Contending with Stanley Cavell
Russell B. Goodman, Editor
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
CONTENDING WITH STANLEY CAVELL
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Contending with Stanley Cavell
Russell B. Goodman, Editor
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
CONTENDING WITH STANLEY CAVELL
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CONTENDING WITH STANLEY CAVELL
EDITED BY
Russell B. Goodman
1 2005
3 Oxford New York Auckland Bangkok Buenos Aires Cape Town Chennai Dar es Salaam Delhi Hong Kong Istanbul Karachi Kolkata Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Mumbai Nairobi Sa˜o Paulo Shanghai Taipei Tokyo Toronto
Copyright 2005 by Oxford University Press, Inc. Published by Oxford University Press, Inc. 198 Madison Avenue, New York, New York 10016 www.oup.com Oxford is a registered trademark of Oxford University Press All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior permission of Oxford University Press. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Contending with Stanley Cavell / edited by Russell B. Goodman p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-19-517568-9 1. Cavell, Stanley, 1926– I. Cavell, Stanley, 1926– II. Goodman, Russell B. B945 .C274C66 2004 191—dc22 2004041506
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper
In memory of my father Lester Morris Goodman
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Contents
Contributors ix Introduction 3 1. Cavell on Skepticism 10 Richard Rorty 2. On Refusing to Begin 22 Stephen Mulhall 3. Cavell’s “Romanticism” and Cavell’s Romanticism 37 Simon Critchley 4. Cavell and the Concept of America 55 James Conant 5. Rethinking the Ordinary: Austin after Cavell 82 Sandra Laugier 6. Cavell and American Philosophy 100 Russell B. Goodman 7. Guessing the Unseen from the Seen: Stanley Cavell and Film Interpretation 118 Andrew Klevan 8. The Avoidance of Stanley Cavell 140 Garrett Stewart 9. Responses 157 Stanley Cavell 10. Passionate and Performative Utterance: Morals of Encounter 177 Stanley Cavell Selected Bibliography 199 Index 201
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Contributors
STANLEY CAVELL is Walter M. Cabot Professor of Aesthetics and the General Theory of Value at Harvard University, Emeritus. A list of his publications is given in the bibliography of this volume. JAMES CONANT is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Chicago. He has written articles on Kant, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, William James, Frege, Carnap, and Wittgenstein, among others. SIMON CRITCHLEY is Professor of Philosophy in the Graduate Faculty, New School University, New York, and at the University of Essex, England. He is author of five books, among them Very Little . . . Almost Nothing (second edition, Routledge, 2004), from which the contribution to this volume is taken, and most recently On Humour (Routledge, 2002). He is currently working on the philosophical significance of the poetry of Wallace Stevens and on a theory of the ethical subject and its relation to politics. RUSSELL B. GOODMAN, Professor of Philosophy at the University of New Mexico, has written American Philosophy and the Romantic Tradition (Cambridge University Press, 1990) and Wittgenstein and William James (Cambridge University Press, 2002). He is the editor of Pragmatism: A Contemporary Reader (Routledge, 1995) and Pragmatism: Critical Concepts in Philosophy (Routledge, 2005). ANDREW KLEVAN, Lecturer in Film Studies at the University of Kent, is the author of Disclosure of the Everyday: Undramatic Achievement in Narrative Film (Flicks Books, 2000) and Film Performance: From Achievement to Appreciation (Wallflower Press, 2004). His “Teaching Film Style” will appear in Style and Meaning (edited by Douglas Pye and John Gibbs, Manchester University Press, 2004). SANDRA LAUGIER is Professor of Philosophy at the Universite´ d’Amiens (France). She is the author of several books, on Quine, Wittgenstein, Carnap, and Austin, and a translator of the work of Stanley Cavell. STEPHEN MULHALL is Fellow and Tutor in Philosophy at New College, Oxford. He is the author of Stanley Cavell: Philosophy’s Recounting of the Ordinary (Oxford University Press, 1994) and the editor of The Cavell Reader (Blackwell, 1996). His most recent publications are Inheritance and Originality (Oxford University Press, 2001) and On Film (Routledge, 2002). RICHARD RORTY teaches philosophy in the Comparative Literature Department of Stanford University. He is the author of Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton University Press, 1979) and Philosophy and Social Hope (Penguin, 2000).
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Contributors
GARRETT STEWART, James O. Freedman Professor of Letters at the University of Iowa, is the author most recently of Dear Readers: The Conscripted Audience in NineteenthCentury British Fiction (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996) and Between Film and Screen: Modernism’s Photo Synthesis (University of Chicago Press, 1999).
CONTENDING WITH STANLEY CAVELL
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Introduction
Stanley Cavell writes like no one else, with a range of interests and competencies unmatched by any of his contemporaries. He is not only an important philosopher but the author of three books of film criticism and theory, a literary critic who is a major interpreter of Shakespeare, and an important voice in American studies. Within philosophy, he is a prominent interpreter of Wittgenstein, the first writer to point out the Kantian background to Wittgenstein’s thought and to take seriously the therapeutic nature of his method. Cavell is the only major philosopher in any country to write a book on Thoreau, and, with the exception of Nietzsche, the only major philosopher to seriously engage Emerson. His work has implications for moral theory, epistemology, aesthetics, philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, and political philosophy. And yet Cavell occupies a curious position in all the fields in which he works: he is at the same time a major figure and one whose work people do not quite know how to use. He is, to use the verb employed by Garrett Stewart in an essay included in this book, “avoided” by the literary—and other—establishments. A recent account of his work on film, for example, observes that “within the field of film study, the potential usefulness of philosophy—as he understands and practices it—remains generally unrecognized.”1 A primary aim of this volume is to show a predominantly new generation of writers at work on and with Cavell’s ideas. When Cavell and I began to talk about assembling this volume, we agreed on three criteria for the critical essays: that they stand on their own as works of writing and thinking; that they illustrate the range of Cavell’s work, not only in philosophy but in literature and film; and that they offer criticisms to which Cavell could constructively respond. We also sought to include writers not known for their interest in Cavell, but who have taken up and used his thought in new ways. The collection accordingly includes discussions of Cavell’s work in literature, film, and American thought, as well as in philosophy; and four of the eight critical essays are by Europeans, each of whom comes to Cavell from a different intellectual background. While some of the essays are more critical and others more expository, Cavell’s extended set of responses is testimony to their richly searching character. The collection also includes Cavell’s groundbreaking new essay in speech act theory, “Passionate and Performative Utterance: Morals of Encounter.” Stanley Cavell was born in Atlanta, Georgia, in 1926, moved with his family to Oakland during his teenage years, and took his B.A. in music at Berkeley in 1946. 3
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Introduction
He moved to New York to study composition at Julliard the following year, but found himself more interested in reading—Thomas Mann, James Joyce, Sigmund Freud—and in going to the movies than in pursuing a musical career. In 1948 he returned to California to enroll as a student at UCLA, first in psychology, then in philosophy, where he met a visitor from Harvard, Morton White, who suggested he apply there. It was at Harvard in 1954−55 that Cavell met another visitor, John Langshaw Austin, from Oxford. Austin’s precise delineations of “what we say when,” of the multiple things we do with words, and of the ordinary as opposed to the philosophical worked a revolution in Cavell’s thinking. In Cavell’s hands, the ordinary language philosophy of Austin (and Wittgenstein) provides a series of bridges: to psychoanalysis in its idea of philosophy as a form of therapy (as Cavell argued in one of his earliest essays, “On the Availability of Wittgenstein’s Later Philosophy” [1962]); to literature, in its contrast between ordinary trust and fantastic skepticism (in “The Avoidance of Love: A Reading of King Lear” [1969]); and to an “undiscovered” region of American thinking (in The Senses of Walden [1971]). In the new essay with which this collection concludes, “Passionate and Performative Utterance: Morals of Encounter,” Cavell returns to Austin, taking up his work on performative utterances—those “things we do with words.” In How to Do Things with Words, Austin draws a distinction between illocutionary and perlocutionary acts. An illocutionary act is what we do in saying something, for example, christening a ship, or making a promise by uttering appropriate words in appropriate circumstances. Perlocutionary acts, in contrast, are what we do by saying something, for example, frightening someone. They need not be accomplished through language—I may frighten someone by jumping out from behind a tree, without saying anything at all. Austin puts the perlocutionary aside, after distinguishing it from the illocutionary, so that his theory of “speech acts” is mostly a theory of illocutionary—essentially linguistic—things we do with words, such as stating, inquiring, ruling, and promising. Cavell’s innovation is to set forth the conditions for a class of perlocutionary acts—acts, as he puts it, that confront their hearers with something, in a way not governed by convention. His examples range from “I’m bored,” said when it is obvious that I am bored, to Carmen’s “No. You do not love me,” uttered in response to Don Jose´’s false protestation of love. These utterances invite responses for which there is no established procedure, invitations that may be taken up, refused, acknowledged, avoided, or countered. If illocutionary acts are offers to participate in the “order of law,” Cavell suggests, then passionate utterances can be understood as “improvisation[s] in the disorders of desire.” Passionate utterances, Cavell holds, are representative of human language generally, which “everywhere reveal[s] desire.” He intends his essay to work toward “something I want from moral theory, namely a systematic recognition of speech as confrontation, as demanding, as owed . . . ” This new paper is thus at once a contribution to the philosophy of language and to moral philosophy, subjects which have been Cavell’s concurrent concern beginning with “Knowing and Acknowledging” and “The Avoidance of Love,” in his first book, Must We Mean What We Say?; through The Claim of Reason (the subtitle of which is “Wittgenstein, Skepti-
Introduction
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cism, Morality, and Tragedy”); to the “Emersonian moral perfectionism” delineated in Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome, This New Yet Unapproachable America, and Cities of Words. Like Kierkegaard, Cavell addresses “existing individuals” (not least himself), whose lives are governed by norms or claims as well as by the laws of nature, and who yet have the chance—indeed who cannot avoid the chance—to determine those lives through their own free actions. The essays in this volume begin with Richard Rorty’s “Cavell on Skepticism,” a review of The Claim of Reason (1979) that originally appeared in The Review of Metaphysics and was then reprinted in Consequences of Pragmatism (1985). As Cavell says in his responses, this was “about the only serious and substantial treatment of the book as a whole to have appeared, so far as I know, for most of the decade after the book’s publication.” Parts of Rorty’s review are quite critical of Cavell, for from Rorty’s neopragmatic perspective, disciplinary boundaries have faded away and Cavell’s allegiance to “philosophy” is outmoded. Rorty agrees with Cavell’s diagnosis of the Cartesian project as an impossible attempt to transcend human finitude, but he argues that pragmatists and others appreciated the point long before Cavell made it. He accordingly finds the first half of The Claim of Reason unhappily committed to traditional philosophical problematics, but he praises the second half of the book (parts three and four), where, as he sees it, Cavell succeeds in freeing himself from “what the ‘professionals’ do.” The third part of the book (“Knowledge and the Basis of Morality”) is, Rorty claims, “all by itself . . . one of the best books on moral philosophy which has appeared in recent years.” Rorty usefully distinguishes Cavell’s project from other attempts to find common ground between the Anglo-American and Continental traditions. Whereas many writers try to show that the Continental philosophers have “good arguments” after all, and so are respectable candidates for inclusion in a canon that includes Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell, Cavell’s originality consists in his attempt to “romanticize our own tradition.” Especially in part four of The Claim of Reason (“Between Acknowledgment and Avoidance”), Rorty finds, Cavell effectively and properly sets Wittgenstein in a philosophical context that includes such “friends of finitude” as Rousseau, Thoreau, Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche. Stephen Mulhall’s “On Refusing to Begin” continues the discussion of The Claim of Reason, slowing things down for a close reading of the first five paragraphs of the book. Mulhall begins with the issue of Cavell’s style by quoting Anthony Kenny’s early, irritated review of it (in The Times Literary Supplement). Kenny wrote: “Despite Cavell’s philosophical and literary gifts [The Claim of Reason] as it stands is a misshapen, undisciplined amalgam of ill-assorted parts.” Mulhall’s response is to carefully consider Cavell’s method, as revealed and described in the book’s opening pages. Cavell begins the book by raising the question of when and how philosophy begins—in particular the philosophy called for in Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations, and by extension the philosophy of The Claim of Reason itself. The epigraph to The Claim of Reason is from Emerson’s “Divinity School Address”:
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Introduction
“Truly speaking, it is not instruction, but provocation, that I can receive from another soul.” Cavell’s suggestion is that the Investigations is a provocative text, written “in criticism of itself,” in a style that is internal to its teaching. Mulhall, in turn, considers The Claim of Reason’s provocations and its multiple styles (lyric and dramatic modes, for example). He argues that The Claim of Reason, like Wittgenstein’s Investigations, is both “modernist” and “perfectionist”: written without any sure context of philosophical conventions, but teaching good readers to dispense with certain illusions—of knowledge, “human cultivation,” or philosophy. Part four of The Claim of Reason foreshadows Cavell’s developing interest in romanticism, which he conceives as “the discovery that the everyday is an exceptional achievement” (p. 463). In the central essays of In Quest of the Ordinary (1988), Cavell portrays romanticism as a set of responses to skepticism—a skepticism conceived more broadly than the Cartesian intellectual project of doubting the existence of the external world. Skepticism becomes for Cavell a name for something that we live: an existential condition of alienation and strangeness, from which (and from the philosophical responses to which) romanticism seeks a recovery. In “Cavell’s ‘Romanticism’ and Cavell’s Romanticism,” Simon Critchley considers Cavell’s romantic project from the perspective of German romanticism, chiefly that of Friedrich and August Schlegel, authors of the Athenaeum Fragments. The Schlegels seek a union of poetry and philosophy, as do the English writers to whom Cavell devotes most of his attention, William Wordsworth and Samuel Taylor Coleridge. But writing with the Schlegels’ notion of the fragment in mind, Critchley objects to Cavell’s claim that a union of poetry and philosophy is given “a fair realization” in Emerson’s essays. For romanticism, he argues, no such realization is possible. In the second section of his essay, “Why Stanley Loves America and Why We Should Too,” Critchley considers whether Cavell’s employment of the concept of America is “close to a form of cultural nationalism.” He writes of America’s extreme disjunctions—Yosemite and Graceland are his examples—and finds in Cavell’s writing both a deep critique of, and a perfectionist aspiration for, America. That aspiration follows the direction taken by Wordsworth, Emerson, and Wittgenstein: not toward the remote or otherworldly but toward the (recovery of the) everyday, common, ordinary, or low. In the end, Critchley finds a “tragic wisdom” in Cavell’s approach. The idea of America is taken up again in James Conant’s contribution. Taking his cue from Cavell’s appropriation of Emerson’s idea of a “new yet unapproachable America,” Conant finds America to be a goal rather than a place, something to be achieved rather than something that already exists. Just as Kierkegaard found himself in “Christendom” but doubted whether there were any true Christians, so, Conant suggests, Cavell and Emerson find themselves in “Americadom, . . . a state of affairs in which, because almost everyone in America already knows that he is an American, hardly anyone any longer takes the trouble to become one.”
Introduction
7
In the second part of his essay, Conant considers the style of American philosophical writing as compared to the French—the characteristic diffidence of American writers like Thoreau, and the characteristic brilliance of Parisian intellectuals like Derrida. Cavell’s project, Conant holds, is not simply to revive interest in Emerson and Thoreau, as if no one pays any attention to them any more, for many do; but to recover or encounter their thought as philosophy. Doing so requires a readjustment in what we understand philosophy to be and in how we expect it to be written, the attainment of a perspective from which European philosophy appears provincial and even “somewhat unphilosophical (in taking a certain dispensation of philosophy to be philosophy itself).” Conant ends his chapter with a consideration of Cavell’s discussion of America in his early essay “The Avoidance of Love.” Written during the height of the Vietnam War in 1969, the essay finds an America that, like King Lear, seeks love as proof of its existence, and becomes enraged and destructive when it feels unappreciated. Sandra Laugier considers the fruitful idea of “ordinary language philosophy” that Cavell originally learned from Austin and Wittgenstein. Like romanticism, ordinary language philosophy is a response to skepticism; but it is not, Laugier makes clear, a refutation of skepticism. According to Cavell, Thoreau and Emerson (and Austin and Wittgenstein) respond to skepticism “not by offering new knowledge or a new belief, but by a recognition of our condition.” That recognition, and the acceptance of our form of life called for by Wittgenstein, is not to be confused, she warns, with simple conventionalism. There is nothing obvious or immediate about the ordinary: like “America,” “it is to be discovered.” Laugier argues that the conventionalism advocated by some interpreters of Wittgenstein, with its emphasis on the arbitrariness of language and the conventional character of words’ relation to the world, actually cuts us off from a recognition of our life with things. Working back through some of Cavell’s earliest writing, Laugier considers the connections between Cavell’s work on the ordinary and his discussions of Wittgenstein on knowing other minds, Kant on aesthetic judgments and Rousseau on the social contract. The problems of knowledge Cavell considers are to be solved by a recovery of the ordinary, but this is a recovery in which we have to take some of the steps. Laugier concludes that works such as Emerson’s essays, Wittgenstein’s Investigations, and Cavell’s The Claim of Reason, are self-critical and provocative writings that have “something of autobiography, but a curious autobiography that is also our own.” My contribution, “Cavell and American Philosophy,” begins by charting the trajectory of Cavell’s interest in Thoreau and Emerson, as he learns to extend the idea of ordinary language philosophy to the issues of intimacy discussed by the American transcendentalists. Cavell speaks of “inheriting” Emerson and Thoreau, and of their founding a distinctive American way of doing philosophy. This raises the question, as Cavell is well aware, of his and their relation to the more canonical representatives of American philosophy, the pragmatists Charles Sanders Peirce, William James, and John Dewey. In scattered remarks and in his essay “What’s the Use of Calling Emerson a Pragmatist?” Cavell distances himself from pragmatism, seeing Dewey in particular as a naive child of the Enlightenment who does not see
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Introduction
that the Enlightenment (including modern science) has brought its own forms of ruin. I argue that Cavell looks only at one side of Dewey—what Rorty characterizes as the “let’s make everything scientific” side of him—and neglects his romantic, poetic and, non-instrumentalist side. Moreover, the skepticism and sense of despair Cavell does not find in pragmatism in fact permeates a pragmatist work such as James’s Varieties of Religious Experience. Finally, I consider the question of James’s presence (and hence an American presence) in Cavell’s “inheritance” of Wittgenstein, for James is referred to more than almost any other philosopher in the Investigations, and Wittgenstein, late in life, anxiously considered his own relation to pragmatism. Andrew Klevan’s “Guessing the Unseen from the Seen: Stanley Cavell and It’s a Wonderful Life” represents Cavell’s interest in film and at the same time connects with the issues of the ordinary and the everyday discussed by Laugier, Conant, Critchley, and Goodman. For the fundamental insight of his chapter, as of his book Disclosure of the Everyday, is that the ordinary is undramatic and uneventful. Drawing on writings of the film theorist Victor Perkins and the philosopher George Wilson, Klevan investigates factors in A Wonderful Life that, though “peripheral to the basic tale,” modify or displace the main issues raised by the drama. Klevan’s example is a banister knob that, to James Stewart’s continual annoyance, keeps coming off. At the end of the film, when Stewart realizes how much there is in his “ordinary” life, he kisses the banister and “it assumes a new aspect.” Klevan also considers Stewart from the perspective of Cavell’s discussions of film’s power to create “stars.” A star such as Stewart or Katherine Hepburn is a person, not a character, someone who transcends his or her filmic roles. Stars appeal to us, according to Cavell, because of “their power of privacy, of a knowing unknownness.” Thinking about Stewart, Klevan considers the relation of the power of privacy both to the human capacity for suffering and to democratic freedom. Garrett Stewart’s “The Avoidance of Stanley Cavell” assesses Cavell’s position in literary studies, where, as in philosophy, he is both seen as a major figure and yet somehow avoided. Stewart points out that Cavell’s work on Shakespeare, now collected in Disowning Knowledge in Seven Plays of Shakespeare, relied on and made claims about authorship and the human condition just at the time when cutting-edge literary theorists such as Stephen Greenblatt and Jonathan Dollimore were challenging the legitimacy of precisely such notions as “author” and “text.” Cavell’s interest in marriage as a form of “conversation” between potentially autonomous persons, for example, runs up against contemporary suspicions of language, autonomy, and the self. The hermeneutic of suspicion, Stewart argues, keeps the traditional literary effects that are Cavell’s concern “ at arm’s length,” for Cavell’s close readings also posit a reader with convictions about—and convictions by, as Cavell likes to say—a text. For Cavell, the reader is as much read by, as she is a reader of, the text. “In the epoch of cultural studies, discourse analysis, and the semiotics of social energy,” Stewart writes, “what are called legible texts, in their constitutive deceit, don’t exactly require what we once called reading at all.” Stew-
Introduction
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art concludes with a series of more positive remarks, about Cavell’s conception of philosophy as “a textual process” and his ability to produce in his writing a form of “prose flight.” Cavell’s responses to these essays begin with an extended discussion of skepticism, pragmatism, and his own philosophical education. Acknowledging that many of his best teachers at Harvard were responding to or continuing pragmatism in one way or another, he found nevertheless that their ways of doing philosophy were not “possible or hopeful” for him. He agrees with Rorty and the pragmatists that traditional epistemology has been overcome, but he nevertheless sees skepticism not only as a live intellectual option in philosophy but as something endemic to our condition. The task, as he sees it, is not to get rid of skepticism (e. g., by proving that there is a world or other people or by simply ignoring it), but to learn to manage or “govern” it—a lesson Cavell finds taught in the Investigations and in Emerson’s “Experience,” but not in pragmatism. With these words and others Cavell continues the conversations his work has provoked. This volume was originally conceived as part of a series edited by Herman Saatkamp, whose Richard Rorty: The Philosopher Responds to His Critics (Vanderbilt University Press) provided the model for its format. David Justin Hodge and Patricia Aragon scanned previously published material. The contributors were amazingly patient and understanding as I assembled the book, and Stanley Cavell was a steady companion throughout, and a happy and thoughtful interlocutor at the end. To all of them, my sincere thanks. Note 1. William Rothman, “Cavell on Film, Television, and Opera,” in Richard Eldridge, Stanley Cavell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 206.
1
Cavell on Skepticism RICHARD RORTY
Cavell’s The Claim of Reason consists of two books in one—the first (parts I–II) written some twenty years back, and the second (part IV) composed quite recently.1 Most (parts I–II) of the first book is about epistemology, and this is the book with which I want to take issue. So I shall spend most of my time on it, saying only a little, toward the end, about the second. This is unfortunate, since I admire the second book as much as I disagree with the first. But one always has more to say in disagreement than in agreement. Parts I–II suggest that the material studied in the standard introductory courses in epistemology (Descartes’s table, Berkeley’s tree, Moore’s hand, and the like) helps us see something important about the human situation, about human finitude. It takes us from epistemology to romance. It promises to relieve us philosophy professors from the shame we have felt ever since we began to suspect that our introductory courses in epistemology merely kicked up a cloud of dust around our students—so that they might be grateful to us for leading them out of it into the light. Austin, Bouwsma, Wittgenstein, Wisdom, and Ryle all suggested that we just shrug off the claims which Berkeley and Descartes and Moore made on us—that we teach epistemology as the history of some bad ideas. Now Cavell tells us that, unless we take these claims very seriously indeed, we shall not get the full benefit of what Wittgenstein and Austin (in particular) can do for us. We must not, he tells us, shrug off skepticism too easily, for then we may miss “the truth of skepticism”: “that the human creature’s basis in the world as a whole, its relation to the world as such, is not that of knowing, anyway not what we think of as knowing” (p. 241). What Cavell wants us not to miss is, to be sure, as important as he thinks it. But does he have to drag us back through Berkeley and Descartes to get us to see it? Why are not “Rousseau and Thoreau and Kierkegaard and Tolstoy and Wittgenstein” (to cite one of Cavell’s lists of heroes) enough? Why “the external world” again? Cavell sometimes seems to argue as follows: Wittgenstein is as important as Rousseau or Thoreau or Kierkegaard or Tolstoy, for getting us to see these things. Wittgenstein spent a lot of time discussing problems raised by people who claimed to doubt the external world. So we had better take such doubts seriously. 10
Cavell on Skepticism
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This seems to me like arguing that we should take Napoleon seriously because of the amount of time Tolstoy spent on studying him in War and Peace. Frederick the Great would have served Tolstoy’s purposes almost as well, especially if the latter had been an Austrian rather than a Russian. Analogously, I think we should view skepticism about the external world as just a handy, local, “English” example of a much more general phenomenon, what Cavell calls “the attempt to convert the human condition, the condition of humanity, into an intellectual difficulty” (p. 493). Had Wittgenstein stayed in Central Europe, he would have met philosophy professors who worried more about the transcendental standpoint and less about skepticism. But he would probably have written pretty much the same books, and directed our attention to the same things.2 Wittgenstein, however, is not Cavell’s only hero. Shrugging off the problem of the external world would matter to a reading of Austin, Moore, or C. I. Lewis. Perhaps we just would not read them any more. These writers, unlike Wittgenstein, are just philosophy professors. One may feel grateful to Austin for freeing one from Moore’s worries about unsensed sensibilia, or Lewis’s about terminating judgments, but this is the perfunctory gratitude due a doctor who cures a minor ailment, brought on by a colleague’s malpractice. It is not the sort of gratitude one feels toward the romantic hero, or the psychoanalyst, who saves one from monsters. Cavell, however, does seem to view Austin as a romantic hero. He even views Lewis and Moore as something more than professors. Thus he speaks of the “genuineness of philosophical inspiration in the teaching of C. I. Lewis.” One of his epigraphs is a tribute by I. A. Richards to Moore’s “intensity.” He dedicates The Claim of Reason in part to Austin and in part to Thompson Clarke, who, Cavell says, showed him that “the dictates of ordinary language . . . were as supportive as they were destructive of the enterprise of traditional epistemology” (p. xii). More generally, Cavell says that one of his motives is to keep lines open to the events within American philosophical life that we can call the reception of ordinary language philosophy (sometimes called then Oxford philosophy, and represented here primarily by some work of J. L. Austin’s) together with that of Wittgenstein’s Investigations, as if certain paths for philosophy, opened by those events, are always in danger of falling into obscurity. (p. xiv)
For, he says, it can seem that the reception of Wittgenstein and of Austin has yet to have its public or historical effect on this [our American] philosophical culture. I do not say that this is a bad thing. Wittgenstein’s writing is not of a character that lends itself to professionalization . . . and if Austin wished for professionalization, it was not to be as philosophy. Nor do I say that this lack of a certain reception is surprising. Philosophical Investigations, like the major modernist works of the past century at least, is, logically speaking, esoteric. That is, such works seek to split their audiences into insiders and outsiders (and split each member of it). . . . If I say that the basis of the present publication is that Wittgenstein is still to be received, I mean to suggest that his work, and of course not his alone, is essentially and always to be received, as thoughts must be that would refuse professionalization. (p. xvi)
But if one is not concerned about being professional, why worry about “American philosophical life”? The latter phrase can only refer to current trends in fash-
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ionable philosophy departments. Among intellectuals generally, Wittgenstein is in fact being read and used more and more. It is only within certain philosophy departments that he, and “Oxford philosophy,” are vieux jeu. Such parochial matters should not concern Cavell, nor lead him to conclude that “certain paths for philosophy, opened by these events, are always in danger of falling into obscurity.” Cavell says he wants to “understand philosophy not as a set of problems but as a set of texts,” and believes that “the contribution of a philosopher . . . to the subject of philosophy is not to be understood as a contribution to, or of, a set of given problems” (p. 34). So one would have expected him to conclude that Wittgenstein would be better served by forgetting “events within American philosophical life” than by recapturing them. Cavell’s ambiguous attitude toward the “events” of which he speaks is part of an equally ambiguous attitude toward academic philosophy’s place in culture. Sometimes he uses “philosophy” in a large sense in which it means “the criticism a culture produces of itself” (p. 175) or “the education of grownups” (p. 125). Sometimes he uses it in a narrow “professional” sense in which it is plausible to say that epistemological skepticism is central to philosophy and in which fashions in philosophy departments matter to philosophy. He plays back and forth between these two senses in such passages as the following, which treat “philosophy” and skepticism as near synonyms: But the philosopher has to make a problem for us, show us in what sense it might so much as be a problem. And though intellectual advance often depends upon someone’s ability to do just that, the conclusion the philosopher takes us to goes beyond anything we should expect from investigations which seem to proceed as his does. To some philosophers that fact has itself, I think, proved the power and subtlety of philosophy; while to others it has only demonstrated its intellectual frivolity. If one has felt both of these ways about skepticism, then one may come to sense that this very conflict itself may be displaying, or concealing, some critical fact about the mind, and one which neither side has been able, or willing, to articulate. (p. 159) [T]he methods of ordinary language, far from trivializing the impulse to philosophy (as many of its detractors, not, perhaps, without some reason, have found it to do) show how complex and serious an ambition the criticism of philosophy, which must inevitably remain internal to philosophizing itself, ought to be. (p. 166)
In the latter passage, “the impulse to philosophy” is implicitly identified with the impulse to raise the sort of problems (of epistemological skepticism) in which the “ordinary language philosophers” specialized. Nobody, after all, has thought that the criticism of culture was frivolous. But they have thought that philosophers were frivolously neglecting the duty to offer such criticism by getting hung up on “the external world.” Perhaps I can make this complaint clearer by distinguishing between two intellectual phenomena that I think Cavell wrongly conflates: (a) The ‘‘professional” philosopher’s skepticism created by what Reid called “the theory of ideas” (the theory that analyzes perception in terms of immediately, certainly known givens). (b) The Kantian, Romantic worry about whether the words we use have any relation to the way the world actually is in itself.
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These two phenomena have all sorts of historical connections, but they are dialectically independent. Suppose one pooh-poohs the theory of ideas in good Austinian fashion. Unlike Austin, one may still feel something like panic at the thought that there is no way to hold the world in one hand and our descriptions of it in the other and compare the two—to get, as Cavell says, “outside language games.” Both (a) and (b) seem distinct from a third phenomenon (c), described by Cavell as that experience I have called “seeing ourselves outside the world as a whole,” looking in at it, as we now look at some objects from a position among others. This experience I have found to be fundamental in classical epistemology (and, indeed, moral philosophy). It sometimes presents itself to me as a sense of powerlessness to know the world, or to act upon it; I think it is also working in the existentialist’s (or, say, Santayana’s) sense of the precariousness and arbitrariness of existence, the utter contingency in the fact that things are as they are. . . . All of existence is squeezed into the philosopher’s tomato when he rolls it toward his overwhelming question. (p. 236)
The tomato in question is the one about which H. H. Price, in the opening pages of his Perception, said, “There is much that I can doubt.” The differences in tone between that work, Fichte’s Vocation of Man, and Sartre’s Nausea might normally be accounted for by saying that Price was presupposing (a), whereas Fichte was expressing (b), and Sartre (c). Price does not find his questions overwhelming, nor do most writers on the subjects he discusses, most of the writers in what Cavell calls “the English tradition” (p. xiii). Cavell, however, lumps these writers together with Kant, and (a) together with (b), in such passages as the following: Locke avoided skepticism only apparently, through distraction and good English sense; Berkeley through God; Descartes through God and a special faculty of intellectual “perception”; Kant, denying such a faculty, avoided it through world-creating categories; Hume, to the extent that he did through “natural belief”; Moore, through furious common sense. And all who have followed the argument respond to it as a discovery about our world, one catastrophic in its implications, overturning what we all, until now, believed as completely as we believed anything. (pp. 222–23)
The “argument” in question is the usual textbook, Pricean argument, in which we are driven to admit that we do not see a whole tomato, but only. . . . Cavell is either being obscurely ironic, or is just wrong, in saying that “all who have followed the argument respond to it as a catastrophic discovery.” Most of them, including Locke and Hume, thought of the skeptical consequences of the theory of ideas in the same way as the developers of a revolutionary scientific theory think of the “anomalies” (in Kuhn’s sense) which the theory generates. They view them as annoying and unfortunate, but by no means catastrophic, and providing employment for epigoni. (If Cavell means by “apparently” and “to the extent that,” that Locke and Hume should, by rights, have been overwhelmed, then he is not making the point he wants to make.) The only people who go all existential about the invisibility of the rest of the tomato are lecturers on epistemology who relieve the classroom tedium by hype. When such lecturers encounter an unstable freshman who actually does feel the tomato to have catastrophic implications, they hasten to join his more robust classmates in assuring him that it is all “just philosophy.”
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Contending with Stanley Cavell
One would have thought that, once we were lucky enough to get writers like Wittgenstein and Nietzsche who resist professionalization, we might get some criticism of philosophy which did not remain internal to philosophy. (As Montaigne, Spinoza, and Feuerbach gave us criticism of religion which was not internal.) But Cavell switches with insouciance from the narrow and professional identification of “philosophy” with epistemology to a large sense in which one cannot escape philosophy by criticizing it, simply because any criticism of culture is to be called “philosophy.” To resolve this ambiguity, Cavell would have to convince us that skepticism in the narrow sense, the sense used in ritual interchanges between philosophy professors (Green and Bain, Bradley and Moore, Austin and Ayer), is important for an understanding of skepticism in some deep and romantic sense. He would have to show us that “skepticism” is a good name for the impulse that leads grownups to try to educate themselves, and cultures to try to criticize themselves. Then he would have to connect this broad sense with the narrow, “technical” sense. My main complaint about his book is that Cavell does not argue for such a connection, but takes it for granted. He does not help us see people like Moore and Austin as important thinkers. Rather, he answers the transcendental quaestio juris—how could they, appearances perhaps to the contrary, be important?—while begging the quaestio facti. He is “professional,” it seems to me, in just the sense that he criticizes others for being so. He takes for granted that the “philosophical problems” with which we infect the freshman by assigning Descartes and Berkeley are something the freshman really needs—not just so that he can understand history, but so that he can be in touch with himself, with his own humanity. In an attempt to establish connections between (a), (b), and (c), Cavell connects a particular notion of knowledge which he takes to be characteristic of “the Cartesian project” with the attempt to escape from human finitude which he takes to be “the cause of skepticism.” He says that the project of assessing the validity of knowledge as a whole, as that is prosecuted by the Cartesian tradition, is based upon a particular concept of knowledge (and thus leads to a particular problem of knowledge), viz., the concept I have characterized, with little sense of satisfaction, as a concept of knowledge as revelatory of the world’s existence; and I contrasted that with a concept of knowledge such as Austin’s, a concept of knowledge as the identification or recognition of things. (p. 224)
This contrast seems to me real and important, but not to serve Cavell’s purposes. It is the contrast between knowledge as what Kant told us we could not have— knowledge of things as they are in themselves formulated in those things’ own language, rather than ours—and knowledge as justified true belief, where “justification” is the ordinary sort given by the language-game we in fact play. Kant made epistemology Romantic, and thereby made room for moral faith. The theory of ideas as Reid knew it, before it went transcendental, was not romantic. It was just an incidental spin-off of the Galileo-Newton world-picture, one which did not pan out well. By contrast, Cavell can connect (b) with (c), Kant with Sartre. He can view the Kantian hope for an impossible kind of knowledge, a knowledge unmediated by
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our language-games, our patterns of justification, our ideas or words—knowledge “revelatory of the world’s [not just our world’s] existence”—as produced by the Sartrean sense that only such an impossible sort of knowledge would overcome our terror at the sheer contingency of things. But I do not see how he can connect Pricean puzzles about getting from perceptions to non-perceptions with either Kantian longing or Sartrean terror. Cavell seems to think he has made this latter connection by noting that, in his phrase, epistemological skepticism has to be about a “generic object”—not a goldfinch but “the physical object as such,” not one’s sister but “any passing humanoid form.” To questions about whether it’s a goldfinch or a goldcrest, whether one’s sister is disappointed or pleased, there are commonsensical answers, and commonsensical justifications of these answers. To set the freshman up for epistemology, we have to generalize our way out of common sense. This is a very nice point, but it does not do the job Cavell wants it to do—it does not take us across the Channel from Berkeley to Kant, from (a) to (b), from perceptual error to romance. All it shows is that we can only get the freshman from the silly stuff about tomatoes to the heavy stuff about things-in-themselves by dropping the “problem of perception,” skipping sense-data, and inculcating a contrast between “for us” and “in itself” that problems about perception do not illustrate. As long as we stick to breaking the tomato up into sensibilia, there will be, as Austin said, “the bit where you say it and the bit where you take it back,” the bit where you deconstruct the tomato and the bit where you reconstruct it. It is only when we drop the Lockean question about whether the redness is “out there” or “in us” and get to the romantic Kantian question, “Is there anything beyond the coherence of our judgments to which we can be faithful?” that the student is hooked. There is no logical connection between the “in the mind/outside the mind” contrast and the “for us” vs. “in itself” contrast.3 “For us” means, roughly, “inside our language-games, our conventions, our form of life, our standards of legitimation.” “In the mind” is an uncashed and probably uncashable metaphor, as Reid saw very clearly. Kant’s phenomenal world is not Price’s tomato on a grand scale. It is a change of subject, a way of expounding (b) rather than (a). Cavell’s point that skepticism only makes sense for generic objects shows just what he does not want to show—that one can leave Ayer and Price in the care of Austin and Ryle, and hasten on to the serious thinkers across the water. Cavell says (in unfortunately professionalized terms) that he is interested in a tradition, anyway an idea, of philosophizing opposed to the tradition in English, as that tradition is represented in the best English-speaking departments of philosophy.
But, he says, I have made no effort to sophisticate my early, tentative amateur efforts to link the English and the Continental traditions, because I want them to show that to realign these traditions, after their long mutual shunning, at any rate to write witnessing the loss in that separation, has been a formative aspiration of mine from the earliest of the work I refer to here. (p. xiii)
Nevertheless, the strategy of these efforts is clear. Cavell’s way of linking the traditions is the reverse of that used by most bridge builders who start from our
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Contending with Stanley Cavell
side. Usually we Anglo-Americans try to deromanticize the Continental tradition by showing that it has some good arguments. Cavell tries to romanticize our own tradition by showing that it does not. As he says, the “discovery” that “the object is gone, unknowable by the senses alone” (p. 222) is a stage effect, produced by intruding “an invention, a production of dialectic, a historical-philosophical construction called the senses” (p. 224). To show that this invention is not just a suitable subject for Rube Goldberg or Ronald Searle (which is how Austin thought of it), he has got to show that the motives for its fabrication are the same as, or at least as interesting as, the motives for various bits of Continental apparatus. I take it that Cavell’s strategy is to find these motives in (c)—the Sartrean sense of contingency—and to construe the attempt, described by Heidegger and Sartre, to escape our humanity, our finitude, as an attempt to evade this sense. He wants to construe “ordinary language philosophy” as an effort “to reclaim the human self from its denial and neglect by modern philosophy” (p. 154), and he thinks of the history of this topic as suitably titled “Philosophy and the Rejection of the Human” (p. 207). I think that Cavell is dead right in analyzing the Cartesian project as an expression of this need to transcend our condition, but I think that he oversophisticates his point. It seems a sufficient diagnosis of Cartesianism to say (with Gilson, Burtt, Maritain, Randall, Malcolm, and others) that Cartesianism asks for impossible certainty, that its methodological solipsism is an impossible demand to do it all by oneself. This Luciferian attempt to cut oneself off from God, or one’s fellow humans, by using only one’s natural light has usually been taken as sufficient motive for inventing what Cavell calls “absolute simples . . . outside languagegames” (clear and distinct ideas, sense-data, indubitable first principles, primitive terms, and so on) (p. 226). Cavell, however, thinks that “the quest for certainty” is an inadequate diagnosis of the Cartesian project. He criticizes the Deweyan dismissal of this project as “not taking the problem of the existence of objects seriously” and says that “it is too late to tell a philosopher to forgo the quest for certainty when it is the sheer existence of objects—of anything at all—that seems to be at stake” (pp. 224–25). Perhaps he just means that anybody who has somehow managed to connect textbook skepticism about the external world with the experience of “seeing oneself outside the world as a whole” will not be responsive to the usual Gilson-Dewey-Malcolm treatment of the Cartesian illness. This is doubtless true; but it seems like saying that somebody who is wholeheartedly psychotic, rather than merely neurotically confused, will not be helped by psychoanalysis. What we need to understand is how it is possible to get this far out, how one could connect (a) with (c), how anybody could think that textbook “English” epistemology is intimately connected with a sense of the contingency of everything. My complaint about Cavell’s treatment of skepticism may be summed up by saying that his book never makes this possibility clear for someone for whom it is not yet an actuality. It is fairly easy to connect (b) with (c): the realization that the world is available to us only under a description hooks up with the realization that it exists without a self-description, that it has no language of its own which we might one day learn. Its existence “makes no sense” because sense is relative to descriptions and existence is not. But, just as I do not know how to hook up (a) with (b), I do not know how to
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hook up (a) with (c) either. Thus (c) seems to me not to serve as a useful link between (a) and (b). So much for my complaints, which have centered upon Cavell’s discussion of “external world” skepticism in parts I and II. I hope, however, that dissatisfaction with the argument of these parts will not prevent readers from forging ahead through parts III and IV. In part III Cavell drops the topic of skepticism and the attempt to recapture the importance of “ordinary language philosophy.” This part consists of four short essays on what is wrong with what various people have said about the nature of moral philosophy—Stevenson, Rawls (in his early “Two Concepts of Rules”), and Prior. These essays remind us that moral reflection cannot be identified with appeals to principle, that morality is not a name for whatever influences choice, that morality must leave itself open to repudiation; it provides one possibility of settling conflict. . . . Other ways of settling or encompassing conflict are provided by politics, religion, love and forgiveness, rebellion, and withdrawal. Morality is a valuable way because the others are so often inaccessible or brutal: but it is not everything. (p. 269)
Part III, all by itself, is one of the best books on moral philosophy that has appeared in recent years. It ranks with Iris Murdoch’s Sovereignty of Good as a criticism of the notion that moral philosophy must be a search for yet more “absolute simples”—self-evident principles, basic values. Like Murdoch, Cavell criticizes the Bentham-Kant-Sidgwick notion that rational action is action on principle, and the corollary that moral reflection is the attempt to discover the rules by which each of us, simply as a human being, is committed to living. He says: No rule or principle could function in a moral context the way regulatory or defining rules function in games. It is as essential to the form of life called morality that rules so conceived be absent as it is essential to the form of life we call playing a game that they be present. . . . . . . [A] suggestion emerges about why philosophers appeal to rules in theorizing about morality, and about how rules are then conceived. The appeal is an attempt to explain why such an action as promising is binding upon us. But if you need an explanation for that, if there is a sense that something more than personal commitment is necessary, then the appeal to rules comes too late. For rules are themselves binding only subject to our commitment. (p. 307)
He thus helps us see the quest for “foundations of moral obligation” as parallel to the Cartesian quest for “foundations of knowledge.” Both are attempts to get outside language-games, to find some “natural” way of getting in touch with reality or goodness that is independent of the actual people among whom we live, who talk in a certain way. Both help us avoid acknowledging that we are mortals, who think and talk as we do because we have read the books we have read, talked with the people we have talked with. They encourage us to think that philosophy will do for us what we once thought religion might do—take us right outside language, history, and finitude and put us in the presence of the atemporal. They lead the philosopher to think himself so little dependent upon his community that what he says will “work on people at random, like a ray” (p. 326).
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Cavell’s comments on the form of life of Anglo-Saxon moral philosophers are much more external, and thus much clearer and more useful, than his comments in parts I and II on that of Anglo-Saxon epistemologists. In the case of the moral philosophers, he sees why they want to do what they do, diagnoses it quickly and surely, and then lets go of it. In the case of epistemologists, he insists on regarding their plight as a sickness that somehow we are all bound to suffer, as a necessary stage in reaching intellectual maturity. His insistence on the pathos and ubiquity of epistemology leads him, I have argued earlier, to confuse temporary, historically conditioned little frenzies (the seventeenth-century theory of ideas, ordinary language philosophy) with aspects of the human condition. In part III, by contrast, he no longer avoids history. He briskly and brilliantly explains (pp. 259ff.) the connection between Galilean models of scientific explanation and the philosophical claim that science is “rational” in a way that moral reflection is not. He concludes: If you begin by being struck with the peculiarity of ethical arguments as perhaps unsettleable, and struck with how different other questions are, then you will pick examples from science which illustrate its capacity for agreement, and then you will have the idea, or illusion, that you know that, and why, science is rational and morality not. (p. 263)
Applying lessons learned from Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Cavell in these pages does a great deal to help rid us of the distinctions between “science” and “nonscience,” “objective” and “subjective,” “fact” and “value,” “reason” and “emotion,” which have been the warp of intellectual life in recent centuries. Part IV is rather perversely called “Skepticism and the Problem of Others,” but is coextensive with chapter 12, which is more helpfully titled “Between Acknowledgement and Avoidance.” This material is, Cavell tells us, more recent than anything else he has written. In particular, as noted earlier, it was written some twenty or twenty-five years after some of the material in parts I–III. In this later manner— that of “Leopards in Connecticut” and “The Avoidance of Love”—he comes into his own. He speaks with a much stronger voice. Now he is free of worry about rival philosophers, or about what makes epistemology, or skepticism, or philosophy, special and deep. He just reflects on the fact that there are such things. In this part Cavell is concerned with a “problem of other minds” that does not even pretend to hook up with the “professional” problem of how, given that the logical construction of the Other’s body uses up the sensory qualia I receive, I have a right to construct a mind for him as well. Wittgenstein taught us that this problem results from thinking that one first describes oneself to oneself in ostensively learned Mental, the Lockean inner language of the ideas themselves. So one might expect Cavell to repeat that if we drop Locke and the theory of ideas we shall no longer speculate about private languages, the possible inner emptiness of the Other, and so on. Instead, Cavell shrugs off all that and goes straight to a deep reading of such speculations: The wish underlying this fantasy [of a private language] covers a wish that underlies skepticism, a wish for the connection between my claims of knowledge and the objects upon which the claims are to fall to occur without my intervention, apart from my agreements. As the wish stands, it is unappeasable. In the case of knowing myself,
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such self-defeat would be doubly exquisite: I must disappear in order that search for myself be successful. (pp. 351–52)
This reading uproots the “problem of other minds” from the soil in which it is usually taken to have sprouted—empiricism and phenomenalism—and transplants it across the Channel. It is now the sort of problem you have after reading the Phenomenology of Spirit, or the Critique of Practical Reason, or Being and Nothingness. This is a good thing to do if you want to find something interesting to say about Other Minds. It ignores the question of whether the “professional,” “English,” epistemological question has anything to do with romantic Kantian questions, whether (a) has anything to do with (b). One of the advantages of the later over the earlier Cavell—of part IV over parts I–II—is that he does ignore this question. For now he is no longer concerned about hooking up with what the “professionals” do. This permits him, at last, to explain what he was hinting at in earlier passages about “reclaiming the human self” and modern philosophy’s “rejection of the human.” What he has in mind is summed up in such passages as the following: The skeptic insinuates that there are possibilities to which the claim of certainty shuts its eyes, or whose eyes the claim of certainty shuts. It is the voice, or an imitation of the voice, of intellectual conscience. Wittgenstein replies, “They are shut.” It is the voice of human conscience. . . . In the face of the skeptic’s picture of intellectual limitedness, Wittgenstein proposes a picture of human finitude. (p. 431)
Where else can we find out about human finitude? Presumably in novels, plays, and works of “Continental” philosophy rather than in epistemology courses, or in the sort of reflection on science in which “English” philosophy specializes: science fiction cannot house tragedy because in it human limitations can from the beginning be by-passed. This idea helps me explain my difference in intuition from those philosophers who take it that a scientific speculation, or fiction, is sufficient to suggest skepticism; for example, the speculation that for all I know I may be a brain in a vat. (p. 457)
The human self that philosophy has been avoiding is the one described in all the vocabularies which are of no use for predicting and controlling people—the vocabularies which are useless for science, and for philosophy when it is conceived as quasi science. “Literature” tells us, as do Hegel and Sartre, that there is no universal religious, or scientific, or philosophical vocabulary to use in talking about, or dealing with, our fellow humans, but that we cannot help thinking that there must be one: Tragedy and comedy are all but filled with this possibility—that one among the endless true descriptions of me tells who I am. (p. 398)
Pre-Kantian, pre-Romantic philosophy was filled with assurance that that possibility had been actualized. The self-knowledge which was prevented by this kind of philosophy (a kind which survives in Anglo-Saxon philosophy departments, though it is pretty much extinct elsewhere) is the knowledge that
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Contending with Stanley Cavell with respect to the external world, an initial sanity requires recognizing that I cannot live my skepticism, whereas with respect to others a final sanity requires recognizing that I can. I do. (p. 451)
This makes “final sanity” consist in getting out from under the impulse that led to “professional” philosophy, in escaping the temptation “to convert the human condition, the condition of humanity, into an intellectual difficulty” (p. 493). In one of the best remarks in part IV—a part studded with splendid sentences—Cavell says: Not finitude, but the denial of finitude, is the mark of tragedy. This denial of finitude has also been taken as the mark of sin. It was to free humanity of that libel of sinfulness that Blake and Nietzsche undertook, as it were, to deny the distinction between the finite and the infinite in thinking of the human. (p. 455)
I doubt that the aim of “modern” writing has been better stated than in this final phrase. I hope that my account of the various parts of The Claim of Reason has made clear that its second half (parts III and IV) makes it an important book, and also why a prospective reader should not be daunted by part I, nor by Cavell’s (occasionally) heavy-handed style. One way of describing its importance is to say that it helps us realize what Wittgenstein did for us. Unlike Austin and Ryle, he did not just help us shrug off the theory of ideas. He also raised the question of the moral worth of our epistemology courses, of our discipline, of our form of life. We philosophy professors are lucky that one of the great writers of the century came among us, and left behind a description of our habits that we might never have formulated for ourselves. Wittgenstein suffered from, and constantly complained about, the company he had to keep in the course of this endeavor. But he persisted, and produced writings which even the determined efforts of a host of commentators will not be able to construe as offering “philosophical theories” or “solutions to philosophical problems.” Cavell is one of the few interpreters Wittgenstein has so far had who (at least in part IV of his book) is free from the temptation so to construe him.4 He is also one of the few who puts him in suitable company—that of Rousseau and Thoreau, Kierkegaard and Tolstoy, Blake and Nietzsche, the friends of finitude, the friends of man. Notes I am grateful to John Cooper for helpful comment on the first draft of this essay. This essay was previously published in the Review of Metaphysics 34 (1980–81): 759–774. Reprinted by permission. 1. Parenthetical page references are to this book. Part III is a reworking of material from Cavell’s twenty-year-old dissertation (as were, to some extent, Parts I and II). 2. See Jacques Bouveresse’s treatment of Wittgenstein as “the anti-Husserl” in Le Mythe de I’Interiorite (Paris: Editions Minuit, 1978). 3. Recently, however, philosophers have once again started to run these two contrasts together. For example, Bernard Williams, in his Descartes: The Project of Pure Enquiry, tries to rehabilitate Descartes’s project through a notion of “the absolute conception of real-
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ity,” a notion which Williams thinks involved in our intuition about the nature of knowledge, and which raises the skeptical question of whether knowledge is possible. This notion, as Williams formulates it, is ambiguous between a “determinate picture of what the world is like independent of thought” (Williams, p. 65) (the sort of thing that Kant told us we would not have) and a description of the world “using concepts which are not peculiarly ours, and not peculiarly relative to our experience” (ibid., p. 244). The latter phrase is Williams’s attempt (unsuccessful, in my view) to update Locke’s notion of “resembling objects.” Another example is Thomas Nagel’s use of the “subjective vs. objective” distinction to cover both the difference between a “personal” and an “impersonal” account of, e.g., the morally relevant features of a situation and the difference between the linguistically inarticulable phenomenological character of an experience and a characterization of the experience in ordinary public terms. (See Nagel’s Mortal Questions [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978], chap. 14: “Subjective-Objective.”) Both Williams and Nagel, on my view, misleadingly yoke together the contrast between the veridical (the “objective” as the “intersubjective”) and the nonveridical (the “subjective” as the “merely apparent”) with the quite different contrast between the communicable (what our concepts catch) and the incommunicable (what they may, or must, fail to catch). 4. Another of these happy few is James C. Edwards. See his Ethics without Philosophy: Wittgenstein and the Moral Life (Gainesville: University Presses of Florida, 1982). Cavell’s and Edwards’s books, taken together, suggest that Wittgenstein commentary has recently turned a corner.
2
On Refusing to Begin STEPHEN MULHALL
Despite Cavell’s philosophical and literary gifts [The Claim of Reason] as it stands is a misshapen, undisciplined amalgam of illassorted parts. . . . [It] is a worthwhile book, but it could have been much better had it been pruned of dead wood and over-exuberant foliage. The need for trimming can be illustrated by the very first sentence. . . . The exasperated reader might well put the book down and go no farther. Anthony Kenny, Times Literary Supplement, 18 April 1980
What kind of text is The Claim of Reason?1 What does it ask of its readers, and what designs does it have upon them? Since any such designs can be effective only if those who encounter this text choose to stay with its orderings of words, we must first ask how it aims to elicit such a choice—how its opening encounter with its readers is designed to attract them. But where and how does this text conceive that its readers are to approach it? How are we to let this book teach us, this or anything?
First Paragraph: Integrity and Reflexivity We might, provisionally, begin at the beginning. After all, the book’s Emersonian epigraph tells us that “[t]ruly speaking, it is not instruction, but provocation, that I can receive from another soul”; and the opening sentences of The Claim of Reason are certainly amongst its most provocative: If not at the beginning of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, since what starts philosophy is no more to be known at the outset than how to make an end of it; and if not at the opening of Philosophical Investigations, since its opening is not to be confused with the starting of the philosophy it expresses, and since the terms in which that opening might be understood can hardly be given along with the opening itself; and if we 22
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acknowledge from the commencement, anyway leave open at the opening, that the way this work is written is internal to what it teaches, which means that we cannot understand the manner (call it the method) before we understand its work; and if we do not look to our history, since placing this book historically can hardly happen earlier than placing it philosophically; nor look to Wittgenstein’s past, since then we are likely to suppose that the Investigations is written in criticism of the Tractatus, which is not so much wrong as empty, both because to know what constitutes its criticism would be to know what constitutes its philosophy, and because it is more to the present point to see how the Investigations is written in criticism of itself; then where and how are we to approach this text? How shall we let this book teach us, this or anything? (CR, 3)
From such provocation, what instruction? First, that The Claim of Reason is, above or at least before all, a reading of the Philosophical Investigations, a response to that highly unusual text. Second, that any such reading should begin by reflecting upon its own beginnings; it originates in its responsiveness to the issue of its own origin, in a capacity to regard the proper place and manner of its own commencement as a genuine question. (Here, the form of the first sentence—with its seemingly endless series of clauses deferring completion in favor of reiterated beginnings—underwrites its substance.) Third, that the series of clauses through which this question is articulated also constitutes a provisional answer to it. The fourth clause asserts the futility of beginning from the historical context in which the Investigations was written and is read; the fifth and first clauses deny that earlier points in Wittgenstein’s philosophical development can provide a useful opening; the second warns against assuming that the opening of the Investigations contains everything needed to comprehend its own philosophy; and the third suggests that the book’s substance is inseparable from its form. Taken as a whole, they tell us that we must avoid treating the Investigations as a part of a larger whole, or treating any of its parts as more important than the whole they make up, or treating its manner or method as if it were not integral to its work. In short: if we are to read it properly, we must read it whole. A further implication is that, properly read, the Investigations will give us everything we need to answer the external and internal questions that have just been rejected as inappropriate approaches to that text. For Stanley Cavell, it is fundamental to the work of the Investigations that it simultaneously provide the terms in which its readers can understand its work (and so its manner or method), the terms in which it will criticize itself and other philosophies, and the terms in which it might be related to its personal and historical context; and by linking these apparently separate issues in a single sentence, as if they add up to a single, complete thought, he further implies that the terms needed to comprehend them will turn out to be, if not identical, then internally related. Each budget of terms will form part of a larger lexicon; understanding the work of the Investigations appears inseparable from understanding its parts, its manner, and its context. If, however, Wittgenstein’s text must provide its readers with the terms in which to read it, that responsibility must have priority; the first aim of its teaching must be to teach the terms in which its teaching can alone be taken up. The consequent paradox is evident. If only the book as a whole can teach us the terms in which to
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understand its teaching, how can we learn which terms those are? It would seem that, if we are to learn anything from this book, we must first understand it. It is to this paradox, the apparent burden of The Claim of Reason’s first sentence, that its second sentence is a response: “How shall we let this book teach us, this or anything?” What does this second sentence have to teach us, and how shall we let it do so? First, it is a response to the book’s previous sentence—as if this text’s progress will be determined as much by Cavell’s responses to the Investigations as by the Investigations itself. Second, it does not directly answer the preceding question, but rather restates it—as if this investigation neither begins nor ends with theses but is rather a matter of continuously renewed questioning, as if this sentence itself constitutes a new beginning to the investigation, as if every sentence in this book aspires to be a new beginning (and so, a new end). Third, it restates the question by reformulating it; the second sentence drops the unquestioning reliance of the first upon the idea of an approach to the Investigations and shifts from active to passive mode. It thereby asks whether this idea of an approach (as opposed to a mode of reception) is prejudicial—whether the sense of paradox that the first question generates is a function not of the task it describes but of the present description of it. Shall we move on to this further question? Has a sufficiently attractive horizon opened up for us to stay with this ordering of words? Have we really exhausted the interest of this first paragraph? I am inclined to stay a little longer with it, to question a further range of its significance. For my guiding intuition is that The Claim of Reason’s characterizations of the text to which it is a response are also self-characterizations, and so that their opening instructions concerning how (and how not) to read the Investigations apply also to readers of the book whose opening they constitute. This does not mean that I take The Claim of Reason to be a mechanical reiteration of the teachings and methods of the Investigations, as if Cavell’s response to this text is to ventriloquize its voice. My claim is rather that the various extensions and denials of Wittgenstein’s voice to which Cavell is driven by the need to investigate his own preoccupations in his own way are compatible with his continuing to look to its general form or manner, and in particular its tendency to embody self-characterizations within its orderings of words, as exemplary for the present of philosophy.2 From such an intuition, what tuition? On this reading, the opening sentence of The Claim of Reason tells us that its fundamental task is to begin providing the terms needed to understand its teaching, terms that will also make sense of this book’s modes of self-criticism, its criticism of earlier texts by Cavell, and its criticism of other philosophers, as well as its historical placement. This text cannot therefore be understood by approaching it via these contextual and intratextual matters; it must rather be taken as a whole, and it can only be so taken if its manner or method is seen as internal to its work. This means that the paradox apparently involved in understanding the Investigations seems equally applicable to The Claim of Reason: only those who already understand it can come to understand it. Where and how, then, are we to approach this text? The second clause of the book’s first sentence appears to intensify our difficulties. For it claims that we should not regard the opening of the Investigations as an approach to the book as a whole, “since its opening is not to be confused with
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the starting of the philosophy it expresses, and since the terms in which that opening might be understood can hardly be given along with the opening itself” (CR, 3). Does it not then follow that approaching The Claim of Reason through its opening violates the book’s proffered terms for understanding itself? My intuition is that the instruction contained in this clause has no such implication. An external ground for this intuition appears in Cavell’s recently published “Notes and Afterthoughts on the Opening of Wittgenstein’s Investigations.”3 They contain a late version of a set of lecture notes through which Cavell has introduced his students to Wittgenstein’s thought, and they begin precisely with the opening sections of the Investigations; indeed, Cavell claims that “what’s left of these opening lectures in The Claim of Reason, or epitomized there, is its paragraph-length opening sentence” (PP, 126)—which suggests that The Claim of Reason implicitly opens, not with its discussion of Wittgenstein’s notion of a criterion, but with a compressed response to the Investigations’ famous opening. Since, however, this line of thought might seem to violate another of its opening instructions—that which forbids utilizing texts other than The Claim of Reason as part of an approach to it—I will not pursue it here. I want instead to suggest two other ways of responding to our difficulty. The first is to suggest that the second clause of the opening sentence does not guide its readers away from beginning their encounter with The Claim of Reason with its opening, but guides them away from thinking that its opening is a way to approach The Claim of Reason; in short, that what we are being warned off is the idea of there being “an approach” to this or any other such text. The second response is to suggest that beginning with the opening of The Claim of Reason need not involve either confusing that opening with the starting of the philosophy it expresses or assuming that the terms in which it might be understood can be given along with it. We might, for example, think that the book’s opening offers some guidance for interpreting both itself and the book it initiates, without assuming that it offers all the guidance we shall need; on the contrary, when we do move beyond its opening paragraph, we shall find that further, vital specifications of how The Claim of Reason should be read appear regularly throughout this text. Similarly, we can begin a reading of The Claim of Reason with its notorious opening sentence without confusing that opening with the starting of the philosophy that the book expresses; we might, for example, think that its philosophy starts before that opening—with the epigraph to the part of the book in which this opening chapter appears, with the title, subtitle, and epigraph of the book itself, or with its foreword. The fact that our reading begins by passing over these elements does not entail that it must overlook the instruction they contain; a reading of a text might as properly go on from the point at which it begins by going backward as by going forward. Mine will do both.
Second Paragraph: Texts and Problems Shall we go on? The third sentence of the book’s opening chapter, the opening sentence of its second paragraph, has as follows:
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Contending with Stanley Cavell I will say first, by way of introducing myself and saying why I insist, as I will throughout the following pages, upon the Investigations as a philosophical text, that I have wished to understand philosophy not as a set of problems but as a set of texts. (CR, 3)
I believe that this sentence has been taken to establish two conclusions. First, that this is where Cavell first appears in person in The Claim of Reason;4 and second, that in so doing he asserts that The Claim of Reason as a whole is predicated upon an understanding of philosophy as a set of texts rather than a set of problems.5 Both appear to me to be based on misconstruals of the sentence. The first conclusion is doubly erroneous. It fails to appreciate that the pronoun that appears for the first time in this paragraph is the first person singular—the first paragraph is studded with instances of the first person plural, and as always, “we” includes both speaker and addressees. It further fails to appreciate that the explicit deployment of the first person singular pronoun is not needed for an author to leave his personal mark on a sentence. On the contrary, if any sentences of philosophical prose fit the aphorism Le style c’est l’homme meˆme, it is surely those opening The Claim of Reason; they perform as full an introduction to their author’s philosophical personality as might be desired. What the shift from “we” to “I” rather implies is Cavell’s sense of isolation, his sense that he cannot even hope (and perhaps does not even wish) that the idea he will advance is something with which others already, unknowingly agree. The second conclusion registers the contrastive force of the “but” in Cavell’s sentence but fails to register the presence and the tense of the verb “to wish.” This sentence does not say that Cavell understands philosophy not as a set of problems but as a set of texts; it does not even say that he wishes so to understand philosophy; it says that he has so wished. The past tense strongly implies that this wish is one by which he is no longer possessed, or at least with which he is no longer comfortable as it stands—that it is something from which he has attained, or wishes to attain, a certain perspective; without entirely wishing to spurn it, he harbors a suspicion about it. We might feel that this suspicion is also registered in his description of himself as “insisting” upon the Investigations as a philosophical text. In the Investigations itself, Wittgenstein is always suspicious of interlocutors who are led to insist on something; and Cavell maintains this wariness throughout The Claim of Reason. We might therefore ask ourselves: when Cavell insists that the Investigations is a philosophical text, who does he take himself to be informing, and of what? How or why might anyone think otherwise? These suspicions are clarified in the following sentence: This means to me that the contribution of a philosopher—anyway of a creative thinker—to the subject of philosophy is not to be understood as a contribution to, or of, a set of given problems, although both historians and non-historians of the subject are given to suppose otherwise. (CR, 3–4)
Here, the stress falls not upon the idea of problems but upon their givenness. Cavell appears not to propose a view of philosophy as a set of texts rather than problems (a proposal requiring a suspiciously simple opposition between problems and texts), but rather to oppose the presumption that philosophical problems can be thought to form a given set or list. The implication is that if we properly acknowl-
On Refusing to Begin
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edge the obvious fact that philosophers typically contribute to their subject by means of texts, then we will question the idea that we can define a distinctively philosophical problem by pointing, or by enumerating a given set of features. For Cavell, what a distinctively philosophical problem might be is itself a philosophical problem, and of a fundamental kind. This idea harks back to the emphasis of his first sentence upon the idea that the terms of criticism and self-criticism that a philosophy deploys are definitive of it. For they crystallize that philosophy’s understanding of what it is for a position or statement to be philosophically problematic or questionable; and on Cavell’s view, to elaborate terms of criticism is precisely the work of philosophical texts. To characterize philosophical texts by their shouldering of such burdens is bound to unsettle given philosophical conceptions of the nature of a text, as well as the idea that which texts count as philosophical can be specified by a given list—in terms of what one might call a canon (one from which literary texts, for example, are excluded). In other words, Cavell’s investigation aims to question our conception of philosophical problems as given by questioning our conception of philosophical texts as given; so for him, the concept of a philosophical problem and that of a philosophical text are not so much opposed as internally related. All of this preliminary unsettling induces the first intervention of many from his interlocutor (or at least the first intervention from one of his many interlocutors)—a signature effect of this text: —And is the remark about texts and not problems itself to be taken as a philosophical text? It seems argumentative or empty enough, since obviously not all texts are philosophical ones, but only these that precisely contain problems of a certain sort! (CR, 4)
Cavell’s response to this intervention is a straight-faced, even stuffy reply to the first rather than the second of its sentences; he simply points out that the shortness of his own remark is no bar to its being counted as philosophical. This is hardly calculated to satisfy the interlocutor, for it responds to what is (clearly?) a piece of sarcasm disguised as a query as if it were a genuine question and leaves entirely unaddressed the substantive (argumentative?) points contained in the second sentence. Insofar as it does, however, it brings into question the interlocutor’s standing conceptions of what a well-directed philosophical intervention, and what a satisfying philosophical response to it, might be. It implies, for example, that the sarcastic query is a more genuinely philosophical intervention than its argumentative followup, more genuinely deserving of a philosophical response. Why? Because it at least takes the form of an attempt to apply the (argumentative?) content of Cavell’s third sentence to itself, to test its consistency with or responsiveness to itself—to measure its self-consciousness or reflexivity. The implicit instruction here is that no text that fails to measure up to the claims it advances can count as genuinely philosophical, that a philosophical text is one whose form and content are mutually attuned from top to bottom. In reality, however, Cavell does not overlook his interlocutor’s second sentence. For he immediately develops the theme of the length of philosophical texts into what he calls a budget of philosophical genres or paradigms, and this development contains the following remark:
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Contending with Stanley Cavell Some philosophers are able to make about anything into a philosophical text, like a preacher improving upon the infant’s first cry; while some people are not even able to start a quarrel with God. (CR, 4)
Here, Cavell implicitly denies that he is endorsing what the interlocutor thinks his earlier remark about texts and problems commits him to—the idea that all texts are (at least potentially?) philosophical ones. For him, someone who treats anything and everything as a philosophical text is no more a genuine philosopher than someone who improves upon an infant’s first cry is properly preaching; both, in their eagerness to extend the reach of their responses, have exceeded their grasp of what might merit or require such a response. Of course, it also implies that those who find nothing to be worthy of a philosophical response have equally lost touch with the point of philosophy; it has gone dead for them, receded from their grasp. In this sense, Cavell has no quarrel with his interlocutor’s second remark; since he does not wish to assert what the interlocutor denies, he need not oppose that denial. He cannot, however, simply refuse to satisfy the interlocutor’s wish for an argument, because of the way the interlocutor formulates the denial. The interlocutor does not say: “Not all texts are philosophical ones, but rather: “Obviously not all texts are philosophical ones”; and the criterion invoked for this obvious distinction is the fact that a text contains problems of a certain sort. That “obviously,” paired with the assumption or a standing sense of what sort of problems are distinctively philosophical, conflicts with Cavell’s view that whether a text is one to which a philosophical response is appropriate, or (if you prefer) one that raises problems of a sort requiring a philosophical response, is not given or obvious, but is rather to be discovered through individual acts of what one might call philosophical criticism. After all, the whole of the Investigations can be thought of as a philosophical response (to a preacher’s response) to an infant’s first utterances, its first cry for language (and we might ask whether Wittgenstein thinks that Augustine was (philosophically?) wrong because he improved upon that cry, or because he improved upon it in the wrong way); and the whole of The Claim of Reason might be thought of as attempting not to start (or to transcend) a quarrel with God.
Third Paragraph: Writing, Speech, and the Human Voice Within the first of his overtly self-introductory remarks, Cavell devotes his third paragraph to a further specification of what he wants from the idea of a new emphasis upon (or an emphasis upon a new) conception of philosophical texts: A measure of the quality of a new text is the quality of the texts it arouses. That a text may exist primarily in an oral tradition would not counter my thought here. Though the fact that it exists primarily in an oral tradition may determine the size or shape of its response, i.e., of an acceptable contribution to its text. I may say that while Wittgenstein’s philosophizing is more completely attentive to the human voice than any other I think of, it strikes me that its teaching is essentially something written, that some things essential to its teaching cannot be spoken. This may mean that some things he says have lost, or have yet to find, the human circle in which they can usefully be said. (CR, 5)
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Clearly, Cavell’s concept of a text does not signify writing as opposed to speech. Nevertheless, from the third clause of his opening sentence, his emphasis upon philosophical texts has hung together with an emphasis upon the essential contribution made to philosophical work by philosophical writing, its manner and its method; and he states that some things essential to the teaching of the Investigations (and thus, according to my intuition, to The Claim of Reason) cannot be spoken. However, this assertion is multiply qualified. First, since Cavell also regards the Investigations as fundamentally attuned to the human voice, its writtenness appears not in opposition to that voice but as essential to its proper expression; if anything, what this remark opposes to the voice is not writing but speech. And second, Cavell’s own (admittedly tentative) gloss on his claim that some things essential to Wittgenstein’s teaching cannot be spoken bargains away the necessity of that “cannot”; he suggests that the context in which it might be spoken may be absent only at present. Here is a concrete instance of his methodological claim that essence is expressed by grammar, and so must be understood as a function of the embodiment of the language it governs in a form of life, which means in the particular arrangements of a human community. This Wittgensteinian conception implies that essence and necessity ultimately rest upon the responses that are normal and natural to human beings, and so that what is necessary can be subject to alteration, to the forces (however vast, unintended, and slow moving) of contingency. With respect to the particular essences and necessities in question here, Cavell’s second qualification shows that for him, both the essential connection between Wittgenstein’s teaching and writing, and the essential opposition between that teaching and speech, are a function of the prevailing forms of human community to which that teaching is addressed. It suggests, in other words, that in another human community, or in this one under another dispensation of culture, what must now be written could usefully be said—that the human voice could reappear in both oral and written texts.
Fourth Paragraph: Modernism Why, then, under the present dispensation of culture, must this teaching—both Wittgenstein’s and that of The Claim of Reason—be written? Cavell devotes his fourth (entirely parenthetical) paragraph, still within the first of his overtly selfintroductory remarks, to a reformulation of and response to this question: If one asks: When must a work, or task, be written, or permanently marked?, one may start thinking what makes a work, or task, memorable. And of course the answer to this alone should not distinguish philosophy from, say, music or poetry or early astronomy or ruler and compass proof in geometry (or, I wish I knew, what level of logic?). Poetry (some poetry) need not be written; novels must be. It seems to me that a thought I once expressed concerning the development of music relates to this. I said (“Music Discomposed” pp. 200, 201) that at some point in Beethoven’s work you can no longer relate what you hear to a process of improvisation. Here I should like to add the thought that at that point music, such music, must be written. If one may speculate that at such a stage a musical work of art requires parts that are unpre-
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Contending with Stanley Cavell dictable from one another (though after the fact, upon analysis, you may say how one is derivable from the other), then one may speculate further that Beethoven’s sketches were necessary both because not all ideas are ready for use upon their appearance (because not ever ready in any but their right company), and also because not all are usable in their initial appearance, but must first, as it were, grow outside the womb. What must be sketched must be written. If what is in a sketch book is jotted just for saving, just to await its company, with which it is then juxtaposed as it stands, you may say the juxtaposition, or composition, is that of the lyric. If it is sketched knowing that it must be, and gets in time, transformed in order to take its place, you may say that its juxtaposition, or composition, is essentially stratified and partitioned; that of the drama; the drama of the metaphysical, or of the sonata. Here are different tasks for criticism, or tasks for different criticisms. (CR, 5–6)
I want to concentrate on the instructions this paragraph contains for reading the Investigations, and so for reading The Claim of Reason; we have, after all, been told that the form of both texts is internal to their work, and the most fundamental fact about their form—more fundamental than any fact about how they are written—is that they are written. According to Cavell’s opening formulation, one reason for thinking that a certain teaching must be written is the idea that it would otherwise be impermanent, that its oral expression or marking would not ensure that it remained open to remarking. Presumably, then, in the present state of human (philosophical) culture, if this teaching were not written, it would be forgotten; it is written in the name of a past or future human circle, of a kind that our present circle cannot recall or create (remember or re-member). But why is our present human circle unable to preserve this teaching in the absence of its written record? Cavell offers an analogy, recalled from his earlier writings, to develop this theme. It will help our understanding of what is to come if I recall some sentences from that essay, in which he describes Beethoven’s earlier work: One can hear, in the music in question, how the composition is related to, or could grow in familiar ways from, a process of improvisation; as though the parts meted out by the composer were reenactments, or dramatizations, of successes his improvisations had discovered—given the finish and permanence the occasion deserves and the public demands, but containing essentially only such discoveries. . . . Somewhere in the development of Beethoven, this ceases to be imaginable. . . . Why might such a phenomenon occur? . . . The context in which we can hear music as improvisatory is one in which the language it employs, its conventions, are familiar or obvious enough (whether because simple or because they permit of a total mastery or perspicuity) that at no point are we or the performer in doubt about our location or goal; there are solutions to every problem, permitting the exercise of familiar forms of resourcefulness; a mistake is clearly recognizable as such, and may even present a chance to be seized; and just as the general range of chances is circumscribed, so there is a preparation for every chance, and if not an inspired one, then a formula for one. But in the late experience of Beethoven, it is as if our freedom to act no longer depends on the possibility of spontaneity; improvising to fit a given lack or need is no longer enough. The entire enterprise of action and of communication has become problematic. The problem is no longer how to do what you want, but to know what would satisfy you. We could also say: Convention as a whole is now looked upon not as a firm inheritance from the past, but as a continuing improvisation in the face of problems we no longer understand. Nothing we now have to say, no
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personal utterance, has its meaning conveyed in the conventions and formulas we now share. . . . [O]ur choices seem to be those of silence, or nihilism (the denial of the value of shared meaning altogether), or statements so personal as to form the possibility of communication without the support of convention—perhaps to become the source of new convention. . . . Such, at any rate, are the choices which the modern works of art I know seem to me to have made.6
Add to this, as Cavell immediately does, the thought that at such a point, such music must be written, and the work of the Investigations and The Claim of Reason appears as essentially modernist. Their teaching is triply devoid of memorability. Its parts or elements can no longer be read as reenactments or memorials of insights originally discovered by improvisation; this is because neither writer nor readers possess a common fund of agreed-upon conventions that they might call upon or recall to control their sense of what a philosophical problem is, what might count as its solution, of what resources might be used to discover those solutions, what might count as a mistaken resolution; and the absence of such familiar landmarks or reference points puts the direction of any exercise of philosophical thinking, and so the tasks of predicting or recalling its progress, in the absence of a permanent record of it, essentially beyond us. In these conditions, philosophical teaching must be written, and written in face of the thought that the entire enterprise of creative thinking has become problematic, that thinkers in the present circumstances of human culture lack any grasp of what they want of thinking, let alone how to achieve it. In short, there are no given philosophical conventions; the present philosophical task is continuously to improvise them, and to do so through the writing of texts that offer statements so personal as to permit communication without convention, or the origination of new conventions. Given this, would we want to say that The Claim of Reason is a lyric or a dramatic composition? Were its elements fully formed on their first appearance and written down only to await their right company; or were they preserved so that they might grow outside the womb, to allow the transformations through which they might find their proper place? On the one hand, parts two and three appear as reduced but otherwise unaltered from their original appearance in Cavell’s dissertation. Their pairing is intended to facilitate comparisons and contrasts between epistemological and moral debates (CR, 250); and the reader’s sense of shock in making the transition from part three to part four, thereby encountering prose possessed of a very different range, complexity, and intensity, indicates that parts three and four appear to be at best related by juxtaposition—with neither adapting to nor accommodating the specificities of the other’s style and substance. On the other hand, Cavell’s description of the dramatic mode of composition as “essentially stratified and partitioned” seems an apt characterization of The Claim of Reason as a whole: it is partitioned into four portions, and multiply stratified by its shifting periods of composition and its alterations of textual telos. I take it, then, that answering the question of this book’s composition depends upon whether we read its parts as prefabricated units or as organically premature—as building blocks or body parts. The fact that the textual indications point to two different answers shows, I believe, not that we can read The Claim of Reason as either a lyric or a dramatic composition, but rather that we must read it
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as both. I think of this as the book’s theory of itself—as composed of fragments or as fragmentary—and understand this theory as both a confirmation and a further specification of The Claim of Reason’s understanding of itself as a modernist work. If we focus on the dramatic aspects of the book’s composition, its fragments will appear as both embryos and members—each is capable of further growth (even if outside the womb), but each thereby grows toward taking its place as a member of, to remember, a larger organic whole. But there remains the undeniable sense that this book remains somehow fragmentary, its members never shaking off the aura or memory of dismemberment. We might ask why this air of the embryonic is internal to the book’s work; and if we now try thinking of its fragmentariness in lyric terms—in terms of building blocks rather than body parts—we will start thinking of the book as an edifice arising from ruins, and of its material as stones, slabs, pillars, and blocks strewn along the ground. Such an image recalls the work of the builders at the opening of the Investigations; it also recalls Wittgenstein’s interlocutor’s sense that philosophy as he practices it destroys everything that is important, “[a]s it were all the buildings, leaving behind only bits of stone and rubble” (PI, 118), in response to which Wittgenstein claims that he is only “clearing up the ground of language” on which structures of air, philosophical houses of cards, once stood. So is a modernist philosophical text engaged in destruction or reconstruction, or both, or neither? Is destroying structures of air true destruction? Is clearing up the ground of language on which they stood a form of construction or of reconstruction, or a preparation for (re)construction? What are the materials for such a project, and what does it aim to build? From what we have learned so far, we might say: the birth or rebirth of a new human circle, which means a new dispensation of culture, one that dispenses with the present illusion of human cultivation in the name of a possibility of genuinely creative thought, of a form of life in which thinkers (which means language users, which means all human beings) can discover genuine satisfaction, in which the fragments of past communities of meaningful thought and value can be used in the reconstruction of new but personally authorized conventions. In such a circle, what Wittgenstein and Cavell hope to teach can indeed be usefully said; but since the texts they now write are written in the name of that future possibility and in the shadow of the present actuality, on a ground where construction is possible but only with the ruins of the past and amid the ruination of the present, they must take on a form that is both dismembered and embryonic, a half-built edifice whose form acknowledges both its origin in ruins and the completion it foreshadows. Cavell effects just such an acknowledgment by placing his most recent writing as his book’s final part; it thereby appears as the future foreshadowed in (that is, unpredictable from but retrospectively derivable from) the book’s preceding and originating parts—the fragments, as he tells us in the foreword, of his past dissertation. Sequentially and thematically, part four draws upon, develops, and reworks material from the other three parts; and in terms of his philosophical development, it is only at its center that Cavell hears himself using his own voice (a voice that is at once an extension and a denial of Wittgenstein’s (CR, xv) to say “something fairly continuously at the right level” for thinking about the problems that sparked
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his original interest in Wittgenstein, the shifting focus of his dissertation and his continuing concerns in philosophy (CR, xiii). Accordingly, anyone interested in the mode of composition of The Claim of Reason must be concerned with the mode of composition of its culminating portion; and in this too, the foreword has more than autobiographical value. There, Cavell offers the following account of the composition of part four: What emerged . . . was something I more and more came to regard, or to accept, even to depend upon, as the keeping of a limited philosophical journal. Writing it was like the keeping of a journal in two main respects. First, the autonomy of each span of writing is a more important goal than smooth, or any, transitions between spans (where one span may join a number of actual days, or occupy less than one full day). This ordering of goals tends to push prose to the aphoristic. . . . Second, there would be no point, or no hope, in showing the work to others until the life, or place, of which it was the journal, was successfully, if temporarily, left behind, used up. (CR, xix)
I note the implication that this part of The Claim of Reason conforms to both the lyric and the dramatic modes of composition that one could apply to the book as a whole—its entries are at once autonomous building blocks juxtaposed with one another, and yet responsive to conclusions formed in earlier entries (there are real transitions between them, as Cavell’s note on the overlapping ranges of the subtitles he assigns to their various phrases makes clear [CR, viii]). I note also certain ideas of temporality and progress—the dailiness or diurnality of the journal form (and name), the idea of entries as records of past inhabitations and experiences, but as allowing new inhabitations and new experience (so that their composition amounts to the remembering of a journey, the using up of nostalgia in the name of the future). I note finally the idea of the aphorism as a paradigm for prose produced under such pressures, an idea that Cavell has recently argued is as applicable to the Investigations as it is to this part of his text, and internal to its modernist work. Can the motley of writing modes to which Cavell resorts in the development sequence of part four be more precisely characterized? Instruction emerges in two further passages. The first, from part one, interprets Cavell’s reading of Wittgensteinian criteria as showing that statements of fact and judgments of value rest upon the same capacities of human nature, that only a creature that can judge of value can state a fact (CR, 14–15). He reformulates this as the claim that “what can comprehensibly be said is what is found to be worth saying” (CR, 94), which he thinks of as requiring an aesthetics and an economics of speech: In the former case we follow the fact that understanding what someone says is a function of understanding the intention expressed in his or her saying it, and then the fact that one’s intention is a function of what one wants, to a perspective from which responding to what another says is to be seen as demanding a response to (the other’s) desire. When in earlier writing of mine I broach the topic of the modern, I am broaching the topic of art as one in which the connection between expression and desire is purified, . . . [in which nothing] secures the value or the significance or an object apart from one’s wanting the thing to be as it is. . . . A strictness or scrupulousness of artistic desire thus comes to seem a moral and intellectual imperative. About the latter case. . . . —If we formulate the idea that valuing underwrites asserting as the idea
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Contending with Stanley Cavell that interest informs telling or talking generally, then we may say that the degree to which you talk of things, and talk in ways, that hold no interest for you, or listen to what you cannot imagine the talker’s caring about, in the way he carries the care, is the degree to which you consign yourself to nonsensicality, stupefy yourself. . . . I think of this consignment as a form not so much of dementia as of what amentia ought to mean, a form of mindlessness. It does not appear unthinkable that the bulk of an entire culture, call it the public discourse of the culture, the culture thinking aloud about itself, hence believing itself to be talking philosophy, should become ungovernably inane. (CR, 94–95)
Here, the Wittgensteinian philosopher’s responsiveness to those moments when we find ourselves meaning something other than what we took ourselves to be saying, or meaning nothing intelligible at all, is interpreted as a response to moments when our speech loses touch with comprehensible human desires and interests; and this inanity is read as exemplary of a possibility that our present culture faces or has already actualized. In this light, philosophy becomes the education of grown-ups; its task, that of turning its interlocutors away from mindlessness, and toward a form of life in which they might become genuinely interested. Texts written in this spirit ask for a species of conversion or rebirth, and attempt to effect it by forcing their readers to acknowledge themselves as internally split—fixated upon spurious forms of culture but attracted to a new circle of possibilities. Hence the connection, mooted in the foreword, between modernist philosophy and esotericism (CR, xvi); hence also Cavell’s future interest in moral perfectionism. Retaining from this press of implication the idea of an aesthetics and an economics of speech, we can turn to a final passage bearing upon the method or manner of part four. It occurs within that part, in the pause between its opening exposition of Wittgenstein and its later development, where Cavell denies that Wittgenstein’s (and so his) aphorisms are to be understood as metaphorical—certainly not when the idea of “metaphor” in play is reductive, one that pictures metaphorical meaning as reducible to, exhausted by, paraphrase. Instead, Cavell suggests the following paradigm: Such remarks . . . may be looked upon as myths, or fragments of a myth. . . . I should imagine that a reason one feels certain remarks about the soul to be metaphorical is that one does not want, or know how, to speak of them as mythological. (CR, 364)
What, then, might it mean to regard them as mythological? I assemble a list of distinctive features mentioned in succeeding pages. Myths are the subject of interpretation and argument; they will generally deal with origins at which no one can have been present; they are open to continuation, which can be thought of as revision; a false myth is not just untrue but destructive of truth; when the mythology and actuality cease to coexist harmoniously, then you have stopped living the myth. Cavell’s view seems to be that our myths of the soul and the actuality of which they are mythological expressions (which in this case means our sense of ourselves, and our lives, as embodied individuals in community with others) have come apart, and that we consequently find ourselves burdened with fragments of myths that we have stopped living, or with fragments of false myths—myths that are destructive of the truth of our nature, myths that cannot or should not be
On Refusing to Begin
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thought of as humanly livable. These are the materials with which the Wittgensteinian philosopher finds the ground of language strewn; they are the fragments from which a properly responsible modernist philosophy must construct its criticism of present human culture and attempt to reconstruct a humanly inhabitable form of life: Wittgenstein’s expression “The human body is the best picture of the human soul” is an attempt to replace or reinterpret these fragments of myth. It continues to express the idea that the soul is there to be seen, that my relation to the other soul is as immediate as to an object of sight, or would be as immediate if, so to speak, the relation could be effected. But Wittgenstein’s mythology shifts the location of the thing which blocks this vision. The block to my vision of the other is not the other’s body but my incapacity or unwillingness to interpret or to judge it accurately, to draw the right connections. The suggestion is: I suffer a kind of blindness, but I avoid the issue by projecting this darkness upon the other. (CR, 368)
This interpretation of Wittgenstein’s myth-fragment or aphorism exemplifies the way in which Cavell takes mythological uses of words to invite accounts of why they seem to epitomize or give expression to (to construct) a truth, or to destroy it; and by giving an account of why a given word is or is not the word I want—of whether or not it gives expression to a genuine human desire or interest or response—I make it possible to move away or to move on from those words, probably to some others. Cavell points out parenthetically that “the willingness and the refusal to exchange one word or expression for another, as well as the usefulness or futility in doing so, are themes running throughout the Investigations” (CR, 363). This same willingness or refusal is the engine of part four of The Claim of Reason. It moves from one aphoristic myth-fragment to another, constantly purifying their responsiveness to human desires and assessing their proper modes or rates of exchange, and thereby exemplifying at once an aesthetics and an economics of speech; and by forming itself from fragments of myth and aphorism, it can never itself be other than fragmentary or embryonic in form—thus continuing in philosophy one line of the modernist impulse in modern human culture.
Fifth Paragraph: Approaching the Hermeneutic Circle We have so far completed an interpretation of the first of the two self-introductory remarks Cavell offers before embarking on his opening interpretation of Wittgenstein’s notion of a criterion. The second of these remarks provides his solution to the paradox that emerged in the first paragraph of the book: But I was supposed to be saying something more, having said something first, by way of introducing myself, and concerning how we should approach Wittgenstein’s text. Accordingly, I will say, second, that there is no approach to it, anyway I have none. Approach suggests moving nearer, getting closer; hence it suggests that we are not already near or close enough; hence suggests we know some orderly direction to it not already taken within it; that we sense some distance between us and it which useful criticism could close. (CR, 6)
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Our paradox was: if the terms needed to approach a book can only be learned from the book itself, how can we ever begin to learn from it, this or anything? It can now be seen that the misunderstanding here arises from our having recourse to the idea of there being an approach to the text—for that places us entirely outside the text, and makes the text entirely opaque to us. The reality is that anyone capable of opening its covers is already close enough to learn from it—in part because no reader can begin a text entirely without a range of relevant capacities and experiences, or a basic orientation toward it; in part because to begin to read it is to begin to learn from it, which includes beginning to learn how to read it. Yet some texts are produced under conditions that entail that the reader’s preliminary orientation cannot be trusted, and so they must bear most of the responsibility of establishing the terms on which they can be understood—perhaps by attracting their readers across an unhelpful distance, perhaps by issuing rebukes that create a fruitful perspective. In these cases, nothing outside each text itself will provide an opening; only directions already taken within them will help. They cannot give their readers everything they need for deeper understanding at the outset; but they can give them enough to go on further, where they can be given more. On this understanding, there can be no objection to beginning our reading at the opening of a text, beginning with what it can teach us about how to learn from this text and then going on to explore other directions proposed within it; but there can be no excuse for confusing the end of that reading with the completion of our understanding, and less than none for refusing to begin. Notes This essay is reprinted from Common Knowledge, Fall 1996, by permission of the author and Oxford University Press. 1. Stanley Cavell, The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, Tragedy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979); hereafter cited as CR. 2. See CR, xv. 3. In Stanley Cavell, Philosophical Passages (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), 125–86; hereafter cited as PP. 4. “Before introducing himself in The Claim of Reason, thus reserving the first-person pronoun for his second paragraph, Cavell insists that his reader enter the text through a labyrinthine first sentence of two hundred and sixteen words.” Michael Payne, “Introduction,” Bucknell Review 32 (1989): 15. 5. “Why an interest in texts over problems? . . . The problems of philosophy for Cavell are secondary to the contributed texts of philosophy.” Richard Fleming, The State of Philosophy: An Invitation to a Reading in Three Parts of Stanley Cavell’s The Claim of Reason (Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 1993), 24. 6. Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say? A Book of Essays (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 200–202.
3
Cavell’s “Romanticism” and Cavell’s Romanticism SIMON CRITCHLEY
I do not deny that truth can be used as a weapon; especially when it comes in fragments. Stanley Cavell, The Claim of Reason
The Romanticization of Everyday Life Romanticism is a persistent theme in Stanley Cavell’s work that has assumed increasing prominence in his later writings, in particular In Quest of the Ordinary (1988) and This New Yet Unapproachable America (1989). As one would expect from Cavell, the trajectory of his recovery of romanticism is singular: it leads from his abiding interest in the procedures of ordinary language philosophy, in particular Austin, back to the recovery of an American romantic tradition in Emerson and Thoreau, and forward into a strongly perfectionist reading of Wittgenstein and Heidegger, where these twin peaks of twentieth-century philosophy are seen “as showing philosophy to be [possible] as a continuation of romanticism” (NYUA, 5). Indeed, his intensification of interest in romanticism seems to be continuous with his perfectionist turn. The fascinating consequence of this linking of romanticism to perfectionism for the reading of Wittgenstein and Heidegger—that is, on Cavell’s account, for the continuation of philosophy—is that their concern with the ordinary or the everyday cannot be assimilated to a defense of certain commonsense or common-room beliefs about the world, but rather that they are both engaged in a contestation of common sense in the name of a transfiguration of everyday life. Thus, the Wittgensteinian teaching that philosophy must become a practice of leading words from their metaphysical usage to their everyday usage becomes a fantastic practice (NYUA, 66), insofar as Cavell claims that Wittgenstein views the actual everyday as a scene of illusion, best represented by a Spenglerian picture of culture as decline or a Nietzschean diagnosis of European civilization as nihilism. On Cavell’s reading, Wittgenstein is proposing a practice that would deliver us from the actual everyday to the eventual everyday (eventual might be considered speculatively here as both having an event character, an Ereignis in Heidegger’s 37
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sense, and linking the eventual to the possible, in German eventuell), a deliverance that is not a Platonic ascent out of the cave and the public space of doxa, but is rather a descent—a downgoing—into the uncanniness of the ordinary, or, in Heideggerian terms, the enigma of the everyday (NYUA, 46–47).1 This would be what Cavell calls a diurnalization of philosophy’s ambitions, looking beneath our feet rather than over our heads. As I see it, Cavell’s reading of Wittgenstein, particularly his biological interpretation of forms of life (NYUA, 42–45), is a crucial advance upon the breathtaking cultural and political complacency of much that passes for Wittgensteinian philosophizing: the everyday is not a network of practices or forms of life to which we can return by leaving our colleges and taking a turn in the street or a job in Woolworth’s. Rather, the turn to the everyday demands that philosophy becomes therapy or, to use Cavell’s words, “the education of grownups.” That is, it becomes a way of addressing the crisis of late modernity where the everyday is concealed and ideologically repackaged as “common sense,” what the later Husserl rightly saw as Lebensweltvergessenheit. We do not, therefore, return to the ordinary, the everyday or the Lebenswelt, so much as turn to them for the first time, undergoing a turning around, a conversion. The ordinary is not a ground, but a goal. It is something we are in quest of, it is the object of an inquest, it is in question—hence Cavell’s ambiguous title In Quest of the Ordinary. Of course, it is in relation to this sense of the ordinary as something extraordinary that we might begin to consider the relation between romanticism and everyday life: Romanticism’s work here interprets itself, so I have suggested, as the task of bringing the world back, as to life. This may, in turn, present itself as the quest for a return to the ordinary, or of it, a new creation of our habitat; or as the quest, away from that, for the creation of a new inhabitation. (IQO, 52–53)
The world must be romanticized, the quotidian must be made fantastic and the human made strange, “attracting the human to the work of becoming human.” Although it is not dealt with at any length in The Claim of Reason, romanticism remains a persistent presence in that work. In the concluding pages of part two, after claiming that a serious bond between Wittgenstein and Heidegger can be found in the way in which they both acknowledge the question of the mystery of existence, Cavell adds gnomically, “To be interested in such accounts . . . I suppose one will have to take an interest in certain preoccupations of romanticism” (CR, 241). However, romanticism assumes more centrality in the extraordinary fourth part of The Claim of Reason. In addition to the allusions to romantic poets, especially Blake, in the multiple epigraphs to part four and the sporadic outbreaks of citations from romantic texts, Cavell writes: One can think of romanticism as the discovery that the everyday is an exceptional achievement. Call it the achievement of the human. (CR, 463)
Thus, romanticism is the discovery of the exceptionality of the everyday, or, in terms discussed here, the uncanniness of the ordinary. However, the discovery of the everyday as an exceptional achievement must be combined with the acknowledgment that this achievement is never achieved. That
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is to say, romanticism is that process of secularization (CR, 470) or de-divinization that aims at the establishment of a community based on moral autonomy, but this ideal of community is never realized. Romanticism is, in my terms, a response to the problem of nihilism that aims at a de-theologized re-enchantment of the world. Happily, it fails—which does not imply a rejection of romanticism, but an elaboration of its unworked, nonromantic essence. This is why Cavell concludes, “So romantics dream revolution, and break their hearts” (CR, 464).
Emerson as the Literary Absolute I will come back later to this question of a broken-hearted romanticism, but I first want to criticize a specific claim that Cavell makes about romanticism. It concerns Cavell’s reading—or rather misreading—of The Literary Absolute. In the preface to In Quest of the Ordinary, which is essentially a foreword to Cavell’s 1983 Beckman lectures on romanticism, he notes: As I pack off the present material, a general misgiving is focused for me in my having just read The Literary Absolute. . . . There I find features of my Beckman lectures preceded, generously and practically, in certain opening themes and strategies, from the other side of the philosophical mind—the German by way of France, opposed to the English by way of America—specifically, the theme of a romantic call for the unity of philosophy and poetry precipitated by the aftermath of Kant’s revolution in philosophy. (IQO, xi)
Cavell rightly sees the central demand of romanticism as the unification of philosophy and poetry, a demand that he places alongside another demand announced in the foreword to The Claim of Reason, namely the unification of the two halves of the philosophical mind—the analytic and the Continental, of the English by way of America and the German by way of France. It presumably remains Cavell’s philosophical ambition—or his ambition for philosophy—“to define and date a place” of the overcoming of these opposed traditions; adding—with some justification, I think—that part four of The Claim of Reason is written “as though these paths had never divided” (CR, xiii). As Cavell has recently written, taking up a metaphor I discussed earlier, his thinking operates “within the tear in the Western philosophical mind, represented, so I believe, by the distances between the EnglishAmerican and the German-French dispensations.”2 However, this tear or rift in the Western philosophical mind reflects a third— and most important—aspect of division and demand for unification, which is the splitting within culture itself (CR, xiii). This is a crisis at the level of everyday life, which calls for a mending of the world. The diagnosis of crisis emerges most strongly in a text like This New Yet Unapproachable America, where Wittgenstein is rightly read as a philosopher of culture, who opposes the nomadism and nihilism of contemporary life with a practice of philosophy that has in view the achievement of the everyday, the redemption or—Cavell’s preferred word—recovery of culture. But rather than basing this claim in a reading of Wittgenstein’s Culture and Value—a more obvious and highly illuminating para-text and successor to Schle-
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gel’s fragments—Cavell argues that it is the very form of the Philosophical Investigations, with its weave of voices, that provides a picture of a redeemed culture, the imagined practice of an eventual everyday. Of course, this makes Wittgenstein—and Cavell, too—a prophet (NYUA, 74). Thus, the way in which Cavell’s interpretation of romanticism is, as he says, “preceded” by the concerns of The Literary Absolute permits us to focus three demands for unification in his work: 1. that of philosophy and poetry, 2. that of analytic and Continental philosophy, 3. that of culture with itself through the mediation of philosophy.
So far so good, we might say. This rehearses arguments set out earlier and shows that Cavell’s work is continuous with the bewildering naivete´ and failure of Jena Romanticism.3 However, continuing the quotation from In Quest of the Ordinary, Cavell makes a crucial second claim that takes him well beyond the argument of The Literary Absolute. He writes: It would have been, it seems to me, of exactly no philosophical use for me to have sought to weigh the relative merits of these starting places [i.e., Cavell’s own and Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy’s] apart from establishing to my own satisfaction that, among other matters, Emerson’s writing bears up under the pressure of the call for philosophy, that he constitutes a fair realization of the bonding of philosophy and poetry that both Coleridge and Friedrich Schlegel had called for [emphasis added]. (IQO, xii)
Thus, the romantic demand for the unification of philosophy and poetry is, Cavell claims, given a “fair realization” in the writing of Emerson. A good deal turns here on what is meant by “fair” and on how this adjective modifies and softens the substantive “realization.” If we let the adjective soften the substantive, then Cavell’s claim would seem to be that Emerson is a “fair realization” in the same way that one might speak of a fair likeness in portraiture, that is, it is the best available under present conditions. However, Cavell makes the same claim in the opening pages of This New Yet Unapproachable America, entitled “Work in Progress,” the difference being that “realization” is no longer qualified by “fair,” but stands alone. I quote at length: Accepting the thesis presented by Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy (which they find anticipated in Walter Benjamin and in Maurice Blanchot) that the idea of literature becoming its own theory . . . is what constitutes romanticism (in its origin in the Athenaeum), and beginning to see Emerson’s responsiveness to that Athenaeum material (or to its sources or its aftermath), my wonder at Emerson’s achievement is given a new turn. . . . So I should like to record my impression that, measured against, say, Friedrich Schlegel’s aphoristic, or rather, fragmentary, call for or vision of the union of poetry and philosophy, Emerson’s work presents itself as the realization of that vision. I do not mean that Emerson’s work is not “fragmentary.” Indeed it seems to me that the puzzle of the Emersonian sentence must find a piece of its solution in a theory of the fragment: maintaining fragmentariness is part of Emerson’s realization of romanticism. (NYUA, 20–21; emphasis added)
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Thus, Emerson’s writing is no longer “work in progress”—which, as LacoueLabarthe and Nancy remark and as we saw earlier, “becomes the infinite truth of the work” (LA, 48) or “the work of the absence of the work”—but the Work itself, the realization of the ideality of romanticism. Measured against the fragmentary nature of Schlegel’s call for the unification of philosophy and poetry, a call that results only in failure and unfinished works, Emerson is the realization of that call. Emersonian writing is the literary absolute, “the transformation of genius into practical power,” or again, “the gradual domestication of the idea of Culture.”4 But what does this claim mean? How exactly is Emerson the realization of romanticism? This is obviously bound up with the enormously privileged status that Cavell attributes to Emersonian writing: that is, to the genre of the Emersonian essay, the Emersonian sentence, and even the Emersonian word. First, and importantly, the Emersonian essay is not a renunciation of fragmentation in the name of wholeness—the great novel of secular modernity—rather Cavell claims that the essay is the realization of the fragment, the fulfillment of this genre. As Emerson writes of himself and the essay form in “Experience,” “I am a fragment, and this is a fragment of me.”5 Second, the Emersonian essay is not a realization of romanticism in the sense of a return to a precritical immediacy that allegedly characterized the art of antiquity. The essay as form is essentially self-conscious, self-critical, and modern. In what sense is it therefore a realization? In his labyrinthine, and at times highly convoluted, discussion of Emerson’s “Experience,” Cavell writes: I would like to say that Emerson’s “Experience” announces and provides the conditions under which an Emersonian essay can be experienced—the conditions of its own possibility. (NYUA, 103)
Focusing on the phrase “conditions of its own possibility,” we might say that the Emersonian essay, like a miniature transcendental deduction—a hedgehogsized version of the First Critique—self-consciously announces the conditions of possibility for its own intelligibility. The claim here is that each essay, each sentence, and each word has a reflective self-awareness of the conditions of possibility for its own realization. The effect of this form of writing is inertia or what Stephen Mulhall calls “lack of momentum.”6 In In Quest of the Ordinary, Cavell quotes Thoreau, where the latter imagines that a philosophy book suitable for students would be written with next to no forward motion; it would be a book that culminates in each sentence, and for which we can find no reason to continue reading from one sentence to the next (IQO, 18). For Cavell, the virtue of Emersonian (and, incidentally, Wittgensteinian) writing is that it knows when to stop, and this knowledge opens a certain relation to finitude. Indeed, reading an essay like Emerson’s “Experience,” it is not difficult to see what Cavell means about Emersonian writing: the rhythms of Emerson’s English are strange to my English ears—the style has a staccato muscularity, where each sentence seems to be the culmination of the argument and an argument in itself, the sentences form a dense linguistic undergrowth, each sentence plantlike and damp with individual pathos, momentarily reflecting a light that seems to emanate from an unseen source.
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Thus, Cavell presents Emerson (or, on Mulhall’s account, presents himself)7 as a realization of the Schlegelian demand for the unification of philosophy and poetry, and he presents the Emersonian essay—the sentence and the word—as the realization of the romantic fragment. That is to say, the “hedgehog theory” of the fragment discussed earlier, where the fragment is “entirely isolated from the surrounding world” and “complete in itself.” However, and this is my critique, in terms of the reading of Jena Romanticism set out earlier, Cavell must be said to misread The Literary Absolute and misunderstand the theory of the romantic fragment—a misunderstanding that, I believe, is at least partially caused by the fact that Cavell overlooks the decisive influence of Blanchot’s conception of literature upon Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy. If, on my account, Jena Romanticism is rooted in the acute self-consciousness of its unworking or failure, the exploration of the lack of final synthesis in a continual process of self-creation and self-destruction and the quasi dialectics of wit and irony, then Cavell’s romanticism would seem to take us in a rather different direction. Jena Romanticism is rooted in essential ambiguity, which is the ambiguity of the genre of the fragment itself. The ambiguity of the fragment is continually directed toward and open to the future, a future underwritten by a lack of final synthesis. I would argue that it is the very futuricity of fragments that explains why we carry on reading them, and why their reading is not, as Cavell suggests, characterized by lack of momentum or inertia, but rather by a relentless and vertiginous forward motion without destination. The abrupt and discontinuous music of the fragments leaves the reader perpetually dissatisfied, perpetually craving more and perpetually frustrated by their seeming superficiality and evanescence. Cavell’s claim that Emerson represents a (fair) realization of the unification of philosophy and poetry, and an achievement of the theory of the fragment, misunderstands how the fragment works—or rather, unworks. To speak of realization in relation to the fragment is to misunderstand the fragment. It is to try and arrest the restless futural movement of worklessness; it is to try to close down the future opened by fragments; it is to put satisfaction in place of the dissatisfaction that haunts romanticism; it is to claim the coincidence of ideality and reality that characterizes the aesthetic absolutism discussed earlier, and whose pernicious political consequences I mentioned. Finally—and paradoxically, as we shall soon see—Cavell’s claim for Emerson disarms the threat of skepticism by arresting the limping of irony; it permits us not to be disappointed with criteria; it leaves the romantic without a broken heart.
Digression: Why Stanley Loves America and Why We Should Too The name “Emerson” has a privileged status in Cavell’s discourse. But it has to be associated with another name, a name to which it is intimately linked, a name which functions like “Germanien” for Heidegger, like “Auschwitz” for Adorno, and like “Israel” for Levinas. That name is “America.” The place of Emerson in Cavell’s work is profoundly related to America as a place for philosophy, as a response to the question “Has America expressed itself philosophically?” (IQO,
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11). The singular trajectory of Cavell’s thought, which takes him back from the philosophical present of Wittgenstein and Heidegger to Emerson and Thoreau, is driven by the fact that Emerson and Thoreau are American philosophers, part of an American formation, foundation, and inheritance. As Cavell notes in This New Yet Unapproachable America, Emerson’s writing is the “provision of experience for America, for ‘these’ shores” (NYUA, 92). Again, in In Quest of the Ordinary: On the contrary, my wish to inherit Emerson and Thoreau as philosophers, my claim for them as founding American thinking, is a claim both that America contains an unacknowledged current of thinking, and that this thinking accomplishes itself by teaching the inheritance of European philosophy—an inheritance that should make me not the master of this European philosophy, but also not its slave. (IQO, 181–82)
Neither master nor slave to the European tradition, but a distinct and distinctive voice—these are handsome republican sentiments that aspire to putting America on an equal philosophical footing with Europe. But I think Cavell goes slightly further than this. We saw earlier how Cavell claims that Emersonian writing realizes the romantic demand for the unification of philosophy and poetry, analytic and Continental philosophy and the division within culture itself. Now, the place where this union is most actively sought, where the gradual domestication of culture might take place, is America. Might we not hear this when Cavell writes: To claim Emerson and Thoreau as of the origin in America, not alone of what is called literature but of what may be called philosophy, is to claim that literature is neither the arbitrary embellishment nor the necessary other of philosophy. You can either say that in the New World, distinctive philosophy and literature do not exist in separation, or you can say that the American task is to create them from one another, as if the New World is still to remember, if not exactly to recapitulate, the cultural labors of the Old World. (IQO, 182)
America is an origin or is of the origin in a way that precedes the bifurcation of philosophy and literature. America’s founding texts ignore or sublate this bifurcation; they are, in a sense, both pre-and post-Platonic, both the union of philosophy and poetry seemingly sundered by the Republic and sought by romanticism and its heirs. Although Cavell does not make this vast claim for actually existing America, but for a kind of perfectionist Amerique a venir, in Emerson’s words, “this new yet unapproachable America that I have found in the West,”8 America is the romantic place par excellence. It is the place which promises romanticism, it has romantic promise, it is the achievement of romanticism as a promise. What Cavell often refers to as America’s belatedness is also the reason for its place as the destination of Europe, as both Europe’s exhausted disappearance and its fulfilled completion. This is perhaps what Hart Crane meant by referring to the American condition as “an improved infancy.”9 But shouldn’t such views arouse a little suspicion? Looking again at the earlier quotations from In Quest of the Ordinary, one might begin to wonder what Cavell could mean by “inheritance” and “founding.” What is the relation between the inheritance of the European philosophical tradition and the founding of America, specifically an American philosophical tradition? In Cavell, the notion of “found-
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ing” is often connected with “finding,” namely the alleged “finding” of America by Europeans—the title of Cavell’s piece on Emerson in This New Yet Unapproachable America is “Finding as Founding”—and the founding of a nation. What, one might ask, is the relation between philosophy and the founding of a nation? What does it mean to claim Emerson and Thoreau as founders of American philosophy, that is, as the origin of America’s self-consciousness as something—as a place—distinct from Europe? One might begin by noting the connection between founding/finding and inheritance, where the founding of an American philosophical tradition, and of America tout court as something new, is articulated together with the question of the inheritance of the European tradition. America inherits: that is to say, it is the recognition of both the exhaustion of the European tradition upon the territory of Europe, and of America as the continuation and completion of that tradition in a new territory. American philosophy, for Cavell, seems rooted in the experience of immigration, in the migration of words and worlds from the Old to the New, an experience of uprooting, displacement, and settlement. The question of founding raises the vast issue about the relation of America as it is figured in Emersonian writing to both the past of America as a place already founded, that is, native American culture, and also to cultural memory of extermination and slavery, which has produced the many countertraditions and counterinheritances that are found in late American modernity. To his credit, Cavell has persistently raised the question of slavery and oppression in relation to Emersonian writing, and one might note the following revealing passage from Must We Mean What We Say? It is simply crazy that there should ever have come into being a world with such a sin in it, in which a man is set apart because of his color—the superficial fact about a human being. Who could want such a world? For an American, fighting for his love of country, that the last hope of earth [emphasis added] should from its beginning have swallowed slavery, is an irony so withering, a justice so intimate in its rebuke of pride, as to measure only with God. (MWM, 141)10
It must be asked: What is the relation of Cavell’s Emersonian perfectionism to the hybrid ensemble of traditions and inheritances which make up the great rhizome of American cultural identity? Although it is doubtless banal to be reminded of this fact, the connection between philosophy and the founding of a nation or polis has decisive precedents in the philosophical tradition, whether one thinks of Plato’s misadventure in Syracuse or Heidegger’s repetition of Platonism in his National Socialist commitment. However, although it would be wrong to accuse Cavell of falling prey to the gross naı¨vete´ of philosophical nationalism, one can nonetheless note a continual continentalism in Cavell’s writing that typifies a whole genre of philosophical and political discourse, a continental drift where the names “America” and “The United States” become synonyms, and where the name of the nation is inflated and identified with an entire continent. Cavell, like so many others, does not speak of the Americas, but of America in the singular, which means the United States. American philosophy is, at best, a national philosophy with pretensions of becoming a continental philosophy.
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What does America mean as a philosophical event? What is the place of America in philosophical discourse? We might begin by considering a tradition of political philosophy that to my knowledge begins with Locke, where America is characterized as an infinite state of nature, and therefore the condition of possibility for the development of private property, mercantile capitalism, and liberal government.11 America is imagined as an infinite and empty space, as the wild, uncultivated, unpopulated resource for individual property and capital accumulation. Of course, America was not empty before European colonization and this myth of emptiness is as pernicious as Zionist claims that Palestine was empty prior to the establishment of the state of Israel. What is the time of America? Philosophically and politically, America is the thought and the land of the future.12 This is a trope that also recurs in political philosophy, for example in Tom Paine, where American revolutionary democracy is declared to be the future of Europe, an American future that begins in France in 1789 and will spread to all corners of Europe, even England.13 In this way, for Paine, the New World regenerates and rejuvenates the Old World and the onward march into the future will be accompanied by the music of collapsing monarchies. For Europe, America is an idea, an idea of democracy as Tocqueville described, an idea in the Kantian sense, the promise of a better future and the expression of political hope. Within the United States, America is also an idea, the core of a political theology. It is something in which the citizen is obliged to believe either as an object of love or intellectual and cultural hatred (which is but another form of love). America is the place for utopia, its locale—which is to say that America is the romantic place par excellence, the place where, in Emersonian terms, genius might be transformed into practical power. This is particularly visible in Coleridge’s plans for Pantisocracy, but also in Blake’s prophetic dreamscape where the ideas of revolution, liberty, and passion are defended against the wrath of Albion.14 But what of America as a place? The idea of America as the place for utopia, as the place where ideality should be (but cannot be) realized, allows us to highlight what I would see as a “founding” disjunction in the experience of America. What does one find in the West? Does one approach the unapproachable America? One anecdote among others comes to mind: driving from Death Valley to Las Vegas is a trip from the unearthly to the unreal. One traverses the desert and—lo!—the New Jerusalem rises out of the desert, shimmering with inexplicable, tacky splendor. Las Vegas is a shining beacon of nihilism, a place where European civilization evaporates into a series of casino complexes. Concrete, steel, and glass accelerate into the desert scrub, a hallucinatory architecture adorns itself in a submythology of imaginative travesty: Desert Sands, Excalibur, Treasure Island. America is an experience of absolute disjunction. On the one hand, it is to be overwhelmed by the utter sublimity of nature, say the un-Alpine granite vastness of Yosemite. But on the other hand, America is the cheerful celebration of the disappearance of culture into kitsch: the Liberace Museum, Graceland. There are two Americas and perhaps they are equally unreal: the double unreality of nature and culture. I also think here of the appearance that American cities have for the European, the cinematically induced conviction that this is what cities should look
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like—muscular, vast, inhuman spaces. But their effect exceeds reality, which is what Baudrillard, in his piece of romantic cultural metaphysics, means by hyperreality.15 American culture, in its justified historical revolt against Europe, is perhaps the aspiration that culture might achieve the condition of nature, become nature. I think this is what Baudrillard means when he describes America as the last remaining primitive society on earth.16 This might sound like faint praise, but praise it is. Two Americas: both utopia and dystopia. This much would seem to be clear in Cavell when he reads Wittgenstein as a philosopher of culture in the tradition of Nietzsche and Spengler, where culture is diagnosed as decline, as nihilism, so Cavell reads Wittgenstein as a philosopher of culture in order to read his own culture as this decline, as the acceleration of European nihilism. But, for Cavell, the experience of culture as decline in America and as America is always linked to the perfectionist hope for a redemption of culture through a recovery of the everyday, the demand for a sky under which philosophy might be possible (NYUA, 7). For Cavell, and this is the source of his disagreement with Rorty, the greatest danger is a culture without philosophy, that is, without that endless play of voices that Cavell finds at work in Wittgenstein’s Investigations. It is the latter that provides Cavell with both the diagnosis of culture as decline—the actual everyday— and the image of a redeemed culture—the eventual everyday. In Cavell, this twoAmericas problem is focused in his repeated invocation of Emerson’s remark, “I know the world I converse with in the city and in the farms is not the world I think.”17 But how is one to approach this new but unapproachable America? Is one to approach it? Cavell does not pretend to solve this dilemma; rather he recommends to us another Emersonian sentence, “Patience, patience, we shall win at the last.” What might Cavell mean by this? What I find here—and it is very little—is the offer of “a passive practice,” that is, a way of inhabiting the actual everyday with one eye on the eventual everyday, a passive power that Cavell explicitly links to Thoreau’s notion of civil disobedience (NYUA, 115). Such is perhaps Cavell’s weak messianism. However, Cavell’s most revealing passage on America appears in his 1969 essay on King Lear, and it allows one to glimpse another America in Cavell, an America of unworked romanticism, a separated and tragic America. Cavell writes: Those who voice politically radical wishes for this country may forget the radical hopes it holds for itself, and not know that the hatred of America by its intellectuals is only their own version of patriotism. (MWM, 345)
America, Cavell insists, needs to be loved. It needs love like no other nation, and like no other nation has it been the object of love. The union of love is what America has always wanted; it is what it tore itself apart in the Civil War trying to achieve. America has never been able to bear its separateness and therein lies its tragedy. In lines written at the height of the fateful involvement of the United States in Vietnam, Cavell writes of America, in an act of literary civil disobedience: Union is what it wanted. And it has never felt that union has been achieved. Hence its terror of dissent, which does not threaten its power but its integrity. So it is killing
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itself and killing another country in order not to admit its helplessness in the face of suffering, in order not to acknowledge its separateness.
“America,” Cavell goes on, “is the anti-Marxist country,” the nation where, as Baudrillard cheerfully notes, the nineteenth century did not happen.18 But things could change. After all, it’s a free country, “but it will take a change of consciousness. So phenomenology becomes politics” (MWM, 346). “Has America happened?” (NYUA, 114). Cavell grants that this is a romantic question, the romantic question par excellence, for it concerns the unification of philosophy and poetry as a unification of culture with itself and the possibility of a transformation of genius into practical power. Such a unification would be the moment when phenomenology becomes politics, the fantastic moment when Plato lives happily ever after in Syracuse and when Heidegger benevolently looks down from his hut on a Germany resolute in its collective Dasein. Now, although Cavell comes close to a form of cultural nationalism (or even cultural continentalism) that is both historically fallacious and politically pernicious, failing to take account of the deep hybridities of American memory; and although Cavell’s names—“Emerson” and “America”—call for a careful critical dismantling, I would claim that nonetheless he avoids the deepest naı¨vete´ of romanticism, namely its aestheticization of politics. America, for him, is the tragic experience of separation I will return to later, an unworked America that hesitates in the tension between nihilism and its overcoming, between the actual everyday and the eventual everyday. America is a philosophical event that can never happen. All that remains is an approach and a series of hallucinatory cliche´s: the Manhattan skyline emerging from the mist to the accompaniment of Gershwin, the soiled pearl of Las Vegas shimmering in the baking desert heat, the sublimity of the nighttime Chicago sky-scape. We arrive and it is too late. There is only the approach.
Cavell’s Romanticism What happens to us at the death of the body is what happens to the music when the music concludes. There is a period of reverberation, and then nothing. (CR, 410)
I Live My Skepticism Cavell’s “romanticism” is, on the view I have presented, not romantic. His reading of The Literary Absolute, and particularly his claims for “Emerson” and “America,” yield a version of romanticism that can be offered as an aesthetic absolutism ripe for Hegelian/Schmittian critique. However, and this is the positive thought that I would like to pursue in concluding, this does not mean that Cavell’s thought is not ultimately romantic, despite itself, and despite its “romanticism.” The curious thing about Cavell’s Emersonian “romanticism,” at least on my account, is that it is unCavellian. As is clear from the opening chapters of The Claim of Reason,19 Cavell’s thought is dominated by the insight that criteria come to an end (CR, 412). The idea of a criterion, which is understood as the means by which the existence of something is established with certainty, thereby refuting the possibility of skepti-
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cism, fails to provide us with the certainty we desire. To take the famous Wittgensteinian example of whether I have criteria to decide whether another person is in pain, Cavell concludes that my criteria will always fall short. There is no epistemic assurance that my words will reach all the way into the other’s interiority. Thus, rather than refuting skepticism, criteria—whose necessity only arises at that fateful moment when attunement or agreement (Ubereinstimmung) is threatened or lost, when the social contract breaks down—reveal the truth of skepticism, that is, its irrefutability. Of course, to acknowledge the truth of skepticism is not the same as admitting that skepticism is true, for this would constitute a further escape into a new inverted metaphysics of certainty, namely relativism. Rather Cavell is seeking to draw us into a position where we are denied both the possibility of an epistemological guarantee for our beliefs and the possibility of a skeptical escape from those beliefs. Of course, this is hard for us to bear, but it is here that we must learn to, as Putnam puts it, “wriggle.”20 The burden of much of Cavell’s argument in The Claim of Reason is to show that this struggle with skepticism provides both the animating intention and dramatic tension of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations. The deeply self-conscious and willfully unsystematic rhetorical form of the Investigations, particularly its endless play of questioning and answering voices, is, according to Cavell, intended to show our continual exposure to the threat of skepticism. The Investigations is both paradigmatic of philosophy, insofar as criteria do not overcome skepticism but are disappointed and disappointing, and paradigmatic of what it means to be human as such, because the denial of skepticism would ultimately be the denial of what it is to be human. To grasp this second claim, we have to understand that the problem of skepticism (particularly skepticism concerning other minds) is not first and foremost a theoretical problem. For Cavell, unlike Heidegger,21 there is no everyday or commonsense alternative to skepticism (CR, 431). To entertain skeptical doubt is an everyday occurrence, and there is nothing about other minds that satisfies me for all practical purposes. (Is this true? Does it not assume the activity of reflection at all stages of everyday life?) As Cavell puts it, to live without skepticism “would be to fall in love with the world” (CR, 431). Perhaps the desire that governs so much philosophy is this wish to fall in love with the world and to achieve what Cavell calls “empathic projection” (CR, 420) with the other, the identity of subject and object without remainder, slack, or excess. Perhaps this goes some way toward explaining what is going on in Heidegger’s existential analytic of inauthenticity in division I of Being and Time—but that is another story for another occasion. For Cavell, on the contrary, “I live my skepticism” (CR, 437). That is, skepticism is a praxis, a practice of the self conditioned by the acknowledgment of ignorance and limitation. As Cavell puts it, “My ignorance of the existence of others is not the fate of my natural condition as a human knower, but my way of inhabiting that condition” (CR, 432).22 Thus, the real problem with skepticism, according to Cavell, is that we attempt to convert the way we inhabit the human condition into a theoretical problem and this prevents an acknowledgment of the limitedness of the human glimpsed in skepticism. However, it should be noted that the theoreticism of skepticism is only a problem for modern, epistemological skepticism and the
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same claim cannot simply be made for ancient skepticism, which was not merely theoretical doubt about the truth of certain metaphysical theses but a practical doubt about the whole of one’s life, a full existential epoche. In this light, Cavell’s work might be viewed as a tacit recovery of the ethos of ancient skepticism.23
Cavell’s Tragic Wisdom This brings me to what I see as the central insight of Cavell’s work, what one might call its tragic wisdom, which, like a musical leitmotif, is rarely explicitly formulated but which constantly returns in different variations throughout his work: the need for an acceptance of human finitude as that which cannot be overcome— that is to say, an acceptance of the finiteness of the finite, of the limitedness of the human condition. Contra Mulhall, this is why Cavell’s work can be seen as neither Christian nor anti-Christian, that is, crudely “Nietzschean,” insofar as both the Christian and the Nietzschean share the belief that the human condition is something that must be overcome whether in redemption through the person of Christ revealed through Scripture or through Zarathustra’s teaching of the overman. To express this with a historical figure, I think Cavell rightly accepts Pascal’s tragic vision of the limitedness of the human condition without his accompanying faith in the possibility of overcoming that condition through redemption. As Mulhall’s use of Charles Taylor’s Sources of the Self attempts to show, the roots of Cavell’s philosophical preoccupations may well be religious, but I do not see why this entails that their consequences should be religious.24 To make this move is to sidestep the problem of nihilism which has been the framing theme of this book. Philosophy cannot say sin, but neither can it say salvation. What philosophy can say is itself, an endless self-assertion, an endless arrogance and arrogation of the voice that is in conflict with the religious (i.e., Kierkegaardian-Weilian) vision of dying to the self that characterizes the awaiting for God. However, such assertion is not the expression of the self’s mastery, but the expression of its frailty, its separateness; a minimal but irreducible ipseity that returns reluctantly to itself in the absence of God, a self for whom at the moment of the body’s death, “there is a period of reverberation and then nothing.” In these disappointing circumstances—and it has been my claim that philosophical modernity is the attempt to live with(in) the disappointment of religion—the best that can be hoped for is an acknowledgment of this limitedness, whilst the worst is the failure to make this acknowledgment. Responding to the skeptical teaching of King Lear—ventriloquized through the character of Edgar—Cavell writes: “What the skeptic opens my eyes to is the knowledge that this is the best—the occurrence of this tree, of that stone, at that distance, in this light, myself undrugged and unhampered, in the best of health” (CR, 432–33). “This is the best”—such is the maxim of the person who has survived skepticism, something that is doubtless true of a tragic figure like Edgar, but perhaps equally true of the comic hero: of Chaplin, Keaton (CR, 452), or, as Cavell has recently said, Groucho Marx—for these are also survivors of skepticism. Perhaps the secret desire of this lecture is to replace Emerson with Groucho Marx as the
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hero of Cavell’s philosophy and as a spokesman for this new yet unapproachable America.25 The inanity and insanity of Groucho’s words, these words in migration, these words of immigration, such is Cavell’s spectre de Marx: Groucho rather than Karl-o.26 Recalling the most Marxist moment in Cavell—”It wasn’t hurting, I was just calling my hamsters” (CR, 89) we can see how the whole problem of skepticism (was he really calling his hamsters?) also opens in the experience of the comic. Moving from the comic to the tragic, the path from skepticism to tragedy becomes clear in part four of The Claim of Reason, “tragedy is the public form of the life of skepticism with respect to other minds” (CR, 476). That is, in Cavell’s terms, tragedy is the dramatization of the failure to acknowledge others. The skeptical teaching of tragedy—and the tragic teaching of skepticism—is the fact that I cannot know the other. In part four of The Claim of Reason, Cavell gives three examples of tragedy by looking at Shakespeare’s The Merchant of Venice, A Winter’s Tale, and a stunning, extended reading of Othello. The book closes with the image of Othello and Desdemona dead on their nuptial bed. For Cavell, this image constitutes an emblem for the truth of skepticism. Othello—like America—could not yield to what he knew, he could not accept the tragic wisdom of the limitedness of his knowledge of Desdemona and consequently he failed to acknowledge her separateness, her alterity. This is why Othello kills Desdemona. For Cavell, intrinsic to any acceptance of the limitedness of the human condition, of the finiteness of the finite, is an acknowledgment of separation. In a retrospective remark, Cavell writes, “I have argued for an understanding of the having of the self as an acceptance of the idea of being by oneself” (CR, 367). Cavell is proposing here a conception of self in terms of ‘aloneness’, ‘oneness’ or what Thoreau calls “holiness.”27 In relation to the problem of skepticism, the claim here is that skepticism concerning other minds becomes a way of acknowledging the other’s separateness from me and my separateness from the other. Of course, to say that I and the other are separated is to say something about the nature of our relationship, namely that it is a relationship across separation, a relation between separated terms, an absolute relation. Of course, this is what Levinas, and Derrida after him, call justice. As Cavell puts it: There is “no assignable end to the depth of us that language reaches; that nevertheless there is no end to our separateness. We are endlessly separate, for no reason” (CR, 369). “For no reason”—as Cavell puts it elsewhere, where the rationality of moral argumentation breaks down, we do not witness the collapse of morality but the beginning of moral relationship (CR, 326). Both skepticism and tragedy conclude with the recognition of separation, with the anti-Hegelian recognition that intersubjective relations are not based on cognition or recognition, but on acknowledgment.28 But what is romantic about Cavell’s tragic wisdom? Simply this: that the picture of philosophy (and picture of culture) that Cavell claims to find in Wittgenstein’s Investigations, with its endless circulation and oscillation of voices and positions, is the very picture which I claimed earlier was the truth of romanticism, namely its nonromantic essence. The play or “wriggling” between the demand for criteria and the skeptical disappointment of that demand—what Putnam sees as the neces-
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sity of learning to live with the double bind of acknowledgment and alienation (RP, 178)—can be mapped directly onto the quasi dialectics of wit and irony that I presented earlier in relation to Schlegel. The criterial demand for Witz and Wissen, the attempt to unify subject and object in a creative act of synthesis, is always subject to the destructive activity of irony, that ‘ho¨chste und reinste skepsis.’ The na¨ivete´ of romanticism is rooted in the self-consciousness of its failure, of the fact that the demand for the Work—the aesthetic or literary absolute—like the demand for criteria, will always open itself to the skeptical movement of unworking, it will never achieve “realization,” not even a “fair realization.” In terms of the problem of other minds, the empathic projection of the philosopher stumbles across a seam in human experience behind which the other withdraws. The general claim made earlier was that this oscillation between wit and irony, work and unworking, and criteria and skepticism is (barely) held together by the genre of the fragment itself. This is what I meant when I stated that Cavell’s claim for Emerson was unCavellian and unromantic. Namely, that it attempts to realize the ideal, thereby disarming the skeptic and freezing the movement of irony in the living present of aesthetic Witz and Wissen. The work is always in progress, which is to say that it opens the future, is the possibility that the future might have a future. What is Cavellian and romantic, in my view, is the endless wriggling between criteria and skepticism, a movement that is manifested in both romantic texts and the Investigations themselves, but equally in the fragmentary quality of Cavell’s prose. Exemplary in this regard, I feel, is part four of The Claim of Reason, which might be read as an amnesial rewriting of the Athenaeum Fragments. With its endless play of voices and sheer aphoristic force, Cavell’s writing recalls the practice of romantic fragmentation. It is a writing that is rambling, deviatory, tendentious, obscure, but littered with moments of explosive brilliance. Cavell’s style is Shandyesque: it is marked by ellipses, circumlocutions, parentheses, occasionally agonizing formulations which are, turn and turn about, defensive and defenseless. I note his predilection for certain words, for an idiosyncratic and quasi-religious, quasi-legal language: settlement, dispensation, inheritance, entitlement, rescue, recovery, rebirth; and his taste for present participles: accounting, counting, acknowledging, founding, finding, declining. And yet, in reading Cavell there is the conviction that one is listening to a philosophical voice, that this voice, like no other I know currently writing in English, exemplifies philosophizing.
Finiteness, Limitedness I have claimed that romantic oscillation—between wit and irony, work and unworking, criteria and skepticism—yields an insight into finitude, a tragic wisdom centered in an acceptance of the limitedness of thought, of the finiteness of the human condition as that which cannot be overcome. In the Lyceum Fragments, Schlegel notes in passing, before quickly dismissing the idea, that wit is the substitute for an impossible happiness (CR, 59). For me, this remark captures well the mood of melancholy that is the ambience of the fragments, the night whose vast profile is briefly traced by those tiny explosions of wit and irony.
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But what exactly is the link between the romantic fragment and the thinking of finitude? For all systems of thought that take seriously the question of finitude and the problem of nihilism, the fundamental philosophical quest is that of finding a meaning to finitude. If death is not the gateway to another life, and if it is not just going to have the contingent character of a brute fact, then one’s mortality is something that one has to project freely, as the product of a resolute decision. Death is therefore something to be achieved; it is a Work. However, the interpretation of romanticism given here emphasizes its exploration of the lack of final synthesis, its inability to produce the aesthetic absolute, the great work, the work of death that would give meaning to life and overcome nihilism. The ceaseless quasi dialectic within romanticism perpetually postpones the possibility of finding a meaning to finitude, thereby making death impossible, ungraspable and unworked. In their refusal of final synthesis, fragments provoke us into an acceptance of finitude as that which evades the grasp of my criteria, as that towards which I am certainly destined but without knowing the time and the manner of my arrival. Beneath their explosive brilliance, their substitution for an impossible happiness, romantic fragments quietly recall us to the unworking of the work, the ungraspability of the finite, the impossibility of death and the endless process of mourning. We are left unable, impotent and insomniac, trying to imagine what happens when the body dies, when the reverberation of life fades into silence. As Beckett writes, “No, life ends, and no, there is nothing elsewhere.”29 The future is faced with fragments, with fragments of an impossible future, a future that itself appears fragmentary. And this is the best, and for no reason. Out of the bonfire of our intellectual vanities come the ashes of compassion, of tenderness and generosity, and for no reason. After the unworking of human arrogance, we become “the finally human natives of a dwindled sphere.” Notes This text, originally written in 1994, is extracted from a much longer discussion of Stanley Cavell’s work in relation to romanticism that can be found in Very Little . . . Almost Nothing (London: Routledge, revised edition, 2004). Reprinted by permission. 1. Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. J. MacQuarrie and E. Robinson (Oxford: Blackwell, 1962), 423. 2. Stanley Cavell, A Pitch of Philosophy. Autobiographical Exercises (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 1994), 4. 3. See Simon Critchley, Very Little . . . Almost Nothing (London and New York: Routledge, 1997), 85–117 [ed.]. 4. Emerson, “Experience” and “The American Scholar,” in Selected Essays, ed. Larzer Ziff, 311 and 99. 5. Ibid., 309. 6. See Stephen Mulhall’s extremely helpful book Stanley Cavell: Philosophy’s Recounting of the Ordinary (Oxford: Clarendon, 1994), xii. 7. In Ecce Homo, Nietzsche remarks, against his earlier Wagnerian incarnation, that every time one sees the name “Wagner” in his work, one should erase it and insert the name
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“Nietzsche” (trans. R. J. Hollingdale. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1979, 82). I wonder whether this remark might be applied to Cavell, and that every time one sees the name “Emerson” one should strike it out and write “Cavell.” This question of nomination and the proper name would seem to resonate with Cavell’s recent autobiographical exercises in his Jerusalem Harvard Lectures and with the history of his own name: Goldstein—Cavalier— Cavalerskii—Cavaleriiskii—Cavell (A Pitch of Philosophy, 25–30). Cavell is therefore not so much a name as an alias. What interests me is why Cavell decides to tell us this fact. Why does he need to confess? After all, what’s in a name? Interestingly, he shares this obsessional and confessional relation to the proper name with Derrida in his recent text Circonfession, where the young Jackie changes his name to Jacques when he publishes his first book (Jacques Derrida, Geoffrey Bennington and Jacques Derrida, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993, 41). What is the difference between Jackie Derrida and Jacques Derrida, or between Stanley Goldstein and Stanley Cavell? And to what extent is this question separable from the issue of Cavell’s or Derrida’s Jewishness? 8. Emerson, Selected Essays, 302. 9. Cited in Harold Bloom, The American Religion (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992), 31. 10. This would be the place to begin a reading of Emerson’s “Emancipation Address” from 1844, which discusses at length the question of slavery in the British West Indies and the United States, in Essays, Second Series (London: Harrap, no date), 191–229. See also Len Gougeon, Virtue’s Hero (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1990). 11. “Thus in the beginning all the world was America.” Two Treatises of Government, ed. P. Laslett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960, 1988), 301. 12. See Hegel’s famous remark in the Philosophy of History (New York: Dover, 1956), 86–87: “America is therefore the land of the future.” 13. Tom Paine, Rights of Man (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1969). 14. Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Poems, ed. J. Beer (London: Dent, 1963), 18; William Blake, America: A Prophecy (1793), in The Prophetic Writing of William Blake, eds. D. J. Sloss and J. P. R. Wallis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1956), 47–62. 15. Baudrillard, America, trans. C. Turner (London: Verso, 1988). 16. Ibid., 7. 17. Emerson, Selected Essays, 310. 18. Baudrillard, America, 90. 19. Cavell’s arguments are impressively documented in part two of Mulhall’s Stanley Cavell: Philosophy’s Recounting of the Ordinary, 77–181. For an excellent account of skepticism in Cavell, see Gerald Bruns, “Stanley Cavell’s Shakespeare,” Critical Inquiry, 16 (spring 1990): 612–32. 20. Hilary Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 1992), 177; hereafter RP. 21. Being and Time, 229. Heidegger restates, in his fashion, the classical refutation of skepticism: “A skeptic can no more be refuted than the Being of truth can be ‘proved’. And if any skeptic of the kind who denies the truth, factically is, he does not even need to be refuted. Insofar as he is, and has understood himself in his Being, he has obliterated Dasein in the desperation of suicide; and in so doing, he has also obliterated truth. It has no more been demonstrated that there ever has “been” an “actual” skeptic . . . than it has been demonstrated that there are any ‘eternal truths.’” 22. Emphasis added. 23. For a discussion of ancient skepticism, see J. Annas and J. Barnes, The Modes of Skepticism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
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24. Mulhall, 301–2. I return to a similar question around religion in Very Little . . . Almost Nothing, lecture 3, where I criticize Martha Nussbaum’s interpretation of Beckett. 25. See “Nothing Goes Without Saying,” London Review of Books, vol. 16, no. 1 (1994), 3–5. 26. As Cavell speculates at the end of his review of the Marx Brothers scripts, such would be the gift of American culture to Derrida. 27. Incidentally, it is in terms of aloneness and separateness that Harold Bloom describes the American religion, the post-Christian, gnostic tradition that he traces back to Whitman’s “Song of Myself.” Bloom writes, with his characteristic penchant for provocation: The American Orphic ecstasy never has been Dionysiac, for the Bacchic freedom is the freedom to merge into others. American ecstasy is solitary, even when it requires the presence of others as audience for the self’s glory. Our father Walt Whitman, despite his self-advertisements and the dogmatic insistences of our contemporary gays, seems to have embraced only himself. (The American Religion, 264) 28. The elements of Cavell’s work that I have chosen to emphasize have certain distinct resonances with the work of Levinas as interpreted in Lecture I of Very Little . . . Almost Nothing. Cavell’s proximity to Levinas can be seen in the way in which the problem of skepticism (which is also extensively discussed by Levinas) opens a noncognitive relation to the other as a distinctively ethical insight. The Cavellian need to accept the limitedness of human cognition, the need for the acknowledgment of the other’s separateness from me and my own irreducible separation can be placed alongside Levinas’s account of the ethical relation to the other exceeding the bounds of knowledge. Might not such a view have the perverse consequence of viewing Levinas as a romantic thinker? For a brief but suggestive comparison of Levinas and Cavell, see Gerald Bruns’s “Stanley Cavell’s Shakespeare,” 619–20. 29. Beckett, Six Residua (London: Calder, 1978), 38.
4
Cavell and the Concept of America JAMES CONANT
Sometimes people call me an idealist. Well, that is the way I know I am an American. America is the only idealistic nation in the world. Woodrow Wilson, Address at Sioux Falls, 8 Sept. 1919 There is nothing the matter with Americans except their ideals. The real American is all right; it is the ideal American who is all wrong. G. K. Chesterton, “The American Ideal” The business of America is business. Calvin Coolidge, Speech to the Society of American Newspaper Editors, Jan. 17, 1935 I am willing to love all mankind, except an American. Samuel Johnson, quoted by James Boswell in The Life of Johnson Your American eagle is very well. Protect it here and abroad. But beware of the American peacock. R. W. Emerson, “American Nationality”
Is there, as President Wilson thought, an internal relation between the concept of America and a certain ideal? Or is it that, as Chesterton thought, there is nothing the matter with Americans except their ideals?1 Or does America stripped of its ideals amount to nothing more than President Coolidge’s vision of it? And, if so, ought one then to sympathize with Dr. Johnson’s view of the matter? Or is there a 55
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distinction to be drawn, as Emerson thought, between the ideal and its debasement by those who most loudly proclaim it? As these quotations evidence, the topic of America—what it stands for, what it is, and what it should be—excites and aggrieves both those who make their home in America and those who do not. Many of the former (whose visions of America differ as widely as do those of President Wilson and President Coolidge) worry about what sort of home America is or ought to be; and some of the latter (whose views about real Americans differ as widely as do those of Mr. Chesterton and Dr. Johnson) worry about the way Americans worry about this. Some who do not make their home in America are drawn to reflect on the topic not out of distrust or disdain for America’s idealism, but out of their own idealism—and often because they, too, wonder what sort of home America, at its best, might be able to make. The reason that there is an America at all is because there have been people of this last sort. Many of these are drawn to wonder about America precisely because they do not (or are made not to) feel at home where they live and imagine America as a place where things might be otherwise. None of the quotations here is from such a person—a prospective immigrant. Karl Rossman, the hero of Franz Kafka’s novel Amerika, is such a person. The novel begins as follows: As the seventeen-year-old Karl Rossmann . . . stood on the liner slowly entering the harbor of New York, a sudden burst of sunshine seemed to illumine the Statue of Liberty, so that he saw it in a new light, although he had sighted it long before. The arm with the sword rose up as if newly stretched aloft, and all around the figure blew the free winds of heaven.2
No other Kafka narrative begins with—or is as suffused with—such a note of hope. What does Karl Rossman hope to find in Amerika? What is this possibility that can suffuse even a Kafka narrative with hope? The beginning of the novel provides some hints. But this is still a novel by Franz Kafka and so questions about the soundness of the hope linger. The scene opens with Karl seeing something he had sighted long before and had been seeking to reach for even longer—a statue named Liberty—only now suddenly seeing it in a new light, as if for the first time. Does the sudden burst of sunshine that seems to illumine the countenance of Liberty provide him with a clear or a distorted view of her features? Is the wind that blows around Liberty free? Does the arm with the sword rise up as if newly stretched aloft or will it, upon closer examination, prove overwrought and awkwardly frozen in time? Does or can or should America measure up to the hopes of those who seek the place Karl Rossman seeks in seeking Amerika?
A Peculiar Concept ‘AMERICA’ always means two things: a country, geographically, the USA, and an idea of that country, the ideal that goes with it. “American Dream,” then, is: a dream OF a country
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IN a different country, that is located where the dream takes place . . . ‘I want to be in America’, the Jets sing in that famous song from West Side Story. They are in America already, and yet still wanting to get there . . . . Wim Wenders, “The American Dream”3
Kierkegaard draws a helpful distinction between objective and subjective categories. A short and simple way of trying to distinguish the concepts that belong to the former from those that belong to the latter category would be just to say that objective concepts characterize the different kinds of ways in which an object can be, whereas subjective concepts characterize the different kinds of ways in which a subject or a person can be. But this will not quite do: there are many concepts that can be predicated equally of objects and persons—being six feet tall, weighing two hundred pounds, being in a certain location, and so on. So our initial formulation stands in need of some qualification along the following lines: objective concepts characterize the different kinds of ways in which objects qua objects can be, whereas subjective concepts characterize the different kinds of ways in which subjects qua subjects can be. (This allows us to say that being six feet tall, weighing two hundred pounds, being in a certain location, etc., are not characterizations of subjects qua subjects, but rather characterizations of them qua objects.) Or, as Kierkegaard and his pseudonyms prefer to say: subjective concepts characterize a subject or person qua existing individual.4 Both objective and subjective concepts can be predicated of human beings: a given individual has, say, blue eyes, is six feet tall, weighs two hundred pounds, and is also, say, a husband, a Christian, a philosopher. But the former concepts hold of the person regardless of whether or not he would predicate them of himself; the latter concepts hold of an individual (not merely if he is indeed prepared to predicate them of himself, but) only to the extent that his daily existence is beholden to the ethical or religious demands such concepts entail—to the extent that his life is shaped by these demands.5 These latter concepts, Kierkegaard argues, if they are properly understood as subjective concepts—that is, as properly subjective characterizations of the lives of existing individuals—must be clearly distinguished from certain merely objective concepts which these same words (‘husband’, ‘Christian’, ‘philosopher’) might also be taken to denote. The word ‘husband’, inflected subjectively, signifies participation in a certain sort of ethical relationship between two individuals pledged to devote their lives to one another; inflected objectively, it signifies a certain juridical status. A husband, in the latter sense, is something one either is or is not (depending upon whether one’s papers are in order); a husband, in the former sense, is someone (Kierkegaard says) one becomes—it presupposes involvement in an existential task that must be reaffirmed and renewed every day of one’s married life. (If a wife says to her husband “This isn’t a marriage!” he does not rebut her charge by producing their marriage certificate.) The word ‘Christian’, inflected subjectively, signifies an
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involvement in a religious way of life; inflected merely objectively, it signifies certain straightforwardly observable external facts about a person’s behavior (e.g., that he goes to church on Sundays, has his children baptized, puts money in the collection box, etc.). Understood the latter way ‘a Christian’ is something one either is or is not.6 Understood subjectively, ‘a Christian’ is someone (Kierkegaard says) one becomes—it presupposes the undertaking of an existential task that must be reaffirmed and renewed every moment of one’s existence.7 (If Kierkegaard says “While Christendom flourishes Christianity gradually withers away!” someone does not rebut his charge by pointing out how full the churches are on Sundays.) Here is a characteristic passage in which one of Kierkegaard’s pseudonyms, Johannes Climacus, offers a comparatively straightforward example of a conflation of subjective and objective categories: Once it was at the risk of his life that a man dared to profess himself a Christian; now it is to make oneself suspect to venture to doubt that one is a Christian. . . . [I]f a man were to say quite simply and unassumingly, that he was concerned for himself, lest perhaps he had no right to call himself a Christian, he would indeed not suffer persecution or be put to death, but he would be smothered in angry glances, and people would say: “How tiresome to make such a fuss about nothing at all; why can’t he behave like the rest of us, who are all Christians?” . . . And if he happened to be married, his wife would say to him: “Dear husband of mine, how can you get such notions into your head? How can you doubt that you are a Christian? Are you not a Dane, and does not geography say that the Lutheran form of the Christian religion is the ruling religion in Denmark? For you are surely not a Jew, nor are you a Mohammedan; what then can you be if not a Christian?8
The term ‘Christendom’ is Kierkegaard’s name for such a state of affairs—one in which everyone already thinks he or she is a Christian and thus no one takes the trouble any longer to become one. Now what about the concept American? Should we classify it as objective or subjective? Should it be grouped together with Dane or with Christian? Well, surely, one can be an American in the same sense that one can be a Dane. Thus understood, an American is something one either is or is not (depending upon whether one’s papers are in order, or upon other equally objective facts about, say, one’s birth, upbringing, or cultural heritage.) But “America”9 is also the name of a certain moral and political ideal and thus “to be an American” can also signify a commitment to that ideal,10 and thus an existential task, a way of life, and even a kind of person that one must struggle—and that one can fail—to become. If we are to follow Kierkegaard’s lead, then we should seek clearly to distinguish between the objective concept of being an American and the subjective one. This will lead us to the conclusion that one can be an American in the objective sense while failing to be one in the subjective sense. We could then further follow Kierkegaard’s lead and introduce the concept Americadom to signify a state of affairs in which the merely objective inflection of the concept has gained ascendancy—a state of affairs in which, because almost everyone in America already knows that he is an American, hardly anyone any longer takes the trouble to become one. Yet this fails to do justice to the peculiar complexity of the concept of America. As a first step toward appreciating the peculiarity of this concept, it helps to notice
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that it involves what Kierkegaard seems to regard as an impossible combination of categories: it combines some of the logical features of an objective concept with some of those of a subjective concept.11 At one and the same time, ‘America’ names a certain place at a certain time with a certain history and signifies a certain dream of what might happen in that place if certain moral and political ideals could be realized.12 To be an American can mean, at one and the same time, to be someone who happens to be a citizen of one particular nation (rather than another) and to be committed to a moral and political project whose continuation cannot be guaranteed simply through the continued existence of that nation (as merely one among others).13 The aforementioned peculiarity of the concept of America notwithstanding, the following feature of Kierkegaard’s analysis remains pertinent: an expression retains its ethical (or religious) significance only if it continues to be predicated of individuals whose lives reflect a commitment to the exigencies of thought and action it entails; if not—if it comes to be predicated solely of individuals whose lives in no way bear the stamp of such exigencies—it will be drained of its former significance. In the latter case, the expression may continue to circulate in daily use and retain an aura of ethical significance, but it will no longer have its original import.14 It may, with time, even shed that aura and acquire some other perfectly coherent, utterly non-ethical—descriptive or juridical or institutional—meaning. As a husband can remain “married” in the eyes of the law, even if he has a made a mockery of his vows, so, too, Americans can retain their juridical status as “American citizens” and a place named ‘America’ will continue to stand as one nation alongside others, even if America makes a mockery of the words that figure in its founding pledges to itself—the pledges that constitute the original ground of its existence. Once one has distinguished between objective and subjective sorts of concepts, it becomes possible (as Kierkegaard and his pseudonyms frequently do) to say some seemingly paradoxical things that can come to be understood to be not merely true, but platitudinous—to have the status of categorial (or as later Wittgenstein prefers to put it: grammatical) truths. Not just things like “A ‘husband’ may not be married,” or “There may be no Christians in Christendom”; but also things like these: Christianity is not plausible. Religion only conquers without force.15 The principle that the existing subjective thinker is constantly occupied in striving, does not mean that he has, in the finite sense, a goal toward which he strives, and that he would be finished when he reached this goal.16 A human being can forget to exist.17
The substitution of the word ‘America’ for the word ‘Christianity’ in the first, for ‘religion’ in the second, for ‘existing thinker’ in the third, and for ‘human being’ in the fourth of these sentences would yield four sentences very much like ones scattered throughout Stanley Cavell’s writings about America. But what could it mean to say such things in characterization or criticism of something as seemingly
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palpable, enduring, and powerful as America? How could America forget to exist? How tiresome of this fellow Cavell to make such a fuss about nothing at all!
Parisian Brilliance and American Diffidence I have attempted more and more systematically to find a non-site, or a non-philosophical site, from which to question philosophy. But the search for a non-philosophical site does not bespeak an anti-philosophical attitude. My central question is: from what site or non-site can philosophy as such appear to itself as other than itself, so that it can interrogate and reflect upon itself in an original manner? Such a non-site or alterity would be radically irreducible to philosophy. But the problem is that such a non-site cannot be defined or situated by means of philosophical language. Jacques Derrida in Dialogues with Contemporary Continental Thinkers18 Walden has a reasonably tight bottom at a not unreasonable, though at an unusual, depth. I fathomed it easily with a cod-line and a stone weighing about a pound and a half, and could tell accurately when the stone left the bottom, by having to pull so much harder before the water got underneath to help me. This is a remarkable depth for so small an area, yet not one inch of it can be spared by the imagination. What if all ponds were shallow? Would it not react on the minds of men? Henry David Thoreau, Walden19
Much French philosophy has a distinctively French sound. And there is nothing in that sound that precludes it from sounding like philosophy. On the contrary, to the ears of many today—and not only of those who live in Paris—it is the sound of philosophy. If one comes across a passage from the writings of a French philosopher, such as the passage from Jacques Derrida quoted here—regardless of whether one likes its sound (or of whether one takes oneself to understand what it says, or of whether one takes oneself to agree with what one thus understands)—for better or worse, one knows this much about it right off: this stuff is (or is, at least, trying to sound like) philosophy. Derrida is far from alone among philosophers, at least since Kant, in thinking that a radical questioning of philosophy is to be achieved only from a site that is, in some sense, “outside” (what we presently understand to be) philosophy—a site
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that allows one, without turning one’s back on philosophy, to confront it on an altogether new ground. And Derrida (and, again, not only Derrida) appreciates the difficulty of finding or arranging for such a site. For a radical questioning of philosophy would seem to require a radically new kind of philosophical discourse—one conducted in altogether different cadences from any in which philosophy has hitherto been attempted. And the problem is that nowadays—especially in France—the call for such a discourse tends to result simply in the production of further sentences whose sound is indistinguishable from that characteristic of business as usual in French philosophy. (Sentences that sound like this: “Such a non-site or alterity would be radically irreducible to philosophy; but the problem is that such a non-site cannot be defined or situated by means of philosophical language.”) What else could a call for a different philosophical discourse sound like? Will it not of necessity itself sound like philosophy? And if it no longer sounded like (what we know as) philosophy, how would we be able to recognize it as such? The sound of much of the language in Thoreau’s Walden is apt to strike a reader—at least on a first encounter—as not particularly philosophical at all, as not even trying to be philosophy. Admittedly, the text does have moments when it seems to want to veer toward (something recognizable as) philosophy. But mostly, on a first listen, it can seem to be nattering on about how much certain items cost, how to live in the woods, hoe beans, or measure the depth of a pond. Indeed, the writing’s intermittent gestures in the direction of something that has the aspect of philosophy (such as the concluding lines in the above quotation) may even strike a reader, at first blush, as puzzling digressions from its primary concerns. Not all of the remarks in Walden are of this sort, of course. Some of them may even immediately strike one as sage. (“Beware of all enterprises that require new clothes.”20) And some of them may immediately strike one as clever. (“A man sits as many risks as he runs.”21) The tone may occasionally even remind one of Socrates (“A man is rich in proportion to the number of things he can afford to let alone.”22) A sentence or two here or there may even strike one as the sort of thing that might actually have been said by Socrates. (“If I seem to boast more than is becoming, my excuse is that I brag for humanity rather than myself; and my shortcomings and inconsistencies do not affect the truth of my statement.”23) But the resulting whole, made up of these and other remarks, is not apt immediately to strike one as in serious competition with the enterprises of a Kant or a Hegel or a Derrida. If one comes across a quotation from Thoreau, such as the one paired with the passage from Derrida above—regardless of whether one likes the sound of such writing (or of whether one takes oneself to understand what it says, or, if so, whether one takes oneself to agree with what one thus understands)—the following two features of the prose will be hard to gainsay: it has a distinctively American sound, and its sound is not that of European philosophy. Could the finding or founding of a site from which to question the inheritance of European philosophy possibly sound like this? How does one measure the depth of Walden? In his book The Senses of Walden, Cavell asks: “Has America expressed itself philosophically?”24 Some years ago I participated in a conference in France on American philosophy whose title sought to allude to this question of Cavell’s. The conference was titled “Exist-il une philosophie americaine?” Many of the French
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participants understood the question to be asking whether there had been individuals who managed to be genuinely original philosophers even though, at least for the better part of their lives, they grew up in and were educated in America. The French participants at the conference each wanted to answer the question resoundingly in the affirmative; and each did so by giving a paper explaining why he or she admired the work of some particular American philosopher or philosophers— Emerson, Thoreau, Peirce, James, Dewey, Quine, or, notably (in the case of several of the French participants), Cavell. Being French, many of them were equally concerned to make clear why they vehemently opposed some alternative candidate for the title “important American philosopher”—always one, of course, that one or another of their French colleagues were concurrently concerned to champion. (Among the candidates that were particularly contested in this regard were Emerson, Thoreau, Rorty, and Cavell.) I take it that Cavell himself (in asking his question that provided the conference with its title) meant to be asking something that went unaddressed in these displays of generosity and enmity—that is, in efforts to demonstrate or deny that there had indeed been this or that individual who was both undeniably American and who could qualify as a first-rate philosopher even when judged by the highest European standards. Cavell’s question speaks rather to an internal relation between philosophy and the broader cultural context within which the activity of philosophizing takes place—an internal relation between America and those individuals who happen to be both Americans and philosophers. One cannot hear Cavell’s question until one recognizes that it turns upon a prior claim that philosophy necessarily exists on a different cultural basis in America than in, say, France—that a different economy of exchange prevails between the culture at large and those who attempt to speak philosophically in it—and this affects what it can mean for a philosopher to attempt to speak philosophically to (or for) his culture. In order to become clear why this might be thought to be so, it will help first to review some facts—facts about America and facts about, say, France. If you ask your average intellectually inclined French citizen if he has ever read any Descartes or Pascal or Rousseau, he will almost certainly tell you that he has (and in most cases he will be telling you the truth). To be a French intellectual and to be simply unacquainted with the classics of French thought and to be happy to admit that one is thus unacquainted is to be a very unusual person indeed. There is no American philosopher ignorance of whose work could strike a measure of fear or embarrassment in the soul of an American man or woman of letters at all comparable to what it would mean for a French intellectual to have never read a word of Descartes. If you attempt to hit upon the name of an American philosopher that almost every educated American has read, you will seek in vain. Insofar as you can find a philosopher that most educated Americans have read, it will not be an American—most likely, it would be Plato or Descartes or Hume or Nietzsche. There is nothing you could call “American philosophy” which plays a role in the formation of an American intellectual identity that parallels the role that French philosophy plays in French culture. A highly literate American intellectual may well have read a great many of the classics of English, French, and German philosophy without necessarily having any literacy in something you might call “Ameri-
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can philosophy.” He may, of course, have also read some pages of William James or John Dewey, but then again he may not have. To be a French intellectual means in the first instance to have a certain literacy in certain landmark moments of the history of French thought. To be an intellectual in the United States means in the first instance to have a certain literacy in certain landmark moments in the history of European thought. To be an intellectual in France means, above all, learning how to be a French intellectual. The intellectual in America is not haunted by the fear that he might be failing to be an American intellectual; more often he is haunted by the fear that he might be succeeding in being just that—and hence perhaps someone a European might look upon as a philistine.25 (It generally does not occur to such an American that this is itself a recipe for philistinism.26) Even if someone were somehow to fall under the illusion that becoming an intellectual in America meant, above all, learning somehow how to become an American intellectual, there would be few American landmarks by means of which he or she could confidently navigate his or her way toward such an identity. These facts have a significance that extends well beyond philosophy. There exists no single article of American letters of any sort (say, a novel or an essay) that most Americans share as a common intellectual inheritance in the way that the work of a Descartes or a Rousseau is a shared possession in France.27 Indeed, it is not an uncommon event in the history of American letters for Americans to become excited about some domestic product (say, the stories of Edgar Allan Poe or the novels of Ernest Hemingway) because a Frenchman (a Baudelaire or a Sartre) told them it is the work of a great writer. To the extent that there is some single object of American culture that a group of randomly selected educated Americans will have in common as a shared American cultural reference point, it will, as likely as not, be a classic Hollywood movie. This is not to deny that many Americans participate in a shared fantasy of a common literary culture consisting of a range of widely cherished documents—to cite a few candidates: The Constitution of the United States of America, Leaves of Grass, Moby Dick, The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn—but these tend to be cherished at a distance. How many Americans have really read, let alone retained, the words and thoughts contained therein? (Most are at least as likely to remember the details of a TV show or movie or cartoon either about or loosely based on and bearing the title of the text in question.) Regardless of how much significance is attached to the fact of their existence, the bulk of the prose in these documents does not presently circulate in America as shared possessions of the citizenry. With the exception of a few inaudibly famous phrases, there are within American cultural circles no documents of American writing to which one can safely allude with the same confidence in the possibility of shared intimacy that a judicious allusion to a line or scene from a widely cherished Hollywood movie—to cite a few candidates: The Wizard of Oz, It’s a Wonderful Life, Casablanca, or Dr. Strangelove—is likely to be able to achieve. If Dorothy were to find herself suddenly transported to a region of America where allusions to literary or philosophical texts were able to forge this sort of intimacy, she would have reason to exclaim: “Toto, I have a feeling we’re not in Kansas anymore!”28
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The facts reviewed here must be kept in perspective if one wishes to understand any of the following: what Cavell means to be asking with his question “Has America expressed itself philosophically?” what could count for him as an answer to it (and why the accomplishments of a thinker such as Quine, however great they may be, cannot bear on it), why this leads him to wonder at the chronically American tendency to undervalue the work of figures such as Emerson and Thoreau as philosophers (and, in particular, to ignore their role in founding a distinctively American moment in philosophy), and why he thinks this is a function of a chronic American tendency to overpraise and undervalue any distinctively American cultural achievement (most tellingly, he thinks, the high-water marks of the golden age of Hollywood29). Some of my French colleagues at the conference on American philosophy assumed that Cavell’s interest in Emerson and Thoreau was that of someone who wishes to revive interest in two previously famous but now neglected American philosophers. To think this is to miss the salience of the following two facts for Cavell: (1) Emerson and Thoreau have not fallen out of view; they continue to be celebrated as important American writers of some kind; but (2) precisely on the condition that the title of philosopher be withheld from them—on the condition, that is, that one neither take seriously their claim to both inherit and challenge a prior tradition of European philosophy (most especially the tradition they themselves looked back upon as that of German Transcendentalism), nor take seriously their claim to have thus opened up new possibilities for philosophy, let alone their claim that these new possibilities rested on and arose out of possibilities for cultural and intellectual newness possible only in a New World. One way of taking the measure of the degree to which Emerson, in particular, is not credited with having what it takes to be a philosopher is to notice how difficult it is for even Emerson’s American admirers seriously to credit Nietzsche’s claim to have been profoundly influenced by him,30 let alone his assessment of him as the greatest philosopher of their (i.e., the nineteenth) century.31 Part of Cavell’s interest in drawing attention to this phenomenon is in order to sharpen the following question: What, within the history of American thought, is America prepared to count as an instance of an American difference in philosophy—an instance of a mode of thought that is both philosophy and distinctively American? Perhaps the answer will be: Nothing. But then Cavell wants to know: Why? Is it because any American candidate that openly bears the stamp of its Americanness is somehow too American to count as an uncluttered instance of serious philosophy? So that to do philosophy just is to participate in and therefore to accommodate oneself to a European tradition?32 So that to speak with a voice that is recognizably philosophical is of necessity to speak with a European accent? Or is it because America is, above all, the name of a democracy and a business that is as inherently practical as democracy can have at best only an incidental bearing on how an enterprise as inherently theoretical as philosophy ought to be conducted? If either of these is our conclusion, then it is one which rests on assumptions—assumptions Cavell wishes to examine—about what can count as an inheritance of philosophy and about the possibilities of thought available to someone who does not wish to suppress the American accent in his voice. It is a further
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claim of Cavell’s that a reception of the thought of Emerson and Thoreau depends upon an appreciation of the ways in which they sought to contest such assumptions—so that the reception of their thought requires not only a simultaneous rethinking of what philosophy, America, and Europe each are, but a rethinking of each in the light of the other two. On this ambitious conception of what the establishment of a genuinely “American philosophy” is to achieve, there will turn out to be a significant internal relation between the concepts philosophy and America: a relation between what we are able to recognize as philosophy (and whether it presently rests on an impoverished idea of philosophy) and what we are able to recognize as cosmopolitan (and whether it presently rests on an impoverished idea of the cosmopolitan—one which is itself a form of provincialism—and recognizable as such only from the vantage point afforded by a non-European perspective).33 An American philosophy is thus to provide a new perspective on our old ways of thinking and living—a perspective which is to enable our European conceptions of the philosophical and the cosmopolitan to come into focus together as somewhat unphilosophical (in taking a certain dispensation of philosophy to be philosophy itself) and somewhat provincial (in taking the aspiration to an American culture to be a quest for a secondhand version of European culture). In the midst of a discussion of J. L. Austin, Cavell indulges in the following offhand sketch of the difference between the French and the American intellectual: Austin was committed to the manners, even the mannerisms, of an English professor the way a French intellectual is committed to seeming brilliant. It is the level at which an American thinker or artist is likely to play dumb, I mean undertake to seem like a hick, uncultivated. These are all characters in which authority is assumed, variations I suppose of the thinker’s use—as unmasked by Nietzsche—of the character of the sage.34
Aristotle’s elucidation of the concept of the sage takes the form of a question we are to ask ourselves: “What more accurate standard or measure of good things do we have than the Sage?”35 If it is constitutive of what it is to be a French intellectual that one is committed to seeming brilliant, then it is bound to be difficult for such an intellectual to recognize someone who is undertaking to appear lacking in cultivation as the personification of a sage (in Aristotle’s weighty sense of the term), and it will be harder still for him to credit the cultivation of such an appearance as itself a guise through which intellectual authority is asserted—as itself a guise of the Sage. This is not to deny that many American intellectuals are committed to seeming brilliant. (All that proves is that many Americans seek to emulate a Parisian model of what it is to be an intellectual. Some of them, given the choice, would even prefer to live in Paris—or, at least, to go there when they die.36) Nor is it to claim that those American intellectuals who do not seek to emulate such a model are therefore eager to mount a critique of European intellectual life. It is to claim only that many American authors and artists and thinkers find the Parisian model cannot be theirs. A European will not understand the intellectual manners of a Henry David Thoreau or Mark Twain or William Faulkner or Robert Frost or Howard
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Hawks if he or she fails to appreciate what underlies their apparently intellectually uncultivated postures—as thrifty woodsman or riverboat captain or Southern gentleman or New England farmer or uncouth cowboy—if he or she fails to appreciate how these modes of cultivating an apparent lack of (European) cultivation are themselves forms through which the American artist or author expresses his refusal of an alien standard or measure of good things and seeks to fashion his own native standard or measure. These differences between the French and American scenes are themselves a function of a difference in their respective relations to history—and, in particular, to the accomplished edifice of European culture. The French philosopher or author or artist can take that accomplishment for granted and build on it without threat to his or her identity. The challenge for the French intellectual lies in finding or clearing room for something new to do within the confines of that edifice. This is not the challenge the American philosopher or author or artist qua American feels him- or herself to face. Mark Twain narrates the adventures of a Tom Sawyer or Huck Finn in a voice that betrays little hint of interest in or familiarity with the accomplished edifice of European literature. The apparent naturalness of that literary voice—its apparent innocence of European cultivation—is an integral and easily overlooked aspect of its achievement. Emerson and Thoreau seek to fashion a mode of philosophical writing that actively refuses to lay claim to the accomplished edifice of European philosophy, as if philosophy’s history could be made to begin again—as if “no time had elapsed [since] the oldest . . . philosopher . . . [first] raised a corner of the veil.”37 The American philosopher or author or artist often seems to proceed thus, as if history could be made to begin anew—as if the accomplishments of European culture could constitute only a dangerous temptation for an American, at all costs to be resisted—as if those accomplishments could only become his, for the taking and making his own, at the cost of placing his own identity in pawn. Among the opening remarks in an address to the Phi Beta Kappa Society at Harvard in 1837, Emerson famously declares the following hope: Our day of dependence, our long apprenticeship to the learning of other lands, draws to a close. The millions that around us are rushing into life, cannot always be fed on the sere remains of foreign harvests . . . . In this hope I accept the topic which not only usage but the nature of our association seem to prescribe to this day,—the AMERICAN SCHOLAR.38
Ever since at least this address bearing the title, and issuing its call for, The American Scholar, it has been a central ambition of American thinking and writing and art to call forth a form of culture in which American intellectuals—philosophers or authors or artists—can eschew European models—of philosophy or authorship or art—in a manner that will enable them finally to be able to feel at home in their homeland qua philosophers or authors or artists (as they imagine their European counterparts are able to feel at home in their respective cultures). The realization of such an ambition is supposed to require a reciprocal change on the part of American thinking and writing and art and on the part of the homeland itself; and the accomplished fact of such reciprocal change is an integral part of what it means,
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for Emerson, for the American scholar finally to have come into existence. But to say that American thinking and writing and art have been fueled by such an ambition is not to say that such a vision of America has ever yet been realized—that the American philosopher or author or artist has ever yet been able to feel him- or herself permanently or comfortably at home in America.39 This is not to deny what one shrewd native observer of the American scene has called the greatest single fact about our modern American writing—namely, America’s writers’ (and thinkers’ and artists’) “absorption in every last detail of their American world together with their deep and subtle alienation from it.”40 What is at issue here is neither the familiar European intellectuals’ loudly proclaimed revulsion at and revolt from the diurnal and everyday (familiar since at least Baudelaire) nor the equally familiar European intellectuals’ loudly proclaimed longing to be reconciled with and incorporated harmoniously into the rhythms of an already available mode of diurnal and everyday life (familiar since at least Tolstoy). An attentive absorption in the details of an American life that engulfs the author combined with a quiet yet ineradicable alienation from the very life which so absorbs and fascinates him remains a hallmark of great American writing throughout the generations, from that of Nathaniel Hawthorne and Herman Melville to that of Raymond Carver and Don DeLillo. This characteristically American (“deep and subtle”) form of cultural alienation should not be confused with a far less deep and subtle form of cultural alienation that is equally characteristically American—an alienation that is cultivated and displayed as a badge of honor by a different constituency of American intellectuals41 —namely, those whose understanding of their identity as “intellectuals” depends upon a principled disinterest in any project of attentive absorption in the details of their American life. Such “American” intellectuals—especially those most preoccupied with what it means to be an intellectual, and most especially those in the thrall of the Parisian model of what it is to be one—will themselves generally never be able see past the rough-hewn manners of a Thoreau or Faulkner or Frost or Hawks to the exquisite cultivation shining through that surface, to the extraordinary rigor of their undertakings (to reinvent philosophy or poetry or the novel or the cinema). But whereas a Parisian intellectual can without threat to herself permit herself to be fascinated by the exotic manners of such an American literary woodsman or cowboy (and thereby discover in them a new and usable measure of the good, the true, or the just), the American intellectual in the thrall of the Parisian model is generally unable to permit himself such latitude. Here his own Americanism comes into play and freezes his powers of perception. He is apt to recoil from what he perceives as the vulgarity of his countrymen’s provincialism and amateurism. But often what chagrins such an American intellectual is simply his Americanism—his fear of his own lack of cultivation. His recoil from cultural efforts distinctively marked by an American provenance is often a reflection of his own shame—a symptom of his fantasy to be someone he is not. Nowhere are the great achievements of American culture more undervalued than in America, which is not to deny that nowhere are they more celebrated. It belongs to the nature of great American cultural achievements that they not only easily permit, but actively invite their audience thus to underestimate them.42 (Apropos Emerson and Thoreau,
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Cavell remarks: “[T]hey leave themselves dismissible.”43) To assess such work requires first punching through its false bottom.44 If it is characteristic of the French thinker or author or artist to be committed to seeming brilliant and to playing the part of the genius, then it is equally characteristic of the American thinker or author or artist to be committed to diffidence and to playing the part of someone who is just doing his job—say, measuring the depth of his pond.45
America’s Drama of Self-Constitution It is simply crazy that there should ever have come into being a world with such a sin in it, in which a man is set apart because of his color— the superficial fact about a human being. Who could want such a world? For an American, fighting for his love of country, that the last hope of earth should from its beginning, have swallowed slavery, is an irony so withering, a justice so intimate in its rebuke of pride, as to measure only with God. Stanley Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say?46
The quotation is from Cavell’s early essay on Beckett’s Endgame. His subsequent writings intermittently pick up the thread here left hanging, in further sudden remarks, often in contexts no less surprising than a reading of a Beckett play. But this may well be the earliest of these recurring moments in Cavell’s corpus—moments that are equally expressions of love and expressions of anger and disappointment in America. The earliest occurrence of an extended meditation on this theme occurs, less surprisingly perhaps, in Cavell’s first extended meditation on Shakespearean tragedy, titled “The Avoidance of Love.” This is where the question of America’s discovery is first broached by him: America . . . had a mythical beginning, still visible, if ambiguous, to itself and to its audience: before there was Russia, there was Russia; before there was France and England, there was France and England; but before there was America there was no America. America was discovered, and what was discovered was not a place, one among others, but a setting, the backdrop of a destiny.47
The drama of America begins with its birth; and it is essential to its myth of itself as a destiny that its birth be unlike that of other nations. Long before there was a Russian or English or French nation or revolution or constitution, there were already a Russian or English or French kingdom or empire or realm, already Russian and English and French history and architecture and literature, and already a distinctively Russian and English and French language and people and identity. The issue in founding America was not just to arrange for there to be one more such place alongside Russia and England and France. It was to show the world what a nation and a constitution and a revolution could and should be, and thereby to create not only a new nation but a new concept of nation—one that was to have
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no history or literature or identity prior to the completion of its revolution and the realization of its constitution, comprising a people united by neither language, creed, nor blood—one whose history and literature and identity were forged through a vision of how a people might be united such that they no longer could be divided. But how is one to tell if such a revolution attains its end, if such a constitution is fully enacted, if such a union stands achieved? Cavell’s meditation continues as follows: “It began as theater. Its Revolution, unlike the English and French and Russian Revolutions, was not a civil war; it was fought against outsiders, its point was not reform but independence.” One might argue that America’s beginning as theater was both its blessing and its curse. It bore some of the earmarks of other revolutionary conflicts: shots were fired, colonies liberated, ties with a monarch severed, royalist administrators evicted, and so forth. But such a beginning was largely a blessing for the very reasons that might lead one to declare that the American Revolution was not a revolution at all: in its declaration of independence America did not declare war on itself, no king was beheaded, no guillotines were erected, no people’s tribunals convened, there was no orgy of bloodletting to expiate, and the empire to which it had once belonged continued happily on without it.48 These seemingly unrevolutionary aspects of its Revolution were a blessing because it meant America could begin the business of nationhood with a public debate over its founding principles to determine how each could have a voice in the ensuing whole and what kind of voice it should be,49 rather than with a tribunal of inquisition to determine who was a friend of the Revolution and who its enemy, sorting its citizenry into those who formed part of the solution and those who formed part of the problem. The American revolutionaries had no need to justify an extended internecine conflict in the name of an indivisible will of the people, in whose name violence could be demanded and in expectation of whose gratitude all sins would be washed away. Instead of having to invoke the will of the people, the Founding Fathers could afford to seek their consent. Instead of insisting upon the indivisibility of such a will, they could seek to accommodate and protect a diversity of opinion. Instead of replacing religion with the state, they could seek to separate them. Was the American Revolution therefore a success? How does one measure the success of a revolution? Hannah Arendt has devoted a book to this topic. She notes a marked tendency—exacerbated by a literary and philosophical concentration on the example of the French Revolution—that she thinks is apt to cloud our thinking on the topic. The tendency is to identify the concept of revolution with the idea of a violent overthrow of an existing order (something she takes to be a merely accidental feature of the concept). This identification leaves out what she takes to be the essential end of revolution: namely, the institution of a new order—not merely in the superficial sense that a new one replaces an old one, but in the deeper sense that it brings into being the conditions of the possibility of a new kind of order— one which alters not only the quantity of freedom but also its quality. A revolution is to be assessed not by how much it destroys, but by what it creates—not by its powers of dissolution, but by its powers of constitution. If, rather than measuring the success of revolutions by the degree to which they afford freedom from a prior state of affairs, we instead go by the degree to which they enable freedom for the
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institution of something radically new—an unprecedented yet stable form of social order—then, Arendt argues, this will dramatically affect an estimate of the relative success of the American and French Revolutions. But she thinks this is not the measure usually employed. Arendt laments: It was the French and not the American Revolution that set the world on fire, and it was consequently from the course of the French Revolution, and not from the course of events in America or from the acts of the Founding Fathers, that our present use of the word ‘revolution’ received its connotations and overtones everywhere. . . . The sad truth of the matter is that the French Revolution, which ended in disaster, has made world history, while the American Revolution, so triumphantly successful, has remained an event of little more than local importance.50
An American such as Thoreau might easily agree with Arendt that it is lamentable that the French Revolution has been the preferred model for subsequent “revolutions,” while still feeling that the question has yet to be answered what it would mean for the American Revolution to have been “triumphantly successful.”51 Does it mean, as the national anthem declares, that America is now the land of the free and the home of the brave? If so, Thoreau will want to know what those words mean, particularly since, at the time of writing Walden, America was hiding from itself the withering irony of its having swallowed slavery. It is at this point that Cavell sees an internal relation between the drama of America and that of Shakespeare’s tragedies—dramas that turn on a hero’s failure to acknowledge what he cannot help but know. In The Senses of Walden, on Thoreau’s behalf, Cavell laments: For an American poet . . . the American Revolution is . . . apt to constitute the absorbing epic event. Only it has two drawbacks: first, it is overshadowed by the epic event of America itself; second, America’s revolution never happened. The colonists fought a war against England alright, and they won it. But it was not a war of independence that was won, because we are not free; nor was even secession the outcome, because we have not departed from the conditions England lives under, either in our literature or in our political or economic lives.52
Thoreau thinks his countrymen have allowed themselves to mistake the first act (the framing of a constitution) for the drama itself (the actualization of the freedoms it envisions), and thus to remain unclear as to what ought to count as their having finally departed from the conditions England lives under. Do we know what the next act of the drama is to be and when it ought to be performed? Or has it already been performed? Is America now the land of the free? It has, we are often told, freed its slaves. So was the Civil War the second act of the Revolution? America’s Civil War does in some ways resemble other countries’ revolutions: one half of the country fighting the other, brother sometimes taking arms against brother, one side fighting to uphold tradition and property, the other claiming to represent freedom and equality. But it was not a revolution—the point, according to one side, was to make what was formerly one nation two, and the point, according to the other side, was to ensure that it remained one. And to the extent that either point was settled, it was not by its being settled in the way things are settled in a revolution, not merely because America has as such never suffered defeat, but because, since its initial inception, its subsequent growth pains have been accompa-
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nied neither by the sort of overthrow of an existing order that would mark (and has marked) the completion of a successful revolution in England or France or Russia nor by the sort of change in political constitution that would mark the completion of a successful revolution by Arendt’s lights.53 And, surely, this is a blessing that has helped to protect it from some of the recurrent crises of coherence and confidence that afflict so many other nations. Yet the fact of America’s innocence of such national traumas does not by itself answer Thoreau’s question: Is the drama of America—the drama of the nation’s taking possession of itself— accomplished or still underway? Is the absence in its history of the moments that are formative in the history of other nations—moments of traumatic birth or loss or change of identity, of defeat from without or overthrow from within, of collapse of empire or toppling of ancien regime, of change of constitution or convulsion in system of government—its curse or its blessing? There is, after all, no shortage of those on the outside who think that it has been its curse that it has been so seemingly blessed—and therefore that there is nothing America needs today more than a humbling. What should those on the inside think? In his early meditation on America, Cavell notes these dimensions of national inexperience and observes: So its knowledge is of indefeasible power and constancy. But its fantasies are those of impotence, because it remains at the mercy of its past, because its present is continuously ridiculed by the fantastic promise of its origin and its possibility, and because it has never been assured that it will survive.54
The thought that America must overcome fantasies of its own impotence in order to believe in itself (and thus become itself) provides one immediate link with the topic of Cavell’s essay—King Lear. But it also provokes a question that reflects a feature of the times in which that essay was written—the late 1960s. Continuing the present theme, I might phrase the question that haunts the essay as follows: Is the Vietnam War (and the War at Home it provoked) a further act in America’s drama of self-constitution? Here is the passage in which Cavell touches most explicitly upon the connection between the topic of America (and its discovery of itself), the subject of the essay (Shakespeare’s King Lear), and the matter mentioned in its title (the avoidance of love): Since [America] had a birth, it may die. It feels mortal. And it wishes proof not merely of its continuance but of its existence, a fact it has never been able to take for granted. Therefore its need for love is insatiable. It surely has been given more love than any other nation: its history, until yesterday, is one in which outsiders have been drawn to it and in which insiders are hoarse from their expressions of devotion to it. . . . It is the need for love as proof of its existence which makes it so frighteningly destructive, enraged by ingratitude and by attention to its promises rather than to its promise, and which makes it incapable of seeing that it is destructive and frightening. It imagines its evils to come from the outside. So it feels watched, isolated in its mounting of waters, denying its shame with mechanical lungs of pride, calling its wrath upon the wrong objects. It has gone on for a long time, it is maddened now, the love it has had it has squandered too often, its young no longer naturally feel it; its past is in its streets, ungrateful for the fact that a hundred years ago it tore itself apart in order not to be
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As I read these lines today, thirty-five years after they were written, I find them to have acquired a peculiar pertinence in the wake of the events of September 11, 2001. America has seldom received more declarations of love, from outsiders as well as insiders, than on the days immediately following the events of that day. Yet America remains, now more than ever, incapable of seeing how it appears from the outside, having squandered that love as unreservedly as it was proffered. America, so confident of its own goodness, has always found it difficult to see itself—as those on the outside see it—as destructive and frightening. But this selfblindness has deepened, now that the fantasy has been catastrophically reinforced that America’s evils come from the outside. As America responds to her momentary feeling of impotence with awesome displays of power, and to her continuing fear of violation with calls for unprecedented acts of surveillance, a question about the times in which this essay (on “The Concept of America”) is written arises: Are we seeing the curtain open on a further act in the drama of America’s self-constitution? Or has the drama become irretrievably stuck, somewhere in the middle of the third act? In the immediate aftermath of September 11, 2001, many things were as different from the days of the Vietnam War as one could wish for. The following descriptions of the nation all seemed to be evidently true: it was not only not divided against itself, but its citizens were eager to declare that they stood behind its president; its young were not ungrateful and openly protesting its hypocrisy in the streets; it was not presently killing another country; its fears of violence were directed not at the actions of its own citizens but at those of outsiders, thereby enabling it to unite against a common enemy. And even if America was not quite able to tell itself, with all the confidence it could muster when younger, that it was opposing tyranny, it could at least tell itself that its enemies were the enemies of freedom and thus would-be tyrants. So whatever threats there were, there seemed to be none that threatened the union as such—whatever national trauma was underway, it did not seem to be one that threatened internal schism—now that its people seemed suddenly able, once again, to stand united, indivisible, and firm. Now, less than three years later, none of these seemingly evidently true descriptions is any longer evidently true. America’s sense of its own helplessness in the face of suffering was seldom more acute than on that September 11 and its appetite for action seldom more provoked. America feels again, as seldom before, mortal—and wishes proof not merely of its continuance, but proof that it is indeed America (and not just some heavily armed superpower) that thereby continues. Thus the rhetoric of proof vastly exceeds any reality that it thus demonstrates. Seldom have those in power felt less
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humility when invoking—seldom have they found it easier to pronounce—words such as “freedom,” “justice,” “truth.” Every action America commits, every treaty it breaks, every bomb it drops, every border it crosses, it declares it does in the name of freedom, suggesting that this is something that it thinks it can—and revealing that this is something it has never believed it can—take for granted. Today, it has once again become evident that the struggle for union is hardly at an end. Today the young, certainly in comparison with the generation of the sixties, are not notably ungrateful or angry: they are not in the streets in great force rebuking the hypocrisy of their elders or protesting America’s betrayal of its promises to itself. But that is not to say that they are grateful, or even that most of them feel any urgency about remembering or reminding others exactly what those promises—what exactly the Revolution or the Constitution—were. America will vehemently deny that it is presently killing another country. But that is not to say that it will now affirm that it is not killing anyone—or even that, when it now seeks to shoot at the enemy, its aim is particularly good. True, its fears are presently directed not at the violence of insiders but at that of outsiders. But that is not to say that it is able to tell the one from the other. It is perhaps in some—alas, increasingly notional—sense still true that it stands internally united against a present common enemy. But that is not to say that it is in agreement with itself about where that enemy is or what would count as having defeated him. (With each passing day, there appears to be less agreement about what sort of victory ought to be sought and what would count as its having been achieved.) And even if America can still tell itself that its enemies are enemies of freedom, it must now rest uneasy in the knowledge that it has made a habit of befriending its enemies’ enemies whether or not they are truly its friends or freedom’s friends. Its enemies of today it was calling, only yesterday, friends—friends it was eager to help against a prior common enemy. Amidst these shifting allegiances, it becomes increasingly difficult to tell freedom’s friends from its foes—not only when looking at those on the outside but also at those on the inside, and not only for for those on the outside looking at us, but also for those of us on the inside looking around at each other. For, as in Kierkegaard’s Christendom, so, too, in today’s America, there is reason to worry that those who experience the least difficulty in declaring themselves faithful to certain values are the ones who are most likely to succeed in depriving them of the necessary conditions for their application. America could not disguise from itself that the Vietnam War (and the War at Home it provoked) was a struggle over its own soul. But now that America can tell itself that it has been attacked, that it is vulnerable, and that it acts only to protect itself, it has become easier than ever for it to disguise from itself how its continuance depends not only on what it does but on how it does it. America’s threats from within—its triumphal assurances to itself that its constitution stands fully achieved and its equally vehement rejections of such assurances—have now become clothed in the guise of arguments about how to deal with threats from without. But if it is to have a soul worth saving, attacks on it from without must not silence its ongoing argument from within over what would count as its having a soul worth saving. For it belongs to that peculiarity of the concept of America that I have sought to elucidate here that there is no contradiction in the following
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thought: America might cease to exist on the very day that its citizens become convinced that the continued existence of “America” has been safeguarded and now rests assured. Notes This essay is an excerpt from a longer manuscript. I am indebted to the audience at the University of Athens and at Wesleyan University for valuable discussions at occasions when parts of it were given, and to conversations with Stanley Cavell about America, with Sandra Laugier and Jean-Philippe Narboux about France, with Aristides Baltas and Vasso Kindi about modern Greece, with Jonathan Lear about Kierkegaard, with Joel Snyder about American art, and with Lisa Van Alstyne about everything. 1. “The American Ideal,” New York Times, Feb. 1, 1931. Reprinted in Sidelights (in The Collected Works of G. K. Chesterton, Volume 21: What I Saw in America and Other Writings [San Francisco: Ignatius, 1990], 523). The passage continues: The real, natural Americans are candid, generous, capable of a beautiful wonder and gratitude; enthusiastic about things external to themselves; easily contented and not particularly conceited. They have been deliberately taught to be conceited. They have been systematically educated in a theory of enthusiasm, which degrades it into mere egotism. The American has received as a sort of religion the notion that blowing his own trumpet is as important as the trumpet of doom. 2. Franz Kafka, Amerika, translated by Willa and Edwin Muir (New York: New Directions, 1946), 3 [I have amended the translation]; Der Verschollene (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Verlag, 1983), 9. 3. Wim Wenders, “The American Dream,” in Emotion Pictures, translated by Shaun Whiteside (London: Faber and Faber, 1989), 117–19; Emotion Pictures: Essays und Filmkritiken (Berlin: Verlag der Autoren, 1988), 142–43. The line here from West Side Story (rendered by Wenders as “I want to be in America”) also appears in English in Wenders’s original German text; but it is a misquotation. What they sing is “I like to be in America”— which in its ungrammaticality is nicely ambiguous between (an observable accomplished fact about the singer) “I like being in America” and (a subjective aspiration of the singer) “I would like to be in America.” 4. Or, as Kierkegaard says even more frequently: qua subjectively existing individual. Someone will want to object that the occurrence of “subjectively” here makes the definition circular. But what is offered here, in any case, cannot be a definition but, at best, an elucidation. And the circularity is already present without the explicit inclusion of the word “subjectively.” This elucidation is understood only if one understands “existing” and “individual” here each already as subjective concepts. In ordinary language, we can equally say of rocks and persons that they “exist.” To understand what it means to say subjective concepts characterize existing individuals requires understanding the relevant sense of “existence.” (Kierkegaard and his pseudonyms reserve the term ‘existence’ for persons and ‘being’ for objects.) We can, in ordinary language, speak equally of an individual rock and of an individual person. To understand what it means to say subjective concepts characterize existing individuals requires understanding the relevant sense of “individual.”(Kierkegaard and his pseudonyms will therefore want to distinguish between mere particulars (that merely have being) and genuine individuals or agents (who are faced with the task of existence).) Every elucidation of a subjective concept—including the subjective concept subjective— will itself have to employ further subjective concepts.
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5. Thus someone may want to predicate such a concept of him- or herself without being entitled to do so. This, Kierkegaard thinks, is the case with most who are eager to avow that they are Christians. 6. Kierkegaard himself refrains from using the terms ‘Christianity’ and ‘Christian’ in this way and uses other terms instead—such as ‘churchgoer’ and ‘Christendom’—to refer to individuals whose lives are characterized merely by the external motions of leading the life of a Christian. 7. It is perhaps advisable to head off a common misunderstanding: Kierkegaard’s (and his pseudonyms’) employment of the terms ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ is misunderstood if it is taken to mark a distinction between that which is epistemically public and that which is necessarily epistemically private—a distinction the terms ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ are often employed in contemporary philosophical parlance to mark: on this way of speaking, what is ‘objective’ can be shared, captured in concepts, expressed in language, etc., whereas what is ‘subjective’ is inherently private, eludes the grasp of concepts, and is inexpressible. The terms ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ in Kierkegaard’s parlance do not work in this way. This should be evident from the fact that they are supposed to mark a distinction between kinds of concept, each of which is expressible in language (e.g., by terms such as ‘churchgoer’ and ‘Christian,’ respectively). Many commentators have been tempted to run Kierkegaard’s distinction together with the currently fashionable one. The following features of his thought no doubt have encouraged this misunderstanding: (1) understanding utterances involving subjective concepts, for Kierkegaard, is necessarily a more fragile and delicate affair than understanding those involving objective concepts; (2) subjective concepts, Kierkegaard thinks, will generally apply only to the thoughts and actions of isolated and extraordinary members of a community; (3) the communication of thoughts involving subjective concepts requires what Kierkegaard calls “indirect communication.” For all of these reasons one might be drawn to say that the acquisition and possession of subjective concepts is a less “public” (hence a comparatively “private”) matter in comparison to that of objective concepts. But none of these reasons entails that for Kierkegaard subjective concepts are inherently incommunicable (indirect communication is a form of communication for Kierkegaard) or that they have an essentially private meaning (when one says of two individuals that they are each struggling to become a Christian, Kierkegaard thinks one is saying the same thing about each of them—something each of them can also say about themselves or each other—without equivocating on the meaning of the term ‘Christian’). 8. Johannes Climacus, Concluding Unscientific Postscript [henceforth CUP], edited by S. Kierkegaard, translated by Walter Lowrie (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1968), 49. 9. “America” for the purposes of this essay means the “America” in “The United States of America.” This is, of course, not all this word can or does or should mean. But this is what it means, and all it means, in this essay. This restriction of topic will, no doubt, appear to some readers (north and south of—as well as nowhere near—the U.S. border) to be inexcusably chauvinistic. My only excuse is that there is such a concept of America and it is the one I am trying to understand in these pages. It lies with others who are more qualified to do so than I to say what the America as it occurs in other contexts—e.g., the compound “Latin America”—can or does or should mean either to themselves or to others. 10. Commitment to this ideal is not a matter of commitment to some fully fleshed out moral, political, or religious orthodoxy. Indeed, it is not a matter of commitment to a doctrine or creed at all in any except a very attenuated sense—namely, the minimal sense in which a commitment to principles such as freedom of speech or freedom of religion can be said to constitute a commitment to a particular sort of political doctrine or creed. The application of such principles within a particular institutional or juridical frame may, of course,
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involve and even require the specification of very detailed sorts of legal or procedural doctrine. But someone who is committed to the ideal here at issue is not a fortiori committed to any particular specification of the ideal. Thus to be committed to the ideal in question— i.e., to be an American, in the weighty sense of the term—does not require one to be committed to every law of the land. Indeed, one may feel that it obliges one to protest certain laws. (It was, for example, partly out of fidelity to their understanding of America’s pledges to itself that Martin Luther King, Jr., and his followers were able to take themselves to be justified in opposing various municipal and regional ordinances to the point of civil disobedience, as it was out of fidelity to their understanding of America’s pledges to itself that Emerson and his followers were able to take themselves to be obliged to resist certain federal laws—such as the Fugitive Slave Act.) Indeed, often, the closest thing to a point of orthodoxy one encounters in connection with the ideal here at issue is precisely the proscription of certain kinds of orthodoxy. Thus we often encounter unbending pronouncements of the following sort in American public life: “If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official . . . can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion” (West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 [1943]). 11. I do not mean to suggest it is unique in this regard. Consider the logic of the concept Jew. 12. Since the gratuitous chauvinism of Wilson’s remark—that “America is the only idealistic nation in the world”—is bound to annoy and distract, it is worth noting that the idealism and the chauvinism can be disjoined. But there are more and less delicate ways to disjoin them. Here, for example, is Josiah Royce: When foreigners accuse us of extraordinary love for gain, and of practical materialism, they fail to see how largely we are a nation of idealists. . . . When I speak, in this way, of contemporary American idealists, I do not now specially refer to the holders of any philosophical opinions. . . . I here use the term in no technical sense. . . . I mean by the word “idealist,” a man or woman who is consciously and predominantly guided, in the purposes and in the great choices of life, by large ideals, such as admit of no merely material embodiment, and such as contemplate no merely private and personal satisfaction as their goal. In this untechnical sense the Puritans were idealists. The signers of our Declaration of Independence were idealists. Idealism inspired us during our Civil War. Idealism has expressed itself in the rich differentiation of our national religious life. . . . [U]sing the term “idealism” in this confessedly untechnical sense, I say that many of our foreign judges have failed to see how largely we Americans are today a nation of idealists. To be sure, we are by no means alone amongst modern men in our idealism. (“On Certain Limitations of the Thoughtful Public in America,” in The Basic Writings of Josiah Royce [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969], 1111–112) Royce’s way of keeping his declaration of America’s idealism from degenerating into gross chauvinism is to suggest that, although America is rather remarkable for the breadth and depth of its idealism, there is nothing peculiar about its brand of idealism—its ideals are the same as those of people elsewhere. This invites the following rejoinder: Is not the concept of America internally related to certain particular ideals (rather than others)—ones that might not be to the taste of certain “idealists” (in Royce’s loose sense of the term)—and, however related those ideals might be to ones held by people prior to the founding of America, have not those ideals received a particular and decisive articulation through the course of America’s struggle to keep its promises to itself? If so, then—while it is silly to think that America is the only idealistic nation in the world—it is not silly to think that understanding the concept of America involves understanding how America has differed from other nations and how those differences are partly due to the particular ideals that shaped the aspirations
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of those who helped to shape America: the Puritans, the signers of the Declaration of Independence, the author of the Gettysburg Address, etc. 13. This is not to deny that “to be an American” can, and nowadays often does, signify little or nothing more than that one falls under certain objective concepts—such as that one is a citizen of a certain country, that one has the right to vote, that one is entitled to a passport, etc. To concede this is not to gainsay the following: if the day comes to pass when this is all the word ‘American’ any longer means, then we will have lost a concept (of America) we previously had. The question then is: What kind of loss is this? And: Should such a loss be mourned or welcomed? 14. This is the topic of my “Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, and Anscombe on Moral Unintelligibility” (in Morality and Religion, edited by Timothy Tessin and Marion von der Ruhr, New York: St. Martins Press, 1995). 15. Variants of both this sentence and the preceding one recur throughout Kierkegaard’s The Case of Adler (in Fear and Trembling and The Book on Adler, translated by Walter Lowrie [New York: Everyman’s Library, 1994], see, e.g., pp. 147n–148n, 162); originally published in English as On Authority and Revelation (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1955). For reasons that will become clear, it is worth noting that both remarks are quoted by Stanley Cavell in his essay “Kierkegaard’s On Authority and Revelation,” in Must We Mean What We Say? [henceforth MWM] (New York: Scribners, 1969), 169. 16. CUP, 84 17. See CUP, 223. 18. “Dialogue with Jacques Derrida,” in Dialogues with Contemporary Continental Thinkers, edited by Richard Kearney (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1984), 108. 19. Walden, chap. 16, par. 6 (in Walden and Other Writings, Modern Library College Edition, edited by William Howarth [New York: Modern Library, 1981], 256. 20. Walden, chap. 1, par. 36; p. 21. 21. Walden, chap. 6, par. 16, p. 139. 22. Walden, chap. 2, par. 1, p. 74. 23. Walden, chap. 1, par. 79, p. 44. 24. The Senses of Walden [henceforth SW] (San Francisco: North Point, 1981), 32. 25. Not that there has ever been any shortage of Europeans willing to second Matthew Arnold’s quip: “[O]ur Society distributes itself into Barbarians, Philistines, and Populace; and America is just ourselves, with the Barbarians quite left out, and the populace nearly” (Preface, Culture and Anarchy, [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960], 19–20). 26. There are, of course, those who attempt to escape the problem by simply recoiling into the opposite point of view. Nothing I say here is meant to deny that this is a recipe for a far more terrifying species of philistinism—more terrifying because of the unsavory mixture of chauvinism and anti-intellectualism it encourages. The cultural inferiority complex of those Americans who fear the condescension of Europe is not cured (but merely repressed) in those who imagine that they make progress when they undertake simply to shake off their cultural hypochondria by declaring that it is actually we—Americans—who ought to be doing the condescending. The following passage from Daniel Boorstin, from a chapter bearing the title “Our Cultural Hypochondria and How to Cure It,” exemplifies this recoil from insecurity to smugness: We are too easily persuaded that the cancers of European life . . . are healthy growths and that we are deformed for not possessing them. . . . It is, of course, some solace to a declining European culture . . . to think that their ills are simply the excesses of their virtues. That theirs must be the virtues of all cultures. And hence that the accidents of history which may have immunized us against such vices also sterilize our culture and doom us to philistinism and vagrancy.
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Contending with Stanley Cavell There is no denying that our intellectuals and, most of all, our academics, being the most cosmopolitan part of our culture, have been especially susceptible to the well-meaning advice of our sick friends in Europe. Like many sick friends, they are none too sorry to be able to tell us that we are not in the best of health. We have, in a word, been too easily led to deny our peculiarly American virtues, in order to seem to have the peculiar European vices. Moreover, our intellectuals . . . have been much too sensitive to the charge of chauvinism. Hence they, too, have been readier to tell us what we lack than to help us to discover what we have. Our historians and political scientists . . . have failed to help us discover the peculiar virtues of our situation. . . . Is it any wonder that the very word “patriotism” should come to be suspect among intellectuals? Is it any wonder that we suffer from cultural hypochondria? (The Genius of American Politics [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953], 182–83)
Boorstin retains the central assumption of the view he opposes: namely, that Europe and America between them have only one form of culture worthy of respect and admiration. The view he opposes takes European culture to be the real article and American culture to be a pale imitation. He suggests instead that we ought to regard European culture as sick and dying and American culture as healthy and vibrant. These two views are mirror images of one another—each feeds on and sustains the other. One can sympathize with Boorstin’s thought that one of the reasons that patriotism comes less naturally to American intellectuals has to do with their tendency to identify culture and cosmopolitanism with Europe, without sympathizing in the least with his thought that the way for America to cure itself of this unhealthy self-conception is to learn to view itself as the paradigm of a healthy nation and to look upon the glories of European culture as symptoms of illness. 27. Cavell is concerned to take the point much further than I do here. The issue turns for him not merely on the relatively superficial matter of the extent to which there are certain commonly shared texts in the culture at large but on the far more searching matter of how they circulate in the culture and authorize what can count as a contribution to the culture’s discourse about itself. Hence Cavell writes: Suppose it is true, and significant about the American “style of thought,” that it has lacked the concept of ideology. . . . Is this like lacking thirteenth-century cathedrals (also true, and significant, of American culture), or like lacking churches of any kind, or like lacking the concept of religion altogether? In the last case you may have a theory of human culture that tells you this is impossible, in which case one tack for you to take would be to look for what concepts “do duty” for the absent concept. I think a related cultural difference between American and European intellectual life is that the American (with isolated exceptions) has no sacred intellectual texts, none whose authority the intellectual community at large is anxious to preserve at all costs—no Marxian texts, no Freudian, no Hegelian, no Deweyan, and so forth. Every text stands at the level of professional journal articles, open for disposal. . . . If the concept of ideology depends for its usefulness on its functioning with such favored texts, then its absence in American intellectual life would be explained by the absence of such texts. . . . [I]t surely makes for drastic barriers to communication, both within American intellectual life and between American and European thinkers. (Themes Out of School [henceforth TS] [San Francisco: North Point, 1984], 59–60) 28. The Wizard of Oz: The Screenplay, edited by Michael Patrick Hearn (New York: Bantam Doubleday, 1989). 29. Cavell holds, on the one hand, that the relatively accomplished edifice of distinctively American cinema is able partially to compensate for America’s failure to realize that it has expressed itself philosophically, while holding, on the other hand, that the significance of this accomplishment must, nonetheless, remain obscured in the absence of a correspondingly accomplished edifice of American philosophy:
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I assume that movies have played a role in American culture different from their role in other cultures, and more particularly that this difference is a function of the absence in America of the European edifice of philosophy. And since I assume further that American culture has been no less ambitious, craved no less to think about itself, than the most ambitious European culture, I assume further still that the difference everyone recognizes as existing between American and European literature is a function of the brunt of thought that American literature, in its foundings in, for instance, Emerson and Whitman and Poe, had to bear in that absence of a given philosophical founding and edifice, lifting the fragments that the literature found, so to speak, handy and portable. Finally, I assume that American film at its best participates in this Western cultural ambition of self-thought or self-invention that presents itself in the absence of the Western edifice of philosophy, so that on these shores film has the following peculiar economy: it has the space, and the cultural pressure, to satisfy the craving for thought, the ambition of a talented culture to examine itself publicly; but its public lacks the means to grasp this thought as such for the very reason that it naturally or historically lacks that edifice of philosophy within which to grasp it. (Contesting Tears [henceforth CT] [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996], 72) 30. “Emerson.—Never have I felt so much at home in a book, and in my home . . . —I may not praise it, it is too close to me.” (Nietzsche, posthumous fragment, translated and quoted by Walter Kaufmann in his translator’s introduction to The Gay Science [New York: Vintage, 1974], 12.) 31. Ibid., “The author who has been richest in ideas in this century has been an American (unfortunately this has been made obscure by German philosophy).” For a discussion of Nietzsche’s relation to Emerson, see my “Nietzsche’s Perfectionism: A Reading of Schopenhauer as Educator,” in Nietzsche’s Postmoralism, edited by Richard Schacht (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 32. Was Socrates, when he pestered his fellow citizens in the Agora with his questions, participating in a European tradition? How does a tradition of philosophy begin? 33. I am drawing here on remarks from Cavell’s essay “An Emerson Mood” (see SW, 148). 34. TS, 29. 35. Aristotle, Protrepticus, fragment 5; in Aristotelis Fragmenta Selecta, edited by W. D. Ross (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1955), 33. 36. “Good Americans, when they die, go to Paris” (attributed to Thomas Gold Appleton, reported by Oliver Wendell Holmes, in Autocrat of the Breakfast-Table [Pleasantville, NY: Akadine, 2001], 125). Oscar Wilde, in his play A Woman of No Importance, adds a characteristic wrinkle: Mrs. Allonby: They say, Lady Hunstanton, that when good Americans die they go to Paris. Lady Hunstanton: Indeed? And when bad Americans die, where do they go to? Lord Illingworth: Oh, they go to America. (The Complete Works of Oscar Wilde [Leicester, UK: Galley Press, 1987], 421) 37. Walden, chap. 3, par. 1, p. 90. In connection with this question, Cavell himself offers a contrast between Derrida’s (characteristically European) and Emerson’s and Thoreau’s (distinctively American) relations to the history of European philosophy; see CT, 64–65. 38. Ralph Waldo Emerson, “The American Scholar”; in Essays and Lectures, edited by Joel Porte (New York: Library of America, 1983), 53. 39. This pertains not only to how an American writer is apt to experience his or her
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relation to a wider American public, but to the converse relation as well. Archibald MacLeish, in a striking passage, speaks in this connection of how American writers often appear to live in a kind of domestic exile: [T]hough the possibility for artists and writers to work in America can be demonstrated by the work itself, it is not so obviously self-evident that they have a place in American life . . . . Our writers appear . . . to live in a kind of domestic exile. They are noticed in the news columns when they die or when they distinguish themselves in some artistically irrelevant way such as selling a novel to the movies for more than the last novel brought, or marrying for the seventh time, but their opinions on questions of public concern are not recorded. There are, that is to say, no American Goethes. There is not even an American Sartre. (A Continuing Journey