Cosmopolitan Criticism and Postcolonial Literature
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Cosmopolitan Criticism and Postcolonial Literature
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Cosmopolitan Criticism and Postcolonial Literature Robert Spencer Lecturer in Postcolonial Literature and Culture, University of Manchester, UK
© Robert Spencer 2011 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No portion of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, Saffron House, 6–10 Kirby Street, London EC1N 8TS. Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The author has asserted his right to be identified as the author of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First published 2011 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN Palgrave Macmillan in the UK is an imprint of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS. Palgrave Macmillan in the US is a division of St Martin’s Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010. Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world. Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries. ISBN 978–0–230–23166–5
hardback
This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing processes are expected to conform to the environmental regulations of the country of origin. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Spencer, Robert, 1977– Cosmopolitan criticism and postcolonial literature / Robert Spencer. p. cm. Includes index. ISBN 978–0–230–23166–5 (hardback) 1. Cosmopolitanism in literature. 2. Postcolonialism in literature. 3. Imperialism in literature. I. Title. PN56.C683S64 2011 809’.04—dc22 2011008059 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 Printed and bound in Great Britain by CPI Antony Rowe, Chippenham and Eastbourne
For my parents
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Contents Acknowledgements
ix
1
Introduction: Sound upon Silence
1
Defining cosmopolitanism
4
The cosmopolitan novel?
7
2
3
4
5
6
‘A cosmopolitanism of humility’
13
Competing Cosmopolitanisms
18
Cosmopolitanism in postcolonial theory
20
‘A cosmopolitanism worthy of the name’
32
Conclusion
38
Cosmopolitan Criticism
40
Worldliness
40
Cosmopolitan hermeneutics
50
Conclusion
58
Late Yeats: ‘Beating upon the Wall of the Irish Free State’
60
Yeats and the idea of late style
64
Seeking a theme
74
‘An old man’s eagle mind’
84
Civilisations fall and rise
90
Conclusion
97
J.M. Coetzee and the ‘War on Terror’
104
Torture and dehumanisation
108
Form and allegory
112
Power and the body
126
Conclusion
136
Refuse to Choose, or, How to Read The Satanic Verses
138
Literature and fundamentalism
140
Styles of migration
146 vii
viii Contents
7
8
‘The clash of fundamentalisms’
154
Conclusion
160
‘Listening for the echo’: Representation and Resistance in Timothy Mo’s The Redundancy of Courage
163
Said contra Said
166
Narrative and truth
176
Reading and resistance
183
Conclusion
188
Conclusion
191
Notes
199
Bibliography
205
Index
223
Acknowledgements Thanks are due to friends who have read sections of the book at various stages: Iain Bailey, Tom Day, Andy Frayn, Jane Poyner, Will Smith, Jeremy Tambling and Anastasia Valassopoulos. I am grateful to those who gave me the opportunity to present my ideas at the Universities of Bern, Central Lancashire, Newcastle, Northampton, Princeton and Southampton. Far too numerous to mention by name are those friends, students, innocent bystanders and others with whom I have discussed these ideas and from whom I have learnt a great deal. I owe a special debt to my colleagues and students at Manchester. And I am much obliged to Barbara Slater for her meticulous copy-editing of the manuscript. Earlier versions of some sections were published in the following journals: Chapters 6 and 7 in volumes 46:3–4 and 45:1 of the Journal of Postcolonial Writing, Chapter 5 in volume 10:2 of Interventions, and some paragraphs in Re-routing the Postcolonial, edited by Janet Wilson, Cristina Sandru and Sarah Lawson Welsh, London: Routledge, 2009, pp. 36–47. Thank you to the publishers for permission to reprint. Finally, I am more grateful than I can possibly express to my parents, Paul and Susan Spencer, for their aid, faith and gentle forbearance over the years. To them this book is dedicated.
ix
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1 Introduction: Sound upon Silence
The pages that follow were born of a conviction that the writers who really matter for the student of world literatures are those whose works attend to the extraordinarily violent and unequal conflicts inaugurated over the past several centuries by the project of imperialism. Another way of saying this would be to state that postcolonial literature is literature concerned with those conflicts, whether in a direct or oblique manner, and also with the no less fascinating and sometimes rather auspicious forms of contact and communication that have sometimes resulted from them. It is these intimations of solidarity that interest me in this book and that I have dubbed ‘cosmopolitan’. Colonialism was and (here is another of the book’s key contentions) still is predominantly a harbinger of oppression and violence. But what is attested to by the rise in recent years of popular protests against exploitation and war, by social and political movements that stretch across national frontiers, by the expanding (though of course still very imperfect) reach of international law, and by the world-historical experiments in cultural mixing undertaken every day in the world’s metropolises is an unprecedentedly acute sense of the vast possibilities brought into view by the various forms of contact between peoples and cultures. I am not apologising for imperialism of course or implying that we should be grateful to it for mixing cultures together. I am simply pointing out that imperialism, which as Marxists would argue is an essential aspect of capitalism’s restless search for new markets, cheap labour and raw materials, has created the conditions, though not yet, alas, the reality, of its own supersession. Even a cursory survey of the vast critical literature on the idea of cosmopolitanism will suffice to remind us of the diverse and often contradictory meanings attached to the term. Cosmopolitanism is variously 1
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Cosmopolitan Criticism and Postcolonial Literature
used to designate the Kantian ideal of hospitality and perpetual peace (Bohman and Lutz-Bachmann, 1997); a democratic community that transcends the nation state (Archibugi and Held, 1995; Falk, 1995); an expanded definition of citizenship (Smith, 2007); the universality of human rights (Falk, 2000); the institutions of the European Union (Beck, 2006; Habermas, 2006); the new ideological mask of advanced capitalism (Brennan, 2003); a pretext for military intervention (Gowan, 2003); a kind of cultural mixing dramatised by literary texts (Schoene, 2010); and a ‘convivial’ and even ‘planetary’ mentality cultivated in everyday encounters and relationships (Gilroy, 2004). For the Oxford English Dictionary, ‘cosmopolitan’ implies a sense of ‘belonging to all parts of the world’, while ‘cosmopolitanism’ means adherence to this principle. What form this adherence takes is a question with many answers. In its colloquial usage cosmopolitanism still means roughly what it meant to the Cynics of the fourth century BC and later to the Stoics, to Christian intellectuals such as Saint Paul and to Enlightenment thinkers like Voltaire and Kant: devotion to humanity and detachment from local bonds. Generally it contains something of the political utopianism of later proposals for world government such as those set out in the early twentieth century by Bertrand Russell in Has Man a Future? and by H.G. Wells in works of prophecy like A Modern Utopia and The World Set Free. Cosmopolitanism still calls to mind images of Wellsian castles in the sky: of limitless cityscapes, glittering monorails, and blissfully altruistic masses. But it continues to strike its critics as Wells’s prophecies struck George Orwell in 1941: as a hopelessly wide-eyed vision of a forcibly united globe in which ancient hatreds are regally pacified by an aristocracy of coolly superior brains. In Wells’s The Shape of Things to Come, as well as in Alexander Korda’s 1936 film version, this eccentrically attired patriciate, the ‘Air Dictatorship’, fans out across the globe from, of all places, Basra! Wells, remarked Orwell, ‘is too sane to understand the modern world’ (Orwell, 1994, 193); ‘he emigrated to World Government’, Raymond Williams later grumbled, ‘as clearly as Lawrence to Mexico’ (Williams, 1970, 128). Not entirely unfairly, cosmopolitanism remains tainted by the pejorative connotations of utopianism, escapism and condescension. Cosmopolites are viewed as free-floating and ethereal creatures: recklessly, deludedly and perhaps even selfishly indifferent to the travails and responsibilities of those who are confined through choice or necessity to the local sphere. Hence in postcolonial theory cosmopolitanism is usually understood to denote either a principled eschewal of the
Introduction: Sound upon Silence
3
nation state or a thoughtless neglect of its continuing importance in the lives of the rich (who rely on it to facilitate their returns) and in those of the poor (who must petition it to redress their grievances). It is the purpose of this book to locate common ground between these positions by theorising cosmopolitanism as an intellectual, moral and political process, one in which acts of literary reading can play an integral part. Cosmopolitanism does not yet exist, or at least, as Scott Malcolmson implies in referring to ‘actually existing cosmopolitanisms’ (1998, 238), it exists in distorted or at any rate incomplete forms. The book’s main thesis is that many works of postcolonial literature can be studied productively with these facts in mind. Those works dramatise imperialism’s violence and divisions in addition to – as a vital aspect of their form as well as their content – exploring and even instilling the cosmopolitan forms of relationship that would be required to create and to legitimise a global society that has left imperialism behind. The contacts, conflicts and convergences between different peoples and cultures have left their mark on the very forms of literary texts. Some works register this better than others of course; Mansfield Park with greater insistence and complexity than Frankenstein, The Tempest more effectively than, say, The Merchant of Venice (and The Merry Wives of Windsor not at all).1 Literature whose explicit subject and occasion is the tumultuous and usually forceful and unequal encounter between different peoples – postcolonial literature in other words – does this best of all. This study discusses four such works, novels by J.M. Coetzee, Timothy Mo and Salman Rushdie in addition to the later poetry of W.B. Yeats. It aims to stress the way in which these works respond in both their content and their form to the turbulent milieus in which they are composed and in which we encounter them. All of these works strive to galvanise their readers, to provoke them into purposeful introspection, and potentially to interpellate them as more self-conscious, more critical and more broad-minded citizens of the world. They demonstrate that literature’s value is its potential to arouse the capacity for critical self-reflection. In Franz Kafka’s beautiful phrase, it provides an axe for the frozen sea inside us (1978, 16). This study is therefore a defence of the moral and political efficacy of postcolonial writing. Works of postcolonial literature potentially engender the kind of negotiation and interaction that for the American sociologist Craig Calhoun can succeed in fostering a sense of mutual obligation and even cosmopolitan solidarity: ‘Community is not just inherited’, Calhoun argues, ‘it is made and remade’ (Calhoun, 2003, 98). Social solidarity can result not just from our inherited identities and
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interests but also, more auspiciously, from our shared participation in the public sphere. In other words, solidarity can be a process as well as a fact. My purpose in what follows is to concur with that line of argument and to show that the gradual elaboration of cosmopolitan solidarities is to a large extent the very raison d’être of postcolonial literary criticism. A further aim, however, is to refute the sociologist’s assumption, in a revealingly dismissive aside, that literature, along with food, tourism and clothes, is what Calhoun calls an ‘easy face’ of cosmopolitanism (108). My claim is that there is nothing facile or inconsequential about the best products of postcolonial writing. Far from permitting a weak and superficial internationalisation of tastes they can actually give rise in their readers to self-reflection and to the moral and ultimately political convictions associated with cosmopolitanism.
Defining cosmopolitanism There are four questions that we need to ask about cosmopolitanism. The first and most obvious is: what is it? A provisional answer is that cosmopolitanism is both a disposition – one characterised by self-awareness, by a penetrating sensitivity to the world beyond one’s immediate milieu, and by an enlarged sense of moral and political responsibility to individuals and groups outside one’s local or national community – and, it is very important to add, a set of economic structures and political institutions that correspond to this enlarged sense of community. Daniele Archibugi calls this the ‘cosmopolitical democracy project’ (2003a), an inelegant neologism and one that it is difficult to imagine being inscribed on banners but that nonetheless captures the way in which cosmopolitanism is sometimes seen, as I see it, as a political as well as merely cultural undertaking. And cosmopolitanism is not the same thing as globalisation. If globalisation seeks to homogenise the planet from above (economically and culturally), then cosmopolitanism is a reaction or counter to this process, one that seeks to make general not exploitation or culture but democracy, rights and the rule of law: ‘globalization is a set of designs to manage the world’, according to Walter Mignolo, ‘while cosmopolitanism is a set of projects toward planetary conviviality’ (Mignolo, 2002, 157). Nineteenth-century imperialism and contemporary neo-liberalism are examples of globalisation. The protests that preceded the war in Iraq are an example of cosmopolitanism. The possibility of global community presupposes a belief that wealth and resources can be distributed more equitably and that the exclusionary and violent designs of powerful states and classes
Introduction: Sound upon Silence
5
can be quelled. It depends on the development of what Pheng Cheah has called ‘new cosmopolitanisms, mass-based emancipatory forms of global consciousness’ (1998, 32). The second crucial question to be asked about cosmopolitanism is: why is it necessary? It must suffice to say that cosmopolitanism is called into being by the global reach of problems that require both democratic global institutions and, in order to make these legitimate and effective, global allegiances and solidarities. These problems include ethnic nationalism; underdevelopment and exploitation (exacerbated and globalised by the relocation and subcontracting of production to lowwage economies); environmental degradation and the jeopardising of humankind’s very survival on earth by the changing climate; the abuse of human rights; the unequal distribution of resources; the proliferation of deadly weapons; and, of course, the United States’s political and military supremacy, along with the threats posed by a host of lesser militarisms. To express a wish for a democratic and cosmopolitan settlement is now less to sign up to any grandiose blueprints for world government than, more modestly, to propose political mechanisms that are capable of keeping pace with the global character of the various problems currently facing humanity. The third question is: what will cosmopolitanism look like? One needs to refer here to the work of cosmopolitan political theorists on, for instance, the Global Peoples’ Assembly envisaged by Richard Falk and Andrew Strauss (2000 and 2003) and to numerous thinkers’ proposals for democratising the United Nations and the European Union (Balibar, 2003; Calhoun, 2002; Habermas, 2006), for strengthening international law (Sands, 2005), for discharging trade deficits, preventing the accumulation of debt and engineering sustainable development (Mertes, 2004; Monbiot, 2004). Then there are what Immanuel Wallerstein calls the ‘antisystemic movements’ (2002) associated with, for example, the World Social Forum. These movements typically combine short-term goals such as legal and electoral action, middlerange campaigns against the commodification of the environment and public services (what Naomi Klein calls ‘reclaiming the commons’ (2004)), and longer term aspirations to replace a world based on hierarchy, division and inequality with one that is far more democratic and egalitarian. What unites such movements in the global South with those in the North is a common appreciation of the need for the divisive and exploitative demands of capitalism and imperialism to be rolled back by newer forms of solidarity and democratic participation. Like Robert Young (2001), I see this kind of cosmopolitanism as
6
Cosmopolitan Criticism and Postcolonial Literature
a continuation of the abortive aspirations of anti-colonial and socialist movements for political and economic integration in the decades after the Second World War: the Pan-Africanism of Kwame Nkrumah and George Padmore; the global horizons and affiliations of nationalists such as Amilcar Cabral, Frantz Fanon and Fidel Castro; the non-aligned movement initiated at Bandung in 1955 by Sukarno, Nasser, Nehru and Tito; and the trans-continental solidarity expressed (but, alas, not realised) at the Organization of Solidarity of the Peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America gathered in Havana in 1966.2 My point is not that these initiatives were perfect but that they recognised something it is time we recalled: that the confrontation with an adversary so potent and far-reaching as imperialism, though it perforce takes place initially at the level of the nation state (which is where power is currently concentrated), depends for its ultimate success on the cultivation of post-national institutions and allegiances. This is a point I will try to substantiate more thoroughly in my reading of Yeats’s late poetry. By cosmopolitanism therefore I mean not so much an outlook or a form of conduct, let alone a lifestyle, but something more concrete than these: a system of trans-national relationships embodied in structures and institutions. Cosmopolitanism, in Pheng Cheah’s words, is an ‘expansive form of solidarity that is attuned to democratic principles without the restriction of territorial borders’ (Cheah, 2006, 19). Why call this cosmopolitan? I prefer the word not, as might be suspected, because it lends my title the catchiness of alliteration but because it does important work that is not performed by the more commonly used term ‘international’: that is, it forecasts a form of community beyond rather than between existing nation states. My concern here, however, is less with the institutional forms that such cosmopolitan arrangements will take (though I believe it is crucial to spell out the ways in which democracy, human rights and respect for cultural diversity can be established) than with a fourth question, which I hope postcolonial literary critics might be qualified to answer and on which I endeavour to offer some suggestions: assuming that some form of political and institutional cosmopolitanism is necessary and feasible, how are cosmopolitan sentiments to be engendered? How, in other words, are we to move from the uncosmopolitan present to the cosmopolitan future? What I wish to explore in this book are the ways in which postcolonial writing, largely through the relationships that it engineers with its readers, can engender modes of being that deserve to be called cosmopolitan. By advocating the use of this adjective to describe such work I want not to replace postcolonial literary criticism but to spell
Introduction: Sound upon Silence
7
out the discipline’s normative potential and thus push it into a new area of enquiry. ‘Cosmopolitan criticism’ is the name I give to a literary critical approach which is alert to the ways in which postcolonial texts make available for scrutiny both the nature of colonial violence and the latency and desirability of cosmopolitan alternatives.
The cosmopolitan novel? Several critics have discussed the potential of literary texts to embody or encourage a cosmopolitan ethos. The most compelling are Berthold Schoene’s The Cosmopolitan Novel (2010), Katherine Stanton’s Cosmopolitan Fictions (2006), Jessica Berman’s Modernist Fiction, Cosmopolitanism, and the Politics of Community (2001) and Rebecca Walkowitz’s Cosmopolitan Style: Modernism Beyond the Nation (2006). All four critics demonstrate persuasively the interest of such diverse writers as James Joyce, Joseph Conrad, Virginia Woolf, Kazuo Ishiguro, Marcel Proust, Gertrude Stein, Michael Ondaatje, Jamaica Kincaid and J.M. Coetzee ‘in states of feeling, modes of belonging, and practices of citizenship in an increasingly pluralized cosmos’ (Stanton, 2006, 2). But when it comes to assessing the cosmopolitan effects of reading and analysing literary texts what matters is not just which texts we read but also how we choose to read them. It is the effect of these texts on their readers – specifically, their capacity to instil self-consciousness and to compel attention to the moral and political dimensions of the postcolonial situation – and not really their ability to embody or achieve a cosmopolitan outlook that makes these texts worth reading. They are less cosmopolitan in themselves in other words, than susceptible to cosmopolitan interpretations. Ultimately, I am advocating a versatile literary critical method, and not – in the manner of Schoene, Berman, Stanton and Walkowitz – identifying a select corpus of texts that deserve to be called cosmopolitan. I am interested less in cosmopolitan texts than in cosmopolitan readings. One significant advantage of Walkowitz’s book, which portrays Ishiguro, Rushdie and Sebald as contemporary modernists, is that it diverges from the preoccupation among literary critics interested in cosmopolitanism with the high modernism of the early years of the last century. When that preoccupation is combined, as it is in Jed Esty’s fascinating book on English modernism (2004), with an account of how the outward-looking ethos of modernism’s heroic phase gives way after the 1930s and the end of empire to a new inward-looking focus on national culture among English writers, then the erroneous impression is given that both modernism and literary cosmopolitanism have been
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Cosmopolitan Criticism and Postcolonial Literature
exhausted. It is much closer to the truth, I think, to argue that what Esty interprets as the preoccupation of post-war British intellectuals and writers with a national rather than a trans-national culture meant not the wrapping up of modernism and literary cosmopolitanism but rather something like their migration to other climes, and in the first world itself the passing of the modernist baton to immigrant writers who possess an oblique perspective on the national culture. It is worth pausing at this point to recall what Fredric Jameson had to say about the connection between modernist style and empire in his influential essay on ‘Modernism and Imperialism’ (2007). For Jameson, modernist works are to some extent responses to imperialism. This is primarily because European imperialism, particularly in its late phase after around 1900, was an experience that entailed an awareness of the existence of regions that were newly at hand, voluble and even threatening. Much of modernist literature’s self-consciousness of the limitations of consciousness and language is a product of this confrontation, as Edward Said too has argued. Europe and the West, in short, were being asked to take the Other seriously. This, I think, is the fundamental historical problem of modernism. The subaltern and the constitutively different suddenly achieved disruptive articulation exactly where in European culture silence and compliance could previously be depended on to quiet them down. (Said, 2000, 313) This experience is registered for Jameson not so much in the explicit content of works such as Thomas Mann’s Death in Venice or, to use his example, E.M. Forster’s Howards End, as in their form and style. Far from being manifested in confident and authoritative accounts of the world beyond Europe’s frontiers, the colonised world instead makes itself felt above all in the self-doubt of modernist fictions’ narrators, in their acute and often anguished reticence and in the vague and ambiguous mysteries pondered even by those who do not travel, and which, some time around the turn of the last century, began to infect the very syntax and idiom of European fiction. The distinctively hesitant and faltering – in fact, self-undermining – style of the modernist novel attests ‘the radical otherness of colonial life, colonial suffering and exploitation’, as well as the difficulty and perhaps even the impossibility of mapping ‘the structural connections between that and this, between absent space and daily life in the metropolis’ (Jameson, 2007, 157).
Introduction: Sound upon Silence 9
The main point, as Richard Begam and Michael Valdez Moses have put it, is that while modernism ‘was Eurocentric – how could it not be? – it was nevertheless deeply committed to thinking beyond its cultural moment’ (Begam and Valdez Moses, 2007, 13). But what Begam and Valdez Moses do not add is that texts written outside Europe and written after the period of European high modernism possess formal qualities similar to those of the canonical modernists and, what is more, contain noticeably cosmopolitan elements as a result. All of the works discussed in this study ought to be characterised as modernistic. They constitute evidence of the endurance and continued utility of the modernist style. Written by authors whose backgrounds and beliefs permit them something of an outsider’s perspective on the discourses and ideologies prevalent in Europe and North America, they dramatise the complicated connections and engagements between different cultures, peoples and situations. Furthermore, the manifest uncertainty of their style and the flagrant contentiousness of their principal voices, not to mention their incompleteness (by which I mean their orientation towards an audience and thus their enthusiastic solicitation of that audience’s rejoinders, criticisms and interpretations), make them modernist in a quite exemplary way. These works’ modernist capacity to dramatise at the level of form the complex relations between cultures is also what makes them susceptible to cosmopolitan readings. They explore the hugely complex, convoluted and varied connections between the colonised subject and, for example, the culture and language as well as the daunting material presence of the colonisers. Because they are produced at the sharp end of imperialism and cultural conflict, they dramatise the deleterious effects of that system with particular acuteness and amplify alternatives to it with singular insistence. Postcolonial texts, in short, have a great capacity to explore cosmopolitan modes of being and are at least as susceptible to the sort of cosmopolitan analysis customarily reserved for the products of European modernism. What is also crucial is Walkowitz’s (2006) insight that it is the style of her chosen texts that makes them into cosmopolitan documents. Her point is that a peculiar posture of self-consciousness gives rise to the elaboration by writers such as Joyce and Conrad of unusual and experimental forms of relationship that transcend the hierarchies and divisions that underpin imperialism. It is an idea that bears comparison with the proposition put forward in Joseph Conrad and the Fiction of Autobiography (1966), Edward Said’s half-forgotten book on Conrad, that modernist style is both an effect and – for the reader – also a catalyst of the experience of deracination. There is an intimate link, in other
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Cosmopolitan Criticism and Postcolonial Literature
words, between self-conscious style and the experience of cultural displacement or, put differently, between the manifest diffidence of modernist narrators and their conversance with multiple cultural perspectives. Conrad’s self-conscious style, which for Said has the potential to generate in its readers a no less powerful sense of uncertainty and introspection, is best described not as the product of a uniquely modernist consciousness but as the consequence of an increasingly common experience of cultural dislocation or at least of the multiplicity and relativity of cultures. It is above all else the writer’s awareness of several situations, identities and discourses that allows him to recognise and make use of an insight intrinsic to literary language: the limitedness, fallibility and relativity of the singular point of view. He or she is thus able to inject that dominant way of seeing the world with the powerful vaccines of uncertainty and self-doubt and to contrast it with alternative perspectives. This holds true of modernism, but as Rushdie suggests, it holds even truer of the writer from the postcolonial world, who is able to harness literature’s ability to discredit the dominant perspective and to articulate other voices: ‘And those of us who have been forced by cultural displacement to accept the provisional nature of all truths, all certainties, have perhaps had modernism forced upon us’ (1991, 12). The important work done by the contributors to Howard Booth and Nigel Rigby’s collection of essays on Modernism and Empire (2000) demonstrates that the experience of colonialism destabilised European consciousness and registered itself in European literature as a series of omissions or moments of self-consciousness. The modernist style is ironic and sceptical of authority as well as receptive to the amplifications in the text of numerous clashing perspectives and voices. It registers a critique of the high-handed attitudes associated with colonialism. It also explores, sometimes explicitly and at other times very tentatively, cosmopolitan forms of relationship. As Elleke Boehmer makes clear, it was largely those writers who by virtue of their nationality, class, gender or sexuality (or because they hailed from outside the imperial metropolis and approached it from an oblique angle) were exiles or outsiders in some way, who were the main figures of European high modernism: Eliot, Joyce, Lawrence, Mansfield, Pound, Woolf and Yeats. Their distanced and critical perspective on the imperfections and frailties of the dominant culture allowed them to express its fallibility and contentiousness and give voice to what Boehmer calls ‘the pessimism of late imperial culture’ (Boehmer, 2005, 97). Migration to the metropolis, as Terry Eagleton (1970) and Raymond Williams (1989a) both contend, was the principal catalyst of literary innovation in this period. At the level of
Introduction: Sound upon Silence 11
theme and form, high modernism is for Williams the effect of strangeness, distance and alienation, of writers’ liberation ‘from their national or provincial cultures’ and the resultant experience of language as a medium to be shaped rather than as a social custom (Williams, 1989a, 45–6). European modernism is thus, among other things, an early and tentative instance of something much more overt and consequential: the fostering of a cosmopolitan outlook in later writers who were even better placed to explore the complex relationships between cultures. It is now postcolonial writers, in other words, armed with what Boehmer calls the ‘double vision of the colonized’ (Boehmer, 2005, 110), who are best placed to undercut the authority of empire and foretell moral and political alternatives: ‘modernism is therefore revealed’, Boehmer observes, ‘as the beginning of a process of global transculturation in literature that has continued to effloresce’ (Boehmer, 2005, 124). We therefore require a method of reading more than we need a canon of texts, one that can be employed to analyse contemporary works of literature as well as those of canonical modernism. The distinction between Walkowitz’s idea of ‘critical cosmopolitanism’ (2006, 2–3) and my own method of ‘cosmopolitan criticism’ is not Jesuitical. We should be looking for the ways in which literary works intimate or foretell the shape of a cosmopolitan future, not for particular texts that embody or achieve a cosmopolitan style. Perhaps there can be images of a cosmopolitan community in novels or, as I have heard it argued, cosmopolitan ‘moments’ realised therein. The passengers on board the Ibis in the Bengali novelist Amitav Ghosh’s Sea of Poppies form one such community.3 So too, as C.L.R. James has argued in his Mariners, Renegades and Castaways (1978), does the crew of the Pequod in Herman Melville’s Moby Dick. But ships, as Paul Gilroy reminds us in The Black Atlantic (1993), are also purveyors of violence. The Ibis transports opium and indentured labourers, while the Pequod, as well as being the scene of a kind of convivial fraternity between mariners from different cultures, is also the vehicle of Ahab’s monomaniacal quest, his rage for mastery over things and men, and the United States’s nascent imperial ethos. Since cosmopolitanism is not a lifestyle or ethos, but a political condition that is latent but unrealised, it is in fact not possible for literary texts to incarnate cosmopolitanism successfully any more than it is possible for them to incarnate, say, socialism or feminism. Quite apart from controversies about what such terms mean, we say, for example, that a text is written by a feminist, that it explores feminist ideas, that it has feminist implications, or that it is approachable with a method of reading inspired by feminism. We would not declare the task
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of Marxist criticism to be the identification of socialist books, unless we wanted to restrict our students to celebrations of The Ragged Trousered Philanthropists and The Iron Heel. The same goes for cosmopolitanism. This study is not looking in literary texts for direct engagement with the problems that I have been outlining. Indeed, it would be difficult to assemble a group of writers less likely to call themselves cosmopolitan. Rather, I am looking in their work for thematic as well as formal expressions of the antagonisms and difficulties that plague the postcolonial world and of the latent possibilities that, no less insistently, are germinating within it. The project will perhaps seem even more quixotic when I announce that the word ‘cosmopolitan’ will frequently recede from view in the course of my discussions. But my claim is not that these poems and novels are blueprints for cosmopolitan action, nor that they espouse the concept or even use the word, but that their dramatisations of cultural conflict and convergence foster habits of attention and self-scrutiny that deserve to be called cosmopolitan, habits that might further the aims of those thinkers and movements who are agitating for more expansive forms of citizenship and community. Not a lifestyle or a mindset but a system of relationships embedded in institutions, structures and forms of law, cosmopolitanism cannot by definition be realised in works of art; it can only be pointed to as a possibility. Indeed – to return to another modernist trope, one articulated most compellingly by that great philosopher of modernism Theodor W. Adorno – it is important that texts lend emphasis to their own failure in this respect. Art-works of the highest rank are distinguished from the others not through their success – for in what have they succeeded? – but through the manner of their failure. For the problems within them, both the immanent, aesthetic problems and the social ones (and, in the dimension of depth, the two kinds coincide), are so posed that the attempt to solve them must fail, whereas the failure of lesser works is accidental, a matter of mere subjective incapacity. A work of art is great when it registers a failed attempt to reconcile objective antinomies. (Adorno, 1998, 100) This is the effect achieved by the writers studied here. All these works by Yeats, Coetzee, Mo and Rushdie are out and out failures. Hopefully this will seem like a less unforgiving verdict when I suggest that the criterion that distinguishes such works from the average is not reconciliation
Introduction: Sound upon Silence 13
but its opposite: the extent to which they raise formal antagonisms – which are at bottom political, social and economic ones – to expression and pose their resolution as a practical rather than merely aesthetic problem. Since, as Adorno claims, modernist art, ‘with its vulnerability, blemishes and fallibility, is […] the critique of success’ (Adorno, 1999, 160), then these works, in raising – before dashing – the possibility of cosmopolitan relationships, hold true to the prospect of a cosmopolitanism that encompasses a realm much broader than the aesthetic one. They each incite a desire for cosmopolitanism at the same time as they arouse indignation at the way in which the structures and attitudes of the present frustrate cosmopolitanism’s realisation. Adorno compared works of art to fireworks; they aspire ‘not to duration but only to glow for an instant and fade away’ (1999, 28). Literary images of cosmopolitanism disappear when the book is put down, though their memory may linger. But if they can encourage the kind of moral and political introspection required to instil a desire for cosmopolitan forms of life then the effect may be more durable.
‘A cosmopolitanism of humility’ One of the things that might as well be admitted at the outset is the quixotic nature of my enterprise. There is always the danger that avowals of cosmopolitan purpose risk acting as a kind of rhetorical cover for the imposition of political and intellectual presuppositions that are in fact provincial and self-interested. Had my skin not been thick enough to withstand accusations of ‘cultural imperialism’ this book would never have been written. When asked if cosmopolitanism is just the latest camouflage for Western power I always respond by saying that it should be too self-critical for that, too committed to the procedure of self-examination, and too conscious that cosmopolitanism is a process not a finished vision. We have need of what Scott Malcolmson calls ‘a cosmopolitanism of humility’ (1998, 236; emphasis in the original). I do not think we should be afraid to espouse cosmopolitan principles of solidarity, community, democracy and human rights. For their avowal logically implies that one should agree to abide by those same principles. Cosmopolitanism therefore enjoins at least as much self-criticism as evangelism. And in any case I am espousing those principles, not seeking to impose them by violence. If it takes place then the transition from the globalisation of force and inequality to one that is much more democratic and egalitarian in nature will not be an act of fiat or coercion but of open debate and voluntary collaboration. As Paul
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Kingsnorth has put it, this ‘is a politics in which means matter as much as ends’ (2004, 74), in which we value discussion about the shape of a post-imperial social order so we can ensure both that such an order will be democratic and that it will not follow a one-sided, Eurocentric blueprint. The bottom line is that, as the chapter on Mo’s The Redundancy of Courage seeks to show, the point of criticising imperialism is to put something else in its place. ‘Colonialism is alive’, as C.L.R. James put it in his book on postcolonial Ghana, ‘and will continue to be alive until another positive doctrine takes its place’ (James, 1977, 28; emphasis in the original). Accordingly, we face two dangers: imposing our own ideas and priorities in the mistaken belief that they serve cosmopolitan purposes; and, in fear of this danger, relinquishing the goal of cosmopolitanism altogether and settling for the status quo. It is frequently objected that cosmopolitanism mistakenly assumes good intentions in those who espouse it. Jackie Stacey has put this case very eloquently. She argues that cosmopolitanism often posits a self that is transparent, accessible and fully intelligible to ourselves and others […] [But w]hat if one’s own sense of openness to difference appears to others as closure, assimilation or appropriation? […] What if the projection of world citizenship is a blended panhumanity which violently erases difference instead of recognising it? (Stacey, 2009, n.p.) No student of Freud could safely assume that our desires and motivations are transparent to us. Similarly, no reader of Robert Burns or observer of the so-called ‘humanitarian’ interventions of the last few years could be in any doubt about what usually happens to the best laid schemes of mice and men. Humanitarian intentions do not always bring about humanitarian results. Similarly, one might sincerely believe oneself to be acting in a cosmopolitan way whilst furthering objectives that are actually profoundly partial and provincial. But this insight, though sound, calls not for the repudiation of cosmopolitan ends. In this context it constitutes a recommendation that any avowal of cosmopolitanism must be accompanied by the most stringent self-criticism of the kind that I have elsewhere associated with humanism (Spencer, 2006). Beware parochialism decked out as humanitarianism. Humility and self-criticism are cosmopolitan virtues. So too is democratic discussion about what it means and takes to be cosmopolitan. Western readers are my main concern, not only because I am one but also because anything else would be too ambitious a project for a
Introduction: Sound upon Silence 15
single monograph. Though I am writing about Anglophone texts this is not because I do not think that other texts in other languages intended for other audiences are not important. Nor do I accept, as my analysis of The Redundancy of Courage will show, that Western critics and readers aren’t qualified to discuss such subjects in a knowledgeable and sympathetic way. Postcolonial critics who do not hail from the places about which they write are not therefore barred from speaking; after all, nobody expects medievalists to come from the Middle Ages. But there is a crucial divide here that cannot be ignored. Notwithstanding its sympathy for the history and aspirations of anti-colonialism and what later chapters will reveal to be its suspicions about some of the principal tenets of metropolitan postcolonial theory, I am well aware that this study would look like a decidedly self-indulgent affair to, say, the resident of a slum in Manila. Leaving aside the obvious objection, that this is true of most studies in the humanities, few of which are likely to bring people out onto the streets, my consciousness of the gap between the literatures and realities of the postcolonial world on the one hand and the ‘Western’ milieu of postcolonial scholarship on the other means that the impact of the former on the latter (rather than vice versa) is my primary subject. Those texts most likely to have a cosmopolitan effect on the Western reader are the subjects of my analyses. Besides, it is possible to make a virtue out of necessity, for an essential aspect of any viable cosmopolitan project is the cultivation of a much more inclusive sense of moral and political responsibility in citizens of the affluent countries of the West. As I have argued elsewhere, we need to see postcolonial criticism less as a means of encouraging actual movement away from the nation state than as a form of intervention that in the first instance takes aim at the nation state (Spencer, 2009). This is another way of saying that postcolonial criticism entails a decision to situate oneself in opposition to nation states that are driving forward the environmentally and humanly destructive policies of neo-liberal globalisation. For all of us this means attending before anything else to local manifestations of this system. Cosmopolitanism, paradoxically, begins at home. Asked in an interview what European and North American sympathisers could do to aid the landless farmers of Brazil (and the very outlandishness of the question is, in a way, an indication of the limits and the necessary direction of postcolonialists’ critical and political energies), João Pedro Stedile of the Sem Terra Movement responded with this straightforward suggestion: ‘bring down your neoliberal governments’ (Stedile, 2004, 46). That kind of activity is, at least, a contribution!
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Cosmopolitan Criticism and Postcolonial Literature
I am contending that one of the most significant effects of postcolonial literature, though far from the only one, is likewise its capacity to reform the thoughts and deeds of Western readers. Of course, I do not believe that only Western readers matter, nor that only they are capable of becoming cosmopolitan. Neither do I think that only the texts analysed here are susceptible to a cosmopolitan analysis, still less that a cosmopolitan reading is the only productive way of approaching them. My method of reading postcolonial literature is one among many. In a sense, I am seeking to supplement critics’ increasing appreciation of the diverse articulations of postcolonial culture by fostering an awareness that postcolonial literature’s capacity to engender cosmopolitan sentiments is a crucial aspect of its appeal and utility, though far from the only aspect or even necessarily the most important. Not silence but speech, not incomprehension but self-knowledge, as well as the selfredefining and horizon-broadening experience of intellectual dialogue are what this reader likes to think he has taken from these authors’ works and would like to encourage in others. The reflexive narrative method employed in the novels by Coetzee, Rushdie and Mo as well as the acute self-consciousness and self-scrutiny of Yeats’s late poems have the potential to instil a similarly introspective mindset in their readers. As such, they can induce a relativisation of one’s outlook that leads to the gregarious and self-critical disposition of the cosmopolitan citizen. The German philosopher of hermeneutics Hans-Georg Gadamer describes the enterprise of literary reading as ‘a conversation with the text’ (1979, 331). Literary reading is a voluble and even rumbustious interchange between identities and points of view that, as Kwame Anthony Appiah says in his account of what it takes to be a citizen of the cosmos, are not fixed for all time but capable of being altered and therefore made more inclusive by stimulating encounters with difference. People often recommend relativism because they think it will lead to tolerance. But if we cannot learn from one another what it is right to think and feel and do, then conversation will be pointless. Relativism of that sort isn’t a way to encourage conversation; it’s just a reason to fall silent. (Appiah, 2006, 31) Coetzee’s book White Writing is in part a critical analysis of the silences and elisions that characterise pastoral writing by white South Africans: in particular, their careful deafness to the presence of black labour on
Introduction: Sound upon Silence 17
the idealised farm and their obliviousness to the evidence of a native presence that pre-dated white settlement. Fascinatingly, however, Coetzee suggests, with characteristic obliqueness, that this critical practice is insufficient. The tactic of identifying pastoral writing’s silences about colonial violence and dispossession lacks any capacity or even willingness to envision the replacement of this uncommunicativeness with the kind of dialogue or conversation that I am entreating. To note the historical fact of attempted silencing and then simply leave it at that is surely to present the conflicts between coloniser and colonised as insuperable. Unless the colonised take the opportunity to speak and be heard, to narrate their own experiences and aspirations, and to sway impressible interlocutors with their narratives, then colonialism will not have been overcome. Thankfully they do this anyway. Our task is to cup our ears and then join the conversation. Coetzee, who is not only thinking about South African pastoral and about European music, enjoins sensitivity to the sounds with which communities make themselves known to each other in addition to the silences that prevail between them. He summarises the critical practice that guides the present study when he suggests that the critic’s task is not only to emphasise the silence left behind by violence but also to help the work of art effect or envision a situation in which communication will be possible once more. Our ears today are finely attuned to modes of silence. We have been brought up on the music of Webern: substantial silence structured by tracings of sound. Our craft is all in reading the other: gaps, inverses, undersides; the veiled; the dark, the buried, the feminine; alterities […] Only part of the truth, such a reading asserts, resides in what writing says of the hitherto unsaid; for the rest, its truth lies in what it dare not say for the sake of its own safety, or in what it does not know about itself: in its silences. It is a mode of reading which, subverting the dominant, is in peril, like all triumphant subversion, of becoming the dominant in its turn. Is it a version of utopianism (or pastoralism) to look forward (or backward) to the day when truth will be (or was) what is said, not what is not said, when we will hear (or heard) music as sound upon silence, not silence between sounds? (Coetzee, 1988, 81; emphasis in original)
2 Competing Cosmopolitanisms
Postcolonial theorists are waking up to the enormous threats posed by the age of exponential globalisation, as well as to the equally sizeable opportunities of a world in which cultures and allegiances are being complicated, mixed and broadened. Popular discourses of hybridity, diaspora, exile and migration constitute not always successful but nonetheless welcome and auspicious attempts to think through a situation in which the globalisation of exploitation and injustice must be matched, as Terry Eagleton has implored, by a comparable and countervailing globalisation of experiences, allegiances and values. What Eagleton puts his finger on in his After Theory (2003) is the incapacity of post-modern, post-structuralist and post-colonial discourses, insofar as the claim to novelty implicit in their shared prefix rests on a common rejection of narratives of emancipation and enlightenment in favour of a fixation with difference and ‘little narratives’, to respond with sufficient ambition and clarity to a situation in which capitalism and all its attendant shortcomings are fully, indeed unprecedentedly, global in scope. With the launch of a new global narrative of capitalism, along with the so-called war on terror, it may well be that the style of thinking known as postmodernism is now approaching an end. It was, after all, the theory which assured us that grand narratives were a thing of the past. Perhaps we will be able to see it, in retrospect, as one of the little narratives of which it has been so fond. This, however, presents cultural theory with a fresh challenge. If it is to engage with an ambitious global history, it must have answerable resources of its own, equal in depth and scope to the situation it confronts. (Eagleton, 2003, 221–2) 18
Competing Cosmopolitanisms 19
There is an increasing recognition of the need for those in the first world to take responsibility for injustices that take place beyond their borders (frequently at the behest of their governments) and for those in the rest of the planet to join in making powerful governments and corporations accountable to the people whom their decisions and actions affect. Yet postcolonial scholars have in the past been too reluctant to take on the task not just of discrediting but also of imagining our way beyond the doctrines and practices of imperialism. They have dragged their heels when it comes to the various resources required to supplant (as opposed merely to criticise or bemoan) the gross inequality and violence of imperial rule. Understandably, the discipline’s energy has been devoted to the critique of imperialism as it is manifested in European culture, philosophy, historiography and so on, and to the equally stringent appraisal of doctrines and practices such as anti-colonial nationalism, which are seen as merely rehashing an exclusionary logic inherited from imperialism. But this criticism has rarely been matched by any comparable dedication to the task of formulating alternatives to the divisions and hierarchies inflicted by imperialism. This study’s emphasis on cosmopolitanism is designed to show that it is now time to decide whether we are content to persevere with the, admittedly indispensable but in my view insufficient, work of reproving the practices and doctrines of imperialism and of questioning the immediate political and cultural responses to it, or whether we are prepared instead to stretch our wings a little and add to that work of criticism and censure an ambitious attempt to formulate principles, practices and procedures of our own. Everybody knows what postcolonial theorists are against; the clue is in the name. But what are they actually for? There are several ‘schools’ of thought on cosmopolitanism in postcolonial studies: I will call them, perhaps too schematically, the sceptical, the celebratory and the socialist schools. A further school, which I shall recommend in conclusion, combines the best elements of the first three: this is the emerging school of what I am calling cosmopolitan criticism. Of course, none of these schools are self-conscious movements with agreed agendas and card-carrying memberships. Rather, they are comprised of scholars whom I have grouped together because in each case their work has common and distinctive characteristics, many of which they share with theorists in cognate fields such as sociology and political theory. It is interesting to note, incidentally, that thinkers in all these schools are adopting increasingly nuanced and multifaceted conceptions of cosmopolitanism and are thus in many cases moving towards a common position, which I shall attempt to
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theorise at the end of this chapter. The object of the exercise, then, is not to separate the sheep from the goats but to assess the current variety of positions held by postcolonial critics on cosmopolitanism and by so doing to identify some common ground.
Cosmopolitanism in postcolonial theory The first, sceptical, school dominated the postcolonial field in the years after its inception. Among this group of thinkers one would wish to include figures who are so concerned about the dominance of Western ideologies and political institutions that they tend to dismiss all efforts to gain knowledge of other cultures and societies, let alone cosmopolitan institutions and universalist ideas like human rights, as inevitably coercive. Such thinkers present local identities and communities as the natural units of affiliation and action. This early form of postcolonial work, in for example the deconstructive procedures of Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, was more interested in undermining the cultural and epistemological authority of colonialism than in elucidating the relationship between colonialism and capitalism or in asking how to move beyond these things. One might also adduce Edward Said’s Orientalism, which was in many ways the book that inspired the discipline. If for Michel Foucault any discourse that claims privileged access to the unvarnished state of things is deceitfully masking its own partiality, then likewise for the Said of Orientalism, a book that relies on Foucault for its methodology, what passes for knowledge of the so-called Orient is actually a self-interested myth, a pretext for the exercise of colonial power. My worry is not that Orientalism stresses the erroneousness and partiality of much purportedly disinterested scholarship about the Middle East but that it harps on so relentlessly about the East–West divide and about Western scholars’ inability to say anything accurate and constructive about the Arab world that it makes these divisions out to be insuperable. It therefore risks undermining any basis for the sort of cosmopolitan solidarity that the later Said, as this study will repeatedly make clear, advocated much more overtly. An excessively sceptical epistemology yields, in short, to a relativist political philosophy. As Satya Mohanty points out, this tendency in postcolonial criticism complicates efforts ‘to make decolonization a meaningful project involving cross-cultural contact and dialogue’ (1997, 145). Whatever Said’s intentions, this is how Orientalism was initially received and how, as the chapter on Mo shows, the discipline of postcolonial studies subsequently developed.
Competing Cosmopolitanisms 21
I think there is now a much greater awareness among postcolonial scholars that the placing of undue emphasis on difference and identity has not done enough to challenge imperialism and imagine alternatives to it. As Said himself has acknowledged more recently, the humanities in general and literary studies in particular have had trouble locating real sites of resistance to neo-liberal globalisation because much research on colonialism and its effects has for too long focused principally (and sometimes exclusively) on issues of identity (Said, 2001, 66). Faced with a choice between an easygoing tolerance of diversity and the homogenising hubris of colonialism many postcolonial critics have opted for the former. And who could blame them? Would not anybody, who bore in mind the calamities perpetrated in the last two centuries by states that sought to put into effect blueprints for some flawless utopia, rather switch these grandiose dreams for a more modest vision of a diverse and multiform world? Should we not all be partisans of a world in which the little narratives have won out over the all-encompassing epic, in which an infinity of points of view have proliferated at the expense of one total and all-embracing truth, and in which the specific demands of the local now supersede the destructive force of the global? The answer, clearly, is yes. But this laudable penchant for diversity must not be too hasty. Two pitfalls lie in wait for this way of thinking. Firstly, it risks celebrating the arrival of a diverse and tolerant society before it has been adequately inaugurated. In other words, we must avoid extolling difference indiscriminately in a world in which the most salient differences are not admirable dissimilarities between identities and lifestyles but abhorrent disparities such as those between the rich and the poor. To acclaim the ideal of diversity too hastily is to collapse the distinction between the ideal for which we yearn and the reality that currently holds sway. As well as cutting the sinews of radical politics by removing the cause of its discontent, this fixation with identity downplays the sheer political and organisational effort required to instate a society in which diversity could truly flourish; that is the second pitfall. Will Kymlicka’s books The Rights of Minority Cultures (1995) and Politics in the Vernacular (2001) voice a widespread fear that the grand transnational designs of cosmopolitanism are incompatible with respect for cultural diversity. Another sceptic about such aspirations is the conservative philosopher John Gray, for whom contemporary movements against capitalism are of a piece with the fanatical utopianism of neoliberalism and the millenarian cults of the Middle Ages (2008). Gray argues that utopias always founder on the incompatibility of human needs and on the terminal imperfections of human nature. The best we
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can hope for is a multipolar world free from crusading universalisms. This school might also encompass many of the contributors to the Cosmopolitanism (2002) anthology of Carol Breckenridge, Homi Bhabha, Dipesh Chakrabarty and Sheldon Pollock, a collection anxious above all else that cosmopolitan sentiments and institutions might erode local traditions and cultural differences. Can there, the editors ask, be a cosmopolitanism that is egalitarian and not simply a generalisation of the values and practices of ‘the West’? The cosmopolitanism that they commend is modest, ongoing, sceptical of utopian outcomes, and reluctant to throw its weight behind world-altering political projects: ‘cosmopolitanism must give way to the plurality of modes and histories – not necessarily shared in degree or in concept regionally, nationally, or internationally – that comprise cosmopolitan practice and history. We propose therefore that cosmopolitanism be considered in the plural, as cosmopolitanisms’ (Breckenridge et al., 2002, 8). The aim of their volume is to unearth diverse cosmopolitan practices, none of which, however, point to the eventual achievement of a cosmopolitan polity. The danger flirted with by the sceptical school threatens the postcolonial field as a whole; so besotted is it with the affirmation of identity that it neglects the substantive political goals of cosmopolitanism and merely adopts cosmopolitanism’s argot. Cosmopolitanism, as I have said already, ought to be seen as an objective rather than a reality, even though, obviously, auguries and anticipations of it can be seen germinating here and now. Cosmopolitanism, in other words, must be a cogent and feasible platform of economic, political and institutional proposals. Instead of avowing cosmopolitanisms in the plural, it will be necessary to contrast our cosmopolitanism (one of equality, rights and democracy) with their cosmopolitanism (of capital, exploitation and cultural standardisation). Cosmopolitanism is not a virtuous platitude but a contested and intensely political idea. Breckenridge and her co-editors spell out the view of cosmopolitanism from which this book demurs when they suggest that cosmopolitanism ‘should be considered entirely open, and not pregiven or foreclosed by the definition of any particular society or discourse’ (Breckenridge et al., 2002, 1). Talk of cosmopolitanisms is far too woolly. We are not out to celebrate diversity as an end in itself but to show that our cosmopolitanism is the best guarantor of cultural and other forms of valuable diversity and that it must be fought for in a tented field on which differing and not always compatible forms of cosmopolitanism are doing battle. What the fixation with diversity neglects, as Eagleton again has made clear, is that ‘there are certain key political struggles that someone is going
Competing Cosmopolitanisms 23
to have to win and someone will have to lose’ (Eagleton, 1993, 124). Better this unabashed partisanship than the impossibly vague notions that ‘[c]osmopolitanism is infinite ways of being’ and that ‘we already are and have always been cosmopolitan, though we may not always have known it’ (Breckenridge et al., 2002, 12). The postcolonial field’s second school of thought on cosmopolitanism, which is less circumspect than the first and has more or less eclipsed it, celebrates the advent of a condition in which borders between peoples and regions are rapidly being dismantled. Its most prominent exponents in postcolonial circles are writers like Homi Bhabha (2004) and Arjun Appadurai (1997), but the field is shared with countless less well-known scholars whose work explores the practices of hybridity, migration and diaspora. For these thinkers the experience of migration and the increasingly cosmopolitan character of culture (in particular, of communications and patterns of consumption) are outstripping the culture of the nation, which is where exclusion and oppression take place. Appadurai is ‘convinced that the nation-state, as a complex modern political form, is on its last legs’ (1997, 19). So too, apparently, are dreams of ethnic purity, moral sympathies and ‘communities of sentiment’ circumscribed by national borders, as well as the similarly passé belief that the world is divided up into powerful states and comparatively powerless ones. Globalisation for Appadurai constitutes ‘a complex overlapping, disjunctive order that cannot any longer be understood in terms of existing center-periphery models’ (1997, 32). Similarly, Homi Bhabha asserts that ‘it is from those who have suffered the sentence of history – subjugation, domination, diaspora, displacement – that we learn our most enduring lessons for living and thinking’ (2004, 246). Bhabha accentuates what he calls a normative ‘third space’ brought into being as a result of the contacts engineered by colonialism in which conflicts between cultures are bridged by negotiation and communication. At its most extreme the celebratory rhetoric of cosmopolitanism becomes a marketing strategy, a kind of flashy greasepaint used to hide the persistent repulsiveness of neo-liberal capitalism. G. Pascal Zachary’s odd book The Global Me: New Cosmopolitans and the Competitive Edge: Picking Globalism’s Winners and Losers (2000) is a particularly egregious case in point. The senior writer at the Wall Street Journal’s London Bureau sets out to show how individuals who cross cultural boundaries can triumph in the global marketplace. But of course cosmopolitanism is emptied of all substantive meaning when it is used to denote rapacious corporate power. Zachary’s book at least has the virtue of reminding
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us that there is more than one type of cosmopolitanism. Essentially, there is the substantive cosmopolitanism being developed by thinkers and movements agitating for cultural dialogue, for just institutions, for social and economic equality, and for the disinterested application of international law; then there is the superficial cosmopolitanism of ideologues like Zachary who wish to hide capitalism’s snarling features behind a multicultural mask. The third, socialist, school is characterised principally by its impatience with this sort of rhetoric and with the implication in works like Appadurai’s that the evils of inequality, exploitation and excessive state power that have attended capitalism since its inception are now a thing of the past. For a very trenchant critic like Timothy Brennan, cosmopolitanism is ‘less an analytical category than a normative projection’ (1997, 1), a kind of ideology that works to conceal the larger part of the world’s population that is still vulnerable to the enduring power and centrality of the nation state, and that remains at the mercy of a global order that is, alas, as systematic and as unequal as it ever was. The positions held by critics in the socialist school merit somewhat lengthier consideration because they constitute some of the most pertinent criticisms made by postcolonial scholars of the practice and ideal of cosmopolitanism. If cosmopolitanism proves robust enough to withstand their barbs, as I believe it will, then it will undoubtedly emerge with what its leftist critics have been urging: a much stronger focus on the political and critical aspects of the cosmopolitan project. What needs to be avoided like the plague, in the eyes of Brennan, Benita Parry and Aijaz Ahmad, is the precipitate rhetoric that Michael Mann has described as ‘breathless transnationalism’ (1995, 117–18), that Tom Nairn (less forgivingly) has called ‘departure lounge internationalism’ (2000, 148) and Andrew Smith (still less forgivingly) has dubbed ‘the “free-air-miles” sentiment in postcolonial theory’. This sentiment forgets ‘that, for most people in the modern world, migration is a terrifying option. Without the right circumstances of birth or bank account the majority of the world’s population remain intractably in place and very distant from the celebration of a newly mobile, hybrid order’ (Smith, 2004, 245–6). Likewise, Parry warns against ‘[t]he use of “diaspora” as a synonym for a new kind of cosmopolitanism’ because, though it is certainly relevant to émigré writers, artists, academics, intellectuals, and professionals […] it can entail forgetfulness about that other, economically enforced dispersal of the poor from Africa, Asia, Latin
Competing Cosmopolitanisms 25
America, and the Caribbean – the vast numbers of contract workers, casual laborers, or domestic servants in Europe, North America, and the Gulf States, undocumented immigrants, refugees, asylum seekers, and victims of ethnic cleansing – whose passage is largely coerced and who encounter punitive barriers hindering the movement of populations from South and East to North and West. (Parry, 2004a, 73) For the socialist school, the celebration of globalisation and cosmopolitanism pays insufficient attention to the fact that colonialism was and is characterised at least as much by violence, conflict and exploitation as it is by interactions and ‘third spaces’. Globalisation, in other words, is volatile and uneven. Furthermore, continuing inequality and poverty are more salient features of the current dispensation than cultural hybridity. Not all (nor even a significant minority) of the world’s citizens are exemplars of free movement between places and identities; more often they are victims of situations in which mobility is not an option or in which actual mobility is usually coerced and traumatic. There persists an offensive asymmetry between, on the one hand, the extraterritorial elites and corporations that seek to detach themselves from legal and political constraints and, on the other, the exploitable mass of labour divided up, as ever, into confined spaces. ‘If the new exterritoriality of the elite feels like intoxicating freedom’, in the sociologist Zygmunt Bauman’s words, ‘the territoriality of the rest feels less like home ground, and ever more like prison – all the more humiliating for the obtrusive sight of the others’ freedom to move’ (1999, 18). Those who do move are usually chased from their native places by war and ecological collapse or are condemned to flee by the desperate pursuit of sanctuary or employment. To celebrate the advent of a truly cosmopolitan culture is to defer a concerted political engagement with the causes of these misfortunes. In a very biting critique of what he calls ‘cosmo-theory’ Brennan describes a disturbing ‘continuity between the discourse of globalization in government planning and the discourse of cosmopolitanism in the humanities’ (2006, 211). Cosmopolitanism, in other words, like globalisation for James Petras and Henry Veltmeyer, ‘is an ideological tool used for prescription rather than accurate description’ (2001, 12). It amounts to what Paul Smith has called a ‘millennial dream’ (1997) embraced by gullible academics whose intoxication with a rhetoric of flows, exchanges, networks, diasporas, hybrids and nomads makes them heedless of the profoundly uneven access to the privileges of travel
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and cultural eclecticism, and of the blatant endurance of poverty and inequality. In Aijaz Ahmad’s words: It is not at all clear how the celebration of a postcolonial, transnational, electronically produced cultural hybridity is to be squared with this systematic decay of countries and continents and with decreasing chances for substantial proportions of the global population to obtain conditions of bare survival, let alone electronic literacy and gadgetry. (Ahmad, 1995, 6) Peter Gowan too condemns what he calls ‘the new liberal cosmopolitanism’ (2003) beloved of ‘third way’ politicians, corporate mission statements and the mainstream media, which envisions a fractious globe united by the free market and led by altruistic states that put human rights before national sovereignty. For Gowan this naive vision has not replaced the power politics of the United States and its allies. In Leo Panitch’s words, those who focus on global trade at the expense of less seemly realities like exploitation and war ‘can’t see the bombs for the bananas’ (2000, 20). Similarly, the existing institutions of global governance are patchy at best. At worst they are disguised manifestations of US power. The Security Council of the United Nations, the World Trade Organisation, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank are all ostensibly cosmopolitan bodies that in practice, as the renegade former World Bank economist Joseph Stiglitz has remarked, are ‘dominated not just by the wealthiest industrial countries but by commercial and financial interests in those countries’ (2002, 18). Advocates of cosmopolitanism are, in Brennan’s phrase, ‘globalization’s unlikely champions’ (2006, 126–44). Their function, if not their intention, is to camouflage corporate and military expansion. Brennan argues that postcolonial theorists’ inattention to the endurance of imperialism and to its inseparability from capitalism makes them peculiarly susceptible to the misconception that globalisation, via the development of trade and advances in technology and communications, is bringing national chauvinism as well as the world economy’s imbalances to an end. When it is applied to formerly colonised but still subjugated peoples and nations, the very term ‘postcolonial’ acts as a euphemism. It disguises contemporary forms of imperial power or else invites us to consider poverty and under-development to be the legacies of a colonial past rather than the effects of a neo-colonial present. Our discipline’s moniker is indicative of a preference for addressing the
Competing Cosmopolitanisms 27
results of European colonialism not its contemporary manifestations. Brennan complains of a widespread neglect and even ignorance of older traditions of investigating the close connections between imperialism and capitalist globalisation: those of Marx, Lenin and Hobson; the dependency theory of Andre Gunder Frank and Walter Rodney; the world-systems theory of Samir Amin and Immanuel Wallerstein; anticolonial nationalism; and third international communism (Brennan, 2002). Without reference to those traditions it becomes possible to overlook capital accumulation as a driving force of colonial violence and to point the finger instead at nation states. As in Appadurai’s work, the weakening of the nation state by capital flows is then seen as unambiguously positive since it allows us to transcend ethnic chauvinism and gives rise to new transnational identities. Capitalism, colonialism’s cause, is celebrated as its antidote! Hence the charge levelled at postcolonial studies in the work of critics like Aijaz Ahmad (1992, 1995), Arif Dirlik (1997) and Epifanio San Juan (1998) that postcolonialists, far from being the opponents of contemporary imperialism or its obituarists, are actually its beneficiaries and propagandists. In the eyes of the socialist school that I am discussing, one of the chief flaws of the celebratory rhetoric of cosmopolitanism is its failure to recognise the continued importance of the nation and the state (San Juan, 1998, 196–226). The assumption that the nation state is withering away takes no account of the massive proliferation of nation states in the last twenty years, of the efflorescence of ethnic nationalisms, of corporations’ dependence on states and nations, and, crucially, of the progressive possibilities of nation-based political struggles. Despite the internationalist cant of business magnates the nation state is, as the Pakistani intellectual Eqbal Ahmad observed as long ago as the early 1980s, the indispensable structure that guarantees and protects corporate profits. Their claims to internationalism and transcendence are belied by a mundane reality: big businesses have much to protect in the world, especially from the forces of national liberation, but few means of doing so except to employ the coercive capabilities of certain states. No corporation owns an army, air force, or navy. Yet one knows from three centuries of experience that these military forces are ultimately necessary to protect corporate investments and perpetuate the exploitation of people and their resources. Nothing has changed this fundamental reality which, since the advent of modern imperialism, has defined the symbiosis between monopoly capitalism and imperial states. (Ahmad, 2006, 210)
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As Leo Panitch too has argued, ‘states, and above all the world’s most powerful state, have played an active and often crucial role in making globalization happen. Increasingly, they are now encumbered with the responsibility of sustaining it’ (2000, 5). Far from it being the case that unstoppable market forces are rendering the state obsolete, the state has in fact abetted the global propagation of capitalism (Harvey, 2005, 64–86). Despite its anti-state rhetoric, capitalism requires a limited role for the state only in the area of social provision. It invents ever more tasks for the state to perform in criminalising dissent, maintaining ‘security’, hampering trades unions, surveilling citizens, removing regulations on businesses while inflicting them on the poor and unemployed, transferring vast sums of public money into private hands via a permanent arms economy, and subsidising and occasionally bailing out supposedly self-sufficient corporations. Risk and cost are the responsibility of the state; only power and profit have been privatised (Chomsky, 1998; Panitch, 2000). Nevertheless Brennan is quick to insist that nation states also offer an opportunity to subject unaccountable sources of power to the rule of law, to provide welfare and other social services, to regulate economic activity and to distribute its proceeds fairly (2003). In various articles, in his At Home in the World: Cosmopolitanism Now (1997), and more recently in his 2006 book Wars of Position, Brennan argues that a hasty desire to transcend the nation state and to celebrate a new trans-national order is likely to overlook the fact that for impoverished citizens excluded from the oases of affluence that characterise neo-liberal globalisation, nation states remain the sites at which they must direct their political energies and of which they must take charge if they are to redress their grievances: ‘in the current phase of worldwide neo-liberal hegemony, they also offer a manageable (albeit top-heavy) site within which the working poor can make limited claims on power, and have at least some opportunity to affect the way they are ruled’ (Brennan, 2003, 40). One’s critique of the nation state, Brennan continues, must be subtle enough to distinguish constructive uses of it (to subject rootless corporations to the rule of law and to provide citizens with welfare, education and health care) from oppressive ones (to incarcerate citizens unjustly, to silence, torture and murder them, to underwrite corporate power and enforce cultural homogeneity). We need, in other words, to resist the temptation to make our hostility to state power so total that ‘[t]he terror dome of the Paraguayan dictator Alfredo Stroessner is rendered equivalent to Roosevelt’s New Deal or Hugo Chavez’s Venezuela’ (Brennan, 2006, 19). We urgently need a more nuanced and discriminating theory
Competing Cosmopolitanisms 29
of nationalism, one that does not just write it off as a ‘retrograde ideology’ (Breckenridge et al., 2002, 3). Nationalism has much to offer. Abandoning sovereignty in some abstract cosmopolis might be very attractive for those whose modernity was engineered in the first place by a strong state and who now stand to gain economically from the pooling of statehoods. As Tom Nairn points out, the prospect is less beguiling for those, such as the Kurds or the Palestinians or even the Scots and the Flemish, who have been denied the prosperity that political independence helps to facilitate or the political recognition that the possession of a nation state commands (2000, 150). They do not wish to pool sovereignty for they have no sovereignty to pool. Additionally, it is only on the basis of the nation state, as Neil Lazarus (1997) maintains, that capitalism can be destabilised. This is not because control over the nation state is the ultimate goal of socialist politics. Far from it; the capture of state power is for Marxist thinkers like Brennan, Lazarus and Parry, as for Lenin (1990), Trotsky (1969) and even Fidel Castro (1972, 2001), the first step in that power’s dissolution. Alas, we cannot, as the miller’s daughter did to Rumpelstilzchen, make our adversary disappear simply by pronouncing its name; rather, we must capture, control, subdue and dissolve it. Likewise, the conquest of the nation state is not an end in itself but a stage in the liquidation of nation states. The state and the nation are among the obstacles that must be tackled and removed before the goal – a world without states and nations – can be reached. For the socialist school in postcolonial theory, cosmopolitanism is a straightforward ideology. Arif Dirlik, one of the postcolonial field’s most persistent critics, has bemoaned what he sees as its retreat from Marxism’s dialectical models of conflict towards morally dubious and politically unavailing motifs of interaction and hybridity. Contemporary postcolonial criticism privileges the ‘liminal, subaltern figures’ of ‘the excluded middle’ over the antithetical categories of colonizer and colonized, which in many ways have ceased to be antithetical as the boundary dividing them has been called into question for its essentialist and homogenizing assumptions. In stressing the experiential aspects of colonial encounters over their structural context, postcolonial criticism has moved past ‘Manichean’ divisions between the colonizer and the colonized, and even the ‘spectral excluded middle’, to stress ‘borderlands’ conditions, where the domination of one by the other yields before boundary crossings, hybridities, mutual appropriations, and, especially, the everyday resistance
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of the colonized to the colonizer. This new emphasis helps give voice to the victimized but, in the process of rescuing the colonized from voicelessness, also blurs the depth of the victimization colonialism visited upon its ‘objects’. (Dirlik, 2002, 433) Dirlik’s claim, doubtless exaggerated for polemical effect, is that for fear of being branded ‘essentialist’ and in order to avoid sketching reductive or patronising oppositions between the all-powerful coloniser and his helpless victims, many postcolonial critics have bent the stick too far in the opposite direction and forgotten the elemental truth that colonialism is by definition about conflict and power. Rash assertions of an achieved equality between cultures have even led, as Lazarus has complained, to a situation in which the ‘the staggeringly intensive and often quite systematic deployment of violence over the course of a couple of hundred years is in danger, today, in the name of a certain “postcolonial prerogative”, of being forgotten’ (Lazarus, 2001, 438). To speak unguardedly, as Bhabha does, of ‘the negotiation of colonial power-relations’ (2004, 292) is to mischaracterise the relationship between coloniser and colonised quite as grievously as Orientalism did in implying an absolute and insuperable difference or antipathy between them. ‘The necessary intimacies that obtain between ruler and ruled’, Sara Suleri argues in her book on British rule in India, ‘create a counterculture not always explicable in terms of an allegory of otherness’ (1992, 3). Suleri hastens to show that colonialism’s victims are not radically different, exotic and unknowable ‘others’. Yet by displaying the ‘intimate’ connections between cultures she succeeds in blurring the difference between the powerfulness of the one and the comparative powerlessness (or at least oppression) of the other. The history of colonialism is made to look more like one of friendly collaboration than of exploitation and slaughter. The so-called ‘colonial encounter’ is likened (or better, reduced) to a sort of get-together between interlocutors not (as it unquestionably was) an unequal conflict between combatants. Statements like Suleri’s surely invite a corrective dose of what Bertolt Brecht famously called plumpes denken or crude thinking: an unsophisticated but entirely salutary reminder that colonial domination, though it may once in a while be the cause of what Bhabha (2004) calls ambivalence, mimicry and hybridity, as well as numerous other forms of cultural cross-fertilisation, entails additionally and much more importantly the systematic exploitation and even the unnatural curtailment of hundreds of millions of human lives. All talk of ‘intimacy’ and
Competing Cosmopolitanisms 31
‘negotiation’, in other words, ought to be juxtaposed with reminders that between 1890 and the beginning of the First World War the plundering of the Congo by Leopold and his mercenaries caused somewhere between eight and ten million deaths (Hochschild, 2006). When the Herero and Namaqua of what is now Namibia revolted against their German conquerors in 1904 they provoked from General von Trotha not an ambivalent ‘colonial encounter’ but a campaign of extermination. Many were slain; the rest were driven into the desert where they starved to death. Similarly, references to the cultural transactions that took place under the British Raj, no matter how cordial and auspicious they may occasionally have been, should always be accompanied by an acknowledgement that the catastrophic droughts and famines in nineteenth-century India led (via the negligence and inhumanity of British colonial administrators) to one of the most appalling events in human history and, as Mike Davis (2002) has shown, sowed the seeds of the third world’s enduring underdevelopment. Such ‘crude thinking’ should today be applied to Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s Empire. For Hardt and Negri the revolution has already taken place: ‘proletarian internationalism actually “won” […] [W]hat they fought for came about despite their defeat’ (2001, 50)! Hardt and Negri claim that imperialism is no longer directed by any single colonial power (xiv) and that capitalism is being beneficially transformed by the flights of migrants, by ‘[n]ew figures of struggle and new subjectivities, [that] are produced in the conjuncture of events, in the universal nomadism, in the general mixture and miscegenation of populations, and in the technological metamorphoses of the imperial biopolitical machine’ (61). This sort of ecstatic rhetoric, as Bashir Abu-Manneh (2003) points out, acclaims as revolutionary movements of populations that are usually the results of coercion and exploitation, or else of unemployment and deprivation. These professedly communist philosophers present a picture of a utopian cosmopolis of equality and free movement in a world in which thirty thousand children under five die every day of preventable diseases and in which comparable numbers of people fall victim annually to the practice of human trafficking. Uncounted millions have been raped, murdered and displaced in the interminable armed conflict in today’s Democratic Republic of Congo. Despite its galloping economic growth half of India’s people live in poverty and half its children are malnourished. The colonial situation, I am suggesting, in agreement with what I am calling the socialist school of postcolonial criticism, is neither ambiguous nor serendipitous but inexcusable and radically objectionable. Without question, this
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situation is ongoing, no matter how insistently we champion the goals of cosmopolitanism.
‘A cosmopolitanism worthy of the name’ It might be objected that the complex accounts of cosmopolitanism formulated by thinkers in the postcolonial field actually have little in common with the discrete schools of thought on cosmopolitanism that I have been describing. It is true that until now I have exaggerated the unanimity within these schools and the extent of the differences between them. For though there undoubtedly are differences of emphasis, all the critics mentioned so far have adopted multifaceted positions on the question of cosmopolitanism. There is no reason, therefore, why all of these different ‘schools’ cannot unite behind a collective position. Each position has its strengths and weaknesses; to enumerate these is thus to allow the strengths of each school to correct the weaknesses of the others. For example, an obvious shortcoming of the celebratory school that I have associated with Bhabha and Appadurai is that it acclaims cosmopolitanism without sufficient regard for the obstacles that forestall cosmopolitanism’s realisation. It is, in other words, a form of cosmopolitanism that neglects, underestimates or simply fails to notice the political work, frequently at the level of the nation state, that needs to be done in order to bring cosmopolitanism about. However, the celebrants of cosmopolitanism are not so naive as their opponents make out. Even such an enthusiastic proponent of trans-national identities as Homi Bhabha, though many of his critics have not yet recognised it, was prepared to admit as long ago as 1991 that I don’t think we can eliminate the concept of the nation altogether, at a time when in many parts of the world – in South Africa, in Eastern Europe – people are actually living and dying for that form of society. You can’t completely do away with the nation as an idea or as a political structure, but you can acknowledge its historical limitations for our time. (1991, 82; emphasis in the original) No postcolonial critic is so jejune that he or she is naive enough to endorse the indefensible claim made by Thomas Friedman (2007), the New York Times columnist and globalisation cheerleader, that we live in a ‘flat world’ levelled by the global marketplace and the internet. The real strengths of the celebratory current include its capacity to sketch
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an auspicious and at times utopian vision of cultural interaction which forms a very instructive and critical contrast with our decidedly uncosmopolitan present. Even its stress on the actuality of cosmopolitan relationships, which tends to mistake the value of cultural interaction for the fact of an achieved cosmopolitanism, at least has the benefit of preventing the goal of cosmopolitanism receding from view and, furthermore, of identifying the contacts, arrangements and cultural forms in which cosmopolitan sentiment is germinating here and now. Again, Bhabha has called our attention to those whose experiences of our economically and politically unequal globe are very far from cosmopolitan in any simplistic or celebratory sense: ‘The enslaved, the colonized, the untouchable dalits earn and learn their way through a world culture as a way of understanding not simply its glories but its horrors, not simply its major events but its small, forgotten voices’ (2002, 23). In other words, a responsible cosmopolitan outlook entails cognisance of those impoverished and immobile citizens presently prevented from helping to shape the world order. Indeed Bhabha now writes less of hybridity than of what he calls ‘vernacular cosmopolitanism’ (2004, ix), which is an experience more grounded in the complex lived reality of the world’s citizens. The preface to the most recent edition of his seminal Location of Culture focuses, as ever, on peoples who move between cultural traditions and develop hybrid forms of life and art. Yet Bhabha now takes care to stress that a ‘global cosmopolitanism’ of prosperity and privilege founded on free market forces and neo-liberal forms of governance is restricted at present to an elite. In celebrating a ‘world culture’ or ‘world markets’ this mode of cosmopolitanism moves swiftly and selectively from one island of prosperity to yet another terrain of technological productivity, paying conspicuously less attention to the persistent inequality and immiseration produced by such unequal and uneven development. (2004, xiv) Moreover, globalisation, he writes, ‘must always begin at home’ (xv), addressing problems of diversity and redistribution at the local level before endeavouring to instate a hybrid global village. Cosmopolitanism should be vernacular because it needs to be measured from the perspective of those whom it currently excludes. Similarly, those critics for whom the protection of cultural diversity is paramount are both right and wrong. They are right because diversity is under threat from the concentration of media ownership and the
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promiscuous penetration of the globe by corporations, and because without significant variety in outlooks, inclinations, identities and tastes cosmopolitanism would be a monochromatic, conformist and frankly uninteresting condition. They are wrong, however, because the affirmation of difference is only half the battle. This is not least because an abstract appeal to cultural diversity is meaningless unless one is prepared to consider it a universal norm and thus countenance the possibility of establishing laws and institutions capable of ensuring the universal recognition of the rights of others. In other words, if we wish to create diversity, to adapt a remark of Raymond Williams, we need to create more than diversity.1 It is on the basis of practical solidarity, interaction and negotiation, and ultimately of democratic institutions and the comprehensive rule of law, that important differences in taste, inclination, talent and identity will thrive. Cosmopolitanism need not override or sacrifice difference. On the contrary, cosmopolitanism may be the best means of guaranteeing it. For diversity to flourish a certain amount of uniformity is necessary. Individuals, communities and nations have distinctive traditions, potentials and inclinations, and to fight for a situation in which they would have the opportunity to explore fully these divergent gifts is perhaps the foremost objective of political action. Yet for such differences to flourish others have to be abolished. The difference between those who enjoy rights and the rule of law and those who lack either of these things must be removed so that differences in outlook and culture can be allowed to survive and prosper. Cosmopolitanism, therefore, does not equal homogeneity but seeks, on the contrary, to lay down the conditions that must generally prevail in order for difference to be safeguarded and encouraged. It would entail laws, rights and institutions designed to ensure equality as well as, flourishing on and protected by this basis, the greatest possible cultural distinctiveness. The world as it is currently organised is not cut out to ensure this. Far from being able to guarantee diversity, capitalist imperialism is stamping it out. At present we have the worst of both worlds: both a globe that is shrinking and losing its diversity and, frequently in reaction to (and as a kind of compensation for) this uniform culture, an efflorescence of militant particularisms in the forms of nationalism and religious fanaticism. The obverse side of capitalist globalisation, as Slavoj Žižek has claimed, is Balkanisation: maximum uniformity combined with maximum fragmentation (1999, 215–21). Nor does cosmopolitanism reject localism in favour of an uncritical celebration of global civil society, largely because it is conscious that supra-national institutions like the World Bank are dominated by
Competing Cosmopolitanisms 35
powerful states and that humanitarian NGOs are sometimes prey to those states’ selfish agendas. Cosmopolitanism entails loyalty not to this global order but to a different one based on grassroots social movements and to the promise of equality latent in, for example, international law and the UN Charter. It therefore presupposes local forms of resistance. To inaugurate an alternative global order would in the first instance require opting out of (or as the Egyptian economist Samir Amin puts it ‘delinking’ from) the present one. For Amin, the ‘newly industrialising’ or ‘developing’ countries are not, as such terms imply, simply lagging behind the advanced economies; rather, their impoverishment is the condition of the first world’s prosperity. They must resign from this system in the short term in order to make possible the creation of a more just system in the long term. Disintegration of the system […] is not a negative phenomenon. On the contrary it is the most advanced form of construction of a genuinely multipolar world; it also provides the objective basis for a new internationalism of peoples, if the various social forces that refuse subjection to the logic of worldwide capitalist expansion can come together to define their minimum shared objectives and offer each other mutual support. (Amin, 1990, 78) The cosmopolitanism that I am espousing resembles this radical alternative to the status quo. It too presupposes an initial seizure of sovereignty followed by sovereignty’s voluntary dilution, a vision that may be vulnerable to criticism on the grounds of its likelihood or feasibility but not because it is millenarian and coercive. This emphasis on free volition opens up the prospect of a cosmopolitanism capable of combining difference with community, local and national solidarities with larger trans-national ones. In any case, negotiation between the various levels of organisation and affiliation is the normal business of politics. This complex give-and-take would not be suspended in a cosmopolitan polity so much as greatly intensified, as Raymond Williams once said of socialism (1989b, 295–313). Hence David Held’s stress on ‘multiple citizenships’ whereby individuals are ‘citizens of their immediate political communities, and of the wider regional and global networks which impact upon their lives’ (1996, 233). Cosmopolitanism need not be a behemoth that swallows us up. The problem thrown into relief by an examination of the sceptical school is this: the safeguarding of diversity is one of cosmopolitanism’s dearest objectives, but too great
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a stress on the fundamental differences between societies and cultures tends to result in an unavailing (or at least insufficient) politics that values distinctive identities at the expense of any meaningful common engagement. It can lead to what Gayatri Spivak calls a ‘wishy-washy pluralism’ (1990a, 104) that fails to tackle (and might even reproduce) the divisions put in place by imperialism. Likewise, the socialist position has advantages as well as disadvantages. Critics like Brennan and Parry point to the considerable obstacles represented by capitalism, imperialism and the nation state. They thus make it less likely that we will sell cosmopolitanism short by confusing it with neo-liberal globalisation. On the other hand, both their often intemperate insistence that capitalism and the nation state must be tackled before we are distracted by talk of the cosmopolitan condition and their brusque dismissal of cosmopolitan proposals and mission statements as forms of naive or furtive collusion with the status quo have potentially deleterious consequences. As Daniele Archibugi has noted, Brennan leaves himself open to the charge of devoting ‘far more space to critical analysis of the present situation than to concrete proposals for a way out of it’ (2003b, 265). A blinkered fixation with the uncosmopolitan present is every bit as off beam as a credulous announcement of the arrival of a cosmopolitan future. For a start, it risks losing sight of, postponing, even slighting as foolish and impractical, the possibility of a post-national, post-statist and post-capitalist future. It should be remembered, however, that the necessity of postnational and post-statist institutions and loyalties and the view that the germs of a post-capitalist mode of production are contained in the womb of the present one are both central planks of the Marxist tradition to which these thinkers adhere. In the end, however, no socialist critique of capitalism is so fixated with the here and now that it loses sight entirely of the there and then of a transformed and cosmopolitan future. The strident anticosmopolitanism of socialist critics like Parry is combined in their work with a stress on the global level at which capitalism must be confronted and at which alternative institutions and relationships must be realised. Their nationalism is a result of their hostility to nations, one might say, their focus on state power derives from their wish to rid themselves of states, and finally their aversion to cosmopolitanism is the outcome of their wish to tackle and supplant capitalism definitively and comprehensively before they announce its demise. These are paradoxical positions certainly, though a better word for them might be ‘dialectical’. Despite their distaste for the term, critics like Brennan and Parry are
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not opposed to the goals of the radically political cosmopolitanism that I am sketching in this study. To the contrary, as Parry declares, ‘those who regard themselves as anti-imperialist should surely acknowledge the urge towards and the practice of a borderless resistance to capitalism’s unbounded oppression’ (2004b, 102). They are sceptical rather of the sort of premature cosmopolitanism that dooms itself to failure by not first tackling the undiminished power of capitalism and capitalism’s indispensable conduit, the nation state. Given that the uprooting of populations and the entanglement of economies has already taken place, the point of cultural and political work for Brennan is not to flee from the global, but to socialize it. No doubt global economic restructuring has forced on everyone the need to build new international forms of communication and mutual support […] To conceive of one’s political goals or cultural objectives on a uniquely national basis has never been the position of a left culturalism, and it is not mine. (1997, 307–8) The task, as he puts it, is ‘to build a cosmopolitanism worthy of the name’ (2003, 309). Moreover, political organisation at the level of the nation state is not inconsistent with the goals of cosmopolitanism. Cosmopolitanism can, as Fredric Jameson (2000) has argued, be accomplished through or via rather than in spite of nationalism. Jameson regrets that the globalisation of capital (that is, the capacity of corporations to devastate local labour markets by transferring or by threatening to transfer their operations to cheaper locations overseas) has not yet been counteracted by a comparable globalisation of the labour movement. Jeremy Brecher, Tim Costello and Brendan Smith call this counter-globalisation ‘globalization from below’ (2000), Tom Mertes calls it ‘grass-roots globalism’ (2003), and Paul Gilroy observes ‘a new cosmopolitanism centred on the global south’ (2005, 289). Because the ‘new social movements’ (Mertes, 2004) are hampered by the constitution of political communities and institutions largely at the national level they must organise locally as well as globally.2 But ‘the struggle against globalization’, as Jameson claims, ‘though it may partially be fought on national terrain, cannot be successfully prosecuted to a conclusion in completely national or nationalist terms’ (2000, 66).3 As Alejandro Colás has argued, ‘cosmopolitan political action would actually involve the defence of social and political rights via the democratic nation-state’ (1994, 533). We have
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to work through the national towards the global, establishing rights and democracy at the level of the former in order to then guarantee and extend these at the level of the latter. All things considered, what we are faced with are less discrete schools than differing emphases. In fact, postcolonialists are currently refining a variety of cosmopolitanism capable of reconciling seemingly contradictory objectives. Combined as they are in the work of the figures mentioned thus far, those preoccupations point to a unified, albeit multifaceted and distinctively postcolonial cosmopolitanism. This united position is conscious of the need to think and to campaign at the local and national levels, whilst at the same time thinking and campaigning at the level of trans-national institutions and arrangements. In other words, we do not have to choose between the local and the global, for we can and must do both at the same time. Cosmopolitanism involves reconciling local attachments with global allegiances. Thus, Mitchell Cohen has talked of a ‘rooted cosmopolitanism’ (1992) and Kwame Appiah of a ‘cosmopolitan patriotism’ (1997). Cosmopolitanism, then, obliges us to work on the local or national level as well as, at the same time, on the global or cosmopolitan one that is our ultimate objective. Indeed, as well as being in two places at once cosmopolitanism also requires us, in a sense, to occupy two times. We need to think of a way in which we can face up to and work politically within our uncosmopolitan present (a time, as Parry and others rightly point out, of immense division and inequality) without losing sight of the desirability and feasibility of a cosmopolitan future.
Conclusion Cosmopolitan theory, as the authors of Global Transformations contend, needs to acknowledge the potential for, as well as the current absence of cosmopolitanism. ‘Far from being a world of “discrete civilizations”, or simply an international society of states, it has become a fundamentally interconnected global order, marked by intense patterns of exchange as well as by clear patterns of power, hierarchy and unevenness’ (Held et al., 1999, 49). What all this is intended to demonstrate, therefore, is that the two terms in my title should be given equal weight. I seek, in other words, to lay just as much emphasis on criticism as upon cosmopolitanism, to draw attention to the contumacious and oppositional mindset required to recognise the absence of a cosmopolitan world and to bring it about at the same time as accentuating the sense of global solidarity needed to imagine such a world and sustain it. It would be
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a mistake, therefore, to think that these different theoretical schools have nothing in common. Notwithstanding their disagreements, what has hopefully emerged from a consideration of existing approaches in postcolonial studies is a distinctively dialectical understanding of cosmopolitanism: one that combines an attachment to diversity with a recognition of the need for community; political action at the level of the nation state with political action at a global level; and hard-headed awareness of the insufficiently cosmopolitan present with cognisance of the necessity and desirability of a cosmopolitan future. Therefore, the most promising stance on cosmopolitanism in the postcolonial field combines elements of all these approaches. This is the approach that I am calling ‘cosmopolitan criticism’. Our task is to find ways of thinking – simultaneously – the absence (or rather the latency) as well as the urgent desirability of the cosmopolitan condition. As the next chapter argues, this is what postcolonial literary criticism ought to do: convey the undiminished power, divisiveness and exploitativeness of imperialism whilst articulating the need, hope and the currently germinating potential for an effective supersession of imperialism in the shape of cosmopolitan arrangements.
3 Cosmopolitan Criticism
It ought to strike us as a curious fact that thinkers involved in the ‘cosmopolitical democracy project’ have overlooked literature as a potential source of cosmopolitan sentiment. For as Raymond Williams once argued, the task of constructing an emancipated society is surely ‘one of feeling and imagination quite as much as one of fact and organization’ (1989b, 76). It is a cultural as well as a political undertaking and therefore entails not just the regulation of economic activity but also the re-imagining and even the invention of new and more meaningful forms of human relationship. If cosmopolitan institutions are to be legitimate, sustainable and effective – indeed, if citizens are to will them into being in the first place as instruments of popular sovereignty – then cosmopolitan values, principles and ideals must perforce be encouraged. My claim in this chapter is that it is worth exploring encounters with postcolonial literature as one way of encouraging the aptitudes required to imagine, contrive and then sustain cosmopolitan institutions. A theory of cosmopolitan criticism would demonstrate how reading postcolonial literature can exemplify and engender the critical consciousness and the global solidarities that are required to uphold cosmopolitan political arrangements. My focus here, therefore, is on the capacities presupposed by effective cosmopolitan action. To be explicit, the qualities potentially instilled by an intelligent engagement with postcolonial literature are more or less indistinguishable from the democratic and cosmopolitan outlook presupposed by what Janna Thompson (2001) has called ‘planetary citizenship’.1
Worldliness This book is an assertion of the importance (though not, of course, the paramountcy) of literary reading in the cosmopolitan project. Reading 40
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postcolonial literature is obviously not the only way (nor is it among the most important or widely available) of creating citizens who are far-sighted enough to acknowledge obligations to people in distant countries and who are also in possession of the kinds of critical awareness required to overturn parochial ideologies and institutions. Plainly, it is not even among the most promising of such methods, given the possibility of reading postcolonial texts in ways other than those which I shall recommend and given also the significant obstacles of literacy, education, time, capital and inclination that lie between the vast majority of people and the experience of literary reading. One needs to stress too the ways in which postcolonial texts are often filtered and marketed in the West by publishers and universities. Such processes of mediation are at best selective and tendentious. We have access in the West to a tiny and unrepresentative portion of the literary output of the rest of the world. Moreover, we are often subliminally encouraged to read those texts that do reach us in ways that flatter rather than challenge our preconceptions (Huggan, 2001; Lazarus, 2005a). It would be Pollyannaish to claim too much importance and value for literature or to argue that encounters with postcolonial texts invariably result in constructive forms of moral and political engagement. Surely T.S. Eliot’s riposte to I.A. Richards is still valid: ‘Poetry “is capable of saving us”, he says; it is like saying that the wall-paper will save us when the walls have crumbled’ (quoted in McDonald, 2002, 104). In the same vein Edward Said contends that ‘in an age of the mass media and what I have called the manufacture of consent, it is Panglossian to imagine that the careful reading of a few works of art considered humanistically, professionally, or aesthetically significant is anything but a private activity with only slender public consequences’ (Said, 1994a, 385). Undoubtedly this is true, but the alternative is not simply to cultivate our gardens. My own approach does at least have this merit: it poses the question of why we consider reading and teaching literature worthwhile in the first place. To be sure, literary reading is a marginal activity but is not for that reason valueless or inconsequential. For literary texts can give rise to the sort of self-critical examination of one’s own prejudices and loyalties as well as to the kind of far-reaching awareness that are inseparable from the idea of cosmopolitan citizenship. To put it plainly, they provide, in Kenneth Burke’s congenial phrase, ‘equipment for living’ (1973, 293–304). Not least because of their peculiar power to foreground questions of authority and therefore to encourage critical reflection on power and its consequences, literary representations actually call forth this critical attentiveness and this expansive awareness.
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Indeed, how much more penetrating is this critical sense and how much more far-reaching is that awareness when the situation on which literature invites us to reflect is overtly bound up with the legacies of colonialism and with the effects of neo-colonialism, is, in short, postcolonial? I want, therefore, to demonstrate that it is among the principal purposes of postcolonial literary criticism to address the ways in which postcolonial literature engenders a critical and ultimately moral and political response to contemporary imperialism. In my view, works of postcolonial literature provide a fascinating deviation from orthodox ways of understanding and representing the postcolonial world. Each encounter with them constitutes what Said, referring to musical performance, calls an ‘extreme occasion’ (Said, 1991, 17), a chance to engage in the sort of penetrating enquiry, the imaginative exploration and the prolonged self-scrutiny so often regarded as uncalled-for (but actually sorely required) in other practices, vocations and disciplines. It is the extremity of the literary occasion – that is, its suggestion of a peculiarly heightened, acute and invigorating form of experience as well, alas, as its frequent marginality in the face of other pressures – that makes it what Said, after Theodor Adorno, calls autonomous of ‘the ordinary, regular, or normative processes of everyday life’ (Said, 1991, 20). Poems and novels, as William Carlos Williams reminds us, do not easily divulge information. Nevertheless, they are one source of the kind of self-reflection and humane awareness that in time might develop into effective moral and political action: It is difficult to get the news from poems yet men die miserably every day for lack of what is found there. (Williams, 2000, 318) Informed awareness of other cultures and especially the capacity to reflect critically on one’s own are potential consequences of reading literary texts. This is only partly a result of the fact that postcolonial literature allows a diversity of voices from unfamiliar situations to contest one’s preconceptions. It is also, crucially, a result of literature’s distinctive and distinctively valuable ability to arouse in its readers a critical attitude or disposition. Literary texts are where voices are dramatised, reflected on and appraised. Characters’ voices are opposed and disputed
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by other characters, while the authority of authors and their narrators is rendered moot by their narratives’ manifestly partial (in both senses of that word) quality and, of course, by the patently fictional nature of the world they describe. Works of literature do not posit truth claims or authoritative statements but openly fallible and therefore contestable points of view: the poet ‘nothing affirms’, as Sir Philip Sidney put it in a classic formulation, ‘and therefore never lieth’ (Sidney, 1973, 123). This is another way of saying that the voices one attends to in literature are invariably imperfect, ironised and contestable: openly susceptible to and therefore actively soliciting the critical and evaluative rejoinders of their readers. Through encounters with different and unfamiliar perspectives and via an appreciation of the limitations of orthodox points of view, readers of postcolonial literature can acquire the kind of selfreflexiveness required to relativise and evaluate their own sometimes partial or even parochial outlook. Works of postcolonial literature are thus valuable sources of critique, discussion and discovery. Part of what I am saying, however, is that self-criticism is an important upshot of literary reading: that the authority assailed by postcolonial texts includes that of the reader’s preconceptions about the people and places which those texts dramatise. Though he doesn’t quite put the matter in the more explicitly political terms that I am using here, Kwame Appiah calls this approach ‘cosmopolitan reading’ (2001). I am, then, reaffirming the relevance of literary criticism in the face of the widespread disparagement of its importance, of the increasing annexation of the university system by the priorities and jargon of the corporate world, and, even more importantly, of the frequent heedlessness, complacency and insularity of the wider culture (Miyoshi, 1998 and 2000). Another way of saying this would be to concur with the French philosopher of hermeneutics Paul Ricoeur, whose work is discussed in the final section of this chapter, that ‘[o]ne of the aims of all hermeneutics is to struggle against cultural distance’ (1981, 159). Few academics in the humanities have been more dedicated to explaining and defending this proposition than the American critic Michael Bérubé. His work is a vindication of what he is not afraid to call ‘the utility of the arts and humanities’ (2006, 71–89). In his What’s Liberal About the Liberal Arts? Bérubé makes a very persuasive case for pedagogy dedicated to the processes of free discussion and inquiry. The humanities in general and literary studies in particular are worthwhile pursuits as well as popular targets for the political Right because they subject received truths like nationalism to critical scrutiny. ‘The true purpose of education’, Bérubé claims, ‘is to try to foster in students a kind of critical
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cosmopolitanism, such that they learn, among other things, to question any notion that one’s nation or tribe is favored by God or destiny’ (2007, 56). Other cultures must be studied and analysed so that one can learn to subject all beliefs and identities to criticism, to discuss them and expect them to justify themselves against rival points of view. As Martha Nussbaum argues in her Cultivating Humanity, one of the salient effects of a liberal and humane education – and the study of literature is a central, indeed indispensable part of such a thing – is that it instils a critical as well as self-critical disposition. In so doing it prepares its beneficiaries for responsible inhabitation of the world. The humanities are ‘aimed at producing citizens who can take charge of their own reasoning, who can see the different and foreign not as a threat to be resisted, but as an invitation to explore and understand, expanding their own minds and their capacity for citizenship’ (Nussbaum, 1997, 301). Nussbaum envisions courses that make students conversant with diverse cultural practices and traditions, as well as anxious to question conventional beliefs. She is adamant that the purpose of literary study cannot be restricted to vocational preparation: that its uses include things other than patriotism and profit. This implies an expanded raison d’être for literary studies in the era of globalisation. If the aim of the humanities is to persuade students to think critically then, as Nussbaum observes, they are becoming more not less relevant in an age of intensified division and conflict. Since literary study is in part a preparation for democratic citizenship then the unprecedented interconnectedness of the globe points to the expanding role of literary study in inculcating democratic citizenship on a cosmopolitan level. What I have in mind in trying to specify a cosmopolitan outlook that can be engendered by literary texts is something akin to the disposition of ‘worldliness’. The political theorist William Smith has argued that the political project of cosmopolitanism requires a corresponding account of cosmopolitan virtue that identifies the qualities and dispositions that make individuals aware of their cosmopolitan obligations, more likely to discharge them, and more effective in doing so. His philosophically informed discussion concludes that cosmopolitan citizens ought to adopt a mode of being in the world that he calls, after Hannah Arendt, worldliness (Smith, 2007). Guided by this idea, citizens are able to promote a world that is reflective of cosmopolitan aspirations by applying the principles of justice and solidarity in their actions and judgements. In so doing, they work to create new cosmopolitan institutions and to reform existing institutions along cosmopolitan lines. In Smith’s words, they are able to act in a cosmopolitan way in a world that does not yet
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serve cosmopolitan ends: ‘this element of worldliness’, he concludes, ‘should be interpreted as a strong desire to cultivate the cosmopolitan promise latent in the world as it is with a view to promoting a more cosmopolitan future’ (2007, 46). Another critic who has espoused and whose work has exemplified the disposition of worldliness is Edward Said, the postcolonial field’s most interesting and politically engaged voice and therefore one to whom this study returns again and again. Worldliness, according to Said’s definition, betokens a set of intellectual attributes. To be worldly means being articulate, persuasive, daring, independent and troublesome. It also enjoins one to campaign for the general (as opposed to the partial, self-interested or hypocritical) application of fundamental rights. The worldly critic is therefore insistent on making known the experiences and aspirations of those who might otherwise struggle to make their voices heard amidst the clamouring of the powerful and privileged.2 The idea of worldliness thus allows us to place at the forefront of our minds something that is too often lost or overlooked: namely, the pugnacious, even subversive nature of criticism and the fractious rather than politely deliberative context in which the critic is called upon to act. Indeed, this is the deceptively simple but too often overlooked proposition of Said’s essays on ‘Secular Criticism’ and ‘The World, the Text, and the Critic’ (Said, 1983), which draw our attention to criticism’s turbulent worldliness. There are two dimensions to the worldliness of texts, Said argues. Firstly, all texts are products of circumstance, a fact that obviously limits what can be done with them interpretatively but which also sets the critic free to investigate the ways in which texts express, intervene in, and provide insight into the milieus from which they emerge and in which, subsequently, they travel. Secondly, texts are not private exclamations but, by virtue of being texts in the first place, objects that are placed in the world and that beseech the attention of readers. A text’s production in a particular time and place restricts what can convincingly be said about it. Conversely, opportunities for diverse interpretations are opened up again by the text’s presentation of itself to a gallery of readers. Each of us reads and interprets the text in ways that, while limited by the text’s material fixity and by its identifiable origin in a particular situation, are nevertheless always varied and idiosyncratic. Texts hardly ever produce consensus, Said points out, and far from being a fact to be lamented this contentiousness has to be seen as the – and not just a – key aspect of their utility. Every experienced critic and reader knows that literary texts are, though frequently disobliging and
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even displeasing, seldom uninteresting or unavailing partners in dialogue. More often they are provocative and engaging. Literary texts generate discussion and controversy and they spawn new, singular, often unconventional and even radically subversive ways of experiencing the world. The literary critic’s task is to clarify the ways in which texts provoke us into interrogating our presuppositions. One upshot of criticism, therefore, is that received ideas resulting from ignorance and insularity should be made to appear much shakier and far less authoritative once they have been subjected to the text’s complex rejoinders. Criticism involves a kind of dialogue – or, if that sounds too amicable a description for what is frequently an eristic situation, a clash or quarrel – between critic, text and reader in which beliefs and convictions are placed on trial. Therefore criticism is not secondary or optional but an indispensable part of the process by which texts achieve their textuality: their being in the world. Criticism in the broad sense means contesting those theoretical systems and forms of explanation that result from academic near-sightedness or political orthodoxy and pressing instead the claims of detail, circumstance and human need. Yet even that does not say all that we need to know about criticism’s worldliness, for the critic is worldly not just in the sense of being knowledgeable, outgoing and possessed even of a certain savoir faire, but also worldly in another and more political sense: that is, possessed of far-reaching, ecumenical and even cosmopolitan principles. The critic’s charge is to cast doubt (and to show how literary texts frequently cast doubt) on received truths. He or she does so by revealing the contingency, contestability and alterability of such truths, revelations sorely required when it comes to the virulent fundamentalisms and complacent universalisms that currently hold sway over our political thinking. That being the case, the critic’s mission implies and possibly even leads to a similarly radical, though far from doctrinaire, political position. Were I to use one word consistently along with criticism (not as a modification but as an emphatic) it would be oppositional. If criticism is reducible neither to a doctrine nor to a political position on a particular question, and if it is to be in the world and self-aware simultaneously, then its identity is its difference from other cultural activities and from systems of thought or method. In its suspicion of totalizing concepts, in its discontent with reified objects, in its impatience with guilds, special interests, imperialized fiefdoms, and orthodox habits of mind, criticism is most itself and, if the paradox
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can be tolerated, most unlike itself at the moment it starts turning into organized dogma […] For in the main – and here I shall be explicit – criticism must think of itself as life-enhancing and constitutively opposed to every form of tyranny, domination, and abuse; its social goals are noncoercive knowledge produced in the interests of human freedom. (Said, 1983, 28; emphasis in the original) The critic’s sphere of operation, as Said makes clear in typically idealistic terms, the area with which he and his work are concerned, is certainly not academia nor even the nation, but the world. The kind of literary study that attends to – and is induced by texts themselves to investigate – the complex relations between different cultures and different societies has among its objectives, as one of Said’s intellectual forebears Erich Auerbach made clear, the illumination of humankind’s post-national reality: ‘our philological home is the earth: it can no longer be the nation […] We must return, in admittedly altered circumstances, to the knowledge that prenational medieval culture already possessed: the knowledge that the spirit [Geist] is not national’ (1969, 17).3 A worldly approach enjoins us to place stress on the combative and subversive nature of criticism, as well as on criticism’s implicit orientation towards a social goal made possible by enhanced critical consciousness and by the appraisal and denunciation of entrenched sources of power. Perhaps this point about the ways in which a critical attitude and a cosmopolitan disposition are potentially cultivated through literary reading but ought then to be employed more widely will be understood better if I relate briefly the misadventures of one John Agresto, the Director of Higher Education Reconstruction for the occupying powers in Iraq in 2003 and 2004. Agresto, a former president of St John’s in Santa Fe, New Mexico, a ‘liberal arts college’ that prides itself on its great books curriculum, envisaged his responsibilities in Iraq as the making of ‘a clean start’ in that country’s beleaguered universities. Agresto admits he knew nothing of Iraq; he had purposely refrained from reading any books about it so that he might arrive in Baghdad with an ‘open mind’ (Chandrasekaran, 2007, 189). As he saw it, his job, like that of Peter McPherson (the economic adviser to Paul Bremer who saw the theft of state property as an admirable form of spontaneous privatisation), was to start from scratch. Unsurprisingly however, Agresto’s ambitious plans to restock libraries, equip classrooms with high-speed internet connections, ‘introduce’ the concept of academic freedom, and offer courses in ‘Western civilization’ and ‘the history of liberty’ all came to
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naught. His universities’ books, computers, lab equipment, desks, even their electrical wiring were looted from under the noses of the occupiers; Iraqi academics fled the burgeoning insurgency or were slain by it; promises of aid from federal funds and donor governments disappeared like smoke; and what remained of his miniscule budget was channelled to American universities that wished to set up ‘partnerships’ with Iraqi institutions. What it is not unfair to characterise as Agresto’s intentional ignorance of the place he was assigned to overhaul – in other words, the sheer intellectual and moral illiteracy of the occupation itself – is encapsulated with unusual clarity in his blasé disregard for the practice of reading and the disastrous results of his consequent ignorance. Agresto arrived not with an open mind but with a set of totally unexamined preconceptions. To give him his due, he seems to have picked up a modicum of self-knowledge during his sojourn in Iraq. Agresto now styles himself a neoconservative who has been ‘mugged by reality’: the title of a book written in an effort to make sense of his experiences (2007). But the limits of this conversion can be found in his view that the ‘reality’ by which he was molested had nothing to do with the nature of American power or with the Bush administration’s real reasons for invading Iraq. It was related rather to the incorrigible faults of the people and culture that the United States had, selflessly, sought to set free. Agresto’s mission was foiled by Iraqi ingratitude, fatalism and fissiparousness, by their ‘peculiar defects of character’ (153), and in the end by what Agresto refers to, in Conradian vein, as ‘the dark and despotic underside of the Iraqi soul’ (177). Agresto sticks closely to his lofty self-assurance and his gullible faith in American ‘good intentions’. Don’t suppose when I say that I, along with all America, was mugged by reality in Iraq that I was mugged by the strangeness of Iraqi mores or by Iraqi culture. What most hit me behind the head was America’s ignorance of what America had accomplished and what made America great. (Agresto, 2007, 107; emphasis in the original) After all, in America what is there to criticise apart from the people’s forgetfulness of their own greatness? For Agresto, the humanities furnish ‘the tools for rational deliberation’ (131). But he has evidently not allowed them to rewire his prejudices about the backwardness of Iraqis and the irreproachable excellence of their rescuers. If only he had read a book or two, as Naomi Klein drolly remarks, Agresto might have thought twice about the need to erase everything and start again (Klein, 2007, 338).
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Here is an admonitory vignette for our times, perhaps to set alongside Said’s encounter with an old college friend who worked in the Department of Defense during the Vietnam War (Said, 1983, 2–3). For Agresto, the humanist qualities of critical consciousness and self-knowledge are an essential part of a liberal education. The administration of a foreign country, it seems, is undertaken with the aid of another set of beliefs and attitudes altogether. Likewise for the Secretary for Defense, who Said’s friend tells him keeps a copy of Lawrence Durrell’s Alexandria Quartet on the same desk from which he orders B-52 strikes over Vietnam. It is as though the aesthetic and the political are still two worlds that have nothing to do with each other and as though the former does not serve in part to help us think more deeply about the latter but instead functions to boost our liberal self-image and to exist harmlessly alongside the world of bombing raids and blundering ‘interventions’. Accordingly, we must keep at the very forefront of our minds the warning issued by Theodor Adorno that works of culture often simply mask the violence and injustice that take place in the world. Adorno could hardly be more explicit in his scorn for culture that seeks to insulate itself from the world of terror and suffering symbolised by Auschwitz: ‘It abhors stench because it stinks – because, as Brecht put it in a magnificent line, its mansion is built of dogshit’ (Adorno, 1996, 366). This foul dwelling should provide no sanctuary from atrocities that were perpetrated in Europe’s recent past and which are now being inflicted elsewhere. ‘In a situation where the miserable reality can be changed only through radical political praxis’, Herbert Marcuse reminds us, ‘the concern with aesthetics demands justification’ (1979, 1). Attention to culture is justifiable and not a means of distraction only when it amplifies the suffering contingent on an exploitative social order or when it instils the capacity to reflect on that order as well as the aptitudes required to undertake a moral and political transformation. Part of what a materialist theory of culture has to say, as Terry Eagleton reminds us, ‘is that culture is not of first importance’ (2000, 240), at least not yet in a world characterised instead by coercion, toil and scarcity. Paradoxically, culture’s role is to direct us to this world and to permit us to do so not in a spirit of fanaticism but in one of thoughtful, self-critical concern. Agresto’s experiences demonstrate that if we are to make contact with reality before it mugs us then ways must be found of engineering the kind of self-criticism and self-knowledge required to peer beyond established wisdom. Even with the best will in the world, humanitarian missions that lack self-awareness and the ability to interrogate received truths about one’s own cultural superiority will fail. My point is that
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the experiences and conclusions recounted in Agresto’s unselfconscious memoir are symptomatic of a widespread belief, even among professed defenders of the humanities like Agresto (author of The Humanist as Citizen (1982)), that the kind of self-knowledge and democratic sensibility that he celebrates in relation to the great literary and philosophical touchstones of the West do not usually extend to our dealings with a place like Iraq. There, on the contrary, attitudes of condescension, belittlement and haughty exasperation, not to mention an extraordinary complacency with regard to the supposed merits of one’s own society and government, still prevail. I am suggesting that the salient outcome of an ability to read well, which means attentively, openly and self-critically, is an ability to subject to criticism everything from nationalism to religious enthusiasm, as well as smug faith in the preeminence of Western culture. No less essential is an informed reflection on other cultures and situations and on peoples who are often obscured by disadvantage, enforced silence or the complacent heedlessness of the dominant point of view. ‘To read well’, as George Steiner once remarked, ‘is to take great risks. It is to make vulnerable our identity, our self-possession’ (1967, 29).
Cosmopolitan hermeneutics ‘The starting point for any genuinely profitable discussion of interpretation’, as Fredric Jameson has argued, ‘must be not the nature of interpretation, but the need for it in the first place’ (1989, 5). Put differently, in the words of Susie O’Brien and Imre Szeman, ‘it is worth considering why one would be worried about literature in the era of globalization at all’ (2001, 611). My answer to these questions and hence the reason for my emphasis on the special value of literary analysis is that informed and literate citizens are the precondition of a democratic cosmopolitanism. Moreover, that emphasis is intended to correct the widespread neglect and in some cases the active disparagement (Calhoun, 2003, 108) of the cosmopolitan potential of literary texts. Plucking books from the pile at the edge of my desk as I write, or running my eyes along the adjacent shelves, is sufficient survey to demonstrate the myriad of ways in which works of postcolonial literature might accomplish the twin goals of dramatising imperialism whilst foretelling alternatives. The style, form and genre of these works of literature are as diverse as their provenance. Yet they all stress what too many theorists in the postcolonial field, whose work on matters to do with imperialism and with resistance to imperialism addresses culture in a broad sense and is hosted in the main
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in university departments of literature, are sometimes inclined to forget: that the analysis of literature is the central purpose of our work because such works provide their readers with a source of self-knowledge and a cosmopolitan conscience. As Peter Hallward has noted, what is peculiar about postcolonial criticism ‘is just how little it has to say about its own “home” discipline, about literature proper […] Most postcolonial readings are brief, often insubstantial, sometimes simply anecdotal’ (2001, 334–5; emphasis in the original). Aijaz Ahmad is mistaken when he bemoans the way in which ‘interest has shifted from the “facts” of imperialist wars and political economies of exploitation to “fictions” of representation and cultural artefact’ (1992, 93), not because he is wrong about the relative inattention to war and exploitation in postcolonial scholarship but because the study of postcolonial fictions and representations might serve usefully to shed light on such phenomena. I am defending the neglected importance of the ‘literary’ in postcolonial literary criticism. This is not of course because postcolonial literature transcends and has nothing to do with the blatantly political milieus from which it emerges but, on the contrary, because such writing possesses a distinctive ability to make us attend to those milieus in ways that are penetrating and self-critical. Overcoming what Eli Sorensen has called ‘the lack of attention to the specifically literary in much postcolonial literary criticism’ (2007, 74) necessitates a recognition that the moral and political objectives of postcolonial criticism can be arrived at by passing through rather than avoiding or performing perfunctorily the essential task of analysing the details and complexities of literary texts.4 What I am trying to do is explore the way in which many postcolonial literary texts actually give rise to a cosmopolitan consciousness as opposed to being merely susceptible to analysis by readers who are already cosmopolitan. The usual method of analysing the relationship between literature and its worldly contexts – that outlined by Franco Moretti in Graphs, Maps, Trees (2005) and by the French critic Pascale Casanova’s World Republic of Letters (2004) – fails in this respect. Both volumes, in addition to the essays collected in Christopher Prendergast’s Debating World Literature (2004), constitute efforts to think through Goethe’s idea of weltliteratur in order to understand the complex relationship between literature and globalisation. In this endeavour Moretti is confronted by the problem of how to furnish a tolerably accurate picture of that relationship in spite of the colossal wealth of relevant material, in the face of which even the most learned and unflagging scholar must be tempted to throw up his hands in despair. Auerbach’s
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solution when writing Mimesis, his magisterial study of ‘the representation of reality in Western literature’, was to fasten upon fertile passages of key texts, the elucidation of which will, he writes elsewhere, ‘open up a knowledge of a broader context and cast a light on entire historical landscapes’ (1965, 18). By contrast, Moretti’s solution is to stop reading books closely or even at all. In his wholly quantitative effort to chart the development of the global ‘literary field’ Moretti ‘decided to rely’, he tells us disarmingly, ‘wholly on other people’s work’ (2005, 4). Moretti’s preference ‘for the explanation of general structures over the interpretation of individual texts’ (91) or, put differently, his method of distant (as opposed to close) reading is not without its sociological uses. Graphs, Maps, Trees traces the divergence of forms, styles and conventions under the pressure of the literary market. Casanova, similarly, employs the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu’s concepts of symbolic capital and the cultural field to demonstrate the inequalities between different national literatures and the ways in which peripheral literatures seek to gain legitimacy and prominence. But both volumes (though Moretti’s most of all) seek to understand literature’s relationship with globalisation without attending to literature itself, which seems to me to mean abandoning one of the things that makes studying literature and especially postcolonial literature worthwhile in the first place: its ability to encourage its readers to reflect on their political and other preconceptions by portraying unfamiliar situations, by describing extraordinary points of view, and by encouraging critical self-reflection. As Paul Jay writes, ‘we need to turn our attention away from a simple preoccupation with how national literatures function in relation to historically homogeneous cultures and toward an examination of how postnational literatures are instrumental in the formation of subjectivity in deterritorialized and diasporic contexts’ (2001, 39). This is a serviceable summary of the new challenges faced by literary critics, though it is only an announcement of a need. Moreover, it is one that does not pay sufficient attention to the drawbacks and shortcomings of globalisation or to the way in which literary texts of the kind encountered in this study enjoin a critical (as opposed to celebratory) attitude to globalisation. What it takes to fulfil that need is perhaps signalled by the great British critic F.R. Leavis, for whom the distinctive value of literary study as an academic discipline is to be found in its compelling attention to concrete details, its consequent suspicion of abstract systems of explanation, as well as its postulation when examining particular works of provisional judgements aimed at instigating dialogue. The criticism of literature, in other words, trains one to criticise, scrutinise and discuss, all aptitudes that are
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conducive to what I am calling worldly conduct but which are difficult to acquire by looking at and past rather than in books: ‘literature’, in Leavis’s words, ‘will yield to the sociologist, or anyone else, what it has to give only if it is approached as literature’ (1984, 193). If we wish to spell out what it is that literature can give us then we ought to heed the description by the French philosopher of hermeneutics Paul Ricoeur of how the interpretative process helps reformulate us into beings capable of undertaking self-criticism. The term hermeneutics refers to the study and practice of interpretation: the understanding of objects and of the self. Indeed, for Ricoeur these two processes take place together. His philosophy conceives of selfunderstanding not as the result of isolated cogitation but instead as the product of reflection on the interlocutors with whom and the objects with which the self interacts. Knowledge of the self, according to Ricoeur, is contrived principally via interpretation of the signs and symbols through which we encounter and shape our world. Ricoeur therefore endeavours to establish the three dimensions of a text’s meaning to which the reader consecutively applies his interpretative skill (1981, 145–64). These are the prepositional dimension (the verbal structure of the text or words on the page); the author’s intention (by which Ricoeur does not quite mean the discoverable purpose of the text’s author, but rather the implied author as a social and historical being who is revealed and manifested by his text); and finally the text’s effect on its readers. Corresponding to these three dimensions of meaning are the three stages of interpretation. These are explanation (elucidating the form of the text), understanding (clarifying its meaning), and appropriation (establishing the text’s significance for its reader). The object of interpretation is appropriated when one seeks to make sense of it in one’s own terms. Hence the meaning and significance of, say, a literary text are not so much discovered as made, not found lying about like a discarded coin but minted anew in the process of each distinctive reading. There can, therefore, be more than one legitimate reading of a literary text, which is what Ricoeur means by the ‘conflict of interpretations’ (1974). To explain, understand and appropriate a text is to conduct a dialogue with it, or at least with the surplus of meaning contained in any textual utterance: that is, with the suggestive connotations, ambiguities and associations that differ slightly from mind to mind. What Ricoeur achieves in this exposition of the process of literary interpretation is to account for the variety and inexhaustibility of legitimate readings of a particular text without surrendering too much ground to the permissive or relativist view that all readings are equally
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valid because they are entirely dependent on subjective experiences rather than external evidence. We come therefore to what is the deepest or at least, for my purposes, the most useful of Ricoeur’s insights. When one interprets an object, Ricoeur is saying, one thinks forwards as well as backwards; one thinks about the self as well as about the world beyond the self. The voices, postures and ways of being dramatised by literary texts, all of which inhabit a ferment of dialogue and conflict with each other and with the reader, serve to relativise and to make appear newly problematic and changeable readers’ existing ways of thinking and living. What Ricoeur’s philosophy has gained insight into is the combination of self-reflection and broadened perception to which every genuine feat of interpretation perforce gives rise. His complicated exposition of the process of interpretation to which readers subject literary works thus prepares Ricoeur’s ingenious contention in Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences (1981) that the world of the literary work is brought into being rather than obediently rendered. That world is not copied but realised in readers’ interpretations. One is invited by literary texts not so much to look out over existing situations as to explore new modes of being and new viewpoints that can then be contrasted with one’s customary ways of interpreting and inhabiting the world. ‘Through fiction and poetry’, as Ricoeur puts it elsewhere, ‘new possibilities of being-in-the-world are opened up within everyday reality’ (Ricoeur, 1991, 86). Ideally, literary language leads to an adjustment of our understanding. Though it is certainly mimetic, the work of art does not reproduce reality. Ricoeur is concerned instead with the capacity of literary language ‘to redirect, restructure an experience, to produce a new manner of inhabiting the world’ (1998, 83). Thus the proposed world of the text ‘is not behind the text, as a hidden intention would be, but in front of it, as that which the work unfolds, discovers, reveals. Henceforth, to understand is to understand oneself in front of the text’ (1981, 143; emphasis in the original). In the dual processes of reflection and self-reflection that they instigate, literary texts open up new worlds: ‘[t]o understand is […] to receive a self enlarged by the appropriation of the proposed worlds which interpretation unfolds’ (1981, 94). In The Political Unconscious Fredric Jameson translates Ricoeur’s theory into an altogether more political idiom. Such is then the general theoretical framework in which I would wish to argue the methodological proposition outlined here: that a Marxist negative hermeneutic, a Marxist practice of ideological
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analysis proper, must in the practical work of reading and interpretation be exercised simultaneously with a Marxist positive hermeneutic, or a decipherment of the Utopian impulses of these same still ideological cultural texts. (Jameson, 1996, 296; emphasis in the original) Literary analysis, in other words, has for Jameson both a functional and an anticipatory dimension. The primary responsibility of the literary critic, whose work is distinguished by his or her sensitivity to relations of power and the facts of violence and exploitation, is, obviously, to unmask the ways in which such things are sublimated and concealed by texts as well as to show how texts themselves sometimes lay bare these things (something Jameson fails to mention). However, an ancillary but nevertheless still indispensable objective of his or her work is to reveal the ways in which literature can also point beyond exploitation and injustice. In Yeats’s phrase, ‘the arts lie dreaming of things to come’ (1961, 191). For Jameson the ‘Utopian idea […] keeps alive the possibility of a world qualitatively distinct from this one’ (1971, 111). Since the aim of the critic is both to reveal the present’s defects and in some way to foretell a future in which those defects have been put right then literary criticism involves explaining and accentuating those utopian moments in the text or, better, as they emerge in the text’s impact on its recipients, which make it possible to envision or even to prepare for that future. Utopia has been a key motif in the tradition of Marxist aesthetics. Jameson inherits it from Ernst Bloch’s (1996) voluminous studies of the way in which works of art anticipate a form of consciousness appropriate to the classless society and from Adorno’s belief that aesthetic experience, which is self-reflexive and non-violent, is ‘the model of a stage of consciousness in which the I no longer has its happiness in its interests, or, ultimately, in its reproduction’ (Adorno, 1999, 346). Jameson’s calls for ‘the renewal of Utopian thinking’ (1989, 110) are an extension of this tradition and can be heeded by a postcolonial criticism prepared not just to demystify ideology (or to show how texts themselves succeed in acts of demystification), but also to amplify the ways in which literary texts help construct new, more reflexive forms of subjectivity in addition to more comprehensive forms of human community. I am commending a hermeneutic method for the analysis of works of postcolonial literature that combines an emphasis on their critical dimension (that is, on their capacity to dramatise and incite opposition to imperial practices) with an emphasis too on their frequently neglected
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normative aspect, by which I mean their equally crucial ability to delineate – or at least to implore, contemplate or, however obliquely, foretell – moral and political alternatives to imperial rule. Axiomatic for this study therefore is Timothy Brennan’s conviction ‘that the literary intellectual in the analysis of literary texts most matters by remaining, as it were, in literature, speaking to an aesthetic need that is also a social need’ (2006, 119). I take it that Brennan means not that the critic’s focus on literature screens out literature’s broader origins and consequences but, on the contrary, that the special aptitudes that the critic employs in textual analysis are also those that the sensitive reader can employ productively elsewhere and can encourage in others: analytic attentiveness to details and contradictions; a capacity for painstaking reflection on the use and misuse of language; a self-critical examination of ideologies and preconceptions; and an acute sense of intellectual and political responsibility. What this project is designed to uphold, therefore, is the centrality of literary interpretation to the task of modifying a world characterised by force and conflict. We need a critical practice that takes seriously the insight that the ability to read well, though it is often learnt and refined in literary interpretation, has an application way beyond the hermeneutic endeavour of elucidating works of literature and that, as Said argues, we must endeavour to connect the ‘more politically vigilant forms of interpretation to an ongoing political and social praxis’ (2000, 147). Hermeneutics, according to the German philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer, is not a method for the human sciences comparable to that of the natural sciences. Hermeneutic understanding is not secured through a technique and then objectively verified. Rather, it arises through the experience of objects, situations, interlocutors and especially artworks that have not previously been accounted for and cannot easily be explained by one’s presuppositions. To understand, therefore, is to understand differently, to either modify one’s point of view or to be made to justify one’s reasons for holding it. A no less rigorous procedure than scientific method, hermeneutics gives rise to both knowledge of one’s object of study and to an equally valuable re-examination and illumination of the preconceptions, the motivations and the very identity of the self. Human experience, in the hugely enabling conclusion of Gadamer’s magnum opus Truth and Method (1979), ought to be modelled on such open-minded conversations. By conversing with the other we become conscious of the limitations of the self and the alterability of its precepts. To seek knowledge is for Gadamer to partake in ‘the conversation that we ourselves are’ (340), to lay one’s own prejudices and
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presuppositions on the line at the same time as one explores the meaning and significance of the other. People are not adversaries, therefore, but interlocutors. Human life is not a power struggle but an unending dialogue. As linguistic beings we transcend the isolated and embattled self in the unpredictable yet fruitful course of human colloquy. There is thus, as Andrew Bowie points out, an ethical imperative to Gadamer’s hermeneutics, which behoves one to recognise and attend to the broadest possible circle of interlocutors. Interpretation ‘imposes a continuing obligation upon free actors to attempt to see the world from the viewpoint of the other, and to articulate the potential created by the other, including oneself as other in self-reflexive interpretation’ (Bowie, 1997, 125; emphasis in the original). Language is for Gadamer a medium of democratic congress. He culls a social ideal from a sensitive epistemology and extracts the value of fellowship from the fact of linguistic interaction. Hence his philosophy insinuates what Richard Wolin calls a modest utopian vision according to which illegitimate relations of authority, domination, and force will be replaced by those of human mutuality. To acknowledge our lot in these terms means to credit the profane illuminations of language with a power to defetishize a reified social world and to reforge relations of solidarity and trust among men and women. (Wolin, 1992, 19) Likewise Richard Bernstein identifies ‘a latent radical thrust or telos in [Gadamer’s] thinking which points to the demand for the type of society in which every citizen has the opportunity to engage in the open dialogue, conversation, and questioning that he takes to be constitutive of what we are’ (1986, 78–9). The practice of dialogue with other experiences and points of view tests and potentially refutes parochial ideas and loyalties. ‘To be in a conversation’, as Gadamer remarks, ‘means to be beyond oneself, to think with the other and to come back to oneself as if to another’ (1989, 110). Here dialogue is synonymous with the mind-broadening power of travel, of an itinerant exploration of alternative perspectives. It is perhaps not surprising, therefore, to learn that hermeneutics, in the work of its founder the German theologian Friedrich Schleiermacher, has its origins not just (as is well known) in the decipherment of scripture but also in the interpretative encounter with other cultures and situations. While beginning to think through the peculiar challenges of interpretation (particularly the central role in it of the interpreter)
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Schleiermacher was asked in the early 1800s to translate David Collins’s Account of the English Colony in New South Wales, a grim sketch of the conditions of the aboriginal population of that colony which he planned to supplement with his own research. The project was never completed, though not for any want of enthusiasm on Schleiermacher’s part.5 My point, specifically, is that the study and practice of interpretation have always been bound up with the interpretation of other cultures and situations and that, furthermore, we too should conceive of interpretation as an attempt to contrive understanding (a vital part of which, as I have been saying with the aid of Gadamer and Ricoeur, is self-understanding) of different experiences and lives. For Gadamer, the interpretation of works of literature entails a conversation with the text and with other interpreters, a process that inculcates respect for other views as well as consciousness of the potential fallibility and revocability of one’s own. According to his biographer, it was his appreciation of the implications of this process that ‘brought the late Gadamer to an almost “political” or cosmopolitan broadening of his hermeneutics’ (Grondin, 2003, 329). In so far as they give rise to dialogue and to self-reflection, literary texts engender a potentially limitless fraternity of interlocutors. They ‘create a community, and in principle, this truly universal community extends to the whole world’ (Gadamer, 1986, 39). According to Gadamer, the sensitive and reflexive encounter with artworks and with other readers provides a model for a type of thinking that no longer tolerates parochial doctrines and allegiances.
Conclusion I am concerned with works that merit analysis because they are arresting and interesting enough to provoke self-critical dialogue. They must furnish meditation not disseminate programmes for action let alone blueprints of an achieved cosmopolis. As Ariel Dorfman has argued in his study of Latin American writing over the last decades, the most constructive works are not those which, didactic or propagandistic, seek to alter the immediate political consciousness of the reader. That sort of aesthetic relationship would preserve in the work of art the authoritarianism that is being challenged in the larger society in which the Latin American writer lives and creates. The works that Dorfman discusses conceive of the reader in a more respectful way, as if she were a citizen of the future, trusting him to decide the multiple ways in which the work must be internalized in order to be fulfilled, giving to them
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the task of completing the fiction massively and plurally in the mirror or window of their community. (Dorfman, 1991, xiv) These authors, in the title of Dorfman’s book, ‘write to the future’. Never strident or dictatorial, their aim is to provoke thought via complex, multifarious and inconclusive renderings of particular situations. As ever, in Gabriel García Márquez’s words, ‘the writer’s duty – his revolutionary duty if you like – is to write well’ (Márquez, 1983, 59). ‘A work of art should, in the first place, be judged by its own law, that is, by the law of art’, wrote Leon Trotsky (1991, 207) in response to those Bolsheviks who would reduce art to political propaganda. The critic’s task is not to prescribe themes for texts or to impose visions on them but to read them carefully and attentively, to respect their complexity and particularity. In so doing he or she can learn to appreciate and then, for his or her readers, amplify the diverse ways in which those texts dramatise as well as assail doctrines of power and insularity. In the situations they portray and especially the relationships they engineer with their readers, works of postcolonial literature not only engage with and draw attention to the deplorable endurance of colonialism but envision colonialism’s supersession as well. The dialectical task of the cosmopolitan critic is therefore, in Yeats’s felicitous phrase, ‘to hold in a single thought reality and justice’ (1978, 25).
4 Late Yeats: ‘Beating upon the Wall of the Irish Free State’
My aim in this chapter is to identify the reasons for the existence of a distinctive style in the late work of the Irish poet W.B. Yeats. I am far from being the first critic to reflect on the peculiar tone and technique of Yeats’s late poetry. Critics as distinguished as R.P. Blackmur (1986), T.S. Eliot (1975), Richard Ellmann (1985), Paul de Man (1984) and, I think more effectively than any of these, the Yeats scholar Thomas Parkinson (1964), have all done so before me. But I want to contest or rather add to the biographical or artistic explanations that have hitherto been advanced to account for the notable phenomenon of late Yeats. The late work’s violence and provocativeness as well as its ‘thirst for accusation’ (VP, 542) are occasioned largely by the poet’s disappointment and frustration at what Yeats sensed was Ireland’s merely partial decolonisation in the years after the founding of the Irish Free State in 1922.1 To be more specific, Yeats’s late work is distinctive and valuable, indeed it is one of the major heralds of the themes and forms of postcolonial writing, because it encourages its readers to prepare and express cosmopolitan perspectives. In 1917, at the age of only fifty-two, Yeats prepared to use his old age to put into effect a deliberate policy of offensiveness and intransigence. A poet when he is growing old, will ask himself if he cannot keep his mask and his vision, without new bitterness, new disappointment […] Could he if he would, copy Landor who lived loving and hating, ridiculous and unconquered, into extreme old age, all lost but the favour of his muses […] Surely, he may think, now that I have found vision and mask I need not suffer any longer. Then he will remember Wordsworth, withering into eighty years, honoured and 60
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empty-witted, and climb to some waste room, and find, forgotten there by youth, some bitter crust. (Yeats, 1959, 342) Yeats emulated Landor. His late style betokens a growing alienation from the new regime in Ireland and from what Yeats came to see as its sanctimonious and offensively bourgeois followers. Nor is it an exaggeration to state that Yeats’s poetry during this period was even more reckless, intemperate and at times raucously impertinent than his studiedly confrontational public performance as a ‘wild old wicked man’ (VP, 587): ‘I must lay aside this pleasant path I have built up for years’, he told Ethel Mannin in 1938, ‘and seek the brutality, the ill breeding, the barbarism of truth’ (quoted in Foster, 2003, 608). In late Yeats there is a brusque repudiation of the hieratic and the lofty, of pretentious attitudinising, along with a new irony and self-awareness that deflate bathetically both his own stridency and that of what W.H. Auden has called ‘youth’s intolerant certainty’ (1968, 73). What follows is indebted to the German philosopher and musicologist Theodor W. Adorno’s work on the transition from the harmonious compositions of Beethoven’s middle period to the articulation in the composer’s late works of a fragmentary and almost dissonant aesthetic.2 Adorno attributes this shift less to the composer’s deafness or old age than to his music’s acute sensitivity even in the innermost elements of its compositional style to its changing social and political context. Likewise, I do not want to relate the similarly difficult, discordant and vigorously contumacious style of Yeats’s last collections to the (for us) relatively banal fact of the poet’s age or even to what another champion of late style, Edward Said, refers to, vaguely, as the late stylist’s aversion to the ‘Zeitgeist’ (Said, 2006, 23). Rather, the distinctiveness of late Yeats testifies, firstly, to the poet’s exemplary capacity to reinvent both the forms and themes of his work in the last period of his life. Not for Yeats the fate of Virginia Woolf’s Mr Ramsay whose early success is followed by a life of cautious amplification and repetition: ‘I have felt the convictions of a lifetime melt through at an age when the mind should be rigid’, Yeats wrote in A Vision (1978, 301). But the poet’s own senescence is the least important as well as the least interesting explanation for the ‘lust and rage’ (VP, 591) that spur late Yeats into song. Secondly therefore, the peculiarity of the late style is also the result of the poet’s disillusionment with orthodox nationalism. Though Yeats’s support for Irish independence was unflinching, he derided the intolerance
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and ideological narrowness that he first discerned in the Playboy riots of 1907 and which intensified in the turbulent years of the Easter Rising, war with England, the fratricidal civil conflict and the exhilarating though in many ways for Yeats also disappointing first few years of Ireland’s independence. The apotheosis of Yeats’s late style, as Helen Vendler has claimed (2006), is the poetry written after about 1920, which, she does not add, coincides with and is in large part occasioned by his ‘Being out of heart with government’ (VP, 317). The late poems are exercised by the fear that an independent Ireland will be a replica of the England from which it had broken away. They compel reflection on the myriad of threats in the new Ireland to freedom of thought and artistic expression: fanaticism, intolerance, conformity, philistinism and censorship, religiosity and sexual repression, bourgeois mediocrity and the intolerable complacency and claustrophobia of cultural nationalism. Yeats was always acutely conscious of his political context, especially when around this time he came to see his role as a poet as being one of aggravation and provocation rather than, as before, one of service to the nationalist movement. It is perhaps truer to say therefore not that Yeats was absorbed in politics but that politics absorbed Yeats, thoroughly and lastingly. For one of the things that distinguishes Yeats’s work in all its modes and phases is its recognition that in a situation so fraught as that of a nation seeking to resist colonial power, everything, including poetry, assumes an urgently political complexion. Yeats moved, indeed he grew to maturity and formulated his aesthetic, in an atmosphere that was densely political. His late poetry was able to articulate a growing disenchantment with institutionalised nationalism because he was himself a nationalist, the intensity of his disillusionment corresponding to the intensity of his attachment. Yeats had no need for ventriloquism, for his precocious championing of the Celtic Revival, his involvement in nationalist agitation, his heated participation in the Senate in the crucial debates on divorce and censorship, in addition to his personal acquaintance with prominent political personalities (Maud Gonne, Patrick Pearse, Kevin O’Higgins, Eoin O’Duffy, even Herbert Asquith) all permitted him to speak with a voice that was overtly, if never shrilly or didactically, political in nature.3 It was precisely his fidelity to the desire for freedom that inspires nationalism, primarily the freedom from constraints set upon selfexpression, that enabled Yeats to see through and deplore the constraints imposed by the new dispensation. If the Free State constituted, in Michael Collins’s phrase, the freedom to achieve freedom then Yeats was determined to hold it to its word. In his campaign in the Senate
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against the prohibition of divorce, for example, Yeats took a decidedly liberal stand for pluralism and freedom of conscience. He consistently defended Ireland’s Protestant minority against what he saw as its growing marginalisation at the hands of a nation that, like his tower at Ballylee, was ‘Half dead at the top’ (VP, 482). Fanaticism having won this victory […] will make other attempts upon the liberties of minorities. I want those minorities to resist, and their resistance may do an overwhelming service to this country, they may become the centre of its creative intellect and the pivot of its unity. For the last hundred years Irish Nationalism has had to fight against England, and that fight has helped Fanaticism, for we had to welcome everything that gave Ireland emotional energy, and had little use for intelligence so far as the mass of the people were concerned, for we had to hurl them against an alien power. The basis of Irish nationalism has now shifted, and much that once helped us is now injurious, for we can no longer do anything by fighting, we must persuade, and to persuade we must become a modern, tolerant, liberal nation. I want everything discussed, I want to get rid of the old exaggerated tact and caution. (Yeats, 1960, 159–60) In both this speech, which was published in the Irish Statesman, and in the more famous oration delivered on the floor of the Senate, in which he defended Southern Protestants as ‘one of the great stocks of Europe’ (Yeats, 1960, 99), Yeats revealed his distinctively post-nationalist and even Fanon-like consciousness that the winning of independence is nothing but a first step towards liberation. An embittered Yeats at his most ostentatiously prophetic stirred up the Senate and provoked discussion beyond its walls. His target was nothing less than the received practice of Irish nationalism, which had served its purpose and was now standing in the way of progress. In his late work Yeats is preoccupied with what comes after state and nation. What, in other words, should be the alternative or successor to nationalism once it has accomplished its immediate goal? Yeats’s work is increasingly dedicated not to the Ireland that existed, about which he harboured profound misgivings, but to ‘that ideal Ireland, perhaps from this out an imaginary Ireland, in whose service I labour’ (Yeats, 1961, 246). Though Yeats did not succeed in formulating a vision of a genuinely postcolonial or, to use Richard Kearney’s (1997) term, ‘postnationalist’ Ireland, his late work certainly does register the failings of
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institutionalised nationalism in addition to promoting reflection on political alternatives. Most of all it is the verse contained in his extraordinary late collections, New Poems from 1938 and Last Poems from 1939, that allows his readers to make out a vision of comprehensive liberation. I am referring to its great explicitness and ‘barbarous tongue’ (VP, 313), its sexual frankness, its acute sense of ‘this foul world in its decline and fall’ (VP, 619), its bracing repudiation of conventional pieties, and above all its peculiarly stimulating form. For Yeats’s late work, blind loyalty and ‘the morbid persistence of minds unsettled by some fixed idea’ (Yeats, 1961, 313) such as nationalism should be succeeded by the examined life. His late work entails disagreement between its readers and the reigning creeds of the new Ireland, a willed provocation and cultivation of ‘the work of intellect’ (1961, 526), in addition to the consideration and free evaluation of orthodox practices and ideas. The freedom and integrity of the intellect are always uppermost in late Yeats. Hence his belief that ‘[w]e cannot have too much discussion of ideas in Ireland’ (1994, 118). In Seamus Heaney’s words, Yeats’s ‘mature music is not a lulling but an alerting strain’ (1980, 72). In late Yeats a politics of liberation characterised above all by a distinguishing stress on the free intellect corresponds to a poetics of liberation typified by the way his recondite images encourage reflection on the various limitations and restrictions on Ireland’s new political freedom. The cosmopolitan dimension of Yeats’s late work is to be found neither in his disillusionment with nationalism nor in his estimable fascination with Eastern cultures but in the way these things are mediated by the formal details and complexities of the poems. For the attentive reader, these poems furnish images and portents of a world that has left merely national loyalties far behind.
Yeats and the idea of late style Style is not quite the same thing as form. I favour Michael Spitzer’s definition of style, in his book on Adorno and Beethoven, as ‘a fusion of thought and language’ (2006, 10): a combination of the work’s content and the way that content is expressed. Yeats’s late style is therefore a fusion of his political disenchantment with the intensely provocative forms of the late poems. By style, therefore, I intend to designate something like a blend of form and content or of expression and theme, a blend so complete that the critic cannot study these aspects in isolation. In short: idea plus form equals style. It is through style, in this case the confrontational and stimulating quality of Yeats’s late poems, that his confrontation with the shortcomings of independence finds articulation.
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Whose style is this? Not just Yeats’s. For Adorno, Beethoven’s revolutionary late style prefigures and is to a degree shared by later composers in the Viennese tradition such as Mahler, Berg and of course Schoenberg, whose radicalism is indebted to Beethoven’s last-ditch interrogation of tonality (Adorno, 1991b and 2006). So too for Yeats, whose late style is not his alone, even though like Beethoven he was perhaps its first and most eloquent practitioner, but is later bequeathed to and elaborated by writers in Ireland and the rest of the postcolonial world who are struggling to surmount the obstacles thrown up by hitherto insurgent but now institutionalised nationalist projects. We must therefore resist the conclusion put forward by Richard Wollheim, for whom style cannot be attributed to schools or periods, only to individual artists (1993, 171–84). This is unsupportable, unless one believes that artists, because of the undeniable artistic individuality that is theirs, are not also social beings. Style must come from somewhere, though stating this proposition is not at all the same thing as saying that individuals do not have styles or that all style is the product of abstract historical processes. For the concept of style encompasses but also exceeds the unique manner or technique of the artist, who, whatever originality he or she may possess, is inevitably somebody who works within society and language and who therefore must share important stylistic traits with others. The most noteworthy recent account of late style is therefore mistaken in its surprising insistence that late style is the product of the intentions and experiences of the stylist not of the complex combination between these things and wider historical processes. Edward Said’s On Late Style (2006) contends that works produced towards the end of an artist’s life frequently frustrate the urge for harmonious closure and even the expectation of immediate understanding. For Said it is the extraordinary sagacity of old age and especially the defiant confrontation with imminent death that imbue the senescent mind with an uncommon aptitude for facing facts, as well as relinquishing nostalgic dreams and precipitate visions. We have late works’ dissonance and sheer difficulty as well as their demanding and uningratiating quality to thank for refusing us the sort of appeasement and consolation furnished by more beguilingly melodious compositions. Late works in Said’s view give rise to dissatisfaction and alertness, to a sort of vigilant refusal to settle down, comply or be of the same mind with the dominant view. Late style is intensely provocative, contrary and disobliging, not to mention unashamedly resistant to simplification. It is a mode of expression adopted by one who is determined to eschew orthodox perspectives and to promote that eschewal in his readers.
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Said’s rather surprising examples of thinkers’ and artists’ eleventhhour productions include the tacit fatalism of Mozart’s Così fan tutte, the anti-redemptive vision of Benjamin Britten’s late opera Death in Venice, Richard Strauss’s unsettlingly backward-looking final compositions (most obviously the Four Last Songs), the daring political affiliations of the French novelist Jean Genet, the Sicilian aristocrat Giuseppe Tomasi di Lampedusa’s lapidary novel The Leopard, and (an old obsession) the prodigious virtuosity and eccentricity of the Canadian pianist Glenn Gould. Said is referring to late style as something that dispels what Joseph Conrad in the closing line of his novella Youth calls ‘the romance of illusions’ (1975, 39): that is, what Said elsewhere refers to as youth’s ‘facility for romanticizing unpleasant realities’ (1997a, 112). ‘Lateness is being at the end, fully conscious, full of memory, and also very (even preternaturally) aware of the present’ (Said, 2006, 14). In late style is revealed the vulnerability of youth’s frequently grandiose ambitions to the disappointment and disenchantment consequent upon the passage of time: ‘the justice that examines all offenders’, as Rosalind puts it in As You Like It (IV.i.187–8). For Said, who is glossing but also, as I will show, simplifying Adorno’s account of Beethoven’s late compositions, late style is a chapter in the career of the artist whose consciousness of mortality leaves him indignant and disillusioned (in the literal sense of that word), distrustful of expressions of hope and ideas of reconciliation, and prepared as a result to begrudge his audience any pat, homiletic conclusions. Late works ‘do not fit any scheme, and they cannot be reconciled or resolved, since their irresolution and unsynthesized fragmentariness are constitutive, neither ornamental nor symbolic of something else’ (Said, 2006, 12). Age and the consciousness of mortality are, in Said’s view, the exclusive basis of late style. I would not wish to deny the productiveness of Said’s largely biographical approach. For Yeats’s work certainly gives a sense of the sobering power of old age. The ageing poet is acutely conscious of time and transience, of ‘Whatever is begotten, born, and dies’ (VP, 407). Yeats ‘wither[s] into the truth’ (VP, 261), as he puts it in ‘The Coming of Wisdom with Time’, and gains insight into the hypocrisy, cowardice and falsity of the scene he regards: ‘we old men are massed against the world’ (VP, 486). So too is Yeats remorsefully fixated with ‘Things said or done long years ago’ (VP, 501). Often the defiant tone of ‘tragic joy’ (VP, 564) is Yeats’s riposte to mortality. He is like the varied figures that populate heaven in ‘Her Courage’ ‘Who have lived in joy and laughed into the face of death’ (VP, 366). Furthermore, Yeats’s late style is antagonistic and difficult: a bromide against solace and false optimism, what he calls ‘the folly of
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being comforted’ (VP, 200). But I think we need to qualify or rather add to Said’s largely biographical explanation of late style lest we neglect the vital political and historical conditions of the style of a poet like Yeats. According to the more materialist account provided by Adorno’s book on Beethoven, the late stylist is more than just a gifted paragon of truculence and dissent. His work can also, far more importantly, be a means of expressing an entire culture’s consciousness or at least inkling of its own moribundity. Adorno is exceedingly impatient with standard biographical or psychological interpretations of Beethoven’s late works in which their enigmatic quality is put down to the composer’s age and debility (Adorno, 1998, 125). The mordant outlook of late-period creators can instead be a consequence of a whole society’s elongated death throes, of a perceptive (and not necessarily elderly) individual’s more or less conscious recognition that a specific social order’s halcyon period of youthfulness and promise has given way to a late phase of decrepitude. In the middle or classical period of Beethoven’s work the final movement or reprise of the sonata always resolves different themes in the ambit of the dominant theme. This is music that resounds with a revolutionary desire for social harmony; it ‘reverberates with the roar and ideals of the heroic years of its class’ (Adorno, 2006, 100). But this classical idiom rings false in a society with no experience or imminent expectation of harmony. The transition from Beethoven’s classical to his late style reveals in aesthetic form the flawed and incomplete character of the social whole: ‘late style’, according to Adorno, ‘is essentially critical’ (1998, 97). In, for example, his late mass, the Missa Solemnis, which eschews Beethoven’s characteristic principle of thematic development (138–53), or in the way that particular phrases in the last quartets and piano sonatas, because of the music’s jarring caesurae and its outworn conventions, no longer seem yoked to the dynamic flow of the whole, the first encroachments of dissonant twentieth-century music can be perceived. Beethoven’s late works are bare and fragmentary. Because the recapitulation of the dominant theme grates against the common experience of antagonism it is employed, as Charles Rosen also notes, in an incongruous or sardonic and even ironic fashion (1971, 460), indefinitely postponing the thematic resolutions effected during his mature period. Beethoven’s late works are for Adorno the ne plus ultra of bourgeois art, the limit point beyond which the highest forms of cultural expression are essentially negative. To the musical experience of the late Beethoven the unity of subjectivity and objectivity, the roundedness of the successful symphony,
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the totality arising from the motion of all particulars, in short, that which gives the works of his middle period their authenticity, must have become suspect. He saw through the classic as classicism […] At this point he raised himself above the bourgeois spirit, of which his own oeuvre is the highest musical manifestation. Something in his genius, probably the deepest thing, refused to reconcile in the image what is unreconciled in reality […] It is, in the proper sense of the word, a realistic trait in him which is dissatisfied with tenuously motivated conflicts, manipulated antitheses of the kind which in all classicism generate a totality which is supposed to transcend the particular but in reality is imposed on it as if by a dictate of power. (Adorno, 1998, 151–2) Late style, therefore, is both an unavoidable misfortune in the life of the artist, who in consciousness of mortality ceases to impose his unifying will on his aesthetic material and thus reveals its rifts and fissures, and a seismic event in the history of modern culture. No longer content to camouflage the existence of alienation and social conflict, the composer devotes his works, in Adorno’s terms, to the articulation of truth: to the candid assertion of society’s deficient, unfinished character. To be late, in Adorno’s view, is therefore to be disillusioned: to view the bourgeois world without consoling fancies and daydreams. Late style is, then, not just an approach or a technique that affects artists when they are long in the tooth. What Adorno is getting at, in contrast to Said, is an appreciation, grasped and conveyed through artistic form, that a social order characterised by division and conflict is therefore unsustainable and, consequently, on the verge of dying out. Late style dramatises what Adorno calls the ‘limit of the bourgeois mind’ (1998, 141). We would therefore be well-advised when seeking to account for the dissonance of Yeats’s late work to look beyond the standard biographical explanations. Blackmur (1986), Eliot (1975), Ellmann (1985) and Arra M. Garab (1969) all contend that Yeats’s late works fought out an exhilarating though perforce unsuccessful battle with the inescapable limits of reality and time. In his final works, like Prospero’s, every third thought is the grave. I am suggesting that instead we explain Yeats’s late work in relation to its context. This involves augmenting Said’s influential characterisation of Yeats’s work, in his extended study of the poet’s oeuvre in Culture and Imperialism, as postcolonial (Said, 1994a, 265–88). Because Yeats was embroiled in a nationalist struggle against colonial power, his early work, for Said, bears comparison with that of anti-colonial poets such as Aimé Césaire, Mahmud Darwish and Pablo
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Neruda. Yeats is seen as ‘the indisputably great national poet who during a period of anti-imperialist resistance articulates the experiences, the aspirations, and the restorative vision of a people suffering under the dominion of an offshore power’ (Said, 1994a, 265–6). What this interpretation fails to emphasise is what Said himself has characterised as ‘the anger and gaiety of [Yeats’s] anarchically disturbing last poetry’ (1994a, 278). For it is precisely here that Yeats’s work responds to the failings and limitations of national consciousness. We should therefore place Yeats not just in the context of anti-colonial nationalism but in the more topical context of the period that comes after the formal winding up of Europe’s colonial empires and therefore after the partial or preliminary success of the kind of anti-colonial nationalist project of which Yeats and his works were a part. As Jahan Ramazani (2001) along with Marjorie Howes (2006) and some of the contributors to Deborah Fleming’s volume of essays on W.B. Yeats and Postcolonialism (2001) have contended, Yeats’s work rewards the attention of postcolonialists for several reasons, including its involvement in cultural resistance to colonial power and its fascination with the experiences and values of other cultures (Ramazani, 2001, 21–48). A further reason, I am claiming, is that his late work alerts us to a historical stage that was soon to become universal: a failed transition from the age of colonialism to a genuinely post-colonial dispensation. For Said, nationalist resistance to colonialism has two different, if not quite distinct, phases (1994a, 277). The first entails an awareness of the exceptionable fact of colonial domination and a resultant determination to resist colonialism both politically and at the level of culture. This is the moment at which the nation is taken possession of through political and even military organisation and is given shape at the level of the imagination through symbols and narratives that replace demeaning stereotypes with images of the awakening nation’s unity, value and purposefulness. Yeats’s early poetry and drama along with his championing of the Celtic Revival belong to such a moment. The second stage of resistance, according to Said, who is glossing Frantz Fanon’s ideas, takes place alongside this first and emerges from it before, hopefully, superseding it. This stage becomes most constructive and necessary at the point at which the former colony’s political independence has been achieved. For of what use are braggadocio and cultural unity once the coloniser has been expelled? Indeed, there is a danger that nationalism will then degenerate into narrow chauvinism. This is a point made by Said when he decries the deficiencies of those regimes that took power in Africa and Asia after decolonisation: regimes that failed to move from the first stage of resistance to the second, from (to use Fanon’s terms)
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national consciousness to social and political consciousness and even international consciousness (Fanon, 1990, 199). Resistance’s second stage involves repudiating the rhetoric of unity and sacrifice that, of necessity, characterised nationalism during its insurgent phase and replacing it with a willingness to address, for example, social injustices and the oppression of women, to prioritise education, and to encourage democratic participation. This is the milieu of Yeats’s later poetry, the point after the achievement of Ireland’s independence at which in Ireland nationalism in the sense of a unified struggle against colonialism becomes largely unnecessary. At this point Yeats aimed to substitute ‘positive desires for the negative passions of a national movement’ (1966, 572). The heroic phase of nationalism aspirant has given way to the compromises and prevarications of nationalism triumphant. Now other forms of injustice, hitherto repressed pending the expulsion of the foreign power, must be tackled. ‘The boy who used to want to die for Ireland’, Yeats declared in 1914, confident that Home Rule would be enforced, ‘now goes into a rage because the dispensary doctor in County Clare has been elected by a fraud. Ireland is no longer a sweetheart but a house to be set in order’ (quoted in Foster, 1997, 513). Crucially, the struggle against colonialism’s legacy also entails the cultivation of much broader post-nationalist allegiances. The original goal of anti-colonial resistance was never separation or the assertion of exclusive identities. Of course, the affirmation of their identity is an essential means for a people to regain self-confidence and legitimacy after centuries of defamation, just as national sovereignty ought to be used to curtail dependency and under-development. But as Fanon and others recognised, sovereignty and identity are no more than staging posts en route to genuine emancipation, which would necessitate new, non-nationalist allegiances that solicit loyalty not to some hunk of territory gerrymandered by the former colonial power but to a fully global community. Decolonisation, in Fanon’s words, ‘sets out to change the world’ (1990, 27). Yeats, Said rightly suggests, ‘partially belonged to this second moment’ (1994a, 278), as shown by that anarchic late poetry and its voluble dissatisfaction with nationalism, a crucial point that Said does not expand on or substantiate. My objective is to show in detail (as opposed to pointing out in passing) how Yeats’s work can be read not just in relation to anti-colonial nationalism but also in relation to the second or post-nationalist phase of liberation that explores expansive alternatives to national power and consciousness. However, there is a very different and widely held view of Yeats’s late work that must first be considered. For late Yeats is associated more
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often with fascism than with militant anti-colonialism. My sense is that close attention to the late poems makes one extremely sceptical of the simplistic narrative of Yeats’s political development set out in, say, Paul Scott Stanfield’s Yeats and Politics in the 1930s (1988). Stanfield sees Yeats eschewing nationalism and turning himself into a snobbish Anglo-Irish reactionary and even a fascist. Elizabeth Cullingford, however, in her Yeats, Ireland and Fascism (1981), views Yeats’s brief flirtation in the 1930s with the quasi-fascist Blueshirt organisation of Eoin O’Duffy as an injudicious response to his otherwise laudable contempt for the conservative stuffed shirts that headed official nationalism. More significantly, we should be more careful to distinguish the politics of the poet from the politics of his poetry.4 The aristocratic mask donned by Yeats in the late poems should be seen less as a defiantly illiberal assertion of outmoded ideals of hierarchy than, on the contrary, as the assumption of a persona that allowed him to attack prevailing dogmas all the more fiercely by presenting himself as a free spirit beholden to no particular interest or party. Far from a defence of social order, the aristocratic stance might equally license an eschewal of it: ‘What if the Church and the State | Are the mob that howls at the door!’ (VP, 554), where the unexpected exclamation mark has the force of a self-critical revelation. The celebrations of Lady Gregory’s aristocratic demesne in poems like ‘Coole Park, 1929’ (VP, 488–9) and ‘Coole Park and Ballylee, 1931’ (VP, 490), though ostensibly a thoroughly reactionary and nostalgic, even high Tory, vision of the poet as an aristocrat’s obedient retainer, are on another level elegies for the loss of artistic freedom in Ireland in the face of growing censorship.5 ‘Another emblem there!’, exclaims the poet as a swan swims into view, though as Thomas Parkinson has noted, the emblematic significance of the swan is less obvious here than in previous poems (1964, 126). Now it seems to connote not just the Platonic soul but, drifting on its ‘darkening flood’, also the poet and his milieu’s vulnerability to some vague threat. What is central is less the ancient house, which is on the wane, than the ancient house as an emblem of the unfettered intellect and of artistic freedom. ‘Upon a House shaken by the Land Agitation’ is indefensibly conservative if read literally as a protest against the reduction of tenants’ rents at Coole on the grounds that this measure imperils the existence of Yeats’s writing sanctuary. But it becomes far more persuasive if the poem is read as a poem rather than as a political statement: in other words, if we interpret creatively the image of the sturdy house ‘Where passion and precision have been one’ in giving birth to ‘sweet laughing eagle thoughts’ (VP, 264). I am suggesting that the indeterminacy of such images leaves us free to interpret
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the poems as personal experiences transmuted into general morals and therefore, perhaps, as a defence of what Theodor Adorno calls the ‘autonomy’ of the aesthetic or what Yeats calls ‘a written speech | Wrought of high laughter, loveliness and ease’ (VP, 264).6 Likewise, the vision of the cautious shopkeeper in ‘September 1913’ fumbling in the ‘greasy till’ whilst adding ‘the halfpence to the pence’ and ‘prayer to shivering prayer’ (VP, 289), though unquestionably disdainful, stems perhaps from Yeats’s fear that in independent Ireland minds might be circumscribed by the middle-class vices of vulgarity, avarice and piety.7 Yeats was no anti-capitalist of course. Despite his admiration for revolutionaries like James Connolly it would be unconvincing, not to say absurd, to claim Yeats on behalf of Connolly’s project of hoisting the green flag over Dublin as a prelude to the building of a Socialist Republic (Connolly, 1973, 124). In the late poems, however, we find an aversion to the unequal social order of independent Ireland: ‘money’s rant is on. | He that’s mounting up must on his neighbour mount’ (VP, 580). The ostensibly patrician disparagement of the bourgeois ethic, of ‘the merchant and the clerk’ breathing on the world ‘with timid breath’ (VP, 266), might equally be seen as a progressive rejection of capitalist social relations. I am even tempted to say of Yeats what Fredric Jameson has argued of Wyndham Lewis: that it is when he is at his most apparently reactionary that his affront to orthodox sensibilities makes his work most interesting and emancipating (Jameson, 1979). Indeed, Yeats seems surprisingly and even commendably willing to sacrifice personal reputation for poetic effect: ‘O what am I that I should not seem | For the song’s sake a fool?’ (VP, 553). Even the notorious misogyny of the later poems, in which it is usually women who are enchanted by hysterical or extremist passions, can be explained, if not entirely excused, in this way: by approaching them as literary works not as statements of the poet’s views. Everywhere in late Yeats, women’s voices grow ‘shrill’ (VP, 392) and their minds become ‘bitter’ and ‘abstract’ (VP, 397). Eva Gore-Booth and Constance Markiewicz, for instance, are distracted from beauty and fineness by ‘Some vague Utopia’ (VP, 475). Yet these dubious figures for hysterical abstraction and militancy are also bound up with Yeats’s laudable suspicion of ‘the morbid persistence of minds unsettled by some fixed idea’ (1961, 313): that is, of people whose vibrancy, beauty and individuality are subordinated entirely to nationalist agitation and who therefore lose sight of the nobler intellectual, artistic and humane values that national independence paves the way for but does not itself represent and cannot bring about. ‘In Memory of Eva Gore-Booth and Con Markiewicz’
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(VP, 475–6) should be read alongside ‘Why Should not Old Men be Mad?’ (VP, 625–6). Here the extreme disillusionment of old age is put down to the transformation of youthful creativity and elegance into mediocrity, ‘intellectual hatred’ (VP, 405) and single-minded extremism. The poet’s disaffection is brought about less by his own old age than by his having lived long enough to witness the frustration of youth’s ambitions. That he laments his former companions’ shrillness is an example of the poet’s misogyny perhaps but it is also, more interestingly and less moralistically, a metaphor for a kind of chronic and inordinate political zeal. It is the poetry that concerns us here. An essential part of my argument in this study is that it is literary texts, not least by virtue of their contentiousness and indeterminacy, that provoke their readers into adopting alert, inquisitive and self-critical postures. As Auden suggested in his elegy for Yeats, we must attend mostly to the complex truths that unfold through language and not to the simplifications now and then put about by the mortal, sometimes misguided and frequently, ‘like us’, ‘silly’ people who wield it. Time that with this strange excuse Pardoned Kipling and his views, And will pardon Paul Claudel, Pardons him for writing well. (Auden, 1940, 109) We need to understand the enduring complexities and provocations of Yeats’s poems as an implicit repudiation of fascism as well as nationalism.8 By 1937 Yeats associated fascism with the contrived and violently imposed unity that he was rebelling against in his verse: ‘What discords will drive Europe to that artificial unity – only dry or drying sticks can be tied into a bundle – which is the decadence of every civilisation?’ (Yeats, 1978, 301–2). Yeats expressed his horror that ‘men will die and murder for an abstract synthesis’ (161). His late work’s complexity and its polysemic character, its refusal to effect what Adorno calls ‘reconciliation under duress’ (1991a, 216–40) by forcibly uniting a complex reality in the poetic image, went hand in hand with its political aversion to all ideologies that demand conformity and obedience. Perhaps here we find the reason why lateness is so frequently associated with failure and the inability to finish. Adorno’s book on Beethoven, like Said’s on late style, was published posthumously. It is a collection of scattered, though characteristically dazzling, fragments culled by his indefatigable executor
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from sketches, research questions and recondite aide-mémoires. Adorno’s failure to write his long-gestated study is itself an object lesson in the vanity of human wishes and in the resistance of the composer’s oeuvre to coherent theoretical exposition. It also denotes the expressive power of failure, of a Yeatsian eschewal of contrived unity and coherence (of which the bundled sticks of the Italian fasces are a symbol) in favour of uncertainty and fragmentariness. There are political implications here, as well as philosophical and epistemological ones. The form of Yeats’s late poems, particularly the ways in which the subjective intentions of the poet have given way to a new kind of uncertainty, a new absence of resolution and therefore to a new interpretative freedom on the part of their readers, is the most eloquent rejoinder to accusations of fascism. The value that I am ascribing to late Yeats is to be found in the poems’ calculated provocation of intellectual exertion and therefore of disagreement and dissent: estimable characteristics of course not fascist ones, no matter what we make of Yeats’s frequently ill-judged political sympathies.
Seeking a theme Yeats’s early plays and poems are indebted to the traditions of French symbolism; Arthur Symons’s influential The Symbolist Movement in Literature of 1899 was dedicated to Yeats (Symons, 1899, v–vi). They are also part of the edifying legends and myths of the Celtic Twilight (Yeats, 1981), the national symbols unearthed in folk culture and fairy lore, in addition to Yeats’s enduring fascination with the visions of Blake. Frank Murphy aptly characterises Yeats’s early poetry as a ‘quest for reconciliation’ (1975). This is also the eccentric milieu of theosophical societies, neo-Platonism and the occult, of alchemical research and séances where the spiritual and material worlds intersect. Early poems like 1892’s ‘To Ireland in the Coming Times’ (VP, 137–9) are products of the youthful poet’s desire to articulate Ireland’s national spirit through graspable symbols. The poem begins by rejecting the view that the symbolic nature of the poet’s work distances it from political involvement: ‘Know, that I would accounted be | True brother of a company | That sang, to sweeten Ireland’s wrong’. He places himself in the company of earlier patriotic poets, Thomas Davis, James Clarence Mangan and Samuel Ferguson. Far from escaping politics, Yeats endeavours to defend poetic composition itself as a profoundly political act. He represents the nation figuratively, encapsulating it in a resonant image: ‘Nor be I any less of them, | Because the red-rose bordered hem | Of her, whose history began | Before God made the angelic clan, | Trails all about the
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written page’. The ‘measure’ of the dancer’s ‘flying feet’ are echoed in the poem’s similarly sprightly, scarcely varying iambic tetrameter. Here no disparity is perceived between the measured, temporal world and the unmeasured realm of eternal beauty and national unity that the poet seeks to incarnate in compelling symbols. On a superficial level the change in Yeats’s style is heralded by his poetry’s altered rhythms, which change from repetitious and incantatory to quite intricate and varied metrical patterns; the introduction of more topical allusions to people and events; and the placing of declamatory emphasis not on the realms of the divine but on the desires and limitations of the body: here ‘All dreams of the soul | End in a beautiful man’s or woman’s body’ (VP, 374). The contemplative mood is replaced with one of stridency, vehemence and perturbation. Grand and archaic diction is rejected and a decision is taken ‘to make the language of poetry coincide with that of passionate, normal speech’ (Yeats, 1961, 521). Responsibilities (1914) marks the advent of work that is ‘not at all a dream, like my earlier poems, but a criticism of life’ (quoted in Foster, 2003, 1). The stylistic equivalent of this transition and the deeper as well as more interesting reason for the late poetry’s distinctiveness and originality is, as Paul de Man suggests, the changed function of the image or symbol. We should take note of de Man’s persuasive contention in The Rhetoric of Romanticism that ‘the change in manner’ that led to ‘the masterly poetry written after 1916’ is best understood ‘in terms of the different kind of imagery that precedes it’ (1984, 181). The imagery of late Yeats is always so indeterminate, uncertain and even obscure that it demands from us a sort of hermeneutic exertion. Here the onus of interpretation is bequeathed by the poet to his readers. Hence the prevalence of insoluble predicaments and inconclusive dialogues in late Yeats as well as the unanswered questions that are asked, most famously, in the last lines of ‘Leda and the Swan’ (VP, 401) and ‘The Second Coming’ (VP, 402). Images now raise but do not answer questions: Images and memories From ruin or from ancient trees, For I would ask a question of them all. (VP, 410) De Man draws a distinction between the relatively simplistic mythological allusions in Yeats’s early drama and verse and the much more complex, multifaceted, even esoteric emblems employed in the later
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poetry. In these compound emblems the connection between symbol and meaning is always precarious, provisional and contestable. ‘No interpretation will do Yeats justice that fails to account for the controlled violence of the late work’ (de Man, 1984, 189). The violence to which de Man refers is done to the preconceptions of the late poems’ readers. It is in late Yeats’s practised capacity to provoke his readers into reflection on the poems’ images and their connotations that he reminds us that this violence is, to use de Man’s term, ‘controlled’: that the late works’ capacity to needle, inflame and even aggravate us is in fact intentional as well as purposeful. It is worth recalling at this point Benedict Anderson’s contention in his Imagined Communities that, since the nation is too large and diffuse an entity to be experienced directly, it becomes a compelling reality to its subjects through its incarnation in symbols like cenotaphs, maps and flags, as well as in textual representations such as, for example, newspapers and novels: emblems ‘that penetrated deep into the popular imagination’ (Anderson, 1991, 175). ‘Nations’, as Timothy Brennan has argued, ‘are imaginary constructs that depend for their existence on the apparatus of cultural fictions in which imaginative literature plays a decisive role’ (1990, 49). For the young Yeats too the nationalist artist provides symbols of Ireland’s unity. In 1901 he expressed his ambition to ‘re-create the ancient arts […] as they were understood when they moved a whole people’ (1961, 206); ‘a country which had no national institutions must show its young men images for the affections’ (312–13). That the later poetry complicates the poetic image – which is to say confounds it, throws it off balance and renders it much more intricate and demanding – expresses a philosophical alienation from certainty and is evidence at the poetic level of what I have been calling Yeats’s prescient disillusionment with nationalism. Yeats’s late style differs from the early on account of its new consciousness (as well as appreciation) of a truth that is at best implicit in the early work and which often seems there to vex or baffle the poet and which he therefore frequently resists. It is a truth that has been recognised most clearly and discussed most convincingly by Paul Ricoeur. Ricoeur’s The Rule of Metaphor contends that the value we ascribe to the figurative use of language should be put down to the capacity of metaphors and symbols to refresh our habitual perceptions. They goad readers into thought through their indeterminacy and therefore their manifest susceptibility to interpretation. Intrinsic to the effect of metaphor is the obligation of interpretation they place on one. Why is all the world a stage? What is Yeats’s restored tower at Ballylee a symbol of? All
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language, of course, is metaphorical, but we call that language literary which foregrounds this quality, which openly retains the gap between the metaphor and that with which it is being likened, and which thus invites reflection and interpretation. For Ricoeur, metaphors are capable of suspending our ordinary ways of describing their referents in order to provide imaginative and refreshing ways of experiencing them: ‘metaphor is that strategy of discourse by which language divests itself of its function of direct description in order to reach the mythic level where its function of discovery is set free’ (1978, 247). This sounds grandiloquent but Ricoeur’s point is simple enough: fresh metaphors can regenerate meaning by encouraging new and inventive ways of perceiving their referents. They rejuvenate and breathe new life into perception, something captured in the original title of Ricoeur’s book, La métaphore vive. An effective metaphor for Ricoeur, like ‘true expression’ for Pope, ‘Clears and improves whate’er it shines upon’ (Pope, 1966, 73). Metaphors provide alternative forms of perception, unusual angles from which to view seemingly familiar phenomena. ‘Literary language’, for Ricoeur, ‘has the capacity to put our quotidian existence into question; it is dangerous in the best sense of the word’ (quoted in Kearney, 1984, 24; emphasis in the original). Thus the creative use of metaphor goads us into reflecting in new ways upon our world; it ‘forces conceptual thought to think more’ (Ricoeur, 1978, 303; emphasis in the original). The metaphor or symbol is opaque and inconclusive. Its meaning and significance cannot be found in itself but must be brought to light. ‘The symbol invites us to think, calls for an interpretation, precisely because it says more than it says and because it never ceases to speak to us’ (Ricoeur, 1974, 28). Yeats’s late poetry furnishes enigmatic material for reflection. Above all through its recondite, indeterminate imagery it provokes us to think more about the shortcomings of the postcolonial state and in so doing to begin to explore intellectual and political alternatives. In ‘The Circus Animals’ Desertion’, the penultimate poem in his last collection, Yeats’s metaphors take on a life of their own (VP, 629–30). I sought a theme and sought for it in vain, I sought it daily for six weeks or so. Maybe at last, being but a broken man, I must be satisfied with my heart, although Winter and summer till old age began My circus animals were all on show, Those stilted boys, that burnished chariot, Lion and woman and the Lord knows what.
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The absconding animals of the poem’s title are the images and symbols of Yeats’s early poems and plays such as ‘that sea-rider Oisin’ and ‘the Fool and Blind Man’ from On Baile’s Strand. Crucially, they have abandoned the poet and not the other way round, for this is less a confession of Yeats’s disillusionment with symbolic art than an admission of its impossibility in the sense that he had once conceived it. This is not a straightforward poem about the waning of the poet’s creative powers in other words, though the first stanza, as in ‘An Acre of Grass’, does its best to make us think this is so. Yeats describes himself as ‘a broken man’. He has ‘sought’ for a new theme or inspiration but sought for it ‘in vain’, a failure made more poignant by the obsessive and rather frantic use of the past-tense ‘sought’ three times in the first two lines. In my view, the poem is a successful pursuit of a resonant new theme for Yeats’s verse and a new method for employing symbols that are eloquent and engaging precisely because they lack directness and specificity. In the first two lines, despite his habit of repeating himself, the elderly poet does not seem to possess another of the characteristics of old age: shortness of breath. ‘I sóught a théme and sóught for ít in váin, | I sóught it dáily fór six wéeks or só’ is in steady iambic pentameter. That last, rather blasé colloquialism ‘or so’ prepares the ear for the abrupt variation of the next line with its decidedly less formal, indeed positively dishevelled and irregular, metre. ‘Maybe at last, being but a broken man’ would represent a more fluent shift of gears within the limits of blank verse were it not for the jarring ‘but’ in the middle of the line, which takes it from ten to eleven syllables. Michael Wood refers to these moments in Yeats’s verse as ‘snags’ (2010, 128), points at which the metrical flow is disturbed and we become uncertain how to scan the line and even whether we should scan it at all. Without this snag, the line would have a steady enough rhythm, consisting of three dactyls (one stressed syllable followed by two unstressed syllables) and a final, satisfying stress on ‘man’ in the manner of the fifth line of this poem as well as, say, the title and first line of Keats’s sonnet ‘Hów many bárds gild the lápses of tíme!’. But that incongruous conjunction serves instead to convey the poet’s brokenness and loss of inspiration (in both senses of the word): the disappointing disorderliness of his work as well as the elderly poet’s shortness of breath (as well as ours when reading the line aloud). ‘But’ both scrambles the metre and shifts some of the emphasis of ‘man’ onto itself. It thereby lays stress not on the coherent or controlling personality of ‘man’ but on man’s incoherence and lack of control; the poet is not ‘a broken man’, he is ‘but’ or only a ‘broken man’. Those alliterative, plosive bs in ‘being but a broken man’
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contribute to the reader’s need to enunciate this line haltingly and with difficulty rather than fluently and with equanimity. Almost spat out, they hint for the first time in this poem at the anger expressed elsewhere in the late poems and which is here held back until the final stanza. But it is the metrical variation above all that throws into relief the stanza’s main themes of limitation and deficiency. Something similar happens in the next line, which again botches and oversteps the metre and does so once more in order to lay emphasis on an out of place element, this time the dramatically stressed monosyllables ‘with my heart’, another malfunctioning organ it seems, given the irregular beat of these lines. Yet neither the Muse’s departure nor the poet’s physical debility, nor even his loss of inspiration, make this poem an expression of defeat, for the tone of resignation with which Yeats contemplates his abandonment by his early works’ visionary motifs involves him in a telling performative contradiction; by saying these things, he disproves them, announcing his loss of virtuosity with undiminished virtuosity. Just as the colloquial announcement of poetry’s redundancy in ‘The Tower’ (‘It seems that I must bid the Muse go pack’ (VP, 409)) is nevertheless in tightly controlled iambic pentameter, so this later announcement of artistic crisis takes the form of a no less rigorous and characteristically stately ottava rima with apposite variations of emphasis. Form refutes content therefore, the poem’s technical control and vigorous manner belying the professed loss of purpose and power. Yeats resembles the protagonists of Shakespeare’s tragedies and the Chinese figures on the carving in ‘Lapis Lazuli’, greeting impending catastrophe with a kind of defiant vivacity: ‘Gaiety transfiguring all that dread’ (VP, 565). He greets the prospect of war in that poem as he greets old age and artistic crisis in this one: with an exemplary intensification of his poetic energies that controverts the threat of imminent death. Furthermore, the poem refutes the first few stanzas’ ostensible scepticism about the possibility of transmuting reality into art by doing exactly that. This time, however, reality’s miscellaneous oddities are not transmuted into the Gaelic images of the early poems and plays. Those images are ‘stilted’ in both senses of the word: that is, out of the reach of the bustle and commotion of ordinary life as well as affected, wooden and unnatural. In ‘High Talk’, also from Last Poems, stilts stand for elevated style and lofty thoughts and metaphors (VP, 622–3). Here, in ‘Those stilted boys, that burnished chariot, | Lion and woman and the Lord knows what’, that last phrase is a sort of offhand admission of the poet’s own exasperation with the elaborate system of symbolic correspondences he constructed for the early poems. The underwhelming
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half-rhyme of the vague, indifferent ‘what’ with the incongruously hyperbolic ‘chariot’, especially after the uncomplicated rhymes of the rest of the stanza, adds to the bathetic effect. This sense of anti-climax is compounded by the contrast with the lucid internal rhyme of ‘lion’ and ‘woman’. In addition, the phrase ‘the Lord knows what’ is not just an exasperated colloquialism but also a literal statement that God alone and certainly not the modestly proficient, randomly associative minds of men could make sense of Yeats’s esoteric system of symbols. Yet if ‘stilted’ is one adjective Yeats chooses to apply to his images then ‘burnished’ is another, implying a creative and artistic process of which the poet is justly proud. The ‘burnished chariot’ was a stylish product of the poet’s craft, as is the phrase itself, which echoes melodiously the assonance and stress of ‘circus animals’ in the previous line. Yeats is again removing his coat ‘Covered with embroideries | Out of old mythologies’ (VP, 320), so long as one recognises that this act of disrobing also contains a measure of delight in the beauty, intricacy and craftsmanship that went into the needlework. Already, therefore, the mood of despair, confusion and renunciation is offset by a sense of the poet’s pride in his achievements and therefore by a hint that neither his poetic skill nor his belief in its efficacy have been entirely put aside. It is important to remember that Last Poems gets underway with Yeats’s attempt in ‘Under Ben Bulben’, partly through dictating his own epitaph, to prescribe his work’s fate after his death. He ‘commands’ the words of his epitaph to be cut and stipulates themes for the next generation of Irish poets (VP, 639–40). However, the rest of the volume, of which ‘The Circus Animals’ Desertion’ is the penultimate poem, serves to undermine this last-ditch attempt to control the reception of his work and the responses of Yeats’s readers and successors. Even the circus animals, those wild creatures that he once aspired to tame and put ‘on show’ in order to gratify his audiences, have proven to be as ‘ungovernable’ as the sea fought by Cuchulain. Therefore the poet must accept the necessity of making poetry out of more feral, brutish and undomesticated, as well as unappealing, material and of allowing his readers to judge the results. One of the salient traits of Yeats’s late collections, also evident in the historical cycles of A Vision, is their acute and even ebullient awareness of the impermanence of civilisations’ ‘glory’ and ‘monuments’ and therefore also of the imminent passing of Yeats’s own: ‘Egypt and Greece good-bye, and good-bye, Rome!’ (VP, 563). All things, including the poet’s own ‘glory’ and ‘monuments’, his poems, are made to seem mortal, a truth realised and proclaimed in a tone of levity not disappointment. So too the poet’s own life, which, like Swift,
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he recapitulates from the standpoint of his own death in pensive poems like ‘The Municipal Gallery Revisited’ (VP, 601–4), ‘Under Ben Bulben’ (VP, 636–40), and ‘The Black Tower’ (VP, 635–6). As Adorno says of Beethoven’s last works, these poems ‘abdicate before reality’ (Adorno, 1998, 123); they seek out what Yeats calls ‘the desolation of reality’ (VP, 563). By now the poet is ‘worn out with dreams’ (VP, 329). His themes and images, the poet realises, are to be found elsewhere than in the realm of abstractions and eternal ideals. Consequently, he must forfeit his fixation with perfection and completeness. However, the ‘counter-truth’ voiced in the third and fourth stanzas subverts the dismissal of myths and symbols in the first two. Yeats admits that at one time he was obsessed by art itself, not the emotions and situations in which it originates: ‘Players and painted stage took all my love | And not those things that they were emblems of’. The distinctive emphasis in ‘Players’, not an iamb but a lone trochee, serves to spotlight that word and so establish the pre-eminence of art rather than the stuff from which art is made. The Countess Cathleen was written, the poem tells us, in order to divert ‘my dear’ Maud Gonne from the ‘fanaticism and hate’ that were ‘destroying’ her soul. Cathleen had sold her soul to the devil to buy bread for the starving poor, and Yeats thought that Maud too had bartered her beauty for political commitment. But the ‘dream’ of the play took ‘all my thought and love’, that ‘all’ perhaps implying that his devotion to art and his obliviousness to the realities and motivations that brought art into being was itself a kind of fanaticism no less intolerable than Maud’s. The ‘counter-truth’ is countered. Neither an obsessive fixation with perfected symbols nor their impatient disavowal represents a satisfactory method of composition. The final stanza concludes that reality is too wilfully unmanageable to be transformed into coherent symbols or into what ‘Sailing to Byzantium’ calls ‘Monuments of unageing intellect’ (VP, 407). By making this admission the poet locates a new theme. Yeats is able to plot a course between the poem’s truth and its counter-truth, between a disavowal of art in favour of reality and a nostalgic recollection of a time when it was art that engrossed him entirely. Those masterful images because complete Grew in pure mind, but out of what began? A mound of refuse or the sweepings of a street, Old kettles, old bottles, and a broken can, Old iron, old bones, old rags, that raving slut Who keeps the till. Now that my ladder’s gone,
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I must lie down where all the ladders start, In the foul rag-and-bone shop of the heart. That ‘must’ in the penultimate line is poised, as Harold Bloom has pointed out (1970, 456–9), somewhere between a resigned admission that the poet has no choice but to lie there and an affirmative and volitional desire to do so, between defeated resignation and a kind of triumph. While ostensibly a disappointed admission that Yeats’s ‘masterful images’ originate in and cannot ultimately transcend the confused, unpropitious flotsam of the real world, the poem is also a culminating realisation and acceptance, even celebration, that poetry can and ‘must’ be made from this material. Nobody but Yeats has encapsulated so memorably in suggestive images Walter Benjamin’s declaration that the achievements of culture grow from (and at their best seek to express) art’s origination in violence, grime and desire (Benjamin, 1992, 248). The ribaldry of the Crazy Jane poems in The Winding Stair already reminded us of the earthly origins of higher things: of the fact that ‘Love has pitched his mansion in | The place of excrement’ (VP, 513). ‘Byzantium’, another of Yeats’s late reflections on death and on the inevitable vagueness and evanescence of the images with which we try to imagine it, sees life’s deeds and wishes originating in ‘The fury and the mire of human veins’ (VP, 497). These late poems of abandonment are at once impressive feats of poetic skill and surprisingly carefree disavowals of poetry’s capacity to transcend its coarse starting point in the ‘fecund ditch’ (VP, 479) of human passion. By turning his mind to ‘the sweepings of a street’, Yeats is recapitulating a theme that had occupied him for years. Now, however, poetry’s origination in the multiply suggestive jumble and refuse of ordinary life is, if not celebrated, then at least accepted with a kind of stoical dignity. There is no tone of resentment in the concluding stanza of ‘The Circus Animals’ Desertion’, because the poem recognises the poetic possibilities in sourcing one’s images in this way. The line from the second stanza, ‘What can I but enumerate old themes’, has no question mark, as though this is a merely rhetorical and private expression of dissatisfaction. By the final stanza, however, this mood of introspection has dissipated and the reader can add her own question mark and even hazard an answer: ‘why, enumerate new ones!’ But this is not an answer in the sense of a crowning resolution; these new themes and images are too indeterminate for that. This is the end of the poet’s oeuvre but the beginning of his readers’ deliberations. The Muse in ‘The Tower’ has obeyed the poet’s command to pack her bags and has
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taken up residence here. She is ‘that raving slut | Who keeps the till’, although this time she is not fumbling there like the dreary shopkeepers in ‘September 1913’ but is, to the contrary, frenzied and unmanageable. Unusually, it is she, not the poet, who is angry and she, not the poet, is the manager here, though hers is a special kind of authority. Though she is described with the derogatory word ‘slut’, it is by no means certain, especially in the light of Yeats’s almost Joycean insight into female sexuality in the Crazy Jane poems, that we should understand that word in a pejorative sense. She is only as slovenly and promiscuous as the images of the final stanza, which are in a similarly slatternly state and which, being opaque and puzzling, are not betrothed monogamously to the poet’s intentions but wantonly solicitous of each reader’s efforts at interpretation and elucidation. It is undeniable that there is a profound scepticism about imagery in these late poems. The impressionistic ‘Beautiful Lofty Things’ (VP, 577–8) in New Poems relates experiences, such as the poet’s father ‘upon the Abbey stage’ brazening out the mob and the stately, defiant Augusta Gregory ‘seated at her great ormolu table’. These are images of course, but it is left to the poem’s readers to decide what they are images of. Likewise, ‘The Circus Animals’ Desertion’ is not abandoning the essential poetic task of fashioning resonant images from material discovered in the grossly physical world. The poem utilises that material, but refrains from ‘burnishing’ the resulting images in the way that Yeats’s youthful self burnished Cuchulain’s ‘chariot’ in the first stanza. These are not immaculate wares placed in an extravagant, upmarket shop window, polished and perfected, the labour of their composition concealed. ‘Old kettles, old bottles, and a broken can, | Old iron, old bones, old rags’, they are placed before the reader with the artifice of their composition still showing. The poet does not direct their interpretation; he cannot even describe or distinguish them adequately, applying to each one the same inexpressive adjective. The production of beauty and the manufacture of symbols requires labour, as Yeats admits in ‘Adam’s Curse’ (VP, 204–6) and demonstrates in ‘Easter 1916’ (VP, 391–4). The circus animals were ‘on show’ ‘Winter and summer’, perhaps because circuses are seasonal concerns but also because the toil that went into coaching and preparing his images was for the poet both long and arduous. Here, in a poem about the writing of poems, that labour is laid bare. But Yeats actively disproves the first line’s admission that he has run out of themes. He combines the most profound scepticism about poetry’s ability to transmute life into lasting art with the most exhilarating and efficacious reaffirmation of poetry itself and
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in particular of poetry’s highest merit: its capacity to generate images that stimulate the mind. This is not a rejection of poetry in other words but an expansion of its remit. ‘The “ladders” that lead upwards towards art’s dubious triumphs are not kicked aside’, as Michael O’Neill has pointed out, ‘merely viewed from the bottom rung’ (2003, 257). Yeats’s ladder has ‘gone’ but he leaves it possible for others to climb the ones that remain. The concluding stanza is at once an act of renunciation or exhaustion as well as, in the insistent monosyllables and the forceful rhyme of its last line, a last-ditch outburst of poetic energy and skill that attests to the undiminished viability and importance of the poet’s life’s work. Yeats has responded to the finale of his poetic oeuvre not with some artificial and contrived sense of completion but by finding a new theme and purpose: the initiation of evocative images.
‘An old man’s eagle mind’ One of the most significant and topical questions asked by late Yeats is about the limitations of space. Yeats argued in his Senate speech on divorce that Ireland’s partition could not possibly be addressed if the country ‘is going to be governed by Catholic ideas and Catholic ideas alone’ (1960, 92). The eventual transcendence of arbitrary borders and partitions, the Free State’s dearest objective, would be the result of persuasion not force: of the moral and intellectual allure of tolerance’s good example. ‘An Acre of Grass’ (VP, 575–6) from New Poems addresses Yeats’s concerns about the Free State’s chauvinism and claustrophobia more subtly and effectively than any other of his works. The scene is Riversdale, the house outside Dublin to which Yeats and his wife moved in 1932. The poem gets underway with a candid admission as well as exposure of the elderly poet’s apparently fading powers. Picture and book remain, An acre of green grass For air and exercise, Now strength of body goes; Midnight, an old house Where nothing stirs but a mouse. In the very first line the stress falls on the strong plosives in the first two feet of the trimeter (a trochee and then an iamb) before the much fainter consonants of the iambic third foot and the comparatively elongated second vowel sound in ‘remain’ denote a palpable flagging of
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force and energy: ‘Pícture and bóok remáin’. The nostalgic note adds to the effect. That slackening is also evoked by the unimaginative couplet that ends the stanza, rhyming ‘house’ with ‘mouse’ as though Yeats were merely going through the motions of writing poetry. This is what Ted Hughes might have called a ‘deadlock rhyme’, one that lacks the nuance and dissonance to prompt any further reflection or variation. This is also a so-called masculine rhyme; all the stress is placed on the final beat, especially since ‘mouse’ is preceded by two unstressed syllables. It is as though the poet is drawing our attention to this undemanding rhyme and therefore to the exhaustion of his poetic skill. A similar effect is achieved in ‘Now strength of body goes’, where the stress falls on ‘strength’ before the clipped vowel sounds give way to the extended drift of ‘goes’, which is stretched out further by the sibilance that ends this line, as it does six of the seven lines in the stanza. The opening to the poem therefore possesses something of what Terry Eagleton has called ‘the contrived swagger and slap-dash of the last poems’ (1998a, 284). ‘Swagger’ seems the wrong word for the ebbing strength of the poet until one realises that this evocation of the poet’s enervation is a skilful poetic effect like any other and that Yeats is so audaciously, perhaps swaggeringly, convinced of his own virtuosity that he is prepared to accentuate it by appearing to write badly. The next stanza, the second of three, continues in the same vein. My temptation is quiet. Here at life’s end Neither loose imagination, Nor the mill of the mind Consuming its rag and bone, Can make the truth known. The ‘looseness’ of the senescent imagination, its sloppiness and laxity, is even more evident in the second stanza than in the first. The jumbled metre with its apparently capriciously varying line lengths and uncertain stresses suggests a loss of poetic control. But the mind’s mill fares no better. It tries to transmute the flotsam of ordinary life, seen here as in ‘The Circus Animals’ Desertion’ as recycled ‘rag and bone’ (VP, 630), into poetic images. The mechanical metaphor suggests a method of composition so disciplined and regulated that it is akin to industrial production, an effect reinforced by the machine-like anapaestic reverberations of each foot and the alliterative repetition: ‘Nor the míll of the mínd’. But the mill too is powerless, as is suggested perhaps by the faint archaism of
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the word: powerless, that is, to enable poetry to express reality in vivid and truthful images. The stanza begins, however, with a covert ambiguity that many of the poem’s readers have failed to detect and which starts to suggest, perhaps, a new way of bringing poetry closer to truth. As Jon Stallworthy (1963, 216–17) has pointed out, ‘My temptation is quiet’ can be read in two opposed ways: as it has customarily been read, as an announcement that the poet’s daring, sinful self has been silenced; or, alternatively, as I am inclined to read it, as a declaration that quietness itself represents a temptation for the ageing poet. ‘Quiet’ is a noun as well as an adjective. Read this way, the poet, far from being quiet, still resides amidst disquiet, bustle and unappeased longings.9 The latter reading is supported by the sound of the line, with its strident alliteration in ‘temptation’ as well as the sibilance of ‘temptation is’. Similarly, the trochaic ‘quiet’ loads all the emphasis onto the long first syllable, which, ironically, disturbs the brief lull caused by the two unstressed syllables that precede it. If this is acquiescence in quietness and tranquillity, then it is a decidedly noisy one. For already the poem is preparing at the level of sound for the fury of the final two stanzas, a fury that will enable the inauguration of a more effective compositional method. The abrupt tonal shift at the outset of the third stanza makes explicit the technical control that has been operating more or less surreptitiously in the first two. Grant me an old man’s frenzy, Myself must I remake Till I am Timon and Lear Or that William Blake Who beat upon the wall Till truth obeyed his call. ‘Grant’ introduces immediately a new tone of command that complements the much greater metrical regularity. ‘Grant’ is also an imperative verb, an instruction, like most other verbs in these last two stanzas such as ‘remake’, ‘beat’, ‘pierce’ and ‘shake’. That a frenzied late style must be claimed reinforces the point that it does not come naturally at the end of an artist’s life but must be sought after. The sense of urgency is compounded by the expeditious enjambment which strides over (the literal meaning of enjambe) the confines of punctuation and beyond the sense of enclosure imparted by the hesitant syntax and garden imagery of the first stanza. The tone is not too peremptory or hectic, however, because the poet’s own personality is specified as one of the objects
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to be bent to his will. ‘Myself must I remake’ alters the natural word order in order to place ‘Myself’ at the beginning rather than the end of the line. This is done not for the sake of the metre, one assumes, since ‘I must remake myself’ would still be in iambic trimeter but in order perhaps to emphasise, by foregrounding ‘Myself’, that it is the poet’s character and identity that will be subjected to radical alteration. If the last two stanzas assume an aura of command, therefore, then this is less Ozymandias’s ‘sneer of cold command’ in Shelley’s sonnet than that of a fretful will fortifying itself before the commission of an arduous task. Self-remaking is an ongoing and incomplete process in other words: the ‘I’ is not something immutable but a project to be worked on. The objective of that remaking is to perform the roles of Shakespeare’s tragic heroes Timon and Lear. Yeats imagines himself penning an unrepentant epitaph like Timon and assuming Lear’s righteous fury.10 Craving an ‘old man’s frenzy’, Yeats rages in the final two stanzas like Lear on the heath. He is an ‘Unaccommodated man’ (III.iv.103), exiled now from safety and from home as well as reduced to the lowest common denominator of all men, their insubstantial corporeality: ‘a paltry thing’ or ‘A tattered coat upon a stick’, as Yeats puts it in ‘Sailing to Byzantium’ (VP, 407). Yeats remains focused on restyling and rejuvenating his own personality. He is resolved to become like ‘Timon and Lear | Or that William Blake, | Who beat upon the wall | Till truth obeyed his call’. Yeats, like Timon and Lear, finds himself in political exile. He is a prophet in the wilderness, performing the roles of these two great tragic protagonists in a dramatic display before his audience. The fury of late style as well as its capacity to affront and challenge result not just from the poet’s private distress but from his assumption of a character whose part is to embody for a public, in an exemplary and instructive way, a condition of exile and dissatisfaction. This exaltation of creative vision induces readers to look more closely at the four images contained in these two stanzas. The first, Blake beating upon the wall, in which the thudding iambic trimeter sounds out the poet’s insistent pounding, is of the imagination protesting against physical and mental constraint. It conjures a violent protest against the sense of enclosure evoked in the first stanza. The next three images are contained in the final stanza, where the poet claims A mind Michel Angelo knew That can pierce the clouds, Or inspired by frenzy Shake the dead in their shrouds;
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Forgotten else by mankind, An old man’s eagle mind. In the second image the precision and control implied by ‘pierce’ contrast with the recollected ‘looseness’ and enervation of the first two stanzas. By this stage, moreover, the assertive rhymes have lent the brief lines a kind of focus and exactitude whereas the bathetic and sibilant endings of the first stanza made them seem merely fatigued. More significantly, the intensely evocative nature of the images, even though their significance and meaning are not spelt out, indeed because this is the case, conjure reality more effectively than either the loose or mechanical symbolising that Yeats rejected in stanza two. By adding the Renaissance artist to his roll call of models, Yeats is also preparing for the poem’s third major image, the artist’s readiness to ‘Shake the dead in their shrouds’. This is probably a reference to another late work, Michelangelo’s fresco of the Last Judgement on the altar wall of the Sistine Chapel, which depicts the resurrection of the dead and which Yeats may have seen when he visited Rome in 1934. Since the fresco was famously denounced for its portrayal of naked figures, there may also be an allusion here to Yeats’s campaign against censorship in the Free State. Like the ‘upright’ dead shaking in their tomb in ‘The Black Tower’ (VP, 635–6), the image is more dramatic than meaningful, though it is suggestive rather than merely vague. The dead in these poems are ‘upright’ in two senses: because they are uncorrupted and because they are not really dead. One might, for example, recall Walter Benjamin’s reflections in wartime Paris less than four years later on the angel in the painting by Paul Klee whose gaze, according to Benjamin, is fixed steadily on the unavenged and therefore unquiet victims of injustice (1992, 249). Perhaps the departed companions of the poet’s long life are being invoked and commemorated, as they are in ‘Beautiful Lofty Things’ (VP, 577–8), or, more likely, the heroic dead of the Easter Rising, as MacDonagh and MacBride and Connolly and Pearse were in ‘Easter 1916’ (VP, 391–4), ‘Sixteen Dead Men’ (VP, 395) and ‘The Rose Tree’ (VP, 396). Benjamin refers to revolution as ‘the avenger that completes the task of liberation in the name of generations of the downtrodden’ (1992, 251). By abandoning our outrage at the injustices inflicted on our forebears and by forgetting their sacrifices and abortive revolts we forfeit any appreciation of the necessity and possibility of political change. Thus we fall prey to passivity and to the chicanery and compromises of our leaders. By awakening the dead, Yeats endeavours to combat the forgetting described in the penultimate line. He fills our thoughts not
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with peace or satisfaction but with the melancholy realisation that the ideals of the fallen have not yet been fulfilled. The final image is the most important and the one for which the others have been preparing us: ‘An old man’s eagle mind’. This is an emphatic final statement; four of the six syllables in this last line are stressed. The struggle against restraint and enclosure, the quest for poetic images that are evocative without being merely vague, and the rousing of the dead out of dissatisfaction with the status quo, all preface this last compelling image of solitary, belated flight. What is Yeats in his ‘old man’s frenzy’ railing against? There is no explicit suggestion that the dead being shaken are the martyrs of the Rising, but there is a very subtle indication in the first stanza that Ireland itself, as so often in the late works, is the veiled target of the poet’s disenchantment. The guttural alliteration and dual, spondaic stress of ‘green grass’ are the only hints in the first stanza at the impatience and agitation that explode in the second half of the poem. What requires further reflection, however, is the metaphorical significance of ‘An acre of green grass’. Critics have not given anywhere near enough attention to the poem’s title, though I believe it provides the most instructive context for the anger and disenchantment dramatised by the poem. The sense of confinement in a small garden hints only vaguely at the poet’s similar distress at his imprisonment within the larger national space, although that specifically political disaffection is suggested quite insistently by the first stanza’s addition of the adjective ‘green’. Ireland too is ‘no country for old men’ (VP, 407). The eagle, which was Ezra Pound’s slightly ingratiating nickname for Yeats, is in part an image of the ascending imagination piercing the clouds of confusion with suggestive images. Whereas in 1917 he had still sought to restrain ‘the balloon of the mind’ that ‘bellies and drags in the wind’ by bringing it ‘Into its narrow shed’ (VP, 358) of discipline and purpose, here Yeats positively relishes such imaginative and insubordinate flights. But if we insist on seeing the acre of Yeats’s new house as a metaphor for the Free State then the eagle becomes not just a possessor of acute perception but also a harbinger of movement. The bird recalls the ‘hawk of the mind’ cleaving ‘the tumbling cloud’ in The Wild Swans at Coole (VP, 349), ‘The ravens of unresting thought’ that pestered the poet in the much earlier ‘The Two Trees’ (VP, 136) and the ‘eagle thoughts’ nurtured at Coole (VP, 264). There the bird symbolises something like the mind’s unruly deviation from the rest of one’s faculties, a departure both celebrated for its defiance and freedom and deplored for impairing the unity of personality. For Yeats’s alter ego Tom O’Roughley, whose thoughts are rooted in the body, ‘“wisdom is a butterfly | And not a gloomy bird of prey”’
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(VP, 338). Here, however, the eagle connotes, in addition to far-sightedness, predatoriness and a certain grandeur, the sort of freedom from locality and restraint that Yeats had celebrated in his elegy to the ‘Irish airman’ Robert Gregory (VP, 328). Neither public men nor cheering crowds drove young Gregory to the Royal Flying Corps according to Yeats, but rather the opposite of these things: a ‘lonely impulse of delight’ in selfsovereignty and a praiseworthy indifference to national attachments.11 Something of this note of jubilant unrestraint is suggested by the image of the eagle, which is capable of a movement more stylish and expansive as well as more self-delighting than the cursory excursions undertaken in his garden by an ailing versifier ‘For air and exercise’. Yeats summons anger and tumult in this late poem, passions that enable him to intensify his poetic energies and therefore to produce images and effects that are neither simplistic nor too neatly systematic. The reasons for this are at once personal – to do with the poet’s illnesses and his commendable determination in the last years of his life to shake himself from lethargy (as he shakes the dead in the final stanza) – and public, a product of his desire to do the same to his readers and to incite disenchantment with restraint of all kinds. After all, it is an unabashedly political rage that animates New Poems’ reflections on Parnell, Oliver Cromwell and Roger Casement. Indeed, the memorable images of the final two stanzas of ‘An Acre of Grass’, which are resonant and lucid without being didactic and which are at once specific and multiply suggestive, are precisely the result of Yeats’s struggle, dramatised in the second stanza, to augment the potency and effectiveness of his verse. He does so by devoting it to the presentation of expressive and intriguing metaphors. I am trying to present enough evidence to show that we are justified in construing the gusto and anger summoned by late Yeats, as well as being related to his own old age and to a perceived impasse in his way of composing poetry with symbols, as also partly political in nature. In my view it betokens and enables a confrontation with censorship and intellectual conformity, a remembrance à la Benjamin of the possibility of resistance and of the ideals of independence, as well as, faint perhaps but audible nonetheless and much more vociferous in later postcolonial writing, an intolerance of the distressingly narrow horizons of official nationalism.
Civilisations fall and rise ‘Lapis Lazuli’ from New Poems utilises the same compositional method in order to subvert cultural stereotypes about the East and its art. There
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are three poems on the theme of sculpture in Yeats’s last two collections: ‘Lapis Lazuli’ (VP, 565–7) is one; the others are ‘The Statues’ (VP, 610–11) and ‘A Bronze Head’ (VP, 618–19). ‘The Statues’ is an idiosyncratic reflection on the European sculptor’s imposition of ideal or exemplary form. Here, however, that process is represented in a way that is objectionably Orientalist in Edward Said’s sense of conforming to an ensemble of durable doctrines and stereotypes about the alleged ontological difference and inferiority of the East (Said, 1985). Europe is contrasted with what the poet sees as the vastness and diffuseness of the East. The poem contends that Pythagoras’s mathematical measurements and ratios of human proportion gave rise to a lasting ideal of physical perfection. Even greater than Pythagoras were those sculptors who embodied that ideal with mallet and chisel. These acts of creation not only gave birth to the European model of human beauty; they also ‘Gave women dreams and dreams their looking-glass’. The sculptor’s ideal determined the composition of the species by influencing sexual selection. In addition to the sinister eugenic implications of the argument that reproduction should conform to carefully delineated types, another, equally dubious political point made by the poem is that the artistic imposition of form has been an active part of Europe’s imposition of its will upon the plastic, unformed material of the East. European sculptors put down All Asiatic immensities, And not the banks of oars that swam upon The many-headed foam at Salamis. (VP, 610) The poem seems to deny that the Greek navy’s defeat of the Persian fleet at Salamis in 480BC was as significant in quelling Asia’s unruly immensities as Phidias’s controlled, archetypal forms. But just as the ‘many-headed foam’ betokens both Asia’s chaotic immensities and the drowning sailors, so the phrase ‘put down’ suggests actual violence as well as a mere violence of will or technique. Nonetheless the third stanza complicates slightly the brash certainties of the first two. Although the Europeans are said to impose truth while Easterners are merely trapped within a series of mirrors, there is at least a suggestion that it is the starved and abstract Hamlet whose ‘eyeballs’ are ‘Empty’ and unseeing and it is therefore he and not the Buddha who is trapped within mirrors. Moreover, the ‘Grimalkin’ or cat who ‘crawls to Buddha’s emptiness’
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is an image of either cunning or submission, but certainly not of control. Europe is as wasted and anxious as its great tragic hero. But this brief mood of uncertainty is conjured only so that it can be cancelled by the imperious tone that introduces the final stanza: ‘Pearse summoned Cuchulain to his side’. What stalked through the Post Office at the Easter Rising? ‘What intellect, | What calculation, number, measurement, replied?’ Unusually for the late poet