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Author: Rongxing Guo

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Cross-Border Resource Management Theory and Practice

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“Each square li of land should be divided into nine plots, the whole containing nine hundred mu. The central plot will be the public field and the eight households, each owing a hundred-mu farm, will collaborate in cultivating the public field. Not until the public has been properly attended to, may each household attend to its private plot. This is how the countrymen should be required to learn.” —Mencius (372–289 BC)

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Cross-Border Resource Management Theory and Practice

by

Rongxing Guo China Regional Science Association at Peking University Haidebao, B66, Changping, Beijing 102209, China; and Resource Management in Asia-Pacific Program Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies The Australian National University, Canberra, Australia

2005 Elsevier

Amsterdam – Boston – Heidelberg – London – New York – Oxford Paris – San Diego – San Francisco – Singapore – Sydney – Tokyo iii

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© 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. This work is protected under copyright by Elsevier B.V., and the following terms and conditions apply to its use: Photocopying Single photocopies of single chapters may be made for personal use as allowed by national copyright laws. Permission of the Publisher and payment of a fee is required for all other photocopying, including multiple or systematic copying, copying for advertising or promotional purposes, resale, and all forms of document delivery. Special rates are available for educational institutions that wish to make photocopies for non-profit educational classroom use. Permissions may be sought directly from Elsevier’s Rights Department in Oxford, UK: phone (+44) 1865 843830, fax (+44) 1865 853333, e-mail: [email protected]. Requests may also be completed on-line via the Elsevier homepage (http://www.elsevier.com/locate/permissions). In the USA, users may clear permissions and make payments through the Copyright Clearance Center, Inc., 222 Rosewood Drive, Danvers, MA 01923, USA; phone: (+1) (978) 7508400, fax: (+1) (978) 7504744, and in the UK through the Copyright Licensing Agency Rapid Clearance Service (CLARCS), 90 Tottenham Court Road, London W1P 0LP, UK; phone: (+44) 20 7631 5555; fax: (+44) 20 7631 5500. Other countries may have a local reprographic rights agency for payments. Derivative Works Tables of contents may be reproduced for internal circulation, but permission of the Publisher is required for external resale or distribution of such material. Permission of the Publisher is required for all other derivative works, including compilations and translations. Electronic Storage or Usage Permission of the Publisher is required to store or use electronically any material contained in this work, including any chapter or part of a chapter. Except as outlined above, no part of this work may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission of the Publisher. Address permissions requests to: Elsevier's Rights Department, at the fax and e-mail addresses noted above. Notice No responsibility is assumed by the Publisher for any injury and/or damage to persons or property as a matter of products liability, negligence or otherwise, or from any use or operation of any methods, products, instructions or ideas contained in the material herein. Because of rapid advances in the medical sciences, in particular, independent verification of diagnoses and drug dosages should be made. First edition 2005 Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data A catalog record is available from the Library of Congress. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record is available from the British Library. ISBN: 0 444 51915 7 ISSN (Series): 1474-8177 The paper used in this publication meets the requirements of ANSI/NISO Z39.48-1992 (Permanence of Paper). Printed in The Netherlands.

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Contents

Introduction to the Book Series

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Acknowledgments

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Preface

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Part 1: Theory 1. Some basic concepts

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2. Resource management and cross-border areas

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3. Can cross-border resources be optimally managed?

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4. Cross-border resource management: Methodological puzzles

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5. Institutions for cross-border resource management

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6. Cross-border resource management in disputed areas

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Part 2: Practice 7. The triangular resource management of the Tumen River area

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8. The transnational water pollution in the Lower Mekong Basin

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9. The US–Mexico border environment cooperation

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10. China’s interprovincial border disputes at Lake Weishan

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Bibliography

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Appendix A

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Appendix B

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Appendix C

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Appendix D

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Index

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Introduction to the Book Series

Environmental pollution has played a critical role in human lives since the early history of the nomadic tribes. During the last millennium industrial revolution, increased population growth and urbanization have been the major determinants in shaping our environmental quality. Initially primary air pollutants such as sulfur dioxide and particulate matter were of concern. For example, the killer fog of London in 1952 resulted in significant numbers of human fatality leading to major air pollution control measures. During the 1950s, scientists also began to understand the cause and atmospheric mechanisms for the formation of the Los Angeles photochemical smog. We now know that surface level ozone and photochemical smog are a worldwide problem at regional and continental scales, with specific geographic areas of agriculture, forestry and natural resources, including their biological diversity at risk. As studies continue on the atmospheric photochemical processes, air pollutant transport, their atmospheric transformation and removal mechanisms, so is the effort to control the emissions of primary pollutants (sulfur dioxide, oxides of nitrogen, hydrocarbons and carbon monoxide), mainly produced by fossil fuel combustion. During mid 1970s environmental concerns regarding the occurrence of “acidic precipitation” began to emerge to the forefront. Since then, our knowledge of the adverse effects of air pollutants on human health and welfare (terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems and materials) has begun to rise substantially. Similarly, studies have been directed to improve our understanding of the accumulation of persistent inorganic (heavy metals) and organic (polyaromatic hydrocarbons, polychlorinated biphenyls) chemicals in the environment and their impacts on sensitive receptors, including human beings. Use of fertilizers (excess nutrient loading) and herbicides and pesticides in both agriculture and forestry and the related aspects of their atmospheric transport, fate and deposition; their direct runoff through the soil and impacts on ground and surface water quality and environmental toxicology have become issues of much concern. In the recent times environmental literacy has become an increasingly important factor in our lives, particularly in the so-called developed nations. Currently the scientific, public and political communities are much concerned with the increasing global scale air pollution and the consequent global climate change. There are efforts being made to totally ban the use of chlorofuorocarbon and organo-bromine compounds at the global scale. However, during this millennium many developing nations will become major forces governing environmental health as their populations and industrialization vii

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grow at a rapid pace. There is an on-going international debate regarding policies and the mitigation strategies to be adopted to address the critical issue of climate change. Human health and environmental impacts and risk assessment and the associated cost-benefit analyses, including global economy are germane to this controversy. An approach to understanding environmental issues in general and in most cases, mitigation of the related problems requires a systems analysis and a multi- and interdisciplinary philosophy. There is an increasing scientific awareness to integrate environmental processes and their products in evaluating the overall impacts on various receptors. As momentum is gained, this approach constitutes a challenging future direction for our scientific and technical efforts. The objective of the book series “Developments in Environmental Science” is to facilitate the publication of scholarly works that address any of the described topics, as well as those that are related. In addition to edited or single and multi-authored books, the series also considers conference proceedings and paperback computer-software packages for publication. The emphasis of the series is on the importance of the subject topic, the scientific and technical quality of the content and timeliness of the work. Sagar V Krupa Editor-in-Chief, Book Series

Acknowledgments

This book springs from a research project that was supported by the fourth individual research grant of the East Asian Development Network (EADN). I have also benefited from the National Social Science Foundation (NSSF) and the National Science Foundation of China (NSFC) for financial support (1991–1994, 1994–1997 and 1998–2001, respectively) during my early stage of research on cross-border areas. The current manuscript was finalized during my visit to the Resource Management in Asia-Pacific (RMAP) Program of The Australian National University (ANU). Some parts of the book (specifically, Chapters 1.1, 1.2, 3.2, and 8) are based on my earlier publications. I have presented some chapters of this book at various seminars held at the RMAP of the ANU, Beijing Development Institute at Peking University, the 2004 EADN Annual Forum hosted by Thailand Development Research Institute (TDRI), and Xi’an University of Science and Technology. Research and administrative assistances I have received from Mr. Guo Liqing and Mr. Zhao Gongzheng during the first stage, and from Ms. Helen Glazebrook (RMAP Coordinator) during my stay at Canberra in 2004 are appreciated. During the various stages of the research (including proposal drafting, filedwork research, and report writing), I have benefited from many colleagues and friends. Without their support and encouragement, the completion of this book would have been delayed considerably. Specifically, I thank Professor Chia Ciow Yue (Singapore Institute of International Affairs), Dr. Chalongphob Sussangkarn (TDRI and EADN Regional Coordinator), Professor Hu Xuwei (Institute of Geography, The Chinese Academy of Sciences), Professor Thomas Heberer (University of Duisburg), Professor Kaizhong Yang (Peking University), and Dr. Colin Filer (ANU). I owe a great debt to my wife (Liu Yuhui) and my son (Guo Changlei) for their understanding and tolerance when I conducted this difficult research. I am very grateful to Mr. Dirk Vanderstighelen (Mekong River Commission, or MRC) and Dr. Rajendra P. Shrestha (UNEP) for providing the primary data on water quality of the Lower Mekong Basin, Dr. Zhao Jun of Commission of Planning, Xuzhou Municipal Government, Jiangsu province, for arranging our field investigations, and Mr. Yu Haijian of Shandong Administration of Coal Industry for providing data on water quality of Lake Weishan in East China. In particular, thanks are due to Dr. Ian Campbell (MRC), Professor Eui-Gak Hwang (Korea University), Professor Peter Warr, Dr. Marjorie Sullivan and Dr. Nicolas Tappe (all from ANU), Professor Zhang Yunling (Institute of Asia and Pacific Studies of The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences), Dr. Adis ix

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Israngkura (National Institute of Development Administration, Bangkok) as well as other seminar participants, and the anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments and suggestions on the early versions of this book. Last but not least, I express my sincere gratitude to Professor Sagar Krupa (University of Minnesota and Editor-in-Chief of the Series) for his insightful comments and suggestions on the revision of the book, and to Dr. David Lawrence (ANU) for his skillful assistance with regard to the revision of many parts of the book. Many readers and editors at Elsevier and the production team of Macmillan India Limited also helped me refine the contents. Ms. Nicolette van Dijk (Senior Publishing Editor) and Ms. Jasmin Baker (Administrative Editor) merit particular mention. Without their generous help, many linguistic and stylistic errors in this book would not have been corrected. All views and remaining errors in this book, however, are my sole responsibility. R.-X. Guo Heidelberg, Beijing, January 2005

Preface

This book is about the management of natural and environmental resources in cross-border areas.1 It explores a group of geographical, political, legal, economic, and cultural factors that arise when political units (such as sovereign countries, dependent states, and other administrative units) seek to utilize natural and environmental resources efficiently and equitably, while minimizing the resultant damages (e.g., prevention of resource degradation and preservation of the physical environment). A cross-border area is a geographical system governed by political rules and divided by two or more man-made boundaries. In this system, all subareas interact with each other. The elements of each sub-area, which include various political, economic, and cultural factors, are correlated with each other in a sequence. The whole geographical system provides a very complicated function with respect to the locations. The interactions between the various elements of all sub-areas are complex. In addition, cross-border areas are sometimes integrated and dynamic. The former emphasizes that all adjacent areas are geographically interdependent, whereas the latter describes the relationship between the state and time of systems. Rational exploitation and utilization of natural and environmental resources is more difficult in cross-border areas than in areas under the jurisdiction of a single authority. Moreover, cross-border resource management is constrained by the number of independent stakeholders involved. The primary reasons for this come from the uneven spatial distribution of production factors as well as the non-cooperative cross-border mechanism resulting from two or more political regimes. When dealing with cross-border pollution, policymakers have been always shortsighted, emphasizing on the direct costs and benefits of their own regional development at the expenses of their neighbors. Besides, research institutions and international donor agencies have not paid full attention to the environmental problems common in cross-border areas. Consequently, cross-border resource management remains a marginalized, easily forgotten topic. Objectives of the Book

In this research, we assume that, due to the existence of various border barriers, the production factors (such as labor, capital, technology, information, 1

In what follows, unless stated otherwise, a “cross-border area” is one that is under the jurisdictions of two or more sovereign nations or sub-national administrative units.

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etc.) that are unevenly distributed between states cannot freely flow across the border(s). This creates inequality, tension, and even armed disputes in crossborder areas. This study considers various types of cross-border areas—at both international and sub-national levels. The main objectives of this book are: ●

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To clarify how natural and human systems interact in cross-border areas under conditions of uncertain, imperfect information and, in some circumstances, irreversibility. To identify and, where possible, quantify the various impacts of “border” on the environmental activities in cross-border areas. To evaluate the costs and benefits of cross-border cooperation in the exploitation and utilization of natural and environmental resources. To recommend measures in improving national and international legal and regulatory mechanisms for resource exploitation and environmental protection in cross-border areas.

Besides, this study examines policies in relation to specific resource and environmental issues, showing both positive and negative policy impacts on the cross-border management of resource and environment, both retrospectively and proactively. It covers the impacts of global and regional policies, including multilateral environmental agreements. Policy-relevant issues of the research project emphasize integration across different political boundaries between the state of the environment and policy, between the past and future, and among sectors—resource exploitation, environmental protection, economic, social, and cultural. The book is organized into two parts and appendices. Part one discusses theoretical issues and arguments relating to the cross-border management of natural and environmental resources. Part two provides four typical case studies in different parts of the world in order to clarify the above arguments.The appendices, which will be referred to in the text, contains a list of internationally adjacent protected areas as well as an international convention relating to the cross-border management of natural and environmental resources.

Part 1: Theory

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Chapter 1 Some basic concepts 1.1. Political unit

In its simplest explanation, “political unit” means “a unit with political responsibilities.” More precisely, it refers to “a politically organized body of people under a single government.”1 The existing political units may be classified into three major forms: (i) independent country, (ii) internally independent political entity under protection of other country(ies) in matter of defence and/or foreign affairs, and (iii) dependent political entity. 1.1.1. Independent countries

Independent countries are the highest form of political units in the world. An independent country must have a defined geographical scope (territory). Since the disintegration of the former USSR into 15 independent states, the existing independent countries of the world have territorially varied from as small as 0.5 sq. km (i.e., Vatican City) to as large as 17 million sq. km (i.e., the Russian Federation). Independent nations must also have citizens within the territory. As one of the largest countries in the world, China has already a population of 1.3 billion, whereas Nauru, also an independent country, only has a population of about 10,000. Independent countries are also diversified organizationally. The existing independent countries can be divided into 17 categories of political status in the forms of governments and ruling powers. These are2 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

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Republic (110) Constitutional Monarchy (18) Parliamentary State (13) Provisional Military Government (12) Socialist Republic (9) Federal Republic (8)

Source: www.worldwebonline.com/en/POLITICALUNIT. Calculated by the author based on World Atlas (1994). Figures within parentheses are number of countries involved. 2

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(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17)

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Monarchy (6) Federal Parliamentary State (3) Islamic Republic (2) Transitional Military Republic (2) Federal Islamic Republic (2) Transitional Government (1) Federal Constitutional Monarchy (1) Federation of Monarchy (1) Monarchical–Sacerdotal State (1) Constitutional Monarchy under Military Rule (1) None (1)

1.1.2. Internally independent political entities

Internally independent political entities are also known as quasi-independent political entities. They are independent in matter of internal affairs, while under the protection of other independent political entities in matter of defence and/or foreign affairs. For example, Andorra is a coprincipality under the joint protection of Spain and France; Bhutan is a monarchy under Indian protection; The Cook Islands are a self-governing territory under the protection of New Zealand; and Greenland is a self-governing territory under the Danish protection. Hong Kong is also an example of an internally independent entity. Under the “Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China,” Hong Kong became a Special Administrative Region (SAR) of China in 1997. The Basic Law was drafted in accordance with the Sino-British Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong, signed between the Chinese and British governments on December 19, 1984. The Law stipulates the basic policies of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) towards the Hong Kong SAR. As agreed between the PRC and the United Kingdom in the Joint Declaration, in accordance with the “One Country, Two Systems” principle, socialism as practised in the PRC would not be extended to Hong Kong. Instead, Hong Kong SAR would continue its previous capitalist system and its way of life for a period of 50 years (i.e., from 1997 to 2046 AD). A number of freedoms and rights of the Hong Kong residents are also protected under the Basic Law. 1.1.3. Dependent political entities

These political units are generally regarded as the territories which are fully or partially subject to their respective mother states. For example, American Samoa, Guam, the Midway Islands and the Virgin Islands are unincorporated territories of USA; the Cayman Islands, Bermuda, the British Indian Ocean

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Some basic concepts Table 1.1. The first-class administrative regions, selected countries Country Russia Canada USA China Brazil Australia Kazakhstan Ukraine Spain Turkmenistan Uzbekistan

Name(s)

Number

ARP, S, FR P, T S, DC P, AR, M, SAR P S, CT S S P S AR, S

76 10 51 33 25 8 19 25 50 5 13

Note: ARP ⫽ autonomous republic; AR ⫽ autonomous region; FR ⫽ frontier region; S ⫽ state; P ⫽ province; SAR ⫽ special administrative region; T ⫽ territory; M ⫽ municipality directly under the central government; CT ⫽ capital territory; DC ⫽ district of Colombia. Source: Calculation by the author based on the maps of relevant countries.

Territory, Gibraltar, Montserrat, Pitcairn (including its dependencies), St. Helena (including its dependencies), South Georgia (including its dependencies), Turksand Caicos Islands and Virgin Islands are dependent territories of UK. Within the independent political units, there usually exist various forms of administrative subdivisions. Specifically, administrative subdivisions directly under the central government of a country are called first-class administrative units, or province, or dependent state; the second-class administrative subdivisions directly under the first-class administrative divisions are usually called municipality, county, etc.; Table 1.1 gives some facts on the first-class administrative divisions for selected countries. 1.2. Border 1.2.1. Definition

In English language, the word “border” (or “boundary”) delimits a political territory and living space. In most cases, it has wider meanings in political and economic geography than “frontier,” which refers to a special case of border used to divide the sovereign limits of adjacent independent states.3 3 In Chinese language, “border” (or “boundary”) and “frontier” are written as “bianjie” and “bianjiang” in Pinyin forms, respectively. In some other European languages, only a single word is used, such as “frontière” (French), “Grenze” (German) and “frontera” (Spanish).

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A border (or boundary) exists not only between independent nations but also between other forms of political units (as discussed in Section 1.1). As the marginal lines of political units, borders are either visible or invisible on landscape: they have extension but no width. Sometimes they are marked only with stone tablets, or they may be fortified: for example, the Roman limes against the barbarians to the North, the Magnet Line, the 38th Parallel of Korea, the Great Wall of ancient China, or the former Berlin Wall. 1.2.2. Classification

Political borders are also diversified. They can be classified according to different approaches. (A) Natural borders Natural borders are identified by different natural barriers or screens, such as mountains, rivers, lakes, seas, bays or straits. Because their importance to military defence, mountains, rivers, lakes, seas, bays and straits have been usually adopted by territorial rulers to serve as political borders. (a) Mountain Detailed description of mountain boundaries is needed. In general, a waterparting is by no means always a barrier, or along a line of hills or mountains, or even visible. Its chief virtues as a political boundary are that it is precise, and that it separates drainage basins, which for many purposes are best treated as units under a single government. Some peculiarities of waterparting are: (i) they often lie well away from the zone of high peaks; (ii) along the waterparting may be lakes and swamps with outlets in both directions; (iii) there may be streams and even large rivers which split and drain in two directions; (iv) the waterparting may be extremely crooked; (v) underground drainage may prevent ready determination of the waterparting; (vi) basins without drainage to the sea (due to evaporation) may bifurcate the waterparting; and (vii) in extreme flat regions the waterparting may be hard to locate.4 If a mountain exists between adjacent political regimes it usually serves as a natural border. Mountains, when serving as military borders, have the advantages of being easy to defend but difficult to attack, while they have the economic disadvantages for the relevant countries or regions to develop cross-border exchange and cooperation due to the geographic barriers. However, mountains are not necessarily great barriers to settlement. They in some cases could be centers of settlement in tropical forests and in deserts, and many so serve in middle and even high latitudes, if power, minerals, pasture, or timber are important.

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Cited from Jones (1943, p. 105).

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Some basic concepts

Many mountains have been used to serve as political borders in the world: Switzerland, Italy and France jointly use the Alps to separate their territories. Argentina shares Andes Mountains with Chile, a geographically long and thin country along the Pacific Ocean. The Himalayas separates India, Nepal, Bhutan and China. The Pyrenees lies between Spain and France; the common borderland of Malaysia and Indonesia includes Upper Kapuas Mts and Iran Mts in Kalimantan. Table 1.2 shows more principal mountains in the international borders. (b) River Because rivers have distinctive extensions and that they are cadastral or property boundaries, the adoption of a river as an international boundary may have some advantages with respect to local government and the operation of farms, mines or other properties. The reconnaissance of a river under consideration as a political boundary should cover the following points: (i) Is the river a suitable line of separation? (ii) Is it flowing between rock walls or is it shifting its Table 1.2. The principal mountains in the international borders Mountain Belukha, Gol’tsy Blanc, mont Elgon, Mt. Everest, Mt. Fairweather, Mt. Gasherbrum Haltiatunturi K2 (Godwin Austen) Kamet Kanchenjunga Karisimbi, Volcan Korab Llullaillaco, Volcan Makalu Margherita, Pk. Matterhorn Neblina, Pico da Ojos del Salado, Nevado Paektu-san Pobedy, pik Rosa, Monte St. Elias, Mt. Tupungato, Portezuelo de Zugspitze Source: World Atlas (1994).

Country–country

Elevation (m)

Kazakhstan–Russia France–Italy Kenya–Uganda China–Nepal Alaska–Canada China–Pakistan Finland–Norway China–Pakistan China–India India–Nepal Rwanda–D. R. Congo Albania–Macedonia Argentina–Chile China–Nepal D. R. Congo–Uganda Italy–Switzerland Brazil–Venezuela Argentina–Chile North Korea–China China–Russia Italy–Switzerland US–Canada Argentina–Chile Austria–Germany

4506 4807 4321 8848 4663 8068 1328 8611 7756 8598 4507 2751 6723 8481 5109 4478 3014 6893 2744 7439 4634 6542 6800 2962

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bed or channel? (iii) Is there an obvious main channel? If not, which channel should contain the boundary? (iv) Are there islands of undermined sovereignty? (v) In different portions of the river, what line is most suitable as the boundary? (vi) To what stage of water should the description be referred? (vii) Will a permanent administration commission be needed.5 When demarcating a border along a river between two political areas, it has been commonly suggested that the possible borderline may be set at (1) the middle or median (i.e., a line every point of which is equidistant from the nearest points on opposite shores at mean water or other specified stage), (2) the channel (if there is more than one channel, the main or principal channel might be the one used, the deepest, the widest, or the one carrying most water), (3) the thalweg (it is usually defined as the line of continuously deepest soundings in a river), (4) a bank, or (5) an arbitrary line between turning points (Jones, 1943, pp. 106–108). Many rivers have been used to mark international borders. The Oder River flows between Germany and Poland. Bulgaria, Romania, Yugoslavia, Czech Republic and Hungary meet at the Danube. The Rio Grande River is the border between USA and Mexico. The Amur (known as Heilong-jiang in China), the Ussuri and the Argun Rivers divide three sections of the Sino-Russian border. Table 1.3 gives some principal rivers by which different countries are separated. Even inside independent countries there are administrative borders that can be identified by rivers. For example, the United States uses the rivers as shown in Table 1.4 as its inter-state borders. Under topographical influence, Brazil is administratively divided by many internal rivers (listed in Table 1.5) between Atlantic Ocean and Andes Mts. The Yellow River was used to separate Henan (south river) and Hebei (north river) provinces in Central China and is now used to define some sections of the Shaanxi–Shanxi and Henan–Shandong interprovincial borders. (c) Lake Characterized by clear segregations and convenient for water transportation, lakes are also regarded as suitable natural screens in which political borders may be established between adjacent regimes. A border along a shallow lake might follow the middle of the navigable channel, if one exists. In deeper lakes or shallow lakes without navigable channels, a median line may be defined as for a river (as mentioned above). Unless it is understood that a lake undergoes no significant changes of water level, it is wise to specify the water stage to which the description applies. If the boundary follows the bank of the lake, generally not a satisfactory arrangement, it is especially important to give the stage. Dams or other physical structures that raise or lower the lake level may change

5

Cited from Jones (1943, p. 106).

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Some basic concepts Table 1.3. The principal rivers along the international borders River Abuna Amu Darya Amur Arauca Argun Cassai Congo Courantvne Cuando Cuango Danube Douro Drava Drina Faleme Gavalla Guapore Javari Lainoalven Limpopo Logone Maroni Mekong (Lancang) Meta Mloomou Niger Oder Okavango Orange Oued Drad Oyapock Prut Pupumayo Rhine Rio Grande Rio Orinoco Rio Paraguay Rio Uruguay Ruvuma Sava Tumen Ubangi Ussuri Yalu Zambezi

Country–country Brazil–Bolivia Turkmenistan–Uzbekistan–Afghanistan–Tajkistan China–Russia Venezuela–Colombia China–Russia Angola–D. R. Congo Congo–D. R. Congo Guyana–Suriname Angola–Zambia Angola–D. R. Congo Hungary–Slovakia; Bulgaria–Romania–Yugoslavia Spain–Portugal Hungary–Croatia Yugoslavia–Bosnia and Herzegovinia Senegal–Mali Liberia–Cote d’lvoire Brazil–Bolivia Peru–Brazil Sweden–Finland South Africa–Botswana Chad–Cameroon Brazil–French Guyana China–Myanmar–Laos–Thailand Venezuela–Colombia D. R. Congo–Central African Republic Niger–Benin Germany–Poland Angola–Namibia Namibia–South Africa–Lesotho Morocco–Algeria Brazil–French Guyana Moldova–Romania–Ukraine Peru–Colombia–Ecuador France–Germany–Switzerland U.S.–Mexico Venezuela–Colombia Brazil–Paraguay–Argentina Uruguay–Argentina–Brazil Tanzania–Mozambique Croatia–Bosnia and Herzegovinia China–North Korea–Russia D. R. Congo–Congo China–Russia China–North Korea Namibia–Zambia–Zimbabwe

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Table 1.4. The principal rivers as the inter-state borders, USA River Columbia R. Snake Cololado Red Mississippi Wabash Ohio Savannah Connecticut Delaware

State–state Washington–Oregon Oregon–Idaho California–Arizona Texas–Oklahoma Minnesota–Wisconsin–Iowa–Illinois–Missouri–Kentucky Missouri–Tennessee–Arkansas–Mississippi–Louisiana Indiana–Illinois–Kentucky Illinois–Kentucky–Indiana Kentucky–Ohio–West Virginia South Carolina–Georgia Vermont–New Hampshire New York–Pennsylvania–New Jersey

Table 1.5. The principal rivers as internal borders, Brazil River Rio Parana Paranpanema Rio Grande Paranaiba Araguaia Braco Maior Parnaiba Rio Sao Francisco Gurupi Sao Manuel Jumunda Jari

Internal border(s) Parana–Mato Grosso Do sul–Sao Paulo Parana–Sao Paulo Sao Paulo–Minas Gerais Minas Gerais–Goias Goias–Mato Grosso Do sul; Para–Tocantins Mato Grosso–Tocantins Maranhao–Piaui Bahia–Pernambuco; Alagoas–Sergipe Maranhao–Para Mato Grosso Do sul–Para Amazonas Selvas–Para Para–Amapa

the banks and the median line. Without bilateral or multilateral agreements concerning the boundaries between the waters and banks, disputes might arise.6 A number of lakes constitute elements in the international borders of the world. The Five Great Lakes (Lake Superior, Michigan, Huron, Erie and Ontario) are located between Canada and the United States; Lake Khanka (Xingkai-hu) lies on the Sino–Russian border; Lake Buir Nur covers a section of the border between China and Mongolia; Lake Victoria separates Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania; Lake Tanganyik is the border of Tanzania, Zambia,

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There will be a case study in this regard in Chapter 10.

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Some basic concepts

D. R. Congo and Burundi; Switzerland meets France and Italy across Lakes Geneva and Maggiore, respectively; Lago Titicaca is located between Peru and Bolivia. Other lakes that are divided by international borders are Chad (between Niger, Chad, Nigeria and Cameroon), Albert (between D. R. Congo and Uganda), Kanba (between Zambia and Zimbabwe), Mweru (between D. R. Congo and Zambia), Rudoff (between Ethiopia and Kenya), Nyasa (between Malawi, Mozambique and Tanzania), etc. In addition, lakes may also serve as sub-political borders within independent states. Table 1.6 gives some principal lakes in the inter-provincial borders of China. (d) Sea Like lakes, seas also have a significant segregation and are suitable for water transportation. International borders can be easily established between the territorial and international seas. For example, the Sea of Azov straddles Russia and Ukraine and the Black Sea separates Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine. The Red Sea is surrounded by seven nations (Egypt, Eritrea, Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan and Yemen). The Aral Sea lies between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. It is worth noting that the exploration and exploitation of underground resources in internationally shared seas could lead to disputes. Examples would Table 1.6. The principal lakes in the inter-provincial borders, China Lake Chahan–diao Danjiangkou–shuiku Dingshan–hu Dongting–hu Erlongshan–shuiku Gaoyou–hu Guanting–shuiku Gucheng–hu Hedi–shuiku Hong–hu Hongjian–diao Hongzhe–hu Longgan–hu Lugu–hu Mitijiangzhanmu–cuo Nanshi–hu Shijiu–hu Tai–hu Weishan–hu Youyi–shuiku Yuecheng–shuiku

Inter-provincial border Hebei–Inner Mongolia Hubei–Henan Shanghai–Jiangsu Hunan–Hubei Jilin–Liaoning Jiangsu–Anhui Hebei–Beijing Jiangsu–Anhui Guangdong–Guangxi Zhuang Hubei–Anhui Shaanxi–Inner Mongolia Jiangsu–Anhui Hubei–Anhui Sichuan–Yunnan Qinghai–Tibet Shandong–Jiangsu Anhui–Jiangsu Jiangsu–Zhejiang Shandong–Jiangsu Inner Mongolia–Hebei Hebei–Henan

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include the bilateral dispute in Timor Sea (Australia and East Timor) and the multilateral disputes in the Spratly Islands (China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam), among others (see Chapter 6.1.2 for details). (e) Bay/Gulf A bay is often applied to very large tracts of water around which the land forms a curve; it can also be defined as a part of a sea or lake indenting the shoreline. A gulf, which is generally known to be larger than a bay, refers to an arm of a sea or ocean partly enclosed by land, or a portion of an ocean or sea extending into the land or a partially land-locked sea. In bays and gulfs, borders may either be navigable channels, medians or arbitrary lines. The selected major international bays and gulfs are shown in Table 1.7. (f) Strait/Channel Unlike a bay (or gulf) boundary, which reaches a seacoast on the one hand and continues through the sea on the other, a strait (or channel) boundary only connects with the sea(s). The selected major international straits and channels are shown in Table 1.8. Table 1.7. The major international bays and gulfs Bay or gulf Bay of Bengal Bay of Biscay Bight of Benin Bight of Biafra Golfe de St. Malo Golfo de Fonseca Golfo de Guayaquil Golfo de Venezuela Gulf of Aden Gulf of Aqaba Gulf of Bothnia Gulf of Danzig Gulf of Finland Gulf of Honduras Gulf of Mannar Gulf of Mexico Gulf of Oman Gulf of Riga Gulf of Tonkin/Beibu Persian Gulf Rio de la Plataa a

Country–country Bangladesh–India–Myanmar France–Spain Ghana–Togo-Benin–Nigeria Cameroon–Equatorial Guinea France–Is. Jersey/UK Elsalvador–Honduras–Nicaragua Ecuador–Peru Venezuela–Colombia Yemen–Djibouti–Somalia Egypt–Israel–Jordan–Saudi Arabia Sweden–Finland Poland–Russia Finland–Russia–Estonia Honduras–Belize–Guatemala India–Sri Lanka Mexico–USA Oman–United Arab Emirates–Iran Latvia–Estonia China–Vietnam Iran–Iraq–Kuwait–Saudi Arabia–Bahrain–Qatar–United Arab Emirates Argentina–Uruguay

Also as mouths of Rio Parana and Rio Uruguay.

13

Some basic concepts Table 1.8. The major international straits and channels Strait or channel Bab el Manadeb Balabac Strait Beagle Channel Bering Strait English Channel Korea Strait Mona Passage Palk Strait Phillip Channel Singapore Strait Soya Kaikyo St. George’s Channel Strait of Dover Strait of Gibraltar Strait of Hormuz Strait of Juan de Fuca Strait of Malacca Strait of Otranto Torres Strait Windward Passage Yucatan Channel

Country–country Yemen–Eritrea–Djibouti Malaysia–the Philippines Chile–Argentina Russia–Alaska/US England–France Korea–Japan Dominican Rep.–Puerto Rico/US India–Sri Lanka Indonesia–Singapore–Malaysia Indonesia–Singapore–Malaysia Japan–Russia England–Ireland England–France–Belgium Spain–Morocco Iran–Oman Canada–USA Indonesia–Malaysia Albania–Italy Australia–Papua New Guinea Cuba–Haiti Mexico–Cuba

(B) Artificial borders If no significant natural barrier is available, or the natural screen is not suitable to serve as a border between two adjacent political units, an artificial border should be jointly established by the adjacent political units. Generally, artificial borders can be one of the three categories: (a) an artificial barrier, (b) a geometrical border and (c) a cultural border. (a) Artificial barrier Stone tablets, walls and wire entanglements are commonly constructed by one or both adjacent territorial rulers to act as artificial barriers. These objects then serve as political borders. The former Berlin Wall is one example. The Wall was constructed following the territorial division of the post-war Germany by the European Advisory Commission. The Commission was established by the governments of the USA, the UK and the former USSR, following the defeat of Germany in 1945. Berlin was divided into East and West Berlin under the jurisdiction of the occupying forces during the period of the Cold War. The border wall was hated by Germans on both sides of the

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divide and it was finally removed in 1989 following the collapse of the Soviet Union.7 As one of the greatest construction projects in the world, the Great Wall of China, or Bianqiang (border wall), was originally built during the Spring and Autumn period (770–476 BC) and the Warring States period (475–221 BC) in ancient China. Following the unification of the six states of Wei, Han, Zhao, Chu, Yan and Qitian, the emperor Qinshi-huang (258–210 BC) began to renovate and connect the northern sections of the border walls of the Qin, Zhao and Yan states in 214 BC in order to prevent the invasion from the Hunish aristocrats (xiongnu) in the north. The Wall extends from Linyao (located around Min-xian county of Gansu province) in the west, to Yin-shan in the north and to Liao-dong in the east. Almost all the emperors of the Han (206 BC–220 AD), the Northern Wei (386–534 AD), the Northern Qi (550–577 AD), the Northern Zhou (557–581 AD) and the Sui (581–618 AD) dynasties invested heavily in the rebuilding of the Wall in order to prevent their territories from being attacked from the north. During the reign of emperor Hongwu (1368–1399 AD) and emperor Wanli (1573–1619 AD) in the Ming dynasty (1368–1644 AD), the border wall was rebuilt as many as 18 times. The current wall—6700 km long, 85 m high and 5.7–6.5 m thick—commences at Jiayu-guan in the west and ends at Shanhai-guan in the east. Several sub-units of the wall can be found south of the towns of Xuanhua and Datong and between Shanxi and Hebei provinces. (b) Geometrical border Geometrical boundaries may prove difficult to describe precisely. The major difficulties arise from the fact that the Earth is neither flat like a map nor perfectly spherical like a globe. Geometrical lines on flat maps may have very different properties from lines through corresponding points on the Earth. These differences arise from the projection on a curved surface onto a plane (Jones, 1943, p. 113). A meridian boundary may be described as a line due north (or south) from a given point, or as the meridian north (south) from one point, or as the meridian of X degrees, Y minutes, Z seconds, west (or east) of Greenwich. A parallel might be described as the parallel of X degrees, Y minutes, Z seconds, north (or south) latitude, or as the parallel east (or west) from a given point. The longest latitude border is the US–Canadian border on the 49th Parallel of the north latitude. The international border between Egypt and Sudan is the 22nd Parallel of the north latitude. The longitude lines are also used as international borders. Examples include those between Canada and Alaska/US along the 14th Parallel of the west longitude, between Egypt and Libya along the 25th Parallel of the east longitude, and between Indonesia and Papua New

7

More stories about the Wall may be found in Pond (1990) and Marcuse (1992).

Some basic concepts

15

Guinea on the 14th Parallel of the east longitude. In addition, the 60°36⬘ Parallel of the west longitude marks the border of Argentina and Chile on Greande de Tierra del Fuego Island off South America. (c) Cultural border A cultural border is defined as one that separates two or more different cultures. In China, for example, four interprovincial borders are currently marked by the political separation of different ethnic identities. The Uygur and Tibetan peoples are divided by the border of Xinjiang Uygur and Tibet autonomous regions; the Uygur and Han peoples on the border of Xinjiang Uygur autonomous region and Gansu province; the Hui and Han peoples along the border of Ningxia Hui autonomous region and Shaanxi province; and the Hui and Mongolian peoples by the border of Ningxia Hui and Inner Mongolia autonomous regions. The disintegration of the former USSR caused political and cultural tensions between Russia and Ukraine, especially within their cross-border territory. Within Slobozhanskaya Ukraine and the component part—Kharkov region— ethnic diversity has created disputes between people. The region is known by various geographical names in the contiguous regions, by types of relief, names of human settlements and rural areas. The most contentious issue is that of language. No agreement can be found over which language should be spoken and used in secondary and tertiary education, in curriculum development and for entrance examinations at higher education (Damasevich, 1993). Israelis and Palestinians share a narrow territory along the eastern coast of Mediterranean Sea west of the Jordan River and the Dead Sea. Cultural and religious conflicts between the two different groups of peoples have not stopped since the founding of the state of Israel. Even though a common geographical boundary may be settled in the future, the cultural separation between the two neighbors appears eternal. By way of contrast to these examples of internal strife and dissent, there is another landscape in the heart of west Europe where one may find a special Alpine country. In Switzerland, different language groups live peacefully in cantons allocated to speakers of Swiss German, French, Italian and Rhaeto-Romanic. 1.2.3. Function

Intuitively, a political border exists wherever a political unit is established. As both an ending and a starting point in landscape, borders may be viewed as a separation factor. A border cuts off two systems of political authority. Each system can extend only up to the border. A political border also delimits the scope of territory where a government or ruling power can exercise its sovereignty and/or judicature. The governments in the political units may manage the export and import of goods using tariff and non-tariff instruments and supervise

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convex border

concave border Figure 1.1. The convex and concave borders.

people who are crossing the borders by issuing visas, immigration and emigration permits. Specifically, a political border manifests itself in three functions: (a) A legal function where the border line exactly delimits the territories subject to juridical standards and to the country’s legislation. (b) A control function where every crossing of the border line is submitted, in principle, to a state control. (c) A fiscal function where the control function is accompanied by a perception of custom right assuring the adaptation of the fiscal rights in force in the country of entry.8 The geographical locations of the existing political areas have created different geometric properties of borders, which can be classified into two categories—convex and concave (see Fig. 1.1). It is not difficult to understand that political units with convex borders usually have the geographical disadvantages of being both hard to defend but easy to be attacked. For example, the Bohai Bay creates a highly concave coastline for east China and strategically serves as a natural protection for much of the heartland of north China with Beijing as the national capital. Bordered by Egypt and Jordan, the State of Israel is shaped like a dagger pointing to the Gulf of Arabia in the south. The convex border of this state sharply makes Negev, the southern part of Israel, completely exposed to the Arab South. On the other hand, political units with convex borders will benefit more from the cross-border cooperation with the outside world than those with concave borders do (Guo, 1996, p. 25). 1.3. Border area

A border area, or to use a useful synonym, a cross-border area, largely refers to the spatial heterogeneities in terms of political and economic structures. 8

Cited from Guichonnet and Raffestin (1974).

Some basic concepts

17

Political borders divide different systems of political authorities and different ways of lives. Border-areas combine the territories of two or more different political units, such as independent and dependent states, provinces, municipalities and counties. More specifically, a border-area can be politically defined as a special geographic space comprising adjacent sub-areas that are under the jurisdictions of two or more political units, respectively. 1.3.1. Geographical scope

Border-areas are generally known as geographic spaces in proximity to fixed borderlines. Inside these areas significant socio-economic effects are felt due to the existence of borders. However, it is not easy to define the border-areas accurately as there has not yet been any specific methodologies or technologies developed on the geographical demarcation of a crossborder area. In practice, border-area demarcation varies from country to country. It is usually subject to the kinds of problems or targets that the designers intend. In this research, both narrow and wide definitions will be used. For example, in China, international border trade covers an area of 15 km from the border (Cihai, 1988, p. 1035; 1999, p. 1250). This is a narrow definition. Peach (1985, pp. 57–80) includes 23 counties of the four states of California, Arizona, New Mexico and Texas, all of which share a border with Mexico in a broad definition of a border area. This area also includes Culberson and Dimmit counties of Texas which are proximate to the border. Other scholars, who were promoted either by their own research interests or by the data availability in their studies, have defined the US side border-area in an even wider geographical scope. Hansen (1981), for example, used the functional economic areas (FEAs), defined by the Bureau of Economic Analysis, to include cities as far from the border as San Antonio, Texas and Palm Spring, California. According to the “Agreement between the United States of America and the United Mexican States on Cooperation for the Protection and Improvement of the Environment in the Border Area,” signed by President De la Madrid and President Reagan in La Paz, Mexico in 1983, the size of the US–Mexico border area extends 100 km from the border.9 In March 2002, President Bush and President Fox directed their respective administrations to work with their legislatures to make changes to the Border Environmental Cooperation Commission (BECC) and the North American Development Bank (NADB). These changes include expanding the geographic scope for BECC/NADB operations in Mexico from 100 to 300 km and concentrating grants and low-interest rate loans for projects in the poorest communities located within the current border region of 100 km.

9

See Fig. 9.1 of Chapter 9 for details of this border-area.

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1.3.2. Classification

Largely stemmed from the diversification of political borders, border-areas are functionally incorporated by different forms of political status, which will therefore create different operational mechanisms of their own. Usually, border-areas can be classified in terms of three different approaches: at political level, by political composition and based on spatial structure. These are analyzed below. (1) Political level. When adjacent political areas meet, a border-area will be automatically formed. Political borders can generally be classified into different levels. Thus, there exist first-class (or independent state) borderareas, second-class (or dependent state, or provincial) border-areas, thirdclass (or municipality, or county) border-areas and so on. In a broader sense, border-areas exist wherever adjacent political authorities collide at any level. Suburbian residential developments which are a fringe area between the rural and the urban development sectors are one of the most dynamic regions that have attracted attention of many regional scientists and policy-makers. An urban place has by necessity a fringe area, a zone that demarcates the outline of what is considered typically and predominantly “urban.” Similarly, a rural fringe has an outer zone of what is considered typically “rural.” The concept of the rural–urban border-area can therefore be approached from two directions or two perspectives. The first reflects an urban view of the immediate countryside while the second view looks the other way, it reflects a rural perspective of encroaching suburbia. A neighborhood is a delineated area within physical boundaries where people identify their home and where they live out and organize their private lives. However different residents and organizations will not always agree on the actual boundaries, as neighborhoods are fluid, reaching out as well as in. However, the boundaries of urban neighborhoods are often clear, if unwritten. There are both physical and psychological barriers between neighborhoods such as a road or the tenure of the housing, or the social composition of residents. Some neighborhoods, particularly near urban cores, with good transport links, are mixed socially and in property values. But most neighborhoods are recognized either as “better off” or “poorer.” More mixed neighborhoods are often “going up” or “down,” rarely static. There is a strong social component to neighborhoods. People connect with their neighbors in many, often unspoken ways— security, cleanliness, the environment, social behavior, networks and conditions, access to basic services such as schools, doctors, transport and shops. The quality of a neighborhood’s physical and social environment determines its value and status, the competition to access homes within it, the quality of services provided and how much people are willing and able to pay to live within it.10 10

Cited from Power (2004).

Some basic concepts

19

Usually, the socio-economic complexity of a border-area is positively related to the political level of the border(s) involved. For example, the higher the status of the border’s political level, the more complicated the structure of the border-area. A striking difference in the functions between international border-areas and intra-national border-areas is the nature of political dependence in the region. Unlike the situation in the dependent political units and other administrative subdivisions, no central administrative authority can enforce agreements between nations over the transnational issues. (2) Political composition. On the basis of the political diversification, borderareas can be classified into two forms: ●

●

homogeneous border-areas: one in which the same form of government or ruling power meets; or heterogeneous border-areas: one in which different forms of government or ruling power meet.

Consider that m, a number of categories of political form exist in a geographic space. Assuming that all the political units meet together, we may obtain the maximum number of forms of n-dimensional border-areas (n ⫽ 2, 3, ...) between them by mathematical composition of any n adjacent political areas in m (m ⱖ n) forms of political areas, for example, N ⫽ Cmn where N is the number of forms of border-area by composition of n (n ⫽ 2, 3, ...) in m forms of political units. Let us take the independent countries as an example. As mentioned in Section 1.1.1, there exist 17 categories of governments and/or ruling powers (i.e., m ⫽ 17) in the world. Using the expression given above, we may obtain the total number of two-dimensional (i.e., n ⫽ 2) border2 areas: 272 (i.e., N ⫽ C17 ). Obviously, among these border-areas, only 17 forms are homogeneous, the rest therefore are heterogeneous.11 (3) Spatial structure. If a number of adjacent political areas meet together, a border-area differing in spatial structure (or border dimension, i.e., the number of political authorities involved) will be formed between them. Some border-areas with different spatial structures may be described as follows: 2-d border-area. The US–Mexican border-area is a 2-d border-area that runs for 3220 km from East to West. The DMZ (Demilitarized Zone) around the 38th Parallel on the Korean peninsula is also a 2-d border-area that extends from each side of North and South Korea. The political division between the 11

Note that some of the 272 border-areas might not exist due to the geographical unavailability.

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former East and West Germany also divided Berlin into a 2-d border-city along the line of the Berlin Wall. 3-d border-area. The Tumen River delta is a 3-d border-area between China, Russia and North Korea. The Lake Nyas is likewise shared by the three countries of Tanzania, Mozambique and Malawi in southeast Africa and Lake Victoria is a 3-d border-area between Tanzania, Uganda and Kenya. 3-d borders can also be internal boundaries. Lake Pickwick in the United States forms part of the border area between Tennessee, Mississippi and Alabama. 4-d border-area. The Lake Chad area is a 4-d border-area between Chad, Cameroon, Nigeria and Niger in west Africa. The Huaihai Economic Zone, founded in 1986, is under the jurisdiction of four provinces of Jiangsu, Shandong, Henan and Anhui in east China. The Lake Michigan area is also a 4-d border-area separating the four states of Michigan, Wisconsin, Illinois and Indiana in the USA. 5-d border-area. This kind of border-areas includes the Caspian Sea between Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Iran, Azerbaijan and the Russian Federation; and the Mts. Alps straddling France, Italy, Switzerland, Austria and Germany. 6-d border-area. This kind of border-areas includes the Black Sea between Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine, Russia and Georgia; and the Spratly islands in South China Sea between Brunei, China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam. 7-d border-area. This kind of border-areas includes the Red Sea between Egypt, Eritrea, Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan and Yemen; and the Persian Gulf separating the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq and Iran. 8-d border-area. This kind of border-areas includes the South China Sea between China, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Brunei, the Philippines and Taiwan. Two thousand years ago, the feudal rulers of China applied a land management system—called jing-tian zhi (the well-field system). The spatial organizational structure is similar to the two Chinese characters “jing” (well) and “tian” (land) combined together (see Fig. 1.2).12 This system established a public area, a commons, surrounded by eight independent households. This may also be treated as an 8-d border-area. 9-d border-area. This kind of border-areas includes the Baltic Sea between Poland, Germany, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Russia, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.

12

In this system, as described by Mencius (372–289 BC), “Each square li of land should be divided into nine plots, the whole containing nine hundred mu. The central plot will be the public field and the eight households, each owing a hundred-mu farm, will collaborate in cultivating the public field. Not until the public has been properly attended to, may each household attend to its private plot. This is how the countrymen should be required to learn.”(Cited from Chai and Chai, 1965, p. 118)

Some basic concepts

21

Figure 1.2. The well-field system in ancient China.

1.3.3. Disputed areas

As a special kind of cross-border area, disputed areas refer to territories over which two or more countries or groups of people claim sovereignty. Governments or people who have a stake in the disputes are usually very sensitive about how these regions are portrayed on maps. Some of these contentious areas have been noted above. However, in what follows, some disputed areas in different parts of the world are briefly described. 1.3.3.1. Arunachal Pradesh

China claims the northern part of the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh. The boundary between India and China in the disputed territory has been the subject of political argument. In 1914, the British colonial government incorporated the tribal territory into British India, resulting in a border that China never ratified. 1.3.3.2. Cameroon/Nigeria border

Cameroon and Nigeria both command leading political and economic roles within their adjacent African region. They share a 1600 km long common border from the delta of the Rio del Rey in the south to Lake Chad in the north. Territorial ambitions on both sides often generated armed incidents during the first two decades following their independence. The situation is a result of the historical circumstances leading to the creation, during the colonial era, of a poorly defined and highly contested border. In addition, economic issues, such as oil in the delta area, use of water for irrigation and control over fishery resources in the Lake Chad Basin, are some of the main reasons underlying the dispute (Mouafo and Herrera, 1993).

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1.3.3.3. Chile/Argentina border (Beagle channel)

The exact demarcation of the southern border between Chile and Argentina was a source of contention between the two countries from their earliest days as independent nations in the second decade of the 19th century. In 1977, Chile established a complex system of baselines that would enclose the vast archipelago, extending from the eastern mouth of the Beagle Channel southwest to Cape Horn Island and northwest from the Cape along the Pacific coast of Chile. Argentina had objected to the portion of this system enclosing the islands from the Beagle Channel to Cape Horn. This decree had two important implications for the dispute. First, it extended the platform from which Chile might attempt to project its 12-mile territorial sea and 200-mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ) along an unbroken line from Picton, Nueva and Lennox Islands as far south as Cape Horn, thus greatly increasing its potential maritime jurisdiction to the east and southeast. Second, it effectively converted all waters enclosed by the baselines into Chilean internal waters, where navigational rights for Argentina (as well as third-party states) would exist only through explicit agreements with Chile. This made navigational rights a key element of the dispute. Argentina had long regarded the waters surrounding the southern archipelagos as critical to its commercial and military navigation. The Argentine port city of Ushuaia, located on the north shore of the Beagle Channel, was well established as the hub of Argentina’s southern fishing fleet, as well as the base from which all Argentine expeditions to Antarctica proceeded. Argentina thus considered its unfettered use of the waters surrounding the Fuegian Archipelago to be a matter of critical importance.13 1.3.3.4. Cyprus

Following an invasion by Turkish forces in 1974, the northern third of Cyprus came under Turkish control. This area then became the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in 1983, but Turkey alone recognizes this republic. The southern portion remains under the control of the internationally recognized Greek Cypriot government. The two areas are separated by a United Nations buffer zone. 1.3.3.5. Diaoyu Islands

In 1895, China ceded Taiwan and Diaoyu Islands to Japan following defeat in the Sino–Japan War. The secession was ratified by the Shimonoseki Treaty. In 1945, when Japan surrendered at the end of the Second World War, Taiwan was

13

Based on Laudy (2004).

Some basic concepts

23

returned to China under the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations. However, the US government continued to administer Okinawa and the Diaoyu Islands under San Francisco Treaty. In 1970, the US and Japan signed the Okinawa Reversion Treaty that returned the Diaoyu Islands and Okinawa to Japan. In 1978, Japan established official diplomatic relations with the PRC (China). The two governments agreed to shelve the issue of sovereignty over the disputable Diaoyu Islands. On February 25, 1992, the PRC Government passed the territorial sea law that included the Diaoyu Islands as part of China’s territory. 1.3.3.6. Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas)

Argentina claims sovereignty over the Falkland Islands (known as the Islas Malvinas), which remain under control of the United Kingdom. Until 1982, Argentina controlled the islands but the United Kingdom regained sovereignty following a brief regional war, the Falklands War. Argentina continues to assert its claims to the islands. 1.3.3.7. Golan Heights

Israel occupied the Golan Heights region of Syria in 1967 and annexed it in 1981. Syria refuses to recognize Israel’s authority in the region, as do most other Arab nations. 1.3.3.8. Islands of the Lesser and Greater Tunbs and Abu

The United Arab Emirates and Iran dispute ownership of the three islands in the Persian Gulf: the Lesser and Greater Tunbs and Abu. 1.3.3.9. Jammu and Kashmir

Pakistan, India and China each claim all, or part of, the former princely state of Jammu and Kashmir. A cease-fire agreement in 1949 divided the region into two sectors: the eastern part administered by India as the state of Jammu and Kashmir, and the western part administered by Pakistan and known as Azad (Free) Kashmir and the Northern Areas. In 1950, China occupied the northeast portion of Kashmir, a region known as Aksai Chin (EOE, 2004). 1.3.3.10. Kenya/Sudan border

Sudan and Kenya dispute the ownership of an area along their common border known as the Ilemi Triangle. This area is currently administered by Kenya but claimed by Sudan.

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1.3.3.11. Kuril Islands

Both Japan and Russia claim the southern Kuril Islands. Settled by both countries in the 18th century, the Kuril Island chain became Japanese territory through a treaty signed in 1875. However, Japan ceded the islands to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) following defeat in World War II (1939–1945) but maintained a claim to the southernmost islands. After the collapse of the USSR in 1991, the Russian Federation continued to lay claim to the islands and remained in occupation. 1.3.3.12. Libya/Algeria border

Libya claims a small part of southeastern Algeria. 1.3.3.13. Mayotte

The island of Mayotte in the Indian Ocean is administered by France, although Comoros, the neighboring island nation, claims sovereignty over it. In 1974, the four islands of the Comoros archipelago voted on whether or not to become independent from France. Only Mayotte voted to remain a French dependency. Comoros bases its claim on the belief that the 1974 referendum was an archipelago-wide vote, while Mayotte views it as an island-by-island decision (EOE, 2004). 1.3.3.14. Nagorno-Karabakh

The Nagorno-Karabakh region is part of Azerbaijan, but the majority citizens are ethnic Armenians. Between 1988 and 1994, the enclave fought Soviet, then Azerbaijani, forces for secession. A cease-fire was negotiated in May 1994 but prospects for a settlement to long-running disputes remain dim. 1.3.3.15. Ogade¯n

Somalia claims sovereignty over Ogade¯n, an ethnically Somali region of far eastern Ethiopia. In 1977, Somalia invaded Ogade¯n in an attempt to annex it, but Somali forces were defeated by the Ethiopian army in 1978. Ethiopia and Somalia signed a peace accord in 1988 but Somalia did not renounce its claim to the region (EOE, 2004). 1.3.3.16. Spratly Islands

In the 1930s, France occupied various Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. During World War II, Japan displaced the French and occupied the Spratly

Some basic concepts

25

Islands, using the islands as a submarine base. After the war, neither the French nor the Japanese returned to the islands. In 1946, China took possession of Itu Aba Island—the largest in the Spratly group. In 1968, the Philippines took control of three islands and in 1973 South Vietnam assumed possession of five islands. In 1974, China occupied the Paracel Islands north of the Spratly group. In 1978, the Philippines extended an official claim to islands east of the Spratlys, naming them the Freedom Islands. China removed six Spratly atolls from Vietnam’s possession and then in 1979, Malaysia made its first claim to the region by indicating that the island was part of Malaysia’s continental shelf. In 1988, China and Vietnam fought over Johnson Reef which China occupied. By April, Vietnam expanded claims to include a further 15 additional reefs. China occupied six islets. In 1992, the Manila Declaration was drafted and all claimants agreed to the peaceful resolution of the long-running disputes. In July, China occupied Da Lac Reef, its first military presence in the region since the 1988 clash with Vietnam. In February 1995, China occupied Mischief Reef, also claimed by the Philippines. Conflicts continued however and in March 1995 the Philippine forces seized Chinese fishing boats and destroyed Chinese markers on Mischief Reef.14 1.3.3.17. Surinam/French Guiana Border

Surinam claims the area in southwest French Guiana between the Litani and Maroni Rivers. 1.3.3.18. Surinam/Guyana border

Surinam claims the area in Guyana between the Courantyne and New Rivers. 1.3.3.19. Venezuela/Guyana disputed border

Venezuela claims the area in Guyana west of the Essequibo River. 1.3.3.20. West Bank

As a conflicting territory between the Israeli and Arab societies, the West Bank of Jordan River has been a typical cross-border area which is populated mainly by the Arabians while dotted by many Jewish-based settlements since 1967. This area has been jointly operated by the State of Israel and the Palestinian authority in accordance with the Declaration of Principles on Inter SelfGovernment Agreement signed by the two parties in Washington, DC, on

14

Based on www.american.edu/ted/ice/spratly.htm

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September 13, 1993. According to the 1995 Israeli–Palestinian Agreement, the Israeli army should redeploy from the seven largest Palestinian towns on the West Bank, including a partial withdrawal from Hebron; and tentatively, from 450 smaller towns and villages. Together, these two areas contain the great bulk of the West Bank Palestinians—but less than 30% of the territory. The rest of the West Bank, which includes the Israeli settlement and so-called state land, is still under Israeli army control (Israel-PLO, 1995). 1.3.3.21. Western Sahara

Western Sahara is occupied by Morocco, although many Western Saharans are seeking independence for the region. A rebel group, called the Polisario Front, fought Moroccan forces for 15 years before agreeing to a United Nationsadministered cease-fire in 1991. Since that time, the United Nations has been working with both sides to conduct a referendum on self-determination. A dispute over who should be allowed to vote has caused it to be delayed the voting repeatedly (EOE, 2004).

27

Chapter 2 Resource management and cross-border areas 2.1. Literature review 2.1.1. International boundary studies1

One of the earliest systematic studies of international boundaries can be found in Semple’s (1911) book Influences of Geographic Environment. In her chapter on “Geographic Boundaries,” she states that “nature abhors fixed boundaries lines.” Consequently, boundaries rarely attain an established equilibrium but are subject to constant fluctuations. According to Semple, uninhabitable areas form the most “scientific” boundaries because they both partition and protect. In this context, she cites the conscious creation of marsh areas to form “artificial border wastes” (1911, pp. 204–216). It is worth noting that much of the literature on boundary studies was written either during the two world wars (1914–1918 and 1939–1945) or immediately in their aftermath. These studies were concerned with the nature of boundaries in terms of their being “good” or “bad” from the military point of view. They were part of a search for the causes of friction between nations and for a means to avoid it. For example, Holdich (1916, p. 504) viewed boundaries as barriers and maintained that the “best” boundaries, those least likely to be causes of war, must be mountains, lakes or deserts. These physical barriers were suggested as analogous to sea boundaries. By way of contrast, lines of longitude and latitude made for inherently “bad” boundaries as they did not provide secure means for safe, physical separation of warring parties. Lyde (1915), however, argued that boundaries should act positively by encouraging peaceful international intercourse and consequently thought that rivers, as regional bonds, would make good boundaries. This defense-versus-assimilation argument permeated most discussions on boundary functions at this time. Like Holdich, Fawcett (1918, pp. 68–69) held little respect for straight-line boundaries, not from military considerations, but because of their artificiality in that they were not marked by evident features of the natural landscape. However, in his “Principles in the Determination of Boundaries,” Brigham (1919) introduced a new concept “boundaries of economic equilibrium.” 1

Most of the pre-1950s’ literature is based on Minghi (1963).

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He reasoned that economically unnatural boundaries such as those resisting economies of scale, rather than those boundaries that were not marked definite physical phenomena, were wrong. Following the disorganization of spatial relations in the areas affected by the many boundary changes of the Versailles Peace Treaty of 1919, the consequent development of new patterns of spatial interaction stimulated renewed interest in cross-border area research in Europe. A critical and provocative note by Boggs (1932, pp. 48–49) suggested that certain general principles could be drawn from the relationship between different types of boundaries and the different sets of boundary functions. Hartshorne (1933) examined the economic disruptions arising from the division of the Upper Silesian Coalfield after World War I. Further empirical works, particularly stemming from the spate of new frontier drawing in post-Versailles Europe, resulted in borderareas that were generally detected as economically disadvantageous areas by regional scientists and economic geographers with an interest in locational theory and spatial economics. Christaller (1933) observed that towns and cities in border-areas could only develop partial hinterlands which also pushed up the economic overhead cost of investment. One of most valuable contributions to the geography of border-areas was made by Lösch (1940, 1954).2 His greatest contribution was the insight into the impact of a border on the flow of a commodity and on its consequent spatial pattern of distribution. In his model, Lösch analyzed the disruptive impacts of tariff and the limited number of border-crossing points on market areas and the disincentive of the constant threat of military incursions to investment distribution in the US–Mexican border areas. Hence, by applying location theory to the study of the impact of a border for the first time, Lösch indicated how one could actually measure a border by giving it a distance value. In his influential study International Boundaries, Boggs (1940, p. 11) took the view that border functions were “negative rather than positive.” His classification of borders into physical, geometrical, anthropogeographical and complex, represented some advance in the research techniques available at that time. He also presented a useful idea in metaphoric form when he asserted that any border is permeable and, over time, “a sort of osmosis takes place,” the osmotic pressure increasing directly with institutional barriers to interaction. In his 1940 lecture on “Natural Frontiers,” Broek reiterated Lösch’s observation concerning the difference between the sharp and definite political border on the one hand, and most other types of borders which are “really merging zones of the areal distribution of different types of a phenomenon” on the other. In addition, Broek proceeded to dispel the traditional idea of the inherent 2 As noted by Minghi (1963), the lack of a translation in English until 1954 is no doubt largely responsible for our ignorance of Lösch’s (1940) contributions.

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“goodness” of the “natural” border, emphasizing that borders were essentially man-made political phenomena, and even the “unbased” border, that is, one not based on a physical criterion, actually created its own border-area by default (Broek, 1940, p. 9). With the end of the Second World War in sight, two books relating to border problem-solving issues were published. Peattie’s (1944) book suggested that borders with few functions were more serviceable to mankind than those with many important functions; that is, the weaker the border the better. Although he had doubts about the economic and political feasibility of small states, Peattie advanced a type of resurrected buffer state idea that suggested encouraging regionalism in cross-border areas, especially in those that were traditionally sources of friction between adjoining states, such as Alsace between France and Germany (1944, p. 103). In the other border problem-solving work, Jones (1945) intended to provide a guide to laymen who may be instrumental in making decisions involving border changes of great importance. Showing the deep influence of Boggs (1940), under whom he had worked in the US Department of State, the book hypothesized that, in the event of a period dominated by overripe nationalism, and contrary to Peattie’s (1944) belief, “the only good boundary will be the one that strengthens the power structure of one’s own state” (Jones, 1945, p. 19). During this period up to the end of the Second World War the emphasis had been completely shifted from the criteria by which a boundary was drawn to the functions which it performs (Minghi, 1963). After the Second World War, Fischer’s (1949) paper included consideration of the War’s results in Europe, as well as a call for more attention to “historical” borders. He observed that the criteria on which borders had been defined had varied over time. In 1919, language, as an indication of self-determination by cultural distinction, replaced the previous emphasis on physical division. After the Second World War the emphasis shifted to economics coupled with the secondary consideration of population movement. Fischer (1949) argued that all borders left a lasting imprint, and that the longer a boundary functioned, the harder it was to alter. Hence, there exist a concurrent persistence and obsolescence in many borders. After a border change, the pre-existing line often became an internal border of secondary importance, yet this separation could persist and later be resurrected. The geopolitical idea regarding borders was rejected by Fisher (1949) as representing but a “momentary and transitory expression of the power of adjacent countries” although he did detect the emergence of a new kind of border zone, the zone of economic and social penetration (p. 215). 2.1.2. Cross-border area studies

From the mid-1960s to the late 1980s, and probably as a result of the high tide of Cold War, there was decline in the number of studies on border-areas. The

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only literature produced relates to either an examination of the pure geographic nature of the question (Guichonnet and Raffestin, 1974) or the study of economic backwardness in border regions (see e.g., Hansen, 1977, 1981; Gibson and Renteria, 1985). This is quite understandable since many international borders which were marked by either solid-walls such as the Berlin Wall or wire entanglements (sometimes with land mines) had become the forbidden places. Another reason for the stagnating research on border areas is that during much of the Cold War era there were few border changes between major power brokers. There were few attempts by the super powers to bring about these changes. This silence was broken by the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, as well as by the collapse of the USSR shortly thereafter. During the 1990s, some researchers began to deal with the spatial structures and operational mechanisms of transnational and sub-national border areas again (see e.g., Cappellin and Batey, 1993; Guo, 1996). From the viewpoint of Rumley and Minghi (1991), the peripheral nature of border areas, in relation to their national cores, creates geographical disadvantages. The attendant remoteness from the centers of power and decision-making makes them functionally weak. Using a mathematical programming method, Guo (1993a) analyzed the optimization of agricultural production of a transprovincial border-area in China and revealed a more remarkable performance for the border-area given the removal of its interprovincially border-related barriers. Among the above researches, there is an absence of substantive case studies to draw upon the effects of the removal of political borders. The paper by Jones and Wild (1994) may be considered as an interesting venture in this field. Beginning with an introduction into the formation of inner-German border during the Cold War period, this paper examines both the short- and the longterm socio-economic impacts of the removal of this seemingly impenetrable border. The North Bavarian section of the Zonenrandgebiet (ZRG), which separated the former East Germany and the former West Germany states and the former Republic of Czechoslovakia, was characterized by a dispersed industrial base with a lack of highly developed urban centers. Border-related barriers exist where the intensity of interaction suddenly drops. Border crossings are the points of intense interaction. Rietveld (1993) distinguished various reasons for the existence of the barrier effects of international borders: (1) weak or expensive infrastructure services in transport and communication for international links; (2) preferences by consumers for domestic rather than foreign products and internal travel rather than foreign destinations; (3) government interventions of various types; and (4) lack of information on foreign countries. In his paper, Rietveld (1993, pp. 47–59) offered a quantitative measure of international barriers in European countries. He expressed this as a measure of service reduction between areas located in different countries as compared to areas located within the same country. He

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also measured the lack of accessibility due to border crossing by different modes of transportation and communications. To analyze the impact of borders, Cattan and Grasland (1992) developed a framework in which two factors were distinguished to affect places in space: distance and borders. The impacts of distance and borders were specified for two types of variables: state variables relating to the situation in certain places and flow variables relating to the interaction between different places. Two possible effects of borders were considered: (1) non-homogeneities between places at different sides of the border, and (2) discontinuities in flow between places at different sides of the border. In addition, Ratti and Reichman (1993) formulated a theoretical hypothesis that emphasizes the overcoming of barriers through the construction of contact areas allowing inter-regional cooperation. After some necessary specifications, Ratti (1990, 1993, pp. 60–69) also developed two different approaches to overcome the existing barriers and border effects. These were specified as (1) a micro-economic approach which examines the frontier through the analysis of the economic actor’s strategy behavior, and is based on the theory of industrial organization; and (2) a mesoeconomic approach which considers the role of “frontier” within a specific supporting space or milieu. Until the 1990s, little attention was paid to issues relating to the cross-border cooperation and management of natural and environmental resources. For example, Nordenstam et al. (1998) analyzed air pollution in the cross-border area in the US and Chow et al. (2000) monitored the atmosphere pollution in Calexico and Mexicali within the US–Mexico border area. Both of them focused their attention on the special geographical environment of the cities and found that wind direction has different impacts on the cross-border environment between the cities accompanied by seasonal variation. Rietveld et al. (2001) investigated substantial differences in fuel taxes between various countries. This study was developed as one possible way in which the problem of low-fuel taxes in neighboring countries could be solved by using a spatial differentiation of taxes: low near the border and higher farther away. More recently, and based on the cross-section and time-series data of the Lower Mekong Basin (LMB) from 1985 to 2000, Guo and Yang (2003) found that under most circumstances water resources were more seriously polluted in the transnational border areas than in the areas away from the borders. Specifically, the estimated coefficients on the political boundary dummies show that political influence on transnational water pollution was more significant in areas near “the international border along which the river runs” than in places near “the international border across which the river runs.”3

3

See Chapter 8 for more detailed evidence.

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2.2. Resource management in cross-border areas 2.2.1. Definition of cross-border resources

Natural and environmental resources, which are always considered as public goods, are usually used or may even be destroyed more readily than any other economic commodities. Public goods may be defined as those that may be consumed by one person without diminishing the availability for others. Private goods are considered to be those goods that may be divided and shared among a group of people, but the divisibility does not produce any external interest or cost for others. Public goods have the principal characteristics of non-exclusivity, enforceability and indivisibility. The indivisibility of the natural and environmental resources makes ownership of property rights difficult or costly. These characteristics serve as the principal reasons why the efficient utilization of natural and environmental resources, examined as public goods, remains the root cause of increasing conflict over efficient resource utilization. It is difficult to define the property rights of pubic goods, such as meadow, forest, fishery, atmosphere, groundwater, lakes and oceans. It is more difficult to administrate the commonly owned goods, for instance, forest resources in mountainous areas. Declining environmental quality throughout the world has had an inevitable impact on production and on the daily life of human beings. Environmental pollution is caused by its externalities. A negative externality exists whenever private economic actions have adversely affected the general public, and these effects increase the cost of economic actions. External effects can be either positive or negative. The positive effect is termed the external economy, whereas the negative effect is called the external diseconomy. For people with a desire to pursuit the lowest cost of production, the private economic activity, the externality may be described as the “external diseconomy.” People always endeavor to transfer externalities from private cost to social cost by imposing a detached cost. The inappropriate use of natural and environmental resources represents a negative externality. The externality of environmental pollution illustrates one such example. Pollution produced by the private industry or even emanating from domestic point sources imposes an external cost on the public goods. A cross-border resource is defined here as a natural resource, or the maintenance of environmental quality, that is associated with two or more geographically adjacent management regimes. All such resources must exhibit the following two distinctive characteristics. First, from the perspective of efforts to manage resources and maintain environmental quality, they must constitute natural systems or meaningful units. Second, the cross-border resources must be affected by multiple jurisdictions and therefore fully or partially lie outside

Resource management and cross-border areas

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the jurisdiction of any one given regime. That is, any resource of this type must not be subject to effective management of a single regime. It is possible to identify a number of distinguishable bases of cross-border resources. In many cases, the socio-economic bases of cross-border resources are just as compelling as the physical bases. Efforts to exploit natural and environmental resources frequently generate important dependencies or interdependencies among geographically adjacent regimes. A few examples will make this proposition clear. It is common for fishermen from two or more states to be interested in harvesting the same fish stocks. Also situations frequently arise in which the nationals of one state wish to exploit resources under the complete or partial jurisdiction of another state (Young, 1977, p. 24). All this suggests that there are often substantial gains to be achieved by transcending international borders in efforts to manage natural resources and to maintain environmental quality. Furthermore, it seems reasonable to suppose that there will be cases in which transaction costs will not be prohibitive when coordinated management arrangements are limited to a relatively small number of stakeholders. At the same time, transaction costs ordinarily rise steeply with an increasing number of stakeholders participating in a cross-border resource management. 2.2.2. Fundamentals of cross-border relationship

Before examining the effectiveness of the cross-border resource management, it is necessary to clarify the spatial characteristics of driving forces for the cross-border socio-economic activities. In theory, since the adjacent political units—countries or sub-national administrative areas—are independent of each other, the adoption of a common standard and the coordination between them is unlikely to be emphasized. In order to go further, let us suppose that the degree to which a sub-area depends on the outside world is denoted by R and that the size of the sub-area is S (S ⫽ πr 2, where r denotes the average radius of the sub-area). Deriving the differential of R with respect to S, we have ∂R ∂R ∂r ∂R ∂r 1 ∂R ⫽⫽ 2 ⫽ ∂S ∂r ∂s ∂r ∂(π r ) 2π r ∂r

(2.1)

Since interdependence (R) always decreases with respect to distance, so does it with respect to r. Consequently Eq. (2.1) becomes ∂R/∂S 0. As a matter of fact, since the number of sub-areas (N) and the average size of each sub-area (S) are negatively related to each other for the given area, we have ∂R/∂N 0. Finally, we have Proposition 1. Socioeconomic interdependence in a cross-border area usually grows with respect to the number of independent sub-areas involved in the area.

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In contrast to the fact of the cross-border interdependence, the reliability of cross-border cooperation decreases with respect to the number of the independent sub-areas involved. In order to have a concrete expression, let us simplify the scenario of cross-border cooperation of the target area. Suppose that the reliability of cooperation between any pair of sub-areas is expressed by rj (0 ⱕ rj 1). Thus, the aggregate reliability of cross-border cooperation (R) of the area with N sub-areas can be expressed by the product of all rj of the subareas involving in the area, i.e., N1

R(N)

冱 i1 ∏ j 1

i

(2.2)

rj

N1 In Eq. (2.2), ‘∏…’ is the sign of the product of ‘…’; and 冱 i1 i denotes the number of sub-areas in pairs of the N-d cross-border area. To make the expression simpler, let us suppose rj r for all j. Then, Eq. (2.2) becomes N1

R(N) r 冱 i1

i

(2.3)

As Eq. (2.3) shows, since the value of r ranges between 0 and 1, the aggregate reliability of the cross-border cooperation is negatively associated with the number of sub-areas involved, that is, R(N) R(N1) …R(3) R(2). To make the demonstration more intuitive, let us assume that r has four values (0.99, 0.9, 0.5, 0.3). Obviously, as shown in Fig. 2.1, when N 3, R will sharply decrease to almost zero under the condition that r is not 0.5. Consequently, we have

Reliability of cross-border cooperation (R)

1 0.9 0.8 0.7 r = 0.99

0.6

r = 0.9

0.5

r = 0.5

0.4

r = 0.3

0.3 0.2 0.1 0 2

3

4

5

6

7

8

Number of independent sub-areas (N)

Figure 2.1. Reliability of cross-border cooperation (Source: Eq. (2.3).)

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Proposition 2. The reliability of cross-border cooperation usually decreases with respect to the number of independent sub-areas involved. 2.3. Factors influencing cross-border resource management

The management of natural and environmental resources in cross-border areas involves multitudinous branches of learning in such fields as boundary and area studies, natural resource science, environmental resource management and environmental economics, biology, international relations and political economy. As a result, the study of natural and environmental resources in cross-border areas requires an interdisciplinary approach. More importantly, cross-border resource exploitation and environmental protection are closely associated with national policy, societal goals and economic development. Along with the increasing global economic integration, sustainable development and environmental protection have become key slogans in political and economic debate in the world today. Cross-border environmental activities will also have a critical impact on national security and international relations. In this section, physical, political, economic, and cultural influences on the cross-border management of natural and environmental resources are examined. One point to note is that while these influences are interrelated, it may be that one feature plays the dominative role in cross-border resource management. 2.3.1. Physical influences

The geographical and geological formations of natural and environmental resources, such as underground water, minerals, and energy, are usually not consistent with those of political boundaries. As a result, resource exploration and exploitation ventures require close cross-border cooperation. As mentioned in Chapter 1, many political borders are shaped by natural and geographic barriers. If rivers, lakes, and ocean shorelines are shared by several nations, there will always be difficulties in cross-border management regimes, even among democratic and friendly nations. For example, the governments of Canada and the United States have negotiated at least nine treaties and agreements, commencing with the US–Canada Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909, which governs water pollution of the many rivers and lakes that either flow along or cover with their common border. Several major treaties deal with oceanic pollution, including the 1972 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter and the 1973 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships. International controls and enforcement, however, are generally weak (Hart, 2004).

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At Papua New Guinea’s independence in 1975, dissatisfaction on the island of Bougainville over the allocation of mining revenues from the Panguna mine precipitated a crisis which quickly led to secessionist threats. After protracted negotiation, the national government reluctantly agreed to the creation of provincial government as part of a policy of decentralization aimed at striking a balance between local and national interests. A key part of the strategy with regard to Bougainville was an agreement to return a portion of mining revenues to the newly constituted provincial government as a means of containing resentment and defusing separatist sentiment. To a certain extent, this approach seemed to be a feasible solution to the Bougainville conflict, given the relatively compact and unambiguous form the proposed province was to take: as an island, Bougainville’s boundaries seemed obvious. The creation of provincial governments throughout the remainder of the country, however, tended to raise a number of issues concerning political representation that centered around the way in which provinces were to be defined, issues that were sharpened when questions of claims to mineral rights and benefits arose.4 Air pollution in cross-border regions poses many challenges to policymakers. When a strong wind crosses a border region, air pollutants can be easily carried from one place to another, regardless of their origins. The city of Mexicali, the state capital of Baja California in Mexico, lies 189 km inland from the Pacific Coast. However it is also on the Mexico/California border at the lower end of California’s Imperial Valley. Mexicali is adjacent to the Californian city of Calexico and 20 km south of the Imperial county seat El Centro. Airflow to Mexicali is channeled by the Imperial Valley and is usually from the northwest or southeast, with northwesterly winds being most frequent. During the period from March 1992 through August 1993, hourly PM10 (i.e., particles with aerodynamic diameter 10 µm) concentrations were higher in the border area during southerly than northerly flow. For wind flow patterns in both directions, PM10 initially decreased with wind speed due to improved ventilation, then increased at high wind speeds due to increased suspension of soil particles. On average, when the wind was blowing from Mexico (i.e., southerly flow), the PM10 flux at Calexico was three times greater than when the wind was blowing from the United States (i.e., northerly flow). However, because winds from the north were about twice as frequent as winds from the south, the total flux from Mexico was only about 1½ times the total flux from the United States (Chow et al., 2000). The distribution of water resources is extremely irregular in China. The northern part of the country is deficient in water, while the south is waterrich. The areas south of the Yangtze River, which account for only 37% of the

4

Cited from Jorgensen (1996, p. 200).

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country’s total territory, have 81% of its total water resources. However, the areas north of the Yangtze, which make up 63% of China’s territory, possess only 19% of the country’s total water resources (Chen and Cai, 2000). The precipitation is more than 1000 mm yr⫺1 in the southern part and more than 1600 mm yr⫺1 in the southern coastal area while it ranges from 100 to 800 mm yr⫺1 in the northern area. In particular, the Tarimu, Turpan and Qaidamu basins in Northwest region have less than 25 mm of precipitation per annum (see Table 2.1). The monthly precipitation has been rather uneven in both southern (such as Guangzhou and Shanghai) and northern (such as Beijing, Lanzhou, Shenyang, and Yinchuan) cities. Throughout China, rainfall usually occurs heavily in summer but not in winter. This is particularly so for Northwest cities (such as Lanzhou and Yinchuan), where there is almost no rainfall during October–May (Fig. 2.2). Water shortage has become a major economic bottleneck to some areas in north China (such as Liaohe River Valley in the northeast and Haihe River Valley around Tianjin). The North now accounts for 37% of the country’s total population, 45% of cultivated land, but only 12% of the total water resources. Over 80% direct water runoff in China takes place in the south, where cultivated land accounts for just 40% of the total. Since the 1980s, the Haihe and Yellow river valleys have been stricken by chronic drought. Yet, further south, about 1000 billion cubic meters of water from the Yangtze empties into the sea each year.5 Given the existence of surface water surplus in southern China and freshwater shortage in northern China, is it feasible to transfer water from the water-rich south to the north? Transfer project had been discussed for more than two decades before it was started on December 27, 2002. The South–North Water Diversion project involves the construction of three canals running 1300 km across the eastern, middle and western parts of China, linking the country’s four major rivers—the Yangtze, Yellow, Huaihe, and Haihe rivers. This gigantic project is expected to cost US$59 billion and to take Table 2.1. Annual precipitation, 2001 (in mm) Area

Precipitation

Southern China Coastal Area Changjiang River Valley Northern and Northeastern Area Northwestern Inland Tarim Basin, Turpan Basin and Qaidam Basin

1600–2000 1000–1500 400–800 100–200 ⱕ 25

Source: National Bureau of Statistics (2002). 5

Data source: www.china.org.cn/english/1477

38

R. Guo 500 Beijing

450

Guangzhou Lanzhou

400

Shanghai

Precipitation (mm)

350

Shenyang Yinchuan

300 250 200 150 100 50 0 1

2

3

4

5

6

7 Month

8

9

10

11

12

Figure 2.2. Monthly precipitations of selected cities in China. (Drawn by the author based on National Bureau of Statistics, 2002.)

50 years to complete. If all goes well, the South–North Water Diversion project will carry annually more than 40 billion tons of water from the Yangtze River basin to Beijing and the other north provinces. 2.3.2. Political influences

Different political systems meet at the border. This makes the cross-border management of natural and environmental resources much more complicated and difficult. The Tumen River delta has been one of the most complex heterogeneous border-areas in the world. Among the three sovereign countries of China, Russia, and North Korea that administer three parts of the delta area, socio-economic differences stemming from a transition from the centrally planned economies (CPEs) to open market economies can be clearly found. Specifically, the Russian Federation has adopted a radical strategy for the rapid transformation of its socio-economy into a free-market system while North Korea remains fixed in a virtually intact CPE system; China is nevertheless trying to reform its economy towards a socialist market system. The Tumen River Area Development Program (TRADP), announced with much fanfare by the United Nations’ Development Program (UNDP) in 1992, was promoted as the answer to the development of the Northeast Asian border area. This is now in danger of foundering because of the existing political differences between

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the three riparian states plus the additional involvement of South Korea and Mongolia. The complexities of the establishment of the TRADP are appareled by the difficulties in creating local governments in the cross-border regions. The Agreement between the United States of America and the United Mexican States on Cooperation for the Protection and Improvement of the Environment in the Border Area was signed in La Paz, Baja California Sur, Mexico on August 14, 1983, and entered into force on February 16, 1984. The binational efforts to protect and improve air quality in the border–area began with the signing of two annexes to the La Paz Agreement. Annex IV, signed in 1987, outlines a sulfur dioxide emission limit for border copper smelters. Annex V, signed in 1989, directs the United States and Mexico to assess the causes of and develop solutions to air quality problems in border sister cities. In addition to the La Paz Agreement, the Clean Air Act, as amended in 1990, authorizes the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), in cooperation with its counterpart Mexican agencies, to monitor and improve air quality in regions along the border (EPA, 2001, p. 27). The 1996 Ley General del Equilibrio Ecológico y la Protección al Ambiente (LGEEPA, or General Law of Ecological Balance and Environmental Protection) enables Mexico’s Secretaría de Medio Ambiente, Recursos Naturales, y Pesca (SEMARNAP, or Secretariat of Environment, Natural Resources, and Fisheries) to work to improve air quality in cities and the international border areas of the country. Both the United States and Mexico have set health-based ambient air quality standards. Cross-border problems, however, still exist, since each side (the US and Mexico) has its own standards to protect public health with an adequate margin of safety. This makes cross-border coordination meet difficulties. For example, the standard of Ozone (O3) (1 h average) is 0.11 ppm for Mexico, while it is 0.12 ppm for the United States; the standard of sulfur dioxide (SO2) (the arithmetic mean of 24 h) is 0.33 ppm for Mexico, while it is 0.14 ppm for the United States.6 Prior to the Second World War, international borders in the western Europe represented rigid barriers between the independent countries. In the post-war period, the borders have become increasingly permeable to the mobility of persons, goods, services, technology and information. Industrial and commercial expansion in border-regions has clearly generated economic benefits. However, it also has induced or intensified numerous problems that cannot be solved by one side of the border alone.7 Working through the Council of Europe, local and regional authorities from border-regions, and national 6

The detailed evidence can be found in Table 9.4 of Chapter 9. These problems include environmental pollution, transportation, public health, workers who commute across borders, legal and educational differences, and planning of land use. For more evidence, see Hansen (1985, pp. 12–13). 7

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ministers responsible for regional planning have developed a European Outline Convention on Transfrontier Cooperation. In 1979, this Convention was endorsed by the Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly. The nations that have signed the European Convention have agreed that they are resolved to promote transborder cooperation “as far as possible, and to contribute in this way to the economic and social progress of frontier regions and to the spirit of fellowship which unites the peoples of Europe” (Council of Europe, 1982, p. 2). The appendix to the Convention is particularly important because it sets forth an array of agreements, statutes, and contracts that could be used to formalize cooperative efforts in such areas as urban and regional development, transportation and communication, energy, environmental protection, education, health, tourism, disaster relief, culture, industrial development, and issues relating to movement of people across borders. The model cooperative mechanisms represent a graduated system ranging from simple consultation to the establishment of permanent organizations. Thus, transborder cooperation is treated as an evolving relationship that typically develops from a network of informal contracts to an increasing number and complexity of concrete arrangements that could eventually result in planning harmonization across borders (Hansen, 1985, p. 13). 2.3.3. Economic influences

Despite the current tendency towards global economic integration, the policies of economic development and environmental protection in developed countries differ from those of undeveloped countries. Consideration must be given to the different development stages of countries and the existence of old rules for international trade. Almost all developed countries have followed a development pattern that saw the creation of pollution-generating industrialization at the first stage of economic development and this was then corrected later on. These countries developed their economies at the cost of the wholesale depletion of natural resources and the growth of large-scale polluting industry, which saw, in particular, the unsustainable depletion of resources in order to bolster their economic development. When, at present, the environment has made improvements in most developed countries, many undeveloped countries are still on the road to repeat the development path others have followed. With the rapid development of economic globalization characterized by international industrial investment and trade since the late 20th century, environmental pollution and degradation has increased. Globally, economic development has been accompanied by the exploitation of large amounts of natural resources. Some resource-poor countries, such as Japan, rely on imported timber products for the processing of domestic packages, while poorer countries like the

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Republic of Congo rely on exporting the wood products to support their local economies. Technological innovations have made the harvesting of trees, particularly by clear felling, faster, easier and more destructive. Environmentalists have warned of calamity if rainforests are completely destroyed, the side effects of deforestation could be (1) Twenty-five percent of the world’s species lost by the end of this decade. Animals and plants that lived in the rainforests could then be lost forever. (2) Many important resources could be lost. Only a fraction of the rainforest vegetation has been tested for possible medical use. Wild strains of many of the world’s staple crops are in danger of being lost. (3) Indigenous inhabitants of the tropical rainforest may be displaced, their way of life and culture destroyed. (4) Greenhouse gases and carbon dioxide contribute to global warming. The burning of rainforests accounts for nearly 30% of the carbon dioxide released into the atmosphere. (5) Changes may occur in rainfall and air circulation and radiation from the sun may be greatly increased.8 Even though political regions positioned side by side and separated only by a common border may be very similar in natural geography, they may display enormous differences in their individual economic performance. The US–Mexican border area is a typical case in point. In Mexico in 1960, for example, the border municipalities averaged only US$640 per capita income per year, approximately one-fifth the average income in the United States for the same year. Still, the figure represented more than twice the average per capita income of other cities in Mexico. This suggests that despite their relative poverty, the Mexican border cities are prosperous relative to the rest of the nation. Proximity to Mexico, however, appears to lower the per capita income levels of many US border cities. Wage levels in 1977 for border towns such as Calexico, Eagle Pass, Laredo and Brownsville were only one half the average wage levels for the respective states. As one moves away from the border, towards El Centro, Yuma or Tucson, or in cities that have a more diversified economy, such as San Diego, the per capita incomes rise substantially (Herzog, 1990, p. 47). One result of this disparity is that corporate capital is drawn to the border region to take advantage of low wages, low tax rates, and lax public controls over labor standards and waste disposal. Mexican labor comes at 8 to 10 cents to the dollar compared with the United States. Under special provisions of legislation designed to encourage the relocation of assembly plant operations to

8

Cited from Columbus Zoo and Aquarium (2004).

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the Mexican side of the border but with goods destined for northern markets, American, Japanese, and Korean corporations have created nearly 500,000 jobs in Mexican border cities, from Tijuana to Brownsville, in the so-called maquila (in-bond) assembly plants. Some of them straddle the border in a unique arrangement of “twin” plants, with management and parts production located on the US side and the labor-intensive assembly operations on the Mexican side (Friedmann, 1993). Economic and population growth in the US–Mexico border area has had a significant effect on urban and regional air quality. Today, air pollution presents a major environmental risk for some border communities. Border residents are exposed to elevated concentrations of carbon monoxide, sulfur dioxide, ozone and particulate matter. Emissions from industrial sources; residential combustion for both heating and cooking; trash burning; and cars, trucks and buses and dust from unpaved roads are significant contributors to poor air quality. In some border communities, inhalation exposure to toxics, including pesticides, is another concern. In addition, air pollutant emissions within and outside the border region also threaten visibility in some border protected areas, such as the Big Bend National Park in Texas (EPA, 2001, p. 27). The economic barriers between Chinese provinces are another case in point. Since the advent of the administrative decentralization in the early 1980s, China’s national economy had become effectively “cellularized” into a plethora of semi-autarkic regional enclaves. Public finance, as an important component of the Chinese economic system, has undergone a series of reforms on the central–local relations. The main goals of these reforms were to decentralize the fiscal structure and to strengthen the incentive for local governments to collect more revenue for themselves. Obviously, the economic decentralization has been a major factor in China’s current economic success.9 However, these reforms have also had negative impacts on interprovincial relations. For example, in order to protect local market and revenue sources, it became common in China for some provinces to restrict import (export) from (to) other provinces by levying high, if informal, taxes and by creating nontariff barriers on commodities whose production is seen as important to their provincially “domestic” economies.10 Moreover, this unfair competition between provinces has created fierce economic “battlegrounds” in borderareas and there have been numerous examples of “trade embargoes” or “commodity wars” between provinces over, among other items, rice, wool, tobacco, soy beans and mineral products.11 9

See, for example, Oi (1992, pp. 99–129), Wong (1992), Shirk (1993) and Jin et al. (2001). See, for example, Shen and Dai (1990, pp. 1–13), and Li (1993, pp. 23–36). 11 More detailed evidences may be found in Sun (1993, pp. 95–104), Feng (1993, pp. 87–94) and Goodman (1994, pp. 1–20). 10

Resource management and cross-border areas

43

In India, the 1980s and 1990s witnessed a large-scale expansion of iron and coal mining activities, as a result of increased domestic and overseas demands driven by economic growth. The mining areas are subject to extensive land cover changes over a short period of time owing to demand for land, both for mining as well as for dumping of overburden and mine waste. This has resulted in extensive environmental degradation. Opencut mining generates degradation of land, changes the topography and both surface and groundwater hydrology, pollutes watercourses and agricultural land, and deteriorates air quality. In Goa, for example, mining is concentrating mainly in the cross-border areas of Bardez, Bicholim, Ponda, Quepem, Sanguem, Satari, and Tiswadi talukas. Altogether, the mining activities cover an area of about 50,000 ha, in which about 90,000 people reside in near 20,000 households. There are about 8720 ha of land area under lease with 42 operating leases in 1996 producing about 15 million tons of iron ore annually. A study conducted by Sreekesh (1999, pp. 77–86) shows that there has been large-scale expansion of mining activities in the region from 1988 to 1997. In the mining areas, land has been utilized and converted into mine pits, waste dumps, ore stacking, beneficiation plants, tailing ponds, settlements, and offices. The mine pits showed the highest growth in terms of area. There has been an increase of about 900 ha of land under mine pits and sumps. At many places, the mining has reached the aquifer, necessitating excessive pumping of groundwater. During the 1988–1997 period, 342 ha of land were converted into dumps covering an area of about 1300 ha of land lay scattered in and around the mines. This land was subjected to extensive erosion. More than 80% of the dumps are wastelands. The silt from these sumps degrades agricultural land and streams. There is a phenomenal reduction in the vegetation cover, down to only 15%, in the study area over the same period. 2.3.4. Cultural influences

In some cross-border areas, especially in those where there exist two or more distinctive cultural identities, the cross-cultural influences on the management of natural and environmental resources are particularly significant. Without intercultural collaboration, management targets are unlikely to be met. These targets will be easily deflected by new or reinterpreted ecological, cultural, economic, environmental and geographic information. If people with different perspectives are unable to assess options for appropriate reactions to such cross-border resource management, then unnecessary conflict and inefficient outcomes are inevitable. Owing to the existence of geographical remoteness on the one hand and great intercultural disagreement on the other, the crosscultural resource management will always be a difficult task in marginalized border areas.

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The scarcity of fresh water in the Middle East is connected not only to meteorological and geographic but also to demographic factors. Throughout most of the region rainfall is irregular. The rainy season is short, between 6 and 8 months a year, and rainfall varies between 250 and 400 mm annually. This is insufficient for basic agriculture which requires at least 400 mm of regular rainfall. Irrigated agriculture is further restricted because there are few major rivers (Grunfeld, 1997). Furthermore, there is the issue of the vastly expanding population. This population growth stems from two sources. In Jordan, the population increase is due to natural birthrate but in Israel large waves of immigrants in the years following the Second World War have increased the population. The prospect of substantial increases in water demand in the coming years renders it imperative that a solution be found to Palestine’s water shortage. Both the Israeli and Palestinian populations are expected to increase dramatically (see Table 2.2). This is expected to heighten demand on water resources. The Middle East is a region of ideological, religious, and geo-political differences. In the past decades, Israel and Jordan have searched for alternatives to maximize the use of fresh water from the Jordan River. However, each country has developed independent solutions all of which are very expensive. Both Israel and Jordan have come to realize that water resources need protection (Abu-Taleb, 1994, p. 37). Nevertheless, the two countries possess different standards of living: Israel, a first world country, concerns itself with environmental issues and sustainable solutions, while Jordan, a developing country, does not have the ability to deal with such problems (Copaken, 1996, p. 86). Australia’s Kakadu National Park (KNP) comprises almost 20,000 sq. km of savannah woodlands, open eucalypt forest, floodplains, mangroves, billabongs, sandstone plateau and escarpment country. The area is rich in ecological and biological diversity. KNP is an Aboriginal cultural landscape: it represents the combined works of the interaction of nature and humankind and reflects specific traditional techniques of sustainable land use (KBMPA, 1998, p. 3). The Brucellosis and Tuberculosis Eradication Campaign (BTEC) was a Table 2.2. Population growth projections for Israel and Palestine (in persons) Year

Israel

Gaza

West Bank

Palestine

1990 2000 2010 2020

4,559,000 6,023,000 6,695,200 7,457,200

711,000 1,162,000 1,639,900 2,203,900

1,326,000 2,289,400 3,317,000 4,015,600

2,037,500 3,451,900 4,776,900 6,219,500

Source: www.arij.org.pub/wconflict/#as_h2_27992.

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national program to eliminate tuberculosis and brucellosis from Australia’s bovine livestock. However, the successful feral animal management requires flexible and appropriate decision-making processes that not only allow disparate values to be recognized but also to influence outcomes. In Australia’s Northern Territory (NT), the introduced Asian water buffalo (Bubalus bubalis) has the potential to support a significant rural industry. In contrast, environmentalists point to damage done by high buffalo densities on the NT’s floodplains and celebrate reduction of feral herds. Park management and Aboriginal evaluations of the condition of these floodplains since buffalo were reduced note subsequent environmental changes such as the development of dense vegetation that displaces important fauna, inhibits hunting and foraging, and increases vulnerability to wildfires. Local aboriginal people call buffalo Nganabbarru; a culturally and economically important resource hunted and eaten by many (Robinson and Whitehead, 2003). Aboriginal people also have a proud history of participation in the former buffalo industry and have retained strong cultural associations with the animals.12 Following the Second World War and the departure of the colonial powers, Myanmar and Thailand have sought to create separate national identities within their respective territories. These “imagined communities” have been based on the preeminence of the cultures of the dominant Burmese and Thai peoples of the low lands. Confronted with this process, the Karen hill tribes sought refuge in their own state of Kawthoolei, a remote territory on the Thai–Burmese border that was traditionally not subject to either Thai or Burmese control. As a result, the Karen history is often portrayed as an ethnic struggle between the Karen and the more powerful Burmese and Thai peoples. Yet the political significance attached to ethnicity is of comparatively recent origin. The construction of a Karen identity in Myanmar is linked to the policies and practices of colonial officials and missionaries. Under British rule, a distinctive Karen identity developed that was expressed through a separate language, education system and culture. Since 1949, the Thai and Burmese states have exerted greater control over their respective territories, progressively eliminating Karen territory. Consequently, the Karen identity has been forged in the context of pressures from the Burmese and Thai political economies, but it has also been based on a close affiliation with the forests that once covered most of Kawthoolei. Forest use and management has long been an important part of Karen livelihoods. As the Karen were traditionally rural dwellers, forest use and management was inevitably an important part of their life and identity. However, the

12

Based on an e-mail correspondence with Dr. David Lawrence of The Australian National University on December 6, 2004.

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Karen are ethnically heterogeneous, and their use of the forests varied from place to place depending on local social and ecological conditions. In areas where shifting cultivation was practiced, the forest was burned to provide fertilizer for agricultural crops. It was then allowed to grow back for ten or more years until conditions were again right for agricultural production. The forests were also carefully managed so as to provide timber, fuel-wood, fruit, nuts, medicinal products and game.13

13

Based on Bryant (1997).

47

Chapter 3 Can cross-border resources be optimally managed? 3.1. Resource management under a single regime

“Regime” refers to an organization that is the governing authority of a political unit. More precisely, it is “a set of agreed-upon principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures, which govern the negotiations, establishment of agencies, and other interactions by international participants in the area of a specific political issue.”1 Can natural and environmental resources be optimally managed under a single regime? If yes, how? To answer this question, let us first consider a traditional example that has been frequently used by environmental economists. Fig. 3.1 illustrates a highly simplified graphical form for a given fishery. Axis x of this figure represents different levels of effort, and axis y is a measure of total yield (in revenue) of fishery. The curve TC is an aggregate cost curve (based on the simplifying assumption of linear costs with respect to the

Maximum sustainable yield S

y yS

Equilibrium yield

TC

E yE

TR

0

xS

xE

x

Figure 3.1. The equilibrium and maximum sustainable yields of fishery.

1

Source: www.globalchange.org/glossall/glossp-r.htm

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level of effort. And TR is a sustainable yield curve reflecting the fact that harvest per unit of effort will eventually decline due to both stock depletion and crowding in the fishery. The concept of “maximum sustainable yield” (that is, point S) suggests harvesting any given stock at the level that permits the greatest annual harvest over long run. It is, therefore, essentially a biological standard. In the absence of controls, the equilibrium will occur at the intersection of the curves where the total revenue of the fleet is just sufficient to cover the total costs and there is no true profit (see point E). This analysis induces several important implications. Common property arrangements without controls will tend to produce stock depletions in the sense that the equilibrium point will typically occur at a level of yield distinctly below the level of “maximum sustainable yield” for the stock in question. They will also be economically inefficient in the sense that they generate situations in which total benefit and costs, rather than marginal benefits and costs, are equal. Under these circumstances, a reduction in effort would actually lead to an increase in yield from the fishery as well as creating some economic profit (Young, 1977, p. 63). If the fishery falls within the jurisdiction of a single regime, the maximum sustainable yield derived from the above analysis could be easily adopted by the regime as its long-term fishing policy. However, if the fishery falls under the jurisdictions of two or more regimes, the problem could not be solved easily. This can be described by an interesting dilemma faced by fishermen: “If a fishery is subject to open access, every fisherman will harvest too many fish because each has little to gain from conservation. If the current rate of harvest is reduced, growth in the total stock of the fishery is likely to be greater and hence the stock should support a greater rate of harvest in the future. But if one fisherman reduces his harvest, and this fisherman is only one among many, he could only hope to recover (at best) only a small portion of the extra future harvest, most (if not all) of it will be garbled by the other fishermen. Every other fisherman faces exactly the same incentive. Although every fisherman could be better off if use of the resource were reduced by all, each has a private incentive to overexploit the fish population.”2 Obviously, under the shadowy influence of the incentives, the most possible consequence of the above fishery example would be the overexploitation of the scarce fishery resource until it is exhausted. The fishery example illustrates a phenomenon that is common to many social and economic problems in which the private incentives of independent agents (like the slippery fishermen as above) prevent the agents from reaching an outcome that makes all the agents better off. If the resource is under the jurisdiction of a single government, the exploitation of it can be easily coordinated by the government itself.

2

Cited from Barrett (1992, p. 11).

Can cross-border resources be optimally managed?

49

But if the resource is located at cross-border areas and subject to open access to more than one regime, the problem cannot be solved so easily by one side of the border alone but need consistent cross-border cooperation between all parties concerned. With regard to the management of natural and environmental resources under a single regime, there at least exist the following stakeholders—government, industry and community. Although all the stakeholders face the problems of the management of natural and environmental resources, the nature and degree of the problems differ. A community, as a comprehensive concept, can be defined as a society that is made up of a certain number of citizens within a given area of a nation. Although communities have different formation and take various actions, they always compel polluters to control pollution or get compensation by negotiation with the polluters. The public awakening of environmental consciousness is recognized as the beginning of the participation in natural and environmental management. A series of laws and standard systems have been formulated to the management of resource and environment throughout the world, the enforcement of them, however, is fairly weak, especially in developing countries. The reason for this phenomenon results from a combination of factors, including not only the weakness of environmental and legal consciousness of manufacturers, but also the limits of generative capability in technology and capital. With the improvement of environmental consciousness, various forms of non-governmental organizations and communities have gradually become an informal governor of natural and environmental resources. 3.2. Resource management under N regimes 3.2.1. Assumptions

Can cross-border resource management be optimized? My investigation into this question is based on a highly simplified spatial model. To develop this model, I assume that a geographical area is equally divided in size by N regimes, each of which has a different political system from the others. Furthermore, in order to make my analysis clearer and more concrete, I use the following assumptions: (1) All necessary production factors (such as labor force, capital, technology, natural resource, information, etc.) are both scarcely and unevenly distributed within the area. (2) The production factors can flow more freely within each sub-area than between the N sub-areas of the area when N ⱖ 2. (3) Each of the N sub-areas has at least one comparatively advantageous (or disadvantageous) sector over the other(s) when N ⱖ 2.

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(4) Transport and communication cost within each sub-area is too little to influence the preference of the sub-area in allocating its production factors. (5) The objective of each sub-area is to optimize its well being through the behavior of its agents. In fact, Assumption 1 is not ad hoc in the real world. Assumption 2 is a basic law if border-related barriers exist. Since each sub-area is different and independent from the others, inter-area (cross-border) cooperation is more difficult and costly than intra-area cooperation. In the real world, Assumption 3 is the sine qua non for the sub-areas to develop cross-border cooperation after the border-related barriers are removed or reduced. Technically, Assumption 4, which is widely used in most spatial economic analyses, allows the intra-area cooperation to become profitable within each of the N sub-areas when N decreases (or, in other words, when the size of each sub-area increases). Finally, Assumption 5 serves as an indispensable condition under which the output of each sub-area and the total output of the area as a whole can be optimized, respectively. 3.2.2. A N-d model

On the basis of the above assumptions, we can develop a spatial optimization model for cross-border resource management. To begin with the analysis, let us first assume that the target area (S) is under the administration of a single regime (i.e., N ⫽ 1). For the sake of expositional ease, m policy variables are used here to denote the production factors (such as labor force, capital, technology, natural resource, information, etc.), i.e., X1 ⫽ (X111, X112, ..., X11m). In addition, the constraints for the m policy variables are noted as g1(X1) ∈g1, and the objective of the regime is defined as a function of the policy variable set X1, i.e., f1(X1). According to Assumption 5, f1(X 1) can be optimized via the following formula: max f1(X1) s. t.

g1(X1) ∈ g1 X1 ∈ (0, ⬁)

冦

(3.1)

According to Assumptions 1–5 stated in Section 3.2.1, we can obtain an optimal solution for the 1-d system from model (3.1), i.e., * * * , X112 , ..., X11m ) F1*⫽ f1(X 1*) where X 1*⫽ (X111

Assume that the area (S) is now divided into two independent sub-areas (S1, S2), the policy variables of which are defined as X 21 ⫽ (X211, X212, ..., X21m) and X 22 ⫽ (X221, X222, ..., X22m), respectively. The technical implications of X 21 and X22

Can cross-border resources be optimally managed?

51

follow that of X 1. The constraints for the two sub-areas are denoted by g21(X 21) and g22(X 22), respectively. S1 and S2 are now politically separated, the constraints for each sub-area become more tightened than that for the 1-d system, i.e., g21(X 21)⊂g1, g22(X 22)⊂g1 and g21(X 21)∪g22(X 22) ⫽ g1. f21(X 21) and f22(X 22) are defined as two independent objective functions for the sub-areas S1 and S2, respectively. According to Assumption 5, f21(X 21) and f22(X 22) can be optimized via the following formula: max P21 f21(X 21) ⫹ P 22 f22(X 22)

s. t.

冦

g21 (X 21) ∈ g21 g22 (X 22) ∈ g22 X 21 ∈ (0, ⬁) X 22 ∈ (0, ⬁) P21 ∈ (0, ⬁) P22 ∈ (0, ⬁)

(3.2)

In model (3.2), P21 and P22 are set to identify the priorities under which the first and second systems (S1, S2) are optimized, respectively. Obviously, when P21 ⬎ P22, the optimization of S1 is given a higher priority than that of S2; when P21 ⫽ P22, S1 and S2 are equally treated. According to Assumptions 1–5, the optimal solutions for S1 and S2 can be obtained from model (3.2): * * * * F 21 ⫽ f21(X 21*) where X 21* ⫽ (X 211 , X 212 , ..., X 21m ) * * * * F 22 ⫽ f22(X 22*) where X 22* ⫽ (X 221 , X 222 , ..., X 22m ) * * The total output value of the 2-d system is F 2* ⫽ F 21 ⫹ F 22 ⫽ f21(X 21*) ⫹ f22(X 22*). On the basis of Assumptions 1–5, we may prove that the optimized output of the 2-d system expressed by model (3.2) will not in any case exceed that of the 1-d system expressed by model (3.1), i.e.,

F 2* ⱕ F 1* Proof. Suppose that the two independent sub-areas (S1 and S2) in model (3.2) are merged into an area that is under the administration of a single regime. As a result, the constraints of the two sub-areas become g21(X 21)∪g22(X 22) ⫽ g2(X 21, X 22) and g21∪g22 ⫽ g2

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Now, model (3.2) becomes max P 21f21(X 21) ⫹ P22 f22(X 22)

冦

g2 (X 21, X 22) ∈ g2 X 21 ∈ (0, ⬁) s. t. X 22 ∈ (0, ⬁) P21 ∈ (0, ⬁) P22 ∈ (0, ⬁)

(3.2a)

The optimal output for S1 and S2 as a whole can be obtained from model * * (3.3a): C2* ⫽ C 21 ⫹ C*22, where C 21 ⫽ f21(X 21*), and C*22 ⫽ f22(X 22*). Since the constraints of model (3.2a) (i.e., g21 and g22) are more relaxed than those of model (3.2) (i.e., g2⫽g21∪g22), we have C2* ⱖ F 2* Let us compare models (3.2a) and (3.1). Since the inter-area barriers have been removed, the objective functions of the two sub-areas (S1, S2) can be merged as F2(X 2) ⫽ f21(X 21)∪f22(X 22). Therefore, model (3.2a) now becomes max f2(X 2)

冦

g21(X 21) ⫹ g22(X 22) ∈ g1 s. t. X 21 ∈ (0, ⬁) X 22 ∈ (0, ⬁)

(3.2b)

After having compared models (3.2b) and (3.2), we can find that the optimal output of model (3.2b) (C 2*) will not in any case exceed that of model (3.1) (F 1*), i.e., C2* ⱕ F 1*. As a result, we have F2* ⱕ C2* ⱕ F1*.QED Next, let us assume that the area (S) is now composed of N independent sub-areas (S1, S2, ..., SN). The policy variable set of the ith sub-area (Si) is defined as X ni ⫽ (Xni1, Xni2, ..., Xnim) (i ⫽ 1, 2, ..., N). The technical implications of X ni are as those of X1. The constraints for the ith sub-area are noted as gni(X ni) (i ⫽ 1, 2, ..., N). In addition, as all sub-areas are now separated from each other, the constraints for all sub-areas may be expressed as gni(X ni)傺g1 and gn1(X n1)∪gn2(X n2)∪…∪gnN(X nN) ⫽ g1 fni(Xni) (i ⫽ 1, 2, ..., N) stands for the objective function of the ith sub-area. As defined in Assumption 5, fn1(X n1), fn2(X n2), ... and fnN (X nN) should be optimized, respectively. Finally, the

Can cross-border resources be optimally managed?

53

optimization of the N-d system is written as N

max

P ni fni (X ni) 冱 i⫽1

冦

gni (X ni) ∈ gni ni s. t. X ∈ (0, ⬁) ni P ∈ (0, ⬁) (i ⫽ 1, 2, …, N)

(3.3)

In model (3.3), Pni is set to identify the priority under which the ith sub-area (i ⫽ 1, 2, ..., N) is optimized. Obviously, when Pni ⫽ Pnj (i ⫽ 1, 2, ..., N; j ⫽ 1, 2, ..., N; and i ⫽ j) it implies that the ith and jth sub-areas (Si, Sj) are unequally treated and that the larger the parameter of Pni (i ⫽ 1, 2, ..., N), the higher priority is given for the optimization of Si (i ⫽ 1, 2, ..., N); when Pni ⫽Pnj, Si and Sj are equally treated. Similarly, model (3.3) yields an optimal solution for Si, i.e., * * * F ni* ⫽ fni (X ni*) where X ni* ⫽ (X ni1 , X ni2 , ..., X nim ) * * The total output value of the N-d system is F N* ⫽ F n1 ⫹ F n2 ⫹ ... ⫹ F *nN. 3 Applying the approach mentioned above, it can be proved that, under Assumptions 1–5, the largest output of an i-d system (Fi) decreases with respect to i, i.e., * F N* ⬍ F N⫺1 ⬍ … ⬍ F 2* ⬍ F 1* where Fi* ⱖ 0 and i ⫽ 1, 3 …, N (3.4)

On the basis of formula (3.4), we have the following Proposition. The profitability of a cross-border resource management usually decreases with respect to the number of independent sub-areas involved in the area, if border-related barriers exist. 3.3. Obstacles for cross-border resource management 3.3.1. Political and institutional barriers

Without good reason, the path of cross-border management of natural and environmental resources is not a smooth one, especially in countries that have different political, institutional and cultural systems. The US–Mexico border area is an interesting example in this regard. In contrast to the US, Mexico is highly centralized. Political power flows from the presidency in Mexico city as do 3

More detailed analysis can be found in Guo (1995).

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economic resources. Thus, local governments are relatively weak in Mexico. Traditionally, Mexican municipalities have had no secure and adequate source of funding so they have relied on state and federal governments. There is no civil service in Mexico, so with each new municipal governor, or president, there is massive turnover in administrative staff. This makes continuity in programs difficult and works against continuity in cross-border cooperation. There are few direct governmental and administrative counterparts across the border. Areas that are local responsibilities on the US side are often state or federal responsibilities in Baja California. California local governments are able to raise financing for infrastructure through bonding and taxing mechanisms, but these options are extremely limited in Baja California and Mexico (Ganster, 1996). Establishing legislation to control the international and cross-border pollution has proved to be far more difficult than was ever envisaged. The major difficulty relates to the fact that any such transaction will tend to involve a complex network of different countries. For example, European Union (EU) member and nonmember countries may become involved in such a transaction by being designated as sources, destinations; or transit zones, and this greatly increases the complexity of any applicable legislation. Another problem relates to the fact that only classified wastes are controlled by the EU states’ waste disposal legislation, whereas recoverable materials meant for recycling remain uncontrolled. Certain types of recoverable substance go for recovery because the cost is less than the disposal cost of the material as waste. A large number of materials can either be wastes or recyclable, depending on circumstances (Asante-Duah and Nagy, 2001, p. 782). Even inside a sovereign nation, difficulties in cross-border resource management also exist. Here is an example from the Indian context. The Singrauli area lies across the common border of Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh, and is located 200 km approximately from Varanasi. The area includes the blocks of Waishan, Chitrangi and Deosar in Sidhi district of Madhya Pradesh, and Muirpur and Chopan in Sonebhadra district of Uttar Pradesh. It covers a total land area of about 3533 sq. km, with a population of 0.635 million in 1991, 0.76 million in 1997, and more than 1 million in the first decade of 21st century. The Singrauli coalfields are estimated to contain reserves of nearly 10,850 million tons and are capable of supporting 20,000 MW of installed generating capacity in the region for over 130 years. Major environmental problems have been created through the activities of the opencast coal mines, waste generation from power production, and pollution caused by large formal sector industries. Paramount among these problems are: ● ●

Alienation of land through its use for overburden dumps and fly ash disposal. Pollution of water courses and the GBP (Govind Ballabh Pant) Sagar from mine run-off and industrial effluents.

Can cross-border resources be optimally managed? ●

55

Air pollution through stack emissions of SPM (suspended particular matter), NOx (nitrogen oxide), SOx (sulfur oxide), and from dust and smoke associated with mining operations.4

Most of these activities owing to their nature, scale, and spatial distribution have serious ecological implications and, therefore, have led to considerable degradation of the environment of the region that remained relatively isolated and ecologically undisturbed for centuries. However, the first activity that altered the natural environment of the region was to a great extent the construction of a dam on the Rihand River during 1960–1961. Besides, since the region straddles Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh jurisdictions, it is relatively isolated from the main centers of political power, and is governed by weak and fragmented institutions (Meshram and Joadder, 1999, p. 101). 3.3.2. Economic inequality

As a result of the diverse growth processes, national income levels have differed throughout the world. For example, measured in the nominal values, the per capita GNPs of Luxembourg, Liechtenstein, Switzerland, Norway, Japan, Denmark, and United States have exceeded US$30,000. By contrast, GuineaBissau, Mozambique, Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo have had only a per capita GNP of US$100 or less. Even inside sovereign countries, large interregional economic inequalities also exist, especially in developing and transition economies such as China, Indonesia, India and the former Yugoslavia. Since rich and poor countries and areas are unequal parties in their contributions to international and interregional cross-border environmental degradation problems, the poor countries and areas tend to be skeptical of the efforts and strategies taken by the rich states and areas toward cross-border environmental protection. It has been generally realized that the probable cost of preventative measures taken against environmental degradation will generally be less than the cost to repair a damaged environment. Most poor countries and areas however, argue, that it is unfair for them to have to bear the same burden for environmental protection as the rich countries and areas, since most of the present environmental degradation problems may be attributed to activities by the rich world in the creation of their wealth. Thus, it is logical to suggest that the rich should take substantial action and bear most of the cost needed to ameliorate the damage that has already been done to the environment.

4

Based on Meshram and Joadder (1999, pp. 89–90).

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Without the active cooperation by all partners concerned, the cross-border environment problems would not be solved completely. Only the joint effort can contribute to an effective solution to the cross-border environmental problems that both the rich and the poor face. However, we should come to realize that the question is not whether actions should be jointly taken by all the partners, but how to assign equitable and fair levels of responsibilities to all of them. The developing countries argue, and reasonably so, that treaties and multilateral agreements should not place the same burdens on all nations, but rather should recognize the notion of equity and provide for special treatment of developing economies, by allowing such countries to meet much lighter burdens. In fact, differences exist, and will probably always exist, in environmental management policies adopted by various countries or regions, consistent with each nation’s overall development and sustainability goals (Asante-Duah and Nagy, 2001, p. 784). 3.3.3. Social uncertainty and instability

The cross-border management of natural and environmental resources is one of the most important topics in cross-border area studies. It has also been one of the major obstacles for developing and transition nations differing in economic, political and cultural systems to implement sustainable development strategies (Guo and Yang, 2003). Under certain circumstances, conflicts may arise because national interests differ and nations develop diverging policies and plans which are not compatible (Kirmani, 1990; Frey, 1993; Wolf, 1998; Savenije and van der Zaag, 2000). Freshwater resources are distributed very unevenly around the world. Regions such as Europe and the Americas generally contain ample freshwater resources, while other regions such as the Middle East and South Asia face increasingly severe water shortages (at least seasonally). Besides, there are significant differences in terms of the creation and success of cross-border institutions to manage cross-border rivers. For example, Europe has had longstanding international organizations to oversee the Danube and Rhine Rivers, and North America has seen about a century of bilateral US–Canadian and US–Mexican institutions for the management of cross-border water resources, while there has been little success in managing rivers in the Middle East and South Asia. Table 3.1 shows details about the major cross-border disputes on the international rivers in Americas, Western Europe and Middle East from 1816 to 2001.5 There are a total number of 28 dyadic river claims in the Americas, 47 in the

5

The relevant articles would include Cooley (1984) and a variety of empirical analyses in more recent years, which include, for example, Gunër (1998) and Toset et al. (2000).

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Can cross-border resources be optimally managed? Table 3.1. The cross-border disputes at selected international rivers, 1816–2001 Primary (secondary) river

Claim description

Challenger-target

Date

St. Lawrence River (Niagara) Chicago Diversion Milk River (St. Mary’s) St. Mary’s Diversion Milk River Diversion Red River (Souris) Garrison Diversion

Canada–USA UK (Canada)–USA USA–UK (Canada) Canada–USA

Red River (Souris-Sheyenne) Souris River Columbia River (Kootenay-Frasier) Skagit River Taku River Colorado River

Devil’s Lake Diversion Rafferty-Alameda Dam Libby Dam

Canada–USA Canada–USA Canada–USA

1925–1932 1902–1909 1904–1909 1973–1986 1999– 1997– 1989–1992 1951–1961

High Ross Dam Tulsequah Chief Mine Alamo Canal Colorado Apportionment Wellton-Mohawk Salinity All-American Canal Sealing Upper Rio Grande Lower Rio Grande Mexican Water Release San Juan Navigation Petroecuador Oil Spill Segredo Reservoir Itaipú Dam Yacyreta Dam Río Paraguay Navigation Lower Pilcomayo Diversion Uruguay River Border Mauri Irrigation Project Lauca Diversion Silala Fees (Ductec) Albert Canal German Hydroelectric Plan Grand Canal d’Alsace Alsace Salt Releases Scheldt/Wielingen Navigation Lake Lanoux Diversion National Hydrological Plan Lake Huleh Diversion

Canada–USA USA–Canada Mexico–USA Mexico–USA Mexico–USA Mexico–USA

1972–1984 1998– 1901–1904 1905–1944 1961–1973 1989–1999

Mexico–USA USA–Mexico USA–Mexico Costa Rica–Nicaragua Peru–Ecuador Argentina–Brazil Argentina–Brazil Paraguay–Argentina Paraguay–Argentina Paraguay–Argentina

1900–1906 1924–1944 2000– 1982– 1992–1992 1998–1998 1972–1979 1973–1979 1941–1967 1980–1983

Argentina–Uruguay Bolivia–Chile Bolivia–Chile Chile–Bolivia Netherlands–Belgium Switzerland–Germany

1900–1973 1921–1922 1939–1978 1999– 1930–1937 1918–1918

Switzerland–France Netherlands–France Belgium–Netherlands

1919–1922 1979–1982 1919–1932

Spain–France Portugal–Spain

1917–1967 1993–2000

Syria–Israel Jordan–Israel Syria–Israel

1951–1951 1951–1953 1953–1954 1961–1966

Río Grande

San Juan River Napo River Iguazú River Paraná River Paraguay River Pilcomayo River Uruguay River (La Plata) Mauri River Lauca River Silala River Meuse River Rhine River

Scheldt River Segre River (Ariege-Carol) Duero–Tejo–Guadiana Rivers Jordan River

DMZ Diversion National Water Carrier

(continued on next page)

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Table 3.1. (Continued) Primary (secondary) river Jordan River

Hasbani-Baniyas (Jordan)

Hasbani River (Jordan) Yarmuk River (Jordan)

Claim description

Challenger-target

DMZ Diversion National Water Carrier

Lebanon–Israel Syria–Israel UAR (Syria)–Israel Jordan–Israel Jordan–Israel Jordan–Israel Israel–Lebanon Israel–Syria Israel–Jordan Israel–Lebanon Israel–Syria Israel–Jordan Israel–Syria Israel–Jordan Israel–Jordan Jordan–Israel Israel–Jordan Jordan–Syria

Sewage Dumping West Bank Allocation Jordan Headwaters Diversion Wazzani Pipe Bunger Plan Unity Dam

East Ghor Canal (Yarmuk/Jordan)

East Ghor Canal

Yarmuk River

Yarmuk Diversions Golan Heights Dam

Euphrates River

Mafraq Spill Absolute Sovereignty Keban Dam Tabqa (Thawrah) Dam Lake Assad Ataturk Dam Karakaya Dam Iraqi Allocation Birecik Dam

Tigris/Euphrates Rivers Tigris River Shatt al–Arab

Iraqi Allocation Ilisu Dam Thalweg & Navigation

Syria–Israel Jordan–Israel Syria–Jordan Syria–Turkey Syria–Turkey Iraq–Syria Syria–Turkey Syria–Turkey Iraq–Turkey Syria–Turkey Iraq–Syria Iraq–Turkey Syria–Turkey Iraq–Turkey Iraq–Turkey Iran–UK (Iraq)

Iran–Iraq

Orontes River

Syrian Dam Plan

Turkey–Syria Turkey–UAR (Syria)

Source: Hensel et al. (2004).

Date 1956–1966 1956–1958 1959–1961 1956–1966 1989–1989 1989–1989 1964–1966 1964–1966 1964–1966 2001–2001 1953–1956 1953–1956 1987–1998 1987–1998 1969–1969 1976–1994 1999–1999 1987–1987 1992–1998 1997–1998 1997–1998 2000–2000 1964– 1964–1966 1975–1975 1983–1983 1984–1990 1990–1990 1986–1986 1988–1990 1993– 1995– 1988– 1999– 1921–1932 1958–1975 1979–1990 1932–1937 1953–1954 1959–1975 1956–1958 1961– 1958–1961

Can cross-border resources be optimally managed?

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Middle East, and seven in Western Europe. In sum, there are a total number of 762 claim dyad-year cases across all three regions, of which 361 in the Americas, 321 in the Middle East, and 80 in Western Europe.6 The main causes for these disputes are, among the others, water release or allocation, sewage dumping, oil spill, navigation, irrigation, as well as the building of dams, canals or reservoirs. Even inside a sovereign country, social uncertainty and instability also exists in cross-border areas. Most of China’s provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities directly under the central government are on a size and scale equivalent to a European country in population and land area. They are considerable political and economic systems in their own right. The differences between these provinces have long been a defining characteristic of China’s politics. In most cases, their boundaries were created over 2000 years ago (Gottmann, 1973). In addition, Chinese culture is not homogeneous across provinces. There is a broad range of ethnic and linguistic groups as well as religious adherents in the nation. Consequently, the chances of the adoption of a common standard between different groups of people are not likely to be enhanced if they have markedly differing religious beliefs and values (Goodman, 1997). China’s great diversity in physical geography, resource endowment, political economy and ethnical identity has given rise to many difficulties in interprovincial administration. For example, of China’s 66 interprovincial borderlines, 65 are disputed and have even been published, by the provincial level authorities in their official maps and documents (Zhang, 1990, p. 8), according to their own preferences. According to the statistics released by the Ministry of Civil Affairs, of the 52,000 km of interprovincial borders in the People’s Republic of China, only 5% are legally fixed; 77% are regarded as informal (or customary borderlines); and about 18% (about 9500 km) remain the subject of active dispute.7 According to the various sources, there were more than 800 cases of cross-border disputes in 333 of the 849 interprovincial border counties of almost all provinces. The total disputed areas (about 140,000 sq. km) include grassland (about 95,000 sq. km), mining field (about 4000 sq. km), arable land (about 3000 sq. km), forestry (about 2000 sq. km), water area (about 1000 sq. km), and mixed grass-mining-forestry area (about 30,000 sq. km) (Guo, 1993b, p. 176). In defiance of the State Council (1981, 1988) regulations concerning the resolution of interprovincial border disputes, many disputes became the subject of armed fights between different groups of 6 See Hensel et al. (2004). The claim dyad-year data include a separate dyadic observation for each year of an ongoing claim. For example, the Argentina–Uruguay claim over the Uruguay River (La Plata) Border persisted from 1900 to 1973, and thus contributes 74 cases to the claim dyad-year dataset. 7 See Beijing Youth, December 2, 2002 (available at www.sina.com.cn).

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Upper reach

Nation 1

International border River

Nation 2

Nation 3

Nation 4 Lower reach

Figure 3.2. The spatial mechanism of transnational water pollution.

people. This has seriously affected the social security and sustainability of economic development in those cross-border areas.8 3.3.4. Cross-border irreversibility

In many cross-border areas, the natural and human systems are interacting under irreversible conditions. This could make the cross-border management of natural and environmental resources become extremely difficult. Consider cross-border river as an example. Given one place in a river that receives pollutants, the water quality indicators differ significantly in the downstream and the upstream.9 The determination of water pollution will become more complicated when the rivers are serving as transnational boundaries. Suppose that, in the upper reach of a transnationally shared river (as shown in Fig. 3.2), Nation 1’s wastes discharged into the river may affect the water quality of Nation 2 (and, to a lesser extent, that of Nations 3 and 4 in the lower reaches eventually) more than that of Nation 1 itself; by contrast, in the lower reach of the river, water quality is jointly affected by the wastes discharged by Nations 3 and 4. Consequently, the incentives (disincentives) for the policymakers concerned to reduce (increase) the wastes discharged into the river differ from nation to nation. For example, Nation 1 will reduce the wastes discharged into the river, if it has reached an agreement concerning pollution

8

There will be a case study of interprovincial border disputes in Chapter 10. See Jackson and Jackson (2000, pp. 310–325) for different patterns of water pollution with respect to the distance in rivers. 9

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control with some (not all) of Nations 2, 3 and 4, but the reduction will be further promoted if the agreement has been reached by all the four nations. The difficulty in coordinating cross-border weather modification activities is another example in this regard. Largely due to the complicated pattern of clouds’ mobility and the frequently changing distribution of moisture in the skies, many issues related to rainmaking have apparently been ignored by rainmakers and policymakers. The first neglected issue is how to answer the question of who owns the right to use the extra water to be produced by cloud seeding. The answer to that question might depend on who owns the right to use the cloud resource. In contrast to Brooks (1949, p. 119), who analogized clouds to be like wild ducks flowing over the land, Davis (1968, p. 104) suggested that “clouds are rivers flowing through our skies.”10 Even more complicated is that of the deprivation of rainfall downwind from where cloud seeding has enhanced rainfall. Obviously, the downwind atmosphere (clear air and clouds together) has less water content as a result of the greater rainfall upwind, hours, or a day, earlier. If the upwind landowners have the legal right to use an artificial manner to receive a larger amount of rainfall than the naturally occurring rainfall, then downwind landowners are deprived of rainfall. The controversy over who gets access to which clouds demonstrates the need for regulations and agreements on the exploitation and utilization of scarce natural resources. However, as the rain cloud case study (shown below) emphasizes, conditions for scientific regulation have not been mature, since many inherent features of meteorology are still not known. For example, it has been difficult for meteorologists to test the effects of weather modification, such as determining precisely how much rainfall has been caused by rainmaking activities. The natural changes in the atmosphere are very fast and complex. Since it is not possible to observe the atmosphere everywhere and at all times, the data collected are not complete. The most effective way to manage rainfall is for government entities to coordinate efforts. The following cases can provide evidence in support of the above point of view. On July 25, 2004, the Meteorological Bureau of Jiangsu province in Southeast China conducted some unsuccessful precipitation enhancement activities in its five cities with close proximity to Shanghai municipality and Zhejiang province at the Yangtze River delta. It has been suggested that if the rainmaking activities had been coordinated and jointly conducted by the whole cities of the delta area, there would have been better effects. The reason is that each of the three provincial meteorological bureaus of Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Shanghai can only monitor the cloud movement for an area of up to 500 km in length. If the three provincial bureaus could share the monitored information

10

Cited from Standler (2002).

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and data that they collected on the cloud resources, the rainmakers could find more suitable time and locations to conduct more fruitful precipitation enhancement activities.11 Similar stories can be found in Jilin province in Northeast China. In areas around Mt. Changbai bordering with North Korea, the clouds’ complicated mobility and the frequently changing distribution of water vapor make the enterprise unpredictable. Jilin’s joint actions with its neighboring provinces (and perhaps with North Korea, if the latter also needs rainmaking for its own) on cloud-monitoring and cloud-seeding will have better results than the separate ones. But there existed little cooperation and combined action in that area, as an official of the Weather Modification Bureau of Jilin province said: “Although the effect would be great if several provinces work together when there is a huge cloud system in the sky, in reality, we seldom do that.”12 In China, when rare rain clouds appear over some often-parched regions, it has been a routine practice for workers at the local weather bureaus to roll out anti-aircraft guns and blast away at the sky. The shells that explode contain fine particles of silver iodide which scatter through the moisture-laden clouds. Provincial, county and municipal governments in almost all of Mainland China’s 31 provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities have set up weather modification bureaus assigned to regularly bombard the heavens with chemicals in the hope of extracting more rainfall for farmers and city dwellers among 1.3 billion residents of China’s. In contrast to the possible problems resulting from the wide use of the precipitation enhancement technology, China is facing severe shortage in water supplies. Consequently, the use of this rainmaking technology will continue. However, the utilization of this largely ineffective man-made precipitation enhancement technology will become an issue to be faced by all stakeholders concerned. With persistent drought still plaguing China, some neighboring regions have begun squabbling over the rights to clouds. The most hotly debated topic is that upwind neighbors will unfairly intercept clouds, thereby depriving downwind areas of rainfall. Given the severity of water scarcity, such sensitivity

11

Cited from www.dragontv.cn/detail.php?InfoID ⫽ 21232. Cited from Washington Post (2004, p. A12). There is also encouraging news reported by the People’s Daily (2004, p. 16). In 2004, more than 50 counties and cities in the interprovincial border area of Hubei, Henan, Sichuan, Shaanxi and Chongqing decided to establish a Regional Meteorological Community so as to share with each other the meteorological data and information and to jointly utilize the atmospheric resources. Moreover, China Meteorological Bureau also submitted a proposal concerning the construction of man-made precipitation enhancement bases in such areas as the upper reaches of Heihe River, the Qilianshan Mountain area, the upper reaches of Songhuajiang River, etc., so as to build up a mechanism of unified command and coordination for interprovincial rainmaking activities. 12

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is not surprising. A typical case of the accusation of “rain theft” arose in central China’s Henan province, after a heavy rainstorm in mid-2004. The following is the story in detail. From July 9 to 11, 2004, there was a piece of northeasternward-flowing cloud carrying rich water content in the sky of Nanyang in southern Henan province. This was really good news for all the northeastern administrative areas (including Pingdingshan, Zhumadian, Luohe and, Xuchang cities and Zhoukou prefecture), since most of these areas were in serious drought at that period. In order to obtain a larger share of rainfall for their own, the five cities and prefectures competed with each other, with thousands of rocket shells and old anti-aircraft guns shooting canisters of chemicals into the cloud. The final result of the rainmaking was significant but uneven in geographical distribution: the largest rainfall occurred in Pingdingshan and Xuchang cities (each with a rainfall of 100 mm or more); while Zhoukou prefecture, with the same input as the other four cities, had only a 27 mm rainfall in urban area and a meager 7 mm in the rural area where the need of rainfall was the most crying. Zhoukou officials complained that the neighboring cities had milked the cloud system nearly dry before it arrived in their area. Municipal officials later demanded legislation to regulate how to divvy up the clouds. Meteorologists in Zhoukou were accusing their counterparts in Pingdingshan of overusing natural resources by intercepting clouds that would have likely drifted to other places—say, like Zhoukou. Zhoukou’s meteorological officials said the Pingdingshan Weather Modification Office repeatedly seeded clouds that, if nature had been allowed to follow its course, would have scudded along to other places—such as Zhoukou—before delivering their rainfall.13

Indeed, the irrational utilization of cloud resources among the neighboring administrative areas is increasingly becoming a legal and institutional problem in China. Till now, China, like most of other countries, has not had any laws and administrative regulations dealing with the cloud resources as well as the rational application of man-made precipitation enhancement. If the disordered competition mentioned above in rainmaking continues to exist among the neighboring administrative areas, further conflicts will inevitably occur in cross-border areas.

13

Based on Liu (2004), China Daily (2004) and Washington Post (2004, p. A12).

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Chapter 4 Cross-border resource management: Methodological puzzles 4.1. Cross-border separation and resource management

Unrestricted access to natural and environmental resources and human greed leads directly to the misuse of these resources in cross-border areas. Irrational exploitation and utilization is the root of environmental problems. We must resolve problems about the true value of natural and environmental resources and make rational market decisions in order to exploit and utilize these resources wisely. Validity and scarcity are the chief characteristics of the natural and environmental resources. With increasing population and economic growth, the market will undersupply resources as a result of limited supply of the nature. Nature and environment has become scarce from the point of economics. Traditional economics focuses on environmental pollution of an individual country. Scholars believe that the solution of market failure caused by environmental pollution depends on government intervention. But the traditional economics cannot tackle international and global pollution. Effective management of public goods not only requires the participation of all stakeholders concerned but also calls for the active involvement of governments. The difference between global and local governance is that the former is open-ended. The characteristic of openness, when tackling environmental polluting, determines that it is a concept beyond the national sphere. Cross-border pollution in the narrow sense is defined as those pollutants that cross political boundaries due to natural forces, such as running water, wind velocity, atmospheric movements and ocean currents. This is called natural cross-border pollution. In addition, some pollutants are transferred by human actions. For example, highly polluting industries or pollutants in developed countries are exported to undeveloped counties when industries are relocated to avoid labor laws, environmental standards or for taxation minimization. This is called social cross-border pollution. Of course, it should be acknowledged that much of this removal of pollutants is a combination of both natural and social factors. Thereby, cross-border pollution in a broad sense embodies not only pollutants produced by natural factors, but also pollutants made by social factors. International and cross-border environmental pollution is different from other types of pollution because of its transnational diffusibility. According to

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“The 1979 Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution,” longrange, cross-border, air pollution is defined as “air pollution whose physical origin is situated wholly or in part within the area under the national jurisdiction of one State and which has adverse effects in the area under the jurisdiction of another State at such a distance that it is not generally possible to distinguish the contribution of individual emission sources or groups of sources” (UNECE, 1979). Negative external effects occur when pollution produced by a country does harm to its neighboring countries. The policymakers of the country producing the pollution have no need to take additional costs into account when they draft their environmental policies, unlike the neighboring country that is required to take externalities into account due to the impact of pollution from foreign sources. Global environmental pollution can cause negative external effects, whereas its control can produce positive external effects. The dilemma is that there is no central government that can formulate and implement environmental protection policies beyond sovereign states. The policies of any country are designed to take effect only within its frontier for international environmental cooperation is based on voluntary, nonbinding agreements. There is a wide range of impediments to the effectiveness of cross-border management of natural and environmental resources. Difficulties impeding crossborder resource management, as demonstrated by Hamilton et al. (1996) in a case study of protected area cooperation, for example, include the following aspects: (1) Difficult terrain, inaccessibility, lack of roads or rail across national frontiers impedes interchange. (2) Different (sometimes conflicting) laws may reduce the effectiveness of cross-border cooperation. (3) The need for cooperation may slow the response to emergency situations calling for rapid decisions. (4) Religious or cultural differences can cause misunderstanding and language barriers may have to be overcome. (5) Differential commitment and resources on each side of the border can lead to a dominant vs. weak situation. (6) The different levels of professional standards for corresponding staff may impede real equal-partner twinning. (7) Differences in the authority given to the two park superintendents or directors may produce difficulties in cross-border cooperation. (8) A lack of parity with regard to the ratification of international protocols or conventions may prevent their being used for cross-border cooperation. (9) Two or more countries may be at different stages of economic development and have incompatible policies related to resource utilization vs. resource protection.

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(10) Armed conflict, hostility, or political tensions make cross-border cooperation difficult or impossible. (11) Technical incompatibilities in communication, fire suppression equipment, GIS systems, etc. may impede cross-border cooperation. Consequently, an effective solution to the cross-border management of natural and environmental resources requires the joint efforts by all governments concerned. But global environmental problems can only be resolved on the basis of mutual trust and cooperation between sovereign states. This is particularly so between developed and undeveloped countries, for there is no superior governmental structure that can transcend sovereign states and formulate and implement logical policies of environmental protection. The developing countries undergoing industrialization have focused on natural resource exploitation. On the other hand, the developed countries take advantage of their political and economic superiority to transfer toxic pollutants and contaminating industry to undeveloped countries. This exacerbates the social and economic plight of the poor nations while benefiting the rich ones. In addition, the controlling tariffs enforced by developed countries greatly add to undeveloped countries’ difficulties in pursuing meaningful economic development. 4.2. Are there any cross-border environmental trajectories? 4.2.1. The environmental Kuznets curve

There is a long line of thought suggesting that environmental quality changes with respect to income level. Theoretical papers by Gruver (1976), John and Pecchenino (1992), and Seldon and Song (1995) have derived transition paths for pollution, abatement effort and development under alternative assumptions about social welfare functions, pollution damage, the cost of abatement, and the productivity of capital. Empirical studies (Hettige et al., 1992; Shafik, 1994; Selden and Song, 1994; Grossman and Krueger, 1995) have searched for systematic relationships by regressing cross-country measures of ambient air and water quality on various polynomial specifications of income per capita. In the empirical studies based on the cross-national data of the 1980s, Grossman and Krueger (1991) and Shafik and Bandyopadhyay (1992) demonstrate three types of relationships: (i) environmental quality (as indicated by “municipal wastes per capita” and “carbon dioxide emissions per capita”) declines steadily as incomes increase; (ii) environmental quality (as indicated by “population without safe water” and “urban population without adequate sanitation”) increases steadily as incomes increase; and (iii) environmental quality (as indicated by “urban concentration of particulate matter” and “urban concentrations of sulfur dioxide”) first declines but then increases with incomes increase.

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In a more synthesized term, the relationship between environmental pressures and income levels has been summarized to follow an inverted U curve.1 This phenomenon is also known as the environmental Kuznets curve (EKC), due to the similarity with the relationship between the level of inequality and income per capita considered by Kuznets (1955). According to the EKC hypothesis, environmental pressures increase as income level increases at the initial stage of economic development, but later these pressures diminish along with the income levels (see Fig. 4.1). The simplest form of the mathematical expression can be written as y ⫽ a ⫹ bx ⫹ cx2 ⫹ ε

(4.1)

Level of pollution

where y is the level of environmental damage, x the current level of per capita output, and ε the unobservable residual. a is constant, and b and c, to be estimated, reflect the influences of income level on environmental quality. Obviously, according to the EKC hypothesis, b ⬎ 0 and c ⬍ 0. The theoretical work has shown that a Kuznets, or inverted-U, relationship can result if a few plausible conditions are satisfied as income increases: constant or falling marginal utility of consumption; rising marginal disutility of pollution; constant or rising marginal pollution damage; and rising marginal abatement cost (Hettige et al., 1997). The empirical results are roughly consistent with a Kuznets curve for conventional air pollutants such as suspended particulates and sulfur dioxide, but the results for water pollution are mixed. In most cases, however, the implied trajectories are sensitive to inclusion of higher-order

Income level Figure 4.1.

Pollution as a function of income level (EKC hypothesis).

1 See, for example, Lucas et al. (1992), World Bank (1992, 1995), Panayton (1993), Selden and Song (1994), Shafik (1994), Grossman and Krueger (1995), Holtz-Eakin and Selden (1995) and Rock (1996).

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polynomial terms in income whose significance varies widely. Structural interpretation of the estimates remains ad hoc, since the existing studies have incorporated almost no evidence about actual emissions in developing countries. 4.2.2. Empirical evidence

Do cross-border areas follow the EKC hypothesis? To answer this question, we employ different categories of the data on the Lower Mekong Basin (LMB) from 1985 to 2000.2 The classification of these data is based on the following approaches: BORDER (representing “international border”); and ASEAN (representing “ASEAN membership”). Specifically, we divide the whole samples into four groups (as shown in the left column of Table 4.1) according to the following criteria: ●

●

BORDER ⫽ 1 for the sample to be collected at a place near an international border and 0 for otherwise; ASEAN ⫽ 1 for the sample to be collected at a place with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) membership and 0 for otherwise.

The water quality indicators of the LMB are represented by total phosphate (TOTP) and chemical oxygen demand (COD). The unit by which to measure the above indicators is mgL⫺1. Obviously, the estimated results, as shown in Table 4.1 and Fig. 4.2, are less statistically significant for BORDER to be equal to 1 than for otherwise. Thus, they suggest that the determination of water pollution is more complicated in cross-border areas than in other areas. In other words, when dealing with the determinants of cross-border water pollution, care should be taken with respect to the application of the EKC hypothesis; or the noneconomic factors should be included. As for the areas far away from the transnational borders at the LMB (i.e., for the samples when BORDER ⫽ 0), all the estimated coefficients of the explanatory variables are statistically significant at 1% level (see Table 4.1). However, their environmental implications differ in different circumstances. For example, when ASEAN ⫽ 0 (i.e., without the ASEAN membership), the water pollution either follows an U-shape curve with respect to income level (for the case of COD, or has nothing to do with income level (for the case of TOTP). Obviously, both of them are contradictory with the EKC hypothesis. On the other hand, however, when ASEAN ⫽ 1 (i.e., with the ASEAN membership), water pollution follows an inverted U-shape curve with respect to income level (with the turning point at US$4129 for the case of COD; and at US$3013 for the case of

2 More details about these data as well as an econometric analysis of the cross-border determinants of water pollution at the LMB can be found in Chapter 8.

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Table 4.1. The estimated results of environmental and economic relationships Sample type ASEAN

All

Explanatory

BORDER

variables

All

(Constant) ln GDPPC (ln GDPPC)2

0

1

(Constant) ln GDPPC (ln GDPPC)2

1

1

(Constant) ln GDPPC (ln GDPPC)2

0

0

(Constant) ln GDPPC (ln GDPPC)2

1

0

(Constant) ln GDPPC (ln GDPPC)2

Estimated results ln(TOTP)

ln(COD)

Coefficients

t-statistic

Coefficients

t- statistic

0.447 ⫺0.994 0.061 R2 = 0.110 ⫺3.381 ⫺0.042 0.027 R2 = 0.170 28.243 2.774 0.175 R2 = 0.478 ⫺8.616 2.210 ⫺0.208 R2 = 0.296 ⫺39.053 9.052 ⫺0.565 R2 = 0.296

0.447 ⫺1.732** 1.589 N = 875 ⫺0.111 ⫺0.05 0.040 N = 106 2.588* ⫺2.705* 2.543* N = 106 ⫺0.488 0.418 ⫺0.526 N = 322 ⫺5.835 5.319* ⫺5.257* N = 338

2.959 ⫺0.687 0.054 R2 = 0.110 13.055 ⫺3.850 0.308 R2 = 0.128 ⫺1.481 0.751 ⫺0.058 R2 = 0.192 97.636 ⫺28.937 2.153 R2 = 0.379 ⫺23.047 5.828 ⫺0.350 R2 = 0.524

1.774 ⫺1.534 1.809** N = 875 0.371 ⫺0.364 0.390 N = 105 ⫺0.149 0.298 ⫺0.363 N = 106 7.093 ⫺7.013* 6.977* N = 314 ⫺6.067 6.033* ⫺5.744* N = 336

Note: R2 and N are the coefficient of correlation and the number of observations, respectively. Source: Estimated by the author based on the ordinary least squares (OLS) method and the data in Chapter 8. * Denotes the estimated coefficients are significant at 1%. ** Denotes the estimated coefficients are significant at 10%.

TOTP).3 These results are consistent with the EKC hypothesis: pollution increases at first with respect to income level and then decreases after per capita GDP is larger than US$4129 (for COD) or US$3013 (for TOTP). It is worth noting that the ASEAN membership (i.e., ASEAN ⫽ 1) did not play any significant role in the water pollution reduction of the LMB’s transnational border areas (i.e., for BORDER to be equal to 1). This can be witnessed either by the insignificantly estimated inverted-U curve (in the case of COD) or by the U-shape curve (in the case of TOTP). These results indicate that the role of the ASEAN mechanism in transnational water pollution had not been significant for the data from 1985 to 2000. But since the whole sample I used 3 The turning point is obtained by deriving the first-order differential of the dependent variable (ln(COD) or ln(TOTP)) with respect to the explanatory variable (ln(GDPPC)) be zero.

71

Cross-border resource management: Methodological puzzles Samples: ASEAN=0; BORDER=1 0

-2

-1 lnTOTP

lnTOTP

Samples: ASEAN=0; BORDER=0 -1

-3 -4 -5 -6 6.0

-2 -3 -4

6.2

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-5 6.0

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-1 -2 -3 -4 -5 -6 6.0

(a)

6.5

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Figure 4.2. The environmental and economic relationships under different samples. (a) The relationships between TOTP and GDPPC (in natural log). (b) The relationships between COD and GDPPC (in natural log).

here can be controlled by many other variables such as the “Cold War” and other specific country dummies (including Vietnam, Thailand, Laos and Cambodia), a more sophisticated model may be needed before any conclusion about the determinants of transnational water pollution is reached.4 4

More detailed analysis can be found in Chapter 8.

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R. Guo Samples: ASEAN=0; BORDER=1 2.5

1.5

2.0

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(b) Figure 4.2.

7.5 8.0 lnGDPPC

8.5

9.0

9.5

(Continued)

4.3. Dilemmas in choosing cross-border management approaches 4.3.1. Unilateral approach

As shown in Chapter 3.2, the effectiveness of cross-border resource management is constrained by the number of independent stakeholders involved. The primary reasons for this come from the uneven spatial distribution of production

Cross-border resource management: Methodological puzzles

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factors as well as the non-cooperative cross-border mechanism resulting from two or more political regimes. Facing with these difficulties, policymakers would usually adopt a unilateral approach that is based on one side of the border. Precisely, the unilateral approach refers to the doctrine that nations should conduct their border-related affairs individualistically without the advice or involvement of other nations. China has a total length of over 22,000 km international land boundaries with 14 nations (Afghanistan, Bhutan, India, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Vietnam). In sum, China’s frontier regions include four provinces of Heilongjiang, Yunnan, Jilin and Liaoning and four autonomous regions of Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang, Tibet and Guangxi (see Table 4.2). In 1984, the Chinese government promulgated the “Provisional Regulations for the Management of “Small-volume” Border Trade” and opened hundreds of frontier cities and towns. Since the early 1990s, China has embarked on a deeper outward-looking policy in an attempt to promote the frontier development. Within a few of years, a series of flexible measures had been granted to those frontier regions. These measures include, inter alia, (1) “Measures Concerning the Supervision and Favorable Taxation for the People-to-People Trade in the Sino–Myanmar Border” (January 25, 1992, Office of Custom of the PRC). (2) “Notification Concerning the Further Opening up of the Four Frontier Cities of Heihe, Shuifenhe, Hunchun and Manzhouli” (1992, the State Council).

Table 4.2. China’s international land boundaries Frontier region

Neighboring countries (length of the borderline)

Gansu Guangxi Heilongjiang Inner Mongolia Jilin Liaoning Tibet Xinjiang

Mongolia (65 km) Vietnam (1020 km) Russia (3045 km) Mongolia (3640 km), Russia (560 km) North Korea (870 km), Russia (560 km) North Korea (546 km) India (1906 km), Nepal (1236 km), Bhutan (470 km), Myanmar (188 km) Russia (40 km), Mongolia (968 km), Pakistan (523 km), Kazakhstan (1533 km), Kyrgyzstan (858 km), Tajikistan (540 km), Afghanistan (76 km), India (1474 km) Myanmar (1997 km), Laos (710 km), Vietnam (1353 km)

Yunnan

Source: Guo (1999, p. 131).

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(3) “Notification Concerning the Further Opening up of the Five Frontier Cities and Towns of Nanning, Kunming, Pingxiang, Ruili, and Hekou” (June 1992, the State Council). (4) “Some Favorable Policies and Economic Autonomy Authorized to the Frontier Cities of Heihe and Shuifenhe” (June 1992, Heilongjiang province). (5) “Resolution of Issues Concerning the Extension of Open-door and the Promotion of Economic Development” (April 20, 1991, Inner Mongolia autonomous region). (6) “Notification of Promoting the Trade and Economic Cooperation with the Neighboring and Eastern European Countries” (February 9, 1992, Xinjiang autonomous region). (7) “Resolutions Concerning the Further Reform and Opening up to the Outside World” (July 14, 1992, Tibet autonomous region). (8) “Provisional Regulations Concerning the Border Trade” (1991, Yunnan province).5 However, the above measures have been only implemented via a unilateral approach, with the absence of cross-border coordination and the lack of joint efforts by the neighboring countries (especially during the 1990s). As a result, China’s inland frontier development strategy has not resulted in more significant progresses than its coastal area development one. With regard to the effectiveness of China’s coastal area development strategy, the cross-border cooperation mechanism commands a leading role. For example, China’s special economic zones (SEZs) were designed after taking into account their close geographical and cultural linkages with the outside world, such as Shenzhen and Zhuhai, both in Guangdong province, with proximity to Hong Kong and Macau, respectively, and Xiamen, in Fujian province, with proximity to Taiwan. It seemed that the US–Mexican border environment cooperation had followed a bilateral approach. For example, the United States and Mexico signed the Border Environmental Agreements in 1983. This Agreement, which addressed a host of border environmental problems, allows both countries to prevent, reduce, and eliminate sources of air, water, and land pollution in a 100-km wide zone along each side of the boundary. For the first time in their working relationship on environmental issues, the two countries defined the principal goals for environmental problems on the border. Annex I, which was signed on July 18, 1985, is directly related to this case. It called for the development of treatment facilities. Annex III, which was signed on November 12,

5

Based on Bulletins of the State Council, People’s Republic of China (various issues).

Cross-border resource management: Methodological puzzles

75

1986, also has importance in this case. It concerns hazardous waste created by maquiladoras (see Chapter 9.1.1 for details). According to Mexican law, hazardous waste created at the maquiladoras by raw materials from the United States must be returned to the United States. This Annex assists this process. Annex I of the 1983 Agreement has legal jurisdiction of this case, regarding the construction of the treatment facilities. However, all the above environmental documents do not provide for rigorous enforcement. Therefore, it is virtually a “unilateral approach” to cross-border resource management. With regard to the 1983 Border Environmental Agreements, Annex I is the principal document but there are an assortment of laws in both countries that affect this case. First, both countries enact, develop, implement, and enforce their laws, regulations, and standards within different legal systems and frameworks. The US system is built on a tradition of common law, while Mexican system is built on civil law, which relies less on the judiciary for developing and interpreting the law. The primary difference between the two systems is that enforcement, principally, lies within the executive branch in the Mexican system, whereas in the US system the judiciary is much more involved in enforcement. In addition, the NAFTA calls for countries to consider prohibiting the export to the territories of the other Parties of a pesticide or toxic substance whose use is prohibited within the Party’s territory. This wording allows for countries to virtually ignore each other’s concerns, since the NAFTA’s provisions can be used only if Mexico’s laws which deal with pollution are not being enforced. In addition, the United States must provide evidence that there has been a persistent pattern of failure to enforce those laws.6 4.3.2. Bilateral/multilateral approach

The benefit from cross-border cooperation is closely related to the number of independent stakeholders involved, which can be illustrated by the following: Proposition. The profitability of cross-border resource management usually increases with respect to the number of independent sub-areas involved, if all the border-related barriers are removed.7 6

More details will be discussed in Chapter 9. This proposition suggests that the increase of output of a cross-border area involving N independent sub-areas is always larger than that of the cross-borer area involving N⫺1 independent sub-areas. The proof of this proposition can be based on the results of Chapter 3.2.2. Suppose that the total output of all the N sub-areas in the area becomes now F**. Since all the border-related barriers are removed, the largest outputs of all types of cross-border areas are now the same, i.e., FN** ⫽ FN⫺1 ** ⫽ …F2** ⫽ F1*, where F1* (i.e., the largest output of the 1-d spatial system) is defined in model (3.1). As a result, the increase of output of the area involving N sub-areas becomes FN** ⫺ FN* ⫽ F1* ⫺ FN* ⬎ 0. As defined in formula 4.3, FN* ⬍ FN⫺1 * ⬍ ... ⬍ F2* ⬍ F1*. ... … Then, we have F1* ⫺ FN* ⬎ F1* ⫺ F* ⬎ F * ⫺ F * ⬎ ⬎ F * ⫺ F * ⬎ 0. QED N⫺1 1 i 1 2

7

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R. Guo

However, it is asserted that multilateral agreement becomes less effective with respect to the increase of the number of independent participants involved. As the number of nations increases, so do the differences between them, which means that agreement on the basis of simple rules like uniform abatement levels without side payments will then become very difficult to reach. Even if agreement can be reached, it may not be sustainable (Carraro and Siniscalco, 1993). Further empirical evidence can be found in the following cases in which two river basin organizations have been built but with different performances. The Senegal River Authority (Organization pour La Mise en valeur de Fleuve Sénégal, or OMVS), which was found in 1963 by four nations of Guinea, Mali, Mauritania and Senegal, is a genuine active joint-management organization (see Chapter 5.3.2 for details). However, as the case of the nearby river basin, the Niger, shows, a good organization is not always sufficient for successful functioning. The cooperation in the Niger’s basin has evolved since 1963 when seven out of the nine riparian states (Nigeria, Niger, Benin, Burkina Faso, Mali, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Algeria, and Cote D’Ivoire) signed the Act of Niamey. The structure of the Niger Basin Authority (NBA) is similar to the one in the Senegal: secretariat, technical committee of experts and the Council of Ministers. However, unlike the OMVS, the NBA’s performance was poor (Rangeley et al., 1994, pp. 43–48). The failure of the Niger Commission and its replacement, the NBA, could result from the heterogeneous composition of its seven member states. In 1980, this structure was transformed and an upper level of the Summit of Heads of State was added in order to improve the performance of that body but this step did not help. The main reason was the fact that only a few of the nine states really shared a common interest in the joint development of that basin (Ofosu-Amaah, 1990, pp. 246–248). A series of cross-border cooperation programs have been promoted by the western European nations since the Single European Act (SEA) was implemented. These programs involve as many as 29 border-regions (see Table 4.3) of the 16 European countries. Launched on July 19, 1985, through the joint political determination on the part of the three member states concerned and the initiative of the regions associated with the project, the European Development Pole (EDP) takes in the steel-making areas close to the French, Belgian, and Luxembourg borders. These three areas already maintained close ties as they faced the same problems of industrial reconstruction and modernization. The initiative was chiefly centered on the French city of Longwy, about 60 km from Metz, the provincial center in the French Départment of Moselle, Retange, located 20 km from Luxembourg, an important financial center with an international airport and the Belgian towns of Aubange/Athus, 20 km from Arlon. In December 1986, the Commission of the European Community decided to provide this cross-border project with major support by

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Table 4.3. The European border-areas under cooperation No. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29

Border–area Spain–Portugal Ireland–United Kingdom (Northern Ireland) France–Spain Chores–Sardinia France–Italy Belgium (West Flanders)–France (Nord–Pas-de-Calais) Belgium (Wallonia)–France (Nord–Pas-de-Calais) France (Champagne–Ardennes)–Belgium (Wallonia) France–Belgium–Luxembourg Germany–France–Switzerland France–Germany (Pamina) France–Germany France–United Kingdom France–Switzerland (Rhone–Alps) France–Switzerland (Franche–Comte) Belgium–Netherlands (Middengebied) Belgium–Netherlands (Scheldemond) Germany–Belgium–Netherlands (Meuse–Rhine) Germany–Netherlands (Ems–Dollard) Netherlands–Germany (Rhine–Waal) Netherlands–Germany (Rhine–Northern Meuse) Netherlands–Germany (Euregio) Denmark–Germany Italy–Slovenia Italy–Austria Italy–Switzerland Germany (Bavaria) Germany–Switzerland (Hochrhein–Bodensee) Germany–Luxembourg

Source: Association of European Border Regions, Enscheder Strabe 362, D–4432 Gronau.

awarding special status to the newly created International Activity Park. Considerable financial backing was also made through the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF). In the course of the past decades, significant efforts were made in Europe to strengthen cooperation on cross-border waters at the bilateral, multilateral and pan-European levels. More than 100 conventions, treaties, and other arrangements were concluded between European countries for that purpose (UNECE, 1988). They bear witness to the concern and interest of European countries in striving to prevent the deterioration of water quality in cross-border waters and to ensure reasonable and equitable use and joint conservation of cross-border waters. An important function of the joint bodies established under several

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cross-border water agreements is to develop concerted action programs to reduce pollution loads. For example, action programs developed by the International Commission for the Protection of the Rhine against Pollution (1987), the International Commission for the Protection of the Moselle and Saar (1990), and the International Commission for the Protection of Elbe (1991), aim to (i) improve the riverside ecosystem in such a way that higher organisms which were once present can return; (ii) guarantee the production of drinking water; (iii) reduce the pollution of the water by hazardous substances to such a level that sediment can be used on land without causing harm; and (iv) protect the North Sea against the negative effects of the river waters (SUNCE, 1994). Issues pertaining to the territorial control of seawaters have long been the subject of international law. Although there are some generally accepted rules of maritime shipping and the extension of a state’s territorial limits, emphasis on potential undeveloped sea resources has generated a number of inter-state disputes around the globe. Undersea oil exploration has been particularly contentious. To resolve disputes and regulate issues, the United Nations drafted the Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS), which was opened for signature on December 10, 1982 in Montego Bay, Jamaica, and entered into force on November 16, 1994. The UNCLOS is aimed at establishing coastal boundaries, erecting an International Seabed Authority to regulate seabed exploration not within territorial claims, and to distribute revenue from regulated exploration. Territorial sea is defined under the UNCLOS as the 12-nautical mile zone from the baseline or low-water line along the coast. The coastal State’s sovereignty extends to the territorial sea, including its seabed, subsoil, and air space above it. Foreign vessels are allowed “innocent passage” through those waters. Article 56 of the treaty outlines parameters for the establishment of a country’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), which extends 200 nautical miles from the country’s coastline. Article 56 gives sovereign rights for exploration, exploitation, conservation, and resource management of living and non-living natural resources of waters in the country’s EEZ. Aside from defining an EEZ, the UNCLOS also contains parameters for a country’s continental shelf in Article 77. The continental shelf is defined as the underwater portion of the country’s coastal landmass—including the seabed as well as the subsoil of the shelf. The deep ocean floor, however, is not considered part of a country’s continental shelf. The third important part of the UNCLOS is Part VI, in which justification is based on proximity, not history.8 Unfortunately, the UNCLOS is neither accepted by all countries, nor by the major countries in the world. As of 1990, for example, only 42 of the required 60 8 For more information about the UNCLOS, see www.un.org/Depts/los/index.htm. Selected articles of the UNCLOS relating to the protection and conservation of the marine environment are shown in Appendix B.

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ratifications to make the Convention effective were completed. As of January 2000, there are 132 countries that have ratified the UNCLOS. Many coastal countries, such as Republic of Korea, is still reluctant to sign; and it is not sure whether the signatory countries will follow through their pledge to become a signatory. Even though the established limit for a territorial sea is 12 nautical miles, some countries claim larger areas. The UNCLOS further attempts to exclude rocks incapable of sustaining human habitation. The problem, however, stems from the countries’ rights to define the natural feature as a rock or an island. It is worth noting that all the laws and treaties, even if perfectly drafted, cannot solve all the problems that occur in cross-border areas. The disputed territorial seas with overlapping claims from different countries are shown in Table 4.4. Even worse, the UNCLOS could result in territorial disputes under some circumstances. For example, disagreement concerning the scope of maritime jurisdiction associated with the islands of Picton, Nueva, and Lennox was crucial to the Chile–Argentina border dispute (mentioned in Chapter 1.3.3). When Chile and Argentina signed the Boundary Treaty in 1881, international custom restricted territorial waters to a 3-mile offshore zone. During the 20th century, however, changes in the law of the sea greatly expanded that zone; modern maritime custom, as codified in the UNCLOS, provides for territorial waters extending 12 miles offshore and an EEZ up to 200 miles offshore. While the UNCLOS was not Table 4.4. Disputed territorial seas of selected countries Country Angola Benin Cameroon Congo Ecuador El Salvador Liberia Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Nicaragua Nigeria Panama Peru Sierra Leone Syrian Arab Rep Togo Uruguay World

Area (sq. km) 22,246 26,768 10,859 41,362 957,044 87,510 239,112 73,534 94,930 19,390 274,641 746,525 155,928 5356 1302 110,543 2,867,050

Note: No claims or areas for the Caspian Sea have been included. Source: Pruett and Cimino (2000).

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in force during the late 1970s and the early 1980s, its principles had already gained virtually universal recognition in the international community. Thus, possession of the islands had the potential to carry with it control of an extensive area of the South Atlantic. In 1978, Argentina and Chile nearly went to war.9 4.4. Are ‘borders’ always bad for resource management? 4.4.1. Creating boundaries for protected areas

The definition of a protected area adopted by the World Conservation Union (IUCN) is the following: “An area of land and/or sea especially dedicated to the protection and maintenance of biological diversity, and of natural and associated cultural resources, and managed through legal or other effective means” (IUCN, 1994). Although all protected areas meet the general purposes contained in this definition, in practice the precise purposes for which protected areas are managed differ greatly. The following are the main purposes of management: (i) scientific research, (ii) wilderness protection, (iii) preservation of species and genetic diversity, (iv) maintenance of environmental services, (v) protection of specific natural and cultural features, (vi) tourism and recreation, (vii) education, (viii) sustainable use of resources from natural ecosystems, and (ix) maintenance of cultural and traditional attributes.10 The IUCN originally recognized 10 categories of protected areas in 1978. Two important categories, biosphere reserves and World Heritage Sites, are in fact not management categories but international descriptions overlying other categories. The 4th World Parks and Protected Areas Congress, held in Caracas in 1992, reduced this list of 10 categories to a preliminary list of five: scientific reserves or wilderness areas; national parks; natural monuments; habitat or species management areas; and protected landscapes/seascapes. With the addition of the category, managed resource protected areas, there are currently six. The IUCN has defined a series of protected area management categories based on management objective. Definitions of these categories, and examples of each, are provided in the Guidelines for Protected Area Management Categories (IUCN, 1994), as the following: (Ia) Strict Nature Reserve (protected area managed mainly for science). It refers to an area of land and/or sea possessing some outstanding or representative ecosystems, geological or physiological features and/or species, available primarily for scientific research and/or environmental monitoring. 9 Further details about the resolution of the Chile/Argentina border dispute will be discussed in Chapter 6.3.3. 10 Cited from www.wcmc.org.uk/protected_areas/data/sample/iucn_cat.htm.

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(Ib) Wilderness Area (protected area managed mainly for wilderness protection). It refers to a large area of unmodified or slightly modified land, and/or sea, retaining its natural character and influence, without permanent or significant habitation, which is protected and managed so as to preserve its natural condition. (II) National Park (protected area managed mainly for ecosystem protection and recreation). It refers to a natural area of land and/or sea, designated to (a) protect the ecological integrity of one or more ecosystems for present and future generations, (b) exclude exploitation or occupation inimical to the purposes of designation of the area and (c) provide a foundation for spiritual, scientific, educational, recreational and visitor opportunities, all of which must be environmentally and culturally compatible. (III) Natural Monument (protected area managed mainly for conservation of specific natural features). It refers to an area containing one, or more, specific natural or natural/cultural feature, which is of outstanding or unique value because of its inherent rarity, representative or aesthetic qualities or cultural significance. (IV) Habitat/Species Management Area (protected area managed mainly for conservation through management intervention). It refers to an area of land and/or sea subject to active intervention for management purposes so as to ensure the maintenance of habitats and/or to meet the requirements of specific species. (V) Protected Landscape/Seascape (protected area managed mainly for landscape/seascape conservation and recreation). It refers to an area of land, with coast and sea as appropriate, where the interaction of people and nature over time has produced an area of distinct character with significant aesthetic, ecological and/or cultural value, and often with high biological diversity. Safeguarding the integrity of this traditional interaction is vital to the protection, maintenance and evolution of such an area. (VI) Managed Resource Protected Area (protected area managed mainly for the sustainable use of natural ecosystems). It refers to an area containing predominantly unmodified natural systems, managed to ensure long–term protection and maintenance of biological diversity, while providing at the same time a sustainable flow of natural products and services to meet community needs. For the past 120 years, protected natural areas have been the traditional means of nature conservation. As of the late 1990s, these areas have encompassed approximately 13.2 million sq. km around the world (Green and Paine, 1997). The size of a protected area reflects the extent of land or water needed to accomplish the purposes of management. For example, for a Category I

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area, the size should be that needed to ensure the integrity of the area to accomplish the management objective of strict protection, either as a baseline area or research site, or for wilderness protection. For a Category II area, the boundaries should be drawn sufficiently widely that they contain one, or more, entire ecosystems which are not subject to material modification by human exploitation or occupation (IUCN, 1994). For various reasons, many of these protected areas exist on international boundaries, and many of these suggest the existence of cross-border ecosystems. These are especially probable where protected areas in different countries adjoin across international boundaries. Cross-border areas are particularly important to natural and ecological conservation because of the fact that they often cover interdependent ecosystems. Nature does not recognize political boundaries, and in many cases, species continue to migrate across those borders as they always have, regardless of customs and regulations. Pursuing cross-border cooperation and the creation of bilateral or multilateral cooperative mechanisms in internationally adjacent areas would certainly be an important contribution to the management of natural and biological resources. Appendix A contains a list of internationally adjacent protected areas (as of 1998). In total, 136 clusters of adjacent protected areas, or cross-border protected area complexes were identified. These clusters include 488 different protected areas that adjoin others both within countries and across international frontiers. Twenty-seven of the complexes involve three different countries. In addition, 69 other complexes are included on the list of potential adjoining protected areas (see Table 4.5). According to Zbicz (1999a), these clusters or complexes cover at least 10% of the total area of all protected areas in the world. Usually, containing more than two individual protected areas, up to as many as 13, they often provide contiguous habitat for species. The 136 complexes involve 98 different countries, or almost half of the world’s 224 countries and dependent territories. Adjacent protected areas straddle 112 of the world’s 309 different international boundaries maintained in the database of the International Boundaries Research Unit in Durham, UK. Together these existing and proposed complexes offer 205 potential opportunities for crossborder biodiversity conservation. With regard to the establishment of border-contiguous protected areas and the management of abutting protected areas, special consideration should be given by governments (national or sub-national) in the following situations (Sandwith et al., 2001): ●

Where boundaries are located in shared water bodies such as rivers or lakes, and perhaps even for shared underground aquifers, e.g., Rio Grande at Big Bend/Cañon Santa Elena (USA–Mexico).

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Cross-border resource management: Methodological puzzles Table 4.5. Internationally adjoining protected areas (PAs) Region

North America Central and South America Europe Africa Asia TOTAL

Adjoining PA complexes

Protected areas

Proposed complexes

Complexes with three countries

8 24 45 34 25 136

42 93 154 123 76 488

4 15 26 12 12 69

0 6 6 9 3 27

Note: Data as of 1998. Complexes may include proposed protected areas and areas designated under national legislation that have not been assigned an IUCN Category (i.e., unassigned), provided that there is at least one established protected area adjacent to another either side of an international boundary. Source: Zbicz (1999a).

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

Where an important earth feature such as a mountain or a glacier or a coral reef contains national or sub-national boundaries, e.g., Mount Kanchenjungma (India, Nepal, China), Israel–Jordan Coral reef in Red Sea; needed for Mont Blanc, which has no protection, between Italy, France, and Switzerland. Where a natural ecological system straddles one or more boundaries and needs to be managed as a single ecological unit in order to preserve essential species, communities, and ecological processes, e.g., ibex in La Vanoise and Gran Paradiso, which move across the Alps in winter–summer ranges from Italy to France. Where local communities and indigenous peoples in natural areas are linked across boundaries by shared ethnic or sociocultural characteristics, traditions, and practices, e.g., indigenous native hunting in Kluane (Canada)/WrangellSt. Elias (USA). Where the use or management of shared natural resources is or may become a locus of contention, e.g., oil at the Ecuador/Perú border where, after armed conflict, a truce and a Peace Ecological Reserve was established in the Sierra del Condor. Where a boundary dispute involves unresolved claims to land or water, e.g., needed in Kashmir between India and Pakistan where there is fighting over ice and snow. Where, after a period of armed conflict, there is a need to rebuild confidence and security for local communities and provide a stable foundation for conservation and sustainable development. Where there is a need to cooperate against common threats to ecosystems and their integrity, e.g., fire or invasive alien species, with agreements such

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as that between Quetico Wilderness Park (Canada) and Boundary Waters Wilderness Canoe Area (USA) for fire response. 4.4.2. Bio-invasion and border control

There is no doubt about the increasing awareness of the importance of international and cross-border transactions in our daily life. When people say that “the world is becoming smaller every day,” they are referring not only to the increased speed and ease of transportation and communications but also to the increased use of international and cross-border market to buy and sell goods. The overall heightened presence of foreign goods, foreign producers and even foreign-owned assets causes many to question the impact and desirability of all international and cross-border transactions. An increasing number of companies are now relying on production chains that straddle many politically distinctive areas. Raw materials and components may come from different linguistic or religious areas and be assembled in another, while marketing and distribution take place in still other venues. Consumers’ decisions in, for example, New York or Tokyo may become information that has an almost immediate impact on the products that are being made—and the styles that influence them—all over the world. However, strict border control measures are by no means an unnecessary thing, at least in some circumstances. While cross-border dependence may be profitable, it also raises risks and transactional costs. This totally depends on the internal and external conditions concerned. As a result, some economies will inevitably face frustrations in dealing with cross-border relations, and these frustrations will be magnified for small sub-areas. Bio-invasion is now thought to be the second gravest threat to biodiversity in North America, after habitat destruction and degradation (CEC, 2000). The magnitude of exotic plant invasions in some countries is startling. In the USA, the plants are spreading across federal lands at an estimated rate of 1860 ha day⫺1 (Asher and Harmon, 1995). As exotic plants colonize lands adjacent to wilderness, it is usually only a matter of time before they invade the wilderness as well. Exotic species can also be introduced via waterways, wildlife and wind. This problem is compounded in wilderness because removal methods are limited to the minimum tool necessary to do so. When confronted with widespread distribution and the minimum tool requirement, exotic plant management in wilderness can be a serious obstacle to maintaining natural conditions (Kelson and Lilieholm, 1999). Another example is purple loosestrife (Lythrum salicaria), which was introduced from Europe in the mid-1800s as a garden ornamental. The loosestrife has been widely spreading in North America, invading wetland habitats where it dominates native plants and deprives waterfowl and other species of food sources (Pimentel et al., 1999).

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Species that become invasive can be introduced either intentionally or unintentionally through pathways (or vectors). These include transportation (by water, land and air; in the goods themselves, in dunnage, packing materials or containers, in or on ships, planes, trains, trucks or cars); agriculture; horticulture and plant nursery stock; aquaculture industry; live food fish industry; bait fish; ornamental pond, water garden and the aquarium pet trades (UNEP, 2003, p. 141). Where there are no natural predators, they can come to dominate ecosystems, and can alter the composition and structure of food webs, nutrient cycles, fire cycles and hydrology and energy budgets, threatening agricultural productivity and other industries dependent on living resources (Alonso et al., 2001). As those once-ever forbidden borders become more and more open, bio-invasions are expected to increase. Cross-border and global-wide cooperation is essential to stem the tide of bio-invasion and the damage it causes.

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Chapter 5 Institutions for cross-border resource management 5.1. Domestic laws and regulations

It was not until the late 1960s and early 1970s that the “environment” and “resource” became a firm part of the political agenda in developed nations. Not only was this in response to the spectacular growth of the Western economies, it was also due to the extensive industrialization of the rest of the world. The phrase “sustainable development” was popularized by the World Commission for Environment and Development (1987). Since then, environmentalists and economists have given much attention to defining the nature and characteristics of “sustainable development.” Most definitions agree on what is unsustainable but few agree on a precise meaning for sustainability. For example, Pearce et al. (1988, p. 6) state “We can summarize the necessary conditions for sustainable development as constancy of the natural capital stock; more strictly, the requirement for non-negative changes in the stock of natural resources, such as soil and soil quality, ground and surface water and their quality, land biomass, water biomass, and the waste-assimilation capacity of the receiving environments.” Another example, cited by Solow (1991) states: “... every generation should leave water, air and soil resources as pure and unpolluted as when it came on earth.” The above two passages involve a category mistake being to identify the determinants of well-being with the constituents of well-being (for example, welfare, freedom, etc.), as sustainable development is defined as an impossible goal by these authors. Although many industrialized countries have adopted rather similar environmental legislation, the policies and specific measures on environmental management differ from country to country. With regard to air pollution emission charges, for example, most European countries have implemented policies to encourage the early adoption of pollution control equipment with the revenues returned to those paying the charge as a subsidy for installing the equipment. In Japan, however, the emission charge is designed to raise revenue to compensate victims of air pollution. The following presents a French–Japanese comparison in more details:1 The French air pollution charge system has been in effect since 1985. The charge is levied on all industrial firms having a power-generating capacity of 1

Based on Tietenberg (2000, pp. 379–380).

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50,000 W or more or industrial firms discharging over 2500 tons of sulfur or nitrogen oxides per year. The charge is levied on the amount of actual sulfur oxides emitted. Some 90% of the charge revenue is recovered by charge payers as a subsidy for pollution control equipment, while the remaining 10% is used for new technological developments. In Japan, the charge function takes on a different function. As a result of four important legal cases where Japanese industries were forced to compensate victims for pollution damages caused, in 1973 Japan passed the Law for the Compensation of Pollution-Related Health Injury. According to this law, victims of designated diseases, upon certification by a council of medical, legal and other experts, are eligible for medical expenses, lost earnings, and other expenses; they are not eligible for other losses such as pain and suffering. Two classes of diseases are funded: specific diseases where the specific source is relatively clear and nonspecific respiratory diseases where all polluters are presumed to have some responsibility. Let us look at a developing and transition country—China. In 1978, environmental protection legislation was incorporated into the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China for the first time. China’s first Law on Environmental Protection was promulgated in 1989 and then further revised in 1995 by the National People’s Congress (NPC). Since the early 1980s, a series of laws, regulations and national standards concerning environmental protection have been promulgated. These includes four environmental laws, eight natural resource protection laws, more than 20 administrative decrees and more than 30 ministerial regulations for pollution prevention and more than 300 environmental standards.2 A relatively comprehensive legal system concerning environmental protection has taken shape over the past decades, ending the past situation of no laws in this regard. However, problems still remain. For example, in the field of the environment and resources, there is no appropriate legislation on solid wastes and toxic chemicals, radioactive pollution prevention and sustainable management of natural resources. Chinese legislation also faces the problems of lack of coordination and consistency with international treaties and conventions (ACCA21, 1994, p. 1-1A-1). Moreover, as the Chinese legislation relating to sustainable development was promulgated on the basis of a centralized planning system, many problems have arisen during the recent economic transition to decentralization. For example, there have been no environmentally related laws and regulations directly applicable to diversified economic sectors, such

2 These laws, regulations, and other relevant official documents have covered a broader range from air, inland water pollution control, protection of endangered wildlife, to the control of domestic marine pollution from offshore oil drilling and waste release into territorial seas (ACCA21, 1994).

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as the environmental administration of township and village-based enterprises, foreign-funded enterprises and the tertiary sector. It should also be noted that some articles of the environmental legislation have been only defined in principle, leaving the laws weak and unenforceable. For example, Article 44 of the “Law of the People’s Republic of China on Mineral Resources” states: “... those who use destructive methods to extract mineral resources should refund the loss of damages and be additionally charged if the resources have been seriously damaged, till the withdrawal of their certificates for mining permission at the most serious situation” (NPC, 1986). However, the Law should be further clarified in a number of strategic areas: (a) which kinds of extraction methods should be defined as “destructive” to the resources; (b) how to set up the standard of the “serious damages” to the resources; (c) how to calculate the “loss of damages”; (d) how to determine the amount of “additional charges”; and (e) what should be defined as the “most serious situation” (Guo, 1998). Since the 1980s, a number of pieces of legislation relating to the exploitation and protection of water resources have been introduced. But the legislative foundation for the application of the man-made precipitation enhancement has been still weak. For example, China has not had any weather modification laws. It only had the “Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on Meteorological Services” promulgated by the State Council on August 18, 1994. The Meteorological Law was adopted at the 12th Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Ninth National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China on October 31, 1999 and went into effect as of January 1, 2000. However, there are many contradictory issues in the Law. For example, in Article 5, the Law states: The competent meteorological department under the State Council is responsible for meteorological work nationwide. Local competent meteorological departments at different levels are responsible for meteorological work in their own administrative regions under the leadership of the competent meteorological departments at a higher level and the people’s governments at the corresponding level.3

This article defines a dual-track system of leadership for the provincial and local meteorological departments. The problem of this system is its administrative efficiency, given that provincial and local meteorological departments are simultaneously subordinate to two different administrative organs. Regarding the prevention of meteorological disasters, the law states: Competent meteorological departments at all levels shall make arrangements for joint monitoring and forecast of significant weather events among regions or departments, propose

3

Cited from NPC (2000, Article 5).

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Obviously, this article does not define the geographic scopes of and manners for interregional coordination in case that a meteorological disaster occurs. The most serious concern now come to that there has been no article relating to cross-border activities of weather modification in the Chinese laws. In 2002, it appears in the “Regulations on Administration of Weather Modification” (rengong yingxiang tianqi guanli tiaoli) adopted at the 56th Executive Meeting of the State Council on March 13. As defined in Article 14 of this Regulations, Where weather modification operations are to be implemented crossing the boundaries of different provinces, autonomous regions or municipalities directly under the Central Government, the relevant people’s governments of the provinces, autonomous regions or municipalities directly under the Central Government shall make a decision thereon through consultation; if no agreement is reached through consultation, the decision shall be made by the competent meteorological department of the State Council in consultation with the relevant people’s governments of the provinces, autonomous regions or municipalities directly under the Central Government.5

Clearly, this is nothing but an invalid article. And, therefore, its enforcement is weak. In most circumstances, weather modification activities of a province may not be carried out across land borders, but they could have serious impacts on the neighboring provinces. Because of the geographic proximity in cross-border areas, the weather modification activities carried out within each side of a border may affect the territory of the other side. In contrast to the Chinese regulations on weather modification, the “Weather Modification Agreement signed by the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Canada” (source: www.americansovereign.com/ articles/weather.htm) is much clearer in definition. For example, in Article I(b) of the Agreement, the term “weather modification activities of mutual interest” is defined as … carried out in or over the territory of a Party within 200 miles of the international boundary; or such activities wherever conducted, which, in the judgment of a Party, may significantly affect the composition, behavior, or dynamics of the atmosphere over the territory of the other Party.

In Article IV, “each Party agrees to notify and to fully inform the other concerning any weather modification activities of mutual interest conducted by it prior to the commence of such activities. Every effort shall be made to provide

4 5

Ibid, Article 28. Cited from State Council (2002).

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such notice as far in advance of such activities as may be possible….” Furthermore, the Agreement states: The Parties agree to consult, at the request of either Party, regarding particular weather modification activities of mutual interest. Such consultations shall be initiated promptly on the request of a Party, and in cases of urgency may be undertaken through telephonic or other rapid means of communication.

5.2. International laws and treaties: Principles

International laws and treaties provide the normative framework and procedures by which to coordinate behaviors, to control conflicts, to facilitate cooperation and to achieve common values among independent countries concerned. The international laws and treaties on natural and environmental resources, as a part of the international laws and treaties, are designed to regulate relationships between countries with respect to the exploitation and utilization of their shared common or cross-border resources. A piece of natural or environmental resource may be internationalized geographically, if it is linked with two or more territories of sovereign states; from the legal point of view, the resource is international if one single state does not have all the powers to exercise exclusive control over it. The early doctrines on which cross-border resource management are based may include the following five aspects:6 (1) The Doctrine of Absolute Sovereignty. The Doctrine claims the absolute freedom of a country to exploit and utilize its own natural and environmental resources regardless of the effect of its actions on other riparian states. (2) The Doctrine of Absolute Integrity. This Doctrine stipulates that a country may not alter the natural state of natural and environmental resources passing through its territory in any manner that will affect the resources in the other country(ies). (3) The Doctrine of Limited Territorial Sovereignty. This Doctrine has been taken in resolving the majority of international resource disputes. (4) The Doctrine of the Communality of International Resources. It assumes a communality or cross-border communalism of interest between or among countries concerned, and treats the total stock of resources as of shared by these countries.

6

The five Doctrines are borrowed from Kliot et al. (2001, pp. 232–233), which were used to deal with water resources.

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(5) The Doctrine of Correlative Rights. Its emphasis is on the most efficient exploitation and utilization of joint resources, rather than on ownership rights. As a matter of fact, the Doctrine of Absolute Sovereignty has never been a generally recognized principle of international law. The idea of “sovereignty” is a major obstacle to achieving integrated development of international and crossborder resources. The typical example is for an uppermost riparian country to over-exploit the waters flowing through its territory, which could affect its neighboring countries. The result is that international agreements often refer only to certain aspects of planning of developments (like data collection, or individual water projects), or create organizations that have a coordinative role, rather than an overall planning and management role. The Doctrine of Absolute Integrity is too restrictive, which is not very practical and, therefore, has been rarely used. In fact, the Doctrine of Limited Territorial Sovereignty has been the most widely accepted in various international treaties. It conforms the general legal obligation to use one’s property in a manner that will not cause injury to others. According to Dellapenna (1999, p. 1314), restricted sovereignty goes by the name of “equitable utilization” of the shared resources. The Doctrine of the Communality of International Resources stipulates that the entire cross-border area constitutes a single geographic and economic unit that transcends national boundaries, and therefore the cross-border resources are either invested in the whole community or shared among the countries concerned. Some principles drawn from the above five Doctrines have been accepted today as legal norms which are binding on the management of cross-border resources of many countries. Specifically, they are (a) the prohibition of management practices likely to cause substantial injury to other states; (b) the principle of equitable utilization of shared resources; and (c) the duty of prior consultation and cooperation in good faith.7 They are analyzed below in detail. 5.2.1. The obligation not to cause harm

This obligation includes the duty of preventive and cooperative actions. The 1988 Report to the International Law Commission suggests that appreciable harm resulting from water pollution is a violation of the principle. The World Bank statement for projects in international waterways requires the assessment of potential significant harm before approving projects on international waterways (Solanes, 1992; Caponera, 1995; McCarrey, 1996).

7

See Caponera (1995) and Housen-Couriel (1994) for these principles connected with internationally shared waters.

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India and Pakistan are facing severe water problems. Although India is not among the world’s most severely water stressed countries, there are significant areas of scarcity with one-third of its 570,000 villages declared water-deficient (Chaudharry et al., 2004, p. 175). Its continuing population growth demands careful management of the nation’s water resources. The Himalayan rivers are snow-fed and perennial, while the peninsular rivers are seasonal and dependent on the monsoons. The north and east are water-rich, while the west and south are water-short. There are arid, drought-prone regions (e.g., Gujarat, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu) and in the east areas which periodically experience devastating floods. Primarily arid and semi-arid, Pakistan depends upon the Indus River basin, the headwaters for which are in India. As a result, Pakistan is in a water crisis and faces nearly insurmountable challenges in meeting the demands of its growing population (140 million in 2000; projected to double by 2025). Pakistan’s water resources are now at 1200 cu. ft per capita (below the international standard of 1500) and are down from 5300 cu. ft per capita in 1951. Rapidly declining storage capacity further complicates the problem. Pakistan’s two main reservoirs on the Indus, the Mangla and Terbala, are losing storage capacity due to sedimentation (and have already lost 20% and 43%, respectively).8 The Indus Treaty of 1960, which was signed between the governments of India and Pakistan, was mediated by the World Bank, while the latter also assisted in funding the massive construction connected to the Partition of the Indus (Baxter, 1967). The Treaty assigned the waters of the eastern tributaries of the Indus River to India and the western tributaries to Pakistan. However, other upper riparians were not included in this agreement. Article XI of the Indus Water Treaty states expressively that the parities did not intend to establish any general principle of law or any precedent but the practice and implementation of the Treaty, which points to some important principles of international laws. India gave up its upper stream sovereignty and believed that it could utilize the resources of the upper tributaries whenever it wishes. The second principle of international law that was applied by the Indus Treaty is the principle of equitable apportionment of the water (Kliot et al., 2001, p. 242). After the partition of Indus, India disrupted water flows to Pakistan. With the help of the World Bank, the Indus Water Treaty was signed in September 1960. The treaty gives Pakistan access to the flows of the Western tributaries of the Indus River while allowing India use the Eastern tributaries. Under this treaty, India provides water flows to Pakistan and advises them of potential drought or flood events. The treaty has remained effective even during each India–Pakistan war (Alam, 2002). Negotiation over water issues has been conducted periodically

8

Data source: Economic Review (2002, p. 18), cited from Brannon and Hanson (2004).

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between the two nations. Talks addressing Pakistani concerns over the Indian Baglihar Dam project on the Chenab River in Kashmir have had no conclusive results, as Pakistan believes this project may affect irrigation flows in the Eastern Punjab and India believes it consistent with the treaty (Jan, 2004). 5.2.2. Equitable use

The principle of equitable use requires the interests of all countries concerned to be taken into account when exploiting and allocating the internationally shared resources. The principle has been applied by international courts and also by national courts of various federal countries. It is also endorsed by most writers (see, e.g., Dellapenna, 1999, p. 1315; McCarrey, 1996), as well as by the Helsinki Rules and by the UN’s 1997 Convention. The International Court of Justice’s opinion referred twice to the rule of equitable utilization and did not mention the ‘no harm’ rule (Green Cross, 2000, p. 52). Wouters (1992) also concluded that the principle of equitable utilization emerged as the central concept in reconciling the various interests of watercourse states in the development of their trans-border waters. The Beibu Gulf Demarcation Agreement and the Beibu Gulf Fishery Cooperation Agreement (both were signed by China and Vietnam on December 25, 2000 in Beijing and entered into force on July 30, 2004) follows the ‘equitable’ principle. The Iraq–Saudi Arabia boundary is based on the Treaty of Muhammarah (Khorramshahr) signed on May 5, 1922, and the subsequent Protocol of Uqayr, on December 2, 1922. This delimitation of a boundary was the first in this desert area. There are no known disputes pertaining to the alignment of the boundary itself. According to the Treaty of Muhammarah (i.e., Article 1), “the tribes known as the Muntafiq, Dhafir and Amarat will belong to Iraq. Both Governments, that is to say the Government of Iraq and the Government of Najd, guarantee mutually that they will prevent aggression by their tribes on the tribes of the other, and will punish their tribes for any such aggression, and should the circumstances not permit of such punishment, the two Governments will discuss the question of taking combined action according to the good relations prevailing between them.” With regard to the equitable use of the boundary resources, the Protocol of Uqayr (Article 1) state as follows:9 (a) The frontier from the East begins at the junction of the Wadi al Aujah (W. el Audja) with Al Batin and from this point the Najd frontier passes in a straight line to the well called Al Wuqubah (El Ukabba) leaving Al Dulaimiyah (Dulaimiya) and Al Wuqubah (El Ukabba) north of the line and from Al Wuqubah (El Ukabba) it continues N.W. to Bir Ansab (Bir Unsab). 9

Based on BIR (1971).

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(b) Starting from the point mentioned above, i.e., from the point of the junction of the Wadi al Aujah (W. el Audja) with Al Batin (El Batin), the Iraq boundary continues in a straight line N.W. to Al Amghar (El Amghar) leaving this place to the south of the line and from thence proceeds S.W. in a straight line until it joins the Najd frontier at Bir Ansab (Bir Unsab). (c) The area delimited by the points enumerated above which includes all these points will remain neutral and common to the two Governments of Iraq and Najd who will enjoy equal rights in it for all purposes. 5.2.3. Joint development

Joint development is an ideal pattern for the exploitation and utilization of natural and environmental resources in cross-border areas. However, under most circumstances, it is difficult to achieve because of questions of sovereignty, ownership, jurisdiction, financing, scope of cooperation, and so on. In international border areas, especially in disputed areas, the joint development schemes cannot be stable and efficient without enforceable agreements or treaties signed by all parties concerned (details will be discussed in Chapter 6). The UNDP has been working to develop a multilateral environmental framework within the Tumen River Area Development Program (TRADP). The TRADP environmental effort was launched in 1995 with a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on the Environment. The MOU, signed by all riparian countries, sought to outline a plan for environmentally sound and sustainable development in the entire TRADP region. On May 30, 1995, trade officials from China, Russia, South and North Korea and Mongolia met in Beijing and initialed three agreements aimed at revitalizing a faltering UN-sponsored scheme to develop the delta area. In addition to a commitment of establishing the Tumen River Area Development Coordination Committee (TRADCC) whose task will be to boost trade and investment in this area, the three riparian states (China, Russia, and North Korea), plus South Korea and Mongolia, also agreed to set up a consultative commission with broader responsibilities for developing trade, infrastructure, finance and banking in the under-developed but resource-rich Northeast Asia. The MOU tasked governments to coordinate and cooperate to protect the region’s environment, and committed them to exchange data, conduct environmental impact assessments, enhance public participation, seek outside funding, and consider harmonization of standards.10 The North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC) took effect on January 1, 1994. Intended to promote sustainable development through joint environmental and economic policies, the NAAEC brought together

10

More details can be found in Chapter 7.

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environmental officials from Mexico, Canada and the US in the Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC) and charged them with protecting, conserving and improving the environment in each country through increased cooperation and public participation in their border areas. The projects launched by the CEC focused on four major themes—conservation, protecting human health and the environment, enforcement and public information and outreach. The CEC operates with three groups: a council consisting of cabinet-level environmental officials from Canada, the US and Mexico; the Secretariat, a Montreal-based staff of 30 professionals from all three countries; and the Joint Public Advisory Committee (JPAC), a 15-member committee evenly divided among the three countries. The committee advises the commission and works to increase public participation on relevant issues (TCPA, 1998, Chapter 9, endnote 27). 5.3. International laws and treaties: Categories

There are three requisites for an international regime to be established in a cross-border area: (i) active support and long-term commitment on the part of top-level political representatives; (ii) mobilization of the available geological, meteorological, legal, social, engineering and other expertise; and (iii) a domestic government structure capable of effective international cooperation and collaboration (Housen-Couriel, 1994, p. 2).11 Specifically, an international treaty or agreement on cross-border resources should include the following items: ● ● ● ● ●

Objects (rivers, lakes, seas, forestry, oil, coal, or minerals); Subjects (data collection, planning of allocation, or exploitation); Parties involved in the agreement (bilateral or multilateral); Territorial scope (the whole area or parts of it); and Intensity of cooperation (consultation, joint management, or implementation of integrated development plans).

The various institutional arrangements and mechanisms as reflected in the existing treaties, conventions and agreements relating to cross-border resource management can be divided into three categories: (i) cross-border resource allocation, (ii) joint resource management, and (iii) integrated cross-border planning. 5.3.1. Cross-border resource allocation

A large number of treaties and agreements belong to this category, which include, inter alia, the “International Commission of the Elbe” (1919–1936,

11

Cited from Kliot et al. (2001, p. 235).

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based on the Treaty of Versailles), the “Internationalization of the Danube Basin Treaty of Versailles” (1919–1939), the “Environmental Program for the Danube River Sofia 1992–1994 Convention,” and the “La Plata Treaty 1973” of Rio de la Plata. One of the shortcomings of these narrowly defined legal regimes is their inability to extend their operation beyond their mandate (Kliot et al., 2001, p. 239). Agreements and treaties on how to allocate shared resources have become a common expression of neighboring sovereign states. The Nile’s water resources were divided between Egypt and Sudan first in 1929 when the two countries were under British administration, and in a second agreement in 1959 when both countries became independent states. The 1929 Agreement allocated 48 billion cu. m of Nile water to Egypt and only 4 billion cu. m to the Sudan. The 1959 Treaty improved Sudan’s allocation from 4 to 18.5 billion cu. m whereas Egypt increased its allocation to 55.5 cu. m (Waterbury, 1979; Kliot, 1994). The Treaty of Peace for Jordan River, which was signed by the governments of Israel and Jordan on October 26, 1994, put an end to the state of war which had lasted for almost 50 years between Jordan and Israel. Some specific articles (such as Article 6a of Annex II) of the Treaty deal with the Jordan River. Israel and Jordan have agreed to share the river. Both countries will create storage facilities to hold excess water from rain floods as well as build dams for river flow management. The parties agreed to provide water to one another. In terms of environmental conservation, Jordan and Israel are obligated to protect the river from pollution, contamination, or industrial disposal. Furthermore, according to the Treaty, the countries will establish a joint water committee to oversee issues regarding the quality of the water (Hof, 1995, p. 53). Other examples of cross-border resource allocation would include the “Indus Treaty 1960,” the “Treaty between Bangladesh and India on Sharing the Ganges Waters at Farakka 1996,” and the “Tonkin Gulf Demarcation Agreement and the Tonkin Gulf Fishery Cooperation Agreement signed by China and Vietnam, 2000.” 5.3.2. Joint resource management

During the past decades, multipurpose projects have been constructed in transnational and cross-border areas for water supply, flood control, irrigation, navigation and hydropower generation. Large dams are sometimes justified because of hydropower, which provides a high return and subsidizes other project purposes. Some of the best basin-wide multipurpose organizations can be found in developing regions. Most of these institutions also incorporate mechanisms for sharing the benefits and costs of the various projects and mechanisms for dispute resolution.

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Joint management of cross-border resources is based on resource sharing principles, cooperation, of environmental protection and promotion of dispute settlement. It is embraced by the international law (1997 Convention, Helsinki Rules) and by academics (see Green Cross, 2000; Savenije and van der Zaag, 2000). Joint management follows the doctrine of communality of property. Its major facets are as follows: joint management of the whole cross-border area as a unit regardless of the borders; management according to some agreedupon formula; joint investigation and resolution of the inevitable cross-border disputes according to peaceful and friendly manners. The Mekong committee, which was established in 1957 by Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Vietnam, had a wide range of activities including collection of basic data, flood control, assistance and planning of dams, fishing, navigation and pollution control (Chomchai, 1986; Kirmani, 1990). The Mekong River Commission (MRC), founded in 1995, has a more complex structure in which a political layer was superimposed on the MRC. The MRC’s contributions include a flood forecasting and warning system, a network of hundreds of hydrological and meteorological stations, water balance studies, water quality monitoring, and salinity control structure for the Mekong delta (Jacobs, 1999). The 1995 Agreement provides for the extension of the MRC to include China and Myanmar—the uppermost riparians, but does not include any mutually binding clauses concerning the use of the river’s resources. The new commission has a dam building agenda which could potentially threaten the lower rice-growing regions, particularly in Vietnam and Cambodia. Besides, the fact that China’s water requirements are growing as well as the fact that it is not a member in the MRC, are all serious impediments to achieving sustainable cooperation in the Mekong Basin (Green Cross, 2000, p. 92). The Senegal River Authority (Organization pour La Mise en valeur de Fleuve Sénégal, or OMVS) which manages the Senegal River basin is a genuine active joint-management organization. The functions of the OMVS are navigation, promotion of irrigation and hydropower production and the authority to construct and operate joint projects. Between 1934 and 1952, the structure in the Senegal collected data and proposed projects to harness the river. Since 1963, the Senegal has been managed by the OMVS in which Guinea, Mali, Mauritania and Senegal have been members (OMVS, 1988). Unlike the Mekong basin, the OMVS not only plans and formulates policies but also implements them. What is the greatest contribution to the implementation of the OMVS projects is its structure, in which the political layer, represented by government ministers, is the upper and decisive level in this organization. The OMVS conciliated successfully Senegal and Mauritania to the sharing of the resources of the Senegal after the 1988 conflict in which farmers and herders on both sides of the river fought over the same land and water resources (Green Cross, 2000, p. 84). The two dams constructed by the

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OMVS are owned jointly by the member states, as are the river seaports that the OMVS has developed and maintained. 5.3.3. Integrated cross-border planning

This concept is interpreted as that a cross-border area should be treated as a single unit for development planning and management. Given the geographical and geological characteristics of the natural and environmental resources, only an integrated planning of the cross-border area as a whole may be effective. Although the integrated cross-border planning is the ideal form (in terms of both the economic and environmental benefits) of institution for the management of cross-border resources, it still remains rare in practice. One of the legal regimes which started with the fundamental role of water allocation and became a multipurpose organization which practiced joint management is the International Boundary and Water Commission of the USA and Mexico, which jointly manages the Colorado and Rio Grande/Rio Bravo. In 1992, an integrated environmental plan was approved by the US and Mexican governments for their border area. This plan, as an outgrowth of talks between the presidents of the two nations, is known as the Integrated Border Environmental Plan (IBEP). Goals include strengthening enforcement of environmental laws; reducing pollution; increasing cooperative planning, training, and education; and improving mutual understanding of border environmental challenges. The first agreement, the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC), took effect on January 1, 1994. Intended to promote sustainable development through joint environmental and economic policies, the NAAEC brought together environmental officials from Mexico, Canada and the US in the Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC) and charged them with protecting, conserving and improving the environment in each country through increased cooperation and public participation. By 1996, the commission had launched nearly 40 projects focused on four major themes—conservation, protecting human health and the environment, enforcement and public information and outreach (EPA, 2001). The significance of monitoring cross-border groundwater was stressed by the Economic Commission for Europe, which established a Task Force on Monitoring and Assessment of Transboundary Waters in 1994 (Buzas, 2000). The joint Polish–Lithuanian program of environmental geological research entitled “Belt of Yotvings—fragment of Green Lungs of Europe” was launched in 1992 to deal with the collection of all information significant for assessment of geological environment, resources, and possible hazards in order to ensure sustainable use of the subsurface and better living conditions for the population (Slowanska, 1997). The name of the program comes from the idea of creating the “Green Lungs of Europe,” covering the most valuable

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natural areas of Eastern and Central Europe. The “Belt of Yotvings” refers to the ancient people who lived in the present Polish–Lithuanian–Belarussian border-region until the 14th–15th centuries. The Polish–Lithuanian borderarea is characterized by rich biodiversity, forests, valuable geomorphologic features formed by continental glaciation, and picturesque landscapes that are subject to protection and that occur in several protected areas on both sides of the border (Giedraitiene et al., 2002). Other examples which follow principles of integrated river basin management come from Asia and Africa. In 1996, India and Nepal signed a treaty for the integrated development of the Mahakali River. The Mahakali Treaty incorporated former agreements and provided for a new project—The Pancheshwar Multipurpose Project. The Treaty has provisions for water-sharing projects for power generation, irrigation use, and flood control. The Agreement stipulates that the two countries will share equally the energy generated and share the cost in proportion to the benefits accruing to each. The Protocol on Shared Watercourse Systems of Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), which was signed in 1995 and ratified in 1998, refers to three international river basins: Zambezi, Limpopo, and the Okavango. It calls for the establishment of River Basin Commissions in each basin, to collect and exchange data, monitor and research, and settle disputes. There is the intention to bring the Protocol in line with the UN 1997 Convention (Green Cross, 2000; Kliot et al., 2001, p. 251).

5.4. Cross-border resource cooperation

One of the exciting cases concerning cross-border cooperation is Czech’s territorial exchange with its neighbors. Based on an agreement signed by Governments of the Czech Republic and Germany in Prague in April 2003, which was approved by the Czech Senate in November 2004, the Czech Republic and Germany would exchange almost 3000 sq. m of territory in connection with the Rozvadov–Waidhaus border crossing motorway construction project. Within the construction of the motorway, the border is to divide the planned motorway bridge at the west Bohemian crossing. The border line, however, has had a different course up to date, therefore the two countries have to exchange territory in the bridge’s surroundings. In the early 2004, the Czech parliament also approved the exchange of almost 42,500 sq. m of land on the Czech–Austrian border, mainly due to changing river courses and somewhere also to facilitate people’s access to real estate.12

12

Source: www.ceskenoviny.cz/news/index_view.php?id ⫽ 101914.

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The establishment of cross-border resource cooperation mechanism is an important vehicle for resource and environmental security. In addition to the benefits from providing resource and environmental security, cross-border cooperation mechanism also enhances sovereignty in areas where borders have been contested or ill-defined. For instance, in southern Africa, Singh (2000) demonstrated that establishing cross-border conservation areas would increase control over border areas through the establishment of joint border patrols, stricter monitoring of human movements and collaborating on controlling illegal activities leading to higher political cooperation. The benefits of cross-border cooperation in internationally shared protected areas are summarized by Hamilton et al. (1996) as the following aspects: ●

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A larger contiguous area will better safeguard biodiversity since very large areas are needed to maintain minimum viable populations of many fauna species, particularly large carnivores. Where populations of flora or fauna cross a political or administrative boundary, cross-border cooperation promotes ecosystem or bioregional management. Reintroduction or natural recolonization of large-range species is facilitated by cross-border cooperation. Pest species (pathogens, insects) or alien invasives that adversely affect native biodiversity are more easily controlled if joint control is exercised rather than having a source of infection across the boundary. For rare plant species needing ex situ bank and nursery facilities, one facility for both parks will be cheaper to set up. Joint research programs can eliminate duplication, enlarge perspectives and the skills pool, standardize methodologies and share expensive equipment. Wildfires cross boundaries, and better surveillance and management is possible through joint management. Poaching and illegal trade across boundaries are better controlled by crossborder cooperation. Cooperation is needed for effective law enforcement. Joint patrols in border areas become possible. Nature-based tourism is enhanced because of a greater attraction for visitors, the possibilities of joint approaches to marketing and tour operator training, and the possibility of agreements on fees, visitor management, etc. More cost-effective and compelling education materials can be produced, and joint interpretation is stronger concerning shared natural or cultural resources. Joint training of park staff is more cost-effective and usually benefits from greater diversity of staff with different experiences. Cross-border cooperation improves staff morale and reduces feeling of isolation. Contact with cultural differences enriches both partners. Cross-border cooperation makes staff exchanges easier, and staff exchange programs have shown their worth.

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A cross-boundary pool of different expertise is available for problem-solving. Expenses for infrequently used heavy equipment, aircraft rental for patrols, etc., may be shared. Cross-border cooperation in priority actions can carry more weight with authorities in each country. The ministry level may feel greater obligation to honor commitments of support when another jurisdiction or another country is involved. International donors and assistance agencies are more attracted to an international joint proposal. Outside threats (e.g., air pollution, inappropriate development) may be more easily met when there is an international or interstate response. Customs and immigration officials are more easily encouraged to cooperate if parks are cooperating. Search and rescue is often more efficient and economical.

The idea of cross-border resource cooperation incorporates various components, including importance attached to biodiversity conservation and ecosystem-based management, as well as philosophical concepts of environmental law and sustainable development such as inclusion of all stakeholders and conservation of natural and environmental resources for future generations. There are three mechanisms to implement international protocols of transnational public resources: the first mechanism is to transform the protocols into contracts and set up the authority to bring contracts into effect; the second is to cultivate the habits that everyone complies with the protocols; the third is that even though there are no trusts between people and there are no more powerful authority to implement the protocols, the protocols can still be stood by. There is hope that international protocols relating to environmental problems can come true through the last two mechanisms, especially the second one (Dasgupta, 1996). Through an empirical survey of more than 136 cross-border protected area complexes, Zbicz (1999b) demonstrated the effectiveness of simple, cost-effective measures to enhance cross-border conservation, while putting forth six levels of cooperation ranging from no contact to joint management (Table 5.1). Since the late 1980s, the emerging interest in the co-management of natural and environmental resources covers both theoretical and empirical researches. Co-management may be referred to under several names, such as joint or shared stewardship, joint management or partnerships. The term comanagement has been used loosely to describe a variety of institutional arrangements encompassing consultation with members of the public on matters of environmental and resource allocation and management; the devolution of administrative, if not legislative, authority; and multi-party decision making. Co-management is thus essentially a form of power sharing, although the

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Table 5.1. The six levels of cross-border cooperation Levels of cooperation between adjoining protected areas 0. No cooperation 1. Communication

2. Consultation

Characteristics of cooperation

(0.1) (0.2) (1.1) (1.2) (1.3) (1.4) (2.1) (2.2)

3. Collaboration

(3.1) (3.2)

4. Coordination

(4.1) (4.2) (4.3) (5.1) (5.2) (5.3)

5. Full cooperation

Areas of hostility and armed conflict No communication between staff of adjoining areas Information sharing Staffs communicate Low-level meetings Possibly the duty to notify about actions that may have cross-border impacts Both sides agree to consult on specific items of common interest Duty to notify about actions that may have cross-border impacts Regular meetings Programmatic cooperation such as joint research, search and rescue, signage and tourist facilities, etc. Both acknowledge ecosystem as a single unit Equal levels of protection on both sides Joint advisory committees and coordination of planning Coordinated management Joint protection of natural and environmental resources Joint long-range planning

Source: Based on Zbicz (1999b).

relative balance among parties, and the specifics of the implementing structures, can vary a great deal (Abbott, 2001). The existing case studies in comanagement have offered many documented descriptive examples, most of which pertain to specific natural resources such as of fisheries (Pinkerton, 1989; Dubbink and van Vliet, 1996; Pomeroy, 1996; Symes, 1997; Klooster, 2000; Castro and Nielsen, 2001). Table 5.2 summarizes characteristics frequently associated with co-management.13 The context of co-management is defined through resource characteristics, claims of property rights and potential regimes. Co-management is almost solely associated with common pool resources. Because of the seeming vastness of these resources, it is difficult to stop users from deriving benefits from them

13

Note that these common characteristics are not mutually exclusive. Pluralistic actors, for example, are an essential element to many of the characteristics associated with co-management (Ryan and Fitzgibbon, 2004, pp. 880–881). Berkes (1994) describes seven different levels of communication and negotiation that may occur.

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Table 5.2. Characteristics of co-management Characteristics Pluralism Communication and negotiation Transactive decision-making Social learning

Shared action/ commitment

Definition/description Inclusion of diverse interests and/or input (participants) into the process Exchange of information between two or more parties through dialog that leads to consensus or shared understanding Decisions are made through dialog involving pluralistic inputs and multiple knowledge systems Mutual gaining of knowledge by actors through sharing values, developing strategies, implementing actions, and reflecting upon feedback The commitment or undertaking of a series of events by actors

Source: Ryan and Fitzgibbon (2004, p. 880).

(Ostrom, 1990, p. 280). The nonexclusive or common nature of these cross-border resources manifests in multiple claims to property rights. These claims serve as a basis in challenging the dominant property rights regimes, and also become the impetus into the spectrum of potential institutional arrangements at the nexus of bureaucracy, community and market-based approaches (Yandle, 2003). Co-management is also distinguished as a type of management system or rights regime. RCAP (1996) classifies co-management system into the following: ● ● ●

Claims-based co-management Crisis-based co-management Community-based resource management

Once enacted, claims-based co-management regimes are constitutionally protected. They have a broad range of environmental and resource matters. These include power-sharing and cooperation as concerns fish and wildlife harvesting, the management of parks and conservation areas, environmental screening and review procedures, land use planning and water, etc. Crisis-based models, which have multiple boards for different mandates, are in contrast to the claims-based co-management agreements. However, crisis-based arrangements are in practice much closer to true co-jurisdiction than any of the claims-based agreements. There are many models for community-based agreements. General features of community-based resource management include enhanced relationship with the concerned government department, final government decisions, etc. Ontario’s community forestry initiative, which consists of four pilot projects, is one type of provincial response, such as the Elk Lake Community Forest Project. Another type is the system of controlled exploitation zones for fish and wildlife in Quebec (Abbott, 2001).

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Co-management as a political process could be useful for the cross-border management of natural and environmental resources. Successful institutional arrangements for co-management can improve the cross-border management and decision-making process through encouraging participatory democracy, flexibility, multiple accountability, and strategic planning at local and regional scales. While local communities, organizations may not be capable of accepting full responsibility for resource and environment management, they can actively participate in planning and management initiatives related to resource access, allocation and decision-making through effective institutionalized comanagement arrangements. Organizations that remain in constant contact with the social field of the domain are best suited for dealing with such issues. This may range from ultimate decision-making authority to simply serving as an energy center to present local concerns to a higher authority (Noble, 2000).

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Chapter 6 Cross-border resource management in disputed areas

6.1. Resource scarcity and cross-border conflict 6.1.1. Theoretical hypotheses

Although there is some similarity between border-area studies that focused on resource unitization and environmental protection and those that are concerned with conflict resolution, the two fields have been treated distinctively (see, e.g., Minghi, 1963, p. 423). The latter centers on areas in disputes with respect to the location of the border, while the former relates to a common resource whose formation often remains unaffected by the border, but whose utilization is strictly determined by the border. The idea that resource scarcity enhances prospects for cross-border conflict is not new in the literature of international and area studies. This can be traced back to early theorists such as Choucri and North (1975, 1989), who contend that internal demands on resources push states toward outward expansion, increasing the possibility for conflicts to arise through hostile lateral pressure. Resource-poor regions will create environments that are highly competitive, where the creation of institutions to manage conflict will be lacking or ineffective. Resource-rich regions, on the other hand, will be faced with fewer potential conflict situations overall, which will enhance the prospects for the creation of institutions to manage conflicts that do arise (Hensel et al., 2004). Gleditsch (2001, p. 253) provides a nice summary for these Malthusian-type arguments. Population growth and high resource consumption per capita (demand-induced scarcity) lead to deteriorated environmental conditions (supply-induced scarcity), which increase resource scarcity further and create harsher resource competition. This process, when combined with inequality with respect to resource access (structural scarcity), increases the chances for violence. There is an obvious linkage between resource scarcity and cross-border conflicts. The resource scarcity and environmental damage involves real threats to public health, agricultural and industrial production, as well as national security. Clearly, as population increases the demand for the resources increases as well. The lack of alternatives for the resources increases the dependency of both sides of the border. Control over the cross-border resources by one party usually indicates a decrease in the amount of the

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resources for the other party, which can be described as a zero-sum game. For example, in the year following the Six-Day War, Israel increased its water use from the Jordan River by 33% (Grunfeld, 1997). As the outcomes of the war, Jordan not only lost the significant access to the water from the Jordan River, it but also had to terminate the plans to expand usage of the river and its cannal system. In addition, Palestinians also took control over large sectors of the Jordan Valley that held these source waters. Critchley and Terriff (1993, pp. 332–333) argue that resources directly result in conflict when (i) they are becoming increasingly scarce in a region, (ii) they are essential for human survival, and (iii) the resource can be physically seized or controlled. They assert that direct conflict over renewable resources will be rare, but competition over scarce resources will have a strong indirect effect on the propensity for conflict. Limited availability of resources places stress on society, which makes the society less stable and more conflictprone. Like Critchley and Terriff (1993), Homer-Dixon (1999) believes that the probability of conflict rises due to “decreased agricultural production, economic decline, population displacement, and disruption of legitimate institutions and social relations.” In addition to the studies linking resources broadly with conflict, scholars have begun to focus their attention on water resources. In cross-border areas, rivers serving as borders can be distinguished between three categories of river relations: upstream/downstream (i.e., shared across a border), border demarking and mixed. According to Toset et al. (2000) and Furlong and Gleditsch (2003), only 9% rivers have a clear upstream/downstream categorization and 52% have a “border demarking” category. Both studies show that the upstream/downstream type of river was most significant for risk of conflict. This hypothesis can be witnessed in countries where borders have made water issues internationally irreversible and institutionally complex.1 For example, the Indian–Bangladeshi dispute started in 1951 when India decided to construct the Farakka Barrage. The Barrage began operating in 1975. India’s intentions were to divert waters from the Ganges River to the Houghly River, to maintain navigability of this river, and to flush out the silt that was deposited in the Calcutta Port. The dispute concerns the quantity of Ganges water which India was ready to release from the Barrage for Bangladesh’s usage, which Bangladesh claimed was insufficient (Salman et al., 1999, pp. 304–307). The conflict between Bangladesh and India centered on the quantity of Ganges water to be released for the Bangladeshi utilization during the dry season, because disputes on supply of water quotas to downstream countries during the dry season are becoming more frequent than during the other seasons. Even in water-rich river basins such as the Mekong 1

For more evidence in Middle East and Africa, see Falkenmark (1990).

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or Euphrates, low water flow during droughts may turn into a dispute between riparians with storage capacity. Examples are China and Thailand vs. Vietnam in the Mekong, and Turkey vs. Syria and Iraq in the Euphrates. In 1974, the water shortage almost triggered a war between Iraq and Syria (Bilena and Uskay, 1991; Kliot et al., 2001, p. 253). Using a dataset on shared water resources, Gleditsch et al. (2004) conducted a series of statistical tests on the relationships between rivers and military disputes. Using a dummy for the presence of a shared basin, they affirmed that there is a positive and significant relation between countries sharing water and incidence of conflicts. They also tested the length of the border demarcated by a river and the river crossings (defined by the number of places where a river crosses their border), which prove to have no relation to conflict. Instead, they found that the shared river variable might explain something other than the presence of contentious river crossings or fuzzy borders. Another interesting test of the resource war scenarios is that basin size has a positive and significant relationship with conflict, as does basin upstream. 6.1.2. Empirical evidence

The increasing scarcity of natural and environmental resources, combined with other factors, usually becomes a source of cross-border conflict in disputed areas. The narrative below gives five examples in this regard. Case 1. The Jordan River originates in the mountains of eastern Lebanon. As the Jordan flows south through the entrance to the Great Syrian Rift Valley, it is fed from underground sources and small streams at various points in Jordan, Israel, Syria and Lebanon. The Jordan’s main sources are the Hasbani River, which flows from Lebanon to Israel, the Banyas River, which flows from Syria to Israel, the Dan River, which begins and flows inside Israel, and the Yarmouk River, which begins near the Golan Heights and flows to the Jordan River. Following its flow into Lake Galilee, the Jordan River continues southward into the center of the Jordan Valley, forming the border between the western edge of Jordan and eastern side of Israel including part of the Palestinian Autonomy. The Jordan River continues flowing into the Dead Sea, and then through a smaller stream it flows eventually into the Red Sea. The Jordan River is the largest and longest river that flows in Israel. Moreover, it is the only river within Israel that has a permanent flow all through the year. The Jordan River supplies Israel and Jordan with the vast majority of their water. Inside Israel’s border, the availability of water per-capita in 1990 was 470 cu. m. It is estimated that by the year 2025 this availability will be reduced to 310 cu. m. As such, over 50% of Israel’s water sources rely on rain which falls outside of the Israeli border. Israel depends on water supply, which either comes from rivers that originate outside the border, or from disputed lands. For

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the State of Jordan, the Jordan River supplies about 75% of its needs. In contrast to Israel, only 36% of the total river flow originates outside the Jordanian border. However, in terms of water availability for the year of 1990, Jordan had only 260 cu. m per capita, which is almost one-fourth less than the minimum water requirement for an industrial nation. Moreover, by the year 2025 it is estimated that Jordan will only have 80 cu. m per capita per year (Grunfeld, 1997). The struggle for fresh water in the Middle East was a primary cause of military disputes in the region. The Syrian government, inside its borders, attempted to divert the Banyas River which is one of the Jordan River’s tributaries. This was followed by three Israeli army and air force attacks on the site of the diversion. These incidents regarding water issues led up to the outbreak of the Six-Day War in June 1967 between Israel against Syria, Jordan, and Egypt. During that war, Israel captured the Golan Heights and the site of the Banyas headwaters, which enabled Israel to prevent the diversion of the Banyas by the Syrians. Israel also gained control of the West Bank, the Jordan River as well as the northern bank of the Yarmouk (Cooley, 1984, p. 16). Like other conflicts that revolve around scarce resources, there are ways to determine the likelihood of water issues escalating into a large-scale multinational conflict. The probability that the degree of scarcity of water to a region, the need of several nations to share one fresh water source, the military or economic power of the state that controls the water, and existence of other fresh water sources aids the ability to predict the causes and possible solutions for these conflicts. The Middle East dispute is a multistate one since not only Israel and Jordan have attempted to control the river, but other parties, such as Syria and the Palestinians, have also taken part in trying to control sections of the river. Israeli and Jordanian attempts to control the river were illustrated by several different constructions such as the King Talal dam, built by the Jordanians, and the National Water Carrier, built by the Israelis. These attempts led to reactions that often were followed by militant attacks. The Israeli War of Independence in 1948 and the Six-Day War in 1967 highlight this dispute as a “war threat” conflict, in which the need for water often encouraged actual war between states.2 Case 2. The river Ganges is popularly known by its Hindu name, Ganga. The river has its source in the Himalayas, at Gaumukh in the southern Himalayas on the Sino–Indian border. It is 2510 km long and flows through China, India, Nepal, and Bangladesh, before entering the Bay of Bengal. The Ganges river basin is one of the most densely populated in the world and covers an area of 1,000,000 sq. km. The river flows through 29 cities with a population of over 100,000, 23 cities with a population between 50,000 and 2

Based on Grunfeld (1997).

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100,000, and near 50 towns. The people of the Ganges basin are of mixed origin. In the western and central parts of the region Turks, Mongols, Afghans, Persians, and Arabs intermingled with the original Aryans, while in the eastern and southern parts (i.e., the Bengal area) the people originate from a mixture of Tibetan, Burman and hill peoples. The Ganges has been used for irrigation since ancient times. In the Ganges valley, the use of irrigation canals has increased the production of cash crops such as sugarcane, cotton and oilseeds. Before the 19th century much of the Ganges was navigable but this declined with the construction of railroads and the increasing use of water for irrigation. West Bengal and Bangladesh, however, do still use the waterways to transport jute, tea, grain and other agricultural products. The hydroelectric potential of the Ganges is 13 million kW, two-fifths of which lies in India and the rest in Nepal.3 The construction of the Farakka Barrage at the head of the delta in West Bengal is a cause of major tension between India and Bangladesh. India claims that the port of Calcutta is detrimentally affected by deposits of silt and by the intrusion of saline seawater. To counter these effects, fresh water is diverted into the Bhagirathi River via a large canal from the Ganges at Farakka. However, after its construction the salinity of water and soil increased markedly. Also recurring floods caused by siltation and the opening of the Farakkaits Barrage sluice gates during the monsoon season resulted in extensive damage to crops. Soil moisture and groundwater levels continue to decrease and the ecosystems of the region are being damaged.4 Bangladesh claims that the Farakka Barrage deprives the country of a valuable source of water on which it depends because the Ganges waters are vital to irrigation, navigation and prevention of saline incursions in the Bangladesh Ganges delta region. Bangladesh holds that there should be joint control between India and Bangladesh over the waters of the Ganges as an international river. After decades of conflicts over the waters from the Ganges River, India and Bangladesh signed a 30-year water-sharing agreement on December 12, 1996.5 This is a significant milestone in cross-border water management and cooperation. Although successful thus far, the agreement has not eliminated all uncertainties. Bangladesh has expressed concern over India’s intended water redistribution projects involving other rivers affecting their water supply. Even worse, pollution of the Ganges has become so serious that bathing in and 3

Sources: www.britannica.com and www.cs.albany.edu/~amit/ganges.html. See www.cetacea.org/ganges.htm. 5 See the “Treaty Between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh on Sharing of the Ganga/Ganges Waters at Farakka,” available at www.thewaterpage.com/farakka_water_treaty.htm. 4

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drinking its water become very dangerous. The major polluting industry along the Ganges is the leather industry especially near Kanpur, from which Chromium and other chemicals leak into the river. Another huge source of pollution is that of the nearly 1 billion L of mostly untreated raw sewage that enters the river every day. The Ganges river dolphin (Platanista gangetia) is found in India, Nepal, Bhutan, and Bangladesh, in the Ganges, Brahmaputra, Meghna, Karnaphuli, and Hoogli river systems. The river is so muddy that vision is useless and so these dolphins are blind and their eyes have no senses. They have become an endangered species as a result of the damming of rivers and the increase in boat traffic, fishing, and pollution.6 Case 3. The State of East Timor is located in the eastern part of the Timor Island in the Indonesian archipelago that lies between the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean. It includes the enclave of Oecussi, which is located within West Timor (Indonesia). After Indonesia, East Timor’s closest neighbor is Australia in the south. Substantial oil and natural gas deposits lie under the Timor Sea between Australia and East Timor. The oil and gas fields lie much closer to East Timor than to Australia, but the International Court of Justice and the 1982 UNCLOS Tribunal leave East Timor with no legal recourse in the absence of cooperative negotiations from Australia. In 1989, a deal between Indonesia and Australia set the maritime boundary along Australia’s continental shelf, which gives Australia control of 85% of the sea and most of the oil. East Timor, which became independent from Indonesia on May 20, 2002, has never had maritime boundaries with the neighboring countries. If East Timor and Australia redraw their boundary halfway between the two countries, it is estimated that this would allow East Timor to earn AU$12 billion over the next 30 years, as opposed to AU$4.4 billion.7 The fate of the oil revenue depends on establishing a permanent boundary agreement. Australia prefers a maritime boundary based on its continental shelf, which stretches north far past the median line, and maintains this is in accordance with standard international maritime law. Yet the East Timorese believe they are morally and legally in the right in arguing for a border equidistant from the two nations, a border that would afford East Timor a much bigger slice of the oil and gas pie. East Timor has suggested that the money from the disputed fields could be put into an escrow account until the dispute is resolved (Powell, 2004). Australia has not only refused to exercise restraint in the disputed area, it has actually awarded new licenses in this area. The lucrative Laminaria–Corallina and Buffalo fields are in a disputed area immediately

6 See http://animaldiversity.ummz.umich.edu/accounts/platanista/p._gangetica$narrative.html; and www.thewaterpage.com/farakka_water_treaty.htm. 7 Source: www.nswlf.org.au/media/latest/20040704_fretlin.html.

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west of the joint development zone agreed to by East Timor and Australia. It is there that the lateral border dispute heats up, with East Timor saying its maritime borders should be pushed out to the west and east into the wealth of the Greater Sunrise field. Case 4. Diaoyu Islands are a group of eight uninhabited islands located in the East China Sea. The largest island is about 5 sq. km. After defeat by Japan in the Sino–Japan War in 1894, China ceded Taiwan to Japan under the Shimonoseki Treaty. As a part of Taiwan, the Diaoyu Islands belonged to Japan at that time. On the basis of the 1943 agreement of the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations, Taiwan was returned to China at the end of World War II in 1945. The Diaoyu Islands dispute had not been raised until the ECAFE (United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East) suggested possible large hydrocarbon deposit off Diaoyu Islands in 1969. Before that time, the three sides (the PRC, Japan, and Taiwan) seemed to be less enthusiastic about the Diaoyu Islands. In 1970, the US and Japan signed the Okinawa Reversion Treaty, which included the Diaoyu Islands as part of Okinawa to be returned to Japanese rule. This Treaty was immediately challenged by the Chinese side (both Taiwan and mainland China). This dispute includes the ownership of natural resource and the territory it is on. However, it is also related to other circumstances. An even more important significance of the disputes over the Diaoyu Islands is its implication for other island and maritime disputes involving China (both Taiwan and the mainland) and Japan. For the Chinese side, the Diaoyu issue is linked to China’s other maritime claims, particularly with regard to the South China Sea. If China soften their posture over the Diaoyu, they might be considered as softening of their position on the other disputed areas (such as the Spratly and Paracel Islands in the South China Sea). They also should have not forgotten that National pride concerning the islands is an issue for the three countries, especially for the Chinese given the recent history of Japanese aggression. For the Japanese, any softening on the Diaoyu Islands might have implications for the more serious territory dispute with Russia over the question of the “Northern Territories.” In addition, the islands have become an important nationalist symbol used by the right-wing parties to attack the current government (Huang, 1997). Case 5. The Spratly Islands are situated in the South China Sea—one of the largest continental shelves in the world. The land is not arable, does not support permanent crops, and has no meadows, pastures, or forests. Furthermore, the Spratly Islands have not been occupied by humans until recently. Typically, continental shelves are abundant in resources such as oil, natural gas, minerals, and seafood. Oil and natural gas reserves in the Spratly region are estimated at 17.7 billion tons, even larger than Kuwait’s reserves of 13 billion tons. The Spratly reserves place it as the fourth largest reserve bed worldwide. The Spratly Islands comprise 104 islands, reefs, cays, and banks. The area

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containing the islands stretches 810 km from north to south and 900 km from east to west. Despite the fact that the archipelago is spread over 250,000 sq. km of sea space, the total land mass of the Spratly Islands is a mere 5 sq. km.8 Approximately 44 of the 51 small islands and reefs are claimed or occupied by China, the Philippines, Vietnam, Taiwan, Malaysia, and Brunei. The conflict is the result of overlapping sovereignty claims to various Spratly Islands thought to possess substantial natural resources—chiefly oil, natural gas, and seafood. Since the 1950s, the involved claimants have developed 29 oil fields and four gas fields in the Spratly region. China’s rising energy demands, decreasing ability to meet demand growth with domestic energy sources, and continued reliance on oil have propelled China to look to alternative energy sources. Consequently, China must either import more oil and gas, improve its production capabilities, or undertake joint exploration of off-shore areas to develop potential oil and gas fields. Unfortunately, the third option will likely entail exploration in the potentially oil-and-gas-rich Spratly Islands, where territorial disputes are hotly contested. Tenuous stability in the Spratly region has been ignited by the oil exploration in territories with overlapping claims. In 1992, China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) signed a joint exploration contract with Crestone Energy Corporation (CEC) for a disputed area in the Spratly Islands. The Sino–US contract infuriated Vietnam, which claimed the contract location is part of its exclusive economic zone (EEZ). The situation was further aggravated in 1996, when Vietnam forged ahead with joint exploration plans in Spratly waters also claimed by China. Vietnam awarded exploration rights to Conoco in 1996, infuriating China. China claims that the area covered in the 1996 Vietnam–Conoco deal overlaps with the block awarded to Crestone Energy by China in 1992. The conflict is further exacerbated by foreign firms willing to undertake riskier oil development projects in Asia. The foreign oil firms are looking to profit from the current energy boom in Asia as well as to find replacement reserves for those in the United States and the North Sea where production approaches its peak (The Economists, 1996, p. 66). Overlapping claims for the Spratly Islands resulted in several military incidents since 1974 and in several countries awarding foreign companies exploration rights in the same area of the South China Sea. Regional nation states not directly involved in the Spratly disputes became concerned about regional stability and established a regional forum to discuss the peaceful resolution of the disputes. Sovereignty and exploration disputes were thought to be resolved with the drafting of ASEAN’s 1992 declaration, which committed members to resolve disputes peacefully and to consider joint exploration of the territory. How the events in the Spratly Islands unfold have far-reaching implications. 8

Data source: www.american.edu/ted/ice/spratly.htm.

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The resolution of Spratly-related disputes will not only impact the distribution of sovereignty and exploration rights, but also implicate how future economic and security arrangements will develop in Southeast Asia.

6.2. Cross-border conflict and resource management

During the 20th century, the number of wars taking place worldwide increased. According to McNeely (2000), more than 160 wars have been recorded since the end of World War II (for information about some selected cross-border wars, see Table 6.1). Armed conflicts have always been destructive of resource and environment in cross-border areas and are antithetical to their rational management and use. The negative impacts of armed conflict on environment are becoming well documented in a growing body of literature.9 During and following armed conflict, an armed and lawless society can have Table 6.1.

Selected cross-border wars in the 20th century

War name

Countries involved

Russo–Polish Greco–Turkish Lithuanian–Polish Sino–Soviet Saudi–Yemeni Russo–Finnish First Kashmir Assam Second Kashmir Bangladesh Turco–Cypriot Vietnamese–Cambodian Ethiopian–Somalian Ugandan–Tanzanian Sino–Vietnamese Iran–Iraq Falklands Israel–Syria (Lebanon) Sino–Vietnamese

Russia, Poland Greece, Turkey Lithuania, Poland China, USSR Saudi Arabia, Yemen Russia, Finland India, Pakistan China, India India, Pakistan India, Pakistan Turkey, Cyprus Vietnam, Cambodia Ethiopia, Somalia Uganda, Tanzania China, Vietnam Iran, Iraq Argentina, UK Israel, Syria China, Vietnam

War start (M/D/Y) 2/14/1919 5/5/1919 7/15/1920 8/17/1929 3/20/1934 11/30/1939 7/17/1948 10/20/1962 8/5/1965 12/3/1971 7/20/1974 5/1/1975 8/1/1977 10/30/1978 2/17/1979 9/22/1980 3/25/1982 4/21/1982 1/5/1987

Duration (days)

Deaths

613 1256 140 109 55 104 169 34 50 15 13 1348 226 165 22 2890 88 138 33

100,000 50,000 1000 3200 2100 74,900 2000 1853 7061 11,000 1500 8000 6000 3000 21,000 1,250,000 910 1235 4000

Source: Sarkees (2000).

9

See, for example, Austin and Bruch (2000), Blom et al. (2000), Blom and Yamindou (2001), Hart and Mwinyihali (2001), Hatton et al. (2001), Jacobs and Schloeder (2001), Kalpers (2001a), Matthew et al. (2001), Plumptre et al. (2001) and Shanbaugh et al. (2003).

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both direct and indirect impacts on the environment, which include at least three aspects—environmental damage, resource destruction and over-exploitation, and institutional threats to environmental protection. 6.2.1. Environmental damage

The most serious environmental impact of armed conflict is pollution. Pollution can take many forms, and it can result directly from actions by military or other armed groups, as well as indirectly from human and economic crises created by the conflict. In the recent conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa, for example, pollution has most often been a serious problem during humanitarian crises. Refugees and internally displaced people often find themselves living in conditions so overcrowded that they become a significant source of potential pollution. In their need to subsist, the displaced may pollute surface water; in their flight, they may bring infectious diseases. The latter concern threatens not just the health of human populations but also that of the indigenous wildlife (Kalpers, 2001a). In sum, armed conflicts could result in the following five types of environmental damage: (i) High levels of pollution around main military targets, in particular chemical industry. (ii) Ecosystems threatened, in particular river ecosystems. (iii) Food contamination resulting from soil pollution (also as a secondary effect of air pollution). (iv) Drinking water contamination. (v) Human health stemming from the long-term effects of toxic/carcinogenic substances and radiation. Throughout the 1990s, armed conflicts resulted in serious environmental damages in Kosovo. A study carried out by a team of expert staff from the Regional Environment Center for Central and Eastern Europe and other contracted country experts shows that armed conflicts have had a strong impact on the human/built environment in Kosovo, as a result of Yugoslav Army activities. All over Yugoslavia, the infrastructure suffered heavy damage (REC, 1999). In 1999, the Kosovo crisis lasted more than 70 days, with 1200 aircraft dropping around 20,000 bombs and rockets. By the NATO estimates around 5000 members of the Yugoslav armed forces were killed in the bombardment, together with hundreds of civilians in both Serbia and Kosovo. Around 1.4 million Kosovar Albanians were forced to flee from their homes, of which an estimated 782,100 are now in Macedonia, Albania, Bosnia and the semi-detached Yugoslav province of Montenegro. One of the principal environmental concerns highlighted by the media and NGOs during and immediately after the conflict was the possible damage to the Danube. Most of key industrial facilities—all of

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which are located alongside the Danube, along major tributaries such as the Sava, or on smaller tributaries such as the Lepenica and Morava—were targeted during the air strikes. Consequently, there were genuine fears that large quantities of hazardous substances could have entered the Danube system, with risk for people in Yugoslavia and, downstream in Bulgaria and Romania, through drinking contaminated water or eating contaminated fish (Sinha, 2001). 6.2.2. Resource destruction and over-exploitation

Habitat destruction and the accompanying loss of wildlife are among the most common and far-reaching impacts of conflict, and occur for subsistence, strategic, or commercial reasons. Habitats are sometimes directly affected during armed conflict. For example, vegetation may be cut, burned or defoliated to improve mobility or visibility for troops. In Rwanda in 1991, the Rwandan army cut a swath 50 to 100 m wide through the bamboo forest connecting the Virunga Volcanoes in order to reduce the possibility of ambush along a key trail (Kalpers, 2001a). Overexploitation of natural resources is often directly linked to armed conflict, and occurs for both subsistence and commercial reasons. In all cases, the breakdown of law enforcement and traditional local controls makes sustainable resource management even more challenging. It is important to understand that incentives for local communities to conserve resources and species decrease when economic benefits from them decline. This is true even in areas that are not directly affected by armed conflict. Environmental disturbances resulted from the refugee situation in Kosovo, Albania and FYR Macedonia, but also from refugees coming home (e.g., use of wood for heating) and refugees in Serbia and Montenegro (REC, 1999). In some areas where fighting occurs, troops often hunt large mammals in great numbers to obtain food. This practice can have a devastating impact on wildlife populations, especially if military action continues in an area for an extended period (Kalpers, 2001a). Larger species with slow reproductive rates are particularly vulnerable, and tend to disappear first. In a side effect of the war in Sudan, the wildlife in Garamba National Park of Dem. Rep. of Congo, just across the border, was heavily exploited by marauding poachers who killed park animals, primarily for their meat. Patrol monitoring and maps showed the poaching moved steadily south through the park, killing large mammals—initially buffalo (Syncerus caffer), and later elephants—from 1991 onward. More than 70% of the annual incidents involved Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) “deserters” based on the Sudan side of the border (Hillman Smith and Smith, 1997).10 10

Cited from Shanbaugh et al. (2003, p. 7).

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6.2.3. Institutional threats

Depletion of natural and environmental resources as a result of armed conflict can weaken the chances of lasting peace and sustainable livelihoods for the residents. Although conflicts may start for other reasons, there is a risk that resource depletion and environmental degradation can drag a region into a vicious circle: poverty, further political instability, more armed conflict, greater environmental degradation and even greater poverty (Shanbaugh et al., 2003, p. 11). Besides, armed conflict can radically alter the political, social and economic context in which conservation takes place—changing the balance of political power, eroding law and order, and destroying local and national economies. All these would often fragment societies, disrupt traditional systems of environmental and natural resource management, divert resources away from development and conservation, and lower the priority of conservation in general. Although it is difficult today to deny the existence of the rules of international law which impose restrictions on combatants as to the way and manner in which armed conflicts are to be conducted, and the nature of weapons to be used in armed conflicts. However, in reality, there has always been a tendency on the part of warring parties to argue that in war, laws are silent. As the Bosnian experience has shown, environmental protection tends to have a low priority in reconstruction processes. Especially under time pressures this can lead to decisions where the environmental impact of an activity is not taken into consideration. For example, it has been estimated that the position of Yugoslav authorities that seek to deal with environmental issues is even weaker than it was prior to the conflict (REC, 1999). This means that even existing environmental legislation cannot be implemented or enforced. There has been increasing awareness of international conventions that protect the environment in disputed and armed-conflicting areas, and the need to improve their enforceability. In theory, armed conflicts are governed by an international legal framework that restrains the conduct of soldiers toward civilians and noncombatants, the natural environment, and any other nonmilitary targets, including wildlife. In practice, these laws are often ineffective, particularly during civil wars and other internal conflicts (Shanbaugh et al., 2003, p. 18). International environmental law provides specific protections for natural environment and wildlife that may extend to times of armed conflict. For example, the 1972 UNESCO World Heritage Convention establishes a clear framework for protection of designated World Heritage Sites, and its language suggests that it is meant to apply during wartime. By itself, this convention does not automatically have an effect on the ground, and it must be recognized that the World Heritage Convention has not always fulfilled the role expected of it

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at the international level. Key personnel at relevant sites must be made aware of the convention’s potential, and then use it to support site conservation.11 Finally, in the aftermath of armed conflict, there have been increasing calls for ad-hoc legal mechanisms that could hold governing authorities and individuals financially accountable for damages to natural resources and wildlife. One existing model is the United Nations Compensation Commission, which has created to assess civil liability against the government of Iraq for its actions during the Persian Gulf War. Another suggestion proposes that funds be set aside to create an international environmental emergency task force that would assess and mitigate environmental damage even before lengthy civil claims procedures are put into place (Austin and Bruch, 2003).

6.3. Approaches for resource management in disputed areas

Since the 20th century, various approaches have been applied to conflict resolution as well as the resource management in cross-border areas. In this section, six approaches a will be discussed in detail: (i) fair division scheme; (ii) transboundary collaboration; (iii) third-party mediation; (iv) international peace park; (v) neutral zone; and (vi) demilitarized zone. It is worth noting that each approach has its own conditions under which cross-border resources could be efficiently managed. 6.3.1. Fair division scheme (FDS)

The idea of setting aside claims to sovereignty in favor of joint development has been articulated on many occasions. Scholars have put forward various forms of joint development schemes for the resolution of cross-border resource disputes. For example, Denoon and Brams (1997) propose that a new mathematical technique, called “fair division,” be used to help facilitate the negotiations over the sovereignty of the disputed areas. In fair division, each side is given an agreed-upon number of points to allocate over various assets they desire, and a neutral umpire then calculates how to divide the assets in a way that gives each side the same percentage of its preferences.12 The advantage of this technique

11

The UNESCO/United Nations Foundation program for the conservation of the five World Heritage Sites in Dem. Rep. of Congo (see Kalpers, 2001a; Hart and Mwinyihai, 2001) is a typical example. 12 As an example, Denoon and Brams (1997) suggest that the South China Sea could be divided into five zones, and the PRC and ASEAN could bid for the areas that were most important to them. Thus, the PRC and ASEAN might each get some of the islands and some of the deep-water hydrocarbon development areas.

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is that it would be fair and resolve sovereignty definitively, thus making it easier to get businesses to invest in the follow-on development needed. In addition, Valencia et al. (1997) develop a range of possible options for consideration as part of a multilateral joint development authority similar to the Antarctic Treaty, a multilateral agreement to share resources in Antarctica. The Timor Gap treaty between Australia and Indonesia, agreements in the Persian Gulf, and other bilateral/multilateral resource development agreements provide ample precedent for considering this approach. The resource management of the disputed Iceland-Jan Mayen continental shelf is a good example in practice. The “Agreement on the Continental Shelf between Iceland and Jan Mayen” was signed by the Governments of Iceland and of Norway on October 22, 1981. According to Article 6 of the Agreement, “In the part of the area south of the delimitation line between the two Parties’ economic zones (approximately 12,720 sq. km), Norway shall be entitled to participate with a share of 25% in such petroleum activities as are referred to in the agreement. In negotiations with outside governmental or non-governmental petroleum companies, Iceland shall not be bound to seek to arrive at an arrangement whereby the Norwegian percentage of the costs of such petroleum activities are carried by the company (or companies) concerned.” “Icelandic legislation, Icelandic petroleum policy and Icelandic regulations relating to the control of such activities, safety measures and environmental protection shall apply to the activities in the area referred to in the first paragraph. The Icelandic authorities shall also be responsible for enforcement and administration in the said area.” The successful demarcation of the Beibu (Tonkin) Gulf between China and Vietnam is another example. The Beibu Gulf, with an area of 128,000 sq. km, is enclosed by the land of mainland China and Vietnam and China’s Hainan Island (see Fig. 6.1), and had never been demarcated. In spite of its richness, the fishery resource in the Beibu Gulf is not infinite and many years of mass exploitation has influenced resource reproduction. It is estimated that the maximum sustainable yield is 600,000 tons yr⫺1. However, during the past years, the fishermen from both sides have overexploited more than 1,000,000 tons of fishery products annually.13 If this situation continues, the fishery will become depleted eventually. China and Vietnam ratified the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCOLS) in 1994 and 1996, respectively. This means that both nations stipulate that, in addition to 12 nautical miles of territorial water, coastal countries are also entitled to 200 nautical miles of exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and continental shelf. But the Beibu Gulf, shared by the two countries, is only 180 nautical miles at the widest, meaning that China and Vietnam’s claims overlap and a clear borderline needed to be defined through 13

Data source: China Daily (2004), cited from http://english.sina.com/news/china/6866068.shtml.

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Figure 6.1. The shared fishing area of China and Vietnam at Beibu (Tonkin) Gulf.

negotiations. The adoption of the EEZ system has had an impact on traditional fishing rights. As far as the Beibu Gulf is concerned, fishing disputes between China and Vietnam have been on the rise, undermining the interests of fishermen and affecting the smooth development of bilateral ties. Circumstances necessitate a speedy solution by both sides to the demarcation issue and the establishment of a new mechanism of cooperation in fishery. The Beibu Gulf Demarcation Agreement and the Beibu Gulf Fishery Cooperation Agreement were signed by China and Vietnam on December 25, 2000 in Beijing, which took effect on July 30, 2004. China and Vietnam began talks on the demarcation of the Beibu Gulf in the mid-1970s. The Beibu Gulf demarcation agreement defines the borderlines of the territorial waters, the exclusive economic zones and the continental shelf for both China and Vietnam. The Chinese side held that both sides maintain balanced geopolitical ties in the Beibu Gulf area. Based on such a view, the two sides achieved a fair result by dividing roughly evenly the sea area between both sides (see Fig. 6.1) and fairly distributing the fishing resources in the Gulf. The agreement represents successful work by both sides in settling the maritime demarcation under a new order of maritime law.

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According to this Agreement, the two sides marked off relatively large cross-border fishing area (more than 30,000 sq. km). This area covers most of the high and medium yield fishery ground in which both countries’ fishing boats can enter for as long as 15 years. Moreover, a cross-border water area, set as a transitional arrangement for 4 years, was marked off to the north of the shared fishing area to admit fishing boats from both sides. The agreement also stipulates that the two sides will carry out long-term fishery cooperation in the shared fishing area under the principle of mutual benefit. 6.3.2. Transboundary collaboration (TBC)

In many areas of the world, cross-border natural and environmental resources are not managed jointly. Consequently, there are no prior principles to guide partners as to how much each of them can utilize from the common resources and for what purposes. Since cross-border areas tend to be remote and undeveloped, they often contain protected areas, relatively intact vegetation, and high biodiversity, and so are particularly vulnerable to environmental damage. Besides, they are also often the location of armed conflicts, including both conflicts between neighboring countries and civil conflicts, since groups opposing the government often establish bases and hold territory in remote border areas (Shanbaugh et al., 2003, p. 71). In contrast to conflicts, transnational resources, because of their nature as of commonality, tends to induce even hostile nations to cooperate, even as disputes rages over other issues (see, e.g., Wolf, 1999; Blatter et al., 2001, pp. 31–56). A successful example of transboundary collaboration during armed conflict is in the Virungas, where montane forests in three adjacent protected areas in Rwanda, Uganda, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) are home to the endangered mountain gorilla. The gorilla population ranges freely across the borders of the three countries. In the 1980s, protected-area authorities started collaborating on gorilla conservation and tourism development on an ad hoc basis. The International Gorilla Conservation Program (IGCP) was created in 1991, as conditions began to deteriorate. The IGCP still works very closely with the three protected-area authorities, aiming to strengthen their capacity to conserve the forests and gorillas in the face of ongoing threats (poaching, deforestation and agricultural encroachment), and to promote a framework for regional collaboration. During the past decade the forests have seen much fighting at various stages of the complex conflict. Several times, park authorities in Rwanda and the DRC were forced to withdraw from all or part of the parks. In 1994, refugee camps were established on the border of the Virunga National Park in the DRC, causing serious deforestation in the vicinity. More recently, when the DRC government forces were fighting against troops in the east backed by

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Rwanda and Uganda, its wildlife authority, was unable to support its staff in the Virungas in the east. The IGCP stepped in to provide this support, and helped to facilitate collaboration among the staff of the three protected areas. Remarkably, this collaboration continued, at the local level and the wildlife authority headquarters level, despite the worsening political situation (Lanjouw et al., 2001; Kalpers, 2001b). Transboundary collaboration may include control of illegal hunters moving across borders, control of fires and diseases in border areas, monitoring of cross-border wildlife movements and joint effort on conflict resolutions. Under the IGCP, only the military forces were allowed to carry arms in the Virungas. At such times, unarmed park guards underwent training and conducted joint patrols with the military. In turn, the military received training from the park authorities on the ecological importance of the forest; health, behavior, and social structure of gorillas; and park regulations. This collaboration ensured that the military presence was not disruptive to the park and also sensitized an important interest group. The high conservation and economic value of the gorillas, the enormous dedication of the government protected-area staff, and the presence of the IGCP are the key factors that have ensured conservation of the gorilla population during this long-lasting and complex conflict (Shanbangh et al., 2003, p. 73). 6.3.3. Third-party mediation (TPM)

Given the failures of cooperative negotiations between parties concerned, the third-party mediation (TPM) could play a critical role in resolving many disputes. In most cases, the TPM might provide communication and the technical means for verifying complex boundary negotiations. Successful cases for using the TPM include the Indus Treaty between the governments of India and Pakistan in 1960 (which was mediated by the World Bank)14 and the resolution of the dispute between Argentina and Chile over the Beagle Channel in 1981 (which was mediated by the Vatican, whose moral authority has had supreme influence over the large Catholic populations in South America). The Beagle Channel conflict had its origins in a long-standing disagreement over the contours of the Argentine–Chilean border.15 The core issue in this dispute was sovereignty over three barren islands (Picton, Nueva, and Lennox) to the south of Tierra del Fuego and the scope of the maritime jurisdiction associated with those islands. In the course of attempting to resolve this initial problem, however, the parties confronted several collateral issues of great

14 15

See Chapter 5.2.1 for more details. This case study is based on an article by Laudy (2004), which also gives other references.

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importance, including navigation rights, sovereignty over other islands in the Fuegian Archipelago, delimitation of the Straits of Magellan, and maritime boundaries south to Cape Horn and beyond. In 1978, Argentina and Chile nearly went to war over a cluster of small islands at the southern tip of South America.16 As early as in 1881, Chile and Argentina attempted to definitively resolve their territorial disputes through a comprehensive agreement known as the Boundary Treaty of 1881. This agreement provided that the border between the two countries would follow the Andes as far south as the 52th Parallel. At the 52th parallel, the border was to proceed along a generally eastward course to Point Dungeness, on the northern shore of the Straits of Magellan, just where the Straits empty into the Atlantic Ocean. To the south of the Straits, the 1881 Treaty stipulated that the border would run to the south from Cape Espiritu Santo, on the northern shore of Tierra del Fuego, “until it touches the Beagle Channel.” Tierra del Fuego was thus to be divided into an eastern portion belonging to Argentina and a western portion belonging to Chile. Finally, the treaty included a provision for allocation of the islands to the south of Tierra del Fuego: “As to the islands, Argentina will possess Staten Island, the small islands immediately surrounding it, and any other islands that may exist in the Atlantic to the east of Tierra del Fuego and the eastern coast of Patagonia; and Chile will possess all the islands to the south of the Beagle Channel as far as Cape Horn, and any other islands that may exist to the west of Tierra del Fuego.” This language led to various difficulties of application. With respect to the Beagle Channel and the islands south to Cape Horn, the key problem was the Treaty’s failure to specify the eastern terminus of the Channel. Since the

16

The major events of the dispute resolution are briefly reported below in a chronological order. From May to October, 1978, unsuccessful negotiations were held, with military mobilization accelerated in Chile and Argentina. In November, Argentina accepted Chilean proposal for mediation. On December 12, the Argentine and Chilean foreign ministers met in Buenos Aires and were unable to select a mediator, with armed forces being at full state of alert. On December 23, Pope John Paul II informed Chile and Argentina that he was sending a personal envoy to meet with their respective governments. On January 8, 1979, the Chilean and Argentine foreign ministers formally requested mediation by the Vatican and renounced the use of force. On May 4, mediation process officially began at the Vatican. During May and summer, mediation team gathered background information. On January 8, 1981, Chile accepted papal proposal. On March 17, Argentina delivered a note to Vatican expressing serious objections to papal proposal. On January 21, 1982, Argentina announced termination of 1972 General Treaty on the Judicial Settlement of Disputes, creating vacuum juris. From April to June, Falkland Islands War broke out. On February 3, 1983, Cardinal Samoré died. On December 10, President Raúl Alfonsín took office. On January 23, 1984, Chile and Argentina signed a Declaration of Peace and Friendship. On April 14, Vatican Secretary of State Cardinal Agostino Casaroli met separately with each delegation, requesting proposals for final settlement. On June 11, Casaroli delivered final proposal to the parties. Vatican proposal accepted by both Chile and Argentina. On November 29, the Chilean and Argentine foreign ministers executed the Treaty of Peace and Friendship at the Vatican. (Cited from Laudy, 2004.)

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Boundary Treaty granted Chile possession of all the islands south of the Beagle Channel, the Channel effectively defined the longitudinal scope of Chilean sovereignty to the south of Tierra del Fuego. It was therefore impossible to definitively separate Chilean and Argentine claims in this region without determining where the Channel ends. The Chilean view was that the Beagle Channel extended well to the east of Navarino Island, and beyond the three smaller islands—Picton, Nueva, and Lennox—which were the focus of the dispute. Under this interpretation, all three islands are south of the Channel, and thus Chilean. Argentina, on the other hand, argued that the Beagle Channel veered sharply to the south along the east side of Navarino Island, making everything to the east of that island Atlantic, and thus, under the terms of the Boundary Treaty, Argentine. The TPM method that resolves cross-border disputes (before armed conflicts were shed) was remarkable in most circumstances. Mediation by a third party would be a way of catalyzing political negotiations at the highest levels. Perhaps a useful model for conducting such negotiations would be to consider “proximity” talks hosted by a nonofficial third party—similar to the role provided by the United States during the Dayton negotiations on Bosnia (DOS, 1995). In the resolution of the Beagle Channel conflict, the mediator was the Vatican, whose supreme moral authority and influence over the large Catholic populations in each country made it a mediating body that the parties could not ignore. In general, a mediator plays two distinct roles within a conflict resolution. First, it acts to defuse the situation by bringing the parties to an agreement that stopped the immediate military crisis. In the next phase, the mediator can craft a process that allows all parties concerned to grapple with increasingly difficult issues. The process was remarkable because it is flexible enough to accommodate the changing political environments in all parties concerned. This process serves to protect a fragile peace between the parties and ultimately allows them to create an agreement. Besides, it is also significant that regional and legal institutions (such as the Organization of American States and the International Court of Justice in the case of Beagle Channel conflict resolution) play a role in cross-border conflict resolution. 6.3.4. International Peace Park (IPP)

The creation of International Peace Park (IPP) is a pragmatic way to cement harmonious relations between nations concerned, while providing a model for peace for nations around the world. The past decades brought times of war and peace, prosperity and poverty around the world. But through the IPP all the idea of international peace proved a powerful symbol for mankind’s capacity for friendship. The reasons for the creation of the IPPs are twofold. First, people have named the parks “peace parks” because they believe the parks can help

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countries learn to work together. Second, they will help cross-border resource management. For example, when animals are kept in small areas, they can spread diseases more easily. They can also hurt the environment by eating too many plants and other animals. Allowing animals to cross borders would help improve these conditions (Ives, 2004). Since the first IPP, Waterton-Glacier International Peace Park, was established between the United States and Canada in 1932, there have been dozens of IPPs on the five continents. Waterton-Glacier International Peace Park celebrates the longest unguarded boundary on Earth: The 8000-km boundary between the United States and Canada. In the early 1930s, the scars of World War I were still fresh, much of the world was gripped in economic crisis and the first hints of World War II were beginning to emerge. Since the end of the Cold War, cross-border and area disputes have shown an increasing tendency in many parts of the world. Given the political and socioeconomic complexities associated with border areas, the fate of the endangered wildlife will be decided by a volatile political process. Thus, the IPP can offer an innovative method to not only mitigate these political problems, but also help protect and maintain the biological health of the fragile environment. A cursory glance at the potential snow leopard habitat reveals an important aspect of snow leopard conservation in Central Asia (Singh, 2002). Much of the cat’s habitat lies along international border areas, most of which are either hotly contested or arenas of conflict and refugee movements. Singh and Jackson (1999) argue the necessity of establishing cross-border conservation areas to protect not only the snow leopard as a keystone species to maintain the region’s rich biodiversity but also to defuse tensions along international borders. In fact, the IPP as a vehicle for the resolution of political and military conflicts has gained importance over the last decade. For example, Bolivia and Guatemala have resolved their border disputes through the negotiations surrounding the La Ruta Maya cross-border conservation initiative. Additionally, Peru and Ecuador have recently ended a 150-yr-old border dispute by establishing a cross-border peace park. Although small in number, these conservation successes serve notice that cross-border conservation can assist in creating opportunities for peace. In several essays and articles, Westing (1998, 1992) and Weed (1994) have also attested to this conservation benefit especially in areas of high military activity. These IPPs have definite political objectives and have clear symbols in nature. Even though no legal definition of peace parks exists, the IPPs can be created with the following three objectives (Shine, 1997): (i) The term is generally applied to cross-border cooperation where the primary aim is to confirm, strengthen or re-establish good relations with a neighboring state(s).

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(ii) They may be able to prevent escalation of border disputes such as Demilitarized Zones. (iii) International peace parks may be able to safeguard important areas of biodiversity, which are or were in military zones. The establishment of IPPs has created a link between communities and a common desire to learn more about one another. It can help nations resolve international conflict or even war. The Kgalagadi (ka-gal-a-GA-dee) Transfrontier Park is in the Kalahari Desert in South Africa and Botswana. The countries work together to manage the land and the animals that live there. Other countries, such as Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Namibia, and Lesotho, are also forming IPPs in order to attract tourists and create jobs. But sometimes, the use of Peace Park had serious political ramifications. An instance where a specific cross-border term caused tension was during the recent negotiations on establishing the proposed Khunjerab/Taxkorgan Peace Park. The use of the term Peace Park in this case was largely recognized by the Indian side as a strategic move by governments of China and Pakistan to demonstrate control over an area disputed by India (Singh, 2002). 6.3.5. Neutral Zone (NZ)

In the WordNet Dictionary, “neutral” is defined as “one who does not side with any party in a war or dispute.”17 Before discussing how the “Neutral Zone” influences cross-border resource management, let us first look at Switzerland— a special Alpine country in the heart of West Europe. As a neutral state, Switzerland combines almost all aspects of the heterogeneous European societies and plays an important role as the headquarters of numerous international fora and serves to promote the cause of moderation between different parts of the West Europe. Due to its neutralism, Switzerland dodged two world wars in the 20th century. The Iraq–Saudi and the Arabia–Kuwait boundaries, like many other boundaries in the Near East, reflect the historic difficulty of boundary drawing in the desert, like drawing a boundary in the ocean. In addition to the technical geographic problems, there are substantial impediments to delimitation of a boundary on the ground, based on the way of life of the Nomad and Islamic tradition. In earliest historic times, the boundary area was located across what is said to have been a traditional route where early nomadic man migrated across the desert in search of the more fertile lands of the Tigris—Euphrates Rivers. There empires rose and fell, while in the Arabian Peninsula the barren desert sustained a relatively unchanged nomadic pattern of life until the recent discovery of oil. 17

Source: www.webster-dictionary.org/definition/neutral.

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The present boundary between Iraq and Saudi Arabia is the first international boundary that ever has been defined in this area. In 1922, a British High Commissioner, exasperated at the disputes between Ibn Saud and the Amir of Kuwait, took a red pencil and drew the boundaries between them. He also decided the area of two “neutral zones” along the borders between Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iraq. While both were about 5000 sq. km of desert, they were called “neutral” because the Bedouin would be able to pass back and forth to graze their flocks. The “neutral zones” also had two separate landlords.18 The Iraq–Saudi Arabia boundary is about 686 km in length and is delimited. The additional “Neutral Zone,” which begins at the Kuwait boundary at the junction of the Wadi al-“Awja” with the Wadi al-Batin at 29°06⬘05⬙ North Latitude and 46°33⬘19⬙ East Longitude, is about 192 km long in the northern segment and about 201 km in length between the “Neutral Zone” and Saudi Arabia in the south. This desert boundary is essentially artificial and, historically, the first, defined delimitation in the land between Mesopotamia and the Arabian Peninsula. The total area of the State of Kuwait is 17,818 sq. km. Kuwait’s desert plain slopes gradually from the west, where it reaches 300 m above sea level, to the Gulf’s shores. A number of discontinuities occur on the form of low depressions, sand dunes and escarpments. The Kuwait mainland, having no mountains or rivers or other natural features, was for a long time a transit area for nomadic tribes and caravans. Such freedom of movement made delineation of borders rather difficult and resulted in some border problems. The whole matter was amicably resolved following the creation of the Neutral Zone between the State of Kuwait and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on July 7, 1965. The northern part of the partitioned zone is administered by Kuwait, while the southern part is the administrative responsibility of Saudi Arabia. Both countries share the crude oil extracted from the partitioned zone equally. Saudi Arabia shares the “Neutral Zone” and its oil revenues equally with Kuwait. The long-running saga of negotiations between Arabian Oil Company (AOC) of Japan and Saudi Arabia came to an end earlier this year, when the kingdom refused to extend AOC’s offshore concession, replacing the firm as operator with Saudi Aramco. The breakdown of negotiations led to expiration of AOC’s concession on February 27, 2000. However, AOC’s concession for Kuwait’s half-interest in the Neutral Zone’s offshore area was not affected. The Saudis had demanded increased access to Japan’s energy markets and an increase in Japanese investment in Saudi Arabia. AOC was replaced by Aramco’s subsidiary, Aramco for Gulf Operations (AGO). AGO was established specifically to take over AOC’s concession. The new company inherited 18

For more details about the two “neutral zones,” refer to Yergin (1992).

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all the offshore fields and installations in the Saudi half of the zone and will employ AOC’s 1300 Saudi personnel. The takeover by AGO was surprisingly smooth, and crude oil production and exports were not interrupted. Operations are carried out under a temporary 50–50 agreement between AGO (Saudi Arabia) and AOC (Kuwait) until a formal agreement between the two companies is reached.19 There have been a number of disputes among the tribes of Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia since the delimitation of the boundary in 1922. In recent decades, however, the administrative controls by the respective governments have reduced tribal conflict. Whatever potential for disputes exists between Iraq and Saudi Arabia does not relate to the boundary itself (BIR, 1971). Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have demarcated their water boundaries. The Neutral Zone was also the center of attention, when Iran began exploring in the area’s waters that are disputed with Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. However, within their Neutral Zone, there are no active disputes regarding the specific alignment of the boundary itself. Grazing and watering practice traditionally conducted by tribes crossing the boundary remain undisturbed. 6.3.6. Demilitarized zone (DMZ)

A demilitarized zone (DMZ) is an area, separated by a border between two or more groups, where military forces or operations or installations are prohibited, usually by treaty or other agreement.20 Often a DMZ lies upon a line of control (a line of control is a line which demarcates the boundary between two militaries or political entities) and forms a de-facto international border. The DMZ option is the last comprehensive solution for cross-border disputes. It would require, as essential preconditions, the prevention of any potential reoccurrence of armed conflict. The creation of the DMZs should be accompanied by the complete withdrawal of all military presence. Such a withdrawal would be accompanied by the removal of all military hardware from the disputed area, and a prohibition on aerial patrolling and reconnaissance by either side. The agreement should also include a commitment on both sides to refrain from reoccupying vacated positions. Another confidence building measure could be the use of hotlines between force commanders as well as senior personnel at military headquarters.

19

Cited from Alhajji (2000). Note that the term DMZ has been used in different fields. In computer network terms, a DMZ is a network or part of a network, separated from other systems by a Firewall which allows only certain types of network traffic to enter or leave. For example, a company will protect its internal networks from the internet with a Firewall, but will have a separate DMZ to which the public can gain limited access. 20

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A military disengagement agreement should incorporate many of the clauses of an agreement specifically aimed at de-escalating hostilities, including confidence-building measures such as prior notification of over-flights and flag meetings between all sides concerned. Such an accord would, however, move from conflict management to conflict resolution since it would demonstrate the willingness of both parties to find a more comprehensive solution to the dispute. It could also serve as a continuum from cease-fire to demilitarization should the political will exist. Relocating troops to minimize the chance of conflict implies (1) gradual reductions of forces in forward positions and (2) an incremental dismantlement of forward pickets and observation posts. Forces would then be redeployed and repositioned in agreed areas.21 The Korean DMZ is one of the most phenomenal military edifices left on this planet after the end of the Cold War. Established with the armistice that ended the Korean war in 1953, the DMZ runs along a line 213 km long and extends 2 km on either side of the North-South Korean border along the 38th Parallel across the middle of the Korean peninsula. Fences 3 m high were erected at each border of the DMZ and all civilian homes were removed. There is only one crossing point in the DMZ: the village of Panmunjon, which also lies on an old high road that linked north to south in the days before the Korean War. North and South Korea have sporadically exchanged delegations and officials through Panmunjon. But the border area bristles with tension and they more often exchange gunfire and ultimatums. Except in the area around the truce village of Panmunjeom and more recently on the Donghae Bukbu Line on the east coast, humans do not normally enter the DMZ, and 50 years of human absence have unintentionally created an abundant wildlife refuge. Along with pollution-related health problems, one of the most devastating is the widespread destruction of natural habitats and resultant loss of biological species in the Korean peninsula. Already, more than 18% of Korea’s vertebrate species are endangered or extinct, including 60% of amphibians, 45% of reptiles, 13% of birds and 25% of mammals (Brown, 1996). Given South Korea as one of the most densely populated countries on the globe, with continuing urbanization, the loss of species continues apace. However, inside the DMZ, four decades of “forced inaccessibility” have created a natural sanctuary. No humans have set foot in the core zone. As a result, numerous previously unreported species have been recorded and many that were thought to have been lost, along with a number of unique habitats, have been “re-discovered.” The biota of the DMZ corridor represents the last vestige of natural heritage of the Korean peninsula.22

21 22

Cited from Ahmed and Sahni (1998). Source: www.rps.psu.edu/jun96/dmz.html.

Part 2: Practice

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Chapter 7 The triangular resource management of the Tumen River area 7.1. Northeast Asia and the Tumen River delta 7.1.1. A few words about Northeast Asia

The Northeast Asia, as generally defined, includes North and South Korea, Japan, Mongolia, Northeast part of China, Siberia and the Far East part of Russia. This area covers more than 9.6 million sq. km of land and comprises 318 million or 1/20 th of the world population.1 The end of the Cold War has softened the bilateral hostilities and nurtured the bilateral relations between China and South Korea, China and Russia, and Russia and its Northeast Asian neighbors. The collapse of the Soviet Union abruptly cut off the supply line to the Far East region away from Russia’s European core. Since establishing the formal diplomatic relations with South Korea and China, the Russian government has been able to consider the economic issues of its Far East area. China’s open-door policy and its rapid economic growth has provided a huge potential of investments and consumer markets for the industrial economies. It will also demonstrate an example for North Korea’s industrialization and internationalization given the two countries’ traditional ties. Japan, subject to its internal resource and market constraints, may be able to utilize its locational advantages and industrial complementarities with other Northeast Asian economies. South Korea perhaps has an exceptional interest in the Northeast Asia. Having a mighty national identity and social, cultural, and linguistic homogeneities, people of the two Koreas have been separated by the 38th Parallel since the World War II. Since South Korea established formal diplomatic relation with China in 1992, the two Koreas have found an intermediate in the Tumen River delta, due to the latter’s political access to both of the two starkly rival regimes. Northeast Asia has plentiful natural resources, including minerals, energy, waters, farmlands, and forests. Even more important is this area’s great mutual complementarities in terms of natural resource, labor force, and industrial

1

Estimated as of the year 2000 (Van Arsdol et al., 2004).

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structure by region. For example, Japan and South Korea, with the most dense population and developed manufacturing industry as well as abundant capital, technology, and information sectors, have relatively limited land area and scant natural resources. The vast and resource-rich Siberia and Far East of Russia has a sparse population and is far away from its European core. Northeast China, with a relatively appropriate size of land area, population density and physical environment, faces the lack of resources, especially capital and technology (see Table 7.1). From the economics point of view, the uneven distribution of natural resources and industrial sectors implies a great potential of cross-border cooperation among these countries.

Table 7.1. The mutual complementary conditions of Northeast Asian countries Nation

Advantages

Disadvantages

Japan

Capital saving, advanced technology, plenty of superior equipment ready to move out, vanguard industrial products and management experiences Plenty of forest, non-ferrous metal ore, aquatic resources, oil, gas, coal and some products of heavy and chemical industries (such as steel, fertilizers, etc.) Favorable agricultural conditions, adequate and various agricultural products (such as corn, soybean, meat, and fruit), some textile industrial products, oil, coal, building materials, Chinese medicinal herbs, and excess labor Rich mineral resources, metal ore and simple processed products, aquatic products, some industrial commodities and plentiful labor Surplus capital, advanced technology and equipment ready to move out, vanguard industrial products Plentiful products of animal husbandry and of mineral ores, especially fluorspar

Severe shortage of energy and industrial resources, insufficient grain for animal husbandry and some agricultural products, comparative deficiency of labor Severe shortage of agricultural and light industrial products, lack of labor and capital, backward industrial equipment, and management experience Lack of capital, advanced equipment, technology and management experience, comparative shortage of some mineral resources, conditioned infrastructure

Russia (Far East)

China (Northeast)

DPRK

ROK

Mongolia

Source: Chen et al. (1991).

Shortage of capital, insufficiency of farm, sideline and light industrial commodities, backward equipment, and technology Shortage of energy and industrial resources, lack of grains for stock raising, insufficiency of labor No convenient way to communicate directly with other Northeast Asian nations, lack of capital, technology, equipment, farm products, and light industrial commodities

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Even though the Northeast Asian countries have had different economic and political systems, most of them are to some extent historically and culturally interdependent. For example, there was about 2 million Korean ethnic population in Northeast China.2 Hunchun, a border city of Jilin province, China, has a total population of more than 175,000, of which 47.3%, 42.2%, and 10.22% are Korean, Han-Chinese and Manchu, respectively. Furthermore, 1000 people of this city are married to Japanese, and 1500 with North and South Koreans and 5000 people have relatives in Russia, the United States, Canada, Brazil and so on (Jin, 1993, pp. 12–13). What is more important, the general tendency of political detente in Northeast Asia as a result of the end of the Cold War has greatly contributed to the multinational economic cooperation. In conclusion, the increasing interdependence among the Northeast Asian nations certainly will result in a mutual cooperation across their adjacent land–the lower Tumen River delta (Fig. 7.1). 7.1.2. The Tumen River delta and its strategic role

With a total length of more than 500 km, Tumen River originates from Mt. Changbai-shan (or Paektu san in Korean) between North Korea and China’s

Figure 7.1. Northeast Asia and the Tumen River Delta.

2

Source: Office of 1990’s Census of P.R. China, Beijing, China.

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Jilin province, which is said to be the mythic birthplace of the Korean ethnic group. The River flows north-eastward at first and then south-westward along the Sino–North Korea border and, before running into the Sea of Japan, forms an about 18 km-long international border between North Korea and Russia. The Tumen River delta is generally known as the area bordering China, North Korea, and Russia. Broadly, the area extends triangularly to China’s Yanji, North Korea’s Chongjin, and Russia’s Vladivostok. A narrow scope of the area covers China’s Hunchun, North Korea’s Najin, and Russia’s Posyet (see Table 7.2). The Tumen River area has been the dwelling place of Manchu, Korean, and Han-Chinese for a long time.3 Before the mid-1980s, part of the Tumen River delta served as the defensive bases for China and the former USSR, which created a military “core” and a socioeconomic periphery. In the Chinese side, few infrastructures (such as railway, highway, and ports) were built. While in the Russian side, the Far East area remained as an economic virgin. As the outpost for the Asian and Pacific strategy of the former USSR, Vladivostok had been closed for decades and served as a military base. In addition, the Sino–North Korea border-region has been still a backward area because of its difficult physical environment as well as the geographic peripheries far away from their respective economic and political cores. As a triangle border area, the Tumen River delta strategically plays an important role in the Northeast Asian economic development and cooperation. This may be found through the following three aspects: First of all, the Tumen River delta has a huge, resource-rich hinterland, which includes Northeast China, North Korea, and Russia’s Far East region. Specifically, Northeast China abounds in iron and steel, timber, coal, grain, and mechanical products. North Korea has already established Songbong industrial zone of mining, non-ferrous metals, forest and aquatic production from the Tumen River, Najin, to Chongjin. Russia specializes in coal, natural gas, forest, and aquatic production within the area from Tumen River, Posyet, Vladivostok, to Sovestskaya Gavan. Second, through the Sea of Japan, the Tumen River delta is expected to create a closer connection between the ports of the Northeast Asian mainland and the coastal cities of South Korea (such as Pusan and Pyonghae) and Japan (such

3 The historical evolution of the Tumen River area is briefly reported as the following. In 1860, China’s Qing Dynasty (1644–1911) ceded as large as 400,000 sq. km of territory to the tsarist Russia under the Sino–Russian Treaty of Peking. In 1862 the duty-free trade within 100 km from both sides of the border was permitted in accordance with the Sino–Russian Trade Treaty. Since then, China’s Hunchun city became an international trade center. In 1909, Vladivostok became a naval port. In 1913, the Sino–Russian Trade Treaty was abolished. In 1938, China lost access to the Sea of Japan through the last 12 km Tumen River—the shared waters of North Korea and Russia.

The geographical scope of the Tumen River delta Small delta

Key city East longitude North latitude Population (000 persons) Land area (sq. km) Source: Guo (1996, p. 156).

Great delta

China

North Korea

Russia

Hunchun 130°35⬘ 42°88⬘ 126.5

Najin 130°30⬘ 42°25⬘ 32.5

Posyet 130°84⬘ 42°67⬘ 132.5

Total

291.5 1000

China

North Korea

Russia

Yanji 129°58⬘ 42°90⬘ 886.5

Chongjin 129°76⬘ 41°80⬘ 842.5

Vladivostok 131°92⬘ 43°14⬘ 1302.5

Total

3031.5 10,000

The triangular resource management of the Tumen River area

Table 7.2.

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as Hakodate, Akita, Sakata, Niigata, Kanazawa, Fukui, and Shimonoseki). After the shipping routes are established across the Sea of Japan, mutual complementarities can be more effectively developed between the South (Japan and South Korea) and the North (Northeast part of China, North Korea and Russia’s Far East region) economies. What is more important, the exit of the Tumen River to the Sea of Japan has many geographical advantages, including a deep water level, proximity to Far East port of Russia in the North and connection with the main ports of the Korean peninsula in the South. Third, the Tumen River delta may serve as a new Asia–Europe land bridgehead. The existing two land bridges between Europe and Asia are (1) Siberia Land bridge (from Russia’s Eastern port via the Siberia railway to Europe) and (2) China’s Land bridge (from Liangyungang port in east China to Europe via Longxi–Haizhou and Lanzhou–Xinjiang railroad network). The establishment of the new land bridge will generate many benefits to most parts of the Northeast Asia. For example, Mongolia used to transport its commodities through the Siberia Land bridge to the Sea of Japan, the total distance of which is 3645 km. After the Sino–Mongolia border crossing railway is constructed, it will take only 1430 km for Mongolia’s goods to enter the Sea of Japan via the Tumen River delta.4

7.2. The Tumen River Area Development Program (TRADP) 7.2.1. The historical evolution

Few people knew of the Tumen River delta before July 1990 when an International Conference on the Economic and Technological Cooperation in Northeast Asia was held in Changchun, Jilin province, Northeast China. The conference, which focused on the possibility and feasibility of Tumen River delta development, received considerable attention from regional scientists and policymakers from the Northeast Asian countries and the world as well. On July 6–7, 1991, a Northeast Asian sub-regional program meeting, involving representatives from China, North Korea, South Korea, and Mongolia, was convened by the UNDP in Ulanbator, Mongolia. In this meeting, all participating countries accorded a top priority to start the Tumen River area development project. In late August and early September of 1991, the UNDP met again with representatives from the above four countries plus observers from Japan and Russia at the Second International Conference on the Economic and Technological

4

Data source: Zhang (1994), pp. 7–8).

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Development in Northeast Asia, held in Changchun, China. After the conference, a UNDP-sponsored mission paid a fact-finding visit to the three-dimensional area bordering China, North Korea, and Russia and reported to the relevant countries that the strategical location of the Tumen River delta has enormous potentialities of both natural resources and global trade. On October 11–18, 1991, the six countries of Northeast Asia unanimously agreed to start the TRADP in the UNDP-convening conference on the Tumen River area development, held in Pyongyang, North Korea. In this conference, the TRADP management Committee, Experts Office, TRADP Office, National Project Offices were established in order to reinforce the coordination and promotion of the program. In the meantime, the UNDP decided to support the prefeasibility studies of the program with US$3.5 million. According to a UNDP mission report released at this Conference, “... If the region is to develop its expected potential over a span of approximately 20 years, there will be a need for as many as 10 or 11 modern marine terminals, and housing and related facilities for upwards of 500,000 people in new communities. The related total costs may run as high as 30 billion US dollars ... All of the above ideas and factors reinforce the concept of Tumen delta area as a future Hong Kong, Singapore or Rotterdam with the potential for entropy trade and related industrial development akin to theirs.”5 In 1992, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian government opened up the military city of Vladivostok that had hitherto been off-limits to ordinary Russians as well as foreigners. A common hope that economic liberalization would be kick-started by the end of the Cold War formed the background to the way in which the development vision took root in the countries of the Tumen River area, which was a military frontier during the Cold War. The Program Management Committee (PMC), consisting of government representatives from China, Russia, the DPRK (North Korea), Mongolia and the ROK (South Korea), was established in order to promote the region’s development. The first PMC meeting took place in February 1992 in Seoul; thereafter, the PMC met six times, in Beijing (October 1992), Pyongyang (May 1993), Moscow (July 1994), Beijing (May 1995), and New York (December 1995). Meetings of working groups dealing with such issues as legal systems, finance, infrastructure, communications, investment and environment were also held during this period. In December 1995, the Tumen River Area Development Coordination Committee (TRADCC), consisting of China, the DPRK and Russia, and the Consultative Commission for the Development of the Tumen River Economic Development Area and Northeast Asia, consisting of the aforementioned three

5

Cited from Miller et al. (1991).

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countries plus Mongolia and the ROK, were established in order to conduct coordination and discussion between the various countries in place of the PMC. In addition, the Memorandum of Understanding on Environmental Problems Relating to the Tumen River Economic Development Area and Northeast Asia, which dealt with environmental cooperation, was signed. The Tumen Secretariat was set up in Beijing to implement these three agreements. Furthermore, it was decided that the Tumen Trust Fund should be established in order to provide technical assistance aimed at sustainable socio-economic development in the Tumen River area and Northeast Asia as a whole. The Coordination Committee and the Consultative Commission held their first (April 1996), second (October 1996) and third (November 1997) meetings in Beijing, with the subsequent meetings held in Ulanbator (June 1999), Hong Kong (April 2001) and Vladivostok (June 2002).6 At these meetings, in addition to acting as a coordinator between the various countries, the UNDP Tumen Secretariat’s activities cover a diverse range of areas, including commissioning research from external organizations, organizing local investment forums and holding workshops concerning such fields as transport, tourism, the environment and attracting investment. 7.2.2. The input–output analysis

Since the early 1990s, much progress has been made in the Tumen River area development. The major events include (i) Hunchun city was approved by the Chinese government to open to foreigners in November 1991; (ii) North Korea declared Chongjin port as a Free Port and established Najin–Songbong Free Trade Zone (FTZ) in December 1991; (iii) the Russian government decided to open Vladivostok in January 1992; and (iv) Hunchun became one of the first open frontier cities in China in March 1992 and was approved to establish Hunchun Economic Cooperation Zone (HECZ) with the flexible economic mechanism that has been successfully pursued by other Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in China’s southern coastal area next to Hong Kong and Taiwan. Indeed, the positive implications of the Tumen River area development have been far beyond the program itself, as TRADP has attracted the Northeast Asian regimes with different political ideologies to shake hands and discuss the mutual cooperation and development. The UNDP has provided US$4.5 million to advance the scheme and promoted to provide Mongolia and China’s landlocked northern provinces with transport routes to the Sea of Japan through the Tumen River (about 18 km section) between Russia and North Korea. China

6

Details about these meetings can be found in Table 7.3.

The triangular resource management of the Tumen River area Table 7.3.

141

Chronology of Tumen River Area Development Program, 1990–2003

Year

Major events

1990

July: At the Conference on Northeast Asian Economic and Technical Cooperation in Changchun, the Chinese representative presents The Tumen River: a Development Concept for the Golden Triangle Nov.: The Russian Parliament approves the Law on the Nakhodka Free Economic Zone July: announcement that the UNDP is to support the development of the Tumen River area is made at the UNDP’s Northeast Asia Subregional Program Conference (Ulanbator) Oct.: UNDP presents the Vision for the Development of the Tumen River Area at the UNDP’s TRADP Conference (Pyongyang) Dec.: The DPRK government officially announces the establishment of the Rajin–Songbong Free Economic and Trade Zone Jan.: Vladivostok opened up to outsiders Feb.: 1st PMC meeting (Seoul) Mar.: Hunchun opened up to outsiders Oct.: 2nd PMC meeting (Beijing) Dec.: China and Russia sign an agreement regarding the development of the railway between Hunchun and Makhalino May: The Tumen River Development Corporation concept, tripartite land lease proposals and the development area are discussed at the 3rd PMC meeting (Pyongyang) Jan.: At the Informal Meeting of Practitioners, the proposals for a Tumen River Development Corporation and tripartite land leases are dropped July: 4th PMC meeting (Moscow), without the participation of the DPRK May: 5th PMC meeting (Beijing) Oct.: Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture Investment Forum (Yanji) Oct.: Regular container shipping route between Rajin and Busan established, linking Yanbian with Busan Dec.: Agreements on the establishment of the Coordination Committee and the Consultative Commission signed at the 6th PMC meeting (New York) Apr.: 1st Coordination Committee and Consultative Commission meeting (Beijing); Tumen Secretariat established (based in Beijing) Sept.: The Rajin–Sonbong International Investment Forum (with more than 400 people from 26 countries) Oct.: 2nd Coordination Committee and Consultative Commission meeting (Beijing) Oct.: Railway line between Hunchun and Makhalino connected Nov.: Survey for the Zarubino Port Development Plan completed (Keidanren/ERINA) Feb.: Wonjon Bridge opened to Chinese and foreign travelers Nov.: 3rd Coordination Committee and Consultative Commission meeting (Beijing) May: Primorsky Territory International Investment Forum (Vladivostok) Sept.: Hunchun International Investment Forum (Hunchun) June: 4th Coordination Committee and Consultative Commission meeting (Ulanbator), without the participation of the DPRK Aug.: Container shipping routes established between Posiet and Akita, and between Rajin and Niigata Feb.: Cargo transport on the railway between Hunchun and Makhalino (carrying Russian timber to China) (continued on next page)

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997 1998 1999

2000

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Table 7.3.

(Continued)

Year

2001 2002 2003

Major events Mar.: Trade and investment promotion workshop (Beijing) Apr.: Zarbino–Sokcho ferry route established, Hunchun Export Processing Zone established Feb.: Hunchun Sino–Russian Common Market Zone established Apr.: 5th Coordination Committee and Consultative Commission meeting (Hong Kong) June: 6th Coordination Committee and Consultative Commission meeting (Vladivostok) Nov.: Official opening of the railway between Hunchun and Makhalino

Sources: Tsuji (2004) and Davies (2004).

has already spent about US$542 million on infrastructure and industrial development and made considerable progress in developing road and rail systems to facilitate cross-border trade with its Russian and North Korean neighbors. Russia and North Korea have been upgrading ports on the Sea of Japan to handle extra traffic from China. The Russians have installed new handling facilities at Zarubino; and the North Koreans have been modernizing Chongyin, Sonbong and Rajin ports and indicated that they will facilitate visa-free access to a freetrade zone being set up on the border with China (Walker, 1995). To summarize, we can find that the UNDP-sponsored plan for the joint development of the Tumen River area can offer a pilot project for the industrialization and sustainable development in the delta area. The TRADP will generate diffusive effects to the nations in Northeast Asia: China: Through the TRADP, China may either build its own ports in Tumen River or use the existing ports of North Korea and Russia as the entrance to the Sea of Japan. The positive effects may be produced by the complementarities between the prominent advantages of capital and technology in Japan and South Korea and the abundant labor force and natural resources in Northeast China. Russia: The development of the Far East region may benefit from both the surplus capital and technology of South Korea and Japan and the surplus labor force and agricultural products of China and North Korea. North Korea: The development of Chongjin and Najin areas in North Korea will benefit substantially from the export of its mineral products and the imports of agricultural products from China and the absorption of capital, advanced technology and equipment from Japan and South Korea. Mongolia: Mongolia will obtain a more convenient and cheaper route to export its copper, coal and herd products to the countries along the Sea of Japan and the Pacific Basin. It will also benefit from the surplus agricultural products in China and capital and advanced technology in Japan and South Korea.

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South Korea: South Korea will obtain a relatively low-cost source of energy, industrial materials, agricultural products, and labor force with its surplus capital, advanced technology and equipment. In addition, the process of the TRADP may also provide a unique chance for South Korea to cooperate with its ethnically homogeneous but still ideologically antagonistic counterpart in northern Korea. Japan: Through cooperation with China, North Korea, Russia, and Mongolia, Japan will find a relatively low-cost source of energy, industrial materials, and agricultural products, and labor force with its comparative advantages such as surplus capital, advanced technology, and equipment. In addition, the development of Japan’s western coastal areas, which is still far less developed than its eastern core areas, will be accelerated by the TRADP. The input–output effects of the TRADP on Northeast Asian countries is illustrated in detail in Table 7.4.

7.3. The triangular environmental issues of the Tumen River area 7.3.1. Tumen River pollution and its international impacts

About 100 years ago, most of the Tumen River area was covered with a primitive forest and a sparse population. Peter the Great Bay, the Sea of Japan’s most biologically productive area, is home to thousands of species of marine invertebrates, hundreds of species of fish (eleven globally threatened), three species of whales, Table 7.4.

The TRADP’s input–output effects on Northeast Asian countries

Country China (Northeast) North Korea

Input Labor force, grain, building materials, industrial finished products, applied technology, mechanical equipment Labor force, mineral products, agricultural, forest products

Russia (Far East)

Raw materials, forest products, science, and technology

Mongolia

Livestock and herb products, mineral products

Japan and South Korea

Capital, advanced technology, industrial equipment, tourism products

Source: Guo (1996, p. 159).

Output High-technology, capital, industrial finished products, aquatic products Light industrial products, industrial equipments, technology, capital, qualified personnel Light industrial products, foods, agricultural products, capital, techology Industrial products, capital, technology (especially in agricultural production) Industrial raw materials, energy, building materials

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seals and over 200,000 waterfowl. Moreover, the Bay is the only habitat suitable to lay eggs and raise fingerlings for fish stocks on the continental coast of the Sea of Japan. In the recent decades, the rapidly expanded population as well as the unsustainable industrialization of this area has generated water pollution and other environmental damages. According to a Chinese mission report, the Tumen River has been seriously polluted. Several examples of the point-source polluters include the following: the total suspended substances (TSS) averages at 1000 mg L⫺1 (sometimes, as high as 4590 mg L⫺1) in the 350 km long section from the Chongchuan River entrance in the upper reaches, and 200 mg L⫺1 (sometimes, as high as 870 mg L⫺1) in the lower reaches (EMS, 1991). The main pollution sources are (1) Maosan Iron Ore Plant of North Korea in the middle Tumen River, with more than 150 million tons waste water (including 10 million tons sand tailings) annually; (2) Kaishantun and Shixian Chemical Pulp and Paper Mills of China in the middle River, with about 300 million tons of industrial waste water (including 18 thousand ton BOD (biological oxygen demand) and 705.6 thousand tons COD (chemical oxygen demand)) per year into the River; (3) Shijian Paper Making Plant of China in the middle Gaya River, with 2.8 thousand tons waste water (including 13.9 thousand ton BOD and 61.3 thousand tons COD) into the Tumen River every year; and (4) Awude Chemical Plant of North Korea in the lower Tumen River, with more than 180 thousand tons waste water per year.7 The water pollution has negatively affected the delta area through many aspects—ecological, economic and social. For example, Tumen River had been well known for its plentiful Walbaum, Dybuwski, and Dybowski, and other fishes. The fisheries in the river, however, have decreased drastically due to water pollution. The aquatic production in Hunchun municipality, for instance, decreased from 103.5 tons in 1948, with an increase to 180 tons in 1957, and sharply down to 13 tons in 1969, 9 tons in 1980 and 3.5 tons in 1983, respectively (Zhu et al., 1993, p. 66). The citizens of Tumen city (located at the intersect of the Tumen and Gaya Rivers) had mainly depended on the Tumen River water. As a result of the water pollution, the municipal government had to invest 11 million Chinese yuan in 1976 to construct a new drinking water stream. The environmental damage in the Tumen River has also affected the agricultural production. The agricultural use of the polluted water of Tumen River has destroyed the soil structure and reduced rice production by 7–20% in Yanbaian area, the west side of the River.8 Water quality in the middle and lower reaches of the Tumen River is now unfit for industrial and municipal uses. The traditional fishing industry has virtually

7 8

Data source: Zhu et al. (1993). See Yanbian Agricultural Institute (1980).

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collapsed. High levels of tumors and carcinomas on fish and large invertebrates in the Peter the Great Bay have been found. Genetically altered gills and kidneys of fish are reported. Russian officials now consider the pollution a threat to the bay, and particularly to the economically valuable mariculture industry. During 1996–1997 the Institute of Marine Biology at Vladivostok studied the ecological state of the Peter the Great Bay waters adjacent to the Tumen River mouth. By using hydrological, hydrochemical, microbiological, planktonic and benthic techniques, they evaluated the impact of the Tumen River waters on marine ecosystem. At the vicinity of the Tumen River mouth, the high density of heterotrophic microorganisms was detected with high concentration of phenol-oxidizing, proteolytic, pathogenic and conventionally pathogenic bacteria. Species composition and distribution of phytoplankton correspond to the direction of surface currents from Tumen River mouth to the north. Potentially toxic species of microalgae were detected in the samples from this area. Migrating fish coming to the Peter the Great Bay from the south have different skin and tumor-like diseases. Very low density and biomass of benthic organisms are characteristic for the Russian part of Tumen River mouth. When the Tumen River waters came in floods, high concentration of detergents was found at Expeditsia Bight in the Possiet Bay (Kasyanov et al., 1998). In the Tumen River area, cross-border environmental degradation seems to have the potential of exacerbating security issues between the three riparian states of Russia, China and North Korea. Tension is growing over China’s continual pollution of the Russian waters. Although the TRADP is based upon the geographic attributes of the region’s shared resource—access to the Sea of Japan, and the Tumen, Hunchun, and Gaya Rivers—there is no cross-border coordination in the management of the resources. The implications are best illustrated in TRADP’s geography: an upstream China and North Korea with a large number of heavily polluting factories and other sources of point and non-point pollution, and a downstream Russia with scant interest in the TRADP, stricter environmental enforcement, and an economic sector based upon the river and coastal area’s natural resources. Given the stakes, without proper mid-level channels of communication, environmental problems could seep into the political realm very quickly. This has led to a “tragedy of the commons” scenario in the TRADP. As the multilateral effort has failed to develop a sufficient community of interests among riparian states and without a pooling of costs of shared development, the effort states are free-riding on the shared water resources (Hunter, 1998). 7.3.2. TRADP and its environmental implications

The impacts of the TRADP on the environment of the Tumen River area are significant—both positive and negative.

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First of all, the TRADP will increase the demand for water withdrawals as a result of population growth, affluence, and economic growth. Multiplier effects from industrial and economic growth, including greater demand for electric power, will lead to an increase in industrial, municipal, and agricultural demands for water. Withdrawals during low flow periods could heighten shortages, pollution levels, and saltwater intrusion. The short length of the region’s rivers means that surface water is not abundant year round, and may necessitate inter-basin transfers to other municipal and industrial centers— possibly across borders. The waters of the Tumen River area also include the Tumen River’s tributaries that are vital for downstream municipal and industrial water uses, wetlands, and spawning grounds for North Pacific Salmon. This area of rich marine resources, however, is in peril. With economic growth supplanting ideology as the foundation for state legitimacy, especially in China and Russia, provincial governments may push economic growth, leaving little concern for the impacts of environmental degradation. This problem may arise in scope and magnitude as the TRADP develops. As the Tumen River area is separated by China, North Korea, and Russia, the resource utilization and environmental protection needs a multinational cooperation. The most crying task for the three nations is to work out an international standard and establish an international monitoring system. However, the cross-border pollution control is not likely to be emphasized if the adjacent countries have markedly differing levels of developments as well as different attitudes and values with respect to environmental issues. For example, the adoption of common standards would imply that the relatively poor country would have to devote a higher proportion of its resources to pollution reduction than would the relatively rich country. Apart from abstract questions of justice, this circumstance would not lead itself to an agreement between the political regimes concerned. Since 1995, recognizing that the Tumen River area is a possible political flashpoint, the UNDP has been working to develop a multilateral environmental framework within the TRADP. The TRADP environmental effort was launched in 1995 with a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on the Environment. The MOU, signed by all the five countries concerned, sought to outline a plan for environmentally sound and sustainable development in the entire TRADP region. On May 30, 1995, trade officials from China, Russia, South and North Korea, and Mongolia met in Beijing and initialed three agreements aimed at revitalizing a faltering UN-sponsored scheme to develop the delta area. In addition to a commitment of establishing the TRADCC whose task will be to boost trade and investment in this area, the three Tumen River riparian states (China, Russia, and North Korea), plus South Korea and Mongolia, have also agreed to set up a consultative commission with broader responsibilities for developing

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trade, infrastructure, finance and banking in the underdeveloped but resourcerich Northeast Asia.9 The MOU tasked the governments to coordinate and cooperate to protect the region’s environment, and committed them to exchange data, conduct environmental impact assessments, enhance public participation, seek outside funding, and consider harmonization of standards. Protected areas have grown more than 20 times compared with 1980 when there was only one protected area, Kedrovaya Pad Zapovednik, in the Tumen River area (see Table 7.5). In 1995, the size of the formal protection areas was only 187,000 ha in the lower Tumen River area, all of which was on the Russian side of the border. By 2004, the formal habitat protection areas on both Chinese and Russian sides are expected to exceed 400,000 ha, 70 % of which will be on the Russian side, 286,000 ha. In itself, this will be a major achievement for habitat conservation, as it more than doubles the area under official protection since the mid-1990s. This change reflects a major shift in commitment and thinking by authorities, scientists and the local communities on all sides of the border (especially China) towards the protection of endangered species and their habitat in this ecologically sensitive area. Several activities and programs that are now underway on all three sides of the lower Tumen River borderlands are gradually demonstrating the benefits of cross-border cooperation. Table 7.5 summarizes the six protected areas/nature reserves in the cross-border ecological areas of the lower Tumen River in regard to essential institutional, type/purpose, land use, management, area, and future plans. All listed protected areas/nature reserves are contiguous with the Sino–Russian or the Sino–Korean borders or located very close to the border(s). As shown in Table 7.5, the Russian side (in Khasan District) has five protected areas, two at Federal Zapovednik level, one at Krai-level status (territory or provincial level–the Khasan Nature Park), and two low-level poorly funded and poorly staffed wildlife refuges (Barsovy and Borisovskii Plateau Zakazniks) contiguous with the Sino–Russian border. The Chinese side has had only one Nature Reserve, at provincial level, but with 122,200 ha it is the largest of all protected areas in the Lower Tumen River area. It is aimed at preserving the last-remaining habitat in China of the wild Northeastern China Tiger (Siberian/Amur Tiger) and Far East Leopard. The DPR Korea’s Tumen River estuary wetland area (known as the Bonpo Wetland Reserve in Sonbong County, and related coastal and island sanctuaries for seabirds and seals) was designated a preservation area as carly as 1959, and upgraded on paper between 1995 and 2002, but owing to lack of resources, these areas are totally lacking in infrastructure, and management institutions are non-existent (Davies, 2003).

9 For more details, see “Agreement of the Tumen River Area Development Program among China, Mongolia, Russia, North and South Korea,” signed in Beijing, China, May 30, 1995.

Table 7.5.

The structures of the protected areas/nature reservesa in the Lower Tumen River Area Nature protected area category and status

(A) China/Jilin province Jilin Hunchun Provincial Nature status Reserve, nature Hunchun reserve Muncipality, Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture

Name of the management institution and system

Principal landowner rights and land use

Year established

Area

Planned or proposed developments and timing

Primary and secondary forest ecosystem and wetlands; Protection of habitat for the Northeast Tiger, Far East Leopard, and migratory birds

Jilin Hunchun Forestry in northern December Nature part of reserve; 2001 Reserve rice farming a Administration secondary landuse; under the Jilin freshwater fishing Forestry and rice farming in Department Jingxin; some tourism in Jingxin

122,200 ha State-level nature (core zone reserve, Dece59,689 ha; mber 2003; buffer zone UNESCO bios46,152 ha; phere reserve experimental application zone 16,358 ha) under consideration after state-level nature reserve confirmed

Marine ecosystem; Protection of migratory/sea; bird colonies and habitat

Institute of Marine Biology, Far East Branch of the Academy of Science, Vladivostok

64,360 ha, of which 63,000 ha is marine area, and 1.36 ha is land near Posyet in Khasan District; Core area 37,500 ha

Strictly protected area; restricted mariculture near Posyet; restricted tourism

1978

UNESCO biosphere reserve status approved July 2003; award October 2003

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(B) Russia/Khasan district (a) Far East Federal State Marine reserve Reserve (strictly (FESMR) protected) Offshore zapovednik from Khasan District, Primorsky Territory, in a cluster of four separate zones (Peter the Great Bay)

Type and purpose of the protected area

148

Name of the protected area and location

(continued on next page)

(Continued)

Name of the protected area and location

Nature protected area category and status

Type and purpose of the protected area

Name of the management institution and system

Principal landowner rights and land use

Year established

Area

Planned or proposed developments and timing Possible applicant for UNESCO biosphere reserve status, 2003–2004; possible component of the proposed amalgamated Barsovy National Park 2004–2005 Possible component of the proposed amalgamated Barsovy National Park 2004–2005

(b) Kedrovaya Federal Pad, Barabash reserve (strictly protected) zapovednik

Primary forest ecosystem; Protection of habitat for the Far East Leopard and Siberian Tiger

Institute of Biology and Soil Sciences, Far East Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Vladivostok

Strictly protected area

1916

17,900 ha

(c) Barsovy Federal Federal Refuge wildlife (zakaznik) refuge Barabash– (zakaznik) Slavyanka and along Chinese border Khasan District

Secondary forest ecosystem; protection of habitat of Far East Leopard and Siberian Tiger

Ministry of Forestry Agriculture, (goslesfondPrimorsky state forestry Krai Wildlife & service fund); Game some Russian Department, army use; deer Vladivostok farms; hay-making

1979

106,000 ha

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Table 7.5.

150

Table 7.5.

(Continued)

Name of the protected area and location

Nature protected area category and status

(d) Borisovskii Provincial Plateau Refuge wildlife (zakaznik) refuge North of (zakaznik) Barabash, in Nadezdinskii/ Khasan Districts (e) Khansanskii Nature park, Nature Park, provincial Khasan (territory) Wetlands, on level border of Tumen River (DPRK, FESMR, and China border (Jingxin)

Type and purpose of the protected area

Name of the management institution and system

Principal landowner rights and land use

Year established

Area

Planned or proposed developments and timing

Ministry of Forestry Agriculture, (goslesfondPrimorsky state forestry Krai Wildlife & service fund) Game Department, Vladivostoik

1996

63,430 ha

Possible component of the proposed amalgamated Barsovy National Park 2004–2005

Primary wetland; protection of habitat of migratory birds

Khasanskii Recreational fishing Nature Park Ecotourism Management, Slavyanka, under Primorsky Krai Administration, Natural Resources Committee, Vladivostok

1998

9,540 ha

Enlargement of Nature Park underway, northwards, to a total area of 36,000 ha, with expected completion of process Jan.– June 2004

(continued on next page)

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Secondary forest ecosystem; Protection of habitat of Far East Leopard and Siberian Tiger

(Continued)

Name of the protected area and location

Nature protected area category and status

Type and purpose of the protected area

(C) DPR Korea/Rajin–Sonbong (a) Bonpo Municipal Primary wetland Wetland (provincial) comprising the Reserve (also level-status lakes of Manpo, known as the nature Tongbon & as the Sonbong preservation Ponpo. Migratory bird area Protection of Reserve) habitat of migratory birds and small mammals

(b) Al Island Seabird Sanctuary, Natural Monument No. 334

Name of the management institution and system

Principal landowner rights and land use

Ra-Son People’s Fresh/saltwater Committee, fishing, Land and mariculture & Environmental duck farming in Protection Manpo Lake Administration some tourism Rajin around lakes and beaches

Strictly Marine & rocky Ra-Son People’s protected island ecosystem. Committee, nature Protection of sea Ship preservation bird colonies, Navigation area and seal habitat Office, Rajin

Strictly protected area, but some restricted ecotourism

Year established

Area

Planned or proposed developments and timing

Manpo Wetland Reserve part established 1959 Bonp Reserve expanded 1995– 2002 Unknown

3,200 ha

Unknown. Financial constraints have prevented establishment of infrastructure, proper institutions, and staffing

Unknown, but possibly 20 ha

No Plans

151

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Table 7.5.

152

Table 7.5.

(Continued)

Name of the protected area and location

Nature protected area category and status

(c) Uam Seal Sanctuary

Strictly Rocky coastal/ protected; marine probably ecosystem. Sonbong Protection of County-level seal colonies status nature and habitat area preservation area

Type and purpose of the protected area

Name of the management institution and system

People’s Committee, State Land and Environmental Protection Bureau, Rajin

Principal landowner rights and land use

Strictly protected area

Year established

Area

Planned or proposed developments and timing

Unknown

Unknown but possibly 20 ha

Unknown

a

Include potential candidates for inclusion in a Lower Tumen River Area cross-border Biosphere Reserve (as of October 2003). Source: Davies (2003).

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Other developments that are improving protection mechanisms or have or are contributing to the strengthening of the foundations for cross-border cooperation and improving communication across the borders are as follows:10 ●

●

●

●

To conduct joint border habitat surveys and environmental cooperation programs. To commence training in educational awareness, anti-poaching, and border habitat monitoring and surveys. To create a clean environment for eco-tourism throughout Khasan District; especially the coastal belt that attracts thousands of holidaymakers every summer could become a model for similar clean-up programs on the Chinese and DPR Korean sides of the border. To encourage local authorities and protected areas to apply for international status for selected protection zones.

7.4. Future perspective

The Tumen River delta has been one of the most typical heterogeneous crossborder areas in the world. Among the three sovereign countries of China, Russia, and North Korea that administer three parts of the delta area, socio economic differences stemming from a transition from the centrally planned economies (CPEs) to open market economies can be clearly found. The Russian Federation has adopted a radical strategy for the rapid transformation of its socioeconomy into a free-market system while North Korea remains fixed in a virtually intact command system. China is nevertheless reforming its economy gradually towards a socialist market economy. All of these institutional differences have posed challenges to the sustainable development of the Tumen River area as a whole. Although Japan is geographically close to the area, neither its public nor private sectors have demonstrated any interest in the project. In the past, Japan was passive because it had a poor image as a result of its colonial-era rule of this area (Tsuji, 2004). These differences, however, were thought to be surmountable. According to the project’s planners, simply the dire need to foster economic growth in a region just awakening from the cold-war deep freeze would drive states to cooperate. Specifically, the TRADP would capitalize on the region’s beneficial geographic location (deep sea ports, access to Trans-Siberian railways and the East Asian markets), and combine Japanese and Korean capital and know-how with low-cost Chinese and North Korean labor to exploit and process the natural resources of Mongolia and the Russian Far East. Moreover, economic 10

More details about these as well as other developments can be found in Davies (2003).

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cooperation would provide a functional base of iterated interaction between the states surrounding the Tumen River area, thereby leading to further noneconomic cooperation. In essence, economics would be the horse that pulled the wagon of regional cooperation and political stability. It is much close to an orthodoxy among practitioners and theorists of international relations that cross-border conflicts frequently arise between the narrowly individual interests and protectionisms of different states on the one hand, and an orderly cross-border interdependent system on the other. Notwithstanding the political, economic, and cultural differences between the participating countries, it looks more and more possible, under the growing mutual complementarities as well as the tendency towards unanimity of political, social, and especially economic points of view among the participants, to find an appropriate approach that can maximize the benefits for all the parties concerned, while also taking into account their respective articulated objectives in the future even though not immediately.

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Chapter 8 The transnational water pollution in the Lower Mekong Basin 8.1. The Lower Mekong Basin

The management of water resources confronts many obstacles. First, because of the critical importance of water for human existence and secondly, because of its many uses: for drinking and domestic purposes, irrigation, fishing, and navigation, hydropower generation, flood management, recreation, tourism, and preservation of uses are often in conflict and the satisfaction of one obstructs the fulfillment of the other (Kliot et al., 2001, p. 230). Other major difficulties in the management of transboundary water resources are their sheer scale and the frequent gaps among policies, plans, and practices (Savenije and van der Zaag, 2000, p. 14). The water resources of the Mekong represent enormous potential and use of these resources poses numerous challenges. Measuring more than 4000 km in length, the Mekong is one of the longest rivers in the world. From its source in Qinghai plateau in West China, it flows through two administrative regions (Tibet and Yunnan) of China, forms the political boundaries between Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR) and Myanmar as well as between Lao PDR and Thailand, divides thereafter into two streams—the Song Han Giang and Song Tien Giang— below Phnom Penh, and continues through Cambodia and Vietnam before reaching the South China Sea through nine mouths. Geographically, the Lower Mekong Basin (LMB) has an area of 600,000 sq. km containing large sections of Cambodia, Lao PDR, Thailand, and Vietnam (see Table 8.1 and Fig. 8.1). The LMB’s water resources have sustained the livelihoods of the basin’s people. Today, the basin has served as the basis for a variety of waterrelated activities—watershed management, irrigated agriculture, fisheries, navigation and transport, hydropower development, tourism and recreation. As the dominant hydrological structure in Southeast Asia, the Mekong River plays a key role in virtually every aspect of human life. The Mekong’s waters provide access to remote areas, facilitate transport of goods and people, and provide the LMB’s 60 million inhabitants (the number has been doubled over the last 30 years) with food, employment, and income

156 Table 8.1.

R. Guo The basic conditions of the LMB nations

Item Capital Land area (km2) Population (million) Language Religion Government type Major industries

Cambodia

Lao PDR.

Thailand

Vietnam

Phnom Penh 181,035

Vientiane 236,800

Bangkok 513,115

Hanoi 331,700

11.0 (1999)

5.3 (1999)

62.3 (2000)

77.5 (2000)

Khmer Buddhism

Lao PDR Buddhism

Thai Buddhism, Moslem Constitutional Socialist Constitutional monarchy Republic monarchy Textiles and Garment industry, Electronics, garments, wood-based and gems and jewelry, beverages, processing footwear, textiles, food processing, industries, clothing, mobiles wood processing and electricity

Vietnamese Buddhism, Christians Socialist Republic Agriculture, forestry, fishery, industrial construction

Source: Based on http://www.aseansec.org/.

(Kristensen, 2001). Despite the LMB’s rich and plentiful water resources, the full social and economic potential of these resources has yet to be realized. In Cambodia, Lao PDR, and Thailand, for example, living conditions within the LMB are generally poorer than in areas outside the Basin. Infant and maternal mortality rates are higher, and disease is common due to lack of access to basic services such as sanitation and safe drinking water.1 In Thailand and Vietnam, the Mekong forms the basis of extensive irrigation systems that remain to be fully developed in the other Mekong countries, particularly in Cambodia. Till now, the most serious problems relating to the resource and environment within the LMB have been the indiscriminate lumbering, the sharp decreasing of fresh water, and the degradation of water quality, especially in Thailand (UNEP, 1997, p. 7). Although the Mekong River is the lifeline to the four nations within the LMB, the importance of the sustainable use and protection of the water resources has not been fully realized. This is not only because of the historical, political, and cultural barriers between the four nations, but also because of the large disparities in economic development within the LMB (e.g., per capita GDP of Thailand is about 8–10 times that of Cambodia, Lao PDR, and Vietnam).

1

Source: www.mrcmekong.org/mekong_basin/.

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Figure 8.1. The location of water-quality stations of the Lower Mekong Basin (LMB). (Based on the map provided by the Mekong River Commission.)

Because river water is continuously in motion in most circumstances, issues of control, jurisdiction, and utilization are much more complicated than when dealing with static water resources. This task is even more difficult when river water resources are shared by a number of independent entities differing in

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political systems, economic interests as well as cultural values.2 On the basis of the cross-section and time-series data of the LMB, this chapter will find little evidence in support of the environmental Kuznets curve (EKC) hypothesis. Instead, water pollution is found to be positively related to income level and that, as a result of the end of the Cold War era, it had been significantly reduced in the 1990s vis-à-vis the 1980s. In most circumstances, water resources were more seriously polluted in the transnational border areas than in the other areas. Specifically, the estimated coefficients on the political boundary dummies show that political influence on transnational water pollution was more significant in areas near “the international border along which the river runs” than in places near “the international border across which the river runs.” The estimated coefficients on the Association for Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) dummy present some information about the positive role of the ASEAN membership in the reduction of transnational water pollution. Finally, the estimated coefficients on the country-specific dummies are found to present conflicting information about the transnational differences of water pollution, although Thailand is found to have the least water pollution in the LMB. The above arguments are supported by the following empirical analysis.

8.2. Analytical approach 8.2.1. The model

Water pollution is defined as any chemical or physical changes in water detrimental to living organizations. It may occur through natural processes (e.g., by sediments from natural erosion). In this research, the discussion of water pollution will be restricted only to pollutants that are directly or indirectly made by human activities. Under most circumstances, the diffusion of pollutants in rivers differs from that in lakes, reservoirs, and seas. Specifically, given one place in a river that receives pollutants, the indicators of water quality downstream follow different patterns with respect to the distance to the place of entry.3 As a result, the determination of water pollution is much more complicated, especially when a micro-regional environmental analysis is conducted. For example, wastes

2

For example, Roger (1992) identified 286 treaties that have settled the management of international rivers, two-thirds of which were ratified in the politically and culturally homogeneous nations of Europe and North America. 3 More details about the effects of the wastes on watercourses, with references to the changes experienced downstream from a sewage discharge pipe can be found in Jackson et al. (2000, pp. 310–325).

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discharged into a river may affect the water quality of the downstream more seriously than that of the upstream. Since the incentives (disincentives) for the policymakers concerned to reduce (increase) the wastes discharged into the river differ from nation to nation, the EKC hypothesis might not be appropriate to represent the relationship between water quality and income level (this can be witnessed by the empirical evidence in Chapter 4.2.2). In order to avoid spurious regressions on the determinants of transnational water pollution of the LMB, let us look for more explanatory variables. Assume that transnational water pollution in the LMB’s four nations (Thailand, Vietnam, Lao PDR, and Cambodia) differs not only between the core and border areas, but also between various types of border areas. To identify the differences between the border areas, we introduce two dummy variables: BORDER1—international border across which the river runs; and BORDER2—international border along which the river runs. In addition, we assume that the efforts on the reduction of transnational water pollution could not be emphasized if all nations concerned has not reached any bilateral or multilateral agreement on cooperation. To investigate whether or not ASEAN membership has played a role in the reduction of transnational water pollution (as will be mentioned later, the strategies and guidelines toward achieving the long-term environmental goals were already recommended by the ASEAN in 1995), we also include ASEAN as a dummy variable. Although many other multilateral and multinational cooperative organizations—such as the Mekong River Commission (MRC) and Greater Mekong Sub-regional (GMS) program initiated by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) in 1992, to list but two— have been established in the LMB, none of them have reached mutually binding clauses concerning the environmental protection of the Mekong river. We therefore ignore their environmental influences in this research. In addition, since the early years of the 1985–2000 period was branded by the Cold War, which could affect to certain degree the bilateral or multilateral cooperation of the LMB, the time dummy (COLDWAR) will be employed. Finally, after each of the four countries is treated as a dummy (as a matter of fact, since there is usually one country dummy to be excluded from statistical regressions, only three country dummies will be needed), the political economy analytical model is written as follows: ln(yijt) ⫽ α ⫹ β ln(GDPPCit) ⫹ γ [ln(GDPPCit)]2 ⫹ η BORDER1ij ⫹ ϕ BORDER2ij ⫹ λ ASEANit ⫹ δ COLDWARt ⫹ π THAILAND ⫹ θ VIETNAM ⫹ ρ LAO ⫹ µijt (8.1) where ln (…) is the natural logarithm of the variable in parenthesis, yijt the indicator of water quality of Nation i at water quality station j in year t, GDPPCit the per capita GDP of Nation i in year t, and µ is the unobservable

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residual. α is constant, and β and γ to be estimated, reflect the influences of income level on water quality. According to the EKC hypothesis, β >0 and γ <0. The remaining variables included in Eq. (8.1) are dummies. BORDER1ij is 1 for water quality station j to be close to an international border across which the river runs and 0 for otherwise. BORDER2ij is 1 for water quality station j to be located at an international border along which the river runs and 0 for otherwise. ASEANit is 1 for Nation i to hold the ASEAN membership in year t and 0 for otherwise. COLDWARt is 1 for years from 1985 to 1990 and 0 for otherwise. THAILAND, VIETNAM, and LAO are three dummies, representing Thailand, Vietnam, and Lao PDR, respectively (with Cambodia being excluded). η, ϕ, λ, δ, π, θ and ρ, to be estimated, reflect the effects of the respective dummy variables on water quality. Since Eq. (8.1) includes political and country-specific factors, it may provide statistical information about the influences of these factors on transnational water pollution. Specifically, η, ϕ, λ, and δ, which may be either positive or negative, reflect the effects of the dummy variables (BORDER1, BORDER2, ASEAN, and COLDWAR) on the dependent variable. If water pollution is more serious in international border areas than in the other areas, η and ϕ are expected to be positive. If the ASEAN provides an opportunity for its member nations to enhance the multilateral cooperation in the reduction of water pollution, λ is expected to be negative. In the same way, if water pollution was worse in the Cold War period (represented by the second half of the 1980s in the research) than in the post-Cold War period (represented by the 1990s in the research), δ is expected to be positive. π, θ, and ρ are the country effects of Thailand, Vietnam and Lao PDR, respectively. Concerning the appearance of our analytical model, one might insist that the impacts of economic growth of the upper Mekong riparian nations (such as Myanmar and Yunnan province of China) on the water quality of the LMB should also be treated as an extra explanatory variable. However, it looks technically plausible that these impacts have already been represented, at least approximately, by the inclusion of the dummy “BORDER1” in Eq. (8.1). 8.2.2. The data

Our data on the water quality of the LMB were provided by the Mekong River Commission (MRC). The original data were monthly statistics including 21 indicators in 71 water-quality stations of Thailand, Vietnam, Lao PDR (each from 1985 to 2000, with the exception of a few stations in which the data are not available in some years), and Cambodia (only from 1993 to 2000). We selected the indicators according to their environmental relevance and data availability. In most circumstances, dissolved oxygen (DO) is a poor indicator of water quality because the results were from samples collected only during the

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day. In nutrient-rich water, DO would often be high during the day and low at night. The change in total suspended solids (TSS) in the mainstream was a consequence of the closure of Manwan Dam in China—an extraneous factor, not related to development in the LMB. Finally, two indicators were selected in this research: total phosphate (TOTP) and chemical oxygen demand (COD). The unit by which to measure the above indicators is milligram per liter (mgL⫺1). It is worth noting that the water flow differs greatly between different seasons. For instance, at the hydro-station H390199 (shown in Fig. 8.1) in the year 1988, the rate of water flow was as large as 6886 m3 s⫺1 on August 12; it was only 3.74 m3 s⫺1 on April 11.4 As a result, the level of water pollution, ceteris paribus, differs significantly within the year. The possible way to prevent the estimation errors stemming from the fluctuations of the monthly data is to use the annual data on the indicators of water quality. Another reason for us to use the annual data is that we have only the yearly data on the income levels of each nation. The yearly data (YD) on the water-quality indicators are calculated by the author based on the mean of each year’s monthly data (MD) weighted by the respective reliability scores (RS) of the monthly data, i.e., 12

冱 MDi RSi YD ⫽ ᎏᎏ 冱 RSi i⫽1

12

for RSi ⫽ 0 for MDi to be not available

(8.2)

i⫽1

In Eq. (8.2) the original data on MD were provided by the MRC, and each monthly monitored indicator was assigned by the MRC experts for a reliability score (ranging from 0 to 1). The final data on the water-quality indicators are calculated based on the mean of each year’s monthly data weighted by the respective reliability scores. The reliability score (ranging from 0 to 1) for each monthly monitored indicator was assigned by the MRC staff (Mr. Dirk Vanderstighelen, the DB/GIS-Team Leader of the Technical Support Division at the MRC provided these data). Finally, the largest number of observations considered to represent each water-quality indicator of the LMB from 1985 to 2000 is 878. The descriptive statistics (as reported in Table 8.2) show that the water resource of the LMB as a whole has not been seriously polluted. However, the maximum values of TOTP and COD show that water pollution has been very serious in some areas (TOTPmax⫽0.960 mgL⫺1 and CODmax⫽11.020 mgL⫺1). In addition, Table 8.2 also reports some inconsistent information about the cross-country differences of water-quality indicators within the LMB.

4

Data source: provided by the Technical Support Division, Mekong River Commission (MRC), Phnom Penh, Cambodia.

162 Table 8.2. Indicator

R. Guo Descriptive statistics of water quality of the LMB, 1985–2000 (mgL⫺1) Number of observations

Minimum value

Maximum value

Mean value

Std. deviation

All nations TOTP COD

876 865

0.005 0.350

0.960 11.020

0.063 2.698

0.066 1.561

Thailand TOTP COD

250 250

0.009 0.840

0.101 11.020

0.045 2.940

0.019 1.143

Vietnam TOTP COD

293 291

0.007 0.430

0.576 5.490

0.088 2.575

0.053 0.948

Lao PDR TOTP COD

258 249

0.005 0.350

0.960 10.770

0.063 2.493

0.098 2.350

Cambodia TOTP COD

75 75

0.011 1.120

0.066 7.030

0.028 3.049

0.010 1.231

Notes: “TOPT” and “COD” denote “total phosphate” and “chemical oxygen demand,” respectively.

The per capita GDP (GDPPC) is measured in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP) international dollars.5 For those that are not available from official sources, we will use the roughly estimated GDPPC data for Vietnam (for years from 1986 to 1990) and for Cambodia (for years from 1986 to 1990 and from 1992 to 1994).6 The data on the GDP per capita in terms of PPP rates were only roughly estimated. But they are likely to give better results and to be more meaningful than those in terms of exchange rates. The time-series data on GDPPC (see Fig. 8.2) show that, except for Thailand, the LMB has still been at the initial stage of economic development. Another noticeable phenomenon is that, due to the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the income level of the LMB (except for that of Vietnam) declined substantially in the last years of the 20th century. The data on the dummy variables of BORDER1 and BORDER2 are measured based on the map of the LMB (see Fig. 8.1). Specifically, BORDER1 is 5

The sources for the GDPPC data of the LMB are the following: (1) ASEAN Secretariat, ASCU Database (www.aseansec.org/macroeconomic/gdp); (2) Global Economic Outlook Database of IMF and UN Yearbook of Asia-Pacific; and (3) World Development Indicators (various issues, released by the World Bank). 6 The data were estimated by Mr. Zhao Gongzheng of China Center for Price Supervision, State Development Planning Commission (SDPC) of China, Beijing, China.

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8000 7000

(PPP dollars)

6000 5000 Thailand Laos Vietnam Cambodia

4000 3000 2000 1000

0 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Year

Figure 8.2. Per capita GDP of the LMB, 1985–2000.

set at 1 for water-quality stations to be located at around an international border across which the Mekong River runs, and 0 in other cases. BORDER2 is set at 1 for water-quality stations to be located at around an international border along which the Mekong River runs, and to be 0 otherwise. The dummy variable ASEAN of each nation is determined by the year in which the nation joined the ASEAN. With regard to the four LMB nations, Thailand is the founding member of the ASEAN, and Vietnam, Lao PDR, and Cambodia have joined the ASEAN in 1995, 1997 and 1999, respectively. As a result, the dummy variable ASEAN is set at 1 for: Thailand for years from 1985 to 2000; Vietnam for years from 1995 to 2000; Lao PDR for years from 1997 to 2000; and Cambodia for years in 1999 and 2000, and 0 otherwise. 8.3. Results of estimation

The changes of water quality of the LMB are shown in Fig. 8.3 (notice that the curves labeled by the word “All” are those that are based on the data of all water-quality stations in the LMB). It is obvious that the major indicators of water quality were not worsening from 1985 to 2000. However, it should be noted that water pollution has become more serious for BORDER2 to be 1 than otherwise. All the above information indicates that water pollution is

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R. Guo TOTP 0.2 0.18 0.16

All BORDER1=1 BORDER2=1 ASEAN=1

0.14

mg/l

0.12 0.1 0.08 0.06 0.04 0.02 0

1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000

Year COD 5.5

All BORDER1=1

5 4.5

BORDER2=1 ASEAN=1

mg/l

4 3.5 3 2.5 2 1.5

1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000

Year Figure 8.3. Changes of water-quality indicators of the LMB, 1985–2000.

more serious in transnational border areas than in the other areas of the LMB. This is quite understandable as, in the absence of balanced cross-boundary integration, riparian nations may easily get into conflicts over shared waters (Kliot et al., 2001, p. 231). There is, however, an exception: COD was always smaller for BORDER1 to be 1 than otherwise.

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The transnational water pollution in the Lower Mekong Basin

It is natural that basinwide cooperation is the optimal solution to the reduction of transnational water pollution. Clearly this can be witnessed by the positive role of the ASEAN membership in the reduction of the pollutants of TOTP for most years (see the curve marked “ASEAN⫽1” in Fig. 8.3). But the positive role in the reduction of the COD pollutants did not exist for most years. Were the relationships between the water pollution and the cross-border separation (cooperation) causal or not at the LMB during 1985 and 2000? In order to answer this question, we need more concrete (econometric) estimations. 8.3.1. The determinants of transnational water pollution

Tables 8.3 and 8.4 report the estimated results for regressions of transnational water pollution in terms of natural logarithms of TOTP and COD, respectively. Let us first consider regression that include only two economic variables (denoted by natural logarithm of GDPPC and its square). Clearly, according to either the statistical significance or the magnitudes of the estimated coefficients, regressions (1) of Table 8.3 and (4) of Table 8.4 provide little evidence in support of the EKC hypothesis. The results might indicate that the determinants of transnational water pollution could be better explained jointly by the political and economic factors rather than by the economic factors alone. Table 8.3.

Regressions for transnational water pollution, dependent variable: ln(TOTP)

Explanatory variables (Constant) ln(GDPPC) [ln(GDPPC)]2 BORDER1 BORDER2 ASEAN COLDWAR THAILAND VIETNAM LAO N R2 F Sig.

(1) Coeff.

(2) Std. error

0.954 ⫺0.994 0.061 — — — — — — —

2.134 0.574c 0.038 — — — — — — — 875 0.012 5.390 0.005

(3)

Coeff.

Std. error Coeff.

Std. error

⫺8.424 0.811 ⫺0.017 0.267 0.519 ⫺0.288 0.136 ⫺0.260 1.125 0.326

2.289a ⫺7.488 0.597 0.559 0.039 — 0.077a 0.266 0.054a 0.520 0.068a ⫺0.276 0.073b 0.134 0.166 ⫺0.282 0.081a 1.116 0.080a 0.321

0.689a 0.098a — 0.076a 0.054a 0.063a 0.073c 0.158c 0.078a 0.080a

875 0.337 48.964 0.000

875 0.337 55.114 0.000

Notes: (1) N, R 2, F and Sig. are the number of observations, coefficient of correlation, F-statistic value, and overall significance of the regression, respectively. (2) a, b and c denote that the estimated coefficients are statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10% confidence levels respectively. (3) “—” denotes that explanatory variable is excluded from regression. (4) Country dummies only include Thailand, Vietnam, and Lao PDR, with Cambodia being excluded.

166 Table 8.4.

R. Guo Regressions for transnational water pollution, dependent variable: ln(COD)

Explanatory variables (Constant) ln (GDPPC) [ln (GDPPC)]2 BORDER1 BORDER2 ASEAN COLDWAR THAILAND VIETNAM LAO N R2 F Sig.

(4) Coeff.

(5) Std. error Coeff. 1.668c 0.448 0.030c — — — — — — —

2.959 ⫺0.687 0.054 — — — — — — — 864 0.036 16.179 0.000

(6) Std. error Coeff. 1.988 0.518 0.034 0.066 0.047a 0.059 0.064a 0.144a 0.071a 0.070a

⫺0.947 0.117 0.023 ⫺0.050 0.343 ⫺0.052 0.440 ⫺0.837 ⫺0.223 ⫺0.587 864 0.197 23.243 0.000

Std. error 0.596a 0.085a — 0.066 0.047a 0.054 0.064a 0.137a 0.068a 0.069a

⫺2.249 0.468 — ⫺0.049 0.342 ⫺0.068 0.442 ⫺0.807 ⫺0.209 ⫺0.580 864 0.196 26.106 0.000

Notes: As in Table 8.3.

Following Eq. (8.1), our estimated results (regressions (2) of Table 8.3 and (5) of Table 8.4), however, show that the estimated coefficients on economic variables are still not statistically significant. As a result, they provide no evidence in support of the view that there exist an inverse relation between environmental degradation and economic growth (i.e., the EKC hypothesis). Why do the estimated results not fit with the EKC hypothesis? The reason might be threefold. First, the LMB is still at the initial stage of economic development, most of its per capita GDPs (see Fig. 8.2) being around or even lower than those of the low-income nations, with the exception only of Thailand. Second, although there is certain evidence that environmental quality may be improved along with the rise of income level, especially in developed nations, none of the pollutants examined in the existing literature fulfills the EKC hypothesis unequivocally (see Ekins, 1997; Roca et al., 2001; among others), or at least it still remains unclear (Stern and Common, 2001). Third, technological innovation and economic and environmental policies could be analyzed as independent shocks that can take place at very different income levels and probably affect simultaneously countries with quite different income levels (Roca et al., 2001).7

7 For example, Unruh and Moomaw (1998) show that the 1973 shock of oil prices had an enormous influence on the behavior of CO2 emissions in all the OECD countries they studied, in spite of the important differences in per capita income.

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Even worse, the possible existence of multicolinearity between the two variables (natural logarithm of GDPPC and its square) would have resulted in the insignificantly estimated coefficients (an anonymous reviewer reminded me of this point). We conducted a joint test of the significance of the two income variables and found that the multicolinearity problem does exist (the Pearson correlation is 0.999, which is statistically significant at the 1% level). Next, we will drop the attempt to estimate an EKC and focus on the other issues of our interests. The estimated results on the natural logarithms of TOTP and COD, shown as regressions (3) of Table 8.3 and (6) of Table 8.4, respectively, provide strong evidence in support of the view that water pollution tended to be positively related to income level. The coefficients on the natural logarithm of GDPPC, which are statistically significant at the 1% level in both regressions, suggest that 1% increase in per capita GDP would increase 0.559% of TOTP and 0.468% of COD, respectively. 8.3.2. The boundary effects

The estimated coefficients on the two boundary variables (BORDER1 and BORDER2) are statistically significant in most cases. Specifically, the estimated coefficients on BORDER2 (statistically significant at the 1% level in both regressions) are larger in magnitude than those on BORDER1 (only statistically significant for regression (3) of Table 8.4). Specifically, the estimated coefficients on BORDER1 and BORDER2 in regression (3) show that the TOTP pollutants would increase by an average rate of about 0.305 (i.e., exp(0.266)⫺1) mgL⫺1 when the Mekong River flows across the transnational borders; they would increase by an average rate of about 0.682 (i.e., exp(0.520)⫺1) mgL⫺1 when the Mekong River flows along the transnational borders. In regression (6), the estimated coefficients on BORDER1 and BORDER2 show that the COD pollutants would decrease (with little statistical significance) by an average rate of about 0.048 (i.e., 1⫺exp(⫺0.049)) mgL⫺1 when the Mekong River flows across the transnational borders; they would increase by an average rate of about 0.408 (i.e., exp(0.342)⫺1) mgL⫺1 when the Mekong River flows along the transnational borders. Why is the estimated coefficient on BORDER1 negative for COD (not statistically significant at the 10% level)? This might result from the fact that BORDER1⫽1 is usually represented by the remote and mountain areas (such as the China–Myanmar–Lao PDR border area in the north and the Cambodia–Vietnam border area in the south), where the COD pollutants (such as sewage effluent, agricultural run-off including animal wastes, as well as industrial effluents from paper mills and food processing) were usually kept very low. In general, two reasons might be used to demonstrate the differing effects of BORDER1 and BORDER2: First of all, in areas near “the international border

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across which the river runs” (denoted by BORDER1) only the upper side (nation) of the border has incentives to discharge wastes regardless of whether or not the upper and lower sides (nations) have reached any agreements; whereas in areas near “the international border along which the river runs” (denoted by BORDER2), both sides (nations) of the border, given that each of them is defined as an egomaniacal economy, have incentives to discharge wastes if they are not seriously restricted by any effective agreements. Second, as for the LMB, BORDER1 is usually located at the agriculturally based areas (such as those between China, Myanmar, and Lao PDR; as well as those between Cambodia and Vietnam) where industrial pollutants (such as sewage effluent, as well as industrial effluents from paper mills, food processing, etc.) were usually kept lower than in the urban areas. In order to identify the geographical effects of BORDER2 on transnational water pollution, we introduce a new variable: DBLR (distance to the nearest border in the lower reach). The DBLR is measured in kilometers on the basis of the map provided by the MRC. According to the indicators of TOTP and COD of each water-quality station and the distance between the station and its nearest international border (BORDER2) site in the lower reach (i.e., DBLR), we can find that the two water pollution indicators decrease with respect to the DBLR (see Fig. 8.4). In other words, the above findings once again provide evidence in support of the view that water pollution tends to be more serious in the section of Mekong River that serves as an international border than in the others. 8.3.3. The effects of policy variables

It is widely recognized that local and national policies and international treaties have played a major role in environmental protection. Let us now see how transnational water pollution was influenced by the ASEAN membership during 1985 and 2000. The estimated coefficients on ASEAN (see regressions (3) of Table 8.3 and (6) of Table 8.4) (note that the result is statistically insignificant for COD) show that the average rates of TOTP and COD pollutants would be reduced by about 0.241 (i.e., 1⫺exp(⫺0.276)) mgL⫺1 and about 0.066 (i.e., 1⫺exp(⫺0.068)) mgL⫺1 respectively, for the ASEAN membership nations. These results indicate that the ASEAN membership is helpful, at least in terms of the reduction of TOTP, for the nations concerned to reduce their pollutants in the Mekong River. Clearly the importance of the environmental protection of the Mekong River has been recognized by policymakers in the LMB nations (all of which have ASEAN memberships). For example, in the “Resolution on Environment and Development” (signed in Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei Darussalam, April 26, 1994), the year 1995 was first declared as the ASEAN Environment Year to highlight ASEAN environmental issues

169

The transnational water pollution in the Lower Mekong Basin TOTP

0.5 0.4

mg/l

0.3 0.2 0.1 0

0

10 20 30 40 Distance to the Border in the Lower Reach (km)

50

COD

10 9 8 7 mg/l

6 5 4 3 2 1 0

0

10 20 30 40 Distance to the Border in the Lower Reach (km)

50

Figure 8.4. The impacts of “distance” on transnational water pollution.

and cooperative programs, and to stimulate awareness of these issues among the ASEAN populace. One year later, the Third Meeting of the ASEAN Working Group on Environmental Management (WGEM), which was held in Singapore from March 20 to 22, 1995, recommended the strategies and guidelines toward achieving the long-term environmental goals: (a) making environmental factors and considerations an integral part of overall land-use planning; (b) harmonizing the procedures of environmental impact assessment (EIA) for ASEAN member countries; (c) ensuring that effluent from wastewater treatment plants complies with stipulated standards; (d) use of cleaner fuels or alternative clean sources of energy; (e) use of clean technology and

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pollution control equipment; and (f) provision of adequate facilities for disposal of wastes.8 From Fig. 8.3, we cannot find any general tendency of water pollution over time for years from 1985 to 2000. However, this does not mean that there were not any time-related differences of water pollution between 1980s and 1990s if other political economy variables are kept fixed. In our research, we assume that transnational water pollution during the whole period (1985–2000) is additionally determined by a time dummy (COLDWAR). Our estimated coefficients on COLDWAR (see regressions (3) of Table 8.3 and (6) of Table 8.4) suggest that, compared with those of the 1990s, the average levels of TOTP and COD pollutants would increase by about 0.143 (i.e., exp(0.134)⫺1) mgL⫺1 and about 0.556 (i.e., exp(0.442)⫺1) mgL⫺1 respectively, during the period 1985–1990. Since we had already included another time-related political dummy (ASEAN)—which had different values from 1985 to 2000—in our regressions, the above results might be mainly generated by the political tensions between the LMB nations during the Cold War era, if there were no other convincing reasons. However, as shown in regression (6) of Table 8.4, the role of the ASEAN dummy in the reduction of the COD pollutants was not statistically significant. From Table 8.5, we can find that there was a negative effect of the ASEAN membership on the reduction of COD pollutants in the BORDER1 areas. How to plausibly interpret these phenomena? The effects of the ASEAN membership on the transnational reduction of the COD pollutants might be offset by the following: First, the management of the Mekong River water has been inefficient as a result of the separate developments of the upper and lower basins and because the powerful China is not interested to cooperate in the Mekong management (Kliot et al., 2001, p. 245). Second, during the last decades of the 20th century, the continuous conflicts in Indo–China peninsular hampered the transnational cooperation in this area. 8.3.4. The country influences

Finally, let us look at the effects of the country dummies on water pollution. Specifically, Thailand is found to have the least water pollution, whose average levels of TOTP and COD pollutants were about 0.246 (i.e., 1⫺exp(⫺0.282)) mgL⫺1 and about 0.554 (i.e., 1⫺exp(⫺0.807)) mgL⫺1 lower than those of the other countries as a whole. However, the coefficients on VIETNAM and LAO dummies provide conflicting information: Vietnam and Lao PDR had increased their TOTP pollutants by about 2.053 (i.e., exp(1.116)⫺1) mgL⫺1 and about

8

Source: www.aseansec.org.

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The transnational water pollution in the Lower Mekong Basin Table 8.5.

A comparison of the effects of the ASEAN on pollutants in border areas (mgL⫺1)

Type of area All Samples

ASEAN (0 or 1) 0 1

BORDER1⫽1

0 1

BORDER2⫽1

0 1

Other Areas

0 1

Type of pollutant TOTP COD TOTP COD TOTP COD TOTP COD TOTP COD TOTP COD TOTP COD TOTP COD

No of Minimum Maximum observations value value 430 421 446 444 22 22 42 42 85 84 65 65 323 315 339 337

0.005 0.380 0.007 0.350 0.030 0.890 0.020 1.020 0.020 0.900 0.010 0.720 0.005 0.380 0.007 0.350

0.689 10.570 0.960 11.020 0.170 3.460 0.190 3.080 0.690 10.570 0.960 11.020 0.220 7.030 0.576 5.360

Mean value

Std. dev.

0.067 2.623 0.060 2.769 0.084 1.998 0.055 2.370 0.116 4.270 0.071 2.961 0.053 2.228 0.058 2.782

0.068 1.794 0.063 1.301 0.041 0.699 0.038 0.423 0.122 2.752 0.119 2.672 0.037 1.166 0.048 0.907

0.379 (i.e., exp(0.321)⫺1) mgL⫺1 respectively; by contrast, they had reduced their COD pollutants by about 0.189 (i.e., 1⫺exp(⫺0.209)) mgL⫺1 and about 0.440 (i.e., 1⫺exp(⫺0.580)) mgL⫺1 respectively. Clearly, this does not provide us any consistent evidence to conduct an international evaluation of pollution controls in the LMB. What is more important, one must be very cautious when he or she tries to clarify the results of the environmental differences between all the three nations. Since geographically Thailand is an upper riparian nation whereas Lao PDR, Vietnam, and Cambodia are the lower ones, given that the other political economy variables being constant, water pollution should usually tend to be worse in the lower areas of the LMB.

8.4. Policy implications

Water pollution control in transnational areas has been of great importance to riparian states. This case study provides a political economy framework for the determinants of transnational water pollution. Our particular interests are to test the relationships between the water pollution and income level as well as to see whether the political variables (BORDER1, BORDER2, ASEAN, COLDWAR, and other specific country dummies) influence transnational water pollution from 1985 to 2000 in the LMB. Since the LMB has still been at the initial stage of economic takeoff, environmental pressures, according to

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the developmental process experienced by the developed economies, were always accompanied by economic growth at certain degree. The estimated results on the basis of the whole time-series samples show little evidence in support of the EKC hypothesis during 1985–2000. Although water resource in the LMB as a whole has not been heavily polluted, this study shows that, ceteris paribus, water pollution tend to be positively related to income level and that, due to the international political relations represented by the Cold War dummy, it was worse in the second half of the 1980s than in the 1990s. With statistical significance in most circumstances, water pollution is found to be more serious in the transnational border areas than in the other areas. The estimated coefficients on the boundary variables (BORDER1 and BORDER2) show that the political influences on water pollution differ in different types of border areas. More specifically, political influence on transnational water pollution is more significant in areas near the international border along which the river runs (denoted by BORDER2) than in places near the international border across which the river runs (denoted by BORDER1). It looks plausible that in the BORDER1 areas only the upper side (nation) of the border has incentives to discharge wastes regardless of whether or not the upper and lower sides (nations) have reached any agreements, whereas in the BORDER2 areas both sides (nations) of the border, given that each of them is defined as an egomaniacal economy, have incentives to discharge wastes if they are not seriously restricted by any effective agreements. The estimated coefficients on ASEAN and COLDWAR present information about the positive roles of the ASEAN membership as well as the post-Cold War détente between the LMB nations in the reduction of transnational water pollution. For more than 5000 years, the Mekong River has sustained the people who live in the LMB. As the human population in the LMB continues to grow, the challenge will be to manage its precious resources wisely and ensure future growth. The population of the LMB, encompassing Cambodia, Lao PDR, Thailand, and Vietnam, has doubled over the last 30 years; and by 2025 the population is expected to reach more than 100 million (Kristensen, 2001). The pressure on natural resources will increase dramatically, as will the demand for additional food, water, and energy. However, without full cooperation of all the nations by which the Mekong River is shaped, there would be no optimal solutions to control pollution eventually. The Mekong River Commission (MRC), found in 1995 as the successor of the Mekong Committee (found in 1957), which has practiced joint management only in the LMB and the upper riparian nations—China and Myanmar—are not partners to these activities. This seriously hampered efforts to manage the river efficiently and equitably, for the benefit of all its riparians (Kliot et al., 2001, p. 249). Initiated in 1992, the Greater Mekong Subregional

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(GMS) program, consisting of Cambodia, Yunnan Province of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Lao PDR, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam covers seven sectors: transport, energy, tourism, trade and investment, telecommunications, human resource development, and environment. However, the GMS has not yet established any permanent bodies, nor has it reached any mutually binding clauses concerning the use of the water resources of the Mekong River. If an international environmental problem has significant political and security implications, then the chances of finding the international political will to address the problem will likely increase. However, if the political and security implications are minimal, then there is danger that the problem will not be addressed (Hunter, 1998). Heading toward the 21st century, there is a tendency that economics is replacing political power as the foundation of state legitimacy in most, if not all, states in the LMB. Given that there already exist transnational water pollution in both the upper and lower Mekong basins; and given that some states’ ability to govern their periphery areas, there is a possibility that the security implications of water pollution will go unheeded until it is too late.

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Chapter 9 The US–Mexico border environment cooperation 9.1. The US–Mexico border area and the maquiladoras 9.1.1. The US–Mexico border area

The Guadalupe Hidalgo Treaty of February 2, 1848 established an international boundary between the US and Mexico. The Treaty of December 30, 1853 re-established the southern boundary of New Mexico and Arizona to enable the United States to construct a railroad to the west coast along a southern route and to resolve a question arising from the 1848 Treaty as to the location of the southern boundary of New Mexico. As established by these two Treaties, the international boundary between the United States and Mexico extends over 3000 km, exclusive of the maritime boundaries. The boundary follows the middle of the Rio Grande from its mouth on the Gulf of Mexico, a distance of over 2000 km to a point just upstream of El Paso, Texas and Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua; then it follows an alignment westward overland and marked by monuments a distance of over 800 km to the Colorado River; then it follows the middle of the river northward a distance of 38 km; and then it again follows an alignment westward overland and marked by monuments, a distance of 226 km to the Pacific Ocean. The area along the US–Mexican border is characterized by deserts, rugged mountains, abundant sunshine, and by two major rivers—the Colorado River and the Rio Grande, which provide life-giving waters to the largely arid but fertile lands along the rivers in both countries. Although sparsely settled at the time of the 1848 and 1853 treaties the area developed rapidly, beginning with the coming of the railroads in the 1880s and the development of irrigated agriculture after the turn of the century. All along the US–Mexico border, for 100 km on either side, is now a unique region. Beneath the official territorial divisions, life in the borderlands is not easily defined by which side one might happen to live on. The border area is the home of over 12 million people, roughly half on either side. Many of the cities along the border have grown up in pairs. In addition to the rapid population growth in the US–Mexican border area, due in large part to continuing migration to the border area from both countries, the key characteristic of population is its concentration in urban areas along the border. Today the boundary is singularly characterized by 15 pairs of

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sister cities (see Fig. 9.1), which are sustained by agriculture, industry, import–export trade, service and tourism. The urban areas have grown so rapidly that it has been impossible to provide adequate infrastructure on the Mexican side and to keep up with the deterioration of the infrastructure on the US side. The growing population size and concentration, along with associated industrial development, has put considerable pressure on the natural resources of the area and has resulted in an increase in the number and intensity of environmental problems. For example, many of the environmental problems of the San Diego–Tijuana area are linked quite directly to the chronic infrastructure deficit in the cross-border area (Ganster, 1996). In addition to other international issues associated with the US–Mexico border, there remain locally significant surface issues along Colorado and Rio Grande Rivers. For example, the waters of a number of international streams are yet to be apportioned. These include the Tijuana River in the Tijuana–San Diego area; and the Santa Cruz River, San Pedro River, and Whitewater Creek, which all cross the Arizona–Sonora border. The San Pedro River carries contaminants from the large copper works at Cananer, Sonoran into Arizona, and the New River, which rises south of Mexicali and flows northward to the Salton Sea in California, is perhaps the most polluted stream in the United States (Hansen, 1989). In addition to water pollution in those cross-border rivers, principal solid waste and air pollution resulting from fast industrialization and population growth in both sides next to the border have also posed challenges to the governments of the United States and Mexico.

Figure 9.1. The officially defined scope of the US–Mexico border area. (Source: http://www.epa. gov/usmexicoborder/index.htm.)

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The US–Mexico border environment cooperation

The US–Mexican border area contains about 400,000 sq. km, and extends about 3000 km between the Gulf of Mexico and the Pacific Ocean. The limits of the hydrologic border area range from 4.5 to 285 km from the international boundary. In size, the border area is similar to California (which is about 411,000 km2), and is larger than the combined area of the 12 smallest states in the United States. In order to better categorize the water-related issues, the border area has been divided into eight sub-areas that have similar hydrologic and hypsographic features (see Table 9.1). The US–Mexican border area exists in an arid climate with limited water resources. In spite of this, and to a large extent accelerated by the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the border area continues to develop at a very rapid rate. Water managers face many difficult and unique water-resources issues and challenges. Recent passage of the NAFTA and the subsequent establishment of the North American Development Bank (NADB) and the Border Environment Cooperation Commission (BECC) indicate the importance each country places on the US–Mexican border area (DOI, 1996). 9.1.2. The maquiladoras

During the Second World War, Mexico and the United States signed an agreement that allowed Mexican laborers, principally agricultural workers, to cross into the United States to work. This program was conceived as a temporary Table 9.1.

Areal extents of the US–Mexico border area, by sub-area (unit: sq. miles) Sub-area

No. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

Name Pacific Basins/Salton Trough Colorado River/Sea of Cortez Mexican Highlands Mimbres/Animas Basins Rio Grande—Elephant Butte Reservoir to above Rio Conchos Rio Grande—Rio Conchos to Amistad Reservoir Rio Grande—below Amistad Reservoir to Falcon Reservoir Lower Rio Grande Valley—below Falcon Reservoir to Gulf of Mexico Total

Total area

Area in Mexico

Area in US

Federal land in US

14,000 22,590 21,840 12,450

4870 8370 5395 6185

9,130 14,220 16,445 6265

6355 12,970 9665 3380

28,940

5760

23,180

10,835

34,630

13,910

20,720

1495

12,910

7840

5070

60

10,240 157,600

6155 58,485

4085 99,115

70 44,830

Note: Data on all areas are rounded to nearest 5 sq. miles. Source: DOI (1996).

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measure to ease the manpower shortage created in the United States by the need to expand the number of men under arms during the war. After the war, Mexico came to depend on the program as a source of foreign exchange earnings and as an outlet for its “excess” supply of labor. The program continued until 1964 when it was unilaterally terminated by the United States, largely in response to pressure exerted by organized labor in the United States. The abrogation of the program led to a substantial increase in unemployment in the border regions of Mexico, and partly as a measure to alleviate this problem, the new Mexican president, Diaz Ordaz, announced in 1965 a new program that would permit the United States’ firms to import equipment and materials into Mexico capital for re-export.1 The Johnson Administration agreed to this proposal, whereby use would be made of items 806.30 and 807.00 of the US tariff schedules which permit re-import of finished or partially finished goods with duty to be paid only on that value added to the product while outside of the United States. In Mexico, the plants set up under the Border Industrialization Program (BIP) are called “maquiladoras” and the industry is called the “maquila” industry. Maquila means “measure” in Spanish in the sense that a miller of grain kept a measure or plant of the grain in payment for this service. The parallel here is that the Mexican plants provide only labor services, never owning the products. The plants are also called “in-bond” plants, since the products they assemble never legally leave the parent company, although they may be out of the home country (Goddard, 1985, p. 141). It should not be surprising that Mexico and the United States have most interdependent assembly activities. As a developing country, Mexico shares a nearly 3000 km border with one of the world’s largest producer. The border is fairly accessible and transportation from almost any point in the United States to the border is cheap when compared to overseas trade. Not only geographically but also culturally, the distance between the two countries is not very great. Since the United States has a relatively high real-wage economy in comparison with that of Mexico, its firms have amply incentive to move segmental production processes that are labor-intensive to lower real labor cost areas. Real labor cost as a whole is lower in Mexico because labor productivity in general is lower, and because Mexico has abundant supplies of unskilled labor. Furthermore, more than three-quarters of the labor force in Mexican assembly industries are women, most of whom are very young (about two-thirds of the women are ⬍ 25 years of age) and were previously not in the labor force (Grunwald, 1985, pp. 110–111). The country has been one of the most frequently chosen locations for labor-intensive production processes, mainly assembly. The industries represented in the maquila sector include those of 1

A more deailed history of the border industrialization program (BIP) can be found in van Waas (1981, pp. 143–191).

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television receivers and parts, semi-conductors, toys, textiles, office machines, scientific instruments, electric motors lumber and paper products, electrical equipment, motor vehicle parts, ceramic parts and luggage, among others (Goddard, 1985, p. 141). Since 1965, when the BIP got under way, a significant number of assembly plants have been established almost every year. Most of the Mexico’s assembly activities are located along the border with the United States, concentrating on six towns from Tijuana, just south of San Diego, California, on the Pacific Ocean, to Matamores opposite Brownsville, Texas, near the Gulf of Mexico, while the proportion of the assembly plants in the interior of the country has been increasing steadily even though being still very small. The development in Mexico’s northern border area has been strongly influenced by its proximity to the United States, and it has been both a cause and an effect of migration from Mexico’s heartland. The environmental problem in the US–Mexican border area has been partially related to the creation of Mexico’s BIP in which the maquiladora industry began in 1965. The attractiveness of the maquiladora industry is that companies have access to relatively low-cost labor and remain close to the US market (Herzog, 1990, p. 47). According to Mexico’s Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía, e Informática (INEGI, or National Institute of Statistics, Geography, and Information), in January of 1993, there were 2078 maquiladoras in Mexico. By January 1999, the figure had risen by more than 50% to a total of 3143 in all of Mexico. In the same period, the number of the maquiladora employees doubled, from approximately 515,000 to 1,060,000, of which approximately 80% of the maquiladoras are located in the border states.2

9.2. The environmental problems along the US–Mexico border 9.2.1. Water supply and water quality

In the vicinity of the US–Mexico border, there is a great deal of variation in dependency on the natural environment being subject to open access to the two nations. The Colorado River, for example, flows over a distance of 2320 km, and forms a drainage basin of 632,000 sq. km. For 27 km, the River serves as the border between Arizona of the US and Mexico; it then flows 129 km through Mexico to the Gulf of California. Issues concerning groundwater quantity and quality particularly take on even more complex dimensions along the US–Mexico border. Waters in underground basins located partly in the United States and partly in Mexico have never been apportioned between the two coun2

Data source: EPA (2001).

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tries. At least 12 US border municipalities are completely dependent on groundwater, and another four partially. Agricultural production in Arizona and New Mexico and along the upper Rio Grande in Texas is also heavily dependent on groundwater. With the exception of the lower Rio Grande valley, Mexican agriculture relies just as much on this resource. The Mexican cities of Nogales, San Luis Rio Colorado, Agua Prieta, Ciudad Juarez, Presido, and Ciudad Acuna are nearly totally dependent on groundwater, while Mexicali, Tijuana, Reynosa, and Matamoros are variously dependent on it for upto half of the water. Along the entire border area there are at least 20 locations where groundwater is at present or may become a source of bi-national conflict (Mumme, 1982, pp. 3–4). The California–Baja California area, which includes the California counties of San Diego and Imperial and the Mexican municipalities of Tijuana, Tecate, and Mexicali, constitute the most populous and rapidly growing areas of the entire US–Mexican border area. The population of the area is concentrated in large urban areas, particularly in the San Diego–Tijuana area (see Table 9.2). Water quality is deteriorating along the border largely due to overdevelopment. In 1991, the Council on Scientific Affairs of the American Medical Association described the border area as “a virtual cesspool” of pollution and disease, noting that 46 million L of raw sewage flow each day into the Tijuana River. Much of the sewage that enters the river in Mexico, crosses the border, sometimes referred to as “renegade” flows, and travels through aged, inadequate or nonexistent pipelines.3 Surface and groundwater supplies are threatened everywhere along the California–Baja California border due to raw sewage dumping, agricultural runoff, and industrial and hazardous waste pollution. Such contaminations reduce the supply of water for human use and has other serious consequences on plants, animals, and human health (Ganster, 1996).

Table 9.2.

Population growth in San Diego and Tijuana, Imperial Valley and Mexicali

Year

San Diego county

Tijuana

Imperial valley

Mexicali

1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 1995

209,659 289,348 556,808 1,033,011 1,367,200 1,873,300 2,520,500 2,690,255

11,000 22,000 65,000 166,000 341,000 462,000 747,000 1,035,415

60,903 59,740 62,975 72,105 74,400 92,500 110,400 141,500

29,985 44,399 124,362 281,333 396,324 510,664 601,938 695,805

Source: Ganster (1996).

3

Source: www.american.edu/TED/sandiego.htm.

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One of the most serious problems along the US–Mexican border is the lack of access to adequate drinking water. Thousands of families along the border—approximately 30% of those living close to the border in Mexico— live in neighborhoods that have no running water or plumbing. Residents of these communities, called colonias, must seek water from questionable sources and dispose off their own wastes, both of which contribute to higher incidence of disease. Colonias in the border city of Ciudad Juárez are populated by several hundred thousand individuals who lack direct access to potable water and seweage services. However, this problem is not limited to the Mexican side of the border. In the state of Texas alone, it is estimated that 376,026 individuals live in 1526 colonias. Some 45,000 to 60,000 El Paso County residents do not have drinking water services and 74,000 individuals live in colonias in the county (IRSC, 1996). 9.2.2. Air pollution

Economic and population growth in the US–Mexico border area has had a significant effect on urban and regional air quality. Today, air pollution presents a significant environmental risk in some border communities. Many border residents are frequently exposed to elevated concentrations of carbon monoxide, sulfur dioxide, ozone, and particulate matter. Emissions from industrial sources, residential combustion (heating and cooking), trash burning, and cars, trucks, and buses, dust from unpaved roads are significant contributors to poor air quality. In some border communities, inhalation exposure to toxics, including pesticides, is another concern. In addition, air pollutant emissions within and outside the border area also threaten visibility in some border-protected areas, such as Big Bend National Park in Texas.4 Air pollution comes from different sources, but ultimately it is linked to growing human populations in the area. The exact transborder linkages of air pollution are very complicated. For example, the air quality on one side’s is sometimes affected by pollutants transported from the other side and vice versa. At the same time, driven by natural forces (such as strong winds), the pollutants generated near the international border move back and forth across the border. Also, air pollution sources from outside the area are not a neglected factor. The city of Mexicali, the state capital of Baja California in Mexico, lies 189 km inland from the Pacific Coast on the Mexico–Californian border at the lower end of California’s Imperial Valley. Mexicali is adjacent to the Californian city of Calexico and 20 km south of the Imperial county seat El Centro. Airflow to Mexicali is channeled by the Imperial Valley and is usually from the northwest or southeast, with northwesterly winds being most frequent. During the period 4

Cited from EPA (2001, p. 27).

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from March 1992 through August 1993, hourly PM10 (i.e., particles with aerodynamic diameter ⬍10 µm) concentrations were higher in the border area during southerly than northerly flow. For wind flow patterns in both directions, PM10 initially decreased with wind speed due to improved ventilation, then increased at high wind speeds due to increased suspension of soil particles. On average, when the wind was blowing from Mexico (i.e., southerly flow), the PM10 flux at Calexico was three times greater than when the wind was blowing from the United States (i.e., northerly flow). However, because winds from the north were about twice as frequent as winds from the south, the total flux from Mexico was only about one and a half times the total flux from the United States (Chow et al., 2000). Major sources of pollution include point and non-point sources. In terms of point source pollution, the major contributors are permanent installations, such as electricity generating plants and large industrial plants like as cement plants. Rapid growth of the number of vehicles in the border area has been the largest contributor to air pollution problems in the area. The vehicle fleet numbers 1,894,567 for San Diego County (September 1995), that for 112,523 for Imperial County (September 1995), 228,297 for Mexicali (December 1992), 20,591 for Tecate (December 1992) and 241,581 for Tijuana (December 1992). Although there are fewer vehicles in Baja California than in San Diego and Imperial counties, the Mexican vehicle fleet is characterized by poor maintenance and by older vehicles that do not have catalytic converters as well as by use of leaded gasoline (Ganster, 1996). Consequently, the Mexican vehicles contribute a disproportionately large share of the total pollution of the area. 9.2.3. Industrial and municipal wastes

The expansion of the maquiladora industry, together with the growth of urban population and domestic manufacturing and associated activities, has largely increased the industrial waste and other pollutants in the US–Mexcian border area. The treatment system is not able to process all of the waste produced. Consequently, millions of gallons of raw sewage have spilled into the Pacific Ocean and flows up to San Diego County beaches. During the 1960s, the sewage problem became unmanageable as a result of the influx of people seeking work. Both industrial and human wastes comprise the excess sewage. This problem has grown over the years along with the growth of the population of Tijuana and the growth of the maquiladora industry. The severity of the problem dramatically increased when the number of maquiladoras increased. The Mexican domestic industries and businesses in Tecate, Tijuana, and Mexicali, ranging from automobile repair shops to small furniture manufacturers and large chemical plants, produce significant pollution—both point and non-point sources. Only a portion of this waste is disposed of properly; the rest

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is discarded into the sewer systems, solid waste dumps, or simply dumped on the ground in canyons or other areas. This type of pollution is picked up from the flushing action of rains or the normal operation of the sewage system and is transported by rivers and washes, and then to the Pacific Ocean or Salton Sea. The pollution from urban runoff is also a significant problem in San Diego and other urban areas on the US side of the boundary. Another problem related to industrial waste is that of illegal dumping. Given the high costs to properly dispose of some hazardous wastes, there is a long history of illegal dumping in the border area. Smuggling of hazardous wastes into Mexico is a potentially lucrative criminal activity and has been a sporadic problem along the California–Baja California border. Continued problems with industrial waste are related to lack of adequate infrastructure in Mexico and in the California border area, the high cost of proper disposal, and the lack of enforcement of existing regulations by Mexican authorities. Collaborative bi-national efforts to track the movement of hazardous waste across the international boundary have been only partially successful as a computerized tracking system has been slow to come on line and has significant limitations. Even though there has been progress, it will be some time before illegal movement of hazardous materials in the area is largely curtailed. 9.2.4. Disease and health care

In recent times, the US–Mexican border area has come under heightened scrutiny for high levels of environmental degradation. Among a wide variety of different water pollution and depletion problems affecting the border region, water pollution in the San Diego–Tijuana area represents a highly visible and serious challenge to environmental quality. The problem is not new. Untreated sewage has contaminated the Tijuana River Valley and that the pollution problem has grown worse. The raw sewage has created an environment where mosquito breeding is rampant and the potential for the transmission of vector-borne diseases is high. At the beach, swimmers are in danger of contracting hepatitis, dysentery, and other diseases from bathing in waters polluted by sewage. Swimmers most frequently suffer from gastroenteritis—an illness characterized by vomiting, diarrhoea, stomachaches, and fever.5 Some people living in the colonias in and around Tijuana are exposed to dangerous levels of toxins. Their drinking water is polluted. In the hospitals in San Diego County, cases of tuberculosis have increased. Women on both sides of the border are giving birth to children who are deformed; some are born without brains, some have deformities, and some are retarded.6 5 6

Source: www.american.edu/TED/sandiego.htm. Source: www.american.edu/TED/TIJUANA.HTM.

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The implications of having no access to potable water and sewage services are quite serious in relation to disease. Diarrhoea, caused by water contaminated with fecal matter (often due to inadequate disposal of human wastes), is still a significant cause of illness in both El Paso and Ciudad Juárez. In Ciudad Juárez, the disease is the seventh cause of death in children under age five, and the second cause of death in infants under one year of age. Other diseases related to untreated water, such as Hepatitis A, Salmonella and Shigella Dysentery, are also leading causes of illness among young children on both sides of the border. A recent study of Hepatitis A in San Elizario, an El Paso colonia of about 3000 inhabitants, revealed that 281 of the residents (one-third of children below 9, and 90% of adults between the ages 30 and 34) had, or had contracted in the past, Hepatitis A. The rates of Shigella Dysentery and Hepatitis A infection in El Paso are four times the national average (IRSC, 1996). The border cities may be growing in numbers, but infrastructure development simply cannot keep up, leading to the growing colonia communities an unincorporated subdivision along the border in which one or more of the following conditions exist: lack of potable water supply or no water system, lack of an adequate wastewater system or no wastewater facilities, lack of decent, safe and sanitary housing, and inadequate roads and health care. After visiting a rural health clinic near El Paso, Madden (2004) writes “In Islas’ clinic, the majority of his patients are residents of the colonias and of El Paso. Colonia life, I learned, is discouraging. Colonias range from essentially squatter communities to underdeveloped city outskirts, and they exist on both sides of the border. … Without running water or sewage systems, water contamination, Islas said, is one of the primary health concerns for the colonias. Person-to-person transferable diseases spread easily through water. The most common health problem related to human contamination of water is Hepatitis A, a viral infection passed through contact with human fecal matter. In the colonias in Texas, for example, the incidence of Hepatitis A is 50.3 percent (compared to the state incidence rate of 18.3 percent) with some regions, such as the area surrounding El Paso, having an incidence rate of 90 percent in adults and greater than 30 percent in elementary school children. While many bacterial diseases spread through water contamination are treatable, if living conditions remain the same, infection and illness will continue to occur, reducing quality of life significantly. If untreated, many of these diseases can be life-threatening, especially for young children who cannot sustain the water loss of severe diarrhoea diseases.”

9.2.5. Biological resource

There are a number of endangered species and ecosystems in the US–Mexican border area. Examples include the coastal chaparral complex of plants and animals along the Pacific Coast, Tijuana National Estuarine Reserve and Baja California salt water estuaries, Cleveland National Forest and the Sierra de Juárez, and the Sonoran desert natural areas from Borrego southward into Baja

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California. All of these ecosystems and their associated plant and animal species need to have bi-national cooperation for conservation and protection to assure their long-term sustainability. Because of greater growth along the US side of the border, there is often a greater presence of undisturbed habitats and ecosystems on the Mexican side. The Imperial Valley–Mexicali area includes several natural areas of importance that are threatened by human activities. The lower Colorado delta area, although not directly on the border, is directly affected by the quality and quantity of water provided by the Colorado River. Imperial Valley includes sensitive desert protected areas that reach the border (Ganster, 1996). From the coastal wetlands along the Gulf of Mexico to the Pacific Ocean, the areal extension and diversity of species is being reduced, and important ecosystems and habitats are striking. The rapid growth of rural and urban communities has particular impact on marine environment, because unchecked growth can lead to the degradation of water resources. Contamination of habitats, introduction of exotic species, and losses from illegal extraction of species have become serious issues in the border area (EPA, 2001, pp. 101–102).

9.3. The US–Mexico border environment cooperation 9.3.1. The International Boundary Commission7

During the 19th century, temporary commissions were formed jointly by the Governments of the United States and Mexico, in order to survey and demarcate their common boundary. For example, a temporary commission was created by the Convention of July 29, 1852, which surveyed and increased the number of monuments marking the land boundary westward from El Paso, Texas and Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua. As the settlements grew along the boundary rivers and the adjoining lands began to be developed for agriculture in the late 19th century, questions arose as to the location of the boundary when the rivers changed their course and transferred tracts of land from one side of the river to the other. The two Governments by the Convention of November 12, 1884 adopted certain rules designated to deal with such questions. By the Convention of March 1, 1889, the Governments of the United States created the International Boundary Commission (IBC), to consist of a United States Section and a Mexican Section. The IBC was charged with the application

7

This section is based on an introductory article posted in the official website of International Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC), available at www.ibwc.state.gov/htm/about_us.html.

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of the rules of the 1884 Convention, for the settlement of questions arising as to the location of the boundary when the rivers changed their course. This Convention was modified by the Banco Convention of March 20, 1905 to retain the Rio Grande and the Colorado River as the boundary. The Convention of May 21, 1906 provided for the distribution between the United States and Mexico of the waters of the Rio Grande above Fort Quitman, Texas, for the 143 km international boundary reach of the Rio Grande through the El Paso–Juárez Valley. This Convention allocated to Mexico 60,000 acre-feet of waters of the Rio Grande annually to be delivered in accordance with a monthly schedule at the headgate to Mexico’s Acequia Madre just above Juárez, Chihuahua. To facilitate such deliveries, the United States constructed, at its expense, the Elephant Butte Dam in its territory. The Convention includes the provision that in case of extraordinary drought or serious accident to the irrigation system in the United States, the amount of water delivered to the Mexican Canal shall be diminished in the same proportion as the water delivered to lands under the irrigation system in the United States downstream of Elephant Butte Dam. In the Convention of February 1, 1933, the two Governments agreed to jointly construct, operate, and maintain, through the IBC, the Rio Grande Rectification Project, which straightened and stabilized the 249 km river boundary through the highly developed El Paso–Juárez Valley. The project further provided for the control of the river’s floods through this Valley. 9.3.2. The International Boundary and Water Commission

The Treaty of February 3, 1944 for “Utilization of Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande” distributed between the two countries the waters of the Rio Grande, from Fort Quitman to the Gulf of Mexico, and the waters of the Colorado River. Of the waters of the Rio Grande, the Treaty allocates to Mexico: (1) all of the waters reaching the main channel of the Rio Grande from the San Juan and Alamo Rivers, including the return flows from the lands irrigated from those two rivers; (2) two-thirds of the flow in the main channel of the Rio Grande from the measured Conchos, San Diego, San Rodrigo, Escondido and Salado Rivers, and the Las Vacas Arroyo, subject to certain provisions; and (3) one-half of all other flows occurring in the main channel of the Rio Grande downstream from Fort Quitman. The Treaty allots to the United States: (1) all of the waters reaching the main channel of the Rio Grande from the Pecos and Devils Rivers, Goodenough Spring and Alamito, Terlingua, San Felipe and Pinto Creeks; (2) one-third of the flow reaching the main channel of the river from the six named measured tributaries from Mexico, and the treaty provides that this third shall not be less, as an average amount in cycles of five consecutive years, than 350,000 acre-feet annually;

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and (3) one-half of all other flows occurring in the main channel of the Rio Grande downstream from Fort Quitman.8 The 1944 Treaty further provided for the two Governments to make optimum use of its allotted waters. Specifically, (1) a guaranteed annual quantity of 1.5 million acre-feet to be delivered in accordance with schedules formulated in advance by Mexico within specified limitations; and (2) any other waters arriving at the Mexican points of diversion under certain understandings. To enable the diversion of Mexico’s allotted waters, the Treaty provided for the construction by Mexico of a main diversion structure in the Colorado River, below the point where the California–Baja California land boundary line intersects the river. It also provided for the construction at Mexico’s expense of such works as may be needed in the United States to protect its lands from such floods and seepage as might result from the construction and operation of the diversion structure. This Treaty entrusts International Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC), with the application of its terms, the regulation and exercise of the rights and obligations which the two Governments assumed here after, and the settlement of all disputes to which its observance and execution may give rise. It changed the name of the IBC to IBWC. The IBWC is an international body composed of the United States Section and the Mexican Section, each headed by an Engineer-Commissioner appointed by his/her respective president.9 The mission of the IBWC is to apply the rights and obligations which the Governments of the United States and Mexico assume under the numerous boundary and water treaties and related agreements, and to do so in a way that benefits the social and economic welfare of the people on both sides of the boundary and improve relations between the two countries. As provided for in the treaties and agreements, those rights and obligations include: distribution of the waters of the Rio Grande and the Colorado River between the two countries; regulation and conservation of the waters of the Rio Grande for their use by the two countries by joint construction, operation and maintenance of international storage dams and reservoirs, and plants for generating hydroelectric 8

Source: www.ibwc.state.gov/htm/about_us.html. The United States Section of the International Boundary and Water Commission (USIBWC) is headquartered in El Paso, Texas, while the Mexican Section is in Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua. The United States and Mexican Sections maintain their respective headquarters in the adjoining cities of El Paso, Texas, and Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua. The Commissioners meet at least weekly, alternating the place of meetings and are in almost daily contact with one another. Each Section maintains its own engineering staff, a secretary and such legal advisers and other assistants (if necessary). Each Section also has field offices on its side of the boundary at the location of joint projects or related operation where the engineers of the adjoining offices work closely with each other to effect the essential cooperation. Each Government funds the cost of the operation of its Section of the IBWC. Cited from www.ibwc.state.gov/htm/about_us.html.

9

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energy at the dams; regulation of the Colorado River waters allocated to Mexico; protection of lands along the river from floods by levee and floodway projects; solution of border sanitation and other border water quality problems; preservation of the Rio Grande and Colorado River as the international boundary; and demarcation of the land boundary.10 One of the legal regimes which started with the IBWC’s fundamental role of water and environment is the joint management of the Colorado and Rio Grande/Rio Bravo (see Table 9.3). The Treaty was a dramatic turning point in the legal stance of the United States on its sovereign rights concerning water resources. Until that date the US side maintained that it had absolute right to use the water resources in its territory as it wished. The 1944 Treaty was accompanied by an agreement for the solution of the international problem of the salinity of the Lower Colorado River—IBWC Minute No. 242 dated August 30, 1973. In 1979, the two countries signed IBWC Minute No. 261 to solve their border sanitation problems. The 1944 Treaty further authorized the two countries to jointly construct, operate, and maintain the main channel of the Rio Grande—those dams required for the conservation, storage and regulation of the greatest quantity of the annual flow of the river—to enable each country to make optimum use of

Table 9.3.

Management of international water resources: Colorado and Rio Grande

(1) Legal regime

(2) Customary law

(3) Territorial extent and membership (4) Functions (5) Explicit or implicit expression (6) Purposes and power of implementation

(7) Conflict and conflict management

Source: Kliot et al. (2001, p. 246).

10

Ibid.

International Boundary and Water Commission IBWC/CILA series of treaties established the regime 1906, 1944 are the most important United States held off the Harmon Doctrine (absolute sovereignty) and changed its legal stance to one nearer to the Doctrine of Limited Sovereignty United States and Mexico Organization covers the whole basin Water allocation. Water quality: salinity and sewage. Groundwater resources 1906 convention explicitly mentioned equitable division. The 1944 Treaty stressed equitable distribution of the water Management of water works, implementation monitoring and enforcement of agreements and resolution of conflicts. Practically it has basin wide comprehensive development approach Conflicts on water allocation to United States and Mexico led to the conclusion of the 1906 and 1944 treaties. IBWC/CILA is also a forum for conflict resolution

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its allotted waters (IBWC/CILA, 1996). In addition to water allocation of 234 million cu. m of Colorado water to Mexico and of Rio Grande water, the IBWC is to fulfill the following tasks: ● ● ● ● ● ● ●

flood control; data exchange and monitoring; dam construction and operation; provision of standby water loan to municipal needs; channel preservation and silt removal; salinity control; and groundwater resources.

In addition, the two countries have also dealt with border sanitation and water-quality matters based on Minute No. 261, which denies this type of problem. The IBWC operates and maintains the international wastewater treatment plant in Nogales, Nuevo Laredo, Tijuana–San Diego sanitation, and Calexico–Mexicali sanitation. Also, water quality-monitoring (even of groundwater resources) in Nogales Arizona and Nogales, Sonora, is also carried out by the IBWC (IBWC, 1998). The Chamizal Convention of August 29, 1963 resolved the nearly 100year-old boundary problem at El Paso, Texas, and Juárez, Chihuahua, known as the Chamizal dispute, involving nearly 250 ha of territory which were transferred from the south to the north bank of the Rio Grande by movement of the river during the latter part of the 19th century. By this Convention, the two Governments gave effect to a 1911 arbitration award under 1963 conditions. The Convention provided for the relocation of the IBWC, 7 km of the channel of the Rio Grande so as to transfer a net amount of 177 ha from the north to the south side of the river.11 The Treaty of November 23, 1970 resolved all pending boundary differences and provided for maintaining the Rio Grande and the Colorado River as the international boundary. The Rio Grande was re-established as the boundary throughout its more than 2000 km limitrophe section. The Treaty includes provisions for restoring and preserving the character of the Rio Grande as the international boundary where this character has been lost, to minimize changes in the channel, and to resolve problems of sovereignty that might arise due to future changes in the channel of the Rio Grande. It provides for procedures designed to avoid the loss of territory by either country, incident to future changes in the river’s course due to causes other than lateral movement, incident to eroding one of its banks and depositing alluvium on the opposite bank. This Treaty, like other treaties, charged the IBWC with carrying out its provisions. 11

Ibid.

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9.3.3. The La Paz Agreement

Since the early 1980s, the US and Mexican governments have begun to focus on joint environmental issues in their common border area. The “Agreement between the United States of America and the Mexican United States on Cooperation for the Protection and Improvement of the Environment in the Border Area,” also known as the La Paz Agreement, was signed on August 14, 1983 (coded T.I.A.S. No. 10827), and entered into force on February 16, 1984. The scope of the agreement and its annexes is limited to the area within 100 miles of each side of the US–Mexico border. The La Paz Agreement established a national coordinator for each country, regular meetings, and constituted working groups that now include the Air Work Group, the Contingency Planning and Emergency Response Work Group, the Hazardous Waste Work Group, the Pollution Prevention Work Group, the Water Work Group, and the emerging Environmental Information Management Group. The working groups include mainly the US and Mexican federal agency representatives and state representatives. Since 1983, a number of annexes to the agreement have been negotiated. Later, additions to the La Paz Agreement enhanced cooperation on specific environmental issues such as wastewater treatment facilities in Tijuana, Baja California, and San Diego, California; accidental spills of hazardous waste along the border; the cross-border shipment of hazardous wastes; limits on air emissions and monitoring of copper smelters on the border; and the joint assessment of causes of urban pollution on the border as well as the development of emergency response solutions to environmental disasters. Specifically, they include the following:12 ●

●

●

●

12

Annex I: Agreement of Cooperation for Solution of the Border Sanitation Problem at San Diego, California–Tijuana, July 18, 1985, US–Mexico, T.I.A.S. No. 11269 (entered into force on July 18, 1985), Annex II: Agreement of Cooperation Regarding Pollution of the Environment along the Inland International Boundary by Discharges of Hazardous Substances, July 18, 1985, US–Mexico, T.I.A.S. No. 11269 (entered into force on November 29, 1985), Annex III: Agreement of Cooperation Regarding the Transboundary Shipment of Hazardous Wastes and Hazardous Substances, November 12, 1986, US–Mexico, T.I.A.S. No. 11269 (entered into force on January 29, 1987), Annex IV: Agreement of Cooperation Regarding Transboundary Air Pollution Caused by Copper Smelters along their Common Border, January Source: www.lectlaw.com/files/env15.htm.

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29, 1987, US–Mexico, T.I.A.S. No. 11269 (entered into force on January 29, 1987), Annex V: Agreement of Cooperation Regarding International Transport of Urban Air Pollution, October 3, 1989, US–Mexico, T.I.A.S. No. 11269 (entered into force on August 22, 1990).

The La Paz Agreement, which addressed a host of cross-border environmental problems, allows both countries to “prevent, reduce, and eliminate sources of air, water, and land pollution in a 100 km-wide zone along each side of the boundary.” For the first time in their working relationship on environmental issues, the two countries defined the principal goals for environmental problems on the border. Annex I is directly related to this case. It called for the development of treatment facilities. Annex III also has importance in this case. It concerns hazardous waste created by maquiladoras. According to the Mexican law, hazardous waste created at the maquiladoras by raw materials from the US must be returned to the US. This Annex assists this process. Only in the last few years have the two countries been able to improve their tracking of the waste that needs to be returned to the US. Some of the waste which is unaccounted for ends up in the deserts in the surrounding area and some of it ends up in the Tijuana River. 9.3.4. The Washington Agreement

On February 3, 1993, the Governments of the United States and Mexico signed an Agreement concerning the establishment of the Border Environment Cooperation Commission (BECC) and the North American Development Bank (NADB) in Washington, DC, to help border communities address the lack of existing environmental infrastructure and the anticipated environmental consequences of the NAFTA. The BECC and NADB had some start-up difficulties, including management and personnel issues, cumbersome procedures, and faulty coordination. The Washington Agreement, wishing to follow upon the goals and objectives of the NAFTA, is purposed to “help preserve, protect, and enhance the environment of the border-area ....”13 As joint ventures, the BECC and NADB will be established with other national and international institutions, and private sources supplying investment capital, and environmental infrastructure projects in the border area.

13

“Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Mexican States Concerning the Establishment of a Border Environment Cooperation Commission and a North America Development Bank,” Washington, DC, USA, February 3, 1993, Section 1, Article I, Chapter I.

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In carrying out these purposes of cross-border water cooperation and environmental protection implemented by the United States and Mexico, the BECC may do any or all of the following:14 ●

●

To assist states and localities and other public entities and private investors in (A) coordinating environmental infrastructure projects in the border area; (B) preparing, developing, implementing, and overseeing environmental infrastructure projects in the border area, including the design, sitting and other technical aspects of such projects; (C) analyzing the financial feasibility or the environmental aspects, or both, of environmental infrastructure projects in the border area; (D) evaluating social and economic benefits of environmental infrastructure projects in the border area; and (E) organizing, developing, and arranging public and private financing for environmental infrastructure and projects in the border area. To certify applications for financing to be submitted to the NADB, or to other sources of financing that request such certification, for environmental infrastructure projects in the border area.

Furthermore, according to Article III of the Washington Agreement, the BECC shall have a Board of Directors, a General Manager, a Deputy General Manager, an Advisory Council, and such other officers and staff who are based on the border area to perform such duties as the BECC may determine. The purposes of the NADB as a joint venture established by the United States and Mexico have also been determined: (a) to provide financing for projects certified by the BECC, as appropriate, and, at the request of the BECC, to otherwise assist the BECC in fulfilling its purposes and functions; (b) to provide financing endorsed by the United Sates, as appropriate, for community adjustment and investment in support of the purposes of the NAFTA; and (c) to provide financing endorsed by Mexico, as appropriate, for community adjustment and investment in support of the purposes of the NAFTA. To implement its purposes, the NADB has planned to utilize its own capital, funds raised by it in financial markets, and other available resources and shall fulfill the following functions: (a) to promote the investment of public and private capital contributing to its purposes; (b) to encourage private investment in projects, enterprises, and activities contributing to its purposes, and to supplement private investment when private capital is not available on reasonable terms and conditions; and (c) to provide technical and other assistance for the financing and, in coordination with the BECC, the implementation of plans and projects.15 Over the years, progress has been made on some of these issues, and the institutions can point to tangible accomplishments. The BECC has certified 57 projects, of which 39 are operational or under construction. The NADB has 14 15

Ibid, Section 2, Article I, Chapter I. Ibid, Section 2, Article I, Chapter II.

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administered or is in the process of administering US$330 million in grant funds to 36 of these projects and coordinates other financing for BECC-certified projects. These projects will represent a total investment of approximately US$1 billion and many more projects are in the pipeline (EPA, 2001). The second NAFTA side agreement established the BECC and the NADB to encourage the improvement of environmental infrastructure along the border. The commission, drawing upon technical and environmental criteria, recommends projects that address environmental challenges for possible funding by NADB. By March 1997, NADB—governed and funded equally by Mexico and the United States—had received US$337 million in paid-in capital and US$1.9 billion in callable capital, or funds set aside to meet future outstanding debts (NADB, 1997, p. 9). By the side agreement, NADB financing was limited to border environmental infrastructure projects certified by the BECC. Mercedes, Texas, is the site of one of NADB’s early projects. The project, approved in late 1996 and scheduled for completion in 1999, involves an interim loan from the bank to help fund a US$4.1 million expansion of water and sewer systems. Among the beneficiaries of the new utilities will be 4000 colonia residents (NADB, 1998, p. 13). 9.3.5. The Border XXI Program

The Border XXI Program was preceded by a number of formal and informal cooperative efforts to protect the environment and human health in the US–Mexican border area. The formal foundation for these efforts is the Agreement between the United States of America and United Mexican States on Cooperation for the Protection and Improvement of the Environment in the Border Area signed by President De la Madrid and President Reagan in La Paz, Mexico in 1983. The Border XXI Program achieved some notable successes, including significant increase in infrastructure development, innovative, and wide-reaching mechanisms for addressing border clean-ups, a partnership agreement with border states and tribes, and an ambitious agenda for work with the private sector. The US–Mexico Border XXI Program: Progress Report 1996–2000 provides an assessment of the Border XXI Program and a summary of its accomplishments. In March 2002, President Bush and President Fox directed their respective administrations to work with their legislatures to make changes to the BECC and the NADB. These changes include:16 ●

16

Expanding the geographic scope for BECC/NADB operations in Mexico from 100 to 300 km, concentrating grants and low-interest rate loans for projects in the poorest communities located within the current border area of 100 km, Source: www.epa.gov/usmexicoborder/index.htm.

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Expanding NADB’s ability to extend concessional financing by doubling its low-interest rate lending facility and increasing its capacity to provide grants out of its own resources, Replacing the two boards of directors with a single board to oversee both institutions with representatives from the federal governments, the border states, and the public, Making a more concerted effort to certify and finance private sector environmental projects.

9.4. Unresolved issues

For more than a century, leaders from both the United States and Mexico have recognized the importance of the cross-border cooperation on water and environmental issues. The Treaty of 1848 establishing the river as a new US–Mexico boundary was modified in 1853 to set today’s boundary, taking into account the changing course of the river. In 1889, a treaty signed by representatives of both nations created the IBC. A commissioner appointed by each country was entrusted with enforcing rules established in an 1884 agreement to fix the location of the boundary as the river meandered. In 1944, another treaty—the Treaty on Utilization of Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande, otherwise known as the Water Treaty— converted the IBC into the IBWC. The treaty increased the commission’s authority to include issues affecting the quality, conservation, and use of water on the border (EPA, 2001, p. A1.1). Even with these institutional progresses, many problems still exist. With regard to the division of the surface waters of rivers that cross the international boundary between Mexico and the United States, although specific minimum quantities of water are detailed in the treaty, there is no definition of quality of water delivered to Mexico, nor is there any requirement as to when water has to be delivered. Over the past years, Mexicans have frequently made the point that the division of waters is unfair and that declining quality of water is a problem. The Mexicans have also pointed out that the Colorado River is managed not to deliver optimum water supply for agricultural and domestic uses downstream in Mexico, but to optimize hydroelectric power production. This results in irregular and inefficient water deliveries to Mexico. Both the United States and Mexico have set health-based ambient air quality standards. The Clean Air Act, which was amended in 1990, authorizes the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), in cooperation with its counterpart Mexican agencies, to monitor and improve air quality in areas along the border. The 1996 Ley General del Equilibrio Ecológico y la Protección al Ambiente (LGEEPA or General Law of Ecological Balance and Environmental

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Protection) enables Mexico’s Secretaría de Medio Ambiente, Recursos Naturales, y Pesca (SEMARNAP or Secretariat of Environment, Natural Resources, and Fisheries) to work to improve air quality in cities and the international border areas of the country (EPA, 2001, p. 27). Cross-border problems, however, still exist, since each side (the United States and Mexico) has its own standards to protect public health with an adequate margin of safety, which make cross-border coordination difficult. For example, the standard of ozone (O3) is 0.11 ppm for Mexico, while is 0.12 ppm for the United States; the standard of sulfur dioxide (SO2) (the arithmetic mean of 24 h) is 0.33 ppm for Mexico, while is 0.14 ppm for the United States (see Table 9.4). Most of the Border XXI Program’s projects were implemented at the local level, its organizational structure therefore lacks inter-regional and borderwide coordination and planning. Nine border-wide workgroups—each focusing on a particular environmental program, such as air quality or hazardous waste management—coordinated the efforts of various federal, state, tribal, and local government activities in the border area. This structure, however, did not facilitate comprehensive regional- and local-level planning, and made it difficult for communities to fully participate in all the discussions affecting a single area. For example, many border residents have suffered serious illness and death due to inadequate drinking water. Providing potable drinking water infrastructure and adequate sewerage systems would reduce the number of these cases significantly. Unfortunately, such a solution would require not only an enormous financial investment, but also the commitment of local, state, and Table 9.4.

Comparison of the US and Mexican health-based ambient air quality standards

Pollutant Carbon monoxide (CO) Nitrogen dioxide (NO2) Ozone (O3) Sulfur dioxide (SO2) Particulate matter smaller than 2.5 µm (PM2.5) Particulate matter smaller than 10 µm (PM10) Total suspended particulate matter (TSP) Lead (Pb)

United States 8 h average 1 h average Annual average 1 h average 8 h average 1 h average Annual average 24 h average Annual average 24 h average Annual average 24 h average Annual average 24 h average Quarterly average

Source: http://www.epa.gov/ttn/atc/cica/airq_e.html.

9 ppm 35 ppm 0.053 ppm

Mexico 11 ppm

0.21 ppm 0.08 ppm 0.12 ppm 0.03 ppm 0.14 ppm 15 µg m⫺3 65 µg m⫺3 50 µg m⫺3 150 µg m⫺3 15 µg m⫺3 65 µg m⫺3 1.5 µg m⫺3

0.11 ppm 0.03 ppm 0.33 ppm

50 µg m⫺3 150 µg m⫺3 75 µg m⫺3 260 µg m⫺3 1.5 µg m⫺3

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federal politicians. While city officials on both sides of the border are working toward this long-term goal, resolution of the infrastructure deficit will not be achieved soon (IRSC, 1996). With regard to the Border Environmental Agreements 1983, Annex I is the principal document, but there are assortment of laws in both countries that affect this case. First, both countries “enact, develop, implement, and enforce their laws, regulations, and standards within different legal systems and frameworks.”17 The US system is built on a tradition of common law; while Mexico’s system is built on civil law, which relies less on the judiciary for developing and interpreting the law. The primary difference between the two systems is that enforcement, principally, lies within the executive branch in the Mexican system, whereas in the US system the judiciary is much more involved in enforcement. Different political systems meet at the border, which makes cooperation on mutual problems much more complicated and difficult. For example, in contrast to the United States, Mexico is highly centralized. Political power flows from the presidency in Mexico city as do economic resources. Thus, local governments are relatively weak in Mexico. Traditionally, Mexican municipalities have had no secure and adequate source of funding, so they have relied on state and federal governments. There is no civil service in Mexico, so with each new municipal governor, or president, there is massive turnover in administrative staff. This makes continuity in programs difficult and works against continuity in cross-border cooperation. There are few direct governmental and administrative counterparts across the border. Areas that are local responsibilities on the US side are often state or federal responsibilities. In California, local governments are able to raise financing for infrastructure through bonding and taxing mechanisms, but these options are extremely limited in Baja California and Mexico (Ganster, 1996).

17

See Annex I of the La Paz Agreement.

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Chapter 10 China’s interprovincial border disputes at Lake Weishan 10.1. The administrative evolution of Lake Weishan

Lake Weishan is located on the border of Shandong and Jiangsu provinces in East China mid-way between Shanghai and Beijing (see Fig. 10.1). It is composed of four connective sub-lakes, Dushan, Nanyang, Zhaoyang and Weishan, and is also identified by an alternative name, Nansihu (four southern lakes). However, the name Weishan is preferred here. As the largest fresh water reservoir (with an area of 1260 sq. km) in northern China, Lake Weishan receives water from 53 rivers in a broad catchment area spread across 32 counties and cities of four provinces (Jiangsu, Shandong, Henan, and Anhui). The maximum capacity of the lake is 4.73 billion m3.1 For centuries, Lake Weishan has been an important storage area of fresh water, but it also assisted in the prevention of flooding, the production of aquatic products, as the route of local shipping and the source of water for agricultural and industrial production. It remains vital in the daily life of the residents of 14 cities and counties (districts) in Jiangsu and Shandong provinces. In addition, Lake Weishan contains 79 species of fish, 74 types of waterrelated plants, 364 plankton species and 87 identified species of birds. The local saying is Lake Weishan is capable of “producing ten litres of gold per day” (ri chu doujin).2 High-quality coal resources have also been discovered beneath the lake. These are seen as extremely important by the economic policy-makers at both central and provincial level government in China. Lake Weishan was an important area in ancient China. According to archaeologists, the cultural relics and objects discovered in the region are evidence of early human activity dating from as early as 5000 or 6000 years.3 During the Song (960–1279 AD), the Yuan (1279–1368 AD), the Ming (1368–1644 AD)

1

Source: Weishan Statistical Yearbook 2001, edited by the Statistical Bureau of Weishan county, May 2002, p. 1. 2 Source: “An Outline of Report Concerning the Environmental Protection Work on the Four Southern Lakes” (guanyu nansihu huanbao gongzuo de huibao tigang), the CCP Committee of Weishan County and the People’s Government of Weishan County, December 29, 1998. 3 Unless stated otherwise, all data in this section, are cited from Weishan County Annuals (weishanxian xianzhi), the government of Weishan county, Shandong province.

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Figure 10.1. A Sketch Map of Lake Weishan (Drawn by the author with assistance by Guo Liqing).

and the Qing (1644–1911 AD) dynasties, Lake Weishan was shared by two provinces and seven counties (the current Yutai, Jining, Zoucheng, Tengzhou, and Yicheng counties of Shandong province in the North and Southeast; and Peixian and Tongshan counties of Jiangsu province in the West and Southwest). During the period of the War of Resistance against the Japanese Troops (1937–1945) it was a region of armed resistance against Japanese occupation. A Squadron of Volunteer Army (the kangri yiyong zongdui) was established in the lake area. This squadron included the No. 1 Group of No. 1 Detachment,

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South Shandong Railroad Force (the Railroad Guerrillas), the (BeijingHangzhou) Grand Canal Detachment, and the Lake Military Group. In July 1944, the border county of Peixian–Tengzhou (then known as Pei–Teng Bianxian) was renamed Lincheng county, while the latter was composed of nine districts, with a prefectural office located in Xiazhen township. In October 1944, the western parts of Zoucheng and Tenzhou counties were merged to form Fushan county, which was composed of today’s Fushan county in the North and the border areas of the present-day Peixian, Tongshan, and Lincheng counties in the South. When the People’s Republic of China was founded, Weishan county was cut into eight counties under separate administration from Shandong and Jiangsu provinces. In September 1949, a Working Committee of the Chinese Communist Party was established with an Administrative Office at the lake area. This working committee had jurisdiction over northern Xuzhou municipality and the four lake areas of Weishan, Zhaoyang, Dushan, and Nanyang as well as villages with proximity to those lakes. Prior to 1953, most of Lake Weishan was part of Xuzhou Administrative Region, and under the jurisdiction of Shandong province: 90% of the southern part of Lake Weishan was shared by two counties (Peixian and Tongshan); and the eastern part of the lake was part of the Seventh District of Peixian county, with Xiazhen township as the administrative center of the District. This district comprised of eight towns and over 100 villages. In 1953, Xuzhou Administrative Region was transferred from Shandong to Jiangsu provinces. During the process of territorial re-adjustment, Shandong province submitted a proposal stating that: for the sake of the unified administration and public security of the whole lake area, the sub-lakes of Zhaoyang and Weishan, together with some villages of Tongshan county (all of which had been under the jurisdiction of Jiangsu province), should comprise a new county (Weishan) and placed under the administration of Shandong province. This proposal was submitted to the Ministry of Civil Affairs (MCA) by the Administrative Commission of East China Region on July 17, 1953 (dongbanzi [53] official letter, No. 0643) and supported by the People’s Government of Shandong province on May 4, 1953 (luminzi [53] official letter, No. 1533).4 The interprovincial border set at that time followed principles set by the Central Government: Shandong’s Weishan county was to be separated from Jiangsu’s Peixian and Tongshan counties by the border between the lake’s waterline and lakeside land, with the exception of a few villages located outside the lakeside land. These villages were set as border markers between the two provinces. The State Administrative Council, the former State Council, approved this proposal on August 22, 1953 (zhengzhengbuzi [53] official 4

Details about these official documents are shown in Table 10.3.

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letter, No. 136). The newly established county of Weishan was entitled to administer 267 villages and four towns.5 In March 1956, the counties of Fushan and Xuecheng were also put under Weishan’s administration. However, from May to September of the same year, some villages were transferred from Weishan county to Xuzhou municipality of Jiangsu province and others were transferred from Yixian, Jiaxiang, and Jining counties of Shandong province to Weishan county. In early 1984, other 14 villages from Peixian county in Jiangsu province were transferred to Weishan county in Shandong province. As a result of the above administrative re-adjustments, the county of Weishan now contains 565 administrative villages and five neighborhood committees, covering a total geographical area of 1780 sq. km (this includes 514 sq. km of lake). As of 2001, Weishan county had a total population of 682,000. The majority are Han Chinese, but 25 other ethnic minorities, such as Muslim, Miao, Mongol, Zhuang, Manchu, Korean, Yi, and Hani, are also residents in Weishan.6

10.2. Interprovincial border disputes and Lake Weishan 10.2.1. Reasons for discord

The Lake Weishan area has experienced drastic changes in provincial administration during the 20th century. This has placed the Shandong–Jiangsu interprovincial relation on an unstable foundation. The 1953 border re-adjustment scheme created many problems. The fact that changes in natural conditions could result in either a rise (during rainy season) or a fall (during dry season) of water level in Lake Weishan, which would in turn either reduce or increase the size of the lake and the lakeshore land, was not taken into consideration. Naturally, this would cause frequent changes in the location of the interprovincial borderline, which followed the decision that: “Wherever water reaches is under Shandong’s jurisdiction; but the land is regarded as Jiangsu’s territory.” In addition, it was clearly assumed in the 1953 border delimitation scheme that the whole area of the lake should be exclusively under the administration of Weishan county in Shandong province. Jiangsu residents living along the lakeside were permitted to continue conducting their lake-related businesses, such as fishing in the lake and farming in the lakeside land. 5 Source: The State Administrative Council of the PRC (under the form of Letter zhengzhengbuzi, No. 136), August 22, 1953. According to the Weishan Statistical Yearbook 2001 (p. 1), the total number of villages was 302. 6 Source: Weishan Statistical Yearbook 2001, p. 2.

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During the first years when Shandong province exercised its governance over the whole area, Jiangsu province did not fully realize the lake’s crucial importance to the agricultural and industrial economy of the region nor was there sufficient recognition of the area’s importance to the people’s livelihood. It was only when Jiangsu province attempted to build an iron-ore mine in Liguo at the southern side of Lake Weishan, in an area near the provincial borders, that debate strengthened. The mining proposal was impeded in 1956 and this stimulated the Jiangsu administrators to demand the return of 35 villages, which had been transferred to Shandong province in 1953. The central government in Beijing agreed to Jiangsu’s request in principle, but still kept the whole lake under the sole administration of Weishan county.7 Since then Jiangsu has increasingly sought to gain strategic recognition of the lake as a part of its provincial economy. In 1958, Shandong province decided to construct a dam, which effectively divided the whole lake into two parts—an upper lake and a lower lake (see Fig. 10.1.). While the construction of the dam in the middle of the lake was good for the provincial economy of Shandong province, it was not beneficial to the economy of Jiangsu province. Jiangsu had no administrative jurisdiction over Lake Weishan, and could neither change Shandong’s construction scheme nor exercise any control of water rights. Not only did the dam result in 90% of the lake’s water reserves contained on the Shandong side of the border, but it also submerged 210,000 mu (1 mu is ⯝ 667 sq. m) of arable land on the Jiangsu side. Even worse, it made the farmers of Peixian district completely unable to irrigate their crops during a drought or to drain their waterlogged fields after a heavy rain.8 The central government made great efforts to resolve the Lake Weishan disputes and these attempts can be traced through three documents issued by the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee and the State Council in 1984. (This will be further discussed in Section 10.3.) The three documents, which transferred disputed areas and villages from Jiangsu to Shandong, provide a large part of the present administrative picture of the Shandong–Jiangsu border area issues (see Fig. 10.2(a)). However, the Shandong and Jiangsu provincial governments have both chosen to interpret the three central documents differently. The result has been uncertainty over interprovincial border and lack of resolution of what is a fundamental border demarcation issue. In the following years, the Shandong administrators emphasized an exact implementation of the three central documents, 7

See “Statistics on Status of the Lakeside Land and Lake-related Resources in Lake Weishan, Peixian County” (peixian guanyu zai weishanhu nei hutian, huchan qingkuang tongji), Office of Lakeside land, Peixian county, June 8, 1996. 8 Ibid.

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Figure 10.2. The differently defined borders between Shandong and Jiangsu provinces, (drawn by the author with assistance by Guo Liqing). (a) Based on the map of administrative division of Weishan county (drawn by the government of Weishan county, published by Xi’an Map Press, Xi’an, Shaanxi province, 1995). (b) Based on the map of administrative division of Peixian county (drawn by the Surveying and Drawing Academy of Xuzhou Municipality, edited by the government of Peixian county, published by China Map Press, Beijing, 1995).

insisting that Lake Weishan be under the sole administration of Weishan county. However, the Jiangsu administrators argued that the decisions made by the central government were unfair.9 Jiangsu suggested that the use of the widely recognized principle on water-area delimitation that “shared lakes are divided along the deepest line”) (see Fig. 10.2(b)). Both provinces had far too many differences to reach an agreement.10

9

See “Report on the Work of the Delimitation between Peixian and Weishan Counties” (guanyu peiwei bianjie kanjie gongzuo de huibao), the Working Office of Lake Area, Peixian County, February 17, 1998. 10 Based on the author’s two talks with officials in Weishan and Peixian counties on June 1 and 2, 2000 respectively.

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The argument about ownership of Lake Weishan continued, so did the border conflict between the provinces. From the founding of the People’s Republic in 1949 to the year 2000 there have been nearly 400 cases of cross-border conflicts in the region with nearly 400 people killed or seriously wounded. The details are: 16 people died and 24 people were disabled in Peixian county; four people died in Weishan county; as well as numerous casualties in Tongshan and Fengxian counties of Jiangsu province.11 The main causes for these causalities came from fights between the cultivators of the lakeside land and fishermen operating other lake-related business, as well as workers involved in the construction of various water conservancy, public security, construction of communication equipment programs, and the collectors of fees and taxes for use of lake-related resources (Table 10.1). The Shandong–Jiangsu border disputes have seriously affected the social solidarity and public security of the Lake Weishan area. Besides, due to the lack of appropriate coordination between all stakeholders concerned, natural and environmental resources have been overexploited or destroyed. The border disputes have damaged the ecological sustainability of the lake and caused substantial environmental degradation. Since the 1990s, along with the rapid development of industrial enterprises in the area, industrial wastes and pollutants had been discharged directly via 53 rivers that all feed into the lake, at Table 10.1. Casualties in selected armed fights at Lake Weishan, 1961–1998 No.

MM/DD/Year

Weapons used

Deaths

Wounded

1 2 3 4

11/18/1961 10/12/1971 10/15/1973 10/11/1980

1 1 4

2 ⬎ 10 55

5 6 7 8 9 10

10/19/1980 9/13/1983 10/22/1986 6/5/1990 2/17/1995 5/17/1998

Duck gun, javelin, sword, stick, etc. Duck gun, reaphook Duck gun, self-made gun Self-made gun, reaping hook, bayonet, shovel, scourge, spear, dagger, etc Rifle, light machine gun Rifle Rifle Dynamite, rifle, cannons, grenade, lance, stick Police pistol NA

3 1 3 1 3 1 1

35 47 1 7 11 — —

Sources: (1) Office of Lakeside Land, Peixian county, Jiangsu province; and (2) Magistrate Office of Weishan county, Shandong province.

11

Source: “Report on the Work of the Delimitation between Peixian and Weishan Counties.”

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Table 10.2. Water pollution at Lake Weishan, 1995–2000 mg L⫺1 Year

TOTP (total phosphate)

COD (chemical oxygen demand)

1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000

0.08 0.20 0.18 0.19 0.18 0.15

8.01 6.16 8.43 11.64 9.64 8.05

Note: In China, standards for polluted water are defined as: TOTP ⬎ 0.09 mg L⫺1 and COD ⬎ 6 mg L⫺1. Source: Bureau of Environmental Protection, Shandong province, October 2002.

the rate of over 570,000 tons per day (see Table 10.2). From 1992 to 1998, there had been 23 major pollution accidents, resulting in a direct loss to the local economy of 80 million yuan.12 During our field-inspections, we found that five major rivers, the Chengguo, Xiaoni, Peiyan, Zhengji and the Sulu, have been the major polluting sources. Freshwater fish and the important limnobiological plants no longer existed around the mouths of these rivers. There are generally more than 10 pollution accidents in the lake per year. On the eve of the Spring Festival (the traditional Chinese new year holiday) in January 1988, a pollution accident occurred in the southern coast of Lake Weishan that left more than 400,000 residents in the northern district of Xuzhou city with no fresh water supply. 18 factories had to stop production for 20 days.13 Water pollution has not only endangered the local fishery and the collection of limnological plants, but it has also affected the daily lives and health of the nearby residents. According to a survey conducted by a correspondent of Qilu Evening News, the frequency of cancer causing illnesses and tumors has been much higher in the lake region than in the nearby inland areas. Reported health events related to liver diseases, diarrhoea, and birth defects have also been much more frequent in the polluted area than in the non-polluted area. For example the following case was reported in the newspaper: “Located at the mouth of Chengguo River, Shadi village, Liuzhuang township in Weishan county, has a population of 1000 persons and an area of over 20,000 mu of shoaly land. Due to the lack of arable land (with a per capita area of only 0.013 mu), most of the residents

12 See “An Outline of Report Concerning the Environmental Protection Work on the Four Southern Lakes.” 13 Source: Released by officials in charge of economic planning and environmental protection of Xuzhou municipal government in a meeting sponsored by the author, Nanjiao Hotel, Xuzhou city, Jiangsu province, May 24, 2000.

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were used to taking reeds, lotus-roots and other lake-related resources. Fishing and fishery cultivation has been their major sources of living. During recent years, as industrial and living waste water discharged from Tengzhou city into Lake Weishan via Chengguo River has increased, water sources on which the residents have depended for their living have been seriously polluted. Consequently, fish stocks have been extinguished, and limnological plants have died. Even worse, the health conditions of the residents living in the region have been seriously affected. Since 1988, 26 young residents have died from diseases caused by, as diagnosed by hospitals at county or higher levels, drinking the polluted well water.”14

10.3. How have the interprovincial border disputes been resolved?

Since the interprovincial border of Lake Weishan was not accurately marked by the central government in 1953, the handover of the lakeside land from Tongshan county to Weishan county was not formally implemented. Peixian county only transferred 15 villages and the related population and land to Weishan county. The Jiangsu’s residents in Peixian and Tongshan counties continued their farming and other lake-related businesses on the lakeside lands and waters. The situation appeared to be settled during the first years following the establishment of Weishan county but, in 1959, Weishan county complained that Peixian had cultivated 80,000 mu of land for wheat without authorization along the lakeside. Subsequently, in 1960, Weishan county redistributed all the lakeside land that had been publicly or privately owned by the Jiangsu side to farmers or companies of Shandong province. Since then, interprovincial relations have worsened.15 As described earlier, the size and scope of the lakeside land changes frequently due to natural conditions. Therefore, whenever disputes occurred, it was usually very difficult to find an effective solution. This can be witnessed by the two consultative meetings on the resolution of border conflicts held between August 15 and December 15, 1961, by Jiangsu and Shandong provinces first in Xuzhou and then in Ji’nan. During the consultations, Shandong insisted that: (1) the interprovincial border should be defined on the basis of the document approved by the State Administrative Council in 1953; (2) all the lands within Shandong’s border, regardless of whether they were owned by Jiangsu, should be returned to Weishan county; and

14

See “The Village Surrounded by Polluted Water” (bei wushui baowei de cunzhuang), Qilu Evening News, December 14, 1997. 15 See “Status Concerning the Past Resolutions of the Jiangsu and Shandong Provinces over the Four Southern Lakes Disputes” (sulu liangsheng lici xieshang jiejue nansihu zhengyi qingkuang), provided by the Office of Lakeside Land, Peixian County.

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(3) the lake-related resources, regardless of who owned or operated them, should be returned to Weishan, if they were covered by lake water. In addition, Weishan county suggested that, for the sake of promoting production and avoiding further conflicts, all villages within 5 km of the lake should be transferred to Shandong province.16 Since the central government was not involved in this consultation, the 3-month interprovincial meeting did not result in any agreements of any substance. Usually, armed fights in Lake Weishan were resolved by the relevant local authorities. However, there have been a few examples that were extremely serious. These have been resolved by higher-level authorities from both sides concerned. It was told that the self-resolved cases have not been documented17 but that from the 1960s to the mid-1980s, there were six jointly-resolved cases for the armed fights in 1961, 1967, 1973, 1980, 1981, and 1984. The resolution of the conflicts required participation by officials from both provinces and the related counties. However, since most resolutions were not mediated by the central government, they did not resolve the fundamental problems underlying the disputes. Each side, Shandong and Jiangsu, only emphasized their own interests. Only some minor border-related problems were resolved. Some of the resolution processes are useful case studies. 10.3.1. The Nanjing accord

During the wheat-harvesting season in 1967, the Production Command Department (shengchan zhihui bu) of the Revolutionary Committee of Shandong province (the de facto provincial-level government organ in Shandong at that period) reported to the State Council that farmers from Peixian and Tongshan counties of Jiangsu province were conducting agricultural activities beyond their provincial border. Zhou En’lai, then Premier of the State Council, appointed General Du Ping, the Commissar of Nanjing Military District (NMD) of the Central Military Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, to convene a consultative meeting of leaders from the relevant cities and counties of Jiangsu and Shandong provinces and military representatives in Nanjing. Later, they came to reach an accord. This agreement, known as the 16

See “Records of the Seventh Meeting of Shandong and Jiangsu Provincial Representatives Concerning the Resolution of Disputes of Peixian and Weishan Counties over the Lakeside Land and Lake-related resources” (shandong jiangsu daibiao guanyu jiejue peixian yu weishanxian hutian, huchan jiufen xietiao huiyi di qici huiyi jilu), October 30, 1961, provided by the Office of Lakeside Land, Peixian County. 17 Based on the author’s talks with county officials in Peixian township, Jiangsu province on June 2, 2000.

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Nanjing accord, stated that the lake-related products, while they could still be operated by Peixian county, should be under the sole administration of Weishan county. It also determined that “The arable land with a height of more than 32.5 m (i.e., from the mouth of the abrogated Yellow River) shall be jointly cultivated by all adjacent counties; while those with a height of less than 32.5 m shall be cultivated by Weishan county alone, with the exception of a few lakeside land that still can be cultivated by farmers of Tongshan and Peixian counties.”18 With regard to the ownership of the lake-related resources, the accord only gave an in-principle agreement that “Those who have cultivated land shall own it.” Besides, it re-emphasized that Weishan county was exclusively authoritative to administer all lake-related resources, to issue operation permission certificates, and to levy resource use taxes and fees.19 Later on, the Nanjing accord was jointly issued by the State Council and the CCP’s Central Military Committee in its No. [67]173 Ordinance. Unfortunately, the Cultural Revolution of the late 1960s seriously impacted on the implementation of the Nanjing accord. Neither the accord nor the central ordinance was in force at that time. As a result, the social and political environment around the lake was tense. To prevent possible conflicts, leaders from the two provinces met in Ji’nan city, the provincial capital of Shandong, to establish a united working group. This group commenced formal operations on October 15, 1973. The first task was the resolution of reed-harvesting conflicts. The second task was to seek ways in which a fundamental resolution of the cross-border disputes could be achieved. In the meantime, an armed fight between Dajuan brigade from Weishan county and Dianzi brigade from Peixian county broke out, in which four brigade members were killed and 55 others were wounded (see Table 10.1). After both sides finally reached a temporary agreement concerning the cross-border harvesting of reeds, the consultative meeting was able to raise the interprovincial border issue. The Shandong side insisted that the borderline had already been fixed by State Council orders and that the disputed areas should be under Shandong province administration. Again, the Shandong side proposed a version of administrative re-adjustment program, in which Peixian county transferred an area of 1.5–2.5 km or more of lakeside land to Weishan county. Shandong also insisted that the drainage from the lake drainage be under Shandong’s administration. In contrast, the Jiangsu side disagreed, insisting that, following the administrative re-adjustment and the fact that the lake had already been divided into two parts by the Shandong dam, then the whole lake should be shared jointly by Shandong and Jiangsu provinces.20 18

See “Status Concerning the Past Resolutions of the Jiangsu and Shandong Provinces over the Southern Four Lakes Disputes.” 19 Ibid. 20 Ibid.

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Again, the differences between the two sides resulted in an inconclusive meeting that ended without any real conflict resolution. 10.3.2. The “inter-ministerial scheme”

In October 1980, two armed fights, this time between waring parties equipped with rifles and light machines guns, ended with four persons killed and 82 others wounded (see Table 10.1 for details). Realizing the critical status of the Lake Weishan, the State Council appointed the MCA and Ministry of Water Conservancy (MWC) to jointly investigate the situation. After the joint fieldinvestigations, the MCA–MWC working group21 presented a report concerning the administrative re-delimitation on Lake Weishan. In this report, the group finally concluded that the 1953 delimitation scheme in which “the lakeside land was set as the interprovincial border” failed to take a full account of the changing natural conditions, and that the delimitation scheme was neither in accord with proposals for economic development of the area, nor did it follow the conventional, and acceptable, models of administrative divisions. Moreover, the MCA–MWC group also proposed a new administrative readjustment scheme, known as the “inter-Ministerial scheme,” or IMS. The main decisions of the IMS included proposals that determined: (1) To set the border at the center of the lower area of the lake (that is, of the southern area from the dam), while the eastern and western parts of the border being under Shandong and Jiangsu provinces respectively, (2) To set the border along the river of the lake-bank (shundi he) (from the dam to Yaolou River in the north), approximately with the eastern and western parts of the river under Shandong and Jiangsu provinces respectively, (3) For sake of the unified management of the dam, to set an area of 1 km long from the dam as under the administration of Shandong province.22 In addition, the IMS also recommended that it was important to (1) return to the old (pre-1953) interprovincial border, while keeping Weishan county under Shandong province; and (2) to put the upper and lower lakes to be under the jurisdictions of Shandong and Jiangsu provinces, respectively.23 21

Members of the group included Liu Jinzhang of Department of Civil Affairs (of MCA), Fan Beitian of Department of Planning and Zhang Defu and Chen Chuankang of Department of Strategic Programming (both of MWC), and Tang Youngyuan of Huaihe River Administrative Commission. 22 See “Report Concerning the Scheme of Re-adjusting the Shandong–Jiangsu Border in Lake Weishan Area” (guanyu sulu liangsheng weishanhu diqu huajie fang’an de baogao), the document of Ministry of Civil Affairs and Ministry of Water Conservancy, (min[1981], No. 68; [1981]shuigui, No. 48, signatures by: Zhang Bangying and Qian Zhengying). 23 Ibid.

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With regard to the inter-Ministerial scheme, the State Council wrote in its official comments: “Conflicts have lasted for more than 20 years in this [Weishan] lake, which have not been resolved successfully. The interMinisterial scheme can resolve those problems fundamentally. Both provinces should, from the standpoints of long-run security and solidarity of the whole area, do their best jobs for the ideological persuasion of the related counties and administrative localities, so as to resolve this issue smoothly.”24 However, when the inter-Ministerial scheme was released, Shandong and Jiangsu provinces again reacted with different points of view. Jiangsu agreed it in principle, while requesting some supplementary revisions. Shandong rejected the scheme as saying that it would not solve the old problems; in effect it would result in an entire list of new ones. Specifically, Shandong argued that the scheme had four major drawbacks: (1) bring about difficulties for about 40,000 Weishan’s fishermen, who lived at the lower lake will become jobless; (2) be disadvantageous for the construction and management of water conservancy, and to raise the contradictions between draining, and storing water and construction of projects related to the lake; (3) be disadvantageous for the lake-related production and fishery production in particular; and (4) be disadvantageous for the administrative governance and public security of the whole area.25 In addition, Shandong province re-emphasized the effectiveness of the official document approved by the central government in 1953, insisting that, with the exception of some minor areas, the whole Lake Weishan area should be under the unified administration of Weishan county. Shandong’s border readjustment scheme included the transfer of 109 villages on the western lakeside, or at least 30 villages with the closest proximity to the western lakeside, from Jiangsu province to Weishan county.26 Since the views from both sides were once again in conflict, the inter-Ministerial scheme ended in failure. In 1981, conflicts came again, commencing with lakeside reeds being burnt near border areas. On the evening of September 22, 1981, Peixian county authorities asked Weishan county officials to allow their police to enter a border area 24

See “The State Council’s Official Comments on ‘Report Concerning the Scheme of Re-adjusting the Shandong–Jiangsu Border in Lake Weishan Area’ of Ministry of Civil Affairs and Ministry of Water Conservancy” (guowuyuan dui minzhengbu, shuilibu ‘guanyu sulu liangsheng weishanhu diqu huajie fang’an de baogao’ de pishi), 1981, State Council, Beijing. 25 Based on the author’s talks with county officials of Weishan county in Xiazhen township, Shandong province on June 1, 2000. 26 Ibid.

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to investigate the causes of the fires. The Weishan administrators replied: “The lake is under the administration of Shandong province and the fires have already been investigated by officials from the Weishan side. No help is needed.”27 The vice-governors of Shandong and Jiangsu reached an oral agreement concerning the joint investigation into lakeside fires and joint control of border fires but, unfortunately, this agreement did not signal the implementation of cordial relations between the two sides. 10.3.3. The “Three Central Documents”

The Shandong–Jiangsu disputes over Lake Weishan have exhausted the energy of all provincial and local governments concerned. Unfortunately, there is still no sign of an end to the border conflicts. On September 13, 1983, three farmers were killed and one was seriously wounded in a border fight. To resolve the conflict, the State Council dispatched yet another working group, this time led by Cui Naifu, Minister of the MCA.28 Before his departure from Beijing, on the afternoon of January 22, 1984, Cui met Vice-Premiers Wan Li and Tian Jiyun of the State Council. Wan Li pointed out: “In order to thoroughly resolve this problem, the State Council has made a definite decision. After having taken into account of all gains and losses, it seems better to put all disputed villages under the administration of Shandong province.”29 This speech, as Jiangsu provincial administrators complained, proved that the Lake Weishan disputes had been settled before the Cui Naifu-led group went to Lake Weishan. On April 30, 1984, the CCP Central Committee and the State Council in an official document (zhongfa [84], official letter No. 11) approved the “Report on Issues Concerning the Resolution of Lake Weishan Disputes” presented by the working group. With regard to the lake-related resources, the Report 27

See “Status Concerning the Past Resolutions of the Jiangsu and Shandong Provinces over the Four Southern Lakes Disputes.” 28 Members included Yang Zhenhui, vice-Minister of MWC, Wu Jiafu, vice Minister of Public Security, Lu Feng, vice-Governor of Shandong province, Ling Qiming, vice-Governor of Jiangsu province, Li Xianzhou, Department Chief of the MCA, Li Wen, Chief of Department of Civil Affairs of Shandong province, Shi Hongxian, Deputy Executive of Jining Administrative Region of Shandong province, Deputy Chief of Department of Civil Affairs of Jiangsu province, Dai Dengdong, Department Deputy Chief of MWC, Zhu Qun, Deputy Executive of Xuzhou Administrative Region of Jiangsu province, and Chen Leyin, vice-Magistrate of Weishan county of Shandong province. 29 Cited from “Comrade Wan Li’s Speech at the Meeting of Report Delivered by Comrade Cui Naifu of Minister of Civil Affairs on the Issues Concerning the Resolution of the Disputes over Lake Weishan” (wanli tongzhi zai tingqu minzhengbu buzhang cuinaifu tongzhi guanyu jiejue weishanhu zhengyi wenti huibao shi de jianghua), recorded material provided by Office of Lakeside Land, Peixian county.

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suggests: “Areas where reeds and valliseria sprialis have been harvested by people of Peixian county without violence for the last 3 years may be kept unchanged, but should be under Weishan county administration.” With regard to the disputed areas, the Report states: “Areas where there were armed conflicts within the last 3 years should be under the administration of Weishan county if villagers are dependent on the lake-related resources; if villagers are not dependent on lake resources then they should not be allowed to enter the lake to conduct any lake-related businesses.” With regard to the issue concerning the administrative division of lakeside land, the Report notes: “the (interprovincial) border shall be set on the basis of the actual status of land cultivation in 1983.” Besides, the issue of public security was specified to be “the unified responsibility of Weishan county”; in addition “the armed fights after 1978 should continue to be handled by Weishan county; and the fighters generally may not be prosecuted except for those who have committed intentional killings.”30 In order to promote the implementation of the interprovincial re-allocation of the lakeside land and other lake-related resources, as well as on the border delimitation, the State Council approved in its official document (guofa [84], official letter No. 109) “The Second Report on Issues Concerning the Resolution of Lake Weishan Disputes.” This report, presented by the State Council’s working group, recommended that 14 disputed villages31 of Peixian county, Jiangsu province be transferred to Weishan county, Shandong province, but that the coal resources under Lake Weishan should still belong to Jiangsu. This was because Shandong is a much more energy-resource-rich province than Jiangsu. But this arrangement created yet another series of cross-border disputes. These will be examined in more detail in Section 10.4.3. In addition, the six border villages of Qianfeng’le, Houfeng’le, An’zhuang, Dianzi, Penglou, and Mazhuang in Jiangsu were granted their own provincial identity, responsible for their own administration, but villagers from these communities were not allowed to enter the lake area to conduct lake-related activities.32 Finally, the report made two further declarations: (1) the lake fisheries shall be under the unified administration of Weishan county; and (2) the maintenance of the western lake embankment 30

Citied from “Report on Issues Concerning the Resolution of Lake Weishan Disputes” (guanyu jiejue weishanhu zhengyi wenti de baogao), the State Council’s Dispatched Working Group to Lake Weishan, April 9, 1984. 31 These villages include Sun Tang, Dongmingcun, Ximingcun, Liuying, Chaozhuang, Wangzhuang, Dawagongzhuang, Zhaolou, Zhaomiao, Zhangzhuang, Guanlou, Pangmengzhuang, and Zhongwagongzhuang. 32 Notice that Peixian county considered this decision as of unfair redistribution of productive and living materials from Jiangsu to Shandong provinces. See “Status Concerning the Implementation of the Three Central Documents” (guanyu guance zhixing zhongyang ‘sange wenjian’ de qingkuang), Office of Lakeside Land, Peixian county.

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shall be under the unified guidance and management of the Huaihe River Administrative Commission (the regional water resource management organ of the Ministry of Water Conservancy).33 With regard to the administrative division of the lakeside land and lakerelated resources, the Administrative Office of the State Council issued another official document (document No. 61). In this document, the 10-kmlong section from Fangcun to the border between Peixian and Tongshan counties, about 10,000 mu reeds and 14,000 mu lakeside land and lake-related resources in the eastern part of the Beijing-Hangzhou Canal would be operated by Peixian county, while the rest would be operated by Weishan county; and about 7000 mu lakeside land and lake-related resources along the lower reach from the dam (i.e., from the Beijing-Hangzhou Canal in the west to the foot of Sidaodi in the east) would be shared by Peixian and Weishan counties under a proportionate allocation of 2:1.34 The interprovincial division of lakeside land was based on the actual status of land cultivation in 1983, but that of the lake-related resources was based on what actually operated over the 3 years from 1981 to 1983. These decrees were considered appropriate for the sake of protecting the benefits of the farmers while still following the established production schedules.35 On September 8, 1984, the counties of Peixian and Weishan drafted a statement regarding attempts made toward the fulfilment of the objectives included in these decrees.36 However, since the supervision of these objectives from higher governmental authorities has been ineffective, these central documents have not been implemented successfully. The central government has now issued three high-level official documents relating to the resolution of disputes in the Lake Weishan region. The Weishan area has been the only interprovincial border area that has received serious attention from central government authorities in China (see Table 10.3).

33

See “The Second Report on Issues Concerning the Resolution of Lake Weishan Disputes” (guanyu jiejue weishanhu zhengyi de dierci baogao), presented by the State Council’s dispatched working group, August 23, 1984. 34 See “Notification on the Dispatching of the ‘Report Presented by the MCA on Issues Concerning the Resolution of the Scopes of the Lakeside Land and Lake-related Production between the Southern and Northern Lake Weishan’” (zhuanfa minzhengbu guanyu jiejue weishanhu nanbei liangduan hutian, huchan jingying fanwei wenti de baogao tongzhi), Official Document No. 61, Administrative Office of the State Council, September 5, 1985. 35 Ibid. 36 See “Summary of the Negotiations Concerning the Fulfillment of the Documents Issued by the CCP’s Central Committee (zhongfa[1984], No. 11) and the State Council (guofa[1984], No. 109)” (guanyu guance zhixing zhongfa[1984] 11hao wenjian he guofa[1984] 109hao wenjian de shangtan jiyao), Peixian county, Shandong province and Weishan county, Shandong province, September 8, 1984.

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Table 10.3. List of the major official documents on issues relating to Lake Weishan, 1953–1998 No.

Description

1

Official Letter (zhengzhengbuzi No. 136), State Administrative Council of the People’s Republic of China, August 22,1953. No. (67)173 Ordinance, State Council and the CCP Central Military Committee, 1967. “Report Concerning the Scheme of Re-adjusting the Shandong-Jiangsu Border in Lake Weishan Area” (guanyu sulu liangsheng weishanhu diqu huajie fang’an de baogao), jointly by the Ministry of Civil Affairs (min[1981], No. 68) and Ministry of Water Conservancy ([1981]shuigui, No. 48), 1981. “The State Council’s Official Comments on ‘Report Concerning the Scheme of Re-adjusting the Shandong-Jiangsu Border in Lake Weishan Area’ of Ministry of Civil Affairs and Ministry of Water Conservancy” (guowuyuan dui minzhengbu, shuilibu ‘guanyu sulu liangsheng weishanhu diqu huajie fang’an de baogao’ de pishi), State Council, 1981. “Report on Issues Concerning the Resolution of Lake Weishan Disputes” (guanyu jiejue weishanhu zhengyi wenti de baogao), the State Council’s Dispatched Working Group to Lake Weishan, April 9, 1984. The Second Report on Issues Concerning the Resolution of Lake Weishan Disputes” (guanyu jiejue weishanhu zhengyi de dierci baogao), presented by the State Council’s dispatched working group, August 23, 1984. Official Letter (zhongfa[1984], No. 11), CCP Central Committee, April 30, 1984. Official Letter (guofa[1984], No. 109), State Council, August 27, 1984. “Summary of the Negotiations Concerning the Fulfillment of the Documents Issued by the CCP Central Committee (zhongfa[1984], No. 11) and the State Council (guofa[1984], No. 109)” (guanyu guance zhixing zhongfa[1984] 11hao wenjian he guofa[1984] 109hao wenjian de shangtan jiyao), Peixian county, Shandong province and Weishan county, Shandong province, September 8, 1984. “Notification on the Dispatching of the ‘Report Presented by the Ministry of Civil Affairs on Issues Concerning the Resolution of the Scopes of the Lakeside Land and Lakerelated Production between the Southern and Northern Lake Weishan’” (zhuanfa minzhengbu guanyu jiejue weishanhu nanbei liangduan hutian, huchan jingying fanwei wenti de baogao tongzhi), Official Document No. 61, Administrative Office of the State Council, September 5, 1985. Official Letter No. 54, Government and CCP Committee of Jiangsu Province, March 18, 1992. Official Letter of the Ministry of Geology and Minerals (dihan [1994], No. 318), December 21, 1994. “Status Relating to the Cross-Provincial Exploitation of Datun Coal and Electricity Company and Xuzhou Coal Administration” (kuasheng kaicai de datun meidian gongsi, xuzhou kuangwuju youguan qingkuang), the Local Taxation Bureau, Shandong province, April 17, 1995. “Letter Concerning Jiangsu’s Sole Right over the Collection of Resources Taxation on the Datun Coal and Electricity Company” (guanyu jiangsu quanquan zhengshou datun meidian gongsi ziyuanshui de han), suzhenghan [1995], No. 56, Government of Jiangsu province, March 1995. “Emergent Request on Issues Concerning the Resources Taxation Levied by Shandong Province on Datun Coal and Electricity Company” (guanyu shandong sheng zhengshou datun meidian gongsi ziyuanshui wenti de jinji qingshi), Government of Peixian county, November 1, 1996. (continued on next page)

2 3

4

5

6

7 8 9

10

11 12 13

14

15

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Table 10.3. (Continued) No. 16

17

18

19

20

21

Description “Request Concerning the Jiangsu Province’s Collection of the Mining-Compensated Fees on Datun Coal and Electricity Company” (guanyu you jiangsu sheng zhengshou datum meidian gongsi kuangchan ziyuan bushangfei de shenqing), sucaiji [1997] No. 26, Government of Jiangsu province. “Report Concerning the Collection of the Mining-Compensated Fees on Datun Coal and Electricity Company” (guanyu zhengshou datum meidian gongsi suoshu ge meikuang kuangchan ziyuan bushangfei youguan yijian de baogao), ludifa [1997], No. 16, Government of Shandong province. “Letter on Opinions Concerning the Location of Collection of Taxation on Coal Resources in the Lake Weishan Area” (guanyu weishanhu diqu meitan ziyuanshui nashui didian de yijian de han), Ministry of Finance and State Taxation Bureau (caishuizi [1997], No. 55), 1997. “Letter Replying to Issues Concerning the Collection of the Mining-Compensated Fees on the Datun Coal and Electricity Company” (guanyu zhengshou daun meidian gongsi kuangchan ziyuan bushangfei de youguan wenti de pifu), Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Geology and Minerals (caijizi [1997], No. 851), November 21, 1997. “Report on the Work of the Delimitation between Peixian and Weishan Counties” (guanyu peiwei bianjie kanjie gongzuo de huibao), the Working Office of Lake Area, Peixian County, February 17, 1998. “Report on Request of a Thorough Resolution of Jiangsu-Shandong Disputes over Lake Weishan” (guanyu qingqiu cedi jiejue sulu weishanhu maodun de baogao), peizhengbao [1998], No. 18, the government of Peixian county, June 10, 1998.

Source: Provided by various government agencies of counties of Peixian (Jiangsu province) and Weishan (Shandong province).

However, the fundamental problems of Lake Weishan have still not been resolved. Each side of the dispute will only accept the items favorable to its case and rejects the unfavorable conditions. For example, at the technical meeting on the administrative transfer of the disputed villages from Jiangsu to Shandong provinces (i.e., the implementation of the No. 11 central document), held in Xuzhou city, Jiangsu province in 1984, Weishan county stated that the number of disputed villages is 38, while Peixian county argued that the figure had been overstated. Jiangsu province argued that “[this border re-adjustment scheme] disrupts the [Jiangsu’s] draining and irrigating system that was established in the past, with most entrances and exits (eight of the ten rivers) being controlled by Shandong province.”37 Some items in the three central documents were neither well defined nor were they consistent with each other. As a result the decrees were not implemented. 37

See “Status Concerning the Implementation of the Three Central Documents,” Office of Lakeside Land, Peixian county.

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As Jiangsu provincial administrators argued, the governing principle that “Wherever there is a conflict, the judgement of the administration of Shandong province will stand” had not solved the long running problems; rather, it was set to create new problems. For example, after 1984 when the administrative division was re-adjusted, the 64.2 km lakebank on the west side of Lake Weishan was divided into 16 separately administered sections between Shandong and Jiangsu provinces. Eight sections, with a total length of 23 km, were placed under Weishan county governance. Even worse, the 10 km long lakeside road from Datun to Hutun, both in Peixian county, was also divided into six separately administered sections.38 As a result, the Shandong–Jiangsu border on the western coast of Lake Weishan has been divided into an irregular administratively complex set of districts that are the basis for further discord and confusion (see Fig. 10.2(a)). This will have further negative impacts on projects for the construction of water conservancy and communication infrastructure as well as on public security for the whole border area. Just a few days prior to our first field trip to Weishan between June 1 and 3, 2000, an armed fight once again broke out between the local residents of the two provinces in the border region. This fighting resulted in the dislocation of communication between Weishan and Peixian counties. Our cross-border trips were also impeded by security problems. Fearing that their car might be detained by the Jiangsu side (Peixian county), Weishan county officials did not dare to send us beyond their border with Peixian county. Peixian’s officials would not venture across to Weishan county to meet us. As a result, we had to be transferred between the two cars by walking across the “forbidden” border.

10.4. The determinants of the interprovincial border disputes

The long-lasting conflicts have resulted from the inaccurate, changeable borderline between Shandong and Jiangsu provinces. In the Lake Weishan area, the interprovincial border is represented by lakeside land (hutian) boundaries set by the central government in 1953. Because this boundary line is subject to the changing levels of the water, conflict over the fluctuating dimensions of the lake and the lakeside land is the core element in the interprovincial borderline dispute. As a result, until a permanent solution is found, cross-border conflicts are unavoidable in the Lake Weishan area. In addition to this geographical factor, political, economic and cultural factors have also been responsible for dissent. 38 See “Report on Request of a Thorough Resolution of Jiangsu–Shandong Disputes over Lake Weishan” (guanyu qingqiu cedi jiejue sulu weishanhu maodun de baogao), peizhengbao [1998], No. 18, the government of Peixian county, June 10, 1998.

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10.4.1. Political and institutional causes for discord

The experiences of both developed and developing countries in the post-World War II period have demonstrated that the success of a nation in promoting its social security and prosperity depends to a large extent on a comprehensive national legal system and effective jurisprudence. China’s current political and legal systems have been deeply influenced by long periods of feudalism, which are not consistent with a market system.39 Recently, China has made efforts to improve its legal system on the interprovincial relations, but further progresses are still needed. For example, China does not have any constitutional clauses which specifically prohibit the establishment of barriers to interprovincial commerce. Many rules and regulations relating to the removal of local business blockades have had little influence on the policymakers at provincial and local levels.40 Although regulations concerning the resolution of border disputes between administrative regions have been adopted and then revised by the State Council in 1981 and 1989, many articles in the regulations are unclear and difficult to enforce.41 As mentioned in Section 10.1, the whole lake area had been under the sole jurisdiction of Shandong province as early as in 1953. The central government’s initial intend was based on a logical redistribution of water resources between the two provinces. This was based on resource calculated over the whole province, not just the Weishan region. However, since most of the water resources in Jiangsu province have been distributed in the southern and central areas, the northern areas, especially those bordered with Shandong province, have been dependent on Lake Weishan for fresh water supplies. In addition, due to China’s lack of petroleum, coal exploitation has been for a long period given critical attention by both central and provincial governments. According to the final resolution of Lake Weishan disputes, all underground coal resources were granted to Jiangsu province (see Section 10.3.3). Once again, this decision was based on an estimation of the poorer resource base held by Jiangsu. Shandong is considered a relatively resource rich province. However, it must be noted that, without appropriate institutional building and interprovincial coordination, the above arrangements could cause further harm to the management of the cross-border resources in Lake Weishan. For a long period, especially during the Cultural Revolution, Chinese society had little respect for rule of law. According to Article 132 of the 1979 39

For example, about 220 Chinese laws are incompatible with the World Trade Organization rules and will have to be changed (Reti, 2001, pp. 17–19). 40 See, for example, State Council (1980, 1982, 1986, 1990) and NPC (1993). 41 See State Council (1981, 1988).

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version of the Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China (NPC, 1979), “A person who commits murder with intend may be sentenced to death, to life imprisonment, or to between 10 years of fixed-term imprisonment but no less than three years in prison. If a person commits manslaughter the sentence should be no more than 10 years in prison.” However, this Article had not been put into effective with regard to the armed fights in the Lake Weishan region (the weapons stockpiled or used by the border fighters are listed at the last column of Table 10.1). Moreover, according to the current Criminal Law, “Whoever illegally manufactures, trades, transports, mails, or stockpiles guns, ammunition, or explosives is to be sentenced to no less than three years but no more than 10 years of fixed-termed imprisonment; or no less than 10 years of imprisonment, life imprisonment, or death if the consequences are serious.”42 During the time of our field trip to Lake Weishan, we were told that the people who had been responsible for killing other fighters in border disputes had actually been treated meritoriously by their respective sides. They either remained at large or, for the sake of calming down the state of cross-border tensions, had been only punished with trivial rebukes or fines. Many were later appointed to chief posts. For example, during the dispute resolution in 1973, Duan Yongkan—General Secretary of the CCP branch of Dajuan Brigade (an administrative unit of Weishan county)—was known to have led a crossborder fight in which four people were killed and 55 wounded (see Table 10.1). A local court in Shandong province sentenced him to 3 years of fixedterm imprisonment. Duan was later released ahead of time and he continued to hold the post as Party General Secretary. In 1981, he was again involved in a border conflict.43 10.4.2. Provincial economic reforms

Since the late 1970s, public finance, as an important component of the Chinese economic system, has undergone a series of reforms on the centrallocal relations. The main goals of these reforms were to decentralize the fiscal structure and to strengthen the incentive for local governments to collect more revenue for themselves. Obviously, the economic decentralization has been largely responsible for China’s current economic success.44 However, this kind of reform has also had negative impacts on interprovincial relations. For example, in order to protect local market and revenue sources, it has 42

See NPC (1997, Article 125). See “Status Concerning the Past Resolutions of the Jiangsu and Shandong Provinces over the Four Southern Lakes Disputes.” 44 See, for example, Oi (1992, pp. 99–129), Wong (1992), Shirk (1993) and Jin et al. (2001). 43

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become very common in China for provinces to restrict imports (exports) from (to) other provinces by levying high, if informal, taxes and by creating non-tariff barriers on commodities whose production is seen as important to their provincially “domestic” economies.45 This unfair competition between provinces has become a fierce “battleground” in border regions and there were numerous examples of “trade embargoes” or “commodity wars” between provinces over essential items, such as rice, wool, tobacco, soy beans and mineral products.46 Setting aside the period of the Cultural Revolution during the early 1970s, fighting was more serious at Lake Weishan during the 1980s (see Table 10.1). This was due to the fact that the farmers residing around Lake Weishan had more incentives to cultivate lakeside land when the Household Responsibility System (HRS) was introduced following the People’s Commune System (PCS) of collectivization.47 From 1982 to 2002, the outputs of grains and aquatic products increased by the annual rates of 2.56% and 8.63%, respectively. In some disputed areas along the western coast of the lake (in the proximity of the interprovincial border), the growth rates were much higher. For example, as shown in Table 10.4, the output of aquatic products in Xiping and Zhaomiao townships increased drastically by 19.69%, and 15.80%, respectively, from 1986 to 2001, much higher than that in Weishan county as a whole (8.63%). Even more dramatic was the eightfold increase in the area of cultivated land. The output in grain harvesting of Gaolou township between 1982 and 2001 was almost four times that of Weishan as a whole. Given that the total size of land, water, and other lake-related resources were constant, the interprovincial redistribution of these resources must be following a zero-sum game. Along with the cross-border competitions for capturing the resources at Lake Weishan, the frequency of disputes and armed fighting increased accordingly. The economic decentralization also provided incentives for the provincial and local governments in Shandong and Jiangsu provinces to compete with each other for the collection of local taxes and fees for cross-border coal exploitation. An example is given below in this regard. Located at the township of Datun, Peixian county, the Datun Coal and Electricity Corporation (DCEC) was built by the Shanghai municipal

45

See, for example, Shen and Dai (1990, pp. 1–13), and Li (1993, pp. 23–36). More detailed evidences may be found in Sun (1993, pp. 95–104), Feng (1993, pp. 87–94), and Goodman (1994, pp. 1–20). 47 For example, the average output value for the cultivation of the lakeside land had been approximately 2000 yuan mu⫺1, with few inputs in fertilizers and pesticides and almost no need of arable management. If cultivation included both agricultural and aquatic productions, the average output level of the lakeside land would increase additionally. Source: Office of Lakeside Land Administration, Peixian county. 46

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China’s interprovincial border disputes at Lake Weishan Table 10.4. The imbalanced cultivations in selected disputed areas at Lake Weishan Area

Xiping township Zhaomiao township Gaolou township Weishan county

Year

1986 2001 AGR (%) 1986 2001 AGR (%) 1982 2001 AGR (%) 1982 2002 AGR (%)

Population (’000 persons)

Area of cultivated land (ha)

7429 9299 1.51 11169 14423 1.72 15885 20586 1.37 509212 685200 1.50

773 696 ⫺0.70 1027 954 ⫺0.53 2140 3976 4.52 50053 54213 0.57

Output of grains (ton) 3276 4689 2.42 4803 5533 0.95 3850 20468 9.19 152335 252800 2.56

Output of aquatic products (ton) 34 504 19.69 78 704 15.80 3500 11450 6.44 11848 62000 8.63

Notes: (1) AGR ⫽ annual growth rate. (2) Xiping and Zhaomiao townships were administratively transferred from Jiangsu to Shandong provinces in 1985. Source: Calculated by the author based on the data provided by Statistical Department of Weishan county, Shandong province.

government in 1970. It includes a thermal power plant, a railroad, and four coalmines (Longdong, Yaoqiao, Xuzhuang and Kongzhuang , with an annual output of 4,000,000 tons of raw coal). The initial reason for the construction of these coalmines was to meet the urgent demand for electric energy in Shanghai municipality. However, as the DCEC was entitled to exploit coal resources under the Lake Weishan area, it was affected by the Shandong–Jiangsu border disputes. Faced with operational difficulties, the Shanghai municipal government transferred this Corporation to the Ministry of Coal Industry in Beijing in the early 1980s. The Ministry was abolished subsequently in 1998, and the DCEC was made a sub-company of a stateowned coal enterprise in Beijing. Although the central government has granted underground resources to Jiangsu province, it did not specifically mention the collection of taxes and fees levied on the exploitation of these resources, nor were the relevant laws and regulations issued during that period. This was not a problem in the pre-reform era when the Chinese economy had followed a centrally planned system. However, in the reform period, it has brought about interprovincial disputes, as the Chinese economy has been increasingly decentralized. With regard to the cross-border collection of taxes and fees on coal exploitation, Jiangsu and Shandong provinces submitted proposals separately to the Ministry of Geology and Minerals (MGM) in late 1993 and

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early 1994.48 On December 21, 1994, the MGM replied to the two provincial bureaus of geology and minerals (BGMs) and granted Shandong province the right to collect 30% (Longdong coalmine) and 45% (Yaoqiao, Xuzhuang and Kongzhuang coalmines) of the MCFs, and Jiangsu province to collect the rest.49 Shandong and Jiangsu province reacted to this decision differently. While Shandong officials were collecting their MCF allocations, the Bureau of Local Taxation of Shandong province submitted a new proposal to the State Taxation Bureau (STB). In this proposal, dated on April 17, 1995, Shandong provincial administrators stated that because the coal exploitation of the DCEC’s four coalmines extended across the border of Shandong province, the MGM had granted Shandong and Jiangsu the right to collect the MCFs separately; moreover, since resource tax had much similarity with MCFs, it also should be shared by Shandong and Jiangsu provinces proportionally.50 The Jiangsu provincial officials rejected both the MGM’s decision and Shandong’s new proposal.51 Jiangsu’s gave the following reasons for rejecting the decision: (1) the ownership of the underground resources had been granted to Jiangsu province, this had already been settled according to the Jiangsu local government; (2) during its coal exploration and exploitation phases, the DCEC received a great deal of assistance from Jiangsu province with regard to land utilization, migration, employment, the supply of living facilities, public security and environmental protection; and (3) Shandong province did not assist with the operation of the DCEC, even though its local villagers had already been compensated properly for their damages and losses in relation to the coal exploitation.52 Realizing the critical emergency of this issue, the MGM forwarded Jiangsu’s request to the MCA, the STB and the Ministry of Finance (MOF) for comments, before submitting it to the State Council for final assessment. 48 See (1) “Temporary Regulations Concerning the Resource Taxation of the People’s Republic of China” (zhonghua renmin gongheguo ziyuanshui zhanxing tiaoli), Article 12, Beijing, State Council, No. 139 document, December 25, 1993; and (2) “Regulations Concerning the Management of Collection of the Mining-Compensation Fees” (kuangchan ziyuan bushangfei zhengshou guanli tiaoli), Beijing, State Council, No. 150 document, February 27, 1994. 49 See the official letter of the Ministry of Geology and Minerals (dihan [1994], No. 318), December 21, 1994. 50 See “Status Relating to the Cross-Provincial Exploitation of Datun Coal and Electricity Company and Xuzhou Coal Administration” (kuasheng kaicai de datun meidian gongsi, xuzhou kuangwuju youguan qingkuang), the Local Taxation Bureau, Shandong province, April 17, 1995. 51 See “Letter Concerning Jiangsu’s Sole Right over the Collection of Resources Taxation on the Datun Coal and Electricity Company” (guanyu jiangsu quanquan zhengshou datun meidian gongsi ziyuanshui de han), suzhenghan [1995], No. 56, Government of Jiangsu province, March 1995. 52 See “Emergent Request on Issues Concerning the Resources Taxation Levied by Shandong Province on Datun Coal and Electricity Company” (guanyu shandong sheng zhengshou datun meidian gongsi ziyuanshui wenti de jinji qingshi), Government of Peixian county, November 1, 1996.

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The interprovincial taxation disputes had lasted for 4 years before the MOF, MGM, and STB jointly issued a final resolution on November 21, 1997: resource tax should be solely collected by Jiangsu province; and MCFs should be collected by Jiangsu province and be equally shared by the central government and Jiangsu provincial government.53 Shandong province would not benefit from the interprovincial taxation disputes. 10.4.3. Cultural issues

Most of China’s provinces have considerable political and economic systems in their own right. The social, economic, and cultural differences between these provinces have long been part of the defining characteristic of China’s political sphere for over 2000 years. Chinese culture is not homogeneous across provinces, in terms of ethnic and linguistic groups. As a result, the chance of the adoption of a common standard and interprovincial coordination is slight. During the field research in the Lake Weishan area, we noted that the local officials doubted about the fairness of the central government’s final decisions on resolutions of the Lake Weishan disputes. Their most serious concern was that those key central government officials who had provincial ties to either Shandong or Jiangsu were inclined to make resolutions in favor of one side or the other. According to our talks with the local officials of Peixian county, the final decision made by the central government concerning the resolution of the Weishan lake disputes (see Section 10.3.3) was seen as unfair by Jiangsu provincial authorities since the top decision-makers, Wan Li and Tian Jiyun— both held vice premiers of the State Council during the 1980s—were born in Shandong province (see Table 10.5). The speech given by Mr. Wan Li, as Jiangsu officials complained, had set the scene for the final resolution of the disputes in 1983.54 In our meetings with the local officials in Peixian county, the Jiangsu side stated that, since some key central officials were natives of Shandong 53

See “Letter on Opinions Concerning the Location of Collection of Taxation on Coal Resources in the Lake Weishan Area” (guanyu weishanhu diqu meitan ziyuanshui nashui didian de yijian de han), MOF and STB, caishuizi [1997], No. 55; and “Letter Replying to Issues Concerning the Collection of the Mining-Compensated Fees on the Datun Coal and Electricity Company” (guanyu zhengshou daun meidian gongsi kuangchan ziyuan bushangfei de youguan wenti de pifu), MOF and MGM, caijizi [1997], No. 851, November 21, 1997. 54 Wan Li pointed out: “In order to find a thorough resolution to this problem, the State Council has made a fairly definite decision. After having taken into account of all gains and losses, it seems better to put all disputed villages under the administration of Shandong province.” Cited from “Comrade Wan Li’s Speech at the Meeting of Report Delivered by Comrade Cui Naifu of Minister of Civil Affairs on the Issues Concerning the Resolution of the Disputes over Lake Weishan.”

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Table 10.5. Who’s who in the resolution process of the Lake Weishan disputes Name Zhou En’lai Du Ping Zhang Bangying Qian Zhengying Wan Li Tian Jiyun Cui Naifu

Title

Native place

Year(s) of resolution involved

Premier of SC Commissar of NMD Minister of MCA Minister of MWC Vice-Premier of SC Vice-Premier of SC Minister of MCA

Jiangsu Jiangxi Shanxi Zhejiang Shandong Shandong Jiangxi

1967 1967 1980–81 1980–81 1983–84 1983–84 1983–84

Notes: SC ⫽ the State Council; MCA ⫽ Ministry of Civil Affairs; MWC ⫽ Ministry of Water Conservancy; NMD ⫽ Nanjing Military District of the Central Military Committee of Communist Party of China.

province, Jiangsu province had been placed in a disadvantageous position. By contrast, there was also a growing fear from the Shandong side that the resolution of the local disputes had favored Jiangsu province since, during the 1990s, more key central government officials came from southern China.55 For example, with regard to their victory in the resolution of the interprovincial taxation disputes (as discussed in Section 10.4.2), the Jiangsu officers admitted in an internal, confidential, report that they had done “hard and meticulous works.”56 The key issues that were not included in the final resolution were: (1) the legality of the ownership transfer of Shandong’s underground resources to Jiangsu province; and (2) the entitlement by Shandong province to levy taxes and fees on the exploitation of resources underlying its territory.57 During our stay at Weishan, we saw, first hand, the deep mistrust felt between both sides when a member of the reception staff of the Magistrate Office of Weishan county saw the two Chinese characters “da tun” in the name card of our team member. The word “Datun” written on the card referred to a place of Beijing not a locality in Peixian county. The receptionist was made immediately suspicious of the credentials of the field team. In addition, some border-related questions were raised by my accompanying member who used 55

There was a joke released by Chen Xitong, former Major of Beijing municipality and then member of Politburo of CCP’s Central Committee during the early 1990s. When asked by his friends about the content of Jiang Zemin-sponsored meeting of Politburo of CCP’s Central Committee that he just attended, he burbled: “I cannot hear a word, since they only spoke in Shanghai tone [a sub-category of Wu dialect that has been widely applied in southern Jiangsu and the Yangtze river delta areas].” 56 See “Report on the Work of the Delimitation between Peixian and Weishan Counties.” 57 For instance, Article 12 of “Temporary Regulations Concerning the Resource Taxation of the People’s Republic of China” (Beijing, State Council, No. 139 document, December 25, 1993) states that: “Tax payers shall pay taxes to the taxation bureau in charge of places from which the taxed products originate.”

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Wu-style Mandarin in his speech (Wu is a Chinese dialect widely applied in southern Jiangsu province). This led to further uneasiness in the approach of some Weishan county officials. Fortunately, our survey went smoothly, since we stated time and again that our inquiry was for academic purpose. Nevertheless, a private comment by a Deputy Magistrate reminded us of the prospect of the final resolution of the interprovincial border disputes: “We don’t care which province administers Weishan lake and the county. It is also OK for us if Weishan county belongs to Jiangsu province.”58

10.5. Is there any solution?

The Shandong–Jiangsu border disputes have resulted in a long history of human casualty and environmental damage. The situation as complex as this can rarely be found in any other disputed interprovincial border areas in Mainland China. The border disputes have been fought over lakeside land, submerged resources, drainage and irrigation project, water conservancy projects, communication infrastructure and public security. The disputes have received the urgent attention from many ministries including the MCA, the MGM, the Ministry of Public Security, the MWC, the MOF, the State Taxation Bureau, and even the State Council and the CCP’s Central Committee. For decades, the border conflicts have peaked during periods of seasonal calamity. It has been recognized that: “A great drought occurred in the lake for every eight or nine years; this “drought” has usually lasted for three years and during this period conflicts have reached their highest levels.”59 The interprovincial conflicts have wasted energy and resources at all provincial and local government levels. This has impeded the economic and social development of the lake area as a whole. In Weishan county, the position of magistrate deputy has been established principally for the purpose of dealing with border conflicts and the related matters; while in Peixian county, an office has been established to take charge of the lakeside land cultivation and the borderrelated affairs. Indeed, the economic separation between Shandong and Jiangsu provinces has become particularly serious during the current reform era when the Chinese economy has been transformed from a centrally planned system into a decentralized administrative model. Even worse, Shandong and Jiangsu provinces both have different policies relating to issues such as population control, market management, pricing, collection of taxes and fees, public 58 Cited from a private conversation at a banquet hosted by the government of Weishan county in Xiazhen town, June 2, 2000. 59 Source: “Report on the Work of the Delimitation between Peixian and Weishan Counties.”

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security, and agricultural and industrial production. This cross-border diversity provides further disincentives for the sustainable development of the Weishan lake area. Given the difficulties in the current administrative arrangements, is there an alternative to the present situation of continual interprovincial border disputes? Mainland China’s 31 provinces (autonomous regions, autonomous municipalities) average about one-third of a million sq. km of land area with more than 40 million people, each equivalent to a European country in population and land area. Of course, it is not possible to find an optimal size for each of these provinces. However, we can conclude from the Chinese data (see Table 10.6) that the four provinces of Jiangsu, Shandong, Henan and Anhui surrounding the Weishan lake area are too large both in terms of population, land area, or economic fundamentals to be single provinces. In short, the establishment of a new province (or provincial unit) in the border areas of Jiangsu, Shandong, Henan, and Anhui provinces could serve two major functions: ●

●

First, increase the efficiency of spatial administration over Lake Weishan and the adjacent areas by transferring the multitude of administrative system into a unitary administrative structure; and Second, achieve more economies of scale for provincial administration by separating the marginal border areas out of the over-sized provinces.

The Chinese government has already set an example in the case of Sichuan— the most populous province with a population of more than 100 million. In 1997 a new provincial unit, the Chongqing municipality, was created. In 1988, Hainan Island, previously a marginalized area of Guangdong province, became Table 10.6. Are the provinces surrounding the Lake Weishan area too large in size? Province

Henan Shandong Jiangsu Anhui Provincial average of Chinac a

Populationa (’000 persons)

Land area (’000 km2)

Economic sizeb (’000 (persons ⫻ km2)½)

Distance from Weishan to provincial capital (km)

95550.0 90410.0 73550.0 63280.0 40897.7

160.0 150.0 100.0 130.0 299.8

3910.0 3682.6 2712.0 2868.2 2762.8

349 317 346 296

As of the end of 2001 (Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2002). Calculated by the geometric mean of “Population” and “Land Area”. c A total number of 31 provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities (except Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan) are included. b

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a separate province. Since then, all the new provinces have worked quite well in promoting their provincial economic identities.60 It should be noted that the establishment of the new province in the border regions of Jiangsu, Shandong, Henan and Anhui provinces will not guarantee that all the border-related problems will be solved. Nevertheless, it would transform the inter-provincial border disputes into a set of issues that could reasonably be solved by a single province administration. In such a case, the question “Who owns Lake Weishan?” will no longer be part of an unsolved interprovincial equation!

60

Based on the data of China Statistical Yearbooks (1996 and 2002, China Statistics Press, Beijing), we can find that from 1992 to 1995 the provincial economy of Sichuan lagged behind the Chinese economy as a whole; during 1998 and 2001, however, both of the two new provincial economies of Chongqing and Sichuan became more robust than the Chinese economy.

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Appendix A. A list of internationally adjacent protected areas Protected areaa

Host country

Adjoining country(ies)b

Aggtelék Aguas Turbia Ai-Ais Akamina Kishinena Altamachi Vicuña Alto Golfo Altopeu Amboseli Arctic Arly Atakora Auen Babia Hora Babiogorski Badiar Badiar-Sud Baixa-Lima-Serra do Xures Baixo Sao Miguel Banhine Barro del Colorado Batang Ai Bayerischer Wald Bayerischer Wald, Böhmerwald Belovezhskaya Pushcha Berchtesgaden Bernardo O’Higgins Besharalsky Beskydy Bialowieski Biele Karpaty Bieszczadski Big Bend Black Mountain Blockheide Eibenstein Böhmerwald Bol’shekhekhtsizskiy Boni Dodori Bonompak Bosawas

Hungary Belize Namibia Canada Bolivia Mexico Laos Kenya USA Burkina Faso Benin Austria Slovak Poland Guinea Guinea Spain Brazil Mozambique Costa Rica Malaysia Germany Austria Belarus Germany Chile Kyrgyz R. Czech Poland Slovak Poland USA Bhutan Austria Germany Russia Kenya Mexico Nicaragua

Slovak Guatemala; Mexico S. Africa USA Brazil USA Vietnam; Cambodia Tanzania Canada Benin Burkina Faso Slovakia Poland Slovak Senegal Senegal Portugal Bolivia S. Africa; Zimbabwe Nicaragua Indonesia Austria; Czech Czech; Germany Poland Austria Argentina Uzbekistan Poland; Slovak Belarus Czech Slovak; Ukraine Mexico India Czech Austria; Czech China Somalia Guatemala Honduras (continued on next page)

240 Appendix A.

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Protected areaa

Host country

Adjoining country(ies)b

Boucle de la Pendjari Boundary Waters Canoe Area Bükki Bushbush Buxa Bwindi Cabeza Prieta Calakmul Cañón de Santa Elena Catatumbo-Bari Cathedral Cazanele Cerová Vrchovina Cerro Machado-El Silencio Changbai Mountains Chañy Charara Safari Area Chiquibul Columbia River Complejo III Complejo Islote Lobos Copahue Coronado Cross River Cultus Lake Cuyabeño Dalai Lake Danube Delta Darién Daurskiy Delta (Iles) du Saloum Deutsch-belgischer Dhudhwa Diawling Djerdap Djoudj Dollard Dollart Donau-Auen Donau-March Dong Ampham Duna-Drava Dunaiskie Plavni Durmitor Dzanga Sangha Dzanga-Ndoki

Benin USA Hungary Somalia India Uganda USA Mexico Mexico Colombia Canada Romania Slovak Venezuela China Argentina Zimbabwe Belize Belize Guatemala Argentina Argentina USA Nigeria Canada Ecuador China Romania Panama Russia Senegal Germany India Mauritania Serbia Senegal Netherlands Germany Austria Austria Laos Hungary Ukraine F. Yugoslavia C. African R. C. African R.

Burkina Faso Canada Slovak Kenya Bhutan D. R. Congo; Rwanda Mexico Belize; Guatemala USA Venezuela USA Serbia Hungary Colombia N. Korea; Russia Chile Zambia Guatemala Guatemala Belize Chile Chile Mexico Cameroon USA Peru; Colombia Mongolia; Russia Ukraine Colombia China; Mongolia The Gambia Belgium Nepal Senegal Romania Mauritania Denmark; Germany Netherlands; Denmark Slovakia Slovakia Vietnam; Cambodia Croatia Romania Bosnia-Herzegovina R. Congo; Cameroon R. Congo; Cameroon (continued on next page)

Appendix A. A list of internationally adjacent protected areas Appendix A.

241

(Continued)

Protected areaa

Host country

Adjoining country(ies)b

E. C. Manning E. Carpathians E. Nimba Eduardo Avaroa El Mirador–Río Azul El Pinacate y Gran Desierto de Altar El Tamá Elimussalo Ensengi Forest Estero Real Femundsmarka Fenshuiling Peak Fertö Hansag Fish River Canyon Flathead Flathead Foresta Di Tarvisio Fraternidad o Trifinio Gading Forest Galichica Gandoca y Manzanillo Garamba Gemsbok Glacier Glacier Bay Gonarezhou Gran Paradiso Guanyin Mountain Guaporé Federal Guepí Gueumbeul Gulong Mountain Gunung Bentang Karimum Gunung Gading Gunung Mulu Gutulia Haparanda Archipelago Haparanda Skärgård Haparanda-Sandskar Hautes Fagnes Eifel Hlane, Mlawula Hoang Lien Son #2 Hong River Horná Orava Hosteinische Schweiz Huerqueque

Canada Slovak Liberia Bolivia Guatemala Mexico Venezuela Finland Brunei Nicaragua Norway China Hungary Namibia USA Canada Italy Guatemala Malaysia Macedonia Costa Rica D. R. Congo Botswana USA USA Zimbabwe Italy China Brazil Peru Senegal China Indonesia Malaysia Malaysia Norway Sweden Sweden Sweden Belgium Swaziland Vietnam China Slovak Germany Chile

USA Ukraine; Poland Côte d’Ivoire; Guinea Brazil Mexico; Belize USA Colombia Russia Malaysia Honduras Sweden Vietnam Austria S. Africa Canada USA Slovenia Honduras; El Salvador Brunei Albania; Greece Panama Sudan Namibia; S. Africa Canada Canada Mozambique; S. Africa France Vietnam Bolivia Colombia; Ecuador Mauritania Vietnam Malaysia Brunei Brunei Sweden Finland Finland Finland Germany Mozambique; S. Africa China Russia Poland Netherlands; Denmark Argentina (continued on next page)

242 Appendix A.

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Protected areaa

Host country

Adjoining country(ies)b

Iguaçu Iguazú Iona Iser Mountains Isla Bastimentos Iso-Palonen & Maariansarkat Iténez Reserva Fiscal Ivvavik Jiangcun Jingbo Lake Juba Left Juortansalo-Lapinuo Kachchh Desert Kaeng Tana Kagalagadi (Kalahari Gemsbok) Kainou Park Kalahari Kalkhochalpen Karancs-Madves Karkonoski Karpatskiy Kasivarsi Kasungu Katarniaghat Kedrovaya Pad Khankaiskiy Khovsgul Nuur Khunjerab Kibira Kidepo Kidepo Kilimanjaro Kluane Kopacki Rit Korup Kostomukskiy Kourtiagou Kourtiagou Krkonoše Kruger Kurshaskayja Kosa Kursiu Nerija Kyambura Kysuce La Amistad La Amistad

Brazil Argentina Angola Czech Panama Finland Bolivia Canada China China Somalia Finland India Thailand S. Africa Finland Namibia Austria Hungary Poland Ukraine Finland Malawi India Russia Russia Mongolia Pakistan Burundi Sudan Uganda Tanzania Canada Croatia Cameroon Russia Burkina Faso Burkina Faso Czech S. Africa Russia Lithuania Uganda Slovak Costa Rica Panama

Paraguay; Argentina Brazil; Paraguay Namibia Poland Costa Rica Russia Brazil USA Nepal N. Korea; Russia Kenya Russia Pakistan Laos Botswana; Namibia Russia S. Africa; Botswana Germany Slovak Czech Poland; Slovak Norway Zambia Nepal China; N. Korea China Russia China Rwanda Uganda Sudan Kenya USA Hungary Nigeria Finland Benin Niger; Benin Poland Zimbabwe; Mozambique Lithuania Russia D. R. Congo Czech; Poland Panama Costa Rica (continued on next page)

Appendix A. A list of internationally adjacent protected areas Appendix A.

243

(Continued)

Protected areaa

Host country

Adjoining country(ies)b

La Paya Labi Hills Labské Pískovce Lacandón Lag Badana Lagunas de Volcán Lainsitzniederung Lake Lobeke Langtang Lanín Lanjak Entimau Lantoto Laplandskiy Las Tablas Las Vicuñas Lauca Lehtua Lemmenjoki Letea Liancabur Limpopo Valley Limpopo Valley Liuana Liuana Loitokitok Forest Los Flamencos Los Glaciares Los Katios Lososuo-Saarijarvi Lower Zambezi Luambe Lukusuzi Lunddsneset Luzicke Hory M. S. Bertoni Maasai Mara Madidi Magura Makalu-Barun Male Karpaty Mamili Mana Pools Manas Maputo Marchaven-Marchegg Maritime Alps

Colombia Brunei Czech Guatemala Somalia Panama Austria Cameroon Nepal Argentina Malaysia Sudan Russia Costa Rica Brazil Brazil Finland Finland Romania Brazil S. Africa Mozambique Angola Angola Kenya Brazil Argentina Colombia Finland Zambia Zambia Zambia Norway Czech Paraguay Kenya Bolivia Poland Nepal Slovakia Zambia Zimbabwe India Mozambique Austria Italy

Ecuador; Peru Malaysia Germany Mexico Kenya Costa Rica Czech C. African R.; R. Congo China Chile Indonesia D. R. Congo Finland Panama Bolivia Bolivia Russia Norway Ukraine Bolivia Zimbabwe; Botswana S. Africa; Zimbabwe Namibia; Zambia Zambia Tanzania Bolivia Chile Panama Russia Zimbabwe Malawi Malawi Sweden Germany Argentina; Brazil Tanzania Peru Slovak; Ukraine China Austria Angola; Namibia Zambia Bhutan S. Africa; Swaziland Slovakia France (continued on next page)

244 Appendix A.

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Protected areaa

Host country

Adjoining country(ies)b

Maswa Mavrovo Maya Maya Mountains Maza Mercantour Mgahinga Gorilla Mkomazi Mocamedes Mohacsi Tortenelmi Emlekhely Mom Ray Mondo Misso Mongul Daguur Mont Nimba Mont Nimba Montecristo Montecristo Trifinio Montes Azules Mosi-oa-Tunya Mount Elgon Mount Kei White Rhino Mucusso Mudan Peak Muong Nhe Musalangu N. Luangwa N. Cascades Naachtún-Dos Lagunas Nahuel Huapi Nam Et Nam Kong Ndumu Neguaguon Lake Neusiedler See und Umgebung Neusiedler See Neusiedler See–Seewinkel Ngorongoro Crater Niedersaohsisones Wattenmeer Nimule Niokola Koba Niomi Nordeifel Nordfriesisches Wattenmeer Nord-Sylt Northern Tuli Northern Waldviertel Area

Tanzania Macedonia Guatemala Belize P. N. Guinea France Uganda Tanzania Angola Hungary Vietnam D. R. Congo Mongolia Côte d’Ivoire Guinea El Salvador Honduras Mexico Zambia Kenya Uganda Angola China Vietnam Zambia Zambia USA Guatemala Argentina Laos Laos S. Africa Canada Austria Austria Austria Tanzania Germany Sudan Senegal The Gambia Germany Germany Germany Botswana Austria

Kenya Serbia Mexico; Belize Guatemala Indonesia Italy D. R. Congo; Rwanda Kenya Namibia Croatia Cambodia; Laos Sudan Russia; China Guinea; Liberia Liberia; Côte d’Ivoire Guatemala; Honduras El Salvador; Guatemala Guatemala Zimbabwe Uganda Sudan Namibia; Zambia N. Korea; Russia Laos Malawi Malawi Canada Mexico; Belize Chile Vietnam Vietnam; Cambodia Swaziland; Mozambique USA Hungary Hungary Hungary Kenya Netherlands; Denmark Uganda Guinea Senegal Belgium Netherlands; Denmark Netherlands; Denmark S. Africa; Zimbabwe Czech (continued on next page)

Appendix A. A list of internationally adjacent protected areas Appendix A.

245

(Continued)

Protected areaa

Host country

Adjoining country(ies)b

Nouabalé Ndoki Ñuble Nyika Nyika Nyungwe Old Crow Flats Ordessa y Monte Perdido Organ Pipe Cactus Otze Otze-Dufile Oulanka Ovre Annarjakka Ovre Pasvik & Reserve Paanajärvi Padjelanta Paektou Mountain Palava Palo Seco Pama Pampas Pasayten Pasvik ovednik Patuca Pedras Negras Pelister Pendjari Peneda-Geres Perameri Perijá Pfälzerwald Pha Tam Phanom Dong Rak Phou Dene Dinh Phou Xiang Thong Pico da Neblina Pieninski Pieninskiy Podyjí Polessky Preh Vihear Prespa Lake Prespes Pripiatsky Pulau Penya Punta Patiño Puyehue

R. Congo Chile Malawi Zambia Rwanda Canada Spain USA Uganda Uganda Finland Norway Norway Russia Sweden N. Korea Czech Panama Burkina Faso Peru USA Russia Honduras Brazil Macedonia Benin Portugal Finland Venezuela Germany Thailand Thailand Laos Laos Brazil Poland Slovak Czech Ukraine Cambodia Albania Greece Belarus Malaysia Panama Chile

Cameroon; C. African R. Argentina Zambia Malawi Burundi USA France Mexico Sudan Sudan Russia Finland Russia; Finland Finland Norway Russia; China Austria Costa Rica Benin Bolivia Canada Finland; Norway Nicaragua Bolivia Albania; Greece Burkina Faso Spain Sweden Colombia France Laos Cambodia Vietnam Thailand Venezuela Slovak Poland Austria Belarus Thailand Greece; Macedonia Macedonia; Albania Ukraine Philippines Colombia Argentina (continued on next page)

246 Appendix A.

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Protected areaa

Host country

Adjoining country(ies)b

Pyrenees Occidentales Queen Elizabeth Quetico Radom Rago Raisdoutterhaldi Rann of Kutch Rantumbecken Región Lago de Maracaibo Regional Park Alpi Guilie Reisa Richtersveld Rio Bravo Río Coco Río Indio-Maíz Río Negro Río Plátano Rogen Rogen-Langfjallet Rosca-Buhaiova Royal Bardia Royal Chitwan Royal Manas Rutshuru Rwenzori S. Luangwa Sächsische Schweiz Sagarmatha Sajama San Antonio-Ureña Sapi, Chewore, Dande Sarek Schleswig-Holsteinisches Wattenmeer Sebei Semliki Serengeti Serranía La Neblina Shara Mountains Sierra Sioma Ngweze Sipaliwini Sjaunja Skagit Valley Skeleton Coast Slovakia Zahorie Slovenský Kras

France Uganda Canada Sudan Norway Norway Pakistan Germany Venezuela Italy Norway S. Africa Belize Honduras Nicaragua Honduras Honduras Sweden Sweden Romania Nepal Nepal Bhutan D. R. Congo Uganda Zambia Germany Nepal Bolivia Venezuela Zimbabwe Sweden Germany Uganda Uganda Tanzania Venezuela Serbia Mexico Zambia Suriname Sweden Canada Namibia Slovakia Slovak

Spain D. R. Congo USA C. African R. Sweden Finland India Netherlands; Denmark Colombia Slovenia Finland Namibia Guatemala; Mexico Nicaragua Costa Rica Nicaragua Nicaragua Norway Norway Ukraine India India India Rwanda; Uganda D. R. Congo Malawi Czech China Brazil Colombia Zambia Norway Netherlands; Denmark Kenya D. R. Congo Kenya Brazil Macedonia USA Angola Brazil Norway USA Angola Austria Hungary (continued on next page)

Appendix A. A list of internationally adjacent protected areas Appendix A.

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(Continued)

Protected areaa

Host country

Adjoining country(ies)b

Sohagibarwa Sop Cop Stelvio Stora Sjõfallet Suisse Šumava Sumaveská Raselinisté Sundarbans Sundarbans W. Sungei Ingei Superior Sutjeska Tamá Tara Tashikuergan Tatranský Tatrzanski Tatshenshini-Alsek Tawasha Tembe Elephant Thayatal Töfsingdalen Tohono O’odham Tonda Tongass Torres del Paine Tortuguero Trebonsko Tresticklan Triglavski Trungkhanh Tsavo West Tucumaque Tuli Safari Turkinskiy Turtle Island Tysfjord Hellembotn Ubsunurskaya Kotlovina Udaipur Ugam-Chatkal Ulvinsalo Umba Untere Marchauen Urho Kekkonen Uvs Nuur Basin Vaca Forest

India Vietnam Italy Sweden Switzerland Czech Czech India Bangladesh Brunei USA Bosnia-Herzegovina Colombia F. Yugoslavia China Slovak Poland Canada Honduras S. Africa Austria Sweden USA P. N. Guinea USA Chile Costa Rica Czech Sweden Slovenia Vietnam Kenya Brazil Zimbabwe Russia Philippines Norway Russia India Uzbekistan Finland Tanzania Austria Finland Mongolia Belize

Nepal Laos Switzerland Norway Italy Germany; Austria Germany; Austria Bangladesh India Malaysia Canada F. Yugoslavia Venezuela Bosnia-Herzegovina Pakistan Poland Slovak USA Nicaragua Swaziland; Mozambique Czech Norway Mexico Indonesia Canada Argentina Nicaragua Austria Norway Italy China Tanzania Suriname Botswana; S. Africa Mongolia Malaysia Sweden Mongolia Nepal Kyrgyz R. Russia Kenya Slovakia Russia Russia Guatemala (continued on next page)

248 Appendix A.

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Protected areaa

Host country

Adjoining country(ies)b

Vadehavet Valmiki Vanoise Vätsäri Vhembe-Dongola Victoria Falls Victoria Falls Villarica Vincente Perez Rosales Virachey Virunga Virunga Volcans Vosges du Nord Voyageurs Vuntut Vwaza Marsh Vychodne Karpaty W. Caprivi W. Nimba “W” du Benin “W” du Burkina Faso “W” du Niger Waddensea Waddensea Area Wasur Waterton Lakes West Zambezi White Carpathians Wrangell-St Elias Xialeishui Yuanlin Xingkai Lake Yasuni Yata-Ngaya Faunal Yot Dom Zambezi Zhufeng Zinave Zittauer Gebirge Zywiecki

Denmark India France Finland S. Africa Zambia Zimbabwe Chile Chile Cambodia D. R. Congo D. R. Congo Rwanda France USA Canada Malawi Slovak Namibia Liberia Benin Burkina Faso Niger Denmark Netherlands Indonesia Canada Angola Czech USA China China Ecuador C. African R. Thailand Zimbabwe China Mozambique Germany Poland

Germany; Netherlands Nepal Italy Norway; Russia Zimbabwe; Botswana Zimbabwe Zambia Argentina Argentina Laos; Vietnam Rwanda; Uganda Uganda Uganda; D. R. Congo Germany Canada USA Zambia Ukraine; Poland Zambia; Angola Côte d’Ivoire; Guinea Burkina Faso; Niger Niger; Benin Benin; Burkina Faso Germany; Netherlands Denmark; Germany P. N. Guinea USA Zambia Slovak Canada Vietnam Russia Peru; Colombia Sudan Cambodia Zambia Nepal S. Africa; Zimbabwe Czech Slovak; Czech

a

(1) Most of these areas have different suffices such as “National Park,” “Biosphere Reserve Area,” “Nature Reserve Area,” “Wildlife Reserve Area,” “Wilderness Area,” “Biological Reserve Area,” “Biodiversity Conservation Area,” and “Protected Area”. (2) In some cases, two or more suffices—each representing a protected area—may exist. (3) Source: IUCN (1998). b Estimated by the author based on Zbicz (1999a).

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Appendix B. United Nations convention on the law of the sea (selected articles)1 Article 197 cooperation on a global or regional basis

States shall cooperate on a global basis and, as appropriate, on a regional basis, directly or through competent international organizations, in formulating and elaborating international rules, standards and recommended practices and procedures consistent with this Convention, for the protection and preservation of the marine environment, taking into account characteristic regional features. Article 198 notification of imminent or actual damage

When a State becomes aware of cases in which the marine environment is in imminent danger of being damaged or has been damaged by pollution, it shall immediately notify other States it deems likely to be affected by such damage, as well as the competent international organizations. Article 199 Contingency plans against pollution In the cases referred to in article 198, States in the area affected, in accordance with their capabilities, and the competent international organizations shall cooperate, to the extent possible, in eliminating the effects of pollution and preventing or minimizing the damage. To this end, States shall jointly develop and promote contingency plans for responding to pollution incidents in the marine environment. Article 200 studies, research programs and exchange of information and data

States shall cooperate, directly or through competent international organizations, for the purpose of promoting studies, undertaking programs of scientific research and encouraging the exchange of information and data acquired about pollution of the marine environment. They shall endeavor to participate actively in regional and global programs to acquire knowledge for the assessment of the nature and extent of pollution, exposure to it and its pathways, risks and remedies. Article 201 scientific criteria for regulations

In light of the information and data acquired pursuant to article 200, States shall cooperate, directly or through competent international organizations, in 1 Source: www.admiraltylawguide.com/conven/unclostable.html. Reproduced with permission from the United Nations.

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establishing appropriate scientific criteria for the formulation and elaboration of rules, standards and recommended practices and procedures for the prevention, reduction and control of pollution of the marine environment. Article 207 pollution from land-based sources

1.

2. 3. 4.

5.

States shall adopt laws and regulations to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment from land-based sources, including rivers, estuaries, pipelines and outfall structures, taking into account internationally agreed rules, standards and recommended practices and procedures. States shall take other measures as may be necessary to prevent, reduce and control such pollution. States shall endeavor to harmonize their policies in this connection at the appropriate regional level. States, acting especially through competent international organizations or diplomatic conference, shall endeavor to establish global and regional rules, standards and recommended practices and procedures to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment from land-based sources, taking into account characteristic regional features, the economic capacity of developing States and their need for economic development. Such rules, standards and recommended practices and procedures shall be re-examined from time to time as necessary. Laws, regulations, measures, rules, standards and recommended practices and procedures referred to in paragraphs 1, 2 and 4 shall include those designed to minimize, to the fullest extent possible, the release of toxic, harmful or noxious substances, especially those which are persistent, into the marine environment.

Article 208 pollution from seabed activities subject to national jurisdiction

1.

2. 3. 4. 5.

Coastal States shall adopt laws and regulations to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment arising from or in connection with seabed activities subject to their jurisdiction and from artificial islands, installations and structures under their jurisdiction, pursuant to articles 60 and 80. States shall take other measures as may be necessary to prevent, reduce and control such pollution. Such laws, regulations and measures shall be no less effective than international rules, standards and recommended practices and procedures. States shall endeavor to harmonize their policies in this connection at the appropriate regional level. States, acting especially through competent international organizations or diplomatic conference, shall establish global and regional rules, standards and recommended practices and procedures to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment referred to in paragraph 1. Such

Appendix B. United Nations convention on the law of the sea (selected articles)

251

rules, standards and recommended practices and procedures shall be reexamined from time to time as necessary. Article 209 pollution from activities in the area

International rules, regulations and procedures shall be established in accordance with Part XI to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment from activities in the Area. Such rules, regulations and procedures shall be re-examined from time to time as necessary. Subject to the relevant provisions of this section, States shall adopt laws and regulations to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment from activities in the Area undertaken by vessels, installations, structures and other devices flying their flag or of their registry or operating under their authority, as the case may be. The requirements of such laws and regulations shall be no less effective than the international rules, regulations and procedures referred to in paragraph 1. Article 210 pollution by dumping

1. 2. 3. 4.

5.

6.

States shall adopt laws and regulations to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment by dumping. States shall take other measures as may be necessary to prevent, reduce and control such pollution. Such laws, regulations and measures shall ensure that dumping is not carried out without the permission of the competent authorities of States. States, acting especially through competent international organizations or diplomatic conference, shall endeavor to establish global and regional rules, standards and recommended practices and procedures to prevent, reduce and control such pollution. Such rules, standards and recommended practices and procedures shall be re-examined from time to time as necessary. Dumping within the territorial sea and the exclusive economic zone or onto the continental shelf shall not be carried out without the express prior approval of the coastal State, which has the right to permit, regulate and control such dumping after due consideration of the matter with other States which by reason of their geographical situation may be adversely affected thereby. National laws, regulations and measures shall be no less effective in preventing, reducing and controlling such pollution than the global rules and standards.

Article 211 pollution from vessels

1.

States, acting through the competent international organization or general diplomatic conference, shall establish international rules and standards to

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2.

3.

4.

5.

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prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment from vessels and promote the adoption, in the same manner, wherever appropriate, of routing systems designed to minimize the threat of accidents that might cause pollution of the marine environment, including the coastline and pollution damage to the related interests of coastal States. Such rules and standards shall, in the same manner, be re-examined from time to time as necessary. States shall adopt laws and regulations for the prevention, reduction and control of pollution of the marine environment from vessels flying their nag or of their registry. Such laws and regulations shall at least have the same effect as that of generally accepted international rules and standards established through the competent international organization or general diplomatic conference. States that establish particular requirements for the prevention, reduction and control of pollution of the marine environment as a condition for the entry of foreign vessels into their ports or internal waters or for a call at their off-shore terminals shall give due publicity to such requirements and shall communicate them to the competent international organization. Whenever such requirements are established in identical form by two or more coastal States in an endeavor to harmonize policy, the communication shall indicate which States are participating in such cooperative arrangements. Every State shall require the master of a vessel flying its flag or of its registry, when navigating within the territorial sea of a State participating in such cooperative arrangements, to furnish, upon the request of that State, information as to whether it is proceeding to a State of the same region participating in such cooperative arrangements and, if so, to indicate whether it complies with the port entry requirements of that State. This article is without prejudice to the continued exercise by a vessel of its right of innocent passage or to the application of article 25, paragraph 2. Coastal States may, in the exercise of their sovereignty within their territorial sea, adopt laws and regulations for the prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution from foreign vessels, including vessels exercising the right of innocent passage. Such laws and regulations shall, in accordance with Part XI, section 3, not hamper innocent passage of foreign vessels. Coastal States, for the purpose of enforcement as provided for in section 6, may in respect of their exclusive economic zones adopt laws and regulations for the prevention, reduction and control of pollution from vessels conforming to and giving effect to generally accepted international rules and standards established through the competent international organization or general diplomatic conference.

Appendix B. United Nations convention on the law of the sea (selected articles)

6.

7.

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(a) Where the international rules and standards referred to in paragraph 1 are inadequate to meet special circumstances and coastal States have reasonable grounds for believing that a particular, clearly defined area of their respective exclusive economic zones is an area where the adoption of special mandatory measures for the prevention of pollution from vessels is required for recognized technical reasons in relation to its oceanographical and ecological conditions, as well as its utilization or the protection of its resources and the particular character of its traffic, the coastal States, after appropriate consultations through the competent international organization with any other States concerned, may, for that area, direct a communication to that organization, submitting scientific and technical evidence in support and information on necessary reception facilities. Within 12 months after receiving such a communication, the organization shall determine whether the conditions in that area correspond to the requirements set out above. If the organization so determines, the coastal States may, for that area, adopt laws and regulations for the prevention, reduction and control of pollution from vessels implementing such international rules and standards or navigational practices as are made applicable, through the organization, for special areas. These laws and regulations shall not become applicable to foreign vessels until 15 months after the submission of the communication to the organization. (b) The coastal States shall publish the limits of any such particular, clearly defined area. (c) If the coastal States intend to adopt additional laws and regulations for the same area for the prevention, reduction and control of pollution from vessels, they shall, when submitting the aforesaid communication, at the same time notify the organization thereof. Such additional laws and regulations may relate to discharges or navigational practices but shall not require foreign vessels to observe design, construction, manning or equipment standards other than generally accepted international rules and standards; they shall become applicable to foreign vessels 15 months after the submission of the communication to the organization, provided that the organization agrees within 12 months after the submission of the communication. The international rules and standards referred to in this article should include inter alia those relating to prompt notification to coastal States, whose coastline or related interests may be affected by incidents, including maritime casualties, which involve discharges or probability of discharges.

Article 212 pollution from or through the atmosphere

1.

States shall adopt laws and regulations to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment from or through the atmosphere, applicable to the air space under their sovereignty and to vessels flying their

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flag or vessels or aircraft of their registry, taking into account internationally agreed rules, standards and recommended practices and procedures and the safety of air navigation. States shall take other measures as may be necessary to prevent, reduce and control such pollution. States, acting especially through competent international organizations or diplomatic conference, shall endeavor to establish global and regional rules, standards and recommended practices and procedures to prevent, reduce and control such pollution.

Article 2l3 enforcement with respect to pollution from land-based sources

States shall enforce their laws and regulations adopted in accordance with article 207 and shall adopt laws and regulations and take other measures necessary to implement applicable international rules and standards established through competent international organizations or diplomatic conference to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment from landbased sources. Article 214 enforcement with respect to pollution from seabed activities

States shall enforce their laws and regulations adopted in accordance with article 208 and shall adopt laws and regulations and take other measures necessary to implement applicable international rules and standards established through competent international organizations or diplomatic conference to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment arising from or in connection with seabed activities subject to their jurisdiction and from artificial islands, installations and structures under their jurisdiction, pursuant to articles 60 and 80. Article 215 enforcement with respect to pollution from activities in the area

Enforcement of international rules, regulations and procedures established in accordance with Part XI to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment from activities in the Area shall be governed by that Part. Article 216 enforcement with respect to pollution by dumping

1.

Laws and regulations adopted in accordance with this Convention and applicable international rules and standards established through competent international organizations or diplomatic conference for the prevention, reduction and control of pollution of the marine environment by dumping shall been forced: (a) by the coastal State with regard to dumping within its territorial sea or its exclusive economic zone or onto its continental

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shelf; (b) by the flag State with regard to vessels flying its flag or vessels or aircraft of its registry; (c) by any State with regard to acts of loading of wastes or other matter occurring within its territory or at its off-shore terminals. No State shall be obliged by virtue of this article to institute proceedings when another State has already instituted proceedings in accordance with this article.

Article 217 enforcement by flag states

1.

2.

3.

4.

States shall ensure compliance by vessels flying their nag or of their registry with applicable international rules and standards, established through the competent international organization or general diplomatic conference, and with their laws and regulations adopted in accordance with this Convention for the prevention, reduction and control of pollution of the marine environment from vessels and shall accordingly adopt laws and regulations and take other measures necessary for their implementation. Flag States shall provide for the effective enforcement of such rules, standards, laws and regulations, irrespective of where a violation occurs. States shall, in particular, take appropriate measures in order to ensure that vessels flying their flag or of their registry are prohibited from sailing, until they can proceed to sea in compliance with the requirements of the international rules and standards referred to in paragraph 1, including requirements in respect of design, construction, equipment and manning of vessels. States shall ensure that vessels flying their nag or of their registry carry on board certificates required by and issued pursuant to international rules and standards referred to in paragraph 1. States shall ensure that vessels flying their nag are periodically inspected in order to verify that such certificates are in conformity with the actual condition of the vessels. These certificates shall be accepted by other States as evidence of the condition of the vessels and shall be regarded as having the same force as certificates issued by them, unless there are clear grounds for believing that the condition of the vessel does not correspond substantially with the particulars of the certificates. If a vessel commits a violation of rules and standards established through the competent international organization or general diplomatic conference, the nag State, without prejudice to articles 218, 220 and 228, shall provide for immediate investigation and where appropriate institute proceedings in respect of the alleged violation irrespective of where the violation occurred or where the pollution caused by such violation has occurred or has been spotted.

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Flag States conducting an investigation of the violation may request the assistance of any other State whose cooperation could be useful in clarifying the circumstances of the case. States shall endeavor to meet appropriate requests of nag States. States shall, at the written request of any State, investigate any violation alleged to have been committed by vessels flying their flag. If satisfied that sufficient evidence is available to enable proceedings to be brought in respect of the alleged violation, nag States shall without delay institute such proceedings in accordance with their laws. Flag States shall promptly inform the requesting State and the competent international organization of the action taken and its outcome. Such information shall be available to all States. Penalties provided for by the laws and regulations of States for vessels flying their nag shall be adequate in severity to discourage violations wherever they occur.

Article 218 enforcement by port states

1.

2.

3.

4.

When a vessel is voluntarily within a port or at an off-shore terminal of a State, that State may undertake investigations and, where the evidence so warrants, institute proceedings in respect of any discharge from that vessel outside the internal waters, territorial sea or exclusive economic zone of that State in violation of applicable international rules and standards established through the competent international organization or general diplomatic conference. No proceedings pursuant to paragraph 1 shall be instituted in respect of a discharge violation in the internal waters, territorial sea or exclusive economic zone of another State unless requested by that State, the nag State, or a State damaged or threatened by the discharge violation, or unless the violation has caused or is likely to cause pollution in the internal waters, territorial sea or exclusive economic zone of the State instituting the proceedings. When a vessel is voluntarily within a port or at an off-shore terminal of a State, that State shall, as far as practicable, comply with requests from any State for investigation of a discharge violation referred to in paragraph 1, believed to have occurred in, caused, or threatened damage to the internal waters, territorial sea or exclusive economic zone of the requesting State. It shall likewise, as far as practicable comply with requests from the nag State for investigation of such a violation, irrespective of where the violation occurred. The records of the investigation carried out by a port State pursuant to this article shall be transmitted upon request to the flag State or to the coastal

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State. Any proceedings instituted by the port State on the basis of such an investigation may, subject to section 7, be suspended at the request of the coastal State when the violation has occurred within its internal waters, territorial sea or exclusive economic zone. The evidence and records of the case, together with any bond or other financial security posted with the authorities of the port State, shall in that event be transmitted to the coastal State. Such transmittal shall preclude the continuation of proceedings in the port State. Article 219 measures relating to seaworthiness of vessels to avoid pollution

Subject to section 7, States that, upon request or on their own initiative, have ascertained that a vessel within one of their ports or at one of their off-shore terminals is in violation of applicable international rules and standards relating to seaworthiness of vessels and thereby threatens damage to the marine environment shall, as far as practicable, take administrative measures to prevent the vessel from sailing. Such States may permit the vessel to proceed only to the nearest appropriate repair yard and, upon removal of the causes of the violation, shall permit the vessel to continue immediately. Article 220 enforcement by coastal states

1.

2.

3.

When a vessel is voluntarily within a port or at an off-shore terminal of a State, that State may, subject to section 7, institute proceedings in respect of any violation of its laws and regulations adopted in accordance with this Convention or applicable international rules and standards for the prevention, reduction and control of pollution from vessels when the violation has occurred within the territorial sea or the exclusive economic zone of that State. Where there are clear grounds for believing that a vessel navigating in the territorial sea of a State has, during its passage therein, violated laws and regulations of that State adopted in accordance with this Convention or applicable international rules and standards for the prevention, reduction and control of pollution from vessels, that State, without prejudice to the application of the relevant provisions of Part XI, Section 3, may undertake physical inspection of the vessel relating to the violation and may, where the evidence so warrants, institute proceedings, including detention of the vessel, in accordance with its laws, subject to the provisions of Section 7. Where there are clear grounds for believing that a vessel navigating in the exclusive economic zone or the territorial sea of a State has, in the exclusive economic zone, committed a violation of applicable international rules and standards for the prevention, reduction and control of pollution

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from vessels or laws and regulations of that State conforming and giving effect to such rules and standards, that State may require the vessel to give information regarding its identity and port of registry, its last and its next port of call and other relevant information required to establish whether a violation has occurred. States shall adopt laws and regulations and take other measures so that vessels flying their flag comply with requests for information pursuant to paragraph 3. Where there are clear grounds for believing that a vessel navigating in the exclusive economic zone or the territorial sea of a State has, in the exclusive economic zone, committed a violation referred to in paragraph 3 resulting in a substantial discharge causing or threatening significant pollution of the marine environment, that State may undertake physical inspection of the vessel for matters relating to the violation if the vessel has refused to give information or if the information supplied by the vessel is manifestly at variance with the evident factual situation and if the circumstances of the case justify such inspection. Where there is clear objective evidence that a vessel navigating in the exclusive economic zone or the territorial sea of a State has, in the exclusive economic zone, committed a violation referred to in paragraph 3 resulting in a discharge causing major damage or threat of major damage to the coastline or related interests of the coastal State, or to any resources of its territorial sea or exclusive economic zone, that State may, subject to Section 7, provided that the evidence so warrants, institute proceedings, including detention of the vessel, in accordance with its laws. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 6, whenever appropriate procedures have been established, either through the competent international organization or as otherwise agreed, whereby compliance with requirements for bonding or other appropriate financial security has been assured, the coastal State if bound by such procedures shall allow the vessel to proceed. The provisions of paragraphs 3–7 also apply with respect to national laws and regulations adopted pursuant to article 211, paragraph 6.

Article 221 measures to avoid pollution arising from maritime casualties

1.

Nothing in this Part shall prejudice the right of States, pursuant to international law, both customary and conventional, to take and enforce measures beyond the territorial sea proportionate to the actual or threatened damage to protect their coastline or related interests, including fishing, from pollution or threat of pollution following upon a maritime casualty or acts relating to such a casualty, which may reasonably be expected to result in major harmful consequences.

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For the purposes of this article, “maritime casualty” means a collision of vessels, stranding or other incident of navigation, or other occurrence on board a vessel or external to it resulting in material damage or imminent threat of material damage to a vessel or cargo.

Article 222 enforcement with respect to pollution from or through the atmosphere

States shall enforce, within the air space under their sovereignty or with regard to vessels flying their flag or vessels or aircraft of their registry, their laws and regulations adopted in accordance with article 212, paragraph 1, and with other provisions of this Convention and shall adopt laws and regulations and take other measures necessary to implement applicable international rules and standards established through competent international organizations or diplomatic conference to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment from or through the atmosphere, in conformity with all relevant international rules and standards concerning the safety of air navigation.

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Appendix C. The US–Mexican agreement concerning the establishment of a Border Environment Cooperation Commission (selected articles) The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Mexican States (“the Parties”): Convinced of the importance of the conservation, protection and enhancement of their environments and the essential role of cooperation in these areas in achieving sustainable development for the well-being of present and future generations. Recognizing the bilateral nature of many transboundary environmental issues, and that such issues can be most effectively addressed jointly. Acknowledging that the border region of the United States and Mexico is experiencing environmental problems, which must be addressed in order to promote sustainable development. Recognizing the need for environmental infrastructure in the border region, especially in the areas of water pollution, wastewater treatment, municipal solid waste, and related matters. Affirming that, to the extent practicable, environmental infrastructure projects should be financed by the private sector, but that the urgency of the environmental problems in the border region requires that the Parties be prepared to assist in supporting these projects. Affirming that, to the extent practicable, environmental infrastructure projects in the border region should be operated and maintained through user fees paid by polluters and those who benefit from the projects, and should be subject to local or private control. Noting that the International Boundary and Water Commission, established pursuant to the Treaty between the United States and Mexico Relating to Utilization of Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande, signed at Washington February 3, 1944, plays an important role in efforts to preserve the health and vitality of the river waters of the border region. Recognizing that there is a need to establish a new organization to strengthen cooperation among interested parties and to facilitate the financing, construction, operation and maintenance of environmental infrastructure projects in the border region.

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Affirming the desirability of encouraging increased investment in the environmental infrastructure in the border region, whether or not such investment is made under the auspices of this Agreement. Convinced of the need to collaborate with states and localities, non-governmental organizations, and other members of the public in the effort to address environmental problems in the border region. Seeking to assist community adjustment and investment in the United States and Mexico. Reaffirming the importance of the environmental goals and objectives embodied in the Agreement on Cooperation for the Protection and Improvement of the Environment in the Border Area, signed at La Paz, Baja California Sur, August 14, 1983. Wishing to follow upon the goals and objectives of the North American Free Trade Agreement, signed at Washington, Ottawa, and Mexico December 8, 11, 14, and 17, 1992, and the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, signed at Mexico, Washington, and Ottawa September 8, 9, 12, and 14, 1993. Have agreed as follows:

…

Chapter I. Border Environment Cooperation Commission Article I. Purpose and functions Section 1. Purpose

(a) The purpose of the Commission shall be to help preserve, protect and enhance the environment of the border region in order to advance the well-being of the people of the United States and Mexico. (b) In carrying out this purpose, the Commission shall cooperate as appropriate with the North American Development Bank and other national and international institutions, and with private sources supplying investment capital for environmental infrastructure projects in the border region. Section 2. Functions

In carrying out this purpose, the Commission may do any or all of the following: (i) with their concurrence, assist states and localities and other public entities and private investors in:

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(A) coordinating environmental infrastructure projects in the border region; (B) preparing, developing, implementing, and overseeing environmental infrastructure projects in the border region, including the design, siting and other technical aspects of such projects; (C) analyzing the financial feasibility or the environmental aspects, or both, of environmental infrastructure projects in the border region; (D) evaluating social and economic benefits of environmental infrastructure projects in the border region; (E) organizing, developing and arranging public and private financing for environmental infrastructure projects in the border region; and (ii) certify, in accordance with Article II, Section 3 of this Chapter, applications for financing to be submitted to the North American Development Bank, or to other sources of financing that request such certification, for environmental infrastructure projects in the border region. The Commission, with the concurrence of the United States Environmental Protection Agency and the Mexican Secretaría de Desarollo Social, may carry out these functions with respect to an environmental infrastructure project outside the border region upon finding that the project would remedy a transboundary environmental or health problem. Article II. Operations Section 1. Use of resources

The resources and facilities of the Commission shall be used exclusively to implement the purpose and functions enumerated in Article I of this Chapter. Section 2. Requests for assistance

(a) The Commission may seek and accept requests from states and localities, other public entities and private investors for assistance in carrying out the activities enumerated in Article I of this Chapter. (b) Upon receipt of a request for assistance pursuant to paragraph (a) of this Section, the Commission may provide any and all such assistance as it deems appropriate. In providing such assistance, or in making certifications pursuant to Section 3 of this Article, the Commission shall give preference to environmental infrastructure projects relating to water pollution, wastewater treatment, municipal solid waste and related matters. (c) In providing such assistance, the Commission shall consult with the Advisory Council established pursuant to Article III, Section 5 of this

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Chapter, and, as appropriate, with private investors and national and international institutions, particularly the North American Development Bank. Section 3. Applications for certification

(a) The Commission may accept applications from states and localities, other public entities and private investors for certification of environmental infrastructure projects in the border region with respect to which an applicant will be seeking financial assistance from the North American Development Bank or other sources of financing requesting such certification. (b) The Commission may certify for such financing of any project that meets or agrees to meet the technical, environmental, financial or other criteria applied, either generally or specifically, by the Commission to that project. To be eligible for certification, a project shall observe or be capable of observing the environmental and other laws of the place where it is to be located or executed. (c) For each project located in the border region and having significant transboundary environmental effects, (1) an environmental assessment shall be presented as part of the application process, and the Board of Directors shall examine potential environmental benefits, environmental risks and costs, as well as available alternatives and the environmental standards and objectives of the affected area; and (2) the Board of Directors, in consultation with affected states and localities, shall determine that the project meets the necessary conditions to achieve a high level of environmental protection for the affected area. (d) Upon certification of a project for financial assistance from the North American Development Bank, the Commission shall submit a proposal for such assistance to the Bank for its consideration. (e) Upon certification of a project for financial assistance from another source of financing requesting such certification, the Commission shall submit a proposal for such assistance to that source for its consideration. Article III. Organization and management Section 3. Board of directors

(a) All the powers of the Commission, including the power to determine its general operational and structural policies, shall be vested in the Board of Directors. The Board shall have ten directors: (1) the United States Commissioner of the International Boundary and Water Commission, who shall serve ex officio;

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(2) the Mexican Commissioner of the International Boundary and Water Commission, who shall serve ex officio; (3) the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency of the United States, or his/her delegate, who shall serve ex officio; (4) the Secretario de Desarollo Social of Mexico, or his/her delegate, who shall serve ex officio; (5) six additional directors having expertise in environmental planning, economics, engineering, finance, or related matters, consisting of— (i) a representative of one of the US border states, appointed by the United States in such manner as it may determine; (ii) a representative of one of the Mexican border states, appointed by Mexico in such manner as it may determine; (iii) a representative of a US locality in the border region, appointed by the United States in such manner as it may determine; (iv) a representative of a Mexican locality in the border region, appointed by Mexico in such manner as it may determine; (v) a member of the US public who is a resident of the border region, appointed by the United States in such manner as it may determine; and (vi) a member of the Mexican public who is a resident of the border region, appointed by Mexico in such manner as it may determine. (b) The Board of Directors may delegate to the General Manager authority to exercise any powers of the Board, except the power to: (i) certify environmental infrastructure projects in accordance with Article II, Section 3 of this Chapter; (ii) apply, either generally or specifically, technical, environmental, financial or other criteria to an environmental infrastructure project; (iii) determine the salary and terms of contact of service of the General Manager and the Deputy General Manager; and (iv) approve the annual program and budget and the annual report of the Commission. (c) The Board of Directors shall hold quarterly regular sessions, and such other special sessions as may be called by the Board or the General Manager. At all regular sessions, the Board of Directors shall hold at least one public meeting. One public meeting each year shall be designated the Annual Meeting of the Board. (d) A quorum for any meeting of the Board of Directors shall be a majority of the directors appointed by each of the Parties.

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(e) All decisions of the Board of Directors shall require the approval of a majority of the members appointed by each Party. A written record of such decisions shall be made public in English and Spanish. (f) The Board of Directors may adopt such rules and regulations as may be necessary or appropriate to conduct the business of the Commission. (g) Directors shall serve as such without compensation from the Commission, but the Commission shall pay them reasonable expenses incurred in attending meetings of the Board of Directors. Section 4. General Manager

(a) The Board of Directors shall appoint a General Manager and a Deputy General Manager, neither of whom shall be a director. The General Manager and the Deputy General Manager shall each be appointed for a term of 3 years and may be reappointed. The General Manager and the Deputy General Manager shall cease to hold office when the Board of Directors so decides with respect to either officer. The offices of General Manager and Deputy General Manager shall alternate between nationals of the Parties. The General Manager and the Deputy General Manager shall be nationals of different Parties at all times. (b) The General Manager shall exercise all the powers delegated to him or her by the Board of Directors. The General Manager may participate in meetings of the Board, but shall not vote at such meetings. The General Manager shall be chief of the operating staff of the Commission and shall conduct, under the direction of the Board of Directors, the ordinary business of the Commission. Subject to the general control of the Board of Directors, the General Manager shall be responsible for the organization, appointment and dismissal of the officers and staff of the Commission. (c) The General Manager, officers and staff of the Commission, in the discharge of their offices, shall owe their duty entirely to the Commission and to no other authority. The Parties shall respect the international character of this duty and shall refrain from all attempts to influence any of them in the discharge of their duties. (d) In appointing the officers and staff, the General Manager shall, subject to the paramount importance of securing the highest standards of efficiency and technical competence, seek to achieve at each level a balanced proportion of nationals of each Party. (e) The General Manager shall submit to the Board of Directors, for its approval, an annual program and budget for the Commission. The Advisory Council established pursuant to Section 5 of this Article shall

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receive at the same time as the Board of Directors drafts of the annual program and budget and may make comments to the Board on the same. Section 5. Advisory Council

(a) The Advisory Council shall be composed of: (i) at least one resident of each of the US border states, totaling not more than six such representatives, who shall represent states or 12 localities, or local community groups, to be appointed by the United States in such manner as it may determine; (ii) one resident of each of the Mexican border states, who shall represent states or localities, or local community groups, to be appointed by Mexico in such manner as it may determine; (iii) three members of the public, including at least one representative of a US non-governmental organization, appointed by the United States in such manner as it may determine; and (iv) three members of the public, including at least one representative of a Mexican non-governmental organization, appointed by Mexico in such manner as it may determine. (b) Council members shall be appointed for a term of 2 years and may be reappointed. Each of the Parties shall select from among the members it appoints a Co-Chairperson of the Council. Council members shall serve as such without compensation from the Commission, but the Commission shall pay them reasonable expenses incurred in attending meetings of the Council. (c) The Council shall meet quarterly during the regular sessions of the Board of Directors, and at such other times as the Council, with the consent of a majority of the members appointed by each of the Parties, or the Board shall determine. (d) The Council may adopt such rules as may be necessary or appropriate to conduct the business of the Council. (e) The Council may provide advice to the Board of Directors or the General Manager on any matter within the scope of this Chapter, including certifications pursuant to Article II, Section 3, of this Chapter, and on the implementation and further elaboration of this Chapter, and may perform such other functions as directed by the Board. Section 6. Relationship to the International Boundary and Water Commission

(a) The Commission may enter into arrangements with the International Boundary and Water Commission (“IBWC”) regarding facilities, personnel

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and services and arrangements for reimbursement of administrative and other expenses paid by one organization on behalf of the other. (b) Nothing in this Chapter shall make the Commission liable for the acts or obligations of the IBWC, or the IBWC liable for the acts or obligations of the Commission. (c) The Parties shall call upon the Commission and the IBWC to cooperate, as appropriate, with each other in planning, developing and carrying out border sanitation and other environmental activities.

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Appendix D. The US–Canadian agreement relating to the exchange of information on weather modification activities The Government of the United States of America and the Government of Canada are Aware, because of their geographic proximity, that the effects of weather modification activities carried out by either Party or its nationals may affect the territory of the other; Noting the diversity of weather modification activities in both the United States and Canada by private parties, by State and Provincial authorities, and by the Federal Governments; Believing that the existing state of knowledge warrants the expectation of further development over a period of time in the science and technology of weather modification; Taking into particular consideration the special traditions of prior notification and consultation and the close cooperation that have historically characterized their relations; Believing that a prompt exchange of pertinent information regarding the nature and extent of weather modification activities of mutual interest may facilitate the development of the technology of weather modification for their mutual benefit; Recognizing the desirability of the development of international law relating to weather modification activities having transboundary effects; Have agreed as follows. Article I: As used in this Agreement: (a) “Weather modification activities” means activities performed with the intention of producing artificial changes in the composition, behavior, or dynamics of the atmosphere; (b) “Weather modification activities of mutual interest” means weather modification activities carried out in or over the territory of a Party within 200 miles of the international boundary; or such activities wherever conducted, which, in the judgment of a Party, may significantly affect the composition, behavior, or dynamics of the atmosphere over the territory of the other Party;

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(c) “Responsible agencies” means the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration of the United States and the Atmospheric Environment Service of Canada, or such other agencies as the parties may designate; (d) “Reporting requirements” means the requirements established by the domestic laws or regulations of the Parties for reporting to the responsible agencies information relating to weather modification activities by persons or entities engaged in weather modification. Article II: (1) Information relating to weather modification activities of mutual interest acquired by a responsible agency through its reporting requirements or otherwise shall be transmitted as soon as practicable to the responsible agency of the other Party. Whenever possible, this information shall be transmitted prior to the commence of such activities. It is anticipated that such information will be transmitted within five working days of its receipt by a responsible agency. (2) Information to be provided by the responsible agencies shall include copies of relevant reports received through the reporting procedures after the effective date of this Agreement, and such other information and interpretation as the responsible agency might consider appropriate. (3) Nothing herein shall be construed to require transmission to the other responsible agency of information, the disclosure of which is prohibited by law, or of information which, in the judgment of the responsible agency, is proprietary information. Article III: The responsible agencies shall consult with a view to developing compatible reporting formats, and to improving procedures for the exchange of information. Article IV: In addition to the exchange of information pursuant to Article II of this Agreement, each Party agrees to notify and to fully inform the other concerning any weather modification activities of mutual interest conducted by it prior to the commence of such activities. Every effort shall be made to provide such notice as far in advance of such activities as may be possible, bearing in mind the provisions of Article V of this Agreement. Article V: The Parties agree to consult, at the request of either Party, regarding particular weather modification activities of mutual interest. Such consultations shall be initiated promptly on the request of a Party, and in cases of urgency may be undertaken through telephonic or other rapid means of communication. Consultations shall be carried out in light of the Parties’ laws, regulations, and administrative practices regarding weather modification.

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Article VI: The Parties recognize that extreme emergencies, such as forest fires, may require immediate commencement by one of them of weather modification activities of mutual interest notwithstanding the lack of sufficient time for prior notification pursuant to Article IV, or for consultation pursuant to Article V. In such cases, the Party commencing such activities shall notify and fully inform the other Party as soon as practicable, and shall promptly enter into consultations at the request of the other Party. Article VII: Nothing herein relates to or shall be construed to affect the question of responsibility or liability for weather modification activities, or to imply the existence of any generally applicable rule of international law. Article VIII: Each Party shall conduct an annual review of this Agreement while it remains in force, and shall inform the other of its views regarding the Agreement’s operation and effectiveness and the desirability of its amendment to reflect the evolution of the science and technology of weather modification and of international law. The Parties shall meet periodically, by mutual agreement, or at the request of either, to review the implementation of this Agreement or to consider other issues related to weather modification. Article IX: This Agreement shall enter into force upon signature. It may be amended by mutual agreement of the Parties and may be terminated by either Party upon 6 months written notice to the other Party.

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Index

38th Parallel 6, 133 see also North-South Korean border 49th Parallel 14 see also US-Canadian border Absolute Integrity 91, 92 Absolute Sovereignty 91, 92 Acequia Madre 186 Administrative Commission of East China Region 199 Administrative Office of the State Council 212 Afghanistan 73 Afghans 111 Africa 20, 83, 100 AGO 128, 129 Agreement on the Continental Shelf between Iceland and Jan Mayen 120 Agua Prieta 180 Akita 138 Aksai Chin 23 Al Amghar (El Amghar) 95 Al Batin (El Batin) 95 Al Batin 94 Al Dulaimiyah (Dulaimiya) 94 Al Wuqubah (El Ukabba) 94 Al Wuqubah 94 Alabama 20 Alamito 186 Alamo Rivers 186 Alaska/US 14 Albania 116, 117 Albert 11 Algeria 24, 76 Alpine 15 Alps 7, 83 Alsace 29 Amarat 94 Americas 56, 59 Amir 128 Amur 8 An’zhuang 211 Andes 124 Andes Mountains 7, 8 Andhra Pradesh 93 Andorra 4 Angola 79 Anhui 20, 197, 224, 225

Antarctic Treaty 120 Antarctica 22, 120 Arabia–Kuwait boundaries 127 Arabian Oil Company (AOC) 128, 129 Arabian Peninsula 128 Arabs 111 Aral Sea 11 Aramco for Gulf Operations 128 see also AGO Argentina 7, 15, 22, 23, 79, 80, 123, 124, 125 Argentine–Chilean border 123 Argun 8 Arizona 17, 175, 176, 179, 180 Arizona–Sonora border 176 Arlon 76 artificial barriers 13 artificial borders 13 Arunachal Pradesh 21 Asia 83, 100, 138 Asian Development Bank (ADB) 159 Asian financial crisis 162 Association for Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 69, 70, 114, 119, 158, 159, 160, 162, 163, 165, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172 Atlantic Ocean 8, 124 Aubange/Athus 76 Austria 20 Australia 12, 44, 45, 112, 113, 120 Awude 144 Azad (Free) Kashmir 23 Azerbaijan 20, 24 Bahrain 20 Baja California 36, 54, 181, 182, 184, 190, 196 Baja California Sur 39 Baltic Sea 20 Banco Convention 186 Bandar Seri Begawan 168 Bangladesh 108, 110, 111, 112 Bangladeshi 108 Banyas 110 Banyas River 109, 110 Bardez 43 Barrage 108

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274 Barsovy and Borisovskii Plateau Zakazniks 147 Bay of Bengal 110 bays 12 Beagle Channel 22, 123, 124, 125 Beagle Channel conflict 123, 125 BECC 191, 192, 193 Bedouin 128 Beibu (Tonkin) Gulf 120, 121 Beibu Gulf area 121 Beibu Gulf Demarcation Agreement 94, 121 Beibu Gulf Fishery Cooperation Agreement 94, 121 Beijing 16, 37, 38, 94, 95, 139, 140, 146, 147, 162, 197, 201, 202, 209, 219, 220, 225 Beijing-Hangzhou Canal 212 Bengal area 111 Benin 76, 79 Berlin 13 Berlin Wall 6, 13, 20, 30 Bermuda 4 Bhagirathi River 111 Bhutan 4, 7, 73, 112 Bianqiang (border wall) 14 see also Great Wall Bicholim 43 Big Bend National Park 42, 181 Big Bend/Cañon Santa Elena 82 biodiversity 84 bio-invasion 84, 85 BIP 179 Bir Ansab (Bir Unsab) 94, 95 Black Sea 11, 20 BOD (biological oxygen demand) 144 Bohai Bay 16 Bohemian crossing 100 Bolivia 11, 126 Bonpo Wetland Reserve 147 Border Environment Cooperation Commission 17, 177, 191 see also BECC Border Environmental Agreements 74, 196 border industrialization program (BIP) 178 Border XXI Program 193, 195 Borrego 184 Bosnia 116, 125 Botswana 127 Bougainville 36 Bougainville conflict 36 Boundary Treaty 79, 124, 125 Boundary Waters Wilderness Canoe Area (USA) 84

Index Brahmaputra 112 Brazil 8, 10, 135 Brownsville 41, 42, 179 Brucellosis and Tuberculosis Eradication Campaign (BTEC) 44 Brunei 20, 114 Brunei Darussalam 168 Buenos Aires 124 buffalo (Syncerus caffer) 117 Buffalo 112 Bulgaria 8, 11, 20, 117 Bureau of Economic Analysis 17 Burkina Faso 76 Burundi 11 Bush 11 Cairo 23, 113 Calcutta 111 Calcutta Port 108 Calexico 31, 36, 41, 181, 182 Calexico–Mexicali sanitation 189 California 17, 36, 54, 176, 177, 179, 180, 190, 196 California border area 183 California–Baja California area 180 California–Baja California border 180, 183 California–Baja California land boundary 187 California–Tijuana 190 Cambodia 71, 98, 155, 156, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 165, 168, 171, 172, 173 Cambodia–Vietnam border 167 Cameroon 11, 20, 21, 79 Cameroon/Nigeria border 21 Canada 10, 14, 35, 90, 96, 99, 126, 135 Cananer 176 Cape Espiritu Santo 124 Cape Horn 22, 124 Cape Horn Island 20 Caracas 80 carbon dioxide (CO2) 41, 67, 166 carbon monoxide 42, 181 Cardinal Samoré 124 Casaroli 124 Caspian Sea 20 Cayman Islands 4 CCP 217 CCP Central Committee 210 CEC 96 Central and South America 83 Central Asia 126

Index Central Military Committee of the Chinese Communist Party 206 Chad 11, 20 Chamizal Convention 189 Chamizal dispute 189 Changchun 138, 139 channels 12, 13 Chaozhuang 211 Chenab River 94 Chengguo 204 Chengguo River 204, 205 Chihuahua 175, 185, 186, 187, 189 Chile 7, 15, 22, 79, 80, 123, 124 Chile/Argentina border 22 Chile/Argentina border dispute 80 Chile–Argentina border 79 China 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, 20, 21, 22, 23, 25, 30, 36, 37, 38, 42, 55, 59, 62, 63, 73, 74, 83, 88, 89, 94, 95, 97, 98, 109, 110, 113, 114, 120, 121, 127, 133, 136, 138, 139, 140, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 153, 155, 160, 161, 162, 168, 170, 172, 173, 197, 212, 216, 225 China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) 114 Chinese Communist Party 199 see also CCP Chinese Communist Party Central Committee 201 see also CCP Central Committee Chitrangi 54 Chongchuan River 144 Chongjin 136, 140, 142 Chongqing 62, 224, 225 Chopan 54 Chromium 112 Chu 14 Ciudad Acuna 180 Ciudad Juárez 175, 180, 181, 184, 185, 187 Clean Air Act 39 Cleveland National Forest 184 COD (chemical oxygen demand) 69, 70, 71, 144, 161, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 170, 204 Cold War 13, 29, 30, 71, 126, 130, 133, 135, 139, 158, 159, 160, 170, 172 Colonia 184 Colonias 181, 183, 184 Colorado 99, 186, 188, 189, 194 Colorado delta area 185 Colorado River 175, 176, 179, 186, 187, 188

275 Commission for Environmental Cooperation 96, 99 see also CEC Communality of International Resources 91, 92 Comoros 24 concave border 16 Conchos 186 Congo 79 Conoco 114 convex border 16 Cook Islands 4 Correlative Rights 92 Cote D’Ivoire 76 Council of Europe 39, 40 Council of Ministers 76 Courantyne 25 Crestone Energy 114 Crestone Energy Corporation (CEC) 114 Criminal Law 217 cross-border wars 115 Cui Naifu 210, 221 Culberson 17 cultural border 13, 15 Cyprus 22 Czech 100 Czech Republic 8, 100 Czech Senate 100 Czech–Austrian border 100 D. R. Congo 11 Da Lac Reef 25 Dajuan Brigade 217 Dan River 109 Danube 8, 56, 116, 117 Datong 14 Datun 215, 218 Datun Coal and Electricity Corporation (DCEC) 218 Datun Coal and Electricity Company 220, 221 David Lawrence 45 Dawagongzhuang 211 DCEC 219, 220 De la Madrid 17 Dead Sea 15, 109 Declaration of Principles on Inter Self-Government Agreement 25 Dem. Rep. of Congo 117, 119 see also DRC demilitarized zone (DMZ) 119, 129 see also DMZ Democratic Republic of Congo 55, 122 see also DRC

276 Denmark 20, 55 Deosar 54 Department of Civil Affairs (of MCA) 208 Devils River 186 Dhafir 94 Dianzi 211 Dianzi brigade 207 Diaoyu 113 Diaoyu Islands 22, 23, 113 Diarrhoea 184 Diaz Ordaz 178 Dimmit 17 dissolved oxygen (DO) 160, 161 DMZ (Demilitarized Zone) 19, 127, 129, 130 Donghae Bukbu Line 130 Dongmingcun 211 DPRK 139 see also North Korea DRC 122 Du Ping 206 Durham 82 Dushan 197, 199 Dybowski 144 Dybuwski 144 Eagle Pass 41 East China 20, 197 East China Sea 113 East Germany 20, 30 see also Germany; compare West Germnay East Timor 12, 112, 113 Eastern and Central Europe 100 Eastern Punjab 94 ECAFE (United Nations Economic Commission) 113 Economic Commission for Europe 99 Ecuador 79, 126 EEZ 78, 79, 121 Egypt 11, 14, 16, 20, 97, 110 EKC (environmental Kuznets curve) 68, 167 EKC hypothesis 68, 69, 70, 159, 160, 165, 166, 172 El Centro 36, 41, 181 El Paso 175, 181, 184, 185, 187, 189 El Paso–Juárez Valley 186 El Salvador 79 El Ukabba 94 Elephant Butte Dam 186 Elk Lake Community Forest Project 104 environmental impact assessment 169

Index Environmental Program for the Danube River Sofia 1992–1994 Convention 97 EPA 39, 42, 99, 181, 185, 193, 194, 195 Erie 10 Eritrea 11, 20 Escondido 186 Essequibo River 25 Estonia 20 Ethiopia 11, 24 EU 54 Euphrates 109 Europe 15, 28, 40, 56, 83, 99, 138, 158 European Advisory Commission 13 European Convention 40 European Development Pole (EDP) 76 European Outline Convention on Transfrontier Cooperation 40 European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) 77 European Union 54 see also EU Exclusive Economic Zone 22, 78, 114, 120, 121 see also EEZ Expeditsia Bight 145 Fair division scheme (FDS) 119 fair division scheme 119 Falkland Islands 23, 124 Falklands War 23 Far East 133, 134, 136, 142 Far East area 133 Far East Leopard 147 Far East port of Russia 138 Far East region 136 Farakka 111 Farakka Barrage 108, 111 Farakkaits Barrage 111 Federal Zapovednik 147 Finland 20 Fort Quitman 186, 187 Four Southern Lakes 204, 205, 217 Four Southern Lakes Disputes 210 Fox 17 France 4, 7, 11, 20, 24, 29, 83 Freedom Islands 25 French 15 French Guiana 25 Fuegian Archipelago 22, 124 Fujian 74

277

Index Fukui 138 functional economic areas (FEAs) 17 Fushan 199, 200 FYR Macedonia 117 Ganga 110 Ganges 108, 110, 111, 112 Ganges basin 111 Ganges River 108, 111 Ganges river basin 110 Ganges river dolphin (Platanista gangetia) 112 Gansu 14, 15, 73 Gaolou 218 Garamba National Park 117 Gaumukh 110 Gaya Rivers 144, 145 Geneva 11 geometrical border 13, 14 Georgia 11, 20 Germany 8, 13, 20, 29, 100 Gibraltar 5 GMS 173 Goa 43 Golan Heights 23, 109, 110 Goodenough Spring 186 Gran Paradiso 83 Greande de Tierra del Fuego Island 15 Great Syrian Rift Valley 109 Great Wall 6, 14 Greater Mekong Subregional program 159, 172 see also GMS Greater Sunrise field 113 Greek Cypriot government 22 Green Cross 94, 98, 100 Greenland 4 Greenwich 14 Guadalupe Hidalgo Treaty 175 Guam 4 Guangdong 74, 224 Guangxi 73 Guangzhou 37 Guanlou 211 Guatemala 126 Guinea 76, 98 Guinea-Bissau 55 Gujarat 93 Gulf of Arabia 16 Gulf of California 179 Gulf of Mexico 175, 177, 179, 185, 186

gulfs 12 Guo 16, 30, 31, 56, 59, 89, 143 Guyana 25 Habitat/Species Management Area 81 Haihe 37 Haihe River Valley 37 Hainan 120 Hainan Island 224 Hakodate 138 Han (206 BC–220 AD) 14 Han 14, 15 Han-Chinese 135, 136 Hansen 17, 30, 40 Hasbani River 109 Hebei 8, 14 Hebron 26 Heihe 73, 74 Heihe River 62 Heilongjiang 73 Heilong-jiang 8 Hekou 74 Helsinki Rules 94, 98 Henan 8, 20, 62, 63, 197, 224, 225 Hepatitis A 184 Himalayan rivers 93 Himalayas 7, 110 Hong Kong 4, 74, 139, 140, 224 Hong Kong SAR 4 see also Hong Kong Hong Kong Special Administrative Region 4 see also Hong Kong Hongwu (1368–1399 AD) 14 Hoogli river 112 Houfeng’le 211 Houghly River 108 Household Responsibility System (HRS) 218 Huaihai Economic Zone 20 Huaihe 37 Huaihe River Administrative Commission 212 Hubei 62 Hui 15 Hunchun 73, 135, 136, 140, 144, 145 Hunchun Economic Cooperation Zone (HECZ) 140 Hungary 8 Hunish aristocats (xiongnu) 14 Huron 10 Hutun 215

278 Ibn Saud 128 Iceland 120 Iceland-Jan Mayen continental shelf 120 IGCP 122, 123 Ilemi Triangle 23 Illinois 20 Imperial 180, 182 Imperial county 36, 181, 182 Imperial Valley 36, 180, 181, 185 Imperial Valley–Mexicali area 185 India 7, 21, 23, 43, 55, 73, 83, 93, 94, 100, 108, 110, 111, 112, 123, 127 Indian Baglihar Dam project 94 Indian Ocean 4, 24, 112 Indiana 20 Indian–Bangladeshi dispute 108 India–Pakistan war 93 Indo–China peninsular 170 Indonesia 7, 14, 20, 55, 112, 120 Indus 93 Indus River 93 Indus River basin 93 Indus Treaty of 1960 93 Indus Treaty 123 Indus Water Treaty 93 Inner Mongolia 73, 74 inner-German border 30 see also Berlin Wall International Activity Park 77 International Boundaries Research Unit 82 International Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC) 99, 185, 187, 188, 189, 194 International Boundary Commission (IBC) 185, 186, 187, 194 International Commission 78 International Commission for the Protection of Elbe (1991) 78 International Commission for the Protection of the Moselle and Saar (1990) 78 International Commission of the Elbe 96 International Court of Justice 94, 112, 125 International Gorilla Conservation Program (IGCP) 122 see also IGCP International Law Commission 92 International Peace Park 119, 125 see also IPP International Seabed Authority 78 Internationalization of the Danube Basin Treaty of Versailles (1919–1939) 97 IPP 125, 126, 127 Iran 20

Index Iran Mts 7 Iraq 20, 94, 95, 109, 119, 128, 129 Iraq–Saudi 127 Iraq–Saudi Arabia boundary 94, 128 island Atlantic 125 Islands of the Lesser and Greater Tunbs and Abu 23 Islas Malvinas 23 Israel 11, 15, 16, 20, 23, 25, 44, 97, 109, 110 Israeli 110 Israeli settlement 26 Israeli War of Independence 110 Israeli–Palestinian Agreement 26 Israel–Jordan Coral reef 83 Italian 15 Italy 7, 11, 20, 83 IUCN 80, 82, 83 Jamaica 78 Jammu 23 Japan 22, 23, 24, 55, 88, 113, 128, 133, 134, 136, 138, 142, 143 Ji’nan 205 Jiangsu 20, 61, 197, 198, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 210, 214, 216, 220, 221, 224, 225 Jiangsu–Shandong Disputes 215 Jiaxiang 200 Jiayu-guan 14 Jilin 62, 73, 135, 138 Jining 198, 200 Johnson Administration 178 Johnson Reef 25 Joint Public Advisory Committee (JPAC) 96 Jordan 11, 16, 20, 44, 97, 109, 110 Jordan River 15, 25, 44, 97, 108, 109, 110 Jordan Valley 109 Jordanian border 110 Juárez 186, 189 Kaishantun 144 Kakadu National Park (KNP) 44 see also KNP Kalahari Desert 127 Kalimantan 7 Kanazawa 138 Kanba 11 Kanpur 112 Karen 45 Karnaphuli 112 Karnataka 93

Index Kashmir 23, 83, 94 Kawthoolei 45 Kazakhstan 11, 20, 73 Kedrovaya Pad Zapovednik 147 Kenya 10, 11, 20, 23 Kenya/Sudan border 23 Kgalagadi (ka-gal-a-GA-dee) 127 Kharkov 15 Khasan District 147, 153 Khasan Nature Park 147 Khunjerab/Taxkorgan Peace Park 127 King Talal dam 110 Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 128 Kliot 91, 96, 97, 100, 109 155, 164, 170, 172, 188 Kluane (Canada)/Wrangell-St. Elias 83 KNP 44 Kongzhuang 219, 220 Korea 6 Korean 135, 136 Korean DMZ 130 see also DMZ Korean ethnic 135, 136 Korean peninsula 130, 138 Korean war 130 Kosovar Albanians 116 Kosovo 116, 117 Kosovo crisis 116 Kunming 74 Kuril Islands 24 Kuwait 20, 113, 128, 129 Kuwait boundary 128 Kuznets 68 Kuznets curve 67, 68, 158 see also EKC Kyrgyzstan 73 La Paz 17, 39 La Paz Agreement 39, 190, 191, 196 La Plata Treaty 1973 97 La Ruta Maya 126 La Vanoise 83 Lago Titicaca 11 Lake Buir Nur 10 Lake Chad 20, 21 Lake Chad Basin 21 Lake Galilee 109 Lake Khanka 10 Lake Michigan 20 Lake Nyas 20 Lake Pickwick 20 Lake Superior 10

279 Lake Tanganyik 10 Lake Titicaca 11 Lake Victoria 10, 20 Lake Weishan 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 208, 209, 210, 211, 213, 217, 219, 221, 224, 225 see also Weishan Lake Weishan Disputes 211, 216 lakes 7, 8, 10, 11, 82 Lanzhou 37 Lao PDR 155, 156, 159, 160, 163, 165, 168, 171, 172, 173 Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR) 155 see also Laos; Lao PDR Laos 71, 73, 98 Laredo 41 Las Vacas Arroyo 186 Latvia 20 Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS) 78 Lebanon 109 Lennox 22, 79, 123, 125 Lepenica 117 Lesotho 127 Lesser and Greater Tunbs and Abu 23 Liangyungang 138 Liaohe River Valley 37 Liaoning 73 Liberia 79 Libya 14, 24 Libya/Algeria border 24 Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 79 Liechtenstein 55 Limited Territorial Sovereignty 91, 92 Limpopo 100 Lincheng 199 Linyao 14 Litani 25 Lithuania 20 Liuying 211 Liuzhuang township 204 LMB 69, 70, 155, 156, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 168, 170, 171, 172, 173 Longdong 219, 220 Longwy 76 loosestrife 84 Lösch 28 Lower Mekong Basin (LMB) 31, 69, 155, 157, 173 see also LMB lower Tumen River 147 lucrative Laminaria–Corallina 112

280 Luohe 63 Luxembourg 55, 76 Macau 74 Macedonia 116 Madhya Pradesh 54, 55 Maggiore 11 Magnet Line 6 Mahakali River 100 Mahakali Treaty 100 Malawi 11, 20 Malaysia 7, 12, 20, 25, 114 Mali 76, 98 Managed Resource Protected Area 81 Manchu 135, 136 Mangla 93 Manila Declaration 25 Manwan Dam 161 Manzhouli 73 Maosan 144 maquila (in-bond) 42 maquila 178 maquiladora 179 maquiladoras 178, 179 Maroni Rivers 25 Matamores 179, 180 Mauritania 76, 98 Mayotte 24 Mazhuang 211 Mediterranean sea 15 Meghna 112 Mekong 108, 109, 155, 156, 159, 168, 170, 173 Mekong Basin 98 Mekong Committee 172 Mekong committee 98 Mekong delta 98 Mekong River 155, 156, 163, 167, 168 Mekong River Commission 98, 157, 159, 160, 161, 172 see also MRC Mencius (372–289 BC) 20 Mesopotamia 128 Meteorological Bureau 61 meteorological disasters 89, 90 Meteorological Law 89 Metz 76 Mexicali 31, 36, 176, 180, 181, 182 Mexican 99 Mexican Canal 186 Mexican States 39

Index Mexican United States 190 Mexico 8, 17, 36, 39, 41, 53, 54, 74, 75, 96, 99, 175, 176, 178, 179, 180, 182, 183, 185, 186, 187, 189, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196 Mexico city 53 Mexico/California border 36 Mexico–Californian border 181 MGM 220 Michigan 10, 20 Middle East 44, 56, 59, 110 Ming (1368–1644 AD) 197 Ming dynasty (1368–1644 AD) 14 Minghi 29, 30, 107 Ministry of Civil Affairs (MCA) 59, 199, 208, 210, 212. Ministry of Coal Industry 219 Ministry of Finance (MOF) 220 Ministry of Geology and Minerals 220 see also MGM Ministry of Water Conservancy (MWC) 208, 212 see also MWC Min-xian county 14 Mischief Reef 25 Mississippi 20 Mongolia 10, 15, 39, 73, 95, 133, 138, 139, 140, 142, 143, 146, 147, 153 Mongols 111 Mont Blanc 83 Montego Bay 78 Montenegro 116, 117 Montreal 96 Montserrat 5 Morava 117 Moroccan 26 Morocco 26 Moscow 139 Moselle 76 Mount Kanchenjungma 83 mountain boundaries 6, 7 mountains 6 Mozambique 11, 20, 55, 127 MRC 98, 161, 168 Mt. Changbai 62, 135 see also Paektu san Mts. Alps 20 Muirpur 54 Muntafiq 94 MWC 210 Mweru 11 Myanmar 45, 73, 98, 155, 160, 168, 172, 173

281

Index NABD 17, 177, 191, 192, 193 Nagorno-Karabakh 24 Najd 94, 95 Najin 136, 142 Najin–Songbong Free Trade Zone (FTZ) 140 Namibia 127 Nanjing 206, 207 Nanjing accord 207 Nanjing Military District (NMD) 206 Nanning 74 Nansihu 197 Nanyang 197, 199 National Park 81 National People’s Congress (NPC) 88 see also NPC National Water Carrier 110 NATO 116 natural barrier 13 natural borders 6 Natural Frontiers 28 Natural Monument 81 Nauru 3 Navarino Island 125 NBA 76 Near East 127 Negev 16 Nepal 7, 73, 83, 100, 110, 111 Neutral Zone (NZ) 127 neutral zone 119, 127, 128, 129 New Mexico 17, 175, 180 New River 25, 176 New York 84, 139 New Zealand 4 Nganabbarru 45 Nicaragua 79 Niger 11, 20, 76 Niger Basin Authority 76 see also NBA Nigeria 11, 20, 21, 76, 79 Niigata 138 Nile 97 Ningxia 15 nitrogen oxide 55 Nogales 180, 189 Nogales Arizona 189 North America 56, 83, 84, 158 North America Development Bank 191 see also NADB North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC) 95, 99

North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 75, 177, 191, 192 North Korea 20, 38, 62, 73, 95, 130, 133, 135, 136, 138, 139, 140, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 153 compare South Korea North Pacific Salmon 146 North Sea 114 Northeast 133, 134 Northeast Asia 95, 133, 135, 138, 139, 140, 143, 147 Northeast Asian border area 38 Northeast China 62, 134, 135, 136, 138, 142 Northeastern China Tiger (Siberian/Amur Tiger) 147 northern China 37, 197 Northern Qi (550–577 AD) 14 Northern Territory (NT) 45 Northern Wei (386–534 AD) 14 Northern Zhou (557–581 AD) 14 North-South Korean border 130 Norway 55, 120 NPC 89, 216, 217 Nueva 22, 79, 123, 125 Nuevo Laredo 189 Nyasa 11 Oder River 8 OECD 166 Oecussi 112 Ogade¯n 24 Okavango 100 Okinawa 23, 113 Okinawa Reversion Treaty 23, 113 OMVS 76, 98, 99 Ontario 10, 104 opencut mining 43, 54 Organization of American States 125 Ozone (O3) 39, 42, 181, 195 Pacific Basin 142 Pacific Coast 36, 184 Pacific Ocean 7, 175, 177, 179, 182, 183, 185 Paektu san 135 see also Mt. Changbai Pakistan 23, 73, 83, 93, 94, 123, 127 Palestine 44 Palestinian authority 25 Palestinian Autonomy 109 Palestinians 110 Palm Spring 17 Panama 79

282 Pancheshwar Multipurpose Project 100 Pangmengzhuang 211 Panmunjeom 130 Panmunjon 130 Papua New Guinea 14, 36 Paracel 113 particulate matter 42, 181 Partition of the Indus 93 Patagonia 124 Peace Ecological Reserve 83 Peace Park 127 Pearson correlation 167 Pecos 186 Peixian 198, 199, 200, 202, 203, 205, 206, 207, 209, 210, 211, 212, 215, 218, 220, 221 Peixian county 201, 202, 206 Peixian–Tengzhou (Pei–Teng Bianxian) 199 Peiyan 204 Penglou 211 People’s Commune System (PCS) 218 People’s Republic of China (PRC) 4, 23, 74, 88, 113, 119, 173, 200, 217 see also China Persian Gulf 20, 23, 120 Persian Gulf War 119 Persians 111 Peru 11, 79, 126 Peter the Great Bay 143, 145 Philippines 12, 20, 25, 114 Phnom Penh 155, 161 Picton 22, 79, 123, 125 Pingdingshan 63 Pingxiang 74 Pinto Creeks 186 Point Dungeness 124 Poland 8, 20 Polisario Front 26 Polish–Lithuanian–Belarussian border 100 Polish–Lithuanian border 100 Ponda 43 Possiet Bay 145 post-Cold War 172 compare Cold War Posyet 136 Potsdam 23, 113 Prague 100 precipitation enhancement 61, 89 see also rainmaking

Index Presido 180 Program Management Committee (PMC) 139 protected areas 80, 81, 82, 83, 123, 148 Protected Areas Congress 80 Protected Landscape/Seascape 81 purchasing power parity (PPP) 162 purple loosestrife (Lythrum salicaria) 84 Pusan 136 Pyonghae 136 Pyongyang 139 Qaidamu 37 Qatar 20 Qian Zhengying 208 Qianfeng’le 211 Qilianshan Mountain 62 Qilu Evening News 204, 205 Qin 14 Qing (1644–1911 AD) 198 Qing Dynasty 136 Qinghai plateau 155 Qinshi-huang (258–210 BC) 14 Qitian 14 Quebec 104 Quepem 43 Quetico Wilderness Park (Canada) 84 rainmaking 61, 62 Rajin 142 Raúl Alfonsín 124 Reagan 17, 193 REC 117, 118 Red Sea 11, 20, 83, 109 Regional Environment Center for Central and Eastern Europe 116 see also REC Republic of Congo 41 see also Congo Republic of Czechoslovakia 30 Republic of Korea 79 see also South Korea, ROK Retange 76 Reynosa 180 Rhaeto-Romanic 15 Rhine 56, 78 Rihand River 55 Rio del Rey 21 Rio Grande 82, 175, 180, 186, 187, 188, 189, 194 Rio Grande Rectification Project 186 Rio Grande River 8, 176

Index Rio Grande/Rio Bravo 99 Rio Parana 12 Rio Uruguay 12 rivers 7, 8, 9, 57, 61, 82, 116 ROK 139, 140 see also South Korea Roman limes 6 Romania 8, 11, 20, 117 Rotterdam 139 Rozvadov–Waidhaus border 100 Rudoff 11 Ruili 74 Russia 11, 15, 20, 24, 38, 73, 95, 133, 134, 135, 136, 138, 139, 142, 143, 145, 146, 147, 153 Russian 142 Russian Far East 153 Russian Federation 3, 20, 24, 38, 153 see also Russia Russian government 139 Rwanda 117, 122, 123 Rwandan 117 Sakata 138 Salado Rivers 186 Salmonella 184 Salton Sea 176, 183 Samoa 4 San Antonio 17 San Diego 41, 179, 180, 182, 183, 186, 190 San Diego–Tijuana area 176, 180, 183 San Elizario 184 San Felipe 186 San Francisco Treaty 23 San Juan 186 San Luis Rio Colorado 180 San Pedro River 176 San Rodrigo 186 Sanguem 43 Santa Cruz River 176 Satari 43 Saudi Arabia 11, 20, 128, 129 Saudi Aramco 128 Sava 117 Sea of Azov 11 Sea of Japan 136, 138, 142, 143, 144, 145 seas 11 Second World War 22, 29, 39, 44, 45 see also World War II Senegal 76, 98

283 Senegal River 98 Senegal River Authority (Organization pour La Mise en valeur de Fleuve Sénégal) 98 see also OMVS Senegal River Authority 76 Serbia 116, 117 Shaanxi 15, 62 Shadi village 204 Shandong 20, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 205, 207, 208, 209, 210, 212, 214, 216, 220, 221, 224, 225 Shandong–Jiangsu border 215 Shandong–Jiangsu border disputes 203 Shanghai 37, 61, 197 Shanhai-guan 14 Shanxi 14 Shenyang 37 Shenzhen 74 Shigella Dysentery 184 Shijian 144 Shimonoseki 138 Shimonoseki Treaty 22, 113 Shixian 144 Shuifenhe 73, 74 Siberia 133, 134, 138 Siberia Land bridge 138 Sichuan 62, 224, 225 Sidhi district 54 Sierra de Juárez 184 Sierra Leone 76, 79 Singapore 139, 169 Single European Act (SEA) 76 Singrauli area 54 Singrauli coalfields 54 Sino–Indian border 110 Sino–Japan War 22, 113 Sino–Korean borders 147 Sino–Mongolia border 138 Sino–Myanmar Border 73 Sino–North Korea border 136 Sino–North Korea border-region 136 Sino–Russian border 8, 147 Sino–Russian Trade Treaty 136 Sino–Russian Treaty of Peking 136 Six-Day War 108, 110 Slobozhanskaya Ukraine 15 Somali 24 Somalia 24 Sonbong 142, 147

284 Sonebhadra 54 Song (960–1279 AD) 197 Song Han Giang 155 Song Tien Giang 155 Songbong 136 Songhuajiang River 62 Sonora 189 Sonoran 176, 184 South Africa 127 South America 15, 123, 124 South Asia 56 South China Sea 20, 24, 112, 113, 114, 119, 155 South Georgia 5 South Korea 19, 39, 95, 130, 133, 134, 135, 136, 138, 142, 143, 146 compare North Korea South Vietnam 25 Southeast Asia 115, 155 Southeast China 61 southern Africa 101 Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) 100 southern China 37 Southern Four Lakes Disputes 207 South–North Water Diversion 37, 38 Sovestskaya Gavan 136 Soviet 24 Soviet Union 14, 133, 139 Spain 4, 7 Special Administrative Region (SAR) 4 see also Hong Kong Special Economic Zones (SEZs) 74, 140 Spratly 20, 24, 25, 113, 114, 115 Spratly Islands 12, 24, 113, 114 Spring and Autumn period (770–476 BC) 14 St. Helena 5 State Administrative Council 199, 200, 205 State Council 59, 73, 74, 89, 90, 199, 201, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 216, 220 Staten Island 124 straits 12, 13 Straits of Magellan 124 Strict Nature Reserve 80 sub-Saharan Africa 116 Sudan 11, 14, 20, 23, 55, 97 Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) 117 Sui (581–618 AD) 14 sulfur dioxide (SO2) 39, 42, 67, 181, 195

Index sulfur oxide 55 Sulu 204 Summit of Heads of State 76 Sun Tang 211 Surinam 25 Surinam/French Guiana Border 25 Surinam/Guyana border 25 suspended particular matter 55 Sweden 20 Swiss German 15 Switzerland 7, 11, 15, 20, 55, 83, 127 Syria 23, 109, 110 Syrian 110 Syrian Arab Rep 79 Taiwan 12, 20, 22, 74, 113, 114 Tajikistan 73 Tamil Nadu 93 Tanzania 10, 11, 20 Tarimu 37 Tecate 180, 182 Tengzhou 198, 205 Tennessee 20 Tenzhou 199 Terbala 93 Terlingua 186 Texas 17, 42, 175, 179, 181, 185, 187, 189 Thai–Burmese border 45 Thailand 20, 45, 71, 98, 109, 155, 156, 159, 160, 163, 165, 172, 173 third-party mediation (TPM) 119, 123, 125 Tian Jiyun 210, 221 Tianjin 37 Tibet 15, 73, 74, 155 Tierra del Fuego 123, 124 Tigris—Euphrates Rivers 127 Tijuana 42, 180, 182, 183, 190, 194 Tijuana National Estuarine Reserve 184 Tijuana River Valley 183 Tijuana Rivers 180, 186, 191 Tijuana–San Diego area 176 Tijuana–San Diego sanitation 189 Timor Gap treaty 120 Timor Island 112 Timor Sea 12, 112 Tiswadi 43 Togo 79 Tokyo 84 Tongshan 198, 199, 205, 207 Tongshan County 199

285

Index Tonkin Gulf Demarcation Agreement 97 Tonkin Gulf Fishery Cooperation Agreement 97 total phosphate (TOTP) 69, 70, 71, 161, 165, 167, 168, 170, 204 total suspended solids (TSS) 161 total suspended substances (TSS) 144 TRADCC 146 TRADP 39, 95, 139, 140, 142, 143, 145, 146, 153 Transboundary collaboration (TBC) 113, 122 Transfrontier Park 127 Treaty 23 Treaty between Bangladesh and India on Sharing the Ganges Waters at Farakka 1996 97 Treaty of Muhammarah (Khorramshahr) 94 Treaty of Muhammarah 94 Treaty of Versailles 97 tsarist Russia 136 Tucson 41 Tumen 144, 145 Tumen city 144 Tumen River 135, 136, 138, 139, 142, 144, 145, 146, 147, 153 Tumen River area 136, 138, 139, 140, 143, 145, 146, 147, 148, 154 Tumen River Area Development Coordination Committee (TRADCC) 95 see also TRADCC Tumen River Area Development Program (TRADP) 38, 95, 138, 141 see also TRADP Tumen River delta 38, 133, 135, 136, 137, 138, 153 Tumen River Economic Development Area 140 Tumen River mouth 145 Turkey 11, 20, 109 Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus 22 Turkmenistan 20 Turks 111 Turksand Caicos Islands 5 Turpan 37 Uganda 10, 11, 20, 122, 123 Ukraine 11, 15, 20 Ulanbator 138, 140 UNEP 85, 156 UNESCO 119 UNESCO World Heritage Convention 118

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) 3, 13, 15, 24, 30, 136 see also Soviet; Soviet Union United Arab Emirates 20, 23 United Kingdom 4, 5, 13, 23, 82 United Mexican States 17, 193 United Nations 26, 78, 94, 95, 100, 119, 146 United Nations buffer zone 22 United Nations Compensation Commission 119 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCOLS) 78, 79, 112, 120 United Nations’ Development Program (UNDP) 38, 95, 138, 139, 140, 142, 146 United States 8, 10, 20, 35, 36, 39, 41, 55, 74, 75, 90, 125, 126, 135, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 182, 185, 186, 187, 188, 191, 192, 194, 195, 196 see also US; USA United States of America 17, 39, 190, 193 see also US; USA United States Section of the International Boundary and Water Commission (USIBWC) 187 Upper Kapuas Mts 7 Upper Silesian Coalfield 28 Uqayr 94 Uruguay 79 US 17, 23, 31, 39, 41, 53, 54, 75, 96, 99, 113, 175, 179, 188, 191, 196 US Department of State 29 US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 39, 194 see also EPA USA 4, 8, 10, 13, 20, 84, 99, 191 US–Canada Boundary Waters Treaty 35 US–Canadian border 14 Ushuaia 22 US–Mexican border 19, 28, 41, 74, 175, 177, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 193 US–Mexican border area 177 US–Mexico 190, 191 US–Mexico border 17, 31, 42, 53, 175, 176, 177, 179, 181, 185, 190 US–Mexico border area 176 US–Mexico boundary 194 Ussuri 8 Uttar Pradesh 54, 55 Uygur 15 Uzbekistan 11 Varanasi 54 Vatican 123, 125

286 Vatican City 3 Vatican proposal 124 Vatican Secretary of State Cardinal Agostino Casaroli 124 Venezuela 25 Venezuela/Guyana disputed border 25 Versailles Peace Treaty 28 Vietnam 12, 20, 25, 71, 73, 94, 97, 98, 109, 114, 120, 121, 155, 156, 159, 160, 162, 163, 165, 168, 171, 172, 173 Vietnam–Conoco deal 114 Virgin Islands 4, 5 Virunga National Park 122 Virunga Volcanoes 117 Virungas 122, 123 Vladivostok 136, 139, 140, 145 W. el Audja 94, 95 Wadi al Aujah 94, 95 Wadi al-“Awja” 128 Wadi al-Batin 128 Waishan 54 Walbaum 144 Wan Li 210, 221 Wangzhuang 211 Wanli (1573–1619 AD) 14 War of Resistance against the Japanese Troops (1937–1945) 198 Warring States period (475–221 BC) 14 Washington Agreement 191, 192 Washington Post 62, 63 Washington, DC 25, 191 water buffalo (Babulus bubalis) 45 Water-Glacier International Peace Park 126 weather modification 61, 90 Weather Modification Bureau 62 Weather Modification Office 63 Wei 14 Weishan 197, 199, 200, 202, 203, 207, 209, 212 Weishan county 197, 199, 204 West Bank 25, 26, 110 West Bengal 111 West China 155 West Europe 15, 127 West Germany 20, 30 see also Germany; compare East Germany West Timor 112 Western Europe 56, 59 Western Sahara 26 Western Saharans 26

Index Whitewater Creek 176 Wilderness Area 81 Wisconsin 20 World Bank 68, 92, 93, 123, 162 World Commission for Environment and Development 87 World Conservation Union (IUCN) 80 see also IUCN World Heritage Convention 118 World Heritage Sites 80, 119 World Parks 80 World Trade Organisation 216 World War I 28, 126 World War II 24, 113, 115, 126, 133, 216 see also Second World War Xiamen 74 Xiaoni 204 Xiazhen 199, 209 Ximingcun 211 Xingkai-hu 10 Xinjiang 15, 73, 74 Xiping 218 Xuanhua 14 Xuchang 63 Xuecheng 200 Xuzhou 205, 214 Xuzhou Administrative Region 199 Xuzhou city 204 Xuzhou Coal Administration 220 Xuzhou municipality 199, 200, 202 Xuzhuang 219, 220 Yan 14 Yanbaian 144 Yangtze 37 Yangtze River 36, 38, 61 Yanji 136 Yaoqiao 219, 220 Yarmouk 110 Yarmouk River 109 Yellow 37 Yellow River 8, 207 Yemen 11, 20 Yicheng 198 Yinchuan 37 Yin-shan 14 Yixian 200 Yuan (1279–1368 AD) 197 Yugoslav 116, 118

287

Index Yugoslavia 8, 55, 116, 117 Yuma 41 Yunnan 73, 74, 155, 160, 173 Yutai 198 Zambezi 100 Zambia 10, 11 Zarubino 142 Zhang Bangying 208 Zhangzhuang 211 Zhao 14 Zhaolou 211

Zhaomiao 211, 218 Zhaoyang 197, 199 Zhejiang 61 Zhengji 204 Zhongwagongzhuang 211 Zhou En’lai 206 Zhoukou 63 Zhuhai 74 Zhumadian 63 Zimbabwe 11, 127 Zonenrandgebiet (ZRG) 30 Zoucheng 198, 199

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