De Broglie's Armada: A Plan for the Invasion of England, 1765-1777

De Broglie’s Armada A Plan for the Invasion of England, 1765–1777

Translated with Critical Analysis by Sudipta Das

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Contents

List of Tables

v

Foreword

vii

Abbreviations

ix

Introduction

xi

Map of British Isles I II

xiv

Broglie and His Lineage

1

French Foreign Policy Objectives, 1763–1778

4

III

An Overview of Broglie’s Plan of War, 1765–1777

14

IV

Broglie’s First Mémoire

22

V

Broglie’s Second Mémoire

42

VI

De Broglie’s Observations

67

VII

Execution of the Invasion of England

74

VIII

The Honorable Last Word

97

Conclusion

99

Bibliography

103

Index

113

iii

Tables

Table 3.1. Table of the different expeditions to be undertaken in concert by France and Spain against England

19

Table 5.1. Table of the different expeditions both real and simulated that form the general offensive project to be concerted between France and Spain against England according to the consequently prepared memoir in which one sees the number of vessels and troops that the two crowns could employ in this and the number that the English would of necessity have to oppose to it. [p. 68 #2; p.91 # 1]

64–65

Table 7.1. Table on the current situation of our land forces and the successive project of augmentation

87

Table 7.2. Army of the ocean destined for the descent in England and placed from Dunkirk to Brest

88

Table 7.3. The table of our land forces with the increases announced

92

Table 7.4. State of the Distribution of the Fleet Destined to Transport an Army of Invasion of England according to the Expeditionary Plan

v

94–95

Foreword

This volume represents my second monograph on the study of crucial developments in eighteenth century French imperial and diplomatic history. My first contribution attempted to study and analysis of the French presence in India from 1763–1778 and was published in December 1991. It offered a new perspective positing that the French, unlike the British, did not aspire for an Indian empire in the eighteenth century. A successive attempt at another monograph was stalled owing to serial upheavals in my personal life. Thus, the present endeavor represents a long-awaited enterprise. It is based on my collection of research information from the French archives on an intriguing invasion scheme in French military and naval history that was brainstormed during the great era of Anglo-French commercial and colonial rivalry in the eighteenth century. The subject of this contribution—the theme of an invasion of England— has never ceased to be of topical interest to students and scholars of British and French diplomatic, military, and naval history. References to the invasion plans made by Spain in the Spanish Armada (1585–98), or by the French Directory (1795–99) against Ireland and England in the later 1790s, or those of Napoleon Bonaparte (1799–1815), or perhaps “Operation Sea Lion,” the German plan of invasion during the Nazi era are common in England. This knowledge has of course been based on published material. Yet, most of these grand schemes of invasion were derivatives of earlier plans, at the heart of which was the grand project authored by Charles François, Comte de Broglie, Marquis de Ruffec (20 August, 1719–16 August, 1781) in 1777. This great plan has not been published in its entirety in the English language and I am excited to be the architect of this exposition.

vii

viii

Foreword

Therefore, my present contribution is centered on my translation of Broglie’s original plan of an invasion of England. The grand scheme was first drawn up by Broglie in 1765, but he revised and resubmitted it toward the end of 1777. I have included additional chapters that are focused on an introduction of Broglie’s political background, an analysis of French foreign policy objectives post-1763, and a sneak summary of Broglie’s lengthy invasion scheme, all of which I believe will serve as essential links in elucidating the core translation. I would like to acknowledge my deep appreciation of the assistance that I received at the French Foreign Affairs Archives in Paris for the collection of rare and significant information on the subject. I am also informed that this translated version will be added as an advanced research resource to the acquisitions of the French Foreign Affairs Archives. I eagerly hope that my published work will offer English-speaking students interested in French colonial and maritime history a document of reference on one of the most intriguing military and naval projects ever shaped in the ivory towers of French diplomacy. On a personal note, I dedicate this endeavor to the loving memory of my deceased husband, and to the love and support of my two beloved daughters. I must also fondly mention the inspiration I received from my eldest brother who spurred me on to retrace and restore the disappearing threads of my research in its proper perspective at the present time. My entire family’s spiritual and emotional support has been of inestimable value in the completion of this project.

Abbreviations

A.E.

Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Paris (Archives of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Paris)

A.N.

Archives Nationales, Paris (National Archives, Paris)

B.N. (N.A.F.)

Bibliothèque Nationale, Nouvelles Acquisitions Français (National Library, New Acquisitions in French)

C.P.

Correspondance Politique (Political Correspondence)

M.D.

Mémoires et Documents Memoirs and Documents)

S.P.

Secret Proceedings

ix

Introduction

A leading French naval historian praised Broglie’s plan as “the most carefully studied and the most complete plan of naval warfare against England ever drawn up.”1 According to another French historian, Napoleon Bonaparte studied Broglie’s plan and drew from it.2 A modern French naval historian pronounced Broglie’s war plan as “infinitely superior” to all others that preceded it.3 Furthermore, it is historically significant that the Franco-Spanish invasion plan of 1779, as well as those of the French Directory from 1795–99 and Napoleon’s schemes during 1803–05, were no more than the last of a long series of pet projects formed in France over a long period of time and were essentially drawn from Broglie’s original plan of invasion. It is on this premise that I consider this endeavor as an important project because it attempts to offer a holistic exposition of Broglie’s war plan of 1777 in every detail as its author had structured it. As a necessary backdrop to the exposition of the plan, I have dedicated Chapter One to the portrayal of Broglie’s family ancestry and his own military and political identity and career. Broglie’s wealth of diplomatic experience prepared him as a grand military and naval strategist. It is anticipated that the information will help to elucidate the influences which shaped Broglie’s political upbringing and his political acumen, inspiring him to contrive a war plan of a unique nature. In Chapter Two, I have attempted to offer information on the political climate prevailing in Europe and in Versailles in the aftermath of the Seven Years’ War (1756–63). French foreign policy objectives are explained as a historical rationale for the coming of Broglie’s invasion plan. The Seven xi

xii

Introduction

Years’ War had ended in the ignominious defeat of France, resulting in a significant decline in her rank among the European powers. The war had also dramatically altered the European balance of power with England reigning supreme in her newfound colonial and naval supremacy established by her victory in the war. French sentiment for national revenge reached a state of frenzy at the royal court, thus prompting an enthused extension of diplomatic patronage to a war plan which seemed to excel in strategy and sound planning over all others that had preceded it. In Chapter Three, I have offered a preview of Broglie’s detailed invasion plan using my insight and training of historical investigation and presentation. All the links in the chain of planning in strategy and deployment, which Broglie laid out step-by-step in tremendous detail in the original document for his august King and his military advisers, are connectively summarized in this single chapter. The translation of Broglie’s war plan document is covered in Chapters Four, Five, Six, and Seven. Chapter Four dwells on Broglie’s first memoir to his King, in which he introduces the text of his war plan and explains his intention for the drawing up of an invasion plan of a detailed nature. His interpretation of the political and military situation in England and in France is laid out in enormous detail with his rationale stated in clear terms for making his pointed interpretation. In this memoir he also builds up his case for requesting the King’s prompt attention to his submission. He writes it in the third person, passive voice, perhaps to denote that his presentation represented an erstwhile endeavor that should have long been fulfilled with the appropriate royal patronage. Chapter Five covers Broglie’s second memoir to the King in which he offers a realistic survey of French military and naval preparedness at that juncture. He compares French military and naval strength with England and proposes strategies by which France would be able to overcome her weaknesses and match the strength of England. In this memoir, Broglie also suggests a military and naval alliance with Spain that would ensure a powerful defensive and offensive strategy with the use of concerted forces. The various points of defense and attack, deployment of forces, and details of strategy, including the points of attack on English soil are also laid out with justifications for each category in the second memoir. Chapter Six continues with Broglie’s observations on the plan of operations designated in Chapter Five. It continues to design the plan of operations to be undertaken by Spain and an evaluation of Spanish military and naval strength and ability. Chapter Seven documents Broglie’s stipulations on the execution of the direct invasion of England, which he considers as the “last preparation.” He ad-

Introduction

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vises three separate operations, namely in England, Ireland, and Scotland and maps strategies for sea and land forces to follow. Actual projections in terms of infantry, cavalry, and naval compositions are made in this final analysis by Broglie, in which he also underlines the proposed routes of attack. Chapter Eight includes Broglie’s concluding statement on his entire project. The translation in English follows the original French document in syntax and punctuations. As a result, translated sentences in some parts of the text may appear convoluted and awkward in construction. The Conclusion represents the author’s summative reflection on the theme of this monograph, including an overview of the historical turn of developments in 1778 that precluded Broglie’s invasion project from being translated into action. The last word iterates the significance of a document that is preserved to this day among clandestine historical papers in the French Foreign Affairs archives. Broglie’s Plan bears singular testimony to the genius of its author. The End Notes for each chapter document additional references along with the principal source used in the writing of this monograph. Details of historical analysis and reference elucidating textual information are also offered in this section. The Bibliography offers a list of unpublished and published primary and secondary sources, including books, articles, and dissertations used for attempting this presentation. Some of the references that may have been studied but not directly cited in the text are also listed, only to indicate their intrinsic relevance to the subject of Anglo-French diplomatic and military history in the eighteenth century.

NOTES 1. G. Lacour-Gayet, La Marine Militaire de La France sour le Règne de Louis XV. Paris, Honoré Champion, Libraire, 1910, 430. 2. P. Coquelle, Les Projets de descente en Angleterre. Paris 1902, 61. 3. R. Castex, Les Idées Militaires de la Marine au XVIIIe Siècle. Paris, 1902, 157–59.

xiv

Introduction

Map of England and Wales, 1660–1892

Chapter I

Broglie and His Lineage

Charles François, who was also known as the Comte de Broglie (Count of Broglie) and Maréchal de Ruffec (Marshal of Ruffec), (20 August, 1719—16 August, 1781) came from a distinguished family of French war leaders. Hereafter in the text, Charles François will be referred to as “Broglie.” A brief exposition of Broglie’s ancestral background is offered below in order to unravel the key to his own ascendancy to the limelight of eighteenth century French military and diplomatic history.1 Broglie’s great grandfather was François Marie (1611–56), who took the title of the Comte de Broglie and distinguished himself as the heroic lieutenantgeneral who died at the siege of Valenza (2 July 1656). Broglie’s grandfather was Victor Maurice, Comte de Broglie (1647–1727), who served under Condé, Turenne, and other great military commanders during the reign of Louis XIV. Victor Maurice became Maréchal de camp in 1676, lieutenantgeneral in 1688, and finally Maréchal of France in 1724. Broglie’s father was referred to as François Marie, Duc de Broglie (11 January, 1671—22 May, 1745). He achieved military honor and glory through a distinguished career of military service, which started from his childhood and ended two years prior to his death in 1745. François Marie was appointed marshal of France in 1734 and governor-general of Alsace in 1740, and a peer of France in 1743. The eldest son of François Marie was Victor François, Duc de Broglie (1718–1804), who also achieved fame as a renowned soldier and general. Victor François received the rare honor of being appointed as MaréchalGénéral, meaning first marshal of France. Broglie was the younger son of François Marie, and the younger brother of Victor François. He left his indelible imprint in French imperial history as a courageous soldier and patriot, a skilled diplomat, and a military strategist of 1

2

Chapter I

the highest cadre. Broglie entered the army in 1734, and was stationed at several army headquarters in Italy (1734–35), in Bohemia and Bavaria (1741–43), in the Rhine (1744–45), and in Flanders (1746–48). He was promoted to the rank of Brigadier general in 1747. Subsequently, he was appointed ambassador to Poland in 1752 and retained the position until 1758. While executing this diplomatic role, he received other military honors such as Maréchal de camp (temporary marshal) in 1756, and as Chevalier du Saint-Esprit (knighthood) in 1757. Broglie participated in the campaigns of the Seven Years’ War under the orders of the Comte de Clermont (1758) and the Marshal of Contades (1759), and as a sergeant (in mounted arms) under his brother, Victor François, who was then the marshal of Broglie (1759–61). In 1760, Broglie was made lieutenant-general, a position which he did not enjoy for long. Court intrigues forced Broglie into exile in 1762. He was returned to royal favor in 1764. He drafted his first invasion plan of 1765 during the ministry of the Duc de Choiseul (1758–70). Broglie may have risen to the limelight of French politics if his invasion plan had been implemented at that very juncture. Unfortunately, a conglomeration of developments such as the lack of French military preparedness for a major war, Louis XV’s persistent political indifference, and the downfall of Choiseul in December 1770, followed by Broglie’s own exile, created a state of diplomatic incertitude during which Broglie’s strategy and ideas faded into insignificance. Broglie’s other political honors included his appointment as governor of Saumur in 1770, secondin-command of Trois-Évêchés in 1774, and finally Commander-in-Chief of Franche-Comté in 1781. Intriguingly, Broglie’s amour-propre stemmed largely from his leading role in the Secret du Roi, (1756–1774), which was a clandestine intelligence service that Louis XV maintained with various French diplomats and other confidential agents outside the knowledge of his official ministers. Broglie is described as the chief actor in the little drama of the King’s secret correspondence circle in Versailles.2 To acquire an understanding of his role in this ministerial underworld propped up by royal connivance, as well as his character and personality, and his unparalleled courage and bravery, one may consult the testimonies contained in the Correspondance Secrète du Comte de Broglie avec Louis XV, 1756–74 by Ozanam Didier and Antoine Michele.3 It is stated therein that in spite of Broglie’s many weaknesses, he was endowed with “. . . the pleasing spectacle of a mind to which lofty political views were familiar, and of a soul filled with passionate desire for the public welfare.”4 The war plan for the invasion of England was designed by Broglie in two phases. His first invasion plan of 1765 comprised of a main attack and no

Broglie and His Lineage

3

fewer than six subsidiary operations intended to distract the attention of the British. As mentioned above, political intrigues frustrated Broglie’s efforts and he was forced into exile in 1771. He was asked to return to court in 1774 when the Comte de Vergennes, French foreign minister, resumed Choiseul’s anti-British policy. The outbreak of the American Revolution prompted Broglie to prepare an improved version of his original plan which he submitted to Louis XVI (1774–1792) at the end of 1777, just when the British setback at Saratoga had shown that France might safely join the American colonists in their struggle against England. The revised invasion plan entailed minor changes in certain areas of strategy and details of resources. In his grand military and naval design, Broglie passionately emphasized that everything had to be subordinated and directed to obtaining a crushing naval victory in the Channel which would pave the way for a military invasion of England.5 The political climate and circumstances in France and in Europe which impelled Broglie to draw up his grand project will be the focus of the next chapter.

NOTES 1. Charles François, Comte de Broglie, the main subject of this chapter, will be referred to as Broglie hereafter. 2. See Didier Ozanam and Michel Antoine, Correspondance Secrète Du Comte De Broglie Avec Louis XV (1756–1774). Paris: Librairie C. Klincksieck, 1961, for a detailed analysis of Broglie’s intriguing role and his character and activities in the King’s private circle of clandestine correspondents. 3. Ibid, 56, 147, 154, 288. 4. Ibid vi. 5. It is contained in three volumes, A.M./A.N./ B/4, 297–299.

Chapter II

French Foreign Policy Objectives, 1763–1778

Angleterre: c’est notre modèle et notre rivale Notre lumière et notre ennemi. England is our model and our rival Our guiding light and our enemy1

French antipathy to England was grounded in centuries of mutual rivalries, conflicts, and mistrust. The hostility was exacerbated by the terms of the Treaty of Paris in 1763, which ended the Seven Years’ War between France and England and their allies. The treaty marked the worst moment of degradation for France in the eighteenth century. It was the second time that the Bourbon power had bowed before another European power, the first being at the Treaty of Utrecht. The Seven Years’ War had started, as the Duke of Choiseul, French foreign minister, passionately expressed, when England “threw at its feet the most sacred rules of equity, the most inviolable maxims of the rights of nations.”2 Its intention, he alleged, was to attack France’s American colonies, chase France from that Continent and engross all its commerce there. But, even this did not arrest its ambitions. It aspired to seize all of Louisiana, to enter by this way to Mexico, and thereby cut a passage through to all the Spanish possessions. This was the reverie of Cromwell. Indeed, they would go further. They would stifle our marine in its birth, rule the sea alone and without a rival.3

According to Choiseul, the treaty was a national humiliation. It was shamefully purchased at the price of French colonial possessions, French commerce, and French credit in the Indies. It was purchased, he said, at the cost of Canada, 4

French Foreign Policy Objectives, 1763–1778

5

Louisiana, Isle Royale, Acadia, and Senegal. According to the peace terms, France ceded to England the vast part territorially of what was still left of her great colonial empire that had once comprised half of North America and the richest of the American islands, some outposts in India, and the West African coast. She retained Gorée on the African coast, St. Dominic, Guiana, Martinique, Guadeloupe, Saint Lucia and its dependencies in the West Indies, the small fishing islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon (off Newfoundland), and a few trading outposts in India with the isles of France (Mauritius) and Bourbon (Rèunion). She was prohibited from fortifying the fishing stations.4 Ironically however, even though the material losses appeared to be colossal, they were not economically or strategically crippling for France. On the map, Canada and Louisiana embodied an impressive domain, but from the standpoint of commercial or trading advantages these possessions were worthless. Louisiana was practically uninhabited and Canada was hardly returning the cost of administration. The losses in India were regarded more of a blessing than a calamity, while Guadeloupe and Martinique (in place of which England had finally consented to take Canada) were of great commercial value.5 France’s veritable loss aside from the prodigious expenses of the war was in prestige. Her armies were defeated, her fleets annihilated, and her allies were disappointed. In the political hierarchy in Europe, France had descended to the rank of a second grade power. The peace treaty signalized this humiliation most graphically by renewing the defunct provisions of the Treaty of Utrecht against the fortification of Dunkirk, to which was later added the provision of an English commissioner at that port, “. . . without whose consent not a pier could be erected, not a stone turned.”6 Equally ominous was the nature of the claims made by British diplomatic representatives at various courts that in view of their victory in the Seven Years’ war, they were entitled to more privileges over French diplomatic representatives. French amourpropre could not have been more bluntly flouted.7 Choiseul’s communication with Louis XV on the subject clearly demonstrated the direction that French foreign policy was likely to adopt in the subsequent years— England is, and will ever be, the declared enemy of your power, and of your state. Her avidity in commerce, the haughty tone she takes in the world’s affairs, her jealousy of your power, the intrigues which she has made against you, make us foresee that centuries will pass before you can make a durable peace with that country which aims at supremacy in the four quarters of the globe.8

Choiseul’s language was pointed. It demonstrated how ruffled the feathers of French diplomacy had become at this juncture of Britain’s maritime and colonial supremacy in Europe. The fact that Britain’s commercial and colonial

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pre-eminence had been won almost completely at the expense of France was clearly unveiled.9 The Seven Years’ War was clearly the most disastrous defeat France had suffered in modern times.10 How then was France to recover her prestige and influence upon continental affairs? This was the question that addressed itself and in terms extremely poignant to the guardians of French diplomacy in the period from 1763 to 1778. The responses to this question by all schools of French diplomats carried the analogous implication that in order for France to restore her status in Europe English power had to be vanquished. This became the unique goal of French foreign policy between the years of 1763 and 1783. Preparations for implementing the premeditated war of revenge were vigorously undertaken through the reconstruction of French internal and external resources. To Choiseul, the prevailing peace agreement was a provisional measure. It would also be his personal defeat if the treaty terms could not be reversed. From 1763, he became “Cato, the Elder” of France, urging ceaselessly that England had to be vanquished and the treaty had to be undone.11 He perceived the Seven Years’ War as only a first game in a match of three. England had won the first game, but France will prepare to win the second. The ramifications of French diplomacy as laid out by Choiseul ultimately resulted in French participation in 1778 in the War of the American Independence. The restoration of the balance of power in Europe and the retrieval of France’s position as a great power were at stake, and subsequent formulation of French foreign policy aimed to attain this prime objective. Ironically, the articulation and preparation of the modus operandi for a successful war of revenge against England required an intervening climate of peace and diplomatic amity in Europe. While Choiseul’s plan of retaliation was to seize a pretext for rupture with England at the first opportune moment, all had to remain peaceful until then.12 In the inter-war years, Choiseul, his cousin Choiseul-Praslin, Broglie, and several others of the avant-garde at Versailles strove to resuscitate their nation’s former ascendancy by laying down a systematic plan of approach to the war of revenge by an invasion of the British Isles. A keynote feature of this plan was the rebuilding of French overseas commerce and sea power in order to enable a naval victory as a prelude to invasion. Only the knowledge that France would not be strong enough for several years after 1763 to fight Britain with any prospect of success tempered the resentment of France toward her traditional enemy.13 A redefinition of French foreign policy followed in 1763. Limitation of continental commitments and a new focus on the colonial conflict with England, with a special emphasis on the war at sea, marked a significant readjustment of French political priorities.14 “If,” as William Pitt (the Elder) had

French Foreign Policy Objectives, 1763–1778

7

phrased it, “Canada had been conquered on the banks of the Elbe,” Choiseul was determined that it was not to be defended there.15 French resources were never again to be diverted from the struggle overseas, which Choiseul and his successors considered to be France’s main interest. Therefore, they tried to ensure that the continental states would remain neutral in the event of future Anglo-Bourbon war at sea.16 The fulcrum on which the lever of French revanche strategy was to rotate was the “Family Compact” or the Pacte de Famille of 1761. It was essentially a military alliance between France and Spain, but the treaty also contained some commercial agreements. The agreement became the cornerstone of French diplomacy after 1763.17 Since the conflict centered on a concentration of sea power, a navy able to defeat England became the prerequisite of a successful war of revenge. Choiseul was well aware of England’s continued mastery at sea. During the Seven Years’ War, the English navy had reached an unprecedented size, and after the Peace of Paris its strength on paper was at least 120 ships or even 150 of the line.18 The English could be successfully challenged only if the two Bourbon States built a combined fleet approximately equal in strength to the English navy. In his Mémoire of February 1765 to Louis XV, Choiseul placed absolute emphasis on the military and naval alliance between France and Spain. The war of revenge had to be waged in cooperation with a rejuvenated Spain.19 The French colonies in the Antilles, Martinique, St. Dominic, and Guadeloupe would also play a significant role by augmenting the French forces and providing strategic military bases. In the East Indies, preparation would be made in the Isles of France and Bourbon to strengthen the French possessions in India and equip these to launch an attack on the English settlements in the region. French resources were to be used for launching an attack on the English colonies in the Eastern and Western Hemispheres. The French would also help the English colonies in North America if these revolted against England, and above all, carry out a successful invasion of England herself.20 The idea of attacking England in England had been a pet project of the French government since 1545.21 Just as Carthage had been destroyed by the Romans, the French planned to destroy England by an invasion of her homeland. While the planning of such an invasion had continued without a pause since 1545, it became charged with a burning desire for national revenge in the aftermath of the Seven Years’ War, and particularly under the patronage of the Duke of Choiseul (1758–1770) and Broglie. This project continued to be extremely popular in government circles until 1779. Choiseul and Broglie believed that in any war with England, the ideal French strategy would be a direct invasion of the island. But, an essential precondition for the success of this enterprise was to acquire a temporary naval superiority in the

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Channel. Since the combined naval strength of France and Spain was not calculated to give that superiority, it was necessary to reduce the presence of the English fleet in home waters by creating diversions in outer seas. One of these principal diversions was to be an attack on the English settlements in India. In view of England’s large vested interests in that region, it was anticipated that England would immediately send a strong naval squadron to neutralize the French assault. At the time of the Falkland Islands’ crisis between England and Spain in the early 1770s, France was offered the ideal opportunity to execute these projects. However, the sudden dismissal of Choiseul in 1770, followed by Broglie’s exile, aborted the attempt and the plan remained in abeyance. The scheme was revived in 1778, but the pressure of French commitments on American soil during the War of the American Independence unexpectedly diverted from this endeavor. A pre-condition for the timing of the conflict with England, including the plan to invade the island was the readiness of the Franco-Spanish armed and marine forces, particularly the marine. Thus, rearmament became the primordial issue in the plan for a war of revenge. In the correspondence exchanged between Louis XV and the King of Spain, these realities were repeatedly emphasized. In his first letter written in end-December 1770, Louis XV warned the King of Spain that France was avoiding hostilities until such time she was adequately prepared to launch her crusade of vengeance.22 He cautioned that Spain must peacefully resolve the dispute over the Falklands with England, or else fight alone. However, in his second letter written after the fall of Choiseul in January 1771, Louis XV assured King Charles of the sanctity of the Family pact and encouraged the Spanish king to accelerate the Spanish rearmament program, so that the Bourbon powers would be well-equipped to consummate the war of revenge once hostilities started.23 To accomplish the readiness for war, the two Bourbon powers instituted a number of reforms at home and in their overseas possessions. In addition, there were administrative reforms strengthening the forces on the continent and in the colonies, in preparation for the war of retaliation against England.24 Given Spain’s limited resources, it was inevitable that the main burden of any future war would fall on France. Hence, the French administration from the time of Choiseul devoted its energy to the construction of a powerful French army and navy.25 In 1761, Choiseul assumed ministerial responsibility for the army and navy. While his cousin, the duke of Choiseul-Praslin, took over the day-today conduct of French diplomacy under Choiseul’s direction, Choiseul vigorously pursued the task of military and naval reconstruction. He devoted more resources to the upgrading of the navy owing to the war that was anticipated to come at sea. It may be said that under Choiseul’s direction, there was

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a veritable renaissance in the army and in the navy. The French army recovered swiftly from its partial destruction during the Seven Years’ War. Originally there were twenty-six foreign battalions in the French army, comprising of Germans, Italians, Swiss, Corsicans, and Irish French.26 By 1770, the total number of foreign recruits increased to 152,758. When Choiseul reported in 1765 to Louis XV about his military reforms, he set the date of 1768 for its completion. He was confident that by that time France would emerge with a strong army that would “. . . reap the fruits at the next war.”27 Choiseul restored the marine as a most formidable weapon to fight an effective sea battle and to protect French commerce and French overseas possessions. He expressed that the “marine must be the principal defense of the colony. . . .”28 In 1763, France had only forty-four ships of the line and ten frigates, most of them not being in seaworthy condition. In 1765, Choiseul estimated that France needed more than eighty ships of the line and forty frigates, plus boats for transporting supplies for the planned war of revenge.29 Based on this calculation, he ordered a replacement of the ships destroyed during the Seven Years’ War and requisitioned for new ships to be built, furnished, and armed. The anticipation was that by 1770, France would secure a total of 80 ships of the line, 118 battalions, and 56 squadrons.30 However, Choiseul’s enthusiasm was not appreciated by the dilettante Louis XV who had the minister removed from power in December 1770. Broglie was also exiled from court through the influence of his private enemies soon after Choiseul’s fall. Ironically, by this time the French naval and armed forces had been sufficiently retrieved to play the decisive role in the successful American Revolution eight years later.31 As mentioned before, the acceleration of the military and naval reconstruction program had been designed as part of a modus operandi of an “invasion of England” and the ancillary wars of diversion in the colonies, which were planned for execution some time between 1769 and 1771.32 If Choiseul and Broglie had not left the diplomatic scene in 1771, their plans and impending strategy may have created a milestone in the annals of French history at that very juncture. However, this is a point of speculation. On the other hand, in spite of their dismissal the impetus that both diplomats had provided to the plan of an invasion of England during their tenure in office, subsisted for a long time after them. The Abbé de Terray (Comptroller General of Finance, who also acted as the Minister of Marine for a few months after the fall of Choiseul-Praslin in 1770) and Pierre Étienne Bourgeois de Boynes (who succeeded as Minister of Marine in 1771) conducted the reforms in the administration of marine and colonies on the principles fathered by Choiseul.33

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Chapter II

The stimulation in the planning of an invasion of Britain ebbed during the last four years of Louis XV’s reign (1770–74). The next chapter will offer an overview of Broglie’s scheme before the actual unfolding of his written version on the political rationale and military strategy he would use in planning his pet project for the demise of the national enemy.

NOTES 1. J.P.L. de Luchet, Les Contemporains de 1789 et 1790, ou les opinions débattues pendant la première legislature; avec les principaux événemens de la revolution. Rédigé par l’auteur de la Galerie des états-généraux. 3 Vols. Paris, 1790. 2. Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, (hereafter cited as A.E.) Mémoires et Documents, (hereafter cited as M.D.)—France, Vol. 581, 3–4. 3. A.N., K/164,dossier 3, No. 22. Also see, Étienne François de Choiseul, Mémoire de Monsieur de Choiseul Remis du Roi en 1765. Paris: Charles Giraud, 1881, 8. Hereafter cited as Choiseul, Mémoire. 4. G. F. de Martens, Recueil de Traité . . . des Puissances et États de l’Europe . . . depuis 1761 jusqu’à Présent. Göttingen, 1817, I, p. 104–120. Quoted in Edward S. Corwin, “The French Objective in the American Revolution,” American Historical Review, 21 (1915–16), 51. 5. See M. De Flassan, histoire Général et Raisonnée de la Diplomatie Française depuisla Fondation de la Monarchie jusqu’à la fin du Régne de Louis XVI. 7 Vols. Second Edition. Paris 1811, VI, 480. 6. E. S. Corwin, “French Objectives in the American Revolution,” 52. 7. M. De Flassan, VI, 183–187; VII, 26–27. 8. A.N., K/164, dossier 3, No. 22. Also see Choiseul, Mémoire. 9. Henri Verdier, Le Duc de Choiseul. La politique et les plaisirs. Nouvelles Éditions. Paris, 1969, 121. 10. H. M. Scott, “The Importance of Bourbon Naval Reconstruction to the strategy of Choiseul after the Seven Years’ War,” International History Review I (1979), 17. See also, Hubert Méthivier, L’Ancien Régime en France, XVIe, XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles. Presses Universitaires de France, 1981. 11. C. H. Van Tyne, “Influences which determined the French Government to make the Treaty with America, 1778,” American Historical Review 21 (1915–16), 529. See Henri Blet, Histoire de la colonization Française. Naissance et decline d’un Empire des origins à 1789. Paris, 1946, 279. 12. Henri Verdier, Le Duc de Choiseul. La politique et les plaisirs. Nouvelles Éditions. Paris, 1969, 121. 13. H. M. Scott, “The Importance of Bourbon Naval Reconstruction to the strategy of Choiseul after the Seven Years’ War,” International History Review I (1979), 17. See also, Hubert Méthivier, L’Ancien Régime en France, XVIe, XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles. Presses Universitaires de France, 1981.

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14. See D. Gerhard, “Kontinentalpolitik und Kolonialpolitik im Frankreich des ans gehenden ancient régime,” Historische Zeitschrift, 147 (1933), 21–31, for this new emphasis and its implications. The desire to abstain from continental commitments was most clearly seen in the aftermath of the death of the King of Poland, Augustus III in October 1783. France had traditionally played an active role in Polish politics; yet in 1763–64, she was an idle though not an indifferent spectator of the election of Stanislaus Poniatowski as King. (On France’s attitude to the Polish situation, see H. M. Scott, “France and the Polish Throne, 1763–64.” Slavonic and East European Review, 53 (1975), 370–88). This restraint was a severe challenge to the assumptions on which French foreign policy had long been based; opposition to Russia had been scarcely less important to eighteenth century French foreign ministers than hostility toward England. This opposition was necessarily suspended during the Severn Years’ War and in these early years of peace when revenge against England was the dominant theme at Versailles. 15. See E. Daubigny, Choiseul et la France d’outre mer après le traité de Paris. Paris: Hachette, 1892, 274. Choiseul, he says, first planned to isolate England before undertaking any enterprise against it, and he had essentially planned a maritime war because the results of the Seven years’ War had shown that a continental war would be detrimental to French interests, which after 1763, aimed predominantly at the weakening of British power. 16. H. M. Scott, 18. Choiseul’s judgment on the Franco-Austrian alliance of 1756: “Cette nouvelle alliance fit négliger la guerre de mer et d’Amérique qui était la veritable guerre. Tous les moyens se portèrent avec enthusiasme et sans réflexion à une guerre de terre don’t le but était d’élever la maison d’Autriché.” Quoted in E. Daubigny, 28. 17. For a detailed discussion of the implications of the Pacte de Famille, see John Roopnarine Singh, “French Foreign Policy, 1763–1778, with special reference to the Caribbean.” Ph.D. dissertation, University of Oklahoma, 1972, 24–44; For the clauses of the Pacte de Famille concluded at Paris on August 15, 1761, see Alfred Bourguet, Le Duc de Choiseul et l’alliance Espagnole. Paris, Librairie Plon, 1906, 239–50; see also, F. P. Renault, “Études sur le Pacte de Famille et le politique coloniale française, 1760–90.” Révue de l’histoire des colonies françaises, Dixième année (first semester, 1921), 1–52; William C. Stinchcombe, The American Revolution and the French Alliance. New York: Syracuse University Press, 1969, 1. 18. Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery. London, 1976, 106; Nicholas Tracy, ‘The Falkland Islands Crisis of 1770: Use of Naval Force,” English Historical Review, 90 (1975), 40, in which a paper strength of as much as 157 ships is suggested. 19. A. S. Aiton. “Spanish Colonial Reorganization,” Hispanic American Historical Review, 12 (1932), 270; Louis Blart, Les rapports de la France et de l’Espagne après de Pacte de Famille. Paris: Libraire Félix Alcon, 1915, 78. Also see, Choiseul to Ossün, November 13, 1763, A.E./Correspondance Politique (hereafter cited as C.P.), Vol. 530—Espagne, 319. It was essentially a military alliance between France and Spain, but the treaty also contained some commercial agreements.

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20. Choiseul, Mémoire, 8–9. 21. Earlier in 1377, the French had burnt Portsmouth and landed in the Isle of Wight, but the expedition had ended in failure. 22. M. E. Boutaric, Correspondance secrete inedited de Louis XV sur la politique étrangére avec le comte de Broglie, Tercier, etc. et autres documents relatifs au ministère secret. 2 vols. Paris, Henri Plon, Chief Editor, 1866, I, 412. “Tout les mesures que j’ai prises jusqu’icy dans mes ports, sur mes côtes et dans mes colonies ne sont que de pure defensive.” In this connection, see “Instructions Duchatelet (French ambassador at London, 1768–70), January 10, 1768. A.E./C.P., I, Vol. 477, 30. Also published by P. Coquelle, Le Comte Duchatelet, ambassadeur de France à Londres (1768–70) d’après les documents inédits des archives des Affaire Étrangéres. Paris, 1909, 3–6. Louis XV instructs Duchatelet to approach the English foreign minister with propositions for a commercial treaty with England that will maintain freedom of the seas and commercial equilibrium. France desired to prolong the peace in order to gain sufficient time for her internal reorganization. 23. M. E. Boutaric, I, 416–18. 24. For Bourbon internal reconstruction, see John R. Singh, 60–85. See also, H. M. Scott, 17–35. For the reforms in the army, see H. Carré, Histoire de France, ed. E. Lavisse, VIII:ii (Paris 1909), 369–75; and, Comte de Montbas, “Choiseul et la resurrection de l’armée de Rossbach,” Révue des Travaux de l’Académie des Sciences, Morales et politiques, 107 (1954), 48–61. For Choiseul’s reforms, see Henri Verdier, 122–27. Also, see the following works on French military and naval reconstruction: Georges Lacour-Gayet, La Marine Militaire de la France sous le régne de Louis XV. Second Edition, Paris 1910. The volume enthusiastically plaudits Choiseul’s achievements; J. Tramond, Manuel d’histoire maritime de la France: des origins à 1815. Second Edition, Paris, 1927; R. E. Abarca, “Bourbon Revanche against England. . . ,” Unpublished Ph. d. dissertation, University of Notre Dame, 1964, 137–71; E. Batiffol, “Le Ministère de la Marine du duc de Choiseul et la preparation de l’Ordonnance de 1765,” Ibid, 118 (1893), pp. 31–48. These treatises give useful information on the administrative reforms; P. Roger, “Choiseul, Ministere de la Marine,” Révue Maritime, 203 (1963), 1160–71. This article offers a laudatory tribute to Choiseul’s accomplishments; Jacques Aman, Les Officiers beaus dans la marine française. . . , (Genève 1976); Above all, see Choiseul, Mémoire, 397–409. On the regeneration of the army, see especially, Emile Léonard, L’armée et ses problèmes au XVIIIe siècle. Plon, 1958. 25. For the spadework done by Choiseul to implement the war of revenge, see Jules-François Saintoyant, La Colonisation français sous l’Ancien Régime (du XVe siécle à 1789). Tome II, Paris 1929. 26. Choiseul, Mémoire, 14. 27. Ibid, 258; 15. 28. Choiseul, “Mémoire concernant la defense des colonies françaises de l’Amérique et le moien de tenir la marine militaire en activité en temp de pais, Amérique du Nord 1714–77.” A. N. Colonies, F/2C, Vol. 8, Carton No. 8. 29. Choiseul, Mémoire, 17. 30. “Mémoire sur les forces de mer et de terre de la France et l’suage qu’on pourrait en faire en cas d’une guerre avec l’Angleterre.” A.E./C.P., vol. 550—Espagne,

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495–97. In his treatise, “The Importance of Bourbon Naval Reconstruction to the strategy of Choiseul after the Seven years’ War,” International History Review, H. M. Scott states that the shortage of ready cash slowed down the pace of the naval reconstruction program. In the critical early years of peace, the navy did not receive the funds necessary for reorganization on the scale Choiseul had planned, nor were the amounts allocated to the navy paid in full (25). Instead of the eighty ships, the French navy consisted of only sixty seven ships of the line (27). See, “Liste Générale des Vaisseaux du Roi (1768).” Archives Marine, B.5/5. Naval reconstruction had in the short term proved a failure for both Bourbon powers; the large numbers of ships of the line demanded by an aggressive strategy simply could not be built with any speed. In A Diplomatic History of the American Revolution, (London: Yale University press, 1985), Jonathan R. Dull contradicts Scott’s numbers on French naval strength. He maintains that the French had only sixty three line ships during this period. He also adds that owing to the slowness of naval rearmament in France and Spain, Choiseul suspended indefinitely the planned war against England and assumed a more truculent stance against expansionist Russia (35). By the time of the great Falklands crisis of 1770, the Franco-Spanish war of revenge against England had become largely a hollow threat (36). See, ‘Tableau des forces navales du roi dans le courant des treize années, 1775.” Archives de la Marine at the A.N. (Paris), Series B5, Box 10. Because of his country’s military unpreparedness, Choiseul strove to convince the English government of France’s pacific intentions. See Choiseul to Comte de Chatelet, February 29, 1768, A.E./C.P., vol. 477—Angleterre. Choiseul encouraged the ambassador on his peace mission to the Duke of Bedford, Lord Shelburn and Lord Weymouth. 31. John F. Ramsey, 146. 32. See, Choiseul, “Mémoire sur les forces de mer . . . guerre avec l’Angleterre,” 1767. A.E./C.P., Vol. 550. It is clear from the statements in this document that Choiseul anticipated the French offensive to happen within ten years of the peace of 1763. 33. E. Daubigny, 285. Chapter III: An Overview of Broglie’s Plan of War, 1765–77.

Chapter III

An Overview of Broglie’s Plan of War, 1765–1777

The idea to attack England in England had been a favorite scheme in the ivory towers of French diplomacy for at least a century and a half. Successive French administrations had demonstrated continuous patronage to the evolution of ideas nurturing the pet scheme. In the aftermath of the Peace of Paris, the objective became even more alluring and quite realistic. France had not recovered sufficiently to contend with England in a long drawn out war. Her finances and her military resources were not ready for a sustained effort. However, in a short and vigorous assault upon her neighbor, there lay some possibilities of success. There existed a consensus among the higher government officials at Versailles that the only effectual way to defeat England would be to strike at London. The court of St. James would be bound to accept the terms of the invaders once the capital was invaded successfully. A more sharpened and systematic approach became a keynote of the planning under the direction of one or the other of the two outstanding figures of Choiseul and Broglie. Already, Choiseul had ordered a thorough survey of all the ports along the northern coast of France to deduce their present condition and the number of ships they were capable of harboring. At the same time he had deputed secret agents to reconnoiter the southern coast of England with the plan of a descent on her shores.1 On April 7, 1763, Broglie had been entrusted by Louis XV to draw up a vast project of a maritime campaign against England.2 At the heart of the project was the necessity of a victory in a major sea battle that would give the Bourbon powers the advantage to accomplish the land invasion. While the succession of invasion plans submitted prior to that of Broglie had all been of a defensive nature, the latter’s original proposal prepared in 1765 rejected any

14

An Overview of Broglie’s Plan of War, 1765–1777

15

defensive distribution of forces and laid down a strategy of peripheral attacks intended to distract the British forces from the Channel which would open the way for an invasion of the island. M. René Castex, a modern French naval historian wrote in 1901 that Broglie’s plan was infinitely superior to the others before him because it rejected a defensive distribution of forces. However, he added that even Broglie had not clearly grasped that a major naval battle was the indispensable preliminary to invasion, and that the main purpose of contriving local superiority at sea must be to fight one at an advantage.3 The deficiency in Broglie’s original invasion plan of 1765 (which M. Castex referred to) was subsequently corrected by Broglie in a revised plan which he was prompted to prepare after the outbreak of the American Revolution. In his second great plan of 1777, Broglie insisted on a decisive naval victory and a single deadly thrust at Britain’s heart and capital.4 While he had continued to urge through his secret correspondence the invasion of Britain on the lukewarm Louis XV, and could not make much headway in the actual implementation of his project in the late 1760s, Broglie obtained leave (exiled) to rethink his information and ideas with those of Choiseul. On the accession of Louis XVI in 1774 and the appointment of Comte de Vergennes as the foreign minister, Broglie obtained permission to return to court. Although Louis XVI was peace-loving by nature, he had an intrinsic interest in the navy, and the idea of France avenging herself against Britain through an invasion of the island kindled his interest as it gained popularity in French political circles. Broglie re-submitted an improved version of his original plan to Louis XVI toward the end of 1777. Broglie’s revised plan reformulated his first (original) plan in all details except that his allocation and distribution of military and naval resources were designed to achieve a major naval victory to facilitate the mainland invasion. It had taken Broglie four years (1763–66) to draw up his first plan.5 He prepared this plan after a grueling investigation of the topography, coastal data, strength and size of the marine, and the financial and military resources of both France and England. He had appointed M. de la Rozière, an engineer and officer of merit, to reconnoiter the English coast. Broglie’s project actually embraced operations in several corners of the globe. In June 1765, he sent two memoirs to the King on “the general disposition of the project,” one with regard to France and the other pertaining to Spain. The French part of the project consisted of four maneuvers: diversion in Scotland, diversion on Mahon in the Mediterranean, the expedition to India from the Isles, and assembling an array of observation in Flanders. Broglie underscored in his original plan that the wars of diversion in other parts of the globe are accessories to the principal project of a descent on England. “It is to London that we must go and attain success.”6

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The following excerpt from Broglie’s correspondence indicate his rationale for drawing up the plan The unfortunate events of the last war between France and England and its disastrous consequences necessitated considerable sacrifices for obtaining the peace; the manner of despotism and arrogance that the English, swollen by their successes, have taken during and since the course of this negotiation, and the multiple proofs that they have given of always abusing the superiority of their forces on sea to impede the augmentation of the marine of the King, needed to sustain the few French colonies that have escaped their greed, have determined His Majesty to look in the wisdom and range of his enlightenment, a new means which in order to succeed demands an assiduous effort for some years. . . . It is strongly feared that the injustices and vexations of the English will renew the war between the two nations, and in order to confront this event with success that we must promise ourselves of measures well-planned. . . . These are His Majesty’s views with regard to England. He perceives the possibility of… a descent on England, (which) is the goal he proposes. . . .7

In his instructions to Rozière, Broglie had emphasized that this was a top secret mission, and that Rozière ought to conduct his investigations with the utmost secrecy. On December 14, 1763, Rozière had submitted his views in a long letter to Broglie. “I dare to assert,” he wrote, “that the plan of an invasion of England is not only possible but will also be easy from the moment that His Majesty will make preparations for such a massive project.” On July 12, 1764, Broglie had delivered a closed case to the King, the key of which was left in the solitary possession of the King. The case contained two maps of England. A large map, prepared by Rozière, detailed the thirty leagues of coasts and drew an itinerary on London. The smaller map was of the whole island, illustrating the remoteness of the different points on the coast from the capital. “While waiting for the general plan of the project which will take several months to make,” wrote Broglie to King Louis XV, “he presents for the moment to the King what he calls the ‘Prospectus’.” In order to convince his King again of the necessity of this operation, Broglie had eloquently iterated the first principles of his grand project— I will begin, Sir, by establishing as a maxim recognized as incontestable that all States which are reduced to a simple defensive posture must begin at once to undo it as it loses everyday its esteem . . . the only means of abandoning the position where France finds herself vis-à-vis England, if scarcely proportionate to the dignity of its crown and the actual strength of its power, is of forming a gen-

An Overview of Broglie’s Plan of War, 1765–1777

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eral plan, well-conceived, of which the goal will be of destroying its enemy’s arrogance.8

He had proposed that an agreement be made with Spain for a military liaison against England, ensuring that Spanish operations remain confined to a mere exhibition of strength and not play a decisive role. A Spanish fleet would be assembled at Havana for making a demonstration against the English colonies of New England and Jamaica, and one other in Spain itself for threatening Gibraltar. There were to be two channels of operation: the first would create two diversions with the fleet of the Mediterranean, one toward Minorca and the other toward the Isle of France (directed at India). Thereafter, the final act of an invasion of England would be implemented. The diversion attacks involving at least six subsidiary naval engagements were designed to divide the forces of the enemy so that they would not be able to impede the passage of the French fleet and its debarkation on the coast of England. Thus, such a strategy would consummate the glory of the reign of “. . . His Majesty, the salvation and welfare of his State and the happiness of his subjects.” Broglie’s memoir dealt at length with questions of martial preparations and details of strategy. He had suggested that the French were to arm at Brest twenty-six vessels and four frigates; at Rochefort eight vessels, six frigates, and six prames. The transportation vessels had to be reassembled at diverse points of the coast from Dunkirk to Bayonne. (Later, during the launching of the main operation, all the transportation vessels were to be reassembled in the Channel). The fleet of Brest would join the fleet of Rochefort to sail together to Plymouth. The Rochefort squadron would cruise around this port, while the fleet of Brest would continue to cross the canal of Portsmouth. These would secure the safe passage for the transportation vessels coming in four divisions and carrying an ensemble of sixty thousand men, who were to be landed between Dunge Ness and Beachy Head, at Rye, Winchelsey, Hastings, and Pevensey respectively. After the debarkation was completed, the troops would march toward London. In eight marches of which the details are minutely indicated, the army could arrive to the interior of the English capital. The cost of the transportation of troops would be approximately thirtythree million livres. In March 1768, Broglie had sent his ambitious project to Choiseul. Perhaps, he became impatient with the inaction of the king and hoped that the energetic Choiseul would envision the significance and worth of his marvelous strategy. Broglie had also believed that a conjunction of ideas and efforts

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would increase the chances of implementation of the project. He received the cooperation of the foreign minister as Choiseul signed off on all the instructions on the project while the former directed the communication. Broglie had employed the services of several agents such as Hugel, Mesnil-Durand, Béville, La Rozière, and d’Ornay for the exploration of different parts of the French coast in August 1768. The surveillance reports were treated as highly confidential. These were studied by Broglie who forwarded the reports to Choiseul with his recommendations.9 Choiseul’s dismissal in 1770 brought a suspension in the progress of this investigation. Broglie was also exiled to Ruffec being disliked by the Duke of Aiguillon who succeeded Choiseul in office. As will be recalled, Broglie was recalled to court after the accession of Louis XVI to the throne and the appointment of Vergennes as foreign minister in 1774. When the outbreak of the American Revolution in 1775 foreshadowed the extended nature of England’s military preoccupation across the Atlantic, the indefatigable Broglie renewed his efforts to prevail upon the Comte de Saint-Germain, Minister of War, to render serious consideration to his plan of an invasion of England. It was in 1776 that Broglie started to revise his first plan and submitted his “grand design” toward the end of 1777 to Louis XVI for consideration. He explained the purpose for the re-submission of his idea to invade England as follows— An offensive on the part of France is absolutely necessary in 1778 since it would act as a preventive war. The English, an extirpating and avaricious race, seeking to establish an universal monarchy, would soon aggrandize at the expense of French and Spanish possessions in America, in the Antilles, and in Asia. Before England can secure the advantage, France and Spain should strike, taking the advantage of England’s preoccupation with her North American Colonies.10

Broglie’s revised plan vehemently emphasized that everything must be subordinated and directed to obtaining a crushing naval victory which would pave the way for invasion. As mentioned earlier, the revisions focused on secondary details complementing the first plan that he had submitted to Louis XV in 1765. They included the same diversionary attacks as was projected in the plan of 1765, with the object of producing local superiority in the Channel. However, in the second edition, he offered precise figures and expanded the deployment figures of the vessels, men, and horses needed for the expedition.11 He added two large Tables depicting every detail of his colossal scheme of an invasion of England. Table I underlined the different expeditions planned against England.

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An Overview of Broglie’s Plan of War, 1765–1777

Table 3.1. Table of the different expeditions to be undertaken in concert by France and Spain against England12 For France

Number of Vessels

Number of Troops

Descent on England

40 20 6 10 10

60,000 men

Diversion in Scotland In the Mediterranean

vessels frigates frigates vessels frigates

In India (Isle of France)

800 men 15,000 men 1,500 men

Total

50 vessels 36 frigates

77,300 men

For Spain

Number of Vessels

Number of Troops

Enterprise on Gibraltar

12 vessels 8 frigates 15 vessels 10 frigates 15 line ships 10 frigates

20,000 men

42 vessels 28 frigates

47,000 men

Diversion in America (attack Jamaica) Descent on Ireland and Canal of Bristol Total

12,000 men 15,000 men

Source: A.E./M.D./53: Angleterre, 72–73

In a second table, Broglie described the details of the operations on the invasion on England.13 He insisted that there were to be no other splitting up of forces. The invasion fleet, which would consist of French ships only, would be concentrated at Brest to forty line ships and twenty frigates. The function of this great force would be to win a decisive battle in order to clear the way for a landing on the island. The attack would be launched in April or October, preferably the latter because of the prevailing winds, the absence of many British seamen in distant waters at that time, and the fact that after harvest the invaders would be able to live on the resources of the country.14 He laid out the structure and strength of the land forces, naval forces, transport fleet, and the ports where troops were to be assembled. The naval squadron was to comprise of forty vessels, twenty frigates, and some light boats to be united at Brest. The author placed emphasis on this part of the scheme. The land forces consisting of sixty thousand men would be divided in four regiments. The first regiment would embark at Dunkirk, Calais, and Boulogne; the second at Dieppe and Havre; the third at Honfleur and Cherbourg; and, the fourth at Saint-Malo and Morlaix. There would be five hundred and ninety boats transporting the troops, which would be apportioned

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equally for the transportation of troops to each of the nine ports. Their average tonnage would be 150 tons. In regard to the debarkation strategy, Broglie suggested that as soon as the fleet of Brest would cross the canal of Portsmouth after having defeated the English fleet, the transportation vessels carrying the four land detachments would debark under cover in Sussex, Rye, Winchelsey, Hastings, and Pevensey. These ports were advantageous in view of their proximity to France, facility of debarkation, and easy for the march to London where the troops could arrive only in eight halts. The enemy, Broglie believed, could be defeated in a single blow and the war terminated in a conjoined naval and land campaign involving a period of some weeks. The subsequent pages of this volume will unfold a translation of Broglie’s invasion plans as submitted by his first and revised submissmions cited in the reference notes.

NOTES 1. The idea of invading England was first developed in the correspondence of M. Durand, the French minister in London, (1763). According to him, a descent on England would produce a financial panic in a short time, and would put the country at the mercy of the invader. He adduced his arguments by recalling the difficulties of the bank of England during the invasion of Charles Édouard. The financial weakness is the other side of an England whom we solely see as a formidable naval power with endless resources, he wrote. As all the defensive forces of England consisted in its marine, it would be necessary to combine the fleets of France and Spain for attacking as well as for creating diversions for the English fleet in the Channel to remote parts away from the metropolis. England would be without power and resources when attacked at those strategic points that provide her with the means of economic sustenance. On April 11, 1767, Colonel Grant of Blairfindy, who had been entrusted by Choiseul on a highly secret mission to survey the topography of the English coast, also submitted his report on the feasibility of an invasion of the island. Colonel Grant considered that the most suitable landing place would be “Deal,” which was eight miles from Dover. The topography being flat would enable smaller vessels to come right up to the shore, while larger vessels of the fleet could approach close enough to protect the debarkation of the troops. Another mémoire titled, “Reflections on the reconnaissance made in England in September and October 1768,” was drawn up by M. de Béville, a marshal who had been assigned by Choiseul to investigate the military situation at the English coasts. In this report, Béville discussed various plans of invasion at considerable length, but favored a descent near Portsmouth from where the French could effectively ruin the English fleet. Béville submitted another mémoire titled, “Essai d’un projet de descente en Angleterre,” in December 1770, just before Choiseul’s dismissal. See A.G., Ang., T.1414, 13. Also see, M. C. Morrison,

An Overview of Broglie’s Plan of War, 1765–1777

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“The Duc de Choiseul and the Invasion of England,” R. Hist. S. Trans. (Third Series), IV, 93–100. 2. Although Louis XV abhorred another immediate war, he had surprisingly agreed to this project in principle. See Henri Verdier. Le Duc de Choiseul. La Politique et les Plaisirs. Nouvelle Editions. Debresse, Paris, 1969, 127. The documents containing the project of Broglie are filed in three large registers in the Archives of the Marine at the Archives Nationales in Paris, B/4/297–299. In December 1777, Broglie revised his plan and resubmitted it to Louis XVI under the title, “Plan of War against England, drawn up on the orders of the late King, in the years 1763, 1764, 1765, and 1766, by M. le Comte de Broglie and recast and adapted to the present circumstances in order to be placed under the eyes of His Majesty to whom it has been sent, the December 17, 1777.” Of this revised edition, there are two copies in the Archives de la Marine, B/4/132, B/4/135, and four copies in the Archives Nationales among the papers compiled by the Consulate for the expedition of England, AF IV, 1597. One of the copies at the National Archives bear this note: “This report remains under the personal custody of the Director-General of the Department of Marine, who can only communicate or deliver the copies on a written order from the Minister of War. Signed the 1st Nivôse (fourth month of the Republican Calendar, i.e. DecemberJanuary) of year IV of the Republic. Aubert Dubayet.” This notification demonstrates the extraordinary importance and secrecy of this document. 3. R. Castex, Les idées militaries de la marine au XVIIIe siècle, 157–9. Cited in, A. Temple Patterson, The Other Armada: The Franco-Spanish Attempt to Invade Britain in 1779. London: Manchester University Press, 1960, 8. 4. A. Temple Patterson, 20. 5. While the subsequent chapters of this volume will offer a translation of Broglie’s actual Plan step-by-step as formulated in his own language, this chapter intends to offer a holistic preview of the plan. The author feels that such a summary would make the reading of the actual plan more connective and meaningful. 6. Broglie, Memoire, A.F./M.D. Angleterre 53, 1778, 80. Also, see G. LacourGayet, 429. 7. Broglie, “Memoire: Plan of War against England. . . ,” A.E./C.P. Angleterre 53, 1778, 25–133. 8. Broglie, Memoire, A.F./M.D. Angleterre 53, 1778, 57. 9. Mémoire du Comte de Broglie au duc de Choiseul. Mars 1769, A.F./M.D. B4 298. 10. See Henri Doniol, Histoire de la participation de la France à l’establissement des États-Unis d’Amérique. Tome II. Paris Imprimerie Nationale, 1884–89, 668. 11. See M.D.53 Angleterre, 92-93. 12. G. Lacour-Gayet, La Marine Militaire de la France sour le Règne de Louis XV. Paris,Honoré Champion Libraire, 1902, 448–9. 13. See A.E./M.D. Angleterre, 73. Also, see M. Lacour-Gayet, 450–51. 14. A. Temple Patterson, 13.

Chapter IV

Broglie’s First Mémoire

MÉMOIRE FOR PRESENTATION TO LOUIS XVI1 When the political crisis of the kingdom invites all good citizens to speculate and reflect, there are some to whom this right seems particularly suited and for whom it is even a duty.2 Such are those who, attached to the King and the State through long service and great benefits, have acquired some insight through their diligence and experience. The Count de Broglie takes the liberty of presenting to his Majesty his political and military speculations on the current state of affairs. His Majesty knows that the late King deigned to honor the Count de Broglie with an intimate trust for nearly twenty-three years and that he had entrusted him with a specific task and that this task—which covered all political interests and whose branches stretched across all Europe—had placed the most important and secretive affairs before the eyes and hands of the Count de Broglie during the duration of this correspondence. Among the diverse great objects confided to the Count de Broglie, one of the most important was the preparation of a war plan contrived in all parts and aspects against England. All the letters, memoirs, maps, and plans relative to the work were sent to the late King from April 20, 1763, until June 15, 1766. The reigning King must have found them in the private papers of his august late ancestor. After [the King’s] death, the Count de Broglie had a complete copy made and gave it to the Marshal de Muy; one says that it is lost; it is not located in the War Offices. This was in 1762,3 nearly at the moment of peace, when the Count de Broglie, although enveloped then in the disgrace of his brother the Marshal, had proposed to the King to prepare this great endeavor. This was not because 22

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of ambition or with a goal of ending a peace that the kingdom needed in order to recover from its losses. He knew too well the principles of moderation and the good faith of his Majesty, and he was himself too penetrated with his principles to present him with projects that might prove contrary to them but he knew that the King kept in his heart the old memory of the wrongs of England. Even the peace had just revealed the claims of this power to an exclusive empire of all the seas, and in the execution of the articles of this peace, she [England] conducted herself with an arrogance that merely betrayed her plan to humiliate France and to attach her [France] again every time that she [France] would try to improve her navy. Never had it thus been more prudent to think about war while conducting the peace. The experience of the two unfortunate wars at sea and the wisdom of the judgment of the late King had shown him that our dreams had as their principal source4 to have always been averted by the English and to have never opposed them with an organized strategy. It was thus simply necessary to place before his eyes a comparison of the potential of France and that of England in order to have him see the enormous superiority of the former when one would know how to prepare and employ it and the advantage that France should have in attacking the latter, corps for corps, instead of wasting her forces in distant and disparate expeditions. These consequences caused him to embrace ardently the project of an invasion of England as the first blow that it was necessary to strike at the beginning of a new war and as the only one that was capable of eliminating the deficits of the peace that one had just concluded and of setting the two crowns in the place and rank that their real power assigned to them in Europe. Approved by the late King, this work was accomplished in spite of all the obstacles that resulted from its intrinsic difficulties and then from the profound secret to which it was subjected. Because not even the minister could have any knowledge of it, it was done with as much activity as care; it was not conducted like all the war works that are ordinarily drafted with vague and uncertain speculations in the cabinet but was instead drafted on the spot and was supported by demonstrated calculations. Talented officers were sent to England; they recognized the possibility of an invasion, the points of debarkation, the methods of supplying provisions, the marches, the camps, the points, and every possible operation even beyond London. Finally, one calculated and combined on our very coasts all the resources that we had to execute its project, the places where one had to assemble the troops, the ports from which it was necessary to dispatch them, the quantity of ships that each one was able to furnish, the materials that it was necessary to prepare, the artillery, the munitions, the provisions, the number and type of required troops; alas, everything—including the calculations of the seasons, the winds, and the tides—entered into this plan, which one accompanied at the same time

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with maps, spending charts, and other information proper to contributing the greatest probability to the possibility of success. The Count de Broglie did not limit himself to these speculations alone. He linked this principal expedition to other diversionary projects to be executed at the same time, whether this is done by us, or Spain. He indicated the secret and hidden measures that it was necessary to take during the peace in order to be placed in a state to strike this great blow unexpectedly at the onset of the war; he proposed to prepare an international political plan that sapped the credit of England little by little in the north and among the great powers of the continent; finally, the revolution that England undergoes today with the revolt of her colonies and the war that must likely result from it between France and her were foreseen and indicated as the moment that this great project could be executed.5 Such was the immense work placed by the Count de Broglie into the hands of the late King. This Prince did not do with the plan that which he was susceptible of doing. It was necessary that he might have dictated to his ministers the measures that were to be taken in advance either by initiating6 them into his secret diplomacy (as the Count de Broglie often took the liberty of beseeching him to do) or by directing the measures himself without communicating the goals of this to them; but, while he wanted on one hand to hide from them the slightest traces of this work, his wisdom—which enabled him to see the best advantages in all occasions—was, on the other hand, unfortunately not (one dares to say) always accompanied by the trait that carries [the advantages] out. Thus, none of the preparatory measures indicated by the Count de Broglie was taken—the stockpiling of munitions and artillery, premeditated concert with Spain, international negotiations—all remained unprepared. Even the navy, which was supposed to be the basis of the project, remained in a state of lethargy, and it was not until the reign of his Majesty that one became occupied with this with zeal and success. With the death of the late King having exposed the mystery of the correspondence with the Count de Broglie as well as the work that he had bestowed upon him and with the7 clouds between France and England being able to induce in a single moment that war that the object of this work was to predict and prepare,8 the Count de Broglie believed that he had to devote himself to a new examination of the former plan with all the attention that his zeal and experience can make him capable of, and it is this former work— examined, reworked, and applied in the greatest detail to the present possibilities—that he takes the liberty of placing before the eyes of his Majesty. This work will be divided into the two following memoirs. The first9 has as its subject the development of the present conditions between France and England relative to the great event in America and of the nearly inevitable consequences that it is necessary to expect from an approaching war between

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the two powers. Subdivided into several parts, the second incorporates a strategy of the military preparations that must be taken in the different cases that could lead to the events. Whether it is to prepare to maintain a war if England starts it or to act before she does if this is judged necessary, one has adopted the great project of the invasion of England to the offensive preparations that are discussed in this memoir, as drafted by the order of the late King. One thus exposes the present situation of our resources with regards to troops and military material, the distribution that one will be forced to assign to them relative to the different war plans that one can form, the insufficiencies that result from this distribution compared to our current state of armament, the urgent need of correcting this, and the resources that seem to be needed to be taken in order to correct this. A portion of the ideas that are developed in this second memoir and notably that which related to an invasion of England will not be kept from his Majesty. With the work of the Count de Broglie having appeared in his hands after the death of the late King and unfortunately perhaps in those of many others after it was lost in the War offices, different people have procured extracts, and some others have even tried to take credit for it, but the insight of his Majesty will easily allow him to see the differences that exist between the surreptitious, mutilated, and parceled works that lack any knowledge of places or things in comparison to a complete work linked in all its branches and accompanied by all the original proofs and maps submitted to his Majesty—in a word, a work so prepared by all the officers that were employed in the reconnaissance and in its confection and the Count de Broglie, author of the project that he has just adapted with the most mature reflection on the present circumstances.10 Finally, the Count de Broglie deposes the totality of his work into the hands of his Majesty as an indication of his attachment to his service and his person, and he asks of him no other price than to deign to read it attentively. His Majesty must sufficiently see that from the conduct that the Count de Broglie constantly maintains since [his Majesty’s] ascension to the crown and throne that he does no attempt to become involved in affairs nor to solicit trust, but it is a matter today of the major interest of the State and of the glory of the King. In the crisis, the Count de Broglie would believe his silence to be culpable, and he considered the following work as a debt to his conscience and his master.

POLITICAL MEMOIR ON THE SITUATION OF FRANCE AND ENGLAND There has never been greater events, as much for their implications as for their consequences, than the quarrel of England with the Colonies. In effect,

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this is not at all an affair of intrigue and ambition, a precarious jealousy, or a momentary discussion; this is an absolute resolution; it is a continent that is separating itself from the others, and there is a new order of interest and conformity that is going to arise in the midst of this great shock; while waiting for this event to have an influence on all of Europe, it actually places England and France in the most delicate and difficult crisis in which two neighboring and rival countries have ever found themselves. The most likely result of this crisis will be a war between these two powers; one could even say that it [war] has already awkwardly begun and that it will thus spread even more everyday until it explodes since—unless the impossible happens—all topographical and political circumstances result in inviting the two governments to an impending rupture. One will begin by examining the situation and the interests of England. It is England that is the most essentially and most actively involved in the crisis; for us, it [the crisis] is only possibility and speculation, and our interests will be the subject of the second part of this memoir. Speaking about the interests of France in relation to the current circumstances is to include Spain in this; their politics and their motivation are or must be common.

SITUATION AND INTERESTS OF ENGLAND One will reflect as little as possible on the past; it is from the present state of affairs that one must depart, but these are bases that it is essential to recall and—without any precision—one only speaks haphazardly. England cannot do without its colonies since, without colonies there is no commerce; without commerce, there is no navy; without a navy, England is no more than a thirdrate power in Europe. With the defection of the colonies in the continent of America, England finds herself reduced to her possessions in the Antilles, her vast establishment in Asia, and her holdings in Africa, but all these colonies united consequently do not suffice to meet the needs of her navigation or her maritime power, which must be her first objective. Her glimmering islands are very inferior to ours; her establishment in Asia is without doubt an immense source of richness for her, but her commerce there only consists in commodities of luxury;11 it does not furnish any outlets for her national factories and is only conducted with a small number of ships and sailors. This is the same with her possessions in Africa; they are of no resource to England’s navy, and the commerce in Negroes that she conducts there has no value for her unless she has immense plantations to cultivate in the continent of America.

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It is the urgent need of the metropolis to have large, dependent colonies consuming manufactured goods, and an immense number of sailors. Up to this moment, this need blindly obliged the English government to place the American insurgents under the yoke; this is the need felt by the entire nation; it is the reason for the efforts that it undertakes today and for the spirit of animosity that (in the opposition party at least) is felt for its rebellious colonies. If passion allowed for clear minds to reflect, the English government would have examined above all else what the nature of the colonies of the continent of America was like; it would have seen that it was unlike that of the other European colonies. In the Antilles for example, where a small number of whites—although weakened and nervous12 dominates a large number of blacks and constantly needs foreign troops—the land only produces items of luxury and remains completely dependent on Europe for all the necessities of life. For such colonies, there is a certain need for protectors and masters, and the day that would separate them [the colonies] from them [the protectors] would be the period of their ruin. The English colonies of the continent of America are under absolutely different circumstances; they are agricultural and are populated by a majority of free men; they abound in all the commodities of basic needs, and they have many others that place their metropolis in their dependence. On the other hand, if this latter [the metropolis] caused them to be dependent on it because of its factories, it is by means of forced and prohibitive laws whose bonds they break by becoming free, by constructing factories of the same type and of which they have the primary material in their midst, and by opening their ports to all nations; such colonies are thus evidently destined one day to form an independent state from Europe, and the nature of things always mastering the events in the long run, such a natural destiny must be accomplished sooner or later. This is thus the inevitable point that must form the basis of the diplomacy of England; she must have felt that the independence of her colonies in the continent of America was an inevitable revolution and that she was able to suspend it or delay it a few years by address or force but that there would arrive a time when no human effort could prevent it. Out of this, all of her diplomacy must have attempted to procure establishments that might lessen the loss of this vast continent; she was only able to obtain these compensations by attacking the House of Bourbon and by carrying off the Antilles. This conquest assured her domination in this part of the seas of the new world. She acquired the exclusive property of several commodities—such as spices—that luxury has made necessary for us as well as for the Dutch; she opened for her factories an outlet nearly as abundant and secure as that of her former colonies; she thus acquired some establishments that she was no longer able

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to lose and guarded only with the assistance of her fleets without being obliged to maintain costly garrisons there. Nothing was easier for the English than to strike this great blow last year; we furnished them with a sufficient pretext to justify a war begun without any preliminaries of a declaration. Our commerce was secure; our navy, which has made immense progress for two years, was ineffective; our colonies were not in a state of defense, the six battalions of reinforcement that one has since sent there had still not arrived; the English troops in America numbered 50,000 men—an immense force in these areas and more than sufficient for all the conquests to be had at the expense of the House of Bourbon; their arms had not suffered any great defeat. The congress, less proud, was able to accept accommodating dispositions. Thus, whether England comes to terms with her colonies or whether she takes the position of limiting herself to a naval war, never has she had a more brilliant or fortuitous occasion to amend her losses.13 Because of a course of destiny that has favored us in such a remarkable manner for three years, this storm spared us; English generals conducted themselves even more poorly than their ministers, and from all sides the lot of our rivals was only mistakes and misfortune. But the end of their blindness must have finally arrived; they can no longer delude themselves about the fate of their American colonies; they must see that this is not a false uprising conducted by some ambitious persons but a unanimous confederation of all the provinces founded upon the thoughtful recognition of their position and their interests; moreover, they can no longer reasonably suppose to vanquish them and to dictate a temporary peace to them; they would not reduce them, and the inevitable loss of these rich possessions would only be deferred for a few years. If these reflections do not sufficiently open the eyes of the English minister, the calculation of the resources that would be necessary to undertake a fourth campaign in America will end in overwhelming them. It would be necessary to send no less than 30,000 men to the army of General Howe only to redress it on the footing where it was at the beginning of the last campaign; whatever are the resources either outside or within England to furnish such reinforcement? There only remain 15,000 trained troops in the three realms of Gibraltar, Minorca, and the Isle of Wight. Will she dismantle them under the current circumstances? Will this be those new levies of troops, those regiments offered by subscription about which their gazettes have made so much noise?14 First of all, one knows that this movement of zeal has diminished greatly, but if it would subsist and if these levies would eventually be completed, is it during the journey that they would be trained and hardened to war? And would they not be worth less upon arriving than the troops of the insurgents

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who—with already three campaigns of experience—combine the pride of success to the good spirit that is born of their cause and the advantage that one has always had from fighting on one’s land?15 Will the English procure foreign troops? The last campaign especially disgusted the German youth. With the disaster of Bourgoin having ramifications in large part upon the people of Brunswick, Hessse will not want to weaken herself; the landgrave received on this point very lively representations from the states of the country, and the Electorate of Hanover would easily have still 10,000 to 12,000 men to furnish, but England feels that there are more pressing and essential needs for which it is necessary to reserve them. The King of Prussia is opposed to the departure of troops from Auspack, and finally, in the crisis where the Empire finds itself, it is not the moment for England to conclude new treaties. Given England’s impossibility to continue the war on land with an army strong enough to suppress America, she could limit herself to a naval war mixed with destruction and incursions on the coast without attempting to penetrate any further into the country, but this type of war will oblige her to have at least 20,000 troops stationed in New York and the neighboring islands, Canada, Halifax, etc. It will oblige her to block the ports of the insurgents and the entrance of the principal rivers and to maintain a large number of frigates to protect both her commerce and her operations. This new endeavor would be almost as costly as the one she renounced without ever being able to ensure from this the benefit of subduing the country. Since a war of this nature only serves to sour the spirit instead of reducing it, the English would soon become, with respect to the Americans, what the Genoese— locked up in a few places, hesitant to come out, and even scoffed in their entrenchment—were with respect to the Corsican masters of the entire interior of their island. Thus, in the supposition that they might succeed in remaining in these places by means of numerous garrisons and vessels for support, they would be at least easily chased from all the flatlands that they maintain in all the continent of America, such as in Canada, Florida, Nova Scotia; it would be there that the insurgents would direct all their effort, and thus these three provinces would be irreparably lost to England because they would not fail to enlarge the confederation and incorporate themselves into the new Republic. All types of war with her colonies thus necessarily being equally ruinous and useless for England, the most reasonable course of action that she might able to follow would be to accommodate herself to them, but this very course offers the greatest difficulties. First of all, we could have acted before the English, and our alliance with the insurgents creates great hindrances to their vices and removes all types of resources from them. Even if our treaty was not ratified, England could negotiate an accommodation; these accommodations

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would be no less difficult, and in effect, what could the conditions of this be and what would its basis be? The insurgents will never renounce independence, and would the current ministry dare to recognize it? Would the nation forgive it for this? A portion of it believed up to now that honor is lost for England. If she does not suppress America, a new ministry composed of members of the opposition directed by Lord Chatham himself will find no fewer difficulties for an accommodation if independence is not the first article. Lord Chatham spoke several times himself in his speech to parliament of a treaty of union; he said that it requires the English to form a familial pack with their American brothers—a remarkable expression that, alluding to our familiar pact, positively indicates what the plan of this ex-minister would be if he were to return to the head of affairs. But how did Lord Chatham understand this pact? He did not explain if he wanted to speak of a treaty of union on the model of that which subsists between England and Scotland—a formally insidious treaty to the disadvantage of Scotland and which converted the realm into a simple province of England.16 Certainly, the insurgents will reject it with disdain; it is evident that their success must not have weakened their resolve not to have any community of fate, politics, or interest with the English. The goal of those who fight is independence without compromise or restriction; after learning about the proposal of Lord Chatham, Doctor Franklin said that one does not become brothers when one was a master. The insurgents no longer have to consent to an exclusive treaty of commerce in compensation of recognition of their independence. For such spirits as those of Adams, Hancock, Franklin, and the other congressional leaders who are so enlightened and advanced in the true principles of politics and administration, would one create illusions on a treaty of commerce that—if it is advantageous for England—could only be detrimental to America? This is not the effervescence of a moment, this is not fanaticism, this is not a feeling of vengeance or of persecution that placed arms into the hands of the insurgents. To repeat, this is the thoughtful recognition of their situation and their interests. At the same time as they had recourse to arms, they declared themselves free, and they drafted one of the best devised and most generally approved plans of the Republic. Such people have made their decision. In effect, they want to be free; they want to exist alone, and their plan of commerce is to open their ports to all nations. Consequently, everything must lead England back to the first plan that her real interest dictates to her and that she should have undertaken last year—that of attacking the House of Bourbon and recuperating from this the immense loss that is caused by the defection of her colonies.17 This plan, as audacious and extreme as it can appear, is the only one that might save her, it would have been easier without doubt last year, but her mis-

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fortune only made it more indispensable the following year, and only a total weakness might prevent it. By making this decision, peace with her colonies—which we have demonstrated as so burdensome and so difficult to negotiate—becomes easier and smoother; the English nation can thus without humiliation recognize the independence, her pride is sheltered behind the necessity of the circumstances; she renounces separating herself from her children, her brothers, her compatriots in order to unite and turn against her natural enemies who profited from her distress and against whom she will not fail to avenge her grievances. So will the consul of St. James speak to parliament, and whether the ministry subsists such as it is or whether it will undergo a revolution that may create new members, the day that it will make this great decision will be applauded with great enthusiasm. If it is the current ministry, one will forgive it for everything; if it is a new one, one will say that it saved everything. By recognizing the independence, by evacuating all that the English troops occupy in the United States of America, by not insisting upon any treaty of privileged commerce that is consequently contrary to the interests of the new republic, there are still some conditions that would make the peace very advantageous to England. If she was able to secure it, such would be the promise of congress: a complete neutrality with the House of Bourbon, guarantees for Florida and Nova Scotia—provinces acquired by England through the right of conquest and which do not form a part of the United States—and exclusive permission for all the nations of Europe to fish for cod.18 By allowing the American colonists access to it [the cod] for the supplies of their continent, this accommodation will be simultaneously advantageous to the two contradictory parties; it would be so for England because it would stop her on the edge of an abyss into which the entire fortune of the nation is on the verge of falling; it would be so for the insurgents because, in spite of their success, they have need of peace in order to close the profound wound that three years of war and devastation have created in their country; they have need of it in order to give free reign to the export of their commodities that have accumulated in their warehouses and have fallen a third below the value that they had prior to the war; they especially need it to consolidate their government and their legislation. Feeling how dangerous it is for public liberty to keep a large army in a state of preparedness for too long a period, the enlightened minds and good spirits that set the foundation of this nascent state must especially fear those individuals who grow accustomed to the easy regularity of military allowances and the insupportable license of war later, who have trouble returning into peaceful or laboring classes of the other orders of citizens. They must particularly fear those heads of the army who have grown accustomed to the honors and the rights of command and who are likely to be

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always tempted because of this to dominate the congress or to become the first subjects of a master that would shower them with dignity and riches. To this general interest that must cause the congress to lean toward an accommodation, it is necessary to add that other interest born of the bonds of blood, language, nation, correspondence, and habit that the war did not generally break and that could regain their influence as soon as England will offer both liberty and peace.19 Perhaps we have prevented this event by conducting a treaty of alliance with the insurgents. One even believes that this is assured. We will return to it while dealing in the second part of this memoir with the situation and the interests of France, but while supposing that this treaty exists, it cannot be long before it is discovered, and England will only have more motives still to go to war against us; she will attack us out of a desire for vengeance, and her passion will thus be brought to an extreme; she must do this because of selfinterest and common sense in order not to allow this alliance the time to solidify and unite its forces. England20 has an interest in attacking France as soon as she is able to do so. Apart from the crisis in which she finds herself in relation to her colonies, there is a reason that must suffice alone to influence her. This is the progress of our navy; today we have fifty vessels of the line; in one year we will have sixty; in two years a replacement navy will fill our arsenals and our warehouses. She must fear the same progress on the part of Spain; the same policies can engage her [Spain] to undertake the same efforts. For a century, this is the first and the most essential object of the jealousy and the just worries of England; this is what made her go to war in 1755 and what in effect determines her because her role as a great power in Europe can only exist through her maritime superiority. Could she suddenly see herself deprived of it? One must admit that this must not be presumed. It remains to examine what England can hope to accomplish in attacking the House of Bourbon and what resources she has to do it.21 One has already shown that it had to be the goal of England to acquire new colonies and that she was only able to do this at the expense of France and Spain and particularly by undertaking the conquest of all the Antilles. This conquest—which would have just been an easy invasion for her last year if she had suddenly employed all the forces that she had in America without a declaration of war—would be without doubt more difficult today, but it is still quite necessary that this should be impossible for her. In effect what do we have to oppose her with in the Antilles? Twelve weak battalions; a few poorly disciplined colonial troops without any war experience; some rough and perhaps poorly maintained fortifications; a system of defense that relies on false principles because we seem to believe that one can prevent incursions and our

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forts, our magazines, and all our resources are consequently on the coast; colonists who are weakened by inaction but who might have been disposed to sacrificing their fortune and their lives in several circumstances and whom one has often attempted to persuade that it was in their interest to belong to a preponderant sea power that will assure them in all occasions of the assistance of Europe and the outlet for their goods. Deciding to go to war against France, England can cover her plans until the moment that she will put them into action; she can send only seven to eight thousand men of reinforcement to this part of the world under the pretext of continuing [the war] in America, and can thus employ with these forces— which would be reunited or combined with the remainder of those of Howe— approximately 23,000 men in the invasion of our islands. This attack— certainly more to fear several months ago—could be still undertaken with sufficient secrecy and quickness that the news might not reach us in France until the moment of its execution; let us remember what they did in Havana and in Martinique with 14,000 landing troops and seventeen or eighteen vessels. Our islands were garrisoned with an equal number of troops as of today; St. Dominique was even more so garrisoned. Spain had a flotilla of twelve vessels in the port of Havana, and we had a squadron of eight vessels in Santa Domingo.22 Our colonies in Asia were even more at the mercy of the English than [are] those in America. Pondicherry is open and without defense; our warehouses on all the coasts of India only exist as a result of their permission, and we buy their scraps at the price of gold and humiliation. The Isles de France and de Bourbon are without troops, position, artillery, or munitions. Four English vessels on the high seas with a landing party of two thousand European soldiers and three or four thousand Cipayes (foot soldiers) whom they will pick up at Madras and the other possessions can take from us our weak establishments in these regions and irreparably close to us the seas of Asia, and a simple summons will suffice to steal from us that which we retain in this part of the world. With much probability and success, this is what England can undertake against us. With the exception of Havana, with which the court of Madrid seems to be greatly occupied, the Spanish colonies offer them perhaps still more of a prize; they are almost all without resources, and the example of the Philippines will be repeated everywhere without doubt. Here is such a plan that cannot only hinder the English and prevent them from thinking about these conquests but that even cause them to tremble.23 The purpose of this first memoir is not to develop it (the plan), it was first necessary to present the possibilities and the hopes that must determine the English for war, and one will continue in the same vein.

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The English can attack us in America and in Asia without being obliged to employ new measures herein since it is not necessary to take into account the four or five vessels that they will need in the seas of Asia and the six to seven thousand men that they can send to General Howe and that will only be the first shipment of reinforcement that they seem to have destined for the war against the colonies. They still have a considerable navy to use against us, and their use of it is assuredly dictated to them by our situation; the objective must be to contain us in our ports and to prevent the conjunction of our reinforcements. It is established and according to reports worthy of faith that they have forty vessels prepared or on the verge of so being and perhaps even more; they only have to send a portion of them before Brest and the remainder to Cabo de Finisterre; they will occupy all at once our navy at Brest and that of Spain; they will prevent the junction of our squadron at Toulon if one delays any longer to send it to sea. Thus will they have—with two large flotillas stationed as one just described—the advantage of two skillful armies that have taken the offensive and have maneuvered in order to assist one another over forces that are perhaps superior but broken in five or six places and reduced to assembling under the hazards of combination and events. It is necessary to add that the English navy is surely superior to us in the art of grasping the wind and the sea and of having in abundance the means of replacement. She maintains herself [in such a state] in all varieties of weather and seasons. Finally, provided that—by starting the war—they succeed through this offensive approach in holding us in our ports for only three months—they have theirs [vessels?] executing their planned invasion of our American islands and our establishments in Asia; it is necessary to repeat that one does not debate here that which the English are capable of doing, and this is in order to prove that it is never without the hope of success that they will decide to go to war with us; that which we are able to oppose them with will find its place elsewhere; let us come to the proof of the resources that is freely pleased to oppose them with. One emphasizes that the English are without sailors, that they have never been able to form the crews of their observation flotillas, and that the forced enlistment of recruits has been attempted for eighteen months in their country without much success. It is necessary to keep on guard against creating extensive illusions on this supposed scarcity. The English have difficulties finding sailors at this actual moment because all their efforts are directed toward commerce, but—whether war might delay them or slow them down; whether the government places an embargo on the crews of the India company and coastal traffickers; whether it has more decidedly supported the forced enlistment act—instead of the attractiveness of travel; whether Danish, Swedish, Dutch, Italian, and even French sailors are attracted, as it will not fail to hap-

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pen, by the promise of booty, compensation, and wages that are three times greater than ours and that they give to them at a moment of a great effort; whether in order to succeed they undertake a general invasion on all the seas in all seasons of departure without a declaration of war; whether they steal as in 1755 all the merchant vessels that we have at sea; finally, whether the national pride that resentment inspires is the result—one will see if their navy will lack in arms.24 By accommodating herself with the insurgents or by renouncing the war effort against them on land and consequently having use of this prodigious quantity of transport vessels that one maintains there today, would she [England] not immediately have at the disposition of her military navy the 25,000 sailors that she keeps for years at sea and who must be the most war-hardened and formidable crews that exist on the globe. It will be the same for the infantry as for the sailors; whether England comes to an agreement with her colonies or whether she only renounces the continental war with them, her infantry will thus suffice; what exhausts her and is beyond her means is this army of conquest that no other power would be capable of feeding and maintaining at the distance at which it operates; with the same subsidies that she consumes in buying twenty-five thousand Germans to employ them in America, she would hire double that in Europe. Without doubt, she is not in a position to renew the efforts that she made on the continent, and the pompous show that public papers make on this account is only a ridiculous ostentation, but she will find resources as soon as it will no longer be a question of forming an army for the defense of England. Whether she assembles her militia, whether she calls up ten to twenty thousand Hanoverians who are still at her disposition, whether she places at the head of this army a general whose reputation inspires some confidence, she will find herself in a state of defense. One does not conclude from this however that England is shielded from an invasion on the part of France, but this invasion will require on our part greater preparations than in the current state, in which she [England] would have to fear not being able to resist mediocre efforts.25 The common opinion on the weakening of the finances of England is perhaps also a little too exaggerated; without doubt, England has a debt that is nearly three times that of ours with a legal-tender value half as considerable, but her credit subsists, and it has still not suffered any setbacks; loans are made at four percent, and the Dutch and foreigners still invest there with confidence. As long as things remain in this state, one will not be able to fool oneself in seeing the English succumb to the efforts of their enemies as a result of pecuniary measures; even with France able to see that her credit and her resources in this area do not give her a real and marked advantage over England.

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According to what one believes, such is the strongest idea that one can have on the situation of England and of her real interest in the great crisis in which she finds herself engaged. All that one has said in this regard is summarized in the following arguments. It is impossible to continue the type of war that England maintains in America today; it consumes her interest and her funds and can never procure for her a proportionate and durable compensation; that which England would substitute by attacking the House of Bourbon will hardly be more expensive, and if fortune is favorable to her—especially if we fail to prevent or stop its progress—it will provide her with the resources of repairing all her losses. Thus, cost for cost, hazard for hazard, she must prefer one to the other. However proven this interest may be, it is however in the order of possibilities that the English ministry—not experiencing revolution at all and continuing to be struck with the spirit of pride and dizziness that has conducted it up until now—might adopt certain resolutions that may be completely opposed to it [the interest of England];26 everything seems to announce that this will not be, but the chance exists, and in this situation, it can still be prudent to prepare this trap for the blindness of the English and to anticipate the event; this what one is going to examine by discussing in turn the situation and the interests of France in the present circumstances.

SITUATION AND INTERESTS OF FRANCE27 To have proven that England cannot withdraw except by going to war is to have already almost sufficiently shown the interest that France would have to profit from the distress of her natural enemy in order to achieve her defeat because—between two rival nations—whatever lifts one necessarily has to lower the other. Never has the comparison of counter points been able to apply in such a true manner; England has need of war with France in order to compensate her losses; France has need of this to prevent her own [losses]; for one, it is a war of compensation, for the other, [it is a war] of conservation. Independently of this last motive, France has past injustices to avenge; she has to retake from England the superiority that nature so evidently intended to be hers. This is the simple and evident interest that has struck the eyes of the entire nation for . . .28 years and raised among a portion of its speculations the vow of attacking England; but there can be herein several circumstances and reflections that differently complicate the question in the eyes of the government and that might force it to accept another political war; the administrators have their secrets and to judge their comportment on that which is apparent is an in-

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discreet and often unjust precipitation. Thus, one will agree that peace is a very great and real asset for a nation, so necessary for France in a state of financial exhaustion,29 which, by an inevitable fatality, sixteen years of peace have only increased; it is simple and even wise that the desire for its conservation be the base of the government. Moreover, men who voted without reflection and without examination for war for the past two years undoubtedly do not know that our navy did not exist three years ago, that one lacked wood and all types of equipment, and that it was necessary to create, repair, and order everything. War in such a state was thus impossible, and when politics would have more evidently required it, it would have been dangerous to undertake it. The mistakes of the English have happily led to giving us the leisure and means of exiting the state of weakness that this branch of our forces was in. It is starting to become more respectable; our arsenals, magazines, and depots are garrisoned, and if the English commit the error of giving us still another year of rest, the stability of the French navy will have become real. There is thus a decisive reason for not being the aggressor right now. In spite of appearances to the contrary, the English are capable of making the mistake of leaving us be; they can add to this that enormous [error] of engaging in a fourth campaign in America; this fortune—although unlikely—would be too advantageous for us to neglect in the present state of things. From the point of view of the insurgents, the question is reduced to this alternative: either our treaty is made with them, or it is not; if our treaty is concluded and if our ministry believed that it had to seize the moment for this and profit from the need that the insurgents can have of us, the great advantage that we will take from this will be to have acted before the English and to have removed from them all possibility of accommodation with their colonies in revolt.30 But one must not count infinitely on the help of the rebels in the war between England and us; they have their wounds to heal and their government to consolidate. If our treaty with them is not made, we have to fear that the English may make their own. It is a difficult problem to resolve if the congress prefers peace with England and her independence recognized by the metropolis over any type of alliance with us. Through the peace with England, America acquires a sense of calm and abundance and the return of its commerce. Allied with us and consequently taking part in our war with England, she [America] continues to be in a tiring and dangerous agitation; she can fall prey to internal factions, to the prolongation of the evils of war, or—with malcontents in the country—to personal interests in opposition to the general interest. The alliance with France was of the greatest utility last year. They still did not know their strength, and they were menaced by a formidable army; today, this army is nearly destroyed, and England is in a state of rehabilitating it. The insurgents know this as well as we do; they thus have to negotiate today with

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France only in terms that are absolutely to their advantage. With the nature of things making us the certain enemy of England, it does not suffice to insure them of our disposition toward that power and—in necessary consequence— of the greatest desire31 to cooperate effectively on all that will be useful and advantageous to them; if our navy does not have superiority on the seas, they will assuredly require subsidies from us in the event of war; they will not even be able to conduct the intercity commerce with us that furnishes them and assures them of the outlet for a part of their commodities. The small navy that they were able to build and that was only a navy of pirates and buccaneers is destroyed; they will form one from this in time without doubt; their situation, their abundant fisheries, and their beautiful rivers, capable of being entered by warships up to thirty leagues (75 miles) inland—an advantage that not a single of our rivers in Europe has—invite them and destine them to become formidable on the seas one day, but they still require more time, and it is on the actual moment that we negotiate. Such as they are today, they cannot even guarantee our colonies in the Antilles. There is still some time before they can defend themselves in their country or bring war to the islands that are three hundred leagues (750 miles) from them. The power of nations has marked ages, and theirs is hardly in its infancy; it will be capable of making very large steps. The Antilles will perhaps one day be counted amongst their colonies. A new order of things will follow from this in commerce and in the politics of Europe, but this is useless to the present question. One has proposed the possibility of a commercial treaty as the basis and the great objective of our alliance with the insurgents, but this treaty will be, (1) a declaration of war against England as soon as it will be public; this deserves a lot of attention on our part; (2) it is necessary to be careful lest it be illusory and with no effect on the future because the interest of the United States of America is not to agree on conditions of privileged and exclusive commerce with France any more than with England; they will argue against it at the very first moment of tranquility and affirmation of their power and would return to the healthy and extended policies as their brilliance so dictates to them to trade with all Europe and to open their ports to all nations;32 this treaty would not be as useful for the moment if our fleets do not dominate the seas, and the commerce that the insurgents would conduct with us could not take place except with a lot of trouble and danger; thus, the actual crisis is such that, no matter what policies one might be able to adopt, it appears evident that war alone can and must bring an end to this. For England, it is a question of perishing or of rising up, and [it is a question] for the House of Bourbon of conserving the colonies, of lowering England, or perhaps of running the risk of being reduced only to its holdings on our continent.

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In this state, what must France do? [She must] first of all present [our position] to Spain and make her understand it. Our ministry has undoubtedly already seen to this; thus,33 the two courses—united in their approach to the common interest—can still wait since the passion that has until now blinded the English ministry can—by directing her to war in America—combat for us better than we can; at the same time, however, the two united courses must be prepared for war, double their activity and efforts, and be prepared for a strict and limited defensive plan; at the same time [they must be prepared for] a great and well concerted offensive plan that, at the first hostile movement of England, can thus prevent her on one hand from invading our colonies and on the other hand cause her to fear for her home. The topic of the following memoir will be the discussion of these preparations and this great plan. One will follow this by observing that all that is treated in relation to the actual position of England, the insurgents, and ourselves must be considered as susceptible to modifications and even to changes since it is not from general knowledge that one was able to draw the picture;34 however, one believes that the principal bases are not very distant from the truth and that one has not run the risk of going afar by adopting them as real.

SUPPLEMENT TO THIS MÉMOIRE With this memoir barely transcribed, a part of the suppositions that it outlined begins to be realized. The English are realizing the impossibility of continuing the war in America and are determined to open negotiations with the insurgents; the commissaries are named, and one waits for the message of the news of their departure.35 If the instructions and the full powers that are given to them only authorize them to negotiate on the basis outlined in the discourse of Lord North, this approach will not have any effect because of the expectation that the insurgents—victorious and convinced of the impossibility of England to continue to wage an inland war against them—might want to renounce independence, but the commissaries under secret instructions can have a wider approach; their first approaches will soon reveal it. There is a great question to consider but which will lead us too far astray— to wit, if England should not be content with concluding a treaty of neutrality with the United States after having recognized their independence and if the insurgents themselves should not prefer this36 to a stricter alliance with the English than with us.37 Whether they take one of these three possibilities—to ally themselves with France or England or to maintain a state of neutrality with the two powers and to open their ports equally to them—one will be content with observing that

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the result of these possibilities is always as inevitable and near war between England and us. But let us gain some time; let us fortify ourselves; let us prepare ourselves; let us be in the position to conduct a vigorous war against England at the first sign of hostility on her part; let us not even wait for them if we have made and concluded a treaty with the insurgents. Its publication will be considered in London as a manifest. The past mistakes of England and the state of exhaustion in which she finds herself—still engaged in a crisis filled with inconvenience and difficulties—all these presumptions are in our favor, but let us seize the proper moment. If it escapes from us, we will never find it again.

NOTES 1. The translation incorporates information presented in Broglie’s first submission in 1765 and his revised submission made in 1777. If a different word or phrase was used in the text in the first submission, this will be indicated through the endnote as reference to document #1, which means the first submission. The revised submission will be referred to as document #2. 2. Broglie, Plan of War. . . , 1–7. 3. #1 adds: “that is to say,” 2 4. #1 gives: “vice,” 3 5. #2, 3 6. #1 gives: “enlisting,” 6 7. #1 adds: “current,” 6 8. There appears to be a missing page from #1 at this point; however, my own numbering of the pages of #1 does not take the missing page into consideration, and I continue to number the pages consecutively. Page 7 thus follows page 6. 9. #2, 4 10. Ibid, 5 11. Ibid, 7 12. #1 does not give: “and nervous,” 11 13. #2, 9 14. #1 begins a new paragraph here 15. #2, 10 16. Ibid, 12 17. Ibid, 13 18. Ibid, 14 19. Ibid, 15 20. #1 adds: “thus,” 23 21. #2, 16 22. #1 begins a new paragraph here 23. #2, 18 24. Ibid, 20

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25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37.

Ibid, 21 Ibid, 22 Ibid, 23 In place of the ellipsis, #1 gives: “several,” 34 #2, 24 Ibid, 25 #1 adds: “on our part,” 37 #2, 27 #1 gives: “then,” 39 #2, 28 #1 states a new paragraph here #2, 29 #1 gives: “or with us:” 41

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Broglie’s Second Mémoire

MILITARY MEMOIR RELATIVE TO OUR CURRENT SITUATION WITH ENGLAND1 War is like a business; there is no success without a plan. This is what we essentially lacked in the last war, and it is good to hope that we do not lack one in the one [war] that threatens us. One would be even less excusable in that never has war approached in a less sudden manner. For two years, the two nations have been in a tacit state of war and in an open display of armament. Today, the crisis appears closer than ever; the slightest event, a step, a word, a misunderstanding can set us off. Never, thus, was it more necessary to form a plan. It is likely that the government has one, and if one dares to place this one before the eyes of his Majesty, it is only a zealous homage that can however place him in the state of company [?]. The conclusion of the preceding memoir on the political situation of France in relation to England was that, given the blindness that has until now misguided the English and the seeming possibility although not likely that they will persist in this, it was necessary not to go to war but only to prepare for it in the manner of being able to go into action at the first indication that it would be necessary. According to this result, it is a matter of tracing out a general plan that, defensive for the moment,2 might be capable of becoming offensive as soon as war breaks out. This discussion is too important not to be treated with all the method and depth that it demands; one will thus begin by resolving several preliminary questions that are related to their situation3 will thus become the basis of the plan that one must formulate.

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SITUATION OF OUR NAVY COMPARED TO THAT OF THE ENGLISH AND OF THE MANNER OF USING IT One will not enter any detail on the material of our navy compared to that of the English navy. The government must know what to do on this account; it knows the secrets of our real situation, our depots, our arsenals, and our magazines, and it must have also procured those of the English. One will thus limit oneself here to a few results supported on the past facts and on the recognized truths in order to attempt later to infer from this the plan of operation that seems to be the most advantageous for our navy to adopt.4 This branch of our forces has made immense progress for two years, and every day this increases. A spirit of competition and activity has succeeded that of languor and—one dares to say—of discouragement; but it is on the sea, with the great results of practice, that the English wait for us; that which we lack, and the points on which they are perhaps still superior to us, is the custom of navigation; it is the hardening in campaigns of long duration and difficult posts; it is the art of spreading and holding great hopes everywhere; finally in the midst of many officers it is having those who have commanded squadrons and flotillas. In this situation, any sort of situation5 does not suit without doubt equally our navy; it appears that one must avoid all those that will cut up our forces, divide them, or compromise them either in particular skirmishes or perilous situations or expeditions of long duration. The experience of the past two wars has only exceedingly confirmed this principle; one wanted to make a display of force everywhere and cover everything and [was] everywhere weak, everywhere inferior in force as well as in maneuvers and perhaps in capacity; one was everywhere beaten or forced to retreat to ports which is the same since operations were nullified because of this. After three campaigns, one wanted to return to the system of reuniting forces, and there was no longer any time. The squadron of Toulouse, just as will always happen every time that one will not act before the English [do], was not able to join the ocean fleet; this one, hardly equal to the English fleet while it could have been superior if the conjunction had been made, wanted to set sail. One knows the result of this combat, and since then our colors do not dare to show themselves. Louis XIV did not at all use them thus during the two years of triumph when he had the empire of the sea; he had large fleets, and he used them together. If he experienced a large defeat at La Hogue, it is incorrect if one says that this battle was the tomb of the navy because the following year he placed a fleet of eighty vessels to sea. What caused the navy to topple was that it was not at all endowed with considerable navigation. Consequently, it was merely

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factitious and offered an ephemeral effort of its strength. Finally, with circumstances having forced it to devote all its expenditures and attention to wars on land, it was slowly and finally totally neglected.6 This is the system that one will propose for our navy: no small squadrons or no distant expeditions but large fleets, all our forces in a single sea, a naval battle delivered at the start according to and with a great objective, a lively and short war. In the actual state it would be dangerous for us to believe we are able to defend our colonies and protect our commerce during the war with squadrons. Six French ships sent to the seas of Asia at the same time as six English ships at the end of a year would find themselves in a seriously inferior state to the latter with the disadvantage of our navy in the long, difficult, and distant trajectories. By assembling the greatest part of our forces at Brest, we will much more effectively protect our commerce and our colonies because we oblige the English to keep not only equal but superior forces in the ocean and in the English Channel; in effect, they must not risk the fate of England whose invasion would become easy—to the hazard of a battle given on equal terms; thus, if there is an operation that we could and should attempt, it is this battle because on one hand it can end the war in a single strike and on the other, by losing it, we do have the same risks to run, and this game is consequently very unequal for the English.7 A great reason requires moreover that we prefer decisive actions to all those that could cause the war to endure; because of our navy—still not at all consolidated; not having at all for its support, as do the English, any magazines [or] arsenals filled with the means of re-supply; not being able to have without pause, as they do, fresh vessels to replace those that we will lose or that the sea will damage; being less within the reach than they are of retrieving from the north all the materials for replacement—we necessarily weaken ourselves through the duration of the war; furthermore, they have for themselves the chance that foreign events will arrive to distract our attention and our resources, and—as with the force of subsidies, negotiations, and intrigue—they are clever enough to give rise to them [foreign disturbances]; unfortunately, they have never lacked this talent. It finally remains, in order to weigh the decision to take, to begin with our navy with large measures and never to allow ourselves to become consumed with details and the seasons, reasons taken from the character of the nation. Everything that concerns affairs of constancy disheartens her [the nation], tires her, discourages her even with time, all that concerns the character of hardiness and vigor lifts her and communicates it to her. A portion of the naval officers may be opposed to the system, but it is necessary to observe that it is their personal interest that involuntarily leads this operation; the zeal and the great emulation that reigns in this moment among them must redouble it [?]. They want to act on

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their account; they desire particular commands, and it’s a type of occasion that will raise for them the system that one proposes, it is up to the government to appraise these views and not allow itself to be carried along by them. One will be limited here to general principles, the applications that derive from it [them?] and will be found in the plan that is the topic of this memoir.

NECESSITY OF CONCERTING THE WAR PLAN WITH SPAIN: BASES ON WHICH THIS CONCERT MUST BE PLACED The necessity of concerting our plan with Spain is evident; it suffices to state it in order to demonstrate it [the necessity], but this concert cannot be easy to establish. There must be presented here an infinity of obstacles taken from the difference of minds, characters, national prejudices, and private interests that all, without a major force or a well thought out or convenient plan that rallies them and contains them, will act in a contrary sense. Between the two powers there should necessarily be a plan so combined in all its branches that all the respective advantages might be recognized in it, that all offensive and defensive views might be developed in it, that it be determined in it what each power can and must do in each supposition, that which one can have to fear of the enemy, that which will be necessary to oppose him against these dispositions;8 finally, it would be necessary that such a plan would be guaranteed in all circumstances by the determined will of the two sovereigns. A great advantage for the formation of this plan is that never has the interest of the two nations had to lead as evidently toward a common good as in the present circumstances; it is a question for Spain as well as for France to defeat the maritime power of the English and at the very least to prevent this nation, desperate from its losses and struggling in its distress, from attempting to seek compensation from the colonies of the two crowns. The most decided political interest thus dictates to the cabinets of Versailles and Madrid9 that it is not at all a question here of separating its defensive and offensive efforts each on its own account; since beyond that this false plan would be very advantageous to England in that it would permit her to face alternately each of her enemies; isolated and mediocre successes would never be decisive. A large strike is necessary to beat England, and this strike can only be dealt against her in England herself, in a word, it is necessary to dictate to her the terms for peace if one wants it to be advantageous and durable. It consequently follows from this that it is up to France to assume the burden of the principal offensive role; the preponderance of her power and her means, her proximity to the principal point of attack all imposes upon her; that of Spain must be to support her; she must not lose sight of the fact that

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by France’s triumphing and giving the law to England, her commerce and her colonies are forever assured to her, whereas beaten and humiliated she [France] would drag her [Spain] to her ruin even if she would have had some success on her own. What the two powers, in order to give more vigor and constancy to their plan, must promise each other in the most solemn manner is not to separate their interests at the conclusion of the peace any more than in the conduct of the war and to remain reciprocally allied in their losses as well as to gain a common benefit from their successes. Such must be the general views of the plan that is to be concerted between France and Spain and without which the two powers can acquire from their union only a mediocre and perhaps worthless effort. One will discuss after this, what the defensive as well as the offensive operations of this war offer to the two crowns and it is according to this discussion that one will establish the most advantageous plan for the common cause. By speaking of combining the strategies of the two nations in the general plan, one does not mean that it might be necessary to unite their forces at the same points for this; on the contrary, it is necessary to have them always act separately but toward the same goal or in the views that lead to the execution of the general plan; thus, in order to develop this idea, in which the Spanish will be charged with a portion of their navy in the defense of the seas of America, they will coincide in effect with our offensive views since they will permit us by this effort to assemble all our forces in the ocean when we thus undertake a landing in England. By undertaking the second landing with a division in Ireland or in Bristol channel, Spain does not unite its forces with ours at the same point, but she does not contribute any less effectively to the same object; these indications are no more than examples because one does not want to anticipate those details that will find their place elsewhere; by assigning also to each nation the separate points of operation, they will act together with more vigor; they cannot leave anything to the other; and there will be no occasion for those discussions that end up by dampening alliances and often cause all enterprises to fail; it is also in relation to the navy of the two nations that one will be well off; from this important principle, it will suffice to confirm this recalling the example of the battle of Toulon.

EXAMINATION10: THE DIVERSE OPERATIONS AND STRATEGIES THAT CAN ENTER IN THE FORMATION OF A WAR PLAN CONCERTED BETWEEN FRANCE AND SPAIN AGAINST ENGLAND The strategies and operations that France and Spain have to plan against England are of offensive and defensive sorts. We will begin with the latter.

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DEFENSIVE: FROM THE COASTS OF FRANCE AND SPAIN The possibility of any serious undertaking on the part of England on the coasts of France and Spain is too devoid of foundation for one to need to pause for long on this article; it [the possibility] could exist only as long as these two powers would find themselves engaged in a continued war that would employ all their land forces; this circumstance can no longer occur in Spain now that her peace with Portugal is confirmed, and it [the possibility?/the undertaking?] appears unlikely to be realized in France at least for some time, given the decision that she has made not to get involved in the affairs of Germany. At no time has England had enough land forces to hazard a decisive expedition against states that are so superior to her; because of this, she can at the very most undertake a few devastating incursions and miserable expeditions and by which, not able to penetrate in the country nor attack here by land our principal ports that begin to be in a sufficient state of defense, she would never know how to fulfill the objective that could compensate for her the immense costs of her armament. Currently engaged in a ruinous war with America and having carried nearly all her forces here, this type of expedition is not even to be feared. Supposing finally that she uses up all her means, it would suffice in order to remove any possibility of it [expedition] from her for France and Spain to form different camps of observation on their coasts within the reach of their principal ports; this menacing disposition for England will always oblige her to keep on hand the few troops that she could use in a foreign expedition.11 Such is thus the difference of the disposition of France and Spain from England that these two powers never have to fear this enemy in “her” midst while she has to fear constantly for her own.12 The land forces of England are practically worthless; her coasts are everywhere susceptible to debarkation; no place or great river defends the county. The capital is from one side a two day march and from the other a four day march across land; this capital is the seat of their commerce, their richness, and their power; it is completely open; if we march there, she is done for; their naval establishment, their depots, and their arsenals are barely any longer capable of defense; let one then compare in order to see the parallel between France and Spain united against what the English proudly call their three realms, thirty million men against seven or eight, and one will be confounded to see that in all foreign wars, with the exception of that supposed army13 of the Philippines and the chimerical barges of Marshal de Bellisle, one has never executed much less considered against her a serious expedition and that of the three, it is always she who carried out the offensive as the constant basis of her plans.14

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If England cannot and does not even dare to undertake anything on the coasts of France and Spain when they [coasts?/France and Spain?] will thus be garrisoned with some defensive camps disposed in a manner to cause them to fear an offensive expedition on their own coasts, one will concur however that she can risk a strike against some of our maritime cities or those at the mouth of our rivers, and for this type of mission, a very determined navy with a landing crew of three or four thousand men suffices, and one would not know how to deny them this advantage, which is all at once the result of courage and experience; the English will conserve this possibility as long as they will be superior to us on the seas because, by forcing our fleets to be holed up in our ports, they are in proximity to all the parts of our immense defense, and our territorial superiority thus becoming worthless, she only offers a greater consolidation to their insults. One will thus treat in the general plan the defensive measures to take in our roadsteads and in the points of our coasts most exposed to naval attacks; the lack of positive and local knowledge on the points of the coast of Spain susceptible to this type of attack will not allow one to enter in the same detail on what concerns them, but the same precautions are common to all countries, and the application is easy to do according to place and circumstance.15 There remains a vast portion of these coasts that, although not at all nominally belonging to France and Spain, has however reason to interest these two powers because it is under the dominion of a prince of the same blood and because this prince, having consented to the familial pact, is in the situation of sharing in the rupture with England; such is the realm of Naples and Sicily. A superior English squadron in the Mediterranean,16 as the English have had in the last two wars, can at will affront, pillage, and ransom them. She can menace as far as Naples, and this capital as well as its sovereign must still recall17 Captain Martin forcing Don Carlos, with a loaded pistol and a watch in his hand,18 to sign a treaty.19 It is thus necessary that he [the prince] enter into the plans of the courts of France and Spain and protect that of Naples from a similar affront by having it [the court] open its eyes to its situation, the dilapidation of its military, and the scarcity of its resources in all forms by having it adopt those [resources] that are presented in their entirety to remedy this. The King of Prussia and the emperor will never make an acquisition that does not contribute to the increase of its military forces, and only the House of Bourbon will neglect the means that fortune has placed in its hands; a large country and a population of thirty million men will be useless in its political balance and will add nothing to its forces. Let us leave these reflections that are however not at all foreign to the subject, and let us pass to the examination of another preliminary point.

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DEFENSE OF THE COLONIES OF SPAIN AND FRANCE20 The same lack of knowledge that one has concerning the coasts of Spain being still even greater in relation to her colonies, one will not speak of the means of defending these; it is up to Spain to know them [the means] and how to employ them. France can do nothing here; because of this situation, she is charged with the principal active role, and it is under this relation that we will consider it [the role] in our plan of operation. Let us see what can be her [France’s] conduct relative to her own colonies. We will start with those of America. If the English do what they ought and what we have shown to be their only resource in the first memoir, they will direct against our colonies the same efforts that they have used up until now against the insurgents; it is to be feared that they may come on the verge of suppressing them [colonies/insurgents?]. Martinique alone can be in a state of defending itself for a few months. Santo Domingo, having just in its French section 180 leagues [450 miles] of coast and a single fortified post at the harbor of St. Nicolas, which there is no need to attack in order to become master of the whole island, cannot withstand a vigorous and well planned attack; Mr. de Belzune, Mr. d’Emery [?], and all the officers who have successfully commanded here have announced this. Guadeloupe is capable only of a mediocre resistance; Cayenne, St. Lucia, and other small establishments such as St. Pierre and Miquelon will surrender at the first notice; it would be foolish to count on these colonists for the defense of our colonies; several physical, moral, and public causes whose detail cannot find any place here equally contrary to this [defense], one must thus decide on the momentary abandonment of our colonies if the English take the initiative of employing at the beginning of the war all the forces that they can muster. Once they become masters of our Antilles, the English can go about easier conquests if they do not want to engage themselves in the siege of Havana— which is the only island of these seas that may be capable of an obstinate defense—or if they want to content themselves with the assurance of having this rich establishment fall through scarcity; the new world is known to them, and they only have to choose the site that they will attack. In the present situation, France must thus send for the defense of her islands neither squadrons nor reinforcements of troops; she must abandon them to their own fate because wanting to have a powerful defense in all her points is to eliminate the means of acting offensively in turn. It is not the same for Spain in the general war plan. She must not be charged in principle with the offensive role. She can divide her forces and oppose the projects of the English in America, but to achieve this, it is not necessary that she accept herself the system of strengthening all the points of her vast defensive in this part

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of the world. It is necessary that she unite all her forces in a central point where she might be able to protect them all and cause the English to fear the offensive. Havana appears to be this point. By maintaining constantly a flotilla of fifteen to twenty thousand men here, she first of all shelters this important establishment from all the attacks on the part of the English, and she protects all at once hers and ours because she menaces Jamaica and she can even effect with success this expedition if the English attempt to execute theirs. With regard to our establishments in Asia, we can only recall what we have said about their state of weakness in the first memoir; to protect them effectively, there would only be one means; this would be to attack the English. The possibility of this project will be discussed by treating offensive operations. One will limit oneself here to saying that simple defensive measures would be our responsibility and would only guarantee them [Asian colonies] imperfectly.21 It was necessary to prepare for this from afar and not to neglect them during sixteen years of peace. Today, one is no longer on time, and it is only by occupying the English elsewhere that one can defend them [the colonies]. This measure may be the only one that might save our colonies in the two worlds. The basis of our war plans must be a vigorous offensive in England. This power will only thus hereafter think of defending herself, and if she neglects this, she would be lost without repair.

EXAMINATION OF THE OFFENSIVE OPERATION FOR THE TWO POWERS AGAINST ENGLAND The offensive operations that can enter either as simulated or real in the war plan of Spain and France against England can have Gibraltar and Jamaica as the objective of the Spanish. The establishments of Asia, Minorca, and finally England [are the objective] of France; one is going to examine them successively in order to weigh their difficulties, their possibilities, their advantages, and consequently the preferences that is required to be given to each one in the arrangement of the general plan.

ATTACK ON GIBRALTAR This conquest would deliver Spain from the most annoying and humiliating fetter and would be all at once one of the sensible strikes that one can make against the arrogance and power of the English. It suffices for this to observe that Gibraltar places in their hands the key to the Mediterranean and that

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nearly one third of their merchant marine is employed in the commerce of this sea. One thus senses the trouble and the resolution that an attack on this place would cause in England and the immense harm that it would cause if it were successful and at the very least the important diversion that would result from it when it would only come about as a false attack in [conjunction with] another more direct offensive project. The port of El Ferrol, Cadiz, and Cartagena offers Spain all the facilities to make promptly and surely the preparations for this attack. Out of two things comes one. Either the English would abandon Gibraltar to its own forces and the attack would thus be pushed truly and vigorously made until the moment of complete success, or well informed of the preparations that one could even make with force and without hiding the goal of the armament, they would send a flotilla of support. If this flotilla was weaker than the one that Spain could employ to cover its operation, the siege should not at all be interrupted. If it was too strong, the Spanish flotilla could avoid combat, and in this last case, the diversion that she would have caused would favor the great operation of France by diminishing the number the English would have to oppose her. Spain, moreover, either by menacing or attacking Gibraltar has for her flotilla an immense advantage over that of the English since she has ports and harbors on both sides of the sea. As far as the possibility of the siege and the manner of executing it, one will not treat this here; Spain must be informed of this.22 Mr. de Valliere, French lieutenant General, had been charged in 1762 with conducting the reconnaissance and strategy for it. His memoir must exist. One will add to this only that the result was that this mission was not as difficult as one had always believed it to be and that it can be undertaken with every appearance and possibility of success.

ATTACK ON JAMAICA Here is the grand offensive operation that Spain must be charged with and which she must occupy herself with before all others, including that at Gibraltar. It is through this that she can herself deliver a great defeat to the commerce of the English in the Antilles and create a diversion from their offensive projects on our colonies and their own. It is at Havana that she must prepare the means of this expedition, and it is from this point of view that in the article on the defense of the islands one said that she had to send a flotilla and an army corps here. The conquest of Jamaica would be an immense loss for England and an acquisition of the greatest importance for the Spanish. This island is in the middle of their possessions and continually deals in contraband on the coasts of solid ground and conducts the attacks in the Bay of

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Honduras. The assurance of conserving it [the bay] would thus be an attraction that it would be necessary to convince Spain of in order to engage her in this expedition. This is the richest possession of the English in America. Only one quarter of it is cultivated, and this part with only the personal estates and properties of the colonists included is estimated at more than seven and one half million sterling. Inspection of the map suffices to show the facility that the Spanish have for undertaking this mission. They can leave from Cartagena and Campeche at the same time as from Havana. Our colonies in Santo Domingo and Martinique can assist them. There are no strong points in Jamaica, and the incursion is easy. One knows of a memoir written by Mr. de Macarty, captain of Spanish vessels, on the possibility and the means of this mission. He believes it to be infallible and only requests twenty warships, a few frigates, two galiots with cannons, and five or six thousand landing troops in order to undertake it. The Marquis d’Ossun has knowledge of this project, which he proposed during the last war, and no one can give better information than he about this project as well as about all that concerns Spain.

ATTACK ON INDIA This attack, which concerns us, would still be one of the most deadly blows that one might make against the English because of their commerce in this part of the world and the vast domain at Bengal, which is an immense source of richness both for the nation as well as for the government, but this attack had to be prepared at a great distance; it was necessary to profit from the calm of the peace in order to form a great military establishment on the Isle de France; it was necessary to assemble provisions and artillery of all sorts in secret here, and unfortunately none of all this exists; one has spent eighty thousand [francs?] on this, and there is not a fort or a battery under construction; because of this shortage, we are not in the condition of being able to undertake a serious mission against India.23 The English are ahead of us there; they have no less than five or six thousand European soldiers and ten thousand Cipayes (foot soldiers) there; they have six warships or frigates there, and we do not have a single one. In these regions, they have Madras, which, for India, is a prime place and a great point of support, and we only have some warehouses without defense or troops and of which, at the first sign of war, they [the English] will not leave any vestige. In order to change roles and to become offensive and conquering in these conditions instead of passive and unarmed as we are, it would be necessary to send not only a squadron of seven or eight ships with six to seven thousand

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trained troops to India but a prodigious quantity of gear and equipment, all of which lack equally for the defensive as for the offensive.24 Such an effort could only be accomplished by setting us back or weakening us in more important and decisive operations; it is thus necessary to abandon our Asian colonies to their destiny, and it is through other successes, such as those in America, that it is necessary to defend them and try to acquire a better fate for them in peacetime.

ATTACK ON MAHÓN The preparations for an attack on Mahón, whether real or simulated, can only concern France, but one believes that in no case would one of necessity think seriously about it; in effect, although the chance that placed it in our hands at one time would not favor us once again, one saw that this conquest was not of great usefulness to us in the last war and that it did not remove the empire of the Mediterranean from the English. This empire is destined to the flotilla that will be superior, and if this will, that of the English, Gibraltar and the ports of Italy will suffice for them. Mahón can thus only be considered as a point that it is necessary to menace in order to augment the trouble of England and to distract a part of her forces and her attention from points where one really intends to strike. The English can really believe that Mahón is susceptible to capture a second time, and their commerce in the Mediterranean is such an important issue for them that Mahón menaced could at least alarm the nation and cause troubles for the English ministers.

MISSION IN ENGLAND In all time, and especially in the circumstances in which England is found, this is the great operation that must form the basis of the war plan of France and Spain. Through this mission, one can deliver a blow to her from which she will never recover. One can dictate the peace to her in London and demote her to the rank that she must occupy in Europe, that is to say the second or third power. France and Spain thus have a common interest in this mission since, as long as English power will subsist as it is today, their [French and Spanish] navy, their commerce, and their colonies will always be in a precarious and passive state. Through the lowering of this power, the House of Bourbon necessarily climbs to the first rank; one only has to see what commerce has done in one century to this isolated population and to what degree it has raised itself, and one will judge what it [commerce] could add to a mass

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of power as united and abundant in men, money, and real means as the House of Bourbon possesses.25 By undertaking this favorable mission in England, the war is decided in a single strike. The contributions and the ransom that one can demand may pay for the costs of this mission. The English navy is destroyed in its ports, its arsenals, and its magazines, that is to say in its source and its means of reproduction. One dictates to England such peace terms as one judges appropriate to impose on her; one dictates them to her in all four corners of the globe; one tightens, diminishes, and limits her colonies such as this can be advantageous for the security and the prosperity of our own. Finally, what ten years of naval warfare have done on another level and what several similar wars accompanied by some success cannot produce, this single mission accomplishes it in a single moment without repair. A great rationale taken from the political situation of Europe argues in favor of this mission, and for this to be our war plan, the objective of our first campaign is the need to free ourselves as promptly as possible from the war with England in order to survey over everything that is happening in Germany. Everything announces a war here. If it takes place, England will attempt to make us take part in it. Her negotiations and her subsidies will perhaps make her in two years from now the ally of one of the great powers that comprises Germany. She will throw herself into the arms of the one that could be angry at us and will neglect nothing in order to oblige us through this alliance—if we give her the time—to abandon our neutrality for a more decisive policy. It appears convenient to profit from this interval. Returning later, if necessary, to partake in the affairs of the continent with all the weight of our forces and success, we can pacify everything, reconcile everything, and maintain the existence of the Empire and its rights, which is such an important barrier to rendering peace unto us and Europe. It is thus at the beginning of the war that it is necessary to strike a great blow. To wait for the second campaign will be able to give the English the time to consolidate her forces, to call foreign troops to their country, to assemble and form their militias, to redeploy a portion of their troops from America, and finally to develop a defensive strategy, something that they still have not had an idea about since their confidence and their talent in the art of ground warfare have never caused them to envision their country under such conditions. One has just exposed the immense utility and advantage of this mission. If one envisions it from the perspective of cost, a single campaign at sea conducted under the usual plan and with simple defensive preparations will cost just as much, and it will necessarily lead to a second, third, and maybe even a fourth one. Long wars are ruinous, and to this inconvenience is added that

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of being indecisive and always leaving in peace time, or, more appropriately, in the truce that ends them, the germ of a new war. A great nation like France should never lose sight of the example of the Romans; all the wars of their best days were short and lively, and one saw their end result. Let us pass to the possibility and the explanation of this mission. Of all the objections that are raised against a project of debarkation in England, not one dares to claim its impossibility or even doubt its success once the landing is executed, and one has constantly diminished the inconveniences and the difficulties of arriving at the moment of debarkation. This is thus the objective that one must resolve. The partisans of the landing have two opinions relative to the possibility; some, and these are the greater number, as nearly all naval officers agree, think that in order to execute the mission in England, it is necessary to gain mastery of the English Channel with a superior or victorious fleet; some others have claimed that it was possible to rob an English fleet of passage with the favor of the winds that reign in the English Channel. The winds that would carry us to the English coast necessarily forcing26 the English toward the ocean, but when this hypothesis would be admitted, we will absolutely align ourselves with the opinion of the former group because what could be executed with the favor of the winds for a few ships and even a small army flotilla would have the greatest inconvenience for a great army such as we believe to be necessary to use in this expedition. It is necessary to embark on a large number of ships leaving from several different points and which one cannot consequently compromise to the fate of a risky change of the wind, to obstacles, or to a simple delay in the execution of the debarkation and consequently to the return of an English flotilla that would come to trouble and ruin it. If one cannot cover the passage and the landing because of a decided superiority or the gain of a naval battle, there is no execution. This is thus the basis that we are establishing in the developed project of this memoir. Opinion is more shared on the force, the objective, and the place of the expedition. We are going to discuss all these points successively.27 Several strategies presented in diverse times by different people propose to limit the objective of the landing in England to a simple expedition against the principal establishments of the English navy and to undertake it consequently with only fifteen thousand men, which they believe to suffice for this operation. The authors of this project rely on the possibility of hiding the apparatus of a minor armament from the enemy and being able to execute this expedition by surprise or without having to be compromised to the chance of a naval battle. Finally, they say that destroying the principal establishments of the English navy must be the unique goal and that—if this goal is fulfilled— one may impose peace upon them as though one dictated it to them in

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London, that a larger mission requires greater forces, and that it would be too risky in the event of misfortune. One is of a completely opposite opinion. First of all, with a mediocre expedition, one cannot simultaneously undertake the attack of the three principal establishments of the English navy at Portsmouth, Plymouth, and Chatham. These establishments being too far from one another, one cannot attack them at the same time without separating his forces, which would be dangerous. If one attacked them one after the other, this would take too long and would give time to England to assemble troops and come to their aid. Instead of being astonished and struck by a great, unexpectedly delivered blow, the country would soon recuperate when it would see that this is no more than a minor expedition that could penetrate neither to the capital nor into the heart of the country. By admitting even that one might take possession of one of the principal establishments of the English navy, this strike would not be desired.28 With the English navy having a fleet before Brest or in the English Channel, it will also be difficult to conceal from them the departure of a small landing flotilla—much less one that would be even larger. It will likewise be impossible to attempt the landing without having previously won a battle in the wake of which one can cover and assure the passage for this debarkation. The same maritime means are thus necessary as well as the chance of a naval battle to protect a small expedition and to assure the re-embarkation and return of the small army corps that one will have employed. Thus, it is necessary to be the absolute master of the English Channel and consequently to have won such a complete battle that it entirely removes from the English the possibility of holding the sea and of risking a second one [battle].29 On the other hand, a major expedition undertaken with a large army only has need of maritime protection for the passage. To debark in the country, it can thus profit from the partial success of our navy or an indecisive battle after which the English navy would only have to retreat into its ports for a few days. A large army will be able to maintain itself there, feed itself, and make itself respected. It will conduct the peace terms in London, and all the English vessels, masters of the channel, will only serve as a wage of its triumph and a means of return.30 No half projects and no partial expeditions—this is the conclusion of all the arguments made above and of many others that the project and the details of a great expedition will even better cause to be felt. One can apply to all these projects and all those ideas of small expeditions that which we said about the system of fragmenting the navy and of having it act in separate theaters.31 The same points of view could have guided the authors and be the result of personal opinions.

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It is only with an army—and with an army of sixty thousand men—that one believes that a landing can be followed with a certain, glorious, and decisive success because in any strategy whatsoever it is necessary that the passage be equally assured and covered by a superior and victorious navy. Why risk a success that can be demonstrated in positive and proven calculations? Why not profit from the superiority of our land forces? Why execute a weak and limited landing such that England could execute one on our coasts? Why, finally, attempt uncertain and timid strikes against an enemy that one can defeat without repair in a single blow? The diverse planners of landing projects are not any more in agreement on the points of debarkation. Some would like to enter the Thames; others propose embarking near Portsmouth or Plymouth; others say in the country of Kent or Suffolk. Most of them rely on chance according to projects that were not conducted in the field or according to ideas that they attempted to take credit for. The project that one adopted in this general plan is made to inspire the most confidence; it is calculated on a great scale, and one believes that it leaves nothing to be desired in detail; it was even conducted in the field itself by officers whose talent is known, of which it was the expressed mission, and who saw everything with their own eyes. One determined the landing points here not only according to the apparent facilities of the coast but according to the interior view of a plan of operations devised beyond London and consequently according to the topography of the country. One thus examined with care the other diverse, proposed landing points, and one recognized that they could not fulfill the same objectives; hence, without elaborating on this in details that could only be the material of a specific memoir, one rejected the plan of proceeding through the Thames onto Chernon, Chatham, Depford/Depfort, Woolwich, and London because of local difficulties that are presented; one rejected the plan of acting through Portsmouth and Plymouth either simultaneously or sequentially because this is impossible at the same time since, with these two points being too distant one from the other, the points of debarkation—especially with relation to Plymouth—are out of the reach of our coasts and since, by starting the mission through them, success could be uncertain, whereas—once [the landing crews gain mastery] of London and the country that lies before them and has consequently cut [the cities and villages] off from all assistance—they fall on their own. One rejected as well the other diverse propositions for an infinity of evident reasons made on the spot. Those which one selected are in the county of Sussex, the same ones where Jules Caesar, William the Duke of Normandy, and William, Prince of Orange landed. These points offer at once all the advantages that once can desire. First of all, the landings [are] very practical. Second, one can march to London from there without coming

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across any obstacles; one crosses the Medway/Medwin at its mouth; one defeats and suppresses behind oneself during the early marches to the provinces of Kent, Sussex, and Suffolk; one finally arrives at London in five or six marches at the most, and one necessarily forestalls here all the troops that the English could muster from their different defensive positions, nearly all these positions, and especially Portsmouth and Plymouth, where they would be obliged to maintain the largest part, being farther from London than are our ports marked for the debarkation. It would only remain now to talk about the possibility and the means of the great expedition, but one will return to this with the project itself; it will be presented in the remainder of this memoir with enough clarity and, one will dare to say, with proof. In order to dispense with preliminary discussions, one wants to avoid repetition; this memoir is already voluminous enough, but its interest and its importance must excuse its length.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE GENERAL DEFENSIVE AND OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS AGAINST ENGLAND Having determined in the preceding memoirs the bases on which it is necessary to establish a general plan, one is going to develop them hereafter by dividing them into parts. One, current and applicable to the moment, will embrace the defensive and preparatory circumstances as much to shelter themselves from a sudden and unexpected attack as to put themselves in a position to attack her [England] if circumstances render this advantageous or necessary; the second part will be essential and applicable when, war being declared, it will be necessary to go into action; consequently, it will embrace the specifics of the offensive operations.

FIRST PART: GENERAL PLAN FOR WHAT CONCERNS FRANCE 1. One will prevent in the next sailing seasons the departure of our merchant vessels for the seas of America, Asia, and the north, and one will end the same orders to our colonies for all returning vessels; only the commerce of the Mediterranean sea will be able to remain free and open because the trajectories are short and in the case of hostilities, our vessels will find asylum from all sides. One will be able to object that this precaution will harm commerce, will create alarm, will reduce funds, and will impose a character of timidity, but all these reasons must be of little consideration

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when compared to the important goal of protecting our sailors and preventing the English—making a general incursion into all the seas as in 1755 and augmenting their fleet by force—from effectively ruining our commerce and destroying our means of equipping our fleets. For the rest, the circumstances the two powers, their respective work, their armament, and the movement of troops that we have just undertaken recently had to produce—as far as the effects of opinion and the bias of papers—all that one had to fear, and the precaution indicated above will add nothing. Finally, even if the precaution would find itself taken a little too early and if the war would still not be begun yet be announced—inappropriately, if one wishes, being that does not take place—our commerce will only lose one expedition at most, and in this case the interest of the state must have precedence over private interest. Abandoned for two years, our American colonies will be provided with all that they may lack in order to create the best possible defense with the understanding that one will send to them at the same time all at once all the recruits assembled on the Isle of Rhé/Ré [?] and destined to complete the troops that are there. According to the plans and memoirs that are in the hands of the government, it is proven that a reinforcement of fifteen or eighteen hundred men could suffice to shelter the Isle de France from an attack on the part of the English; one will risk sending there this reinforcement with a man carefully selected to command it, and one will add to this the necessary munitions and material. The Isle de Bourbon will be abandoned to its own forces, and one will not develop at present any offensive against the English establishments in India. In order not to rouse the suspicions of the English concerning these shipments of provisions and munitions to the American islands and the Isle of France, it will be necessary to send them from different ports that are not apparent and from which these sorts of expeditions do not ordinarily take place. One could likewise ship them as simple expeditions of commerce. Hence, what is necessary to avoid with care is sending large envoys that require strong squadrons to escort them since there could thus be no secret, and once warned, the English, if they are determined to go to war as there is much reason to suppose, must prevent them from arriving. The best reason32 is that one must not divide our navy, and it is necessary to reserve it for greater missions. Ten vessels from the department of Toulon would sail to Brest, and as a result of this reinforcement, the naval army of Brest would rise to the number of forty vessels of the line, all equipped and ready to set sail, in addition to a proportionate number of frigates and other war ships. This

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envoy of ten vessels from the port of Toulon to Brest will take place as promptly as possible in order that the junction not be hindered by the English. For this result, one could not wait for the vessels of the Mediterranean to be completely armed; one will send them out successively and in proportion to their preparedness unless prudence recommends that it be undertaken in its entirety because of specific advice or because of a sortie of an English squadron from which one could expect hostilities. In this case, Spain could protect the junction by expediting at the same time the squadrons from Cadiz and El Ferrol and accompanying ours for the distance that one deems necessary so that it arrives in Brest in all security. This junction is one of the most essential and pressing objects to fulfill for there will be no great offensive operation against the English if one has at Brest a strong enough fleet to become master of the English Channel; there is no longer any possibility of undertaking this junction if we leave time for the English to realize the consequences of it and prevent it. 6. If a few of the vessels or frigates that are at Rochefort or the Orient must take part in the great forces prepared at Brest, one will have them arrive as soon as possible since the flotilla of Brest must be assembled in one place and since this assembly must not be risked to the fate of the winds, the stations that the English could take, or any other obstacles that might arise. 7. The naval army of Brest will thus remain completely assembled in port if the basin does not suffice to contain it in the Landerneau; but in no case will it be laid up either in whole or in part so that at the moment when war is declared it will be determined to have it leave for combat. This objective is too important not to deserve some detail. The Brest Channel is susceptible to being forced by very determined vessels assisted by winds from the west, southwest, or northwest. They can thus pass in less than six minutes and without the batteries of the two banks being able to provide any obstacles. If a flotilla or squadron thus finds itself in any part whatsoever in the roadsteads of the Brest, the same winds that would allow enemies to enter the roadsteads would oblige this flotilla or squadron to combat on the coast or in the inlets and consequently with such an imminent disadvantage that a number of inferior vessels could destroy it, and all the batteries that surround the harbor could thus not offer it any protection; whereas if the harbor is free, an enemy vessel could not maintain itself there or even attempt to penetrate it because it would risk losing itself uselessly and without gain; one will say that a similar attack would be very difficult and very hazardous, that it would demand a favorable set of circumstances that are nearly impossible to unite, that the

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enemy squadron or flotilla could lose several vessels upon entering, that the wind could change or falter, and that the small number of vessels that would have penetrated would be irreparably lost.33 All of this can be, but when fortune could be unique, why run risks freely? This would not be the first time that the English would hazard similar attacks; one only has to recall the destruction of the Spanish flotilla at Vigo by Admiral Rooke and two or three similar occasions in the war of 1700.34 One only has to recall the expedition of Du Guay-Trouin to Rio Janeiro. M. de Vauban, who had fortified Brest and knew it better than anyone, was so persuaded of this possibility that he had convinced Louis XIV to remove the fleet from this port, for which he still feared a bombardment form the land, and to shelter it in the Landerneau. The veritable theater of a fleet when it is destined for combat is undoubtedly the sea, but prior to this, it is necessary to shelter it from all attacks, even when apparently impossible; perhaps in a moment about to be realized by unexpected fate and sudden circumstances, all of our hopes would be ruined. By the same strategy of not dividing our navy and not compromising it in particular to defeat or to a hostile surprise on the part of the English, it is believed that in the current circumstances one must not at all set war vessels to sail and not to hold them above all in harbor and in bays where they could be attacked advantageously such as at Quiberon, where M. de la Mothe Piquet was for a few days, but it is necessary on the contrary to have frigates on reconnaissance on all coasts in order to observe all that can leave from the ports of England. There will be formed in the surroundings of Brest a camp of twenty battalions. These troops will serve on one hand to work vigorously and on the other to support the roadstead and cover the Landerneau from the land in the supposition that the general fleet requires vessels to enter there. Sixty other battalions and thirty squadrons, composed of twenty-five Dragons and five Hussars, will be redeployed in different camps from Morlaix to Dunkirk.35 At the same time, one will conduct in all ports the necessary and proportionate storage of artillery, munitions, and provisions; it will be necessary at least that these goods exist in the magazines and depots of the interior of the maritime provinces in such a manner to be transported to the ports without delay or inconvenience at the first order that will be given. Under the pretext of the consumption of different camps, one will purchase the oxen necessary for pulling the artillery and the provisions of a landing army in the case of an invasion of England, and while waiting for

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13.

14.

15.

16.

17.

18.

19.

Chapter V

one to assemble enough horses to replace them in the field, these oxen will be placed in different depots within reach of the camps; this portion will serve in effect for their consumption, this consumption being replaced with successive provisions with the result that the number will always be ready at the first order. In magazines, one will also store the necessary yokes, traces, and harnesses with replacements for either, oxen or horses, as well as a certain amount of equipment for horses. All posts, guards, and signals of the coast will be established with the greatest of care from Dunkirk to Bayonne, or one will at the very least take the measures to establish them in first rate order by adopting to this effect a general plan according to the most recent surveys. All the batteries of the coast will likewise be placed in preparedness according to a new general plan, and if they are not all sufficiently furnished with artillery and munitions, one will take measures to have this arrive in the closest cities or ports. With batteries of all sorts but especially with mortars and moreover with redoubts, boats armed with cannons, and all other means that will be judged appropriate, one will strive more particularly to fortify the roadsteads of Cherbourg, La Hogue, and others situated in the English Channel that would be recognized, in the case of defeat, of being able to serve as a retreat and asylum for our navy. One will not neglect the points of our coast that are the most susceptible to a naval attack such as the entrance of our principal rivers, St. Malo, Le Havre, and the other cities that, being on the coast, can fear bombardment, and one will draw up for all these different points some defensive instructions that, at the first movement of the English, will be expedited to the commanders of the closest provinces and troops. One will prepare a general strategy for the assembly of coast guards; when first needed, this strategy will be preceded by an ordinance in order to constitute them in a regular and uniform manner; it [the ordinance] is all ready, but it will be necessary at the moment of their assembly not to neglect at least a few companies of officers taken from the troops of the line and capable of assembling them and having them serve and especially [to attach] some directors of artillery charged with their inspection, all necessarily being gunners. This last article is essential; the neglect of these first principles have always resulted in the coast guards being negligible and in one not having any use for them in any instance. All the rest of the vessels of the port of Toulon that will be susceptible to being armed will be prepared in addition to the frigates, to as many xe-

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becs and bombing galiots as possible; twenty-five battalions will be assembled in the province and will camp in the vicinity of Toulon.36 20. On will thus prepare in silence and with the greatest of care for the execution of the offensive operations that form the second part of the general plan in such a manner that if war were to render it necessary, one might immediately enter into action without hesitancy, slowness, or uncertainty. 21. But in order to fulfill all these goals as perfectly as their importance demands, in order to survey the execution and accomplish the details of all the parts of the general plan, it is important that the King and his Minister confide its direction to two people superior in rank and capable of answering to this confidence; that would naturally find themselves susceptible to being divided in two parts.37 One would embrace all the coasts of the ocean from Dunkirk to Bayonne, which he would be charged with having under his orders a particular command from the river of Nantes to Bayonne. The other part would stretch from the Gulf of Roussillon to Antibes. It would also be appropriate to choose, for being employed in different points where one will place troops, the general officers that the commander of the ocean coasts would propose as the most proper to serve in the mission of the invasion of England. Under no circumstances would it be no longer necessary to give the greatest attention to this choice. These arrangements are thus indispensable in the current circumstances and in the supposition that one might adopt a plan because to the axiom that was established at the beginning of this memoir—that there was no chance of success without a plan—it is necessary to add that no plan can be executed with success if its execution is not entrusted to the capable leaders who might answer for it to King and Minister.

NOTES 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

#2, 30 Ibid, 31 #1 gives “their solution,” 44 #1, new paragraph starts here #1 gives: “any sort of position,” 45 #2, p. 33. #1 starts a new paragraph here #1 starts a new paragraph here

1. Descent in England 2. Division in Scotland

10[#1:50] vessels 50 frigates

10 frigates without counting xebecs or galleys

40 vessels 20 frigates

What concerns France

3. Division on the Mediterranean menacing Mahón and effecting later a portion of the East Indies 4. Reinforcement sent to The Isle of France by various ships departed from different ports that will successively provide the effects to begin to give worries and troubles to the English

Number of Vessels or Frigates

86,800 men [#1:73,300]

15,000 idem

10 vessels 15,000 idem

56,000 men 800 idem.

Number of troops

45 vessels 25 frigates 6 idem to support either Mahón or Gibraltar and defend the Mediterranean 15 vessels They already have 4 here Earlier one said 15 vessels to defend the Mediterranean; all is fulfilled concerning this object

in the ocean and in the Channel to meet the fleet of Brest

in England relative to diverse ordered points 40,000 men 5 or 6,000 idem in Mahón 4,500 men One supposes that they will not send reinforcements of troops to the Indies, but thus {“if” #1} the expedition that has to be prepar-ed at Toulon {“is executed” #1}she [England?] will find {“them beyond” #1}measure

Forces that England would be forced to have in order to meet these diverse operations, whether real or simulated

Table 5.1. Table of the different expeditions both real and simulated that form the general offensive project to be concerted between France and Spain against England according to the consequently prepared memoir in which one sees the number of vessels and troops that the two crowns could employ in this and the number that the English would of necessity have to oppose to it. [p. 68 #2; p.91 # 1]

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3. Descent into Ireland and the Bristols [Bristol Channel?]

2. Division in America having as its object to defend the islands and attack Jamaica if the English leave their Garrison in this part of the world

What concerns Spain 1. Attack on Gibralter

1 fleet from El Ferrol 15 vessels 42 vessels 28 frigates

15 vessels 10 frigates

12 vessels 8 frigates

Squadrons united from Cadiz and Cartagena

47,000 men

15,000 idem

12,000 men

20,000 men

15 vessels at Cabo de Finisterre to observe the fleet of El Ferrol 100 vessels of the line, not counting frigates

To meet the Spanish fleet that must constantly remain in Havana and menace Jamaica at least 19 vessels

72,000 men 10 frigates

10,000 men

in Ireland

at Jamaica and in the Antilles at 8,000 men

4,000 men

Garrison at Gibraltar

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8. #1 gives: “and the counter dispositions that would be necessary to oppose him with,” 50 9. #2, 36 10. Ibid, 38 11. #1 gives the following two sentences (as cited in the text) continuing into the next paragraph as a single, independent paragraph – from “Such . . .” to “. . . country.” 12. It appears that “her” refers here to either France or Spain 13. #1 gives: “supposedly invincible army,” 56 14. #1 starts a new paragraph here 15. #1 starts a new paragraph here 16. #2, 41 17. #1 adds here: “the English,” 57 18. The two manuscripts, #1 and #2, give literally: “the lighted fuse.” 19. #1 adds: “of neutrality,” 58 20. #1 gives: “of France and Spain,” 58 21. #2, 44 22. #1 does not start a new paragraph at this point 23. #2, 48 24. #1 begins a new paragraph here 25. #1 begins a new paragraph here 26. # 1 states: “forces,” 71 27. #2, 53 28. Ibid, 54 29. #1 begins a new paragraph here 30. #1 begins a new paragraph here 31. #1 states “to both of these,” p. 75. The text as iterated appears on document #2, 55. 32. #1 adds “thus,” 81 33. #2, 62 34. Ibid, 63 35. Ibid, 64 36. Ibid, 66 37. #1 gives: “this command and this inspection,” (meaning of “that” in #2), 89.

Chapter VI

De Broglie’s Observations

If one wants to reflect attentively on this table, one will see that nothing is exaggerated concerning the possibility of the resources that the two crowns can employ on behalf of naval forces and more reasonably on behalf of land forces. It is quite possible1 that England might never be able to attain the possibility of the means of defense that one has demonstrated above to be necessary for her at the actual moment; having 25,000 sailors occupied in the American war, she could arm at the most only fifty or sixty vessels, and this is very far from the one hundred that she would need to prepare and maintain the defensive plan that one has just detailed. As far as her land forces are concerned, the American war has left her with a still greater scarcity; in the three realms of Gibraltar, Mahón, and the Isle of Wight, she only has remaining fifteen thousand men to which she could add thirty thousand militia men for a total of forty-five thousand men. Would this be an army capable of resisting a vigorous mission such as one proposes in the general plan that was the subject of this memoir? Supposing finally that once peace is made with her colonies and a portion of these resources are consequently recalled to her, England would still not be in a state to prepare the defense that would be necessary in the case in which she would be attacked with all the means and in the manner that we have proposed because all her forces united would not reach seventy-two thousand men, and with this supposition fulfilled, the distribution of forces done according to how it was just demonstrated would be indispensable; our project could still be executed with the greatest superiority on our part, for what will forty thousand men be to garrison all the points of the coast that would be menaced?2

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As far as their navy is concerned, their sailors employed in the American seas will not hardly suffice to complete the armament of vessels that would be necessary for them; this is easily demonstrated by the adjoining calculations. For the armament of hundred vessels of the line each requiring a crew of six hundred men, this would necessitate sixty thousand sailors to which one must add at least twenty thousand for the frigates and escort ships, but England, in consideration of all the sailors of her commerce and sea trade, can furnish no more than eighty thousand sailors, and these are two objectives that are so important for her that she cannot sacrifice them entirely to her military armaments because, without them, she cannot replenish her needs by herself or fulfill her public responsibilities or meet the war expenditures. The result of this table is thus the most evident demonstration that one can give of the necessity of conducting a vigorous war on a grand scale; any other plan will allow her to breathe, to re-establish herself, to face us with inferior means, to take the offensive against our weak and open sectors, and to renew thus the example of the unfortunate wars that we had against her for the past century. One has made an approximate table, which was sent to the late King, on the extraordinary expense that a similar expedition could occasion, and supposing a duration of six months, this detailed state would reach thirty million [francs?] for the land and sea together, but one would be reimbursed with interest by the English if we for once landed sixty thousand men in England.

GENERAL DISPOSITIONS RELATIVE TO SPAIN 1. Spain will take the same measures as France relative to her ships of commerce; the same motives must in this regard be common to the two nations. 2. The Spanish colonies in all parts of the world will be, if they are not already, furnished with everything that is necessary for their defense in such a manner that they can be abandoned to themselves for two years. 3. The fleet as well as the army corps that are employed in Brazil will transfer to Havana and will establish themselves there until further instructions in order to fulfill the defensive and offensive strategies of the present plan. This fleet will be composed of fifteen vessels of the line with the necessary frigates and escort ships, and the army corps [will be composed] of twelve thousand trained men without including the actual garrison of Havana. 4. His Catholic Majesty will maintain at Cadiz a squadron of nine to ten vessels and a few frigates with transport ships and a corps of twelve to fifteen thousand men camped within reach of this place.

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5. The camp of San Roque near Gibraltar will be composed of twenty thousand men,3 and one will make here as well as at Cadiz the same preparations for the siege. 6. At the same time, there will be ten to twelve armed vessels and a few xebecs in the port of Cartagena. 7. The remainder of the Spanish navy will be assembled at El Ferrol with the necessary ships for embarking an army of twenty thousand men who will camp in this place.4 8. The actual ties between the courts of Lisbon and Madrid do not seem to leave anything to fear for this, but for the greatest security, the remainder of the Spanish troops that will not be necessary for the defense of the Mediterranean will be transferred to quarters, camps, or billets in the provinces of León, Castile, Estremadura [in Portugal], and Andalucia. 9. Moreover, for the defense of her coasts, ports, and roadsteads as well as for her supply of provisions, the expedition of her convoys, and the manner of employing her navy, Spain will take all the measures and dispositions corresponding to those of France according to the circumstances and the places. Such is the first general strategy in which one believes that the two powers must await the events; this strategy must be entirely formed from now until the end of the month of May; it fulfills simultaneously all the objects that one can expect; it shelters the two nations from a sudden attack on the part of England; for the insurgents, it is the most effective diversion because it menaces England and prevents her from directing her fleets against them; it obliges her to augment her armaments; by this, one weakens her finances and suspends the activity of her commerce; finally, if there is a means of avoiding war (which no one believes)? the passion and the interest of the English minister necessarily carrying her away on all matters?, it would still be that of being capable of maintaining it [war] very vigorously and with menacing resources. At the same time that France and Spain could adopt this attitude, they could simultaneously claim to England that this strategy is only preparatory and defensive and that they are quite determined not to begin the war but that they want to conserve and protect their commerce and have their colors respected on all seas without exception; and that they will consequently consider as a provocation of hostility and declaration of war all insults, visits of vessels that are armed, violations of the right of protection, colors, or batteries, etc., if it [the hostile act] is not solemnly disavowed and repaired by England as soon as the complaint will have been made.5 It is also likely that such a declaration might be considered by England herself as a declaration of war if she is at the same time certain that we have a

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treaty with the insurgents.6 France and Spain can and must expect this, but they will have at least thus conducted themselves as worthy of their power, and since the circumstances make war inevitable, is it not prudent, reasonable, and glorious to conduct it [the war] under such auspices.7

STRATEGIES AND OPERATIONS IN THE CASE OF WAR 1. The expedition in England being executed conjointly by the two powers will be the basis and principle objective of their offensive plan, and for this result, all the other operations and strategies, whether real or simulated, will all have to lead to this. 2. With our American colonies abandoned to their own fate, the officers who command here will be ordered to concert themselves with the commander of the fleet and [the commander] of the Spanish army in Havana for the diversions that they will judge as advantageous and good to execute against the English colonies and particularly against Jamaica by assisting them with transport vessels for troops and provisions, this diversion being one of the most effective means of preventing or counterbalancing the success of the English in this part of the world. 3. Our Asian colonies will similarly be abandoned to their own fate for the moment. 4. The squadron of Toulon and the army corps of Provence will be prepared for a mission somewhat similar to that of 1756 against Mahón. This mission will only be simulated unless the English are totally determined to abandon this region. Its principal objective will be to increase the problems of the English and to attract their attention in the Mediterranean. A portion of this squadron and armament will thus be employed as one will state below. 5. Spain will place herself in a position for the siege of Gibraltar. This operation will be real; she will employ all the forces that she will have assembled at Cadiz, Cartagena, and the camp of San Roque. 6. Five or six vessels from the fleet of Brest with seven or eight battalions and the necessary transport ships will receive the order to prepare to leave for India, and one will consequently make with much fanfare all the preparations tending to the destination of this armament; a sudden order will interrupt the departure of this squadron at the moment of its execution, the object being only to create a diversion for the English and to engage them in dispatching seven or eight vessels into this part of the world and to weaken herself as much as possible in the English Channel and the ocean.

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7. One will attempt as far as it will be possible to deceive the public and England about the great mission, and for this, one will take care to circulate that one recognized its impossibility, that one prefers to expedite all forces for the support of our colonies and to undertake the operations of Gibraltar and Mahón; to augment this probability, one will order ten vessels and a few frigates to stock provisions for six months by announcing that this squadron is destined to reinforce the Spanish fleet at Havana, and one will speak of sending the fleet of Brest to join that of El Ferrol and Cadiz to undertake together and cover the siege of Mahón and Gibraltar and to chase the English from the Mediterranean; as a secondary plan it offers great advantages, and one will be able to reveal it after all with a great appearance of probability in order to detract attention from the true project. 8. As soon as one will have allowed these rumors and different strategies enough time to effect the English preparations, of which the result will likely be to divide their forces and weaken them in the ocean and in the English Channel, one will immediately turn to the great mission while guarding as much secrecy about it as possible and revealing it only with as little time as possible left before its execution. 9. One must repeat here that the practically assured result, as much for the first general strategy that will be undertaken by the two crowns before the war as for the different preparations, illusions, and explanations given above, will necessarily be to lead to the division of the English forces at several points; in effect, the commerce of Great Britain all throughout the east makes Gibraltar and Mahón so important to her that she will not dare to abandon them to their own fate and will be determined to send a fleet for their support, and this fleet could not be any smaller than eighteen to twenty vessels. Likewise, she cannot avoid sending to the Gulf of Mexico a fleet to observe that of Havana. Twenty vessels will not be too much to fulfill this goal. The English lack ports that are as secure or well situated as those of the Spanish in this part of the world and consequently cannot maintain themselves there without a clear superiority. Moreover, would they know how to prevent the effects of the intemperance of the climate and the air that is more bothersome for them than for any nation in Europe? This division, which will thus have to subsist for the entire duration of the war, will thus be for them all at once the object of a great consumption of men and money.8 The slight reinforcement that one will have sent to the Isle de France will suffice to cause fear in the English for some mission in the Persian Gulf or against the Ganges and force them to dispatch a small squadron

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there even if they would not have any offensive objectives in this part of the world. Remaining with the naval army of Brest will be that of El Ferrol and the squadron of Cadiz, which will fix and necessarily share the principal attention of the English; these armaments menacing all at once England and Ireland and that of Cadiz being able to cause concern for them about their establishments in Africa and absolutely even those in India, their attention will be even more divided by a small squadron of six or seven frigates that it will be appropriate to assemble at Dunkirk and that will have as its objective in the general plan to attempt a small diversion in Scotland. Everything thus leads one to presume that the trouble and the uncertainty of England will be at the highest degree. If she decides to send a fleet to the Mediterranean and one to America, she will remain incapable of resisting the large fleet of Brest and El Ferrol in the English Channel and in the ocean, and the great mission can be executed thus without a naval battle. If she decides to keep all her forces around herself, Spain can thus vigorously undertake the mission against Gibraltar, and the fleet of Havana becomes master of the American seas. The invasion of England can no longer in truth be executed without a naval battle, but one had to consider every possible scenario, and this is the great event to which it is necessary to commit oneself. 10. In the midst of all the movements that the war can bring about, such a moment can present itself when a great expedition against India (which first of all does not enter into the general plan) will become advantageous and easy to execute. Such, for example, would be the case if all the English forces assembled in the English Channel and in the ocean would leave all the other seas free; such would be the case in which the gain of a naval battle would permit the great expedition to be accomplished and in which it would be necessary to profit from the hardships and the trouble of the English to defeat them all over at once. Such would also be the case if we were to lose the naval battle and failed to undertake the invasion of England while the English would have nevertheless been obliged to assemble all their forces in the English Channel and the ocean and it would be necessary to seek elsewhere the successes that might redeem that which we will have lost. This is what the squadron of Toulon could be used for with a portion of the equipment and the five to six thousand men and troops that would have been assembled in province to simulate an expedition against Mahón. This back-handed strike would only have to be kept in great secrecy, and one could undertake it by claiming that it was a reinforcement sent to the Spanish before Gibraltar. Once the straits are passed, this squadron would necessarily have three or four months of

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advance on the assistance that the English could send, and its objective being not to conquer the English establishments but to devastate them and to cut off this source of revenue, the mission would be accomplished before they were in any condition to defend against it. 11. It results from the entirety of this plan that if it is undertaken with vigor, it is nearly impossible for the English not to undergo the greatest damage because if the invasion of England succeeds, they are forever defeated, and if it does not come about, it will have at least favored other secondary operations whose success will still result in deadly strikes against them; to complete this plan, it remains to treat in detail the greatest objective of this expedition, and this is what one is going to do in the following chapter.

NOTES 1. #2, p. 69. #1 adds: “on the contrary,” 92 2. #2, 70. 3. # 1 gives: “occupied by,” 95 4. #2, 72 5. #1 gives: “proventoire,” p. 97; #2 gives: “préventoire;” neither word is listed in any of my French dictionaries; I think that “provocative” is probably the closest possible meaning of the original word used. 6. #1 adds: “and thus her hostility will be her response,” 98 7. One departs here from the generally held supposition that Spain can arm fifty vessels of the line; if this is not founded, it is necessary to make in this project the dispositions and proportionate reductions but while always conserving the basis, which must be to have a fleet at Ferrol; in this case, Spain would not have a fleet at Cartagena, and she would combine all her forces in the ocean. In #2, this note appears on page 73 at the end of section entitled “General Strategies Relative to Spain;” in #1, the note appears somewhat earlier within the body of the section. 8. #1 (p.102) is worded slightly different here from #2, but the general meaning remains the same.

Chapter VII

Execution of the Invasion of England

The invasion of England will be composed of three separate operations— 1. The actual landing executed in England 2. A small diversion in Scotland; these two operations will concern only France. 3. A division in Ireland executed by Spain.1 4. With all the interior preparations of this project needing to be completed in advance as one so reads in this memoir, it only remains to speak here about the last preparations that are properly those of the execution.

LAST PREPARATIONS One will begin by determining which season is best for this great enterprise; this can only be the period of the month of April or October, but one believes the latter to be the most convenient under all considerations, whether with regard to the winds that reign thus or because this is the time when one will more abundantly find provisions in Great Britain and when the English will, following the course of their commerce, have the greater number of ships and consequently the greater number of sailors and equipment for defense abroad; it is thus this period, that is to say from 1 October to 15 or 20 November, that it will be necessary to be in a state to profit from the favorable wind to leave our ports and sail for the coasts of England. Let us now pass to the objective of these preparations.

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75

1. In consequence of the dispositions proposed in the first part of this work, one supposes that all our merchant vessels will have been retained in our ports; if this part had not generally been taken, it would be necessary on that very day to place an embargo on all ships, whether they be national or foreign, that would be in the ports of the kingdom. Spain will have to take the same measures on the same day. 2. Light ships will have to patrol all the coasts of the English Channel carefully in order to prevent any news about what is happening here from reaching the English. 3. At the same time, it will be ordered that all ship owners—be they national or foreign privateers or merchants—will have to release those ships of theirs that will be ready to sail and to arm and prepare those that are not, to have two good boats as large as possible (there are replacements in all ports), and to stock provisions for six weeks or two months. All the expenses relative to this cargo and these supplies will be negotiated at a good price that might both reimburse them and stimulate their seal; the names of the owners who will have given the most and the best of their prepared ships will be sent to the court to receive the thanks and even the grace proportionate to their activity and to the service that they will have rendered.2 4. Because of precise reconnaissance conducted on the spot, one has assumed that there was always in our ports many more ships than were necessary in order to transport to England an army twice the size of the one that is destined for there in the present project. One joins here a condition that is proof of this and according to which it is easy to determine the quantity of ships that each port will have to furnish. 5. At the rate that transport ships from each specific port will be unloaded and armed, one will send them to the ports of assembly—Those of Picardy at Dunkerque, Calais, Boulogne Those of Normandy at Dieppe, Le Havre, Honfleur, and Cherbourg Those of Brittany at St. Malo, Morlaix, the Orient, Vannes, and Painbeuf [?] If there was need for a greater quantity, one could have supplemental ships arrive from Poitou, Aunis, and Guyana, but as far as one can tell from the above conditions, the ships from the three provinces of Normandy, Picardy, and Brittany will more than suffice. 6. While one will work on the armament of these ships and as they are assembled in the ports mentioned above, one will have transported artillery, provisions, and medical supplies to all the appropriate points, and one will deliver them as necessary.

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7. The army will carry provisions for only one month; these provisions will consist of wheat and rice; there will independently be biscuits for fifteen days, and it is superfluous to say here that one limits the supplies and provisions of the army to the duration of six weeks because the invasion up to the moment of debarkation and even during the formation of the magazines assembled in the county itself does not require more than a month of operation and because England can later furnish provisions of all sorts into any part that the army may travel. 8. Spread throughout the maritime provinces and their surroundings, all the troops destined for the invasion will begin their march to come to camp or billet within reach of the ports of assembly, and they will embark as soon as the transport vessels will be ready to receive them.3 The horses and oxen will also be loaded after a few days of rest. One will choose the smallest ships for [the horses and oxen] as well as for the artillery so that one might have them enter easily into the ports that are closest to the place where one will land and where much water does not rise. 9. It is at the moment and in the process of all these preparations that one will evidently feel what advantage it will be to have entrusted its preparation to the general who will have to take command of this army. In advance, he will have recognized and foreseen everything. He will have been personally interested in having all the preliminary dispositions well conducted and will know the places, the equipment, the possibilities, and the obstacles. If one were to imagine in place of this a man unfamiliar with all these preparations and coming to take charge of the execution4 of a project that he will not have prepared, one will see without any trouble all the inconveniences that must arise from this. It is necessary to add that his arrival will betray the mystery of everything whereas, having charged from the beginning with the preliminary dispositions that will have appeared to be related just to an early defense, he will appear to act only through a continuation of earlier commission. Whoever thus may be the general whom His Majesty will decide as appropriate to choose for an operation of such importance, it is necessary that it be he who, in the actual moment, may be charged with the command and the general inspection of all the coasts and maritime provinces at least from Dunkirk to the area of Aunis, this part of the kingdom necessarily being the foyer of the great expedition against England.

FINAL COMPOSITION OF THE ARMY OF INVASION The army will be composed of all the troops that will have been assembled from Dunkirk to Morlaix and will consist of eighty battalions each of six hun-

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dred and fifty trained men and will consequently have fifty-two thousand infantry men. Thirty squadrons of Hussars and Dragons consisting each of hundred men of whom fifty will embark with the best horses and fifty with saddles, reins, and the necessary equipment that one will use on the horses of the country [of England] as far as they [the cavalry men] will be able to procure them; one will attach to these troops and consequently dispatch the companies of riflemen from twenty battalions as large as possible which, being placed at one hundred and fifty trained men, will form a corps of one thousand and five hundred trained men, which form the first guard. The artillery will be composed of hundred pieces of field cannon of four, eight, and as much as twelve [military terminology/measurements?], and one will join to this an additional thirty pieces of sixteen and twenty-four and twenty mortars or howitzers; because of this artillery, one will not attach cannons to the battalions; one will augment the usual number of gunners for each piece so that they might be manned with as much activity as possible, especially for the smaller pieces so that when necessary they can be maneuvered by hand as easily as possible. One will join to this a large detachment of workers as well as a few miners with tools, pontoon bridges, and all the necessary materials for a lively and rapid field war mixed with several siege operations. This last point can only be relative to Portsmouth and Plymouth, which the English have barely fortified.5 One will only take soldiers who are in a perfect state of serving. All those who are not in this state will be left in France with arrangements for training them. The army thus completed will be at a strength of fifty-six thousand five hundred men without artillery. Only the necessary number of general officers will be attached to it, but it will be necessary to multiply the number of officers of the General Staff and especially to choose them well because there will never again be an opportunity to use them separately and as leaders. The retinue of the Officer Generals will be fixed at the strictest necessity as well as for that of superior officers. There will be two soldiers’ tents and only two kettles for all the officers of the same company, and there can only be three servants between them all. Each soldier will have in his knapsack just two shirts and two pairs of shoes.6 With the possibility of the invasion extending into a rigorous season, the army will be provided with vests and blankets; one will not allow any women to follow the regiments with the exception of those who will be indispensably useful under the title of laundresses or merchants of provisions [vivandières]. Infantry officers will march on foot for the entire beginning of the expedition and just until one might be able to provide them successively with equipment on behalf of the country. The soldiers will also carry their tents at the beginning.

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PREPARATIONS FOR THE SEA 1. If the English have, as it is apparent, a considerable fleet in the English Channel, they will take the measure of sending it before Brest or of holding it in their ports to block us and to defend the English Channel at the moment that we will leave from Brest. In either case, a naval battle is the indisputable preliminary, for there is no possibility or security of the invasion or the landing as long as one is not absolutely the master of the English Channel. 2. If the English fleet is before Brest, it is recognized that it cannot block ours there; consequently, as soon as all the measures of the landing army will be taken, it will leave to go to combat the English fleet. If it beats it, it is necessary that it push it vigorously and that it attempt to repulse it into its ports to establish itself later across from the Portsmouth canal and cover thus the passage and debarkation. 3. In case of an unfortunate success and considerable defeat that will dispose of and ruin our fleet, it follows that all hope for the invasion will be lost, but in case of a partial success or a slight defeat, one could later regroup in the ports and test fortune once again; with the invasion not being able to take place except in the event of a great advantage, one assumes this here and will pass consequently to the ultimate details. 4. If the wind is favorable, the victorious fleet will immediately give the departure signal. Once it arrives at the closest point of the coast, the signal will be repeated at once on land from St. Malo to Dunkirk, and one will place from point to point small posts that will confirm the signals by sending successively the order of departure to every point in order to prevent all inconveniences. Formed in divisions that will be escorted by vessels, frigates, and other light ships detached from the fleet, the landing army will immediately set sail.7 Each division commander will have his instructions on the point where it must debark, and all four [divisions] will thus go there by way of the shortest route to the coast of Sussex between Dangerest/Dengreck [?] and Beachy Head. The 1st Division in the Port of Rye The 2nd Division before Winchelsca/Winkelsey [Winchester?] The 3rd Division before Hastings The 4th Division before Pevinzey/Perinzey [?] One will immediately place the boats to sea, and the troops will prepare to debark.

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DEBARKATION The grenadiers and riflemen of each division, with the benefit of the cover of the vessels and artillery ships, will begin the landing at the points indicated. Each soldier will have at least sixty shots to fire and two gun flints in reserve. There will be two engineers and twenty carpenters for each advanced guard with six boats loaded with diverse tools, racks, beams, girders, ropes, nails, sand bags, etc., so that one might be entrenched as soon as one will have landed and can communicate from one point to another. Each advance guard will have three pieces of light artillery if it finds that it must disembark at a place that is too fortified with enemy troops.8 The vessels and artillery ships will fire arduously into the night with the entire apparatus of the landing, and thus with the continuation of this fire, the troops destined for the debarkation will descend at one of the points on the left or on the right where the landing will have succeeded, but there is reason to presume that the landing will take place without great resistance on their part since there are neither forts or batteries that can hold out against the fire of the vessels in all this sector of the coasts of England and since—by virtue of the large number of divisions—one will have obliged the English to divide and disperse their troops. As soon as the grenadiers and riflemen will have established positions on the coast, one place ashore the Hussars and the Dragons who will move forward after a few hours of rest. The infantry will disembark with its tents and kettles, and the cavalry [will disembark] with bridles, saddles, and boots. One will work at all the necessary entrenchments, and one will then unload the oxen, the artillery, and half the provisions and medical supplies. The transport ships will be anchored in the order of each division until one can enter them into the ports or send them back. One will leave in each ship trustworthy men who will be responsible for the equipment of the officers and who will deliver it when one will ask for it. Rye, Winchelsea/Winkelsey [Winchester?], Hastings, and Pevenzey/Perenzey [?] will be entrenched and guarded in order to construct the army depots in security. Each division will march forward of these four points to await new orders there. One will immediately spread in the country patrols led by intelligent and prudent officers in order to have news about the enemy and to disperse or raise the small parties that they will be able to have in the field. They will seize a few inhabitants, heads of family mayors, and principal magistrates whose conversation concerns the country and whose safety will depend on the obedience and the submission of their respective districts in the furnishing of the different contributions that will be imposed on them. These patrols

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will assemble at the same time all the horses, oxen, and carts that they will be able to find. Because only very little cavalry is required for the war in England because of the nature of the country, the fifty Dragons in squadrons that will be on foot will be mounted only to the extent that one will find horses that will be proper for them as long as the General will judge this necessary. While waiting, they will serve on foot with the advanced guards and the riflemen detached from the ten regiments remaining in France.

WAR IN THE COUNTRY All the marches and positions specified below were recognized in the same and are indicated on a map drawn specifically for this. It is necessary to observe that the eight marches for arriving in London can be easily reduced to four, and this will depend on the circumstances and movements of the enemy.

FIRST MARCH Leaving from Rye and reinforced with two thousand men, the advanced guard will march to Nosthyan/Northiant [?] on the Rothiar/Rothar [?], from which it will push its troops on Terdendren [?] and Croanbrook/Craonbrok [?]. Leaving from Winchelsea/Winkelsey [Winchester?] and Hastings, the two advance guards of the center will march to Battle/Batle [?], and their light troops [will march] to Salshurst/Salehourt [?]. Followed by a detachment of four thousand men, that of the left will march to Lellugley/Hellugley [?] on the Kormerk/Kormerik [?] and will push its light troops to Waldron [?]. It will send a patrol to Lewa [?] to occupy this city and to observe the side of Steining/Steyming [?]. The divisions will stay encamped at the point where they will be disembarked.

SECOND MARCH The advanced guard of the right will march to Craonbrook/Cambrook [?]; its light troops will move on to Beula [?]; those that will have occupied Enderdren/Terdendren [?] will march to Ashford [?].9 The advanced guard of the center will march to Salshurst/Salhourt [?] and its light troops will to Flinwel/Flaineville [?].

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The two divisions of the right will move to occupy Northian [?] and that of the left to the heights of Battle and before this village. The advance guard of the left will march to Maresiole/Marsfield [?], and its light troops will occupy the mount of Hanover Hill [?], from which one has a distant view of the country.

THIRD MARCH The right advance guard will go to camp on the Beula [?], and its light troops will move to Maidstones/Maldtonvil [?]. A patrol will be sent to occupy Ashford/Hertford [?] with the order to dispatch a few small troops to Canterbury to have news of the enemies in this point of the country of Kent. The advance guard of the center will advance on Lamberhust/Camsbershure [?], and its light troops [will march] to Woodgate [?]. The divisions of the right will march to Flimwell/Flainville [?], and those of the left [will march] to Salshurt/Salshurst [?]. The advance guard of this left will occupy the mount of Hanover Hill [?] and will advance its troops on the Medway [?]; the patrol of Lewes will continue to observe from the side of Steining [?] and Chischester/Chichister [?].

FOURTH MARCH The advance guard of the right will march to Maidstone; its light troops will go up in part to Rochester and in part to Welmsking/Westminister [?]. The patrol of Ashford/Hertford [?], without occupying Canterbury, will observe from the side of Dover and the Thames and will communicate with Maidstone and Rochester; the advance guard of the center will advance to Tumbridge [Tonbridge?], and its light troops will go to Sevenoaks or will remain on the mount of Riversalt [?]. The divisions of the right will camp at Woodgate [?], and those of the left will come to Flimwell/Flaineville [?]. The advance guard of the left will march to Ginstead/Ginhead [?]; it will send its light troops to Alendley-head [?].

FIFTH MARCH The advance guard of the right will go to camp at Wrotham/Wrothant [?], and its light troops will advance from West-Maling [?], Alings [?], Domstréal [?],

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and from Rochester to Gravesend [?] and in part to Cantorbery [Canterbury?] and will stay in the vicinity of this city10 to observe and give news about what is happening on the Thames and from the side of Dover. The advance guard of the center will go to Seven Oaks [?]; its light troops will advance to the heights of Madamscouth/Madanscourt Hill [?]. The four divisions of the army will camp at Tunbridge/Tambridge [Tonbridge?]. The advance guard of the left will march to Wlethingley/Welchingley [?] and will send its light troops to Kobherant/Koberant [?].

SIXTH MARCH The advance guard of the right will camp at Foolseray [?], and its light troops will advance to Athant/Atham [?] and Crayfort/Brayfort [?]; that of the center will march to Fornborough/Fourtanbouroug [?], and its light troops to Bromley/Bromby [?]. The army will camp at Sevenoaks [?]. The advance guard of the left will go to Croÿdon [?], and its light troops to Lorhn-HillHead/Thorn-Hill-Head [?].

SEVENTH MARCH The advance guard of the right will camp at Septon/Sepfort [?], and its light troops will advance as near to London as possible. That of the center will march to Lewksan/Lewksausen [?], and its light troops [will march] on London. The army will march to Bromley/Bronchy [?]. The advance guard of the left will go to camp at Ducwick/Derwick [?]; its light troops will march to London and on Wandernorth [?].

EIGHT MARCH The army will advance on London and will take a position on the heights that are between Deptfort/Depfort [?] and Haltersen [?]. The advance guard would camp on the flanks and in front of the army; its patrols will be recalled and dispersed according to the demands of the circumstances. The objective of these marches being to arrive in London in order to cover and defend this capital and conquer the province of Kent at the same time and all those in the middle of England and to cut these off from the Thames before the enemy can assemble his forces, one easily conceives

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that it is essential for these marches to take place with as much speed and order as possible.11 If the enemy insists on remaining in the county of Kent, or if he allows himself to be too closely approached there, one would sufficiently reinforce the corps on the right and would attack him; except for a considerable defeat on the right, this would not prevent the army or the corps of the left from advancing to London in order to force the advantage on them, to deprive them of the time to realize their situation and recover, and to spread terror and fear to the capital. If it happens that the enemy may have the time to entrench himself and to assemble a few troops and that one may not want to sacrifice too many people in attacking them and expelling them from their entrenchments, one will have a detachment of seven or eight thousand men cross the Thames in order to act against the capital from the left of the river, and one will profit from the diversion to gain mastery of it from the right. In whatever manner one arrives at taking possession of London and of the Tower, with this operation completed, one will leave a corps of ten to twelve thousand men in a camp that one will pitch in this city, and the army will take a position from the side of Windsor in order to be equally within reach of London and Oxford. If necessary, the corps of the left will be reinforced and will march immediately on Oxford in order to gain mastery of it. All the bridges and passages of the Thames and Lisis [?] that are between this city and London will be guarded or destroyed. Once in control of Oxford, the army will camp beneath this city while leaving a corps of three to four thousand men at Windsor in order to reconnoiter here and communicate with London and the army. The corps of the left will go to Gloucester and will remain encamped here. All the bridges and all the passages of Lisis [?] and Churchill from Oxford to Excester [Exeter?]—where one will leave a small corps of observation—will be guarded or destroyed according to whether it will be judged possible or necessary. With the army reduced to thirty or thirty-five thousand men in its position on Lisis [?], and sufficing for the defense of the passage of this river and the Thames in all places that the enemy would want to test it and in order to support London and Gloucester if there was need, one would create detachments from the remainder in order to attack the port of Dover, Portsmouth, and Plymouth and to gain control of these as well as of the principal places of the central provinces, which will be the objective of the first campaign and certainly the end of the war in England. It seems quite pointless to say that as soon as one enters London, it will be necessary to gain control of the Treasury, the Bank, and all the registries that

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one will find there, the houses of the principal bankers or negotiators and even their record books, Town Hall, and the arsenal that is in the Tower of London, and one will gain control through this of all the public fortune of England and that of its citizens; one will place oneself in the position of dictating the peace that one will want, which must be the objective of this expedition. In consideration of all the ports, depots, arsenals, magazines, rope manufactures, foundries, and generally all sorts of military establishments, not a single one will be spared; if one is master of the sea, one can employ the transport ships and bring back the spoils to France. If not, it will be necessary to burn or destroy everything, and one will do the same for all the material of all the establishments.12 No thought must prevent this; this is a mortal blow that it is necessary to strike against England and from which nothing can reestablish her. As far as one will act with rigor and inflexibility in the destruction of all public resources relative to the military—because this is in keeping with the rights of war and the laws of prudence and necessity—one will double the correct order and discipline in the country with regard to individuals; but at the same time, the General will be authorized to use the contribution to reward advantageously the officers and soldiers relative to their rank and proportionally to distinguished and special services; and it will be appropriate to announce this measure at the moment of embarkation such as the English did at Havana and as the Romans, Greeks, and people—who are concerned with glory as we are—used to do. A vehicle of common interest is necessary for man. In spite of this conduct, if thrift and unselfishness are well observed by the General and the principal administrators, the interests of the government and the reimbursement of the people in such an operation will still be amply provided without speaking of the glory of success and the priceless advantage of peace that will result from this and from the eternal damage done to England. This rite of victory, this conduct in the country after having invaded it, this firmness, and this intelligence—necessarily combined to destroy conserve, or benefit according to the circumstances of the maintenance of the strictest discipline at the same time as the right of reparations for the army from a portion of the fruits of the conquest—will not render all men (military quarter excepted) proper to the conduct of a similar expedition; it is necessary to follow it [the conquest] and use it to the very end with prudence, wisdom, and integrity.13 It is necessary to derive from it the most honorable and useful conduct possible for the nation, and this double objective requires the union of virtue and talent, which is often sadly difficult to assemble.

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DIVERSION CREATED BY SPAIN The fleet of El Ferrol (which one assumes as necessarily being from twenty to twenty-five vessels together with the proportionate number of frigates and accompanying ships as well as the army corps of eighteen to twenty thousand men) will be used to create this diversion, which can have two objectives— either an expedition to Ireland in order to incite a rebellion there or to detach it perhaps from England, or a landing in England in the Bristol Channel itself in order to support there the operations of the French army in the case that it might have executed its landing. All indications must lean to giving favor to the expedition in Ireland. If one hopes to cause a rebellion there—and this is what one must gage in advance by means of emissaries and intelligence that it is necessary to conduct in the country—then interest, liberty, and religion are the motives that can lead Ireland to rebellion when one offers her a favorable occasion to shake off the yoke of England.14 Commerce there is passive and subordinate to that of the metropolis. The country is treated as a conquered province. The acts of the London Parliament make the law there. All the ancient houses there were pillaged of their wealth, and they guard the memory of this. Catholic religion is oppressed there. Not a single one of them [Catholics?] can hold civil or military positions. Everyone is disarmed, and there are in this kingdom at least six Catholics to every Protestant. The spirit of discontent and sedition has not ceased to germinate. One must recall the troubles that arose there a few years ago under the name of “White Boys.” The troubles were only quieted at first; they could very well be revived. Hence, the example of insurgents must necessarily inspire the Irish, and it would likely suffice to develop their sentiments by supporting them with a landing and with the assistance of men and money, but the best way to excite their will would not be to propose that they depose the King and call the Prince of the House of Bourbon to their throne as one suggested last year but rather to propose that they form a republic under the protection of France and Spain. The ease of the project appears equally probable as useful. The coasts of Ireland are everywhere susceptible to landings. At the present moment, the English only have four regiments there. It would be easy to prove within three months with the positive and local identification of the place where it would be best to land and with the plan of operation that it would be necessary to follow according to the notes that one has before us and according to the military ideas that the geography and topography can furnish. It appears that it would be necessary to enter by way of the St. George’s Channel and even Dublin, and two essential reasons must cause one to prefer this point. One is certain of the influence that the invasion of the capital would have on the

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conquest of the rest of the country; the other is the proximity of the communication of this part of Ireland with Bristol county, and consequently the advantage that the two armies would have operating in the two kingdoms at very proximate points that would allow them if necessary to combine their ultimate movements. Such are the advantages that appear to decide in favor of the expedition in Ireland. It would be up to the circumstances and the results of actual and future reconnaissance and intelligence to determine if these advantages must have precedence over [the plan] in which one would prefer to execute the landing of the Spanish in England. In order to accomplish the invasion of the kingdom with greater speed and security, two reasons argue in favor of this last idea. The first is that England is the principal objective and the center of the English power and that it is consequently against her that it is necessary to unite all one’s efforts. The second reason is that once England in invaded, Ireland will separate herself thus on her own, and the slightest assistance would suffice to convince her. On the assumption that one might decide on the ideal of the diversion in England, it must take place in the Bristol Canal, where all the possibilities of the landing and the operation were recognized. Consequently, it results that whether one operates in Ireland or in England, the points of Dublin and Bristol are so close that the route of the Spanish fleet will always be through St. George’s Channel and that one will still remain in control in the end. Following the advice that one will have from our progress in England or of the movements in Ireland, [one will] decide for one or the other, but in any case, one sees the importance of the diversion of the Spanish, even if it only distracts the attention of the English and diminishes the force that they would have opposed to the fifty-six thousand Frenchmen landing on the central coasts of England. It only remains to speak of the departure and the moment of the departure of the Spanish fleet. If the English decide to send a fleet to Cabo de Finisterre to survey the movements of Spain, this fleet can only be inferior to that of Spain in consideration of their obligation to have a fleet of at least forty vessels to defend against ours in Brest. In this case, the Spanish fleet will have to depart, combat it, and, assuming it to be victorious, attempt to repel it toward the coasts of England, following it with vigor to come in position above the fleet of Brest, which will thus have to come out to combat in the ocean or the English Channel. With regard to the Spanish army corps that will have embarked like our large invasion army, it will not put to sea until the two fleets will have either independently, coordinately, or—if the circumstances so require—, conjointly chased the English fleets permanently from their ports. The diversion will thus be linked to the principal operation, and it will take place only as far

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as the other will be in a position to have an effect. If the Spanish fleet suffers a defeat in the ocean, whether this be separately or in sharing that which we would have had ourselves, it will have to try thus to retreat to our ports rather than return to its own, the objective being to keep its forces united in order to attempt a second effort if possible.

DIVERSION IN SCOTLAND There are few things to say about this diversion. It will be undertaken with the six or seven frigates and twelve or fifteen hundred men of the debarkation troops leaving from Dunkirk. As its objective, it will trouble the eastern coast of England, and to show itself on the coast of Scotland is a diversion in the simple meaning of the word and whose goal will only be to trouble the English further. It actually remains to examine what the current state of our Table 7.1. Table on the Current Situation of Our Land Forces and The Successive Project of Augmentation15 Battalions 79 Regiments of French infantry forming 160 Battalions of 572 men 12 Foreign Regiments of the same force 11 Regiments of Swiss at 523 men per battalion French guards Swiss guards

160 24

91,520 13,727

22 6 4

11,704 3,360 2,246

218 Squadrons 23 Regiments of cavalry each with 500 men and 350 horses 24 Regiments of Dragons each with 500 men and 300 horses 4 Regiments of Hussars with 530 mounted men Riflemen Gendarmarie Guards

Men

122,827 Horses

Men

115

8,050

11,500

120

7,200

12,000

20 8 8 1,200

2,120 1,160 896 1,200

2,120 1,160 896

271

20,626

28,876

Note: One has just decided upon an augmentation of 2,600 horses both for the cavalry and the Dragons, but these increases have still not been completed; it is necessary to consider it presently as not accomplished.

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Table 7.2. Army of the Ocean Destined for the Descent in England and Placed from Dunkirk to Brest16 80 Battalions Defensive along the coasts of Aunis, Poitou, and French Guiana to Bayonne 14 Battalions In Languedoc and Roussillon

30 Squadrons

15 Squadrons

10 Battalions

10 Squadrons

104 Battalions

55 Squadrons

80 Battalions Defensive along the coasts of Aunis, Poitou, and French Guiana 14 Battalions to Bayonne

30 Squadrons 15 Idem

10 Battalions to Languedoc and Roussillon

10 Idem

104 Battalions Army Corps in Provence

55 Squadrons

24 Battalions Island of Corsica in the case of war 16 Battalions American colonies 12 Battalions 156 Battalions

55 Squadrons

military means are for fulfilling the plans that one has just developed. Those of our navy are already partially sufficient provided that one continues as one does. It is thus our land forces that we must occupy ourselves with and which will be the subject of this last chapter. Similarly, one has just reestablished one hundred and five battalions under a new form by proposing to attach one of these battalions to each of the seventy-nine regiments of French infantry to serve as the garrison battalion and by withholding the decision on the placement of the remaining twenty-six battalions. These one hundred and five battalions must be raised and assembled by the upcoming June 1. One can only approve the first considerations of the plan, with the internal details undoubtedly coming about. Consequently, sixty battalions and two hundred and twenty squadrons, not including in reality the third battalion, are all that it remains for us to complete all the other objectives such as the garrisons of our borders from Dunkirk to Landau and those of Dauphiné and Provence to Antibes and the

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formation of an army of observation between the Meuse and the sea or on the Rhine. In consideration of the state of our forces, it evidently results that we cannot all at once conduct a vigorous war against England at the same time as the continental war, however insignificant this might be. In effect, by supposing the latter, it is no longer possible to think about executing the great offensive plan that would use more than hundred battalions either for the landing army or for the simulated expedition. It would then be necessary to leave on the coasts only the number of battalions indispensable for their defense. It would be necessary to submit to a drawn out war that will have no effect but will, by dragging on and preparing ourselves everywhere for the requirements of defense, cost us more than a short and lively war after considering all the results. Thus, it is shown that in order to strike a great blow against England, it is necessary to profit from the moment that one will have no entanglements on the continent. If one delays and deliberates, the moment will be lost forever; thus, by admitting that the rupture with England must take place in the springtime or in the midst of the summer, it would be in the month of October that it would be necessary to execute the offensive part of the great plan; next year, there will be more difficulties. The English will have had the time to study the situation, to prepare themselves to create diversions, and perhaps to have great successes. The map of Europe can change; the English can take advantage of the fortune that leans today in our favor; in either case, our land forces do not suffice, and it seems indispensable to augment them. These augmentations do not have to be sudden or great; they have to be proportionate to the circumstances and events. There is only one point to which it is necessary to bring them without delay, whether to have the possibility of acting offensively or to acquire a more respectable situation with regard to the powers of the continent. One is going to work on the measures to take in order to reach this point; these are the ones that the moment demands and are consequently applicable to the present memoir.

INFANTRY From now until September 1, the entire infantry will be increased to six hundred and fifty men per battalion. This will allow for an increase of one hundred and fifty-six men and will consequently increase the two hundred and six battalions—without counting the ten battalions of the Guards—to 133,900 men. If the eighty battalions destined for the major invasion were

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not completed with the augmentation above at the moment when it takes place, they would be completed by means of the garrison battalions. This year, the garrison battalions will receive all the material that it will be possible to give to them, and as a result, they would be assembled in less than three weeks even in the assumption that war might not have broken out. If it has broken out, it naturally follows that they would be assembled in part or in entirety over a longer period and that one would use them for the defense of the coasts as well as for the garrisons of our borders, and as long as we will only be at war with England, it will certainly be useful to have recourse to the totality of these battalions, and it will suffice to assemble some of them alternatively, but as soon as we will be menaced with a continental war, it is necessary that they be assembled in their entirety and placed in a permanent state in the rear of their regiments and within reach of the borders where these regiments will be in action. It is by this excellent supplement that one will be able to maintain the front-line troops on an intimidating footing and be in a state of pursuing the war vigorously. For the present, it will suffice to create the provincial battalions each on a footing of five hundred men; in the case of a continental war, one will augment them successively according to the circumstances.17

THE CAVALRY It is this part of our military that is the most outdated and in all honesty does not really exist. In a war with England, this arm is without doubt useless, but it is surely not on a peacetime footing, and no matter what the price can be, this is at least something that it is necessary to bear. A continental war can surprise us, and then there would be neither effort nor money that might place it on a war footing. If one leaves it in its current state, the footing that one is going to propose thus for it is not relative to any use in war; it is a matter of giving it its first constitutional base; it is its simple and passive state in peace time. It will still be inferior to that in which foreign powers keep their own, but this first basis can suffice, and one will indicate below the means of using it in the case of war. All the regiments of Dragons18 will from now until September 1 be brought up to the complete number of one hundred and six men for each squadron and five hundred and thirty for mounted regiments. If this term is too short for the augmentation of the horses, one will be able to postpone it for six months at the most, but it will be dangerous to push this delay any further back; in this regard, there are no calculations for spending that ought to delay.

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This augmentation of troops will create six additional men and thirty-six additional horses for each squadron of cavalry and six additional men and forty-six additional horses for the Dragons. One consequently brings the two hundred and fifty-five squadrons to 27,030 mounted men, without counting riflemen, gendarmes, or guardsmen. The augmentation of horses proposed above being for the cavalry and the Dragons of nine thousand six hundred and sixty men and its result merely placing the regiments on a peacetime footing, one must judge the inconvenience that there would be to allow oneself to be caught ill-prepared for the immense and sudden augmentation that war would require if one remained in the current state. In effect, by undertaking this first increase, one would still have to augment the squadrons by thirty-four houses in order to be placed on a proper war footing if a land war was to occur. That is one hundred forty men and one hundred forty horses because in no case can one attain—and it is useless to dream so—the complete number of one hundred seventy one men per squadron as indicated by the last calculations, which would make the squadron too strong and would give the King a cavalry beyond his means and needs. The two propositions admitted above for the cavalry in peace time and in war time form in both cases a reasonably constituted cavalry.19

ARTILLERY20 The artillery corps such as it is can suffice provided that the regiments that lack nearly two hundred men per battalion are promptly completed. Its distribution will have to be completed according to the above proposed war plan against England, and there is no need to enter into any details for this. In the case of a land war, a few increases would thus be necessary, and this objective would be easily fulfilled with the resources of the provincial battalions that one can bring into its service. In this state, one did not include the artillery—not being front-line troops— or the flanking guards that are not on foot but that are certainly necessary to reestablish. With such forces, one can undertake a vigorous war against England without fearing being unprepared for a continental war, and in the case that it would occur, here is an idea to consider and the distribution of troops that one will be able to undertake. The invasion of England needing to be thus undertaken to avoid failure, the defense of the coasts would not require more than approximately fifty garrison battalions with the coast guards, who, in our new formation, must all be gunners commanded and inspected by the artillery directors spread throughout the maritime provinces. For the land war, we would still have one hundred thirty or one hundred forty thousand men, without counting the

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Table 7.3. The Table of Our Land Forces with the Increases Announced Above Will Thus Be as Follows Infantry 206 battalions of French infantry at 650 men 10 battalions of guards 79 garrison battalions attached to 79 French regiments at 500 men each 26 militia battalions whose use is still not indicated Cavalry 255 squadrons of cavalry, Dragons, and Hussars at 106 men per squadron 8 squadrons of riflemen 8 squadrons of gendarmes Guardsmen Recapitulation Field infantry, including the house of the King Garrison and militia infantry Cavalry, Dragons, and Hussars

133,900 5,876 39,500 13,000 192,276 27,030 1,160 896 1,200 30,286 139,286 53,500 30,286 222,072

remainder of the infantry garrison, nearly all the cavalry, and the necessary battalions for our colonies and Corsica. One will be able to place the field battalions destined for the army successively at seven hundred, seven hundred fifty, and up till eight hundred men as the last limit of their force since a battalion beyond this number becomes too large and too difficult to control. Turning to the regiments destined to serve the army, one would likewise conduct a successive augmentation in the regiments of the cavalry, Dragons, and Hussars. It would be necessary to talk here about an infinity of military preparations that it is important to see to, such as the supplying of provisions, tents, kettles, tools, and all sorts of field utensils that prudence would prefer that one always has a certain quantity in all magazines. Such are in all times the Austrian and Prussian armies which even have their horses for their artillery and the provisions marked for the province. Beyond the priceless advantage that they have in this to be able to enter into action at the first sign, it follows that all these supplies prepared in the calm of peace time are collected with much more thrift and firmness. When war arrives in France, it always appears as an unexpected event. All needs explode at once. Time is short; money lacks; one is obliged to place oneself in the hands of entrepreneurs, and one thus pays with a destructive usury the negligence of peace time. It would be time to change this system and to adopt with this regard that of our neighbors. They get this example from Louis XIV in his best days. It is through the wise foresight of M. de Louvois and through that abundance of well prepared resources21 of all types and in all times that we al-

Execution of the Invasion of England

93

ways forestalled our enemies. The French armies thus had this advantage over all armed strangers; we lost it; our neighbors did not allow it to disappear. By adapting [this advantage] to constitutions that are more militaristic than ours was and perhaps is today, they have made a more perfect and detailed art out of it. It is superfluous to calculate here what all these preparations must cost. Whether it be the augmentation of troops or the preparation relative to our land forces, this would be to raise the problem if—and up to what point—they must be undertaken. One has proven that they were indispensable. One has restricted them to what prudence, the strictest economy, and the most healthy politics would require. Next to this urgent need and right of the state, it must no longer be a question of balancing the inconvenience of spending and all that one can do to lessen the use of finances or of having the most severe and widespread thrift reign over the details of execution. One has been led to this latest memoir even though it may not be uniquely relative to the former work on an invasion of England that had been placed before the eyes of the late King and whose original was corrected in several places by his own hand.22 But, when speaking of a project as important as this, it is impossible not to expand to all that ends to the means that must assist in its execution. These means reside in our navy and land forces. With an infinite amount of success, one was greatly occupied with the navy. With our contribution being greatly neglected at the least, it was difficult to resist several details to this regard, such as what concerns the preparations that must precede the war. One is moreover persuaded that everything was foreseen and ordered. N. B. We will add here a reflection that should have been placed with the section on the infantry. It is a great problem to resolve the uses that one must make of the provincial battalions. Will one destine them to recruit the front line battalions during the war, or will one be content with placing here in reserve the recruits conscripted by the corps in order to summon them when [the battalions] would be formed and would have acquired a little more force? Finally, will one be content to recruit the cavalry with provincial soldiers, and will one give them to the infantry only after extraordinary details or circumstances? This is such a difficult question to decide that it would be necessary to treat it separately and on all the different points of view under which it must be imagined. Or will [one] be content with saying that the resource of provincial battalions must be used sparingly, and if the King rendered the companies to the captains, the occasions to have recourse to them would become less frequent. By pressing this last point, it would be indispensable to double the companies, thus there would be ten instead of five for each battalion as well as in proportion to the cavalry. This would not create in one or the other any increase or decrease of officers unless one may judge that with the current constitution there might be too few of them in the time of war.

1 General Commander 12 lieutenant generals 24 camp marshals 1 major as needed

Total…………………………...59,000

80 battalions of 650 men each…52,000 10 companies of riflemen detached from garrison in Flanders and destined to form corps of advanced guard….1,500 30 squadrons made from 25 Dragons and 5 Hussars each with 100 men of which 50 will be mounted……...3,000 2 regiments of artillery with the necessary Detachment of workers and miners (#1 gives “riflemen”………………..2,500

Land Army

Ports of Assembly 1st Division: Dunkirk, Calais, Boulogne 2nd Division: Dieppe, Le Havre 3rd Division: Honfleur, Cherbourg 4th Division: St. Malo, Morlaix

Squadron assembled at Dunkirk 6 frigates destined To menace the coasts of Scotland and the east coasts of England with 7 or 8,000 men drawn from frontline troops taken from garrisons in Flanders

Number of transport ships in each port of assembly Dunkirk, 60; Calais, 40; Boulogne, 30: 130 Dieppe, 100; Le Havre, 100: 200 Honfleur, 50; Cherbourg, 60: 110 St. Malo, 100; Morlaix, 150 N. B. One estimated the capacity of each transport ship at 150 tons of burden

The possibility of assembling this number of ships is proven by the general table of reconnaissance of the means of all the points that were conducted under the orders of the late King at the same time as one drew up the project of the invasion of England

Transportation of Ships Formed at the Four Points as indicated

40 frontline vessels 20 frigates, corvettes, prams, and other small vessels as needed

Naval Army Formed at Brest

Table 7.4. State of the Distribution of the Fleet Destined to Transport an Army of Invasion of England according to the Expeditionary Plan included here23

94 Chapter VII

115 ships will carry 14 Battalions….9,100 men 1 regiment of Hussars all mounted…530 men The 15 ships remaining for artillery, provisions, and munitions

180 ships will carry 18,200 men 2 regiments of Dragons with 1,000 men and 500 horses The 20 remaining ships for artillery, provisions, and munitions

Distribution of the Army on the Transport Ships 1st Division 2nd Division Dunkirk…….60 Dieppe…..100 Calais………40 Le Havre..100 Boulogne…..30 Total: 130 ships Total: 200 ships 125 of these ships will carry 24 battalions…. …15,600 men 2 regiments of Dragons of 1,000 men and 500 horses The 25 remaining ships for artillery, provisions, and munitions (#1 gives “hospitals” instead of “munitions.”

Total: 150 ships

Total: 110 ships 96 ships will carry 9,100 men 1 regiment of Dragon ……500 men The 15 remaining vessels for artillery, provisions, and munitions

4th Division St. Malo….100 Morlaix……50

3rd Division Honfleur….50 Cherbourg..60

Execution of the Invasion of England 95

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NOTES 1. #1 gives: “a diversion,” p. 107, which seem to be more appropriate in relevance to the original plan. 2. #2, 80 3. #2, 82 4. #1 gives: “examination,” 111 5. #2, 84 6. This sentence is part of the preceding paragraph in #1. 7. #2, 86 8. Ibid, 87 9. #1 gives: “will occupy Hartfort,” 120 10. #1 gives instead: “its light troops will advance to Westmoling [?], to Lingsdonstréat [?], and from Rochester to Gravesend [?], and will leave from Cantorbery Canterbury?] and will stay in the vicinity of this city,” 121 11. #2, 92 12. Ibid, 94 13. Ibid, 95 14. Ibid, 96 15. Ibid, 100 16. Ibid, p. 101; #1 gives this table in 133 17. Ibid, 104 18. #1 adds “and cavalry,” 137 19. #2, 105 20. Ibid, 107 21. #1 document abruptly ends here 22. #2, 110 23. In #1, this Table begins at the start of section entitled, “Execution of the Invasion of England,” p. 106.

Chapter VIII

The Honorable Last Word

Letter of M. le Comte de Broglie to the King December 17, 1778 Sire, Your Majesty may recall that, during the last audience that he had the kindness to grant me in 1775, he sincerely wanted to permit me to address directly to him the reflections that I thought would interest his service and even to request his kindness for objects that could concern me personally. I hope that your Majesty will allow me to benefit today from this permission to address to him a work whose circumstances can prove important. This is the same work that had been one of the objectives that I had to treat for the twentythree years that had lasted the secret correspondence that the late King and great Father of your Majesty had felt it appropriate to charge me with.1 This work must have been located among the papers that he left at his death, but since they may have been dispersed or lost and since the situation of the affairs took another direction, I believed it to be my task to recreate them and to think about them with new care and to adopt it [the plan?] to the current circumstances in order to place it before the eyes of your Majesty. I ardently desire that he judge it worthy of his attention, and if after having read it, he thinks that it deserves to be examined and discussed, I will be very eager to give to the Ministers whom he will charge with its examination all the explanations that they can ask for since such a discussion can only contribute infinitely to the perfection of this work. In order not to waste the precious time of your Majesty, I would have greatly desired to present it to him in a more concise form. I deleted much from the original work in the hope that his Majesty will find in the papers of 97

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the late King the memoirs, plans, and maps that I had had the honor of sending to him.2 It only remains for me, Sire, to hope that the proof of my zeal may be agreeable to your Majesty and may convince him that he does not have a more faithful subject to his glory and service than me. I am etc.

NOTES 1. Louis XVI succeeded Louis XV in 1774. De Broglie was the most important personage in the clandestine group of ministers of the Secret du Roi, which existed outside of the official royal cabinet of Louis XV’s administration. 2. This partially explains the disparity in the text of the original document #1 and the revised document #2. Also, no maps exist with the submitted documents. It is possible that some leaves from the submitted document which included maps are misplaced or lost.

Conclusion

An offensive on the part of France is absolutely necessary in 1778 since it would act as a preventive war. The English, an extirpating and avaricious race, seeking to establish an universal monarchy, would soon aggrandize at the expense of French and Spanish possessions in America, in the Antilles, and in Asia. Before England can secure the advantage, France and Spain should strike, taking the advantage of England’s preoccupation with her North American Colonies.1

In these words, Broglie had emphasized that no thought ought to prevent the planned offensive against England. It is necessary to strike against England, he wrote, and it will be a mortal blow from which nothing can reestablish her. Broglie had laboriously explained in his first memoir the rationale for an invasion, and in his second he had mapped the details of the plan with a discussion of strategy, deployment, and distribution of resources to support his objective. Historically however, the merit and feasibility of Broglie’s plan was never put to the test. An “invasion” was planned in mid-1779, which entailed occupying the Isle of Wight and raiding the Portsmouth docks, but it was cancelled as the year turned out to be unpropitious for French military efforts. The effort to organize an invasion collapsed due to the cumulative effect of insufficient French naval logistics, poor combined naval operations with the Spanish, and an outbreak of disease. In the same year, Vice-Admiral d’Estaing2 undertook some naval operations in the West Indies and in the American continent, during which he participated in some very disappointing combined military operations with the rebel colonists. The reverses fraught with heavy losses may have also disheartened French military advocates from undertaking a more aggressive plan of invasion. Thus, the suspension of the plan to invade England became clear and definitive when France signed a Treaty of Commerce and a military alliance pact 99

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with the American colonists in February 1778. The treaty indicated France’s first diplomatic recognition of the United States and its commitment to openly assist the Americans in their war of independence. This was the political setting in 1780, when the Marquis de Lafayette3 returned from America to argue for a substantial deployment of French armed and naval forces to fight alongside with the American colonists. His powerful persuasion matched the propensity of French diplomacy and a large army and navy under the leadership of Count Rochambeau4 and Admiral de la Grasse5 sailed across the Atlantic to America. Thus, the objective of weakening England followed a different course. The strategy in America appeared as more feasible in fulfilling the primary objective of eighteenth century French diplomacy. The plan of an invasion of England which had long been projected as a turning point in French diplomacy avoided the turn that Broglie had envisioned to maneuver in the years from 1765–1778. The change in the direction of French foreign policy in 1778 was inevitable. Previously in 1764 and 1768, Choiseul had entrusted secret agents, M. de Pontleroy and Colonel de Kalb to survey the political situation in England’s North American colonies. On receiving reports in both investigations that Americans were averse to seeking foreign assistance at the time, Choiseul changed his focus to avenging French pride through an invasion of England. He gave extensive consideration to Broglie’s plan of an invasion of the island and nurtured the idea of a short and decisive naval offensive. However, the situation altered in 1778. Americans were eager for foreign assistance after their victory against the British at Saratoga in 1777. The American delegation under Ben Franklin which came to Paris to seek French assistance left little doubt in the mind of Charles Gravier, Comte de Vergennes (French foreign minister, 1774-1787) about the mutual benefits underlying the proposed alliance. Vergennes believed that defeating England in America through direct assistance to the American colonies was a sound consideration and a better strategy, and French policy followed his directive. The appeal of American independence and Vergennes’ patronage of the French plan to intervene in favor of the thirteen American colonies most likely lay in considerations of its probable effect on the European balance of power, and also on an analysis of the relative strength of the French navy in 1778. From the continental perspective, if England was sufficiently weakened by the loss of her thirteen American colonies and her lucrative American trade, she (England), at the very least, could no longer provide subsidies to eastern powers like Russia; at best, a chastened England might become more cooperative with French desires in Eastern Europe.6 The rebellion in America was once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to strike at England and raise France to her rightful “superiority of consideration and in-

Conclusion

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fluence.”7 England, Vergennes had discerned, was most vulnerable and exposed in America and the American Revolution was in his analysis, the moment le plus beau.8 Additionally, in spite of an accelerated program of naval reform and reconstruction, the French navy in 1778 was still weaker than that of the English.9 Shortage of ready cash in the aftermath of the Seven Years’ War also slowed down the arms and naval build-up program and prevented it from reaching its target figure.10 It would not be possible to fight England simultaneously on several fronts in the Americas, in England, and in India in spite of the concerted action of the two Bourbon powers. It is impossible to know all that transpired in the ivory towers of French diplomacy on this change of strategy. However, it may be hypothesized that two main factors may have influenced French decision to intervene directly in America instead of undertaking the invasion of Britain as the primary offensive. One, that the Saratoga victory in October 1777 seemed to promise ultimate American success, and the other, that the French government was fearful lest England should acknowledge American independence, win the new Republic’s alliance, and then, reinforced with the fresh supply of men and resources from her new ally, she would turn against the Bourbon powers of France and Spain and crush them. Edward S. Corwin has argued that the raison d’être which propelled Vergennes to enter the war directly was that an independent America would be a total loss for British interest leading to a diminution of British power. Since Britain and France were rivals, whatever abased the power of Britain would elevate the power of France.11 As marked by destiny, Broglie’s prognosis of a chastened England as the veritable outcome of a successful French invasion of the British Isles was not to be borne out by history. His planned Armada was blown away by the powerful wind from America. Broglie’s passion and patriotism to see his country avenged through the major land and naval offensive in the English Channel died with him. Intervention in the American Revolution thus took precedence over an all-encompassing invasion of England. Broglie’s invasion plan ws placed in abeyance; but it left a fascinating rubric for later invasion plans to build upon that would take birth during the tenure of the French Directory and the Napoleonic regime.

NOTES 1. See Henri Doniol, Histoire de la participation de la France à l’establissement des États-Unis d’Amérique. Tome II. Paris Imprimerie Nationale, 1884–89, 668. 2. Jean Baptiste Charles Henri Hector, Comte d’Estaing (November 24, 1729–April 28, 1794) was a French admiral, appointed as a vice-admiral during the

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naval operations undertaken by France to assist the American colonists between 1777–1779. 3. (1757–1834). He was a great French general who championed the cause of the American Independence, and influenced the French government for rendering the maximum assistance possible to the rebel colonists. 4. Jean-Baptiste Donatien de Vimeur, Comte de Rochambeau (July 1, 1725–May 10, 1807) was a French aristocrat, general, and a marshal of France who participated gallantly in the American Revolution. His battalion of 5,000 French soldiers assisted General Washington effectively to compel the surrender of the British forces under Lord Cornwallis at Yorktown on October 19, 1781. 5. François Joseph Paul, Marquis de Grasse Tilly, Comte de Grasse (1722–1788) was a French admiral who defeated the British navy in the Battle of the Chesapeake in September 1781. His fleet of three thousand assisted General Washington and Rochambeau to compel the surrender of Lord Cornwallis at Yorktown, Virginia, in 1781. 6. Murphy, Orville T. Charles Gravier, Comte de Vergennes: French Diplomacy in the Age of Revolution, 1719–87. Albany: State of University of New York Press, 1982, 260. 7. A.E./M.D. États-Unis, I, 289-95. Quoted in O. T. Murphy, 260. See also Louis R. Gottschalk, Lafayette and the Close of the American Revolution. Chicago, 1942, 61. 8. See, C. H. Van Tyne, “Influences which determined the French government to make the treaty with Ameica, 1778.” American Historical Review, 21 (1915–16), 532. See also, “Précis des faits relatifs au traité de la France avec les Americains,” 18 Mars, 1778. A.E./C.P., Vol. 529–Angleterre, 1778, 183–186. 9. See Jonathan R. Dull, A Diplomatic History of the American Revolution. Yale University Press, New Haven, London, 1985, 110. 10. See Robert D. Harris, “French Finances and the American War,” Journal of Modern History 48 (1976): 233–258. 11. See E. S. Corwin, French Policy and the American Alliance. Princeton; Princeton University Press, 1916.

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de Prossignac (Décembre 1777); sur les interest actuels de la France et de l’Angleterre par Du Pons. . . . Volume 53 (Angleterre, 50), 1743–1813: plan de Guerre contre l’Angleterre redigé par les orders du feu Roi dans les anneés 1763, 1764, 1765, et 1766, par M. le Comte de Broglie, en refondu en adapté aux circonstances actuelles pour être mis sous les yeux de sa Majeste a qui il a été envoyé le 17 Octobre 1778; Plan de campagne contre l’Angleterre comprenant la discussion d’un projet de guerre dans l’Inde, de descente en Irlande . . . d’alliance avec les États-Unis, par Deforgues. . . . Volume 208 (Espagne, 213B), 1776–1782: Extrait d’un mémoire politique du Comte de Vergennes (1776). . . .

British Public Record Office, London: British State Papers, Foreign 978), France S.P. 78, France: Correspondence between he ambassador at Paris (Harcourt) and the Secretary of State during the period 1765–1778. Until the establishment of the Foreign Office in 1782, responsibility for the conduct of relations with France was vested in the Secretary State for the Southern Department.

PUBLISHED MATERIALS Broglie, Albert Duc De. Le Secret du Roi: Correspondance secrete de Louis XV avec ses Agents diplomatiques, 1752–1774. 2 Vols. Paris, 1878–1888. Choiseul, Etiènne-François, Duc De. Mémoire de Monsieur de Choiseul Remis au Roi en 1765. Paris: Charles Giraud, 1881. ———. Mémoires du Duc de Choiseul, 1719–1785. Calmettes ed., Paris: PlonNourret et CIE, 1904. Coquelle, P. Le Comte Duchatelet, ambassadeur de France à Londres (1768–1770) d’après les documents inédits des archives des Affaires Etrangères. Paris, 1909. ———. L’alliance Franco-Hollandaise contre l’Angleterre 1735–1788. D’apre les documents inédit des archives du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères. Paris, 1902. Dubuc, Jean Baptiste. Lettres critiques et politiques sur les colonies et le commerce des Villes maritimes de France, adréssees à G. T. Raynal. Geneva, 1785. Louis XV, King of France. Correspondance secrete inedited de Louis XV sur la politique étrangère avec le comte de Broglie, Tercier, etc. et autres documents relatifs au ministère secret. Ed. M.E. Boutaric. 2 Vols. Paris: Henri Plon, Imprimeuréditeur, 1866. Mably, Gabriel Bonnot De. Observations sur le gouvernement et les loixs (sic) des États secrete du comte de Broglie avec Louis XV (1756–1774). 2 vols. Paris: C. Klincksieck, 1956–1961. Martens, G. F. De. Recueil des Principaux Traités d’Alliance de Paix, etc. 3 vols. Göttingen, 1791.

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Index

Abbé de Terray, 9 Admiral Rooke, 61 Africa, 26, 72 Aiguillon (Duke of), 18 Alendley-Head, 81 America (United States), 24, 26–27, 31, 34–35, 37–39, 46–47, 49, 54, 58, 72, 99, 100–101 American Revolution (War of the American Independence), 3, 6, 8, 9, 15, 18, 101 Andalucia, 69 Antibes, 63, 88 Antilles, 26–27, 32, 38, 49, 51, 99 Ashford, 80–81 Asia, 26, 44, 50, 58, 99 Atham, 82 Aunis, 75–76 Auspack, 29 Batle (Battle), 80–81 Bay of Honduras, 52 Bayonne, 17, 62–63 Beachy Head, 17, 78 Bellisle (Marshal de), 47 Belzune (M. de), 49 Bengal, 52 Benjamin Franklin, 30, 100 Beula, 80–81

Béville (M. de), 18 Bonaparte (Napoleon), vii, xi Boulogne, 19, 75 Brayfort, 82 Brazil, 68 Brest, 17, 19–20, 34, 44, 56, 59–61, 70–72, 78, 86 Bristol, 46 Bristol Channel, 85–86 Brittany, 75 Bromley, 82 Broglie, Charles François, vi–viii, xixiii, 1–3, 7, 9, 14–20, 22, 24–25, 97, 99–101 Broglie, François Marie, 1 Broglie, Victor François, 1 Broglie, Victor Maurice, 1 Brunswick, 29 Cabo de Finisterre, 34, 86 Cadiz, 51, 60, 68–72 Calais, 19, 75 Cambrook, 80 Campeche, 52 Canada, 29 Canterbury, 81–82 Cartagena, 51–52, 69, 70 Castile, 69 Cayenne, 49 113

114

Chatham, 56, 57 Cherbourg, 19, 62, 75 Chernon, 57 Chichister, 81 Choiseul, Étienne François (Duke of), 2–8, 14–15, 17–18, 100 Choiseul-Praslin, 8–9 Churchill, 83 Corsica, 92 Croydon, 82 Dauphiné, 88 De Kalb (Colonel), 100 Depford, 57, 82 Derwick, 82 Dieppe, 19, 75 Domstréal, 81 Dover, 81–83 Dublin, 85–86 Dunge Ness, 17, 78 Dunkirk, 5, 17, 19, 61–63, 72, 75–76, 78, 87–88 Dutch, 27 El Ferrol, 51, 60, 69, 71, 72, 85 Emery (M. de), 49 Enderdren, 80 England (Great Britain), xii–xiii, 4–9, 14–18, 22–33, 35–39, 42, 44–48, 50–51, 53–58, 61, 63, 67, 68–77, 79–80, 83–91, 93, 99, 100, 101 English Channel, 8, 18, 44, 55–56, 60, 62, 70–72, 75, 78, 86, 101 Estaing (Vice Admiral de), 99 Estremadura, 69 Exeter, 83 Falkland Islands, 8 Family Pact (with Spain), 8 Flaineville, 80–81 Flanders, 15 Florida, 29, 31 Foolseray, 82

Index

Fornborough, 82 France, xii, 4–9, 14–15, 18, 20, 23–24, 26, 32–33, 35–39, 42, 45–51, 53, 55, 58, 68–70, 74, 77, 80, 84–84, 92, 99, 100–101 French Directory, vii, xi, 101 Ganges, 71 General Howe, 28, 33, 34 Germany 47, 54 Gibraltar, 17, 28, 50–51, 53, 67, 69–72 Ginhead, 81 Gloucester, 83 Gravesend, 82 Guadeloupe, 5, 7, 49 Guay-Trouin (Admiral de), 61 Guiana, 75 Gulf of Mexico, 71 Gulf of Rouissillon, 63 Halifax, 29 Haltersen, 82 Hanover, 29 Hanover Hill, 81 Hastings, 17, 20, 78–80 Havana, 17, 33, 49–52, 68, 70–72, 84 Hesse, 29 Honfleur, 19, 75 House of Bourbon, 28, 30–32, 36, 38, 48, 53–54, 85 Hugel, 18 India, 5, 7–8, 15, 17, 33, 52–53, 71, 101 Ireland, xiii, 46, 72, 74, 85–86 Isle of Réunion, 59 Isle of Wight, 28, 67, 99 Isles of France and Bourbon, 7, 17, 33, 52, 59, 71 Italy, 53 Jamaica, 17, 50–52, 70 John Adams, 30 Jules Caesar, 57

Index

Kent, 57–58, 81–83 Koberant, 82 Kormerik, 80 La Grasse (Admiral de), 100 La Hogue, 43, 62 Lafayette (Marquis de), 100 Lamberhust, 81 Landau, 88 Landerneau, 60, 61 Le Havre, 19, 75 Lellugley, 80 Léon, 69 Lewes, 81 Lewksan, 82 Lisbon, 69 Lisis, 83 London, 14, 53, 56–58, 80, 82–83 Lord Chatham, 30 Lord North, 39 Louis XIV, 1, 43, 61, 92 Louis XV, 2, 5, 7–10, 14–16, 18 Louis XVI, 3, 15, 18, 22, 42 Louvois (M. de), 92 Macarty (M. de) 52 Madanscourt Hill, 82 Madras, 33, 52 Madrid, 69 Mahon, 15, 53, 67, 70–71 Maidstones, 81 Marsfield, 80 Martinique, 5, 33, 49, 52 Mediterranean, 15, 48, 50, 53, 58, 60, 69–72 Medway, 81 Medwin, 58 Mesnil-Durand (M. de), 18 Meuse, 89 Minorca, 28, 50 Miquelon, 49 Morlaix, 19, 61, 75–76 Mothe Piquet (M. de), 61 Muy (Marshal de), 22

115

Nantes, 63 Naples, 48 New England, 17 Normandy, 75 Northiant, 80–81 Nova Scotia, 29, 31 Ornay (M. de), 18 Ossun (M. de), 52 Oxford, 83 Painbeauf, 75 Paris, 100 Patrick Hancock, 30 Persian Gulf, 71 Pevensey, 17, 20, 78–79 Philippines, 47 Picardy, 75 Pierre Étienne, 9 Plymouth, 17, 56–58, 77, 83 Poitou, 75 Pondichérry, 33 Pontleroy (M. de), 100 Portsmouth, 17, 20, 56–58, 77–78, 83, 99 Portugal, 47 Provence, 70, 88 Prussia, 29, 48 Quiberon, 61 Rhine, 89 Rio de Janeiro, 61 Riversalt, 81 Rochambeau (Comte de), 100 Rochefort, 17, 60 Rochester, 81–82 Rothiar, 80 Rozière (M. de la), 15–16, 18 Russia, 100 Rye, 17, 20, 78–80 Saint-Germain (Comte de), 18 Saint-Malo, 19, 62, 75, 78

116

Salshurst, 80–81 San Roque, 69–70 Santo Domingo (St. Dominique), 33, 49, 52 Saratoga, 100–101 Scotland, xiii, 15, 30, 72, 74, 87 Sepfort, 82 Sevenoaks, 81–82 Seven Years’ War, xi, 4–7, 9, 101 Sicily, 48 Spain, xii, 7–8, 15, 17–18, 24, 26, 32–34, 39, 45–53, 60, 68–70, 72, 74–75, 85–86, 99, 101 Spanish Armada, vii St. George’s Channel, 85–86 St. Lucia, 49 St. Nicolas, 49 St. Pierre, 49 Steining, 81 Steyming, 80 Suffolk, 57–58 Sussex, 20, 57–58, 78 Thames, 57, 81–83 Thorn-Hill Head, 82

Index

Toulon, 34, 46, 60, 62–63, 70, 72 Treaty (Peace) of Paris, 4, 14 Treaty of Utrecht, 4–5 Tunbridge, 82 Vallierre (M. de), 51 Vannes, 75 Vergennes (Comte de), 3, 15, 18, 100–101 Vigo, 61 Waldron, 80 Wandernorth, 82 Welchingley, 82 West Indies, 99 West-Maling, 81 Westminister, 81 William Pitt (the Elder), 6 Winchelsey, 17, 20, 78–80 Windsor, 83 William, Duke of Normandy, 57 William, Prince of Orange, 57 Woodgate, 81 Woolwich, 57 Wrotham, 81