them. Tradesmen created new caravan routes, moving goods and products between Asia, Africa, and Europe. The legendary “silk road” through

124

Akbar Ahmed

central Asia, which linked China with the Muslim world, was a testimony to the thriving civilization. Ever since the time of the Prophet, who was also a merchant, Islam has held the trader at a certain level of respectability. Knowledge, too, has always been held in high esteem. At the peak of Islamic civilization about one thousand years ago, the court library in Cordoba contained some four hundred thousand books, while the largest library in Europe at the time had only about six hundred. Acknowledging the debt the West owes to Islam for retrieving Greek thought, which had laid the foundations for the European Renaissance, historian Philip Haiti notes that “had the researches of Aristotle, Galen, and Ptolemy been lost to posterity, the world would have been as poor as if they had never been produced.”26 Religious scholarships were encouraged along with the growth of literature, which explored new expressions of verse. Emphasis was placed on dialogue and understanding between those who believed in the Ajmer, Deoband, or Aligarh models. The great Islamic philosophers such as Imam al-Ghazali ref lect the balance between these three models. It is little wonder that Islamic civilization was the light and glory of the world in its day. The Taj Syndrome is further reinforced by the state of the media in the Muslim world. On our journey, we saw satellite antennas and dishes everywhere, even in the poorest neighborhoods. In the midst of these crowded and depressing neighborhoods, Muslims see glamorous and seductive images from the West that challenge their traditional values—some of naked women in provocative poses, some of wars against fellow Muslims, and some of grandiose luxuries, all of which serve to disillusion Muslims with the outside world or with their own society. The Taj Syndrome is symptomatic of the crisis in the Muslim world. Leadership, authority figures, relations with the state, the economy, how people view their neighbors and treat the women in their families, and religion itself are all caught up in the mixture of emotions engendered by the syndrome. This crisis is not a direct consequence of the events set in motion after 9/11, as some commentators in the West believe, but has been underway for the past two centuries. The mounting anger and perception of injustice among Muslims in the wake of that fateful September day is but a further f lare-up of the Muslim fire of unrest. One college student at Faith University in Istanbul aptly described the Muslim world as “a sleeping bear that has been awakened. It is difficult to put that bear back to sleep.” That unrest—especially in the great cities of the Muslim world—is rooted in the gaps between the rich elite and the poor, now reaching dangerous proportions. Large estates with magnificent houses similar to those in America’s wealthiest communities sit amidst poverty and squalor. New office buildings and international hotels rise above a sea of makeshift homes and shops. The two sides are separated by watchdogs and armed security guards who check everyone entering the expensive homes and hotels to guard against suicide bombings. The poor feel not only left out but also angry at the realization that they have little chance of sharing the economic cake the elite

The Clash of Civilizations?

125

seem to be consuming so greedily. As for the elite, their primary concern seems to be to protect the money that has come with international contracts and deals, in some cases from a lucky venture in globalization with a swift payback, much like the “dot-com” phenomenon in the United States. The Islamic injunction of giving to charity and providing for the community is sidestepped with excuses such as the “trickle-down theory,” suggesting that if the wealthy spend enough money, eventually the poor will see some of it. Globalization is successfully injecting such communities with one of its more toxic characteristics—greed. Meanwhile, the small apartments and shantytowns of the poor are becoming more crowded and rundown. In many major cities in the Muslim world the infrastructure is collapsing under the weight of the population explosion and constant inf lux of migrants from the rural areas. Water supplies, transportation, electricity, and public health facilities are erratic at best, sometimes not even available. Karachi and Jakarta are urban nightmares with large populations living in poverty. In Cairo, the poor live in such desperate circumstances that they have become squatters in cemeteries. This is not to say that we saw no beneficial effects of globalization on our journey. Living standards were certainly higher in some places, Delhi being one, and the gap between rich and poor showed some signs of decreasing. In general, however, I saw only the rich growing richer from globalization. The elite of the oil-producing Muslim countries are perhaps the worst culprits, leading lives far removed from the majority of the ummah and in many respects from the ideals of Islam itself. The vulgar “conspicuous consumption” of the elite is apparent in the way they live, dress, and move physically. Their girths would suggest poverty must not exist in the Muslim world. The fact is that they are guzzling the honey of globalization all by themselves. The ordinary Muslims who are watching the elite are not as willing to “ride the wave” of globalization. One fifty-year-old man in Indonesia said that he had recently seen “more dependency on technology, materialism, and selfishness” with a resulting “lack of good deeds, no sincerity, and the contamination of Western civilization.” The danger is real as many are watching television several hours a day, surfing the Internet, and buying the latest technological products like iPods. Even a thirteen-year-old in Indonesia told us that technology had made “young people lazy and irresponsible” and dependent upon an “instant culture.” Although a middle class is emerging in many places, its focus is not necessarily on re-creating Islamic values. What Muslims see on television both repels and attracts them, and this is the dilemma aff licting the Aligarh model. While most Muslim countries can boast a few excellent centers of learning, the overall picture of education in the Muslim world is depressing. Comparative figures published by the United Nations Development Program and the World Bank consistently put Muslim countries at the bottom of the ladder. Their dismal educational performance is a particularly sore point because the pursuit of knowledge is the highest calling in Islam, some would

126

Akbar Ahmed

say even higher than prayer itself; yet the number of educational or intellectual prizes won by Muslims on the international stage is small in proportion to their world population. In desperation, Muslim parents send their children to madrassas with limited facilities and even more limited syllabi. In most Muslim societies, the few elite schools are too expensive and out of reach for the majority of the population and free public education offered by the state is limited. The education of the elite who study abroad unfortunately does not help Muslims resolve social ills. They return with a few Western phrases and clichés on their lips, and they make no serious attempt to relate the rich legacy of their own Islamic traditions to the great Western minds they study. A tradition of critical thinking has been missing for the past few decades in the Muslim world. Indeed, some Muslims appear blissfully unaware of the need to provide hard and sometimes painful answers to the difficult questions relating to the disconnect between the West and the Muslim world. Their understanding of both worlds is often superficial, compartmentalized, and even manufactured by the West. When I asked a prominent Arab minister in Doha who his favorite author was, he replied with a broad grin, “Professor Bernard Lewis.” He was clearly oblivious to the irony that an Arab might quote with such relish the quintessential Orientalist, accused by Arabs themselves of contributing to the Western misunderstanding of their culture and history. I wondered whether the seminal work of Edward Said on Orientalist had made any impact on the Muslim elite. As someone who grew up in the mainstream of the Aligarh model, I am amazed at its slow but steady decline over the last decades. It is difficult to imagine now that Muslims were actively engaged in relating the traditions of their past with the conditions of the present, and doing so within the frame of ijtihad, or “innovative thinking” encouraged in Islam. These Muslims were at the cutting edge of change and were truly towering figures, with admirers both in the East and the West. Today their names redound in glory— Muhammad Abduh and Jamal Ad-Din Al-Afghani in the Middle East; Sir Sayyid, Jinnah, and Iqbal in South Asia. These thinkers weren’t isolated scholars living in ivory towers. Their ideas were a catalyst for change affecting the lives of millions of people. What is evident is that the Aligarh form of leadership became corrupt and distorted during the second half of the twentieth century. While those who followed the Aligarh model strove for a modern democratic Muslim polity based on Western legal systems, they found that the pressures of the Cold War forced them to choose between either socialist or capitalist camps. Joining one or the other camp brought aid, weapons, and international standing but also led to a dependence on the source of this support and a lack of accountability to the state’s citizenry. The resulting repressive regimes precluded the development of genuinely modernist Muslim societies. Gamal Abdel Nasser, for example, was a hero of Arab nationalism in the 1950s and 1960s, but he resorted to torture and executions to deal with orthodox

The Clash of Civilizations?

127

Muslims such as Sayyid Qutb, who became a martyr for orthodox Islam after he was executed in 1966. Such acts of repression radicalized large segments of the population and would reverberate during the next decades with each misstep taken by so-called democratic leaders, who were compromising the Aligarh model. Another factor that hinders the development of democracy in most Muslim countries is that the army is by far better organized and trained than any other part of the establishment, to the exclusion of democratic systems of governance. There is a more sinister aspect to the lack of democracy, too. The intelligence services are now being widely used to persuade politicians and critics of the government to fall in line. Tactics can range from assassinations to straightforward blackmail or the abduction of family members. The army’s anticorruption or antiterrorism agencies have become the most coercive authority to win over wavering politicians, poisoning the atmosphere almost as much as in the time of Saddam in Iraq. Ultimately, dictators rule through fear. When people are too frightened to stand up and speak their minds because of what happens to critics, democracy is further discouraged. Even if a democracy is present, political parties tend to be opportunistic and disorganized, and too easily shift alliances, abandoning their leaders when offered a better deal. When the military hanged Pakistan’s most popular elected political leader Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in 1979, people expected a storm of reaction, but nothing very much happened and life went on as normal. The new military dictator was hailed as a savior, and he ruled with an iron fist for over a decade, until his plane exploded mysteriously in midair. The failure of the world powers and the helplessness of Muslim leaders to solve the long-standing problems of the Palestinians, Kashmiris, Chechens, and now Iraqis, Afghans, and Lebanese have further angered Muslims. Political developments over the past century have left millions of Muslims displaced from their homes, surrounded by despair and uncertainty. The stagnation and lack of moral leadership have only added to Muslim anger and frustration, feeding directly into the Deoband model. Many Muslims feel dissatisfied with the state of affairs and desperately want change. Whatever misgivings Muslim commentators may have had about the American-led invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, they were tempered with the hope that perhaps a new era of democracy would be introduced to these nations, and people would lead better lives. There was heady rhetoric about democracy, human rights, and civil liberties following the invasions. Unfortunately, the biggest challenge for both Kabul and Baghdad has been to maintain law and order. The rapid collapse of society into tribal and sectarian rivalries and killing dissipated whatever goodwill remained for the experiment in democracy, especially after scandals emerged of the almost casual cruelty inf licted on local people by American troops. The uncertainty of life for most people turned to despair and then anger. However loathed the Taliban in Afghanistan and Saddam in Iraq, people looked back with nostalgia to recent times that offered

128

Akbar Ahmed

some semblance of stability. Thus in its attempts to improve its image, the United States is now in lower esteem than even the harshest of religious governments or the worst dictator.

Conclusion These policies are making the Ajmer model irrelevant and the Aligarh model little more than an excuse to compromise with the West. Muslims who consider themselves under attack from the West, not only militarily but also culturally, see little point in talking about Ajmer universal humanism and, given the established track record of U.S. foreign policy, have little hope of support for democratic leaders of the Aligarh model unless they are prepared to surrender national interests. That is why so many Muslims rally to the Deoband model. But because the United States refuses to talk to them, communications break down, the same old arguments of the past few decades resurface, the same old policies are implemented, and the same disasters take shape. As Americans struggle to either help the Muslim world or to control it, the situation only seems to grow more chaotic and to continually echo the past. The Muslim world notices this and is not fooled by U.S. talk of democracy. Instead it awaits the predictable—and avoidable—disasters that loom on the horizon. Even now, a radical shift in policies toward the Muslim world could avert those disasters, both in the long and short term. A giant step in the way of creating trust and goodwill would be to reach out to the Muslim world and emphasize respect for its culture and religion. The United States should also match its rhetoric about democracy with genuine support for the democratic process irrespective of the need for convenient allies. Similarly, rather than giving military aid to Muslim countries, it should develop educational programs and facilities that would change the thinking of the young Muslims now schooled by radical madrassas. The Muslims’ hateful view of the Americans comes from being at the receiving end of American weapons used by either their dictators or American soldiers to the point where they attribute these brutal actions to the United States as a whole. If these policy shifts were implemented in the war on terror, it would change the relationship dramatically and reduce the number of current and future enemies. None of these initiatives are expensive or require anything more than applying sensible thinking to the complicated issues. As the cycle of violence that now embraces the planet continues in its seemingly uncontrollable orbit, Western and Islamic civilizations are moving further and further away from their cherished ideals of justice, compassion, and wisdom. It is essential for all humankind to understand this complicated relationship, whatever one’s political perspective or religious beliefs. Without

The Clash of Civilizations?

129

the universal will to halt this momentum, the violence and uncertainty will eventually progress into an unending global nightmare. Societies need to return to those ideas that have nourished them over the millennia and created in them compassion and empathy for others. In sum, the current crisis is nothing short of a challenge to the very identity of humankind as a caring and thinking species.

Notes 1. Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign Affairs 72 (Summer 1993), pp. 22–49. 2. See Thomas L. Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1999), p. xix. 3. For a recent analysis of new trends in reality television and its capacity to re-create aspects of social identity and consumer lifestyle, as well as to change ordinary people into celebrities and celebrities into ordinary people, see Dana Heller, Makeover Television: Realities Remodeled (London: I. B. Tauris, 2006). 4. Jonathan Sacks, The Dignity of Difference: How to Avoid the Clash of Civilizations (London: Continuum, 2002), pp. 106–107. 5. See Alkman Granitsas, “Americans Are Tuning Out the World,” Yale Global, November 24, 2005. 6. Tim Lahaye and Jerry B. Jenkins, Left Behind: A Novel of the Earth’s Last Days (Carol Stream, IL: Tyndale House Publishers, 1996). 7. Jose Antonio Vargas, “Way Radical, Dude: Now Playing: Video Games with an Islamist Twist,” Washington Post, October 9, 2006. 8. Dave Gilson, “Michael Savage: America’s Laziest Fascist” (Salon.com [May 20, 2004]). 9. Deborah Tate, “U.S. Senator: ‘Outraged by the Outrage’ over Iraqi Prisoner Abuse, Capitol Hill” (VOAnews.com [May 12, 2004]). 10. Bob Drogin, “Most ‘Arrested by Mistake’: Coalition Intelligence Put Numbers at 70% to 90% of Iraq Prisoners, Says a February Red Cross Report, Which Details Further Abuses,” Los Angeles Times, May 11, 2004. 11. Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq (New York: Pantheon, 2006). 12. Andrew J. Bacevich, “What’s an Iraqi Life Worth?” Washington Post, July 9, 2006. 13. Hanna Rossin, “Younger Graham Diverges from Father’s Image; Ministry’s Patriarch Accepted Islam, but His Son Condemns the Religion,” Washington Post, September 2, 2002, A3. 14. Alan Cooperman, “Anti-Muslim Remarks Stir Tempest; Leading Evangelicals Back Baptist Preacher,” Washington Post, June 20, 2002, A3. 15. Richard N. Ostling, “Jerry Falwell Calls Islam’s Prophet a ‘Terrorist’ in Television Interview,” Associated Press, October 3, 2002. 16. For incidents quoted, see Council on American-Islamic Relations website. 17. Richard Saunders, Poor Richard, 1734. An Almanack for the Year of Christ 1734 (Philadelphia: Yale University Library), p. 349. 18. David Hackett Fischer, Washington’s Crossing (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 379. 19. See www.quoteland.com/author.asp?AUTHOR_ID=288. 20. Bob Woodward, State of Denial: Bush at War, Part III (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006), p. 134.

130

Akbar Ahmed

21. “Putin Jabs Bush: ‘We Certainly Would not Want . . . the Same Kind of Democracy as They Have in Iraq,’ ” in Think Progress (http://thinkprogress.org/2006/07/15/putin-jab/ [ July 15, 2007]). 22. Ryan Lenz, “Soldier Pleads in Iraq Rape, Murder Case,” Associated Pres (November 15, 2006). 23. Robert H. Reid, “Videotape Alleges Three U.S. Soldiers Killed in Revenge for RapeMurder,” Associated Press Worldstream News ( July 11, 2006). 24. Sufism is Islam’s tolerant, mystical, and universal philosophy. Its message of sulh-i-kul, peace with all, has endeared it to both Muslims and non-Muslims alike. It appeals to all Muslim sects and social classes. One has only to visit shrines such as that of the Sufi saint at Ajmer in India and observe the stream of Muslim and non-Muslim visitors for confirmation of this. Sufis see the unity of God, tawhid, in everything and everyone. Although in its vulgar or more populist forms Sufism has acquired distinctly un-lslamic practices, but nevertheless its origin is unimpeachable, tracing back to the Prophet himself. The Sufi must first master the Shar’iah, the true path of Islam, before venturing onto the tariqah, the Sufi way. 25. Salman Rushdie, The Satanic Verses (New York: Henry Holt, 2000). 26. Philip Haiti, History of the Arabs (New York: St. Martin’s, 1970), p. 363.

CH A P T E R

N I N E

Debating Absolutism and Pluralism in Contemporary Islam A sma A fsaruddin

In the post-9/11 context, any reference to a “war of ideas” conjures up a civilizational showdown primarily between the world of Islam and the West. This is a scenario made popular by the Harvard scholar Samuel Huntington in his provocative “clash of civilizations” thesis. Although Huntington recognized several civilizational blocs at odds with the West, Islam has received disproportionate attention. The atrocities of 9/11 were believed by a considerable number of people, many of them inf luential policymakers under the previous Bush administration, to have vindicated this thesis. Such a belief has spawned a dangerously Manichaean worldview pitting an assumed monolithic Islamic world against a monolithic West, the disastrous results of which were only too evident in the last eight years in particular. Some had predicted, however, that such a Manichaean worldview would lead to unfortunate consequences. These voices had a better sense of the reality of the internal politics of contemporary Muslim-majority societies. They argued that an ideological rift was/is more evident within such societies, which are internally plural and diverse and racked by debates over highly contentious issues. The real war of ideas was therefore being waged among Muslims themselves who were grappling, against the backdrop of globalization, pluralism, and secular modernity, with questions as fraught with controversy as the nature of political authority, the purview of religious law, definitions of jihad, and roles of women. In this context, several important questions arise. How are Muslims today adapting—or not—to a globalizing and modernizing world? Is liberal pluralism—broadly defined as embrace of religious pluralism, equal rights for women and minorities, and democratic governance—part of an emerging

132

Asma Afsaruddin

Islamic lexicon in the twenty-first century? Will the idea take root and find broad acceptance in Muslim-majority societies today? The answer may well depend on how pluralism is scripted within Islamic historical and intellectual frameworks. It is important to remember in this context that many Muslims (not unlike other groups) envision the future according to how they remember the past. History is, after all, the record of a collective memory of things past and their significance. Fidelity to a past history, particularly a sacred history, undergirds authenticity, and authenticity provides credibility for the present. The critical question becomes: Can the collective memory of Muslims retrieve past precedents in support of pluralism and respect for diversity today? Responses will vary: some will vigorously deny it, others will be more qualified in their response, and yet others will heartily reply in the affirmative. For heuristic reasons, we will focus on the ways the first and third groups remember the past and subsequently configure the present, particularly in relation to three key issues that are constitutive of their discourses: (1) the nature of shariah, the revealed law of Islam; (2) the nature of the so-called Islamic State; and (3) definitions of jihad. We are deliberately eluding other pertinent views in the middle of this spectrum on the assumption that this sharp contrast between those whom I am labeling for our purposes “absolutists” (deniers of pluralism) and “modernists” (advocates of pluralism) yields important insights into the construction of two highly important and competing worldviews in the Muslim world today. Elsewhere, I have conf lated absolutists with hard-line Islamists, who may also be labeled as “radical” or “militant” Islamists.1 For our purpose, the term “Islamist” refers to activist individuals and groups in various contemporary Islamic societies whose primary wish is to govern and be governed politically only by Islamic principles, understood by them to be immutably enshrined in the shariah or the religious law. Among these individuals and groups, we are using this term to refer particularly to those who have been considerably inf luenced by the thought of the twentieth-century Indian (later Pakistani) Muslim ideologue Abul A’la Maududi and his disciple, the Egyptian activist Sayyid Qutb, and whose attitude toward secular modernity and its epistemic foundations can fairly be described as “rejectionist.” There are also “moderate” Islamists (as they are usually termed), who, while also committed to a highly politicized form of Islam, subscribe to democratic norms and embrace modern notions of gender equality and human rights to a considerable extent. The moderate Islamists are generally not included in my use of the term “absolutist” (or Islamist) in this discussion. unless specifically stated to the contrary. I am also conf lating “pluralists” with “modernists” or “reformist” Muslims. In my usage, all three terms refer to observant Muslims who, starting roughly in the eighteenth century, began to emphasize the inherent adaptability of Islamic principles and thought to modernity. Thus, the modernists or pluralists argue, certain freshly interpreted Islamic principles can reveal their congruence

Absolutism and Pluralism in Islam

133

with modern liberal principles of democratic government, civil society, gender equality, and so on, without necessarily being identical to their formulations in the Western context. Like the Islamists, they too would like to usher in social change but their means of effecting change is essentially hermeneutic, that is, interpretive, and educational. Accordingly, they stress the rereading of religious texts, primarily the Quran and hadith, as a legitimate exercise in ijtihad (independent reasoning) to arrive at interpretations appropriate to their historical circumstances without jettisoning the classical heritage, as well as to foster a sense of a continuous critical and dynamic process of engagement with this heritage through education.2 Despite their respect for tradition in general, modernists tend to be critical of traditionalists who are perceived as unthinkingly following precedent and stymieing the efforts of Muslims to adapt to the modern world in an ethical and critical manner. Modernists, pluralists, and reformists are also called “liberals” and “moderates” by some.

Differences between the Absolutist and Pluralist/Modernist Worldviews Views on the Shariah Absolutists in general adhere to the notion of a practically immutable religious law, the shariah. The two principal sources of the shariah, the Quran and the sunna, are assumed by them to admit of a single and uniform, often literal, meaning. While there still may be room for interpretation in limited cases, reasoned interpretive activity (ijtihad) is the province of only a few, preferably those who subscribe to their particularist views and share their ideological orientation. The absolutists tend to reject the possibility of multiple, equally valid interpretations of the religious law as expressed in the four Sunni schools of jurisprudence since, in their view, proper interpretation of the law by those who are qualified to do so will yield a single, uniform understanding of it. They claim to find their warrants in the precedents set by the first generation of Muslims who are deemed to have f lawlessly emulated the example of the Prophet Muhammad and apparently never disagreed among themselves on key issues. In their reification of the religious law, the absolutists do not concede the need for accommodation of customary and cultural practices (‘urf ) nor for the legitimacy of multiple readings of religious texts. Nor is there room for the historical contextualization of legal rulings as they developed over time nor for the invocation of public commonweal (maslaha) as grounds for legal reasoning, as actually occurred in the praxis of Muslim communities throughout time. The slogan “Islam is the solution” is meant to convey to the world that Islam, distilled as a frozen corpus of religious and political commandments, has left nothing unaddressed. Not surprisingly then, absolutists, like the Egyptian revolutionary Sayyid Qutb, have more frequently referred to Islam as a “system” rather than as a faith.

134

Asma Afsaruddin

In contrast to the absolutists, modernists argue against the assumed allpervasive, reified nature of the shariah as imagined by the Islamists and against the notion that the shariah comes with ready-made answers to every imaginable circumstance. Modernists tend to affirm that the reach of the religious law extends to many aspects of human existence, while not directly addressing others. Outside of worship the shariah offers broad guidelines rather than detailed precepts for proper conduct in various spheres of social and other forms of interaction. The religious law certainly does not, and cannot, have a specific injunction in advance for every possible human situation or contingency. The Quran, the principal source of the religious law, is not, after all, “a lawbook but is a repository of broad moral principles from which a legal system may be derived.”3 This legal system derived from the Quran as well as from the sunna or the precedents set by the Prophet is the result of human reasoning and effort, and thus contextually determined and historically contingent. Modernists further tend to emphasize the application of the intent and overall objectives (maqasid) of the religious law more than its literal injunctions, especially when the literal understanding of a specific dictum in a particular circumstance would result in unusual hardship and/or violation of an inviolable broader moral imperative. Thus, many of them argue, since the shariah must uphold certain ethical values such as justice and mercy at all times, specific legal injunctions may never violate these fundamental requisites in any given historical and social circumstance. They also place more emphasis on the discernment of the ratio legis (underlying rationale) of specific legal precepts than on their literal, textual meaning.

Views on the so-called Islamic State Nowhere is the absolutists’ perception of the shariah as immutable more evident than in their conception of political authority and the nature of the so-called Islamic State. A highly politicized version of Islam is the cornerstone of most, if not all, hard-line Islamist discourses today. According to this version, a full-blown concept of what most Islamists call “the Islamic State” and “Islamic Government” is articulated by the religious law. Such a state, they affirm, has existed since the time of the Prophet and was replicated particularly by Abu Bakr and ‘Umar, the first two Rightly-Guided caliphs. The absolutists among the Islamists (not all are so) assert that the primary characteristic of this idealized “Islamic State” is “divine sovereignty” or “divine governance,” termed in Arabic al-hakimiyya by the inf luential Islamist thinker Abu ‘l-A’la al-Mawdudi (d. 1979). In this Islamic State, Mawdudi maintained, its ideal leaders and servants “will all work with a sense of individual and collective responsibility to God [alone], not to the electorate, neither to the king nor the dictator.” Such a utopian Islamic state, assert the absolutists, must of necessity be opposed to democracy, which is founded upon the will of the

Absolutism and Pluralism in Islam

135

people. Thus Mawdudi would retort, “Wherever this system [sc. democracy] exists, we do not consider Islam to exist, and wherever Islam exists, there is no room for this system.” Muslims who advocate democracy, he said, are harking back to the Jahiliyya, the “Age of Ignorance” before the rise of Islam and betraying their own legacy.4 With regard to the Islamic State, modernists do not necessarily have a consistent position on this issue. Some modernists may advocate the establishment of a state that would be recognizably Islamic, primarily by upholding the shariah, which however, unlike the Islamists, is understood by them to be adaptable to and accommodating of modern life and its complexities. Unlike in the case of absolutists, the revival of the caliphate as an institution is not part of the modernist project, although the revival of the ethical and political principles and the general élan associated with the Rashidun caliphate usually is. Furthermore, unlike the absolutists, modernists do not believe that there is a preconceived blueprint specifying the structural format of an Islamic State as such. The Quran is essentially apolitical, they affirm. Over time, a separate science of government and bureaucratic administration under the rubric of al-siyasa emerged, which dealt with purely temporal and pragmatic matters. Rather than positing a pure type of Islamic State, modernists tend to regard any state that guarantees certain basic individual and communal rights and liberties as being in accordance with broad moral parameters and thus meeting the Islamic litmus test. The actual mode of governance may be decided upon by consultation with knowledgeable people, the consent of the public, and the prevailing historical circumstances, since they believe that there are no specific religious directives concerning this matter. In the contemporary period, Muslims tend to invoke the precedent set by Abu Bakr, the first caliph, to argue for a basic right to elect their political representatives and hold them accountable for their behavior in office. They have argued that the three cardinal tenets of legitimate government based on the historical praxis of Muslim communities through time—consultation, consent, and consensus— are best realized in democratic systems, creating a moral imperative for instituting democratic reform. Many modernists have persuasively argued along these lines. With regard to the political concept of divine sovereignty, modernists point to many of the defining characteristics of the early political culture of Islam to counter the absolutist understanding of this concept as a divine mandate for a complete way of life with a set of prescribed answers for nearly every imaginable situation, a scenario that leaves little room for human input and interpretation. While acknowledging God’s sovereignty over all creation, modernists do not view this as impeding in any way human freedom in determining their course of action in particularly the political sphere under the guidance of broad moral imperatives. The Quranic designation of human beings as “God’s vicegerent” (khalifa) on earth is emphasized by modernists as investing humans with the right and authority to assume custodianship of earth. The example of the Rightly-Guided Caliphs, the modernists

136

Asma Afsaruddin

assert, clearly establishes that such custodianship was understood in the early period to be predicated on human agency and deliberative reasoning, while safeguarding the moral objectives and spirit of the religious law. The second caliph ‘Umar’s bold innovations, for example, in instituting the state register of pensions and establishing the Islamic calendar, for which there were no prophetic precedents, are lauded by posterity as reasoned measures whose adoption was prompted by practical and ethical considerations. The register of pensions in fact was a pre-Islamic Persian institution. Caliphal practices such as these show, contrary to the ahistorical pronouncements of the absolutists, that the pre-Islamic period sometimes provided the inspiration for some innovation or other during the Islamic period and was not the object of demonization as it is currently for them.

Views on Jihad The extremist absolutist view of the world holds that Islam represents a drastic rupture with everything that went before, effaces the validity of prior religious traditions, and mandates its political hegemony over all. Hard-line Islamists signal this kind of “historical” view by their contemptuous use of the term Jahiliyya, which signifies everything that antedated Islam and is not Islamic, as they define it, and therefore morally worthless in their evaluation.5 What reeks of Jahiliyya and is assumed to be an obstacle to the spread of Islam must be ruthlessly stamped out. The vehicle for doing this is the Islamic State and the means for achieving this goal is jihad. Since, according to many radical Islamists, “Islam is a revolutionary ideology and programme which seeks to alter the social order of the whole world and rebuild it in conformity with its own tenets and ideals,” jihad then “refers to that revolutionary struggle and utmost exertion which the Islamic Party brings into play to achieve this objective.”6 Jihad in this sense is arguably the most controversial issue that dominates activist Islamist rhetoric. Of course not all Islamists (or modern Salafis in general) are militants who advocate the use of violence for political gain. Those who are militants, however, tend to understand jihad as the waging of unrelenting military activity against non-Muslims deemed hostile to Islam and against those perceived as “lapsed” Muslims until they are politically vanquished.7 The “true” Muslims, namely themselves, who die waging militant activity against their adversaries are martyrs, who are promised bounteous rewards in the hereafter. Once again, these militant Islamists attempt to justify their positions and rhetoric by asserting that they ref lect first/seventh-century views regarding jihad and martyrdom. They refer in particular to the so-called sword verses (9:5 and 9:29) in the Quran without any contextualization as scriptural warrants for their militant position. They have developed a cult of martyrdom in justification of which they appeal to the hadith genre known as the “excellences of jihad” ( fada’il al-jihad), which tends to contain unreliable

Absolutism and Pluralism in Islam

137

and spurious reports in fulsome praise of military activity and which hold out the promise of abundant posthumous rewards for such activity.8 The militant Islamists’ novel conception of jihad as armed combat directed against other Muslims is predicated on their doctrine of takfir: the declaration of Muslims, whom they regard as lukewarm or lapsed, to be unbelievers.9 A particularly unsavory militant tract titled “The Lapsed Duty” (al-Farida al-gha’iba) was penned by an Egyptian extremist ‘Abd al-Salam Faraj, who is said to have inspired the assassins of former Egyptian president Anwar al-Sadat. His screed scathingly criticizes various Muslim rulers for having apostasized from Islam, on which account they must be fought against. The binary vision of the world articulated by jurists of the ninth century, which divided it into the “abode of Islam” and “abode of war,” finds considerable resonance among radical Islamists. Despite the fact that these divisions are not to be found either in the Quran or the sunna (a fact that may not be known to many among them), they tend to promote these categories and the worldview behind them as normatively mandated. They thus appeal to the legal opinions of the ninth-century jurist al-Shafi’i (d. 820) who fully articulated this dichotomous conception of the world, which, however, he had qualified by the addition of a third domain, the abode of treaty or reconciliation (dar al-‘ahd).10 By the twelfth century, this notion of a bifurcated world had become quite passé as it no longer matched the political realities of the time. However, militant Islamists have resurrected the ninth-century concepts of opposed dual spheres or abodes in the contemporary period, preferring to ignore the period before the late eighth century (from the time of the early salaf ) when these notions had not existed, as well as ignoring the later period when these concepts fell into disuse. They also prefer the understanding of jihad as exclusively “armed combat,” a meaning that had gained ascendancy from roughly the ninth century on, once again bypassing the earlier period when this was a much more diverse and polyvalent term, ref lecting its Quranic usage.11 They also skip over the later period when its spiritual significations became considerably heightened, specially in Sufi circles. Radical Islamists in fact are dismissive of hadiths, which speak more highly of spiritual and non-militant jihad than the military one, such as the famous one that divides jihad into the greater and lesser one.12 They further tend to denigrate Sufism in general which is too other-worldly and self-abnegating for them.13 The military jihad may bring these Islamists untold pleasures in the next world if they should expire in its midst, but the kingdom of this world is their most coveted and preferred prize. The term jihad for them primarily serves to yoke the religious to their temporal, political ambitions. Modernists find the radical Islamist conception of jihad to be anathema and also have trouble with a considerable portion of the classical juridical conception of jihad and related concepts. They point out that al-Shafi’i divided the world into three realms of war, peace, and treaty/armistice on his own initiative without appealing to religious texts. Modernists point to this as

138

Asma Afsaruddin

an example of independent ijtihad (reasoning) on al-Shafi’i’s part in order to make sense, from an Islamo-centric point of view, of the conf lict-ridden world that he inhabited, which has no bearing on the contemporary world.14 Muslim reformists have pointed to the diversity of opinions throughout the classical and post-classical period to point to the contested and historically contingent nature of many of the classical pronouncements on jihad and related issues. Once again, modernists and reformists have turned to accounts of the views and practices of the salaf that have a bearing on these topics to challenge the legitimacy of the Islamist position, particularly in its radical form. A favorite example of modernists drawn from the first century of Islam is the treatment of the Christian Abyssinians by the Prophet and various Muslim administrators after him. The Christian Abyssinians under the devout Negus became famous in early Islam for having harbored a group of destitute Muslims f leeing from the persecution of the pagan Meccans before the emigration to Medina by Muhammad and his followers in 622. As a consequence of this exceptional act of goodwill and religious fellowship, various Muslim authorities in the early period, following the example of the Prophet, exempted the Abyssinians from the payment of any taxes ( jizya) that would otherwise be expected and automatically considered them to be part of the abode of treaty/peace. The Nubians of North Africa, despite being non-Muslims, were also exempted from the jizya and not considered dhimmis (“protected people”). Instead they entered into a trade agreement (baqt) with the Muslims according to the terms of which they mutually traded goods.15 Modernist Muslims are particularly heartened by these concrete historical instances, which they invoke to bolster their argument that in an era of an international commonwealth of nations subscribing to shared values of human rights and peaceful coexistence, these examples of Muslim and nonMuslim interaction yield a much more pertinent and appropriate model for international relations today. It further underscores the fact that relations with non-Muslims are governed not on the basis of religious affiliation but on the goodwill and peaceableness of the people involved. Jizya or the head-tax, they point out, was not always consistently imposed on non-Muslims. Women, the elderly, the poor, religious clerics, and monks were routinely exempted from its payment. There are also instances when nonMuslims requested to pay the zakat, the poor-tax enjoined on Muslims, in lieu of the jizya and the request was granted. Thus, ‘Umar ibn al-Khattab exempted the Christian tribe Banu Taghlib from the jizya when the latter protested its imposition on them and allowed them to pay zakat instead; the Christians of Tanukh were treated similarly by him. The Jarajima tribe agreed to serve in the military in lieu of paying the jizya.16 Modernists point to these historical instances to underscore the contingent nature of jizya and its imposition. The division of the world into two mutually opposed spheres requiring the subjugation of one by the other is regarded as being completely obsolete by the modernists. Thus Muhammad ‘Abduh and Rashid Rida recognized that the assumed bipolar division of the world had been defunct for centuries and

Absolutism and Pluralism in Islam

139

explicitly affirmed that peaceful coexistence was the normal state of affairs between Islamic and non-Islamic nations.17 Mahmud Shaltut (d. 1963), the reformer who like Abduh became the rector of al-Azhar University, expressed a similar conviction. He further stated that Muslims and non-Muslims were equal with regard to rights and duties in a Muslim-majority state, and that only defensive wars are permissible in response to external aggression.18 Modernists also wish to forefront the spiritual and social reformist aspects inherent in jihad and restore its full semantic purview, compromised by hawkish medieval jurists who were reacting to a violent, adversarial world that was part real, part imaginary. They reject the abrogating status of the so-called sword verses, which would result in the abrogation (naskh) of numerous Quranic verses that counsel peace and reconciliation.19 Besides emphasizing the multiple significations of the term jihad in the Quran, modernists point to the broad range of views among the early salaf on what constitutes jihad and martyrdom. Thus modernists stress various reports recorded in early hadith collections like the Musannaf of ‘Abd al-Razzaq (d. 827), which define jihad in terms of striving daily to live righteously through acts of worship, earning a licit livelihood, and serving one’s family, in addition to military defense of Islamic realms.20 These reports are used by them as proof-texts to support their position that the multifaceted aspects of jihad informed the lives of the early salaf and that the monolithic, military conception of jihad promoted by many of the classical jurists was a historically contingent development and lacking in normativeness today.21 The position of contemporary radical Islamists that jihad refers to unrelenting military activity against all those unlike them, Muslim and non-Muslim, until the latter come around to their view of things is regarded by modernists as a desperate and grotesque distortion of a noble and morally uplifting concept, whose reclamation from the extremists is necessary and long overdue.

Weighing the Evidence The absolutist and pluralist worldviews are then diametrically at loggerheads with one another. How may we determine who is the more credible in their claim of ownership of the past and therefore in their vision for the present and the future? In a recent study I showed that based on the evidence contained in early, reliable sources, it is the modernists or the pluralists who may be regarded as having more faithfully captured the spirit of the times of the Prophet and his immediate successors.22 Modernists typically approach the past in a critical and forensic manner that allows them to strip away the accumulated layers of myth over time and retrieve the more historically credible personas of the earliest Muslims (salaf ) and their variegated beliefs and practices. Such an approach has led them to discover the seeds of democratic governance, gender egalitarianism, and even religious pluralism in the lives of the salaf, seeds they toss into today’s fertile ground in the hope that they will take root among Muslims.

140

Asma Afsaruddin

Thus modernists hope that consultative modes of governance instituted by early Muslim rulers will spawn democratic reform today. Traditional protection of the rights of religious minorities to worship as they please under early Muslim rule forms the basis for mandating complete freedom of religion today in Muslim majority societies. Early legal guarantees for Muslim women’s rights to hold property in their own name and contract their own marriages are being invoked to argue for sweeping legal reform that ensures full gender egalitarianism in the contemporary period. The list can go on. Such historical precursors in support of a panoply of social and legal rights consonant with universal notions of human rights and empowerment today have been and continue to be exhumed from Islam’s variegated past by Muslim modernists and pluralists. Their names range from Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and Muhammad Abduh in the nineteenth century to contemporary thinkers and scholars, such as Sa’id al-Ashmawy, Khaled Abou el Fadl, Tariq Ramadan, Azizah al-Hibri, Muqtedar Khan, and Abdulaziz Sachedina.23 Modernist crafting of such credible, alternative scenarios is guaranteed in the long term to take the wind out of the sails of the absolutists and their extremist agendas. Historical scrutiny shows that the heavily politicized ideology of utopianism subscribed to by absolutists has no early pedigree and thus constitutes a dangerous and discredited innovation in time. The term al-hakimiyya is not encountered before the twentieth century, despite the protestations of the absolutists to the contrary, and the concept represents in fact a rupture from mainstream Sunni political thought. And illiberal positions of the absolutists concerning the rights of women, religious minorities, and political freedoms can be shown to be specifically based upon the writings of late medieval scholars, such as Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Hajar in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, respectively. In contrast, earlier scholars, such as Ibn Sa’d and al-Tabari of the ninth and tenth centuries, respectively, document more f lexible notions of political governance, robust roles for women in the public sphere, and greater rights for religious minorities in the formative period of Islam. By their own criteria, the absolutists, who claim fidelity to the practices of the earliest Muslims, have fallen dangerously short of providing a credible platform for reform and renewal in Muslim-majority societies. Rather than the much-touted clash of civilizations, this internal struggle between the absolutists and the pluralists for “the soul of Islam,” as it has been described, is the real crisis for Muslims. How this crisis will be resolved is not easy to predict; for the long term, the revival of religious learning and historical scholarship among Muslims will prove to be the most effective counterweight to the obscurantism of the absolutists.

Notes 1.

See my book The First Muslims: History and Memory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 148–192. The following discussion draws heavily from this section.

Absolutism and Pluralism in Islam

141

2. For an excellent, comprehensive introduction to the development of Islamic modernism, see Fazlur Rahman, Islam & Modernity: Transformation of an Intellectual Tradition (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1982); also Modernist Islam 1840–1940: A Sourcebook, ed. Charles Kurzman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 3–27. 3. Fazlur Rahman, Major Themes of the Qur’an (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1980), p. 47. 4. Many of these ideas are contained in Mawdudi, Al-Islam wa-’l-madaniyya al-haditha (“Islam and Modern Civilization”) (Cairo: Dar al-ansar, 1978). See my critique of this notion of theo-democracy titled “Mawdudi’s Theo-Democracy: How Islamic Is It Really?” Oriente Moderno 87 (2007), pp. 301–25. 5. The standard Islamist work on this is Mawdudi’s al-Islam wa al-Jahiliyya (“Islam and the Age of Ignorance”) (Beirut: Mu’assasat al-risala, 1975). For a discussion of Sayyid Qutb’s understanding of Jahiliyya, see the article by William Shepard, “Sayyed Qutb’s Doctrine of Jahiliyya,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 35 (2003): pp. 521–545. 6. S. Abul A’la Mawdudi, Jihad in Islam (Salimiah, Kuwait: International Islamic Federation of Student Organizations, 1977), p. 5. 7. For a broad range of views on this topic among Islamists in Jordan, e.g., see Quintan Wiktorowicz, “The Salafi Movement in Jordan,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 32 (2000): 222–226. 8. See further my monograph Striving in the Path of God: Jihad and Martyrdom in Islamic Thought and Practice, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010, forthcoming). 9. See further the article “Takfir” in Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World, ed. John L. Esposito (New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 4: 178–179. 10. Even though we pointed out earlier that many Islamists eschew the interpretations of the premodern jurists based on independent reasoning for which method they claim to have scant regard, they have embraced, however, this particular Shafi’i postulate, despite its not having a Qur’anic nor sunnaic antecedent, since it accords very nicely with their “fundamentalist” Manichaean view of the world. 11. See further my article, “Competing Perspectives on Jihad and Martyrdom in Early Islamic Sources,” in Witnesses for the Faith: Christian and Muslim Perspectives on Martyrdom, ed. Brian Wicker (London: Aldershot, 2006), pp. 15–31. 12. This hadith, which appears to have emanated from Sufi circles, is recorded by al-Ghazali, “The book of invocation,” Ihya’ ‘ulum al-din, translated by Kojiro Nakamura as Ghazali on Prayer (Tokyo: University of Tokyo, 1975), p. 167. For further attestations of this hadith, see John Renard, “Al-Jihad al-Akbar: Notes on a Theme in Islamic Spirituality,” Muslim World 78 (1988): pp. 225–242. 13. For an account of general tension between Suf is and Islamists as well as traditionalists, see Julian Johansen, Sufism and Islamic Reform in Egypt: The Battle for Islamic Tradition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), passim. See further Carl W. Ernst, The Shambhala Guide to Sufism (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997), pp. 211–214. 14. For example, Mohammad Talaat al-Ghunaimi, The Muslim Conception of International Law and the Western Approach (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1968), p. 104. 15. Majid Khadduri, War and Peace in the Law of Islam (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1955), pp. 257–261. 16. Ibid., pp. 198–199. 17. Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World, 2: 369–373. 18. See Kate Zebiri, Mahmud Shaltut and Islamic Modernism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 68. 19. Al-Suyuti, al-Itqan fi ‘ulum al-Qur’an (Damascus: Dar Ibn Kathir, 1993), 2: 714, where he says that the sword verse would effectively abrogate 124 conciliatory verses.

142

Asma Afsaruddin

20. See Abou El Fadl, The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists (New York: HarperSanFrancisco, 2005), pp. 220–249; Afsaruddin, “Competing Perspectives,” pp. 15–31. 21. See the articles “The Myth of a Militant Islam,” by David Dakake and “Recollecting the Spirit of Jihad,” by Reza Shah-Kazemi, in Islam, Fundamentalism, and the Betrayal of Tradition: Essays by Western Muslim Scholars, ed. Joseph E.B. Lumbard (Bloomington, IN: .World Wisdom, 2004), pp. 3–38; 121–142. 22. First Muslims, pp. 183–199. 23. For names of more reformist and modernist Muslims, see Charles Kurzman, ed., Liberal Islam: A Sourcebook (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); and idem., Modernist Islam 1840–1940: A Sourcebook (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).

CH A P T E R

T E N

Democracy, Religion, and the War of Ideas Eri c D. Patte r s on

President Barack Obama challenged the worldview of violent Islamists like al Qaeda in an interview with al-Arabiya during the first week of his presidency: “Their ideas are bankrupt.”1 Obama spoke on the assumption that there is a conf lict of ideas between the values he deeply holds, and those of most Americans, with those of radical Islamists. More broadly, the War of Ideas is a foment of moral claims, political philosophies, and historical interpretations that compete for assent within a society and across borders. In short, it is a war about the fundamental principles of human society. This chapter focuses specifically on one aspect of the War of Ideas: the struggle over fundamental individual liberties within democracy, with a focus on religion. Al Qaeda, other Islamist organizations (including those that are not violent in methods), and many governments in Muslim-majority countries claim a religious hegemony that limits the bundle of liberties that the United States believes inherent to all people and essential to human f lourishing. Both the broad notions of individual liberty as explicated in George W. Bush’s “freedom agenda” and Barack Obama’s “sustainable democracy” as well as the specific issues of faith and religious liberty are keenly contested in the War of Ideas.2 It is a “war” because apostasy and blasphemy laws are on the books of many Muslim-majority countries and people of non-Muslim faith are routinely prosecuted by the state or persecuted (either officially or unofficially). It is a war because many in the Muslim world believe that the United States is waging a war against Islam itself, not for oil or territory, but for cultural and religious supremacy. It is also a war because the issue of human rights and basic religious freedom is a non-negotiable issue for the United States whereas such ideas directly contradict understandings of religious obligation in parts of the Muslim world. The terms of this battle

144

Eric D. Patterson

within the larger War of Ideas regard individual religious freedom, church-state separation, and sovereignty. Simply put, for some of those involved, these are matters of life or death.

Religious Freedom in the War of Ideas U.S. International Religious Freedom Policy For the United States, religious freedom—individual choice about matters of faith and worship—is a fundamental right, inextricably linked to a variety of other notions of freedom: worship, conscience, speech, press, assembly, and the like. Religious freedom is part of America’s founding narrative and the United States continues to be a consistent champion of religious liberty both home and abroad. From the perspective of most U.S. citizens, it is simply impossible to conceive of a situation in which basic human rights were observed without religious freedom and it is similarly doubtful that one can imagine a community where true religious freedom—including the right to change or leave religion—exists where other human rights are in jeopardy. The United States is not alone. A recent Pew Global Attitudes survey found that over 90 percent of the people in the forty-six countries surveyed say that religious freedom is important to them.3 Citizens in the United States tend to see religious freedom as an inherent right, one that is expressly adumbrated and protected in the First Amendment of the Constitution: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” The United States also has a long tradition of supporting religious freedom within the modern human rights framework, most notably as a signatory of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the 1966 International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Furthermore, because almost every country has signed on to the UDHR (not legally binding) and the ICCPR (a legally binding treaty), the United States sees its promotion of religious and other civil liberties as simply calling other countries to live up to their commitments. Article 18 of the ICCPR commits countries to the following: 1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching. 2. No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice.

Democracy, Religion, and the War of Ideas

145

3. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs may be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others. In addition to its multilateral commitments, the United States has undertaken concrete actions to promote religious liberty worldwide for nearly four decades. That leadership began in the Cold War with concern for the plight of Soviet Jews and later Soviet Pentecostals. In 1974 Congress passed the JacksonVanik Amendment, which linked trade relations with the Soviet Union to the freedom of Jews and others to emigrate. The following year, the Helsinki Accords resolved the territorial status of the Soviet Union, linking that issue to a substantive human rights agenda that included religious freedom. Two decades later, and after intense lobbying and political maneuvering, President Clinton signed the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (IRFA),4 which: ●

●

●

●

●

●

Declared “The right to freedom of religion undergirds the very origin and existence of the United States . . . as a fundamental right and as a pillar of our Nation . . . Freedom of religious belief and practice is a universal human right and fundamental freedom . . . ” Created an independent U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) to make recommendations to the President and Congress. Designated an Ambassador at Large for International Religious Freedom at the U.S. Department of State, leading an Office of International Religious Freedom. Mandated an Annual Report on International Religious Freedom to include every country in the world. Provided a menu of options for U.S. government action to name, shame, and punish violators of religious freedom, with a special focus on “Countries of Particular Concern.” Called for institutionalized training, programming, and recognition for U.S. diplomats engaged in this work.5

Challenges to Religious Freedom in the Muslim World Western circles find it difficult to understand the contradictions in religious freedom in the Muslim world. Western governments are routinely told that the Quran commands “no compulsion in religion,” but the media evidence of court cases involving blasphemy and apostasy, not to mention violence directed at Christians, Hindus, and Jews as well as their houses of worship, suggests either hypocrisy, misunderstanding, or real contradictions between Muslim and Western notions of religious freedom.

146

Eric D. Patterson

One of the areas of contradiction seems to be in the explication of Muslim texts. Three oft-quoted passages demonstrate this. ● ●

●

“There is no compulsion in religion.” Quran 2:256 “Had God willed, they would not be idolaters; but We have not appointed you [addressing Muhammad] a watcher over them, nor are you their guardian. Do not abuse to whom they pray, apart from God, or they will abuse God in retaliation without knowledge.” Quran 7:107–108 “And whoever among you turns away from their religion and dies as an unbeliever, their works have failed in this world and the next; these are the inhabitants of the Fire; therein they shall dwell forever.” Quran 2:217

In contrast, a famous hadith says, ●

“Whoever turns back from his belief, openly or secretly, take him and kill him wheresoever ye find him, like any other infidel. Separate yourself from him altogether. Do not accept intercession in his regard.” Sura 4:88–89

These mandates seem to be in direct conf lict. On the one hand, the first three verses suggest that God himself will make judgments on matters of personal faith and piety; humans are not to pass judgment. However, the hadith commands not only executing an apostate (someone who turns his back on Islam) but also “any other infidel.” What are we to make of these competing discourses? Historian of Islam Asma Afsaruddin argues that in this context we need a better understanding of the historical significance of the Arabic term ridda, which tends to be translated into English as “apostasy,” but which has a more nuanced historical meaning: The earliest usage of ridda was in the context of the political revolts that occurred during the reign of Abu Bakr, the first caliph, immediately after the death of the Prophet. The punishable offense in this case was the political rebellion and the act of disloyalty to the government in Medina, not renunciation of Islam . . . to say that Islamic law mandates the death penalty for simple apostasy is erroneous.6 She concludes that the first three Quranic texts given earlier argue against forced conversions and that human beings are not to judge those of other faiths or apostates—God will do them justice in the end. Regarding the hadith, she argues that it is regarded by scholars as a “solitary report” (ahad) and therefore “does not have the same probative value” as the Quranic passages or as other hadiths where Mohammed chose to not decree punishments in similar cases.7

Democracy, Religion, and the War of Ideas

147

Afsaruddin is arguing that the Quran in its historical context does not provide a basis for religious persecution nor wars of religion. The basis for ridda was a political notion of treachery, not heresy, irreverency, or even apostasy. However, when viewed through the lens of the U.S. commitment to religious freedom, many real-world cases simply do not meet this criteria. Of key interest to the United States in particular is Afghanistan, which was liberated from the Taliban by an alliance of the U.S. military and various Afghan factions in the fall of 2001. The United States has spent billions of dollars on security, reconstruction, and economic development in Afghanistan and together with its NATO allies has maintained an international peacekeeping force of over fifty thousand troops on the ground for seven years. Hence, there is great interest in the United States on issues of Afghan religious freedom, particularly as U.S. and international negotiators helped draft the Afghan constitution. Afghanistan can be seen as a critical test case for religious freedom in a conservative, Muslim-majority society that provides a window into the thinking of law enforcement and jurisprudence in many other Muslim countries. Two recent court cases provide troubling evidence that robust religious freedom is under assault in Afghanistan. The first is a case of apostasy. In February 2006 Abdul Rachman was arrested. Rachman had converted to Christianity sixteen years earlier while working for a Christian NGO in Peshawar. He left the area and worked in Germany for nine years, returning in 2002. Rachman says that he returned in order to gain custody of his daughters, who had been living with his parents. His parents contacted authorities that their son had converted to Christianity; a Bible was found in his possession. The judge trying the case issued the following statement, “The Attorney General is emphasizing he should be hung. It is a crime to convert to Christianity from Islam. He is teasing and insulting his family by converting . . . we are not against any particular religion in the world. But in Afghanistan, this sort of thing is against the law. It is an attack on Islam.”8 Other inf luential Afghan clerics urged the death penalty as well. The chief cleric at Haji Yacob Mosque said: “The government is scared of the international community. But the people will kill him if he is freed . . . There will be an uprising. The government will lose the support of the people. What sort of democracy would it be if the government ignored the will of all the people?” A member of the Afghan Ulama Council demanded, “The government is playing games. The people will not be fooled. Cut off his head! We will call on the people to pull him into pieces so there’s nothing left.” Perhaps most telling is the argument of Mirhossain Nasri of the Hossainia Mosque, If he is allowed to live in the West then others will claim to be Christian so they can too. We must set an example . . . He must be hanged . . . We are a small country and we welcome the help the outside world is giving us, but please don’t interfere in this issue. We are Muslims and these are

148

Eric D. Patterson

our beliefs. This is much more important to us than all the aid the world has given us.9 In late March 2006, Rachman was freed. It is clear that the tremendous international pressure brought to bear on the Karzai government played a role; the court too dismissed the case due to lack of evidence. However, because Rachman was in mortal danger, he was spirited out of the country. A different case is that of Parwez Kambakhsh, accused of blasphemy for writing an article that criticized the Quran’s depiction of women. He is also alleged to have had an offending history book in his possession, “asked difficult questions” in his courses, and sent an inappropriate joke as a text message via cell phone. Kambakhsh says that he did not write the offending article, but merely downloaded it and forwarded it to friends. A year and a half after Kambakhsh was detained, the court convicted him of blasphemy, sentencing him to twenty years in prison. His lawyer, Azfal Nooristani, found out about the decision nearly a month later: “I had a legal right to see the Supreme Court judges, but they would not see me; they did not let me submit my defense statement. They had already made up their minds.”10 Elsewhere, another Afghan journalist has been charged with blasphemy for translating the Quran into one of Afghanistan’s official languages, Dari. He also faces twenty years in prison. These cases are not from the fringe: they are not the Taliban or al Qaeda kidnapping or murdering Western aid workers. Rachman and Kambakhsh are Afghan citizens exercising fundamental rights, ones that are mentioned in the Afghan constitution and that are protected by international covenants that Kabul has publicly signed. These cases are important tests of competing values systems in the region—will individual religious liberty be protected? Is such a thing possible in a Muslim-majority society? Can individuals count on due process and the rule of law? Certainly the Afghan judges fear Rachman’s Christianity as an existential threat to their social order, just as the West understands that his punishment is a violation of universal moral standards.

“Separation” of Church and State in the War of Ideas In a speech at Georgetown University in 2008, Brookings Institution scholar William Galston outlined a basic misunderstanding about religion and the United States in the Muslim world: They tend to view the United States through their millennium-long encounter with Europe. This has bred two opposing misunderstandings: first, that the United States is the latest of the Christian crusader nations entering their region to crush Islam; and second, that the United States is a godless, militantly secularist regime like revolutionary France and

Democracy, Religion, and the War of Ideas

149

the many nations—some in their own region—that the French example inspired. My stock description of the United States as religiously vibrant as well as diverse genuinely surprised my Muslim interlocutors, who were well-informed in most other respects.11 Galston is talking about laicite. Many Muslim majority countries including Lebanon and much of North Africa have direct experience with French political institutions, including this “militant secularism,” the French approach to dividing church and state. Such secularist separationism is anathema not only to violent Islamists but also to many mainstream people of faith. Although laicite sounds superficially like the United States’ “separation of church and state,” it is fundamentally different: in the United States, “separation” restricts the government from interfering in religion, in France; laicite shields the government and society from the inf luence of religion. Laicite is a legacy of the French Revolution, spread throughout its colonies. The French revolutionaries distrusted religion, specifically the Catholic Church, as a pillar of the ancien regime, resulting in numerous efforts to subjugate the Church, including government acquisition of religious properties, requiring priests to take an oath of loyalty to the Republic, and persecuting those who refused to do so. The second half of the nineteenth century saw the Church’s fortunes rise and fall based on France’s turbulent political climate (Church and state were officially separated in the French constitution in 1905), but laicite was essentially codified politically—and ultimately culturally—in French national life. That reality is simple: religion is an absolutely private matter. It has no place in the public sphere. The official French position today is that this extreme separation of religion and state is a foundation of freedom for all citizens. The policy has come under fire recently as laicite’s suspicion of religion has resulted in a ban on religious clothing in public schools and other policies that are seen by many to prevent freedom of religious expression. Indeed in February 2009, the European court upheld a ruling that a French school was able to expel two female Muslim students for wearing the hijab.12 Supporters of the policy say that keeping religious paraphernalia out of public schools protects the rights of all students by keeping religious inf luence separate from education. Unfortunately, many people in highly religious societies, especially in the Muslim world, assume that the U.S. version of “separation” is identical to the French. Consequently, the claims of Western democracy—if separationism is a key tenet—can never be accepted by many in the Muslim world. However, this may be a misunderstanding of less divisive nature between the United States and its foreign interlocutors. The American concept of “separation of church and state” is neither a fusion of religion and government nor the exile of religion from the public square. Instead, it is what Alfred Stepan has called “twin tolerations: the minimal boundaries of freedom of action . . . for political institutions vis-à-vis religious authorities, and for religious individuals and

150

Eric D. Patterson

groups vis-à-vis political institutions.”13 The American system is one where the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution expressly forbids government intervention in religion, but anticipates a robust religious public. In the United States both private and public—but not government—expressions of religion f lourish, from acts of veneration in houses of worship to religiously inspired actors engaging in debate on major issues in politics and society. Moreover, as discussed earlier, religious liberty is part of a wider bundle of liberties that involves freedom of speech, press, and assembly. Ironically, the United States’ “separation” provides a greater opportunity for faiths to practice than most other systems, and it provides a formal check on the invasive power of the central government to keep it from attempting to utilize religion instrumentally for its own purpose. Debates over “separation of church and state,” or better the role of religion in government and politics, are a part of the War of Ideas. The United States has come into direct conf lict with its partners on these issues, notably on the drafting of the Afghan and Iraqi constitutions, but also in engaging other heavily religious societies such as Saudi Arabia or governments who favor a quasi-religious monopoly (e.g., Turkey). Because savvy propagandists in the Muslim world attach secularist separationism to democracy, women’s and minority rights, and the like, it is critical that the United States respectfully yet broadly challenge this narrative. The United States needs to disentangle its notion of “separation” from laicite in its arguments for religious freedom, tolerance, and pluralism: that religious societies need not radically privatize faith, but they can provide an environment where the state is disengaged from religious practice yet zealously guards the rights of its citizens to worship individually and collectively.

Contested Notions of Sovereignty: Popular versus Divine In her book The Mighty and the Almighty, former U.S. secretary of state Madeline Albright ref lects on a clash between the United States and many Muslims, “The resulting turbulence is the product of a momentous and inherently complex encounter between two profound ideas: that all power comes from God, and that legitimate authority on Earth comes from the people.”14 Albright’s “resulting turbulence” is an element of the War of Ideas, and the clash of “two profound ideas” is contrasting notions of sovereignty. In short, the political concept of popular sovereignty is viewed by many as being incompatible with the religious concept of God’s sovereignty.

Popular Sovereignty in Western Democratic Theory Popular “sovereignty” is a key presupposition of democratic theory, particularly in the American tradition. The idea is so foundational that it is widely

Democracy, Religion, and the War of Ideas

151

assumed, deeply held, and rarely spoken. The concept of sovereignty in the American tradition is clearly a political notion, but its claims have been attacked by many Islamists who deem it heretical. Thus, herein lies another controversy in the War of Ideas where ideas of democracy and Muslim faith collide. In American democratic theory, the notion of sovereignty derives from the assumptions of the social contract rooted in Hobbes and Locke: individuals willingly assign some of their rights to the state in exchange for protection. However, in democracies this exchange is assumed to be willing, hence in theory the creation and sustenance of the state is predicated on the decision of the sovereign populace. The American revolutionaries argued that their break with the English Crown was on just such lines: London had lost its claim to govern because it had abused its power—the sovereign people were asserting themselves in forming a new association. The Declaration of Independence states, We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness. Hence, the “consent of the governed” assumes a sovereignty of the citizenry when it comes to governance. However, that sovereignty is not a religious concept per se. Indeed, the Declaration states that rights (and thus human agency) derive from a Creator, but the Founders were ambiguous about what that meant other than some universal promise of equality and freedom for citizens. The Declaration makes no claim that the sovereign people are the ultimate repository of truth or morality, indeed, the opening of the Declaration refers to the “Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God.” This suggests that an ultimate moral code does exist outside of the whims of the consenting governed. Consequently, the idea of sovereignty in American democratic theory is a political idea for how governments should be established and operate—in ways that are consonant with morality and based on—and limited by—the sovereignty of the citizenry. That sovereignty only extends to the political realm, both to check unrestrained government power as well as to underscore the opportunity and responsibility of citizens to constructively advance “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.”

152

Eric D. Patterson

Over time the definition of a sovereign citizenry has expanded, evolving from the male land-owning class (including proprietorship of human chattel) to include men and women regardless of race, religion, or wealth. That expansion has coincided, particularly in the past half century, with a dramatic opening in the mores and moral strictures of American life, from the existentialism and postmodernism of academic theory—which questions any universal ethical code—to profound challenges to old patterns of society: declines in religious practice, the sexual revolution, a new pluralism in religious affiliation (due in part to immigration and the presence of large non-Christian and non-Jewish diasporas), changes in family structure and alternative claims of family (e.g., same-sex unions), and the like. It is not necessarily the case that the Founder’s claims of a sovereign people directly caused this “dramatic opening” in American life, but a fundamental argument of its varied proponents is that the people have the right to define “the pursuit of happiness.” This, of course, is a key basis for the “culture wars” in American society of the past two generations, as competing claims of morality, law, and experience are ferociously debated by partisans, religious actors, intellectuals, and average citizens. Thus, we have arrived at two conclusions on the American notion of popular sovereignty. First, the notion of a sovereign citizenry was at first a political notion, constrained both by the realities of political life (the Declaration says that “Prudence, indeed, will dictate that Governments long established should not be changed for light and transient causes”) and by assumptions in political theory that “the consent of the governed” was a political principle, rooted in broader moral realities of “the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God.” Second, over time the United States and many of its Western allies have expanded their definition of “citizen” at the same time that their cultures and social mores have broadened to allow a far wider diversity of lifestyle choices. However, these definitions are bitterly contested by many in the Muslim world.

The Muslim View of Sovereignty A theme in the War of Ideas is the application of the principle of sovereignty in the Muslim world. The sovereignty of God and the explication of that sovereignty via the Prophet Muhammad and the scripture is the justification for rejecting Western “separation of church and state” and for governmentsponsored prosecution and persecution of individual blasphemy and apostasy. This confrontation was launched with Sayyid Qutb’s Milestones and monumental In the Shade of the Quran a half-century ago.15 Qutb argued that the West, and the authoritarian governments then in power in many Muslim countries, rejected the sovereignty of God over mankind. More specifically, humankind has rebelled against God’s truth and chosen not to listen to the interventions that God has sent in the person of the Prophet Muhammad

Democracy, Religion, and the War of Ideas

153

and the Quran. For Qutb, there is not only a universal moral order but there is a sociopolitical order clearly specified in the Quran based on the sovereignty of God. God has provided man “divine guidance concerning everything . . . including faith, morals, values, standards, systems, and laws.”16 It is beyond the scope of this short essay to go deeply into the thought of Sayyid Qutb or the dozens of important voices on this subject. Indeed, a half-century later the debates still rage in many quarters of the Muslim world about these issues, both in theory as well as in the practice of democratic governments in Turkey, Indonesia, and elsewhere. What is important, however, is that for many Islamists this view makes democracy at best problematic and at worst heretical because of the notions of radical individual freedom and the suggestion that political institutions and perhaps even the moral order are defined by popular sovereignty, both of which violate the sovereignty of God. Moreover, for those Islamists who believe that the Quran and hadiths clearly specify an enduring Muslim political order [a caliphate], democratic mechanisms such as parties and elections are illegitimate. Abu Yahya al-Libi, a senior al Qaeda official, made this argument in 2006. Democracy is a “mirage,” containing “slogans of freedom, and deception of equality.” The “infidels” argue from “rules that they adopted and debate with them and oblige them to accept the principles that they defended and called for, to the extent that the facts of religion and its major terms have melted amid the waves of dilution and courtesy.”17 Similarly, in a 2007 interview in al-Arabiya, Abu Bakr Ba’shir, leader of Al-Gama’a Al-Islamiyya in Indonesia, argued, The path taken by many political parties in their effort to establish an Islamic regime is not the right path, because these parties adopt democracy. Democracy is not an Islamic means. Democracy runs counter to Islam, because it emphasizes the sovereignty of the people, whereas Islam emphasizes the sovereignty of God. Thus, if we are to submit to the law of God, Muslims have no choice but to say: “We hear and obey.” In democracy, God’s commands may be open to discussion, and if we agree with them, we accept them, but if we do not agree with them, we reject them. Herein lies the f law. Therefore, as long as the Islamic political parties endeavor to adhere to Islam by means of democracy, they will not achieve their goal.18 In short, a third dimension of the War of Ideas where religion and democracy intersect, or better collide, is the conceptualization of sovereignty and its expression in matters of faith, government, and society. The political philosophy associated with classical liberalism, Bush’s freedom agenda, and the still-developing Obama foreign policy are in direct contrast to some voices in the Muslim world who specifically challenge popular sovereignty with

154

Eric D. Patterson

competing claims of not just God’s spiritual and moral sovereignty over the affairs of humanity, but God’s expressed guidance on sociopolitical affairs that contravenes a political popular sovereignty. Frankly, this aspect of the War of Ideas has been playing itself out not only across the Muslim world, but also among many who consider themselves Islamists of various types. The basic argument is about whether or not democratic institutions can ref lect God’s sovereignty or if the practices of representative government (e.g., elections, political parties, constitutions, and laws) are simply incompatible with it. This debate, sometimes including violence, is being waged in Cairo, Islamabad, Tehran, Jakarta, as well as in diaspora communities in North America and Western Europe, and only time will tell if a reconciliation of views, or the triumph of one, will endure across the greater Muslim world.

Conclusion In conclusion, is a “peace” or “truce” of ideas likely in the areas of religious freedom and attendant human rights and civil liberties? Is there some middle ground on the issues of individual and collective religious freedom—broadly defined—as well as on the concepts of popular versus divine sovereignty and church-state separation? It is possible that on notions of sovereignty and church-state separation, there can be some rapprochement. One could imagine a Muslim political doctrine of representative government as stewardship of God’s children nestled within a broader doctrine of divine sovereignty. That construct could easily accommodate broad protections of God’s children of all faiths. Similarly, religiously vibrant societies do not need to have the state poking into religious matters at all times, and it is conceivable that Muslim intellectuals will win a “civil war” within Islam over these issues that is consonant with the views of the West. Religious freedom issues, however, are not theory—they are intertwined with the lived religion of people and communities of faith in the day-to-day world. The religious freedom issue’s multidimensionality, and the widespread real persecution of people who challenge the monolithity of Islam within the borders of countries like Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan make it likely that this element of the War of Ideas is just that—a war, not a misunderstanding or gentlemen’s disagreement. Optimists point to places like Turkey that ostensibly have religious freedom on the books, but close scrutiny of Turkey suggests that not only is it difficult for Turkish citizens to practice Christianity or Judaism, but also that converts from Islam would face sanctions, either informal or formal (e.g., in the workplace). For decades we in the West thought that there were Muslim-majority countries like Indonesia that pursued a very different form of Islam from that inspired by Arab Wahabbism, particularly on issues such as religious tolerance. However, the past decade has

Democracy, Religion, and the War of Ideas

155

demonstrated that the aggressive, exclusivist style of Islamist politics known in Saudi Arabia and parts of Central Asia has diffused across parts of the greater Muslim world. Finally, there are additional reasons that other countries have some skepticism about the notion of international religious freedom, notably a desire to maintain religious monopolies and/or protect culture from outside interference or proselytization. In some cases, such as Saudi Arabia, an alliance has developed between the central government and “national” religious authorities to exclude “outside” religions. Even secular Turkey has a centralized government relationship with the official religious apparatus. Elsewhere, the notions of citizenship are intimately tied to shared ethno-religious identities, making religious freedom sound like a challenge to essential citizenship. The United States remains optimistic that in the long run its values of human liberty—including religious freedom—are not only for everyone, but desired by almost everyone and probably part of the natural course of societal evolution. This confidence infuriates Islamists who see pluralism and robust religious freedom as an attack on Islam. As long as both sides see this as a fundamental conf lict, individual and collective rights versus religious monocracy, and as long as the stakes include human life, this aspect of the War of Ideas will continue.

Notes 1. Al-Arabiya interview, available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/28870724/ ( January 26, 2009). 2. For an introduction to the Bush administration’s Freedom Agenda and a forecast of the Obama administration’s democracy support programs, see “Presidential Leadership and Democracy Promotion,” in Public Integrity (forthcoming, Fall 2009). 3. Pew Global Attitudes Survey (2007). The Survey included numerous countries with large Muslim populations, such as Pakistan, Kuwait, Nigeria, and Indonesia. 4. For a detailed history of the political debate at the time and the establishment of IRFA, see the summer 2008 issue of Review of Faith and International Affairs (vol. 6, no. 2), 25–40, especially the following essays: Nina Shea, “The Origins and Legacy of the Movement to Fight Religious Persecution” and Laura Bryant Hanford, “The International Religious Freedom Act: Sources, Policy, Inf luence.” 5. The year 2008 was the tenth anniversary of IRFA becoming law, and a series of activities marked the milestone including a special issue of the journal Review of Faith and International Affairs, the publication of a book on U.S. foreign policy and religious liberty by the former director of the State Department’s Office of International Religious Freedom, and three symposia on IRFA hosted by Georgetown University and synthesized into a policy recommendations brief for the Obama administration titled, The Future of U.S. International Religious Freedom Policy. 6. Asma Afsaruddin, “Making the Case for Religious Freedom in the Islamic Tradition,” The Review of Faith & International Affairs vol. 6, no. 2 (Summer 2008), 58. 7. Ibid. 8. “Clerics demand death for Christian convert,” Associated Press, March 23, 2006. 9. “Clerics call for Christian convert’s death despite Western outrage,” Associated Press, March 23, 2006, at http://www.foxnews.com/.

156

Eric D. Patterson

10. Qtd in “Afghanistan: 20 Year Sentence for Journalist,” March 10, 2009, at www.hrw.org/ en.news/2009/03/10/afghnistan-20=year-sentence-upheld?ptp. 11. William A. Galston, qtd in “Report of the Georgetown Symposia on International Religious Freedom Policy,” The Berkley Center for Religion, Peace & World Affairs, Georgetown University (December 2008), 35. 12. “French headscarf ban not discrimination, says European Court,” The Muslim News. http:// www.muslimnews.co.uk/news/news.php?article=15819. 13. Alfred C. Stepan, “Religion, Democracy, and the “Twin Tolerations,” Journal of Democracy vol. 11, no. 4 (October 2000), 38. 14. Madeline Albright, The Mighty and the Almighty (New York: Harper Collins, 2006), p. 216. 15. Much of this material was first written in letters and journals and subsequently published. 16. Sayyid Qutb, In the Shade of the Qur’an, M.A. Salahi and A.A. Shamis, trans., vol. 5 (London: Wamy International, 1995), p. 207. 17. Abu Yahya al-Libi. Untitled Lecture. World News Network website (www.w-n-n.net), May 12, 2006. 18. Interview of Abu Bakr Ba’shir, spiritual leader of Al-Gama’a Al-Islamiyya in Indonesia, which aired on al-Arabiya TV on October 26, 2007. Can be viewed at http://www. memritv.org/clip/en/1598.htm.

CH A P T E R

E L E V E N

Inter-civilizational Conflict between Value Systems and Concepts of Order: Exploring the Islamic Humanist Potential for a Peace of Ideas Bassam Tibi

The concept and the reality of a “War of Ideas” being waged within a new Cold War predate 9/11.1 The former bipolar East-West conf lict between competing systems has been replaced by a new polarization. The new one relates not only to the rivalry between secular and religious value systems, but foremost to the political order both rest on. This cultural-religious rivalry is twenty-first-century inter-civilizational conf lict in world politics over political order and the values that undergird it.2 This conf lict is not between the religions of Islam and Christianity as such, but instead to the combination of these world religions with politics. I call this “return of the sacred” to the political sphere “religionized politics,”3 which means a combination of a constructed religion and real politics. Activists of “political religion” believe themselves to act in a war of ideas as the “defenders of God.”4 Religion is not addressed here in terms of faith, cult, and cultural system, but rather in its function as an ideology of religionized politics. Religion as faith or as a cultural system deserves to be respected and honored as a part of human rights as entitlements. In contrast to the faith, cult, and religion as a cultural system any politicized religion is a body to be named “political religion.”5 It follows that the inter-civilizational conf lict6 is not between Islam, Christianity, and the West, but rather between Islamism and the “synthesis” of the Westphalian system, on which the present world order rests.7 This chapter investigates the claims of Islamists, considers the crisis of

158

Bassam Tibi

modernity in the Muslim world, and argues for a better civil Islam able to negotiate on the grounds of a democratic peace for conf lict resolution. This chapter revives the tradition of Islamic rationalist humanism as a potential for a peace of ideas.

The Return of the Sacred and Inter-civilizational Conf lict The inter-civilizational conf lict between secularism and political religion in the War of Ideas is not simply an intellectual debate. It is a “return of the sacred” where differing political viewpoints become religionized; it is not so much about a religious renaissance. The notion of a War of Ideas was coined by political Islam long before 9/11. One can look to the godfather of modern Islamism, Sayyid Qutb, and his contemporary followers who embody the Islamist movement. For Qutb the inter-civilizational conf lict between the West and the world of Islam is neither social-economic nor political, but rather a War of Ideas waged between believers and the infidels. He describes the fight as a battle between believers and their foes. It is in substance about a dogma/ idea (aqidah) and it is absolutely about nothing else . . . (In other words) the battle is neither about politics nor about economic interests . . . if it were so, a conf lict resolution would be feasible. Since it is in substance a War of Ideas (ma’rakat aqidah) it is about belief against kufr (infidelity/ unbelief ). The issue therefore is either Islam prevails, or a setback into jihaliyya (pre-Islamic ignorance/unbelief ) takes place . . . The enemies of believers have tried to deceive in presenting the battle/war (ma’rakah) as a political, economic or racial one. It is not. Believers should turn down this deception . . . done by world crusaderism (Salibiyya alamiyya) . . . 8 Qutb’s diatribe, written in the 1950s, clearly has Marxist-Leninist origins, in particular when Qutb speaks of a “world revolution”9 and replaces the “proletariat” with an imagined “umma.” Qutb makes clear that Islamic claims are not negotiable and thus leaves no space for dialogue or debate. His argument, as well as that of his disciples like Osama bin Laden, is for the need to tear down the global political order and rebuild it on Islamist lines. The Islamists who fight against the Westphalian world order are believed to fight a war against kufr (unbelief ) and therefore they have no inclination to engage in a debate of ideas. Qutb also wrote, Today, humanity stands at the brink . . . bankruptcy . . . is the most obvious feature of the West . . . democracy is finished along this bankruptcy . . . The leadership of the West is about vanishing . . . It is Islam—and nothing next to it—that possesses the needed values (to save humanity) . . . It is now the

Value Systems and Concepts of Order

159

time for Islam to take over in this time of crisis and turmoil . . . There is a need for the restoration of the supremacy of the umma to make Islam resume its expected leadership of humanity . . . This is the meaning of Islamic revival (ba’th Islami).10 “Political Islam” (i.e., Islamist fundamentalism) wages a war on the secular international order legitimized by the “authority structure ref lected in the Westphalian synthesis,” says scholar Daniel Philpott. “Radical Islamic revivalism . . . challenges the authority structure of the international system. This is the tradition behind al Qaeda’s attacks.”11 John Kelsay concurs, “In the encounters between the West and Islam, the struggle is over who will provide the primary definition to world order. Will it be the West . . . or will it be Islam? . . . The very question suggests a competition between cultural traditions with distinctive notions of peace, order and justice . . . ”12 The Westphalian system refers to the Western system of international society, which ended the religious wars of the seventeenth century, made collective faith a national or individual (rather than international) matter, and defined international relations in terms of state sovereignty (government autonomy within national borders) and nonintervention (by other states). Thus, a key element of the War of Ideas is competition and difference between secular and religious worldviews on international political order. The “return of the sacred” in the Muslim world contributes to tensions between the normative claims of universalization and real structural globalization. In my work these tensions are addressed in terms of a “simultaneity of cultural fragmentation of norms and values and structural globalization.” The contended simultaneity of globalized structures and the missing cultural underpinning for this globalization—as needed to render them legitimacy—creates the world-historical context of the current crisis of the secular nation-state in the non-Western world. In other words, there is a gap between the globalized assumptions of the Westphalian system and the reality of the “abode of Islam.” All states in Muslim world are considered “nation-states,” however, only by the legal definition of international law, not in reality. The institutions that undergird the nation-state are not in place, at best they are “nominal nation-states.” Consequently, the “revolt against the West” is not only directed against Western political hegemony but also against the globalized values and concepts of international order: the “Westphalian synthesis.” Underlying this revolt is a legitimacy crisis of the international order ref lecting an international system (interaction), but lacking the commonalities needed for establishing an international society (rules, norms, and values). The challenge of global jihad combined with a politicized return of the sacred leads to an emerging world disorder. Islamists invent an Islamic peace, a political order they call “Allah’s rule (Hakimiyyat Allah).” This term was coined by Sayyid Qutb.13 He rejected the subdivision of the world of Islam into nation-states, as well as the secular world order they are embedded into. It is imperative to take a look at these

160

Bassam Tibi

views to understand that Qutb’s idea of “World Peace and Islam” aimed “to defeat any power on earth that prevents the mapping of the world under the call to Islam (Da’wa).” This is the definition of Islamic proselytization as related to jihad. Qutb concludes: “Islam needs a comprehensive revolution . . . being a jihad prescribed on Muslims to lead this revolution to success for establishing the Hakimiyyat Allah (rule of God).”14 In short, we read him summarizing the argument, jihad envisages a world revolution (thawra alamiyya) . . . for the realization of (Islamic) peace . . . for the entire humanity . . . These are the outlines for world peace in Islam . . . This does not mean to avoid war (qital) at any price . . . Islam is a permanent jihad which will not cease until Allah’s mission rules the world.15 The quotes indicate a declaration of global jihad on the present world order presented as a message of peace in the language of war. Qutb’s ideological “permanent jihad” has been promoted to a real one as global jihad practiced by a variety of jihadist movements on the top of which we see al Qaeda. This is the correlation between the War of Ideas and jihadist war, both are features of political Islam that indicate a powerful return of the sacred in a political guise. In conclusion, the return of the sacred in the world of Islam occurs as a political religion. It aggravates the difference and prevents an accommodation of Islamic civilization to the global environment in a democratizing world. The competing choices in a War of Ideas between jihadism and democratic world peace are related to cultural concepts of the sacred and the secular. Later I will argue for a return to the tradition of Islamic rationalist humanism as the basis of a dialogue, not a war, of ideas between Islam and the West.

Islam, Islamism, and the Crisis of the Nation-State It is wrong to confuse the ideology of Islamism with Islam.16 Unlike Islam, which is a faith established in spiritual beliefs, Islamism is a religionized political ideology. Even though Islam includes some political implications that were unfolded in the course of Islamic history the reference of “political Islam (al-Islam al-siyasi)” refers exclusively to contemporary politics. Islamism is a twentieth-century contemporary phenomenon continued in the twenty-first century. It heralds the return of Islam to world politics in a new shape. The assumed depoliticization of Islam in the aftermath of the abolition of the caliphate is challenged by political Islam. The re-politicization of religion is related to a historical background embedded in the context of local, regional, and international developments. Ever since the abolition of the Islamic order of the Caliphate in 1924, the disintegration and fall of the last Islamic empire in the world, the Muslim

Value Systems and Concepts of Order

161

world has been reshaped and subdivided into secular nation-states to be integrated into the Westphalian international system.17 Given these facts and in view of the secular Kemalist revolution in Turkey, it was believed that Islam has been restricted to a spiritual faith, thus has ceased to matter to world affairs. However, a counter-narrative developed in the 1920s in Cairo as the movement of the Muslim Brotherhood was established, aiming to restore the territoriality identified as “Dar al-Islam (abode of Islam).” Political Islam opposes the reality in which the former provinces of the Islamic order are now mapped as “new states” into the international system. The former Ottoman provinces went through a transitory period of colonial rule and then emerged formally in terms of international law as nation-states based on popular sovereignty, that is, on secular foundations. In the twenty-first century this is changing. In the world of Islam the secular nation-state is undergoing a double-crisis. One is a legitimacy crisis while the other is a crisis of development. Islamism emerges from this context: the crisis of the secular nation-state.18 Islamism fights a War of Ideas against the Westphalian order in favor of establishing an Islamist shariah state. This targeting of the secular nation-state happens in the context of the return of Islam in a political guise. The secular nation-state is accused of being a failed state: one that is not consonant with shariah and one that has not delivered power, justice, or economic development. The crushing Arab failure in the 1967 Six Day War undermined the legitimacy of the secular nation-state and gave a great boost to nascent political Islam.19 Political Islam thrives in the context of the delegitimation of the nation-state in a crisis of Arab politics. The 1967 war was a watershed moment for Islamism. It was upgraded to a mobilisatory ideology that calls for “al-hall al-Islami (the Islamic solution).”20 This is what “Islamist politics” is all about. This solution preaches a political theology of “din-wa-dawla (unity of religion and state).” Within this context, Islam is interpreted by Islamism as “nizam (system or order),” which governs all aspects of life with no separation between what is public and what is private. This is a true totalitarianism. On the top we face the claim: It is only Islam that determines how the state is to be shaped. The new call has been framed as a political Islam that not only challenges the secular nation-state in presenting an alternative to it, namely, the “nizam Islami (Islamic order),” based on “Hakimiyyat Allah (Allah’s rule),” but also the world order. This is the opposite option to popular sovereignty and it contradicts the civic culture of pluralism and its provision to power sharing. All this happens in the new drive toward de-secularization. It is argued that only Allah is the true sovereign and thus it was concluded that the Western concept of popular sovereignty on which the nation-state rests is an import from the West decried as “kufr (heresy)” leading away from true Islam. This is not only the core issue in the development of political Islam, it is also the core issue in the War of Ideas as a new Cold War between the legitimacy of the existing nation-states in the world of Islam and is constructed as an “Islamic state” based on shariah.

162

Bassam Tibi

In its origin, Islamist jihadism is a Sunni-Arab movement, but following the defeats of secular Arab regimes in 1967 and 1973, a new inf luence reinforced the crisis of the secular nation-state. The Islamic Revolution in Iran of 1979 presented a new jihadist dimension as a Shi’a internationalism, which is ironically based on a nation-state. The Islamic Republic of Iran views itself to be the center of the world and is aimed at exporting its model of an Islamic revolution in pursuit of jihad, but it is still a nation-state, which runs counter to its ideology.21 Still, the Sunni and the Shi’a Islamisms are different branches of Islamist internationalism: both wage their own wars of ideas, but nevertheless share challenging the West and also Western-educated secular liberal Islamic elites. The Islamist counter-elites contest cultural modernity as an import from the West that derails Muslims from “sabil Allah (the path of God),” even though Islamists adopt many of the techno-scientific instruments of modernity such as modern communications technologies. In conclusion, the end of the caliphate, the rise of secular nation-states, the well-known legacies of colonialism, competing Cold War ideologies, and the failure of pan-Arabist secular regimes were part of the context of Islamist critiques of the nation-state model in the Muslim world. Indeed, the source of the idea of “Hakimiyyat Allah (Allah’s rule)” is the work of Sayyid Qutb, who reinterpreted jihad in the new meaning of an “Islamic world revolution.”22 More recently, the spectacular attacks on modern states by Islamist nonstate actors—first the Soviets in Afghanistan and later New York, Madrid, London—portend for many the ultimate demise of the nation-state. As noted previously, the agenda of contemporary Islamist movements based on a transnational religion is a new variety of internationalism to establish a new order for the world in which the Islamic claim of Siyadat al-Islam (Islamic dominance) materialized in a return of history.

U.S. Foreign Policy: Past Mistakes and Future Recommendations Islamists want to remake the world according to what they view to be a shariah, Islamic divine law. Well-informed observers know that there is no revival of shariah, but rather an Islamist invention of its tradition. Classical shariah and its reasoning are about right conduct and at times about just war, but never about the world order. The Islamist venture opposes the values of cultural modernity in a War of Ideas poised for remaking world order. The aggressive tone reveals a very uncompromising spirit. Though the War of Ideas is against outsiders, it unveils a predicament within Islam that revolves around its relation to modernity.23 Thus, the War of Ideas is not only about a civilizational binary worldview that divides humanity into “them” and “us.” It is also about problems within Islam itself. The strategy of Islamists like al Qaeda has been to strike at the West in order to provoke a reaction, and then call upon Muslims to rally to the

Value Systems and Concepts of Order

163

Islamist cause against “Crusaders” and “Jews.” The attack of 9/11 is a case in point. Nevertheless, with such a shocking attack on American soil, the war in Afghanistan to beat al Qaeda was inevitable, and the decision the Bush administration undertook to wage it was the right thing to do. This does not apply to the war in Iraq, which was a distraction from the War on Terror, and thus resulted in a catastrophe. It was from the very beginning a great strategic mistake, even a self-defeating one in the War on Terror, which is combined with a War of Ideas. What happened was that the Islamists received ammunition for their War of Ideas in which they were more successful than Bush and his administration were. The Islamists used the mistakes of the United States to their favor in the War of Ideas. How can this be rectified? I suggest that there are several ways that the new administration can learn from the experience of the previous one. Most importantly, among the most consequential f laws of the Bush administration was its failure to distinguish in the War of Ideas between Islam and Islamism, on the one hand, and between jihad and jihadism, on the other.24 The best way to fight jihadist terrorism is to dissociate these jihadists from ordinary Muslims by winning the hearts and souls of Muslims, who are not Islamists, in a War of Ideas. This task can only be accomplished, if one distinguishes between Islam and Islamism. I have the misgiving that the new administration may go into the other extreme, namely, in an illusionary appeasement of Islamism, again doing the same mistake, but in reverse while overlooking the distinction between Islam and Islamism. Second, actions and policies of the previous administration “racialized” the War on Terrorism. I personally experienced this. I recall attending a Western-Islamic dialogue in Jakarta where I defended the United States,25 siding with the attending U.S. ambassador against the defamation voiced there that the “War on Terror is a war against Islam.” But every time I entered the United States I had to go through a second inspection because I am a Muslim born in Damascus, as indicated in my German passport. My ethnic German blonde wife did not have to go through this ordeal. The European citizenship that I share with her did not protect me from being placed among people of “countries of concern.” This racial profiling, in contrast to the preference that my blonde German wife received, made clear to me that the Bush administration did not care to lose friends and allies among Muslims. As a liberal Muslim I admire U.S.-American democracy, but it has been damaged by the way Muslims are treated in the War on Terror. This racialization of the War on Terror is not the primary cause of anti-Americanism in the Muslim world, but it has been used by Islamists to give anti-Americanism a boost. Moreover, in its blind “crusade for democratization” the Bush administration lost sight and acted with no compass. In this way it—directly or indirectly—helped Islamists to come to power. This happened through the ballot-box. Islamists were able to come to power in Iraq, Gaza, and also in Turkey.26 Of course, policymakers are challenged, not only to distinguish between Islam and Islamism, but also to make distinctions within Islamism

164

Bassam Tibi

itself. There are violent Islamists committed to global jihad on the order of Qutb’s “Islamic world revolution.” One cannot talk to these Islamist terrorists (e.g., Taliban). There are, however, institutional Islamists who agree to participate in the game of democracy, go to the ballot-box, and claim to be moderate. For them democracy is, however, restricted to an electoral procedure, they refuse the related cultural values, above all those of political pluralism and powersharing. With restrictions and for convenience sake the West may do business with them, but beware of the delusion that they are allies of the West. They are not. For instance, Turkey’s AKP is not as it presents itself a conservativeIslamic party. The AKP is clearly an Islamist party. Therefore, the AKP cannot serve as the model for the world of Islam, above all not for Egypt where the Islamist Muslim Brothers are waiting to take over with a U.S. blessing.27 In the War of Ideas the AKP fights on the anti-Western front and also supports Hamas. President Obama needs advisors who do not conceal this from him as was the case with Bush, who was ignorant about the issue. The U.S. president has to be protected from the consequential naïveté that the Muslim Brothers represent an “Islam without Fear” compatible with democratic solutions.28 This is not the case! The situation is complicated by what Sunni Islamists call iham (dissimulation). The Shi’a also have a word for this: taqiyya. It means dissimulation through doublespeak. A European example is Tariq Ramadan. He is accused of this doublespeak, yet he succeeded in becoming a member of the task force summoned by then-prime minister Tony Blair for consultation on Islam.29 In this doublespeak the inter-civilizational conf lict is concealed. Another factor is the simmering conf licts in Palestine, Kashmir, Chechnya, and elsewhere. They are not the root cause for Islamism; however, their rekindling gives boost to the thriving of Islamist movements. In the War of Ideas these conf licts are abused to promote the perception of an Islam under siege.30 The Bush administration did nothing substantial that contributed to resolution of these conf licts to deescalate the War of Ideas. The new president could do better, if he disarms Islamists in their War of Ideas by demonstrating an U.S. approach for bridging. Cooperation and conf lict resolution should replace the earlier politics of confrontation that was harmful to the United States and for the rest of the world and nourished anti-Americanism. In his speech given in Ankara in April 2009 during his first visit to an Islamic state Obama made a step in this direction; however, he shies away from referring to differences and conf licts. Despite all odds one needs to give him credit for putting the word “secular” ahead of democracy, “secular democracy,” and for having avoided the Washington formula of “moderate Islamic democracy” that justifies the rule of institutional Islamists. In sum, the United States and its allies need a double-strategy comprised of dialogue and security. That strategy should: (i) fight the War of Ideas against those who reject dialogue and refuse compromise, (ii) engage with those who are willing to overcome inter-civilizational “fault-lines” in a venture

Value Systems and Concepts of Order

165

to establish common ground in terms of achieving a “cross-cultural morality” (i.e., Islamic humanism is an ally, Islamism is not), and (iii) beware of the tensions ignited by identity politics. Moreover, in the context of the Muslim diaspora in Europe and the United States that results from global migration, 31 government policies must not result in Islamic “enclaves” but rather engage and include their Muslim citizens and immigrants.

Toward a Peace of Ideas: Islam, Hellenism, and Reform History is most pertinent for the study of the War of Ideas and suggests ways to overcome it in peace. Modernity, as it undergirds the international system, is Western in its origin and for this reason may not always be acceptable to Muslims. However, we can look to at least two important historical lessons to defuse—or win—the War of Ideas. The first has to do with religion as ethics rather than as world order; the second has to do with inter-civilizational bridging, as Islam embraced Hellenism a millennium ago. First, my critique of political Islam(ism) and its War of Ideas is not driven by an a-religious position at all. In contrast, religious ethics is admitted. The commitment to secular modernity expressed here is restricted to decoupling religion from politics. Religion can be related to politics in ethical terms, but it should be dismissed in the meaning of a concept of political divine order. Parallel to the criticism advanced, religion is admitted as a source of ethics for a cultural underpinning of modernity. There is a precedent for this thinking in the Hellenized tradition of Islamic rationalism, which is further elucidated in the following paragraphs. Based on this I argue that religion—as ethics, not as a concept of world order—could be incorporated into a cross-religious and cross-cultural morality that contributes to bridging between Islam and other religions as well as other cultures. However, this task is not fulfilled by the contemporary “return of the sacred” in a political shape, for all of these politicized religions aim at a remaking of the world along their own concept of order. The politicization of Islam results in the combination of a religiocultural neo-absolutism with a new political variety of totalitarianism not acceptable to others. Hence, the War of Ideas. In an analogy to Karl Popper’s call to defend the “open society” against its “enemies,” I argue in the spirit of Islamic enlightenment in favor of an “open Islam” against global jihad to overcome any inter-civilizational war. This position is compatible with the tradition of Averroes who put Islam in harmony with the rational worldview of Hellenism. As much as medieval Islamic rationalists32 were receptive to the Hellenization of Islam, contemporary Muslims could embrace cultural modernity to give its values an Islamic underpinning. Such an effort would end their predicament with cultural modernity in line with reviving the heritage of Islamic rationalism. The issue is not only the need for such enlightenment, but also that Western hegemony should be put on the table. Western hegemony and the oversized power of

166

Bassam Tibi

the West are realities that Islamists use to legitimize their activities and thus must be part of a wider inter-civilizational dialogue. Thus, my second argument toward a “peace of ideas” is the need for intercivilizational bridging. Islamists, and their counterparts in every society, prefer to construct fault-lines. Nevertheless, the alternative of inter-civilizational bridging is well-known to educated Muslims. Islam succeeded in embracing Hellenism 33 and sharing its cultural heritage. The classical Greek heritage is considered to be one of the pillars of modernity in the West. Today, Islamists suppress the fact that this Hellenist heritage was essential for the classical heritage of Islam and for its tradition of rationalism. I claim that there existed a secular humanism in Islam based on the adoption of the heritage of Hellenism.34 Hellenism is one of the sources of secular Western civilization that was established on a reason-based view of the world. In this capacity Hellenism was also accepted by medieval Muslim rationalists such as al-Farabi, Ibn Sina, and Ibn Rushd up to Ibn Khaldun from the ninth through the fourteenth centuries. This process was described as the Hellenization of Islam. A revival of the related historical records matters to the international relations of our present, because it helps to revive the tradition of Islamic rationalism and the secular political philosophy of the state established by al-Farabi.35 In this regard, I draw on Leslie Lipson’s formidable comparative study of civilizations to adopt from it two major arguments and related insights pertinent to a peace of ideas. First, the introduction of Hellenism to Europe took place via the rationalist line of Islamic civilization. Lipson informs us that “Aristotle crept back into Europe by the side door. His return was due to the Arabs, who had become acquainted with Greek thinkers . . . Both Avicenna and Averroës were inf luenced by him. When the University of Paris was organized, Artistotle was introduced there from Cordoba.”36 Second, with the assistance of Hellenism (i.e., the Medieval Scholastics and later the juridical traditions associated with humanism), the Christendom that determined the civilization of Europe was secularized to smooth the way into a new civilization that today we name “the West.” Ever since, European-Christian civilization has been transformed into the existing one, which is secular. As Lipson states, “The difference in the West before and after the Renaissance . . . can be summarized in one sentence . . . The main source of Europe’s inspiration shifted from Christianity back to Greece, from Jerusalem to Athens, Socrates, not Jesus, has been the mentor of the civilization . . . The West.”37 These references to history shed a better light on Islam in the present War of Ideas and they support with justifications the view that in the history of ideas there were bridges for a peace of ideas between civilizations. Given the fact that Muslims in the past were capable of accommodating Hellenism to incorporate it in the heritage of Islamic rationalism, one is compelled to ask why this cannot happen today? Are the Muslims of today ready to accommodate in a similar manner and mindset cultural modernity to end the War of Ideas?

Value Systems and Concepts of Order

167

Historically, the Muslim adoptions from Hellenism ref lect a positive civilizational encounter and create a precedent for cross-cultural fertilization pertinent to our age. The revival of this humanist legacy could serve as a cultural underpinning for embracing modernity and its vision of democratic peace in world politics. The contemporary Islamic rationalist Mohammed Abed al-Jabri rightly argues that for people of Islam a promising “future can only be Averroist.”38 By this al-Jabri means that a true Islamic revival can only be established on a reason-based (i.e., rational) worldview in contemporary Islamic civilization. This Islamic-enlightened mindset is supportive of a peace of ideas, but it is unfortunately not the mainstream, as Islamism is. In summing up the argument, it is argued that Muslims instead of waging global jihad could, if they wanted to, engage in reviving the tradition of Islamic rationalism that f lourished in Medieval Islam. Establishing a rational worldview would help smooth the way for the acceptance of democratic peace that includes a peace of ideas. In medieval Islam the rejection of rationalism came basically from the fiqh orthodoxy (sacral jurisprudence), as it comes today from Islamism. In the past, the fiqh orthodoxy prevented the institutionalization of the scientific view of the world established by rational Islamic philosophy. Without a process of institutionalization in society no cultural innovation can be enduring. The Salafist-orthodox effort at undermining cultural innovation took place in the Islamic institutions of learning in which this orthodoxy prevailed. The introduction of the reasoning of Islamic philosophy into the curriculum was prevented. The tradition of darkness, not Islamic humanism, is being revived today by political Islam in an alliance with Wahhabi orthodoxy, which does the same job. Wahhabism provides funds for waging a global jihad, certainly not for the spread of democratic Islam. What are the repercussions from the point of view of the need to incorporate Islamic civilization into an international society on the premise of democratic peace? Can we draw on the classical heritage of Islam (science and philosophy) to present a better Islamic perspective for the future? How can we bridge between Islam and the West within the framework of an international secular community? I profess not to have a recipe for ultimate success. These questions provide an agenda of research for dealing with inter-civilizational conf lict in which the War of Ideas is embedded. A thrust of that research agenda would be the study of conf lict, akin to the Sovietology of the Cold War. In short, what is needed is an international relations subdiscipline or specialty on Islamology. 39 For a peace of ideas the violence of Islamist jihadism needs to be dismissed for the favor of Islamic humanism as a thinking of cross-civilizational bridging against religionized politics.40

Conclusion: Between Islamism and Islamic Humanism The positive common history of Islam and Hellenism belies the essentialist efforts at constructing fault-lines between the civilizations to justify the

168

Bassam Tibi

Islamist War of Ideas. For living in peace with one another, global jihad and the related fault-lines are to be not only dismissed, but abandoned altogether. No doubt, a new international morality is required. One needs to engage in cross-cultural bridging, which is not merely restricted to an intellectual undertaking. At issue is the search for a cross-cultural consensus over a reformed new world order, of course not an Islamist one. Hedley Bull places the issue of order at the center of his reasoning. Seen from this perspective, post-bipolar world politics is characterized by a competition between two concepts of order—one is secular the other is based on religionized politics. Without mentioning the work of Bull, John Kelsay, in his book Islam and War, phrases the problem in asking who will determine the future of world order. The question is not a rhetorical one, it is about the agenda. As Kelsay states: Much of the contemporary return to Islam is driven by the perception of Muslims as a community . . . having a mission to fulfill. That this perception sometimes leads to conf lict is not surprising. In encounters between the West and Islam, the struggle is over who will provide the primary definition to world order. Will it be the West, with its notions of territorial boundaries, market economies, private religiosity, and the priority of individual rights? Or will it be Islam, with its emphasis on the universal mission of a transtribal community called to build a social order founded on the pure monotheism natural to humanity? The question for those who envision world order, then, is, “Who determines the shape of order, in the new international context?” The very question suggests a competition between cultural traditions with distinctive notions of peace, order, and justice. It thus implies pessimism concerning the call for a new world order based on notions of common humanity.41 In short, the twenty-first century heralds a competition between two visions of order for the future of humanity: Either the expansion of Dar al-Islam pursued with the means of the revived jihad to map the entire globe according to the visions of Sayyid Qutb, or the concept of a “democratic peace” based on reviving the views of the greatest philosopher of European Enlightenment, Immanuel Kant, on “Ewigen Frieden (perpetual peace).” This peace is an expression of cultural modernity. Therefore, the pivotal subject matter is not “Islam or the West”—this phrase is in my view too general and therefore inappropriate—but rather the conf lict between the worldview of cultural modernity and the one of global jihad for the system of “Hakiymiyyat Allah (rule of God).” The present analysis supports the hypothesis that most problems of Islam derive from its predicament with modernity. The pending choice is: Either Muslims subscribe to a world of religious and cultural pluralism and thus accept that others are equals to them, or they engage themselves in the ongoing political articulation of the well-known da’wa, that is, proselytization with the vision of a global Dar

Value Systems and Concepts of Order

169

al-Islam. The overall identity of Islamic civilization is being revived, but it puts Muslim people at a cross-road. Viewed from this angle, an embracing of cultural modernity by Muslims would be a contribution to embracing a view of a pluralist world. Then, jihad would be viewed as a legacy Muslims could dispense with in their present. In recommending an Islamic embracing of cultural modernity I hasten to add that modernity cannot be reduced to items to be adopted from instrumental modernity, for it is also a rational worldview based on secular values. At the cross-road there are other options than the extreme choice between Islamization and Westernization. Kemalism and similar varieties of equating progress (tarakki) with Westernization have failed and paved the way for the rise of Islamism in contemporary Turkey.42 In learning from this experience, we need to seek other options. I refuse to see in the drive toward de-Westernization the needed conclusion from the failure of Westernization. It is worth mentioning that the Egyptian Islamist Hasan al-Sharqawi refuses Kemalism as a strategy of Westernizing the world of Islam, but is keen at adopting Western weaponry for fighting jihad against the West. For him there is no contradiction in arguing in this manner, as he blatantly states: “Our goal cannot be to Westernize, but to learn from the West how to deal with modern weapon systems, and even more: to produce these systems by ourselves to be in a position to defeat the West as our enemy.”43 This Islamist author engages himself in reviving the nostalgia of Islamic growth. The mindset of Islamic nostalgia combined with political jihadist Islam is not simply an expression of cultural self-assertion—as some Western scholars believe—but rather a dream of restoring Pax Islamica as the proper Islamic world order. As Kelsay rightly puts it, It would be wrong . . . to understand the contemporary call for revival among Muslims as simple nostalgia . . . Some authors long for the glory of the past . . . (and) have argued that the ascension of European and North American civilization in world affairs has been based on a failure of leadership in the Islamic world and on the Western willingness to shamelessly exploit, in the name of profit, the human and material resources of the developing countries. The mood of such writers is not nostalgia but outrage over the state of the world, in particular the state of the Muslim community.44 Clearly, at present the Islamist supporters of the mindset of this nostalgia of an Islamic order will not be able to topple the existing order, but they are in a position to destabilize it through their action of global jihad. One should be concerned about a “new Cold War” (see note 1) between the secular state in pursuit of what Islamists gear at, namely, “Hakimiyyat Allah (Rule of God).” This is their political order pursued on the illusion of being able to remake the world45 through a global mapping of the world in an enhanced Dar al-Islam. The present analysis argues that Islamism wages the War of Ideas over the

170

Bassam Tibi

structure of political order—the nation-state and world order—and thus that political Islam and its jihadism matter to international and security studies. We need dialogue across civilizations on what might be accepted by both sides as the right order. Dialogue should be viewed as a variety of conf lictresolution in peace, not merely as a forum for rhetorical pronouncements. The so-called Christian-Muslim Understanding alleged to happen as an indication of goodwill is not an effort at conf lict resolution. This venture falters at the bedrock of reality of conf lict that “good will” avoids acknowledging. The present study on the War of Ideas suggests that a revival of the heritage of Islamic medieval philosophers committed to reason could not only demonstrate to contemporary Muslims that their ancestors were able to learn from Plato’s concept of the state and the Aristotelian logic of politics, but also legitimate a peace of ideas based on secular humanism. If contemporary Muslims were willing to look back to this Islamic heritage, and to revive it instead of engaging in Islamist illusions, then there would be a way for coming to terms with the non-Muslim others. In my view, al-Farabi’s classic “al-Madina al-Fadila (The Perfect State)” (see note 35) is also acceptable to non-Muslim parts of humanity; it is the rational order of the Madina al-Fadila as a perfect polity supposed to be led by a philosopher as a ruler. This ruler is understood in the Hellenistic sense, not as an Imam complying with the shariah. In contrast, any imposition by the Islamists of a Hakimiyyat Allah, which is—by the way—neither mentioned in the Quran, nor in the hadiths, would be perceived by non-Muslims as a jihad (declaration of war) on them for coercing them to accept their subordination to an Islamic order alien not only to non-Muslims, but also to truly democratic Muslims. Ethical integrity compels me not to conclude this chapter without a confession to be made. With sadness it is stated that the propositions made in this chapter are only shared by a minority of contemporary enlightened Muslim thinkers such as al-Jabri and Arkoun, and so on. This vision of a civil Islam is not among the current popular public choices in the world of Islam (Indonesia and partly Turkey are an exception). In contrast, Islamist internationalism, be it in the Shi’a shape of exporting the Islamic Revolution of Iran or al Qaeda’s Sunni variety of jihadism, enjoys at present to varying degrees being the dominating public choice. For a real change in the Arab Middle East, being the hub of the world of Islam, a cultural change in the dominating mindset is needed. If instead Islamist policies geared at a further Islamization were to prevail, modernity combined with rethinking Islam would stay out of the door. If Muslims continue to ignore the need for innovations and cultural change for a successful coping with a changing world in terms of coming to terms with Islam’s predicament with modernity, then the War of Ideas will continue unabated and it also could assume a violent, jihadist shape. Of course, a War of Ideas related to culture and modernity is also interrelated with issues of security. For accomplishing democratic peace in moving away from global jihad, there is also a need for a security approach and a

Value Systems and Concepts of Order

171

dialogue related to it. Among the findings of this chapter is the insight that post-bipolar politics is also affected by culture and religion as these require combining dialogue with concerns of security. To be sure, this security has to be a joint Western-Islamic venture to avert the development of the scenario of a clash of civilizations to a self-fulfilling prophecy in a War of Ideas.

Notes 1. Mark Juergensmeyer, The New Cold War? Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular Nation State (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993). To be sure, this confrontation indicates a War of Ideas. 2. Among the sources of the War of Ideas in world politics one finds politicized religion in the context of post-bipolarity; on this subject, see Pippa Noris and Roland Inglehart, Sacred and Secular. Religion and Politics Worldwide (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004); and Eric Hanson, Religion and Politics in the International System Today (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006); see also the more pertinent references related to Islamism made in notes 3 and 6. 3. On this term, see B. Tibi, Political Islam, World Politics and Europe. Democratic Pace and EuroIslam vs. Global Jihad (New York: Routledge, 2008). 4. Bruce Lawrence, The Defenders of God (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1989). 5. The journal Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions deals with political religion and publishes important articles on this subject. Also the Hannah Arendt Institute for the Research on Totalitarianism/HAIT, based at the University of Dresden/Germany, conducted a research project on “political religion” that resulted in the publication of the following book: Gerhard Besier/Hermann Lübbe, eds, Politische Religion und Religionspolitik (Goettingen: Vandenhoek & Ruprecht, 2005). This volume includes my case study on AKP in Turkey viewed as an example for institutional Islamism, which is also a political religion (pp. 229–260). 6. B. Tibi, “Jihadism and Inter-Civilizational Conf lict,” in Shahram Akbarzadeh and Fethi Mansouri, eds, Islam and Political Violence. Muslim Diaspora and Radicalism in the West (London: Taures, 2007), pp. 39–64, notes on pp. 201–206, at the end of the volume. 7. Daniel Philpott, “The Challenge of September 11 to Secularism in International Relations,” World Politics, vol. 55, no. 1 (October 2002), pp. 66–95. 8. Sayyid Qutb, Ma’alim fi al-tariq [Signposts along the Road] (Cairo: Dar al-Shuruq, 13th legal edition, 1989), pp. 201–202. On Qutb as the authority of political Islam, see Roxanne Euben, The Enemy in the Mirror. Islamic Fundamentalism (Princeton/NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), chapter 3; and David Cook, Understanding Jihad (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), pp. 202–206. 9. For Sayyid Qutb jihad is an Islamic world revolution, as he argues in his book: al-Salam al-alami wa al-Islam [World Peace and Islam] (Cairo: al-Shuruq, 10th legal edition, 1992), pp. 172–173. 10. Qutb, Ma’alim fi al-tariq, pp. 5–9. 11. Philpott, “The Challenge,” p. 67. 12. John Kelsay, Islam and War. A Study in Comparative Ethics (Louisville: John Knox Press, 1993), p. 117; see also the new book by John Kelsay, Arguing the Just War in Islam (Cambridge/MA: Harvard University Press, 2007). 13. Qutb, Ma’alim fi al-tariq, p. 169. 14. Qutb, al-Salam al-Alami wa al-Islam. 15. Ibid., pp. 172–173.

172

Bassam Tibi

16. See also the two monographs on Islamism, published in 1998 and 2008 by B. Tibi: The Challenge of Fundamentalism. Political Islam and the New World Disorder (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998, updated 2008); and Political Islam, World Politics and Europe. The third one is forthcoming with Yale University Press (referenced in note 24). 17. For more details, see David Fromkin, A Peace to End all Peace. The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East (New York: Avon Books, 1989); and on replacing the Islamic Empire in Turkey by a secular order, see Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey (London: Oxford University Press, 1979). 18. On the tensions between the secular nation-state and the Islamist shariah state, see my book, The Challenge, especially chapters 6–8. 19. On these repercussions, see Adeed Dawisha, “1967 and After,” in Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century (Princeton/NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003), chapter 10, pp. 252–281; and B. Tibi, Conflict and War in the Middle East (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998, new expanded edition; first published 1993 in association with Harvard/CFIA), chapters 3 and 4 on the 1967 war. 20. This is a coinage by Yusuf al-Qaradawi, al-Hulul al-Mustawrada wa kaif janat ala ummatuna (The imported solutions and how they damaged our umma), vol. I of a three-volumed book trilogy, published in Cairo and Beirut in the 1970s under the title al-Hall al-Islami (Beirut: Mu’assat al-Risalah, 1970–1980), and reprinted many times. 21. See Graham Fuller, The Center of the Universe. The Geopolitics of Iran (Boulder/Col.: Westview Press, 1991). 22. Qutb, al-Salam al-Alami wa al-Islam, p. 169. See also his Ma’alim fi al-Tariq. 23. B. Tibi, Islam’s Predicament with Modernity. Religious Reform and Cultural Change (New York: Routledge, 2009). 24. Islam and Islamism are different issues analyzed by B. Tibi, “Between Islam and Islamism,” in Tami A. Jacoby and Brent Sasley, eds, Redefining Security in the Middle East (New York: Palgrave, 2002), pp. 62–82. My study of “Islamism and Islam” is already completed and is forthcoming in 2010 as a book to be published by Yale University Press/New Haven. 25. See the contribution by the U.S. ambassador to Jakarta in 2002, Ralph Boyce, U.S. Foreign Policy. On our place in the community of nations, see Karlina Helmantia and Irfan Abubakar, eds, Dialogue in the World Disorder ( Jakarta: AIN-Hidayatollah Islamic State University, 2004), pp. 9–24; this volume also includes B. Tibi, “Islamic Civilization and the Quest for Democratic Pluralism,” pp. 159–202. 26. For a criticism, see B. Tibi, “Islamist Parties. Why they Can’t be Democratic,” Journal of Democracy, vol. 19, no. 3 (2008), pp. 43–48, and the case study by B. Tibi, “Turkey’s Islamist Danger. Islamists Approach Europe,” Middle East Quarterly, vol. 16, no. 1 (2009), pp. 47–54 (see also note 5 earlier). 27. Zeyno Baran, “Turkey Divided,” Journal of Democracy, vol. 17 (2008), pp. 55–69, and also the references made in the previous note. On Egypt, see note 28. 28. The following books on Egypt provide reason to worry, because they are based on a misconception about the Movement of the Muslim Brothers (MB). They also muster U.S. support for this Islamist movement and indirectly help it to come to power: Raymond Baker, Islam without Fear. The New Islamists in Egypt (Cambridge/MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), and most recently Bruce Rutherford, Egypt after Mubarak (Princeton/NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008). It is amazing to see how these people support one another. On the book cover Baker writes the endorsement for Rutherford. 29. Caroline Fourest, Brother Tariq. The Doublespeak of Tariq Ramadan (New York: Encounter Books, 2008); and Melanie Phillips, Londonistan (New York: Encounter Books, 2006), pp. 174–175. 30. Graham Fuller, Sense of Siege. The Geopolitics of Islam and the West (Boulder/Col: Westview Press, 1995).

Value Systems and Concepts of Order

173

31. Myron Weiner, Global Migration Crisis (New York: Harper & Collins, 1995). 32. On this tradition of Islamic rationalism, see Herbert A. Davidson, Alfarabi, Avicenna and Averroes on Intellect. Their Cosmologies, Theories of the Active Mind, and Theories of Human Intellect (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), chapter 6 on Averroës. 33. On the Hellenization of Islam, see William M. Watt, Islamic Philosophy and Theology, 2nd ed. (Edinburgh: University Press, 1997); see also the references made in note 32. 34. See B. Tibi, “Bridging the Heterogenity of Civilizations. Reviving the Grammar of Islamic Humanism” Theoria. A Journal for Political and Social Theory (2009, forthcoming). 35. See the excellent translation of al-Madina al-Fadila by Michael Walzer, ed., Al-Farabi on the Perfect State. Abu Nasr al-Farabi: Mabadi ara’ ahl al-madina al-fadila (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985). 36. Leslie Lipson, The Ethical Crises of Civilizations. Moral Meltdown or Advance? (London: Sage, 1993), pp. 62–63. 37. Ibid. 38. Mohammed Abed al-Jabri, Arab Islamic Philosophy (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1999), pp. 120–130. 39. A new model for Islamic studies is needed, one that I label “Islamology.” Islamology is a study of conf lict, however, in a discursive-communicative, hermeneutical manner; it is not based on quantitative methods most of which do not help much for understanding Islamic societies and their problems. Islamology resembles the earlier Sovietology as a study of global conf lict, but it dismisses any Cold War mentality and focuses on bridging concepts and differences. Neither the classical Orientalist study of the scripture of Islam nor the cultural-relativist narrative of culture pursued in U.S. anthropology devoted to the study of Islam are helpful for the understanding of religionized politics in the contemporary world. What is needed is an international relations subdiscipline or specialty on Islamology: Western scholars of Islam who are philologians, historians, and cultural anthropologists cannot replace political scientists who study international conf lict. In view of this state of affairs, there is a need for a combined historical and social-scientific study of Islam, not as a religion, but as a political reality. This discipline is Islamology. In 2003 the elite Swiss University of St. Gallen established the position of a “visiting professor of Islamology,” in contrast to traditional Islamic studies. The author was the first incumbent of this professorship. 40. On religionized politics, see my chapter in Efraim Inbar and Hillel Frisch, eds., Radical Islam and International Security (New York: Routledge, 2008), pp. 11–37. 41. Kelsay, Islam and War, p. 117. See also Kelsay’s, Arguing the Just War in Islam (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007). 42. On this issue, see the classic by Niyazi Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey, new edition (New York: Routledge, 1998); and on the failure, see my article “Turkey’s Islamist Danger.” 43. Hasan al-Sharqawi, al-Muslimun, Ulama wa Hukama (Muslims as Ulema and Wise Men) (Cairo: Mu’ssasat Mukhtar, 1987), p. 12. 44. Kelsay, Islam and War, p. 25. 45. See the parts on “Remaking Politics” and “Remaking the World,” in Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby, eds, Fundamentalisms and the State. Remaking Polities, Economies and Militance (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1993), parts 1 and 3.

This page intentionally left blank

CH A P T E R

T W E LV E

The War of Ideas as Therapy: Reflections on a Eureka Moment in the “War on Terror” Abde lwahab El -A f f e ndi

There was a palpable “Eureka moment” for many Americans when the 9/11 Commission’s long-awaited report was published in the summer of 2004.1 The confusion was cleared, the mystery was solved, the threat defined and a clear strategy to confront it proposed. The enthusiasm was general, and the report became an instant bestseller. Among the more enthusiastic recipients of the report, David Brooks, a conservative columnist at The New York Times, waxed lyrical. For Brooks, the Commission’s report has made the coveted achievement of producing that “all-encompassing, epoch-defining essay, the way George F. Kennan did during the cold war under the pseudonym X,” an achievement of which “foreign policy wonks [dream when they] go to bed.”2 Now, that report is here, the mystery is no more. According to the report, We’re not in the middle of a war on terror . . . We’re not facing an axis of evil. Instead, we are in the midst of an ideological conf lict. We are facing . . . a loose confederation of people who believe in a perverted stream of Islam that stretches from Ibn Taimaya [sic] to Sayyid Qutb. Terrorism is just the means they use to win converts to their cause. Only with this success in defining the problem correctly can we proceed to prescribe the suitable remedy. When you see that our enemies are primarily an intellectual movement, not a terrorist army, you see why they are in no hurry . . . Their time horizon can be totally different from our own . . . [and] they can play by different rules. There is no territory they must protect. They never have to win a battle but can instead profit in the realm of public opinion from the glorious martyrdom entailed in

176

Abdelwahab El-Affendi

their defeats. We think the struggle is fought on the ground, but they know the struggle is really fought on satellite TV, and they are far more sophisticated than we are in using it.3 In essence, therefore, the “war on terror” is a “war of spin,” to be fought in the media. It also needs to take the form of an “ideological counteroffensive,” which should involve the promotion of democracy, modern education, crosscultural dialogue, and even the encouragement of a religious “reformation.” “We need to set up the sort of intellectual mobilization we had during the cold war, with modern equivalents of the Congress for Cultural Freedom, to give an international platform to modernist Muslims and to introduce them to Western intellectuals.”4 The U.S. foreign policy apparatus, which “is geared toward relations with states,” must now adapt to a confrontation with “a belief system that is inimical to the state system.” This calls for the setting up of new institutions and the adoption of new approaches.5 Welcome to the First World War of Spin.

Liberation in Thought Eureka moments are very revealing in themselves. An exhilarating discovery derives its value and the excitement it inspires from the spirited search driven both by a deep anxiety and a deeply felt loss. What is to be found is already there, in a sense. There is a defined space, a gaping hole, with a shape in which the object one is looking for would fit perfectly. When the new object is found, when a new discovery is made, it is instantly recognized, since it was exactly what we have always been looking for. This was characteristic of another famous Eureka moment described by Frederick Engels in his essay Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy6: Then came Feurbach’s Essence of Christianity. With one blow it pulverized the contradiction in that without circumlocution it placed materialism on the throne again . . . Nothing exists outside man and nature, and the higher beings our religious fantasies have created are only the fantastic ref lection of our own essence . . . One must have himself experienced the liberating effect of this book to get an idea of it. Enthusiasm was general; we all at once became Feurbachians. The liberating effect of “discoveries” is often derived from success in disentangling oneself from webs of one’s own creation. You have to have fallen completely under the spell of Hegel’s convoluted web of idealistic philosophy to find salvation in Feuerbach’s materialist counterattack. Often, a new discovery reveals and appeals to what Pierre Bourdieu calls the unconscious or

The War of Ideas as Therapy

177

7

the “unthinkable,” and Durkheim calls “the habits . . . the real forces which govern us.”8 These are things we take so much for granted that they are not even discussed. They are “what is most hidden” since they are “what everyone agrees about, agreeing so much that they don’t even mention them, the things that are beyond question, that go without saying.”9 The discovery thus fits in the picture we always had but could not fully articulate since it has always been there, but has been disturbed and displaced by the new dissonant events or ideas that shocked us. In the case of U.S. officialdom and intelligentsia, the web in question was the master narrative that saw the 9/11 attacks as having come out of the blue, an event that cannot be explained by reference to history or politics, but only comprehended with reference to its own unique depravity. It is, in the words of Bruce Cumings, the epitome of an apolitical act, in “its utter recklessness and indifference to consequences, its craven anonymity, and its lack of any discernible ‘program’ save for inchoate revenge.” Its depravity is only matched by its futility. [N]othing in our adult lives has prepared us for such a contemptible fusion of willful mass terrorism, blood-stained earthly tragedy, and passionate, ardent conviction—the adolescent fantasy that one big bang will change the world and usher in a global “jihad,” a new epoch of “Crusades,” or the final solution to eight decades of history that have passed since the Ottoman Empire collapsed . . . What programmatic direction issues forth from the collapse of the twin towers and the attack on the Pentagon?10 The assault on American pride in its “superior virtue as a nation” was “one of the two great shocks of September 11 for Americans.” That there were “persons in the world who denied any good faith at all to American actions and motives in the world arena . . . amazed Americans and they found it galling.” “How was it possible that persons who had less of everything worth having doubt that those who had more of everything had earned it by their merit?”11 The other great shock was the revelation about America’s vulnerability to such enemies. Until the attacks took place, “Americans could afford to ignore the verbal attacks so rampant in the world as the babblings of fools . . . We were supposed to be in a position to be able to ignore such criticisms because we were essentially invulnerable, and we have now discovered that we are not.”12 Given that the attack was considered “an attack on our values and on civilization itself,” Americans found “such an attack unconscionable.” We are determined to show that, despite this attack, we are and remain the greatest country in the world. In order to prove this, we are . . . expected to applaud without reservation whatever our government and our armed forces will do, even if this is not normal.

178

Abdelwahab El-Affendi

The extent of this requirement of “no reservations” may be seen in the widespread denunciation of those who try to “explain” why the events of September 11 occurred. Explanation is considered justification and virtual endorsement of terror.13 In this narrative, explanation is unwelcome, and also impossible. For “social science can have little to say about September 11th”14 Yet the search for explanations is as desperate as ever. People constantly ask: Why? Like a youngster covering her face with her hands while watching a horror movie, but peeping through her fingers, people want to ask for reasons and are keen to find out what happens next. But by its very nature, this narrative does not admit of explanations. For it starts with New York’s blue skies and (largely) peaceful workday mornings, and concludes that the disruptive force must have no origins within the walls of this peaceful city. The aliens, barbarians from beyond the gates, must fully account for everything. And here the “official” and authoritative account of the 9/11 Commission comes in: it perfectly fulfils the role of a soothing master narrative that suddenly explains everything. By starting the narrative in fourteenth-century Syria, it completely absolves America from any contribution to creating this “evil monster” that has been growing within the bosom of Islam through its own internal pathology of dogmatic intolerance. By not extending the narrative sufficiently back to the Crusades, or fast forwarding it to Spain and the Inquisition, let alone colonialism, the creation of Israel, the Cold War, Afghanistan, and the 1991 war with Iraq, this sanitized narrative provides an account with which the West can be perfectly comfortable: it has nothing to do with us. In his counternarrative, bin Laden refers precisely to these blind spots, citing the Crusades, Spain, and the colonial devastation of Muslim lands in justification of his actions. It is interesting, however, to see how parochial his account is. While referring to Muslim grievances against colonialism, he puts the clock back eighty years to World War I, when the Arab East was occupied and the Caliphate abolished. Earlier attacks affecting other parts of the Muslim world are not deemed relevant: Napoleon’s epoch-making, if brief, occupation of Egypt in 1799; the occupation of Algeria in 1831, Tunisia in 1881, and Egypt again in 1882, not to mention most of Africa during the nineteenth century and Indonesia and India much earlier. All these cataclysmic events hardly register on his radar, since they were too far from his native Arabia. The 9/11 Commission’s account is complex and sophisticated enough to be seductively plausible, but simple enough to be instantly adoptable. Recognizing the complex motives and inspirations of al Qaeda, the Commission disarmingly admits hostility to U.S. policies as a major factor in enhancing the appeal of the extremist group, pointing out how bin Laden’s rhetoric selectively draws from multiple sources—Islam, history, and the region’s political and economic malaise. He also stresses grievances against the

The War of Ideas as Therapy

179

United States widely shared in the Muslim world. He inveighed against the presence of U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia, the home of Islam’s holiest sites. He spoke of the suffering of the Iraqi people as a result of sanctions imposed after the Gulf War, and he protested U.S. support of Israel.15 The appeal of his message was helped by a combination of nostalgia to the past glory of Islam, frustration with corrupt rulers blamed for the decline of the community, and a tendency to scapegoat outsiders and rising social discontent. Against the background of the bankruptcy of secular regimes where “political, social, and economic problems created f lammable societies” bin Laden “used Islam’s most extreme, fundamentalist traditions as his match.” All these elements—including religion—combined in an explosive compound. Other extremists had, and have, followings of their own. But in appealing to societies full of discontent, bin Laden remained credible as other leaders and symbols faded.16 However, the source and inspiration of bin Laden’s “extreme Islamist version of history” can be traced, through the leading Egyptian Islamist ideologue Sayyid Qutb (1906–1966), to the fiery medieval Muslim jurist, Ibn-Taymiyyah (1263–1328) via the founders of Wahabbism (in eighteenthcentury Arabia) and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (founded in 1928). Both men preached an uncompromising message that saw no middle ground in what they “conceived as a struggle between God and Satan.”17 Following Qutb in branding the majority of Muslims who do not subscribe to his vision as deviants and unbelievers, bin Laden uses this stark view “to rationalize even unprovoked mass murder as righteous defense of an embattled faith.”18 As a consequence, the United States is faced here with a religious conf lict, in which fanaticism, and in particular Islamic fanaticism, is the instigator and the determinant factor. That stream is motivated by religion and does not distinguish politics from religion, thus distorting both. It is further fed by grievances stressed by Bin Ladin and widely felt throughout the Muslim world—against the U.S. military presence in the Middle East, policies perceived as antiArab and anti-Muslim, and support of Israel. Bin Ladin and Islamist terrorists mean exactly what they say: to them America is the font of all evil, the “head of the snake,” and it must be converted or destroyed. It is not a position with which Americans can bargain or negotiate. With it there is no common ground—not even respect for life—on which to begin a dialogue. It can only be destroyed or utterly isolated.19 What the United States is facing is thus a “war of holy vengeance” where it remains “unclear what, if anything, could end this jihad.”20 The campaign “may have started in reaction to specific U.S. policies but it quickly became far deeper.” Unless the United States was prepared to “abandon the Middle

180

Abdelwahab El-Affendi

East, convert to Islam, and end the immorality and godlessness of its society and culture,” the terrorists will not abandon their campaign.21 In the face of this apolitical phenomenon of “infantile nihilism,”22 only a dual “crusade” of “struggle of ideas” and enforced reform could help confront this menace (described alternatively as “Islamism,” “political Islam,” or “radical Islam”). At one level, there is a need for a “struggle of ideas” modeled on the Cold War conf lict with Communism to roll back the inf luence of radical Islam. At another, the reform and democratization of Muslim societies is unavoidable in order to further undermine support for extremism.

Communication as War What is most interesting about the concept of “war of ideas” is that it has been first advanced by the military and security establishments in the United States as an adjunct for the war effort. Former U.S. defense secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld was first off the mark with the suggestion in a newspaper interview in September 2003 in which he argued that the war on terror needed to be waged primarily in the realm of ideas.23 The theme was taken up in the following year by Condoleezza Rice (who was national security advisor at the time) in a talk to the U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP) in which lessons from the propaganda battles of the Cold War were rehearsed. A month later (in September 2004), the Strategic Communication Task Force of Defense Science Board issued a report calling for a radical overhaul of strategic communications.24 A number of voices from among intellectuals and the academic community did contemplate some initiatives in this area. In fact the first salvo in the war of ideas could arguably be the famous (notorious) Letter from America published in February 2002 by about sixty prominent American intellectuals in support of the war on terror.25 In that letter, published at first mainly as an advertisement in a number of European newspapers, the intellectuals tried to defend the American reaction to the attacks. By arguing that the attackers despise and target “our overall society, our entire way of living,” the signatories proceeded to define American identity in terms of core values of respect for human dignity, belief in universal moral truths, civility, openness to other views, rationality, and freedom of conscience, a characterization that makes America a uniquely virtuous entity. “Historically, no other nation has forged its core identity—its constitution and other founding documents, as well as its basic self-understanding—so directly and explicitly on the basis of universal human values.” America’s own determination to fight in self-defense and to safeguard the country and its universal values thus stands in marked contrast with the action of the terrorists who claim to launch a “holy war” against all those who do not share their beliefs. The perpetrators were hostile to “a foundational principle of the modern world, religious tolerance, as well as . . . fundamental human rights.”

The War of Ideas as Therapy

181

In contrast to this particularistic stance that justified murder in God’s name, the intellectuals argue that the only permissible recourse to violence as a last resort must be based on the principle of just war, which holds that war can only be waged to “protect the innocent from certain harm,” if and when “the danger to innocent life is real and certain, and especially if the aggressor is motivated by implacable hostility.” Even then, only the use of proportionate force under “a legitimate authority with responsibility for public order” can be morally justified. The significance of this intervention stems from the fact that it brings together a number of diverse themes, including the debate on religion and politics, the distinction between fanatical terrorism and the rational use of force, and the quest for a secular, universally acceptable (but quasi-religious) legitimation for the use of violence, in contrast to the arbitrary resort to indiscriminate violence, and so on. In sum, by trying to define their own stance, and America’s very identity, in terms of universal human values, an attack on America becomes an attack on humanity as a whole. Of no less interest is the way in which the intellectuals sought to draw a clear line of demarcation between the “universal values” they espouse, on the one hand, and the parochial fanaticism of the terrorists, on the other. The first offers a rational justification for resort to violence as a last resort, in contrast to the irrationalism of the terrorists who engage in violence for its own sake, and are motivated by ideological imperatives that are based on the contempt for life and the contempt for all those who do not share their fanatical beliefs. The epistle of the intellectuals embodies the ambivalence in the discourse on the war on terror between regarding it as an isolated phenomenon or seeing it as broadly supported “Muslim insurgency.” It denies the insurgents’ claims to Islamic legitimacy, affirming that the “radical Islamicists [sic]” who perpetrated that act of terror represented a “violent, extremist, and radically intolerant religious-political movement that now threatens the world, including the Muslim world.” They have no legitimacy in Islam, which is “one of the world’s great religions, with about 1.2 billion adherents,” the great majority of whom are “guided in large measure by the teachings of the Qur’an,” and “are decent, faithful, and peaceful.” But no sooner had this categorical affirmation of distinction been made than we detect another note of unease. Addressing themselves to “our brothers and sisters in Muslim societies,” the intellectuals conclude thus: “One day, this war will end. When it does—and in some respects even before it ends—the great task of conciliation awaits us.” “We know that, for some of you, mistrust of us is high, and we know that we Americans are partly responsible for that mistrust. But we must not be enemies. In hope, we wish to join with you and all people of good will to build a just and lasting peace.” The subtext of this hope for reconciliation is that the conf lict is not going to merely touch an isolated rogue group, but will be in part directed at (or resented by) the wider Muslim community.

182

Abdelwahab El-Affendi

These entanglements dominate in the area of policy as well. How can one have a reconciliation when the whole argument is that no conf lict is taking place in the first place, at least not with “our brothers and sisters” in the Muslim world? And where does the war on terror end and the “war for hearts of minds” begin? When (and how) does occupation and domination turn into democracy promotion? And, no less important, against who is the war of ideas being waged? And how can one distinguish between genuine efforts of communication and “reach out campaigns” on the one side, and propaganda designed to deceive and mislead, on the other? Where does “communicative action” stop and spin and manipulation begin? I have discussed the motives, strategies, and shortcomings of this campaign and the questionable premises behind it elsewhere,26 and there is no need to go over these issues once more. Suffice it to reiterate here that this whole campaign is based on a host of untenable assumptions and false analogies (such as the analogy with the Cold War). The DSB Task Force report, which acknowledges this problem, poses the issue in an equally problematic framework, in stark contrast to the Cold War, the United States today is not seeking to contain a threatening state/empire, but rather seeking to convert a broad movement within Islamic civilization to accept the value structure of Western Modernity—an agenda hidden within the official rubric of a “War on Terrorism.”27 While clearing the confusion over Cold War tactics, this comment reproduces the confusion about the war being one between Western and Islamic civilizations, a claim that is alternately made and denied by U.S. officials and intellectuals. Equally problematic is the vacillation between targeting governments and populations. It is at times recognized that “while the Cold War represented a confrontation between governments, this new battle was one brought on by the failure of governments.”28 However, other equally important distinctions are not clearly recognized. An important contrast was that in the Cold War contest the West was engaged in the promotion of values and prospects that both appealed to the target populations’ value system and to their national and individual aspirations. In the Middle East, however, the West is acting simultaneously against the value system and the perceived interests and the national aspirations of the region’s peoples. Attempts to clear this confusion hinge on a distinction between the hard core hostile groups and the sympathetic masses. The “war of ideas” strategy thus calls for destroying the hardliners while wooing the masses, or at least trying to “dampen the animosity” the wider Muslim community felt toward the United States.29 The enemy can thus be seen as a “relatively small but still sizable, intensely ambitious, and disproportionately powerful subgroup of Muslims [who] do indeed hate ‘who we are.’ ”30 The rest include those alienated by U.S. policies, as well as a majority who are too preoccupied with

The War of Ideas as Therapy

183

survival to care. Implicit in the intellectuals’ appeal for reconciliation at a later stage, after U.S. forces whack the extremists, is a call for the masses to stand aside while this whacking was going on. We can detect here again the ambivalence regarding whether the terrorist phenomenon is an isolated pocket of fanaticism or, as some have argued, a broader “Muslim insurgency.” In the latter case, the call for isolating the terrorists and seeking dialogue with the wider Muslim community would be misguided. The arguments outlined earlier entail two contradictory positions. At one level, the very attempt to deny the legitimacy of the terrorist fanatics is instantly contradicted by the simultaneous attempt at engaging with them in a contest to win the hearts and minds of the wider Muslim population. For this move in fact grants the terrorists a recognition that their position is indeed not isolated. This approach also puts the United States and other major powers in a position where they appear to be vying, on almost equal terms, with the radical Islamists in the “struggle over Islam” where the United States tries to portray itself as “more aware than Muslims of the correct orientation regarding their beliefs and culture” and as keen to “rescue Islam from its fundamentalist hijackers.”31 This realizes and reinforces the terrorists’ claim to political and moral equivalence to the United States, given that one of the major objectives of the acts of violence committed by terrorists is to announce “that the power of the [terrorist] group is equal or superior to that of the state.”32 Fighting the war on the ideological territory of these groups enhances their claim to equivalence. Second, and more seriously, the claims about the imperviousness of the terrorists to reason commit those waging the war on terror to irrational, even paranoid policies. This was personified in the stance of British prime minister Tony Blair, whose fixation with the terror threat put him in conf lict with his own party and a wide section of the British public. The increasing sense of desperation with which Blair continued to deplore the lack of appreciation for his “prescient” stance on terrorism and the war in Iraq33 highlights this predicament. Blair has had a “revelation” on 9/11, the substance of which was that “the nature of the global threat we face in Britain and round the world is real and existential and it is the task of leadership to expose it and fight it, whatever the political cost; and that the true danger is not to any single politician’s reputation, but to our country.”34 This sounded like the determined utterance of a “suicide politician” who, like his adversary, the suicide terrorist, continues to complain that what he sees so clearly does not appear so obvious to everyone else. Most people appear to think, Blair complains, that the challenge “is a very remote threat and it is far away.” They need to be woken up to the stark fact that “it is a matter of time unless we act and take a stand before terrorism and weapons of mass destruction come together.”35 The letter of the American intellectuals provoked fierce criticism, a lot of it from within the United States itself. For reasons of space, we cannot go into these exchanges, which contest both the moral authority of the authors and

184

Abdelwahab El-Affendi

their claims to speak for America. But its significance stems from the fact that a number of prominent and credible intellectuals were prepared to put their names to it, and thus give the war of ideas more credibility. However, the fact that it was the defense establishment that took the lead in this field is very telling. The primary task of the personnel in the defense and security apparatus is to engage the enemy in combat, and not chat it up. It is usually, moreover, when military campaigns are going badly that these remarks are made by the top brass. Both type of acts (the military and the intellectuals) problematized the intellectual engagement by portraying it in conf lictual terms (as war or propaganda).

What was Unique about 9/11? Crucial to deciphering the nature of the problem at hand is to address the more basic question, not of “How Did This Happen?”36 or “Why did it happen?” but, more pertinently: “What did actually happen on 9/11?” More accurately, what did people think had happened on that fateful Tuesday? What significance is being ascribed to the event by those witnessing it? This question goes to the heart of the modern debates about competing and conf licting narratives and perceptions of truth. On the face of it, what has happened was simple enough, since it has been witnessed by the whole world, live and uncut. But the central aspect of the post-9/11 narrative has been the emphasis on the uniqueness of the event. For many, this sprang from its unimaginable nature, the total shock of seeing “the unimaginable Impossible” happen.37 As one commentator put it, even the most imaginative of right-wing conspiracy theorists could not have predicted that a group of fanatics . . . could have carried out an attack which devastated two apparently indestructible buildings in the heart of New York, and then make a series of ghoulish videos boasting the fact to loyal followers around the world.38 Part of the shock comes, as Wallerstein pointed out, from the strong sense of American invulnerability, both moral and physical. America was so good and benevolent that one could not imagine someone contemplating attacking it, and so powerful and remote from potential enemies that no one could conceivably dare to attack it, or succeed if he tried. While this sense of shock is understandable, it is also surprising in provenance and scale. And this is not because of what Zizek argues (that, like the Titanic catastrophe, this was “a shock, but the space for it was already prepared in ideological fantasizing”), or what amounts to the same thing, Jean Baudrillard’s claim that “everybody without exception has dreamt of it, because everybody must dream of the destruction of any power hegemonic to that degree.”39 For

The War of Ideas as Therapy

185

both authors, the very existence of an overwhelming world power invites fantasies about its destruction. For the United States, like all other Western countries, has been busy throughout the Cold War preparing for similar events and worse: a nuclear holocaust in which most American cities would be obliterated. The shock could then be ascribed to the nature of the attackers and their style: in other words, the fact that the attack had been perpetrated by a band of terrorists using civilian airplanes as weapons. As the 9/11 Commission put it, the attack was “carried out by a tiny group of people, not enough to man a full platoon. Measured on a governmental scale, the resources behind them were trivial. The group itself was dispatched by an organization based in one of the poorest, most remote, and least industrialized countries on earth.”40 But again, terrorist attacks (invariably carried out by small bands of fanatics in any case) are not a first in the United States or in the rest of the world. Admittedly, the scale is unprecedented, and the symbolic nature of the targets quite significant. However, the scale pales when compared with what happened in Rwanda, where over eight thousand people were slaughtered every day for a hundred days, or Bosnia or Darfur. It also pales in comparison with the close to a quarter of a million who perished within a comparable time frame in the Indian Ocean tsunami of Boxing Day 2004. More significantly, it pales in comparison with atrocities in which America itself was involved, such as the death of about half a million children due to sanctions on Iraq, or the death of between twenty thousand and one hundred thousand people during the first phase of the Iraq invasion in 2003 (and over and hundreds of thousands since then). Could it be then the fact that 9/11 has been the “mother of all spectacles,” or as Jean Baudrillard puts in his own inimitable hyperbole, “the absolute event, the ‘mother’ of events, the pure event which is the essence of all the events that never happened.”41 Having taken place in the media capital of the world, the “terror spectacle took over TV programming for the next three days without commercial break as the major television networks focused on the attack and its aftermath,” making it easily “the most documented event in history.”42 The coverage itself became “a media spectacle of the highest order” as the networks “framed the terrorist attacks to whip up war hysteria” and ensure that a military response becomes inevitable, a line that was pushed further by the Bush administration’s belligerent and Manichean rhetoric of war against evil.43 And when the world’s largest military machine signals its intention of going on a worldwide rampage to avenge the attacks, the incidents acquire a new international significance as all other nations must take account of what might happen in their respective neighborhoods. As President Bush issued his threat that “you are either with us or with the terrorists,” everyone became a willing on unwilling conscript in this endless war, and no one could ignore what had happened, or what was going to follow. The insistence on this singularity is partly an aspect of Western, in particular American, ethnocentrism. By the insistence of American media from

186

Abdelwahab El-Affendi

the beginning on “funneling the experience through the image of American exceptionalism, 9/11 quickly took on an exceptional ahistoricity.” It became “an exceptional event beyond history and theory, especially those theories tainted . . . by ‘postmodernism’ and ‘post-colonialism.’ ”44 Again, as we have seen Wallerstein point out, any attempt at explanation became equivalent to heresy and treason. The hegemonic narrative of the events as unique and unprecedented, as well as being completely unprovoked and unrelated to anything the United States does, was difficult to resist, either within the United States or outside it. Any dissident narratives or accounts, even any nuances or qualifications of the official narrative, were regarded as taboo. But that was not all. The events themselves were charged with symbolism and fascinating contrasts, which drew on popular myths and images. Here, we have a clash between what was seen as the world’s most “primitive” force of “religious fanaticism” and the world’s most technologically advanced nation in an eerie replay of a Matrix-type confrontation. And as befits a Matrix scenario, it is a clash in which the “primitive” enemy has appropriated “all the arms of dominant power. Money and financial speculation, information technologies and aeronautics, the production of spectacle and media networks: they have assimilated all of modernity and globalization, while maintaining their aim to destroy it.” This rich symbolism ensured that in “this singular event, in this disaster movie of Manhattan, the two elements that fascinate twentieth century masses are joined: the white magic of movies and the black magic of terrorism.”45 These symbols resonated well beyond American shores, and not only in the Western world. The characterization of what happened on 9/11 in New York and Washington as something unique and exceptional thus relied not on a single feature of those events, but on the unique combination of them: that it was an attack on the world’s only superpower, by a group of anonymous individuals using civilian airliners as weapons; that it was not part of a declared ongoing war (at least not one of which many were aware),46 and thus were a completely unexpected shock; that the targets were highly symbolic and iconic; that the perpetrators were immediately identified as belonging to an alien culture and worldview; and that perpetrators, hailing from a “backward cult,” have appropriated the technological advances of their opponents and turned them back against them. The attacks themselves appeared to express so much hate and anger that ordinary Americans felt they did not deserve. The genius of the 9/11 Report (and the dominant narratives it underpins and reconfirms) stems from its apparent success in squaring the circle of reconciling the argument regarding the uniqueness of the event that was beyond explanation, with the claim of offering the perfect explanation for this inexplicable occurrence. It does this by locating the uniqueness of the event in the presumption of American exceptionalism, while seeing the event in itself as ref lective of a new trend in world affairs, the rise of a new form of “Islamic extremism” that was inherently violent and anti-Western. In other words, the phenomenon is seen as a symptom of a disease that is abroad (in both senses of

The War of Ideas as Therapy

187

the word) and that is ref lective of a pathology affecting alien societies. It just should not have impacted America, and if it did, it is only because America is exceptionally good and the perpetrators are exceptionally evil. This contrasts with some of the dissident narratives that see the event itself as exceptional, ref lective of a unique combination of processes, including the unusual emergence of terrorist entrepreneurs (a phenomenon the report recognizes and documents) allied with the world’s most notorious entrepreneurturned-terrorist. By locating the uniqueness and exceptionalism in the target rather than the act itself, the search for explanation has been automatically loaded in favor of explaining first how irrational and deranged the act was, and second how it ref lects a broader phenomenon of irrationality and derangedness that is located completely outside the world: in the realm of ideology and perception.

Paradigm Repair The 9/11 Commission’s account was welcomed so widely and enthusiastically within the United States because it fit perfectly into the gaping hole left by the dominant narrative, like the last missing piece in a jigsaw puzzle. What was completely inexplicable suddenly became perfectly intelligible. And like all great accounts, it lent itself to completely contradictory interpretations, being celebrated by hardliners and moderates alike. For the opponents of the militarist approach adopted by the Bush administration, its identification of an ideological foe who could only be tackled through a “struggle of ideas” to win hearts and minds was seen as a potent critique of Bush’s belligerence as displayed in his militarized war on terror and his campaign in Iraq. While for the neoconservative hardliners and other enthusiastic war supporters, the implacable nature of the enemy and its irrational inspiration was proof that nothing but an endless war could deal with the problem. The complete shifting of the blame on the other side was a relief to all. The conjuring trick worked out by the 9/11 Commission cannot be simplistically dismissed as an instance of spin as some critics of the Bush-Blair policies have done. Eureka moments can be understood in terms of Kuhnian “paradigm shifts,” but the shift here is as subtle as the need for it was urgent and the impact wide and profound. Thomas Kuhn’s famous theory of paradigm shift posits a crisis in a certain scientific discipline that could only be resolved by rethinking its most basic presuppositions. In the case of the 9/11 trauma, the whole self-perception of the United States (and the Western world) was in crisis. It was also a crisis of the liberal paradigm of politics and its paradoxical history, where presuppositions about the full equality of all human beings have frequently coexisted with practices that denied this equality. This discrepancy has been explained in the past by arguing that some sections of humanity (women, slaves, barbarians, etc.) were not (or not yet) fully rational and needed guardianship in order to guide them along the path

188

Abdelwahab El-Affendi

to rationality and full humanity. It was along these lines that imperialism was justified as a necessary “civilizing process.”47 However, the “end of history” thesis has always been built into the liberal paradigm, since it has always imagined nonliberal societies as a species that was in evolution or on the road to extinction. When faced with what appeared to be an apparent resurgence on nonliberal forces, it was thrown completely off balance. The genius of the 9/11 Commission was to avert the need for a paradigm shift by refusing to question the fundamental presuppositions of the prevailing paradigm. Instead, it decided to redraw the picture of the surrounding world with the objective of reinforcing deeply held beliefs. In a similar way to the positing of the quasi-material ether to salvage Newtonian physics, the Commission’s efforts were an exercise in paradigm repair: it wanted to salvage the dominant paradigm by slightly modifying its outer limits, without in any way touching its core assumptions. One can compare this to another—very relevant—Eureka moment reminiscent of Engels’ revelation. The invasion of Kuwait by Saddam’s troops in 1990 and the subsequent arrival of U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia precipitated a deep crisis for the ultra-traditionalist worldview espoused by many in this kingdom. For the more religiously inclined activists, the crisis was compounded when the Committee of Grand Ulama, the guardians of orthodoxy, issued an official fatwa endorsing the government’s decision to permit a massive inf lux of non-Muslim troops into Arabia for the first time since the death of the Prophet in 632. Given that Saudi orthodoxy does not permit even the organized public observance of non-Islamic religions on its soil, the contradiction became intolerable. Traditionalists were torn between, on the one side, their hostility to Saddam and their sympathy with their Kuwaiti brethren, in addition to their deference toward the regime and the loyal religious establishment and, on the other side, their deeply felt antipathy toward the American presence and suspicion of U.S. motives. The result was a deep moral crisis and complete intellectual paralysis. Then a middle ranking cleric spoke out, offering a dissenting view. A well-known Saudi dissident takes up the story. Then God providently guided the mujahid Sheikh Safar al-Hawali to unmask the American project from A to Z. He—may God guide him and release him from captivity—did not explicitly mention the Committee of Grand Ulama, nor did he contradict it directly. But the gist of his words was that the Committee was unknowingly colluding in the American designs. As for the case for seeking American assistance, the Sheikh demolished it completely. That was done in two lectures, one in Jeddah . . . and the other in Riyadh, in early September 1990. The two lectures were like a salvation to those with sound thought and true faith . . . Within days, millions of copies were distributed of these two lectures in all areas of the Kingdom. I personally remember how, in the period between the issue of the fatwa by the Committee of Grand

The War of Ideas as Therapy

189

Ulama and this tape by Safar, we had been so completely lost, and how the whole wide earth became like a cage to us. The tape came to us like a salvation which brought us back to life.48 Sheikh Safar, like the 9/11 Commission, performed a complex operation of paradigm salvation. In his lectures, he first tried to reaffirm the orthodox traditionalist world vision, depicting the whole crisis as a divine test and punishment for deviation from strict adherence to Islamic norms. Some of this deviation consisted in official support for Saddam’s dictatorial and antiIslamic regime. By thus depicting Saddam as a heretic and revealing a divine plan behind the events, he assuaged the anxiety of the militants and dampened down their anger. Then he proceeded to “unmask” the real American intentions by quoting extensively from American documents detailing longstanding U.S. intentions to seize the oil fields in the Gulf. Finally, he warned that the U.S. presence was going to create “moral problems,” especially in the area of encouraging deviance among the youth and women. However, his prescriptions were restricted to the traditional approach: repent from your sins, prepare to counter the anticipated negative American inf luence and prepare for the future. Nothing revolutionary here, but a significant realignment of perceptions to save the faltering paradigm from impending collapse, and restore it on a firmer footing. That was what merited the enthusiastic welcome it received: it reassured without demanding any major paradigm shift, and without demanding drastic action different from what was already going on, just like the 9/11 Commission’s report. The relief proved temporary, though, and the Islamists were put on the collision path that led to 9/11. But that is another story. Going back to the 9/11 Commission’s report, it is clear that, in spite of its success in reassuring its intended audience, its use of the analogy of the Cold War appeared to rest on two implausible ideas: that al Qaeda presented to the United States and the West the same ideological threat Communism presented during the last century, and that this threat was inherent in the ideology itself rather than in the political situation that included American policies. It is almost redundant to point out the f law in the belief that this threat can be assimilated to the Communist threat in the sense of seeking to overturn the American political system and challenge the United States globally. Here, Francis Fukuyama was closer to the truth when he dismissed such a prospect early as unrealistic.49 For it is clear that the al Qaeda’s main goal is to resist U.S. hegemony in the Middle East, and is not built around the intention, as the 9/11 Commission argued, of “destroying or converting” the United States and the West. Its most ambitious objective, as reiterated in its statements, was to inf lict a heavy defeat on U.S. troops in the Middle East and hope for a repeat of an unraveling of the American empire similar to that which the Soviet Union suffered after Afghanistan. Al Qaeda cannot thus be seen as an ideological threat in the sense in which Communism was seen as a threat to convert Americans en masse to its cause. Even in their most extravagant

190

Abdelwahab El-Affendi

pronouncements, al Qaeda leaders never mentioned establishing the caliphate in Washington DC. That is why this attempt at “paradigm repair” appears to leave many questions unanswered in spite of its strong appeal to the masses and intellectual elite alike. However, its very appeal and the fact that it has succeeded in displacing most alternative explanations is revealing in itself, and helps to shed light on the complex dynamics of the underlying conf lict. For what it shows is that part of the defensive mechanism in this confrontation is the construction of “narratives of reassurance”: complex ideological constructions designed to shield us from unpleasant realities.

Conclusion Both the Letter from America and the reaction to the 9/11 Commission Report illustrate the problem with the concept of war of ideas in graphic terms. The seductiveness of the attempted redefinition by the 9/11 Commission of the nature of the crisis facing America stems primarily from the way it offered reassurance and reconfirmed America’s original (positive) self-image through a process of paradigm repair, or paradigm salvaging. Its impact and authority also spring from its form: the institution of the “independent report” is by itself a key device for conferring authority on views and analyses, precisely because it is a form of exercising power through the production of Foucauldian “authoritative knowledge.” It performs this usually by combining the authority of recognized social figure(s) and “authoritative” experts with procedures of “exhaustive” and thorough investigation guaranteed to distil the ultimate wisdom on the matter. As an “official” report, commissioned by the highest authority in the land, with full support from the legislative and executive branches of government, it also enlists the authority of government behind it, acquiring quasi-judicial authority, both in its powers to investigate and for its findings. In addition to using its judicial powers to procure essential documents and to induce witnesses to testify, it had even made indirect recourse to torture, as was the case with regards to some of the intelligence information it relied on, some of which had certainly been obtained under torture. In the end, the report can only be as good as its raw materials, which include many inconsistencies, gossip, and outright fiction peddled by intelligence bodies or reproduced in the media. Like 9/11 Commission Report, the Letter from America tried to combine prestige and authority of prominent names with the strength of numbers. An impressive line-up of scholars and public personalities who have achieved distinction and public recognition in their respective fields lent their names to the message. They included such luminaries as Theda Skocpol, Michael Walzer, Amitai Etzioni, Samuel P. Huntington, and Francis Fukuyama. The authors also sought to derive additional authority from claiming to speak for

The War of Ideas as Therapy

191

America as a whole, and even to define its identity and what it stands for. But the subtext was also that they spoke for humanity, or at least civilized humanity. This claim was buttressed by the pointing out that the signatories belonged to diverse religious backgrounds, and that they emphatically distanced themselves from the more despised aspects of American culture (consumerism, etc.), not to mention repudiating American policies that many outside America might find objectionable. In both cases, the limited purpose of the endeavor was to restore confidence in the system and reassure the people. It was a form of therapy, Americans talking to themselves even as they address themselves to the world at large. Neither was designed to occasion a “paradigm shift” by posing deep and penetrating questions. Like media reports, its objective is to make sense of what has happened within the overall context, to bestow meaning on it for the community in a way that keeps the community content about itself. But in this sense, the war of ideas continues to suffer from this dual handicap: by being a monologue addressed to oneself, its reach remains limited; by styling itself as a war it rules itself out as a process of dialogue with the other.50 Let us hope that it at least succeeds in its primary objective of becoming therapeutic. But once the therapy is over, then it will be time for dialogue.

Notes The author is currently the recipient of a fellowship in the Global Uncertainties Programme run jointly by the Economic and Social Research Council and the Arts and Humanities Council. He would like to thank both councils for support for his current research. 1. A Eureka moment either ref lects the joy of finding a way out of the labyrinth of the imagination, or of touching solid ground after a hazardous voyage. Like a good bedtime story, it turns horror stories into reassuring lullabies mainly because the person telling them is a reassuring presence. 2. David Brooks, “War of Ideology,” The New York Times, July 24, 2004. 3. Ibid. 4. Ibid. 5. Ibid. 6. Frederick Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1946 [1886]). 7. Pierre Bourdieu, Sociology in Question (London: Sage, 1993), pp. 50–51. 8. Robert van Krieken, “The Paradox of the ‘Two Sociologies’: Hobbes, Latour and the Constitution of Modern Social Theory,” Journal of Sociology, Vol. 38, No. 3 (2002), pp. 255–273. 9. Ibid., p. 51. 10. Bruce Cumings, “Black September, Infantile Nihilism, and National Security,” in Craig Calhoun, Pal Price, and Ashley Timmer (eds), Understanding September 11 (New York: The New Press, 2002). 11. Immanuel Wallerstein, “America and the World: The Twin Towers as Metaphor,” 2002, in Social Science Research Council/After Sept. 11, at http://www.ssrc.org/sept11/essays/ wallerstein_text_only.htm (accessed April 23, 2009).

192 12. 13. 14. 15.

16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26.

27.

28. 29.

30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38.

39.

40.

Abdelwahab El-Affendi

Ibid. Ibid. Cumings, “Black September, Infantile Nihilism, and National Security.” The 9/11 Commission, The 9/11 Commission Report, Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2004), pp. 48–49. Ibid., p. 54. Ibid., pp. 50–51. Ibid., p. 51. Ibid., p. 362. Seyla Benhabib, The Claims of Culture: Equality and Diversity in the Global Era (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), p. 243. The 9/11 Commission, p. 54. Cummings, “Black September, Infantile Nihilism, and National Security,” p. 198. Abdelwahab El-Affendi, The Conquest of Muslim Hearts and Minds: Perspectives on U.S. Reform and Public Diplomacy Strategies (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 2005), p. 5. Ibid., p. 4. “What We’re Fighting For: A Letter from America,” Institute for American Values, February 2002, at http://www.americanvalues.org/html/wwff.html. Abdelwahab El-Affendi, The Conquest of Muslim Hearts and Minds: Conquest of Muslim Hearts and Minds? Perspectives on U.S. Reform and Public Diplomacy Strategies, Brookings Project on U.S. Policy towards the Islamic World, Working Paper, September 2005. DSB Task Force, Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense For Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Washington, D.C., September 2004, p. 36. Jon B. Alterman, “The False Promise of Arab Liberals,” Policy Review, no. 125, June and July 2004. DSB Task Force, pp. 54–56; Edward P. Djerejian, Report of the Advisory Group Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim, a report to the Committee on Appropriations, US House of Representatives, October 1, 2003. p. 17. Robert Satloff, The Battle of Ideas in the War on Terror: Essays on U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Middle East (Washington DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2004). Radwan Alsayyid, Al Sira’ ‘ala al-Islam (Beirut, 2004), pp. 11–12. Mark Juergensmeyer, “Religious Terror and Global War,” in Calhoun, Price, and Timmer, Understanding September 11, p. 33. Tony Blair, “Clash about Civilisation Foreign Policy Speech I,” March 21, 2006; text available at http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page9224.asp (accessed January 13, 2007). Tony Blair, “Blair Terror Speech in Full,” BBC News, March 5, 2004, at: http://news.bbc. co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/3536131.stm (accessed July 31, 2009). Ibid. James F. Hoge and Gideon Rose, How Did This Happen?: Terrorism and the New War (Cambridge, MA: PublicAffairs, 2001). Slavoj Zizek, “Welcome to the Desert Of The Real,” reconstructions, September 15, 2001, http://web.mit.edu/cms/reconstructions/interpretations/desertreal.html. Michael Cox, “Meanings of Victory: American Power after the Towers,” in Ken Booth and Tim Dunne (eds), Worlds in Collision: Terror and the Future of Global Order (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2002), p. 152. Jean Baudrillard, “The Mind of Terrorism” (trans. Douglas French, original: “L’esprit du terrorisme,” Jean Baudrillard, Le Monde, November 2, 2001), at http://watch.windsofchange. net/themes_35.htm#terrorism (accessed April 25, 2007). The 9/11 Commission, pp. 339–340.

The War of Ideas as Therapy

193

41. Baudrillard, “The Mind of Terrorism.” 42. Douglas Kellner, “September 11, Spectacles of Terror, and Media Manipulation: A Critique of Jihadist and Bush Media Politics,” Logos II/1 (Winter 2003): pp. 86–102, 88–89. 43. Ibid., pp. 89–94. 44. James Der Derian, “In Terrorem: Before and after 9/11,” in Ken Booth and Tim Dunne (eds), Worlds in Collision: Terror and the Future of Global Order (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2002), p. 102. 45. Baudrillard, “The Mind of Terrorism.” 46. The title of a book published in 1999 by Y. Bodansky was Bin Laden: The Man who Declared War on America. So at least someone was aware that a war had been declared. 47. Mahmood Mamdani, Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War, and the Roots of Terror (New York: Three Leaves, 2005), p. 6. 48. Saad al-Faqih, Zilzal Al Saud (London: Islamic Reform Movement, c. 1995), copy at http:// www.islah.tv/books/b3.htm (accessed August 1, 2009). 49. Francis Fukuyama “The West has Won,” The Guardian, Thursday October 11, 2001, at http:// www.guardian.co.uk/Archive/Article/0,4273,4274753,00.html (accessed August 1, 2009). 50. Former president Bush warned Americans to expect a long war that may never end in “a surrender ceremony on a deck of a battleship.” What would a surrender ceremony in a “war of ideas” look like? And what would a victory speech contain? In the end, it is about who will have the last word: who can stake the claim to speak for God. A surrender ceremony in a war of ideas will be like the Day of Judgment, when the guilty admit to their guilt and there is no other court of appeal.

This page intentionally left blank

CH A P T E R

T H I RT E E N

Waging Trans-epistemological Warfare Jarret M . Brach man

Winning the War of Ideas against al Qaeda requires discrediting the al Qaeda movement by exposing its doctrinal hypocrisy and internal inconsistencies, ideologically inoculating those populations who might be most susceptible to its message using a variety of engagement strategies, ensuring that those populations who are not currently susceptible to al Qaeda’s ideology remain that way by working closely with partner nations, and bolstering support at home for the aforementioned activities through transparent and open communication.1 One metric for assessing America’s effectiveness in waging these kinds of initiatives is whether more people seem to have more access, more incentive, more knowledge, and more opportunities to get more engaged in supporting the al Qaeda ideology in more places than previously.2 Unfortunately, the answer to this question is a resounding yes. Al Qaeda’s incessant use of the Internet, increased sophistication of its public affairs outlets, and its codification of the al Qaeda ideology has helped transform once consumers into producers and expand the movement’s base along multiple dimensions.3 In many ways, al Qaeda has managed to become the world’s most successful self-fulfilling prophecy. Without question, al Qaeda has become a global movement. Another useful metric is whether those Muslim populations who are most susceptible to the ideology described in this chapter as “Jihadi-Salafism” are gravitating toward that ideology or pulling away from it.4 Recent polling suggests that al Qaeda’s popularity has waned significantly in most Muslim countries around the world.5 Arguably, however, this trend is occurring in spite of, not because of, American actions abroad. Should al Qaeda begin to actually operationalize its own suggested reforms, this trend could begin to

196

Jarret M. Brachman

slow or even reverse. Either way, it can be convincingly argued that America’s performance in the “War of Ideas” from 2001 to 2009 has been dismal. It is important to recognize at the outset that the United States is neither engaged in a popularity contest nor in a marketing campaign against al Qaeda and for the hearts and minds of Muslims. If this postulate were true, America would simply need to peddle its ideological wares more effectively than the competition in order to win the war. After a series of failed public diplomacy initiatives, however, the U.S. government seems to have recognized that “selling” America is an ineffective strategy.6 The U.S. government has not adequately answered why this is the case. This chapter seeks to answer that question and provide some initial suggestions to the Obama administration for making course corrections. More specifically, this chapter attempts three things. First, it will seek to demonstrate that a major gulf exists between what the United States believes knowledge to be and what al Qaeda believes it to be. Our epistemological stance handicaps our ability to directly combat al Qaeda on the ideational front and severely constrains America’s ability to compete with al Qaeda for the hearts and minds of Salafists around the world. Second, the chapter will seek to show how a hermeneutical based approach to studying al Qaeda’s written works yields significantly more insights about how they conceive of this fight. Third, the chapter will present several thoughts about how the U.S. government can apply the insights gained from this exercise in a real way. It will identify three basic questions that analysts ought to ask themselves in the course of monitoring al Qaeda’s maneuverings. These include: “Who are the sources of intellectual authority for a target demographic?”; “What constitutes authentic, reliable and credible knowledge for a target demographic?”; and “How does that target demographic interpret knowledge given their own particular experiences, outlooks and situations?”

America’s Failure to Grasp al Qaeda’s Epistemology and Hermeneutics The Clash of Epistemologies In short, two culprits can be blamed for America’s post-9/11 impotence in waging an effective War of Ideas. The first is the government’s total lack of understanding about the role that epistemology plays in engaging target populations. The second reason is a pervasive inability within the government to think about al Qaeda through hermeneutical lenses. Without enhancing the sophistication of America’s thinking about who its adversary is and how they are waging their own War of Ideas, the United States will continue floundering on this front. Epistemology is a concept that does not frequently appear in discussions about terrorism. Not only is the term supremely academic, known only to

Waging Trans-epistemological Warfare

197

those who have studied the philosophy of science, its utility to discussions about combating al Qaeda has yet to be popularized. In short, epistemology refers to our theories of knowledge: What is the basis for knowing what we know and how do we know it? Running the risk of creating a false dichotomy, this clash of epistemologies (vice war of ideas) between the United States and al Qaeda can be boiled down to two competing traditions. In the one corner, there is the epistemology that underlies the approach to knowledge commonly associated with “the West,” “Modernism,” “Lockean Empiricism,” “Cartesian rationalism,” and “The Enlightenment.” In recent centuries, Western “knowledge” has relied heavily on the scientific method and observation rather than on revelation. As Ken Archer explains, “Descartes and the early moderns sought to quell the terrifying violence of their times by redirecting man’s concerns from God and destiny to science and self.” 7 They thus needed to establish dramatic authority for their claims if they were to achieve their historic aims. It is on this epistemological groundwork that contemporary forms of liberalism and the Westphalian state system are rooted. Adherents of al Qaeda’s ideology, on the contrary, can be described as subscribing to a particularly narrow subset of Salafist scriptural positivist/literalist epistemology, referred to in this chapter as “Jihadi-Salafism.” In other words, al Qaeda’s worldview is a fanatical outgrowth of the Salafist scripturalist epistemology, which, for millions of Muslims, answers the question: “What is knowledge?” by pointing to the Book (Quran) and the Sunnah. Most importantly, al Qaeda’s approach significantly narrows the spectrum of what is considered a legitimate reading of the Quran and the Sunnah.8 Whereas revelation-based epistemologies, including Salafism, “aimed high and had low expectations,” the modernist turn in human history, “aimed low and had absolute expectations.” 9 In other words, thinkers like Machiavelli, Descartes, Hobbes, and Locke rewrote the rules of the game: consciousness of self and one’s interest became the foundations on which knowledge would stand. “I think therefore I am,” offered the basis on which human knowledge was now grounded, at least for a part of the world. No longer were ideals of virtue rooted in Heaven. Rather, they were found in the product of human labor on Earth, particularly the pursuit of power and control over territory. The Salafist epistemological approach views this statement, on the contrary, as consummate apostasy and rejection of their entire basis of knowledge. Humans cannot be creative individuals. They cannot invent. They cannot express themselves as individuals. Humans have no claim of sovereignty or autonomy. God is one and all (the Salafist doctrine of Tawhid). All that is in line with God’s law ought be followed, all that stands against it ought be disavowed (the Salafist doctrine of Al-Wala’a wal-Bara’a). Humans are conceived best as servants of God in the Salafist epistemology. Therefore, all sources of knowledge and intellectual authority reside in God’s hands.

198

Jarret M. Brachman

Policymakers have danced around this issue for some time suggesting silly things like al Qaeda hates America for its values or freedoms, for instance. But it is an appalling understatement to suggest that, in its core formulation, the Salafist epistemology simply rejects American values. It would be more appropriate to say that it rejects the basis on which America obtains knowledge and the sources by which it evaluates the authority of that knowledge. Two points must be made clear at the outset, however. First, the Salafist epistemology is not at war with the United States or the proverbial West. Salafist scripturalism/literalism is not the enemy. Most Muslims who subscribe to this approach are traditional, pious Muslims living in places like Saudi Arabia, the Maghreb, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. They also live in London, Paris, Toronto, and New York. They want nothing to do with extremist groups like al Qaeda. It just so happens that they share the same epistemology as these groups, which makes them the first community that is targeted by al Qaeda and like-minded groups for recruitment and support. What matters is how that Salafist epistemological commitment shapes behavior—how Salafism is applied on Earth and used to justify violence. This chapter characterizes al Qaeda as a “Jihadi-Salafist” group in order to both recognize the group’s undeniably Salafist epistemological foundations while reminding readers of its unique and ultra-violent way of operationalizing those understandings in reality. Second, every religion has a subset of believers who reject modernist epistemological positions for the truth of revealed knowledge as made known through the scripture. It is not an extreme position to be a literalist or scripturalist, no matter what the religion. It is the fanatical application of this approach to knowledge combined with a dedication to the violent application of certain political positions that are informed by this epistemology that makes Jihadi-Salafism so problematic.

America’s Failure to Integrate Hermeneutics Thus far this chapter has argued that there is a clash of epistemologies between the United States and al Qaeda, but that the United States has largely failed to take this into consideration in the War of Ideas. The second reason for America’s disastrous performance in the War of Ideas is the government’s widespread failure to integrate hermeneutical approaches into its collective analytical frameworks in the midst of this epistemological warfare. Hermeneutics most broadly refers to the theory and methodology of interpretation. Specifically, hermeneutics is a qualitative research tradition related to phenomenology that uses the lived experiences of people as a tool for understanding the social, cultural, political, and historical context in which those experiences occur. Originally relating to the study of texts, hermeneutics has become an interpretive approach now employed across

Waging Trans-epistemological Warfare

199

a broad array fields of study to a diverse body of subjects. The approach believes that it is only possible to grasp the meaning of an action or statement by relating it to the whole discourse or worldview from which it originates. Abstracting texts or objects from their context, either in terms of their production or reception, distorts their meaning. By trying to understand author’s intent (authors who are rooted in particular epistemologies and cultures), it becomes easier to understand an author’s mindset. It also becomes easier to ascertain why certain narratives may resonate within a given population. The overall point of this chapter is that knowledge is not only a contested social construct, but the very basis of what constitutes knowledge fundamentally differs between the United States and the al Qaeda movement. The United States cannot begin to wage an effective war of ideas against al Qaeda unless it first assesses the trans-epistemological context within which the warfare is taking place. Arguments that rely on modernist understandings of knowledge or truth will fall f lat in populations that embrace Salafist understandings of knowledge. This includes populations that may live in the West but who still subscribe to literalist and scripturalist epistemologies. Trying to turn that insight into policy is a daunting challenge given how narrowminded the U.S. government has become with regard to thinking about wars of ideas.

Hermeneutics and the Clash of Civilizations Western societies continue to panic about the “homegrown threat,” or the prospect of a citizen in a Western country radicalizing and wreaking violence in his or her own country. Certainly these individuals have increased operational capacity given their cultural familiarity with Western society, language f luency, and preexisting networks. But on the strategic level, these individuals inhabit two oppositional intellectual spaces simultaneously. They are arguably the most unstable of all Jihadi-Salafists because they hate but cannot escape their own Western epistemological mindset. This internal epistemological strife often translates into intense feelings of self-guilt, shame, and humiliation. Al Qaeda has already realized this point and is fully engaged in finding ways to tap into these worldview fence-sitters, these “epistemological schizophrenics.” Al Qaeda’s goal is to empower these individuals with the kind of encouragement, knowledge, and tools they need to cross over epistemological chasm more readily and more completely. The American al Qaeda member Adam Gadahn (aka, Azzam al-Amriki) embodies the archetype of al Qaeda’s most successful epistemological transplant case.10 Gadahn now serves as al Qaeda’s chief liaison to the West, trying to calibrate al Qaeda’s appeals to susceptible Western Muslims.

200

Jarret M. Brachman

Another example is Abu Musab al-Suri, a violent Jihadi but non-Salafist, also sought to pioneer new ways to reach out to susceptible youth.11 His approach, however, was a curious blending of Western pragmatism and revealed truth. He spoke just enough “Salafis” to make sense but was conversant in modernist traditions enough to think about harnessing, co-opting, and exploiting them in new ways. Arguably, it is these kinds of trans-epistemological characters who employ hermeneutical analytical approaches to their adversary, who pose the greatest risk to American security. It is also the precise model that the United States should be studying and aggressively adopting against al Qaeda. The word hermeneutics comes from the Greek word for interpretation.12 At its most basic level, hermeneutical analysis is useful for interpreting the intersection of tradition and human life. It has been most often applied to researching religious texts but has been usefully applied to other forms of media in diverse fields. Hermeneutical approaches to analysis assume that humans experience the world through language and this language provides both understanding and knowledge. This method of analysis, usually of texts, emphasizes the sociocultural and historic inf luences on qualitative interpretation. Given the epistemological differences outlined earlier, understanding the messaging coming from al Qaeda is an obfuscated process at best for the U.S. government. Often times these messages are misinterpreted or even dismissed wholesale for their seeming incoherence. Curiously, understanding messages from the United States is an equally obfuscated process for al Qaeda. Thinking hermeneutically about al Qaeda’s war of ideas against the United States and for control over Islam helps to not only better understand their strategy and assess resonance but also identify the vulnerabilities in their messaging strategy that can be targeted. It also helps to understand how al Qaeda processes, interprets, and applies American knowledge. The goal of interpretation is not simply to understand the text from the author’s perspective but to understand the relevance of the text Perhaps one of the most confusing interactions between al Qaeda and the United States has been centered on the notion of how to characterize the present conf lict between them. The “Clash of Civilizations” narrative has been employed in varying degrees within the United States. President George W. Bush, for instance, announced, “The struggle has been called a clash of civilizations. In truth, it’s a struggle for civilization. We fight for a free way of life against a new barbarism—an ideology whose followers have killed thousands on American soil, and seek to kill again on even a greater scale.”13 It is less well-known that al Qaeda has also employed the “Clash” narrative in its own rhetoric. Sometimes al Qaeda supporters embrace the concept as an effective way of characterizing the ongoing struggle between them and their “Zionist-Crusader” adversaries. Other al Qaeda thinkers have rejected the characterization outright. Their vacillation on this issue is not due to

Waging Trans-epistemological Warfare

201

ignorance or f leeting opinions. Rather, it is an outcome of the complicated process by which thinkers rooted in one epistemology seek to understand, apply, and appropriate a concept rooted in a fundamentally contradictory epistemology and use it simultaneously for both inter- and intra-epistemological propaganda. The following section conducts a hermeneutical analysis of al Qaeda’s employment of the “Clash of Civilization” thesis in order to gain a deeper appreciation for how complicated trans-epistemological wars of ideas can actually be.

When Wars of Ideas Transcend Epistemology The more thoughtful members of al Qaeda deal with the Clash of Civilizations in a way that qualitatively differs from how it has been conventionally discussed or understood by Western analysts. When those rooted in a Modernist epistemology use the phrase, they mean the impact that supposed “civilizational” fault-lines have on global politics in specific geographic areas. When Jihadi-Salafists use the term, however, they have to first decide on whose epistemological playing field they will employ it. Consider, for instance, how, in an undated pre-9/11 interview with the journalist Taysir al-Alluni, Osama bin Laden was first asked about his thoughts on Samuel Huntington’s “Clash” thesis. “Your repetition of the words Crusade and Crusades,” al-Alluni queried, “indicates that you support the inevitability of the clash of civilizations?”14 Bin Laden responded, “I say there is no doubt about that. It is clearly established in the [Quran] and the Sunna. No faithful Muslim can deny these facts.” Perhaps the most insightful point is not that bin Laden employs the Clash concept to characterize the current conf lict. Rather, it is that he claims to have already known that a Clash existed based on revelation from God. “Whether it is said or not, what counts to us is what exists in the [Quran] and the Sunna of our prophet,” he reasserts.15 Rationally obtained knowledge or direct empirical evidence about this “Clash,” as bin Laden sees it, is secondary in importance. It is merely confirmation of a truth that he considers to be a priori. Bin Laden discusses the “Clash” thesis again in a 2004 written statement. He writes that when the occupier [former American Presidential Envoy to Iraq, Ambassador] Bremer announced that he will not accept that Islam be the source of all legislation, meaning that he will not accept Islam as a religion for Iraq. Hence, the announced constitution came according to his will. This clearly shows on one hand that the Governing Council is but a puppet and a tool in their hands to implement their plans against an unwary people and on the other hand shows the extent of their hidden

202

Jarret M. Brachman

hatred against Islam. This also shows that the struggle is an ideological and religious struggle and that the clash is a clash of civilizations.16 In other words, according to bin Laden, America’s goal is to “destroy the Islamic identity in the entire Islamic world,” a conclusion he is able to make because of the fact that the United States refuses to ground ruling authority in shariah, or God’s law.17 Again, the epistemological argument is at the heart of bin Laden’s condemnation of the United States. In short, America’s decision to establish human-based sources of governance over divine-based sources of governance in Iraq is no surprise. It is merely confirmation of what God had already revealed. The renowned Saudi al Qaeda commander and author Yusuf al-Ayiri ref lects a similar willingness to deal with the Clash thesis from his own epistemological doorstep. In President George W. Bush’s 2002 West Point speech, al-Ayiri quotes, it was said, “When the issue concerns rights and the common needs of men and women, there is no clash of civilizations. The requirements of freedom apply entirely to Africa, Latin America and the whole Muslim world.”18 Furthermore, al-Ayiri quotes Bush as saying, “If you give people the choice between tyranny and freedom, they will choose freedom. We only need to look at the streets of Kabul, which are busy with people celebrating the end of the Taliban regime last year.”19 For al-Ayiri, President Bush’s comments were clear, “tyranny is Islam and the sought-after freedom is the rejection of Islam.” How much clearer does alAyiri need to be to demonstrate the diametric opposition that exists between Modernist approaches and Jihadi-Salafist approaches. Tyranny for one is freedom for the other. And vice versa. President Bush’s attempt to universalize these themes of freedom and liberty is, to al-Ayiri, the ultimate form of imperialism. This is because it is not just about governance or territory. It is epistemological. The problem with current analytical approaches is that, without this kind of hermeneutical engagement with the author and his original intent, these insights would be overlooked. Abu Yahya al-Libi, the al Qaeda leader poised to succeed bin Laden as head of the global jihadist movement, helps bring the contrast between the Western epistemology with that of scriptural Salafism into stark relief. In his May 2006 statement about the Danish cartoon incident, Abu Yahya declares that the event demonstrated that any Muslim who advocates interfaith dialogue is simply replacing “what is good with what is bad.” Democracy is a “mirage,” containing “slogans of freedom, and deception of equality.” 20 The infidels (read the West), he explains, argue with Muslims based on the “rules that they adopted and debate with them and oblige them to accept the principles that they defended and called for, to the extent that the facts of religion and its major terms have melted amid the waves of dilution and

Waging Trans-epistemological Warfare 21

203

courtesy.” In other words, he is identifying the fact that the West holds on the conversation with Islam on its own epistemological turf, one that eliminates any term that is predicated in a Salafist epistemological foundation. As the Islamic world bends at the knees, Abu Yahya says, it becomes unable to call the West by the proper terms, in this case, “infidel.” This is not simply an issue of language. It is an issue of the basis of language. The West is doing more than simply bullying Islam into moderating its language, actions, and beliefs. It is actually seeking to erode the epistemological foundation of Islam. Abu Yahya continues, noting that the West is “looking for common denominators for coexistence to move away from the clash of civilizations, as they have claimed and wished.” In this case, he is using the clash of civilizations concept to refer to the diametric opposition between the foundations of Salafist scripturalism and Westernism. Since the Islamic world is unwilling or unable to fight back, he says, they have sought to build inter-epistemological bridges through dialogue. The problem for Islam, as he suggests, is that the conversation itself is structured by Western rules (read epistemology) and is therefore “misleading” Islam from realizing that this process has “drugged and deceived” Muslims, has “killed zeal and enthusiasm in the hearts of Muslims and reversed the facts in their minds.” The Salafist epistemological foundations of Islam are being supplanted by Western epistemological concepts right under the noses of Islam, he implies, and no one but al Qaeda is doing anything to stop it. Abu Yahya brings his argument to a head by rhetorically questioning, “So why do we confuse right with falsehood and mix what is pure with what is dirty and then tell the people: This is God’s religion, which the messengers brought to us and for which swords were unsheathed and heroes fought.” What is “right” and “pure,” for Abu Yahya, is knowledge based in God’s revelation, or the Salafist epistemology. What is “false” and “dirty” is knowledge based on human consciousness. Abu Yahya’s thinking could well have been informed by the commentary of the now dead al Qaeda commander in Iraq, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. In a 2005 lecture, al-Zarqawi criticized the “religious discourse” of numerous contemporary Islamic movements as being “distorted.”22 He believed that the idioms employed within the discourse were “ambiguous.” The reason for this defeatist position is to ingratiate themselves with the West and mitigate the perception of threat that they might cause to Western governments. “As a result,” al-Zarqawi explains, “we have begun to hear the words resistance and clash of civilizations instead of jihad in God’s cause, and the words civilians and innocent people instead of infidels and combatants, and the words ‘the other side’ instead of Jews and Christians.” For al-Zarqawi, these ‘turncoat Muslims’ who advance concepts rooted in a Western cultural, historical, and epistemological framework are not only selling their religion and their people down the river, but also the very basis on which all knowledge stands: God. In effect, by way of a curiously

204

Jarret M. Brachman

hermeneutical analytical approach, these al Qaeda figures are arguing that Islam is being lobotomized from within through the imposition of an Islamic “Newspeak.” For al Qaeda analysts like Abu Yahya and bin Laden, it is not just the excising of Islamic lexicon that is such an existential threat, but it is the quiet supplanting of the Salafist epistemology with a Western, modernist epistemology that accompanies those changes in language.

Conclusion There can be no denying the fact that a very real war is underway between those who adhere to ultra-militant Jihadi-Salafism and the United States. Neither side believes that they asked for this war but both acknowledge that it must be fought to the end. The War of Ideas concept is a key component of this ongoing war between the two parties. One dimension of this War of Ideas is the ideological one being waged between the United States and the al Qaeda movement. Al Qaeda has mastered the art of exhaustively propagandizing the American public, military, and government in an effort to demoralize, humiliate, and pressure certain political decisions. In response, the United States has sought to communicate the cost of participating in this movement, as well as support other country’s efforts to press on existing fissures within the al Qaeda movement and foment questions among supporters about the religious justification over violent acts. Both parties are also intensely vying for the hearts and minds of other target audiences, the most significant being the world’s Salafist communities. The reason that al Qaeda believes this is a useful community to petition is not simply due to their shared religious roots. It is due to the fact that pious Salafists of all ideological stripes are rooted in a particular epistemology, one characterized by scripturalism, literalism, and revelation. The transition from mainstream Salafism to Jihadi Salafism, therefore, requires little in terms of adapting one’s epistemological position or doctrinal beliefs. Rather, it is a question of consequence, of “so what?” Whereas most mainstream Salafists advocate against waging violence against the West or Arab regimes, despite a general antipathy for both, Jihadi-Salafists demand absolute and immediate violence against both. America’s attempt to engage the Salafist community is more challenging because of that epistemological chasm, which must be first overcome. The challenge is less the popularity of the ideas being advanced, including democracy, liberalism, human rights, and capitalism, but rather the epistemological basis of those concepts, namely, America’s ideas are based on human self-consciousness, autonomy, secularism, and sovereignty. These epistemological touchstones of Western Modernity are antithetical to the Salafist epistemology.

Waging Trans-epistemological Warfare

205

The United States has failed to understand that dressing ideas that are predicated on human sovereignty in Islamic garb is not sufficient and actually comes off as patronizing to these communities. Furthermore, it has failed to fully appreciate the enemy from the enemy’s perspective. Roots in a different intellectual authority or justification structure many of the same constructs being pushed internationally, including ideas like respect for minority rights and responsible governance, which would find much greater resonance within Salafist populations. This is an inherently local process, however. The second part of this chapter called for an integration of hermeneutical analysis into the U.S. government’s engagement with al Qaeda. It is only by understanding how Jihadi-Salafists think about and transliterate inherently Western/Modernist ideas into their own epistemological context can the United States better formulate strategies for discrediting the al Qaeda movement. By conducting a hermeneutically oriented analysis of al Qaeda’s statements about the “Clash of Civilizations” thesis, this chapter sought to demonstrate the complexity of trans-epistemological dialogue and highlight the ways in which al Qaeda thinkers epistemologically appropriate Western concepts to prove their own points. In sum, the United States has a Sisyphean task ahead in terms of waging an effective, sophisticated, and nuanced War of Ideas against al Qaeda. It is, however, a war that al Qaeda will fight relentlessly, exploiting all discursive vacuums to their fullest. The United States and its allies must engage the global discursive space with as much or more gusto as its adversary, but it must do so recognizing the epistemological challenges that it faces and the hermeneutical tools that it has at its disposal.

Notes 1. To be clear, this formulation is my own. The U.S. government has not articulated its approach to combating al Qaeda in this fashion, although I advocate conceptualizing the war in these terms. The U.S. Department of State’s Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism website has a useful summary of the American government position on combating al Qaeda’s ideology: http://www.state.gov/s/ct/enemy/index.htm#defeat1. 2. The indirect inspiration for this metric comes from the work of Abu Musab al-Suri, a jihadist thinker who had dedicated himself to the transformation of al Qaeda from a hierarchically structured terrorist organization into a global system of individualized terrorism. For alSuri, a global jihadist movement can only sustain itself with proper educational foundation, one that equips and empowers individuals regardless of geographic proximity to a conventional front with the complete arsenal of intellectual, spiritual, emotional, and military training necessary to become a terrorist cell of one. 3. For further detail on the ways in which al Qaeda has leveraged the Internet since 2003, see Jarret Brachman, “High-Tech Terror: Al-Qaeda’s Use of New Technology,” Fletcher Forum of International Affairs vol. 30, no. 2 (Summer 2006): pp. 149–164; Magnus Ranstorp, “The

206

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9. 10.

11.

12.

13.

14. 15. 16. 17.

Jarret M. Brachman

Virtual Sanctuary of Al-Qaeda and Terrorism in an Age of Globalisation,” chapter appearing in Johan Eriksson and Giampiero Giacomello (eds), International Relations and Security in the Digital Age (London: Routledge, 2007), pp. 31–56. I use the term, “Jihadi-Salafism,” fully appreciating the baggage that the “Jihadi” label carries. I nonetheless chose to use the Anglicized version of the phrase that this group uses to refer to themselves and their underlying creed, As-Salafiyah Al-Jihadiyyah, in an effort to maintain normative objectivity. Public Opinion in the Islamic World on Terrorism, al Qaeda, and US Policies. World Public Opinion. February 25, 2009. http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/feb09/ STARTII_Feb09_rpt.pdf. See Marc Lynch’s discussion on strategic communication for a good diagnosis of what went wrong with public diplomacy under the George W. Bush administration. Marc Lynch, “The Conversation,” The National, February 20, 2009. http://www.thenational.ae/ article/20090220/REVIEW/771649250/-1/OPINION. Ken Archer, “Review of D.A. Carson’s Becoming Conversant with the Emerging Church” ( June 2005). http://kenarcher.typepad.com/theological_thought/2005/06/ review_of_da_ca.html. What separates Jihadi-Salafists from mainstream Salafists is their narrow interpretation of the sources of Islamic authority. Take this explanation given by a Jihadi-Salafist article that highlights this narrowing of legitimate knowledge by Jihadis. The author, Shaykh Abu bilal Al-Shaami, writes in, “Al-Quroon ath-Thalaathah al-Faadilah,” “Imaam al-Haafiz adh-Dhahabi, a student of the well-known Shaykh ul-Islaam Ibn Taymiyyah, said in his Kitaab ul-Kabaa’ir (The Book of Major Sins), in the chapter of The Seventieth Major Sin: Cursing any of the Companions of Allaah’s Messenger”: “The noble qualities and merits of the Companions are too numerous to be mentioned here. However, the scholars of the Sunnah agree that the noblest among the Companions are ten, and among the ten, four are ranked as highest. These are, in order of their rank: Abu Bakr, then ‘Umar bin al-Khattaab, then ‘Uthmaan bin ‘Affaan, and then ‘Ali bin Abee Taleeb, May Allah be pleased with them all. There is no doubt concerning this, and whoever doubts it is an innovator (mubtadi’) and a malicious hypocrite (munaafiq khabeeth)”: http://www.ummah.com/forum/showthread. php?p=656473. Archer, “Review of D.A. Carson’s Becoming Conversant with the Emerging Church.” http://kenarcher.typepad.com/theological_thought/2005/06/review_of_da_ca.html. For more biographical information on Gadahn, see Raffi Khatchadourian’s piece, “Azzam the American: The making of an Al Qaeda homegrown,” The New Yorker, January 22, 2007. http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2007/01/22/070122fa_fact_khatchadourian. The definitive account of Abu Musab al-Suri’s life and works is Brynjar Lia’s Architect of Global Jihad: The Life of Al Qaeda Strategist Abu Mus’ab Al-Suri (New York: Columbia University Press, January 2008). The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy has an excellent explanation for the philosophical evolution of hermeneutics as a concept. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ hermeneutics/. Transcript of President Bush’s Speech at the Veterans of Foreign Wars Convention. New York Times, August 22, 2007. http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/22/washington/ w23policytext.html. Interview with Taysir Alluni of Al-Jazeera. October 2001. Ibid. Osama Bin Laden. Audio Statement. Al-Qal’ah website (http://www.qal3ah.net). May 6, 2004. Ibid.

Waging Trans-epistemological Warfare

207

18. Shaykh Yusuf Bin Salih al-Ayiri, “The Crusader Campaign against Iraq. Center for Islamic Studies and Research. The Future Of Iraq and the Arabian Peninsula. After the Fall of Baghdad, Religious, Military, Political and Economic Prospects . . . ” Published August 2003. 19. Ibid. 20. Abu Yahya al-Libi. Untitled Lecture. World News Network website (www.w-n-n.net). May 12, 2006. 21. Ibid. 22. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi., “Do Ye Know Better Than Allah?” From the lecture series, “They Will Not Be Harmed By Those Who Fail Them,” www.goafalaladyn.com/vb (October 7, 2005).

This page intentionally left blank

CH A P T E R

FOU RT E E N

Counter-radicalization and Europe’s New Security Dilemma L ore nzo Vidino

In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, governments throughout the world rushed to improve their counterterrorism policies. Several countries tightened their legislations, increased the resources available to their intelligence and law enforcement agencies, and established aggressive policies to uncover and prosecute terrorist networks. Policymakers, fearing an imminent attack, understandably focused their attention on suppression. Yet, over the last few years, many governments have started thinking about more comprehensive and long-term counterterrorism policies. Understanding that simply dismantling terrorist networks without preventing the radicalization of new potential scores of militants is like playing a never-ending game of “whack-a-mole,” several Muslim countries have devised various programs to fight extremism. From Saudi Arabia to Indonesia, authorities have in fact devised more or less comprehensive measures to de-radicalize committed militants and prevent the radicalization of new ones. This “soft” approach to counterterrorism has also been adopted by some European governments. The attacks in Madrid and London and the arrests of hundreds of European Muslims who had been involved in terrorist activities have clearly shown that radicalization is also a problem on the Old Continent. Acknowledging that they cannot simply arrest their way out of their contemporary security dilemma, over the last few years various European governments have decided to combat radicalization processes among their Muslim populations and enacted various counter-radicalization programs. Initiatives vary from interfaith meetings to the creation of government-funded Muslim magazines and TV channels, from lectures by moderate Muslim clerics

210

Lorenzo Vidino

exposing the theological f laws of al Qaeda’s ideology to mentoring projects and professional development seminars. A crucial component of the programs enacted in all European countries is the participation of the Muslim community, which is deemed a necessary ally to stem radicalization among its youth. Yet the Muslim community of each European country is characterized by deep divisions along ethnic, linguistic, sectarian, and political lines and such fragmentation has prevented the formation of widely representative Muslim organizations. “When government officials look for a responsible interlocutor,” perfectly summarizes one commentator, “they find that the Muslim voice is a cacophony rather than a chorus.”1 European authorities face a difficult challenge in their choice of which of the many and often competing Muslim organizations they should partner with in their counter-radicalization programs. A source of particularly heated debate among policymakers is the role that could be played in such programs by nonviolent Islamists, such as European Muslim organizations that trace their ideological roots to various forms of political Islam. Hardly a homogeneous category, they include movements that publicly express their desire to participate in the democratic process, such as offshoots of the Muslim Brotherhood and the South Asian Jamaat-e-Islami, and even others like political Salafists, who openly reject democracy but oppose the use of violence in the West. Authorities in most European countries are faced with the same dilemma: Can nonviolent Islamists be engaged and used as partners against violent radicalization? Various American and European experts answer the question in the affirmative. “Bin Laden-ism can only be gutted by fundamentalism,” argues former CIA official Reuel Marc Gerecht.2 “Muslim ‘moderates’ can’t defeat bin Ladenism since they don’t speak to the same audience with the same language and passions,” he adds.3 An argument supporting this view was expressed by Robert Leiken and Steven Brooke in their 2007 Foreign Affairs article tellingly entitled “The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood.”4 According to Leiken and Brooke, the Brotherhood “works to dissuade Muslims from violence, instead channeling them into politics and charitable activities” and Western authorities should find ways to work with it to pursue the common goal of swaying young Muslims away from the appeal of jihadist groups. The argument that only nonviolent Islamists could serve as “firewalls” against al Qaeda style radicalization is also made by many Islamist leaders throughout Europe, who have actively sought forms of partnership with governments on counterradicalization efforts.5 On the other hand, critics of such approaches argue that, even assuming nonviolent Islamists can indeed sway some young Muslims from committing acts of terrorism, such short-term gains in the security field would be offset by the long-term implications of such a partnership. These critics maintain that, while opposing acts of terror in the West, nonviolent Islamists have views and goals that are incompatible with those of the secular and multi-faith societies of modern Europe. Their refusal to condemn acts of violence in Palestine

Europe’s New Security Dilemma

211

and Iraq, as well as their ambiguous position on women’s rights, apostasy, and homosexuality, are just some of the issues raised to prove the real nature of nonviolent Islamists. Seeing them as part of the problem rather than the solution, critics argue that governments should not legitimize and empower them with any form of partnership. The long-term repercussions on social cohesion and integration of such engagement, they add, would be much greater than the yet-to-be-proven short-term gains that can be achieved in preventing acts of terrorism.

Determining Factors In January 2008 the Danish government, spurred by a series of arrests of Danish-born Muslims involved in terrorist activities, established an interministerial working group to devise an action plan to fight extremism and radicalization in the country. After months of research and meetings, Minister of Integration Birthe Hornbech, who chaired the task force, released a sixtyfive-page report with several recommendations.6 The report was immediately criticized by Karen Jespersen, the minister of welfare and a fellow member of Hornbech’s Liberal Party. Along with other critics, who belonged mostly to Hornbech’s coalition government, Jespersen accused it of adopting a narrow interpretation of extremism and advocating partnership with Muslim organizations that did not adhere to basic Danish values.7 As the rift moved from the cabinet to the front pages of Danish newspapers, Danish authorities decided to shelve the action plan until an agreement on engagement criteria was found. A new plan adopting many of Jespersen’s observations was finally approved in February 2009.8 The Danish example is paradigmatic of the dilemma facing all European countries on whether nonviolent Islamists can serve as partners against their violent cousins. Even though no country can be said to have adopted a cohesive and definitive policy on the matter and the debate is ongoing within every European government, it is apparent that the decision of partnering with nonviolent Islamists is closely linked to the definitions of extremism and radicalization formally or informally adopted by authorities in any given country. Authorities that tend to closely associate the definitions with the use of violence are more likely to be open to some form of partnership with nonviolent Islamists. That is the case in Great Britain, where the aim of Prevent, the government’s counter-radicalization program, is to “stop people from becoming or supporting terrorists or violent extremists.”9 As a consequence, over the last few years various Islamist organizations that reject violence inside the country have been engaged as partners and have received funding from the British government. Other countries adopt a broader interpretation of what constitutes extremism and, consequently, of what the aim of their counter-radicalization programs should be. Dutch authorities, for example, define radicalization as “the

212

Lorenzo Vidino

growing preparedness to wish to or to support fundamental changes . . . in society that do not fit within our democratic system of law.”10 The Netherlands’ domestic security services (AIVD) specifically state that violence is not necessarily part of the extremism they are monitoring among segments of the Dutch Muslim community. “There is no threat of violence here,” states a 2007 AIVD report, “nor of an imminent assault upon the Dutch or Western democratic order, but this is a slow process which could gradually harm social cohesion and solidarity and undermine certain fundamental human rights.”11 Consequently, Dutch authorities are much more reluctant than their British counterparts to partner with nonviolent Islamists, even though they have not completely ruled out the possibility of doing so in extraordinary circumstances. Each country’s assessment of what constitutes extremism and their subsequent determination of what the goals of their counter-radicalization programs should be are the necessary starting points from which to examine the issue of partnership with nonviolent Islamist organizations. Yet, an array of concurrent factors also play a role in the complex decision-making process over the matter, such as the security environment, the mandate of government institutions, and the lack of unified assessments.

The Security Environment The single most important factor inf luencing policymakers is the security threat facing their country. Governments faced by a relatively high level of radicalization among their Muslim population and a severe threat of a terrorist attack are more likely to focus simply on violent radicalization rather than more general and less immediately visible threats to social cohesion. As a consequence, they eagerly use any tool that can stop a terrorist attack and are likely to be more open to the idea of partnering with nonviolent Islamists. In other terms, the higher the terrorist threat, the lower the level to which the bar of partner acceptability is set. Great Britain seems to be a perfect case in point. Since 9/11 Great Britain has been targeted multiple times by terrorists linked to or sympathizing with al Qaeda. Thanks to a combination of luck and impressive skills on the part of British authorities, terrorists have been able to successfully strike only once, but the threat to the country has dimensions that are unparalleled in any other European country. In 2008, for example, British security services estimated that two thousand individuals, mostly British citizens or residents, were involved in al Qaeda inf luenced terrorist activities and claimed to monitor around thirty serious plots at any given moment.12 It is no coincidence that British authorities, facing the most imminent and constant terrorist threat of any other European country, have established the most extensive forms of partnership with nonviolent Islamist organizations of any of their counterparts throughout the continent.

Europe’s New Security Dilemma

213

One of the best-known examples of such cooperation is the takeover of the North London Central Mosque, better known as the Finsbury Park Mosque. Originally founded as a mainstream, moderate mosque for the large Muslim community of north London, Finsbury Park was taken over by the notorious Egyptian cleric Abu Hamza al Masri and a small group of followers in the mid-1990s.13 After having intimidated the mosque’s trustees, Abu Hamza turned the place into what intelligence agencies from various countries considered the undisputed headquarters of jihadist activities in Europe. Scores of individuals linked to al Qaeda, from shoe bomber Richard Reid to the so-called twentieth hijacker Zacarias Moussaoui, passed through its doors and hundreds of militants were recruited by Abu Hamza to fight or train with al Qaeda in places such as Afghanistan or Chechnya. British authorities kept the mosque under surveillance for years but only in January 2003, after it became apparent that it had been used by a cell of North African militants planning an attack in Britain, was the decision to swoop in on Finsbury Park made.14 After a dramatic night raid uncovered items such as military manuals, handguns, combat clothing, hundreds of stolen and forged documents, and even three nuclear, chemical, and biological warfare protection suits, authorities decided to shut down the mosque. The decision proved to be unpopular in the Muslim community and boosted local support for Abu Hamza, who began holding his Friday sermons in the middle of the street across from the mosque. Even after Abu Hamza’s arrest in May 2004 his supporters kept holding sway in the area surrounding the mosque, creating a tense situation for the entire neighborhood. It was at this point that British officials became convinced that the mosque had to be reopened and turned to somebody that would be accepted by the community.15 Officials from Scotland Yard, the Charity Commission, and Islington Council then approached the leaders of the Muslim Association of Britain (MAB) with the idea of taking over the mosque. After lengthy consultations MAB leaders accepted British authorities’ offer to take over the mosque. On a cold morning in February 2005 some seventy to eighty MAB activists arrived at the mosque, while police officers stood ready a few blocks away. A confrontation with Abu Hamza’s supporters ensued but, after a few hours of tension and some minor scuff les, MAB activists physically secured the mosque. MAB’s takeover of Finsbury Park has been touted by British authorities as a major accomplishment. Abu Hamza’s supporters no longer have a base and what was a “suicide factory,” as a book that profiled the mosque called it, has become a thriving community center with activities for Muslims and non-Muslims. If during Abu Hamza’s reign only a few dozen people, most of them hardcore followers of the radical cleric, used to attend Friday services, today the mosque welcomes more than a thousand worshippers every week. Moreover, Finsbury Park’s new leadership has established excellent relations with the local community and even participates in interfaith forums. Muslim and non-Muslim residents of the neighborhood are enthusiastic about the change and law enforcement officials are relieved to be able to divert the

214

Lorenzo Vidino

human and financial resources needed to monitor Abu Hamza’s supporters elsewhere. By turning Finsbury Park over to MAB, British authorities have unquestionably removed a major center for incitement and preparation of attacks on British soil, bringing a problematic situation under control. The short-term success of the operation is unquestionable and, given the circumstances, no other solution was likely to achieve the same result. Only an organization like MAB, in fact, had the legitimacy and street credibility to be accepted by the local Muslim community. But it is the very reasons that give MAB its street credibility that raise questions about the long-term repercussions of the operation. Officially independent, MAB was founded in 1997 by Kamal Helbawy, a former senior leader of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, and most of its leadership openly declare their past membership and current support for organizations such as the Muslim Brotherhood or Hamas. While condemning acts of violence inside Great Britain, MAB leaders have publicly vowed their support for suicide attacks in Palestine and in other places where “Muslims are oppressed.”16 Such selective condemnation of violence, together with MAB leaders’ controversial positions on issues such as gay rights and integration, give pause to many British policymakers, who wonder what the long-term implications of indirectly helping an organization like MAB to spread its interpretation of Islam to thousands of Muslims could be.17 Yet, there is a consensus among British policymakers that the Finsbury Park takeover was a perfect example of short-term success obtained by partnering with nonviolent Islamists. While British officials do not consider partnering with nonviolent Islamists an established policy, cutting deals on a case-by-case basis with admittedly less-than-ideal partners is seen as an unavoidable realpolitik move dictated by the emergency of the severe terrorist threat under which the country finds itself.18 Most other European countries that are not faced with a terrorist threat of same magnitude hold more conservative positions, making the Finsbury Park case a unique situation on the Old Continent. Dutch authorities, who estimate the number of individuals involved in terrorist activities in the country at just a few dozen, seem to address the issue by drawing a clear line between engaging and empowering. All sorts of voices, as long as they do not advocate violence, should be engaged, since pushing nonviolent Islamists to the margins could have negative repercussions. Nevertheless, authorities feel they cannot consider them as permanent partners, as there is a clear understanding that these forces espouse a message that clashes with the Dutch government’s ideas of democracy, integration, and social cohesion.19 This assessment leads to a case-by-case approach in which authorities engage nonviolent Islamists when they need to and when common ground can be found. This policy was implemented, for example, during the months preceding the release of the controversial movie Fitna by Dutch MP Geert Wilders. Security services held several meetings with some of the most radical

Europe’s New Security Dilemma

215

Salafist imams in the country, explaining that the Dutch government did not support Wilders and obtaining from the imams a promise, later kept, that they would have urged their followers not to react violently to the movie. Nevertheless, the security services do not consider political Salafists as reliable partners and discourage local authorities from doing so. The security services’ advice is particularly significant since political Salafists have been regularly approaching municipalities and provinces with offers of partnership in counter-radicalization and integration programs.

Institutional Mandate Together with the reality of the security environment, another factor inf luencing the choice of whether or not to partner with nonviolent Islamists is the institutional mandate of the body making the decision. Once again the British example perfectly captures such a reality. In 2002 Scotland Yard established the Muslim Contact Unit (MCU), a unit composed of a dozen highly trained Muslim and non-Muslim police officers whose task is to interact with London’s Muslim community.20 Building on a long-established tradition of community policing, the MCU attempted to establish trust-based relationships with community leaders who could help prevent terrorist attacks and counter the radicalization of local Muslims. Under the leadership of Robert Lambert, the MCU chose an unusual path, deciding to engage, and in some cases, partner with all sorts of Islamists, including some of the most radical voices in London’s relatively large Salafi community. Lambert argues that the “ideal yes-saying” Muslim leaders lack credibility in their communities and have no knowledge of radicalism. Thus, he advocates “police negotiation leading to partnership with Muslim groups conventionally deemed to be subversive to democracy.”21 According to Lambert, only these groups have the street credibility to challenge the narrative of al Qaeda and inf luence young Muslims.22 Following this pragmatic approach, the MCU established formal and informal partnerships with some of London’s most radical imams. Under the Channel Project, for example, Salafi imams work with police officials to identify youths that seem to be undergoing the radicalization process and attempt to sway them away from violent extremism.23 Lambert argues that nonviolent or political Salafis might have views that run against the feelings of most British citizens, but they have an interest and the capacity to prevent young men from becoming terrorists and are therefore necessary counterterrorism assets.24 If the MCU understandably seeks to utilize all possible tools to fulfill its institutional mandate of preventing acts of violence from taking place, other public institutions with different institutional mandates look at such partnerships with suspicion. Top officials at the Home Office or at the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG)—the agency deputed to

216

Lorenzo Vidino

find long-term solutions to radicalization issues—have argued that the British government’s aim should be to target not simply “violent extremism” but, rather, all forms of extremism. Top Labour and Tory members have publicly stated that being against al Qaeda is not enough; they insist that Muslim organizations should be treated as partners only if they adhere to “non-negotiable” British values. “It is only by defending our values that we will prevent extremists radicalizing future generations of terrorists,” argued former secretary of state for DCLG Ruth Kelly in a 2006 speech in which she announced fundamental changes in the criteria used to disburse public funding for counterradicalization programs.25 In 2008, Home Secretary Jacqui Smith reiterated the message that groups that condemn al Qaeda’s violence while praising the acts of other groups considered as terrorist by the British government are also part of the problem. “They may not explicitly promote violence,” said the minister, “but they can create a climate of fear and distrust where violence becomes more likely.”26 Institutions whose mandate is simply the prevention of acts of violence naturally tend to focus on violent extremism and are therefore satisfied with the short-term security gains that partnerships with nonviolent Islamists can achieve. On the other hand, institutions that aim at the preservation of a harmonious and cohesive society will be more careful about long-term repercussions of such cooperation. While they might understand that occasional cooperation might be necessary in emergency situations, they fear that the legitimacy and financial support derived from a permanent partnership with the government could unduly empower organizations whose agenda they deem negative.

Lack of Unified Assessment An additional factor inf luencing the decision-making process on partnership with nonviolent Islamists is the different analyses adopted about the radicalization process. Despite many studies, there is no consensus among experts and policymakers on how and why radicalization takes place. Analysts debate, for example, whether integration into society and lack thereof are related to radicalization. Germany’s Office for the Protection of the Constitution argues confidently that “a successful integration is a substantial contribution to the prevention of extremism and terrorism.” 27 Others point to a lack of empirical evidence that definitely links lack of integration, radicalism, and violence. 28 Equally debated is the role played by nonviolent Islamist organizations in relation to the radicalization process. Do such groups work as firewalls against radicalization or, to the contrary, do they serve as conveyor belts for more extremist groups? Danish security services (PET) argue the former, stating that “it is precisely these individuals who have the best chance of inf luencing the attitudes of the young people who are in a process of radicalization, in

Europe’s New Security Dilemma

217

29

a non-violent direction.” German authorities, on the other hand, publicly state in their annual reports that nonviolent Islamist organizations do not carry out recruitment activities for the purpose of the violent “Holy War” ( jihad). They might rather claim to immunize young Muslims against Jihadist indoctrination by presenting to them an alternative offer of identification. However, one has to critically ask whether their activities that are strongly directed at preserving an “Islamic identity” intensify disintegration and contribute to the development of Islamist parallel societies.30 Moreover, they argue, “here is the risk that such milieus could also form the breeding ground for further radicalization.”31 Various factors contribute to such asymmetry of analysis, from the cultural background of analysts involved in the process to political considerations. What is clear is that no European government has adopted a definitive analysis of the radicalization process, the role integration plays in it, and the effect nonviolent Islamists have on it. This, of course, often leads to unclear guidelines and incoherent decisions on how a counter-radicalization program should work, what goals it should achieve, and how it should choose its partners. The 2008 report of the British Audit Commission on the implementation of Prevent tellingly found “varying levels of clarity about what partnerships are trying to deliver in Prevent and how this links with cohesion and other local strategies.”32 Such problems are nevertheless inevitable as authorities venture in unchartered waters, attempting to tackle an extremely complex and still unclear issue. Most programs have been established only a few years back and authorities recognize that the learning process will take years.

A Complicated Balancing Act Do European governments achieve their interests by engaging with nonviolent Islamists? Different perceptions of what the state interest is lead to different answers to the question. If the state interest in counter-radicalization programs is the prevention of terrorist attacks, then, prima facie, there seems to be reasons to say that engagement bears some fruit, at least in the short-term. The issue becomes more complicated if a more ambitious interpretation of state interest is adopted. If success in counter-radicalization is deemed to be the almost complete marginalization of extremist and anti-integration ideas among young European Muslims, then many believe that partnering with nonviolent Islamists is counterproductive. The debate goes to the heart of the identification of the enemy, but Western policymakers have failed to find a consensus on this fundamental issue. If the enemy is simply “terrorism” or groups like al Qaeda that use violence to

218

Lorenzo Vidino

pursue their agenda, then partnership with nonviolent Islamists appears to be a useful tactic to counter the enemy. But if the enemy is defined more broadly as political Islam in all its forms, the assessment must be different. In that case, short-term and occasional forms of cooperation with nonviolent Islamists can be used to achieve gains against jihadists. But such tactical partnerships should not develop into a permanent strategy. Senior security officials in various European countries embrace the view that identifying the enemy only in violent groups is a self-deceiving act. Alain Grignard, deputy head of Belgian police’s antiterrorism unit and a professor of Islamic studies at Brussels Free University, calls al Qaeda an “epiphenomenon,” the most visible aspect of a much larger threat that is political Islam.33 Alain Chouet, the former head of France’s counterintelligence service DGSE, agrees with Grignard and believes that “Al-Qaeda is only a brief episode and an expedient instrument in the century-old existence of the Muslim Brotherhood. The true danger is in the expansion of the Brotherhood, an increase in its audience. The wolf knows how to disguise itself as a sheep.”34 Chouet’s comparison of the Muslim Brotherhood to a wolf in sheep’s clothing is echoed by many security experts who fear that nonviolent Islamists are attempting to benefit from what in social movement theory is known as positive radical f lank effect.35 According to the theory, more moderate wings of a political movement improve their bargaining position when a more radical fringe emerges. Applied to nonviolent Islamists, the positive radical f lank effect would explain why the emergence of al Qaeda and other jihadist groups has led European governments to see them more benignly and even to f lirt with the idea of establishing forms of partnership. The emergence of a severe and prolonged terrorist threat, argue people like Chouet, has led European governments to lower the bar of what is acceptable and to endorse extremist organizations as long as they oppose violence in the Old Continent. Yet, argue many, the social engineering program envisioned by nonviolent Islamists, which entails a rejection of many core Western values, is the core problem. Nonviolent Islamists aiming to become partners with various European governments portray themselves as firefighters, determined to extinguish the f lames of violent radicalization among young European Muslims.36 That is unquestionably true in some cases, as many Islamist organizations have been consistent in their denunciation of acts of terror against Europe. Yet it can be argued that they simultaneously play the role of the arsonists, pushing a message that plays on the separate identity of Muslims, on the alleged persecution to which Muslims are subjected in Europe and justifying violence in other circumstances. In the words of the Quilliam Foundation, a London-based think tank established by former members of Hizb ut-Tahrir who have rejected Islamism, nonviolent Islamists “advocate separatist, confrontational ideas that, followed to their logical conclusion, lead to violence. At the very least, the rhetoric of radicals provides the mood music to which suicide bombers dance.”37

Europe’s New Security Dilemma

219

Lack of clarity over the overarching goals of their counterterrorism efforts and the consequent inconsistency of counter-radicalization strategies; limited knowledge of various aspects of political Islam and the differences between various Islamist groups and the radicalization process; and the tension between the need to prevent terrorist attacks in the short term while preserving social cohesion in the long have European authorities mired in a real security dilemma. Even viewing nonviolent Islamists in the most negative terms, it must be acknowledged that there is room for some form of cooperation with them when circumstances demand it. On the other hand, few would advocate publicly endorsing and financially supporting organizations that glorify violence in some parts of the world and reject basic human rights. Most would agree that engaging nonviolent Islamists for security purposes without empowering them seems the best strategy, but implementing such policy on the ground is extremely challenging.

Notes 1. Jytte Klausen, The Islamic Challenge: Politics and Religion in Western Europe (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 81. 2. John Mintz and Douglas Farah, “In Search of Friends Among the Foes: U.S. Hopes to Work with Diverse Group,” Washington Post, September 11, 2004. 3. An Interview with Reuel Marc Gerecht, American Enterprise Institute’s website (http:// www.aei.org/publications/pubID.21739/pub_detail.asp), December 16, 2004. 4. Robert S. Leiken and Steven Brooke, “The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood,” Foreign Affairs 86, no. 2 (March/April 2007): pp. 107–121. 5. One of the most vocal advocates of this approach is Kamal Helbawy, a former senior leader of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and currently a London-based activist. 6. A Common and Safe Future: Proposal for an Action Plan to Prevent Extremist Views and Radicalisation among Young People, Danish Ministry of Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs, June 2008. 7. Personal interview with Karen Jespersen, Copenhagen, November 2008; see also “Rønn: Jespersen maler fanden på væggen,” Berlingske Tidende, November 18, 2008. 8. En Fælles og Tryg Fremtid, Danish Ministry of Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs, January 2009. 9. The Prevent Strategy: A Guide for Local Partners in England, HM Government, June 2008, p. 4. 10. “Amsterdam Against Radicalisation,” Municipality of Amsterdam, November 15, 2007. 11. The Radical Dawa in Transition, report by the AIVD (Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst, or General Intelligence and Security Service, the Netherlands’ domestic intelligence agency, 2007), pp. 9–10. 12. The Prevent Strategy: A Guide for Local Partners in England, p. 5; James Kirkup, “More than 20 Serious Terrorist Plots against Britain are being Planned in Pakistan,” Daily Telegraph, December 15, 2008. 13. The history of Finsbury Park’s takeover is told in Sean O’Neill’s and Daniel McGrory’s book The Suicide Factory: Abu Hamza and the Finsbury Park Mosque (London: Harper Collins, 2006), pp. 34–52. 14. Ibid., pp. 253–264.

220

Lorenzo Vidino

15. Information on the takeover of the Finsbury Park Mosque were provided to the author by Kamal Helbawy, Mohammed Kuzbar, and officials at the Home Office and Scotland Yard. 16. Interview with Kamal Helbawy and Mohammed Kuzbar, London, December 2008. 17. Interview with Ruth Kelly and Baroness Neville Jones, London, December 2008. 18. Interview with senior Home Office officials, London, December 2008. 19. Interview with senior Dutch officials, The Hague, May 2008. 20. Interview with official of Scotland Yard’s Muslim Contact Unit, London, January 2007. 21. Robert Lambert, “Empowering Salafis and Islamists Against Al-Qaeda: A London Counterterrorism Case Study,” Political Science & Politics 41 (2008): pp. 31–35. 22. Interview with Robert Lambert, London, December 2008. 23. Preventing Violent Extremism: Learning and Development Exercise, Audit Commission report to the Home Office and Communities and Local Government, October 2008, p. 10. 24. Lambert, “Empowering Salafis and Islamists,” pp. 31–35. 25. Philippe Naughton, “Funding Cut-off Threat by Minister Angers Muslim Groups,” Times, October 11, 2006. 26. Alan Travis, “Time to Tackle the Non-Violent Extremists, Says Smith,” Guardian, December 11, 2008. 27. Integration as a Means to Prevent Extremism and Terrorism: Typology of Islamist Radicalisation and Recruitment, report by the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution), January 2007, p. 7. 28. See, e.g., “Study on the Best Practices in Cooperation Between Authorities and Civil Society with a View to the Prevention and Response to Violent Radicalisation,” report by The Change Institute for the European Commission, July 2008, p. 35. 29. “A Common and Safe Future: Proposal for an Action Plan to Prevent Extremist Views and Radicalisation among Young People,” Danish Ministry of Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs, June 2008, p. 36. 30. “Integration as a Means to Prevent Extremism and Terrorism,” p. 5. 31. Annual report of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Bundesverfassungsschutz, 2005), p. 190. 32. “Preventing Violent Extremism: Learning and Development Exercise. Audit Commission report to the Home Office and Communities and Local Government,” October 2008, p. 10. 33. As quoted in Sylvain Besson, La Conquête de l’Occident (Paris: Seuil, 2005), p. 40. 34. As quoted in Caroline Fourest, Brother Tariq: The Doublespeak of Tariq Ramadan (New York, NY: Encounter, 2008), p. 103. 35. See, e.g., Herbert H. Haines, “Black Radicalization and the Funding of Civil Rights: 1957–1970,” in Doug McAdam and David A. Snow, eds, Social Movements (Los Angeles, CA: Roxbury Publishing Company, 1997), pp. 440–441. 36. The comparison has been made to the author in two separate conversations with two Islamist leaders in two European countries. 37. Quilliam Foundation’s launch publication, April 2008.

CH A P T E R

F I F T E E N

The Struggle for Islamism in the Levant: The Case of Northern Lebanon B e rnard Rou g ie r

The purpose of this chapter is to study the evolutions of Islamism in the Levant over the past decade. It aims at depicting the behavior of the various categories of Islamist actors and the struggle among regional powers—Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia—for control over the overall orientation of Islamism in the Middle East. In order to achieve its aim, such an essay needs to describe and explain the efforts of the antagonists in context. The choice is North Lebanon, both because the area constitutes an Islamist universe in and of itself, and because of its unique connection to multiple centers of power and inf luence, first and foremost in the Muslim world, and also among the various Arabic diasporas in Northern Europe and Australia. A privileged observation post for understanding the debates and contradictions informing Sunni Islam in particular, North Lebanon will not be considered only as a section of the Lebanese territory but rather as part of the bilad al-Sham (Greater Syria). Throughout this region, Islamist groups and networks split over questions such as the following: Which enemy constitutes the top priority—Israel, United States, Iran, the Shia, Arab regimes, secularized Muslims, Western symbols, or the United Nation Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)? Where does the main locus for the struggle lie—Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine/Israel, or the Arabic Peninsula? And, which methods are to be used against the enemy—neighborhood militias, clandestine terrorist action, proselytism, or political participation? Since the mid-2000s, the various components of Sunni Islamism in the Near East have fundamentally disagreed over the meaning of recent

222

Bernard Rougier

developments in the region. The sectarian massacres in Iraq since 2004, the murder of Rafik al- Hariri in 2005, Hezbollah’s resilience in the face of Israeli bombings in 2006, Hamas’ lasting control over Gaza in 2007, Hezbollah’s military blow in Beirut in 2008, and the Israeli bombings of Gaza in 2008–2009 have significantly divided the various movements belonging to radical Islam. Moreover, after the fall of Saddam’s regime in Iraq and the westward shift of the historical border between Sunni and Shia Islam, a number of prominent Salafist sheikhs in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere denounced the “Safavid threat” in the region, calling for the defense of Sunni identity. At the same time Hamas and Hezbollah invoked the values of resistance against Israel in an attempt to stave off the risks of fitna (internal discord). Against the backdrop of a new regional “Cold War” between the allies and adversaries of Iran, and amidst the general disruption of the militant opposition, Middle Eastern Islamists no longer share a common view of political and religious realities and find themselves opposing each other over the meaning of major events that took place in the region, despite the shared, proclaimed wish to restore God’s reign on earth. These contradictions find a unique receptacle in North Lebanon. It operates as an echo chamber and a space for interaction, confrontation, and unusual alliances between (i) a range of religious protagonists representing the entire Islamist spectrum in the Muslim world; (ii) major states of the Middle East, starting with Iran, Syria, and Saudi Arabia; and (iii) radicalized Islamist diasporas of Western societies. At the core of North Lebanon’s uniqueness lies the area’s ability to articulate the two systems of crisis that define today’s political Middle East: the Levant system of crises and the Gulf system of crises. The two systems are crossed by different sets of issues. The Levant system of crises is overshadowed by the Israeli-Palestinian question, the struggles—both internal and regional—for control over the Palestinian cause, and the extent of Syrian inf luence in Lebanon. The Gulf system of crises is characterized by sectarian tensions between Shias and Sunnis in Iraq, the rejection of U.S. military presence in the Gulf, and the assertion of a Sunni religious identity drawing on the various strands of Salafism. At the heart of those systems, the question of Iranian inf luence is particularly critical. The presence of two Palestinian refugee camps—Nahr al-Bared and Baddawi— constitutes an additional factor in the process of regionalization of North Lebanon because the Palestinian environment, wedged at the center of both crisis- systems, has been invested by these regional divides. Finally, this case study will demonstrate how three different interpretations of “the fight” have resulted in three overlapping figures of Islamism in bilâd al-châm: the muqâwim (the resistant fighter), the muqâtil (the defensive fighter), and the mujâhid (the jihad fighter).

The Struggle for Islamism in the Levant

223

The Regional Relevance of Northern Lebanon Although insignificant in size on a map of the Middle East, North Lebanon has risen in less than a decade to being a highly coveted strategic area inside which an impressive number of political actors operate. Among them are states (Syria, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Kuwait, Qatar, and Egypt), hybrid organizations (Lebanese Hezbollah, Palestinian Hamas, and Fatah), and transnational networks (al Qaeda in its Pakistani, Iraqi, and Saudi variants as well as Western Salafist diasporas). This varied set of players shares a common desire to exert itself on the exceptionally vast range of regionally existing Islamist organizations and networks: the Lebanese and Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, sectarian-oriented Salafist networks with varied relationships to the religious Wahhabi establishment, jihad-oriented Salafist networks (Fatah al-Islam), pro-Iranian organizations (Tawheed), and potential al Qaeda intermediaries. Indeed, being the main demographic hotbed of the Sunni community in Lebanon, North Lebanon concentrates the major ideological and militant trends of Sunni Islamism in the Near-East. The area has thus recovered a similar political relevance to the one it enjoyed during the civil war of the 1980s. At that time, the Syrian regime sought to eliminate both Yasser Arafat’s Fatah and its allies among the Islamists of Tripoli (the Syrian army invaded the city in 1985). Syria saw this as the same kind of war it had engaged against its homegrown Muslim Brotherhood a few years before. In view of the sheer number of involved parties, their varying natures and the extent of their statist as well as their transnational ties—from Europe to the Persian Gulf through Iraq and Iran, and from Palestine to the confines of Waziristan—North Lebanon offers a unique opportunity to fully grasp the political and religious stakes involved in the region. It is therefore not an exaggeration to state that this area harbors the largest gathering of protagonists directly involved in the changing ideological scene of Sunni Islam, at least since the second half of this decade. North Lebanon has thus turned into the crux of a struggle for the monopoly of a supranational myth—Islamism— spreading throughout the Syria-Lebanese region and causing human and ideological f lows to run from Iraq to Palestine. The situation recalls the Cold War waged among the Arab states for the control over yet another supranational myth—pan-Arabism. This time, however, the nature of the coveted symbolic resource is such that the struggle involves a much larger number of contenders. To begin with, the Islamic Republic of Iran, a non-Arab and non- Sunni Islamic regime, is asserting itself as an increasingly inf luential actor. As far as its leaders are concerned, sectarian Sunni Islamism represents as much of a threat to national cohesion as it does to their strategic interests in the Gulf

224

Bernard Rougier

and in the Near East. The moment North Lebanon is perceived as the principal hotbed for this blend of anti- Shia Islamism, the area calls for the intervention of Hezbollah, the main ally of Iran in the Middle East. It is therefore possible to study the way this threat is being dealt with at a practical level by looking at the interventions of the Shia militia in a supposedly hostile Sunni Arab environment. As it is, the strategy consists in setting up a network of allied Islamist elements in the Sunni environment, with a view to constituting a protective buffer to shield the Shia Hezbollah from direct confrontation with Sunni religious forces. In order to avoid losing its prestige in the mainly Sunni Arab societies of the region and to retain its supra-sectarian Islamic legitimacy, Hezbollah needs to promote an ideological narrative of the events in the region rather than a sectarian one. The themes of resistance against Israel and rejection of U.S. policy in the Middle East are emphatically stressed by Hezbollah leaders, who legitimize Iran and Syria’s regional roles each time those countries are criticized by local forces. Sectarian tensions are thereby attributed to the sole enemies of the umma, who allegedly seek to increase internal divisions in order to increase their control on divided Muslims. As for the inf luential Hariri family, it is the object of two contradictory sets of accusations, depending on the targeted audience. When addressing the Sunni Islamists it is looking to win over, Hezbollah advances the Western secularism of Saad al-Hariri and of Prime Minister Fouad Siniora, both in their lifestyles and in their external alliances with the United States and Europe. Before the Western media it seeks to convince— and with the help of carefully tended contacts in Washington and in Paris—Hezbollah lays allegations of their involvement in the secret financing of radical Islamist groups. As regards the Syrian regime, North Lebanon constitutes nothing short of an integral part of the homeland, and the very existence of Islamist groups escaping its control looms as a vital threat to the regime. The North Lebanese city of Tripoli in particular is the object of constant watchfulness— a state of affairs unchanged by the withdrawal of Syrian troops in April 2005— explaining the city’s status as a symbol of militant Islamism in the bilâd al-Shâm. Ever since the withdrawal from Lebanon, Syrian discourse has sought to bring the idea of a Salafist threat of Saudi origin that is liable to conduct cross-border terrorist operations, to the attention of Western diplomats. North Lebanon is thus pictured as a radical base for mobilization against the regime of Bashar al-Assad. Shortly before the summer war of 2006, jihadist militants originating from jihadi Iraqi branches were also channeled to the camps of Nahr al-Bared and Baddawi, in order to provoke an intra-Sunni conf lict between partisans of jihad against the West, on the one hand, and allies of the Hariri family against Syria on the other hand. Finally, for Saudi Arabia North Lebanon is a sectarian Sunni space particularly difficult to deal with since it brings up many inner contradictions of Saudi society. Different religious currents are thus trying to project their

The Struggle for Islamism in the Levant

225

own interpretation of the Islamic creed in the Levant through the regional gate of Tripoli, the main city of North Lebanon. The official religious establishment would like to reaffirm its authority over those who claim to be Salafists—the religious doctrine of the Saudi kingdom—without answering either to a religious institution or to any kind of authoritative control. Voices of the Saudi religious opposition in the 1990s also managed to establish power bases in Tripoli. These sheikhs share with the religious Saudi establishment a common concern against the progress of the Iranian inf luence in the Middle East—which is matched, according to them, by a hidden agenda of religious conversion to Shiism—but they also encourage the continuation of an Islamic resurgence against the U.S. army in Iraq. To complete the picture, young Saudis belonging to the group “al Qaeda in the Arabic peninsula” set up clandestine cells in North Lebanon with the help of some Lebanese militants. They aimed at implementing military action across the Lebanese-Israeli frontier, in accordance with the wishes of Ayman al-Zawahiri (the ideologue of al Qaeda). These three trends—the conservative, the dissident, and the terrorist— claim altogether to speak on behalf of the Salafi creed. They draw different conclusions from this creed concerning their relationship to politics and violence; however, they promote a common Islamic code in dealing with moral issues in everyday life. The first and second trends tend to conditionally support the Hariri family and its quest for international justice after the murder of Rafik al-Hariri in 2005, in spite of the family’s secularist identity. The third trend considers the Hariri family as an extension of the hated Saudi princes.

The Strategic Divisions of Sunni Islamism since 2005 The general orientation of Sunni Islamism is central to the confrontation/ interaction between the Gulf system of crises and the Levant system of crises. Today, three contradictory directions shape this general orientation. The first option is oriented toward sectarian mobilization. The enemy assumes the face of Shia Islam and, behind it, Iran and its Syrian ally. Immediately after Hariri’s assassination, a number of religious clerics from Tripoli lifted a taboo and gave free rein to sectarian Islamism, freed from the Syrian yoke and deliberately hostile to the Syrian familial dynasty. Those who claim Salafist ascendancy think of their relation to the Hariri family as a political alliance. Theoretical animosity against the secularized and pro-Western family fades to the background because priority is given to the necessity of protecting “the independence of Sunni decision-capability” in the face of Hezbollah and their regional allies. This is what is called here the muqâtil (defensive fighter) stand, based upon a sectarian solidarity in front of regional threats. The second option looks in the direction of Palestine. The point, then, is to advocate the duty of “resistance” alongside every local and regional protagonist at war— or in a state of war— against Israel, and to challenge the United

226

Bernard Rougier

States’ role in the Middle East. Within this framework, Sunni militants do not hold Iran to be a contemporary resurgence of the Safavid Shia state; on the contrary, the country is viewed as the only contender able to challenge American hegemony in the region. States such as Iran and Syria are rallied in this view by quasi-states such as Hamas and Hezbollah. The territorial footholds of these two organizations explain their leaders’ constant wavering between a hard religious line, founded on the values of jihad for Palestine, and a rather more realistic political line, structured around participation in the formal politics of institutions and diplomacy. This attitude is embodied by the muqâwim who will join forces with Syria and Iran in order to bring down Western designs in the region. Finally, Sunni Islamists afford a third option, halfway between the two former ones. Indeed, such armed groups rejecting any form of institutional anchorage may primarily define themselves with regard to the liberation of a territory, such as Iraq or Palestine. This stance was adopted by the leaders of the jihadi group Fatah al-Islam after their settlement in the refugee camp of Nahr al-Bared in November 2006. Nonetheless, the exterior commitment remains ambivalent, since any force seeking to obstruct the implementation of “ jihad in the way of God” for Palestine automatically becomes an “enemy of the umma.” Fatah al-Islam’s appointed mission was to be accomplished outside of Lebanon; however, it ended up confronting the Lebanese army in May–September 2007. In that case, jihadism conveys a terrorist dimension by giving way to all- out struggle against any form of Westernization in the region, be it political, cultural, or economical. This ambivalent attitude is peculiar to the mujâhid ( jihad fighter) who is mainly concerned by the umma situation. Those categories are “ideal categories” that help us in understanding the war from within, which is taking part in Sunni Islamism, from the Gulf to the Levant. In real life, one can easily switch from one type to another according to the prevalent balance of power and the changing situations. In addition to that, as it will be seen, one can fulfill two roles simultaneously but in different locations, depending on the top priorities at stake in each place. The area’s propensity to elicit exterior intervention is rooted in a more complex sectarian fabric than the one portrayed by Sunni Islamists accounts. While the area holds a predominantly Sunni population, North Lebanon remains a heterogeneous environment. The neighborhood of Baal Mohsen, next to the historic core of the city of Tripoli, harbors an Alawi minority, the same minority that has been governing Syria for more than thirty years. During local clashes in 2008 summer, rumor had it that this neighborhood was secretly defended by regular Alawi Syrian soldiers who crossed the border in order to assist their co-religionists. Moreover, Tripoli is surrounded by a mountainous hinterland that counts many Christian and Alawi villages in the provinces of Dinnieh and Akkar, not to speak of the proximity of the Maronite city of Zghorta. This heterogeneous human landscape renders every regional issue all the more sensitive, since it can find an easy local translation each

The Struggle for Islamism in the Levant

227

time a regional or transnational issue is raised. For instance, the mobilization about the Prophet’s caricatures in 2006 was built up by Sunni Salafi clerics in Europe closely linked by informal networks to North Lebanon, where most of them were originally from. Moreover, due to the contacts it has established with Arabic diasporas in Europe and Australia and ties it maintains with Iraq and Saudi Arabia, the Sunni religious element is far more empowered than any other force. Indeed, these exterior ties significantly enhance its actionand initiative- capability.

The Recomposition of Islamism at the End of the Lebanese Civil War At the end of the Lebanese civil war and the consolidation of the Syrian presence in Lebanon, reliable personalities had replaced militia men as an authorized expression of Islamism in Lebanon. In order to increase the odds of playing a role in local politics and eventually become an MP, those Islamist personalities had to subscribe his political speech within the frame of resistance against Israel on the one hand, and avoid any kind of criticism vis-à-vis Syria on the other hand. For some, accessing notable positions was directly associated with the war and was obtained through a privileged link with the Syrian military apparatus. For example, the predicator sheikh Fathi Yakkan (1933–2009), who was then a member of the Lebanese Muslim Brotherhood, emerged as a key actor on the local Islamist scene. The sheikh’s mediation was the only recourse for Northern families seeking information about their sons arrested during Syrian army raids. In 2000, the Syrian regime allowed the release of Islamic Unity senior leaders in order to optimize its support in Northern Lebanon and keep the Sunni community in geographical and ideological limbo. This strategy aimed at preventing any form of political mobilization around Rafik al-Hariri whose inf luence in the region was at the time censored. Those who fought against the Syrian army during the war were authorized to resume their political activity in exchange for a written commitment in which they pledged not to challenge the Baathist regime. This is how one of the Tawheed historical leaders, sheikh Hachem Minqara, was released in 2000, after thirteen years in Syrian jails. Furthermore, he was able to bring together several former militants from his own neighborhood who were also released for the same reason. While the Syrian apparatus, whose center was based in the old city of Mar Maroun, was busy trying to co-opt former Islamist militants, another religious group formed: the Salafist sheikhs who emerged throughout the 1990s. This group was relatively autonomous vis-à-vis the power struggles over access to politics during the Syrian imperium (1985–2005). In the 1990s indeed, Northern Lebanon became a geographical destination for the Salafist sheikhs. It was a consequence of the new human geography

228

Bernard Rougier

transformed by waves of emigration toward Europe and the Gulf. It would appear that the Salafist dynamic was a collateral result of the Syrian troops’ invasion of Tripoli in 1985, since many people asked for and obtained political asylum in Western countries (e.g., Denmark, Sweden, and Australia) who were then liberal in giving resident cards to Lebanese and Palestinian political refugees. In these host cities— Copenhagen, Stockholm, and Sidney—former Tawheed militants came to embrace Salafism and had a significant impact on their families and friends back home. Meanwhile, others such as the Tripolitean Bassam al-Kanj chose an alternative by answering the call of sheikh Abdallah Azzam, the well-known theoretician of jihad in Afghanistan in the 1980s. For the core militants gathered around the Salafist sheikh Salem al- Chahhâl—the main representative of Salafism at that time—Saudi Arabia seemed to be the natural choice. By enrolling in the Medina Islamic University, from which he graduated in 1984, Salem’s son, Da’ï al-Islam al- Chahhâl, opened the way to a whole new process. In 1984, upon his return to Lebanon, he took part in setting up a small armed group called the “Islamic Nucleus army.” By doing so, he hoped to counterinf luence the Tawheed, which was perceived as a promotional tool serving the Khomeini revolution in a Sunni environment. The second Syrian invasion of Tripoli in 1986 forced him to an extended stay in the Gulf. Meanwhile, other students, who were to become the main figures of Salafism in North Lebanon, followed his footsteps to Saudi Arabia and then back to Lebanon. Living at the Medina Islamic University in the 1980s was a turning point in broadening intellectual horizon of non-Saudi Muslim students. It was through bonds of friendship among students coming together from the Muslim world to the University campus that the umma became a human reality. The salafi creed gave religious and intellectual legitimization to that attitude. The emphasis put upon the prophetic sunna combined with the dismissal of religious schools (madhhab) contributed to the sense of a new religious universality. This universality is based on a unitarian dogma (‘aqîda) and a Salafist style of life (manhaj). The campus hosted all major Salafist figures, such as Professors Abd al-Aziz ibn Baz and Abou Bakr al-Jaza’ïri, and Sheikh Nasser al-Dîn al-Albani. In the 1980s, Lebanese students witnessed a crucial time in the history of Islam in Saudi Arabia, since the religious preaching became more and more politicized with the upcoming generation of religious activists.1 In these circumstances, Da’ï al-Islam befriended sheikhs that became, a decade later, the main representatives of Saudi religious dissent, such as Safar al-Hawali, Nasir al-Umar, and, worth special mention, Salman al-Auda. As their disciple, he took upon himself to adopt the premise of “decoding reality” ( fiqh al-wâqih). It is on this basis that the believer had the obligation to take interest in the political issues challenging the umma. This attitude allowed questioning the legitimacy of those who are holding political power (wali al-amr), who should always be obeyed according to the wahhabi doctrine. This is how he distanced himself from his own father, faithful to the traditional wahhabite sheikhs, mainly concerned by theological concepts, such as divine unity and dogmatic purity.2

The Struggle for Islamism in the Levant

229

At the end of the Lebanese civil war students of Lebanese and Palestinian origin, freshly graduated from the Medina Islamic University, returned to Lebanon with countless worldwide Salafist connections. Thanks to these networks, they considerably modified the religious landscape of Tripoli and Northern Lebanon more generally, working to extend Salafism through promoting Islamic moralization.3 To this end Da’ï al-Islam founded a religious association in 1990, the “League for Moral Direction and Islamic Charity” (al-hidâya wa al-ihsân), which was responsible for a teaching madrassa of the same name. Other Salafist teaching schools, directed and animated by Islamic Medina University students, followed the same pattern. Thanks to their external connections, the Salafist sheikh built their local prestige and their respectability, while Syria’s Islamist allies depended strongly on the Syrian apparatus. The only limitation was the tight control by Lebanese Ministry of Interior and Syrian services.

Salafist Ambiguities and Jihadist Violence Connected to numerous Salafist sites in the Arabic peninsula, the Lebanese city of Tripoli became a promised land for militants of the new call. The most motivated intended to endorse Islamic vigilance by blowing up cabarets and liquor stores.4 Another target was the Ahbash, a Syrian-backed Islamic heterodox sect. Assassination attempts against Ahbash leaders followed the same conviction. These acts of violence did not aim at changing the political regime, since Salafist contented themselves with challenging lifestyles and activities not based on Islamic values. They targeted their violence toward those who were challenging them directly—be it by refusing the uniqueness of the dogma (the case of the Ahbash) or the style of life adopted by the Salafist (the case of the “impious Muslims”). Those deeds triggered many arrests among the Salafists. The minister of interior’s decision to close down the Islamic Institute of Da’ï al-Islam led them to believe that they were persecuted by the State and its intelligence agents.5 In addition to the morality-oriented violence, there was umma-oriented violence that took place at the end of the 1990s.6 A former “Arab Afghan” called Bassam al-Kanj tried to rejuvenate the legacy of Abdallah Azzam by setting up a military camp in the mountains of Sir al-Dinnieh in order to help the Chechens’ resistance against the Russian army. Within a few months, he managed to build cells in Tripoli thanks to the help of friends who experienced jihad in Peshawar in the 1980s. A fight with the Lebanese army in January 2000, which caused Bassam al-Kanj’s death, put an end to this attempt. Some of the students of Sheikh Da’ï al-Islam joined the network, and consequently Da’ï, whose involvement was not clear, had to go underground. For the Salafist circles, this episode provided further proof that the Lebanese state was obsessed with persecuting Salafists to the benefit of infidels, even when the sacred duty of protecting the umma within its borders was involved.

230

Bernard Rougier

This is why the Tripoli Salafist sheikhs strongly denied the prosecutor’s allegation that the insurgents intended to build up an “Islamic Emirate” in North Lebanon. A third source of violence emerged after the fall of the Afghani Taliban regime. In 2002–2003, a small group initiated a wave of terrorist violence against Western- style fast-food restaurants on the road connecting Tripoli to Beirut in order to avenge the Taliban regime. Those who committed the attacks had in fact never left Lebanon. It is through their encounter with one member of al Qaeda, referred to as Ibn al- Chahîd, that they were able to conduct their project.7 It is this Islamism that facilitated the link between the local milieu—the poor neighborhoods of Bab Tebbaneh, Qobbeh, and the Palestinian camps of Baddawi and Nahr al-Bared— and transnational jihadist type networks. Stunningly, in a rather short period of time young men of modest backgrounds (i.e., small retail trades) reinvented themselves as “soldiers of umma” by attacking American commercial brands. Furthermore, through the networks of radical Australian and Danish diasporas, they were able to gain financial and logistical resources to support their actions. Faced with the three types of violence, the Salafist sheikhs could not keep up the same attitude. On one hand, it was tricky to disclaim the “moral violence” that came with the obligation to command Good and persecute Evil. As for the Dinnieh events, it was an expression of religious solidarity with Chechenya, that is, a weakened part of the umma (confrontation with the army was ascribed to the deeds of “agents provocateurs”). On the other hand, for outright terrorist operations, the condemnation was straightforward. As far as the senior Tripolitean sheikhs were concerned, resorting to jihad had to be subject to restrictive conditions that only they could define in an authoritative way, in accordance with Saudi religious peers. Salafism as a whole was mainly obsessed by the mujâhidin (jihad fighter) figure, since many sheikhs complained that they were excluded by Hezbollah from the Southern front against Israel and looked for compensation on every possible grounds—be it moral (defense of the “true” Islam) or geographical (defense of the umma abroad). As mediators between their local constituencies and various outside authorities [e.g., the town’s zu’amâ (local or national political leaders), the Army “deuxième bureau,” the police, and the Syrian mukhabarat] the Salafist sheikhs wanted to be acknowledged as reliable religious figures in exchange for a promise to efficiently control this milieu. Hence, as far as the Salafist sheikhs were concerned, the fall of the Saddam regime in 2003 was an opportunity to channel the poor youth’s resentment, by steering volunteers against American troops occupying Iraq. Their religious credentials were therefore asserted among part of a determined youth ready to take action against the umma’s enemies, while making sure that North Lebanon remained immune to repression. In that way, Salafi sheikhs could enjoy the quality of being “mujahedeen by proxies” in taking part in the Sunni insurgency against the U.S. army in Iraq, while keeping a low profile in Lebanon before nurturing an open sectarian mobilization starting from 2005.

The Struggle for Islamism in the Levant

231

Sectarian Mobilization against Syria and Hezbollah Following the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri (February 14, 2005) and the subsequent pullback of Syrian troops from Lebanon (April 2005) resulting from international pressures as well as huge pro-sovereignty demonstrations, Sunni Islamism underwent major transformations. The political party of Rafik al-Hariri, the Future Movement, reached out to Islamist actors who had the most to gain from the Syrian withdrawal—in order to earn their support for elections the following spring. That support was expected to express the emotion provoked by the assassination of the main representative of Levantine Sunni Islam. In return for that support, the new anti- Syrian majority decided to release many Islamists that were detained following the Sir al-Dinnieh clashes, thus confirming the Salafist notables in their position of privileged intermediaries between the new government and the militant masses. In order to establish their authority over Tripoli, Islamist forces hostile to Damascus elaborated, following the departure of Syrian troops, a policy aimed to reactivate the memory of massacres perpetrated by the Syrian army. For instance, the role of the Syrians and their auxiliaries in the Bab al-Tebbaneh massacre (October 19, 1987) was stressed. By the end of 2006, a Tripolitean Salafist sheikh Zakariyya al-Masri made a tripartite alliance with a Jama’a Islâmiyya (the Muslim Brotherhood Lebanese branch) former deputy and a Tawhid leader who shied away from Damascus, thus forming the Independent Islamic Gathering (al-liqa’ al-islâmi al-mustaqil). The presence of a former Tawhid hero had a special symbolic importance, since it was a way to reincarnate the martyrdom of an Islamic city at the hands of the Syrian army and to allude to the possible reformation of an Islamic axis against Damascus.8 For sheikh al-Masri, Tripoli remained a symbol of Sunnis in bilâd al-châm. According to him, the city was surrounded by the enemies of Sunni Islam, all linked together by a Shia common ground. The city might fall “under the hegemony of nusaïri shi’a at the northern gate and under the hegemony of Shia at the southern gate.”9 The Syrian war over Tripoli in 1985–1986 was part of “the common efforts of Syria and Iran to cancel the slightest expression of Sunni power to the benefit of Shias.”10 In another Salafist pamphlet, signed with a pseudonym, Hezbollah is accused of exploiting the “resistance against Israel” theme to the advantage of Iranian and Shia regional interests.11 The author states that Party leaders have hijacked jihadist ideals in order to reassert the Shia presence in the Mashreq and to take over control of the Lebanese powerbase. According to him, Islamic values are being led astray. Thus, Hezbollah’s jihad is a fake jihad since it is theoretically subject to at least two critical conditions: the return of the Hidden Imam, the only competent authority to declare jihad, and the wilâyat al-faqîh theory, dependent upon the goodwill of the Revolution’s Guide.12 After the Iraq-Iran war, the author goes on, “in which several high ranking Hezbollah members took part,” the Shia militia had been described

232

Bernard Rougier

as promoters of anti- Sunni and anti-Arab violence. The author backs up his analysis by reminding the reader of Hezbollah’s implication in the Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia in 1996 and its alleged participation in the “repression of the Sunni student Intifada” in Ahwaz, Iran, in 1999.13 At the end of 2006, a year after the anti-Syrian coalition’s electoral victory, Hezbollah decided to block the institutional process and launch a civil disobedience movement by organizing a sit-in in downtown Beirut, a few meters away from Prime Minister Fouad Siniora’s office. This prolonged sit-in gave Salafist voices the opportunity to assert themselves as popular counterweights to the Shia organization. In these circumstances, Hariri’s mustaqbal had no choice but to accept the sectarian process, hoping that it would keep Hezbollah from actually attacking Siniora’s government, since doing so would mean crossing the red line of the Muslim fitna. For mainstream Salafists, what was going on was nothing less than another manifestation of the Safavid threat. Major elements of Salafist spectrum reunited in reaction to this new danger, but, interestingly enough, the Salafi jihadist current reacted in a much more complex way.

The Fatah al-Islam Chapter It is in this context that what is known as “Fatah al-Islam” emerged (December 2006–September 2007). Fatah al-Islam is a jihadist group formed in the Palestinian camp of Nahr al-Bared, ten kilometers northwest of Tripoli.14 This jihadist armed group entrenched itself in a special space, unreachable by legal authorities due to the sensitiveness of the Palestinian refugee issue across the whole Middle East.15 For the first time, those tempted by a jihadist revolt could at least enjoy a rallying point, without being under the thumb of the Salafists sheikhs. Facing a phenomenon that they could not have forecasted, the Salafist sheikhs were no longer able to fulfill the mission they were assigned since the Rafik al-Hariri assassination, that is, channeling first and foremost the religious zeal of their militants against Hezbollah. Resisting Hezbollah was all the more difficult since the Shia militia gained further popularity by proving its resilience against the Israeli army’s attempt to destroy its military capacities during the summer war of 2006. Public opinion in the Arab world came to recognize Hezbollah as the winner of the “fifth Arab-Israeli conf lict,” as it was labeled by the TV channel al-Jazeera. Faced with this new situation, the Sunni jihadist groups had to prove their own existence, at least verbally, in order to show that Hezbollah was not the only fighting force in the area. This point has been relentlessly underlined in Ayman al-Zawahiri’s video messages. With Fatah al-Islam as a platform, many among its followers thought that it would become possible to speak on behalf of jihad without being entangled in the rationales of regional and local alliances, unlike the mainstream Saudi Salafist currents. Conversely, Tripolitean sheikhs and their Saudi sponsors were no longer able to control a quite explosive ideological resource. Jihad

The Struggle for Islamism in the Levant

233

became thus an agenda freely discussed by militants coming from various countries in the Middle East. Some of the top leaders had fought before in Iraq within al Qaeda fî bilad al-rafidayn.16 The very existence of Fatah al-Islam was like a lure for attracting young volunteers, through informal ties or the simple use of jihadist forums on the Internet. On the regional scale, this network was enhancing the centrality of Sunni Islam as a locus for the power struggle between Syria and Saudi Arabia. By facilitating, thanks to many incentives, the redirection of jihadist volunteers from Iraq to Lebanon, those in charge of the Sunni radical file in the Syrian regime were setting up germs of discord at the heart of the religious system co-opted by the Future Movement and its Saudi advisors. The leaders of Fatah al-Islam identified the most urgent enemies as Israel, the West, UNIFIL, and the allies of “America in Lebanon,” and this trend ruined the mobilization efforts of confessional Salafism advocated by the sheikhs from Tripoli. The aim being the struggle against the West and Israel, Hezbollah and Iran were de facto immune. The unsuccessful attempts led by the sheiks trying to incorporate Fatah al-Islam to their confessional agenda immediately resulted in the launching of a political campaign, relayed by international media, about the possible links between the Future Movement and the jihadi groups. Some of these sheikhs might also have thought that by relying on Fatah al-Islam while the Lebanese state was on the verge of collapsing, they could behave on their own and get rid of the Future Movement’s tutelage. From an ideological perspective, Fatah al-Islam was a synthesis between the system of crises of the Gulf and the system of crises of the Levant. It aimed at taking a new look at the Palestinian and the Iraqi causes by designating a common enemy: a West intrinsically hostile to Islam. Thanks to small groups of fighters who came back from Iraq, Fatah al-Islam was able to easily convince young recruits, especially young Saudis, that military training in the camp of Nahr al-Bared was essential before the departure to the “Two-Rivers Country” (Iraq) or in order to “free Palestine.” According to witnesses who spoke with top leaders on several occasions, attacking Hezbollah was out of question as long as the Shia organization fought against Israel. The number one priority was the struggle against those who were considered obstacles to jihad in Palestine and aligned themselves with the West. The expressed incompatibility with the Shia organization was mainly theological—in Salafist circles, Hezbollah is commonly referred to as Hezb al-Lât, named for the goddess to whom the Meccans worshipped in pre-Islamic Arabia. On the strategic level, no action was engaged against the Shia militia. This ambivalence allowed leaders to simultaneously play on the sectarian Shia playfield and on the jihadist religious one. The former was used in order to enlist young Saudis and look for support among Salafist sheikhs from Tripoli, known for their hostility toward the Shias as a whole and Hezbollah more specifically. The latter, the jihadist religious frame allowed for continued relations with the leader of the Islamic Front of Action

234

Bernard Rougier

in Tripoli, the preacher Fathi Yakkan, who was close to the Syrian leadership and Hezbollah. After the attack of a bus of civilians in the Christian area of Aïn ‘Alaq on February 13, 2007, in which three people died, the Forces de Sécurité Intérieure (FSI) decided to strike Fatah al-Islam before it could expand to Tripoli. The assault, on May 20, 2007, of apartments used as arms warehouses by jihadists from Tripoli led to a decisive confrontation between the group and the army. After three months of battle and over four hundred deaths, the camp fell in September 2007. One will not be surprised to know that certain sheikhs who were going around with Fatah al-Islam switched in record time from their former stand. Leaving the “mujâhid attitude” for the “muqâtil” one, they became hard-line critics of Hezbollah in the region. Conversely, after the violent Hezbollah blow on West Beirut against Hariri’s partisans on May 7, 2008, others Salafi sheikhs switched to the muqâwim paradigm, in fear of being the future victims of a Syrian/Hezbollah’s coming back in inf luence in the country.17

Conclusion What took place in Tripoli allows us to understand three main rival figures of Islamism in Greater Syria (bilâd al-châm): the muqâwim, the muqâtil, and the mujâhid. The figure of the muqâwim was annexed by the resistance because Hezbollah absorbed that signifier during the 1990s. The Sunni muqâtil drew his legitimacy from Tripoli’s local history and the epic stories of fights to protect the city against the Syrian regime in the 1980s. The third and last figure is the mujâhid. It the most versatile figure: it can fight a jihad to protect the umma from foreigners as much as struggle against regimes and societies in the region, as demonstrated by Fatah al-Islam. In bilâd al-châm, a fierce debate took place among jihadi circles vis-à-vis the attitude to adopt toward the Syrian regime. From 2003 to 2006, a majority of the jihadi fighters were willing to consider Syria as a sanctuary, in exchange for a free hand to cross over the Syrian/Iraqi border. Fatah al-Islam in 2007 marked a breach. The regime, by giving up its practice of benign neglect, chose to use a systematic and vigorous repression. Ever since, the jihadists, whose exact number is difficult to evaluate, tend to consider the regime a priority foe. The regional interests of Syria and Iran are to put forward the figure of the muqâwim against the muqâtil on one hand, and to control mujâhid on the other hand. Indeed the mujâhid can reveal itself helpful because of its nuisance potentially both toward the West and regional neighbors. Left on its own, the mujâhid, versatile in nature, becomes the sheer embodiment of the terrorist threat. For Saudi Arabia, those different expressions of Islamism constitute identity stakes that erase the distinction between domestic and foreign policy. The religious Wahhabi institution has a hard time reasserting its authority on

The Struggle for Islamism in the Levant

235

a more and more fragmented Salafist regional context. It cannot easily throw away the mujâhid figure when the umma is occupied by foreigners, and it seeks to unveil the Iranian design hidden behind the muqâwim. This encourages sectarian mobilization in order to fight jihadist temptation. This latter occurrence is preferably dealt with abroad in Iraq than inside the Saudi kingdom, even if it means negotiating with the Ministry of Interior the rehabilitation of lost sheep once they come back. The question that remains open is to understand which figure is going to have the upper hand in the years to come, and, correlatively, to what extent one of the three regional powers will manage to impose its own definition of Islamism (or facilitate the kind of Islamism that is the more difficult to manage for others). Another question is related to the autonomy of Islamist actors. The short Islamist history of North Lebanon has proved that jihadism can easily find people ready to fight and die for it once the opportunity is given. Politicized from their childhood and used to politics reduced to its simplest expression (violence and slogans), the rank and file can be involved in direct action in a very short period of time. When such things happen, the opportunity is mostly given by professional activists who barely escape the many Middle Eastern political contradictions— something that can account for the failures of al Qaeda leaders to find a power base in bilâd al-châm up to now. The situation has become quite tragic in its structure. Hariri’s secularist and pro-Western policy is unable to resist Hezbollah in its constant progress toward a control of the Lebanese state. It is also meeting problems in setting up a grassroots organization of its own. The very existence of an efficient ideological and military tool such as Hezbollah remains a permanent challenge for Sunni Islamist militants— something many of them would like to emulate for themselves without fully understanding that radicalism has been a very useful way of enhancing the Shia community’s status, while it has been weakening the Sunnis from within in the whole region.

Notes 1. See the forthcoming book of Stephane Lacroix, “Awakening Islam: a History of Islamism in Saudi Arabia” (Harvard University Press, Winter 2010). 2. Salem al-Islam al- Chahhâl set up in 1988 the first salafist teaching Institute in Lebanon, the Center for Predication and Guidance (ma’had al-da’wa wa al-irchâd). Supervised by his nephew, Hassan Saïd al- Chahhâl, the Center benefited from aid furnished by the Saudi minister for religious affairs, predication and guidance. 3. This explains why Tripoli saw for the first time women dressed in niqâb (a veil that covers the whole body, except the eyes) or in khimâr (a veil that covers the whole body, included the eyes) walking in the streets. The city’s networking corresponds to a shift in a space of solidarity than concerns more than just Lebanon. In Tripoli and in the Arab world as a whole, Arabic television channels have had an inf luence via satellite in the 1990s. Most of the households, even very modest ones, gained access to Arab media. In very tiny homes, several generations discovered the staging of the “Arab misery” in Iraq or in Palestine, or the “Muslim misery” in a broader sense from the Balkans to Central Asia via the Middle East and

236

4.

5. 6. 7.

8.

9.

10. 11. 12. 13. 14.

15.

16.

Bernard Rougier

the Caucasus. Indeed most of the crises of the post–Cold War have involved Muslim populations. This geopolitical context coincided in 1996 with the emerging of an Arab TV channel: al-Jazeera. As its Western model, CNN, during the first war Gulf, al-Jazeera eased emotional identification. The way people related to this media also eased the decoding work engaged by the sheiks who considered that the violence post–Cold War was an expression of multiform hostility directed against Islam. It enabled religious spokesmen to empty the history of Lebanon from its political and national meaning in order to incorporate it into the geographical continuum of persecuted Muslims. In the middle of the 1990s, Saïd Hassan al- Chahhâl, Hassan Saïd al- Chahhâl’s son, was arrested after a gunfight at an Army roadblock. He was carrying guns in his car’s trunk in order to intimidate liquors store owners. The League for Moral Direction and Islamic Charity was running a religious broadcast, The Holy- Coran Radio, which has also been closed down. Those categories are built by Thomas Heggammer in “Jihad in Saudi Arabia: Violence and pan-Islamism since 1979” (Cambridge Middle East Studies, 2010). Ibn al- Chahîd was a Yemeni who f led from Afghanistan in 2001 after the fall of the Taliban. He sought refuge in the Lebanese camp of Aïn el-Helweh and was caught up by the Lebanese Army when he tried to leave the camp at the end of 2003. Formed in 1982, the Islamic Tawheed movement (Harakat al-Tawheed al-Islâmiyya) was the reunion of preexisting groups such as the Popular Resistance led by Khalil Akkawi and Jund Allah. Its leader, Sheikh Saeed Sha’ban, was very close to the Iranian leadership at time where relationships between Syria and Iran were quite tense in Lebanon. See Zakariyya al- Masri’s book, Raising the Velvet Curtains. On the Extremism of those related with the Shia Faction (izâhat al-satâ’ir al-mukhmila. ‘An gulât al-qâdat al-mansûbîn ila al-firqa al-shi’a) (Hamza Center for Allegiance, Scientific Research and Islamic Work, first edition 2007/1428; second edition 2008/1429). The book, freely available, circulated widely among Islamist circles in North Lebanon. By speaking of the “nusaïri shi’a,” the author is pejoratively referring to the Alawi sect. Ibid., p. 223. See Ali Sadeeq, What Do You Know about Hezbollah?(madha ta’rif ‘an Hezbollah?) (2006/1427). Ibid., p. 97. Ibid., p. 85. The nucleus was formed by jihadists of Palestinian and Syrian origins. Once they were freed from their Syrian jail in April 2005, they started to go to Lebanon. Thanks to permissions delivered by Abou Khaled al-Amleh, the secretary- general of Fatah al-Intifada, a Fatah dissident organization close to the Syrian military apparatus, they started to build footholds in Palestinian refugee camps in Beirut (Chatila and Bourj al-Barajneh) and North-Lebanon (Nahr al-Bared and Baddawi). After a clash in Baddawi camp in November 2006 with the camp’s security committee opposed to the sudden f low of uncontrolled Islamists militants, Fatah al-Islam was proclaimed on November 26, 2006, in Nahr al-Bared’s camp. The first press release encapsulates the failure of the Palestinians nationalist struggle, unable to fulfill its mission because it relied on “States and leaders” instead of relying solely on God. One needs to mobilize the whole umma in “order to free Palestine and fight the Jews enemy and those who back them among the Zionized and Crusaded West.” By using both a Palestinian and Jihadist speeches, this new grouping was able to attract volunteers from all over the Arab World. Such is the case of Chaker al-Absi, the former chief of Fatah al-Islam. Once a Fatah, then a Fatah al-Intifada militant, he became jihadist at the end of the 1990s. Involved in the murder of the American diplomat Lawrence Folley in 2000 in Amman, he went to Iraq at the end of 2002.

The Struggle for Islamism in the Levant

237

17. On July 2008, conservative Salafi sheikhs signed a Agreement Document with Hezbollah in which a distinct separation was made between religious creed and strategic stand. According to the document, it was a duty “to strongly fight against the American and Zionist plans, whose main instrument is to sow discord [ fitna], to divide what is dividable and to fraction what is fractionable.”

This page intentionally left blank

CH A P T E R

SI X T E E N

Dissonance and Denial: U.S. Foreign Policy and the War of Ideas Robe rt S pe nce r

The United States is not at war with Islam, and Islam is a religion of peace. At this point virtually everyone in the public square of Western capitals takes these two propositions for granted. They have informed and guided U.S. policy since the Clinton administration, continuing through the two terms of George W. Bush and into the presidency of Barack Obama. In 1998, President Bill Clinton said this at the United Nations: Many believe there is an inevitable clash between Western civilization and Western values, and Islamic civilizations and values. I believe this view is terribly wrong. False prophets may use and abuse any religion to justify whatever political objectives they have— even cold-blooded murder. Some may have the world believe that almighty God himself, the merciful, grants a license to kill. But that is not our understanding of Islam . . . Americans respect and honor Islam.1 This did not change after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. In their aftermath, President George W. Bush went on to say that those attacks violated “the fundamental tenets of the Islamic faith.” In his September 20, 2001, address to Congress, he elaborated: “The terrorists practice a fringe form of Islamic extremism that has been rejected by Muslim scholars and the vast majority of Muslim clerics— a fringe movement that perverts the peaceful teachings of Islam.”2 Bush expressed it again in June 2007, when he spoke at the celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of the opening of the Islamic Center of Washington: “In the Middle East,” he said, “we have seen . . . the rise of a

240

Robert Spencer

group of extremists who seek to use religion as a path to power and a means of domination. This self-appointed vanguard presumes to speak for Muslims. They do not.” In accord with these very assumptions, Barack Obama said in his first interview as president: “My job to the Muslim world is to communicate that the Americans are not your enemy.” In a highly significant symbolic move, he gave that interview to the Dubai-based Al-Arabiya network. Although he echoed the same line about Islam and terrorism that his two immediate predecessors had taken, Obama emphasized what he perceived as a break with the past in relaying the instructions he gave to his personal envoy to the Middle East, George Mitchell: “What I told him is start by listening, because all too often the United States starts by dictating—in the past on some of these issues— and we don’t always know all the factors that are involved.” Yet Obama himself, like Bush and Clinton before him, did not demonstrate any awareness of— to take just one of many available examples— the fact that one of the foremost Islamic groups in the world, the Muslim Brotherhood, is dedicated in its own words to “a kind of grand jihad in eliminating and destroying the Western civilization from within and sabotaging its miserable house by their hands and the hands of the believers so that it is eliminated and God’s religion [Islam] is made victorious over all other religions.”3 Obama seemed to think that this imperative was caused by the United States being dictatorial and ignorant, and that it can be turned aside by open-handed dealing with the Islamic world and some judicious listening by George Mitchell. These assumptions are in turn predicated upon a more fundamental belief: that any conf lict between the Islamic world and the West is all the West’s fault. What’s more, these conf licts can be smoothed over by infusions of cash and aid: Obama said of the jihadists themselves that “their ideas are bankrupt. There’s no actions that they’ve taken that say a child in the Muslim world is getting a better education because of them, or has better health care because of them.” Bush and Clinton had made numerous similar statements over the years. Obama appeared to be banking everything on the notion that the ideas that bring one the most material prosperity are the ideas that everyone in every case will choose. Unfortunately for him (and us), this is not always the case. The followers of Osama bin Laden and the rest have other goals, other priorities— ones that no amount of American largesse will make waver. Obama, Bush, and Clinton share these misapprehensions with most Western analysts. In a peculiarly ethnocentric contradiction of their multiculturalist dogma, they fail to take into account that the jihadists may have beliefs of their own that lead them to hate the West—beliefs that are independent of anything the United States is doing or has the power to change.

U.S. Foreign Policy and the War of Ideas

241

Cognitive Dissonance in U.S. Foreign Policy Not only Clinton, Bush, and Obama, but also the mainstream media (both Left and Right) take it as axiomatic that the jihad we see all over the world today represents a perversion of Islam, repudiated by the vast majority of Muslims. Former British prime minister Tony Blair likewise agreed: 9/11, he said f latly, “has nothing to do with Islam.” Yet open the pages of Islam’s holy book, the Quran, and you will find statements like this: “Slay the pagans wherever you find them” (9:5; cf. 4:89; 2:191). Those who insist— and there are many—that such passages do not apply to today’s world, or have no literal application, are repeatedly confronted by uncomfortable disconfirmation of their claims. This disconfirmation comes not from non-Muslims styled in the contemporary discourse as “Islamophobes,” but from Muslims themselves. The Quranic verse quoted earlier and others like it have inspired people like Amir Maawia Siddiqi, the Pakistani son of a small businessman, to take oaths like these: “I, Amir Maawia Siddiqi, son of Abdul Rahman Siddiqi, state in the presence of God that I will slaughter infidels my entire life . . . May God give me strength in fulfilling this oath.”4 In one notorious example, in January 2004, Reem Raiyishi, a mother of two children, ages three and one, in Gaza, blew herself up at an Israeli checkpoint, murdering four Israelis. Before she did that, she posed for pictures holding a rif le in one hand and the Islamic holy book, the Quran, in the other. She also made a videotape, in which she said, “It was always my wish to turn my body into deadly shrapnel against the Zionists and to knock on the doors of heaven with the skulls of Zionists.”5 Apparently nothing she read in the Quran she cherished disabused her of this notion, or made her think that holding up the book with a rif le in the other hand was incongruous. Nor was Reem Raiyishi by any means the only jihad terrorist, or even the only suicide bomber, to hold up the Quran in the photographs, or to invoke it as a justification for violence against non-Muslims. Typical of this line of thinking was a statement by a Britain-based jihadist preacher Abu Yahya, who asserted that “it says in the Quran that we must try as much as we can to terrorize the enemy . . .”6 The dissonance between these views of the Quran and Islam and the prevailing wisdom calls for a deeper investigation into Islam’s commitment to peace, and encapsulates in microcosm a series of even larger problems with the West’s perceptions of Islam.

Poverty as a “Root Cause” of Terrorism? The conventional answer to the question of why so many Muslims turn to murderous violence is that poverty causes terrorism, and will be mitigated

242

Robert Spencer

by aid— an assumption shared, as we have seen, by Barack Obama. Yet study after study has disproven it. A 2005 analysis of five hundred al Qaeda members found, according to the Times of London, that “the typical recruit to al Qaeda, the terrorist organization, is upper middle class, has been educated in the West and is from a professional background.” 7 And in 2004 the Sydney Morning Herald reported on two other studies with similar results: A study of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad suicide terrorists from the late 1980s to 2003 found only 13 per cent were from a poor background, compared with 32 per cent of the Palestinian population in general, according to a New Scientist report. Suicide bombers were also three times more likely to have gone on to higher education than the general population, Claude Berrebi, an economist at Princeton University in the U.S., found.8 Muslim writers and analysts have also criticized the notion that poverty causes terrorism. Saudi columnist Muhammad Mahfouz wrote in 2004 that “financial and economic factors can not be associated” with terrorism, which he attributed to “cultural and religious” factors. He added that “we need to formulate a new religious vision isolating and freeing it of all the facets of extremism and fundamentalism.” Likewise columnist Abdallah Rashid, writing in the Emirati newspaper Al-Itihad, declared: The greatest mistake of the social and political commentators is their attributing the cause for the spreading of the phenomenon of terrorism in the Arab and Islamic world solely to the lack of social justice, the spreading of poverty, and the harsh social conditions in most of the Arab and Islamic countries. The socio-economic situation of most of the terrorists who participate in the criminal operations around the world is very good. Thus, for example, Faysal Zayd Al-Matiri, a young Kuwaiti man from an economically well-off family, went to Fallujah to fight alongside the terrorists supporting the al Qaeda organization, together with the terrorist Abu Mus’ab Al-Zarqawi. He left behind his parents, his wife, and his three girls. He was killed in the fighting, leaving a widow, three orphan girls, and stricken parents mourning his death . . . Interrogations by the Iraqi authorities of terrorists arrested during raids and searches in Iraqi towns revealed that most of the Saudi youth and some of the [youth] from the Gulf who went to Iraq to join the al Qaeda terrorist groups come from families that are not poor and from a social environment that does not suffer from economic problems.9

U.S. Foreign Policy and the War of Ideas

243

A Religious Commandment Islamic jihadists themselves explain their motivations quite clearly. For instance, in 2002, a London-based Arabic-language newspaper carried an interview with Umm Nidal, the mother of Muhammad Farhat of Hamas, who carried out a suicide attack on March 3 of that year. Said Umm Nidal: Jihad is a [religious] commandment imposed upon us. We must instill this idea in our sons’ souls, all the time . . . What we see every day—massacres, destruction, bombing [of ] homes— strengthened, in the souls of my sons, especially Muhammad, the love of jihad and martyrdom . . . Allah be praised, I am a Muslim and I believe in jihad. Jihad is one of the elements of the faith and this is what encouraged me to sacrifice Muhammad in jihad for the sake of Allah. My son was not destroyed, he is not dead; he is living a happier life than I.10 Umm Nidal was referring to the Quran: “And say not of those who are slain in the way of Allah: ‘They are dead.’ Nay, they are living, though ye perceive (it) not” (2:154). Umm Nidal continued: Because I love my son, I encouraged him to die a martyr’s death for the sake of Allah . . . Jihad is a religious obligation incumbent upon us, and we must carry it out. I sacrificed Muhammad as part of my obligation. This is an easy thing. There is no disagreement [among scholars] on such matters.11 Did Umm Nidal misunderstand the Quran and Islam? Western analysts would likely agree that she did. Yet a recurring feature of jihadist literature is its heavy reliance on quotations from the Quran and Islamic authorities, a practice that would be curious, although assuredly not inexplicable, if they were— as is the common belief—twisting their teachings. In his 1996 “Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places,” Osama bin Laden quotes seven Quranic verses, including the notorious “Verse of the Sword” (Quran 9:5).12 One pro- Osama website asserted: The truth is that a Muslim who reads the Quran with devotion is determined to reach the battlefield in order to attain the reality of Jihad. It is solely for this reason that the Kufaar [unbelievers] conspire to keep the Muslims far away from understanding the Quran, knowing that Muslims who understand the Quran will not distance themselves from Jihad.13 Meanwhile, in Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and elsewhere, one of the key recruiting grounds for jihad terrorist groups are Islamic schools (madrassas): the

244

Robert Spencer

students learn that they must wage jihad warfare, and then these groups give them the opportunity. Students in these schools are made to understand that passages such as “slay the unbelievers wherever you find them” and “Therefore, when ye meet the unbelievers in fight, smite at their necks; at length, when ye have thoroughly subdued them, bind a bond firmly on them” (Quran 47:4) are words they need to take to heart and carry out in order to be pleasing to Allah.

The Quran on Tolerance But perhaps these schools are seeing only what they wish to see in the Quran, and ignoring or deemphasizing passages that contradict their political vision. After all, there are passages of the book that teach tolerance. In one, Allah instructs Muhammad to deliver a message of tolerance to those who have rejected his prophetic claim: “Say: O disbelievers! I worship not that which ye worship; Nor worship ye that which I worship. And I shall not worship that which ye worship. Nor will ye worship that which I worship. Unto you your religion, and unto me my religion” (109:1–5). Above all, no Muslim should forcibly convert an unbeliever: “Let there be no compulsion in religion: Truth stands out clear from Error: whoever rejects evil and believes in Allah hath grasped the most trustworthy hand-hold, that never breaks. And Allah heareth and knoweth all things” (2:256). Allah also admonishes his prophet to emphasize that he believes in the same God in which Jews and Christians believe: And dispute ye not with the People of the Book [that is, primarily Jews and Christians], except with means better (than mere disputation), unless it be with those of them who inf lict wrong (and injury): but say, “We believe in the revelation which has come down to us and in that which came down to you; Our Allah and your Allah is one; and it is to Him we bow (in Islam).” (29:46; Note: the parenthetical glosses are not in the Arabic original but have been added by the Muslim translator to bring out the sense of the text) Yet as Muhammad’s prophetic career went on, and particularly after his f light to Medina and establishment there of the first Islamic political and military entity, he began to receive Quranic revelations allowing Muslims to fight under certain circumstances. The necessity of self- defense is emphasized in the Quran’s eighth chapter, which is entitled Al-Anfal (“The Spoils of War”): Remember thy Lord inspired the angels (with the message): “I am with you: give firmness to the Believers: I will instill terror into the hearts of the Unbelievers: smite ye above their necks and smite all their

U.S. Foreign Policy and the War of Ideas

245

finger-tips off them.” This is because they contended against Allah and His Messenger: If any contend against Allah and His Messenger, Allah is strict in punishment. Thus (will it be said): “Taste ye then of the (punishment): for those who resist Allah, is the penalty of the Fire.” O ye who believe! When ye meet the Unbelievers in hostile array, never turn your backs to them. If any do turn his back to them on such a day—unless it be in a stratagem of war, or to retreat to a troop (of his own)—he draws on himself the wrath of Allah, and his abode is Hell, an evil refuge (indeed)! (8:12–16) Another verse commands the Muslim community to defend not only itself but also houses of worship—not just mosques, but all kinds: Sanction is given unto those who fight because they have been wronged; and Allah is indeed able to give them victory; Those who have been driven from their homes unjustly only because they said: Our Lord is Allah—for had it not been for Allah’s repelling some men by means of others, cloisters and churches and oratories and mosques, wherein the name of Allah is oft mentioned, would assuredly have been pulled down. Verily Allah helpeth one who helpeth Him. Lo! Allah is Strong, Almighty. (22:39–40) The Quran returns elsewhere to this theme of self- defense. Fight in the cause of Allah those who fight you, but do not transgress limits; for Allah loveth not transgressors [Another prominent Muslim translation renders this as “begin not hostilities. Lo! Allah loveth not aggressors.”] And slay them wherever ye catch them, and turn them out from where they have turned you out; for tumult and oppression are worse than slaughter; but fight them not at the Sacred Mosque, unless they (first) fight you there; but if they fight you, slay them. Such is the reward of those who suppress faith. But if they cease, Allah is Oft-forgiving, Most Merciful. And fight them on until there is no more tumult or oppression, and there prevail justice and faith in Allah; but if they cease, let there be no hostility except to those who practice oppression. (2:190–193) Warfare in this context still must be limited. One verse that has been frequently quoted since 9/11 forbids Muslims to take innocent life: “Whosoever killeth a human being for other than manslaughter or corruption in the earth, it shall be as if he had killed all mankind, and whoso saveth the life of one, it shall be as if he had saved the life of all mankind” (5:32). Alongside the verses enjoining warfare in self-defense, the Quran includes a cluster of verses containing general and open-ended commands to fight: “O ye

246

Robert Spencer

who believe! Fight the unbelievers who gird you about, and let them find firmness in you: and know that Allah is with those who fear Him” (9:123). “O Prophet! Strive hard against the unbelievers and the hypocrites, and be firm against them. Their abode is Hell, an evil refuge indeed” (9:73). The Arabic word translated here as “strive hard” is jahidi, a verbal form of the noun jihad. The command applies first to fighting those who worship other gods besides Allah: “Then, when the sacred months have passed, slay the idolaters wherever ye find them, and take them (captive), and besiege them, and prepare for them each ambush. But if they repent and establish worship and pay the poor-due, then leave their way free. Lo! Allah is Forgiving, Merciful” (9:5). However, Muslims must fight Jews and Christians as well, although the Quran recognizes that as “People of the Book” they have received genuine revelations from Allah: Fight those who believe not in Allah nor the Last Day, nor hold that forbidden which hath been forbidden by Allah and His Messenger, nor acknowledge the religion of Truth, (even if they are) of the People of the Book, until they pay the Jizya [the special tax on non-Muslims] with willing submission, and feel themselves subdued. (9:29)

Sorting it Out: Tolerance or War? With material enjoining tolerance, defensive warfare, and offensive warfare, can it ultimately be said rightly that the Quran preaches either tolerance or war? Muhammad’s earliest biographer, Ibn Ishaq (704–773), explains that originally Muhammad “had not been given permission to fight or allowed to shed blood . . . He had simply been ordered to call men to God and to endure insult and forgive the ignorant.” However, as tensions increased between Muhammad and his enemies, the revelations he was receiving from Allah began to change in character. Eventually Allah “gave permission to His apostle to fight and to protect himself against those who wronged them and treated them badly.”14 Ibn Ishaq then explains the progression of Quranic revelation about warfare. First, he explains, Allah allowed Muslims to wage defensive warfare. He explains that Allah has “allowed” the Muslims “to fight only because they have been unjustly treated while their sole offence against men has been that they worship God.”15 That was not Allah’s last word on the circumstances in which Muslims should fight: “Then God sent down to [Muhammad]: ‘Fight them so that there be no more seduction,’ i.e. until no believer is seduced from his religion. ‘And the religion is God’s’, i.e. Until God alone is worshipped.”16 The Quran verse Ibn Ishaq quotes here (2:193) commands much more than defensive warfare: Muslims must fight until “the religion is God’s”—that is, until Allah alone is worshipped. Later Islamic law, based on this development in the doctrine of jihad

U.S. Foreign Policy and the War of Ideas

247

warfare during Muhammad’s career, would offer non-Muslims three options: conversion to Islam, subjugation as inferiors under Islamic law, or warfare. According to a chief justice of Saudi Arabia Sheikh ‘Abdullah bin Muhammad bin Humaid, “at first ‘the fighting’ was forbidden, then it was permitted and after that it was made obligatory.” He also distinguishes two groups Muslims must fight: “(1) against them who start ‘the fighting’ against you (Muslims) . . . (2) and against all those who worship others along with Allah . . . as mentioned in Surat Al-Baqarah (II), Al-Imran (III) and At-Taubah (IX) . . . and other Surahs (Chapters of the Quran).”17 And what about “there is no compulsion in religion”? The Saudi Sheikh Muhammad Saalih al-Munajid, a popular preacher and teacher throughout the Islamic world today, demonstrates this in a discussion of whether Muslims should force others to accept Islam. In considering Quran 2:256 (“There is no compulsion in religion”) the Sheikh quotes Quran 9:29, as well as 8:39 [“And fight them until there is no more Fitnah (disbelief and polytheism, i.e. worshipping others besides Allaah), and the religion (worship) will all be for Allaah Alone (in the whole of the world)”], and the Verse of the Sword. Of the latter, Sheikh Muhammad says simply: “This verse is known as Ayat al-Sayf (the verse of the sword). These and similar verses abrogate the verses which say that there is no compulsion to become Muslim.”18 This view is not limited to the Saudi Wahhabi sect, to which Sheikh ‘Abdullah and Sheikh Muhammad belong, and which many Western analysts imagine to have originated Islamic doctrines of warfare against unbelievers. Jihad theorist Sayyid Qutb, who was not a Wahhabi, held the same ideas. In his jihad manifesto Milestones, he quotes at length from the great medieval scholar Ibn Qayyim (1292–1350), who, says Qutb, “has summed up the nature of Islamic Jihaad.” Ibn Qayyim outlines the stages of the Muhammad’s prophetic career: For thirteen years after the beginning of his Messengership, he called people to God through preaching, without fighting or jizyah, and was commanded to restrain himself and to practice patience and forbearance. Then he was commanded to migrate, and later permission was given to fight. Then he was commanded to fight those who fought him, and to restrain himself from those who did not make war with him. Later he was commanded to fight the polytheists until God’s religion was fully established.19 Qutb further quotes Ibn Qayyim as emphasizing the need to wage war against and subjugate non-Muslims, particularly the Jewish and Christian “People of the Book”: It was also explained that war should be declared against those from among the “People of the Book” who declare open enmity, until they

248

Robert Spencer

agree to pay jizyah or accept Islam. Concerning the polytheists and the hypocrites, it was commanded in this chapter that Jihaad be declared against them and that they be treated harshly.20 Qutb says that if someone rejects Islam, “then it is the duty of Islam to fight him until either he is killed or until he declares his submission.”21

Islamic Law Teaches Warfare against Unbelievers This is not simply a modern view, conceived and formulated in the heat and anger of the colonial and postcolonial periods. There is a firm basis for this view in the traditional teachings of all four principal Sunni schools of Islamic jurisprudence, the Maliki, Shafi’i, Hanafi, and Hanbali. Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328), a Hanbali jurist who is a favorite of Osama bin Laden and other modern-day jihadists, stated the obligation in this way: “Since lawful warfare is essentially jihad and since its aim is that the religion is God’s entirely and God’s word is uppermost, therefore according to all Muslims, those who stand in the way of this aim must be fought.”22 Ibn Abi Zayd al- Qayrawani (d. 996), a Maliki jurist, declared that Jihad is a precept of Divine institution. Its performance by certain individuals may dispense others from it. We Malikis maintain that it is preferable not to begin hostilities with the enemy before having invited the latter to embrace the religion of Allah except where the enemy attacks first. They have the alternative of either converting to Islam or paying the poll tax ( jizya), short of which war will be declared against them.23 That accords with Muhammad’s command to Muslims to invite non-Muslims to Islam and then go to war with them if they refused both conversion and second-class dhimmi status: When you meet your enemies who are polytheists, invite them to three courses of action. If they respond to any one of these, you also accept it and withhold yourself from doing them any harm. Invite them to accept Islam; if they respond to you, accept it from them and desist from fighting against them . . . If they refuse to accept Islam, demand from them the jizya [a special tax on non-Muslims; cf. Quran 9:29]. If they agree to pay, accept it from them and hold off your hands. If they refuse to pay the tax, seek Allah’s help and fight them.24 The Hanafi school sounds the same notes in The Hedaya: “If the infidels, upon receiving the call [to convert to Islam], neither consent to it nor agree to

U.S. Foreign Policy and the War of Ideas

249

pay capitation tax, it is then incumbent on the Muslims to call upon God for assistance, and to make war upon them . . .”25 And so does the Shafi’i scholar Abu’l Hasan al-Mawardi (d. 1058): It is forbidden to . . . begin an attack before explaining the invitation to Islam to [unbelievers], informing them of the miracles of the Prophet and making plain the proofs so as to encourage acceptance on their part; if they still refuse to accept after this, war is waged against them and they are treated as those whom the call has reached . . .26 All these jurisprudential schools also teach that when a Muslim land is attacked by non-Muslims, every individual Muslim has the responsibility to wage defensive jihad. Also, if there is no caliph, Muslims must still wage jihad.27 Jihad is ordinarily fard kifaya— an obligation on the Muslim community as a whole, from which some are freed if others take it up. Jihad becomes fard ayn, or obligatory on every individual Muslim to aid in any way he can, if a Muslim land is attacked. That is what jihadists argue today—that the American presence in Iraq and Afghanistan makes jihad fard ayn, or obligatory on every individual Muslim. But this is just jihad for the defense of Muslim lands, although the defensive aspect of jihad activity is often interpreted quite elastically. It is the province of the caliph, who for Sunni Muslims was the successor of Muhammad as the political, military, and religious leader of the Muslim community, to authorize the waging of offensive jihad to spread the rule of Islamic law into non-Muslim lands—but the caliphate was abolished by the secular Turkish government in 1924. This is a primary reason why jihadists want to restore the caliphate. In 1996 the Taliban’s Mullah Omar went to the shrine of the Respectable Cloak of Muhammad in Kandahar and stood on the roof of the shrine wrapped in the cloak. His followers proclaimed him Emir al Momineen, or leader of the believers— a title of the caliph.28 So far, however, only a jihadist group in Algeria has joined the Taliban in accepting Mullah Omar as caliph.29 In any case, these are all extremely old authorities, yet no Islamic sect or school has ever reformed or rejected these teachings. The doctrines of jihad enunciated by those ancient jurists remain unchanged. That is an exceedingly strange fact. The great Islamic scholar Majid Khadduri explained the role of the Islamic state in this way in his seminal book War and Peace in the Law of Islam: The state which is regarded as the instrument for universalizing a certain religion must perforce be an ever expanding state. The Islamic state, whose principal function was to put God’s law into practice, sought to establish Islam as the dominant reigning ideology over the entire world. It refused to recognize the coexistence of non-Muslim communities,

250

Robert Spencer

except perhaps as subordinate entities, because by its very nature a universal state tolerates the existence of no other state than itself. Although it was not a consciously formulated policy, Muhammad’s early successors, after Islam became supreme in Arabia, were determined to embark on a ceaseless war of conquest in the name of Islam. The jihad was therefore employed as an instrument for both the universalization of religion and the establishment of an imperial world state.30 Khadduri added this on the concept of jihad: Thus the jihad may be regarded as Islam’s instrument or carrying out its ultimate objective by turning all people into believers, if not in the prophethood of Muhammad (as in the case of the dhimmis [unbelievers subjugated under the rule of Islamic law]), at least in the belief in God. The Prophet Muhammad is reported to have declared “some of my people will continue to fight victoriously for the sake of the truth until the last one of them will combat the anti- Christ.” Until that moment is reached the jihad, in one form or another, will remain as a permanent obligation upon the entire Muslim community. It follows that the existence of a dar al-harb [house of war] is ultimately outlawed under the Islamic judicial order; that the dar al-Islam [house of Islam] is permanently under jihad obligation until the dar al-harb is reduced to non-existence; and that any community which prefers to remain non-Islamic—in the status of a tolerated religious community accepting certain disabilities—must submit to Islamic rule and reside in the dar al-Islam or be bound as clients to the Muslim community.31 Imran Ahsan Khan Nyazee, assistant professor on the Faculty of Shariah and Law of the International Islamic University in Islamabad, in a 1994 book on Islamic law quotes the twelfth-century Maliki jurist Ibn Rushd: “Muslim jurists agreed that the purpose of fighting with the People of the Book . . . is one of two things: it is either their conversion to Islam or the payment of jizyah.” Nyazee concludes: “This leaves no doubt that the primary goal of the Muslim community, in the eyes of its jurists, is to spread the word of Allah through jihad, and the option of poll-tax [ jizya] is to be exercised only after subjugation” of non-Muslims.32 But then why hasn’t the worldwide Islamic community been waging jihad on a large scale in modern times, at least up until the latter part of the twentieth century? Nyazee says it is only because they have not been able to do so: “the Muslim community may be considered to be passing through a period of truce. In its present state of weakness, there is nothing much it can do about it.”33 Making war on unbelievers is one of the responsibilities of the Muslim umma. That the three stages of jihad, culminating in offensive warfare to

U.S. Foreign Policy and the War of Ideas

251

establish the hegemony of Islamic law, which is normative for all time, can be found not only in the writings of contemporary Islamic jihadists, but also in the writing of ancient Muslim scholars underscores the traditional character of contemporary Islamic jihad activity. Modern mujahedin are, in their own view, not “hijacking” Islam; they are restoring its proper interpretation— and they are successfully convincing peaceful Muslims around the world that they are correct in this.

Conclusion Yet instead of standing against these teachings and working to reform them, American Muslim advocacy groups have never even admitted that they exist. The Council on American Islamic Relations (CAIR) has quite successfully portrayed any exploration of the elements of Islam that give rise to and justify jihad violence and Islamic supremacism as a manifestation of “hatred,” “bigotry,” and “Islamophobia.” However, if in fact it is true that the seeds of terrorism are found at the heart of Islam itself, it doesn’t make every Muslim evil or a terrorist. Any reasonable person should understand that to report accurately about the Islamic doctrines that jihadists use to justify violence and Islamic supremacism is in no way an attack on those who hold to that faith. If Islam contains elements that give rise to terrorism, only the most irrational bigot would imagine that injustice toward Muslims is therefore justified. And if Islam really does contain such teachings, then these groups are doing a grave disservice to the United States and even to peaceful Muslims. For if there is nothing in Islam that needs reforming, people of goodwill cannot possibly offer assistance to Islamic reformers, and need not call upon Muslims in the United States and elsewhere to perform a searching and honest reevaluation of their beliefs, and decide whether they want to live in a state of conf lict with the rest of the international community on an indefinite basis. Fair-minded analysts, both Muslim and non-Muslim, should acknowledge the existence of the elements of Islam are giving rise to violence and terrorism today, and work in good faith to formulate ways for Muslims and non-Muslims to live together as equals in a secular society on an indefinite basis. The future depends on it.

Notes 1. Bill Clinton, Remarks by the President to the Opening Session of the 53rd United Nations General Assembly, White House Press Release, September 21, 1998. 2. George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People, White House Press Release, September 20, 2001.

252

Robert Spencer

3. Mohamed Akram, “An Explanatory Memorandum on the General Strategic Goal for the Group in North America,” May 22, 1991, Government Exhibit 003–0085, U.S. vs. HLF, et al., 7 (21). 4. Quoted in David Rohde and C.J. Chivers, “Al Qaeda’s Grocery Lists and Manuals of Killing,” New York Times, March 17, 2002, A-1. 5. “Arab Mother Cried For Mercy, They Responded—And She Murdered Them,” Israel National News, January 15, 2004. 6. “Focus: Undercover in the academy of hatred,” The Sunday Times, August 7, 2005. 7. Nick Fielding, “Al- Qaeda Lures Middle Classes to Join its Ranks, The Sunday Times, April 3, 2005. 8. Deborah Smith, “Rational, Educated and Prosperous: Just Your Average Suicide Bomber,” Sydney Morning Herald, May 14, 2004. 9. “Arab Columnists: Terrorists are Motivated by Cultural and Religious Factors, Not Poverty,” Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI) Special Dispatch No. 853, January 26, 2005. 10. “An Interview with the Mother of a Suicide Bomber,” Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI), Special Dispatch No. 391, June 19, 2002. 11. Ibid. 12. Osama bin Laden, “Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places,” 1996. http://www.mideastweb.org/osamabinladen1.htm. 13. “Jihad in the Quran and Ahadeeth,” www.waaqiah.com, 2002. 14. Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad: A Translation of Ibn Ishaq’s Sirat Rasul Allah, A. Guillaume, trans. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1955), pp. 212–213. 15. Ibid. 16. Quran 2:193; Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad, pp. 212–213. 17. ‘Abdullah bin Muhammad bin Humaid, “The Call to Jihad (Holy Fighting for Allah’s Cause) in the Quran,” Appendix III of Sahih Bukhari, vol. 9, p. 462. The Roman numerals after the names of the chapters of the Quran are the numbers of the suras: Sheikh ‘Abdullah is referring to verses quoted earlier such as 2:216, 3:157–158, 9:5, and 9:29. 18. “Question #34770: There is no compulsion to accept Islam,” Learn Hajj Jurisprudence, Islam Q & A, http://63.175.194.25/index.php?ln=eng&ds=qa&lv=browse&QR=34770&dgn=4. 19. Sayyid Qutb, Milestones, The Mother Mosque Foundation, n.d., p. 53. 20. Ibid., pp. 53–54. 21. Ibid., p. 57. 22. Ibn Taymiyya, “Jihad,” in Rudolph Peters, ed., Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam (Princeton, NJ: Markus Wiener Publishers, 1996), p. 49. Cited in Andrew G. Bostom, “Khaled Abou El Fadl: Reformer or Revisionist?,” http://www.secularislam.org/articles/bostom.htm. 23. Ibn Abi Zayd al- Qayrawani, La Risala (Epitre sur les elements du dogme et de la loi de l’Islam selon le rite malikite) translated from Arabic by Leon Bercher, 5th ed. (Algiers: Bibliothèque arabe-française, 1960), p. 165. Cited in Bostom, “Khaled Abou El Fadl,” http://www. secularislam.org/articles/bostom.htm. 24. Sahih Muslim, Abdul Hamid Siddiqi, trans., Kitab Bhavan, revised edition 2000, no. 4294. 25. From the Hidayah, vol. Ii. P. 140, qtd in Thomas P. Hughes, A Dictionary of Islam (Boston: W.H. Allen, 1895); “Jihad,” pp. 243–248. Cited in Bostom, “Khaled Abou El Fadl,” http:// www.secularislam.org/articles/bostom.htm. 26. Abu’l Hasan al- Mawardi, al-Ahkam as-Sultaniyyah (The Laws of Islamic Governance) (London: Ta-Ha Publishers, 1996), p. 60. 27. ‘Umdat al-Salik, translated by Noah Ha Mim Keller (Sunna Books, 1991), o9.6. 28. Craig Pyes, Josh Meyer, and William C. Rempel, “Officials Reveal Bin Laden Plan,” Los Angeles Times, May 18, 2002. 29. “Algerian Terror Group Seeks Zarqawi’s Help,” United Press International, May 2, 2006.

U.S. Foreign Policy and the War of Ideas

253

30. Majid Khadduri, War and Peace in the Law of Islam (London: The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd., 2006), p. 51. 31. Khadduri, War and Peace in the Law of Islam, p. 64. 32. Imran Ahsan Khan Nyazee, Theories of Islamic Law: The Methodology of Ijtihad (London: The Other Press, 1994), pp. 251–252. 33. Nyazee, Theories of Islamic Law, p. 253.

This page intentionally left blank

SE L ECT

BI BLIOGR A PH Y

Abbas, Hassan. Pakistan’s Drift Into Extremism: Allah, The Army, And America’s War On Terror. Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 2004. Abou El Fadl, Khaled M. The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists. New York: Harper, 2005. Afsaruddin, Asma. The First Muslims: History and Memory. Minneapolis: Oneworld Publications, 2007. ———. “Making the Case for Religious Freedom in the Islamic Tradition.” The Review of Faith & International Affairs 6, no. 2 (Summer 2008): 57–60. ———. “Mawdudi’s Theo-Democracy: How Islamic Is It Really?” Oriente Moderno 87 (2007): 301–325. Akbarzadeh, Shahram, and Fethi Mansouri. Islam and Political Violence: Muslim Diaspora and Radicalism in the West. London: Tauris Academic Studies, 2007. Albright, Madeleine. The Mighty and the Almighty: Reflections on America, God, and World Affairs. New York: Harper Perennial, 2007. Al-Ghunaimi, Mohammad Talaat. The Muslim Conception of International Law and the Western Approach. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1968. Al-Jabri, Mohammed Abed. Arab Islamic Philosophy. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1999. Al-Sayyad, Nezar. Muslim Europe or Euro-Islam: Politics, Culture, and Citizenship in the Age of Globalization. New York: Lexington Books, 2002. Alterman, Jon B. “The False Promise of Arab Liberals.” Policy Review, no. 125 ( June/July 2004): 77–86. Armstrong, Karen. Battle for God: A History of Fundamentalism. New York: Ballantine Books, 2000. Assmann, Jann. Die Mosaische Unterscheidung oder Der Preis des Monotheismus. Munich: Carl Hanser Verlag, 2003. Ayubi, Nazih. Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World. New York: Routledge, 1993. Baker, Raymond William. Islam without Fear: Egypt and the New Islamists. New York: Harvard UP, 2006. “Barack Obama on Foreign Policy in the Islamic World.” Interview by Fareed Zakaria. July 13, 2008. Baran, Zeyno. “Turkey Divided.” Journal of Democracy 17 (2008): 55–69. Baudrillard, Jean. “The Mind of Terrorism” (trans. Douglas French; original: “L’esprit du terrorisme,” Jean Baudrilliard, Le Monde, November 2, 2001), at http://watch.windsofchange. net/themes_35.htm#terrorism (accessed April 25, 2007).

256

Select Bibliography

Berger, Peter. Holy War Inc.: Inside the Secret World of al-Qaeda. New York: Free Press, 2001. Berkes, Niyazi. The Development of Secularism in Turkey. New York: Routledge, 1998. Berque, Jacques. Le Coran: essai de traduction. Paris: Albin Michel, 2002. Bonner, Michael. Aristocratic Violence and Holy War: Studies in the Jihad and the Arab-Byzantine Frontier (American Oriental Series). New York: American Oriental Society, 1996. Brachman, Jarret. Global Jihadism: Theory and Practice. New York: Routledge, 2008. ———. “High-Tech Terror: Al-Qaeda’s Use of New Technology.” Fletcher Forum of International Affairs 30, no. 2 (Summer 2006): 149–164. Brynjar, Lia. Architect of Global Jihad: The Life of Al Qaeda Strategist Abu Mus’ab al-Suri. New York: Columbia UP, 2008. Bull, Hedley, and Adam Watson, eds. The Expansion of International Society. New York: Oxford UP, 1985. Chodkiewicz, Michel. The Seal of the Saints: Prophethood and Sainthood in the Doctrine of Ibn ‘Arabi. Cambridge, UK: Islamic Texts Society, 1993. Cook, David. Understanding Jihad. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005. Cuypers, Michel. The Banquet: A New Reading of Fifth Sura of the Quran. Cairo: Convivium Press, 2009. Davidson, Herbert A. Alfarabi, Avicenna and Averroes on Intellect: Their Cosmologies, Theories of the Active Mind, and Theories of Human Intellect. New York: Oxford UP, 1992. Dawisha, Adeed. Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century From Triumph to Despair. New York: Princeton UP, 2005. DeLong, N. Wahhabi Islam. New York: Oxford UP, 2004. Dershowitz, Alan M. Case against Israel’s Enemies: Exposing Jimmy Carter and Others Who Stand in the Way of Peace. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2008. ———. The Case for Israel. New York: Wiley, 2004. ———. The Case for Peace: How the Arab-Israeli Conflict Can be Resolved. New York: Wiley, 2006. Doran, Michael S. “Somebody Else’s Civil War.” Foreign Affairs 81, no. 1 (2002): 22–42. El-Affendi, Abdelwahab. Rethinking Islam and Modernity. New York: Islamic Foundation, 2001. ———. Who Needs An Islamic State? London: Malaysia Think Tank, 2008. Elshtain, Jean Bethke. Just War Against Terror: The Burden of American Power in a Violent World. New York: Basic Books, 2004. ———. Sovereignty: God, State, and Self. New York: Basic Books, 2008. Ernst, Carl W. The Shambhala Guide to Sufism. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1997. Esposito, John L., ed. Voices of Resurgent Islam. New York: Oxford UP, 1970. Esposito, John L., and Dalia Mogahed. Who Speaks For Islam? What a Billion Muslims Really Think. New York: Gallup Press, 2008. Euben, Roxanne L. Enemy in the Mirror. New York: Princeton UP, 1999. Fourest, Caroline. Brother Tariq: The Doublespeak of Tariq Ramadan. New York: Encounter Books, 2008. Fromkin, David. A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East. New York: Avon Books, 1989. Fuller, Graham. Center of the Universe: The Geopolitics of Iran. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991. ———. Sense of Siege: The Geopolitics of Islam and the West. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995. Grotius, Hugo. On The Law of War and Peace. Roslyn, NY: Walter J. Black Inc., 1949. Habermas, Jürgen. The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures. Cambridge, MA: MIT UP, 1987.

Select Bibliography

257

Hanford, Laura Bryant. “The International Religious Freedom Act: Sources, Policy, Inf luence.” Review of Faith and International Affairs 6, no. 2 (Summer 2008): 33–40. Hanson, Eric O. Religion and Politics in the International System Today. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 2006. Heraclitus. Fragments. Translated by Marcel Conche. Paris: PUF, 1986. Herzog, Roman. Preventing the Clash of Civilizations: A Peace Strategy for the Twenty-First Century. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1999. Hodgson, Marshall G.S. The Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in a World Civilization. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974. Hoffer, Eric. The True Believer. New York: Harper Perennial, 2002. Holt, P.M., ed. Political and Social Change in Modern Egypt: Historical Studies from the Ottoman Conquest to the United Arab Republic. London: Oxford UP, 1968. Huntington, Samuel P. “The Clash of Civilizations.” Foreign Affairs 72 no. 3 (1993): 22–49. Ibn Arabi. Tanazzul al-Amlak fi Harakat al-Aflak. Beirut: Nawaf al-Jarrah, Dar Sader, 2003. Inbar, Efraim. Radical Islam and International Security. New York: Routledge, 2008. Jacoby, Tami A., and Brent Sasley, eds. Redefining Security in the Middle East. New York: Palgrave, 2002. Jansen, Johannes J.G. The Neglected Duty: The Creed of Sadat’s Assassins and Islamic Resurgence in the Middle East. New York: Macmillian Company, 1986. Johansen, Julian. Sufism and Islamic Reform in Egypt: The Battle for Islamic Tradition. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1996. Johnson, James Turner. The Holy War Idea in Western and Islamic Traditions. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State UP, 1997. ———. Morality and Contemporary Warfare. New York: Yale UP, 2001. ———. The Quest for Peace. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1987. ———. “Searching for Common Ground: Ethical Traditions at the Interface with International Law.” In Universalism vs. Relativism Making Moral Judgments in a Changing, Pluralistic, and Threatening World, edited by Don Browning. New York: Rowman & Littlefield, Inc., 2006, 93–110. ———. The War to Oust Saddam Hussein: Just War and the New Face of Conflict. New York: Rowman & Littlefield, Inc., 2005. Juergensmeyer, Mark. The New Cold War? Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State. New York: University of California Press, 1994. Kagan, Robert. Dangerous Nation: America’s Foreign Policy from Its Earliest Days to the Dawn of the Twentieth Century (Vintage). New York: Vintage, 2007. Katzenstein, Peter, and Timothy Byrnes, eds. Religion in an Expanding Europe. New York: Cambridge UP, 2006. Keddie, Nikki R., ed. Religion and Politics in Iran: Shiism from Quietism to Revolution. New Haven: Yale UP, 1983. ———. Islamic Response to Imperialism: Political and Religious Writings of Sayyid Jamal ad-Din “al-Afghani.” Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983. ———, ed. Scholars, Saints and Sufis: Muslim Religious Institutions in the Middle East Since 1500. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972. Kelsay, John. Arguing the Just War in Islam. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2007. ———. Islam and War a Study in Comparative Ethics. Louisville: John Knox Press, 1993. Khadduri, Majid. The Islamic Law of Nations. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins UP, 1956. ———. War and Peace in the Law of Islam. Baltimore: The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd., 1955. Kull, Steven, et al. Public Opinion in the Islamic World on Terrorism, al Qaeda, and US Policies. World Public Opinion. February 25, 2009. http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/ feb09/STARTII_Feb09_rpt.pdf.

258

Select Bibliography

Kurzman, Charles, ed. Liberal Islam: A Sourcebook. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1998. ———. Modernist Islam 1840–1940: A Sourcebook. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2002. Lahaye, Tim and Jenkins, Jerry B. Left Behind: A Novel of the Earth’s Last Days. Carol Stream, IL: Tyndale House Publishers, 1996. Lawrence, Bruce. The Defenders of God. San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1989. Lewis, Bernard. The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror. London: Phoenix-Orion Books, 2004. ———. The Emergence of Modern Turkey. London: Oxford UP, 1979. ———. Islam and the West. New York: Oxford UP, 1994. ———. What Went Wrong?: The Clash Between Islam and Modernity in the Middle East. New York: Harper Perennial, 2003. Lipson, Leslie. The Ethical Crises of Civilizations. Moral Meltdown or Advance? London: Sage, 1993. Lumbard, Joseph E.B., ed. Islam, Fundamentalism, and the Betrayal of Tradition: Essays by Western Muslim Scholars. Bloomington, IN: University of Indiana Press, 2004. Maqdsi, M., trans. The Charter of Hamas. Dallas, TX: Islamic Association for Palestine, 1990. Mawdudi, Sayyed Abul A’la. Jihad in Islam. Kuwait: Salimiah, 1977. ———. Towards Understanding Islam. Chapel Hill: Islamic Circle of North America, 2002. Meddeb, Abdelwahab. Malady of Islam. Darby, PA: Diane Co, 2003. Melchert, Christopher. “The Hanbali Law of Gihad.” The Maghreb Review 29, no. 1–4 (2004): 22–31. Meyer, Ann Elizabeth. “War and Peace in the Islamic Tradition and Natural Law.” In Just War and Jihad: Historical and Theoretical Perspectives on War and Peace in Western and Islamic Traditions, edited by John Kelsay and James Turner Johnson. New York: Greenwood Press, 1991, 145–159. Michot, Yahya. Muslims under Non-Muslim Rule, Ibn Taymiyya. Oxford, London: Interface Publications, 2006. Milton-Edwards, Beverly. Islamic Politics in Palestine. London: Tauris, 1996. Mitchell, Richard. The Society of the Muslim Brothers. London: Oxford UP, 1969. Montagu, Mary Wortley. L’Islam au péril des femmes. Paris: La Découverte, 1991. ———. Selected Letters. New York: Penguin Classics, 1997. Norris, Pippa, and Ronald Inglehart. Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide. New York: Cambridge UP, 2004. Nyazee, Imran A. Theories of Islamic Law: The Methodology of Ijtihad. Islamabad: International Institute of Islamic Thought and Islamic Research Institute, 1994. Patterson, Eric D. Christianity and Power Politics Today: Christian Realism and Contemporary Political Dilemmas. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008. ———. Just War Thinking: Morality and Pragmatism in the Struggle Against Contemporary Threats. New York: Lexington Books, 2007. Patterson, Eric, and Jonathan Amaral. “Presidential Leadership and Democracy Promotion.” Public Integrity vol. 13, no. 1 (forthcoming, Fall 2009). Peters, Rudolph. Islam and Colonialism: The Doctrine of Jihad in Modern History. The Hague: Mouton De Gruyter, 1979. ———. Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam. Princeton, NJ: Markus Weiner, 1996. Pew Global Attitudes Survey 2007. Washington, DC: Pew Global Attitudes Project, 2007. Phares, Walid. The Confrontation: Winning the War against Future Jihad. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. ———. Future Jihad: Terrorist Strategies against the West. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006. ———. The War of Ideas: Jihadism against Democracy. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008. ———. Al-Taadudiya fi Lubnan [Pluralism in Lebanon]. Kaslik University Press, 1979. Phillips, Melanie. Londonistan. New York: Encounter Books, 2007.

Select Bibliography

259

Philpott, Daniel. “The Challenge of September 11 to Secularism in International Relations.” World Politics 55, no. 1 (October 2002): 66–95. Pound, Ezra. ABC of Reading. New York: New Directions, 1960. Qutb, Sayyid. Milestones. Chicago: Islamic Book Service, India, 2006. Qutb, Sayyid, and Adil Salahi. In the Shade of the Quran. New York: Islamic Foundation, 2002. Rahman, Fazlur. Islam & Modernity: Transformation of an Intellectual Tradition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982. ———. Major Themes of the Qur’an. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1980. Ramazani, Rouhollah K. Revolutionary Iran: Challenge and Response in the Middle East. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1987. Ranger, Terence, and Eric Hobsbawm, eds. The Invention of Tradition. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1999. Ranstorp, Magnus. “The Virtual Sanctuary of Al-Qaeda and Terrorism in an Age of Globalisation.” In International Relations and Security in the Digital Age International Relations and Security in the Digital Age (Routledge Advances in International Relations and Global Politic), edited by Johan Eriksson and Giampiero Giacomello. New York: Routledge, 2007, 20–39. Renard, John. “Al-Jihad al-Akbar: Notes on a Theme in Islamic Spirituality.” Muslim World 78 (1988): 225–242. Report of the Georgetown Symposia on International Religious Freedom Policy. The Berkley Center for Religion, Peace & World Affairs, Georgetown University (December 2008). Rice, Condoleezza. “Rethinking the National Interest: American Realism for a New World.” Foreign Affairs ( July & August 2008): 2–26. Rosenthal, Franz. Classical Heritage in Islam. London: Routledge, 1975. Rougier, Bernard. Everyday Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam among Palestinians in Lebanon. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2009. Rutherford, Bruce K. Egypt after Mubarak: Liberalism, Islam, and Democracy in the Arab World. Princeton: Princeton UP, 2009. Schwartz, Stephen. The Two Faces of Islam. The House of Sa’ud from Tradition to Terror. New York: Doubleday, 2002. Schwarzenberger, Georg. Frontiers of International Law. London: Stevens and Sons, 1967. Shea, Nina. “The Origins and Legacy of the Movement to Fight Religious Persecution.” Review of Faith and International Affairs 6, no. 2 (Summer 2008): 25–32. Shepard, William. “Sayyed Qutb’s Doctrine of Jahiliyya.” International Journal of Middle East Studies 35 (2003): 521–545. Smith, William Cantwell. Islam and Modern History. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1957. Spencer, Robert. Onward Muslim Soldiers: how jihad still threatens America and the West. Washington, DC: Regnery, 2003. Taha, M.M. The Second Message of Islam. Translated by Abdullah Ahmed al-Na’im. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse UP, 1996. Tibi, Bassam. The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World Disorder. Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2002. ———. Islam Between Culture and Politics, Second Edition. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005. ———. Islam’s Predicament with Modernity: Politics, Religious Reform and Cultural Change. New York: Routledge, 2009. ———. Political Islam, World Politics and Europe. New York: Routledge, 2007. ———. “Public Policy and the Combination of Anti-Americanism and Antisemitism in Contemporary Islamist Ideology.” The Current 12 (Winter 2002): 123–146. Vidino, Lorenzo. Al Qaeda in Europe: The New Battleground of International Jihad. Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2005.

260

Select Bibliography

Watt, William M. Islamic Philosophy and Theology. Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 1997. Weiner, Myron. Global Migration Crisis: Challenge to States and to Human Rights. New York: HarperCollins College, 1995. Wicker, Brian, comp. Witnesses for the Faith: Christian and Muslim Perspectives on Martyrdom. London: Aldershot, 2006. Wiktorowicz, Quintan. “The Salafi Movement in Jordan.” International Journal of Middle East Studies 32 (2002): 222–226. “World Islamic Front Statement Urging Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders.” February 23, 1998. http://www.library.cornell.edu/colldev/mideast/wif.htm. Zebiri, Kate. Mahmud Shaltut and Islamic Modernism. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1993. Zegart, Amy. “The Legend of a Democracy Promoter.” The National Interest Online, September 16, 2008. http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=19688.

I N DE X

9/11. See September 11, 2001 Abu Ghraib, 111, 115 academia, 26–27, 31, 36–37 Afghanistan, 5, 28–29 Islamic fundamentalism in, 13, 147–148 al Qaeda in, 9 Soviet presence in, 25, 189 War on Terrorism in, 112, 121, 127–128, 163, 249 women in, 27, 30 Africa, 9, 12, 123, 149, 178 see also individual countries Africans, oppression of black, 31, 116, 122 Ahmedinijad, Mahmoud, 111 al Albani, 228 Albright, Madieline, 150 Algeria, 178, 249 see also Berbers Al-Zarqawi, Abu Musab, 203, 242 anti-American offensive, 120, 163–164 antidemocracy ideologies, 21–33, 210 see also Jihadism, al Qaeda Aquinas, Thomas, 2, 88 Arab-Israeli conf lict, 67, 232 Arafat, Yassir, 74, 223 Assad, Bashar, 224 Augustine, Saint, 2, 17–88, 90 Azzam, Abdallah, 228–229

Baathism, 26, 227 Banna, Hassan, 4 Benedict XVI, Pope, 122 Berbers, 15, 17, 30–31 bin Laden, Osama, 61–62, 76–77, 121, 178–179, 201–202, 210 Blair, Tony, 163, 183, 241 blasphemy, 13, 103, 143, 145, 148, 152 Bosnia, 185 Bush, George W., 185, 187 foreign policy under, 3, 30, 117–118, 143, 153, 163–164, 200 views on Islam, 16, 202, 239–240 Canada, 26 Cedar Revolution, 30 Chechnya, 36, 62, 164, 213 clash of civilizations, 10, 37, 56, 83–84, 111–130, 131, 140, 170–171, 199–203, 205, 239 Cold War, 9, 182 aftermath of the, 21, 26 framing of freedom and international relations in the, 145 ideological wars during the, 126, 180, 189 Jihadism during the, 24–25 collective memory, 12, 132 Communism, 9, 14 capitalism versus, 24 Islamism and, 38, 180, 189 jihadists and, 25, 76

262

Index

Copts, 75 Council on American Islamic Relations (CAIR), 77–78, 251 Crusades, Christian, 56, 74, 94, 108, 148, 178, 201 Danish cartoon incident, 122–123, 202 dar al harb (house of war), 73, 86–88, 94, 250 dar al islam (house of islam), 36, 73, 86–88, 90, 93, 95, 161, 168–169, 250 death, jihadist views of, 104–105, 243 democracy: Jihadism’s confrontation with, 21–33, 134–135, 143–155, 202, 214–215 “spreading” of, 3, 56, 62, 97, 112, 127–128, 164, 176, 182 see also antidemocracy ideologies Deobandism, 112, 121–124, 127–128 dhimmi (people under custody), 77, 138, 248, 250 dissidents and reformers, framing of, 29–30 East Timor, 27 Egypt, 60, 63, 75, 164, 178 see also Copts; Muslim Brotherhood; Nasser, Gamal Abdel; Sadat, Anwar Empires: American, 189 Ancient/Roman, 87–88 Islamic, 123, 160 Ottoman, 63, 177 fascism, 14, 24 French scarf affair, 149 Fukuyama, Francis, 37, 189–190 fundamentalism, 10, 55–65, 103, 159, 179, 183, 210, 242 gender apartheid, 27 genocide, 30, 108

Germany, 15, 28, 108, 216 Global War on Terror (GWOT), 6, 17, 23, 27, 112, 163, 175–192 Guantanamo, 116 Hadith, 43–44, 68, 70, 72–73, 133, 136–137, 139, 146, 153, 170 Hariri, Rafiq, 222, 224–225, 227, 231–232, 235 Hezbollah, 21, 25, 29, 222–226, 231–235 see also Nasrallah, Hassan Hinduism, 56, 58, 61, 145 Hollywood, 115–116 Holocaust, 108 Huntington, Samuel, 8, 22, 112, 131, 190, 201 Hussein, Saddam, 117 Ibn Taymiya, 4, 38, 40, 92–95, 248 Ibrahim, Saad Eddine, 119 Ikhwan (Brotherhood), 24–25 see also Muslim Brotherhood India, 25, 55, 121, 132, 178 Indonesia, 13, 123, 153–154, 170, 178, 209 international relations, 14, 138, 159, 166 Iran see also Ahmedinijad, Mahmoud; Islamic Revolution (Iran); Khamenei, Ayatollah Iraq jihadist networks in, 222–227, 230, 233, 242 sanctions on, 178–179, 185 U.S. invasion of, 29, 62, 127, 201–202, 249 see also Hussein, Saddam Iraq War, 8, 111, 115–119, 163 Islamic jihad, 242–243, 251 Islamic Revolution (Iran), 61, 162, 170 Islamism, 10–11, 14, 16, 24, 36–41, 49, 83–84, 91–95, 157–158, 160–165, 167–169, 221–235

Index al Jazeera, 24, 28, 232 Jihadism: collective, 93–94 defining, 57, 60, 67, 76, 86–87, 91–96, 226 democracy confronted by, 29–32, 163, 167, 217–218, 240–244 development of modern, 21–28, 162 “good” and “bad” jihad, 72–73 guidelines for, 75–77, 90 historical, 83–85 ideologies of, 49, 89, 160, 224, 247–251 Muslim perception of, 136–139, 167–170, 202–205 political parties and, 230–235 rhetoric of, 104 Jihadophilia, 31 Jordan, 104 Kambakhsh, Parwez, 148 Kelsay, John, 84, 92–93, 97, 159, 168–169 Kemal, Mustafa, 59 Kemalism, 161, 169 Khamenei, Ayatollah, 61, 104, 228 Khomeinism, 9, 21, 23–26, 28–32 see also Khumeinism and Salafists Khumeinism and Salifists: goals of, 30–31 history of, 24–28, 136–139 jihadi-Salafism, 195–205 political pluralism and, 215 Salafi networks and, 222–234 Koran. See Quran. kufr/kuffar (infidelism), 158, 161 laicite, 13, 149–150 Lebanon, 15–16, 30, 62, 104, 149, 221–235 Lewis, Bernard, 37, 40, 126 London bombings (2005), 28, 62, 162, 209

263

Madrid bombings (2004), 28, 162, 209 martyrdom, 71, 104–105, 110, 136, 139, 243 Marxism, 24–25 Marxism-Leninism, 158 al Maududi, Sayyid Abul, 4, 60–61, 132, 134–135 media, 21, 25–30, 62, 113, 115, 124, 145, 176, 185–186, 190–191, 233, 241 Mohammed, Prophet, 4, 39, 43–45, 56, 71, 74, 77–78, 85–86, 116, 121–122, 133–134, 138–139, 152, 244–247, 250 Mujahideen, 9, 14, 70, 104, 119, 230, 251 Muslim Brotherhood: alliance of United States and, 16 early existence, 24, 161 inf luence of, 26, 179, 214 moderate factions of, 210 Nasser’s suppression of, 60 in Syria and Lebanon, 223, 227, 231 threat of, 218 Wahabis and, 28–29, 31 Nasrallah, Hassan, 103 Nasser, Gamal Abdel, 60, 126–127 nationalism, Arab, 14, 126 NATO, 27, 147 North Africa, 68, 105, 138, 149, 213 Obama, Barack, 7, 16, 31, 143, 153, 164, 196, 239–241, 242 OPEC, 31 Pakistan, 67, 120–121, 127 Pan-Arabism, 14, 223 Peace, 67, 71, 79, 85–90, 137–139, 157–160, 165–168, 239 Phares, Walid, 9 pluralism, 4, 10, 12–13, 22, 32, 57, 131–140, 150, 155, 161, 168–169 political culture, 28, 32, 135 political pluralism, 164

264

Index

political systems, 7, 62 propaganda, 24–25, 72, 75, 77, 184, 201 Putin, Vladimir, 118 al Qaeda, 21–22, 27–29, 143, 162–163, 178, 189–190, 195–205, 210, 212–213, 215–218, 223, 242 al Qardawi, Sheikh Yussef, 24 Qatar, 26, 31, 223 Quran, 44–45, 55–57, 61–62, 68–69, 71–76, 92, 133–137, 145–148, 153, 241, 243–248 Qutb, Sayyid, 60–62, 127, 132, 152–153, 158–160, 162, 164, 175, 179, 247–248 Rachman, Abdul, 147–148 Ramadan, Tariq, 140, 164 rhetoric, battles of, 136 Rice, Condoleezza, 180 Romans, 87–89 Rushdie, Salman, 122 Russia, 25, 229 Rwanda, 185 Sadat, Anwar, 84, 91, 137 Said, Edward, 126 Salafists. See Khumeinism and Salifists Saudi Arabia, 24, 62, 78, 154–155, 188, 222–225, 228, 232–235, 242–243, 247 separation of powers, 3 separation of state and religion, 13, 144, 148–154 September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks of, 14, 17, 25, 28, 62, 115–116, 124, 175–190 third War of Ideas and, 9, 21, 23, 131, 157–158, 196 Shariah laws, 37–42, 68, 71, 73, 76, 132–135, 161–162 Shiism, traditional, 55, 61 slavery, 42, 91 South Africa, 26

Soviet Union, 25, 145 collapse of, 3, 189 Sudan, 27–30 suicide bombings, 62, 104, 213–214, 241–243 Sunnah, 41, 43, 197 Sunni fundamentalists, history of, 59–61 Syria, 31 inf luence in Lebanon, 221–234 Takfir (rendering opponents infidels), 137 Taliban, 5, 121, 127, 147, 230, 249 totalitarianism, 161, 165 ummah (nation, universal community), 6–7, 24, 38, 42, 56, 158–159, 224, 226, 228–230 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 97, 144 Wahabism, 24–26, 28–29, 167, 179 War of Ideas: 21–33 alternatives for, 49, 165–167 consequences of, 17, 158–164, 170, 239–253 key concepts of, 4–5, 9, 131, 143–145, 148–155, 195–200 use of the term, 1, 8, 21, 101, 180, 184, 191 War on Terrorism, 17, 112, 163, 175–176, 180–183, 187 see also Global War on Terror (GWOT) weapons of mass destruction (WMD), 17 Westphalian state system, 157–159, 161, 197 World War I, 63, 178 World War II, 24, 63 Yugoslavia, 27 Zawahiri, Ayman, 84, 92, 225, 232 Zionism, 27, 200, 241