De Facto States
In this new century, the relentless appeal of national self-determination has moved beyond decolonisat...
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De Facto States
In this new century, the relentless appeal of national self-determination has moved beyond decolonisation. A large group of de facto states, would-be sovereignties, now seek international recognition. In some cases these ‘nations in waiting’ have already established the exclusivity of their writ on the ground and wait only for the outside world to come to terms with the realities of their existence. In others, there are powerful external players who could undermine their claims on one hand or ensure their success on the other. The cases described in this book are to be found throughout the world: Abkhazia and Chechnya in the Caucasus; Kosovo, Montenegro, Republika Srpska and Transnistria in eastern Europe; Palestine and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in the Middle East; Somaliland in Africa and Bougainville in the Pacific. Are these isolated voices or a harbinger of things to come? Their demands for separate statehood have breached the orthodoxies of territorial integrity and eroded the taboos of secession. Other large states, such as Indonesia, Nigeria and the Sudan, also teeter on the brink of disintegration. This volume for the first time provides a comprehensive theoretical and empirical examination of a new and very significant development in the international politics of fragmentation. Tozun Bahcheli is Professor of Political Science at Kings University College, University of Western Ontario, Canada. Barry Bartmann is Professor of Political Studies at the University of Prince Edward Island. Henry Srebrnik is Professor in the Department of Political Studies, also at the University of Prince Edward Island.
De Facto States The quest for sovereignty
Edited by Tozun Bahcheli, Barry Bartmann and Henry Srebrnik
First published 2004 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 270 Madison Ave, New York, NY 10016 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2005. “To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.” © 2004 Tozun Bahcheli, Barry Bartmann and Henry Srebrnik for selection and editorial matter; individual contributors their contribution All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. The publisher makes no representation, express or implied, with regard to the accuracy of the information contained in this book and cannot accept any legal responsibility or liability for any errors or omissions that may be made. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data A catalog record for this book has been requested ISBN 0-203-48576-9 Master e-book ISBN
ISBN 0-203-58221-7 (Adobe eReader Format) ISBN 0–714–65476–0 (Print Edition)
Contents
List of contributors Foreword Acknowledgements Maps Introduction: a new world of emerging states
vii ix xii xiii 1
TO Z UN BA HC HELI, BARRY BART MANN AND HENRY SREBRNIK
1 Political realities and legal anomalies: revisiting the politics of international recognition
12
BA R RY BA RT MANN
2 Republika Srpska
32
M A R I E - J O Ë L L E Z AHAR
3 Montenegro and Serbia: disassociation, negotiation, resolution?
52
P H I L I P LYO N
4 Albanian and Serb rivalry in Kosovo: realist and universalist perspectives on sovereignty
74
V J E R A N PAV L AKOVIC AND SABRINA PET RA RAM ET
5 From frozen conflict to frozen agreement: the unrecognized state of Transnistria
102
S T E V E N D. ROPER
6 Chechnya K AT H E R I N E GRANEY
118
vi
Contents
7 The Abkhazians: a national minority in their own homeland
143
E DWA R D M IHALKANIN
8 Under Turkey’s wings: the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, the struggle for international acceptance
164
TO Z UN BA HC HELI
9 Palestine 2003: the perils of de facto statehood
187
DA N T S C HI RG I
10 Can clans form nations? Somaliland in the making
210
HE N RY S R EBRNIK
11 Bougainville: the quest for self-determination
232
R AL P H R . P REMDAS
Conclusion: states in waiting, nations tiring of waiting
245
TO Z UN BA HC HELI, BARRY BART MANN AND H ENRY S REBRNIK
Index
257
Contributors
Tozun Bahcheli is Professor of Political Science at Kings University College (University of Western Ontario), London, Canada, where he teaches courses in international politics. He is the author of numerous journal articles and of Greek–Turkish Relations Since 1955 (Westview, 1990). During the 1995/96 academic year, Bahcheli was a Senior Fellow at the United States Institute of Peace in Washington, DC. Currently he is preparing a book on ethnic conflict in Cyprus. Barry Bartmann, Ph.D. (London School of Economics and Political Science) is Professor of Political Studies at the University of Prince Edward Island, where he teaches International Relations and Comparative Politics. He is also a member of the Graduate Faculty in Island Studies. He has published widely on issues relating to very small islands, including recently as co-author with Dr Dag Anckar, Framing an Independent Åland. Katherine Graney is Assistant Professor of Government at Skidmore College in Saratoga Springs, NY, a position held since 1999. She holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Wisconsin-Madison and has done extensive fieldwork in Tatarstan and Bashkortostan. She is currently finishing a book-length manuscript about the drive for sovereignty in Tatarstan. Philip Lyon worked as an OSCE election monitor in Montenegro and Kosovo and also served with the OSCE in Croatia. In 2002 he earned an M.A. in International Relations from the Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) and is currently completing a Ph.D. in history at the University of Maryland. His most recent publication is ‘Discord, Denial, and Dysfunction: The Serbian–Montenegrin–Kosovar Triangle’ in Problems of Post Communism. Edward Mihalkanin is an Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Political Science Program at Texas State University-San Marcos, Texas. He teaches International Relations and is co-author of the Historical Dictionary of Human Rights and Humanitarian Organizations, published in 1997. Vjeran Pavlakovic is currently a Ph.D. candidate in the History Department at the University of Washington. His research is centred on both historical and
viii
Contributors current issues of Croatian nationalism. He is the editor of ‘Nationalism, Culture, and Religion in Croatia since 1989’, issue Number 32 of the Donald W. Treadgold Papers.
Ralph R. Premdas, Ph.D. (Illinois), is Professor of Public Policy at the University of the West Indies, Trinidad and Tobago. His research focus is Comparative Ethnic Politics; multi-culturalism and migration. His publications include eighteen monographs and books, and over a hundred refereed articles and book chapters including most recently Identity, Ethnicity and Culture in the Caribbean. Sabrina Petra Ramet, Ph.D. (UCLA) is a Professor of Political Science at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU), Trondheim, Norway, and a Research Associate of the Science and Research Centre of the Republic of Slovenia, in Koper. She is the author of several books including Whose Democracy? Nationalism, Religion, and the Doctrine of Collective Rights in Post1989 Eastern Europe which was named an Outstanding Academic Book for 1997 by Choice magazine. Her specialties are East European affairs, religion and politics, and applied philosophy. Steven D. Roper is an Associate Professor of Political Science at Eastern Illinois University. His research focuses on parliamentary politics, regime types and conflict resolution in East Europe and the former Soviet Union. He is the author of Romania: The Unfinished Revolution (Routledge, 2000). Henry Srebrnik is a Professor in the Department of Political Studies, University of Prince Edward Island, Charlottetown, PEI, Canada. He teaches Comparative Politics and Ethnic Relations and has published extensively on the impact of nationalism and ethnically-based political conflict, especially in island societies and among diaspora peoples. He is also the associate editor of the Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism. Dan Tschirgi, Ph.D. (University of Toronto) is currently Professor of Political Science and Chairman of the Department of Political Science at the American University in Cairo. His published works have mainly dealt with the Arab–Israeli conflict and US policy towards that issue as well as with comparative political development and political violence in developing states including such publications as The American Search for Mideast Peace and The Origins and Development of the Arab–Israeli Conflict. Marie-Joëlle Zahar is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the Université de Montréal. Her research interests and her most recent publications are centred in conflict-resolution, peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction. She has held a number of distinguished international research fellowships including positions at Stanford University.
Foreword De facto states and the international order John McGarry
The international system, supposedly based on a community of nation-states, is in fact an inter-state system, made up of what are frequently multi-national polities. Within these polities, different national communities may co-operate, as in Canada or the United Kingdom, but in others, including those described in this volume, they are locked in conflict. Conflict results from the capture of the state by one nation, which uses its power to oppress others, to involuntarily assimilate them, to expel them or to wipe them out. Such policies frequently provoke a secessionist response from the beleaguered minority in question. As the volume makes clear, however, the members of the inter-state system invariably oppose secession, as it is seen as threatening their fundamental interests. The right of self-determination, recognized in international law, applies only to colonies which are separated from their metropoles by salt water. It does not apply to regions of states, even when, as in some of these case-studies, the state–region relationship is as imperial and exploitative as the metropole–colony relationship. Recently, some have detected an easing in the international community’s position on secession. While only one case, Bangladesh’s secession from Pakistan, was recognized in the period between the end of the Second World War and the end of the Cold War, several new states have succeeded in joining the international state system since the 1990s. This was mainly a result of the break-up of the three communist federations of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, although Eritrea and East Timor have also been accepted as independent states. Any easing, however, has been strictly limited, and we should be wary about expecting it to continue. Recognition was forthcoming in the case of the three communist federations because there was no central government willing to resist break-up. Both Prague and Moscow (eventually) assented to the break-up of Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. Yugoslavia, as the Badinter Commission pointed out, was breaking apart, i.e. it was not simply a matter of a region seceding. Even then, the Commission made clear, only Yugoslavia’s federal republics had the right to secede, and not regions within these republics, such as Republika Srspka or Kosovo. Eritrea and East Timor left with some degree of consent from the central authorities in Ethiopia and Indonesia, respectively, and both could also
x Foreword plausibly claim to be examples of decolonization rather than secession, as they had been at one time distinct colonies. There has, by contrast, been few if any recent cases, where secession has been successful, i.e. that have achieved widespread recognition against the wishes of the state’s central authorities. The situation now does not appear dramatically different from the early 1970s when Samuel Huntington warned that ‘the bias against political divorce, that is, secession, is just about as strong as the nineteenth-century bias against marital divorce’. This continuity can be seen in the consensus among international actors, including the United Nations and the European Union, that Cyprus be put together as a single state, in spite of the fact that it has been partitioned for over thirty years. It can be seen in the current international consensus that Iraq should remain united, in spite of the fact that its Kurdish minority has enjoyed de facto autonomy since 1991, that the Kurds were gassed by the Baathist regime in Baghdad, and that Kurds overwhelmingly prefer independence. It can also be seen in Kosovo, where, ironically, the international community intervened to prevent the abuse of the local population by the Serbian authorities, but nonetheless appears reluctant to sanction Kosovo’s independence from Serbia. In certain respects the ability of states to win international support against secessionists may even have been strengthened, as a result of the consequences of 11 September 2001. Chechen separatists, Mindanao separatists, Tamil separatists and Basque separatists are facing an even more hostile international environment than they did previously. De facto states are a result of a strong secessionist bid, on the one hand, and the unwillingness of the international system to condone secession on the other. They are regions which carry out the normal functions of the state on their territory, and which are generally supported by significant proportions of their population. They are not ‘de jure states’, because they are not sanctioned by the international order. Instead, other states and inter-state organizations, such as the mis-named United Nations, continue to recognize the authority of the state from which the secession occurred, even though its writ no longer runs in the breakaway region, and though its legitimacy is rejected by the region’s population. Some de facto states appear able to manage without international approval, but others suffer considerable hardship as a result of sanctions and of barriers to trade and travel. This poses Lenin’s question: what is to be done? For some of the cases discussed in this volume, de facto statehood is a transitional stage to full independence. It is widely accepted throughout the international order that Palestinians should have their own state. This is, after all, unfinished business from the colonial era. Montenegro will also be recognized, should its electorate choose to secede, as it is a republic of the former Yugoslavia with the same rights enjoyed by other breakaway republics, such as Croatia or Slovenia. Bougainville has managed to extract, as part of its settlement with Papua New Guinea, the promise of a referendum on independence. Others may be able to go the same route, i.e. persuade their former central authorities to accept the divorce, in which case international recognition will follow unproblematically. There is, interestingly, some emerging
Foreword
xi
evidence that states, particularly if they are liberal democracies, are no longer as prepared as they once were to retain territory against the wishes of the local population. Both Canada and the United Kingdom have recently established legal channels whereby regions may secede. Some of the others may be able to endure in their present status for a considerable time, particularly if they have support from an ethnic kin-state, as the example of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus shows. For the remainder, all that may be on offer is re-integration. The best that can be hoped for in such circumstances is a negotiated re-entry resulting in a decentralized federal system combined with consociational power-sharing. This is what was provided to Republika Srspka under the Dayton Accords, and it is what is being offered to Turkish Cypriots under the so-called ‘Annan Plan’. It is also what the Kurds of Iraq and the Tamils of Sri Lanka are hoping for during their current negotiations, for both understand that independence is a pipedream. Federation combined with consociation may not be as satisfying as independence, but it is usually much better than what existed prior to breakaway. In fact there is much to be said for states exploring such forms of accommodation prior to secessionists bids, for they may help to prevent them arising in the first place. Not all states are likely to take such-pre-emptive action of course, and many will also continue to refuse to relinquish territory. This is why the phenomena of ‘de facto states’ is likely to remain with us, and why this volume will remain relevant for a considerable time. Kingston, Ontario March 2004
Acknowledgements
We are grateful to Rob Turner of the Weldon Library of the University of Western Ontario for his meticulous work with the maps in this volume. Tozun Bahcheli would like to thank Henry Srebrnik, David Milne, Peter Pavilionis and William Mckercher for their useful comments on his chapter on Cyprus. Barry Bartmann would like to express his appreciation to David Milne of the University of Malta for making substantive suggestions on his chapter. Henry Srebrnik would like to thank Irving Hexham at the University of Calgary for his valuable input on the chapter on Somaliland. Tozun Bahcheli is grateful for the support of his research on Cyprus by King’s University College of the University of Western Ontario, and particularly for the encouragement of Principal Gerry Killan, Dean Des Dutrizac, and Professor Hugh Mellon. We are grateful for the support of the University of Prince Edward Island, particularly Dr Richard Kurial, Dean of Arts. We also immensely appreciate the many administrative tasks which Maureen Mackay undertook with typical generosity. And we thank Sarah Murphy for her patience and diligence in the preparation of the index.
Introduction A new world of emerging states Tozun Bahcheli, Barry Bartmann and Henry Srebrnik
The late twentieth century was clearly a time when conventional notions of sovereign statehood were changing. The phenomenon of globalization along with the emergence of new regional and international regimes in virtually every dimension of traditional sovereign authority are now widely acknowledged. The post-1945 period, paradoxically, has also been one of fragmentation and disintegration. The proliferation of new states, indeed the celebration of separate statehood, has reached the most improbable corners of the world. States may be conceding large areas of exclusive competence, succumbing to new regulatory regimes and collaborating in all manner of jurisdictional authority. But, they also continue to assert their separateness, their exclusivity and their final sovereign authority in an international system predicated on the symbols and the recognition of the centrality of the sovereign state. Indeed, the appeal of sovereignty has ignited the ambitions of scores of societies for whom such a status would have once seemed both absurd and unreachable. But, as new states emerge from the detritus of empires, it has also increased the level of friction between and within states. The demise of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia demonstrated the chaos that ensues when large states that were informed by an all-encompassing and transnational ideology collapse and leave in their wake a multitude of ethnies within complex belts of mixed population. Some of the nationalities in these multinational empires were already politically organized into legally recognizable and ethnically homogeneous territorial units that made the transition to sovereign statehood relatively easily: Lithuania and Slovenia come to mind. But others found themselves without a political status that could quickly or easily become transformed into sovereign statehood. The Abkhazians, Chechens, Ossetians and Tatars, in the Soviet republics of Georgia and Russia, were examples of such peoples: while they enjoyed a considerable legal measure of autonomy, their lands did not constitute fully-fledged union republics (as say, Uzbekhistan did) with the theoretical right to independence under the Soviet constitution – a right which, surprisingly, all the union republics were able to exercise in 1992. Yet others discovered their claim to sovereignty over all or part of what they considered their historic patrimony was contested by groups competing for parts of the same geographic areas; such was the case of the Armenians and Azeris in the enclaves of
2
Tozun Bahcheli, Barry Bartmann and Henry Srebrnik
Nagorno-Kharabakh and Nakhichevan, the Romanians and Ukrainians in Moldova and the Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo. Compounding the difficulty was the fact that virtually every group could justify its claim to some other group’s territory, or at least a portion thereof, based on their particular reading of demography, geography and history. Competing groups living in claustrophobic proximity often quarrel over the most basic definitions regarding cultural, linguistic, religious and national identity, and over core-foundation myths, historical memories, traditions and other aspects of a collective heritage. Macedonia is so diverse its very name became the term the French use for a mixed salad, while all of its neighbours have tried to define Macedonians as members of other ethnic groups – Bulgarians, Greeks and Serbs. Boundaries, no matter how skilfully drawn, still remain to some extent arbitrary and illogical. Robert Kaplan has, with a measure of exasperation, described the territorial claims of the various Balkan groups: ‘Each nation demands that its borders revert to where they were at the exact time when its own empire had reached its zenith of ancient medieval expansion.’1 Hence the forcible assimilation of minorities, or else their eviction, displacement or transfer, to create homogeneity, a brutal solution known nowadays as ethnic cleansing. The alternative, after all, might be permanent irredentist pressures on the newly-formed state’s majority, with incendiary activities culminating in further territorial re-divisions or partitions – the eventual fate, no doubt, of Bosnia-Herzegovina, since the Dayton Peace Accords have legitimized the de facto decentralization and pseudo-partition of the country. New nations are most likely to emerge when the following two factors are present: a pre-existing and defined geographic area with recognizable boundaries, one that has already obtained some form of recognition, even if at a sub-state or colonial, level; and an ethnic, religious and/or cultural sense of self-definition of the inhabitants of the territory, propelling the group in question towards the desire for independent statehood. Both of these elements can be found in, say, Bougainville, Chechnya or Kosovo, as well as ex-Soviet or Yugoslav republics such as Armenia, Lithuania and Slovenia, which successfully obtained independence with very little opposition. In such instances we have what amounts to a geographic Procrustean bed, inhabited by an overwhelming and distinct majority that is seeking sovereignty. Somewhat more problematic are those places which have never been formally subdivided and are co-inhabited by two or more identifiable groups, even when the peoples in question live within segregated enclaves and communities, in a checkerboard or fruitcake pattern. Most of these are post-colonial states, such as Guyana, Trinidad and Fiji, where the composition of the population was altered fairly recently through the sponsored settlement of transplanted labourers by the colonial rulers; but similar states exist where communities have been intermingled for centuries, as in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Lebanon and Sri Lanka. Pre-1963 Cyprus and pre-1948 Palestine also fit this definition, though both were eventually partitioned, despite the lack of internally defined boundaries. Of course, military action, ethnic cleansing and transfer of populations occurred in such circumstances. Ireland and the Indian subcontinent are somewhat anomalous in that they fit into neither of the above categories. Colonial Ireland did have internal boundaries,
Introduction
3
namely its 32 counties, but the part that remained British, as Northern Ireland, following the granting of sovereignty to the Irish Free State in 1921, had never itself constituted a sub-national unit within those boundaries. The Ulster Protestants, a majority in the six northern counties, considered themselves ‘British’ rather than ‘Irish’ and refused to leave the United Kingdom. It was a partition, based on ethno-religious definitions, rather than secession. British-ruled India had also been an aggregation of provinces and quasi-autonomous princely states but, once again, the boundary lines drawn between India and the new entity of Pakistan in 1947 reflected the principle that religion would, where feasible, determine citizenship. This entailed the partition not just of the subcontinent, but some of the sub-units: Bengal and the Punjab were apportioned between the two new states and, in a manner that remains unresolved to this day, so was Kashmir. The least common category of countries seeking independence, a group to which Somaliland belongs, are those where there are pre-existing geographic configurations – in this case, the old British Somaliland protectorate – but few discernable cultural, ethnic, linguistic or religious differences, the usual markers hiving one group off from another, between those wishing to secede and those in the state being divorced. Still, Amitai Etzioni has drawn our attention to the fact that quite subtle differences in geography, religion and culture ‘can be fanned into new separatist movements’.2 ‘Ethnic conflict does not require great differences; small will do’, adds Daniel Patrick Moynihan.3 It is the group’s own psychological perceptions and preferences, and not tangible attributes such as racial characteristics, which should constitute ‘the basis of their claim to have the power to decide their future course’.4 Perhaps all that is necessary is that the group constitutes a ‘politically coherent’ community.5 The clans in Somalia, for instance, effectively correspond to ethnies, and are the primary locus of allegiance. The Fijians, the Germans and the Scots, in earlier periods of their histories, all had political structures resembling those of the Somalis. Though they shared common characteristics, considered themselves related, and were at various times united under the banner of a single leader in order to battle invaders from outside, yet they also engaged in warfare amongst themselves. Culture and ethnicity, as David Brown observes, have in the past often been ‘relegated to the status of epiphenomena’ by many political scientists and economists, regarded as merely part of the ‘superstructure’ of given societies rather than as an engine of change.6 Providing non-sovereign ethnic communities with political legitimacy, it was felt, would undermine international stability by encouraging small peoples to seek statehood. Many, notes Uri Ra'anan, were enamoured of sheer size, which they equated with efficiency and viability. Because it appeared axiomatic that large territorial units would prove more competent and effective members of the international community, they persuaded themselves that large political states, however arbitrary their frontiers, would evolve into nation states.7 Their model was the western European nation state, which over the generations had successfully assimilated – so they assumed – the various minority groups that
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inhabited its territory. The process undergone by Europeans would presumably be repeated elsewhere. They were, of course, proved wrong. Where ethnicity and nation do coincide, and the state becomes the embodiment of the national group, nationalism and patriotism reinforce each other. In these happy circumstances, ‘civic’, ‘political’ and ‘territorial’ nationalism converge with ‘ethnic’, ‘integral’ and ‘organic’ nationalism. Yet all but some 15, at most, of the world’s 194 states are multi-ethnic states; indeed, in almost one-third of these, the largest ethnic group does not even constitute a majority. As Walker Connor notes, ‘The political borders of states have been superimposed upon the ethnic map with cavalier disregard for ethnic homelands.’8 In such heterogeneous entities loyalty to one’s ethnie has usually remained more important than allegiance to state structures whose boundaries were imposed through war, conquest or colonization, and which are therefore dismissed as ‘artificial’; this is especially true if the state is controlled by one nationality which discriminates against other groups who are ostensibly compatriots. Most countries in the world are ‘little empires, where one dominant ethnic group imposes its imperium [authority] in varying degrees of harshness upon the unfortunate weaker neighbours that happen to live within the same political boundaries’.9 This is particularly true in what Samuel Huntington calls ‘cleft’ states, that is, countries which are not just multi-ethnic but which bestride the fault lines between religious-cultural civilizations: examples include the Sudan, Nigeria, Cyprus, India, Sri Lanka, the Philippines and Malaysia. The former USSR and Yugoslavia, and Ethiopia before the secession of Eritrea, were cleft countries unable to survive their very deep cleavages.10 Tonya Langford has described Somalia as ‘the quintessential case of state failure: a fractured society with weak and often no connections to the body politic suffering under authoritarian rule’.11 Of course Somalia is not unique in this regard. It falls within the pessimistic framework espoused by John Comaroff when he refers to ‘a world map with spreading gray areas, in which no identifiable political community exists at all’ and where power has been appropriated by local warlords or pre-state chieftains12 who, as Paul Rich points out, ‘represent desperate and militarised fragments of societies’.13 Benjamin Barber maintains that in such heterogeneous regions, ‘the real players are not nations at all but tribes, many of them at war with one another’.14 Rich defines failed states as those with only ‘juridical’ legitimacy within the international framework of states but with no ‘empirical’ legitimacy – that is, ‘its ability to secure its authority at the local level’.15 Joel Migdal has determined that most Third World states have been ‘on the low end of a spectrum of capabilities’, especially in their ability to regulate social relations and make use of resources. The state’s drive for social control ‘has stalled in many countries because of tenacious and resilient organizations scattered throughout their societies’, where ethnic and linguistic fractionalization remains high. States find themselves ‘at loggerheads with kinship and ethnic groups and others’, often led by ‘strongmen’.16 Mehran Kamrava cites religion, kinship and tribe, all of which may serve as a strong base of heritage and identity, and as a source of protection for its members, being ‘the prime focus of social interaction and cultural expression’ in such countries,
Introduction
5
and thus instrumental in undermining the growth of a unified political culture. A regime may be accepted on the surface, but in reality may not be able to compete with ideologies that give pre-eminence to religion or ethnic nationalism. Since a supportive political culture is, Kamrava notes, the ‘transcendental link that binds state and society together’, a mismatch between the formal political institutions and the underlying culture of a society may result in a ‘soft’ or unstable state, one given to ‘personalist’ and patrimonial politics, rife with corruption, nepotism and patronage, and therefore lacking in legitimacy. Such systems, often imposed from the outside and not normatively backed by an indigenous political culture, have time and again, regardless of their ideological pedigrees, failed to provide a framework for good governance or sustainable economic development.17 Many of these states are little more than notional entities, and some have imploded and have ceased to exist except as legal fictions: examples include Angola, Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone and, of course, Somalia. When the state becomes little more than a hollow shell, other forms of collective identity provide the infrastructure for survival, notes William Zartman, and there is usually a retreat to ethnic nationalism ‘as the residual, viable identity’.18 A complete ‘descent into statelessness’ may result in smaller-scale, family bonds assuming great importance, according to Julia Maxted and Abebe Zegeye. ‘The use of kinship in a political context acts as compensation against the weakness or incapacity of state institutions to protect citizens and advance their interests.’19 As Pierre van den Berghe has noted, ‘ethnic sentiments are primordial, ineradicable, and ancient, since ethnicity is, in the last analysis, kinship writ large’.20 In such circumstances, writes David Carment, ‘there are clear competitive advantages attached to an ethnic identity’ as a basis for collective action.21 Where loyalty to the state and the ethnically-based nation are perceived as being in irreconcilable conflict, nationalism typically proves the more potent. Robert Cooper and Mats Berdal remind us that the ‘voluntary acceptance of majority decisions implies a strong sense of common destiny’, which presupposes a political community to which everyone belongs.22 After all, one basic definition of nationhood is the notion that a people share at least a minimal sense of common fate and destiny, and that when one part suffers, others empathize. Yet in most of the case studies in this book, we find that the regimes in power exhibited a complete lack of concern for the suffering of those groups that eventually decided to secede and form their own polity; indeed, many rulers attempted to crush secessionist movements through sheer military force. This has certainly been true for the behaviour of the Russians in Chechnya, the Serbs in Kosovo, the Georgians in Abkhazia and the Papuans in Bougainville. What overarching set of national myths could provide any sense of cohesion following such bloodletting? Typically, dominant ethnic elites use the power of the state to their own advantage, and rarely are the fruits of development distributed equitably. Groups totally excluded from power in a state usually find themselves with only two options: ‘either overthrow the ruling group and seize power themselves, or secede’.23 Obviously, most ethnically or religiously distinct minority peoples will chose the latter course of action, so, as John Chipman indicates, the first act of liberated
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groups is often ‘to seek some permanent escape from the state they see as having oppressed them’.24 As a result, demands by subordinate ethnic communities range from full independence to autonomy, local political control, language and religious rights, and control of land, resources and economic development. Arguments for independence by those wishing to withdraw include claims of ‘unjust incorporation, drastic oppression and/or severe economic discrimination by the mother state’.25 Ethnic groups struggling for independent statehood or attempting to wrest disputed territories from rival claimants have found it advantageous to solicit support from kith and kin abroad, in particular from those compatriots now living in diasporic communities in countries such as Canada, the United States and Britain. Diaspora communities, ‘rather than fading away as anomalous anachronisms of the past’, write Yossi Shain and Martin Sherman, ‘appear to be not only an endemic feature of the international system, but a pivotal element in comprehending the direction of present and future trends in it’.26 As Mary Kaldor has observed, ‘Many nationalist movements rely on diaspora support, especially in North America and Australasia, where ethnic immigrants have retained and indeed reinvented their identity.’27 Pluralistic, democratic countries allow great scope for pressure from organized interest groups in the formulation of foreign policy. The US, in particular, has a very diffuse political system; in contrast to most countries, foreign policy is not just the preserve of the executive branch and professional bureaucracy, but is also constitutionally subject to input and oversight by Congress. These legislators are, naturally, particularly attentive to the concerns of their constituents. This provides great opportunity for lobbying by demographically concentrated, relatively wealthy and politically influential ethnic groups. American Armenians, Greeks and Jews, in particular, have sought support for embattled co-religionists in Nagorno-Kharabakh, Cyprus and Israel/ Palestine. Given their fewer numbers and political clout, Azeris, Palestinian Arabs and Turks, on the other hand, have found themselves on the short end of this particular stick. Of course, as Lea Brilmayer writes, ‘every separatist movement is built upon a claim to territory, usually based on an historical grievance, and that without a normatively sound claim to territory, self-determination arguments do not form a plausible basis for secession’.28 All of the peoples described in this book have passed that test. Each of these unrecognized states has become what Alexis Heraclides calls a ‘separate society’, that is, ‘one whose members are convinced that self-rule would result in far greater justice and equality’ than continued allegiance to the previous unified state, and who consider the territory in which they live ‘as having historical roots and being viable as an independent state’.29 The international community still frowns on the principle of self-determination being invoked by what it considers ‘disaffected minorities within states’30 and the UN (United Nations) remains stubbornly wedded to a position of restoring such fractured states as Cyprus and Somalia. Still, much has changed with the end of the Cold War. More than 20 new countries emerged in the 1990s as ‘successor states’ to former ‘empires’ such as the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, and many
Introduction
7
others are trying to follow the same path. The latest entity to join the world community, which now counts 194 sovereign states, is East Timor, which extricated itself from Indonesian domination in 1999. Donald Horowitz emphasizes that with the breakup of Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia in the 1990s, ‘there has been a sharp change in the willingness of Western states to recognize secessionists’. He contrasts these events with the non-recognition of Biafra in 1968, when, despite the great sympathy the Igbos received in their attempt to break away from a repressive Nigerian state, western capitals remained steadfast in their adherence to the then-established international law doctrine ‘forbidding recognition of secessionist units whose establishment is being resisted forcibly by a central government’.31 Ali Mazrui has argued that the independence of Eritrea in 1993 might be the start of a redrawing of African maps. He calls that event the breaking of the postcolonial ‘taboo of officially sanctioned secession’, which had survived previous attempts at separation by breakaway movements in Nigeria, Sudan and Zaire, for example. In the future, he argues, ethnic self-determination will result in smaller, more homogeneous states.32 Michael Chege has recommended to the Organization of African Unity (OAU) that it accept this new reality: ‘There is nothing remiss about altering state frontiers in the nobler interests of domestic tranquility and sustained economic growth.’33 Dozens of the world’s smallest and weakest colonial territories now raise their flags in the United Nations Plaza and negotiate their own terms of engagement with the most powerful state and intergovernmental players in the system. The successful demonstration of this global devolution has emboldened peoples who have seen themselves trapped in the borders of an alien state. These are not salt-water colonies and claims for self-determination are far more difficult when pitted against the equally sacrosanct principle of territorial integrity. Nonetheless, as the collapse of the Soviet Union so dramatically illustrates, empires can be contiguous land masses and their captive peoples moved by the same sense of separate destiny as far-flung societies in maritime imperial systems. The closing years of the twentieth century were witness to a liberation of those ambitions in lands where the doctrine of territorial integrity would surely have precluded such claims only a few decades earlier. The fate of the Baltic states, for example, is just such an example of the prevailing orthodoxy of territorial integrity. While the plight of these states was viewed with enormous sympathy in the Western world, even to a refusal to acknowledge the legality of their incorporation into the Soviet Union, the notion of separate independence received only lip service among their erstwhile allies in the West. Even in the last hours of the unraveling of the modern Russian empire, George Bush, then president of the United States, still obsessed with the need to preserve the integrity of the Soviet Union, and with it the authority of Mikhail Gorbachev, urged the Baltic peoples to temper their demands and to seek accommodation within their fated destiny. Similarly, save perhaps for Germany, Western powers attempted to coax the unhappy peoples of Yugoslavia from abandoning their federal state. In some cases the appeal was laced with threats of exclusion from Europe’s family table should they insist on pursuing their separatist aspirations.
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All of this is behind us now. The map of the Eurasian continent has been dramatically altered with the emergence of so many new states, all of them determined claimants from the carcasses of exhausted imperial/federal states. This phenomenon has not been confined to the voluntary disintegration of the Soviet Union or Czechoslovakia or the wars of the former Yugoslavia. There are other national peoples, even within the rump successor states themselves, who are moved by the successful demonstration effect of secession. Indeed, the post-Soviet republics might be likened to Maryushka dolls, containing increasingly diminutive nations within each stage of imperial disrobing. Nor is this process confined to the dismantling of the huge Russian Empire, the last of the great European imperial systems. It was evident in Ethiopia with the final victory of the Eritreans, and it is a powerful force in Cyprus, Palestine and Western Sahara. Should not governments in the post-Cold War era adopt ‘a broader and less alarmist view of self determination’?34 At some point, argues Jeffrey Herbst, the reality of disintegrating, dysfunctional states stands in such contrast to the legal fiction of sovereign states ‘that experimentation with regard to new states is in order’. Alternatives to an ‘old, failed political order’ must be discussed.35 Maybe that is why many of the states in this volume, though still denied recognition, do seem to have won for themselves ‘a degree of toleration’ and ‘limited accommodation’ from the members of international society.36 After all, as Chaim Kaufmann put it, sometimes ‘separation is the worst solution, except for all the others’.37 The seemingly relentless appeal of national self-determination, and the demands for separate statehood, have breached the orthodoxies of territorial integrity and eroded the taboos of secession. In all of this, conventional notions of recognition are central to the status of these de facto players in the global system. To what extent is formal recognition still relevant in addressing the place and the fate of these disputed entities within the global system? In some cases these ‘nations in waiting’ have already established the exclusivity of their writ on the ground and wait only for the outside world to come to terms with the realities of their existence. In others, there are powerful and sometimes mischievous external players, which could undermine their claims on one hand or ensure their success on the other. Unrecognized states were barely known in the early post-Second World War years, though separatist movements were common enough. The case of Japanese client-state Manchukuo, in the 1930s, seemed to prove the rule that gatecrashers could never succeed in breaching the formidable codes of the international system. Yet while there is still a determined effort to withhold recognition from such pretender states, there is today also an acknowledgement that this is a phenomenon that can be neither ignored nor dismissed. Clearly, with only a few European dependencies left, self-determination has moved beyond decolonization and reality is forcing the international community to revisit this complex matter. Other large states, such as Indonesia, Nigeria and the Sudan, also teeter on the brink of disintegration. All of the cases described in this book challenge long-held assumptions regarding the application of the right of self-determination and the nature
Introduction
9
of sovereignty. This volume, then, is an examination of this most timely and pressing subject, a comparative analysis of a new and very significant development in the international politics of fragmentation.
Notes 1 R. Kaplan, Balkan Ghosts: A Journey Through History (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993), p. 57. 2 A. Etzioni, ‘The Evils of Self-Determination’, Foreign Policy, 89 (1992/93), p. 27. 3 D. Moynihan, Pandaemonium: Ethnicity in International Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 15. 4 V. Nanda, ‘Self-Determination Under International Law: Validity of Claims to Secede’, Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, 13, 3 (1981), p. 276. 5 W. Ofuatey-Kodjoe, The Principle of Self-Determination in International Law (New York: Nellen, 1977), pp. 156–59. 6 D. Brown, ‘Ethnic Revival: Perspectives on State and Society’, Third World Quarterly, 11, 4 (1989), pp. 1–3. 7 U. Ra'anan, ‘The Nation-State Fallacy’, in J. Montville (ed.), Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1991), p. 11. 8 W. Connor, ‘The Impact of Homelands Upon Diasporas’, in G. Sheffer (ed.), Modern Diasporas in International Politics (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1986), p. 20. 9 G. Van Cleemput, ‘Clarifying Nationalism, Chauvinism and Ethnic Imperialism’, International Journal on World Peace, 12, 1 (1995), p. 67. 10 S. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), pp. 137–8. 11 T. Langford, ‘Things Fall Apart: State Failure and the Politics of Intervention’, International Studies Review, 1, 1 (1999), p. 61. 12 J. Comaroff, ‘Ethnicity, Nationalism and the Politics of Difference in an Age of Revolution’, in E. Wilmsen and P. McAllister (eds), The Politics of Difference: Ethnic Premises in a World of Power (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), p. 173. 13 P. Rich, ‘Warlords, State Fragmentation and the Dilemma of Humanitarian Intervention’, Small Wars and Insurgencies, 10, 1 (1999), p. 79. 14 B. Barber, Jihad vs. McWorld: How Globalism and Tribalism are Reshaping the World (New York: Ballantine Books, 1996), p. 8. 15 See Rich, ‘Warlords’, p. 78. 16 J. Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States: State–Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), pp. 3, 32, 37, 40. 17 M. Kamrava, Understanding Comparative Politics: A Framework for Analysis (London: Routledge, 1996), pp. 43–8, 71, 175–80. 18 I. Zartman, ‘Introduction: Posing the Problem of State Collapse’, in I. Zartman (ed.), Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995), p. 1. 19 J. Maxted and A. Zegeye, ‘State Disintegration and Human Rights in Africa’, International Journal of Comparative Sociology, 38, 1–2 (1997), pp. 68, 73. 20 P. van den Berghe, ‘Denationalizing the State’, Society, 33, 2 (1996), p. 65. 21 D. Carment, ‘The International Dimension of Ethnic Conflict’, Journal of Peace Research, 30, 2 (1993), p. 138. 22 R. Cooper and M. Berdal, ‘Outside Intervention in Ethnic Conflicts’, Survival, 35, 1 (1993), p. 119. 23 G. Ayittey, ‘Obstacles to African Development’, in G. Agbango (ed.), Issues and Trends in Contemporary African Politics: Stability, Development and Democratization (New York: Peter Lang, 1997), p. 330.
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24 J. Chipman, ‘Managing the Politics of Parochialism’, Survival, 35, 1 (1993), p. 168. 25 R. McMullen, ‘Somaliland: the Next Eritrea?’, Low Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement, 2, 3 (1993), p. 421. 26 Y. Shain and M. Sherman, ‘Dynamics of Disintegration: Diaspora, Secession and the Paradox of Nation-States’, Nations and Nationalism, 4, 3 (1998), p. 322. 27 M. Kaldor, ‘Transnational Civil Society’, in T. Dunne and N. Wheeler (eds), Human Rights in Global Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 208. 28 L. Brilmayer, ‘Secession and Self-Determination: A Territorial Interpretation’, Yale Journal of International Law, 16 (1991), p. 192. 29 A. Heraclides, The Self-Determination of Minorities in International Politics (London: Frank Cass, 1991), pp. 14, 16. 30 J. Mayall, ‘Non-Intervention, Self-Determination and the “New World Order,” ’ International Affairs, 67, 3 (1991), p. 424. 31 D. Horowitz, ‘Self-Determination: Politics, Philosophy and Law’, in M. Moore (ed.), National Self-Determination and Secession (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 189. 32 A. Mazrui, ‘The Bondage of Boundaries: Why Africa’s Maps will be Redrawn’, in The Future Redrawn: 150 Economist Years, supplement to The Economist, 11 September 1993, p. 28. 33 M. Chege, ‘Remembering Africa’, Foreign Affairs, 71, 1 (1991/92), p. 153. 34 M. Halperin and D. Scheffer with P. Small, Self-Determination in the New World Order (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1992), p. 46 35 J. Herbst, States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), pp. 266, 269. 36 S. Pegg, International Society and the De Facto State (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 1998), pp. 98, 198. 37 C. Kaufmann, ‘Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars’, International Security, 20, 4 (1996), p. 170.
References Ayittey, G., ‘Obstacles to African Development’, in G. Agbango (ed.), Issues and Trends in Contemporary African Politics: Stability, Development, and Democratization (New York: Peter Lang, 1997), pp. 321–35. Barber, B., Jihad vs. McWorld: How Globalism and Tribalism are Reshaping the World (New York: Ballantine Books, 1996). Brilmayer, L., ‘Secession and Self-Determination: A Territorial Interpretation’, Yale Journal of International Law, 16 (1991), pp. 177–202. Brown, D., ‘Ethnic Revival: Perspectives on State and Society’, Third World Quarterly, 11, 4 (1989), pp. 1–17. Carment, D., ‘The International Dimension of Ethnic Conflict’, Journal of Peace Research, 30, 2 (1993), pp. 137–50. Chege, M., ‘Remembering Africa’, Foreign Affairs, 71, 1 (1991/92), pp. 146–63. Chipman, J., ‘Managing the Politics of Parochialism’, Survival, 35, 1 (1993), pp. 143–70. Comaroff, J., ‘Ethnicity, Nationalism and the Politics of Difference in an Age of Revolution’, in E. Wilmsen and P. McAllister (eds), The Politics of Difference: Ethnic Premises in a World of Power (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), pp. 162–83. Connor, W., ‘The Impact of Homelands Upon Diasporas’, in G. Sheffer (ed.), Modern Diasporas in International Politics (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1986), pp. 16–46. Cooper, R. and Berdal, M., ‘Outside Intervention in Ethnic Conflicts’, Survival, 35, 1 (1993), pp. 118–42. Etzioni, A., ‘The Evils of Self-Determination’, Foreign Policy, 89 (1992/93), pp. 21–35.
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Halperin, M. and Scheffer, D. with Small, P., Self-Determination in the New World Order (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1992). Heraclides, A., The Self-Determination of Minorities in International Politics (London: Frank Cass, 1991). Herbst, J., States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000). Horowitz, D., ‘Self-Determination: Politics, Philosophy and Law’, in M. Moore (ed.), National Self-Determination and Secession (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 181–214. Huntington, S., The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996). Kaldor, M., ‘Transnational Civil Society’, in T. Dunne and N. Wheeler (eds), Human Rights in Global Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 195–213. Kamrava, M., Understanding Comparative Politics: A Framework for Analysis (London: Routledge, 1996). Kaplan, R., Balkan Ghosts: A Journey Through History (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993). Kaufmann, C., ‘Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars’, International Security, 20, 4 (1996), pp. 136–75. Langford, T., ‘Things Fall Apart: State Failure and the Politics of Intervention’, International Studies Review, 1, 1 (1999), pp. 59–79. McMullen, R., ‘Somaliland: the Next Eritrea?’, Low Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement 2, 3 (1993), pp. 421–33. Maxted, J. and Zegeye, A., ‘State Disintegration and Human Rights in Africa’, International Journal of Comparative Sociology, 38, 1–2 (1997), pp. 64–86. Mayall, J., ‘Non-Intervention, Self-Determination and the “New World Order,” ’ International Affairs, 67, 3 (1991), pp. 421–9. Mazrui, A., ‘The Bondage of Boundaries: Why Africa’s Maps will be Redrawn’, in The Future Redrawn: 150 Economist Years, supplement to The Economist, 11 September 1993, pp. 28–30. Migdal, J., Strong Societies and Weak States: State–Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988). Moynihan, D., Pandaemonium: Ethnicity in International Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994). Nanda, V., ‘Self-Determination Under International Law: Validity of Claims to Secede’, Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, 13, 3 (1981), pp. 257–80. Ofuatey-Kodjoe, W., The Principle of Self-Determination in International Law (New York: Nellen, 1977). Pegg, S., International Society and the De Facto State (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 1998). Ra'anan, U., ‘The Nation-State Fallacy’, in J. Montville (ed.), Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1991), pp. 1–20. Rich, P., ‘Warlords, State Fragmentation and the Dilemma of Humanitarian Intervention’, Small Wars and Insurgencies, 10, 1 (1999), pp. 78–96. Shain, Y. and Sherman, M., ‘Dynamics of Disintegration: Diaspora, Secession and the Paradox of Nation-States’, Nations and Nationalism, 4, 3 (1998), pp. 321–46. Van Cleemput, G., ‘Clarifying Nationalism, Chauvinism and Ethnic Imperialism’, International Journal on World Peace, 12, 1 (1995), pp. 59–77. van den Berghe, P., ‘Denationalizing the State’, Society, 33, 2 (1996), pp. 64–8. Zartman, I., ‘Introduction: Posing the Problem of State Collapse’, in I. Zartman (ed.), Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995), pp. 1–11.
1
Political realities and legal anomalies Revisiting the politics of international recognition Barry Bartmann
The decade since the end of the Cold War witnessed a number of developments that challenge conventional norms concerning the nature and legitimacy of contemporary states. Those developments speak directly to the core assumptions and practices of international recognition. In some cases recognition is granted readily or, more typically, persistently maintained in spite of conditions on the ground which are tantamount to legal fiction. In other cases, recognition is stubbornly withheld even though the realities on the ground themselves expose the legal fictions which the international community supports in the defence of the principle of territorial integrity. We are thus faced with an absurd combination of states and would-be states existing in a legal fog: some widely-recognized states can claim only the rudimentary conditions for statehood; indeed, in some instances, even those minimal conditions seem ephemeral and random. In other cases, fullyfunctioning and self-contained states are quarantined as pariahs, excluded from the mainstream channels of international diplomacy, existing in conditions beyond the pale of normal international intercourse. In short, they have been ‘sent to Coventry’! In reviewing the developments of the late twentieth century which have raised questions about the contemporary nature of statehood, two can be said to have reinforced trends to greater universality and inclusiveness, while suggesting new perspectives on those waiting in the wings for their opportunity to be accepted as normal states in the ever-expanding network of global diplomacy. First, the process of decolonization, and particularly its extension in the late 1960s to even the smallest and most fragmentary of colonial territories, has most altered the complexion of the international system. The United Nations system is itself the most obvious and dramatic example of that change. From its beginnings in 1945, with 51 members to its present membership of 191, with the recent accession of East Timor and Switzerland, the UN reflects a dramatic shift from a largely Euro-centred state system to a genuinely universal community of states, engaged in a vast range of obligations and commitments that touch upon nearly every facet of their sovereign authority. Of course, these ties are reinforced further and often with greater depth in an astonishing number of regional agreements and institutions. The second sea-change, as it is often cited, came in the aftermath of the collapse of communism, the end of the Soviet Union, the velvet divorce in Czechsolovakia,
Political realities and legal anomalies 13 the success of Eritrean and other anti-Dergue forces in Ethiopia, and, of course, the wars of succession in Yugoslavia. In a breathtakingly short period of time a whole new group of states was introduced to swell the membership of the international system. To be sure, there was reluctance to encourage these trends, again for fear of the precedents that would be set for other restless national minorities, and indeed, perhaps for those people like the Turkish Cypriots, who had already established the realities of their statehood on the ground. For instance, at one point, the first President Bush, in contrast to long years of American moral support for the Baltic peoples, urged them to reconsider the option of full independence from the Soviet Union, a gesture of support for the increasingly beleaguered Mikhail Gorbachev.1 And European Union spokesmen warned Czech and Slovak leaders that their impending divorce could mean isolation outside the European family.2 Most significant, tensions between leading members of the European Union over a strategy of recognizing the self-proclaimed independence of former Yugoslav republics, the first cases being Slovenia and Croatia, reflected the anxieties over exactly what was being released in this post-Soviet can of worms.3 Still, in the end, new precedents for achieving statehood had been established, albeit with the democratic sanctions of free elections of governing parties committed to the independence agenda and reinforced in most cases by referenda with convincing majorities in support of separate statehood. The narrow interpretations of self-determination being granted only to colonial peoples, as outlined in General Assembly Resolutions 1514 and 1541 (1960), had suddenly given way to new possibilities for people whose links to their metropolitan centres were not those of the traditional and more familiar blue-water colonies, but rather those who were in effect challenging the identity and the international frontiers of those states from which they sought to liberate themselves. For the most part, they were eventually recognized and accepted into international councils. In any case, through international recognition of these new states the international system was expanded again and a new wave of inclusiveness stretched the parameters of the system to a point that would have been unthinkable in 1945. The very nature of the controversy over early recognition of the former Yugoslav republics reflected deep concerns over precedents set by states born out of the womb of secession. Yet, though the conventional post-war taboo against secession was breached, it was not overrun. Indeed, the conservatism of international norms on the genesis and prerequisite conditions of statehood remain powerfully formidable and consequently contradictory, inconsistent and even hypocritical. In short, the contemporary international system is one of egregious double standards. On the one hand, there is a continuing commitment to states whose legal international personality masks a general state of domestic collapse, where the writ of the state is incidental and random at best. This is particularly true in several sub-Saharan African countries where rebel armies, warlords, and in some cases foreign armies, roam over vast swathes of territory with the official state authorities confined only to the capital and adjacent areas and even then only in broad daylight.
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In cases such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, or Somalia, one is bound to go beyond the question of recognizing the legitimate government of these alleged states to raising the deeper issue of whether the state actually exists. Are such states legal fictions on international life-supports to safeguard the cardinal and sacred principle of territorial integrity, a principle particularly and frantically held by African states in recognition of capricious colonial roots, the many dangerous internal cleavages endemic in the region and the fragile basis of legitimacy, not only of so many governments but of the states themselves? Robert Jackson was one of the first scholars to attack the sacred cows of legal and diplomatic correctness in his unequivocal exposure of what he called ‘quasi-states’ or ‘pseudo-states’.4 Similarly, inspired by the work of Thomas Homer-Dixon, Robert Kaplan paints a portrait of the total collapse of governance in a string of states in his remarkable book, The Ends of the Earth.5 In all of these cases the policies of stubborn recognition of dubious, pretender or substantively non-existing states is nonetheless consistent with the spirit of inclusiveness and continued universality in the international system. But it is a policy which is at odds with its mirror image, that is the determined non-recognition of states which do meet de facto criteria, nonetheless, continue to be treated as if they did not exist or banished to a shadowy underworld of the shunned, international lepers in a world of lawful states. Moreover, a firm commitment to keep the usurpers beyond the gate is hardly consistent with patterns of greater universality and inclusiveness. Nor does it offer much prospect of conflict resolution in these cases because one partner’s status precludes the confidence, good faith and security to engage a long-term settlement. Indeed, this hardline policy of dismissing the claims of dissident peoples who see themselves trapped in the legal framework of an alien state also risks undermining the credibility of international recognition as an instrument of international order and security. It is that question to which we will return later in the discussion. First, let us consider the implications of the trends outlined thus far in this necessarily broad introduction.
Statehood: legality and legitimacy An abiding concern throughout this volume is the attendant tension between conditions of legal status, reflected in the act of state recognition, and the conditions of legitimacy of statehood, which are assumed, at least officially, in the act of recognition itself. Legal status and convincing arguments for the legitimacy of states may not always conform to the formalities of diplomatic practice for either recognized or unrecognized states, whatever private misgivings may be acknowledged in world chancelleries. In other words, members of the international community, and indeed the international community collectively, may recognize and continue to recognize in response to diplomatically correct pressures a state whose status and future is a source of deep misgivings. Similarly, there may be a reluctance to challenge those same orthodoxies of diplomatic consensus by publicly
Political realities and legal anomalies 15 acknowledging the realities so obvious in a shunned and unrecognized state. Consider the misfortune of the hapless former foreign minister for Italy, Lamberto Dini, who was forced to withdraw his acknowledgement that there were indeed two states on the island of Cyprus.6 When we speak of the legitimacy of a state in international relations we are referring to the justification for its existence in both practical and moral terms;7 that is, the credentials of statehood. In the first sense legitimacy refers to an assessment of the state’s capabilities. Can the state (or would-be state) act in the capacities normally understood to be the functions of a state? Here the emphasis is on viability: that is, ‘surviving and functioning in a changing environment’.8 The capacity to fulfill the functions of statehood can be seen as a measure of a state’s ‘survivability’. A state with intrinsic and chronic disabilities may be viewed by other members of the international system (and even by its own subjects) as an aberration likely to succumb eventually to a more rational and capable political system. Legitimacy is withheld to the extent that permanence is doubted. But the legitimacy of a state is not only a reflection of its capacities. It is also a consideration of moral justification, of its ‘right’ to a separate destiny. The justification of a state’s existence is a question of both domestic and international support. The internal basis of legitimacy reflects the extent to which the state is identified with primary community loyalties. Legitimacy is present if the state is believed to be the ‘basis of which a particular group organizes its separate and distinct existence’.9 The international judgement of a state’s legitimacy is based, in part, on an assessment of this evidence. It is also the belief that these majority sentiments can be accommodated within the framework of other principles, particularly the territorial integrity of other historical claims of other peoples and states. (Herein lies the rub for the aspiring states in this volume.) Legitimacy then is the conviction that a particular territorial community has a right to be constituted as a state and to enjoy the privileges of sovereignty and membership in the international system. Legitimacy is most convincing if the separateness of the community as a sovereign state is seen to be in accord with clear evidence of self-determination. This aspect of the legitimacy of the state is also an issue of viability. Clear domestic consensus in support of the state’s separate independence, buttressed by a favourable international climate, is particularly important in times of crisis when a state’s survival is threatened by larger interests and alternative versions of a just settlement. Of course, this is even more pressing for aspiring, unrecognized, states where the issue is not just survival but abortion. The legitimacy of the state in international relations refers, then, to the extent to which there is positive commitment to a state’s right to exist and confidence in its ability to survive, at least in the foreseeable future. The legitimate state is the state which is seen as credible, durable and authentic. In this sense, the concept of legitimacy conveys more than the acceptance derived from legal recognition, though recognition and admission to international organizations most certainly invest even the most improbable states with at least some measure of legitimacy.
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Every state jealously protects the rituals, symbols and privileges of its sovereign status. For some, the legal prerogatives of sovereignty may contribute in time to legitimacy where it is not yet confidently established. That is certainly the hope of visionary nation builders in fledgling and fragile African states. Similarly, for leaders of unrecognized states, international recognition and legal acceptance would surely reinforce the legitimacy which they believe to be the basis of their claims to separate statehood. When there are misgivings about a state’s right to exist (Macedonia, perhaps) or its likelihood of survival (the Democratic Republic of the Congo or even Iraq), a state can be said to suffer ‘a crisis of legitimacy’. In such cases, self-justification becomes a foreign-policy priority, reflecting both the lack of confidence in the state itself and the perceived scepticism or indifference of the outside world. This is all the more true for governments of unrecognized states in waiting. Behind the weakness of a state’s or would-be state’s credentials is the fear that the identity of the state will be surrendered to more persuasive claims or more expedient interests. Legitimacy is a bulwark against expendability (a major factor in the defence and rescue of Kuwait) and for the smallest and weakest states, and certainly for unrecognized states in gestation, the appeal to the legitimacy of their independence may be their only defence in the face of challenge. There is one further dimension of the legitimacy question that needs to be noted, particularly in relation to the cases in this volume: the role of external interventions in the struggle for independence and recognition. This is an issue which speaks to both the ‘consumatory’ and the ‘instrumental’ elements of Apter’s familiar elucidation of legitimacy. The active presence of foreign allies can obscure the clarity and even the authenticity of the domestic call for self-determination. At worst, the role of external allies, particularly if there is an obvious asymmetry between domestic and external forces, can cast the cause for independence as one of external fabrication and manipulation. Similarly, at the instrumental level, the struggle may be portrayed successfully in international councils as a contest between the metropolitan government and an avaricious third-party state with the domestic forces successfully marginalized to the sidelines. Because of these dangers even sympathetic allies to the independence cause are reluctant to risk the possible dangers of premature recognition if foreign forces are in the picture. Thus the most supportive allies of an independent Bangladesh initially withheld formal recognition while it appeared that Indian forces might be critical to the outcome. But Bangladesh was a case of secession, not decolonization. The same inhibitions have not been evident in those cases of decolonization where foreign troops have been in the front lines of the liberation struggle. Consider the role of Cuban forces in the Portuguese colonial territories in Africa. Indeed, a number of sympathetic African and Third World states recognized an independent Guinea-Bissau with Cuban troops active in the country, even while the Portuguese were still firmly in charge of the capital, Bissau. In the vein of the constitutive theory of recognition, it was as if this act would hasten the birth process of an independent Guinea-Bissau. But Portugal was an illegitimate occupying colonial power with no claim in the international community for the respect of its overseas territories.
Political realities and legal anomalies 17 The situation for our case studies is entirely different. None is a case of decolonization according to the language and practice of self-determination in the United Nations in the post-war period. To be sure, one can argue persuasively for a broader interpretation of ‘decolonization’ that would include the contiguous imperial expansion of Russia, for example, a colonial adventure in substance not unlike the overseas expansion of her European maritime rivals. But, fairly or not, the cases in this volume are cast within a context of secession and separatism and not decolonization. This in itself makes issues of legitimacy more pressing and more formidable. The presence of external allies remains a critical factor in some of these cases (the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, Abkhazia, the TransDniester Republic), but not a major issue in others (Somaliland, Bougainville and even Chechnya where, in spite of various volunteer Islamic insurgents, foreign troops from other states have not been involved). In summary, both the instrumental and the consumatory elements of the legitimacy question have been radically challenged by major shifts in the international system since 1945. The conventional emphasis on competence, capacity and viability, which were widely assumed to be the minimal conditions for statehood in the early post-war years, were abandoned entirely in a wave of universal inclusiveness in the latter periods of decolonization, reflected primarily in the micro-state phenomenon. Indeed, most of the unrecognized and would-be states in this volume would seem to demonstrate more convincing and more promising conditions of long-term capacity and viability than a number of the smallest states which currently sit in the General Assembly. For instance, given the dire prognostications of global climate change, the very physical existence of some of these states is under threat. There has been also a similar shift in the normative dimension of the legitimacy question which may have profound implications for the candidate states in this volume, and for those who would follow in their wake. Since 1991 the strictly narrow right to self-determination confined to the colonial territories of the European maritime powers has been breached; not without formidable resistance, to be sure, but breached nonetheless. These shifts in international norms have implications not only for the unrecognized states and subnational movements central to this discussion but also for the conventional and orthodox underpinnings of international recognition in policy and practice.
Self-determination, decolonization and the micro-state phenomenon When the great European maritime powers first contemplated the realities of post-Second World War withdrawal from their overseas territories, they understandably viewed this process as one of independence for the major peoples of the empire. After all, these were, for the most part, very large, resource-endowed territories where prospects for their viability as independent states were not in question, except for the most stubborn and reactionary soldiers of empire in the Conservative Party, Whitehall and their continental counterparts. Still, the conventional thinking of the time was that the smallest territories, those bits and
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pieces of empire which came to be known as micro-states or very small states, would likely remain permanent wards of their metropolitan centres. It was widely felt that for the smallest colonial territories perhaps continued integration with the metropolitan power was the only reasonable choice.10 Accordingly, much of the debate in the 1950s and early 1960s on the future of these diminutive entities centred on notions of viability, or rather the absence of those conditions which were deemed to lie beyond the traditional criteria for statehood in international law: a resident population, a fixed territory, a government and a capacity to engage in relations with other states. ‘Viability’ meant those conditions necessary to give full meaning to these familiar prerequisites of international law. A fixed population, for example, was understood to be a critical mass large enough to ensure that the state could indeed engage in relations with other states and, more important, be capable of undertaking those rather vague responsibilities and obligations under international law. Many of these very small territories were seen to be obviously so small that these conditions were clearly in doubt. In general in United Nations usage, very small states or micro-states, were those territories with populations of approximately one-million or less. That arbitrary classification is still widely used in the literature, though the Commonwealth employs the figure of 1.5 million, which would mean including such states as Trinidad and Tobago, and Mauritius.11 These doubts concerning the viability of very small states reflected several concerns at the time. The first of these anxieties related to their capacity to meet even the most rudimentary conditions of statehood: the capacity to ensure their own security, to establish a viable economy, to represent themselves in international affairs given the paucity of their resources and the early ceiling on qualified personnel. The second concern was one of fairness and equity: was it reasonable to grant a voice for village states in international councils equal to that of such great powers as the United States or China? Was this not a gross distortion of the principle of the equality of states? Was there not a risk of a Lilliputian majority in the General Assembly overwhelming a more genuine reflection of international opinion? Even worse, given the growing Western disenchantment with the complexion of the General Assembly at the time, was there now a danger of such an extension amplifying even further the stridently anti-Western tone in the General Assembly? Above all, did self-determination and sovereignty for such very small territories corrode the meaning of statehood itself ? For many sceptics, universality in this extreme would extend the normal understanding of a state to the limits of absurdity, and undermine the tacit assumption that there were normal dimensions of statehood rooted in the intuitive but common-sense practices of international diplomacy. Those tacit assumptions were clearly in place in 1920 when the League of Nations turned down Liechtenstein’s application for membership, in spite of Swiss sponsorship, on the grounds that the principality had deputed too many of the prerogatives of statehood in its treaty relations with Switzerland to be considered capable of exercising its obligations as a member state under the Covenant. In other words, Liechtenstein could be considered a state for some purposes (read courtly, or ceremonial or courteous) but not for
Political realities and legal anomalies 19 12
others. This was an approach taken up years later by Rosalyn Higgins in her discussion of the dilemma of dubious states and United Nations membership in her landmark work, The Development of International Law through the Political Organs of the United Nations.13 In a tone that would be echoed later by Robert Jackson, Professor Higgins insisted on ‘the importance of actual independence’ (my italics) in order to ensure the marriage ‘between law and fact’.14 The predispositions against very small states remained the same in 1945 as they had been in 1920. Luxembourg was the only very small state to be a founding Charter member. Iceland joined a year later. The other very small states remained outside the United Nations, except for some participation in the specialized agencies and eventual observer missions for Monaco, the Vatican and San Marino. This situation remained in place for 15 years, until 1960, when the great wave of decolonization began and Cyprus, Gabon and Mauritania (then with a population of less than one-million) became the first micro-states to join the United Nations since Iceland in 1946. However, the handwriting was soon on the wall. Literally scores of these very tiny territories were queuing up to take their places as recognized and fully accepted members of the United Nations system, and more broadly the full international community. In part this was due to a growing impatience in metropolitan capitals with the continued costs and responsibilities in these far flung remnants of empire, especially in Great Britain. In part it was due to the growing confidence of ever smaller territorial governments to make their way as separate independent states, inspired by the successful demonstration effect of other very small states only marginally larger than themselves. In part, too, it was a response to the growing and relentless pressure for complete and universal decolonization, whatever the obstacles, in the General Assembly and particularly the increasingly strident tone of the Committee of Twenty Four. The 1965 admission of the Maldive Islands, the first candidate state then below the unspoken 100,000 barrier, prompted the United States and Great Britain to seek assistance from the Legal Counsel to the Secretary General to explore alternatives to the micro-state question.15 Could there be a distinction between the right to statehood on the one hand, and the right to United Nations membership on the other? Could a micro-state participate for some purposes, those related to their specific and particular interests, for example, but not for others? In the end it became impossible to impose such qualifications or to resist the relentless pressure for unequivocal universality, at least for colonial peoples. Non-admission or partial admission, no matter how much the sovereignty of the micro-state was reaffirmed, was seen to be compromising both to the quality of that state’s sovereignty and, equally important, to its dignity and status. By the early 1990s the drift to inclusiveness came full circle when, exactly 50 years after the principality was turned down at the League of Nations, Liechtenstein assumed her long-delayed place as a full member of the United Nations. The other European micro-states, San Marino, Monaco and Andorra soon followed. In 1999 and 2000 the extent of this pattern was even more dramatically evident when, apart from the Vatican (admittedly, a special case),16 the smallest countries in the world, the tiny Pacific Island states of Nauru and Tuvalu with populations of only 10,000 each, the size
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of some housing complexes in any major North American or European city, joined the General Assembly as full members of the United Nations. This represents a major change in a very short period of time as to the contemporary understanding of the conditions for legitimate statehood in the international system. Statehood for Tuvalu would have seemed preposterous in the early years of decolonization. The recent efforts of the governments of Nevis ( population 9,000) and the Faeroe Islands (population 45,000), for independence from St Kitts and Denmark respectively, would have been met with disdain in both academic and diplomatic circles not so long ago. But we have now reached an understanding that there are no material conditions for statehood that could thwart the self-determination of those people seeking the acknowledgement of their own identity in the international system through international recognition and admission to the councils of the world. The notion of statehood, then, has become much more elastic and much more all embracing. Revisiting the micro-state issue is useful in the context of current issues of international recognition and the apparent contradictions therein. The debate was characterized by widespread anxiety that the familiar foundations of statehood were being eroded in deference to a universal and unequivocal commitment to self-determination, and that such erosion would have a dangerous long-term impact of the marriage of law and fact. Yet, in all but a few cases, both the analysis of the conditions of micro-states and the fears which that assessment provoked were both exaggerated and ill-founded. The nearly four-dozen micro-states that sit in the General Assembly have not undermined the authority and effectiveness of United Nations bodies. Nor have they compromised conventional conditions of statehood. Most are stable and prosperous states. Indeed, it might be argued that the conditions of statehood in most of these jurisdictions are enviable when compared to Professor Jackson’s quasi-states. Moreover, in considering the enormous challenges of national integration facing such states as the Democratic Republic of Congo, very small size might be seen to be a distinct advantage. The micro-state explosion has certainly altered the complexion of the international system. Preconditions of size and notions of viability (witness the independence of East Timor) may have been defeated by the sheer clamour of a universal call for self-determination. But one huge hurdle remains: the unqualified right of self-determination in terms of separate statehood is still a privilege exclusive to separate colonial peoples, those societies seeking liberation from metropolitan centres in blue-water relationships. It is not recognized to apply to those hapless people whose own colonization was from a contiguous eastward moving Russian empire where there were no oceans to cross. Such is the fate of the Chechens among others. Nor are there residual rights to separate statehood once a new state is recognized as a single entity whose territorial integrity must be respected at all costs, even when the integration of dissident minority peoples was fraught with controversy from the outset, such as the Papuans of West Irian in Indonesia or the Bougainville Islanders in Papua New Guinea, or when the original constitutional terms of the state collapsed, as was the case in Cyprus in 1963. In short, conditions for recognized statehood changed during the period of
Political realities and legal anomalies 21 decolonization, particularly with the abandonment of criteria of viability so evident in the micro-state phenomenon. Yet aspirations for legitimate, separate, statehood among peoples within states that are internationally recognized are still fiercely resisted in the name of the principle of territorial integrity. The changing conditions of statehood as represented in the widespread international acceptance of micro-states may be heartening on one level but also exasperating when set against the aspirations of such peoples as the Turkish Cypriots, the Northern Somalis or the Bougainville Islanders. Yet recent developments since 1991 have surely forced a reassessment of these rigidities. Or at least there may be an uncomfortable recognition that there have been some deviations from the narrow confines of self-determination for colonial peoples only, deviations which could have long-term implications for the peoples included in this volume.
New states in the post-Soviet era The collapse of the Soviet Union certainly exposed the myths of the national identity of Soviet Man. The aroused national sentiments of non-Russian peoples including Ukrainians (Little Russians in the eyes of Moscow), confirmed the realities of the Soviet experience as one of Great Russian imperialism, a colonial history not so different in substance than its European maritime counterparts. The Soviet collapse resulted in 15 independent republics, including the Russian Federation itself. However, some of these republics proved to be Maryushka dolls with dissident nations within their borders immediately asserting their own national aspirations and even establishing their own de facto states: Abkhazia, for example, in Georgia; Nagorno-Kharabakh in Azerbaijan; the Trans-Dniester Republic in Moldova and, of course, Chechnya in the Russian Federation. Of these only Chechnya came briefly to the precipice of near recognition. Indeed, Boris Yeltsin’s Human Rights Commissioner, Sergei Kovalev, who spent much of the first Chechen war in Chechnya, in 1997 described the agreement between the Russian and Chechen High Contracting Parties as one which sought to ‘establish equal relations built on commonly recognized principles and norms of international law’.17 Given the retreat of Russian troops and the consolidation of Chechen authority on the ground, it seemed likely that the final status of Chechnya, which was to be settled in 2001, would have been in accord with the language of the agreement that brought an end to the war. Tragically, the Chechens squandered their hard-won gains when leading Islamic militants among them initiated a series of attacks on villages and Russian troops in neighbouring Dagestan, with a long-term objective of establishing an Islamic state in the Caucasus. President Putin branded Chechnya a bandit republic which was harbouring terrorists and unleashed the second Chechen war with a full-scale invasion of the republic. The brutality of the second invasion aroused condemnation in the West, particularly among various human-rights groups. However, with the events of 11 September (2001), criticism of Russian activities in Chechnya
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is clearly muted as Moscow has joined in a global coalition to root out terrorism everywhere. Chechnya lies in ruins and the immediate prospects for a sovereign Chechen state seem as bleak as they have ever been; though, after hundreds of years, Chechen resistance is unlikely to wane. Resistance to Chechen independence was largely a fear that successful secession would encourage other peoples in the kaleidoscopic Russian Federation to press their claims, with unleashed forces of fragmentation spinning out of control. In multi-national states such as Russia or even India and China, and certainly Indonesia, that is a spectre for national catastrophe. The international community, then, resists any attempt to sanction self-determination through what appears to be secession from a recognized, established state. Such pressures are evident even in the case of the tiny Commonwealth Caribbean state of St Kitts-Nevis, where the 1983 constitution allows for the legal secession of Nevis should the there be a majority of 66.6 per cent in favour in a referendum. Three days before the vote in August 1998, the then Canadian foreign minister, Lloyd Axworthy, circulated an open letter among the people of Nevis urging them to vote against independence.18 Such a gesture reflects Canada’s own near-paranoid preoccupations with separatism and the dangers of successful example. In the event the yes vote fell only a few hundred votes short, a result so close that the question is likely to be revisited again.19 Consider too the case of Montenegro. Apart from Serbia itself, Montenegro, of all the former republics of Yugoslavia, was the only one to have a genuinely modern pedigree of sovereignty and statehood. Montenegro was a full member of the European state system through most of the nineteenth century and until 1918. During the Milosevic years Milo Djukanovic, Montenegro’s reformist prime minister and a staunch Milosevic opponent, was encouraged by the West to keep his distance from Belgrade. Montenegro’s economy was virtually withdrawn from Yugoslav economic space, the Deutsche Mark was the currency circulating throughout the republic and Montenegro established its own trade offices that tended to function as diplomatic missions across the Western world. Now the West is encouraging Montenegro to stay in some sort of partnership with Serbia rather make the break altogether. This new cosmetic confederation is now known as Serbia and Montenegro where each republic will continue to go its own way save for a few shared responsibilities and a common seat at the United Nations: an entity without equal in the current international system. Given Djukanovic’s long-held views on independence, a sceptic might be forgiven as viewing this arrangement as ‘playing for time’. The West will be facing an even more intractable dilemma in Kosovo. Having secured the return of the Kosovo Albanians to their homes and, in the process, encouraged the out-migration of the province’s few remaining Serbs, the West has created the foundations of an independent Kosovo state. Belgrade was promised that Kosovo would be permanently part of Yugoslavia, but once again the political realities on the ground belie such legal commitments. Like Montenegro, Kosovo has its own economic space, and with the retirement of the Deutsche Mark, widely in use there, it is now part of the Euro zone. And the Kosovo
Political realities and legal anomalies 23 Albanians are unlikely ever to relinquish their security again to the Serbs, however generously democratic, federal or confederal those arrangements might be. The cement of trust is simply not there. Commitments to respect the will of the people of Kosovo in a democratic exercise(s) then run straight into the brick wall of hasty commitments to honour the territorial integrity of Serbia. Some may hope that with the evolution of democracy in both Kosovo and Serbia, Kosovo Albanians might be persuaded to reconsider their future by maintaining constitutional links with Belgrade. More likely, and there is already some evidence for this from various voices in Belgrade, is the possibility of growing resignation to the loss of Kosovo in Serbia, an exhaustion with the Kosovo issue and even a recognition that the separation of Kosovo may be in the best long-term interests of Serbia. In all of this the sacrosanct principle of territorial integrity has been challenged, and some might argue fatally compromised, by the eventual acceptance of states where the self-determination process was the consequence of that great taboo, secession. These issues might be blurred by convoluted language; for example, it might be argued that the independence of the Baltic states was in fact an act of state restoration given the illegality of the Molotov–Ribbentrop pact. However, the reality is that the Baltic states did withdraw from the Soviet Union, the illegal agreements which led to their incorporation in 1940 notwithstanding, agreements which Mr Gorbachev himself released. In spite of the West’s refusal to accept the legality of the Baltic republics’ annexation, there was still an acknowledgement that they were functioning as integrated entities with the Soviet Union for 51 years! The situation is different in the case of Czechoslovakia, where both parties agreed to terminate their marriage, a decision which was never submitted to popular consultation. In Yugoslavia, the secession of Slovenia and Croatia was met with fierce resistance by federal troops. Their determination to leave opened the path for Bosnia-Hercegovina and Macedonia. The openly raging debate among Western governments over the recognition issue clearly reflected the concern that such precedents might have for the further fragmentation of the international system, and its consequences for international peace and security. In short, the post-Soviet experience has, at the very least, forced a reassessment of those conditions for statehood which lie at the core of the recognition question. The dismantling of the old Soviet edifice clearly did not exhaust the demands for self-determination across the vast corpus of the old superpower. Other national movements surfaced and in some cases established their writ on the ground and are continuing to function as de facto states as we speak. We have noted the same phenomenon in the former British territory of Somaliland and elsewhere. These states remain unrecognized but in control of their day-to-day circumstances. Second, the post-Soviet experience has admitted a crack in the stalwart defence of the principle of territorial integrity and the unflinching resistance to any form of separatism or secession. In the first 45 years of the post-Second World War era there was only one case of successful secession: Bangladesh. And there the circumstances were extraordinary and even absurd given the geopolitical nightmare of the original separation of the two parts of Pakistan. In Biafra, attempts to win
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support for the fledgling Ibo state failed when, apart from a handful of sympathetic African leaders, the international community rallied around the Federal Government in its efforts to protect the territorial integrity of Nigeria. Even in the case of South Yemen, which had existed as a separate state for 23 years, attempts to restore its independence in 1994 were successfully put down by the government in San’a in the face of quiet international acceptance. Up until the early 1990s, then, the sanctity of territorial integrity held, and the international community rallied behind the doctrine that there was no residual right to self-determination within the internationally recognized frontiers of existing states. The first significant challenge to that consensus came with the independence of the Baltic states, and particularly with the new realities in the former Yugoslavia. It is against the backdrop of these changing perspectives on the nature of the contemporary state, the rights of self-determination and the values and purposes of recognition or non-recognition, that the international status of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, perhaps the most familiar unrecognized state, should be re-visited.
The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) is the longest established de facto state considered in this volume, and as such warrants particular attention given the larger issues discussed thus far. The political realities on the ground in Cyprus are those of a separate democratic state functioning on a day-to-day basis without any reference to the authorities in the south. For 20 years this state has met its obligations to its citizens, albeit under very difficult conditions of boycott and international isolation. Every election indicates that the TRNC is generally meeting the expectations of its people, allowing freedom for issues of opposition and division across the political spectrum. In short, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is no Manchukuo. Ever since the Lytton Commission’s report in 1932, international jurists, diplomats and scholars have referred to the Manchukuo case as a guide in determining the extent of credible and genuine sovereignty and, conversely, those conditions which make a mockery of such pretensions, thereby establishing credible norms for the recognition of international legal personality.20 Unlike Manchukuo, or indeed, unlike Transkei, Northern Cyprus was not a fabrication of the Turkish government. Ministers and government officials of the TRNC are not appointed by Ankara. Disagreements between representatives of the TRNC and the government in Ankara are not uncommon. The TRNC enjoys what Alan James, in his classic work on sovereign statehood, has called ‘constitutional self-containment’, the notion that the state is not constitutionally bound to any higher authority than that of its own constitution.21 These are crucial distinctions in assessing whether a state is a puppet-state or not. In the case of Transkei and the other Bantustans, statehood was a cosmetic contrivance designed and put in place by the government of South Africa, directly funded by that government and often manned by South African officials in so-called Transkei positions. This is not so to say that a state which is constitutionally
Political realities and legal anomalies 25 self-contained must also be effectively independent. If that were the case most of the nations that sit in the General Assembly would have their credentials cast into doubt, including Canada whose security provisions, foreign investment and trade are almost exclusively with the United States. Professor Higgins notwithstanding, effective independence is not a prerequisite for sovereignty. It is patently the case that the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is necessarily hugely dependent on Turkey for its military security, its trade links to the outside world and many of its basic supplies. But this is the consequence of international opprobrium and boycott, not the imperial and hegemonic designs of Turkey. The presence of such a large Turkish military force is often cited to undermine the credibility and the legitimacy of the TRNC. No doubt in negotiations these numbers might well change. There is also little doubt, however, that there is considerable public support for some kind of ongoing security presence from Turkey given their small population size vis-à-vis the Greek Cypriots. Finally, the status of the TRNC is questioned because these constitutional developments occurred in the wake of the events of 1974. Greece and the Greek Cypriots portray the Turkish intervention as an invasion that resulted in ethnic cleansing and eventually de facto partition. In this view the Turkish presence on the island is presented as the real foundation for a separate Turkish state in the north. Thus, for Greek Cypriots the events of 1974 mark the beginning of the Cyprus crisis. In their view it was in 1974 that they lost their country. From their perspective Turkish Cypriots were a small minority, not equal partners, in an otherwise Hellenic island or, as Henry Srebrnik put it recently, ‘400 year old guests’.22 For Turkish Cypriots the events of 1960 through 1974 mark the failure of the promise of a unified Cyprus, a partnership republic. And there is no security being a small minority in a state defined by a hostile majority. Entirely separate memory paths, passing each other like great liners in the night, have thus doomed any attempt to approach consensus on the future of Cyprus. In the wake of that failure only the realities of two functioning states remain, and perhaps it is time those realities were acknowledged. The Republic of Cyprus in the south is a vibrant economy whose progress since 1974 stands in sharp contrast to the deprivations in the north. But the Greek Cypriot state has not controlled the northern part of the island for nearly 30 years. Its writ does not extend an inch beyond the border, and it has no links to those people whom it proclaims as its citizens. Claims to the contrary have the hollow ring of legal fiction. The Republic of Cyprus is the south and no more. That such an entity could enter the European Union with the understanding that it speaks for the entire island and all its residents promises to be a political and administrative nightmare for European governments and officials in Brussels given the obvious yawning gap between fact and fiction, between reality and pretension, public statements to the contrary notwithstanding. Recognition of two functioning states on the island would not necessarily preclude eventual agreements that could involve a generous measure of economic and even political integration. Most states, after all, live in arrangements which the late premier of Quebec called ‘sovereignty-association’. Consider the manifold common rights of citizens in the Nordic countries who, while enjoying their
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separate status as sovereign states, nonetheless move, live and work freely around a common space, largely defined by their common patrimony in these most northern reaches of Europe. Such generous arrangements may be a very long way off in Cyprus or in other cases in this volume as they are based on confidence, trust and mutual interest established over many years. For Turkish Cypriots recognition would at least acknowledge their own historical roots on the island. They would come to negotiations confident in their status as equal parties to a settlement and not with a sense of inferiority as a minority that must accept its fate within a promised benign and tolerant state still constructed on the premises of Hellenic historic national identity. It will not be easy to discover means, however modest, whereby links between the two sides might develop on the ground. As David Milne noted in a recent discussion of possible federal and confederal solutions for Cyprus, experience in similar bicommunal conflicts elsewhere is not encouraging. ‘There is little point’, he argues, ‘in trying to reconstruct the past’. Moreover, he adds: Realism is needed to take account of the fact that the policy of non-recognition of the TRNC by the international community has not worked. No progress can be made from here unless and until the world engages with the obvious reality of a Turkish Cypriot state that has functioned now for more than a quarter of a century.23 Realism must dictate, then, not only the facts on the ground in the north, but also the moot and eclipsed claims of a single Republic of Cyprus across the island. The recurring reality in international politics is that few situations can be confidently predicted as permanent, including frontiers and the terms of international legal identity. Who would have imagined in 1914 that the great Austro-Hungarian Empire would be lying in ruins five years later never again to see the light of day? Even more dramatically, who could have imagined with the success of its pioneering space programme, that little more than 30 years later, this huge superpower, the Soviet Union, would no longer exist? Nothing is cast in stone and all of the wishful thinking and the neglect of uncomfortable realities can’t make it so. It is difficult to imagine that, as with Humpty Dumpty, the 1960 republic of Cyprus can be put back together again. No amount of positive thinking will reverse the fact that the Republic was a victim of cradle death, surviving in its original construct only for a few years in its infancy. Similarly, no amount of shunning will force the Turkish Cypriots to renounce their status as a national people and timidly accept their fate as a minority within a fictional state that the international community insists is the legitimate reality, contrary to all the evidence.
Conclusion Where do the dilemmas surrounding this growing lobby of unrecognised states, not to mention the scores of similar movements in the wings, some of them in decades-old struggle, stand in the context of the nuanced issues of legality and
Political realities and legal anomalies 27 legitimacy raised at the outset of the discussion and, more particularly, the major shifts in the post-Second World War international system in the wake of unbridled decolonization and, with its exhaustion, the redirection of the forces of self-determination, now secessionist, to established recognized states? All unrecognized states remain illegal personalities in the eyes of the organized international community. Their plaintive claims are received by most other states as matters of domestic conflict to be resolved within the parameters of the sovereign authority of the challenged state. Even those peoples with a powerful longstanding and culturally-rich historic identity, such as the Tibetans, are not able to penetrate the rigidities of diplomatic orthodoxy, even with an enormous army of dedicated and zealous supporters campaigning around the world. Even Taiwan, admittedly compromised in part by its determined stance as ‘The Republic of China [ROC], the fifth largest economy in Asia’24 now a well-established democracy, and a formidable military power in the region, exists in the shadowy world short of normal diplomatic intercourse, with ostensibly commercial delegations serving as diplomatic outposts in Taipei, a few well-touted ROC embassies in a handful of lonely very small capitals abroad and, more significantly, defence agreements with the United States that seem to defy all the other internationally imposed terms of the outcast. In short, unrecognized entities, are forced to demur to the prevailing criteria of legality in the international system’s current terms for acceptable conditions of statehood, criteria which, above all, seek to honour the respect for existing recognized frontiers (read independence and non-intervention) and the sanctity of territorial integrity. There is no ambiguity in their legal position as they confront the formidable common front of the organized international system, where even potentially sympathetic states are reluctant to break ranks. As we noted at the outset, the issues of legality and legitimacy are inextricably intertwined, there are yet important distinctions between the two concepts. States may be accepted as wholly legal international personalities and function as such while legitimacy is withheld by a vast majority of the population at home as well as among officials and public opinion abroad. Such was the case for apartheid South Africa for many years and particularly during the latter period of selective punitive measures both symbolic and substantive. Similarly, some currently unrecognized states, while gatecrashers should they attempt to access the normal channels of diplomatic exchange, nonetheless may count on a considerable measure of sympathy and genuine support among neighbouring and ethnic or confessional confrère states not yet ready to risk the international opprobrium of diplomatic isolation.25 It can be assumed, for example, that among Islamic states there is instinctive support in the street, and even among cautious government ministers, for the plight of such outcast peoples as the Chechens. It would not be rash to make similar assumptions concerning the Melanesian neighbours of Bougainville. And in the case of Somaliland, relatively free trade access in spite of diplomatic isolation, however clandestine, has bolstered a stable economy, enviable in the Horn of Africa. To illustrate the ambiguities of what constitutes a legitimate claim to statehood, and how those claims might open the doors to legal recognition, consider the truly
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aberrant case of Western Sahara or the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) which claims to be the successor state to the Spanish Sahara abandoned by Madrid in 1975. By all practical measures for recognition the case for the SADR appears wanting: there is no Sahrawi presence on the ground behind the huge wall of sand which the late King Hassan built to protect himself against an increasingly effective Polisario guerilla force and to secure the population of the contested territory, now primarily Moroccan immigrants. The original Sahrawi population with the infrastructure and goverment of their state is based in a refugee camp in Tindouf across the Algerian border. And yet Western Sahara is recognized by some 70 states and is a member of the African Union! Indeed, at the founding of the African Union, Sahrawi President Mohammad Abdelaziz was named one of the five vice-presidents of the new body.26 That this untypical legal overstretch has been achieved in spite of the realities on the ground speaks to the enormous advantages in the Sahrawis’ kit bag of legitimacy arguments: Spanish Sahara was a clearly separate colonial territory and therefore in keeping with United Nations doctrine and practice on decolonization subject to separate independence; many subsequent resolutions in the General Assembly reinforced those arguments; the visits of Olof Rydbeck, as the Secretary-General’s mediator to Sahrawi and Polisario representatives in the Sahara and Tindouf confirmed, both the Sahrawi desire for independence and Moroccan obstructionism were clear; and the ICJ decision, which King Hassan had initiated, concluded that there were no historical legal ties between the Sahrawis and the Sultans of Morocco or the Mauritanian entity, and certainly none which could approximate obligations of sovereignty. Western Sahara remains a case where issues of legality and legitimacy are blurred, an international personality which seems to be half in and half out of a network where full diplomatic acceptance can open nearly ever door to full participation in the global state system. In returning to the opening remarks of this discussion concerning the legal status and legitimacy conditions for states, how might the inherent assumptions of these principles affect future developments for the unrecognized states in this volume, particularly in light of the changes in international norms outlined in the body of the discussion? Crucial here are issues of legitimacy for these issues, particularly when wedded to a final resigned recognition of the realities on the ground, are those that are likely to determine the prospects for unrecognized states. As suggested earlier, the universal acceptance of even the smallest and most fragile of micro-states has put to rest material viability as a condition for statehood. There can be no convincing arguments that these small, unrecognized states are bound to falter if eventually recognized and faced with the presumably lonely challenge of engaging a harsh, competitive and likely indifferent outside world. Indeed, if the micro-state experience offers any new and fresh perspective about the international system it is this: contrary to the earliest and most pessimistic prognoses for very small states, global engagement has introduced an unexpected broad range of supports far beyond those available to them in confined metropolitan relationships, while creating new opportunities for productive bi-lateral and multi-lateral relationships. For the most part, micro-states are
Political realities and legal anomalies 29 middle-income countries, some with most impressive indices of economic growth and diversification, and most with confident security arrangements.27 Some even make significant contributions to major agenda issues in international and regional councils. Far from floundering, they are flourishing. It must be said, for it is relevant to the states under discussion in this volume, that these outcomes were hardly anticipated in the early days of small-state literature and even now there is a persistent emphasis on issues of vulnerability for those who address the prospects of these smallest states.28 Yet the actual experience of micro-states dispels similar arguments concerning those states eagerly awaiting legal recognition and international acceptance. Who could possibly now doubt that once international opprobrium was lifted and legal channels were opened that these states would begin to take off, admittedly some more dramatically and some more modestly than others. They would immediately enjoy access to official development assistance, both bilateral and multilateral, to new sources of foreign investment, possibly to an expanded tourist market, to technical assistance, infrastructure improvement and, of course, to the many opportunities in regional cooperation. But to realise these benefits, to allow the incentives to prevail, there needs to be a dramatic reassessment of the conservative policies of international recognition. The fear of a wholly uncontrollable unleashing of fragmentation in the international system may be a red herring to delay facing inevitably difficult choices. There are many proud national minorities which live peacefully within host states largely dominated by majority groups but where sub-national and national identities coexist in stable civic cultures. For most of the national minorities in Europe these conditions prevail. And, even in the Balkans, particularly with the integration of these multi-national states into the central institutions of the European family, there is reason for guarded optimism in the months and years ahead. Sadly, there are scores of other cases, where wounds run deep, where battle memories are generational and where sensibilities seem irretrievably alienated. The solutions to the question, ‘Whose land is this anyway?’ are always agonising, let alone the actual steps to end the stalemate that is the perpetual lack of recognition in the face of continued defiance on the ground, though as the chapters in this volume clearly indicate, some cases offer more promise than others. Specific suggestions of process lie beyond this chapter and could very well constitute another volume in this discussion. Yet one very general principle may be stressed at this point, and it is a principle found unexpectedly in the recently released ‘Road Map’ for a permanent settlement in the Middle East. While acknowledging the intensity of dismissal and hostility from rejectionists on both sides, and the horrific violence that has followed the Aqaba summit of 2003, the Road Map is not without promise. It is supported by the major pillars of the international system: the United States, the European Union, Russia and the United Nations. More important, for our purposes, it is premised on the equal rights and claims both of the Israelis and of the Palestinians, each entitled to the full prerogatives of international legal personality within the frontiers of two viable and secure states within the Holy Land. There can be no underestimating the land mines and
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the dangers of sabotage that lie ahead. But Aqaba at least confirms the equality and, critically, the dignity of the parties as they set out on this road to peace and full integration within their region and within the international community. A similar stage was nearly reached at the end of the first Chechen war. Is there any reason to doubt that such a road map could be drawn in the Horn of Africa or in Western Melanesia? One reality seems certain: claims for self-determination outside the nearly exhausted framework of decolonization are likely to continue to loom over the international agenda. Indeed, it would not be injudicious to anticipate the centrality of these issues in global politics over the next century. It remains abundantly clear that complacency and a continuing indifference to the realities of self-determination on the ground, combined with a Pavlovian deference to conventions of international recognition, fictions increasingly hollow and eventually irrelevant, remain wholly unsatisfactory strategies in the future. A direct head-on collaborative effort to revisit the contradictions of international-recognition practice on the part of the globe’s major players may provide insights and even guidelines where none seem now to exist in the murky complexities of these particular conflicts.
Notes 1 New York Times, 28 March 1990, A1. 2 The Times, London, 9 June, 10. 3 Misha Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War (London: Penguin Books, 1996), p. 179. 4 Robert H. Jackson, Quasi-states: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). 5 Robert D. Kaplan, The Ends of the Earth: A Journey at the Dawn of the 21st Century (New York: Random House, 1996). 6 The Irish Times, 28 August 1997. 7 In discussing the legitimacy of governments, David Apter chose to see legitimacy as the composition of two sets of values: those which can be described as ‘consumatory’, that is, normative and those which he calls ‘instrumental’, that is, utilitarian. David Apter, The Politics of Modernization (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1965), pp. 83–7. 8 Patrick Emmanuel, ‘Independence and Viability: Elements of Analysis’, in Vaughan A. Lewis (ed.), Size, Self-Determination and International Relations: The Caribbean (Kingston: Institute of Social and Economic Research, University of the West Indies, 1976), p. 3. 9 John Herz, ‘The Territorial State Revisited: Reflections on the Future of the NationState’, in James N. Rosenau (ed.), International Politics and Foreign Policy (New York: The Free Press, rev. ed.,1969), p. 82. 10 David W. Wainhouse, Remnants of Empire: The United Nations and the End of Colonialism (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, Harper and Row, 1964), p. 72. 11 Commonwealth Advisory Group, A Future for Small States: Overcoming Vulnerability (London: Commonwealth Secretariat, 1997). 12 Michael Gunter, ‘Liechtenstein and the United Nations: A Precedent for the United Nations’ Ministate Problem’, American Journal of International Law, LXVIII, July 1974, pp. 496–501. 13 Rosalyn Higgins, The Development of International Law Through the Political Organs of the United Nations (London: Oxford University Press, 1963).
Political realities and legal anomalies 31 14 Ibid., p. 55. 15 Memorandum by the Legal Counsel on the proposal of the United States of America (S/9836, Annex I) and the suggestion of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (S/9836, Annex II) regarding membership for exceptionally small states in the United Nations, Committee of Experts Established by the Security Council at its 1,506th meeting, Conference Room Paper no. 8, 23 July 1971 (mimeograph). 16 Though the Vatican City, or more precisely the Holy See, is not a member of the United Nations, it participates actively in the UN system through many of its specialized agencies and a large permanent observer mission in New York. Jorri C. Duursma, Fragmentation and the International Relations of Micro-States: Self-determination and Statehood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 400–07. 17 Sergei Kovalev, ‘Russia After Chechnya’, The New York Review of Books, XLIV, no. 12, 17 July 1997, 27. 18 Toronto Star, 14 August 1998, A21. 19 Globe and Mail, 12 August 1998, A3. 20 Gerhard von Glahn, Law Among Nations: An Introduction to International Public Law (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 7th edn, 1996), p. 70. 21 Alan James, Sovereign Statehood: The Basis of International Society (London: Allen and Unwin, 1986). 22 Henry Srebrnik in plenary discussion at the international conference, Small Island States in a Changing World, 6–8 May 2001, Eastern Mediterranean University, Famagusta, Cyprus. 23 David Milne, ‘One State or Two? Political Realism on the Cyprus Question’, The Round Table (2003), 368, 159,157. 24 The Economist, The World in Figures: 2003 Edition (London: Profile Books, 2002), p. 24. 25 Western Sahara and East Timor have shared a similar status of half-hearted support outside the normal channels of international diplomacy since 1975. It is not surprising that Sahrawi President Abdelaziz was given full honours at his welcome in Dili when East Timor finally became independent. The two governments immediately exchanged full diplomatic relations. 26 www.moro16a-sah-au.htm, www.afrol.com/news2002/afr020_au_launched.htm 27 Barry Bartmann, ‘Meeting the Needs of Microstate Security’, The Round Table (2002), 365 (361–74). 28 Lino Briguglio’s 1995 study well represents a more sceptical view of very small states’ prospects. See Lino Briguglio, ‘Small Island Developing States and their Economic Vulnerabilities’, World Development, XXIII, no. 9, 1995, 1615–32.
2
Republika Srpska Marie-Joëlle Zahar
On 7 May 2001, several thousand rioters disrupted the ceremony of laying the foundation stone of the Ferhadija Mosque in Banja Luka, the capital of Republika Srpska (RS). At least 34 persons were injured; one elderly Bosniak man subsequently died of his injuries. Police looked on as demonstrators set buses and cars on fire and trapped about 400 Bosniak pilgrims, as well as local and international officials, inside the Islamic Community Centre for several hours. This was no isolated incident but an orchestrated move that bespeaks the failure to create a common sense of Bosnian identity and the attachment of a majority of Serbs to the Serbian character of Republika Srpska. Indeed, local newspapers revealed that secondary-school classrooms had been emptied on the afternoon of 7 May.1 In its official statement on the event, the RS government blamed leaders of the Islamic Community for their haste in rebuilding the mosque and for not acting ‘in accordance with the normal order of works required for a foreign investor who wishes to respect the law in such cases’ (emphasis mine). While the foundation stone for the Mosque was ultimately laid on 18 June, more than 1,200 police were required to keep back several hundred demonstrators and rioters. Coming as it did on the heels of increasing violence against minorities seeking to re-integrate their homes in Republika Srpska,2 the Banja Luka incident can be interpreted in at least two ways. The first interpretation would link the incident to the ethnic hatred that supposedly fanned the flames of war in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992. This interpretation cannot give a full account of the logic by which a Bosniak is considered a foreign investor by the government of Republika Srpska. A fuller account necessitates an understanding of the institutional structures of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and of their role in strengthening the fiction of a Serb ‘state within the state’. Republika Srpska – one of two entities that constitute the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the terms of the Dayton Agreement – is the epitome of aborted statehood. Each of the entities has extensive autonomy in the conduct of its internal affairs and a large margin of independence in the conduct of foreign relations. They also retain their wartime armies. There is no antecedent to this situation, a country with two separate national armies. The constituent entities of Bosnia and Herzegovina have more powers than most federated territories, yet they are not recognized as states in their own rights. Could they, however, move
Republika Srpska 33 towards independence? The question is particularly relevant for Republika Srpska. Indeed, Bosnia’s Serbs fought a war from 1992 to 1995 to achieve the right to self-determination with the ultimate objective of joining their kin in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). To answer this question, the chapter outlines the origins, development and future of the Serb entity. I argue that the future of Srpska depends on developments that lie outside the borders of the de facto state. Republika Srpska’s trajectory exemplifies the constraints that outside forces impose on would-be states.
Origins of Republika Srpska The origins of Republika Srpska lie in two related though conceptually distinct historical developments: the unraveling of the former Yugoslavia, and the changing relations between Belgrade and the Bosnian Serb capital, Pale. The nationalist climate that accompanied the unraveling of the former Yugoslavia acutely posed the issue of national self-determination for the Bosnian Serb community. Belgrade’s decision to recognize the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina against the wishes of the Bosnian Serbs was instrumental in entrenching the de facto state by foreclosing the option of Republika Srpska’ s unification with Yugoslavia. Constituent nations adrift: the unraveling of Yugoslavia The birth of Republika Srpska is inextricably tied to the wars of succession in the former Yugoslavia. In the chain of events leading to the dismemberment of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Serbian, Croatian and Slovenian Republican elites used nationalist rhetoric in their dealings with each other. Republican governments led secessionist movements seeking to gain independence from Yugoslavia. They attempted to destabilize their adversaries internally by ‘encouraging ethnic conflicts on their territories, or by tolerating and allowing the drafting of “volunteers” or mercenaries to be sent to areas affected by ethnic rebellion’.3 Although they mediated between the interests of citizens and the policies of the centre, Yugoslav republics were not always coterminous with constituent nations.4 Thus emerged the problem of national ‘minorities’ within the republics aspiring to independence. Whereas some republics like Slovenia were ‘ethnically’ homogeneous, others like Bosnia were not. The Serbs were the most scattered nation with significant populations living outside Serbia. The rise of nationalist republican governments created a dilemma for national minorities. If these nationalist governments were to secede, the minorities lacked guarantees as to their future status within nationalist states. Thus, while civil conflicts within the disintegrating Yugoslav State were essentially about the equal rights of republics to decide their destiny after the federal state’s collapse, civil conflicts within the emerging successor states focused on the equal rights of constituent nations to self-determination. Early on in the process of Yugoslavia’s disintegration, the issue of the national self-determination of minorities did not receive due attention. The international
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community acknowledged the rights of republics to seek independence but remained silent about the right to self-determination of the Yugoslav constituent nations. When the Republic of Serbia asked, ‘Do the Serbian people in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina have the right to self-determination?’ the Arbitration Commission set up by the European Community to study the issue answered: International law at its current stage of development does not specify all the consequences of the right to self-determination . . . Whatever the circumstances, the right to self-determination may not lead to a change of borders existing at the moment of independence (uti posseditis juris) . . . If within a country there is one or more groups . . . these groups have . . . the right to recognition of their identity.5 The Commission proceeded to equate the rights of constituent nations with those of national minorities, arguing that nations should enjoy all the rights of minorities in conformity with international law and that they ought to be granted the right to national determination if necessary. In the nationalist climate that accompanied the breakdown of the old order, this was not a reassuring answer. In this context, the Bosnian war cannot be interpreted solely as an aggression by the rump Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on the newly-independent republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.6 This is not to deny the role of the Yugoslav army in the military operations, or the close relations between President Slobodan Miloˇsevic´ and the Bosnian Serb leadership. However, one should not overlook the fact that Bosnia’s Serbs were genuinely concerned about their physical safety in the event of the republic’s accession to independence. Their fears were historically grounded in the memory of genocidal atrocities committed by an ultra-nationalist Croatian regime against ordinary Serbs in World War Two. The SDS (Serb Democratic Party) leadership argued: ‘Serbs had fought two world wars on the winning side in order to ensure the security which a constitutional connection with Serbia would guarantee.’7 Descent into hell: the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina This is not the place for a detailed recollection of the specifics of the disintegration of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; suffice it to say that after the ‘Ten-Day War’, which established Slovene independence, and the war in Croatia ( June to November 1991), ‘the march to war in Bosnia-Herzegovina was a terribly doomed procession’.8 Upon recognition of Croatia’s independence by the European Community, Bosnia faced a stark choice: either remain in Serb-dominated Yugoslavia or declare independence. Each option carried a risk. In a Serb-dominated Yugoslavia, Bosnian Muslims feared that they would become an oppressed minority. They often referred to the situation of the Kosovo Albanians in this respect. However, a declaration of independence ran against the wishes of the Bosnian Serbs who constituted 33 per cent of Bosnia’s pre-war population. This would
Republika Srpska
35
mean an invitation to the regime of President Milosˇevic´ to come to the rescue of his ethnic kin. In Bosnia, tension ran high between Serbs, Croats and Muslims. Already in September 1990, Serb–Muslim clashes had erupted in Focˇa, a town on the River Drina. That same year, the first multiparty parliamentary elections returned a victory for nationalist parties, Izetbegovic´’s SDA (Party for Democratic Action), Karadzˇic´’s SDS, and the Croat HDZ (Croat Democratic Union of BosniaHerzegovina). Temporarily united against the Communist Party, a coalition of the three parties held the collective Bosnian presidency.9 However, strains would soon tear it apart. In February 1991, Izetbegovic´ put forward a motion to discuss Bosnia’s sovereignty before Parliament. In a typically heated example of the ambient nationalist rhetoric, the Bosnian President declared: ‘I would sacrifice peace for a sovereign Bosnia-Herzegovina, but for that peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina I would not sacrifice sovereignty.’10 Serb deputies refused to discuss the motion. In August 1991, a last minute attempt by the moderate Muslim Bosniak Organization (MBO) to negotiate a Muslim–Serbian accord to preserve Bosnia’s integrity failed. Karadzˇic´ and Milosˇevic´ allegedly accepted the agreement but Izetbegovic´ rejected it.11 In October 1991, Bosnian Serb deputies walked out of Parliament in protest at the Republic’s attempts to secede from Yugoslavia. Ignoring this opposition, the remaining members of the Bosnian Parliament approved the holding of a referendum on independence.12 The Muslim and Croat members of Parliament also amended the Bosnian constitution. They replaced the parliament’s rule of decision making by consensus by that of majority vote. Consequently, Bosnian Serbs’ fears increased that they were ‘about to be excluded from the governance of the area that they had long regarded as an integral part of Serbia’s historical patrimony’.13 When the referendum finally took place, on 29 February and 1 March 1992, the Serbs boycotted it, but 64.4 per cent of eligible voters cast their votes, and 99.7 per cent of those votes favoured independence. The dye was cast. Once military clashes started in Bosnia, events unfolded with great speed.14 President Izetbegovic´ issued a general mobilization of the Bosnian Territorial Defence on 4 April. The Serbs interpreted this as a declaration of war, and their two representatives in the collective Bosnian presidency, Nikola Koljevic´ and Biljana Plavsˇic´, resigned, putting an official end to the myth of nationalist cooperation among the three ethnic groups in Bosnia. The next day, Serb paramilitaries laid siege to the Sarajevo police academy. That same night the JNA seized Sarajevo airport. On 6 April Karadzˇic´ retaliated against the EC’s recognition of Bosnia by proclaiming the independent ‘Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina’ (later renamed Republika Srpska). Sarajevo would be the capital (under occupation) of the new state. Serbs within dismiss Serbs without: relations between Belgrade and Pale At the outset of the SFRY’s (Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) collapse, Slobodan Milosˇevic´’s main objective was the creation of a Greater Serbia, a state
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for all Serbs. This objective failed when the international community recognized Bosnia’s independence. ‘Thereafter, the war objectives were very confused for the inhabitants of the RS. Pale did not know what the future of the Serbs would be without Milosˇevic´ and he himself did not redefine that future for them.’15 Emerging differences in political objectives between the Bosnian Serbs and the Serbian leadership crystallized in a series of confrontations between Pale and Belgrade. Contentious issues centred on the extent of acceptable territorial compromises and the status of Serb-held territory within a unified BosniaHerzegovina. These differences were instrumental in entrenching the de facto Bosnian Serb state. The nature of ties between Milosˇevic´’s FRY and the Bosnian Serbs is a vexing issue for students of the war in Bosnia. According to a high-ranking official at the Office of the High Representative in Bosnia (OHR), Relations between the Bosnian Serbs and Belgrade are difficult to understand. They are not personal (Milosˇevic´ is disliked), not ideological (the Bosnian Serbs disagree with the socialist line of Milosˇevic´’s party) and not political (the Republika Srpska has become the preferred option of the Bosnian Serbs). Somebody once described them to me as ‘primeval’. Whenever there is a crisis, they all go to Belgrade.16 This relationship comprises four components: organizational, military, financial and political. In the early stages, FRY military and financial support was crucial in the establishment of the RS. Post-1993, and with the consolidation of a thriving black-market economy, the RS was increasingly able to dispense with FRY material and financial support. However, the Bosnian Serb leadership became heavily dependent on Belgrade for political support. Ironically and for reasons that will become clearer in the following paragraphs, Milosˇevic´ had already decided to abandon his initial plan of establishing a Greater Serbia. In Milosˇevic´’s new calculations, his former Bosnian Serb partners had become political liabilities. When the Bosnian Serbs held their own referendum on sovereignty, they had the full backing of the Yugoslav National Army ( JNA) and of the regime in Belgrade. When the conflict erupted in full force, in April of 1992, the JNA fought on the side of the Bosnian Serbs. A number of smaller militias, including the – by ˇ ˇelj, came now infamous – Tiger units of Arkan and the Chetniks of Vojislav Ses across the border with Serbia to lend a ‘helping hand’. The most eloquent expression of Belgrade’s support remains the role of the JNA in the creation of the Bosnian Serb Army (VRS). This involved two decisions. First, the JNA, under direct orders from Milosˇevic´, transferred all Bosnian Serb officers back to their native republic, thus preparing for the establishment of the VRS cadres. Second, the JNA armed the VRS by leaving its ammunition and military equipment behind when it formally withdrew from Bosnia in May 1992. This tight connection has led many to infer that the Bosnian Serbs were puppets of the FRY regime. The reality was otherwise. Unlike Croatia, where the Serbian Ministry of
Republika Srpska 37 the Interior was heavily involved in the organization of the SDS,17 the organization of the Bosnian SDS fell mostly to locals. The lack of direct organizational control would prove one of Milosˇevic´’s grave mistakes. ‘It meant that later when conflicts arose with Belgrade, Milosˇevic´ had far less control over [the Bosnian SDS’s] affairs than he wanted.’18 As the war in Bosnia unfolded, the relation between Belgrade and Pale changed. Though VRS officers remained on the Yugoslav payroll throughout, Belgrade became less forthcoming with equipment, especially after the international community tightened sanctions on the Serbs in 1993. ‘Sometimes, material supplies came in from Yugoslavia but whether they were granted or sold depended on the goodwill of Belgrade on that particular day. However, on a personal basis, [VRS] generals could still go to Belgrade and obtain stuff for their units’.19 While the decrease of FRY aid might have partially hurt the Bosnian Serbs, it did not paralyze them. A thriving black market had developed in the meantime. The institutionalization of this predatory war economy generated sufficient revenue to dispense with Belgrade’s financial and material assistance. The gradual loss of influence of the FRY gave rise to tensions between Milosˇevic´ and the Bosnian Serb leadership. As early as the Vance-Owen plan in January 1993, differences had begun to emerge over the extent of concessions the Bosnian Serbs should agree to in exchange for peace. ‘The divide was between a pragmatist, willing to buy the favors of the international community when the price was right, and more maximalist unbending leaders’.20 While Serbia and Montenegro became overly concerned with the weight of economic sanctions, Serbs outside Serbia were still fighting for their right to self-determination. The two objectives were at odds with one another. Lifting economic sanctions was contingent upon resolution of the conflict in Bosnia. In the lead up to Dayton, this divergence of interests had come to a head. Milosˇevic´ had used Krajina21 and Bosnian Serbs when he believed he could establish a Greater Serbia on the ruins of the old Yugoslavia. In summer 1995 they had become ‘a burden to be shuffled off so that Serbia could have sanctions lifted and Milosˇevic´, who had already transformed himself from communist to nationalist, could now evolve into a peacemaker’.22 When in August 1995 the Croat army annihilated the Republika Srpska Krajina, exacting in the process a heavy toll in casualties, Milosˇevic´ stood and watched. His cynicism troubled even RS opposition groups who had no sympathy for the policies of the SDS. One opposition member said, ‘I am not sure about the role of Belgrade, it is not clear to me. I cannot believe that they had such an influence and let such things happen’.23 The Bosnian Serbs watched in awe. Karadzˇic´ accused Milosˇevic´ of abandoning the goal of establishing Greater Serbia: ‘You have turned your back on the Serbs. You have relented under foreign pressure to an extent which could be compared only to treason’.24 Accepted wisdom considers the Bosnian Serbs as an extension of Belgrade; the reality of relations between the FRY and Republika Srpska paints a different picture. This is the tale of a growing gap, a gap that foreclosed for the Bosnian Serbs the option of joining Yugoslavia and left them with only one option: to strengthen their own state.
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Republika Srpska: development of the de facto state With the collapse of the former Yugoslavia, Serbs outside of Serbia became concerned about the prospect of becoming national minorities. In Croatia and Bosnia, newly established Serb parties agitated to keep the two republics inside the Serb-dominated Yugoslav State. Bosnian Serb organization began in July 1990 with the creation of the Bosnian Serb party, Srpska Demokratska Stranka (SDS). Although they considered Bosnia as their homeland, SDS members considered the perpetuation of the Serb-majority Yugoslav state ‘crucial to their “Serbianism” and their perceived security’.25 Under the impulse of the SDS, Bosnian Serbs would reject the independence of Bosnia from the FRY. Bosnian Serb parliamentarians would walk out of the Bosnian parliament and establish the breakaway Republika Srpska. This three-pronged effort involved the diffusion of a ‘national consciousness’, carving the territory of the Serb Republic, and developing the institutions of the state such that they would have the monopoly of coercion. Molding the nation: Serb myths and their diffusion In their effort to mobilize Serbs in Bosnia, the Bosnian Serb leadership drew on readily available ‘national myths’. However, the creation of the nation did not only entail winning the hearts and minds of Serbs but also ensuring their willingness to provide human and financial resources for the war effort. Two institutions were particularly instrumental in mobilizing the Serbs: the SDS network and the media.
Winning hearts and minds: past myths and present objectives The Serb leadership reached into the past for historical events that strengthened its claim for an independent state. Buttressed by the Serb interpretation of historical events, and in the context of real threats of Serb marginalization in the new nationalist Croat and Bosnian republics, this argument was instrumental in winning overwhelming popular support for the war effort. The Serbs’ right to their own nation was at the heart of the highly controversial 1986 Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences, often considered the starting point of post-Tito Serbian nationalism. It argued that Serbs had been unjustly treated in post-Second World War Yugoslavia. They were the victims of political and economic discrimination and their very existence as a nation was threatened by intentional dispersion. The disintegration of Yugoslavia thus threatened to hit the Serbs the hardest. The implication of the Memorandum was stark: if the Serbs were ever to have their own state, the time to act was now or never. The frustrated Serb quest for statehood goes back to the battle of Kosovo in 1389, when the Ottomans vanquished a Serbian army on the Field of Blackbirds. The loss ushered in centuries of Ottoman domination. Serbs blame Muslims,
Republika Srpska 39 perceived as the legacy of Turkish occupation, for aborting their path to statehood. The lessons of Kosovo reinforced the Bosnian Serb determination not to part with their Serbian kin in the FRY. Bosnian Serb objections to the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina are best understood in this framework. The Bosnian Serbs reacted violently to suggestions that held the potential of shattering their dreams of the re-emergence of a Serbian state. Indicative of their state of mind is the old Serbian slogan that came to embody their ideology: ‘Samo sloga Srbina Spasˇava’ [only unity will save the Serbs]. The Krajina experience reinforced the Serb perception that statehood was a territorial issue as well as a ‘national imperative’.26 Although Serbs provided the first line of defence of the Habsburg Empire, the 1878 Congress of Berlin allocated the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina to Austria-Hungary instead of independent Serbia. In spite of their services to the Habsburg Empire, the Krajina Serbs’ desire to live in one state with their Serbian kin had been overruled. The lesson for the Serbs was that real self-determination required an independent territorial base. During World War Two, Krajina Serbs came to associate territorial autonomy with security. Of all Serbian lands, the Krajina suffered most during the war. The Serbs of Bosnia and Croatia fell under the rule of the Ustasˇa leader, Ante Pavelic´. Pavelic´ allied himself with the Germans and established the Independent State of Croatia. The method by which [he] sought to create his ethnically-pure territory was the annihilation of the Serbs as a people . . . The historical memory of an independent Croatian state that extended as far east as the Drina River – Bosnia’s border with Serbia – made the Serbs, living west of the river, consider themselves the most vulnerable of all.27 These historical events provided a reservoir of symbols that resonated with Serb populations outside Serbia. The SDS network During its pre-war popular mobilization effort, the SDS extended its local influence in Serb-dominated regions of Bosnia-Herzegovina, particularly in 18 communes in the north-western and central parts of Bosnia directly adjacent or close to the Croatian Krajina.28 By autumn 1991, the SDS declared large parts of the republic as SAOs or Serbian Autonomous Regions. In these regions, the SDS network established local crisis committees. These groups of local Serb notables prepared the community for war by arming it and mustering available financial resources. In organizing the Serbs, the SDS and the crisis committees relied on the institutional structure provided by the Yugoslav Territorial Defence organization (TO or Yugoslav civil defence). As part of its concept of Total National Defence, the Yugoslav army had set up reserve forces in each republic. In heavily Serb-populated areas, the SDS and the crisis committees used the local TOs as a basis to recruit
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and organize the populace. TOs allowed the quick identification of Serb reservists. They conveniently provided a structure for the mobilization effort. The media The media strengthened the fiction of Bosnian Serb independence. Internally, Kanal-S (a TV channel) bombarded ordinary Serbs with propaganda that served to heighten their fears of Muslims (and, to a lesser degree, Croats) and to diffuse the national myths that created a sense of Serb nationhood. In the process, it strengthened their dependence on and loyalty to the SDS and guaranteed that they would vote correctly in a future referendum on unity with Yugoslavia. Externally, control of the media provided the Bosnian Serb leadership with the leverage to force foreign journalists to deal with them as a de facto government. Foreign crews had to secure clearing and accreditation from the Bosnian Serb authorities.29 TV-Pale also provided additional revenue, ‘because of its exclusive access on the Serbian side, a tidy profit could be made by selling footage to television companies and agencies from around the world’.30 Map drawing and state-making: the territorial dimension In the first two months of war, the Serbs controlled 70 per cent of the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina.31 Their primary war objectives were to secure border towns with Serbia and Montenegro in order to keep the supply lines open. They also sought control of the towns and regions that they had earmarked for themselves. The Bosnian Serbs conducted their war effort on two levels: demarcating their zone of control and ridding it of pockets of enemy presence. The Bosnian Serbs hit two obstacles in their initial efforts to demarcate the boundaries of their enclave. The first was in the Neretva valley, the westernmost limit of the territory, which bordered Herzegovina. The Bosnian Serbs had indicated their intention to draw the border of their state at the River Neretva but there was no agreement to this effect between them and the Croats. The valley was an area of mixed Serb, Croat and, to a lesser extent, Muslim population and pitched battles were fought for its control. Ultimately, the Croats cleansed Serbian villages along the river and secured control of the Herzegovinian historic capital, Mostar. The second obstacle was more serious. Bosnian Serb territory spread in a horseshoe pattern from north-western Bosnia down to the south-east. The territorial contiguity of the Republika Srpska was at risk in the Posavina valley in the north.32 There, the regular Croatian army crossed the River Sava to bolster the fledgling Bosnian Croat and Muslim TOs, cutting Serb lines across the north and separating the Bosnian Serb enclave into two regions. The area was the Serbs’ main access route to Serbia.33 By 2 May, the Serbs carved a corridor nicknamed the ‘corridor of life’ in recognition of its strategic value. At its narrowest, at Brcˇko, the corridor was only two miles wide. In this area, unlike others, military operations continued throughout the war.
Republika Srpska 41 The Bosnian frontlines demarcated in summer 1992 would remain relatively unchanged34 until the Muslim-Croat offensive of 1995. However, the Bosnian Serb leadership still had to ensure that, in case of a referendum on sovereignty, the inhabitants of the enclave voted correctly. This political objective was paramount in view of the recommendations of the Badinter Commission.35 The commission had decreed that international recognition of sovereignty would require a referendum asking residents in a given territory to determine their choice of state. Bosnian Serbs had become acutely aware of the fact that the majority could easily ignore a minority’s objections in a referendum. In 1992 their wishes to remain within Yugoslavia had been brushed aside by Bosnian Muslim and Croat parliamentarians. Hence, it was not sufficient to control territory militarily; ‘population transfers’ had to be carried out ‘to consolidate ethnically pure territories that would vote correctly in a referendum on sovereignty and in future elections and to justify government administration by their national group’.36 Thus originated the policy of ethnic cleansing in Bosnia.37 This was the ultimate instrument through which the Bosnian Serb Republic acquired its territorial definition.38 The institutional backbone of the state When it became clear that Bosnia would seek independence from Yugoslavia, the Bosnian Serbs sought to strengthen their case for secession. One clear way of asserting their claim was to govern territory. The SDS established the breakaway Bosnian Serb Assembly and declared the Serb Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina (later renamed Republika Srpska). In theory, state and party were separate. In practice, authority was highly centralized in the SDS.39 Key SDS people doubled as state officials and the party assumed responsibility by taking over the institutions of the ‘state’. The Serb constitution gave overwhelming powers to the presidency, but the National Assembly retained some checks and controls. Pale largely controlled the Assembly, which was initially made up of SDS members elected to the Bosnian Parliament in 1990 and who later broke away. The SDS also controlled the police forces.40 They used the police as a mechanism for the integration of militias, hence the police appointment of Srd–an Knezevic´, commander of the ‘white wolves,’ for example. Ethnic cleansing The implementation of ethnic cleansing provided the Bosnian Serbs with an opportunity to establish local institutions. ‘Every major population center in northern Bosnia acquired . . . a “Bureau for Population Exchange” ’.41 Recruited locally among SDS sympathizers, bureau ‘officials’ systematically harassed Muslim populations. The methodic imposition of restrictions was one aspect of a system whereby terrorized Muslims would sign documents giving up their material property in return for the right to leave – rendered ‘official’ by the issuance of a departure ‘visa’. The real and movable property of Muslims was made available
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for distribution. The Serbian National Assembly regulated this whole arrangement by passing legislation on ‘abandoned property’ and ‘temporary occupancy’. The black market SDS officials developed a highly sophisticated black market to break sanctions and finance their war effort. It revolved around the provision of needed supplies, the sale and rental of military material to enemy factions and the taxation of international aid.42 The organization and control of the black market was made possible by SDS control of ‘state’ institutions such as customs and key ministries such as the interior and resource ministries. ‘Illicit traffic was institutionalized during the war between all warring sides. Many people lined up their pockets but some of the money also went to organizing the RS’.43 The military wing In May 1992, the JNA withdrew from Bosnia after establishing the foundations of the VRS. In January 1992, President Milosˇevic´ had issued a secret order to transfer all JNA officers who were Bosnian natives back to their republic. The VRS was comprised of ‘about 90,000 “regulars”, consisting of ex-JNA personnel, volunteers and conscripts and 20,000 irregulars, presumably meaning semiindependent armed groups such as the Tigers, Chetniks, Panthers and White Eagles’.44 It was also well equipped as the JNA left behind a substantial amount of military equipment. The army saw itself as the guardian of the Bosnian Serbs, entrusted with the liberation of their historic lands. The VRS maintained strong links to the JNA; Bosnian Serb officers remained on the JNA payroll throughout the war and used their strong personal connections in the Yugoslav army to get supplies for their troops. Because it had independent sources of financing, the army remained one of the few Bosnian Serb institutions not to merely fall under SDS influence.45
The Dayton Peace Agreement: is Republika Srpska here to stay? On 21 November 1995, Serb, Croat and Muslim leaders initialed a peace agreement at Wright-Patterson airbase in Dayton, Ohio. After nearly four years, two hundred and fifty thousand people killed, two million refugees and atrocities that have appalled people all over the world, the people of Bosnia finally [had] a chance to turn from the horror of war to the promise of peace.46 The Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) became the basis for conflict-resolution in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It has been hailed as a symbol of successful foreign mediation to end civil wars.
Republika Srpska 43 However, Dayton has also ushered in a period in the history of Republika Srpska where the status of the entity has been frozen. The agreement is rife with tensions between integration and separation of the two entities that make up Bosnia and Herzegovina. These have led some observers to claim that the Dayton Accords are ‘at war with themselves. They are both a plan for reunification and a plan for partition’.47 The implementation of Dayton reflected this state of affairs. The entrenchment of nationalists at the entity level often undermined small victories for integration at the federal level. Dayton: one step towards recognition? A quick look at the terms of the DPA might lead observers to disagree with the contention of Richard Holbrooke that ‘as diplomats we could not expect the Serbs to be conciliatory at the negotiating table as long as they had experienced nothing but success on the battlefield’.48 The DPA was not highly detrimental to the Bosnian Serbs, and their conciliatory attitude can be attributed as much to the changes in the balance of forces as to the relatively favourable terms of the agreement compared to earlier ones.49 Indeed, Dayton went further than any preceding plan in addressing the question of Serb territorial contiguity. Under the terms of the DPA, the territorial contiguity of the RS, though not guaranteed, was not ruled out either. In the Posavina, the Serbs suffered a slight reduction to the ‘corridor of life’. However, an agreement was reached with the Federation to subject the status of Brcˇko to binding international arbitration. In Eastern Srpska, the Serbs were granted de jure control over some of the enclaves, namely Srebrenica and Zˇ epa, whereas the Federation was awarded Gorazˇde. Thus, territorial contiguity was threatened only in the north-east. In relative terms, this arrangement was better than the Contact Group Map or the Vance-Owen Peace Plan. The most significant Bosnian Serb gain was the recognition of Republika Srpska as an equal partner with the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Referred to as ‘entities’ in the DPA, the RS and the Federation are the two territorial units that constitute the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This recognition is particularly meaningful because of its incorporation in the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, itself an annex of the DPA. Separated by an InterEntity Boundary Line (IEBL), the RS and the Federation maintain separate armed forces. While the IEBL is not an international frontier, the DPA states ‘under no circumstances shall any armed forces of either Entity enter into or stay within the territory of the other Entity without the consent of the government of the latter and of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina’.50 The Entities can only adjust the IEBL by mutual consent. The DPA also contradicted the main Bosnian Serb war aim. By recognizing the continued existence of Bosnia within its internationally recognized borders, the accord closed the door on RS secession and ultimate accession to the FRY. Karadzˇic´ expressed dissatisfaction with the DPA because ‘our natural aspiration is to remain in Yugoslavia, to join Yugoslavia, to join Serbia’.51 The Bosnian Serbs
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even attempted to interpret the DPA clause that ‘The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina recognize each other as sovereign independent States within their international borders’ as non-binding. However, Dayton’s recognition of Republika Srpska granted the Serbs as much autonomy as they could expect under the circumstances. The survival of the RS weighed heavily in the considerations of Bosnian Serb decision makers. Within Bosnia, the creation of a Serb Entity was hailed as a victory. ‘By recognizing Republika Srpska, the international community has recognized that our fight was justified,’ Karadzˇic´ said. ‘We got less than we could but the fact is that the state is there’.52 Cementing the status quo: Dayton implementation in perspective Not only is there an inherent tension in the Dayton Peace Agreement between integration and separation but peace implementation has not helped either in resolving this issue. The current weakness of federal institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the existence of pending problems cast doubt on the solidity of the arrangement. Recent developments that favour integration have not yet shifted the balance. Concrete developments have usually come about because of external pressure rather than domestic will. The unity of Bosnia remains fragile, particularly should the various entities move to intensify relations with neighbouring ethnic kin.53 Weak centre, strong entities The DPA gave wide autonomy to the entities relative to the centre.54 Though there is a unified citizenship of Bosnia and Herzegovina, there also is an Entity citizenship. Entities can establish special parallel relationships with neighbouring states ‘consistent with the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina’. They can also enter agreements with foreign states and international organizations with the consent of the BiH Assembly. Finally, all governmental functions and powers not expressly assigned in the Constitution to the common institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina fall immediately within the preserve of the Entities. The international community arguably undermined political capacity building at the federal level in Bosnia thus weakening the centre further relative to the entities. Power sharing is premised on the will of the parties to compromise, but federal representatives of the three Bosnian ethnic groups have not demonstrated such a will. Instead, the Office of the High Representative has gained quite a reputation for imposing solutions on the Bosnian parties whenever they seem to have reached a deadlock. In 1997, the High Representative was even authorized to make decisions for Bosnians. Thus, Entity leaders can ‘choose intransigence and delay when a decision would be unpopular with constituents or colleagues’. The parties have capitalized on the benefits of cooperation without incurring the domestic cost of compromise.55
Republika Srpska 45 Bosnia’s joint institutions did eventually come together in January 1997. However, it is no exaggeration to state that to date they have failed to function, that every issue has been viewed in zero-sum terms and that almost all ‘breakthroughs’ have required disproportionate, indeed often ridiculous, amounts of time, effort and concessions on the part of the international community.56 Not only do the federal institutions work mostly through international coaxing, but also political control at the entity level has largely remained the preserve of nationalists.57 Elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina have provided the war elites with other means to wage their wars. In the federation, the two wartime parties, the SDA and the HDZ, are still holding the reins of power. In Republika Srpska, the intensive involvement of the international community failed, in September 1998, to prevent the victory of right-wing nationalist Nikola Poplasˇen, who defeated ‘moderate’ president Biljana Plavsˇic´.58 The organization of elections remains in the hands of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe in conjunction with entity governments. The involvement of local authorities in the organization of the ballot provides an opportunity to influence outcomes. In Srpska, for example, the SDS maintained extensive control over voter registration until 1997. The allocation of housing, jobs and social services have been used as bargaining chips by ruling elites to coerce Bosnian Serb refugees to register in the municipalities where they had relocated instead of the municipalities that they lived in before the war. Nationalists also had a total monopoly over the media. When in 1996 the Provisional Election Commission drew up an Electoral Code of Conduct for the media, RTV Srpska adapted its rules. The television channel decided to ‘affirm the sovereignty and integrity of Republika Srpska, determined by the DPA’.59 This re-interpretation of the PEC code of conduct allowed RTV Srpska to refuse airtime to those political parties and factions deemed against the national interest. Opposition parties were put on the defensive and forced to ward off attacks in which SDS sympathizers intimated that they were traitors to the Serbian cause. In general the electoral process seemed to have provided the channel through which nationalist war elites entrenched themselves in power.
Uneven implementation While the RS leadership dragged its feet when it came to implementing civilian aspects of Dayton, they complied with the military aspects of the agreement. The Bosnian Serb leadership negotiated amendments to the Inter-Entity Boundary Line. They also largely complied with provisions concerning cantonment of weapons, withdrawal of forces behind the IEBL, notification of plans for the deployment of weapons systems, and the disbanding of special operations and armed civilian groups. In contrast several civilian aspects of the agreement remain ink on paper. Refugee returns are insignificant, and many publicly-indicted war
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criminals are still free. The common institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina are frail. According to observers, ‘The reason why [the DPA’s] military part is most successful is not because of SFOR but mainly because this is the only element in the DPA which is directed to what delineates the parties rather than what should be bringing them together.’60 At the moment, the Serbs are the status quo power in Bosnia and Herzegovina. For the Serbs, Dayton gave them half of the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina though they form only 35 per cent of its population; it also provided them with a single contiguous territory, allowed them to have their own laws, army, etc. They comply with the military aspect of Dayton and do not really care should the IEBL become a border. They . . . are pleased with its constitutional provisions, which afford them a large degree of autonomy. What they are unhappy about is the return of refugees and, consequently, they obstruct the implementation of Annex 7. They, as well as other parties, see Dayton as a menu from which to choose certain items . . . and from which to reject whatever is not in your interest. They therefore accept and interpret Dayton to reinforce their own political imperatives.61
The status quo in jeopardy? Recent developments and the future of Republika Srpska Developments since 2000 partially contradict the picture painted above. In spite of the seeming entrenchment of the Bosnian Serb entity, the future is still in relative flux. There are several sources of change. Regionally, NATO’s Kosovo campaign, the death of Croat President Franjo Tudjman and the overthrow of Slobodan Milosˇevic´ in Yugoslavia have spurred calls to accelerate Bosnia and Herzegovina’s post-conflict transition. Change also emanates from the international community, notably the Office of the High Representative and the US State Department under former Secretary of State Madeline Albright. The assertiveness of the international community has occasionally meant the use of force by the NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR) to get compliance with certain provisions of the Dayton Accords.62 This assertiveness and the consequent abandonment of impartiality have ‘disturbed the delicate balance of the Dayton accords, leading Serbs and Croats to view American action as even more proBosniac than they had thought and to think even more in terms of protecting their own national interests’.63 Tensions in 2001 between the Bosnian Croats and the international community underscore the heights of Serb and Croat distrust. In early April 2000, SFOR detained the former Serb member of the Bosnian Presidency, Momcˇilo Krajisˇnik, under a sealed indictment from the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. Krajisˇnik is the first high-ranking Bosnian Serb official to go before the Hague tribunal. His arrest came against the backdrop of the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia over Kosovo, of the arbitration decision on Brcˇko,64 and of the dismissal of RS President Poplasˇen by the High
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Representative. All three events indicate an increased international determination to weaken war elites and strengthen non-nationalist forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina. All three events also triggered crises in Republika Srpska. Poplasˇen’s dismissal led to a political stalemate when the ruling SRS/SDS coalition failed to nominate a candidate who could both win support from a majority of the Bosnian Serb national assembly and enjoy the approval of the international community. The arbitration decision was bitterly resented in Republika Srpska given that Brcˇko was the only point where the territorial contiguity of the entity was in danger. Finally, the NATO bombings led the RS to withdraw from the central institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina. High-ranking Bosnian Serb officials claimed the international organizations had turned into occupiers and angry mobs attacked the offices of Western embassies and international organizations in Banja Luka and Bijeljina. More recently, the international community has resorted to the Constitutional Court in its integration drive. The court struck down the consociational arrangement enshrined in the Law on the Council of Ministers of 1996, thus effectively leaving the country without a government; it thus forced Parliament to enact a law providing that council chairmanship rotate among the three constituent peoples every eight months.65 The court also issued landmark decisions forcing the entities to review their citizenship laws and ensuring equal rights to ethnic minorities in Republika Srpska and the Federation. In spite of indicators of tension, the practical consequences of these developments could also be the prelude to better integration of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The decision on Brcˇko can be interpreted as a reversal of the territorial separation principle. NATO bombing has all but destroyed economic ties between the FRY and Republika Srpska.66 As RS revenues dropped, the international community ‘rewarded’ official RS moderation by promising financial support. USAID alone pledged $10 million in direct aid to fill the gap in the budget. At the international donors’ conference in May 1999 the RS received approximately $400 million in additional funding. Finally, the removal of war elites from the seats and the corridors of power could clear the way for moderate leaders willing to work with their Croat and Bosniac counterparts. While on the surface a seeming victory for the nationalist parties, the October 2002 elections point to some hopeful trends, including the decline in support for the SDS and the challenge to its monopoly of Republika Srpska’s political life by the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD or Stranka Nezavisnih Socijaldemokrata). ‘The votes of returnees and potential returnees, voting in absentia, have also begun to affect politics, permitting Federation-based parties to claim 17 per cent of the seats in the RS National Assembly in the October elections’.67 The future of Republika Srpska depends once again on outsiders. If the current assertiveness of the international community continues, and the record under HR Ashdown confirms this trend, the war elites may well be in jeopardy. In addition, if international aid succeeds in improving the RS economy and effectively tying it to the economy of the Federation, then potential gains from economic ties may increase the perception of all sides that there are gains in inter-ethnic cooperation. The international community’s staying power in Bosnia may well determine the future of Republika Srpska.
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Notes 1 ‘Casovi po programu, Djaci na ulici’, Nezavisne novine, 9 May 2001. The information prompted the education minister to suspend principals of the schools whose pupils had participated in the riots. They were quietly reinstated at a later date. See International Crisis Group, The Wages of Sin: Confronting Bosnia’s Republika Srpska, Balkans Report no. 118 (Sarajevo/Brussels: ICG, 2001), at www.intl-crisis-group.org 2 While UN statistics for the 2001 return season (April to September) indicate that Bosniak returns were almost five times greater than Serb returns to the Federation, the number of incidents against returnees ranged anywhere from 208 (UN figures) to 316 (IPTF figures). See UN document, ‘Minority-Related Incidents Reported to IPTF’, quoted in ICG, The Wages of Sin. 3 Dusˇan Janjic´, ‘Resurgence of Ethnic Conflict in Yugoslavia: The Demise of Communism and the Rise of the ‘New Elites of Nationalism’, in Payam Akhavan and Robert Howse (eds), Yugoslavia: The Former and the Future-Reflections by Scholars from the Region ( Washington and Geneva: the Brookings Institution and the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, 1995), p. 35. 4 Tito’s Yugoslavia recognized the separate existence of Yugoslav nations and sought to protect their sovereign rights in the framework of a federal system. However, nations and peoples were not conceptually distinct (both translate as narod in Serbo-Croat). The peoples of Yugoslavia had rights as constituent nations of the federal republics and simultaneously as individual members of nations. 5 Branislava Alendar, ‘Reflection on Nationalism and Minorities in Yugoslavia’, in Michael Freeman, Dragomir Pantic´ and Dusˇan Janjic´ (eds), Nationalism and Minorities (Belgrade: Institute of Social Sciences, and Brighton, England: University of Sussex, 1995), p. 89, fn.7. 6 Haris Silajdzˇic´ talks about the ‘original sin’ committed by those who consider the conflict a civil war. Haris Silajdzˇic´, Bosnian Muslim Foreign Minister, Interview, 13 September 1998. 7 Misha Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War (New York: Penguin Books, 1996), p. 155. 8 Laura Silber and Alan Little, Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation (New York: Penguin Books, 1996), p. 205. 9 Modeled after the Yugoslav rotating presidency, the Bosnian Presidency had two places each for Muslims, Serbs, Croats and one place for Yugoslavs. 10 Quoted in Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, p. 211. 11 The SDA leader felt that the MBO initiative amounted to taking sides with the Serbs, an unacceptable position in light of events in Bosnia and in neighbouring Croatia where an undeclared war raged. 12 At independence in 1992, Bosnia’s population numbered approximately 4.3 million people, of whom 44 per cent were Muslims, 33 per cent Serbs, 19 per cent Croats and 4 per cent described themselves as ‘Other’ (a category including Yugoslav). The Yugoslav Census of 1991 quoted in Edgar O’Ballance, Civil War in Bosnia, 1992–1994 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995), p. 2. 13 Lenard Cohen, Broken Bonds: Yugoslavia’s Disintegration and Balkan Politics in Transition (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995), p. 242. 14 In spite of the widespread belief that the first clashes occurred on 6 April in Sarajevo, upon the EC recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina, they did not. Clashes had already begun in February in Bosanski Brod in the northernmost part of Bosnia. 15 David Stewart-Howitt, Field Officer, European Community Humanitarian Organisation (ECHO), Banja Luka (formerly aide to UNPROFOR Commander, Sir Michael Rose), Interview, 2 September 1998. 16 Vincent Devine, Head of the Political Section, Office of the High Representative Banja Luka, Interview, 3 September 1998.
Republika Srpska 49 17 Judah details the involvement of the SDB (Serbian Ministry of Interior) in the organization of the Croatian SDS in ‘Frankie and Badger Go to War’, in Tim Judah, The Serbs: History, Myth and the Destruction of Yugoslavia (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998), pp. 168–90. 18 Ibid., p. 192. 19 Vladimir Milin, Staff Member, Economic Dept, Office of the High Representative, Banja Luka (formerly a VRS officer), Interview, 5 September 1998. 20 David Harland, Head of Civil Affairs, UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Interview, 24 August 1998. 21 The Republika Srpska Krajina was the Serb-held territory in Croatia. 22 See Judah, The Serbs, p. 298. 23 Branko Peric´, Editor-in-Chief, Alternative Information Network [Alternativna Informativna Mreza], Interview, 5 September 1998. 24 See Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, pp. 360–1. 25 See Cohen, Broken Bonds, p. 130. 26 The Krajina was the defensive line of the Habsburg Empire, a succession of fortresses designed to ward off further Ottoman expansion westward. 27 See Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, p. 92. 28 ‘Of the approximately 670,000 people living in these eighteen communes in 1981, 63.1 per cent were Serbs, 15.1 per cent Moslems and 9.5 per cent Croats, with another roughly 10 per cent classified as ‘Yugoslavs’. Ibid., p. 141. 29 The place and time span involved in this process changed weekly. See Brigitte Hipfl, Klaus Hipfl and Jan Jagodinzski, ‘Documentary Films and the Bosnia-Hercegovina Conflict: From Production to Reception’, in James Gow, Richard Peterson and Alison Preston (eds), Bosnia by Television (London: British Film Institute, 1996) p. 35. 30 See Judah, The Serbs, p. 220. 31 I am indebted to Mihailo Crnobrnja for drawing my attention to the fact that the Serbs did not gain 70 per cent of Bosnia’s territory during the first three months of the war. This, the usual formulation in academic analyses, is misleading because it implies that the Bosnian Serbs started from zero. Actually, the Serbs controlled about 62 per cent of the Bosnian territory at the outset of the conflict. 32 The Posavina was one of the most heterogeneous regions of Bosnia with substantial Muslim and Croat populations, located at the border between Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia. 33 The border between eastern Republika Srpska and Serbia was home to large concentrations of Muslim villages, which at that point were still home to their original inhabitants. 34 The fall of Jajce to the Serbs in October 1992 was the last, major, Serb land gain. Until the fall of Srebrenica and Zˇ epa in July 1995, the confrontation line would not change in any significant way, with the exception of a few weeks in 1994 when the Bosnian 5th Corps broke out of the Bihac´ pocket. 35 The Badinter Commission is the European Community’s Arbitration Commission discussed earlier in this chapter. 36 Susan Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1995), p. 242. 37 It should be noted that Croats had committed ethnic cleansing against Serbs earlier in the conflict. I am indebted to Susan Woodward for bringing this to my attention. 38 The ethnic cleansing campaign concentrated on two heavily Muslim-populated areas: northern Bosnia and the Drina valley. 39 According to Milin, the political wing working through the municipalities, could, for example, decide to send paramilitary reinforcements when the army required backing. However, once on the ground, the paramilitaries were neither accountable nor controllable. Milin, Interview, 5 September 1998. 40 There were three separate police forces: the regular police force, the special force (State security) and the secret police (an SDS apparatus). All three technically reported to the Bosnian Serb ministry of the interior.
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41 See Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, p. 246. 42 For details see Judah, The Serbs, pp. 247–51; The Times, quoted in Edgar O’Ballance, Civil War in Bosnia 1992–94 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995), p. 180. 43 Geoffrey Beaumont, UN Civil Affairs Officer, Pale, Interview, 27 August 1998. 44 See O’Ballance, Civil War in Bosnia, p. 127. 45 The SDS attempted to influence the army by putting its own people in decisionmaking positions. Peric´, Interview, 5 September 1998. 46 President Clinton’s announcement of the DPA, quoted in Richard Holbrooke, To End a War (New York: Random House, 1998), p. 309. 47 Michael O’Hanlon, ‘Turning the Bosnia Ceasefire into Peace’, The Brookings Review 16, 1 (Winter 1998), p. 42. 48 See Holbrooke, To End a War, p. 73. 49 For a detailed comparison of the VOPP, the Contact Group plan and the DPA see Marie-Joëlle Zahar, Fanatics, Mercenaries, Brigands . . . and Politicians: Militia Decision-Making and Civil Conflict Resolution, Ph.D. Dis., McGill University, Montreal, 2000. 50 The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Annex 1A, ‘Agreement on the Military Aspects of the Peace Settlement’, at www.ohr.int/gfa/ gfa-an1a.htm, p. 2. 51 ‘Karadzˇic´ Denies Crimes Committed by Serb Army’, Xinhua News Agency, 1 February 1996. 52 Ibid. 53 In 1997, Republika Srpska signed a cooperation agreement with the FRY. Sophia Clément, ‘Introduction’, Cahiers de Chaillot: Les Questions Soulevées par la Bosnie et le débat transatlantique, 32, May 1998, p. 3. However, this agreement is allowed under the terms of the DPA. Moreover, High Representative Carl Bildt put serious limits on Republika Srpska–Yugoslav cooperation in comparison with the almost confederal relation between Croatia and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 54 General Framework Agreement, Annex 4, ‘Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina’, at www.ohr.int/gfa/gfa-an4.htm 55 Susan Woodward, ‘Transitional Elections and the Dilemmas of International Assistance to Bosnia and Herzegovina’, in Steven Riskin (ed.), Three Dimensions of Peacebuilding in Bosnia: Findings from USIP-sponsored Research and Field Projects (Washington, DC: USIP, 1999), p. 9. 56 International Crisis Group, Doing Democracy a Disservice: 1998 Elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Sarajevo: ICG, September 1998), p. 8. 57 In the 2000 municipal elections, nationalist Croat and Serb parties remained in power in the Croat and Serb areas. Only in the Muslim areas did non-nationalist parties win some marginal gains. 58 By March 1999, the High Representative, Carlos Westendorp, removed Poplasˇen from office because of a deadlock over the appointment of a Prime Minister acceptable to all parties. In this affair, the OHR backed the re-appointment of Milorad Dodik. The Bosnian Serb President refused to comply with the order of the HR and still considered himself in office. 59 Institute for War and Peace Reporting, IWPR Monitoring Report, 10 July 1996, p. 6. 60 UNHCR official, Interview, 7 September 1998. (Identity withheld at the request of the interviewee.) 61 Harland, Interview, 24 August 1998. 62 SFOR has been instrumental in backing former Bosnian Serb President Biljana Plavsˇic´ in her attempt to wrest control of Republika Srpska away from the SDS in 1997. For the best coverage of the split, see ‘Republika Srpska Splits’, War Report, 55, October 1997. 63 Woodward, ‘Avoiding Another Cyprus or Israel’, The Brookings Review 16, 1 (Winter 1998), p. 47. 64 The arbitration award created a condominium in Brcˇko between the Muslim-Croat Federation and Republika Srpska.
Republika Srpska 51 65 The law, adopted when the federal House of Representatives failed in 1996 to achieve agreement on a single candidate, stated that the chair of the council consists of two co-chairs and a vice-chair who occupy the positions on a rotating basis. This contradicts Article IV of the constitution according to which the chair of the council is a single individual. 66 For details of the economic consequences of the NATO bombings, see International Crisis Group, Republika Srpska in the Post-Kosovo Era: Collateral Damage and Transformation (Sarajevo: ICG, July 1999), pp. 13–15. 67 International Crisis Group, The Continuing Challenge of Refugee Return in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Balkans Report no. 137 (Sarajevo and Brussels: ICG, 13 December 2002), p. i.
3
Montenegro and Serbia Disassociation, negotiation, resolution? Philip Lyon
In his introduction to Milovan Djilas’ Land without Justice, William Jovanovich calls the people of Montenegro ‘Serbian by nationality, Orthodox by faith, Montenegrin by choice’.1 As Montenegro begins the twenty-first century, this assessment has perhaps never been so apt or so mistaken. Montenegro, still nominally bound to Serbia in a joint state, is a divided country and has spent much of the past several years wrestling with the prospect of its own formal independence. After elections in April 2001 returned an ambiguous majority to the Montenegrin Parliament, Serbia and the Federal administration also devoted themselves to this topic and engaged with Podgorica over whether, where and who should negotiate either a radically redefined federation or else Montenegrin independence.2 In spring 2002, Serbian, Montenegrin and Yugoslav representatives reached an EU-brokered agreement to establish the new state of ‘Serbia and Montenegro’. Thereafter, however, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) lingered on as a country without a valid constitution or a functional government, a ‘hollow edifice whose institutions hardly function except as an address for the international community’3 while Serbia’s and Monetenegro’s leaders struggled to agree on a constitutional charter for the new state. Even under the new joint-state arrangement, the locus of real power remains in the republics. Montenegro, in fact, has been not just autonomous or even sovereign, but de facto independent for several years. In many ways, therefore, the real question in recent years has not been whether there would be an independent Montenegro, but rather whether there would be a redefined Yugoslav federation. Montenegro’s moves towards disassociation from Yugoslavia have not occurred in isolation. Rather, they have been largely products of and reactions to actions taken by Slobodan Milosˇevic´ during his reign, and thereafter by his successors in Serbia and FRY. Economic arguments are also involved, as are local power politics. Indeed, Montenegrin President Milo Djukanovic´’s stubbornness in negotiations with Belgrade in 2001,was partly tied to the need to satisfy his stridently separatist coalition partners in order to keep his own party, the Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS), in power.4 These have diminished somewhat due to DPS electoral gains in 2002. Nevertheless, Montenegro’s leadership seems only very tenuously committed to their new state arrangement with Serbia. The debate that raged between Podgorica and Belgrade was fundamentally connected with questions of sovereignty. Sovereignty is an inherently slippery
Montenegro and Serbia 53 concept that is imbued with tremendous moral and legal power while being simultaneously difficult to isolate or define. Perhaps it is sovereignty’s multiplicity of meanings and interpretations that have made it so compelling for theorists and politicians for centuries. Sovereignty in turn is predicated on who or what is sovereign. That is, where in a state or society does supreme and permanent authority lie? As Sabrina Ramet observes elsewhere in this volume, sovereignty has been mobilized in the collapse of Yugoslavia by nationally construed, secessionist republics as connoting entitlement to independence. Such normative language has not been totally absent from the Montenegrin political dialogue and Podgorica’s moves toward disassociation from Yugoslavia, but I argue that the debate in that complex society has been highly nuanced and heavily reflective of the writings of John Locke. I argue that the repatriation under Djukanovic´ of legal, economic and political authority to Podgorica was justified, and perhaps necessary, as resistance to the tyranny which was Milosˇevic´’s arbitrary rule. While the language of ‘historic’ and ‘states’ rights’ has intruded on the political debates surrounding Montenegro’s bid for formal independence, it is essential first to understand that Podgorica’s reassertion of authority over Montenegrin affairs was not a usurpation of power, but rather a resistance to Milosˇevic´’s tyranny. The logical conclusion of this resistance, however, is not yet certain. Certainly Montenegro has legitimate grounds for formal secession from its dysfunctional joint state with Serbia. However, formal independence is desired by barely half of the population, for whom the final division of the joint state with Serbia is as much a question of identity as sovereignty. Ultimately, Montenegro is a divided society which is less comfortable with its political allegiances than either the pro-independence or pro-Belgrade groups would prefer to admit. Montenegro is remarkably diverse for its size and has a sense of identity that extends beyond the usual national straitjackets. The history and symbolism of the vanished Montenegrin state have provided some of the language in the debate over separation from FRY, but the driving force behind the Montenegrin independence movement may be the least nationalist in the Balkans.
Serbs by another name? In 1908 National Geographic produced an eponymous article on ‘Serbia and Montenegro’ which observed that ‘both countries are peopled by the Serbs’ but recognized an exceptional Montenegrin character.5 The author approvingly called Montenegrins a warrior race but noted that each possessed ‘the bearing and dignity of a gentleman’ and they were ‘easily distinguishable from the Servians’.6 Similarly, English poet Alfred, Lord Tennyson (1809–1892) celebrated ‘Great Tsernogora!’ and called its inhabitants a race of faithful and free ‘mighty mountaineers’.7 It should first be observed that Montenegro is a remarkably diverse place. In addition to the 61.7 per cent of the population that identified itself as ‘Montenegrin’, the 1991 Yugoslav census found 9.3 per cent were Serbs, 14.5 per cent Muslims, 6.5 per cent Albanians, 1 per cent Croat and 8 per cent other.
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The presence of large number of refugees from Croatia and Bosnia must further alter these numbers, most likely to the benefit of the Serb population. The Montenegrin government estimated the republic’s population in 1998 as 650,575 inhabitants, compared with Serbia’s population of about 10,000,000.8 Montenegrins have always lacked a broad consensus on whether they are their own nation or a distinct branch of the greater Serbian people.9 Nevertheless, they have a historical distinction from the Serbs in that they were the only Balkan people to resist successfully Ottoman conquest. In 1918 Montenegro’s monarch was deposed and the country was absorbed into the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. Many Montenegrins never became fully reconciled to their loss of independence however. A Christmas uprising occurred in 1919 and the monarchist, separatist ‘Greens’ fought a guerrilla war against Yugoslav forces until 1926.10 Commenting on this period, Milovan Djilas observed that a majority rejected inclusion into Yugoslavia and wrote, ‘Old Montenegro was all out of joint. Her mountains and crags still stood, but she herself had fallen, sunken in hatred and blood, seeking but unable to find herself.’11 Serb–Montenegrin relations remained tense throughout the interwar period and during World War Two, Montenegrin autonomists took up arms against Chetniks and Partisans.12 Under Tito, Montenegrins received their own titular republic and were recognized as a distinct nationality by the 1946 constitution. Many, including Djilas, came to wholly endorse Yugoslavia.13 Nevertheless, two basic strains of Montenegrin nationalism competed in the postwar period, one stressing the close kinship between two branches of one Serbian nation, and the other emphasizing the uniqueness of the Montenegrin nation.14 By the mid-1980s, ‘Montenegro was becoming sharply polarized between antiSerbian and pro-Serbian nationalists’.15 In a symbolic move, the remains of King Nicholas and other Montenegrin royals were returned to Montenegro in 1989 and reinterred in Cetinje amidst much fanfare. The Montenegrin leadership nevertheless supported Milosˇevic´ and his Serb nationalist project, and the reformed League of Communists of Montenegro won the first free elections in Montenegro in 1990. However, while many Montenegrins eagerly participated in the wars against Bosnia and, particularly, Croatia, others remained uneasy. By the mid-1990s, Montenegro was moving to dissociate itself from Milosˇevic´’s Yugoslavia.
Montenegro’s political landscape Since early 2001, Montenegro has held two rounds of parliamentary elections, each of which produced a majority for Milo Djukanovic´’s pro-independence platform, but neither of which has indicated overwhelming support for Montenegrin separatism. Montenegro’s political scene can be basically divided into two contending coalitions, between which operates the small but hardly unimportant Liberal party (LSCG).16 Djukanovic´’s coalition, consisting of the DPS and SDP,17 competed in the April 2001 elections as ‘Victory for Montenegro – Milo Djukanovic´’ and in the October 2002 contest as ‘Democratic List for European Montenegro’.18 The Montenegrin opposition (SNP, SNS, NS19) ran as the
Montenegro and Serbia 55 ‘Together for Yugoslavia’ coalition in 2001, but renamed itself for 2002 as ‘Together for Changes’ (ZZP).20 Though it operates in coalition, Milo Djukanovic´’s nominally pro-independence DPS is the leading force in Montenegrin politics. Ironically, the DPS is actually the former Montenegrin division of the League of Communists,21 and Milosˇevic´ was able to count the Montenegrins and particularly their leader, Momir Bulatovic´, among his closest supporters in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In 1992, the DPS assumed its current name, and by 1997 the party was split into two factions respectively led by Momir Bulatovic´ and Milo Djukanovic´. Djukanovic´ himself had become Montenegro’s Prime Minister in February 1991 at the age of 29. In the early 1990s he had been a Milosˇevic´ loyalist but later sought to distance his party from the Serb strongman. When the Djukanovic´-led faction prevailed in 1997 and Djukanovic´ became the coastal republic’s president,22 Bulatovic´ left the party to form the Socialist People’s Party (SNP), which he later also left.23 The DPS’s smaller coalition partner, the Social Democrats (SDP), is strongly pro-independence and draws its support largely from well-educated and urban Montenegrins. Under Zarko Rakcevic´, the party has long been an advocate of a sovereign and internationally recognized country in a union with a similar Serbia. In January 2001, however, the DPS and the SDP went further, calling for international recognition of Montenegro. The Liberal Alliance of Montenegro (LSCG) has occupied an awkward position in the country during the last decade, and until spring 2002 operated as an uncomfortable partner with the DPS and the SDP. Although it shared certain views with the Victory for Montenegro coalition, the LSCG did not join the DPS in government until 2001, and in many ways continued to act like an opposition party. The Liberals support open borders, regional cooperation (including with former Yugoslav republics) and Montenegrin participation in European integration. Founded in 1990, the LSCG persistently opposed Milosˇevic´ and the wars of Yugoslav succession. Furthermore, it never recognized the 1992 establishment of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Milosˇevic´’s rump state that he intended to succeed the defunct socialist Yugoslavia (SFRY). Under the leadership of its current president, Miodrag Zivkovic´ and (until autumn 2002) President of the Parliament Vesna Perovic´, the LSCG has been Montenegro’s most persistent pro-referendum and pro-independence party. Djukanovic´’s ‘Victory for Montenegro’ coalition is opposed by the ‘Together for Changes’ coalition, consisting of the Socialist People’s Party (SNP), the People’s Party of Montenegro (NS) and the Serbian People’s Party (SNS). As its former name (Together for Yugoslavia) implies, this coalition supports union with Serbia, though in a somewhat redefined federation. The coalition contains many pro-Serb elements, but does not include the Serbian Radical Party (SRS) for example, which denies the existence of a separate Montenegrin nation. Together for Changes also attracts the votes of some minorities that fear the results of further Yugoslav dissolution. Its leading party, the SNP, was founded in 1998 after the split in the DPS. Originally headed by Momir Bulatovic´ and now by Predrag Bulatovic´, the party opposes Montenegrin independence, favouring a continued
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relationship with Serbia. Indeed, the SNP has not endorsed Djukanovic´’s moves to dissociate Montenegro from FRY and has been a regular receiver of financial and political support from Belgrade. While under Predrag Bulatovic´, the SNP has edged away somewhat from its pro- Milosˇevic´ past;24 it nevertheless consists of largely unreconstructed friends and allies of Milosˇevic´ who peddle threats of ethnic conflict and block cooperation with the ICTY. Unlike Djukanovic´’s coalition, the SNP did not boycott the September 2000 elections in Yugoslavia, and thus holds all but one seat (which went to its coalition partner, the SNS) in the Federal Parliament. The SNP was thus assured the role of the FRY Prime Minister under the Serb Kosˇtunica, because the 1992 FRY constitution stipulated that the state’s Premier and President could not hail from the same republic. The SNP’s two coalition partners were once one party and were allied with the DPS and the SDP. The NS, under Dragan Sˇ oc´, has additionally been allied previously with the LSCG. Though the NS has moderated its once fiercely pro-Serb tone, it still supports the preservation of a joint state with Serbia. The NS split with the DPS and the SDP as a result of those parties’ pro-independence January 2001 platform, precipitating parliamentary elections in April 2001. A more extreme faction of the NS later broke away to form the SNS under Bozidar Bojovic. Montenegro’s 22 April 2001 parliamentary elections were widely understood to be an unofficial referendum on whether to hold a referendum on independence, which Djukanovic´’s coalition supported. The coalition saw in the forced elections an opportunity to secure enough seats in the Montenegrin parliament to reach the two-thirds majority required for any changes to the Montenegrin constitution and, thus, independence. During the 2001 election campaign, the Victory for Montenegro coalition consistently emphasized the impossibility of achieving equality with Serbia in such a lopsided and twisted federation even after Milosˇevic´’s ousting. The Together for Yugoslavia coalition, by contrast, stressed the uncertainties and perils of Montenegrin independence. In particular, the proYugoslav coalition stressed the potential dangers of further Yugoslav dissolution posed to Montenegro’s ethnic minorities while simultaneously emphasizing the danger which separatist elements of those ethnic groups could pose to ˇ ´ declared ominously that it should not Montenegro itself. NS leader Dragan Soc be left to Muslims and Albanians to decide the fate of Montenegro but rather should be the decision of the country’s Orthodox population.25 Such rhetoric is not atypical of the pro-Yugoslav coalition, which has at times made inflammatory or menacing statements regarding the dangers poised to and by Montenegro’s minorities should the republic achieve formal independence. By contrast, Djukanovic´ tends to draw support from the country’s minorities.26 Though they failed to win a majority, the Together for Yugoslavia coalition celebrated the election results as a victory. In truth, however, the election results showed neither side to have a proper mandate in Montenegro in 2001. Djukanovic´’s coalition won 36 mandates and Together for Yugoslavia earned 33 in the 77-seat chamber, placing the LSCG in the role of kingmaker with its six seats.27 Thus, though there was a majority voice for Djukanovic´, it was a weak one. Despite failing to secure a two-thirds majority, pro-independence forces
Montenegro and Serbia 57 nevertheless vowed to persevere with a referendum. After six weeks of negotiations, the DPS and SDP reached an agreement to govern with the stridently pro-independence Liberals. That government would not be a stable one, however. For reasons that will be discussed elsewhere in this chapter, the government resulting from the 22 April 2001 elections would collapse within one-and-a-half years, foundering on the rocks of the independence issue.
Emergence of a sovereign state That such energy should be spent on a formal assertion of Montenegrin independence is perhaps not surprising, but the fact is that Montenegro has been virtually independent for all intents and purposes for several years. The kernel of independence was planted and gradually nurtured by Djukanovic´ and his supporters for a number of reasons. It became evident to many Montenegrins that the costs of association with Milosˇevic´’s ‘Yugoslav’ pariah state were outweighing the benefits. Furthermore, the economic costs of international sanctions and hyperinflation (as well as lost tourism revenues) were self-evident. That Montenegro could never have equality with its sister republic Serbia, as promised in the FRY constitution, appeared certain by the mid-1990s. Additionally, Montenegrins, many of whom had themselves brutally besieged Dubrovnik in 1991, began to tire of Milosˇevic´’s wars. Regarding the distinction made by Vjeran Pavlakovic´ and Sabrina Ramet (elsewhere in this book) between Jean Bodin’s and Thomas Hobbes’s notions of sovereignty, it almost goes without saying that the modus operandi of the Milosˇevic´ regime was to proceed with a Hobbesian arrogance for power, thinly cloaked with appeals to Bodin’s notions of the secular sovereign’s morally limited authority. Milosˇevic´ was careful to establish a veneer of legality around his actions but in fact acted arbitrarily to secure his own objectives. Milosˇevic´’s amendments to the FRY constitution that altered the nature of that state at the expense of impotent Montenegro stand as a supreme example of precisely such arrogance and will be treated later in this chapter. Montenegro’s de facto independence emerged gradually as Podgorica assumed federal competencies and disregarded federal institutions and FRY authorities abused the constitution or manipulated federal structures to the exclusion and detriment of Montenegro. Montenegro began the 1990s not as an upstart republic but as Serbia’s supplicant. On a republican level, one could say that the disintegration of the SFRY began in Montenegro with Milosˇevic´’s engineering of the replacement of the republic’s leadership with his supporters. Viktor Meier observes that this event beyond Serbia’s borders demonstrated to other republic leaders that Milosˇevic´ intended to dominate not just Serbia but all of Yugoslavia.28 Yet if by the autumn of 1989 Montenegro was ‘for all practical purposes a colony of Serbia’,29 this would change dramatically in the coming years as lost wars and hyperinflation cast a pall over the tiny republic.30 Milo Djukanovic´, a Milosˇevic´ ally installed in 1991 as Prime Minister, began to distance himself from his patron during the mid-1990s. As previously noted,
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meaningful change occurred in 1997 with the split in the DPS and Djukanovic´’s defeat of Momir Bulatovic´ in an October 1997 run-off election for the republic’s presidency.31 The first anti-Milosˇevic´ demonstrations occurred on 28 July of that year, as local police merely looked on.32 Later that year Djukanovic´ called Milosˇevic´ ‘an outdated politician’ and baldly declared that the question for Montenegro was ‘whether we want to enter the twenty-first century as a democratic and free Montenegro or become some insignificant appendage to an undemocratic regime’.33 Previous to his election as president, Montenegrin Prime Minister Djukanovic´ used his votes in the FRY parliament to block constitutional changes that would have granted the FRY President sweeping powers. Milosˇevic´ had become FRY President in July 1997 and sought to replicate the authority he had enjoyed in Serbia in the more figurehead role of FRY executive.34 Milosˇevic´ largely exercised power, however, through his personal authority and the removal of those disloyal to him. Recognizing Djukanovic´ as a threat, Milosˇevic´ orchestrated demonstrations that threatened to block Djukanovic´’s inauguration as president in early 1998. Henceforth, a pattern would develop whereby Milosˇevic´ would attempt to exclude Montenegrins from federal functions and subject the republic to economic blockade or harassment. Meanwhile, Montenegro would try to assert itself as well as possible at the federal level, while simultaneously distancing itself from Belgrade. As such, Podgorica came to assume ever-more federal areas of responsibility as Montenegro’s own. As a means of undermining the Milosˇevic´ regime, the United States and the European Union openly supported the Djukanovic´ government’s rebellion through aid and the relaxation of economic sanctions. Additionally, Montenegro gradually developed its own ties with NATO and the EU. Over the course of several years, Podgorica came to achieve de facto independence from Belgrade’s authority. John Locke provides a theoretical underpinning for Djukanovic´’s defiance of Belgrade in his Two Treatises of Government of 1698. Locke observes that a usurper of power ‘can never have Right on his side’. Should that usurper alter the forms and rules of the government beyond those which previously belonged to the lawful government, ‘tis Tyranny added to the Usurpation’.35 Indeed, the Milosˇevic´ regime and its apologists ruled arbitrarily, habitually denying political and human rights to the citizens of FRY, and regularly abrogating the state’s constitution. Simultaneously, Milosˇevic´’s policies and cronyism launched the country into an economic freefall from which it has yet to recover properly. In a state such as this, Montenegro and Djukanovic´ may be admired for their defiance. Locke states, Whosoever uses force without Right, as every one does in Society, who does it without Law, puts himself into a state of War with those, against whom he so uses it and in that state all former Ties are cancelled, all other Rights cease and every one has a Right to defend himself, and to resist the Aggressor.36 To Milosˇevic´’s consternation and fury, Djukanovic´ did resist. In the run up to the June 1998 parliamentary elections, Victory for Montenegro’s opponents charged
Montenegro and Serbia 59 Djukanovic´ with being a tool of the West and Islamic forces (because he received support from Montenegro’s Albanian and Muslim communities). At political rallies, Milosˇevic´ supporters inveighed against ‘Milo the Turk!’ while Djukanovic´’s supporters retorted, ‘This is not Serbia!’37 After Djukanovic´’s coalition took 49.5 per cent in the 1998 elections to the Montenegrin Parliament, the Parliament declared that it would no longer respect laws promulgated by the FRY parliament; it would not recognize Bulatovic´’s appointment as FRY Premier; and it would henceforth disregard the will of now-FRY President Milosˇevic´.38 Milosˇevic´ for his part blocked the transfer of pension and federal funds to Montenegro and banned President Djukanovic´ from his federal roles. Meanwhile, Djukanovic´ began to build up the Montenegrin police as a potential counterweight to the Yugoslav Army (VJ).39 The VJ’s presence in Montenegro has been significant over the 1990s, prompting one Montenegrin to complain in July 1999, ‘We live under Serbian occupation’.40 The Kosovo crisis provided another opportunity for Djukanovic´ to assert Montenegrin independence against Belgrade. During that conflict, Djukanovic´ walked a tightrope between NATO and Belgrade, and pronounced Montenegro ‘neutral’. Unsurprisingly, the NATO bombing had a crystallizing effect in Montenegro and was a turning point for the government. The government essentially rejected the call up of Montenegrin reservists and new recruits into the army. By July 1999, Montenegrin authorities were promising to arrest anyone on the republic’s territory indicted by the ICTY for war crimes. Foreign Minister Branko Perovic´ warned ‘We will arrest the first person who attempts to operate here in a federal uniform’ adding ‘we do not recognize federal authority’.41 Additionally, the Montenegrin government had called for the withdrawal of VJ troops.42 FRY/Serbia and Montenegro also came to confront each other economically. By spring 1999, the VJ was setting up periodic roadblocks to attempt to enforce payment of FRY taxes and customs duties (which Podgorica had refused to pay), or otherwise block goods from entering Montenegro from Serbia.43 By spring 2000, Serbia had imposed a strict ban on the shipment of goods between Serbia and Montenegro.44 And, perhaps most significantly, after several months of a dualcurrency system with the Yugoslav Dinar, Montenegro introduced the DM as its official currency in November 2000. In 2002, it was formally replaced by the euro.45 Also in 2000, the Montenegrin government declared that it could no longer recognize the VJ as a legitimate authority in Montenegro.46 The VJ maintained its presence, however, and at this writing (2003) is among the few federal institutions still present in Montenegro. By summer of 1999, Montenegro had abolished visa requirements and even set up its own airline. Having already rejected the legitimacy of FRY, Djukanovic´ dismissed the prospects for fair elections to the federal presidency and his supporters boycotted the September 2000 elections. As previously observed, the pro-Yugoslav opposition, however, did participate, winning every Montenegrin seat in the Federal Assembly. Ominously, the tension over Montenegro has produced a schism in the Serbian Orthodox Church in the republic, and resulted in the re-establishment of the autocephalous Montenegrin Orthodox Church.47 The existence of the specifically Montenegrin church is a development of no small significance, since an
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autocephalous Orthodox Church is traditionally seen as the repository of national identity and legitimacy in the Orthodox world. Thus, a bid for a Montenegrin Orthodox Church strongly suggests a bid for separate statehood and has been harshly rejected by the Serbian Orthodox Church. Violence and confrontation between members of the rival churches is not unknown. So, currently Montenegro may be said to exercise the sovereignty of an independent state in numerous ways. The Montenegrin Central Bank is an independent institution from the Yugoslav National Bank, and in fact the two banks have little to do with each other. The official currency in the republic (in which virtually all transactions take place) is the Euro, which further frees the Montenegrin economy from Belgrade’s influence by denying the Yugoslav National Bank the ability to determine monetary policy there.48 Although Montenegro lacks a proper military, the robust Montenegrin police act as an ersatz defence force. The elected government only acknowledges the FRY regime in the most limited and reluctant of ways. The republic effectively runs its own foreign policy through the Montenegrin Ministry of Foreign Affairs and has successfully asserted a separate foreign policy from Belgrade’s. Montenegro’s ‘trade missions’ serve as self-styled embassies and consulates in Washington, Brussels and elsewhere. Since 1999, Montenegro has operated a distinct visa regime from FRY. Montenegro maintains border controls with Serbia, asserts its own customs regime and collects duties on trade. The Serbian Orthodox Church has suffered a split with the establishment of an autocephalous Montenegrin Orthodox Church, traditionally seen as a source of national legitimacy and assertion of national identity. Even after Milosˇevic´’s ousting, the Montenegrin government continued to insist that little had changed in the FRY, and that therefore the coastal republic could not expect fair treatment within the federation or proper representation by the FRY on the international stage. In addition to the pervasive belief that democratic Montenegro would prosper and integrate into the EU faster without the dead weight of the FRY, Montenegrin authorities have based their claims to independence on a number of grounds, including illegal acts and constitutional abuses that occurred under the Milosˇevic´ regime. The chief such abuse was the amending of the FRY constitution which relegated Montenegro to second-class status in the so-called federation. Because of the conduct of the Milosˇevic´ regime even before the passage of constitutional amendments in July 2000, however, the FRY constitution may be said to have already been seriously in breach, raising the matter of the legitimacy of the joint state. Podgorica has thus assumed most of the key functions of the federal state, leading one Deputy Premier of Serbia to acknowledge, that ‘Montenegro is de facto independent’.49 Thus, even before the EU-brokered agreement establishing ‘Serbia and Montenegro’ one may have been forgiven for asking if the Yugoslavia still properly existed at all.
Altered states The 1992 constitution of the Federal Republic of Montenegro opens by citing the ‘determination of its citizens for Montenegro to continue to live in the joint state
Montenegro and Serbia 61 of Yugoslavia as a sovereign and equitable republic’.50 Such an arrangement appears guaranteed by Article 1 of the 1992 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which states that the FRY shall be ‘a sovereign, federal state, founded on the equality of its citizens and the equality of its member republics’.51 Furthermore, the constitution observes that the state is founded upon the rule of law and stipulates that ‘Executive and judicial powers shall be subject to law.’52 Finally, authority in the FRY, according to Article 12, is to be organized on the principle of separation of powers between the legislature, executive and judiciary. On all of these accounts, the FRY failed its constitution, thereby imperiling its legitimacy. By exercising his control of the Federal Constitutional Court, in 1998 Milosˇevic´ blocked Montenegro from installing its legally appointed representatives in the upper house (Chamber of Republics) of the federal parliament, supposing them to be more loyal to Djukanovic´ than himself.53 As such, the previous, Milosˇevic´-loyal, Montenegrin delegates retained their seats and Milosˇevic´ was able to guarantee his influence over that institution. Thus went a pattern where Milosˇevic´ did not circumvent formal institutions but rather controlled them through his proxies to exclude obstreperous Montenegro from its rightful influence in the affairs of state. In addition to locking out the new Montenegrin deputies from the upper house, Milosˇevi´c removed disloyal representatives from Montenegro from the Yugoslav National Bank, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Supreme Defence Council, the Federal Constitutional Court and the Federal Supreme Court.54 Additionally, as Montenegrin representatives regularly complained, the Federal Constitutional Court was beholden to Milosˇevic´.55 In addition to demonstrating the clear lack of separation of executive, legislative and judicial authority in FRY, the barring of the newly-elected Montenegrin representatives to the Chamber of Republics was particularly important because this body was the only one where the Montenegrin republic had absolute parity with the much larger Serbia. It was only here that Montenegro could exercise meaningful influence on the federal level through its veto power over legislation, the election for the FRY President, or the selection of the federal government. Thus when Milosˇevic´ barred the appointed deputies, the Montenegrin government pronounced the FRY’s chief bodies to be illegal and illegitimate. The constitution was in breach.56 Finally, during the summer of 2000, Milosˇevic´ and his cohorts rammed through a collection of constitutional amendments designed to enhance the position of the FRY presidency while reducing even Montenegro’s lingering formal influence in FRY affairs. Montenegro was being constitutionally shut out of FRY matters. The impact of these amendments was immediately recognized in Montenegro and by the Serbian opposition. Opposition politician Zarko Korac (now Serbian Deputy Prime Minister) called the amendments ‘almost a death blow to the Yugoslav federation’.57 Vuk Drasˇkovic´ pronounced the constitutional changes as ‘legal terrorism’,58 while his Serbian Renewal Movement warned ‘The Yugoslav constitution was torn apart and the final stage of the destruction of the Federal state’ begun. The changes, furthermore, ‘fully destroyed the statehood of Montenegro’.59 Meanwhile, Zoran Djindic´’s Democratic Party concurred, charging the new
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constitution as ‘both the annulment of the federal state and a push to drive Montenegro out of Yugoslavia’.60 Miodrag Vukovic´, advisor to President Djukanovic´, stated bluntly that the changes ‘amounted to the constitution of a new country’.61 The amendments were adopted in approximately two hours, without proper review by the Constitutional Committee of the Parliament, or public debate. Podgorica was not even consulted on the amendments, a fact which the International Crisis Group asserts violates the parity principle enshrined in Article 1 of the FRY Constitution.62
General dynamics The struggle to redefine the FRY or achieve formal Montenegrin independence cannot be viewed from a single angle. Indeed, the battle for the future of the FRY and Montenegro contains several other, sometimes interlocking, dynamics. In Montenegro, local politicians struggling over the republic sometimes resemble medieval notables battling to control a fiefdom.63 Djukanovic´ and the DPS were no doubt sincere in their belief that Montenegro needs totally to redefine Yugoslavia or leave it, but there was dissent even within the DPS over which of these alternatives is preferable. Within the DPS some forces urged accommodation with Serbia/FRY. Meanwhile, the LSCG has always been highly distrustful of the DPS and never moderated its strident demands for independence. The LSCG’s recent alliance with the DPS was conditional on a promised independence referendum, and the Liberals made it amply clear during the 2001 to 2002’s independence negotiations with Belgrade that their cooperation in government remained contingent upon that referendum. Thus, during those negotiations Djukanovic´’s DPS had to struggle with itself, with its governing partner and with the opposition Together-for-Yugoslavia coalition, which exclusively represented Montenegro in federal bodies and regularly called Montenegro an authoritarian, personal state of Djukanovic´.64 As for Yugoslavia’s last president, the Montenegrin government saw in Kosˇtunica not democratic renewal but a shrewd repackaging of the Serb nationalist project, which would achieve its aims at Podgorica’s expense. As such, Montenegro was initially very wary of FRY involvement in any negotiations on the future of the Federation, and early on stipulated that SNP member and FRY Prime Minister Dragisˇa Pesˇic´ be excluded from the process. Montenegro’s minorities appear divided on the matter of independence, with Albanians being more in favour of separation from Serbia, and Bosniak Muslims decidedly less enthusiastic. According to the International Crisis Group, leaders of Montenegro’s Albanian political parties have repeatedly professed their loyalty to Montenegro. Nevertheless, opposition parties in Montenegro have been vocal and often provocative in expressing their fears that minorities would proceed to destabilize the country in the event of a declaration of independence. Such claims may be opportunistic, but they also suggest potentially real concerns. The Serb–Muslim border is straddled by a swath of territory known as the Sandzˇ ak that contains a large majority of ‘Bosniak’ Muslims. Cross-border movement by Serbs, Montenegrins and Muslims alike is very common in this region, and it is not unusual for residents of one republic to work or visit family in the
Montenegro and Serbia 63 other. Accordingly, Muslims on both sides of the border have developed opinions on the subject of Montenegrin independence. One main concern is that Muslims would become scapegoats of frustrated Serbs and Montenegrins, or that Muslims would suffer new oppression or expulsion with the formal division of the joint state. In October 2001, Muslim parties organized a pro-Yugoslav rally, and in mid-February 2002 the International Democratic Union, the Bosniak Democratic Union and the Bosniak Democratic Party issued a joint statement in which they declared that they could never support ‘ “Berlin walls” between Rozaje [Montenegro] and Novi Pazar [Serbia]’, nor could they ‘interrupt communication with their relatives in the Serbian part of Sandzˇ ak’.65 The SRNA (Bosnian Serb News Agency) has also quoted the chairman of the International Democratic Union and former leader of the Party of Democratic Action in Montenegro as opposing a referendum in Montenegro as destabilizing and likely to deepen the current political crisis.66 The OSCE believes Montenegro’s Muslims to be generally supportive of Djukanovic´ and the DPS, the SDP, or the LSCG. Indeed, under Djukanovic´, Montenegro’s minority-rights record has been impressive (for the region) and ethnic relations are generally good. Nevertheless, there have been allegations of abuse by Muslim leaders. The Chair of the Bosniak Society, for example, has remarked that Muslims in northern Montenegro live in fear and uncertainty and were increasingly moving to Novi Pazar. Muslim communities near the border in particular favour maintaining ties with Serbia for fear of their communities being divided. To forestall such a division, some Sandzˇ ak Muslims have considered calling their own referendum. Said Chairman of the People’s Movement of Sandzˇ ak, Dzˇemail Suljevic´: The border cannot be at Mehov Krs and cannot be where it never existed in the first place. We do not contest the right of Podgorica and the current authorities in Montenegro to call a referendum, but we shall absolutely and very soon set an initiative in motion to call a referendum at the level of Sandzˇak so that the citizens can have a say in which state Sandzak should be. All citizens should take part [in the referendum], that is Bosniaks as well as Serbs and Montenegrins. We propose or rather send a message to Mr. Djukanovic´ and the current regime in Montenegro that if they want a secession of Montenegro then they have to choose between two issues – Sandzˇak and Montenegro, that is, to set up a new state called Sandzˇak and Montenegro or to have a lesser Montenegro or mini-Montenegro’.67 Even should this be mere hyperbole and such a Sandzˇ ak referendum never be held, that some Sandzˇ ak leaders so oppose the division of the region does not bode well for the future territorial integrity of an independent Montenegro.
Negotiations While there is a Montenegrin nationalist element to Montenegrin separatism, it is hardly comparable to the nationalism that has reigned in Serbia or Croatia. It
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is true that much Montenegrin symbolism and heraldry has been employed by the separatists and there are no doubt true nationalists involved in the separatist movement. As previously mentioned, however, many of the supporters of Montenegrin independence are not Montenegrins at all, or even Slavs: rather, they are Albanian. Montenegrin separatism is on one level a move towards ‘state rights’, a republic asserting its position in the FRY and also that of the historic Montenegrin state. It is also a reaction against the excesses and transgressions of the FRY and Serbia. Perhaps most important from the negotiating point of view, Montenegrin separatism is a point of economic self-defence. The government of Montenegro may be expected to accept many things, but a return to the Dinar, or even a properly unified customs regime with Serbia is unimaginable. Podgorica makes sound arguments about the need for an open trade regime and a monetary policy that is independent of Belgrade. (By adopting the Euro, of course, Podgorica has effectively surrendered monetary policy to the EU.) Finally, the realities of coalition politics eliminated certain options for Djukanovic´’s and then Montenegrin Prime Minister Filip Vujanovic´’s government, and compelled the government to pursue independence. From the onset of talks with Belgrade, the DPS’s coalition partners warned that they would leave the government in the event of rapprochement with Belgrade, thus forcing new elections.68 Meanwhile, though advocates of a joint state no doubt include those who sincerely believe in the wisdom of continued union with Serbia, many of the opponents of separatism are basically unreconstructed friends and allies of Milosˇevic´ who peddle threats of ethnic conflict and block cooperation with the ICTY. Besides opposing Montenegrin independence, they seem still committed to Milosˇevic´’s projects, if ˇ ˇelj. not that of Vojislav Ses Negotiations on the future of the federation took place in a number of forums involving a number of participants over several months. The meetings included the FRY, Serbian, and Montenegrin political authorities, teams of ‘experts’ and, finally, Javier Solana and other EU representatives.69 Beside ways to reorganize the federation, Belgrade and Podgorica argued whether the future of the federation should be discussed at all, with the Montenegrin delegation proposing instead to define an alliance of independent states.70 The talks occurred in Podgorica, Belgrade and Brussels and occasioned alternately optimistic predictions and pessimistic grumbling. Vesna Perovic´, then the fervently pro-independence President of the Montenegrin Parliament, captured the mood when she quipped that the worst aspect of the negotiations was that each meeting concluded only with the agreement to hold future meetings.71 Throughout negotiations, Podgorica advocated a redefined union of internationally recognized, independent states; Serbia and the FRY pushed for a loose federation; and the European Union called for a ‘democratic Montenegro in a democratic Yugoslavia’.
A new Sporazum On 14 March 2002 Yugoslav, Serbian and Montenegrin leaders signed the ‘Proceeding Points for the Restructuring of Relations between Serbia and
Montenegro and Serbia 65 Montenegro’, commonly referred to as the ‘Belgrade Agreement’. The document, which was signed under intense pressure from the European Union, redefines relations between the two remaining Yugoslav republics in an arrangement that Yugoslav President Vojislav Kosˇtunica insisted represents a true break with previous incarnations of Yugoslavia. The Montenegrin President and Prime Minister (accused of ‘treason’ by their coalition partners), however, faced a difficult time in convincing many of their countrymen of the wisdom of the deal.72 When President Djukanovic´ addressed the Montenegrin Parliament on 26 March 2002, he insisted that he and Prime Minister Vujanovic´ were confident that the new arrangements were ‘good for Montenegro and all its citizens’. However, his subsequent remarks do not suggest his own deep conviction of that appraisal, or that he expects many in Montenegro to share it. Djukanovic´’s speech was filled with some truth, some exaggeration and some vagueness. However, the nature and details of the Belgrade Agreement suggest that the new arrangements are neither a permanent nor a real solution. Montenegro’s pro-independence forces have not been defeated, nor can the forces favouring a joint state with Serbia claim final victory. The new arrangement effectively recognizes the status quo between the Serbian and Montenegrin republics, and therefore does little to resolve the basic uncertainty surrounding the joint state. However, with Montenegrin opinion so closely divided over independence, and the international community so unenthusiastic about Montenegrin separatism, such a non-solution may have been the only option for Montenegro’s leaders. As Djukanovic´ said before the Montenegrin Assembly, I think the agreement on redefining relations between Montenegro and Serbia to a large extent acknowledged the political reality in Montenegro, which objectively should result in a more favorable atmosphere for political processes. We who are present in this room today bear utmost responsibility for this. The agreement provides equal opportunity to the forces who prefer an independence option for Montenegro and to those who believe a joint state with Serbia is a better choice. This, too, is one of the qualities of the agreement: we have to observe it whether we like it or not.73 The agreement signed in Belgrade on 14 March 2002 is remarkable for the ‘new’ state it creates, and also in that it ultimately resolves so little of the root differences between Montenegro and Serbia. The ‘Proceeding Points for the Restructuring of Relations between Serbia and Montenegro’ ends the ‘Yugoslav’ fiction of Milosˇevic´’s FRY and establishes a new state to be called Serbia and Montenegro. This ‘truly original solution’ (in Kosˇtunica’s words),74 reconstructs the country as a very loose union of highly autonomous republics linked by a single president, a unicameral parliament, a council of ministers and a Court of Serbia and Montenegro. According to the document, the state’s president will be elected by the Parliament of Serbia and Montenegro, which will ‘provide positive discrimination for Montenegrin representatives’.75 The president’s role will be
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limited and the council of ministers will consist of just five departments, including foreign affairs, defence, international economic relations, internal economic relations and protection of human and minority rights. Serbia and Montenegro are to have a joint army under a Supreme Defence Council, composed of the presidents of Montenegro, Serbia and ‘Serbia and Montenegro’, and the Supreme Defence Council will take decisions by consensus. What will most notably not be common between the two republics is the economic sphere. Though the member states will be obliged to allow the free flow of people, goods, services and capital, they are also responsible for establishing their own customs regimes.76 Additionally, Montenegro will retain the Euro, while Serbia will continue to use the Dinar. Thus Serbia and Montenegro, though nominally one country, will not enjoy a proper common market or a common currency. The agreement envisions a Constitutional Commission that will submit a Constitutional Charter to the republic parliaments, after which elections and appointments for the joint state’s posts and bodies will take place. The agreement, contingent upon approval by member-state parliaments and the federal parliament, is also notable for the lurking distrust that is evident in its many provisions.77 Through the Supreme Defence Council, Montenegro has been certain to secure a veto over the use of a common army. (Podgorica has long viewed the VJ not as a defender of Montenegro but rather as a threat.) Additionally, the agreement stipulates that the EU monitor the economic functioning of the member states and even act as an arbitrator should one member state believe that the other is shirking its responsibilities towards the free flow of commerce. An awkward principle of rotation is meant to ensure parity of representation between the two member republics in international organizations such as the UN, OSCE and the Council of Europe. The document asserts that ‘In the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense, the minister and his/her deputy from different member states shall take turns when one half of the term in office expires’.78 Thus, rotation will apply to domestic portfolios as well. What is perhaps most remarkable about the Belgrade Agreement is the very uncertainty built into the new state. The agreement includes a ‘Provision on Reconsideration’ which stipulates that ‘Upon the expiration of a three-year period, the member states shall be entitled to institute proceedings for a change of state status, that is, withdrawal from the state union [my italics].’79 So likely did the possibility of withdrawal by a member state seem to the agreement’s authors that they included a provision recognizing Serbia as the successor to FRY in regards to international documents related to Yugoslavia, especially UN Security Council Resolution 1244.80 Ultimately, neither federalists nor separatists can claim proper victory with the Belgrade Agreement, which effectively defers a final decision on Montenegro’s status. Indeed, the Provision on Renegotiation could conceivably provide incentive for separatists to sabotage the new arrangements. With two distinct currencies and customs regimes, it is difficult to imagine how the state could hope to move towards a proper common market. Additionally, the rotation principle for ministerial posts and international organizations may well prove inoperable. At
Montenegro and Serbia 67 the very least it is bound to undermine the effectiveness of those institutions it governs. Montenegro’s securing of an effective veto over the deployment of the common army, however, should be considered an unqualified success. Ultimately if Montenegro really is able to exercise effective influence in Belgrade, the deal will have somewhat expanded Montenegrin sovereignty, in that Montenegrin representatives will have accesses to the resources of a much larger state. In essence, however, this deal effectively recognizes the status quo of two highly autonomous republics in a union that at times seems more fictional than real. Reaction to the agreement has been mixed, and it is notable that dissatisfaction has been expressed at the Yugoslav, Serbian, and Montenegrin levels. At the federal level, Mladjan Dinkic´, the Governor of Yugoslavia’s National Bank, pessimistically claimed that the agreement did not resolve matters but in fact created new areas of contention between the member states. Referring to Kosˇtunica’s characterization of the deal as ‘original’, he stated: ‘The solution is indeed original because with no common monetary or tariff system there can be no state’. To Dinkic´’s mind, the only winner from the agreement was Javier Solana.81 Even Yugoslav Deputy Prime Minister Miroljub Labus, a signatory to the agreement, announced that he was ‘not happy’ with it and only signed in order to assure Belgrade’s future progress towards European integration.82 Critics of the deal deride the new joint state as ‘Solania’, after the EU diplomat Javier Solana who brokered the Belgrade Agreement. In Serbia, Serbian Justice Minister and head of the Christian Democratic Party of Serbia (DHSS) Vladan Batic´ announced that his party would not support the new arrangements, which could not last anyway. Batic´, who had earlier called for a referendum on independence in Serbia stated: ‘It’s high time that we [Serbs] came to our senses and at the start of the third millennium created our own, independent, respected, democratic, European, integrated and credible state.’ Calling Serbia the greatest loser of the joint-state accord, Batic´ continued, ‘We have been turned into European Kurds of sorts’, and vowed to persevere with his referendum efforts.83 The DSS and the DS unsurprisingly endorsed the agreement, while the spokesman for Milosˇevic´’s Socialist Party of Serbia called 14 March 2002 ‘the most shameful day in the history of the Serbian nation’.84 Serbian Prime Minister Djindic´ remarked that the deal recognized the status quo.85 Meanwhile Vojvodina’s politicians had mixed reactions to the accord, with some calling on Serbia (to which Vojvodina nominally belongs) to now reassess its own internal make-up and provide greater autonomy for Vojvodina. In Montenegro, debate over the new arrangements was predictably explosive. As previously observed, the DPS’s coalition partners maintained far more strident separatist positions than that party. Indeed, the LSCG predicated its participation in government on the holding of an independence referendum. After signing the agreement with Belgrade, President Djukanovic´ and Prime Minister Vujanovic´ faced a full-scale revolt by their coalition partners which they attempted to quell in part by highlighting the impermanence of the new arrangements. After the main committee of DPS voted unanimously to support the new union, the SDP issued a statement, on 15 March, that it would quit the Montenegrin government
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if the parliament ratified the new union with Serbia. On 19 March the LSCG also announced that it could no longer support the government, and Liberal leader Miodrag Zivkovic´ called upon Djukanovic´ and Vujanovic´ to resign.86 By contrast, representatives of the Together for Yugoslavia Coalition predictably indicated that the coalition would endorse the new state. Djukanovic´ has attempted to mollify his coalition partners by emphasizing the temporary nature of the new state, calling it ‘a transitional arrangement on the way to full independence of both Montenegro and Serbia’. In an attempt to demonstrate DPS’s fidelity to the goal of eventual independence, party official Miodrag Vukovic´ announced that party leaders could easily agree to schedule a referendum in March 2005, shortly after the Period of Reconsideration.87 Djukanovic´’s dilemma over independence has long been acute and a solution to the political fallout has seemed elusive at best. As Miodrag Zivkovic´ observed in the initial aftermath of the Belgrade Agreement, ‘It is important to know one thing and it is that Mr. Djukanovic´ has no good possibilities. All the possibilities are objectively bad and he’s is in a situation [where he must] choose the least terrible.’88 Indeed, the fallout from the signing of the agreement with Belgrade was so intense that extraordinary parliamentary elections were called for October 2002 in Montenegro.
Conclusion The Montenegrin constitution’s preamble begins by invoking the ‘historical right of the Montenegrin people to have its own state, acquired through a centuries long struggle for freedom’.89 With the collapse of the equitable federation guaranteed by the FRY Constitution, which was a Montenegrin requirement for participation in a joint state, this legally codified ‘historical right’ has reasserted itself. A majority in Montenegro favours independence, but the country is closely divided over the issue. Furthermore, opposition to separation from the joint state often follows ethnic or regional lines, suggesting that the territorial integrity of an independent Montenegro could not necessarily be guaranteed. Montenegro’s politicians are in the unenviable position of having to disappoint nearly half of the country’s population no matter which choice (continued union or full independence) they take. Montenegro’s leaders have been bold in their assertion of sovereignty and repatriation of authority to Podgorica. However, the question of independence will be difficult for the coastal republic to resolve and will ultimately depend heavily on issues of identity. Montenegro long ago secured de facto autonomy from Belgrade, but does a majority in this country desire proper independence? Recent electoral results suggest a cautiously affirmative answer to the independence question. In October 2002’s parliamentary elections, Djukanovic´’s reassembled coalition (DPS and SDP) triumphed over Montenegro’s pro-Yugoslav bloc. Still espousing the goal of eventual independence while nevertheless advocating that the new state arrangement with Serbia be given a chance, the ‘Democratic List for European Montenegro – Milo Djukanovic´’ handily defeated the renamed ‘Together for
Montenegro and Serbia 69 Changes’ coalition (ZZP), winning an absolute majority in Montenegro’s parliament. The parties of Together for Changes lost seats, but the real losers in the election were the Liberals, whose calls of immediate independence apparently failed to resound with the electorate. The LSCG also perhaps lost votes for its bizarre behaviour in the months preceding the campaign, when it essentially allied itself with the pro-Yugoslav bloc for the purpose of bringing down the government. Thus, the electorate rewarded Montenegro’s moderates at the expense of both extremes of the independence spectrum.90 Meanwhile, Montenegro continues to exercise its sovereignty at the expense of the joint state in both domestic and international matters. After months of further negotiations, the Serbian and Montenegrin governments were finally able to adopt a constitutional charger for the new state, in February 2003. Thus, ostensibly moribund Yugoslavia continued its zombie-like existence for nearly a year after the ink was dry on the Belgrade Agreement. As such, one may be forgiven for pessimism regarding the future of the new joint state. Indeed, shortly after his May 2003 election as Montenegrin President, Filip Vujanovic confirmed his intention to hold a referendum on independence after a trial period for the new joint-state arrangement.91 In any event, it is difficult to imagine Montenegro surrendering its de facto independence. Ultimately the accord establishing ‘Serbia and Montenegro’ has not resulted in an attempt at a new Yugoslavia. Rather Serbia and Montenegro, their ‘historic rights’ as states explicitly acknowledged in the founding accord of the joint state, have agreed to a loose union of highly autonomous states that appears very temporary in nature. In the process, they have definitively shown that behind the fiction of Milosˇevic´’s FRY lay the obvious truth that Yugoslavia became an anachronism over a decade ago.92
Notes 1 William Jovanovich ‘Introduction’ in Milovan Djilas, Land without Justice (New York: Harcourt Brace,1958), p. xi. 2 Podgorica, formerly known as Titograd, is the capital of Montenegro. 3 International Crisis Group, ‘Montenegro: Resolving the Independence Deadlock’, 1 August 2001, p. 61. 4 Trans. Demokratska Partija Socijalista Crne Gore. 5 Gilbert Harvey Grosvenor, ‘Servia and Montenegro’, National Geographic, November 1908, p. 774. 6 Ibid., p. 783. 7 Alfred Lord Tennyson, Montenegro, available at www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/tennysonmontenegro.html 8 Available at www.montenegro.yu. The Montenegrin government expected to conduct a census in spring 2002. At present, however, it appears that that census will be postponed because of local elections in the republic and a possible referendum. 9 Patrick Moore, ‘Montenegro at a Crossroads’, RFE/RL Newsline, vol. 5, no. 77, II (20 April 2001), available at www.rferl.com 10 Jeff Chu, ‘Time Trail: Montenegro’, available at www.time.com/time/europe/timetrails/ montenegro/
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11 See Djilas, Land without Justice, p. 99. 12 Viktor Meier, Yugoslavia: A History of its Demise, trans. Sabrina Ramet (New York: Routledge, 1995), p. 83. 13 Indeed, Djilas thought of himself as a Yugoslav and objected being called Montenegrin. William Jovanovich in Djilas, Land without Justice, p. xi. 14 Sabrina Ramet, Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia, 1962–1991. 2nd edn. (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1992), p. 212. 15 See Ramet, Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia, 1962–1991, p. 212. 16 LSGC – Liberalni Savez Crne Gore. 17 SDP – Socijal Demokratska Stranka Crne Gore. 18 ‘Pobjeda je Crne Gore – Democratska Koalicija Milo Djukanovic´’. 19 SNP – Socijalisticka Narodna Partija, SNS – Srpska Narodna Stranka, NS – Narodna Stranka Crne Gore. 20 ZZP – ‘Zajedno za Jugoslaviju’ and ‘Zajedno za Promene’. 21 Under the SFRY system, republic Leagues of Communists were highly autonomous and effectively acted as individual parties. 22 When Djukanovic´ was inaugurated president in 1998, SNP and Milosˇevic´ supporters staged several days of protests featuring toughs bussed in from Serbia, a Milosˇevic´ tactic from the early 1990s. After the 2002 parliamentary elections, Djukanovic´ resigned his presidential post to become Prime Minister. 23 SDP – Sociajalisticka Narodna Partija. 24 SNP opposes cooperation with the ICTY, however. For example, in 2001 its representatives in the Federal Assembly blocked the passage of legislation that would have allowed FRY to extradite indicted war criminals to The Hague. 25 International Crisis Group, ‘Montenegro: Time to Decide’, 18 April 2001, pp. 6–7. 26 A pro-Yugoslav position, however, is not necessarily indicative of xenophobia or nationalism. Often positions on independence follow regional and generational lines. 27 Two small Albanian parties also won one seat each. 28 See Meier, Yugoslavia: A History of its Demise, p. 83. 29 Sabrina Ramet, Balkan Babel: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito to the War for Kosovo, 3rd edn (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999), p. 40. 30 Eric Gordy observes that by January 1994, the height of hyperinflation, the monthly inflation rate was 313,563,558 per cent. Eric D. Gordy, The Culture of Power in Serbia: Nationalism and the Destruction of Alternatives (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999), p. 170. 31 On 20 May 1998, Bulatovic´ was appointed Prime Minister of FRY. 32 Jane Perlez, ‘Serbia’s Last Ally in the Yugoslav Breakup is Restive’, New York Times, 7 August 1997, available through Lexis Nexis. 33 Chris Hedges, ‘Rival’s Victory in Montenegro Weakens Milosˇevic´’, New York Times, 21 October 1997, Lexis Nexis. 34 Ibid. 35 John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, ed. Peter Laslett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960), p. 397. 36 Ibid., p. 419. 37 Chris Hedges, ‘It’s Serb vs. Serb in Montenegro Vote’, New York Times, 28 May 1998, Lexis Nexis. 38 Ibid. 39 The VJ was estimated at 25,000 in July 1999 against Djukanovic´’s 15,000 police. Associated Press, ‘Montenegro Begins to Talk with Belgrade on Gaining Autonomy’, New York Times, 15 July 1999, Lexis Nexis. 40 Chris Hedges, ‘Montenegrins, Angry Serbs, Talk of a Split’, New York Times, 10 July 1999, Lexis Nexis. 41 Ibid.
Montenegro and Serbia 71 42 The destruction in Serbia due to NATO bombing was far worse than in Montenegro, providing another economic argument to those who anticipate swift economic growth following independence from FRY. 43 See Hedges, ‘Montenegrins, Angry Serbs, Talk of a Split’. 44 Carlotta Gall, ‘Blockade is Raising Tension for Serbia’s Smaller Partner’, New York Times, 2 April 2002, Lexis Nexis. 45 The DM was replaced by the euro following the introduction of the euro in January 2002. 46 International Crisis Group, ‘Current Legal Status of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and of Serbia and Montenegro’, 19 September 2000, p. 32. 47 The Montenegrin Orthodox Church was abolished under King Alexander Karadjordjevic in 1920. 48 Edmund L. Andrews, ‘Euro is a Hit in Montenegro (Yes, Montenegro)’, New York Times, 17 January 2002, Lexis Nexis. 49 Zarko Korac, Deputy Prime Minister of Serbia at the Swiss Foundation for World Affairs conference, ‘Stabilizing and Reconciling the Balkans’ at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, 23 October 2001. 50 Constitution of the Republic of Montenegro (1992). Available at www.mediaclub.cg.yu (Preamble). 51 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (1992). Article 1. 52 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (1992). Article 9. 53 Miloˇsevic´ insisted that the previous MPs’ mandates simply be extended. Associated Press, ‘Montenegro Begins Talks with Belgrade on Gaining Autonomy’, New York Times, 15 July 1999, Lexis Nexis. 54 International Crisis Group, ‘Current Legal Status of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and of Serbia and Montenegro’, 19 September 2000. p. 20. 55 Indeed, the International Crisis Group observes that the Federal Constitutional and Supreme Courts trespassed beyond their strictly federal jurisdiction when they declared invalid the election process for the Montenegrin Presidency (1997) and Montenegrin Parliament (1998). The Courts had no business in republic affairs. International Crisis Group, ‘Current Legal Status of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and of Serbia and Montenegro’, 19 September 2000, pp. 23–25. 56 Ibid., p. 23. 57 Paul Watson, ‘Miloˇsevic´ Rewrites Constitution in Bid to Extend his Rule’, Gazette (Montreal), 7 July 2000, Lexis Nexis. 58 Ibid. 59 Deutsche Presse-Agentur, ‘Serbian Opposition Condemns Constitutional Amendments’, 6 July 2000, Lexis Nexis. 60 Ibid. 61 Steven Erlanger, ‘Change in Yugoslav Constitution allows Miloˇsevic´ to Seek another Term as President’, New York Times, 7 July 2000, Lexis Nexis. 62 International Crisis Group, ‘Current Legal Status of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and of Serbia and Montenegro’, 19 September 2000, p. 28. 63 Serious allegations against Djukanovic´ have been made by the Croatian weekly Nacional. According to Nacional, Djukanovic´ has been involved in cigarette smuggling and contract killings and has amassed a fortune of US$63 million. Indeed, Djukanovic´ is widely supposed to have mafia connections. 64 The decision of Djukanovic´ and DPS to boycott FRY elections in September 2000 meant that all but one of the Montenegrin seats on the federal level were won by SNP. The remaining seat went to its ally, SNS. 65 Statement by International Democratic Union, the Bosniak Democratic Union and the Bosniak Democratic Party, ‘We Do Not want Walls between Rozaje and Novi Pazar’, Vijesti (Podgorica), 11 February 2002, at www.mnnews.net
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66 Harun Hadzic in BBC Monitoring Service, ‘Montenegro: Bosniak Politician Opposes Referendum’, SRNA News Agency, Bijeljina, 11 February 2002, at www.ft.com 67 Dzˇemail Suljevic´ in BBC Montiroring Service, ‘If Montenegro Calls Referendum, Sandzak’s Bloc Will Do Likewise, Party Chairman’, Radio Novi Pazar, 12 February 2002. 68 Generally, these coalition partners are motivated much less by nationalism or even Montenegrin identity than by seeing secession as a way to move closer to Europe and safeguard or even advance reforms. 69 Groups of technocrats from FRY, Montenegro and Serbia have met to discuss monetary and economic issues, constitutional issues, and foreign policy and defence matters. 70 FRY has sought to capitalize on apparent EU support for an enduring federation while Montenegro counts on its right to democratic self determination through a referendum, its democratic irrefutability. 71 Vesna Perovic´, ‘Solana and Djukanovic´ Meeting to Arrange Meetings’, 11 February 2002, at www.b92.net 72 Slavko Perovic´, ‘Perovic´: Djukanovic´ Explains the Treason’, Publika (Podgorica), 27 March 2002, at www.mnnews.net 73 Milo Djukanovic´’s address to the Montenegrin Parliament, ‘Montenegrin President Recommends Parliament Adopt Agreement with Serbia’, BBC Monitoring Service, TV Crna Gora, 26 March 2002. 74 Vojislav Kosˇtunica, ‘Yugoslav President Says Agreement “Basis for Future Constitutional Document” ’, BBC Montitoring Service, Radio Belgrade, 14 March 2002. 75 Kostunica, ‘Proceeding Points for the Restructuring of Relations between Serbia and Montenegro’, at www.mfa.gov.yu/Sporazum/sporazum_e.html 76 While the agreement does observe that member states’ trade and customs policies should in principle move towards harmonization, it does not stipulate that they must. Given the dramatically different nature of their economies, it seems unlikely that industrialized Serbia would ever adopt the minimal tariffs insisted upon by Montenegro. 77 The parliaments of Montenegro and Serbia approved the new arrangements on April 2002. 78 ‘Proceeding Points for the Restructuring of Relations between Serbia and Montenegro’, at www.mfa.gov.yu/Sporazum/sporazum_e.html 79 Ibid. 80 UN Security Council Resolution 1244 recognizes Kosovo as part of FRY, but not necessarily Serbia. 81 Mladjan Dinkic´, ‘Dinkic´ Warns of New Federal Conflicts’, 15 March 2002, at www.b92.net 82 Miroljub Labus, ‘Yugoslav Official Only Accepted Federal Accord for Purposes of EU integration’, BBC Monitoring Service, FoNet News Agency, Belgrade, 14 March 2002, at Lexis Nexis. 83 Vladan Batic´, ‘Party Leader Batic´ Says Serbia Has “Lost the Most” from Accord’, BBC Monitoring Service, Beta News Agency, Belgrade, 14 March 2002, at Lexis Nexis. 84 Branko Ruzic, ‘Serbian, Vojvodinian Politicians Divided on New State Union’, BBC Monitoring Service, Beta News Agency, Belgrade, 14 March 2002, at Lexis Nexis. 85 ‘Agreement Recognizes Real Life, Says Djindic´’, 14 March 2002, at www.b92.net 86 ‘Montenegrin Minority Government Loses Crucial Support’, 19 March 2002, at www.b92.net 87 ‘Vukovic´ Announces referendum for March of 2005, Simonovic Says that It Should Not Be Even Thought About’, Vijesti (Podgorica), 25 March 2002, at www.mnnews.net 88 Miodrag Zivkovic´, ‘Condition Set by Liberals an Absurdity that Reduces Chances for Reaching Agreement’, Vijesti, 27 March 2002, at www.mnnews.net 89 Constitution of the Repubulic of Montenegro (1992), at www.mediaclub.cg.yu, preamble.
Montenegro and Serbia 73 90 In a surprising twist, the widely popular Djukanovic´ opted in October 2002 to resign his presidency and become the costal republic’s prime minister. While this should guarantee four years of parliamentary stability, it offers Montenegro’s chastised opposition another shot at government. DPS member and former Prime Minister Filip Vujanoric´ has since become President. 91 ‘New Balkan Leader Backs Secession Vote’, BBC News, 12 May 2003, at news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3021977.stm 92 Yugoslav President, Serbian nationalist and sometime democrat recognized this himself in March 2002 when he stated that Yugoslavia and Yugoslavism ‘[does] not exist without all its constituent peoples with whom Yugoslavia was born in 1918’. Vojislav Kosˇtunica, ‘Kosˇtunica Threatens Resignation if Federal Agreement Falters’, 18 March 2002, at www.b92.net
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Albanian and Serb rivalry in Kosovo Realist and universalist perspectives on sovereignty Vjeran Pavlakovic and Sabrina Petra Ramet The people of Kosovo have a right to self-determination. They [enjoy] – just like the Croatians and the Slovenians did, and just like those in Bosnia who wanted to be not under Milosˇevic´’s heel or the Serbians’ heel, and just like the people of the United States had a right as we declared ourselves as in 1776, the right to dissolve the political bonds. (US Representative Dana Rohrabacher)1 . . . just imagine the outcry if, during our civil war, Great Britain would have invaded the North to ‘punish’ Abraham Lincoln for his militant defense of the Union. Kosovo is a part of Yugoslavia and Belgrade has every right to defend its national borders. (Bill Hughes)2
In an essay originally published in 1960, Hans Kelsen, the brilliant if controversial specialist in international law, held that international law and the laws of any given state cannot both be primary: one must take precedence over the other.3 If, Kelsen argued, one posited the primacy of international law, then there can be no room for state sovereignty as such.4 But if, on the other hand, one chooses to affirm the primacy of state sovereignty, then, for Kelsen, one must accept that this entails acceptance of the maxim ‘. . . that the state is not subject to a legal order superior to its own national law’.5 Kelsen tried to resolve this dilemma by holding that the state’s subscription to international law was voluntary; in this way he hoped to salvage the binding character of international law without sacrificing the concept of state sovereignty. But the difficulties do not end there. After all, the notion of popular (or national) sovereignty may be marshalled against that of state sovereignty. If the people are sovereign, or so Locke held, then it would follow that . . . if a long train of Abuses, Prevarications, and Artifices, all tending the same way, make the design visible to the People, and they cannot but feel, what they lie under, and see, whither they are going: ‘tis not to be wonder’d, that they should then rouze themselves, and endeavour to put the rule into such hands, which may secure to them the ends for which Government was at first erected.6
Albanian and Serb rivalry in Kosovo 75 Thus, the doctrine of state sovereignty faces a second challenge, from those who would make the People the ultimate repository of sovereign authority.7 Jacques Maritain has offered a Gordian solution by declaring the concept of state sovereignty ‘intrinsically wrong’ by which he means morally wrong.8 Tracing the doctrine of state sovereignty to the rise of absolute monarchies, Maritain treats the rival notion of popular sovereignty as a bastard extrapolation from the false (for him) doctrine of state sovereignty; for him, the doctrine of popular sovereignty is, moreover, a contradiction in terms.9 Ultimately, for Maritain, neither international law nor state sovereignty can be said to possess the moral credentials necessary to constitute the primary point of reference determinative of both national and international norms. Maritain locates this point of reference, however, in Natural Law (Universal Reason) from which, he argues, the right of people to self-governance proceeds.10 But which people? And within which territorial borders? If the case of Serbia may be adduced, shall such right be restricted to the people of the Republic of Serbia taken as a whole, or may specific groups, aggregated regionally, as, for instance, in Kosovo, also lay claim to such right, even if against the declared right of the whole? In the chapter which follows we shall show how rival understandings of sovereignty have been reflected in rival positions in the dispute over Kosovo, and argue that where Belgrade’s official line has adhered to traditional principles of Hobbesian ‘realism’, with the Albanians making an appeal to a nationalist version of the doctrine of popular sovereignty, stability and respect for human rights can only be grounded on the foundation of political legitimacy and an understanding of sovereignty compatible with the teachings of the sixteenth-century philosopher Bodin, who ‘set out to combat the sceptical trends of his age and to find a new basis of divine and natural right among human beings’,11 in the process setting certain limits to the authority of the sovereign. We shall begin by briefly tracing the development of the idea of sovereignty, then look at how arguments about sovereignty have figured in the debates surrounding Kosovo, examine the historical roots of the independence movement among Kosovar Albanians and, finally, outline the political and economic conditions within the province, as well as the reaction of both the Belgrade government and the international community to the Albanians’ political strivings, concentrating especially on the years from 1989 to the present.
Claims about sovereignty In a recent work, Stephen Krasner has argued that the norms of sovereignty should not be viewed as guiding principles of the international order but as ‘cognitive scripts’ which are ‘instrumentally useful’ to heads of state.12 In this view, states simultaneously want to preserve norms of sovereignty and violate them when it serves their interests to do so. This ‘instrumentalist’ view is set against the ‘constructivist’ view of those who argue that states attune their behaviour to generalized notions of appropriateness. The contemporary debate between instrumentalists and constructivists mirrors, up to a point, a much older debate between those who, like Jean Bodin (1529/30–1596), have sought to set moral limits to the authority of the secular
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sovereign,13 and those who, like Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679), have emphasized instead the supremacy of the sovereign, entrusting to him even the authority to interpret divine and natural law for the body politic.14 For Bodin, the authority of the sovereign is, of necessity, limited by leges naturae et divinae (natural and divine law), by international law and by the laws of the realm, if only because sovereign authority derives from those very legal and normative frameworks.15 But for Hobbes, these appeals to divine and natural law disappear into thin air on the argument that the law does not interpret itself. It follows that someone must have the sovereign power to interpret those laws; indeed, for Hobbes, sovereignty itself consists, in part, in the authority to serve as the ultimate arbiter of divine and natural law. By Hobbes’ time, the earlier aspirations of the Church to such authority already seemed anomalous, while Hobbes had no patience with claims on behalf of popular sovereignty. For Hobbes, no group of citizens can ever constitute more than a mere ‘crowd’ and, Hobbes argues, ‘a crowd is not a natural person’ and, therefore, does not enjoy specific rights.16 Historically, of course, the notion of sovereignty had its incunabulum in theories of divine law, such as that of Francisco de Vitoria, a legal scholar active in the early sixteenth century, who argued that sovereign power was derived from, validated by and ultimately contingent upon its conformity with divine law.17 Yet, within the constraints set by divine law, Vitoria nonetheless salvaged a strong concept of state sovereignty, arguing that: The State may in no wise be deprived of this power to protect citizens and to guard against every injury from its own citizens or from aliens . . . [and even] if all the citizens should agree to dispense with these powers . . . the[ir] agreement would be null and void, being contrary to natural law.18 The concept of sovereign assumed a more formal character in connection with the development of the concept of the divine rights of kings and designated the natural and inalienable right of the king to rule society from above.19 It gained force from the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) and associated covenants, in the course of which the sovereign’s authority in the religious sphere was affirmed and demarcated under the principle, cuius regio, eius religio [whose region, his religion].20 But the subsequent development of theories of sovereignty has failed to establish a single uniform standard for assessing claims of sovereignty or demarcating the rights of sovereign authority. Instead, we have inherited three alternative views: 1
2
State sovereignty: tracing its heritage to Hobbes, emphasizing the alleged rights of recognized governments and regimes, and expressed most recently in the claims registered on behalf of Slobodan Milosˇevic´’s alleged rights to formulate and pursue such policies in Kosovo as he sees fit, without regard to life or limb. Popular sovereignty: tracing its heritage to John Locke (1632–1704),21 emphasizing the alleged rights of people to challenge their government and, in certain circumstances, to secede from the jurisdiction of their government
Albanian and Serb rivalry in Kosovo 77
3
or overthrow it altogether, and expressed in arguments in favour of Kosovar Albanian separatism. Sovereignty defined by Moral Law: this may trace its heritage to Bodin and locates sovereignty in the relationship between government and governed, but which also factors in the moral law – as understood at the time – as a component of legitimate authority.22 On the relational view, thus, one must, in the first place, distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate authority, and hence also between legitimate and illegitimate sovereignty.
These three rival theories of sovereignty have underlain the rival arguments registered on behalf of the Milosˇevic´ regime, the separatist aspirations of Kosovo’s Albanians, and solutions premised on the reconstruction of local politics along classical liberal lines. Although the dispute between Serbs and Albanians over Kosovo may be traced at least as far back as the late nineteenth century, it assumed the form of a clash of formal claims to sovereignty on 19 October 1991, when the underground Assembly of Kosova met clandestinely and adopted a decree, declaring that ‘the Republic of Kosova is a sovereign and independent state’.23 The subsequent recognition of the declaration by neighbouring Albania24 and election the following May of Dr Ibrahim Rugova as President of the Republic of Kosova25 consolidated the Albanian counterclaim. From then until the resignation of Rugova’s government on 2 February 2000,26 in the wake of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) aerial campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) in spring 1999, this underground government served as the vessel for Albanian claims to sovereignty.
Historical sources of rival claims Many of the problems in present-day Kosovo have their origin in the long, turbulent history of this region in the Balkans. However, the history of Serbs and Albanians did not make the current problems inevitable, but the specific configuration of problems and pattern of resentments must be traced to policies pursued in the first and second Yugoslavias. Moreover, the chauvinistic interpretation of this historical record by both sides has taken a prominent place in any discussion of the future of Kosovo. Since the debate is so steeped in historical claims, it is crucial that past developments be reviewed and assessed. The critical issue at the heart of these events (which have escalated from demonstrations, riots and police repression to a full-blown guerrilla war and bombing campaign by the world’s most powerful military alliance) is the desire for independence by Kosovo’s Albanians, that is, political, cultural and economic sovereignty for the Albanian ‘nation’ living in Kosovo. This desire does not originate from an ‘ancient hatred’ of Serbs or from a plan to create a Greater Albania, but rather from the failure of the Yugoslav – and ultimately Serbian – government to create a legitimate system accepted by all of Kosovo’s citizens. The Serbian political leadership (first under the aegis of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) and
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later within a greater Serbian state)27 has been determined to maintain sovereignty over as much territory as possible, relying on force as the primary method for r