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Cuban Communism
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Cuban Communism 1959-2003 Irving Louis Horowitz Jaime Suchlicki editors
11th Edition
Transaction Publishers New Brunswick (U.S.A.) and London (U.K.)
New material in this edition copyright © 2003 by Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, New Jersey. Previous editions copyright © 1970, 1972, 1977, 1981, 1984, 1987, 1989, 1995, 1998, 2001. All rights reserved under International and Pan-American Copyright Conventions. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publisher. All inquiries should be addressed to Transaction Publishers, Rutgers—The State University, 35 Berrue Circle, Piscataway, New Jersey 088548042. This book is printed on acid-free paper that meets the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials. Library of Congress Catalog Number: 2003044787 ISBN: 0-7658-0520-0 Printed in the United States of America Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Cuban communism / Irving Louis Horowitz and Jaime Suchlicki, editors.—11th ed. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 0-7658-0520-0 (pbk.) 1. Cuba—Economic conditions—1990- 2. Cuba—Social conditions—19593. Cuba—Politics and government—1959- 4. Cuba—Armed Forces. 5. Communism—Cuba. 6. Cuba—History. I. Horowitz, Irving Louis. II. Suchlicki, Jaime. HC152.5.C799 2003 972.9106' 4—dc21
2003044787
Contents Acknowledgments INTRODUCTION Irving Louis Horowitz and Jaime Suchlicki Part 1 History 1 One Hundred Years of Ambiguity: U.S.-Cuba Relations in the 20th Century Irving Louis Horowitz
ix xiii
3
2. Cuba: The United States and Batista, 1952-1958 Hugh Thomas
12
3. The Sierra and the Plains Roberto Luque Escalona
21
4. Guerrillas at War Marta San Martín and Ramón L. Bonachea
36
5. Learning from the Missile Crisis Max Frankel
58
6. Immutable Proclamations and Unintended Consequences Luis E. Aguilar
69
7. Fidelismo: The Unfulfilled Ideology Tad Szulc
86
Part 2 Economy 8. The Cuban Economy in 1999-2001: Evaluation of Performance Carmelo Mesa-Lago 9. Labor Conditions in Revolutionary Cuba Efren Córdova and Eduardo García Moure
99
122
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10. The Political Economy of Caudillismo Mary Katherine Crabb
134
11. Market-Oriented Marxism: Post-Cold War Transition in Cuba and Vietnam Julie M. Bunck
154
12. Waiting for Godot: Cuba’s Stalled Reforms and Continuing Economic Crisis Jorge F. Pérez López
176
13. Cuba’s Transition from Communism to Political and Economic Freedom Antonio Jorge
198
14. Economic Organizations and Post-Castro Cuba Ernesto F. Betancourt
210
Part 3 Society 15. Searching for Civil Society in Cuba Damian J. Fernandez
225
16. The Conventionalization of Collective Behavior Benigno E. Aguirre
241
17. The Internet and U.S. Policy toward Cuba Taylor C. Boas
266
18. Women, Family and the Cuban Revolution Marisela Fleites Lear
276
19. Health Care in Cuba Tim Golden
303
20. Cuba’s Refugees: Manifold Migrations Silvia Pedraza
308
21. The Moral Basis of Cuban Society Emilio Ichikawa Morin
329
Part 4 Military 22. Political-Military Relations from 1959 to the Present Phyllis Greene Walker
343
Contents
vii
23. Vanguard of the State: The Cuban Armed Forces in Transition Juan Carlos Espinosa
366
24. Military Origin and Evolution of the Cuban Revolution Irving Louis Horowitz
388
25. The Cuban Armed Forces: Changing Roles, Continued Loyalties Juan M. del Aguila
415
26. Cuban Military Influences on Political and Economic Decision-Making Jaime Suchlicki
428
Part 5 Polity 27. Why the Cuban Regime Has Not Fallen Jorge I. Domínguez
435
28. Cuba: Without Subsidies Jaime Suchlicki
443
29. Cuba: Economic Sanctions and American Diplomacy Susan Kaufman Purcell
451
30. Cuba and the United States: Back to the Beginning Mark Falcoff
471
31. Much Ado About Something?: Regime Change in Cuba Eusebio Mujal-León and Joshua W. Busby
491
32. The Cuban Revolution and Its Acolytes Carlos Alberto Montaner
513
33. After Fidel, What?: Forecasting Institutional Changes in Cuba Josep M. Colomer
523
Part 6 Transition to Civil Society 34. The United States and Cuba: Future Security Issues Brian Latell 35. Role of the United States and International Lending Institutions in Cuba’s Transition Sergio Díaz-Briquets
541
555
36. Three Variations on Communist Successor Regimes Edward Gonzalez
569
37. Festina Lente—The United States and Cuba After Castro Michael Radu
590
38. Humanitarian Assistance during a Democratic Transition in Cuba Andrew S. Natsios
607
39. Economic and Social Disparities in Cuba: Recommendations for Change Carmelo Mesa-Lago
620
APPENDICES I. Chronology of the Cuban Revolution: 1959–2002
637
II. Current and Past Revolutionary Leaders
678
III. Chronology of Cuba and the Middle East: 2000–2002
695
IV. Castro and Terrorism: Chronology and Glossary
699
V. Fidel Castro on the United States: Selected Statements, 1958-2003
711
Contributors
729
Acknowledgments Ch. 1. Irving Louis Horowitz, “One Hundred Years of Ambiguity: U.S.-Cuba Relations in the 20th Century,” originally published in The National Interest, Number 67 (Spring 2002), pp. 58-64. Ch. 2. Hugh Thomas, “Cuba, The United States and Batista, 1952-1958.” Lecture prepared for the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. First published in Cuban Communism (6th edition), 1986, pp. 3-12. Ch. 3. Roberto Luque Escalona, “The Sierra and the Plains,” The Tiger and the Children: Fidel Castro and the Judgment of History. New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers, 1992, pp. 94-115. Ch. 4. Marta San Martín and Ramón L. Bonachea, originally appeared as “The Military Dimension of the Cuban Revolution,” adapted from The Cuban Insurrection, 1952-1959. New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers, 1974. Ch. 5. Max Frankel, originally published as “Learning from the Missile Crisis: What Really Happened on Those Thirteen Fateful Days in October,” Smithsonian, October 2002, pp. 53-64 Ch. 6. Luis E. Aguilar, originally appeared as “From Immutable Proclamations to Unintended Consequences: Marxism-Leninism and the Cuban Government.” Prepared and first published in Cuban Communism (6th edition), 1986, pp. 140-159. Ch. 7. Tad Szulc, originally published as “Fidelismo,” The Wilson Quarterly. Volume 12, Number 5 (1988), pp. 49-63. Ch. 8. Carmelo Mesa-Lago, originally appeared in Cuba in Transition—Volume 11. Washington, DC: Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy, 2001. Revised for publication in Cuban Communism (11th edition), 2003. Ch. 9. Efren Córdova and Eduardo García Moure, originally appeared as “Modern Slavery: Labor Conditions in Cuba,” Institute for Cuban & Cuban American Studies Occasional Paper Series, University of Miami, April 2000. Revised for publication in Cuban Communism (10th edition), 2000. Ch. 10. Mary Katherine Crabb, originally entitled “Politics and the Culture of Work in the Dual Economy” and presented as a paper at the Association for the ix
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Study of the Cuban Economy, Coral Gables, Florida, August 6–8, 1999. Revised for publication in Cuban Communism (10th edition), 2000. Ch. 11. Julie M. Bunck, “Market-Oriented Marxism: Post-Cold War Transition in Cuba and Vietnam,” Cuban Studies, Volume 26, Number 1, (1996), pp. 35–59. Ch. 12. Jorge F. Pérez-López, originally published as “Waiting for Godot: Cuba’s Stalled Reforms and Continuing Economic Crisis,” Problems of Post-Communism, Volume 48, Number 6 (November-December 2001), pp. 43-55. Ch. 13. Antonio Jorge, originally entitled “Cuba’s Transition from Communism to Political and Economic Freedom,” presented as a paper for the Cuba Transition Project of the Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies of the University of Miami, August 2002. Revised for publication in Cuban Communism (11th edition), 2003. Ch. 14. Ernesto F. Betancourt, originally entitled “International Organizations and Post-Castro’s Cuba,” presented as a paper for the Cuba Transition Project of the Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies of the University of Miami, August 2002. Revised for publication in Cuban Communism (11th edition), 2003. Ch. 15. Damian J. Fernandez, originally published as “Society, Civil Society, and the State: An Uneasy Three-Way Affair,” Problems of Post-Communism, Volume 48, Number 6 (November-December 2001), pp. 56-63. Ch. 16. Benigno E. Aguirre, originally published as “The Conventionalization of Collective Behavior in Cuba,” in The American Journal of Sociology. Volume 90, Number 3 (1985), pp. 541-566. Ch. 17. Taylor C. Boas, originally published as “The Dictator’s Dilemma?: The Internet and U.S. Policy toward -Cuba,” Washington Quarterly, Volume 23, Number 3 (Summer 2000), pp. 57-67. Ch. 18. Marisela Fleites-Lear, originally entitled “Women, Family, and the Cuban Revolution: A Personal and Socio-Political Analysis” and presented as a paper at the Latin American Studies Association Congress, Washington, DC, September 1995. Revised for publication in Cuban Communism (10th edition), 2000. Ch. 19. Tim Golden, “Health Care in Cuba” from The New York Times, October 15 (1994). Ch. 20. Silvia Pedraza, “Cuba’s Refugees: Manifold Migrations,” longer version originally published in Origins and Destinies: Immigration, Race, and Ethnicity in America, Silvia Pedraza and Ruben G. Rumbaut, editors, Belmont, Cal.: Wadsworth Press, reprinted with permission.
Acknowledgments
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Ch. 21. Emilio Ichikawa Morin, originally published as “The Moral Basis of Cuban Society,” in Society. Volume 40, Number 3, March/April 2003, pp. 64-71. Ch. 22. Phyllis Greene Walker, originally appeared as “Political-Military Relations Since 1959,” in Conf lict and Change in Cuba, edited by Enrique A. Baloyra and James A. Morris. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1993, pp. 110-135. Ch. 23. Juan Carlos Espinosa, originally published as “Vanguard of the State: The Cuban Armed Forces in Transition,” Problems of Post-Communism, Volume 48, Number 6 (November-December 2001), pp. 19-30. Ch. 24. Irving Louis Horowitz, originally published as “Military Origins and Outcomes of the Cuban Revolution,” Armed Forces and Society. Volume 1, Number 4 (1975), pp. 402-18; and Volume 3, Number 4 (1977), pp. 617-31. Ch. 25. Juan M. del Aguila, “The Cuban Armed Forces: Changing Roles, Continued Loyalties,” first published in Cuban Communism (9th edition), 1998. Ch. 26. Jaime Suchlicki, “Cuban Military Influences on Political and Economic Decision Making.” Prepared for and first published in Cuban Communism (10th edition), 2000. Ch. 27. Jorge I. Domínguez, “Why The Cuban Regime Has Not Fallen,” testimony before the U.S. Advisory Panel on Radio Marti and Television Marti” (1994). First published in the eighth edition of Cuban Communism, 1989. Ch. 28. Jaime Suchlicki, “Cuba: Without Subsidies,” Cuba Brief (March, 1997), pp. 3-7. Ch. 29. Susan Kaufman Purcell, originally appeared as “Cuba” in Economic Sanctions and America Diplomacy, edited by Richard N. Haas. New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1998. Excerpted with permission of the publisher. Ch. 30. Mark Falcoff, “Cuba and the United States: Back to the Beginning,” World Affairs, Volume 156, Number 3 (Winter 1994), pp. 111-123. Ch. 31. Eusebio Mujal-León and Joshua W. Busby, originally published as “Much Ado About Something?: Regime Change in Cuba,” Problems of Post-Communism, Volume 48, Number 6 (November-December 2001), pp. 6-18. Ch. 32. Carlos Alberto Montaner, “The Cuban Revolution and Its Acolytes,” Society, Volume 31, Number 5 (1994), pp. 73-80. Ch. 33. Josep M. Colomer, “After Fidel, What? Forecasting Institutional Change in Cuba,” first published in Cuban Communism (9th edition), 1998.
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Ch. 34. Brian Latell, “The United States and Cuba: Future Security Issues,” Studies in Comparative International Development, Volume 34, Number 4 (Winter) 2000, pp. 87–99. Ch. 35. Sergio Díaz-Briquets, “Role of the United States and International Lending Institutions in Cuba’s Transition,” Studies in Comparative International Development, Volume 34, Number 4 (Winter) 2000, pp. 73–86. Ch. 36. Edward Gonzalez, originally entitled “After Castro: Alternative Regimes and U.S. Policy,” prepared for the Cuba Transition Project of the Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies of the University of Miami. Revised for publication in Cuban Communism (11th edition), 2003. Ch. 37. Michael Radu, “Festina Lente—The United States and Cuba After Castro,” Studies in Comparative International Development, Volume 34, Number 4 (Winter) 2000, pp. 7–22. Ch. 38. Andrew S. Natsios, “Humanitarian Assistance during a Democratic Transition in Cuba,” Studies in Comparative International Development, Volume 34, Number 4 (Winter) 2000, pp. 23–33. Ch. 39. Carmelo Mesa-Lago, originally entitled “Growing Economic and Social Disparities in Cuba: Impact and Recommendations for Change,” prepared for the Cuba Transition Project of the Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies of the University of Miami. Revised for publication in Cuban Communism (11th edition), 2003. Appendix I. “Chronology of the Cuban Revolution: 1959-2002,” prepared for and updated in Cuban Communism (11th edition), 2003. Appendix II. “Current and Past Revolutionary Leaders,” prepared for and updated in Cuban Communism (11th edition), 2003. Appendix III. “Chronology of Cuba and the Middle East: 2000-2002,” prepared for Cuban Communism (11th edition), 2003. Appendix IV. “Castro and Terrorism: Chronology and Glossary,” prepared for Cuban Communism (11th edition), 2003. Appendix V. “Fidel Castro on the United States: Selected Statements, 1958– 2003,” prepared for Cuban Communism (11th edition), 2003.
Introduction to the 11th edition of Cuban Communism “Tyranny consists in the desire of universal power beyond its scope.” Blaise Pascal, Thoughts (Number 332).
I. Long Term Perspectives From the very outset of Cuban Communism, predictions of its demise were made—sometimes quietly, and at other times as a crescendo of self-declared expertise. But over and against what should have taken place, a countertendency emerged—since no such counterrevolution occurred, none could take place. In some measure such predictive extremes were a reflection of the passions the Castro era has generated. Hope replaced reason and passion displaced evidence. In such an environment, the eleven editions of Cuban Communism have served as a beacon for the accurate measurement of events. It has done so in the belief that a free society is indeed far superior to a totalitarian one, and acknowledges that statements of values, however personally satisfying, do not replace the need for careful, factual analysis. This prolegomenon registered, it is fair to say that however important the history, politics, economics and social structure of Cuba may be to the study of the present, it is also the case that the desire to know, nay predict, the future of Castro’s Cuba remains a subtext in a great deal of analysis disguised as purely objective. The steady drumbeat of essays and articles on the “transition” of Cuba attests to precisely this brew of what exists and what we want to exist. This volume, the latest and hopefully the last in the series of volumes on Cuban Communism, attempts to appreciate the admixture of sentiments without falling prey to its worst curses—dogmatic, subjective, and ideological thinking. In serving as the informal record of the progress—if that is the proper word—of the Cuban Revolution, it is our view that this compendium has performed its tasks ably, and at times, brilliantly. One of the grand luxuries of wealthy and large nations is their ability to develop a division of policy labors. As a result, we have an entity called “foreign policy” and another called “domestic policy” or sometimes “national policy.”
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Small and dependent nations like Cuba really do not have such luxuries either of definitions or actions. When we look at Cuba today—at the start of the 44th year of the Castro regime—what we observe is a mélange of events superimposed on one another. To some degree these are domestic policies driven by foreign exigencies, and in other instances, one finds foreign adventures that drive domestic affairs. Whatever the causal chain may be, the fusion and the interaction of domestic and foreign, national and international, is increasingly a hall mark of small nations, none more so than Cuba since 1959. Indeed, it is a high irony of Castro that friend and foe alike harbor a certain admiration for his unwillingness to resign himself to such a sizing down. Yet, the wear and tear of trying to achieve grandeur in a context of small nationhood has finally proven too much even for Fidel. That he felt the need in mid2002 to respond to the Varela Project—a modest effort to petition for a new referendum—by insisting upon a massive show of inflated support, attests to the prospect that time is running out on el comandante. The laws of entropy are greater than even his massive ego can resist. The establishment of 120,000 petition stations across Cuba, and the mobilization of seven to eight million people, or roughly one hundred percent of people on the island over sixteen years of age, does little to reassure the rest of the world. More importantly, it does little to assuage the Cuban people themselves that this call for a constitutional amendment declaring Cuba’s presumably “Marxist socialist” economic, political and social system to be inviolable and unchangeable, is worth any more than the paper on which the petitions are printed. Underlining the present moment of regime desperation are economic circumstances over which Castro has little influence. Cuba during its 44 years of Communism has proven woefully unable to break the shackles of a single-crop economy. It has continued to rely on one crop, sugar, to supply other requirements for the society. Two main factors have limited the impact of such a policy: the continued plummeting of world sugar prices due to a glutted market caused by global overproduction, and of greater consequence, the severe deterioration of Cuban sugar mills themselves. Despite mobilization of the state apparatus, the sugar harvest is only slightly more than in previous years. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the sugar production of Cuba has plummeted from 8.1 million tons in 1989 (the last year of Soviet subsidies) to the present level of about 3.6 million tons. Cuba is now undertaking a program of closing 71 out of 156 currently operating mills. The breakdown of equipment, the inability of Cuba to maintain any sort of technological competition with other nations, has led to a situation in which falling production now reflects declining world prices. The limited ability to purchase oil with sugar has now reached crisis proportions. To further complicate matters, the tourist industry, which was to pick up the slack in sugar production, suffered greatly after the terrorist bombings of the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001. For the first half
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of 2002, tourism to Cuba was off 14 percent from the same period one year earlier. Again, the problem is not simply the international decline in air traffic, but the relatively unattractive situation in Cuba with respect to tourist facilities. People on holidays are not looking for political slogans so much as pleasant personal situations for a limited time. The malaise of the national economy of Cuba feeds into polarizing consequences. The service sector displaces the production sector in the search for surplus. Indeed, in an effort to attract European tourists, the Cuban economic ministry has said it would allow the Euro currency to circulate alongside the U.S. dollar. But even this has a cost to the regime. It heightens the already considerable gap between have and have not individuals, namely, those who benefit from foreign currency speculation and exchange from those confined to the domestic Cuban currency. The idea of a “Marxist” regime heightening the gaps between people in the economic and social realms is clearly an unanticipated consequence of the desperate search for new sources of state revenues. A third element in Cuban life that both props the economy and unbalances any prospects for stability is the remission of considerable sums of money from Cuban Americans to relatives and families in Cuba proper. Such remittances, estimated by The Economist to total $800 million annually at the start of 2003, provide the regime with much needed hard currencies with which to make critical foreign payments and purchases. However, it also “dollarizes” the economy. As a consequence, the internal gulf between haves and have-nots is further exaggerated, making for a strain within the economic and social stratification of Cuban society that can hardly be addressed, much less resolved. Foreign currency remissions pushes further back what was once the primary goal of Castro’s regime: the creation of an egalitarian society—even at low levels of earnings and opportunities. As an indicator of how deeply global events have disrupted the national economy, one needs look at the Venezuela coup and counter-coup. Although Venezuela President Hugo Chavez managed to retain state power, the dubious price of doing so was restoring some semblance of rationality to Venezuela’s oilbased economy. Before the golpe, Venezuela supplied Cuba with more than 50,000 barrels of oil a day—about a third of the island’s requirements. Much of this was to be financed at a two percent rate of interest over a fifteen-year time frame. One of the first pronouncements during the brief spell that Chavez was out of office was an announcement by Petroleos de Venezuela that the Venezuelan nation would immediately cease the shipment of petroleum to Cuba. While it was assumed that ideology would trump economy once again, and Chavez would restore shipments to Castro, the strikes and turmoil that have gripped Venezuela under its military dictatorial period frustrated such resumption. The Cuban government has confirmed that it has received few recent petroleum benefits from Venezuela. Moreover, it has been forced to turn to the spot market and spend “dozens of millions” of dollars in order to obtain oil. The instability of
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the Chavez regime at this point makes it difficult to predict whether any meaningful or permanent resumption of petroleum shipments from Venezuela to Cuba can take place. While it would be illusory to presume that economic reality will displace political despotism—indeed, such “economic determinism” has continually been proven wrong in the past—Cuba’s current economic distress coupled with even modest political resistance and social disorder, makes the prospects for closure of the Castro era appear considerably closer at hand than at any time in the past 44 years. Certainly, it is now reasonable to consider a variety of scenarios for a transitional government after the termination of the Castro regime. The great strength of Castro has been a network of political organizations, from the block level to the women and youth brigades that owe a special allegiance to the regime for its central position in the society. But this depends heavily on some form of reward system—less than for the upper echelons of the armed forces, but still real—from privileges in newly constructed housing units to job favoritism working in industries that have contact with foreign, such as hotel waiters and bank managers. But even if the system cannot readily be toppled by economic rationality, the problem for Castro and his associates remains real: how to maintain ideological fervor and street-level mobilization in such a downwardly spiraling political economy. The limits of charisma should be sorely tested in the near term. Nonetheless, the failure to institutionalize the revolution, to move to a next generation of top echelon political leadership, does not necessarily spell the end of the regime as such. The emergence of dynastic communism, of a hierarchy built upon patronage and family ties, has proven resilient in places as far removed as North Korea and Syria, and is clearly what the Castro brothers envision for Cuba. It will hardly be the first time in history that personal vanity tinged by a sense of infallibility could result less in reform than in reaction. But this pattern of continuing dictatorship might itself also serve as a long-term trigger to rebellion and restitution of democratic norms. With the rest of Latin America serving as onlookers to Cuba’s collapse, rather than active supporters, the time for change in Cuba may actually be closer at hand than skeptics might imagine. In any event, the play of national and global forces has now reached a stage that can hardly be met, much less resolved, by manifestations of support or cooked-up signature drives to assure the great dictator that he still sits, albeit uneasily, on his proletarian throne. The primary evidence for a necessary, if indeed insufficient, cause for such a systemic collapse is the woeful performance of the Cuban economy. Despite the regime’s total dedication to maintain the peso as the currency of the nation, it declined 22.7 percent in 2001, with the same tendencies taking place in 2002. Indeed, the situation has worsened as a result of the decline in tourism from Europe and the deterioration of sugar revenues as mentioned above. A July 2002 report filed from Havana by Marc Frank on behalf of Reuters News Agency
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declares that “the dollar would be trading at 40 pesos to the dollar if not for a government imposed freeze on the exchange rate.” The difficulty is that in the managed Cuban economy, the government is spending more money while declining revenues indicate lower solvency. It is evident that the return to solvency of the last decade has run out of steam in the present decade. As a result, it is hardly an exaggeration to say that Cuba is long in a protracted period best described as a crisis in the socialist state economy—that sector that employs more than 90 percent of the labor force. The political contradictions within the Cuban system have become irrevocable. For the sham vote of 99.7 percent of Cuban people signing onto an amendment to the Constitution making the socialist system irreversible, only served to highlight the brittle character of the regime. The imaginary support for Castro exceeds even the fantasies of Stalin’s popular vote during the heyday of the Soviet terror. What this points to is an insoluble contradiction between Castro’s evident desire to open the economy to globalization, while maintaining a closed political system at home. Thus it would appear that in areas where the United States embargo is simply not an operative factor, the contradictions of the socialist state appear manifest. Indeed, The Economist, in its first issue for 2003, estimates that the United States is already the tenth largest trading partner for Cuba, despite the retention of the embargo. But even these purchases for food create secondary contradictions, since other foreign trading partners dealing in credit envy the position of the United States, dealing with Cuba only in cash. As the recent (2002) memorandum of European investors has made clear, there are a series of obstacles to doing business that are so prejudicial and egregious, as to deter even the most dedicated entrepreneur from going into present-day Cuba. A litany of complaints are cited—from customs and import charges, residence and work permits and visas, inflation of labor charges that bear no relation to actual labor performance or level of tasks needed, to a tax system that requires payment by foreign companies in dollars, while in reverse, offering Cuban pesos in payment of its outstanding obligations, and even the methods of charging payment. The fiscal system as a whole is rigged so that Cuban banks charge exorbitant fees without corresponding guarantees of payment. So it is that European commercial “good intentions” provide a road to economic hell rather than commercial parity. Having provided this brief recitation of the current situation, it is important to reiterate what we have maintained over the years: fiscal hardship and even crisis do not topple dictatorial regimes. The response of such regimes is to redistribute what wealth exists, so that there is essentially a parity of hardships—which itself reduces the risk to regime insolvency. And the regime of Fidel Castro has proven masterful at such management of scarce resources. The problem he and his government now face is how long such statist managerial techniques can keep the lid on the society itself. The redistribution of poverty is, after all, not quite the same as the distribution of wealth—and with the
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omnipresent dollar end of the economy, now reinforced by the inclusion of the Euro currency as a free floating element, the social pressures can only be expected to increase. II. Recent Trends As the first decade of the twenty-first century unfolds, several important international events are having a positive impact on Cuba and the Castro regime. There is the survival capacity of Hugo Chavez in Venezuela; the landslide electoral victory of Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva in Brazil; and the willingness of the Chinese to increase trade with and investments in Cuba. To this must be added the readiness of the U.S. Congress to liberalize the longstanding embargo of the island which is encouraging Cuban leaders in their attempt to muddle through the difficult period following the collapse of the Soviet Union. These events, while not likely to alleviate Cuba’s continuing economic crisis, may prove helpful to the longevity of the Castro revolution. The Chavez presidency has proven highly significant for Castro. Initially Chavez tried unsuccessfully to incorporate Cuba into the San Jose Accord. This would have provided Cuba with Venezuelan petroleum at a discounted price. Mexican and other opposition prevented Fidel’s younger comrade from achieving his goal of helping Castro. But the continued existence of the Chavez regime in Venezuela does provide a genuine, if modest source of raw materials at cheap prices. Of significant importance for Castro recently was the rise to power in January 2003 of President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva in Brazil. A close ally of Castro in Latin America and one of the founders of the Foro de Sao Paulo, a group of leftist, Marxist and revolutionary leaders, Lula could provide Cuba with long-term, concessionary credits to purchase Brazilian food products. More importantly, perhaps, will be Lula’s support for Cuba in international forums and in pressuring the United States to end its embargo of the island. The presence of Lula and Chavez in South America represent a formidable force in challenging U.S. policies with respect to the continuation of Castro’s regime in Cuba. Perhaps the most intriguing, if unanticipated, development in the past few years is the growth of Chinese investments and involvement with the Castro regime. The Chinese have built a variety of factories in the island and have invested in Cuba’s biotechnology industry. But more important is the close military relationship that has developed between China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and Castro’s Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias (FAR). The PLA is providing Cuba with military spare parts, munitions, and technology. Raul Castro and Defense Minister Chi Haotian have exchanged visits and a variety of Cuban military officers have spent time observing the Chinese economic and political experiment. China’s establishment of an eavesdropping station in Cuba and its provision of equipment to interfere with Radio Marti as well as to monitor U.S. military and commercial transmissions is of obvious concern. After the release
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of the congressional “Cox Report” detailing Chinese espionage at a U.S. nuclear laboratory, it is hardly a secret that the Chinese are operating an extensive spy network in the Western Hemisphere. So it should be no further surprise that the Chinese might want an electronic espionage base close to American shores. China is not in the same league as the Soviets were in the 1960s or 1970s, but the People’s Liberation Army hardly regards itself as a friend of the West. If it were, it would not have engaged in such potentially destabilizing practices as shipping advanced weapons to the Syrians and the Iranians. Indeed, Chinese foreign policy is patient and farsighted, In Cuba, the Chinese seem to be taking a calculated gamble: that the United States’ complex relations with and economic interest in China will prevent the Bush administration from raising a big fuss over China’s activities in Cuba. The shift from Russian to Chinese patronage is culturally significant, but the sense of Cuba as a client state of a communist regime appears as a constant. Meanwhile U.S. policy toward Cuba remains under constant pressure. U.S. agricultural groups and states, interested in selling their products to any buyers, are pressuring the U.S. Congress to ease-up on trade relations with the island. During the past 2 years Congress has allowed for Cuba to purchase for cash U.S. agricultural products. Castro has responded by purchasing about $175 million worth of American products. It is the hope of the Cuban leadership that these purchases would entice American capitalists into providing Cuba with loans and credits to buy more in the U.S. market, further eroding the U.S. embargo. Internally there have been several complicating developments in Cuba. Castro continues to cling to an outmoded economic model. Economic reforms of the mid1990s, which indicated a mild opening toward the market, have been stopped and in several cases even reversed. Politically there continues to be Castro’s opposition to even the most minimal opening. The visit of Pope John Paul II encouraged those who expected greater religious and political freedom. Neither has developed. As a matter of fact, at the beginning of a new century, the regime is increasing the persecution of dissidents and human rights activists. Cuba is undergoing a Chinese-type cultural revolution, albeit slower and less dramatic than in China, where an aging leader insists on purifying and rejuvenating “his” exhausted revolution before departing from this world. The two operative words in this collection of first-rate essays: Cuban and Communism have both lost substantial emotional steam over the course of these eleven editions. The rise of democratic politics and free market economics from Mexico to Argentina has reduced the blandishments of Castro’s Cuba to bleatings. At the same time, the collapse of communism throughout Eastern Europe inducing the end of the despotism known as the Soviet Union, has further deprived Cuba of the pretension much less the reality of servicing as a Western hemispheric vanguard of a coming socialist sweep. As is usually the case, whenever events of cataclysmic proportions take place, longstanding political conventions and ideological proclivities are also changed.
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What is often overlooked by those involved in everyday analysis of Cuba is how a remarkable consensus has been forged at the level of principles, which is to say in the overall characterization of Castro’s Cuba. If at the start of the Cuban revolution of 1959 Castro and his small band of guerrillas were the harbinger of greater things to come throughout the hemisphere (and they had every right to think so), by the start of 2003 there was a widespread consensus that Communist Cuba is an isolated regime, drifting somewhere between limbo and the backwater. From left to right, liberal and conservative opinion alike now accepts the premise that the regime has little if any potential for establishing open economic markets, competitive and multiple political parties, or free popular elections. Thus, in the midst of the heated debates that deal with the strategic issues of the U.S. embargo, there has now evolved a strong consensus that Cuban Communism is an antidemocratic ripple in the deep currents of changes that now characterize the hemisphere as a whole. As Freedom in the World reports: “Fidel Castro has shown no signs of loosening his grip on power, as cycles of repression, following harsh economic reforms, continued unabated.” The very singularity of Cuba however makes it a nation of special concern and consideration for students and policymakers alike. This said, since the previous (tenth) edition of Cuban Communism was published, significant events have taken place in the Cuban infrastructure. The economic reforms initiated in 1994-95 have come to a halt; Castro has been clamping down harshly on dissident groups in the island and the revolution has lost its luster, particularly with the young on the island which seem alienated from the system and unwilling to follow the party’s exhortations on Marxist rhetoric. As a result, a certain passive resistance has become the norm in Cuba. It underscores both the deterioration of Castro’s infrastructure and a decline in participation in social and economic activities that could possibly carry the regime to a new plateau. The Castro government has shown very few signs of making meaningful or durable concessions in the political and human rights arena recently or in the past four decades. There has been no indication that Castro intends to truly open up the island’s political or economic system or promote a peaceful solution to Cuba’s deepening crisis. History reveals various instances where strong and even autocratic political leaders have mellowed with age and softened their positions, but there is scant evidence that this is the case with Castro. On the contrary, as the Cuban leader has aged he has become more intransigent and difficult. At the Party Congress in 1997 he reaffirmed his staunch opposition to the U.S. and his unwillingness to relinquish personal power, a statements he has often repeated. During the past few years, Castro has mobilized significant resources to force the United States to lift the embargo and the travel ban. He has invited U.S. religious, political, business, and academics leaders to the island. He has
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reached out to moderate Cuban-Americans to begin a dialogue and to weaken Cuban-American opposition to a Cuba-U.S. rapprochement. He has even visited New York dressed up in a business suit, rather than his usual military uniform, enticing American entrepreneurs with a vision of a major bonanza if Cuba is opened up. Castro’s calculated moves were designed to gain time and to force the U.S. into unilateral concessions regarding the embargo and the travel ban. He hoped that U.S. and world opinion would force U.S. administrations to soften its policies and that U.S. attempts at subverting his revolution could be handled by Cuba’s efficient security apparatus. His short-term tactically motivated actions did not envision the dismantling of communism in Cuba or weakening of his personal power over the Cuban people. On the contrary during the past few years Castro has become concerned with the continuity of the revolution once he disappears. He has been attempting to imbue the masses with a new sense of anti-Americanism through mass mobilizations and in the educational system. He also has been emphasizing the need for a smooth succession of power. The last Party Congress reasserted Raul Castro’s position as the undisputed heir to Fidel Castro’s dynasty. Both in the party’s private meetings and in public, Fidel praised his brother and summoned the faithful to support him. Raul’s position as vice president, head of the military, and second secretary of the party makes him the obvious replacement for Fidel. Clearly, the older brother wanted to make it clear to the party cadres and the population-at-large that the younger brother, as his anointed heir does, should be supported and obeyed and that his leadership would be best for the future of Cuba. The succession from dictatorial father to dictatorial son has been successfully concluded in Communist North Korea as well as in Syria and Jordan. It remains to be seen if the same or similar dynastic processes can be implemented in a Communist Cuba. The Elian Gonzalez case highlighted certain large-scale problems in American foreign policy toward Cuba’s communist regime. Among the most telling of these is an unease over immigration policy as a whole, providing a temporary alliance of residual left-wing support for Castro and rising nativist sentiments on the right. The case also revealed smoldering resentment toward the CubanAmerican enclave in Miami, especially the sense of its economic gains and linguistic commitment to Spanish, again uniting diverse elements such as Haitians who felt slighted and those who dislike multiculturalism as a disguise for bilingualism. Finally, public opinion leaned heavily to the idea that a child should be united with a surviving parent, whatever the politics of that parent—even one loyal to the Castro regime. In microcosm, the fate of a single child indicated just how entangled policy considerations could become with respect to presentday Cuba. However, with respect to the structure of Cuban Communism as such, while this case accentuated the suspicions and hostilities that have been built up over four decades between Miami Cuban-Americans and Havana’s Communist leadership, it does not necessarily change the parameters of the system as such.
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Indeed, it has been argued that the Elian Gonzalez custody battle was a diplomatic coup for Fidel Castro. At the same time, it can justifiably be claimed that this case has again focused attention on the character of the Castro regime in a none too favorable light even among those Americans who believed that a child should have been united with a surviving parent. So at year-end 2002, the most important “on the ground” factor is the continuing survival of the Castro regime, with allies throughout the Third World, but also with powerful critics in parts of the Third World, and not least in advanced democratic nations. Policy concessions and constructive engagement did not work in the past. They are not likely to shake Castro’s faith in a socialist future. Commitment to anti-Americanism, personal rule, and virulent internationalism, remain the cornerstones of Castro’s policies. Faced with the approaching end of his life and his fear that once he is gone “his” revolution will change course and Cuba would end up as another friendly Caribbean island close to the United States, Castro is unlikely to open up either the economy or the political system to fresh winds of change. It might well be the case that impending better relations with the U.S. will be seen and feared by the Cuban leadership as an attempt to subvert the revolution and will lead to tightening political control. Whatever may be the tactical considerations of the moment, on the basis of Castro’s stated beliefs and recent actions, as long as Cuba remains under Castro’s dominion, it will continue as a Communist project. As a project, Cuban Communism was undertaken in splendid isolation from and opposition to the course of history in the Americas-and for that matter, the rest of the contemporary world. This eleventh edition of Cuban Communism is thus offered at a time of economic crisis for the founding generation of the Revolution of 1959. Precisely how this new set of circumstances will play out in the short run is still difficult to say. Offsetting economic difficulties for the Cuban regime are political victories for hemispheric neighbors that feel powerful affinities for Cuban Communism. To modify the famous saying of John Maynard Keynes, in the long run we may not, after all, be dead, but the current regime of Cuba’s aging dictator might be. Irving Louis Horowitz, Rutgers University Jaime Suchlicki, University of Miami January 17, 2003
Part 1 History
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1 One Hundred Years of Ambiguity: U.S.-Cuba Relations in the 20th Century Irving Louis Horowitz Double standards are inspiration to men of letters, but they are apt to be fatal to politicians.… Modern politics is, at bottom, a struggle not of men but of forces. The men become every year more and more creatures of force, massed about central powerhouses. The conf lict is no longer between the men, but between the motors that drive the men, and the men tend to succumb to their own motive forces. —Henry Adams (The Education of Henry Adams, 1905–06, chapter XXVIII).
Much ink has been spilled to determine whether Fidel Castro was a Communist before his seizure of power in 1959, or whether he became one at some later date. While the results are inconclusive, what is certain is that Castro was a Cuban nationalist long before the triumph of the July 26th Movement. Understanding Castro’s Cuba therefore requires examination of that nationalism—its historical roots and its political consequences—as much or more than examination of Castro’s communism. This, in turn, obliges us to study the imperfect origins of independence in Cuba itself. Such study requires a century-long retrospective, not just a look at the 42 years in which the Castro regime has held political power. Two dates stand out in the American-Cuban relationship: 1898 (the year Spain surrendered Cuba to the United States following the Spanish-American War), and 1959 (the year the Soviet shadow to the Cuban Revolution ended any chance of resolving the contentious issues dividing Havana and Washington). There are other critical dates in Cuban internal political dynamics, such as
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1925–33, the period of the Gerardo Machado dictatorship, and 1934–59, the populist-militarist era of the Fulgencio Batista dictatorship. But they do not matter nearly as much as 1898 and 1959, which is a sad reflection of the fact that, unlike most other countries, Cuba’s political history has been marked by popular passivity and hence a tendency toward largely undisturbed military and then totalitarian rule. Despite the importance and drama of the Spanish-American War, 1902 is a better starting date for this narrative than 1898 because it was only after the four years of American colonial hegemony that Cuba could begin to define its status as an independent nation. The four-year interregnum between 1898 and 1902 demonstrates the simple fact that real liberation, much less democracy, cannot be given—certainly not by the armed forces of an occupying power. National independence must be earned; it must be won against opposition. What the United States was able to provide, and the wisest thing in its power to grant, was schooling in the practices of a free and autonomous society. The Cubans were allowed to act as if they had won and created some of the basic rights and duties of a democratic nation. The immediate consequence of this was to heighten a note of ambiguity in a political situation already less than clearcut. As it happened, Cuba has been unable, ever since 1902, to clarify its status vis-à-vis the United States. This was not entirely the fault of Cubans. The native Cuban regime in 1902 was established under the ostensible protection of the Platt Amendment, which was terminated only in 1934 as a part of the Good Neighbor Policy. Thus, in 1902 and 1934, not much less than in 1898 and 1959— and, of course, in October 1962—external forces rather than internal actors determined the course of Cuba’s national existence. Around these dates one may plot, so to speak, Cuba’s one hundred years of ambiguity. Cuba has never been the master of its own fate in its independence struggles. Without minimizing the bitterness of the Cuban popular classes against Spanish colonial rule—or, for that matter, the bravery of the Cuban guerrillas who fought the best troops of the Spanish empire—the plain fact of the matter is that the United States and Spain set the terms of Cuban independence. Native forms of national struggle were not entirely absent; indeed, by 1897 it became evident that the Spaniards were unable to impose a purely political or legal solution on the island, and that raw military force was required. In such circumstances, the indigenous resistance in Cuba could not hope to achieve more than a military stalemate—at least in the short term—without external intervention, whether the resistance wanted it or not. In such a vacuum of power, the United States was able to extend as well as to impose its Monroe Doctrine over a Spanish colony. It did so first by insisting on a pacific solution that did not require outright subjugation of the native peoples and then, when it became apparent that Spain did not have a civil administrative infrastructure that could impose such an outcome without using
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military force, moved to intervene directly. Spain’s frailty thus allowed President McKinley to move into the power vacuum in fairly simple fashion—something that his predecessor, Grover Cleveland, resisted doing. But nothing has been simple since. In 1902 Cuba became a relatively independent nation, modeled after the United States in its formal apparatus of government. The arguments over the one hundred years since 1902 confirm the use of the term “relative.” Radicals argue that “relative” means that Cuba enjoyed little true independence. Conservatives claim that all sovereignty, especially for a small nation with a single-crop economy, is necessarily relative. One of the few scholars writing on Cuba who deeply appreciated this ambiguous legacy is Hugh Thomas. In an essay focusing on the Batista era, he stated the historical situation frankly: Cuba was not China or Nicaragua. It was a state whose independence from Spain in 1898 was in effect secured for it by the United States as a result of the Spanish-American war. As such, Cuba’s freedom of action was limited for thirty years (1902–34) under the Platt Amendment, enabling the United States to intervene legally in the island’s internal affairs under certain circumstances. Such intervention occurred several times—in 1906, 1912, 1917 and 1933. Although after 1933 the country’s industries and services were increasingly “Cubanized” by local entrepreneurs, much of the aura of the old days still hung about U.S. Cuban relations in the 1950s. Thomas goes on to note that “Cuban national history read by students at the University of Havana revived memories of the early part of the century, when U.S. business involvement promoted the rapid economic development of the island and at the same time put a damper on the rhetorical romantic Cuban nationalism articulated by José Martí during two ruthless wars against Spain (1868–78 and 1895–98).”1 Castro was indoctrinated by this special reductionist reading of Cuban-American history—that U.S. domination repressed Cuban national aspirations. The problem for Cuba, after securing its independence, was the ambiguity of the outcome. It achieved a result that it desired without devising a method for accomplishing it. The result was that regimes in Cuba from 1902 through 1959 wrestled with a dilemma that they could not resolve. A group of democratic reforms introduced in 1933 was identified with Machado and represented a step toward securing greater autonomy, for on their account the Platt Amendment was soon lifted. But the reforms fell prey to a series of coups and were weakened further by the illegitimacy of the Batista regime. Instead of resolving matters either with regard to Cuba’s political culture or relations with the United States, the Batista dictatorship was halfhearted and inconclusive, like so many earlier regimes. Into such a situation Fidel Castro came to power—not as living vindication of Marxism-Leninism, but as part of an effort to move Cuba beyond ambiguity and to nationalist closure, and, in consequence beyond the suffocating sphere of American influence.
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The absence of closure before 1959 clearly helps to explain the ferocity of Castro’s resentment of the United States. This resentment is not simply a consequence of generic factors (big power versus small power, or Anglo versus Hispanic cultures). Rather it is a result of the specific history of Cuba and its intersection with the United States from 1898 to the present. In a nutshell: the United States invaded Cuban soil and, no less, liberated it from the Spanish empire. Castro’s May Day speech of 2001 indicates his unbending hostility toward and suspicion of the United States. He denounces hemispheric trade agreements as “annexation.” He says such a free trade “would mean more neo-liberalism, less protection for industry and national interests, and more unemployment and social problems. National currencies would disappear to be replaced by the dollar, and all monetary policy across the region would be dictated by the U.S. Federal Reserve.”2 The distant echo of the Platt Amendment can be heard in his remarks. It is not simply a policy difference, but a psychological distance that is reflected in Castro’s words. How this came about is worth reviewing. Pivotal to any analysis of this history is the fact that in the year 2002—one hundred years after Cuba’s acquisition of independence and more than 42 years after the imposition of Communist dictatorship—one can still speak of Cuba in terms of a single-crop economy, although the sugar crop is sweetened by other revenue streams. However one feels, or better said, to whatever one ascribes the causes, the fact is that Cuba is an economy dominated by dollarization, and tourism is a major source of income. The classical situation of small nations of the Caribbean—still extant in Cuba—is indicative of the hard truth that the politics and ideology of Marxism-Leninism comprise a sort of fool’s gold, a fantasyland of autonomy. The Castro regime is strong enough to goad the United States but weak enough to require appeals for aid to other Western powers. The writing of this scenario was already on the wall with the Cuban missile crisis, which was precipitated as well as settled by the major contestants in the Cold War. The turf may have been Cuban, but the decision-making had distinctly Russian- and English-speaking voices. Listen to the analysis of Adam B. Ulam, perhaps the sharpest Sovietologist of his time, of the events of October 1962: Riding Russian coattails brought quiet rather than solution for the Castro dictatorship. It created a transitional equilibrium that became permanent more through inertia than design. And so it was with the Cuban Revolution of 1959. That cataclysmic event finalized the resentment and focused the animosity toward the United States for its involvement in Cuban affairs. It did not provide a solution in 1902 that satisfied either democrats or autocratic landholders within Cuba, nor did it bring to closure the sense of solitude and isolation that Marxism promises in theory, but that Leninism-Stalinism took away in practice.3 Left-wing scholars take the view that if there had been no U.S. invasion or occupation, Cuba would have ridden the coattails of the 1895 uprising toward full autonomy. In this view, the sinking of the U.S.S. Maine in Havana Harbor on February 15, 1898, with a heavy loss of American lives, provided President
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McKinley with a pretext to intervene in the conflict. The demands were for Spain to terminate its concentration camp policy, offer an armistice to Cuban rebels, and accept the United States as a final arbiter between the parties. Cuban independence was not mentioned. Benjamin Keen and Mark Wasserman develop an interesting view—one that parallels Fidelista historiography: The ensuing war was short and nasty. American commanders ignored their Cuban counterparts, excluding Cuban generals from decision making and relegating Cuban soldiers to sentry and clean-up duties. Incompetence was the dominant feature of both the Spanish and American war effort. American military actions were incredibly ill prepared and badly led. The only major land battle of the war, the famous charge up San Juan Hill, which helped to catapult Theodore Roosevelt to national prominence, was very nearly a catastrophic defeat for the United States. Spain, to some extent, defeated itself, for its generals believed the war lost from the beginning and sought above all to minimize their losses. Thus, in a bizarre little war, the United States Army, wretchedly led, scandalously provisioned, and ravaged by tropical disease, swiftly defeated a demoralized, dispirited Spanish army and snatched the fruits of victory from the Mambises, the Cuban guerrilla fighters who had fought gallantly in a struggle of three years duration. The exclusion of Cuban leaders from both war councils and peace negotiations foreshadowed the course of Cuban-American relations for the next sixty years.4 The unspoken assumption in this account of events, in which Spaniards—and especially Americans—marginalize Cubans, is that Castro put an end to such humiliation. But he did no such thing. The negotiations between the United States and the USSR over the missile installations aptly demonstrated that Castro had no more input in the solution than the Cuban guerrilla leader Antonio Maceo had in the settlement between the United States and Spain. The further presumption is that, if left to their own devices, Cubans would have put an end to Spanish rule. Such an outcome was certainly the wish of José Martí, Antonio Maceo and Máximo Gómez, but whether that wish would have become reality is problematic. Under the direction of General Valeriano Weyler, Spanish military policy shifted to anti-guerrilla tactics. The Spaniards then drove back the Cuban revolutionists to the eastern end of the island. All seemed lost until the U.S. military bailout. What we do know for certain is that the interregnum ended in May 1902 with the voluntary departure of the U.S. military and the declaration of a free and sovereign Cuba. A quite different, conservative reading of the same events comes to us from Milton Eisenhower, the brother of Dwight D. Eisenhower and a diplomat and educator in his own right. Milton Eisenhower viewed the American intervention as an appropriate response to Spanish imposition of taxes and other restrictions on direct trade in sugar and tobacco between Cuba and the United States. He saw this as parallel to the American pre-Revolutionary War slogan of “no taxation without representation.” Indeed, Eisenhower goes so far as to declare
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Spanish cruelties as “forerunners of Hitler’s mass executions in World War II.” In this situation, Cuba “seemed a natural ally if not a dependency of ours.” While there is a big gap between an ally and a dependent state, and while trade irritants hardly seem sufficient cause for an invasion, it is worthwhile listening to this voice of American rationalism: For four years following the victory over Spain in 1898, the United States maintained military rule in Cuba. This seemed essential, for the former colonials had had no experience in self-government. Our military control was honorable. Local governments, the courts, and other public agencies were improved. Progress in agriculture, education, health (especially in the campaign to eliminate yellow fever), transportation, trade, and general living standards was noticeable but not notable. There was little if any serious thought given to changing inherited social customs. The Cuban people themselves did not then seek such change. Most of them wanted independence—only large landowners objecting—and they got it, with qualifications in 1902. The limitation on independence was the Platt Amendment to our treaty with Cuba. In the ensuing years of quasi-independence, Cuba suffered the indignity of numerous interventions by the United States, saw most of its own Presidents promise honesty and reform only to fatten their own pockets, lived in fear of slaughter by military and guerrilla leaders, and came to accept betrayal as an inevitable condition of government.5 The range of professional opinion across the political spectrum, then, confirms this uneasy sense of ambiguity in Cuban national life. All recognize that the United States served as both colonial master of the Western Hemisphere and also democratic liberator from colonialism. Fernand Braudel sees this duality as a function of the “degree of isolationism that has been a basic feature of the United States.”6 Carl Becker, while bemoaning the less-than-sterling conduct of American intervention, nonetheless sees such behavior in terms of a defense of “democratic institutions to which America was committed” and opposition to “the extension of the European political system [Becker’s italics] to this continent.”7 Raymond Aron considers the United States guilty of “a great power policy, even an imperialist policy in the ordinary sense of the term.” This classical colonial policy was followed by a more recent policy of benign, or not so benign, neglect of Latin America. Aron goes on to say that “a sense of geography and memories of the past are at the root of these [American] feelings and this behavior.”8 More recently, Henry Kissinger noted that, by the start of the 20th century, “America found itself commanding the sort of power which made it a major international factor, no matter what its preferences.” In short, from the Monroe Doctrine to the Platt Amendment, the United States was pursuing a policy of “national interest” and not just “remaining unentangled” in its immediate neighborhood.9 Each of these statements is a variation on the same contradictory theme: America simultaneously as dictator and liberator. Clearly, in these two views the moral glass of American power is seen as half empty on the far Left and more than half full on the conservative Right.
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Perhaps no one caught the spirit of ambiguity more ably than Hubert Herring, who in his great History of Latin America wrote that the Cuban Republic from 1902–34 “was now free—but not free to make her own mistakes.”10 He added philosophically that “a clear lesson on the education of nations, as of children, [is] that none learns to order its life unless granted the privilege of going wrong as well as of going right.” Projections of what might have been notwithstanding, it is a fact of history that Cuban independence was granted and not earned. This may be viewed as a bitter fact of island history, or a tribute to a people on a small island navigating colonial forces far larger than itself. What is no less evident is a Cuban Revolution of 1959 that saw itself as settling accounts with the legacy of 1898–1902. Castro’s strength is less a function of the authority of Marxism-Leninism as an ideology than of an unrequited nationalism as a mobilization tool. From the outset, Castro had an image of Cuba as larger than life, certainly larger than the life of the island. From the start, Castro’s self-image was that of Simón Bolívar in an era of communism. He sought to bring the future to the entire hemisphere—if not on horseback, like Bolívar, then as a foot soldier in the mountains. Castro was and remains the embodiment of nationalism tinged by a greater, if ultimately counterfeit, internationalism. The fusion of the two was solidified by the ideology of Marxism-Leninism in the form of the tradition of the Comintern—centered in Havana rather than in Moscow. In each decade, from the Tri-continental in the 1960s through a variety of conferences over the next forty years, Castro maintained that his position was properly in the vanguard, not the backwater, of revolutionary consciousness. So while foreign intervention and great-power intrigue pockmarked the history of Cuba from 1898 to 1959, the history of Cuba after 1959 was supposed to turn this around and make Cuba a world political actor—militarily, diplomatically and otherwise (such as through its international medical teams). This effort has had modest results. On the one side, there was the removal of nuclear warheads from Cuba as a result of a Soviet-American deal, the embarrassment of Cuban troops participating in a losing effort in the Syrian Golan Heights, the humiliating defeat of Cuban troops in Grenada, the routing of the Cuban military presence in Angola and Namibia. These initiatives, aimed at reinforcing Castro’s role in world affairs, failed in frustration and loss of prestige. But on the other hand, Cuba has had a tremendous impact on hemispheric affairs: for example, from the Venezuela of guerrilla Douglas Bravo to the Venezuela of President Hugo Chávez. Castro’s impact on the Nicaraguan Left is widely recognized. Alliances have been forged with China for advanced military supplies, replacing those lost with the collapse of the Soviet Union. Training and arming Palestinians from the PLO forces is ongoing. There is scarcely a dictatorship in the world—from Kim Il Sung’s in North Korea to Muammar Qadaffi’s in Libya—that has not enjoyed the benefit of Castro’s warm embrace. As the late Arthur P. Whitaker predicted as long ago as 1962, “although Cuba’s ties with the
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Communist bloc make it difficult to appraise the difference between the two, Fidelismo is probably a greater potential threat than communism to the interests of the United States in Latin America. This is because Fidelismo expressed so well and for so long the rising Latin American tide of both continental nationalism and populism.”11 However, what neither Whitaker nor Thomas could have anticipated was that national interests and populism would develop in Central and South America along an autonomous axis different from anything envisioned by Fidel Castro— or, for that matter, by Simón Bolívar. What has actually occurred, to Castro’s obvious and public chagrin, is the development of international alliances at the political level, and regional and global market relations that extend far beyond the borders of nations in North or South America. Everything from telephone companies to oil drilling arrangements has changed the old system. Latin America is no longer a decidedly junior partner to North America. It is simply a partner whose size and scope depends upon investment prospects and corporate profits. What has drastically reduced the significance of Castro as a player in global affairs is not a direct assault on Cuba’s shores, but the sheer capacity of nearly every other Latin American nation simply to bypass Cuba on its own road to a new century. Henry Adams’ “forces” are indeed at work. While Cuba remains a force to contend with, its xenophobic nationalism has institutionalized an economic backwardness that has in turn created a diplomatic impasse. Cuba is now isolated from the trends sweeping the region. Bolstered by revitalized democracies from Mexico to Brazil, Latin America is undergoing a degree of economic integration unforeseen by the allies of the United States and unnoticed by its enemies. Economic upheaval notwithstanding, the situation in 2002 is profoundly more favorable to the forces of hemispheric democracy than it was in 1961, or for that matter throughout the 1960s and 1970s. This illustrates Fidel’s myopia as the century of ambiguity nears its end. Post-Castro Cuba will become part of an extraordinary hemispheric vitalization in which the fabled ogre of U.S. domination is absent. The problem of Cuban nationalism and jealousy for its sovereignty will be bound up in choices concerning hemispheric multilateralism, not obeisance to a new Platt Amendment. The long-term positive future of Cuba is neither utopian nor ideological. Rather, it is normalization in the best sense of politics, and rationalization in the best sense of economics. Notes 1.
2. 3.
Thomas, “Cuba, The United States and Batista, 1952–1958”, in Irving Louis Horowitz and Jaime Suchlicki, eds., Cuban Communism (10th edition) (New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers, 2001), pp. 3–12. Quoted in the New York Times, May 2, 2001. Ulam, The Rivals: America and Russia since World War II (New York: The Viking Press, 1971), pp. 330–40.
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11
Benjamin Keen and Mark Wasserman, A Short History of Latin America (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1984), pp. 408–9. 5. Eisenhower, The Wine is Bitter: The United States and Latin America (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Co., 1963), pp. 296–7. 6. Braudel, A History of Civilizations (New York: Penguin, 1995), pp. 496–7. 7. Becker, The United States: An Experiment in Democracy (New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers, 2001), pp. 134–5. 8. Aron, The Imperial Republic: The United States and the World, 1945–1973 (Cambridge, ma: Winthrop, 1974), p. 185. 9. Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), pp. 37–40. 10. Herring, A History of Latin America: From the Beginnings to the Present (2nd edition) (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962), pp. 401–16. 11. Whitaker, Nationalism in Latin America: Past and Present (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1962), pp. 69–70.
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2 Cuba: The United States and Batista, 1952–1958 Hugh Thomas From some points of view, the experience of Cuba in 1958 might be regarded as one more archetypical failure of American foreign policy—of a piece with China in 1946–49 or Nicaragua in 1978–79. A commitment was made to an unpopular tyrant, Fulgencio Batista, who was becoming increasingly unpopular in his own country and, what is more, apparently losing a guerrilla war to insurgents led by Fidel Castro. Today the deplorable consequences are all to evident. What should U.S. policy have been? The question can be simply put, but it cannot be answered without a larger consideration of the background. First, Cuba was not China or Nicaragua. It was a state whose independence from Spain in 1898 was in effect secured for it by the United States as a result of the Spanish-American war. As such, Cuba’s freedom of action was limited for thirty years (1902–34) under the Platt Amendment, enabling the United States to intervene legally in the island’s internal affairs under certain circumstances. Such intervention occurred several times—in 1906, 1912, 1917, and 1933. Substantial U.S. investment in Cuba in the early part of the century led the British minister (who must have known something of such matters) to describe the country in 1933 as a U.S. “protectorate.” Although after 1933 the country’s industries and services were increasingly “Cubanized” by local entrepreneurs. much of the aura of the old days still hung about U.S.-Cuba relations in the 1950s. This long, ambiguous association with North America led Cuban nationalism to be defined. perforce, as anti-Americanism. Much of this was actually anachronistic. Even so. the Cuban national history read by students at the University of Havana1 revived memories of the early part of the century when U.S. business involvement promoted the rapid economic development of the island and at the same time put a damper on the
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rhetorical romantic Cuban nationalism articulated by José Martí during two ruthless wars against Spain (1868–78 and 1895–98). The Cuban attitude toward the United States was thus complex at best. One of the most revealing remarks made by Castro was his characterization of the arrival of the new ambassador from the United States in 1959, Philip Bonsal. Castro described the event as if Ambassador Bonsal arrived like a viceroy, with endless obeisances. Actually, Ambassador Bonsal arrived in his normal, rational way, an experienced professional diplomat determined to make the very best of a potentially difficult post. Indeed, almost until the end of 1959, he went out of his way to try to persuade colleagues at home that all was not lost, that there were some aspects of Castro’s character that were promising, and so on. What Castro seemed to have been describing was not the arrival of Bonsal, but Sumner Welles, Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s special representative at the end of the Machado era in 1933. This form of ultra-anti-Americanism, now so prevalent even in Europe (not to speak of Africa, Asia, etc.), is one of Latin America’s least creditable contributions to political dialogue. There were, of course, ambiguities in public attitudes to Batista. That interesting personality had dominated Cuban politics since the Sergeants’ revolt in 1933, in which he was principal protagonist—sergeant-in-chief, one might say. As the power behind nationalist presidents in the years 1933–39, and subsequently as first president formally elected under the new Constitution of 1940, Batista was actually—and in the minds of most observers of the Cuban scene, truly—a radical reforming soldier of what we would now call the “Nasser type.” His social reforms were precisely what one would expect from a man of his extremely humble birth. In effect, there were two Batistas. The first was a Cuban nationalist who creatively rode the demands for change following the depression of the 1930s and the revolution of 1933–34 very successfully as a populist. Cuban trade unions and the Communist Party were allowed to organize legally for the first time under his aegis, and communists actually served in his government—including, for a short time, the current (1983) Cuban vice-president, Dr. Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, an experienced economist. The first Batista was also a reliable friend of the United States during World War II, in which Cuba benefited from high nickel and sugar prices, and in which Cuba collaborated in interallied defense and anti-German security measures generally. The second Batista was different. His coup d’état in 1952 was a rather lazy protest by a man who seemed certain to lose an election. He may have been pushed into action by that section of the army (the sergeants of 1934 turned into colonels or generals) who wanted a new share in the profits of power. The coup came at a moment when the country had been rendered quite dizzy—first, by a cycle of sporadic political gangsterism (a much more amiable game than the guerrilla wars of the 1970s and 1980s) and second, by the evident corruption under and by two popularly elected Cuban presidents, Ramón Grau San Martín
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and Carlos Prío. These two clever, amusing, self-serving men did more to damage the good name of democracy (in all Latin America) than even England’s Henry Fox. The second Batista showed himself incapable of dealing with the problem of corruption. Rather, he and his colleagues sank deeply into it. He did manage to bring something like an end to political gangsterism—by harnessing some of the leaders as collaborators (Rolando Masferrer) or by driving others into more conventional armed opposition (Castro). The Batista regime of 1952–58 was bad but not wholly evil. It continued to encourage the diversification of agriculture, which most people recognized then as a desirable venture for Cuba if the economy were to prosper in freedom. But Batista himself, though retaining much of his personal charm for occasional visitors, had become lazy and procrastinatory at a time when Cuba—much richer than it had been in the 1930s—was a country much more difficult to govern. One of his old generals told how when communiques were issued saying that Batista had spent the day conferring with his officers, he was in fact playing canasta with them. He accumulated a substantial fortune abroad making him more inclined to dream of retirement in the Canaries of perhaps in Portugal. Only when the opposition began to take shape under Castro and his young associates— some of them merely students or even schoolboys—did Batista allow his police the free run that made them infamous. His army, divided by personal disputes among officers and ill-provided with weapons and supplies, was incapable of coping with a small insurrection whose directors from the start showed themselves masters of public relations both in Cuba and in the United States. Indeed, they would have needed great skill to cope with the Robin Hood-like legend of Fidel en las montañas. American assistance to Batista was never explicitly forthcoming. Training and a limited amount of weapons were available to Cuba throughout the 1950s under the appropriate U.S. hemispheric defense program. But in 1957 the skillful personal relations mentioned above created a powerful lobby against its continuance: Batista had been caught using weapons intended for hemispheric defense against Castro and other opponents, such as the Revolutionary Directorate. The subsequent U.S. arms embargo was a severe psychological blow. But at the same time, U.S. intelligence continued to assist an explicitly anti-communist bureau of the Cuban Minister of Defense, the BRAC (Bureau for the Repression of Communist Activities), founded in 1955 with help from the Central Intelligence Agency.2 But that agency was not specifically concerned at that time, since Batista’s enemies in 1956–58 did not primarily seem to be communists. A different view was held in 1958 by the then-U.S. Ambassador Earl E.T. Smith. In his book3 Mr. Smith, who was not a career diplomat, described how he sought to persuade the State Department, the Embassy Staff, even the local CIA station chief in Havana that Castro’s movement was communist in motivation. Earl Smith turned out to be right in the end, but at the time there was no
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evidence for his views. No doubt the BRAC told him of the activities of certain communists in relation to Castro—the early party youth membership of Castro’s brother, Raúl, for example, or the dubious affiliations of Ernesto Guevara in Guatemala in 1954, or the actions of Dr. Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, Félix Torres, Armando Acosta, Pablo Ribalta, Osvaldo Sánchez, to name a few of the party members who, in 1958, began to prepare the ground for the later association of Castro with the communists. But there was a lot of evidence that other opponents of Batista were more dominant around Castro. It was the “liberal” socialist intelligentsia—most of whom are now in exile—that gave the movement (always small in the field) its ground swell of support in Havana and the cities. The question of what to do about Batista did not really present itself as a serious one until the last quarter of 1958. Until then the Eisenhower administration in the United States did not treat Cuban politics seriously: Secretary of State John Foster Dulles thought Latin America uninteresting; and despite an earlier Marxist episode in Guatemala involving, among others, Ernesto Guevara, and despite the unpleasantries encountered particularly in Caracas by Vice-President Richard Nixon during his Latin America tour, this was entirely comprehensible. Castro had only a few hundred armed followers; he captured no towns at all; and the level of violence was modest; the figure of 20,000 killed in “the war against Batista” appeared in 1959, after Castro was in Havana. This was part of a deliberate policy inspired by the communists to blacken the past in the same way that, say, in France the number of communist “martyrs” in the resistance against the nazis has been grossly (and effectively) exaggerated. During these months Batista’s chief enemy appeared to be less Castro than Herbert Matthews of the New York Times, whose activities—privately intervening in the affairs of Cuba—were fully in the tradition of Sumner Welles. The varying interpretations of what Castro represented led to discussions in the Department of State; but Batista did not seem to be threatened by a communist revolution—rather, by a genuinely nationalist one led, no doubt, by reformers, with modest communist collaboration at the end. It was only after the open failure of the staged elections of November 5—convoked to establish credibility— that the U.S. government began to take any stance at all. The policy pursued was two-fold; on the one hand, an attempt to persuade Batista to resign; and on the other, an attempt to put together a coalition government of “men of good will,” including judges, army men who had offended Batista and were not Castroites, bankers, and ex- and progressive businessmen. Direct approaches were made by the CIA in both Cuba and in the United States to both these ends. Not all the papers are available, but it is obvious that Bill Pawley, the founder of Cubana Airways and an old associate of Batista, played an important part. The efforts to create an intermediary government were divided, and there is a clear sense that the agency’s left hand did not always know what its right one was doing. The situation was clearly exacerbated by the continuing divisions between the ambassador in Havana and his
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embassy staff, and between the ambassador and his department, as well as the apparent divide between the aims of the Department of State and those of the Central Intelligence Agency. In the end, certain successes of Castro with very few men in Santa Clara province as well as in Oriente, but on a small scale all the same, persuaded Batista that he should take his American friends’ advice after all, and by doing so deliberately save most of his own friends as well as his life and money. The efforts to put together an alternative government of the center failed because of the sudden swing of almost everyone to Castro, whose political manipulation of the power vacuum left on December 31, 1958, alone entitles him to be looked on as a master craftsman in politics.4 The momentum was irresistible. Meanwhile, the collapse of the plan for the alternative government led to a consideration of further possibilities in Washington. I have not found any record of the minutes of the meeting held on December 31 in the Pentagon between Admiral Arleigh Burke, Chief of Naval Operations, Allen Dulles of the CIA, and Robert Murphey of the Department of State, but Admiral Burke once gave me an account of it, later confirmed by Allen Dulles. All agreed that “Castro was not the right man” for Cuba but at that hour nothing was decided—could be decided?—and to prevent him from seizing the power that he has since held for now nearly thirty years. Admiral Burke mentioned the possible use of the U.S. Marines, but even he apparently seems not to have pressed the issue. The following months saw—and it is desirable to establish the order of things— the complete capture of authority in Cuba by Castro (by May 1959), his alliance with the communists (in the summer) and subsequently the economic arrangements with the Soviet Union (in the winter of 1959–60) accompanied by what became the cessation of movement and liberty of speech in Cuba. By March 1960 the famous arrangements in Washington had been approved which would lead to the Bay of Pigs in April 1961. All through 1960 the U.S. and Cuba publicly quarrelled; U.S. property was taken over; and the break of diplomatic relations came in January 1961. Having described what happened, let us consider the possible alternatives facing the United States. At the very beginning we are faced with a difficulty. Castro may or may not have been a different man in 1958 to what he made himself out to have been. But until 1961 and even afterwards, there was widespread doubt about his communist affiliations. U.S. officials seized on little straws to suggest that his loyalty to the Soviet bloc was questionable. Even when he boasted in December 1961 that he had been a Marxist-Leninist since the University such affirmation was not believed: rightly, because he probably was not telling the truth. The consequence was the official backing of the view that patient handling of Castro might yield dividends—the obverse of the public and still widely believed argument that impatient handling actually led Castro to choose communism. This is not really a point of view, but something akin to
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religious belief. Castro himself would laugh at the idea, though it is still firmly cherished by people usually impervious to unreason. Returning to the question of what could have been done with Batista—one alternative would have been to deploy U.S. forces in Cuba, either the Marines or naval/military units. Such forces could have landed, presumably, by the middle of 1958, either to sustain Batista (as was done that very year in Lebanon to prop up another U.S. ally) or to overthrow him. Though it is hard to imagine such action now, it is well to recall U.S. action in the Dominican Republic (1965) and in Grenada (1983), and to keep in mind that there were far more people active in American public life at that time used to the frequent deployment of U.S. armed forces in Latin America. I believe that a relatively small number of soldiers—say, 3,000—could have done either of these two things relatively easily. Batista could not have held on against a public display of force of this kind, and I do not think he would have wanted to. The use of marines in support of Batista would probably have been more difficult, but the accounts of the modest scale of the war in the Sierra suggest that it would not have been difficult to bring the insurgency to an end. The problem would have been to find Castro, not to defeat and scatter his forces. Neither policy, of course, would have any direct legal sanction, though Batista could surely have been induced to make a formal request for military assistance in much the same way that the government of the Dominican Republic did in 1965 (when the forces deployed were, of course, very large indeed). It may be doubted whether the use of these forces in the way suggested would have met with the kind of violent international protest that such action would now receive. European public opinion had at that time not yet awoke to its extraordinary love affair with anti-American causes in Latin America. The Guatemalan affair of 1954 occurred with virtually no protest, even though the CIA’s role in what happened was barely hidden and generally realized by the small number of international observers who knew where Guatemala was on the map. National opinion in the United States is much more difficult to gauge in retrospect. I believe that either way the intervention would have been initially condemned by the democratic opposition, but the overthrow of Batista and his substitution—in the manner of 1906 or 1917—with a good government would have been quickly accepted had it worked. The same would very probably have happened had Batista been assisted to crush the rebellion, provided he swiftly moved to a democratic regime guaranteed by U.S. officials and provided Castro was caught—a proviso that probably could not have been fulfilled given the skills of that political leader. If the campaign on Batista’s behalf against Castro had lasted more than a few weeks, public opinion at home would have turned sour. In either case, of course, the action concerned should have been accompanied by an elaborate and well-thought-out information policy programme designed to pinpoint all the issues. Given the time, it could have worked. Eisenhower was a
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popular president, in the middle of his second term, and U.S. opinion would have cheered a resounding success the year after the bad news of Sputnik (October 1957). Of course, neither plan was put forward. The reason was, first, that no one thought the crisis in Cuba justified action of that kind of seriousness. Second, the different agencies of the government were divided and undecided as to what to make of Castro; and, nearly all intelligent men were optimistic about him. In no time other than 1958 could military intervention have had the desired effect one way or the other. Action such as discussed—as mentioned above, in the Pentagon on December 31, 1958—would have led to many difficulties even in the relaxed atmosphere of the 1950s. Sending in forces to prevent Castro from capturing power at that stage would have been almost like sending troops into Paris in June 1944 to prevent De Gaulle taking over the government. Similar problems, more muted perhaps, would have occurred had the two choices—to sustain Batista or to substitute him—been left to the CIA, in the style of Guatemala. No attempt of either sort was contemplated, though Ambassador Arthur Gardner (Earl Smith’s predecessor in Havana) did once tell me that he offered to Batista to have Castro assassinated. What agency would have been entrusted with this task is something upon which he did not elaborate. (Batista’s answer, interestingly, was ‘“Of course we couldn’t approve that: we’re Cubans.” It had the ring of truth to me at the time.) Otherwise U.S. assistance to Batista seems to have been really limited to the BRAC. This still seems to me to be odd. Those were the golden days of the Central Intelligence Agency. The money, the people, and the opportunities were there—as Guevara and other survivors of the Guatemalan affair were believed to be constantly warning Castro. What was lacking was the will, basically because the issue was not properly defined, and—given real doubt about Castro’s motives—could not be. If the Department of State and the Havana station chief of the CIA were in general agreement that Castro probably promised well, then the chances of a successful operation against him were nil. The CIA did, as we have seen, seek to operate against Batista in the end, but its actions were too late: too late above all for a centrist, decent, law-abiding government of North American educated democrats to have any chance of being formed. One other possible pressure against Batista could have been considered, though it could not have way to give a disadvantage to Castro: the imposition of sanctions. I mention this not because I think there is as a rule a chance of such policies being effective against countries that need to import: but perhaps the case is less clear in respect of exports—and sugar at that. Suppose the United States had sent in Ambassador Pawley early on with the message that unless Batista hand over power to a democratic government, the U.S. sugar quota would be reconsidered. This kind of pressure might be used more effectively against a country such as Cuba than one with a diversified agriculture. Indeed,
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it was represented by Castro that Eisenhower had used it spitefully, though the idea occurred to the United States only after months of abuse by Castro. The consequences if such a policy were carried out in 1958 as a means of pressure against Batista are less clear, of course, but perhaps one should bear in mind that the only possible alternative buyer of Cuban sugar on the desired and necessary scale was in 1958, 1960, and for that matter, 1985, the Soviet Union. The international sugar market is too quota-controlled for any other smaller purchaser to be able to take part. A limited sanction on U.S. sugar purchases from Cuba therefore might have been effective. Two qualifications to this argument must be made. First, historians, including myself, have made much of the “Cubanization” of industry on the island between the revolutions of 1933 and 1958. Yet we know little about how much stock was held in Cuban enterprises by North Americans in 1959. Enough, perhaps, to have exerted quite an influence on behalf of “Cuban investors” in the event of an export blockade. Second, the consequence of the abrogation of the quota in 1960 was to make it easy for the Soviet Union to step in and establish itself quickly as Cuba’s chief trading partner, with the disastrous consequences that we all know. Given Batista’s earlier record, given known Soviet interest in the 1950s in breaking into Latin America somehow5 and given the facts of sugar economics, it might have been Batista who turned first to Russia, not Castro. It sounds like fantasy now, but then it was surely not. So much has happened in Cuba and in the United States since 1959 that it takes an effort to think back when these choices were possible. Perhaps one should also consider the chances of a more skillfully carried out intervention along the very lines that were embarked upon, too late, in December 1958. Some show of force would have been necessary, and a lot of trouble should have been taken to find the names of men in Cuba who would not only have sounded like good men of the center but who had the capacity to govern, coupled with the toughness and agility to outwit Castro. U.S. troops should have stayed until free elections could have been held on much the same basis as those elections should have been in 1953. Such action would have been denounced as “imperialism” in the end by Castro and his friends, and as thwarting then as the Cuban rebels of 1898 were in legend thwarted by the U.S. army of those years. Another legend would thus have been created. The trouble with this picture is that the men in the center with the capacity required—always very difficult to identify beforehand by outsiders—were never easy to find in Cuba. Since 1959 the only real opponents of Castro of any quality have been men and women who were for a time with him and certainly were so in 1958. They might have been the most bitter opponents of the United States at the time. Once again we have to recognize that, between conquest or empire and independence, the intermediate stage of protectorate is a most uneasy one. I believe that the only policy that could have worked in Cuba in 1958 would have been the deployment of a large number of troops—adequate, first, to en-
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able Batista’s army to defeat Castro; and then to remain to guarantee free elections after a reasonable length of time. This would have meant a willingness to be associated with a quasi-imperial role in an explicit sense. Though an old method, it seems to have been the only one that could have guaranteed continued U.S. control of the Caribbean. Notes 1.
2. 3. 4.
5.
Quite typically, the works of Herminio Portell-Vilá (Historia de Cuba en sus relaciones con Estados Unidos y España). Sr. Portell-Vilá, a virulent opponent of Castro, subsequently resided in exile in Washington. I recall former CIA director Allen Dulles telling me “I was the father of the BRAC.” The Fourth Floor (New York: Random House. 1962). I have elaborately considered this in Chapter LXXXIX of Cuba: The Pursuit of Freedom (New York: Harper and Row, 1971) and feel no need to add to what I have said there. Argentina was the most likely contender before 1958 for a possible host to major Soviet interests, as the major maverick Latin American country very critical of the United States for reasons different from Mexico and Cuba.
3 The Sierra and the Plains Roberto Luque Escalona By 1956, there appeared on the national scene two figures who embraced Fidel’s immediate goals but might have threatened his long-range plans. One was yet unknown to the general public, working in the shadows in Santiago de Cuba. Energetic, capable and brave as few men, Frank País would become famous on November 30, 1956. País at least was active in the July 26th movement. The other, a product of the militant student tradition of Havana University, preferred to go at it alone. He was a tall, stocky, (or better yet corpulent) young man with rosy cheeks, the unaffected charm that Cubans find irresistible, and the blind courage of a fighting cock: José Antonio Echeverría. Both Frank and José Antonio were students; Frank studied pedagogy and José Antonio architecture; and, besides bravery and patriotism, they had something else in common: their deep religious convictions. Frank was the pastor of a Baptist church and José Antonio was a fervent Catholic. Strange martyrs for a Marxist-Leninist revolution. While Fidel was preparing for war, the Society of Friends of the Republic offered to mediate peace talks between the government and the opposition. This attempt at national reconciliation was led by Cosme de la Torriente, an old Conservative politician and one of the last surviving officers of our War of Independence, and José Miró Cardona, president of the Cuban Bar Association. But such negotiations were doomed to fail from the start: Batista had been cured for good of all populist illusions by the elections of 1944. The Ortodoxo party was split into many factions, and what had once been a formidable political machine, was slowly but surely coming apart. One of these factions decided to set up its tent elsewhere: Jorge Mañach and José Pardo Llada founded the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement. They then joined not the Revolution, but the controversial peace negotiations. The Auténtico party, which 21
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ruled Cuba for eight years prior to Batista’s coup, practically had ceased to exist, though its leaders continued to speak as if it still existed. In the plaza adjoining the Muelle de Luz, there was a mass gathering of the opposition. It was attended by representatives from the entire political spectrum, ranging from Grau to the University Students Federation. Only the unpopular Popular Socialist Party was excluded, because it had labelled the Moncada assault a “putsch” and “petite bourgeoisie adventurism.” Fidel’s supporters in the crowd sang in unison, “Revolution! Viva Fidel!” Tempers flared to the boiling point. Suddenly, someone was thrown headfirst from the grandstand and an hell broke loose. Everywhere in the crowd rival groups were beating up on one another, folding chairs were flying through the air like birds of ill omen, and the great meeting of the opposition broke apart. We are in 1956, the year that Fidel had selected to begin the insurrection. Yet it wasn’t only Fidel and his followers, or the boys from the University, who were plotting Batista’s downfall. A clique of officers headed by ex-Colonel Ramón Barquín was preparing a coup d’état. Nothing came of their plans: someone turned informant. The conspirators were apprehended, spending the remainder of the Batista dictatorship in the stockade. That would be, however, less than three years. The aborted conspiracy cost the army its most competent high ranking officer: José Ramón Fernández (dubbed “El Gallego” because he spoke like a Galician), the able artilleryman who years later would play a pivotal role in what Fidel has called “the first defeat of imperialism in the Americas [i.e. the Bay of Pigs].” Shortly before Fidel’s 1956 deadline had expired, students under the leadership of José Antonio Echeverría founded a new insurrectional organization: the Revolutionary Directorate, which was almost from the first marked by a tragic destiny. José Antonio travelled to Mexico to sign an alliance with Fidel and Frank País. Little time remained to make good Fidel’s promise. In November 1956, the storied yacht Granma, with 82 men aboard, set out from Tuxpan, Mexico, bound for the southern coast of Oriente province, which is but a few miles from the Sierra Maestra. The yacht was expected to arrive on November 30. On that day, as planned, Frank País, who was always precise and reliable, led his men to action on the streets of Santiago de Cuba, in a diversionary operation that paralyzed government troops. The July 26th Movement accomplished its mission with only three casualties; and then went into hiding in the belief that the men of the Granma expedition were also safely ensconced in the Sierra Maestra. But the Granma had not arrived; it would not arrive for two more days, and when it finally touched land, it was not on the coast of the Sierra Maestra, but on a mangrove swamp not far from Manzanillo on the Gulf of Guacanayabo. After a mile-long trek through the marshlands, the exhausted expeditionaries saw a vast plain before them, and in the distance, very far away, the outline of
The Sierra and the Plains
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the foothills of the Sierra Maestra. That’s about as close as most of them would get to their destination. The army caught them by surprise, cornered them, and many lost their lives. Others were taken prisoner and spent the last 25 months of the Batista regime in prison. Among the captured rebels was Mario Chanes, that much-persecuted man who has never had the good fortune of becoming famous. Fidel was presumed dead, but, of course, he wasn’t. A few days later, somewhere in the hills, a small band of survivors would re-group round their leader; they were twelve. Much has been said about them, for they have not lacked historians; some enjoy international fame, and almost all have occupied or still occupy high government office—those, of course, who are still alive and have been able to retain Fidel’s favor. There is no reason, then, to enumerate them. I do want, however, to mention another small group of revolutionaries, not twelve, but fourteen men. When the July 26th Movement was disbanded in the wake of the news of the disastrous landing of the Granma and the supposed death of the movement’s leader, there were only 14 urban fighters left alive in Havana. Since no one has ever mentioned their names, I shall. Of the top men in the Movement, there were only two survivors in the capital: Gerardo Abreu (“Fortín”) and Carlos Franqui. The others who were ready to resume the struggle, were Julio Alon, Julio Bauta, Federico Bell-Yoch, Sergio González (“El Curita”), Enrique Hart, Alonso Hidalgo, Ricardo Martínez, Francisco Miralles, José Pellón, José Prieto, Héctor Ravelo and Aldo Vera. When Faustino Pérez, one of Fidel’s Twelve, was sent to Havana in late December 1956 to revive the July 26th Movement, he found that it was still alive. Dr. Faustino Pérez, a physician and veteran of García Bárcenas’ conspiracy, proved an underground leader difficult to surpass or even equal. Under his direction, the Movement carried out a long series of successful actions, overcoming the tyranny’s repressive net. Shortly after Faustino’s arrival, Haydée Santamaría, who had been in Santiago during the tragic events of November 30, and René Rodriguéz, another of “The Twelve” but a very different sort of man than Faustino, were sent by Fidel to Havana on a mission which I am unable to clarify. I know nothing about the objectives of the mission, but I do know the results: René Rodriguéz, whom Haydée called “a little gangster,” devoted himself to creating a group independent of the leadership of Faustino Pérez, with the connivance of the attorney Humberto Sorí Marín. Expelled from the July 26th Movement, Rodriguéz and Sorí Marín marched off to the Sierra Maestra, where, despite the expulsion dictated against them, they were received well enough for both to attain the rank of comandante. Sometime later, in 1961, Sorí Marín was executed by firing squad. René Rodriguéz had much better luck. He still occupies high office and has even achieved a kind of international celebrity: in 1982 he was indicted by a Miami grand jury for drug trafficking.
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But let’s return to the Fifties. The Revolutionary Directorate committed itself in the Mexico pact to supporting the Granma expedition with diversionary tactics similar to those carried out on November 30 by the July 26th Movement, but didn’t do it. The Directorate decided instead to liquidate the tyranny with one blow, a great blow meant to decapitate it. While it prepared for that mission, the Directorate kept up a seeming passivity. The calm was broken by the assassination of the head of Military Intelligence, Colonel Blanco Rico, which was carried out with great skill. Next the Directorate would attempt to get the Colonel’s boss. Meanwhile, in the Sierra Maestra, the fledgling fidelista guerrillas, supplemented now by some peasant recruits but still small, gave some signs of life by attacking a small army barracks. Nevertheless, the government continued to insist that Fidel had been killed in the Granma landing, as if it believed that its unshakable faith in a lie could somehow modify reality. One of the first feats of Faustino Pérez and his men was to demolish this stupid legend. They arranged to bring Herbert Matthews of The New York Times from Havana to the Sierra Maestra. Matthews interviewed and photographed the “dead man,” and so Fidel became an international celebrity overnight, and, in time, the most famous of Cubans. But wars are not won with propaganda alone; men and arms are also necessary. Frank País came to the rescue of the decimated expeditionary group in the Sierra Maestra. He reinforced it with a detachment of well-armed and -equipped fighters that tripled the guerrilla force in one day. The July 26th Movement created the rebel army; in time, the army would devour it. By the way, the reinforcements sent by the Movement were transported on trucks provided by “an arrocero from Manzanillo,” as Ernesto Guevara was later to describe Huber Matos. When Dr. Guevara wrote those words he had already been in our country long enough to know what we Cubans mean by arrocero: a landowner who cultivates rice on vast tracts of land using the latest agricultural technology and with a great concentration of capital, as economists say. In short an arrocero is, as Guevara well knew, an agrarian capitalist. Except that Huber was, as Guevara also knew, a schoolteacher with an enterprising spirit who had rented some trucks to transport the rice that others grew. “I am extremely rigid in my actions,” Dr. Guevara wrote on another occasion. I also can be quite rigid at times. Under certain circumstances, however, I wish I could be less rigid because I realize that being rigid doesn’t do me any good. But respect for the truth won’t let me. My veracity compels me to accuse Dr. Guevara of lying. He may be one of the major deities in the revolutionary pantheon, but he lied through his teeth when he portrayed Matos as bourgeois. My love of the truth also obliges me to say, as I have already, that the Directorate did not live up to the commitment it made in Mexico. But in this case it was not due to bad faith; it had, quite simply, decided to stake all on one card.
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On March 13, 1956, the Directorate stormed the presidential palace with all the force at its disposal. In an interview with a CBS reporter, Fidel labelled the attempted assassination of Batista “useless bloodshed,” adding that “the dictator’s life is of no importance.” With a heavy heart, I must disagree. Batista’s dictatorship, like Fidel’s, centered around one man. There was no substitute for that man among his followers. With the death of the dictator, his regime would have been condemned to disappear immediately or in short order. To eliminate Batista was tantamount to destroying the dictatorship, which was all for the good. What Fidel found objectionable was that the Directorate should bring about the fall of the dictator; such a contingency would have affected seriously his future plans. As for the bloodshed, it was “useless” only because it did not directly benefit him. Moncada also ended in failure, but the blood expended there was not “useless” because it served to make him a national figure and put him on the road to power. What is certain and undeniable, however, is that to assassinate Batista made much more sense than attacking an army barracks. The assault on the presidential palace itself was better planned and executed than Moncada. However, certain imponderables predominated that day, and to the great misfortune of many and the great luck of few, the Directorate suffered a terrible defeat that included the death of its leader. While the assault was underway, José Antonio Echeverría burst into a radio station and read a somewhat impassioned and puerile communiqué announcing the death of the tyrant. It was a mistake. In politics, one shouldn’t announce possibilities as facts, however feasible these may seem. The brave José Antonio didn’t have the time to learn that axiom: he died a few minutes later in an encounter with the police on the street. Hardly a few weeks had passed when we again had proof of the tragic fate that dogged the Directorate: four participants in the events of March 13—Fructuoso Rodriguéz (José Antonio’s successor and as intrepid as the fallen leader), José Westbrook (one of the most promising young men of his generation), Juan Pedro Carbó Servía (a medical student whose name now adorns a wing of the Havana Psychiatric Hospital—an institution that will surely be investigated by the Secretary General of the United Nations whenever he decides to comply with his duty), and José Machado—were ambushed and murdered in an apartment on Humboldt Street where they had taken refuge. It was not known then, but they had been betrayed to the authorities by a Communist informant about whom I shall have more to say in due course. Meanwhile, in far off Santiago de Cuba, death continued to reap its harvest. Frank País was murdered; gunned down in the street, like José Antonio. I have already compared these two young men who could have contributed so much to the restoration of democracy in our country. Today, far removed in time (and despite the sympathy that the recollection of a youth so filled with
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kindness and joy inspires in me), I believe that José Antonio never got to be more than he was: a youth. Not so Frank; this serious-minded native of Santiago was already a mature man, although no older than the brave student from Cardenas. “They don’t know what a man they have killed,” wrote Fidel on learning of Frank’s death. On that day, he was truthful. José Antonio was the promise. Frank was the realization of that promise. Two leaders died that would forever remain in our memory, but the struggle continued. In Matanzas, an armed group attempted to seize the Goicuría barracks. They got as far as the gates: the army was waiting for them, and the slaughter that ensued was the work of the curiously named Colonel Pilar García. Another group (which like the last was financed by ex-president Prío) disembarked on the Northern coast of Oriente, where they were ambushed and wiped out (only two escaped) by Colonel Fermín Cowley, commander of the Holguín regiment and a criminal psychopath who celebrated Christmas 1956 by distributing 25 corpses throughout the streets of the city. In September, navy contingents supported by the July 26th Movement mutinied in Cienfuegos and took the city. They couldn’t defend it against the army’s Third Tactical Squadron and another massacre ensued. Batista had returned to his old ways: not since the days of his colonelcy had he shed so much blood. Attempts at mediation continued, but there seemed to be no peaceful way out of this situation. Batista would not compromise. He felt strong. He was sure that he could finish off all the revolutionaries. Of course, the government also sustained losses—important losses. On a day that would prove fatal for him and others, the ferocious General Salas Cañizares burst into the Haitian embassy in Havana with the objective of murdering a group of asylum seekers. One of these men was armed and wounded Salas Cañizares in the lower abdomen before the general’s henchmen killed him and all the other rebels under Haiti’s protection. Salas Cañizares died amidst atrocious and prolonged suffering. It served that criminal right. Cowley was luckier; they blew his head off with a sawed-off shotgun in an operation executed with much ability and luck. Later, the new chief of Military Intelligence, Irenaldo García Báez, son of Pilar García (the colonel with the woman’s name), practically exterminated the forces of the July 26th Movement in Holguín. Among the dead was Manuel Angulo, my old high school gym teacher. I had always considered him an idiot because he let his students get away with so much, but he faced torture and death with admirable firmness. I pay tribute to his memory and offer these words as belated amends. Batista cried publicly at Cowley’s funeral. It was out of pure sentiment because in truth, he had henchmen to spare. Good henchmen who were merciless, amoral and sometimes even brave: Ventura, Carratalá, Martín Pérez and José Salas Cañizares, the spitting image of his late brother. And let’s not forget Rolando Masferrer, another townsman of mine, who fought on the side of the Republic in the Spanish Civil War but later turned gangster in the Forties.
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Masferrer was ready to fight the putschists on March 10, 1952, but the next day embraced Batista’s cause with all the enthusiasm of a new convert. The tyrant allowed Masferrer to dedicate himself to what had always been his vocation: killing. Masferrer was not a soldier or a policeman. He was a senator and editor of his own newspaper, but the vocation of which I spoke held a very strong sway over him. No doubt about it, the henchmen were plentiful. They had all kinds of advantages to fight the July 26th Movement and what was left of the Directorate. What Batista didn’t have, however, were officers, soldiers capable of leading men into combat. He had only one: Colonel Sánchez Mosquera, who attacked Fidel’s guerrillas with the obstinate ferocity of a pit bull. But a fidelista bullet penetrated his cranium and damaged vital brain matter. The pit bull lived but lost his ferocity and obstinacy. Batista, who had a surplus of murderers, from then on had not a single warrior in his army. The lengthy task of destroying the effectiveness of the army, initiated by Machado and continued in all aspects by Batista, was by now complete. The army no longer existed. Batista, despite his long military career, was unaware of it; after all, he was only a sergeant stenographer. Fidel did understand the situation. He always understood it. Before him opened the road to power. He still had a long way to go, but the road was free of obstacles. Meanwhile, under the fierce and relentless pursuit of the not inefficient Batista police, the July 26th Movement continued to hit and hit hard in Havana. Havana was the principal theater of urban combat, not Santiago de Cuba, as official history claims. The men of the July 26th Movement, under the direction of Faustino Pérez, carried out a series of well-conceived and -executed operations, some even spectacular. On the way, they became the main source of financing for the rebel army. It’s not for me to write the history of their daring deeds. That responsibility and honor rests with those who lived for years under constant pressure from repressive forces and at the mercy of chance, and who confronted day after day the possibility and the reality of torture and death. I will cite only three of their successes: the so-called “Night of a Hundred Bombs,” which drove the tyranny mad; the abduction of the Argentine Juan Manuel Fangio, the world champion professional race car driver—a masterful tactical operation that in addition to generating loads of publicity, served to demoralize the enemy; and the blackout of sections of Havana, an operation that involved the excavation of a tunnel from a rented safe house on Suárez Street to the main electrical cables servicing the city just across that street. Of all the men who have fought dictatorships in the cities of Latin America, I believe that only the Uruguayan Raúl Séndic equalled Faustino Pérez as a clandestine leader. And since I have already alluded to chance—that terrible and unforeseeable enemy of clandestine fighters—I want to point out that both Faustino and Séndic were captured by chance. A police officer who knew Faustino
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happened to run into him on a street; and a detachment of police carrying out a routine house to house search knocked on the door of a residence where the leader of the Tupamaros happened to be visiting. I also want to point out how Faustino was freed from prison after undergoing the usual beatings. Judge Enrique Hart, father of two brothers of that name who were active in the Movement, got in touch with the examining magistrate in charge of the case and arranged bail for the revolutionary. The bond was posted immediately, Faustino was released and vanished. Human solidarity with a man in danger, risking livelihood and social position to aid a deserving man, is one of the traditions that has been erased by fidelismo. Such traditions saved the lives of many men and women who fought so that Fidel could reach power. The urban fighters, the “plainsmen” as they were beginning to be called, withstood the hardest and most dangerous part of the fight against the tyranny, confronting the most efficient forces that the tyranny had at its disposal and living in a climate of permanent tension that the guerrillas in the mountains in no way knew. Although subject to material hardships, Fidel’s men were spared the constant worry that is an inevitable part of the life of one who may lose his life at any moment, sometimes just by chance. The harshness of war, or of any confrontation that involves the use of violence is in direct proportion to the degree of danger that the enemy poses, whether he is capable of doing us little or great harm. From this axiom of war, it naturally follows that it is impossible to compare the struggle waged by the rebel army and that waged by the clandestine resistance. To put up with hardships requires only a strong will, but to withstand torture requires strength of character. How many men died in the mountains as compared to the cities? How many died in Havana alone? I have no answers to those questions. Those who do have the figures, answer if you are able. I can, however, point out some interesting facts. Of “The Twelve” who made it to the Sierra Maestra, only one died in combat: Ciro Redondo, who by the way was active in the Catholic Workers Youth. None was captured. None suffered torture, except Faustino Pérez, and this happened in Havana when he was fighting with the underground. By contrast, of the fourteen members of the July 26th Movement in Havana, four died: Gerardo Abreu (“Fortán), Sergio González (“El Curita”), Enrique Hart, and José Prieto. Another eight were detained and tortured. Aldo Vera miraculously escaped torture, but was imprisoned. Only one escaped unharmed. One in fourteen. The publicity surrounding the insurrection centered on the guerrillas. Besides Fidel, other names were becoming famous: Raúl Castro, Cienfuegos, Guevara and Juan Almeida. The men of the urban resistance were photographed only when their corpses turned up or they were put on trial. This was unavoidable: those who fought in the shadows had to shun the limelight. But what was historically unjust (and in the long run politically tragic),
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was that the struggle waged by the Sierra Maestra guerrillas was promoted as the sole image of the Revolution. That’s where the theory of the guerrilla foco originated, meaning, of course, the guerrilla foco as the heart, brains and very center of the revolutionary struggle. Ernesto Guevara was the principal exponent of this theory. The growing confrontation between “The Mountains” and “The Plains” is reflected, on a small scale, in an epistolary skirmish between Guevara and René Ramos Latour, who had succeeded Frank País as head of the July 26th Movement in Santiago de Cuba. Ramos Latour sent a shipment of arms to the Sierra Maestra that Guevara pronounced defective. In a letter to the urban leader, Guevara, an Argentine physician but now a comandante, complained of the poor quality of the arms with that asperity that Guevara considered one of the most beautiful adornments of his character. In a devastating reply, Ramos Latour told Guevara that in order to send him that defective shipment he first had to disarm men who were in constant danger of death. These differences, which would become more pronounced with time, were not founded on mere jealousy. They were, to use the political jargon that has been imposed on Cuba in the last three decades, “a manifestation of the ideological struggle.” The rebel army was under the complete control of Fidel, who by then had discovered (although he was careful not to say so) that the dictatorship of the proletariat afforded the greatest felicity to those who rule. Guevara shared Fidel’s point of view, as did (naturally) Raúl Castro, Ramiro Valdés and Juan Almeida (all of whom, as far as I can tell, have never had an idea of their own in their lives). In the urban resistance movement, on the contrary, those who favored the restoration of democracy were in the majority. Facing an army that was every day more inept, corrupt and demoralized, the guerrillas began to spread out over the mountainous zones of Oriente. To the northeast of Santiago de Cuba, a second guerrilla front was established under the command of Raúl Castro. A third front commanded by Almeida cropped up in the very Sierra Maestra, just west of the capital of Oriente. But it wasn’t just the rebel army that was creating new guerrilla fronts. At the center of the island, a group of men rose under the command of Eloy Gutiérrez Menoyo, becoming the autonomous Second Escambray National Front. The decimated Directorate, now led by Faure Chaumont, took refuge in the Escambray mountains and was able at least to survive. In April 1958, the ideological struggle between “The Mountains” and “The Plains” finally came to a head. After a long string of successes, Faustino Pérez and his men met at last with disaster: the general strike that the July 26th Movement had convened in Havana for April 9 was a complete failure. “April is the cruelest month.” I remember that April 1958 because it did indeed prove cruel for our country. Fidel, Guevara and the rebel army used to great advantage the Movement’s reverse of fortune. Faustino Pérez couldn’t
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rise to the occasion; his strength lay as a clandestine fighter, not as a politician. He also lacked ambition and independent judgement, qualities that every leader should have. As a result, the Movement of “The Plains” came completely under the control of the men of “The Mountains.” Emblematic of that control was the appointment of Enzo Infante to replace Faustino Pérez. I have a friend who is also friends with Infante and holds him in the highest esteem. I have myself met the gentleman on several occasions and he seemed a decent sort to me. But the fact remains that Enzo Infante was an absolute nobody then, surely no substitute for Faustino Pérez. Why wasn’t someone chosen who was at least known in revolutionary circles? Why not, for example, the energetic and capable Manolo Ray, who led the Movement of Civic Resistance (a collateral arm of the July 26th Movement)? Or the respected Haydée Santamaría? Nothing stimulates men’s courage more than the presence among them of a courageous woman. Her appointment would have constituted a promising token of that much vaunted but as yet unrealized “equal opportunity” that the Revolution would later promise women. Or if not Ray or Haydée, then why not at least name one of the survivors of the original fourteen, none of whom lacked courage? Sometime in 1975, a conference was held in the economics department of Havana University to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the founding of the Cuban Communist Party. One of the superabundant cretins in attendance asked a panel member, Professor Sergio Aguirre, why Martí had named Tomás Estrada Palma as his replacement in the United States rather than Carlos Baliño, a Key West tobacco cutter who much later would become one of the founders of the party. Aguirre was an old member of the Popular Socialist Party but nonetheless an honest man. After explaining the role that each played in the independence struggle and their respective merits—Estrada Palma’s vast and Baliño’s very modest contribution—he concluded that the appointment of Estrada Palma was both natural and logical in view of his record. “Whereas if Martí had named Baliño, all would have asked themselves. ‘why Baliño?’, or what’s worse, ‘who’s Baliño?’” And so I ask myself, why Infante? Or worse, who was Infante? He was named Faustino Pérez’s replacement precisely because he was an irrelevant figure, the ideal candidate if you wanted to minimize the July 26th Movement’s role in the revolutionary process. And minimized it was. In the days to come the Revolution would mean only the rebel army. And Fidel was the rebel army. But that was not the only cruelty that April 1958 showered upon us. In Mexico, certain events transpired that have not been given much importance. Since they happened to be important in my life—and this is my book—I shall treat them, for I consider those events if not significant then surely symptomatic. When the yacht Granma departed from Tuxpan in November 1956, various members of that expedition were obliged to remain in Mexico for various reasons (imprisonment, illness). Among those left behind were Pedro Miret and
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Gustavo Arcos, two leaders and founders of the July 26th Movement who were entrusted with the mission of organizing and training a new group of recruits and sending them to Cuba in a reinforcement expedition. Miret and Arcos set out to work. By April 1958 almost everything was ready. A few recently arrived recruits were still scheduled to receive basic training, but the arms and the ship had already been acquired. These were kept somewhere on the Yucatán peninsula under the custody of a small group of men. In April, while Arcos was in Caracas, Miret learned that various members of the Movement were planning to fly a small plane from Costa Rica to the Sierra Maestra. Such an action could not be taken without Miret’s approval, for he was chief of foreign operations for the Movement, with Arcos as second in command. Miret decided to go to Costa Rica to impose his authority. Up to that point everything was done correctly. But then Miret assumed direct control of the Costa Rican group—which included, by the way, Huber Matos—and flew with them to Cuba, landing at Cienaguilla, a small plain on the foothills of the Sierra Maestra. The plane landed but could not take off again. While this did not affect those who intended to stay, Miret was supposed to return to Mexico. With Miret in Cuba and Arcos in Caracas, the expeditionary group in Mexico was temporarily without a leader. Jesus Suárez Gayol, Heliodoro Martínez Junco, an American named Jay Silvester who was our military instructor, and the other custodians of the arms and the ship, decided, without consulting God or the devil, to set out for Cuba on their own, leaving behind the rest of their companions. That is exactly what they did, sailing as far as the coast of Pinar del Río, which is at the opposite end of the island from the Sierra Maestra. Upon landing, they were detected by the army and lost everything except their lives, with which they were able to escape. The long and patient work of more than a year came to naught. This seemed to me then, seems to me still and will always seem to me even if hailstones should rain on me for saying so, a signal instance of irresponsibility on Miret’s part, and of irresponsibility, insubordination and lack of esprit de corps on the part of Suárez Gayol, Martínez Junco and the other adventuresome voyagers. Nonetheless they were not penalized. Fidel, who is always so unforgiving of errors (I mean, of course, errors committed by others), took no disciplinary measures against the architects of this disaster. Miret was named a comandante before finally returning to Mexico. Suárez Gayol remained in Cuba, fighting bravely in Las Villas and achieving the rank of captain. Martínez del Junco returned to Mexico a few days after the failed expedition. Some day he would become Minister of Public Health. Of course, not everything was going wrong for the rebels. With his characteristic sagacity, which was then functioning at full capacity, Fidel understood just how near he was to the end of the struggle. So perhaps Fidel was inclined
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to forgive the perpetrators of the Mexican fiasco. One who was not forgiven, however, was Gustavo Arcos, who in no way was implicated in that disaster. El Comandante has shown an inexplicable hatred toward him. Perhaps I should say it was a hatred that has yet to be explained. Another who did not rub Fidel the right way was Huber Matos. However, Matos must have been a very good guerrilla. How else do you explain the fact that he became not only one in a heap of comandantes, but the chief of a column? There were barely a dozen chiefs of column in the rebel army, including Guevara, Cienfuegos, Almeida and Raúl Castro. In time, Matos would pay dearly for being “the stranger in their midst.” In Mexico, at the other end of that stage on which this April drama was played, were a group of disillusioned men who had been abandoned by their leaders; some of these individuals would later gain notoriety. José Abrahantes, for example, who, like me, saw the end of the struggle without shooting one bullet or placing one bomb, was named a captain on arriving in Cuba in January 1959. He then embarked on a brilliant career in repression, which ended just recently in complete ignominy. We arrive now at the final stage of the Batista dictatorship, which signals the end of the presence in the public life of our country of that wretch without whose actions our present misfortunes would not have been possible. It was he who led the way to that “blind alley without a glimmer of hope,” of which Lezama spoke. The guerrillas came down from the Sierra Maestra and began to move west; at the end of the road in that direction, lay Havana and power. Some but not all of the rebel army came down from the hills; in fact, very few abandoned their mountain stronghold. Fidel was not among them. Two columns commanded by Ernesto Guevara and Camilo Cienfuegos crossed on foot the plains of Cauto and the flatlands of Camagüey, a total of more than 300 miles, until arriving at Las Villas. This march has been compared to the Westward Invasion led by Generals Gómez and Maceo during our War of Independence, an absurd and disrespectful analogy that is in keeping with the Communist practice of using our national heroes for propaganda purposes. Gómez and Maceo were facing more than 100,000 enemy troops and had to fight every inch of the way. Yet our mambises broke through the box formations of the Spanish—a feat rarely accomplished in any war. The enemy that Guevara and Cienfuegos confronted was very different. Batista’s army was no army. Perhaps Dr. Guevara recalled his uninterrupted hike through the plains of Cuba as he saw his guerrilla forces in Bolivia battered, encircled and finally annihilated by a battalion of army rangers. There was nothing special about those little Bolivian soldiers; they had been welltrained and -armed, and when their officers led them into battle, they fought. But Batista didn’t have at his disposal a single battalion like that.
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The trek of the two guerrilla columns was undoubtedly a great feat, but it wasn’t a military feat, because that would have required an enemy willing to fight. The 300-mile hike instead was an impressive demonstration of physical resistance and forbearance in the face of material hardships. Guevara arrived in the Escambray mountains and was received with cordiality by the Directorate and with cold hostility by Gutiérrez Menoyo’s men. This was the beginning of the bleak future that awaited Gutiérrez Menoyo. Cienfuegos, for his part, proceeded to northern Las Villas, where a small guerrilla band hastily organized by the Communists operated. At the last moment, the Communists had decided to abandon their opposition to the armed struggle. “It’s never too late to enjoy good fortune,” says a somewhat incongruous Spanish proverb, which was fulfilled on that occasion. The veteran Stalinists were the last to climb on the bandwagon, but they’re still aboard today. Camilo Cienfuegos should have kept going west, where a guerrilla front organized by Comandante Escalona was waiting for him. Escalona commanded a “stationary front,” to borrow a meteorological term. No fighting ever happened on that front. Its mission was to prepare a base of operations for when Comandante Cienfuegos arrived. But Cienfuegos never came: it wasn’t necessary. In the western mountains, Batista’s army continued to demonstrate its absolute incapacity to fight. It was undermined by cowardice and corruption. The rapacious and shameless General Tabernilla, head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and his equally rapacious and shameless subordinates, turned the war into a business venture by selling material. One example: Colonel Sosa Blanco, a fearless man when it came to murdering defenseless peasants and burning their thatched huts, but incapable of facing armed and dangerous people. One day the Colonel and his troops arrived at the outbuildings of a sugar refinery, situated some twenty miles from Holguin. The soldiers hurriedly dismounted their trucks, falling over themselves in a mad scramble to get to a nearby park where there was a grove of coconut trees. The desperate soldiers climbed those trees like monkeys and knocked down every coconut, which they opened with their bayonets and devoured as if someone were going to take them away. Meanwhile, the townspeople and other witnesses looked on in astonishment. The frenzied enthusiasm that Colonel Sosa Blanco’s troops demonstrated for coconuts had a very simple explanation: they were starving. Their scoundrelly colonel had sold their rations. Batista’s army continued to prepare and launch attacks on rebel positions, but they always had the same result: defeat and desertion. Although these were small fights, sometimes only skirmishes, Radio Rebelde, the guerrilla’s clandestine station, referred to every encounter as a “battle.” One of these so-called battles (not that it matters, but I don’t remember what it was named) was described as “one of the greatest defeats ever sustained by a modern army.” How was it possible that such a propaganda fraud could have gone undetected? We didn’t suspect. No one suspected—even though the magnitude of those
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lies was self-evident—because we were all overpowered by hope, which makes men blind. When Pandora opened her blessed box and let loose all those evils, the last to escape was hope. I sometimes think it would have been better if hope had stayed in the box. The end came. Villages were captured, then towns. Finally, troops led by Comandante Guevara with the assistance of Directorate forces under the command of Rolando Cubelas attacked the city of Santa Clara. Batista sent an armor-plated train to reinforce the city. However, the train and its contents served only to rearm the rebels, who had captured it but rather had bought it from the colonel Batista had entrusted with this last-ditch mission. Santa Clara fell to the rebels in late December 1958. On the morning of January 1, 1959, having fulfilled his historic mission, Batista fled the country. We thought then that all vistas were opening to us. And so it was, but only for the chosen few who have lived like princes since that day. The fugitive tyrant headed for Santo Domingo. The Americans didn’t want him in their country, even though they granted asylum to some of his worst henchmen. Batista made a bad choice: Rafael Léonidas Trujillo, the fiery Dominican despot, had many scores to settle with Batista and availed himself of this opportunity to get even. Trujillo moved him violently from one place to another, terrorized him (which wasn’t hard to do); corralled him (which is the best word to use in his case); forced him to clean the toilet of his cell, and, lastly, stripped him of several million of his heart’s dollars. I know that this is of absolutely no historical importance, but I am a vengeful man and I take great satisfaction in narrating the misfortunes of scoundrels. Alas, Batista’s travails were not many. Another dictator, Oliveira Salazar of Portugal, granted Batista asylum on the condition that he remain on the Isle of Madeira. There (and later in Estoril and Costa del Sol), Batista spent his final years, enjoying the golden exile of thieving rulers. But I waited. I expected he would be punished as he deserved, either by Fidel or Providence. Years later, the Sandinistas signed a family pact with the Montoneros that entrusted the Argentine terrorists with the assassination of the deposed dictator Somoza, then living in Uruguay. Fidel attempted no such undertaking against Batista, even though he has managed (or rather others working under his orders have managed) to pull off much more difficult and risky things. Providence failed me too. I had expected something like the cancer that killed Machado, but it was not to be. Many years after the fall of the tyrant, I was waiting at a stop on Santa María del Mar beach for a bus to take me back to Havana. Meanwhile, I was keeping one eye on a certain diminutive young man whose wild perambulations threatened the public safety. At a certain moment when he tried to cross the street, I took the necessary measures against the subject in question. It was then that I heard, from passers-by on the street, that
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Fulgencio Batista had died of a stroke, sweetly and quietly, in his luxurious residence in Spain. “Daddy, I’m a big boy,” said my five-year old son Ernesto, enraged at what he considered excessive control over his person. I lowered my gaze and looked sadly at that tiny and mischievous being who meant the world to me. I recalled at that instant that Batista, while in the last years of his millionaire exile, had lost one of his numerous male offspring to leukemia, and I conceived the hope that the wretch loved his children as I love mine. A malignant idea, perhaps, but comforting. The designs of Providence are inscrutable, as my mother used to say. But not so men’s designs. As I scrutinize Fidel’s designs, I can’t help thinking that the indifference he demonstrated to Batista’s fate, the dolce vita that he allowed the tyrant to enjoy in his exile, was in large measure due to a conscious or unconscious sense of gratitude. Fidel has been able to do everything that he has done thanks to the Revolution. This is not my idea; it belongs, as far as I know, to Carlos Alberto Montaner. Without Batista there would have been no Revolution; without the aborting of Cuban democracy on March 10, 1952, there would have been no Fidel Castro. And even with Batista’s disruption of the democratic process in Cuba, if only he had not destroyed the professional army and replaced it with a parody of an army after his own image and likeness, cowardly and corrupt like him. Then Fidel’s fate would have been very different, as would have that of our country and all its people. Fidel would then have had to face troops led by career officers of the caliber of a General Martí Zayas Bazán; Colonel Lezama (“according to his instructors at West Point, my father was capable of commanding an 100,000-man army,” José Lezama Lima said proudly one day); men like Colonel Martín Helena, Colonel Barquín, or even the same Captain José “Gallego” Fernández who is today Fidel’s unconditional follower. Had Fidel had such men as adversaries, he and his guerrillas would have met with the same fate as the Salvadoran rebels, or, worse yet, Ernesto Guevara in Bolivia. I don’t think that Gary Prado, the Bolivian captain who commanded the troops that annihilated Guevara’s guerrillas, was a military genius; he was only a competent and gutsy officer.
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4 Guerrillas at War Marta San Martín and Ramón L. Bonachea The militarism of Cuban society is now undeniable. Various students of the revolution have observed the increasing dominance of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR), which has dampened early hopes that the Cuban Revolution would not fall prey to a professional military machine. On the surface, the militarization of Cuba seems to be the result of a policy geared toward establishing a strong defense on the home front as well as in respect to the United States. Yet the larger question is whether any underdeveloped nation can acquire the appropriate tools with which to allocate and distribute its economic, social and political resources without resorting to militarization. Has the Cuban leadership concluded that only men from the armed forces can move the revolution into a new economic and political takeoff phase? Has the Cuban Revolution become institutionalized in the structure of the FAR while it still retains an uncompromising communist party? What new ideological dimensions have resulted from the militarization of the revolution? These are some of the important questions that must be raised about the Cuban military if one is to grasp recent changes in Cuba. From Rebels to Soldiers General Batyn Dorzh, minister of defense of the People’s Republic of Mongolia, pointed out, after touring Cuba’s military establishment, that one of the most important achievements of the Cuban Revolution was the development and consolidation of the Revolutionary Armed Forces.”1 This accomplishment, he said, had been made possible by the Soviet Union. Similarly, when Army General Heinz Hoffman, minister of national defense of the GDR, visited the San Antonio Air Force Base last spring, he reminded the Cubans that every socialist nation was in debt to the Red Army of the Soviet Union for the achievements of 36
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their armies.2 Brigadier General Carlos Araya Castro, heading the delegation of Chilean Armed Forces that visited Cuba in January 1971, praised the “seriousness” of the Cuban Armed Forces’ training Programs. 3 All of these observations lend weight to Major Fidel Castro’s assertion that Cuba’s FAR is today the strongest, most modern, most professional military organization in Latin America. Certainly as early as 1964 the U.S. State Department had agreed that Cuba’s FAR constituted the most powerful military establishment in the area.4 Though economic and domestic policies such as the unfulfilled ten-million-ton sugar quota or the March 1968 revolutionary offensive have captured the attention of Cuba’s observers, the role of the military is the single most important development of recent years, and one that is rapidly changing the profile of the revolution. Their professionalism, and to a great extent, technocraticism, impresses one most about the men wearing the olive green uniform. The FAR began with the civilian, middle-class-origin guerrillas who participated in the armed struggle against General Fulgencio Batista. Known as the Rebel Army of the Revolution, they included the insurrectionist groups of the Sierra Maestra and Escambray mountains as well as urban underground fighters from the 26th of July and the Revolutionary Directorate movements. From the Granma landing on December 2, 1956, to the final collapse of the regular army and the government, the rebel forces grew steadily, and included over 1,500 men when they finally reached Havana in January 1959. The extermination of the regular army—by execution, exile and discharge— posed the need for a new one to take on the responsibilities of national defense. Such a task was by no means easy; both Fidel and his brother Raúl have conceded that the rebel army’s lower ranks were mostly illiterate and unfamiliar with military science. Priorities for the defense of the revolution were set early in 1959. First, the revolutionary leaders understood that they must defend the revolution from Batista’s forces within and abroad. Second, the possibility of a U.S.-sponsored intervention, such as in Guatemala in 1954, could not be dismissed, especially after American properties were confiscated. The available manpower in the rebel guerrilla army could not possibly meet such challenges. As a result of these political realities, the National Revolutionary Militias were officially created in October 1959. Majors Raúl Castro and Sergio del Valle and Captain Rogelio Acevedo met with 50 militants to discuss the need for a militia based on voluntary enrollment by workers. It was discussed as a pilot project for the city of Havana, but by 1960 the regulations of the revolutionary militias stated that they would be organized “through units in every cooperative, farm, factory, working and student centers, neighborhoods and/or any state or state related organizations.”5 Militia instructors were drawn from the 26th of July, the Organización Auténtica (OA) and the Revolutionary Directorate underground movements. Rebel army
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officers also volunteered to teach workers the elementary notions of military defense in case of attack. Classes were held after work and on weekends so as not to affect production, and in areas belonging to working centers, military posts or syndicates. The National Revolutionary Militias were to be a supporting and dependent corps of the Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces. The Escuelas de Instrucción Revolucionaria On December 2, 1960, a meeting of decisive importance for the future of the rebel army was held. Headed by Fidel Castro, the meeting was to unite the main revolutionary movements within the military. Cadres were to be formed from among the veterans of the insurrection. Others present at the meeting were Emilio Aragonés, National Coordinator of the 26th of July movement, Faure Chomón, Secretary General of the Revolutionary Directorate, and Blas Roca, Secretary General of the Partido Socialista Popular (PSP). This meeting disclosed the urgent need to build a strong armed forces.6 As a result, the Escuelas de Instrucción Revolucionaria were set up. These cut vertically and horizontally across geographical and occupational lines. There were national EIR for teachers, fishermen, farmers and members of syndicates and provincial EIR encompassing regional and municipal cadres from all professions. Of particular interest were the Escuelas Básicas de Instrucción Revolucionaria (EBIR) especially designed for core revolutionary militants. Classes lasted from three to six months, depending on production schedules, contingency planning, mobilization against counterrevolutionists (the so-called Escambray “bandits”), literacy campaigns, etc. The programs of these schools included the study and discussion of Fidel Castro’s “History Will Absolve Me,” Blas Roca’s “Los fundamentos del socialismo en Cuba” and the controversial manuals of the USSR Academy of Science such as Manual of Political Economy, The Basis of Marxist Philosophy, O. Kuusinen’s Manual of Marxism-Leninism and even Mao Tse-tung’s On Contradictions.7 By the autumn of 1961, the EIR Osvaldo Sánchez School of the Revolutionary Armed Forces had graduated 750 battalion and company instructors. In less than eight months 1,175 students had completed studies at the provincial EIR and 4,000 had been trained at the EBIR. These men and women assumed revolutionary leadership in the areas of production, defense and culture.8 As for the FAR, the injection of fresh cadres could not be more desirable. The EIR and EBIR eliminated the intergroup friction that had characterized the various insurrectionary organizations, particularly the 26th of July and the Revolutionary Directorate movements. The cadres’ politicization through these schools, and their virtual integration within the armed forces, paved the way for the emergence of a united FAR. At last the rebel forces were beginning to look like a modern-day military institution.
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Mass Organizations and the Test of Strength As the revolution moved toward the Soviet Union and showed evidence of a deepening Marxist-Leninist character, the leadership began to adopt a socialist program for each of the existing revolutionary organizations. The EIR and the EBIR were essential tools in providing trained personnel to organize, educate and eventually consolidate the masses. The Asociación de Jóvenes Rebeldes (AJR) became the Unión de Jóvenes Comunistas (UJC); the loose vigilance committees started at random in 1959 were turned into sophisticated committees for the defense of the revolution in September 1960. The Revolutionary Directorate, 26th of July, OA and the PSP became the Organizaciones Revolucionarias Integradas (ORI), while the Federación de Mujeres Cubanas retained its name but added new cadres and leaders. The first phase of the revolution reached its climax with the April 17, 1961, Bay of Pigs invasion. This began a series of tests of the strength of the revolutionary forces. Despite the confusion and severe measures imposed on the population during this crisis, the revolution successfully met the challenge. The National Revolutionary Militias suffered many casualties but by and large FAR’s ground troops and air force easily decided the outcome. Meanwhile, the revolutionary leadership was waging a fierce fight against the Escambray guerrillas in Las Villas province. The Escambray had been the scene of Ché Guevara’s and Rolando Cubelas’ most resounding victories, such as the attacks on Guinea de Miranda and the Battle of Santa Clara; now it was the setting of new guerrilla warfare—this time against the revolution. Disenchantment with the radical measures of the revolution was not an exclusive prerogative of economically affected classes. The movement in the Escambray region was mostly led by former Castro supporters, ex-guerrillas who had a thorough knowledge of the terrain and respectable expertise in irregular warfare. Of them, the most popular was Porfirio Ramírez, a student leader from Las Villas University and former guerrilla. Equally popular was Major Evelio Duque, who commanded wide support from the Escambray guajiros. At the height of their campaign, official sources estimated that these leaders commanded approximately 3,591 men,9 who comprised 179 guerrilla groups. Open counterrevolutionary activities began throughout the six provinces of Cuba. Groups operated in the Sierra Maestra mountains of Oriente province and the Sierra de los Organos in Pinar del Río province. Others were actively engaged in operations to the south of the city of Havana and around the coastal areas of Matanzas and Las Villas, both to the north and south. The counterrevolutionary guerrilla movement was nurtured by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency’s shipment of arms, food supplies and explosives. In addition, the CIA oversaw the recruitment of an urban underground. A few guerrilla groups attempted to remain independent though the effort was useless
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since they depended on the CIA for military supplies. It is no secret that without the CIA the guerrillas would never have been able to establish their fronts across the island. Regular aid parachuted at night, infiltration of saboteurs from various points in the Caribbean and a continuous flow of intelligence data from the CIA staff at the U.S. embassy in Havana gave the insurgents momentum. Against the persistence of the counterrevolution, the Ministry of the Armed Forces prepared a number of retaliatory measures. The struggle against the Escambray “bandits”—as it is called in Cuban military parlance—became known as the Lucha Contra Bandidos (LCB). Amidst the revamping of the old rebel army, the Ministries of Defense and the Interior rapidly mobilized the CDR and the National Revolutionary Militias. The former participated in Operación Anillo (Ring Operation) while the latter were charged with Operación Cerco (Encirclement Operation). Altogether, 50,000 workers were mobilized from all the surrounding cities and provinces, and 50,000 peasants from various regions of the country.10 Legendary figures from the revolutionary war such as Ché Guevara, Raúl Castro, Faustino Pérez and Raúl Menéndez Tomasevich all took part in the struggle. At Escambray, a column led by Guevara suffered a crushing defeat at the hands of Porfirio Ramírez’s guerrillas. After regrouping and charging again, Guevara’s column was ambushed in a place called Potrillo, and as a result his force was cut to pieces. Afterwards, he was rescued by helicopter and transported to the nearby city of Cienfuegos. Raúl Castro encountered a similar fate; he was outmaneuvered by Major Evelio Duque’s outfit, which inflicted heavy casualties on the militias before the terrified eyes of many an Escambray family. At the Sierra Maestra, small guerrilla bands attacked isolated posts of the rebel army. Castro’s response to these defeats was to arm the peasants for self-defense, and after a few sound skirmishes the guerrillas took refuge in the heights of the Sierras. The final drive on the Escambray guerrillas came with the removal of the rural population from the zone of operations. Selective terrorism was applied to any peasants suspected of aiding or abetting the counterrevolutionaries. Executions and imprisonment were frequent. Both the Anillo and Cerco operations succeeded in exterminating the hard core of the insurgents. In November of 1960, before the Bay of Pigs invasion, the CIA suspended most of its aid to these groups. After President Kennedy’s decision to back an invasion of Cuba, and the creation of the CIA-supported Cuban Revolutionary Council, the Escambray guerrillas were on their own. If a U.S.-supported invasion had succeeded the guerrillas would have had a direct claim to power, and the CIA feared that these men were too far to the left in comparison with their counterparts in the Cuban Revolutionary Council. Thus, the CIA discouraged the urban underground movement from joining the guerrillas in the mountains. As the CIA phased out its support for the guerrillas it became a matter of days until they would be exterminated. Guerrillas went to the llanos searching
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for food and supplies and were caught by the revolutionary forces. Without an external base of logistical support they were condemned—as Ché was to be in Bolivia—to total oblivion. The first front to be eliminated was that of Pinar del Río, followed by groups in Camagüey, Havana and Matanzas provinces. The last haven of the guerrilla movement became the Escambray. Some favored trying to get out of the country to join the training camps already underway for the coming invasion. Others decided to stay and continue the fight. Meanwhile, FAR’s offensive escalated in a final effort to clear the country’s rear guard as reports told Castro of the impending invasion. Although Ministries of the Interior and Defense effectively eradicated most of the guerrillas, scattered groups remained hidden in the mountains until well into 1965, when the government finally claimed to have successfully mastered the Lucha Contra Bandidos. Fidel and Raúl Castro make no bones about their deep bitterness about the Escambray episode, in which the revolutionary government lost 500 men and spent between 500 and 800 million pesos.11 For Fidel, Raúl, Ramiro Valdés, Sergio del Valle and others—especially after the nuclear confrontation of October 1962, when the Soviet Union and the United States decided everyone’s status—“arming to the teeth” became necessary if the revolution and its leaders were to survive at all. The tests of Cuba’s strength during the first five years of the revolution tended to consolidate the revolutionary consciousness of the leaders and the people—except those who remained but were philosophically at odds with the socialist regime. The various political and educational campaigns waged during these years increased the feeling of solidarity among the FAR, and their pride in having defended the revolution. The literary output through the Escambray period, the Girón invasion and the Caribbean crisis reflects these sentiments. Poems praised the sacrifice of the literacy brigadistas, and novels depicted the epic of the Escambray,12 while Girón (or Bay of Pigs) was celebrated. The changes in FAR’s profile were noticeable. Many revolutionaries from these campaigns went on to occupy important positions throughout Cuba’s defense system and structure. The youngest fighters went into advanced military schools to become FAR officers, and others joined the intelligence units of the Ministry of the Interior (MININT) and the Ministry of Defense (MINFAR). Compulsory Military Service On July 26, 1963, Fidel Castro told the people of Cuba that the defense of the fatherland was a duty of everyone, not just of a few. Accordingly, on November 26, 1963, the revolutionary government approved Law 1129, by which it directed every male between the ages of 16 and 44 to register for military service.13
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In April 1964 the first draftees went into the various military schools throughout the island. Many a traditional Cuban family disapproved this measure, for it took their children away from home—an unprecedented event in Cuban history. Certainly Cuba had not been as militaristic as her Latin neighbors. However the Cuban tradition of civilian rule, which had been upset at times by the dictatorships of General Gerardo Machado and Fulgencio Batista and the military skirmishes of the first years of the revolution, now came abruptly to an end. Instrumental in the draft movement were the CDR. Through them youngsters qualifying for service were issued their Servicio Militar Obligatorio (SMO) cards. The SMO reached many youngsters who in the view of the revolutionary government did not study, work and were not engaged in any significant task. The conscription of cadres through the SMO increased the politicization of a substantial sector of the population, particularly the young. To resolve the contradiction between education and national defense, the government gave technical training to the draftees while they were serving in the FAR. Credits were given cadres for the time worked in agriculture or industry.14 Those who remained in the FAR to become future officers attended technological institutes or precollege institutes.15 Altogether a conscripted cadre had to serve three years. Then he had to decide whether to continue with the military or to enroll in one of the three universities or simply to put his knowledge and services to the use of the revolution. Universal conscription insured that there were no criteria for membership in the cadres. To qualify for an officer’s school, however, the cadre member had to be a good communist (belong to one of the mass organizations such as the UJC, have a record of good moral conduct (homosexuals, drunkards, thieves and the like were excluded from membership in mass organizations), demonstrate absolute self-discipline and respect for military discipline, be of a responsible nature (judged by his record of militancy in the mass organization) and above all obey the orders of the chief. The SMO no doubt helped supply the FAR with manpower, not just numerically but qualitatively. Yet it was also instrumental in extending the authority of the military establishment over adolescents and youth. The revolutionary leaders felt no qualms about this trend; it is their philosophy that every Cuban citizen must be a soldier, a student and a worker, or, put into a slogan, “Trabajo, Estudio y Fusil.” The Military and the Party In 1965 the United Party of the Socialist Revolution (PURS) was created. Then the Cuban leadership complied to Soviet pressures to patch up their Marxist-Leninist revolution with an earthly touch of reality: the PURS became the Cuban Communist Party (PCC).
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The PCC structure places Major Fidel Castro as its first secretary general, prime minister, director of the Institute of Agrarian Reform and commanderin-chief of the revolutionary armed forces. Major Raúl Castro is second in command for each of the above positions. The Politburo is made up of Majors Juan Almeida, Ramiro Valdés, Guillermo García and Sergio del Valle, along with two civilians, President Osvaldo Dorticós Torrado and Armando Hart as the secretary of organization. The party’s secretariat is headed by Fidel Castro as chairman, Raúl Castro as vice-chairman, in addition to Major Faure Chomón, Carlos Rafael Rodríguez and Blas Roca. The party structure bears a striking resemblance to the internal organization of the clandestine 26th of July Movement. In addition, 63 of the Central Committee’s 100 members were military men, and only three women were members16—Vilma Espín (Raúl’s wife), Haydée Santamaría (Hart’s wife) and Celia Sánchez. Responsibility for the decision-making process falls on the first and second secretaries of the party as well as on the members of the Politburo. The Central Committee seems to wield little power except as a supporting body for any and all decisions taken by either Secretariat or Politburo. In 1963, Raúl Castro issued orders to the effect that the creation of the party within the FAR should have priority over the coming years. To create the appropriate objective and subjective conditions a number of steps were taken. First, the FAR conducted a mass media campaign to introduce FAR members to some elementary notions about the forces leading to the creation of Marxist-Leninist parties. Study material for this task involved the Communist Manifesto by K. Marx and F. Engels, the “Historic Mission of the Working Class” and chapters related to the organization and functions of the party in Kuusinen’s Manual of Marxism–Leninism.17 Second, commissions for the creation of the party were developed by selecting the best political instructors from the FAR, including some troop officers. These men were to instruct their comrades about the materials they themselves had previously studied. Last, encounter sessions were held with political commissars from other socialist countries experienced in the building of other communist parties. Shortly thereafter, FAR’s political instructors were sent to Oriente province to begin the pilot construction of the Cuban Communist Party. December 2, 1963, or the seventh anniversary of the Granma expedition, was chosen as the beginning date for this task. One of the main concerns in forming a communist party within the armed forces was to ensure a careful selection of future party members.18 The MINFAR may have chosen Oriente because its army division there was farthest away from key influential members of the old communist guard residing in Havana which had intimate contacts with the USSR embassy. But officially Oriente was chosen for traditional reasons: the building of the party would simulate an invasion recalling both the War of Independence from Spain and the revolutionary war against Batista forces, that is from Oriente to Pinar del Río.19
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The available literature of this period shows a tactful but firm emphasis on the precept that the party in the armed forces had to differ “totally from the experience of the party’s construction in working centers.”20 This zealous preoccupation lends substance to the belief that FAR’s structure was not to be controlled by the remnants of the old Cuban Socialist Party (PSP), which commanded strong support among the working class, or by revolutionary civilians of any of the major movements in the struggle against Batista. Instead the MINFAR, through the Joint Chiefs of Staff, diligently and carefully supervised the arrangements leading to FAR’s screening of future party cadres, leaving no doubt that FAR would control them rather than the other way around. Many of the drilling mottos of the FAR were geared to instill obedience and loyalty not to the party but to the chief, i.e., “to educate the officers and the troops in the principle that the order of the chief is the law incarnating the will of the land,” or “for anything, in any way, and wherever at your orders Commander in Chief.”21 It was this clear-cut distinction that led René Dumont to remark sarcastically that “the Party is still impregnated with a Spanish-American mentality gladly delegating all powers on the Chief, the Caudillo.”22 The construction of the party clearly involved an attempt to avoid disrupting the monolithic nature of FAR’s structure. But during the ensuing two years other events produced deep-seated unrest. First, the dismissal of Major Efigenio Almeijeiras, Vice-Minister of the Armed Forces, began a drive against “inmoral conduct.” This move was followed by an intensive campaign against homosexuals, paving the way for the much-resented UMAP (Military Units to Aid Production). The impact was felt at every echelon of Cuban society and created bitter resentment. Second, a plot to assassinate Fidel Castro was unveiled, and Major Rolando Cubelas, a former leader of the Revolutionary Directorate and president of the University Student Federation, was tried and sentenced to 30 years of hard labor. Other military officers were to participate, along with Manuel Artime, a former civilian leader of the Bay of Pigs invasion. This and the disappearance of Ché Guevara increased the intrigue and uneasiness within the FAR. Third, the People’s Republic of China was suspected of promoting widespread dissaffection against Fidel Castro by means of propaganda within Cuba and abroad. Pekín Informa (the Spanish version of Peking Review) was sent freely in large quantities to army personnel, and in September of 1965 the MINFAR reported that massive distribution was carried out systematically among officers of the FAR by delegates of the Chinese government. Individual contacts were made with officers of the General Joint Chiefs of Staff, of armies, army corps, divisions and chiefs of political sections of the army.23 In February of 1966 Castro charged the Chinese with economic aggression and disclosed China’s attempt to subvert Cuba’s military institutions. Declaring that the government could not tolerate China’s maneuvers to “influence the
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military and administrative cadres through acts amounting to betrayal,”24 Castro came close to a complete break with the People’s Republic of China. In the process it was revealed that pro-Guevarist officers were less willing than their pro-Castroite comrades to compromise with the Soviet Union on Cuban policy toward guerrilla wars in Latin America.25 In spite of Castro’s much-talked-about promises to support such plans there is evidence that he never seriously intended to risk too much on behalf of the idea of “many Vietnams” in Latin America.26 Meanwhile the construction of the party proceeded while the approach changed. It became necessary to instill discipline by preparing cadres loyal to Castro and to his pro-Soviet line. New methods were employed to assess the political and military performance of FAR’s officers. Previously, self-criticism offered many low-ranking officers an opportunity to openly criticize their superiors. A new approach established eight categories according to rank wherein group discussions would take place: privates, corporals, sergeants and officers were grouped under four categories, and officers from the Chief of Sections of the General Staff of Armies, Chiefs of the General Staffs of Divisions, Brigades and Units—including battalions, artillery and company chiefs—would form the remaining four.27 Other structural arrangements concerned the centers of political command: the National Commission of the FAR, the Political Direction of the FAR, Political Sections, the Party’s Bureau, the Bureau of Nuclei, and the núcleos at the base of the military pyramid. The National Commission, headed by Raúl Castro as chairman, was followed by the Political Section, which would select members and from which the Political Direction would be fed the correct orientation. In turn, Political Sections would supervise the party’s work in brigades and armies. The party’s Bureau was to control the activities at the level of battalions, followed by the Bureau of Nuclei, and last the núcleos at the platoon level, the base organization of the party.28 The above scheme parallels that of other mass organizations, especially the CDR, which as a paramilitary organization is closely related to FAR. It contains a national directorate, provincial, regional, municipal, sectional and lastly the local CDR or base organization, which in the FAR is the nucleus. Closely intertwined with the party’s structure in the FAR is the UJC, with cadres up and down the party structure. Together they form the FAR-UJC nucleus, balancing FAR and injecting “militant enthusiasm” in addition to checking the activities of platoon leaders whose behavior is the subject of monthly reports to the Bureau of Nuclei. UJC members can be ready for combat duties with 24 hours’ notice.29 The construction of the party within FAR has not only contributed to the emergence of various military figures but also to their promotion to key positions within the power structure usually filled by civilians. Some of the key men surrounding Fidel Castro are Major Senén Casas Regueiro, first deputy minister
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of the FAR and chief of the General Staff, his brother Major Julio Casas Regueiro, deputy minister of services of the FAR. Major Oscar Fernández Mell, deputy chief of the General Staff, Major José R. Machado, first secretary of the party, Havana province, and Major Julio Camacho, first secretary of the party, Pinar del Rio province, in addition to Majors Julio García Olivera and Roberto Viera Estrada, members of the Central Committee of the CCP and Major José N. Causse, chief of the Political Section, Captain Manuel Peñado, deputy chief of the Political Department of the MINFAR and Major Lino Carreras of the Armored Division. The Ministry of the Interior (MININT) The right arm of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Cuba is the MININT, one of the country’s most complex and awesome revolutionary institutions. The MININT performs as important a role in the national defense system as the FAR. Its immediate domestic branches are the National Revolutionary Police, the Department of Technical Investigations and well-known Department of State Security. There also is the International Section, dealing mostly with espionage and counterespionage as well as the Liberation Directorate, concerned with guerrilla activities. But the MININT also includes a Joint Chief of Staff supervising the tasks of the MININT’s army divisions. Very little is heard or known about this “secret army,” which commands at least two very important outfits: the Batallones Fronterizos (Bons) and the Milicias Serranas (the LCBs—Lucha Contra Bandidos). The MININT’s army divisions are autonomous bodies reporting directly to Fidel Castro and to Minister of Defense Raúl Castro. The Bons keep a 24-hour constant surveillance along the first lines of defense, the coasts. In case of invasion or small landings the Bons are responsible for prompt execution of orders and strategies. The LCBs are equally important because they patrol the plains and mountains of Cuba. Staffed by and constantly in contact with the peasantry, these military detachments constitute the guardians of the revolution against the “bandits.” In terms of manpower the Bons are an elite corps, since they include able political cadres whose status symbolizes the “exemplary socialist soldiers” who are experts on Marxist-Leninist theory. Their training is carried out jointly by MININT’s and FAR’s political instructors from various military schools, so they are also known as the MININT-FAR forces. Approximately half of the troops are regular FAR soldiers and the other half MININT’s cadres. In the event of an exile raid, or any other irregularity, the units of the MININT-FAR are to report to the MININT Havana headquarters, which in turn notifies the FAR. As for the LCBs these largely stem from the paramilitary CDR organization, the National Militias and regular soldiers from the FAR. Together, these organizations comprise an army within an army, a system that permits a constant flow of intelligence badly needed in a militarized revo-
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lutionary process. Should the army plot against Fidel Castro, either by allowing exile raids or among themselves, the MININT cadres—also known in Cuban parlance as Contra-Seguridad del Estado—are there to see that the attempts are thwarted and punished. The same holds true for the communist party if it should move against the revolutionary leadership. For MININT cadres are present throughout the FAR as well as throughout the party’s top positions, especially at the provincial levels where most positions such as provincial secretaries are held by majors. Major Sergio del Valle,30 Minister of the MININT since October 1968 (replacing Major Ramiro Valdés) has described his ministry’s performance as one of the most important in the field of national defense.31 Major Fidel Castro himself has argued the merits of the MININT when criticisms against it have come from certain sectors such as Havana University students in the School of Humanities and Cuban intellectuals.32 Overall, the MININT is essential to the survival of the revolution as well as to Fidel himself. The Making of a Professional Officer Future professional officers are recruited from the UJC-led Union of Cuban pioneers (UPC), a new concept enveloping the embryo of Fidel Castro’s new “army of cadres.” The UPC embraces children between the ages of seven and 14 years with a membership of one million in 1970.33 Their motto “Pioneers for Communism: We Shall Be Like Ché,” represents the government’s effort to create the “new man” evoked by “Ché” Guevara. One of the objectives in this recruitment is to gradually eliminate universal conscription. However, instead of doing away with the SMO, the revolutionary government has internalized it into the educational system. Prior to September 1970 grade school children were trained in drilling, marching and political instruction until reaching the Escuelas Básicas. From ages 15 to 77 they would serve three years in some branch of the FAR. Until 1966, secondary and pre-university schools were not so militarized. In that year Raúl Castro issued orders for the first Camilo Cienfuegos military school with an enrollment of 300 students.34 This pilot project generated five similar schools throughout the remaining provinces. The Camilo Cienfuegos enroll children between ages 11 to 17 and are coeducational institutions which provide secondary and pre-universitary education under regimentation paralleling FAR’s cadet military schools. In 1972 it included 12,000 students through the six provinces; these youngsters were called “the principal source feeding the schools of technical cadres as well as cadres for the FAR’s command posts.”35 While the secondary and pre-university schools are in operation alongside the Camilo Cienfuegos, the latter will gradually replace the last vestiges of civilian-oriented public instruction. In the view of the government, if the revolution is to survive its economic crises, more disciplined cadres must be formed.
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After the “Camilitos”—as these students are known—have completed their basic pre-college education they are absorbed into the CEM, or Centros de Estudios Militares. The CEM is a conglomerate of military schools, the foremost of which is the Instituto Técnico Militar founded on September 16,1966, in the former building of Belén School where Fidel Castro graduated from high school. The ITM became a reality thanks to Soviet advisors and the students themselves. Previously, technicians were trained in other socialist countries, especially the Soviet Union. In this sense, the ITM was a step in the direction of training Cubans in Cuba with the help of Soviet instructors and Cubans already trained in the Soviet Union. Until 1971 students enrolling in the ITM came from the Secundarias Basicas and the Pre-universitarias. This pattern changed with the increasing output of “Camilitos”; by the end of 1971, 74 percent of the incoming recruits came from the Camilo Cienfuegos schools.36 Once in the ITM students are given a 45-day training course known as the Soldier’s School where they are further acquainted with the life, rule and regulations of the armed forces. They are also given short courses on physical fitness, tactics, engineering training, preventive measures against mass extermination weapons, political instruction and topography. They are compelled to engage in agricultural production in areas programmed for these camps. Before actually enrolling in the ITM’s schools their work and study is evaluated by faculty members who decide if they meet the standards and/ or if vacancies are available.37 Overall the ITM is a fine technological training institution preparing officer-technicians to assume professional positions in the modernized FAR. There are four major schools at the ITM: the School of Geodesy and Construction, specializing in phototopography, construction of anti-aircraft shelters, cartography and land surface; the School of Mechanics, emphasizing physics, chemistry and machinery, especially tanks, heavy equipment and armaments, mechanical aviation and engineering; and the Schools of Electrical Mechanics and Radiotechnical Mechanics, specializing in rocketry armaments, radar, wireless communications, radio-navigation, radio-communication and automatic computer systems.38 These studies last from three to five years depending on whether the student wants to become a technician or an engineer. Not all students pursue technical training though FAR emphasizes qualified technical manpower. Those who choose to become strictly military officers, and who have completed their secondary and pre-college schooling, will, depending on their aptitudes and socialist consciousness, enroll in any of the special military schools under the CEM. If the student prefers the navy he will enroll at Mariel Naval School in Pinar del Río province. If he wants to become an air force cadet he will go to San Antonio, one of the main military installations of the celebrated DAAFAR (Defensa Anti-Aérea de las Fuerzas Aéreas Revolucionarias) where most of the sophisticated rockets and air force planes are found.
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But with most armies the trend is to enroll in any of three main military schools of the FAR: the “General Maceo Inter-Armas School,” which includes the Schools of Communications and Infantry, the Máximo Gómez Military School specializing in artillery and armored equipment, or the Advanced School of War reserved for the best military officers trained at any one of the CEM’s special military schools or in the Soviet Union. Ever since the Cuban Revolution proclaimed its allegiance to socialism there has been a marked emphasis on preparing responsible personnel to occupy decision-making positions in agriculture, industry, the military or education. This qualified manpower has been termed cadres or, more specifically yet, “command cadres,” a managerial development within the revolution that led René Dumont to suspect the existence of a vastly militarized bureaucracy. After training in Soviet military academies, the revolutionary Cuban leaders have been able to initiate their own training schools such as the ITM, and to replace civilians in key managerial posts by military personnel technically qualified to carry out the programs, exerting stern discipline in the economic area, which has become Cuba’s vital artery. Officers attending the Soviet M.V. Frunze Military Academy, founded in 1918 by Lenin, have ranged from first and second lieutenants to majors who now hold important positions in the military establishment.39 Criteria for selection of faculty members in the Soviet Academy include combat experience, breadth of knowledge in the field of education, direct experience with the country from which the recruits have come, and thorough familiarity with the theater of operations as well as knowledge of the “peculiar local conditions” of each nation sending officers to study at the academy.40 Raúl Castro has asserted that the military establishment represents the most important institution of the Cuban Revolution, and that the nation’s resources are to be placed solidly behind the FAR even if Cuba is forced “to sacrifice some aspects of social development.” The military must be allocated “a greater amount of resource.”41 Some of the results of this intensive training of professional officers deserve mention. In 1960–1961, 750 political instructors—the antecedents of the command cadres—graduated from the Osvaldo Sánchez school. By comparison, in 1970 1,579 professional officers graduated, of whom 90 percent were either members of the UJC or the PCC.42 Similarly, 1,304 cadets graduated from the ITM, the naval academy, and other military schools already mentioned. At least 275 successfully completed training in Soviet military academies and returned to Cuba to assume jobs in any of the CEM’s schools or further studies at the Advanced School of War in Cuba.43 The Military Structure Despite the lack of substantial data concerning the structure of FAR it is safe to say that it appears to function along the model of the USSR Red Army. But
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noticeable variations—the National Militias or the LCBs—answer to Cuba’s specific needs. In terms of weaponry, training and political orientation, FAR may be categorized as a modern professional military institution. To what extent this professionalism is sine qua non of power capability or commendable performance is a question that remains largely unanswered for lack of empirical evidence. In turn, the division of services remains orthodox, with an air force, navy and an army, each with its own general staff under the supervision of the Joint General Staff of the Armed Forces. The structure of Cuba’s FAR ties into the country’s defense strategy. As early as September 20,1961, Fidel Castro projected three types of offensive overtures that remain equally feasible today: a formal or informal U.S.-sponsored Cuban exile invasion, guerrilla warfare or a spontaneous uprising generated by the elimination of the main revolutionary leaders.44 These alternatives are largely cancelled out by the effectiveness of the FARMININT forces controlling mass organizations such as the CDR, UJC and the National Militias. Being dependent paramilitary organizations they can be instrumental in breaking up any urban underground, and since an internal uprising must be planned from inside, an urban underground movement must be developed first. A massive invasion, or an invasion like the Bay of Pigs is not at all impossible and FAR prefers to concentrate on this possibility. As for irregular war or guerrilla warfare, the existence of an underground is concomitant to any successful armed struggle. Because of organizational difficulties the likelihood of this alternative is remote. As for the specific characteristics of Cuba’s topography and geography, FAR has seemingly opted for three main blocks of military concentrations: the Western Army covering the provinces of Pinar del Rio, Havana and the eastern half of Matanzas: the Central Army including the western half of Matanzas; all of Las Villas province and half of Camagüey; and the Oriente Army extending from Camagüey city to all of Oriente province. This geo-strategic breakdown is followed by a geo-political one, that is, the existence of six independent armies or divisions such as the Independent Army Corps of Pinar del Río, Havana, Matanzas, Las Villas, Camagüey and Oriente. If the island were invaded at several points, resistance could be maintained even if it were cut off in half—witness the opposite effect during 1958 when Batista concentrated his army in Las Villas and Oriente. If the Joint General Chiefs of Staffs were unable to direct operations, the General Chiefs of Staff of the independent armies would continue to pursue pertinent strategies and tactics. Initiative, flexibility and unity of command parallel Fidel Castro’s military and political tactics during the Sierra Maestra days. Military exercises are conducted every month in various parts of the island. The strategy is to crush the invaders before they approach the coast, or to annihilate them entirely if they land. Large quantities of human and material
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resources are mobilized to this end since any hesitation would be costly in terms of lives and time. FAR is a large military machine with unprecedented manpower of approximately 300,000 men; yet it can revert to guerrilla warfare. Theoretically, FAR has the capability to atomize into hundreds or thousands of guerrilla columns to oppose an enemy like the United States. Cuban leaders may not be entirely confident that they can reject a U.S. invasion of Cuba. If such an invasion takes place, FAR would suffer heavy casualties though it ultimately would control the situation, assuming use of conventional weapons only. But the ensuing phases of resistance would be more difficult. Thus, the FAR are trained in guerrilla warfare, and selected units receive careful attention. These vanguard units are usually located in the mountains and have their own independent arms depots camouflaged in the hills and caves. More specifically the Batallones Serranos constitute these guerrilla outfits. The evidence available shows that because of the Serranos’ knowledge of the terrain, their high degree of fighting morale and constant mobility, their counterinsurgency actions have proven lethal against small bands of Cuban exiles who attempt to promote guerrilla warfare. The latest recorded attempt took place on April 17, 1971, when a group commanded by Vicente Méndez unsuccessfully tried to establish a guerrilla center in the region of Baracoa, Oriente province. FAR’s high degree of combat readiness is a response to the “socialist emulation” technique whereby every military unit competes for first place in socialist production, socialist military behavior or socialist performance in the field of battle. One of the most important competitions consists of reaching the highest possible level of politicization for the members of each unit. Such an objective is attained through the study of Marxism-Leninism, the advancement of the party within the FAR and the maintenance of vigilance within the military organization. A Large Military Establishment The need to maintain a large military establishment is emphasized by the leaders of the revolution. Fidel Castro has referred on various occasions to the disproportionate numerical force of the FAR in relation to the total population of Cuba (eight million). In Chile Fidel Castro disclosed that that FAR’s manpower can increase its numbers from 300,000 to 600,000 in 24 hours by adding its paramilitary organizations.45 The leaders of the revolution constantly remind the people that the survival of their revolution depends on the combat preparedness of the mass organizations. If FAR must incorporate more men for defense it can count on the cooperation of roughly a million persons militarily trained from the CDR. The same holds true for the Federation of Cuban Women
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(1.5 million), and the Central Confederation of Cuban Workers (1.5 million) though the CDR (3.5 million) are the most numerous of all. It is doubtful that any other Latin American army could mobilize such an impressive manpower, or that it could match FAR’s technological prowess. Unlike Argentina or Chile, Cuba never had a professional navy despite its geographic situation. With the revolution, Cuba’s heavy, often obsolete vessels have been exchanged for a large fleet of Soviet-built speed boats such as the Krondstads, Komar I and II. Numerous naval posts have been erected along the coasts, particularly in the inlets and small bays. The navy’s own approach to defense has also undergone palpable transformations. Until 1971, the navy maintained a surveillance system to intercept exile commando raids, and to capture Cubans trying to leave the country clandestinely. The persistent attempts of several exile organizations to infiltrate the island has prompted Fidel Castro to order the navy to intercept vessels navigating too close to the coast, and to capture known counterrevolutionary ships cruising the Caribbean. This policy and the navy’s efficiency in accomplishing such objectives have greatly discouraged exile raids, and have alerted potential counterrevolutionaries of the dangers involved in attacking Cuba’s coastal villages. The traditional immunity of vessels in international waters is disregarded by the Cuban government. Recently there were rumors that the USSR was building a submarine base at the port of Cienfuegos in Las Villas province. The U.S. State Department immediately complained to the Soviet Union, and an Izvestia analyst reported such assertions were groundless.46 However, the southern part of Cienfuegos has been made available to Russian ships, possibly for refueling or repair work, and plausibly for propaganda effects. No concrete evidence exists to assume that facilities have been established there “to service missiles or Y-class nuclear missile submarines.”47 Militarization of Society The final militarization of Cuban society may be traced to Castro’s speech on the 11th anniversary of the Palace Attack, March 13, 1968. The striking note in that address was the take-over of whatever remnants of the private sector had been able to survive earlier revolutionary measures.48 The new policy of the revolution, known as the “revolutionary offensive,” signaled a turning point which would require the utmost utilization of human resources for a huge economic mobilization in anticipation of the much-heralded ten-million-ton sugar harvest. One of the aspirations of the leadership in setting forth the offensive was to achieve a technological revolution in the field of agriculture. Fidel himself claimed that Cuba’s agriculture “in the shortest period of time will become the most developed, mechanized, technical and productive of the world.”49 To that effect the revolutionary leaders initiated the famous “Jornada de Girón” whereby
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production in every working center would—as a matter of moral and revolutionary commitment—surpass all goals. Aside from using the Jornada to mobilize the masses for economic production—as the Cuban leadership had been doing every year—the Jornada would function along the guidelines of Cuba’s civil defense to “make sure by means of practice all the plans elaborated at war time.”50 To this end, people were mobilized into squadrons, platoons, companies and battalions at the level of provinces, regions and municipalities under the supervision of the party from civil defense command posts. Mass organizations like the UJC numbered 40,000 and the FAR contributed with 60,000 regular soldiers. Of these, 20,000 came from the technological institutes headed by a contingent of high-ranking officers from the General Joint Chiefs of Staff and eight members of the Central Committee led by Juan Almeida of the Politburo.51 This large force concentrated its efforts in the provinces of Camagüey and Oriente where absenteeism was sharpest. In the cities, workers moved from their homes to the respective working centers for several weeks and sometimes months. These centers were christened “Centros Guerrilleros” because of the exemplary labor productivity achieved by means of voluntary working hours. In addition, the party called for the formation of the Youth Centennial Column which would be established by 40,000 UJC volunteers ranging from ages 17 to 27 years. This force would be deployed throughout Camagüey province for three consecutive years, or until 1971. To prepare this column for economic tasks the FAR arranged short courses lasting 20 days and involving military topics. According to Raúl Castro each provincial UJC would recruit volunteers in the following numbers: Oriente, 15,000; Camagüey, 5,000; Las Villas, 10,000; Matanzas, 3,000; Havana, 15,000; and Pinar del Río, 2,000. Altogether they would add up to 50,000 young people working in Camagüey.52 By August of 1968, five months after launching the revolutionary offensive on the economy, 350,000 workers, students, soldiers and peasants were mobilized in the agricultural field. One of the immediate effects of the revolutionary offensive was the ebullient, almost frenzied mood that overcame the masses. Such disposition underlined a sense of urgency and feverish desire to tackle the aggressive challenge of the coming ten-million-ton sugar harvest. The revolutionary leadership was confident that the new approach to economic production would substantially solve, perhaps alleviate, the problems of discipline, absenteeism, waste and almost chaotic disorganization among workers, administrators, auditors and political cadres. Raúl Castro, for one, at Camagüey felt that a “revolutionary offensive” organized along military lines would offer sound proof that such techniques must be utilized in every sugar harvest from then on. He made it clear that the “revolutionary offensive is not a simple political password but a plan of action geared to further production . . . to raise the consciousness, cultural and political level of the people, to deepen the ideological struggle against the remnants of the past.”53
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The leadership saw the issue as the lack of discipline and coordination in agriculture as well as in industry. The sense of attack injected in 1968 was directed at regrouping—in the economic and psychological sense—and counterattacking. Thus when Fidel Castro officially launched the ten-million-ton sugar harvest goal on October 27, 1969, he bitterly asserted that the problem was discipline, and it had to be solved at once.54 Less than a month later he called on the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Cuba to exert their influence concerning administrative and decisionmaking matters. Of them he said that “the Army, the Armed Forces, is a disciplined institution par excellence; they have more experience in organization, and have more discipline. It is necessary that the positive influence of such organizational spirit, of discipline, of experience, be constantly exerted.”55 In this mood, the FAR became a decisive factor in the ten-million-ton sugar harvest. And so it was that from November 1969 to mid-summer 1970, 100,000 men from the FAR were mobilized in agriculture.56 This manpower did not include the members of the Ministry of the Interior whose forces also participated in the canefields. FAR’s participation in the harvest became known as Operación Mambí. At the managerial level FAR’s presence became more than obvious. Not only were the command posts staffed by lieutenants and captains, but the party’s secretariats at the provincial level were undertaken mostly by FAR’s majors, such as Guillermo García in Oriente, José R. Machado Ventura in Havana, Julio Camacho in Pinar del Río, Arnaldo Milián in Las Villas and Rogelio Acevedo in Camagüey. The above, together with the number of cabinet positions already filled by FAR majors, could only confirm a vision of militarism throughout Cuban society. Cuba had evidently made vital commitments to the Soviet Union in regard to sugar exports; to achieve a satisfactory level of production entailed crucial decisions on the part of the revolutionary government. Fidel Castro chose to bring in large FAR contingents to solve the crises of absenteeism and disorganization. FAR-officers trained in the ITM or the provincial technological institutes were supposedly better equipped to make economic decisions, and to handle heavy agricultural equipment. At the same time, by incorporating soldiers and officers into agricultural tasks, the revolutionary leaders were averting the potential problems of an idle military manpower stationed only in the barracks. The most controversial aspect of the 1970 sugar harvest, which prompted harsh criticism from René Dumont, the closest economic advisor Fidel Castro has had from Europe,57 was the issue of puestos de mando, or the military structuring of the economic sector. The Cuban government is unfolding a subtle campaign to erase this idea from the minds of foreign observers. Thus, Pelegrín Torres, a Cuban economist, has denied that the command posts are structured along military lines and discloses that Fidel Castro has suggested “their names be changed to Agricultural Provincial Departments.”58
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A similar response has come from the field of education. In a recent article about the school system in Cuba, newspaperman Lionel Martín critically notes that “in the last few years there has been a trend in the school system, particularly among the free boarding schools toward what the Cubans themselves call ‘militarization’ that is, applying a kind of military discipline in the schools.”59 These are but sparse indications that the Cuban leaders are slowly attempting to disengage themselves from the image of a militarized society. The question is whether it is a passing strategy or an outright policy. Presently, however, the social and economic militarization of Cuba appears to be the almost natural consequence of all the steps taken by the leadership to consolidate the revolution without relinquishing political power. In 1972, military personnel hold key positions in society, at the national, provincial and municipal levels. The military presence must be reckoned with as part of the contemporary revolutionary scenario. To think that this process can be reversed in 24 hours—as if it were a matter of concentrating the masses at the Plaza of the Revolution—seems at best wishful thinking. For one must remember that precious time, resources and organizational energy—to say nothing of money—have been used to erect this awesome military complex. At this point the question is whether the price of militarism has been the loss of all other elements of the revolution’s earlier claim to producing a just and abundant and free society. For a revolutionary process that says it is committed to the people but becomes stagnated in the hands of the military certainly frustrates the spontaneous flow of ideas. Needless to say, under this rigid climate the people will not produce more but less. Whatever vestiges of freedom may still be enjoyed by small cliques, whatever claims are made to “democratization,” the empirical evidence hardly supports such illusory assumptions. In the late sixties Fidel Castro was confronted with a decisive choice: to reorganize the entire system allocating power where it should belong, that is, with the people, or to confer this power on an institution that would be loyal and responsive to him. He has opted for the second choice in the hope that discipline is the cure for economic, social, cultural and political illnesses. The Cuban Revolution has been victimized, and delivered into the hands of a few men striving for supra-natural power. The creative, dynamic, humanistic and populist ingredients of the revolution apparently were expendable to the Maximum Leader. Notes 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
Granma Weekly Review, January 16, 1972. Granma Weekly Review, April 25, 1971. Granma Weekly Review, January 30, 1972. U.S. Department of State, U.S. Policy Toward Cuba (Washington, D.C., 1964), p.2. Reglamento de las Milicias Revolucionarias, Verde Olivo, No. 1, 1960, p. 38.
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6. 7. 8. 9.
10. 11. 12.
13. 14. 15. 16.
17. 18. 19. 20.
21.
22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30.
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Lionel Soto, “Dos años de instrucción revolucionaria,” Cuba Socialista III, 18, February 1963, p. 30. Lionel Soto, “Las Escuelas de Instrucción Revolucionaria y la formación de quadros,” Cuba Socialista I, No. 3, November 1961, p. 33. Ibid., pp. 40–41. Raúl Castro, “Graduación del III Curso de la Escuela Básica Superior ‘General Máximo Gómez,’” Ediciones El Orientador Revolucionario 17, 1967, p. 11. Also Fidel Castro, “Décimo aniversario de la creación del MININT,” Granma Weekly Review, June 17, 1971. Ibid., p. 11. Ibid., p. 11. See Norberto Fuentes Los condenados del condado (Havana: Casa de las Américas 1968); Víctor Casaus. Girón en la memoria (Havana: Casa de las Américas, 1970); and Jésus Díaz, Los años duros (Havana, 1966). Comités de Defensa de la Revolución, Memorias de 1963 (Havana: Ediciones con la Guardia en Alto, 1964), p. 193. Raúl Castro, “Speech on May 1, 1968 in Camagüey.” Política Internacional, Nos. 22–23–24, 1968, p. 136. Verde Olivo IX, No. 48, December 1968, p. 18. Four members of the Central Committee, Juan Vitalio Acuña, Antonio Sánchez Díaz, Alberto Fernández Montes de Oca, and Eliseo Reyes Rodríguez, were killed with Major Ché Guevara in Bolivia in 1967. José N. Causse Pérez, “La construcción del Partido en las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Cuba,” Cuba Socialista V, No. 47, July 1965, p. 52. See Fidel Castro’s speech “Fidel Castro Denounces Bureaucracy and Sectarianism” (New York: Pioneer Publishers, 1962), pp. 13–14. Verde Olivo, December 5, 1971, p. 71. José N. Causse, op. cit., p. 55. Also see Combatiente IV, No. 10. May 1, 1965, p. 12, and IV, No. 11, May 15, 1965. Combatiente is the newspaper published by the Army of Oriente. Raúl Castro, “Discurso en la graduación de la Escuela de Cadetes InterArmas ‘Antonio Maceo’ y la Escuela de Artílleria ‘Camilo Cienfuegos,’” Política Internacional 7, No. 25, 1969, pp. 330–31. René Dumont, Cuba: ¿es socialista? (Caracas: Editorial Tiempo Nuevo, 1970), p. 26. Granma, February 6, 1966. Ibid. Peking Rundschau No. 19, 1966, p. 9. Interview with Major C. Rojas, former Political Commissar of the FAR, February, 1972. José N. Causse Pérez, op. cit., p. 56. Ibid., pp. 60–61. Juventud Rebelde, February 3, 1970. Major Sergio del Valle is a medical doctor by profession, and one of the first physicians to have joined Fidel Castro in the Sierra Maestra.
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31. Sergio del Valle, “Discurso en el Fórum de Orden Interior,” Pensamiento Critico No. 45, October 1970, p. 163. 32. See the entire text of Armando Hart’s speech in the Schools of Humanities and Philosophy at Havana University. Política Internacional, Year 7, No. 26, 1969, pp. 269–84. 33. Granma Weekly Review, February 28, 1971. 34. González Tosca, “Escuelas,” Verde Olivo, December 5, 1971, p. 90. 35. Ibid., p. 90. 36. Luis López. ‘’Futuros ingenieros y técnicos,” Verde Olivo, December 5, 1971, pp. 51–51. 37. Luis López, op. cit., p. 52. 38. Marta Borges, “La preparación militar como parte muy importante de la formación del hombre nuevo,” Verde Olivo IX, No. 31, August 4, 1968. pp. 37–41. 39. Gregorio Ortega, “Cubanos en la Academia Militar ‘M.V. Frunze,’” Verde Olivo, December 5, 1971, p. 75. 40. Ibid., p. 81. 41. Raúl Castro, “Discurso de Graduación.” El Orientador Revolucionario 17, 1967, pp. 5 and 24. 42. Granma Weekly Review, August 23, 1970. 43. Ibid. 44. Fidel Castro Ruz, El instructor revolucionario tiene que ser ejemplo (Instrucción MINFAR, Imprenta Nacional de Cuba, 1961). 45. Granma Weekly Review, December 19, 1971. 46. Izvestia, October 10, 1972, p. 2. 47. New York Times, April 7, 1972. 48. To give an idea, 57,600 businesses were nationalized in two weeks, and people’s administrators were appointed by the local CDRs. See Raúl Castro, “Discurso del 1° de Mayo en Camagüey,” Política Internacional VI, Nos. 22– 24, 1968, p. 122. 49. Fidel Castro. “Discurso en el estadio deportivo de Batabanó el 17 de julio de 1968,” Política Internacional VI, Nos. 22–24, 1968, p. 207. 50. Raúl Castro, op. cit., p. 123. 51. Ibid., p. 134. 52. Raúl Castro, op. cit., p. 136. 53. Ibid., p. 130. 54. Fidel Castro. “Discurso en el teatro ‘Chaplin’ de La Habana, el día 27 de octubre de 1969,’” Política Internacional VII, No. 26, 1969, p. 323. 55. Fidel Castro, “Discurso en el teatro del MINFAR, el 4 de Noviembre de 1969,” Política Internacional VII, No. 26, 1969, p. 351. 56. Ibid., p. 339. 57. René Dumont, “The Militarization of Fidelismo,” Dissent, September–October, 1970, pp. 411–428. 58. Cuba Internacional, February 1971, p. 31. 59. Cuba Internacional, May 1971, p. 18.
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5 Learning from the Cuban Missile Crisis Max Frankel It was a lovely autumn day 40 years ago in October 1962, a day not unlike September 11, 2001, when Americans realized that the oceans no longer protected us from enemy attack. Those old enough to remember the presidency of John F. Kennedy will never forget the fear that swept through homes and cities on October 22, 1962 when the president appeared on television, grave and gray, to proclaim a crisis. Reading a stern ultimatum to the Russians that called them nuclear cheats and liars for placing offensive missiles in Cuba, he also left the impression that his counteractions might any minute provoke a rain of Soviet missiles. The news terrified the public for six days and nights (though less for those of us trained to parse the bellicose words and signals flying urgently between Moscow and Washington). And as Hollywood has demonstrated time and again, the drama of the Cuban missile crisis has the power to instruct, beguile and entertain Americans in every decade. The 2000 film version, with Kevin Costner playing an absurdly fictionalized role as Kennedy’s aide Kenneth O’Donnell, was called Thirteen Days, referring to the period of public alarm plus the period of frantic, secret debate that preceded it as Kennedy planned a response to the discovery of the nuclear rockets in Cuba. If the moviemakers had bothered with the Soviet and Cuban sides of the crisis, they could have made a vastly better film, reasonably called Thirteen Weeks. And had they examined the calamitous miscalculations on all sides, it might have been titled Thirteen Months. Most accounts of the crisis concentrate only on the Washington players, led by the glamorous, nervous president and his shrewd younger brother, Robert. A view of Havana would feature the humbling of Fidel Castro, Cuba’s bearded Robin Hood, and his scheming younger brother, Raúl. In Moscow a bombastic Nikita Khrushchev was drowning in sweat as his boldest Cold War maneuver collapsed into retreat. This is a tale about a fateful triangle. 58
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Like the attacks of 9/11, the missile crisis had deep political roots that were unwittingly nourished by our own conduct. Also like 9/11, our failure to imagine the threat beforehand caused us to ignore the few available warnings. Yet the 1962 showdown left us ill prepared for an Osama bin Laden, because our Soviet foes 40 years ago—though we demonized them as evil aggressors—were rational rivals who valued life. We played nuclear poker against them but shared a common interest in the casino’s survival. As a reporter in Washington I covered the Cuban drama for the New York Times and have studied it faithfully since. Over the years, our knowledge of it has been enhanced by autobiographies written by many participants, by a great deal of scholarship and by nostalgic, on-the-record gatherings of Soviet, American and Cuban officials. We also have had credible reports on the contents of Soviet files and most recently, verbatim records of crisis deliberations in the Kennedy White House. In hindsight, I think two common views need correction. It is clear now that Nikita Khrushchev provoked America not from a position of strength, as Kennedy first feared, but from a chronic sense of weakness and frustration. And it is also clear from the historical record that the two superpowers were never as close to nuclear war as they urgently insisted in public. Calamitous Miscalculations Khrushchev, the Soviet leader, was a gambler who had expected great returns from his radical economic reforms, denunciation of Stalin, release of political prisoners and gradual engagement with the rest of the world. He had visited the United States preaching coexistence and vowing to compete peacefully. But he was under tremendous pressure. The Soviet hold on Easter Europe, a vital zone of defense against hated Germany, remained tenuous; Khrushchev’s generals were clamoring for more expensive weaponry; his people were rioting to protest food shortages; and China’s Chairman Mao was openly condemning Khrushchev for undermining Communist doctrine and betraying revolutionaries everywhere. After the launch of Sputnik in 1957 revealed the sophistication of Soviet rockets, Khrushchev acquired the habit of rattling them at his most stubborn problems. Thanks to his missiles, which cost far less than conventional forces, he was hoping to shift money from military budgets into the USSR’s backward food and consumer industries. By aiming medium-range missiles at West Germany, France and Britain, he hoped to force NATO to acknowledge Soviet domination over Eastern Europe. Toward that end, he kept threatening to declare Germany permanently divided and to expel Western garrisons from Berlin, which lay vulnerable in Communist East Germany. By also rattling long-range missiles at the United States, Khrushchev expected finally to be dealt with as an equal superpower.
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Although President Eisenhower had not directly challenged the Soviets’ sway over Eastern Europe, he had not yielded to any of Khrushchev’s other ambitions. A new and inexperienced President Kennedy, therefore, struck the Soviet leader as a brighter prospect for intimidation. Kennedy had arrived at the White House in early 1961 visibly alarmed by Khrushchev’s newest bluster, a promise to give aid and comfort—though not Soviet soldiers—to support “wars of national liberation” in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Then, in April of that year, Kennedy stumbled into the fiasco of Cuba’s Bay of Pigs, the humiliating failure of a CIA-sponsored invasion aimed at overthrowing Fidel Castro. So when Kennedy and the Soviet leader met in Vienna in June 1961, Khrushchev pummeled the American leader with threats to end Western occupation rights in Berlin and then watched with satisfaction when the president acquiesced in the building of the Berlin Wall. Kennedy’s response to Khrushchev’s taunts was to flex his own missile muscle. During his presidential campaign he had criticized Republicans for tolerating a “missile gap” in Khrushchev’s favor. Now he abandoned that pretense. As both governments knew, the Russians held only 20 or 30 intercontinental missiles, of unreliable design, and were having trouble building more. By contrast, the United States’ missile, bomber and submarine forces could strike 15 times as many Soviet targets. The Kennedy team began to boast not only of this advantage but also to hint that it might, in a crunch, resort to a “first use” of nuclear weapons, leaving Russia unable to strike American targets. Thus stung in the spring of 1962, Khrushchev came up with a bold idea: plant medium-range missiles in Cuba and thereby put most of the United States under the nuclear gun. Without having to wait a decade for long-range missiles that he could ill afford, the Soviet leader would give Americans a taste of real vulnerability, save money for other things and strengthen his negotiating position. Marshal Rodion Malinovsky, the Soviet defense minister, embraced the idea and helped sell it to dubious Soviet colleagues. Khrushchev’s old chum and American expert Anastas Mikoyan predicted an unpleasant reaction from Washington and a tough sell in Cuba. But Khrushchev thought he could hide the buildup from Kennedy until the missiles were mounted and armed; he hoped to reveal his new poker hand in November during visits to the United Nations and Havana. The Castro brothers were desperate for Soviet weaponry to protect them from American invaders, but they didn’t want sealed-off bases under alien control. To overcome their resistance, Khrushchev forgave Cuba’s debts, promised more economic aid and insisted his missiles would help defend the island and support Castro’s dream of inspiring other Latin revolutions. Castro was not fooled. There were easier ways to deter an invasion; Soviet ground troops in Cuba could serve as a trip wire to bring Moscow into any conflict, or Cuba could be included in Soviet defense agreements. Castro knew he was being used, but agreed to the bases to show “solidarity,” as he put it, with the Communist bloc and to win more aid for his people.
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In Washington as in Moscow, domestic politics fueled the drive toward confrontation. Through the summer of 1962, the U.S. Navy had tracked a large flotilla of ships from Soviet ports to Cuba, while the CIA heard confusing reports about sightings of military equipment on the island. Heading into a close Congressional election, Republicans saw a chance to repay Kennedy for his past attacks on their Cuba policy by mocking his tolerance for a Soviet buildup just go miles from Florida. But the administration’s intelligence teams detected only nonnuclear “defensive” weapons—MIG fighter planes, torpedo boats and surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), which had a range of only 25 miles. Having roundly misread each other, Khrushchev and Kennedy brought this diplomatic stew to a boil. The Making of a Crisis Hearing the Republican alarms about missiles in Cuba, Khrushchev sent his ambassador, Anatoly Dobrynin, to Robert Kennedy with assurances that the Soviets would do nothing provocative before the American election. And when RFK complained that the buildup in Cuba was bad enough, the ambassador insisted—in innocence, it would turn out—that his government would never give another nation control over offensive weapons. To fend off the Republicans, the Kennedy brothers hurriedly produced a statement saying that if any nation’s forces were to achieve a “significant offensive capability” in Cuba, it would raise the “gravest issues.” In a deceptive riposte, Khrushchev responded that his long-range missiles were so good he had “no need” to send big weapons “to any other country, for instance Cuba.” OK, then, Kennedy countered, if Cuba ever became “an offensive military base of significant capacity for the Soviet Union,” he would do “whatever must be done” to protect American security. American analysts concluded that the president’s strong warnings made it highly unlikely that the Soviets would install a missile base in Cuba. After all, they had never placed nuclear weapons outside their own territory, not even in Communist Europe. That fixed American mind-set caused Kennedy to dismiss reports from spies in Cuba of missiles much larger than “defensive” antiaircraft SAMs. Then a dumb coincidence delayed photoreconnaissance. Because on September 9 the Chinese shot down a U-2 plane photographing their terrain, the White House ordered U-2 pilots over Cuba to steer clear of areas protected by SAM defenses. Equally ill timed was the marriage of CIA chief John McCone, a Republican and former businessman who was the only Washington official to have reasoned his way into Khrushchev’s mind. Before embarking on his honeymoon at the end of August, McCone had tried to persuade Kennedy that the SAMs in Cuba could have only one purpose: to prevent U-2 Spy planes from observing Khrushchev’s probable next step—the installation of medium-range missiles ca-
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pable of striking American cities. McCone’s absence meant his suspicions, and insights, were not heard in Washington for most of September. Once McCone returned, he learned that an intelligence analyst had indeed spotted, in a photograph, suspicious bulldozer patterns in the terrain in western Cuba—patterns resembling the layout of missile bases in Russia. McCone insisted on more aggressive reconnaissance, and finally, on October 14, in the suspect area near San Cristóbal, U-2 cameras 13 miles up snapped remarkably clear pictures of medium-range missile transporters, erectors and launchpads. It was compelling evidence of imminent deployment of nuclear weapons capable of striking Washington, D.C., St. Louis, Dallas. Khrushchev, deeply committed to defying Kennedy’s warnings, was, in fact, installing at least 24 medium-range ballistic missile launchers (MRBMs), plus 16 intermediate-range missiles (IRBMs) that could reach any point in the continental United States except the northwest comer. Kennedy, in turn, was just as deeply committed to prohibiting such bases. Upon seeing the U-2 photographs the morning of October 16, he first envisioned an air strike to destroy the missiles before they became operational. His more sober second thought was to keep the news a tight secret until he could take counsel and sift his options. Gauntlets thrown, here began the historic “thirteen days.” The President’s Men Convene What appears in retrospect to have been a quickly devised and effective American plan of action was actually the product of chaotic, contentious debate among official and unofficial advisers. They functioned as a rump “executive committee of the National Security Council,” soon jargonized as “ExComm,” and often met without Kennedy, to free up the discussion. The ranking ExCommers were the president and his brother, the attorney general; Dean Rusk, secretary of state; Robert McNamara, secretary of defense; McGeorge Bundy, national security adviser; Douglas Dillon, secretary of the treasury; Gen. Maxwell Taylor, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the other chiefs; John McCone of the CIA; and United Nations representative Adlai Stevenson. They all made a show of keeping their public schedules while moving in and out of secret meetings. From Tuesday, October 16, through Sunday, the 21st, they gulped sandwiches for lunch and dinner and kept their own notes in longhand, without secretaries. They shuttled among meeting sites by crowding circus-style into a few cars, to avoid a telltale herd of limousines. They lied to their wives, to subordinates and to the press. For the climactic hours of decision, the president cut short a campaign visit to Chicago, feigning a bad cold and a slight fever. All this undemocratic secrecy served a policy purpose. The president was afraid that his options could be dangerously reduced if Khrushchev knew he had
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been found out. Kennedy worried that the Soviet leader might then stake out a preemptive threat to retaliate for any attack on his missiles, either by firing some of them or attacking American forces in Berlin or Turkey. Alerting Congress could have provoked demands for swift military action without allowing time to study the consequences. The more the ExComm members talked, the less they agreed on a course of action. Every day brought more evidence of Soviet haste. Some of the missiles, the ExComm members speculated, would surely be armed with nuclear warheads within days, and all within weeks. So what?, the president asked provocatively at one point. He had once said a missile was a missile, whether fired from 5,000 or 5 miles away. And Defense Secretary McNamara held throughout the discussion that 40 or so more missiles pointed at U.S. targets, while perhaps quadrupling the Soviets’ strike capacity, did nothing to alter our huge strategic advantage. The Joint Chiefs disagreed, insisting that by dramatically increasing America’s sense of vulnerability, the Soviet weapons would greatly limit our choices in any future exchange of threats or fire. Everyone soon acknowledged that Soviet bases in Cuba were, at the very least, psychologically and politically intolerable. They would embolden Khrushchev’s diplomacy, especially when it came to his designs in Berlin. They would also enhance Castro’s prestige in Latin America and erode Kennedy’s stature at home and abroad. As if the missiles themselves were not challenge enough, Khrushchev’s deception was seen as undermining U.S.-Soviet negotiations. The president kept posing the issue starkly, insisting there were only two ways to remove the missiles: bargain them out or bomb them out. Bargaining might entail painful concessions in Berlin or the withdrawal of American missiles from NATO bases in Turkey; though the weapons were technically obsolete, they represented commitment to an ally. Bombing Cuba would surely kill Russians and risk Soviet counterattack against American bases in Florida or Europe. (Our southern coast lacked radar defenses; as General Taylor observed prophetically at the time, “We have everything, except [the capability] to deal with a simple aircraft coming in low.”) In any case, a strike at Cuba was bound to miss some missiles and require a follow-up invasion to seize the island. Small wonder the advisers changed opinions as often as they changed clothes. For every possible “if,” they conjectured a discouraging “then.” If we withdrew our missiles from Turkey, then the Turks would shout to the world that American guarantees are worthless. If we sent a Polaris missile submarine into Turkish waters to replace the missiles, the Turks would say we always slither out of harm’s way. What if we warn Khrushchev of a coming air strike? Then he’ll commit to a violent response. And if we don’t warn him? Then he’ll suffer a surprise attack,
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seize the moral high ground and announce that the United States would rather risk world war than live with the vulnerability that all Europeans have long endured. Round and round they went. What about a U.S. naval blockade of Soviet weapons coming into Cuba? Well, it would not remove missiles already in place or prevent deliveries by air. A total blockade? That would offend friendly ships but not hurt Cuba for months. Time grew short. Many Soviet missiles were installed, and the scent of crisis was in the air. At the New York Times, we heard of canceled speeches by the Joint Chiefs and saw officials being summoned away from their own birthday parties. Lights at the Pentagon and State Department blazed at midnight. We clamored for enlightenment, and officials mumbled about trouble in Berlin. Kennedy heard us approaching and asked our bureau chief, James “Scotty” Reston, to call him before we printed anything. Thursday, October 18, was the day for a double bluff when Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko paid a scheduled visit to the White House. He sparred with the president over Berlin but held tightly to his written-out claim that only “defensive” weapons were going to Cuba. Though angry, Kennedy and Rusk pretended to be fooled. The president had told ExComm earlier that morning that he discounted the threat of a nuclear attack from Cuba—”unless they’re going to be using them from every place.” He most feared nonnuclear retaliation in Europe, probably in Berlin. But as McNamara put it to the group, firm action was essential to preserve the president’s credibility, to hold the alliance together, to tame Khrushchev for future diplomacy—and by no means least—to protect the administration in domestic American politics. Most important, ExComm had the benefit of the considered views of Llewellyn “Tommy” Thompson, Jr., the just-returned ambassador to Moscow who knew Khrushchev better and longer than any Western diplomat. He thought the Soviet leader intended for his missiles to be discovered—to invigorate his campaign against the West. Thompson felt that Khrushchev might well respect a U.S. weapons blockade and was unlikely to risk a fight in faraway Cuba. While he might strike impetuously at Berlin, that was a gamble he had been reluctant to take for four years. Returning Saturday from Chicago with his “cold,” Kennedy seemed to buy Thompson’s assessment. He was ready to risk a Berlin crisis because, as he had told the ExComm, “if we do nothing, we’re going to have the problem of Berlin anyway.” A blockade would buy time. They could always ratchet up tougher action if Khrushchev didn’t back down. Kennedy was plainly haunted, however, by the Bay of Pigs and by his reputation for timidity. So he ended the week’s deliberation by again cross-examining the Joint Chiefs. Would an air strike destroy all the missiles and bombers? Well, 90 percent. And would Russian troops be killed? Yes, for sure. And couldn’t
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Khrushchev just send more missiles? Yes, we’d have to invade. And wouldn’t invasion provoke countermoves in Europe? The president decided to avoid violent measures for as long as possible. But he did not want to reveal the tactical reasons for preferring a blockade. He insisted his aides use “the Pearl Harbor explanation” for rejecting an air strike— that Americans do not engage in preemptive surprise attacks—a disingenuous rationale that Robert Kennedy piously planted in histories of the crisis. Story of a Lifetime When I learned from his butler that the West German ambassador was fast asleep before midnight Friday, I became certain that the agitation in Washington did not concern Berlin, and so my Times colleagues and I focused on Cuba. And if it was Cuba, given all the recent alarms, that had to mean the discovery of “offensive” missiles. On Sunday, October 21, as promised, Scotty Reston called the White House. When Kennedy came on the line, Scotty asked me to listen on an extension. “So you know?” Kennedy asked Reston, as I recall it. “And do you know what I’m going to do about it?” “No, sir, we don’t,” Reston answered, “except we know you promised to act, and we hear you’ve asked for television time tomorrow night.” “That’s right. I’m going to order a blockade.” I was tasting a great story when Kennedy dropped the other shoe. If he lost the element of surprise, he went on, Khrushchev could take steps that would deepen the crisis. Would we suppress the news in the national interest? Reston called a meeting. For reasons patriotic or selfish, I at first resisted granting the president’s request. A blockade is an act of war. Did we have the right to suppress news of a superpower war before Congress or the public had even an inkling of danger? Reston phoned the president again and explained our concern. Did Kennedy want secrecy until after the shooting had begun? “Scotty,” the president said, “we’ve taken a whole week to plan our response. I’m going to order a blockade. It’s the least I can do. But we will not immediately attack. You have my word of honor: there will be no bloodshed before I explain this very serious situation to the American people.” Given the president’s word of honor, I believe to this day that we were right to defer publication by 24 hours. Kennedy’s reasons were persuasive: our disclosure could have led the Soviets to threaten a violent response against the blockade and thus provoke a violent conflict. But I took my name off the fudged story I wrote for Monday’s paper: “Capital’s Crisis Air Hints at Development on Cuba,” which, without mentioning missiles or a blockade, said the president would deliver news of a crisis. Like the Washington Post, which had been similarly importuned by the president, we held back most of what we knew.
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Kennedy’s speech that Monday evening, October 22, was the most menacing of any presidential address during the entire Cold War. Although the Senate leaders whom he had just briefed deplored his reluctance to attack, Kennedy stressed the danger implicit in the moment: “[T]his secret, swift, and extraordinary build-up of Communist missiles … in violation of Soviet assurances, and in defiance of American and hemispheric policy … is a deliberately provocative and unjustified change in the status quo which cannot be accepted by this country if our courage and our commitments are ever to be trusted again by either friend or foe.… Should these offensive military preparations continue … further action will be justified.… It shall be the policy of this nation to regard any nuclear missile launched from Cuba against any nation in the Western Hemisphere as an attack by the Soviet Union on the United States, requiring a full retaliatory response upon the Soviet Union.”
Americans certainly did not underrate the gravity of events; families drew close, planned emergency escapes, hoarded food, and hung on every news bulletin. Friendly governments supported the president, but many of their people feared his belligerence, and some marched in protest. In a private letter to Khrushchev, Kennedy vowed to stand firm in Berlin, warning him not to misjudge the “minimum” action the president had taken so far. The Kremlin’s response encouraged both ExComm and diplomatic observers. While denouncing America’s “piracy” at sea and instructing Soviet agents abroad to fan the fear of war, the Kremlin obviously had no ready plan for counteraction. Berlin was calm; so were our bases in Turkey. Moscow’s governmentcontrolled press pretended that Kennedy had challenged little Cuba rather than the Soviet Union. Khrushchev assented at once when the U.N. Secretary General, U Thant, tried to broker a pause for negotiation, but Kennedy decided to balk. In fact, Washington prepared a blunt notice about how the United States planned to challenge Soviet ships and fire dummy depth charges to force submarines to surface at the blockade line. More good news came on Wednesday, October 24. The president kept some of his nuclear bombers airborne for the Russians to notice. And suddenly word arrived that Khrushchev had ordered his most vulnerable Cuba-bound ships to stop or turn tail. Recalling a childhood game in his native Georgia, Dean Rusk remarked, “We’re eyeball-to-eyeball, and I think the other fellow just blinked.” Washington also soon learned that the Soviets had instructed the Cubans not to fire antiaircraft guns except in self-defense, giving American reconnaissance unhindered access. Kennedy now stressed that he, too, wanted no shots fired. He also wanted the Pentagon generals eager to enforce the blockade (officially designated a “quarantine”) to know that although it was a military action, it was intended only to communicate a political message. Public tension, however, persisted Thursday because work on the missile sites continued. But Kennedy let a Soviet oil tanker pass through the blockade
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after it identified itself and its cargo. And Friday morning, October 26, a Soviet ship allowed Americans to inspect what they knew would be innocent cargo. At the prospect of negotiation, however, Kennedy still could not decide what price he was willing to pay for a Soviet withdrawal of the missiles. ExComm (and the press) debated removing the U.S. missiles in Turkey, but the Turks would not cooperate. The most unsettling hours were the next 24, which brought a maddening mix of good and bad news that once again rattled nerves in both Washington and Moscow. Three separate unofficial sources reported a Soviet inclination to withdraw from Cuba if the United States promised publicly to prevent another invasion of the island. And Friday night, in a rambling, highly emotional private message that he had obviously composed without the help of his advisers, Khrushchev implored Kennedy “not now to pull on the ends of the rope in which you have tied the knot of war.” He said his weapons in Cuba were always intended to be “defensive,” and if Cuba’s safety were guaranteed, “the necessity for the presence of our military specialists in Cuba would disappear.” “I think we’d have to do that because we weren’t going to invade them anyway,” Kennedy told ExComm. But early Saturday, Moscow broadcast a colder message asking as well for an American withdrawal from Turkey. The Turks publicly protested and urged American officials not to capitulate. The Russians seemed to be upping the ante, and Kennedy feared that he would lose world support and sympathy if he held out against the reasonablesounding proposal to trade off reciprocal missile bases. Then came the shocking news that an American U-2 pilot had been shot down over Cuba and killed, presumably by a Soviet SAM, and another U-2 was chased out of Soviet Siberia, where it had accidentally strayed. Were accidents and miscalculations propelling the United States and the Soviet Union toward war after all? In another Kennedy-Reston conversation that night that I was invited to listen in on, the president expressed his greatest fear that diplomacy might not resolve the crisis after all. He said the reconnaissance simply had to continue, and if his planes were again molested, he might be forced to attack antiaircraft installations. With the Pentagon pressing for just such an attack, the president made doubly sure that no one assumed he had already decided to strike. He told ExComm that unless more planes were shot down, he envisioned the slowest possible escalation of pressure on the Soviets—starting with a blockade of oil shipments to Cuba, then of other vital supplies—taking great care to avoid the nuclear conflagration that the American public so obviously feared. Eventually, perhaps, he would take a Russian ship in tow. And if he had to shoot, he thought it was wiser to sink a ship than to attack the missile sites. Plainly neither Kennedy nor Khrushchev was anywhere near risking anything like a nuclear shoot-out.
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Still, without much hope for negotiations, Kennedy yielded to advice from several ExComm members that he accept Khrushchev’s no-invasion bargain and ignore the bid for a missile swap in Turkey. The president signaled his readiness to guarantee that the United States would not attack Cuba if the missiles were withdrawn, but simultaneously sent his brother to tell Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin that the time for diplomacy was running out, that work on the missiles had to stop at once. In delivering this ultimatum, however, Robert Kennedy also offered Khrushchev a sweetener: an oral promise to withdraw the missiles from Turkey within a few months, provided that this part of the deal was not disclosed. Only a half dozen Americans knew of this promise, and they, as well as the Russians, kept the secret for more than a decade. A Collective Sigh of Relief The sun shone bright in Washington Sunday morning, October 28, as Radio Moscow read out Khrushchev’s response to Kennedy’s offer. He said he had wanted only to protect the Cuban revolution, that work at the bases on the island had now stopped, and that he had issued orders to dismantle, crate and bring back “the weapons which you describe as offensive.” Castro, bypassed in all the negotiations, threw a fit and refused to admit U.N. inspectors sent to the island to verify the de-armament, forcing homebound Soviet ships to uncover their missile cargoes for aerial inspection at sea. For a month, Castro even refused to let the Russians pack up their “gift” to him of several old Ilyushin bombers, which Kennedy also wanted removed. President Kennedy, sensing Khrushchev’s discomfort in retreat, immediately warned his jubilant aides against gloating. He had now earned his spurs as a Cold Warrior and the political freedom to reach other deals with the Soviets, starting with a crisis “hot line,” a ban on aboveground nuclear tests and a liveand-let-live calm in Berlin. Thirteen months later he would be killed in Dallas— by a psychotic admirer of Fidel Castro. Khrushchev emerged from the crisis with grudging respect for Kennedy and tried to share in the credit for moving toward a better relationship. But his generals and fellow oligarchs vowed never again to suffer such humiliation. Two years later, denouncing Khrushchev’s many “harebrained schemes,” they overthrew him, going on to spend themselves poor to achieve strategic weapons parity with the United States. The Soviet Union and the United States never again stumbled into a comparable confrontation. Both nations acquired many more nuclear weapons than they would ever need, but they kept in close touch and learned to watch each other from orbiting satellites, to guard against surprise and miscalculation.
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6 Immutable Proclamations and Unintended Consequences Luis E. Aguilar The study of the correlation between events and changes in the Cuban regime’s interpretation of Marxist-Leninist ideology offers numerous difficulties. To begin with, contemporary Marxism, even its more apparently dogmatic variation, Marxism-Leninism, has become such a loose theory that it is constantly invoked by a wide spectrum of revolutionary groups and regimes to justify different policies. As Leszek Kolakowski aptly puts it: “At present Marxism neither interprets the world nor changes it: it is merely a repertoire of slogans serving to organize various interests, most of them completely remote from those with which Marxism originally identified itself.”l There is also the complexity of the Cuban phenomenon: the evolution from a democratic rebellion against a dictatorship into a “socialist” revolution, and eventually, into a “communist” regime. An unexpected social and political transformation practically imposed by a charismatic leader devoted more to action than to theory. Castro’s Marxism-Leninism, and consequently his regime’s, has been generally limited to vague declarations or sporadic quotes often aimed at justifying pragmatic political decisions. Ernesto “Che” Guevara had a deeper knowledge of Marxism, but he seemed to have wandered into an antidogmatic vague idealist concept of “a new man” and “a new society”. 2 On practical political matters, and especially on foreign affairs, he usually coincided with or yielded to Castro’s decisions. Occasionally those decisions seemed quite remote from orthodox (Soviet) Marxist tenets. Cuba’s guerrilla theory of the 1960s, for example, initially expounded in the name of Martí and Bolívar, was based on the notion that in Latin America the peasants, not the workers, integrated the real revolutionary army. This thesis obviously clashed with the Leninist dogma of the proletariat as the only truly revolutionary class and
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his indictment of the peasants as a class who as soon as feudalism is abolished “join the forces of order”.3 The influence of the Soviet Union in Cuban affairs must also be taken into account. But the distinction between Moscow’s policies, which might be ascribed to Marxism-Leninism, and those aimed at defending Russian national interests is far from clear. Similarly, Soviet-Cuban relations cannot always be explained by Moscow’s overwhelming power. It is difficult to ascertain if the Cuban regime’s adoption of Soviet “proletarian imperialism,” the promotion of revolutionary movements in the Third World, is a result of Moscow’s pressure, Castro’s own adventurism, or a combination of both.4 There is also what Paul Johnson calls the law of “unintended consequences.” Actions taken in the name of a political doctrine might create an unexpected situation, forcing leaders to adjust the doctrine to new circumstances and take further unplanned actions. There is no better illustration of this law in the Marxist field than the growing breach between the concept of the state and the reality of its development. Far from disappearing, as Marx predicted, the communist state continues to expand. And each expansion is followed by a f lood of Marxist literature trying to justify the phenomenon. In 1983, the then Soviet leader Yuri Andropov recognized that developments in the Soviet Union did not follow the laws laid down by Marx and the Engels: “the specific historical ways of the emergence of socialism have proved to be not in all respects what the founders of our revolutionary theory expected.”5 This law of unexpected consequences also applies to the Cuban process. Significantly, in 1961 Castro declared that “la revolución nos va revolucionarizando” (the revolution proceeds to revolutionize us). That is, revolutionary action had compelled further, and perhaps unplanned, revolutionary radicalism in theory and practice. To determine whether action or theory is more influential in such a dialectical correlation of factors is a vexed question. Nevertheless, the basic thesis or orientation of this paper is that the margin of freedom of the Cuban regime to interpret Marxism-Leninism had been inexorably constrained by the consequences of its own actions. The law of unexpected consequences and the iron hand of reality reduced Castro’s initial wide horizon of options to a narrow pro-Soviet position. All research on the relationship between Marxist-Leninist doctrine and Castro’s policy at any given time should be done with caution, and be considered as a tentative interpretation of a very complex process. For reasons of space, this paper will only examine the most important political consequences, national and international, of Castro’s decision to follow a Marxist-Leninist path. Considering the meanders of Cuba’s socialist current, I would have liked to emulate Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s famous book on Marxism, and give this paper the theme, “Adventures of the Dialectic in the Tropics.”
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From a Democratic Rebellion to a Marxist-Leninist Proclamation It is a well-known fact that Castro’s revolution was successfully fought under nonsocialist banners. Rooted in some of the aspirations and dreams of the Cuban people, nationalism, social justice, political honesty, the program of the 26th of July Movement was far from radical. For Mario Llerena, one of the founders of the 26th of July, the initial goals of the Movement “amounted basically to the ethical reforms of public life.”6 James O’Connor, an analyst of the initial period of the Cuban revolution, went as far as to assert that “one of the supreme ironies of the revolution is that the social and economic programs of the Batista government closely resembled those of Castro’s 26th of July Movement.”7 Whether Castro was a Marxist before reaching power, whether his “revolutionary conscience” evolved rapidly toward Marxism afterward, or if the change resulted from his personal ambition and political opportunism, is not relevant here. The pertinent issue is that by the end of his second year in power he had rejected the democratic option. By then, all political power was concentrated in Castro; the press was controlled, elections were no longer mentioned and, most important, anticommunism was branded counterrevolutionary. These developments, plus an increasingly radical legislation which began transforming Cuba’s social and economic structure, along with an evident rapprochement with the Soviet Union, provoked numerous internal conflicts in Cuba and a growing chasm between Cuba and the United States. Diplomatic relations between Washington and Havana were officially broken on January 3, 1961. The trend toward the left then gained momentum. On April 16, 1961, the eve of the Bay of Pigs invasion, at a rally in Havana, Castro ended his speech with the cry “Long live our socialist revolution!” After the defeat of the U.S. backed expedition, Castro unfolded plans to merge every revolutionary political group into a single socialist party. On December 1, the Cuban leader publicly proclaimed that he was and always would be a Marxist-Leninist. Consequences and Problems of the Marxist Proclamation Castro’s power and popularity, enhanced by the euphoria of a “victory against U.S. imperialism,” made it relatively easy for him to proclaim a socialist revolution and to publicly commit himself to Marxism-Leninism But as always, fulfilling the commitment proved difficult. When Castro and the 26th of July Movement emerged victorious in 1959, the prestige of the Cuban Communist party—supposedly the Marxist revolutionary vanguard—was at a very low point. The party had collaborated with Batista in the 1940s, and dismissed Castro’s guerrilla campaign as “petty-bourgeois adventurism.” Most revolutionaries had only contempt for the communists. On its side, jolted by the collapse of Batista’s regime,
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and loyally following Moscow’s strategy of peaceful coexistence, the communists looked askance at the sudden radicalism of the new revolutionary leaders.8 Castro’s Marxist proclamation could not erase this mutual mistrust. Forced underground by the leader’s call for unity, the antagonism remained ready to reappear at the first opportunity. Furthermore, the proletariat itself had remained passive during the revolutionary struggle. The total failure of the general strike ordered by Castro in April 1958, which provoked a crisis in the 26th of July Movement, had demonstrated the unwillingness of the workers to join the political fight against Batista. Efficiently organized since the 1930s within the powerful Confederation of Cuban Workers (C.T.C.), the majority of the proletariat supported the new revolutionary government. But, following its own tradition, it was more inclined to fight for labor gains than for political issues. Even worse for Castro’s Marxist plans, most of the workers mistrusted the communists. In May 1959, five months after the triumph of the revolution, twenty of the thirty-two confederation leaders reaffirmed their anticommunism and pledged to defend the rights of private property. Under those conditions, the acceptance of a Marxist-Leninist regime, which implied surrendering the labor movement to the communist leadership, had to overcome the resistance of many workers. This resistance explains Castro’s repeated complaints about the “lack of political conscience” in the Cuban proletariat.9 Only the personal intervention of the Cuban leader, mixing emotional appeals with oblique threats (many 26th of July labor leaders, such as David Salvador, fell in disgrace or prison) forced the workers to submit. However, as French economist René Dumont keenly noted, official coercion planted in the proletariat the first seeds of disillusion. The Decision to Create a Marxist-Leninist Party In July 1961, yielding to Castro’s pressure, the 26th of July Movement, the PSP (communists), the Revolutionary Directorate, and minor revolutionary groups merged into the Integrated Revolutionary Organization (ORI). The next step was to form a United Party of the Socialist Revolution (PURS). Probably aware of the shaky political basis of his Marxist-Leninist proclamation, Castro devoted most of his long speech of December 1, 1961, to explain the history and essence of Marxism and to stress the urgency of creating PURS. Because of the nature of his audience or his own limited knowledge of the subject Castro offered a simplistic explanation of both subjects. His vision of Russia and socialism bordered on the idyllic. Imperialism, the source of all evils, was rapidly decaying, he said. In the scientific and cultural fields, the Soviet Union had surpassed all nations.10 Russians were healthier and happier than any people on earth. Marx was the greatest of all geniuses. Scientific socialism, the source of all goodness, meant
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the actual elimination of abuse, injustice and torture, Even rough peasant-like Krushchev was praised as a profound theoretician whose ideas marked “the true beginning of a new era: the era of building communism.” Some points, though, are worth noting in that shallow speech, including the assertion that “objective and not subjective conditions” were essential for revolutionary success (an argument destined to be reversed in a couple of years); the fear of discord among revolutionary groups, which prompted him to once again extol the “old communist fighters”; and the candid recognition that they were making “a socialist revolution without socialists.”11 This last admission, and the undeserved praise, led the communists to what seemed a logical conclusion. If, in the new party, only they had socialist experience, then they alone could organize the new socialist cadres. Trying to redeem the communists, Castro had set the stage for a crisis which in three months would shake the party’s unity, discredit the communist old guard, and force him to revise his utopian image of Marxism. His speech made the communists reach a wrong conclusion. Sectarianism and a Marxist Twist Believing themselves indispensable, as veteran socialists and Moscow’s trusted allies, the communists moved swiftly to control ORI. Publicly disdaining the “political ignorance” of their revolutionary allies, they proceeded to remove from key positions many ex-members of the 26th of July. It proved a costly miscalculation. In March 1962, an angry and alarmed Castro made a scathing denunciation of veteran communist leader Aníbal Escalante and other comrades as “ambitious sectarians” who had tried to turn ORI into an instrument for personal power. Disguised as a criticism of a small group of comrades, his attack included all communists and revived old sensitive topics. Castro reminded his audience that “some” communists had stayed under the bed while the true revolutionaries were fighting in the mountains.12 Castro’s vision of socialism appeared to have also changed. Instead of exultation, the maximum leader stressed the difficulties of building a socialist society. He spoke of error, struggle, and sacrifice. Imperialism was not the only enemy. In the midst of a “socialist” revolution, a socialist faction, integrated precisely by some of those “old fighters” he had lauded, had been forging a party of “trained and domesticated revolutionaries,” creating “a veritable garbage” (una reverenda basura).l3 Perhaps to justify his criticism, or to prepare the public for future changes, he pragmatically and conveniently interpreted of the Marxist dialectic: “dialectic teaches us that what is a correct method at a certain moment might be later an incorrect method.”14 The law of unexpected consequences had functioned. A simplistic, utopian approach to Marxism, destined to explain a political change, had produced un-
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foreseen consequences. As a result, Castro was forced to adjust his interpretation of socialism, and to face the new reality with decisions he had not previously envisioned. Changing Relations with the Soviet Union Castro’s change of attitude toward the old communists signified a reassertion of his personal power and a test of his relations with the Soviet Union. In their bid for power, the communists had apparently relied on Moscow’s support, and on the Cuban regime’s increasing dependence on that support. Castro’s drastic actions implied a warning to Moscow that he was the only power in Cuba, and that he was dissatisfied with the Soviet attitude. With valid reasons, he believed he had given more than he had received. After all, it was Castro who had initiated the rapprochement with the Soviet Union. In February 1960, he invited Soviet Vice Premier Anastas Mikoyan to Havana, received him with full honors, and praised to the limit Soviet achievements. He appeared ecstatic after signing the first commercial agreement between Cuba and the Soviet Union. And naturally, he expected equal enthusiasm in Moscow. The initial reaction of the Kremlin, though, was one of traditional caution. Latin America had never been one of Moscow’s priorities. And past experiences, especially the events in Guatemala in 1954, did not encourage haste. The temptation to establish a zone of influence 90 miles from U.S. shores, was tempered by the possibility of provoking a strong reaction in Washington. A confrontation in the Caribbean could jeopardize Soviet international pacifist propaganda. In September 1959, Krushchev toured the United States making numerous public statements emphasizing the danger of nuclear war and appealing for peaceful coexistence and disarmament. The Cuban revolution was publicly applauded, but Moscow refrained from signing any military commitment. The Bay of Pigs invasion changed Moscow’s attitude. Convinced that President Kennedy lacked the necessary nerve to act decisively,15 Khrushchev shifted from caution to boldness. He ordered the construction of the Berlin wall, and began to pour military equipment into Cuba. At the beginning of 1962, he must have felt he could achieve a demonstration of Soviet military power capable of impressing the U.S. and China, which had become a rebellious neighbor challenging Russia’s international revolutionary leadership: the decision to install missiles in Cuba was made.16 Under those circumstances it would have been practically impossible for Moscow to make any gesture in defense of the old Cuban communists. The Soviets condoned the ouster of Aníbal Escalante, praised the integrity of Cuba’s leadership, and in May 1962 signed a decisive commercial treaty with Cuba. The so-called missile crisis of October-November 1962 altered the situation once more. The Soviet Union withdrew its missiles without consulting Castro, provoking the anger of the Cuban leader. Not even the fact that the so-called
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“Kennedy-Khrushchev pact” gave him a guarantee of survival calmed him. Feeling betrayed, he began to defend a belligerent, almost anti-Soviet Marxist line. There were no third alternatives, no peaceful roads to socialism, no compromises with imperialism. The Declaration of Havana became a rallying war cry for Latin American revolutionaries. The time had come to transform the Andes into the Sierra Maestra of the continent. The Rise and Decline of a Marxist Heresy, 1963–1968 As previously stated, the interrelation between theory and praxis is a complex one. To conclude that Castro embarked on his continental guerrilla adventure because of his frictions with the Soviet Union, or because of a sudden insight on the “revolutionary essence” of Marxism, simplifies the issue, and fails to take into account Castro’s character. Since his early youth Castro had a part in internationalism. He had enrolled in an aborted expedition organized by the Caribbean Legion to topple Dominican dictator Trujillo, had seen (or participated in) political violence in Bogota in 1948, and kept contacts with some of the veterans of the Caribbean Legion.17 Once in power, and even before his Marxist proclamation, he sent expeditions to Panama and the Dominican Republic. By 1961, he was bitterly denouncing his former protector, Venezuelan president Rómulo Betancourt, and all Latin American oligarchies. The crisis with the Soviet Union gave Castro the opportunity to radicalize his policies and to carry on his dreams for continental action. This aggressive strategy received the enthusiastic backing of Che Guevara, who, early on, showed contempt for those communists, including the Cubans “who sit down to wait until in some mechanical way all the necessary objective and subjective conditions are given without working to accelerate them.”l8 Guevara had expressed similar disdain for the Soviet formula of a “peaceful road to socialism.” Castro’s decision to revolutionize the continent came at a seemingly propitious time. The Sino-Soviet dispute had become public and bitter. The inevitable polemics and splits which shook many communists and Marxist groups weakened Moscow’s traditional monopoly on Marxist dogmas. Encouraged by this atmosphere, young radical Marxists rebelled against the passivity of Latin American communist parties and began clamoring for action. A defiant new left emerged in the continent. Furthermore, Castro’s prestige as a true revolutionary, enhanced by his independent Marxist stand, was at its peak. Even some sectors of the Catholic Church began to respond to his radical appeal. In Colombia, father Camilo Torres, who would eventually join the guerillas, proclaimed that “for Christians, revolution is not only permissible, it is an obligation.”19 The new radicalism, though, needed a respected theoretician. In spite of his prestige, Guevara was too involved in the struggle; and his Argentinian nation-
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ality was against him. Traditionally, Latin Americans, including leftists, pay more attention to European writers than to those of their own continent. Very soon Castro found his European theoretician: a young French Marxist writer, a disciple of Louis Althusier, named Régis Debray. The “guerilla” or the “focus” theory defended by Debray represented, at least from Moscow’s point of view, something close to a Marxist heresy. According to Debray, the Cuban experience had given birth to “a new conception of guerrila warfare.” The peasants were the revolutionary soldiers and the guerilla the revolutionary vanguard. Objective conditions, always latent in Latin America, might be created or made patent by heroic subjective actions. The duty of a revolutionary was to make revolution. The blunt nature of Debray’s criticism fell on Moscow’s traditional allies, the Latin American communist parties. “Fidel Castro says simply that there is no revolution without a revolutionary vanguard: that this vanguard is not necessarily the Marxist-Leninist party; and that those who want to make the revolution have the right and the duty to constitute themselves a vanguard, independently of those parties.” Che Guevara made once this mordant comment: “You (the communists) are capable of creating cadres . . . but not of training cadres who can capture a machine-gun nest.”20 Moscow did not find it necessary to answer directly this challenge, but almost all Latin American communist parties rallied around the “orthodox” Marxist banner and condemned Debray’s and Castro’s heresy. By March 1967, Castro and the Venezuelan communist party were publicly exchanging insults. Three months later the Communist parties of Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela issued a joint communique reaffirming their role as the only revolutionary vanguard, and condemning “foreign influences in the affairs of national communist parties.” Ironically, at the time that this confrontation was becoming quite heated, the Cuban Marxist heresy was declining. The Cuban-modeled rural guerillas who had appeared in almost every corner of the continent had been everywhere defeated. And the ranks of the new left, whose representatives displayed a bellicose radicalism at the Tri-Continental Conference in Havana (January 1967), had been rapidly decimated by Latin American armies. In September of 1967, Régis Debray was captured in Bolivia. The following month Che Guevara was killed after a skirmish with the Bolivian army. After so many disasters, Guevara’s death was a devastating blow for Castro’s guerilla theory. “Success is the final test for every theory” Debray had written. His own dictum condemned his ideas.21 It was then that the Soviet Union, no longer hampered by China’s influence in the Third World (China was in the throes of the Cultural Revolution), decided to intervene directly in the continental polemic. Moscow’s pressure, and the disastrous consequences on Cuba of Castro’s erratic application of Marxist economy, forced the “maximum leader” to alter his political course.
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A Forced Return to “Orthodox” Marxism, 1968–1975 As stated before, Castro’s goals of gaining absolute power and imposing a socialist revolution encountered from the very beginning numerous obstacles. He coped with political and economic problems with what he later called a “guerilla mentality,” a series of improvised measures which, rather successful in the political field, totally disrupted Cuba’s economic infrastructure. As usual, each new crisis compelled him to adopt more drastic decisions. By 1962, Castro had completely won the political battle. No one in Cuba, not even the veterans of the old communist party, could challenge his power. But the price had been high. The massive emigration of about one million Cubans had deprived the regime of trained technicians, economists and planners. And the Cuban economy, which Castro had inherited in healthy conditions, began to show the strain of efforts aimed at political and not economic gains. The lack of clear economic programs, and the substitution of technicians by enthusiastic but unskilled supporters of the regime, resulted in widespread economic disorganization.22 Practically disdaining the realties and the limited resources of Cuba, the revolutionary leaders set unreachable goals. In 1961, in Punta del Este, Uruguay, an arrogant Che Guevara confidently proclaimed that by 1980 “Cubans will have a net income of about $3000, more than today’s U.S. per capita”. In ten years Cuba would have had eliminated the dependance on sugar, erradicated poverty, and become an industrial power.23 Barely three years later, Guevara had been forced to modify his utopian outlook of the future. Retreating to his basic idealism, he stressed moral incentives for the Cuban workers, insisted on the need of creating a “new man” free from bourgeois material desires, and spoke of a revolutionary spartan way of life. But sugar production continued to decline, rationing became a necessity, and dependency on Soviet aid increased24. By 1967, the production of sugar, previously scorned as the “Cuban chain to capitalism,” had become once more the top priority of the Cuban government. In 1975, Castro recognized “in the economic field we had suffered from idealistic errors, and on occasions we have disdained the reality of objective economic laws which must be taken into account.”25 These events resulted in a growing dissatisfaction of the Cuban masses. The seeds of disillusion planted in 1960–61 began to emerge after 1967. Apathy and absenteeism among the workers replaced enthusiasm. On August 8, 1969, Jorge Risquet, Minister of Labor, recognized that indiscipline, negligence and resistance were expanding evils among workers, and announced stern measures to fight them. The only answers the regime found to those problems were increasing repression and the militarization of the society. Castro’s famous “dialogues” with the masses, a curious political system hailed as “direct democracy,” became monologues. Discipline and military virtues were extolled. As in the Soviet Union, centralized democracy, a method devised by Lenin as a tactic to control the party before reaching power, evolved into a permanent way to rule the country.
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Through centralized democracy, different levels of political institutions are created to give the masses the illusion of participating in the political process. Actually, those institutions are used by the power elite to decide who deserves promotion. The majority in and outside the party can never ask the elite to step down; the elite can always select who will step up. Recognition of errors, self-criticism, admission of failures, even as grave as the disaster of the 10 million-ton sugar crop, provoke changes in the lower or middle strata of the party or the government, but not in the eite that rules. Inside that elite Fidel Castro is supreme. Any criticism of a certain policy of the government must be preceded by a cautious and safeguarding, as el Compañero Fidel has pointed out.” René Dumont, a witness of the process, concluded that in Cuba, Castro was not creating “socialism with a human face” but “Stalinism with a human face.”26 As in Russia, militarization and tropical Stalinism could not solve the growing Cuban economic crisis. By 1967, hundreds of Cubans who had lost hope on any improvement were lining up to leave the island. In view of the deepening economic crisis, the question arose why the Soviet Union tolerated for so long Castro’s defiance and his confrontation with the Latin American communist parties. The answer probably lies in Moscow’s pragmatism. As long as Castro’s guerilla offensive in the continent appeared to have some possibilities of success and China posed a challenge, the Soviet Union refrained from using economic pressure to bring the Cuban leader back to an “orthodox” Marxist path. During the polemic Moscow limited itself to an occasional criticism of the new left, but tolerated Castro’s sporadic anti-Soviet tirades. By 1968, China was out of the picture as a disruptive element, and Castro’s Marxist heresy had resulted in failure. Moscow decided it was about time to settle accounts with the mercurial Cuban leader. On January 1, 1968, a somber Castro informed Cubans that the Soviet Union “apparently” was not going to meet the increasing petroleum needs of the nation. Strict controls on the consumption of fuel had to be imposed. No criticism of the Soviet Union followed the announcement. The Cuban leader evidently accepted the necessity of a new rapprochement with Moscow. Fearing that his opponents inside Cuba could be encouraged to take advantage of this new change in policy, or that the Soviet Union could be tempted to further weaken his position, Castro took measures to reaffirm his political control. In February 1968, the Cuban government denounced the existence of a “micro-faction” inside the Communist party (organized in 1965 under Castro’s tight control) which, in unexplained ways, was in contact with the CIA and with several Soviet and East German officials. The principal culprit was Aníbal Escalante, who had been allowed to return to Cuba in 1964. Significantly, the micro-faction was accused of criticizing Castro as an erratic dictator who felt superior to Marx, Engels and Lenin, while pushing Cuba to economic disaster. After punishing the principals involved, Castro felt free to initiate his reconciliation with Moscow.
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In August 1968, carefully selecting his words and still posing some questions about Soviet foreign policy, Castro justified the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia. It was a thorny task. The similarities between Czechoslovakia and Cuba were dangerouslsy evident. If “a minority” was right in asking for Soviet intervention against “a majority” which was betraying socialism, why were Aníbal Escalante and his group condemned as traitorous for doing the same thing in Cuba? How could masses that had been living under socialism for twenty years still be attracted by capitalism, “a monstrous system of exploitation”?27 While trying to use his best dialectic to answer those questions, Castro could not resist the temptation of firing a parting shot at the recent Soviet support for the Latin American communist parties: “Yet we were accused of being adventurers, of interfering in the affairs of other parties . . . I ask myself if the nations of the Warsaw pact which send their troops into Czechoslovakia . . . will also cease to support these rightist, reformist, soldout, submissive leaderships in Latin America that are enemies of the armed revolutionary struggle.”28 In spite of those questions and criticisms, the speech was warmly received in Moscow (at least the part that was published) and marked a new period in Soviet-Cuban relations. A quietly as possible, Castro folded the guerilla banners, praised nonrevolutionary Latin American governments, and denied that armed struggle was the only road to socialism. In June 1969, Cuba attended the Conference of Communist Parties in Moscow and joined the chorus criticizing China. In April 1970, Castro declared that without the Soviet Union, Cuba could not have become a socialist country, and proclaimed his unshakeable alliance with Moscow. To demonstrate his new orthodox position, Castro’s passivity was as eloquent as his declarations. In October 1968 Mexico was convulsed by a bloody repression of student demonstrations. Ironically, the students had begun their protest with a march in honor of the Cuban revolution. Their appeals for solidarity and the boycott of the Olympic Games in the capital received no answer from Havana. Two weeks after the so-called massacre of Tlateloco, Russian and Cuban athletes displayed their flags at the opening of the Olympic Games in Mexico City. Cuba was back in the fold of the faithful. The Dialectics of the Rapprochement (1970–1985) In terms of examining the relationship between the actions of the Cuban government and the principles of Marxism-Leninism, the period which followed the reconciliation with the Soviet Union is less interesting. After 1970, the year of the 10 million-ton sugar crop failure, Castro’s horizon of options was limited to the margin of freedom allowed him by the Soviet Union. And even that margin refers to a freedom of action, there and where Moscow has no particular interest. Castro’s autonomy does not include a capacity to deviate from the Soviet official interpretation of Marxism. In 1975, in an increasingly common
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display of humbleness, Castro recognized that “if we would have been able to understand that revolutionary theory was not sufficiently developed in our country, and that we really lacked true economists and scientists of Marxism,” Cuban revolutionaries would have been able to learn, “with the modesty of true revolutionaries,” from the experiences of “other socialist countries.”29 The most obvious consequence of this humbleness was what Castro called “the return to reality.” After 1970 (and even before) pragmatism had become the basic trademark of the Cuban regime. When asked in Chile in November 1971 if there were contradictions in the socialist field, Castro answered: We have had contradictions at times. On occasions those contradictions were due to a certain idealism (from our side) . . . We expected things to develop the way our imagination pictured them.”30 By the end of 1975, Cuba began implementing the Soviet-directed “System for Economic Management and Planning.” According to that system, and following strict Soviet guidelines, sugar remained the principal sector of the economy, decentralization was emphasized, and dependence on “voluntary” labor, one of the few remnants of Guevara’s dream, was drastically reduced.31 Identification with the goals and ideology of the Soviet Union had continued to expand in Cuba. One of the resolutions adopted in the Second Congress of the Cuban Communist Party (December 1980) plainly stated, “The basis of our party’s foreign policy is its historic, lasting alliance with the Soviet Union.”32 On occasion of the 68th anniversary of the Russian revolution, Cuban media repeated ad nauseam the same exalted praise of and gratitude toward the Soviet Union. And Castro’s speech in Moscow at the XXII Congress of the Soviet Communist party (1986) was a laudatory homage to the Soviet Union and Gorbachev. Castro’s failed attempt to become a leader of the Third World, one of his oldest dreams, clearly demonstrated the limits of his capacity to act independently. He did become president of the nonaligned movement in 1979. But his efforts to manipulate the movement toward a sort of alliance with the Soviet Union (a strategy openly opposed by Yugoslavia), and the sudden Russian invasion of Afghanistan, which Castro could not condemn, frustrated his plans. After those events, the majority of the “nonaligned” countries consider Castro too “loyal” to the Soviet Union. Cuba’s long and bloody intervention in Africa, especially in Angola, hailed as an expression of the principle of international socialist solidarity and of Castro’s capacity to make decisions “independently” of Moscow, had brought many more benefits to the Soviet Union than to Cuba. While Cuban soldiers had been dying in Angola for eleven years, the Soviet Union had been able to expand its influence in Africa by simply providing logistical support to Castro’s adventurism. Using troops of a small Third World country like Cuba, the Soviet Union can achieve important military and political objectives without arising accusations of imperialism or sacrificing a single Soviet soldier.
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The events following the triumph of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua provides another clue to Castro’s peculiar decline. Managua’s regime had proclaimed itself Marxist-Leninist, built a formidable military machine, and adopted many of the institutions and symbols that Cuba had made familiar. At first sight it appeared that Castro had obtained a resounding success; the guerilla theory appeared revindicated. A closer analysis shows another panorama. Nicaraguan guerillas, and in general those of Central America, had not followed Guevara’s model. The destruction of the new left had convinced many guerilla leaders that military success requires Soviet aid. Consequently, present day guerillas are closer to an “orthodox” Marxism than to the radicalism of the 60s. Not one of them had openly criticized Moscow or broken with the communist parties. In that situation, Cuba has become a channel for weapons and propaganda. Castro is a revered leader who should be listened to, but not a dominant figure who can decide the route to follow. Managua has its own direct connection with Moscow. Castro is a leader among equals. But the deterioration of the image of the Cuban model, and Nicaragua’s own economic problems, determine a mutual gravitation toward the Soviet Union. Finally, in neither Cuba nor Nicaragua has Marxism-Leninism promoted a cultural revitalization. As in Europe, the establishment of a rigid Marxist system has stifled creativity. Beyond the usual slogans and military parades, there is only the state version of Marxism. At the Cuban Communist Congress in the 1980s, after recognizing a certain decline in work discipline and “the spirit of austerity,” Castro issued a stern warning that “we must keep our state of alert at the highest level and observe the most rigorous firmness against all petit-bourgeois spirit, accommodation. relaxation of revolutionary discipline and any sign of corruption, no matter how insignificant it may seem.” The “purity” of official MarxismLeninism must be kept at all costs. The only recent relevant development in Cuba that could offer a possibility for theoretical analysis is Castro’s aparent desire to soften religious restrictions in Cuba, and to establish better relations with the Catholic church in Latin America. A glance at the past is essential to evaluate this situation. Castro’s Marxism and Cuban Catholicism In Cuba, Catholicism, and in general religious devotion, has always been weak. The Catholic church in particular suffered from severe economic limitations imposed by the Spanish government during the nineteenth century and by its reputation of having sided with Spain during Cuba’s war for independence. Only after World War II did the church begin to increase its influence in Cuba by actively promoting labor, youth and religious organizations. At the triumph of the revolution, there appeared to be no reason for any confrontation between Catholics and revolutionaries in Cuba. Many Catholic
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leaders had opposed Batista and more than once the Catholic church raised a protest against the brutal methods of the dictatorship. Castro himself, a graduate of the Jesuit school of Belén, owed his life to the intervention of Monsignor Pérez Serantes, Archbishop of Santiago de Cuba, after his defeat at Moncada’s barracks in Santiago de Cuba. Nevertheless, in November 1959, several Catholic organizations convened a National Congress “to revitalize the faith and the union of all Cuban Catholics.” Behind the spiritual call was a growing concern on the part of many Catholic groups about the course the revolution was taking, and the division among Catholics. Many supported the government; some suspected that the “humanism” proclaimed by Castro was evolving toward communism. The Congress was a success. Thousands of Cubans gathered in Havana to proclaim their Catholic faith. But a final proclamation in support of social justice was accompanied by a denunciation of all totalitarianism, especially the communist one. Immediately, criticism from several government spokesmen intensified the tension. By the middle of 1960, the government’s leftist tendencies were evident. When Mikoayan deposited flowers on Martí’s monument, Catholic students protested and brought a Cuban flag to the monument. Several were arrested. A few weeks later Communist leader Marinello accused the Catholic youth of being counterrevolutionary. Government control on the press silenced any valid Catholic protest. In August, the attacks against the church had become so violent, that Monsignor Evelio Díaz announced the possible closing of the churches to let the world know that “the Church of silence had been imposed in Cuba”33 After Castro’s Marxist-Leninist proclamation, that assertion became a reality. Catholic schools were closed, church activities drastically curtailed, and discriminatory policies against Catholics imposed. Outside Cuba, however, the Catholic church was entering a period of liberalization or modernization. Following this trend, certain Catholic groups defended the need to establish a dialogue with the Marxists. For those groups capitalism became the main enemy of progress in Latin America. Consequently a true commitment to defend the poor and exploited implied for them the acceptance of a possible alliance with the communists, and even the use of revolutionary methods. Consequently, almost at the same time that the new left was promoting an anti-Soviet “Marxist heresy,” the most radical representatives of an emerging Liberation Theology posed the threat of a Catholic “heresy.”34 Curiously, Castro apparently failed to grasp the importance of these potential Catholic allies. Concentrating on his guerilla crusade and the struggle against Latin American communist parties, he made no real effort to exploit his prestige among “progressive” Catholics as an “independent” revolutionary. In his conversations with Chilean priests in 1971 and during his visit to Jamaica in 1977, Castro spoke of the possibility of an alliance between Christians and revolutionaries, but he seldom mentioned Marxism and insisted on the necessity of Christians joining the revolutionaries.
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Only in 1985 did he speak of moderating the measures taken against the church and Catholics in Cuba. Yet, when interviewed by an admiring Brazilian priest, Frey Betto, he showed a remarkable ignorance of what Liberation Theology was about. Asked if he was considering the admission of Christians in the Cuban communist party, his answer was “not yet.”35 It looks as if this moderate change of attitude has come too late. The two defiant groups that in the 1960s would have responded to his appeal for union are in a weaker condition. Among Marxists, The new left has practically ceased to exist; among Catholics, the Vatican has bridled some of the most radical aspects of Liberation Theology. What could have been an impressive gesture a decade ago appears now as a belated and unreliable promise. More than twenty-seven years of a personal socialist dictatorship weigh heavily in the minds of many Catholics. The passing of time and his repeated demonstration of submission to the Soviet Union had eroded Castro’s revolutionary prestige. In a recent speech in Managua, Brazilian theologian Leonard Boff, a radical representative of Liberation Theology, praised the Sandinistas as the first revolutionary group who had demonstrated how just a revolution can be. Castro and Cuba were not mentioned in his speech. Considering the rigidity of Cuba’s socialism, and the limited options opened to Castro, it seems that the most pressing problems for Cuban Marxists today are the typical problems of a Soviet-type society: bureaucracy, inefficiency, declining morale among workers, and gaps between the masses and the party as well as between Marxist theory and official practice. Notes 1. 2.
3.
4. 5. 6.
Leszek Kolakowski, Main Currents of Marxism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982) p. 530. Guevara’s personal interpretation of Marxism lasted to the end. One of the few books he carried to Bolivia was one by Trotsky. On July 26, 1966, he lectured his small guerrilla group “on the significance of the (Cuban) 26th of July: rebellion against oligarchies and against revolutionary dogmas.” El Diario del Che en Bolivia (Mexico: Siglo XXI, 1973) pp. 185, 188. Lenin, “Las Vicisitudes Históricas de la Doctrina de Karl Marx,” In Contra el Revisionismo (Moscow Ediciones en Lenguas Extranjeras, 1959), p. 157. Lenin also bitterly criticized the Populist and Social Revolutionary parties’ argument, similar to those of Castro and Guevara, that since in czarist Russia the vast majority of the population was formed by peasants, the revolution had to be a peasants’ revolution. An excellent study of this last point is W. Raymond Duncan, The Soviet Union and Cuba, Interests and Inf luence (New York: Praeger, 1985). Speech at the June 1983 CC Plenum, Pravda, June 16, 1983. See, Mario Llerena, The Unsuspected Revolution, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978) p. 251.
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7. 8.
9.
10.
11. 12. 13. 14. 15.
16.
17.
18. 19. 20. 21.
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James O’Connor, The Origins of Socialism in Cuba (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970) p. 7. In 1978, trying to explain the communist party’s intial coolness toward the revolutionary government, Carlos Rafael Rodríguez wrote: “Fidel Castro’s confessed prejudices against the communists were similar to the Marxists’s prejudices against the petty bourgeois revolutionaries.” See his Cuba en el tránsito al socialismo, 1959–63, (Mexico: Siglo XXI, 1978). p. 110. In 1975, seventeen years after the triumph of the revolution, Castro still complained about the “relatively low cultural level of our masses.” See his Informe Central, Primer Congreso del Partido Comunista de Cuba (Havana: Departamento de Orientación Revolucionaria, 1975), p. 207. To partially understand Castro’s initial attitude toward the Soviet Union, we should recall that for a short period of time (1958–1962), the success of Sputnik, the earth’s first artificial satellite, convinced some leaders of the Third World that the Soviet Union had achieved a permanent technical supremacy. All the quotations from that speech are taken from Fidel Castro, El Partido Marxista Leninista (Buenos Aires: La Rosa Blindada, 1963). For a complete text of the speech, Fidel Castro, Autocrítica de la Revolución Cubana (Montevideo: Ediciones Uruguay, 1963). Ibid, pp. 20, 21. Ibid. p. 17. President Kennedy was aware that Krushchev had judged his conduct at the Bay of Pigs crisis as “a failure of nerves.” See Joseph L. Nogee, Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War II (New York: Pergamon Press, 1984), p. 133. The question of who took the initiative of placing the missiles in Cuba is still not resolved. Both Krushchev and Castro had on different occasions conceded the initiative to the other partner. See Elie Abel, The Missile Crisis (New York: Bantam Books, 1966). The Caribbean Legion was a loose organization of democratic groups and parties, formed to help fight dictators in the region. It had some influence in the Costa Rican revolution of 1948 and other regional episodes. Quickly disbanded, it added a romantic, if not very effective aura to the struggle against dictatorship in the Caribbean. Che Guevara, “Guerilla Warfare”, quoted in Michael Lowry, The Marxism of Che Guevara (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1973), p. 92. Camilo Torres, “Message to Christians,” in Enrique López, El Camilismo en la América Latina (Havana: Casa de las Americas, 1970), p. 16. Régis Debray, Revolution in the Revolution?, (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1967). pp. 98 and 103. (my emphasis). Much later, in 1985, Régis Debray made this astonishing confession: “I was passionately interested in what happened in Cuba between 1956 and 1959, on what happened afterwards unfortunately I had not thought much about it. . . . I meddled (tome cartas) in affairs that are not the business of an
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22.
23.
24. 25. 26. 27.
28.
29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34.
35.
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European.” See “Régis Debray: las metamorfosis de un revolucionario”, El País Semanal, Madrid, March 31, 1985. Castro himself proclaimed in 1965, “it is better a noncompetent revolutionary than a competent nonrevolutionary.” This slogan horrified French Marxist economist René Dumont. See his excellent Cuba, est-il socialiste? (Paris: Seuil, 1970), p. 50. Dumont’s book, usually ignored by leftist writers, is one of the best studies of Cuba’s economic misadventures. See La Profecía del Che (Buenos Aires: Escorpión, 1964), pp. 38–51. Actually, Guevara was echoing Krushchev’s exaggerated optimism displayed at the 22nd Congress of the Soviet Communist Party: “in the current decade the Soviet Union will surpass the strongest and richest capitalist country, the U.S.A.” Ten years later Brezhnev painted a different, more sober picture. A good study of Cuba’s economic development, even if a little inclined to gloss over the regime’s failures, is Carmelo Mesa Lago’s Cuba in the 1970s. Castro, Informe Central, p. 104. Dumont, Cuba, p. 178. Castro was dealing with something that no Marxist or Leninist text had envisioned: a crisis in a communist society. Both Marx and Lenin saw all societies of their time as being crisis-prone, but they were convinced that the communist society of the future would be crisis-proof. The only Marxist who considered the possibility of a decline and breakup of an established communist regime was Mao Tse Tung. See his On Krushchev’s Phoney Communism (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1964), p. 71. Quoted in Ernst Kux, “Contradictions in Soviet Socialism,” Problems of Communism (Nov.-Dec. 1984). For a complete text of the speech in English, see Appearance of Major Fidel Castro analyzing events in Czechoslovakia (Havana: Instituto del Libro, 1968). A fascinating analysis of the speech from a Trotskyite perspective is Hansen, Dynamics of the Cuban Revolution (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1978), pp. 355–78. Castro, Informe Central, p. 103. Granma Weekly Review, Nov. 28, 1971, quoted in Mesa-Lago. Cuba, p. 27. Maurice Halperin, The Taming of Fidel Castro (University of California Press, 1980), p. 326. Fidel Castro Speeches (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1981), p. 359. Quoted in Manuel Fernández, Religión y Revolución en Cuba (Madrid: Ediciones Saeta, 1984), p. 82. I am using the term in its original sense, “heresy,” from the greek “option.” For a more detailed account of this subject, see Luis E. Aquilar “Catolicismo y Marxismo o el Encuentro entre dos Herejías,” in Comentario (December 1985). Frey Betto, Fidel y la Religión, (Havana: Publicaciones del Consejo de Estado, 1985), p. 249.
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7 Fidelismo: The Unfulfilled Ideology Tad Szulc “It was much easier to win the revolutionary war than it is to run the Revolution now that we are in charge.” So Fidel Alejandro Castro Ruz observed some months after taking power in Cuba early in 1959. Only 33 years old, he had just launched Latin America’s most fundamental social and politial upheaval in a half-century, proclaiming a wide-ranging agrarian reform and ordering a mass literacy campaign to teach all Cubans to read and write as prerequisites for progress. On this particular evening, over steaks served in the kitchen of a Havana hotel, the fiery young “Maximum Leader” was explaining to a few friends and visitors how hard it was to transform his Caribbean island. The conversation went on through midnight, and then past daybreak. As one of the guests, I vididly remember the glorious dreams and promises Castro spun off, and the excitement that pervaded Cuba at the dawn of what was to be a splendid new age. Thirty years later, a still-ebullient Castro has not solved the problem that confronted him in 1959: How to provide his 10 million compatriots (there were six million when he ousted Gen. Fulgencio Batista) with a modicum of satisfaction, if not the boundless Marxist-Leninist joy that he so often promised during the 1960s. After three decades of experimentation, of costly zig-zagging in economic plans, of vast national effort and sacrifice, and increasing Soviet subsidies, Fidel’s overarching revolutionary goal—the creation of a new “Socialist Man” in an efficient socialist system—still eludes him. And to make matters worse, old and new Cuban generations are paying a heavy price—the denial of personal and political freedoms—for the social gains that do exist today. Thus, especially to its early sympathizers at home and abroad, Castro’s regime on the threshold of its fourth decade must answer a poignant question: 86
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Why was political freedom not welcomed alongside the Revolution’s accomplishments in the realm of social progress? Castro’s revolution, widely admired when it began, might well have turned out better if instead of exercising absolute power, he had tolerated personal freedoms creating a form of partnership with the nation. After all, as he told us that night in the hotel kitchen, that was what the Revolution would be all about: freedom and happiness. Yet, even today, he keeps hundreds of political prisoners, many of them at the penitentiary on the Isle of Pines where he himself was confined during 1953–55. Unquestionably, Castro’s regime stands at something like a final crossroads. At home it is stagnating. Following the sizable gainst of the 1960s and 70s, Cuban living standards have declined during the 1980s. In 1987, for example, domestic production dropped by 3.2 percent from the previous year. Abroad, Castro finds himself out of step in the Marxist-Leninsit world. He clings to a public orthodoxy that most other Communist leaders have begun to abandon. He has refused to emulate Mikhail Gorbachev’s push toward decentralization, modernization, and higher productivity (perestroika), and relative openness and liberalization (glasnost) in the Soviet Union. China’s economic reforms have been anathema to him. Today, Cuba is, with the possible exception of Kim II Sung’s North Korea, the most inefficient and repressive Communist country in the world. (During a speech on the revolutionary holiday of July 26 this year, Castro asserted that the Cuban Revolution “need not imitate others; she creates.”) in the Soviet Bloc today, ironically, the Cuban leader stands with the antiGorbachev conservatives—East Germany’s Erich Honecker, Romania’s Nicolae Ceausescu, and Czechoslovakia’s Milos Jakes. Yet Castro, a public relations virtuoso, generally succeeds in projecting an image of tolerance, bonhomie, and unruffled self-assurance. Last April, for example, he found time to meet at length with New York’s Roman Catholic Archbishop, John Cardinal O’Connor, and actor Robert Redford to discuss Cuba’s relations with the church and the fate of political prisoners held by the regime. Like so many other foreign visitors, both the Cardinal, the first U.S. churchman of his rank to travel to Cuba in well over 30 years, and the Hollywood star declared themselves very impressed by their host. That Castro has not lost his touch as Cuba’s great master of political seduction is as obvious on Cuban television as in the many interviews he gives to U.S., West European, and Latin American TV networks. And there are his all-night meetings with Yankee businessmen, professors, and politicians, all of whom are welcome in Havana. Having given up cigars—his trademark olive-green uniform and beard remain, although the latter is now greying and kept closely trimmed—he emphasizes the healthy life for himself and all Cubans. He swims, goes spearfishing, plays basketball with the children when visiting Cuban schools, and in general behaves as if all were well in the best of all possible worlds, i.e. socialist Cuba. But his outward show of confidence, his ability to woo visitors, mask the travail of his people: the shortages of consumer goods, the lack of urban hous-
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ing, the glaring inefficiencies of the state-run economy, and, finally, the likelihood that little will change in the foreseeable future. They live in a mood of hopelessness. And there is a private Castro—moody, impatient, irascible, and downright violent with his subordinates. His behavior patterns have not changed in 30 years: Since the time he entered Havana riding a column of jeeps, tanks, and trucks on January 8, 1959, he has never deviated from “L’état, c’est moi” (I am the state), and, like Louis XIV, he has kept himself surrounded by sycophants. Yet, for all his outward ebulience, he is a very lonely man, trusting no one. Since I first met him in 1959, I have been impressed by his erudition, his sense of history, and his political agility and imagination. These qualities—and others—brought him victory over Batista against immense obstacles. For several decades, they helped make him a widely admired Third World leader and made Cuba a player in Central America and Africa. What, then, is happening to Fidel Castro? It appears that he has, oddly, become both the victim of his unfulfilled promises to construct socialism in “the most orderly manner possible” and the prisoner of his enduring conviction, unchallenged by his colleagues, that he alone understands what is good for Cuba. The added difficulty Castro seems to have created for himself (and for Cuba) stems from his misperception of what is really happening among the Cuban people. He still crisscrosses the island on trips by helicopter or Mercedes limousine, but he seems not to see and not to hear what is around him. And, increasingly, there is the steady murmur of discontent. “Fidel is desperate over his inability to make Cuba work,” a man who has known Castro all his life told me not long ago, when we ran into each other in Europe, “and this is why he is losing control and he is doing things that make no sense.” This man doubts that Castro believes in Marxism-Leninism viscerally or intellectually. He suggests that Fidel adopted it as convenient revolutionary dogma, and that his only true beliefs, underneath all the rhetoric, now revolve around himself—Fidelismo. We were discussing the great ideological campaign the Maximum Leader unveiled in 1987, known as “Rectification of Errors . . . and Negative Tendencies.” Specifically, Castro has re-introduced in Cuba the notion of “spiritual incentives” to inspire the citizenry to labor unselfishly for the common welfare, instead of the various “material incentives” that the Chinese, Soviets, and East Europeans have begun to offer. Under “rectification,” Cuba’s workers and students are instructed to “volunteer” for unpaid work in the fields or in construction on their days off, just as they did during the 1960s when the nation was still in the grip of nationalistic (if not ideological) fervor, and most Cubans were ready to do almost anything Fidel proposed. Interestingly, Castro is stressing “spiritual incentives” (medals, awards, publicity) to revive the ideal of “Socialist Man” that the famous Ernesto “Che”
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Guevara propounded during the Revolution’s early years. Guevara, the Argentine-born physician who joined Castro’s exiled rebel movement in Mexico in 1955 and became his chief lieutenant in the guerrilla campaign, was probably the purest believer in Marxism-Leninism of his generation; he was also Castro’s only intellectual equal among the rebels, and his principal ideological counselor. Castro told me several years ago that the greatest error committed by the “Revolution” (Fidel never says he has committed mistakes; it is “we” or the “Revolution”) was to try to implant pure communism in Cuba, skipping over the prepatory “socialist” stage that Marx and Lenin had recommended. Not even Stalin’s theoreticians saw the Soviet Union achieving the status of a classic “communist” society, but Fidel and Che set out to create such a society on their Caribbean island. They were on the verge of abolishing money altogether (in 1966) when the Soviets persuaded Castro that premature experimentation with classical communism would sink Cuba economically. Che Guevara was killed in October 1967 in the Bolivian mountains where, for reasons that remain unclear to this day, he had launched a guerrilla movement, hoping to rouse local Indian peasants. For the next 20 years, Castro appeared to have forgotten “spiritual incentives” and “Socialist Man,” concentrating on other themes. Meanwhile, Fidel used pay raises and favoritism in the distribution of scarce consumer goods to keep both top officials and lowly workers attentive to their duties. One result was creeping corruption in the Cuban Communist Party—Fidel is its first secretary as well as president of Cuba and the armed forces’ Commander in Chief—which has added to the erosion of popular faith in the selfless qualities of Cuba’s rulers. That his regime is in profound crisis is, to some degree, publicly recognized by Fidel himself. During the mid-1980s, he berated Cuba’s “workers who do not work” and “students who do not study.” He has also been discarding the annual plans drafted by his top economists, and firing the authors for being “despicable technocrats.” Castro personally redrafts the plans, down to the smallest detail— typical of his intervention in almost every arena of government. Fidel has reacted in other ways. To the call for “spiritual incentives,” he added a series of harsh austerity measures early in 1987. These ranged from a cut in the sugar allowance (even rice and meat are still imported and rationed) to an increase in urban transit fares (the bus system is in shambles) and a curtailment of daily television broadcast schedules. Cuba’s external debt to Western Europe had to be renegotiated because Havana had no hard currency with which to make payments; the Soviets presumably extended again the deadline for payments on the billions (the figures are never published) that the Cubans owe to Moscow. Thus, Castro had no choice but to embrace some sort of radical crisis management. What is surprising, however, is Castro’s recourse to the old Marxist-Leninist gospel. Fidel’s “rectification” campaign is aimed at warding off the twin demons of “capitalism” and the “bourgeoisie.” He has closed down small farmers’ mar-
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kets that he authorized in 1980, claiming that peasants were getting too rich selling piglets, chickens, and garlic directly to private customers. He now contends that any free-market experiment pollutes Marxism-Leninism. In a public remark that must have reached Gorbachev’s ears in Moscow, Castro announced recently that the way things were being managed around the world, he regarded himself as the last true bearer of the Marxist-Leninist banner. And Fidel does not joke about such matters. Nevertheless, it is difficult to fathom his apparent belief that contemporary Cubans will be turned toward noble socialist purposes by the revival of ideological slogans. Most Cubans are of the postrevolutionary generation (40 percent are under age 15). Although they may increasingly regard Fidel Castro as a heroic figure, they regard his revolutionary goals as abstractions. They did not experience the struggle of the 1950s. They take for granted universal education and health care, and, like people elsewhere, they want to enjoy a better life—a life they hear about via Spanish-language radio stations 90 miles away in Florida, where some 1.5 million native-born Cubans now reside. An exile in Miami remarked recently that “what throws me is that Fidel really seems to think that a team of aging revolutionaries—a 30-year-old team— can rekindle the fires of revolution in Cuba.” Another Cuban, who lives in Havana, drew a comparison between Castro and China’s late Mao Zedong. He suggested that Fidel had made a decision to risk everything on his version of a “Cultural Revolution” (though a bloodless one) to preserve the purity of the original struggle. “But please remember that Mao lost in the end, and the reformists took over to liberalize and modernize,” the Cuban said. “No two situations are alike, yet there are constants in human behavior, and Fidel, who should know better, is disregarding reality.” Castro won his struggle against the Batista dictatorship 30 years ago precisely because he had disregarded what was widely perceived as reality at the time: that his tiny guerrilla force in the Oriente Mountains could never oust an entrenched (albeit incompetent) military regime. Castro’s faith in himself is as strong today as it was then. Relying on his own audacity and imagination, Castro has always moved from one turning point to another, either defining them himself or exploiting events. His first move after the 1959 victory was the decision to transform the ouster of Batista into a continuing radical revolution. As Fidel explained it later, mocking “liberals” and “imperialists,” he had always planned it that way, but “our enemies never understood what we had in mind, and we didn’t act until we were good and ready.” Castro also understood that the United States would never endorse a radical regime next door, one committed to the nationalization of U.S.-owned land and other investments and to the rejection of Washington’s continued influence over Havana, and he behaved accordingly. America-baiting was a key element in Castro’s strategy. He foresaw that his regime would gain at home and in the eyes of much of the world if the
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Eisenhower administration (and later President Kennedy) reacted with hostility to his actions and his rhetoric; the Yankees would be the bullies. And, given the 60–year history of American dominance on the island, it was easy for Fidel to rouse latent nationalist sentiment among his compatriots. Quickly, his supporters came up with the chant, repeated endlessly at every public appearance by Castro: “ . . . Fidel, for sure . . . Hit the Yankees Hard! . . . ” This was the atmosphere as the Revolution acquired momentum—and as Washington officials began hatching plans to remove the Maximum Leader, especially after he declared himself a Marxist-Leninist in December 1961. But Castro’s decision to sever links with the United States required some new ally who could compensate for the loss of resources and trade from the mainland. Given the Cold War rivalries of the superpowers and Castro’s public fealty to communism, the Soviet Union was the logical candidate. By early 1960, high-level talks were underway between Havana and Moscow, and soon Soviet weaponry as well as oil and wheat began arriving in Cuba. By all accounts, Premier Nikita Khrushchev was as anxious as Castro to nurture the new relationship, inasmuch as it gave the Soviets their first strategic foothold and a Marxist-Leninist ally in the Western Hemisphere. But it is possible to argue that, in truth, Fidel manipulated the eager Soviets into providing massive economic aid. In any case, Castro owes his regime’s survival to the Soviet connection; it is less clear what continuing real profit the Kremlin has reaped from its long investment. Soviet weapons (and Washington’s bungling) helped to save Castro from the ill-fated 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion by CIA-organized Cuban exiles. And Khrushchev’s installation of Soviet nuclear missiles on the island in 1962 led to the now-famous “eyeball-to-eyeball” U.S.-Soviet confrontation, still depicted in the United States as a Cold War triumph for John F. Kennedy. The story has another side. In return for removal of the missiles, President Kennedy gave private assurances to Khrushchev that the United States would never invade Cuba, thereby guaranteeing the future of Castro’s regime. Still, a regime with revolutionary aspirations must do more than simply survive. To prosper as a social and political phenomenon, it must create a better life for its citizenry. This became Castro’s overwhelming concern along with the permenent Soviet-aided defense of the island. Yet immense contrasts developed between the regime’s success in achieving social progress and its failure in economic development. That social progress did occur, to a degree rarely achieved elsewhere in the Third World, is widely recognized. As a result of the mass read-and-write campaign of the early 1960s, Cuba today has an impressive 96 percent literacy rate. The island has an ample network of schools and universities, and the postrevolutionary generation is by far the best educated in Cuban history; nowadays it lends teachers and doctors to other Third World countries. Public health in Cuba is better than in most Latin countries: Between 1960 and 1986, infant
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mortality below the age of one dropped from 62 to 15 per 1,000 live births (the U.S. rate: 10 per 1,000). Life expectancy at birth is 74 years (lower than the United States’ 75, but far ahead of Bolivia’s 53); caloric intake per capita is 127 percent of the international standard (it is 79 percent in Haiti). One can dispute such statistics, but few observers, hostile or friendly, dispute Cuba’s progress in these areas. Health, literacy, and education have improved since Batista’s time, even as political freedom has not. The economy is a disaster, and, in retrospect, one of the reasons is that Fidel Castro, the Maximum Leader, kept changing his mind. When he took power, Cuba was a monocultural country with sugar as its principal product and export-earner. The vulnerable, narrowly based economy could have been transformed with a blend of diversified agricultural and industrial growth. This was what Castro talked about at our hotel kitchen dinner in 1959. But his ideas never seemed fully thought out. And, in the end, they were never realized. At the start, both Castro and Che Guevara believed, almost as a matter of dogma, that the role of sugar cane had to be greatly diminished. But sugar was the only commodity that Cuba could produce in quantity for export to the Soviet Union. By 1968, when that reality could no longer be ignored, Fidel shifted gears so brusquely as to strip them altogether. Although the normal crop yielded about six million tons of sugar, the 1970 crop, Castro proclaimed, would yield a record 10 million tons. In the attempt to reach that goal (the harvest came up 1.5 million tons short), he damaged the rest of the economy by diverting transport, labor, and other resources to the cane fields. Today, sugar remains the mainstay of Cuba; the Soviet Union not only purchases the export crop, but pays more than the world market price. But Cuba’s inability to meet all of its economic production quotas led to the austerity measures of 1987. In fact, Castro has recently admitted that he has had to buy sugar at 10-1/2 cents a pound on the world market to live up to his export commitments to the Soviet Bloc. Sugar has been only one of the failures. Much of the once flourishing cattle industry was destroyed when Cuban- and American-owned estates were broken up under land reform; professional managers were replaced by untrained army offiers. Herds began dying off, and they were never replenished. Castro, meanwhile, experimented with mass production of poultry; it was a fine idea, but, again, nobody in the state apparatus knew how to make it work. And, at the start, Fidel refused to encourage tourism; it represented a throwback to “imperialism.” When, during the 1970s, he finally decided that tourism could provide desperately needed foreign exchange, Cuba no longer had the facilities to handle visitors; major efforts to spruce up resorts and colonial towns such as Santa Clara, Santiago, and Trinidad did not start until the 1980s. For years, Fidel was repeatedly distracted by new economic visions, neglecting Cuba’s existing assets—such as sugar and tobacco. One of his grander concepts was to surround Havana with a “Green Belt” where coffee, fruit, and vegetables would grow in abundance. After great investments of time, effort,
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and money, Castro quietly dropped the idea; for one thing, it was discovered belatedly that there was no water available for irrigation. In the end, the best that can be said of Castro’s hands-on managements is that perhaps a quarter-century—and billions of dollars in Soviet aid—has been wasted in the process. Amid austerity, mismanagement, and worker absenteeism, Cuba suffers increasingly from unemployment and underemployment. The island has seen growth in population without equal growth in jobs. The 1980 exodus of 125,000 Cubans— freedom-seekers as well as convicts, inmates of mental asylums, and other undesirables—from the port of Mariel to Florida eased the pressure briefly. The absence of many Cubans (around 55,000 as of mid-1988) serving in military units in Angola and Ethiopia has also helped to reduce joblessness. And in 1987, Castro agreed to an annual flow of emigrants to America: ex-political prisoners, and up to 20,000 others with U.S. relatives or certain skills. From exporting revolution, Cuba has turned to exporting unemployment. The Cubans are tired. One sees it in the faces of men and women riding to work in Havan’s rickety, overcrowded buses and in the faces of shoppers queuing up for rationed goods in front of nearly empty stores. It may take long years to be able to rent an apartment (72 percent of Cubans now live in Havana, Santiago, and other cities). To purchase a car (a Soviet Lada), the buyer must be recommended by the Communist Party, the labor union, and the local Committee for the Defense of the Revolution (part of the Interior Ministry’s neighborhood police network). Cuban’s work every other Saturday as an extra boost to the economy. Under Castro’s “rectfication” campaign’s “voluntary” labor requirements, men and women have little time to themselves—or for leisure. In addition to full-time jobs, most employees are expected to attend frequent indoctrination meetings at the workplace or at local Communist Party headquarters—often to discuss Castro’s latest speech. Then there are long hours of mandatory drill in the Territorial Militia. Thus, ordinary people are physically exhausted much of the time, and bored much of the rest. Leisure activities are severely limited. Those fortuante enough to own cars face gasoline rationing. Most people find it difficult to reach the beautiful beaches that Castro has proclaimed as the proud property of the pueblo; buses are few and tardy. Travel to the lovely old colonial towns is no easier. So, by and large, Cubans stay at home, visit neighbors, read, or watch television. The residents of the capital fare better. Old Havana, the colonial barrio adjoining the harbor, has been beautifully restored, and thousands stroll in the narrow streets and wide plazas on serene evenings. A pianist may play Chopin in the courtyard of a restored palace, a violin quartet may perform Mozart’s works in a chamber next door, and a Caribbean ensemble may evoke tropical rhythms down the street. They all blend marvelously—and provide an escape from reality.
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Under Castro, the official encouragement of culture has been constant, but highly selective. The government awards literary prizes to Cuban and foreign writers and poets. But nothing that is politically (or even aesthetically) unorthodox—of Cuban or foreign origin—is visible in the bookstores. Yes, there are novels by Fidel’s friend Gabriel García Márquez, the Colombian Nobel laureate, and by Ernest Hemingway (who lived in Havana before his death in 1961), but not by many other “bourgeois” authors. The collected works of Marx, Engels, and Lenin are in every bookshop, but even telephone directories and foreign language dictionaries are difficult to obtain. Movie houses (Havana alone has about 30) show some good Cuban productions. Television, to which Cubans are condemned as their principal distraction, is less well endowed. Its menu relies on East European movies with Spanish subtitles (Western films cost too much to rent in hard currency), Mexican soap operas, occasional Cuban historical dramas, propaganda-laden news programs, baseball (the national sport), live broadcasts of official ceremonies, and speeches by Fidel Castro. The Cuban National Ballet is among the world’s best, but it is difficult to see a regular performance; there are 1,000 applicants for each ticket. Nightlife, to the average citizen of Havana, means a few bars with loud music; the traditional hot spots, such as the hotel nightclubs and the famous Tropicana with its spectacular f loorshows, are reserved for visiting foreign delegations or hard currency-spending tourists from Canada and Western Europe. In contrast to the Soviet Union, Cuba has little trouble with alcoholism: At more than $20 a liter, Cuban rum is out of the average Cuban’s reach, and foreign liquor is only obtainable in special hard-currency stores. But beer is cheap; young people in Havana drink it with gusto, especially on weekend evenings downtown. What will their future be? The simple answer is that as long as Fidel Castro keeps his health, nothing is likely to change. Since he appears to be in fine fettle, chances are that he will be in charge for some time—although he claims, unpersuasively, that he has already turned over many of his responsibilities to others, e.g., the Communist Party, the labor confederation, and “Popular Power” self-government goups operating locally under the aegis of the National Assembly (it meets twice a year for some speechmaking and rubber-stamping). Clearly, governing will become more difficult for Castro because he cannot arrest the warning of the old revolutionary esprit or (at this late date) perform economic miracles. For three decades, the threat of a U.S. invasion has been invoked (with some reason during 1959–62), and it is still used to justify the 500,000–member armed forces and reserves, and the even-larger militia. But the Yankee menace, now more illusory than real, cannot keep a growing, well-educated society united forever in the absence of some other kind of glue. This is the crux of Castro’s problem. Fidelismo, in contrast to Marxism-Leninism, seems strong enough to assure him a certain mass following—quite apart from
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the all-pervasive security apparatus that watches out for deviants. Yet, people talk more and more about having “one son in Miami and one son in Angola,” alluding to those Cubans who have fled to the United States and to those dispatched to fight in Africa in the name of socialist “internationalism.” Fidel still electrifies a great many Cubans when he rises to perorate, threaten, promise, and cajole, but the heartfelt explosive response that came from the admiring crowds during the early 1960s is no longer heard. Today, the cheers are much more ritualistic. Cubans know that the political system does not really work, and they increasingly, if quietly, resent the Communist Party’s privileged bureaucrats. The challenge to the existing system probably will come from the younger generations. They were educated by the Castro regime, they listen to foreign radio, and nowadays they ask why the system does not function more rationally. To be sure, they do not ask such questions in public. During Fidel’s student years, Havana University was a forum for great political debates; under communism, there simply are no such forums. In contrast to Eastern Europe, in Cuba there is no visible political dissent and no underground literature. One can glean enough from casual conversations to suspect that young Cubans are more attentive to what America and the West can offer them—in material ways and in ideas—than they are to the strictures of Marxism-Leninism. After 30 years of Castro’s rule, young Cubans do not seem convinced that trading total dependence on the United States for total dependence on the Soviet Union was a triumph of national policy. They probably would be delighted if Castro could not find ways of establishing a fruitful dialogue with the next U.S. administration. In Havana, one finds no overt resentment over the Bay of Pigs or the CIA’s past plotting against Castro. Generally, Cubans remain attracted to the United States, where so many have relatives, and U.S. visitors get a friendly reception (Russian residents are almost never seen in public). What seems beyond firm prediction is Cuba’s future when Fidel becomes incapacitated in some fashion. An agreed-upon mechanism for succession exists: Raúl Castro, Fidel’s younger brother by five years, has been formally designated as the inheritor of the state, the Revolution, and the Communist Party. Recent history demonstrates, however, that such advance arrangements may not function as planned. In Cuba’s case, it would be preposterous to assume that Raúl Castro could enjoy Fidel’s personal popularity. Raúl is feared and respected, but he is not loved. His command of the armed forces and security services would presumably assure him of a period in power—it would most likely resemble a military occupation. It is doubtful that any other figure could emerge from among Castro’s aging revolutionary peers to take on Fidel’s role for long. Cuba would be plunged into instability. In the Maximum Leader’s absence, the reformist tendencies surfacing in the Communist world today would surely come to the fore in Cuba. It is even questionable whether any vestiges of Marxism-Leninism would survive Fidel. More-
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over, one must assume that the United States would not sit idly by as the process of change unfolded. And it may be that the Soviets would not greatly object if a new Cuba sought better relations with the West—and lessened its need for Soviet subsidies. In a real sense, the coming 30th anniversary of Castro’s rise to power marks the end of an era in Cuba, Latin America, and the rest of the Third World. Fidel Castro, his political genius, and his rhetoric may remain with us for a time, but this is a different world from the heady days of 1959. To a degree that neither Fidel nor his foes could have imagined, the East-West relationship has changed, as has the communism that Castro embraced. The poorer nations increasingly seek other development models: Marxism- Leninism has fallen out of favor in most of Latin America, Asia, and Africa. So has Fidel Castro’s revolution. The struggles for national liberation on which he sought to capitalize are essentially over. Castro is gradually shrinking as a major figure on the international stage. Fidelismo is not what it used to be.
The Cuban Economy In 1999-2001: Evaluation of Performance
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8 The Cuban Economy in 1999-2001: Evaluation of Performance Carmelo Mesa-Lago In 1999-2000, the Cuban economy grew at an annual average rate of almost 6% and yet, in 2000, GDP still was one-fifth below the 1989 level. Cuba kept controlling inflation and the fiscal deficit, although the latter slightly rose and the monetary overhang expanded significantly. Gross revenue from tourism, as well as output of oil and nickel, continued to rise and reached record levels, but sugar output was stagnant at less than half the level of the 1980s. Production of several key industrial and agricultural products declined (textiles, fertilizers, milk) or rose and decreased (cement, cigars, fish, rice, eggs), while steady increases occurred in few lines (electricity, citrus); in all these cases, however, output in 1999-2000 was still below that of 1989. The external merchandise trade deficit kept climbing and surpassed the $3 billion mark in 2000, the highest ever, aggravated by low sugar production and high world oil prices. The trade deficit was partly compensated with tourism earnings and remittances from abroad, but Cuba had to resort to costly shortterm loans to cover the difference. The external debt slightly declined to less than $11 billion and a significant increase in cumulative foreign investment was reported albeit related to committed rather than actual investment. Open unemployment kept descending but estimates of underemployment were not available; the real wage slightly increased although still was 40% below the 1989 level. Social security expenditures (mainly pensions) rose to 13% of GDP and will continue to grow as the Cuban population rapidly ages to become the oldest in the region. Infant mortality continued its decline and, in 2000, was 35% below the 1989 level. University enrollment began a modest reversal of the dramatic fall of the 1990s but in 2000 still was 56% below the 1989 level. The large majority of economic and social targets set by the V Party Congress for 1998-2002 has not been fulfilled. Targets for 2001 are more moderate,
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but two thirds of them will be difficult or impossible to achieve. An interesting debate is taking place among some Cuban scholars on the need to advance reforms further and design a new strategy to give a thrust to growth and cope with the external disequilibria. The economic reform process has been basically halted since 1996, as only two measures were taken in 1997-1998, both of an administrative nature, without a further move to the market: restructuring of the banking sector and promotion of the system of enterprise perfection (sistema de perfeccionamiento empresarial). A Cuban scholar has compiled a comprehensive list of all reform measures taken from 1990 to mid-2001 and there are no such measures for 1999-2001 (Ferriol 2001). Economic Performance Several tables in this essay summarize Cuba’s major economic and social indicators, as reported by key government institutions such as the Oficina Nacional de Estadísticas (ONE), the Banco Central de Cuba (BCC) and ministries. Additional data come from Cuban scholars (whose academic output has expanded significantly, both in quantity and quality) and the U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) based on official data. The series start with 1989, the year before the crisis began, tend to show their worst point in 1993, and recover in 1994-2000 (for a recent analysis of Cuban statistics see Mesa-Lago 2001a). Domestic comparisons are made between 1989 and 2000; international comparisons with Latin America and the Caribbean are also made when possible. The evaluation of performance is divided into four major sections: macroeconomic, external, physical output and labor/social. Domestic Macroeconomic Indicators Growth: Table 1 shows that gross domestic product (GDP) grew by 6.2% in 1999 and 5.6% in 2000, for an annual average of 5.9%, contrasted with an average of 1.8% during the slowdown of 1997-1998. The Cuban average rate of growth for 1999-2000 was the fifth highest in Latin America and the Caribbean, after the Dominican Republic, Belize, Nicaragua and Trinidad and Tobago. Except for the latter, which benefited from very high oil prices, these countries are among the least developed in the region, and Cuba suffered a 35-45% decline in GDP in 1989-1993. Cuba’s annual growth rate during the 1994-2000 recovery averaged 3.8%, but for the entire period 1990-2000 it averaged -1.2%, the lowest in Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC 2000b). In 2000, Cuba’s GDP level at constant prices of 1981 was 16,556 million pesos (BCC 2001; ONE 2001), 21% below the 20,960 million pesos level of 1989 (ECLAC 2000b; according to BCC 2001, the gap compared with 1989 was only 15%). In 2000, GDP per capita at constant prices, in pesos, was 25% below the 1989 level. At the average growth
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rate of 1994-2000, it would take six years for GDP to recover its absolute level of 1989 and eight years to recover the per capita level. Capital Formation: Gross capital formation as a percentage of GDP shrunk from 26.7% to 5.4% in 1989-1993, but rose since 1995 and reached 13.2% in 2000, still 51% below the 1989 level (ECLAC 2001 estimates that gross domestic investment averaged 8.4% of GDP in 1997-2000). A Cuban scholar argues that a strong economic recovery would require investment rates similar to those of 1975 and 1989, that is, 25% of GDP (Marquetti 2000). Another scholar also acknowledges the currently low level of investment and that, to increase it, is necessary for GDP to expand at a faster rate, instead of changing the structure of investment/consumption, because the latter cannot be further reduced (Triana 2001). Price Stability: Inflation (based on changes in the consumer price index— CPI) peaked at 25.7% in 1994 and turned into deflation: -2.9% in 1999 and –2.3% in 2000 (BCC 2001). These figures are questionable for four reasons: (1) Cuba has never published information on the methodology for calculating the CPI, including the basket of goods and services used; (2) 1981 has been used for 20 years as a base for constant prices despite foreign criticism because it was an abnormal year (high inflation); (3) the CPI variation (negative) is significantly Table 1 Cuban Marcroeconomic Indicators: 1989-2000 (in percentages) Indicators
1989
1993 1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
% 2000 1989
GDP growth ratea
1.2
-14.9
2.5
7.8
2.5
1.2
6.2
5.6
-21d
GDP per capita (pesos) a
1,976 1,172 1,175 1,201 1,290 1,317 1,327
1,405
1,478
-25
0.7
Gross capital 26.7 formation/GDPa
5.4
5.5
7.2
8.2
9.5
9.4
10.3
13.2
-51
Inf lation rateb
n.a.
19.7
25.7
-11.5 -4.9
1.9
2.9
-2.9
-2.3
n.a.
Monetary liquidity/GDPc
21.6
73.2 51.8
42.6
42.0
41.1
40.6
38.8
37.9
+75
-33.5
-3.5
-2.5
-2.0
-2.3
-2.4
-2.5
-65
Fiscal balance/ -7.2 GDPc
-7.4
a At constant 1981 prices. b Annual variation of the CPI. c At current prices. d Based on GDP at constant prices of 1981, in million pesos: 20,960 in 1989 and 16,552 in 2000.
Sources: 1989 from CCE 1991; 1993-1997 from ONE 1999; 1998-1999 from ONE 2000 and BCC 2000; 2000 from ONE 2001, BCC 2001, and ECLAC 2001a.
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different from the behavior of the implicit GDP deflator (positive change): 5.2% in 1998, 0.8% in 1999 and 0.1% in 2000 (the latter estimated by ECLAC 2001a); and (4) “monetary liquidity” (monetary overhang) was reduced from 11 to 9.2 billion pesos in 1994-1995 (from 73.2% to 42.6% of GDP), but increased again in 1996-2000 to reach 10.5 billion pesos, 2.5 times the level of 1989 (see Table 2). An intriguing question is how there could have been deflation in 1999-2000 while the GDP deflator slightly increased and the monetary overhang rose in those two years. The fiscal deficit as a percentage of GDP fell from 33.5% to 2% in 1993-1997, a significant achievement, but rose to 2.5% in 2000, above the regional average of -2.3% (ECLAC 2000b). One important component of the deficit is the fiscal subsidy to inefficient state enterprises (concentrated in sugar and agricultural sectors), that accounts for 18% of total expenditures (Triana 2000). Table 2 Cumulative Monetary Liquidity of the Cuban Population: 1989-2000 (in million current pesos and % of GDP)
a
Cumulative Monetary Liquidity a
% of GDP
1989
4,164
21.6
1990
4,986
25.4
1991
6,564
40.4
1992
8,362
56.1
1993
11,043
73.2
1994
9,944
51.8
1995
9,251
42.6
1996
9,534
42.0
1997
9,441
41.1
1998
9,710
40.6
1999
9,902
38.8
2000
10,490
37.9
Monetary overhang
Sources: CEE 1991; ONE 1999, 2000, 2001; BCC 2000, 2001.
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External Sector Trade Balance: The major indicators for the external sector are shown in Table 3. After a dramatic decline of 79% in 1989-1993, the value of exports (goods) increased by 61% in 1993-1996, but declined/stagnated thereafter; export value was 1.7 billion pesos in 2000, still 68% below the 1989 level. Imports of goods dropped 75% in 1989-1993 but steadily rose thereafter reaching 4.9 billion pesos in 2000, still 40% less than in 1989. As imports expanded faster than exports, the trade balance deficit of goods jumped six-fold in 1993-2000, reaching the historical record of 3.2 billion pesos, 18% higher than the 1989 deficit. There is a major difference between 1989 and 2000, however, that Cuba does not benefit any longer from generous Soviet automatic long-term loans to cover the deficit, at very low interest rates and never paid. Now Cuba has to resort to short-term loans from foreign banks and other financial institutions, which charge high interest (see below). Table 3 Cuban External Sector Indicators: 1989-2000
a
Indicators
1989
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
% 2000 1989
Exports (billion pesos)
5.4
1.1
1.3
1.5
1.9
1.8
1.5
1.4
1.7
-68
Imports (billion pesos)
8.1
2.0
2.1
2.8
3.6
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.9
-40
Trade balance (billion pesos)
-2.7
-0.9
-0.8
-1.3
-1.7
-2.3
-2.7
-2.9
-3.2
+18
Terms of trade (1989=100)
100.0
54.4
65.9
73.9
66.7
68.5
57.3
55.9
49.9
-50
External 6.2 debt (billion US$)
8.8
9.1
10.5
10.5
10.1
11.2
11.1
11.0
+77
Foreign n.a. investment (billion US$)
n.a.
n.a.
2.1
n.a.
n.a.
2.2
n.a.
4.3 b
n.a.
Exchange rate (pesos per 1 US$)a
78
95
32
19
23
21
20
21
+200
7
Unofficial rate, annual average.
b
“Committed investment” rather than actual.
Sources: 1989 from CCE 1991; 1993-1997 from ONE 1999; 1998-1999 from ONE 2000 and BCC 2000; 2000 from ONE 2001, BCC 2001, ECLAC 2001. Terms of Trade from ECLAC 2001. Foreign investment for 1998 from Martínez 1998, and 2000 from Rodríguez 2000.
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Cuban Communism
The merchandise trade deficit was partly compensated with a substantial surplus from services, mainly tourism, and yet the current account balance was negative: -462 million pesos in 1999 (1.8% of GDP) and -687 million pesos in 2000 (2.5 % of GDP); these were the two highest deficits since the end of the 1980s. The current account deficit was partly compensated with “net transfers,” mostly remittances from Cubans abroad; such transfers rose from zero in 1989 to 799 million pesos in 1999 and 842 million in 2000. But payments of debt principal and interest, combined with profit taking by foreign investors, added to the negative balance: -514 in 1999 and -693 million pesos in 2000 (BCC 2000, 2001; for statistical series on Cuba’s balance of payments see Pérez-López 2000). Terms of Trade: There was a significant steady deterioration in the terms of trade in 1989-2000 (-50 percentage points). In 1999, the price of sugar in the world market dropped one-third while the price of oil jumped 2.5 times provoking a 18.3% deterioration in the terms of trade (BCC 2000). In 2000, rising oil prices cost $500 million more for a similar volume of oil imported in 1999, and higher prices of sugar and nickel did not compensate for the high oil prices, leading to a 22% deterioration in the terms of trade (BCC 2001). In October 2000, however, Cuba signed a trade agreement with Venezuela, which might help to improve the terms of trade (in 1999 Venezuela was Cuba’s fourth trading partner, ahead of Russia, and jumped to first place in 2000). Under this agreement, the island will receive 53,000 barrels of oil daily, equivalent to 2.5 million tons annually, meeting 29% of domestic needs (8.6 million tons). About 80% of the imports will be paid at world prices within 90 days; the remaining 20% will be paid in 5 to 20 years, based on the average annual price of oil in that period, and one-fifth of that with Cuban services and goods (Rodríguez Castellón 2001). Trade Composition: Export concentration on sugar steadily decreased from 73.2% to 31.8% of total export value in 1989-2000 as a result of the fall in sugar export quantum and value. And yet, although all other export shares increased in 1989-1999 (nickel, tobacco, fish, citrus, rum), their actual value—and in most cases also volume—shrunk, except for cigars and cement. The composition of imports showed some important differences between 1989 and 1999 also: the share of food, fats and beverages rose from 13% to 19% and of manufactures from 14% to 26%; meanwhile, the share of imported machinery/transportation equipment decreased from 31% to 26%, and the share of fuels sank from 32% to 17% (CCE 1991; ONE 1999 and 2000). These trends are clear indicators of both Cuba’s decreasing self-sufficiency on food and of the de-industrialization process. Trade Partners: In 1989, about 79% of Cuban total trade was with the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries but, after the collapse of the socialist bloc, the island has significantly diversified trade partners. In 2000, the main partners were: Venezuela (13.9% of trade, an increase from 8% in 1999), Spain (13.4%), Canada (9%), Netherlands (8.3%), China (7.6%), Russia (6.7%, a decline from 65% with the Soviet Union in 1989), Mexico (5.1%), France (5.1%)
The Cuban Economy In 1999-2001: Evaluation of Performance
105
and Italy (4.8%) (BCC 2001). Cuba is the only country in Latin America and the Caribbean that has not reached full membership in any of the regional commercial associations (CACM, CAN, CARICOM, MERCOSUR) and has been excluded from FTAA negotiations. In 2000, Cuba entered the Asian, Caribbean and Pacific group (ACP) and, based on this, could become a member in the Cotonou Accord and receive aid from the European Union (EU). Cuba did not comply with the EU conditions on human rights and, when the EU countries voted against the island at the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, Cuba decided not to sign the accord. The island has gained observer status in CARICOM but trade with member countries is minuscule (León 2001). The U.S. embargo on Cuba was slightly mollified by allowing the island to buy food, but the Cuban government rejected this action due to the lack of credit facilities. External Debt: The hard-currency external debt jumped from $6.2 to $11.2 billion in 1989-1998, and slightly declined to $11.1 billion in 1999 and $10.96 billion in 2000, because of the depreciation of currencies that make up most of that debt in relation to the U.S. dollar. About three-fourths of the debt has matured and has not been paid (BCC 2001). In 1986, Cuba suspended payments of the debt and in spite of several efforts to renegotiate its government debt with the Club of Paris, as of July 2001 there was no an agreement with the Club, hence, Cuba has not received fresh loans. The debt with Russia and the former socialist countries of Eastern Europe, as well as the extinct Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), has not been paid, and Cuba has not reached an agreement on the sums to be reimbursed either, allegedly because “they are not convertible in hard currency … and those countries unilaterally did not fulfill the terms and conditions of that debt” (BCC 2001, p. 38). Negotiations with creditors in the United Kingdom, Belgium and Japan resulted in agreements in 1999-2000. In 1999, 80% of imports were financed with external loans, 70% with maturity of one year or less, and high interest rates, which imposed a heavy burden on the island’s finances (BCC 2000). One-year loans from foreign banks were received in 1996-1997 to finance the sugar harvest (about $500 million), but the cost was quite high, and the net gain from a declined sugar production was lower that the amount of the loan plus interest. The crop failure of 1997 led to less foreign credit available for 1998, the situation improved with a slightly larger harvest in 1999-2000 ($500 million in credits were obtained), but deteriorated with the poor harvest of 2001 (Mesa-Lago 1998; Triana 2000). In that year Cuba defaulted on obligations with France, Spain, South Africa, and other countries (Frank 2001b). Foreign Investment: Cumulative foreign investment since 1990 was officially reported at $2.1 billion by 1995 and $2.2 billion by 1998, virtually stagnant in three years. But it was given as $4.3 billion at the end of 2000, a surprising two-fold increase in two years, explainable because it referred to committed rather than actual investment. Other estimates of foreign investment vary wildly, according to divergent definitions, for instance: $1,352.6 million in “direct for-
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Cuban Communism
eign investment” in 1999 (Pérez Villanueva 2000); more than $4 billion in “committed investment” in 2000 (Ferriol 2001), and $5 billion in “total capital involved” in 2000 (Triana 2001). In spite of the significance of this item, there are not reliable statistics available. Exchange Rate: The official exchange rate of the peso to the dollar continued to be par, but the state exchange houses (CADECA), established in 1995, use a more realistic exchange rate. The latter, in pesos per one dollar, deteriorated from 7 to 95 in 1989-1994, steadily appreciated reaching 19 in 1996, deteriorated again to 23 in 1997, and appreciated to 20 in 1999 but slightly deteriorated to 21 in 2000 (ECLAC 2001a). Some Cuban scholars argue that maintaining the artificial parity with the dollar is harmful for the Cuban economy and advocate for convertibility based on the market (see last section of the paper). Tourism: The number of tourists visiting the island rose from 270,000 in 1989 to 1,774,000 in 2000, and gross revenue jumped ten-fold, from 168 to 1,940 million pesos in the same period. The problem is that data on the cost of imported inputs, which must be deducted from gross revenue to calculate net revenue, are not officially published. Table 4 is an attempt, admittedly speculative, to calculate the cost of imported inputs in 1992-2000 based on rough estimates given by Cuban scholars in some years. According to Table 4, net revenue increased from 99 to 1,182 million in the period 1992-2000, but these estimates are debatable. For instance, the 2000 figure is based on a statement from the Central Bank in the sense that 61% of inputs for tourism were produced domestically, implying that 39% were imported (BCC 2001, p. 25), but that does not mean that the total cost of imported inputs Table 4 Rough Estimates of Net Revenue From Tourism: 1992-2000 (in million pesos) 1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
Gross revenue
550
720
850
1,100
1,380
1,515
1,759
1,901
1,939
Cost of imports (%)
82
77
72
67
63
60
55
50
39
Net revenue (%)
18
23
28
33
37
40
45
50
61
Estimated net revenue
99
165
238
363
510
606
792
950
1,182
Sources: Gross revenue from CCE 1991; ONE 1999, 2000, 2001; BCC 2001. Estimated cost of imports: 1992 from Gutiérrez Castillo 2000 (he says that the percentage gradually increased to reach 54% in 1999 and an expected 60% in 2000); 1999 from Marquetti 2000; 2000 from Del Barro 2001 based on BCC 2001; rest are author’s interpolations.
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was 39%. The Minister of Tourism, Ibrahim Ferradaz (cited by Muñoz 2001) has clarified that, in 2000, “the cost per dollar of revenue [in the tourist industry] was 0.78 cents … about the same as in 1999.” If this is correct, then the cost of imported inputs in 1999-2000 was not 39% but 78%, and net revenue in those years should be 418 and 427 million pesos, respectively. A Cuban scholar warns that the tourist sector is a grand importer and that the country must work in producing some of the inputs needed in that industry, otherwise, with the planned expansion, Cuba would have to import $3,000 billion–equivalent to the 2000 merchandise trade deficit (Pérez Villanueva 2000). Other two problems faced by the industry are: (1) the occupancy rate in international tourist rooms climbed from 39.7% in 1990 to 59.7% in 1999 (ECLAC 2000; BCC 2000), still low by international levels, hence, raising the question of how the added rooms will be filled; and (2) average expenditures, overnight stays at hotels and receipts for visitors have declined since 1994-1995 (Espino 2001). Physical Output The performance in terms of physical output of key products (export products, energy, food and manufactures) is presented in Table 5. Except for oil and nickel, production of all of the key products was lower in 2000 than in 1989. Nickel: Nickel output decreased 43% in 1989-1994 but, with the help of Canadian investment, surpassed the previous production peak in 1996 and kept rising thereafter. Output in 2000 was 51% above the 1989 level. There are three plants in operation: René Ramos Latour (formerly Nicaro, built with U.S. investment and technology), Pedro Soto Alba (formerly Moa, built with U.S. investment and technology) and Ernesto Che Guevara (built with Soviet technology and financial aid); a fourth plant, at Las Camariocas, has not been completed. In 1989 the installed capacity of the three operating plants were: 22,500, 24,000 and 30,000 tons, respectively, for a total of 76,500 tons. Production in 1989, however, was only 47,000 tons, because the Che Guevara plant was just starting and it consumed much energy, while the two former U.S. plants needed modernization (Mesa-Lago 2000). Production in 2000 was as follows: 10,708 tons by the Ramos Latour plant (it was said that production capacity was 10,000 tons, less than half the 1989 level), 29,700 tons by the Soto Alba plant, and 31,000 by the Che Guevara plant, for a total of 71,400 tons. Current production, therefore, is below the installed capacity of 1989, in spite of investment by Sherritt International Corporation. In 2000, the Che Guevara plant used half of the fuel it did in 1990, but still had high fuel consumption (BCC 2001; Portal 2001). Oil: Oil extraction peaked at almost one million tons in 1986, declined by 44% in 1987-1991, rose in 1992-1995, was stagnant in 1996-1997, and rapidly expanded in 1998-2000, to reach a record of 2.4 million tons (other estimates give 2.6 to 2.8 million tons). Output in 2000 was 234% above 1989, and 140% over 1986. This impressive performance has been the result of $450 million in foreign
108
Cuban Communism TABLE 5 CUBAN INDICATORS OF PHYSICAL OUTPUT: 1989-2000 (thousand metric tons)
Indicators
1989
1993
1994
1996
1997
1998
Sugar
8,121
4,246
4,016 3,258 4,528
4,252
3,229 3,783 4,059
Nickel
47
30
Oil
718
1,107
16
11
Cement
3,759
1,049
Textiles
220
Electricity (billion Kwh)
a
51
27
1995
43
54
1,299 1,471 1,476 12
12
13
1,085 1,456 1,438 56
45
48
62 1,462 14 1,701 54
68
1999 2000
66
14
-59
71
1,678 2,136 2,695 14
% 2000 1989
15
1,713 1,785 1,633
+51 a
+275 -6 -56
54
51
n.a.
-77
Fertilizers
898
94
136
217
241
184
156
138
118
-87
Cigars
308
208
186
192
194
214
264
284
226
-27
Fish catch
192
94
88
102
120
136
133
145
162
-16
Citrus
1,016
644
540
585
690
835
744
795 959
-6
Rice
532
177
387
396
573
614
441
567 462
-13
Milk (cow)
1,131
585
636
638
640
651
655
618 590
-48
Eggs
2,673
1,512
1,647 1,542 1,412
1,632
1,416 1,753 1,688
-37
BCC 2001; 2,635 according to ONE 2001 and 2,899 by Rodríguez Castellón 2001.
Sources: 1989 from CCE 1991; 1993-1997 from ONE 1999; 1998-1999 from ONE 2000 and BCC 2000; 2000 from ONE 2001, BCC 2001, ECLAC 2001a, Pérez Villanueva 2001, Triana 2001.
investment, two-thirds of total investment in this crucial sector (Triana 2000). About 42.3% of Cuba’s total energy needs are met with domestic sources, mainly bagasse (25%) and crude oil (17%); the contribution of natural gas and hydroelectric power is minimal (0.3%). Imports cover 58.4% of needs, 46% from oil derivatives and a 12% from crude oil (Rodríguez Calderón 2001). The contribution of domestic output of crude oil to total crude oil and derivative needs was 22.7% in 1999, up from 11.6% in 1987 (Mesa-Lago 2000). The increase in domestic oil production has reduced foreign energy dependency by half of what it was a decade ago, but it still is 77%. Sugar: At least until 1999, sugar was the main source of export revenue, although nickel was rapidly closing the gap. The tight relationship between sugar and GDP has been shown by Triana (2000), but this vital sector has been unable to recover: “The sugar industry has gone through a depressive state and
The Cuban Economy In 1999-2001: Evaluation of Performance
109
its performance decides the rhythm and dimension of the process of economic recovery” (Marquetti 2000, p. 11). After small increases in the harvests of 1999 (3.8 million tons) and 2000 (4 million tons), sugar output declined to 3,532,000 tons in 2001—the third lowest under the Revolution. (The worst harvests were in 1995 and 1998, with production of 3.26 and 3.23 million tons, respectively.) The initial target for 2001 had been set at 5 million tons, but later was reduced to 3.7 million; actual output in 2001 was 59% below the 1989 level. In per capita terms the decline was from 0.76 tons in 1989 to 0.31 tons in 2001; the latter was half the per capita output of 0.60 tons. The Minister of the Sugar Industry, General Ulises Rosales del Toro, blamed the climate (a draught) for the failure, but other factors were responsible. Annual average sugar output (in million tons) steadily declined in the last two decades: 7.8 in 1981-1985, 7.6 in 1986-1990, 5.2 in 1991-1995, 3.9 in 1996-2000 and 3.5 in 2001 (Mesa-Lago 2000, and Table 5). The total sugar cane area sown declined by 22% in 1990-1999, from 1.76 to 1.38 million hectares, while the irrigated area decreased from 22% to 9% of the total area sown. The agricultural yield per hectare sank from 60 in 1989 (59.4 in the state sector and 62.8 in the non-state sector) to 34.1 in 1999 (31.5 and 34.4 in the state and non-state sectors, respectively). Weeds cover from 10% to 15% of the sown area and there is a severe scarcity of herbicides. Due to a decline in domestic production, as well as imports, the use of chemical fertilizers has decreased and has been partly replaced with natural fertilizer. Because of insufficient fuel, most of the transportation is done with animal traction and that, combined with the lack of spare parts, has reduced the number of cane cutters in operation and the capacity of the sugar-cane cleaning centers (CCE 1991; ONE 1991, 1999, 2000; Orrio 2001). Finally, the sugar industrial yield has steadily fallen under the Revolution: from 12.5 in 1961-1965, to 11.0 in 1981-1985, 10.7 in 1986-1990, and 10.6 in 1996-2000 (Mesa-Lago 2000; ONE 2000). Manufacturing: Five key manufactured products have been selected for the analysis of performance; these products played a key role in Cuba’s industrialization process before the crisis, mainly for domestic consumption but also for export. For all of them, output drastically shrunk in 1989-1993 and rose thereafter, but output in 1999-2000 was still below the 1989 level: -6% for electricity, 27% for cigars, -56% for cement, -77% for textiles, and -87% for fertilizers. Several factors have contributed to this negative performance: scarcity of fuel, lack of spare parts (most Cuban factories were built and equipped by the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries, which no longer supply those parts), difficulties to acquire needed inputs abroad, and absence of foreign demand (except for cigars). According to Marquetti (2000), the level of decapitalization and technological obsolescence in various industrial branches is 30%. Fishing: Fishing was one of the major economic successes of the Revolution but its problems actually began before the crisis. The catch peaked at 244,000
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Cuban Communism
tons in 1986 and by 1989 had declined to 192,000 tons; the crisis reduced it to 88,000 in 1994, and there was a slow increase in 1995-2000 to 162,300 in 2000. Output in the latter year was 16% below the 1989 level and 34% below the 1986 peak. Agriculture: The non-sugar agricultural sector (both for domestic consumption and export) has had a poor performance and its recovery has been sluggish and unsteady; thus, in 2000, output was below the 1989 level in the following key staples: -48% for milk, -37% for eggs, -13% for rice and –6% for citrus. Similar declines occurred in other fruits and tobacco leave. Conversely the output of vegetables, tubers, corn and beans increased but, in per capita terms, output was either stagnant or lower (CCE 1991; ONE 1999, 2000, 2001; BCC 2001; ECLAC 2000a). The number of cattle heads peaked at 6.8 million in 1967 and sank to 4.6 in 1993, stagnated in 1994-1998, and decreased to 4.4 million in 1999; there were 0.83 heads per capita in 1967, 0.46 in 1989 and 0.39 in 1999. The decimation of cattle led to the fall in beef output from 289,000 tons to 152,000 tons, as well as in milk production (Mesa-Lago 2000; ONE 1999, 2000). The third agrarian reform introduced in 1993-1994 has been unable to solve the problems in agriculture, such as inefficiency and lack of incentives. The new cooperatives (UBPC) are highly dependent on the state, who in practice directs production and buys virtually all of their output at prices set below the market price, hence, creating serious disincentives. As a result, in 1997, the UBPC’s share of cultivated land was 57.6% but their share of total sales in the free agricultural markets was 3.6%; conversely the private sector shares were respectively 16.9% and 72.7%. In 1995-1996, 94% of UBPCs suffered losses and required state subsidies; by 1999-2000 the proportion had been reduced to 37%, still a high percentage. Another problem is the increasing size of the UBPCs, which makes them more difficult to manage. The UBPCs operate 74% of sugar cane plantations, which largely explains the failure of this sector. Finally, total cultivated agricultural land decreased by 13% in 1990-1997 (ECLAC 2000; Novoa 2001). Social and Labor Indicators Unemployment: Table 6 selects five key labor and social indicators of performance. Open unemployment was reduced from 7.9% in 1989 and 1995 to 5.8% in 2000, a decline of 26% (BCC 2001 gives a rate of 5.5% in 2000). The “equivalent unemployment rate” (open unemployment plus displaced workers receiving compensation), estimated by ECLAC (1998, 2000 a), peaked at 35.2% in 1993 but decreased to 25.1% in 1998 (the latest year available). The question is how this feat was accomplished when in 1995 from 500,000 to 800,000 workers in the state sector were considered surplus (disponibles) and should have been dismissed, and the small private sector is stagnant under increasingly tight regulations and taxes.
The Cuban Economy In 1999-2001: Evaluation of Performance
111
Table 6 Cuban Labor and Social Indicators: 1989-2000 Indicators
1989
1993 1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
Open unemployment (% EAP)
% 2000 1989
7.9
6.2 6.7
7.9
7.6
7.0
6.6
6.0
5.8
-26
Social security expenditures (% GDP)
10.1
15.8 13.2
12.3
12.1
12.2
12.4
13.0
13.3
+31
Infant mortality (per 1000)
11.1
9.4
9.9
9.4
9.0
7.2
7.1
6.4
7.2
-35
University enrollment (thousands)
242
166 141
122
112
105
102
107
n.a.
-56
Sources: Infant mortality and university enrollment: 1989 from CCE 1991; 1993-1997 from ONE 1999; 1998-1999 from ONE 2000; 2000 from ONE 2001. Open unemployment from ECLAC 2000a, 2000b; BCC 2001 gives 5.5% for 2000. Social security includes health, pensions and social assistance, from Mesa-Lago 2001 and ONE 2001.
Some measures taken in 1996-2001 against self-employment and other private sector activities are: (a) 300% increase in licenses and 650% in fees to the self-employed; (b) taxes of $850 monthly for tiny restaurants (paladares) and $250 for a room rented in tourist areas (fines of $1,000 to $1,800 per guest are imposed for rental violations); (c) halting new licenses for paladares; (d) prohibiting private taxis to transport tourists; (e) closing of independent private galleries, allowing only state galleries to sell art work; and (f) a tax of 300 pesos on “video saloons” and of 800 pesos for rental of dresses (Bauzá 2001; Cawthorne 2001; Henken 2001). These measures led to a decrease in the number of registered self-employed workers from 208,500 at the end of 1995 to 156,600 in 1999 (ECLAC 1998; ONE 2000). Minister of Economy José Luis Rodríguez has declared on this issue: “It is not our policy to eliminate self-employment ... But we do not stimulate it because we do not believe it is the way to get the country out of its economic difficulties” (cited by Cawthorne 2001). A draft law circulating in 1995, which allowed Cubans to own and operate small business, went into limbo and has not been discussed in the last three years. Real Wages: Table 7 presents two indices of real wages in 1989-1999, converted to the year 1989 as a base: Togores’ index indicates a decline of 42%, while ECLAC’s index exhibits a decrease of 39%. The small wage increase in 1999 did not raise the purchasing power, because of the high prices in dollar shops and agricultural markets (prices in the latter did not change in three
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Cuban Communism
years, and rose in 2001). The lack of connection between wages and real prices is a disincentive to labor productivity and an obstacle for the improvement of population consumption (Triana 2000). A survey undertaken in 1999 by the Instituto Nacional para la Salud de los Trabajadores detected an increase of 41% in workers’ discontent (Garve 2001). Social Security: The cost of social security (combining pensions, health care and social assistance) has been climbing as a result of several factors: virtual universal coverage, very low ages of retirement, the maturity of the pension scheme, and the aging of the population (it is estimated that, by 2025, Cuba will have the oldest population of the region and there will be only two persons of productive age for one person of retirement age). Table 6 shows that social security expenditures as a percentage of GDP peaked at 15.8% in 1993, because Table 7 Estimates of Real Wages and Real Wage Indices in Cuba: 1989-1999 Source
1989
1993
1994
1995
189
184
186
195
Consumer price index
1.443
6.578
5.575
Real wage
130.98
27.97
Real wage index (1989=100)
100.00
Consumer price indexb
1996
1997
1998
1999
207
206
206
221
2.940
2.883
2.904
2.983
2.896
33.36
66.32
73.34
70.94 a
69.05 a 76.31
21.35
25.47
50.63
55.99
54.16 a
52.72 a 58.26
0.962
1.245
1.645
1.862
1.898
1.896
1.922
1.866
Nominal wage index (1990=100)
100.5
97.3
98.9
103.7
108.0
110.2
110.2
118.2
Real wage index (1990=100)
104.5
78.1
60.1
55.7
56.9
58.1
57.3
63.3
Real wage index (1989=100)
100.0
74.7
57.5
53.3
54.4
55.6
54.8
60.6
Togores Nominal average wage
ECLAC
a
Togores uses higher nominal wages than actual: 214 in 1997 (instead of 206) and 217 in 1998 (instead of 206); as a result, real wages are higher: 73.68 and 72.75 respectively; the author recalculated the real wage and the index based on actual figures.
b
Calculated by the author from ECLAC nominal and real wage indices.
Sources: Nominal average wage from CCE 1991, ONE 1999 and 2000. Togores 1999. ECLAC 2000a. The year 1999 are author’s estimates based on the official def lation rate of -2.9%.
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GDP decreased by 35% while social security expenditures kept rising. As GDP began to increase again, the proportional burden of social security declined and stabilized at about 12.2 % of GDP in 1995-1998 but, because social security expenditures expanded faster than economic growth, such burden rose to 13% in 1999-2000 and should continue growing in the future. Furthermore, there is an expanding deficit in the pension scheme, which is covered by the state (38% of total expenditures and 2.6% of GDP in 1999) and all health care is financed by the state (5.5% of GDP in 1999). The real average pension declined by 42% in 1989-1998 and the average monthly pension of 104 pesos in 2000 was equivalent to $5. The rationing system only provides food rations for one-third of the month (for about 25 pesos); other food and essential consumer goods must be bought with the remaining $4 in dollar shops and in the agricultural markets, where prices are very high (Mesa-Lago 2001b). The government is considering a significant reform of the pension scheme that may increase the age of retirement, implement workers’ contributions and incorporate the growing private sector (Gutiérrez and Peñate 2000). Health: The infant mortality rate continued to fall: it decreased from 11.1 (per 1,000 born alive) in 1989 to 6.4 in 1999, although it rose to 7.2 in 2000, for a decline of 35% over the period (Table 6). That rate was the lowest in Latin America and the Caribbean (BCC 2000). Morbidity rates for eleven contagious diseases in 1994-1999 showed increases in six (chicken pox, hepatitis, syphilis, gonorrhea, tuberculosis and typhoid), continuous non reported cases in five (diphtheria, malaria, measles, polio and tetanus), and no decreases (ONE 1999; MINSAP 2000). Data on nutrition are extremely difficult to find, but the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) shows the following changes in 1970-1997 in daily per capita supply: calories -6%, protein -23.9% and fat -27.7% (UNDP 2000). The number of physicians increased almost two fold in 1989-1999, and in the latter year Cuba had the highest proportion of physicians to population in the region: 58.2 per 10,000 inhabitants (MINSAP 2000; ECLAC 2000a). Actually there is a surplus of these professionals: “We are sending thousands of physicians free to provide their services ... in Latin America, the Caribbean and Africa. This is possible because of our abundant human resources” (Castro 2000). Thousands of physicians work as taxi drivers, waiters in tourist facilities and other occupations where they can earn dollars, thereby earning several times the salary paid in their profession. Education: University enrollment steadily diminished in 1989-1998, with a small increase in 1999, for a 56% decrease in the period (Table 6). The percentage of the population in the cohort age of higher education fell from 21% in 1989-1990 to 12% in 1998-1999, and while in 1993-1994 there were 31,105 graduates at that level, the number dropped to 10,706 in 1998-1999 (ECLAC 2001b; Orrio 2001). Two main reasons for these declines are: the lack of incen-
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tives for university graduates, who are unable to find jobs in the state sector and are prohibited from practicing their professions as self-employed, and reduced quotas for university enrollment set by the government. Distribution: A survey of the economic conditions of households in the city of Havana in March 2000 had the following findings: (a) the average income per capita was 198 pesos ($9.90 at the unofficial exchange rate); (b) 53.4% of households had a per capita income between 50 and 150 pesos ($2.50 to $7.50) and 14% less than 50 pesos; (c) 77.9% of food expenditures were in agricultural and private markets; and (d) 77.2% declared that their income was insufficient to cover expenditures (Oficina Territorial de Estadísticas de la Ciudad de La Habana, Encuesta sobre la situación económica de los hogares, cited by Pérez Villanueva 2001). In a previous paper I reported that inequalities had significantly expanded in the 1990s (Mesa-Lago 1998). Rationing has extended to all consumer goods but ceased to be a significant equalizer because the monthly rations cover less than two weeks of the minimum food requirements; the rest has to be bought in state dollar shops or in the agricultural and black markets, at very high prices, affordable only by those who earn or receive hard currency from abroad. Finally, there is a significant concentration in bank accounts: 12% of such accounts have 80% of the total deposits (5.3 billion pesos) and new banking accounts earning as much as 7% interest will increase such concentration (Triana 2000). Housing: “Housing is recognized as the gravest social problem affecting the nation ... the accumulated needs [housing deficit] are substantially higher than new housing construction, among other reasons because of the deterioration of the existing stock” (Triana 2000, p. 10). In the city of Havana the situation is particularly difficult: in 1999, out of 575,795 housing units only 57% were in “good shape” and the remaining 43% were “so-so” (regular) or in “bad shape”; the situation was worse in some poor neighborhoods (for instance, old Havana), where 75% of the dwellings were ranked as so-so or bad. In the survey cited above, 59.3% of the households reported construction problems and, although 98.3% had piped water, only 49.8% received water daily (Pérez Villanueva 2001). The Debate on Future Strategy Targets for the Medium Term (1998-2002) and the Year 2001 The V Congress of the Cuban Communist Party, held in October 1997, set very ambitious targets for the five-year period 1998-2002 (Mesa-Lago 1998). I contrast such targets with actual performance in 1998-2000 as follows: (1) GDP growth at an annual rate of 4% to 6% (it was 4.3% in 1998-2000); (2) sugar output increase to 7 million tons (actually 3.6 million in 1998-2001); (3) nickel production increase to 100,000 tons (output in 2000 was 71,400 tons, close to installed capacity); (4) tobacco leaf output increase to 50,000 tons (output in
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1999 was 30,562 tons); (5) two million tourists and gross tourism revenue of $2.6 billion (there were 1.7 million tourists and $1.8 billion in revenue in 2000); (6) oil needs met with increasing domestic production and savings from conservation (the domestic contribution to total oil supply was less than 23% in 1999); (7) 50,000 dwellings built annually (43,000 dwellings were built annually in 1998-2000); and (8) state pensions supplemented with individual savings accounts and life insurance (none of the two have materialized). None of these targets had been achieved by 2000 and, with the exception of tourism, they probably will not be met by 2002. The VI Congress of the CCP is scheduled for 2002; it will be interesting to see if the party evaluates the targets set by the V Congress. The economic targets set for the year 2001 are modest, with a few exceptions. The main targets, and my assessment of their feasibility, are: (1)
5% GDP growth (difficult target to meet; due to the poor sugar harvest in 2001, GDP grew at 3.5% in the first half of the year and growth at the rate of 6.5% in the second half will be needed; for comparison, GDP grew 7.7% in the first half of 2000 and 3.5% in the second half); (2) 14% increase in investment (improbable target; the annual rate averaged 8.7% in 1997-2000); (3) fiscal deficit at 2.5% of GDP (probable; same as in 2000); (4) 20% surge in exports, at least (exports decreased at an annual average of 2% in 1996-2000 and the poor sugar harvest of 2001 will conspire against this target); (5) 4% or less increase in imports (imports rose at an annual average of 5% in 1996-2000 and 12% in 2000, but the oil deal with Venezuela might help to achieve this target); (6) combining the two previous targets, a merchandise trade deficit of 3 billion pesos, for a reduction of 4.5% vis-à-vis 2000 (improbable; since 1992, the trade deficit has systematically risen); (7) 2 million tourists, a 14% increase over 2000, and 15% increase in gross revenue (average annual growth in tourists was 15% in 1996-2000 and 7% in gross revenue, the first might be feasible but the second appears difficult); (8) 4 million tons of sugar for a 14% increase (feasible but not easy target); (9) 5.7% expansion in nickel output (annual average increase was 7% in 19972000 and there is sufficient installed capacity to accomplish this target); (10) 3.4 million tons of oil, a 26% jump over 2000 (feasible; output rose at an annual average of 27% in 1998-2000); (11) 36% increase in cigar output (feasible but difficult; production declined 20% in 2000, and the planned increase will put output at 271,000 tons, below the 1999 level, but annual cigar increase averaged 13.5% in the good years 1997-1999); and (12) 10% in non-sugar agriculture (difficult to accomplish; agriculture as a whole, including sugar, grew at an annual rate of 4% in 1997-2000).
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In addition, the system of enterprise perfection, which was introduced in 1998 is planned to be fully implemented by the end of 2001 but, by the end of 2000 only 50 of 3,000 enterprises had such system in operation (Carranza 2001) and, by mid-2001, only 133 enterprises had been “approved to establish the system” (Ferriol 2001). No targets have been set for inflation, monetary overhang, other production lines and in the social area (targets from Rodríguez 2000; BCC 2001; Triana 2001; background data from ONE 1999, 2000, 2001; Frank 2001a). Cuban Scholars’ Analyses of Current Problems In the first half of the 1990s there was a lively debate in Cuba on alternatives for economic reform that was abruptly halted in mid-1996. In 2000-2001 there has been a modest revival of the analysis of economic problems and proposals for reforms. Limitations of time and space do not allow a thorough examination herein of all existing positions, hence, this section summarizes the views of five Cuban economic scholars: Carranza (2001), González (2001), Marquetti (2000), Monreal (2001), and Triana (2000). All of them praise the progress achieved, some explicitly reject neoliberalism, and virtually all express the need to work within a socialist framework. Although there are logical differences among them, the essential thrust in their identification of current problems and key guidelines for solutions is fairly similar. I have tried to faithfully translate and abridge the views of those scholars but am fully responsible for any misinterpretation of their views. First I will summarize their views on the problems and then the proposed solutions. Problems: (1) (2)
(3)
(4)
the progress achieved lacks solid support to guarantee the sustainability of the recovery and has been unable to rebuild the internal bases of capital accumulation (Marquetti); macroeconomic adjustment is still insufficient and continues to generate economic and social tensions; the process of change generates an internal tension between economic objectives and political effects (Carranza, González); the Soviet Union and other former socialist countries contributed high levels of capital accumulation prior to the 1990s, but there is no possibility to return to those favorable conditions; new investment has been insufficient and not played the key role required for long-term growth; it is impossible to restrict consumption further, as it is very depressed, and the only way out is to increase domestic efficiency and enterprise competitiveness (Marquetti); tourism, foreign investment, remittances from abroad and a few exports helped in the economic recovery of the 1990s, but their multiplier effects
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(5)
(6)
(7)
(8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
(13) (14)
(15) (16)
117
are insufficient to keep dynamic growth and reduce external dependency; in 2001 still the economy has not recovered completely and is below the level of 1989 (Carranza, Marquetti); the sugar industry is in a depressed state which adversely impacts the recovery; the fall in sugar output has harmed manufacturing and the overall economy and reduced the access to international credit; the decline of the sugar share in total exports has not been the result of growth of other exports (Marquetti, Monreal); the majority (83%) of Cuban exports (sugar, nickel, tobacco and fish) are traditional, primary products, typical of underdeveloped countries, while only a tiny minority (7%) are manufactured or semi-manufactured products and have played a very minor role in generating exports; this results in excessive dependency on activities with a low level of value added (e.g., processing natural resources) at the expense of exports with high value added and technological complexity (Monreal, Carranza); tourism services do not involve industrial upgrading, are typical of underdeveloped countries, are not an indicator of progress toward higher modes of international insertion, and do not necessarily lead to overcoming development (Monreal); biotechnology has not made significant insertions in the international market; excessive and growing dependency on imports of essential food products (as well as fuel) curtail the import of intermediate and capital goods, which are crucial for economic growth (Carranza); there is an excessive imported component in the activities that generate hard currency, such as tourism (González); the overvaluation of the peso at the official exchange rate provokes negative effects in terms of incentives for exports (Triana); economic growth has not reduced the deficit in the balance of payments, an obstacle to further growth; access to external credit is scarce; available credit is short-term and very costly, hence, making difficult to pay it (Carranza, Marquetti); the dual currency in circulation and the dual exchange rate are problems that must be corrected (González); monetary liquidity significantly increased in 2000, 79 months after the inception of the program to fight it (desmonetización); there is a decreasing effectiveness of the original tools used to extract money from circulation because the majority of the population has less money to buy high-priced goods in free markets (Carranza); prices have not declined in six years in the agricultural markets thus fueling inflation and affecting population consumption (Carranza); there is a disconnection between wages (largely tied to an overvalued peso at the official exchange rate) and prices of goods in free markets (more connected with the unofficial exchange rate), hence provoking adverse effects: distortions in agricultural production due to differential rent between the price-regulated and unregulated sectors, relative stagnation in free markets outside of agriculture, obstacles to reestablish labor as the
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fundamental source of income, disincentives to labor productivity and to peasants, and obstacles for improvement in the population consumption (Carranza, Triana); (17) the conventional model of centralized physical planning is not viable, but there is no consensus on various proposals on the type of planning to follow and there is not an explicitly defined strategy of development either, key aspects which require discussion (González, Carranza); (18) the system of enterprise perfection is incipient and slow; there is actually a surge of “verticalism” and a trend toward enterprise concentration, and the process will generate surplus labor which will be difficult to employ elsewhere (Carranza, González, Triana); and (19) real wages have declined, and there is disguised unemployment, stratified income and significant concentration of bank deposits in a minority of the population (Triana, Carranza). Suggestions for Change: The partial modification of the economic structure in the 1990s was unable to transform it to the needed degree required to promote development within the current international context. The economy cannot grow, as prior to 1990, based on a model of extensive accumulation and low efficiency, only viable then because of the economic support from the Soviet Union and the socialist countries. It is unavoidable, therefore, to have a rigorous debate on the alternatives to cope with the effects of the crisis and to accelerate its solution through a more logical and viable development strategy (Carranza). There is a view that the slowdown of 1997-1998 was the outcome of the “relative paralysis” of economic reform (Marquetti). Overcoming the current crisis requires a model of intensive accumulation and higher efficiency, and this is only feasible with a “fundamental restructuring of the economy” and the completion of the economic reform with adequate coherence. The first decade of the 21st century is the time to face this challenge (Carranza, Monreal). Specific proposals are few and succinct: (1) the new strategy of development should be based on sectors that intensively use skilled manpower in activities of increasing technological complexity; this would increase labor incentives and solve the existing contradiction between skilled-based expectations and remuneration (Carranza); (2) the main growth potential is the domestic market, through an increase in its level of competitiveness; ministries should exert regulatory rather than fiscal functions; prices must be reformed (Marquetti); (3) the structure of exports should be radically transformed, increasing exports of manufactured products as well as services with significant value added, utilization of knowledge and technological complexity, thus promoting a reindustrialization process but export-oriented rather than geared to the domestic market as in the past; ways to insert the Cuban economy in the world market must be redefined (Monreal);
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(4) property relations and economic institutions should be transformed; different forms of ownership should work together; state property should be energized through more competition (González, Carranza); and (5) markets should be of buyers instead of sellers in order to promote competition, hence, reducing prices and improving quality; there must be more decentralization in management; the domestic economy must be adapted to the external adjustment and move progressively to the convertibility of the peso (González). I conclude this essay in the same way my previous one ended, recommending: open up the economy further; facilitate the expansion of the private sector; transform the UBPCs into real cooperatives, autonomous and with more incentives to increase production and profitability; allow university graduates to practice their professions as self-employed and authorize Cuban citizens and groups of workers to manage small and medium businesses, hence, creating enough jobs in the non-state sector to permit the dismissal of non-needed workers in the state sector; complete the banking reform and implement a comprehensive price reform; create a domestic capital market; allow foreign enterprises and joint ventures to hire, promote and pay their employees directly; establish a truly convertible peso; introduce a progressive income tax and workers contributions to social security and reform the pension scheme; and devise a social safety net to protect the most vulnerable groups of the population. References Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy (ASCE). 2000.Cuba in Transition. Washington D.C.: Vol. 10. Banco Central de Cuba (BCC). 2000. Informe Económico 1999. La Habana, April. Banco Central de Cuba (BCC). 2001. Informe Económico 2000. La Habana, May. Bauzá, Vanessa. 2001. “Cuba’s Entrepreneurs Find it Tough,” Sun Sentinel, June 11. Carranza Valdés, Julio. 2001. “La economía cubana: Un balance breve de una década crítica,” University of London-Institute of Latin American Studies: Workshop Facing the Challenges of the Global Economy,” January 25-26. Castañeda, Rolando. 2000. “Cuba y América Latina: Consideraciones sobre el nivel y la evolución del Indice de Desarrollo Humano y el gasto social,” Cuba in Transition—Volume 10, pp. 234-253. Castro, Fidel. 2000. “Entrevista concedida a Felipe Mayor, el 28 de enero de 2000,” Granma, 22 junio 2000. Cawthorne, Andrew. 2001. “Private Entrepreneurs a Rare Species in Cuba,” Reuters, June 6. Centro de Investigaciones de la Economía Mundial (CIEM). 2000. Investigación sobre el Desarrollo Humano y la Equidad en Cuba 1999. La Habana: CIEM/ PNUD
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Comité Central de Estadísticas (CCE). 1990. Anuario Estadístico de Cuba 1989. La Habana. Del Barro Menéndez, Emilio. 2001. “En el sector de turismo, ni satisfacción ni complacencia,” and “Por influjo del turismo, creados o recuperados 250,000 empleos,” Granma, June 25 and 28. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). 1998, 2000a. La economía cubana: Reformas estructurales y desempeño en los noventa. México: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1st and 2nd editions. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). 2000b. Balance Preliminar de las Economías de América Latina y el Caribe 2000. Santiago. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). 2001a. Cuba: Evolución Económica Durante 2000. Santiago: LC/MEX/L.465, May 21. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). 2001b. Statistical Yearbook for Latin America and the Caribbean 2000. Santiago: February. Espino, María Dolores. 2001. “Cuban Tourism: A Critique of the CEPAL 2000 Report,” in this volume. Ferradaz, Ibrahim. 2001. Cited by Mario Jorge Muñoz, “El complejo mundo de la locomotora,” Granma, January 11. Ferriol Muruaga, Angela. 2001. “Reforma económica cubana e impactos sociales,” Paper presented at the Congreso de Latinoamericanistas y Caribólogos, Moscow, June 25-29. Frank, Marc. 2001a. “Se desacelera la economía cubana,” Nuevo Herald, June 27. Frank, Marc. 2001b. “France Freezes $175 Mln in Cuba Trade Cover,” Havana, Reuters, September 4. Garve, Lucas. 2001. “El pícaro, el gerente y la corrupción,” CUBANET, June 26. González Gutiérrez, Alfredo. 2001. “Aspectos estratégicos en el perfeccionamiento del modelo de planificación,” El Economista de Cuba, June 20. Gutiérrez Castillo, Orlando. 2000. “Cuba, turismo y desarrollo económico,” La Economía Cubana: Coyuntura, Ref lexiones y Oportunidades . La Habana: Centro de Estudios de la Economía Cubana/Fundación Friedrich Ebert, April: 125-142. Gutiérrez Urdaneta, Luis and Orlando Peñate Rivero. 2000. La Reforma de los Sistemas de Pensiones en América Latina: La Alternativa Cubana. La Habana: Editorial Ciencias Sociales. Henken, Ted. 2001. “Condemned to Informality: The Self-employed Operators of Cuba’s New Bed and Breakfasts,” unpublished paper. León, Francisco. 2001. “The Prospect of Upgrading in Cuba: The European Factor,” “Workshop Facing the Challenges of the Global Economy,” cit. Marquetti Nodarse, Hiram. 2000. “Cuba reanimación del sector industrial,” Revista Bimestre Cubana, No. 13, July-December: 5-30. Mesa-Lago, Carmelo. 1998. “The Cuban Economy in 1997-1998: Policies and Performance,” Cuba in Transition. Washington D.C.: ASCE, Vol. 8: 1-8.
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______.2000. Market, Socialist and Mixed Economies: Comparative Policy and Performance–Chile, Cuba and Costa Rica. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. ______. 2001a. “The Resurrection of Cuban Statistics,” Cuban Studies, No. 31: 139-150. ______. 2001b. “Las pensiones de seguridad social en Cuba: Diagnóstico y sugerencias de reforma.” Pittsburgh: Unpublished paper, March. Ministerio de Salud Pública (MINSAP). 2000. Anuario Estadístico 1999. La Habana. Monreal, Pedro. 2001. “Export substitution industrialization in Cuba,” Workshop Facing the Challenges of the Global Economy,” cit. Novoa González, Armando. 2001. “Las Unidades Básicas de Producción Cooperativa y las granjas cañeras entre 1993 y el 2000,”La Economía Cubana en el 2000: Desempeño Macroeconómico y Transformación Empresarial. La Habana: Centro de Estudios de la Economía Cubana/Fundación Friedrich Ebert, April: 59-72. Oficina Nacional de Estadísticas (ONE). 1999. Anuario Estadístico de Cuba 1997. La Habana. ______. 2000. Anuario Estadístico de Cuba 1999. La Habana. ______. 2001. Panorama Económico y Social: Cuba 2000. La Habana, January. Orrio, Manuel David. 2001. “Mitos de la educación superior,” CUBANET, June 19. Pérez-López, Jorge. 2000. “Cuba’s Balance of Payment Statistics,” Cuba in Transition, cit.: 136-144. Pérez Villanueva, Omar Everleny. 2001. “Ciudad de La Habana: Desempeño económico y situación social,” La Economía Cubana en el 2000 ..., cit.: 35-58. ______. 2000. “Estabilidad macroeconómica y financiamiento externo: La inversión extranjera directa en Cuba,” La Economía Cubana: Coyuntura.… , cit: 17-41. Portal, Marcos. 2001. Minister of Basic Industry, cited in “Esperan producción récord de níquel en el 2001,” Nuevo Herald, June 17. Rodríguez, José Luis. 2000. Report on the Cuban economy, Granma, December 23: 1, 5. Rodríguez Castellón, Santiago. 2001. “Consideraciones sobre el sector energético cubano,” La Economía Cubana en el 2000, cit.: 18-34. Triana Cordoví, Juan. 2000. “La Economía Cubana en 1999,” La Economía Cubana: Coyuntura.…, cit.: 1-16. Triana Cordoví, Juan. 2001. “La Economía Cubana en el Año 2000,” La Economía Cubana en el 2000.… , cit.: 1-17. Togores González, Viviana. 1999. “Cuba: Efectos Sociales de la Crisis y el Ajuste Económico de los 90s,” Balance de la Economía Cubana a Finales de los 90s. La Habana: Centro de Estudios de la Economía Cubana, March: 82-112. United Nations Development Program (UNDP). 2000. Human Development Report 2000. New York: Oxford University Press.
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9 Labor Conditions in Revolutionary Cuba Efren Córdova and Eduardo García Moure One of the most outstanding and paradoxical characteristics of the Cuban Revolution has been the few benefits derived from it by the worker. From the outset, Castro alluded to past injustices and invoked the interest of the working class as the target for his plans and promises of well-being. The first year was marked by a flurry of offers and predictions, often extravagant, in regard to the wonderful destiny awaiting workers and peasants. Certain labor benefits were implemented in 1959, but by the following year difficulties and scarcities were starting to be announced. Conscious of an imminent geopolitical change, of the social price of transition, and the certain impact of the revolution’s other objectives, Castro warned the Cuban worker of the sacrifices that would inevitably have to be made in the near future. In fact, in November 1961, the 11th Congress of the Confederation of Cuban Workers (CTC) witnessed the loss of acquired rights by the working class. A few months later, the rationing system was installed that would so deeply affect living conditions. The worker had in fact begun early on to experience hardships both as consumer and producer. However, this was also a time of tremendous e