Culture, Globalization and the World-System: Contemporary Conditions for the Representation of Identity

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C o p y r i g h t 1997 b y the Regents of the University of Minnesota A l l rights reserved. N o part'of this publication may be reproduced, stored i n a retrieval system, or transmitted, i n any f o r m or b y any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the publisher. Published by the University of Minnesota Press 111 T h i r d Avenue South, Suite 290 Minneapolis, M M 55401-2520 Printed in. the United States of .America o n acid-free paper Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Culture, globalization, and the w o r l d - s y s t e m : contemporary conditions for the representation of identity / edited b y A n t h o n y D . King.: p. cm. Papers presented at a s y m p o s i u m h e l d at the State University of N e w York at Binghamton on A p r i l 1,1989. Originally published: Binghamton : Dept. of A r t and A r t History, State University of N e w York at Binghamton, 1991. With, n e w pref. Includes bibliographical references .and indexes. I S B N 0-8166-2953-6 (pb) 1. Culture:—Congresses. 2. Acculturation—Congresses. 3. Ethnicity—Congresses. I. K i n g , A n t h o n y D . GN357.C848 1997 306—dc21 97-2347

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Preface to the Revised Edition.

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Acknowledgments

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Introduction: Spaces of Culture, Spaces of Knowledge Anthony King

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1. The Local and the Global: Globalization and Ethnicity Stuart Hall

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2. O l d and N e w Identities, O l d and N e w Ethnicities Stuart Hall

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3. Social Theory, C u l t u r a l Relativity and the Problem of Globaiity Roland Robertson

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4. The N a t i o n a l .and 'the Universal: C a n There Be Such a T h i n g as W o r l d Culture? Immanuel Wallerstein

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5. Scenarios for Peripheral Cultures UlfHannerz

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6. Interrogating Theories of the G l o b a l

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CONTENTS •" T

G o i n g Beyond Global. Babble Janet Abu-Lughod

Preface to the Revised Edition

II. Languages and M o d e l s for C u l t u r a l Exchange Barbara Aboii-El-Haj III. Specificity and Culture Maureen Turim IV. The Global, the U r b a n , and the W o r l d Anthony King TV. Globalization, Totalization and the Discursive Field John Tagg 7, The G l o b a l and the Specific:: Reconciling Conflicting Theories of Culture Janet Wolff N a m e Index Subject Index Notes on Contributors

SINCE THE ESSAYS IN THIS BOOK WERE FIRST PRESENTED AT A N INTER¬ national s y m p o s i u m i n upstate N e w York i n 1989, there has been a. phenomenal growth of interest i n the subject of globalization. Yet, relatively little of the literature on this topic has addressed 'the many complex questions arising from the impact of globalization on specifically cultural issues or, indeed, of culturéis) on the processes of globalization, however those two very problematic concepts are interpreted. If this is one good reason for bringing out a second North. American edition of 'this book, another is the continued relevance of 'the many powerful arguments and different perspectives raised by its various contributors. Encouraged, therefore, by the positive reception accorded the first edition, the enthusiastic support of editor M i c a h Kleit at the University of Minnesota Press, and, i n a more pragmatic sense, the somewhat furtive circulation of its predecessor, 1 start this preface to the revised edition. 1

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A s I indicated i n the original edition, each term of the m a i n title is associated w i t h the name of particular leading scholars — the authors of the principal papers h e r e — w h o , over the past two decades, have pioneered

In addition to the titles cited here, Public Culture (1988-), the journal of the Society for Transnational Cultural Studies, and Theory, Culture and Satiety (1983-) provide valuable guides to the existing literature. Published under the imprint of my parent department, the title never quite made it into the American edition of Books in Print. Outside North America, the book is published by Macmillan (London) and, in Japanese, by Tamagawa University Press. 1

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PREFACE TO T H E REVISED EDITION

the study of issues that the title suggests, some f ocusing p imarily o n questions of culture, others on the world political economy, st. il others on questions of societal transformation and identity formation, .'et., despite their different positions and different «..«nu»'» "»"•»* ».* • conceptual , v - . languaReiiri3rsMre, ° ,° „ .... ;

rethought at the close ot the second millennium, a time i n historical space w h e n additional symbolic meaning is being invested i n the construction of a new space i n historical time. It is fair to predict 'that scholars i n an increasing number of specialized fields, from architecture to zoology, not only w i l l look to existing theories of "the w o r l d as a single place," to' quote Roland Robertson, but also w i l l , through their o w n fields of expertise and research, refine and develop them. Illustrative of the emergence of more specialized studies in this area has been the increasing use of the notion of "global culture." In recently reviewing some 'twenty books and essays in. which the term either figures i n the title or is defined and discussed in. the text, 1 became aware of a number of points. First, perhaps, is the very obvious one that the w o r d " g l o b a l " has acquired a certain fashionable éclat, n o w used, without definition or explanation, where previously " w o r l d w i d e , " "universal," or "everywhere" w o u l d have sufficed. More seriously, however, Featherstone writes that as there is a wide variety of responses to the processes of globalization, there is "little prospect of a unified global culture, rather there are global cultures i n the p l u r a l . " Yet, meanings accorded to "global culture" differ. Recognizing this, there is a temptation to suggest a basic distinction between what might, from a spatial perspective, be termed centripetal and centrifugal uses: i n 'the first, cultural forms, influences, and practices from many parts of the w o r l d locating at a place or population are seen to create a new "global culture";

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to a greater or iesser extent, at least two perspectives: to reiection of the nationally constituted society as the appropriate object of discourse, or "unit of social and cultural analysis, ar^o^n^jppgpt w a y s ajqdjp varying degrees, a commitment to conceptualizing "the w o r l d as a w h o l e . " "" Since the book was first published, these authors, either on their o w n or i n collaboration with others, have continued to forge ahead, developing their' ideas and, i n some cases, responding to issues and questions raised at the 1989 symposium, stimulating our thoughts and extending our v i s i o n . In addition, a growing number of authors have both interrogated and .reinterpreted notions of globalization and the world-system, or, as I later suggest, have responded by refusing them. Other scholars have pursued some of the more focused issues they prompt: 'the future of national identities and cultures; the rethinking of. ideas of modernity, religion, and w o r l d history from '^perspective of globalization; the localization of the global; the transformation of statecentric assumptions i n the social sciences; and, i n the humanities, ways of theorizing contemporary novels as examples of the globa lization of culture. These and many other studies of globalization, i n '. widely different fields, are surely indicative of a major paradigm shift taking place .in.'th.e„way.that the scholarly production of knowledge is being 3

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For example, David Morley and Kuan-Hsing Chen, eds., Stuart Hall: Critical Dialogues in Cultural Studies (London and New York: Routledge, 1996); Ulf Kannerz, Transnational Connections: Culture, People, Places (London and New York: Routledge, 1996); Roland Robertson, Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture (London, Newbury Park, and New Delhi: Sage, 1992); and Immanuel Wallerstein, Geopolitics and Geoadture: Essays on the Changing World-System (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991) and After Liberalism (New York: New Press, 1995). Both in this volume and in other publications, Robertson, as well as other scholars mentioned here, take up a number of the points made by Janet Wolff in her concluding critical essay; see note 4 and also essays in Morley and Chen, Stuart Hall; and Hannerz, Transnational Connections. "Malcolm Waters, Globalization (London and New York: Routledge, 1995); Tony Spybey, Globalization and World Society (Cambridge: Polity, 1996); Anthony Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modem Age (Cambridge: Polity, 1991); Frederick Buell, National Culture and the Mem Global System (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994); Jonathan Friedman, Cultural Identity and Global Process (London, Thousand Oaks, and New Delhi: Sage, 1994); Mike Featherstone, Scott Lash, and Roland Robertson, eds., Gbbd Modernities (London, Thousand Oaks, and New Delhi: Sage, 1995); Peter Beyer, 3

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Religion and Globalization (London, Thousand Oaks, and New Delhi: Sage, 1994); Bruce Mazlish jnd Ralph Buultjens, eds.. Conceptualizing Global History (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1993); Rob Wilson and Wimal Dissanayake, eds., Global/Local: Cultural Production and the Transnational Imaginary (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1996); Peter J. Taylor, "On the Nation-State, the Global, and Social Science," Environment and Planning A, 28 (1996), with commentaries fromfourteensocial scientists currently writing on globalization; Michael. Valdez Moses, The Novel and the Globalization of Culture (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1995). Anthony D. King, "The Problem of Global Culture and the Internationalization of Architecture," in Distanzierte Verstrickungen: Die ambivalente Bindung sociologist Forschender., an ihren Gegenstand. Festschrift für Peter R. Gleichmann, eds. Eva Barlösius, Elcir. Kürsat-Ahlers, and Hans-Peter Waldhoff (Berlin: Sigma "Verlag, forthcoming, in German). The following paragraphs draw from this. Mike Featherstone, "Global Culture: An Introduction," in Global Culture: Nationalism, Globalization and Modernity, ed. Featherstone (London, Newbury Park, and New Delhi: Sage:, in association with Theory, Culture and Society, 1990), 8. For example, Karen Fog Qlwig, Global Culture, Island Identity: Continuity and Change in the Afro-Caribbean Community of Nevis (Philadelphia: Harwood, 1993). 5

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PREFACE TO T H E REVISED EDITION

i n the second (more commonly), cultural influences or practices, stemm i n g from one location, are said to be found, i n various forms, i n many parts o f the globe. '(Neither of these, incidentally, is a particularly new phenomenon.) " Such, a dichotomy is all too simple, however. .If there are globally pro¬ '* duced cultures, there are (as Robertson maintains) culturally produced * views of globality. Where John Dobson assumes the increasing exis» tence of a global corporate culture, the more w i d e l y held opinion is — that specific cultural practices and institutions, w h e n not resisted, are invariably i n d i g i n i z e d , h y b r i d i z e d , subjected to processes of cultural translation i n the manner of their reception. Globalization is not a one¬ way process, ñor does it come from a single source... Furthermore, its effects are not equally distributed i n a. global situation of grossly uneven ^ d e v e l o p m e n t . At¡pr^An|M.durffis Idea of a variety of cultural flows, * - stemming from different social, spatial, .and historical locations (see — pages 10—11 of the Introduction), along w i t h alternative in terpretatíons, — still has value. M o r e recently, the less-than-elegant "glocalization," a ^ Japanese marketing neologisn from, the 1980s, has been proposed to capture the process whereby rhe global is adapted to differentiated — local conditions. There is, ho- -ever, still a tendency i n many studies to delineate, i n relation to mate.ial, media, or professional cultures, a — process of global production — legitimate in itself — ye to ignore the -» very different circumstances < if their recep tion /consur. .ption and the — meanings invested i n this pro< 'S.s. 8

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For example, Karla Poewe, eel., C irismatic Christianity as a Gbbal Culture (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1 94); and other examples in. Waters, Globalization, among others. 'John Dobson, "The Role of Ethic • in Global Corporate Culture," Journal of Business Ethics, 9 (1990): 481-488. Cyan Prakash, "Science 'Gone 1 ative' in Colonial India," Representations, 40 (Fall 1992): 153-178. Jan. Nederveen Pieterse, "Glob: zation as Hybridization," in Featherstone, Lash, and Robertson, Global Modernities, 45- 1 Anthony McGrew/"A Global Sot ery?" in Modernity and Us Futures, eds. Stuart Hall, David Held, and Tony McGrew (Cam! idge: Polity Press, 1992), 62-113. "Waters, Gktbdimtian, 156-157. Roland Robertson; "Glocalizatii i: Time-Space and Homogeneity-Heterogeneity," in Featherstone, Lash, and Robertson, -iobai Modernities, 25-44. We must also acknowledge that ie increasing numbers, of people in the category of global travelers are likely to be indir d to accord similar meanings- to globalized phenomena and hence the growth of "glo a-talk.™ 8

A l l of these interpretations might be said to be "internal" to the notion of the global, encompassed within its boundaries, so to speak. A t quite a different level, Kenneth Surin writes that "a theory of culture is something that is produced or created no less than its putative object...... A 'theory of culture, in this case, global culture, is not about culture/global culture itself but about the concepts that culture generates. A theory of culture does not impinge directly on culture but on the concepts of culture. It is a part of the process by w h i c h every culture generates for itself its o w n 'thinkabiiity' (and ' u n t h i n k a b i l i t y ' ) . " Yet, all of these views stem from a particular Western episteme. Because all stress the importance of transnational forces, the practices of coding and decoding everyday practices that disrupt, disturb, and even deny the identity of the global are not revealed. One realm of intellectual inquiry that aims to do this, namely, the more historically and politically grounded arguments- of post-colonial criticism, though crucial to this topic, is too extensive to be treated here. Moreover, contestations of these representations- of globalization are also likely to be found i n major w o r l d religions. TJjls,xa»^Ae.very' basicjque^oaflf whether it is actually possible for different geographical, social, political, religious, and cultural constituencies to w o r k w i t h the same concepts. A n d as only some of the works cited here address the question of gender, there is clearly an. urgent need to remedy this. In m y original preface I made, reference to the necessity of thinking about globality through the arts, in contrast to the (mainly) social science perspectives of the authors here. A l t h o u g h a growing body of theoretical w o r k on globalization and the arts is emerging, the real answer to this question is to be found, rather i n the contents and -contexts of their actual performance and practice rather than in theory — much of it 16

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"-Kenneth Surin, "On Producing the Concept of a Global Culture," in Nations, Identities, Cultures, ed. V. Y. Mudimbe. Special issue- of South Atlantic Quarterly, 94 (1995): 1179-1200. 1 am indebted to Abidin Kusno for this comment. "Reference must be made, however, to Edward Said's Culture and Imperialism (London: Chatto and Windus, 1993). "'For example, Spybey, Globalization and World Society; Robertson, Globalization. See, for example, Doreen Massey, Space, Place and Gender (Cambridge: Polity, 1994). A preliminary bibliographic search suggests that feminist research and writing are primarily focused on global economic, social, and political issues (including, but not limited to, the condition of women, as well as peace, health, ecology, and so on) rather than more generalized studies of globalization. 1

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CULTURE, GLOBALIZATION A N D THE WORLD-SYSTEM generated through 'the very historically, geographically, and spatially specific sites of w o r l d and global cities, increasingly significant political, .and cultural formations 'that, until now, have been conceptualized, and researched more i n economic than social and 'Cultural terms. It is the very specificity and originality of novels, music, dance, video, poetry, graphics, film, photography, theater arts, painting, architecture, radio, television, carnival .arts, public sculpture, and their equally distinctive cultural politics and political effects, their' personal and comm u n i t y histories and memories, that w i l l help refine the next generation of theorizing about globalization in. 'the political, social, and, especially, cultural sphere, j 21

Acknowledgments

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Anthony D . King Binghamton, N Y September 1996

Paul L. Knox and Peter J. Taylor, eds.. World Cities in a World-System (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Anthony D. King, Global Cities: Post-Imperialism and the Intermtionalisation of London (London and New York: Roufledge, 1990); Saskia Sassen, The Global City: New York, London, Ta'kya (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1991); Sharon Zukin, The Cultures of Cities (Cambridge, Mass., and Oxford: Blackwell, 1995). For some initial consideration of the arts in this context see, for example, "The Global Issue: A Symposium," Art in America, 77 (July 1989),; also Jean Fisher, Global 'Visions: Towards a New Internationalism in the Visual Arts (London: Kala Press, 1995), and selected papers in Third Text (1957-;. 11

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THE ESSAYS IN THIS COLLECTION WERE FIRST PRESENTED AT A ONEday s y m p o s i u m held at the State University of N e w York at Binghamton i n A p r i l 1989 and subsequently revised and edited for publication. The first two talks, by Stuart H a l l , were given two weeks before the main symposium; the chapters that appear here represent slightly edited versions of the transcriptions made from the taped presentations. The symposium was supported b y grants from the offices of the Dean, VicePresident and Vice-Provost for Graduate Studies and Research at the university. I w o u l d like to thank them and also many others w h o helped organize and make the conference possible, including the speakers; the associate dean of H a r p u r College, Trudy Cobb Denard; Steve Ross and Barbara Abou-El-Haj for chairing; Carol Breckenridge, editor of Public Culture; the A r t History Graduate Students U n i o n , particularly, its then president, Joe Socki; m y art history colleagues, particularly John Tagg, Wendy Sorting, and others w h o assisted in various ways; the members of the Fernand Braudel Center, especially Donna De Voist; George M c K e e for his advice; M a r i o A . D i Cesare for his help w i t h the production of the first edition; Carol Marcy and Joan Scott of the Department, of A r t History; and especially the staff of the then University Manuscript Center, Lisa Fegley-Schmidt, Phyllis Antos, Lois Orzel, .and Elizabeth Regan, for their excellent cooperation and expertise. Finally, my thanks to A b i d i n Kusr.o and Janet Wolff for their comments on the preface to this second edition.

Introduction: Spaces of Culture, Spaces of Knowledge

ANTHONY

KING

I WANT TO START THIS INTRODUCTION BY LOOKING AT THE THREE terms u s e d in. the m a i n title of this book and by explaining w h y they have been p u t together, if somewhat uneasily, to f o r m one single idea. C u l t u r e , whether i n its material or symbolic f o r m , is .an attribute w h i c h people(s) are said to have; globalization is a process a n d the w o r l d - s y s t e m is a, structure. Each term is a. construct associated, botl in this, book a n d more generally, w i t h a substantial though dis tine b o d y of scholarship .and also, w i t h the names of i n d i v i d u a l scholars modes of i n q u i r y and academic disciplines. ,„ I shall not attempt here to provide m u c h elaboration of the tern culture w h i c h , especially i n recent years, has undergone yet m o r transformations of meaning. In the .announcement of the symposiun w h i c h f o r m e d the basis of this v o l u m e , reference was made to cul tures as "socially organized systems of m e a n i n g expressed i n p a i ticular f o r m s " and to " t h e historical .and sociological study of con crete cultural forms and practices." A s Janet W o l f f points out i n he concluding chapter, however, the p r i n c i p a l papers here operate bot w i t h different .and, i n some cases, undifferentiated notions of c u l t u n the various authors use the term to refer, at different times, to way

CULTURE/ GLOBALIZATION A N D T H E WORLD-SYSTEM of life, the arts a n d media, political or religious culture a n d attitudes to globalization. Both here and elsewhere, I m m a n u e l Wallerstein differentiates between culture (usage I) as "the set of characteristics w h i c h distinguish one group f r o m another" and usage LT, i n the belles lettres sense, as " s o m e set of phenomena w h i c h are different from (and 'higher' than) some other set of phenomena w i t h i n a n y one g r o u p , " an evaluative distinction w h i c h m a n y w o u l d see as part of the cultural problematic, F o r the purposes of this introduction, I shall try and collapse this distinction between what i n crude terms one might broadly call older " a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l " notions of culture (i.e. ways of life, values, beliefs) and " h u m a n i s t i c " ones {arts a n d media) and adopt W o l f f ' s conceptualisation: i.e. by suggesting that culture i n its sense of art, literature, f i l m , practices of representation of all kinds, both draws f r o m and participates i n the construction of culture as a w a y of life, as a system of values a n d beliefs w h i c h , i n t u r n , affects culture as a creative, representational practice, w e can b r i d g e what is often a gap between these different meanings. In this sense, the study of culture has become the particular province of C u l t u r a l Studies. ?, 1

A s i m o ' d e of academic and. intellectual i n q u i r y , C u l t u r a l Studies is particularly associated w i t h the establishment, i n 1964, of the Centre for Contemporary C u l t u r a l Studies at the University of B i r m i n g h a m , E n g l a n d , u n d e r the Directorship of R i c h a r d Hoggart, Professor of English Literature, a n d subsequently, Stuart H a l l , Director between 1968 and 1979. A c c o r d i n g to H a l l / C u l t u r a l Studies arose from, a concern that major cultural transformations were taking place i n society, not least i n w o r k i n g class culture, yet none of the " t r a d i t i o n a l " disciplines were addressing them. The emergence of C u l t u r a l Studies i n the 1960s was part of a crisis that was to undermine the humanities a n d social sciences and w h i c h also represented a politicization of academic w o r k . Essentially theoretical i n its orientation, 2

Immanuel Wallerstein, "Culture as the Ideological Battleground of the .Modem World-System," in Global Culture. Nationalism, Globalization and Modernity, ed. Mike Featherstone (London, Newbury Park and New Delhi: Sage, 1990)33. Stuart Hall, Dorothy Hobson, Andrew Lowe, Paul Willis, eds., Culture, Media, Language, Working Papers in Cultural Studies, 1972-9 (London: Hutchinson, 1987):7. This paragraph draws on cornm.en.ts made by Stuart Hall at a Round Table Seminar, Department of Art and Art History, SUNY-Binghamton, 13 March, 1989. 1

INTRODUCTION d r a w i n g on M a r x i s m , semiotics, feminism and. other discourses, Cul¬ tural Studies was not seen as a discipline, but " a n area where dif_^ ferent disciplines intersect i n the study of the cultural aspects of ^ society."* Subversive i n intent, the field was consciously concerned w i t h transforming the practice of p r o d u c i n g knowledge, w i t h issues of cultural politics, and w i t h asking cultural and theoretical questions in relation to power. A l o n g w i t h C u l t u r a l Studies' epistemological, methodological and theoretical concerns of the 1970s and 1980s w h i c h , as Stuart H a l l ' s contribution demonstrates here, have constantly been transformed by n e w critical paradigms, m u c h of the w o r k of C u l t u r a l Studies was solidly g r o u n d e d i n historical studies of English society, the three paradigmatic and foundational texts usually being acknowledged as Richard Boggart's The Uses of Literacy (1958), R a y m o n d W i l l i a m s ' Culture and Society (1961) and E. P. Thompson's The Making of the English Working Class (1968). Subsequent influential texts such as P a u l W i l l i s ' s Learning to Labor have also f o l l o w e d i n the same geographical, social and class context. The question arises, however, as to whether the nationally defined society is the most appropriate unit either for cultural or for social analysis, It is immediately apparent here that, i n discussing globalization f r o m the particular' point of v i e w of " E n g l i s h n e s s , " of E n g l i s h cultural identity, Stuart H a l l is m o v i n g between, and o c c u p y i n g , at least four inter-related yet still identifiable cultural spaces w h i c h I «m w i l l call those of post-imperialism (Britain), post-colonialism (Jamaica, Britain/England, the U S A , and other post-colonial spaces elsewhere) and what he terms " g l o b a l mass c u l t u r e " and the " g l o b a l post-mod¬ e m . " W h i l s t each of these cultural spaces may be seen, hypothetically, as sub-cultural parts of an equally hypothetical " g l o b a l c u l t u r e , " o:r maybe just pieces of a larger jigsaw, not all of them would, be usef u l for placing the identity of say, a T u r k i s h migrant i n G e r m a n y , the Vietnamese c o m m u n i t y i n N e w Y o r k or, to change the example, the built environment of South K o r e a n workers i n the G u l f . These are precisely the k i n d of issues w h i c h are anticipated b y Janet W o l f f i n her conclusion: first, w e need a theory of culture "at 5

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CULTURE, GLOBALIZATION A N D THE WORLD-SYSTEM

INTRODUCTION

the. l e v e l of the international"' a n d second, in. suggesting that cultural theory "has started to m o v e away from its earlier, rather ethnocentric approach to investigate the global dimensions of cultural p r o d u c t i o n and c o n s u m p t i o n , " acknowledgement of the l i m i t e d , culture-specific contexts i n w h i c h earlier cultural theory paradigms operated. If both these propositions are accepted, they .also i m p l y that, i n a d d i t i o n to needing a " d i f f e r e n t i a t e d " notion of culture, as W o l f f suggests, w e also need a differentiated notion of " t h e international" a n d " t h e g l o b a l . " This, to return to m y opening paragraph, is precisely the reason for juxtaposing the contributions of Wallers tein o n the world-system a n d Robertson on globalization with, a discourse on, culture. These I shall refer to i n more detail below. 6

A n y theory of the international, or global, w o u l d need, to recognise both the totally different presuppositions, as w e l l as conceptualizations resulting f r o m them, of both these terms: at their simplest, the w h o l e historical problematic of the formation of nation-states, the proliferation i n the nineteenth a n d especially twentieth century of the idea, of the nation, nationalism and national cultures (a result, Robertson w o u l d maintain, >t increased globality) a n d the distinctive historical, a n d unequal, conditions i n which, the notion of the "international" w a s constructed. This topic has a literature w h i c h is far too extensive to quote.. Similarly, concepts of the global and. globalization, especially as they have been foregrounded i n the last t w o decades, w i t h their i m p l i e d trans- or even a-nationality, their implicit concern, w i t h " h u m a n k i n d , " " t h e earth," as w e l l as a range of other issues, w o u l d require very careful u n p a c k i n g . In either case, little could be achieved towards constructing " a theory 6f culture at the level ofJ:he international" or "investigating the global dimensions of cultural p r o d u c t i o n " w i t h o u t very specific historically, geographically 7

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* Ulf Hannerz in his . •aper here also- suggests that "what is required is .an overall conceptualization >f contemporary culture which incorporates a sense of the pervasiveness of globalization." See Anthony D. Kin,;, "Viewing the World, as One: Urban History .and the World-System," in Urban ism. Colonialism and the World-Economy (London and New York: Routledge, 19'»a):78„ A n early attempt is made in Roland Robertson and Frank Lechner, "Modernization, Globalization and the Problem of Culture in World-Systems Theory," Tneory, Culture and Society, 2 (1985) 3:103-18. According to the Oxford English. Dictionary, the term "globalization" had. entered the vocabulary at 'the latest by 1962...

and sociologically informed conceptualizations, of " t h e w o r l d as a w h o l e " a n d , to somewhat caricature this process, the "international. _ Tev^lJtj^ing^esr^cial notice of the economic, political^cultural a n d nation-state elements i n the development of the w o r l d "order a n d the ' " g l o b a l d i m e n s i o n s " possibly focusing on the cultural, spatial, tecj^nological, material and representational dimensions of the construction' of globality.' In any event, such an investigation, by also taking in different representations of the w o r l d as a w h o l e , or globality, from different social, spatial or cultural locations i n the w o r l d , w o u l d require not only a history a n d sociology of knowledge but also a n historical geography of such, to give equal treatment to contesting representations of " t h e w o r l d as a w h o l e . " Some of these issues are addressed b y Robertson i n his paper here. W h i l s t these m a y be seen as essentially theoretical concerns, it might be preferable to start by l o o k i n g at m u c h more specific questions of cultural identity a n d the historical conditions w h i c h have p r o d u c e d them. H e r e , I shall return to the subject of C u l t u r a l Studies, its distinct historical relation to the study of E n g l i s h working-class culture a n d of contemporary culture i n the U K . In particular, as a contribution to developing a theory of culture at an international level, I shall try and m a p out some aspects of the geographical, historical, and cultural, specificity of post-colonialism as one distinctive p r i s m through w h i c h some contemporary c u l t u r a l phenomena can be approached. The " E n g l i s h w o r k i n g class," neither economically, socially, c u l turally nor spatially, can be understood as an. autonomous unit (irrespective of its connection to the larger " B r i t i s h " class structure); its. constitution resulted from occupying a particular space i n an. international d i v i s i o n of labor, the other parts of w h i c h were as essential to its existence as they (the English w o r k i n g class) were as essential to theirs. The system, of course, as H a l l points out, was the colonial empire, w h i c h was not only a political a n d economic, but also a social and cultural system.: w i t h o u t the sugar plantation w o r k e r s i n

1

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The source of this concern was prompted by a study of "the production of a global culture" as represented by the near global diffusion of one particular item, and settlement type, in the built environment: see Anthony D. King, "The Global Production of Building Form," in Urbanism, Colonialism and the WorldEconomy, 100-29, and The Bungalow: The Production of a Global Culture (London and New York: Roulledge and Kegan Paul, 1984). 9

5

INTRODUCTION

CULTURE, GLOBALIZATION A N D THE WORLD-SYSTEM the West Indies there c o u l d have been no trade u n i o n labor at the Thameside's Tate a n d Lyle refinery i n L o n d o n ; w i t h o u t workers i n the C a d b u r y ' s Cocoa plant i n B i r m i n g h a m , there w o u l d be n o cash crop cocoa labor i n West Africa. The cultural system w h i c h was the outcome of this political a n d economic system is most obviously, and importantly, represented b y language, but not only that: it includes a mass of variations of c o m m o n institutions r a n g i n g f r o m administrative a n d religious practices to architecture, f r o m university curriculae to literature. A n d historically, it includes the U n i t e d States w h i c h , for the present, still retains English as its official language. W i t h o u t this post-colonial, transnational cultural system (and. I am. not i m p l y i n g that it is hegemonic) the contents of this book w o u l d not be w r i t t e n i n (international) English. » m .» **. «e .»> «**• m.

-** -* — ¿0. <*

The shortcomings of any academic p a r a d i g m , be it sociology or cultural studies, conceived o n the basis of a " n a t i o n a l society," can be* illustrated by t w o examples. W i t h a potentially exponential g r o w t h i n international migration, w i t h many cultures existing far f r o m their places of o r i g i n a n d indeed, not necessarily for' any length of time (vide migrants f r o m K u w a i t , South A f r i c a , the Soviet U n i o n ) , there is no " n a t i o n a l l y grounded." theoretical p a r a d i g m which, can adequately handle the epistemological situation. It is not just that, increasingly, m a n y people have no roots; it's also that they have n o soil. Culture is increasingly deterritorialized. In the second place, a k n o w l e d g e p a r a d i g m based p r i m a r i l y on a nationally organized society, or at least, w i t h o u t a larger transnation¬ a l frame, can also not cope w i t h cultural phenomena w h i c h , w h i l e clearly related to those of that society, nonetheless circulate i n , out¬ side and around i t , i n the case of the U K , i n the U S A , India, N i g e r i a , South Africa, A u s t r a l i a , H o n g K o n g and elsewhere i n the " E n g l i s h s p e a k i n g " ecumene. The rapidly expanding post-colonial discourse i n English, though itself posing distinctive problems i n regard to its origins and location of both theoretical a n d political reference, is ample i l l u s t r a t i o n . E d w a r d Said makes a similar point: 10

See, for example, Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths, Helen Tiffin, The Empire "** Writes Back, Tticory and Practice in Post-Colonial Literatures (London and New York: Routlcdge, 1989); Trinh T. Minh-ha, Women, Native, Other. Writing Postcokmiality «. end Feminism (Bloomington: Indian University Press, 1989); Gayatri C. Spivak, 101

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O n e of the canonical topics of m o d e r n intellectual history has been the development of dominant discourses a n d disciplinary traditions i n the m a i n fields of scientific, social or cultural i n «p» quiry. W i t h o u t any exceptions that 1 k n o w of, the paradigms for this topic have been d r a w n f r o m what is considered exclusively Western sources. Foucault's w o r k is one instance of w h a t I mean ^ a n d , i n another d o m a i n , is R a y m o n d W i l l i a m s ' . I mention these ^ t w o formidable scholars because In the m a i n I a m i n almost total * sympathy w i t h their genealogical discoveries to w h i c h I a m *m inestimably indebted. Yet for both of them the colonial experiM, ence is quite i r r e l e v a n t . . . Elsewhere i n the same article Said writes:

<*- there have been no full-scale critical studies of the relationship between m o d e r n Western imperialism a n d its culture, the occlusiort of that deeply symbiotic relationship being a. result, of .it. j»» M o r e particularly, the extraordinary dependence — formal a n d ideological — of the great F r e n c h and E n g l i s h n o v e l o n the facts *~ of empire has never been studied from, a theoretical

•-«• viewpoint.

11

W i t h o u t this recognition of the historical specificity of colonialism it is impossible properly to c o m p r e h e n d one, if not the central p h e n o m enon of many contemporary cultures: race and racism. This is w h y the study of specifically colonial cultures is an essential pre-requisite for the study of many contemporary post-colonial and post-imperial ones.

*» 17« Post-Colonial Critic (London: Routledge, 1990) and issues of the journal, ••*» Inscriptions brought out by the Group for the Critical Study of Colonial Discourse s» and Center for Cultural Studies, University of California at Santa Cruz, parlicularly, Travelling Theories, Travelling Theorists, ed. James Clifford and Vivek Dhareshwar, 1989. The question of whether the "rediscovery" of colonialism, -~ postcolonialism, postcoleniality and its relevant discourses in particular regions » and institutions of the US in the late 1980s has more to do with the restructuring, m through "diversity," of American national cul tural identity rather than social and cultural movements in the immediate "post-colonial" societies of Africa or Asia themselves is a problem which still remains to be addressed. Both Lata Man! and James Clifford provide valuable insights into the role of locality In the production of cultural theory in Inscriptions, 5, 1989. "EdwafffSaid, "Intellectuals in the Post-Colonial World," Salamagundi, 70-71 (Spring-Summer 1986),:44-64, 62, 59. 7

CULTURE, GLOBALIZATION A N D THE WORLD-SYSTEM

INTRODUCTION The point is made more specifically i n Feathersfone's introduction to Global Culture (1990) where he speaks of " t h i r d cultures" developi n g to facilitate transcultural c o m m u n i c a t i o n : the " t h i r d c u l t u r e " idea has already almost half a. century of history b e h i n d it, grounded in. ideas of M a l i n o w s k i , though relating specifically to a "colonial, third c u l t u r e " situation. To conclude this section, therefore, it is clear that, i n certain locations, a n d certain cultural contexts, even indeed for certain cultural actors a n d practices, the relevant cultural space to w h i c h the discourse belongs is not, certainly, the " n a t i o n a l " society, the " i n t e r n a t i o n a l " society nor even the economically a n d politically neutral, technologically-transformed space of " t h e g l o b a l " but a m u c h more historically a n d culturally inscribed space of post-colonialism. T h o u g h dependent on the location, the actors and the institutions, it c o u l d also be post-imperialism w h i c h is characterised by quite a different distribution of p o w e r .

•»

A s has been pointed out elsewhere, the first substantial encoun¬ ter between (to use a l l terms defined b y the center to describe its " O t h e r " ) Europe a n d non-Europe, -between what have been called " d e v e l o p e d " a n d j " d e v e l o p i n g " societies, between capitalist a n d pre-capitalist economies, between w h i t e a n d non-white, between people largely of one cultural a n d religious background and those of m a n y other cultural a n d religious backgrounds, took place i n w h a t were to become the colonies, not the metropole; i n the periphery, not t o r e ; i n non-Europe, not Europe, whichever conceptualisation w e prefer. The first globally multi-racial, multi-cultural, multi-continental societies"on any substantial scale were i n the periphery, not the core. They were constructed under the very specific economic, political, social and cultural'conditions of colonialism and they were largely, if not entirely, products of the specific social a n d spatial conditions of colonial cities. O n l y since the 1950s (and somewhat earlier i n the U n i t e d States) have such multi-racial, multi-cultural, multi-continental urban cultures existed i n a n y substantial w a y i n Europe. Since the 1950s, different terms have been invented (almost entirely by " t h e W e s t " to map, i n R o l a n d Robertson's terms, the global c o n d i tion: First/Second/Third W o r l d , N o r t h / S o u t h , developed/underdeveloped/ developing, core/'periphery/semi-periphery, a n d so on. The First/Second/Third W o r l d categories were first a p p l i e d , u s i n g Western economic a n d social indicators, to measure processes of " d e v e l o p m e n t " i n different market and centrally-planned economies. Yet if this classification were reinterpreted to refer historically to those societies w h i c h , racially, ethnically, socially and culturally first a p p r o x i mated to what today are the culturally diverse, economically, socially and spatially polarised cities i n the West but also, increasingly, major cities r o u n d the w o r l d , w h a t is n o w the T h i r d W o r l d w o u l d historically more accurately be labelled the First W o r l d , a n d the First W o r l d w o u l d become the T h i r d . In other w o r d s , the culture, society a n d space of early twentieth century Calcutta or Singapore pre-figured

— * » ** *»•

the future i n a m u c h more accurate w a y than d i d that of L o n d o n o:r N e w York. " M o d e r n i t y " was not born i n Paris but rather in. R i o . W i t h this interpretation, Euro-American paradigms of a so-called "Post¬ M o d e r n i s m " have neither m u c h meaning n o r salience outside the narrow geographical confines of Euro-America where they developed.

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Yet w h i l e post-colonialism a n d post-imperialism fill a fair amount of the space i n a w o r l d - w i d e cultural system, like the red or blue i n k w h i c h colored the " i m p e r i a l " parts of old maps of the w o r l d , they d o not b y any means occupy all of it. A n d w h i l s t I have been focusing specifically on the English-speaking post-colonial cultural ecumene, it is equally evident that there are also the French, Spanish, Portuguese, D u t c h , Japanese to mention the more important. I now want to return once again to the question i n m y opening paragraph as to w h y these three ideas of m y title were put together.

The World-System and Globalization I have so far been addressing the p r o b l e m of a C u l t u r a l Studies p a r a d i g m based, if not p r i m a r i l y on the notion of a nationally-consti-

Mike Featherstone, "Global Culture: An Introduction," in Global Culture, ed. Mike Featherstone (London, Newbury Park, New Dehli: Sage, 1990):9. See Anthony D. King, Colonial Urban Development. Culture, Social Power and Environment (London and New York: Routledge, 1976) 58 et seq. See note 10 on the role of locality. 13

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'Anthony D, King, Urban ism. Colonialism and the World-Economy, 7. 8

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CULTURE., G L O B A L I Z A T I O N A N D T H E W O R L D - S Y S T E M ruled society, at least o n one inadequately related to a larger social and c u l t u r a l system. For I m m a n u e l Wallerstein, " t h e only k i n d of social system is a world-system w h i c h w e define'quite s i m p l y as a unit w i t h a single division of labor and multiple cultural systems. It follows logically that there can, however, be t w o varieties of such w o r l d systems, one w i t h a c o m m o n political system and one without. W e designate these respectively as w o r l d empires and w o r l d e c o n o m i e s . " Yet just as C u l t u r a l Studies has represented its object w i t h o u t reference to the rest of the w o r l d (whether through the " w o r l d - s y s t e m , " the "international l e v e l " or " t h e global"), so the w o r l d - s y s t e m perspective has represented the w o r l d , u n t i l relatively recently, w i t h o u t m u c h reference to culture. One c o u l d therefore add to Wallerstein's formulation above that there could be two varieties of w o r l d - s y s t e m , one w i t h a c o m m o n political (and, I w o u l d a d d , elements of a c o m m o n social a n d cultural) system, especially as it is l i n k e d b y l a n guage, cultural practices a n d institutions (i.e. the world-empires) and the second, w i t h o u t a c o m m o n political (but, I w o u l d a d d , w i t h strong elements of a social and cultural) system (i.e. the w o r l d economy). In the former, w e might locate H a l l ' s post-colonial a n d postImperial discourse; i n the latter, his propositions about a " g l o b a l mass c u l t u r e " and a n " A m e r i c a n conception of the w o r l d . " The two, of course, are inter-related. 16

The extent to w h i c h one can begin to map out, and develop, even to the l i m i t e d extent I have done here w i t h colonial and post-colonial cultures, the conceptual. language w h i c h w o u l d capture the culture of the capitalist world-economy is a task yet to be undertaken. O n e m i g h t refer, for example, to A p p a d u r a i ' s five dimensions of global cultural flows w h i c h move in, non-isomorphic paths: ethnoscapes produced b y flows of people: tourists, immigrants, refugees, exiles a n d guest workers. Secondly, there are technoscapcs, the machinery and plant flows produced by multinational and national corporations a n d government agencies. T h i r d l y ,

INTRODUCTION there arefinanscapes,p r o d u c e d b y the r a p i d flows of money i n the currency markets a n d stock exchanges. Fourthly, there are mediascapes, the repertoire of images of information, the flows w h i c h are p r o d u c e d a n d distributed b y newspapers, magazines, television .and film. Fifthly, there are ideoscapes, l i n k e d to flows of images w h i c h are associated w i t h state or counter-state movement ideologies w h i c h are comprised of elements of freedom, welfare, rights, etc. 17

L i n k e d to these w e may a d d , s i m p l y , the town a n d landscapes w h i c h are p r o d u c e d b y the global diffusion of information, images, professional cultures a n d sub-cultures and supported by international capital flows. It is i n the context of these non-isomorphic flows that w e can n o w t u r n to the third term i n m y title, globalization. R o l a n d Robertson has spelt out his use of this term i n a n u m b e r of papers: " t h e crystallization of the entire w o r l d as a single p l a c e , " the emergence of " t h e global-human c o n d i t i o n " a n d " t h e consciousness of the globe as s u c h . " O n the face of It, the notion of globalization, i n its v e r y neutrality, w o u l d seem to have m u c h i n its favor. E t y m o logically, global does not carry as m u c h cultural, religious, historical baggage w i t h It as does the term world, with. its. historically richer connotations of w o r l d l y , u n w o r l d l y , this/ next w o r l d etc. L i n g u i s t i cally, w o r l d (the historical etymology of w h i c h takes u p four pages i n the Oxford English Dictionary c o m p a r e d to a mere half page for globe) is most frequently used to refer to the w h o l e of h u m a n k i n d , h u m a n society, the earth or a region of it; globe, however, has a more limited connotation, referring more specifically to the earth or terrestrial globe. It is also m u c h easier to set out an. array of grammatical terms (noun, adjective, verb, etc.) for the latter than the former, (i.e., globe, global, globally, globalize, globalization, globality, globe-wide) 18

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Arjun Appadurai, "Disjunction and Difference in the Global Cultural Economy," Global Culture, 295-310, as paraphrased by Featherstone, Introduction, 6-7. Anthony D. King, "Architecture, Capital and the Globalization of Culture," Global Culture, 397-411. Roland Robertson, "Globalization and Societal Modernization: A Note on Japan and Japanese Religion," Sociological Analysis, 47 (1987):3S-43; ibid. "Globalization Theory and Civilizationai Analysis," Comparative Civilizations Review, 17 (1987):20-30. 17

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Immanuel Wallerstein, "The R: ; and Future Demise of the World Capitalist System: ConceptsforComparati e Analysis," Comparative Studies in Society and History, 16 (1974):390; also in ibid. Tlte Capitalist World-Economy (Cambridge University Press, 1979). 16

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CULTURE, GLOBALIZATION A N D THE WORLD-SYSTEM

INTRODUCTION

a n d t h o u g h the same is indeed possible for the concept of the w o r l d system, (i.e. w o r l d - s y s t e m , world-systemic, world-sys: ?mically, etc.) it is clear that the concepts covered by these terms are c bviously very different (for example, the notion of social movements. 1 eing anti-systemic cannot p r o p e r l y be r ' p r o d u c e d i n the global vo :abulary). Yet if defined i n terms of "the process b y w h i c h the w o : Id becomes a single p l a c e , " globalization has .also its ambiguities, irrespective of its silencing of economic, p o l deal or cultural parameter 3. Does it, for example, merely i m p l y a s .ate of inter-connectedness ? O r does the inter-connectedness take a special f o r m (as i n an inte national d i v i sion of labor)? Does it i m p l y c u l t u r a l homogerdzr tion, c u l t u r a l synchronization or cultural proliferation? W h a t does ii say about the direction of cultural flows? Is it the interaction of the local and the global, w i t h the emphasis o n the former, or vice v.:rsa? Is it the synchronization of temporality? W h i l s t Robertson speaks to some of these issues, the questions demonstrate that, on a global scale, culture has to be thought spatially, politically, economically, socially a n d historically a n d also very specifically.

stood by reference to " a single division of labor w i t h multiple cultural systems." A n d i n regard to the same realm of cultural production, Robertson's array of global concepts can be equally effective in helping to explain, if only i n a small, but g r o w i n g sector of built environments r o u n d the w o r l d , the p r o d u c t i o n of both homogeneity a n d of difference. The question of whether such phenomena are consumed as homogenous or different, by people w i t h a range of cultural i d e n tities, is of course a totally different issue. A n d whilst it is true, as Janet W o l f f points out, that concepts such as "the West," " T h i r d W o r l d / F i r s t W o r l d , " " c e n t e r / p e r i p h e r y " are ideologically i m b u e d constructs p r o d u c e d i n discourse, it is equally the case that such constructs are constantly m o b i l i z e d a n d used as if they were real. E v e n the concept of culture itself, as used by anthropologists, was of course invented by European theorists to account for the collective articulations of h u m a n d i v e r s i t y .

A s both Barbara A b o u - E I - H a j a n d Janet W o l f f point out i n their comments, the language of the debate forces particulai positions and pre-empts particular options. The over-generalising sv eep of globalization submerges difference at the local, regional or -lational scale. A b u - L u g h o d suggests that instead of l o o k i n g at p r o c sses f r o m the top d o w n (or f r o m the center to the periphery) w e m ght better see them f r o m the bottom u p . W e might, i n this context, f peak rather of de-Iocaiization a n d , f o l l o w i n g the arguments of 1 oth H a l l a n d Robertson concerning the oppositional potential of gle >alization, also refer to re-localization, re-nationalization. 20

In any event, i n terms of developing a theory of cult ire at an. international or global level, it seems evident that, dep. ndent on the sphere of cultural p r o d u c t i o n under discussion, ideas from both the world-systems perspective as w e l l as globalization h e o i y can be operationalsed. T o speak o n l y i n terms of the producti on of space, i n all of its urban, architectural, a n d built form dimertsio i s , 'this can — both i n the present and. historic past — be very effe :tively u n d e r -

Jean Gottman, "What Are Cities Becoming the Centers Of' Sorting Out the Possibilities," in'Cities, in a Global Society, eds. Richard V... F night and Gary Gappert (Newbury Park, London, Delhi: Sage, 1989):58-67, 61. 20

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The papers H a v i n g given some indication as to w h y these papers, and their authors, were brought together it w o u l d be abusing an editorial p r i v ilege if, i n p r o v i d i n g brief introductions to them, I were to iron out the v e r y different positions and perspectives they represent. O n e of the m a n y points w h i c h emerges f r o m Janet Wolff's very comprehensive s u m m i n g u p is that, despite some agreements, the more general factor is the absence of c o m m o n ground between them as w e l l as the gap i n connecting the title and subtitle of the v o l u m e . In the f o l l o w ing comments, I shall merely set out what I see as some of their salient and valuable points,

King, Urbmrism, Colonialism mid the World-Economy; ibid.. Global Culture. James Clifford, Vie Predicament of Culture (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1988) 273; for a particularly powerful illustration of the political use of specific "ideologically imbued constructs produced in discourse" informing the writer's positionality, see Lata Mani's self-description as "a postcolonial Third World feminist working on India in the United Slates," in her "Multiple Mediations: Feminist Scholarship in the Age of Multinational Reception.;* Inscriptions, 5 (1989):l-24, 5. Mani's article also provides a useful source for the necessary differentiation of feminist perspectives mentioned in the concluding chapter by Janet Wolff, particularly the need to locate these perspectives in relation to a (larger) colonial discourse. 21

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CULTURE, GLOBALIZATION A N D THE WORLD-SYSTEM M o r e perhaps than other contributors, Stuart H a l l addresses both the sub-title a n d title of the m a i n theme m a p p i n g , i n his first paper, the w a y i n w h i c h differing configurations of the global and the local are p r o d u c i n g a n d transforming different subject positions. In looki n g at globalization f r o m the point of v i e w of E n g l i s h culture, he demonstrates not only h o w " E n g l i s h n e s s " was f o r m e d i n the context of imperialism but h o w the colonised other was constituted as part of E n g l i s h cultural identity. Yet where both Wallerstein a n d H a n n e r z see the nation state as the m a i n organizer and p r i s m for constructing cultural identity, H a l l , for a variety of reasons, sees this relationship between the state a n d identity eroding, "the o l d political a n d social terrain of Englishness being broken u p " ; w i t h this erosion comes a reaction, a narrower and more dangerous definition of identity, d r i v e n by racism. Particularly interesting are H a l l ' s comments on the " n e w forms of g l o b a l i z a t i o n " w h i c h have to d o w i t h n e w forms of global mass culture but w h i c h nevertheless remain, i n terms of technology, capital, advanced labor, centered i n the West. Yet the other characteristic of this global mass culture is its peculiar f o r m of homogenization, . . . enormously absorptive of things . . . but the homogenization -*» is never absolutely complete, a n d it does not w o r k for complet -•a? ness . .. It is w a n t i n g to recognise and absorb those differences w i t h i n the larger, over-arching f r a m e w o r k of w h a t is essentially *~ . .an .American inception of the w o r l d . .. It does not attempt to obliterate (loc , capitals) but operates t h r o u g h them.. It has to jm. h o l d the fran -work of globalization i n place a n d police that system: it staj • manages independence within, it, so to speak. The logic of a ital w o r k s through specificity: a n e w regime of dif— ference product b y capital. H a l l adamantly rejects the notion of - globalization as . ion-contradictory space; it is always contested, and - is always w i t h <. ntradictions. Indeed, " t h e most p r o f o u n d c u l t u r a l revolution has c ne about as a consequence of the margins c o m i n g into representation"; " m a r g i n a l i t y has become a p o w e r f u l space." The p o w e r of b a l l ' s analysis comes out especially i n his second, paper w h e r e 'the notion of identity is theorised specifically i n terms of its political cc ..sequences: identity Is "the guarantee of authentici t y . " The five grt..t de-centerings of m o d e r n thought have ended the old logic of identity: M a r x , l o d g i n g the i n d i v i d u a l or collective subject always w i t h i n historical practices; F r e u d , confronting the self 14

INTRODUCTION w i t h " t h e great continent of the unconscious," m a k i n g it " a fragile t h i n g " ; Saussure a n d linguistics pre-empting the process of enunciation; the relativisation of the Western episteme by the rise of other cultures; a n d finally, the displacement of the masculine gaze. These old. collective identities of class, race, nation, of gender a n d the West no longer p r o v i d e the codes of identity w h i c h they d i d i n the past; existence i n the m o d e m w o r l d is m u c h more characterised b y "technologies of the self." It is i n this context, that H a l l discusses, with, the immense p o w e r of personal experience, the development of " B l a c k " as a historical a n d cultural category of identity, the emergence of Black consciousness i n Jamaica i n the 1970s, "the most p r o f o u n d cultural r e v o l u t i o n i n the Caribbean. M u c h greater than any political revolution they've ever h a d " .and also i n Britain. The central question is l i v i n g identity through difference .and. recognizing that " a n y m politics w h i c h attempts to organize people through, their diversity of identifications, has to be a struggle which, is conducted positional!}' * » ..,.. the Gramscian notion of the w a r of p o s i t i o n . " R o l a n d Robertson, also takes u p some of these themes, if i n a different theoretical language. In a globally compressed w o r l d w i t h increasingly polyethnic, nationally constituted societies, the c o n d i tions " o f and for the identification of i n d i v i d u a l a n d collective selves." become ever more complex. D r a w i n g attention to the civilizational basis of identity construction, Robertson suggests that " c u l t u r e " has become a globally authoritative p a r a d i g m for explaining difference, a means for locating " t h e O t h e r . " H e poses this question in the interesting alternative positions of relativism on one h a n d , and worldism o n the other, a strategy w h i c h , temporarily at least, has the effect of m a k i n g culture disappear. Despite their quite different positions, Robertson would, seem to agree w i t h H a l l , at least implicitly, that capitalism thrives on the celebration, and construction of difference. For Robertson, any discussion of globalization needs to address four elemental points of reference — national societies, individuals, the w o r l d system of societies and h u m a n k i n d . H e r e , he draws attention to the w a y i n w h i c h globalization has i n v o l v e d the institutional construction of the i n d i v i d u a l as w e l l as, d r a w i n g on Geertz, the i n creasing construction of "foreignness" and the globewide establishment of " m i n o r i t i e s . " E q u a l l y suggestive are his comments on the substantive, self-reflexive utilisation of theoretical societal constructs in the development of Japanese society, and the notion that "societali s m " — the commitment to the idea of the national society — is a 15

M» «» ist

"** -•• -« .

CULTURE,, G L O B A L I Z A T I O N A N D T H E W O R L D - S Y S T E M

INTRODUCTION

crucial ingredient of the contemporary f o r m of globalization. Robertson, incidentally, is the only contributor to mention that the major w o r l d religions are m u c h older than national societies: the c u l t u : i of particular societies resulting f r o m their interactions w i t h other societies i n the global system. For Immanuel Wallerstein, the nation-state is the central organizing unit of culture, a n d nationalism, " t h e quintessential p a r t i c u l a r i s m . " .Increasingly, nation states resemble each other i n their c u l t u r a l forms. The notion that there could, be a single w o r l d culture finds deep r e sistances, opposed by political chauvinisms and by multiple counter cultures. C u l t u r e , in, Wallerstein's v i e w , is essentially a reactive force: defining culture is a question of defining boundaries that are esst ntially political boundaries of oppression a n d of def ense against opp ression. The history of the w o r l d , rather than m o v i n g towards cult iral homogenization, has demonstrated the opposite: a trend to cultural differentiation and cultural complexity. W i t h these developments, each i n d i v i d u a l increasingly belongs to m a n y cultures — an alterna¬ five w a y of saying perhaps, as Stuart H a l l points out, that people have multiple Cultural identities. Increasingly, one goes through life p i c k i n g u p identities. In this sense, identity construction is never finished,

w i t h i n the w i d e r w h o l e . " In this paper, H a n n e r z sees the world,,as increasingly becoming a global ecumene of persistent cultural interaction and exchange though w i t h asymmetry between the center and periphery, the relationship is one-sided. H e also suggests, echoing comments earlier i n this introduction, that the " F i r s t W o r l d " has been present i n the consciousness of the " T h i r d W o r l d " m u c h longer than the " T h i r d W o r l d " has been i n the minds of the " F i r s t . " A s other speakers, H a n n e r z suggests there is a need for alternative, m u c h more complex scenarios for the study of cultural homogenization a n d , as w i t h the subsequent intervention from Janet A b u L u g h o d , d r a w s on concrete ethnographical research from West Africa to back u p his abstractions.

In Wallers tein's v i e w , the state through its. m o n o p o l y of policies % and resources w i l l over time clearly create a national culture, even if it d i d not have one before. Where people see themselves belonging to a " w o r l d c u l t u r e " this is essentially the.culture of dominant-groups, i a v i e w also made by H a l l though i n reference to globalizing theories s as "the self-representatton of the dominant particular." It is from the i state that both cultural uniformity as w e l l -as cultural resist;.nee i stems: the p o w e r f u l coopt cultural resistance either b y commodify ir.g it or accommodating it i n a k i n d of cultural corruption. The present concern w i t h culture, i n the o p i n i o n of Wallerstein, follows from, the ; decline i n faithj i n the economic and. political, arenas as loci of social progress a n d individual, salvation. " C u l t u r e " and. " i d e n t i t y " are '4 means to help them regain their bearing. F o r U l f H a n d e r a , w r i t i n g subsequently to the paper i n c l u d e d here, there is n o doubt that "there is n o w a w o r l d culture... It is marked by an organization of diversity rather than the replication of uniformity. It is created through the increasing interconnectedness of varied local e n u r e s / as w e l l as through the' development of cultures w i t h o u t a clear anchorage i n one territory. These are all b e c o m i n g sub-cultures 16

2 3

H a n n e r z proposes four typical frameworks for e x a m i n i n g cultural process, " o r g a n i z e d as a flow of meanings, by w a y of meaningful forms, between p e o p l e " : the market, the state, form of life and movements, H e shares w i t h Wallerstein the belief i n the state as a strong organizational cultural force, constructing subjects culturally as citizens. But whilst recognizing that global cultural flows are u n p a c k e d , dismantled and reassembled, H a n n e r z also sees, like H a l l , the autono m y of cultural competence w h i c h exists at the local level. Nonetheless, as the local d i v i s i o n of labor is d r a w n into that at the international level, some forms of life more than, others are defined more i n terms of cultural flows f r o m the center, and some people more than, others are more i n v o l v e d w i t h metropolitan systems of meaning. W i t h movements (the women's, environmental and peace), Hannerz's four scenarios offer a considerably more sophisticated w a y of thinking about globalization, echoing some of A p p a d u r a i ' s models m e n tioned earlier. W i t h these frameworks, he asks h o w people are d r a w n into w o r l d cultures and h o w , through technology and people, c u l tures become separated from territories. Hannerz's attention to the spatial ordering of culture prompts important questions, about the i n herent social a n d spatial units through w h i c h culture is organized: ethnicity, race, gender and class on one side, and the neighborhood, city, region, nation and the w o r l d o n the other. These are ideas w o r t h further development. The extent to w h i c h the state organizes culture, moreover, clearly

23

Ulf Hannerz, "Cosmopolitans and Locals in World Culture/' Global Culture,

237. 17

CULTURE, GLOBALIZATION A N D THE WORLD-SYSTEM depends o n material conditions. A n d as A b o u - E l - H a j points out i n her commentary on the H a n n e r z paper, this is equally true whether i n the core or periphery, w i t h culture constantly being " c o r r u p t e d " and reconstituted i n both places. G l o b a l culture results f r o m multi¬ - » dimensional cultural flows a n d obviously comes f r o m a n u m b e r of — different cores or centers. In this context, H a n n e r z suggests that it is likely that increasingly cultural differences are to be found w i t h i n societies, not between them, a point that I take u p , i n relation to the cultures of so-called " w o r l d cities," i n m y o w n paper.

1. The Local and the Global: Globalization and Ethnicity

24

I shall not attempt to comment o n the five brief interventions w h i c h follow the m a i n papers, each of w h i c h raises both a n u m b e r of substantial issues as w e l l as, i n some cases, basic questions about the premises a n d organization of the debate. W h i l s t these Interventions have, for convenience, been gathered together i n one chapter, it s h o u l d be mentioned that Janet A b u - L u g h o d ' s response w a s particu l a r l y addressed to the papers of Robertson and Wallerstein a n d that of Barbara A b o u - E l - H a j to that of H a n n e r z . M a u r e e n T u r i m , John Tagg and myself each addressed the theme of the s y m p o s i u m i n the context of o u r specific subject fields of cinema, photography a n d urbanism. Finally, i n w r i t i n g this introduction, I have made considerable use of comments f r o m the c o n c l u d i n g paper by Janet Wolff, drafted .partly prior to a n d also d u r i n g the s y m p o s i u m a n d briefly revised shortly afterwards. W h e r e these comments closed the " C u r r e n t Debates i n A r t H i s t o r y " s y m p o s i u m for 1989,1 have extended it into 1990 i n this introduction, not least by reference to recent publications. Janet W o l f f poses some excellent and fundamental questions and also provides leads for further research. I w o u l d , however, have to disagree that the project of a dialogue between the different discourses represented b y the title a n d the sub-title is premature, as she suggests. It has in fact taken place. It w i l l be u p to the readers, reviewers and others to see whether it provides a basis for the debate to be developed.

See Carol Breckenridge, Preface, Public Culture, 1 (1988) 1. 18

STUART

HALL

THE DEBATE ABOUT GLOBALIZATION AS A WORLD PROCESS, A N D its consequences, has been going on n o w i n a variety of different fields of intellectual w o r k for some time. What I am g o i n g to try a n d do here is to map some of the shifting configurations of this question, of the local and the global, particularly i n relation to culture a n d i n relation to cultural politics. I a m g o i n g to try to discover what is emerging a n d h o w different subject positions are being transformed or p r o d u c e d i n the course of the u n f o l d i n g of the n e w dialectics of global culture. I w i l l sketch i n this aspect towards the e n d of this first talk and develop it in. the second w h e n I shall address the question of new and old identities. The question of ethnicity spans the two talks. I a m going to look at this f r o m what might be thought of as a very p r i v i l e g e d corner of the process, or rather, an u n p r i v i l e g e d corner, a declining corner, that is, f r o m the U n i t e d K i n g d o m , a n d particularly, E n g l a n d . Certainly f r o m the perspective of any historical account of E n g l i s h culture, globalization is far from a n e w process. Indeed, it is almost impossible to think about the formation of E n g l i s h society, or of the U n i t e d K i n g d o m a n d a l l the things that give it a k i n d of p r i v ileged place i n the historical narratives of the w o r l d , outside of the processes that w e identify w i t h globalization. So w h e n w e are talking about globalization i n the present context,

C U L T U R E , GLOB . L I Z A T I O N A N D T H E W O R L D - S Y S T E M

THE LOCAL A N D THE GLOBAL

w e are talking about some of the n e w forms, some of the n e w rhythms, some of the i.ew impetuses i n the globalizing process. For 'the moment, I do not want to define it more closely than that but I do want to suggest that it is located w i t h i n a m u c h longer history; w e suffer increasingly r'rom a process of historical amnesia i n w h i c h w e think that just because w e are t h i n k i n g about an idea it has only just started.

everything else but is not so good at recognizing that it is itself actually l o o k i n g at something. It becomes coterminous w i t h sight itself. It is, of course, a structured representation nevertheless and it is a cultural representation w h i c h is always binary. That is to say, it is strongly centered; k n o w i n g w h e r e it is, what it is, it places everything else. A n d the thing w h i c h is w o n d e r f u l about E n g l i s h identity is that it d i d n ' t only place the colonized Other, it placed everybody else.

A s an entity a n d nat.onal culture, the U n i t e d K i n g d o m rose w i t h , and is declining w i t h , c \e of the eras, or epochs, of globalization: that era w h e n the formatio of the w o r l d market was dominated by the economies and culture of p o w e r f u l nation-states. It is that relationship between the form...don and transformation of the w o r l d market and its domination by the economies of p o w e r f u l nation-states w h i c h constituted the era w i t h i n w h i c h the formation of E n g l i s h culture took its existing shape. Imperialism was the system b y w h i c h the w o r l d was engulfed in and by this framework, and also through the intensification of w o r l d rivalries between imperial formations. In this p e r i o d , culturally, one sees the construction of a distinct cultural identity w h i c h I want to call the identity of Englishness. If y o u ask what the formative conditions are for a national culture l i k e this to aspire to, a n d then acquire, a w o r l d historical identity, they w o u l d have a great deal to do w i t h a nation's position as a leading c o m mercial w o r l d p o w e r ; it has to do w i t h its position of leadership i n a highly international and industrializing w o r l d economy, a n d w i t h the fact that this society a n d its centers have long been placed at the center of a w e b of global commitments. But it is not m y purpose to sketch that out. What I a m t r y i n g to ask something about is. what is the nature of cultural identity w h i c h belongs w i t h that part cular historical moment? A n d I have to say that, i n fact, it was def.ned as a. strongly centered, h i g h l y exclusive and exclusivist f o r m of cultural identity. Exactly w h e n the transformation to Englishness took place is quite a long story. But one can see a certain point at w h i c h the particular forms of E n g l i s h identity feel that they can c o m m a n d , w i t h i n their o w n discourses, the discourses of almost everybody else; not quite everybody, but almost everyone else at' a certain moment i n history. :

To be E n g l i s h is to k n o w yourself in relation to the French, and the hot-blooded Mediterraneans, and the passionate, traumatized Russian soul. Y o u go r o u n d the entire globe: w h e n y o u k n o w what everyb o d y else is, then y o u are what they are not. Identity is always, i n that sense, a structured representation w h i c h only achieves its positive through the n a r r o w eye of the negative. It has to go through the eye of the needle of the other before it can construct itself. It produces a very M a n i c h e a n set of opposites. W h e n I speak about this w a y of being in the w o r l d , being English i n the w o r l d , w i t h a capital " E " as it were, it is g r o u n d e d not only i n a whole history, a whole set of histories, a whole set of economic relations, a whole set of cultural discourses, it is also p r o f o u n d l y grounded, i n certain forms of sexual identity. Y o u cannot think, of what the true-born Englishman is — I mean, c o u l d y o u imagine advancing into the liberties of a true-born Englishwoman? It's unthinkable. It was not a phrase that was a r o u n d . A free-born English person was clearly a free-born English man. A n d the fully buttoned-up, stiff upper l i p , corsetted notion of E n g l i s h masculinity is one of the ways i n w h i c h this particular cultural identity was very f i r m l y stitched into place. This k i n d of Englishness belongs to a. certain historical moment in the u n f o l d i n g of global processes. It is, in. itself, a k i n d of ethnicity.

Certainly, the colonized Other was- constituted w i t h i n the regimes of representation of such a metropolitan center. They were placed i n their otherness, i n their marginality, b y the nature of the " E n g l i s h eye," the all-encompassing " E n g l i s h e y e . " The " E n g l i s h e y e " sees

It has not been polite u n t i l the day before yesterday to call it this at all. O n e of the things w h i c h happens in E n g l a n d is the long discussion, w h i c h is just beginning, to try to convince the English that they are, after all, just another ethnic group. I mean a very interesting ethnic group, just hovering off the edge of Europe, w i t h their o w n language, their o w n peculiar customs, their rituals, their myths. Like any other native peoples they have something w h i c h can be said in their favor, and'of their l o n g history. But ethnicity, i n the sense that this is that w h i c h speaks itself as if it encompasses everything w i t h i n its range is, after all, a. very specific and peculiar f o r m of ethnic identity. It is located i n a place, i n a specific history. It c o u l d not

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CULTURE, GLOBALIZATION A N D THE WORLD-SYSTEM

T H E L O C A L A N D T H E GLOBAL

speak except out of a place, out of those histories. It is. located i n relation to a w h o l e set of notions about territory, about where is home and w h e r e is. overseas, what is. close to us a n d what is far away. It is m a p p e d out i n a l l the terms i n w h i c h w e can understand w h a t ethnicity is. It is, unfortunately, for a time, the ethnicity w h i c h places all the other ethnicities, but nevertheless, it is one i n its o w n terms. If y o u ask something about the nation for w h i c h this was the major representation and w h i c h c o u l d represent itself, culturally and ideologically, through the image of an E n g l i s h identity, or an E n g l i s h ethnicity, y o u w i l l see, of course, what one always sees w h e n one examines or opens u p an ethnicity. It represents itself as. perfectly natural: born a n Englishman, always w i l l be, condensed, homogenous, unitary. W h a t is the point of an identity if it isn't one thing? That is w h y w e keep h o p i n g that identities w i l l come o u r w a y because the rest of the w o r l d is so. confusing: everything else is turni n g , but identities ought to be some stable points of reference w h i c h were' like that i n the past, are n o w and ever shall be, still points in, a turning world. B u t of course, Englishness never was a n d never possibly c o u l d be that. It was not that either i n relation to those societies w i t h w h i c h it was deeply connected, both as a commercial a n d global political p o w e r overseas. A n d one of the best-kept secrets of the w o r l d is that it was not that i n relation to its o w n territory either. It was only b y dint of e x c l u d i n g or absorbing all the differences that constituted Englishness, the m u l t i t u d e of different regions, peoples, classes, genders that composed the people, gathered together i n the A c t of U n i o n , that Englishness c o u l d stand Tor everybody i n the British Isles... It was always negotiated agalnst'difference. It always had. to absorb all the differences of class, of region, of gender, i n order to present itself as a homogenous entity. A n d that is something w h i c h w e are only n o w beginning to see the true nature of, w h e n we are beginning to come to the end of it. Because w i t h the processes of globalization, that form of relationship between a. national cultural identity a n d a nation-state is n o w beginning, at any rate i n Britain, to disappear. A n d one suspects that it is not only there that it is beginn i n g to disappear. That notion of a national formation, of a national economy, w h i c h could, be represented through, a -national cultural identity, is under considerable pressure. I ought to try a n d identify very briefly w h a t it is that is happening which, makes that an untenable configuration to keep i n place for very much. longer.

First of all, i n the British case, it results .from a. long process of econ o m i c decline. F r o m being the leading economic p o w e r i n the w o r l d , at the pinnacle of commercial and industrial development, the first industralizing nation, Britain then became s i m p l y one amongst other, better, stronger, competing, n e w industrializing nations. It is certainly no longer at the forefront, or at the cutting edge, of industrial a n d economic development. The trend towards the greater internationalization of the economy, rooted i n the multinational f i r m , built o n the foundations of Fordist models of mass production, and mass consumption long outran some of the most important leading instances of this w h i c h one can f i n d i n the British economy. F r o m the position of being i n the forefront, Britain has increasingly fallen b e h i n d as the new regimes of accumulation, production, a n d consumption have created n e w leading nations i n the global economy. M o r e recently, the capitalist crisis of the seventies has accelerated the opening u p of n e w global markets, both, c o m m o d i t y markets and financial, markets, to w h i c h Britain has been required to harness itself if it were not to be left behind, i n the race. W i t h the horrendous noise of deindustrialization, Britain is, under Thaicherism, t r y i n g to g r o u n d itself somewhere close to the leading edge of the n e w technologies w h i c h have l i n k e d production and markets i n a new surge of international global capital. The deregulation of the C i t y is s i m p l y one sign, of the movement of the British economy and the British culture to enter the new epoch of financial capital. A n d new multinational production, the new new international division of labor, not only links b a c k w a r d sections of the third w o r l d to so-called advanced sections of the first w o r l d i n a form, of multinational production, but increasingly tries to reconstitute the b a c k w a r d sectors w i t h i n its o w n society: those forms of contracting out, of franchising, w h i c h are beginning to create small dependent local economies w h i c h are l i n k e d into m u l t i national production. A l l . of these have broken u p the economic, political a n d social terrain on w h i c h those earlier notions of Englishness prospered. Those are things w h i c h one k n o w s about. Those are the constituent elements of the process w h i c h is called globalization. I want to a d d some other things to them because I think w e tend to think about globalization i n too unitary a w a y . A n d y o u w i l l see w h y I am going to insist on that point i n a moment. Something else w h i c h has been breaking u p that older, unitary for-

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CULTURE, GLOBALIZATION A N D THE WORLD-SYSTEM

THE LOCAL A N D THE GLOBAL

A n o t h e r aspect of globalization comes from a quite different direction, from increasing international interdependence. This can be looked at .in two quite different w a y s . First, there is the g r o w t h of monetary and regional arrangements w h i c h link Britain into N A T O , the C o m m o n M a r k e t and similar organizations. There is a g r o w t h of these regional, supranational organizations a n d connections w h i c h s i m p l y make it impossible, if it ever was, to try to conceive of w h a t is g o i n g on i n English society as if it o n l y h a d an internal dynamic. A n d this is a. very p r o f o u n d shift, a shift i n the conceptions of sovereignty, and of the nation-state. It is a shift in. the conception, of w h a t the English government can do,

w h a t is i n its control, transformations w h i c h it could b r i n g about by its o w n efforts. These things increasingly are seen to be Interdependent w i t h the economies, cultures and polities of other societies. Last but not least is the enormous impact of global ecological interdependence. W h e n the i l l w i n d s of C h e r n o b y l came our w a y , they d i d not pause at the frontier, produce their passports and say, " C a n I rain o n y o u r territory n o w ? " They just flowed on i n and rained on Wales and on places w h i c h never k n e w where C h e r n o b y l was. Recently, we have been enjoying some of the pleasures and anticipating so ie of the disasters of global w a r m i n g . The sources a n d consequ -nces are miles away. W e c o u l d only begin to do something about it <. n the basis of some f o r m of ecological consciousness w h i c h has to ha /e, as its subject, something that is larger than the freeborn E n g lishman. The freeborn E n g l i s h m a n cannot do a n y t h i n g about the destruction of the rain forest i n Brazil. A n d he h a r d l y k n o w s h o w to spell ozone. So, something is escaping here f r o m this older unit w h i c h was the l y n c h p i n of globalization of an earlier phase; it is beginning to be eroded. W e w i l l come to look back at this era i n terms of the i m p o r tance of the erosion of the nation-state and the national identities wivich are associated w i t h it. The erosion of the nation-state, national economies and national cultural identities is a very complex a n d dangerous moment. Entities O! p o w e r are dangerous w h e n they are ascending and w h e n they are declining and it is a moot point whether they are more dangerous i n the second or the first moment. The first moment, they gobble u p everybody a n d i n the second moment they take everybody d o w n w i t h them. So w h e n I say the decline or erosion of the nation-state, d • not for a moment imagine that the nation-state is b o w i n g off the s u g e of history. " I ' m sorry, I was here for so long. I apologize for all the things that I d i d to y o u — nationalism, jingoism, ferocious w a r fare, racism. I apologize for all that. Can. I go n o w ? " It is not backing o f like that. It goes into an even deeper trough of defensive exc usivism. Consequently, at the very moment w h e n the so-called material basis of the o l d E n g l i s h identity is disappearing over the horizon, of L ie West and the East, Thatcherism brings Engiishness into a more f . r m definition, a narrower but firmer definition than, it ever had before. N o w we are prepared to go to anywhere to defend it: to the South Seas, to the South Atlantic. If w e cannot defend it i n reality, w e

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mation is certainly the enormous, continuing migrations of labor i n the post-war w o r l d . There is a tremendous paradox here w h i c h I cannot help relishing myself; that i n the very moment w h e n finally Britain c o n v i n c e d itself it h a d to decolonize, it h a d to get r i d of them, w e a l l came back home. A s they hauled d o w n the flag, w e got o n the banana boat a n d sailed right into L o n d o n . That is a terrible paradox because they h a d r u l e d the w o r l d for three h u n d r e d years a n d , at least, w h e n they h a d made u p their m i n d s to c l i m b out of that role, at least the others ought to have stayed out there i n the r i m , behaved themselves, gone; somewhere else, or f o u n d some other client state. N o , they had always said that this was really home, the streets were paved w i t h g o l d a n d , bloody hell, w e just came to check out whether that was so or not. A n d I a m the p r o d u c t of that. I came right i n . Someone said, " W h y don't y o u live i n M i l t o n Keynes, w h e r e y o u w o r k ? " Y o u have to live i n L o n d o n . If y o u come f r o m the sticks, the colonial sticks, w h e r e y o u really w a n t to live is right o n Eros Statue i n Piccadilly Circus. Y o u don't w a n t to go and live i n someone else's metropolitan sticks. Y o u w a n t to go right to the center of the hub of the w o r l d . Y o u might as w e l l . Y o u have been hearing about that ever since y o u were one m o n t h o l d . W h e n I first got to E n g l a n d i n 1951, I l o o k e d out and there were W o r d s w o r t h ' s daffodils. O f course, what else w o u l d y o u expect to find? That's w h a t I k n e w about. That is w h a t trees and flowers meant. I d i d n ' t k n o w the names of the f l o w ers I'd just left b e h i n d i n Jamaica. One has also to remember that Engiishness has not only been decentered by the the great dispersal of capital to Washington, W a i l Street and T o k y o , but also by this enormous influx w h i c h is part of the cultural consequences of the labor migrations, the migrations of peoples, w h i c h go on at an accelerated pace i n the m o d e r n w o r l d .

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CULTURE, GLOBALIZATION A N D THE WORLD-SYSTEM

T H E L O C A L A N D T H E GLOBAL

w i l l defend it in; mime... What else can y o u call the Falklands episode? L i v i n g the past entirely through m y t h . R e l i v i n g the age of the dictators, not Just as farce but as m y t h . R e l i v i n g the whole of that past through m y t h , a very defensive organization. W e have never been so close to an embattled defensiveness of a n a r r o w , national definition of Englishness, of cultural identity. A n d Thatcherism is g r o u n d e d i n that. W h e n Thatcherism speaks, frequently asking the question, " A r e y o u one of u s ? " W h o is one of us? W e l l , the numbers of people w h o are not one of us would, fill a. book. H a r d l y anybody is one of us any longer. N o r t h e r n Ireland is not one of us because they are bogged, d o w n i n sectarian warfare. The Scots are not one of us because they did, not vote for us. The Northeast a n d the N o r t h w e s t are not one of us because they <are manufactur ng and declining and they have not j u m p e d on to the enterprise cuT are; they are not on the b a n d w a g o n to the South, i n their heads. N o i lacks are, of course, not quite. There may be one or 'two w h o are " h o ; l o r a r y " but y o u cannot really be one of us. W o m e n cart o n l y be in, thes r traditional roles because if they get outside their traditional roles t! ey are clearly beginning to edge to the margins.

p o w e r f u l , is that the response seems to go in t w o w a y s simultaneously. It goes above the nation-state a n d it goes below it. It goes global and local i n the same moment. G l o b a l and local are the two faces of the same movement f r o m one epoch of globalization, the one w h i c h has been dominated b y the nation-state, the national economies, the national c u l t u r a l identities, to something n e w . W h a t is this, n e w kind, of globalization? The n e w k i n d of globalization, is not E n g l i s h , it is A m e r i c a n . In cultural terms, the n e w k i n d of globalization has to do with, a n e w f o r m of global mass culture, very different f r o m that associated w i t h E n g l i s h identity, a n d the cultural identities associated w i t h the nation-state i n an earlier phase. G l o b a l mass culture is dominated by the m o d e r n means of cultural p r o d u c tion, d o m i n a t e d by the image w h i c h crosses a n d re-crosses linguistic frontiers m u c h more r a p i d l y and more easily, and, w h i c h speaks across languages i n a m u c h more Immediate w a y . It is dominated by all the w a y s In w h i c h the visual and graphic arts have entered directly into the reconstitution of popular life, of entertainment and of leisure. It is dominated by television a n d b y f i l m , a n d b y the image, imagery, a n d styles of mass advertising. Its epitomy is i n all those forms of mass communication of w h i c h one might think of satellite television as the prime example. N o t because it is the only example but because y o u could not understand satellite television w i t h o u t understanding its g r o u n d i n g in, a, particular advanced national econo m y a n d culture a n d yet its w h o l e purpose is precisely that it cannot be l i m i t e d any longer b y national boundaries.

- The question, is still asked in the.expectation.that.it m i g h t have been answered w i t h the same large confidence w i t h w h i c h the English have always occupied their o w n identities. But it cannot be occupied i n that w a y any longer. It is produced, w i t h enormous effort. H u g e ideological w o r k has to go o n every day to produce this mouse w h i c h people can recognize as the English. Y o u have to look at everything i n order to produce it. Y o u have to look at the c u r r i c u l u m , at the Englishness of E n g l i s h art, at w h a t is truly E n g l i s h poetry, and y o u have to rescue that f r o m a l l the other things that are not. E v e r y w h e r e , the question of Englishness is i n contention. All, I want to say about that is, that w h e n the era of nation-states in globalization begins to decline, one can see a regression to a vers' defensive and h i g h l y dangerous f o r m of national, identity w h i c h is driven by a very aggressive f o r m of racism. That is something of the story of questions of ethnicity and identity in an, older f o r m of globalization. W h a t Thatcherism and other E u r o pean societies are t r y i n g to come to terms w i t h is h o w to enter new forms of globalization. The n e w forms of globalization are rather different f r o m the ones I have just described. O n e of the things w h i c h happens w h e n the nation-state begins to w e a k e n , becoming less convincing a n d less

W e have just, i n Britain, opened, u p the new satellite T V called " S k y C h a n n e l , " o w n e d by Rupert M u r d o c h . It sits just above the Channel. It speaks across to a l l the European societies at once and as it went u p all the older models of communication i n our society were being dismantled. The notion, of the British Broadcasting Corporation, of a p u b l i c service interest, is rendered anachronistic i n a moment. It is a v e r y contradictory space because, at the same time as sending the satellite aloft, Thatcherism sends someone to watch the satellite. So M r s . Thatcher has put into orbit Rupert M u r d o c h and the " S k y C h a n n e l " but also, a, new Broadcasting Standards Committee to make sure that the satellite does not immediately communicate soft pornography to all of us after 1,1 o'clock w h e n the children are i n bed. So this is not an uncontradictory phenomenon. One side of Thatcherism, the respectable, traditional side, is watching the free market side. This is the bifurcated w o r l d that w e live in but nevertheless, in

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C U L T U R E , G L O B A L I Z A T I O N A.'- D T H E W O R L D - S Y S T E M terms of w h a t is likely to carry the nev international global mass i u l ture back into the o l d nation-states, th. national cultures of European societies, if is very m u c h at the leading edge of the transmitters of the image. A n d as: a consequence of the e- plosion of those n e w forms of cultural communication a n d cultural r. presentation there has opened u p a n e w field of v i s u a l representation itself. It is this field w h i c h 1 a m calling gk bal mass culture. G l o b a l mass culture has a variety of different char, cteristics but I w o u l d identify 'two. O n e is that it remains centerec .in the West. That is, to say, Western, technology, the concentratior of capital, the concentration of techniques, thé concentration, of advai ced labor in. the Western, societies, a n d the j stories a n d the image y of Western societies: those remain the d r i v i n g powerhouse of th s global mass culture. In that sense, it is centered i n the West a n d i always speaks English. O n the other h a n d , this particular fo m does not speak the Queen's English any longer. It speaks English as an international language w h i c h is quite j a different thing. It speaks a. variety of b r o k e n forms of English: E n g l i s h as it has been invac ed, a n d as it has hegemonized a variety of other languages w i t h o u t bt ing-able to exclude them f r o m it. It speaks Anglo-Japanese, Anglo-Fr< .mch, A n g l o - G e r m a n or A n g l o English i n d e e d . It is a. n e w f o r m of int :rnatio.nal language, not quite the same o l d class-stratified, dass-dc mutated, •canonically-secured f o r m of standard or traditional h i g h b r o w E n g l i s h . That is what I mean b y "centered i n the W e s t . " It is centered in. the languages of the West but it is not centered in. the same w a y . The second most important characteristic of this f o r m of global mass culture is its peculiar form of homogenization. It is a homogeni z i n g f o r m of c u l t u r a l representation, enormously absorptive of things, as it were, but the homogenization is never absolutely c o m plète, and. it does not w o r k for completeness. It is not attempting to produce little mini-versions of Englishness everywhere, or little versions of A m e r k a n n e s s . It is wanting to recognize and absorb those differences w i t h i n the larger, overarch ing framework of w h a t is essentially a n A m e r i c a n conception, of tae w o r l d . That is to say, it is very p o w e r f u l l y located in. the increasing and. ongoing concentration, of culture a n d other forms of capital. But it is n o w a f o r m of capital w h i c h recognizes that it can only, to use a metaphor, rule through other local capitals, rule alongside and i n partnership with, other economic and political elites. It does not attempt to obliterate them; it operates through them,. It has to hold the w h o l e framework of glob28

THE LOCAL A N D THE GLOBAL alization i n place a n d simultaneously police that system: it stagemanages independence w i t h i n it, so to speak. Y o u have to think, about the relationship between the U n i t e d States and Latin A m e r i c a to discover w h a t I a m 'talking about, h o w those forms w h i c h are different, w h i c h have their o w n specificity, can nevertheless be repene¬ trated, absorbed, reshaped, negotiated, w i t h o u t absolutely destroying w h a t is specific a n d particular to them,. W e used to think at an, earlier stage, that If one could s i m p l y identify the logic of capital, that it. w o u l d gradually engross everything in the w o r l d . It would, translate everything i n the w o r l d into a k i n d of replica, of itself, everywhere; that all particularity w o u l d disappear; that capital i n its o n w a r d , rationalizing march w o u l d not i n the end care whether y o u were black, green or blue so long as y o u could sell y o u r labor as a c o m m o d i t y . It w o u l d not care whether you, were male or female, or a bit of both, p r o v i d e d it c o u l d deal w i t h y o u In terms of the commodification of labor. . But the more w e understand, about the development of capital itself, the more w e understand that that is o n l y part of the story. That alongside that drive to c o m m o d i t y everything, w h i c h is certainly one part of its logic, is another critical part of its logic w h i c h w o r k s i n and t h r o u g h specificity. Capital, has always been quite concerned w i t h the question of the gendered nature of labor p o w e r . It has never been able to obliterate the importance to itself of the gendered nature of labor p o w e r . It has always been able to w o r k i n a n d through, the sexual d i v i s i o n of labor in, order to accomplish, the commodification of labor. It has always been able to w o r k between the different ethnically- a n d racially-inflected labor forces. So that notion of the overarching, ongoing, totally rationalizing, has been a very deceptive w a y of persuading ourselves of the totally integrative a n d all-absorbent capacities of capital itself. A s a, consequence, w e have lost sight of one of the most profound insights i n M a r x ' s Capital w h i c h is that capitalism o n l y advances, as it were, on contradictory terrain. It is the contradictions which, if has to overcome that produce its o w n forms of expansion. A n d that until one can. see the nature of that contradictory terrain and precisely h o w particularity is engaged and h o w it is w o v e n i n , a n d h o w It presents its resistances, a n d h o w it is partly overcome, and h o w those overcomings then appear again, w e w i l l not understand it. That is m u c h closer to h o w we ought to think about the so-called, " l o g i c of c a p i t a l " i n the advance of globalization itself. 29

CULTURE, GLOBALIZATION A N D THE WORLD-SYSTEM

THE LOCAL A N D THE GLOBAL

U n t i l w e m o v e a w a y from the notion of 'this singular, unitary logic of capital which!does not m i n d where it operates, w e w i l l not fully understand it. C a n I refer to a n u m b e r of things w e have not been able to understand as a consequence of reading Capital that w a y ? W e have not been able to understand w h y anybody is still religious at the e n d of the twentieth century. It ought to have gone; that is one of the forms of particularity. W e have not 1 sen able to understand w h y nationalism, a n o l d f o r m of particularism, is still around. A l l those particularisms ought b y n o w to have b. en m o d e r n i z e d out of existence. A n d yet w h a t w e find is that the most advanced forms of m o d ern capital o n a global scale are constantly splitting o l d societies into their advanced a n d their not so advanced sectors. C a p i t a l is constantly exploiting different forms of labor force, constantly m o v i n g between the sexual d i v i s i o n of labor in order to accomplish its c o m modification of social life.

globalization, .fully i n the keeping of capital, fully i n the keeping of the West, w h i c h is s i m p l y able to absorb everybody else w i t h i n its drive? O r is there something important about the fact that, at a certain point, globalization cannot proceed w i t h o u t learning to live w i t h .and w o r k i n g t h r o u g h difference? If y o u look at one of the places to see this speaking itself, or beg i n n i n g to represent itself, it is in the forms of m o d e r n advertising. If y o u look at these what y o u w i l l see is that certain forms of modern advertising are still g r o u n d e d on the exclusive, p o w e r f u l , dominant, h i g h l y masculinist, o l d Fordist imagery, of a very exclusive set of Identities. But side by side w i t h them are the new exotics, and the most sophisticated thing is to be i n the new exotica. To be at the leading edge of m o d e r n capitalism is to eat fifteen different cuisines i n any one week, not to eat one. It is no longer important to have boiled beef a n d carrots and Yorkshire p u d d i n g every Sunday. W h o needs that? Because if y o u are just jetting i n f r o m T o k y o , via Harare, y o u come i n loaded, not w i t h " h o w everything is the s a m e " but h o w w o n d e r f u l it is, that everything is different. In one trip around the w o r l d , i n one weekend, y o u can see every w o n d e r of the ancient w o r l d . Y o u take it i n as y o u go by, all i n one, l i v i n g w i t h difference, w o n d e r i n g at p l u r a l i s m , this concentrated, corporate, over-corporate, over-integrated, over-concentrated, and condensed f o r m of economic p o w e r w h i c h lives culturally through difference and w h i c h is constantly teasing itself w i t h the pleasures of the transgressive Other.

I think it is extremely important to see this more contradictory notion, this w h o l e line of development w h i c h is leading to different phases of global expansion, because otherwise w e do not understand the cultural terrain that is in. front of us. I have tried then to describe the n e w forms of global economic and c u l t u r a l p o w e r w h i c h are apparently paradoxical: multi-national but de-centered. It is hard to understand b i : t I think that is what w e are m o v i n g into* not the unity of the singular corporate enterprise w h i c h tries to encapsulate the entire w o r l d w i t h i n its confines, but m u c h more decentralized and decentered forms of social a n d economic organization. N o t everywhere, by any means, but in some of the most advanced parts of the globalization process w h a t ; ne finds are n e w regimes of accumulation, m u c h more flexible regimes founded not s i m p l y o n the logics of mass production and of mass consumption but on n e w flexible accumulation strategies, on segmented markets, on post-Fordist styles of organization, on lifestyle and identify-specific forms of marketing, d r i v e n by the market, d r i v e n by just-in-time production, d r i v e n b y the ability to address not the mass audience, or the mass consumer, but penetrating to the very specific smaller groups, to i n dividuals, i n its appeal. F r o m one point of v i e w , y o u might say that this Is just the o l d enemy i n a, n e w disguise a n d that actually is the question I a m going to pose. Is this just the o l d enemy i n a new disguise? Is this the everrolling m a r c h of the o l d f o r m of comn. odification, the o l d f o r m of 30

Y o u see the difference f r o m the earlier f o r m of identity that I was describing: embattled Britain, in its corsetted form, rigidly tied to the Protestant Ethic. In E n g l a n d , for a very long time, certainly under Thatcherism, even, n o w , y o u can only harness people to y o u r project if y o u promise them a bad time. Y o u can't promise them a good time. Y o u promise them a good time later on. G o o d times w i l l come. But y o u first of a l l have to go through a thousand hard winters for six months of pleasure. Indeed, the whole rhetoric of Thatcherism has been, one w h i c h has constructed the past i n exactly that w a y . That is what was w r o n g about the sixties and seventies. A l l that s w i n g i n g , all that c o n s u m p t i o n , a l l that pleasurable stuff. Y o u k n o w , it always ends i n a b a d w a y . You. always have to pay for it i n the end. N o w , i.ie regime I a m talking about does not have this pleasure/ p a i n economy built into it. It is pleasure endlessly. Pleasure to begin w i t h , pleasure i n the m i d d l e , pleasure at the e n d , nothing but pleasure: the proliferation of difference, questions of gender a n d sexuality. 31

CULTURE, GLOBALIZATION A N D THE WORLD-SYSTEM It lives w i t h the n e w man. It p r o d u c e d the n e w m a n before anyone was ever convinced he even existed. A d v e r t i s i n g p r o d u c e d the image of the post-feminist man.. Some of us cannot f i n d h i m , but he is certainly there i n the advertising.. I d o not k n o w whether a n y b o d y is Kving w i t h h i m currently but he's there, out there i n the advertising. In E n g l a n d it is these new forms of globalized p o w e r that are most sensitive to questions of f e m i n i s m . It says, " O f course, there'll be w o m e n w o r k i n g ! w i t h us. W e must think about the question of creches. W e must think about equal opportunities for Black people. Of course, everybody k n o w s somebody of different skin. H o w boring it w o u l d be just to k n o w people like us. W e don't k n o w people like us. W e can go anywhere i n the w o r l d a n d w e have friends w h o are Japanese, you. k n o w . W e were i n East A f r i c a last week a n d then w e were on safari and w e always go to the Caribbean, etc.?" This is what I call the w o r l d of the global post-modern. Some parts of the m o d e r n globalization process are p r o d u c i n g the global postmodern. The global post-modern is not a unitary regime because it is still i n tension w i t h i n itself w i t h an older, embattled, more corporate, more unitary, more homogenous conception of its o w n identity. That struggle is being i fought out w i t h i n itself a n d y o u may not see it actually. If y o u don't see it, y o u ought to. Because y o u ought to be able to hear the w a y i n w h i c h , i n A m e r i c a n society, i n A m e r i c a n culture, those two voices speak at one and the same time. The voice of infinite pleasurable consumption a n d what I call "the exotic c u i s i n e " •and, on the other h a n d , the voice of the moral majority, the more fundamental and traditional conservative ideas. They are not coming out of different places, they are coming out of the same place. It is the same balancing act w h i c h Thatcherism is t r y i n g to conduct by releasing Rupert M u r d o c h and Sir W i l l i a m Rees M o g g at one a n d the same time, i n the hope that they w i l l k i n d of h o l d o n to one another. A n old. petite bourgeois morality w i l l constrain the already deregulated. Rupert M u r d o c h , Somehow, these two people are g o i n g to live in the same univérse — together. So.- the notion of globalization as a non-contradictory, uncontested space i n w h i c h everything is f u l l y w i t h i n the k e e p i n g of the institutions, so that they perfectly k n o w where it is going, I s i m p l y do not believe. I think die story points to something else: that i n order to maintain its global position, capital has h a d to negotiate a n d by negotiate I m e a n it h a d to incorporate a n d partly reflect the differences it was t r y i n g to overcome. It h a d to try to get h o l d of, a n d r.eu32

THE LOCAL A N D THE GLOBAL tralize, to some degree, the differences. It is t r y i n g to constitute a w o r l d i n w h i c h things are different. A n d that is the pleasure of it but the differences do not matter. N o w the question is; Is this s i m p l y the final t r i u m p h , the closure of history b y the West? Is globalization nothing but the t r i u m p h a n d closure of history b y the West? Is this the final moment of a global post-modern where it n o w gets h o l d of everybody, of everything, where there is no difference w h i c h it cannot contain, no otherness it cannot speak, no m a r g i n a l l y w h i c h it cannot take pleasure out of? It's clear, of course, that w h e n I speak about the exotic cuisine, they are not eating the exotic cuisine i n Calcutta. They're eating it i n M a n hattan. So do not imagine this, is evenly and equally spread throughout the w o r l d . I a m talking about a process of p r o f o u n d unevenness. But I a m nevertheless saying that we shouldn't resolve that question too q u i c k l y . It is just another face of the final t r i u m p h of the West. 1 k n o w that position. I k n o w It is very tempting. It is what I call ideological post-modernism: I can't see r o u n d the edge of it and so history must have just ended. That f o r m of post-modernism I don't b u y . It is w h a t happens to ex-Marxist French intellectuals w h e n they head for the desert. But there is another reason w h y one s h o u l d not see this f o r m of globalization as s i m p l y unproblematic and uncontradictory, because I have been talking about what is happening w i t h i n its o w n regimes, w i t h i n its o w n discourses, I have not yet talked about what is happ e n i n g outside it, what is happening at the margins. So, i n the conclusion of this talk, I want to look at the process from the point of v i e w , not of globalization, but of the local. I want to talk about two forms of globalization, still struggling w i t h one another: an older, corporate, enclosed, increasingly defensive one w h i c h has to go back to nationalism and national cultural identity i n a h i g h l y defensive w a y , a n d to try to b u i l d barriers around it before it is eroded. A n d then this other f o r m of the global post-modern, w h i c h is t r y i n g to live w i t h , and at the same moment, overcome, subíate, get h o l d of, and incorporate difference. W h a t has been h a p p e n i n g out there i n the local? W h a t about the people w h o d i d not go above the globalization but went underneath, to the local? The return to the local is often a response to globalization. It is w h a t people do w h e n , i n the face of a particular f o r m of modernity w h i c h confronts them i n the form of the globalization I have de33

CULTURE,, G L O B A L I Z A T I O N A N D T H E W O R L D - S Y S T E M scribed, they opt out of that and say " I don't k n o w .anything about that any more. I can't control it, I k n o w n o politics, w h i c h can get h o l d of it. It's too b i g . It's too inclusive. E v e r y t h i n g is o n its sido. There are some terrains i n between, little interstices, the smaller spaces w i t h i n w h i c h I have to w o r k . " T h o u g h , of course, one has 10 see this always i n terms of the relationship between uneven! vbalanced discourses a n d regimes. But that is not all that w e have to say about the local. F o r it w o u l d be an extremely o d d a n d peculiar history of this part of the twentieth century if w e were not to say that the most p r o f o u n d cultural revolution has come about as a consequence of the margins c o m i n g into representation — i n art, i n painting, i n f i l m , i n music, in literature, i n the m o d e m arts everywhere, i n politics, and i n social life generally. O u r lives have been transformed by the struggle of the margins to come into representation. N o t just to be placed by the regime of some other, or i m p e n a l i z i n g eye but to reclaim some f o r m of representation for themselves. Paradoxically: i n our w o r l d , marginality has become a p o w e r f u l space. It is a space of weak p o w e r but it is a space of p o w e r , nonetheless. I n the contemporary arts, I w o u l d go so far as to say that, increasingly, anybody w h o cares for w h a t is creatively emergent i n the m o d e r n arts w i l l f i n d that it has something to do w i t h the languages of the m a r g i n . The emergence of n e w subjects, n e w genders, new ethnicities, n e w regions, n e w communities, hitherto excluded f r o m the major forms of cultural representation, unable to locate themselves except as decentered or subaltern, have acquired through struggle, sometimes in very marginalized ways, the means to speak for themselves for the first time. A n d the discourses of power i n our society, the discourses of the dominant regimes, have been certainly threatened by this de-centered cultural empowerment of the marginal a n d the local. Just as I tried to talk about homogenization a n d absorption, and then p l u r a l i t y a n d diversity as characteristic of the n e w forms of the dominant cultural post-modern, so i n the same w a y one can see forms of local opposition and resistance going through exactly the same moment. Face to face w i t h a culture, an economy and a set of histories w h i c h seem to be w r i t t e n or inscribed elsewhere, a n d w h i c h are so immense, transmitted f r o m one continent to another w i t h such extraordinary speed, the subjects of the local, of the m a r g i n , can only 34

THE L O C A L A N D THE GLOBAL come into representation by, as it were, recovering their o w n h i d d e n histories. They have to try to retell the story f r o m the bottom u p , instead of f r o m the top d o w n . A n d this moment has been of such p r o f o u n d significance i n the post-war w o r l d that y o u could not describe the post-war w o r l d w i t h o u t it. Y o u could not describe the movements of colonial nationalism without that moment w h e n the u n s p o k e n discovered that they h a d a history w h i c h they c o u l d speak; they h a d languages other than the languages of the master, of the tribe. It is an enormous moment . The w o r l d begins to be decolonized at that moment. Y o u could not understand the movements of m o d ern f e m i n i s m precisely without the recovery of the h i d d e n histories. These are the h i d d e n histories of the majority that never got told. H i s t o r y w i t h o u t the majority inside it, history as a minority event. Y o u c o u l d not discover, or try to discuss, the Black movements, c i v i l rights movements, the movements of Black c u l t u r a l politics i n the m o d e r n w o r l d , w i t h o u t that notion of the rediscovery of where people came f r o m , the return to some k i n d of roots, the speaking of a past w h i c h previously had n o language. The attempt to snatch f r o m the h i d d e n histories another place to stand i n , another place to speak f r o m , and that moment is an extremely important moment. It is a m o m e n t w h i c h always tends to be o v e r r u n and to be marginalized b y the dominant forces of globalization. But do not misunderstand me. 1 a m not talking about some ideal free space i n w h i c h everybody says, " C o m e on i n . T e l l us what y o u think. I'm glad to hear from y o u . " They d i d not say that. But those languages, those discourses, it has not been possible to silence in the last twenty years. Those movements also have an .extraordinarily complex history. Because at some time, i n the histories of many of them over the last twenty years, they have become locked into counter-identities of their o w n . It is a respect for local roots w h i c h is brought to bear against the anonymous, impersonal w o r l d of the globalized forces w h i c h we do not understand. " I can't speak of the w o r l d but I can speak of m y village. I can speak of my neighborhood, I can speak of my c o m m u n i t y . " The race-to-race communities that are knowable, that are beatable, one can give them a place. One k n o w s what the voices are. O n e k n o w s what the faces are. The recreation, the reconstruction of imaginary, knowable places i n the face of the global post-modern w h i c h has, as it were, destroyed the identities of specific places, absorbed them into this post-modern flux of diversity. So one under35

CULTURE, i GLOBALIZATION A N D THE WORLD-SYSTEM stands the moment w h e n people reach for those groundings, as it were, a n d the reach for those groundings is what I c a l l ethnicity. Ethnicity is the necessary place or space f r o m w h i c h people speak. It is a v e r y important moment i n the birth a n d development of all the local .and m a r g i n a l movements w h i c h have 'transformed the last twenty years, that moment of the rediscovery of their own. ethnicities. But just as, w h e n one looks at the global post-modern, one sees that it can go i n both an expansive a n d a defensive w a y , i n the same sense one sees that the local, the marginal, can also go i n t w o different w a y s . W h e n the movements of the margins are so p r o f o u n d l y threatened b y the global forces of postmodernity, they can themselves retreat into their o w n exclusivist and defensive enclaves. A n d at that point, local ethnicities become as dangerous as national ones. W e have seen that h a p p e n : the refusal of modernity w h i c h takes the form, of a. return, a rediscovery of identity w h i c h constitutes a form of fundamentalism. But that is not 'the only w a y i n w h i c h the rediscovery of ethnicity has to go. M o d e r n theories of enunciation always oblige us to recognize that enunciation comes f r o m somewhere. It cannot be unplaced, it cannot be unpositioned, it is always positioned i n a. discourse. It is w h e n a discourse forgets that it is placed that it tries to speak everyb o d y else. It is exactly w h e n Englishness is the w o r l d Identity, to w h i c h everything else is o n l y a small ethnicity. That is the m o m e n t w h e n it mistakes itself as a. universal language. But i n fact, it comes from, a place, out of a specific history, out of a specific set of p o w e r relationships. It speaks w i t h i n a tradition. Discourse, i n that sense, is .always placed. So the moment of the rediscovery of a place, a past, of one's roots, of one's context, seems to me a necessary moment of enunciation. I d o not think the margins could speak, u p w i t h o u t first grounding themselves somewhere. . But the p r o b l e m is, do they have to be trapped i n the place f r o m w h i c h they begin to speak? Is it going to become another exclusive set of local identities? M y answer to that is, probably, but not necessarily so. A n d i n closing, I w i l l tell y o u one little local example w h y I give that answer. I was i n v o l v e d In a photographic exhibition w h i c h was organized in L o n d o n b y the C o m m o n w e a l t h Institute. The C o m m o n w e a l t h Institute h a d this idea; ii. got money f r o m one of the v e r y large, ex-colonial banks w h o were anxious to pay a little guilt money back to the societies w h i c h they had exploited for so l o n g , a n d they said: 36

THE LOCAL A N D THE GLOBAL " W e ' l l give a series of regional prizes i n w h i c h w e ' l l use photography; w e k n o w that everybody i n these societies doesn't, have access to photography but photography is a w i d e s p r e a d m e d i u m . Lots of people have cameras; it reaches a m u c h w i d e r audience. A n d w e ' l l ask the different societies that used to be l i n k e d together under the hegemonic definition, of the C o m m o n w e a l t h to begin to represent their o w n lives, to begin to speak about their own. communities, to tell us about the differences, the diversities of life i n these different societies that used to be all threaded together by the domination of English, i m p e r i a l i s m . That's what the C o m m o n w e a l t h was, the harnessing of a h u n d r e d different histories w i t h i n one singular history. The history of the C o m m o n w e a l t h . " This was a notion of using the cultural m e d i u m of photography tp explode that o l d u n i t y a n d proliferate, to diversify, to see the images of life as people i n the margins represented themselves photographically. The exhibition was judged in. the far regions of the w o r l d where there are C o m m o n w e a l t h c o u n tries, a n d then was j u d g e d centrally. What was that exhibition like? W e f o u n d precisely what enormous access can be given to such peoples w h e n the margins are e m p o w e r e d , in. h o w e v e r s m a l l a w a y . Extraordinary stories, pictures, images of people l o o k i n g at their o w n societies w i t h the means of m o d e r n representation for the first time. S u d d e n l y , the m y t h of unity, the u n i f i e d identity of the C o m m o n wealth, was s i m p l y exploded. Forty different peoples, w i t h forty different histories, all located i n a different w a y i n relation to the u n even, m a r c h of capital across the globe, harnessed at a certain point w i t h the b i r t h of the m o d e r n British Empire — a l l these things h a d been brought into one place and stamped w i t h an overall identity. Y o u w i l l a l l be i n one, contribute to one overall system.. That is what the system, w a s , the harnessing of these differences. A n d n o w , as that center begins to w e a k e n , so the differences begin to p u l l away. That was an enormous moment of the e m p o w e r i n g of difference a n d diversity. It is the moment of w h a t I call the rediscovery of ethnicity, of people photographing their o w n homes, their o w n families, their o w n pieces of w o r k . W e also discovered t w o other things. In our naivety, w e thought that -the m o m e n t of the rediscovery of ethnicity, i n this sense, w o u l d be a rediscovery of w h a t w e called " t h e past," of people's roots. But the f u n n y thing is that the past has not been sitting d o w n there w a i t i n g to be discovered. The people from the Caribbean w h o went home [where is that, y o u know?] to photograph, the past [where is 37

CULTURE, GLOBALIZATION A N D THE WORLD-SYSTEM 'that, y o u k n o w ? ] : w h a t explodes through the camera is twent. 'thcerttury A f r i c a not seventeenth century Africa. The h o m e l a n d is not w a i t i n g back there for the n e w ethnics to rediscover it. There is a ast to be learned about, but the past Is n o w seen, and has to be gras •ed as a history, as something that has to be told. It is narrated, t is grasped through m e m o r y . It is grasped through desire. It is gras ted through reconstruction. It is not just a fact that has been waitin ; to g r o u n d o u r identities. W h a t emerges f r o m this is. n o t h i n g liki an uncomplicated, dehistoricised, u n d y n a m i c , uncontradictory r ast. N o t h i n g like that is the image w h i c h is caught i n that moment of return. B u t then the second, more extraordinary t h i n g is that people w a n t to speak right out of that most local moment — w h a t do they w ant to talk about? E v e r y w h e r e . They w a n t to tell y o u about h o w t iey came f r o m the smallest village i n the deepest recesses of where •/er and went straight b y N e w Y o r k to L o n d o n . They w a n t to talk about w h a t the metropolis, w h a t the cosmopolitan w o r l d looks like to an ethnic. They were not prepared to come on as " e t h n i c artists." " I w i l l s h o w y o u m y crafts, m y skills; I w i l l dress u p , metaphorically i n m y traditions, I w i l l speak m y language for y o u r edification." They :iad to locate themselves somewhere but they wanted to address pi oblems w h i c h c o u l d no longer be contained w i t h i n a n a r r o w versio.. of ethnicity. They d i d not w a n t to go back a n d defend something w h i c h was ancient, w h i c h h a d stood still, w h i c h h a d refused the openin ? to new things. They wanted to speak right across those boundaries, ..nd across those frontiers. W h e n I stopped talking about the global, I asked, is this the cleverest story the West has ever told or is this a more contradictory phenomenon? N o w I ask exactly the opposite. Is the local just the li ttle local exception, just w h a t used to be called a blip i n history? It w i l l not register anywhere, it does not do anything, it is not very p r o found. It is just w a i t i n g to be incorporated, eaten u p by the all-see .ng eye of global capital as it advances across the terrain. O r is it also, itself, i n an extremely contradictory state? It is also m o v i n g , his.orically being transformed, speaking across older a n d n e w languages. Think about the languages of m o d e r n contemporary music a n d t r • to ask, where are the traditional musics left that have never hear i a modern musical transcription? A r e there any musics left that h i v e not heard some other music? A l l the most explosive m o d e r n musics are crossovers. The aesthetics of m o d e r n popular music is the aesthet38

T H E L O C A L A N D T H E GLOBAL ics of the h y b r i d , the aesthetics of the crossover, the aesthetics of the diaspora, the aesthetics of creolization. It is the mix of musics w h i c h is exciting to a y o u n g person w h o comes right out of w h a t Europe is pleased to think of as some ancient civilization, and w h i c h Europe can control. The West can control it if only they w i l stay there, if only they w i l l remain simple tribal folks. The moment they want to get h o l d of, not the nineteenth-century technology to make a l l the mistakes the West d i d for another h u n d r e d years, but to leap over that a n d get h o l d of some of the m o d e r n technologies to speak their o w n tongue, to speak of their o w n condition, then they are out of place, then the Other is not where it is. The p r i m i t i v e has somehow escaped f r o m control. W e l l , I a m not trying to help y o u to sleep better at night, to say it's really all right, the revolution throbs d o w n there, it's l i v i n g , it's all ok. Y o u just have to wait for the local to erupt a n d d i s r u p t the global. I a m not telling any k i n d of story like that. I a m asking that w e s i m p l y do not think of globalization as a pacific and pacified process. It's not a process at the end of history. It is w o r k i n g o n 'the terrain of post-modern culture as a global formation, w h i c h is an extremely contradictory space. W i t h i n that, w e have, i n entirely new forms w h i c h w e are only just beginning to understand, the same o l d contradictions, the same o l d struggle. N o t the same o l d contradictions but continuing contradictions of things w h i c h are trying to get h o l d of other things, a n d things w h i c h are trying to escape f r o m their grasp. That o l d dialectic is not at a n e n d . Globalization does not finish it off. W i t h the story about the C o m m o n w e a l t h Institute Photography Exhibition I tried to speak about questions of n e w forms of identity. But I have just barely signalled that. H o w can w e think the notion of what these n e w identities might be? W h a t w o u l d be an identity that is constructed through things w h i c h are different rather than things w h i c h are the same? This I shall address i n m y second talk.

39

2. O l d and New Identities, O l d and New Ethnicities

STUART

HALL

IN MY PREVIOUS T A L K , I TRIED TO OPEN OUT THE QUESTIONS about the local a n d the global f r o m their somewhat closed, somewhat over-integrated, a n d somewhat over-systematized formulations. M y argument was that w e need to t h i n k about the processes w h i c h are n o w revealing themselves i n terms of 'the local a n d the global, i n those t w o spaces, but w e also need to think of these as more contradictory formulations than w e usually do. Unless w e do, 1 was concerned that we are likely to be disabled i n trying to think those ideas politically. I was therefore attempting — certainly not to close out the questions of p o w e r a n d the questions of appropriation w h i c h I think are l o d g e d at the v e r y center of any notion of a shift between the dispositions of the local and the global i n the emergence of a cultural politics o n a w o r l d scale — but rather to conceptualize that w i t h i n a more open-ended a n d contingent cultural politics. A t the e n d of the talk, however, I was obliged to ask if there is a politics, i n d e e d , a counter-politics of the local. If there are new globals a n d n e w locals at w o r k , w h o are the n e w subjects of this politics of position? What conceivable Identities could they appear in? C a n identity itself be re-thought and re-lived, i n and through difference? It is this question w h i c h is what I want to address here. I have called it " O l d a n d N e w Identities, O l d and N e w Ethnicities" and

CULTURE, GLOBALIZATION A N D THE WORLD-SYSTEM

O L D A N D N E W IDENTITIES

w h a t I am. going to do first is to return to the question of Identity and try to look at some of the ways i n w h i c h w e are beginning to reconceptualize that w i t h i n contemporary theoretical discourses. I shall then go back from that theoretical consideration to the g r o u n d of a. cultural politics. Theory is always a detour on the w a y to something more important.: I return to the question of identity because the question of identity .has returned to us; at any rate, it has returned to us i n British politics and British cultural politics today. It has not returned i n the same old. place; It is not trie traditional conception of identity. It is. not going back, to the o l d identity politics of the 1960s social movements. But it is, nevertheless, a k i n d of return to some of the g r o u n d w h i c h w e used to think i n that w a y . I w i l l make a comment at the very end about what is the nature of this theoretical-political w o r k w h i c h seems to lose things o n the one side and then recover them i n a different w a y from another side, a n d then have to think them out all over again just as soon as they get r i d of them.. W h a t is this never- * ending theoretical w o r k w h i c h Is constantly losing and regaining concepts? I talk about identity here as a point at w h i c h , o n the one hand, a w h o l e set; of n e w theoretical discourses intersect a n d where, on the other, a w h o l e new set of c u l t u r a l practices emerge. I w a n t to begin b y trying, v e r y briefly, to m a p some of those points of intersection theoretically, and then to look at some of their political consequences.

to the rest of the w o r l d . It is a k i n d of guarantee of authenticity. N o t u n t i l w e get really inside a n d hear what the true self has to say do w e k n o w what we are " r e a l l y s a y i n g . " There is something guaranteed about that logic or discourse of identity. If gives us a sense of d e p t h , out there, .and i n here. It is spatially organized. M u c h of o u r discourse of the Inside and the outside, of the self a n d other, of the i n d i v i d u a l a n d society, of the subject and the object, are g r o u n d e d i n that particular logic of identity. A n d it helps us, I w o u l d say, to sleep w e l l at night. Increasingly, I think one of the m a i n functions of concepts is that they give us a good night's rest. Because what they tell us is that there is a k i n d of stable, only very slowly-changing g r o u n d inside the hectic upsets, discontinuities and ruptures of history. A r o u n d us history is constantly breaking i n unpredictable w a y s but w e , s o m e h o w , go on b e i n g the same. That logic of identity is, for good or i l l , finished. It's at an end. for a w h o l e range of reasons. It's at an e n d i n the first instance because of some of the great de-centerings of m o d e r n thought. O n e c o u l d discuss this v e r y elaborately — I c o u l d spend the rest of the time talking about it but I just want to slot the ideas into place very q u i c k l y by u s i n g some names as reference points. It is not possible to hold, to that logic of identity after M a r x because although M a r x does talk about m a n (he doesn't talk about w o m e n m a k i n g history but perhaps they were slotted i n , as the nineteenth century so often slotted w o m e n i n under some other masculine title), about m e n a n d w o m e n m a k i n g history but under conditions w h i c h are not of their own. choosing. A n d h a v i n g lodged, either the i n d i v i d u a l or collective subject always w i t h i n historical practices, we as individuals or as groups cannot be, and can never have been, the sole origin or authors of those practices. That is a p r o f o u n d historical decentering i n terms of social practice.

The o l d logics of Identity are ones w i t h w h i c h w e are extremely f a m i l a r , either philosophically, or psychologically. Philosophically, the old. logic of identity w h i c h m a n y people have critiqued i n the form of -the o l d Cartesian subject was often thought i n terms of the origin of being itself, the g r o u n d of action. Identity is the g r o u n d of action. A n d w e have i n more recent times a psychological discourse of the self w h i c h is v e r y similar: a notion of the continuous, selfsufficient, developmental, u n f o l d i n g , inner dialectic of selfhood. W e are never quite there, but always o n o u r w a y to it, and w h e n w e get there, w e w i l l at last k n o w exactly w h o it is w e are... N o w this logic of identity is very important in. a whole range of political, theoretical and. conceptual discourses. I a m interested i n it also as a. k i n d of existential reality because I think the logic of the language of identity is extremely important to o u r o w n self-conceptions. It contains the notion of the true self, some real self inside there, h i d i n g inside the husks of all the false selves that we present 42.

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If that was not strong enough, k n o c k i n g us sideways as it were, F r e u d came k n o c k i n g from, underneath, like H a m l e t ' s ghost, and said, " W h i l e you're being decentered f r o m left to right like that, let me.decenter y o u f r o m below a bit, a n d r e m i n d y o u that this stable language of identity is also set from the psychic life about w h i c h y o u don't k n o w very m u c h , a n d can't k n o w very m u c h . A n d w h i c h y o u can't k n o w v e r y m u c h b y s i m p l y taking thought about it: the great continent of the unconscious w h i c h speaks most clearly w h e n it's s l i p p i n g rather than w h e n it's saying what it means," This makes the 43

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I mean here the great collective social identities w h i c h w e thought of as large-scale, all-encompassing, homogenous, as unified collective identities, w h i c h c o u l d be spoken about almost as if they were singular actors i n their o w n right but w h i c h , indeed, placed, positioned, stabilized, a n d allowed us to understand and read, almost as a code, the imperatives of the i n d i v i d u a l self: the great collective social identities of class, of race, of nation, of gender, and of the West.

These collective social identities were formed i n , and stabilized by, the huge, long-range historical processes w h i c h have produced the m o d e r n w o r l d , just as the theories and conceptualizations that I just referred to v e r y briefly are w h a t constituted modernity as a form, of self-reflection. They were staged a n d stabilized b y industrialization, by capitalism, by urbanization, by the formation of the w o r l d market, by the social and the sexual division of labor, by the great punctuation of c i v i l and social life into the public a n d the private; by the dominance of the nation state, a n d b y the identification between Westernization and the notion of modernity itself. I spoke i n m y previous talk about the importance, to any sense of where w e ai • placed i n the w o r l d , of the national economy, the nation-state :\d of national cultural identities. Let me say a w o r d here about th. • great class identities w h i c h have stabilized so m u c h of our understanding of the immediate a n d not-so-immediate past. Class w a s the m a i n locator of social position, that w h i c h organized o u r understanding of the m a i n g r i d and g r o u p relations between social groups. They linked us to material life through the economy itself. They p r o v i d e d the code through w h i c h w e read one another. They provide .1 the codes through w h i c h w e understood each others' languages. Tney p r o v i d e d , of course, the notions of collective action itself, that w h i c h w o u l d unlock politics. N o w as I tried to say previously, the great collective social identities rise and fall and it is almost as difficult to k n o w whether they are more dangerous w h e n they are falling than w h e n they are rising. These great collective social identities have not disappeared. Their purchase and efficacy i n the real w o r l d that we all occupy is ever present. B u t the fact is that none of them is, any longer, In either the social, historical or epistemological place where they were i n our conceptualizations of the w o r l d in the recent past. They cannot any longer be thought i n the same homogenous form. W e are as attentive to their inner differences, their inner contradictions, their segmentations a n d their fragmentations as we are to their already-completed homogeneity, their unity a n d so o n . T h e y are not already-produced, stabilities a n d totalities i n the w o r l d . They do not operate like totalities. If they have a relationship to o u r identities, cultural a n d i n d i v i d u a l , they d o not any longer have that suturing, structuring, or stabilizing force, so that we can k n o w w h a t w e are s i m p l y by a d d i n g u p the s u m of o u r positions in relation to them. They do not give us the code of identity as I think they

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self begin to seem a pretty fragile thing. N o w , buffeted on one side b y M a r x and upset f r o m below b y F r e u d , just as it opens its m o u t h to say, " W e l l , at least I speak so therefore I must be s o m e t h i n g , " Saussure a n d linguistics comes along a n d says "That's not true either, y o u k n o w . Language was there before y o u . Y o u can only say something b y positioning yourself i n the discourse. The tale tells the t e l e r , the m y t h tells the myth-maker, etc. 'The enunciation is always f r o m some subject w h o is positioned b y a n d i n discourse." That upsets that. Philosophically, one comes to the end of any k i n d of notion of a perfect transparent continuity between o u r language a n d something out there which, can be called the real, or the truth, without any quotation marks. These various upsets, these disturbances i n the continuity of the notion of the subject, a n d the stability of identity, are i n d e e d , w h a t modernity is like. It is not, incidentally, modernity itself. That has an older, a n d longer history. But this is the b e g i n n i n g of modernity as trouble. N o t modernity as enlightenment and progress, but m o d e r n i ty as a problem. 1

It is also upset by other enormous historical transformations w h i c h do not have, a n d cannot be given, a single name, but w i t h o u t w h i c h the story c o u l d not be told. In addition to the three or four that I have quoted, we c o u l d mention the relativisation of the Western narrative itself, the Western episteme, b y the rise of other cultures to prominence, and fifthly, the displacement of the masculine gaze. N o w , the question of t r y i n g to come to terms w i t h the notion of identity i n the w a k e of those theoretical decenterings is an extremely problematic enterprise. But that is not all that has been disturbing the settled logic of identity. Because as I was saying earlier w h e n I was talking about the relative decline, or erosion, the instability of the nation-state, of the self-sufficiency of national economies a n d consequently, of national identities as points of reference, there has s i m u l taneously been a fragmentation a n d erosion of collective social i d e n tity.

CULTURE, GLOBALIZATION A N D THE WORLD-SYSTEM d i d i n the past. It is a moot point by anybody w h o takes this argument directly on the pulses, as to whether they ever functioned i n that w a y . Perhaps they never functioned i n that w a y . This m a y be, indeed, w h a t the narrative of the! West is like: the notion that w e told of the story we told ourselves, about their functioning i n that w a y . W e k n o w that the great homogenous function of the collective social class is extremely difficult for any ^ good historian to actually lay his or her finger o n . It keeps disappearing just over the h o r i z o n , like the organic c o m m u nity. Y o u k n o w the story about the organic c o m m u n i t y ? The organic community was just always in. the childhood, y o u have left b e h i n d . R a y m o n d W i l l i a m s has a w o n d e r f u l essay on these people, a range of social critics w h o say you. can measure the present i n relation to the past, and y o u k n o w the past because back then it was m u c h more organic a n d integrated. W h e n was " b a c k then"? W e l l , w h e n I was a c h i l d , there was always some adult saying, " W h e n I was a child, it was m u c h more integrated." A n d so, eventually, some of these great collectivities are rather like those people w h o have an. activity of historical nostalgia going o n i n 'their retrospective reconstructions. W e always reconstructed them more essentially, more homogenously, more u n i f i e d , less contradictorily than they ever were, once y o u actually k n o w a n y t h i n g about them.. That is one argument. Whatever the past was like, they may have all marched forth, unified a n d dictating history f o r w a r d , for m a n y decades i n the past. They sure aren't d o i n g it now... N o w as I have said, the question of h o w to begin to think questions of identity, either social, or i n d i v i d u a l , not i n the w a k e of their disappearance but i n the w a k e of their erosion, of then* fading, of their not h a v i n g the k i n d of purchase a n d comprehensive explanatory p o w e r they h a d before, that is what it seems to me has gone. They used to be thought of — and it is a w o n d e r f u l l y gendered definition — as "master concepts," the "master concepts" of class. It is not tolerable any longer to have a "master concept" like that. Once it loses its " m a s t e r " status its explanatory reach weakens, becomes more problematic. W e can. think of some things i n relation to questions of class, t h o u g h always recognizing its real historical complexity. Yet there are certain other things it s i m p l y w i l l not, or cannot, decipher or explain. A n d this brings us face to face w i t h the increasing social diversity a n d plurality, the technologies of the self 46

O L D A N D N E W IDENTITIES w h i c h characterize the m o d e r n w o r l d i n w h i c h we live. W e l l , w e might say, where does this leave any discourse on social identity at all? H a v e n ' t I n o w abolished it f r o m about as m a n y sides as I c o u l d think of? A s has been true i n theoretical w o r k over the last twenty years, the moment a. concept disappears through the left h a n d door, it returns through the right h a n d w i n d o w , but not i n quite the same place. There is a w o n d e r f u l moment i n Althusser's text where he says " I can n o w abolish the notion of ideas." A n d he actually writes the w o r d " i d e a s " a n d d r a w s a line through it to convince h i m self w e need never use the w o r d again. In exactly the same w a y , the o l d discourse of the subject was aboEshed, p u t i n a. deep container, concrete p o u r e d over it, w i t h a half-life of a m i l l i o n years. W e w i l l never look at it again, w h e n , b l o o d y hell, i n about five minutes, w e are talking about subjectivity, and the subject i n discourse, and it has come roaring back i n . So it is not, I think, surprising that, h a v i n g lost one sense of identity, w e f i n d w e need it. Where are w e to f i n d it? O n e of the places that w e have to go to is certainly i n the contemporary languages w h i c h have rediscovered but repositioned the notion of the subject, of subjectivity. That is, principally, and preeminently, the languages of f e m i n i s m a n d of psychoanalysis. I do not want to go through that argument but I w a n t to say something about h o w one might begin to think, questions of identity from this n e w set of theoretical spaces. A n d I have to do this programmatically. I have to state what I think, from this position, identity is and is not as a sort of protocol, although each one c o u l d take me a v e r y l o n g time. It makes us aware that identities are never completed, never f i n ished; that they are always as subjectivity itself is, i n process. That itself is a pretty difficult task. Though, w e have always k n o w n it a little bit, we have always thought about ourselves as getting more like ourselves everyday. But that is a sort of Hegelian notion, of going forward to meet that w h i c h we always were. I want to open that process u p considerably. Identity is always i n the process of formation. Secondly, identity means, or connotes, the process of identification, of s a y i n g that this here is the same as that, or w e are the same together, i n this respect. But something w e have learnt f r o m the w h o l e discussion of identification, i n f e m i n i s m and psychoanalysis, is the degree to w h i c h that structure of identification is always constructed through ambivalence. A l w a y s constructed through splitting. 47

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People like m e w h o came to En -land the 1950s have been there for centuries; symbolically, w e h . ;-e been there for centuries. I was c o m i n g home. I am the sugar at the bottom of the English c u p of tea. I am the sweet tooth, the sugar plantations that rotted generations of English children's teeth. There are thousands of others beside me that are, y o u k n o w , the c u p of tea itself. Because they d o n ' t g r o w it i n

Lancashire, y o u k n o w . N o t a single tea plantation exists w i t h i n the U n i t e d K i n g d o m . This is the symboiization of English identity — I mean, w h a t does anybody i n the w o r l d k n o w about an English person except that they can't get t h r o u g h the day w i t h o u t a cup of tea? W h e r e does it come from? C e y l o n — S r i L a n k a , 'India. That is the outside history that is inside the history of the English. There is no E n g l i s h history w i t h o u t that other history. T h e notion that identity has to do with, people that look the same, feel the same, c a i themselves the same, is nonsense. A s a process, as a narrative, as a discourse, it is always told f r o m the position of the Other. W h a t is more is that identity is always i n part a narrative, always i n part a k i n d of representation.. It is always w i t h i n representation. Identity is not something w h i c h is. f o r m e d outside a n d then w e tell stories about it. It Is that w h i c h is narrated i n one's o w n self. I w i l l say something about that i n terms of m y o w n narration of identity In a moment — y o u k n o w , that w o n d e r f u l moment where R i c h a r d 11 says, " C o m e let u s sit down, a n d tell stories about the death of k i n g s . " W e i , I a m going to tell y o u a story a n d ask. you. to tell one about yourself. W e have the notion of identity as contradictory, as composed of more than, one discourse, as composed always across the silences of the other, as w r i t t e n i n a n d through ambivalence a n d desire. These are extremely important w a y s of trying to think an. identity w h i c h is not a sealed or closed totality. N o w w e have within, theory some interesting w a y s of t r y i n g to think difference In this w a y . W e have learnt quite a lot about sexual difference i n feminist writers. A n d w e have learnt a lot about questions of difference f r o m people like D e r r i d a . I do think that there are some important w a y s i n w h i c h Derrida's use of the notion of the difference between " d i f f e r e n c e " and. "differan.ce," spelt w i t h .an " a , " is significant. T h e " a , " the anomolous " a " i n Derrida's spelling of difference, w h i c h he uses as a k i n d of marker that sets u p a disturbance i n o u r settled understanding of translation of o u r concept of difference is v e r y important, because that little " a , " d i s t u r b i n g as it is, w h i c h you. can. h a r d l y hear w h e n spoken, sets the w o r d i n m o t i o n to n e w meanings yet w i t h o u t obscuring the trace of its other meanings i n its past. H i s sense of " d i f f e r a n c e , " as one writer has p u t it, remains susp e n d e d between the t w o F r e n c h verbs " t o d i f f e r " a n d " t o defer,"

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Splitting between that w h i c h one is, and that w h i c h is the other. The attempt to e x p e l the other to the other side of the universe is always c o m p o u n d e d b y the relationships of love a n d desire. This is a different language f r o m the language of, as it were, the Others w h o are completely different f r o m onesel i. This, is the Other that belongs i .side one. This is the Other that one can only k n o w f r o m the place frc n w h i c h one stands. This is the self as it is inscribed i n the gaze of the Other. A n d this notion w h i c h breaks d o w n the boundaries, be ween outside and inside, between those w h o belong a n d those w h . do not, between those whose histories have been w r i t t e n a n d th >se whose histories they have dep e n d e d on but whose histories cf i n o t be spoken. That the u n s p o k e n silence i n between that w h i c h cai be s p o k e n is the only w a y to reach for the whole history. There is i o other history except to take the absences and the silences along TA .th w h a t can be spoken. E v e r y t h i n g that can be spoken is o n the grou: d of the enormous voices that have . not, or cannot yet be heard. e

T h i s doubleness of discourse, t; i s necessity of the Other to the self, this inscription of Identity i n th • look of the other finds its articu l a t i o n p r o f o u n d l y i n the ranges of a g i v e n text. A n d I w a n t to cite one w h i c h I a m sure y o u know but w o n ' t remember necessarily, t h o u g h it is a w o n d e r f u l , majes ic moment i n Fanon's Black Skin, White Masks, w h e n he describes h .mself as a y o u n g A n t i l l e a n , face to face w i t h the white Parisian chi 1 a n d her mother. A n d the c h i l d p u l l s the h a n d of the mother and jays, " L o o k , M a m a , a black m a n . " A n d he said, " F o r t h e first time, I
CULTURE, GLOBALIZATION A N D THE WORLD-SYSTEM both of w h i c h contribute to its textual force, neither of w h i c h can. fully capture its meaning. Language depends on difference, as Saus¬ sure has s h o w n : the structure of distinctive propositions w h i c h make up its economy. But where D e r r i d a breaks n e w g r o u n d is i n the extent to w h i c h " d i f f e r " shades into " d e f e r . " N o w this notion of a differance is not s i m p l y a set of binary, reversible oppositions; t h i n k i n g sexual difference not s i m p l y i n terms of the fixed opposition of male a n d female, but of all those anomolous s l i d i n g positions ever i n process, i n between w h i c h opens u p the continent of sexuality to increasing points of disturbance. That is w h a t the odyssey of difference n o w means i n the sense In w h i c h I am. t r y i n g to use it.

O L D A N D N E W IDENTITIES

The truth is that D e r r i d a does not help us as m u c h as he m i g h t here i n t h i n k i n g about the relationship between identity a n d difference. A n d the appropriators of D e r r i d a i n A m e r i c a , especially i n A m e r i c a n philosophical and literary thought, help us even less. By taking Derrida's notion of differance, precisely right out of the tension between the t w o textual connotations, " d e f e r " a n d " d i f f e r , " and l o d g i n g it only i n the- endless play of difference, Derrida's politics is i n that v e r y m o m e n t u n c o u p l e d . From that moment unrolls that enormous proliferation of extremely sophisticated, playful, deconstruction w h i c h is a k i n d of endless academic game. A n y b o d y can d o It, a n d o n and o n it rolls. N o signifier ever stops; no-one is ever responsible for any meaning; a l l traces are effaced. The moment anything is lodged, it is immediately erased. Everybody has a great time; they go to conferences a n d do it, as it were. The v e r y notion of the politics w h i c h requires the h o l d i n g of the tension between that w h i c h is both placed a n d not stitched i n place, by the w o r d w h i c h is always i n motion between positions, which requires! us to think both positionality a n d movement, both together, not one and the other, not p l a y i n g w i t h difference, or " f i n d i n g nights to rest u n d e r " identity, -but living i n the tension of identity and difference, is u n c o u p l e d . . We have then to go on t h i n k i n g b e y o n d that mere playfulness into

the really hard game w h i c h the play of difference actually means to us historically. For if signification depends u p o n the endless repositioning of its differential terms, meaning i n any specific instance depends on the contingent a n d arbitrary stop, the necessary break. It is a very simple point. Language is part of an infinite semiosis of meaning. T o say anything, I have got to shut u p . I have to construct a single sentence. I k n o w that the next sentence w i l l open the infinite semiosis of meaning again, so I w i l l take it back. So each stop is not a natural break. It does not say, " I ' m about to end a sentence a n d that w i l l be the t r u t h . " It understands that it is contingent. It is a positioning. It Is the cut of ideology w h i c h , across the semiosis of language, constitutes meaning. B u t y o u have to get into that game or y o u w i l l never say any thing at all. Y o u think I'm joking. I k n o w graduate students of mine w h o got into this theoretical fix i n the seventies, one enormous French theoretician after another, throwing them aside, until they could not commit a single w o r d to paper at all because to say anything was to open oneself to the endless sliding of the signifier. So if they said, what I think Derrida really, i n — really — ooh — start again, yes, start again. M e a n i n g is i n that sense a wager. Y o u take a bet. N o t a bet on truth, but a bet o n saying something. Y o u have to be positioned somewhere i n order to speak. E v e n if y o u are positioned i n order to imposition yourself, even if y o u w a n t to take it back, y o u have to come into language to get out of it. There is no other w a y . That is the paradox of meaning. T o t h i n k it only 'in terms of difference and not i n terms of the relational position between the suturing, the arbitrary, over determ i n e d cut of language w h i c h says something w h i c h is instantly opened again to the play of meaning; not to think of meaning a l w a y s , i n supplement, that there is always something left over, always something w h i c h goes on escaping the precision; the attempt of language to code, to make precise, to fix, to halt, etc.; not to think it i n that w a y is to lose h o l d of the t w o necessary ends of the chain to w h i c h the n e w notion of identity has to be conceptualized. N o w I can t u r n to questions of politics. In this conception of an identity w h i c h has to be thought through difference, is there a general politics of the local to bring to bear against the great, over-riding, p o w e r f u l , technologically-based, massively-invested u n r o l l i n g of global processes w h i c h I was t r y i n g to describe i n m y previous talk

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That is about difference, a n d y o u m i g h t ask the question, w h e r e does identity come .in. to this infinite postponement of m e a n i n g that is l o d g e d i n D e r r i c k ' s notion of the trace of something w h i c h still retains its roots i n one meaning w h i l e it is, as it were, m o v i n g to another, encapsulating another, w i t h endless shiftings, slidings, of that signifier?

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O L D A N D N E W IDENTITIES

In the course of the search for roots, one discovered not o n l y where one came f r o m , one began to speak, the language of'that w h i c h is home i n the genuine sense, that other crucial moment w h i c h is the recovery of lost histories. The histories that have never been told about ourselves that w e c o u l d not l e a m i n schools, that were not i n any books, a n d that w e h a d to recover. This is an enormous act of w h a t I w a n t to call imaginary political

re-identification, re-territorialization a n d re-identification, w i t h o u t w h i c h a counter-politics c o u l d not have been constructed. I do not k n o w an example of any group or category of the people of the margins, of the locals, w h o have been able to mobilize themselves, socially, culturally, economically, politically i n the last twenty or twenty-five years w h o have not gone through some s u c h series of moments in. order to resist their exclusion, their marginalization. That is h o w a n d where the margins begin to speak. The margins begin to contest, the locals begin, to come to representation. The identity'Which that w h o l e , enormous political space p r o d u c e d in Britain, as it d i d elsewhere, was the category Black. I w a n t to say something about this category w h i c h w e all n o w so take for granted. I. w i l l tell you. some stories about it. I w a s brought u p i n a lower m i d d l e class family i n Jamaica. I left there i n the early fifties to go and study i n E n g l a n d . U n t i l 1 left, though I suppose 98 per cent of the Jamaican population is either Black or colored i n one w a y or another, I h a d never ever heard anyb o d y either call themselves, or refer to anybody else as " B l a c k . " N e v e r . I heard a thousand other w o r d s . M y grandmother could differentiate about fifteen different shades between light b r o w n and dark b r o w n . W h e n I left Jamaica, there was a beauty contest i n w h i c h the different shades of w o m e n were graded according to different trees, so that there was M i s s M a h o g a n y , M i s s Walnut, etc. People think of Jamaica as a simple society. In fact, it h a d the most complicated color stratification system i n the w o r l d . Talk about practical semioticians; a n y b o d y i n m y family could compute a n d calculate anybody's social status b y grading the particular quality of their hair versus the particular quality of the family they came f r o m a n d w h i c h street they l i v e d i n , including p h y s i o g n o m y , shading, etc. Y o u could trade off one characteristic against another. C o m p a r e d w i t h that, the n o r m a l class stratification system is absolute child's play. But the w o r d " B l a c k " was never uttered. W h y ? N o Black people around? Lots of them, thousands and thousands of them. Black is not a. question of pigmentation. The Black I'm talking about is a historical category, a political category., a cultural category. In o u r language, at certain historical moments, w e have to use the signifier. W e have to create an equivalence between h o w people look and w h a t their histories are. Their histories are i n the past, inscribed i n their skins, But it is not because of their skins that they are Black i n their heads. I heard Black for the first time i n the w a k e of the C i v i l Rights

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w h i c h tend to m o p u p all differences, and occlude those differences? W h i c h means, as it were, they are different — but it doesn't make any difference that they are different, they're just different. N o , there is n o general politics, I have n o t h i n g i n the kitbag. There is nothing I can p u l l out. But I have a little local politics to tell y o u about. It m a y be that a l l w e have, i n b r i n g i n g the politics of the local to bear against the global, is a lot of little local politics. I do not k n o w if that is true or not. But I w o u l d like to s p e n d some time later talking about the c u l t u r a l politics of the local, a n d of this n e w notion of identity. F o r it is i n this n e w .frame that identity has come back into cultural politics i n Britain. The formation of the Black diasporas in. the p e r i o d of post-war migration i n the fifties and sixties has transf o r m e d E n g l i s h social, economic and political life. In the first generations, the majority of people h a d the same i l l u sion that I d i d : that I w a s about to go back home. That m a y have been because everybody always asked me: w h e n was I g o i n g back home? W e d i d think that w e were just going to get back o n the boat; w e were here for a temporary sojourn. B y the seventies, it w a s perfectly clear that we were not there for a temporary sojourn. Some people w e r e g o i n g to stay and. then the politics of racism really emerged. N o w one of the m a i n reactions against the politics of racism i n Britain was w h a t I w o u l d c a l "Identity Politics O n e , " the first f o r m of identity politics. It h a d to do w i t h the constitution of some defensive collective identity against the practices of racist society. It h a d to do w i t h the fact that people were b e i n g blocked out of a n d refused an identity a n d identification w i t h i n the majority nation, h a v i n g to f i n d some other roots on w h i c h to stand. Because people have to f i n d some g r o u n d , some place, some position o n w h i c h to stand. Blocked out of any access to an English or British identity, people h a d to try to discover w h o they were. This is the moment I defined i n m y previous talk. It is the crucial moment of the rediscovery or the search for roots.

C U L T U R E , G L O B A L I Z A T I O N A N D T H E WORLD-SYSTEM movement, i n the w a k e of the de-colonization a n d nationalistic struggles. Black was created as a political category i n a certain historical moment. It was created as a consequence of certain symbolic and ideological struggles. W e said, " Y o u have spent five, six, seven h u n d r e d years elaborating the s y m b o l i s m through w h i c h Black is a negative factor. N o w I don't want another term. I want that term, that negative one, that's the one I want. I want a piece of that action. I want to take it out of the w a y i n w h i c h it has been articulated i n religious discourse, i n ethnographic discourse', i n literary discourse, i n v i s u a l discourse. I want to p l u c k it out of its articulation a n d rearticulate it .in a n e w w a y . " In that very; struggle is a change of consciousness, a change of self-recognition, a n e w process of identification, the emergence into visibility of a n e w subject. A subject that was always there, but emerging, historically... Y o u k n o w that story, but I d o not k n o w if y o u k n o w the degree to w h i c h that story is true of other parts of the Americas. It happened i n Jamaica, i n the 1970s. In the 1970s, for the first time, Black people recognized themselves as Black. It was the most p r o f o u n d cultural revolution i n the Caribbean, m u c h greater than, any political r e v o l u tion they have ever had. That cultural revolution i n Jamaica has never been, matched b y a n y t h i n g as far-reaching as the politics. The politics has. never caught u p with. it. Y o u probably k n o w the moment w h e n the leaders of both major political, parties i n Jamaica tried to grab h o l d of Bob M a r l e y ' s h a n d . They were trying to p u t their hands o n Black; M a r l e y stood for Black, and they were t r y i n g to get a piece of the action. If only he w o u l d look i n their direction he w o u l d have legitimated them. It was not politics legitimating culture, it was culture legitimating politics. Indeed, the truth is I call myself a l l k i n d s of other things. W h e n I went to E n g l a n d , I w o u l d n ' t have called myself an i m m i g r a n t either, w h i c h is what w e were a l l k n o w n as. It was not until I went back home i n the early 1960s that m y mother w h o , as a. good middle-class colored. Jamaican w o m a n , hated, all Black people, (you k n o w , that is the truth) said to me, " I hope they don't think, you're an. i m m i g r a n t over there." A n d ' I said, " W e l l , I just migrated. I've just e m i g r a t e d . " A t that very moment, I thought, that's exactly what I am, I've just left home — for good... I went back to E n g l a n d a n d I became what I'd been named. I h a d 54

O L D A N D N E W IDENTITIES been hailed as an immigrant. I h a d discovered w h o I was. I started to tell myself the story of m y migration. j 'Then. Black erupted and people said, " W e l l , you're f r o m the Caribbean, i n the midst of this, identifying w i t h what's going o n , the Black population i n England. You're Black." _ I A t that v e r y moment, m y son, w h o was two and half, was learning the colors. I said to h i m , transmitting the message at last, " Y o u ' r e B l a c k . " A n d he said, " N o . I'm b r o w n . " A n d I said, " W r o n g referent. M i s t a k e n concreteness, philosophical mistake. I'm not talking about y o u r paintbox, I ' m talking about y o u r h e a d . " That is something different. The question of learning, learning to be Black. Learning:to come into an identification. W h a t that moment allows to h a p p e n are things w h i c h were not there before. It is not that what one then does was h i d i n g away inside .as m y true self. There wasn't any bit of that true self in. there before that identity was learnt. Is that, then, the stable one, is that w h e r e w e are? Is that where people are? I w i l l tell y o u something n o w about what has happened to that Black identity as a matter of cultural politics i n Britain. That notion was extremely important i n the anti-racist struggles of the 1970s: the notion that people of diverse societies a n d cultures w o u l d all come to Britain i n the fifties and sixties as part of that huge w a v e of m i g r a tion f r o m the Caribbean, East A f r i c a , the A s i a n subcontinent, Pakistan, Bangladesh, from, different parts of India, and all identified, themselves politically as Black. What they said was, " W e may be different actual color skins but vis-a-vis the social system, vis-a-vis the political system of racism, there is more that unites us than what divides u s . " People begin, to ask " A r e y o u f r o m Jamaica, are y o u from. T r i n i d a d , are y o u from. Barbados?" Y o u can. just see the process of d i v i d e and. rule. " N o . Just address me as I am. I k n o w you. can't tell the difference so just call me Black. T r y u s i n g that. W e a l l look the same, y o u k n o w . Certainly can't tell the difference. Just call me Black. Black i d e n t i t y . " A n t i racism, i n the seventies was only fought and only resisted i n the c o m m u n i t y , in. the localities, b e h i n d the slogan of a. Black politics a n d the Black, experience. In. that moment, the enemy was ethnicity. The enemy h a d to be w h a t w e called " m u l t i - c u l t u r a l i s m . " Because multi-culturalism. was precisely what I called previously "the exotic." The exotica of difference. N o b o d y w o u l d talk about racism but they were perfectly pre55

CULTURE, GLOBALIZATION A N D THE WORLD-SYSTEM pared to have "International E v e n i n g s , " w h e n w e w o u l d all come .and cook o u r native dishes, sing o u r o w n native songs a n d appear i n our o w n native- costume. It is true that some people, some ethnic minorities i n Britain, do have indigenous, very beautiful indigenous forms of dress. I didn't. I h a d to rummage i n the dressing-up box to f i n d m i n e . I have been de-racinated for four h u n d r e d years. The last thing I am g o i n g to do is to dress u p i n some native Jamaican costume a n d appear i n the spectacle of m u lti-culturalism. H a s the moment of the struggle organized around this constructed Black identity gone away? It certainly has not. So l o n g as that society remains i n its. economic, political, cultural, and social relations i n a racist w a y to the variety of Black and T h i r d W o r l d peoples i n its midst, .and it continues to do so, that struggle remains. W h y then don't I just talk about a collective Black identity replaci n g the other identities? I can't d o that either and I'll tell y o u w h y . The truth is that i n relation to certain things, the question of Black, i n Britain, also has its silences. It had a certain w a y of silencing the* v e r y specific experiences of A s i a n people, Because t h o u g h A s i a n people c o u l d identify, politically, i n the struggle against racism, w h e n they came to u s i n g their o w n culture as the resources of resistance, w h e n they w a n t e d to write out of their o w n experience a n d reflect on their o w n position, w h e n they wanted to create, they naturally created w i t h i n the histories of the languages, the cultural tradition, the positions of people w h o came f r o m a variety of different historical backgrounds. A n d just as Black was the cutting edge of a politics vis-a-vis one k i n d of enemy, it c o u l d also, if not understood p r o p e r l y , provide a k i n d of silencing i n relation to another. These are the costs, as w e l l as the strengths, of t r y i n g to think of the notion of Black as an esseniialism. W h a t is more, there were not only A s i a n people of color, but also Black people w h o d i d not identify w i t h that collective identity. So that one was aware of the fact that always, as one advanced to meet the enemy, w i t h a solid front, the differences were raging b e h i n d . Just shut the doors, a n d conduct a raging argument to get the troops together, to actually hit the other side. A t h i r d w a y i n w h i c h Black was silencing was to silence some of the other dimensions that were positioning individuals a n d groups i n exactly the same w a y . To operate exclusively through an unreconstructed conception of Black was to reconstitute the authority of Black masculinity over Black w o m e n , about w h i c h , as I a m sure y o u 1

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O L D A N D N E W IDENTITIES k n o w , there was also, for a l o n g time, an unbreakable silence about w h i c h the most militant Black m e n w o u l d not speak. To organize across the discourses of Blackness and masculinity, of race a n d gender, a n d forget the w a y i n w h i c h , at the same moment, Blacks i n the under class were being positioned i n class terms, i n similar' w o r k situations, exposed to the same deprivations of poor jobs and lack of promotion that certain members of the white w o r k i n g class suffered, was to leave out the critical dimension of positioning. What then does one do w i t h the p o w e r f u l m o b i l i z i n g identity of the Black experience a n d of the Black c o m m u n i t y ? Blackness as a political identity i n the 'light of the understanding of any identity is always complexly composed, always historically constructed. It is never i n the same place but always positional. O n e always has to think about the negative consequences of the positionality. Y o u cannot, as it were, reverse the discourses of any identity s i m p l y by turni n g them upside d o w n . What is it like to live, by attempting to valorise a n d defeat the marginalization of the variety of Black subjects and to really begin to recover the lost histories of a variety of Black experiences, w h i l e at the same time recognizing the end of any essential Black subject? That is the politics of l i v i n g identity through difference. It is the politics of recognizing that all of us are composed of multiple social identities, not of one. That we are all complexly constructed through different categories, of different antagonisms, and these may have the effect of locating us socially i n multiple positions of marginality and subordination, but w h i c h do not yet operate on us i n exactly the same w a y . It is also to recognize that any counter-politics of the local w h i c h attempts to organize people through their diversity of identifications has to be a struggle w h i c h is conducted positionally. It is the beginning of anti-racism, anti-sexism, and anti-classicism as a w a r of positions, as the G r a m s c i a n notion of the w a r of position. The notion of the struggles of the local as a w a r of positions is a very difficult k i n d of politics to get one's head around; none of us k n o w s h o w to conduct it. N o n e of us even k n o w s whether it can be conducted. Some of us have h a d to say there is no other political game so w e must f i n d a w a y of p l a y i n g this one. W h y is it difficult? It has no guarantees. Because identifications change and shift, they can be w o r k e d on by political and economic forces outside of us a n d they can be articulated in different ways, 57

CULTURE, GLOBALIZATION A N D THE WORLD-SYSTEM There is absolutely no political guarantee already inscribed i n an identity. There is no reason o n G o d ' s earth w h y the f i l m is g o o d because a Black person made it. There is absolutely no guarantee that all. the politics w i l l be right because a w o m a n does it. There are n o political guarantees of that k i n d . It is not a freefloating o p e n space because history has lodged on. it the p o w e r f u l , tendential organization of a past. W e bear the traces of a past, the connections of the past. W e cannot conduct this k i n d of cultural politics w i t h o u t returning to the past but it is never a return of a direct a n d literal k i n d . The past is not w a i t i n g for us back there to recoup o u r identities against. It is. always retold, rediscovered, r e i n vented. It has to be narrativized. W e go to o u r o w n pasts through history, through m e m o r y , through desire, not as a literal fact. It is a very important example. Some w o r k has been done, both in. feminist history, i n Black history, and i n w o r k i n g class history recently, w h i c h recover the oral testimonies of people w h o , for a verylong time, f r o m the v i e w p o i n t of the canon, and the authority of the historian, have not been, considered to be history-makers at all. That is a very important moment. But it is not possible to use oral histories and testimonies, as if they are just literally, the truth. They have also to be read. They are also stories, positionings, narratives. You, are b r i n g i n g n e w narratives into play but y o u cannot mistake them for some " r e a l , " back there, b y w h i c h history can be measured. There is no guarantee of authenticity like that i n history. O n e is ever afterwards i n the narrativization of the self a n d of one's histories. Just as i n trying to .conduct cultural politics as a w a r of p o s i tions, one is. always i n the strategy of hegemony. H e g e m o n y is not the same thing as incorporating everybody, of m a k i n g everybody the same, though nine-tenths of the people w h o have marginally read G r a m s c i think that that is w h a t he means. G r a m s c i uses the notion of hegemony precisely to counteract the notion of incorporation. H e g e m o n y is not the disappearence or destruction, of difference. It is the construction of a, collective w i l l through difference. It is the articulation of differences w h i c h do not disappear. The subaltern class does not mistake itself for people w h o were born w i t h silver spoons i n their mouths... They k n o w they are still second on the ladder, somewhere near the bottom. People are not cultural dopes. They are not w a i t i n g for the moment w h e n , like an overnight conversion, false consciousness w i l l fall f r o m their eyes, the scales w i l l fall, away, a n d they w i l l s u d d e n l y discover w h o they are. 58

O L D A N D N E W IDENTITIES T h e y k n o w something about w h o they are. If they engage i n another project it is because it has interpolated them, hailed them, and established some point of identification w i t h them. It has brought them, into 'the historical project. A n d that notion of a politics w h i c h , as it were, increasingly is able to address people through the multiple identities w h i c h they have — understanding that those identities d o not r e m a i n the same, that they are frequently contradictory, that they cross-cut one another, that they tend to locate us differently at different moments, conducting politics i n the light of the contingent, i n the face of the contingent — is the o n l y political game that the locals have left at their disposal, i n m y v i e w . If they are w a i t i n g for a politics of manoeuvre, w h e n a l l 'the locals, i n every part of the w o r l d , w i l l a l l stand u p at the same moment and go i n the same direction, and roll back the tide of the global, i n one great historical activity, it is not going to h a p p e n . I do not believe it any more; I think it is a dream. In order to conduct the politics really w e have to live outside of the dream, to w a k e u p , to g r o w u p , to come into the w o r l d of contradiction. W e have to come into the w o r l d of politics. There is no other space to stand i n . O u t of that notion some of the most exciting cultural w o r k is n o w being done i n E n g l a n d . T h i r d generation y o u n g Black m e n and w o m e n k n o w they come f r o m the Caribbean, k n o w that they are Black, k n o w that they are British. They w a n t to speak f r o m all three identities. They are not prepared to give u p any one of them.They w i l l contest the Thafcherite notion of Englishness, because they say this Englishness is Black. They w i l l contest the notion of Blackness because they w a n t to make a differentiation between people w h o are Black f r o m one k i n d of society and people w h o are Black from another. Because they need to k n o w that difference, that difference that makes a difference i n h o w they write their poetry, make their films, h o w they paint. It makes a difference. It is inscribed i n their creative w o r k . They need it as a resource. They are all those identities together. They are m a k i n g astonishing cultural w o r k , the most important w o r k In the v i s u a l arts. Some of the most important w o r k i n f i l m a n d photography and nearly all the most important w o r k i n p o p u l a r music is c o m i n g f r o m this n e w recognition of identity that I am speaking about. V e r y little of that w o r k is visible elsewhere but some of y o u have seen, though y o u may not have recognized, the outer edge of i t Some of y o u , for example, may have seen a f i l m made b y Stephen 59

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O L D A N D N E W IDENTITIES

Freers a n d H a n i f K u r e i s h i , called My Beautiful Laundrette. This was originally m a d e as a television f i l m for local distribution o n l y , a n d s h o w n once at the E d i n b u r g h Festival w h e r e it received an enormous reception, If y o u have seen My Beautiful Laundrette y o u w i l l k n o w that it is the most transgressive text there is. A n y b o d y w h o is Black, w h o tries to identify it, m m across the fact that the central characters of this narrative are t w o gay m e n . W h a t is more, anyone w h o wants to separate the identities into their t w o clearly separate points w i l l discover that one of these Black gay m e n is white a n d one of these Black gay m e n is b r o w n . Both of them are struggling i n Thatcher's Britain. O n e of them has an uncle w h o is a Pakistani l a n d l o r d w h o is t h r o w i n g Black people out of the w i n d o w .

time, is imaginative w r i t i n g that gives us a sense of the shifts and the difficulties w i t h i n o u r society as a w h o l e . If contemporary w r i t i n g w h i c h emerges f r o m oppressed groups ignores the central concerns a n d major conflicts of the larger society, and if these are w i l l i n g s i m p l y to accept themselves as marginal or enclave literatures, they w i l l automatically designate themselves as permanently m i n o r , as a sub-genre. They m u s t not allow themselves n o w to be rendered invisible a n d marginalized i n this w a y b y stepp i n g outside of the maelstrom of contemporary h i s t o r y . "

This is a text that n o b o d y likes. E v e r y b o d y hates it. Y o u go to it l o o k i n g for w h a t are called " p o s i t i v e images" a n d there are none. There aren't any positive images like that w i t h w h o m one can, i n a s i m p l e w a y , identify. Because as w e l l as the politics — a n d there is certainly a politics i n that and i n Kureishi's other f i l m , but it is not a politics w h i c h Invites easy identification — it has a politics w h i c h is g r o u n d e d o n the complexity of identifications w h i c h are at w o r k .

I have been asked to say more about w h y I speak about the politics of the local. I d i d not talk about other attempts to construct a n alternative politics of the global principally because I have been trying to trace through the question of ethnicity; the question of positioning, of placing, w h i c h is w h a t the term ethnicity connotes for me i n relation to issues of the local a n d the global. A n d also, because i n many respects, I don't think that those attempts to p u t together an alternative politics of the global are, at the moment, very successful. But the second part of the question is the more important one. W h y do I only talk about w h a t is local w h e n the questions 1 seem to be addressing are, of course, v e r y universal, global phenomena? I d o not make that distinction between the local a n d the global. I think there is always a n interpretation of the t w o . The question is, w h a t are the locations at w h i c h struggles might develop? It seems to me that a counter-politics w h i c h is pitched precisely a n d p r e d o m inantly at the level of confronting the global forces that are trying to remake a n d recapture the w o r l d at the moment, a n d w h i c h are conducted s i m p l y at that level, are not m a k i n g very m u c h headway. Yet where there does seem the ability to develop countermovements, resistances, counter-politics, are places that are localized. I d o not mean that w h a t they are about are " l o c a l " but the places w h e r e they emerge as a political scenario are localized because they are separated f r o m one another; they are not easy to connect u p or articulate into a larger struggle. So, I use the local a n d the global as prisms for l o o k i n g at the same thing. B u t they have pertinent appearances, points of appearance, scenarios i n the different locations. There is, for instance, ecologically, a n attempt to establish a counter-politics of the planet as a single place a n d that, of course, is

I w i l l read y o u something w h i c h H a n i f K u r e i s h i said about the question of responding to his critics w h o said, " W h y don't y o u tell us good stories about ourselves, as w e l l as good/bad stories? W h y are y o u r stories m i x e d about ourselves?" H e spoke about the difficult m o r a l position of the writer f r o m an oppressed or persecuted c o m m u n i t y a n d the relation of that w r i t i n g to the rest of the society. H e said it is a, relatively n e w one i n E n g l a n d but it w i l l arise more a n d more as British writers w i t h a colonial heritage a n d f r o m a colonial or m a r g i n a l past start to declare themselves. "There is sometimes," he said, " t o o simple a d e m a n d for positive images. Positive images sometimes require, cheering fictions — the writer as P u b l i c Relations Officer. A n d I'm glad to say that the more I looked at My\Beautiful Laundrette, the less positive images I c o u l d see. If there i s ' t o be a serious attempt to understand present-day Britain w i t h its;mix of races a n d colors, its hysteria a n d despair, then w r i t i n g about it has to be complex. It can't apologize, or idealize. It can't sentimentalize. It can't attempt to represent any one g r o u p as having the total, exclusive, essential m o n o p o l y o n virtue. 1

A jejune protest or parochial literature, be it black, gay or feminist, is i n the long ran no more politically effective than w o r k s w h i c h are merely p u b l i c relations. W h a t w e need n o w , i n this position, at this 60

( F o l l o w i n g the lecture, questions were p u t f r o m the audience.)

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CULTURE, GLO i!ALIZATION A N D THE WORLD-SYSTEM important. A n d if I liad taken the question of ecology rather than ethnicity as the p r i s m through w h i c h I spoke, the story w o u l d have been told very differently. I hinted at that i n m y first talk w h e n I said that ecological consciousness was. constituting the sense of the global, and this is. not necessarily entirely i n the keeping of the advanced West. So there is more than one political game bejng p l a y e d . This isn't the only game. B u t if y o u came at it through the question of where those w h o have m o v e d into representation, into politics, as it were, through the political movements that have been v e r y p o w e r f u l a n d important i n the post-war w o r l d , and especially i n the last twenty years, it is precisely their inability to connect u p into one global p o l i tics w h i c h seems to be their difficulty. But w h e n y o u try to f i n d whether they are able to resist, to mobilize, to say something different to globalism at a more local level, they seem to have more p u r chase o n the histórica; present. That's the reason w h y I concentrated the story f r o m that point of v i e w . But It w o u l d be w r o n g to thinks that y o u either w o r k at one or the other, that the t w o are not constantly interpenetrating each other. W h a t I tried tb say in m y first talk was that what w e usually call the global, far f r o m being something w h i c h , i n a systematic fashion, roils over everything, creating similarity, i n fact w o r k s through particularity, negotiates particular spaces, particular ethnicities, w o r k s through m o b i l i z i n g particular identities a n d so on. So there is always a dialectic, a continuous, dialectic, between the local and the global. I tried to identify those collective social identities in. relation to certain historical processes... The other ones w h i c h have been talked about are v e r y Important structurings, such as inside/outside, normal/ pathological, etc. But they seem to recur: there are w a y s i n w h i c h the other identities are l i v e d . Y o u k n o w if y o u are inside the class, then y o u belong. If y o u are outside, then there is. something pathological, not n o r m a l or abnormal, or deviant about y o u . So I think, of those identities somewhat differently. I think of those as ways of categorizing w h o is inside and w h o is outside i n any of the other social identities. I was t r y i n g to identify, historically, some of the major ones that I think exist. If y o u say w h o y o u are y o u c o u l d say where y o u came f r o m ; broadly speaking, what race y o u belong to, a nation state of w h i c h y o u are a citizen or subject; y o u have a class position, aijt established a n d relatively secure gender position. You. k n e w where y o u fitted i n the w o r l d . That is what I meant, whereas most of us n o w live w i t h a sense of a m u c h greater p l u r a l 62

O L D A N D N E W IDENTITIES ity, a sense of the unfinished character of each of those. It is not that they have disappeared but they do not stitch us i n place, locate us, in the w a y thvy d i d in the past. Regardii a second question, as to what shifted on us: it was politics. W) -at shifted was our attempt to understand w h y the scenario of the revolutionary class subject never appeared. W h a t happened to It? There were a few moments w h e n it appeared... W h e n were those? W h e n y o u go back historically a n d look at those moments, they were not o n stage as. they ought to have been either. 1917 is not the subject of the unitary, already-identified Russian w o r k i n g class, m a k i n g the future. It was. not that! The Chinese Revolution is not that either. N o r is the seventeenth century, the history of the already formed bourgeoisie taking the stage. A c t u a l l y , they do not take the political stage for another 200 years. So if it is a bourgeois revolution i n a larger sense, it cannot be specified i n terms of actual historical actors. So, w e h a d a w a y of l i v i n g w i t h that for a very long time. It is coming. O f course, it is more complex than that but the basic grid is still ok. But then, one asks oneself, what politics flows f r o m t h i n k i n g it never really happened like that, but one day it w i l l ? A f t e r a time, if y o u are really trying to be politically active, i n that setting y o u have to say to yourself: that may be the w r o n g question. It may be that I a m not actually d o i n g something n o w because 1 think that something i n the w o r k s , some G o d in. the machine, some law of history w h i c h I do not understand, is going to make it all right. It is hard to describe this moment. It is a moment like w a k i n g u p . Y o u s u d d e n l y realize y o u are relying on history to do w h a t y o u cannot do for yourself. Y o u make a bungle of politics but " H i s t o r y , " w i t h a capital " H , " is going to fly out of somebody's m o u t h at five minutes to m i d n i g h t a n d make it all right. O r " t h e E c o n o m y " is going to march o n the stage and say, " y o u have got it all w r o n g , y o u k n o w . Y o u ought to be over there: y o u are i n the proletariat. Y o u ought to be t h i n k i n g that." Sort us all out, y o u k n o w . A n d we are w a i t i n g for that moment; w a i t i n g , w a i t i n g , w a i t i n g 200 years for it. M a y b e y o u are w a i t i n g for the w r o n g thing. N o t that the insights, of that story, that theory, that narrative were w r o n g ; I am not trying to throw that over. I a m t r y i n g to throw over the moment of the political guarantee that is lodged i n that, because then y o u do not conduct politics contingently; y o u do not conduct it positionally. Y o u 63

CULTURE, GLOBALIZATION A N D THE WORLD-SYSTEM think someone has prepared the positions for y o u . This is a v e r y practical issue. Y o u go into the miners' strike, w h i c h ' the British went into i n the early eighties, the only major industrial s h o w d o w n w i t h the Thatcher government, on the assumption that the industrial w o r k i n g class was u n i f i e d behind y o u w h e n it was not. A n d y o u d i d not conduct a politics w h i c h had the remotest chance of u n i f y i n g it because y o u assumed it was already u n i f i e d . If y o u said it seven times, it w o u l d be unified. So the miners' leader said it seven times. " T h e m i g h t of the u n i f i e d industrial w o r k ing class is n o w i n a head-to-head w i t h Thatcher." It was not. It was the w r o n g politics. N o t the w r o n g struggle, but the w r o n g politics, conducted i n the w r o n g w a y , i n 'the light of some hope that .history was going to rescue this simpler story out of the more complex one. If y o u lose enough, battles that w a y , y o u just d o not play that game any more. Y o u have to play it differently. Y o u have to try a n d make some politics out of people w h o insist o n remaining different. Y o u are w a i t i n g for them all to be the same. Before y o u get them inside the same political movement y o u w i l l be here till doomsday. Y o u have to make them out of the folks in this r o o m , not out of something else called socialism or whatever it is. W e made history out of figments. S u d d e n l y y o u see that it is a k i n d of w a y of sleeping at night: " I made a botch of that. I lost that o n e . " Y o u k n o w , the w a y the left constantly told itself that all its losses were victories. Y o u k n o w , I just w o n that although I lost it. Heroically, I lost it. Just let us w i n one. Leave the heroism out of it. A n d just w i n a few. The next time I w i l l be i n a little bit ahead. N o t t w o steps b e h i n d but feeling g o o d i n myself. That is a moment I a m t r y i n g to describe existentially. It d i d not h a p p e n like that. It happened in, a complicated set of ways, But y o u realize at a certain, moment, y o u go through a, k i n d of transparent barrier that has kept y o u i n a place, f r o m d o i n g a n d t h i n k i n g seriously, w h a t y o u s h o u l d have been thinking about. That is w h a t it is like. Question: C o u l d y o u then say something about w i n n i n g one? C o u l d y o u say something about what prospect y o u see for r e b u i l d i n g another politics, other than the one A r t h u r Scargill headed i n the miners' struggle. A n d what prospect that has for breaking d o w n that exclusivist, solidified, ego-identified consciousness' SH: The prospects for that are not very good because the left is still stuffed w i t h the o l d notion of identity, w h i c h is w h y I a m t h i n k i n g about it. It is still w a i t i n g for the o l d identities to return to the stage. 64

O L D A N D N E W IDENTITIES It does not recognize that it is i n a different political game w h i c h is r e q u i r e d to articulate, precisely, differences that cannot be encapsulated any longer and represented i n that unified b o d y . So, w e do not k n o w whether w e can shift enough of that old. t h i n k i n g to begin to ask the question. What w o u l d a politics like that be like? W e k n o w a little bit about it. I do think, w i t h o u t being romantic about it, that the period of the G L C (Greater L o n d o n Council) i n L o n d o n was. very prefigurative, but that it cannot be repeated elsewhere. It was the b r i n g i n g together of groups and movements w h i c h remained the same, a n d yet retained their differences, N o b o d y w h o came into the G L C said "I, w i l l forget I a m an activist black g r o u p because 1 am, n o w i n the same r o o m as a feminist g r o u p . " W h a t you, heard there was the very opposite of what w e n o w usually think of as the conversation of a collective political subject c o m i n g into existence. W e think of a nice, polite, consensual discussion; everybody agreei n g . W h a t y o u heard there was what democracy is really like: an, absolutely, b l o o d y - u n e n d i n g r o w . People h a m m e r i n g the table, insisting, " D o not ask me to line u p b e h i n d y o u r banner, because that just means forgetting w h o I a m . " That r o w , that s o u n d of people actually negotiating their differences i n the open, b e h i n d the collective p r o gram, is the s o u n d I a m w a i t i n g for. I think it d i d something; it opened some possibilities. It s h o w e d that it was possible. It h a d exactly what politics always has, w h i c h is the test, that differences do not remain the same as a, result of the articulation. O n e g r o u p has to take o n the agenda of the other. It has to transf o r m itself i n the course of c o m i n g into alliance, or some k i n d of formation w i t h another. It has to learn something of the otherness w h i c h created the other constituency. It doesn't mistake itself that it becomes it but it has to take it o n board. It has to struggle w i t h it to establish some set of priorities. That is the sound that one is w a i t i n g for but on the w h o l e , that Is not the s o u n d one is hearing in the politics opposed to Thatcherism. O n e is hearing " L e t us go back to the o l d constituencies. Line u p b e h i n d us. The o l d parties w i l l come a g a i n . " I do not believe it. i think Thatcherism Is more deep-seated than that; it is actually shaki n g the g r o u n d f r o m underneath the possibility of a return to that old, f o r m of politics. So if y o u ask me w h a t the possibilities are, then the first stage of it is i n o u r o w n ranks. It is quarrelling among ourselves 65

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Thatcherism is hegemonic because it is able to address the i d e n tities of a variety of people w h o have never been i n the same political c a m p before. It does that i n a very complex w a y b y always attending, through its political, social, m o r a l and economic p r o g r a m , to the c u l tural a n d Ideological questions. A l w a y s m o b i l i z i n g that w h i c h it represents as already there. It says " t h e majority of E n g l i s h p e o p l e . " " T h e majority of the British p e o p l e . "

It does not have yet a majority. It is s u m m o n i n g u p the majority and telling y o u that it is already a majority. A n d i n the majority are a variety of people, people f r o m different classes, people f r o m different genders, people f r o m different occupations, people f r o m different parts of the country. That's what the Thatcherite majority is. N e x t time r o u n d it w i l l not be exactly the same. It cannot reproduce itself. It is not the essential class subject. That is not the politics of Thatcherism. Indeed, far f r o m it; m y o w n v i e w is that no-one understands G r a m s c i better than M r s . Thatcher. She has never read it but she does k n o w that politics nowadays is conducted through the articulation of different instances. She k n o w s that politics is conducted o n different fronts. Y o u have to have a variety of programs, that y o u are always trying to b u i l d a collective w i l l because no socio-economic position w i l l s i m p l y give it to y o u . Those things she knows. W e read Gramsci til the cows come home and w e do not k n o w h o w to do it. She cannot get a little bit of it off the ground. It is called "instinctive Gramsci-ism." "Instinctive G r a m s c i - i s m " is what is. beating us, not the old collective class subject. Question: This Idea of multiple identities, w h i c h y o u represented i n some k i n d of " p i e - c h a r t . " Y o u gave an example of people w h o are Caribbean, British a n d Black. Is there five or ten percent or something w h i c h can be c a l e d " H u m a n i t y ? " SH: I d o not think that there is. I think that what w e call 'the global' is always composed of varieties of articulated particularities. I think the global is the self-presentation of the dominant particular. It is a way i n w h i c h the dominant particular localizes and naturalizes itself and associates w i t h it a variety of other minorities. W h a t I think it is dangerous to do is to identify the global w i t h that sort of lowest c o m m o n denominator stake w h i c h w e all have i n being h u m a n . In that sense, I a m not a humanist. I do not think w e can mobilize people s i m p l y through their c o m m o n humanity. It m a y be that that d a y w i l come b u t I do not think w e are there yet. Both the sources of the p o w e r f u l , a n d the sources of the powerless, w e both, always, go towards those universal moments through locating; ourselves, through some particularity. 'So I think of the global as something h a v i n g more to do w i t h the hegemonic sweep at w h i c h a certain configuration of local particularities try to dominate the w h o l e scene, to mobilize the technology .and to incorporate, i n subaltern positions, a variety of more localized identities to construct the next historical project.

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about w h i c h direction to go before one begins to open that out. But I do think that there are possibilities i n that. I think the reason w h y , in spite of the fact that the G L C was never below 60-65 percent i n the popularity ratings, Thatcherism nevertheless destroyed it, w a s because it understood its prefigurative role. It understood that if it c o u l d persist, a n d make some changes to the I v e s of a variety of different constituencies i n that city, other peoples w o u l d begin to say, " H e r e is a different k i n d of m o d e l . H e r e is a different w a y to g o . " W h a t w o u l d that mean o n a more national scale? W h a t w o u l d that mean i n another part of the country where the constituencies are different? I think Thatcherism understood that .and it b l e w the G L C out of the water. It destroyed it b y legislative f i a t That tells y o u h o w i m portant they k n e w it actually w a s . Thatcherism's p o p u l a r i t y a n d hegemonic reach precisely arises f r o m the fact that it articulates differences. The numbers of people w h o are 100 percent w i t h the project on, all fronts, are very small indeed. W h a t Thatcherism is fantastic at is the s k i l l of m o b i l i z i n g the different minorities a n d p l a y i n g one m i n o r i t y against another. It is In the game of articulating differences. It always tries to condense them w i t h i n something it calls " t h e Thatcherite subject" but there is no such thing. That is a political representation. It is the condensation of a variety of different identities. It plays on difference, a n d through difference, a l l the time. It tries to represent that difference as the same. B u t d o not be mistaken about it. I do not think that is so. C o n d u c t i n g the counter-hegemonic politics w h i c h I have been trying to describe does not carry any guarantees that it w i l l w i n . A l l that I a m saying is that there is a difference between the politics of positionality I have been o u t l i n i n g a n d some unitary politics w h i c h is successful, w h i c h is Thatcherism. That is not the difference. The difference is be tween t w o politics of positionality; one well-conducted and one w h i c h is conducted v e r y half-heartedly, a n d w h i c h is, indeed, not being conducted at all.

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CULTURE, GLOBALIZATION A N D THE WORLD-SYSTEM I a m deliberately u s i n g Gramscian terms — construct the hegemonic project, the historical project, i n w h i c h is lodged a variety of differences b u t ; w h i c h are a l l committed either i n a dominant, or a subaltern position, to a single historical project, w h i c h is the project of globalization^ of the k i n d I think y o u are talking about.

3. Social Theory, Cultural Relativity and the Problem of Globality

That is w h a t is "universal." I think universal is always i n quotation marks. It is. the u n i v e r s a l i z i n g aspect, the universalizing project, the universalizing hope to be universal. It is like M r s , Thatcher's " A l l the British p e o p l e . " It is a w a y of t r y i n g to say everybody is n o w inside this particular f o r m of globalization. A n d at that very moment, there I am. I remain M a r x i s t . A t that very moment, whenever the discourse declares itself to be closed Is the moment w h e n y o u k n o w it is contradictor}.'. Y o u .know, w h e n it; says, " E v e r y t h i n g is inside m y k n a p sack. I have just got h o l d of a l l of y o u . I have a bit of all of y o u n o w . Y o u are inside the bag,,. C a n I close i t ? " N o . Something is;just about to open that out a n d present a problem,. H e g e m o n y , i n that sense, is never completed. It is always t r y i n g to enclose more differences w i t h i n itself. N o t w i t h i n itself. It doesn't want the differences to look exactly like it. B u t it wants the projects of its i n d i v i d u a l a n d smaller identities to be only possible if the larger one becomes possible. That is h o w Thatcherism locates smaller identities w i t h i n itself. Y o u want to have the traditional family? Y o u cannot d o it for yourself because it depends o n larger political a n d economic things. If y o u want to d o that, y o u must come inside m y larger project. Y o u must identify yourself w i t h the larger things inside m y project. That is h o w y o u become part of history. You, become a little c o g in, the larger part of history. 1

N o w that is a different game f r o m saying, " I want everybody to be exactly a, replica of m e . " It is a more complicated game. But there Is a moment w h e n it always declares itself to be universal a n d closed, and, that is the moment of naturalization. That's the moment w h e n it wants its boundaries to be coterminous w i t h the truth, w i t h the reality of history. A n d that is always the moment w h i c h , I think, escapes it. That's m y hope. Something h a d better be escaping it.

ROLAND ROBERTSON

THE NATIONALISMS OF THE MODERN WORLD ARE NOT THE TRI¬ u m p h a n t civilizations of yore. They are the ambiguous expression of the d e m a n d both for .,.. assimilation into the universal — a n d simultaneously for .,.,. adhering to the particular, the reinvention of differences. Indeed, it is universalism through particularism, a n d particularism through universalism. Immanuel Wallerstein'

M o d e r n societies are characterized less b y what they have in c o m m o n or by their structure w i t h regard to well-defined universal exigencies,, than b y the fact of their involvement i n the issue of universalization ,..,. The need, even the urgency, for 'universal reference' has never been felt so strongly as i n o u r time ..... The process of modernization, i s — the challenge hurled at .groups closed

Immanuel Wallerstein, The Politics of ike World-Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984) 166-7. 1

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CULTURE, GLOBALIZATION A N D THE WORLD-SYSTEM i n by their o w n contingencies and particularities to form themselves into an open ensemble of interlocutors and partners . . . François B o u r r i c a u d

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L i k e nostalgia, diversity is not w h a t it used to be; and the sealing of lives into separate railway carriages to produce cultural renewal or the spacing of them out w i t h contrast effects to free u p m o r a l energies are romantical dreams, not u n d a n g e r o u s — [MJoral issues stemming f r o m cultural diversity . . . that used to arise . . . m a i n l y between societies . . , n o w increasingly arise w i t h i n them The day w h e n the A m e r i c a n city was the m a i n m o d e l of cultural fragmentation and ethnic t u m b l i n g is quite gone.

stipulation does indeed constitute a relatively sharp focus—and w h i l e I w i l l not confine myself slavishly to it I w i l l bear it carefully i n m i n d as a directive for a general, theoretical discussion. I begin b y formulating a general position w i t h respect to the issue of universalism and particularism i n global context, to w h i c h m y opening: quotations d r a w attention. I then move to a discussion of our social-theoretical resources for the analysis of global complexity, w i t h special, reference to the concept of culture. M u c h of that exercise involves .an attempt to loosen the notion of culture; but not to the extent that culture becomes everything and everything becomes culture, w h i c h is a strong tendency i n a lot of recent w o r k under the headings of deconstruction, postmodernism, and, more diffusely, " c u l t u r a l studies."

Identity and the Particular-Universal Relationship

C l i f f o r d Geertz ' 3

Basic Problems The title of the s y m p o s i u m i n w h i c h this paper was first presented contained three key terms: culture, globalization and world-system. Each of these is i n one w a y or another problematic a n d contestable and it is, I think,;, desirable not merely to identify the m a i n problems involved i n the uses to w h i c h they may i n d i v i d u a l l y be p u t but also to address the issue of their constituting an analytical package. To some extent the rationale i n the latter respect is p r o v i d e d b y the sub-title of the s y m p o s i u m . " C o n t e m p o r a r y G nditions for the R e p resentation of Identity" suggests that w e shouk consider the ways i n which "the representation of i d e n t i t y " is intim itely b o u n d - u p , first, w i t h cultural aspects of and responses to pre .cesses w h i c h can be identified as global i n their reach and significance a n d , second, w i t h an entity w h i c h has been conceptualized as the world-system. That

In addition to 'the ideas of culture, globalization, .and world-system, the concept of identity is, of course, also problematic. H o w e v e r , I cannot get i n v o l v e d directly i n that thorny issue here. I w i l l instead s i m p l y take the approach, that, i n a w o r l d w h i c h is increasingly compressed (and indeed identified as the w o r l d ) and in w h i c h its most formidable units — namely, nationally constituted societies — are increasingly subject to the internal, as w e l l as external, constraints of multiculturaiity or, w h i c h is not quite the same thing, polyethnicity, the conditions of and for the identification of i n d i v i d u a l and 4

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François Bourricaud, "Modernity, 'Universal Reference' and the Process of Modernization," in Patterns of Modernity, Volume I: The West, ed. S. N . Eisenstadt (New York: New York University Press,-1987):21. - * Clifford Geertz, "The Uses of Diversity," Michigan Quarterly, 25, 1 (1986):114-5. 2

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See Burkhart Holzner .and Roland Robertson, "Identity and Authority: A Problem Analysis of Processes of Identification and Authorization," in Hen lily and Authority: Explorations in the Tiieory of Society, ed. Roland Robertson and Burkhart Holzner (Oxford: Basil Blackwel.1,1980):l-39. Also see my "Aspects of Identity and Authority in. Sociological Theory," in ibid.., 218-65. Among the most important recent contributions to the study of national-identity formation are: Anthony D. Smith, Theories of Nationalism (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1983); Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1983); Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (London: Verso, 1983); Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds., The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); Carol Gluck, Japan's'ModemMyths (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985); Tom Nairn, Ttte Enchanted Glass: Britain and its Monarchy (London: Hutchinson Radius, 1988); Harold James, A German Identity: 1770-1990 (New York: Routledge, 1989); Hugh Kiemey, The British Isles (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). 4

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collective selves a n d of individual a n d collective others are becoming ever more complex. M o r e o v e r , what Bernard M c G r a n e calls " t h e authoritative p a r a d i g m for interpreting a n d explaining the difference of the other" has undergone mutation, so that increasingly " ' C u l t u r e ' accounts for the difference of the other." M c G r a n e is concerned w i t h "the history of the different conceptions of difference f r o m r o u g h l y the sixteenth, to the early twentieth c e n t u r y " — almost entirely i n the West.' H e sees a shift f r o m "the alienness of the non-European O t h e r " b e i n g interpreted " o n the h o r i z o n of Christianity i n the sixteenth c e n t u r y " through an Enlightenment concern w i t h the Other as Ignorant, a nineteenth-century use of time as " l o d g e d between the European, a n d the non-European O t h e r , " to the twentieth-century employment of C u l t u r e . This approach is important i n that it draws specific attention to the civilizational bases of identity construction a n d representation. O n the other h a n d , it neglects Oriental a n d other civilizational interpretations of the West — as. w e l l , for the most part, as concrete "intercivilizational encounters."" It also does not explicitly address the crucial contemporary question as to the emergence of a globally "authoritative p a r a d i g m " or globally con tested paradigms for " i n t e r p r e t i n g a n d explaining the difference of the other." ' 5

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The overall circumstance of identity representation i n conditions of great global density a n d complexity poses large analytical problems, to w h i c h there have been a n u m b e r of responses. A m o n g the most immediately relevant a n d " e x t r e m e " of these are what I w i l l for the

* Bernard McGrane, Beyond Anthropology (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989) x. * Ibid., ix. Ibid,, x. * See Benjamin Nelson, "Civilizational Complexes and Intercivilizational Encounters," in On the RoadstoModernity: Conscience, Science and Civilizations, ed Toby E. Huff (Totowa, New Jersey: Rowman and Littlefield, 1981):80-106" However, Nelson did not address the issue of the interpenetraiion of national identities. James in his A German Identity has much to say about that as far as Germany is concerned. See my "Globality, Global Culture, and Images of World Order," in Social Change and Modernity, ed. Hans Haferkamp and Neil Smelser (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991). Also see Roland Robertson and Frank Lechner, "Modernization, Globalization and the Problem of Culture in World-Systems. Theory," Theory, Culture & Society, 2, 3 (1985):103-18. 3

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sake of convenience call relativism, on the one hand, and worldism, on the other. Relativism — w h i c h term covers a multitude of " s i n s , " i n c l u d i n g postmodernism as an ideology of the intelligentsia and " t h e n e w p r a g m a t i s m " — involves, for the most part, refusal to make any general, " u n i v e r s a l i z i n g " sense of the problems posed b y sharp discontinuities between different forms of collective a n d i n d i v i d u a l l i f e . In. the fashionable phrases, this perspective is anti-foundational or anti-totalistic; a n d one of its offshoots is the v i e w that talking about culture — certainly i n global perspective — almost inevitably involves participation i n a game of free-wheeling cultural politics, i n w h i c h culture is regarded as being inextricably b o u n d - u p w i t h " p o w e r " and "resistance" (or "liberation"). W o r l d i s m is, i n contrast, foundational. It is based u p o n the c l a i m that it is possible a n d , indeed, desirable to grasp the-world as a whole .analytically; to s u c h an extent that virtually everything of socioculturel or political interest w h i c h occurs a r o u n d the globe — Including identity presentation — can be explained, or at least interpreted i n reference to, the dynamics of the entire " w o r l d - s y s t e m . . " H o w e v e r , that does not preclude anal y z i n g the formation or representation of identity i n terms of cultural politics; for m a n y of those w h o emphasize culture as. a " p r i v i l e g e d area" at the present time make diffuse, h i g h l y rhetorical claims as to its g r o u n d i n g i n a world-systemic, economic realm. 10

M y o w n argument w i t h respect to these matters involves the attempt to preserve both direct attention to particularity and difference, on the one h a n d , a n d to universality and homogeneity, on the other. It rests largely on the thesis that w e are, i n the late-twentieth century, witnesses to — a n d participants i n — a massive, twofold process Involving the interpénétration of the universalization of particularism and the particularization of universalism, a claim that I w i l l flesh out in reference to the three quotations, w i t h w h i c h began m y discussion. Speaking specifically of recent nationalism — w h i c h is, i n a n u m ber of respects, paradigmatic of contemporary particularism —

See Zygmunt Baurnan, "Is There a Postmodern Sociology?" Theory, Culture & Society, 5, 2/3 (1988)217-38. A major example is Fredric Jameson. See in particular his Third-World Literature in the Era of the Multinational Corporation," Social Text (Fall, 1986):6588 Also see Scott Lash and John Urry, The End of Organized Capitalism .(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1987) and David Harvey, The Condition ofPoslmodemity (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989). 101

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CULTURE, GLOBALIZATION A N D THE WORLD-SYSTEM Wallerstein insists, i n m y v i e w very correctly, o n the simultaneity of particularism a n d universaEsm. H o w e v e r , I do not think that he goes far e n o u g h i n addressing the issue of their direct interpénétration, a shortfall w h i c h can be largely attributed to Wallerstein's adamance i n g r o u n d i n g the relationship between them i n "the genius and the contradiction of capitalist c i v i l i z a t i o n . " While I think there is m u c h to the v i e w that capitalism amplifies a n d is bound-up w i t h "the ambiguous expression of the d e m a n d both for assimilation into the u n i versal .and f o r . , . . adhering to the particular," I do not agree w i t h the implication that the problematic of the interplay between the particular .and the universal is unique to capitalism. Indeed, I w o u l d claim that the differential spread of capitalism can partly be explained, in terms of its accommodation to the historical " w o r k i n g o u t " of that problematic. N o r d o I agree w i t h the argument that we can, i n an explanatory sense, trace the contemporary connection between the t w o dispositions directly to late-twentieth century capitalism (inwhatever w a y that m a y be defined). Rather, I w o u l d argue that the consumerist global capitalism of our time is w r a p p e d into the i n creasingly thematized particular-universal relationship i n terms of the connection between globewide, universalistic s u p p l y and local, particularistic demand. The contemporary market thus involves the increasing interpénétration of culture and economy: w h i c h is not the same as arguing, as Fredric Jameson tends to do, that the production of culture is directed by the " l o g i c " of " l a t e " c a p i t a l i s m . M o r e spe1

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Wallerstein, 167. Wallerstein also argues in the same passage that "capitalist civilization . . . as it hurtles towards its undoing .... becomes in the interim stronger and stronger." This is undoubtedly both a more sophisticated and a "safer" point of view than that of another prominent advocate of world-systems analysis, namely, Christopher Chase-Dunn, who had the misfortune to have the following statement published in late 1989: "The revolutions In the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China have increased our collective knowledge about how to build socialism despite their only partial successes and their obvious failures. Their existence widens the space available for other experiments with socialism" (Global Formation: Structures of the World-Economy, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989) 342. The difference between Wallerstein and Chase-Dunn is important in that it illustrates the contrast between sophisticated and simplistic forms of "world-systems analysis," Whereas the apparent collapse of communistic socialism in 1989 must surely come as a great disappointment to Utopian members of that school of thought, there is nothing about 1989 which should embarrass, "true Wallersteinians," In, fact there is a crucial sense in, which it could be said, that Wallerstein predicted the collapse of in-ene-country "socialism." Fredric Jameson, "Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capital13

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cifically, the contemporary capitalist creation of consumers frequently involves the tailoring of products to increasingly specialized regional, societal, ethnic, class and gender markets — so-called " m i c r o marketing." Bourricaud, although less specific i n the sense of not indicating a " d r i v i n g m e c h a n i s m , " comes closer to the mark i n suggesting that there has emerged a globewide circumstance — i n v o l v i n g what I call the compression of the w o r l d — w h i c h increasingly constrains m u l t i tudes of groups a n d Individuals to face each, other i n what he calls an "open, ensemble of interlocutors a n d partners." This is what gives rise to the issue of " u n i v e r s a l i z a t i o n " — and also accentuates the issue of particularization. Bourricaud draws attention to a critical issue w h i c h must surely lie at the center of any discussion of globalization a n d culture — namely, the ideational a n d pragmatic aspects of interaction and communication between collective a n d i n d i v i d u a l actors on the global scene. This is an aspect of global "reality construction" w h i c h has been grossly neglected. H o w e v e r , B o u r r i c a u d does not go far enough. M i s s i n g from, his formulation, is concern w i t h the terms i n w h i c h interaction between different particularisms may occur. To h i m the issue of universalization is apparently a more-or-less purely contingent matter arising f r o m the p r o b l e m of " h o w to get a l o n g " i n a compressed w o r l d and thus has little or no cultural autonomy — although, i n a l l fairness, it should be said that 'Bourricaud is m a i n l y trying to move us a w a y f r o m the purely logical or ideal solutions to the p r o b l e m of w o r l d order w h i c h some of the more philosophically-minded anthropologists and sociologists have offered i n recent years i n the face of sharp cultural discontinuities, i n particular Louis Dumont. I a m emphasizing t w o m a i n points w i t h respect to the interesting w a y s i n w h i c h Wallerstein and Bourricaud have raised the universalism-particularism issue. First, I am arguing that the latter is a basic feature of the h u m a n condition, which, was given substantial and extremely consequential historical thematization w i t h the rise of the 14

ism," New left Review, 146 i(1984):53-92. For a neoMarxist, or "Postmarxist," view which gives more autonomy to culture, see Lash and Urry. Louis Dumont, Essais Sur L'lndividtialisme (Paris:, Editions du Seuil, 1983). This, however, is not 'intended as a pejorative comment on Dumont's pioneering work on what he calls, in a very abstract sense, the major civilizatlonal ideologies. 14

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CULTURE, GLOBALIZATION A N D THE WORLD-SYSTEM great religiocultural traditions, d u r i n g what K a r l Jaspers called the A x i a l P e r i o d . Those traditions were, i n large part, developed precisely a r o u n d w h a t has come to be called the universalismparticularism theme and their significance i n that regard has continu e d into our time. A major example of great contemporary relevance has to do w i t h the w a y i n w h i c h Japan acquired the substantive theme of universality through its encounters w i t h and modifications, along nativistfcj lines, of Confucianism a n d M a h a y a n a B u d d h i s m . Japan's crystallization of a f o r m of "universalistic p a r t i c u l a r i s m " since its first encounter w i t h C h i n a has, i n fact, resulted i n its acquiri n g paradigmatic, global significance w i t h respect to the h a n d l i n g of the universalism-particularism issue. Specifically, its paradigmatic status is inherent i n its very l o n g a n d successful history of selective incorporation an d syncretization of ideas f r o m other cultures i n such a w a y as to particularize the universal a n d , so to say, return the product of that process to the w o r l d as a uniquely Japanese contribu-. tion to the u n i v e r s a l . 15

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• • Second, I a m jarguing that i n more recent w o r l d history the u n i versalism-particularism issue has come to constitute something like a global-cultural form, a major axis of the structuration of the w o r l d as-a-whole. Thus rather than s i m p l y v i e w i n g the theme of universalism as h a v i n g to do w i t h principles w h i c h can a n d s h o u l d be applied to all and that of particularism as referring to that w h i c h can and should be applied only " l o c a l l y , " I suggest that the t w o have become tied together as part of a globewide cultural nexus — united i n terms of the universality of the experience a n d , increasingly, the expectation 0/particularity, o n the one hand, and the experience and, increasingly, the expectation of universality, on the other. The latter — the particularization of universalism — involves the idea of the universal being given global-human conciseness; while the former — 17

Jaspers, The Origin and Goal of History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953). M important contribution to this aspect of Japanese identity see David Pollock, The Fracture of Meaning: Japan's Synthesis of China from the Eighth through the Eighteenth Centuries (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986). See Roland Robertson, "Globalization Theory and Civilization Analysis " Comparative Civilizations Review, 17 (Fall 1987):20-30 and "Mapping the Global Condition: Globalization as the Central Concept," Theory, Culture & Society 7 2/3 (19901:15-30. ' ' ' 15

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the universalization of particularism — involves the extensive diffusion of the idea that there is virtually no limit to particularity, to uniqueness, and thus also to difference and otherness. (One aspect of the latter tendency is conveyed by Jean Baudrillard's aphorism concerning our present condition: "It is never too late to revive your origins.") I suggest that along these lines w e may best consider contemporary globalization i n its most general sense as a f o r m of institutionalization of the two-fold process i n v o l v i n g the universalization of particularism a n d the particularization of universalism. Resistance to contemporary globalization — as, for example, some consider to be i n v o l v e d o n the more radical side of the general Islamic movement — w o u l d thus be regarded as opposition not merely to the w o r l d as one, homogenized system b u t also — a n d , 1 believe, more relevantly — to the conception of the w o r l d as a series of culturally equal, relativized, entities or w a y s of life. The first aspect c o u l d w e l l be regarde d as a f o r m of anti-modernity, w h i l e the second c o u l d fruitfully be seen as a f o r m of anti-postmodernity. P u t another w a y , it is around the universalism-particularism, axis of globalization that the discontents of globally manifest themselves i n reference to n e w , globalized variations o n the oldish themes of Gesellschaft and Gemeinschaft, The Gemeinschaft-GcseUschaft theme has constituted a primary focus for the critique of modernity (most directly i n G e r m a n y ) . It is n o w increasi n g l y interwoven w i t h the discourse of globality i n the sense that it has been " u p g r a d e d " so as to refer to the relationship between the particular a n d the c o m m u n a l , on the one hand, and the universal and the impersonal, o n the other. This issue is closely related to what A r j u n A p p a d u r a i calls " t h e tension between cultural homogenization and cultural heterogenization" a n d w h i c h he regards as " t h e central problem of today's global interactions. A p p a d u r a i (1990:17) argues that " t h e central feature of global culture today is the politics of the m u t u a l effort of sameness and difference to cannibalize one another and thus to proclaim their successful hijacking of the t w i n Enlightenment ideas of the triumphantly u n i versal a n d the resiliently p a r t i c u l a r . " This evocative interpretation 18

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Jean Baudrillard, America (London: Verso, 1988) 41. Arjun Appadurai, "Disjunciure and Difference in the Global Cultural Economy," Public Culture, 2 (Spring 1990):5. Ibid.,, 17. 1 8 19

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CULTURE,: GLOBALIZATION A N D THE WORLD-SYSTEM is, it should, be noted, connected b y Appadurai to his suggestion that " t h e theory of global c u l t u r a l interactions . , . w i l l have to move into something like à h u m a n version of the theory that some scientists are calling 'chaos' theory,," W h i l e this cannot be the place for a n adequate discussion of this complex issue, it s h o u l d be said that A p padurai's advocacy of a c t a - t h e o r e t i c approach to global culture w h i c h he sees more specifically i n terms of a " d i s j u n c t i v e " series of " s c a p e s " (ethnoscapes, technoscapes, finanscapes, mediascapes, a n d ideoscapes) — cjlearly involves denial of the idea of the global institutionalization of the relationship between universalized particularism and, particularized universallsm. 21

W h i l e not rejecting the fruitfulness of A p p a d u r a i ' s ideas about there being empirically disjunctive relationships between different cultural " s c a p e s " at the global level, I d o insist u p o n the general, structuring significance of the particular-universal connection — its crystallization as the elemental f o r m of " g l o b a l l i f e . " Some of m y differences-with A p p a d u r a i m a y arise f r o m his implication that the Enlightenment ideas of universalism a n d particularism were necessarily incongruent. M y o w n interpretation is that they were basically complementary. A s A n t h o n y Smith has written, of the late eighteenth century, '"{A)t 'the root of the 'national i d e a l ' is a certain v i s i o n of the w o r l d . — A c c o r d i n g to this v i s i o n mankind, is 'really' a n d 'naturally' d i v i d e d into d i s t i n c t . , . . nations. Each nation . . . has its peculiar contribution to make to the w h o l e , the family of n a t i o n s . " O r , to put it more incisively, the idea of nationalism (or particularism) develops only in, tandem w i t h internationalism. 22

Finally, as f a r as fleshing-out i n relation to m y introductory quotations is concerned, the citation f r o m Geertz, reminds us strongly of the fact that globalization, is not s i m p l y a matter of societies, regions and civilizations being squeezed together in, various problematic w a y s but also of such occurring w i t h increasing intensity inside n a tionally constituted societies. N o w a d a y s , to quote .further f r o m

Ibid.,, 20. Anthony D. Smith, Nationalism in the Twentieth Century (New York: New York University Press, 1979) 2. See also Hans Kohn, "Nationalism and Internationalism," in. History and ike. Idea of Mankind, ed. W. Warren Wagar (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1971). On a more recent period see Rupert Emerson, Self-Determinalion Revisited in the Era of'Decolonization (Harvard: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1964).

S O C I A L T H E O R Y , C U L T U R A L RELATIVITY Geertz, "foreignness does not start at the water's edge but at the skin's '.., the wogs begin long before Calais.," ' P u b l i s h e d i n 198-6, Geertz's suggestions have acquired a poignant relevance to current prognoses about Eastern Europe a n d the Soviet U n i o n - for m those areas the problems of o l d ethnic identity are being played-out w i t h i n •the context of increasing global thematization, of ethnicity-wiftmhumankind. In a n y case, Geertz's observations press u s , infer re, to take seriously into account the position of individuals in the globalization process' (I return briefly to the issues of multiculturality and polyethnicity raised b y Geertz at a later point.) There has been a m a r k e d tendency i n many discussions of the world-system, w o r l d society, or whatever, to ignore individuals - more precisely, the contemporary' construction of i n d i v i d u a l i s m - for the apparent reason that globalization of alleged necessity refers to very large scale matters, i n contrast to the "small-scale" status of individuals, This b o w i n the direction of the textbook w i s d o m w h i c h distinguishes microsociological f r o m macrosociological approaches i n terms of naive conceptions of scale a n d complexity is, 1 believe, misplaced. Thus I have i n m y own, w o r k insisted, that individuals are as m u c h a part of the globalization process as any other basic category of social-theoretical discourse. To be more specific, I have argued that there are, analytically speaking, four elemental points of reference for any discussion of contemporary globalization - namely, national societies, individuals, the world system of societies (international relations) a n d humankind. ' M y general argument i n m a k i n g this set of distinctions is that globalization increasingly involves thematization of these four elements of the global-human condition (rather than the world-system). (In that perspective it m a y be seen, that there are t w o major particularistic elements i n the w o r l d as a w h o l e - individuals a n d societies - and t w o major universalistlc elements: the system of societies, o n the one h a n d , a n d h u m a n k i n d , the species aspect, on, the other.) A n y g i v e n element is constrained b y the other three. F o r example, individuals as 23

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23 Geertz 112 » This model, was first introduced, along somewhat different lines, in Roland Robertson and JoAr.r. Chirfco, "Humanity, 9^^™.^™^*™% S gious Resurgence: A Theoretical Exploration," Sociological Analysis, 46 (Fall, 1985):219-42, 79

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CULTURE, GLOBALIZATION A N D THE WORLD-SYSTEM such are increasingly constrained by being members of societies, members of an increasingly thematized and threatened h u m a n species a n d greatly affected by the vicissitudes of international relations. Thus late-twentieth century globalization involves the institutionalization of both the universalization of particularism and the particularization of universalism and can be more specifically indicated as consisting i n the interpenetrating processes of societalization, i n d i v i d u a l i z a t i o n , the consolidation of the international system of societies, a n d the concrétisation of the sense of h u m a n k i n d . R e t u r n i n g directly to 'the i n d i v i d u a l , m y p r i m a r y claim is that globalization has i n v o l v e d and continues to involve the institutionalized construction of the i n d i v i d u a l . E v e n more specifically, w e must recognize that world-political culture has led to a globewide institutionalization of "the life c o u r s e " — w h i c h has, John M e y e r maintains, t w o dimensions: "aspects of the person that enter into rationalized social organization" a n d "the public celebration o f . . . the 'private' or subjective i n d i v i d u a l " » M u c h of that has been and continues to be mediated by state structures, but international nongovernmental organizations have also increasingly mediated and promoted i n d i v i d ualism, i n the areas of education, h u m a n rights, the rights of w o m e n , health, and so on. In s u m , the globewide encouragement of i n d i v i d ualism i n association w i t h increasing polyethnicity and multiculturality — themselves encouraged by large migrations and " d i a s p o r a t i o n s " — has been crucial i n the move towards the circumstance of "foreignness" described so w e l l by Geertz. A t the same time w h a t M e y e r calls the celebration of subjective identity relative to involvement i n "rationalized social organization" has p l a y e d a major part i n the virtually globewide establishment of various " m i n o r i t y " forms of personal a n d collective identification — among w h i c h gender has been of particular significance. 25

A t the conference w h i c h has f o r m e d the basis for the present v o l u m e , a n d thus also of this paper, an important question was raised as to the place of w o m e n i n m y conception of globality a n d

Elsewhere I have sketched a model of distinct phases of globalization in modem world history. See Robertson, "Mapping the Global Condition." I - Meyer, "Self and the Life Course: Institutionalization and Its Effects," in Institutional Structure: Constituting State, Society and the Individual ed. George Thomas et al. (Beverly Hills, California: Sage):243-1.

globalization. W h i l e I cannot present here anything resembling an appropriate reaction to that query, t w o sets of short reflections are possible. First, i n empirical terms, it should be said that m y o w n experience of the female response to the discourse of globalization is that w o m e n take to it as eagerly as m e n , particularly w i t h respect to the humankind component of m y m o d e l — the latter tendency h a v i n g been confirmed to me by others, i n c l u d i n g female teachers w o r k i n g i n the field of international (or global) studies. O n the other hand, it can be reasonably argued that that " f a c t " s h o u l d not be regarded uncritically.. Is not the assignment of w o m e n to the most " f a m i l i a l " aspect of the globalization process a macroreplication of the historically subordinate status of w o m e n inside societies a n d c o m m u nities? M y answer to that is ambiguous — for w h o can tell where the m a x i m u m leverage is going to be as far as the patterning of the world-as-a-whole is concerned? Certainly the entire question of global ecology a n d the fate of h u m a n k i n d as a species w i l l be central to the politics of the global-human condition, i n the c o m i n g decades. It could be the case that concern w i t h h u m a n k i n d w i l l be " i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d " as " m e r e l y " a female issue; but yet it c o u l d , alternatively, come to be a p o w e r f u l basis for feminism. The w a y s i n w h i c h w o m e n participate in the discourse of globalization is obviously the most vital factor. A t this stage w e do not have m u c h to inform us. There is, most certainly, an " i n t e r n a t i o n a l " w o m e n ' s movement. There are also signs of serious attempts to address directly the actual insertion of w o m e n in. the globalization process, the recent book b y C y n t h i a Enloe being an interesting example.. Enloe attempts to make " f e m i nist sense of international politics" b y d r a w i n g attention to the role of women, i n the m a k i n g of the contemporary system of international relations — as wives of male diplomats, as prostitutes for male m e m bers of a r m e d forces, as victims of sex-tourism, as instruments of global advertising, a n d so on. Specifically, Enloe casts the w o m a n as a "global victim." 27

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Social Theory and Global Culture There seems to be something of a consensus a m o n g those sociologists w h o have been d o i n g w o r k directly o n the global circumstance that the m a i n traditions of social theory are inadequate to the task of illuminating discussion of the w o r l d as a whole a n d the m a k i n g thereof. Wallerstein has probably p u t the matter most sharply i n arguing that " w o r l d - s y s t e m s analysis" is a protest against the received 'tradition of social science as a w h o l e . I have great sympathy w i t h the general, if not the specific, thrust of that claim a n d I w i l l n o w outline some of m y o w n m a i n v i e w s i n that respect, i n relation to the substantive task at h a n d a n d m a i n l y i n reference to m y o w n " o f f i c i a l " discipline of sociology, w h i c h has played a significant role i n the actual patterning of twentieth-century globalization; b u t w h i c h has not, to p u t it m i l d l y , done m u c h i n its mainstream to focus analytically a n d interpretively on globalization as a n historical p h e n o m enon of increasingly salient contemporary significance. 28

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There can be little doubt that sociology took its classical shape d u r i n g the declining years of the nineteenth century and the first quarter of the present century i n p r i m a r y reference to what has come to be called the p r o b l e m of modernity, on the one h a n d , and the mode of operation of the nationally constituted society, on the other — w i t h the society-individual problematic b e i n g central to both. I n such a perspective there was little or no r o o m for the analysis of cultural differences except i n terms of analytical contrasts between civilizations and civilizational traditions; since it was w i d e l y assumed that the m o d e r n f o r m of society was culturally homogenous or h a d to become so i n order to achieve viability. O b v i o u s l y M a x Weber h a d no clear sociological sense of, certainly n o l i k i n g for, what w e have come to call a pluralistic society. In one w a y or another the leading classical sociologists promoted the idea — if only implicitly — that what later came to be called a central value system w a s a n essential feature of

Immanuel Wallerstein, "World-Systems Analysis," in Social Theory Today, ed. Anthony Giddens and Jonathan H . Turner (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1987}:309. Some of the following thoughts on and documentation with respect to this subject are developed in my "After Nostalgia? Wilful Nostalgia and the Phases of Globalization," in Theories of Modernity and Poslmodemitu, ed. Bryan S Turner (London: Sage, 1990):45-61. M

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SOCIAL T H E O R Y , C U L T U R A L RELATIVITY viable national societies a n d that i n external terms each society s h o u l d develop a sense of its o w n collective identity. In that respect some sociologists of that period became very influential outside Western E u r o p e . Social-scientific ideas — notably those of the E n g l i s h utilitarians and the French positivists — h a d , of course, been influential among dominant, " l i b e r a l " elites i n n e w l y independent L a t i n A m e r i c a n societies d u r i n g the nineteenth century; but such turn-of-the-century people as Dürkheim, Toennies, Spencer a n d M a x W e b e r h a d a particular' impact i n E u r o p e a n a n d A s i a n countries In terms of their ideas concerning such matters as culture a n d national identity, as w e l l as those relating to the issue of what f o r m a m o d e r n national society s h o u l d take. F o r example Spencer — whose w o r k w a s very influential i n late-nineteenth century Japan a n d C h i n a — explicitly a d vised the M e i j i political elite to establish a f i r m tradition-based Japanese identity, D u r k h e i m ' s ideas o n the theme of c i v i l religion were influential i n the establishment of the new T u r k i s h republic i n the 1920s, w h i l e the G e r m a n theme of Gemeinschaft v . Gesellschaft (or culture v . civilization) was w i d e l y manipulated i n East A s i a a n d elsewhere. (The M e i j i elite decided quite early to erect a nationally organized c o m m u n i t y — to try to have both Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft.) T h u s even t h o u g h it is conventional to think of Western social science as h a v i n g developed more or less solely i n the West itself (with the partial exception of its M a r x i a n component), the fact of the matter is that i n a great array of different juxtapositions it f o u n d its w a y into the life-courses of a large n u m b e r of non-Western societies w e l l before the peaking of Western social-scientific theories of societal modernization i n the late 1950s a n d early 1960s (in relation to the emergence of the T h i r d W o r l d as a global presence). B y the e n d of the first quarter of the twentieth century Western social science h a d become a " c u l t u r a l resource" i n a n u m b e r of global regions — most notably i n East A s i a , w h e r e there w a s a long-standing cultural tendency to juxtapose superficially contradictory sets of ideas i n syncretic f o r m . Thus w h i l e Western social scientists — most outstandingly M a x W e b e r — were busy comparing East a n d West as an analy tical exercise (with strong political and ideological overtones), the objects of the comparison (more accurately, intellectual and political elites) were busy sifting a n d i m p l e m e n t i n g packages of Western ideas for

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CULTURE; GLOBALIZATION A N D THE WORLD-SYSTEM v e r y concrete political, economic a n d cultural reasons. The irony i n this is, of course, that i n spite of the diffusion of their ideas to the v e r y societies w h i c h they were contrasting w i t h the West there was exceedingly little sense among the leading sociologists of the classical period that a n increasing n u m b e r of societies around the w o r l d were in v a r y i n g degrees subject — often very w i l l i n g l y — to their ideas concerning the functioning a n d operation of m o d e r n , nationally constituted societies; although those ideas were invariably recast f o r local purposes. In. other words they h a d little sense of the possibility of national societies being subject.to generalized, external expectations as to h o w societies c o u l d establish and maintain viability — that they themselves were actually central to the formation of an increasingly global sense of h o w a society s h o u l d be constructed. They were, i n a w o r d , insensitive to what has come to be called globalization — particularly cultural aspects thereof. 30

To be sure, Dürkheim became increasingly conscious of w h a t he called a n "international l i f e " to w h i c h i n d i v i d u a l societies became i n creasingly subject and w a s actually engaged i n w o r k on the more-orless logical — rather than the contingent-sociological — question of how culturally different societies c o u l d f o r m a n ensemble of societies i n moral terms,;For the most part, however, the dominant idea i n the foundational period of sociology w a s — insofar as international or global matters were attended to at all — that societies were engaged i n something like a D a r w i n i a n struggle, a. v i e w w h i c h w a s to be found particularly i n those quite numerous societies w h i c h w e r e d i rectly influenced b y so-called Social Darwinism, a n d , less explicitly, i n the orbits in w h i c h M a x W e b e r w a s particularly influential. M y m a i n point here is. thus that not merely has sociology suffered greatly from its inattention to extra-societal issues but that it still remains remarkably ill-equipped to deal w i t h inter-societal let alone global matters, although clearly considerable effort is currently being exerted i n order to rectify that circumstance. A s I have said, one of its major liabilities i n this regard has been its general acceptance of something like a dominant ideology or common culture thesis at the level of nationally constituted societies. A n d it is to that specific issue w h i c h I n o w turn.

SOCIAL T H E O R Y , C U L T U R A L RELATIVITY A s Margaret A r c h e r has argued, sociological discussion of cultural phenomena has been plagued by " t h e m y t h of cultural integration," according to w h i c h all societies that are considered to be viable are normatively integrated, with, culture p e r f o r m i n g the major function i n that r e g a r d . A r c h e r ' s p r i m a r y concern is to distinguish between culture as an objective, ideational phenomenon — possessing considerable autonomy i n terms of its o w n inner " l o g i c " (but not necessarily consistency) — f r o m agents w h o , i n specific circumstances, seek to comprehend, invoke, manipulate a n d act i n reference to systems, of ideas. Those analysts w h o consider culture to be almost exclusively of significance i n terms of its capacity to constrain action (and. social structure) are classified b y A r c h e r as " d o w n w a r d conflationists." The basic m y t h of cultural integration derives mainly f r o m the latter, most particularly f r o m anthropological functionalists of the 1930s, a n d was incorporated, i n Archer's v i e w , into sociological structural-functionalism i n the 1940s a n d 1950s. 31

O n the other h a n d , w e have also, according to A r c h e r , witnessed more recently another f o r m of the m y t h of cultural integration, arising f r o m M a r x i s t a n d neoMarxist schools of thought. Deeply concerned about the problem of the persistence of capitalism, a considerable n u m b e r of M a r x i a n social scientists have p r o d u c e d their o w n versions of " t h e m y t h . " A r c h e r classifies this as " u p w a r d conflat i o n i s m , " on. the grounds that i n contrast to d o w n w a r d conflation it involves the notion of culture d e r i v i n g f r o m a n d being i m p o s e d by one set of agents upon, other members of a collectivity a n d pays little attention to the idea of culture having some k i n d of inner logic. In both d o w n w a r d a n d u p w a r d conflation the upshot is, to a l l intents .and purposes, the same, i n spite of differing conceptions of h o w the result is achieved. C u l t u r e is to be considered p r i m a r i l y as a constraint. 3 2

A r c h e r also deals with, a third approach, w h i c h involves the refusal or analytical inability to distinguish between culture a n d action (or between culture and. social structure). " C e n t r a l c o n f l a t i o n i s m " — of

Margaret Archer, Culture and Agency: The Place of Culture in Social Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), For discussion see; Nicholas Abercrombie. Stephen Hill and Bryan S. Turner, The Dominant Ideology Thesis (London: Allen and Unwin, 1980). Also see Dominant Ideologies, ed. Abercrombie, Hill and Turner (London: Unwin Hyman, 1990). 3 1

S i

For an instructive discussion of the Japanese reception of Max Weber's ideas in Japan, see' Takeshi Ishida, Japanese Political. Culture (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Books, 1983) 51-68. More generally see ibid., 69-86. 3 0

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w h i c h A n t h o n y G i d d e n s ' structuration theory is p r o v i d e d as a major example — is actually the target of m u c h of A r c h e r ' s harshest criticism, since it leaves r o o m neither for action i n relative independence of culture nor for the objective, ideational status of the latter. I n any case, m y p r i m a r y reason for rehearsing the central thrust of Archer's argument is that she helps clear the w a y for a definite sociological m o v e away f r o m the o l d culture-as-integrating approach. I n particular, she d r a w s attention to the issue of the different ways i n w h i c h ideational patterns may be interpreted, e m p l o y e d , reconstituted and expanded u n d e r a variety of situational circumstances. O n the other h a n d , there are, most certainly, weaknesses i n A r c h e r ' s Culture and Agency. Probably the most significant is her rationalistic bias, w h i c h precludes her f r o m attending to expressive m e a n i n g and to morality. She also sets-up an implausible distinction between social •and cultural, action and does not attend directly to interaction between a n d interpénétration, of societal cultures. It w o u l d seem that the m y t h of cultural integration was, indeed, closely b o u n d to the perception of the national society as a h o m o genized entity a n d thus it needs to be periodized just as m u c h as does the idea of the culturally homogenous, state-governed society. In the latter respect I can d o no better than invoke W i l l i a m M c N e i l l , w h o has p r o v i d e d three reasons for "the prevalence of polyethnicity i n civilized societies before 1750 . . . (C)onquest, disease, a n d trade all w o r k e d i n that direction, most pronouncedly i n the M i d d l e East, a n d somewhat less forcefully towards the extremities of the Eurasian ecumene." I n the latter "ethnic diversity d i m i n i s h e d , though even i n remote offshore islands, like medieval Japan, .and Britain, aliens p l a y e d significant roles as bearers of special s k i l l s , " McNeill argues generally that the idea of an ethnically homogenous society is fundamentally " b a r b a r i c . " In any case, w i t h the French R e v o l u t i o n and the n e w conception of citizens constituting a single nation a n d possessing rights and duties to participate i n public life, t r i u m p h e d nationalism as, to quote M c N e i l l again, "the central, reality of m o d e r n times.." T h e major issue i n the present context is whether a n d i n what w a y s w e can develop modes of understanding of the m o d e r n

circumstances of polyethnicity a n d multiculturality, on the one hand, a n d globality, o n the other w h i c h w i l l not involve repetition of mainstream sociology's enchantment w i t h the national society. Let m e emphasize in. this connection that I a m not arguing that the nationally constituted society is about to whither away. To the contrary it is being r e v a m p e d i n various parts of the w o r l d as the multicultural society, w h i l e " o l d E u r o p e a n " and other nationalisms have reappeared — but i n n e w global circumstances — i n the context of the: w o r l d - p o l i t i c a l ferment of 1989. I have, i n any case, insisted, that "sQcietalism" — the commitment to the idea of the national society — is a crucial ingredient of the contemporary f o r m of globalization (the rendering of the w o r l d as a single place). Rather m y point is that w e s h o u l d not carry into the study of globalization the k i n d of v i e w of culture w h i c h w e inherit from, the conventional analysis of the national society. M u c h of our difficulty i n t h i n k i n g about culture at the global level stems f r o m our experience in. the latter respect — specifically conceiving of societies as unitary and larger units, i n c l u d i n g the world-as-a-whole, as lacking i n such. T o a significant extent the unitary v i e w of the nationally-constituted society is an aspect of global culture.

1

33

34

35

36.

A p a r t f r o m limitations stemming f r o m the derivation of the notion of culture f r o m a particularly unitary notion of society (one w h i c h was also projected by anthropologists onto p r i m a l societies d u r i n g the crucial take-off phase of recent globalization, 1880-1925), the other m a i n p r o b l e m about t h i n k i n g of culture i n global terms derives f r o m the fact that the dominant image of w h a t is often called global interdependence has been centered on the global, economy — although the.self-serving idea of "the global v i l l a g e , " p r o m o t e d b y television, commentators remains a close a n d also misleading contender, as does " p l a n e t earth."

See also John W. Meyer, "The World Polity and the Authority of the Nation-State," in Studies of the Modern World-System, ed. Albert Bergesen (New York: Academic Press; 1980}:109-37; and Frank J. Lechner, "Cultural Aspects of the Modem World-System," in Religious Politics in Global and Comparative Perspective, ed. William H . Swatos, Jr. (New York: Greenwood Press, 1989):ll-28. For an important critique of the unitary conception of society in a sociologically-based world-historical frame of reference, see Michael. Mann, The Sources of Social Power: Volume .', A History of Power from the Beginning to A.D. 1760 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986). 35

3 6

William H . McNeill, Pohethniciiy and National Unity in World History (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985) 33. Ibid., 34. 3 3

3 4

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CULTURE, GLOBALIZATION A N D THE WORLD-SYSTEM The m a i n difficulty w i t h the primarily-economic attitude parallels the p r o b l e m arising from, o u r having been h e l d i n thrall b y the idea of the homogenous national society. Because there has, indeed, occurred a v e r y r a p i d crystallization of a global economy in relatively recent times we are tempted into t h i n k i n g that that is what defines or determines globalization i n general. S u c h a v i e w , unfortunately, overlooks a n u m b e r of historical developments w h i c h — however loosely — are b o u n d u p w i t h the notion of global culture. M o r e o v e r concentration almost exclusively on the global economy exacerbates the tendency to think that w e can only conceive of global culture along the axis of Western hegemony a n d non-Western cultural resistance. W h i l e it- w o u l d be extremely foolish to reject the relevance of that perspective i t has a n u m b e r of serious liabilities. A s is well k n o w n , there has recently been considerable expansion of the rhetoric of globality, globalization, internationalization, and so o n . In fact there appears to have crystallized across the w o r l d a relatively autonomous m o d e of discourse concerning such themes. P u t another way, "globe t a l k " — the discourse of globality — has become relatively autonomous, although its contents a n d the interests that sustain them vary considerably f r o m society to society a n d also within societies. The discourse of globality is thus a vital component of contemporary global culture. It consists largely i n the shifting a n d contested terms i n w h i c h the world-as-a-whole is " d e f i n e d . " T o p u t it more specifically, images of w o r l d order (and disorder) — i n c l u d i n g interpretations of a n d assertions concerning the past, present a n d future of particular societies, civilizations, ethnic groups and regions — are at the center of global culture. A l o n g such lines w e can readily conceive of global culture as havi n g a very l o n g history. " T h e idea of h u m a n k i n d " is at least as o l d as Jaspers' A x i a l A g e , i n w h i c h the major w o r l d religions a n d metaphysical doctrines arose, many centuries before the rise of national communities or societies. Throughout that l o n g p e r i o d civilizations, empires a n d other entities have been almost continuously faced w i t h the p r o b l e m of response to the w i d e r , increasingly compressed and b y n o w global, context. The w a y s i n w h i c h such entities (in

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I

relatively recent history, national societies, i n particular) have at one and the same time attempted to learn f r o m others a n d sustain a sense of identity — or, alternatively, isolate themselves f r o m the pressures of contact — also constitute a n important aspect of the creation of global c u l t u r e . E v e n more specifically the cultures of particular societies are, to different degrees, the result of their interactions w i t h other societies i n the global system. In other w o r d s , national-societal cultures have been differentially formed i n interpénétration w i t h significant others. B y the same token, global culture itself is partly created i n terms of specific interactions between a n d among national societies. The issue of "selective response" is thus particularly important i n any attempt to grasp w h a t might be meant b y the term " g l o b a l c u l t u r e , " because it indicates the contemporary phenomenon of particular national societies becoming positive or negative paradigms as far as involvement i n globalization is concerned. The global thematizaiion of the Soviet-based peresiroika/glasnost motif has played a large part i n this respect. It has brought into the forefront of global discourse the p r o b l e m of the relationship between societal identity and participation i n the globalization process. A t the same time the global p o p ularity of the perestroika/glasnost motif reminds us that a l l societieshave been under the -constraint to institutionalize a connection between inwardness and outwardness. 39

40

In combination w i t h m y discussion of the universalism-particularism issue I have indicated some of the more neglected aspects of the analysis of global culture. M y general argument has been that commitment to the idea of the culturally cohesive national society has b l i n d e d us to the various w a y s i n w h i c h the w o r l d as a whole has been increasingly " o r g a n i z e d " around sets -of shifting definitions of the global circumstance. In fact it w o u l d not be too- m u c h to say

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38

See Wagar, ed. - See; my "Globality, Global Culture and Images of World Order." Also- see Harvey, Tue Condition ofPostmodemHy, 350-9, for a Marxist discussion of respons37

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es to "time-space compression." For an excellent study of what is called "selective receptiveness," see Erik Cohen, "Thailand, Burma and Laos—an Outline of the Comparative Social Dynamics of Three Theravada Buddhist Societies in the Modem Era," in Patterns of Modernity, Volume II: Beyond the West, ed. S.N. Eisenstadt (New York: New York University Press, 1987):192-216. For a case study, see my "Japan and the USA: The Interpénétration of National Identities and the Debate About Orientalism," in Dominant Ideologies, ed. Abercrombie, Hill and Turner, 182-98. 3 9

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CULTURE, GLOBALIZATION A N D THE WORLD-SYSTEM that the idea of global culture is just as meaningful as the idea of national-societal, or local, culture.

4. The National and the Universal: C a n There Be Such a Thing as W o r l d Culture?

IMMANUEL

WALLERSTEIN

THE VERY CONCEPT OF " C U L T U R E " POSES US WITH A GIGANTIC paradox. O n the one hand, culture is by definition particularistic. C u l ture is the set of values or practices of some part smaller than some w h o l e . This is true whether one is u s i n g culture i n the anthropological sense to mean, the values and/or the practices of one group as opposed to any other group at the same level of discourse (French vs. Italian, culture, proletarian vs. bourgeois culture, Christian vs. Islamic culture, etc.), or whether one is u s i n g culture i n the belles-lettres sense to mean the " h i g h e r " rather than the " b a s e r " values and/or practices w i t h i n any g r o u p , a meaning w h i c h generally encompasses culture as representation, culture as the production of art-forms. In either usage, culture (or a culture) is what some persons feel or do, unlike others w h o do not feel or do the same things. But on the other h a n d , there can be no justification of cultural values and/or practices other than b y ref erence to some presumably u n i v e r s a l or universalis! criteria. Values are not good because m y group holds them; practices are not good because m y group does 1

1 have elaborated on the distinction between these two usages of "culture" in a previous paper, "Culture as the Ideological Battleground of the Modem. World-System" in Mike Featherstone, ed. Global Culture. Nationalism, Globalization and Modernity (London, Newbury Park and Delhi: Sage, 1990):31-56. 1

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THE NATIONAL A N D THE UNIVERSAL

Side by side with the emergence of such nation-states, each w i t h frontiers, each with, its o w n invented 'traditions, the w o r l d has been, m o v i n g , so it is said, towards a w o r l d consciousnesses, a consciousness of something called h u m a n i t y — a universal, persona b e y o n d even that of the so-called w o r l d religions, w h i c h i n practice tended to include inside their universe only those w h o shared the religion.

A n d . to top off this d u a l track — the historical creation of the particular nations side by side w i t h the historical creation of u n i v e r sal h u m a n i t y — w e f i n d a very curious anomaly. O v e r time, the particular nation-states have come to resemble each other more a n d more i n their' cultural forms. W h i c h state today does not have certain standard political forms: a legislature, a constitution, a bureaucracy, trade unions, a national currency, a school system? F e w indeed! E v e n i n the more particularistic arena of art forms, w h i c h country does not have its songs, its dances, its plays, its museums, its paintings, a n d today its skyscrapers? A n d are not the social structures that guarantee these art forms increasingly similar? It is almost as though the more intense the nationalist fervor i n the w o r l d , the more identical seem the expressions of this nationalism. Indeed, one of the major nationalist demands is always, is it not?, the obtaining of some f o r m that more privileged countries already have. This is i n part, no doubt, the result of cultural diffusion. The means of. transport a n d c o m m u n i c a t i o n at our disposition are ever better. W e all k n o w more about what are for us the far corners of our earth than d i d previous generations. But it should also lead us to reflect on w h a t pressures exist such that we are asserting our cultural differences a n d exclusions i n such clone-like fashion? Let us deal w i t h t w o opposite modes of explaining this phenomen o n that have been put f o r w a r d repetitively. O n e is the thesis of the linear tendency towards one w o r l d . O r i g i n a l l y , it is argued, the globe contained a very large n u m b e r of distinct and distinctive groups. O v e r time, little by little, the scope of activity has expanded, the groups have merged, a n d bit b y bit, w i t h the aid of science a n d technology, w e .are arriving at one w o r l d — one political w o r l d , one economic w o r l d , one cultural w o r l d . W e are not yet there, but the future looms, clearly before us. The second explanation suggests a rather different course but the outcome predicted is more or less the same. The historic differences of a l l groups, it is argued, have always been superficial. In certain k e y structural w a y s , all groups have always been the same. There have no doubt been several different such structures, but they make up a patterned sequence. This is of course the stage theory of h u m a n development, so p o p u l a r i n m o d e r n social science since its onset. Since, i n this m o d e of theorizing, a l l "societies" go through parallel stages, w e end u p w i t h the same result as i n the theory of a secular' tendency towards one w o r l d . W e e n d u p w i t h a single h u m a n society

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them. To argue the contrary w o u l d be hopelessly solipsistic a n d force us either into an absolutely p a r a l y z i n g cultural relativism (since the argument w o u l d h o l d equally for any other group's values and/or practices) or into an absolutely murderous xenophobia (since no other group's values and/or practices c o u l d be g o o d a n d therefore could be tolerated). f If I have chosen as the theme " t h e national and the u n i v e r s a l , " that is, if I have chosen the national as m y prototype of the particular, it is because, i n o u r m o d e m world-system, nationalism is the quintessential (albeit not the only) particularism, the one w i t h the w i d e s t appeal, the longest staying-power, the most political clout, a n d the heaviest .armaments in its support. M y query is, can there conceivably be such, a t h i n g as a world, c u l ture? This m a y seem an absurd question, given two facts. First, for thousands of years n o w , some people at least have p u t forward ideas w h i c h they have asserted to be universal values o r truths. A n d seco n d l y , for some 200 years n o w , a n d even, more intensively for the last 50 years, m a n y (even most) national governments as w e l l as w o r l d institutions have asserted the validity and. even the enforceability of such values or truths, as i n the discussion about h u m a n rights, concerning w h i c h the U n i t e d Nations proclaimed i n 1948 a Universal. Declaration. If I insist that the paradox is gigantic, it is because it is not only a logical paradox but .an historical paradox. The so-called nation-states, o u r p r i m a r y cultural container (not o u r only cultural container by any means,; b u t today our p r i m a r y one), are of course relatively recent creations. A w o r l d consisting of these nation-states came into existence e v e n partially only i n the sixteenth century. Such, a w o r l d was theorized a n d became a, matter of w i d e s p r e a d consciousness even later, o n l y in the nineteenth century. It became a n inescapably universal p h e n o m e n o n later still, i n fact o n l y after 1945.

CULTURE, GLOBALIZATION A N D THE WORLD-SYSTEM and therefore necessarily w i t h a w o r l d culture. But can there be a w o r l d culture, I have asked? N o t s h o u l d there be one — I w i l l return to that question — but can there be one? There seems clearly to be some deep resistance to the v e r y idea. It takes the f o r m on the one h a n d of the m u l t i p l e political chauvinisms w h i c h constantly seem to resurface a r o u n d the globe. It takes the f o r m as w e l l of the m u l t i p l e so-called countercultures w h i c h also seem to surge u p constantly, and whose rallying-cry, whose a de coeur, always seems to be the struggle against u n i f o r m i t y . I d o not think that either of the t w o classic explanations — the secular tendency towards one w o r l d , or the stage theory of h u m a n development — are very h e l p f u l models. N o doubt both capture some elements of the empirical reality we think w e k n o w , b u t both also disregard some v e r y visible phenomena. A n d both require leaps of inference (leaps of faith?) that seem quite hazardous. I w o u l d rather start w i t h a m o d e l of successive historical systems i n w h i c h w h a t is certain is only that there has been a n d w i l l be a succession of systems, leaving quite open w h a t both its content ana its f o r m might be. M y basic reason for an initial skepticism about the concept of a w o r l d culture stems f r o m the sense that defining a culture is a question of defining boundaries that are essentially political — boundaries of oppression, a n d of defense against oppression, The boundaries must necessarily be arbitrary i n the sense that the case for d r a w i n g the boundaries at one point rather than at another is s e l d o m (perhaps never) logically tight. W h o is an A r a b ? W h a t is g o o d music? or even w h a t is music? Is C o n f u c i a n i s m a religion? It is clear that the b o u n d aries d e p e n d o n definitions, and that these definitions are not u n i v e r sally shared, or even consistent over time. Furthermore, of course., at any g i v e n time, all A r a b s do not speak A r a b i c , all E n g l i s h m e n are not individualists, some Jews a n d some M o s l e m s are atheists. That is to say, it is clear that however a culture is defined, not a l l members of the designated g r o u p h o l d its p r e s u m e d values or share its p r e s u m e d practices. H e n c e , i n w h a t sense does such a g r o u p share a culture? A n d w h y are the boundaries d r a w n where they are d r a w n ? Let me begin the discussion w i t h an example from the 10th century, A t that time, a .change i n the social relations of p r o d u c t i o n was occurring i n western E u r o p e w h i c h historians call incasteUamento (from the Italian w o r d for castle). It i n v o l v e d the b u i l d i n g of a castle b y a p o w e r f u l person, w h o sought to use this castle as a base to force the 94

THE N A T I O N A L A N D T H E UNIVERSAL juridical and economic submission of the local peasantry — both the freeholders and the tenant-farmers — to the seignior of the castle. These seigniors successfully asserted their right to c o m m a n d , to constrain, a n d to apprehend these peasants. W h a t is interesting i n terms of this discussion is that, as part of this process of social transformation, the terminology changed. It seems that by the 11th century these rights that the seigniors had basically u s u r p e d by force i n the 10th century were being officially termed " u s a g e s " a n d " c u s t o m s . " Thus w e see, i n this case at least, that the w o r d " c u s t o m , " a basic term i n cultural discourse, was used to describe w h a t we k n o w to have been a p o w e r that was u s u r p e d only a relatively short time before. In effect, calling this practice a custom w a s a w a y of legitimating it, that is, of r e d u c i n g the amount of current force required to enforce it. C a l l i n g it a " c u s t o m " w a s an effort to transform it into a " r i g h t . " The effort presumably succeeded, more or less. N o doubt, not every peasant internalized fully the idea that the dues to the seignior were the latter's " r i g h t , " but m a n y d i d , a n d most c h i l d r e n were thereupon being socialized into this culture, even as they were also learning a given language, identifying w i t h particular religious practices, and being taught to consider certain objects beautiful. A perceptive visitor traveling f r o m one region to another c o u l d have described h o w the cultures of different regions v a r i e d . This same traveler no d o u b t m i g h t have noticed as w e l l boundary uncertainties, w h e r e one culture's reach b l u r r e d into that of a neighb o r i n g culture. The more foreign the visitor the larger the arena he m a y have considered to constitute the boundaries of a single culture. W h a t m a y have seemed a " C h i n e s e " cultural zone to M a r c o Polo m a y have been visualized as a series of smaller zones to a merchant b o r n w i t h i n M a r c o Polo's " C h i n e s e " cultural zone. 2

W h a t m i g h t be called the fluidity of culture has. always been a social reality, and can only have become intensified w i t h the increasing density of h u m a n settlement. Perhaps, i n 100,000 B . C . w h e n h u manity m a y have consisted of a series of small bands l i v i n g distantly f r o m each other, each such band was relatively culturally homogeneous. But it makes no sense whatsoever today, or even for the period of so-called recorded history, to conceive of ourselves as l i v -

2

See Isaac Johsua, Le face cachée du Moyen Age (Paris: La Brèche, 1988) 21. 95

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i n g i n culturally homogenous bands. E v e r y i n d i v i d u a l is the meetingpoint of a v e r y large number' of cultural traits. If one imagined a series of groups consisting of all persons w h o h e l d each of the particular traits f o u n d i n a single i n d i v i d u a l , each s u c h g r o u p w o u l d be composed of a different list of persons, although no doubt there w o u l d be substantial overlapping. Still, it means that each i n d i v i d u a l is i n effect a u n i q u e composite of cultural characteristics. To use a metaphor of p a i n t i n g , the resulting collective cultural landscape is a v e r y subtle b l e n d i n g of an incredibly large n u m b e r of colors, even if w e restrict ourselves to l o o k i n g only at a relatively s m a l l unit (small spatially, s m a l l demographically). In this sense; the history of the w o r l d has been the very opposite of a t r e n d towards cultural homogeneization; it has rather been a trend towards cultural differentiation, or cultural elaboration, or c u l tural complexity. Yet w e k n o w that this centrifugal process has not at all tended towards a T o w e r of Babel, pure cultural anarchy. There seems to have [been gravitational forces restraining the centrifugal tendencies and organizing them. In our m o d e m world-system, the single, most powerful such gravitational force has been the nation-state. In the u n f o l d i n g of the capitalist w o r l d - e c o n o m y , the nation-states that were c o m i n g into existence were a v e r y special k i n d of state. For they defined themselves i n function of other states, together w i t h w h o m they f o r m e d an interstate system. The nation-state h a d b o u n d aries that were f i x e d not merely b y internal decree but just as m u c h b y the recognition of other states, a process often formalized i n treaties. N o t o n l y d i d the nation-state have boundaries, but there was a very strong tendency to b o u n d the states such that a l l their parts were contiguous to each other, i n w h i c h case the outer boundaries of the state were constituted by a single continuous line, hopefully not containing enclaves w i t h i n it. This is of course a p u r e l y f o r m a l consideration of political geography, but It w o u l d be a mistake not to notice h o w forceful and h o w constant has been the pressure to c o m p l y w i t h such a m o r p h o l o g y . There was- some additional de facto rules i n the creation of the i n terstate system; There were to be n o no-man's-lands, no zones that were not part of some particular state. A n d all these resultant states were to be juridically equal, that is, they were each to be " s o v e r e i g n . " This presumably meant that the authorities i n any state h a d not o n l y f u l l but also exclusive authority w i t h i n the boundaries of the state, a n d that noone escaped the authority of some state.

O f course, it took several h u n d r e d years to include all parts of the globe w i t h i n this system, to make each part share the same f o r m a l characteristics, a n d to have the volatile boundaries settle d o w n . W e are not really altogether there yet. But, compared to say 1648, w h e n the Treaty of Westphalia was signed, consolidating the then existing European state-system, the post-1945 era of the w o r l d - s y s t e m (the era of the U n i t e d Nations) is a m o d e l of juridical clarity a n d stability. The system as it developed was not o n l y a system structuring state-units but also one defining the relationship of each i n d i v i d u a l to the nation-states. B y the nineteenth century, the concept of " c i t i z e n " w a s w i d e s p r e a d . Every i n d i v i d u a l was p r e s u m e d to be a participant member of one sovereign unit, but o n l y of one. To be sure, we have wrestled ever since w i t h the problem of "stateless persons" as w e l l as w i t h that of " d o u b l e nationality," but the trend pattern has been clear. T h u s were created a series of clearly-bounded entities of contiguous territory w i t h a specified list of member-individuals. There remained the issue of h o w one acquired citizenship. A n d this issue posed itself at t w o moments i n the life cycle: at birth, a n d later i n life. A t birth, there are really o n l y t w o non-arbitrary possibilities: one acquires citizenship genetically (via the parents) or geographically (via the location of the birthplace). T h o u g h w h i c h of these methods is to be used has been a matter of constant passionate political debate, the overall trend has been f r o m reliance o n genetic inheritance to reliance "on geographic rights. Later i n life, there are also o n l y t w o possibilities: either it is possible legally to change citizenship, or it is not. W e have m o v e d f r o m impossibility to possibility, and the latter d o u b l y : possibility of acquiring a new citizenship; possibility of relinquishing an old one. The codification of all of this has been complex, and the process is- still not completed, but the direction has been clear. If w e take these political processes as given, then it is clear that they have posed incredible " c u l t u r a l " problems. E v e r y i n d i v i d u a l belongs juridically to one unit only, a n d each such unit is called u p o n to make a series of cultural decisions, most of them legally b i n d i n g . M o d e r n states have official languages, school systems w i t h specific curricula, armies that require specific behavior, laws about migration across boundaries, laws about family structures and property (including inheritance), etc. In all of these arenas, some decisions must be made, and one can see w h y states in general s h o u l d prefer uniformity w h e n e v e r it is politically possible. In addition to these arenas

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CULTURE, GLOBALIZATION A N D THE WORLD-SYSTEM w h e r e decisions are inescapable, there is a further arena where states c o u l d theoretically r e m a i n neutral but i n practice are pressed to make political decisions. Since the state has become the major mechar .sm of allocating social income, the states are pressed to offer financial support to both the sciences a n d the arts, i n all their m u l t i p l e foi tns. A n d since the money available is inherently limited, the state must m a k e choices i n both the sciences a n d the arts. Clearly, i n a n y g i v e n state, after 100 years of m a k i n g such decisions, it is very clear that a " n a t i o n a l " culture w i l l exist even if it didn't exist at the outset. A particular past, a heritage is institutionalized. But there is a second reality, w h i c h is economic. O u r m o d e r n w o r l d - s y s t e m is a capitalist w o r l d - e c o n o m y . It functions b y g i v i n g priority to the ceaseless accumulation of capital, a n d this is o p t i m i z e d by the creation of a geographically v e r y w i d e d i v i s i o n of labor, today a d i v i s i o n of labor that is w o r l d w i d e . A d i v i s i o n of labor requires flows — flows of commodities, f l o w s of capital, flows of labor; not u n l i m i t e d or unrestricted f l o w s , but significant ones. This means that the state boundaries must be permeable, a n d so they are. A t the v e r y m o m e n t that one has been creating national cultures each distinct from, the other,! these flows have been breaking d o w n the national distinctions. In parts, the flows have broken d o w n distinctions by simple diffusion. W e talk, of this w h e n we speak, of the steady internationalization of culture, w h i c h has become striking e v e n i n realms where it seemed least likely — i n everyday life: food habits, clothing styles, habitat; a n d i n the arts. H o w e v e r , a l l has not been smooth i n this diffusion process. People cross frontiers regularly, and not merely as temporary visitors. People m o v e i n order to w o r k , but they do this i n t w o different w a y s , o:r at t w o different levels. A t the top of the occupation scale, people m o v e regularly f r o m rich countries to poor ones, and such persons are n o r m a l l y sojourners, rather than, emigrants. They neither " a s s i m i l a t e " n o r w i s h to assimilate; n o r d o the receiving states w i s h them to assimilate. C u l t u r a l l y they tend to f o r m relatively discrete enclaves i n their country of sojourn. 'They often see themselves as bearers of w o r l d culture, w h i c h means i n fact bearers of the culture of dominant groups i n the w o r l d - s y s t e m .

T H E NATIONAL A N D T H E UNIVERSAL. to assimilate into the national culture of the receiving country, they are often rejected. A n d w h e n they reject assimilation, they are often required, to assimilate. They become, usually quite officially, a " m i nority." " M i n o r i t i e s " are not rare today; quite the opposite. E v e r y country has one or several; a n d they have them more and more. So just as there is a dialectic of creating simultaneously a homogeneous w o r l d and distinctive national cultures w i t h i n this w o r l d , so there is a dialectic of creating simultaneously homogeneous national cultures and distinctive ethnic groups or " m i n o r i t i e s " w i t h i n these nation-states. 'There is h o w e v e r one critical difference i n the two dialectics. In the t w o parallel contradictions — tendency to one w o r l d vs. tendency to distinctive nation-states, a n d tendency to one nation vs. tendency to distinctive ethnic groups w i t h i n each state — it has been the states w h i c h have h a d the u p p e r h a n d i n both contradictions. The states have h a d this u p p e r hand for one simple reason: they have controlled the most physical force. But the states have p l a y e d opposite roles i n the t w o contradictions., In one case, they have used, their force to create cultural diversity, a n d i n the other case to create c u l tural uniformity. This has made the states the most p o w e r f u l cultural force i n the m o d e r n w o r l d and the most schizophrenic. A n d this is true of the states, whether w e are referring to relatively p o w e r f u l states like the U . S . A . , France, or the U.S.S.R., or to relatively weak states like Ecuador, Tunisia, or Thailand.

II

The bigger issue is the other k i n d of migration, of persons at the lower e n d of the occupational scale, going f r o m poorer countries to richer ones. These persons are In cultural conflict w i t h the receiving country. They often stay permanently, or try to stay. W h e n they w i s h

C u l t u r e has always been a w e a p o n of the p o w e r f u l . That was what I sought to illustrate w i t h my very brief reference to m e d i e v a l E u rope. But culture has always cut both ways. If the p o w e r f u l can legitimate their expropriations by transposing them into " c u s t o m s , " the w e a k can appeal to the legitimacy of these same " c u s t o m s " to resist n e w a n d different expropriations, This is an u n e q u a l battle to be sure, b u t not one that has h a d no effect. W h a t is striking about the political his tor/ of the m o d e r n w o r l d system, as it has historically developed, is the ever more frequent and ever more efficacious utilization by oppressed elements of what m i g h t generically be called cultural resistance. O f course cultural resistance is an eternal theme. There have l o n g been relatively stable p o p u l a r cultures w h i c h have asserted their values and their forms

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against elite cultures. A n d there have l o n g been conjunctural countercultures i n the sense of groups w h o have deliberately sought to w i t h d r a w f r o m the control systems to w h i c h they were subjected. This has often been l i n k e d with, p r o d u c t i o n i n the arts i n the f o r m of bohemias, or with: p r o d u c t i o n of utopias i n 'the f o r m of n e w religions. But the conjunctural countercultures have regularly been recuperated, losing their bite. A n d the v e r y stability of p o p u l a r cultures has been their weakness as w e l l as their strength. They have more often led to social anesthesia than to social revolution. W h a t is n e w i n c u l t u r a l resistance today is the result of the sociological invention of antisystemic movements i n the nineteenth century, h a v i n g the key idea that opposition must be organized if it is to succeed i n transforming the w o r l d . Cultural resistance today is very often organized resistance — not spontaneous resistance or eternal resistance, but p l a n n e d resistance. P l a n n i n g cultural resistance is like p l a n n i n g political resistance: its efficacity is also its fatal f l a w . W h e n an antisystemic movement organizes to overthrow or replace existing authorities in, a state, it p r o vides itself w i t h a very strong political w e a p o n designed to change the w o r l d i n specific ways. But, by so organizing, it simultaneously integrates itself a n d its militants into the v e r y system it is- opposing. It is u t i l i z i n g the structures of the system to oppose the system, w h i c h however! partially legitimates these structures. It is contesting the ideology of the system by appealing to antecedent, broader ideologies (that is, more " u n i v e r s a l " values), and by so d o i n g is accepting i n part the terms of the debate as defined by the dominant forces. This is a contradiction w h i c h a movement of political resistance cannot escape, a n d w i t h w h i c h it must cope as best it can. The same thing is true of organized, cultural resistance. This is not surprising since cultural resistance is part and parcel of political resistance. If w e deliberately assert (or reassert) particular cultural values that have been neglected or disparaged i n order to protest against the i m p o s i t i o n of the cultural values of the strong u p o n the weaker, w e are to be sure strengthening the weaker i n their political struggles, w i t h i n a g i v e n state, w i t h i n the world-system as a whole. But w e are then pressed to prove the validity of our asserted (or reasserted) values in. terms of criteria laid down, by the p o w e r f u l . A c c u s e d of being " u n c i v i l i z e d , " the proclaimers of the (re)asserted cultural values \ suggest that it is they w h o are truly " c i v i l i z e d . " " C i v i l i z a t i o n " (or some equivalent term) thereupon, becomes the u n i -

versai criterion by w h i c h one judges particular cultural acts — whether these are acts of artistic performance, or acts of religious ritual, or acts of the esthetic utilization of space and time. The planners of cultural resistance, i n planning the assertion of some particular culture, are in. effect (re)legitimating the concept of universal values. The systemic cooption of cultural resistance occurs i n two opposite w a y s , w h i c h combine to deprive the cultural resistance of its raison d'être, resistance. O n the one hand, the p o w e r f u l of the w o r l d seek to commodity and thereby denature the practices of cultural resistance. They create h i g h market demand for the forms of avant-garde (and/or exotic) artistic production... They create high-tech market netw o r k s for the distribution of previously artisanal or illicit production of the means of everyday life; that is, they transform a private dom a i n into a semipublic one. They assign public space, delimited public space, to the non-standard linguistic, religious, even juridical forms.

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But it is more than a matter of mere cooption, of a k i n d of cultural corruption. It is as m u c h the fact that any movement of cultural resistance that succeeds, even partially, i n m o b i l i z i n g significant support must deal w i t h the consequences of w h a t Weber called the " r o u t i n i z a t i o n of charisma." There are, it seems to me, only 'twow a y s to deal w i t h the routinization of charisma. O n e can reduce the difference of substance to- a difference of form. Thereby one may guarantee the s u r v i v a l of the organization that originally promoted the resistance, but at the sacrifice of the quality of its "resistance." O r one can reassert the quality of its resistance b y shifting f r o m a policy of self-assertion to a policy of proselytization. This too- m a y enable the. organization to survive, but o n l y as- a protagonist of some universal. It is the shift f r o m p r o c l a i m i n g an alternative art-form, an alternative religion, an alternative epistemology to p r o c l a i m i n g a singular truth that deserves to be i m p o s e d . Thus the case of cultural resistance involves the same dilemmas as resistance at the level of political p o w e r i n the n a r r o w sense. The contradictions of p l a n n e d resistance are inescapable, a n d the movements m u s t cope w i t h them as best they can. O f course, one can try to take a different tack. O n e can move i n the direction, of anarchy or Iibertarianism as a strategy. O n e -can argue that the o n l y mode of c u l t u r a l resistance, the o n l y mode of cultural assertion, that is of value is that of the franc-tireur, of the i n d i v i d u a l against the mass (all masses, any mass). A n d surely this has been 101

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tried, time and again — whether i n the f o r m of so-called art for art's sake, o:r i n the f o r m of w i t h d r a w a l into small communes, or i n the f o r m of n i h i l i s m , or i n the f o r m of schizophrenia. W e s h o u l d not dismiss these diverse modes of resistance out of h a n d . There .are enormous advantages to these modes of cultural resistance, to w h i c h one m i g h t give the label " i n d i v i d u a l i s t . " They are easy to pursue i n the sense of not r e q u i r i n g the effort of organizing them, or at least r e q u i r i n g less effort. They are relatively spontaneous a n d need less to take account of dominant values. They become therefore somewhat more difficult for the authorities to control, a n d thereupon to coopt. They do not seek organizational t r i u m p h , a n d hence are less likely to breed among those w h o practice such modes the temptation to justify themselves i n the universalistic language of the dominant culture. Individualistic modes of resistance are for a l l these reasons more total as resistance than planned social modes,

iff

This being the case, such modes however create their o w n difficulties i n turn. Because individualistic modes involve so m u c h less' social organization, the holders of cultural p o w e r can a n d d o treat them either w i t h the disdain that requires no notice, or b y severe repression, w h i c h is harder to combat precisely because of the relative lack of social organization. Thus, the individualist forms of cultural resistance have exactly the opposite advantages and disadvantages of the planned forms of c u l tural resistance. It is not at all clear that the balance-sheet i n the e n d is any more positive. Furthermore, can i n d i v i d u a l resistance be called cultural resistance? If one pursues activities w i t h reference only to one's inner ear, i n what sense is one sharing a culture w i t h anyone else, even w i t h other individualist resisters? A n d i f the answer is that the inner ear is a guide to the true path, is this not an appeal to u n i versalis! values w i t h a vengeance, since i n this case, the c l a i m to u n i versalism lacks a n y control whatsoever of social dialogue? I have never thought, and d o not think, that w e can successfully escape the contradictions of p l a n n e d cultural resistance b y t u r n i n g i n w a r d . It m a y be .quite the opposite: it is perhaps the case that w e can m i n i m i z e these contradictions (one can of course never escape them entirely) of p l a n n e d cultural resistance only b y afuite en avant of bei n g still more social i n o u r outlook.

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This therefore brings us to the issue of w o r l d culture. W o r l d culture, the h u m a n i s m of many sages, has l o n g been advocated o n these grounds, that it alone permits one to overcome the provinciali s m — hence both the limitations to m o r a l g r o w t h , and the obscurantism. — of cultural particularisms. Let us eliminate f r o m our discussion the naive conceptualizations of w o r l d culture, those that barely disguise an attempt to impose a particular culture i n the guise of a mission civilisatrice. S u c h naive conceptualizations are to be sure commonplace, but they are a n easy target of our criticism. Let us take its more sophisticated version, the advocacy of what Leopold-Sedar Senghor has called, i n a celebrated phrase, le rendez-vous du donner et du recevoir: C a n there be such a rendez-vous, a n d what w o u l d it look like? In a sense, the concept of the university is itself supposed to constitute this rendez-vous, A f t e r all, the w o r d s , university a n d universalism, have the same etymological root. A n d , curiously, i n medieval E u r o p e a n usage, a universitas was also the name g i v e n to a f o r m of particular c u l t u r a l c o m m u n i t y . Was it then that the university i n the sense of the universal was being suggested, as the meeting-place of the universities i n the sense of particular'communities? It is certainly d o u b t f u l that this is what they have been historically, b u t it is regularly suggested that this is what they s h o u l d become today a n d i n the future. The post-1968 discussion i n many universities of the concept of " c u l t u r a l d i v e r s i t y " (and its implications for curricula) is one more instance of this call. W e face the very bizarre situation today of a major debate within. U . S . universities between, on the one side, those w h o advocate a universe of cultures v i a the promotion of Black studies or w o m e n s ' studies or the extension (if not the elimination) of the so-called canons i n literature, and, o n the other side, those w h o advocate a universal culture v i a the promotion of courses i n Western civilization. T r u l y the w o r l d is upside d o w n . O n e arrives, it seems to be argued b y both sides, at the universal v i a the particular (although they differ as to w h i c h particular). Still, is this call for cultural diversity, as Sartre suggested of N e g r i tu.de, a H e g e l i a n negation of the negation? W i l l not only the states, but the national cultures, wither away, sometime i n the future? A n d if they were to w i t h e r away, is that the image at last of the good 103

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society? or is it some n e w hell of robot-like uniformity? W o u l d this be the fulfilment of the o l d anti-socialist joke: (Orator:) " C o m e s the revolution, everyone w i l l eat strawberries -and c r e a m " ; (Worker i n audience:) " B u t I don't like strawberries and cream"; (Orator:) " C o m e s the revolution, y o u w i l l have to like strawberries a n d cream"? I believe w e have too l o n g avoided t h i n k i n g seriously about the cultural implications of a post-capitalist future, g i v e n our quite u n derstandable preoccupation with, the difficulties of a. capitalist present. Suppose it is true, as I myself believe, that there can be n o liberty outside an egalitarian w o r l d , a n d no equality outside a libertarian w o r l d , what then follows i n the realm of culture — i n the arts a n d i n the sciences? Is a libertarian w o r l d one i n w h i c h everyone follows his/her inner ear? Is an egalitarian w o r l d one i n w h i c h w e a l l share equally the same universal values? A n d if, as I have tended to argue here, culture is a collective expression that is combative, that requires an other, i n this putative libertarian-egalitarian w o r l d , does " c u l t u r e " exist? I c o u l d retreat at this point and say I don't k n o w , w h i c h is true. I c o u l d also retreat at this point a n d say that, to solve the problems of the present, the answers to these hypothetical questions can wait, but I do not really believe this to be true. It is n o accident, it seems to me, that there has been so m u c h discussion these past 10-15 years about the problematic of " c u l t u r e . " It follows upon, the decomposition of the nineteenth-century double faith i n the economic and political arenas as loci of social progress a n d therefore of i n d i v i d u a l salvation. Some r e t u r n to (God, a n d others look to " c u l t u r e " or " i d e n t i t y " or some other realistic i l l u s i o n to help them regain their bearing. I a m skeptical w e can f i n d o u r w a y via a. search for a p u r i f i e d w o r l d culture. B u t I a m also skeptical that h o l d i n g on to national or to ethnic or to any other f o r m of particularistic culture can be anything more than a crutch. Crutches are not foolish. W e often need them to restore o u r wholeness, but crutches are by definition transitional and. transitory phenomena. M y o w n h u n c h is to base our utopistics o n the inherent lack of long-term equilibria i n any phenomena — physical, biological, or social. Hence we shall never have a stable libertarian/egalitarian w o r l d . W e may h o w e v e r achieve a world-system that is structured so as to tend in. the direction of being libertarian a n d egalitarian. I a m not at .all sure what such a. structure w o u l d look like. But whatever it might be, I assume that there w o u l d also be w i t h i n its operation a

constant tendency to move away from both libertariarosm and equality In this v i s i o n of the best future I can envisage, there w o u l d indeed be a place, a n d a permanent place, for cultural resistance. The w a y to combat the falling away f r o m liberty and equality w o u l d be to create and recreate particularistic cultural entities - arts, sciences, identities; always n e w , often claiming to be o l d - that w o u l d be social (not individual), that w o u l d be particularisms whose object (avowed or not) w o u l d be- the restoration of the universal reality of liberty and equality. . , Of course, this may not be a description only of a hypothetical future; this may in part be a description of the present w e are l i v i n g .

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5. Scenarios for Peripheral Cultures

ULF HANNERZ

THE TWENTIETH CENTURY HAS BEEN A UNIQUE PERIOD IN WORLD cultural history. ' H u m a n k i n d has finally b i d farewell to that w o r l d w h i c h could w i t h some credibility be seen as a cultural mosaic, of separate pieces w i t h hard, well-defined edges. Because of the great increase i n the traffic in. culture, the large-scale transfer of m e a n i n g systems and symbolic forms, the w o r l d is increasingly becoming one not only i n political .and economic terms, as i n the climactic p e r i o d of colonialism, but i n terms of its cultural construction as w e l l ; a global ecumene of persistent cultural interaction and exchange. This, h o w ever, is no egalitarian global village. W h a t we see n o w is quite f i r m l y structured as a n asymmetry of center and periphery. W i t h regard to cultural flow, the periphery, out there i n a distant territory, Is more the taker than the giver of meaning and meaningful f o r m . M u c h as w e feel called u p o n to make note of any examples of counterflow, it is difficult to a v o i d the conclusion that at least as things stand n o w , the relationship is lopsided, 1

In this presentation I draw on. perspectives developed within the research project "The World System of Culture," based in the Department of Social Anthropology, University of Stockholm, and supported by the Swedish Research Council for the Humanities, and Social Sciences. 1

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W e do not assume that this is the e n d point of these globalizing developments. The shaping of w o r l d culture is an ongoing process, t o w a r d future a n d still uncertain states. B u t perhaps one conceivable outcome has come to dominate the imagery of the c u l t u r a l future,, as a master scenario against w h i c h every alternative scenario has to be measured. Let us call it a scenario of global homogenization of c u l ture. 'The murderous threat of cultural imperialism is here rhetorically depicted as i n v o l v i n g the high-tech culture of the metropolis, w i t h p o w e r f u l organizational backing, facing a defenseless, s m a l l scale folk culture. But " c u l t u r a l i m p e r i a l i s m , " it also becomes clear, has more to do! w i t h market than w i t h empire. The alleged prime m o v e r behind the p a n - h u m a n replication of u n i f o r m i t y is- late Western capitalism, l u r i n g forever more communities into dependency on the fringes of an e x p a n d i n g w o r l d - w i d e consumer society. H o m o g e n i z a t i o n results m a i n l y f r o m the center-to-periphery flow of c o m m o d itized culture. Consequently, the c o m i n g homogeneous w o r l d culture according to this v i e w w i l l by and large be a version of contemporary Western culture, a n d the loss of local culture w o u l d s h o w itself most distinctively at the periphery. This master scenario has several things going for it. A quick look at the w o r l d today affords it a certain intrinsic plausibility; it may seem l i k e a mere continuation of present trends. It has, of course, the great advantage of simplicity. A n d it is dramatic. There is the sense of fatefulness, the prediction of the irreversible loss of large parts of the combined heritage of humanity. A s m u c h of the diversity of its behavioral repertoire is w i p e d out, H o m o Sapiens becomes more like other species — i n large part m a k i n g its o w n environment, i n contrast w i t h them, but at the same time adapting to it i n a single, h o w e v e r complex w a y . There is also another scenario for global cultural process, although more subterranean; thus not so often c o m i n g out to compete openly w i t h the global homogenization scenario. W e may call it the p e r i p h eral corruption scenario, for what it portrays as a recurrent sequence is one where the center offers its h i g h ideals and its best k n o w l e d g e , given some institutional form, a n d where the periphery first adopts them and then soon corrupts them. The scenario shows elected heads of state becoming presidents for life, then bizarre, merciless emperors. It shows Westminster a n d Oxbridge models being s w a l l o w e d by the bush. The center, i n the e n d , cannot w i n ; not at the periphery.

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The peripheral corruption scenario Is there for the people of the center to d r a w on w h e n they are pessimistic about their o w n role i n i m p r o v i n g the w o r l d , and d o u b t f u l and/or cynical about the p e r i p h ery. It is deeply ethnocentric, i n that it posits a very uneven distribution of virtue, and i n that it denies the validity a n d w o r t h of any transformations at the periphery of w h a t was originally d r a w n f r o m the center. There is little question of cultural difference here, but rather of a difference between culture and non-culture, between civilization and savagery. The global homogenization scenario m a y have a greater intellectual appeal than its shadowy competitor, but I think a brief exercise i n the sociology of knowledge may suggest that this is because m a n y of us share some sources of bias w h i c h contribute to m a k i n g it plausible. First of all, this scenario, too, may d r a w on a certain k i n d of ethnocentrism. The global homogenization scenario focuses o n things that we, as observers and commentators f r o m the center, are very familiar w i t h : our fast foods, our soft drinks, our sitcoms. The idea that they are or w i l l be everywhere, and enduringly p o w e r f u l everywhere, makes o u r culture even more important and w o r t h arguing about, and relieves us of the real strains of h a v i n g to engage w i t h other l i v i n g , complicated, p u z z l i n g cultures. G r i e v i n g for the vanishing Other is after all i n some w a y s easier than confronting it live a n d kicking. Furthermore, the homogenization scenario Is directly tied to a line of domestic cultural critique. There are surely those w h o see the w o r l d w i d e spread of their culture as a cause for celebration, but for m a n y of us it w o u l d be something to regret. A n d those at the center w h o have taken the greatest, reasonably consistent interest i n the circumstances of life at the periphery, for some decades at least n o w , have usually been those w h o are also critically inclined t o w a r d m a n y of the effects of the market economy back home. The homogenization scenario, then, allows the export, a n d globalization, of cultural, critique; or alternatively formulated, b r i n g i n g i n fuel f r o m the periphery for local debates at the center. Finally, one may have some doubts about the sense of time i n the homogenization scenario. If indeed there is often an idea that p e r i p h eral cultures come defenseless, unprepared to the encounter w i t h metropolitan culture, that they are insufficiently organized a n d are 109

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taken by surprise, then this notion w o u l d frequently entail a measure of ignorance of the continuous historical development of centerperiphery contacts. It, may w e l l be that the First W o r l d has been present i n the consciousness of m a n y T h i r d W orld people a great deal longer than the T h i r d W o r l d has been on the minds of most First W o r l d people. The notion of the sudden engagement between the cultures of center 'and periphery m a y thus i n large part be an imaginative by-product of the late a w a k e n i n g to global realities of many of us inhabitants of the center.

concrete ethnography l u r k i n g behind m y abstractions, and I should say that it is a more general familiarity w i t h , as w e l l as specific research experiences i n , West A f r i c a n u r b a n life that have -done most to provoke m y interest i n the center-periphery relationships of w o r l d culture a n d to shape m y gut reactions to the scenarios I have pointed to.

T

Perhaps all of us began long ago to nourish doubts about the t w o scenarios I have identified, and w o u l d be ready on d e m a n d to i m provise a critique bf each. Yet some of their continued viability as constructs i n the m i n d of the general public m a y d e p e n d o n a lack of available alternatives, alternatives w h i c h w o u l d also offer w a y s of t h i n k i n g a n d talking about w h a t m a y h a p p e n at the periphery i n a w o r l d of increasingly connected culture. A s any such scenario that w e w o u l d f i n d reasonably satisfactory w o u l d probably have to bemore complicated fhan these t w o , a n d thus more d e m a n d i n g of o u r a n d e v e r y b o d y else's patience, it might automatically be at some rhetorical disadvantage. Yet if it can both identify the weaknesses of the competitors a n d use whatever grain of truth m a y be i n them, it m i g h t do better i n Jong-term, credibility. A s an anthropologist, I m a y have other biases than those w h i c h seem to be built into the global homogenization a n d peripheral corr u p t i o n scenarios. Anthropologists are perhaps forever rooting for d i versity; some wouljd suggest w e have a vested interest i n it. In any case, I see the scrutiny of such scenarios, and. attempts to formulate alternatives to them, as an important task for a macroanthropology of contemporary culture — not the only task, but not a v e r y special one set aside in. its o w n intellectual c o m e r either. W h a t is required is rather an overall conceptualization of contemporary culture w h i c h incorporates a sense of the pervasiveness of globalization. I also think that this is a task.which one m a y w e l l try and deal w i t h i n relatively general terms. Anthropologists, again, may have some predilection for variability a n d for the particular, exceptional, a n d unique, but I do not think it serves us w e l l to respond to the scenario of global homogenization, or that of peripheral corruption, only as ethnographers w i t h a m y r i a d of stories. If w e want a n -alternative to them, it h a d better be at allevel of generality where the points of difference -can be readily recognized. Yet I w o u l d h a r d l y be an anthropologist if there were not some 110

In a Nigerian tenon Let me therefore say just something about the modest m i d d l e N i g e r i a n t o w n w h i c h I k n o w best, its people a n d the settings in w h i c h m e a n i n g flows there. Some sixty years ago this t o w n was just -coming into existence, at a n e w junction of the railroad built b y the British colonial government. It is a c o m m u n i t y , then, w h i c h has k n o w n no existence outside the present w o r l d system. The Inhabitants are railroad workers, taxi' drivers, bank clerks, doctors a n d nurses, petty traders, tailors, shoe shiners, teachers a n d school children, policemen, preachers and. prostitutes, bar owners and truck pushers, praise singers and peasant w o m e n w h o come i n for the day to sell, produce i n the market place. A p a r t from, attending to w o r k , townspeople s p e n d their time i n their rooms a n d yards, managing household affairs; going u p and d o w n the streets to greet one another; s h o p p i n g ; a r g u i n g a n d d r i n k i n g In the beer a n d palmwine bars; or especially if they are y o u n g m e n , taking in. a show at the -open-air m o v i e theater. Since about fifteen, years ago, w h e n electricity finally came to town at a. time w h e n the N i g e r i a n oil economy was b o o m ing, they m i g h t w a t c h T V — a l l of a. s u d d e n there were a great many antennae -over the rusting zinc roofs. People h a d battery-operated reco r d players l o n g before, a n d there were several record stores, but a n u m b e r of them have since closed d o w n . The listeners n o w prefer cassettes, and there are hawkers selling them, mostly pirate editions, from, the backs of their bicycles. People also go to their churches or mosques. (A couple of years ago, actually, a, visiting preacher chose his w o r d s u n w i s e l y , a n d Christians and M u s l i m s i n the t o w n proceeded to b u r n d o w n a n u m b e r of each other's houses of worship.)

Where meaning flows: market, state, form of life, and movement N o w let me take a r o u n d of collective h u m a n existence such as this apart, to see h o w culture is arranged w i t h i n it. C u l t u r e goes on 111

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CULTURE, GLOBALIZATION A N D THE WORLD-SYSTEM everywhere i n social life, organized as a f l o w of meanings, b y w a y of m e a n i n g f u l forms, between people. B u t it does so along rather different principles i n different contexts. For a comprehensive accounti n g of c u l t u r a l f l o w , it is useful, I think, to distinguish some s m a l l n u m b e r of t y p i c a l social frameworks i n w h i c h it occurs; frameworks w h i c h i n part because of globalization recur i n contemporary life n o r t h and south, east a n d west; i n an A f r i c a n t o w n as w e l l as i n E u r o p e or A m e r i c a . The frameworks are recurrent, that is, even as their cultural contents are different. The totality of cultural process, then, can be seen w i t h i n these frameworks a n d i n their interrelations. To begin w i t h , one m a y look at these frameworks i n synchronic terms. But time can be made to enter i n , a n d w e can then return to the p r o b l e m of scenarios-, as a matter of the cumulative consequences of cultural process. A l l this, obviously, I can only hope to sketch r o u g h l y here. I see p r i m a r i l y four of these typical frameworks of cultural process. Whatever culture flows outside these four, I w o u l d claim, amounts to rather little. The global homogenization scenario, as I have described it, is preoccupied w i t h only one of these, that of the market, so if anything significant at all goes on i n the other three, that scenario w o u l d obviously have to be m a r k e d " i n c o m p l e t e . " B u t let us begin there. In the market framework, cultural commodities are m o v e d , A l l commodities presumably carry some meaning, but i n some cases i n tellectual, esthetic or emotional appeal is all there is to a c o m m o d i t y , or a very large part of it, a n d these are what w e w o u l d p r i m a r i l y have i n m i n d as we speak of cultural commodities. In the market framework, meanings and meaningful forms are thus produced "and disseminated b y specialists i n exchange for material compensation, setting u p asymmetrical, more or less centering relationships between producers a n d consumers. The market also attempts expansively to bring more a n d more of culture as a whole into its framework, its agents are i n competition w i t h one another, and they also keep innovating to foster n e w demand. There is, i n other words, a built-in tendency toward instability i n this framework. Let me say no more about i t a t f h i s point. The second framework of cultural process is that of the state, not as a bounded physical area but as organizational form. The state is engaged i n the management of m e a n i n g i n various w a y s . To gain legitimate- authority state apparatuses nowadays tend' to reach out 112

w i t h different degrees of credibility a n d success t o w a r d their subjects to foster the ide.i that the state is a nation, and to construct them c u l turally as citizens. This involves a degree -of homogenization as a goal of cultural engineering. O n the other h a n d , the state also takes an interest i n shaping such differences among people as are desirable for the purpose of fitting categories of individuals .into- different slots i n the structure of p r o d u c t i o n .and reproduction. B e y o n d such i n volvements i n cultural process, some states more than others -engage in what one may describe as cultural welfare, t r y i n g to provide their citizenry w i t h " g o o d c u l t u r e " ; that is, meanings a n d m e a n i n g f u l forms h e l d to meet certifiable intellectual a n d esthetic standards. N o t least w o u l d this cultural welfare p r o v i d e the instruments people may use i n d e v e l o p i n g constructive reflexive stances t o w a r d themselves and their w o r l d . The state framework for -cultural process again involves a significant asymmetr • between state apparatus a n d people. It concentrates resources at tiV center for long-term cultural w o r k , a n d the flow of meaning is mostly f r o m the center outward.. In at least one current of the cultural f l o w w h i c h the state sets i n motion, the tendency may be t o w a r d a stability of meaning — the idea of the nation is usually tied to conceptions of history a n d tradition. But then again, w e s h o u l d k n o w b y n o w that such conceptions may i n fact be spurious a n d quite contestable. ' The t h i r d framework of cultural process I w i l l identify, for lack of a more precise term, as that of " f o r m of l i f e . " It is surely a framew o r k of major importance, i n that it involves the everyday practicalities of p r o d u c t i o n and reproduction, activities going o n i n w o r k places, domestic settings, neighborhoods, and some variety -of other places. W h a t characterizes cultural process here is that f r o m d o i n g 2

3

In Karl Polanyi's terminology, we may say that the cultural economy here is redistributive. See Karl Polanyi, "The Economy as Instituted Process," in Trade and Market in the Early Empires, eds. Karl Polanyi, Conrad A . Arensberg and Harry W. Pearson (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1957). This is in line with Immanuel Wallerstein, The Politics of the World-Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984) :162, although the main -current source for this understanding is Eric J. Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds.. The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983). 2

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the same things over a n d over again, a n d seeing and hearing others d o i n g the same things a n d saying the same things over a n d over again, a great deal of redundancy results. Experiences and interests coalesce into habitual perspectives a n d dispositions, W i t h i n this f r a m e w o r k , too, people's mere going about things entails a free and reciprocal cultural flow. In contrast w i t h the market a n d state framew o r k s , there are n o specialists in the production a n d dissemination of m e a n i n g as such w h o are to be materially compensated for cultural w o r k . W h i l e every f o r m of life includes some people a n d excludes a, great m a n y others,- there are not "necessarily well-defined b o u n d aries between them, and people may develop some conception of each other's forms of life through m u c h the s a m e l d r i d of everyday"" looking and listening, although probably w i t h less precision. A s "a whole, encompassing the variety o f particular f o r m s ' ó f life, this framework involves cultural processes w h i c h are diffuse, uncentered, The " c o m m a n d i n g h e i g h t s " of culture, as it were, are not here. A s the everyday activities are practically adapted to material c i r c u m stances, there is not m u c h reason to b r i n g about .alterations i n culture here, as l o n g as the circumstances do not change. In the f o r m of life framework, consequently, there is a tendency t o w a r d stability i n c u l tural process.

continues to- f l o w f r o m center to periphery. It is true that through their livelihoods at least, the peasant w o m e n w h o come to market in the N i g e r i a n t o w n , or the praise singer w h o performs for local notables, are not very m u c h i n v o l v e d w i t h metropolitan meaning systems; the railroader, the bank clerk a n d the doctor are rather more. Yet there is no one-to-one relationship either between the specificity of such c u l t u r a l definition and degree of w o r l d system material i n volvement. In many places on the periphery, there are forms of life o w i n g their material existence, such as it may be, very immediately to the w o r l d system. — forms of life r e v o l v i n g a r o u n d o i l wells, copper mines, coffee plantations, A n d yet the plantation w o r k e r may earn his. l i v i n g w i t h a. relative m i n i m u m of particular technological or organizational skills originating at the center.

In contemporary complex societies, the d i v i s i o n of labor is the dominant factor i n shaping forms of life, p r o v i d i n g material bases as w e l l as central experiences. But as the reciprocity a n d redundancy of the f l o w of m e a n i n g between people i n v o l v e d w i t h one another at w o r k , i n domesticity a n d i n sociability seem similar enough, I think of this as a single f r a m e w o r k . L o o k i n g n o w at m y N i g e r i a n t o w n , or at peripheral societies generally, one can see that the variety of forms of life .are d r a w n into the w o r l d system i n somewhat different ways, as the local d i v i s i o n of labor is entangled with, the international d i v i s i o n of labor. There are still people, fairly self-sufficient agriculturalists i n the vicinity of the t o w n , w h o seem only rather incompletely integrated into the w o r l d system i n material terms: w h o just barely make it into the periphery. O n the other h a n d , there are people like the railroad employees whose m o d e of existence is based on the fact that the desire arose, some time early i n this century, to carry tin and groundnuts f r o m Inland N i g e r i a to the w o r l d .

For the f o u r t h a n d final, f r a m e w o r k of cultural process i n contemporary life I w o u l d nominate that of movements, more intermittently part of the c u l t u r a l totality than the other three, although it can h a r d l y be gainsaid that especially i n the last quarter-century or so, they have h a d a major influence — examples of this being the w o m e n ' s movement, the environmental movement, and the peace movement. In the present context of considering center-periphery links of culture, I w i l l say less about the movement framework, however, and m e n t i o n it here mostly for the sake of completeness. It Is undoubt-

To the extent that forms of life, or segments of the d a i l y r o u n d w h i c h they encompass, are not subjected to any higher degree of c u l tural definition f r o m the center, by w a y of the international division, of labor or otherwise, there is r o o m for more cultural autonomy. A n d of course, the strength of the culture existing i n such reserves may be such that it also reaches back to penetrate into segments more directly a n d more extensively defined b y the center. This is p u t t i n g things very briefly; w e come back to the implications.

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But then also some forms of life more than others become defined, w i t h precision and overall, i n terms of culture w h i c h has flown a n d

Movements tend to be less centralized in their management of the cultural flow than what we usually find in the state and market frameworks, .and there is also, less concentration of material resources. In this they are more like forms of life, out of which they of course tend to emerge as people within the latter become dissatisfied with existing conditions or are threatened by changes. As compared with what goes on within the form of life framework itself, on the other hand, movements foster a more deliberate .and explicit flow of meaning, .and are more outward-oriented, missionizmg. Insofar as they are oriented toward specific changes or toward averting such changes, they are also more inherently unstable — they tend to succeed or fail.

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edly true, as R o l a n d Robertson notes, that globalization often forms an important part of the background for the rise of contemporary movements. Yet it seems to me that the great transnational movements of recent times have not i n themselves seemed to become fully organized i n a reach all the w a y between center .and periphery. Some rather combine center and semi-periphery, others parts of the periphery. M a r k e t , state; f o r m of We a n d movement can be rather c o m m o n sensically distinguished, but w e see that they differ i n their centering a n d decentering tendencies, i n their politics of culture a n d i n their cultural economies. They .also have their o w n tendencies w i t h respect to the temporal dimension of culture. A t the same time, it is true that m u c h of what goes on. i n culture has to do w i t h their interrelations. States, markets and. movements are ultimately only successful if they can get forms of life to open u p to them. States sometimes compete i n markets; nationalist movements have been k n o w n to- transform, themselves into, states; some movements create internal markets, a n d they can be n e w s w o r t h y a n d thus commoditizable i n the market; forms of life can be selectively c o m m o d i t i z e d as life style news; and so o n , indefinitely. These entanglements, i n v o l v i n g often m u t u a l l y contradictory tendencies, keep the totality alive, shifting, continuously unstable.

if interactions are tied to particular spaces is culture likewise so. W h e n culture, as i n the w o r k s of classical .anthropology, was altogether a matter of a flow of meaning in face-to-face relationships between, people w h o do not move a r o u n d m u c h , it could be a simple e n o u g h matter to think, of cultures i n the p l u r a l as entities located i n territories. W h e n cultural technology allows alternatives to face-toface contacts a n d w h e n people become increasingly footloose anyw a y , then it all gets more complicated. W i t h the globalization of c u l ture, that is certainly where we are n o w . But to reiterate, the frameworks for cultural process relate differently to territoriality... A s the state is i n itself an organization of territory, this is the framework i n w h i c h there is the greatest vested interest i n a spatial definition of culture. E v e n where the state as an agent is closely coordinated w i t h the agents of a transnational market econo m y , it is likely to maintain some of its autonomy of action, some of its effectiveness a n d ^ d i s p e n s a b i l i t y as a broker between the transnational a n d the local, t h r o u g h appeals i n which, the idea of the nation mediates between state a n d f o r m of life. This may entail some disregard for, or even suppression of, the diversity of forms of fife existi n g w i t h i n the territorial boundaries of the state. L o o k i n g o u t w a r d , it is i n the peripheral state apparatuses that what w i t h i n the transnational market framework is called " t h e free flow of i n f o r m a t i o n " meets with, most resistance, a n d it is f r o m there that " a n e w international information o r d e r " is proposed to constrain it. A n d it is likewise w i t h i n the peripheral state apparatuses that campaigns for national distinctiveness often emanate — away w i t h miniskirts, neckties ' a n d Christian names, i n w i t h presidential hippopotamus-hide flyw h i s k s and the management of tradition b y " c u l t u r a l .animateurs" e m p l o y e d b y the M i n i s t r y of C u l t u r e or the district commissioner,. Some peripheral states do more w i t h this than others, N i g e r i a , w i t h its rather deep internal cleavages a n d a rapid, turnover of political regimes, has not used its state apparatus v e r y insistently or consistently for such promotional efforts — the prime example that w o u l d come to the m i n d of an Africanist w o u l d rather be the Zairean " a u thenticity" campaigns, of M o b u t u Sese Seko.

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The frameworks at the periphery A p a r t f r o m w h a t I have already said about forms of life, then, w h a t are the characteristics of the frameworks and. their interrelations i n the cultural process of the periphery, and h o w do they affect the w a y the periphery is d r a w n into w o r l d culture, n o w a n d i n the future? W h a t is. not least significant here are the different although internally diverse ways i n w h i c h the frameworks relate to space. The connection between cultural process and territory, w e s h o u l d r e m i n d ourselves here, is only contingent. A s socially organized meaning, culture is p r i m a r i l y a phenomenon of interaction, and o n l y

Roland Robertson, "Global ity, Global Culture and Images of World Order," in Social Change and Modernity, eds. Hans Haverkamp and Neil. Smelser (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991). 5

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* On "cultural animateurs," .see Roy Shaw, "The Cultural 'Animateur' in Contemporary Society," Colliers d'Histoire Mondiale, 14 (1972):460~72. On authenticity in Zaire, see Thomas M . Callaghy, "State-Subject Commur.i7

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World-system theory i n the Wallersteinian version, as I have so far understood it, may not have h a d m u c h time for culture at all, but w h e n culture has entered i n , mostly as a matter of ideology and a manipulative use of tradition, it is this k i n d of spatial o r d e r i n g of it, to b o u n d periphery f r o m center, w h i c h has been emphasized. Y e t the part of the state i n the global organization of culture is certainly ambiguous a n d contradictory. Contemporary state forms, a n d contemporary ideas of nation and nationalism, are themselves i n large part items of transnational diffusion. A n d for the peripheral state, to p r o v i d e for the; material welfare of its citizenry and to stay i n b u s i ness as a competitor w i t h i n the international system, it has h a d to be heavily i n v o l v e d i n the wholesale importation of culture f r o m center to periphery. A s it reconstructs society w i t h i n its territory into a f o r m w h i c h is more or less globally recurrent, institutions are introduced w h i c h are fundamentally inspired b y a n d modeled o n those of the w o r l d system centers. M o r e o v e r , these institutions require standard;, ized competences, guaranteed by educational systems w h i c h are at least in principle, in terms of their objectives, remarkably u n i f o r m between states. The schools, indeed, are the most conspicuous means b y w h i c h the state-organized flow of culture reaches into the N i g e r i an t o w n . i

and territory rather tenuous; and one may observe that the state, as it culturally constructs people to take u p the positions i n question w i t h i n the d i v i s i o n of labor, and insofar as it also constitutes m u c h of that d i v i s i o n of labor itself, ensures that there w i l l be people whose horizons transcend Its o w n territorial boundaries. W i t h i n the market framework, i n line w i t h the scenario of global homogenization, we m a y expect the l i n k between territory and c u l tural process to be rather weak. N a t i o n a l boundaries may be ignored, subverted or devalued, rather than celebrated, Some transnational cultural c o m m o d i t y f l o w is indeed based on m i n i m a l attention to any particular, differentiated characteristics on the part of consumers. This is true of what K a r i n Barber, i n an o v e r v i e w of A f r i c a n p o p u l a r culture, has aptly called " c u l t u r a l d u m p i n g " — " a k i n to the d u m p ing of expired drugs and non-functional b u s e s . "

Forms of life v a r y in the strength of their territorial .anchorage. The daily r o u n d of activities for some people m a y still remain in one place, over a lifetime. But for others it is a matter of m u c h c o m i n g and going. In contemporary N i g e r i a n u r b a n life, one of the recurrent events of the ritual order is the sendoff party — and w h i l e i n a s m a l l t o w n like the one I have described, the c i v i l servants or bank clerks or teachers or students may not be likely to be transferred v e r y far a n d usually stay in N i g e r i a , if y o u go to a larger city y o u w i l l r u n into the cosmopolitan entrepreneurs, managers, professionals and i n tellectuals, the jet set a n d perhaps potential brain drain, often staying conveniently close to an international airport, but also constantly maintaining contact w i t h the center through the written w o r d or other m e d i a . H e r e the f o r m of life makes the l i n k between culture

cation in Zaire; Domination -and the Concept of Domain Consensus," Journal, of Modern African Studies, 18 (1980):469-492; for a portrayal, of its re-exported form in Togo, see George Packer, The Village of Waiting (New York: Vintage, 1988)::lQlff. 6

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The cost of taking o l d westerns, soap serials or s k i n flicks (to choose o n l y examples f r o m the screen) to their final b u r i a l place at the periphery is so l o w that whatever they m a y earn is almost pure profit; an unanticipated addition to w h a t they made i n those markets for w h i c h they were actually p r o d u c e d . The global homogenization scenario takes a special, perhaps temporary twist here: the periphery is seen to be for the time being not really different, but b a c k w a r d and third-rate. So it can be treated to leftovers. If there is one tendency w i t h i n the market f r a m e w o r k to homogenize and reach as w i d e l y as possible w i t h the same single product, however, there is also the alternative of limiting the competition b y f i n d i n g a particular niche for a more specialized product. In focusing on the market as the major force of global homogenization, one of our scenarios for peripheral cultures rather too m u c h ignores this alternative. B u t since that scenario is so often preoccupied w i t h the commodities of popular culture, whether i n the f o r m of music, television, f i l m , fashion or the written w o r d , let us observe that m u c h of w h a t the entrepreneurs of popular culture i n the T h i r d W o r l d are d o i n g these days involves carving out such niches: nobody w i t h any experience of West A f r i c a n urban life can fail to be impressed w i t h the continuously changing variety of popular music — highlife, juju, Afrobeat, apala or whatever... Peter M a n u e l , i n his ethnomusicological 1

' Karin Barber, "Popular Arts in Africa," African Studies Review, 30 (1987) 3: 1-18, 119

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survey of the field, concludes that " i t may seem that every prominent West A f r i c a n musician has coined some label for his particular fusion of traditional a n d m o d e r n s o u n d s . " O n N i g e r i a n television, a large part of the p r o g r a m m i n g is indeed a matter of cultural d u m p i n g , o l d A m e r i c a n serials w h i c h those of us w h o are at the center m a y barely e v e n remember any longer. But i n m y N i g e r i a n t o w n , it seemed that they often d r e w little attention or involvement. W h a t engaged v i e w ers, a n d this is also what the beginnings of N i g e r i a n m e d i a research suggest, were the Nigerian, sitcoms, s h o w i n g incidents- a n d people of a more familiar k i n d . I note also what K a r i n Barber says about m o v i e - g o i n g i n small towns i n ; outhwestern N i g e r i a . Some years ago, the theaters s h o w e d mostly A m e r i c a n , H o n g k o n g or Indian films, b u t according to Barber, they have n o w become increasingly h a r d to f i n d . Locally p r o d u c e d f i L n s , i n the language of the area a n d using the personnel, style a n d themes of a well-established tradition of traveling popular theater, havi • replaced the imports.

meanings can be communicated; the meanings themselves. A n d where they are taken apart, they can also be assembled i n n e w ways, c o m b i n e d w i t h parts of other, often local derivation. A t w h i c h times some of the Imported components may certainly also be discarded, as rubbish. Perhaps so m u c h of this creativity passes quite neglected in, the global homogenization scenario for the twin, reasons that f r o m a vantage point at the center, many of us really do not see it, a n d since it is so m u c h a phenomenon of the market, some prefer not to see it. Yet it is there i n the arenas where the force of global homogenization Is usually taken to be at its strongest, a n d it often seems to compete with, considerable success.

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These entrepreneurs m a y not aave the material, resources of the culture businesses of the center, but like local entrepreneurs anywhere, they k n o w their' territory; their particular asset is cultural competence, cultural sensibility. A n d this derives f r o m an involvement w i t h local forms of life. C o m i n g out of these themselves, indeed b e i n g still i n them, they are tuned in to the tastes a n d concerns w h i c h can p r o v i d e markets for particular commodities, a n d thus niches for their enterprises. To a degree this m a y entail c o m m o d i t i z i n g meanings a n d cultural forms w h i c h were previously contained w i t h i n the free-flow c u l t u r a l economy of a f o r m of life, but often this is o n l y made possible t h r o u g h their incorporation into new syntheses w i t h technology, organizational forms, a n d modes of expression d r a w n f r o m the global f l o w of culture. W h i c h is to say that this flow does not necessarily constitute an i n divisible w h o l e . A l o n g the w a y , somewhere, it can be u n p a c k e d as a m u l t i t u d e of separate parts — the cultural technology, such as m e d i a or musical instruments; the symbolic forms or genres t h r o u g h w h i c h

Peter Manuel, Popular Musics of the Non-Western World (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988). See O. O. Oreh, "Masquerade and other Plays on Nigerian Television" and Theo Vincent, "Television Drama in, Nigeria: A Critical Assessment," in Mass Communication, Culture and Society in West Africa, ed., Frank Okwu Ueboaiah (Munich: Hans Zell/K. G . Saur, 1985). 9

Prospects: saturation and maturation Let me approach n o w the question of longer-term trends of cultural process at the periphery. The interactions between the several frameworks of cultural process d e p e n d on their respective contents a n d modes of organization as w e l l as their relative strengths, w h i c h m a y change over time. The "movement framework, about w h i c h I have said least here, obviously waxes a n d wanes, The state, especiall y apart f r o m what it does in, the field of education, is quite variably strong. It may speak, i n a very l o u d voice i n its celebration of national ideology, or it may be barely audible. W i t h regard to what I described before as policies of cultural welfare, one has to be especially aware that peripheral states are often what G u n n a r M y r d a l some twenty years ago described as "soft states," w i t h very l i m i t e d capacity for policy i m p l e m e n t a t i o n . This tends to be obvious e n o u g h i n the area of cultural policy. Clearly the performance of the state i n managing cultural flow depends i n some significant part on material conditions. The soft state is often an i m p o v e r i s h e d state w h i c h may i l l .afford to maintain a p o w e r f u l cultural apparatus. The factor of material bases is n o less important w i t h i n the market framework — w h e n culture Is comm o d i t i z e d , it has to be materially compensated for. This simple but fundamental fact seems often to be treated i n a 11

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Gunnar Myrdal, Asian Drama (New York: Pantheon, 1968). 121

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rather cavalier manner w i t h i n the global homogi>nizarion scenario. O n e w o u l d have to take a range of possibilities .in to account here... If the involvement of the periphery w i t h the international d i v i s i o n of labor is not to its advantage-, at any one time or over time, this w o u l d rather suggest that the periphery through its involvement w i t h 'the w o r l d system becomes a poorer market for a transnational flow of c u l t u r a l commodities; w i t h the possible exception, of w h a t w e have labeled " c u l t u r e d u m p i n g , " w h i c h m a y involve l o w , affordable prices, but otherwise often unattractive goods. Conversely, of course, if some part of the periphery becomes nouveau riche, it m a y be flooded w i t h the cultural commodities of the center. In recent times, again, the economies of some parts of the periphery, i n c l u d i n g N i g e r i a , have been o n a rollercoaster ride, and it is not altogether' obvious what are the longer term implications of such shifts i n 'the c u l tural market, O n e question, is certainly at w h a t points local entrepreneurs w i l l become more active i n i m p o r t substitution, a n d i n what^. form. *

differences celebrated a n d recommended for safeguarding n o w may o n l y be a pale reflection of w h a t once existed, a n d sooner or later they w i l l be gone as well. W h a t is suggested here is that the center, through the frameworks of c u l t u r a l process w i t h i n w h i c h the transnational f l o w passes most readily, .and a m o n g w h i c h the market framework is certainly conspicuous, c u m u l a t i v e l y colonizes the m i n d s of the periphery, w i t h a corresponding institutionalization of its forms, getting the periphery so " h o o k e d " that soon e n o u g h there is no real opportunity for choice. The mere fact that these forms originate in. the center makes them, even more attractive, a peculiar but undeniable aspect of c o m m o d i t y esthetics in. the p e r i p h e r y . This, colonization is understood to proceed t h r o u g h relentless cultural bombardment, t h r o u g h the r e d u n dancy of its seductive messages. A s the market f r a m e w o r k interpenetrates w i t h that of forms of life, the latter becomes reconstructed a r o u n d their dependence o n w h a t w a s initially alien, u s i n g It for their practical adaptations, seeing themselves w h o l l y or at least partially t h r o u g h It. It w o u l d appear, however, that one can turn this sort of argument at least some of the w a y around. The form, of life framework, as I have said, also has a redundancy of its o w n , built u p through its ever recurrent daily activities, perhaps at least as strong as, or stronger than, any redundancy that the market framework can ever achieve... It m a y involve interpersonal relationships, resulting configurations of self a n d other, characteristic uses of symbolic m o d e s , There is perhaps a core here to w h i c h the market framework cannot reach, not even i n the longer term, a core of culture w h i c h is not itself easily c o m m o d i t i z e d a n d to w h i c h the commodities of the market are not altogether relevant. The inherent cultural p o w e r of the f o r m of life f r a m e w o r k c o u l d

There are noteworthy uncertainties here, then, which, w e have to bear i n m i n d even as w e try to think of what m a y be trends of cumu- . lative change. This m u c h granted, I propose that it m a y be useful, to identify two tendencies i n the longer-term reconstruction of peripheral cultures w i t h i n the global ecumene. O n e might think of each (although as w i l l be noted later, I prefer not to) as a distinctive scenario of future cultural history, a n d i n these terms they w o u l d bear some resemblance to the global homogenization scenario a n d the peripheral c o r r u p t i o n scenarios respectively. I w i l l call one the saturation, tendency, a n d the other the maturation tendency. The saturation tendency is that w h i c h m a y be seen as a version, of the global homogenization scenario, w i t h some more detailed interest i n historical sequence. It w o u l d suggest that as the transnational cultural influences, of whatever sort but i n large part certainly market organized, a n d operating i n a continuously o p e n structure, u n e n d i n g l y p o u n d o n the sensibilities of the people of the periphery, peripheral culture w i l l step b y step assimilate more a n d more of the i m p o r t e d meanings a n d forms, becoming gradually i n distinguishable from the center. A t any one time, what is considered, local culture is a little more penetrated b y transnational forms than what w e n t before it as local culture, although at any one time, u n t i l the end. point is reached, the contrast between local and transnational, m a y still be d r a w n , a n d still be regarded as significant. The cultural 122

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I have exemplified this in the Nigerian context in. Ulf Harmerz, "Bush and Beento: Nigerian Popular Culture and the World." Paper presented 'in session on Transnational Practices and Representations of Modernity, Annual Meeting of the American. Anthropological Association, Chicago, November 18-22,1987. I am reminded here of Wolfs comment that what is referred to as "national character''' is often lodged in such contexts and relationships. See Eric R. Wolf, "Kinship, Friendship and Patron-Client Relations in Complex Societies," in The Social Anthropology of Complex Societies, ed. Michael Banton (London: Travistock, 1966). 1 2

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perhaps also be such that it colonizes the market framework, rather than vice versa. This is more i n line w i t h what I see as the maturation tendency;'a notion w h i c h has its affinities w i t h the peripheral corruption scenario, although probably w i t h other evaluative overtones. The p e r i p h e r y , it is understood here, takes its time reshaping metropolitan culture to its o w n specifications. It is i n phase one, so to speak, that the metropolitan forms i n the periphery are most m a r k e d by their p u r i t y ; b u t o n closer scrutiny they t u r n out to stand there fairly ineffective, perhaps vulnerable, i n their relative isolation. In a phase t w o , a n d i n innumerable phases thereafter, as they are made to interact w i t h whatever else exists, i n their n e w setting, there m a y be a m u t u a l influence, but the metropolitan forms are s o m e h o w n o longer so easily recognizable — they become h y b r i d i z e d . In these later phases, the terms of the cultural market for one thing .are i n a reasonable measure set f r o m w i t h i n the peripheral forms of life, as these have come to be constituted, h i g h l y variable of course i n the degree to w h i c h they are themselves culturally defined i n the terms d r a w n f r o m the center.

already i n place to meet the transnational culture industries of the twentieth century. It is not a scene where the peripheral culture is utterly defenseless, but rather one where locally e v o l v i n g alternatives to imports are available, and where there are people at h a n d to keep p e r f o r m i n g innovative acts of cultural brokerage.

O b v i o u s l y w h a t I have already said about the creativity of p o p u l a r culture i n m u c h of the T h i r d W o r l d , .and not least i n W e s t A f r i c a , fits i n here. L o c a l c u l t u r a l entrepreneurs have gradually mastered, the alien cultural forms w h i c h reach them through the transnational c o m m o d i t y f l o w and i n other w a y s , taking them apart, tampering a n d tinkering w i t h them i n such a w a y that the resulting n e w forms are more responsive to, a n d at the same time i n part outgrowths of, local everyday life. In this connection I s h o u l d return to the doubts I expressed before about the sense of time, or perhaps lacking sense of time, i n the scenario of global homogenization. The onslaught of transnational i n fluences, as often described or hinted at, seems just a bit too s u d d e n . In West A f r i c a , such influences have been filtering into the coastal societies for centuries already, although i n earlier periods o n a smaller scale a n d b y modest means. There has been time to absorb the foreign influences, a n d to m o d i f y the modifications i n t u r n a n d to fit shifting cultural forms to developing social structures, to situations a n d emerging-audiences. This, then, is the local scene w h i c h is 14

The periphery in creoiization I s h o u l d b e g i n to p u l l things together. It is probably evident that I place some emphasis o n the theme of maturation, a n d that I continue to resist the idea of saturation, at least i n its u n q u a l i f i e d f o r m , w h i c h is that of global homogenization. In fact, i n that f o r m , it has s u s p i ciously m u c h i n c o m m o n w i t h that 1940s or 1950s imagery of mass culture w i t h i n the metropole w h i c h s h o w e d a faceless, undifferentiated c r o w d d r o w n i n g i n a flood of mediocre but mass-produced c u l tural commodities. Since then, metropolitan scholarship at home has mostly m o v e d a w a y f r o m that imagery, t o w a r d m u c h more subtle conceptions of the differentiation of publics, and the contextuallzed reception of culture industry products. E x p o r t i n g the older, rather w o r n o u t a n d c o m p r o m i s e d notion to the periphery, consequently, looks suspiciously like another case of cultural d u m p i n g . It is no doubt a trifle unfortunate that there seems to be no single scenario to p u t i n the place of that of global homogenization, w i t h similarly strong — but more credible — claims to predictive p o w e r . But then prediction is not something the h u m a n sciences have been very g o o d at, and i n the case of the global ordering of culture, what I have said may at least contribute to some understanding of w h y this is so. The diversity of Interlocking principles for the organization of cultural process involves too m a n y uncertainties to allow us to say m u c h that is v e r y definite w i t h regard to the aggregate outcome. 1 5

Repercussions: A Celebration of African-American Music, eds. Geoffrey Haydon .and Dennis Marks .(London: Century, 1985) and Christopher A. Waterman, "Asiko, Sakara and Palmwine: Popular Music and Social Identity in Inter-War Lagos," Urban Anthropology, 17 (1988):229-258. Cf. the critical discussion of media research in the 'cultural dependency' framework in J. O. Boyd-Barrett, "Cultural Dependency and the Mass Media," in Culture, Society and the Media, eds. Michael Gurevilch, Tony Bennett, James Curran and Janet Woollacott (London: Methuen, 1982). 1 5

For discussions of this in the context of West African popular music, see John M. Chernoff, "Africa Come Back: The Popular Music of West Africa," in 1 4

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SCENARIOS FOR P E R I P H E R A L C U L T U R E S

A f e w points about h o w things seem to be g o i n g m a y at least sensitize to some issues i n s t u d y i n g culture i n the w o r l d , n o w a n d i n the future. T h e center-periphery structure is one undeniable fact. W h e n s t u d y i n g culture, w e n o w have to think, about the f l o w between places as w e l l as that within, them. E a c h society at the periphery, each T h i r d W o r l d society, has its o w n cultural distinctiveness, b u t it is not as absolute as it has been (which was never quite absolute). Increasingly, distinctiveness is a matter of degree, as it has l o n g been within, that N o r t h Atlantic ecumene made u p of a n u m b e r of societies of the center a n d the semi-periphery; let us say between the U n i t e d States, G e r m a n y , S w e d e n a n d Portugal. Interactions of m a n y sorts have been going o n i n this ecumene over a v e r y long time a n d the cultural affinities are obvious, yet nobody w o u l d deny that there are 'differences as w e l l . Increasingly, however, w e f i n d the cultural differences w i t h i n societies, rather than be tween them. If y o u look w i t h i n some society for what is most uniquely distinctive, y o u w i l l perhaps look among peasants rather than, bank managers, i n the country rather than i n the city, a m o n g the o l d rather than the y o u n g . A n d obviously the reason is that through the operation of the v a r i e d frameworks for cultural process, a n d the interaction between them, some meanings and m e a n i n g f u l forms become m u c h more localized, m u c h more tied, to space, than others. U s i n g the w o r d "societies" i n the p l u r a l as, w e often, do i n a loose manner, conflating its meaning w i t h that of "states," w h i c h refers to undeniably territorial phenomena, w e are m i s l e d t o w a r d a very partial understanding of contemporary cultural process, as some of its frameworks are not contained w i t h i n particular states.

here, and, it m a y be that what I take f r o m a rather volatile field of linguistic thought is little more than a r o u g h metaphor. Y e t it has a n u m b e r of components w h i c h are appropriate enough. I like it because it suggests that cultures, like languages, can be intrinsically of m i x e d origin, rather than historically pure a n d homogeneous. It clashes conspicuously, that is to say, w i t h received assumptions about culture c o m i n g out of nineteenth century European nationalism. A n d the similarities between " c r e ó l e " and "create" are not fortuitous. W e have a, sharper sense than usual, that creóle cultures result as people actively engage i n m a k i n g their o w n syntheses. W i t h regard to the entire cultural inventory of h u m a n i t y , creolization m a y involve losing some, but certainly gaining some, too. There is also in, the creolization scenario the notion of a more or less open c o n t i n u u m , a gradation of l i v i n g syntheses w h i c h can be seen to match the cultural distance between, center a n d periphery. A n d just as it is understood to involve a political economy of language, so the creolization c o n t i n u u m can be seen i n its organization, of diversity to entail a political economy of culture.

If there is any term which, has m a n y of the right associations b y w h i c h to describe the ongoing, historically cumulative cultural interrelatedness between center a n d periphery, it is, I think, "creolizat i o n , " a b o r r o w i n g f r o m particular social a n d cultural histories b y way of a more generalized linguistics. ' I w i l l not d w e l l o n the potential of a creolization scenario for peripheral cultures very l o n g 1

6

1 have discussed the idea, of creolization in earlier publications. See Ulf Hannerz, "The World in Creolization," Africa, 57 (1987):546-59 and "American Culture: Creolized, Creolizing," i n American Culture: Creolized, Creolizing, and Other Lecturesfromthe NAAS Biennial Conference in Uppsala, May 28-31,1987, ed. Erik Asard (Uppsala: Swedish Institute for North American Studies).

Furthermore, there is the dimension of time. L o o k i n g b a c k w a r d , the creolist point of v i e w recognizes history. Creole cultures are not instant products of the present but have h a d some time to develop and d r a w themselves together to at least some degree of coherence; generations have already been b o r n into them, but have also kept w o r k i n g o n t h e m . L o o k i n g f o r w a r d , the creolization scenario is open-ended. This is perhaps an intellectual copout, but again, probably .an inevitable one. It suggests that the saturation a n d maturation tendencies are not necessarily alternatives, but c a n appear i n real life i n t e r w o v e n w i t h one another. W h e n the peripheral culture absorbs the i n f l u x of meanings and symbolic forms f r o m the center and transforms them to make them i n some considerable degree their o w n , they m a y at the same time so increase the cultural affinities between the center a n d the periphery that the passage of more cultural i m ports is facilitated. W h a t the e n d state of all this w i l l be is impossible to say, but it is possible that there is none. A l o n g the creolizing c o n t i n u u m , then, I see the various frameworks for c u l t u r a l process exercising their continuous Influence. Forms of 17

1 6

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Cf. Johannes Fabian, "Popular Culture in Africa: Findings and Conjectures," Africa, 48 (1978):315-334. 17

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CULTURE, GLOBALIZATION A N D THE WORLD-SYSTEM life, variously place-bound, take their positions on it, a n d help tie it together as- the p e o p l e i n v o l v e d also observe each other; the people i n the small t o w n i d o l i z i n g the jet set, perhaps, a n d the jet set m y t h o l o g i z i n g the peasants. They m a y o p e n themselves to v a r y i n g degrees to the transnational cultural f l o w of the market, or allow m i d d l e m e n to occupy the c u l t u r a l space between the center a n d whatever is their place o n the periphery. O r they may d o both, since the t w o need not be m u t u a l l y exclusive. N o w a n d then a movement f r o m the metropolis perhaps comes traveling along the c o n t i n u u m . A t other times, what the metropolis offers may clash instead w i t h a movement generated at the periphery., A n d finally, a w o r d about the state. W e have seen, that the state is both a large-scale importer of culture f r o m the center and a g u a r d i a n of either more or less authentic traditions f r o m the periphery. B u t i n between, frequently, there is nothing, or not very m u c h . Perhaps it is inevitable that the state, for the sake of its o w n legitimacy, is a promotor of uncreolized authenticity. Yet it is also possible that this is a rather quixotic struggle, a p r o d u c t i o n of culture of dubious merit i n the v i e w of large parts of the citizenry whose m i n d s are elsewhere. It may be a perverse proposal, but it c o u l d be that to p l a y its part i n cultural welfare, to cooperate w i t h that citizenry i n shaping intellectual and esthetic instruments w h i c h h e l p people see w h e r e they are a n d w h o they are today, a n d decide w h e r e they want to go, the state has- to be more self-consciously, but not self-deprecatingly, a participant i n a m i x e d cultural economy, a creóle state.

6. Interrogating Theories of the Global

I. J A N E T A B U L U G H O D n. B A R B A R A A B O U - E L - H A J HI. M A U R E E N T U R I M IV. A N T H O N Y K I N G V. JOHN T A G G

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6. I. Going Beyond Global Babble

JANET ABU-LUGHOD

ONE CANNOT THINK OF A LARGER DOMAIN T H A N GLOBAL NOR A broader topic than culture, especially if one wants also to understand (a) h o w structural characteristics and politics shape culture-creation and flows (as does Wallerstein), (b) the processes whereby s u c h flows are unevenly articulated (as does Hannerz), or (c) the form and content of the n e w globalized culture (as does Robertson). The topic seems too b i g to handle. E v e n t h o u g h I consider myself a macrosociologist, I felt uncomfortable w i t h the h i g h level of abstraction of m u c h of the discourse I read i n preparation for this session. The field, if not controlled, can degenerate into what w e m i g h t c a l l "global-babble."' In m a n y w a y s I was more comfortable w i t h the approaches of U l f H a n nerz (and Stuart H a l l , whose lectures I read later), since both try to capture the ambiguities and nuances of the concrete, as they are e m b e d d e d i n the lives of people. That is- what I should like to address, but I w o u l d like to expand H a n n e r z ' s approach to capture more of the cross-currents. H i s f l o w is still too one-way, from, center to periphery; there is more movement f r o m the periphery to the core than his exposition suggests (a point captured brilliantly b y Stuart H a l l ) . A n d h a d I more time, I w o u l d even argue that multiple cores are proliferating and some c u l tural p o w e r differences are actually decreasing. O n l y o u r o w n not-

CULTURE, GLOBALIZATION A N D THE WORLD-SYSTEM fully globalized perspective makes us b l i n d to h o w the c u l t u r e ; of rising cores i n A s i a are d i f f u s i n g w i t h i n their o w n circuits. H o w to get a handle on this gigantic and amorphous topic? Let rne try to concretize v i a three cases. First, i n the traditional m e d i e v a l city of Tunis, i n a fashion \ „>ry typical of an " I s l a m i c " city, two suqs (linear bazaars) radiate f: i m the great Z a y t u n i y a M o s q u e w h i c h always constituted the geogra; hie focal point a n d organizing principle of the o l d city. O n e s u q le ids f r o m the mosque to the gateway that connects the m e d i e v a l con- to the French-built n e w city, a n d was once the s u q . A second sets oi t at right angles to another exit f r o m the formerly w a l l e d city. O v e r the years, a remarkable fissure has been d e v e l o p i n g i n these suqs, w h i c h m a y p r o v i d e a parable for the w o r l d . The first suq n o w specializes i n T u n i s i a n handicrafts, " t r a d i t i o n a l " goods, etc. It has kept its exotic architecture and multicolored columnades. The plaintives sound of the ancient nose flute and the w h i n i n g of A r a b i c music p r o v i d e background for the E u r o p e a n tourists i n their shorts a n d T-shirts, who amble i n twos a n d threes, s t o p p i n g to look a n d to b u y . F e w natives, except for sellers, are to be seen. The second s u q , formerly less important, is currently a bustling madhouse. It is packed w i t h partially v e i l e d w o m e n a n d y o u n g e r T u n i s i a n .girls i n blouses a n d skirts, w i t h m e n i n knee-length tunic/toga outfits or i n a variety of pants and shirts, w i t h c h i l d r e n everywhere. F e w foreigners can be seen. The background to the d i n is blaring rock a n d r o l l music, a n d p i l e d h i g h o n the pushcarts that line the w a y are transistor radios, watches, blue Jeans (some p rewashed), rayon si arves, L u x face a n d O m o l a u n d r y soaps. H e r e is H a n n e r z ' s " m a r k e t , " the w o r l d of commodities. But note that, i n the globalization of cultural artifacts that Hannerz describes, a t w o - w a y process of "objectification" is going on. O n the outskirts of the same city, m e n sit cross-legged on the floors of crude w o r k s h o p s , h a n d s e w i n g the finishing touches o n G u c c i purses. In. other sweatshops w o m e n sew seams o n couturier creations. H e r e , w i t h o u t any doubt, is Wallerstein's international d i v i sion of labor, w i t h undeniable economic hegemony. In the Census Office of the T u n i s i a n government, w h e r e I h a d come to negotiate fox access to census data (collected, f o l l o w i n g the advice of the U n i t e d Nations, to make it u n i f o r m a n d comparable to the data of over 100 other nations) w e discuss i n F r e n c h the mechanics of data transfer — I B M , C o n t r o l Data, sept piste or neuf piste 132

I N T E R R O G A T I N G THEORIES O F T H E G L O B A L (7 or 9 track tape). H e r e is the u p p e r circuit of hi-tech/ communication, fully globalized, but w i t h i n the nation-state. H e r e is Robertson's global GeseUschafi. But only a few are privileged to it. I may have more i n c o m m o n w i t h these T u n i s i a n demographers than w i t h m y cleaning w o m a n , but she has more i n c o m m o n w i t h me than w i t h a T u n i s i a n domestic servant. I present the second anecdote w i t h a real cautionary. M y eldest daughter, w h o is an anthropologist, l i v e d for several years w i t h a g r o u p of sedentarized bedouins i n the western desert of Egypt. She recently returned for a, visit. S t o p p i n g i n Cairo, she learned that the newest, most p o p u l a r singer i n the country — his cassettes p l a y i n g everywhere — w a s a. y o u n g male b e d o u i n rock singer' whose music combines b e d o u i n rhythms (actually, the " d a n c i n g h o r s e " patterns) w i t h western style music. A m o n g the presents she took to the " t r i b e , " then, were some of his cassettes, m u c h appreciated by the y o u n g girls w h o found the singer's picture, on the cassette cover, " s e x y . " The older w o m e n commented that he looked " f u n n y . " There was clearly something w r o n g w i t h his eyes (i.e., the older w o m e n d i d n ' t recognize his encoded sidelong glance as seductive). A proper m a n stares seriously ahead... N o w , this genre of m i x e d western a n d " o r i e n t a l " music is proliferating all over the w o r l d . I was first introduced to it b y a BelgianA m e r i c a n political scientist w h o fell i n love w i t h it i n G e r m a n y , where T u r k i s h migrant laborers h a d evolved a. similar syncretic genre! I'm m a k i n g a. copy of m y daughter's tape to pass on to the Belgian, w h o w i l l probably send a copy to his G e r m a n friends. F r o m an ethnocentric point of v i e w , w h a t we tend to see is the westernization of oriental music, but I w o u l d like to propose an alternative diagnosis. W h a t we are seeing is the orientalization of western music. A s the early sociologists of A m e r i c a n assimilation pointed out, it is a t w o - w a y street. T h u s far, m y comments have been supportive of the convergence thesis. G r a n t e d , I see more movement from, the periphery to the center than most people do. (Listen to p o p u l a r music i n the States these days a n d y o u ' l l p i c k u p third w o r l d influences; w a l k d o w n the streets of N e w Y o r k and y o u ' l l see third w o r l d culture i m p o r t e d and affecting Americans.) I do not d e n y the hegemonic influence of western, patterns i n the diffusion of the " n a t i o n state" (although form s h o u l d never be confused w i t h content, w h i c h varies w i d e l y ) , nor do I ignore the influence of central institutions, even that of otherwise 133

CULTURE, GLOBALIZATION A N D THE WORLD-SYSTEM impotent international organizations, i n creating a western-based m o d e l of " m o d e r n " society w i t h relatively u n i f o r m aspirations if not characteristics. But culture is more than " t r a i t s , " everyday practices, a n d even i n stitutions — economic, educational, technological, a n d political. The early anthropologists insisted it was, fundamentally, beliefs, " w o r l d , v i e w s , " a n d special constructions of reality. In the last analysis, that is what constitutes the hallmark of civilizations, i n Wallerstein's v i e w , or of true globalization, i n Robertson's work, A n d here w e seem a l o n g w a y f r o m convergence. M y t h i r d example, then, is d r a w n f r o m the Satanic Verses — the author, the book, the reception, the battle ikies that have been d r a w n about it. This case allows us to lay bare Just what is syncretizing, w h a t is globalizing, and what remains unconvergent i n our so-called global village! Let us e m p l o y Robertson's Weberian device of ideal types, A French historian (Chaunu) has used the term univers cloisonnée to describe the cultural condition of the globe before the formation of a western-hegemonic w o r l d system. W h i l e one can. argue that there were more connections a n d linkages crossing the mosaic pieces of culturally distinctive regions than this term conveys (and I argue this i n m y book, Before European Hegemony: The World System A.D. 1250¬ 1350), the basic point is w e l l taken. N o w , i n such a w o r l d , the recent cause célèbre c o u l d not have H a p pened, Salman Rushdie w o u l d most probably have stayed w h e r e he was born — o n the Indian subcontinent. H e would, have written i n a language and genre of his region. A n d if he h a d w r i t t e n heresy, he w o u l d have been burned, at the stake (as happened, in. Europe), i m paled or halved, at the waist (if i n the M i d d l e East), or met w i t h whatever sad fate was traditional i n his region. Furthermore, he w o u l d have been aware of what he was d o i n g a n d the risk he was r u n n i n g — because he w o u l d have been addressing an audience of people w i t h i n his piece of the mosaic. M o r e o v e r , he w o u l d have emp l o y e d , albeit imaginatively a n d creatively, a genre of his cul-.ure. Thus, he w o u l d k n o w that he communicated, what he intended, .and his readers w o u l d k n o w w h a t he meant by.it. If indeed, he were a. renegade a n d an. exile — a n d earlier w o r l d history contains not a few of these, individuals w h o left their original culture, adopted the w a y s of others, sometimes rose to prominence i n their n e w cultures — he might have chosen to write a book, even a brutally sarcastic one, 134

I N T E R R O G A T I N G THEORIES OF T H E G L O B A L about his culture of origin. But i n a cloissoneed universe, there is almost no w a y his w o r k could have become k n o w n in the place he left. That d i d not happen. N o r d i d its opposite. A t the other extreme of globalization is .an ideal type of instantaneous, indiscriminate .and complete diffusion, of all cultural products, w i t h no need for intermediate interpretation. W e are still very far f r o m that. Rather, w h a t w e are experiencing is r a p i d , incomplete and h i g h ly differentiated flows i n global transmission. W e have a globalizing but not necessarily homogeneous culture. W h i l e i n the last analysis, w e think that this is good, enriching, and generative, we have not f i g u r e d out h o w to live w i t h the dilemmas it creates. Clearly, w e w i l l need a lot of verstehen and w i l l have to develop m u c h more tolerance for the w o r l d views of others, no matter h o w offensive w e f i n d them. Communications have irretrievably shattered the cloissoneed character of cultural boundaries; there is. no longer a n y place to hide. Wallerstein sees w i t h radical v i s i o n the equally abhorrent choices — between a universalism based u p o n xenophobia and a globalization, based u p o n a p a r a l y z i n g cultural relativism. I think, however, that a t h i r d w a y is conceivable, at least romantically, namely: m u t u a l awareness, sensitivity a n d , if not acceptance, an attempt to interpret a n d evaluate the beliefs and acts of others on their o w n , not our, terms, This need not lead to bland cultural relativism. It need not Imply no values. O n e could still believe and prefer, one c o u l d choose to associate or disassociate, but one w o u l d have to learn to grant to the other his/her contextual wholeness. If w e cannot go back to ignorance, w e must move ahead to understanding. Let us return to the Rushdie case. What, indeed, happened? I have been insisting to m y arm-chair theorist friends that, before pontificati n g o n the case, they read i n f u l l not only the Satanic Verses (rather than just the offensive excerpts) but some of his earlier w o r k s , especially Midnight's Children. For here is a satirist of rapier w i t , for w h o m n o t h i n g is sacred — neither M r s , Thatcher, w h o m he calls throughout M r s . Torture; nor the anglophile Indian poseur (who i n the n o v e l turns into, or believes he has turned into, the devil); nor the Indian p o p - m o v i e star (who play gods so often that he becomes, or thinks he has become, the good angel, G a b r i e l , transmitting G o d ' s message to M o h a m m e d ) ; nor even the inviolate i m m u t a b i l i t y of the K o r a n . (It r e m i n d s one of P o s t - D a r w i n discussions i n the west about " w h o wrote the B i b l e " and of the so-called " m o n k e y " trial.) In the course of this James-Joycean-novel of puns a n d broadside 135

CULTURE, GLOBALIZATION A N D THE WORLD-SYSTEM hilarity, of dream, sequences narrated conventionally a n d of bizarre " l i f e " sequences narrated fantastically, one grasps immediately that the genre is pure post-modern West, In its intent as veiled social criticism, the n o v e l descends linearly f r o m Rabelais a n d Swift. Yet it uses the raw matter u p o n w h i c h all writers must d r a w — his o w n experiences, his o w n stream of consciousness associations, his o w n " c u l t u r e , " w h i c h , i n this case, is Islamic and eastern, as w e l l as British and cosmopolitan. The audience i t addresses — the English-speaking literati — recognizes the genre but not a large part of the " c u l t u r e . " The people w h o c o u l d understand the cultural content cannot recognize the genre. A s w e have noted, i n the univers cloissonnee, these t w o culture zones w o u l d have been buffered b y distance a n d communication barriers. But today's global village offers f e w such protections. Rather, n e w s of Rushdie's n o v e l reaches M u s l i m bilinguals w h o perceive it as sacrilegeous ;— w h i c h it clearly is. They report this to their state;, officials, perhaps excerpting and translating the passages they f i n d most offensive. The w o r k is b a n n e d here and there (and not only i n M u s l i m countries), is c o n d e m n e d , a n d finally, the head of a n Islamic state condemns jnot just the book but the author. Inter alia, h u n d r e d s of M u s l i m s i n N e w Y o r k demonstrate i n front of Barnes a n d N o b l e bookstore a n d i n front of V i k i n g publishers, whose office receives a b o m b threat. (Up the street, fundamentalist Christians are picketing The Last Temptation of Christ.) Nor is the response of western writers m u c h more enlightened. Rallies are h e l d a n d famous authors declare their fealty to freedom of expression. (Do they deplore western censorship? Do- they notice it?) They passionately express their condemnation of K h o m e i n i ' s " b a r b a r i s m . " Talk of trade retaliation surfaces. (So far, I haven't heard " N u k e 'em.") V i r t u a l l y none of these authors has read the book. But even if they were to read it, w i l l they ever be able to understand the response of a believing M u s l i m to this attack on a most fundamental tenet of the religion, the pristine God-givenness of the K o r a n , its i m mutability, a n d M o h a m m e d as p u r e m e d i u m for its transmission? C a n they be offended b y an attack on w h a t they don't believe? This real event i n such recent m e m o r y (Rushdie is still i n h i d i n g and the book is selling like hot-cakes) can stand as a very concrete i n stance of how globalized a n d yet how unglobalized C U L T U R E has become. H o w one analyzes w h a t happened i n t'Affaire Rushdie, .and h o w one resolves the real conflict i n v o l v e d i n it can give some hints

I N T E R R O G A T I N G THEORIES OF T H E G L O B A L about a deeper theory of global culture than w e n o w have, and h o w , i n g r o u n d e d fashion, w e s h o u l d be l o o k i n g for it.

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BARBARA ABOU-EL-HAJ

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U L F H A M N E R Z HAS CHARACTERIZED AS ETHNOCENTRIC (i WOULD say Eurocentric) current theorizations w h i c h conceive art emerging global culture u n f o l d i n g asymmetrically i n homogenized or corrupt forms generalized f r o m west to east, f r o m n o r t h to south. Eurocentric is a relatively m i l d expression we apply to comparative studies w h i c h fall short of their intentions because i n fact they perpetuate o l d regimes of t h i n k i n g , continue into a hegemonic future the colonial past .and imperialist present. The predicted scenarios, for a homogen i z e d or corrupt global culture, look like contemporary a n d deceptively m i l d e r versions of their colonial predecessor, the quasi-scientific theory of vanishing races incapable of competing w i t h E u r o p e an, civilization, d o o m e d to extinction, w h i c h justified efforts to assimilate or remove a n d finally to annihilate indigenous peoples. In their m o d e r n forms a n d systematizing language, theories of homogenization a n d c o r r u p t i o n offer their h u m a n subjects as little alternative to massive subordination as was offered native A m e r i c a n s w h o , w h e n not k i l l e d outright, were " p r o t e c t e d " by the Indian R e m o v a l A c t of 1830. A n associated theory predicated the rise of the West u p o n the 1

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decline of the East, a " m o d e l of cultural study crystallized i n the early colonial p e r i o d , 1750-1850" for the Orient and v e r y m u c h alive a m o n g leading " o r i e n t a l i s t s . " In place of homogenization a n d corruption, H a n n e r z offers a set of energizing variables: not global cultural p r o d u c t i o n / local reproduction, but reciprocity a n d synthesis, premised on the transforming nature of m u t u a l cultural " f l o w s . " This formulation has a clear advantage in its capacity to decenter the p o w e r f u l core-periphery f o r m u l a w h i c h makes of world-systems i n practice, if not in theory, a one-way penetration f r o m center to m a r g i n , f r o m strong to w e a k , f r o m aggressive to passive and concentrates analytic energy o n the global over thé local. In the older practice culture is reflexive of unequal power; relations operating i n the sphere of ideology. D o m i nant culture is generated by groups whose concentration of p o w e r allows them to structure core a n d peripheral relations in favor of themselves and at the expense of those w h o are their economic, political a n d social objects. In the alternative suggested b y H a n n e r z a n d argued b y I m m a n u e l Wallerstein, culture is an arena for struggle a n d transformation.

Eurocentrism l u r k i n the unequal attention given to the local stake i n the reception a n d alliance w i t h global p o w e r brokers, i n strategies for a hierarchical distribution of p o w e r i n local arenas m a r k e d as m u c h by local class divisions as by international regimes of power. Seemingly clear cases of local ambitions shaped b y global interests can be p r o f o u n d l y local i n their formation, for example nationalism, a E u r o p e a n creation and a E u r o p e a n import. A p p e a l s to global political culture, i n the f o r m of nationalism and i n the context of decolonization, served particularly w e l l to consolidate for local elites positions of p o w e r vacated b y the colonial predecessors w i t h w h o m they were formerly allied. In these instances, locally-formed hierarchies were the essential condition for colonial a n d post-colonial regimes so often orchestrated b y the same groups. F r o m a western perspective, the cultural spheres of these political a n d economic processes i n education, i n shaping nationalizing histories, seem to epitomize a subordination of local to global culture. Perhaps the more significant pattern is the appropriation of global cultural forms because they suit so w e l l the ambitions of local elites. U l f H a n n e r z has described parallel agendas i n peripheral states to "construct t w o (contradictory) cultures: the one of homogenization, as citizens w i t h a coherent national identity; the other as differences, especially t h r o u g h education, to fit categories of i n d i v i d u a l s into different slots in. the structure of production a n d r e p r o d u c t i o n , " what I m m a n u e l Wallerstein called dialectic and schizophrenia. A n instructive case of globally f o r m e d but locally p r o d u c e d historical culture can be observed i n near Eastern historiography where Orientalist paradigms have been reproduced not only by those trained i n E u r o p e and the U n i t e d States, but also in. M i d d l e Eastern universities. A generation of scholars, i n c l u d i n g Turks, has created, modernist, a n d by definition secular, national histories predicated, on the virtual exclusion of four to five h u n d r e d years of O t t o m a n history. Clearly these respond, to global patterns, to the o v e r w h e l m i n g historical paradigm, of western imperialism:: modernization theory. In this local f o r m modernity Is assimilated to the secular nation state. The O t t o m a n multi-ethnic, multi-regional empire is conceived only i n its regressive, theocratic f o r m , shaped b y centuries of European fear a n d competition. N e v e r is it conceived as a defeated alternative (transformed to be sure) to that European nation-state m o d e l whose current d o m i n a t i o n of local political systems appears inevitable only in. retrospect, and in. 1989-1990 increasingly transitional as a political

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Yet reciprocity a n d synthesis seem also m i l d , suggest a capacity for equal exchanges i n a w o r l d r i d d l e d w i t h unequal exchanges. In Gramsci's terms, w e might argue that the parameters of consensus, of hegemony, are never guaranteed, but p r o f o u n d l y volatile, charged f r o m both directions i n a tense exchange between manipulators and their intended objects, eloquently addressed by Stuart H a l l i n the o p e n i n g essays. Yet, h o w are w e to reconcile this volatility w i t h the apparent p o w e r of c u l t u r a l forms to serve so p r o d i g i o u s l y the capacity of dominant groups to reproduce themselves o n their o w n terms, to mobilize their v i s i o n into national and even global c u l t u r a l norms? The tendency to emphasize the center in cultural analyses is prem i s e d o n the core-periphery m o d e l a n d its analyses of visible a n d p r o f o u n d l y u n e q u a l distribution of material and cultural p o w e r between centers where industrial a n d financial capital are concentrated and peripheries where they are not. In this m o d e l the remnants of

dan," Art Journal (Depictions of the Dispossessed, ed. C. F. Klein), 49 (1990)119-24. P. Gran, Islamic Roots of Capitalism, Egypt, 1760-1840 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1979) x l , and, of course, E. Said, Orientalism (New York: Penguin, 1978). 2

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formation. ' Because the nation-state has been the political f o r m u n d e r w h i c h international capital expanded, it does not f o l l o w that this political f o r m a n d its c u l t u r a l expression arise only f r o m the center nor that it w o u l d have achieved its massive success w i t h o u t a corresponding local formation of merchant capital to receive global industrial and f i nancial capital. S i m i l a r l y c u l t u r a l forms w h i c h help to shape capitalist social relations arise also i n the periphery. " T h e non-Western regions collaborating i n the larger social transformation of the late eighteenth century h a d indigenous roots for their o w n m o d e r n capitalist cultures, f o r m e d through processes of indigenous struggle a n d in some f o r m of struggle w i t h the European, part of the system, I am convinced that, properly understood, the industrial revolution was a global event, a n d I question the strong tradition i n the West to ass u m e a proprietary relationship to it." In this formulation, class d i visions occupy the center not the periphery and w h e n w e ask whose interests are served by the wholesale exclusion of a half m i l l e n n i u m of O t t o m a n rule, w e m a y answer perhaps the v e r y same post-colonial architects of m o d e r n , M i d d l e Eastern nation-states whose sources of p o w e r were f o r m e d indigenously a n d locally, i n l a n d and i n merchant capital.

States and U n i t e d K i n g d o m , w h o indeed controls wealth? Between west a n d east, north .and south, w h o are the debtors a n d w h o the debtees? G l o b a l capital w o r k s precisely across national frontiers, its boundaries formed by an international division of labor. In what relation does the underclass of N e w Y o r k C i t y stand to that of Rio? The l o n g progression of binary oppositions, divorced over time f r o m their colonial a n d i m p e r i a l roots, even w h e n d e p r i v e d of their spatial image, don't seem adequate to the task of p r o v i d i n g descriptive or analytic p o w e r to fluid and volatile spheres of activity. If w e cannot phrase an alternative, if an adequate language eludes us, h o w can w e visualize a comparative theorization of culture(s)?

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Who is central and who peripheral? O u r ambition to do equal justice to global .and local, is l i m i t e d at the outset b y o u r failure to generate a comparative language beyond, the set of tidy binaries w h i c h reproduce the global regime i n the v e r y attempt to eviscerate it: center/periphery, core/periphery, western/non-western, developed/ developing, etc. The periphery is, in. H a n n e r z ' s phrase, " b y no means a defense-less v i c t i m " ; rather it has powerfully shaped the center, sweats f r o m its pores, In truth the centers are somehow difficult to locate, to isolate. They are not c o n cordant w i t h national or even hemispheric boundaries. In the U n i t e d 1

R.A. Abou-EI-Haj, "The Uses of the Past. Recent Arab Historiography of Ottoman Rule," International Journal of Middle East Studies, 1.4 (1982). Maxime Rodinson, Islam and Capitalism, Eng. trans. B, Pearce (New York: Penguin, 1973) 118-37. From Gran's introduction to his study of Egyptian .cultural and material life, 1760-1840, p. xii. 3

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Global/local is a qualitative step f o r w a r d . It suggests no charged hierarchical divisions, is less concordant w i t h spatial boundaries or geographical regions, is capable of encompassing u n e q u a l distribution within as w e l l as between national and regional entitles. In H a n nerz's formulation, cultures freely shape syntheses between the global and the local, " t h o u g h always understood as themselves shaped by the international division of labor." Synthesis suggests reciprocal transformations, but abstractly, passively, a n d i n this respect w e m a y remain not too distant f r o m the core-periphery m o d e l w i t h its i m p l i c i t treatment of the " t h i r d w o r l d " as receiver, overw h e l m e d by the authority, the sheer wealth of metropolitan culture distributed through the mass m e d i a apparatus of global technology. H a n n e r z resists this passive characterization as an "Imaginary byproduct of the awakening to global realities of many of us inhabitants of the center." So his scenario gives to local culture the capacity not o n l y to take, but to give, to synthesize, to transform. H o w cultural transformations may shape material transformations receives little attention, although his " m o v e m e n t s " category may be the space for this discussion. The "international division of l a b o r " just begins to touch u p o n the horrific forms of subordination imposed b y unequal exchanges, material, political, cultural. Sweat-shop labor i n north A f r i c a and east Los Angeles transgress spatial divisions. T o describe processes of cultural synthesis a n d transformation H a n n e r z offers " c r e o l i z a t i o n , " a " c o r r u p t m e t a p h o r " n o w m a i n streamed top d o w n to describe a true cultural dialectic, its former racist baggage of debasement subverted. For those of us outside anthropological and sociological discourse, the after-image lingers uncomfortably. Beyond our p r i m a r y categories, global/local, w e have yet to f i n d a language capable of describing equal exchange i n a 143

CULTURE, GLOBALIZATION A N D THE WORLD-SYSTEM w o r l d of u n e q u a l exchanges. Is o u r vocabulary so i m p o v e r i s h e d because there is no such t h i n g to be described, or because w e have such difficulty envisaging it?

6. III. Specificity and Culture

M A U R E E N TURIM

I BEGIN WITH A QUESTION: DOES CULTURAL HEGEMONY SIMPLY follow f r o m , overlap w i t h , a n d m i m i c economic a n d political d o m i n a tion? If so, then the study of culture w o u l d reveal an exceedingly simple narrative, an illustration of activities enacted i n these other spheres alone. If the current economic moment is one of globalization, culture w o u l d s i m p l y follow that pattern, emanating f r o m those areas w h i c h control the rest of the w o r l d , H o w e v e r , i n s t u d y i n g c u l ture, I f i n d the situation far more complex, I a m r e m i n d e d of a passage i n a particular cinematic text, N a g i s a Oshima's Merry Christmas, Mr. Lawrence u p o n w h i c h I have w o r k e d , a n d its relationship to a source text, Lawrence V a n D e r Post's The Sower and the Seed. A character i n the novel, Jack Celliers, is portrayed as t h i n k i n g : H e felt that the first necessity i n life was to make the universal specific, the general particular, the collective i n d i v i d u a l a n d what was unconscious in us conscious. This is a conclusion that Celliers arrives at after an emotionally devastating personal crisis. H e is A f r i k a a n s , attending a British-style boys' school w h e r e his hunchback younger brother is also enrolled. D u e to the conformity exiged b y this context, he fails to defend his deformed brother f r o m harassment. This failure to act precipitates an unsettling of the self that permeates the rest of the novel. W h i l e I don't subscribe to the oppositions offered i n the quoted passage, I a m struck by its will towards transformation, evidenced i n the desire to make the universal specific. I cite it to raise basic questions about o u r patterns of logic, o u r w a y s of thinking. Are they dialectic? Do they m o v e b e y o n d the dialectic? D o they Incorporate the

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specific a n d multiplicity that feminist criticism, particularly, has introd u c e d into o u r discourse? These seem to be v e r y important questions i n this context, ones that call for anti-totalizing theories. The models that have been dealt w i t h by the essays i n this v o l u m e are largely econocentric. The debate is over the f o r m market i m p e r a tive takes. It has not been o n the role the market imperative has i n the p r o d u c t i o n and reception of culture. One of the problems for me has been the absence of images, the absence of s o m i d i n addressing this 'throughout the conference. W e have hermetically sealed o u r discourse off from, the v e r y objects and effects that w e are meant to be considering. I want, therefore, i n the rest of this intervention, to introduce some specific examples to begin a discussion of h o w the p r o d u c t i o n of culture needs to be analyzed. One comes f r o m the A c a d e m y A w a r d s presentation of 1989. The A c a d e m y A w a r d s conjoin two industries, two parts of culture p r o duction, television and. the film industry, that are increasingly inter-, 'twined. M o r e o v e r , this time, immense attention was devoted to the fact that the A c a d e m y A w a r d s presentation itself was distributed b y satellite and exhibited globally. It was continually discussed: this was on satellite and ninety-one countries were receiving it, either directly or b y delay (at w h i c h point it w o u l d be translated). The spectators w o u l d be counted i n the billions.

nihilate remnants of a specifically Canadian culture. But the point is that the A c a d e m y A w a r d s give us one w a y of l o o k i n g at the A m e r i can d o m i n a t i o n of culture .in the w o r l d right n o w , a moment i n w h i c h certain myths continue to circulate even if this process is filled w i t h p u z z l i n g uncertainties. A second example. Early i n 1989, the French government presented a position paper i n w h i c h the M i n i s t e r of Culture, Jack L a n g , res p o n d e d to the fact that currently two thirds of the box office receipts i n France were going to A m e r i c a n films. O v e r French f i l m history there have been governmental controls and even quotas o n the i m portation of foreign films meant to stop this A m e r i c a n domination; a i m i n g only at the n u m b e r of films screened, these controls can not address the w a y A m e r i c a n films sell more tickets. Further attempts must be made to rescue the European f i l m industry. W e have to ask, if it is necessary to intervene to rescue the European f i l m industry, what is going on i n the rest of the w o r l d ? Does this signal the end of French culture or G e r m a n culture?

Early o n , however, there was a disjuncture i n the manner this text self-consciously signalled the global reception of culture. Comedienne L i l y T o m l i n came center stage after the first lavish a n d grotesque p r o d u c t i o n n u m b e r to joke about just this phenomenon, even as she presented it. She said, "Imagine the entire w o r l d t r y i n g to figure out what that m e a n t . " H e r moment of irony, reflexivity and contradiction points out w h a t w e need to study i n what w e might call dominant global culture. W e k n o w culture is being p r o d u c e d for global consumption, b u t w e don't k n o w w h a t the w o r l d makes of w h a t it receives a n d w e can not assume inherent meanings, whatever w e might take those to mean. C u l t u r e is m a r k e d b y a k i n d of p o l y v a lence of meaning, a kind, of multiplicity that is highly contextual a n d even internally contused. K n o w i n g the site a n d means of p r o d u c t i o n and the manner of distribution w i l l not necessarily reveal h o w the texts of culture are consumed. There is a lot more to say about the awards, not the least of w h i c h is to highlight the award, to the N a t i o n a l F i l m Board of Canada at the very moment that the U.S.-Canadian trade agreements threaten to an146

A look at a f i l m like W i m Wender's Paris, Texas m i g h t lead us to say not yet. It was made by a G e r m a n director w i t h A m e r i c a n money and distributed by A m e r i c a n firms, but offers a European sensibility on an A m e r i c a n subject. In terms of the dichotomy between financial investment and profit o n one h a n d and notions of national identity and national discourses, y o u can have incredible splits. Y o u can have A m e r i c a marketing Europe back to Europe. The same is true of every other country. W e have a w o r l d system, but the lines of p o w e r and influence change direction d e p e n d i n g on what aspect of production or reception are under scrutiny; the p r o d u c t i o n of meanings continues to confuse. W e can not s i m p l y assume w e k n o w the vectors shaped b y articulations. M y t h i r d illustration: a short article i n an advertising supplement t o ; t h e New York Times (March 26, 1989) b y a Japanese musician R i u i c h i Sakamoto. H e argues that there are various trade imbalances, one to w h i c h he is subject. N o one i n A m e r i c a is b u y i n g foreign c u l ture, w h i l e Japanese people b u y A m e r i c a n music all the time. Sakamoto is exaggerating and moreover his argument is being positioned ideologically i n Japanese advertising against trade regulations; not only is his music w e l l k n o w n i n the U.S., but (to return to the Academ y A w a r d s ) he w o n an Oscar for his score for The Last Emperor and became internationally k n o w n as the star of Merry Christmas, Mr, Lawrence, Yet there is something to his complaint; the culture indus147

CULTURE, .GLOBALIZATION A N D THE WORLD-SYSTEM tries i n the U n i t e d States are not suffering on the w o r l d market. They are amongst the most productive a n d rich industries that the U . S . have. Yet increasingly, they are o w n e d by Japanese " p a r e n t " concerns or are dependent o n Japanese investors. A s somebody w h o studies culture, the significance of these changes is all very apparent to me. Y e t global economic models leave us almost bereft of a methodology for approaching the i n d i v i d u a l w o r k s themselves. Certainly, in, l o o k i n g at something like Merry Christmas, Mr. Lawrence w e must consider that it is a f i l m made for the global market. It's m a d e w i t h N e w Zealand a n d British money for international distribution. Its Japanese director couldn't f i n d Japanese m o n e y w i l l i n g to back h i m . Y e t the strategy of the f i l m is to tell the enemy's story, i n this case, the enemy f r o m W o r l d W a r n , as embodied i n the British a n d South, A f r i c a n characters. It seeks to share i n the manner i n w h i c h they v i e w e d the Japanese. This serves a debate about language, about the psyche a n d about identity, articulated a r o u n d the trope of homosexuality a n d homosocial bonds. T w o rock stars play the lead roles, R i u i c h i Sakamoto and D a v i d B o w i e . This juxtaposition, this placement of contemporary stars into historical personas plays out w i t h grand theatricality a conflict of identity and sexual attraction u n d e r l y i n g absolute conflict. The Japanese c o m m a n d accuses Celliers (Bowie) of willfulness; his crime is assertion of the self. H i s crime is not his being the enemy, not his taking of British commands, but rather a willful, disobedience at a l l points of c o m m a n d . Because of that, the f i l m makes a v e r y critical incursion into Japanese culture, where the projection of a self a n d a w i l l remains culturally dangerous. Its readings elsewhere i,might be quite different; I have heard it read i n the U.S. as Japanese cultural justification of their w a r effort because a British officer forgives his c o n d e m n e d former captor after the war, Contradictory readings, unclear meanings, patterns of investment sometimes inverse to identities expressed a n d the nagging uncertainties of cultural reception — all combine to create a distortion to the m a p w e m i g h t attempt to d r a w of o u r global culture. M y examples, m y arguments, are meant as questions.

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6. IV. The Global, the Urban, and the World

ANTHONY

KING

WHAT CONTRIBUTIONS C A N THESE VARIOUS T H E O R I Z A T I O N S O F "the world, as a single p l a c e " make t o w a r d the understanding of contemporary c u l t u r a l practices a n d of cultural transformations i n the contemporary w o r l d ? In attempting to answer this question, I want to address the topic of " c u l t u r e , globalization and the w o r l d - s y s t e m " i n relation to three themes. First, i n regard to transformations i n the built environment, i n architecture, i n the physical and spatial f o r m of cities, a n d the meaning a n d significance of these changes, at a global scale; second, i n relation to the views expressed i n the p r i n c i p a l papers here concerning the significance of the nation-state in, the p r o d u c t i o n of culture and the development of national cultures and identities. Finally, I want to make a few observations about the implications of globalization theory a n d the world-systems perspective for the study of c u l tural practice, .and especially, the understanding of cultures on a global scale. In the first instance, it w o u l d seem that a great deal might be learnt, a n d m a n y of the abstract theorizations aired here could be operationalized a n d tested b y s t u d y i n g certain aspects of the material world, as they have been physically a n d spatially produced and expressed. O f course, this assumes that there is indeed an objective,

CULTURE, G L O B A L I Z A T I O N A N D T H E W O R L D - S Y S T E M " r e a l " material w o r l d w h i c h exists independently of the discourses w h i c h are used to represent it. For people w i t h an interest i n architecture, i n b u i l d i n g a n d u r b a n f o r m , phrases used i n o u r debates such as constructions of ethnicity, concrete cultural practices, ideas grounded i n notions of the class subject, or discussions about the erosion or rebuilding of national identities, have an i m m e d i a c y a n d p h y s i c a l referent w h i c h p r o m p t m e to start l o o k i n g for their v i s u a l and spatial representation. Let me take some ideas from, the m a n y offered b y the p r i n c i p a l contributors to this s y m p o s i u m a n d illustrate more precisely w h a t I mean, Stuart H a l l discusses at length, the topic of " o l d and n e w identities" particularly w i t h reference to E n g l a n d , though, m a n y of his i n sights are, of course, equally applicable elsewhere. This is especially the case i n relation to the conditions creating the o l d collective social identities of class, region, gender, or race, as w e l l as the "distinctive ethnic identity of Englishness." H e also addressed the n e w conditions of international interdependence, national economic decline, international labor migration, a n d the " d e c l i n e of the masculine g a z e " w h i c h are contributing to these n e w identities. Yet these transformations i n subjectivity do not occur i n a spatial v a c u u m , nor on an environmental tabula rasa. The o l d identities of class, region, gender, nation — of the whole place of Britain i n the old, nineteenth century international division of labor — are massively and, monumentally inscribed o n the English landscape, in, its cities, its politically p r o d u c e d house forms, its socially and culturally significant distinctions between " t o w n " a n d " c o u n t r y " a n d the socially constructed terminology a n d mental .images i n which, 'these not-so-subtle distinctions are w r i t t e n — " c o u n t r y h o u s e , " " c o u n c i l estate," " t o w e r b l o c k , " " i n n e r c i t y . " The material w o r l d constructs the mental, a n d 'the mental, the material. Cultures are constituted i n space a n d u n d e r specific economic and social conditions: they are physically a n d spatially .as. w e l l as socially constructed, whether i n regard to the economic basis of people's lives, the regions a n d places they inhabit, the degrees of segregation between them, the symbolic meanings of the w o r l d they create, the w a y they represent themselves through d w e l l i n g s , or the v i s u a l markers they use to c o m m u nicate meaning. These are a l l part of what B o u r d i e u refers to as the general habitus, a system of dispositions, a w a y of b e i n g , Built 1

I N T E R R O G A T I N G THEORIES OF T H E G L O B A L environments a n d space are more than a " m e r e representation of social o r d e r " or a " m e r e e n v i r o n m e n t " i n w h i c h social relations and action takes place; physical a n d spatial form, actually constitute as well, as represent social and cultural existence: society is to a very large extent constituted t h r o u g h the buildings a n d spaces it creates, In. .any discussion about identities, the built environment of space .and place is a crucial, critical factor w h i c h both inhibits as w e l l as facilitates the construction of n e w i n d i v i d u a l as w e l l as social identities. O r w e may take one of the questions posed, by I m m a n u e l Wallerstein: h o w are boundaries d r a w n r o u n d specific cultures? " B o u n d a r i e s " are constantly being d r a w n r o u n d cultures, and sub-cultures, i n terms of p o w e r , economic, political or social; territorial markers establish specific domains, whether laid d o w n b y the state, the market, b y ethnic groups, or b y people w h o are inside, or outside. C u l t u r a l insignia can be v i s u a l or spatial, static or carried, around. T h i r d , w e m i g h t take a suggestion made b y U l f H a n n e r z , that w e lack, sufficient scenarios for conceptualizing the processes of globalization. If w e take globalization to refer to " t h e processes b y w h i c h the w o r l d becomes a single p l a c e " or " t h e consciousness of the globe as s u c h " then it s h o u l d not be difficult to f i n d examples of h o w the transnationalization of capital is. changing the social organization of space a n d f o r m o n a global scale. R o l a n d Robertson has suggested that w h i l s t concepts, of the w o r l d or global economy are easy enough to demonstrate, notions of the w o r l d or global culture are less so. Yet i n the nineteenth century, the gardens of the u r b a n w o r k i n g class l i v i n g in c r a m p e d r o w s of industrial h o u s i n g i n Britain w e r e i n the tea plantations of 'India or the sugar estates of 'the West Indies. "This is a single space economy and a single c u l t u r a l landscape, a n d needs to be examined as s u c h . 2

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University Press, 1977) 214. L. Prior, "The architecture of the hospital: a study of spatial organization .and medical knowledge," British Journal of Sociology 39 (1) (1988):86-113. * See Anthony King. "Architecture, Capital and the Globalization of Culture," in. Global Culture. Nationalism, Globalization and. Modernity, ed. Mike Featherstone (London, Newbury Park, New Delhi: Sage, 1990):397-411. See "Buildings, architecture and the new international division of labor,"in Anthony D. King,' Urbanism, Colonialism and the World-Economy (London .and New York: Routledge, 1990):130-149. 1

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Pierre: Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge 150

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C U L T U R E , G L O B A L I Z A T I O N AN1 T H E W O R L D - S Y S T E M Elsewhere, H a n n e r z writes that, inert isingly, w e f i n d cultural differences w i t h i n societies rather than b e t /een them. I w o u l d take this further to suggest that if there is a " g l o b J c u l t u r e " emerging it is the culture of contemporary post- (or eve.... i n places, pre-) industrial capitalist: u r b a n i s m ; this m a y be what Stuart H a l l calls " g l o b a l mass c u l t u r e " or rather, " g l o b a l u r b a n i t y " c haracteristic of 'the contemporary w o r l d city. It is neither rraiisnatk aal n o r international, each of w h i c h implies relations either between or across nations, but is global i n Robertson's sense of " t h e w o r l d becoming a single p l a c e . " N o r a m I referring here to Wallerstein's elite w l > believe they live i n a w o r l d culture. I refer rather to the culture, botr material, social a n d s y m b o l ic, w h i c h enables an increasing n u m l er of scientists, academics, artists a n d other elites (and perhaps also a less p r i v i l e g e d population) of w i d e l y different nationalities, languages, ethnicities and races to communicate more easily w i t h each otl er than w i t h others of their o w n ethnic or national b a c k g r o u n d i n t le less globalized regions of their society. Of course, such a " g l o b a l u l t u r e " c o u l d also be called another form of localism. L e t me t u r n to the subject of nation., i t y and of national cultures and. identities, all of w h i c h have been mentioned i n the previous papers. T w o or three of the contributors have d r a w n attention to a n d even p r i v i l e g e d the role of the state as the principal " o r g a n i z e r " of culture: it is also w o r t h m e n t i o n i n g that w h i l e H a n n e r z notes a strengthening^ of national identity o n the periphery, H . i l l points to its erosion at the core. Yet if, as Wallerstein suggests, the nation-state is the m a i n force behind, "state organized c u l t u r e , " i n the form of the w h o l e apparatus of museums, educational systems, national archives, art galleries a n d the rest, w h y are these a l l so m u c h a l i i a? (This, of course, Is a relative statement). W h a t is it that account for their initial conception? There are clearly other p o w e r f u l forces rganizing " o f f i c i a l " cultures apart f r o m the nation-state, just as there are p o w e r f u l forces organizi n g a n d influencing " u n o f f i c i a l " or " p u b l i c cultures." O n e insight into this question m i g h t be gained b y e x a m i n i n g the institutions and practices of w h a t I w o u l d term the international (or is it global?) professional sub-cultures, c. f museology, of architecture, or u r b a n p l a n n i n g and especially, the c rigin of their o w n , often, u n questioned, supranational ideologies. In general terms, these have developed not s i m p l y i n "the W e s t " but under the v e r y distinctive 1

1.5.2

I N T E R R O G A T I N G THEORIES OF T H E G L O B A L imperatives of a capitalist mode of production w h i c h has pre-empted global perceptions of " m o d e r n i t y . " A s R i c h a r d H a n d l e r has written: that most nation-states (and. many " m i n o r i t y g r o u p s " as well) n o w seek to objectify unique cultures for themselves; that they import Western (including anthropological) definitions of what culture is; that they import Western technical routines to manage their objectified cultures; that they promote their " c u l t u r a l selfi m a g e " internationally i n an effort-to w o o the economically c r u cial tourist trade; that, i n short, everyone wants to put (their) o w n culture i n (their) o w n museums — all this indicates that modernity has not only conquered the w o r l d , but has ushered i n a " p o s t m o d e r n " global society of objectified culture, pseudoevents and spectacles. 5

T h o u g h what is problematic i n H a n d l e r ' s comment here is his use of " m o d e r n i t y " to describe what, in. the majority of cases, is the product of the capitalist w o r l d - e c o n o m y . The extent to w h i c h states (or for that matter, towns a n d cities) do not have their o w n historical museu m s , d o not have self-conscious " c u l t u r a l p o l i c i e s , " do not have " h i s t o r i c a l l y - i n f o r m e d " conservation policies a n d , if i n the (sic) " n o n W e s t e r n " w o r l d , are not concerned about problems of " c u l t u r a l hom o g e n i z a t i o n , " " n a t i o n a l i d e n t i t y " a n d " W e s t e r n i z a t i o n , " is the most accurate a n d telling comment o n the uniqueness of their cultures a n d sub-cultures; the degree to w h i c h cultures are self-consciously " d i f ferent" is an indication of h o w m u c h they are the same. Let m e conclude b y addressing w h a t I see as some of the i m p l i c a tions of " g l o b a l i z a t i o n " for the development of n e w theoretical models for s t u d y i n g cultural p r o d u c t i o n on a global scale; for it w o u l d seem evident that globalization must make necessary totally n e w forms of knowledge i n m a n y different spheres. To do this, I w a n t to r e t u r n to Stuart H a l l ' s story f r o m Fanon's Black Skins, White

Richard Handler, "Heritage and Hegemony: Recent works on historic preservation and interpretation," Anthropological Quarterly, 60 (1987):137-41.1 .am indebted to Larry McGinn is for this reference. With regard to "global professionalism," the internationalization of the legal field under the conditions of contemporary capitalism, is discussed by Yves Dezalay, "The Big Bang and the Law: The internationalization and restructure:ion of the legal field," in Featherstone, 279-94. 5

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CULTURE, GLOBALIZATION A N D THE WORLD-SYSTEM Masks, on the discovery of identity, and to quote H a l l ' s comment: " t h e notion of two histories, one over here, one over there, never h a v i n g spoken to one another, never h a v i n g h a d any thing to do w i t h one .another, is s i m p l y not tenable any longer i n .an increasingly globalized w o r l d . " If this means, o n one h a n d , the w h o l e unearthing of b u r i e d histories, it also means, on the other, the development of some k i n d of c o m m o n conceptual language. It puts into question the entire set of labels, periodizations, categorizations w h i c h (generally i n a totally Eurocentric w a y ) " a r t , " "architecture," a n d " c u l t u r a l p r o d u c t i o n " are generally discussed. O f course, it is naive to assume that histories a n d cultures w h i c h contest representations of each other o n the basis of region, religion, gender, race, class, ethnicity or other criteria w o u l d ever have a c o m m o n conceptual vocabulary, or agreed set of categorizations. Yet it does assume the existence of some k i n d of theoretical arena i n w h i c h these contestations can take place. C u r r e n t conceptualizations such as those offered b y theories of globalization, the world-systéms perspective, postmodernism, post-colonialism, post-imperialism (all, incidentally, c o m i n g out of "the West") are offered as this arena, though they are also, of course, i n that arena themselves. Questions concerning the cultural effects of globalization, i n c l u d i n g the possibilities of a " g l o b a l c u l t u r e , " may suggest to some that this marks the e n d point of a long debate; it is evident f r o m the papers here that, on the contrary, it is rather the beginning.

6. V. Globalization, Totalization and the Discursive Field

JOHN TAGG

EVERYTHING BECAME DISCOURSE — PROVIDED WE C A N AGREE on this w o r d — that is to say, a system i n w h i c h the central signified, the o r i g i n a l or transcendental signified, is never absolutely present outside a system of differences. 1

Jacques D e r r i d a I have been asked to say something about the proliferation of photographies i n the context of this debate on " C u l t u r e , Globalization a n d the W o r l d - S y s t e m . " The p r o b l e m is that 1 have also been asked to be brief a n d this m a y impose o n w h a t I w a n t to say a certain negative tone: a refusal of a place i n the debate and of its mode of theorizing, w i t h o u t being able to go o n to construct i n detail the beginnings of other k i n d s of account. The difficulty is partly the present

Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1978) 280. 1

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CULTURE, GLOBALIZATION A N D THE WORLD-SYSTEM context, not o n l y this conference, but also the present state of the field of research w h i c h has h a r d l y b e g u n to p r o v i d e adequate materials for extensive accounts of the w o r l d - w i d e dissemination of photography. It is, i n d e e d , one of the great merits of today's debate that it directs o u r attention so forcefully to this need. .And yet, I would still be resistant to the v i e w that it is only empirical research that stands between us .and a comprehensive account. Quite b l u n t l y , I w o u l d suggest that the very desire for such an account is tied to notions of social totality and historiographical representation that are untenable. If w e .are to talk of global systems, then w e shall have to ask. whether concepts of globalization can be separated from theoretical totalizations. H e r e , it w o u l d seem that I am. i n agreement w i t h R o l a n d Robertson, mat it w o u l d 'be difficult to see as .anything but reductive a n d economistic Immanuel Wallerstein's injunction to w o r k against the " v e r y logical consequence" of "'the process of m a s k i n g the 'true existential situation," and "trace the actual development of the ' c u l t u r e ' . . . over time w i t h i n 'the historical system, w h i c h has g i v e n birth to this extensive .and confusing use of the concept of culture, the m o d e r n w o r l d system w h i c h is a capitalist w o r l d - e c o n o m y . " S u c h " l o g i c " seems to p u t us back, once more, i n the p r i m i t i v e architecture of the base .and superstructure m o d e l of the social w h o l e . N o matter h o w m a n y staircases a n d landings are inserted, we still f i n d ourselves t r u d g i n g u p and d o w n the same'metaphorical tenement, from, 'the ground-floor' shopfronts a n d w o r k s h o p s to the garrets i n the roof, w h e r e the painters and photographers of bohème always have their studios. The c o m m u n a r d s have not yet pierced, the walls a n d floors of this d w e l l i n g . The o n l y difference seems to be that the local storefront n o w opens o n a. great global, thoroughfare, b e y o n d even H a u s s mann's imagination. 'The vista is. expansive but, like Daguerre's diorama, its illusion of realism depends o n o u r identifying w i t h the imposed convention of its single, .fixed perspective. A s a representation of a social totality, it claims both too little a n d too m u c h for what it wishes to see as a determinant space: evacuating f r o m the " e c o n o m i c , " cultural practices that have been increasingly structural to it, a n d collapsing the political effectivity of material modes of p r o 2

Irruxtanuel Wallerstein, "Culture .as the IdeolGgieal tetteground of the Modem World-Systent" in Global Culture: Nationalism, Globalization and Modernity, ed. Mike Featherstone (London, Newbury Park and Delhi: Sage, 1991):35. 2

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duction of meaning through a reflectionist concept of representation. By contrast, I m i g h t agree w i t h R o l a n d Robertson that, far from being economically fixed and culturally masked, concepts of globalism, have no status outside the fields of discourse and practice that constitute them. B u t here, too, I w o u l d have to depart from the w a y the construction of a range of representations of globality seems to be thought of by Robertson as the effect or expression of a, real process of globalization, and even a " g l o b a l - h u m a n c o n d i t i o n , " l y i n g b e h i n d its " i m a g e s " a n d knowable, somehow, outside the processes of representation. Closely related to this is Robertson's c l a i m for his o w n position that "globalization theory contains the seed of an account as to why there are current i n t e l e c t u a l fashions of deconstruction, o n the one h a n d , .and postmodernist v i e w s concerning the 'confluence of everything w i t h everything else', on the o t h e r . " For all his conviction, that he is .also opposed to " w h a t poststructuralists .and postmodernists n o w call a ' g r a n d n a r r a t i v e ' , " Robertson w o u l d still seem to be privileging some sort of master knowledge: a metatheory that can, like Wallerstein's or Jameson's reading of M a r x i s m , account for a l l other types of theoretical production. F o r the so-called deconstructionists a n d postmodernists, one might reply that Robertson's notion of the world-as-a-single-place w o u l d seem to be caught i n precisely w h a t the Derridians might think of as a "metaphysics of presence," or the Lacanians as a projection, onto the isolated image of the planet of an Imaginary wholeness that represses the multiple and heterogeneous positioning effects of language. Put briefly, the w o r l d that is systematic or one place can never be a w o r l d of discourse: this w o r l d is never present to itself; it never constitutes an accomplished totality. 3

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Before I a m indicted of idealism, let me begin to trace out something of w h a t this, m i g h t mean i n relation to m y designated " a r e a " of photographies.* Perversely, perhaps, I can begin by conceding i m m e -

Roland, Robertson, "Globality, Global Culture .and Images of World Order," in Social Change and Modernity, ed. Hans. Haferkamp & Neil Smelser (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991). * Roland Robertson, "Globalization Theory and Civilizational Analysis," Comparative Civilizations Review, 17 (Fall 1987):22. * Robertson, "Globality, Global Culture and Images of World Order," 4. * For a, more argued treatment of some of the themes sketched here, see: John Tagg, The Burden of Representation, Essays on Photographies and Histories (London: Maanillan, and Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1988). 3

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diately the Importance of the perspectives opened b y a n understandi n g of the geographical expansion a n d increasing structural integration of capitalist production. This might have to be qualified to the extent that a neglect of specific local factors, such as national frameworks of patent and copyright l a w , w o u l d leave one unable to explain the different patterns of exploitation of the early daguerreotype a n d calotype processes or, indeed, the u n e v e n constraints o n the later development of national photographic a n d , subsequently, film industries. H o w e v e r , it is equally clear that a n a r r o w l y national focus w o u l d not allow one e v e n to pose the question of the extraordinarily r a p i d proliferation of photographie practices i n the nineteenth centur y , from the dissemination of daguerreotypes i n the 1840s, through the entrepreneurial phase of mass p r o d u c e d portraiture, to the fully corporate stage of d r y plate, camera a n d photofinishing industries of the 1880s a n d 90s.

be seen as determinant conditions of capitalist growth in themselves. W e might take as .another example the widespread emergence of instrumental photography, d r a w i n g on older practices of cartography a n d mechanical d r a w i n g and closely allied to the development of social, statistics a n d specialized forms of w r i t i n g . Its very function i m plied a. universal a n d objective technique that w o u l d transcend the limits of all existing notational languages. Yet, for it to w o r k , whan h a d to be set i n place were local discursive structures whose power! and effectivity were never given i n the technology, but h a d to be p r o ! duced a n d negotiated across a constellation of n e w apparatuses thaj] reconstituted the social as object of n e w disciplinary practices and technical discourses whose political character w a s elided. The institutionalization of record photography was not, therefore, just a matter of overcoming conservative resistance to a n e w technology, but a struggle over n e w languages .and techniques a n d the agencies that claimed to control them. The notion of evidentiality, on w h i c h instrumental photographs depended, was not already and unproblematically i n place: it h a d to be p r o d u c e d and institutionally sanctioned. A n d if, more generally, photography was taken to h o l d out the promise of an immediate a n d transparent means of representation, a universal and democratic language, and a tool for a universal science, then these claims, too, have to be treated as the specific, historical stakes of a politico-discursive struggle.

It is also true that this latter development created crucial conditions not only for the vast expansion of the photographic economy, but also for the transformation of its institutional structures, i n part as a reaction to the emergence of a broadly based, economically significant a n d aesthetically troubling sphere of amateur practice. To acknowledge this is not, however, to grant that we could ever derive the categories, constraints and motivations, or the cultural subordination, of amateur photographies f r o m the technological and economic shifts themselves. T o talk about the emergence of amateur photographies is to talk of the tracing out of n e w levels of meaning and practice, n e w hierarchies of cultural institutions, a n d n e w structures and codes of subjectivity: processes unquestionably b o u n d u p w i t h technological innovation a n d the restracturing of p r o d u c t i o n and marketing, but equally part of the m o m e n t u m of a reconstitution of the family, sexuality, consumption and leisure that plots a n e w economy of desire and domination. A n d if we can follow this overdetermined development across a radiating cultural geography, it is never as a simple u n r o l l i n g economically a n d technologically d r i v e n process. The formation of amateur photographies h a d always to be negotiated i n and across the fields of specific national structures, cultural conventions, languages, practices, constructed traditions a n d institutions. So far from, expressing 'the necessity of a. purely economic or even ideological process, amateur practices constituted a discursiveformationi n the fullest sense, saturated with relations of power, structuring new effects of pleasure, and generating n e w forms of subjectivity that have then to 1

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W h a t I a m arguing, against any totalizing or teleological v i e w , is that the meaning a n d value of photographic practices cannot be adjudicated outside specific language games. N o r can a single range of technical devices guarantee the unity of the field of photographic meanings, A. technology has no inherent value outside its. mobiliza- u tions i n specific discourses, practices, institutions a n d relations of jj power. Import: and status have to be produced and effectively institu- j/ tionalized and such institutionalizations do not describe a unified field or the w o r k i n g out of some essential causality. Even, as they interlink i n more or less extended chains, they are negotiated locally a n d discontinuously a n d are productive of value .and meaning. A n d it is on this same g r o u n d that they w o u l d have to be challenged. It is b e y o n d m y brief — a n d m y time — to pursue the consequences of this discursive .analysis for notions of a w o r l d or global culture. Returning to the models w i t h w h i c h I began, I might, h o w e v er, underline the following a w k w a r d points. In the first place, once one allows any effectivity to discursive practices i n constituting 159

CULTURE, GLOBALIZATION A N D THE WORLD-SYSTEM meaning and Identity a n d generating effects of p o w e r , then there is no longer any w a y of m v o k i n g another, determinant and exterior tier of " s o c i a l " explanation. But, beyond this, once one confronts the openness a n d indeterminacy of the relational a n d differential logic of the discursive field, then notions, of social totality have to be radically displaced. A s Ernesto Laclau and Chantal M o u f f e have argued:

7. The Global and the Specific: Reconciling Conflicting Theories of Culture

The incomplete character of every totality necessarily leads us to abandon, as. a terrain of .analysis, the premise of " s o c i e t y " as a sutured a n d self-defined totality. " S o c i e t y " is not a v a l i d object of discourse. There is n o single u n d e r l y i n g principle f i x i n g — and hence constituting — the w h o l e field of differences. 7

If the " s o c i a l " exists — a n d here w e might usefully substitute the " g l o b a l " — It is o n l y "as an effort to construct that°impossible object," b y a temporary a n d unstable domination of the field of discursivity, i m p o s i n g a partial fixity that w i l l be overflowed b y the articulation of n e w differences. There is n o e n d to this history. " W h o l e ness" cannot t h r o w d o w n its " c r a t c h e s " and walk, restored. W e have lost the guarantees of an immanent objective process, but 'that .very lack opens the w a y to the multiplication of forms of subversion a n d the imagination of n e w identities, i n w h i c h cultural strategies can no longer be contained i n a secondary role. 8

JANET WOLFF

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Ernesto Laclau & Chantal. Mouffe, Hegemony and SocMist Strategy. Towards a Radical Democratic Politics (London, Verso, 1985) 111, Ibid., 112 ' ^ Immanuel Wallerstein, " H i e Universal and the National. Can There Be Such a Thing as a World Culture?" in this volume. 8

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IT WAS A BRAVE A N D FAR-SIGHTED VISION THAT COLLECTED SUCH disparate scholars a n d perspectives i n the same s y m p o s i u m . Certainly, it was time that those interested i n the global dimensions of culture met together a n d began the process of learning f r o m one .another the theoretical developments a n d g r o w t h i n k n o w l e d g e w h i c h relate to this issue. World-systems theory, already e q u i p p e d to provide an account of the complex interconnectedness of the global system, particularly w i t h regard to its economic and political dimensions, has recently b e g u n to recognize the importance of culture i n these processes. G l o b a l i z a t i o n theories, w h i c h have generally p r i v i l e g e d culture (or at least a specific notion of " c u l t u r e " ) , seemed ready to benefit f r o m a better understanding of the u n d e r l y i n g social and material relations i n w h i c h culture is p r o d u c e d (and w h i c h it, i n turn, ( r e p r o duces). A n t h r o p o l o g i c a l theories of culture, rich i n those empirical i n vestigations w h i c h enable us to reject simplistic general theories, are w e l l placed, to combine ethnography w i t h a more wide-ranging understanding of the relations of culture and, society, center a n d periphery. A n d cultural theory, w h i c h includes recent developments i n art, film and literary criticism, as w e l l as cultural studies, has started to move away f r o m its earlier rather ethnocentric approach, and to investigate the global dimensions of cultural production and con1

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sumption. H e r e we: h a d representatives of each of these traditions closeted together for a day, .and w i l l i n g to listen a n d to reconsider these issues f r o m n e w points of v i e w . 1

T w o rather strange things occurred. In the first place, it appeared that there was general agreement a m o n g the three m a i n speakers at the conference. V a r i e d t h o u g h their contributions were, w h a t was never at issue were the fundamentally different (and perhaps i n c o m patible) theoretical positions on w h i c h they were based. I m m a n u e l Wallerstein's M a r x i s t perspective is obviously committed to the v i e w that relations of p r o d u c t i o n are p r i m a r y i n social process a n d social change. A l t h o u g h s u c h a v i e w can be m o d i f i e d to take account of the effectivify of culture (that is, it need not be a crude economic determinist model), it is not compatible w i t h an approach, such as that of Roland Robertson, w h i c h denies the p r i m a c y of the economic. Robertson's commitment is to a "voluntaristic w o r l d system t h e o r y " w h i c h stresses the 'independent dynamics of global culture' (independent, that is, f r o m polity a n d economy), a n d the cultural p l u r a l i s m of the m o d e m w o r l d system. H i s argument is that it is p r i m a r i l y consciousness of a n d response to globalization w h i c h affects a n d permeates the lives of people a n d societies. This stress o n the subjective, at odds w i t h Wallerstein's perspective, also sits uneasily w i t h U l f H a n n e r z ' s more pragmatic analysis, w i t h its focus on actual social 2

3

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5

See, for example, Maiek Alloula, The Colonial Harem (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, : 1986); Pratibha Parmar, "Hateful Contraries: Media Images of Asian Women," Ten 8, no. 16,1984. Reprinted In Looking On, Images of Femmmtty m the Visual Arts and Media, ed. Rosemary Betterton .(London* Pandora Press, 1987); Horrti K. Bhabha, "Signs Taken for Wonders: Questions of Ambivalence and Authority Under a Tree Outside Delhi, May 1817," in 'Race', Writing and Difference, ed. Henry: Louis Gates, Jr. (Chicago: University of 'Chicago Press' 1986); Gayatri Chakravorty Sptvak, "Can the Subaltern Speak?," in Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture, eds. Gary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg (Urbana and Chicago: University,of Illinois Press, 1988). Immanuel Wallerstein, Roland Robertson, Ulf Hannerz; Stuart Hall's lectures were delivered prior to the day of the symposium. Roland Robertson, "The Sociological Significance of Culture: Some General Considerations," Theory, Culture and Society, 5 (1988):20. * Roland Robertson and Frank Lechner, "Modernization, Globalization and ~™ ! S World-Systems Theory," Theory, Culture and Society, 2 (1985)103. . * Robertson 1988,22; Roland Robertson, "Globalization Theory and Civlizattonal Analysis,"* Comparative Civilzations Review, 17 (Fall 1987):23-4. 2

3

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and economic processes at the periphery. O n the other hand, H a n nerz's conception of the operation of the economy (labour, c o m m o d i ties, markets) is different again, i n theoretical orientation and i n level of analysis, f r o m that of Wallerstein. Secondly, the real split in, the day's proceedings occurred late i n the afternoon, w h e n it became clear that the discourse of those w o r k i n g i n c u l t u r a l theory was of such a radically different order that the earlier proceedings had, no w a y of transforming this particular debate (or, for that matter, vice versa). The w a y s i n w h i c h art historians, f i l m theorists a n d others explore the international dimensions of cultural p r o d u c t i o n a n d dissemination seemed to have nothing i n c o m m o n w i t h those other approaches. The first of these phenomena was the one more in, need of explanation. For what became increasingly clear to those listening to the papers delivered was the fact that there was no real debate. Indeed, despite the g o o d intentions of the organizers and the contributors, w e m i g h t conclude that such a dialogue is premature. In fact, there were far more serious divisions between the speakers than became apparent, i n what w a s , for the most part, a polite, friendly a n d openm i n d e d discussion. Those w h o k n e w the w o r k of the m a i n speakers were probably expecting three major points of disagreement, none of w h i c h materialized. In the first place, w e might have predicted an opposition between " e c o n o m i s m " a n d " c u l t u r a l i s m . " This is an issue w h i c h R o l a n d Robertson has already taken u p w i t h I m m a n u e l Wallers tein. Despite Wallerstein's attempt at this S y m p o s i u m to take u p questions of " c u l t u r e , " it is clear to me that n o t h i n g has changed i n the very different: points of v i e w , a n d i n d e e d conceptual f r a m e w o r k s , of these t w o writers. A n d yet this key question was absent f r o m their debate.: Secondly, w e might have expected an opposition between grand sociological t h e o r y " a n d "concrete ethnography," k n o w i n g that the speakers were f r o m different disciplines, a n d k n o w i n g , too, something about their style of w o r k . A g a i n , the opportunity was not taken u p by either side to comment on the limitations of the other approach. Rather, the gentlemanly juxtaposition, of papers suggested. 6

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* In particular John Tagg and Maureen Turim. See, for example, Robertson and Lechner, 1985. 7

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(wrongly) that somehow these different approaches were different but compatible.

stead, w e were left w i t h the cosy impression that w e were all addressing the same questions. In particular, the f o l l o w i n g appeared to be at issue: — H o w useful is it to see contemporary societies as a w o r l d system/in terms of globalization? (The different formulations, of course, disguise different perspectives, a n d i m p l y accordingly different k i n d s of answer.) — H o w extensive is this process of globalization? H a s it l e d to an increasing, or even complete, homogeneity across social systems?

A n d thirdly, some k n o w l e d g e of the different theoretical orientations of the speakers w o u l d have l e d us to expect an opposition between "systems t h e o r y " and " v o l u n t a r i s m , " the latter emphasising action over structural constraint, a n d insisting on 'the role of motivated h u m a n behavior i n effecting social change. This, too, is something w h i c h has been at issue i n earlier publications. A n d although m a n y contemporary versions of M a r x i s t theory eschew determinism a n d emphasize the constitutive role of h u m a n action, i n the context of structural features of the social formation, there is no doubt that the M a r x i s m of world-systems theory is not (yet?) such a version. N e v e r theless, there w a s silence on this issue at the s y m p o s i u m . Despite the appearance of reconciliation a n d cooperation w h i c h characterized most of the day's proceedings, it was clear that little has changed i n t h e ; m a i n focus of the three m a i n speakers. R o l a n d Robertson is still p r i m a r i l y concerned w i t h the experience of globalization a n d g l o b a l l y , a n d the ways i n w h i c h this experience n o w pervades a n d affects social life throughout the w o r l d , (Indeed, " g l o b a l t y " i n Robertson's analysis can almost be defined as consciousness of the w o r l d as one place, its existence — or, as we might say i n an entirely different discourse, its " m a t e r i a l i t y " — consisting precisely i n its centraliry to h u m a n consciousness,) Immanuel Wallerstein, o n the other hand, retains a central focus on the reality of the structures of the w o r l d system — those economic and political relations w h i c h constitute the interconnectedness of the contemporary w o r l d . U l f Hannerz's m a i n preoccupation is w i t h the processes of cultural relations between different sectors a n d communities, a n d although he employs some of the vocabulary of w o r l d systems theory (particularl y ' t h e notions of " c e n t e r " a n d " p e r i p h e r y " ) , his w o r k is different from W a l e r s t e i n ' s i n its agnosticism on the question of p r i m a r y structuring features of the w o r l d economy. These differences, as I have said, were never articulated, either i n the papers themselves or i n the discussion among the speakers. In8.

9

— W h a t is the role of culture i n the world-system/globalization process? — W h a t are the cultural relations between (and within) states i n the context of the world-system/global system? Consensus seemed to have been reached, implicitly where not explicitly, on a number of points: — There is, i n d e e d , a world-system (or, the w o r l d is a single, interconnected, place). There are important w a y s i n w h i c h the w o r l d is interconnected, and it makes sense, therefore, to talk about globalization. — H o w e v e r , w e have to recognize the persistent (or, it sometimes seemed to be suggested, consequent ) diversity of cultures. That is, cultures continue to be diverse, and some of the w a y s i n w h i c h they continue to be diverse are actually a product of increasing globalization, for example the extension of multi-national capital a n d of c u l tural products a n d m e d i a industries across the globe. — C u l t u r e is of central importance to social and economic processes (though this importance is conceptualized very differently according to the particular 'theory of culture/society employed). — W e need an interdisciplinary approach to the study of culture i n a global context. 10

11

See Ulf Hannerz in. this volume; also "The World in Creolization," Africa, 57 (1987):546-559. This belief was not necessarily clearly stated at the symposium, but has been argued by each of the three main speakers. See Immanuel Wallerstein, "World-Systems Analysis," in Social Theory Today, eds. Anthony Giddens and Jonathon H . Turner ' (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987); Robertson, 1988; Ulf Hannerz, "Theory in Anthropology: Small is Beautiful? The Problem of Complex Cultures," Comparative Studies in Society and History, 28 (1986):326-7. 13

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Robertson, 1988. For example, Anthony Giddens, Central Problems in Social Theory (London: Macmillan, 1979); Veronica Beechey and James Donald, eds. Subjectivity and Social Rdations (Miton Keynes/Philadelphia: Open University Press, 1985). 8

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CULTURE, GLOBALIZATION A N D THE WORLD-SYSTEM So far, I have stressed the (unacknowledged) conflicts between the m a i n speakers (and, w e c o u l d a d d , between their' w o r k a n d the perspective a n d orientation of Stuart H a l l ' s t w o lectures, w i t h w h i c h each of the three speakers has serious differences). I want n o w to suggest that what:they share is a failure to deal adequately w i t h the question of culture i n a global context. Ironically, g i v e n one of their agreed commitments, this failure results f r o m a n insufficiently interdisciplinary approach to the subject. For where they are all enthusiastic about the crossing of discipline boundaries w i t h i n the social sciences, none of t h e m has taken on the challenge of recent w o r k i n the humanities w h i c h ' provides a far more sophisticated analysis of c u l tural processes, texts and institutions. This means that their theories and approaches remain unable to analyse c u l t u r a l p r o d u c t i o n and cultural texts,: I shall identify five problematic areas here; w h a t they have i n c o m m o n is an inability to take account of, first, social process and secondly representation. 12

|[I] A l l three papers take as unproblematic such concepts as " W e s t " and " T h i r d W o r l d i " " c e n t e r " a n d " p e r i p h e r y , " " m e t r o p o l i t a n " a n d " l o c a l " cultures, as if the objects they described were coherent, i d e n tifiable entities. B u t each of these pairs is a construct, whose apparent identity is the p r o d u c t of a discourse a n d w h i c h (to switch to a somewhat different discourse myself) is ideologically i m b u e d . W e ought, therefore, to be taking these terms as problematic, a n d exploring h o w the terms, a n d o u r conceptions of those entities, have been constructed. The " d o m i n a n t " term i n each (West, center, metropolis, a n d so on), as Stuart H a l l demonstrated i n the first of his lectures, is defined in difference — constructed i n opposition to the Other. It is not a monolithic, pre-existing, real subject, i n any sense. The " s u b o r d i n a t e " term '(Third. W o r l d , periphery, local culture) is equally an invention, p r o d u c e d i n a variety of post- and anti-colonial discourses (including M a r x i s m , ethnography, theories of development). It posits, or i m p l i e s the existence of cultural a n d political sub-

See, for example, Terry Eagleton, literary Theory. An Introduction (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983); Constance Penley, ed., Feminism and Film Theory (London: Routledge, 1988); Richard Leppert and Susan McClary, eda., Music and Society. The Politics and Composition, Performance and Reception (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1987); Tony Bennett et al., eds., Culture, Ideology .and' Social Process (Batsford, 1981). 166

T H E G L O B A L A N D T H E SPECIFIC jects, whose constitution a n d whose contradictory features are thereby obscured. Recent w o r k i n anthropology has s h o w n that ethnographers, too, w o r k w i t h cultural constructs of the societies they s t u d y . Rather than s i m p l y describing a n d presenting cultures, they invent them i n a certain sense, t h r o u g h the discourses a n d models of their o w n investigation: they identify a n d label the g r o u p of the Other, attributing to it an essential identity w h i c h it does not possess. A n approach w h i c h took account of the discursive constitution of " c u l t u r e s " — the ways i n w h i c h they are represented — w o u l d already have access to the relations between cultures, here generally formulated s i m p l y as a p r o b l e m to be addressed. For those cultures are constructed i n relation to one another, produced, represented and perceived through the ideologies a n d narratives of situated discourses. This is not, of course, to deny the " r e a l i t y " of relations of social a n d economic inequality between groups and between cultures. It is to insist that w e do not make the mistake of granting these groups or cultures some "essential" existence, d e n y i n g the linguistic and other strategies through w h i c h they are negotiated and produced. John Tagg's paper i n this volume addresses this issue directly. 13

[2] A l l three of the m a i n papers operate w i t h an undifferentiated notion of "culture..." It is true that U l f H a n n e r z went to some trouble to itemize four " f r a m e w o r k s " of the cultural process (the market, the State, forms of life, and social movements), though it is not entirely clear whether these categories are intended to be exclusive, whether they are exhaustive, or whether they are equivalent (three different issues). Nevertheless, H a n n e r z shares w i t h Robertson and Wallerstein a retention of a concept of " c u l t u r e " w h i c h confuses a variety of p r o cesses, practices a n d levels of analysis. The authors often move w i t h out comment f r o m one meaning to another; at other times they restrict themselves, also w i t h o u t comment, to one particular meaning. " C u l t u r e " therefore can mean: (i) ways of life (Hannerz); (ii) the arts and m e d i a (Hannerz; also H a l l ) ; (iii) political, or perhaps religious, culture (Wallerstein; also Hall); (iv) attitudes to globalization (Robertson).

For an elaboration of this argument, see James Clifford, The Predicament of Culture (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988). 1 3

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CULTURE, GLOBALIZATION A N D THE WORLD-SYSTEM • In fact, this loosely e m p l o y e d term describes a variety of different processes, institutions and discourses, whose separation a n d careful •analysis is crucial to any discussion of culture i n the global context. W e need to look v e r y carefully at the interrelations between these areas, and to examine the specific institutions, social processes, regimes of representation a n d so on, a n d their relationship to other " c u l t u r a l " factors. This is a p r o b l e m I return to at the e n d of m y paper.

a n d oftenconfa-adtoc^ A s A d o r n o pointed out fifty years ago i n his critical comments to Walter Benjamin, culture is n o t . s i m p l y the reflection or expression of the economic, but it is p r o - [ cessed through social relations (and, we might a d d , systems of repre- * sentation). Objecting to the simple connection Benjamin makes bet w e e n themes i n Baudelaire's w o r k a n d economic features of the period (such as the d u t y on w i n e ) , A d o r n o urges that he recognize that the "materialist determination of cultural traits is only possible if it is mediated t h r o u g h the total social process." 14

[3] A l l three of the m a i n speakers ignore the level of the economic and the social. This might seem a peculiarly inappropriate comment to make about Immanuel Wallerstein, w h o has been criticized (by Robertson amongst others) for an over-emphasis o n the economic, B u t i n the paper presented to this conference, i n his concern to p a y due attention to the operations of " c u l t u r e , " he entirely by-passes questions of economic a n d material factors w h i c h pertain to.culturahpxo..duction a n d dissemination, H i s only references, to a potentially materialist theory of culture (a theory for w h i c h I myself w i l l argue) are of the order of stating that the capitalist w o r l d economy produces cultural diffusion. W e need to k n o w how this occurs. W h a t are the primary economic structures w h i c h enable, contain a n d affect cultural production? In w h a t circumstances does cultural resistance become possible? W e need, as the contributions of John Tagg and M a u r e e n T u r i m make clear, a w a y of investigating the nature a n d effects of the cultural industries, on a national a n d international l e v e l W e need to examine the role of technology, o w n e r s h i p , a n d c u l t u r a l markets. In other w o r d s , rather than s i m p l y situating a w e l l - m e a n i n g discussion of " c u l t u r e " w i t h i n a pre-formulated m o d e l of international economic relations, w e have to explore the cultural economic relations themselves, • B y the same token, attention must be p a i d to the social processes involved i n p r o d u c t i o n of culture. A n economism w h i c h gallantlyi switches, its attentions to the operations of culture is still economism. Rather, it s h o u l d undertake a radical reform of its assumptions, b y acknowledging the mediation of the economic a n d the cultural through the level of the social. It m u s t look, for example, at social class, relations of gender a n d of race, a n d at other social groups (subcultures, professional groups, and so on), a n d grasp the w a y s i n w h i c h they mediate, through their practices, values a n d institutions, the production of culture. CujtmeJ§,produced, i n a range o f c o m p l e x . 168

[4] Related to this last argument is the indifference of a l l three papers to the question of gender. There are at least three reasons w h y we cannot discuss culture w i t h o u t discussing gender. In the first place, identity is always gendered identity. In his first paper, Stuart H a l l demonstrated this v e r y clearly, w h e n he talked about the identity of the " E n g l i s h m a n " as precisely that. Political a n d other ideologies thus operate t h r o u g h notions of gender difference. This means that it is crucial to incorporate the feminist perspective into the discussion of culture a n d globalization. Discursive oppositions (West and n o n West, self a n d Other, West and Orient, .and so on) are also complexly i n t e r w o v e n w i t h meanings and discourses of gender. A s John Tagg emphasizes i n his paper, c u l t u r a l practices a n d institutions are also b o u n d u p w i t h questions of f a m i l y , sexuality a n d desire. Secondly, w e must recognize that the majority of studies of " t h i r d w o r l d " cultures have described the experiences of m e n at the expense of those of w o m e n . A s i n every other intellectual a n d academic pursuit u n t i l recently, w o m e n have remained more or less invisible as a result of gender-biased investigations. Feminist anthropologists have b e g u n to intervene i n this, field, t h o u g h too often o n l y by a d d i n g ethnographies of w o m e n to existing ethnographies of m e n (and thereby leaving unchallenged the very terms of a discipline w h i c h persists i n f i n d i n g the issue of gender irrelevant to its concerns). W e m i g h t start here b y taking seriously, a n d taking further, U l f H a n n e r z ' s stress o n divisions of labor, since such divisions are 15

Theodor Adorno, "Letters, to Walter Benjamin," in Ernst Bloch et a l , Aesthetics and Politics (London: New Left Books, 1977):129. In the revised version of his paper, Roland Robertson does begin to address this issue. 1 4

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CULTURE, GLOBALIZATION A N D THE WORLD-SYSTEM .always (amongst other 'things) gender-based, • • T h i r d l y , the continuing failure across the social, science disciplines to connect the public w o r l d of politics, economics, a n d institutions w i t h the domestic sphere a n d w i t h the sexual d i v i s i o n of labor must be addressed i n this context as w i t h i n sociology generally. Just as the early development of industrial capitalism cannot be described, p u r e l y i n terms of p r o d u c t i o n a n d profit, labor and, capital, economics a n d politics, w i t h o u t w i d e n i n g o u r scope to grasp the location of these processes w i t h i n relations of gender and the family, so contemporary relations o f the w o r l d system must be perceived as u n a v o i d ably implicated i n the sexual d i v i s i o n of labour and i n the practices •and, ideologies of the "separation of spheres." Feminist sociologists and historians have shown, the inadequacy of our conception of the nineteenth century as a p e r i o d i n which, there w a s an increasing d i vision between the public a n d the'private, the male and the female spheres, w h i c h w e r e clearly demarcated. Rather, the p u b l i c a n d private spheres were interconnected, a n d interdependent, i n m a n y crucial respects. Women, were still actively (if often indirectly) i n v o l v e d i n their husbands' w o r k . F a m i l y a n d marriage contacts were central to business a n d w o r k procedures. Financial aspects of enterprise were often located i n the domestic sphere (fathers-in-law l e n d i n g money, for example). I a m arguing here, then, that w e m u s t be prepared to investigate the interrelations of public: a n d private, of the economy a n d the domestic, of male a n d female roles, a n d of ideologies of w o r k a n d politics a n d ideologies of gender, i n our attempt to theorize the global! dimensions of culture and. society. 1

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[5] Finally, the papers are "pre-theoretical" with, regard to developments i n cultural itheory. N o n e of them is able to recognize the •nature of culture as representation, nor its. constitutive role w i t h regard to ideology a n d social relations. They operate w i t h a notion of " c u l t u r e " as an identifiable realm or set of beliefs, objects a n d practices, more or less determined b y social and economic relations, w i t h more or less independence f r o m a n d effectivity on the social process. C u l tural theory, however, has stressed the " m a t e r i a l i t y " of culture, by w h i c h is meant the "determinacy and effectivity of signifying practic-

T H E G L O B A L A N D T H E SPECIFIC es t h e m s e l v e s . " Codes and conventions, narrative structures, and, systems of representation i n texts (literary, visual, filmic) produce •• m e a n i n g a n d inscribe ideological positions. In a rather extended | sense of the w o r d " m a t e r i a l , " then, they are perceived as h a v i n g their o w n level of determinacy. Thus, w o r k i n literary studies a n d art history has analysed the constitutive nature of representation. This limitation i n world-system and globalization theories i n fact lies b e h i n d some of the earlier problems I have identified. The debate about " e c o n o m i s m " thus takes place at the w r o n g level, a n d its resolution i n the terms in which, it is usually phrased still w o u l d net provide an adequate w a y of comprehending the relationship between culture a n d society. It is not, that is to say, a. question of counterposing to a mechanistic, deterministic v i e w (economism) a " b e t t e r " account, stressing the "relative a u t o n o m y " of culture, or e m p h a s i z i n g the effects of culture i n social change. N o r is it a question of investigating " c u l t u r a l response" to economic factors. W h a t is at issue here, is the integral place of culture in social processes a n d i n social change: the cultural formation and identity of social groups, as w e l l as of ideologies, discourses, and practices. To take the example of gender, w e have to recognize that w o m e n do not s i m p l y discover the reflection of their 'real' situation, or even the presentation of ideologies of that situation, i n paintings, novels, religious tracts. Rather, it is i n those very texts that ideologies are constructed, a n d that social relations are forged. The very codes of art a n d literature, the narrative structures of the text, are part of the ongoing process of the construction of m e a n i n g and, hence, of the social w o r l d . 17

18

These are the m a i n difficulties confronted by the approaches taken b y the three m a i n papers. The authors are, as I have said, committed to crossing the boundaries between sociology, anthropology, a n d economic a n d political history. In suggesting that their p r o b l e m is a lack of interdisciplinarity, I mean that an openness to other disciplines i n the social sciences a n d , particularly, the humanities is a necessary

Rosalind Coward, "Class, 'Culture' and the Social Formation," Screen, 18, 1 (1977):91, For example, Cora Kaplan," "Like a Housemaid's Fancies': The Representation of Working-CIass Women, in Nineteenth-Century Writing," in Grafts. Feminist Cultural Criticism, ed. Susan Sheridan (London: Verso, 1988). Lynda Nead, "The Magdalen in Modem Times: The Mythology of the Fallen Woman in Pre-Raphaelite Painting," in Betterton, 1987. 17

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. ••." See Leonore Davidoff .and Catherine Hall, Family Fortimes, Men and Warnen ofthe English. Middle Ctess, 1780-1850 (London: Hutchinson, 1987), 16

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CULTURE, GLOBALIZATION A N D THE WORLD-SYSTEM

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first step to addressing these difficulties, a n d it w o u l d also begin, to - bridge the gap between the concerns of these papers .and those of the other speakers at the symposium.. In particular, social history w o u l d illuminate the processes a n d social relations i n v o l v e d i n identity formation; cultural theory w o u l d facilitate a grasp of the nature, complexity a n d operation of " c u l t u r e ; " a n d f e m i n i s m w o u l d ensure a constant recognition of the centrality of questions of gender i n any analysis of culture a n d society, at the national a n d international level. The p r o b l e m , i n the e n d , is in connecting 'the title a n d the sub-title of the s y m p o s i u m (and of this volume). The hope of the organizers was that this connection c o u l d be made, a n d indeed, as I hope I have begun to show, such a, development is essential a n d pressing. Leaving aside for the moment the matter of the particular theoretical implications of the terms " g l o b a l i z a t i o n " a n d " w o r l d - s y s t e m , " the fact is that w e need a theory of culture at the level of the international, w h i c h is sensitive to the w a y s i n w h i c h identity is constructed a n d represented i n culture and, i n social relations. Stuart H a l l ' s t w o papers indicate, i n a p r e l i m i n a r y w a y , h o w this might be accomplished. The three papers under discussion here, however, have focussed o n the m a i n title of the s y m p o s i u m , ignoring the challenges of the sub-title. O f course the very title and sub-title encode diverse discourses, w h i c h are only w i t h difficulty reconciled, a n d it m a y be after all that the project of a dialogue is premature. A central p r o b l e m , increasingly apparent throughout the s y m p o s i u m , and already indicated at several points i n this paper, is the definition of " c u l t u r e . " R o l a n d Robertson has argued that his solution is not to define " c u l t u r e , " since the term has a complex history and is used i n so m a n y different w a y s . But this clearly w i l l not do. What is important is that w e resist too n a r r o w a definition of " c u l ture," w h i c h w o u l d outlaw m a n y of its other c o m m o n uses. Rather, w e must f i n d a w a y of exploring the relationships between (for example), culture as values and beiefs, and culture as arts a n d media. C u l t u r a l studies a n d cultural theory offer the beginning of such an analysis, h i g h l i g h t i n g as they d o the ways i n w h i c h cultural texts participate i n the construction of w i d e r cultural values a n d ideologies. But this, i n t u r n , must be l i n k e d w i t h the sociological (and historical) analysis of institutions of cultural production (and cultural

reception): the necessary emphasis on the constitutive role of culture can otherwise too easily become a n e w idealism. B e h i n d these cultural processes and institutions lie the social relations i n w h i c h they exist (and w h i c h they also produce). A n d those social relations, as w e l l as cultural texts a n d institutions, operate i n the global context — a context, i n t u r n , w h i c h consists of economic a n d material factors, social relations, and ideologies. B u i l d i n g an adequate m o d e l of culture and representation i n the global context w i l l not be an easy matter. The proceedings of the s y m p o s i u m have at least made apparent what is n o w required: namely an account of culture in the contemporary w o r l d w h i c h grasps the fundamental economic factors i n an international capitalist economy; w h i c h analyzes the cultural industries i n this connection; w h i c h combines this w i t h specific studies of local societies and their relationship to " c u l t u r a l i m p e r i a l i s m " ; a n d w h i c h is based on an understanding of the complex relations of social formations, social and cultural processes and institutions, and the ideologies and systems of representation w h i c h create, maintain a n d subvert these.

19

Robertson, 1988, 4. 172

173

Name Index

Abercrombie, N., 85, 89 Abou-El-Haj, R A . , 142 Abou-El-Haj, B., vil, xi, 12,18, 139-144 Abu-Lughod, J., xi, 17,18,131-7 Academy Awards, 146 Adorno, T., 169 Africa, 38,126,127,143 Africa, East, 32,55 Africa, South, 6 Africa, West, 6, 111, 120,124 Alloulah, M., 162 Althusser, L., 47 America, North, 27, 28, 50,112,147 (See also USA, Canada) America, Latin, 29 Anderson, B., 71 Appadurai, A., 10,11,17,77, 78 Archer, M , 85 Arensberg, C , 113 Asard, E„ 126 Ashcroft, B., 6 Asia, 55> 132 Australia, 6 Bangladesh, 55 Danton, k i , 123

Barbados, 55 Barber, K., 119,120 Barnes & Noble, 136 Baudelaire, 169 Baudrillard, J., 77 Bauman, Z., 73 Beechey, V., 164 Benjamin, W., 169 Bennet, T., 125,166 Bergeson, A., 87 Betterton, R., 162 Bhabha, H., 162 Birmingham, x, 2, 6 Bloch, E., 169 Bourdieu, P , 150 Bourricaud, F., 70, 75 Bowie, D., 148 Boyd, Barratt, J. A., 125 Brazil, 25 Breckenridge, C , 18 Britain, British Isles, 3,15, .22, 23, 27, 31, 52, 55, 56, 86 British Broadcasting Corporation, 27 British Empire, 37 Broadcasting Standards Committee, 27

N A M E INDEX,

N A M E INDEX Cadbury's Cocoa, 6 Ca iro, xi, 133 Calais, 79 'Calcutta, 8,33 Callaghy, T., 117 Canada, National Film Board of, 146 Caribbean, 15, 32, 37, 55, 59 Center for Contemporary Cultural Studies, x, 2 Ceylon, see Sri Lanka Chase-Dunn, G , 74 Chernobyl, ,25 Chernoff, J., 124 China, 74, 76, 83 Chinese Revolution, 63 Chirico, J., 79

Endoe, C , 81 England, 3,19, 21,24,31,32,48,53, 54, 55,150 Eros statue, 24 Euro-America, 9 Europe, Eastern, 79 Europe,-an, 39, 83, 87, 94, 99,112, 134,141,147 Fabian, J,, 127 Falklands, 26 Fanon, F., 48,154 Featherstone, M,.,, 9,91 Foucault, M . , 7 France, 99 Freers, S., 60' Freud, S , 14, 43

Civil .Rights Movement, 53 Clifford, J., 7,13,167 Cohen, E„ 89 Common, Market, 24 ; Commonwealth Institute, 36,39 Coward, R,., 171 Curran, J., 125

Gappert, G . , viii, 12 Gates, H . L., 162 Geertz, C , 15, 70, 78, 79 Gellner, E , 3, 71 Germany, 126, 133' Giddens, A., 82,164,165 Gluck, G , 71 Gottmann, J., 12 Gramsci, A , 57,58, 67, 68,140 Gran, P., 140,142 Greater London Council, 65 Griffiths, G . , 6 Grossberg, L., 162 Group for Critical Study of Colonial Discourse, Santa Cruz, 7 Gucci, 132 Gulf, 3 Gureviteh, M . , 125

1

Daguerre, 156 Davidoff, L , 170 ; Derrida, J„ 49, 50, 51,155,157 Dezelay, Y., 153 Dhareshwar, V., 7 Donald, J., 164 i Dumont, L., 75 'Dürkheim, E„ ,83,84 J !

Eagleton, T„ 166' Ecuador, 99 Edinburgh Festival, 60 ; Egypt, 133 Eisenstadt, 5.N., 70, 89 Emerson, R., 78

Haferkamp, H., 72 Hall, C , 170 H a l l S„ x, xi, 2,3,5,10,12,14,15, 176

16,19-68,131,140', 150,151,152, 154,166,167,169 Handler, R-, 153 Hannerz, U . , xi, 4,14,16,17, 18,107-28,123,131,132,139, 140,141,142,152,162,165, 167,169 Harare, 31 Harvey, D., 73 Haussmann, 156 Haydon, G., 125 Hight, K. S., 139 Hill, S., 85,89 Hobsbawm, E. J., 71,113 Hoggart, R., x, 3 Holzner, B., x, 71 Hong Kong, 6,120 Huff, T,, 72 IBM, 132 India, 6, 49, 55,120 Indies, West, 6 Ireland, Northern, 26 Ishida, Takesha, 84 Jamaica, 3,15, 24, 53, 54 James, H . , 71 Japan, 11, 76, 83, 86,148 Jaspers, K., 76, 88 Johsua, I., 95 Kaplan, C , 171 Khomeini, 136 Kierney, H , 71 King, A . D., 1-18,4,5,9,11,13, 149-54,151 Knight, R. V., viii, 12 Kohn, H . , 78 Kureishi, H . , 60 Kuwait, 6

'Lacanians, 157 Laclau, E., 160 Lancashire/ 49 Lang, J.„ 147 Lash, S., 73, 75 Lechner, F., 4, 72, 87 Leppert, R., 73,166 London, 6, 24,38 Los Angeles, 143 Mahogany, Miss, 53 Manhattan, 33 Mani, L„ 7,13 Mann, M . , 87 Manuel, P., 119,120 Marco Polo, 95 Marks, D., 125 Marley, Bob, 54 Marx, K., 14, 28, 43, 44 McGrane, B., 72 Mcl ary, S., 166 McNeill, W. H . , 86 Meyer, J. W„ 80,87 Middle East, 86,141,142 Milton Keynes, 24 Minh-Ha, Trinh, 6 Mobuto, Sese Seko, 117 Mogg, Sir W. R., 32 Mohammed, 135,136 Morocco, xi Mouffe, C , 160 Murdoch, R., 27, 32 My Beautiful Laundreite, 60 Myrdall, G , 121 Nairn, T'., 71 NATO , 24 Nead, L , 171 Nelson, B., 72 Nelson, C , 162 1

177

N A M E INDEX Netti, P., x New York, 3, 38,136,143 New Zealand, 148 Nigeria, 6> 111, 114,117,118,120

Scargill, A., '64 Scots, 26 Senghor, L., 103 Shaw, R., 117 Singapore; 8 Sky Channel, 27 Smelser, N . , 27 Smith, A . D„ 71, 78 South Seas, 25 South Atlantic, 25 Soviet Union, 6, 79 Spencer, H . , .83 Spivak, G . C , 7,162 Sri Lanka, 49 Swatos, W, FL, 87 Sweden, 126 Swift, J., 136

Oreh, O. O., 120 Oshima, Nagisa, 145 Oxbridge, 108 Oxford English Dictionary, 4,11 Packer, G„ 118 Pakistan, 55 Paris, 8 Parmar, P., 162 Pearson, H . W., 113 Penley, C , 166 Piccadilly Circus, 24 Polanyi, Karl, 113 Pollock D., 76 Portugal, 126 Prior, L,, 151

N A M E INDEX Urry, J„ 73, 75 USA, 3, 6, 28,99,126,141,143,148 (See .also America, North) USSR, 99 Van der Post, L., 145 Vincent, T., 120 Wagar, W., 78, 88 Wall Street, 24 Wallerstein, I., xi, 2, 4,10,14, 16,18, 69, 74,82, 91-105,113, 118,131,132,134,140,141, 151,152,156,157,160,162, 163,164,165', 167,168

Washington, 24 Waterman, C. A., 125 Weber, M . , 82, 83,84 Wender, W i m , 147 Westminster, 108 Westphalia, Treaty of, 97 Williams, R., x, 3,7, 46 Willis, P., 2, 3 Wolff, J., xi, xii, 1,2, 3, 4,12, 13,18,161-73. Wolff, E., 123 Wollacott, J., 125 Wordsworth, W.., 24 Zayrunia Mosque, 132.

Tägg, J,, vii, xii, 18,155-60,157,163, 167,168 Tate and Lyle, 6 Thailand, 99 Thatcher, M . , 27, 64, 67,135 Thomas, G„ 80 Thompson, E. P., 3 Tiffin, H . , 6 Toermies, F., 83 Tokyo, 24,31 Tomlin, L., 146 Trinidad, 55 Tunis, 132 Tunisia, 99

Raba t, xi Rabelais, 136 Ranger, T, 71,113 Richard II, 49 Mo, 8,143 ; Robertson, R„ x, xi, 4,8,11,12,15, 18, 69-90, 71, 72, 76, 79, 82,116, 131,132,134,151,156,157,162, 163,164,167,168,172 Rabat, xi Rodinsort, M . , 142 Rushdie, S., 134,135,136

Turim, M . , xii, 18,145-8,163,168 Turner, J., 82,165 Turner, B., 82,85,89

Said, E„ 6, 7,140 Sakamoto, R„ 147,148 Sartre, J. P, 103 Satanic Verses, 134,-135 Saussure, F., 15,44

Ugboajah, F., 120 UK, 6, 19, 20, 49,143 {See also Britain, England) United Nations, 92, 97 178

179

SUBJECT INDEX

Subject Index

advertising, 27,31,32,81,147 American society, culture, 32 Americanness, 28 anthropology,-ists, 75, 87,110,117, 133,167,169,171 Arabs, 94 architecture,-ural, ix, x, 12,132,149, 150,151,152,154 : archives, national, 152 art history, x art,-s, x, xii, 26, 27, 34, 59, 91, 93, 98, 100,101,102,105,152,154,161, 171,172 axial period, 76, 88 Black, 15,35,53,54,55,56, 57,58, 59, 65,103 boundaries, 151 Buddhism, Mahayana, 76 built environment, ix, 12,13,149, 150 capital, viii, xi, 28,29,30,31, 98, • 140,143,151,165

Capital Marx's, 29', 30, 32, 37 capitalism, 15, 29, 31, 73, 74,108, 170 capitalist, 8,104,142,153,157 capitalist world-economy, 10, 96, 153,156,168,173 Cartesian subject, 42 Christianity, 72 cinema, x, 18,145 (see also film) cities, colonial, 8 citizenship, 97 ciry,-ies, 17,118,132,149, 150,152, 153 civilization,^, 100, 109,134 colonial,-ism, xi, 7, 8,13, 35, 60, 111, 139,141,143 colonies, 8 community, organic, 46 conflationism, 85 Confucianism, 75, 94 country, 150 creolization, 39,126,143 critical theory, x, xii cultural animateurs, 117 categories, ix

dumping, 122,125 hegemony, 145 identity (see also identity), 7,14, 20, 33 insignia, 151 landscape, 151 imperialism, 108,173 policy, 121,153 politics, 19, 41, 42, 52, 58 resistance, 100,101, 105, 168. revolution, 54 studies, vii, x, xii, 2, 3, 4, 6,10, 71,163 technology, 120 theory, 163,170 culturalism, 163 culture industries, 125,173 culture, viii, ix, xii, 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 9, 10,12,14,15,16,17,18, 23, 26, 27, 28,33,34,41,42, 56, 59, 70, 71, 72, 75, 85, 91, 94, 95, 99,100, 102,104,112,114, 115, 117,118, 119,120,122,125,126,127,131, 134,136,140,145,146,148,153, 161,162,165,167,168,169,170, 172

East, 83 ecological interdependence, 25, ecology, 62, 81 economic.-s, 12, 145, 148, 150,151, 168,173 economy, global (see also world economy. Capitalist world economy), 87, 88,132 education, 80,118,121,141,152 "English eye", 20 English language, 28 Englishness, 14, 20, 22, 36 Enlightenment, 72, 77, 78 environmental movement, 17,115 esthetic instruments, 12,8 esthetics, 38, 39 esthetics, commodity, 123 ethnicity, ix, xi, 17, 21, 22, 26, 34, 36, 37, 41, 55,150 ethnoscapes, 10, 78 Eurasian ecumene, 86 Eurocentricism, 139,141,154 European theorists, 13 ex-Marxist French intellectuals, 33 family, 158,169, 170 fashion, 119 feminism,,, 3, 32, 35, 47, 60, 65, 169, 170,172 feminist criticism, studies, x, xii, 146 film, 59,119,120,146,147, 148,161, 171 (see also cinema) finanscapes, 11, 78 First World, 8,13,17, 110 foreignness, 15, 80 "form of life", 113,116 French Revolution, 86

culture, global, 3, 9, 19, 78, 82, 87, 88, 89,137,139,141,151,152, 154,159,162 culture, world, 16, 91, 94, 98, 103, 111, 116 Darwinian struggle, 84 decolonization, 78 deconstruction, 50 deregulation, 23 difference, difference, 49, 50, 51, 52, 59, 68, 72,153 discursive formation, 158 diversity, 110

gay literature, 60 gaze, 48 181

SUBJECT I N D E X Gemeinschaft, 77,83 gender, ix, 15,17,22,31,34,62,75, 80; 150,168,169,170 Gesellschaft, 77,83,133 Glasnost 89 global mass culture, 3,10,27, 28, 152 global postmodern, 3, 32, 33, 35, 36, global urbanity, 152 globality, 4,5,11, 77,80, .88,164 globalization, viii, x, xi, xii, 1,4, 9, 11,12,14,16,17,19, 20, 22, 23, 24,26, 27,29,30,31,32, 33,35, 39, 68,70, 71, 75, 76,78, 79,80, 84, 87,110,112,116,117,132, 134,135,145,149,151,153,154, 156,161,162,164,167,169,172 habitat, 98 habitus, 150 health, 80 hegemony, 58 heterogenization, cultural, 77 history, intellectual, 7 history, economic and political, 171 history, social, 172 homogeneity, 73, 86, 95, 98 homogenization, viii, 28,34,77,96, 108,109,112,113,119,120,122, 124,125,135,139,140,141,153 house forms, 150 human rights, 80, 92 ! hurnanity, 92 humankind, 79, 81, 88,107

105,149,150,151,152,154,160 ideo!ogy,-ies, 100,118,140,170,173 images, absence of, 146 imperialism, 7 incasteilamento, 94 individualization, 80 international division of labor, 23, 115,122,132,143,151 international interdependence, 24 mterna'tionalism, 78 internationalization, 23,88 Islamic movement, 77 knowledge, 4,6 labor, 6, 17, 23, 24, 29, 30,150 (see also international division of labor) landscapes, 11,150 language, 44, 50, 51, 95, 97,120, 127,139,142,148,152,157 leisure, 158 linguistics, 15,44 literary criticism, 161 texts, 171 literature, 171 locality, ix market, 112,116,123,132,146,151 Marxism,-ist, 3,85,88 masculine gaze, 15, 44 masculinity, 21, 31,56, 57 master concepts, 46 media, 118,119,125 mediascapes, 11,78 men, 43,169 minorities, 15, 99 mission civilisatrice, 103 mode of production, ix modernity, x, 8,44,45, 77,82,153

ideascapes, 11, 78 identity, 7,14,15,16, 20, 21, 22, 26, 30,31,32,33,35> 37,39,41,42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 50, 52, 53, 545, 55,56,57, 62, 64, 70, 83, 89,104, 182

SUBJECT INDEX pastiniper.ali.sm, 3, 7,154 poststructuralists, 157 postmodemity,-ism, x, 8, 34, 36, 39, 71, 73, 74, 77,136,153,154,157 Protestant Ethic, 31 psychoanalysis, 47

modernization theory, 141 modernization, x movements, 115 multicultaralism, 55, 56, 79 multiculturality, 71, 87 muscology, 152 museums, 153 music, 38, 94,119,120,125,132, 133,147

race, ix, 7,15, 60, 62,150,168 racism, 7,14, 26, 55, 56 region. 17, 22,150 relativism, 15, 73, 92,135 religiones, 79, 83, 88, 92, 95,101 relocalization, 12 renationalization, 12 representation, 14,16, 20, 21, 2.8, 34,

nation-states, 4,17, 20, 24, 25, 26, 27, 44,62,78, 87, 93,96,97, 99, 133,141,142,152 national society, 9,15 nationalism, 4,16, 30, 33, 35, 69, 71, 78, 87, 92, 93, 96,118,127 new international information order, 117 non-European, 72

35, 37, 49, 66, 67, 70, 73,150,151, 156,159,167,173 "routinization of charisma", 101 school systems, 93, 97 sciences, 98 semiotics, 3 sexual, division of labor, 30, 45 difference, 49 identity, 21 sexuality, 50,158,169 social science, 83 social theory, 82 socialism, 64, 74 societalism, 15, 87 societalization, 80 society, nationally-defined, 3,1.0,15 society ,-ies, 79, 93,126 sociology, 75, 82,171 South Korean workers, 3 space, 116,117,150,151 space, production of, 12 space economy, 151 state,-s, 17,112,113,116,126,128 structu ration theory, 86

objectification, 132 orientalists, 140 Ottoman history, 141 painting, ix particularism, 71, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 89,103,145 peace movement, 17,115 perestroika, 89 "peripheral corruption", 108,109, 124,139 photography,-ies, 18, 37, 59,155, 15?, 158,159 planfatfons, 48, 49,115,151 poIit.ics,-ical, 50, 51, 52. 57, 59, 61, 62, 63, 81,100,117,150,156,169 polyethnicity, 71, 79,86,87 post-Fordist, 30 postcolonial,-ism, 3, 5, 6, 7, 9,10, 13,141,142,154,166 183

SUBJECT I N D E X technology, 93,120,133,159 technoscapes, 10 television, 27,87,119,120,146 territory, 116,118,119,126 Thatcherism, 23,25, 26, 27,31,32, 66 Third World, 8,13,17, 23, 83,110, 124,126,133,143,166 time, 127 totalizations, 156 town, 150 townscapes, 11 Turkish migrants, 3,133

visual representation, 150 texts, 171 war of positions, 57 West, the, 13,15, 28,33,38,39,44, 46,62,83,152,154,166,169 Western episteme, 44 Westernization, 153 women, 26, 43, 58, 80, 81,103, 111, 132,133,169,170; 171 women's movement, 17,115 working class, English, 4, 58,151 world consciousness, 92 world cities, 18,152 world economy, viii, 20,98,151,

uni vers cloisonnée, 134 universal, 68, 91,100 universalization, 69, 75, 77 universalism, 71, 73, 74, 75, 76, 78, 80, 89,103,145 urban design, ix urban form, 150 urban planning, 152 urbanism, xi, 12,18 Utilitarians, 83

153 (see also capitalist world , economy) world culture, 16, 91, 94, 98,103, 111, 116 world, 11,17 world-system,-s, ix, xi, xii, 1, 4, 9, 10,11,12, 70,71, 74, 79,82,87, 92, 97,98,100,114,115,118,147, 149,154,156,161,162,164,172 worldism, 15, 73 writing,, ix, 119

1

Vietnamese community, 3 visual markers, 150

Notes on Contributors

Barbara A b o u - E l - H a j is associate professor of art history at Binghamton University, State University of N e w York. She is the author of The Medieval Cult of Saints: Formations and Transformations (Cambridge a n d N e w York: Cambridge University Press, 1994). Janet A b u - L u g h o d is professor of sociology and director (Urban Research) Center o n Lower Manhattan, N e w School Research. H e r most recent book is The World System in the Century: Dead-End or Precursor? (Washington, D . C . : American Association, 1994).

of R E A L M for Social Thirteenth Historical

Stuart H a l l is professor of sociology at the Open University, U K . H e was previously director' of 'the Centre for Contemporary C u l t u r a l Studies at the University of Birmingham. H i s most recent book (with D a v i d H e l d a n d Tony M c G r e w ) is Modernity and Its Futures (Cambridge: Polity, i n association w i t h the Open University, 1992). In 1989, H a l l was Distinguished Visiting Scholar i n A r t History at the State U n i versity of N e w York at Binghamton. LTf Hannerz is professor a n d chair of the Department of Social Anthropology at the University of Stockholm and director of the research project "The W o r l d System of C u l t u r e " there. H i s most recent book is Transnational Connections (London and N e w York: Routledge, 1996). A n t h o n y D . K i n g is professor of art history a n d of sociology at Binghamton University, State University of N e w York. H e is the author of Global Cities: Post-Imperialism and the Internationalisation of London (London a n d N e w York: Routledge, 1990) .and editor of Re-Presenting the City: Ethnicity, Capital and Culture in the 21st-century Metropolis (London: M a c m i l l a n ; N e w York: N e w York University Press, 1996).

184

R o l a n d Robertson is professor of sociology .and of religious studies at the University of Pittsburgh. H e is the author' of numerous books, and papers on various aspects of the global situation, including Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture (London, N e w b u r y Park, and Delhi: Sage, 1992). J o h n Tagg is professor of art history at Binghamton University, State University of N e w York, and (1996-97) Fellow at the Society of H u manities, Cornell University. H i s most recent book is Grounds of Dispute: Art History, Cultural Politics, and the Discursive Field (London: Macmillan; Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992). M a u r e e n Turirn • is professor of f i l m studies and English at the U n i versity of Florida, Gainesville. H e r most recent book is Flashbacks in Film: History and Memory (London and N e w York: Routledge, 1989). Immanuel Wallerstein is Distinguished Professor of Sociology and d i rector of the F e m a n d Braudel Center for the Study of Economies, H i s torical Systems, and Civilizations at Bmghamton University, State U n i - *" versify of N e w York. His. most recent book is After Liberalism (New York: N e w Press, 1995). Janet W o l f f is professor of art history and director of the V i s u a l and Cultural Studies Program at the University of Rochester. H e r most recent book is Resident Alien: Feminist Cultural Criticism (Cambridge:: Polity, 1995).

186