Lecture Notes in Computer Science Commenced Publication in 1973 Founding and Former Series Editors: Gerhard Goos, Juris Hartmanis, and Jan van Leeuwen
Editorial Board David Hutchison Lancaster University, UK Takeo Kanade Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA, USA Josef Kittler University of Surrey, Guildford, UK Jon M. Kleinberg Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, USA Alfred Kobsa University of California, Irvine, CA, USA Friedemann Mattern ETH Zurich, Switzerland John C. Mitchell Stanford University, CA, USA Moni Naor Weizmann Institute of Science, Rehovot, Israel Oscar Nierstrasz University of Bern, Switzerland C. Pandu Rangan Indian Institute of Technology, Madras, India Bernhard Steffen University of Dortmund, Germany Madhu Sudan Microsoft Research, Cambridge, MA, USA Demetri Terzopoulos University of California, Los Angeles, CA, USA Doug Tygar University of California, Berkeley, CA, USA Gerhard Weikum Max-Planck Institute of Computer Science, Saarbruecken, Germany
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Roberto Setola Stefan Geretshuber (Eds.)
Critical Information Infrastructures Security Third International Workshop, CRITIS 2008 Rome, Italy, October 13-15, 2008 Revised Papers
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Volume Editors Roberto Setola Complex System and Security Lab - University CAMPUS Bio-Medico of Rome Via A. del Portillo, 21, 00128 Rome, Italy E-mail:
[email protected] Stefan Geretshuber IABG mbH Germany, InfoCom, Safety and Security, Dept. for Critical Infrastructures Einsteinstr. 20, 85521 Ottobrunn, Germany E-mail:
[email protected]
Library of Congress Control Number: 2009934295 CR Subject Classification (1998): C.2, D.4.6, J.2, B.4.5, K.4.1, K.4.4 LNCS Sublibrary: SL 4 – Security and Cryptology ISSN ISBN-10 ISBN-13
0302-9743 3-642-03551-5 Springer Berlin Heidelberg New York 978-3-642-03551-7 Springer Berlin Heidelberg New York
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Preface
This volume contains the proceedings of the Third International Workshop on Critical Information Infrastructure Security (CRITIS 2008), which was held October 13–15, 2008 in Villa Mondragone (Rome), Italy, and was co-organized by AIIC (The Italian Society of Critical Infrastructures Experts) and ENEA (The Italian National Agency for New Technology, Energy and the Environment). This year’s workshop was focused on an interdisciplinary and multifaced dialogue about the third millennium security strategies for critical information infrastructures (CII) and their protection (CIP). The aim was to explore the new challenges posed by the CII, bringing together researchers and professionals from universities, private companies and public administrations interested in all security-related aspects, and actively involved in the scientific communities at a national, European and trans-European level. More than 70 papers were submitted to the conference, which were screened by a very selective double-blind review process to identify the 39 papers selected for presentation, based on their significance, novelty and technical quality. Revisions were not checked and the authors bear full responsibility for the content of their papers. CRITIS 2008 also had six outstanding invited speakers: Erol Gelenbe (Imperial College, UK), Massoud Amin (University of Minnesota, USA), George Apostolakis (MIT, USA), Andrea Valboni (Microsoft, Italy), Sujeet Shenoi (University of Tulsa, USA) and Angelo Marino (DG Information Society and Media, European Commission). All the contributions highlight the current development in the field of critical (information) infrastructures and their protection. Specifically they emphasized that the efforts dedicated to this topic are beginning to provide some concrete results. Indeed the main focus has moved from the problem definition toward its formalization, qualification and solution. Some papers illustrated interesting and innovative approaches devoted to understanding, analyzing and modeling a scenario composed of several heterogeneous and interdependent infrastructures. Interesting results were related to vulnerability and risk assessment of the different components of critical infrastructures and more specifically to those of the cyber layer. Furthermore, issues concerning crisis management scenarios for interdependent infrastructures were illustrated. Encouraging preliminarily results were presented about the development of new technological solutions addressing self-healing capabilities of infrastructures, regarded as one of the most promising research topics to improve the resilience of infrastructures. The relevance assumed by CRITIS conferences was confirmed by the support given by the IEEE and IFIP communities active in CIP, by the patronage offered by the Italian Prime Minister Office and the JRC of the European Commission, as well as by sponsorship provided by Telecom Italia, Microsoft, Theorematica,
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Siemems, IABG, D’Appolonia, and IAS Fraunhofer, to whom we are greatly indebted. Many people have contributed to the successful organization of the conference and we are really very much obliged to all of them. Among others we need to thank the General Co-chairs Sandro Bologna and Stefanos Gritzalis and the Conference Honorary Chair, Salvatore Tucci. We sincerely thank them for their excellent support, encouragement and for their help in all organizational issues. Our special thanks also go to Emiliano Casalicchio for managing all the organizational and logistical issues as Local Organization Chair, Stefano Panzieri for the preparation and maintenance of the workshop website and all other people who worked together organizing the conference. CRITIS 2008 thanks the members of the Program Committee and the external reviewers who performed an excellent job during the review process, which is the essence of the quality of the event, and last but not least the authors who submitted papers as well as the participants from all over the world who chose to honor us with their attendance. April 2009
Roberto Setola Stefan Geretshuber
CRITIS 2008 Third International Workshop on Critical Information Infrastructure Security Villa Mondragone Monte Porzio Catone, Rome October 13–15, 2008 Organized by AIIC – Associazione Italiana Infrastrutture Critiche ENEA – Ente per le Nuove tecnologie, l’Energia e l’Ambiente
Program Co-chairs Roberto Setola Stefan Geretshuber
Università CAMPUS Bio-Medico, Italy IABG, Germany
General Co-chairs Sandro Bologna Stefanos Gritzalis
ENEA, Italy University of the Aegean, Greece
Honorary Chair Salvatore Tucci
Italian Prime Minister Office, Università Roma Tor Vergata, AIIC, Italy
Sponsorship Co-chairs Salvatore D’Antonio Marcelo Masera Stefano Panzieri
CINI, Italy IPSC, Joint Research Centre, Italy Università di Roma Tre, Italy
Local Organization Chair Emiliano Casalicchio
Università di Roma Tor Vergata, Italy
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Organization
International Program Committee George Apostolakis Fabrizio Baiardi Robin Bloomfield Stefan Brem Donald D. Dudenhoeffer Myriam Dunn Claudia Eckert Urs E. Gattiker Erol Gelenbe Adrian Gheorghe Eric Goetz Nouredine Hadjsaid Bernhard M. Hämmerli Chris Johnson Raija Koivisto Rüdiger Klein Javier Lopez Eric Luiijf Angelo Marino Simin Nadjm-Tehrani Eiji Okamoto Andrew Powell Kai Rannenberg Michel Riguidel Erich Rome William H. Sanders Sujeet Shenoi Neeraj Suri Giovanni Ulivi Paulo Veríssimo Stephen D. Wolthusen Stefan Wrobel Jianying Zhou
MIT, USA Università di Pisa, Italy City University, UK Federal Office for Civil Protection, Switzerland INL, USA ETH Center for Security Studies Zurich, Switzerland Fraunhofer SIT, Germany CyTRAP Labs, Switzerland Imperial College London ,UK Old Dominion University, USA Dartmouth College, USA L.E.G., Grenoble Institute of Technology, France Acris GmbH & Univ. Applied Sciences Lucerne, Switzerland Glasgow University, UK VTT, Finland Fraunhofer IAIS, Germany University of Malaga, Spain TNO -Defence, Security and Safety, The Netherlands European Commission Linköping University, Sweden and Univ. of Luxembourg University of Tsukuba, Japan CPNI, UK Goethe University Frankfurt, Germany ENST, France Fraunhofer IAIS, Germany University of Illinois, US University of Tulsa, USA TU Darmstadt, Germany DIA – Università di Roma Tre, Italy Universidade de Lisboa, Portugal Royal Holloway, University of London, UK University of Bonn and Fraunhofer IAIS, Germany Institute for Infocom Research, Singapore
Organizing Committee Susanna Del Bufalo Stefano De Porcellinis Annamaria Fagioli
ENEA, Italy Università CAMPUS Bio-Medico, Italy ENEA, Italy
Organization
Emanuele Galli Bernardo Palazzi Federica Pascucci Elena Spadini
Università di Roma Tor Vergata, Italy Università di Roma Tre, Italy Università di Roma Tre, Italy Università CAMPUS Bio-Medico, Italy
Steering Committee Chairs Bernhard M. Hämmerli Javier Lopez
Acris GmbH and University of Applied Sciences Lucerne, Switzerland University of Malaga, Spain
Members Sokratis Katsikas Reinhard Posch Saifur Rahman
External Reviewers Salvatore D'Antonio Vincenzo Fioriti Andrea Rigoni Reinhard Hutter Sandro Meloni Marco Carbonelli-Laura Laura Gratta Roberto Obialero Giovanni Pellerino Ugo Marturano Ilaria Scarano Claudio Calisti
University of the Aegean, Greece Technical University Graz, Austria Advanced Research Institute, Virginia Tech, USA
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Table of Contents
Blackouts in Power Transmission Networks Due to Spatially Localized Load Anomalies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Carla Dionisi, Francesca Mariani, Maria Cristina Recchioni, and Francesco Zirilli Stability of a Distributed Generation Network Using the Kuramoto Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Vincenzo Fioriti, Silvia Ruzzante, Elisa Castorini, Elena Marchei, and Vittorio Rosato Enabling System of Systems Analysis of Critical Infrastructure Behaviors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . William J. Tolone, E. Wray Johnson, Seok-Won Lee, Wei-Ning Xiang, Lydia Marsh, Cody Yeager, and Josh Blackwell Information Modelling and Simulation in Large Interdependent Critical Infrastructures in IRRIIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . R¨ udiger Klein, Erich Rome, C´esaire Beyel, Ralf Linnemann, Wolf Reinhardt, and Andrij Usov Multi-level Dependability Modeling of Interdependencies between the Electricity and Information Infrastructures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Marco Beccuti, Giuliana Franceschinis, Mohamed Kaˆ aniche, and Karama Kanoun Interdependency Analysis in Electric Power Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Silvano Chiaradonna, Felicita Di Giandomenico, and Paolo Lollini Modeling and Simulation of Complex Interdependent Systems: A Federated Agent-Based Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Emiliano Casalicchio, Emanuele Galli, and Salvatore Tucci Self-healing and Resilient Critical Infrastructures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Rune Gustavsson and Bj¨ orn St˚ ahl Critical Infrastructures Security Modeling, Enforcement and Runtime Checking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Anas Abou El Kalam and Yves Deswarte INcreasing Security and Protection through Infrastructure REsilience: The INSPIRE Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Salvatore D’Antonio, Luigi Romano, Abdelmajid Khelil, and Neeraj Suri
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Increase of Power System Survivability with the Decision Support Tool CRIPS Based on Network Planning and Simulation Program R PSSSINCAL .................................................. Christine Schwaegerl, Olaf Seifert, Robert Buschmann, Hermann Dellwing, Stefan Geretshuber, and Claus Leick Information Modelling and Simulation in Large Dependent Critical Infrastructures – An Overview on the European Integrated Project IRRIIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . R¨ udiger Klein
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Assessment of Structural Vulnerability for Power Grids by Network Performance Based on Complex Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ettore Bompard, Marcelo Masera, Roberto Napoli, and Fei Xue
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Using Centrality Measures to Rank the Importance of the Components of a Complex Network Infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Francesco Cadini, Enrico Zio, and Cristina-Andreea Petrescu
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RadialNet: An Interactive Network Topology Visualization Tool with Visual Auditing Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Jo˜ ao P.S. Medeiros and Selan R. dos Santos
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Quantitative Security Risk Assessment and Management for Railway Transportation Infrastructures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Francesco Flammini, Andrea Gaglione, Nicola Mazzocca, and Concetta Pragliola Assessing and Improving SCADA Security in the Dutch Drinking Water Sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Eric Luiijf, Manou Ali, and Annemarie Zielstra
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Analysis of Malicious Traffic in Modbus/TCP Communications . . . . . . . . Tiago H. Kobayashi, Aguinaldo B. Batista Jr., Jo˜ ao Paulo S. Medeiros, Jos´e Macedo F. Filho, Agostinho M. Brito Jr., and Paulo S. Motta Pires
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Scada Malware, a Proof of Concept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Andrea Carcano, Igor Nai Fovino, Marcelo Masera, and Alberto Trombetta
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Testbeds for Assessing Critical Scenarios in Power Control Systems . . . . Giovanna Dondossola, Geert Deconinck, Fabrizio Garrone, and Hakem Beitollahi
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A Structured Approach to Incident Response Management in the Oil and Gas Industry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Maria B. Line, Eirik Albrechtsen, Martin Gilje Jaatun, Inger Anne Tøndel, Stig Ole Johnsen, Odd Helge Longva, and Irene Wærø
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Security Strategy Analysis for Critical Information Infrastructures . . . . . Jose Manuel Torres, Finn Olav Sveen, and Jose Maria Sarriegi
247
Emerging Information Infrastructures: Cooperation in Disasters . . . . . . . . Mikael Asplund, Simin Nadjm-Tehrani, and Johan Sigholm
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Service Modeling Language Applied to Critical Infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . Gianmarco Baldini and Igor Nai Fovino
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Graded Security Expert System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . J¨ uri Kivimaa, Andres Ojamaa, and Enn Tyugu
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Protection of Mobile Agents Execution Using a Modified Self-Validating Branch-Based Software Watermarking with External Sentinel . . . . . . . . . . Joan Tom` as-Buliart, Marcel Fern´ andez, and Miguel Soriano Adaptation of Modelling Paradigms to the CIs Interdependencies Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Jose M. Sarriegi, Finn Olav Sveen, Jose M. Torres, and Jose J. Gonzalez Empirical Findings on Critical Infrastructure Dependencies in Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Eric Luiijf, Albert Nieuwenhuijs, Marieke Klaver, Michel van Eeten, and Edite Cruz Dependent Automata for the Modelling of Dependencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Susanna Donatelli Application of IPK (Information, Preferences, Knowledge) Paradigm for the Modelling of Precautionary Principle Based Decision-Making . . . . Adam Maria Gadomski and Tomasz Adam Zimny
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Disaster Propagation in Heterogeneous Media via Markovian Agents . . . Davide Cerotti, Marco Gribaudo, and Andrea Bobbio
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A Study on Multiformalism Modeling of Critical Infrastructures . . . . . . . Francesco Flammini, Valeria Vittorini, Nicola Mazzocca, and Concetta Pragliola
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Simulation of Critical ICT Infrastructure for Municipal Crisis Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Adam Kozakiewicz, Anna Felkner, and Tomasz Jordan Kruk An Ontology-Based Approach to Blind Spot Revelation in Critical Infrastructure Protection Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Joshua Blackwell, William J. Tolone, Seok-Won Lee, Wei-Ning Xiang, and Lydia Marsh
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Security of Water Infrastructure Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Demetrios G. Eliades and Marios M. Polycarpou Critical Infrastructures as Complex Systems: A Multi-level Protection Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Pierluigi Assogna, Glauco Bertocchi, Antonio DiCarlo, Franco Milicchio, Alberto Paoluzzi, Giorgio Scorzelli, Michele Vicentino, and Roberto Zollo Challenges Concerning the Energy-Dependency of the Telecom Infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Lothar Fickert, Helmut Malleck, and Christian Wakolbinger An Effective Approach for Cascading Effects Prevision in Critical Infrastructures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Luisa Franchina, Marco Carbonelli, Laura Gratta, Claudio Petricca, and Daniele Perucchini Author Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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Blackouts in Power Transmission Networks Due to Spatially Localized Load Anomalies Carla Dionisi1 , Francesca Mariani1 , Maria Cristina Recchioni2 , and Francesco Zirilli1 1 CERI - Centro di Ricerca “Previsione, Prevenzione e Controllo dei Rischi Geologici”, Universit` a di Roma “La Sapienza”, Piazza Umberto Pilozzi 9, 00038 Valmontone (Roma), Italy
[email protected], fra−
[email protected],
[email protected] 2 Dipartimento di Scienze Sociali “D. Serrani”, Universit` a Politecnica delle Marche, Piazza Martelli 8, 60121 Ancona, Italy
[email protected]
Abstract. In this paper we study cascading blackouts in power transmission networks due to spatially localized load anomalies. The term “spatially localized load anomalies” means that the overloaded nodes in the graph representing the power transmission network are concentrated in a small zone of the graph. Typically these anomalies are caused by extreme weather conditions localized in some parts of the region served by the power transmission network. We generalize a mathematical formulation of the cascading blackout problem introduced in [1] and later developed in [2]. This mathematical formulation of the blackout problem when the load of the network is perturbed randomly allows the study of the probability density functions of the measure of the size of the blackout generated and of the occupation of the network lines. The analysis presented shows that spatially localized load anomalies of a given “magnitude” can generate blackouts of larger size than the blackouts generated by a load anomaly of the same magnitude distributed proportionally on the entire network. Load anomalies of this last type have been studied in [1], [2]. The previous results are obtained studying the behaviour of the Italian high voltage power transmission network through some numerical experiments. Keywords: power transmission network, cascading blackout, stochastic optimization, mathematical programming.
It is a pleasure to thank A. Farina and A. Graziano of SELEX-Sistemi Integrati s.p.a., Roma, Italy for helpful discussions and advice during the preparation of this paper. The work of Francesca Mariani has been partially supported by SELEX Sistemi Integrati s.p.a., Roma, Italy through a research contract granted to CERI-Universit` a di Roma “La Sapienza”. The numerical experience reported in this paper has been obtained using the computing grid of ENEA (Roma, Italy). The support and sponsorship of ENEA are gratefully acknowledged.
R. Setola and S. Geretshuber (Eds.): CRITIS 2008, LNCS 5508, pp. 1–13, 2009. c Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009
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1
Introduction
The problem of cascading failures is of great interest in the study of large complex transmission networks such as the electric power networks. The cascading failures are failures occurring in a fast time scale as effect of the reduction of the operating margins in the transmission network due to congestions or line breakdowns. The control of these cascading failures is a challenging problem since the transmission networks present high interdependence between their components. In the case of power transmission networks this interdependence is the main reason of their vulnerability, in fact, due to it local overloads of lines or local failures of components can generate cascades of current breaks that, in extreme cases, can cause the fall of the whole network. This phenomenon is called “cascading blackout”. The meaning of the term “blackout” is simply “temporary absence of electric power in some parts of an electric network”. The “cascading blackout” phenomenon in the recent scientific and technical literature has been studied using several approaches (see [2], [3] and the reference therein). The analysis presented in this paper is inspired by the approach that studies the blackout dynamics considering the network behaviour in steady state conditions when random fluctuations are introduced in the load of the network. In this approach the blackout dynamics is simulated as a sequence of stationary states. An analytical model of this type is the “CASCADE” model presented in [4] and further developed in [2]. In this model the status of the network is represented through the DC power flow problem. This type of model has been used to study the behaviour of a part of the USA power transmission network in [1] (the IEEE 118 bus network [5]) and of the Italian high voltage power transmission network in [2]. Furthermore since the blackouts generated are induced by random fluctuations of the loads of the network around prescribed mean load values using this type of models the statistical analysis of the blackout size measure associated to load anomalies is easily performed. Similarly the statistical analysis of the resulting line occupations is easily performed. This approach is of great practical value since it makes possible the numerical simulation of the behaviour of relevant networks at an affordable computational cost. Obviously, this simple approach provides a crude approximation of the blackout dynamics. In fact, it does not consider issues due to reactive voltages. More realistic models such as the AC model could be used (see for example [6]) and their use in blackout dynamic simulation deserves further investigation. The work presented here is based on the analysis proposed in [2] and when compared with [2] introduces two main novelties: the first one is a nonlinear merit function and the second one is a new way of increasing the load of the network that models a spatially localized load anomaly. In [2] the merit function is a linear function so that the optimal DC power flow problem reduces to a linear programming problem that can be solved with the simplex algorithm. Here we remove the restriction of the linearity of the merit function considering nonlinear merit functions. However, we retain the linearity of the constraints. In particular, we consider a quadratic merit function that tries to select the configuration that minimizes the cost of the power injected by the generator nodes present in the
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network. Obviously, this change in the objective function induces a change in the numerical method used to solve the optimization problem that is now a problem with linear constraints and quadratic objective function. The use of the nonlinear merit function and of an interior point algorithm to solve the corresponding optimization problem changes substantially the resulting optimal flow. In general the flows determined with the model presented in this paper have smaller power generation cost than those determined with the models used in [1], [2]. In [2] starting from a feasible optimal DC power flow problem the power demand is increased increasing the expected value of the power demanded by all the load nodes proportionally. This is the case to consider when we want to study the network response to the behaviour over the years of the power demand. In this paper we study the blackout dynamics when the power demand increment is concentrated in a group of load nodes that are localized in space. This is the case to consider when exceptional events, such as, extreme weather conditions, hit some zone of the network. Finally, to simulate a cascading blackout we consider values of the total power demand corresponding to unfeasible optimal DC power flow problems. An optimal DC power flow problem is unfeasible when the constraints are inconsistent. An unfeasible problem is unsolvable. However in general, depending on the objective function, a constrained optimization problem can be unsolvable even if the constraints are not inconsistent. We note that the choice of the objective function made later, see (9), implies that when the DC power flow problem is unsolvable the constraints are inconsistent. We reduce the simulation of the dynamics of cascading blackouts to the study of a sequence of optimal DC power flow problems. In fact, once established that the optimal DC power flow problem is unfeasible, following some specified rules, we simulate the blackout cascade (see Steps 1-10 in Section 2). As done in [2] we measure the size of the blackout generated as being the fraction of the total power load that has been shed during the cascading blackout simulation. If all the loads are shed the measure of the corresponding blackout size is equal to one and this means that the whole power transmission network is blackout. Under some specified assumptions we study the probability density function of the measure of the size of the blackout generated with the previous scheme and in particular we consider the probability of generating large blackouts. We consider probability density functions of the blackout size measure for several given values of the (mean) total power demand. We say that the transmission network is in critical condition whenever these probability density functions show a tail decreasing as a power law when the blackout size measure increases. We limit our analysis to the study of the blackout size measure probability density function as a function of the power demand in the case of the Italian high voltage power transmission network (Figure 1) when the power demand increment is concentrated in a group of load nodes that are localized in space (black box in Figure 1). As a function of the power demand we investigate when this probability density function changes from being best fitted by a negative exponential function to being best fitted by an inverse power law. This phenomenon
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Fig. 1. A graph representing an high voltage power transmission network and the box containing the overloaded load nodes
describes the transition of the network from noncritical to critical condition and is reminiscent of the phase transition phenomenon in statistical mechanics. The group of load nodes localized in space where the power demand increment is concentrated is such that a significant fraction (about 30%) of the total power demand is contained in it and is made of nodes highly interconnected between themselves and with the remaining part of the network. The blackout resulting from anomalies in the condition of a group of load nodes localized in space depends on the fraction of the total power demand subject to the anomalies and on the connectivity of the network in the region where the anomalies are concentrated and outside this region. The results presented in this paper with the load anomalies concentrated in the region shown in Figure 1 must be regarded as an example of the “generic” behaviour of the network. This analysis shows that the overload of a group of nodes localized in space generates critical situations for the network for a mean total power demand smaller than the mean total power demand necessary to generate critical situations when the overload is distributed proportionally over all the load nodes. Moreover, for the localized overload considered in this paper we see that the probability density function of the blackout size measure when the power demand increases has some large flat regions (Figure 2). Finally, we study the line occupations of the Italian high voltage power transmission network analyzing the mean values of the occupation of the lines when the loads fluctuate randomly as said above. The occupation of a line is the fraction of its capacity that is occupied by the power flowing on it. Our analysis shows that due to the presence of the quadratic merit function the lines in correspondence of generator nodes producing low cost power and/or contained in the region where the load anomaly is concentrated are heavily occupied. The numerical work needed to perform the study of the Italian high voltage power transmission network described above has been carried out using a Fortran code that runs on the ENEA computing grid. The ENEA grid is an infrastructure for multiplatform, parallel and distributed computing made of approximately
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4000 processors located in 6 research centers around Italy [7]. The computation that has been done is very well suited for distributed computing and exploits deeply the power of the computing grid. In Section 2 we recall the mathematical model used to study the power transmission network and the cascading blackout dynamics, we define the line occupation and we explain how the load anomalies are generated. In Section 3 we use the model introduced in Section 2 to study the probability density function of the blackout size measure and the corresponding mean value of the occupations of the lines of the Italian high voltage power transmission network when a specified group of nodes is overloaded.
2
The Optimal DC Power Flow Model and the Simulation of the Blackout Dynamics
Let us define the optimal DC power flow problem studied (see [1] and [2] for further details). We begin describing the undirected graph representing the transmission network (Figure 1). The graph is made of nodes and branches. The nodes of the graph are divided into generator nodes (triangles), load nodes (circles), and junction nodes (diamonds). The branches of the graph are the network transmission lines where the electric power flows. We associate to each line (branch) its characteristic admittance. When in a real power transmission network multiple lines connect two nodes we substitute these lines with a unique line with admittance equal to the sum of the admittances of the multiple lines. We denote with k = 1, 2, ..., N, the N nodes of the graph representing the power transmission network (N ≥ 1), and for k, m = 1, 2, . . . , N we denote with with (k, m) the branch connecting the nodes k and m, and with yk,m , gk,m , bk,m , respectively the values of the admittance, of the conductance and of the susceptance of the line (k, m). We remind that yk,m = gk,m + ιbk,m , k, m = 1, 2, ..., N , where ι denotes the imaginary unit. When two nodes k, m are not connected by a line we associate to the branch (k, m) zero admittance, this implies that the power flowing in the branch will be zero. Let | · | be the absolute value of the complex number ·, we denote with Sk the total complex power injection at node k, with Pk and Qk its real (active power) and imaginary (reactive power) parts (i.e.: Sk = Pk + ιQk ), k = 1, 2, ..., N and with S = (S1 , S2 , ..., SN ) the power vector. We note that Pk and Qk are measured in MW (Megawatt) and that they can be expressed as differences of L G nonnegative quantities, that is Pk = PkG − PkL and Qk = QG k − Qk , where Pk , L Pk denote, respectively, the real power generated and the real power demanded L by the node k and QG k , Qk denote, respectively, the reactive power generated and the reactive power demanded by the node k, k = 1, 2, . . . , N . Moreover, for k = 1, 2, ..., N let SkG = PkG + ιQG k be the total complex power injection at node k and SkL = PkL + ιQL be the total power load withdrawn at node k. k Moreover, for k = 1, 2, . . . , N if the node k is a load or a junction node we have |SkG | = 0; on the other hand a generator node k may have nonzero complex power load SkL . In fact, this nonzero power demanded by the generator node
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may be needed to guarantee the functioning of the generator node. With Fk,m we denote the power flowing through the line (k, m), k, m = 1, 2, ..., N. The quantity Fk,m , k, m = 1, 2, ..., N, is a complex quantity measured in kVA (kilo Volt Amp`ere). For k = 1, 2, . . . , N let Vk = |Vk |(cos θk + ι sin θk ) be the complex voltage at node k, with absolute value |Vk | measured in kV (kilo Volt) and phase θk measured in radians. We remind that in [2] we have chosen the voltage vector |V | = (|V1 |, |V2 |, ..., |VN |) = (1, 1, ..., 1). We keep this choice here. Under suitable assumptions (see [2] and the reference therein for further details) a linearization of the balance power law holds, that is we have: Pk = PkG − PkL =
N
−bk,m δk,m ,
k = 1, 2, ..., N,
(1)
m=1,m=k
Qk = 0,
k = 1, 2, ..., N,
(2)
where δk,m = θk − θm , k, m = 1, 2, . . . , N . In this formulation the base power S0 and the base voltage V0 are chosen equal to 1 so that the equations (1) are dimensionless p.u. (proper unit) equations (see [2] and the reference therein). Let us state the DC (Direct Current) power flow problem: Given the load power demand vector P L = (P1L , P2L , ..., PNL ), the voltage magnitude vector |V | = (|V1 |, |V2 |, . . . , |VN |)=(1, 1, . . . , 1), the upper real power G limit of the nodes vector P G = (P1G , P2G , ..., PN ), the upper power flow limit Fk,m of the power flowing along the line (k, m), and the values of the susceptance bk,m of the line (k, m), k, m = 1, 2, ..., N , find the generator real power vector P G = (P1G , P2G , ..., PNG ), and the voltage angle vector θ = (θ1 , θ2 , ..., θN ) satisfying (1). Note that in general given P L , P G , Fk,m and bk,m , k, m = 1, 2, ..., N, the DC power flow equations (1) have several solutions so that it is a natural idea to introduce a merit function that will be minimized to choose one among these solutions. That is the following optimization problem is formulated: min Φ(P1G , P2G , ..., PNG ),
(3)
subject to: PkG − PkL =
N
Fk,m ,
k = 1, 2, ..., N,
(4)
m=1,m=k
Fk,m = −bk,m (θk − θm ),
k, m = 1, 2, ..., N,
(5)
|Fk,m | ≤ Fk,m , k, m = 1, 2, ..., N, 0 ≤ PkG ≤ PkG , k = 1, 2, ..., N,
(6) (7)
θ1 = 0,
(8)
where the merit function Φ is given by: Φ(P1G , P2G , ..., PNG ) =
N k=1
ck (PkG )2 − W
N
(PkL )2 ,
k=1
(9)
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where W is a real positive constant representing a cost associated to the load nodes that we choose equal to 100 (as suggested in [4]) and ck is a positive constant associated to the cost of generating power in the node k, k = 1, 2, . . . , N . Remind that in the present formulation of the problem the quantities PkL , k = 1, 2, . . . , N , are given. Equation (8) is a normalization condition. Finally, we N L G denote with PD = N k=1 Pk the total power demand and with PC = k=1 Pk the total power capacity of the network. We consider the blackout dynamics generated by load anomalies concentrated in a group of nodes that are spatially localized in a zone of the graph when the values of the remaining parameters are unchanged. We study this effect as a function of the total power demand PD looking at increasing values of the total power demand PD . Let us define the blackout size measure. Let A˜ be the subset of {1, 2, ..., N } that contains the indices corresponding loads shed as a consequence of to the L the blackout cascade and let PS = P , ˜ k∈A k that is PS is the disconnected power load. We define the blackout size measure as the ratio PS /PD and we have: 0 ≤ PS /PD ≤ 1. The maximum blackout size measure is PS /PD = 1 that corresponds to a total blackout, that is when we have PS /PD = 1 all the loads are shed. Finally, for k, m = 1, 2, ..., N, when Fk,m > 0 we define occupation of F the line (k, m) the value Ok,m = Fk,m , when Fk,m = 0 the occupation of the k,m
line (k, m) is not considered, in fact in this case the branch (k, m) of the graph does not represent a real transmission line of the network (there is no power flowing on the branch (k, m)). The numerical scheme used to study the blackout phenomenon is a very simple scheme that tries to reproduce a sequence of events able to generate a blackout. The fact that the DC optimal power flow model describes a stationary situation (independent of time) and the time dependent character of the blackout phenomenon force us to consider a sequence of DC optimal power flow problems. This sequence of problems is built with the numerical scheme that follows. This scheme is only one choice between many other schemes implementing the same ideas in a different way. The quantitative results on the blackout phenomenon obtained depend on the scheme adopted but the broad picture of the phase transition phenomenon is substantially independent from the scheme adopted. The numerical scheme used to simulate the blackout cascade when some prespecified loads are overloaded is described in the following steps: Step 1: initialize the load power demand vector P 0,L = (P10,L , P20,L , ..., PN0,L ) with P L , the voltage magnitude vector |V |, the upper real power limit vector P G , the upper power flow limit values Fk,m , and the susceptance values bk,m , k, m = 1, 2, ..., N, with the given data; assign the set JL containing the indices of the load nodes where the mean load increment is concentrated, the parameter α ≥ 0 that will be used to increment the loads and the number NE of simulations to be performed; set n = 0; Step 2: for k = 1, 2, . . . , N , set PkL ← Pk0,L , k ∈ / JL , PkL ← Pk0,L (1 + α), k ∈ JL N and PD = k=1 PkL ;
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Step 3: set n ← n + 1. If n > NE stop, otherwise generate the random numbers γkn , k = 1, 2, ..., N, independent uniformly distributed in [0, 1] and set PkL ← 2 × γkn × PkL , k = 1, 2, ..., N ; Step 4: set PS = 0; Step 5: consider the optimal DC power flow problem (3)-(8). If problem (3)-(8) is feasible, go to Step 6, otherwise go to Step 7; Step 6: solve problem (3)-(8), compute the corresponding blackout size measure PS /PD and the line occupations and go to Step 10; Step 7: if problem (3)-(8) is unfeasible due to the fact that the constraint (6) is violated for some (k, m) (and there are no other reasons of unfeasibility), that is the presence of overloaded lines is the only reason of unfeasibility, record the overloaded lines and go to Step 8 otherwise go to Step 9; Step 8: for each overloaded line (k, m) generate a random number p1 (k, m) uniformly distributed in [0, 1]. If p1 (k, m) is smaller than a reference value p0 ∈ [0, 1] outage the overloaded line (k, m) multiplying the line admittance by a small number. If at least one of the overloaded lines is outage, shed the loads that became isolated as a consequence of the outages of the lines, sum the power demanded by the loads shed to the value PS . Go back to Step 5. If there is no outage of overloaded lines go back to Step 6 after having relaxed the violated constraints (6) to make the problem feasible; Step 9: if problem (3)-(8) is unfeasible, check the total power PJL demanded by the load nodes k ∈ JL . If PJL /PD is greater than a threshold, that we choose equal to 0.3 in the simulation of Section 3, shed the smallest load belonging to JL otherwise shed the smallest load of the entire network; sum the power demanded by the load shed to the value PS and go back to Step 5; Step 10: record the blackout size measure PS /PD and the line occupations and go back to Step 2. The previous numerical scheme used to generate cascade can be interpreted as follows. Steps 1, 2, 3 define the load of the network, Step 4 is an initialization step, Step 5 verifies if the load assigned can be served satisfying the physical constraints of the network. If this is the case the computation stops. If this is not the case Steps 7, 8, 9 define the rules used to disconnect lines and loads in the attempt to restore feasibility. We begin disconnecting overloaded lines and when necessary we disconnect loads beginning from the smallest one in a suitable subset of nodes. The Steps 7, 8, 9 define the blackout cascade. Finally the Steps 6, 10 are technical steps needed to conclude the computation. Using the procedure described in Steps 1-10 to generate the blackout we can perform a statistical analysis of the blackout size measure generated by statistically known random fluctuations of the loads similar to the analysis presented in [4], [1], [2]. In fact, starting from a reference value of the load power vector P L (Step 2) we overload the network adding to the components of P L a random disturbance of known statistical properties (Step 3), this corresponds to changing the value of the total power demand PD randomly. In this way the resulting blackout size measure PS /PD computed through Steps 1-10 becomes a random variable so that after generating an appropriate statistical sample of PS /PD we
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can compute an approximation of its probability density function. Note that for the networks studied in [1], [2] it has been shown that when the increment of PD is distributed proportionally on all the load nodes (JL = {1, 2, . . . , N }) and PD assumes plausible values, the probability of having large blackouts is small, and that blackouts of small size are much more likely than large blackouts. That is, the probability density function of the blackout size measure PS /PD decreases when PS /PD increases. When the increment of PD is concentrated in a group of load nodes localized in space (the black box in Figure 1) this may change depending on the magnitude of the total power demand increment and on the interdependence of the group of nodes considered. In fact, probability density functions with huge flat regions can be obtained (Figure 2). As suggested in [2] we use this statistical analysis to understand when the observed probability density function says that the transmission network is in ∗ critical condition. We identify critical condition with the condition PD > PD ∗ ∗ where the “critical value” PD is such that when PD /PC goes across PD /PC the probability density function of PS /PD changes from being best fitted by a negative exponential function to being best fitted by an inverse power law. Note that when random fluctuations of the loads are considered also the occupation of the line (k, m), Ok,m , is a random variable and that we study its mean value when k,m =1, 2, . . . , N , and Fk,m > 0 as a function of the total power demand PD . For k,m =1, 2, . . . , N , and Fk,m > 0 we limit our study to the mean value of the random variable Ok,m instead than studying its probability density function for practical reasons. In fact, in power transmission networks of real interest (Figure 1) there are (at least) several hundreds of lines and it will be unpractical to study the probability density functions of hundreds of random variables.
3
The Numerical Study of the Italian High Voltage Power Transmission Network
Let us use the models described in Section 2 to analyze the Italian high voltage power transmission network (Figure 1). The Italian high voltage power transmission network is represented as an undirected graph made of NG = 117 generator nodes (triangles), NL = 163 load nodes (circles), NJ = 30 junction nodes (diamonds), that is a network made of N = NG + NL + NJ = 310 nodes and having of 347 lines (see [2] for further details). Indeed the Italian high voltage network has 361 lines and among them 14 lines are double lines. We have removed these double lines as explained in Section 2. We consider the snapshot of the Italian high voltage power transmission network parameters considered in [2] and we use the normalizations of the voltage magnitude and power load vectors used in [2]. That is, since in the Italian high voltage transmission network the base power S0 is equal to 750 MW and the base voltage V0 is equal to 380 kV we must normalize the voltage magnitude vector |V | and the power load vector P L contained in the snapshot dividing them by 380 kV and by 750 MW, respectively.
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Starting from these data we perform a statistical analysis of the random variable PS /PD defined in Section 2 using samples made of 20000 individuals (NE = 20000 in the procedure described in Steps 1-10). We use samples of size 20000 since we have observed that in the numerical experiment presented here considering greater samples (i.e. made of NE > 20000 individuals) leaves substantially unchanged the estimated probability density functions. We consider increasing values of the mean power load of the load nodes contained in the black box shown in Figure 1. Remind that the load nodes are marked as circles in Figure 1. In particular, we increase the mean power load of these load nodes choosing in Step 2 α = 0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.4, 0.8. That is, we increase proportionally the power demand of each node in the box shown in Figure 1 (see Step 2 of the numerical scheme in Section 2) with respect to a “standard” (i.e. “expected”) demand contained in the vector P 0,L . The load power demand vector P 0,L contains the mean load power demand measured at the nodes of the Italian high voltage network. Moreover, as done in [2] we choose the probability of outage an overloaded line equal to 30%, that is in Step 8 we choose p0 = 0.3. As discussed in [1], the choice of p0 influences the properties of the blackouts generated by the scheme of Section 2. In fact when p0 = 0 there are no line outages. When p0 = 1 all overloaded lines outage and the cascading blackout generated are characterized by jumps in the load shed. Moreover the size of these jumps can be remarkable. The choice p0 = 0.3 is an intermediate choice. We approximate the probability density function of the random variable PS /PD dividing the interval [0, 1] in 20 non overlapping subintervals of equal size and for i = 1, 2, ..., 20 we compute the relative frequency fi in the sample of PS /PD generated with the Steps 2-10 associated to the subinterval i of the random variable PS /PD (see [2] for further details). We consider the resulting relative frequency fi associated to the center xi of the corresponding subinterval i, i = 1, 2, .., 20, and we construct the histogram approximating the probability density function using the couples (xi , fi ), i = 1, 2, ..., 20 (Figure 2).
(a)
(b)
Fig. 2. Histograms approximating the probability distribution function of PS /PD when PD /PC = 0.6941 (a), PD /PC = 0.8098 (b)
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Table 1. Least squares errors made fitting the approximations of the probability density function of PS /PD with the exponential and with the inverse power law functions versus PD /PC α 0 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.8
PD /PC 0.6767 0.6941 0.7114 0.74599 0.8098
σe∗ 0.1220 0.3419 0.3786 0.4095 0.4495
σp∗ 1.4362 1.2287 0.7206 0.1165 0.0656
We note that Figure 2 shows some flat regions in the approximated probability density functions and that the approximated probability density functions are not monotonically decreasing functions of PS /PD . These two facts seem to be associated to spatially localized load anomalies. Let us use the couples (xi , fi ), i = 1, 2, . . . , 20 to analyze the behaviour of the (approximated) probability density function of the blackout size measure PS /PD when PS /PD increases. We fit the data (xi , fi ), i = 1, 2, ..., 20, using the negative exponential or using the inverse power law, that is using the formulae below: f1 (x) = Ae−mx , A > 0, m ≥ 0, f2 (x) = B/xa , B > 0, a ≥ 0, 0 ≤ x ≤ 1, (10) where A, m, B and a are real constants to be determined. The values of A, m, B and a are determined imposing that the corresponding functions (10) are the best fits of (xi , fi ), i = 1, 2, ..., 20, in the least squares sense. That is we choose the values A, m, B and a that minimize respectively the following quantities: 20 20 −mx 2 i σe = σe (A, m) = |fi − Ae | , σp = σp (B, a) = |fi − B/xai |2 , i=1
i=1
(11) subject to the constraints on A, m, B, a contained in (10). We denote with σe∗ , σp∗ the values assumed respectively by σe and σp in the minimizers. The results contained in Table 1 show that when PD is small “enough” the exponential law (10) fits the data (xi , fi ), i = 1, 2, . . . , 20 better than the power law (10)(σe∗ < σp∗ ). However, when PD is large “enough” the situation is reversed (σe∗ > σp∗ ). In particular, we are able to determine two values of PD that we (1)
(2)
(1)
denote PD = 0.7114PC and PD = 0.74599PC such that when PD < PD (2) we have σe∗ ≤ σp∗ and when PD > PD we have σe∗ ≥ σp∗ . We can say that in the hypotheses specified above when the power demand PD is greater than (2) (1) PD the transmission network is in “critical” condition and when PD < PD the transmission network is not in “critical” condition. Reasoning in analogy with what is done in statistical mechanics we can conclude that this analysis suggests that in the situation described above the Italian high voltage power ∗ transmission network has a phase transition in a point PD such that 0.7114 ≤
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(a)
(b)
Fig. 3. Expected value of the line occupations of an high voltage power transmission network when PD /PC = 0.7114, (a) and PD /PC = 0.8098, (b)
∗ PD /PC ≤ 0.74599. In [2] when the overload is distributed proportionally over all the load nodes of the network the corresponding interval is the following: ∗ 0.74 ≤ PD /PC ≤ 0.77. Finally, we study the effects produced by the increments in the mean total power demand PD on the occupation of the lines. Figure 3 shows a comparison between the mean values of the line occupations obtained when PD /PC = 0.7114 (α = 0.2) and when PD /PC = 0.8098(α = 0.8), that is for values of PD /PC below and above the phase transition phenomenon. We can see that, in general, the mean value of the line occupation is not homogeneous, that is the occupation of some lines is considerably greater than the occupation of the remaining lines of the network. This is due to two facts: the choice of the quadratic merit function that heavily induces to prefer the low cost generators and the effect due to the outage of the lines that determines the saturation of the line occupations when PD /PC is large enough. We note that the mean value of the line occupations when PD /PC = 0.7114 outside the black box is similar to the mean value of the line occupations of the original snapshot configuration (that has PD /PC = 0.6767) while when PD /PC = 0.8098 the mean value of the line occupations is different from that of the snapshot both inside and outside the black box. In particular, when PD /PC = 0.8098 the mean values of the line occupations of several lines is about 100%. However, Figure 3(a) shows that some lines have a mean occupation close to one also when PD /PC = 0.7114. This unbalance between the line occupations could be the origin of the possibility of large blackouts even when the mean value of the total power demand is substantially smaller than the total network capacity. The study of this vulnerability of the network should be further pursued. We note that the study of the relation between the network vulnerability and the network topology in the case of the Italian high voltage power transmission network has been started in [8]. In the website http://www.ceri.uniroma1.it/ceri/zirilli/w1 some auxiliary
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material that helps the understanding of [2] and of this paper is available. In particular, the website contains two animations that show the cascading blackout phenomenon at a given value of PD and the line occupation tableau as a function of PD in the case of the Italian high voltage power transmission network when the optimal DC power flow problem (with linear merit function) is used to determine the power flow distribution and the overload is distributed proportionally over all the load nodes.
References 1. Carreras, B.A., Dobson, I., Lynch, V.E., Newman, D.E.: Critical points and transitions in an electric power transmission model for cascading failure blackout. Chaos 12, 985–994 (2002) 2. Farina, A., Graziano, A., Mariani, F., Zirilli, F.: Probabilistic analysis of failures in power transmission networks and “phase transitions”: a study case of an high voltage power transmission network. Journal of Optimization Theory and its Applications 139, 171–199 (2008) 3. Andersson, G., Donalek, P., Farmer, R., Hatziargyriou, N., Kamwa, I., Kundur, P., Martins, N., Paserba, J., Pourbeik, P., Sanchez-Gasca, J., Schulz, R., Stankovic, A., Taylor, C., Vittal, V.: Causes of the 2003 major grid blackouts in North America and Europe, and recommended means to improve system dynamic performance. IEEE Transactions on Power Systems 20, 1922–1928 (2005) 4. Carreras, B.A., Dobson, I., Newman, D.E.: A loading dependent model for probabilistic cascading failure. Probability in the Engineering and Informational Sciences 19, 15–32 (2005) 5. http://www.ee.washington.edu/research/pstca/ 6. Rider, M.J., Garcia, A.V., Romero, R.: Power system transmission network expansion planning using AC model. Generation, Transmission & Distribution, IET 1, 731–742 (2007) 7. http://www.afs.enea.it/project/enegrid/index.html 8. Bologna, S., Issacharoff, L., Rosato, V.: Influence of the topology on the power flux of the Italian high-voltage electrical network, http://www.giacs.org/files/wp3_files/V%20Rosato%20Europhys% 20Lett%20preprint.pdf
Stability of a Distributed Generation Network Using the Kuramoto Models Vincenzo Fioriti1 , Silvia Ruzzante2 , Elisa Castorini1 , Elena Marchei2 , and Vittorio Rosato1 1
2
ENEA, Casaccia Research Center, Via Anguillarese 301, 00123 S. Maria di Galeria (Rome) Italy {vincenzo.fioriti,elisa.castorini,rosato}@casaccia.enea.it ENEA, Portici Research Center, Via del Macello Vecchio, 00122 Portici, Italy {silvia.ruzzante,elena.marchei}@portici.enea.it
Abstract. We derive a Kuramoto-like equation from the Cardell-Ilic distributed electrical generation network and use the resulting model to simulate the phase stability and the synchronization of a small electrical grid. It is well-known that a major problem for distributed generation is the frequency stability. This is a non linear problem and proper models for analysis are sorely lacking. In our model nodes are arranged in a regular lattice; the strength of their couplings are randomly chosen and allowed to vary as square waves. Although the system undergoes several synchronization losses, nevertheless it is able to quickly resynchronize. Moreover, we show that the synchronization rising-time follows a power-law.
1
Introduction
One of the most important complex Critical Infrastructure (CI), the electric power system, is evolving from a ”concentrated generation” model towards a ”distributed generation” (DG) model, where a large number of small power generators are integrated into the transmission (and/or in the distribution) power supply system according to their availability. Large power plants (nuclear, coal, gas etc.) will be joined by low- (or intermediate-size) power generators, based on alternative sources (wind, solar, micro-hydro, biomass, geothermal, tidal, etc). Whereas the concentrated generation model can be (in principle) more simply controlled and managed, the DG model, with geographically unevenly distributed generation plants, producing electrical power as a function of the season, of the time of the day and the meteorological conditions, does indeed introduce, in an already complex scenario, further instability issues which are worth to be considered. More importantly, renewable source generators insert in the network different amounts of electrical power, amounts which can be, in turn, smaller (or even much smaller) than those provided by “conventional” means (fossil sources). Developing a successful grid supporting technologies for DG requires mathematical models of interconnections, control strategies able to cope with transient effects and to produce an efficient and robust distribution R. Setola and S. Geretshuber (Eds.): CRITIS 2008, LNCS 5508, pp. 14–23, 2009. c Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009
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system. Unfortunately, the connection of a large set of small- and intermediatesize generators to the generation and distribution network raises some problems as harmonic distortion of voltage [6], [11], [12], [13], stability of synchronization with the network, thermal limits, network faults. Moreover, in the future, other technological networks will tightly interact with the DG grid producing a tangled set of interdependencies whose final effects will undermine the stability of synchronization. Here we will focus on the development of a mathematical model, based on the Kuramoto model (KM) [2] equation, for the study of the stability of a DG grid. KM is the most successful attempt to study the ubiquitous phenomenon of synchronization, starting with Huyghens up to Van der Pol, Andronov, Wiener, Winfree, Kuramoto, Watanabe, Strogatz [3]. From simple mechanical devices to complex systems, a rich variety of dynamical systems have been modelled [8]: crowds of people, flocks of birds, school of fish, associative memories, array of lasers, charge density waves, nonlinear control systems, Josephson junctions, plasma, cardiac cells, power grids, epidemic spreading, social and economic behaviours. To derive a KM model for describing a distributed generators network, we have used the Cardell-Ilic linearized dynamic model for DG, that uses the power flow connecting the networks nodes as coupling parameter. On such a model system, we will attempt to study the effects of perturbations on the synchronization of a number of power generators (modelled as oscillators with given frequencies, different phase angles and connected with known couplings). Our model has been inspired by a previous work by Filatrella et al. [5] for a three large generators grid model. We have based our analysis on the same assumptions but further introducing coupling perturbations under the form of square waves with different amplitudes in order to simulate a large coupling spread among nodes and mimic a sudden collapse of the couplings.
2
The Kuramoto Model
In the following, for the sake of clarity, we will use the following convention: matrices will be denoted by upper case boldface characters while vectors will be denoted by lower case boldface characters. Moreover, if A is a matrix, we will use the notation aij to refer to its (i, j)th entry; likewise, if x is a vector, xi will denote its ith component. The standard Kuramoto model (SKM) [1], [2], [9] is a mean-field dynamic system resulting from a model of coupled oscillators whose phases are described to interact through a constant coupling as follows: N K θ˙i = ωi + sin(θj − θi ) N j=1
i = 1, . . . , N
(1)
where θi is the phase of the ith oscillator and depends on time t, ωi its natural frequency (natural frequencies are symmetrically distributed around ω0 ), K is strength of the constant coupling (same value for all links), N is the number of oscillators. The not-oriented oscillator network is supposed to be fully connected.
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In the case when lim (θi − θj ) = 0
t→∞
(2)
oscillators synchronize, and their phase differences become asymptotically constant. Oscillators run independently at their natural frequencies, while couplings tend to synchronize them all, acting like a feedback. In order to measure the phase coherence, a so-called order parameter R has been introduced [2] N 1 iθi R= e (3) N i=1
R ranges between 0 (no coherence) and 1 (perfect coherence). Kuramoto [2] showed that, for the model of (1), for K < kc (N −→ ∞) oscillators remain unsynchronized, while for K > kc they synchronize. If we modify SKM by introducing a generic adjacency matrix connecting nodes whose generic entry Kij (t) represents variable coupling strength between nodes and may vary as a function of time, we end up with a modified Kuramoto model equation which reads as follows: N ˙ θi = ω i + K m Kij sin(θj − θi ) i = 1, . . . , N (4) j=1
where Kij (t) values might be randomly selected and expressed as fractions of the maximum coupling value Km . The pertinence of the modified Kuramoto model to our purposes will be shown in the next section, where we derive the modified Kuramoto equation (4) starting from a Cardell-Ilic model of a distributetd network of power generators.
3
Derivation of the SKM from the Cardell-Ilic Model
The Cardell-Ilic model [6] is a linearized dynamic model for distributed generators (steam-turbine, combustion turbine, combined cycle, wind) in a power distribution system, using a very small number of state variables and incorporating the generated power as coupling variable among the individual models through the equation: ˜ + p˙ x˙ = Ax − Kω (5) where x is the state vector representing the physical variables of the generators ˜ according to the input-output decription. A is defined as the system matrix, K is derived from the jacobian matrix (of the linearized state equations), ω is the generator frequency and p˙ the power output. For the i-th row: x˙ i = aij xj − k˜ij ωj + p˙i i = 1, . . . , N (6) j
j
only for the the state variables regarding the phase.
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Setting θ˙i = xi , p˙ i = −
Ω0 max p Ii i
sin(θj − θi )
(7) i = 1, . . . , N
(8)
j
where Ii is the inertial moment, Ω0 the nominal system frequency and pmax is i the maximum power of the ith generator. We derive that [5]: j
aij θ˙j =
j
Ω0 max k˜ij ωj + p sin(θj − θi ) Ii i j
i = 1, . . . , N
(9)
in which we recognise the same formal equation of Kuramoto model where at the left hand side we find a linear combination of θ˙j , and at the right hand side a sum of a linear combination of frequencies and sinusoidal terms. Therefore, the simple, linearized Cardell-Ilic model is in relation with the SKM by means of the power couplings and expressing phases as linear combinations of the state variables of the complete distributed generation system (7). Many technical details have been neglected, but the general sense is that SKM can be used to map the dynamics of a distributed generation system.
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The Simulation of the Modified SKM
Fig. 1 (right) reports a sketch of a model of a distributed network composed by the connection of smaller subnetworks. Each node represents a power generating unit; they are connected in a ring topology. The choice of this specific topology is motivated by a recent finding [7] that synchronization is preserved in the generic case of a graph formed by connected ring subgraphs, as in the left side of Fig. 1. While their [7] demonstration refers to a wider topology class, we study a simple ring topology for a single block; results could be then generalized to a more general structure. Simulations have been thus carried out by using the network in Fig. 1 (right). Scope of the simulations is to measure how a time-dependent coupling between nodes might affect the system’s synchronization. To this purpose, we have introduced time-dependent kij , under the form of square waves with amplitudes chosen from an uniform distribution between 0 and Km , and period from 55 min to 0.25 s, in order to simulate an abrupt change in the power. In fact, relevant problems for DG stability are the dropped generators and the small inertia of the generators. Both these problems induce a frequency destabilization. The physical constraint of the energy conservation has been taken into account by considering a dissipation node (the black node in Fig. 1). A stringent quality of service has been asked for defining the onset of synchronization among nodes, by requiring a value of R as large as R > 0.8. Under this assumption, the critical value for the onset of system’s synchronization results to be Km 0.1, which will be retained as the critical threshold of the Kuramoto model kc . Below this threshold, synchronization does not take place.
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Fig. 1. On the left side the block topology of the oscillators/generators, with the dissipating node. On the right side, a single block. This is the network used for the simulations whose results are the object of the present work.
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Results
The network (right side of Fig. 1) has been simulated using t = 104 s with steps of dt = 0.05 s Figs. 2, 3, 4 show the behavior of the phase angle θi and the order parameter R in case of low Km = 0.1 (Figs. 2, 3) and high Km = 400 (Figs. 4, 5) coupling cases, respectively.
Fig. 2. Phases with low coupling (Km = 0.1)
Fig. 3. Order parameter R with low coupling (Km = 0.1)
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Fig. 4. Phases with high coupling (Km = 400)
Fig. 5. Order parameter R with high coupling (Km = 400)
Fig. 6. Enlargement of Fig. 5, t > 5000 s, high coupling
As a general feature of the model when the maximum coupling strength Km is low, R behaves erratically (Fig. 3), while when it increases, R rapidly goes to 1, although several crises can be observed. Phase differences θi remain almost constant (see Fig. 6). In particular: – low coupling strength: in Fig. 3 the order parameter oscillates erratically around a mean value (different from zero) because Km is close to the critical value kc . Unfortunately, this is not sufficient to guarantee a sufficiently stable synchronization as < R > 0.8.
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Fig. 7. Enlargement of Fig. 5, (between 3500 and 4000 s)
Fig. 8. Phases synchronization crisis (enlargement between 3500 and 4000 s) for Km = 400
Fig. 9. Further enlargements of the data shown in Fig.6
– high coupling strength: the order parameter is 1 for most of the time; some deep “crises” are observed, but the system quickly recovers stability. In Fig. 5 Km = 400: as a result, R oscillates around the unity. Figs. 6, 7 show successive enlargements of the phase angle behaviour during the crisis of synchronization loss at Km = 400. It is relevant to observe that, during the synchronization losses, the phase angles tends to remain synchronized, although the spread between the phase angle grows (see Figs. 8, 9).
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Fig. 10. The rising time, for Km = 4
Fig. 11. The power law: rising-time ts vs. max. coupling amplitude Km (log-log plot)
As a further finding, we have also studied the rising time (i.e. the time for R to pass from zero to the unity value, see Fig. 10) as a function of the value of Km , follows a power low pattern (Fig. 11). Moreno and Pacheco [8] found that the resynchronization time of a perturbed node decays as a power law of its degree, for the SKM in a scale free topology. Although we consider a simple ring topology, nevertheless the occurrence of two power laws may be clues of some kind of a self-organizing criticality (SOC) working in the KM. On the other hand, Carreras et al. [4] have suggested the SOC in power grids as an explanation to the blackouts. The meaning of Fig. 9 is that the restarting of a grid after a failure or during a control action, if an high value of the couplings is present, this will determine a fast re-synchronization, coping with the problem of the fault clearing time.
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Conclusions
We discuss some stability issue of a DG power system modelled through a small (seven nodes) network; the dynamics of the generator’s phase angles have been described using a modified Kuramoto model [10] derived by a Cardell-Ilic model [6] by using the interaction scheme proposed by Filatrella [5]. Differently from that efforts, in our model, internode couplings are allowed to vary as square waves, with randomly chosen coupling amplitudes. Under these assumptions, we
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observe that the system, for average coupling values undergoes several synchronization losses from which has been able, however, to quickly recovering. We have also shown that the rising-time of synchronization follows a powerlaw, in qualitative agreement with previously reported findings [8], [4]. Our results are also in agreement with recent findings of Popovych et al. [3]. They showed that, for N ≥ 4 and Km sub-critical, the SKM shows phase chaos as N increases, developing rapidly high-dimensional chaos for N = 10 with the largest Lyapunov exponent (LLE) at its maximum positive value. Then the LLE decreases very fast as 1/N , indicating a less chaotic regime. They conclude that, for an intermediate size system (in term of number of oscillators), a more intense phase chaos than small (N < 4) or large (N > 20) ones can be generated; our simulation [10] seems to confirm their conclusions (see Figs. 2, 3).Thought their results have been obtained for the standard SKM (i.e. one fixed K) they seem to support the idea that an intermediate (5 < N < 20) value for N should be avoided, in order to have a robust phase-lock. In conclusion, the modified Kuramoto model seems able to describe a distributed generation and various model instabilities, both in power amplitude and frequency. Some useful indications can be derived: coupling strength must be kept as high as possible which means high voltage transmission/distribution lines, DG size (number of nodes) should be very small or very large, the grid must ensure the coupling feedback actions by means of an appropriate topology. Simulation of the modified SKM with larger and more complex network topologies are planned.
Acknowledgements The authors acknowledge fruitful discussion with R.Setola (Campus Biomedico). One of us (Silvia Ruzzante) acknowledges project CRESCO (PON 2000-2006, Misura II.2.a) for funding.
References 1. Chia, H., Ueda, Y.: Kuramoto Oscillators. Chaos Solitons & Fractals 12, 159 (2001) 2. Kuramoto, Y.: Chemical Oscillation. Springer, Berlin (1984) 3. Popovych, O., et al.: Phase Chaos in Coupled Oscillators. Phy. Rev. E 71, 06520 (2005) 4. Carreras, B., et al.: Evidence for SOC in a Time Series of Electric Power System Blackouts. Chaos 51, 1733 (2004) 5. Filatrella, G., et al.: Analysis of Power Grids using the Kuramoto Model. Eur. Phy. J. B 61, 485 (2008) 6. Cardell, J., Ilic, M.: Maintaining Stability with Distribute Generation. IEEE Power Eng. Soc. Meeting (2004) 7. Canale, E., Monzon, P.: Gluing Kuramoto Coupled Oscillators Networks. In: IEEE Decision and Control Conf., New Orleans (2007) 8. Moreno, Y., Pacheco, A.: Synchronization of Kuramoto Oscillators in Scale-Free Networks. Europhys. Lett. 68(4), 603 (2004)
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9. Acebron, J., et al.: The Kuramoto Model. Rew. Mod. Phy. 77, 137 (2005) 10. Fioriti, V., Rosato, V., Setola, R.: Chaos and Synchronization in Variable Coupling Kuramoto oscillators. Experimental Chaos Catania (2008) 11. http://www.iset.uni-kassel.de/publication/2007/ 2007 Power Tech Paper.pdf 12. Carsten, J., et al.: Riso Energy Report (2000) 13. Cardell, J., Ilic, M.: The Control of Distributed Generation. Kluwer Academic Press, Dordrecht (1998)
Enabling System of Systems Analysis of Critical Infrastructure Behaviors William J. Tolone1 , E. Wray Johnson2 , Seok-Won Lee1 , Wei-Ning Xiang1 , Lydia Marsh1 , Cody Yeager1 , and Josh Blackwell1 1
The University of North Carolina at Charlotte, 9201 University City Blvd, Charlotte, NC 28223-0001, USA 2 IntePoint, LLC, Charlotte, NC 28223-0001, USA
Abstract. Critical infrastructures are highly complex collections of people, processes, technologies, and information; they are also highly interdependent where disruptions to one infrastructure commonly cascade in scope and escalate in impact across other infrastructures. While it is unlikely that disruptions can be prevented with certainty, an effective practice of critical infrastructure analysis can reduce their frequency and/or lessen their impact. We contend that proper critical infrastructure analysis necessitates a system of systems approach. In this paper, we identify requirements for integrated modeling and simulation of critical infrastructures. We also present our integrated modeling and simulation framework based on a service-oriented architecture that enables system of systems analysis of such infrastructures.
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Introduction
Critical infrastructures are those systems or assets (e.g., electric power and telecommunication systems, hospitals) that are essential to a nation’s security, economy, public health, and/or way of life [9]. The blackout in the northeast United States and southeast Canada in 2003, the hurricane damage in Louisiana and Texas in 2005, and numerous other smaller scale occurrences demonstrate the potentially catastrophic impacts of critical infrastructure disruptions. While it is unlikely that disruptions can be prevented with certainty, an effective practice of critical infrastructure analysis can reduce their frequency and/or lessen their impact by improving vulnerability assessments, protection planning, and strategies for response and recovery. In [17], it is argued that proper critical infrastructure analysis must account for the situated nature of infrastructures by incorporating into analysis the spatial, temporal, and functional context of each infrastructure. It is also argued that proper critical infrastructure analysis must account for the multi-dimensional nature of infrastructures by accounting for both the engineering and behavioral properties of each infrastructure. Engineering properties are the underlying physics-based properties that shape and constrain the operation of an infrastructure. Behavioral properties are the relational properties that emerge from R. Setola and S. Geretshuber (Eds.): CRITIS 2008, LNCS 5508, pp. 24–35, 2009. c Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009
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business processes, decision points, human interventions, participating information, etc. of an infrastructure.1 These two characteristics contribute to making critical infrastructure analysis a “wicked problem” [15]. Wicked problems are non-linear problems that are without definitive formulations. Such problems have an open solution space where solutions have relative quality. Furthermore, each problem instance is arguably unique. We contend that the situated and multi-dimensional natures of critical infrastructures and the “wickedness” they introduce to analysis necessitate a system of systems approach to critical infrastructure analysis. System of systems analysis is appropriate for understanding large-scale, highly complex phenomena that are comprised of highly interdependent participating systems, which themselves may be large-scale and highly complex. Such a phenomenon is described as a system of systems when the behavior of the system is reflected in the emergent, synergistic behaviors of the participating systems. Critical infrastructure systems possess these characteristics as each infrastructure system is a highly complex collection of people, processes, technologies, and information. In addition, critical infrastructures are highly interdependent where disruptions in one infrastructure commonly cascade in scope and escalate in impact across other infrastructures [14]. As such, to analyze one of these infrastructures properly requires a system of systems analysis of all of these infrastructures. To meet this challenge, integrated modeling and simulation has emerged as a promising methodology to support system of systems analysis of critical infrastructures. However, integrated modeling and simulation necessitates both: 1) a proper representation of the situated, multi-dimensional nature of critical infrastructures; and 2) a proper integration framework and methodology for system of systems analysis. In [17], a representation of infrastructure context and behavior for integrated modeling and simulation is presented. In this paper, however, we examine the latter issue, the challenge of designing a proper integration framework for the modeling and simulation of critical infrastructures. The primary contributions of the work reported here are: 1) we identify emerging integrated modeling and simulation requirements for system of systems analysis of critical infrastructures; 2) we demonstrate the application of a service-oriented architecture to the challenge of integrated modeling and simulation of critical infrastructures; and, 3) we illustrate how this framework enables system of systems analysis of critical infrastructures. The structure of this paper is as follows. We begin by exploring related work in critical infrastructure modeling and simulation. Next, we examine emerging requirements for integrated modeling and simulation of critical infrastructures. We then present our framework for integrated modeling and simulation based on the popular service-oriented architecture. We conclude by providing an illustration that demonstrates system of systems analysis of critical infrastructures using our framework. Lastly, we provide a summary and discuss future work. 1
Casalicchio et. al. [2] provide an analogous description of the situated and multidimensional natures of critical infrastructures to that found in [17] in their discussion of the horizontal and vertical partitioning of federated models.
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Related Work
Numerous approaches to critical infrastructure modeling and simulation have been explored. A comprehensive survey conducted in 2006 of current solutions highlights several of these approaches [11]. One approach to critical infrastructure modeling and simulation is to focus analysis to the exploration of single, isolated infrastructures, e.g., [1,4,13]. However, this non-integrated approach to modeling and simulation fails to recognize the situated nature of critical infrastructures. Furthermore, this approach does not offer a generalized way to fuse independent analyses. Another approach to critical infrastructure modeling and simulation is to focus on the interdependencies among infrastructures, e.g., [5,7]. Though not an integrated approach to modeling and simulation, this approach recognizes the situated nature of critical infrastructures. However, this approach does not adequately incorporate into the analysis the underlying multi-dimensional nature of each infrastructure. While dependencies among critical infrastructures can lead to cascading effects with escalating impacts [14], such effects and impacts often emerge from the interplay between these dependencies and the multi-dimensional behavior of each infrastructure. By focusing only on infrastructure interdependencies, the fidelity of the analysis is greatly reduced. Still another approach to critical infrastructure modeling and simulation is to build comprehensive models of critical infrastructures, e.g., [3,6,8,14,16]. However, this approach is not necessarily tractable due to the unique characteristics of each infrastructure. As a result, comprehensive models typically emphasize high level analysis. Finally, a more recent approach to critical infrastructure modeling and simulation focuses on the development of what Pederson et. al. [11] describe as a coupled modeling approach, e.g., [2,17,18]. Under this approach, individual infrastructure models are integrated in a generalized way with models of infrastructure dependencies to enable system of systems analysis - thus, coupling the fidelity of individual infrastructure models with the requirement for situated analysis. The promise of a coupled approach to critical infrastructure modeling and simulation highlights the challenge of designing a proper integration framework. Specifications for such frameworks have been developed. For example, the IEEE Standard 1516 High-Level Architecture (HLA) for modeling and simulation presents one such specification. The HLA specification is comprised of federates (which could model individual infrastructures), an object model (which defines a vocabulary for discourse among federates), and a run-time interface and infrastructure (which enable interaction among federates).
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Modeling and Simulation Requirements for System of Systems Analysis of Critical Infrastructures
Enabling system of systems analysis of critical infrastructures presents many challenges. We describe a specific set of these challenges by identifying associated requirements for integrated modeling and simulation of critical infrastructures.
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Requirement #1: Modeling and simulation solutions for critical infrastructure analysis should provide a generalized approach to model integration. Critical infrastructure analysis requires the participation of a dynamic set of infrastructure models. Evolving analysis requirements will necessitate the plug-n-play of different representations of the same infrastructure as well as different collections of infrastructure models. Requirement #1 highlights the importance of a uniform approach to model integration to account for changing requirements. Requirement #2: Modeling and simulation solutions for critical infrastructure analysis should provide a generalized method for infrastructure model discovery. Critical infrastructure analysis is shaped not only by evolving requirements, but also by infrastructure model availability. Requirement #2 emphasizes the need for a uniform approach to discover infrastructure models to afford this dynamism. Requirement #3: Modeling and simulation solutions for critical infrastructure analysis should provide a generalized method for infrastructure model configuration. Often critical infrastructure models are not static representations, but are configurable to afford a range of behaviors for comparative analysis, to address issues of precision, and to manage computation and performance tradeoffs. Requirement #3 articulates the need for a generalized approach to configure the parameterized aspects of infrastructure models. Requirement #4: Modeling and simulation solutions for critical infrastructure analysis should provide a method for infrastructure model mapping and mediation. Critical infrastructures are highly interdependent. Events within one infrastructure produce effects within other infrastructures. As such, requirement #4 highlights the importance of a uniform approach to mapping and mediating interactions among models so that a method that accounts for dependencies across infrastructures can be afforded. Requirement #5: Modeling and simulation solutions for critical infrastructure analysis should provide a method for supporting emergent critical infrastructure behaviors. Situating critical infrastructure analysis requires more than the ability to link infrastructure models. Properly situating analysis also requires a method for supporting emergent critical infrastructure behaviors. These behaviors are not present within individual infrastructures; nor do they emerge due to simple cross-infrastructure dependencies. Rather, these behaviors appear from the synergy of interacting infrastructures. Requirement #6: Modeling and simulation solutions for critical infrastructure analysis should provide a method for registering interest in temporal events and model events. Events within one infrastructure often produce effects within other infrastructures. To mediate this interplay, a method for registering interest in model events is required. In addition, infrastructure behavior may vary with time - e.g., energy demands at 3:00pm on a hot summer day are different than at 2:00am on a cool spring night. As such, a method to make infrastructure models temporally aware is required. Requirement #7: Modeling and simulation solutions for critical infrastructure analysis should provide a method for accommodating differing simulation
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methodologies. Different infrastructure models may leverage different simulation methodologies. For example, some models leverage a discrete simulation methodology while other models leverage a continuous simulation methodology. Requirement #7 highlights the necessity for an approach to mediate the differences among simulation methodologies.
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A Service-Oriented Framework for Integrated Modeling and Simulation
Given the diversity and complexity of individual infrastructure models, we contend a key to enabling integrated modeling and simulation of critical infrastructures is simplicity in the design of an integration framework. Service-oriented architectures (SOAs) embody this simplicity and provide a promising approach to integrated modeling and simulation. SOAs are an emerging approach for enterprise application design and business function integration [10,12]. Structurally, such architectures are characterized by three component roles: service providers, service requesters, and service registries. Service providers implement some business functionality and expose this functionality through a public interface. Service requesters leverage needed business functionality through these public interfaces. Service registries broker the discovery of business functionality by service requesters. Functionally, SOAs are characterized by two distinct mechanisms: mechanisms that facilitate business function registration/discovery; and mechanisms that exercise business functions through requester/provider interaction (see Fig. 1). SOAs are also known for their configurability, extensibility, and scalability. SOAs enable with greater ease the dynamic aggregation of different functionality (i.e., configurability); they facilitate with greater ease the introduction of new functionality (i.e., extensibility); and, they accommodate with greater ease various numbers of providers, requesters, and registries (i.e., scalability). Given these characteristics, the simplicity of the SOA design, and the aforementioned modeling and simulation requirements, SOAs serve as the design foundation for our integrated modeling and simulation framework to enable system of systems analysis of critical infrastructures. Our framework is highlighted by four important design elements: 1) the instantiation of the SOA component roles; 2) a common service provider interface (SPI); 3) the service registration and
Fig. 1. Service-Oriented Architecture
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discover method; and 4) the simulation execution protocol. Collectively, these design elements address to varying degrees the identified modeling and simulation requirements. 4.1
SOA Component Roles
As previously described, SOAs are comprised of three component roles: service providers, service requesters, and service registries. Within our integrated modeling and simulation framework, individual infrastructure models function as our service providers. Our Integrated Modeling Environment (IME) functions in the role of service requester. The service registry is enabled by a configuration file and the underlying file system (see Fig. 2).
Fig. 2. Integrated Modeling and Simulation Framework
Service providers participate in multi-infrastructure simulations by implementing a Connector that realizes the common SPI. This allows the service requesters, to interact with all infrastructure models using a common interface. Given, however, that infrastructure models are often configurable, e.g., PowerWorld Simulator [13] allows end users to select different solvers, each Connector may define the set of configurable properties. Configurable properties must be assigned a valid value before a Connector, and the infrastructure model it represents, can participate in multi-infrastructure simulations. Together, the common SPI and Connector properties provide a generalized approach for infrastructure model interaction, while enabling infrastructure model configuration, i.e., Requirements #1 and #3. 4.2
Service Registration and Discovery Method
To participate in integrated simulations, infrastructure models must register with our framework. First, service providers add entries for their infrastructure
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models to a configuration file and place relevant software assemblies in specified file directories. The configuration file and supporting file directories provide the IME a means to discover infrastructure models automatically, i.e., Requirement #2. Next, service providers expose their infrastructure model data to the IME. This is occurs for several reasons: development of a common intermediate representation is needed in order to support the specification of cross-infrastructure dependencies, i.e., Requirement #4; awareness of these data facilitate support for emergent infrastructure behaviors, i.e., Requirement #5; and exposing relevant infrastructure data enables the IME to generate a unified visualization for the region of interest. Infrastructure model registration and discovery concludes with the IME possessing a set of Connectors where each Connector encapsulates access to an infrastructure model. 4.3
Common Service Provider Interface
Interaction with infrastructure models presents a special challenges to integrated simulations. First, to address the need for a generalized approach to model integration, i.e., Requirement #1, our framework defines a common SPI for all infrastructure models. The simplicity of our common SPI is one aspect of our framework that distinguishes it from the HLA by reducing the complexity of Connector/federate design. The common SPI also allows infrastructure models to register interest in selected temporal events and model events, i.e., Requirement #6. In the following, we introduce the common SPI. Connect(); When a user wishes to conduct system of systems analysis of critical infrastructures by means of multi-infrastructure simulations, the IME (i.e., service requester) “connects” to all enabled Connectors. The connection process accomplishes two things. First, it initializes each infrastructure model with a timestamp indicating the simulation start time. Second, it allows each infrastructure model in response to register interest in relevant temporal events and model events, i.e., Requirement #6. Disconnect(); When a simulation is complete, the IME “disconnects” from the participating infrastructure models. GetState(); Before a simulation begins, the IME requests from each infrastructure model the operational state of infrastructure components. This interaction between the IME and the infrastructure models synchronizes the state of IME data with each infrastructure model. In response to a GetState() request, an infrastructure model will report to the IME the requested state attributes for the requested infrastructure features. SetState(); When infrastructure models or the IME model of infrastructure dependencies indicate that the state of an infrastructure feature should change (i.e., disabled to enabled; or, enabled to disabled), the SetState() operation is invoked on the relevant infrastructure model. In response, an infrastructure model will report the plausible effects of the state change as a set of subsequent change events. These events are scheduled in the IME simulation timeline for processing.
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ClockAdvanceRequest(); This functionality is required due to the behavior of some infrastructure models. Some infrastructure models require, as much as possible, that all change events for a given timestamp be processed in batch. Thus, when the IME has processed all events associated with the current time on the simulation clock, each infrastructure model is notified and a request is made for approval to advance the time clock. In response, an infrastructure model returns the plausible effects of queued events as a set of subsequent change events. These events are scheduled in the IME simulation timeline for future processing. AdvanceClock(); When the simulation time clock reaches a relevant temporal event, interested infrastructure models are notified of this event using the AdvanceClock() operation.
4.4
Simulation Execution Protocol
The simulation execution protocol supported by the integrated modeling and simulation framework enables event-driven, i.e., discrete, simulations. The IME as service requester, maintains a simulation clock and an ordered simulation timeline of events. The IME also realizes the following simulation execution protocol. At the beginning of a simulation, the IME connects, via the Connect() operation, to each enabled Connector, i.e., infrastructure model. Each Connector responds with infrastructure and temporal events of interest. Next, the IME synchronizes its state with each infrastructure model using the GetState() operation. Every simulation is associated with a course of action (COA). A COA identifies the infrastructure events that are “scheduled” to occur during the simulation. These events are inserted into the simulation timeline. Thus, in the timeline there may be three types of events: scheduled infrastructure events (called actions), emergent infrastructure events (resulting from event processing), and temporal events. Simulation execution begins by processing the “current” events. Processing either a scheduled or emergent event, involves two parts. First, state change is affected in the relevant infrastructure model using the SetState() operation. This operation will return a list of emergent events which are properly inserted into the simulation timeline by the IME. If state change is not affected because the relevant infrastructure model already possesses the desired state, the event is retained but processing of the event terminates. Second, if the event results in a state change, then the infrastructure event is processed according to the relational model specified in the IME context and behavior ontology [17]. Processing a temporal event requires the IME to use the AdvanceClock() operation to notify interested infrastructure models. Once all “current” events have been processed, the IME interacts with each infrastructure model using the RequestAdvanceClock() operation to request approval for the advancement of the simulation clock. If no new “current” events are generated from these requests, then the simulation clock is advanced to next timestamp when either a scheduled, emergent, or temporal event is to occur.
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When no unprocessed events remain in the simulation timeline, the IME disconnects from each infrastructure model using the Disconnect() operation; and the simulation terminates. While this framework supports discrete simulations, its design does not necessarily prevent the integration of infrastructure models that support continuous simulations. This is possible because the IME “knows” about infrastructure models only by the common SPI. Thus, the framework encapsulates infrastructure model behavior in a manner that hides the service provider simulation methodology, e.g., discrete or continuous, from service requesters. As such, continuous simulations can be embedded within multi-infrastructure discrete simulations. For example, using our framework we have integrated into multi-infrastructure discrete simulations electric power simulations, supported using PowerWorld Simulator, which uses a continuous simulation approach. Thus, the design of the SPI and the encapsulation of infrastructure models, provide an approach to address Requirement #7. The simulation execution protocol is another aspect that distinguishes our framework from the HLA. While the HLA is designed to allow a full range of distributed interaction among federates including both synchronous and asynchronous interaction, our integration framework centralizes interaction through the IME using a well-defined synchronous interaction protocol. Furthermore, the IME centralizes management of the simulation clock. While these characteristics restrict the range of interaction among Connectors, we believe the simplicity of this design and the common SPI will increase the usability and utility of the integration framework.
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Illustration
To demonstrate how our framework for integrated modeling and simulation enables system of systems analysis of critical infrastructures, an illustration is provided. This illustration focuses on an urban region, possessing infrastructures for electric power, telecommunication, and rail transportation (see Fig. 3).
Fig. 3. Illustrative Infrastructure Models
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In this illustration, independent models for electric power, telecommunication, and rail transportation have been incorporated into our framework as service providers. In other words, a Connector that realizes the common SPI has been implemented for each infrastructure model. Using the IME ontology for infrastructure context and behavior [17], temporal, spatial and functional relationships within and among the infrastructure models are also specified. Fig. 4 depicts the order of effect for an illustrative multi-infrastructure simulation. The initial state of this simulation has all three participating infrastructures enabled. The course of action for this simulation includes one scheduled event - a fallen power line, i.e., 1st order effect. Loss of this power line leads to a power outage in the specified region, i.e., 2nd order effect. This power outage forces a telecommunications central office to migrate to backup power. After backup power is exhausted, however, the central office is disabled, which, in turn, disables connected wireless towers, i.e., 3rd order effect. The subsequent loss of telecommunications affects rail transportation as indicated since the rail infrastructure depends on the telecommunication infrastructure to operate rail switches, i.e., 4th order effect. The simulation final state is also shown. Once simulations complete, they may be explored, replayed, and saved for further analysis. Using the IME, users can examine the order-of-impact of events as well as the plausible impact to each critical infrastructure. In addition, users can examine the event trace to understand and/or validate the event chain that led to an effect. During analysis, users may refine the infrastructure context and behavior ontology, reconfigure infrastructure models, and add/remove/plug-nplay different infrastructure models to explore “what-if” scenarios.
Fig. 4. Illustrative Multi-infrastructure Simulation
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For this illustration, three infrastructure models were integrated using our SOA framework for integrated modeling and simulation. Due to obvious data sensitivities, notional data were intermixed with actual data. To date, we have used our framework to integrate numerous infrastructure models including models supported by 3rd party solutions such as PowerWorld Simulator [13] and Network Analyst [1]. We have also developed a toolkit of Connectors to enable rapid prototyping of infrastructure models (no Connector development required), which is useful when model data are relatively sparse. The resulting models, however, are still known to the IME only through the common SPI. Finally, we have coupled continuous infrastructure simulations, e.g., [13], into discrete multi-infrastructures simulations.
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Conclusion
Our framework for integrated modeling and simulation is actively being used to explore and analyze critical infrastructures for large scale (>100,000 km2 ) geographic regions. In addition, we have developed integrated models for urban regions of various scales (e.g., >500 mi2 , 1000 acres). We have also demonstrated the IME on a corporate IT infrastructure model for a Fortune 100 company integrating models for IT hardware, system software, business applications, business processes, and business units. Verification and validation is further enabled by our adherence to the underlying principle of transparency. Analysis enabled by our framework is transparent to the analyst. Event traces can be explored and questioned by subject matter experts. In fact, this practice is regularly utilized by our user community. At the same time, there are aspects of our framework that require further investigation. First, the robustness of our common SPI and simulation execution protocol must be examined. The SPI and simulation execution protocol have undergone some revisions since their initial design to address emergent requirements of individual infrastructures models. For example, the ClockAdvanceRequest() was introduced after discovering that some infrastructure models require, as much as possible, that all change events for a given timestamp be processed in batch. Second, Connector developers are currently responsible for mapping infrastructure model data into a common intermediate representation. This increases the complexity of Connector development while simplifying the design of the IME. Further study is required to determine and validate the proper balance of this responsibility between the Connector developer and the IME. Third, further research is required to validate the integrated modeling and simulation requirements identified in Section 3. These requirements emerged through both research and practice. Additional research is required to determine the completeness and appropriateness of this set. Finally, formal study of the scalability and complexity of our framework from a cognitive perspective is required. That is, a better understanding is needed of how our framework impacts (positively and/or negatively) the cognitive limitations of the developers of integrated models for system of systems analysis.
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References 1. ArcGIS Network Analyst, http://www.esri.com/software/arcgis/extensions/networkanalyst 2. Casalicchio, E., Galli, E., Tucci, S.: Federated agent-based modeling and simulation approach to study interdependencies in IT critical infrastructures. In: 11th IEEE Symp. on Distributed Simulation & Real-Time App. IEEE Computer Society, Los Alamitos (2007) 3. Chaturvedi, A.: A society of simulation approach to dynamic integration of simulations. In: Proc. Winter Simulation Conference (2006) 4. Craven, P., Oman, P.: Modeling advanced train control system networks. To appear in: Goetz, E., Shenoi, S. (eds.) Critical Infrastructure Protection, 2nd edn. (2008) 5. Dudenhoeffer, D.D., Permann, M.R., Manic, M.: CIMS: a framework for infrastructure interdependency modeling and analysis. In: Winter Simulation Conf. (2006) 6. Flentge, F., Beyer, U.: The ISE metamodel for critical infrastructures. In: Goetz, E., Shenoi, S. (eds.) Critical Infrastructure Protection, pp. 323–336. Springer, Heidelberg (2007) 7. Gursesli, O., Desrochers, A.A.: Modeling infrastructure interdependencies using petri nets. In: IEEE Int’l Conference on Systems, Man and Cybernetics (2003) 8. Marti, J.R., Hollman, J.A., Ventrua, C., Jatskevich, J.: Design for survival real-time infrastructures coordination. In: Int’l Workshop Complex Network & Infrastructure Protection (2006) 9. National Strategy for Homeland Security, U.S. Dept. of Homeland Security (2002) 10. Papazoglou, M.P., Georgakopoulos, D.: Service-oriented computing. Communications of the ACM 46, 10 (2003) 11. Pederson, P., Dudenhoeffer, D., Hartley, S., Permann, M.: Critical infrastructure interdependency modeling: a survey of U.S. and international research. Rep. No. INL/EXT-06-11464, Critical Infrastructure Protection Division, INEEL (2006) 12. Perrey, R., Lycett, M.: Service-oriented architecture. In: Proc. of Symp. on Applications and the Internet Workshops, pp. 116–119 (2003) 13. PowerWorld Simulator, http://www.powerworld.com/products/simulator.asp 14. Rinaldi, S.M., Peerenboom, J.P., Kelly, T.K.: Identifying,understanding, and analyzing critical infrastructure interdependencies. In: IEEE Control Sys. Mag. (2001) 15. Rittel, H., Webber, M.: Dilemmas in a general theory of planning. In: Policy Sciences, pp. 155–159. Elsevier Scientific Publishing, Amsterdam (1973) 16. Svendsen, N., Wolthusen, S.: Multigraph dependency models for heterogeneous critical infrastructures. In: Goetz, E., Shenoi, S. (eds.) Critical Infrastructure Protection, pp. 337–350. Springer, Heidelberg (2007) 17. Tolone, W.J., Lee, S.W., Xiang, W.N., Blackwell, J., Yeager, C., Schumpert, A., Johnson, E.W.: An integrated methodology for critical infrastructure modeling and simulation. In: Goetz, E., Shenoi, S. (eds.) Critical Infrastructure Protection II, 2nd edn. Springer, Heidelberg (2008) 18. Tolone, W.J., Wilson, D., Raja, A., Xiang, W.N., Hao, H., Phelps, S., Johnson, E.W.: Critical infrastructure integration modeling and simulation. In: Chen, H., Moore, R., Zeng, D.D., Leavitt, J. (eds.) ISI 2004. LNCS, vol. 3073, pp. 214–225. Springer, Heidelberg (2004)
Information Modelling and Simulation in Large Interdependent Critical Infrastructures in IRRIIS R¨ udiger Klein, Erich Rome, C´esaire Beyel, Ralf Linnemann, Wolf Reinhardt, and Andrij Usov Fraunhofer IAIS, Schloss Birlinghoven, Augustin, Germany {Ruediger.Klein}@iais.fraunhofer.de
Abstract. Critical Infrastructures (CIs) and their protection play a very important role in modern societies. Today’s CIs are managed by sophisticated information systems. These information systems have special views on their respective CIs – but can frequently not manage dependencies with other systems adequately. For dependency analysis and management we need information taking the dependency aspects explicitly into account – in well defined relations to all other relevant kinds of information. This is the aim of the IRRIIS Information Model. It is a semantic model or ontology of CI dependencies. This Information Model allows us to integrate information from different CIs – from real ones as in SCADA systems, or from simulations – in order to manage their interdependencies. This paper gives an overview of the IRRIIS Information Model and the way it is used in the IRRIIS simulator SimCIP for the analysis of interdependent infrastructures. An example will be given to illustrate our approach. Keywords: CI dependability, CI dependencies, information modelling, federated simulation, simulation environment.
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Introduction
Critical infrastructure systems are getting more and more complex. At the same time their (inter-)dependencies grow. Interactions through direct connectivity, through policies and procedures, or simply as the result of geographical neighbourhood often create complex relationships, dependencies, and interdependencies that cross infrastructure boundaries. In the years to come the number, diversity, and importance of critical infrastructures as well as their dependencies will still increase: advanced traffic management and control systems, mobile information services of any kind, ubiquitous computing, ambient intelligence – just to mention a few key words. Even classical domains like electric power networks will change their shape: more distributed generation facilities, intelligent consumers, smaller but interdependent distribution networks are examples of developments to be expected. The good news is that more or less all R. Setola and S. Geretshuber (Eds.): CRITIS 2008, LNCS 5508, pp. 36–47, 2009. c Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009
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of these critical infrastructures provide and use many kinds of information during operation. This allows us to use this information also for interdependency analysis and management. The modelling and analysis of dependencies between critical infrastructure elements is a relatively new and very important field of study [2]. Much effort is currently being spent to develop models that accurately simulate the behaviours of critical infrastructure [12, 14, 15]. Today, there exists already comprehensive knowledge about managing large and complex systems. There are sophisticated approaches dealing with optimal operation, management of interoperation, safety and risk management issues, etc. Different modelling and problem solving approaches are considered [2] including agent based modelling, game theory, mathematical models, Petri nets, statistical analysis, etc. One of the main challenges for managing CIs and their dependencies comes from the quite different kinds of behaviour of critical infrastructures. Electrical power networks, traffic systems, water and oil pipelines, logistics, or telecommunication systems have their information and communication systems needed for their control – but at the same time they exist in the physical world, they behave according to the laws of physics, and they interact with their physical environment. The management of many critical infrastructures has to take both dimensions and their mutual interactions into account: the physical and the information and communication aspect. For this purpose we need – information models which are sufficiently expressive for CI dependency modelling and analysis – for the physical as well as the information and control aspects and their relationships; – simulation techniques which allow us to describe the physical behaviour of the different systems, their control, and the resulting dependencies; and – methods and tools supporting communication between CIs in order to manage their dependencies. These are the main goals of the IRRIIS project. The modelling and simulation approach taken in this project to deal with CI dependencies will be outlined in this paper. The paper is organized as follows: In Chapter 2 we motivate and describe our modelling approach to CI dependencies. How to use the IRRIIS models for the simulation of critical infrastructures will be explained in more detail in Chapter 3. In Chapter 4 we summarize our results and give an outlook to future research.
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The IRRIIS Information Model
Today, the management and control of critical infrastructures depends to a large extend on information and communication technologies (ICT). They provide the “nerve systems” of these large infrastructures. There are highly sophisticated software systems allowing the stakeholders to manage, control, and analyse their
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systems under more or less every condition. What is frequently missing today is information related to dependencies to other systems: geographic neighbourhood information, physical or information and control dependencies, etc. The information systems used to model the critical infrastructures tend to be very different. There is no common modelling approach. They are quite different for different domains, but even within the same domain different information modelling and processing approaches are used. This is quite natural considering the many different kinds of information and the various approaches and algorithms taken for these purposes. Critical infrastructures are physical systems or based on such systems. Electrical power networks, traffic systems, or telecommunication systems exist in the physical world, they behave according to the laws of physics, and they interact with their physical environment. They process information about their state, and they may also exchange information with other systems in order to manage their dependencies. The dependency analysis of critical infrastructures has to take both dimensions and their mutual interactions into account: the physical and the information and communication aspect. Consequently, a key issue is to establish information models and simulation techniques which take exactly these issues into consideration: the components and systems, their behaviours, events, actions of control, risks, etc. This will help to manage critical infrastructures more effectively and efficiently, and it will improve information interchange between those information systems dealing with control of different critical infrastructures. The main point is to bring all dependency related information together with all other kinds of information necessary to manage and control the various kinds of critical infrastructures. We need an information model which is – as general as necessary in order to represent the commonalities of critical infrastructures for dependency analysis independent from their concrete type, – sufficiently expressive in order to represent the many different kinds of related information, and – which is well defined with clear semantics in order to be manageable by the different kinds of information systems working with them. Following established semantic modelling techniques [4] we build the IRRIIS Information Model as an ontology [11] of Critical Infrastructures. In order to be as general as necessary and at the same time as adaptive as needed for the different kinds of CI the IRRIIS Information Model is built on three levels of generalization: 1. the Generic Information Model (GIM): it is the top level ontology of Critical Infrastructures. It is based on the assumption that there is a common core information model for critical infrastructures and their dependencies. Whatever the CI to be modelled and its dependencies are: for the purpose of CI dependency analysis and management it will be described in terms of this IRRIIS Generic Information Model and its domain specific extensions (see below). This common model provides the basis for communication between
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different CIs. It provides a common semantically well-defined vocabulary as pre-condition for this communication. It captures the basic physical structure of the CI with its components and systems and their connections, their behaviours on an appropriate level of abstraction, the services they provide, and events, actions and associated risks. In this way it is sufficiently expressive to capture all dependency related information. 2. The domain specific information models: they adapt, specialize and extend the Generic Information Model according to the special needs of the various domains (like electrical power networks, traffic systems, or telecommunication nets). They contain the specific types of components and their behaviours as specializations of the more general concepts introduced in the GIM. 3. The instance level models: this third layer describes the concrete critical infrastructures in terms of the respective domain specific information model as instantiations of the concepts and relations defined in this model.
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The IRRIIS Generic Information Model
These three models are, of course, tightly related to each other – to be shown in more detail now. The Static Information Model. The Static Model is the basic ontology describing the main concepts, their relations and attributes (see fig. 2) needed for CI modelling1 . Components and systems describe the structure and topology of a CI. Components and systems can be described by a set of relevant attributes (not shown here). In the domain model more specific sub-classes of systems, components and attributes can be introduced. Part Structures Systems have parts – described by the hasPart relation. Its terminal elements are components. Connections Systems and components are connected to other systems and components. (Because connections form a central element in typical CI models they are described by classes with attributes etc. – not just as relations). There can be different types of connections like physical and control connections in the domain models (see below). Services Systems and components provide services to other systems/components, and systems and components need services in order to work correctly. This is a useful and attractive abstraction providing a lot of flexibility for modelling 1
The UML diagrams are just used as illustrations of the model. UML does not provide the necessary semantic precision.
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event
triggers
causes event
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Static model:
classes instances relations topology attributes
Fig. 1. An overview of the three layers of the IRRIIS Generic Information Model: the static model, the behaviour model, and the event and action layer
– especially for the action of systems and critical infrastructures. In parts of the model or in the whole model we may use services as the basic level of description – omitting the component layer. Effects Services may have effects. An effect is described as resulting in certain values for attributes of involved components or services (heating, cooling, ...). A connection may be used to mediate some services – that’s a way how actions of systems and components can be described in IRRIIS. Dependencies A connection causes a dependency. Due to the different types of connections there may be different types of dependency. Dependencies may be characterized in more detail by various attributes. Geospatial attributes Components, systems and events (see below) may be described by their geospatial locations. Locations and areas are related to each other through geospatial contained-in, neighbourhood, or distance relations. Systems and services. Every service is provided by a system/component. In the same way a system/component needs services in order to work correctly. The failure of any of these input services results in a failure of the component or systems – with the consequence that the services normally provided by it will also fail. A service oriented modelling is an adequate abstraction in those cases where a system or CI provides this service in different ways to other systems/CIs [3]. The IRRIIS Behaviour Model. The key elements in the IRRIIS behaviour model are states and transitions (Fig. 5).
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Fig. 2. The core of the IRRIIS Static Model: components, systems, services and connections
States Components/systems, services, and connections can have states. An entity is in a certain state either if explicitly given (like ‘broken’ or ‘switched-off’) or if the criteria defining this state are fulfilled by this entity (see below). The states are defined according to the respective entity type, i.e., components of a certain type can have different states then other component types or services. Which states are defined depends on the application – the IRRIIS model does deliberately not provide any restrictions here. All we need is a finite set of states. States and Services The state of a service is determined by the state of the component or system which provides this service. The state of a component or system depends on the state of the services it needs. Transitions States (as discrete entities) are related to each other via transitions. States and transitions together form finite state machines for the entities they apply to. The transitions do not have to be deterministic – i.e., we may have probabilistic state machines. We may also assign temporal aspects to such transitions (duration, delay, etc.). Propagation of state transitions The state of a system/component depends on the states of the services it needs or on the states of other components/systems it depends on. If one of those states is changed this transition will be propagated to the depending systems/components. Temporal aspects state transitions are not necessarily instantaneous. They can occur with a certain delay. An overloaded power transmission line will withstand this
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Fig. 3. The IRRIIS Behaviour Model with states and transitions
overlaod for a while (depending on the amount of overload). Only then it will break. States and Attributes. The states of a component, system, or service can be related to its physical attributes: in order to be in normal operational state a system for instance has to fulfil some constraints on its attributes. In this way states can be classified according to attribute values using classification constraints. These constraints are part of the domain model and are applied to each instance. States may be changed directly by events or actions – without explicit reference to physical attributes. For instance, a system’s state may change when the state of one of its components changes. Or we simply say that a component is broken without saying why and in which way. The definition of states is a key issue in an IRRIIS model. It may be adequate for an IRRIIS application just to discriminate between two states like “working” and “out of work”. In other cases we may need much more fine-grained states (and transitions between them). For instance, a system may still provide the services it is responsible for but with the restriction that some of its sub-systems do not work at the moment and that the built-in redundancy or emergency systems already took over responsibility for these services (resulting in a higher risk of failure). 2.2
The IRRIIS Events and Actions Model
The IRRIS Generic Information Models contains the concepts needed to describe scenarios, events, actions, etc. – and how these concepts are related to the other main information categories. Events Events trigger state transitions. They are either external or internal events. An external event is something happening outside of the respective system or component changing its state. An internal event is a state transition within one of the parts of a system.
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Actions are like events but performed deliberately by a certain agent in order to achieve a certain state change in a certain system/component. Scenarios A scenario is a sequence of events and actions. They are ordered by time, and the events and actions in a scenario may be related to each other by causal relations. They can also be independent from each other (just happening by accident) – thus allowing us to model a large variety of different types of scenarios and of analyzing in which way they affect the dependent critical infrastructures. Scenarios may contain events coming from outside, and events resulting from the evolution of the system. Actions (see below) are similar to events – with the exception that they are executed deliberately as reaction to a certain state, pursuing a certain goal (a state to be reached) and following a certain strategy or policy. Temporal aspects Events and actions can be described in their temporal aspects: when they occur, if they are instantaneous or if they have a duration, etc.
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The IRRIIS Domain Models and Instance Models
The IRRIIS Generic Information Model as top level CI ontology contains the main concepts and relations for modelling large Critical Infrastructures and their dependencies. It provides the basis for the concrete domain models which contain those concepts and relations needed to model domains like electrical power grids or telecommunication networks. These concrete domain concepts and their relations are specializations of the generic concepts defined in the GIM. For instance, in the electrical power grid domain we may have concepts like power station, transformer, and consumer as special categories under the general concept “component/system”, or we may have special relations like ‘controls’ as specialization of the general connection concept in the GIM. The IRRIIS domain models will then be instantiated in order to model concrete systems like the ACEA electrical power network in Rome or the Telecom Italia communication network in central Italy.
3 3.1
The Simulation of Dependent Critical Infrastructures The IRRIIS Simulation Environment SimCIP
In the previous chapter we outlined the IRRIIS Information Model. Now we will explain in which way these models will be used. There are mainly two ways to deal with CI dependency: the management of real critical infrastructures or the simulation of such CIs and their dependencies. The simulation approach will need a simulation environment which allows us to simulate the behaviour of the systems to the necessary granularity and
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Power N etwo rk
Telc o Powe r N etw ork
Power Tele com Netw ork
Tele com Ne tw ork
Fig. 4. Parts of the instance level models of the simulated networks and their dependencies
precision. In IRRIIS, the simulation environment SimCIP has been developed for this purpose. It is built on our agent based simulation system LampSys which provides important features for CI simulation like encapsulation, modularity, states and transitions, quite different temporal behaviours, and rule based propagation of state transitions along dependency networks. SimCIP can be connected through a generic simulation interface to other external simulators for federated simulation (see the next chapter). 3.2
Federated Simulation
Obviously, critical infrastructures can be quite different and behave in quite different ways. There is a whole bunch of highly sophisticated techniques used to simulate such diverse systems – depending on the type of the systems, their behaviours, and the purposes of the simulation. Typically these simulations do not consider dependencies between systems. That’s exactly the place where the IRRIIS Information Model and its usage come into play. The IRRIIS approach can be characterized as a federated simulation approach: SimCIP takes the simulations of each critical infrastructure and integrates them – taking in this way the dependencies between them into account. The IRRIIS Information Model provides the information “glue” for the federated simulation. SimCIP allows us to relate the results from simulation of one CI in a standardized way to the simulation results of another depending CI by mapping all native simulation results to the unifying IRRIIS Information Model.
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SimCIP federated simulation
Output Input Output Observer
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Fig. 5. Federated simulation in IRRIIS: the simulation tool SimCIP using the IRRIIS Information Model for information integration and native simulation tools for Critical Infrastructures
Though the critical infrastructures are different they communicate through the exchange of information about state transitions and events with each other. This information is formulated in the IRRIIS Information Model allowing all CIs to get the meaning of this information from other CIs. The simulation of the system behaviour of the involved critical infrastructures is combined (or federated) to an overall simulation of dependent critical infrastructures by using the native simulations of each CI and the state transition and event chain mechanism of the IRRIIS simulation. Two points should be highlighted here: – The expressive information model of IRRIIS allows us to represent all relevant information (systems, components, their part structure and dependencies, their behaviours, etc.) in an expressive, adequate and transparent way. – The classification of behaviour results from each CI simulation in terms of states, state transitions, and events is the main “interface” between native CI simulations and IRRIIS’ dependency simulation. In our example federated simulation by SimCIP works as follows: 1. An event in the power network changes the state of the component “power supply” from ‘on’ to ‘broken’. 2. This state transition is propagated by SimCIP to the native power network simulator.
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3. This simulator calculates the new power distribution of the power network. 4. The results are taken by SimCIP and used for state classification on the power network. 5. Every state change of a component/subsystem in the power network which has a dependency relation to a component in one of the other networks is propagated by SimCIP to this depending component. 6. The state transition of this component is now propagated by SimCIP to the native simulator of this network. This propagation can stop after a while in a new stable state (for instance, if sufficient redundancy of a network prevents it from an outage), it can result in a cascade and outage, or appropriate measures may be taken stopping this propagation. The main point here is that SimCIP integrates the native simulations of the respective critical infrastructures through the common IRRIIS Information Model.
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Summary and Outlook
The IRRIIS Information Model introduced here provides the basis for information modelling and simulation for CI dependency analysis and management. It is formulated as an ontology providing an expressive framework with clear semantics for the different kinds of information required. As a lingua franca of dependencies it provides the communication platform for exchanging dependency related information between different critical infrastructures even from different sectors and domains. The model introduced here is a first approach which will be further elaborated. Especially, we plan to gather more experiences regarding the expressiveness of the IRRIIS Information Model and the granularity of the domain models (which states, which dependencies, how to model risks, etc.) required. At the moment, event and action chains are specified manually by domain experts. A logical next step is to generate such event action chains automatically in a systematic way. This allows us to analyse dependencies more comprehensively and systematically.
Acknowledgement The research described in this paper was partly funded by the EU commission within the 6th IST Framework in the IRRIIS Integrated Project under contract No 027568. The authors thank all project partners for many interesting discussions which greatly helped to formulate the approach described here.
References 1. The IRRIIS European Integrated Project, http://www.irriis.org 2. Pederson, P., et al.: Critical Infrastructure Interdependency Modeling: A Survey of U.S. and International Research, Technical Report, Idaho National Lab (August 2006)
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3. Beyer, U., Flentge, F.: Towards a Holistic Metamodel for Systems of Critical Infrastructures. In: ECN CIIP Newsletter (October/November 2006) 4. Staab, S., Studer, R. (eds.): Handbook on Ontologies. International Handbooks on Information Systems. Springer, Heidelberg (2004) 5. Bernardi, S., Merseguer, J.: A UML Profile for Dependability Analysis of RealTime Embedded Systems. In: Proc. WOSP 2007, Buenos Aires, Argentina (February 2007) 6. Annoni, A.: Orchestra: Developing a Unified Open Architecture for Risk Management Applications. In: van Oosterom, P., et al. (eds.) Geo-information for Disaster Management. Springer, Heidelberg (2005) 7. Schmitz, W., et al.: Interdependency Taxonomy and Interdependency Approaches. The IRRIIS Consortium, Deliverable D.2.2.1. (June 2007) 8. Alexiev, V., et al.: Information Integration with Ontologies. Wiley, Sussex (2005) 9. Rathnam, T.: Using Ontologies To Support Interoperability In Federated Simulation, M.Sc. thesis, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA, USA (August 2004) 10. Borst, W.: Construction of Engineering Ontologies, Centre of Telematica and Information Technology, University of Tweenty, Enschede, The Netherlands (1997) 11. Gruber, T.: Toward Principles for the Design of Ontologies Used for Knowledge Sharing. In: Proceedings of the International Workshop on Formal Ontology, Padova, Italy (1993) 12. Cerotti, D., Codetta-Raiteri, D., Donatelli, S., Dondossola, G., Garrone, F.: Representing the CRUTIAL project domain by means of UML diagrams. In: Proc. CRITIS 2007, Malaga, Spain (October 2007) 13. Kr¨ oger, W.: Reliability Engineering and System Safety. Reliability Engineering and System Safety 93, 1781–1787 (2008) 14. Min, H.J., Beyeler, W., Brown, T., Son, Y.J., Jones, A.T.: Toward modeling and simulation of national CI interdependencies. IIE Transactions 39, 57–71 (2007) 15. Hopkinson, K., Wang, X., Giovanini, R., Thorp, J., Birman, K., Coury, D.: EPOCHS: A Platform for Agent-Based Electric Power and Communication Simulation Built from Commercial Off-The-Shelf Components. IEEE Transactions on Power Systems 21(2), 548–559 (2006)
Multi-level Dependability Modeling of Interdependencies between the Electricity and Information Infrastructures Marco Beccuti1 , Giuliana Franceschinis1 , Mohamed Kaˆaniche2 , and Karama Kanoun2 1
Dip. di Informatica, Univ. del Piemonte Orientale, 15100 Alessandria, Italy {beccuti,giuliana}@mfn.unipmn.it 2 LAAS-CNRS, Univ. de Toulouse, F-31077 Toulouse, France {mohamed.kaaniche,karama.kanoun}@laas.fr
Abstract. The interdependencies between infrastructures may be the cause of serious problems in mission/safety critical systems. In the CRUTIAL1 project the interdependencies between the electricity infrastructure (EI) and the information infrastructure (II) responsible for its control, maintenance and management have been thoroughly studied; moreover countermeasures to substantially reduce the risk to interrupt the service have been developed in the project. The possible interdependencies have been investigated by means of model at different abstraction levels. In this paper, we present high level models describing the various interdependencies between the EI and the II infrastructures, then we illustrate on a simple scenario how these models can be detailed to allow the evaluation of some measures of dependability.
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There is a wide consensus that developing modeling frameworks for understanding interdependencies among critical infrastructures and analyzing their impact is a necessary step for building interconnected infrastructures on which a justified level of confidence can be placed with respect to their robustness to potential vulnerabilities and disruptions. Modeling can provide useful insights into how component failures might propagate and lead to cascading, or escalating failures in interdependent infrastructures, and assess the impact of these failures on the service delivered to the users. In the context of CRUTIAL, we focus on two interdependent infrastructures: the electric power infrastructure (EI) and the information infrastructure (II) supporting management, business, control and maintenance functionality. As discussed in [3], there has been extensive work on the modeling of individual infrastructures and various methods and tools have been developed to predict the consequences of potential disruptions within an individual infrastructure. 1
CRUTIAL (Critical Utility Infrastructure resilience), FP6 European Project (http://crutial.cesiricerca.it)
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However, the modeling and evaluation of interdependent infrastructures is still at an exploratory stage. The modeling activities carried out in CRUTIAL aim at contributing to fill this gap taking into account in particular: a) the three types of failures that are characteristic of interdependent infrastructures [6] (cascading2 , escalating3, and common-cause failures), b) various classes of faults that can occur, including accidental as well as malicious threats, c) the temporal and structural characteristics of the power and information infrastructures investigated. A major challenge lies in the complexity of the modeled infrastructures in terms of largeness, multiplicity of interactions and types of interdependencies involved. To address this problem, a number of abstractions and appropriate approaches for composition of models are necessary. In CRUTIAL, the interdependencies have been analyzed at different levels: from a very abstract view expressing the essence of the typical phenomena due to the presence of interdependencies, to an intermediate detail level representing in a rather abstract way the structure of the system (in some scenarios of interest), to a quite detailed level where the system components and their interactions are modeled in a fairly realistic way and simulation is used to derive interesting reliability measures. In this paper a two-level modeling approach is proposed and illustrated through a simple scenario inspired by the CRUTIAL project. This is part of a multi-level and multi-formalism approach to the qualitative and quantitative study of the interdependencies between the EI and the II controlling and managing it. In Section 2, the highest abstraction level is considered, showing the sequences of (abstract) events leading to typical interdependency phenomena such as cascading and escalation. In Section 3, a (simple) scenario is used to illustrate a more refined, second level representation, from which quantitative information can be provided to enable performance/reliability analysis. We will show how the higher level models can be composed with the more refined one and used to highlight possible instantiations of the abstract interdependencies phenomena. Section 4 concludes the paper.
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This section summarizes the high-level abstract models presented in [5]. We model the EI and II behavior globally, taking into account the impact of failures in the infrastructures, and their effects on both infrastructures, without taking into account explicitly their underlying implementation structure. For sake of clarity, events and states of the II are prefixed by i- while those of the EI are prefixed by e-. We first address accidental failures in II, then malicious attacks. 2 3
Cascading failures occur when a failure in one infrastructure causes the failure of one or more component(s) in a second infrastructure. Escalating failures occur when an existing failure in one infrastructure exacerbates an independent failure in another infrastructure, increasing its severity or the time for recovery and restoration from this failure.
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Accidental Failure Model
The model, given in Fig. 1, is based on assumptions related to the behavior of the infrastructures as resulting from their failures and mutual interdependencies. These assumptions are summarized, before commenting the model. Impact of i-failures. Accidental i-failures, affecting the II can be either masked (unsignaled) i-failures, leading to latent errors, or signaled. Latent errors can be either passive (i.e., without any action on the EI, but keeping the operators uninformed of possible disruptions occurring in the EI) or active (provoking undue configuration changes in the EI). After signaled i-failures, the II is in a partial i-outage state. Latent errors can accumulate. Signaled i-failures may take place when the II is in latent error states. When the II is in a partial ioutage state, i-restoration is necessary to bring it back to an i-working state. We assume that an i-failure puts some constraints on the EI (i.e., cascading failure), leading to a weakened EI (e.g., with a lower performance, unduly isolations, or unnecessary off-line trips of production plants or of transmission lines). From an e-weakened state after a signaled i-failure, an e-configuration restoration leads EI back into a working state, because no e-failures occurred in the EI. Accumulation of untimely configuration changes, may lead to e-lost state (i.e., a blackout state), from which an e-restoration is required to bring back the EI into an e-working state. The above events and the resulting states are recapitulated in Table 1.
Fig. 1. Model of the two infrastructures when considering accidental failures
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Table 1. States and events of the information infrastructure (II) Events Signaled i-failure Masked i-failure i-restoration
Detected i-failure. Undetected i-failure. Action for bringing back the II in its normal functioning after ifailure(s).
States i-working The II ensures normal control of the EI. Passive latent error Parts of the II have an i-failure, which prevents monitoring of the EI: e-failures may remain unnoticed. Active latent error Parts of the II have an i-failure, that may lead to unnecessary, and unnoticed configuration changes. Partial i-outage Parts of the II have knowingly an i-failure. Partial i-outage is assumed: the variety of functions and of the components of the infrastructure, and its essential character of large network make unlikely total outage. i-weakened Parts of the II can no longer implement their functions, although they do not have an i-failure, due to constraints originating from e-failures (e.g., shortage of electricity supply of unprotected parts).
Table 2. States and events of the electricity infrastructure (EI) Events e-failure
Malfunctioning of elements of the power grid: production plants, transformers, transmission lines, breakers, etc. e-restoration Actions for bringing back the EI in its normal functioning after e-failure(s) occurred. Typically, e-restoration is a sequence of configuration change(s), repair(s), configuration restoration(s). e-configuration change Change of configuration of the power grid that are not immediate consequences of e-failures, e.g., off-line trips of production plants or of transmission lines. e-configuration restoration Act of bringing back the EI in its initial configuration, when configuration changes have taken place. States e-working Electricity production, transmission and distribution are ensured in normal conditions. Partial e-outage Due to e-failure(s), electricity production, transmission and distribution are no longer ensured in normal conditions, they are however somehow ensured, in degraded conditions. e-lost Propagation of e-failures within the EI led to losing its control, i.e., a blackout occurred. e-weakened Electricity production, transmission and distribution are no longer ensured in normal conditions, due to i-failure(s) of the II that constrain the functioning of the EI, although no e-failure occurred in the latter. The capability of the EI is degraded: lower performance, configuration changes, possible manual control, etc.
Impact of e-failures. We consider that the occurrence of e-failures leads the EI to be in a partial e-outage state, unless propagation within the infrastructure leads to losing its control (e.g., a blackout of the power grid) because of an i-failure
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(this latter case corresponds to escalating events). Also e-failures may lead the II to an i-weakened state in which parts of the II can no longer implement their functions, although they are not failed, due to constraints originating from the failure of the EI. The above events and the states are recapitulated in Table 2. 2.2
Malicious Attacks Model
Attacks fall into two classes: deceptive attacks provoking unperceived malfunctions, thus similar to the latent errors previously considered, and perceptible attacks creating detected damages. Deceptive attacks can be passive (i.e., without any direct action of the II on the EI) or active, provoking configuration changes in the EI, by the II. Fig. 2 gives the state machine model of the infrastructures. Due to the very nature of attacks, a distinction has to be performed for both infrastructures between their real status and their apparent status. For the EI, the apparent status is as reported by the II. Models of Figs. 1 and 2 are very similar: they differ by the semantics of the states and of the inter-state transitions. In state 2, the effects of the passive deceptive attack are: i) the II looks like working while it is in a partial i-outage state due to the attack, ii) it does not perform any action on the EI, but informs wrongly the operator that the EI is in partial e-outage, and as consequence iii) the operator performs some configuration changes in the EI leading it to an e-weakened state. Accumulation of configuration changes by the operator may lead the EI into e-lost state.
Fig. 2. Model of the two infrastructures when considering malicious attacks
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In state 3, the effects of the active deceptive attack are: i) the II looks like working while it is in a partial i-outage state due to the attack, ii)it performs some configuration changes in the EI leading it to an e-weakened state without informing the operator, for whom the EI appears as if it were working. Accumulation of configuration changes by the II may lead the EI into a e-lost state. The difference between states 2 and 3 is that in state 2 the operator has made some actions on the EI, while in state 3 the operator is not aware of the actions performed by the II on the EI. After detection of the attack, the apparent states of the infrastructures become identical to the real ones (state 4), in which i-restoration and e-configuration restoration are necessary to bring back the infrastructures to their working states. States 5, 6 and 7 are very similar respectively to states 5, 6 and 7 of Fig. 1, except that in state 6 the II is in a partial i-outage state following a perceptible attack in Fig. 2 and following a signaled i-failure in Fig. 1. State 8 corresponds to e-lost state but the operator is not aware, he has been informed wrongly by the partial i-outage of II that it is in a partial e-outage state. 2.3
Global Conceptual Model
The global abstract model, taking into account both accidental failures and malicious attacks, results from the superposition of the two models. In [4], a unified model is presented. In this paper we have presented the separate models for sake of simplicity. Our aim is to illustrate how to join the abstract modeling level to detailed models allowing dependability quantification.
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Detailed Models of Scenarios
The high level abstract models show typical failure scenarios and the combined states of the infrastructures as resulting from their interdependencies. The evaluation of quantitative dependability measures based on these models requires the specification of the probability distributions associated with the transitions of the abstract models. As these transitions result from the occurrence of several elementary events affecting the components of the infrastructures, the development of more detailed models highlighting these events and taking into account the internal behavior of the infrastructures should help to identify representative probability distributions. States in Fig. 1 and 2 are in reality macro states gathering a set of elementary states of the infrastructures in which the service delivered is equivalent. Let us for example consider the transition from state 1 to state 4 in Fig. 1. This transition takes place only when the accumulation of elementary events result in a significant degradation of the service delivered by EI, leading it to an “e-weakened state”. Quantification of dependability measures requires to model the underlying systems behavior. A measure of dependability could be for example the distribution of the time to reach state 4 from state 1, either directly or through states
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2 and 3, i.e., the distribution of the time to a signaled failure (Fig. 1), or the distribution of the time to a perceptible attack (Fig. 2). In this section, we show a simple example of a detailed model allowing the evaluation of this distribution. We will describe the underlying system and its associated models and show the relationship between the detailed and the highlevel abstract model. 3.1
A More Detailed Model of a Simple Scenario
The system considered is described in [2] and it is illustrated in Fig. 3. It represents the teleoperation function performed between a Control Centre (CC) and a SubStation (SS), by means of a communication network. We suppose that the communication between the sites is performed in the following way: the CC sends requests to the SS to obtain the execution of a command by the SS (e.g., arming), or to retrieve data from the SS (signals, measures, etc.). The SS replies to the CC by acknowledging the command execution, or by sending the required data. Each communication needs a minimum level of available bandwidth to be completed. In this context we consider two types of i-failures, bringing the system from state 1 to state 4 of Figs 1 and 2 models, respectively. 1. A signaled i-failure of the CC that can occur in the two following cases: the TELECONTROL devices (ATS or ATS Web Server) are not available or the communication inside the CC is not available due to the failure of either Local Area Network (LAN, Firewall and Router). 2. A perceptible denial of service (DoS) attack to the communication network. Such attack consists of sending a high number of packets on the communication network, with the effect of reducing the available bandwidth and causing excessive delay or loss of packets between CC and SS. A DoS attack may last for a random period of time, and it may be blocked by the success of a countermeasure (firewalling, traffic monitoring, etc.).
Fig. 3. Architecture of the EI and II considered for the example
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Description of the Model
For modeling the above scenario we use a multi-formalism combining the Stochastic Well-formed Net (SWN) [1] and Fault Tree (FT) [7] formalisms. In particular, the multi-formalism model is composed by two submodels: an SWN model and an FT model. The first is an SWN model (Fig. 4), which represents the exchange of requests and replies between the CC and the SS by means of the communication network, and the possibility of the occurrence of a DoS attack on the same network. Instead the second one, a FT model (Fig. 5), represents the failure mode of the CC. The SWN is an High Level Stochastic Petri Net formalism. Places (circles) containing tokens (which in HLPN can carry information) represent the state, while transitions (boxes) represent state changes whose preconditions and effects are represented by arcs. Transition firing times are random variables. The fact that tokens can carry information make the model parametric: e.g. each message can have a distinct identifier, moreover the model can be easily extended to represent several SS. Finally, SWN models can be studied through very efficient analysis techniques exploiting the presence of symmetries in the model. SWN model description. The SWN model is shown in Fig. 4 where the dashed boxes represent the CC, the SS and the attacker respectively. The transition CC send models the generation of a request to be sent to the SS, by putting a token inside the place CC buf f er out and inside the place Commands describing the requests to be sent on the network, and the requests waiting for a reply, respectively. The bandwidth is modeled by a set of tokens inside the place Bandwidth; each time a request has to be sent (a token is present in CC buf f er out), the marking of Bandwidth is reduced by one for modeling the reduction of bandwidth due to the transmission (transition CC transmit). When the transition CC transmit fires, the token representing the request is moved from the place CC out to the place SS buf f er in, in order to model the receipt of the request by the SS. Moreover, the firing of CC transmit determines the increase of the marking of the place Bandwidth, in order to model the fact that more bandwidth is now available. The requests to be processed by the SS are represented by tokens inside the place SS buf f er in. The processing is modeled by the transition process. The replies are represented by tokens put inside the place SS buf f er out; their transmission is represented by the transition SS transmit; as in the case of the requests, the transmission of replies determines a temporary decrease of the marking of the place Bandwidth. Once the reply is received by the CC (token inside the place CC buf f er in), the corresponding pending request is removed from the place Commands. The failure event of the CC is modeled by transition CC f ail: its firing time distribution is given by the FT. The firing of such transition leads to the marking of the place CC f ailed modeling the state of failure. The marking of CC f ailed causes the inhibition of the transition CC send. The attacker state is modeled by the places Idle and Active; the initial state is idle, but it can turn to active after the firing of the transition Begin attack.
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In the active state, the attacker generates packets (transition AT send) to be transmitted on the communication network (transition AT transmit). As in the case of the transmission of requests and replies, the transmission of the attacker packets determines the reduction of the marking of the place Bandwidth. The complete unavailability of the bandwidth (the success of the DoS attack) is modeled by the place DoS becoming marked when no tokens are present in the place Bandwidth. The state of the attacker can turn back to idle if the transition End attack fires representing the discovery of the attack by some countermeasure. The loss of replies is modeled by the timed transition Delay: if a token (pending request) stays inside the place Commands for a long time (the corresponding reply has not been received during that time), the transition Delay may fire leading to the marking of the place P acket loss modeling the loss of a reply. Moreover, transition RT removes a token from the place P acket loss. Finally the transitions perceptible attack, signaled failure, recovery and recovery1, and the places af terP A and af terSF are used for mapping this model on the abstract model (Sect. 2), as we will describe in details in the next section. FT model description. Fig. 5 shows the FT model representing the failure mode of the CC. Such failure is represented by the top event called CONTROL CENTRE. Such event is the output of an OR gate whose inputs are the event TELECONTROL and NETWORK ; therefore, the top event (the CC failure) occurs if the telecontrol function or CC network fails. The event T ELECON T ROL represents the failure of the telecontrol devices; such event is the output of an OR gate having AT S and AT S W EB SERV ER as input events. Therefore the event T ELECON T ROL is caused by the failure of the AT S or by the failure of ATS WEB SERVER. Finally the N ET W ORK fails if the ROU T ER, the FIREWALL or the LAN fails. 3.3
Interpretation of the Model Measures w.r.t. the Abstract Model
The abstract model introduced in Sect. 2 allows capturing at a high abstraction level the interesting interdependency phenomena. The example introduced in Sect. 3.2 can be mapped on the abstract model as follows: 1. The signaled i-failure in the CC is triggered by the firing of the transition CC f ailed whose firing time is controlled by the FT model. 2.The perceptible attack corresponds to a loss of responsiveness due to a DoS attack and is modeled by a transition firing activated when n commands are lost in a short period. Observe that in the model command messages (and the corresponding acknowledgments) are never actually lost, however if the acknowledgment of a transmitted command arrives later than a specified maximum amount of time, this is interpreted as a command loss. This mechanism is implemented by introducing a Delay transition, activated when a command has been sent from the CC, and working as a timeout used to record an excessive delay of the command acknowledge. When Delay fires, another timeout starts to count, which is used to forget about command/acknowledge losses after a certain time since their occurrence. If the model manages to accumulate enough (n) command
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losses before they expire, this is interpreted as an indication that some misbehavior is happening which should be signaled. The connection between the detailed and abstract models can be performed in different ways: the first option is to define a correspondence among states: so for example we could say that all states with at least one token in place af terP A or in place af terSF correspond to state 4 while all states where these two places are not marked correspond to state 1. So to compute the distribution of the time required to reach abstract state 4 from abstract state 1 can be performed on the detailed model by simply making the states with m(af terP A)+m(af terSF ) > 0 as absorbing and computing on the model the distribution of the time to absorption. If we consider also the possibility of restoration (which for the moment is represented in the detailed model as two simple ”reset” transitions, called recovery and recovery1, which bring the whole net back to the initial state), then we can also compute steady state behavior measures, e.g., the probability of being in state 1 or 4. The alternative way to couple the two models is by making a correspondence between the transitions: in this example this is particularly simple because transitions ”Signaled failure” and ”Perceptible attack” (as well as “recovery” and“recovery1”) can be directly put in correspondence with the homonymous transitions in the abstract model: in this case the mapping among the states is indirect (but can be made explicit by adding some “implicit places” in the detailed model representing the abstract model states and connect them to the matching transitions). Finally, in order to compute performance measures it is necessary to associate a firing delay probability distribution with every timed transition in the detailed model. These firing delay probability distributions can be deduced from experimental data obtained both by real system behavior observation and by testbed simulation. After that, if all these distributions can be expressed by negative exponential distributions then the system performance measures can be computed by numerical analysis, else by simulation.
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Conclusion and Perspective
This paper presented a dependability modeling approach that takes into account interdependencies related failures affecting electrical infrastructures and associated information infrastructures supporting e.g., management, control and monitoring activities. Two abstraction levels are considered. At the highest level, each infrastructure is modeled globally as a black box and the proposed models identify cascading and escalating related failure scenarios and corresponding service restoration actions resulting from accidental failures or malicious attacks. The failure scenarios highlighted at this abstraction level result from the occurrence and propagation of elementary events originating from the subsystems and components of the infrastructures. The development of detailed models taking into account the structure and the internal behaviour of the infrastructures is useful to link the elementary failure events to the high level scenarios of cascading and escalating failures. Also,
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the detailed models can contribute to the definition of the probability distributions to be associated with the transitions in the high level abstract model to evaluate quantitative measures characterizing the impact of interdependencies with regards to the occurrence of blackouts. One of the critical issues that need to be addressed in this context is the mapping of the detailed models to the high-level abstract models. The example presented in this paper, inspired from a case study investigated in CRUTIAL, is aimed at illustrating how this mapping can be achieved and how the effects of accidental and malicious failures can be analyzed together. So far we have considered simple scenarios. More complex detailed models are currently investigated, taking into account the main subsystems and components of both the electrical and the information infrastructures. Two other possible directions of future work are: (1) the compositional construction of the higher abstraction level models from submodels of the two infrastructures highlighting the cause-effect relations between events: this can be done either using automata or using Petri Nets (the latter choice would also ease the successive composition with lower level PN models), (2) adding a further level of detail (typically corresponding to accurate simulation models) from which the quantitative parameters of the intermediate level models can be deduced when direct measures from true systems are not available. Acknowledgment. This work is partially funded by the European Commission through the CRUTIAL project. All our thanks to Jean Claude Laprie who developed the main concepts behind the abstract model of interdependencies used in this paper.
References 1. Chiola, G., Dutheillet, C., Franceschinis, G., Haddad, S.: Stochastic well-formed coloured nets for symmetric modelling applications. IEEE Transactions on Computers 42(11), 1343–1360 (1993) 2. Garonne, F., et al.: Analysis of new control applications. Crutial Deliverable D2 (2007), http://crutial.cesiricerca.it/Dissemination 3. Kaˆ aniche, M., et al.: Methodologies Synthesis. Crutial Deliverable D3 (2007), http://crutial.cesiricerca.it/Dissemination 4. Kaˆ aniche, M., et al.: Preliminary modelling framework. Crutial Deliverable D8 (2008), http://crutial.cesiricerca.it/Dissemination 5. Laprie, J.-C., Kanoun, K., Kaˆ aniche, M.: Modelling interdependencies between the electricity and information infrastructures. In: Saglietti, F., Oster, N. (eds.) SAFECOMP 2007. LNCS, vol. 4680, pp. 54–67. Springer, Heidelberg (2007) 6. Rinaldi, S.M., Peerenboom, J.P., Kelly, T.K.: Identifying, understanding, and analyzing critical infrastructure interdependencies. IEEE Control Systems Magazine 42(11), 11–25 (2001) 7. Schneeweiss, W.G.: The Fault Tree Method. LiLoLe Verlag (1999)
Interdependency Analysis in Electric Power Systems Silvano Chiaradonna1, Felicita Di Giandomenico1, and Paolo Lollini2 1
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Italian National Research Council, ISTI Dept., via Moruzzi 1, I-56124, Pisa, Italy {chiaradonna,digiandomenico}@isti.cnr.it Universit`a degli Studi di Firenze, Dip. Sistemi e Informatica, viale Morgagni 65, I-50134, Firenze, Italy [email protected]
Abstract. Electric Power Systems (EPS) are composed by two interdependent infrastructures: Electric Infrastructure (EI) and its Information-Technology based Control System (ITCS), which controls and manages EI. In this paper we address the interdependency analysis in EPS focusing on the cyber interdependencies between ITCS and EI, aiming to evaluate their impact on blackouts-related indicators. The obtained results contribute to better understand the EPS vulnerabilities, and are expected to provide useful guidelines towards enhanced design choices for EPS protection at architectural level.
1 Introduction Nowadays, public health, economy, security and quality of life heavily depend on the resiliency of a number of critical infrastructures, including energy, telecommunications, transportation, emergency services and many others. The technological advances and the necessity for improved efficiency resulted in increasingly automated and interlinked infrastructures, with consequences on increased vulnerabilities to accidental and human-made faults. Modeling the interdependencies among such interlinked infrastructures and assessing interdependencies impacts on the ability of the system to provide resilient and secure services are of primarily importance. Following this analysis, steps can be taken to mitigate the identified vulnerabilities. Critical infrastructure protection is therefore a priority for most of the countries, and several initiatives are in place to identify open issues and research viable solutions in this highly challenging area, especially to identify vulnerabilities and devise survivability enhancements on critical areas. An overview of relevant current initiatives in this field is provided in [1]. Among such initiatives, the European project CRUTIAL [5] addresses new networked systems based on Information and Communication Technology for the management of the electric power grid, in which artefacts controlling the physical process of electricity transportation need to be connected with information infrastructures, through corporate networks (intra-nets), which are in turn connected to the Internet. A major research line of the project focuses on the development of a model-based methodology for the dependability and security analysis of the power grid information infrastructures. One of the approaches pursued in CRUTIAL is a model-based quantitative support for the analysis and evaluation of critical scenarios in EPS. An overview of the developed quantitative modeling framework is in [3,1]. It is based on generic models capturing structural R. Setola and S. Geretshuber (Eds.): CRITIS 2008, LNCS 5508, pp. 60–71, 2009. c Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009
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and behavioral aspects of the two involved infrastructures: the electric infrastructure, EI, and the information-technology based control systems (ITCS). The novelty with respect to traditional analyses of EPS systems is that the framework explicitly takes into account the various forms of interactions which are the vehicles through which failures are propagated to possibly end up with cascading, escalating and common-mode outages. As a follow up of these previous studies, the contribution of this paper consists in the application of the developed modeling framework to a case study in the electric power system under different system conditions. The goal is to show the practical usage of the framework in assessing quantitative values for user-oriented measures in the electric field and to highlight some of the potentialities of the framework in analyzing the various aspects involved in the complex relationships between EI and ITCS in EPS. The obtained results are useful in getting insights and to understand the interplay of failure phenomena and critical system functions (like repair of failed components/subsystems), so to derive useful guidelines towards configurations enhancing resiliency and survivability. The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the logical structure of the electric power system instance we have considered in our study. The next Section 3 focuses on the failures of the information control infrastructure and their consequences on the controlled electric infrastructure. The overall model of the considered EPS instance is sketched in Section 4. The analyzed case study, in terms of electric grid topology, the varying system conditions as well as the measures of interest is introduced in the next Section 5. The results of the numerical evaluation are discussed in Section 6. Finally, conclusions are summarized in Section 7.
2 The Analyzed EPS Instance The logical structure of the analyzed EPS instance is depicted in Figure 1. For the sake of simplicity, the proposed EPS instance is limited to a homogeneous region of the transmission grid and to the corresponding regional control system. In the bottom part of Figure 1 we can see the main elements that constitute the overall electric infrastructure, and thus in particular a region of the transmission power grid: generators (NG components), substations (NS components), loads (NL components) and power lines (AL components, which also logically include breakers and protections connected to the power lines). The energy produced by the generators is adapted by transformers, to be conveyed with minimal dispersion, to the different types of end users (loads), through different power grids. The power lines are components that physically connect the substations with the power plants and the final users, and the substations are structured components in which the electric power is transformed and split over several lines. In the substations there are transformers and several kinds of connection components (like bus-bars, protections and breakers). Information-Technology based Control System (ITCS) implements the information control system managing the electrical grid. Among the several logical components composing ITCS (all detailed in [3]), here we focus the attention on the tele-operation system for a region of the transmission grid (named T T OS), since its failure can affect a large portion of the grid, also leading to black-out phenomena. In the upper part of
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Figure 1 we have depicted a possible logical structure of a regional ITCS, i.e., the part of the information control system controlling and operating on a region of the transmission grid. The components LCS (Local Control System) and RT S (Regional Tele-control System) differ for their criticality and for the locality of their decisions, and they can exchange grid status information and control data over a (public or private) network (ComNet component). LCS guarantees the correct operation of a node equipment and reconfigures the node in case of breakdown of some apparatus. It includes the acquisition and control equipment (sensors and actuators). RT S monitors its assigned region in order to diagnose faults on the power lines. In case of breakdowns, it chooses the most suitable corrective actions to restore the functionality of the grid. Since RT S is not directly connected to the substations, the corrective actions to adopt are put in operation through the pertinent LCS. 2.1 RTS/LCS Reconfiguration Strategies, and EI Autoevolution The main operations performed by ITCS on EI are to control its correct functioning and to activate proper reconfigurations in case of failure of, or integration of, repaired/new EI components. Such operations are not considered in detail but they are abstracted at two levels, on the basis of the locality of the EI state considered by ITCS to decide on proper reactions to disruptions (the same approach adopted in [4]). Each level is characterized by an activation condition (that specifies the events that enable the ITCS reaction), a reaction delay (representing the overall computation and application time needed by ITCS to apply a reconfiguration) and a reconfiguration strategy (RS), based on generation re-dispatch and/or load shedding. The reconfiguration strategy RS defines how the configuration of EI changes when ITCS reacts to a failure. For each level, a different reconfiguration function is considered:
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– RS1 (), to represent the effect on the regional transmission grid of the reactions of ITCS to an event that has compromised the electrical equilibrium1 of EI, when only the state local to the affected EI components is considered. Given the limited information necessary to issue its output, RS1 () is deemed to be local and fast in providing its reaction. RS1 () is performed by LCS components when they locally detect that there is no (electrical) equilibrium. – RS2 (), to represent the effect on the regional transmission grid of the reactions of ITCS to an event that has compromised the electrical equilibrium of EI, when the state global to all the EI system under the control of ITCS is considered. Therefore, differently from RS1 (), RS2 () is deemed to be global and slower in providing its reaction. When new events occur changing the status of EI during the evaluation of RS2 (), then the evaluation of RS2 () is restarted based on the new topology generated by such events. RS2 () is performed by RTS. The activation condition, the reaction delay and the definition of the functions RS1 () and RS2 () depend on the policies and algorithms adopted by T T OS. An autoevolution function AS() is also considered to represent automatic evolution of EI each time an event modifying the grid topology occurs. In this case, EI tries to find a new electrical equilibrium for the new grid topology, by changing the values of the power flow through the lines but leaving the generated and consumed power unchanged (only redirection of current flows). The new equilibrium is reached instantaneously (if any) and no ITCS actions are performed. Otherwise, LCS and RT S operations, i.e. RS1 () and RS2 () respectively, are triggered. 2.2 About RS1 (), RS2 () and AS() Implementation Some simplifying assumptions have been made to represent the power flow through the transmission grid, following the same approach used in [4,5,6,7]. Therefore, the state and the evolution of the transmission grid are described by the active power flow F on the lines and the active power P at the nodes (generators, loads or substations), which satisfy linear equations for a direct current (DC) load flow approximation of the AC system. In the considered instance, the output values of AS() for active power flow F on the power lines are derived by solving a linear power flow equation system for fixed values of P. The output values of RS1 () and RS2 () for P and F are derived considering that for a given power demand, the power flow equations do not have a unique solution. The adopted definition for the function RS1 () is given by the solution (values for P and F) of power flow equations while minimizing a simple cost function, indicating the cost incurred in having loads not satisfied and having the generators producing more power. The output values of RS2 () for P and F are derived by solving an optimization problem to minimize the change in generation or load shedding, considering more sophisticated system constraints, as described in [4]. The reconfiguration strategy RS1 () is applied immediately, while RS2 () is applied after a time needed to RT S to evaluate it. All these 1
Events that impact on the electrical equilibrium are typically an EI component’s failure or the insertion of a new/repaired EI component; for simplicity, in the following we will mainly refer to failures.
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functions are based on the state of EI at the time immediately before the occurrence of the failure.
3 Cyber Interdependencies An interdependency is a bidirectional relationship between two infrastructures through which the state of each infrastructure influences or is correlated to the state of the other. Among the several types of interdependencies identified in [8], our interest is on the cyber interdependencies, which in general occur when the state of an infrastructure depends on information transmitted through the information infrastructure the former has relation with. In our context, EI requires information transmitted and delivered by ITCS, for example when RTS triggers a grid reconfiguration (RS2 ()); therefore the state of EI depends on the outputs of ITCS. Cyber interdependencies are especially critical considering the possible ITCS failures that may impact on the state of EI, depending on the logical components affected by the failures, and obviously on the type of the failures. For example, consequences of a failure of the component LCS associated to an EI component NG , NS or NL can be: Omission failure of LCS, fail silent LCS. No (reconfiguration) actions are performed on the associated EI component. Time failure of LCS. The above (reconfiguration) actions are performed after a certain delay (or before the instant of time they are required). Value failure of LCS. It is performed an incorrect closing (or opening) of the power lines directly connected to the associated component, or an incorrect variation of the power produced by the associated generator. Failures of the components LCS can also impact on the input values that the component RT S receives from LCS. These values can be omitted, delayed (or anticipated) or erroneous. Since reconfigurations required by RT S are actuated by the associated components LCS, a failure of a component LCS can also impact on the reconfigurations required by RT S. The failure of the component RT S corresponds to an erroneous (request of) reconfiguration of the state of EI (including an unneeded reconfiguration) affecting one or more components of the controlled region. The effect of the failure of RT S on a component N is the same as the failure of the component LCS associated to the component N. In the case of Byzantine failure these effects can be different for each component N. In general, the failure of the components LCS and RT S may depend on the failures of the network connecting them.
4 The Overall SAN Model for the Analyzed EPS Instance The body of the modeling framework has been already introduced in [3], where the authors also discussed the feasibility of the proposed framework using M¨obius [9], a powerful multi-formalism/multi-solution tool, and presented the implementation of a few basic modeling mechanisms adopting the Stochastic Activity Network (SAN) formalism [10], which is a generalization of the Stochastic Petri Nets formalism.
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In this section we show the composed SAN model representing the overall considered EPS instance. The following atomic models have been identified as building blocks to generate the overall EPS model: – PL SAN, which represents the generic power line with the connected transformers. – PR1 SAN and PR2 SAN, which represent the generic protections and the breakers connected to the two extremities of the power line. – N SAN and LCS SAN, which represent, respectively, a node of the grid (a generator, a load or a substation) and the associated Local Control System (see Figure 1). – AUTOEV SAN and RS SAN, which represent, respectively, the automatic evolution (autoevolution) of EI when an event modifying its state occurs, and the local reconfiguration strategy applied by LCS (function RS1 ()). – RTS SAN and COMNET SAN, which represent, respectively, the Regional Telecontrol System RTS, where the regional reconfiguration strategy RS2 () is modeled, and the public or private networks (ComNet of Figure 1). In Figure 2, it is shown how the atomic models are composed and replicated to obtain the composed model representing the EPS region.
Fig. 2. Composed model for an EPS region
The model AL represents a power line with the associated protections and it corresponds to AL logical component of Figure 1. This model is then replicated to obtain all the necessary non anonymous AL components of the grid. The model N LCS is obtained by composing the atomic models N SAN and LCS SAN. Then the model is replicated to obtain all the necessary non anonymous NG , NS and NL components of the grid, with the associated LCS. The model Auto Control is obtained by composing the atomic models AUTOEV SAN and RS SAN, so it represents both the autoevolution function and the reconfiguration strategy locally applied by the LCS components. The overall EPSREG model is finally obtained through composition of the different models and it represents the EPS instance under study. The different atomic models interact with each other sharing some places (common and extended) that represent the parameters or part of the states of the EPS, like the topology of the grid, the susceptance of each line, the initial and the current power of each node of the grid, the initial and the current power flow through each line of the grid,
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the status of the propagation of a failure or a lightning, the disrupted/failed components, the open lines, etc. These models populate our modeling framework as template models, which are used to represent a large variety of specific scenarios in the EPS sector. Theoretically, all the possible EPS configurations involving (a subset of) the addressed components are representable through proper combination of the proposed models, unless some aspects have been currently not yet captured. Exercising the developed framework on several different scenarios will be useful to reveal possible aspects not included and then proceed with a refinement.
5 Analyzed Power Grid, Measures of Interest and Failure Scenarios The analyzed electric power grid is depicted in Figure 3. The grid is a portion of the IEEE 118 Bus Test Case2 , typically used in other studies related to EPS. The label associated to the generators represents the initial (active) power and the maximum power that a generator can supply (“Pi /Pimax ”). The label associated to the loads represents the power demand of a load (“Pi ”). The label associated to the lines represents the initial power flow through the line and the susceptance3 (“Fi j (bi j )”). We suppose that each line can carry the same maximum power flow (Fimax = 620 MW for each i, j). In the j initial grid setting all the ratios Pi /Pimax are equal to a fixed value α = 0.85, called the power grid stress level. By varying α , other EI settings are automatically determined. The measure of interest we consider is PUD (t,t + 1), defined as the percentage of the mean power demand that is not met in the interval [t,t + 1] (the symbol ’UD’ stands for ’Unsatisfied Demand’). It is a user-oriented measure of the blackout size and can be obtained as the load shed (i.e., the not served power due to a load shedding) divided by the power demand. In this paper we aim to assess the impact of cyber interdependencies on the defined black-out related indicator. Among the possible interdependencies (ITCS failures affecting EI) detailed in Section 3, in this paper we evaluate the impact on PUD (t,t + 1) of the omission failure of the communication network (ComNet of Figure 1) when a simultaneous failure of a set of transmission lines occurred. This is a scenario inspired by those considered in the project CRUTIAL. More in detail, the EI state is initially set as depicted in Figure 3, and it is in electrical equilibrium. At time zero we suppose that nLF power lines are simultaneously affected by a permanent disruption (e.g., due to a tree fall or a terrorist attack), thus becoming unavailable. The power lines that fail are randomly (uniformly) selected from the set of all available power lines. The repair time of the failed power lines is fixed to 24 hours. At the same time zero, the communication network ComNet connecting the LCS components to RTS is simultaneously affected by a denial of service (DoS) attack, thus impeding the LCS-RTS communication. Therefore, during a DoS attack, the reconfiguration strategy RS1 () can be applied at any time, while the reconfiguration strategy RS2 () cannot be applied. The DoS attack ends after 2 3
http://www.ee.washington.edu/research/pstca/pf118/pg tca118bus.htm The susceptance is used to determine the values for the power flow through the lines.
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an exponentially distributed time with mean MT T RCNET , and from that time RTS can start computing the RS2 () reconfiguration action that will be applied after 10 minutes. The considered distributions and values for failure, repair and reconfiguration processes do not refer to any specific real case; they are hypothetical but plausible ones and are used just for showing the potentialities of our analysis method. However, to take into consideration to some extent variations of assumed settings, we performed a sensitivity analysis on the following parameters: – MT T RCNET , thus varying the duration of the DoS attack affecting the communication network. If MT T RCNET → ∞, then we are modeling a RTS omission failure. – nLF , thus varying the severity of the overall EI failure. – α , thus varying the initial stress level of the power grid.
6 Numerical Evaluations and Analysis of the Results In this section we present some of the results that we obtained through the solution of the overall model previously sketched. A transient analysis has been performed, using the simulator provided by the M¨obius tool [9]. For each study we executed a minimum of 2000 simulation runs (batches), and we set the relative confidence interval to 0.1 and the confidence level to 0.95. This means that the stopping criteria will not be satisfied until the confidence interval is within 10% of the mean estimate in 95% of the times.
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In Figure 4 we show the PUD (t,t + 1) variations as a function of time t (hours) for different durations of the DoS attack (exponentially distributed with mean MT T RCNET = 6 or 24 hours), for a different number of simultaneous power line disruptions (nLF = 1 or 2) and for different initial stress levels (α = 0.85 or 0.95). We note that the failure of even a single random power line at time zero produces an immediate increment of PUD (t,t + 1) greater than 2%. For α = 0.95, the values of PUD (t,t + 1) increase rapidly over time until the reconfiguration strategy RS2 () is applied (i.e., 10 min. after the DoS
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attack ends). This is the effect of the cascading failures of the overloaded lines and of the too big variation of power demand to generators in a small interval of time. In fact, with a high value of the power grid stress α = 0.95, the autoevolution function AS() or the reconfiguration strategy RS1 () triggered by the failure of even a single power line can produce overload of lines or stress of generators. On the contrary, with the lower stress level α = 0.85, the failure of only one power line leads EI to reach a stable state that does not need a RTS reconfiguration (no shedding operations are needed), and PUD (t,t + 1) remains constant in the interval [0, 24]. At t = 24 hours there is a big improvement due to the repair of the failed power lines and then the nominal conditions in the system are restored, with the consequent full satisfaction of the power demand after some time. It is worthwhile to note that the impact of the system stress level α is less heavy on the percentage of unsatisfied demand than the failure of power lines: e.g., the curve with α = 0.95 and nLF = 1 is better than the one with α = 0.85 and nLF = 2. Figure 5 shows how PUD (t,t + 1) varies as a function of time t (hours) for different durations of the DoS attack (MT T RCNET = 6 or 24 hours) and for a different number of simultaneous power line disruptions (nLF = 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5), fixing α = 0.95. As expected, PUD (t,t + 1) increases considering higher nLF values, and fixing the value for nLF , PUD (t,t + 1) gets worse in the case in which the DoS attack has a longer duration (24 hours). In fact, if MT T RCNET = 6 hours, RTS can earlier apply the RS2 () reconfiguration action (on average, after 6 hours and 10 min.), and then EI moves into a state less degraded than the state in which EI would be without considering the RTS reconfiguration. After 24 hours the disrupted power lines are repaired, and consequently PUD(t,t + 1) rapidly decreases until reaching the zero value, since the original EI grid configuration (with all the loads satisfied) has been restored. The usefulness of applying the RTS reconfiguration can be really appreciated comparing all the plots with the first one, representing the case in which no RTS reconfiguration is performed (RTS omission failure).
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In both Figures 4 and 5 we have provided mean values for the percentage of unsatisfied power demand in an interval [t,t + 1] for different values of t. In Figure 6 we show the discrete probability distribution function (PDF) of PUD (t,t + 1) for different values of t = 0, 5, 6, 23, 24 hours, fixing α = 0.95, nLF = 1 and MT T RCNET = 24 hours. Analyzing the corresponding plot in Figure 4 we see that the mean value of the percentage of the non delivered power in the interval [0, 1] (first hour) is PUD (0, 1) ≈ 2.5%. Analyzing its complete distribution in Figure 6, for t = 0, we note that: i) with a very high probability 0.9 the percentage of undelivered power is equal to zero; ii) PUD (0, 1) is in the interval (0, 10]% with a probability of about 0.03, and it is in the interval (40, 50]% with a probability of about 0.06; iii) all the other probabilities are almost zero. A mean loss of 40-50% of delivered power in the first hour of the system can happen, for example, when the power line affected by the failure is directly connected to a generator. The other plots with t = 5, 6, 23, 24 hours have similar trends.
7 Conclusions This work has addressed the modeling of electric power systems and a quantitative assessment of the impact of failures through interdependencies between the cyber control infrastructure and the controlled electric grid. Reporting from the activity carried on in the European CRUTIAL project and inspired by the failure scenarios there identified as critical ones, we have modeled an instance of EPS made up of a regional teleoperation system and the local control systems connected to it. Simulation analyses have been performed on a portion of the IEEE 118 Bus Test Case, to evaluate the user perceived degradation of the power demand satisfaction under varying failures and system conditions. Although the shown analyses exploit only partially the potentialities of the referred modeling evaluation framework, the obtained results allow to understand some relevant dynamics in failures propagation and their impact through infrastructures interdependencies. Such insights can be usefully exploited towards proper system configurations enhancing resiliency and survivability. For example, the EPS analysis under different stress levels is useful to find a proper configuration of the power grid so to limit the power lines overloading in case of failures. Also, understanding the effect of repair times of the communication network allows to better calibrate repair operations to enhance system availability. Future work includes an extension of the evaluation campaign by introducing other patterns of components failures, as well as enriching the set of measures of interest for the analyses. Currently, we are conducting evaluations to identify the most critical power lines for a given topology; this analysis allows to understand which power lines are especially critical and need to be protected most.
Acknowledgment This work has been partially supported by the European Community through the IST Project CRUTIAL [2] (Contract n. 027513).
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References 1. Chiaradonna, S., Di Giandomenico, F., Lollini, P.: Evaluation of critical infrastructures: Challenges and viable approaches. In: De Lemos, R., Di Giandomenico, F., Gacek, C., Muccini, H., Vieira, M. (eds.) Architecting Dependable Systems V. LNCS, vol. 5135, pp. 52–77. Springer, Heidelberg (2008) 2. CRUTIAL: European Project CRUTIAL - critical utility infrastructural resilience (contract n. 027513), http://crutial.cesiricerca.it 3. Chiaradonna, S., Lollini, P., Di Giandomenico, F.: On a modeling framework for the analysis of interdependencies in electric power systems. In: IEEE/IFIP 37th Int. Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN 2007), Edinburgh, UK, June 2007, pp. 185–195 (2007) 4. Romani, F., Chiaradonna, S., Di Giandomenico, F., Simoncini, L.: Simulation models and implementation of a simulator for the performability analysis of electric power systems considering interdependencies. In: 10th IEEE High Assurance Systems Engineering Symposium (HASE 2007), pp. 305–312 (2007) 5. Dobson, I., Carreras, B.A., Lynch, V., Newman, D.E.: An initial model for complex dynamics in electric power system blackouts. In: 34th Hawaii Int. Conference on System Sciences (CDROM), Maui, Hawaii, 9 page. IEEE, Los Alamitos (2001) 6. Chen, J., Thorp, J.S., Dobson, I.: Cascading dynamics and mitigation assessment in power system disturbances via a hidden failure model. Electrical Power and Energy Systems 27(4), 318–326 (2005) 7. Anghel, M., Werley, K.A., Motter, A.E.: Stochastic model for power grid dynamics. In: 40th Hawaii Int. Conference on System Sciences (CD-ROM), Waikoloa, Big Island, Hawaii, pp. 113–122. IEEE, Los Alamitos (2007) 8. Rinaldi, S.M., Peerenboom, J.P., Kelly, T.K.: Identifying, understanding, and analyzing critical infrastructure interdependencies. IEEE Control Systems Magazine, 11–25 (December 2001) 9. Daly, D., Deavours, D.D., Doyle, J.M., Webster, P.G., Sanders, W.H.: M¨obius: An extensible tool for performance and dependability modeling. In: Haverkort, B.R., Bohnenkamp, H.C., Smith, C.U. (eds.) TOOLS 2000. LNCS, vol. 1786, pp. 332–336. Springer, Heidelberg (2000) 10. Sanders, W.H., Meyer, J.F.: Stochastic activity networks: Formal definitions and concepts. In: Brinksma, E., Hermanns, H., Katoen, J.-P. (eds.) FMPA 2000. LNCS, vol. 2090, pp. 315– 343. Springer, Heidelberg (2001)
Modeling and Simulation of Complex Interdependent Systems: A Federated Agent-Based Approach Emiliano Casalicchio, Emanuele Galli, and Salvatore Tucci University of Roma - Tor Vergata, Roma 00133, Italy {emiliano.casalicchio,tucci}@uniroma2.it, [email protected]
Abstract. Critical Interdependent Infrastructures are complex interdependent systems, that if damaged or disrupted can seriously compromise the welfare of our society. This research, part of the CRESCO project, faces the problem of interdependent critical infrastructures modeling and simulation proposing an agent-based solution. The approach we put forward, named Federated ABMS, relies on discrete agent-based modeling and simulation and federated simulation. Federated ABMS provides a formalism to model compound complex systems, composed of interacting systems, as federation of interacting agents and sector specific simulation models. This paper describes the formal model as well it outlines the steps that characterize the Federated ABMS methodology, here applied to a target system, composed of a communication network and of a power grid. Moreover we conclude the paper with a thorough discussion of implementation issues.
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Introduction
Many researches on Critical Infrastructure Protection are committed to solve the challenging problem of interdependencies modeling and analysis or more in general of modeling and simulation of critical interdependent infrastructures. While some research results are based on mathematical models [15,12,2,11,16,20], other solutions rely on discrete simulation (see [1] for an extended survey) and discrete agent-based simulation [10,17,3,18] and SimCIP (http://www.irriis.org). This research, part of the CRESCO project, faces the problem of modeling and simulation of interdependent critical infrastructures proposing an approach based on discrete agent-based modeling and simulation and federated simulation (Federated Agent-based Modeling and Simulation - Federated ABMS). The idea behind Federated ABMS is the following. A compound complex system, composed of interacting complex systems, can be modeled as a set of interacting agents. The behavior of each agent is modeled by a sector-specific model. Then, the whole model for the compound complex system is obtained federating the agent-based models and the sector specific models. The abstraction introduced by Federated ABMS relieves the modeler of the details of the complex system models (viewed as a black-box), allowing to concentrate her/his R. Setola and S. Geretshuber (Eds.): CRITIS 2008, LNCS 5508, pp. 72–83, 2009. c Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009
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attention on the modeling of the compound complex system and on interdependencies modeling. Another advantage of Federated ABMS is the possibility to simulate with greater detail the agent behavior re-using sector specific simulation models. The concept of Federated ABMS was previously introduced in [9] where the authors mainly discuss simulation and implementation issues and present preliminary results without going into the details of the agent model, and without providing details of the interdependencies model. As mentioned before, in the literature there are different research projects that propose agent-based modeling and simulation techniques to study critical interdependent infrastructures, or that aim at integrating existing simulation models to study the behavior of complex interdependent systems. In [10] the authors describe CIMS, an agent-based simulation framework to study Critical Interdependent Infrastructures. The paper does not give details on how the agent-based modeling techniques were applied. In [17] the authors propose a Critical Infrastructure simulation framework that relies on agents but they do not address the problem of how to model the detailed behavior of complex infrastructures. In [3] the authors propose an agent based simulation model of critical infrastructures. In the paper there are neither details on the interdependencies model nor on implementation aspects of the simulation framework. In [8] the authors investigate how to use agent-based modeling and simulation and UML to study critical infrastructures interdependencies. SimCip is a simulation framework that relies on agent based micro simulation and integrate different simulation models. In [19] the authors propose different modeling and simulation study of telecom networks in case of emergencies or in disaster scenarios. This paper contributes to the literature as in the following. First of all we formalize the concept of federated agent based modeling, providing a formalism to model compound complex systems, composed of interacting systems. The introduced formalism allows: i) to abstract the functional aspects of the infrastructure behavior, modeled in greater depth re-using existing sector specific models; ii) to model direct and cyber interdependencies as service exchange among infrastructures; iii) to model geographical and logical interdependencies as infrastructure perturbations. Therefore, we outline the steps that characterize the Federated ABMS methodology, and we show how to apply the methodology to a target system composed of a communication network and of a power grid. Finally, we conclude with a thorough discussion on implementation issues. It is worth to remark that the proposed methodology is not intended as a direct support for decision makers, who need easy-to-use model composition and results visualization tools. Federated ABMS is intended as a modeling and simulation methodology for whom want to design and to implement modeling and simulation tools for decision making. The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we introduce the federated agent-based modeling formalism and methodology. In section 3 we explain how federated ABMS can be applied to a simple case study. In section 4 we discuss implementation issues about federated ABMS. Section 5 concludes the paper.
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Agent-Based Modeling of Interdependent Complex Systems
As shown in many research works, agents can be used to model interdependent complex systems (e.g. [13]). A general definition of agent is the following [4]: Definition 1. An agent is an entity with a location, capabilities and memory. The entity location defines where it is in a physical space ... What the entity can perform is defined by its capabilities ... the experience history (for example, overuse or aging) and data defining the entity state represent the entity’s memory. A critical infrastructure is characterized by its location, its behavior, interaction capabilities and its internal state. Then a critical infrastructure can be modeled as an autonomous agent and the system composed of interdependent critical infrastructures can be modeled as interacting agents which cooperate and/or compete to realize a common or an individual goal. 2.1
The Federated Agent-Based Model
An agent a is described by the tuple (Va , Sa , Xa ) where: a a 1. Va = {v1a , ..., vN ∈ Via and |Va | = Nva . Va is the set of the agent a }, vi v a attributes and Vi is the domain of the agent attribute i. The values assumed by the agent attributes at time t represent the state of the agent. 2. Sa = {sa1 , ..., saNsa }, |Sa | = Nsa , is the set of services that the agent a provides to other agents. In our model agents interact exchanging services. 3. Xa = {xa1 , ..., xaNxa } (|Xa | = Nxa ) is the set of inputs of the the agent a. Inputs can be services produced by other agents or perturbations. A perturbation is an unpredictable event that modifies the agent state and alters the behavior of the agent a, reducing the a’s capabilities to provide services. An input is characterized by the tuple xai = (tx , x) where x ∈ Xia is the value of the input, Xia the set of possible values for the ith input of agent a, and tx the time at which the value x is available (tx ∈, R+ or tx ∈, N+ if we consider continuous or discrete time respectivelly).
Comparing the proposed federated agent-based model with the Definition 1 we have that: 1. the agent state, memory and location are modeled by the agent attributes Va ; 2. Sa and Xa model the capability of the agent to interact with other agents providing services and consuming data or services; 3. the agent behavior, that determines how inputs are processed, how services are provided and how the agent state evolves, is modeled using a sector specific model of the complex system modeled.
Modeling and Simulation of Complex Interdependent Systems {e1,...,em, {s1} Qpg,cn pg cn o ,...,o om+p} 1 Mcn Vpg={g { 1,…,gn,pc1,…,pcn, Vcn={n1,...,nm,l1,...,lr} sc1,…sc scq,ll1,…,llr}
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Fig. 1. The federated agent-based Fig. 2. The federated agent model of a complex model interdependent system composed of the power grid (left) and of the communication network (right)
Figure 1 shows the proposed federated agent model. It is worth to note that only the agent a can interact directly with the detailed model of the complex system abstracted by a. Let us now define the relationship among agent attributes, services and inputs. The agent state Va is a function of the time and of the agent inputs Xa , and implicitly of the agent behavior (as it will be explained in the following). Assuming that the time is discrete, t ∈ N+ , and that each agent attribute via depends on a subset of the agent inputs {xaji , ..., xaji } we have: n
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In our model we assume that sai = (t, 1) if the i − th service, invoked at time t , is delivered at time t ≥ t . On the contrary, sai = (t, 0) if the service can not be delivered. In the latter case, the time t is meaningless or, depending on the specific service, it can be interpreted as the service time out. The proposed on-off model for service delivery can be extended considering that sai can be provided at different QoS levels s, 0 ≤ s ≤ 1. The QoS level s=0 means that the service is not delivered and the QoS level s=1 means that the service is delivered at the 100% of the QoS level. The last step toward the definition of a federated agent-based model is to provide a solution for (i) a model of the agent state evolution, (ii) a model of service delivery and (iii) a model of service delivery time. We address issues (i)-(iii) using a detailed model of the target complex system. The innovative idea we introduce is to consider the detailed system model as a black-box controlled by the agent model and that computes the new system state, the services delivery time and the service level. The interaction between the agent model and the detailed system model (see Figure 1) is determined as follow. The agent model requests, at the detailed system model, to compute the new system state Va on the basis of the actual agent state Va and of the services requested Sa .req. The service response and the service delivery time are computed by the detailed system model and returned in Sa .resp. In the proposed solution the agent model plays the role of the orchestrator of the simulation, while the detailed system model plays the role of a simulation component that receives, from the orchestrator, the system workload (Va , Sa .req).
2.2
Interconnecting Agents: The Interdependencies Model
Interdependencies can be classified as [15]: physical, geographical, cyber, and logical. In our model, physical and cyber interdependencies are modeled as service exchange. Moreover, the concept of perturbation allows to model geographical and logical interdependencies. In this work we concentrate our attention on cyber and physical interdependencies. Two agents a and b interact if there is at least one service provided by a that is an input for b: sai (t) = xbj (t) for some 1 ≤ i ≤ Nsa and 1 ≤ j ≤ Nxb . In this case the agent b depends on the behavior and on the services provided by a, then a and b are interdependent. If a depends on b and b on a we have cyclic interdependencies and if a and b do not interact directly but interact through a chain of agent interactions we can say that a and b are indirectly interdependent. Then the interdependencies between agents a and b are modeled by the mappings: 1 if sai = xbj Nsa ×Nxb Qa,b = {qi,j } , qi,j = (2) 0 otherwise and Mb (defined in equation 1). The mapping Qa,b defines how a and b interact, while the mapping Mb defines how b’s state is influenced by b’s inputs. In the
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same way, cyclic interdependencies can be described by four mappings Qa,b , Mb , Qb,a , Ma . 2.3
The Federated ABMS Methodology
The steps toward the definition of an federated agent-based model are the following: 1. Identification of the simulation study goals. 2. Identification of the complex systems (e.g. infrastructures) that compose the compound complex system under study. 3. For each component system identified in step 2, identify: (a) the set of variables that are representative of the system state; (b) the set of services that allow to represent the interaction of the complex system with the other component systems, with the environment and with human beings; (c) the set of perturbations and inputs that influence the component system behavior; (d) the relationship among agent inputs and agent state variable. Steps (a)-(c) should be supported by series of interviews of infrastructures experts. 4. Associate an agent a to each system identified in step 3 and define the related agent model (Va , Xa , Sa ) and Ma . Va , Xa Sa and Ma are determined in steps 3.(a)-3.(d) respectively. 5. For each agent defined in the previous step identify the sector-specific simulation model useful to simulate the infrastructure behavior. 6. Identify the system interdependencies, for example using interviews of infrastructure experts. 7. For each couple of infrastructures a and b (a = b) define the interdependencies matrix Qa,b .
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The Case Study
In the following we apply the federated agent-based methodology to a target complex system composed of an IP communication network (cn) and of a power grid (pg). We suppose that the communication network depends on the power grid, and that there are no auxiliary power mechanisms. For lack of space we concentrate our attention on the above described steps 4 and 7. The network state Vcn is represented by {n1 , ..., nm , l1 , ..., lr } where ni is a network node (router, access point, switch,...) and lj is a network link connecting two network nodes; m is the number of nodes and r the number of links. We assume that ni = 1 (li = 1) if the node (link) i works and ni = 0 (li = 0) if the node (link) i does not work. The agent inputs are Xcn = {e1 , ..., em , o1 , ...om+p } where ei models the power supply (electricity) for the network node ni and oi models an unpredictable system outage for the network node ni (link li ). ei = 0 means that the node ni
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can not be supplied by the power grid. oi = 1 means that ni (li ) has experimented an outage and it can not work. The mapping Mcn that models the dependencies of the state variables on the agents inputs is the following n1 , ..., nm , l1 , ..., lp e1 .. . em o1 .. .
Im
0p
Im+p
om+p where Im is an m × m identity matrix and 0p is a p × p null matrix. In our simplified model the relationship fcn among the agent inputs and agent state is modeled by the following function: ⎧ ⎫ ⎨ ni = 0 if (ei = 0) or ((ei = 1) and (oi = 1)), ∀t ⎬ fcn = li = 0 if oi = 1, ∀t ⎩ ⎭ ni = 1, li = 1 otherwise, ∀t The service provided by the communication network is “send a message from ni to nj ” where ni and nj are two network access point. Then our simplified network model provides only one service s with two input parameters p1 and p2 , where p1 is the source node and p2 is the destination node. s = (tR , 1) if the message is delivered at time tR (the service response time) and s = (·, 0) if the service can not be delivered because the internal state of the communication network, given by the value of {n1 , ..., nm , l1 , ..., lp }. To determine the internal state evolution of the communication network on the basis of the agent inputs and service requests we use an event-driven network simulation model implemented using OMNeT++ (http://www.omnetpp.org). Figure 2 (right) shows the connection between the agent model and the detailed network simulation model. The power grid model considers the following components: power generators (or generation plants) pg, primary cabins pc, secondary cabins sc and distributions/transmission lines d. Then the power grid state is modeled by the set of attributes Vpg = {pg1 , ...pgn , pc1 , ..., pcr , sc1 , ..., scq , d1 , ..., dz } where: pgk = 1 if the generator k work properly and gk = 0 otherwise; pck = 1 if the primary cabin k work properly and pck = 0 otherwise; sck = 1 if the secondary cabin k work properly and sck = 0 otherwise; and dk = 1 if the distribution or transmission line k work properly and dk = 0 otherwise. There are many external factors that can influence the power grid behavior, however, for simplicity, we consider only faults {y1 , ...yu }, u = n + r + q + z. If yk = (t, 1) the power grid component k will experience a fault at time t. Otherwise, if yk = (t, 0), the component k does not experiment any outage or it is repaired at time t after a fault at time t < t.
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Then we can define Mpg = {mi,j }u×u = Iu×u and vi = 1 if yi = 1, ∀t fpg = vi = 0 otherwise, ∀t where vi is a power grid component pgi , pci , sci , di . The service provided by the power grid is “provide the electricity to the secondary cabin lk ”. We assume that the load is attached directly to the secondary cabins through a bus. Then we have q services: sj = (t, 1) if the secondary cabin scj is operative at time t and sj = (·, 0) otherwise. The value of sj depends on the state of all the power grid components (generators, primary cabins and links). In the CRESCO project the power grid behavior is modeled using a load flow model (that is a time independent model). At time t the power grid simulation model receives as input Vpg and it recomputes the power flow, producing the new values for the model state Vpg . The interdependencies between the power grid and the communication network, identified in step 6, are defined by the mappings 1 if si = ej Nspg ×Nxcn Qpg,cn = {qi,j } , qi,j = 0 otherwise and by Mcn previously defined. For simplicity and for lack of space we do not model the power grid control functionalities, that is the dependency of the power grid on the communication network.
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Implementation Issues
The implementation of a federated agent-based simulation model is a challenge and there are many open issues. To mention a few: model validation, experiment reproducibility, extensibility to diverse and unforeseen scenarios, simulation scalability, implementation of agents and simulation models federations. In the following we discuss in detail the last two issues. 4.1
Implementation of Agents
In the literature the problem of discrete agent simulation is widely addressed. There are different frameworks that support agent and multi-agents simulation. Examples are RePast [14], JadeSIM [5], SIM AGENT [6]. All these approaches have their advantages and disadvantages. Distributed agents (e.g. JadeSIM) allow to design scalable simulation model, some of them are compliant with distributed simulation standard, but they introduce difficulties in designing and testing the simulation logic. Framework such as Repast do not use distributed agents, thus facilitating the design and testing of the simulation logic, but limiting the simulation scalability. However, Federated ABMS is independent from the technology used to implement agents. In our prototype we have decided to use RePast as discrete agent simulation framework.
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4.2
Federation of the Agent-Based Model(s) and Sector Specific Models
The implementation of the proposed federated agent-based simulation model requires the use of distributed simulation technologies. Distributed simulation allows to integrate together heterogeneous simulation model that can be world wide distributed or locally distributed. Moreover, distributed simulation enable the execution of huge simulations. If a distributed agents technology is used (see figure 3) we have, for each infrastructure, a federation composed of the agents model and of the sector specific simulation model (or more then one if needed). The federated agentbased simulation model is obtained federating together all the federations in a unique federation, the Critical Interdependent Infrastructures Federation. If a centralized agent-based simulation framework is used: the framework interacts with all the sector specific simulation models (see figure 4), while the agents interacts among them using methods invocations. The agent-based simulation framework has a unique federate ambassador, that manages the interaction between each agent and the related sector specific simulation models. Our prototype relies on HLA, the DIS standard. We have used the PoRTIco implementation [7] of the HLA interfaces. We have modified both the RePast scheduler and the scheduler of OMNeT++ to enable the interaction with PoRTIco. Then we have implemented the federate ambassador for both models. The load flow simulator used to model the power grid is a static simulation model, then the integration with PoRTIco was straightforward. 4.3
Interaction between the Agent Model and the Sector Specific Model
The design of the interaction between an agent based model and the related sector specific model is one of the main challenging problems. Critical Interdependent Infrastructures Federation (CIIF)
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Fig. 4. The centralized agents implementation. FA is the Federate Ambassador, A the agent model, DM the sector specific simulation model and FDD the FOM Data Document.
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Two aspects have to be considered: the implementation of the physical interaction between models; and the implementation of the logical relationship between the agent state and inputs (Va and Xa ) and the state variable and parameters of the detailed simulation models. Using the DIS terminology, the physical interaction is defined by the Federate Object Model (FOM). The agent model publishes, as objects, the inputs Xa and the state variables Va , while the sector specific model publishes Va as an object and Sa as an interaction. The logical relationship is implemented on the agent side. The agent implements the function fa and the mapping Ma . Each time an agent state variable changes its value, the agent model change the value of the related sector specific model variable. For example, if the network node ni is a router and ni = 0 at time t, the agent modifies, at time t, the router object published by the OMNeT++ federate. 4.4
Orchestration of the Federated Agent-Based Simulation Model
A distributed application needs an orchestrator process that manages the application logic and the distributed simulation need a process that manages the simulation logic. We named the latter process the simulation orchestrator. In federated agent-based modeling and simulation, the agent model plays the natural role of the simulation orchestrator. If a centralized agent based simulation framework is used, the simulation orchestrator can be easily implemented. For example, in RePast, where each agent is implemented by a Java class, the simulation orchestrator is implemented by the model class that coordinates the setup and running of the agent model. On the other hand, if distributed agents are used, a specific agent that works as simulation orchestrator has to be designed.
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Concluding Remarks
This paper argued for an alternative agent-based modeling and simulation approach to study interdependent complex systems. The proposed methodology that capitalizes the advantages of ABMS and of distributed simulation, is intended as an aid to whom have the challenging task to design a simulation framework for interdependent complex systems analysis. With Federated ABMS a modeler can define an abstract model of the target compound complex system ignoring the details of the component system models (that are used as black-box). This abstraction allows the modeler to concentrate her/his effort in modeling the whole complex system and the system interdependencies. Moreover, the use of distributed simulation allows to build scalable simulation models. However, the proposed solution has some limitations. First of all, the interdependencies model has to be improved to provide more sophisticated formalism to model geographical and logical interdependencies. Furthermore, model validation mechanisms are not yet investigated.
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Acknowledgment This work is partially supported by the CRESCO Project under the contract num. ENEA/2007/1303/ FIM-INFO-AFU, but it does not necessarily represent the official position of the project itself and of its partners. Authors are solely responsible for the views, results and conclusions contained in this work.
References 1. Paderson, P., Dudenhoeffer, D., Hartley, S., Permann, M.: Critical Infrastructure Interdependencies Modeling: A survey of US and International research. Idaho National Laboratory (2006) 2. Asavathiratham, S., Leiseutre, B., Verghese, G.: The influence model. IEEE Control System Magazine (2001) 3. Balducelli, C., Bologna, S., Di Pietro, A., Vicoli, G.: Analysing Interdependencies of Critical Infrastructures using agent discrete event simulation. Int. J. Emergency Management 2(4) (2005) 4. Bonabeau, E.: Agent-based modelling: Methods and techniques for simulating human systems. In: Proc. of National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America (2002) 5. Gianni, D.: Bringing discrete event simulation concepts intro multi-agent systems. In: 10th Int. Conference on Computer Modeling and Simulation. IEEE Comp. Soc., Los Alamitos (2008) 6. Sloman, A., Logan, B.: Building cognitively rich agents using SIM Agent toolkit. Communication of ACM 43(3) (1999) 7. The poRTIco Project, http://www.porticoproject.org 8. Cardellini, V., Casalicchio, E., Galli, E.: Agent-based modeling of interdependencies in critical infrastructures through uml. In: ADS 2007: Spring Simulation Multiconference 2007/Agent Discrete Simulation 2007, Norfalk, VA, USA (2007) 9. Casalicchio, E., Galli, E., Tucci, S.: Federated agent-based modeling and simulation approach to study interdependencies in it critical infrastructures. In: DS-RT 2007: Proceedings of the IEEE International Symposium on Distributed Simulation and Real-Time Applications (DS-RT 2007), Chania, Crete, Greek. IEEE Computer Society, Los Alamitos (2007) 10. Dudenhoeffer, D., Permann, M., Manic, M.: Cims: A framework for infrastructure interdependency modeling and analysis. In: Proceedings of the Winter Simulation Conference, WSC 2006, December 3-6, pp. 478–485 (2006) 11. Gursesli, O., Desrochers, A.: Modeling Infrastructure Interdependencies using Petri Nets. In: Proc. of Int’l Conf. on Systems, Man and Cybernetics (October 2003) 12. Haimes, Y., Jiang, P.: Leontief-based model of risk in complex interconnected infrastructures. Int’l Journal of Infrastructure Systems (2001) 13. North, M.J., Macal, C.M.: Managing Business Complexity: discovery strategic solution with agent-based modeling and simulation. Oxford University Press, Oxford (2007) 14. North, M., Collier, N., Vos, J.: Experiences Creating Three Implementations of the Repast Agent Modeling Toolkit. ACM Trans. Model. Comput. Simul. 16(1), 1–25 (2006) 15. Rinaldi, S., Peerenboom, J., Kelly, T.: Identifying, Understanding, and Analyzing Critical Infrastructure Interdependencies. IEEE Control Systems 21(6), 11–25 (2001)
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16. Svendsen, N.K., Wolthusen, S.D.: Multigraph Dependency Models for Heterogeneous Infrastructures, ch. 23, pp. 337–350. Springer, Heidelberg (2007) 17. Panzieri, S., Setola, R., Ulivi, G.: An agent based simulator for critical interdependent infrastructures. In: Proc. of Securing Critical Infrastructures Conf. (October 2004) 18. Gianni, D., Loukas, G., Gelembe, E.: A Simulation Framework for Investigation of Adaptive Bahaviors in Largely Populated Building Evaquation Scenarios. In: The International Workshop on Organised Adaptation in Multi-Agent Systems, at AAMAS 2008 (2008) 19. Jrad, A., O’Reilly, G., Richman, S.H., Conrad, S., Kelic, A.: Dynamic Changes In Subscriber Behavior and their impact on the telecom network in case of emergency. In: Proc. of Military Communication Conference (MILCOM 2006) (2006) 20. Zhang, P., Peeta, S., Friesz, T.: Dynamic Game Theoretic model of Multilayer Infrastructure Networks. Network and Spatial Economics 5 (2005)
Self-healing and Resilient Critical Infrastructures Rune Gustavsson and Bj¨orn St˚ ahl Blekinge Institute of Technology [email protected],[email protected]
Abstract. The paper describes methods and tools addressing self-healing and resilience of critical infrastructures, specifically power and information networks. Our case study is based on challenges addressed in the ongoing EU project INTEGRAL aiming at integrating DES/RES in cell-based virtual utilities. We propose two experimental environments, EXP II and INSPECT to support a structured approach in identifying, implementing and monitoring suitable self-healing mechanisms entailing an increasing system resilience in our systems. Our approach is based on own results from earlier EU projects and selected approaches from other international projects such as NSF GENI in the US and EU efforts such as SmartGrids and ARECI. keywords: self-healing, resilience, critial infrastructures, interfaces, experiments
1
Background
The investigation of enabling technologies aimed at design and maintenance of future energy systems are the focus of several ongoing international R&D projects. An identified challenge is related to integrating a vast amount of Renewable Energy Sources (RES) as Distributed Energy Resources (DER). One of the international projects addressing related challenges is the EU funded SmartGrids Technological Platform1 . The project ’INTEGRAL’2 is a EU STREP project conducted within the SmartGrids umbrella and a follow up to the earlier two EU projects CRISP3 and MicroGrids4 . According to the Strategic Research Agenda (SRA) of SmartGrids, standardization, modularization and programmable functionality will enable an economy of scale of future power systems, potentially leading to lower costs of operations and more expandable systems. Instrumental in this regard is the proper design and maintenance of multidirectional communication and control systems enabling horizontal and vertical integration of system components. This will facilitate participation of customers 1 2
3 4
http://www.smartgrids.eu The work reported is partially supported by the EU project FP6-038576, Integrated ICT-platform based distribution control in electricity grids with a large share of distributed energy resources and renewable energy-sources. Started November 2007. Distributed intelligence in critical infrastructures for sustainable power: http://crisp.ecn.nl http://microgrids.power.ece.ntua.gr
R. Setola and S. Geretshuber (Eds.): CRITIS 2008, LNCS 5508, pp. 84–94, 2009. c Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009
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and DG in system operation resulting in effective distribution control for the benefit of power quality and reliable enhancement at the connection point. The goals of the INTEGRAL project are addressing some of these challenges and is to be achieved through the following steps: 1. Define Integrated Distributed Control as a unified and overarching concept for coordination and control, not just of individual DER devices, but at the level of large-scale DER/RES aggregations. 2. Show how this can be realized by common industrial, cost-effective and standardized, state-of-the-art ICT platform solutions. 3. Demonstrate its practical validity via three field demonstrations (A, B and C) covering the full-range of different operating conditions including: (a) Normal operating conditions of DER/RES aggregations, showing their potential to reduce grid power imbalances optimize local power- and energy- management, minimize cost etc. (b) Critical operating conditions of DER/RES aggregations, showing stability also in integrated grids. (c) Emergency operating conditions, showing self-healing capabilities of DER/RES aggregations. The expected results of the project is a selected portfolio of important operational aspects of how to run DES/RES integrated with the grid, in particular: – Self-healing, fault handling and automatic grid reconfiguration in the presence of a large number of DER/RES. – Optimality of autonomous DES/RES islanded operations in interaction with higher levels of the grid. – System level security and protection of DER/RES distributed controlinformation and actions. – Balancing and trade services with the help of DER/RES clusters of cells. In this paper we introduce a couple of environments, EXP II and INSPECT, intended to support our investigations towards such ends. The tools are mainly extensions to tools from earlier EU projects such as CRISP and Alfebiite5 . The remaining part of the paper is organized as follows. In the following, Sect. 2 - Selfhealing and resilience, we identify important aspects of some of the challenges outlined above. Sect. 3 - The EXP II and INSPECT environments introduces and motivates those tools aiming at configuring and performing experiments in controlled environments. In Sect. 4 - Configurable experiments we outline our experimental frameworks. Sect. 5 - Other approaches gives a short overview of related relevant international efforts. Sect. 6 - Conclusions gives a short summary and some pointers to the future. 5
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Self-healing and Resilience
The software- and system- engineering efforts of today are largely predicated on the notion that with sufficient efforts one can design systems to eliminate all critical flaws. Hence most techniques for software development of trustworthy systems have focused on design-time techniques: specification, modeling and analysis, validation, protocol design, etc. This approach works quite well for systems that function in a known and controlled environment, that interact with other systems over which we have considerable control, and that can be taken off-line to correct problems. However, there is an increase (as with our case) of systems that must function with an expected QoS while operating in highly unpredictable and even hostile, environments. These systems must be able to interact with other components of dubious quality and/or origin. They must function in a world where resources are not limitless or assured and where cost may be a major concern in achieving trustworthy behavior. And they might be expected to run without interruption. For such systems it becomes essential that systems become more responsible for their own behavior, adapting appropriately during run-time in-order to maintain adequate levels of service. These systems must be able to detect when problems arise and fix them automatically or semi-automatically. In the Autonomic Computing Initiative by IBM6 (2001) the concept of Self Management was introduced to address some of these challenges. Selfmanagement was subdivided into the following self* components; -configuring, -adaptive, -optimizing, -detecting, -protecting, -healing, and -organizing. Neither of those concepts are well defined, but there are several, for our purpose, useful descriptions available such as Elements of the Self-Healing System Problem Space [11], Self-healing systems survey and synthesis [4], along with reports from the EU project IST-516933 Web Services Diagnosability, Monitoring and Diagnosis (WS - DIAMOND7 ). The elements identified in [11] are: Fault model, System response, Systems completeness, and Design context. In [4] the following useful definition of self-healability is given: Self-healability. Self-healability is the property that enables a system to perceive that it is not operating correctly and, without human intervention, make the necessary adjustments to restore itself to normality. That definition can be related to the definitions of: – Dependable systems, that are defined as systems globally trustworthy with respects to their ability to always deliver its service. – Fault-tolerant systems, in which faults may occur but do not affect the performance of the system. – Resilient systems, systems that could reconfigure to harness disturbances. 6 7
http://researchweb.watson.ibm.com/autonomic/overview/challenges.html http://wsdiamond.di.unito.it/
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But opposed these three definitions that specify the goals but not the means, self-healability aims at correcting or put right undesirable system situations. That is an active approach that operationalize the definitions stated above. In our case we will have different elements and operationalizations that depend on the critical infrastructure at hand (EMS, ICT, CBS Section 2.1). The WS DIAMOND approach follows the definition given above in the context of Webservices. Those three reports together act as background to our own approach illustrated by the EXP-II and INSPECT- environments as reported in Sec. 3 and Sec. 4. A desirable systemic property of critical infrastructures is resilience. Due to the inherent complexity of involved systems, this property is only feasible when utilizing well-chosen and implemented mechanisms supporting self-healing. The remaining part of this section discusses those issues in further detail. 2.1
Complexity Issues of Software-Intensive Systems
The INTEGRAL approach is to integrate novel and emergent ideas from Energy Management Systems (EMS) and ICT-systems in order to support DES/RES integration as well as new energy-based business models and processes. In fact, we are investigating the interactions between- as well as within- two internationally identified critical infrastructures (EMS and ICT), to support a third being Critical Business Systems (CBS). In short, challenges related to intraand interdependencies in- and between- critical infrastructures. Fig. 1 gives an overview of the INTEGRAL project. The efficiency of the active distribution networks relies on combination of three types of distributed resources: Distributed generations, Distribution grids and Demand side integration (DSI). The main operation modes addressed are: Normal operation states ICT Coordination
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Fig. 1. Overview of the main concepts of cell-based virtual utilities addressed in the INTEGRAL- project
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Compuational Market when TGM is in a Critical State Technical Grid Management Generation, transmission and distribution
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(Field test A), Critical operation states (Field test B) and Emergency operation states (Field test C). Fig. 2, below, illustrates the basic coordination patterns of the cell-based virtual utility outlined in Fig. 1. The figure illustrates that under normal conditions the interaction between the Technical Grid Management (TGM) and the business processes of the Computational market (CBS) is loosely coupled. It should be noted that the architecture of the information system (ICT), i.e., the glue between TGM and CBS is an invisible overlay of TGM and CBS in Fig. 2, but if the TGM enters a critical yellow state a high level Meta - coordination takes control of the overall coordination of both infrastructures. For instance, control of the computational market might utilize its market processes (buy or sell) enabling the bringing back of 4the technical grid into a Green state while maintaining quality of service. Fig. 2 also illustrates that we might have several feedback loops at different levels between- as well as within- our critical infrastructures. Those feedback loops are potentially creating non-linear system behaviors. That is, complex behaviors difficult to analyze, predict and control. We have to face the challenge of design, implementation and maintenance of resilient open complex systems. Monitoring, coordinating and controlling virtual utilities as depicted in Fig. 1 hence pose new challenges related to proper definition of system states, instrumentation and measurements. The following, Fig. 3, illustrates a state model for the electric grid part of Fig. 2. The classification scheme of states is proposed by CIGRE [20]. The CIGREs diagram shows that there could be a definition of states in terms of adequacy and stability. That definition suits us well given the analysis above. However, the only transitions among states being considered in this model are those due to consequences of natural events. Present SCADA systems have two well-known shortcomings in meeting the requirements of future DES/RES virtual utilities [Sandia8 ]. 8
http://www.sandia.gov/scada/home/htm
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Fig. 3. Classification scheme of operational states of a power-system
– Inherent vulnerabilities, which are exploitable when SCADA systems are integrated with ’foreign networks’. – Present-day hard-wired hierarchical systems make it hard to cope with integration of new RES and DES as well as open up for new energy-based business processes. A Decoupling of SCADA systems enables virtualization at interaction points and hence self-healing as well as allowing a configurable service-based system approach. Exploits of vulnerabilities by an adversary cause attack-patterns that pose as growing threats towards our critical infrastructures [Cert Coordination Center CERT/CC9 ]. Such attack patterns can be instantiated by an adversary having the motif, means and resources to do so, but unintended exploits of vulnerabilities due to software or protocol bugs can also cause system failures or breakdowns of a potentially similar magnitude. A recent thesis on Risk assessment for power system security with regard to intentional events addresses the first aspect [18]. Important sources with regard to the first and second aspects are Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPC)10 and the homepage of Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE)11 . Our approach towards system hardening has been in the same direction [14,15]. To handle state-transitions due to foreign events the concepts and states of Fig. 3 have been further elaborated, including new transitions between operating states [18]. To illustrate the complexities we have to address in maintaining adequate and normal operations of DER/RES cell-based systems as in Fig. 1 we can make the observations that we both have to identify a suitable state-diagram of the infrastructure supporting the Computational Market (CBS) and instrument/monitor the combined system in order to ascertain adequate operations. Furthermore, we should note that the system states being identified and monitored are typically not in equilibrium at any time, again due to the inherent complexity and feedback loops inherent in our system. We can eventually hope for that the system at hand is near equilibrium states most of the time to enabled 9 10 11
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for controllable behavior. It might, of course, be the case that we are in states far from equilibrium. If so, a small change of parameters could result in a quick jump to another (catastrophic) state, due to bifurcation [16]. To further illustrate the complexity of our task, we have inherent uncertainties in measurements of system parameters and inherent limitations of bandwidth and computational power. In short, there is no such thing as a correct and shared view of system states of our distributed systems [12]. The bottom line is that we have to engineer our ICT-system towards having a sustainable and ensured optimal and adequate operational support for the combined systems (Fig. 2). A second conclusion is that we have to build as resilient and secure systems as possible. To that end we use modularization and virtualization techniques to embed self-healing mechanisms at different system levels. 2.2
Mechanisms of Self-healing
Self-healing, as a concept, has a long history in computing. Historic efforts have, however, mainly been related to the introduction of adaptation mechanisms in operating systems or multiprocessor systems. Self-healing could be defined as a mean to transform brittle tightly coupled systems into loosely coupled ductile systems with flexible interaction patterns (virtualization). The idea is that the flexibility of interaction could absorb (self-heal) disturbances not foreseeable at design time of the system. Having said that, it is unavoidable that self-healing mechanisms have to be engineered from carefully performed experiments. Our efforts on self-healing mechanisms have been on the low and high levels of interaction (Fig. 5). That is; on securing software execution by the use of hardening mechanisms (Section 3) and mission-level self-healing [9]. The purpose of the tool and environments introduced in Sec. 3 is to further identify and implement self-healing mechanisms at remaining system levels in a principled way.
3
The EXP II and INSPECT Environments
The EXP II and INSPECT tools and environments are continuations of our efforts towards investigate reliability, security and resilience aspects of critical infrastructures. The starting point was experiments related to the CRISP project. The following Fig. 4 depicts our experimental set-up at that time. The basic services provided by the EXP controller are Generic services (parameter settings), Runtime configuration base and Experiment specific services (including Restoration- and Start-up- services). The main results of the CRISP experiments are: – Coordination between infrastructures in ’yellow situations’. – Customized IP protocols to meet real-time network requirements. – Implementation of secure execution environments implementing self-healing mechanisms protecting execution of unreliable software.
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Fig. 4. Conceptual view of controlled experiments in CRISP of the behaviors of the critical infrastructures controlled and monitored by the nodes A, B and C
– Visualization of system status, with different points of view, to support operators understanding of system components and their interaction and behavior. A comprehensive account of the theoretical foundations and engineering aspects related to EXP is given in the thesis Informed System Protection [14]. Other results are reported in several papers in different contexts [3,6,7,8,19]. The purpose of the EXP suite of environments is to allow for controlled experiments of critical infrastructures. In fact the new EXPII environment allows us to make experiments much along the line of those envisaged by the NSF GENI12 initiative of Fig. 5. The purpose of the INSPECT tool is to explicitly model and assess information flow across component boundaries (Sec. 4). Those experiments aim at develop and test self-healing mechanisms to ensure resilience. Arguably, modeling, understanding and maintaining correct information flows is fundamental for ensuring the proper behavior of critical infrastructures [5][ARECI, Fig. 5]. From Fig. 5 we can read that there are different types of information, i.e., measurements, control information and user information involved in the systems we are addressing. Furthermore, the information has different formats and is typically transformed during its flow through the systems.
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Configurable Experiments
The following experimental environment, based on EXP-II, is an evolution of the experimental environment of Fig. 4. The main features of our new environment under development – Support for environment manipulation during experiments, e.g., fault injections. – Virtualization at interaction points at borders. – Support for experiments on instrumentation and measurements (Network of software probes). – Support for feedback, calibration and debugging. 12
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– Support for configuration of experimental environments. Programmable nodes and connectivity models. As complement, the INSPECT-tool allows us to model different connectivity models such as, Publish/Subscribe, Broadcast or Peer-to-Peer, supported by high-level programmable contract-based interaction protocols. The messages are indexed and transmitted by a pattern based message router. Subscriptions and notifications are based on pattern matching of contract protocols. The indexing allows for on-line monitoring or off line analysis of messages related to predefined contract based dialogues. The off-line analysis of stored messages is supported by event calculus logic. Correctness of interactions or forensics related to breakdowns of communications can thus be established. The theoretical underpinnings and their applicability are reported in [10].
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Other Approaches
There is an increasing international interest in understanding the fundamentals of critical infrastructures. Methods and models related to systemic properties such as dependability, security, resilience, and self-healing are in focus of several international and national R&D programs. Besides the references given in Sect. 1 and Sect. 2 the following references related to self-healing are illustrative [1,2,13,17,21]. However, most of current research on this topic is on formal models and methods or frameworks. We advocate in this paper a complementary experimental approach, much in line with the NSF GENI approach. The GENI initiative by NSF designs and implements a flexible experimental platform towards understanding Future Internet and fundamental innovations in networking and distributed systems. GENI provides these capabilities through an innovative combination of techniques: virtualization, programmability, controlled communication, and modularity. Of particular interest to us is the ”Availability and Robustness of Electronic Communications Infrastructures”(ARECI) report. The ARECI13 report was conducted by AlcatelLucent technologies for the European Commission. A main contribution is the Eight Ingredient Framework of communication Infrastructures 14 . The report focuses how to mitigate vulnerabilities in the eight ingredients to avoid threats exploiting those vulnerabilities. The following Fig. 5 gives an overview of some key concepts and the proposed Network Security Framework. In our approach we make a selection of appropriate models and methods as outlined above. An overview of service - centric systems is given in a recent IEEE journal15 . A recent book by IFIP on related issues on Critical Infrastructure Protection is [5]. 13 14 15
Report to EU DG Information Society and Media. Alcatel - Lucent 2007. Bell Labs Technical Journal 11(3), 73-81 (2006). IEEE Software November-December 2007. Special issue on Service-Centric Software Systems.
3 Security Layers Applications Security Services Security Vulnerabilities
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Fig. 5. The ARECI security model
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Conclusions
We have outlined and motivated two tools and environments supporting a structured experiment based approach towards hardening critical infrastructures. The case study is the ongoing EU project INTEGRAL focusing on resilient integration of DER/RES in virtual utilities. The mitigating of vulnerabilities is supported by an engineering approach utilizing a combination of virtualization and self-healing techniques. The work reported is to a high degree work-in-progress, but with some promising results. The next steps will focus on: – Proper definitions of states and state definitions and related instrumentation and measurements. – Modeling and evaluation of information flows across boundaries. – Developing self-healing mechanisms harnessing vulnerabilities identified by CAPC and CVE.
References 1. Abdelwahed, S., Kandasamy, N., Neema, S.: A control-based framework for selfmanaging distributed computing systems. In: Proceedings of the 1st ACM SIGSOFT workshop on Self-managed systems, pp. 3–7. ACM, New York 2. Bradbury, J., Cordy, J., Dingel, B., Wermelinger, M.: A survey of self-management in dynamic software architecture specifications. In: Proceedings of the 1st ACM SIGSOFT workshop on Self-managed systems, pp. 28–33. ACM, New York (2004) 3. Fontela Garcia, M.: Interaction des rseaux transport et de distribution en prsence de productions dcentralises. Thse pour obtenir le grade de Docteur de LINP Grenoble, de 10 juillet (2008) 4. Ghosh, D., Sharman, R., Rao, R., Upadadhyaya, S.: Self-healing systems survey and synthesis. Decision Support Systems 42(4), 2164–2185 (2007) 5. Goetz, E., Shenoi, S.: Critical Infrastructure Protection. IFIP. Springer, Heidelberg (2008) 6. Gustavsson, R.: Ensuring Dependability in Service Oriented Computing. In: Proceedings of The 2006 International Conference on Security & Management (SAM 2006) at The 2006 World Congress in Computer Science, Computer Engineering, and Applied Computing (2006)
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7. Gustavsson, R.: Sustainable Virtual Utilities Based on Microgrids. In: Proceedings of the Third International Symposium on Energy, Informatics and Cybernetics (EIC 2007), Best paper Award (2007) 8. Gustavsson, R.: Ensuring Quality of Service in Service Oriented Critical Infrastructures. In: Proceedings of The International Workshop on Complex Network and Infrastructure Protection (CNIP 2006). Italian National Agency for New Technologies, Energy and the Environment (ENEA) (2006) 9. Gustavsson, R., Fredriksson, M.: Process Algebra as Support for Sustainable Systems of Services. In: Viroli, M., Omnicini, A. (eds.) Algebraic approaches for multiagent systems. Special issue of Journal of Applicable Algebra in Engineering, Communication and Computing (AAECC), vol. 16, pp. 179–203. Springer, Heidelberg (2005) 10. Knottenbelt, J., Clark, C.: Contract Related Agents. In: Toni, F., Torroni, P. (eds.) CLIMA 2005. LNCS, vol. 3900, pp. 226–242. Springer, Heidelberg (2006) 11. Koopman, P.: Elements of the Self-Healing System Problem Space. In: Proceedings of WADS 2003 Workshop on Software Architectures for Dependable Systems at ICSE 2003 International Conference on Software Engineering, Portland, Oregon (2003) 12. Lindh, J.-O.: On Observation of and Interaction in Open Distributed Systems. Doctoral Dissertation Series No. 2006:06. Blekinge Institute of Technology 13. Mamei, M., Zambonelli, F.: Self-Maintaining Overlay Data Structures for Pervasive Automic Services. In: Keller, A., Martin-Flatin, J.-P. (eds.) SelfMan 2006. LNCS, vol. 3996, pp. 58–72. Springer, Heidelberg (2006) 14. Mellstrand, P.: Informed System Protection. Doctoral Dissertation Series No. 2007:10. Blekinge Institute of Technology 15. Mellstrand, P., Gustavsson, R.: Experiment Based Validation of CIIP. In: L´ opez, J. (ed.) CRITIS 2006. LNCS, vol. 4347, pp. 15–29. Springer, Heidelberg (2006) 16. Nicolis, G., Prigogine, I.: Self-Organization in Non-Equilibrium Systems (Chaps. III and IV). J. Wiley and Sons, New York (1977) 17. Park, J., Yoo, G., Lee, E.: Proactive Self-Healing Systems based on Multi-Agent Technologies. In: Proceedings of the 2005 Third ACIS Inyernational Conference on Software Engineering Research, Management and Applications (SERA 2006). IEEE, Los Alamitos (2006) 18. Tranchita, C.: Risk Assessment for Power System Security with Regard to Intentional Event. Thesis LInstitut Polytechnique de Grenoble (2008) 19. Warmer, C., Kamphuis, R., Mellstrand, P., Gustavsson, R.: Distributed Control in Electricity Infrastructure. In: Proceedings International Conference of Future Power Systems, pp. 1–7, ISBN: 90-78205-02-4INSPEC Accession Number: 9045591 20. CIGRE WG 38-03: Power Systems Security Assessment: A Position Paper. CIGRE Electra, No. 175, December 1997, pp. 53–77 (1997) 21. Weys, D., Haesevoets, R., Eylen, B., Helleboogh, A., Holvoet, T., Joosen, W.: Endogenous versus exogenous self-management. In: Proceedings of the 2008 international workshop on software engineering for adaptive and self-managing systems, pp. 41–48 (2008) ISBN: 978-1-60568-037-1
Critical Infrastructures Security Modeling, Enforcement and Runtime Checking Anas Abou El Kalam1 and Yves Deswarte2 1
Universit´e de Toulouse, IRIT - CNRS, ENSEEIHT - INPT [email protected] 2 Universit´e de Toulouse, LAAS-CNRS {yves.deswarte}@laas.fr
Abstract. This paper identifies the most relevant security requirements for critical infrastructures (CIs), and according to these requirements, proposes an access control framework. The latter supports the CI security policy modeling and enforcement. Then, it proposes a runtime model checker for the interactions between the organizations forming the CIs, to verify their compliance with previously signed contracts. In this respect, not only our security framework handles secure local and remote accesses, but also audits and verifies the different interactions. In particular, remote accesses are controlled, every deviation from the signed contracts triggers an alarm, the concerned parties are notified, and audits can be used as evidence for sanctioning the party responsible for the deviation. Keywords: Security policies and models, access control enforcement, security of critical infrastructures, runtime model checking.
1 Introduction Protecting Critical Infrastructures (CIs) becomes one of the biggest concerns for the safety of our Society. In fact, on the one hand, these infrastructures grow up and become more and more complex; on the other hand, the resilience and security issues are not completely understood, mainly due to their hybrid composition. For example, traditional SCADA systems were not designed to be widely distributed and remotely accessed; they grew-up standalone, closed, with only physical security in mind. Nowadays, the situation is quite different and interdependencies with other infrastructures require openness and interoperability provision. Moreover, the 9/11 events, the North America blackout (2003) [1] and many other examples demonstrate the complex interactions between physical and cyber-infrastructures and emphasize how protecting these CIs is quite important. The international community is worried about these problems and many efforts are deployed to manage the CI-related risks. For example, in the USA, the NERC has organized a Cyber Security Urgent Action (NERC UA 1200 and 1300), that resulted in defining a set of standards CIP–001–1 to CIP–009–1) [2]. In this context, it is important to note that all these committees and reports claim that security-related issues are among the most serious problems in CIs. For example, the US Department of Homeland Security has set up an experiment where hackers attacked the software controlling a power generator, which ended in the destruction of the generator R. Setola and S. Geretshuber (Eds.): CRITIS 2008, LNCS 5508, pp. 95–108, 2009. c Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009
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[3]. Not only this experiment proves that cyber-attacks on CIs can be the next form of terrorism, but also reminds that code written for CIs can be as vulnerable as any other kind of software and that these vulnerabilities can be exploited to cause physical as well as logical damage. Furthermore, several studies have shown that one of the most common problems of CI protection is the lack of adequate security policies, in particular in modern SCADA environments [4]. In this paper, we first identify the security requirements of CIs (in Section 2). Then, in Section 3 we present some security models and policies and we discuss their applicability to CIs. We will show that deriving a security policy and implementing it with traditional security mechanisms is not efficient in our context. In fact, if these mechanisms are able to enforce permissions, they do not efficiently enforce obligations and explicit prohibitions, while these kinds of rules are very important in CIs. Moreover, in such systems, it is crucial to audit the different actions and alarms. In fact, not only we should be able to keep an audit trail, but we also should precisely identify if a certain CI respects its obligations and complies with its expected behavior. For these reasons, in Section 4 we present a runtime model checker (based on timed automata) that is able to verifiy the well execution of the interaction protocol between the different organizations, according to the contracts they have previously signed. Finally, in Section 5 we draw our conclusions and we present open issues in this area. The main contributions of this paper are (1) : 1. a clear identification of CIs security requirements; 2. a framework to express a global security policy for a set of connected CIs, which will enable specifying their security policy and deriving concrete access control decisions as well as suitable security enforcement mechanisms; 3. a template to specify the requirements of the contracts that can be signed between the CI partners, and a framework to securely check the well-execution of the contract clauses by verifying certain security porperties, and to audit the interactions between partners. In this way, not only we do enforce an intra-organizational access control, but also we check (at runtime) and audit the extra-organizational interactions as well as remote accesses, with the possibility to prove infractions and to clearly identify the responsibilities in case of dispute.
2 Security Requirements of CI In order to progressively derive an access control model and a secure architecture adapted to CIs, we first identify the security requirements of a CI and we confront them to existing access control models. Note that even if we take our examples from the electric power grid, the same approach and results apply to any kind of CI. Globally, a CI can be seen as a WAN connecting several organizations involving different actors and stakeholders (e.g., power generation companies, energy authorities, transmission and distribution system operators). Each of these organizations is operated as a LAN, composed of one or more logical and physical systems, and the LANs are interconnected through specific switches to form the WAN. In the context of the CRUTIAL (CRitical
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UTility InfrastructurAL Resilience) European FP6-IST research project, the switches are called CIS (CRUTIAL Information Switches) [5]. In this respect, we can identify the following security-related requirements: 1. Secure cooperation between different organizations, possibly mutually suspicious, with different features, operation rules and security policies. 2. autonomous organizations: each organization controls its own security policy, applications, etc., while cooperating for the global operation of the whole system. We thus need a global security policy that manages the communication between partners while keeping each CI responsible for its own assets and users. 3. Consistency: as no SCADA system operates in isolation, the global as well as local security policies should be compatible. 4. Distributed security: the enforcement and administration of the security policies should be decentralized. A centralized approach is not appropriate since a CI involves the cooperation between independent organizations, with different interests, sometimes conflicting, with no agreed global authority. Inversely, handling the collaboration between the subsystems while keeping some local self-determination seems more appropriate. 5. Heterogeneity: as each organization is free to have its own structure, services, and IS, a CI is heterogeneous. Moreover, the security policy must be vendor- and manufacturer-independent: when technology changes or when new components or systems are implemented in a CI, the policy must remain effective. 6. Granularity vs. scalability: on the one hand, security rules must be extensible in size and structure; on the other hand, internal authentication as well as local access controls should be managed by each organization separately. 7. Fine-grained, dynamic access control: access control enforcement must be at a low granularity level to be efficient, while access decisions should take the context (e.g., specific situations, with time and location constraints) into account. Moreover, as the context may change often and as a certain reactivity is required in such systems, organizations should support dynamic access rights. 8. User-friendliness and easiness of rule administration: as the system links several organizations geographically distributed and as it handles a large amount of information and several users, access right management should be sufficiently userfriendly to manage such a complexity without introducing human errors. 9. External accesses: each organization’s security policy should define if and how outsiders can access the automation system belonging to the organization. E.g., it is important to define how equipment vendors can access the system remotely for off-site maintenance and product upgrades, but also how other organizations participating in the CI can access local resources. 10. Compliance with specific regulations: e.g., in United-States, NERC 1200 [3] specifies requirements for cyber-security related to electric utilities. 11. Confidentiality, integrity and availability: contrarily to other systems where mostly confidentiality (military systems), or integrity (financial systems) or availability is needed, in CIs we often need all three properties: confidentiality of each CI’s data, e.g., invitation to tenders, but also integrity and availability of data such as the voltage/frequency measurements.
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12. Enforcement of permission, explicit prohibition as well as obligation rules: explicit prohibitions can be particularly useful, as we have decentralized policies where each administrator does not know details about the other parts of the infrastructure. Moreover, explicit prohibitions can also specify exceptions, or limit the propagation of permissions in case of role hierarchies. Similarly, obligations can be useful to impose some actions that should be carried out by users or that should be automatically performed by the system itself. 13. Audit and assessment: the security policy should define audit requirements such as what data must be logged, when, where, etc. In particular, an audit should determine if the protections which are detailed in the policy are being correctly used in practice; it also keeps logs on interactions between partners, to verify if they comply with the biparty contracts, and provide evidence in case of dispute. 14. Support, enforcement and real time checking of the contracts that can be established between the different organizations: we should be able to capture and check all the access modalities (permissions, prohibitions and obligations) and temporal modalities, and liabilities concerning the compliance with the contracts. The security requirements cited above should be expressed through a suitable security policy. The security policy is defined by the ITSEC as the set of laws, rules, and practices that regulate how sensitive information and other resources are managed, protected and distributed within a specific system [6]. In this respect, a security policy is specified through security requirements that must be satisfied, and rules expressing how the system may evolve in a secure way. Nevertheless, by itself, the security policy does not guarantee that the system runs correctly and securely: the security policy can indeed be badly designed or violated, intentionally or accidentally. Consequently, it is important to express the policy according to a security model. A model helps to: abstract the policy and handle its complexity; represent the secure states of a system (i.e., states that satisfies the security requirements) as well as the way in which the system may evolve; verify the consistency of the security policy and detect the possible conflicting situations. In the next section we present three different categories of access control models and policies and we confront them to the CI requirements cited above.
3 An Access Control Model for CIs 3.1 OrBAC In [7], we have defined the OrBAC (Organization-based Access Control) model as an extension of the traditional RBAC (Role-Based Access Control) model [8]. For managing the security policy complexity, our first goal was to express it with abstract entities only, and thus to separate the representation of the security policy from its implementation. Indeed, OrBAC is based on roles to abstract users, views as the abstraction of objects, and activities as the abstraction of actions. In OrBAC, an activity is a group of one or more actions; a view is a group of one or more objects; and a context is a specific situation that conditions the validity of a rule. Actually, two security levels can be distinguished in OrBAC:
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– Abstract level: the security administrator defines security rules through abstract entities (roles, activities, views) without worrying about how each organization implements these entities. – Concrete level: when a user requests an access, authorizations are granted to him according to the concerned rules, the organization, the role currently played by the user, the requested action (instanting an activity defined in the rule) on the object (instanting a view defined in the rule), and the current context. The derivation of permissions (i.e., runtime instantiation of security rules) can be formally expressed as follows: ∀ org ∈ Organization, ∀s ∈ Subject, ∀ α ∈ Action, ∀ o ∈ Object, ∀ r ∈ Role, ∀a ∈ Activity, ∀ v ∈ View, ∀ c ∈ Context Permission (org, r, v, a, c) ∧ Empower (org, s, r) ∧ Consider (org, a, a) ∧ Use (org, o, v) ∧ Hold (org, s, a, o, c) → Is permitted(s, α , o) This rule means: if in a certain organization, a security rule specifies that role r can carry out the activity a on the view v when the context c is true; if r is assigned to subject s; if action α is a part of a; if object o is part of v; and if the context c is true; then s is allowed to perform α (e.g., SELECT) on o (e.g., F 1. TXT). Prohibitions, and obligations can be defined in the same way. As rules are expressed only through abstract entities, OrBAC is able to specify the security policies of several collaborating and heterogeneous sub-organizations (e.g., in a CI) of a global organization. In fact, the same role, e.g., OPERATOR can be played by several users belonging to different sub-organizations; the same view e.g., T ECH NICAL F ILE can designate a table TF-TABLE in one sub-organization or a XML object TF1. XML in another one; and the same activity READ can correspond in a particular sub-organization to a SELECT action while in another sub-organization it may specify an O PEN XML FILE () action. In our context, OrBAC presents several benefits and satisfies several security requirements of CIs: rules expressiveness, abstraction of the security policy, scalability, heterogeneity, evolvability, and user-frienliness. However, OrBAC is centralized and does not handle collaborations between non-hierarchical CIs. In fact, as OrBAC security rules have the Permission(org, r, v, a, c) form, it is not possible to represent rules that involve several autonomous organizations. Moreover, it is impossible to associate permissions to users belonging to other partner-organizations. As a result, OrBAC is unfortunately only adapted to centralized infrastructures and does not cover the distribution, collaboration and interoperability needs of current CIs. 3.2 Multi-OrBAC To overcome these limitations, we proposed the MultiOrBAC model in [9]. The main question addressed by MultiOrBAC: in a distributed system, how to securely manage remote accesses? To answer this question we first introduced the Role-in-Organization (RiO), View-in-Organization (ViO), Activity-in-Organization (AiO), and Context-inOrganization (CiO) concepts. Then, we simply transform the OrBAC rules by replacing r by RiO, v by ViO, a by AiO and c by CiO. In this respect, the security rule have the Permission(RiO, ViO, AiO, CiO) form.
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Therefore, contrarily to OrBAC, a MultiOrBAC rule may involve two different organizations (that do not necessarily belong to the same hierarchy): the organization where the role is played, and the organization to which belong the view and the activity. However, in the context of CIs, Multi-OrBAC presents several weaknesses. In fact, MultiOrBAC offers the possibility to define local rules / accesses for external roles, without having any information about who plays these roles and how the (user, role) association is managed in the remote organization. This causes a serious problem of responsibility and liability: who is responsible in case of remote abuses of privileges? How can the organization to which belongs the object have total confidence in the organization to which belongs the user? The MultiOrBAC logic is thus not adapted to CIs where in-competition organizations can have mutual suspicions. Moreover, in MultiOrBAC the access control decision and enforcement are done by each organization, which means that the global security policy is in fact defined by the set of the organizations’ security policies. It is thus difficult to enforce and maintain the consistency of the global security policy, in particular if each organization’s security policy evolves independently. Finally, the enforcement of the policy by access control mechanisms is not treated neither in OrBAC nor in MultiOrBAC. It is thus necessary to describe a secure architecture and a suitable implementation of the security of the studied CI. To summarize, we can say that even if OrBAC and MuiltiOrBAC present some benefits over traditional security models, they are not really adapted to CIs. To cover the limitations cited above, we suggest enhancing OrBAC with new collaboration-related concepts and calling on some mechanisms of the Web Services (WS) technology [10] [11]. The global framework is called PolyOrBAC. 3.3 PolyOrBAC Let us recall that the WS technology provides platform-independent protocols and standards used for exchanging heterogeneous interoperable data services. Software applications written in various languages and running on various platforms can use WS to exchange data over networks in a manner similar to inter-process communication on a single computer. WS also provide common infrastructure and services (e.g., middleware) for data access, integration, provisioning, cataloging and security. These functionalities are made possible through the use of open standards, such as: XML for exchanging heterogeneous data in a common information format [12]; SOAP, acts as a data transport mechanism to send data between applications in one or several operating systems [13]; WSDL, used to describe the services that a business (e.g., an organization within a CI) offers and to provide a way for individuals and other businesses to access those services [14]; UDDI, is an XML-based registry/directory for businesses worldwide, which enables businesses to list themselves and their services on the Internet and discover each other [15]. Basically, PolyOrBAC operated in two phases: First phase: publication and negotiation of collaboration rules as well as the corresponding access control rules. First, each organization determines which resources it will offer to external partners.
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Web services are then developed on application servers, and referenced on the Web Interface to be accessible to external users. Second, when a CI publishes its WS at the UDDI registry, the other organizations can contact it to express their wish to use the WS. To highlight the PolyOrBAC concepts, let us take a simple example where organization B offers WS1, and organization A is interested in using WS1. Third, A and B come to an agreement concerning the use of WS1. Then, A and B establish a contract and jointly define security rules concerning the access to WS1. The contract aspects will be discussed in the next section. In the rest of this section, let us focus on access control rules. These rules are registered according to an OrBAC format in databases located on both A and B’s CIS switches. For instance, if the agreement between A and B is “users from A have the permission to consult B’s measurements in the emergency context”, B should, in its OrBAC policy: – have (or create) a rule that grants the permission to a certain role (e.g., O PERATOR) to consult its measurements: Permission(B, Operator, Measurements, Consulting, Emergency); – create a VIRTUAL USER noted PartnerA that represents A for its use of WS1; – add the Empower(B, PartnerA, Operator) association to its rule base. This rule grants the user PartnerA the right to play the O PERATOR role. In parallel, A creates locally a VIRTUAL OBJECT WS1 image which (locally “inA”) represents (the remote) WS1 (i.e., the WS proposed by B), and adds a rule in its OrBAC base to define which of A’s roles can invoke WS1 image to use WS1. Second phase: runtime access to remote services. Let us first precise that we use an AAA (Authentication, Authorization and Accounting) architecture: we separate authentication from authorization; we distinguish access control decision from permissions enforcement; and we keep access logs in the CIS switches (this point will be discussed in the next section). Basically, if a user from A (let us note it Alice) wants to carry out an activity, she is first authenticated by A. Then, protection mechanisms of A check if the OrBAC security policy (of A) allows this activity. We suppose that this activity contains local as well as external accesses (e.g., invocation of B’s WS1). Local accesses should be controlled according to A’s policy, while the WS1 invocation is both controlled by A’s policy (Alice must play a role that is permitted to invoke WS1 image), and by B’s CIS, according to the contract established between A and B. If both access control mechanisms grant the invocation, WS1 is executed under the control of B’s OrBAC policy (in B, PartnerA plays role Operator that is permitted to consult measurements). More precisely, in our implementation, when Alice is authenticated and authorized (by A’s policy) to invoke WS1, an XML-based authorization ticket T1 is generated and granted to Alice. T1 contains the access-related information such as: the VIRTUAL USER played by Alice: PartnerA; Alice’s organization: A; the contract ID; the requested service: WS1; the invocated method, e.g., Select; and a timestamp to prevent replay attacks. Note that T1 is delivered to any user (from A) allowed to access to WS1 (e.g., Jean, Alice). When Alice presents its request as well as T1 (as a proof) to B, B’s CIS
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extracts the T1’s parameters, and processes the request. By consulting its security rules, B associates the Operator role to the VIRTUAL USER PartnerA according to Empower(B, PartnerA, Operator). Finally, the access decision is done according to Permission(B, Operator, Measurements, Consulting, Emergency) ∧ Empower(B, PartnerA, Operator). Let us now apply PolyOrBAC to a real electric power grid scenario: in emergency conditions, the TS CC (Transmission System Control Center) can trigger load shedding on the DS (Distribution System) to activate defense plan actions (e.g., to prevent an escalading black-out) on the Distribution Grid. More precisely, the TS CC (Transmission System Control Center) monitors the Electric Power System and elaborates some potentially emergency conditions that could be remedied with opportune load shedding commands applied to particular areas of the Grid. As indicated in Fig. 1 and Fig. 2, during normal operation, the Distribution Substations (DSS) send signals and measurements (voltage, Frequency, etc.) to the Transmission System Control Center TS CC (via the Distribution System Control Center DS CC); in the same way, the Transmission Substations (TSS) send signals and measurements to the TS CC (steps 1, 2 and 3 in Fig. 1). At the TS CC level, when the TSO (Transmission System Operator) detects that a load shedding may be needed in the near future, it sends an arming request to the DS CC (step 4 in Fig. 1). Consequently, the DSO (Distribution System Operator) selects which distribution substations (DSS) must be armed (these substations are those on which the load shedding will apply if a load shedding is necessary), and then sends arming commands to those DSS. The DSO has naturally the permission to arm or disarm any DSS in the area depending of the DS CC. If a Transmission SS (TSS) detects an emergency, it automatically triggers (sends) a load shedding command to all the DSS of its area. Of course, only the DSS already armed will execute the load shedding command. In this scenario, we distinguish four organizations (TS CC, a TSS, DS CC and a DSS), two roles (TSO and DSO) and four web services (Fig. 2): Arming Request, Arming Activation, Confirmed Arming and Load Shedding Activation. Basically, when negotiating the provision/use of WS1 between TS CC and DS CC, on the one hand, TS CC locally stores the WSDL description file and creates a new object as a local image of WS1 (whose actions correspond to WS1 invocations), and on the other hand, DS CC creates a virtual user (playing a role authorized to invoke WS1) to represent TS CC. Moreover, TS CC adds local rules allowing Alice, a user playing the role TSO, to invoke WS1 image: Empower(TS CC, Alice, TSO), and Permission(TS CC, TSO, Arm, TSO Distribution Circuits, Emergency). In this respect, when Alice requests the access to WS1, the access decision is done according to the following rule: Permission(TS CC, TSO, Arm, TSO Distribution Circuits, Emergency) ∧ Empower(TS CC, Alice, TSO) ∧ Consider(TSO NCC, rwx, Arm) ∧ Use (TS CC, WS1 Image, TSO Distribution Circuits) ∧ Hold(TS CC, Alice, rwx, WS1 Image, emergency) → is-permitted(Alice, rwx, WS1 Image) Besides, at the DS CC site, two rules are added: Empower(DS CC, Virtual User1, Operator) and Permission(DS CC, Operator, Access, DSO Distribution Circuits, emergency). Consequently, when Alice invokes WS1 Image, this invocation is transmitted to the DS CC by activating a process (running for Virtual User1) which invokes WS1.
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Fig. 2. The different WS invocations
This access is checked according to DS CC’s policy and is granted according to the rule: Permission(DS CC, Operator, Arm, DSO Distribution Circuits, Emergency) ∧ Empower(DS CC, Virtual User1, Operator) ∧ Consider(DSO ACC, execute, Arm) ∧ Use(DSO ACC, WS1, TSO Distribution Circuits) ∧ Hold(DSO ACC, Virtual User1, execute, WS1, emergency) → is-permitted(Virtual User1, execute, WS1) This example shows that PolyOrBAC is a convenient framework for expressing CI security piolicies. The following table compares the three models (presented above) by confronting them to the CI security requirements (identified in Section 2). In this table we used the “0, 1, 2” scale to distinguish the levels of respect of the requirements (by the security model): 0= none; 1: a little; 2: good. As indicated in the Table 1, PolyOrBAC is more suitable than the other two models. However, it has some limitations, essentially related to: – The handling of competition / mutual suspicion between CIs; in fact, PolyOrBAC (as MultiOrBAC) offers the possibility to grant local accesses to external users, without having any information about how the (user, role) association is managed in the remote organization. – Support, enforcement and real time checking of contracts established between different CIs; in fact, the system must be able to check the well-respect of the signed contracts. A contract generally contains clauses with temporal constraints, actions / workflows, deontic modalities (e.g., obligations) and sanctions. All this is out of the scope of PolyOrBAC model, but is addressed in the next section. – Audit logging and assessment of the different actions: every deviation from the signed contracts should trigger an alarm and notify the concerned parties. This is also addressed in the next session. The challenge now is to find a convenient framework that captures all these aspects. Actually, we believe that most of these requirements (except deontic modalities) can be
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Organizations in competition /mutual suspicion Autonomous organizations Coherence and consistency Decentralization Heterogeneity Granularity vs. scalability Fine-grained access control Easiness of rules administration Handling external accesses Confidentiality, integrity and availability Permissions, prohibitions and obligations Audit logging and assessment Using standards to enforce the policy
OrBAC MultiOrBAC PolyOrBAC 0 0 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 0 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 2
specified by timed automata. Our choice is also motivated by the possibility of checking the correctness of the automata behavior and by the availability of several tools dedicated to this issue. The next section extends timed automata [16] to capture the e-contract security requirements and show how we can verify some security properties and enforce them at run-time by model checking.
4 Runtime Model Checking of the Exchanged Messages Permissions correspond to actions that are authorized by the contract clauses. In our timed automata model, permitted actions are actually specified by transitions. For instance, in Fig. 3, the system can (i.e., has the permission to) execute the action a at any time and then, behaves like the automaton A.
Fig. 3. Modeling Permissions
Fig. 4. Modeling prohibitions
Second, we distinguish two kinds of prohibitions in e-contracts: – Implicit prohibitions: the idea is to only specify permissions in the automata. The states, actions and transitions not represented in the automata are by essence prohibited because the runtime model checker will not recognize them.
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– Explicit prohibitions: explicit prohibitions can be particularily useful in the management of decentralized policies / contracts where each administrator does not have details about the other organizations participating in the CII. Moreover, explicit prohibitions can also specify exceptions or limit the propagation of permissions in case of hierarchies. In our model, we specify explicit prohibitions by adding a “failure state” where the system will be automatically led if a malicious action is detected. In Fig. 2, as the a action is forbidden, its execution automatically leads to the failure state described by an “unhappy face”. Let us now deal with obligations. Actually, obligations are actions that must be carried out; otherwise the concerned entity will be subject to sanctions. Besides that, as every obligation is also a permission, obligations will be specified by particular transitions (in the same way as permissions). However, as obligations are stronger than permissions, we should add another symbols to capture this semantics and to distinguish between what is mandatory and what is permitted but not mandatory. Actually, to model obligations, we use transition time-outs and invariants. Obligations are very important in the context of CIs where we can find examples (rules) such as: a power generation station has an obligation to supply data from its plant to the Independent System Operator (ISO) and the Transmission Company (TRANSCO); the system has the obligation to report alarms, notify the administrator and keep an audit trail; the ECI D IRECTIVE imposes (on the owners of a CI) the establishment of an Operator Security Plan, which would identify the ECI owners’ and operators’ assets and establish relevant security solutions for their protection. We distinguish two kinds of obligations: internal and external obligations. – An internal obligation is a set of mandatory actions that must be performed by local entities (possibly constrained by a maximum delay). An obligation is automatically triggered by an event such as a change in the context or a particular message exchanged between the contracting entities. – An external obligation is a set of mandatory actions that must be performed by remote entities, but checked by local entities. In this respect, an obligation is considered as a simple transition, and if a maximum delay is assigned to the obligation, a time-out (noted by d in Fig. 5) is set for the delay. When the obligation is fulfilled, this event resets the time-out and the system behaves like A1. On the contrary, if the time-out expires, an exception is raised and the system behaves like A2 (which can be considered as an exception ). When an explicit prohibition is carried out or when an obligation is not fulfilled, a conflicting situation (e.g., one of the parties does not comply with the contract clauses) arises, and the automaton automatically makes a transition to a dispute situation (i.e., to the unhappy state) or trigers an exception processing (A2 in Fig. 4). Actually, modeling disputes will allow to not only identify anomalies and violations, but go further by identifying activities (succession of actions, interactions) that led to these situations, and finally can automatically lead to the cancelation of the contract. Moreover, as disputes have different severities and as they are not all subject to the same sanctions, we use variables (i.e., labels on the unhappy state) to distinguish the different kinds of disputes as well as the corresponding sanctions (Fig. 6).
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Fig. 5. Modeling obligations
Fig. 6. Modeling dispute situations
In this section, we presented an homogeneous model to specify the most relevant security requirements for contracts (workflows, actions, permissions, prohibitions, obligations, time constraints, disputes). Of course, this model should be instantiated according to the contracts in use. Due to space limitation it is not possible to present our whole scenario in this paper. Once the expected behaviors of the contracting parties are modeled by timed automatan, we can (1) verify if the system can reach a dispute state, (2) maint an audit log and perform model-checking during runtime, and (3) notify the concerned parties in case of contract violation. Actually, proving that all the possible executions of the system will never lead to a conflicting situation is equivalent to prove that the exchange protocol can be run according to the contract clauses. In our implementation, the automata are modeled by the UPPAAL model checker [17] [18]. The reachability properties are modeled by the Computational Tree Logic (CTL) [19]. For example, the following property E <> organization.Dispute stands for: “it exists at least one execution where the organization reaches the dispute state”. Inversely, the A[] not organization.Dispute property means that none of the possible executions will lead the organization to a dispute state.
5 Conclusions This paper presented an access control framework for CIs. We first identified the most relevant security-related requirements of CIs. Then, according to these requirements, we proposed the PolyOrBAC security model and we compared it with two other models. Through the use of web services technology, PolyOrBAC offers a decentralized management of the access control policies and an architecture where organizations mutually negotiate contracts for collaboration. We concluded that PolyOrBAC is well adapted to CI organizations, but we also emphasize its limits and weaknesses. In particular, PolyOrBAC, by itself, supports neither the enforcement nor the real-time checking of the exchanges that are established between the different organizations participating in a CI. Moreover, PolyOrBAC does not provide auditing for the different actions. We thus enhanced PolyOrBAC with a runtime model checking framework that captures the security requirements of CI contracts and that can be instantiated according
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to the actual context of a given CI. Our model checker is also used to check the well execution of the contracts and to verify some security properties. This approach can be extended by taking into account availability and integrity requirements. Availability can be handled by means of obligation rules, making it mandatory to provide enough resources to achieve the requested activities, even in case of events such as component failures or attacks. For integrity, our approach is based on controlling information flows, and preventing flows from low-criticality tasks to high criticality tasks, except when such flows are validated by means of adequate faulttolerance mechanisms, as expressed in Totel’s model [20].
Acknowledgments This work is partially supported by the CRUTIAL (CRitical UTility InfrastructurAL Resilience) European FP6-IST research project, the European Network of Excellence ReSIST and the Airbus ADCN Security project.
References 1. Massoud, A.: North America’s Electricity Infrastructure: Are We Ready for More Perfect Storms? IEEE Security and Privacy 1(5), 19–25 (2003) 2. NERC, Critical Infrastructure Protection Standards CIP-001-1 to CIP-009-1, http://www.nerc.com/page.php?cid=2|20 3. Sources: Staged cyber attack reveals vulnerability in power grid, http://edition.cnn.com/2007/US/09/26/power.at.risk/index.html 4. Kilman, D., Stamp, J.: Framework for SCADA Security Policy. Sandia Corp., 10 (2005) 5. Abou El Kalam, A., Baina, A., Beitollahi, H., Bessani, A., Bondavalli, A., Correia, M., Daidone, A., Deconinck, G., Deswarte, Y., Grandoni, F., Neves, N., Rigole, T., Sousa, P., Verissimo, P.: CRUTIAL Project: Preliminary Architecture Specification. CRUTIAL project, Deliverable D4 (January 2007), http://crutial.cesiricerca.it/content/files/Documents/ Deliverables%20P1/WP1-D2-final.pdf 6. Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria (ITSEC): Preliminary Harmonised Criteria. Document COM(90) 314, V 1.2. Commission of the European Communities (June 1991), http://www.ssi.gouv.fr/site_documents/ITSEC/ITSEC-uk.pdf 7. Abou El Kalam, A., Balbiani, P., Benferhat, S., Cuppens, F., Deswarte, Y.: Organization Based Access Control. In: IEEE 4th Int. Workshop on Policies for Distributed Systems, POLICY 2003, June 4-6, pp. 120–131. IEEE Computer Society Press, Como (2003) 8. Sandhu, R., Coyne, E.J., Feinstein, H.L., Youman, C.E.: Role-based access control models. IEEE Computer 29(2), 38–47 (1996) 9. Abou El Kalam, A., Deswarte, Y.: Multi-OrBAC: a New Access Control Model for Distributed, Heterogeneous and Collaborative Systems. In: 8th International Symposium on Systems and Information Security, SSI 2006, Sao Jose Dos Campos, Sao Paulo, Brazil (2006) 10. Abou El Kalam, A., Deswarte, Y., Baina, A., Ka˚aniche, M.: Access Control for Collaborative Systems: A Web Services Based Approach. In: IEEE Int. Conference on Web Services, ICWS 2007, July 9-13, pp. 1064–1071. IEEE Computer Society Press, Salt Lake City (2007) 11. Baina, A., Abou El Kalam, A., Deswarte, Y., Ka˚aniche, M.: A Collaborative Access Control Framework for Critical Infrastructures. In: IFIP 11.10 Conference on Critical Infrastructure Protection, ITCIP 2008, Washington, DC, USA, March 16-19 (2008)
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INcreasing Security and Protection through Infrastructure REsilience: The INSPIRE Project Salvatore D’Antonio1, Luigi Romano2, Abdelmajid Khelil3 , and Neeraj Suri3 1
Consorzio Interuniversitario Nazionale per l’Informatica [email protected] 2 Dipartimento per le Tecnologie - University of Napoli Parthenope [email protected] 3 Department of Computer Science - TU Darmstadt [email protected], [email protected]
Abstract. The INSPIRE project aims at enhancing the European potential in the field of security by ensuring the protection of critical information infrastructures through (a) the identification of their vulnerabilities and (b) the development of innovative techniques for securing networked process control systems. To increase the resilience of such systems INSPIRE will develop traffic engineering algorithms, diagnostic processes and self-reconfigurable architectures along with recovery techniques. Hence, the core idea of the INSPIRE project is to protect critical information infrastructures by appropriately configuring, managing, and securing the communication network which interconnects the distributed control systems. A working prototype will be implemented as a final demonstrator of selected scenarios. Controls/Communication Experts will support project partners in the validation and demonstration activities. INSPIRE will also contribute to standardization process in order to foster multi-operator interoperability and coordinated strategies for securing lifeline systems.
1 Introduction Systems that manage and control infrastructures over large geographically distributed areas are typically referred to as Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems. A SCADA system is composed of a central core, where system information acquisition and control are concentrated, and a number of RTUs (Remote Terminal Units) equipped with limited computational resources. RTUs communicate with the centre by sending to and receiving from it short real-time control messages. Increasingly, the pressures of modernization, integration, cost, and security have forced SCADA systems to migrate from closed proprietary systems and networks towards Components Off The Shelf (COTS) products and hardware, standard network protocols, and shared communication infrastructure. As a consequence, current SCADA systems are vulnerable to attacks due to the open system concept adopted by vendors. For example an attack could be (a) an exploit against the field network based on wireless technologies, (b) an attack that constricts or prevents the real-time delivery of SCADA messages, resulting in a loss of monitoring information or control of portions of the SCADA system. An attacker may engineer a denial of service (DoS) to inhibit some vital features R. Setola and S. Geretshuber (Eds.): CRITIS 2008, LNCS 5508, pp. 109–118, 2009. c Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009
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of a complex SCADA system, such as control data aggregation in a distributed or a layered control system or a lack of real time status and historical data synchronization in a central SCADA back-up system. While physical security of critical infrastructure components (included the control system) is garnering considerable attention, lesser attention has been paid so far to the analysis of vulnerabilities resulting from the use of shared communication networks to transport management information between ICT systems devoted to the control of critical infrastructures. In this paper we present the INSPIRE (INcreasing Security and Protection through Infrastructure REsilience) project, which aims at extending basic SCADA functionality as well as improving the effectiveness of security systems devoted to preventing, detecting, and tolerating intrusions in SCADA networks. Specifically, by taking into account the stringent security related requirements of networked Process Control Systems onto the underlying communication infrastructure, the project aims to design techniques such as peer-to-peer overlay routing mechanisms and to develop diagnosis and recovery techniques for SCADA systems. Overall, the core idea of the INSPIRE project is to protect networked process control systems and, then, critical information infrastructures by appropriately configuring, managing, and securing the underlying communication network. The analysis of the specific properties and security requirements of the Process Control Systems will drive the design and development of techniques capable to make the network more resilient and reliable. The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we present peer-to-peer overlay routing as a promising technique for SCADA resilience. Section 3 illustrates a distributed approach to SCADA systems diagnosis. In section 4 the most relevant research initiatives in the area of Critical Information Infrastructure Protection are presented by emphasizing their potential relationships with the INSPIRE project. Finally, section 5 provides some concluding remarks.
2 Peer-to-Peer Overlay Routing for Resilient SCADA Systems Peer-to-peer (P2P) overlay networks generalize the established centralized ClientServer architecture (as in SCADA systems) and create a decentralized architecture where equal peer nodes simultaneously act as clients and servers. Along with this decentralized architecture P2P overlays provide for self-organization and self-healing properties which emphasizes the potentials that P2P can provide in building resilient SCADA systems. Furthermore, P2P architectures allow for masking strong heterogeneities in both communication nodes and links making them very attractive for the interconnected by-nature-heterogeneous SCADA critical infrastructures. In addition, P2P overlays work well for dynamic topologies that future SCADA systems are tending towards to integrate dynamic ad hoc networks. Consequently, we consider P2P to play a major role in protecting critical infrastructures by enhancing their self-* properties and enabling their controlled evolvability. As the trend towards all-IP devices in modern and future SCADA systems is obvious, the main infrastructural pre-condition for deploying P2P overlays is provided. The INSPIRE project aims at investigating the characteristics of P2P for the purpose of hardening SCADA systems against a cyber-attack. When it appears that real-time message delivery constraints are not being met (for example,
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given a denial of service attack), a P2P overlay network can be used to route message floods in an effort to ensure delivery. In addition, P2P allows for a controlled replication of SCADA-related data which hardens the resilience of the SCADA responsiveness. In particular, in case of failures or attacks, the P2P overlay may act as a back-up service. In INSPIRE we will investigate the benefits of deploying P2P architectures in existing as well as in future SCADA systems. For existing ones we will investigate the cost trade-off for replacing existing P2P-unenabled nodes and keeping the existing ones while adding a few additional P2P-enabled nodes. We are aware that P2P usage consumes bandwidth which the critical SCADA applications rely upon. We will specifically consider this issue in the design of the INSPIRE P2P overlay network through (a) minimizing the P2P related traffic, (b) reserving a bounded bandwidth for P2P, (c) prioritizing the P2P traffic content, and (d) monitoring the P2P traffic for hot spot identification. To provide for these capabilities, we propose an on-demand use of the P2P overlay network, e.g. upon intrusion detection, otherwise the P2P service is passive. In INSPIRE, the existing P2P systems will be investigated according to their suitability to SCADA systems fulfilling their requirements. In particular, we will ensure that the P2P deployment will not introduce new vulnerabilities to the system. This is achievable through selection of closed P2P systems or systems that enable attack detection and recovery. A closed P2P overlay is characterized by the fact that peers are authorized and known a priori, and that only authorized entities can add/remove peers if needed. The SCADA system and P2P nodes utilize strong hardware-based authentication techniques to prevent injection of false data or commands, and to harden the routing overlay. Also threat modelling and vulnerability assessment for P2P-enabled SCADA systems will be performed. Accordingly, we will provide guidelines for augmenting SCADA systems with P2P networks for the purpose of protection, while addressing the tradeoffs across benefits and risks. In INSPIRE we consider interconnected SCADA systems where the network topology is typically a mesh of heterogeneous tree-based single SCADA systems. The tree topology is usually seen in isolated SCADA systems and thus not used here. Furthermore, modern wireless SCADA systems allow for spontaneous networking allowing for dynamic/evolvable and large-scale topologies. The considered meshed SCADA systems typically show strong heterogeneities in both communication nodes and links. Their reliance on COTS and open components increases the number of threats and cyber attacks they are opposed to. In addition, operational perturbations such as dynamic topology and environmental failures may occur. In case of perturbations and attacks the real-time SCADA data may get either lost or invalid, which may lead to catastrophic consequences. This highlights the need for a middleware that can run on top of various exiting infrastructures and is high scalable and resilient to perturbation (both failures and attacks) by providing for self-organization and self-healing. The P2P architectures are well suited for such network topologies. We will proceed progressively by considering an overlay network initially connecting the central rooms, and subsequently involving RTUs. The type of P2P architecture that we believe to be appropriate for SCADA systems is a closed P2P system [1]. This is useful as policies specifically control access to the overlay and impose dedicated rules for inter-node communication (such as on the topology, i.e. the node degree and the neighborhood). In order to provide for a controlled/predictive communication environment, we believe the structured and
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hybrid P2P [2] to be more applicable for inter-SCADA linkages than unstructured or classical P2P. The hybrid architecture is characterized by a partial reliance on a central server, which can be utilized for critical operations such as strict identity management and access control. Deploying a structured P2P overlay in SCADA systems furthermore limits the overhead traffic and a consequence is the simplification of the security of the overlay. As we plan to tag, prioritize and limit the P2P-related traffic, the perturbations to the SCADA application traffic can be easily controlled. In addition to considering a closed, structured and hybrid P2P system (and in order to minimize new vulnerabilities from getting introduced) we plan to derive a threat model for P2P-enabled SCADA systems identifying potential vulnerabilities and designing counter-measures for them while learning from existing experiences [3][4][5][6][7][8][9]. INSPIRE aims at adopting P2P architecture to SCADA systems to enhance their resilience to operational perturbations or deliberate breaches. Our main objective is to maintain full or partial functionality (graceful degradation) after failures or attacks. Hereby, we focus on the main SCADA operation and the system responsiveness, i.e., the timeliness and reliability of the delivery of sensor data and actuator commands (see our example of re-routing after a DoS attack). In INSPIRE we will focus on path and data redundancy, easily provided by the P2P architecture, as main techniques to maintain the required responsiveness. In particular, we plan to design mechanisms for multi-path P2P routing and for secure distributed storage of SCADA data allowing for fault-tolerant data transport that meets the reliability and timeliness requirements of the application. Furthermore, we plan to investigate further uses of the deployed P2P overlay such as the support for failure diagnosis, QoS provisioning, security and trust management (testing, monitoring etc.) in inter-connected SCADA systems. Overall we will derive best practices and define a domain-tunable framework that can be easily adapted to different SCADA systems. Efforts for coordination between manufacturers, vendors and end-users, are crucial to ensure that INSPIRE outcomes will be successfully considered by these different parties. For example beyond IP, IPsec and Virtual Private Network (VPN) should be supported in future SCADA products. We identify some preliminary efforts to apply P2P concepts for the protection of SCADA critical infrastructures [10], however, a more systematic and excessive investigation is still missing and will be carried on in INSPIRE in order to provide for resilient communication and control for interconnected critical infrastructures.
3 Development of Diagnosis and Recovery Techniques for SCADA Systems In a SCADA system, the availability of dependable (i.e. accurate and timely) diagnostic mechanisms is paramount. The diagnostic process must be able to clearly identify the damaged components and to assess the extent of damage in individual components in order to determine the effective fault/intrusion treatment and system reconfiguration actions (based on the adjudged causes of system misbehaviour). It is also important to determine when such actions should be performed (in order to maximize their beneficial effects, while limiting the impact on the quality of the delivered service). Although diagnosis in distributed systems has been extensively studied, its application
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to SCADA systems raises a variety of issues which have not been comprehensively addressed before. Such issues stem from a number of inter-related factors, which are briefly described in the following: – First, the system architect is typically a system integrator. As such, he/she has limited limited knowledge of the internal mechanisms of individual components and subsystems; – Second, individual components (such as RTUs) are heterogeneous, whereas the targets of traditional diagnosis are – to a large extent – homogeneous; – Third, diagnostic activities must be conducted with respect to components which are large grained, whereas traditional applications typically consist of relatively fine grained components; – Fourth, repair or replacement of system units is costly and in some cases not possible at all (e.g. due to stringent requirements in terms of continuity of service). One-shot collection of a syndrome, typical of traditional diagnostic models [11], is not effective. Threshold-based mechanisms [12] – which have proved beneficial, especially in on-line diagnosis – fail to capture the complexity of interdependencies among individual sub-systems. We claim that, in order to be effective for SCADA systems, diagnostic activities must i) collect data on individual components behaviour over time [21], ii) correlate events which are observed at different architectural levels, and iii) identify event patterns which represent or precede system failures. To this end, centralized data collection and processing is not a viable option. In INSPIRE, we propose a distributed approach to SCADA systems diagnosis. One of the outputs of the INSPIRE project will be the definition of a distributed diagnosis framework, which will process in real-time the information produced by multiple data feeds which are scattered all over the system. In order to do so, the diagnostic system will have to deal with diverse, heterogeneous sources and formats. Attempting to define a common format or to implement adapters per format would not be viable. The proposed system will be able to generate parsers for specific data feeds automatically from grammar on a per-format basis [19] . Collected data will then be processed using Complex Event Processing (CEP) technologies, such as Borealis [20]. The types of faults/attacks that will be considered include: – Denial Of Service (DOS) and Distributed Denial Of Services (DDOS) attacks DOS attacks aim at lowering the availability of a service by preventing legitimate users from access it. DDOS attacks are a mutation of DOS attacks, where attacking actions are performed against the target host or service by multiple sources in a coordinated manner [13]. – Data Validation attacks - These attacks come from poor validation of data provided by external sources. Sloppy validation of externally supplied data can lead to the whole system being compromised, such as in the case of Buffer Overflow attacks. – Passive attacks - A passive attack is conduced by an eavesdropper who exploits information leaks in the system. A passive attacker may compromise secrecy by exploiting covert channels, as in the case of timing attacks [14]. – Spoofing attacks - These kind of attacks are accomplished by an attacker who impersonates a legitimate user or system to gain an illegitimate advantage.
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– Hardware faults - These are faults stemming from instabilities of the underlying hardware platform, which manifest as errors at the software level [15]. We will limit our attention to intermittent and transient faults, since these are by far predominant [16]. – Software aging faults - Software aging is a phenomenon, usually caused by resource contention, which can lead to server hangs, panic, or crashes. Software aging mechanisms include memory bloating/leaks, unreleased file locks, accumulation of unterminated threads, shared-memory-pool latching, data corruption/round off accrual, file-space fragmentation, thread stack bloating and overruns [17]. Recent studies [18] have shown that software aging is a major source of application and system unavailability. Software aging faults may still be present in the code base. As an example, a legacy application may exhibit memory leakage problems. A memory leak can go undetected for years if the application and/or the system is restarted relatively often (which might well be the case of a legacy application). The fault/intrusion-treatment logic, which we will propose, will trigger recovery actions according to a least-costly-first strategy. Example of recovery strategies, each one tailored to a specific class of errors/attacks, are: – Restart of the component - This action can cure inconsistent component states (such as corrupted data structures), but it has no effect on errors which have propagated to the rest of the infrastructure. – Reboot of the interconnection infrastructure - This action can fix erroneous states of the communication channels, but again it has no effect on errors which have propagated to the rest of the infrastructure. – Restoration of stored data - Since multiple copies of relevant data may exist, attempts can be done to correct errors in the stored data. Techniques will be developed for properly chaining/combining alternative diagnostic mechanisms. This will improve the performance of the diagnostic system, by increasing the coverage while reducing false positives.
4 Related Work In this section the main research initiatives in the area of Critical Information Infrastructure Protection are presented by emphasizing potential relationships with INSPIRE. 4.1 The IRRIS Project IRRIS (Integrated Risk Reduction of Information-based Infrastructure Systems) is a EU Integrated Project aiming at protecting Large Complex Critical Infrastructures (LCCIs) like energy supply or telecommunication, increasing dependability, survivability and resilience of underlying information-based infrastructures governing LCCIs themselves. The main objectives of the IRRIS project are to: – Determine a sound set of public and private sector requirements based upon detailed scenario and data analysis.
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– Develop MIT (Middleware Improved Technology), a collection of software components, which facilitates IT-based communication between different infrastructures and different infrastructure providers. – Build SimCIP (Simulation for Critical Infrastructure Protection), a simulation environment for controlled experimentation with a special focus on CIs interdependencies. The simulator will be used to deepen the understanding of critical infrastructures and their interdependencies, to identify possible problems, to develop appropriate solutions and to validate and test the MIT components. There are two kinds of MIT components: MIT communication components to enhance the communication between various infrastructures and infrastructure providers and MIT add-on components with some kind of build-in intelligence. The add-on components will monitor data flowing within and between the infrastructures and raise alarm in case of intrusions or emergencies and take measures to avoid cascading effects. They will be able to detect anomalies, filter alarms according to their relevance and support recovery actions and will thus contribute to the security and dependability of CIs. 4.2 The CRUTIAL Project CRUTIAL (CRitical UTility InfrastructurAL Resilience) is an European IST research project, approved from EU within the Sixth Framework Programme (FP6). The Project addresses new networked ICT systems for the management of the electric power grid, in which artifacts controlling the physical process of electricity transportation need to be connected with information infrastructures, through corporate networks (intranets), which are in turn connected to the Internet. CRUTIAL’s innovative approach resides in modeling interdependent infrastructures taking into account the multiple dimensions of interdependencies, and attempting at casting them into new architectural patterns, resilient to both accidental failures and malicious attacks. The objectives of the project are: – investigation of models and architectures that cope with the scenario of openness, heterogeneity and evolvability endured by electrical utilities infrastructures; – analysis of critical scenarios in which faults in the information infrastructure provoke serious impacts on the controlled electric power infrastructure; – investigation of distributed architectures enabling dependable control and management of the power grid. CRUTIAL looks at the improvement of the CI protection mainly focusing on their information systems, on their multi-dimensional interdependencies and attempting at casting them into new architectural patterns, resilient to both accidental failures and malicious attacks. Minor attention seems to be paid to the communication part. It is worth noting that the objectives of CRUTIAL and INSPIRE are not redundant but on the contrary they complete each other. Furthermore the approach of CRUTIAL that considers the CI information systems interconnected by means of corporate networks (intranets) which are in turn connected to the Internet, exactly goes in the direction that INSPIRE has identified as a market trend, where information systems controlling the critical infrastructures are interconnected by means of commodity infrastructures.
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4.3 The DESEREC Project DESEREC is an Integrated Project of the Sixth Framework Programme of the European Union in the thematic area ”Information Society Technologies”, subprogramme area ”Towards a global dependability and security framework”, with the objective to define a framework to increase the dependability of existing and new networked Information Systems by means of an architecture based on modelling and simulation, fast reconfiguration with priority to critical activities and incident detection and quick containment. 4.4 The SecurIST Project SecurIST is a project whose main objective is to deliver a Strategic Research Agenda for ICT Security and Dependability Research and Development for Europe. The Strategic Research Agenda to be developed by the Security taskforce will elaborate the ICT Security and Dependability Research strategy beyond 2010. It will provide Europe with a clear European level view of the strategic opportunities, strengths, weakness, and threats in the area of Security and Dependability. It will identify priorities for Europe, and mechanisms to effectively focus efforts on those priorities, identifying instruments for delivering on those priorities and a coherent time frame for delivery. 4.5 The RESIST Project RESIST (Resilience for survivability in ICT) is a FP6 Network of Excellence that addresses the strategic objective ”Towards a global dependability and security framework” of the EU Work Programme, and responds to the stated ”need for resilience, selfhealing, dynamic content and volatile environments”. It integrates leading researchers active in the multidisciplinary domains of Dependability, Security, and Human Factors, in order that Europe will have a well-focused coherent set of research activities aimed at ensuring that future ”ubiquitous computing systems”, the immense systems of everevolving networks of computers and mobile devices which are needed to support and provide Ambient Intelligence (AmI), have the necessary resilience and survivability, despite any residual development and physical faults, interaction mistakes, or malicious attacks and disruptions. The objectives of the Network are: – integration of teams of researchers so that the fundamental topics concerning scalable resilient ubiquitous systems are addressed by a critical mass of co-operative, multi-disciplinary research; – identification, in an international context, of the key research directions (both technical and socio-technical) induced on the supporting ubiquitous systems by the requirement for trust and confidence in AmI; – production of significant research results (concepts, models, policies, algorithms, mechanisms) that pave the way for scalable resilient ubiquitous systems; – promotion and propagation of a resilience culture in university curricula and in engineering best practices.
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Besides the above mentioned initiatives we would like to briefly present also CI2RCO. The main objective of the Critical Information Infrastructure Research Co-ordination project is to create a European taskforce to encourage a co-ordinated Europe-wide approach for Research and Development on Critical Information Infrastructure Protection (CIIP), and to establish a European Research Area (ERA) on CIIP as part of the larger Information Society Technologies (IST) Strategic Objective to integrate and strengthen the ERA on Dependability and Security.
5 Conclusions Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems collect and analyze data for real-time control. SCADA systems are extensively used in applications such as electrical power distribution, telecommunications, and energy refining. The connectivity of SCADA networks with outside networks is a relevant aspect which is leading to an increasing risk of cyber-attacks and a critical need to improve the security of these SCADA networks. In this paper we presented the INSPIRE project, which aims at ensuring the protection of critical information infrastructure through the design and development of techniques for securing networked process control systems. In particular, two of the INSPIRE objectives are (i) to adopt P2P architecture to SCADA systems to enhance their resilience to operational perturbations or deliberate breaches and (ii) to design and develop a distributed diagnosis framework, which processes in a real-time fashion the information produced by multiple and heterogeneous data feeds. To prove the effectiveness of the developed solutions a working prototype of the INSPIRE framework will be implemented as a final demonstrator of selected scenarios.
References 1. Seungtaek, O., et al.: Closed P2P system for PVR-based file sharing. IEEE Transactions on Consumer Electronics 51(3) (2005) 2. Keong, L., et al.: A survey and comparison of peer-to-peer overlay network schemes. IEEE Communications Surveys and Tutorials (2005) 3. Wallach, D.S.: A survey of peer-to-peer security issues. In: Okada, M., Pierce, B.C., Scedrov, A., Tokuda, H., Yonezawa, A. (eds.) ISSS 2002. LNCS, vol. 2609, pp. 42–57. Springer, Heidelberg (2003) 4. Liang, J., Naoumov, N., Ross, K.: The Index Poisoning Attack on P2P File-Sharing Systems. In: Proc. of INFOCOM 2006 (2006) 5. P2P or Peer-to-Peer Safety, Privacy and Security. Federal Trade Commission (2004), http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/p2pfileshare/OL-100005.pdf 6. Risson, J., Moors, T.: Survey of Research towards Robust Peer-to-Peer Networks: Search Methods. Technical Report UNSW-EE-P2P-1-1, University of New South Wales, Sydney (2004) 7. Mudhakar, S., Ling, L.: Vulnerabilities and security threats in structured overlay networks: A quantitative analysis. In: Proc. of the 20th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC) (2004) 8. Honghao, W., Yingwu, Z., Yiming, H.: An efficient and secure peer-to-peer overlay network. In: Proc. of the IEEE Conference on Local Computer Networks (2005)
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9. Friedman, A., Camp, J.: Peer-to-Peer Security, Harvard University (2003), http://allan.friedmans.org/papers/P2Psecurity.pdf 10. Duma, C., Shahmehri, N., Turcan, E.: Resilient Trust for Peer-to-Peer Based Critical Information Infrastructures. In: Proceedings of 2nd International Conference on Critical Infrastructures (CRIS) (2004) 11. Mongardi, G.: Dependable Computing for Railway Control Systems. In: Proceedings of DCCA-3, Mondello, Italy, pp. 255–277 (1993) 12. Bondavalli, A., Chiaradonna, S., Di Giandomenico, F., Grandoni, F.: Threshold-Based Mechanisms to Discriminate Transient from Intermittent Faults. IEEE Transactions on Computers 49, 230–245 (2000) 13. Mirkovic, J., Martin, J., Reiher, P.: A Taxonomy of DDoS Attacks and DDoS Defense Mechanisms. UCLA Computer Science Department, Technical report N.020018 14. Kocher, P.C.: Timing Attacks on Implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS, and Other Systems. In: Koblitz, N. (ed.) CRYPTO 1996. LNCS, vol. 1109, pp. 104–113. Springer, Heidelberg (1996) 15. Goswami, K.K., Iyer, R.K.: Simulation of Software Behavior Under Hardware Faults. In: Proceedings of the 23rd Annual International Symposium on Fault-Tolerant Computing (1993) 16. Iyer, R.K., Tang, D.: Experimental Analysis of Computer System Fault Tolerance. In: Pradhan, D.K. (ed.) Fault-Tolerant Computer System Design, ch. 5. Prentice Hall Inc., Englewood Cliffs (1996) 17. Cassidy, K.J., Gross, K.C., Malekpour, A.: Advanced Pattern Recognition for Detection of Complex Software Aging Phenomena in Online Transaction Processing Servers. In: Proceedings of International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks (2002) 18. Huang, Y., Kintala, C.M.R., Kolettis, N., Fulton, N.D.: Software Rejuvenation: Analysis, Module and Applications. In: FTCS 1995, pp. 381–390 (1995) 19. Campanile, F., Cilardo, A., Coppolino, L., Romano, L.: Adaptable Parsing of Real-Time Data Streams. In: Proceedings of 15th Euromicro International Conference on Parallel, Distributed, and Network-based Processing (PDP 2007) (February 2007) 20. Borealis Distributed Stream Processing Engine, http://www.cs.brown.edu/research/borealis/public/ 21. Serafini, M., Bondavalli, A., Suri, N.: On-Line Diagnosis and Recovery: On the Choice and Impact of Tuning Parameters. IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing (October 2007)
Increase of Power System Survivability with the Decision Support Tool CRIPS Based on Network Planning and Simulation Program R PSSSINCAL Christine Schwaegerl1, Olaf Seifert1 , Robert Buschmann2 , Hermann Dellwing2 , Stefan Geretshuber2 , and Claus Leick2 1 2
Siemens AG, Freyeslebenstrasse 1, 91058 Erlangen, Germany {christine.schwaegerl,olaf.seifert}@siemens.com IABG mbH, Einsteinstrasse 20, 85521 Ottobrunn, Germany {buschmann,dellwing,geretshuber,leick}@iabg.de
Abstract. The increased interconnection and automation of critical infrastructures enlarges the complexity of the dependency structures and - as consequence - the danger of cascading effects, e.g. causing area-wide blackouts in power supply networks that are currently after deregulation operated closer to their limits. New tools or an intelligent combination of existing approaches are required to increase the survivability of critical infrastructures. Within the IRRIIS project the expert system CRIPS was R developed based on network simulations realised with PSSSINCAL, an established tool to support the analysis and planning of electrical power, gas, water or heat networks. CRIPS assesses the current situation in power supply networks analysing the simulation results of the physical network behaviour and recommends corresponding decisions. This paper describes the interaction of the simulation tool R PSSSINCAL with the assessment and decision support tool CRIPS; a possible common use-case is outlined and benefits of this application are shown. Keywords: Power supply network, planning, simulation, situation assessment, decision making, emergency management, expert system.
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Introduction
The main goal of the European project IRRIIS (Integrated Risk Reduction of Information-based Infrastructure Systems) [1] is to develop so called Middleware Improved Technology (MIT) components to support the control of power and telecommunication networks in order to mitigate the danger of blackouts in these networks. With open access to deregulated markets increased power transfers are forcing the transmission systems to its limits. Renewable and dispersed generation supported with priority interconnection and access to the network according to R. Setola and S. Geretshuber (Eds.): CRITIS 2008, LNCS 5508, pp. 119–130, 2009. c Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009
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legislation in almost all European countries additionally leads to network congestions, especially by large wind farms that are located i.e. in the North Sea far from load centres or by high shares of dispersed generation units in distribution networks that may reverse power flows. To achieve higher economic objectives the systems are also operated closer to their limits partly supported by increased network automation (monitoring and control) also known as smart grids. As a result unexpected events, weak interconnections, high loading of lines, protection malfunction or problems with data transmission may cause the systems to loose stability - possibly leading to catastrophic failures or blackouts as can be seen by the increased number of blackouts during the last years. An increased number of stakeholders since deregulation of the energy markets with different responsibilities along with high shares of dispersed and renewable generation units also raise the danger of blackouts in distribution systems; thus intelligent software solutions are also required on distribution level. Many control and simulation systems for transmission and partly distribution systems already exist for this purpose - special systems for control and systems which can be used as a “further support”. But, these systems are only dedicated to a special task such as estimation of power flows in the networks, and don’t consider dependencies from other critical infrastructures or neighboured utilities also participating in energy supply tasks. 1 R The PSSSINCAL [2] program for system analysis and planning has been created to simulate, display and evaluate steady - state and dynamic behaviour of power transmission and distribution systems. It calculates power flows in these networks based on the data of the components corresponding to physical laws. CRIPS2 [3] is one of so called “MIT-add-on-components” which are developed in frame of the IRRIIS project. It is realized as an expert system to support the assessment of the current situation - in the case of this paper - in power networks and - as a conclusion of this assessment - to assist the network operator in early detection of and decision making in emergency situation. CRIPS primary does not use directly physical-engineer-knowledge, its knowledge base represents the experience resulting from the operating of the system and corresponding crisis management exercises. Both systems - one system operating on the physical level and one system operating on a “meta-physical level” - should be combined in the sense of: Installation and operation of a power system is based on physical laws, but not all problems in power networks can be “reached” by physical laws. R Thus, a combination of PSSSINCAL with CRIPS seems to be very effective for the crisis management in the operation of power networks to “mitigate the danger of large blackout”. 1 2
R is a registered trademark of Siemens AG comprising a comprehensive power PSS system simulation suite. Crisis Prevention and Planning System.
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Subject Area
The technical part of subject area is limited to the steady state and dynamic simulation of electrical power flows. The meta-technical part of the subject area assesses of the current situation and supports resulting decisions, using particularly experiences and lessons learned - a way to take into account the complex dependencies, which exist in critical infrastructures. 2.1
Simulation of the Power Flow
Time-dependent bottlenecks in a power system can be determined by a steady state analysis such as power flow analysis that determines loading in the network elements such as lines (cables and overhead lines) or transformers as well as voltages in the nodes of the network. This information strongly depends on available power generation, current loads in the network as well as current operation of the network i.e. with planned maintenance and can then be used for the immediate assessment of the current situation. Dynamic simulations support to analyse voltage and phase-angle stability in transmission networks. 2.2
Assessment of the Current Situation
The assessment of the current situation in the power network should be more precisely characterized as “strategic assessment” of the current situation: Not a normal day-to-day problem is to be identified, but the aim is to identify in advance a situation, which can cause an area wide blackout of power supply. Thus, not every possible overload - perhaps dangerous for a part of the power network - has its representation in the knowledge base. Only critical situations which can cause cascading effects and a wide area blackout as result are considered by corresponding rules in the knowledge base. The source of this knowledge are basic rules that must be met for a stable network operation, the long-term experience with the operation of the grid, the content of emergency plans, the results of crisis management exercises or lessons learned of already happened blackouts. The assessment of the current situation is to answer the question: Identified risks can be accepted or not with regard to avoid the danger of a wide area blackout in the power supply grid? 2.3
Decision Making
How to deal with an identified critical situation that can cause an area wide blackout? A canonical decision may be to calculate immediately the compliance with the (n − 1)-criterion in the network where it is checked if an outage of an arbitrary network element may lead to unacceptable network conditions. Observance of this (n−1)-criterion permits the provision of adequate service reliability (continuity of supply) for all network users, secure power transfers, and provision of system services. The (n − 1)-criterion addresses all issues relating to network
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technology, in particular the system services to be provided (e.g. voltage stability including provision of reactive power), equipment utilization, the protection concept, and where applicable, stability issues. Further decisions (or measures) are possible such as: – Network related measures, for example switching on or off selected lines can have the effect, that a critical loading situation of some lines can be resolved due to changed load flows and so a decrease of the danger is possible - but you have to know, in what situation such a measure is successful and what lines should be switched. These measures can be done without further costs. – Market related measures, for example redispatch or activation of additional reserves (additional generation). These measures usually cause further costs. – Emergency measures. These measures (automatically switching off a large number of consumers, disconnecting a wide area from power supply, etc.) have effects to a large number of customers with different negative socioeconomic impacts. These decisions resp. measures are not obvious: The experience of exercises or the lessons learned resulting from already happened critical situations have to be taken into account - this knowledge is implemented as facts and rules in the knowledge base of the expert system CRIPS. Decision support - taking into account dependencies - is to answer the question What decisions lead to a decrease of a critical situation? 2.4
General Spectrum of CRIPS Tasks
CRIPS is designed to deal with dependency structures, which cannot be described completely by deterministic - e.g. physical - laws, resp. by corresponding methods. It shall provide an additional functionality to integrate knowledge and know how of experts, resulting from experience, lessons leaned, etc. This kind of knowledge is represented by heuristic methods and this is the reason, why CRIPS is based on an expert system (see Section 4.2 for details about the structure of the knowledge base). So the characterizing quality of CRIPS is not its special application, but the method of representation and evaluation of knowledge and so the general application is not restricted to the special application, which is described in this paper. A more general application can be described by Evaluation of Interdependencies between different systems resp. critical infrastructures such as power supply and telecommunication networks. It is assumed, that the heuristic approach to describe interdependencies between systems such as telecommunication, networks, power supply networks, gas pipeline systems, which are based on different physical laws, is suitable to deal with those complex and complicate dependency structures. Figure 1 gives an impression of the more general application field, independent from a special system resp. critical infrastructure.
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Fig. 1. CRIPS - General Spectrum of Tasks
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R Simulation with PSSSINCAL
Introduction
R PSSSINCAL is well suited for the needs of both industry and utility companies. Typical user groups include municipal power companies, regional and national system operators, industrial plants, power stations and engineering R consulting companies. PSSSINCAL provides the system planner with highperformance tools for planning and design of supply networks for a variety of critical infrastructures - for gas, distric