Day of Reckoning LACHLAN STRAHAN
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Day of Reckoning LACHLAN STRAHAN
Pandanus Online Publications, found at the Pandanus Books web site, presents additional material relating to this book. www.pandanusbooks.com.au
Day of Reckoning
Day of Reckoning LACHLAN STRAHAN
PANDANUS BOOKS Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies THE AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY
Cover: American transport motor dump on Manus Island, September 1949. Australian War Memorial Negative Number 041526. © Lachlan Strahan 2005 This book is copyright in all countries subscribing to the Berne convention. Apart from any fair dealing for the purpose of private study, research, criticism or review, as permitted under the Copyright Act, no part may be reproduced by any process without written permission. Enquiries should be made to the publisher. Include: Every effort has been made to locate copyright holders of all images. Further information is welcomed by the author. Typeset in Goudy 11pt on 15pt and printed by Pirion National Library of Australia Cataloguing-in-Publication entry Strahan, Lachlan, 1965– . Day of Reckoning. ISBN 1 74076 167 7. 1. Manus Island (Papua New Guinea). 2. China — Foreign relations — Papua New Guinea. 3. Papua New Guinea — Foreign relations — China. I. Title. 327.953051 Published by Pandanus Books, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, The Australian National University, Canberra ACT 0200 Australia Pandanus Books are distributed by UNIREPS, University of New South Wales, Sydney NSW 2052 Telephone 02 9664 0999 Fax 02 9664 5420 Production: Ian Templeman, Justine Molony and Emily Brissenden
For my godfather, Ian ‘Robbi’ Robertson
Acknowledgements
Many people helped me write this book. I would not have gotten very far without the invaluable assistance of dedicated and highly capable librarians and archivists. Carolyn Connor at the National Archives of Australia (NAA) was enormously helpful over many years, tracking down an array of files and sending copies of documents to me while I was living and working in Germany and later South Korea. Other NAA staff assisted me in various ways, especially Linda Macfarlane, Holly Schulte, David Wagland, Fiona Burn and Nancy Taylor. My father, Frank Strahan, and Suzanne Fairbanks dug up material about the New Guinea Goldfields Company in the University of Melbourne Archives. Margaret Heyward at the Registry of the High Court of Australia located the full transcript of one key trial, while Julie Lee and Chris Marshall at the Australian War Memorial helped in the search for photographs to illustrate the text. Rebecca Collier, Wilbert Mahoney, Timothy Nenninger, William Walsh and especially Rich Boylan guided me through the vast resources of the National Archives of the United States. Armed with his prodigious knowledge of US military records, Rich took me into the labyrinth of stacks inside the Archives to find several particularly useful files. Mary Dennis, Deputy Clerk of Court at the United States Army Judiciary in Falls Creek, Virginia, unearthed a copy of the transcript of the court martial of one of the main characters in my book. Kevin M O’Melia, Assistant Vice President and Corporate Secretary at Vinnell Corporation, shed some light on the operations of his company in the Pacific after World War II. Mike Houlahan, Public Relations Officer at the Philippine Scouts Heritage Society,
ix
taught me much about the Filipino Scouts in the US Army, correcting several errors in an earlier version of my manuscript. Aniceto Bagley, a former Scout who served in the western Pacific in the late 1940s, provided an all-important personal perspective. Professor Ton Otto helped me to understand the culture and history of Manus, while Bridget Griffen-Foley and Alison Pilger, Biographical Registrar at the Australian Dictionary of Biography, filled in crucial details in the lives of some of my Australian characters. Ewan Maidment, Executive Officer of the Pacific Manuscripts Bureau at The Australian National University, and Peter Cahill, co-ordinator of the Papua New Guinea Association of Australia collection in the Fryer Library at the University of Queensland, followed up several leads for me. A number of people kindly shared with me their memories of living and working in PNG in the 1940s. They allowed me to gain a much keener sense of the challenges which faced the Australian Administration. Brian Jinks, Maxwell Hayes, Stuart Inder, Adrian Leyden, James Sinclair, Harry West and Terry White answered questions big and small. Peter Grimshaw, John McCubbery and Geoff Melrose supplied biographical information about their fathers who worked for the Administration. Philippa McGuinness helped to hone my publication proposal and steered me towards Pandanus Books. My manuscript would probably still be lying in the bottom draw of my desk without Philippa’s assistance. Hank Nelson was particularly generous, providing wise and detailed comments on the text and helping me to navigate my way through PNG’s past. Paul Davies, David Dutton, my mother, Lynne Strahan, and Geoff Tooth read the entire manuscript and made many insightful suggestions. Ian Britain, Janet Gardiner, Patrick Gibbons, Kate Logan, Frank Strahan, Greg Terrill and Garry Woodard read segments of the manuscript, improving the text in different ways. I am grateful that Ian Templeman and the editorial board at Pandanus Books decided to take up my manuscript. It was a great
x
pleasure to work with the team at Pandanus: Justine Molony was always a good-humoured, skilful and supportive editor; Jan Borrie edited the manuscript with a sharp eye; Emily Brissenden did a fine design job creating a striking cover; Valerie Wayte handled publicity with sure hands; and Jo Bushby looked after the financial and legal aspects of the project with sure hands. My wife, Lily Petkovska, helped me in so many ways throughout this project, through all of its ups and downs over the last eight years. She read different drafts of the manuscript, challenged my ideas and encouraged me to improve the prose and narrative. Our children, Joschka and Katya, always reminded me, so powerfully and joyously, that the present is the place to be. I am of course responsible for any remaining errors and misjudgments in the text. The opinions expressed in this book are those of the author alone and in no way represent the views of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Lachlan Strahan
Table of contents
Acknowledgments
viii
List of Illustrations
xii
Prologue Sunday Afternoon
1
Chapter One On the Edge of the Great Deep Blue
5
Chapter Two An Armed Rebellion in Paradise?
44
Chapter Three In the Midnight Dark
87
Chapter Four Post-Mortem
126
Chapter Five A Great and Powerful Friend
153
Chapter Six Dark Deeds
175
Chapter Seven On the Brink
208
Chapter Eight Judgment Day
232
Chapter Nine A Death in the Spice Islands
261
Chapter Ten Aftermaths
302
Epilogue
338
Endnotes
358
Maps
362
Abbreviations
380
Index
381
xii
List of illustrations
Cover American transport motor dump on Manus Island, September 1949. Australian War Memorial Negative Number 041526. Prologue Derelict US Army Quonset huts on Manus Island after the war. Australian War Memorial Negative Number 304175. Chapter one Eddie Ward, Minister for External Territories (1943–9) [2nd R] meets Sergeant Iwagu, Royal Papuan Constabulary, Finschhafen, April 1944. Australian War Memorial Negative Number 072635. Chapter two District Officer Robert Melrose, Minister for External Territories, Allan McDonald and District Officer G. L ‘Kassa’ Townsend (L to R) on the verandah in Salamaua in 1941 some months before the Japanese invasion. Courtesy of Geoff Melrose. Chapter three Australian troops reclaim Lae in September 1943, examining shattered buildings. Australian War Memorial Negative Number 015780. Chapter four John Scott worked for New Guinea Goldfields before joining the Australian Army in January 1942.
xiii
From the Collection of the National Archives of Australia — B883 NGX376.
Chapter five The US Army used the Philippine Scouts in different roles around the Pacific after the war. Aniceto Bagley (L) and Marcelo Arceo (R), members of an ordnance ammunition company, Saipan c. 1948. Credit: Courtesy of Aniceto Bagley. Chapter six Lae police station and gaol in 1946. From the Collection of the National Archives of Australia — A1200 L5957. Chapter seven Chou Hung-shao (L) and Hsueh Pao-keng (R), members of the Chinese Nationalist contingent on Manus in 1947–48. From the Collection of the National Archives of Australia — A1838 308/1/2/2 part 1; A1838 308/1/2/2 part 1. Chapter eight R. E. Godson, master of the Administration trawler Sirius (L) and Subinspector Charles ‘Kedger’ Carr (4th L) standing in front of a Qantas Empire Airways DC3 at Los Negros airstrip, Manus, August 1948. Credit: Courtesy of Maxwell Hayes. Chapter nine The village of Doroeba on Morotai in 1948. Credit: Australian War Memorial Negative Number 090617. Alexander Newman re-enlisted in the RAAF in 1946, serving on Morotai in 1947–48. From the Collection of the National Archives of Australia — A9301 166006.
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Day of Reckoning
Chapter ten John Grimshaw, Commissioner of the Royal Papuan Constabulary and New Guinea Police Force, April 1950. Courtesy of Maxwell Hayes. Epilogue Flora ‘Ma’ Stewart used old Australian Women’s Army Service huts to re-open her Hotel Cecil in Lae in 1946. The recreation hall is on the left. Credit: Australian War Memorial Negative Number 092412.
Prologue
Sunday Afternoon
THE MONSOONAL RAIN, drenching and enveloping, was falling on 25 January 1948 at Lugos, an old mission settlement on the northern coast of Manus Island. It was Sunday afternoon and the fading light heightened the sense of stillness. The brief tropical twilight was not far off, and then the heavy curtain of sundown would descend with particular abruptness, as it did this close to the equator. As ever, the heat was sweltering. Nourished by the abundant rain, the coastal vegetation was thick and lush. Aside from the insistent rain, all was quiet, the local people sheltering in their village until the clouds had rolled away to the south-east, across the Bismarck Sea to the mainland of Papua New Guinea.1 Not even the local dogs bothered to stir at this time; they, too, waited for the rain to subside before venturing forth to scavenge. The heavy raindrops drummed on the curved corrugated roof of a Quonset hut, creating a sound that was almost soothing in its loud, rhythmical beat. The monsoonal afternoon shower was
2
Day of Reckoning
a time to rest and prepare food, to chat about the events of the day, the size of the catch or the next market. But this scene of serenity was deceptive. Inside the Quonset hut, Pondranei, a 15- or 16-year-old islander from a nearby village, was awash with pain. Four men, members of a Chinese Nationalist labour contingent, had pulled his arms roughly behind his back and high above his head, tying his hands with brass wire and telephone cable to an iron strut supporting the ceiling. Relics of World War II, slowly but inexorably rusting in the tropical damp, the Quonset huts were long, low buildings erected by the Americans to house their troops. With his toes barely touching the floor, his head hanging forward and his chin rubbing against his chest, Pondranei felt like his shoulders were being wrenched out of their sockets. His assailants were standing around him in a semicircle, several holding makeshift weapons — a plank, a fibrous piece of sugar cane and a long reed of pitpit. They were gesticulating in an animated fashion, yelling at him in Chinese, a language he could not understand. Although a few Chinese lived on Manus before and after the war, it seems likely that the young islander knew little about their ways. Dangling from the ceiling, defenceless, surrounded by four shouting men, he kept his eyes closed. His attackers hit him across the face, repeatedly and vigorously, with open hands and closed fists, and then set about beating him on the back, buttocks and legs with the plank and the sugar cane. Far from any likely source of help, Pondranei had good reason to fear for his life. His cries of pain did not deter his attackers, and the bashing continued until he fainted, slipping gratefully into unconsciousness. The four Chinese broke off their attack at last, cut the wire and cable that fastened their young victim to the ceiling of the hut and left him unconscious in a heap on the floor. The Chinese felt vindicated, having delivered what they saw as just punishment for a transgression. Some time later, Pondranei regained consciousness, worked his hands free of the now loose bindings around his wrists and fled from the hut, back through the twilight to his village.
Sunday Afternoon
3
From the beginning, this act of brutality was clouded in intrigue. Why did the Chinese bash a young islander? Why were they on an island thousands of kilometres from their homeland, which was racked by a fierce civil war? This incident was surely a small matter, something that could have ended quickly, without a fuss and without any real conflict. It probably should have ended swiftly, for no greater issues appeared to be at stake. Why bother? If the Australian District Officer had simply decided to do nothing or to resolve the matter in a quiet, ad hoc fashion, this violent encounter would have slipped by without notice, then and now, as one of those countless passing happenings that remain unrecorded by history, accorded no special meaning. But much more would follow from this crime. Sometimes small matters grow unexpectedly and assume much greater dimensions as events acquire a momentum of their own, drawing people along in their wake. No one could have anticipated how this bashing in a disused US Army hut on a remote island would come to cause so much trouble. Not even the most far-seeing observer could have predicted how this crime would come to be a matter of contention between several national capitals. Even less could they have foreseen how it would come to be entangled with other, much darker crimes in other, equally exotic locations. On 25 January 1948, a young islander called Pondranei became one of the unwitting protagonists in a protracted legal, political and cultural drama in which the stakes would rise and then rise again. Before we are finished, we will encounter a web of violent crimes, all committed in seven months from late 1947 to early 1948. These crimes will shed some light on the nature of crime, on the vagaries of justice and the difficulty of casting judgment, on the misunderstandings, rival claims and violence that can flow from cross-cultural encounters. They will open a window into Australia’s place in the world in the tumultuous aftermath of World War II, revealing along the way the personal stories of a generation of Australians who ventured north into PNG and Asia,
4
Day of Reckoning
fired on many occasions by a spirit of adventure or a determination to govern benevolently, on others by a more prosaic need for a job or the desire to turn a profit, and at times by more poignant or darker motives.
Chapter One
On the Edge of the Great Deep Blue
MANUS ISLAND WAS an unlikely place for such an entangled and unexpected cultural, legal and political confrontation to begin. Fringed by coral reefs, it shimmers on the horizon, 320 kilometres beyond the north coast of mainland New Guinea on the outer edge of the Bismarck Sea. On the other side of the island lies the great deep blue of the Pacific Ocean, stretching for thousands of kilometres further north. Although it is the principal island of the Admiralties, a collection of more than 150 islets sprinkled across a considerable expanse of water in the Bismarck Sea, Manus is not large, measuring only 80 kilometres west to east and no more than 32 kilometres north to south. A chain of irregular and broken mountains, thrown up long ago by volcanic eruptions, runs down the spine of the island from west to east, with the highest point, Mt Dremsel,
6
Day of Reckoning
reaching 718 metres. Rivers and streams cut down from this range to the coast, which alternates between steep slopes and swampy bays. Dense rainforest envelops the interior, resisting human penetration, while coconut palms, sago and mangroves cover the flatter stretches of land along the coast. The islet of Los Negros, a small crescent, lies at the western tip of the island across the narrow Loniu Passage. The north-west monsoon sweeps across Manus from November until March, with the south-east trade wind arriving in May and departing in October. The climate is hot and humid. It would be a mistake to assume that Manus and its surrounding islets were cut off in some kind of hermetically sealed container. By the mid-20th century, people had been living on the Admiralties for at least 10,000 years and, over time, a series of overlapping trading networks connected this small island chain to the outside world.1 Tools fashioned from the obsidian mined on Manus had been bought and sold for centuries as far away as Fiji to the east and Indonesia to the west. But Manus was left untouched by the tides of European colonialism until well into the 19th century. Although the Spanish and the Portuguese probably visited the island chain in the early 16th century, it was two Dutchmen, William Schouten and Jacob le Maire, who ‘discovered’ the Admiralties in 1616. They found little reason to pause for long. Far from Europe, the Admiralties were largely ignored for decades, though European whalers and traders could have used the archipelago as an occasional temporary base. It also seems likely that the infamous ‘blackbirders’ kidnapped islanders to supply Queensland’s sugar and cotton plantations with cheap labour, instilling considerable fear among the inhabitants. Manus had little contact with this strange European world, and navigational studies of the area did not begin until 1875.2 This seclusion could not last forever. The European scramble for colonies spread out from Africa in the late 19th century, encompassing finally the distant islands of the Pacific. In the next six decades, four different groups of foreigners first pricked and then cracked open Manus’s cocoon of isolation,
On the Edge of the Great Deep Blue
7
bringing its inhabitants into more substantial contact with the world beyond PNG for the first time. Impelled by a belated bid for an imperial place in the sun, Germany annexed New Guinea and the Admiralties in 1884. Manus became a part of the German empire, but the colonial presence on the ground was limited, with settlers and traders repelled by the island’s remoteness, dense forests and its people, who fiercely resisted European encroachments. The German authorities met this resistance with brutal punitive campaigns, bombarding villages and killing many islanders. It was not until 1911 that Germany finally founded a government station at Lorengau on the northern coast overlooking Seeadler Harbour. The Admiralties were gradually pacified and one planter built up a notable holding, with five plantations and trading posts scattered across the archipelago. Manus was drawn somewhat into the modern economy as plantations from other areas recruited locals, and boat-building and pearling started up on the island. Lorengau remained the only town, though it is uncertain that this small settlement deserved even that name. Despite several decades of colonial rule, Germany left little lasting mark on New Guinea. Although it became a settlement of some standing, with its characteristic Germanic architecture, Rabaul was overshadowed by the great colonial towns in French Indochina and British Malaya, where colonialism penetrated deeply into the surrounding society. Never particularly numerous or well-founded, the Christian missions found few converts until the 1920s. In 1948, the year of our story, two German missionaries were still on Manus, a last echo of the old colonial order. Germany’s sway over Manus was short-lived. With the declaration of war in 1914, Australian troops swiftly occupied Germany’s colonies in the south-west Pacific, bringing Papua and New Guinea together under Canberra’s control. For the next seven years, an Australian military regime ran PNG, and, step by step, Australians took on the responsibilities, complexities and dilemmas of colonial rule. At the end of World War I, the victorious great powers
8
Day of Reckoning
granted Australia control of German possessions in the Pacific south of the equator, fatefully allowing Japan to acquire the Kaiser’s colonies in the northern Pacific, principally the Mariana and Caroline Islands. Guam remained an American territory. Australia assumed trusteeship of PNG under a League of Nations mandate in 1920, while the western portion of the island remained a Dutch colony. With few natural resources, Manus went largely unnoticed during the 1920s and 1930s; the Australian presence on the island was minuscule, Lorengau was still an inconsequential settlement, and indigenous society was left largely to its own devices. Remoteness continued to insulate the island. The capital of the colonial administration, Port Moresby, lay 640 kilometres to the south; the nearest Australian city, Townsville, was more than 1,100 kilometres away; the main Australian cities even more distant. American anthropologist Margaret Mead painted a cheerful, relaxed, idealised picture of life on Manus in her 1930 study, Growing Up in New Guinea. She saw Manus as one of the few parts of the globe where ‘it is still possible to find untouched societies which have chosen solutions to life’s problems different from our own’. The island’s population was divided into three ethnic groups: the Usiai, an agricultural people who dwelled in the inland; the Matankor, who lived on the coast, mixing fishing with agriculture; and the seafaring Manus or Mouks, who inhabited the islands of the lagoon. Mead studied the Manus: ‘It is essentially a primitive society without written records, without economic dependence on white culture, preserving its own canons, its own way of life.’3 Although it is hard to be sure, Pondranei, the youth at the centre of our story, most likely belonged to the Matankor. Australians in the 1930s knew little about this faraway island, which did not impinge on their daily lives. If they became aware of it at all, Manus was a shimmering tropical paradise, faintly mysterious and romantic, inhabited by strange savages. Mead did little to dislodge this simplified image and she underestimated the extent
On the Edge of the Great Deep Blue
9
to which Manus had already altered despite its remoteness. The islanders had experienced profound social change, moving from stone to steel implements, and Christian missionaries had altered or undermined many traditional beliefs. Tribal fighting had been suppressed and many islanders had travelled, bringing them into more substantial contact with other parts of the country. Although the Admiralties remained lightly populated on the eve of World War II, with no more than 13,000 people spread across the chain, about 1,000 Manus Islanders were serving as indentured labourers in other parts of PNG in 1940. More than 200 were working on New Britain alone.4 Others had joined the police force. Such forays into the outside world were little preparation for what was to come; Japan’s invasion of South-East Asia in 1942 shattered Manus Island’s relative tranquillity and isolation, wreaking enormous and often destructive change. With some of its best forces in the Middle East and North Africa, Australia was able to deploy only a token force in the Admiralties. Scattered through the islands, the First Independent Company manned an advanced observation line and was no match for the formidable Japanese invasion force heading towards PNG. The small contingent on Manus wisely destroyed its munitions, laid booby traps and escaped on a schooner, leaving the Japanese to capture Lorengau on 8 April. The Australians had fled without a fight, surrendering not only the island, but their claim to natural superiority, their insistence that only they were capable of ruling. Such retreats all across the Territory in those terrible early months of 1942 permanently damaged ‘white prestige’. The Japanese transformed Manus into a military garrison, clearing away coconut groves to build a vast airfield at Momote and turning Seeadler Harbour, a crescent running along the northern coast, into a naval base. More than 4,600 Japanese personnel were based in the Admiralties by early 1944, the majority on Manus.5 Although they established one short-lived school for a few selected islanders, the Japanese did not leave
10
Day of Reckoning
a lasting cultural mark on the island aside from various physical constructions, some of which survive to this day, slowly rotting in the jungle. In February 1944, less than two years after the Japanese invasion, about 1,000 American soldiers, supported by eight destroyers and several cruisers, landed on Manus. Although it was a small step in the grinding Allied offensive, the Manus campaign was hard-fought. Scouts had reported that the island was ‘lousy with Japs’. Australian participation in this operation was limited to 25 members of the Australian New Guinea Administration Unit (ANGAU) and 12 indigenous policemen from the Royal Papuan Constabulary.6 Though facing certain defeat, the Japanese defenders fought bitterly nonetheless, and Lorengau was not retaken until 18 March. Manus had never seen such carnage. More than 3,000 Japanese were buried on the island far from home, and the Americans lost 330 dead and 1,189 wounded. So, 60 years after the arrival of the German colonialists, the Americans became the fourth foreign people to rule Manus. The island was transformed into a launching pad for MacArthur’s reconquest of the Philippines, and, by October 1944, it was one of the world’s greatest naval bases, with hundreds of warships anchored in Seeadler Harbour. The lights of the base could be seen far out to sea at night. On Los Negros, American engineers expanded the Momote airbase and built an even larger airstrip at Mokerang, 20,000 feet in length. Heavy bombers took off to attack Japanese-held lands to the north. One postwar writer captured the sense of almost overwhelming change: [There were] installations and amenities that today seem fabulous … a fantastic concentration achieved at incredible speed on an island speck … It has been estimated that in a brief six months fifty million pounds was spent on Manus — a quarter of a million pounds per day — by the Americans.7
On the Edge of the Great Deep Blue
11
Spread out along the north-eastern coast of the island, the vast US base covered a staggering 64 square kilometres and contained housing to accommodate 150,000 troops. In all, more than one million Americans spent some time on the island during the last two and a half years of the war, and many Australians came to see Manus as an important rampart in the defences of their apparently vulnerable country, a strong point guarding the northern approaches. Yet the pace of the war moved quickly and Manus slipped back into relative quiet once the American armada had departed to retake the Philippines. The US base became steadily less important and the number of personnel wound down rapidly. It is hard to underestimate the extent to which PNG, including Manus, was turned upside down by the traumatic events of the war. The presence of such large numbers of foreigners, first Japanese and later mainland Australians and Americans, white and black, was a cultural shock for the indigenous people. Rusting military equipment remained on the island for decades, a reminder of the war’s havoc and bloodshed. Life on the island would never be the same. It was this chain of unprecedented events that would eventually see Pondranei hanging from the beams of an old American Quonset hut. The immediate postwar years were a difficult and confusing period across PNG. After so much upheaval, Australia faced daunting challenges. The Administration was chronically understaffed, money was tight and many goods were hard to come by for many years. With the withdrawal of the military, shipping was scarce. Osmar White, a war correspondent, visited the Territory in 1946, finding that economic recovery was ‘painfully slow’. Every European town, except Port Moresby, had been wiped out by bombing. About 90 per cent of the trees on cocoa plantations in the Bismarck Archipelago were dead, gold mining had stopped in the Bulolo Valley, and military sawmills had been closed down. Once they could get permission to re-enter the country, European residents found their homes and old enterprises in a dispiriting
12
Day of Reckoning
condition.8 The sheer diversity and expanse of the country created enormous difficulties: PNG had more than 11,900 villages and more than 500 mutually unintelligible languages. At least onequarter of the Territory was still not under central government control, many areas had been partially depopulated during the war, and local food stocks were low. One of PNG’s most knowledgeable chroniclers, historian Hank Nelson, writes, ‘The old pre-war gradualism that left many people beyond basic government health, education and law and order was no longer tolerable.’9 The Australian Labor Government was determined to implement ‘a New Deal’, amalgamating the two territories into one unified administration, boosting resources, improving the working conditions for indigenous labourers and gradually reforming social and political structures.10 It added another load to this heavy burden by promising to compensate all residents for personal and material losses sustained during the war. Despite the extra funds and the new rhetoric, most politicians in Canberra for the most part continued to ignore PNG — the island was far removed from the concerns of the bulk of Australians. The postwar Minister for External Territories, Edward John ‘Eddie’ Ward, was no exception, displaying little real interest in the region’s affairs. A former boilermaker and tramways worker, Ward was a protégé of the confrontational radical premier of New South Wales, Jack Lang, and an uncompromising player of the political game, earning the distinction of being suspended from the House of Representatives for a record number of times. He was miffed when Prime Minister Curtin moved him from the portfolio of Labour and National Service to Transport and External Territories in September 1943. With an acerbic twist, Curtin quipped, ‘The Japs have got the external territories and the army’s got the transport.’11 Ward could not visit his new domain until the Japanese had been ejected and, in April 1944, he made his only trip to PNG in his six years as minister. He revealed something of his earthy radicalism by refusing to be carried ashore atop the shoulders of
On the Edge of the Great Deep Blue
13
a group of Melanesians. Instead, he rolled up his trousers and waded ashore, risking infection with hookworms. Feisty and temperamental, the Sydneysider had a natural and deeply rooted sympathy for the working people of Australia. Motivated by this radical egalitarianism, he did tackle some of the more glaring social injustices in PNG, earning praise in certain quarters. Nevertheless, Ward displayed a much greater interest in mainstream domestic issues, such as the Labor Government’s illfated attempt to nationalise the banks. His work as Transport Minister took up most of his time, and repeated attacks by the old guard made him loath to articulate PNG policy in public.12 Despite this hands-off approach, Ward was dragged into the controversy that erupted over the Pondranei bashing. Ward mostly left the governance of PNG to four men, all born in the 1890s. The Administrator, Colonel Jack Murray, the Government Secretary, Bob Melrose, and Justice Monty Phillips were at the helm in Port Moresby, while Reg Halligan, Secretary of External Territories, was the key figure in Canberra. All four played important roles in the drama at the heart of this story. A Victorian born on 8 February 1899, Murray was a former professor of agriculture and Chief Instructor at the Army School of Civil Affairs, Duntroon. He was appointed Administrator of PNG in 1945, beating 52 other candidates to the post. He arrived in Port Moresby without a policy objective or a comprehensive reconstruction plan and had to improvise from the beginning. For Brian Jinks, a former District Officer, Murray was a man of Spartan personal tastes who held liberal political opinions for his time and strove to implement Labor’s New Deal as best he could. He certainly cut a striking, even mildly forbidding, figure. Although his build was slight, the former colonel had an upright bearing and a full moustache. Jinks writes: Murray dealt with problems as they arose, paying special attention to the plight of the people in villages devastated by
14
Day of Reckoning
war. He spent many months of each year visiting outlying districts, talking with village leaders and missionaries and encouraging his staff to make the best of what they had.
James Sinclair first met Murray in 1948 as a young cadet Patrol Officer and found him to be decent and invariably polite, if a little stiff and reserved. During his tenure, Murray built on the village to rehabilitate PNG, establishing some schools, cooperatives and local councils and admitting the first Melanesians to the Legislative Council. He battled against powerful vested interests, especially planters who perceived a less firm method of rule as weak. Although inclusive, Murray was not progressive in the modern sense and he shared some of the common views of his day, insisting on a strict separation between indigenes and Europeans and prohibiting local men from wearing clothing above the waist.13 James Reginald ‘Reg’ Halligan was quite unlike Murray. He joined the federal Public Service in 1911 as a telegraph boy at the age of 17, gradually working his way up the hierarchy, in part by doing accountancy classes at night. He occupied several senior positions in the Prime Minister’s Department in the 1930s and served as the acting Administrator of Norfolk Island in 1937. He was appointed the first secretary of the new Department of External Territories in 1944, becoming the ‘paper czar’ of PNG, Christmas Island, Nauru, the Cocos Islands and Norfolk Island.14 By most accounts, Halligan was hardworking but thoroughly traditional, seeing his task as a departmental head in limited terms. He was a staunch Catholic, Roger Thompson writes, and he was inclined to stubbornness. He held definite opinions, though his workaholic habits were appreciated by many of his ministers. ‘For all that, Halligan was an unimaginative bureaucrat who showed no evidence that he read the growing literature on colonial administration.’15 Ian Downs, who joined the Administration in 1936 as a Patrol Officer and worked with Halligan in Canberra as a clerical assistant in 1945–46, presents a rather different portrait. He agrees
On the Edge of the Great Deep Blue
15
that Halligan was ‘obstinate beyond belief’, ‘suspicious of strangers’ and ran his small department like a one-man band, allowing files to pile up in his office and failing to delegate work. But he contends that his old boss was also a loyal and skillful bureaucrat who knew how to play the political game in Canberra, often defeating his opponents by simply doing nothing. If he is sympathetic to Halligan, Downs paints Murray in mixed terms. He maintains that Murray was ‘not a competent executive’, gladly shedding responsibility and failing to realise that he had to assert control and use the political process, including proper budgeting procedures, to run the Territory. He readily affirms, however, that the former Professor of Agriculture did more than anyone else to restore the confidence of the indigenous population in the Australian Administration, travelling widely around the Territory, sitting down with villagers to listen courteously and considerately to their views.16 Murray and Halligan had a poor working relationship, each regarding the other with some frustration and suspicion. It did not help that Murray knew that it was Halligan who had removed his name from the short list of candidates to take the Administrator’s job before Ward had installed him as the Government’s first choice. This tension made it harder for the new civilian Administration to get on its feet. According to one of his offsiders, Halligan did not personally dislike Murray, though he thought his counterpart in Port Moresby sent ‘too many bloody letters’. For his part, Murray saw Halligan as ‘atavistic’, believing that he actively blocked many of the Administration’s plans by neglecting to put proposals before Ward.17 This allegation was not altogether fair, for Ward and the rest of the Labor Government often had their eyes on other issues. Certainly, Halligan was a plodding figure compared with the younger and more dynamic head in External Affairs, John Burton, who had taken up his job in mid-1947 with the full backing of his Minister, the irascible Dr H. V. Evatt, and the Prime Minister, Ben Chifley. Halligan’s handling of the Pondranei case was uninspired.
16
Day of Reckoning
Robert ‘Bob’ Melrose, born in Hay, NSW, on 5 April 1890, was an experienced and able deputy for Murray, committed to the advancement of PNG. He had worked in the Territory since virtually the beginning of Australian rule, with the military from 1916 and then with the civilian administration from 1921. He rose from the rank of Assistant District Officer to become the Director of District Services and Native Affairs in 1939, having served in various parts of New Guinea, including Manus. Some planters resented what they saw as his soft approach to the indigenous population, one accusing him of handing out ‘the most incredibly stupid penalties for really serious crimes’ when he was a District Officer.18 After the Japanese invasion of PNG, Melrose led a group of 34 in a daring escape from Salamaua in early 1942, by canoe and launch to Buna and then by foot to Kokoda. Back in Australia, he was attached to the Department of External Territories during the war and led an advance party to Port Moresby in mid-1945 to prepare the way for the revival of civilian authority. As Government Secretary, he coordinated the work of the Administration. Downs for one was not impressed with Melrose, waspishly describing him as ‘one of those industrious bureaucrats who get ahead by not making mistakes and then produce fatuous memoranda for suffering officers in distant places’. This description seems unfair, even a little ill-intentioned. Geoff Melrose contends that his father was not popular in some quarters because he was always the precise bureaucrat who played by the rule book. Murray, in contrast, valued him: ‘I was very glad to have Melrose. He was devoted to the New Deal; slow to act, perhaps, for the conditions, but careful, hard working and pleasant.’ Melrose was sturdy during the Pondranei affair.19 Like Melrose, Justice Frederick Beaumont ‘Monty’ Phillips was a veteran of the Administration. He was the oldest of the four men at the helm of PNG’s regime, born in Ballarat, Victoria, on 20 January 1890. After serving in the medical and flying corps during World War I, Phillips had a long and distinguished legal
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career in the South Pacific, first in the Solomons and later in PNG. He was appointed as a judge of the Supreme Court of New Guinea in 1928. As such, Phillips was next in the chain of command in the Territory and acted as Administrator if the incumbent was absent or incapacitated. He returned as a senior judge in the amalgamated Supreme Court of PNG after the war. One of his contemporaries, Dr John Gunther, a New Deal appointee who ran public health, once remarked, caustically, that Phillips ‘loved to sit in the chair’ as Administrator. Phillips certainly saw no need after the war to disturb the fundamental colonial division between Europeans and Melanesians. His domestic staff reputedly wore the smartest outfits in Rabaul in the late 1930s, their white lavalava cloth wraps edged by the dark blue of his old school, Melbourne Grammar. Sinclair remembers Phillips as ‘a real character’, who invariably addressed fellow Europeans by their surnames in the old way. ‘He had a stiff leg and would stump around awkwardly. He was rather fine looking and always had a bottle of whisky when travelling on circuit.’20 PNG was so large and sprawling, its communications so uncertain and resources so tight, that Murray and his senior officers had to leave the day-to-day running of the country in the hands of the officials on the ground. Australian authority was spread thinly across an over-stretched network of district and sub-district offices, with patrol stations in the more remote locations, all linked tenuously by boats, aeroplanes and radio. Until 1952, there were only two places — the Gazelle Peninsula of New Britain and the northern coast of New Ireland — where patrols regularly moved around by vehicle.21 Large swathes of the country remained inaccessible and uncontrolled; parts of Manus itself had still not been visited by Patrol Officers as late as the mid-1950s. Acting as the primary interface between villages and the outside world, the District Officers or kiaps (a corruption of ‘captain’ in New Guinea pidgin) belonged to the Department of District Services and Native Affairs, combining the functions of administrator, lawenforcement official, judge and jury, and general patrol officer.
18
Day of Reckoning
Under the ‘sacred trust’ of the League of Nations mandate, they were beholden to look after the welfare of the indigenous population and to ensure that the law was enforced strictly. The kiap has entered Australian folklore in two stark guises: rugged, hardworking, benevolent guardian or racist, thuggish enforcer of a fundamentally unjust colonial order. No doubt, men worked for the service who broadly embodied each stereotype, but naturally enough most kiaps rarely fitted into such clear-cut categories. Many took their mandated role seriously, often contrasting what they saw as their own more just and enlightened rule with the brutality of Germany’s old colonial dominion. They went north fired by a spirit of adventure and a streak of idealism. One kiap, Malcolm Mackellar, remarked: ‘It was a dedicated service. You had to be dedicated.’ Other Australians took up jobs in PNG because they felt less constrained there or because they were running away from something. A few did not fit in back home. ‘In apparent contradiction of public service concerns for correct procedures and orderly promotion by seniority,’ observes Hank Nelson, ‘the Territory Administration seemed to tolerate people of strange habits.’22 A certain number had dishonorable motives, seeing PNG simply as a place where they could gain a personal advantage, wield power or indulge dark impulses. The entire structure of white Australian rule was based on a confused amalgam of paternalism and more hard-headed policies. Australia’s own status as a former colony that had won its independence only a few decades earlier added another layer to this complex interplay of emotions and intentions. Nelson captures well the contradictory nature of how most Australians saw themselves in PNG: They were conscious of their race, but at times they wanted to joke and slap black backs. They wanted cheap and obedient workers, but they did not want to claim privileges of wealth and birth … They wanted to rule, but they did not
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19
want to be seen as the representatives of an imperial power … They also carried with them a record of their experiences with the Aborigines. From the start [they] talked as though they had to make up for their past sins … Most Australians went to PNG with the best of intentions, but poorly equipped intellectually and by experience to establish good race relations. Few could bend their starched white suits.23
Trevor Shearston, a kiap who went on to write several powerful novels about Australia’s colonial dilemma, contends that most Australians in PNG never managed to resolve the tension between the need to be liked, which was an integral part of their national selfimage, and the need to be feared, which was often required to run a restless and struggling country. ‘The Brits knew how to do it, they didn’t give a stuff about whether they were liked. But we weren’t drawing on their tradition. In fact we were often consciously rejecting it. We would be “different” colonialists.’24 Charged with implementing the writ of the Australian authorities, the kiaps had significant, even dictatorial, powers, and isolation meant that they often acted quite independently. Maintaining contact with villages in their area, they settled disputes and provided a transmission belt of directives and information between Port Moresby and the indigenous population. Law enforcement was in many ways the cornerstone of the Administration. Kiaps heard less serious cases during patrols in deliberately informal, low-key settings, though Melanesians were allowed to take criminal or civil complaints to the District Office at any time. Aside from helping to establish educational and health facilities, kiaps also performed valuable anthropological work and explored rugged interior regions. This daunting and multifaceted job was made even more difficult by not being able to speak the local languages. Most kiaps were born far away to the south in Australia and had only a secondary education.25 Nonetheless, political scientist Allan Patience writes, a few of the kiaps were
20
Day of Reckoning
‘a fascinating mixture of bluff Australian masculinity and sympathetic openness to bewilderingly diverse and different human beings’.26 Village elders were brought into the colonial administration, occupying the rung of authority below the kiap, acting as local judges and village constables. Replicating a common colonial pattern, Melanesians were also recruited into the lower ranks of the police force in large numbers. The Administration had been hit hard by the war with Japan, and many of the older and experienced kiaps were either dead or scattered far and wide. Although some of the old hands slowly drifted back and new officers were trained and sent out into the field, Australian authority was shaky for some years to come. In 1947, the Administration had only 975 officials on its books, leaving more than 600 positions unfilled. Recruitment was slow. Kiaps divided in the postwar years into two bands: the old hands and the newcomers. Steeped in the established way of doing things, many old hands, impatient with the postwar reforms, were more adept at using the machinery of governance. Nelson argues that most prewar officials were ‘uneasy’ about taking on the role of civilisers, a reticence that continued after the war. In contrast, many new kiaps had been given more professional training in Australia in a bid to improve the Administration. Jinks notes that the force of tradition and convenience sometimes vitiated this attempt to create a more modern and progressive administration. ‘It was clear that some of the new officers arriving to take up duty usually saw more force in the arguments of the old hands than in the lectures at the School of Civil Affairs.’ Confident in their hands-on experience, the old guard often dismissed the criticism of newcomers or mainland Australians as ignorant and naive.27 Downs identifies yet another problem: some of the prewar officials who returned to the Territory were simply incapable of doing the job, having lost whatever power of command they had once possessed. ‘It would have been better if they had been paid off and stayed at home … It was embarrassing to witness their bewildered
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incompetence as they fussed about with deputations and complaints of discomfort while doing nothing practical to correct their situation.’ Downs contends that it took time for progressive and capable people to rise into positions of authority.28 These deeply rooted internal temperamental and ideological differences sapped the Administration’s energy and effectiveness. There had been a longstanding difference between the old ‘development types’ who had run New Guinea and the ‘protect the villager’ types who had governed Papua. Labor’s New Deal added yet another dividing line in an already splintered Administration. Officials lined up for and against the New Deal, though most of the supporters were postwar appointees. Murray spent much of his time balancing these ‘warring factions’. Another informed observer who worked in postwar PNG contends that some of the Australians still believed that ‘bashing the coons’ was the best way of running the country. Steeped in such an explicitly racist mind-set, these tough nuts regarded the more paternalistic approach that had prevailed in Papua before the war as ‘namby-pambyism’. But one thing was clear: old hand and newcomer alike faced the daunting task of administering PNG in the midst of confusion and a chronic lack of resources.29 These taxing circumstances were made even more difficult on Manus by the unclear status of the island. Shortly after the war ended, the United Nations granted Australia trusteeship over PNG, replacing the old League of Nations mandate, but the Americans declared their intention to retain Manus as a base for some years to come. Manus would become a link in the chain of American strong points spanning the western Pacific, running from Okinawa through Guam to the Admiralties. The Australian Defence Department strongly supported this idea. The Labor Cabinet initially decided that it would be in Australia’s best interests if the Americans stayed on Manus, though it was adamant that the islanders would continue to come under Australian authority, even if they worked on a US base.30 However, difficulties in the
22
Day of Reckoning
negotiations about a continuing American presence aroused ambivalence, even animosity, in some quarters in Canberra, with the Minister for Defence, John Dedman, charging that the American proposal had the savour of ‘the kind of “suggestion” that one might expect the USSR to make to one of its satellites’. Much like the British, the Americans had often taken the Australians for granted during the war. In Washington, the Australian Ambassador, Sir Frederic Eggleston, had been given little access and even less hard information.31 Matters did not improve after the war. After some wrangling Evatt rejected the American request concerning Manus and insisted on a resumption of full Australian sovereignty. Historian Geoffrey Bolton maintains that Labor ‘did not relish a strong American presence too close to home’. In any case, Japan’s defeat had shifted the centre of gravity of postwar events further north and the Americans no longer rated Manus a vital strategic asset. Though somewhat peeved by Evatt’s antipodean stubbornness, the Americans offered the island’s vast military stores to the Australian Government, which at first declined. As we shall see, this fateful decision had a direct bearing on the events of our own story. Once America’s interest in Manus had petered out, Canberra decided to press ahead with its own military plans. An Australian naval reconnaissance party visited Manus in mid-1947 and concluded that the island should be developed as a base. Mindful of the encroachments of the jungle, the naval team recommended that Australia should quickly purchase desirable assets from the Americans.32 It did not help matters, however, that Australian troops and civilians had jumped the gun and helped themselves to surplus US stores in other parts of PNG, often selling the booty for considerable gain and provoking anger in America. Downs maintains that Australian civilian administration resumed on Manus ‘without incident’.33 This was certainly not the case. The American departure from the island was not clear-cut and US forces continued to control their vast base and its
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surrounds for several years. This lingering presence meant that the restoration of Australian civilian control was slow and uneven. Reflecting the broader tensions at the national level, contact between the remaining American forces and the small contingent of Australians on the island was patchy, at times warm and cooperative, at others irritable and competitive, even hostile. At one end of the island, the Australian Navy had established a base, HMAS Tarangau, at Lombrum on Los Negros.34 However, the site of the prewar District Office, Lorengau, was still incorporated into the US base, and the Administration was forced to set up its headquarters in a temporary location at Inrim, a former plantation along the coast to the west. The makeshift buildings were originally built by ANGAU during the war from ‘native’ materials. Sharpening the sense of Australian grievance, the location also lacked an anchorage. After visiting Manus in August 1947, Justice Phillips was scathing. ‘Inrim is pretty grim and not an ideal place for a District Station. Practically all the people I have seen are very much below par in health, and look dispirited.’35 Murray wrote brusquely to Canberra, emphasising that the Manus situation was uncertain and unsatisfactory. ‘Inrim is a place with no “background” and to say it suffers by comparison with the American base area is an understatement of some simplicity.’ Six weeks later, he visited Manus himself and found the US naval commander, Lieutenant Glen Uhl, a difficult man to deal with. ‘His attitude was that of a person overtly hostile to our proposals, and given to the stressing of “the conquest” of the Admiralty Islands by United States Forces, and that, by right of conquest the USA would continue to occupy the area for as long as it desired.’ Murray stressed that the site of the old District Office in Lorengau, on the western side of the Lorengau River and atop a hill commanding a view of the surrounding terrain, was an important symbol of the Administration. Continued American occupation of the site ‘has resulted in a loss of prestige of the Commonwealth and of this Administration in the eyes of the native people’.
24
Day of Reckoning
Establishing an office to the east of the river would further dent the standing of the Administration because this land was known before the war as ‘a place belong to Kanaka’. Murray insisted that Australia intercede with the United States. Only too ready to go into battle, Eddie Ward wrote in late November to the Prime Minister, Ben Chifley, asking that Evatt press the Americans while he was in New York to allow the District Office to return to its proper site. Chifley duly cabled Evatt in the United States, instructing him to approach the American Government.36 In a neat coincidence, a cable from the Australian Embassy in Washington outlining its representations arrived in Canberra on the very day that the Chinese labourers abducted and bashed Pondranei. In another strange twist of fate, the scene of the bashing, Lugos, was located roughly between Inrim and Lorengau. The embassy stated that the last American forces on Manus, a small naval contingent and the US Army’s 53th Survey Battalion, numbering about 200 men, would leave by April. Further, it reported that the US Pacific Fleet had proposed that ‘some local arrangement be worked out for joint occupation of the area west of the river until the Americans can remove their personnel’.37 On the surface, this cable seemed encouraging, but no one in Canberra or Port Moresby was to know that these vague commitments would not be realised for many months. So, with much frustration and recrimination in the air and matters of high policy being debated between Canberra and Washington, Pondranei walked into the run-down District Office at Inrim early on Monday 26 January to lodge a complaint against his Chinese assailants. In January 1948, the Administration on Manus was limited to four overworked officials. Reflecting the broader pattern across the Territory, this small complement was a mixture of the old and the new. Born in Birmingham on 29 June 1906, District Officer Alfred Austen ‘Bill’ Bloxham was one of the old hands. He completed an honours degree in history at Birmingham University in 1926, playing rugby with the First Fifteen, joined the shooting team and
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served for three years as a military cadet. He arrived in Australia in 1928 and worked for two years as the senior history master and junior sports master at Barker College in Hornsby, NSW. About this time, he applied to join the Administration in New Guinea as a cadet Patrol Officer. ‘During the years 1925–27, I spent many months in Egypt,’ he wrote in his application letter, ‘gaining some experience of natives.’38 Bloxham was probably offering up the only relevant experience in his background, but it is hard not to conclude that he was also succumbing to the fallacy that all nonEuropeans were an undifferentiated mass who could be treated in the same way. Armed with this schooling in the ways of colonialism, Bloxham began duty as a cadet with the Administration in late 1929. He served with ANGAU during the war, attaining the rank of major, and rejoined the civilian Administration in June 1947. Bloxham’s wife, Theresa, tried to join him on Manus in late 1947 with their 20-month-old son, but was forced to abandon her plans because the living conditions at Inrim were so tough. Isolation and loneliness made life on the island hard. Another kiap, James Sinclair, recalls that Bloxham was ‘a matter-of-fact bloke with not much small talk’ but a good and well-respected officer.39 Bloxham’s deputy, Assistant District Officer Joseph Richard ‘Dick’ White, was by coincidence a fellow Englishman and teacher, though he was junior in age by nearly a decade. A native of Salisbury, White migrated with his family to Australia and grew up in Pimpinio, a small farming town in western Victoria. He worked as a teacher from 1936 until 1939, when he joined the New Guinea Administration as a cadet Patrol Officer. His career in the Territory was interrupted before it had really taken flight by the outbreak of war. After serving as a pilot for the RAAF and later as a captain with ANGAU, White rejoined the civilian Administration once he was discharged from the armed forces in mid-1946. Often called ‘Gunner’ due to his wartime service, he was seen by some as a rather unconventional individual.40 When Pondranei appeared at the District Office in Inrim, White had just
26
Day of Reckoning
celebrated his 32nd birthday. A regular police station had not yet been re-established on Manus, but Bloxham and White did have 10 Melanesian police constables at their disposal. Sergeant Major Kipau led this small police contingent. Aside from maintaining law and order, Bloxham and White had much work to do; Manus still did not have any government schools in 1948. The other two officials were medical staff, a chief medical officer, Dr William Smythe, and an assistant medical officer, Cyril Lambert. Smythe was one of the first batch of doctors rushed back to PNG to resuscitate the medical service in the early months of 1946. He worked for many months on Manus without taking regular leave. An army nurse during World War I, Lambert gave up his own medical massage business in Sydney to join the Administration as a medical assistant in March 1924 at the age of 29. Aside from a brief intermission in 1927–28, he worked as a medical assistant right up until the Japanese invasion in 1942. Like many of his prewar colleagues, he served with ANGAU, rejoining the Administration in his old job in February 1946. Medical assistants played a crucial role in bringing decent health care to many Melanesians, especially in remote areas that were not yet serviced by doctors on a regular basis. During his many years of service, Lambert had learnt to speak Tok Pisin, a skill he would apply to good effect as the Pondranei affair unfolded in the coming months. Bloxham and White regarded the abduction and bashing of Pondranei as a serious matter. Their interest was propelled in part by a natural concern for the physical and mental welfare of a teenage boy. A medical examination revealed that the young islander had several signs indicative of a beating, including bruising, swelling and two abrasions, one on his left buttock and one near his left kidney. White and Bloxham were also spurred to action by a determination to enforce Australian civilian jurisdiction, an imperative rendered more potent by the continuing American claim that their base stood beyond Australian authority. Sidelined in their dilapidated District Office, the two Australian
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officials felt a strong need to reaffirm the legitimacy of Australian authority in the eyes of the indigenous population. Well might they worry about this for many of the islanders regarded the returning Australians with decidedly mixed feelings. Australian governance in PNG had always been marked by neglect. One historian has argued that Australia’s ‘administration was relatively humane but limited in scope; simple possession was the principal end’.41 The Australians were bureaucratic, minimalist colonists, driven more by the need to impose an Australian structure of government and justice than by any consistent desire to exploit the region’s economic resources. This overall outlook flowed through to the provision of paltry resources. Funding was increased after the war, but one informed observer, the poet and conservative thinker James McAuley, believed that Melanesians still had good cause to view their Australian overlords with great ambivalence. Drafted in 1942, McAuley was assigned, like Jack Murray, to the Directorate of Research and Civil Affairs. A lieutenant by the time the war finished, McAuley had become deeply engaged by the problems of PNG and he lectured at the Australian School of Pacific Administration in Sydney from 1946 to 1960. In early 1944, he accompanied an Australian patrol on a sweep mopping up small groups of Japanese soldiers on the south coast of Manus, for the first time seeing dead bodies and realising that Melanesians had a very different understanding of birth and death. Conscious of the old Western tradition that painted simplistic pictures of the Pacific Islands, McAuley hoped he had ‘learnt to avoid the pitfalls of sentimentalizing the primitive’. He certainly avoided the pitfalls of sentimentalising the Administration, contending that the Manus Islanders compared Australians unfavourably with the Americans. Melanesians knew that the Australians had been ‘chased out’ of Manus in 1942 by the Japanese and ‘were reinstalled only by the power and favour of the United States’. McAuley believed that the war had profoundly altered how the islanders saw the world around them.
28
Day of Reckoning
Impressed by American power and wealth, some local leaders went to the naval base in August 1946 and declared that ‘they wanted the United States to take them over because their previous rulers — first the Germans, then the Australians — while using them as labourers had done nothing for them and given them no schooling’. McAuley ruefully noted that these goings-on provoked a to-do. The Administration dispatched a senior official to the island in March 1947 to investigate the discontent and defend Australia’s record. He later penned a report, often self-righteous and at times bitter: These villages have benefited most from the lavish and often foolish generosity of the United States … and now the United States is folding up [the islanders] are reaping a rich harvest … it is quite common to see stretcher beds, mattresses, pillows, chairs and other articles of furniture in their houses, some of which are built from sawn timber with plywood walls and iron roofs.
The official said he had ‘lectured’ the islanders in accordance with official policy, underlining the generosity of the Administration, though he admitted that some individuals had become ‘rather excited and aggressive in their attitude but they were never offensive and always quiet and friendly at the end of the meeting’. Local feelings had been aroused in recent months by a rumour that two generals, one American and one Australian, would come to the island soon to ‘ask the native people whether they wanted to be governed by Australia or America’. Given such unsettling news, the official was quick to claim, overanxiously, that ‘expressions of loyalty to the Australian Government were outstanding’ the further he travelled from the US base and in areas where the missions were run by ‘Australians or people of British stock’. By implication, loyalty was less in areas covered by the Lutheran missions, which had an American influence. Pondranei lived in a
On the Edge of the Great Deep Blue
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village close to the base and one wonders where he fitted into this sliding geographical scale of loyalty. Many islanders remained unconvinced by Australian promises that things would improve, leaving them to feel a growing frustration which engendered cargo cults. The leader of one cult bluntly explained why Melanesians were dissatisfied: ‘You have no feeling for us. We are your dogs, your pigs … You do not want us to understand.’42 The Paliau Movement represented the most testing challenge to Australian authority. Led by a big, handsome and worldly former sergeant in the New Guinea Police, Paliau of Baluan, it combined the activities of a religious sect with some of the elements of orthodox village administration. At times, Paliau controlled most of the villages in the southern half of the island, winning the support of ‘landless people, young men who could not afford a bride price, and defectors from the Roman Catholic missions’. He stepped up his demands, at one point insisting that all Asians and Europeans should be expelled from the island and boycotting the Administration ‘whose weakness he despised and whose promises he distrusted’.43 Complicating matters, this more structured and conventional political movement overlapped and competed with a much more intensely emotional and radical cult or ‘noise’, which rejected the Administration totally.44 Hank Nelson observes that Australian officials did not know how to respond as ‘the noise’ moved from community to community, oscillating between a desire to punish and suppress and a willingness to divert or cooperate.45 Paliau was arrested in 1947 and held for a time in Port Moresby before being released. When Pondranei was assaulted, the movement was gathering momentum. Although Australia had formerly reassumed de jure authority on Manus, de facto power was still vested with the more numerous Americans. Even at the end of their tenure, the Americans dwarfed the Australian outpost in terms of resources and raw power. At various points during the Pondranei case, the Australians turned to the Americans for advice or perhaps even some kind of tacit
30
Day of Reckoning
permission. This gap between ostensible Australian and real American authority was reinforced by the Melanesian dissatisfaction with Australian rule. Although they never referred to Melanesian disgruntlement in their reports about the Pondranei case, Bloxham and White were only too well aware that the Administration was on the back foot. On this occasion, they could locate the source of Melanesian discontent in a group of strangers, the Chinese, rather than in their own rule. They could see themselves as the protectors of the local people, restoring the integrity of Australian authority. And this role for the Australians was reinforced by the attitude of the remaining Americans. If they had been generous several years earlier, the Americans had lost interest in Manus by 1948. On the way out, packing up the last bits of their once vast base, they were largely indifferent to Pondranei’s complaints and Australian attempts to enforce justice. Bloxham and White had pressing reasons for pursuing Pondranei’s assailants, especially when it became known that the Chinese labourers were employed by an American stevedoring company. What were a group of Chinese Nationalist labourers doing on Manus in the late 1940s? It is here that Manus was swept up into the powerful, sweeping currents of the Cold War, suddenly making a Melanesian boy a protagonist in a small side drama of much larger events on the other side of the globe. As Australia and the United States were haggling over the control of Manus, China was teetering on the edge of a civil war between Mao Zedong’s Chinese Communist Party and Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist Party or Kuomintang. Although he had misgivings about aspects of Chiang’s rule, not least its corruption, US President Truman supported the Nationalist regime with substantial non-lethal aid as a bulwark against what he saw as the rising tide of global communism. Under an agreement signed in Shanghai on 31 August 1946, the US Government sold its surplus property in the western Pacific, except ships, aircraft and combat items, to the Nationalists. The scale of the agreement was staggering; 1.5 million tonnes of
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material, worth about $US800 million, were sold to China for $US175 million, two-thirds of which was a cancellation of certain US obligations to China.46 The remnants of the once vast base on Manus, reputedly valued at $US584 million, were a vital part of the agreement. By this route, a small island became unexpectedly embroiled in China’s fate. Crucially, Canberra had no say in these arrangements. The Shanghai deal was unpopular in Australia, where some claimed that the United States had treated its trusty southern ally shabbily by giving the vast majority of its surplus war stores to China for a nominal sum. Some of the Australian discontent was rather hypocritical. Journalist Osmar White observed that the Australian authorities had allowed much of the war disposals under their control to be misused or squandered. Some items were capable of being adapted to civilian purposes but ‘little of this surplus was retained to help in reconstruction’. The Commonwealth’s disposals authority auctioned off earthmoving equipment, generating plants, vehicles and building supplies, ‘often for absurdly small sums’. Speculators snapped up bargains and either shipped them out of the Territory or sold them at enormous profit. White was blunt in his assessment: ‘Until the early 1950s, the only really profitable post-war business conducted in New Guinea was buying and selling junk.’ These sharp practices engendered ill feeling in the United States. Only three weeks before the massive China contract was signed, the Chicago Tribune claimed that an Australian ‘entrepreneur’ had purchased 300 inoperative vehicles for $2,000 and promptly resold the gasoline, siphoned from the fuel tanks, for $3,000.47 The Chinese merely jumped into the same racket. Under the terms of the Shanghai deal, the Nationalists agreed to arrange and pay for the storage, handling, loading and transportation of the American supplies. From the outset, the exact nature of the operation was complicated and unclear, involving a mixture of military and civilian personnel as well as several American and Chinese organisations. The Office of the
32
Day of Reckoning
Foreign Liquidation Commissioner (OFLC), an arm of the US State Department, oversaw the operation. As we shall see, OFLC officials watched the unfolding conflict that followed the assault on Pondranei from the sidelines. At the Chinese end, the Board of Supplies of the Executive Yuan (BOSEY) was responsible for organising the Manus operation. In a system in which the lines between civilian and military power were blurred, the Executive Yuan was the highest organ of the Nationalist Government, directing central ministries, coordinating economic planning and supervising the military. The Nationalist regime was militarist in ethos and organisation, a structure reinforced by the fact that China was more or less continually at war throughout the 1930s and 1940s. The head of BOSEY, the Director General of Supplies, was General Kiang. A largish man in his mid-fifties, the Germaneducated Kiang spoke English fluently, had a broad engineering and business background, and had at one time run a purchasing commission in the United States. As the BOSEY head, he was charged with the pressing task of ensuring that the Nationalist forces were equipped with a steady stream of supplies for the war against the communists. Kiang’s deputy in the Pacific region was General Ting Wei-hu, a man in his mid-forties and the commander of the Chinese Army’s Marianas Command based on Guam. Like his boss, Ting was German-educated, a good English speaker and an engineer by training. The Americans respected both men as capable and alert.48 BOSEY was not well-placed to manage such a vast logistical operation far from China, and it hired an American stevedoring and construction company, the Vinnell Corporation, to itemise, pack up and ship out the American military equipment scattered across the western Pacific. Established back in the Great Depression by an enterprising businessman in Los Angeles, Vinnell grew quickly, winning important contracts with the US military during the war.49 Securing the BOSEY contract was a coup. After renting an office in Shanghai in a modest four-storey building,
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Vinnell hired 125 American and 1,500 Chinese workers and established a Base of Operations on Guam, an important hub for American activities in the western Pacific. The logistical job at hand was immense. In the dash to get the boys home, the US armed forces had simply dumped masses of material, leaving valuable equipment in a disorderly fashion, exposed to the encroaching jungle and the corrosive climate. Simply locating the equipment was daunting. Vinnell chartered an aircraft to scan islands sprinkled over an enormous area of the western Pacific, from Iwo Jima in the north to Manus in the south. At times, Vinnell workers came ashore to find scenes of near ruin and had to hack jeeps and equipment free of thick undergrowth. Over a two-year period, Vinnell would move more than 100 shiploads of stores, a staggering amount, weighing almost a million tonnes. It soon realised that the Chinese lacked some of the logistical skills required to handle such vast amounts of material. With the Chinese civil war in full swing, Vinnell asked the Australian Government in mid-1947 if it could bring a contingent of Americans and Chinese into PNG to pack up the stores left behind in Finschhafen. Located on the northern coast of PNG, Finschhafen was founded by the Germans in 1885 and became one of the American staging points for the advance northwards against Japan. Canberra and Port Moresby alike were far from happy about allowing a large number of Chinese into Australian territory. Both were committed to the White Australia Policy and perceived PNG’s own Chinese as an unwanted, alien group that would hopefully dwindle away over time. The request to allow the labourers to enter PNG would have been considered even less favourably had it come directly from the Chinese Government. The American connection was vital in opening the way for a temporary waiver, but the Australian authorities were determined to set strict conditions. On 11 June, External Territories declared that the Chinese labourers ‘will be controlled in the same way as the Filipino stevedores, who were brought into the Territory during 1946 … they
34
Day of Reckoning
will be confined to the area under the control of the U.S. forces’.50 This was the language of control, confinement and surveillance, terms that were perhaps more appropriate to describe the treatment of prisoners. A week later, Vinnell informed the Australian Ambassador in Nanking, Douglas Copland, that about 26,000 tonnes of material would be removed from Finschhafen over two and a half months. Vinnell would use its own ships. In previous cases, the United States had given the company a ‘blanket authority for entry of Chinese’ in return for assuming responsibility for the maintenance and control of the labourers. Copland stated that Vinnell wanted similar approval for the Finschhafen operation. The American company planned to dispatch an advance party within the next three weeks to prepare a reception camp to house the main contingent.51 Murray allowed the Vinnell contingent to enter PNG on two conditions. First, the company ‘should give guarantee for maintenance and control of Chinese whilst in territory and repatriation on completion of task’. Second, ‘a full list of names of Chinese should be furnished, and advice given of intended dates of arrival so that entry can be checked by the Administration’. The Chinese could not be allowed to slip away and stay in the Territory; it was imperative that they leave. On 7 July, the Australian Consulate General in Shanghai informed Vinnell that the American technicians and Chinese labourers could enter Finschhafen provided the company accepted the Administrator’s conditions.53 Perhaps frustrated by the delay in getting a firm decision from Australia, Vinnell charged ahead and sent its advance party to Finschhafen without consulting the Australian authorities. The Consul General in Shanghai, Osmond Fuhrman, told Canberra on 16 July in an outraged tone that he had received a letter from Vinnell after the advance party had already left China and was due to arrive in Finschhafen on that very day, 16 July. The letter did not contain the guarantees demanded by the Administration. ‘I therefore sent for the Shanghai representative of the Corporation and informed
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him that I was gravely concerned over the non-observance of [our] requirements.’ Vinnell’s preparedness to act independently of the Australian authorities did not augur well for future cooperation. As far as Fuhrman could ascertain, the full contingent — about 20 American supervisors, 250 Chinese workmen and 50 Chinese officials — was due to leave Guam in early August. Fuhrman noted that the Chinese would possess identity cards but would not be fingerprinted. Federal Labor MP Leslie Haylen visited Shanghai in 1948. He was blunt about Fuhrman: ‘He hates the Russians, [Jewish] refugees and Chinese with an indiscriminate fury.’53 On 20 September, Vinnell belatedly provided Fuhrman with a full list of the Chinese and American members of the team. The Chinese would carry a BOSEY identification card, containing a photograph and brief identifying data, while the Americans would have US passports. The contingent would leave for Finschhafen about 15 October on the S.S. Hai Tee, remaining for a month with a John Morgan acting as superintendent. ‘The Vinnell Corporation assumes complete responsibility for this operation and guarantees the maintenance and control of the personnel involved and their repatriation upon completion of the mission.’ Vinnell and BOSEY ‘deeply appreciated’ Australia’s cooperation. ‘It is hoped that the work may be accomplished with little inconvenience to the local government officials.’54 Like everyone else involved, Vinnell had not even the faintest inkling of just how much inconvenience lay ahead. Given the timetable for the Finschhafen project, it seems likely that the Vinnell contingent did not reach Manus until late November or early December. In a fateful omission, the exchange of cables and letters between Vinnell and the Australian authorities did not mention any subsequent activities on Manus. Initiated in ad hoc circumstances, the nature of the Manus operation was made even more unclear by an informal understanding between the Americans and Chinese. Without consulting Canberra, the United States agreed that BOSEY could dispatch some regular
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Day of Reckoning
Chinese soldiers from an ordinance corps and several military police to accompany the labourers. So, the group of foreigners that arrived on Manus in late 1947 was a mixed crew. The bulk of the contingent were stevedores, mechanics, winchmen, forklift operators, truck drivers, signalmen and a few support staff such as kitchen hands and laundrymen. The military police and soldiers guarded the Chinese camp and supervised the whole operation in conjunction with the Vinnell personnel. Although issued with uniforms, the labourers were not members of the Chinese Army and did not bear arms, though they were subject to some degree of military discipline. Further complicating matters, the two military arms of the Chinese contingent, the ordinance corps officers and the military police, answered to separate commands on Guam, meaning that they were not always pulling in the same direction. This split command generated its own troubles. It is worth noting at this point that Manus was closer to Guam than to Townsville. By late 1947, the vast US base had become something of a ghost town, quietly falling into disrepair in the tropical sun and rain, the jungle steadily reclaiming its own. It contained more than 1,200 buildings of various sizes, the majority having been vacant for several years. The Vinnell/BOSEY contingent had no trouble finding enough space to set up a camp inside the boundaries of the sprawling base; with its own kitchen, mess and laundry, it was largely self-contained. A road connected Lorengau to the smaller US facilities at Momote and Lombrum on Los Negros, 40 kilometres to the east. Once a perfectly maintained highway, the Lorengau-Momote road was rapidly deteriorating by 1947–48, with potholes proliferating by the month, making the relatively short journey between the two bases arduous. The wharves at Lorengau and Lombrum were still in largely good repair, allowing the Chinese to outload the stores with relative ease. Lugos, the old mission settlement, lay less than five kilometres along the coast to the west. Several Melanesian villages and former plantations were scattered around Lorengau.
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At first, the Chinese and Vinnell attempted to establish joint living and mess facilities, no doubt to reaffirm the sense that the two groups were engaged in a joint enterprise. This attempt to live and work together failed utterly, however, and the combined facilities were abandoned, leaving the Americans and Chinese to settle into adjacent, but separate living quarters. Working together proved no easier, leaving the OFLC the uncomfortable and at times fruitless task of mediating. After the operation had wound up at the end of 1948, a senior OFLC official, Captain Marcus DeWolf, US Navy, wrote: ‘There was a considerable amount of friction in the field between Vinnell and BOSEY, largely due to language difficulties and the impatience of Chinese and American foremen with each other’s methods. This continually led to conflicting orders and work stoppages.’ This friction was replicated at higher levels, where the upper echelons of BOSEY and Vinnell often clashed over the running of the entire operation across the western Pacific. DeWolf ascribed much of this disharmony to a fundamental ambiguity in the operation’s contract, which first granted Vinnell independent authority and then undermined that very authority. BOSEY was well aware of the ‘weasel’ in the wording and took full advantage. This ambiguity played out in almost daily disagreements. Although the contract explicitly precluded BOSEY from ‘picking and choosing’, the Chinese rejected numerous items as useless or shabby. Such problems would have been trying enough in an area with all the facilities of modern society, but they were intensified immeasurably by Manus’s isolation. DeWolf readily acknowledged: ‘The day to day difficulties encountered by the Chinese were endless in variety and character. It was no small task to arrange food supplies in locations as remote as Manus.’ Not long after the operation had started, a Vinnell manager told his headquarters that the food situation was bad. The Vinnell camp had no flour, meat, butter, eggs, potatoes or sugar and was forced to fall back on Chinese and ‘native’ food. ‘All of Larai village are fishing and hunting for us.’55 Tempers could be easily tested under such conditions.
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Day of Reckoning
The standing of the Chinese camp was made even more fraught by PNG’s racial politics. Melanesians occupied the lowest social position, of course. One long-time PNG resident said frankly: ‘We expected to be respected, have privileges, feel superior.’ It was only a few ‘cranks’ who challenged this seemingly natural state of affairs, and such people were swiftly ostracised. Whites ‘lived a life of natural apartheid, in which the native inhabitants went their way and we ours, meeting at such points as were mutually advantageous — but where we called the tune’.56 Social segregation was most rigidly enforced in the larger towns, though it was mandatory throughout the country for ‘natives’ to address Europeans respectfully as ‘masta’ or ‘Taubada’. Social intimacy between Melanesians and Europeans was more or less out of the question, and most whites usually encountered ‘natives’ as servants and subordinates. The European community had its own often sharp divisions; officials, planters and missionaries had different interests at stake and often regarded each other with some suspicion, even derision. All three groups, however, shared certain underlying assumptions about the broad racial divide in PNG and few individuals questioned the white race’s allegedly inherent superiority. Asians occupied an uneasy intermediate position above ‘the natives’ but well below the Europeans. Numbering no more than 2,100 in 1940 and concentrated largely in Rabaul, Madang and Morobe District, principally Lae and the goldfields, Chinese were subject to formal and informal discrimination. Regarded as permanent aliens, unable to take out Australian citizenship, they were required to live and work in separate precincts, which invariably became known as Chinatown, and to use separate hospitals, schools and gaols. Asians were paid less than Europeans for the same work in commercial and government jobs. Most Europeans regarded Chinatown with mixed feelings. On the one hand, its laundries and shops performed useful economic functions, and some Europeans came to have relaxed dealings with local Chinese.
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Friendships occasionally bridged the divide. On the other hand, Chinatown was an almost mythic zone in the Australian imagination, a dark and unfathomable place of sin, strange customs and dirty habits. Chinese spent much of their time, it was said by onlooking Europeans with a mixture of intrigue and apprehension, in gambling halls and opium dens. Girls and women were warned to beware of the lecherous desires of the ‘Chinaman’, who would abduct unsuspecting damsels for a ‘white slave trade’. Alleged Chinese sexual depravity provoked particularly strong reactions in PNG, where racial segregation was nowhere more sharply defined than between non-European men and European women. Subjected to various forms of social, economic and institutional discrimination, Chinese naturally tended to be inwardlooking and comparatively self-sufficient. Nonetheless, they became over time a permanent part of PNG society, accepted by Europeans as part of the local scene. Simultaneously insiders and outsiders, they had far more direct social contact with Melanesians than the European population. Pushed to the social margins and confronted by a lopsided sex ratio in their own community, Chinese men were more prepared to form lasting relationships with indigenous women. World War II softened, temporarily and partially, some of the prevailing negative perceptions of Chinese. Australians, Chinese and Melanesians were united by the common struggle against the invading Japanese. Seen for so long as outsiders, Chinese were now clearly on ‘our side’. It is significant that few Japanese settled in PNG, aside from a few boat-builders in Rabaul before World War I. The Japanese naturally replaced the Chinese during the war as the pre-eminent outsiders. Although brought together by the common need to resist the Japanese, Chinese and Australians were not equals. When war broke out, European women and children were evacuated from PNG, but their Chinese counterparts were left behind. While a few escaped to Australia, most Chinese were rounded up by the Japanese, incarcerated and used as forced labour.
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Day of Reckoning
Even the sense of common struggle against Japan was not always enough to remove the old suspicion of Chinese motives and designs. The racial dimension of the Pacific War sharpened attitudes in some quarters — there was no fundamental reassessment of old policies. On the contrary, although Chinese had assisted the war effort, often at great personal cost, the Administration set about reestablishing the prewar racial status quo. The old restrictions were reinstated save for one concession: Chinese who had been temporary residents when the Japanese invaded were permitted to stay on in the Territory. It was not until 1951 that Chinese were granted the right to be called Australian Protected Persons rather than aliens, allowing them for the first time to vote, marry and change jobs and places of residence without notifying the authorities. Other forms of economic and social discrimination continued into the late 1950s. The 300 or so Chinese sent to Manus in late 1947 to pack up the surplus American stores arrived some years before these gradual shifts in policy improved the status of local Chinese. Unlike the New Guinea Chinese, who came overwhelmingly from the southern parts of China, such as Hong Kong, Guangdong and Fujian, the contingent of labourers came out of the middle provinces in the heart of mainland China. They spoke dialects such as Shanghainese while the local Chinese spoke Cantonese or Hakka. As labourers and artisans, men of little education and worldly experience, most had probably never been far from their homes, let alone travelled outside China. Some came from Shanghai, a bustling Chinese metropolis, where they would have dealt with Westerners in the foreign concessions, acquiring some knowledge of foreign ways. But this experience was little preparation for life on a distant, unfamiliar island inhabited by Melanesians. Sequestered in their camp, the Chinese had relatively little contact with the indigenous population or with the Administration officials. They had been shaped by an inwardlooking society. Nicholas Jose, a keen observer of Chinese culture, writes:
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The Chinese world-view creates a chasm between Chinese and others. The concepts of insider and outsider are fundamental at so many levels of life. The language, the script and culture are expressions of this separateness, the manifestations of a culture that is self-enclosed, hermetic and centred on itself. The visitor is always the outsider.57
Twisting this relationship one more turn, the Chinese labourers were the visitors and the outsiders on Manus, cut off from Melanesians and Europeans. One local Chinese worked in the District Office at Inrim, but this solitary individual did not alter the social isolation of the camp. Had the contingent been sent to a town such as Rabaul or Lae, both with sizeable Chinese communities, it would not have been so separate. Without familiar reference points, it was natural for the Chinese to be inwardlooking and to regard the surrounding island with some suspicion, apprehension and even at times with a measure of contempt. The Chinese did not understand the norms and customs that governed day-to-day life on Manus and Australian law was a foreign thing. They were isolated and put on the defensive by their inability to converse with either Melanesians or Europeans. As became only too apparent during the crisis ahead, the majority of the Chinese could not even speak a rudimentary form of English. They communicated with the other two ethnic groups on the island with gestures and the odd pidgin word. It is important to stress at this stage of the story that understanding this multi-sided cultural conflict has been frustrated by a lack of Chinese or Melanesian source material. Australian and US archives yielded a wealth of documents, but I have been unable to examine Chinese collections. An occasional Chinese letter or cable ended up in the Australian or American record, providing small windows into Chinese perspectives. These rare items were formal documents written by elite Chinese, such as diplomats and military commanders. They were almost always directed at
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Day of Reckoning
a foreign audience and did not contain private thoughts or internal deliberations. They inevitably revealed even less about the thoughts and fears of the ordinary workmen and soldiers in the Chinese contingent. Melanesians left virtually no written records in the 1940s. At times, Chinese and Melanesian can be heard in court transcripts, though still through an Australian filter. This information deficit forced me to try to piece together the perceptions of the Chinese and Melanesian participants in the Pondranei case through a necessarily partial record. Unfortunately, other than a few details about the accused and a few references to several army officers, the Australian bureaucratic record contains surprisingly little about the Chinese contingent. Australian officials sometimes quoted Chinese in their reports, but it is impossible to tell if these words were accurately recorded. At no point during this dispute did any Australian try to investigate or understand the dynamics of this small, isolated Chinese community. Perhaps this failure was unsurprising given how hard-pressed the four officials on Manus were; they simply did not have the time or resources to engage in such an exercise. Nonetheless, this failure to even attempt, if only on the surface, to see things from the Chinese viewpoint blunted the effectiveness of the Australian response in the chain of events that would end up in the High Court of Australia. As the pace of events accelerated, the Chinese remained for the Australians a problem, anonymous and poorly understood. Constant references to the ‘Chinese camp’ encapsulated the tendency on both sides of this confrontation to adopt a laager outlook. So, circumstances, Chinese insularity and Australian ignorance ensured that the Chinese remained mysterious outsiders. Conceivably, the embattled Australian officials could have resolved the whole matter more quickly and with less heat had they been armed with more knowledge and patience. Although details about the Chinese camp are sketchy, we do know that the Chinese bartered goods with locals, often at a marketplace at Lugos, the old mission settlement on Seeadler
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Harbour. Marked by the pier, the market or bung was a natural gathering point for islanders and the Chinese to barter goods. Given the difficulty of shipping in food supplies from the outside, the bung served an important function for the Chinese camp. The US Navy and the Chinese also used the wharf to dump rubbish into the sea. Behind Lugos, the narrow coastal strip quickly petered out, with densely wooded hills rising to a mountainous ridge. Locals came in to trade at Lugos from far-flung parts of the island chain, including islets lying at the western end of Manus. Although they frequently went to the ‘bung’, the Chinese did not know the name Lugos, underscoring their lack of familiarity with their surroundings. Only several months after the Chinese had arrived on Manus, it was just such an everyday commercial transaction at Lugos that led, on 25 January 1948, to the Pondranei assault. Pondranei said he had bartered two pineapples to four Chinese in exchange for two cartons of cigarettes; the Chinese accused the islander of stealing the cigarettes and took the law into their own hands.
Chapter Two
An Armed Rebellion in Paradise?
ON MONDAY 26 JANUARY, a day after the bashing in the Quonset hut, Assistant District Officer Dick White and 10 Melanesian police constables, the entire Inrim contingent, travelled on the Administration trawler Sirius to Lorengau. This would be the first of four attempts to arrest the Chinese suspects. Pondranei and several other young Melanesians accompanied White to identify the accused. By deploying all 10 policemen, District Officer Bill Bloxham apparently expected trouble, and hoped that a display of force would convince the Chinese commanders to surrender the suspects. Perhaps a low-key approach would have been better, defusing the situation and allowing the Chinese enough room to comply with the Australian request without losing face. Yet, Bloxham chose to act
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decisively and White was greatly outnumbered even with 10 constables at his back. After landing at Lorengau, White proceeded to the Chinese camp and discussed the alleged assault with Captain Kuo Kecha, one of the Chinese commanders. After some disputation, Kuo agreed reluctantly to an identification parade in the camp’s mess hall later in the day. ‘This matter took some time,’ White said later in his report for Port Moresby, ‘because the Chinese present did not speak good English and were loathe to meet with my request.’ In the meantime, having sent his police back to the trawler, White drove to the scene of the incident, the Quonset hut, with Kuo, Lieutenant Wang, the head of the Chinese military police, and Pondranei. The hut was ‘situated on its own just off the road between Lorengau and Lugos, about one mile from the Vinnell BOSEY camp’. White searched the hut and found the cable wire and pieces of wild sugar cane that had allegedly been used in the assault. White next had a meal with the Vinnell staff, hosted by Mr Dorsey, who was in charge during the absence of the project superintendent, John Morgan, then away on Guam. It is significant that the young kiap lunched with the Americans rather than the Chinese, even though the commanders of the Nationalist contingent spoke English. The Americans were still the overriding authority in Lorengau, but it might have been more sensible for White to sit down and eat with the people at the heart of the problem, building up a connection of some kind with the Chinese commanders. Such small choices reinforced the divide between the Australian Administration and the Chinese camp. While the Chinese labourers gathered in the camp’s mess hall for the identification parade, Dorsey drove White down to the wharf to collect the constables and witnesses. Back at the camp, White and his policemen confronted a scene of considerable commotion. Dorsey warned White that it ‘would be very foolish to go in there amongst such a closely packed crowd, as many fights had taken place in the mess hall previously’. The ‘riotous noise’ convinced White that the Chinese ‘were not under proper control
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Day of Reckoning
and discipline’, and he ordered his police to fix bayonets, issuing each man with two clips of ammunition. Rifles were loaded, though this ‘was not done in the view of the Chinese’. Given the rowdy behaviour of the labourers, it was agreed that the identification line-up could be held outside the cramped confines of the hall. As the Chinese filed out onto the parade ground, White stationed the troopers in front of a nearby Quonset hut under the command of Sergeant Major Kipau, ‘casually standing about so as not to arouse resentment but also in a position to assist me if necessary’. White and Pondranei examined the assembled Chinese with several unarmed Chinese military police present. Sergeant Major Kipau told his superior that the young islanders had identified three of the Chinese earlier in the day, but these men were not in the line-up. The identification parade was a farce, with Pondranei’s four assailants hiding some distance away in a building. White remonstrated with Kuo’s superior, Major Ma, who had just returned from Guam. ‘I am an officer of the police force of the Territory of New Guinea. This is an Australian controlled Territory (I have never received any advice to the contrary). I wish to … arrest four of your labourers and charge them in our Courts. One of our native people has been assaulted and deprived of his liberty, this in his own country and our Government is charged with the protection of these people.’ Major Ma ‘appeared to be most cooperative’ and agreed to deliver the suspects to the Administration. White told Ma the Chinese could have three or four days to find the culprits.1 A potentially ugly confrontation had been averted, for the time being at least. Before returning to Inrim, White drove across to Momote on Los Negros to confer with the US forces on Manus. By January 1948, the once gigantic US military presence on Manus had been stripped back to a skeleton outfit. On 26 January, as White was trying to identify Pondranei’s assailants at the Chinese camp, the US Navy withdrew its last contingent on the island except for Chief Petty Officer B. D. Ferraro. Provided with a jeep and billeted with the last US Army forces, Ferraro was in charge of
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the Lorengau base, acting as a caretaker to protect the Navy’s interests. The US Naval Command on Guam was anxious to close down the Manus operation at an early date.2 Aside from this lone chief petty officer, the US military was represented on the island by the 537th Army Survey Battalion under the command of Major Byers. Numbering about 200 or so, the battalion was a mixture of Americans and Filipinos. White had no way of knowing that the commanders of the remaining US forces on the island were primed to regard him with considerable ambivalence. Only four days earlier, the US Marianas Command on Guam had recommended that the American military forces agree to share the Lorengau site with the Vinnell/ BOSEY contingent and the Australian Administration as a way of easing the tension that had mounted recently on the island.3 However, all the American players on Manus itself immediately rejected this proposition in forceful terms. Vinnell and the 537th Survey Battalion contended that it was not ‘practicable or advisable for Australian joint occupation of Lorengau in any part’ until they had completed their operations about 1 May 1948, a deadline that would slip badly in any case. Vinnell wanted to make sure that it had removed its own valuable equipment before the Australians were allowed in. The navy and army commanders on the island marshalled other arguments to hold the Australians at arm’s length. ‘As all military pers [sic] Manus are males and American Chinese and Filipinos it is not desireable to have Australian families and native women in Lorengau area.’ They rejected the notion of moving their forces east of Lorengau River, arguing that this step would delay the removal operation by two months. Chief Petty Officer Ferraro wanted to present the problem in person to the headquarters of the US Pacific Fleet in Hawai’i, CINCPAC, ‘as many matters pertaining to this subject can not be presented in despatches’. As it turned out, CINCPAC did not need further convincing and readily concurred that the Australians should not be allowed to enter Lorengau for the time being.4
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Day of Reckoning
The 537th Survey Battalion was certainly unreceptive to any apparent Australian meddling. Major Byers gruffly told White on 26 January that he was now in charge of all American personnel and property on Manus and he ‘personally would throw any Chinese into gaol that he found pillaging American property’. Revealing tensions inside the US contingent, Byers seemed quite ready to trump the authority of his naval colleague, Ferraro. It was notable that he said nothing about the attack on Pondranei, not even, it seems, a passing expression of sympathy. This reaction to a difficult situation was not reassuring from the Australian standpoint, suggesting as it did that American property was more important than the physical wellbeing of the local population. White said Byers ‘seemed pleased at my action although he did not take much notice … he seemed to have worries of his own’, above all organising the US withdrawal from Manus and assisting the Chinese removal operations. A day later, Captain Kuo and some Chinese military police brought the four labourers by boat along the coast to Inrim. Suggesting that the Americans were not entirely indifferent, one of Byers’ subordinates, Lieutenant Green, accompanied the Chinese party. Leaving the four labourers on the boat under the watchful eye of the military police, Kuo and Green discussed the stand-off with White in the ramshackle District Office. After an exchange of pleasantries, Captain Kuo insisted that the labourers were under Chinese military control and that any formal proceedings against them would be held in a Chinese court martial. But he proposed a quicker and rougher way of settling the conflict, one that would avoid the need for any messy formal proceedings. He suggested that ‘we fix this matter up between ourselves’, letting ‘our natives thrash the four accused and square matters up’. White was offended by this proposition, and he told Kuo ‘that such an action was impossible, inhumane and contrary to our laws’.5 Rebuffed, Kuo discussed the matter with White’s boss, Bloxham, again indicating that the Chinese Army would not hand over the labourers. He did
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not deny that an offence had been committed, but stated that any men under his command would be tried by the Chinese Army alone. By now, the atmosphere in the small hut was tense. Bloxham was unmoved and told Kuo that he ‘would take all steps necessary to ensure that Territorial law would be enforced’. Despite this declared determination to impose the rule of law, Bloxham was unable to compel the arrest of the labourers, and Kuo’s group left unimpeded. It is unclear what role the American lieutenant played in this drama — he remained largely silent throughout the increasingly sour discussion. Was he watching the conflict from the sidelines, trying not to interfere in a matter of Australian jurisdiction? Or was he backing the Chinese? Why was the Chinese camp so unwilling to cooperate with the Australian request that the suspects be surrendered? Several possible explanations come to mind. First and foremost, it is clear that the Chinese commanders believed that Australians, civilian or military, simply had no right to interfere in an independent Chinese operation. As we have already noted, the Chinese perceived the Manus labour force as a Chinese military outfit subject to Chinese military command and discipline. The Australians naturally saw this issue from an entirely different perspective: the Chinese were a mixed military-civilian contingent and all its personnel, soldiers and labourers alike, were answerable to Australian law. Profound differences in the Australian and Chinese legal systems were also a crucial factor behind the Chinese refusal to back off. Although the Nationalists had tried to create a more modern state structure, the Chinese legal system was still essentially traditional in nature, strongly bearing the mark of a long imperial ancestry. Mirroring the practices of virtually every Chinese dynasty, the Nationalist legal regime was overwhelmingly concerned with the task of defending and strengthening the state. A Western conception of individual rights and due process did not apply. Judges operated within a quite different context and private lawyers were relatively uncommon. Historian Bill Jenner argues
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Day of Reckoning
that China has always lacked a legal system that protects the rights of the individual against the absolutist state. This fixation with the interests of the state meant that Chinese law did not reach down into the lower layers of Chinese society in a formal way. Under dynastic law local communities could be left to settle many matters for themselves. The state allowed and even encouraged families, villages, merchant guilds and other groups to sort out disputes and bring wrongdoers under control. In the past, as now, informal mediation was preferred to court proceedings.
Provided its code ‘was not challenged’, the imperial state adopted a hands-off approach in the realm of the criminal law. The Nationalists’ ineffective, corrupt and loose governance left such local criminal remedies in place; lawyers had only just begun ‘to acquire foreign coloration’ and then only in the big coastal cities.6 Kuo naturally opted then for an informal way of mediating the dispute, eschewing an alternative that was foreign and formal. It is equally telling that physical punishment, the infliction of pain and injury, was still a cornerstone of Chinese criminal justice. Torture, floggings and executions were common. Kuo’s suggestion that the labourers be punished by an extrajudicial method, a quick bashing at the hands of the victim, was entirely consistent with his own country’s approach to law and order. By rejecting Kuo’s attempt to solve the issue extrajudicially, White also turned his back on the retributive notions of justice that prevailed in Melanesian society. Concepts of ‘payback’ (retaliation by a victim or his/her family) and ‘blood money’ (compensation) were part of PNG’s traditional norms. Kiaps were not adverse to settling some disputes outside the courts, but they were also steeped in a legal culture that enshrined the primacy of the rule of law. They were determined to punish crime in the courts, thus counteracting the tendency of Melanesians to mete
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out their own, often violent, extra-legal penalties. The evidential and procedural rules of Australian law had to be applied, and men such as Bloxham and White were certainly unwilling to see them flouted by a foreign labour force. The legal code was based on the written laws of Queensland and did not recognise customary offences, enforcing the concept of individual responsibility for crimes and imposing standard forms of punishment. Having striven to enforce a formal legal system on the indigenous people, the District Officers were not about to allow what they saw as Chinese interlopers to use their own informal punishment, especially when the victim was Melanesian. Australian and Chinese conceptions of justice in the mid20th century were also based on increasingly divergent attitudes towards the use of violence. The Australian colonies had been founded on a regime of often brutal punishment and some Australians fervently supported the use of whipping, particularly for non-European offenders, well into the 20th century. It was not until 1919 that the Australian authorities in PNG abolished the flogging of indigenous labourers for offences, while the whipping of Aborigines continued in the Northern Territory into the 1930s. Executions were still fairly common, especially in the Territory of New Guinea where 90 men were put to death between 1918 and 1942.7 However, the very basis of punishment had changed enormously over time in Australia, moving steadily away from inflicting pain on the body to punishing the mind and reforming behaviour. Although it remained on the books for some decades, corporal punishment was used only in isolated cases or not at all after 1920. By the 1940s, the Australian legal system was founded increasingly on a regime of imprisonment and fines; the death penalty was reserved for the most heinous crimes — treason and particularly vicious murders. Hard labour and solitary confinement were imposed to punish particular crimes. The Chinese legal system in the 1940s could seem arbitrary indeed by Australian standards; many Australian travellers in China often commented on what
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they saw as capricious or brutal forms of punishment.8 By insisting that the Pondranei case should be pursued through the Territory’s courts, White and Bloxham were ensuring that Australian concepts of justice would override rival Chinese and Melanesian norms, buttressing the broader Australian ‘civilising mission’ in PNG and reinforcing Australia’s position on Manus. On 28 January, three days after the bashing, Bloxham informed Port Moresby that four Chinese civilians had ‘bound one native taken him to empty hut beaten him with sticks and left him bound in hut’. He explained that the military commanders of the Chinese labour force were unwilling to accept the jurisdiction of the Australian civil courts, insisting instead that the matter should be handled by a Chinese court martial. Murray saw this attitude as a direct provocation and instructed Bloxham to proceed immediately in the District Court. Nonetheless, unnerved by this sudden eruption of a legal problem with potentially thorny international implications, Murray asked his masters in distant Canberra to confirm that his directive was valid. Given the green light by Attorney-General’s, the Department of External Territories approved Murray’s course of action and informed the Minister, Eddie Ward, that trouble had broken out on Manus. Sensing that this small flame could turn into a bushfire, Ward asked to be kept informed.9 Murray was perturbed by the Manus developments. He told Canberra that the Chinese bid to try their own citizens for offences committed against the local population made the need to clarify the situation of the District Office even more urgent. ‘Australian Governmental authority in Manus cuts a sorry figure.’ It was ‘high time’ that Australian officials moved back to Lorengau ‘so that it shall be clear to all concerned that the Australian Government representatives are not relegated to a backwater’. He stressed that ‘no actual warfare’ had taken place on the island for more than two years. The move would automatically reassert the ‘prestige of the Civil Government … both in natives’ eyes and also I consider in those of our allies’.
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Were the positions reversed, I cannot believe an Australian Naval Lieutenant and 50 or thereabouts Naval personnel together with Chinese ancillaries would be permitted either by Australia or USA to continue occupation of pre-war headquarters of an American civil district being portion of a dependent territory administered by United States.
Making matters worse, the physical infrastructure of the island was deteriorating. Murray insisted that considerable expenditure was imperative to stop the condition of the District Office at Inrim from becoming ‘intolerable’.10 The stand-off continued into February. Muddying the waters further, Bloxham told Port Moresby that Vinnell had stated that the Chinese were not their employees; the American company did not want to be saddled with this problem. While Bloxham and White considered their next move, the Chinese labour contingent sent several representatives to Shanghai and Guam, the headquarters of the Chinese Army’s Marianas Command, to seek instructions on how to proceed.11 Setting the scene for a long and increasingly bitter conflict, the Marianas Command told its officers on Manus to continue to deny Australian jurisdiction. Matters were made even more thorny by Australia’s move to purchase all the American buildings and equipment that would remain on Manus once the Chinese had taken what they wanted. The negotiations between Canberra and Washington to fix a price for this material were protracted and testy, with each side accusing the other at times of acting in bad faith or worse. The US military was becoming more anxious about the assertive Australian attitude. The OFLC believed that the Australian authorities had already illegally sold off US property in Lae, Finschhafen and Milne Bay, often at knock-down prices to Australian companies, breaching ‘any normal standard of ethics and ordinary business practice’.12 This was strong language for a country to use about one of its closest allies. Although not directly linked to the dispute over
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the Pondranei assault, these ructions revealed that the Australians and Americans were regarding each other with growing mistrust. By February, the state of play on Manus had become very complicated, with clashing imperatives straining relations between allies. This tension could not but affect the attempt to reimpose Australian authority by arresting Pondranei’s assailants. While the OFLC was moving to head off any pre-emptive Australian move on US property, the Administration was reviewing its options regarding the conflict with the Chinese contingent. At this time, Bloxham made the long journey south to Port Moresby. On 14 February, he discussed the matter with Murray, and the two men agreed that Australian authority had to be upheld. They were joined in their discussion by the Crown Law Officer, Esme Bignold, who highlighted the problematic situation: ‘We have already experienced trouble with American and Chinese nationals in relation to jurisdiction and I feel that this might continue unless some agreement is reached between Australia and the respective Governments.’ On 16 February, Murray asked Canberra to clarify the legal status of foreign nationals visiting the Territory, a query that AttorneyGeneral’s left unanswered until June.13 Bloxham stayed on in Port Moresby for the first postwar conference of District Officers, which ran from 18 to 28 February. Murray was frank in his opening address: ‘District Officers are autocrats, more or less, and, in the present circumstances, that is the way you get your governing done.’ The Australian insistence on the rule of law had a more authoritarian underside, which recognised that poor communications and the dispersed nature of the Administration placed enormous, and at times unchecked, power in the hands of District Officers. Finding the balance between this unavoidable pragmatic authoritarianism and a strict adherence to due process was not easy. The tense situation on Manus was a prominent topic of conversation for the assembled kiaps. The everwatchful Pacific Islands Monthly tossed a wry comment into the
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debate, noting that Bloxham had ‘spent his early days in the service consolidating administrative control over the Sepik people’ and was ‘now attempting a similar task with the Yanks at Manus’. But the conference was not all hard work. ‘The district officers seemed to enjoy the Moresby social round … And, anyhow, as our informant pointed out, the pub was nice to come home to.’14 Meanwhile, the Pondranei case fell into a lull until Bloxham returned to Manus in early March. Back in Inrim, he ordered White to visit the Chinese camp in another effort to arrest the suspects. Conscious of the possibly explosive situation, he gave his deputy a letter instructing him to proceed firmly but carefully. Once more suggesting that the Australians saw the Americans as intermediaries, Bloxham ordered White to first approach Major Byers to hand over a document outlining the Australian case. If Byers was unwilling to detail an officer to accompany him, White should proceed to the Chinese camp alone and explain that proceedings would be taken against the labourers. He should ask for the names of the offenders and stress that the Administration would follow due process. ‘You will explain that when court proceedings commence their own officers may be present to assist them in their defence and that every opportunity will be given to them to be fully aware of court procedure.’ Bloxham did not want to provoke a confrontation, especially given the limited forces at his disposal. ‘Should the Chinese Commander fail to accede to your request you will take no further action … You will use discretion and tact and avoid any controversy.’15 White’s foray on 14 March was unsuccessful; the Chinese would not relent. He returned to the camp two days later, again without success. As far as can be discerned from the record, no Australian official went to the Chinese camp between White’s first visit on 26 January and his second on 14 March. This interval of more than six weeks probably led the Chinese to believe that the case had been dropped. After such a long period of inactivity, White’s reappearance in mid-March must have been very unwelcome.
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Certainly, the Chinese had not softened in their attitude of noncooperation. Granted, he was away from Inrim for some weeks, but it is hard not to conclude that Bloxham had allowed the matter to drift along unattended. This lack of official action for so many weeks might have hardened the Chinese in their determination to resist. Nearly two months after the assault, the Pondranei case escalated dramatically. On Saturday 20 March the Australian press picked up the affair for the first time. Journalist Ronald Monson happened to be in Port Moresby just at the time that the situation on Manus was coming to a head. In the next three weeks, Monson would play a significant part in the drama unfolding around the Chinese camp. A native of Western Australia, Monson began his long journalistic career in 1925 at the age of 20 and soon acquired a reputation for being something of a daredevil, trekking from one end of Africa to the other and descending to the wreck of the Lusitania in an iron-man suit. In the words of Clement Semmler, he was a ‘good rough and tumble bloke’. Casting himself as ‘a battlefront correspondent by choice and conviction’, Monson covered, first, the Spanish Civil War and later described Japanese atrocities in China in vivid detail. During War World II, he became a notable war correspondent, reporting on the fighting in Europe, the Middle East and Burma for the Sydney Daily Telegraph, the Melbourne Argus and the London Daily Express. By 1948, Monson was an experienced, hands-on journalist, conservative in political opinion and loyal to the British Empire. It is not clear why he was in PNG in March 1948; he had not reported on the fighting there during the war and it seems that he made no return visit. It is possible that he called in on Port Moresby on his way to the Middle East to cover the Arab-Israeli conflict.16 Writing from Port Moresby, Monson provided a colourful account of the Manus situation in the Daily Telegraph on 20 March under the headline, ‘Armed Chinese Defy Aust. Rule; Manus Island Tense’. Carrying grenades and firearms, 300 Chinese had
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formed ‘a defensive perimeter’ of machine-gun posts around their camp to resist Australian authority. ‘The Chinese also have tommy-guns and plenty of ammunition.’ Monson suggested that the Chinese had perhaps purloined firearms from American stores. Next, he made an allegation that clouded the affair in the coming weeks. ‘The trouble began last January when island natives accused the Chinese of interfering with native women. The Chinese beat up one native who accused them and claimed extra-territorial privileges when civil officials tried to arrest them.’ This distortion raised the spectre of depraved Chinese men preying on Melanesian women. Monson warned that the Administration was represented on Manus only by Bloxham, his deputy, two Patrol Officers and two medical assistants. He stressed, forebodingly, that there were only 15 Europeans on the island, including missionaries, with ‘fewer than 20 unarmed RAAF personnel’ at the Momote airstrip. These figures did not square with the number of Americans who were on the island and Monson did not mention the Melanesian police. Readers back in Australia were encouraged to believe that a small group of beleaguered Europeans was confronted by a mutinous force of 300 armed and wild Chinese. This picture fitted into two literary and journalistic genres, one casting PNG as a strange, dangerous land, the other portraying Chinese as a threatening race. Monson said Port Moresby regarded Bloxham ‘as a strong man who will do his best in a bad situation’. He claimed that the Acting Administrator, Justice Monty Phillips, had ordered ‘20 armed native police, in charge of Australian police officers, to leave Moresby for Manus by Catalina at dawn tomorrow’. If Monson’s account can be believed, Phillips believed that it was now necessary to dispatch a sizeable police contingent to suppress the mutinous Chinese. Even when he was away on patrol or holiday, Murray kept an eye on things back in Port Moresby and it is possible that he and Phillips discussed the unfolding crisis before deciding to dispatch police reinforcements. None of the surviving documents suggest, however, that Phillips was able to contact
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Murray and it appears that the judge acted alone. Under the headline, ‘Official radioed for aid against Chinese’, an accompanying article in the Daily Telegraph made a quite erroneous allegation: ‘In January European and native police stood by in Port Moresby ready to fly to Manus island to act against 300 armed Chinese.’ Colonel Murray ‘detailed the police for duty and ordered an R.A.A.F. Catalina to be ready to fly to Manus’. This claim suggested that the island had been on the brink of serious conflict for months. The Daily Telegraph stated that this earlier conflict had been defused when Bloxham had ‘radioed that the situation was quieter and Mr Murray cancelled his orders to the police’. The files held by the National Archives of Australia do not contain any documents referring to this episode. Provided with a scoop by Monson, the Daily Telegraph set the pace, leaving the rest of the press to play catch-up. No other newspaper had a correspondent in Port Moresby to follow the story. Monson’s report set the alarm bells ringing in Canberra on the morning of Saturday 20 March. An External Territories official tried to piece together an accurate picture. He dispatched an urgent cable to Port Moresby stating that the Daily Telegraph had reported that ‘300 Chinese on Manus formed themselves into armed unit with grenades and tommyguns and defying civil administration’. The official noted that the Telegraph had claimed that ‘Administration [was] sending twenty native police under white officers by air from Moresby this morning’. He asked for ‘earliest advice’. He then scrawled a quick note for his superiors, stressing that Canberra had not yet received a report from Murray on the unfolding crisis. He said he had discussed the problem with the Prime Minister’s private secretary, the redoubtable Don Rodgers. Curtin’s press secretary from the mid-1930s through World War II, Rodgers was an experienced political operator and he immediately appreciated the need to manage such a potentially serious problem with a sure hand. He ‘requested any important information received from Administration be phoned to Prime Minister at his bedside
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No.B276 at any hour day or night over the weekend’. Throughout his days as a federal politician, even as Prime Minister, Chifley resided at the Kurrajong Hotel, within easy walking distance of Parliament. The External Territories official also telephoned his own minister, Eddie Ward, at his Sydney office and promised to call back as soon as any information came to hand.17 Flying blind, Ward fronted the press later in the day. Given the paucity of reliable information, he merely stated that he had asked Monty Phillips to clarify the situation, noting that Murray was on holiday somewhere in Queensland. Needless to say, he did not mention that Rodgers was concerned enough to ask that the Prime Minister be informed of any dramatic developments, if need be waking him in the middle of the night. The evening papers covered the press conference temperately, most quoting Ward’s denial that the Chinese were in revolt. The Sydney Sun reported that it had tried to confirm the contents of the Telegraph story but Phillips and Bloxham had ‘refused to speak’. Such apparent official evasiveness seemed to confirm that there was something to hide. The RAAF commanding officer in Port Moresby and a RAN spokesman in Sydney said they had not heard of trouble on the island and had received no request for assistance. Likewise, a contact in Rabaul ‘said that nothing was known there of an uprising on Manus’. Under the heading, ‘Flare-up on Manus?’, the Melbourne Herald reiterated the claim that Chinese had molested native women and stated that ‘no government department in Canberra knows anything of the reported disturbance’. These details added to the picture of official confusion, suggesting that the Government was not in control. Manus Island’s remote position was a boon and a problem for the Government. Isolation made it very difficult for the press to follow the story. Transport links to the Admiralties were limited, infrequent and slow, ensuring that newspapers could not rush correspondents in to cover the story. Without direct access to the island, the press did not have much to play with, except, that is, for
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the reports coming out from Monson in Port Moresby. The Government was no doubt grateful that journalists could not dig around, discovering troublesome details, interviewing the participants, cranking up the pressure. But Manus’s distant location also created difficulties for Canberra; it too was starved of information, increasing the risk that it would be overtaken by events or would inadvertently mislead the press. These information gaps were compounded by weaknesses in the Department of External Territories. On the eve of the Pacific War, a small outfit in the Prime Minister’s Department covered Australia’s scattered overseas territories, and the Government did not create a separate portfolio of external territories until June 1941. As the crisis on Manus unfolded, the Secretary, Reg Halligan, was true to form. To be sure, he had much to contend with and his department’s paltry resources — no more than 100 staff in all in 1948 — would have held back a more capable head. But simply avoiding mistakes and shuffling papers back and forth was not enough in the turbulent circumstances at hand, and Halligan failed to provide any leadership. The files concerning the Manus incident are littered with punctilious, brief memos from Halligan, all carefully dated and properly addressed, for the most part merely informing the Administration or other departments about what was happening in succinct, drab prose. His pedantic attention to bureaucratic details was hardly the framework for seeing the rapidly changing postwar world in complex or subtle ways. As night fell on Saturday 20 March, the state of play on Manus was unclear. The Administration’s apparent failure to report on 20 March had placed Ward and his officials in a difficult position. In fact, Justice Phillips did send a cable, marked secret, on 20 March which was decoded in Canberra at 9am on Sunday 21 March. This message crossed with Canberra’s request for information. Phillips informed Canberra that Bloxham had urgently requested help. He quoted Bloxham’s radio message in full, but did
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not indicate when it was sent: ‘Chinese still evasive reference jurisdiction … Request experienced Police Officer be despatched to Manus by air immediately with sufficient native Police to compel identification parade of 300 Chinese and arrest offenders. Some Chinese known to be armed.’ This message gave cause for concern. Bloxham had conceded that he was unable to control the situation. Given the urgency of Bloxham’s request, Phillips said he intended to send Colonel John Grimshaw, head of the Royal Papuan Constabulary and New Guinea Police Force, to Manus as soon as possible. An Englishman born in Scarborough, Yorkshire, John Spillard Grimshaw was a career police officer with considerable experience. He first saw Australia as a midshipman in the Royal Navy and later migrated, joining the South Australian Police Force as a mounted constable in 1925.18 In the next 15 years, he rose through the ranks to work for the criminal investigations branch and, later, as an instructor at the Police Training College. A former boxing champion and wrestler, he enlisted as a citizen soldier in May 1940 and served with the Seventh Division in North Africa, Greece, Crete and Syria, winning a Military Cross for gallantry in 1941. It was in New Guinea that Grimshaw made his name as an able commander of military police, serving under Lieutenant General V. A. H. Sturdee as Assistant Provost Marshall of the First Australian Army. Attaining the rank of colonel, he was discharged from the Army in October 1946.19 When he applied for the job as superintendent of the PNG Police Force in November 1946, Grimshaw was head of the Police Training College in Adelaide. He had powerful backers — one brigadier general, three lieutenant generals, including Sturdee, and the head of the South Australian Police provided glowing references. But the field for the job boasted 53 candidates. Two contenders had worked for many years for British police forces in Asia before the war. D. J. F. Watson had served with the Shanghai Municipal Police (SMP) between 1928 and 1940 before becoming
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a major in the British Army’s Provost Corps. In 1947, he was the acting Commissioner of Police in Hong Kong. Another SMP officer, C. White, appeared to have even more impressive credentials. After starting out with the Glasgow police in 1921, White had served with the SMP for 18 years, reaching the rank of Chief Inspector at the time of his internment by the Japanese in 1942. Although impressed with his background, the PNG selection committee ultimately discounted White. ‘We are in some doubt … whether such long experience in Shanghai where he has dealt with Chinese has unfitted him for work such as this Territory requires.’ This reason for excluding White looks most ironic given the events that unfolded on Manus in 1948. In the end, the committee initially ranked Grimshaw third, behind two well-regarded and long-serving Territory police officers, Christopher Normoyle and Sydney Elliott Smith. Nonetheless, Murray overturned the committee’s recommendations and placed Grimshaw at the top of the short list.20 Eddie Ward approved this recommendation in January 1947. Barrel-chested and stocky, Grimshaw was an imposing figure accustomed to leading. He arrived in Port Moresby in June and set about rebuilding the police force. It was telling that Monty Phillips felt it necessary to dispatch the head of the Territory’s police force to bring the situation on Manus under control. Superintendent Grimshaw would take a substantial force with him: two European Sub-Inspectors, Charles ‘Kedger’ Carr and Peter Day, and 50 Melanesian constables. Carr was a seasoned police officer, having served with the South Australian force for nearly four years in the late 1930s, becoming somewhat accomplished in his spare time in jujitsu, boxing and horse riding. He worked with Grimshaw at the Police Training College in Adelaide and later in the Middle East early in the war when the two were serving in the Army, building up a personal connection that later stood him in good stead. He spent four and a half years in a German POW camp and was discharged in August 1945, holding the rank of sergeant in the Seventh Division’s
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Provost Company. When he joined the PNG police in May 1947, Carr was just shy of his 29th birthday, single and, according to his medical report, somewhat overweight. Like so many others in PNG, he was a heavy drinker.21 Peter Day was new to civilian police work. A Londoner by birth, he was a soldier of the British Empire, joining the East Surrey Regiment in 1935 and serving in Sudan (1937–38), China (1938–40) and Singapore. While he was with the British forces in Shanghai, he married a Chinese woman and learnt some Chinese. Like so many others, Day was taken prisoner when Singapore fell and spent several years in harsh Japanese POW camps. After his discharge, Day rejoined his wife in Brisbane and applied to join the PNG police in October 1946. Six of his 10 years with the British Army had been served with the military police. Suggesting that he had other motives for wanting to get to PNG, Day applied about the same time for a permit to enter the Territory as a gold prospector. In his application for the police force, he wrote: ‘I have had considerable experience with Orientals, particularly the natives in Malaya, and I am definitely familiar with their mentality and psychology. Thus I am confident that I should be competent in dealing with the natives in New Guinea.’ Like other arms of the Administration, the PNG Police Force was only beginning to get back on its feet, and Day was one of a crop of 23 Sub-Inspectors personally selected by Grimshaw in late 1947. He had been in PNG for less than a week, having arrived by air from Brisbane on 16 March, three days before his 31st birthday, when Grimshaw assigned him to the large police contingent for the Manus operation. His Chinese-language skills would be a vital asset in the coming weeks.22 While Grimshaw prepared his emergency expedition, Phillips and the Government Secretary, Bob Melrose, tried to keep a lid on the situation. By March 1948, Melrose was nearing the end of his career, worn down by a lack of resources and the debilitating infighting in the Administration.23 The mounting crisis on Manus
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only added to an already trying job. With the Government dealing with the press storm back in Australia, he discussed the state of play on Manus with Monson on Saturday 20 March. The conversation was not easy. Monson claimed that an undisclosed informant had told him that the Chinese were defying the Administration and had armed themselves with machine guns and grenades. Melrose forcefully replied that this story was exaggerated and that Bloxham had provided no such report. Monson did seemingly have a source inside the local bureaucracy, but his version of the events unfolding on Manus appeared garbled. Phillips was perturbed by both facts. He reassured Canberra that he had refused to talk to the media, declining requests to travel from Government House to the Wonga radio station to talk with two Sydney newspapers, the Sun and the Truth.24 While prudent in one sense, refusing to make any public comment reinforced the suspicion that the authorities had something to hide. Although he had discounted Monson’s more serious allegations about machine-gun posts and grenades, Phillips had nevertheless provided Canberra with a worrisome account. Spooked by the prospect of the situation getting out of hand, the authorities were more unnerved than they were prepared to admit publicly. Before Colonel Grimshaw’s party could leave Port Moresby, Monson stirred the pot again. Melrose’s cautionary words had failed to sway the tenacious correspondent. In a front-page article on Sunday 21 March, ‘Chinese still hold on on Manus Is.’, he alleged that the Chinese had ‘dared’ Bloxham to ‘enter the area to arrest the wanted man [sic]’. Chinese army officers had put many of the labourers into uniform and given them guns. Bloxham had urgently requested reinforcements and the Administration had decided to send ‘sufficient police to Manus to back up the law’. Monson stressed that the police reinforcements had not yet left Port Moresby. ‘Possibly to avoid international complications, the Administration may now send the reinforcements by a civilian
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Catalina which is stationed here, instead of an R.A.A.F. Catalina.’ He would not retract his earlier statement that the Chinese were armed with machine guns and grenades, claiming sources within the Administration had tipped him off. ‘I have information that came by a more reliable route than bush wireless,’ he insisted, alleging that Bloxham had provided details to Murray. Although they avoided the Telegraph’s more lurid account of armed rebellion, other journalists repeated the accusation that the affair had been sparked by Chinese ‘molestation of native women’. The Sydney Truth, a notorious scandal-sheet, was never shy of whipping up a story and inflaming public feelings. ‘When an attempt was made to contact the senior police officer there it was stated that he was away and it was not known when he would be back. Nobody else would speak for him.’ Another Sydney newspaper, the Sun, repeated Monson’s allegation that the Chinese had ‘challenged’ Bloxham to arrest them. The Government again moved to cool tempers, Navy Minister Bill Riordan affirming in Brisbane that no department had any knowledge of ‘a rising’ on Manus. By now the story had travelled beyond Australia’s shores. On the same day that Monson’s second story appeared, on 21 March, two of the main English-language newspapers in Shanghai, the North China Daily News and the China Press, carried AAP and Reuters reports describing a Chinese ‘rebellion’ on Manus. They noted that there were only 15 Europeans on Manus, a claim perhaps felt keenly by the residents of the Western enclave in Shanghai. In a story entitled ‘Chinese Revolt on Australian Base Reported’, the China Press said 300 Chinese had ‘formed into machine-gun units’ to defy Australian authority. It explained that the Chinese had been sent to Manus to load material purchased from the United States, ‘which built the base during the war and decided to abandon it last year when Australia would not cede absolute control’. The North China Daily News stated that control on the island was ‘vested in a district officer, his assistant, two
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patrol officers and two medical officers’. Both papers repeated the furphy about the molestation of local women. Back in Australia, Eddie Ward avowed on 21 March that the Chinese had not formed a defensive perimeter and that they were not armed with submachine guns. ‘I regard the stories that have been published as grossly exaggerated. There is no evidence of revolt.’ He told the press in Sydney that a police party had been dispatched to the island. He too repeated the charge that ‘some time ago Chinese had committed offences against native women’, but said he was not sure ‘what complaints had led to the present situation’. Ward was firm: ‘We maintain that while they are on Australian territory they are subject to Australian law.’ He said the stand-off would be sorted out when the Chinese-speaking police officer reached Manus.25 The allegation about ‘native women’ had for the time being become a fixed part of the story. At the time that the rebellion story was building in the media, two OFLC officials, the Central Field Commissioner for the Philippines and the South Pacific, James McConnell, and his deputy, John Prior, came to Sydney to discuss the Australian bid to purchase the remaining US stores on Manus. Again, the ruckus following Pondranei’s bashing became entwined with the tense negotiations between Australia and the United States over the Manus base. McConnell and Prior visited Manus between 10 and 13 March and the press interviewed them in Sydney nine days later. The two Americans said they had been on the island less than two weeks earlier and had ‘heard nothing of any trouble between Chinese and the native population’. It is hard to take this statement at face value given that McConnell and Prior had been on Manus immediately before White had tried to arrest Pondranei’s assailants on 14 March. The Melbourne Sun suggested that the two American officials had been evasive, refusing to discuss the ‘reported defiance’ of the Chinese. On 22 March, the press carried McConnell and Prior’s slippery comments and Ward’s statement that a police contingent had
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been sent to Manus to arrest the Chinese offenders. The discrepancy between the two reports was glaring. The Melbourne Age and the Sydney Morning Herald published sober, factual articles, stressing Ward’s assessment that the situation was ‘normal’ on the island. Under the headline, ‘More Police Leave for Manus’, the Melbourne Argus noted that the reinforcements had been sent to the island because the local police had ‘failed to arrest some Chinese for offences against natives’. These reports suggested that the Government was acting decisively, though Bloxham would hardly have appreciated the Argus underlining his ‘failure’ to carry out the arrests. For once, the Daily Telegraph adopted a muted tone, merely noting that the police had been dispatched. That there were no journalists on Manus itself meant that the press could not use any photographs. During the first few days of the brouhaha, newspapers could do no more than reproduce portrait shots of Eddie Ward; even pictures of the Chinese camp would have given their reports greater urgency and immediacy. Unfortunately for Ward, another cable from Phillips was not decoded in Canberra until after he had told the press in Sydney on Sunday night that the police had already been sent to Manus. Clearly annoyed, Phillips said the police reinforcements had not yet left Port Moresby. He stressed that he had said a day earlier that the police were ‘being sent by air earliest’. The Administration was trying to obtain the required aircraft as quickly as possible. Ward would not have been happy to hear this; he had unintentionally misled the press. The Administration monitored an ABC radio report stating that the Chinese ‘had assaulted a native woman and were evasive when questioned’. Phillips was indignant. First, the victim of the assault was a man, he emphasised, and, second, the Chinese had not defied the Administration, but had merely questioned Australian jurisdiction. This second contention was a distortion, for the Chinese had indeed defied the Administration repeatedly. Phillips noted that the RAAF had advised him that a US aircraft had arrived at Manus on Saturday afternoon and found
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everything to be quite normal. ‘Because the above broadcast has diminished effect of intended surprise, modification of original plan may be necessary.’26 This last point undermined his earlier contention that the Chinese were not defying the Administration, for why would the Australian police need to strike in a surprise operation if the Chinese were merely questioning the jurisdiction of the Australian court? The delay in decoding Phillips’ cable of 21 March had embarrassed Ward, making it look like he didn’t know what was going on in his own department. He penned an angry note on a copy of Phillips’ cable: ‘Whole trouble seems to arise out of Telegraph report: get them to print facts and withdraw irresponsible reporter.’ Such a sharp comment indicated that the Government was peeved and worried. The colourful press stories naturally attracted the attention of another player — the Chinese Embassy in Canberra. On 22 March, the Chinese Chargé d’Affaires, Dr Cheng Kang-chi, discussed the crisis with an External Territories official.27 On the same day, the Australian Consul General in Shanghai, Osmond Fuhrman, finally provided welcome news. Vinnell had furnished him with ‘a written undertaking accepting complete responsibility and guaranteeing maintenance and control and repatriation of all personnel (United States and Chinese) engaged in operation on Manus’. But the Shanghai office of the corporation oddly said it had received no word from Manus concerning the trouble surrounding Pondranei.28 Monson doggedly pursued his story. Under the headline, ‘Official Silence on Manus’, he charged on Tuesday 23 March that ‘Administration officials here have retired behind a sound-proof curtain and refuse to give any information whatever about developments on Manus’. He pounced gleefully on Ward’s statement that police had already departed from Port Moresby. ‘Superintendent Grimshaw is still here. This conflicts with the statement by the Minister for External Territories that Grimshaw had left for Manus.’ No politician likes to be caught out and Monson rubbed
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salt into the wound. But he did not stop there. His reports from Port Moresby had been dismissed by the Government as exaggerated, he insisted, because Ward had not received ‘a full report of the original message’ from Bloxham. Monson quoted from Bloxham’s alleged message: ‘Chinese civilians are forming units armed with grenades and tommy guns … Request police reinforcements be despatched.’ He called on Ward to release the full text of this message. ‘It will then be seen who has exaggerated and who is trying to play down the situation.’ Asked by the Telegraph to respond to these allegations, Ward waved aside this demand to see Bloxham’s first report as unnecessary, adding that he was ‘quite satisfied that Mr Justice Phillips is keeping me fully advised’. As for the misunderstanding about Grimshaw’s departure, Ward said he had relied on messages from the Administration. He now confirmed that transport difficulties had held up the police reinforcements. But he carefully avoided mentioning the size of the contingent; a party of 50 constables and three officers would certainly imply that the situation was serious. As Grimshaw’s contingent prepared to leave for the troubled island, what had started out as an apparently straightforward case of assault had assumed more significant dimensions. Pondranei’s allegations had become a matter of national debate and heated press comment. On the same day that Ward was fending off Monson, the Prime Minister, Ben Chifley, spoke to the press in Canberra. He reassured the public that the situation on Manus was ‘nothing particularly serious’. ‘My information does not confirm talk of the Chinese being armed with machine guns.’29 While the politicians tried to contain the controversy, officials scanned their files to try to assemble a clearer picture of what was going on. The last report from Bloxham was dated 8 February, nearly six weeks previously, and nothing further had been received from the Administration until the first Daily Telegraph story on 20 March. This long gap in the records suggested that Bloxham and his superiors had either let the situation slip or they had been
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remiss in keeping Canberra up-to-date. After a lengthy search, officials told Halligan on 24 March that they could locate neither a copy of Bloxham’s first report nor any other cases concerning Chinese in their files. Tellingly, they discovered that the claim that the Chinese had molested local women was a red herring. A cable from earlier in the year explained the source of the confusion. On 22 January, the Crown Law Officer, Esme Bignold, had told Canberra that the American military police had arrested a member of the US Air Force on Manus over an incident involving a native woman.30 Bignold had decided not to intervene because a court martial was already under way. The US military tribunal had subsequently convicted the airman of indecent exposure, sentencing him to 30 days’ imprisonment with hard labour, withholding twothirds of one month’s pay and demoting him in rank from corporal to private (a total loss of $670). So, at least, the Government now knew that the Chinese were not wanted for molesting native women. Meanwhile, Grimshaw told Canberra on 25 March that Bloxham had only radioed Port Moresby, and all these radio reports had been passed back to Australia.31 These frantic attempts to find an earlier report from Bloxham exposed much anxiety; Monson had touched raw nerves. Much of this consternation seems inexplicable and overwrought unless one considers the special place that Manus and PNG occupied in Australia’s strategic outlook. Reaching back into the 19th century, many Australians had long regarded the belt of islands lying to the north as Australian’s defensive outer perimeter, guarding the nation against an attack from Asia or the Pacific Ocean. PNG was Australia’s last line of defence during World War II, the desperate fighting along the Kokoda Trail leaving a lasting legacy. In August 1946, Chifley told Parliament that PNG was vital to the defence of the Australian nation in the future — Australia had to have ‘complete and exclusive power in controlling the administration of New Guinea’.32 A rebellion by a contingent of Chinese soldiers and labourers on Manus seemed to challenge this doctrine.
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The Bulletin reported on the developing crisis in dire terms. ‘Manus … is rapidly reverting to pre-war lawlessness, and at the weekend it appeared that a Chinese labor force was defying the few remaining Australian officials.’ Many Australians saw the end of the war not as the return of order and certainty, but as the beginning of a new era of turmoil as a familiar regional order based on the European empires in Asia subsided before the wave of decolonisation. A string of countries across the region claimed independence: Korea in 1945, India and Pakistan in 1947, and Burma, Ceylon and the Dutch East Indies (Indonesia) in 1948. Some Australians greeted this process with enthusiasm. After some hesitation, the Chifley Government backed the Indonesian independence movement in 1947, despite continuing British and US support for the Dutch, winning much local goodwill. For other Australians, such sweeping change was unnerving rather than invigorating, and represented the rise of a new and uncertain era. Two leading journalists, Robert Gilmore and Dennis Warner, spoke for many of their compatriots when they declared in 1948: ‘With the end of the war, a new chaos has spread through the Jap-pillaged lands of East Asia; the lust for independence has quickened.’ One newspaper used a more elemental metaphor: ‘We in Australia are living on the southern rim of this cauldron. It could spill over into this continent.’33 The Cold War added an ideological dimension to this apparently unstable regional balance. With the Chinese civil war turning against the Nationalists and Stalin ascendant in the Soviet Union, Australian conservatives believed a communist conspiracy, coordinated in Moscow, endangered international security. The Bulletin perceived Manus through the prism of these wider fears; for this journal, much more was at stake than seeking justice for the assault on a Melanesian youth. ‘With the possibility of war against Russia generally accepted, Chifley’s equanimity notwithstanding, the island as a powerful American base would have been invaluable to Australia’s defence of her northern seaboard.’ The magazine
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stressed that the once formidable military installations were pulling apart. ‘The 45,000 Quonset huts and machine-shops which housed 32,000 men and serviced the American Pacific fleet at the height of the war sprawl rusted and empty.’ Roads were breaking into potholes; aerodromes, once accustomed to ‘handling vast air fleets’, were ‘cracked and overgrown with weeds’. The two remaining piers were in dubious repair. ‘The Royal Australian Navy is making valiant efforts to salvage what it can for its own small purposes.’ Reflecting its acerbic criticisms of the Labor Government, the Bulletin said Canberra was ‘to blame for the loss of what was, and still could be but for its vacillating policy, one of the southern Pacific’s strongest bases’. Australians believed that the overseas Chinese, scattered across South-East Asia and the South Pacific, were a dangerous element in the uncertain postwar order, a fifth column waiting to strike. It was no mistake, then, that the Daily Telegraph immediately placed the Manus problem on 20 March, at the very beginning of the crisis, in a wider and much more alarming context by asserting that overseas Chinese were becoming increasingly restive across the Pacific. It claimed that the Chinese on Manus ‘began to insist on their status as Chinese nationals’ soon after they arrived on the isolated island. But this was not all: ‘Since the war ended, Chinese throughout New Guinea … have strongly demanded that Chinese nationals should have a voice in local affairs.’ Painting a picture of militant Chinese nationalism sweeping across the region, the Daily Telegraph claimed that membership had risen in Kuomintang branches. ‘Administration officials have in their possession directives which the Chinese National Government has [sic] issued to Chinese in New Guinea urging that they insist on their national rights.’ The rise of communism added an even more sinister dimension to this problem, linking the furtive overseas Chinese with the allegedly imperialistic claims of Mao and Stalin. Allegations that Chinese labourers on Manus were in open rebellion, defying Australian authority, touched deeply embedded anxieties.
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First, however, the Administration had to move more than 50 police officers from Port Moresby many hundreds of kilometres north to Manus. Communication and transport links to the outer edge of the territory were rudimentary, and the departure of Grimshaw’s contingent was delayed for several days because the RAAF could supply only one Catalina flying-boat. The Administration was forced to charter a second Catalina from a local company. On 24 March, Grimshaw, Sub-Inspectors Carr and Day, and 50 constables finally left in the two Catalinas. Phillips immediately told Canberra that the contingent had departed. The RAAF aircraft flew straight to Manus, but the chartered Catalina was forced to stop at Madang to refuel, slowing the operation still further.24 Ward told the press in Sydney late on 25 March that ‘Mr Grimshaw’s visit to Manus was a routine inspection, adding that an officer who spoke Chinese had accompanied him to explain the legal position to the officer in charge of the Chinese’.35 This was a blatant distortion. Crucially for the Government, Monson’s steady stream of reports had stopped in the Daily Telegraph. Did Ward’s angry instruction to get the Telegraph to print the ‘facts’ have some effect? One can well imagine that the variously embarrassing and troubling stories in the Telegraph had prompted the Administration to tighten up its act, probably drying up Monson’s source of information in Port Moresby. Far from being a ‘routine inspection’, the Manus operation was one of the biggest operations in the history of the PNG police. Grimshaw’s 53-strong contingent reinforced the 10 constables and two kiaps already on the island, bringing the total deployment to 65. In June 1948, the Constabulary consisted of 94 European officers and 2,514 indigenous non-commissioned officers and constables spread across PNG.36 Grimshaw’s detachment was a significant show of force. Concerned about the inadequate police presence on Manus, the Administration had decided to send substantial reinforcements to the island some time before the Pondranei matter got out of hand. Thirty-five of the
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Melanesian policemen in Grimshaw’s party were earmarked to remain on Manus after the apprehension of Pondranei’s assailants. After the journey by flying-boat, Grimshaw and his police travelled on the Sirius to Inrim, arriving on the evening of 24 March. That night Grimshaw ran over the case at length with Bloxham and White. Early the next day, as the Sirius steamed towards Lorengau, he ‘gave definite instructions to the Police party as to their duties in the event of meeting opposition and resistance’. Firearms would be used only if absolutely necessary. Leaving most of the constables at the wharf in a state of readiness, Grimshaw and White drove to the Chinese camp with three police officers. Grimshaw feared armed conflict. He did not want to crash into the Chinese camp with 50 policemen at his back, provoking the very confrontation he hoped to avoid. A Chinese military policeman, armed with ‘a heavy-type Colt automatic pistol’, barred entry to the Chinese camp, but relented when Grimshaw insisted that he was a police officer from Port Moresby and had come to see the commander of the camp. The guard told Grimshaw that his commander was farewelling a general at Momote airstrip. A Chinese car drove Grimshaw to the aerodrome, indicating that the Chinese officers were now more conscious of the need to be cooperative. At the airstrip, Grimshaw discussed the matter at hand with Captain Kuo and Major Byers, the American officer again acting as a reluctant intermediary. He declared that ‘all civilian persons, irrespective of nationality, were liable to be brought before a District Court for any offence’. He said he was confident that he ‘could expect every assistance’ from the US and Chinese armed forces to complete his investigations. An assurance along these lines was duly given and Byers agreed to ask the Chinese general to delay his departure for Guam. General Ting Wei-hu, the deputy head of BOSEY, was the most senior Chinese yet involved in the Pondranei affair. Careful to observe ‘all the respect and compliments’ due to a general, Grimshaw told Ting that ‘four Chinese nationals were suspected of having assaulted a
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Native’ and that ‘these men were subject to the Laws of the Territory’. The men would have to be arrested he said, assuring Ting that an identification parade would ‘strictly conform to the principles laid down in Police procedure in Australia and the other parts of the British Empire’. Ting expressed his ‘regret’ that the Australians had been inconvenienced and ordered his subordinates to cooperate, saying that any arrangements settled on by Grimshaw, Byers and Kuo would be acceptable to him. Back at the Chinese camp, Grimshaw interrogated the four suspects in the presence of Byers and Kuo. He cautioned the labourers ‘in the manner prescribed by any British Court of Law’. Hsueh Pao-keng ‘admitted having assaulted the native Pondranei’, but the other three denied committing any offence. For the second time, the Australians arranged an identification parade at the Chinese camp. Grimshaw asked that between 50 and 60 Chinese labourers assemble in front of the Orderly Room; the atmosphere on the parade ground was crackling. The four suspects were told that they could place themselves anywhere in the parade. Noticing that some of the labourers were wearing caps, White told Captain Kuo that as a matter of fairness all the men should wear caps or dispense with them. Kuo ordered the labourers to stand without headgear. Pondranei and another Melanesian, Pomaki, identified Hsueh as one assailant, while Pomaki and a third witness, Nowan, identified Chou Hung-shao. The other two Chinese were not identified. Grimshaw arrested Hsueh and Chou. Despite Ting’s assurances, the situation threatened to erupt into confrontation when Kuo asked why the two accused could not be left in the camp. Grimshaw replied that a magistrate could release the two on bail at a later time until a trial was held, according to Australian law. Kuo pressed the issue, apparently threatening a showdown: ‘You know, colonel, I have between two and three hundred men here.’ Though he took this to be a ‘veiled threat’, Grimshaw refused to back off. Kuo’s actions were not necessarily belligerent. Was he impelled at least in part
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by a fear that the camp would mutiny if the two labourers were taken away? Whatever his motivations, Kuo prudently opted to relent, and the Australians were allowed to leave the camp with the suspects in custody.37 Finally, two months after the assault, the Chinese suspects were arrested and brought before a magistrate, aptly District Officer Bloxham. Hsueh and Chou were charged with assault occasioning bodily harm and deprivation of liberty and were placed in the gaol at Inrim. Manus had teetered on the edge of open violence between the Chinese camp and the Australian police. On 27 March, the Chinese Consul General in Sydney told the press that claims of a Chinese rebellion were ‘largely untrue’. He said he had just received a message from the commander of the Chinese camp, Captain Wang Yee, stating that the Chinese contingent had only one weapon, a pistol legally borrowed from the US Navy. ‘This is in Captain Wang’s possession and as far as he knows none of the other Chinese there has any weapons.’38 For obvious reasons, the Consul General talked down the situation. No doubt with relief, Phillips informed Canberra on 30 March that two arrests had been made and that the island was calm.39 On the same day, most newspapers carried brief articles based on wire reports stating that everything was ‘normal’ on Manus. In an odd turn of phrase, the Sydney Sun stated that Grimshaw ‘had visited the island following reports of trouble’, the word visit suggesting an altogether false sense of casualness in the operation. The Melbourne Herald noted that civil police had arrested two Chinese and charged them with assaulting natives. Cheekily leaving out the AAP-Reuter byline, the Daily Telegraph carried the same skimpy report on 31 March, but added a summary of Monson’s claim that 300 Chinese had formed armed units and erected a defensive perimeter. Determined to avoid further misconceptions, Ward said on 1 April that the two Chinese suspects had bound and beaten a young male Melanesian. He again declared that Monson had written exaggerated stories.
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On 2 April, Monson had one last crack at exposing what he charged was an official conspiracy. He again demanded that the authorities release the elusive first report allegedly sent by Bloxham on 19 March. ‘I have previously asked Mr Ward to issue Bloxham’s report for publication. He has not done so, and has said he will not do so.’ Unrepentant to the end, the feisty journalist insisted that Bloxham had reported on 19 March that the Chinese were heavily armed and aggressive. Release the report, he charged, and then ‘let the public judge if I have exaggerated … Has that message been lost or merely suppressed?’ The next day the Daily Telegraph noted that Ward had dismissed Monson’s claim: ‘I cannot publish a report which does not exist.’ This author could not find any copies of such a report in the archives. If it did exist, the report was either never sent to Canberra, misplaced at some time or deliberately removed from the files. Although the latter scenario seems unlikely, it is conceivable that the Administration did not admit that Bloxham had sent an earlier urgent request for help on 19 March. Monson’s first report appeared to catch Phillips off guard. He would have looked negligent if it had been revealed later that he had not warned Canberra on 19 March that trouble was brewing. This explanation remains pure conjecture, however, and no evidence of a cover-up exists.40 How heavily armed were the Chinese? This question was a source of great anxiety throughout the affair. In his report after the arrests, Superintendent Grimshaw stated emphatically that he ‘could find no evidence that the Chinese were at any time in possession of machine guns or hand-grenades’. But he stated that Major Byers had given the Chinese several automatic rifles, allegedly because sailors from an Australian warship had landed some time ago and ‘stolen a large amount of material from the Dumps’. Grimshaw insisted that ‘there was not the slightest truth in such allegations’ — no Australian warships had been in the waters around Manus. In his report written a week later, District Officer Bloxham confirmed that the American forces had issued
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the Chinese with 20 Springfield rifles, another sign of the ambivalent American role.41 Grimshaw and Bloxham fought a brief skirmish about who should have taken the lead in the incident. Grimshaw fired the first shot and insisted that the Manus incident should not have been handled as ‘purely a matter for [the Department of District and] Native Affairs’. He stressed that he had ‘no desire to criticize’ Assistant District Officer White, who had ‘performed his task under very trying and difficult circumstances in a most creditable manner’. But White was not a police officer, nor was he acquainted with police procedure. Grimshaw complained that he had heard nothing of the problem on Manus until 20 March when he was called to Government House, and he insisted testily that all criminal offences should be reported in future immediately to the Constabulary. This criticism incensed Bloxham. ‘In this instance as District Officer I had hoped to be left untrammelled in my function as a magistrate.’ While he readily conceded that criminal investigations were usually police matters, he pointed out that no police officers were stationed on Manus and that he had therefore handed over the investigation of the Pondranei assault to White ‘in his function as a police officer’. One feels strongly the tension here between the professional police force and the all-purpose District Officers. The kiaps saw themselves as an elite. Bloxham did not appreciate Grimshaw’s sniping, and his defensiveness was exacerbated by the thinness of the Australian presence on Manus. He pointed out that he had sensibly requested reinforcements when the Chinese had repeatedly refused to hand over the offenders, ‘as it was considered that police action beyond the resources of the District Officer was necessary’. Bloxham insisted that none of his correspondence had ever suggested that there was any matter at issue but the question of jurisdiction. But this contention did not square with the dispatch of such a large police contingent. ‘Owing to the isolation of Manus the first suggestion of any abnormal conditions in this District was the receipt by the District Officer on
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the afternoon of 23rd March 1948 of a radio message from the AAP correspondent at Rabaul requesting information of reported Chinese riots at Manus.’ If this claim is true, Bloxham and White continued about their normal duties for some days unaware of the brouhaha that had erupted in Australia and Port Moresby about the alleged Chinese rebellion, strong evidence that no such revolt had taken place. Bloxham signed off his report with a clipped sentence: ‘I have nothing further to report.’ Pressure mounted on other fronts as well. On 30 March, the commander of the Chinese contingent on Manus, Captain Wang Yee, told Guam that John Morgan, the Vinnell Superintendent, had come into the BOSEY office drunk. Brandishing a pistol, Morgan had threatened the Chinese present and pushed everything off the table.42 Wang’s cable did not say what had driven the American to such extreme behaviour, but it is telling that this incident occurred shortly after Grimshaw’s police contingent had arrested Hsueh and Chou for assaulting Pondranei. We know that more general tensions were already causing trouble between Vinnell and the Chinese, and it is reasonable to assume that the whole sorry Pondranei saga was a cause for particular irritation. One can well imagine that Morgan, already faced with delays and conflicts with the Chinese about the outloading operation, would have resented the extra trouble caused by the assault. The Manus conflict had inevitable international ramifications. Chinese diplomats in Australia wanted to know what was going on. External Territories considered providing the Chinese Embassy in Canberra with a full account of the chain of events from the alleged assault to the arrests. After discussing the case with Dr Cheng on several occasions, Reg Halligan recommended to Ward on 31 March that an official account of the Manus trouble be conveyed to the Chinese. However, given the continuing uncertainty about whether the Chinese suspects were mere civilians or military personnel, an issue with thorny legal implications, Ward decided on 7 April not to provide the Chinese with a written
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summary of the case until things became clearer. Although they were aware of the danger of antagonising the Chinese by not providing an account of the Manus events, the Australian authorities opted for the time being to leave the embassy in the dark — a risky strategy.43 While officials in Canberra were mulling over the best approach to take with the Chinese, the legal process moved ahead on Manus. On 5 April, the labourers appeared in the District Court in Inrim before Assistant District Officer Richard White acting as a magistrate. White committed the two Chinese for trial on charges of assault. It was not uncommon for Australian officials to act as the arresting police officer in a criminal case and later the presiding magistrate at the trial. The exigencies of a colonial administration with meagre resources blurred the lines separating the investigating and judicial powers. Given that he had been centrally involved in the long-running and frustrating attempts to apprehend the Chinese, one might ask if White was the most disinterested figure to then adjudicate in a committal hearing. Presaging complications that would dog the case in the coming months, the Administration informed Canberra that the committal proceedings were being delayed by two factors: ‘Difficulty of interpretation and ignorance of procedure by Chinese officers.’ Bloxham and White were trying to impose an alien legal code on the Chinese. The going was slow. The labourers were originally scheduled to reappear in the District Court on 7 April to be committed for trial on the second offence, deprivation of liberty, but the hearing was again delayed. Bloxham told Port Moresby that the defendants had not been able to obtain counsel from the Chinese command on Guam, and he asked the Crown to provide the defence in the Supreme Court. Unexpectedly, the Americans re-entered the picture. Acting on instructions from his superior, Chief Petty Officer Ferraro, the US naval representative on Manus, asked Bloxham for a stay in proceedings. His patience wearing thin, Bloxham told the American
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that the case would proceed. One can only assume that the US military had become involved at the behest of the Chinese Army. Finally, after some to-and-fro, the labourers were brought back before the District Court on 16 April and White committed them for trial on charges of deprivation of liberty. But the Chinese were still not represented by counsel. A day later, the Administration informed Bloxham that the Crown was unable to supply the defence. A private counsel could appear in the case but his fee would be 50 guineas for each accused, a hefty sum to say the least for two humble labourers. The Administration recommended that Bloxham sidestep this impasse by encouraging the accused to apply for help under the Poor Persons Legal Assistance Ordinance. Hsueh and Chou would be reliant on the Australian authorities for their defence but this was better than going without a lawyer. The Administration also told Bloxham that he had acted appropriately in rejecting the US request for a stay in proceedings. After the committal proceedings, Manus calmed down as the danger of open conflict between the Australians and Chinese subsided. The Chinese officers had reluctantly acquiesced before the assertion of Australian authority, though this backdown continued to rankle.44 By this point, the Americans knew that an escalation of the conflict between the Administration and the Chinese would disrupt, even derail, the BOSEY operation, the US withdrawal from the island and the conclusion of the already lengthy sales negotiations with Canberra. In early April, the OFLC dispatched two officials from Guam, John West and Captain Hinckley, to act as liaison officers on Manus. Quartered with the Vinnell personnel, the two officials had the unenviable task of trying to smooth over relations between the Australians and the Chinese. About the same time, the US Navy upgraded its own presence on the island, replacing Ferraro with Lieutenant V. U. French and 10 ratings. Taking his orders from ComMarianas, the US command on Guam, French was in a difficult position. Instructed to ‘maintain friendly relations with all activities on Manus’, he patrolled the vast base,
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reporting noteworthy incidents and trying to prevent the cannibalisation of the US installations. But he did not have the authority to make any commitments in the name of ComMarianas, and, pointedly, he was ordered ‘not to engage in any controversies and never to sit as a third party to any disputes’. As we shall see, it was impossible for French to adhere to this last instruction, and, in the coming months, he was compelled to take on the invidious position of go-between or mediator.45 The Americans didn’t stop there. Keen to ensure that the outloading operation was proceeding as normally as possible, the OFLC’s field commissioner for the Marianas and Micronesia area, Captain Marcus DeWolf, US Navy, visited Manus between 18 and 20 April to investigate various matters, including the Pondranei case. He was accompanied by General Ting, the BOSEY commander from Guam. Apparently revealing that he did not want to take on, let alone undermine, the Administration, DeWolf asked General Ting to uphold order by instructing the Chinese camp that ‘all personnel are subject to Australian jurisdiction’. He presented Ting with a letter requesting that he take appropriate steps to ‘prevent untoward incidents in the future’. Such a request was seemingly plain enough, and DeWolf later declared that Ting had stated that he had complied with this request.46 Bloxham saw things differently, however. He informed Port Moresby that DeWolf and Ting had in fact requested a stay in the proceedings against Hsueh and Chou pending representations from the State Department. Ting had objected to Australian authority on two counts: an agreement between the American and Chinese governments had given the Chinese permission to exercise jurisdiction over their people on US bases; and the offences on Manus had been committed within the US base. Bloxham stated that he had ‘courteously but firmly’ stated that Australian law would be applied.47 This was all very odd, for Bloxham and DeWolf provided contradictory accounts of the same events. Bloxham mentioned no letter and said nothing to suggest that the American was trying to restrain the Chinese. Had
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DeWolf dissembled, concealing for some reason his own bid to stop the Australian trial from proceeding? Were the Americans playing it both ways? More probably, Ting had ignored the American officer’s injunction to accept Australian jurisdiction. As far as the Chinese were concerned, the Manus affair was far from settled. Just when the Labor Government might have expected things to quieten down, Josiah Francis, the long-time Liberal member for Moreton in Queensland, stood up in the House of Representatives to propel the whole Manus story back into the public realm. On 16 April, he pressed the Government to provide information ‘concerning the recent reports of unrest and rioting among 300 Chinese on Manus Island’. A veteran of the Great War and assistant defence minister back in the early 1930s, Francis saw himself as something of a guardian of white Australian interests in PNG. The situation on Manus appeared to indicate that Australian security was again under threat. Who was on the island, Francis asked, and what were they doing there? And when were they expected to leave? These questions reflected the widespread unease that Manus was not under proper Australian control. External Territories urgently requested a rundown on the nonMelanesian population from Port Moresby. Several days later, the Administration replied that there were 16 Australians on the island, 12 civil servants (no more expected), two planters (three more expected) and two civilians employed by Vinnell. An unknown number of Australian military personnel were also on the island. The American contingent was about 75 (40 military, 30 Vinnell employees and five civilians buying surplus material from the Chinese). Five missionaries were stationed on the island (two German, two American and one British). Numbering 340, the Chinese dwarfed the other non-Melanesian groupings. The Administration said it was ‘unable [to] state whether Chinese will increase numbers’.48 Underlining the complicated nature of the foreign operations on Manus, one official in Canberra noted ‘references to Filipino civilians’ and stated that the Chinese were
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employees of the ‘Vinnell Board of Supplies Executive Yuan (China)’, running an American company and a Chinese government agency into one. On 22 April, nearly a month after the Chinese had been arrested, Eddie Ward told Parliament that the situation on Manus was ‘normal’. ‘Enquiries showed that the reports of disturbances amongst the Chinese now at Manus in connection with the removal of surplus American stores were unfounded.’ Ward gave a brief summary of the facts of the case to dispel any lingering misconceptions. The press reported his answer in a brief and straight manner.49 Conscious of the need to put heated rumours to rest in China, External Affairs told the Australian Consulate General in Shanghai in early May that press reports of disturbances on Manus were ‘unfounded’. Quashing the claims that women had been molested, the department stated that ‘four Chinese civilians had assaulted a male native’.50 Ward’s parliamentary answer did not reveal how close the situation on Manus had come to getting out of hand. The Labor Government didn’t need such scandals when it was coming under attack from the conservative opposition for following an allegedly weak foreign policy and endangering the security of the nation. Aside from placing an embattled government under even more pressure, the Pondranei affair confirmed that relations between Australia and Nationalist China were sliding from bad to worse. The Chinese Embassy in Canberra remained sceptical that its two citizens, Hsueh and Chou, were being treated properly, and Dr Cheng, the Chargé d’Affaires, asked External Territories on 12 May what had happened to the labourers. An official informed Cheng a week later that the Administration had released the accused men on bail after the committal proceedings, and that the indictments would be heard as soon as a hearing could be arranged.51 This affirmation that the Administration was following correct legal procedure did little to appease Nanking, where many in the Nationalist Government believed Australia was increasingly
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hostile towards China. The debate in the United Nations two years earlier about the Trusteeship Agreement to cover Australian rule in PNG had already exposed tensions between Canberra and Nanking. The Chinese Nationalists had argued forcefully that the agreement should grant the citizens of all UN members equal treatment in regard to immigration and commercial and industrial enterprises. Australia fended off this push and the final draft contained no such provision. When the UN General Assembly adopted the Trusteeship Agreement on 14 December 1946, by a margin of 41 votes to six, China was one of three nations to abstain, and it subsequently criticised Australian rule in PNG, alleging that it was discriminatory.52 Sino-Australian relations were even more strained by 1948. The old rhetoric of the shared struggle against Japanese militarism, with its heroic overtones, had evaporated. Save for the diehards, most Australian commentators, either liberated from the wartime necessity to praise an ally or disabused of their illusions, regarded the Nationalist leader, Chiang Kai-shek, with impatience and contempt, the more so as the Communists won the civil war. It is telling that no Australian parliamentarian praised or justified Kuomintang policies in the period 1947–49. The backlash against Nationalist China was even more potent because some observers felt duped or betrayed, their disappointed romanticism leading to angry rebukes. The Australian sense of disillusionment was exacerbated by claims that the Nationalists were rampantly misusing aid provided by the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA). Australians were the third-largest contingent working with UNRRA in China, outnumbered only by the British and the Americans. Canberra provided £7 million in aid to Nanking, including locomotives, trawlers and meat. Leslie Haylen, a Labor parliamentarian, visited Shanghai in 1948 and encountered numerous instances of corruption, ‘squeeze’ and the sale of UNRRA goods, including Australian clothes and wheat, on a thriving black
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market. There is little doubt that the sense of Australian grievance over Manus in 1948 was sharpened by the knowledge that the Nationalists were in part using UNRRA funds to purchase the American equipment and stores on the island. Although he publicly downplayed the extent of Nationalist abuse to protect the UNRRA program as a whole, Chifley was privately scathing to a friend in 1948: ‘I never did have much faith in the possibility of [the Nationalists] surviving. I always had a strong suspicion that they were more interested in establishing the Chiang Kai-shek dynasty than in the welfare of China.’53 Against such a backdrop, it was hardly surprising that the Labor Government did not consider, even in passing, some kind of deal with the Nationalists in the Pondranei case. No one in Canberra felt that Australia owed China any special favours. Perhaps equally importantly, the Administration in PNG had other reasons for pursuing the two labourers so relentlessly, which had nothing to do with Manus or China. And now our story moves back in time to late 1947, south across the Bismarck Sea and the Huon Peninsula to the town of Lae, the scene of another and much more serious crime.
Chapter Three
In the Midnight Dark
ON NEW YEAR’S EVE 1947, the Australian community in Lae gathered at the recreation hall at the Hotel Cecil for a dance. Located deep in the tropics on mainland New Guinea’s north-east coast, Lae lies on a coastal plain near the mouth of the Markham River, overlooking the Huon Gulf. Although it is little more than 150 kilometres in length, the Markham is a formidable river, its turbulent waters beginning in the Finisterre Ranges, fed along the way by numerous tributaries, finally reaching the sea at a more languid pace along a broad flat valley.1 The vegetation around the Huon Gulf is thick jungle, a mass of plants that grow voraciously in the wet heat, covering everything with their insistent tentacles. This jungle gives way to sago palms and mangrove scrub on the coastal plain. The township of Lae was founded in 1927, Melanesians performing most of the hard work, hacking away the vegetation to
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make way for a rough airstrip. With the sea to the south, the Markham to the west, and two small rivers to the east, the Bumbu and the Busu, water borders the township on three sides. Mountains provide an impressive backdrop. Behind the town to the north, the Atzera Range rises; to the west and moving south, the Herzog Mountains dominate the skyline; and to the east stands the Rawlinson Range, completing the chain. During the 1930s, Lae was overshadowed for the most part by Salamaua, the administrative and commercial centre of Morobe District further down the coast to the south. Nonetheless, the Lae airstrip became extremely busy, supplying the nearby goldfields in the Wau and Bulolo Valleys with often staggering quantities of equipment and stores. An airmail link with Australia was established in 1934. As the European population increased, the town’s Spartan living conditions gradually improved; a few shops, a post office, a sports club and eventually a bank branch opened. Some residents put down deeper roots and built pleasant homes with neat gardens and fine lawns, leading at least one traveller to say that Lae resembled a small Australian country town. The European community acquired a strong sense of local identity, though social distinctions between the managers of the big companies such as New Guinea Goldfields and ordinary working men were often sharp. Historian Ian Willis writes, however, that Lae remained a bustling but minor company town in the 1930s and rarely rated a mention in newspapers outside the Territory, aside from the odd story about aircraft accidents. Most memorably, Amelia Earhart flew out of the Lae airstrip in June 1937 on what was to be the longest leg of her famous around-the-world flight and was never seen again. On the eve of the Pacific War, the permanent population of Lae was still small, about 120 Europeans, perhaps 60 Chinese and several hundred Melanesians. In September, the Territory of New Guinea moved its capital to Lae, abandoning Rabaul, which had been badly damaged by a volcanic eruption five years earlier. This new status stimulated a hurried building boom as
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the Administration constructed various buildings to house its offices. Lae’s future looked bright.2 This rising town was engulfed, like the rest of PNG, by World War II. After a bombing attack on 21 January 1942, which damaged virtually every building, Japanese forces captured Lae less than three weeks later. Most of the European population had retreated before the Japanese arrived, destroying fuel dumps and motor cars. The Japanese occupied Lae for 18 months until heavy Allied bombing virtually wiped out the township in 1943, leaving little more than the Ampo Church and the Guinea Airways hangar standing. In contrast with the recapture of Manus, Australian forces played a significant role in retaking Lae. For a while, the town became ‘a military metropolis of temporary buildings’, housing about 20,000 Australian and Americans troops. Another 50,000 Americans were based at Nadzab, the airstrip to the north-west of the township.3 However, just as the vast base on Manus quickly faded away, so this sizeable military establishment vanished once the Japanese were defeated. After Salamaua was devastated during the fighting and subsequently abandoned, the Administration established the headquarters for Morobe District in Lae in late 1945. Even though it was not as far away as Manus, more than 300 kilometres further north-west across the Bismarck Sea, Lae was still a distant outpost of Australian rule in PNG in 1947, connected to the outside world by aeroplane and ship. Finschhafen, the site of a significant US military base during the war, housing at one point as many as 700,000 troops, was 100 kilometres by air to the east at the tip of the Huon Peninsula. Madang was 418 kilometres away by ship, while Port Moresby, the heart of the Administration, lay on the other side of the rough central mountain range. There was no road link to the whole southern side of the island. Geographically isolated and outnumbered by the local Melanesians, the town’s small white population had been looking forward to New Year’s Eve for some months. As ever, the weather
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was stormy on 31 December 1947, for the monsoon had just started. Although its full force is mostly spent when it reaches Morobe, the north-west monsoon still drenches the mountains that rise up behind Lae. The town’s annual rainfall is high, about 4,572 millimetres, while the hinterland is much drier. The rain rots wooden structures with a relentless certainty. On New Year’s Eve 1947, the deluge stopped midway through the evening, but the night air was still hot and clammy. The heat could be unrelenting during the day, wrapping everything in its enervating embrace, making everyday tasks that much harder to do, sapping energy and fraying the nerves, sometimes to breaking point. So, the wet heat was an extra reason to have a drink or two. The aftermath of the war was another. Like the other towns scattered across PNG, Lae was struggling to get back on its feet in 1947. The combined European-Asian population was about 1,020. For several years, the Department of Works and Housing in Melbourne had been considering plans to rebuild Lae as a model tropical town. But the obstacles to achieving such a grand vision were formidable. The town’s military buildings had been hastily constructed to meet ‘brief operational needs’ and had ‘only a casual relationship to the needs of the town to be resurrected’.4 Returning residents were able to attain only one-year leases on land, erecting temporary dwellings from local timber and materials cannibalised from abandoned army huts. Highly inflammable tar paper was used widely. Henry G. Eekhoff, the indefatigable secretary of the local branches of the New Guinea Citizens Association and the Returned Sailors’, Soldiers’ and Airmen’s Imperial League of Australia (RSSAILA), wrote to Eddie Ward in May 1947 lamenting the deplorable condition of the town. ‘The whole atmosphere here is one of uncertainty.’ If the local residents were allowed to continue to build dwellings out of scrap, Lae would become ‘a “shanty town” instead of the model township envisioned by those responsible for town planning’.5 With the promised town plan still on the drawing boards, the tempo of reconstruction picked up in 1947, lifting local spirits. The
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Bank of NSW reopened a branch. ‘Lae is now beginning to resemble a township,’ wrote the Pacific Islands Monthly. Houses were gradually appearing and the Anglican community was ‘well on the way’ towards establishing a church for a priest who would cover the Wau and Bulolo goldfields and outer districts. Burns Philp had built six dwellings for its staff, while the Vacuum Oil Company and Bulolo Gold Dredging were also active.6 A road built during the war made Bulolo more accessible. Despite these steps forward, the future still seemed troubling, and living conditions remained Spartan. Taking possession of some ‘native’ land, New Guinea Goldfields Ltd had to maintain a bakery, a grocery and a freezer to provide for its staff. A chronic shortage of local indigenous labour made the reconstruction task hard and the company was struggling, producing a paltry £13,000 of gold by January 1948.7 Twenty-one Administration employees lived in tents with timber floors in an area known as ‘Canvas Town’. These tents were not weatherproof, lacked proper sanitary facilities and had dangerous wiring that constituted a serious fire hazard.8 Other staff were housed in former army buildings in an area called Rotten Row. Local roads and bridges were dilapidated; work did not start on a bridge across the Markham linking Lae to Wau until 1950. The main wharf, Milford Haven, was a temporary wartime structure on the verge of being condemned. The other wharves were even more rickety. One night in 1947, the end of one wharf and its crane disappeared into the sea after an earth movement. Products from infant formula and eggs to soap and petrol were either scarce or unavailable. By late 1947, shortages were becoming more severe, forcing the bakery to use leftover army flour and leaving the townsfolk to hurriedly buy up local honey stocks to substitute for sugar. An aircraft had recently flown in much needed butter and meat from Townsville, but a food ship had not called at Lae since the Malaita visited on 27 August. The main generator broke down regularly, causing blackouts. Power was often out between midnight and 6am, and the authorities asked residents to
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be economical. Ever ready to speak up for his fellow residents, Eekhoff declared: ‘Will Lae simply become a ghost town, like many other centres which died with their goldfields; or will it, like Charters Towers, Gympie, etc., gain a new lease of life from agricultural industries?’ Linking the local realm with the problems of the postwar era, he believed that a revitalised Lae could produce primary products for the world and act as ‘a bulwark against aggression’. For a time, Lae was under consideration in Canberra as one possible site for the capital of the entire Territory, but the Labor Government eventually chose Port Moresby. The local community’s desire for a secure and prosperous future could assume improbable guises, not least a far-fetched scheme to build an international airport at a cost of £3 million.9 Such grandiose plans were a distant prospect in late 1947, and New Year’s Eve was a welcome opportunity to let off some steam in the midst of the hard work of building up a viable community in a remote locality at a time of sparse resources. The Pacific Islands Monthly noted that ‘virtually the whole town attended’ the ball at the Cecil10 — the term ‘whole town’ referred of course to the white community, for non-Europeans were unwelcome. Several local civic organisations, including the New Guinea Citizens Association and the RSSAILA, arranged the dance, bringing together policemen, District Officers and labour overseers. Engineers and managers from the two main local goldmining companies, New Guinea Goldfields and Bulolo Gold Dredging, rubbed shoulders with the representatives of Qantas Empire Airways and Amalgamated Wireless. In all, about 200–250 people gathered at the Cecil. Most of the men were old PNG hands, steeped in the prejudices of the prewar era, sure, at least on the surface, of their power and accustomed to running the town unchallenged. Some came to the dance with their wives. Like other frontier towns in PNG, Lae’s European community consisted mostly of men with a few married women. Single women were seen as a source of temptation and they rarely ventured north to live and work in such
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a far-off town. A handful, no more than five or so, worked for the Administration, and a few others were nurses at the hospital. Some of them attended the dance. The more established members of the European population were joined at the dance by newcomers, mostly employees of the Department of Works and Housing, who had been in Lae for no more than a few months. The new arrivals were not always welcome. One old-time resident remarked in the Pacific Islands Monthly that some of the newcomers appeared to be the ‘right types’ for PNG. ‘Some, of course, will never do any good wherever they are, but they will soon be weeded out by virtue of the fact that they are not temperamentally suited for tropical life, isolated as it is from the “Dawgs” and the “Horses” and with hard work as the alternative.’ Another long-time resident was more blunt: ‘An unpleasant feature of post-war New Guinea is the influx of persons, locally known as “white trash”, who are causing a breakdown of the community’s ethical standards.’11 Different attitudes towards a range of social issues, including relations with the ‘natives’, often separated the old-timers from the newcomers, overlaying with and at times accentuating the longstanding cleavages in the European community. Seen as ‘the poor and suspect relations in white towns’,12 missionaries did not attend the dance at the Cecil. The kiaps and the business folk did not always see eye to eye, but New Year’s Eve was a time to set aside, at least temporarily, some of their differences and to celebrate together. The war had also helped to forge a stronger sense of common identity and interest in the European community. These powerful internal bonds were symbolically reaffirmed in late 1947 when Eddie Ward agreed to the local request that streets in the town should be named after the pioneering early settlers in the region and soldiers who had died in the war. The waterfront had a European reserve and ‘native labourers’ were confined to certain areas; Melanesians were not permitted to drink alcohol, and Asians were encouraged to do so in their own quarter. The local Chinese population, numbering about
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150, was still confined to Chinatown, a dilapidated area on the town’s north-east edge, which featured 30 trade stores, a Chinese club and a school. Terms such as ‘dance hall’ and ‘ladies’ lounge’ suggest a structure of some solidity, a combination of an Australian country pub and a smaller version of the grand colonial hotels of Asia, but the Hotel Cecil in 1947 was a shadow of its former self. Completed in 1936, less than a decade after the town’s foundation, the prewar Cecil had been an establishment of some standing under the management of the famous Flora ‘Ma’ Stewart. Born in Edinburgh in 1888, Stewart was the daughter of a blacksmith and coachbuilder who migrated to northern Queensland when she was a baby. She went to Papua with her first husband in 1910, launching a long career, which carved out her reputation as one of the Territory’s most redoubtable and colourful characters. Before World War I, she ran a trade store on the Vailala goldfield, shooting crocodiles and curing their skins for sale. She later ran a guesthouse in Port Moresby and then a string of hotels in the 1920s and 1930s, including the Cosmopolitan in Samarai and the Bulolo in Wau. Through all of this, she somehow managed to raise four children. One former kiap, James Sinclair, recalls that Stewart was generous in spirit but ‘no soft touch’, tolerating ‘the idiosyncrasies of her rough-and-ready clientele’ on the goldfields while setting definite limits.13 Named after a hotel outside Sydney, the Cecil was her proudest achievement. The Pacific Islands Monthly described an impressive structure in 1936: It is a well-constructed modern building with a comfortable sitting room on the ground floor and has plenty of bathrooms and running water. The commodious bar and billiards room are up-to-date and the kitchen is remarkable for its size and conveniences. The bedrooms are large and airy. A verandah runs around the top floor, well shaded and made comfortable by lounge chairs and small tables.14
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This commendation evoked the pride of the local white residents and a nervous need to affirm that the town was modern despite its isolation. The hotel hosted Amelia Earhart’s fateful send-off in June 1937. The Cecil, with its colonial comfort, was obliterated in the 1943 bombings. Ever-resourceful, ‘Ma’ Stewart was one of the first white women to return to the Territory after the Japanese surrender, arriving in 1946, even though entry permits for Australian civilians were still hard to acquire. Her son, Moresby, had died during the war fighting for the RAF. Despite the fact that she was approaching the age of 60, she was determined to rebuild her hotel, tramping around the town in the heat to scrounge whatever materials she could find in the chaotic mess left behind by the departing troops. As she literally wore out her shoes, she bought army cots and stocks of bully beef and recovered soiled army blankets, bleaching them so they could be reused.15 At first, she was forced to set up her new establishment in 20 huts that had been left behind by the Australian Women’s Army Service (AWAS) on old ‘native’ land on Butibum Road. War correspondent Osmar White visited the Cecil in 1946 and found a ‘preposterous caravanserai of rotting grass huts’.16 When the white community came together to celebrate the arrival of 1948, the Cecil was still a temporary-looking collection of buildings, really no more than a clump of half-decaying huts, assembled in part from scrap left over from the war. By this time, Ma Stewart had leased some of her huts to local married couples and converted others into rough accommodation units for visitors. Rooms were divided by sheets of three-ply. Running a hotel in such trying circumstances was no easy task. One visitor in the late 1940s, Marjorie Murphy, the wife of a kiap, encountered Stewart ‘dressed in man’s sandals and burned black by the sun’, cooking for the entire hotel on one ‘funny old stove’.17 The Administrator, Colonel Murray, told Canberra that there had been little adverse comment about the meals served at the Cecil, but its sanitary
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conditions were another matter altogether. The Public Health Department was especially uneasy about ‘the general hygiene in connection with the accommodation of guests’.18 Despite its diminished status and its uncertain hygiene, the Cecil was still the centre of the European community’s social activities. On Christmas Eve 1947, Ma Stewart threw a party in the recreation hall for 60 children and their parents, with ‘Rusty’ Phillips dispensing gifts as Father Christmas.19 For the New Year’s Eve celebration, she brought in an orchestra of some description to create a festive atmosphere. Coming off the main road, participants in the dance strolled along a pathway past first the sleeping quarters and then a small hair salon, before reaching the main buildings at the back, the recreation hall on the left and the bar, with its ‘ladies’ lounge’, immediately opposite on the right. The walkway to the buildings was blocked at the car park end by oil drums, preventing access by vehicles. Like the other buildings, the recreation hall was raised off the ground, with a stairway at one end and a verandah with a railing overlooking a lawn. The roof had no guttering, and rainwater poured straight down in great sheets into a large drainage ditch. Lae was a hard-drinking and hard-playing frontier town. Shortly before midnight, as the rain came thundering down again in great torrents, the revellers gathered in a circle in the recreation hall to sing Auld Lang Syne. There was much kissing and merriment. About this time, a commotion erupted at the hall’s entrance. Several Filipino soldiers, members of a recently arrived unit of the US Army, tried to gain entry to the dance. What began innocuously enough as a verbal stoush soon became a scuffle out on the lawn and then a more serious confrontation. Before too long, John Harcourt Scott, the Lae manager of New Guinea Goldfields, reappeared out of the darkness with blood streaming out of a deep gash on his forehead above his left eye. A Sydneysider born on 23 December 1908, Scott was one of the old-timers, having spent more than nine years in the Territory
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by late 1947. An accountant by training, he worked with New Guinea Goldfields in Morobe District before the war. Having served with a militia unit in the late 1920s as a youth, he joined the New Guinea Volunteer Rifles at Edie Creek, the site of a rich goldfield above the Bulolo River, in October 1940. He enlisted in the Australian Army in January 1942 shortly after the start of the Pacific War. By the time he was discharged in April 1946, Scott was a warrant officer (first class) with ANGAU. By all reports, he was a normally reserved man who spoke Tok Pisin well — better than many other Europeans. About 170 centimetres tall, he was a stocky, balding fellow, weighing 90–95 kilograms. After the war, he married Elizabeth ‘Fitzy’ Fitzgerald, who had served during the war with the AWAS, and he came back to Lae as part of a small team of engineers, mechanics, labour recruiters and accountants to rebuild New Guinea Goldfield’s mining and sawmilling operations. At the New Guinea Goldfields annual general meeting in Sydney on 17 January 1947, the company secretary recognised that this resourceful group had achieved much despite being subjected to ‘privations and discomforts’.20 Such circumstances created strong bonds inside the European community. While her husband was working to get New Guinea Goldfields back on its feet, Fitzy Scott opened a women’s hairdressing business in the town.21 In the early hours of 1 January 1948, Scott was taken to the European hospital and released later in the morning. One Lae resident at the time, Adrian Leyden, a former ANGAU officer and kiap who worked for many years with Bulolo Gold Dredging, believes that Scott received only basic treatment at this point because he appeared to be drunk.22 At first, all appeared to be going well, for the gash, though deep, didn’t look too serious, let alone fatal. Scott’s condition deteriorated, however, and he was readmitted to the hospital on the afternoon of 1 January. At some point on 2 January, the commander of the US Army unit, Second Lieutenant Refugio Ordonez, tried to see Scott, but no visitors were permitted given the patient’s turn for the worse.23 Despite
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further treatment, Scott’s health swiftly declined and he died a day later, on 3 January. The coroner, Assistant District Officer John Rigby, viewed the body at the hospital, and two of Scott’s friends, Bertram ‘Bertie’ Heath, another employee of Bulolo Gold Dredging, and Kelm Gross, the General Manager of New Guinea Goldfields, identified the corpse. News, especially bad news, travels fast in a small community, swiftly rippling out from the impact point by word of mouth, along the way acquiring an ever-more dramatic quality. Lae’s tightly knit European population was already incensed about the events that had taken place on New Year’s Eve, believing that some temporary outsiders had tried to barge into their celebration. The talk around the bar at the Cecil was hot during the first few days of the New Year. As Scott’s condition deteriorated, and he slipped from a high fever into delirium and then into a coma, the anger and the illfeeling towards the Filipinos intensified. His death provoked fury. Two vigilante groups quickly formed, ready to march on the compound housing the Filipino soldiers to punish the supposed killers. They reputedly armed themselves with rifles and dynamite.24 Ma Stewart had a wiser and cooler head than many, and she managed to convince one of the mobs, which had formed in the bar of her hotel, their anger stoked by beery talk, to abandon the idea of ‘cleaning up’ the Filipinos. She pointed out that the Scouts were members of the US Army, armed with rifles and plenty of ammunition. Aware that the town was on the verge of tumbling out of control, the District Officer, Allan Roberts, stopped the second group, which had collected at the local RSSAILA branch, from attacking the camp. Along with Inspector Percy ‘Monty’ Moncur, Roberts carried the heavy burden of maintaining law and order in Morobe District in the confused years after the war. A Melburnian born on 29 July 1904, he worked as a teacher for two years in Footscray before joining the Administration in 1925 with the first batch of trained patrol officers. He did considerable first-contact
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patrolling, surviving an ambush by Kukukuku tribesmen in the rugged country behind Wau, and went to Lae in 1935 to open up a new sub-district office. During the war, he served as a RAAF intelligence officer and later as a coastwatcher on New Britain, receiving the Military Cross for carrying out hazardous reconnaissance work and rescuing four US airmen who had been shot down by the Japanese.25 He left the armed forces in March 1946 as a major. With the Administration severely over-stretched, Roberts was rushed back to PNG two months later. Drawing on his long experience in the Territory, he applied unsuccessfully in late 1946 for the job of Police Superintendent, the position eventually won by John Grimshaw. He returned to Lae as District Officer, where he was joined later by his wife, Dorothy, who left their home in Spotswood, Melbourne. Roberts was liked and respected, seen by his contemporaries as a highly able, hardworking and upright man who generated a good feeling in the town.26 Moncur was another old hand. The son of a school teacher, he was born in Drouin in Gippsland, Victoria, on 14 December 1889. Like so many of his generation, Moncur was a veteran of both world wars. After a stint as a blacksmith and then three years with the Victorian Police Force, he joined the Army in 1914. Wounded twice and awarded the Military Cross, he left the AIF in 1916 as a captain, having served at Gallipoli and in France, and joined the Tropical Force or Coconut Lancers in New Guinea. After serving as an assistant District Officer in the Territory in 1918–19, he returned to Sydney to be with his wife, Catherine, working for some years in private business. After Catherine’s death, Percy joined the New Guinea Police Force as a warrant officer in February 1930. He rose through the hierarchy, serving for a time as the Rabaul gaoler, and took charge of the Wau Police District on the eve of the Japanese invasion. In a feat of impressive endurance, the 52-year-old police officer walked from Wau to Port Moresby.27 During the war, he worked as a peace officer with the AttorneyGeneral’s Department in Australia and later with ANGAU in
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PNG, eventually attaining the rank of major. In September 1945, he wrote to Reg Halligan, Secretary of External Territories, to say that many former members of the PNG civil service felt ‘a certain amount of apprehension, probably quite unreasonable’, about their future career prospects.28 Whatever his doubts, Moncur rejoined the PNG Police Force as a warrant officer in February 1946, and was soon posted to Lae as acting Inspector. His second wife, Evelyn, joined him later in the year. By 3 January, the Filipino soldiers were extremely anxious — the local Europeans were enraged by Scott’s death. How did a unit of Filipino Scouts end up in Lae in 1948? They were in fact part of a larger phenomenon, for World War II scattered different groups of Asian soldiers and labourers across the South Pacific. The Japanese Army used Chinese, Taiwanese and Korean conscripts and forced labourers in different parts of PNG. More than 630 Cantonese died on New Britain. One POW camp in Lae housed a contingent of Taiwanese into 1946, while several hundred Korean labourers and artisans were still stranded in Rabaul in early 1948 awaiting repatriation.29 The massive American military machine brought other groups of Asians to PNG. Just as the backwash of the Pacific War had unexpectedly landed a contingent of Chinese Nationalist soldiers and labourers on Manus to pack up surplus war stores, so the receding conflagration with the Japanese had beached a group of Filipino Scouts with the US Army in Lae. In one of those strange coincidences that shape events and make life more complicated, the Chinese and Filipino units arrived in PNG within weeks of each other, ensuring that the Administration would have to contend simultaneously with two potentially explosive conflicts. Founded in 1901 in the wake of the Spanish-American War, the Philippine Scouts were designed originally to be a counterinsurgency force; but, over time, they became a more regular part of the US Army, acquiring infantry, cavalry, artillery and support units. Long waiting lists existed for enlistment in the Scouts, and Filipinos were permitted to enter West Point in 1914, though few
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took up the opportunity and most Scout units remained under the command of American officers.30 During World War II, President Roosevelt famously pledged to grant all Filipino soldiers, including the Scouts, American citizenship in return for their often heroic deeds in fighting the Japanese. However, although several thousand Scouts were naturalised after Japan’s surrender, the US Congress reneged on Roosevelt’s promise when the Philippines gained independence on 4 July 1946 and passed a rider to the Rescission Act stripping all regular Philippine Army soldiers of their rights and privileges as US veterans.31 Following the war, socalled New Scout units were founded, building on around 6,000 old Scouts who had managed to survive combat, imprisonment and the Japanese occupation.32 The New Scouts continued to be a part of the US Army, but they did not receive the same conditions as American soldiers. Even though their wage was increased in June 1946, to 50 Philippine pesos a month, privates in Scout units were still paid only half as much as their American counterparts and they did not receive subsequent raises. The reconstituted Scouts peaked at approximately 36,000 until they too were dissolved in September 1949. Many of the pre and postwar Scouts eventually joined regular units in the US Army, enjoying the same conditions as their American peers and often retiring to the United States. Aniceto Bagley served with the New Scouts for some years, including a stint on Saipan in 1947–48 with the 76th Ordnance Ammunition Company, storing, inspecting and disposing of the large US ammunition stores that had been left over after the war. He believes that being a Scout was a good job, offering steady pay and a chance of social advancement. The New Scouts were a cut above the ordinary Filipino Government troops, occupying a social position that carried some prestige and honour. The US 1946 Rescission Act reinforced this division. In contrast with their pre1945 brothers, most of the New Scouts were literate and spoke English. Bagley recalls that his company interacted at work with the American forces on Saipan for the most part in a businesslike
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way. He contends that there were no racial problems. ‘Whenever we had an opportunity to work with American troops we were treated as equals.’ This account does not ring entirely true. Many American soldiers did regard the Filipino Scouts in a friendly and protective manner, but this sense of comradeship did not disturb the fundamental power structure of the US Army, which kept the Scouts in a subordinate role. Bagley himself admits that social contact between the Scouts and white troops, on Saipan and back in the Philippines, was limited and that occasional beer-hall incidents took place, implying that the two groups were separated by important differences.33 The US Army used the Filipino Scouts for various purposes in the western Pacific in the late 1940s. Some Scout units performed guard duty or carried out reconstruction work. Others were sent to Guam, Okinawa and Saipan to help handle the vast surplus American military stores. These operations brought the Scouts into contact with representatives of the Chinese Nationalists, who had of course purchased the stores under the bulk contract signed in Shanghai in 1946. Members of the 557th Quartermaster Service Company based in Manila, the Scouts who came to Lae in late 1947 were deployed to PNG as a US War Graves Registration Unit, charged with the task of scouring through the local cemeteries to locate the remains of fallen American soldiers. At the end of the war, the US military sent a number of these units, commonly known as search teams, throughout the Pacific War zone to track down as many graves as possible. About 150 Scouts had been working in Finschhafen, the site of a US military cemetery with 11,000 graves, since early 1947.34 Before the events at the Cecil, the contingent in Lae had been in the area for only a month, having arrived on 30 November. The unit was 20 strong, 15 Filipino privates, a Filipino Master Yeoman, three white American sergeants and the commanding officer, Lieutenant Ordonez. Although he was an officer, Ordonez was bound to his soldiers by some powerful bonds besides the normal solidarity of a military
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unit, for he was a Mexican American. Like the Filipino Scouts, he came from a Spanish-speaking, Catholic culture, which was often regarded with disdain by white Americans. Mexicans were subjected to much formal and informal discrimination in the United States, and usually occupied a socially and financially marginal position. Ordonez’s Mexican heritage added another element to an already complicated ethnic mix. As soon as the news of Scott’s death reached him, Ordonez moved quickly to defend his unit’s camp in the Busu area, a few kilometres outside the township to the east, rightly anticipating that the local Europeans would respond with great anger to this awful eventuality. Given the intense feelings in the town, he restricted his men to camp unless they were engaged on essential official business, ruling the Cecil off limits. As night fell, the Scouts dug a trench around the camp and an armed guard of five soldiers, one-quarter of the entire unit, took up positions, rotating every hour. Ordonez nailed special orders on the camp’s bulletin board, revealing just how spooked he was: 1. Guards will walk to their posts on the Detachment Road in an alternating motion, so that they are facing each other at all times. 2. Guards will be alert at all times to see that no trouble arises. 3. There will be no shots fired until it is evident to the guards’ satisfaction that the trespasser is a man or object to undermine this unit. 4. In case of imminent danger, one guard will give the normal challenge — HALT WHO GOES THERE. If there is no answer let him have it! One guard will fire first to allow the object to reveal itself so that the other guard will have a chance to pour it on! If a small length of time elapses after the first shot — He may be wise to your trick. DON’T WAIT. POUR IT ON.
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5. Other two guards will stay back take cover and wait to see if you are needed. Don’t give your position away unless it is necessary; there may be others lurking somewhere else waiting for a wrong move. 6. Keep in clear until trouble arises, then take cover. If you walk near the grass you’re liable to find a stealthy grip depriving you of your protection. 7. The Officer and the Sgt of the Guard will immediately take action to awaken the Detachment and retaliate [against] the aggressors. 8. Every man will sleep with his clothes on and his weapon ready. 9. In case of emergency where all the Detachment must go into action, the positions indicated on the Retaliation Defense Plan below will be taken immediately. Remember at night cover is very important. Once you fire a shot or two from one location in the trench, ease yourself at least 18 inches to the side and fire again. You give your position away with every shot!! But! Don’t move too much or you may give yourself away completely.
These orders left no doubt that Ordonez feared an attack launched from several sides by well-armed opponents. This fear was not misplaced given that many local whites had fought during the war. If it was true that the Europeans had armed themselves with rifles and dynamite, strong precautions were necessary. The Filipinos were greatly outnumbered and in unfamiliar territory. At the foot of his special orders, Ordonez warned his troops that they were ‘not dealing with men who know nothing about military tactics … our methods may be known to them’.35 The Filipinos were adopting a defensive posture, and there is no suggestion that they considered mounting any incursions into the town. But the tone of Ordonez’s orders suggested that he almost relished the chance for a shoot-out. Or was he simply inexperienced and afraid? Some members of the
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European community were certainly anxious about the possibility of an armed conflict getting out of control and hurting innocent civilians. Bulolo Gold Dredging had a large freezer unit in the Busu area, not far from the Scouts’ camp, under the care of an engineer. A vehicle was swiftly sent up to the unit to bring the engineer and his family, a wife and young daughter, back to the company’s main camp in Lae.36 In another special notice issued on 3 January, Lieutenant Ordonez stated that ‘unfavourable circumstances among civil and military organizations in this local [sic]’ made it imperative that the camp should take all security measures without delay. ‘The present local populace is dissatisfied with the idea of having an American unit in the region.’ At the end of this second special notice, Ordonez finally hinted at the reason for the confrontation that appeared to be at hand. ‘On 1 January 1948, the local people deprived this unit of their privileges which the local authorities had guaranteed were available. Although the local authorities were present at the scene of the discord, the local residents and members of this unit nevertheless disagreed and the results were inevitably untasteful [sic].’37 Ordonez did not refer directly to Scott’s death — indeed, his words were designed to avoid any responsibility. Although the two European vigilante groups had been headed off before they could march on the Filipino camp, District Officer Roberts and Inspector Moncur had good reason to believe that Lae was on the brink of serious violence. Their unease about the possibility of bloodshed was sharpened by the memory of events that had taken place almost exactly a year earlier. On 25 January 1947, Richard Burt, a local pilot, had stayed overnight at the Tebb residence, sleeping on the verandah, which overlooked the Lae foreshore. Late at night, Burt awoke to the sound of what he assumed was an intruder. Alerted by his cry, Iris Tebb, who ran the local European primary school, rushed out on to the verandah with a revolver and fired a full magazine, seven shots in all, into the darkness towards the sea. Burt then discharged another seven
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rounds. Two of these 14 bullets hit a Melanesian, Suvia, one passing clean through his right shoulder blade and the other grazing the left side of his neck. Suvia was walking along the beach with three friends as the tide receded looking for a good spot for spearfishing. It seems almost certain that Tebb and Burt fired their fusillades at 12am, suggesting that midnight was a particularly dangerous time in Lae. But the shooting was not the end of the matter, for Suvia and two of his three fishing companions, Borowa and Yosi, were members of the local native police detachment. The morning after the shooting, 30 of Suvia’s comrades, armed and furious, conducted what the Acting Administrator, Justice Phillips, later described as a hostile demonstration outside the Tebb residence. After restoring order and removing the Tebbs and Burt to safety, a European police officer first disarmed and then summarily dismissed all 30 policemen, bringing in replacements from the Lae police depot. The local authorities were determined to prevent Melanesian police from taking matters into their own hands. This was not the only source of disquiet in the town. At the initial trial before the District Court on 19-20 March, James Peterson, the branch manager of Burns Philp, testified that members of the European community commonly discharged firearms, often for no apparent reason. He recalled hearing several volleys of shots at different times on the night of 25 January. Although Suvia spent 16 and a half days in hospital recovering from his shoulder wound, the Supreme Court later meted out a surprisingly light punishment, fining Tebb and Burt £25 each on a conviction of unlawful wounding.38 The widespread carrying and use of firearms by private citizens engendered unease in Canberra and Port Moresby, and it is hardly surprising that the formation of two gangs to avenge Scott’s death provoked further anxiety. If the mobs had advanced on the camp, a firefight between the Filipinos and the local white population would have occurred. Each side was well-armed, and any
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battle would likely result in significant bloodshed. So, the near confrontation on Manus between the Chinese contingent and the Administration police in March 1948 was prefigured by a similar situation in Lae several months earlier. Alarmed by the mounting prospect of violence and acutely conscious that he had little backup — no more than a few policemen — Roberts wired the US military forces based at Finschhafen late on the afternoon of 3 January, reporting that a Filipino Scout had killed an Australian. Early the next morning, Roberts flew by chartered aircraft to Finschhafen to discuss the dangerous situation in Lae with three US army officers — Major Sylvester Merritt, US Provo Marshall, Captain Andrew Morgan and Lieutenant Colonel Caluya. An American doctor from the local Lutheran missionary hospital, Theodore Braun, joined the discussion. Convinced by the District Officer’s sense of urgency, the four Americans flew back to Lae to try to help prevent an armed clash between the two groups. Moncur was at the Lae airstrip to meet Roberts and his companions, the group adjourning to his residence. The two Australians told Major Merritt that ‘a train of events were [sic] set in motion instantaneously on the night of 31 Dec resulting in a general brawl and free for all’. They admitted that Lieutenant Ordonez had made one complaint about discrimination against the Scouts on 26 December, five days before the fateful clash, but they stressed that they had no control over whom the local populace wanted to welcome into their own homes.39 After this meeting, Lieutenant Colonel Caluya, Major Merritt and Moncur’s offsider, Assistant Sub-Inspector Patrick Larkin, travelled across town to the Filipino camp to confer with Ordonez. The Americans moved quickly to quieten things down on their own side — they could not allow tempers to get any more out of control than they already were. There was still a risk that the town’s enraged mood would boil over into violence. An autopsy is a grim task and speed is crucial in a criminal investigation, for the chance of ascertaining the cause of death and
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acquiring sufficient evidence to convict a perpetrator declines rapidly after the first two or three days. Lae Hospital lacked a morgue, and post-mortem examinations had to be conducted in the open without adequate screening. The tropical heat accentuated the foul smells that emanated from a rapidly decomposing corpse. On 4 January, Dr Braun performed an autopsy on Scott’s body, with Dr Carl Gunther assisting. Gunther was an experienced and able doctor, having joined Bulolo Gold Dredging as the company medical officer in 1931, and he saved many lives in the Changi POW camp in Singapore during the war. Given his skills and long experience, he often performed major surgery in Lae.40 Two other doctors, Captain Morgan, US Army, and Roy Scragg, from the Lae Hospital, looked on. After Braun’s autopsy, the coroner, Assistant District Officer John Rigby, issued the order for burial at noon. Later in the day, as the afternoon heat beat down, Fitzy Scott buried her husband far from home in the old Lae cemetery, up on Markham Road near the end of the runway. In an obituary published some weeks later, the Pacific Islands Monthly declared that the mining manager ‘was held in high esteem in the Morobe district’.41 By the evening of 4 January, Major Merritt realised that he had been drawn into a complicated and potentially ugly problem, and he sent an urgent message to his headquarters in Manila, the Philippines-Ryukyus Command (Philrycom), via the Royal Australian Navy’s liaison officer in Port Moresby. He stated that one of the Scouts of a search team had allegedly committed a crime, and asked for instructions. Philrycom replied swiftly, appointing Merritt investigating officer and ordering him to conduct a preliminary inquiry. ‘Due to the belligerent attitude of the population’, Merritt restricted the Scout unit, including Lieutenant Ordonez, to the confines of the camp as a precautionary measure. By exempting the three white American sergeants from the restriction, he underscored the racial divisions within the US Army.42 On 5 January, Philrycom instructed Lieutenant
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Colonel Caluya and Major Merritt to ‘inform Australian authorities that any and all personnel desired by them with reference investigation killing Mr Scott will be provided immediately’. Further, the two American officers were instructed to remove the remainder of the search team from Lae to Dutch New Guinea, safely outside Australian jurisdiction.43 A vessel was due to set sail on 14 January, more than a week away. Caluya departed from Lae two days later for Finschhafen and played no further part in the Scott case. Merritt would not be so lucky. About this time, Roberts contacted his own superiors in Port Moresby, who in turn relayed the news of the Lae incident to Canberra. In each case, the Australian and American officials on the ground were receiving their orders from a distant headquarters, far removed from the emotional cross-currents in a small town on New Guinea’s north coast. Roberts provided the Administration with his account of the chain of events that had led to such a horrible outcome. Six Filipino Scouts of the US Army had entered the dance hall at the Hotel Cecil on New Year’s Eve without paying. When asked to pay, one of the Filipino soldiers had allegedly offered to do so if police at the dance furnished him with a woman. He had then ‘become aggressive’. ‘European spectators and Philippinos engaged in a fracas.’ After some time, the Filipinos had ‘retired’ from the hall but ‘missiles [had been] hurled from their direction in the darkness’. One missile had struck Scott, who sustained serious head injuries and died three days later, leaving his wife to inform his relatives back in Australia. Once more, the bureaucrats and politicians in Canberra were confronted with PNG’s rawness. The Secretary of External Territories, Reg Halligan, ever the efficient public servant, informed his minister, Eddie Ward, without delay that he had sent a copy of Roberts’ message to External Affairs ‘with a suggestion that suitable advice might be sent to the American authorities’.44 Halligan’s spare official prose and his due regard for bureaucratic procedures were perhaps necessary, even inevitable, but they were at odds with Fitzy
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Scott’s overwhelming loss and the anger seething through the small, remote community. At this time, The Canberra Times reported Scott’s death under an unfortunate headline, ‘Mine Manager Dies from Dance Injury’.45 Scott’s death triggered a protracted legal and political imbroglio, which dragged in the members of three ethnic groups — Australians, Filipinos and Americans — and generated considerable tension between Canberra, Manila and Washington. This messy drama was played out before the local Melanesian and Chinese communities. Australians regarded the maintenance of law and order as the cornerstone of their legitimacy in PNG, and saw any serious crime, especially one where the victim was European, as a threat to social stability. Closely parallelling the events on Manus, Scott’s death quickly became a test of the Administration’s ability to impose its jurisdiction over the territory ostensibly under its control. From the very outset, the Scott and Pondranei cases were intertwined; the young islander was assaulted and abducted three weeks after the mining engineer’s death. The two crimes had much common ground: in each instance, the suspected perpetrators were not only Asians but outsiders, transient residents brought to the Territory in the wash-up of the war. The two cases involved the same Australian officials, judges and police, and raised the same issues of sovereignty, justice and, most crucially, power. And in each case, the Australians came to see the Americans as ambiguous allies. Confusion about the events at the heart of the conflict in Lae made the interaction of the Australians, Americans and Filipinos even more abrasive. What had happened on that wet, hot night? Nearly a week after the fight at the Cecil, it was far from clear who had done what. Roberts’ charged cable to Canberra pointed the finger of blame unequivocally at the Filipinos. Lieutenant Ordonez was far from ready to accept any blame — he was incensed by the behaviour of the Australian authorities — and he quickly interviewed the eight privates who had been involved in the fracas and the
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unit’s three white sergeants. The Scouts — Vicente Corbe, Eduardo Bahinting, Augustine de la Cruz, Benedicto Dacillo, Salvador Andico, Marianito Barbonga, Ramon Paton-og, and Pacifico Bantilan — painted a quite different picture of the events at the Cecil. The Scouts recalled that they had travelled on New Year’s Eve first to Chinatown, outside the town limits proper, to attend a party and then on to another gathering in the Malay quarter. They had been welcomed readily in the Asian sector of the town. They had later driven into the town centre to the Cecil. Although several Scouts claimed they had never intended to enter the hall, most of the eight admitted that they had gone to the Cecil with the aim of joining the dance. Barbonga, Paton-og, Corbe, Bahinting, Andico and Dacillo told Ordonez that they had mounted the steps at the end of the hall, reaching the entrance way, where they were blocked by three Australians. They knew one of the men by sight, Inspector Moncur, but could not name the other two. It is telling that the Filipinos were unable to name all but one or two of the Europeans, highlighting the limited level of contact they had had with the surrounding community leading up to the conflict. Indeed, as they were repeatedly interviewed in the coming days, the Scouts contended on several occasions that the Australians tended to look alike, neatly inverting the common white stereotype that it was impossible to tell one Asian from another. Although the Scouts could not name the two other Australians blocking the doorway, they had in fact been John Scott and a local baker, Gregory Kiley. De la Cruz and Bantilan said they had initially mounted the steps but had run back down when the rain had started several minutes later to seek shelter elsewhere. From their own and other statements, Bantilan and de la Cruz were involved only peripherally in the ensuing argy-bargy, looking on from a distance as the disagreement at the top of the stairway escalated. Everything had appeared amicable — well, at least for a few minutes. Dacillo remembered that a ‘big man’, Inspector Moncur,
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had said, ‘Boys, if you want to dance you will have to pay a pound.’ Dacillo claimed that he had replied, ‘We cannot dance because we have no girl and it is useless to pay a pound if we cannot dance.’ As four other Australians had come to the entrance, Moncur had become abusive: ‘OK if you don’t dance get the hell out of here you cocksucker bloody dog.’ Barbonga recalled that the Australians had also insisted that there were no girls at the dance for the Scouts. When Moncur had yelled ‘get out of here’, Andico stated that he had said he would only take shelter and go back to the camp as soon as the rain had stopped. He recalled that at least three Australians had called the Scouts ‘bloody dogs’ and ‘cocksuckers’. The Filipinos who had been standing at the top of the steps all claimed that the Australians had attacked them, pushing them into the drainage ditch at the foot of the staircase. Dacillo said he had been the first to be pushed forcefully by Moncur out into the rain. Falling backwards down the steps, he had cut his hand when he crashed into the drain. Andico contended that one of the other Australians had ‘boxed me on the neck’; his assailant had appeared drunk because he was unable to walk straight, zigzagging back and forth. There had been ‘too many of them’, Corbe stated, ‘all of them were rushing’. Bahinting recalled: ‘One Aussie hit me and knocked me down, and I got up and ran away into the jungle.’ Standing to one side chatting with an Australian and two Malays, de la Cruz recollected that he had heard loud voices coming from the dance hall. He had looked up to see six Australians advancing on his friends: ‘Our men were already in the ditch and the Aussies still kept pushing our men.’ For his part, Paton-og claimed that the Australians had pushed him violently. ‘We were already under the hall. Then they pushed me again. I stumbled down on the ditch. Then one Australian boxed me right away. My cap fell off and I stooped down to pick it up. He boxed me again. Then I ran. Two Australians held me and pushed me to the ground. I got up from the ground and ran to the main road.’ Having escaped from the brawl, Paton-og had waited for his companions at a safe distance.46
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The Scouts told Ordonez that they had fled down the hotel’s pathway until they regrouped at the junction with the main road. Coming out of hiding in the jungle, de la Cruz had rejoined some of his comrades on the road, looking back through the darkness to the parking lot. Moncur had walked down from the hotel and declared, ‘OK boys you can go back to your weapons carrier and you can go home.’ Three of the Scouts, Barbonga, Andico and Dacillo, had returned to the carrier only to find that its rotor or throttle was out of order. While they were repairing the fault, fumbling in the dark, anxious to leave as quickly as possible, three Australians had jumped menacingly onto the carrier, two at the rear and one at the front. One had asked who had started the trouble. Standing astride the hood, another had lunged into the vehicle, pulling Dacillo up over the windscreen and punching him in the face, blackening his left eye. He had then made a grab for Andico, who fled again into the jungle, hiding in thick bushes. A third had asked the two remaining occupants of the carrier, ‘Who wants to fight?’ The Scouts had hastily declined. De la Cruz said one of the men had gripped him by the arm and dragged him back to the carrier. The Australians had then allowed Barbonga to drive the carrier out of the parking lot, with Moncur giving directions, down to the main road, where he had picked up his friends. The Scouts had not stopped on the way home. Back at the camp, they had towelled themselves dry, changed their clothes and gone directly to bed. They all denied using insulting language or drinking alcohol. They were equally adamant that they had not thrown stones or bottles at the Australians.47 Despite some inconsistencies, all the Scouts recounted the same story. To a man, they told Ordonez that it was they who had been set upon and injured, abjuring any aggressive intentions or actions on their own part. Next, Ordonez questioned his three white American sergeants. Sergeant Harold Lemons said he had known nothing about the confrontation until some time later. On New Year’s Eve, he had kept a sick friend company. Mr MacAlister,
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a representative of the Commonwealth War Graves Commission, had fallen ill and Lemons had gone to the Cecil late in the afternoon to buy a pot of soup. The next morning he had taken pictures at the local military cemetery, which contained 2,804 Australian and British Commonwealth graves, returning to the camp midmorning, when he heard of the trouble for the first time. Sergeant Waldo Connelly shed some light on at least the tail end of the events. He informed Ordonez that he had stayed in the camp on New Year’s Eve, talking with Sergeant Okon until 11.30pm or so, before going to bed about midnight. But he had been soon disturbed. ‘I was awakened about 0100 or 0130 … by the men when they came in. They were discussing the fight and making a lot of noise. They were intending to go back to the Hotel with bolos [ie., machetes] and I stopped them. I quited [sic] them down. They went to bed. The weapons carrier was parked in its proper place by one of the men.’ Connelly contradicted the account provided by the Scouts on a crucial point — they had not gone meekly to bed, but had armed themselves with the intention of returning to the hotel to continue the fight. Connelly had explained the ‘complications’ that would inevitably arise if they went back to the Cecil, and, after some discussion, the Scouts had relented. Connelly told Ordonez that one of the boys had returned to the camp with a wound on his hand, while Andico and Paton-og’s faces had been bruised and were extremely red. ‘None of the boys were drunk … There were no knives in their possession.’ Ordonez asked if the Scouts had said anything more about the fight. ‘Yes, they said that the Australians were too many for them,’ Connelly replied, ‘and they had to run through the bush to the main road and then to the cross road where Barbonga picked them up.’ The third sergeant, Lawrence Okon, stated that he ‘knew nothing about the Jamboree until it was all over’. After talking with Connelly, he had gone across to the Cecil about midnight, drinking and dancing until 2am, when he had heard about the fight for the first time. ‘It was just general talk, so I only got the
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gist.’ He had not noticed any confusion in the hall between midnight and 2am so he kept dancing. Oblivious of the brawl that had erupted in front of the hotel, Okon had later gone to a party at a house. He had not returned to the camp until 10pm on 2 January. Somewhat oddly, he had remained unaware of the simmering confrontation in the town — the rising anger in the Australian community and his own camp’s emergency countermeasures — for two full days. Back at the camp on 2 January, he had asked the Scouts what the trouble was about and they had claimed that ‘some of the Australians had tried to push them around’. He could tell his commander no more.48 On 5 January, Ordonez sat down to write a report on the incident at the Cecil. Five typed foolscap pages in length, his account of the events before and after the fight was unapologetic, defiant and at times aggressive. He noted at the outset that the unit had intended to start extensive field operations, locating and registering the war graves, on 8 January, but friction with the local white populace had quickly interfered with the activities of his unit. On or about 24 December, some of the Scouts ‘had been forceably [sic] encouraged by the local residents to keep away from the Hotel Cecil’. He had consulted District Officer Roberts and Inspector Moncur two days later, stating that this discrimination was unacceptable. Reading from a book of regulations, Roberts had said ‘only persons of Aboriginal descent or affiliation’ were barred from a hotel. Given that they were members of the US Army, the Scouts would not be restricted in any way provided they behaved properly. Ordonez wrote that he had pledged that the unit would conduct itself according to all the standing regulations, and Moncur had promised that ‘he would be present to prevent further discord to the best of his ability’. Ordonez said he had posted a notice in the camp on 30 December reminding his men that the celebration at the Cecil on New Year’s Eve was a mask ball. He had instructed the Scouts to wear at least ‘a hand-made eye-mask’. On the night itself, Ordonez
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stated that he and the unit’s Master Yeoman, Teo Agbanawag, had first attended a social gathering at the house of a local Chinese, Peter Ahtun, and then moved on to the dance at the Cecil, arriving 30 or so minutes after midnight. Moncur had immediately notified him of the fight. ‘Although the Inspector did not explain then what had caused the discord, he stated at the spur of the moment that the members of the Detachment were the originators of the trouble.’ Thanking the inspector ‘cordially’ for his prompt notification, Ordonez had sat on a lounge chair for five to 10 minutes ‘with the purpose of acquainting himself with the layout of the hotel Recreation Hall and get an idea of the extent, if any, to which the participants had carried their merriment. The overall appearance of the hall and the people therein revealed that it was an intensive social affair where everyone thought he knew everyone else and felt right at home. Bottles of alcoholic spirits were quite prevalent.’ After swinging by the European hospital and finding that Scott had already been discharged with no serious wounds, Ordonez declared that he had immediately driven back to the camp and awoken the Scouts. After ‘a physical examination’, he concluded that the Scouts had been pushed out of the hall, fleeing, according to standing instructions, back to the camp ‘as quickly as circumstances allowed’. He insisted that the Scouts had followed his exact orders and had acted properly at all times. He recalled that he had met Roberts and Moncur on 1 January, stating that he did not want the Cecil closed because it was ‘the one place where the bulk of the residents congregated socially’. Instead, he had ruled the hotel off limits for his unit and enforced ‘a cooling off period’ to allow things to calm down. But this reasonableness had been met with an implacable attitude. Moncur had again blamed the Scouts for the fray. As his report came to a close, Ordonez became more indignant. He had instructed his men on 31 December that they would not find single women at the dance, cautioning them to always ‘obtain the permission for her escort’, to be courteous and ‘keep their noses clean’. Keenly aware of the systematic discrimination
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against his own people in the United States, this Mexican American had always believed that the behaviour of the local Australians was motivated by prejudice. The third-last paragraph of his report was telling: ‘Local residents have admitted that in their opinion a Filipino is a half-caste, is coloured, and is therefore treated and looked upon as such by them.’ Ordonez regretted that the mission had been ‘stalemated by the course of events’, and the setback in the start-up of the field operations was ‘a true loss to the Military Service’. He clearly regretted Scott’s death, but would not resile from his belief that no fault lay with his own men.49 When they were questioned by Major Merritt on 5 January, the Scouts again claimed that the Australians had called them ‘bloody dogs and cocksuckers’ and pushed them out of the hall down into the ditch. In most instances, they provided accounts that were uncanny in their similarity. Even if they had not colluded to fashion a single, consistent story, they had had five days, cooped up in the camp, to discuss the events at the Cecil. Almost to a man, they replied to Merritt’s questions about the fateful events of New Year’s Eve with a simple yes or no. No, they could not recognise any of the Australians, except perhaps Moncur. No, they did not see any blows. No, they did not drink alcohol. No, they did not pick up any weapons or throw bottles, stones or sticks (though Bantilan did contend that he had seen an Australian carrying a stone during the melee). No, they did not flip an Australian’s necktie. No, they did not flick an Australian with a poncho. No, they did not see an Australian with blood covering his face. Yes, they returned directly to the camp and went straight to bed. Most of the Scouts did not sidestep the difficult question about whether they had wanted to dance with local white women at the Cecil. Paton-og admitted that he had told the Australians at the hall’s entrance that he would pay to join the dance if there were ‘any vacant ladies’.50 But there were some cracks in the Scouts’ common front. Most of the Scouts denied discussing the fight in the weapons
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carrier on the way back to the camp, but Bantilan admitted hearing the other Scouts discussing the fight and their injuries, though he did not elaborate. De la Cruz said he could not hear the conversation in the back of the weapons carrier. It is hard not to conclude that the two Scouts were protecting their comrades. One can well imagine what kind of conversation would have taken place. Bloodied and bruised, the Scouts had been forced to flee and they would have felt angry. Tipped off by Sergeant Connelly’s statement to Ordonez, Merritt suspected that the Scouts had indeed been angry on that return journey and he asked if they had picked up machetes back at the camp. Most of the Scouts again replied with a stub