Critical Infrastructure Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness
Second Edition
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Critical Infrastructure Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness
Second Edition
Critical Infrastructure Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness
Second Edition
Robert Radvanovsky Allan McDougall
CRC Press Taylor & Francis Group 6000 Broken Sound Parkway NW, Suite 300 Boca Raton, FL 33487-2742 © 2010 by Taylor and Francis Group, LLC CRC Press is an imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa business No claim to original U.S. Government works Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 International Standard Book Number: 978-1-4200-9527-2 (Hardback) This book contains information obtained from authentic and highly regarded sources. Reasonable efforts have been made to publish reliable data and information, but the author and publisher cannot assume responsibility for the validity of all materials or the consequences of their use. The authors and publishers have attempted to trace the copyright holders of all material reproduced in this publication and apologize to copyright holders if permission to publish in this form has not been obtained. If any copyright material has not been acknowledged please write and let us know so we may rectify in any future reprint. Except as permitted under U.S. Copyright Law, no part of this book may be reprinted, reproduced, transmitted, or utilized in any form by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying, microfilming, and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without written permission from the publishers. For permission to photocopy or use material electronically from this work, please access www.copyright. com (http://www.copyright.com/) or contact the Copyright Clearance Center, Inc. (CCC), 222 Rosewood Drive, Danvers, MA 01923, 978-750-8400. CCC is a not-for-profit organization that provides licenses and registration for a variety of users. For organizations that have been granted a photocopy license by the CCC, a separate system of payment has been arranged. Trademark Notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Radvanovsky, Robert. Critical infrastructure : homeland security and emergency preparedness / Robert Radvanovsky, Allan McDougall. -- 2nd ed. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-1-4200-9527-2 (acid-free paper) 1. Civil defense--United States. 2. War damage, Industrial--United States. I. McDougall, Allan. II. Title. UA927.R34 2009 363.34’70973--dc22 Visit the Taylor & Francis Web site at http://www.taylorandfrancis.com and the CRC Press Web site at http://www.crcpress.com
2009021581
Dedication—from Bob This book is dedicated to my loving and endearing wife, Tammy, who has been through some very hard and trying times with me since that fateful day on September 11, 2001. Both of our lives have been touched in ways that we can never forget. My wife has been with me through many hardships, as well as endured long and arduous hours spent researching and writing this book. To my wife—all of my love—always.
Dedication—from Allan My small efforts in this work are dedicated to my wife Angela and those who continue to try to continuously improve the overall Critical Infrastructure Protection domain. My particular thanks to Wayne, Ian, Richard, and Shawn for their moral support as we grappled with some of the interesting challenges that presented themselves. By failing to prepare, you are preparing to fail. —Benjamin Franklin
Contents Preface......................................................................................................................xix Authors’ Notes.........................................................................................................xxi Synopsis................................................................................................................ xxiii Acknowledgments.................................................................................................xxvii The Authors............................................................................................................xxix Chapter 1.
Introduction to Critical Infrastructure Assurance.................................1
1.1 Introduction..................................................................................1 1.2 Homeland Security Presidential Directives..................................2 1.3 What Is Critical Infrastructure?...................................................3 1.4 What Is the Private Sector?..........................................................3 1.5 What Is the Public Sector?...........................................................3 1.6 What Is CIP?................................................................................4 1.7 What Is CIA?................................................................................4 1.8 Critical Infrastructure Functions..................................................6 1.9 Origins of Critical Infrastructure.................................................6 Notes......................................................................................................7
Chapter 2.
Demand, Capacity, and Fragility and the Emergence of Networks......................................................................................... 11
2.1 Introduction................................................................................ 11 2.2 What Are We Trying to Protect? The Concept of Capacity...... 11 2.3 Demand: The Reason for Capacity............................................ 12 2.3.1 The Concept of Performance......................................... 12 2.3.2 Local Impact and the Influence on Capacity................. 12 2.3.3 Results of a Local Impact in the Immediate Sense........ 13 2.3.4 Relevance to CIP............................................................ 13 2.3.5 Push, Pull, Lag, and Delay in the Network Environment................................................................... 14 2.4 At the Regional (Small System) Level....................................... 14 2.4.1 Influence at the Small System Level.............................. 14 2.4.2 Current Efforts and Research......................................... 15 2.4.3 The Interdependency Hydra........................................... 15 2.4.4 Network Fragmentation and Dissolution....................... 16 2.5 Cyberterrorism........................................................................... 17 2.5.1 The Pendulum of Convergence...................................... 17 2.5.2 Convergence and the Understanding of Threat.............. 18 2.5.3 Setting the Stage for Fragility........................................ 19 2.5.4 Fragility and Destabilization of Systems....................... 21
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2.5.5 Fragmentation and Dissolution of Networks................. 22 2.6 Dissolution and Convergence: An Emerging Risk..................... 23 2.6.1 Convergence, Network Expansion, Open Architecture, and Common Criteria..................................................... 23 2.7 Marking the Journey..................................................................24 2.7.1 Overview.........................................................................24 2.7.2 Legislation: 107th Congress (Particularly 2001–2002)................................................24 2.7.3 Legislation: 108th Congress–109th Congress................25 2.7.4 The State Today: A Recap..............................................25 2.7.5 Research and Understanding..........................................26 2.8 Authors’ Notes............................................................................26 Notes....................................................................................................26
Chapter 3.
National Response Framework........................................................... 29
. . . . . .
.
3.1 Introduction............................................................................... 29 3.2 What Is the NRF?..................................................................... 29 3.3 Reasons for Replacing the NRP............................................... 30 3.4 Differences between the NRP and the NRF............................. 30 3.5 Target Audience of the NRF..................................................... 32 3.6 Applying the NRF to National Response Efforts..................... 32 3.7 How Does the NRF Tie In with Emergency Management?..... 33 3.8 NRF Key Principles.................................................................. 33 3.9 How Is the NRF Organized?....................................................34 3.10 What Is the Purpose of the NRF?............................................. 35 3.11 Tie between NRF and NIMS.................................................... 35 3.12 Multiagency Communication and Structure Coordination............................................................................. 35 3.13 Coordination Responsibilities................................................... 36 3.14 Updates to the NRF.................................................................. 36 3.15 Incident Command Structure of the NRF................................ 37 3.16 Levels of Authority................................................................... 38 3.17 Key Concepts in the Implementation of the NRF.................... 38 3.18 Roles and Responsibilities........................................................ 39 3.18.1 Role of the Governor................................................... 39 3.18.2 Role of the Local CEO................................................40 3.18.3 Role of the Tribal CEO................................................40 3.19 Roles of the Federal Government.............................................40 3.20 NRF Emergency Support Functions........................................ 43 3.21 Scope of ESFs...........................................................................44 3.21.1 ESF 1: Transportation.................................................. 45 3.21.2 ESF 2: Communications.............................................. 45 3.21.3 ESF 3: Public Works................................................... 45 3.21.4 ESF 4: Fire Services.................................................... 45 3.21.5 ESF 5: Emergency Management................................. 45
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3.21.6 ESF 6: Human Services.............................................46 3.21.7 ESF 7: Resource Management...................................46 3.21.8 ESF 8: Public Health and Medical Services..............46 3.21.9 ESF 9: Urban Search and Rescue Services...............46 3.21.10 ESF 10: HAZMAT Response....................................46 3.21.11 ESF 11: Agriculture and Natural Resources..............46 3.21.12 ESF 12: Energy..........................................................46 3.21.13 ESF 13: Public Safety and Security...........................46 3.21.14 ESF 14: Long-Term Community Recovery and Mitigation................................................................... 47 3.21.15 ESF 15: External Affairs........................................... 47 3.22 Authors’ Thoughts.................................................................... 47 Notes.................................................................................................... 48
Chapter 4.
National Incident Management System............................................... 51
4.1 Introduction............................................................................... 51 4.2 What Is NIMS?......................................................................... 51 4.3 Compliance............................................................................... 53 4.4 Flexibility.................................................................................. 53 4.5 Standardization......................................................................... 53 4.6 NIMS Represents Best Practices.............................................. 53 4.7 Components of NIMS............................................................... 54 4.8 Command and Management..................................................... 54 4.9 Preparedness............................................................................. 54 4.10 Benefits from Using NIMS....................................................... 55 4.11 Resource Recovery................................................................... 56 4.12 Communications and Information Management...................... 56 4.13 Supporting Technologies.......................................................... 56 4.14 Ongoing Management and Maintenance.................................. 57 4.15 Command Structuring under NIMS......................................... 57 4.16 Incident Command System....................................................... 57 4.17 ICS Features.............................................................................. 58 4.18 Common Terminology.............................................................. 59 4.19 Organizational Resources......................................................... 59 4.20 Manageable Span of Control.................................................... 59 4.21 Accountability..........................................................................60 4.22 Integrate Communications Capabilities...................................60 4.23 Incident Action Plan.................................................................60 4.24 Management Command, Coordination, and Control Structures................................................................................. 61 4.25 Unified Command.................................................................... 61 4.26 Area Command........................................................................ 61 4.27 Multiagency Coordination Systems......................................... 62 4.28 Emergency Operations Centers................................................ 63 4.29 Incident Responsibilities..........................................................64
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4.30 4.31 4.32 4.33 4.34 4.35 4.36 4.37 4.38 4.39 4.40 4.41 4.42 4.43 4.44 4.45 4.46 4.47 4.48 4.49
Postincident Responsibilities .................................................64 ublic Information Systems....................................................64 P Joint Information Systems...................................................... 65 Joint Information Centers....................................................... 65 JIC Levels............................................................................... 65 JIC Organizational Structure..................................................66 Preparedness and Readiness...................................................66 Preparedness Organizations................................................... 67 Preparedness Planning and Coordination.............................. 67 Types of Preparedness Plans.................................................. 67 Emergency Operations Plan................................................... 68 Training and Exercise Drills................................................... 69 Personnel Qualification and Certification............................... 69 Equipment and Hardware Certification.................................. 69 Mutual Aid Agreements......................................................... 70 Standby Contracts................................................................... 70 Publication Management........................................................ 70 Resource Management . ......................................................... 71 Effectively Managing Resources............................................ 72 Communications and Information Management Principles................................................................................ 73 4.50 Authors’ Notes........................................................................ 73 Notes ................................................................................................ 74
Chapter 5.
Incident Command System................................................................. 83
5.1 Introduction............................................................................... 83 5.2 What Are NIMS and ICS?........................................................ 83 5.3 What Is an Incident?.................................................................84 5.4 What Is an ICS?........................................................................84 5.5 What Is NIMS ICS?.................................................................. 85 5.6 History of ICS........................................................................... 85 5.7 FIRESCOPE............................................................................. 86 5.8 National Interagency Incident Management System................ 87 5.9 Weaknesses Addressed by Using an ICS.................................. 87 5.10 Benefits of Using an ICS........................................................... 88 5.11 ICS Framework......................................................................... 88 5.12 Applications for the Use of ICS................................................ 88 5.13 ICS Management Characteristics............................................. 88 5.14 Understanding the ICS Organization........................................ 89 5.15 ICS Management Functions...................................................... 89 5.16 ICS Sections..............................................................................90 5.17 What Is Span of Control?..........................................................90 5.18 ICS Position Titles....................................................................90 5.19 ICS Organizational Components.............................................. 91 5.20 Unified Command.................................................................... 91
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5.21 The Incident Commander.........................................................92 5.22 Command Staff........................................................................92 5.22.1 Command Staff: PIO................................................... 93 5.22.2 Command Staff: SO.................................................... 93 5.22.3 Command Staff: LNO................................................. 93 5.23 General Staff............................................................................94 5.24 Operations Section...................................................................94 5.25 Planning Section....................................................................... 95 5.26 Incident Action Plan.................................................................96 5.27 Logistics Section......................................................................96 5.28 Finance/Administration Section...............................................97 5.29 ICS Area Command................................................................. 98 5.30 Communications within the ICS.............................................. 98 5.31 Incident Facilities......................................................................99 5.31.1 Incident Facilities: ICP................................................99 5.31.2 Incident Facilities: Staging Area.................................99 5.31.3 Incident Facilities: Base...............................................99 5.31.4 Incident Facilities: Camp........................................... 100 5.31.5 Incident Facilities: Helibase...................................... 100 5.31.6 Incident Facilities: Helispot....................................... 100 5.32 Differences between NIMS ICS and FIRESCOPE/ NIIMS ICS............................................................................. 100 5.33 NIMS ICS Training................................................................ 100 5.34 How ICS Integrates with Critical Infrastructure.................... 101 5.35 Current Use of ICS with Critical Infrastructure..................... 102 5.36 Hospital Incident Command System...................................... 102 5.37 Authors’ Thoughts.................................................................. 103 Notes ............................................................................................... 103
Chapter 6.
Emergency Preparedness and Readiness.......................................... 109
6.1 Introduction.............................................................................. 109 6.2 Office for Domestic Preparedness............................................ 109 6.3 First Responder........................................................................ 110 6.4 First Responder Classifications................................................ 110 6.5 Guideline Classifications.......................................................... 110 6.6 North American Emergency Response Guidebook................. 111 6.7 Awareness Level Guidelines..................................................... 111 6.7.1 Recognize HAZMAT Incidents................................... 112 6.7.2 Know the Protocols...................................................... 112 6.7.3 Know Self-Protection Measures................................... 113 6.7.4 Know Procedures for Protecting Incident Scenes........ 113 6.7.5 Know Scene Security and Control Procedures............ 114 6.7.6 Know How to Use Equipment Properly....................... 114 6.8 Performance Level Guidelines................................................. 115 6.9 Operational Levels Defined...................................................... 115
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6.10 Level A: Operations Level...................................................... 115 6.10.1 Have Successfully Completed Awareness Level Training........................................................... 115 6.10.2 Know ICS Awareness Procedures............................. 116 6.10.3 Know Self-Protection and Rescue Measures............ 117 6.11 Level B: Technician Level...................................................... 118 6.11.1 Know WMD Procedures........................................... 118 6.11.2 Have Successfully Completed Awareness and Performance Level Training...................................... 119 6.11.3 Know Self-Protection, Rescue, and Evacuation Procedures................................................................. 120 6.11.4 Know and Follow Procedures for Performing Specialized Tasks...................................................... 121 6.11.5 Know ICS Performance Procedures......................... 122 6.11.6 Planning and Management Level Guidelines............ 123 6.11.7 Successfully Completed Awareness, Performance, and Management Training.................. 123 6.11.8 Know ICS Management Procedures......................... 124 6.12 Know Protocols to Secure, Mitigate, and Remove HAZMAT............................................................................... 125 6.13 Additional Protective Measures............................................. 126 6.14 Understand the Development of the IAP................................ 126 6.15 Know and Follow Procedures for Protecting a Potential Crime Scene............................................................ 127 6.16 Know Department Protocols for Medical Response Personnel................................................................................. 128 6.17 National Fire Prevention Association 472.............................. 128 6.18 OSHA Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response.............................................................. 128 6.19 Skilled Support Personnel...................................................... 129 6.20 Specialist Employee............................................................... 129 6.21 DOT HAZMAT Classifications............................................. 130 6.21.1 DOT HAZMAT Class 1: Explosives......................... 130 6.21.2 DOT HAZMAT Class 2: Gases................................ 130 6.21.3 DOT HAZMAT Class 3: Flammable Liquids.......... 130 6.21.4 DOT HAZMAT Class 4: Flammable Solids............ 130 6.21.5 DOT HAZMAT Class 5: Oxidizers.......................... 130 6.21.6 DOT HAZMAT Class 6: Toxic Materials................ 131 6.21.7 DOT HAZMAT Class 7: Radioactive Materials....... 131 6.21.8 DOT HAZMAT Class 8: Corrosive Materials.......... 131 6.22 Importance of Implementing an Emergency Response Plan........................................................................ 131 6.23 Authors’ Notes........................................................................ 132 Notes ................................................................................................ 132
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Chapter 7.
Security Vulnerability Assessment................................................... 135
7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.5
I ntroduction . .......................................................................... 135 What Is a Risk Assessment?................................................... 135 Methods of Assessing Risk..................................................... 137 Threat Risk Equations............................................................ 137 Comparison of Quantitative versus Qualitative Risk Assessments................................................. 138 7.6 Challenges Associated with Assessing Risk........................... 139 7.7 Other Factors to Consider When Assessing Risk................... 140 7.8 What Is an SVA?..................................................................... 140 7.9 Reasons for Having an SVA.................................................... 141 7.10 What Is a Threat?.................................................................... 141 7.11 What Is Vulnerability?............................................................ 142 7.12 Countermeasures.................................................................... 142 7.13 Vulnerability Assessment Framework.................................... 142 7.14 Reasons for Using the VAF..................................................... 143 7.15 Federal Information Systems Control Auditing Manual........ 144 7.16 General Methodologies of FISCAM Auditing........................ 145 7.17 What Are General Controls?................................................... 146 7.18 What Are Application Controls?............................................. 146 7.19 Caveats with Using an SVA.................................................... 146 7.20 How the SVA Is Used............................................................. 147 7.21 Audience of an SVA................................................................ 147 7.22 Initial SVA Plan...................................................................... 147 7.23 Necessary Steps of an SVA.................................................... 148 7.24 Critical Success Factors.......................................................... 148 7.25 VAF Methodology.................................................................. 149 7.26 Initial Steps of the VAF.......................................................... 150 7.27 VAF Step 1: Establish the Organization MEI........................ 151 7.27.1 Strategic-Level MEI.................................................. 152 7.27.2 Tactical-Level MEI.................................................... 152 7.27.3 Resource Elements Comprising an MEI................... 153 7.27.4 Defining Team Composition...................................... 153 7.27.5 Identifying Threat Awareness................................... 154 7.27.6 Potential Threat Sources........................................... 154 7.27.7 Potential Threat Motivation....................................... 155 7.28 VAF Step 2: Gather Data to Identify MEI Vulnerabilities..... 155 7.28.1 Areas of Control........................................................ 156 7.28.2 Areas of Potential Compromise................................ 156 7.28.3 Areas of Concern Using the Framework................... 157 7.28.4 Control Objectives Used in the Framework.............. 157 7.28.5 Data Classification.................................................... 158 7.29 VAF Step 3: Analyze, Classify, and Prioritize Vulnerabilities........................................................ 159
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7.30 Authors’ Notes........................................................................ 159 Notes ................................................................................................ 160
Chapter 8.
Standards and Guidelines.................................................................. 163
8.1 8.2
I ntroduction............................................................................. 163 About the National Fire Prevention Association.................... 163 8.2.1 NFPA 730 and NFPA 731........................................... 163 8.2.2 NFPA 472.................................................................... 164 8.2.3 NFPA 1600................................................................. 165 8.3 North American Electric Reliability Council......................... 165 8.3.1 NERC Standards......................................................... 165 8.3.2 NERC 1200................................................................. 166 8.3.3 NERC 1300................................................................. 166 8.3.4 NERC Critical Infrastructure Protection.................... 166 8.3.5 Subsections of NERC CIP.......................................... 167 8.4 American Gas Association..................................................... 167 8.4.1 AGA 12....................................................................... 167 8.4.2 Subsections of AGA 12............................................... 168 8.5 Instrumentation, Systems, and Automation Society.............. 168 8.5.1 ISA-SP99..................................................................... 169 8.6 American Petroleum Institute................................................. 169 8.6.1 API 1164...................................................................... 169 8.7 Chemical Industry Data Exchange......................................... 170 8.7.1 Open Application Group, Inc...................................... 171 8.7.2 Chemical Information Technology Center.................. 171 8.8 ISO 15408............................................................................... 171 8.8.1 ISO 17799.................................................................... 172 8.8.2 ISO 27001................................................................... 173 8.9 NIST PCSRF.......................................................................... 173 8.9.1 NIST SP800-53........................................................... 174 8.9.2 NIST SP800-82........................................................... 174 8.10 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act............ 174 8.10.1 Subsections of HIPAA............................................... 175 8.11 Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act......................... 175 8.11.1 Subsections of PSQIA............................................... 176 8.12 Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act..................................................... 177 8.12.1 Subsections of GLBA................................................ 177 8.13 Sarbanes–Oxley Act............................................................... 178 8.14 The ANSI-Homeland Security Standards Database............... 178 8.15 Federal Information Processing Standards............................ 179 8.15.1 FIPS 113.................................................................... 180 8.15.2 FIPS 140-1................................................................. 180 8.15.3 FIPS 140-2................................................................. 180 8.15.4 FIPS 180-1................................................................. 181 8.15.5 FIPS 180-2................................................................. 181
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8.15.6 FIPS 186-1............................................................... 181 8.15.7 FIPS 186-2............................................................... 181 8.15.8 FIPS 190.................................................................. 182 8.15.9 FIPS 191.................................................................. 182 8.15.10 FIPS 197.................................................................. 182 8.15.11 FIPS 199.................................................................. 182 8.15.12 FIPS 201.................................................................. 182 8.16 National Standards Systems Network.................................... 183 8.17 IEC 62351............................................................................... 183 8.18 IEEE 1402-2000..................................................................... 183 8.19 Authors’ Notes........................................................................ 184 Notes ................................................................................................ 184
Chapter 9.
Information Sharing and Analysis Centers....................................... 191
9.1 Introduction............................................................................. 191 9.2 What Is a Critical Infrastructure Asset?................................. 191 9.3 What Is an ISAC?................................................................... 192 9.4 Advantages of Belonging to an ISAC..................................... 192 9.5 Access to ISAC Information................................................... 192 9.6 Expanded ISAC Services........................................................ 193 9.7 Surface Transportation ISAC.................................................. 193 9.8 Supply Chain ISAC................................................................. 194 9.9 Public Transit ISAC................................................................ 194 9.10 American Public Transportation Association......................... 195 9.11 Association of American Railroads........................................ 195 9.12 Transportation Technology Center, Inc.................................. 195 9.13 Railinc..................................................................................... 195 9.14 Water ISAC............................................................................. 195 9.15 Association of State Drinking Water Administrators............ 197 9.16 Water Environment Research Foundation.............................. 197 9.17 Association of Metropolitan Water Agencies......................... 198 9.18 Association of Metropolitan Sewage Agencies...................... 198 9.19 National Association of Water Companies............................. 198 9.20 American Water Works Association...................................... 199 9.21 AWWA Research Foundation................................................. 199 9.22 Financial Services ISAC......................................................... 199 9.23 Science Applications International Corporation....................200 9.24 Electricity Sector ISAC..........................................................200 9.25 Emergency Management and Response ISAC.......................202 9.26 Information Technology ISAC............................................... 203 9.27 National Coordinating Center for Telecommunications.........204 9.28 Communications Resource Information Sharing...................204 9.29 Government Emergency Telecommunications Service..........205 9.30 Telecommunications Service Priority....................................207 9.31 Shared Resources High Frequency Radio Program...............208
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9.32 Network Reliability and Interoperability Council..................208 9.33 National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee..............................................................209 9.34 Wireless Priority Services...................................................... 211 9.35 Alerting and Coordination Network....................................... 213 9.36 Energy ISAC........................................................................... 214 9.37 Energy Sector Security Consortium....................................... 214 9.38 Chemical Sector ISAC............................................................ 215 9.39 Chemical Transportation Emergency Center......................... 216 9.40 Healthcare Services ISAC...................................................... 216 9.41 Highway ISAC........................................................................ 216 9.42 Cargo Theft Information Processing Systems........................ 217 9.43 American Trucking Associations........................................... 217 9.44 HighwayWatchÒ.................................................................... 217 9.45 Food and Agriculture ISAC.................................................... 218 9.46 FoodSHIELD......................................................................... 219 9.47 Food Marketing Institute........................................................ 220 9.48 Multistate ISAC...................................................................... 220 9.49 ISAC Council.......................................................................... 221 9.50 World Wide ISAC................................................................... 221 9.51 Real Estate ISAC.................................................................... 221 9.52 The Real Estate Roundtable................................................... 222 9.53 Research and Educational Networking ISAC......................... 222 9.54 Biotechnology and Pharmaceutical ISAC.............................. 222 9.55 Maritime ISAC....................................................................... 222 9.56 Maritime Security Council..................................................... 223 9.57 Marine Transportation System National Advisory Council................................................................................... 223 9.58 Authors’ Notes........................................................................224 Notes ................................................................................................ 225
Chapter 10. Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition....................................... 235
10.1 10.2 10.3 10.4 10.5 10.6
I ntroduction........................................................................... 235 What Are Control Systems?.................................................. 235 Types of Control Systems..................................................... 236 Components of Control Systems........................................... 236 Vulnerability Concerns about Control Systems................... 237 Adoption of Standardized Technologies with Known Vulnerabilities....................................................................... 237 10.7 Connectivity of Control Systems to Unsecured Networks............................................................................... 238 10.8 Implementation Constraints of Existing Security Technologies......................................................................... 238 10.9 Insecure Connectivity to Control Systems........................... 239 10.10 Publicly Available Information about Control Systems........ 239
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10.11 Control Systems May Be Vulnerable to Attack....................240 10.12 Consequences Resulting from Control System Compromises........................................................................ 241 10.13 Wardialing............................................................................ 241 10.13.1 Goals of Wardialing............................................... 242 10.13.2 Threats Resulting from Wardialing....................... 242 10.14 Wardriving............................................................................ 242 10.15 Warwalking........................................................................... 243 10.16 Threats Resulting from Control System Attacks.................. 243 10.17 Issues in Securing Control Systems...................................... 243 10.18 Methods of Securing Control Systems................................. 245 10.19 Technology Research Initiatives of Control Systems...........246 10.20 Security Awareness and Information Sharing Initiatives..... 247 10.21 Process and Security Control Initiatives..............................248 10.22 Securing Control Systems.................................................... 250 10.23 Implement Auditing Controls............................................... 250 10.24 Develop Policy Management and Control Mechanisms...... 250 10.25 Control Systems Architecture Development........................ 251 10.26 Segment Networks between Control Systems and Corporate Enterprise............................................................ 251 10.27 Develop Methodologies for Exception Tracking.................. 251 10.28 Define an Incident Response Plan........................................ 252 10.29 Similarities between Sectors................................................ 252 10.30 U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team CSSP........................................................................... 252 10.31 Control System Cyber Security Self-Assessment Tool......... 254 10.32 SCADA Community Challenges.......................................... 255 10.33 The Future of SCADA.......................................................... 256 10.34 SCADA Resources............................................................... 256 10.34.1 Blogs...................................................................... 257 10.34.2 SCADASEC Mailing List..................................... 257 10.34.3 Online SCADA and SCADA Security Resources.............................................................. 257 10.35 Authors’ Comments.............................................................. 257 Notes ............................................................................................... 258
Chapter 11. Critical Infrastructure Information................................................... 261
11.1 Introduction........................................................................... 261 11.2 What Is Critical Infrastructure Information?........................ 261 11.3 How Does the Government Interpret CII?............................ 263 11.4 Exemption 3 of the FOIA...................................................... 263 11.5 Exemption 4 of the FOIA......................................................264 11.6 Section 214 of the Homeland Security Act............................ 265 11.7 Enforcement of Section 214 of the Homeland Security Act...........................................................................266
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11.8 What Does “Sensitive, but Unclassified” Mean?................... 267 11.9 Information Handling Procedures......................................... 268 11.10 Freedom of Information Act................................................. 268 11.11 Need-to-Know....................................................................... 270 11.12 “For Official Use Only”........................................................ 270 11.13 Enforcement of FOUO Information...................................... 271 11.14 Reviewing Web Site Content................................................. 271 11.15 Export-Controlled Information............................................. 273 11.16 Enforcement of Export-Controlled Information................... 274 11.17 Source Selection Data........................................................... 274 11.18 Enforcement of Source Selection Data................................. 275 11.19 Privacy Information.............................................................. 275 11.20 Enforcement of Privacy Information.................................... 276 11.21 Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information....................... 276 11.22 Enforcement of UCNI........................................................... 276 11.23 Critical Energy Infrastructure Information.......................... 277 11.24 Enforcement of CEII............................................................. 277 11.25 Controlled Unclassified Information.................................... 277 11.26 Lessons Learned Program.................................................... 278 11.27 InfraGard.............................................................................. 279 11.28 Authors’ Thoughts................................................................ 279 Notes..................................................................................................280
Appendix A............................................................................................................ 289 Appendix B............................................................................................................ 295 Appendix C............................................................................................................ 301 Glossary................................................................................................................. 303 Index.......................................................................................................................309
Preface This book represents a culmination of research activity that has stemmed over the past several years. The intent of presenting the materials contained within and referenced throughout this book is to represent the significant strides made in understanding the fundamentals behind securing, protecting, and safekeeping our nation’s infrastructures—all relevant industries, national landmarks, and national assets— that are considered critically vital to the continued economic success and operation of the United States. After September 11, 2001, many people (including the author) were utterly and forever changed by the magnitude of the catastrophic event on that fateful day. Our lives have been altered and scarred by reminders that we are no longer safe; that we cannot feel safe anymore, and that we must take action to safeguard our families, friends, and colleagues. The federal government has taken initiatives, starting as early as mid-1996, to implement a foundational framework that would be useful in the years following 9/11. Little did anyone know how soon that was going to be, only to struggle with something as vast and enormous as the contemplation of the questions—how, what, where, and when—in regard to securing our infrastructures. Many interesting developments have been conceived by several organizations. From those developments, new and useful department/agency-level protocols, procedures, and guidelines have been formulated and are now either in use or will shortly be implemented. These procedures and guidelines provide a base, a foundation, on which our nation’s infrastructures now depend. Those who implement their operation, maintain their integrity and functional status, and safeguard and prevent acts of terrorism from occurring depend on those procedures and guidelines and must demonstrate their fundamental understanding and comprehension. Key factors, terms, and guidelines must be conveyed to individuals and organizations alike in a manner that is generally understood and, more importantly, accepted. Without acceptance and the fundamental understanding of that knowledge being conveyed, our nation may not prosper. Since the initial inception of this book, there have been significant strides in efforts of safeguarding our infrastructures. This edition represents developments performed since the first edition of this book appeared. It is felt that you, the reader, will grasp what is being conveyed within this book, understanding the fundamental, general knowledge that some individuals and organizations consider important.
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Authors’ Notes This publication offers an aid in maintaining professional competence, with the understanding that the authors, editor, and publisher are not rendering any legal, financial, or any other professional advice. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the homeland security industry, the information contained within this publication will become outdated and therefore the reader should consider researching for alternative or other professional or more current sources of authoritative information. The significant portion of this publication was based on research conducted over the past three years from several government resources, publications, and Internet-accessible Web sites, some of which may no longer be publicly available or may have been restricted due to laws enacted by that country’s federal or national government. The views and positions taken in this book represent the considered judgment of the authors and editor. They acknowledge, with gratitude, any inputs provided and resources offered that contributed to this book. Moreover, for those who have contributed to the book’s strengths and its characteristics, we would like to say “thank you” for your contributions and efforts. For any inconsistencies (which should be very few) that have been found, we alone share and accept the responsibility for them and will gladly make corrections as needed. One additional note concerns the evolutionary process that we are witnessing within this industry. The evolvement concerns itself from transecting from a “force protection” doctrine to an all-hazards doctrine; essentially, critical infrastructures are being treated less as a physical asset to protect and instead are being treated as a service or capacity of service to protect. Realistically, private citizens, corporations, and governments alike all see the flow of services and goods, such as electricity, drinkable water, etc., as a service; we turn on a light switch or a faucet, and it just works, not caring much for the route that the service or product takes to get to its final destination. It is that form of thinking that the U.S. government is now beginning to realize. Recently, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security announced its modification to the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP), stating that, “the overarching goal of the NIPP is to build a safer, more secure, and more resilient America by preventing, deterring, neutralizing, or mitigating the effects of deliberate efforts by terrorists to destroy, incapacitate, or exploit elements of our nation’s CIKR and to strengthen national preparedness, timely response, and rapid recovery of CIKR in the event of an attack, natural disaster, or other emergency.”1,2 “The 2009 NIPP replaces the 2006 version and reflects changes and updates to program elements and concepts. It captures the evolution and maturation of the processes and programs first outlined in 2006 without changing the underlying policies. The revised NIPP integrates the concepts of resiliency and protection, and broadens the focus of NIPP-related programs and activities to an all-hazards environment.”1
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Slowly, the U.S. government is beginning to view critical infrastructure as a “service” rather than merely as an “asset.” (A copy of the 2009 NIPP may be accessed at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/NIPP_Plan.pdf.3) In an effort to keep the reference available for the readers, we have provided a set of alternative Web site links for all government Web site references. As these Web site references change, become deleted, etc., it is important that readers of this book know what the references were at the time of the writing of this book. This effort will ensure that those references are “frozen in time,” and will not be changed or altered in any fashion whatsoever. We consider this a value-added feature to this book, and invite you, the reader, to review these alternative Web site references should they become unavailable over time. You may access this information, via a dedicated web site at: http://cipbook. infracritical.com.
Notes 1. http://www.dhs.gov/xprevprot/programs/editorial_0827.shtm (alt URL: http://cipbook.infracritical. com/book3/authors-notes/anref1.pdf). 2. http://www.dhs.gov/xprevprot/programs/gc_1189168948944.shtm (alt URL: http:/cipbook. infracritical.com/book3/authors-notes/anref1a.pdf). 3. http://cipbook.infracritical.com/book3/authors-notes/anref2.pdf.
Synopsis This book is divided into 11 categories that represent months (if not years) of research, as well as strategic and tactical development, which emphasize those factors comprising functions within and throughout critical infrastructures. These factors are categorically subdivided into unique and prioritized levels, beginning with Chapter 1 as the foremost chapter of the book, Chapter 2 slightly less important than Chapter 1, and so on. Each subsequent chapter emphasizes a different meaning that is being conveyed such that it can be structured and remembered in an easy, cognitive fashion. The listing of each chapter (with a brief summary of its description and function) is provided below.
Chapter 1: Introduction to Critical Infrastructure Assurance This chapter provides the base for the entire book and what is described in some of the historical backgrounds of “critical infrastructure,” and why it is important to the United States. There will be some terms and definitions covering a brief synopsis of the intent of this book and what is to be expected from Critical Infrastructure Assurance and Protection Specialists professionals.
Chapter 2: DEMAND, CAPACITY, and THE EMERGENCE OF NETWORKS This chapter is more theoretical than most in that it identifies an emerging trend in thinking rather than describing some of the changes in the strategic infrastructure that have taken place since the first edition appeared. At the time of the first edition, much of the focus on critical infrastructure protection efforts was at the very local level—how to protect key facilities. Recent infrastructure issues have highlighted the fact that this infrastructure is subject to impacts that can flow along interdependencies and also disruptions within its networked environment. This chapter reflects that current trend.
Chapter 3: National Response FRAMEWORK In March 2008, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) created the National Response Framework, which is a guide to conduct all-hazards responses—from the smallest incident to the largest catastrophe. This key document establishes a comprehensive, national, all-hazards approach to domestic incident response. The framework identifies the key response principles, roles, and structures that organize national response.
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Chapter 4: National Incident Management Systems This chapter applies strictly to National Incident Management Systems (NIMS) and how to apply a “chain of command” for any given incident; there is some crossover between this chapter and Chapter 5, which specifically involves Incident Command Systems (ICS) (ICS is a subset of NIMS), and Chapter 6, which outlines scenarios and instructions on emergency preparedness and readiness.
Chapter 5: Incident Command Systems This chapter further elaborates about the chain-of-command structure during a crisis and summarizes the appropriate course of action, definition of Incident Action Plans, and more.
Chapter 6: Emergency Preparedness and Readiness This chapter deals with the overall concept behind emergency preparedness and summarizes “what if” scenarios with explanations from the Office of Domestic Preparedness and the U.S. Fire Administration.
Chapter 7: Security Vulnerability Assessments This chapter is the meat of the book and provides the backbone for reasons of what, where, why, and how risk assessments are to be performed; why they are needed; and what causes them to be needed. This chapter is representative of a set of guidelines that both military and government agencies are currently using or improving.
Chapter 8: Standards and Guidelines This chapter outlines relevant standards, guidelines, and protocols from various agencies, associations, and councils such as the National Fire Prevention Association (NFPA) and how they might apply to critical infrastructure. It also outlines two new standards from the NFPA that are established for on-site premises security, mostly applying to electrical wiring for security systems’ closed-circuit television cameras, perimeter control systems, etc.
Chapter 9: Information Sharing and Analysis Centers This chapter outlines and summarizes all relevant Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISAC), which are information dissemination and distribution points for critical information that may pertain to that particular sector. Not all sectors listed within the President’s Report on Critical Infrastructure [Presidential Decision Directive-63 and Homeland Security Presidential Decision Directive (HSPD)-7/ HSPD-8] outline all ISAC organizations; however, an effort was made to provide as much information as possible and how it is relevant and pertains to critical infrastructure environments.
Synopsis
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Chapter 10: Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition This chapter discusses control systems used within and throughout (just about) every sector. Control systems consist of two subset topics: distributed control systems, which are the distribution mechanisms of a large geographical area, and supervisory control and data acquisition systems, which are devices that interface with noncomputing functions that are critical to that sector (value control, switch control, flow metering, etc.).
Chapter 11: Critical Infrastructure Information This chapter outlines and attempts to summarize all classifications of information that would apply to critical infrastructures. Additionally, any legal ramifications, enforcement capabilities, along with the definition of the term “critical infrastructure information” are likewise outlined.
Acknowledgments Some materials used in this book were taken in part or in their entirety from several very reliable and useful sources. Any information that may appear to be repetitive in its content from those sources was taken to provide a more introspective perception of what defines “critical infrastructure assurance.” The authors, editor, and publisher wish to thank the following organizations for their contributions of references and materials: The United States Department of Homeland Security (www.dhs.gov) The Office of Domestic Preparedness (ODP), which is part of the United States Department of Homeland Security’s Office of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness (SLGCP; www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp) The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), which is part of the United States Department of Homeland Security’s Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate (www.fema.gov) The United States Fire Administration, which is part of FEMA, which is part of the United States Department of Homeland Security’s Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate (www.usfa.fema.gov) The National Fire Prevention Association (www.nfpa.org) The United States Department of Homeland Security’s National Cyber Security Division’s Control Systems Security Program (www.us-cert.gov/ control_systems)
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The Authors Bob Radvanovsky is an active professional in the United States with knowledge in security, risk management, business continuity, disaster recovery planning, and remediation. He obtained his master’s degree in computer science from DePaul University in Chicago. He has also significantly contributed toward establishing several certification programs, specifically on the topics of “critical infrastructure protection” and “critical infrastructure assurance.” Bob has special interests and knowledge in matters of critical infrastructures, and has published a number of articles and white papers regarding this topic. Although he has been significantly involved in establishing security training and awareness programs through his company, Infracritical, his extracurricular activities include working with the InfraGard program, as well as several professional accreditation and educational institutions, specifically on the topics of homeland security and critical infrastructure protection and assurance. This includes maintaining and moderating the SCADASEC mailing list for SCADA and control systems security discussion forums, as well as an active participant with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security Transportation Security Administration’s Transportation Systems Sector Cyber Working Group and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security Control Systems Security Program’s Industrial Control Systems’ Joint Working Group; both working groups are part of President Obama’s Cybersecurity Initiative. Bob’s first book, Critical Infrastructure: Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness (released May 2006), is a reference work dealing with emergency management and preparedness and defines (in greater detail) what “critical infrastructure protection” is; his second book, Transportation Systems Security (released May 2008), was designed for educating mid-level management (or higher) about aspects of holistic security analysis and management of the transportation sector. Both Bob and Allan McDougall have established a private research enterprise investigating concepts surrounding critical infrastructures, how they are impacted, and how they may be preserved. Allan McDougall’s efforts have included working on various projects (with a strong element of research) for the public and private sectors. Following his military service, he continued public service as a security advisor to a number of federal agencies. Within this context, he became recognized as a technical expert in the corporate security management domain and was asked to participate in a number of emerging endeavors, including the Strategic Leadership in Government Security and other courses. Within the private sector, his desire to look toward sound and innovative solutions soon had him participating in a number of efforts toward the professionalization of critical infrastructure protection, including the development of certification level training. These efforts have resulted in his certification as a Professional in Critical Infrastructure Protection, Certified Master Antiterrorism Specialist, and Certified Information Systems Security Professional. Allan’s primary focus is on the transportation sector, where he works within a number of communities. These xxix
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include serving as the chair of the Transportation Security Committee within the Antiterrorism Accreditation Board and active participation in a number of strategic federal working groups on topics ranging from operations security to cyber security. He is a recognized training provider of ship security (International Ship and Port Facilities Security Code) and has been invited to speak to local and federal professional associations, including at the Information Resources Management College (NDU, Washington, U.S.A.). Allan currently works as a co-director in Evolutionary Security Management and lives with his wife in Arnprior, Canada.
to Critical 1 Introduction Infrastructure Assurance 1.1 Introduction Long before the attacks on September 11, 2001, officials from both public and private sectors of the United States have been actively promoting and applying critical infrastructure assurance (CIA) methods since. Yet, it was not so long ago that most citizens had never heard of such words, at least until 9/11. So why is there now so much attention being given to our infrastructures? The urgent call for the protection and assurance of our critical infrastructures began on 9/11, when issues of national safety and security were brought to the fore for leaders of government and industry as well as citizens. Since then, many people have been confronted with the possibility of living and working without one or more of the many basic necessities that they have come to expect and depend on. For example, imagine surviving without water, electricity, home heating oil, natural gas, transportation (e.g., train, airplane, or automotive), communications (e.g., telephones, cellular telephones, the Internet), emergency services, and more. Neither can the government. The operations of protecting a critical infrastructure do not depend on any unique intelligence collection method, nor do they require any unique integrated intelligence function. More important are the specific analytical methodologies that may be used to assess vulnerabilities and perform risk analysis relative to the infrastructure being protected, and its remediation, or the mitigation of any (hopefully all) risk. These tasks involve businesses thinking in terms of self-protection at a business-level capability; the same goes for whatever government or agency is implementing the policy.1 For example, one analytical method for prevention is performing penetration tests (formerly referred to as tiger teams,2 now referred to as red teams3). Tiger teams4 is a former U.S. military term5 (in which private-sector, commercial security groups, but in a more specific sense) defining government- or industry-sponsored teams of experts and professionals who attempt to break down (or through) any defenses or perimeters in an effort to uncover, and eventually patch, any security holes.6 This concept is useful for short-lived projects or tasks that involve designating individuals within a given organization to think, act, and behave in a manner that supports the way criminals (bad guys) or terrorists would think, attack, and study their approach to set targets and priorities. In the U.S. military history, these teams were paid professionals who performed hacker-type tricks, for example, leaving cardboard signs displaying the words “bomb” 1
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within critical defense installations or leaving handwritten notes stating “Your codebooks have been stolen” (even though they usually were not) that were placed inside safes or locked, secured areas. In some instances, after a successful penetration mission, when an official security review was conducted the next morning, officials would find signs, notes, etc., placed by the security team(s) of the previous day or week, which sometimes resulted in the “early retirement” of base commanders or their security officers. It is generally assumed that, with any critical infrastructure protection (CIP) initiative, the bad guys are determined adversaries—flexible, creative, resourceful—and able to learn how to target vulnerable areas while avoiding those that are more protected and predictable. In many situations, modern, sophisticated, or technologically-advanced societies are perfect targets for terrorists; businesses that are not flexible enough also make perfect targets.7
1.2 Homeland Security Presidential Directives Homeland Security Presidential Directives (HSPD) are presidential directives specifically relating to homeland security. Each directive has a specific meaning and purpose and is carried out (almost immediately) by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS).8 For each directive (and its meaning), see the subsequent sections summarizing each directive. A confident researcher might observe that since the first edition of this book appeared in 2006, several significant directives have been introduced. It can be noticed that these directives have now been expanded from purely topical issues and are now beginning to address issues of a much broader scope. Although the topics have not lost their meaning from their initial counterparts [terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMDs)], their inference now indicates a more “all-hazards” approach to solving strategic issues in the United States. The HSPD documents appear to be closely tied to political cycles and agendas. If the various directives are reviewed, a pattern becomes apparent. The inference is that the directives are created during times when there is administrative stability within the nation. For example, the initial directives focused more on terrorism and WMDs. What you see is that the directives are essentially a reactive tool that can be trended back to realign a strategic focus toward a more “all-hazards” approach, rather than focusing simply on antiterrorism and counterterrorism activities. This unconscious shift or evolution in thinking appears to be indicative of a U.S. DHS trend. More importantly, this unconscious shift now appears to be increasingly focused on global aspects, rather than simply one country, which now includes countries such as Canada (www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/inf-inf/documents/auth/transform/transform02eng.asp), the United Kingdom, Japan, etc. For example, the presidential directive on biometrics and identity management appears to be aligned with international compliance and regulatory bodies, such as the International Standards Organization’s ISO 19092:2008 standard (www.iso.org/iso/catalogue_detail?csnumber=50145). For those who would like to know more about the specific HSPD documents, they are listed, along with the website references of all HSPD documents, in Appendix A.
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1.3 What Is Critical Infrastructure? The term critical infrastructure refers to assets of physical and computer-based systems that are essential to the minimum operations of the economy and government. They include, but are not limited to, telecommunications, energy, banking and finance, transportation, water systems, and emergency services, both governmental and private. Many of the nation’s critical infrastructures have historically been physically and logically separated systems that had little interdependence, at least until 9/11. As a result of advances in information technology and efforts to improve efficiencies in these systems, infrastructures have become increasingly automated and interlinked. These improvements have created new vulnerabilities relating to equipment failure, human error, weather, and other natural causes, as well as physical and computer-related attacks. Addressing these vulnerabilities necessitates flexibility, a massive evolutionary approach that spans both public and private sectors and that protects both domestic and international interests. Every department and agency of federal, state, tribal, and local governments is responsible for protecting its own infrastructure; each department and agency should have measures to assure that information is valid and accurate, protecting that information as if it were considered an asset. Part of the assurance process requires consistent testing and evaluation of infrastructures, performing vulnerability assessments periodically against physical and computer-based systems, and obtaining expedient and valid authorities to validate those systems. This applies to both the public and private sectors.9
1.4 What Is the Private Sector? The private sector of a nation’s economy consists of those entities not controlled by the state, that is, entities such as private firms and companies, corporations, private banks, nongovernmental organizations, etc.10 The U.S. DHS has an Office of Private Sector Affairs, which provides the U.S. business community with a direct line of communication to the U.S. DHS. The office works with businesses, trade associations, and other nongovernmental organizations to foster dialogue between the private sector and the department on the full range of issues and challenges faced by America’s business sector. In addition to ensuring open communication between the department and the private sector, the office provides strategic guidance to the DHS secretary on prospective policies and regulations and their impact and promotes public-private partnerships and best practices to improve the nation’s homeland and economic security.11
1.5 What Is the Public Sector? The public sector consists of federal, state, local, and tribal governments; government-owned or government-controlled corporations; and governmental monetary institutions.12 This includes offices, departments, and agencies of these organizations or entities that receive monies and/or appropriations from public interest groups,
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public funding committees, and tax revenue centers (such as the Internal Revenue Service).
1.6 What Is CIP? The term CIP pertains to activities for protecting critical infrastructures. This includes people, physical assets, and communication (cyber) systems that are indispensable for national, state, and urban security, economic stability, and public safety. CIP methods and resources deter or mitigate attacks against critical infrastructures caused by people (terrorists, other criminals, hackers, etc.), natural calamities (hurricanes, tornadoes, earthquakes, floods, etc.), and hazardous materials accidents involving nuclear, radiological, biological, or chemical substances. Essentially, CIP is about protecting those assets considered invaluable to society and that promote social well-being.13 CIP is (oftentimes) considered a reactionary response to threats, risks, vulnerabilities, or hazardous conditions. It does entail some preventative measures and countermeasures but usually is reactive by nature. CIP has two goals. The first goal can be related back to an alternative way of thinking. By its very definition, a critical infrastructure involves physical and logical systems necessary to support the safety, security, and economic well-being of communities (to paraphrase the growing list of definitions). The second goal should be more concerned with the protection of the infrastructure (in its physical and constructional contexts), and whether it is capable of delivering its anticipated services to the community.
1.7 What Is CIA? Most asset-protection programs (and their efforts) often begin with determining why something needs to be protected. The first part of this is generally defined in terms such as “identification of assets” or even “mission analysis.” Various inputs are identified and assigned value based on their contribution to the given system and its desired outputs or results. The second part focuses on threats and assets (things) that can or might disrupt processes. These steps become the foundation for such statements as risk being a “possibility of loss or injury” of “a factor of asset value, threat, and vulnerability.” The value associated with a critical infrastructure can be divided into several parts. The first part involves circumstances in which the critical infrastructure provides a unique service within and to a community. This is often the case where infrastructure costs are relatively (or even prohibitively) high, such that the community can only afford one of the installation types. An example that supports this premise might be that it is unlikely that you will see a town of 7,500 inhabitants with a water purification plant able to handle a population of 15,000 suddenly decide that it is time to put in place a second similar installation. In this example, the concept of physical security and/or force protection14 becomes vital, given any potential impacts associated with the interruption, loss, or destruction of that particular infrastructure—in this case, the loss of fresh drinking water to the local community.
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In a networked environment, an additional layer of protection is possible when leaving the local level as one begins to look at state/provincial, regional, or even national levels. Depending on the nature of the service being provided, the networked environment allows for an application of robustness, resilience, and redundancy to be designed. When one infrastructure suffers a negative impact, the loss of its performance in one area is offset by the remaining elements within the network by either increasing or reallocating their own contributions so as to either reach the desired level of overall performance or, in more extreme cases, reduce the amount of impact associated with the disruption. The question becomes whether to protect an individual infrastructure or the ability of the networked environment to perform at a level that meets the demands. The truth is that both are needed. Individual nodes and conduits associated with an infrastructure network are intrinsic to that network’s ability to function. Simultaneously, individual nodes operating in isolation must be looked at closely in terms of residual risks allowed into a system that is essentially a single point of failure. Another harsh reality of the critical infrastructure domain is that there are people (and this should be read in the context of families) who rely on those operating in that field ensuring that services are there when needed. A range of events illustrates this reality. During the 1998 ice storm in Canada and the August 2003 blackout that affected much of the northeastern portion of the United States, the challenge was that electrical power was not available either to maintain heating and sumps (ice storm) or refrigeration and heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning systems (2003 blackout). This lack of availability prompted the declared states of emergency, and resulted in organizations putting their business continuity plans in motion and practicing other extraordinary measures. The use of Canadian National Railway locomotives and generators to supply electricity (in response to the ice storm) tends to point toward a lack of electricity being the problem (and not simply a specific electrical transmission line being disrupted). Consider another example involving the U.S. postal system. Does it really matter what street the mail comes from before it gets to your home? The answer would be “Of course not.” What does matter is that your mail arrives at your home (or equivalent) on time and in appropriate (unbroken) condition. The concern sets in when we wonder whether the mail or post is actually being delivered at all—something that affects our paying of bills, receipt of ordered goods, and other forms of communication. Finally, consider the U.S. water supply systems. Again, we are less concerned as to whether the water is coming through a central pipe or some peripheral parts of the system. We tend to become significantly concerned if the water supply fails to provide water to our homes. Other examples will tend to follow the same suit because it is the lack of critical services that poses the risk to society. Some might argue that the population is only concerned about protecting critical infrastructure insofar as that protection assures the availability of the service to the public. This leads to the concept and definition of CIA. The definition of CIP focuses on protecting the nodes and conduits of any given infrastructure that delivers services to
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their respective communities through force protection. Although CIP tends to focus on an all-hazards approach, it tends to operate at a very basic or local level—say one facility, one road, etc. CIA, on the other hand, tends to focus on a layer higher than CIP, which includes the necessary arrangements to shift production around within the network (or even surrounding networks) so that demand is met, even if a local node or conduit is disrupted. If we are to take our two power-based examples, we would see the difference in the approach. CIP would tend to focus on a very granular level—power production facilities would be protected against various types of physical attacks or hazards. CIA looks at the entire power grid, ensuring that the system can detect disruption, shift capacity to meet demand, and ensure that services are being met—often transparently to the consumer. In this context, it might be argued that CIA is the holistic view that is actually sought by most CIP professionals.
1.8 Critical Infrastructure Functions Defining, using, and maintaining critical infrastructures are a process in themselves, such that it is an analytical model or template that guides the systematic protection of itself. More importantly, it is a reliable decision-making process, a sequential set of methodologies that assists decision makers in determining the possible needs of what methods should be used for whatever is being safeguarded. The process ensures the protection of only those infrastructures upon which survivability, continuity of operations, and their ultimate successes depend. Thus, these methodologies safeguard only those infrastructures deemed important and vital for the continued operation of the large scales of economies.
1.9 Origins of Critical Infrastructure What U.S. policymakers consider critical infrastructure has been evolving and is often ambiguous. Twenty years ago, the word infrastructure was defined primarily with respect to the adequacy of the nation’s public works. In the mid-1990s, however, the growing threat of international terrorism led policy makers to reconsider the definition of infrastructure in the context of national security. Successive federal government reports, laws, and executive orders have refined and generally expanded the number of infrastructure sectors and the types of assets considered to be “critical” for purposes of homeland security.15 This definition was adopted, by reference, in the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296, Sec. 2.4),16 and it established the U.S. DHS. The National Strategy adopted the definition of “critical infrastructure” in P.L. 107-56, providing the following list of specific infrastructure sectors (and its assets) falling under that definition. Sectors include • agriculture and food production • banking and finance
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• • • • • • • • • • • •
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chemical production critical manufacturing (added April 30, 2008)17 communications emergency services energy government facilities information technology nuclear energy and facilities postal shipping public health and healthcare transportation and logistics services water and wastewater treatment
Key resources include • • • •
defense industrial base commercial facilities dams national monuments and icons
The critical infrastructure sectors within the National Strategy contain many physical assets, but only a fraction of these could be viewed as critical according to the DHS definition. For example, out of 33,000 individual assets cataloged in the DHS national asset database, the agency considers only 1,700, or 5%, to be nationally critical.18 Of the 33,000 assets listed in the DHS database, only a small subset is defined as critical infrastructure sectors.19 Because federal, state, and local governments, as well as the private sector, often have different views of what constitutes criticality, compiling a consensus list of nationally-critical assets has been an ongoing challenge for the DHS. Please refer to Appendix B for a listing of responsible departments and agencies for their respective sectors within the United States, and Appendix C for Canada.
Notes
1. www.usfa.fema.gov/subjects/emr-isac/what_is.shtm (alt URL: http://cipbook.infracritical .com/book3/chapter1/ch1ref1.pdf). 2. www.tsl.state.tx.us/ld/pubs/compsecurity/glossary.html (alt URL: http://cipbook.infracritical .com/book3/chapter1/ch1ref2.pdf). 3. http://www.idart.sandia.gov/ (alt URL: http://cipbook.infracritical.com/book3/chapter1/ ch1ref3.pdf). 4. Ibid. 5. www.comedia.com/hot/jargon-4.2.3/html/entry/tiger-team.html. 6. def: “Tiger team: (n.)—1. Originally, a team (of sneakers) whose purpose is to pen etrate security, and thus test security measures. These people are paid professionals who do hacker-type tricks, for example, leave cardboard signs saying “bomb” in critical defense installations, hand-lettered notes saying “Your codebooks have been stolen” (they usually have not been) inside safes, etc. After a successful penetration, some
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high-ranking security type shows up the next morning for a “security review” and finds the sign, note, etc., and all hell breaks loose. Serious successes of tiger teams sometimes lead to “early retirement” for base commanders and security officers (see the patch entry for an example). 2. Recently, and more generally, any official inspection team or special firefighting group called in to look at a problem. A subset of tiger teams are professional crackers, testing the security of military computer installations by attempting remote attacks via networks or supposedly “secure” communication channels. Some of their escapades, if declassified, would probably rank among the greatest hacks of all times. The term has been adopted in commercial computersecurity circles in this more specific sense. [http://catb.org/~esr/jargon/html/T/tiger-team .html]. 7. http://faculty.ncwc.edu/toconnor/431/431lect06.htm. 8. http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/homeland/index.html (alt URL: http://cipbook.infracritical.com/book3/chapter1/ch1ref8.pdf). 9. www.usfa.fema.gov/subjects/emr-isac/what_is.shtm (alt URL: http://cipbook.infracritical .com/book3/chapter1/ch1ref1.pdf). 10. Principles of Emergency Management Supplement, p. 5, FEMA Emergency Management Institute, U.S. Department of Homeland Security Federal Emergency Management Agency, released September 11, 2007; http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/edu/08conf/ Emergency%20Management%20Principles%20Monograph%20Final.doc (alt URL: http:// cipbook.infracritical.com/book3/chapter1/ch1ref10.doc). 11. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of the Private Sector Liaison; www .dhs.gov/xabout/structure/editorial_0876.shtm (alt URL: http://cipbook.infracritical.com/ book3/chapter1/ch1ref11.pdf). 12. The National Archives (United Kingdom), The Cabinet Papers 1915–1978, the Inter national Monetary Fund and Bretton Woods Conference; http://www.nationalarchives .gov.uk/cabinetpapers/themes/bretton-woods-conference.htm (alt URL: http://cipbook .infracritical.com/book3/chapter1/ch1ref4.pdf). 13. www.usfa.fema.gov/subjects/emr-isac/what_is.shtm (alt URL: http://cipbook.infracritical .com/book3/chapter1/ch1ref1.pdf). 14. A term used by the military establishment of the United States and other countries to define the following: “preventative measures taken to mitigate hostile actions against Department of Defense personnel (to include family members), resources, facilities, and critical information. Force protection does not include actions to defeat the enemy or protect against accidents, weather, or disease.” [Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, April 12, 2001 (as amended through August 26, 2008), pp. 213–214.] 15. The Library of Congress, CRS Report for Congress, Guarding America: Security Guards and U.S. Critical Infrastructure Protection, CRS-RL32670 (November 2004); URL: http://www.italy.usembassy.gov/pdf/other/RL32670.pdf (alt URL: http://cipbook .infracritical.com/book3/chapter1/ch1ref5.pdf). 16. http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=107_cong_public_ laws&docid=f:publ296.107.pdf (alt URL: http://cipbook.infracritical.com/book3/chapter1/ ch1ref9.pdf). 17. www.dhs.gov/xprevprot/programs/gc_1226007062942.shtm and www.dhs.gov/xnews/ releases/pr_1220637439017.shtm (alt URL: http://cipbook.infracritical.com/book3/ chapter1/ch1ref7.pdf and http://cipbook.infracritical.com/book3/chapter1/ch1ref7a.pdf). 18. Liscouski, Robert, Asst. Sec., Infrastructure Protection, Department of Homeland Security, Testimony before the House Select Committee on Homeland Security; Infrastructure and Border Security Subcommittee. April 21, 2004. Note that DHS’s list of 1,700 critical assets may not include the 430 U.S. commercial airports with passenger screeners, whose security is primarily administered by the Transportation Security
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Administration; URL: http://www.italy.usembassy.gov/pdf/other/RL32670.pdf (alt URL: http://cipbook.infracritical.com/book3/chapter1/ch1ref5.pdf). 19. For example, in the chemicals sector, DHS has identified 4,000 facilities as potentially critical out of 66,000 total U.S. chemical sites. See Liscouski, Robert, Asst. Sec. Infrastructure Security, Department of Homeland Security. Testimony before the House Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations. Combating Terrorism: Chemical Plant Security. Serial no. 108-156. Feb. 23, 2004. p13; URL: www.access.gpo.gov/congress/house/ house07ch108.html or http://bulk.resource.org/gpo.gov/hearings/108h/94257.pdf (alt URL: http://cipbook.infracritical.com/book3/chapter1/ch1ref6.pdf and http://cipbook .infracritical.com/book3/chapter1/ch1ref6a.pdf).
Capacity, 2 Demand, and Fragility and the Emergence of Networks 2.1 Introduction This chapter is more theoretical than most in that it identifies an emerging trend in thinking rather than describing some of the changes in the strategic infrastructure that have taken place since the first edition. At the time of the first edition, much of the focus on critical infrastructure protection (CIP) efforts was directed at the very local level—how to protect key facilities, etc. This has evolved over time. Recent infrastructure issues have highlighted the fact that this infrastructure is subject to impacts that can flow along interdependencies and also disruptions within its networked environment.
2.2 What Are We Trying to Protect? The Concept of Capacity If critical infrastructure is really about the infrastructure necessary to preserve the safety, security, and economic well-being of citizens, then shouldn’t the focus necessarily be on protecting infrastructure or assuring that a given service continues to be delivered as required? Although the former is certainly important, the latter aligns much more closely with the stated goals of CIP. The fact is that a given infrastructure at the local level is there to provide some level of contribution into the system. The sum of these contributions, the ability to coordinate how those services are delivered, and the means of delivering them to their intended recipients may be best described as the capacity of the system. These three elements (safety, security, and economic well-being) are important because they operate similarly to the fire triad (heat, oxygen, chemical reaction). If the infrastructure can generate a significant amount of the service but cannot identify where it is useful or deliver it to those points, then the system has essentially failed. At the same time, a well-coordinated and well-maintained grid that does not have anything sent through it is still failing to meet the final goal. The ability of the system to produce, distribute, and deliver can be described as the system’s capacity.
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2.3 Demand: The Reason for Capacity Demand and capacity exist in a constant balancing act. This is not to say that they are always in equilibrium—they rarely are. It is only to say that where there is a demand, capacity will attempt to fill that demand. Where there is surplus capacity, there is likely going to be a demand attempting to exploit that capacity. Those with a background in a supply-and-demand economics will find this concept very familiar.
2.3.1 The Concept of Performance The concept of performance basically describes whether the system works with sufficient capacity to meet its demand. For example, if there is a demand for 500 units of something, then the system would be considered in balance when it delivers those 500 units, and otherwise out of balance. Because of the nature of critical infrastructure, it can be reasonably argued that three imbalances have to be considered. The most serious of these involves a situation where the capacity does not meet the demand. This represents a situation where some portion of the population does not receive an expected level of the critical service—such as occurs during a power failure. The second most serious condition occurs when the capacity exceeds the demand, but leads to a response where the capacity is reduced, leaving the system vulnerable to a spike in demand. This might be exhibited in situations where the private sector is primarily involved in the delivery of the service but due to a surplus of supply, businesses leave the market because they become intolerably unprofitable. The final imbalance is a sustained surplus of capacity.
2.3.2 Local Impact and the Influence on Capacity When infrastructure is disrupted at the local level, that disruption loses its ability to provide the expected level of capacity into the overall system. At the local level, the clearest understanding regarding the loss of capacity will flow from activities less associated with physical security, but rather with business continuity planning (BCP). Within BCP, thresholds are communicated that are used to determine the severity of impacts or losses of key resources, etc. Although BCP generally ends at the edge of the organization’s responsibility or mandate, the concept of CIP urges this approach to be carried on throughout the organization and into progressively larger systems. Some care has to be taken here to ensure that the quality of service is maintained at a manageable level. What if the final product (e.g., a fuel) fails to reach that level of quality for it to be usable in the system? This aspect of integrity is somewhat different than the traditional “nothing added, nothing deleted, and only authorized changes made through well formed or defined processes” and more closely in line with the traditional views of quality assurance and quality management.
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2.3.3 Results of a Local Impact in the Immediate Sense When something is disrupted, we return to the concept that the availability of the critical service has been reduced. This leads to three important events that are worthy of study. The first event involves what the loss or reduction of that service means to the overall system. This revolves around the concept of what consequences arise should the organization fail to meet its goals—again, a power failure, loss of transportation, etc. The second event involves what the loss or reduction of that service means to the internal use or management of inputs that would be normally be used to maintain that level of service delivery. How do the unused inputs survive the impact? Are they perishable or must they be used within a certain time frame before they are no longer of value? Are they persistent in that they can be stored nearly indefinitely without a loss of value? These factors should generally be included in the basic impact analysis—often in consultation with operations or material management personnel. The third event involves asking how the organization manages the fact that it is no longer consuming those inputs at the same rate. Does this mean that they will stop purchases of future inputs or that they will simply delay the delivery of some? These upstream impacts are also important factors to be considered both in the local impact analysis and also later in the understanding of the impact on the overall system. For those seeking parallels, concepts defined in supply chain management and logistics provide some input. Generally, at the local level, four classes of impacts are observed. The first are delaying impacts or those that essentially slow the inward flow of something into the system. This concept is seen when warehouses are filled—at some point, the warehouse is full but we still need to store the material. The second involves the concept of lag. This category of disruption describes the condition where something else is slowed down because the necessary amount of inputs is not being received. Finally, at the other end of the spectrum, the system will attempt to balance itself through either the third class, push (seeking to find new demand) and the fourth class, pull (seeking to find surplus capacity that can be aligned against unmet demand).
2.3.4 Relevance to CIP The concepts of push, pull, lag, and delay are becoming increasingly understood at the local level. This was initially established through bodies of knowledge associated with supply chains and logistics; it then moved into the realm of BCP, and has now become more understood in the realm of CIP. Where the divide currently resides is between the local and regional (small system) levels when you look at the CIP services that have stemmed from such concepts as force protection, infrastructure protection, etc. For the reader, having an awareness that this bridge is likely to be built in the near future has a significant impact on how organizations can prepare and integrate their corporate security, information security [including information technology (IT) security and network security], BCP, incident response (in both the physical and informatics senses of the word), business resumption planning, and disaster recovery planning programs.
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2.3.5 Push, Pull, Lag, and Delay in the Network Environment The concept of push, pull, lag, and delay is not unique to the transportation system— but is rather characteristic of any system that involves exchanges. The concept is familiar within the energy sector in pipelines and across transmission lines. At the same time, these topics are familiar in water systems and networks, and although they illustrate applications in physical networks, the concept is similar to various concepts such as bandwidth, throughput, and buffering within the logical realm. For the CIP specialist, and eventually CIP professional, an understanding of how these four elements operate is of vital importance. Fortunately, these sectors have already carried out significant research with respect to each of these elements as they work on understanding and refining their understanding of their own risks.
2.4 At the Regional (Small System) Level Returning to the first principle (or argument), we find that the core values associated with critical infrastructure services can be prioritized in order of availability, integrity, and confidentiality, as we migrate to a smaller system, usually at a regional level. Understanding what the concept of push, pull, lag, and delay means within that small system plays a vital, if not critical, role in the ability to assure delivery of critical services—now being thought of in some limited circles as “critical infrastructure assurance.”
2.4.1 Influence at the Small System Level When attempting to assure these services, it is most vital to understand how these concepts operate at the small system (regional) level. Consider that each node (or intersection) and each channel (or conduit) can only handle a certain capacity. If there is no release to the surplus demand (e.g., through a release of pressure), then the system simply operates as it is best able to. Beyond that, however, the system begins to clog as the surplus demand that cannot be handled attempts to find other options and, if this is not possible, remains in place. This concept can be seen in most metropolitan automotive traffic congestion conditions quite clearly. A route can handle a certain number of cars in a certain amount of time. When that level is exceeded, the route begins to fill. When the space between intersections is full, cars cannot pass through the intersection (or will block the intersection, thus compounding the problem) and the system begins to fill. What becomes important at this point is the ability to identify that a disruption has taken place, find alternatives that can release the pressure, and then route (or reroute) the demand onto those alternatives. The release of pressure, if balanced correctly, allows the system to break the cycle of cascading and expanding failure, and regain that delicate operating balance between capacity and demand. There are two factors that have a serious influence on this. First, what if there is no surplus capacity available in the system? In this instance, the system fills. What is also important to note is that where the system is “full,” it, too, denies further movement through the system. The second factor may be whether surplus capacity
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within the system can actually be reached from the disruption. The route(s) between them fill as a result of the surplus demand; here, again, we have a situation where the impact is cascading and expanding.
2.4.2 Current Efforts and Research As the reader will soon see, the legislation, regulation, and other forms of oversight regarding the local layer associated with critical infrastructure have evolved somewhat since the first edition of this book came out. The first significant line of research has focused on the concept of interdependencies. Interdependency is where the level of one system’s product is reduced and this reduction causes an impact in another system. For example, a loss of fuel production impacts the transportation sector or a loss of electrical power affects telecommunications. For those involved in BCP, the concept of interdependency may appear to be complicated from an operational viewpoint, but is relatively simple to accept at a theoretical level. The challenge here is that the concept of interdependencies is approaching a situation much like cancer research. Most of us understand that the term cancer actually represents a significant number of different diseases. As a result, one might fund “cancer research” (and we would certainly not discourage you from doing so) but not have a clear sense as to what form of cancer is being researched. The same might be argued for interdependencies (see the example reports within the footnotes, especially the one from Idaho National Laboratories1). The second challenge is associated with the concept of network fragmentation and dissolution. Since the first edition, significant work has been carried out in the transportation and energy sectors to try to understand how the disruption in one part of the system impacts on the rest of the system. For some, it is simply akin to the butterfly effect—an assumption that may hold true for nearly inconsequential parts of the system such as a terminal or isolated node. On the other hand, disruptions at major infrastructure points may be apparent rather quickly as the impacts flow throughout the various connections and begin to influence the capacity at other locations. Documentation has been published through the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s Transportation Security Administration fairly early on, and recently, entire works have been dedicated to the concept of using technology such as intelligent transportation systems as a safeguard against this type of issue.
2.4.3 The Interdependency Hydra We have alluded to the concept that the term “interdependency” is becoming used to describe a number of states within and between networks and their interrelation between other systems. A number of projects have recently attempted to quantify and qualify the relationship between sectors. In Canada, these studies have resulted in the Defence Research and Development Canada putting forward a call for proposals and papers as late as November 2008.2 Similar projects have existed within the United States for a number of years.
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Several centers have been involved in this type of research over the past few years. In 2006, the Idaho National Laboratory conducted a survey to identify the major works associated with “critical infrastructure and interdependency modeling.”3 Private researchers have also published since the publication of the first work (including the authors), often through Web portals and university publication portals. When considering interdependencies, one might argue that there needs to be a basic understanding of how the impact flows between or across sectors. These might include, as a basic system of categorization, the following: • Interdependencies flowing out of one system (host) and impacting an independent system in that the impact does not cycle back onto itself (the host)—henceforth, this would be more of a dependency rather than an interdependency. • Interdependencies flowing out of one system (host) and impacting a system that provides a direct good or service back into the host system, leading to an elevated rate of deterioration attributable to the initial disruption. • Interdependencies flowing out of one system (host) and impacting a system that then provides a service to another sector that then has an influence on the host. There is still a significant amount of work to be done with respect to the proper categorization and definition of these types of events. The questions that persist across a number of blogs and discussions where researchers tend to communicate continue to center on a general acceptance that some of the underpinning principles appear to be common, but are still difficult to quantify.
2.4.4 Network Fragmentation and Dissolution The concept of interdependencies and cascading impacts has also worked in parallel and even contributed to a growing amount of research into the fragmentation and dissolution of networks. Much of this still focuses on the concept of mathematical models and translations of informatics systems into physical infrastructure. Again, there is merit to this research—where such concepts translate gracefully into the physical domain, they are worth keeping. Where a concept is discounted, the results of the research still have value in that they can narrow the focus of other research based not on pet theories or whimsical intuition, but rather on sound scientific bases. For those entering the arena of critical infrastructure assurance, the concept of network fragmentation and dissolution is relatively simple to explain—if one does not get bogged down in the complexity. Consider capacity and demand. Where there is a surplus of demand, it will seek out spare capacity (or where there is an ability to meet the demand, surplus capacity will be sought). This goes back to what was discussed in terms of how impacts affect at the small system level. What has become increasingly important to researchers is the ability to predict how that system will collapse and break apart. This is important for two reasons. First, a predictive model enables effective preventative measures (focusing on the robustness of the system) and also pre-position mitigation and response strategies
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(focusing on the recovery aspects) to be established. To return to the traffic congestion example, this is somewhat akin to being able to identify where the traffic jam is most likely to appear next. It is perhaps fortuitous that this research has coincided with difficult economic times. This is because both U.S. and Canadian administrations appear to have committed to working on significant infrastructure upgrades as part of their economic recovery packages. Although it is perhaps more of an editorialized comment (personal opinion) than critical analysis (if we might beg the indulgence of the academic or critical researcher), we would certainly hope that the concept of rebuilding and repairing an infrastructure takes a forward-looking approach to the capacity that will be needed, rather than simply restoring overburdened infrastructure to its original design.
2.5 Cyberterrorism In addition to the physical and operational safeguards, the concept of “cyberterrorism” has approached the forefront of many critical infrastructure issues. Outside of Hollywood’s extrapolation of potential events, the world has seen clear examples of the results of coordinated cyberattacks in Estonia and Georgia as part of political and military campaigns. We have also seen the specter of groups of cybercriminals operating out of Asia with potential ties to state actors. These issues are of significant concern. The Gilmore Commission4 noted that the “cyberattacks incident” to conflicts in the Middle East “emphasized the potentially disastrous effects that such concentrated attacks can have on information and other critical government and private sector electronic systems.”5 The commission concluded that although not “mass destructive,” attacks on critical infrastructure would certainly be “mass disruptive.” It also concluded that likely perpetrators of cyberattacks on critical infrastructures are terrorists and criminal groups rather than nation-states. As a result, the commission predicted that detection of these attacks would fall primarily to the private sector and to local law enforcement authorities.6 This statement, however, has taken on additional importance. There is now increased recognition within industry and government that if key resources (and this term is chosen specifically to align with BCP approaches) are connected through Internet-enabled technology, cyberthreats to those key resources need to be recognized and addressed.
2.5.1 The Pendulum of Convergence Convergence, in very simple terms, may be explained as the gradual integration of physical and logical infrastructure. For those without degrees in architecture (logical or physical), one may describe it as the gradual march onto the network-enabled system. Convergence is really being driven by two interrelated variables. The first variable involves the need for increased efficiency and situational awareness. This is a direct result from the need to be increasingly competitive on a global stage. Where
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North American markets used to be serviced by North American companies, one might argue that the past 25 years have essentially destroyed that concept, particularly when considering issues associated with supply chains and offshore production. As a result, there is an increasing intolerance for isolated or stand-alone systems that cannot be expanded as operationally required or as per the will of management. The second variable involves changes in technology. The current generation of engineers and developers are not particularly enamored with the concept of working with single-purpose, analog systems. The generation that did have to work with that technology is gradually moving on into its retirement years—something that some consider a crisis and others a blessing. The end result, however, is the deployment of key resources using a type of technology that may, if not treated carefully, be subject to the same types of attacks that were present within the context of cyberterrorism. These two factors, the increasing pressure toward network-enabled systems and also the decreasing supply of those able to work in past logical environments will likely change the face of physical security and enterprise security. The concept of convergence does not simply mean a change in the application of technology; it also requires a change in organizational culture and personal approaches to the issue of security. Some of the basic concepts will, of course, be consistent. As we look at how issues are identified, problems and issues are scoped, challenges are met, and solutions are applied, however, the traditionally diverging IT and physical and personnel security communities will be forced back to the same tables. Although the security industry is in for some interesting years as the various elements in these communities go through the normal processes associated with storming and finally norming, the end result for industry may well be worth the effort if both sides remember the primacy of operations.
2.5.2 Convergence and the Understanding of Threat Convergence is also going to impact on how threats are considered within an organization. The all-hazards approach has been front and center in the past—but its application has largely looked at the surface layers of threat. For example, keeping a cybercriminal at bay was a matter of installing a firewall, whereas keeping a prowler out was a matter of locking the door. Today’s criminal, however, has access to both tools and with the change of technology, it may well be that the prowler is unknowingly working for the cybercriminal and has access to complex tools specifically conceptualized, designed, and used for defeating security infrastructure through logical means. Perhaps, this example can be described by providing three divergent threat scenarios—each of which intersects with the critical infrastructure and key resources domain. First, consider the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) report on December 3, 2008, that identified another threat to United States infrastructure—the theft of copper that is being fed by an increasing demand for the metal, including in overseas markets.7 Although some may argue that all network infrastructure runs on fiber optics (it does not), one should note that this is not the type of traditional threat that might appear on a technical vulnerability analysis. The second threat involves personnel. Again, the FBI published (December 16, 2008) the report describing how
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certain elements of organized crime were able to infiltrate, through financial means, seaports along the East Coast.8 In this case, the threat vector was not asset based, but rather personnel based as the gradual trapping of individuals who had been given access. Finally, in a similar report in CSO magazine, a network administrator was able to establish himself as the key source of control over much of the city’s network infrastructure.9 These three events show how a potential adversary (or attacker) could gain access over key resources using indirect methods. Of significant concern today is the concept of the hybrid attack. As noted earlier, changes in technology and the availability of more and more processing power (an ongoing challenge) is leading to situations where adversaries have a wider array of tools at their disposal. Thus, organizations that tend to focus their security activities in such a way that any one of the personnel, information, or physical safeguards are often left more exposed and may be at risk of an attacker identifying, examining, and finally exploiting that vulnerability. Consider, for example, a meeting room in the public area. On one hand, the fact that it is intended for public access and resides outside of the more sensitive work areas is good; on the other hand, one has to examine whether the IT infrastructure installed in that boardroom is sufficiently hardened. This should be done so that an attacker does not simply bypass the physical security infrastructure by using the network connectivity to pass through the barrier in a way similar to simply crawling over a dropped ceiling or defeating a weak lock. Although hard connections are reasonably simple to address, the propensity of several organizations to work toward wireless access points or capabilities means that the physical security expert will have to look not only at the physical design, but may also have to look at how to establish the necessary levels of shielding and standoff—particularly if the adversary can simply sit in public areas where it is difficult to control their activities.
2.5.3 Setting the Stage for Fragility Given a basic understanding of some of the pressures within the system and some of the upcoming challenges associated with understanding how the infrastructure is protected, we can begin to look at a concept called fragility. Fragility, although reasonably new in this context, is not mystical—it has been inferred in such fields as reliability engineering for some time. Fragility can be described in terms of the propensity of something to fail. At the local level, this aligns reasonably closely with the concept of the risk of loss associated with availability and, as a secondary factor, integrity. In reality, this can be divided into three major categories. The first of these categories refers to the design of objects. When an engineer designs something, they indicate some level of assurance with respect to the design actually performing as intended. This is largely tied to the amount of effort spent in design, implementation, and other aspects of quality assurance. Aircraft manufacturers and other entities are subject to strict safety regimes; for example, they may have remarkably low tolerances when it comes down to failure. Other industries, where the impacts are not so grave, may have considerably lower thresholds. Thus, given that an engineer may assure that an aircraft design will work 99.5% of the time
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whereas another engineer may only have to assure that his product will work 75% of the time, we have our first significant difference in fragility. This fragility, however, is often based on averages, norms, or set ranges of conditions. These norms or averages are used to provide that final calculated value that gives us that assurance regarding the design. We know, however, that as conditions change, they may have an impact. Personnel may be less able to perform tasks in extreme heat or cold, assets may be susceptible to certain conditions (e.g., low humidity leading to static electricity near computers), facilities may require that certain environments be maintained (not in a forest fire), information may require certain systems for handling in order for it to be considered trusted, etc. As we look at the item being examined (similar to a target), we may find that certain inputs into the system do not perform as well under certain conditions—for example, workers in high heat areas may not be able to exert themselves the same way. This leads to the second type of fragility, or natural fragility, so named because it is based on how the target would perform within the immediate environment. As has been noted by scientists and poets alike, change is a constant within our environment. Cyclical fragility brings together the major elements discussed earlier—the concept of systems being sustained by the efforts of various inputs (persons, objects, facilities, information, and activities), the concept of capacity and demand attempting to maintain a level of equilibrium, and finally the fragility that is intrinsic at each point of time within the system. For personnel, there are a number of cycles that one must remain aware of. In the longer-term view, we have the current issues associated with an aging population and the impact this will have on corporate knowledge. At the same time, there is the time involved in developing bodies of knowledge and communicating it to people, such as what we are seeing with the convergence issue. Within the medium term, the life cycle associated with business and with labor contracts provides another example. At the very short and immediate end, one might even argue that the various cycles are associated with fatigue and attention spans. As one will quickly realize, many of these do not impact the security realm—but have a significant bearing on the concept of “critical infrastructure assurance” when looking at potential sources of disruption. Assets face similar challenges. When engineers design things, they generally include a life cycle based on adherence to a specific maintenance cycle and without certain constraints. We see this with our cars. They are anticipated to last a certain period—but only when you do not abuse them and keep the necessary maintenance up to date. Perhaps, the most advanced bodies of knowledge in this regard involve life cycle management and safety programs. These programs track the use, maintenance, and age of assets as part of a means of reducing the risk of failures that can lead to either loss or accidents. Again, however, this type of approach has a significant bearing on critical infrastructure. Facilities provide a nexus between two types of cycles. The first cycle, the age and usefulness of the facility, can be linked back to the same issues associated with assets. Materials deteriorate and require replacement. Structures become outdated in terms of the infrastructure that they can provide. Another variable, weather, plays a significant role. Again, in the longer term, seasonal changes can affect the ability of
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persons, assets, or activities to perform as intended. Although some of these may be reasonably innocuous (e.g., a slight change in temperature), others may be profound, such as periodic flooding or dry spells. In the short term, the sheer change between day and night may lead to different levels of risk. Information and data, however, are somewhat different. In this context, the cycles are not attached so much to natural conditions, but rather to operations and what the information describes. Consider, for example, a table associated with the movement of a container—the value associated with the movement of the container shifts as one moves across the planning stage, through coordination and monitoring, and finally into audit and review. The cycles associated with information, one might argue, are inexorably linked to the timeliness and relevance of the data and what they represent. Finally, consider the concept of activities. Cycles play a factor here. Looking at activities, we cannot ignore the effects of fatigue associated with persons and their assets. Thus, we cannot ignore that various activities are more relevant at some points than others. These are generally associated with operations and coordination— points that permeate various systems and processes. So how do these factors impact critical infrastructure? The answer lies in the need to assure that the critical services are, in fact, available on demand and can be relied on from a quality assurance perspective. Although this argues that these five categories (persons, objects, facilities, information, and activities) cover significant aspects of a process, they must not consider the lists cited above to be complete in any regard. At this point, the challenges associated with convergence and new ways of thinking play a significant role given that those deficiencies in current and forecasted ways of doing things lead to gaps in understanding and knowledge with respect to the risk to critical infrastructure.
2.5.4 Fragility and Destabilization of Systems At the regional or small-system level, all the factors cited above have an influence on the capacity of the system. These influences can skew the balance between demand and capacity, shifting it in ways that lead to situations involving push, pull, lag, and delay. Where these influences stem from single infrastructure points, the effect manifests itself first in that local area. Depending on the nature of the effect, it will then influence those areas around it until the system is able to naturally restore balance. The immediately impacted area will often depend on the level of capacity delivered by the infrastructure into the overall system. A relatively inconsequential or insignificant piece of infrastructure may cause some destabilization within an area that can be corrected reasonably quickly. On the other hand, where a key piece of infrastructure is disrupted, the immediately impacted area may be much larger and the system more destabilized, for example, the removal of a central hub within a transportation system or a key power production facility. How these disruptions cascade through the system will again depend on the system resiliency and redundancy. The second consideration is where the full small system is impacted. The factors involved in this case are those that span the full system—in any of the categories of personnel, assets, facilities, information, or activities. We see this illustrated in terms
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of weather, labor disruptions, certain types of cyberattacks, and similar types of threat vectors. Where these are involved, the capacity in the overall system becomes diminished, again leading to disruption of the equilibrium between demand and capacity.
2.5.5 Fragmentation and Dissolution of Networks Fragmentation (and, catastrophically, dissolution) of systems occur when elements of the system are no longer able to communicate and coordinate their activities, essentially becoming individual entities encapsulated within the system. Although the local level looks at this in terms of a disruption, the same can be said at the small system or regional level. Following a disruption at an infrastructure point (e.g., a facility), the next phase involves fragmentation. Although the concepts of push, pull, lag, and delay provide a mechanical description of the system-level impact, one can also divide the impacts into two broad categories. The first category concerns disruptions involving the loss of infrastructure. This category involves situations where the infrastructure essentially fails, resulting in the contribution of capacity being lost to the system. We have seen these types of events in a range of bridge collapses, failures in the surface system, manufacturing sectors, and so on. When that infrastructure is lost, the capacity is lost, and the loss of capacity skews the equilibrium between demand and capacity in such a way that the system suffers disruption until it can rearrange itself by determining new options on how to meet the demands placed on it. Fragmentation occurs under two conditions. First, the disruption may be at a key point that severs two parts of the system, essentially creating a number of smaller systems until it can be reestablished. In this context, the concept of fragmentation comes from the loss of what could be considered a key resource. It may be characterized by a single event, and because of its localized nature, there may be a significant focus on building up the robustness (in terms of its ability to withstand impacts). The second category involves conditions where the system essentially fills due to a surplus of demand combined with a reduction in capacity. If the capacity of the system involves a rate, then that rate becomes a very important factor, particularly where the system is working at near-capacity. A reduction in the rate of being able to handle demand is essentially a reduction in capacity—and when demand is approaching the limit of capacity, then the system will begin to fill. Once the system is filled, and if the demand continues to try to exploit the capacity, it will not be able to do so. As a result, the system will gradually slow down and, if the reduction in capacity is serious enough, the operations will abruptly halt. This essentially fragments the affected area from the system, although recovery can be attained once the rate at which demand is handled allows for the system to clear itself. Dissolution of the network involves fragmentation at a catastrophic level. In this case, the impacts are adequately severe so that the various components within the
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system can no longer communicate with each other. The end result is that the network becomes a community of individualities, unable to coordinate its activities. Dissolution of the network becomes a real risk where the network relies on a single service, a single type of service, or is vulnerable to a sectorwide vulnerability. Again, we have to return to the concept of persons, objects, facilities, information, and activities at this point. As with BCP, the concept of having single points of failure at the network’s strategic level should be anathema.
2.6 Dissolution and Convergence: An Emerging Risk Where all aspects of an infrastructure share common characteristics or where systems rely on a common point of service, the overall infrastructure or system becomes vulnerable. Given the trend toward convergence and network-enabled infrastructure, it would be worthwhile including some brief and introductory comments regarding the risk of dissolution and the concept of convergence.
2.6.1 Convergence, Network Expansion, Open Architecture, and Common Criteria The increasing reliance on networks illustrates one potential avenue that could become a sector- or systemwide vulnerability if not led diligently. First, convergence describes a condition by which the physical and asset protection infrastructure is becoming increasingly network enabled. Similarly, operational networks are expanding with new partnerships being formed to streamline delivery of services. The concept of open architecture and common criteria pose a significant challenge at this point. By publishing the open architecture and common criteria, a determined attack planner can identify certain characteristics that are common across the system and can attempt to reverse-engineer those characteristics or criteria in an attempt to determine a weakness. Given that both of these concepts communicate on a global scale, one can only assume that this potential threat vector is likely to occur. However, the same concepts, in their development, also allow for a wide community challenge to the architecture and criteria, thereby reducing a number of the vulnerabilities in the system. The key here is in allowing for that broad and diligent consultative period before moving the overall structures into the public domain. This concept has been a challenge for cyptographers and cryptoanalysts for quite some time already. The result is reasonably simple. The encryption process uses a similar process in the development of new methods of protecting data against unauthorized disclosure or modification. For the critical infrastructure sectors, the principle may be similar. On one hand, the common criteria and open architecture may be globally available, but the specific and detailed information necessary to exploit something at the local level remains hidden from view. Again, however, the concept hinges on a concept that was rigorously challenged at the front and then monitored in terms of its effectiveness.
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2.7 Marking the Journey Up to this point, we have looked at a theoretical situation that describes critical infrastructure assurance as an overarching, system-based, mission-focused view of how critical infrastructure sectors function. One might ask why this appears at the relative start of the work. The answer lies in three important steps. First, we understand the nature of the changes that occurred as a result of 9/11. Many of us do not realize that the changes at that time were a fusion of the changes that followed the Y2K concerns of 1999. Second, by providing two benchmarks, or stakes in the sand, based on the first and second editions of this work, we can define some of the changes to date. The first edition marks a point where one might argue that Western society was in a significant mitigation phase with respect to the 9/11 attacks—the term mitigation being used in its emergency preparedness context of those immediate steps used to contain damage. This second edition comes at what might arguably be at the end of that phase. Third, we understand that the business of CIP, homeland security, and similar programs are likely to undergo a significant change. We have looked briefly at convergence and the challenges of an evolving hybrid (physical and cyber) threat. There is also a new pressure to address economic and social issues—it may be argued that the old way of doing business (massive contributions and spending) are about to dry up as we look at renewed fiscal responsibility and restraint. Finally, the people involved are changing—from the retirement of many of the Cold War era security specialists through the process and systems engineers who defined what we now call “critical infrastructure.” Thus, this final step is about looking back into the past and seeing what was there. It is then about looking at what is in place today and understanding and questioning the changes that have taken place. Finally, it is about extrapolating, or projecting, that information into the future to best estimate (or perhaps just guestimate) what is likely to be.
2.7.1 Overview The period following September 2001 was a period of treaties, legislation, and regulation—much of it done quickly to respond to perceived needs. The marine industry is the clearest example of this, where entirely new regimes were constructed from an amendment to a safety code (SOLAS) in response to the events.
2.7.2 Legislation: 107th Congress (Particularly 2001–2002)10 As we look at the legislation that has been passed since the 107th Congress (2001– 2002) and up to the 110th Congress (2007–2008), we see what may be described as the response to one block of activity. In the 107th Congress, one might argue that the focus was on immediate responses to events—particularly within the transportation sector (particularly aviation, seaports, and pipelines), border security, dams, and the
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beginning of the push into cybersecurity. One must also note the legislation that gave rise to the Department of Homeland Security.
2.7.3 Legislation: 108th Congress–109th Congress We see, from the 107th Congress through to the 109th Congress (inclusively), a shift from the very general legislation to issues that are more granular. For example, in the transportation sector, we see the initial marine security bills being general in nature, whereas in 2006, marine security was beginning to legislate the approach of layered defenses (HR4954) and increasing granularity up to 2008. We also need to understand that legislation, where none exists, can be challenging in democracies. As a result, we also see, particularly in Canada and the United States, a gradual shift from legislation to regulation through rule and measure making. There are challenges with this approach—the oversight mechanisms for each of these are fundamentally different. Although not fully examined, one might wonder if there is a research opportunity for someone to examine the nature of this shift with respect to the oversight mechanisms used to create them.
2.7.4 The State Today: A Recap Today’s situation puts the “critical infrastructure protection” and “critical infrastructure assurance” domains at a crossroad. First, there are significant resource issues. The collapses within the financial and automobile sectors put a significant strain on the economy. Concurrently, the costs associated with foreign wars and activities have put strains onto existing economies in terms of debt. Finally, there is the challenge of the reducing tax base caused by an aging population that packs two punches—reduced income through management of fixed incomes (pensions, etc.) as well as lost earnings (in terms of income tax) as well as the costs to social security and social support programs. In essence, one might argue that although the cupboard is not bare, we have certainly seen the back of the cupboard and realized that things cannot carry on as they have. Second, there are significant knowledge base issues. The aging population noted earlier also carries within it a significant portion of the corporate knowledge associated with the infrastructure involved. We are also finally beginning to make the shift from an asset protection mode (some would theorize this being a mitigation response to 9/11) back to an infrastructure assurance mode where a new level of understanding has to be overlaid on top of traditional security and protection approaches. The issues of convergence means that traditionally separate communities will now be forced, through necessity (even if to survive in the economic sense), to interact and crosspollinate, and as we address these issues within our own community, our adversaries and competitors are working on harnessing opportunities provided in the new structure and our readiness to accept it. Finally, there is the concept of public-private partnerships. With significant portions of the infrastructure operating outside of federal, or even government, ownership, governments have had to adjust their thinking from a span of control approach
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(e.g., through the dictating of plans) to a span of influence approach (indicated by the shift toward frameworks).
2.7.5 Research and Understanding For those involved in CIP, homeland security, and emergency preparedness, these are also exciting times in the research community. The concepts described here are those that are openly researched in the community—concepts that are driving new technologies and approaches to infrastructure management. It also causes friction between communities, particularly those that are firmly attached to rigid doctrines and dogmas and are unwilling to expand the breadth and depth of those approaches into new areas.
2.8 Authors’ Notes • Flexibility in thinking for the professional can be challenging—particularly when the profession demands that the professional remain compliant with a certain approach or in line with a certain body of knowledge. Today, the infrastructure and asset protection communities have a plethora of certifications that can be applied to certain aspects or sectors. • Within organizations, there is a certain inertia that resists change. Pride in the organization’s culture, heritage, or traditions can be either an anchor in the storm or an anchor in the race to reach new destinations. The key is to see the anchor for what it is—a tool that needs to be applied correctly. Will organizational issues be a help or a hindrance—and can the conflicts and frictions that inevitably come with changes of culture be managed effectively or will they pose yet another vulnerability to the infrastructure in question? • Finally, where does the leadership in the critical infrastructure assurance question lie? Does it lie with society and its duly elected representatives, or does it lie in the private sector? If you have a specific answer to the question, what does this mean to the role of government and oversight? What if times change and new approaches are needed? Is our own organizational structure resilient enough to meet those challenges? These are some of the questions within this field—making it awesome in its scope and more than a little exciting in terms of its application.
Notes
1. Idaho National Laboratory, “Critical Infrastructure Independency Modeling: A Survey of U.S. International Research,” P. Pederson, S. Dudenhoeffer, S. Hartley, M. Permann, August 2006. http://www.inl.gov/technicalpublications/Documents/3489532.pdf (alt URL: http://cipbook.infracritical.com/book3/chapter2/ch2ref10.pdf). 2. The call for proposals can be found at www.css.drdc-rddc.gc.ca/program/index-eng.asp. Although the proposals technically closed in November 2008, this kind of research is often ongoing and will require significant studies in the future (alt URL: http://cipbook .infracritical.com/book3/chapter2/ch2ref1.pdf).
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3. A clear reference for this work can be found at http://homelandsecurity.tamu.edu/ framework/criticalinfra/general-issues-and-recommendations/critical-infrastructureand-interdependency-modeling-a-survey-of-us-and-international-research.html/ (document identified within the Web site, entitled “Critical Infrastructure and Interdependency Modeling: A Survey of US and International Research.” 2006. Idaho National Laboratory, U.S. Department of Energy, may be found here: http://cipbook.infracritical.com/book3/ chapter2/ch2ref2.pdf and http://cipbook./infracritical.com/book3/chapter2/ch2ref2a.pdf). 4. The Gilmore Commission is an advisory panel that assesses the capabilities for responding to terrorist incidents in the United States involving weapons of mass destruction. Response capabilities at the federal, state, and local levels are examined, with a particular emphasis on the latter; the secretary of defense, in consultation with the attorney general, the secretary of energy, the secretary of health and human services, and the director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency entered into a contract with the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center, to establish the advisory panel, which released its fifth and final report in December 2003. 5. 80–337PS/2003 Homeland Security: The Federal and New York Response, Field Hearing Before the Committee on Science House of Representatives, One Hundred Seventh Congress, Second Session, June 24, 2002, Serial no. 107–71, http://commdocs.house .gov/committees/science/hsy80337.000/hsy80337_0.htm (alt URL: http://cipbook .infracritical.com/book3/chapter2/ch2ref9.pdf). 6. Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives, Hearing Charter, Cyber Terrorism—A View From the Gilmore Commission, Wednesday, October 17, 2001, www.house.gov/science/full/oct17/full_charter_101701.htm (alt URL: http://cipbook .infracritical.com/book3/chapter2/ch2ref7.pdf). 7. www.fbi.gov/page2/dec08/coppertheft_120308.html (alt URL: http://cipbook.infracritical .com/book3/chapter2/ch2ref3.pdf and ch2ref3a.pdf). 8. www.fbi.gov/page2/dec08/unirac_121608.html (alt URL: http://cipbook.infracritical.com/ book3/chapter2/ch2ref4.pdf and ch2ref4a.pdf). 9. www.csoonline.com/article/437873/IT_Admin_Locks_up_San_Francisco_s_Network. 10. http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d109:HR04954:@@@D&summ2=m&|TOM:/ bss/d109query.html (alt URL: http://cipbook.infracritical.com/book3/chapter2/ch2ref5.pdf). 11. http://clinton4.nara.gov/OMB/legislative/sap/106-2/S1993-s.html (alt URL: http://cipbook .infracritical.com/book3/chapter2/ch2ref6.pdf). 12. http://clinton4.nara.gov/OMB/legislative/sap/106-2/S1993-s.html (alt URL: http://cipbook .infracritical.com/book3/chapter2/ch2ref6.pdf). 13. http://www.fcw.com/fcw/articles/2000/1016/web-gisa-10-16-00.asp. 14. http://csrc.nist.gov/drivers/documents/HR3394-final.pdf (alt URL: http://cipbook.infracritical .com/book3/chapter2/ch2ref8.pdf).
Response 3 National Framework
3.1 Introduction This chapter outlines the move made by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to adopt the National Response Framework (NRF) on March 22, 2008, as a replacement to its predecessor, the National Response Plan (NRP). It outlines at strategic levels the what, where, and how in case of a crisis or large-scale disaster, usually at the national level. The last sections of this chapter will identify the key roles and functions of the NRF and its implementations.
3.2 What is the NRF? The NRF builds on and from the NRP. It was designed to give senior elected and appointed officials from federal, tribal, state, and local governments, as well as members of the private sector, a clear, straightforward, easy-to-understand system for working together before, during, and after disasters. It can be used to manage everything from the smallest local incident to a major catastrophic event that impacts the entire nation.1 This framework is built from a scalable, flexible, and adaptable coordinating series of structures that align key roles and responsibilities across the nation, describing specific authority organizations as well as best practices for managing incidents ranging from small, local-scale incidents, to large-scale catastrophic events. This document explains common disciplinary methods and structures that have been exercised and matured at the local, tribal, state, and federal levels over time. It describes key lessons learned from natural disasters, such as Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, and focuses on how the federal government is organized to support communities and states during catastrophic incidents. Most importantly, it builds on the National Incident Management System (NIMS), which provides a consistent template for managing incidents. The term “response” (as used within the NRF) includes methods for saving life and protecting property and the environment, while tending to essential human needs. The response includes execution of emergency plans and actions to support short-term recovery methods, as the NRF is always in effect; its elements can be implemented as needed on a more flexible—if not scalable—basis, to improve coordinated response when needed.2 29
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3.3 Reasons for Replacing the NRP After an investigation by the Senate Committee on Homeland Security & Gov ernmental Affairs in late 2007, it was determined that the DHS, and especially the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), were unprepared for large-scale catastrophic events caused by the failed response and lack of federal support to postHurricane Katrina victims and its recovery efforts. Because of the lack of basic capabilities and resources available to FEMA, the committee found key failures in other parts of the DHS, such as its hesitant, inaccurate, and inconsistent implementation of the NRP, as well as a lack of effective communication between the Secretary of Homeland Security and the then-director of FEMA. The committee recommended replacing the FEMA with another response agency. In late September 2006, the U.S. Congress passed the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006, which President George W. Bush signed into law on October 4, 2006.3 The act established and defined additional leadership positions within the DHS that provided improved functions to FEMA, while creating and reallocating functions to other components within the DHS, and amending the Homeland Security Act of 2002 for large-scale natural disasters. The DHS made certain that other organizational changes outside of FEMA would complement changes mandated by Congress. These changes, taken together, would strengthen the DHS’s ability to prevent, prepare for, protect against, respond to, and recover from all hazard threats. The changes became effective on March 31, 2007.4 The act enhanced FEMA’s responsibilities and its autonomy within the DHS, and was to lead and support the nation in a risk-based, comprehensive emergency management system of preparedness, protection, response, recovery, and mitigation.5 Under the act, the FEMA administrator reports directly to the Secretary of Homeland Security as FEMA is now a distinct entity within the DHS; and the Secretary of Homeland Security can no longer substantially or significantly reduce the authorities, responsibilities, or functions of FEMA, or have the capability to perform them unless authorized by subsequent legislation. The act further directs the transfer to FEMA of many functions of the DHS’s former Preparedness Directorate. The statute codified the existing regional structure, which now includes 10 regional offices within FEMA and specified their responsibilities. It also contains a provision establishing FEMA as a National Integration Center, which is responsible for the ongoing management and maintenance of the NIMS and the now-known NRF.6 In addition, the act includes several provisions to strengthen the management and capability of FEMA’s workforce. For example, the statute calls for a strategic human capital plan to shape and improve FEMA’s workforce, authorizes recruitment and retention bonuses, and establishes requirements for a Surge Capacity Force.7
3.4 Differences between the NRP and the NRF The stated purpose of the NRF is “to ensure that government executives, private-sector and nongovernmental organization (NGO) leaders, and emergency management practitioners across the nation understand the domestic incident response roles, responsibilities, and relationships in order to respond more effectively to any type of incident.”8
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The NRF is an updated version of the NRP, which has been in place since 2004. The NRF incorporates input from stakeholders, lessons learned, and best practices developed since the NRP was first implemented. Emergency management is, and should be, considered a local function and responsibility. When a local government exhausts its available resources, it might request further assistance. Assistance of this nature generally comes in the form of mutual aid from neighboring government jurisdictions. When a catastrophic event occurs, state and federal resources may be deployed; thus, the NRF establishes roles and responsibilities of these entities that involve varied responses. Under the NRF, incident command remains at a local level even though federal resources may be deployed and implemented, except in rare circumstances in which local governments may be unable to lead any response effort(s), even if temporarily.9 Essentially, the NRF does the following.
1. It emphasizes roles of tribal, local, state, and federal governments, nongovernmental organization (NGOs), individuals, and the private sector. 2. It establishes a response doctrine that: • Introduces and/or improves on already engaged partnerships and organizations • Provides a structured and tiered response that is scalable, flexible, and adaptable for most operational capabilities • Provides unity of efforts through unified command structures • Demonstrates readiness and willingness to act 3. It establishes planning as a critical element of effective response.
A core difference between NRP and NRF lies in the nature of accountability. A plan defines details that are to be met and all participants are essentially told to meet those requirements. Although this approach may appear sound, the challenge lies in its application. What do you do with an organization that cannot afford to meet those requirements? Do you provide support to them and, if so, how does that change the liabilities associated with meeting the plan requirements? For example, if an organization is prescribed to purchase lighting and that lighting, purchased by the government, fails to function as intended, can the user of that lighting be held fully accountable? Of course not. In that regard, it came as little surprise that the NRP evolved into the NRF. The NRF puts accountability squarely on the executives who are in charge of the participants. It does this by removing many of the prescriptive measures and replacing them with goals that have to be met by all participants. The key here is that the executive has a fair degree of leeway in how those goals are met—he or she can assign and prioritize whatever resources. The executive simply needs to demonstrate that all goals have been met. Where an executive fails to meet those goals, the argument that he or she had insufficient resources is greatly reduced. This approach, however, puts a different type of burden on those who check to see if compliance with the NRF is being achieved. Under the NRP, prescriptive measures could be comparatively easy to identify. Under the NRF, those performing this function have to have an understanding of the goals, have an understanding
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of the organization striving to achieve that goal, and be able determine if there is a reasonable expectation that the goal is being met—a far cry from the checklist approach. It should be clear, however, that once an organization has defined how it would meet those NRF objectives, those can be verified using traditional “promises kept” approaches, such as through the use of customized checklists.
3.5 Target Audience of the NRF The NRF was written for government executives, private sector, and NGO leader ship and management, as well as emergency management practitioners. First, it addressed effective response responsibilities for senior elected and appointed leaders, such as federal department or agency heads, state governors, mayors, tribal leaders, and city or county officials. For a nation to be prepared for any and all hazards, its leaders must have a baseline familiarity with the concepts and mechanics of the NRF.10 At the same time, the NRF informs emergency management practitioners, explaining operating structures and tools used routinely by first responders and emergency managers, at all levels of government. For its readers, the NRF is augmented with online access to supporting documents, further training, and an evolving resource for exchanging lessons learned.11 One of the challenges toward establishing an effective response is the relatively high turnover and short tenure among elected and appointed officials responsible for response at all levels. Effective response hinges on well-trained leaders and responders who have invested in response preparedness, developed engaged partnerships, and are able to achieve shared objectives; essentially, a concise, common cookbook is needed, thus ensuring consistent responses with all response members.12 The NRF, therefore, becomes similar to an open architecture or common criteria [to use information technology (IT) terminology] that entities either have to adopt or demonstrate that they can link into the system gracefully. There are several benefits to this approach, which are often part of the local level. Conversely, however, there are disadvantages. On one hand, the use of a framework allows the organization a level of flexibility with respect to what specific resources and training it will need to incorporate into its preparation phases. On the other hand, this level of individuality, if not appropriately monitored and controlled, can lead to a lack of coherence and transportability of skills as individuals move into environments using different platforms (hardware and software) when they move between organizations.
3.6 Applying the NRF to National Response Efforts The NRF was not written by the government in isolation. This document reflects an extensive coordination as well as input from state and local level management, emergency management, and private organizations across the country; essentially, the very people who will be using the plan are the ones who have devised the NRF plan. Thus, the NRF is not a federal plan; it is a national strategic document encouraging and ensuring that everyone involved for a given response effort is working on the same strategy.13
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The NRF builds from a set of core principles that:
1. Stresses the need for partnerships across both government and private sector organizations 2. Emphasizes a “bottom-up” approach recognizing that most incidents are managed locally, and that incidents should be handled at the lowest jurisdictional level possible 3. Is designed to be scalable in such a manner that it can be expanded or narrowed based on the scope and nature of the incident 4. Is flexible, but adaptable to varying types of disasters 5. Recognizes that successful emergency preparedness and response management depends on the unity of command as well as a clear understanding of roles and responsibilities among all involved 6. Stems from the concept that the NRF is always activated and encourages a forward leaning posture by emphasizing a more proactive approach to preparedness planning, organizing, training, equipping, exercising, and applying lessons learned from all exercises and events. Planning ahead for a disaster is critical for its successful response, and thus, the NRF encourages such and similar coordination; the term “expect the unexpected” can (and should) apply in using the NRF.14
3.7 How Does the NRF Tie in with Emergency Management? Since the events of September 11, 2001, our nation has resolved to better prepare itself in preventing potential terrorist attacks within the United States; reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, major disasters, and other emergencies; and minimize the damage and recover from attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies that occur. These complex and emerging twenty-first century threats and hazards demand a unified and coordinated national approach to domestic incident management.
3.8 NRF Key Principles The NRF is broken down into five key response principles, participants, roles, and structures that guide response operations, as follows.
1. Engaged partnership means that leaders at all levels collaborate to develop shared response goals and align capabilities. Collaboration is designed to prevent any level from being overwhelmed in times of crisis. 2. Tiered response refers to the efficient management of incidents, so that such incidents are handled at the lowest possible jurisdictional level and supported by additional capabilities only when needed. 3. Scalable, flexible, and adaptable operational capabilities are implemented as incidents change in size, scope, and complexity, so that the response
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to an incident or complex of incidents adapts to meet the requirements under Incident Command System (ICS)/NIMS management by objectives. The ICS/NIMS resources of various formally defined resource types are requested, assigned, and deployed as needed, then demobilized when available and incident deployment is not longer necessary. 4. Unity of effort through unified command refers to the ICS/NIMS respect for each participating organization’s chain of command with an emphasis on seamless coordination across jurisdictions in support of common objectives. This seamless coordination is guided by the “plain English” communication protocol between ICS/NIMS command structures and assigned resources to coordinate response operations among multiple jurisdictions that may be joined at an incident complex. 5. Readiness to act. “It is our collective duty to provide the best response possible. From individuals, households, and communities to local, tribal, state, and federal governments, national response depends on our readiness to act.”
The NRF includes a set of guidelines to be executed in case of a disaster, natural or otherwise, that can be implemented within a relatively short time frame.
3.9 How Is the NRF Organized? The NRF is composed of the core document, the emergency support function (ESF), support annexes, incident annexes, and the partner guides. The core document describes the doctrine that guides national response, roles and responsibilities, response actions, response organizations, and planning requirements to achieve an effective national response to any incident that occurs. The core document of the NRF is effective 60 days after publication. The annexes and partner guides will be updated periodically and effective 60 days after publication.15 The following documents provide more detailed information to assist practitioners in implementing the NRF.16 • Emergency Support Function Annexes group federal resources and capabilities into functional areas that are most frequently needed in a national response (e.g., transportation, firefighting, mass care). • Support Annexes describe essential supporting aspects that are common to all incidents (e.g., financial management, volunteer and donations management, private sector coordination). • Incident Annexes address the unique aspects of how we respond to seven broad incident categories (e.g., biological, nuclear/radiological, cyber, mass evacuation). • Partner Guides provide ready references describing key roles and actions for local, tribal, state, federal, and private sector response partners. The NIMS is a companion document providing command and management strategies that apply to most response activities. This system provides a consistent,
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nationwide template to enable federal, state, tribal, and local governments, private sector organizations, and NGOs to work together to prepare for, prevent, respond to, recover from, and mitigate the effects of incidents regardless of cause, size, location, or complexity. This consistency provides the foundation for utilization of the NIMS for all incidents, ranging from daily occurrences to incidents requiring a coordinated federal response (please refer to Chapter 4).17
3.10 What Is the Purpose of the NRF? The NRF provides strategies for implementing a nationwide response policy and operational coordination for all types of domestic incidents. It can be partially or fully implemented in the context of a threat, in anticipation of a significant event, or in response to an incident. Selective implementation allows for a scaled response, delivery of the resources needed, and an appropriate level of coordination.18
3.11 Tie between NRF and NIMS19 The NRF, using the NIMS, establishes mechanisms to: • Integrate incident prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery activities • Improve coordination and integration of federal, state, local, tribal, regional, private sector, and NGO partners • Maximize efficient utilization of resources needed for effective incident management and critical infrastructure/key resources protection and restoration • Improve incident management communications and increase situational awareness across jurisdictions and between the public and private sectors • Facilitate emergency mutual aid and federal emergency support to governments • Facilitate federal-to-federal interaction and emergency support • Provide proactive and integrated federal responses for catastrophic events • Address linkages to other federal incident management and emergency response plans developed for specific types of incidents or hazards [Author’s note: The NRF (essentially) activates the NIMS (see Chapter 4 for further information) when there is a crisis or national emergency (or of significant importance).]
3.12 Multiagency Communication and Structure Coordination20 The NRF outlines a coordinated command structure for multiple agencies during a crisis or national emergency.
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• It identifies police, fire, public health and medical, emergency management, and other personnel as responsible for incident management at the local level. • Incident responses are handled at the lowest organizational and jurisdictional levels. • Seamless integration of federal involvement when local or state capabilities are exceeded.
3.13 Coordination Responsibilities21 Coordination responsibilities remained the same. The NRF introduces additional responsibility groups, specific to their areas of influence, as part of the structured command coordination control mechanism, which is part of the NRF. • The Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC) serves as the primary national level multiagency hub for domestic situational awareness and operational coordination. The HSOC also includes DHS components such as the National Infrastructure Coordinating Center, which has the primary responsibility for coordinating communications with the nation’s critical infrastructure during an incident. • The National Response Coordination Center (NRCC), a functional component of the HSOC, is a multiagency center that provides overall federal response coordination. • At the regional level, the Regional Response Coordination Center (RRCC) coordinates regional response efforts and implements both local and federal program support until a joint field office is established. • The Interagency Incident Management Group (IIMG) is a group of senior federal interagency professionals who provide strategic advice to the Secretary of Homeland Security during an actual or potential Incident of National Significance. • The Joint Field Office (JFO) is a temporary federal facility established locally to provide a central point to coordinate resources in support of state, local, and tribal authorities. The Secretary of Homeland Security may designate a Principal Federal Official (PFO) during a potential or actual Incident of National Significance. Although individual federal officials retain their authorities pertaining to specific aspects of incident management, the PFO works in conjunction with these officials to coordinate overall federal incident management efforts.
3.14 Updates to the NRF The U.S. DHS FEMA, in close coordination with the Office of the Secretary of DHS, will maintain the NRF. The NRF will be updated to incorporate new presidential directives, legislative changes, and procedural changes based on lessons learned from exercises and actual events.
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In the future, there may be increased movement toward a regulated framework; essentially, all interested emergency management, at all levels, will be held accountable and responsible for their course of actions taken during and after an emergency event or situation. In other words, the key difference between the framework and the plan is that the plan is more rigid, whereas the framework is more flexible and can accommodate change as time moves onward. The framework allows the system to become “mission centric,” focusing on achieving its goals and the eventual solution, rather than fixating on the process of finding the solution.
3.15 Incident Command Structure of the NRF The Secretary of Homeland Security declares “Incidents of National Significance”22 (in consultation with other departments and agencies as appropriate) and provides coordination for federal operations and/or resources; establishes reporting requirements and conducts ongoing communications with federal, state, local, tribal, private sector, and NGOs to maintain situational awareness; analyzes threats; assesses national implications of threat and operational response activities; and coordinates threat or incident response activities. This plan addresses the full spectrum of activities related to domestic incident management, including prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery actions. The NRP focuses on those activities that are directly related to an evolving incident or potential incident rather than steady-state preparedness or readiness activities conducted in the absence of a specific threat or hazard. Since Incidents of National Significance sometimes result in impacts far beyond the immediate or initial incident area, the NRP provides a framework to enable the management of cascading impacts and multiple incidents as well as the prevention of and preparation for subsequent events. Examples of incident management actions from a national perspective might include: • Increasing nationwide public awareness • Assessing trends that point to potential terrorist activities • Elevating the national Homeland Security Advisory System alert condition and coordinating protective measures across multiple jurisdictions • Increasing countermeasures such as inspections, surveillance, security, counterintelligence, and infrastructure protection • Conducting public health surveillance and assessment processes and, where appropriate, conducting a wide range of prevention measures to include, but not limited to, immunizations • Providing immediate and long-term public health and medical response assets • Coordinating federal support to state, local, and tribal authorities in the aftermath of an incident • Providing strategies for coordination of federal resources required to handle subsequent events • Enabling immediate recovery activities while addressing any long-term consequences within the impacted area or zone.
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3.16 Levels of Authority Various federal statutory authorities and policies provide the basis for federal actions and activities in the context of domestic incident management. The NRF uses the foundation provided by the Homeland Security Act, Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-5, and the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act) to provide a comprehensive, all-hazards approach to domestic incident management. Nothing within the NRF alters the existing authorities of individual federal departments and agencies. The NRF does not convey new authorities upon the Secretary of Homeland Security or any other federal official. Rather, this plan establishes the coordinating structures, processes, and protocols required to integrate the specific statutory and policy authorities of various federal departments and agencies in a collective framework for action to include prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery activities. The NRF may be used in conjunction with other federal incident management and emergency operations plans developed under these and other authorities as well as memoranda of understanding among various federal agencies. It should also be noted that local authorities and management, if capable, would retain control over the event or situation, rather than acquiesce to federal management and authorities. Only if local governments cannot operate accordingly, are unable, or unavailable to command leadership, will the federal government take control of the event or situation.
3.17 Key Concepts in the Implementation of the NRF Summarized key concepts that are reflected throughout the NRF include the following concepts. • Systematic and coordinated incident management, including protocols for: −− incident reporting −− coordinated action −− alert and notification −− mobilization of federal resources to augment existing federal, state, local, and tribal capabilities −− operating under differing threats or threat levels −− integration of crisis and consequence management functions • Proactive notification and deployment of federal resources in anticipation of or in response to catastrophic events in coordination and collaboration with state, local, and tribal governments, and private organizations (when/ where possible). • Organizing interagency efforts to minimize damage, restore impacted areas to preincident conditions (if feasible), and/or implement programs to mitigate vulnerability of future occurrences. • Coordinating incident communication, worker safety and health, private sector involvement, and other activities that are common to the majority of incidents.
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• Organize to facilitate the delivery of critical federal resources, assets, and assistance. Federal departments and agencies are assigned to lead or support based on authorities, resources, and capabilities. • Providing mechanisms for vertical and horizontal coordination, communications, and information sharing in response to threats or incidents. These mechanisms facilitate coordination among state, local, and tribal entities, and the federal government, as well as between the public and private sectors. • Facilitating federal support to federal departments and agencies acting under the requesting department or agency’s own authorities. • Developing detailed supplemental operations, tactical, and hazard-specific contingency plans and procedures. • Providing the basis for coordination of interagency and intergovernmental planning, training, exercising, assessment, coordination, and information exchange.
3.18 Roles and Responsibilities Police, fire, public health and medical, emergency management, public works, environmental response, and other personnel are often the first to arrive and the last to leave an incident site. In some instances, a federal agency in the local area may act as a first responder, and the local assets of federal agencies may be used to advise or assist state or local officials in accordance with agency authorities and procedures. Mutual aid agreements provide mechanisms to mobilize and use to support the incident command. When state resources and capabilities are overwhelmed, governors may request federal assistance under a presidential disaster or emergency declaration. Summarized below are the responsibilities of the governor, local chief executive officer (CEO), and tribal CEO.
3.18.1 Role of the Governor As a state’s chief executive, the governor is responsible for the public safety and welfare of the people of that state or territory, such that the governor: • Is responsible for coordinating state resources to address the full spectrum of actions to prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover from incidents in an all-hazards context to include terrorism, natural disasters, accidents, and other contingencies • Under certain emergency conditions, typically has police powers to make, amend, and rescind orders and regulations • Provides leadership and plays a key role in communicating to the public and in helping people, businesses, and organizations cope with the consequences of any type of declared emergency within state jurisdiction • Encourages participation in mutual aid and implements authorities for the state to enter into mutual aid agreements with other states, tribes, and territories to facilitate resource sharing
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• Is the commander-in-chief of state military forces (National Guard when in State Active Duty or Title 32 status and the authorized state militias) • Requests federal assistance when it becomes clear that state or tribal capabilities will be insufficient or have been exceeded or exhausted
3.18.2 Role of the Local CEO A mayor or city or county manager, as a jurisdiction’s chief executive, is responsible for the public safety and welfare of the people of that jurisdiction, such that the local CEO (mayor): • In a similar fashion to the governor, is responsible for coordinating local resources to address the full spectrum of actions to prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover from incidents in an all-hazards context to include terrorism, natural disasters, accidents, and other contingencies • Depending on state and local laws, has extraordinary powers to suspend local laws and ordinances, such as to establish a curfew, direct evacuations, and, in coordination with the local health authority, to order a quarantine • Provides leadership and plays a key role in communicating to the public, and in helping people, businesses, and organizations cope with the consequences of any type of domestic incident within the jurisdiction • Negotiates and enters into mutual aid agreements with other jurisdictions to facilitate resource sharing • Requests state and, if necessary, federal assistance through the governor of the state when the jurisdiction’s capabilities have been exceeded or exhausted
3.18.3 Role of the Tribal CEO The tribal CEO is responsible for the public safety and welfare of the people of that tribe, such that the tribal CEO, as authorized by tribal government: • Has all the roles similar to that of the local CEO, except that the tribal CEO is not dependent on state and local laws insofar as to be able to suspend tribal laws and ordinances, and others • Can elect to deal directly with the federal government (although a state governor must request a presidential disaster declaration on behalf of a tribe under the Stafford Act, federal agencies can work directly with the tribe within existing authorities and resources)
3.19 Roles of the Federal Government The Homeland Security Act of 2002 established the DHS to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States; reduce the vulnerability of the United States to terrorism, natural disasters, and other emergencies; and minimize the damage and assist in the recovery from terrorist attacks, natural disasters, and other emergencies. The act
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also designates the DHS as “a focal point regarding natural and manmade crises and emergency planning.”23 Pursuant to HSPD-5,24 the Secretary of Homeland Security is responsible for coordinating federal operations within the United States to prepare for, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies. HSPD-525 further designates the Secretary of Homeland Security as the “principal federal official”26 for domestic incident management. In this role, the Secretary is also responsible for coordinating federal resources utilized in response to or recovery from terrorist attacks, major disasters, or other emergencies if and when any of the following four conditions apply.
1. Federal department or agency acting under its own authority has requested DHS assistance. 2. Resources of state and local authorities are overwhelmed and federal assistance has been requested. 3. More than one federal department or agency has become substantially involved in responding to the incident. 4. The Secretary has been directed to assume incident management responsibilities by the president of the United States.
In accordance with HSPD-527 and other relevant statutes and directives, the Attorney General has lead responsibility for criminal investigations of terrorist acts or threats by individuals or groups inside the United States, or directed at U.S. citizens or institutions abroad, where such acts are within the federal criminal jurisdiction of the United States, as well as for related intelligence collection activities within the United States, subject to applicable laws, executive orders, directives, and procedures. Generally acting through the U.S. Department of Justice Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Attorney General, in cooperation with other federal departments and agencies engaged in activities to protect national security, coordinates the activities of the other members of the law enforcement community to detect, prevent, preempt, and disrupt terrorist attacks against the United States. This includes actions to prevent, preempt, and disrupt specific terrorist threats or actual incidents that are based on specific intelligence or law enforcement information. Nothing in this plan derogates the Attorney General’s status or responsibilities. Following a terrorist threat or an actual incident that falls within the criminal jurisdiction of the United States, the full capabilities of the United States will be dedicated to assisting the Attorney General to identify the perpetrators and bring them to justice, consistent with U.S. laws and with authorities of other federal departments and agencies to protect national security. The Department of Defense has significant resources that may be available to support the federal response to an Incident of National Significance. The Secretary of Defense authorizes Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) for domestic incidents as directed by the president or when consistent with military readiness operations and appropriate under the circumstances and the law. The Secretary of Defense retains command of military forces under DSCA, as with all other situations and operations.28 Concepts of “command” and “unity of command” have distinct
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legal and cultural meanings for military forces and operations. For military forces, command runs from the president to the Secretary of Defense to the commander of the combatant command to the commander of the forces. The “unified command” concept used by civil authorities is distinct from the military chain of command. The Department of State has international coordination responsibilities. The Secretary of State is responsible for coordinating international prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery activities relating to domestic incidents, and for the protection of U.S. citizens and interests overseas. During an Incident of National Significance, other federal departments or agencies may play primary, coordinating, and/or support roles based on their authorities and resources and the nature of the incident. In situations where a federal agency has jurisdictional authority and responsibility for directing or managing a major aspect of the response, that agency is part of the national leadership for the incident and participates as a Senior Federal Official or Senior Federal Law Enforcement Official in the JFO Coordination Group at the field level, and as part of the IIMG and/or Homeland Security Council/National Security Council Policy Coordination Committees. Some federal agencies with jurisdictional authority and responsibility may also participate in the unified command at the incident command post (ICP). Federal departments and agencies participate in a structure as coordinators, primary agencies, and/or support agencies and/or as required to support incident management activities. HSPD-529 directs the heads of all federal departments and agencies, in the context of domestic incident management, to provide their full and prompt cooperation, resources, and support, as appropriate and consistent with their own responsibilities for protecting our national security, to the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of State. Several federal agencies have independent authorities to declare disasters or emergencies. These authorities may be exercised concurrently with or become part of a major disaster or emergency declared under the Stafford Act. Some examples of agencies exercising independent authorities include the following scenarios. • The Secretary of Agriculture may declare a disaster in certain situations in which a county sustained production loss of 30% or greater in a single major enterprise, authorizing emergency loans for physical damages and crop loss. • The Administrator of the Small Business Administration may make a disaster declaration based on physical damage to buildings, machinery, equipment, inventory, homes, and other property, as well as economic injury. • The Secretary of Commerce may make a declaration of a commercial fisheries failure or fishery resources disaster. • The Secretary of Health and Human Services may declare a public health emergency. • The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) Chief of Engineers may issue a disaster declaration in response to flooding and coastal storms. USACE is authorized to undertake emergency operations and activities.
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• A Federal On-Scene Coordinator, designated by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, DHS/U.S. Coast Guard, DoD, or the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) under the NCP, has the authority to direct response efforts at the scene of a discharge or release of oil, hazardous substance, pollutants, or contaminants, depending on the substance and the location and source of release. The NRF applies a functional approach that groups the capabilities of federal departments and agencies and the American Red Cross into ESFs to provide the planning, support, resources, program implementation, and emergency services that are most likely to be needed during Incidents of National Significance. The federal response to actual or potential Incidents of National Significance is typically provided through the full or partial activation of the ESF structure as necessary. The ESFs serve as the coordination mechanism to provide assistance to state, local, and tribal governments, or to federal departments and agencies conducting missions of primary federal responsibility. ESFs may be selectively activated for both Stafford Act and non–Stafford Act incidents where federal departments or agencies request DHS assistance or under other circumstances as defined in HSPD-5.30 The ESFs provide staffing for the NRCC, RRCC, JFO, and ICP as required by the situation at hand.
3.20 NRF Emergency Support Functions As merged from the NRP and from the Federal Response Plan (FRP), the NRF introduced several corresponding ESFs into the NRF. Previously, the NRP/FRP ESFs were as follows: • • • • • • • • • • • •
Transportation Communications Public works and engineering Firefighting Information and planning Mass care Resource support Health and medical services Urban search and rescue Hazardous materials (HAZMAT) Food Energy
Now, with merged functions from the NRP/FRP, the NRF ESFs are as follows: • • • •
Transportation Communications Public works and engineering Firefighting
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Emergency management Mass care, housing, and human services Resource support Public health and medical services Urban search and rescue Oil and HAZMAT response Agriculture and natural resources Energy Public safety and security Long-term community recovery and mitigation External affairs
The NRF Resource Center (www.fema.gov/nrf) contains supplemental materials including annexes, partner guides, and other supporting documents and learning resources. This information is more dynamic and will change and adapt more frequently as lessons from real-world events are learned, incorporate new technologies, and adapt to changes within our organizations.31 Emergency Support Functions. The 15 ESFs provide a mechanism to bundle federal resources/capabilities to support federal, state, tribal, and local responders. Examples of functions include transportation, communications, and energy. Each ESF has a coordinator as well as primary and support agencies that work together to coordinate and deliver the full breadth of federal capabilities. Support Annexes. The eight support annexes describe supporting aspects of federal response common to all incidents: among them are financial management, public affairs, volunteer and donations management; private sector coordination and worker safety and health. Each support annex has a coordinating agency and cooperating agencies. Incident Annexes. The seven incident annexes describe how the framework will be applied in specific types of incidents: among them, biological, cyber, food and agriculture, mass evacuations, nuclear/radiological, and terrorism. Each incident annex has a coordinating agency and cooperating agencies. Note that the incident annexes are currently being updated and, in the meantime, the existing incident annexes to the NRP remain in effect. Partner Guides. The partner guides provide more specific “how to” handbooks tailored specifically to four areas: local governments, state and tribal governments, the federal government, and the private sector and NGOs.
3.21 Scope of ESFs Each ESF is composed of primary and support agencies. The NRF identifies primary agencies on the basis of authorities, resources, and capabilities. Support agencies are assigned based on resources and capabilities in a given functional area. The resources provided by the ESFs reflect the resource-typing categories identified in the NIMS. ESFs are expected to support one another in carrying out their respective roles and responsibilities. The federal response to actual or potential Incidents
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of National Significance is typically provided through the full or partial activation of the ESF structure as necessary.32 Not all Incidents of National Significance result in the activation of ESFs.33 It is possible that an Incident of National Significance can be adequately addressed by the DHS and other federal agencies through activation of certain NRF elements (e.g., PFO, IIMG) without the activation of ESFs.34 Similarly, operational security considerations may dictate that activation of NRF elements be kept to a minimum, particularly in the context of certain terrorism prevention activities. ESF services (and their scope) are broken into subcategories based on functionality.35
3.21.1 ESF 1: Transportation • • • • •
Federal and civil transportation support Transportation safety Restoration and recovery of the transportation infrastructure Movement restrictions Damage and impact assessments
3.21.2 ESF 2: Communications • Coordination with the telecommunications industry • Restoration and recovery of the telecommunications infrastructure • Protection, restoration, and sustainment of national computer and IT resources
3.21.3 ESF 3: Public Works • • • •
Public infrastructure protection and emergency repair services Infrastructure restoration Engineering services and construction management Critical infrastructure liaison
3.21.4 ESF 4: Fire Services • Firefighting activities on federal lands • Resource support to rural and urban firefighting operations
3.21.5 ESF 5: Emergency Management • • • • •
Coordination of incident management efforts Issuance of mission assignments Resource and human capital assessment management Incident Action Plan Financial management
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3.21.6 ESF 6: Human Services • Mass casualty care • Disaster housing • Human services
3.21.7 ESF 7: Resource Management • Resource support for finding facility space, office equipment and supplies, contracting services, etc.
3.21.8 ESF 8: Public Health and Medical Services • • • •
Public health services Medical services Mental health services Mortuary services
3.21.9 ESF 9: Urban Search and Rescue Services • Lifesaving assistance • Urban search and rescue
3.21.10 ESF 10: HAZMAT Response • Oil and HAZMAT (chemical, biological, radiological, etc.) response • Environmental safety and short- and long-term cleanup
3.21.11 ESF 11: Agriculture and Natural Resources • • • •
Nutrition assistance Animal and plant disease/pest response Food safety and security Natural and cultural resources and historic properties protection and restoration
3.21.12 ESF 12: Energy • Energy infrastructure assessment, repair, and restoration • Energy industry utilities coordination • Energy forecast
3.21.13 ESF 13: Public Safety and Security • Facility and resource security • Security planning and technical and resource assistance
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• Public safety/security support • Support to access, traffic, and crowd control
3.21.14 ESF 14: Long-Term Community Recovery and Mitigation • Social and economic community impact assessment • Long-term community recovery assistance to states, local governments, and the private sector • Mitigation analysis and program implementation
3.21.15 ESF 15: External Affairs • • • •
Emergency public information and protective action guidance Media and community relations Congressional and international affairs Tribal and insular affairs
3.22 Authors’ Thoughts Consider the situation where you operate a medium-sized business that needs to integrate into the NRF. What are some of the core challenges that you are likely to face? First, what goals need to be achieved and how are they to be achieved? In a prescriptive system, those answers are provided within the context of the requirements being defined. When you establish a goal-centric system, you lose this sense of clarity. The onus is placed on the business owner to attempt to use his/her resources to their best effect while reaching this goal. Second, finding people who can implement the plan becomes challenging, depending on the uniqueness of the solution. In prescriptive systems, training against the prescriptive standards is relatively straightforward. They are predictable and (usually) apply across the whole community. Thus, there might be significant pressure to have a central authority responsible for the standards to become responsible for communicating its requirements through awareness, training, and education. When a framework is created, however, fluidity becomes very apparent as owners work toward what can be potentially unique solutions. As a result, any costs associated with training naturally gravitate back to the owner level. These factors aside, there may also be some benefits to this approach. Many of these center around the argument that existing equipment or integration into processes can happen much more readily with this type of model. Finally, monitoring a system’s effectiveness can be measured against goals and compliance. Compliance, under this regime, means delivering on promises made. In short, the company indicates how it will achieve its goal with the third party entering the picture, determining that the party is meeting its obligations. This can be rather challenging for that third party organization as each facility runs the potential of being unique. On the other hand, prescriptive requirements mean that all aspects
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are the same, meaning that the challenge will come with those that are more, even if disproportionately, affected. As a business owner, where would you put the balance in this situation? As a regulator, where would you put the same balance?
Notes
1. http://www.dhs.gov/journal/leadership/2008/01/national-response-framework.html (alt URL: http://cipbook.infracritical.com/book3/chapter3/ch3ref1.pdf); http://www .fema.gov/emergency/nrf/ (alt URL: http://cipbook.infracritical.com/book3/chapter3/ ch3ref1a.pdf and ch3ref1b.pdf). 2. The National Response Framework (NRF), Federal Emergency Management Agency, Department of Homeland Security; URL: http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/nrfcore.pdf (alt URL: http://cipbook.infracritical.com/book3/chapter3/ch3ref2.pdf). 3. “Lieberman, Collins, Landrieu Comment On New National Response Framework,” Press Release, U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Af fairs, October 22, 2007; URL: http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction= PressReleases.Detail&Affiliation=C&PressRelease_id=061f1cd0-2d0d-4733-9505d7e3cd09d5fd&Month=10&Year=2007 (alt URL: http://cipbook.infracritical.com/book3/ chapter3/ch3ref3.pdf). 4. “Implementation of the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act and Other Organizational Changes”; URL: http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/structure/gc_1169243598416 .shtm (alt URL: http://cipbook.infracritical.com/book3/chapter3/ch3ref4.pdf). 5. “Actions Taken to Implement the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006,” General Accounting Office, November 21, 2008; URL: http://www.gao.gov/new .items/d0959r.pdf (alt URL: http://cipbook.infracritical.com/book3/chapter3/ch3ref5 .pdf). 6. Ibid. 7. Ibid. 8. The National Response Framework (NRF), Federal Emergency Management Agency, Department of Homeland Security; URL: http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/nrfcore.pdf (alt URL: http://cipbook.infracritical.com/book3/chapter3/ch3ref2.pdf). 9. Ibid. 10. The National Response Framework (NRF), Federal Emergency Management Agency, Department of Homeland Security; URL: http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/nrfcore.pdf (alt URL: http://cipbook.infracritical.com/book3/chapter3/ch3ref2.pdf). 11. Ibid. 12. Ibid. 13. http://www.dhs.gov/journal/leadership/2008/01/national-response-framework.html (alt URL: http://cipbook.infracritical.com/book3/chapter3/ch3ref2.pdf). 14. Ibid. 15. The National Response Framework (NRF), Federal Emergency Management Agency, Department of Homeland Security; URL: http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/nrfcore.pdf (alt URL: http://cipbook.infracritical.com/book3/chapter3/ch3ref2.pdf). 16. Ibid. 17. Ibid. 18. Ibid. 19. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan (December 2004). 20. Ibid. 21. Ibid.
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22. By definition, the term “Incidents of National Significance” refers to scenarios in which (1) a federal department or agency, responding under its own authorities, requests DHS assistance and/or if resources of state and local authorities are overwhelmed; (2) enactment of the Stafford Act pertaining to major disasters or emergencies; (3) other catastrophic incidents not necessarily covered or pertaining to other categorically defined events or circumstances; (4) situations where more than one federal department or agency is involved; (5) credible threats or indications of imminent terrorist attack; (6) threats/incidents related to high-profile, large-scale events; (7) and/or lastly, in which the president of the United States directs DHS to assume responsibility for incident management; Department of Homeland Security National Response Plan, One Plan, One Goal: a safer, more secure America Federal Partners Briefing, November 2004. www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/NRP_Brochure.pdf (alt URL: http://cipbook.infracritical .com/book3/chapter3/ch3ref19.pdf) 23. http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c107:H.R.1158 (alt URL: http://cipbook.infracritical .com/book3/chapter3/ch3ref17.pdf). 24. http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030228-9.html (alt URL: http:/cipbook.infracritical.com/book3/chapter3/ch3ref18.pdf). 25. http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030228-9.html (alt URL: http:/cipbook.infracritical.com/book3/chapter3/ch3ref18.pdf). 26. http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c107:H.R.1158 (alt URL: http://cipbook.infracritical .com/book3/chapter3/ch3ref17.pdf). 27. http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030228-9.html (alt URL: http:/cipbook.infracritical.com/book3/chapter3/ch3ref18.pdf). 28. Department of Homeland Security National Response Plan, One Plan, One Goal: A safer, more secure America Federal Partners Briefing, November 2004. 29. http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030228-9.html (alt URL: http:/cipbook.infracritical.com/book3/chapter3/ch3ref18.pdf). 30. http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030228-9.html (alt URL: http:/cipbook.infracritical.com/book3/chapter3/ch3ref18.pdf). 31. National Response Framework—Overview for Local, Tribal, and State Audiences; January 22, 2008. 32. Department of Homeland Security National Response Plan, One Plan, One Goal: A safer, more secure America Federal Partners Briefing, November 2004. 33. Department of Homeland Security National Response Plan, One Plan, One Goal: A safer, more secure America Federal Partners Briefing, November 2004. 34. Department of Homeland Security National Response Plan, One Plan, One Goal: A safer, more secure America Federal Partners Briefing, November 2004. 35. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan (December 2004). 36. http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/interapp/editorial/editorial_0566.xml (alt URL: http:// cipbook.infracritical.com/book3/chapter3/ch3ref6.pdf). 37. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan (December 2004). 38. By definition, the term “Incidents of National Significance” refers to scenarios in which (1) a federal department or agency, responding under its own authorities, requests DHS assistance and/or if resources of state and local authorities are overwhelmed; (2) enactment of the Stafford Act pertaining to major disasters or emergencies; (3) other catastrophic incidents not necessarily covered or pertaining to other categorically defined events or circumstances; (4) situations where more than one federal department or agency is involved; (5) credible threats or indications of imminent terrorist attack; (6) threats/incidents related to high-profile, large-scale events; (7) and/or lastly, in which the president of the United States directs DHS to assume responsibility for incident management.
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39. Department of Homeland Security National Response Plan, One Plan, One Goal: a safer, more secure America Federal Partners Briefing, November 2004. 40. http://www.fema.gov/nims (alt URL: http://cpbook.infracritical.com/book3/chapter3/ ch3ref10.pdf). 41. In response to a presidentially declared disaster, FEMA may work with up to 28 federal agencies and the American Red Cross to provide assistance. These agencies provide state and local governments with personnel, technical expertise, equipment, and other resources, and assume an active role in managing the response. To coordinate the federal efforts, FEMA recommends and the president appoints a Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) for each state that is affected by a disaster. The FCO and the state response team set up a Disaster Field Office (DFO) near the disaster scene. It is from there that the federal and state personnel work together to carry out response and recovery functions. These functions are grouped into 12 emergency support functions, each headed by an agency supported by other agencies. 42. United States Government Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept of Operations Plan, January 2001. http://www.fbi.gov/publications/conplan/conplan.pdf (alt URL: http// cipbook.infracritical.com/book3/chapter3/ch3ref11.pdf). 43. On December 7, 1979, following the March 1979 Three Mile Island nuclear power plant accident in Pennsylvania, President Carter transferred the federal lead role in off-site radiological emergency planning and preparedness activities from the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission to FEMA. FEMA established the Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) program to: (1) ensure that the public health and safety of citizens living around commercial nuclear power plants would be adequately protected in the event of a nuclear power station accident and (2) inform and educate the public about REP. FEMA’s REP program responsibilities encompass only “offsite” activities, that is, state and local government emergency preparedness activities that take place beyond the nuclear power plant boundaries. http://www.fema.gov/about/divisions/thd_repp .shtm and http://www.fema.gov/about/divisions/thd_repp_frpcc.shtm (alt URL: http:// cipbook.infracritical.com/book3/chapter3/ch3ref12.pdf and http://cipbook.infracritical .com/book3/chapter3/ch3ref12a.pdf). 44. FEMA REP Planning Guidance, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/ staff/sr0654/sr0654r1.pdf and http://www.nrc.gov/info-finder/reactor/ (alt URL: http:// cipbook.infracritical.com/book3/chapter3/ch3ref13.pdf, ch3ref13a.pdf, ch3ref13b.pdf, ch3ref13c.pdf). 45. EIIP Virtual Forum Presentation—September 15, 2004, The National Response Plan, an Update by Barbara S. Yagerman and Amy Sebring. http://www.emforum.org/vforum/ lc040915.htm (alt URL: http//cipbook.infracritical.com/book3/chapter3/chref15.pdf and http://cipbook.infracritical.com/book3/chapter3/ch3ref15a.pdf). 46. Federal Emergency Management Agency, an Introduction to the National Response Plan (NRP) (IS-800), Self-Study Guide (December 2004). 47. FEMA Independent Study Program: IS-800 National Response Plan (NRP), an Introduction. http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/IS/IS800b.asp (alt URL: http://cipbook .infracritical.com/book3/chapter3/ch3ref16.pdf). 48. Department of Homeland Security National Response Plan, One Plan, One Goal: a safer, more secure America Federal Partners Briefing, November 2004. 49. Department of Homeland Security National Response Plan, One Plan, One Goal: a safer, more secure America Federal Partners Briefing, November 2004. 50. Department of Homeland Security National Response Plan, One Plan, One Goal: A safer, more secure America Federal Partners Briefing, November 2004. 51. Department of Homeland Security National Response Plan, One Plan, One Goal: A safer, more secure America Federal Partners Briefing, November 2004. 52. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan (December 2004).
Incident 4 National Management System 4.1 Introduction This chapter summarizes the need and use for the National Incident Management System (NIMS), which was implemented in March 2004 by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The NIMS is vital in terms of best practices, principles, and methods used for an incident command framework structure. This is useful especially for disasters involving critical infrastructures and the requirement of coordinated efforts between critical infrastructure owners and emergency responders.
4.2 What Is NIMS? On February 28, 2003, the president of the United States issued Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-5, Management of Domestic Incidents, which directs the Secretary of Homeland Security to develop and administer a NIMS. This system provides a consistent nationwide template to enable federal, state, local, and tribal governments, and private sector and nongovernmental organizations to work together effectively and efficiently to prepare for, prevent, respond to, and recover from domestic incidents, regardless of cause, size, or complexity, including acts of catastrophic terrorism. The NIMS provides mechanisms for the further development and refinement of supporting national standards, guidelines, protocols, systems, and technologies.1 The NIMS integrates effective practices in emergency preparedness and response into a comprehensive national framework for incident management. The NIMS enables responders at all levels to work together more effectively to manage domestic incidents regardless of the cause, size, or complexity.2 Although most incidents are generally handled on a daily basis by a single jurisdiction at the local level, there are important instances in which successful domestic incident management operations depend on the involvement of multiple jurisdictions, functional agencies, and emergency responder disciplines. These instances require effective and efficient coordination across this broad spectrum of organizations and their activities. The NIMS uses a systems methodological approach to integrate the best of existing processes and methods into a unified national framework for incident management. This framework forms the basis for interoperability and compatibility that will, in turn, enable a diverse set of public and private organizations to conduct well-integrated and effective incident management operations. It does this through a core set of concepts, principles, procedures and organizational processes, 51
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terminology, and standards requirements applicable to a broad community of NIMS users. Building on the foundation provided by existing incident management and emergency response system methodologies used by jurisdictions and functional disciplines at varied levels, the NIMS integrates best practices that have proven effective over the years into a comprehensive framework that is used by incident management organizations in an all-hazards context (terrorist attacks, natural disasters, and other emergencies) nationwide. It sets in motion mechanisms necessary to leverage new(er) technologies and adopt better approaches, enabling continuous refinement of the NIMS over time. The NIMS document was developed through a collaborative, intergovernmental partnership with significant input from incident management functional disciplines, various private sector industries (and their organizations), and other nongovernmental organizations.3 The NIMS represents a core set of doctrine, concepts, principles, terminology, and organizational processes that enable an effective, efficient, and collaborative incident management at all levels. It should be noted that it is not an operational incident management or resource allocation plan. HSPD-5 requires the Secretary of Homeland Security to develop a National Response Plan,4 now called and referred to as the National Response Framework (NRF),5,6 that integrates federal government domestic prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery plans into a single, unitary-disciplined all-hazards plan. The NRF, using the comprehensive framework provided by the NIMS, provides the structure and mechanisms for national-level policy and operational direction for federal support to state, local, and tribal incident managers, and for exercising direct federal authorities and responsibilities as appropriate under the law.7 HSPD-5 requires all federal departments and agencies to adopt the NIMS and to use it in their individual domestic incident management and emergency prevention, preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation programs and activities, as well as in support of all actions taken to assist state, local, or tribal entities. The directive requires federal departments and agencies to make adoption of the NIMS by state and local organizations a condition for federal preparedness assistance (through grants, contracts, and other activities) beginning in fiscal year (FY) 2005.8 Jurisdictional compliance with certain aspects of the NIMS will be possible for short-term time frames, such as adopting the basic tenets of the Incident Command System (ICS) identified within the document. Other aspects of the NIMS, however, will require additional development and refinement to enable compliance at a future date (e.g., data and communications systems interoperability). To provide this framework for interoperability and compatibility, the NIMS is based on an appropriate balance of flexibility and standardization. In summary, NIMS is intended to: • Be applicable across a full spectrum of potential incidents and hazard scenarios, regardless of size or complexity • Improve coordination and cooperation between public and private entities for a variety of domestic incident management activities (and their issues)9
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4.3 Compliance HSPD-510 required federal departments and agencies to make the adoption of NIMS by state and local organizations a condition for federal preparedness assistance (grants, contracts, and other activities) sometime in FY 2005.11 Jurisdictions can comply in the short term by adopting the ICS, which is subset to NIMS. Other aspects of NIMS require additional development and refinement to enable compliance at a future date.12,13
4.4 Flexibility The NIMS provides a consistent, flexible, and adjustable national framework within which government and private entities at all levels can work together to manage domestic incidents, regardless of cause, size, location, or complexity. This flexibility applies across all phases of incident management: prevention, preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation.14
4.5 Standardization The NIMS provides a set of standardized organizational structures such as the ICS,15 multiagency coordination systems (MACS), and public information systems, as well as requirements for processes, procedures, and systems designed to improve interoperability among jurisdictions and disciplines in various areas, including the following: training, resource management, personnel qualification and certification, equipment certification, communications and information management, technology support, and continuous system improvement. It is important to understand that with the establishment of the NIMS, there is only one ICS. As agencies adopt the principles and concepts of ICS as established in the NIMS, the ICS can expand to meet the needs of the response, regardless of the size or number of responders. The key to both NIMS and ICS is a balance between standardization and flexibility.16
4.6 NIMS Represents Best Practices The NIMS integrates existing best practices into a consistent, nationwide approach to domestic incident management that is applicable at all jurisdictional levels and across functional disciplines in an all-hazards context. There are six major components that make up this systems approach. Of these components, the concepts and practices for command and management (chapter II) and preparedness (chapter III) are the most fully developed, reflecting their regular use by many jurisdictional levels and agencies responsible for incident management across the United States. Chapters IV–VII, which cover resource management, communications and information management, supporting technologies, and ongoing management and maintenance, introduce many concepts and requirements that are also integral to the NIMS but that will require further collaborative development and refinement over time.17
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4.7 Components of NIMS The following provides a brief synopsis of each major component of the NIMS, as well as how these components work together as a system to provide the national framework for preparing for, preventing, responding to, and recovering from domestic incidents, regardless of cause, size, or complexity. A more detailed discussion of each component is included in subsequent chapters of the NIMS document.18 NIMS is composed of several components that work collectively as a complete system providing an overall framework structure for preparing for, preventing, responding to, and recovering from domestic incidents. These components include:19 • • • • • •
Command and management Preparedness Resource management Communications and information management Supporting technologies Ongoing management and maintenance
4.8 Command and Management NIMS standard incident command structures are based on three key organizational systems.
1. ICS—The ICS defines the operating characteristics, interactive management components, and structure of incident management and emergency response organizations engaged throughout the life cycle of an incident. 2. MACS—These define the operating characteristics, interactive management components, and organizational structure of supporting incident management entities engaged at the federal, state, local, tribal, and regional levels through mutual aid agreements and other assistance arrangements.20 3. Public information systems—These refer to processes, procedures, and systems for communicating timely and accurate information to the public during crises or emergency situations. Public information systems are the processes and systems used to communicate with the public during a response.21
4.9 Preparedness Effective incident management begins with a host of preparedness activities conducted on a ready-state basis, well in advance of any potential incident. Preparedness involves an integrated combination of planning, training, exercises, personnel qualification and certification standards, equipment acquisition and certification standards, and publication management processes and activities. • Planning—Plans describe how personnel, equipment, and other resources are used to support incident management and emergency response activities.
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Plans provide mechanisms and systems for setting priorities, integrating multiple entities and functions, and ensuring that communications and other systems are available and integrated in support of a full spectrum of incident management requirements. Training—Training includes standard courses on multiagency incident command and management, organizational structure, and operational procedures; discipline-specific and agency-specific incident management courses; and courses on the integration and use of supporting technologies. Exercises—Incident management organizations and personnel must participate in realistic exercises, including multidisciplinary, multijurisdictional, and multisector interaction, to improve integration and interoperability and optimize resource utilization during incident operations. Personnel qualification and certification—Qualification and certification activities are undertaken to identify and publish national-level standards and measure performance against these standards to ensure that incident management and emergency responder personnel are appropriately qualified and officially certified to perform NIMS-related functions. Equipment acquisition and certification—Incident management organizations and emergency responders at all levels rely on various types of equipment to perform mission-essential tasks. A critical component of operational preparedness is the acquisition of equipment that will perform to certain standards, including the capability to be interoperable with similar equipment used by other jurisdictions. Mutual aid—Mutual aid [and Emergency Management Assistance Com pacts (EMAC)]22 agreements are the means for one jurisdiction to provide resources, facilities, services, and other required support to another jurisdiction during an incident. Each jurisdiction should be party to a mutual aid agreement with appropriate jurisdictions from which they expect to receive or to which they expect to provide assistance during an incident.23 Publications management—Publications management refers to forms and forms standardization, developing publication materials, administering publications, including establishing naming and numbering conventions, managing the publication and promulgation of documents, exercising control over sensitive documents, and revising publications when necessary.
4.10 Benefits from Using NIMS Some of the benefits from using NIMS may include one or more of the following.24 • Flexible framework that facilitates both public and private entities at all levels to work together in managing domestic incidents • Standardized organizational framework structures, processes, procedures, and systems designed to improve interoperability functions • Standards for planning, training, and exercising incident command management • Personnel qualification standards
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Equipment acquisition and certification standards Publication management, its processes and activities Interoperability between communications processes, procedures, and systems Information management systems that use commonly accepted architectures Supporting technologies such as voice and data communications systems, information systems, data display systems, and specialized technologies
Two potential issues arise with the increased use of NIMS. On one hand, those that have adopted the approach may find that they are placed within a larger community—facilitating communications but allowing for less flexibility, even within the context of more flexible frameworks. On the other hand, those that do not adopt the approach may find themselves to be increasingly isolated or even put under pressure as the drive for standardization of approaches continues.
4.11 Resource Recovery The NIMS defines standardized mechanisms and establishes requirements for processes to describe, inventory, mobilize, dispatch, track, and recover resources over the life cycle of an incident.25
4.12 Communications and Information Management The NIMS identifies the requirement for a standardized framework for communications, information management (collection, analysis, and dissemination), and information sharing at all levels of incident management. These elements are briefly described as follows.26 • Incident management communications. Incident management organizations must ensure that effective, interoperable communications processes, procedures, and systems exist to support a wide variety of incident management activities across agencies and jurisdictions. • Information management. Information management processes, procedures, and systems help ensure that information, including communications and data, flows efficiently through a commonly accepted architecture supporting numerous agencies and jurisdictions responsible for managing or directing domestic incidents, those impacted by the incident, and those contributing resources to the incident management effort. Effective information management enhances incident management and response and helps ensure that crisis decision making is better informed.
4.13 Supporting Technologies Technology and technological systems provide supporting capabilities essential to implementing and continuously refining the NIMS. These include voice and data communications systems, information management systems (i.e., record keeping and resource tracking), and data display systems. Also included are specialized
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technologies that facilitate ongoing operations and incident management activities in situations that call for unique technology-based capabilities.27 Another challenge for the business owner may involve remaining current with technologies used to communicate the latest and best versions of online support. Dependent on the nature and extent of functionality included in working tools, another aspect associated with supporting technologies will have to involve ensuring that the mass communication of information takes into account not only the best tools available but the most widely accepted tools available. This is currently a significant challenge in other endeavors, such as in the archiving of electronic media, which requires software and hardware necessary to retrieve information stored on that media; poorly preserved information may be lost. Within the NIMS and ICS domains, this challenge not only speaks of being able to research lessons learned, but also to conduct research into past events—something vital for understanding longerterm threat and risk profiles of areas, entities, and operations. This covers versions of technology used in the past, but should also be considered when looking at the rate of change of technology into the future. Anyone who once owned a VCR and is currently looking at Blu-ray technology can understand this challenge.
4.14 Ongoing Management and Maintenance This component establishes an activity to provide strategic direction for and oversight of the NIMS, supporting both routine review and the continuous refinement of the system and its components over the long term. The DHS established the NIMS Integration Center to provide these functions.28
4.15 Command Structuring under NIMS NIMS uses two levels of incident management structure, depending on the nature of the incident, which are as follows.29 • ICS—This is a standardized on-scene, all-hazard incident management system. ICS allows users to adopt an integrated organizational structure to match the needs of a single or multiple organizational incidents. • MACS—These are combined resources of facilities, equipment, personnel, procedures, and communications that are integrated into a common framework structure for coordinating and supporting incident management. The NIMS requires that all responses for domestic incidents use a common management structure. The ICS is a standard, on-scene, all-hazard incident management concept that is critical to the overall framework structure that makes NIMS such a successful and integrated management system.30
4.16 Incident Command System The ICS is a management system designed to enable effective and efficient domestic incident management by integrating a combination of facilities, equipment,
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personnel, procedures, and communications operating within a common organizational structure, designed to enable effective and efficient domestic incident management. A basic premise of ICS is that it is widely applicable. It is used to organize both near-term and long-term field-level operations for a broad spectrum of emergencies, from small to complex incidents, both natural and man-made. ICS is used by all levels of government—federal, state, local, and tribal—as well as many private sector and nongovernmental organizations. ICS is also applicable across disciplines. It is normally structured to facilitate activities in six major functional areas: • • • • • •
Command Operations Planning Logistics Finance Administration
ICS is an interdisciplinary and organizationally flexible system capable of meeting the needs of any incident of any type, size, or level of complexity. By using ICS, personnel from several degrees of responsiveness, capabilities, and management can meld their capabilities rapidly into a common management framework structure.31 ICS has been tested for more than 30 years and has been used for several incident functionalities including planned events (e.g., parades, political rallies, demonstrations), fires (mostly wildland fires in the Western region of the United States), hazardous materials spills, and multiple casualty incidents; also multiple jurisdictional and multiple agency disasters, usually natural disasters involving such events as earthquakes, hurricanes, severe storms (e.g., tornadoes or heavy rains with flooding); search and rescue missions; biological outbreaks and disease containment, and acts of terrorism.32 Acts of biological, chemical, radiological, and nuclear terrorism represent particular challenges for the traditional ICS structure. Events that are not site-specific, are geographically dispersed, or evolve over longer periods will require extraordinary coordination between federal, state, local, tribal, private sector, and nongovernmental organizations. An Area Command (AC) may be established to oversee the management of such incidents. ICS helps all responders communicate more efficiently, thus getting what they need when they need it. ICS provides a safe, efficient, and (most importantly) cost-effective response and recovery strategy for just about every level of government or organization.33 This is primarily the main reason of why utilizing ICS is so vitally important.
4.17 ICS Features ICS has several features that make it very well suited for managing incidents, which include:34 • Common terminology • Organizational resources • Manageable span of control
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Organizational facilities Use of position titles Reliance on an Incident Action Plan (IAP) (defined further in Chapter 5) Integrated communications Accountability
4.18 Common Terminology The ability to communicate within ICS is absolutely crucial because it defines a standard set of common terminology ensuring efficient, clear, concise communications. ICS requires the use of common terminology, including standard titles for facilities and positions within any given organization. Common terminology includes the use of “clear text,”35 that is, communications without the use of any organizational-specific codes, jargon, or ciphers. Simply put, “clear text” is a method of using plain, old, simple English for daily activities.36
4.19 Organizational Resources Resources, including all personnel, facilities, and major equipment and supply items used in supporting incident management activities are assigned common designations. Resources are categorized based on “types,” that is, resources are classified based on their level of complexity and capabilities, thus helping avoid any confusion as well as enhancing its interoperability functionalities.37
4.20 Manageable Span of Control Maintaining an adequate span of control throughout the organization is critical. Effective span of control may vary from three to seven elements, and a ratio of one supervisor to five reporting elements is (oftentimes) recommended. If the number of reporting elements falls outside of this range, expansion or consolidation of the organization may be necessary. There may be exceptions, usually in lower-risk assignments or where resources work in close proximity to each other.38 Higher ratios may be more plausible:39 • When team members are highly experienced or operating at lower/lowered capability level(s) • Where field safety issues may not be applicable (or even an issue) • Where operating units are running effectively without any disruption to its operations • Where there is a defined hierarchy team structure • When the supervisor is experienced and highly effective • When majority of the team within the unit perform (essentially) similar functionalities and roles The definition of “span of control”40 simply refers to the number of individuals that a supervisor can manage effectively. Usually, there is a specific ratio that is
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applied, staying between three and seven team members before splitting, or departmentalizing the structure even further.41
4.21 Accountability The word “accountability”42 is a concern identified by employees and supervisors alike, particularly by those in organizations with broad spans of control or units in which employees perform work with traditionally high levels of quality control. There may be confusion with some work groups about who is responsible for monitoring results, particularly when it relates to quality control. Employees are openly skeptical that supervisors can be effective at quality control in technical areas for which they have no expertise.43 Effective accountability at all jurisdictional levels and within individual functional areas during an incident is both critical as well as essential. To that degree, the ICS framework structure requires the following elements to allow for accountability within any given incident operation.44 • An orderly chain-of-command such that the line of authority is defined within the ranks of an incident response organization • Provision for check-in capabilities for all responders, regardless of the organization structure or its affiliation • Provision for each individual involved within the incident operations to be assigned to one and only one supervisor (also referred to as the “unity of command”), unless the span of control ratio is higher than anticipated; otherwise, that individual may be reassigned to another supervisor, but still remains under the control of only one supervisor
4.22 Integrate Communications Capabilities Communications needs for large incidents may exceed available radio frequencies. Some incidents may be conducted entirely without radio support. In such situations, other communications resources (e.g., cellular telephones or secured telephone lines) may be the only communications methods used to coordinate communications and to transfer large amounts of data effectively.45 Thus, integrated communication systems require or include: • Functional communications systems that transfer information efficiently • Provide for planning capabilities for the use of all available communications systems and resources for any given incident operation (as needed) • Defined and executed procedures and processes for transferring information both internally as well as externally of the incident operations’ organizational structure
4.23 Incident Action Plan The IAP provides a coherent means to communicate the overall incident objectives in the context of both operational and support activities. The IAP is developed for
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operational periods that exceed 12-hour time frames depending on management objectives to accomplish proper response tactics. These objectives are communicated throughout the organization and are used to:46 • Develop and issue assignments, plans, procedures, and protocols • Direct efforts to attain the objectives outlined by management necessary for supporting the defined strategic objectives Results from the implementation of the IAP are usually documented and provided back into planning processes for the next (or future) incident operational period(s).
4.24 Management Command, Coordination, and Control Structures Although ICS has proven itself to be effective for all types of incidents, other levels of coordination may be required to facilitate management of: • • • •
Multiple concurrent incidents Incidents that are non–site-specific, such as terrorist incidents Incidents that are geographically dispersed Incidents that evolve over a certain period
NIMS-recommended variations in incident management provide two common variations involving the use of Unified Command and/or AC.
4.25 Unified Command Unified Command is subset of ICS used when:47 • There is more than one responding organization for any given incident jurisdiction (and its operations) • Incidents cross political jurisdictions Under a Unified Command control structure, organizations work together through the designated members of the Unified Command to: • Analyze any relevant intelligence information • Establish, define, and implement a common set of objectives, strategies, and goals for a single IAP The Unified Command control structure does not change any of the other features or aspects of ICS. It merely allows all organizations involved with responsibility for the incident to participate in the decision-making process.48
4.26 Area Command AC is subset of ICS used when:49
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• Management oversees multiple incidents that are each being managed by an ICS incident response organization • Management oversees larger-sized incidents that cross multiple jurisdictional boundaries The AC control structures are particularly relevant to public health emergencies because these incidents are typically:50 • Non–site-specific • Not immediately identifiable • Geographically dispersed, evolving over a certain period These types of incidents call for a coordinated response, with larger-scaled coordination typically found at a higher jurisdictional level. The AC control structure has the responsibility for:51 • • • • •
Establishing, defining, and implementing the overall strategies and priorities Allocating critical resources specific to the priorities defined Ensuring that incident operations are properly managed Ensuring that management objectives are (or have been) met Ensuring that management strategies are adhered to
An AC control structure may become a Unified Area Command control structure when incidents become multiple jurisdictional or involve multiple organizations. An AC control structure is organized similarly to that of an ICS structure; however, because incident operations are conducted on-scene, there is no operations section within an AC. Other sections and functions are represented within an AC control structure.52
4.27 Multiagency Coordination Systems For larger-scaled emergencies requiring higher-level resource management or information management, MACS may be required. MACS53 provide for a combination of resources that are integrated into a common framework structure for coordinating and supporting domestic incident management activities. These resources include the following: • • • • •
Facilities Equipment Personnel Procedures Communications
The primary functions of MACS are to: • Support incident operations management policies and priorities • Facilitate logistical support and resource tracking capabilities
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• Provide decision capabilities for allocating resources based on incident management priorities and objectives • Coordinate any incident-related information, both internally and exter nally • Coordinate interorganizational and intergovernmental issues regarding incident management policies, priorities, and strategies Direct tactical and operational responsibility for the conduct of incident management activities rests with the ICS. MACS include emergency operations centers (EOC) and, in certain multiple jurisdictional or complex incidents, multiagency coordination entities (MCEs).54 MACS may be used at:55 • • • • • •
The scene of an incident An AC A jurisdiction’s EOC An interjurisdictional or regional level State and federal levels An international level
Types of MACS can include56 something as simple as a teleconference or something as complex as an assembled group with associated support systems. These systems (usually) include one or more of the following: • • • • • •
Jurisdictional and agency representatives Facilities Equipment Procedures Information systems Communications systems
4.28 Emergency Operations Centers The EOC may be staffed by personnel representing multiple jurisdictions and functional disciplines; the size, staffing, and equipment at an EOC will depend on the size of the jurisdiction, the resources available, and the anticipated incident needs. The EOC organization and staffing is flexible, but should include the following:57 • • • •
Coordination Communications Resource dispatching and tracking Information collection, analysis, and dissemination
EOC activities may also support multiple organizational coordination and joint information activities.58 Senior elected and appointed officials are located at the EOC, as well as personnel supporting critical functions such as operations, planning,
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logistics, and finance and administration. The key function of EOC personnel is to ensure that those who are located at the scene have the resources (i.e., person nel, tools, and equipment) they need for the response. In large emergencies and disasters, the EOC also acts as a liaison between local responders and the state government. Please note that some states operate EOC as well and can activate them as necessary to support local operations. Thus, state-level EOC personnel report to the governor of that state, acting as a liaison between local and federal personnel.59
4.29 Incident Responsibilities Regardless of their form or structure, MCE60 are tasked to:61 • Ensure that each involved organization is providing situation and resource status information • Establish, define, and implement priorities between incidents and/or AC control structures in coordination with the Incident Command or United Command control structures • Acquire and allocate resources required by incident management • Coordinate and identify resource requirements for present and future incidents • Coordinate and resolve any policy issues • Coordinate strategic operations and decision-making capabilities
4.30 Postincident Responsibilities Following incidents, MCE are typically responsible for ensuring that revisions are correctly acted upon, such that any (or all) revisions may be made to:62 • • • • •
Plans Procedures Communications Staffing and personnel Capabilities necessary for improving incident management and operations
Oftentimes, these revisions are based on lessons learned from the incident, and are usually coordinated with the emergency planning team within the jurisdiction as well as with any mutual aid partners.
4.31 Public Information Systems Because public information is critical to domestic incident management, it is imperative to establish public information systems and protocols for communicating timely and accurate information to the public during emergency situations, as well as principles needed to support effective emergency public information systems.63
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Under ICS, the public information officer (PIO) is a member of the command staff. The PIO advises the Incident Command on all public information matters, including media and public inquiries, emergency public information and warnings, rumor monitoring and control, media monitoring, and other functions required to coordinate, clear with proper authorities, and disseminate accurate and timely information related to the incident. The PIO establishes and operates within the parameters established for the joint information system (JIS).64
4.32 Joint Information Systems The JIS provides an organized, integrated, and coordinated mechanism for providing information to the public during an emergency. The JIS includes plans, protocols, and structures used to provide information to the public. It encompasses all public information related to the incident.65 Key elements of a JIS include interagency coordination and integration, developing and delivering coordinated messages, and support for decision-makers. The PIO, using the JIS, ensures that decision-makers, as well as the general public, are fully informed throughout a domestic incident response.66
4.33 Joint Information Centers During emergencies, the public may receive information from a variety of sources. Part of the PIO’s job is to ensure that the information that the public receives is accurate, coordinated, timely, and easy to understand.67 One way to ensure the coordination of public information is by establishing a joint information center (JIC).68 By using the JIC69 as a central location, information can be coordinated and integrated across jurisdictions and agencies, and between all government partners, the private sector, and nongovernmental agencies. The JIC is the physical location where public information staff involved in incident management activities can co-locate to perform critical emergency information, crisis communications, and public affairs functions. The JIC provides the organizational structure for coordinating and disseminating critical information.70 Incident commanders and MCE are responsible for establishing and overseeing JIC, including processes for coordinating and clearing public communications. With the case of a Unified Command control structure, those contributing to joint public information management do not lose their individual identities or responsibilities. In essence, each participating group or organization contributes to the overall unified message.71
4.34 JIC Levels JICs may be established at various levels of government.72 All JICs must communicate and coordinate with each other in an ongoing basis using established JIS protocols. When multiple JICs are established, information must be coordinated among them to ensure that a consistent message is disseminated to the public.73
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JICs have several characteristics in common: • The JIC includes representatives of just about every member type for managing the response to an incident. This may include different jurisdictions, other organizations, private organizations, and other nongovernmental organizations • Each JIC must have procedures and protocols for communicating and coordinating effectively with other JICs, and with the appropriate components that are representative of the ICS organizational structure In most circumstances, a single JIC location is preferable, but the JIS should be flexible enough to accommodate multiple JICs when the circumstances of the incident require larger-scale responses.74,75
4.35 JIC Organizational Structure The typical JIC structure is outlined as follows:76 • Level I −− JIC • Level II −− Press secretary (jurisdiction) −− JIC liaison (as needed) • Level III −− Research team −− Media team −− Logistics team
4.36 Preparedness and Readiness Preparedness is a key phase of the emergency management cycle. Through preparedness, jurisdictions take actions to prevent, mitigate, respond to, and recover from emergencies. Preparedness is critical to emergency management, and involves all actions required to establish and sustain the level of capability necessary to execute a wide range of incident management operations. Preparedness is implemented through a continual cycle of planning, training and equipping, exercising and evaluating, and taking action to correct and mitigate.77 The significant objective of preparedness is to ensure mission integration and interoperability in response to emergent crises across functional and jurisdictional lines; this also includes efforts to coordinate between public and private organizations. Preparedness is the responsibility of individual jurisdictions, which coordinate their activities among all preparedness stakeholders. Each level of government is responsible for its preparedness activities.78,79 NIMS provide tools to help ensure and enhance preparedness. These tools include the following:80 • Preparedness organization and training programs that define, provide, or establish processes for planning, training, and implementation
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Personnel qualification and certification programs Equipment and hardware certification programs Mutual aid assistance programs Publication and information management
National-level preparedness standards related to NIMS will be maintained and managed through a multiple-jurisdictional, multiple-disciplined center, using a collaborative process at the NIMS Integration Center. Using NIMS as a basis, all preparedness stakeholders may attain and sustain the level of readiness necessary to respond to the range of domestic incidents throughout the U.S.81
4.37 Preparedness Organizations Preparedness organizations represent a wide variety of committees, planning groups, and other organizations. These organizations meet regularly to coordinate and focus preparedness activities. The needs of the jurisdiction will dictate how frequently the organizations must meet and how they are structured. Preparedness organizations at all levels should follow NIMS standards and undertake the following tasks:82 • Establish and coordinate emergency plans and coordination protocols • Integrate and coordinate activities and jurisdictions within their purview • Establish guidelines and coordination protocols defining greater interoperability between jurisdictions and other organizations • Implement and adopt guidelines and protocols for resource management • Establish priorities for resources as well as other response requirements • Establish and maintain mechanisms implemented for multiple organizational coordination efforts
4.38 Preparedness Planning and Coordination Preparedness plans describe how personnel, equipment, and other governmental and nongovernmental resources will be used to support incident management requirements. These plans represent the operational core of preparedness and provide mechanisms for:83 • • • •
Setting of priorities Integration of multiple entities, organizations, and their functions Establishment of collaborative relationships among all entities Ensuring support of established communications systems for incident management activities
4.39 Types of Preparedness Plans Jurisdictions must develop several types of plans, including the following.84 • Emergency operations plans (EOPs)85,86 —These describe how the jurisdiction will respond to emergencies.87
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• Procedures—These include overviews, standard operating procedures, field operations guides, job aids, and other critical information or reference materials needed for response scenarios. • Preparedness plans—These describe how training needs are identified and met, as well as how resources are obtained via mutual aid agreements, and the equipment requirements for hazardous situations faced by the jurisdiction. • Corrective action and mitigation plans—These include any activities that are required for implementing procedures based on lessons learned from previous incidents, training programs, or exercises (or drills). • Recovery plans—These describe any actions that will be taken for facilitating any defined long-term recovery mechanisms and their procedures.
4.40 Emergency Operations Plan Generally, the EOP describes how the community will do business in an emergency. The EOP will perform the following.88 • Assigns responsibilities to organizations and individuals for carrying out specific actions that exceed the capabilities or responsibilities of any single entity or organization. • Establishes lines of authority and organizational relationships, and demonstrates how all actions are coordinated. • Describes how individuals and property will be protected in emergencies and disasters (natural or man-made). • Identifies personnel, equipment, facilities, supplies, and other resources that may be made available, within the jurisdiction or through agreement with other jurisdictions, for use during response and recovery operations. • Identifies measures for addressing mitigation concerns during response and recovery operations. State-level EOP establish framework structures within which local EOP are created and through which the federal government is involved with response and recovery operations. Thus, state governments act as the coordinating entity to ensure that all levels of government are able to respond to safeguard the well-being of its citizens.89 The federal-level EOP is called the Federal Response Plan (FRP). When activated following a presidentially declared emergency or disaster, the FRP enables the Federal Emergency Management Agency to coordinate the efforts of 27 federal agencies (including the American Red Cross) to assist state and local response and recovery efforts. The FRP is similar to local and state EOP in terms of its overall goals; however, the federal government may bring highly specialized resources to bear [e.g., Nuclear Emergency Support Teams (NEST)90–92; Metropolitan Medical Response Teams, also called a Disaster Medical Assistance Team (DMAT); 93 Urban Search and Rescue Task Force94] on emergencies and disasters that are outside the response capabilities of local and state governments.95
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4.41 Training and Exercise Drills Organizations and personnel at all governmental levels and in the private sector must be trained to improve all-hazard incident management capability. These organizations and personnel must also participate in realistic exercises to improve integration and interoperability. To assist jurisdictions in meeting these training and exercise needs, the NIMS Integration Center will:96 • Facilitate the development of, and dissemination of, national standards, guidelines, and protocols for incident management training • Facilitate the use of modeling and simulations for training and exercise programs • Define general training requirements and approved training courses for all NIMS users, which include instructor qualifications and course completion documentation • Review and approve discipline-specific training requirements and courses through the assistance of key stakeholders
4.42 Personnel Qualification and Certification Under NIMS, preparedness is based on national standards for qualification and certification of emergency response personnel. Managed by the NIMS Integration Center,97 standards help ensure that the participating agencies’ and organizations’ field personnel possess the minimum knowledge, skills, and experience necessary to perform activities safely and effectively. Standards will include training, experience, credentialing, currency, and physical and medical fitness. Personnel who are certified to support interstate incidents will be required to meet national qualification and certification standards.98 This leads to the challenge of how to keep people up to date. On one hand, the political and economic will is often there when new requirements come into place. What is also becoming clear is that unless there is a clear requirement for refresher training, it is difficult to convince business owners and operators (already strapped for resources) to send individuals on refresher training. Breaking this deadlock is arguably one of the more significant strategic vulnerabilities facing the critical infrastructure sector.
4.43 Equipment and Hardware Certification Incident managers and emergency responders rely on various types of equipment to perform mission-essential tasks. A critical component of operational preparedness is that equipment performs to certain standards, including the capability to be inter operable with equipment used by other jurisdictions. To facilitate national equipment certification, the NIMS Integration Center will:99 • Facilitate the development of and/or publication of national equipment standards, guidelines, and protocols
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• Review and approve listed emergency responder equipment that meets national requirements and standards Equipment certification also comes with its own challenges. Most equipment existed outside of the networked environment 20 years ago. Today, it is becoming increasingly difficult to find infrastructure that is not either networked already or is moving toward becoming a networked environment. This adds another layer onto the certification challenge—how to address the physical certification of the equipment (e.g., the calibration of x-ray machines) while also undertaking the certification of equipment at the logical level.
4.44 Mutual Aid Agreements Mutual aid agreements and EMAC100 provide the means for one jurisdiction to provide resources or other support to another jurisdiction during an incident. Mutual aid agreements are formal, written agreements between jurisdictions that provide the conditions under which resource sharing can take place during an emergency. Mutual aid agreements are most common among fire departments and law enforcement agencies but may be developed to cover other resources and equipment (e.g., construction equipment) as well.101 To facilitate the timely delivery of assistance during incidents, jurisdictions (including states) are encouraged to enter into agreements with the following:102 • Other jurisdictions • Private sector and other nongovernmental organizations • Private organizations (e.g., American Red Cross, Salvation Army)
4.45 Standby Contracts Standby contracts typically are made for equipment, such as dump trucks or other construction equipment, but are also used for supplies, such as plastic sheeting. Under a typical standby contract, the supplier agrees to provide an established quantity of an item at the unit cost in effect on the day before the emergency occurs. Standby contracts are a good means for local governments to meet their resource supply requirements without incurring the costs of stockpiling and without paying the rapidly increasing prices that often follow an emergency.103
4.46 Publication Management The NIMS Integration Center will manage publications dealing with domestic incident management and response. Publication management includes the following:104 • Development of naming and numbering conventions and localizations • Review and certification of publications made available • Methods for publication control (documentation management)
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• Identification of sources and suppliers for publications and similar services • Management of publication distribution and dissemination The NIMS Integration Center will manage a wide range of publications, from qualification information and training courses to computer programs and best practices.105
4.47 Resource Management Resource management106 involves the coordination and oversight of tools, processes, and systems that provide incident managers with timely and appropriate resources during an incident. Historically, resource management has been an issue at incidents, both large and small; thus, resource management is considered an area of special attention under the NIMS guidelines. Resource management involves four primary tasks:107
1. Establishment of systems for describing, taking inventory, requesting, and tracking resources 2. Activation of systems before, during, and after an incident 3. Dispatching of resources before, during, and after an incident 4. Deactivation or recall of resources during or after an incident
The basic concepts and principles that guide resource management and allow these tasks to be conducted effectively are addressed by NIMS. Resource management under NIMS is based on the following.108 • Provision for a uniformed methodology for identification, acquisition, allocation, and tracking of resources. • Classification methods of kinds and types of resources that may be required to support incident management. • Utilization of credentialing systems tied to uniform training and certification standards. • Incorporation of resources contributed from private sector and other nongovernmental organizations. There are (primarily) five key principles toward effective resource manage ment.109
1. Advanced planning. Preparedness organizations should work cohesively before an incident, to develop plans for managing and utilization of resources. 2. Resource identification and ordering. Using standard processes and methodologies that will identify, order, mobilize, dispatch, and track resources. 3. Resource categorization. Categorizing resources by size, capacity, capabilities, skills required, and other characteristics required, making resource ordering and dispatching more efficient.
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4. Use of agreements. Develop agreements for preincident management for providing for, or requesting of, resources. 5. Effective management. Utilization of validated, established practices for performing key or vital resource management tasks (and their assignments).
4.48 Effectively Managing Resources Resource management involves the coordination and oversight of tools, processes, and systems that provide incident commanders with the resources they need during an incident. To assist local managers, NIMS includes standard procedures, methods, and functions in its resource management processes. By following the standards established through NIMS, resource managers are able to identify, order, mobilize, dispatch, and track resources more efficiently.110 Resource “typing”111 involves categorizing resources by capability based on measurable standards of capability and performance. Resource typing112 defines more precisely the resource capabilities needed to meet specific requirements and is designed to be as simple as possible to facilitate frequent use and accuracy in obtaining resources. Certification and credentialing help ensure that all personnel possess a minimum level of training, experience, physical and medical fitness, or capability for the position they are tasked to fill.113 Resource managers use various resource inventory systems to assess the availability of assets provided by public, private, and volunteer organizations; thus, resource managers are able then to identify, refine, and validate resource requirements throughout the incident by focusing on the following questions.114 • What and how much resources are needed? • Where and when will it be needed? • Who will be receiving the resource? Because resource requirements and availability will change as the incident evolves, all entities must coordinate closely beginning at the earliest possible point in the incident. Request for items that the incident commander cannot obtain locally must be submitted through the EOC or MCE using standardized resource-ordering procedures.115 Resource managers use established procedures to track resources continuously from mobilization through demobilization. Resource tracking and mobilization are directly linked. When resources arrive on-scene, they must check in to start onscene in-processing and validate the order requirements. Managers should plan for demobilization as they begin the mobilization process. Early planning for demobilization facilitates accountability and makes transportation of resources as efficient as possible.116 Recovery involves the final disposition of all resources. During recovery, resources are rehabilitated, replenished, disposed of, or retrograded.117 Reimbursement provides a mechanism for funding critical needs that arise from incident-specific activities. Processes and procedures must be in place to ensure that resource providers are reimbursed in a timely manner.118
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4.49 Communications and Information Management Principles Effective communications, information management, and supporting technology are critical aspects of domestic incident management. The concepts and principles on which communications and information management are based include the following:119 • A common operating process that is accessible across jurisdictions and organizations; the common operating process ensures consistency at all levels, of which all who respond to or manage incident response scenarios. • A common communications framework and data standards; effective communications, both within and outside of the incident response structure, are enhanced by adherence and compliance to those standards outlined and identified. NIMS leverages science and technology to improve capabilities at a lowered cost. To accomplish this, NIMS bases its supporting technology standards on five key principles.120
1. Interoperability and compatibility—Systems must be able to work cohe sively. 2. Technical support—All organizations using NIMS must be able to enhance any and all aspects of incident management and emergency response management and their scenarios. 3. Technology standards—Adhere and comply with national standards that will facilitate interoperability and compatibility of most communications systems. 4. Broad-based requirements—NIMS provides mechanisms for aggregated and prioritization of newer technologies, procedures, protocols, and standards. 5. Strategic planning—The NIMS Integration Center will coordinate with DHS to create a national research and development agenda (to be determined).
NIMS communications and information systems enable the essential functions needed to provide a common operating picture and interoperability for the following:121 • Incident management communications • Information management • Interoperability standards122,123
4.50 Authors’ Notes The challenge with any system that is designed to respond to significant incidents is the ability to adapt to new types of incidents coming into the system. There is
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currently an increasing movement toward a more networked and integrated world that has been going on for more than a decade now. Consider what this movement really means when looking at how to integrate the various response capabilities. Networks have long relied on organizations such as National Institute of Standards and Technology, Computer Emergency Readiness Team, etc., as their primary source of guidance. As new technologies that have been encapsulated under other systems gradually integrate the networked technology, how are they going to relate to those types of approaches? What does this mean for the business owner?
Notes
1. Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Incident Management Systems (NIMS) Overview (March 2004). 2. U.S. General Accounting Office, Homeland Security: Process for Reporting Lessons Learned from Seaport Exercises Needs Further Attention, GAO-05-170 (Washing ton, D.C., January 14, 2005); URL: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05170.pdf and http://www.gao.gov/highlights/d05170high.pdf (alt URL: http://cipbook.infracritical .com/book3/chapter4/ch4ref3.pdf and http://cipbook.infracritical.com/book3/chapter4/ ch4ref3a.pdf). 3. Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Incident Management Systems (NIMS) Overview (March 2004); URL: http://www.fema.gov/pdf/nims/NIMS_basic_ introduction_and_overview.pdf (alt URL: http://cipbook.infracritical.com/book3/ chapter4/ch4ref4.pdf). 4. http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/interapp/editorial/editorial_0566.xml (alt URL: http:// cipbook.infracritical.com/book3/chapter4/ch4ref26.pdf). 5. http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/pr_1201030569827.shtm (alt URL: http://cipbook .infracritical.com/book3/chapter4/ch4ref1.pdf). 6. http://www.dhs.gov/xprepresp/committees/editorial_0566.shtm (alt URL: http://cipbook .infracritical.com/book3/chapter4/ch4ref2.pdf). 7. Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Incident Management Systems (NIMS) Overview (March 2004); URL: http://www.fema.gov/pdf/nims/NIMS_basic_ introduction_and_overview.pdf (alt URL: http://cipbook.infracritical.com/book3/ chapter4/ch4ref4.pdf). 8. Federal Emergency Management Agency NIMS Compliance. http://www.fema.gov/ emergency/nims (alt URL: http://cipbook.infracritical.com/book3/chapter4/ch4ref6 .pdf). 9. Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Incident Management Systems (NIMS) Overview (March 2004); URL: http://www.fema.gov/pdf/nims/NIMS_basic_ introduction_and_overview.pdf (alt URL: http://cipbook.infracritical.com/book3/ chapter4/ch4ref4.pdf). 10. White House, Homeland Security Presidential Directive No. 5: Management of Domestic Incidents (February 2003) http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/ 2003/02/20030228-9.html (alt URL: http://cipbook.infracritical.com/book3/chapter4/ ch4ref33.pdf). 11. Federal Emergency Management Agency NIMS Compliance. http://www.fema.gov/ emergency/nims/nims_compliance.shtm (alt URL: http://cipbook.infracritical.com/ book3/chapter4/ch4ref6.pdf).
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12. Federal Emergency Management Agency, An Introduction to the National Incident Management Systems (NIMS) (IS-700.a), Self-Study Guide (February 2009); URL: http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/IS/is700a.asp (alt URL: http://cipbook.infracritical .com/book3/chapter4/ch4ref5.pdf). 13. National Incident Management System (NIMS), State of Oregon Implementation and Compliance Guidance, First Edition, April 12, 2005. http://www.oregon.gov/OSP/SFM/ docs/Emergency_Mobilization/NIMS_IS-700_ DPWG_v3.doc (alt URL: http://cipbook .infracritical.com/book3/chapter4/ch4ref7.doc). 14. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) NIMS and the Incident Command System. http://www.fema.gov/txt/nims/nims_ics_position_paper.txt (alt URL: http:// cipbook.infracritical.com/book3/chapter4/ch4ref8.txt). 15. FEMA Independent Study Program: IS-195 Basic Incident Command System. http:// training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/IS/is195.asp (alt URL: http://cipbook.infracritical.com/ book3/chapter4/ch4ref9.pdf). 16. FEMA NIMS and the Incident Command System. http://www.fema.gov/txt/nims/ nims_ics_position_paper.txt (alt URL: http://cipbook.infracritical.com/book3/chapter4/ ch4ref8.txt). 17. Federal Emergency Management Agency, An Introduction to the National Incident Management Systems (NIMS) (IS-700.a), Self-Study Guide (February 2009); URL: http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/IS/is700a.asp (alt URL: http://cipbook.infracritical .com/book3/chapter4/ch4ref5.pdf). 18. http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/NIMS-90-web.pdf (alt URL: http://cipbook.infracritical .com/book3/chapter4/ch4ref10.pdf). 19. Federal Emergency Management Agency, An Introduction to the National Incident Management Systems (NIMS) (IS-700.a), Self-Study Guide (February 2009); URL: http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/IS/is700a.asp (alt URL: http://cipbook.infracritical .com/book3/chapter4/ch4ref5.pdf). 20. Federal Emergency Management Agency, An Introduction to the National Incident Management Systems (NIMS) (IS-700.a), Self-Study Guide (February 2009); URL: http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/IS/is700a.asp (alt URL: http://cipbook.infracritical .com/book3/chapter4/ch4ref5.pdf). 21. Transit Safety and Security Executive Briefing, Federal Transit Administration, Office of Transit Safety and Security. http://transit-safety.volpe.dot.gov/publications/security/ SEM_TechAssistance/pdf/FTA_SEMTAP.pdf (alt URL: http://cipbook.infracritical .com/book3/chapter4/ch4ref11.pdf). 22. During interstate emergency use of an Emergency System for Advance Registration of Volunteer Health Care Personnel (ESAR-VHP) system, local jurisdictions rarely have the authority to invoke legislative and/or mutual-aid mechanisms such as EMAC, which may only be activated by the state’s highest executive, typically the governor. Under EMAC and other similar state-level mutual aid agreements, all resource requests, including health volunteers, are usually coordinated at the state level. Local jurisdictions might enter into mutual aid agreements, but may not require state approval. 23. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Bioterrorism Hospital Preparedness, ESAR-VHP Interim Technical and Policy Guidelines, Standards, and Definitions, Section 9.0 Authorities and Emergency Operations, Subsection 9.1 Overview of Authorities and Emergency Operations. 24. Federal Emergency Management Agency, An Introduction to the National Incident Management Systems (NIMS) (IS-700.a), Self-Study Guide (February 2009); URL: http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/IS/is700a.asp (alt URL: http://cipbook.infracritical .com/book3/chapter4/ch4ref5.pdf).
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25. Ibid. 26. Ibid. 27. Ibid. 28. Ibid. 29. Ibid. 30. Ibid. 31. Ibid. 32. Ibid. 33. Ibid. 34. Ibid. 35. Meaning “plain text,” or text that is unencrypted. http://www.its.bldrdoc.gov/projects/ devglossary/_plain_text.html (alt URL: http://cipbook.infracritical.com/book3/chapter4/ ch4ref12.pdf). 36. Ibid. 37. Ibid. 38. Ibid. 39. U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land Management, Information Bulletin No. OR-98-003 (October 1997). 40. The term refers to the total number of subordinates that a supervisor can effectively manage, with a guideline of somewhere between three and seven individuals per manager, optimally at five. 41. Federal Emergency Management Agency, ICS Concepts and Principles. 42. The property that ensures that the actions of an individual or an institution may be traced uniquely to that individual or institution. [After X9.57] 2. In information systems (IS), the process of tracing IS activities to a responsible source. [INFOSEC-99] 3. In COMSEC, this is a principle that an individual is entrusted to safeguard and control equipment, keying material, and information, and is answerable to proper authority for the loss or misuse of that equipment or information [INFOSEC-99]. http://www .its.bldrdoc.gov/projects/devglossary/_accountability.html (alt URL: http://cipbook .infracritical.com/book3/chapter4/ch4ref25.pdf). 43. U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land Management, Information Bulletin No. OR-98-003 (October 1997). 44. Federal Emergency Management Agency, An Introduction to the National Incident Management Systems (NIMS) (IS-700.a), Self-Study Guide (February 2009); URL: http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/IS/is700a.asp (alt URL: http://cipbook.infracritical .com/book3/chapter4/ch4ref5.pdf). 45. Ibid. 46. Ibid. 47. Ibid. 48. Ibid. 49. Ibid. 50. Ibid. 51. Ibid. 52. Ibid. 53. Incident Command System, National Training Curriculum Module 16, Multiagency Coordination, October 1994, Instructor Guide; URL: http://www.nims.ws/ics_training_ docs/ICS_i401.pdf (alt URL: http://cipbook.infracritical.com/book3/chapter4/ch4ref13 .pdf). 54. National Wildfire Coordinating Group, Incident Command System, National Training Curriculum, Module 12, Command and General Staff (October 1994); URL: http:// www.nims.ws/ics_training_docs/ICS_mod12.pdf (alt URL: http://cipbook.infractritical .com/book3/chapter4/ch4ref34.pdf).
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55. http://www.fws.gov/contaminants/FWS_OSCP_05/fwscontingencyappendices/C-ICS/ pps/CHAP16.ppt (alt URL http://cipbook.infracritical.com/book3/chapter4/ch4ref14.ppt). 56. http://www.fws.gov/contaminants/FWS_OSCP_05/fwscontingencyappendices/C-ICS/ pps/CHAP16.ppt (alt URL http://cipbook.infracritical.com/book3/chapter4/ch4ref14 .ppt). 57. National Wildfire Coordinating Group, Incident Command System, National Training Curriculum, Module 12, Command and General Staff (October 1994); URL: http://www .nims.ws/ics_training_docs/ICS_mod12.pdf (alt URL: http://cipbook.infractritical.com/ book3/chapter4/ch4ref34.pdf). 58. Ibid. 59. Federal Emergency Management Agency, Principles of Emergency Management (IS 230) (March 2003); URL: http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/IS/is230.asp (alt URL: http://cipbook.infracritical.com/book3/chapter4/ch4ref35.pdf). 60. An MCE typically consists of principals (or their designees) from organizations and agencies with direct incident management responsibility or with significant incident management support or resource responsibilities. These entities are sometimes referred to as crisis action teams, policy committees, incident management groups, executive teams, or other similar terms (e.g., the wildland fire community has such an entity, the Multiagency Coordination Group). In some instances, EOC may serve a dual function as an MCE; in others, the preparedness organizations discussed may fulfill this role. Regardless of the term or organizational structure used, these entities typically provide strategic coordination during domestic incidents. If constituted separately, MCE, preparedness organizations, and EOC must coordinate and communicate with one another to provide uniform and consistent guidance to incident management personnel. http://www .fema.gov/txt/nims/nims_doc2.txt (alt URL: http://cipbook.infracritical.com/book3/ chapter4/ch4ref24.txt). 61. Federal Emergency Management Agency, An Introduction to the National Incident Management Systems (NIMS) (IS-700.a), Self-Study Guide (February 2009); URL: http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/IS/is700a.asp (alt URL: http://cipbook.infracritical .com/book3/chapter4/ch4ref5.pdf). 62. Ibid. 63. Ibid. 64. Ibid. 65. Ibid. 66. Ibid. 67. Federal Emergency Management Agency, Public Information Training Curriculum: Basic Public Information Officers (G-290); URL: http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/ STCourses/crsdesc.asp?courseid=G290 and http://training.fema.gov/emicourses/crsdetail .asp?cid=E388&ctype=R (alt URL: http://cipbook.infracritical.com/book3/chapter4/ ch4ref36.pdf and http://cipbook.infracritical.com/book3/chapter4/ch4ref36a.pdf). 68. The JIC is designed to help emergency responders get accurate, complete, timely, understandable, and appropriate information to you, your neighbors, and the news media throughout the emergency. http://publicsafety.utah.gov/homelandsecurity/documents/ fs_JIC.pdf (alt URL: http://cipbook.infracritical.com/book3/chapter4/ch4ref15.pdf). 69. To make sure information is received quickly, a JIC often is established. The JIC helps different jurisdictions and agencies convey accurate, complete, timely, understandable, and appropriate information to the public and media during an emergency. Trained specialists, such as PIOs, from all the groups involved can work in the same facility to gather, share, and process information. This approach means that abilities and resources of each responding organization are maximized during what some might consider an often confusing and emotional time, especially during a regionwide crisis, emergency, or situation; the JIC’s primary focus is protecting health and safety.
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70. Federal Emergency Management Agency, An Introduction to the National Incident Management Systems (NIMS) (IS-700.a), Self-Study Guide (February 2009); URL: http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/IS/is700a.asp (alt URL: http://cipbook.infracritical .com/book3/chapter4/ch4ref5.pdf). 71. Federal Emergency Management Agency, An Introduction to the National Incident Management Systems (NIMS) (IS-700.a), Self-Study Guide (February 2009); URL: http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/IS/is700a.asp (alt URL: http://cipbook.infracritical .com/book3/chapter4/ch4ref5.pdf). 72. When the JIC is activated, the JIC management team, which includes the JIC manager, a PIO, a department/agency spokesperson, and outside agency representatives, should be located where it can most effectively share and coordinate information. These position titles may vary slightly from site to site, but the functions of information coordination, production, dissemination, and monitoring and analysis of media coverage and public perceptions should be incorporated into the JIC organization. Internal and external organizational relationships should be depicted with a defined emergency plan. http://www .directives.doe.gov/pdfs/doe/doetext/neword/151/g1511-1v4-4.pdf (alt URL: http:// cipbook.infracritical.com/book3/chapter4/ch4ref16.pdf). 73. Federal Emergency Management Agency, An Introduction to the National Incident Management Systems (NIMS) (IS-700.a), Self-Study Guide (February 2009); URL: http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/IS/is700a.asp (alt URL: http://cipbook.infracritical .com/book3/chapter4/ch4ref5.pdf). 74. Ibid. 75. Responsible for the overall management of the JIC, the timely release of clear and accurate information to the public and media; oversight of the JIC facility and JIC staff; and remains in direct communication with any representative from a public affairs affiliation, ensures coordination with, and among, local, state, tribal, and federal designated representatives at the JIC and other locations, and accommodates JIC administrative support needs. http://www.directives.doe.gov/pdfs/doe/doetext/neword/151/g1511-1v4-4.pdf (alt URL: http://cipbook.infracritical.com/book3/chapter4/ch4ref16.pdf). 76. Federal Emergency Management Agency, Public Information Training Curriculum: Basic Public Information Officers (G-290); URL: http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/ STCourses/crsdesc.asp?courseid=G290 and http://training.fema.gov/emicourses/crsdetail .asp?cid=E388&ctype=R (alt URL: http://cipbook.infracritical.com/book3/chapter4/ ch4ref36.pdf and http://cipbook.infracritical.com/book3/chapter4/ch4ref36a.pdf). 77. Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Preparedness Directorate; http:// www.fema.gov/media/fact_sheets/npd.shtm (alt URL: http://cipbook.infracritical.com/ book3/chapter4/ch4ref17.pdf). 78. Essentially, the definition of “preparedness” means “activities, programs, and systems developed before a disaster or emergency designed to build individual organizational capabilities to support the response to and recovery from disasters or emergencies.” http://www1.va.gov/emshg/apps/emp/emp/definitions.htm (alt URL: http://cipbook .infracritical.com/book3/chapter4/ch4ref18.pdf). 79. Conversely, the definition “civil preparedness,” in its broad meaning, is the methodology to carry out basic government functions of maintaining public peace, health, and safety during an emergency. This shall include plans and preparations for protection from, and the relief of, as well as the recovery and rehabilitation from effects of an attack by the forces of an enemy group or nation or the agents thereof, and it shall also include such activity in connection with disaster as defined herein; RESOLUTION/ ORDINANCE #3, Alleghany County Civil Preparedness Ordinance, Alleghany County, Civil Prepared ness Agency, County of Alleghany, Pennsylvania. http://www.alleghanycounty-nc .gov/ordinances/1-49.pdf (alt URL: http://cipbook.infracritical.com/book3/chapter4/ ch4ref19.pdf).
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80. Federal Emergency Management Agency, An Introduction to the National Incident Management Systems (NIMS) (IS-700.a), Self-Study Guide (February 2009); URL: http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/IS/is700a.asp (alt URL: http://cipbook.infracritical .com/book3/chapter4/ch4ref5.pdf). 81. Ibid. 82. Ibid. 83. Ibid. 84. Federal Emergency Management Agency, Emergency Planning (IS 235), Independent Study Guide (March 2003); URL: http://training.fema.gov/EMIweb/IS/is235.asp (alt URL: http://cipbook.infracritical.com/book3/chapter4/ch4ref38.pdf). 85. An emergency operations plan identifies the necessary actions to provide a controlled response that will (1) protect human health and safety and (2) take the necessary steps to prevent further damage or loss to the resource and mitigate current damage. 86. U.S. Department of Interior, National Park Service, Emergency Management. http:// www.nature.nps.gov/rm77/emergency.cfm (alt URL: http://cipbook.infracritical.com/ book3/chapter4/ch4ref20.pdf). 87. Federal Emergency Management Agency, Principles of Emergency Management (IS 230) (March 2003); URL: http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/IS/is230.asp (alt URL: http://cipbook.infracritical.com/book3/chapter4/ch4ref35.pdf). 88. Ibid. 89. Ibid. 90. The NEST is a group of scientists and technicians that are part of a little-known agency inside the U.S. Department of Energy. The team is supported by helicopters forming the main assets of the program. The program is a relatively small organization, consist ing of (mostly) scientists (about 750 individuals), who are all volunteers from the U.S. Department of Energy weapons laboratories, working on a rotating call. Their mission is to protect the countless bridges, tunnels, ports, skyscrapers, and monuments in American cities from a terrorist’s nuclear strike. The task is almost unimaginable in this era of permanent alert. It is a task complicated by the bureaucratic thicket that has encircled the agency throughout its 28-year history. Rooted in the U.S. Department of Energy, NEST assists the FBI and reports to the FEMA as well as the Department of Defense (Pentagon). 91. NEST was started in 1974 after an extortionist threatened to explode a nuclear bomb in Boston, MA, if he didn’t receive $200,000. The threat turned out to be a hoax. Federal officials were horrified that they had no way of responding had it been real. NEST scientists have been deployed on occasional patrols in Washington, D.C., during the U.S. Bicentennial (1976) and in Atlanta, GA, and Salt Lake City, UT, during the Olympics. 92. Advisory Commission on Radioactive Waste & Decommissioning News, Department of Human Services Maine Radiation Control Program, Volume 4, Issue 3 2002. http://cipbook.infracritical.com/book3/chapter4/ch4ref21.pdf. 93. The National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) is a section within the U.S. DHS, FEMA, Response Division, Operations Branch, and is responsible for supporting federal agencies in the management and coordination of the federal medical response to major emergencies and federally declared disasters including natural disasters, technological disasters, major transportation accidents, and acts of terrorism including weapons of mass destruction events. It is the mission of the NDMS to design, develop, and maintain a national capability to deliver quality medical care to the victims of, and responders to, a domestic disaster. NDMS provides state-of-the-art medical care under any conditions at a disaster site, in transit from the impacted area, and into participating definitive care facilities. Under the DHS, the NDMS fosters the development of DMAT. A DMAT is a group of professional and paraprofessional medical personnel (supported by a cadre of logistical and administrative staff) designed to provide medical care during a disaster
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or other events. Each team has a sponsoring organization (e.g., a major medical center; public health or safety agency; nonprofit, public, or private organization) that signs a memorandum of agreement with the DHS. The DMAT sponsor organizes the team and recruits members, arranges training, and coordinates the dispatch of the team. http:// mediccom.org/public/tadmat/ndms/dmat.html (alt URL: http://cipbook.infracritical.com/ book3/chapter4/ch4ref22.pdf) and also http://www.dmat.org (alt URL: http://cipbook .infracritical.com/book3/chapter4/ch4ref22a.pdf). 94. The National Urban Search and Rescue Response System, established under the authority of FEMA in 1989, is a framework for structuring local emergency services personnel into integrated disaster response task forces. These task forces, complete with necessary tools and equipment as well as required skills and techniques, can be deployed by FEMA for the rescue of victims of structural collapse. http://www.fema.gov/ emergency/usr/index.shtm (alt URL: http://cipbook.infracritical.com/book3/chapter4/ ch4ref23.pdf). 95. URL: http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/IS/is230.asp (alt URL: http://cipbook .infracritical.com/book3/chapter4/ch4ref35.pdf). 96. Federal Emergency Management Agency, An Introduction to the National Incident Management Systems (NIMS) (IS-700.a), Self-Study Guide (February 2009); URL: http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/IS/is700a.asp (alt URL: http://cipbook.infracritical .com/book3/chapter4/ch4ref5.pdf). 97. The NIMS Integration Center is a multijurisdictional, multidisciplinary entity made up of federal stakeholders and over time state, local, and tribal incident management and first responder organizations. It is situated at the Department of Homeland Security’s FEMA. http://www.fema.gov/emergency/nims/index.shtm (alt URL: http://cipbook .infracritical.com/book3/chapter4/ch4ref27.pdf). 98. Federal Emergency Management Agency, An Introduction to the National Incident Management Systems (NIMS) (IS-700.a), Self-Study Guide (February 2009); URL: http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/IS/is700a.asp (alt URL: http://cipbook.infracritical .com/book3/chapter4/ch4ref5.pdf). 99. Federal Emergency Management Agency, An Introduction to the National Incident Management Systems (NIMS) (IS-700.a), Self-Study Guide (February 2009); URL: http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/IS/is700a.asp (alt URL: http://cipbook.infracritical .com/book3/chapter4/ch4ref5.pdf). 100. The EMAC is a mutual aid agreement and partnership between states that exists because, from hurricanes to earthquakes and from wildfires to toxic waste spills or acts of terrorism, all states share a common enemy: the constant threat of disaster. Participating organizations join forces to help one another when they need it most or whenever disaster threatens the environment. http://www.emacweb.org (alt URL: http://cipbook.infracritical .com/book3/chapter4/ch4ref28.pdf). 101. URL: http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/IS/is230.asp (alt URL: http://cipbook.infracritical .com/book3/chapter4/ch4ref35.pdf). 102. Federal Emergency Management Agency, An Introduction to the National Incident Management Systems (NIMS) (IS-700.a), Self-Study Guide (February 2009); URL: http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/IS/is700a.asp (alt URL: http://cipbook.infracritical .com/book3/chapter4/ch4ref5.pdf). 103. URL: http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/IS/is230.asp (alt URL: http://cipbook.infracritical .com/book3/chapter4/ch4ref35.pdf). 104. Federal Emergency Management Agency, An Introduction to the National Incident Management Systems (NIMS) (IS-700.a), Self-Study Guide (February 2009); URL: http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/IS/is700a.asp (alt URL: http://cipbook.infracritical .com/book3/chapter4/ch4ref5.pdf).
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105. URL: http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/IS/is230.asp (alt URL: http://cipbook.infracritical .com/book3/chapter4/ch4ref35.pdf). 106. The National Mutual Aid and Resource Management System is a new initiative undertaken by FEMA within the U.S. DHS in support of the NIMS. FEMA received $5 million in FY02 supplemental appropriations and provided a grant of $2 million to the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) for mutual aid initiatives. Currently, FEMA is working with NEMA to develop a comprehensive, integrated National Mutual Aid and Resource Management System that will allow for an efficient and effective response to all hazards, including terrorist attacks. This system will enhance emergency readiness and response at all levels of government through a comprehensive and integrated system that will allow a jurisdiction to augment needed resources to respond. The system will allow emergency management personnel to identify, locate, request, order, and track outside resources quickly and effectively as well as obtain information on specific resource capabilities, location, cost, and support requirements. http://www.fema.gov/emergency/ nims/ResourceMngmnt.shtm (alt URL: http://cipbook.infracritical.com/book3/chapter4/ ch4ref29b.pdf) and http://www.emacweb.org/?150 (alt URL: http://cipbook.infracritical .com/book3/chapter4/ch4ref29a.pdf). 107. Federal Emergency Management Agency, An Introduction to the National Incident Management Systems (NIMS) (IS-700.a), Self-Study Guide (February 2009); URL: http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/IS/is700a.asp (alt URL: http://cipbook.infracritical .com/book3/chapter4/ch4ref5.pdf). 108. Ibid. 109. Ibid. 110. Ibid. 111. On October 20, 2004, FEMA and the NIMS Integration Center released the National Mutual Aid Glossary of Terms and Definitions and the Resource Typing Definitions for 120 different types of resources. Resource typing definitions are prepared by working groups consisting of subject matter experts and federal, state, and local responders who would be using the definitions to inventory their assets and to support mutual aid requests. In addition to the persons directly involved in the working groups, there were more than 300 corresponding members who reviewed working drafts and participated in the formation of these definitions; recommended changes or additions are compiled and fed into the resource typing working groups for consideration on a quarterly basis. Working group membership will remain dynamic so that we can have leaders in these function areas either directly represented in the group or include a corresponding member(s). http://www.oes.ca.gov/Operational/OESHome.nsf/PDF/Resource%20 Typing%20Guidance/$file/NA005.05.pdf (alt URL: http://cipbook.infracritical.com/ book3/chapter4/ch4ref30.pdf). 112. http://cipbook.infracritical.com/book3/chapter4/ch4ref31.pdf. 113. Federal Emergency Management Agency, Guide for All-Hazard Emergency Operations Planning (SLG 101), Attachment H: Resource Management (September 1996); URL: http://www.fema.gov/pdf/plan/slg101.pdf (alt URL: http://cipbook.infracritical.com/ book3/chapter4/ch4ref37.pdf). 114. Federal Emergency Management Agency, An Introduction to the National Incident Management Systems (NIMS) (IS-700.a), Self-Study Guide (February 2009); URL: http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/IS/is700a.asp (alt URL: http://cipbook.infracritical .com/book3/chapter4/ch4ref5.pdf). 115. Ibid. 116. Ibid. 117. Ibid. 118. Ibid.
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119. Ibid. 120. Ibid. 121. Ibid. 122. With the explosion of telecommunications and information technologies has come a disturbing trend—a lack of interoperability among systems. This is demonstrated most dramatically primarily within the public safety community, as police and other agencies fail to communicate with each other during multijurisdictional events. Even when calamities do not occur, however, daily interoperability problems continue to plague public safety agencies nationwide. The federal government is conducting a technical program aimed at providing effective interoperability and information sharing among dissimilar public safety telecommunications and information technology systems. The key to the program is the identification and/or development of interoperability standards to allow local, state, and federal agencies to exchange information without requiring substantial changes to internal systems or procedures. The program is sponsored by three federal agencies: the National Communications System, the National Telecommunications and Information Administration, and the National Institute of Justice (through its Advanced Generation of Interoperability for Law Enforcement program). 123. By definition, communications interoperability refers to the ability of public safety agencies to talk across disciplines and jurisdictions via radio communications systems, to exchange voice and/or data with one another on demand, in real time, when needed, and as authorized. The federal program offices recognize that law enforcement, fire service, emergency medical service, and other emergency response personnel currently lack effective and modern communication systems within their respective organizations. The programs support the need to improve those systems so long as the improvement planning includes a vision for improved interoperability with other agencies. Additionally, the programs further encourage emergency response agencies developing systems to improve communications and interoperability to ensure that their solutions are compliant with the concepts, processes, and protocols set forth in the DHS’s NIMS document. URL: http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/docs/fy05hsgp.pdf (alt URL: http://cipbook .infracritical.com/book3/chapter4/ch4ref32.pdf). 122. http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/interapp/editorial/editorial_0566.xml (alt URL: http:// cipbook.infracritical.com/book3/chapter4/ch4ref26.pdf).
Command 5 Incident System 5.1 Introduction This chapter summarizes the basic functionality of an Incident Command System (ICS), more specifically, the National Incident Management Systems (NIMS) ICS. The first sections of this chapter provide the historical background and significance behind ICSs and how they have become so valuable and important over the past (almost) 30 years.
5.2 What are NIMS and ICS? NIMS provides a consistent, flexible, and adjustable national framework within which government and private entities at all levels can work together to manage domestic incidents, regardless of their cause, size, location, or complexity. This flexibility applies across all phases of incident management: prevention, preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation. NIMS provides a set of standardized organizational structures, which include the ICS, multiagency coordination systems (MACS), and public information systems, as well as requirements for processes, procedures, and systems to improve interoperability among jurisdictions and disciplines in various areas. There will be circumstances in which responders from an incident management operation will depend on the involvement of emergency responders from other (sometimes multiple) jurisdictions, as well as personnel and equipment from other government locations (other local governments, state governments, and the federal government), and it becomes necessary that (due to these circumstances) responders will also require effective and efficient coordination methodologies across a wide degree of involvement of organizations and their activities.1 Successful operations depend on mobilization capabilities, effectively utilizing multiple external resources. These resources (when implemented) define an amalgamated organizational framework that is understood by everyone, who will often use this framework as a common plan, specifying the framework of an Incident Action Plan (IAP) throughout the entire process. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) released the NIMS on March 1, 2004. Secretary Tom Ridge and Under Secretary Michael Brown specifically highlighted compliance with the ICS in a relatively short time frame. Some of the caveats were that in some cities fire and police departments have worked together using an ICS-like command structure for several years; for other cities, only 83
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fire departments used the ICS-like command structure. Although many departments were aware of the concept, those departments regarded ICS as a fire service system. The introduction of NIMS ended this discrepancy, as Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-52 required state and local adoption of NIMS as a condition for receiving federal preparedness funding. Although ICS was first pioneered by a fire service, it was, at its core, a management system designed to integrate resources to effectively attack a common problem. This system was not exclusive to simply one discipline or set of circumstances; its most significant feature was its flexibility to accommodate all circumstances, from large-scale circumstances (e.g., through multiagency assistance programs) to smaller, less-defined circumstances (multidepartment, but not without a single jurisdiction).
5.3 What Is an Incident? An incident is an occurrence caused by either human intervention or a natural phenomenon that requires or may require action by emergency service personnel to prevent or minimize loss of life or damage to property and/or the environment. Some examples of incidents include the following: • • • • • • •
Fires (both structural and wildfire) Hazardous materials incidents Search and rescue missions Oil or chemical spills Natural disasters (e.g., hurricanes, tornadoes, and earthquakes) Terrorist/weapons of mass destruction (WMD) events Planned events (e.g., as parades, conventions, and political rallies)
One of the more interesting challenges is determining the start time of an incident and making the call that an incident is actually under way. For example, in Toronto, Canada, people were observed making recordings of infrastructure and behaving in such a way that they drew the attention of law enforcement. Does this constitute a terrorist attack or does it constitute a tourist event? An aspect that needs significant clarification, particularly in communities that have not been subjected to direct attacks, along with the learning curve that comes with those events, is the cycle of planning and preparation that goes into an attack. Does the initial reconnaissance of an infrastructure constitute a terrorist event? Depending on the lawyers’ perspectives, it may or it may not. What is known is that the NIMS and ICS are essentially reactive systems, and, if a logical layer of this defense approach is to be followed, that reaction should come at the earliest point possible where it may be determined that there is an obligation to act—even if the event has not yet occurred.
5.4 What Is an ICS? Based on financial and budgetary constraints, along with limited staff and resources at all levels of the government, it may not be possible for any one group, department,
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or agency to handle all of the management and resource needs for the increasing number of incidents nationwide. As such, these government groups, departments, and agencies must work together to provide a fairly coordinated effort under a common management framework or system. The ICS is an attempt at standardizing on-scene, all-hazard incident management, which allows its users to adopt an integrated organizational framework structure to match the complexities and demands for single or multiple incidents without being hampered by any one jurisdictional boundary. ICS has considerable flexibility both within and between government groups, departments, and agencies; it can grow or shrink based on whatever needs are presented. Because of this level of flexibility, ICS is cost-effective and provides an efficient management methodology approach for organizations of all sizes. ICS is a proven management framework system based on several best practice methodologies implemented over several years, and it includes several decades of lessons learned in the organization and management of emergency incidents. This system represents best practices and has become the standard for emergency management across the country.3
5.5 What Is NIMS ICS? With the exception of the way the intelligence function is handled, the principles and concepts of NIMS ICS are the same as the Firefighting Resources of California Organized for Potential Emergencies (FIRESCOPE) and the National Interagency Incident Management System (NIIMS) ICS.4 The NIMS ICS provides a common organizational structure for the immediate response to emergencies and involves the coordination of personnel and equipment that are at the site of the incident. One of the FY 2005 NIMS implementation requirements is that federal, state, local, and tribal governments institutionalize the use of ICS across their entire response systems. Although many agencies now use several forms of ICS, ultimately, the supported methodology is the one from the DHS. Although the principles and concepts of the NIMS ICS are similar to FIRESCOPE5 and NIIMS ICS,6 it is important to note that the NIMS ICS retains the most effective elements from the range of existing ICS methodologies.
5.6 History of ICS The concept of ICS was developed more than 30 years ago in the aftermath of a devastating wildfire in California. During 13 days in 1970, 16 lives were lost, 700 structures were destroyed, and more than one-half million acres were burned. The overall cost and loss associated with these fires totaled $18 million per day. Although all of the responding agencies cooperated to the best of their ability, numerous problems with communication and coordination hampered their effectiveness. As a result, Congress mandated that the U.S. Forest Service design a system that would make a quantum jump in the capabilities of Southern California wildland fire protection agencies to effectively coordinate interagency action and to allocate suppression resources in dynamic, multiple-fire situations.
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The California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (CDF) and the Governor’s Office of Emergency Services (OES); the Los Angeles, Ventura, and Santa Barbara County Fire Departments; and the Los Angeles City Fire Department joined with the U.S. Forest Service to develop the system. This system became known as FIRESCOPE.7 In 1973, the first FIRESCOPE Technical Team was established to guide the research and development design of a command structure. Two major components came out of this work: the ICS and the MACS. The FIRESCOPE ICS is primarily a command and control system delineating job responsibilities and organizational structure for the purpose of managing day-to-day operations for all types of emergency incidents.8 By the mid-1970s, the FIRESCOPE agencies had formally agreed on ICS-based commonly defined terminology and procedures, and conducted limited field testing of ICS. By 1980, parts of ICS had been successfully used on several major wildland and urban fire incidents. It was formally adopted by the Los Angeles Fire Department, the CDF, and the Governor’s OES and endorsed by the State Board of Fire Services. Also during the 1970s, the National Wildfire Coordinating Group (NWCG)9 was chartered to coordinate the fire management programs of various participating federal and state agencies. By 1980, FIRESCOPE ICS training was under development. Recognizing that, in addition to the local users for which it was designed, FIRESCOPE training could satisfy the needs of other state and federal agencies, the NWCG conducted an analysis of FIRESCOPE ICS for possible national application.10 By 1981, ICS was widely used throughout Southern California by several fire agencies. In addition, the use of ICS in response to nonfire incidents was increasing. Although FIRESCOPE ICS was originally developed to assist in the response to wildland fires, it was quickly recognized as a system that could help public safety responders provide effective and coordinated incident management for a wide range of situations, including floods, hazardous materials accidents, earthquakes, and aircraft crashes. It was flexible enough to manage catastrophic incidents involving thousands of emergency response and management personnel. By introducing relatively minor terminology, organizational, and procedural modifications to FIRESCOPE ICS, the NIIMS ICS became adaptable to an all-hazards environment.11 Although, tactically, each type of incident may be handled somewhat differently, the overall incident management approach still utilizes the major functions of the ICM. The FIRESCOPE Board of Directors and the NWCG recommended a national application of ICS. In 1982, all FIRESCOPE ICS documentation was revised and adopted as the NIIMS.12,13 In the years since FIRESCOPE and the NIIMS were first combined, FIRESCOPE agencies and the NWCG have worked together to update and maintain the ICS Operational System Description (ICS 120-1).11 This document would later serve as the basis for the NIMS ICS.
5.7 FIRESCOPE The concept for an ICS was developed in the aftermath of a devastating wildfire in California in 1970. The FIRESCOPE ICS was the result of that effort.
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Although the FIRESCOPE ICS was developed for wildland fire response, many within the incident management community recognized that it could be used by other public safety responders for a wide range of situations (e.g., hurricanes, earthquakes, floods, other natural disasters, as well as hazardous materials accidents). In 1982, as a result of the collaboration between FIRESCOPE and the NWCG,15 it was concluded that a national application of ICS was necessary; all FIRESCOPE ICS documentation was revised and consequently adopted as the NIIMS.16
5.8 National Interagency Incident Management System17 Not to be confused with NIMS, the NIIMS is a system for responding to a wide range of emergencies, including fires, floods, earthquakes, hurricanes, tornados, tidal waves, riots, spilling of hazardous materials, and other natural or human-caused incidents. NIIMS has five major subsystems, which provide a comprehensive approach to incident management. The subsystems and their functions are as follows.
1. ICS is an on-site management level structure of positions suitable for managing any crisis or incident. 2. Training encompasses the development and delivery of training courses to personnel. 3. Qualifications and certification are national standards for qualifications and certification for ICS positions. 4. Publications management comprises the development, control, sources, and distribution of NIIMS documentation (provided by the NWCG). 5. Supporting technology covers the technologies and systems used to support first responders of an emergency response.
5.9 Weaknesses Addressed by Using an ICS Weaknesses in incident management were often due to the following factors: • Lack of accountability, including unclear chains of command and super vision • Poor communication due to inefficient uses of available communications systems and conflicting codes and terminology • Lack of an orderly, systematic planning process • No common, flexible, predesigned management framework structure to enable delegation of responsibilities and manage workloads efficiently • No predefined methods of integrating interagency requirements into the management framework structure and planning process efficiently The ICS allows government groups, departments, and agencies to effectively manage their response efforts. ICS is a proven management framework system based on several successful business practices.18
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5.10 Benefits of Using an ICS The adoption of an ICS provides several advantages: • Flexible, standardized response management systems that allow for the cultivation of response management expertise at all echelons within the command structure • Provides an increased level of support for trained personnel during any given incident • Allows unrestricted distribution by the command structure to improve the capabilities of and unify local response communities into a more effective organization • Applies to any response situation (defined as being an “all-hazard, all-risk” incident) • Provides for expansion and/or contraction capabilities that are segmented logically • Maintains autonomy for each department and agency participating in the response
5.11 ICS Framework Designers of the ICS recognized early that ICS must be interdisciplinary and organizationally flexible to meet the following management challenges:19 • Meet the needs of an incident of any type or size • Allow personnel from various agencies to merge rapidly into a common management framework structure • Provide logistical and administrative support to operational staff • Provide cost-effective measure by avoiding duplication of any efforts
5.12 Applications for the Use of ICS Applications for the use of ICS include:20 • Routine or planned events (e.g., parades, concerts, or conventions) • Fires, hazardous materials, and mass casualty incidents • Multiple jurisdiction and agency cooperation resulting from natural disasters (e.g., floods, hurricanes, tornadoes, earthquakes) • Search and rescue missions • Biological outbreaks and disease containment • Acts of terrorism (including WMD)
5.13
ICS Management Characteristics
ICS is based on proven management tools that contribute to the strength and efficiency of the overall system. The following ICS management characteristics are taught by the DHS in its ICS training programs:
Incident Command System
• • • • • • • • • • • • • •
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Common terminology Modular organization Management by objectives Reliance on an IAP Manageable span of control Predesignated Incident Mobilization Center locations and facilities Comprehensive resource management Integrated communications Establishment and transfer of command Chain-of-command and unity-of-command Unified Command (UC) Accountability of resources and personnel Deployment Information and intelligence management
5.14 Understanding the ICS Organization There is no correlation between the ICS organization and the administrative structure of any department or agency and its jurisdiction. Implementing the ICS organization is a deliberate measure, because confusion over different position titles and job requirements within the organizational structures has been a significant stumbling block to effective incident management, especially in recent years. Examples of this breakdown of the organizational structure might include the incident command role being filled by the county sheriff, whereas the county battalion fire chief serves as the operations section chief (OSC). Every incident or event requires that certain management functions are performed consistently, accurately, quickly, and efficiently. The problem must be identi fied and assessed—quickly—to develop and implement, and, when necessary, deploy resources procured and paid for. Regardless of the size of the incident, these management functions still need to apply:21
5.15 ICS Management Functions There are five significant management functions (often referred to as “sections”) that are the foundation upon which the ICS organization develops. These functions apply whether they are handling routine emergencies, organizing for a significant nonemergency event (e.g., a parade or protest), or managing a response to a significant disaster (e.g., train derailment or chemical spill).22 These five management functions are defined as follows:
1. Incident command sets the incident objectives, strategies, and priorities; has overall responsibility at the incident or event. 2. Operations conducts tactical operations to carry out the incident plan; develops the tactical objectives and organization, and directs all tactical resources.
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3. Planning prepares and documents the IAP to accomplish the objectives, collecting and evaluating information; maintains resource status and documentation for incident records. 4. Logistics provides support, resources, and other services needed to meet the operational objectives. 5. Finance/administration monitors costs related to the incident; provides accounting, procurement, time record keeping, and cost analysis management.
During smaller incidents and events, usually one person, the incident commander (IC), may perform all five management functions. In many circumstances, the IC is the only position that is always staffed within any given ICS application. Larger incidents or events may require these five management functions to be set up into separate sections within the organization.23
5.16 ICS Sections Each of the primary ICS sections may be subdivided (as needed). The ICS organization has the capability to expand or contract to meet the needs of the incident. Basic ICS operating guidelines are that the individual at the top of the organization is responsible until the authority is delegated to another, more qualified individual. Thus, for smaller incidents, these individuals may not be required and the IC will oversee and manage all aspects of the incident organization.
5.17 What is Span of Control? Another basic operating guideline concerns the supervisory capacity and structure of the organization. Defined as “span of control,”24 this pertains to the number of individuals or resources that a supervisor can manage effectively during emergency responses to incidents or special events.25 Maintaining an effective span of control is particularly important for incidents in which safety and accountability are considered a priority.26 Maintaining an adequate span of control throughout the ICS organization is considerably important. An effective span of control for an incident may vary from three to seven individuals, but a ratio of one supervisor for every five reporting elements is recommended.27 If the number of reporting elements falls outside of this range, expansion or consolidation of the organization may be necessary. There are, however, exceptions, usually for lower-risk assignments or where resources may work in close proximity with each other.28
5.18 ICS Position Titles To maintain a span of control, the ICS organization may be divided into several levels of supervision. At each level, individuals with primary responsibility positions have distinct titles; using specific ICS position titles serves three very important purposes:
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1. Titles provide a common standard for all users. If a department or agency were to use the titles of “branch chief ” with another using the title of “branch director,” this lack of consistency can (oftentimes) cause confusion (as well as infighting) at the incident. 2. The use of distinct title for ICS positions allows for filling ICS positions with the most qualified individuals rather than based on seniority. 3. Standardized position titles are useful when requesting for qualified personnel; for example, with deployment of personnel, it is (usually) important to note if the positions are “unit leaders,” “clerk,” etc.
5.19 ICS Organizational Components The following definitions are representative of the ICS organization and its components:29 • Section—the organizational levels with responsibility for a significant functional area of the incident (e.g., operations, planning, logistics, finance/ administration); the individual in charge of each section is designated as a “chief.” • Division—used to divide an incident geographically; an individual in charge of each division is designated as a “supervisor.” • Group—used to describe functional areas of operations; an individual in charge of each group is designated as a “supervisor.” • Branch—used when the number of divisions or groups extends the span of control, and may either be geographically or functionally separated; an individual in charge of each branch is designated as a “director.” • Task force—a combination of mixed resources with common communications operating under the direct supervision of the “task force leader.” • Strike team—a set of number of resources of similar kind and type with common communications operating under the direct supervision of the “strike team leader.” • Single resource—may be individuals, a piece of equipment and its personnel complement, or a crew or team of individuals with an identified supervisor that may be used at an incident.
5.20 Unified Command UC is an important element in multijurisdictional or multiagency domestic incident management. It provides guidelines to enable agencies with different legal, geographic, and functional responsibilities to coordinate, plan, and interact effectively. As a team, the UC overcomes much of the inefficiency and duplication of effort that can occur when agencies from different functional and geographic jurisdictions or agencies at different levels of government operate without a common system or organizational framework. The primary difference between the single command structure and the UC structure is that, in a single command structure, the IC is solely responsible for establishing
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incident management objectives and strategies. In a UC structure, the individuals designated by their jurisdictional authorities jointly determine objectives, plans, and priorities and work together to execute them.
5.21 The Incident Commander The IC has overall responsibility for managing the incident. The IC must be fully briefed and should have a written delegation of authority. Initially, assigning tactical resources and overseeing operations will be under the direct supervision of the IC. Personnel assigned by the IC have the authority of their assigned positions and roles, even if it may not be the same (or similar) authority that they may have elsewhere. In addition to having the overall responsibility for managing the entire incident, the IC will conduct the following responsibilities:30 • Must ensure incident safety, provide information services for internal and external stakeholders, and establish and maintain liaison communication capabilities with other groups, departments, and agencies that are participating in the incident response. • May have one or more deputies from the same government group, department, or agency, or from other agencies or jurisdictions. The deputy IC must be as qualified as the IC; henceforth, the deputy IC is the “backup incident commander.” As incidents expand in size, change in jurisdiction or disciplines, or become more complex, command may shift to a more experienced IC. Rank, grade, and seniority are not factors used to select the IC. Rather, the IC should always be a highly qualified individual who is trained to lead an incident response. A formal transfer of command at an incident always requires that there will be a full briefing for the incoming IC and notification to all personnel that a change in command is about to take place.31 As incidents expand, the incident command may delegate authority for performance considerations of specific activities to the Command Staff and the General Staff.
5.22 Command Staff Command comprises the IC and Command Staff. Command staff positions are established to assign responsibility for key activities not specifically identified in the General Staff functional elements. These positions may include the public information officer (PIO), safety officer (SO), and the liaison officer (LNO), in addition to others, as required and assigned by the IC.32 Depending on the size and type of the incident or event, it may be necessary for the incident command to designate personnel to provide information, safety, and liaison services for the entire organization. The ICS command positions are outlined as:33 • PIO—serves as the conduit for information to internal and external stakeholders, including the news media and other organization seeking information directly from the incident or event.
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• SO—monitors safety conditions and develops measures for assuring the safety of all assigned personnel. • LNO—serves as the primary contact for supporting departments and agencies assisting at an incident or event.
5.22.1 Command Staff: PIO Some of the responsibilities of the PIO include34 • Advising the IC on issues related to information dissemination and news media relations • Serving as the primary contact for anyone who wants information about an incident and the response for it • Serving both an external audience through the news media and an internal audience, including both incident staff and agency personnel • Coordinating with other public information staff to ensure that confusing or conflicting information is not issued • Obtaining information from the Planning section, which gathers intelligence and other information pertinent to the incident • Obtaining information from the community, the news media, and other sources and providing that information to the Planning section chief (PSC) and the IC
5.22.2 Command Staff: SO Some of the responsibilities of the SO include35 • Ensuring that all personnel perform their jobs safely and arrive at the scene of the incident and back to their home or office safely • Advising the IC on issues regarding incident safety, and also emphasizes safety awareness for all personnel • Operating closely with operations staff to ensure that safety guidelines are adhered to throughout the incident, including the wearing of appropriate protective equipment and the use of safety gear (helmets, breathing apparatus, etc.) in areas not considered safe • Conducting risk analysis and implementing safety measures (where necessary), which are conducted throughout the planning process, but may also halt any activities deemed unsafe before, during, and after an incident • Minimizing personnel risk through the promotion of safe driving habits and providing safety training and awareness programs to personnel and staff
5.22.3 Command Staff: LNO Some of the responsibilities of the LNO include36 • Assisting the IC through the gathering of information regarding agencies that are supporting efforts during an incident response
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• Serving as a coordinator for all agencies at all levels of government that are not represented within the incident command structure, and acting as “gobetween” for the IC and supporting agencies and their personnel • Providing briefings to agency representatives that facilitate addressing any relevant questions or concerns about the operation of the incident response • Analyzing restrictions on supporting agencies, and their resources, that may impact the operations of the incident, and the possibility of utilizing these resources or other special support requirements that might exist; this