Conflict and Cooperation in the Gulf Region

Joseph Kostiner Conflict and Cooperation in the Gulf Region

Joseph Kostiner

Conflict and Cooperation in the Gulf Region

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Preface

The course at hand entitled Cooperation and Conflict in the Gulf Region is part of the module Conflict and Cooperation in International Relations of our B.A. Politics and Organization. Hence its subject is at the core of this module and takes the Persian Gulf region as an example to show how conflicts emerge, interact and intensify, but also how actors try to tackle these conflicts through international cooperation and build a security architecture in the Gulf region. The issues addressed theoretically in the other courses of this module are deepened here empirically. We have decided to take the Gulf region as a case in point because of the intense conflicts which concern not only the countries there but also Europe and the Western hemisphere. Due to its oil reserves the Gulf region has a central position in the world economy, and due to the struggle against Islamism and terrorism the unsolved security issues are in the main focus of International Relations. I am very glad that this course has been written by one of the profoundest regional experts: Prof. Dr. Joseph Kostiner. He has focused his research for many years on the history, politics, and societies especially of the Arabic countries in the Gulf region. Prof. Kostiner is Senior Research Fellow at the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies in Tel Aviv and Associate Professor in the Department of Middle Eastern and African History at Tel Aviv University. He has visited the FernUniversität in Hagen many times and discussed issues concerning the international relations of the Arab world with students and researchers. These colloquies have always been very fruitful. Finally, I would like to thank Prof. Kostiner for the good collaboration preparing this course. Georg Simonis Chair for International Conflicts and Environmental Policy

Hagen, July 2007

Contents

Preface List of Boxes About the Author Acknowledgments

5 11 12 13

Introduction

15

1 Emergence of Conflict 2 Regional Asymmetry 3 Geographical Disputes and Other Historical Sources of Tension Between Gulf States

17 19

Part One: The Iran-Iraq War

24

1 Introduction 2 Historical Sources of Conflict 2.1 Roots of the Historical Conflict 2.2 The Empires’ Legacies 2.3 Components of a Recurring Conflict 2.4 Another Component of Escalation: The Cold War and Western Attempts to Create an Anti-Soviet Alliance 2.5 Iran: The Gulf‘s Policeman 3 The Regional Status Quo 4 Khomeini and the Islamic Revolution 5 The War 6 Regional Impact of the Iran-Iraq War 6.1 The Tanker War 6.2 GCC and Kuwait 7 The Effect of the War on Iran and Iraq 7.1 Iraq 7.2 Iran 8 Economics in the Iran-Iraq War 8.1 Iraq 8.2 Iran 8.3 Neighboring Arab States

24 24 25 27 28

22

31 38 42 46 50 53 59 61 65 65 68 72 72 73 74

8

Contents

9 Conclusion

76

Part Two: The Iraq-Kuwait Conflict

78

1 Iraq’s Passage to War 2 Kuwait: Confusing Friend and Foe 2.1 Kuwait’s Security: The Attitude Towards Iraq 2.2 Kuwaiti Responses to Iraq’s Demands 3 Inter-Arab Mediation of the Iraq-Kuwait Conflict 3.1 The Legacy of Mediation 3.2 Background to the Gulf Crisis 3.3 Approaching Mediation 3.4 The Mediators and Their Actions 3.5 After 2 August 3.6 Epilogue and Conclusions 4 The Unique Role of the United Nations during the Iraq-Kuwait Conflict 5 The Characteristics of the War 6 The Attempts at Post-War Accords 7 The Search for Gulf Security 7.1 The Arab Gulf States’ Indecisiveness: Basic Considerations 7.2 Difficulties in Arriving at a Security Arrangement 7.3 Divided Security and Growing Conflicts: Escalation of the Iraqi-Kuwaiti Tension 7.4 Iran’s Bid for Regional Influence 7.5 The Saudi-Qatari Dispute 7.6 Gulf Security in the Fall of 1992 7.7 Attempts to Defuse Tensions: Attitudes Toward Egypt and Syria 7.8 Readdressing the Issue of a GCC Army 7.9 Limited Achievements

78 82 87 89 93 94 96 99 103 107 112 115 116 119 123 125 127 131 132 134 135 136 138 139

Part Three: Between the Gulf Wars: Restrained Conflict

141

1 Introduction 2 U.S. Foreign Policy Background: The Nixon Doctrine and Twin Pillars 3 U.S. Dual Containment 4 Iraq 4.1 1991 4.2 Perceptions in the Gulf 4.3 U.S. Policymaking toward Iraq

141 142 146 147 147 150 151

Contents

9

4.4 Iraq and the International Community 4.5 Iraqi Economy 4.6 Saddam’s Defiance 4.7 New U.S. Policy toward Iraq? 5 Iran 5.1 The Iranian Economy during the 1990s 5.2 Social Unrest in Iran 5.3 U.S. Imposes Sanctions on Iran 5.4 Iranian Foreign Policy Background 5.5 Iranian Foreign Policy in the 1990s 5.6 The Iranian Nuclear Issue 5.7 Europe’s "Critical Dialogue” 5.8 Iranian Escalation leads to U.S. Sanctions 5.9 Iranian Response to U.S. Sanctions 6 Limitations of U.S. Sanctions 7 Gulf States’ Security during the 1990s 8 Gulf State Border Issues during the 1990s 8.1 Unity in Yemen 8.2 The Saudi Arabia-Yemen Border 8.3 Bahrain-Qatar Border Dispute 8.4 Oman-UAE Border 8.5 Gulf States and Iran Abu Musa – Two Tunbs Dispute

152 155 156 162 163 165 167 168 170 172 177 179 180 183 191 192 194 194 195 196 197 197 198

Part Four: Al–Qa’ida’s Challenge: Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and the War Against Terrorism, 1992–2005

201

1 Introduction 2 The Rise of Extremist Opposition 3 The 21st Century: Religious Extremism Turns into Fierce Opposition 4 Terrorism 4.1 Achievements 4.2 Saudi Responses 4.3 Two main points worth mentioning in retrospect 5 Responses to Religious Radicalism and Terrorism 6 The Making of Zarqawi 7 The Impact of Terrorism and the Iraqi War – The Gulf and Saudi Arabia 8 Regional Problems in the Gulf

201 205 210 214 219 219 222 223 225 235 239

10

Contents

Part Five: Conclusion

244

1 Causes of Conflict 2 The GCC’s Security Approach 3 The Build-Up to New Security Challenges

244 245 249

Appendices

251

Appendix 1: Chronology: Iran-Iraq War Appendix 2: Chronology: The Iraq-Kuwait War Appendix 3: The Iraq-Kuwait War - Relevant UN Security Council Resolutions Appendix 4: Maps Appendix 5: Middle East and Gulf Research: A Guide for Users I. Middle East Journals II. International Relations and Public Policy Research and Publications III. Internet Research Resources for the Gulf Appendix 5: Glossary

251 257

Bibliography

278

Books and Articles Middle East Contemporary Survey (MECS; New York: Holmes and Meier) Middle East Periodicals English Language Periodicals and Journals

278

260 263 270 270 270 271 273

286 286 287

List of Boxes

Box 1: Box 2: Box 3: Box 4: Box 5: Box 6: Box 7: Box 8: Box 9: Box 10: Box 11: Box 12: Box 13: Box 14: Box 15: Box 16: Box 17: Box 18:

Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1922 and 1930 Baghdad Pact The Eisenhower Doctrine The Ba’ath Party Dhofari Rebellion Carter Doctrine Arab Cooperation Council U.S. led Coalition Forces UNSCOM and UNIKOM The Nixon Doctrine Twin Pillars The Algiers Accord of 1975 Dual Containment U.S. and British Air Strikes, 1992–2003: Wahhabism Ikhwan Abdullah Azzam Sayyid Qutb

29 31 33 35 38 56 98 118 120 142 143 145 146 154 202 203 209 211

About the Author

Joseph Kostiner received his PhD at London School of Economics and Political Science, University of London, in 1982 and is Senior Research Fellow at the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies. He was Chair of the School of History 2000–2004 and is Associate Professor at the Department of Middle Eastern and African History at Tel Aviv University. Prof. Kostiners fields of specialization are: history and current affairs of the Arabian Peninsula states, social history of the Middle East, state and nationbuilding in the Middle East. Prof. Kostiner is author of the following books: The Struggle for South Yemen (1984); South Yemen's Revolutionary Strategy (1990); From Chieftaincy to Monarchical State: The Making of Saudi Arabia 1916-1936 (1993); Yemen: The Tortuous Quest for Unity, 1990-1994 (1996). Coeditor (with P.S. Khoury) of Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East (1991). Editor of Middle East Monarchies (2000). He has written many articles, including The Arab States of the Gulf before and after the Second Gulf Crisis (Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 33, No. 4, 1997, pp. 788–798) and The United States and the Gulf States: Alliance in Need (MERIA Journal Vol. 2, No. 4, 1998).

Acknowledgments

The assistance provided by the FernUniversität Hagen was the basis for the research underlying this book. I am grateful for Professor Dr. Georg Simonis of the FernUniversität for his help in facilitating this assistance, as well as for his continuous encouragement and friendship. A special thanks for additional financial assistance is owed to the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, and its head Dr. Dore Gold. The completion of this research was made possible as a result of special assistance from my friend Dr. Paul Marcus. I am indebted to both Dr. Gold and Dr. Marcus for their generous support. I would also like to extend my gratitude to professor Eyal Zisser, the head of Tel Aviv University´s Department of Middle Eastern History, and the head of the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle eastern and African Studies, as well as to Professor Asher Susser, the former head of the Moshe Dayan center, for ongoing support. The kind hospitality of my relatives Dr. Margarette and Dr. Manfred Wächter provided me with a home whenever I stayed in Germany. Let this book be a token of appreciation for their kindness. I wish to thank Helmut Elbers, at the FernUniversität, whose assistance was an important contribution in bringing the manuscript to completion. I also wish to thank Sarah Ulmer-Sadeh and Brandon Friedman for their assistance. Mr. Friedman´s contribution made him a real intellectual partner in conceiving this book.

Introduction

The Gulf region has experienced continuous conflict throughout the second half of the 20th century and into the 21st century: an Islamist revolution in Iran, three devastating regional wars, and a rising tide of Islamic radicalism that threatens the stability of every regime in the Gulf.1 A former British Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Sir Alan Munro, has stated: “This shallow inlet with its placid sea and shores is today a cockpit, or perhaps a cauldron, possessing natural resources, combined with fervid undercurrents, which can quickly transform it into a flashpoint for aggression.”2 Oil is the fuel for the industrialized economies of the world. The Gulf states possess approximately 62 percent of the world’s proven oil reserves. Saudi Arabia alone possesses approximately 22 percent.3 Security in the Gulf is therefore critically important to the health of the international economy. This course will examine military, political, cultural, and socio-economic developments in the Gulf region that have led to conflicts and shaped regional security. Britain, which had been the hegemonic super-power in the region, announced in 1968 it would withdraw its forces from the Gulf by 1971. This decision was a product of a number of factors. First, the British domestic economy was too weak to support extensive overseas military commitments. Second, Britain’s failure to peacefully resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Suez issue undermined its resolve in the Middle East. Further, its presence in the Gulf was encountering increasingly violent local resistance. In 1971, when Britain removed its forces from the Gulf, it left a power vacuum which created conflict between states ambitious to fill its role as regional power.4 In 1969, the U.S. was overextended by its military commitments in Vietnam, and despite a certain amount of fear of Soviet influence in the Gulf region – and that of Soviet allies, South Yemen, for example – the U.S. adopted a power by proxy security policy in the Gulf. This policy was part of President Richard _________________________________________________ 1 Gary G. Sick, “The Coming Crisis in the Persian Gulf”, in The Persian Gulf at the Millennium: Essays in Politics, Economy, Security, and Religion. Eds. Gary G. Sick and Lawrence G. Potter (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997), p. 11. 2 Alan Munro, “Defence Issues in the Gulf”, Asian Affairs, Vol. 28, No. 2 (June 1997): p. 197-205. 3 BP, Statistical Review of World Energy 2006. 4 J.B. Kelly, Arabia, the Gulf, and the West (New York: Basic Books, 1980), pp. 45-103; Charles A. Kupchan, The Persian Gulf and the West, Dilemmas of Security (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1987), pp. 38-43.

16

Introduction

Nixon’s doctrine and became known in the Gulf as the “twin pillars” strategy, which relied on Iranian military power and Saudi Arabian cooperation and financing. This policy was a reflection of (1) new political constraints on the U.S. military as a result of Vietnam and (2) the new Gulf reality without British forces. The U.S. National Security Study Memorandum of 1969 recommended increased weapons sales to Iran and Saudi Arabia to help them deter Soviet influence in the region and to maintain stability between the smaller Gulf states. The U.S. viewed Iran and Saudi Arabia as friendly powers, capable of keeping the radical ideologies of Iraq and the Soviet Union at bay. The U.S. twin pillars concept meant relying on local military force in place of U.S. forces in the region. During the 1970s, the U.S. supplied Iran (and to a lesser extent Saudi Arabia) with an enormous amount of advanced military weapons and technology to ensure their regional military power. Iran’s high level of modernization and larger population made it a better candidate for rapid military growth than Saudi Arabia. The U.S. also believed Iran’s local military power and Saudi Arabia’s financing and influence on the Gulf states would balance each other’s power in the region.5 The U.S. strategy for regional stability, a product of Cold-War strategic considerations, failed when Ayatollah Khomeini’s radical Islamic revolution erupted in Iran in 1978-79. Iran’s revolutionary leaders challenged the regional order and were not cowed by American power. On 4 November 1979 the U.S. officials in Tehran were taken hostage. On 14 December 1979 the U.S. announced it was creating a Rapid Deployment Force (“RDF“) for the Gulf region. On 26 December 1979 the Soviets invaded Afghanistan posing a new threat to the Gulf region. This added urgency to the U.S. decision to create and position a RDF in the Gulf. The RDF became operational on 1 March 1980. Three amphibious Marine forces and seven Army units designated 100,000 troops for rapid response to regional crises. The RDF initiated a major restructuring of the U.S. military command structure to meet the new threats to stability in the Gulf. The size of the RDF increased during the 1980s in response to the U.S. strategic emphasis on deterring the Soviet Union from invading a new and unstable Iranian regime.6 The U.S. policy during the 1970s was a loose strategy without a clear U.S. commitment on how to respond in the case of drastic domestic crises in the Gulf. Instead of clear commitments, the U.S. policy relied on (1) the goodwill and stability of its local allies; (2) balance of power between local Gulf powers, nota_________________________________________________ 5

Kupchan, pp. 38-43. Maxwell Orme Johnson, The Military as an Instrument of U.S. Policy in Southwest Asia (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1983); Kupchan, pp. 89-125.

6

Introduction

17

bly Iran and Iraq; (3) minimal local military involvement; and (4) limited engagement. The Arab Gulf states practiced a different approach to security. Notably, Saudi Arabia’s approach to regional security during the 1970s was to mediate conflicts before they reached the Kingdom’s borders. Unlike the U.S. approach, the Saudi strategy emphasized “soft power” rather than military strength. The Saudi regime attempted to appease radical regimes and religious groups so that they would not subvert or threaten the Gulf states. The Saudis also tried to coordinate its policies with the U.S. – Lebanon, 1976–78, Afghanistan, 1979–80 – but also rejected certain U.S. policies, such as the Camp David Peace Accords between Egypt and Israel in 1978-79. The Saudi approach reflected, in part, Stephen David’s “Omnibalancing” theory, which explains that regimes try to tackle all threats – internal, as well as external – when considering the balance of power, whereas the typical approach to balance of power only considers countering external threats from other states.7 This meant attempting to thwart many problems simultaneously without a clear hierarchy of priority or rigid planning. The Saudi approach added to the partisan, casual, and undefined atmosphere of security that existed in the Gulf during the 1970s. Therefore there was no clear mechanism to prevent or contain conflicts in the Gulf. There was too varied a patchwork of defense arrangements, and no binding agreements with either of the two regional military powers, Iran and Iraq, that would prevent them from attacking each other, or their smaller Gulf neighbors. Thus Barry Buzan’s characterization of a security complex suits the Gulf:”A security complex is defined as a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely so that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another. Security complexes emphasize the interdependence of rivalry as well as shared interest.”8

1

Emergence of Conflict

Iran and Iraq have traditionally been the two most powerful states in the region. Both countries occupy geographically strategic locations, which border a number of politically sensitive areas. Further, their vast oil and gas reserves have provided them with wealth to build military strength and strategic leverage with the international community. _________________________________________________ 7

Steven R. David, “Explaining Third World Alignment,” World Politics, Vol. 43, No.2, 1991, p. 233. Ayoob, p. 58 quoted from Barry Buzan, People, States, and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 2nd edition, 1991), p. 190.

8

18

Introduction

In 1980, Iraq was ruled by Saddam Hussein. Saddam’s rise to president in July 1979 was through Iraq’s Ba’ath party, which came to power in 1968 and espoused a radical pan-Arab, socialist ideology. However, under Saddam’s rule Iraq was a dictatorship. Saddam used a Sunni network that was based on ties of family, clan, and tribe to rule over a Shi‘i majority and Kurdish minority population. During the 1970s, Ba’ath power was underwritten by the massive explosion of Iraqi oil revenues. Between 1973 and 1975, Iraqi oil revenues increased by eight times. By the end of 1975, Iraq’s annual oil income was $8 billion. During the following years nearly 40 percent of oil income was used to purchase modern weapons for Iraq.9 Further, Iraqi active military manpower grew from 112,500 in 1974-75 to 535,000 in 1979-1980.10 In 1980, Iran was ruled by a new Islamic revolutionary regime that espoused the radical ideology of its supreme leader, Ayatollah Khomeini. Ayatollah Khomeini did not accept the modern nation-state, which he saw as an artificial creation that divided the Muslim community, or ‘umma. Khomeini sought to re-unite the entire Muslim community under his banner of Islam: “Its ultimate goal was to launch an ‘ideological crusade’ aimed at bringing the genuine message of Islam to all peoples everywhere. In fact, Khomeini often compared the movement that brought him to power with the advent of Islam, and with its overall message extending to humanity at large.”11 Iran’s population was predominantly Shi’a, but its population contained a diverse ethnic mix that included Persians, Azeris, and Kurds. Khomeini also had access to great national wealth. Iran’s external cash reserves were $14.6 billion in 1979. And by 1980, Khomeini inherited the Shah’s military resources to back his expanionist threats. In 197475 Iran’s total active military manpower was 238,000, by 1979-80, it was 240,000.12 Iran and Iraq have a historical rivalry that harkens back hundreds of years: Arab versus Persian identity, Sunni versus Shi’a identity, Safavid versus Ottoman Empires, internal Kurdish rivalries between factions, and control over the Shatt al-Arab waterway and the Gulf itself. Even the name of the Gulf is a historical source of rivalry. The Arabs claim it is the “Arabian” Gulf and,”Iran’s claim to the name of the Gulf is an ancient one and has been explained numerous times by contemporary Iranian historians. They assert that the Persian Gulf was _________________________________________________ 9

Charles Tripp, A History of Iraq (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, Second Edition, 2001), pp. 193-235. 10 Anthony H. Cordesman and Abraham R. Wagner, The Lessons of Modern War, Volume II: The Iran-Iraq War (Boulder and San Francisco: Westview Press, 1990), p. 57. 11 David Menashri, Post Revolutionary Politics in Iran: Religion, Society, and Power (Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2001), p. 173. 12 Cordesman and Wagner, p. 57.

Introduction

19

called the Persian Sea 2,500 years ago, when Darius, the Achmaemid king, called it ‘a sea which comes out of Persia ...”13 Iraq’s Ba’ath revolution in the 1960s radicalized a formerly monarchical state and threatened its conservative Gulf neighbors with its radical Pan-Arab agenda, which envisioned Iraq in the pre-eminent role. Iraq’s call for Arab unity and revolutionary ideology also threatened Iran’s Shah, who was a monarchical ruler of a non-Arab nation seeking regional prominence. Iran viewed a radical Ba’athist Iraq as a rival to its regional supremacy. In the 1980s, Iraq, which had been viewed in the early 1970s as a radical regime, became the standard bearer for the conservative Arab Gulf monarchies who were being threatened by Khomeini’s subversive attempts to spread his revolution. In the 1960s and 1970s the small Gulf states viewed Iraq as part of growing trend of radical pan-Arab nationalism that had spread to Egypt, Syria, and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (“PLO”). The Gulf states feared this emerging radical trend would destabilize their governments. However, by the end of the 1970s a new radical threat emerged. In 1975, Ba’athist Iraq, weakened by its battles with Kurdish insurgents, managed a rapprochement with Iran, which culminated in a settlement to the Shatt al-Arab border dispute. However, Iran’s Islamic revolution in 1978-79 jeopardized this settlement and introduced a new element of state-supported pan-Islamic radicalism into the region. Khomeini’s Islamic rhetoric sneered at international state borders and attacked the monarchical institution that governed the smaller Gulf states. Further, Khomeini initiated a relentless campaign of propaganda against Saddam’s Iraq.

2

Regional Asymmetry

The state of continuous conflict in the Gulf was a function of a fundamental asymmetry between the smaller Arab monarchical Gulf states and the larger regional powers, Iran and Iraq. This trend of conflict can be seen as parallel to state formation in the region, as well as to the maturation of the world economy and its need for fuel. The Gulf’s vast reserves of oil and gas magnify the importance of the balance power between the vulnerable smaller states and the larger regional powers. Oil and gas make the Gulf region an integral part of the world economy. As a result, any conflict in the region is likely to involve the international community. The asymmetry in the region is first a product of size. In 1981, the monarchical Gulf states of Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, Saudi Arabia and the UAE _________________________________________________ 13

Christin Marschall, Iran’s Persian Gulf Policy (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), p.5.

20

Introduction

came together to form the Gulf Cooperation Council (“GCC“). Yemen, due to its historic instability, lies at the periphery, but, due to its geography, remains part of the region, nevertheless. The GCC states are much smaller than their larger neighbors, Iran and Iraq. Size, in this case, is measured in terms of geography and demography, more than economic wealth. To a certain degree, Saudi Arabia is an exception, physically, to the rest of its fellow GCC members. Its geographic area is 2,150,000 square kilometers, while Bahrain’s is 662 square kilometers. However, all of the Gulf states are scarcely populated and, therefore, less powerful, traditionally, than Iran and Iraq, because they have less manpower to draw upon for military strength. Therefore, their foreign policies are based, in part, on the natural limitations of their size and populations. Even the size of the populations of the Gulf states can deceive: many of the Gulf states are populated by a high percentage of resident foreign workers. Many of these workers are not eligible for military service. Bahrain, had a population of approximately 230,000 in 1970 and 350,000 in 1980. Today, it has a population of approximately 700,000. It is the smallest Gulf state. In 1995, Bahrain’s military forces consisted of 10,700 men. In 2007, it has roughly the same size military force, but additionally a 10,000 strong internal security force. It is ruled by a Sunni King, Hamad bin Isa al Khalifa, but has a majority Shi’a population. Kuwait is ruled by the Al Sabah family, and achieved full independence in 1961. Today, it has a population of 2.4 million and military manpower of 15,000–17,000 troops. Since 1970, Oman has been ruled by Sultan Qaboos bin Said al Said. He has implemented an extensive modernization program. Oman’s first national census was taken in 1993. At the time it had a population of 2.017 million, including approximately 500,000 foreign nationals. Oman’s military forces grew from 15,000 troops in the early 1980s to 43,000 men in 1995, which is approximately its size today. In 2007, Qatar is ruled by Amir Hamad bin Khalifa al Thani, and has a population of approximately 885,000. Its population in 1970 was only 111,000, of which 45,000 were natives. By the mid-1970s, its population was 200,000. Its armed forces grew from 5,000 men in the early 1980s to 11,000 men in 1995. Saudi Arabia is ruled in 2007 by King Abdallah bin Abd al Aziz, and is the largest geographic GCC state. It has a population of more than 27 million. In 1984, Saudi Arabia only had 63,500 men in its regular armed forces. In 2007, its regular military forces consist of 124,500 men. The United Arab Emirates is a federation of seven emirates ruled by president Khalifa bin Zayid al-Nuhayyan. The federation was formed in 1971, and today has a population of approximately 2.7 million. In 2007, the UAE has a military force of approximately 50,000 men, which is a large increase from 25,000 in 1980.14 _________________________________________________ 14 Anthony H. Cordesman, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, and the UAE: Challenges of Security (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1997); Anthony H. Cordesman and Khalid R. Al-Rodhan, Gulf Military

Introduction

21

These sparsely populated GCC states are, however, rich in natural resources. In 2005, the GCC states accounted for approximately 40 percent of the world’s proven oil reserves. Saudi Arabia alone accounted for 22 percent of that total. Qatar, comparatively oil poor, produces 11.4 percent of the world’s natural gas.15 The vast reserves of oil and gas in the Gulf have generated enormous wealth for the Gulf states. In 1974, 85 percent of the GCC states’ GDP was a product of trade in oil and gas products.16 This wealth has made these states both vulnerable and important. Their strategic importance is a product of the important role oil and gas play in the world economy. Oil and gas fuel industrialization, which is one of the driving forces behind economic growth. Furthermore, oil has increasingly become an integral part of the Western lifestyle, fueling wealthy societies built around automobiles and a tourism industry dependent on air travel. Therefore, there is political pressure from the Western societies to make sure the engines of the world economy have access to the fuel that drives them. This phenomenon was best exemplified by the 1973 oil crisis. The crisis emerged during the 1973 October Arab-Israeli War. On 17 October 1973, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Abu Dhabi, Bahrain, Qatar, Iraq, Syria, Egypt, Algeria, and Libya agreed to decrease oil production by 5 percent a month until Israel withdrew from the territories it seized during the 1967 Six-Day War. Further, these countries cut production by 25 percent the following months and halted all oil shipments to the pro-Israeli U.S., and the Netherlands. This oil embargo lasted until March of 1974. The production cuts by the OPEC plus Syria and Egypt were accompanied by a 400 percent increase in the price of oil. Prices climbed from $3 per barrel before the October War to approximately $20 in December 1973. Oil prices continued to rise and were in the neighborhood of $40 per barrel in 1980. The dramatic price increase shocked the international economy. Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development countries reported an average inflationary increase of 7 percent, and unemployment increased by 2 percent. Further, the new price of oil generated tremendous wealth for the OPEC states. This crisis upset Western economies and elevated the strategic importance of Gulf politics to the international community.17 Due to the regional asymmetry of power, the smaller Gulf states depended on the balance of power between the two larger powers, Iran and Iraq, to main-

Forces in an Era of Asymmetric Wars, Volume 1 (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Security International, 2007). 15 BP, Statistical Review of World Energy 2006, accessed at http://www.bp.com/productlanding.do? categoryId=6842&contentId=7021390 16 Cordesman, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, and the UAE: Challenges of Security, p. 5 17 Kupchan, pp. 44-53.

22

Introduction

tain regional security. During the 1970s, the Gulf states also relied, in part, on one of the larger powers to occassionally assist with their local security. For example, Iran’s military assistance under the Shah was instrumental to Oman’s ability to suppress the leftist insurgents in the Omani region of Dhofar in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Despite mutual security interests between the larger powers and the smaller Gulf states, they were hardly able to fully coordinate on a regional security policy. Iran’s dispute with the UAE over controlling the Gulf islands of Abu Musa and the two Tunbs, which began when the British withdrew from the Gulf exemplified the regional disputes that undermined regional security cooperation in the 1970s.

3

Geographical Disputes and Other Historical Sources of Tension Between Gulf States

Ideological changes in the region have been a historical source of conflict in the Gulf, as well. Arab Nationalism, Khomeinism, Communism, and the broad background of the Cold War were all important historical factors that contributed to regional conflict. The Cold War affected the regional balance of power in the Gulf. The region’s powers, Iran and Iraq, were split between supporting the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. during the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. Following the fall of the former Soviet Union, U.S. policy toward the Gulf also influenced the regional balance of power, and, perhaps unintentionally, sowed the seeds for future conflict. Territorial disputes between Gulf states were a function of the fact that borders between many of these artificially created states have not been fixed or regionally recognized. The Shatt al-Arab waterway between Iran and Iraq was a historical source of conflict dating back centuries, and a recurring bone of contention throughout the 20th century; it served as one of the catalysts that triggered the Iran-Iraq War. Iran’s dispute with UAE over Abu Musa and the Two Tunbs islands began in the 1970s and has continued to the present. Saudi Arabia and Yemen have had a long-standing border dispute that may have reached a resolution – in principle – in June 2000. Bahrain and Qatar have referred their dispute to the International Court of Justice to rule on the sovereignty of the Hawar islands, the Dibal and Jidda shoals, and Zubarah. Oman and the UAE have reached a boundary agreement in March 2000, but the agreement has not been implemented. Territorial ambiguity, lack of clearly defined and recognized borders, and access to natural resources continue to stir tension between the GCC states and hinder coordinated multilateral GCC security agreements.

Introduction

23

Internal changes and political pressures in the smaller states have also caused regional conflict. Factors such as rapid social change, Shi‘i minority groups, and Sunni Islamic radicalism all create internal pressures that lead to internal and external conflict as well as threats to the status quo. The monarchical Gulf states are commonly viewed as “traditional” societies. This usually means that tribal social structures and Islam form the basis of local politics. Some argue this “traditionalism” leads to a political process where institutions are devalued because politics are personal, political participation is minimal, there is little in the way of civil society, political loyalty is a function of religious standards, and monarchical rule based on tribal elites is embedded in the culture. Further, this view leads some to conclude that the Arab monarchies of the Gulf are outdated and weak. And that the traditional rulers are incapable of managing the cultural and economic changes that come with vast oil wealth. This impression is compounded by the inability of the monarchical regimes to defend themselves from threats presented by their larger neighbors.18 The problem with such perceptions is that they fail to recognize the flexibility and adaptability of ruling elites of the Gulf states, which is a function of their wealth. In fact, in many cases, they have been able to develop productive state institutions, manage their wealth, introduce political dialogue and mechanisms for political participation, and remain loyal to their cultural heritage. To be sure, the changes have been slow and in small measures and there are visible social problems, such as foreign labor explosion, rising unemployment for young, educated citizens, and population explosion. One of biggest security challenges caused by recent social and political changes in the Gulf has been the emergence radical Islamic groups, which are threatening the internal stability of the Gulf monarchies.

_________________________________________________ 18

F. Gregory Gause III, Oil Monarchies (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1994), p. 3.

Part One: The Iran-Iraq War

1

Introduction

The Iran-Iraq War was triggered by changes to the status quo in the region caused, in large part, by Khomeini’s Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1978-79. However, the reasons for war were subtle and complex, and included a variety of components. Iran and Iraq also had a longstanding history of conflict that can be traced back to the creation of the modern nation of Iraq – by European powers – following World War I. The historical legacy of conflict between the powerful ethnic, tribal, and religious groups in the two regions is centuries old. The original Arab-Islamic conquest of the Persian Sassanid Empire in 638 at Qadisiyya and the subsequent Sunni-Shi‘i division of the Muslim community of believers (or ‘umma) in 680 are two relevant examples that extend back to the 7th century of the modern era. However, the Iran-Iraq War was most directly a product of an immediate conflict that emerged when the regional goals and ambitions of Ayatollah Khomeini and Saddam Hussein clashed.1 This chapter will attempt to address, (a) the historical sources of conflict between Iran and Iraq; (b) the regional status quo preceding the Iran-Iraq War and the regional goals and ambitions of Iran and Iraq, which led most directly to the conflict; and (c) the effect of the war on Iran and Iraq; (d) the economic factor in the war; and (d) the impact of the war on the Gulf littoral states, and their responses to the shifting challenges presented during the nearly nine years of fighting. The causes of war are complex and subtle, and any isolation of tightly bound historical forces is liable run the risk of oversimplification. To the extent that it is possible, this chapter will isolate direct causes of the war, but also attempt to weave the direct causes into a broader historical narrative.

2

Historical Sources of Conflict

There are four main sources of historical tension between Iran and Iraq: (a) access to, and control of, the Shi‘i holy sites in the Iraqi cities of Najaf and Kar_________________________________________________ 1

Anthony H. Cordesman and Abraham R. Wagner, The Lessons of Modern War, Volume II: The Iran-Iraq War (Boulder and San Francisco: Westview Press, 1990), pp. 10-11.

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bala; (b) state manipulation of the Kurdish nationalist movement; (c ) Iranian control of the traditionally Arab region of Khuzistan in southwest Iran; and (d) the dispute over control of the Shatt al-Arab waterway, which feeds into the Gulf. 2.1 Roots of the Historical Conflict Iran is predominantly Persian, while Iraq is Arab. Iran has a rich Persian cultural identity that pre-dates the 7th century Arab-Islamic conquest and Islamic conversion of the Persian Sassanid Empire. This pre-Islamic, Persian cultural history is viewed by Iranians as separate and distinct from the Arab bedouin tradition originating in the Gulf. However, the Shi‘i sect of Islam constitutes the majority in both Iran and Iraq and links the two regions. Shi‘i Islam is rooted in events that date back to the early days of Islam following the death of the Prophet. The Prophet Muhammad’s cousin and son-inlaw, ‘Ali ibn ‘Abu Talib engaged in a long struggle against Mu’awiya to become rightful successor to the Muslim Caliphate following the third Caliph, ‘Uthman’s, death. After Muhammad died there was a dispute regarding who should succeed him as Caliph, or leader, of the Muslim community. The majority backed ‘Abu Bakr, Muhammad’s father-in-law and long time companion. ‘Ali eventually became the fourth Caliph, succeeding ‘Uthman, but many supported his rival Mu’awiya, the governor of Damascus. In 661, ‘Ali was murdered and his son, Hasan, abdicated his right to the Caliphate to Mu’awiyah. However, not all of ‘Ali’s followers accepted Hasan’s abdication. When Mu’awiyah died in 680, ‘Ali’s second son, Hussein, who hoped to re-claim the Caliphate, was accompanied into battle by a small group of loyal followers. They were massacred near Karbala, on the tenth day of the Moharram, in present-day Iraq by the Umayyad Caliph Yazid (Mu’awiya’s son) and his forces. Hussein’s grave is located in Karbala.2 Hussein’s defeat is commemorated by Shi‘is during ‘Ashura, memorialized on the tenth day of Moharram each year. The holiday includes pilgrimage to the Shi‘i holy shrines in Najaf (where ‘Ali is buried) and Karbala, in Iraq. The Shi‘i believers publicly mourn during the ceremonies on ‘Ashura, and even physically beat themselves in self-punishment for not coming to Hussein’s defense at Karbala in 680. ‘Ashura is one of the holiest days of the year for Shi‘is. Iranians are, for the most part,“Twelver” Shi‘is. The number refers to chain of twelve men (Imams) in ‘Ali’s blood line who possess religious authority _________________________________________________ 2 Carl Brockelmann, History of the Islamic Peoples, Translated by Joel Carmichael and Moshe Perlmann (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd, 1964), p. 75; Kenneth Pollack, The Persian Puzzle, The Conflict Between Iran and America (New York: Random House, 2004), pp. 10-13.

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passed down during the early centuries of Islam. ‘Ali and his sons Hasan and Hussein were the first three Imams. Imams were designated at birth, which was usually accompanied by some kind of miraculous sign of confirmation. The twelfth Imam is said to be in “occultation” (ghayba) where he is hidden from the world. God will determine when the Imam will reappear. It is believed this messianic return will occur before judgment day, and the Imam will lead the righteous to victory over evil forces and rule the world during a period of peace.3 Iranian Shi‘i religious identity is closely tied to the holy sites in Iraq, and Ayatollah Khomeini spent fourteen years of his exile from Iran in Iraq, before he was expelled by Saddam Hussein. Ayatollah Khomeini was not the first Iranian ruler to adopt Shi‘i Islam as the state religion. Shah Ismail’s Safavid dynasty from the 15th to 17th centuries was the first Shi‘i state in Iran in early modern times. Shah Ismail organized his empire around the theology and law of Twelver Shi‘ism. Six of twelve Shi‘i Imams are buried in Iraq, and the last Imam went into occultation in the Iraqi city of Samarra. Shah Ismail sought to capture the Shi’a holy cities of Najaf and Karbala in Iraq to reinforce his empire’s Shi‘i identity. Safavid Persia4 was in perpetual conflict with the Iraq region of the Ottoman Empire throughout the 16th and 17th centuries. In 1510, Shah Ismail captured Iraq, only to relinquish it to the Ottoman Empire in 1514 after defeat in the battle of Chaldiran. In 1529, the Safavids re-captured Iraq, only to be expelled again by Sulaiman the Magnificent in 1534. War over Iraq recurred in 1548, and again between 1553–55. The Safavids were able to occupy Iraq from 1623 until 1638. In 1638, Sultan Murad IV and the Ottomans captured Baghdad; and the treaty of Zuhab, enacted in 1639, formally annexed Iraq into the Ottoman Empire and stipulated that two powers should not meddle in each other’s affairs. This treaty between the Ottoman Empire and the Safavid Empire lasted for more than a century. Tensions between Iran and Iraq resumed in the 18th century. In 1733, Nadir Shah of Iran failed in his attempt to conquer Baghdad. And in 1746 another treaty was signed at Kurdan. In 1775, Iran occupied Basra and border conflicts continued. The troublesome areas were “Arabistan” in southwest Iran and the Zagros mountain region in the north, which was inhabited by the Kurds.5 _________________________________________________ 3 Andrew Rippin, Muslims, Their Beliefs and Practices (London: Routledge, 3rd Ed., 2005), pp. 124127. 4 Modern Iran was known as “Persia” by non-natives from antiquity until the reign of Reza Shah Pahlavi in the first quarter of the 20th century, when he officially changed the name of the nation-state to “Iran” in 1935. See Bernard Lewis, What Went Wrong? (London: Orion Books, 2001), pp. 7. 5 Jasim M. Abdulghani, Iran and Iraq: The Years of Crisis (London: Croom & Helm and Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984); Dilip Hiro, The Longest War, The Iran-Iraq Military Conflict (Grafton Books, London, 1989), p. 8-9.

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2.2 The Empires’ Legacies The formerly Arab area in southwest Iran known as “Arabistan” played an important role in modern tensions between Iran and Iraq. Between 1690 and 1923 the Kabide Emirate6 was a semi-autonomous region extending from Ahvaz in the north, to the Shatt al-Arab waterway in the west, Hindian in the east, and the Gulf in the south. The emirate maintained its independence by playing Iran off of the Ottoman Empire. The Kabide Amir controlled access to the Shatt al-Arab waterway – which formed at the meeting of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers and flowed into the Gulf – and collected tolls on traffic from the Gulf to the Ottoman port in Basra. In 1812–3, the leader of the Muhaisin tribe in southwest Iran carved out an independent principality for himself and established a port on the Shatt al-Arab at Khorramshahr (known in Arabic as Muhammarah). This caused tensions in the region to increase. In 1821, war broke out over control of the nomadic tribes that ventured across common borders. Iran invaded “Arabistan”, conquered the area and seized control of the new port in Khorramshahr. Arabistan became part of Iran. In 1823, with British assistance, the Treaty of Erzerum was signed. This treaty guaranteed protection for Shi‘i pilgrims traveling from Iran to Iraq’s holy cities and regulated tribal movement along common borders. In addition to Arabistan along the southwest Iran – Ottoman Iraq border, the Kurds in the north were a source of regional tension. The Kurds are a separate ethnic-racial group from the Arabs, Turks, and Persians. They trace their history back to Medes of the Bible and the Indo-European mountain tribes who settled in southeastern Turkey, northeastern Iraq, and northwest Iran. The Kurdish language is part of the Indo-European family of languages, and is closer to Farsi than to Arabic. In 1824, in violation of the Treaty of Erzerum, Iran supported a Kurdish rebellion in northeast Iraq. By the Treaty of Erzerum in 1823, British and Tsarist Russian imperial power influenced relations between Persia and Ottoman Iraq. Fourteen years after the Treaty of Erzerum, in 1837, the Ottoman Empire invaded Arabistan and absorbed it into the Wilayet of Basra. Border tension also re-emerged between 1834 and 1840, due to the movement of Turkish tribes across the Iranian frontier. Iran, for its part, had supported the Kurdish rebellion in northeast Iraq in 1824. These problems were further aggravated by the persecution of Shi‘i Iranians in Iraq and the Ottoman invasion of Khorramshahr (Muhammarah). In 1847, with the assistance of the British and Russians, a second Treaty of Erzerum was signed. _________________________________________________ 6

The Kabide Emirate was a portion of the larger area that came to be known as “Arabistan” in the 20th century. Cordesman, p.11.

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The second Treaty of Erzerum was significant because it divided the border territory along the Shatt al-Arab waterway (known in Persian as the Arvand Rud). Iran was granted control over the east bank of the river and the Ottoman Empire controlled the waterway itself, and the west bank. Iran was granted navigation rights on the river and agreed not to involve itself in northern Iraq. In exchange for established rights on the Shatt al-Arab, Iran gave up territory in the Zuhab-Qasr-e Shirin area and also received the island of Abadan (formerly known as Khizr). The port of Khorramshahr was given to Iran in exchange for exclusive Iraqi control over Sulaimaniyya in Kurdish region of the north. The treaty gave Iran control over Arabistan and the Ottoman Empire control over the Shatt al-Arab. The second treaty of Erzerum established the territorial rights along the Iran-Iraq southwest border and the Shatt al-Arab. However, the treaty did not affect the problems that plagued the region. Arab tribes continued to move back and forth across the border, and the region surrounding the port of Khorramshahr continued to behave semi-autonomously. The border disputes, especially the conflict over control of the Shatt al-Arab, continued into the 20th century. In 1908, the British discovered commercial quantities of oil near Arabistan. This complicated the border conflict, and changed the emphasis of the British interest in the Gulf. Iran and the Ottoman Empire signed the Protocols of Tehran in 1911, which called for settling all outstanding border issues. In 1913, British, Russian, Iranian, and Ottoman officials met in Constantinople to establish borders and settle rights on the Shatt al-Arab. The new agreement awarded Iran six islands on the Shatt al-Arab between the Khorramshahr port and the Gulf. The British, seeking easy outlets through the Gulf for its new Iranian oil, may have used its influence to help Iran secure the new territory on the Shatt al-Arab. 2.3 Components of a Recurring Conflict World War I, the collapse of Tsarist Russia, and the dismantling of the Ottoman Empire created big changes in the region. The independent nation of Iraq was established by the British Mandate in 1921 and confirmed by the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923. Iran also underwent a great change. The corrupt Qajar dynasty was ended, and, between 1921 and 1923, a new Iranian nationalism emerged as Reza Shah came to power. In 1923 and 1924, Reza Shah consolidated his power and suppressed Iran’s ethnic minorities in pursuit of his nationalist objectives. Reza Shah used his newly expanded military to crush the Arabs in the semiautonomous region of Arabistan. He expanded the province, renamed the area “Khuzistan,” suppressed the use of Arabic, and resettled the population to dilute the Arab majority. The Shah’s policies of ethnic suppression and resettlement, in

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combination with the establishment of a large British oil industry in Khuzistan, minimized the significance of the Arab factor in future border conflicts between Iran and Iraq. Following World War I, Iran and Iraq confronted one another as two sovereign states pursuing their respective national interests. It was at this point in time that lasting components of war were formed between Iran and Iraq. Each state was an ambitious entity seeking territorial achievements. There was a natural strategic competition between two large states for supremacy over the Gulf basin. Iraq was in a geographically inferior position and forced to compete for control of access to waterways and to the Gulf. The Shatt al-Arab was a natural epicenter of the tension between Iran and Iraq. Further, the common cross border ethnic-religious groups, such as the Kurds, Shi’is, and the Arabs of Khuzistan, blurred the solid lines of international boundaries. Iran refused to recognize the borders of modern Iraq, which it viewed as encroaching on its own interests. The Shi‘i religious scholars, or ulama, of Iraq, who were anti-British, sponsored anti-government resistance following the Anglo-Iraqi treaty of 1922 (see Box 1). Clashes between the British backed Iraqi government and the Shi‘i ulama increased and resulted in the Shi‘i ulama’s selfexile to Iran in 1923. With assistance from Iran, Iraq and the Shi‘i ulama reconciled and the ulama returned to Iraq with the understanding that they would stay out of Iraqi politics. By 1929 conditions between the two states had improved, and Reza Shah recognized King Faisal I’s Iraq. Box 1:

Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1922 and 19307

In 1921, Great Britain installed the Hashemite, Faisal bin Hussein as king of Iraq. Great Britain wanted a formal treaty agreement after years of being the country’s mandate power and Iraq objected to being a mandate and wanted a treaty to represent a change in its status. This treaty was signed in October 1922, but not ratified until the spring 1924. The British high commissioner, Sir Henry Dobbs, was forced to issue an ultimatum to the Iraqi constituent assembly to ensure the treaty was ratified. However, despite the change in status, Iraq could not hide the fact that Britain was overwhelmingly in control of Iraq. Britain controlled Iraq’s financial affairs and maintained a virtual military occupation of the new state. Further, it retained mandate control until Iraq was capable of selfgovernment. The 1922 treaty was replaced by a new treaty in 1930. The treaty became the basis for Britain’s relationship with Iraq following Iraq’s independence in 1932. Domestic control of Iraq fell under the king’s authority, and defense of the borders was a responsibility of the new state, however issues of interna_________________________________________________ 7

Charles Tripp, A History of Iraq, Second Edition (Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 66-67.

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Part One: The Iran-Iraq War tional security remained largely guaranteed by the British and their troops. The British retained full military access to Iraqi land for strategic purposes. The treaty was signed for twenty-five years, with renegotiation possible after twenty years. The new treaty took into account British interests in significant new oil discoveries made in Iraq in 1927.

The Kurds were also unhappy with the newly created Iraqi state. The Kurds of Mosul attacked the British mandate rule and then the subsequent central government in Iraq. In 1927, the Kurdish area of Iraq became an area of strategic importance when the British struck the largest oil reserve ever discovered – as of that date – near Kirkuk. In 1931-2, Sheikh Ahmed Barzani initiated a Kurdish insurgency for independence. It was crushed by a joint Iraqi-Turkish campaign in 1935. Despite diplomatic progress between King Faisal I and Reza Shah, border disputes still fostered underlying hostility. Iran was also not satisfied with Iraqi control of traffic on the Shatt al-Arab waterway. According to Iran, the thalweg – or median line of the deepest part of the waterway – was the boundary agreed to in 1913. In November 1934, Iraq brought the issue of the thalweg boundary on the Shatt al-Arab before the League of Nations. Iraq argued it had rights to (a) control over the entire waterway; (b) customs collections on all traffic; and (c) the right to control all warships on the waterway. Iran claimed that, (a) the border ran along the middle of the waterway; (b) both sides should enjoy free navigation on the water; and (c ) Iran should have free movement of its warships on the waterway.8 In the Spring of 1936, the two countries withdrew the case from the League of Nations, and entered into direct negotiations. Negotiations were affected by the leadership balance between Iran and Iraq, which had changed as a result of the death of King Faisal I of Iraq in 1933. His son, King Ghazi I, was not as adept at balancing the demands of Iraq’s various factions. In November 1936, Bakr Sidqi led a coup d’etat in Iraq that led to a period of internal chaos. In 1937, Iraq signed a treaty with Iran. The treaty was very favorable for Iran with respect to the Shatt al-Arab. It gave Iran, (a) control of the island of Abadan, and a four-mile anchorage area in front of Abadan where the Anglo-Persian company had a large oil refinery; (b) free anchorage to Iranian ships at the Iranian ports without paying Iraqi customs; (c) free navigation of all merchant ships; and (d) joint maintenance of the waterway. Iran gained a lot from Iraq’s political weakness at the time of the 1937 agreement. But the real winner appeared to be Brit_________________________________________________ 8

Abdulghani, pp. 4-17; Cordesman, pp. 11-13; Hiro, pp. 8-13.

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ish oil interests, which benefited from British political influence in both Baghdad and Tehran. However, despite another agreement, the two countries continued to dispute the execution of the agreed-upon boundaries. Four years later World War II erupted and Iran was occupied by foreign powers. Foreign occupation undermined Reza Shah’s nationalism doctrine and he abdicated the throne. During World War II both countries were weakened and used as staging areas for European powers to pursue their war interests.9 The Kurds, seeking to exploit the weakened state of the government during World War II, launched another rebellion against the Baghdad government. Mustafa Barzani (Ahmed Barzani’s brother) led the insurgency which failed. Barzani fled from Iraq to Iran, where he helped found the Kurdish Republic of Mahabad in 1946. The Shah crushed this entity and Barzani was forced to flee to the Soviet Union. After World War II the demands of the new Cold War ushered in a brief period of calm between Iran and Iraq. 2.4 Another Component of Escalation: The Cold War and Western Attempts to Create an Anti-Soviet Alliance By 1955, Iran and Iraq were being pressured to choose sides in the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. Iran and Iraq set aside their border disputes and attempted to jointly participate in a regional security agreement born out of the perceived threat of Soviet Communism to the region. The Baghdad Pact (see Box 2) was a security and defense agreement between Turkey, the United Kingdom, Pakistan, Iran, and Iraq. Box 2:

Baghdad Pact10

This was a defense pact involving Middle Eastern countries, from 1954 until approximately 1979. The Baghdad Pact was also known as Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), which was the term used after Iraq left in 1959. It was also referred to as Middle East Treaty Organization. The name comes from the signing that took place in Baghdad, Iraq in 1955. The treaty was initiated by the U.S. and NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, consisting of most West European countries, Turkey, U.S. and Canada) as part of the intent to create worldwide anti-Soviet alliances. During the first stage of the pact, Turkey signed a Pact of Mutual Cooperation with Pakistan. This was soon expanded to include Iraq and subsequently Iran and Great Britain. _________________________________________________ 9

Abdulghani, pp. 116-117; Cordesman, pp. 16-17; Hiro, p. 10-11. See http://lexicorient.com/e.o/baghdad_pact.htm, accessed 15 February 2007.

10

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Part One: The Iran-Iraq War The pact involved security and defense cooperation and refraining from interference in one another’s internal affairs. The pact which intended to secure the common protection of all the member countries never resulted in combat, but did succeed preventing Soviet expansion. The Soviet Union considered the pact “aggressive“. With the signing of the pact, Great Britain handed over its two air-bases to Iraqi national authorities. During its short career in the alliance, Iraq was the strongest regional participant, and even served as the leader in the Western alliance with the Arab world. The pact was designed to be open to new members, principally coming from the Arab League. Western countries even tried to pressure Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria to join, but without success. In fact Arab states, such as Egypt, became fierce opponents of the”imperialistic“ pact.

Baghdad Pact Chronology 1954 February: Turkey signed a Pact of Mutual Cooperation with Pakistan. 1955 February 24: A military agreement was signed between Iraq and Turkey, and the term ”Baghdad Pact“ begins to be used. – Iran, Pakistan and Britain join the Baghdad Pact. 1959 March: The new republican regime of Iraq withdrew the country from the alliance. 1965: Pakistan tried to get help from their allies in their war against India, but without success. 1971: In a new war with India, Pakistan tried once again unsuccessfully to get allied assistance. 1979: The new Islamic regime of Iran withdraws the country from CENTO, as the alliance was now known.

Iraq perceived the pact as advantageous because it allowed it to work with Iran and Turkey to suppress its Kurdish threat and to neutralize any Turkish designs on its territory. Iraq was also looking to extend its British alliance, which was set to expire in 1957. The Shah of Iran viewed the Communist threat seriously and viewed the pact as a means to protect its national security. In 1957, both Iran and Iraq moved towards closer relations with the West by endorsing the Eisenhower doctrine (see Box 3) and rejecting Nasser’s anti-Western agenda in Egypt.

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Box 3:

The Eisenhower Doctrine11

The Eisenhower Doctrine was outlined in an address to the U.S. Congress delivered in January 1957. It was part of the foreign policy of U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower. The doctrine stated that the U.S. would use military force to respond to aggression against the U.S. Further, the doctrine stressed that countries that opposed Communism would be given aid and support by the U.S. The doctrine was, in part, a response to growing Soviet influence in Egypt under Nasser. It was designed to give Arab regimes in the Middle East an alternative to the growing influence of Nasser and his Soviet backers.

In July 1958, Iraq underwent a revolution when nationalist, republican military officers overthrew the pro-Western Hashemite monarchy. Iran viewed this development with alarm fearing Iraq would align itself with Nasser and his panArabism. In 1958, the new Iraqi revolutionary regime preserved its commitments to the Baghdad Pact and appeared eager to remain aligned with Iran and Turkey. It was not until 1959, that Iraq’s leader, Abdul Karim Qasim, succumbed to internal Communist pressure as well as pressure from Nasser in Egypt to withdraw from the U.S. conceived Baghdad Pact. It was also at this stage that Iraq began to make territorial claims on Kuwait. In 1959, unresolved border disputes and skirmishes between Iran and Iraq increased following the Iraqi revolution, and further aggravated tensions. Iran, backed by the U.S., also reasserted its claim that the thalweg was the boundary running through the Shatt al-Arab. Iran’s recognition of Kuwaiti independence in 1961 further antagonized Iraq.12 Iraq’s desire for a central role in Gulf politics was hindered by its ambitions regarding Kuwait during the early 1960s. Iraq based its claims on Kuwait on the fact that Kuwait had been part of the historical Ottoman vilayet of Basra. However, Kuwait always had its own internal independence, and in 1899 had signed a treaty of protection with Britain. In 1961 Kuwait declared its sovereign independence. In the early 1970s Iraq and Kuwait became engaged in border disputes, and clashed over ownership of the Kuwaiti islands of Warba and Bubiyan, which Iraq sought as a strategic counterbalance to Iran’s presence in the Gulf. Iraq’s new rulers demanded Iran relinquish its harbors in Khorramshahr and its refinery on Abadan. Iraq also extended its territorial claim in the Gulf an additional twelve miles, and made new claims on the Iranian province of Khuzis_________________________________________________ 11 Full text of the Presidential address outlining the doctrine can http://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/midleast.htm, accessed 15 February 2007. 12 Abdulghani, p. 15-17 and 77-80; Hiro, pp. 10-11.

be

accessed:

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tan. In 1960, Iraq claimed sovereignty over the island of Abadan, and in 1961, Iraq demanded only Iraqi pilots could navigate ships on the Shatt al-Arab. The Shah responded by sending warships into the Shatt al-Arab and by stopping all toll payments to Iraq and the use of Iraqi pilots. Both countries moved troops into the area, but nothing serious occurred. Iran ultimately conceded to using Iraqi pilots on the waterway, but rejected all other Iraqi claims. Pro-Western Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi perceived the revolution in Iraq as a threat. Iran reacted by taking strategic steps to protect its interests with respect to the Shatt al-Arab, as well as re-orienting its foreign policy to balance a potential hostile Iraq. Iran built a large new oil export terminal on Kharg Island, which opened in 1965. The facility was intended to reduce the Iranian oil industry’s dependence on the Iraqi controlled Shatt al-Arab. However, Iran still relied heavily on its port at Khorramshahr and the refinery on Abadan. Iran also cemented its security bonds with the U.S. and sought terms with the Soviet Union to limit Communist aid to Iraq.13 Between 1958 and 1968 Iraq was weakened by political instability. Three coups and five different governments undermined its ability to assert its claims with respect to Iran. Iran increasingly defined its foreign policy positions in the early 1960s based on Nasser’s pan-Arabist ambitions in Egypt. Iran perceived Nasser’s panArabist agenda as a regional threat. When Qasim was overthrown in Iraq in 1963, the Shah of Iran was concerned the new Iraqi leadership would align itself with Nasser. Iran began to assist the Kurds in Iraq as a means to destabilize the Iraqi regime. In 1967, Nasser’s pan-Arabist agenda was checked by his failure to defeat Israel. Iraq, after rejecting an agreement with the Kurds, was fighting a Kurdish insurgency from 1961 to 1966. Three of Iraq’s five army divisions were engaged with the Kurdish insurgents. In 1966, Iran agreed to deliver arms from the U.S. and Israel to the Iraqi Kurds. In June 1966, Baghdad came to terms with the Kurds. These efforts were undermined when the Iraqi leadership was removed by the Ba’athist coup d’etat in July 1968. However, the Kurds were not easily deterred. They would play a crucial role in Iraq-Iran relations in the early 1970s. And while Kurdish leadership was often manipulated and exploited by foreign powers, they managed to be a painful thorn in the side of the new Ba’ath Arab Socialist Party of 1968 (see Box 4).

_________________________________________________ 13

Abdulghani, pp. 97-99; Cordesman, p. 17.

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Box 4:

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The Ba’ath Party14

The Ba’ath party was an Arab political party founded in Syria and spread to Iraq. Literally, the term means renaissance. Its main ideological objectives were secularism, socialism, and pan-Arab unionism. It emerged in Damascus in 1941 and assumed the Ba’ath name in the early 1950s. It gradually grew in power in Syria. In 1958 – with one of its founders, Salah al-Din Bitar, as foreign minister – it led Syria into the ill-fated United Arab Republic (UAR) with Egypt. The Ba’athists, like most other Syrians, quickly came to resent Egyptian domination, and the Ba’athist members of the union government resigned in December 1959. Syria withdrew from the UAR in 1961. Syria has been ruled by the Ba’ath party ever since. In 1969, Hafiz al-Asad assumed control of the Ba’ath party in Syria and the leadership of the country. He ruled until his death in 2000, and his son, Bashar al-Asad, succeeded him as the Ba’ath ruler of Syria. The Ba’ath ideology spread to Iraq, but it was not until the Iraqi monarchy was overthrown in 1958 that the Ba’ath party became a growing political force. The Ba’athists first came to power in a coup in February 1963, when Abd alSalam Arif became president. Less than one month later, in March 1963, the Ba’ath assumed power in Syria through a military coup d’etat. The Syrian Ba’athists interfered in Iraqi affairs and disputes between the moderates and extremists culminating in an attempted coup by the extremists in November 1963. In 1966, the Iraqi Ba’ath party severed ties with the Ba’ath party in Syria. In July 1968, a bloodless coup brought to power the Ba’athist general Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr, and his close associate Saddam Hussein. Disputes within the party continued and the government periodically purged its dissident members. In September 1977, all members of the Ba’ath Regional Command also became members of the Iraqi state’s Revolutionary Command Council, which meant the party and state became indistinguishable. Al-Bakr resigned in 1978, and Saddam became president. Saddam and the Ba’ath party ruled Iraq until 2003 when Saddam Hussein was deposed by U.S. allied forces. Since their inception, the Ba’athist regimes of Syria and Iraq have often been diametrically opposed. Under Asad in Syria and Saddam in Iraq, both nations moved away from Ba’athist principles, although the ruling parties retained the Ba’ath name.

The Ba’athist coup of 1968 was more than a simple military power-grab; the new Ba’ath Party in Iraq was more sophisticated and organized than the group that _________________________________________________ 14 See Sarah Graham-Brown, Sanctioning Saddam, The Politics of Intervention in Iraq (London and New York: I.B.Tauris 1999), and http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1E1-Baathpar.html accessed 2006-2007.

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had come to power in 1963. In 1963 the Iraqi Ba’ath party had 850 active members. By 1968 Iraq had 5,000 active Ba’ath party members. Founded in Damascus, Syria in 1947, the Ba’ath party was a “nationalist, populist, socialist, and revolutionary” and believed in the “unity and freedom of the Arab Nation within its homeland.” The party rejected class conflict, but endorsed policies of land reform. The party also stood for the nationalization of natural resources, transportation, industry, and finance. The party ideology advocated the unionization of workers and peasants, but also supported limited private ownership and inheritance. At the international level, the Ba’ath party was viewed in its early days as a radical alternative to the pro-Western Arab monarchical regimes which had joined the Baghdad Pact and refused to condemn the Anglo-French-Israeli aggression against Egypt in 1956. The Iraqi Ba’athist group that seized power in 1968 had already succeeded in establishing itself at the level of National Command (encompassing the party throughout the Arab world). In February 1966, at Ninth National Congress in Damascus, the Iraqi delegation split with the Syrian contingent and backed the Ba’ath Party founder Michel Aflaq. The Iraqi group held a separate Ninth National Congress in Beirut in February 1968, which initiated an intense rivalry between the Syrian and Iraqi Ba’ath parties. In 1968, the five-member Ba’athist Revolutionary Ruling Command Council (“RCC”) in Baghdad consolidated its power over the state apparatus by purging the military of non-Ba’ath loyalists, and installing Ba’ath party activists as the head of government ministries. The RCC meticulously weaved the Ba’athist party machine into all aspects of government. Party members were given military training and installed in key military positions with orders not to act without party clearance from Ba’ath headquarters. The military ranks and officers were indoctrinated with Ba’athist ideology and parallel Ba’athist leadership bureaus were established for the military, police, and intelligence services. The goal of the RCC was to bring the military under civilian control. This initiative was led by Ahmad Hassan Bakr, the chairman of the RCC and the republic’s President. Bakr closest adviser was a young and ambitious Saddam Hussein. The fivemember RCC was expanded to fifteen members in November 1969, and nine of the ten new members were civilians. The 1970 Constitution stipulated a twothirds majority vote for new members of RCC, which insured a perpetual civilian majority. The RCC maintained control over the air force and elite army units.15 The Ba’ath party also tightened its grip on civil society by using cadres of party members to set up secret cells in organizations such as educational institutions, trade unions, and professional associations. Members of these cells kept _________________________________________________ 15

Hiro, pp. 18-21.

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their party affiliation secret and met regularly to evaluate their group’s behavior based on Ba’athist ideology. They reported their evaluations to party headquarters. Party membership grew from 5,000 in 1968 to 20,000 in 1974. Obtaining party membership was awarded only by graduating through a strict hierarchical progression through the ranks of sympathizer, supporter, candidate, trainee and then working member. A minimum of seven years was required to complete the progression. And then working members were expected to attend regular party meetings and participate in the activities of the Popular Army, as well as adhere to a strict code of personal conduct and behavior at home and at work. The Ba’ath party used this tight network of loyal party cadres to create a dual structure of state and party. This insured the state would always be subservient to the party, which had used its apparatus to penetrate and control the state. The Ba’athist regime became the beneficiary of the massive oil income that began to flow into its coffers in the early 1970s. Oil income increased from $75 million in 1972 to $8 billion in 1975. This wealth was used to enlarge its popular base of domestic support by funding economic and social projects, and paying generous state salaries and wages. The wealth was also used to project the Ba’ath ideology through a revolutionary foreign policy. Following Egypt’s defeat in its 1967 war with Israel, the Ba’athists wanted to replace Egypt as the pan-Arabist standard-bearer after Nasser’s defeat. The regime saw itself “as the guardian defending the Arab homeland and effecting Arab unity.” Iraq’s radical attack on the regional status quo made it a threat to its conservative monarchical neighbors in the Gulf. It viewed the borders dividing modern Arab states as superficial, temporary, and subject to change. In pursuit of its radical ideology, the Ba’athist regime provided financial and political support for numerous Arab national liberation movements in Africa and the Middle East. In the early 1970s the Iraqi ambitions in the Gulf were viewed by the conservative monarchical regimes of the Gulf states with great suspicion. On one hand the Iraqi state was conducting state-to-state diplomacy supporting the Gulf regimes; yet, on the other hand, the Ba’athist party apparatus was supporting revolutionary movements in the Gulf that were trying to undermine the monarchical states in the Gulf. For example, the Iraqi Ba’athists supported South Yemen, which was fomenting revolution throughout the Gulf. The rise of the Ba’athists in Iraq in 1968 followed by the British withdrawal from the Gulf in 1971 created a power vacuum in the region. Iran sought to fill the British role as Gulf protector and guarantor of the incumbent Gulf monarchical regimes. With the assistance of U.S., Iran used its abundant oil wealth to build a modern, well-equipped military force. It turned itself into the unrivaled military power in the region. Iraq’s Ba’athist regime viewed this Iranian agenda with suspicion, seeing it as an attempt at Persian dominance in Arab territory.

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Iraq also viewed Iran as agent of imperial western interests. The Shah exacerbated this view when he stated:”Western Europe, the United States and Japan see the Gulf as an integral part of their security, yet they are not in a position to ensure that security. That is why we are doing it for them.”16 2.5 Iran: The Gulf‘s Policeman In the early 1970s Iran became the Gulf’s policeman, backed by military and technological support from the U.S. Iran demonstrated its strength in Oman, the Gulf, and in its support for Iraq’s Kurds, to Iraq’s dismay. Tensions regarding the Gulf were further heightened by Iran’s military build-up and further aggravated by Iran’s 1971 occupation of the islands of Abu Musa and the two Tunbs, which had belonged to the UAE emirates of Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah. The islands were potentially rich in oil resources and strategically located. In addition, these three islands in combination with the Iranian islands of Qeshm, Larak and Hormuz, formed a protective ring at the mouth of the Straits of Hormuz. The bulk of Gulf oil was shipped through the Straits of Hormuz. Neither the U.S. nor Britain objected to the Iranian occupation of these islands. Iraq reacted by immediately cutting diplomatic ties with Iran and Britain. Iraq viewed Britain’s silence as “collusion between the United Kingdom and Iran to bequeath Iran the colonial role played by Britain ...” Iraq also objected to Iran’s 1973 intervention to suppress the Dhofari rebellion in Oman (see Box 5). Box 5:

Dhofari Rebellion17

Civil war erupted in the Dhofar province of Oman between 1968 and 1975. The insurgents called themselves”the People’s Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arab Gulf” (“PFLOAG”). Support for the rebellion may have come from South Yemen. In 1973 the Shah of Iran provided military support to the Sultan of Oman against the rebels. In early 1974 an Iranian combat brigade was placed in Oman on a permanent basis. Iran continually swapped its officers and soldiers in this unit to ensure its combat-readiness. The latest Western weapons acquired by Iran were tested in Oman. In 1975, the PFLOAG was defeated. British commandos also assisted Oman defeat the rebels. Iran’s military support was critical, while Saudi Arabia provided important financial and diplomatic support to Oman. This was a manifestation of the U.S.’s ”Twin Pillars” strategy in operation. _________________________________________________ 16

Abdulghani, pp. 46, 79, 84; Hiro, p. 21. Henner Furtig, Iran’s rivalry with Saudi Arabia between the Gulf Wars (Reading, U.K.: Garnet Publishing, 2002) , p. 11

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The rebels in Oman objected to the rule of Sultan Sa’id bin Taimour and espoused Marxist and socialist views that were perceived by some as a potential Communist threat. In 1974, Oman and Iran signed an agreement for joint naval control of the Straits of Hormuz. In a practical and symbolic sense, control over the Straits of Hormuz was control over the commercial life of the Gulf. In the case of Oman, Iran had used its military strength to ensure the status quo. To increase the strength of its foreign policy hand in the region, Iraq turned to the Soviet Union. In April 1972, Iraq signed a 15-year Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union.18 Iraq’s pact with the Soviet Union alarmed the U.S., which was in the midst of the Cold War. In response, President Richard Nixon strengthened U.S. ties with Iran and agreed to supply it with any non-nuclear weapons it desired. Furthermore, the U.S. agreed to cooperate with Iran in supporting the Kurdish insurgency in Iraq. The Kurds had launched a renewed insurgency against the new Ba’athist regime soon after it assumed power. In March 1969, they attacked the Kirkuk oil refinery which was the engine driving Iraq’s oil industry. The Kurds engaged the Iraqi military for almost one year, taxing Iraqi financial and military resources. In March 1970, facing an internal military plot and a Kurdish insurgency that was costing 30 percent of the country’s annual budget, the Ba’athist regime came to an agreement with Mustafa Barzani’s Kurdish Democratic Party (“KDP”). The agreement was to grant the Kurds a degree of autonomy in the northern region where they constituted a majority. The Kurdish language was to be recognized as one of two official languages (Arabic, the other) in the Kurdish region, and the Kurdish nationality one of two Iraqi nationalities. The agreement also called for a Kurd be appointed vice-president of Iraq. The Ba’athist RCC immediately rejected the Kurdish nominee for vice-president. It also refused to grant autonomy to the Kurds in a region that produced three fifths of Iraqi oil revenue. Instead, the Ba’athist regime continued its Arabization plan in the Kirkuk area by resettling Arabs from south Iraq and deporting Shi‘i Kurds to Iran. In response, Barzani increased his Kurdish forces and cultivated relationships with the U.S., Iran, and Israel. In March 1974, seeking to neutralize the Kurdish threat, the Ba’athist regime sought to enforce the 1970 agreement for Kurdish autonomy in its northern region. It nominated a legislative council for Kurdistan in Arbil (or Irbil), the Kurdish capital. However, the Ba’athist regime excluded the oil producing areas of Kirkuk, Sinjar, and Qanaqin from the area. The KDP insisted on postponing the legislative council until a census could determine the exact numbers of Kurds _________________________________________________ 18

Abdulghani, p. 90; Hiro, p. 15.

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in the areas the regime was excluding from their control. The Ba’athists ignored this demand, which triggered a renewed Kurdish rebellion. In 1974, 45,000 Kurdish rebels engaged nearly 100,000 Iraqi troops. Iran’s support was crucial for the Kurds. Iran supplied the Kurds with U.S. and Israeli weapons, and used the military to assist the rebels with anti-aircraft missiles and artillery. Barzani claimed to have liberated 1.5 million Kurds inhabiting 25,000 square miles in northern Iraq, on the Iranian border. In January 1975, the Shah placed two army regiments in the “liberated” areas of northern Iraq in support of the Kurds.19 Iraq’s internal war with the Kurds was draining its human and economic resources. Some estimates indicate Iraq spent as much as $4 billion fighting the Kurds, and the Iraqi army suffered as many as 16,000 casualties in 1974 and 1975.20 Iraq badly needed a compromise with Iran to neutralize its Kurdish resistance. Iran, for its part, understood that the Kurdish resistance could easily spread to Iran, where the Iranian Kurds also harbored secessionist aspirations. Turkey and Algeria began to mediate between Iraq and Iran for an agreement. The Shatt al-Arab became the focus of agreement between Iran and Iraq to end Iranian support of the Kurdish insurgency in Iraq. The Shatt al-Arab flows through southern Iraq into the Gulf and begins where the Euphrates and Tigris rivers meet. It is a major shipping artery through the region. The growing economic importance of Abadan and Khorramshahr, Iran’s modern ports on the Shatt al-Arab, added weight to Iran’s claims on the Shatt al-Arab.21 The second Treaty of Erzurum in 1847 granted the Ottoman Empire control over the Shatt al-Arab. Iraq viewed itself as the modern successor to the Ottoman Empire with respect to its control of the Shatt al-Arab. Iran was entitled to unrestricted navigation on the Shatt al-Arab, but modern maintenance and control of the waterway was exercised by Iraq. Control over the Shatt al-Arab was considered strategically and culturally vital to Iraq. Iraq has limited coastline, and the Shatt al-Arab represented its connection to the Gulf. In March 1975, in exchange for Iran’s cooperation regarding the Kurds, Iraq conceded to Iran on the issue of the Shatt al-Arab boundary. Iran’s Kurdish support was critical to the KDP. After Iran withdrew its support, the Kurdish rebellion died out. The Algiers Agreement, concluded at a summit of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (“OPEC”) in Algiers, established the line of deepest water, or thalweg, as the international boundary on the Shatt al-Arab. The agreement no longer limited Iran to the eastern bank of the waterway and gave it a shared control of traffic through the waterway. The agreement represented a significant achievement for Iran. Iran had argued for a thalweg bound_________________________________________________ 19 20 21

Abdulghani, p.90; Hiro, pp. 14-16. Abdulghani, pp. 154-155. Abdulghani, pp. 106-109 and 154-155; Hiro, p.14 .

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ary on the Shatt al-Arab for decades. Compromising on control of the Shatt alArab was a political defeat for Iraq.22 While Iraq may have suffered a political defeat in making concessions with regard to the Shatt al-Arab boundary, the waterway itself was not as strategically critical as it had been in years past. To be sure, it was still a defining issue in the region with the capacity to ignite tensions on both sides. However, Iraq had reduced its critical dependence on the Shatt al-Arab. It created new ports at Umm Qasr and al-Fao, and established offshore oil terminals in the Gulf. To reduce its dependence on Gulf ports, it created a new road through Turkey and Jordan and built two new pipelines that became operational in the late 1970s. One pipeline ran for 1,000 kilometers through Turkey and ended in Yumurtalik on the Mediterranean. The second pipeline ran through Syria to the port of Baniyas. The Algiers Agreement also awarded Iraq 240 miles of disputed border territory. This potentially limited the ability of both countries to foment ethnic unrest along the common border. The Algiers Agreement was viewed as a pragmatic step forward for relations between Iran and Iraq. The changing military realities contributed to this pragmatism. Following Britain’s 1968 declaration to withdraw from the Gulf, both Iran and Iraq initiated massive military build-ups. Iran – backed by U.S. technology – surely was the greater of the two, but Iraq, with Soviet assistance, also increased its air power, artillery, and armor. This military strength, on both sides, made each nation’s key economic installations vulnerable to attack regardless of how the Shatt al-Arab and the border issues were resolved. The Algiers Agreement brought an end to the arms race, which would reduce the influence of the two superpowers (the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.) in the Gulf region. The two countries were also interested in strengthening their economic position via OPEC. In the aftermath of the 1975 agreement, Iraq was also able to improve its image with the conservative Arab monarchical regimes, which now viewed the Ba’athist regime as less of a radicalizing agent and more accepting of the status quo in the Gulf. The agreement was also viewed as the beginning of normalized relations between Iran and Iraq.23 Iran’s perception of its historical relations with Iraq was articulated by Iran’s Foreign Minister in December 1965, when he said: “We have more than 1200 kilometers of common frontier with Iraq; evidences of the Iranian culture and civilization are visible all along the Eastern area of the Euphrates; the two nations are Musulmans; the Holy Shrines of our sacred Imams are situated in Iraq; remnants of the Iranian genius in art and workmanship are still standing in Iraq; the Iranians have always been ready from time _________________________________________________ 22 23

Abdulghani, p.152-155; Cordesman, p.19-21; Hiro, p. 17. Abdulghani, pp.152-155, Cordesman, pp.19-21; Hiro, p. 17.

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However, major ideological differences between Iran and Iraq remained. The two countries could not agree on a unified Gulf security system. Iraq still suspected Iran’s military ambitions in the Gulf and its close ties to the U.S. military. There was also some indication that Saddam Hussein, who was a principal negotiator of this agreement for Iraq, viewed the Shatt al-Arab agreement with Iran as a personal humiliation made during a time of weakness.25 During the first half of the 1970s several sources of tension emerged between Iran and Iraq: (1) the rivalry between the two nations for influence and dominance in the Gulf; (2) the pressure to align themselves with a Cold War superpower; (3) territorial rivalries as exemplified by the dispute over the Shatt al-Arab; and (4) Iran’s support of the Kurdish ambitions in northern Iraq. The Algiers Agreement appeared to bring some degree of resolution with respect to the latter two issues. Competition for influence in the Gulf continued, but domestic developments in both Iran and Iraq that began to change the course of Gulf relations as well as relations between Iran and Iraq. These issues will be further examined in the following section. In summary, the historical sources of conflict between Iran and Iraq can be grouped into three broad categories: (a) cultural: Persian versus Arab traditions; (b) religious: the Shi‘i and Sunni split; and (c) territorial: the on-going boundary disputes, as epitomized by the battle for influence in the Gulf and the Shatt alArab dispute. Each of these historical categories is useful for analysis; however, over time, the distinctions collapsed into one another contributing to a general, underlying political hostility between the two states.

3

The Regional Status Quo

Following the Algiers Agreement in 1975, the struggle for regional leadership and dominance in the Gulf became the central issue between Iran and Iraq. How_________________________________________________ 24

Abdulghani, pp. 20-21. Ralph King, Adelphi Papers 219, The Iran-Iraq War: The Political Implications (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1987), p. 7.

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ever, this struggle was muted, somewhat, by each nation’s new domestic challenges. In March 1975, facing increasing internal opposition, the Shah ended Iran’s two party political system and created the government sponsored Hizb-i Rastakhiz, or Resurgence Party.26 Internal opposition in Iran focused on political repression, the Shah’s denigration of the country’s Islamic moral code and tradition, and socio-economic hardship. Iran’s race for Gulf dominance may have contributed to its social unrest. Urban poverty in Iran multiplied exponentially during the 1970s. And at approximately the same time (between 1975 and 1980), following the Algiers Agreement, Iran imported $15.5 billion in military equipment and weapons. In contrast, during the same period Iraq imported $8.1 billion in arms and equipment. These facts may have established Iran as the preeminent local power in the Gulf, but, paradoxically, it may have weakened the Shah ability to sustain his own rule. Meanwhile, the Algiers agreement had neutralized the Kurdish insurrection by ending critical Iranian support and freeing the Iraqi leadership confront growing Shi‘i unrest. The Shi is had been second class citizens in Iraq dating back to the Sunni Ottoman Empire. Shi‘is were denied public office under the Ottomans and Shi‘i ulama were not permitted to control waqfs (religious endowments). However, the Ottomans permitted the Shi‘i holy cities of Najaf and Karbala – containing the respective shrines of Imam Ali and Imam Hussein – to operate as semi-autonomous regions. This changed in 1968 with the new Ba’ath resurgence in Baghdad. The secular Ba’ath regime shut down a theological college in Najaf, harassed Shi‘i ulama, and permitted the sale of alcohol in the Shi’a holy cities. The Shi‘i clergy resisted and were repressed. In the late 1950s, a secret Shi‘i resistance group called Al Daawa al Islamiya (The Islamic Resistance Call) was formed. The group was supported by Ayatollah Muhsin Hakim, the senior most Shi‘i cleric in Najaf, the main Shi‘i city in southern Iraq. In December 1974, Shi‘i religious processions were transformed into violent anti-Ba’athist demonstrations. The government responded by rounding up 25 Shi‘i leaders and executing five of them. The government also tried to co-opt the Shi‘i majority in southern Iraq by using oil revenues to fund development projects in impoverished areas. However, the Shi‘i grievances were more than socio-economic. The Shi‘i majority was absent from leadership positions in every branch of the government and the military. There were no Shi‘is on the Revolutionary Command Council. However, groups like Al Daawa al Islamiya, were not seeking representation from the Ba’athists. Al Daawa was ideologically opposed to Ba’athist rule. The secret group was formed in response _________________________________________________ 26 Ervand Abrahamian, Iran, Between Two Revolutions (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1982), p. 440.

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to Ba’athist neglect of Islam and Islamic institutions, and to protest the Ba’athist state alliance with Communism and the Soviet Union. Tension between the Shi’is and the Ba’athist regime grew until it erupted in 1977. In February 1977, the government sealed off Karbala during a Shi‘i ceremony claiming a Syrian agent had been caught attempting to smuggle explosives into Imam Hussein’s shrine. Shi‘i pilgrims from Najaf to Karbala were stopped by the police. Riots and violent protests erupted, and Shi‘i protesters seized a police station in Haidariya. The police opened fire and killed several people. News of the incident triggered riots in Najaf, which lasted several days. Troops were called in, and 2000 Shi’is were arrested, including Hojat al-Islam Muhammad Baqir Hakim, the son of the Ayatollah. This incident was the most direct challenge to Ba’athist rule since it came to power. The country’s leadership had just implemented a 1976-1980 Development Plan and was trying to re-assert itself in the Gulf in the wake of the Algiers Agreement. Saddam Hussein, the Vice-President, responded to the Shi‘i incitement by persecuting Al Daawa mercilessly, and by granting the Shi’a masses increasing economic and political concessions. He co-opted Shi‘i leadership by incorporating them into the Ba’ath leadership, but altered the structure of the ruling councils so that the Shi‘i members only had nominal authority. Shi‘is remained marginalized and real power remained with the Sunni Ba’ath ministers, and more precisely, with those answering to Saddam Hussein. Indeed, Hussein had power and in 1978 could count on rapidly increasing oil wealth, which was a result of the artificially high price of oil created by OPEC’s oil policy which was meant to pressure the West for its support for Israel.27 Saddam Hussein was 31 years old when the Ba’ath party came to power in 1968. He was not a member of the RCC, but he was the closest adviser to the RCC chairman and president of the republic, Ahmed Hassan Bakr. Hussein had been raised by his maternal uncle, Khairallah Talfa, who was a cousin of Bakr. In 1969, Hussein won a place on the RCC. Hussein and Bakr dominated the party leadership by eliminating their enemies. Hussein negotiated the Algiers Agreement as Bakr’s vice-president, but by the mid-1970s he had surpassed Bakr and began to consolidate his power. Hussein needed Bakr in the 1970s because Bakr was a former military officer, and Bakr’s moderate tone and pious personality were respected by the older, conservative elements in Iraq. Hussein’s confrontation with the Shi‘is demonstrated his iron fist in dealing with challenges to state authority and distanced him from Bakr, who wanted a compromise with the Shi is. In July 1979, Hussein claimed to have uncovered a conspiracy against the regime. Hussein identified 68 Ba’athist civilian and mili_________________________________________________ 27

Hiro, pp. 20-29.

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tary leaders who were involved in the conspiracy. Six members of the RCC who were loyal to Hussein formed a tribunal that held a summary trial of the suspected conspirators. 21 of the conspirators were executed in August 1979, including five members of the RCC. Muhyi Abdul Hussein Mashhadi was a Shi‘i member of the RCC who was executed and accused of being one of the masterminds of the plot. Mashhadi had objected to the government’s harsh response to the Shi‘i demonstrations, and also suggested president Bakr’s successor should be selected through a free vote of the RCC. After the August 1979 executions, Hussein purged dissidents in every organized sector of civil society. At the age of 42, Saddam Hussein had tightened his grip on the Ba’athist regime in Iraq.28 In 1978, Iraq benefited from massive new oil wealth brought about by rapid increases in the price of oil. This led Hussein to moderate his position toward the West. Hussein could afford to pursue this strategy because Iraq’s new financial independence allowed him to distance Iraq from the Soviet Union. The new oil reserves demanded materials and technology from the West, and the new wealth created a new demand for consumer good imports. Hussein also initiated limited privatization and economic liberalization. He may have done this to ease his dependence on the Ba’ath party structure by creating a new group of economic elites who were loyal to his rule. At this juncture it appeared that Hussein was beginning to govern on a pragmatic rather than ideological basis. He was substituting his personality for ideology and this may have improved Iraq’s relations with the conservative Arab states and the West.29 Iraq’s discovery of new oil wealth in 1978 was not the only significant change for Iraq. Egypt’s September 1978 peace accord with Israel at Camp David, a mountain resort in Maryland, U.S., changed the dynamics of inter-Arab politics. Peace with Israel in 1978 was largely rejected by the conservative Arab states of the Gulf. Egypt was cast aside as the standard bearer for the Arab world. Iraq was eager to fill this role in place of Egypt. In 1978, Iraq hosted an antiSadat Arab Summit Conference in Baghdad, cementing its anti-Israel credentials and strongly suggesting its new ambition to play the leading role in Arab politics. Iraq even came to terms with Syria for a brief period of reconciliation in October 1978. The broadening anti-Shah movement in Iran during 1978 also allowed Iraq to play a larger role in regional politics, particularly in the Gulf.30

_________________________________________________ 28

Ibid. Gerd Nonneman, “The Gulf States and the Iran-Iraq War: Pattern Shifts and Continuities,” in Iran, Iraq, and The Legacies of War, Eds. Lawrence G. Potter and Gary G. Sick, (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004), p. 171. 30 Abdulghani, p.171. 29

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Khomeini and the Islamic Revolution

Ayatollah Khomeini’s emergence in 1978 and the establishment of the Islamic Republic in Iran represented a radical ideological and expansionist threat to the Iraqi Ba’ath regime, as well as to the conservative Gulf monarchies. Since the end of World War II, the Gulf monarchies had been coping with the threats of pan-Arabism and Communist ideology. Iran’s militant Islamic regime represented a new kind of threat to the region. Khomeini rejected the concept of modern nationalism. He did not accept the legitimacy of the territorial nation-state, which he saw as an artificial creation that divided the Muslim community, or ‘umma. In fact, Khomeini sought to reunite the entire Muslim community under his banner of Shi‘I Islam: “Its ultimate goal was to launch an ‘ideological crusade’ aimed at bringing the genuine message of Islam to all peoples everywhere. In fact, Khomeini often compared the movement that brought him to power with the advent of Islam, and with its overall message extending to humanity at large.”31 Khomeini was 77 years old when he assumed power in February 1979. He had actively led the anti-Shah campaign for 15 years. Khomeini was born the son of the chief cleric of the town of Khomein, 220 miles southwest of Tehran. At 19, Khomeini became a student of Ayatollah Abdul Karim Hairi-Yazdi in Arak. Khomeini later moved to the holy city of Qom with Hairi-Yazdi. Khomeini completed his Shi’a theological studies in 1925, and two years later published his thesis on ethics and spiritual philosophy. His thesis was written in Arabic, a language he had learned as a child. Khomeini developed a reputation as a teacher who married ethical-spiritual problems with contemporary social issues. In 1941 Khomeini published a book attacking the nationalist dictatorship of Reza Shah Pahlavi. In 1945 Khomeini became a Hojat al-Islam (“proof of islam”), which meant he held a rank one level below Ayatollah (“sign of Allah”). Khomeini had become a follower of Ayatollah Muhammad Hussein Borujerdi in 1936, when his teacher, Hairi-Yazdi, died. In 1961, following Borujerdi’s death, Khomeini’s followers encouraged him to publish his interpretations of the Sharia. His book, Clarifications of the Points of the Sharia, earned him the rank of Ayatollah. In 1963, in a series of public sermons in Qom, Khomeini denounced Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi’s “White Revolution.” In June 1963, Khomeini became a hero to the underclasses when he publicly attacked the Shah’s pro-Western, secular, dictatorial rule. In 1964 Khomeini was exiled to Turkey. From there he went to Najaf in Iraq, and continued to attack the Shah from Najaf until he was expelled by Saddam Hussein, at the Shah’s request, in late 1978. Khomeini and his _________________________________________________ 31 David Menashri, Post Revolutionary Politics in Iran: Religion, Society, and Power (Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2001), p. 173.

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followers used audio-cassette technology to mass distribute Khomeini’s prerecorded messages throughout Iran, despite his exile. Khomeini messages were embraced by the Shi‘i religious masses of Iran. Khomeini called for Muslim people to be ruled by the laws of Islam and governed by the ulama who exercised exclusive authority over religious law. Khomeini’s governing innovation was to create the concept of the velayat-e faqih or the “guardianship of the jurisconsult.”32 For Khomeini, only an Islamic state could protect Muslim interests and provide for the spiritual guidance of man. His vision was of a pan-Islamic region freed from geographic borders. In February 1980, Khomeini gave a speech declaring his intention to export his radical Islamic vision throughout the world. Khomeini’s ideology emerged in response to the corruption of Pahlavi dynasty and the secular rule of the Shah. Khomeini explicitly attacked the conception of a society ruled by a hereditary monarchy. Khomeini’s revolutionary ideology was a direct threat to the rulers of all the monarchical states in the Gulf. The Gulf’s proximity to Iran made it the closest target for Khomeini to begin to export his revolution. Furthermore, Khomeini’s ideology was Shi‘i, which might be expected to appeal to the large Shi‘i groups ruled by Sunni regimes throughout the Gulf.33 Khomeini’s regional revolutionary agenda became apparent in 1979 when he began sending religious emissaries to Gulf states to propagate his teachings. Khomeini’s son-in-law was expelled from Kuwait for politicizing his religious sermons and attacking the local political leadership. Another Khomeini emissary was expelled from Bahrain. Khomeini’s teachings and sermons began circulating throughout the Gulf on audio-cassettes. The Iranian Broadcasting Service, broadcasting to the Gulf in Arabic, encouraged the local populations to overthrow their “anti-Islamic” regimes. Iranian President Bani-Sadr attacked Gulf regimes and promised support to Islamic movements that would destroy them. Iran supported the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain and the Islamic Revolution Organization of the Arabian Peninsula. In December 1981, Bahraini security services stopped an Iranian backed coup attempt. The plot was conducted by agents from the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain and trained in Iran and coordinated with Iranian officials. The new Iranian destabilizing influence in the Gulf created a renewed sense of Arab solidarity, which brought the Gulf closer to Iraq’s Ba’athist ideology.34 Khomeini’s politicization of Islam in Iran was in direct ideological conflict with Iraq’s secular Ba’ath regime. Ba’athists viewed Islam as part of their greater _________________________________________________ 32 33 34

King, p.8. Abdulghani, pp. 179-180; Hiro, pp. 33-34; King, p. 8. Abdulghani, pp. 196-200.

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Arab cultural heritage. Further, they viewed Khomeini’s radical ideology as a fanatical Shi‘i strain of Islam, at odds with the true beliefs of the religion. On a pragmatic level, Iraqi Ba’athist ideology relied on Arab nationalism to unite a diverse Iraqi population threatened by sectarian, ethnic, and religious divisions. The Ba’athist principles appealed to a greater Arab nation, which could unite Shi‘i and Kurdish majorities behind a ruling Sunni minority. In 1979, soon after Khomeini’s rise to power, a verbal war erupted between Iran and Iraq encapsulating the ideological clash between the two neighbors. Khomeini was interested in fomenting unrest in Iraq to consolidate his power at home and to assert his claim on the Shi‘i holy cities of Najaf and Karbala. Khomeini also had a personal score to settle with Iraqi Ba’athist leadership: in 1978 they expelled him from Iraq (at the Shah’s request) after having lived in exile there for fourteen years. Khomeini’s new Islamic revolutionary agenda threatened Iraq’s increasing influence in the region as the dominant Arab player in the region.35 A renewed competition for supremacy in the Gulf between Iran and Iraq reemerged following Khomeini’s rise to power. Iran sought to export its brand of revolutionary Islam to its Islamic neighbors, whereas Iraq was eager to play a leading role in guaranteeing the security status quo of its fellow Arab neighbors against the Iran’s new religious hegemony. Each side accused the other of expansionist ambitions. The ideological differences between Iran and Iraq escalated very quickly into a war of words and then a full-scale war. In March 1979, Iran declared it would not withdraw from the UAE islands of Abu Musa and the two Tunbs occupied under the Shah. In July 1979, Iraq threatened to “cut off the criminal hands” that challenged Arab sovereignty or threatened territorial integrity. Iran re-initiated its support for Iraqi Kurds and began supporting Iraq’s underground Shi‘i movements. On 1 April 1980, the Iranian backed al-Daawa party attempted to assassinate Iraq’s Deputy Premier, Tariq ‘Aziz. Soon after, Iran’s Foreign Minister made several statements calling for the destruction of Iraq’s Ba’athist regime. On 17 April 1980, the Iranian Foreign Minister send a statement to Arab governments calling for “the destruction of the Ba’athist Iraqi regime, (which is) another puppet of the world-devouring imperialism.” Also on 17 April 1980, Ayatollah Khomeini stated, “Iran will break Iraq and advance to Baghdad.” Khomeini also encouraged the Iraqi army and people to rebel against their government, stating, “The people and army of Iraq must turn their back on the Ba’ath regime and overthrow it ... because this regime that is attacking Iran ... is _________________________________________________ 35

King, p. 9.

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attacking the Koran and Islam ...” Khomeini’s rhetoric designed to incite Iraq’s Shi‘is to rebel against its own government was a miscalculation. Khomeini appears to have overestimated the Shi‘is’ loyalty to their co-religionists in Iran, and overlooked the level of penetration the Iraqi power structure had achieved in Iraqi society. The Ba’ath party’s influence extended into every major institution and organization in Iraq. In April 1980, Saddam Hussein, trying to prevent the emergence of another home-grown Khomeini and neutralize internal Shi’a resistance, had the revered Iraqi Shi‘i Ayatollah, Mohammad Baqir al-Sadr put to death.36 Isolated terrorist violence between Iran and Iraq quickly re-ignited border conflict. Between June and September 1980, border clashes between Iran and Iraq increased in frequency and intensity. Iraq claimed there had been 193 border violations during this period. On 4 September 1980, Iraq claimed Iran used heavy artillery to shell the Iraqi border towns of Khanaqin, Mandali, and Zarbatiyah. Iraq also claimed Iran shelled its oil installations at Naft Khanah. These attacks triggered Iraqi responses that moved the two sides closer to war. On 17 September 1980, Saddam Hussein stated Iranians had violated the terms of the Algiers Agreement and Iraq would no longer abide by its terms. Hussein declared the control over the entire Shatt al-Arab would revert to Iraq. Severe border clashes followed this declaration, and on 19 September 1980 Iran announced that it had lost two fighter planes in clashes with Iraq along the Shatt alArab. The Iranian military reserves were activated and heavy fighting was reported along the Shatt al-Arab. On 21 September 1980, the Iraqis shelled the Iranian port of Khorramshahr, and Iranian planes attacked Basra. By 22 September 1980, Iraq had launched a full air invasion into Iran, striking at key strategic military locations. In September 1980, Iran’s leadership was still trying to consolidate its domestic power. Iraq, facing a disorganized and unprepared Iran that was directly attacking its stability, might have believed its best opportunity to both preserve itself and play a leading security role in the region was at hand. Thus, the war begun.37 The 1975 Algiers Agreement had ushered in a regional status quo between Iran and Iraq that Gulf states were comfortable with. Iraq’s image underwent a transformation as the region’s conservative regimes became comfortable with the post-Algiers Agreement status quo. In 1968, the Ba’athist regime was perceived by conservative Gulf monarchies as a radical regime capable of undermining regional stability in the Gulf by fomenting pan-Arabist resistance to traditional monarchical rule. By 1978, Egypt’s Camp David betrayal, the Algiers Agree_________________________________________________ 36 37

Abdulghani, pp. 184-189. Abdulghani, pp. 202-205; King, p.10.

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ment, and Khomeini’s rise to power all worked to transform Iraq’s image in the Gulf from a potential threat to a defender of Arab strategic interests. The outbreak of war between Iran and Iraq in September 1980 created a new set of concerns for the Gulf states and forced them to assess their regional security and political stability in the midst of a bitter regional power struggle.

5

The War

The Iran-Iraq War was fought for nearly nine years. Inexact estimates show a low figure of 450,000 Iranians killed and 600,000 wounded; and 150,000 Iraqis killed and 400,000 wounded. It was a long and bloody war. Iraq invaded Iran in 1980 expecting an easy victory and a quick war. As mentioned above, Iraq’s perceived its attack to be a preemptive strike at a new Iranian regime which was openly hostile, but disorganized and vulnerable. Iraq hoped to take advantage of the internal strife in Iran by destroying the Islamic Republic and asserting its regional authority. Its hopes were dashed by developments on the battlefield. After early limited successes, using air strikes as a precursor to a massive ground invasion that occupied a large area of Iranian territory, Iraq found itself fighting a prolonged and plodding war. Iraq’s initial objective to gain control of both banks of the Shatt al-Arab waterway was unsuccessful. Internal strife and a collapse of Iran’s military command and political structure never materialized. A month into the war, the two armies were bogged down in a struggle that would test both ruling regimes. During the second year of the war, Iran managed to push Iraq out of Iran, neutralizing Iraq’s early success in the war. By mid-1981 Khomeini began to effectively consolidate control of the government and military. Bani-Sadr was removed as commander-in-chief and exiled from the country. Khomeini then appointed his own military leadership, which allowed Iran to mobilize hundreds of thousands of Revolutionary Guards. A few months later, Iran launched the first of four large ground offensives that would continue into the spring of 1982. Large numbers of casualties were taken on both sides, however, Iran managed to push Iraq out of Iranian territory. Iran employed huge amounts of manpower in these offensives, including its Basij, who were largely untrained religious volunteers. The Pasdaran and the Basij would flood the war zone with people, attacking “as waves of combatants”, with little regard for proper military tactics or

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their own safety. By the end of May 1982, Iran took back nearly 5,500 square kilometers of territory and inflicted large casualties on Iraq.38 Beginning in July 1982, during Ramadan, Iran went on the offensive attempting to capture Basra and conquer Iraq. Up until the end of August, Iran unsuccessfully tried to gain ground in Iraq. Iran suffered huge numbers of casualties during these attacks and benefited minimally, if at all. The Iraqi Army had dug in along its borders taking a strong defensive position. Iran appeared to be ready to fight a long war of attrition on the ground and was counting on its superior economic resources to help it outlast Iraq. The Iraqis developed a long-term strategy to attack Iran’s economic resources by targeting its oil exports in the Gulf. Iran’s offensives continued through 1983 and did not accomplish much. By 1984, both sides were beginning to feel the manpower and financial pressure from the fighting.39 In 1985, Iran continued to put its faith alternatively in offensive thrusts on the land front and in build-ups to suggest that such attacks were forthcoming. Iraq maintained a stubbornly defensive position that left it incapable of seizing opportunities for counter-offensives on the ground. Instead Iraq initiated large scale air-strikes against Iranian cities. Little changed during this phase of the fighting. The fighting continued on a large scale, involving thousands of men and large numbers of casualties, but little strategic ground was gained. Each side’s goals remained the same: Iran sought to overthrow Saddam Hussein, and Iraq tried to force a peace. Iran renewed its offensives in southern Iraq during 1986. The main objectives were to capture the Fao Peninsula and block Iraqi access to the Gulf, attack and capture Basra from the north, disrupt Iraqi oil production in the south, block Iraqi access to Kuwait, and support a Shi‘i uprising in southern Iraq. Iran was able to capture portions of the Fao Peninsula in February and March of 1986, but both sides suffered very high casualties. Iraq employed chemical weapons during these attacks. Iraq used such weapons (including: nerve agents, cyanide agents, and mustard gas) against Iran throughout the war with mixed success. As one military analyst notes, “while up to 8,500 Iranians were affected by gas during the Wal-Fajr 8 and 9 offensives, only 700 seem to have been killed or seriously wounded – an uncertain return in casualties for the size of the Iraqi effort and worldwide criticism of Iraq’s use of poison gas.”40 At the end of December 1986, _________________________________________________ 38

Foreign Report, 14 January 1982; Kayhan International, 30 March 1982 Kayhan, 29 November 1982; Radio Baghdad, 1 October 1982 – Daily Report, 14 October 1982; Radio Baghdad, 26 March 1982 – Daily Report 29 March 1982. Washington Post, 8 April 1982. 39 Radio Tehran, 13 July 1982 – Daily Report, 13 July 1982; Radio Baghdad, 27 February 1982 – BBC, Summary of World Broadcasting, 29 February 1984. 40 Cordesman, p. 224

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and early 1987, Iran launched a series of failed offensives to capture Basra. Iran suffered tens of thousands of casualties in these poorly planned attacks. By early February 1987, Iran had as many as 17,000 dead soldiers and Iraq 6,000. Between December 1986 and April 1987 Iran may have had as many as 50,000 soldiers killed. These were the last serious ground offensives by Iran, who was experiencing political fatigue regarding the nature and strain of its military strategy. In 1987, the war was internationalized by the tanker war evolving in the Gulf. The war of attrition continued on the ground, and civilian populations were increasingly hit. Iranian ground forces remained entrenched east of Basra and continued guerrilla operations with Kurdish support in northern Iraq. The Iraqi air force increased its attacks in Iran and the lower Gulf. Iran retaliated by targeting Kuwaiti oil exports. Kuwait received superpower protection for its oil exports, which initiated a major U.S. naval operation. Iran and the U.S. were increasingly moving toward a confrontation. The UN peace initiative was being pushed back and forth, with the U.S. advocating for an arms embargo of Iran, and the U.S.S.R. resisting because it was seeking to develop ties with Iran. Iran used the UN peace process to both seek additional concessions and delay international action. Finally, the fighting continued on the borders and showed no signs of producing a decisive outcome. 41 In the spring of 1988, Iraq launched a series of land offensives that changed the course of the war. Iraq re-conquered the Fao Peninsula at the mouth of the Gulf, by mid-April 1988. In late May, Iraq needed only one day to re-conquer Salamoheh east of Basra. Iran had needed 50,000 soldiers killed to seize that territory in 1987. Iraq also won a series of small battles in Kurdish territory, driving back the combined Iranian-Kurdish forces from positions they had held for almost two years. Iran was facing increasing domestic pressure regarding its losses. On 13 June 1988, Iran launched an attack against Iraq near Salamoheh. Iran experienced some initial success, but was driven back and experienced heavy casualties again. At the end of June, Iraq launched an offensive at Majnoon quickly defeating Iranian forces and driving into Iranian territory. Iran again suffered thousands of casualties. Finally, on 12 July 1988, Iraqi forces attacked and captured the oil fields in the Zubaidat border area of Iran. Iranian forces put-up little resistance. On 20 July 1988, Khomeini accepted a cease-fire,

_________________________________________________ 41

Radio Tehran, 8 June 1987 – Daily Report, 3 July 1987; Radio Tehran, 15 October – Daily Report, 15 October 1987; Radio Tehran, 20 November 1987 – BBC, Summary of World Broadcasting, 23 November 1987; Radio Tehran, 11 December 1987 – Daily Report, 11 November 1987; The Economist, 16 January 1988.

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and on 8 August 1988, the UN announced a cease-fire would go into effect on 20 August 1988. 42 There appears to have been no clear winner or loser to this war. Iraq clearly had the upper hand on the battlefield, but Iran may have skillfully stopped a deteriorating military and economic situation from getting worse by accepting the cease-fire. Khomeini claimed success, “We have not been defeated or conquered in any field. Even in the war, the victory went to our nation. The enemies have achieved nothing.”43

6

Regional Impact of the Iran-Iraq War

The Iran-Iraq War broke out amid a series of troublesome developments in the region. The relatively weak Gulf states began to reassess their security interests in response to these shifting regional threats. There were four primary factors that mobilized the Gulf regimes to protect their interests: (1) the Islamic revolution in Iran, and fear of it spreading to their lands; (2) the 1979 Soviet invasion of Aghanistan; (3) the threat of unilateral American military action in the Gulf region in response to the Soviet threat; and (4) the escalation of the Iran-Iraq conflict into war, and accompanying fear regarding its collateral effect.44 After the British withdrew from the Gulf in 1971, the Shah had positioned Iran as the regional policeman in the Gulf. In 1979, Khomeini’s revolution reversed Iran’s role in the eyes of its Gulf neighbors. Iran’s role was transformed from that of aspiring regional power enforcing the status quo to a radical regime seeking to undermine domestic stability throughout the region. Saudi Arabia, seeing the new security challenge, sought to take the lead in re-establishing Gulf security.45 Khomeini’s revolution awakened powerful historical forces in the Gulf states, which have large Shi‘i minority populations. These Shi‘is are often treated _________________________________________________ 42

Radio Tehran 1 July 1988 – Daily Report, 6 July 1988; Radio Baghdad, Voice of the Masses, 17, 18, April 1988 – Daily Report, 18 April 1988; Radio Baghdad, Voice of the Masses, 24 April 1988 – Daily Report 25 April 1988; al-Tadamun, 30 April 1988; Islamic Revolution News Agency (IRNA), 17,18 April 1988 – Daily Report 18, 19, April 1988; Radio Baghdad Voice of the Masses, 25, 26 June 1988; Radio Tehran, IRNA, 25 June 1988 – Daily Report, 27 June 1988; Radio Baghdad, 13, 15, July 1988, Radio Tehran, 13 July 1988, Radio Baghdad, Voice of the Masses, 16 July 1988 – Daily Report 14, 15, 18 July 1988. 43 Cordesman, p. 395-403; Middle East Contemporary Survey (MECS), Eds. Ayi Ayalon, Daniel Dishon, Haim Shaked, Colin Legum, Itamar Rabinovich ,Vol. VI-XII. 44 Ramazani, p. 126. 45 Nadav Safran, Saudi Arabia, The Ceaseless Quest for Security (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1985), pp. 352-360.

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like second-class citizens by the Sunni ruling elites in the Gulf states. They do not have the same rights, privileges, or opportunities as Sunnis. In Saudi Arabia, where puritanical Wahhabi norms are endorsed by the state, Shi’is are particularly discriminated against. The ideological enmity between Sunnis and Shi’is, regarding each side’s claims to the Muslim Caliphate, is centuries old. Khomeini’s revolution mobilized these ideological and historical divisions and gave them a political-revolutionary dimension. The revolution in Iran resuscitated Shi‘i pride and identity and inspired Islamic radicals.46 In November 1979, Saudi Arabia suffered a radical Sunni attack on the Grand Mosque in Mecca, as well as Shi‘i unrest near its oil fields in Eastern Saudi Arabia. These events were led by radical Islamists inspired by Khomeini’s success in Iran. These events undermined Saudi Arabia’s ability to project itself as a regional security force. Instead, the events conveyed a sense of Saudi instability to its smaller neighbors, and ended the Saudi aspiration to fill the regional security role played by the Shah in the 1970s. In December 1979, Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, which further galvanized radical Sunni Islamic elements in the Gulf. The Sunni Islamists viewed the Soviet invasion as an infidel attack on Muslim land. The Gulf regimes were powerless to do anything to stop the Soviet aggression. These events compounded Gulf sensitivity to the Iran-Iraq conflict and placed the monarchical regimes in an awkward, even paradoxical, position. The Gulf monarchies were now dependent on the U.S., and other Western powers, to guarantee their security against a potential Iranian threat; but such a dependence created the perception among radical Islamic elements in the region that these regimes were merely corrupt “puppets,” serving as proxies for imperial Western powers who also supported Israel.47 The Gulf Cooperation Council (“GCC”)can be viewed, in part, as a reaction to the end of U.S.’s “Twin Pillars” policy (See also the discussion in Part 3) and a discomfort with the new Carter Doctrine. A U.S. official, James Noyes, articulated the basic premise of Twin Pillars policy during a Congressional meeting in 1973: “In the spirit of the Nixon Doctrine, we are willing to assist the Gulf states but we look to them to bear the main responsibility for their own defense and to cooperate among themselves to insure regional stability. We especially look to

_________________________________________________ 46

‘Abd Reda Assiri, Kuwait’s Foreign Policy (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990), p.66 King, p. 32; Michael Sterner, “The Gulf Cooperation Council and Persian Gulf Security”, in Gulf Security and The Iran-Iraq War, Ed. Thomas Naff (Washington, D.C.: The National Defense University Press and The Middle East Research Institute, 1985), p.15. 47

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the leading states of the area, Iran and Saudi Arabia, to cooperate for this purpose.”48

There was not always cooperation between the “Twin Pillars.” Rather than cooperating on the basis of common interests, Iran and Saudi Arabia were competing for regional supremacy. However, as Henner Furtig has written: “Despite these graphic examples of different Iranian and Saudi Arabian ambitions and policies, their partnership within the ‘twin pillar’ policy still worked better than predicted by many experts. Neither Saudi Arabia nor Iran went so far in their oil policy as to harm the other irreversibly. Both monarchs knew very well that they had no alternative but to reach a certain level of understanding in order to protect their capacity for oil production and their export markets. They shared the opinion that open confrontation would only strengthen third parties, be they leftist radical forces in the region or their alleged Eastern bloc supporters. As a result, during the 1970s common interests prevailed.”49

The Twin Pillars concept ended in 1979 with Khomeini’s Islamic Revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The smaller Gulf states were challenged by new destabilizing factors into the region. In addition to handling internal subversion from Iran’s Islamic revolution, Iraqi regional ambitions in the Gulf, and battling leftist radicalism incubating in South Yemen, the Gulf states also had to deflect pressure from an encroaching superpower struggle. The new U.S. policy was designed to aggressively combat Soviet expansionism. The Carter Doctrine (see Box 6) reversed the Nixon Doctrine and promised U.S. direct military intervention in the Gulf if U.S. interests were threatened. The Gulf states were not eager to be dependent on the U.S., or other Western powers, for their state security. In 1979-80, when the idea for the GCC was still in its infancy, the oil-rich Gulf monarchies were still embittered by hardball American diplomacy that was conducted in the mid-1970s regarding the oil embargo. Secretary of State Kissinger and President Ford, in 1975 speeches before the UN, had hinted at linking oil prices to food prices, which the Gulf states viewed as American intimidation. And following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Gulf states were troubled by the “Carter Doctrine,” which used the threat of unilateral military intervention in the region to deter Soviet ambitions beyond Afghanistan. The Gulf states were concerned their backyard would be_________________________________________________ 48

Henner Furtig, Iran’s rivalry with Saudi Arabia between the Gulf Wars (Reading, U.K.: Garnet Publishing, 2002), p. 6. Furtig, p. 10.

49

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come, as Prince Abdallah of Saudi Arabia stated, “an arena for rivalry among foreign powers.”50 Box 6:

Carter Doctrine

Khomeini’s revolution in Iran and the Soviet invasion into Afghanistan in 1979 prompted U.S. President Jimmy Carter to re-evaluate the U.S. foreign policy. The new policy reversed the approach of the Nixon Doctrine, which used regional allies, rather than direct U.S. military force, to project U.S. power. President Carter clarified the new situation in his State of the Union Address of 23 January 1980. Referring specifically to the Soviet invasion, Carter declared that “an attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.“

During the crisis period leading to the Shah’s downfall in Iran, the Gulf states looked for ways to come together on a joint defense structure. However, there were misgivings regarding Iraq’s participation, due to Iraq’s regional ambitions as well as the fear of creating the impression that the Gulf states were ganging up against Iran. In June 1979, the Saudis held military maneuvers at Khamis Mushayt, near the North Yemeni border, to which all the small Gulf states were invited. The location was far from the Gulf, near the Red Sea, and was used as an excuse to exclude Iraq. The military exercises offered the Gulf states an opportunity to have an informal summit to discuss the issues they were confronting and the possibility of a common defense structure.51 Against this backdrop of events, the Gulf states created the Gulf Cooperation Council in the Spring of 1981. The Iran-Iraq War created an immediate impetus and added the urgency necessary to encourage this development; but also removed the two large regional powers from the equation, which had been the historical obstacle to regional cooperation in the past. The GCC was originally formed to address economic and social planning, but regional security coordination quickly became its most significant function. A group of bilateral agreements were made in 1982 to facilitate intelligence sharing between the Gulf states in response to terrorist activity, such as the attempted coup in Bahrain. These agreements also provided assistance for frontier control, and criminal extradition. The uniform foreign policy strategy adopted by _________________________________________________ 50 51

Ramazani, pp. 123-124. Safran, p. 355.

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the GCC was based on the principal of survival by pursuing neutrality and active mediation in regional conflicts. However, as former U.S. Ambassador to the UAE Michael Sterner notes, “They are thrown back on their traditional policy of trying to stay on friendly terms with everybody and hoping somehow this policy will see them through even these more difficult times.” Sterner also adds, however, that the Gulf leaders are”tough-minded realists” and suffer no illusions regarding the relative strength that this regional framework for cooperation can provide.52 The Gulf states lack the capacity to protect themselves from external threats. They generally have small populations inhabiting coastal communities where oil assets, shipping, and industry are all concentrated. Many of the states have large religious minority groups who may identify with elements of Khomeini’s revolutionary ideology. The nature of the tribal cultures supported by the Rentier economic model has created societies without representative institutions in many of the Gulf states. Add to the mix a large foreign work force legally excluded from state benefits, and there is a varied opportunity for destabilizing political forces. The significance of the GCC regional security framework in the wake of the Iran-Iraq War can be summarized as, (a) intelligence sharing to combat internal threats to member states; (b) a domestically acceptable framework for regular and earnest consultation on diplomatic initiatives regarding external aggression; (c) a venue for strategic economic regional planning; and (d) playing, or appearing to play, the role of regional mediator as a strategy for obtaining immunity from aggression by regional powers. Officially, the GCC adopted a neutral position during the war. However, the position from state-to-state within the Gulf was based on each states’s demography, economy, geography, and history. Oman is located at the far end of the Gulf near the Straits of Hormuz. Its relative isolation has insulated it from the demands of Arab nationalism. Oman has been able to both cultivate Western support and remain integrated in the Arab world. It was eager for Western military support to counter threats posed by radical leftist forces from South Yemen. Its geographical position on the Straits of Hormuz also demanded it to keep a watchful eye on Iran, who sought to dominate Gulf traffic. Kuwait, however, is defined by its proximity to Iraq. It adopted an Arab nationalist posture and a nonaligned foreign policy. Its large Shi’a population presented problems with respect to support for Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War. The UAE emirates maintained separate interests that dictated a neutral position during the war. Dubai has enjoyed close commercial ties with Iran and has a large Iranian population. Sharjah _________________________________________________ 52 Joseph Kostiner, “The Gulf States Under the Shadow of the Iran-Iraq War”, Conflict Vol. 6, No. 4, 1985, p. 376; Sterner, pp.16-19.

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and Umm al-Qaiwan reap large revenues and income from the Mubarak oil field on Abu Musa island, which they jointly managed with Iran. Bahrain and Qatar also had significant commercial relationships with Iran. Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, was very sensitive to the threat of the Iranian Islamic Republic. Saudi Arabia’s oil fields were vulnerable to attack and are located in areas of the Kingdom predominately populated by Shi’is. Saudi Arabia’s military capability was unproven and largely incapable of mobilizing the massive military technology at its disposal. In addition, internal politics demand sensitivity in security and foreign policy with respect to its position in opposition to the Islamic Republic of Iran. Saudi Arabia and Iraq signed a mutual security pact in February 1979, probably in response to the Islamic revolution. In February 1980, Iraq’s information minister stated, “any attack on any of the Arab Gulf states is a direct aggression against Iraq.” The GCC position on the war represented a compromise between two divergent views. The Saudi-Kuwait view on one hand, and the states of the lower Gulf on the other hand. The Saudi-Kuwait position supported Iraq and criticized Iran openly and forcefully. The lower states were divided. And the UAE itself was divided into two positions: Dubai, Sharjah, and Umm al-Qaiwan were neutral. Abu Dhabi and Ras al-Khaimah were more pro-Iraqi. However, the UAE was effectively neutral. Bahrain’s position was somewhat closer to the SaudiKuwait position. Each of these positions represented a pragmatic way to navigate a path through the regional hostilities that existed during the Iran-Iraq War. Iranian led Islamic radicalism, and leftist ideology spreading from Yemen, posed real threats to the small, resource rich states who were looking to maintain peace and stability in order to continue to prosper from oil and trade.53 The GCC adeptly navigated this delicate balance between Iran and Iraq throughout the war. In addition to the $30-$50 billion in financial assistance provided by Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, they also sold Iraq’s oil on its behalf. Kuwait allowed its port facilities to be used for Iraqi supplies, and Saudi Arabia assisted Iraq avoid the Gulf with a connecting pipeline from Iraq through Saudi Arabia to the Red Sea. Kuwait and Saudi Arabia also lobbied the U.S. on behalf of Iraq. The GCC also managed to keep channels of communication open with Iran. In 1985, Iranian foreign ministers met with representatives from Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. From 1979-1981, during the U.S.-Iranian hostage crisis, the UAE ignored U.S. sanctions and shipped American goods to Iran. In 1988, UAE President Zayid ibn Sultan Al-Nuhayyan stated, “The UAE enjoys close ties with Islamic Iran.” Even Saudi Arabia ostensibly turned a blind eye toward assisting Iran. In 1985 and 1986 it was Saudi arms dealer Adnan _________________________________________________ 53

Nonneman, pp. 167-173.

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Kashoggi who brokered the scandalous arms deal between the U.S. and Iran, which became known as the “Iran-Contra” affair.54 The GCC framework was implemented in various areas throughout the IranIraq War. The GCC backed Iraq as the lesser of two evils, but did not permit Iraq to use Gulf territory to stage military operations during the war. The GCC worked to balance the demands and involvement with superpowers. The GCC avoided provoking the Soviet Union and limited the U.S. military presence in their territory. The GCC also worked to subdue destabilizing forces active in the southern Arabian Peninsula. South Yemen, Kuwait, and the UAE developed a framework for cooperation, which allowed the GCC to assist the South Yemeni ‘Ali Nasir Muhammad move South Yemen in the direction of reconciling with neighboring Oman. The GCC also worked toward mediating in the Arab-Israeli conflict, as well, but to little effect.55 The Iran-Iraq War placed the Gulf states in a delicate position. Fearful of an Iranian victory, individual Gulf states essentially pursued a policy of defense by proxy during the Iran-Iraq War. By providing Iraq with financial support these states hoped to use Iraq’s war effort as a means to contain Iran’s regional revolutionary ambitions. However, this de facto policy came with a price: there was a Iranian backed coup attempt in Bahrain in 1981; terrorist bombings in Kuwait in 1983, 1985, and 1986; and an assassination attempt on the Amir of Kuwait in 1985. There were also Iranian military attacks on Kuwait, as well as attacks on Gulf oil tankers by both Iran and Iraq. 6.1 The Tanker War In 1983, Iraq made a strategic decision to broaden the scope of the war by attacking shipping and oil tanker traffic moving in and out of Iran and the Gulf. Iraq realized it could not rally international support for a peace agreement unless the war had a regional dimension. It wanted to actively draw in the southern Gulfstates as well as Western oil dependent countries. Iraq also realized Iran was having difficulty importing arms and food. Iraq thought attacking key Iranian economic sites would cause Iran to overreact in response and perhaps threaten its Gulf neighbors. Iraq also knew it would be able to initiate this kind of tactic with limited, or token, resistance from Western powers. The U.S. supported Iraq’s tactic because it was concerned an Iranian victory in the war would have a big impact on the _________________________________________________ 54

Barry Rubin, “The Gulf-States and the Iran-Iraq War,” in The Iran-Iraq War, Impact and Implications, Ed. Ephraim Karsh (Tel Aviv: The Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University and Macmillan Press, Ltd., 1989), p.127. 55 Kostiner, p. 377.

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stability of the Gulf states. The U.S. was less concerned about the impact of Iraq’s new strategy on the oil market. In the early 1980s oil was relatively cheap and supply exceeded demand. The U.S. also felt it could strategically cope with any Iranian attempt to close the Gulf or halt oil exports in response to Iraqi attacks. The U.S.S.R. also supported Iraq, having been rebuffed by the Islamic regime in Iran. And France had a strong financial interest in Iraq’s success: the French advanced Iraq nearly $7 billion of more than $10 billion in military and commercial sales from 1980 to 1984. Iraq began intensively implementing its new strategy in February 1984. Iraqi aircraft attacked Iran’s main oil terminal at Kharg Island, striking ships seven times between 25 February and 1 March. At the end of March, Iraq hit Turkish, Indian, and Greek ships near Kharg Island. Iran responded. Since Iraqi oil exports through the Gulf had been shut down, Iran’s response was directed against the Gulf states. On 7 May, Iran’s fighter aircraft hit a Saudi tanker. On 13 and 14 May, Iran attacked Kuwaiti tankers near Bahrain. On 16 May, a ship was attacking in Saudi waters near Jubail. The GCC failed to cope with these direct threats to commercial shipping through the Gulf, a shortcoming that came with potentially disastrous economic consequences for the region. In May through July 1984, the Saudis postponed turning the Iran-Iraq War into an international conflict by using its military to successfully thwart Iranian aggression. Responding to Iranian attacks on oil tankers in its territorial waters, Saudi Arabia was quick to shoot down an Iranian fighter jet on 5 June. This display of Saudi self-defense appear deterred Iran for the time being and delayed U.S. involvement in the war for at least two years, postponing international involvement in the war. In this particular case, U.S. involvement was avoided, but the GCC had no policy solution that could mitigate a threat to shipping concerns in the region.56 In mid-June 1984, a Kuwaiti tanker was hit near Qatar. This was Iran’s first attack in the southern portion of the Gulf, and it raised international concern. From the end of June until the end of July, Iraq launched a series of attacks on oil shipped to and from Iranian facilities in the Gulf. However, these attacks were having a limited effect. Iraq’s air force did not have the capability to launch massive or sustained attacks on Iran’s key facilities. The damage the Iraqi attacks produced was not causing serious economic harm to Iran. Therefore, the strategic and political impact of Iraq’s attacks throughout 1984 was limited. In 1985, the “War of the Tankers” began to escalate. Beginning in midAugust 1985 Iraq escalated its attacks against Iran’s main oil facility at Kharg Island. 90 percent of Iranian oil exports were exported from the facility at Kharg _________________________________________________ 56

Cordesman, p.195; Kostiner, pp. 380-2; Nonneman, p. 178.

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Island. Iraqi launched four large-scale attacks on Kharg Island between midAugust and mid-September 1985. Iran responded by using its Navy against shipping through the Gulf. More than 130 ships were attacked by both sides through September 1985. Iran threatened to attack ships going into southern Gulf ports. On 19 September 1985 an Iraqi raid on Kharg Island temporarily cut Iranian oil exports by 50 percent and led to Iranian President Khamene’i’s threats to close the Straits of Hormuz. Iraqi strikes continued, and, by the end of 1985, Iraq had attacked Kharg Island nearly 60 times. The total effect of these battles in the Gulf region was still relatively small. Iraqi air strikes were still not meaningfully damaging Iran’s oil exports. Iran had not actively targeted neighboring Gulf states’ shipping and was not yet openly putting military pressure on Kuwait or Saudi Arabia, who continued to support Iraq financially. Iran did, however, succeed at sending messages to its Gulf neighbors. In December 1985, Iranian-backed terrorists launched a series of carbombings in Kuwait, including one directed at the U.S. Embassy. It also increased its harassment of shipping through the southern Gulf. And perhaps most seriously, in May 1985, the pro-Iranian Islamic Jihad, claimed responsibility for attempted assassination on the Kuwaiti Amir, Jaber Al-Ahmad.57 The Tanker War continued throughout 1986 with little change. The number of Iraqi raids on Kharg Island increased dramatically, as did its attacks on the Iranian tanker shuttle between Kharg Island and Sirri Island in the southern Gulf. These attacks began to have an economic impact on Iran. Iran in turn increased its attacks on Gulf shipping, although the cumulative impact of these attacks was minimal. Tankers found they were generally safe from Iranian harassment if they used routes near Dubai and west of Qatar, during the night. 6.2 GCC and Kuwait In early 1987, Iran aggressively increased the frequency and severity of its attacks on Gulf shipping. It launched sixteen attacks in January and February, mostly striking at night. It began using missile attacks, which were capable of sinking ships, not simply damaging them. In March, an Iranian attack struck the Sedera igniting the ship on fire and killing seven crew members. Both the U.S. and the Soviet Union increased their presence in the Gulf, in response to Iran’s new aggression. The U.S. viewed Iran’s new attacks as a sign it would begin targeting shipping that could affect Western oil supplies. 17 percent of the West’s oil passed through the Straits of Hormuz. The West was particularly _________________________________________________ 57

Assiri, p. 72.

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concerned over the fate of Kuwait, which in January 1987 requested U.S. protection, or “reflagging,” of its ships. Kuwait’s decision to seek international assistance was a GCC breakdown. At the seventh GCC summit conference in November 1986, Kuwait had demanded defense assistance from its fellow members. It requested that, (a) GCC forces should be positioned on Bubiyan Island, opposite the Iranian occupied Fao Peninsula; (b) Kuwaiti oil shipping should be protected through the Gulf, and (c) Kuwait should be included in the aircraft surveillance zones so that it could receive early warning of an Iranian attack. The GCC members rejected the Kuwaiti demands for assistance. It remained set on a course of neutrality. The collective notion was that the GCC should maintain contact with Iran to provide itself with long-term insurance depending on the outcome of the war. Additionally, Oman and the UAE were unwilling to jeopardize important commercial ties they had with Iran. Essentially, the independent interests of the GCC member states trumped any sense of a unified GCC defense mechanism. Kuwait had 13 percent of the world’s proven oil reserves, which was almost more oil than Iraq and Iran combined. Since mid-September 1986, 15 of the 19 Iranian attacks on Gulf shipping were directed against ships coming to or from Kuwait. However, of the 284 attacks on Gulf shipping since the start of the Tanker War, only seven of the attacked ships had been Kuwaiti flagged. Yet, it is important to note that Kuwait was the only Gulf State that was shipping all of its oil through the Gulf. Saudi Arabia had pipelines that allowed it bypass the Gulf, if necessary. Iran’s naval attacks were creating a potential commercial crisis for Kuwait. Iran was harassing Kuwait to punish it for its support for Iraq. Iraq had been using the Kuwaiti port of Shuaiba to import arms and war material, as well as Kuwaiti air space to send its planes into the Gulf to attack Iranian oil targets. Kuwait also requested reflagging assistance from the Soviet Union and proposed that the U.S. and U.S.S.R. split protection of the eleven Kuwaiti tankers. The U.S. was afraid of allowing the Soviet Union a foothold into GCC affairs. On 7 March 1987, the U.S. agreed to protect all of the Kuwaiti tankers.58 However, the reflagging of its tankers did not solve all of Kuwait’s problems. The Iranian revolution had politically penetrated Kuwait’s borders and the Kuwaiti Shi‘i population was openly challenging the state regarding grievances they hadn’t dared to express in the past. The Shi‘i support for Iran reinforced traditionally Sunni views in Kuwait that the Shi‘is were a subversive group who did not care if the Kuwaiti state survived. Kuwaiti mass media aggravated the Shi’a-Sunni divide by playing on popular emotions and historical divisions. The Kuwaiti authorities feared potential Shi‘i domestic uprisings and moved to curb _________________________________________________ 58 The Guardian, 17 May 1987; The Economist 27 June 1987; Radio Tehran 24 July 1987 – Daily Report 27 July 1987; Al-Hawadith, London, 2 June 1987 – Daily Report 20 October 1987.

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public political gatherings. By late November 1987, approximately 27,000 people had been deported for security reasons. Iran exploited Kuwait’s internal unrest by using its network of Arab and Iranian sympathizers in Kuwait to carry out attacks and sow dissent. In May 1987, Kuwait’s new $5 billion dollar AlAhmadi oil refinery was attacked and heavily damaged. In July 1987, a seaside bombing killed dozens of civilians sitting in cafes. Meanwhile, the Kuwaiti-U.S. reflagging did not deter Iran. In July 1987, Iran began mining Kuwaiti shipping channels. Interestingly, despite being rejected by the GCC and offered reflagging protection from the U.S., the Kuwaiti authorities embarked on an active public relations campaign in the Arab world to minimize its relationship with the U.S. It portrayed the reflagging maneuver as strictly a commercial deal, and took pains to emphasize that the U.S. would not be allowed to establish bases or use Kuwaiti facilities to support its military forces. In fact, Kuwait’s defense minister, Salem Al-Sabah, said, “we would not allow U.S. bases to be erected in Kuwait no matter what they may be or in any form they may take and there is no way possible that pressure can be exerted on us from outside to erect such facilities.”59 This apparent contradiction, relying on the U.S. for protection but publicly declaiming the relationship, exemplifies the internal tension GCC states experience regarding their relationship with Western powers. The first two Kuwaiti tankers to be reflagged, the Bridgeton and the Gas Prince, sailed under the U.S. convoy protection on 22 July 1987. On 24 July the Bridgeton hit a mine on its shipping route. This blow was covered extensively in the media and was a propaganda victory for Iran. The U.S. was caught unprepared for the contingency of Iranian mines along its shipping routes. The U.S. sought immediate assistance from Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, but, while these states were willing to provide significant assistance, they were unwilling to agree to the formal basing arrangements the U.S. wanted. As a compromise, Kuwait leased two large barges to be placed in international waters in the Gulf, from which the U.S. could stage military operations in response to the Iranian threat. Saudi Arabia and Bahrain agreed to support these stations. Saudi Arabia also agreed to provide its four minesweepers to support the U.S. fleet in the Gulf. Saudi Arabia paid an immediate price for its support of Kuwait and the U.S. On 31 July 1987 Iranian “pilgrims” on the Hajj ignited a massive riot in Mecca. The Iranians attempted to get to the Grand Mosque in Mecca and met Saudi security forces. The battle between the Iranian rioters and the Saudi security

_________________________________________________ 59

Assiri, p. 107.

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forces left 402 dead and 649 injured, 275 of the dead were Iranian, 85 were Saudi security forces, and 42 were of other nationalities.60 Iran continued to escalate the Tanker war by striking outside the Gulf. In the Gulf of Oman, Iranian Revolutionary Guard boats attacked a Liberian chemical tanker outside the Straits of Hormuz. During late August and September of 1987, Iraq resumed its attacks on key Iranian oil installations and Iran retaliated blow for blow. In the most intense period of the Tanker war, between 23 August and 3 September 1987, twenty ships were attacked. On 3 through 6 September, Iran launched daily missiles at targets in Kuwait. The missiles were not effective, but they demonstrated Iran’s ability to strike across Kuwait. The GCC met to discuss the attacks on 12 September 1987, but little was accomplished. However, the U.S. augmented its naval forces in the Gulf, and was now positioned for a major war. There were eleven ships with nearly 4,500 crew members.61 This, apparently, did not deter Iran. On 20 September, an Iranian speed boat attacked a Saudi tanker in the Gulf. On 21 September, a British tanker was attacked by Iran and set on fire. Also on 21 September, the U.S. attacked and sunk an Iranian ship laying mines in the Gulf. The attack occurred as Khamene’i was at the UN, and was a major embarrassment to Iran, whose ship had been filmed laying mines after Iran had claimed it could not be held responsible for mining the Gulf. The Kuwaiti reflagging was a critical factor in the Iran-Iraq War. Iran’s continued aggression against Kuwaiti oil tankers (and the U.S., as a proxy) effectively internationalized the war, and tipped the balance of power in Iraq’s favor.62 In summary, during the 1980s, the GCC’s relationship to the West was fraught with contradiction. On one hand, the GCC did not want overt Western involvement in its regional affairs because of internal political pressures a close alliance with the West presented. This internal political pressure was a result of the popular view of America and the West as an imperial military force, in addition to a hegemonic cultural influence. But on the other hand, the GCC states relied on the West for military defense during a crisis and it needed Western technological expertise, to say nothing of the fact that its economies were dependent on the health of Western economies. The relationship with the West was _________________________________________________

Cordesman, pp. 301, 347. Cordesman, pp. 316-317. 62 IRNA, 30 August 1987 – BBC, Summary of World Broadcasting, 1 September 1987; Tehran TV, 23 October 1987 – Daily Report, 26 October 1987; Radio Tehran, 2 October – Daily Report, 5 October 1987; Radio Tehran, 8 September – BBC, Summary of World Broadcasting, 10 September 1987; Radio Tehran, 3 December – Daily Report, 3 December 1987. 60 61

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further complicated by the notion that the West was providing a security assurance for monarchical regimes with few elements of internal reform or liberalization. Nationality in the Gulf states is tightly restricted, there is little popular participation in government, and political opposition is strongly discouraged, if allowed at all. In essence, the West was guaranteeing a political status quo in the region which was antithetical to is own political principles.63 However, the West’s demand for oil played an important role in reaching a compromise regarding domestic politics in the Gulf. The importance of the formation of the GCC was as much symbolic as it was real. It was created as a means for the Gulf monarchies to project a coordinated policy of control over its regional foreign policy. In reality, this control was “something of a fiction”64 because these small Gulf monarchies lack the military firepower, manpower, and infrastructure to deal with a legitimate external threat. However, outside assistance – from the U.S. for example – must, for internal political reasons, be seen as being requested. The GCC provides an effective means to control subversive elements and officially coordinate such external security requests with a regional consensus.

7

The Effect of the War on Iran and Iraq

7.1 Iraq For Iraq, the Iran-Iraq War was Saddam Hussein’s war. The start of the war followed shortly after Saddam’s rise to power in 1979. Saddam made it clear to the Iraqi people that the war with Iran was his war. Saddam successfully convinced his people that he was leading Iraq in a defensive war that he would end if a stubborn Iranian regime stopped threatening Iraq. Saddam was able to use the war to generate mass support for his leadership and to enhance his authority against any potential internal rivals. He also succeeded in identifying the Iraqi regime with his personal leadership as much as Ba’athist ideology.65 Saddam successfully projected the image that he was seeking to end the war. Iraq began calling for ceasefires in September 1980 and by June 1982 it sought nothing more than a return to the pre-war status quo. While this can be attributed to Iraq’s failures on the battlefield, it can also be seen as Saddam’s _________________________________________________ 63

King, p. 40. Ibid, p. 48. 65 Radio Baghdad 14 March 1981 – Daily Report, 16 March 1981; Radio Baghdad, Voice of the Masses, 6 January 1981 – Daily Report, 7 January 1981. Al-Thawra, 24 November 1981 –JPRS, 9 February, 1982. 64

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success in portraying Khomeini and Iran as fanatical. At one point, Saddam even offered to fly to Tehran to make peace. Saddam was even positioning himself – and Iraq – as the reasonable party in the war. Saddam successfully appealed to the Iraqi people and convinced them he was their national symbol, and his survival was inseparable from the survival of the state itself. Saddam also adeptly manipulated public morale by insuring consumer goods remained available during the war; by compensating and providing for the families of the war dead, and by minimizing the costs of the war. Popular opposition to Saddam was never united and somewhat limited due, in part, to an effective state apparatus to combat it. Of course, war is a useful tool for rallying popular support and Saddam was able to exploit it.66 Saddam did face opposition from political rivals at the top. In mid-1982, Hussein’s authority was challenged during a period of battlefield failure. Saddam responded during the 9th Regional Congress of the Ba’ath Party, using the Ba’ath party system to purge opposition elements from the Revolutionary Command Council. In 1983, Saddam also defeated an internal challenge from his halfbrother, Barzan al-Tikriti, who was the head of the internal security forces. Saddam’s powerful personality and the pervasive reach of the Ba’ath party apparatus into all elements of civil society were important factors that enabled Saddam Hussein to unify Iraq’s sectarian population.67 The Shi‘i population in Iraq did not respond to Khomeini’s call to rise up against Iraq’s government. It is unclear exactly why this was, but some suggest by remaining passive during the war, Iraq’s Shi‘is showed themselves to be Arab Iraqis first and Shi‘is asecond. However, it may have been that the Iraqi Shi‘a were successfully co-opted or repressed by the government security apparatus. A combination of government propaganda emphasizing the ethnic divide between Persian Iranians and Arab Iraqis, and generous financial support from Saddam to the Shi‘i communities in Iraq may explain the Shi‘i quiescence during the war. The notion of a specifically Shi‘i Arab (as opposed to a Persian Shi‘i) identity is important. Saddam was governing a diverse Iraqi population that remained unified through a strong Arab identity propagated through Ba’athist ideology and a delicate balance of interests. Khomeini’s propaganda threatened Iraq’s delicate sectarian balance. Throughout the 1970s the Ba’athist had made great efforts to create a common identity in Iraq that would bridge the divisions between Sunni, Shi‘i, Arab, and non-Arab. Khomeini’s aggressive propaganda campaign directed at Iraq’s ethnic and religious groups was countered by Saddam’s persis_________________________________________________ 66

Le Monde, 25-26 July 1982; Radio Baghdad, 17 July – BBC, Summary of World Broadcasting, 19 July 1982; Radio Baghdad, 27 June 1982 – Daily Report, 1 July 1982; INA (Iraqi News Agency), 5 January 1982 – Daily Report, 6 January 1982; Al-Thawra, 1 February 1982. 67 King, pp.11-13.

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tent appeal to his population’s unique Iraqi identity. This may have represented a slight shift away from the Ba’athist pan-Arab ideology.68 Saddam’s Ba’ath party – perhaps for reasons of expediency – was placing greater emphasis on Iraqi identity,“whilst not negating the reality of the wider Arab nation; in Arabist terminology, it represented the watani, or regional, at the expense of the qawmi, or pan-Arab, identity.”69 In fact, in 1982, the 9th Regional Congress of the Ba’ath party concluded that Iraqi nationalism took precedence over pan-Arabism. This dilution of Ba’athist pan-Arab ideology reflected Saddam’s pragmatic flexibility. Not only would a more narrowly defined Arab Iraqi identity help Saddam unify his people against Khomeini’s Islamic revolution, but it was also more palatable to the conservative Arab monarchical regimes in the Gulf who were financially supporting Iraq during the war. The Iran-Iraq War may have provided the impetus for shifting Saddam’s Ba’athist ideology from pan-Arab to Iraqi nationalism, but this concept of an Arab-Iraqi identity was not embraced by the Kurds. The Kurds opposed Saddam’s leadership just as it had opposed prior leadership from Baghdad throughout the 1960s and 1970s. The Kurds used the war as an opportunity to continue their rebellion. The Kurds were largely unsuccessful, due to their own internal dissension and Saddam Hussein’s brutal repression. The Kurds were divided between the Barzani-led Kurdish Democratic Party (“KDP”), and Jalal Talabani’s Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (“PUK”). The KDP was backed by the Iranians and operated along the northern Iraqi border, in Iranian territory near Hajj Omran. The KDP had some military successes in 1985 and 1986. The KDP reported engagements with Iraqi divisions in Zakho and near Mosul. Reports in 1986 suggested the Kurds were threatening Iraq’s overland oil routes to Turkey. However, Turkey played the spoiler in any Kurdish ambitions during the Iran-Iraq War. It used its influence to rein in Iranian support to the Iraqi Kurds, and threatened to move its troops into northern Iraq to protect its interests regarding the Kurds. The Kurds do not appear to have benefited from the war. If anything, they appear to have been squeezed from all sides, and weakened by internal divisions. Iraq’s dependence on its Gulf neighbors for support during the war moderated its regional posture. During the war Iraq courted Turkey, established relations with the U.S., and limited its anti-Israel rhetoric. However, Iraq’s moderation might have been simply a facet of wartime expediency. Iraqi historical am_________________________________________________ 68 Radio Baghdad 27 June 1982 – Daily Report, 1 July 1982; Al-Thawra, 4 November 1981; Iraq, 15 March 1982; INA, 27 March – Daily Report, 30 March 1982. 69 King, p.15..

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bitions with respect to Kuwait and its aspirations to regional dominance did not indicate a tendency toward long-term moderation.70 The end of the Iran-Iraq War did not solve Iraq’s strategic military issues. The war did not allow Iraq to secure the Shatt al-Arab against an Iranian threat and it did not secure Iraqi access to the Gulf. Iraq’s pipelines to the West offered some measure of security, but they were not a complete substitute for Gulf access. It was not clear, as the war ended, whether Iraq understood the limits of its minor territorial gains from Iran and in its dealings with Kuwait. As the war ended, two key questions emerged regarding Saddam Hussein’s Iraq: (a) would it build on improved relations with Gulf states or would it return to pre-war regional ambitions to dominate the Gulf; and (b) how would it cope with its wardebts and oil-export policy. Iraq, perhaps predictably, used its post-war military superiority over Iran as opportunity to project its military power in the region and expand its influence over neighboring Gulf states. It also managed to turn its war-debts into grants and un-repaid loans.71 7.2 Iran The Islamic Revolution was less than two years old at the start of war. The war provided the ruling clerics with an opportunity to consolidate their power at a time when the initial revolutionary fervor was running out. As the war developed, the Islamic leadership had a natural platform from which to demonstrate their commitment and endurance to the cause of the Islamic Revolution: “We have been able to use the war to awaken the people and to fight the problems that threaten the revolution,” claimed Rafsanjani on the sixth anniversary of the Islamic revolution in February 1985.72 The war also provided the right environment for the establishment of the military-political wings of the Islamic government in the Revolutionary Guards Corps and the Pasdaran. Iran had purged its armed forces following the revolution in 1978, and many experts considered Iran militarily weaker than Iraq in 1980. The army had suffered a 30 percent desertion rate since the start of Khomeini’s revolution. Additionally, Iran purged 12,000 men from its regular military. By the start of the war, Iran’s combat units had only 30-50 percent of normal manpower. Further, the U.S. Embassy hostage crisis ended Iran’s primary source of weapons, spare parts, and logistical training and support. These factors ushered in the early stages of developing its politically loyal Pasda_________________________________________________ 70 71 72

King, pp. 13-17. Cordesman, pp. 594-595. Hiro, pp.255-257; King, p. 20.

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ran/Revolutionary Guards Corps into a reasonable alternative to regular military forces.73 The war also created popular support that provided the Islamic Republican Party (“IRP”) with the time and cover to successfully eliminate its leftist opposition, the Tudeh Party and Mujaheddin-e Khalq. The war was also an opportunity for the Islamic Republic to deal its Kurds and other minority interests. However, the Khomeini regime’s obsession with removing Saddam Hussein and toppling the Iraqi Ba’ath regime took its toll on the Iranian people, who were forced to cope with political repression and economic stagnation. However, perhaps the drama of war drew public attention away from social and economic crises and united the people behind the Islamic Republic.74 During the early days of the war, from 1980 to 1982, Khomeini and the IRP backed the clergy as part of the governing mechanism in the new Islamic Republic. President Bani-Sadr, who advocated a lesser role for the clergy, was driven out of office in June 1981. Also in June 1981, the Mujaheddin-e Khalq declared an open attack on Khomeini. The group began targeting senior government officials in a ruthless bombing and assassination campaign. On 28 June 1981, an explosion at the IRP headquarters killed 74, including IRP leader, Ayatollah Mohammed Husseini Behesti. The newly elected President of Iran, Ali Rajai was killed in a bombing on 30 August 1981. This bombing also killed the newly appointed Prime Minister, Mohammed Javad Bahonar. The IRP responded by conducting a brutal campaign of executions. The Iranian government admitted to executing 2,000, and some outside experts put the number at more than 3,000.75 The public tolerated this campaign of repression, because Mujaheddin-e Khalq was viewed as sowing dissension during a critical early juncture in the war against Iraq. In July 1982, after the government hard liners had prevailed in the debate regarding the decision to invade Iraq, the Communist Tudeh party, which had been an IRP supporter, expressed its concerns regarding the war. Many Iranians harbored suspicions that the Tudeh Party was simply a mouthpiece for the Soviet Union, who opposed Iranian policies and supplied arms to Iraq. In February 1983, the Tudeh leadership was removed by Iranian authorities. In addition to eliminating its opponents, the Islamic leadership began to Islamicize the country’s institutions. Islamic guidelines were introduced into educational programs, and Islamic conduct was enforced in public places and places of employment. The legal system was revised to bring it into line with _________________________________________________ 73

Cordesman, pp. 88-89. Cordesman, pp.88-89; Hiro, pp. 255-257; King, p. 20. 75 Cordesman, pp. 117-118; Kayhan, 11 June 1981; Ettela‘at, 22 June 1981; Radio Tehran, 22 June 1981 – Daily Report, 23 June 1981; Ettela‘at, 7 July 1981; Ettela’at, 2 July 1981; Ettela‘at, 1 Sep74

tember 1981.

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Islamic jurisprudence. The Bonyad-e-Musta’azafin (‘Foundation of the Oppressed’) was established to redistribute wealth by seizing property and businesses on behalf of the poor. And the Bonyad-e-Shahid (‘Martyrs Foundation’) was set up to compensate the families of martyrs. And the Basij-i-Mostazafin (‘Mobilization of the Oppressed’) was created from which teenage volunteers were taken to serve in ‘human wave’ attacks during the war.76 The Kurds were also a factor in Iran. In fact, the government had been fighting a Kurdish insurgency in Iran since early 1979, which pre-dated the Iran-Iraq War by nearly a year. The Islamic Republic’s position was that the question of ethnic minorities, including the Kurds, was irrelevant in an Islamic Iran, and the government took a strong position against the rebellious Kurds. The Kurds in Iran were led by Dr. Abdulrahman Qasemlou’s Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran („KDPI”) and the Marxist Komala, headed by Sheikh Ezzedin Hosseini. The Kurdish resistance in Iran was not insignificant. In June 1984, Iran sent 250,000 troops against 15,000 Kurdish guerrillas. By late 1984 and 1985, the scale of battle had been reduced and the Kurds were fighting on a smaller scale. In 1984, Iran also cooperated with the Turks to neutralize its Kurds. But Iran was frustrated over the Turkish presence in Iraq, which was negating a potential tactical advantage Iran had on its northern border with Iraq. Despite the combined efforts of Turkey, Iran, and Iraq, the Kurds remained a thorn in the side of these regimes during and beyond the war. Following the Islamic Revolution, Iran found itself diplomatically isolated due to its defiant rhetoric. It the beginning, Khomeini welcomed Iran’s isolation and seemed to embrace it as a sign of true independence. However, as the war progressed Iran adopted a more pragmatic approach. After temporarily exhausting its manpower and resources with several unsuccessful offensives in 1984, Iran softened the tone of its rhetoric in an attempt to prevent additional military aid to Iraq. Iran cultivated alliances with Syria and Libya to prevent a united Arab front in support of Iraq. These alliances were important because they emphasized the Islamic nature of the alliance and undermined the Iraqi characterization of the war as an Arab-Persian confrontation. Iran also developed relations with Turkey and Pakistan (which were allies with its U.S. enemy), that ensured their neutrality. Iran sought ties with many different countries to purchase arms. China, Brazil, and Israel are just a few examples of the countries Iran was doing business with. In late 1984, Iran also sought to improve its image in Europe, and _________________________________________________ 76

Tehran Times, 15 December 1980, Tehran Times, 27 November 1980; Radio Tehran, 11 February 1981 – Daily Report, 12 February 1981; Ettela‘at, 7 January 1981, Mizan, 24 May 1981, Ettela ‘at, 21 April 1981;, Tehran Times, 23 June 1981; Kayhan 12 October 1980; Ettela‘at, 18 February 1981; Kayhan International, 10 January 1981; Ettela‘at, 15 March 1981; Jumhuriyye Islami, 11 January 1981.

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sent someone to seek out the West German Foreign Minister. In 1985, Iran sent representatives to Japan and China to improve relations there.77 Perhaps most importantly, Iran sought to change its relationships with the Arab Gulf states to reduce the amount of external assistance to Iraq. This was a difficult task because it forced Iran to do a diplomatic tap dance. On one hand, Iran claimed it had no territorial ambitions in the Gulf and did not intend to widen its conflict with Iraq. However, it also said that while the revolution must be spread, it cannot be spread by force. The Gulf states, for their part, wanted normalized relations with Iran, but realized the Islamic regime, despite its diplomatic overtures, was not giving up its long-term vision to export its revolution to its Islamic neighbors.78 The Gulf states doubted Iran’s acceptance of the regional status quo, much the same way they doubted Iraq’s when the Ba’athist came to power there. Both radical ideologies espoused views that de-legitimized the sovereign rule of the conservative Gulf monarchies and sought to collapse the borders of their modern states into a vision of one state united by, religion in the case of the Islamic Revolution, and ethnicity in the case of pan-Arab nationalism. The Gulf states knew Iran envisioned itself as the regional power and would eventually try to engage in traditional regional power politics. Therefore, for the Gulf states, a strong Arab Iraq was the best strategic counter-balance to achieve normalized relations with Iran, given its regional aspirations.79 Iranian leadership viewed the war as a means to achieve revolutionary objectives. For example, Iran developed its own sophisticated small-arms military industry in response to its war needs. This was consistent with the revolutionary objective of a self-reliant Iran. Iranian leadership were keen on continuing the war for as long as they could continue to advance their revolutionary objectives. Only when it became clear to Khomeini and other Iranian leaders that its popular mass of support could not endure further economic hardship to continue fighting did they seek an end to the war. Military morale also appeared to be eroding. By 1987, the high number of Iranians killed in the fighting may have approached 700,000 and the number wounded 1.4 million. Additionally, the war made approximately two million Iranians homeless, and Iran’s economy remained stagnant from 1977 until the end of the war. However, the Islamic Republic, new_________________________________________________ 77 King, pp. 20-29; Kayhan Hava‘i, 19, 26 June 1985 and 10, 17 July 1985; Kayhan Hava‘i, 21 August 1985; Kayhan Hava‘i, 25 September 1985, 2 October 1985; Kayhan Hava‘i, 8 and 15 January 1986; Iranian Press Digest, 12 August 1985. 78 Kayhan Hava‘i, 29 May 1985; Kayhan Hava‘i, 7 August 1985; Kayhan Hava‘i, 28 August 1985; Kayhan Hava‘i, 18 December 1985; Jumhuriyye Islami, 9 May 1985; Ettela‘at, 28 April 1985. 79 King, p. 29.

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born at the start of the war eight years earlier, had endured and maintained power and had done it largely on its own.80 8

Economics in the Iran-Iraq War

Economics was a critical factor that dictated the outcome of the war. Oil wealth was a critical lifeline and strategic target for both sides throughout the war. Iraq entered the war with an economic advantage due to the economic disorder that prevailed in Iran following the revolution. Iraq also benefited during the war from generous external financial assistance provided, for the most part, by Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, with secondary contributions from a variety of states. This external assistance was the decisive factor that allowed Iraq to continue the war. Iran, however, was ultimately forced to end the war when Iraq’s attacks on its oil industry damaged its financial capacity to sustain its war effort.81 8.1 Iraq On the eve of war with Iran, Iraq’s economy was robust; primarily due to the oil boom of the 1970s. Despite large military and social spending, Iraq had $35 billion in foreign exchange reserves and very little foreign debt.82 At the start of the war Iran closed the Gulf to Iraqi oil exports. In March 1982, Iran also purchased Syria’s support by paying it cash and oil to close the Iraqi oil pipeline through Syrian territory. Iraq was left with a small pipeline through Turkey and overland transport. As a result, Iraqi oil exports shrunk to one-fifth of their pre-war level. This was a critical political victory for Iran. Iraq’s expected export earnings decreased by approximately $5 billion annually. Further, this meant that Iraq’s oil revenues were no longer meeting its war costs.83 The Iraqi government appeared to believe the war with Iran would be short, and continued military and social spending at pre-war levels, despite the shrinking oil revenues. As a result, between 1981 and 1983 Iraq incurred a deficit of $42 billion. And this debt was incurred despite receiving approximately $50 billion in aid from the Arab Gulf states. By 1982, the government realized the _________________________________________________ 80

Cordesman, p. 266; Hiro, p.259. Cordesman, pp.45-48; The Economist, 20 August 1988. 82 Eliyahu Kanovsky, “Economics of War: Economic Implications for the Region and World Oil Market,” in The Iran-Iraq War, Impact and Implications, Ed. Ephraim Karsh (Tel Aviv: The Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies and Macmillan Press, Ltd., 1989), p. 233. 81

83

Cordesman, p. 135; Kanovsky, p. 236.

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war could continue for several more years, and that they would have to institute economic reforms to slow the rate of debt. The rate of debt slowed, but Iraq oil exports could not keep up war spending. By 1987, excluding debts to Gulf state lenders, Iraq had accumulated $40-50 billion in external debt. In addition, foreign exchange reserves had evaporated from $35 billion to approximately $1 billion.84 The estimated loss for the Iraqi oil sector between 1980 and 1985 was $120.8 billion, including $23.4 billion in lost revenue. As a result, Iraq relied on it neighbors to finance its war with Iran. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait provided $25 to $50 billion in financial loans and grants. France granted $5 billion in loans to purchase military equipment. The U.S. granted credits to Iraq, and pressured its allies not to re-supply Iran. Egypt and Jordan supplied Iraq with arms and equipment. The Soviet Union also supplied Iraq with huge amounts of arms during various points in the war. Even despite the external financial assistance it received and limited overland oil exports, Iraq was financially weakened by the long war.85 8.2 Iran Oil revenues accounted for 95 percent of all Iranian income. The oil sector was badly damaged by the war. The cost of the war for the oil sector from 1980-1985 was estimated at $108.2 billion, including approximately $23.4 billion in lost revenue. The damage sustained by the Iranian oil sector between 1986 and 1988 appears to have been a contributing factor in limiting Iran’s ability to continue the war.86 Iran largely financed the costs of war on its own. Its external reserves shrank from $14.6 billion in 1979 to $6 billion in 1986-7. The war was costly for Iran. It needed to pay for arms imports on the open and black markets, especially after the U.S. cut off the supply of arms to Iran. The country’s infrastructure was badly damaged by the fighting. Cities such as Khorramshahr, Dezful, and Abadan were destroyed. The official Iranian total for the cost of the war as of 1986 was $309 billion.87 Oil exports and revenues were critical to Iran’s war effort. Until 1984, these revenues remained unaffected by the fighting. However, in 1984, Iraq began its war on Iran’s major oil terminal at Kharg island. Iranian oil revenues were reduced from $12.3 billion in 1983 to $10.9 billion in 1984. In August and Sep_________________________________________________ 84

Kanovsky, pp.237-239. Cordesman, pp. 2-5. 86 Cordesman, p. 2; King, p. 26. 87 King, p.26 85

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tember 1985, Iraq’s attacks on the main Iranian export terminal on Kharg island caused a brief but large reduction in Iranian oil exports. This forced Iran to secure its oil revenues by building export facilities further down the Gulf, out of range of Iraqi strikes. A shuttle was established between Kharg island and Sirri island; a floating terminal was opened at Larak Island in June 1986, and jetties were built on the islands of Qeshm and Jask in the Straits of Hormuz. Nevertheless, these steps did not prevent the Iraqi attacks on Iranian oil installations. Iraq may have hit Kharg island as many as 60 times by the end of 1985. In August 1986, Sirri island was hit and in November 1986, Larak island was attacked.88 The Iraqi campaign against Iranian oil exports applied considerable military and financial pressure on Iran, however it played an uncertain role in changing Iran’s long-term ability to continue the war. Iraq’s aerial attacks on Iran’s oil sector failed to have a drastic impact on Iran’s monthly oil exports. Iraq did not attack Iran’s more vulnerable refineries and power plants and the Iraqi air campaign also did not have a major impact on the civilian economy. It is more likely that the sharp crash in world oil prices in 1986 – which cut Iranian oil revenues nearly in half – had a greater long-term impact than Iraq’s aerial campaign against the Iranian oil sector. Iranian oil revenues were $6.6 billion in 1986 and $9.5 billion in 1987, compared to $13 billion in 1985 and $19-$20 billion in 1982 and 1983. In March 1988, the Iranian Budget and Planning ministry projected the government would need to cut social expenditures by more than 25 percent over the following two years, given the low revenues from oil sales. Iranian leadership realized it could not maintain public support for its regime if it had to cut social spending along those lines. Through its network of government backed clerics and mosques and its Islamic civil institutions, Iranian leadership could accurately assess the public mood. Iranian leadership also understood it was lacking arms (due to an increasingly efficient U.S. strategy to deprive Iran of new armaments), financial strength, and diplomatic support. The military balance of power had shifted definitively in Iraq’s favor.89 8.3 Neighboring Arab States Saudi Arabia was greatly effected by the Iran-Iraq War. It contributed approximately two-thirds of the $50 billion in aid delivered to Iraq by the Gulf states. And yet Saudi Arabia experienced drastic declines in oil revenue during the course of the war. Saudi oil revenues declined from $96-97 billion in 1981 and _________________________________________________ 88

Cordesman, pp. 185-186, 212.

89

Hiro, pp. 243-250.

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1982 to $16 billion in 1987. The oil price dropped from $32 per barrel to $15 in the early 1980s, reducing Saudi oil revenues by over 30 percent within six months. Between January and July 1986, oil prices dropped from $26 to $8 per barrel. In 1982 Saudi gross domestic product reached an unprecedented level of over 400 billion Saudi Riyals. In 1986 it dropped to 271 billion.90 At the same time that the House of Saud was pumping billions into the Iraqi war effort against Iran, successive budget deficits were slowing the pace of Saudi modernization. Saudi Arabia met its deficits by drawing on reserves and borrowing from the local economy. Overambitious projects were stopped or abandoned in response to growing economic uncertainty. The fourth Saudi development plan (1985-1990) reduced expenditures on infrastructures and shifted more resources to developing economic and human resources. Real GDP growth averaged 1.4 percent per annum, far below the 4 percent anticipated. Spending on prestige construction fell by 8.5 percent. Plans to construct an oil refinery in Qasim and a new international airport in the eastern province were abandoned. Completed high-rise office buildings in the major cities remained unoccupied reflecting low demand, declining revenues and slow economic growth. 91 The decline in Saudi revenues in the 1980s encouraged the government to promote the rhetoric of Saudisation, which meant gradually replacing foreigners with Saudis as the latter acquired education, training, and skills. This was a stated objective of the fourth five-year plan (1985-1990). In reality, this concept was never implemented or advanced.92 In 1985, Saudi Arabia abandoned its role as OPEC’s swing oil producer. It had no choice. It had to continue to produce oil at capacity to meet its mounting deficits. These deficits can be partially attributed to Saudi Arabia’s military spending. They spent $15 billion or approximately 22 percent of GDP on the military between 1985 to 1987. This may be attributed to fear of Iran’s hostile Islamic regime. During the early stages of the war, in 1981, Iran was careful not to use its Navy to provoke the Gulf states and the West. The UAE, in particular, was a valuable asset to Iran. Transshipment of goods to and from Iran went through the UAE. This relationship evolved following the end of the Iran-Iraq War. Iranian oil exports went through the Gulf, and Iran was dependent on two to four billion dollars in food imports that were shipped through the Gulf. Taking into consideration the strategic interests of Iran with the death of Khomeini, who had been _________________________________________________ 90 Madawi Al-Rasheed, A History of Saudi Arabia (Cambrigde, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 149-187. 91 Saudi Press Agency, 30 December 1987; al-Siyasa (Kuwait), 3 January 1988. 92 The Economist Country Report – Saudi Arabia (1988), No. 1, p. 11 & 14; No. 2, p. 11; No. 3. p 12.

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the revolution’s undisputed leader, and the beginning of the Iraq-Kuwait Gulf War, there were several reasons why its new leadership should want to court the GCC. First of all, GCC goodwill was essential for solidarity within OPEC when trying to secure stable oil production and prices. The Islamic Republic earned over 90 percent of its foreign exchange by exporting oil, OPEC’s ability to operate was paramount. Second, Gulf states offered a good prospective market for other Iranian exports, given their wealth. Third, the traditional ties between Iran and the Emirates of the Gulf are an asset to Iran since the ports of Dubai and Sharjah handle a significant portion of trade to and from the region. Fourthly, the financial surplus of the smaller Gulf Arab states could be invested, at least partly, in Iran, if the Islamic Republic could ensure the necessary preconditions. Finally, Iran would have the opportunity to use the GCC as a mediator between itself and Iraq.93

9

Conclusion

The sources of conflict between Iran and Iraq were not new. Ethnic, religious, and territorial tension had caused intermittent conflict in the region for centuries before the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War in 1980. Competition for control of the Shi‘i holy sites in Najaf and Karbala was a constant source of historical tension, dating back to the Iranian Safavid Empire in the sixteenth century. Conflicts between the Safavids and the Ottomans led both sides to manipulate local tribal interests. This practice continued into the 20th century; the most conspicuous examples were the Kurds, and the Arabs in Khuzistan. And, the most persistent and unresolved source of conflict was the dispute over sovereign control of the Shatt al-Arab waterway that lay on the border between Iran and Iraq. It represented access to the Gulf and, perhaps, the greater issue of which power – or more specifically, which leader – would assume dominance in the Gulf region. Saddam Hussein and Ayatollah Khomeini both assumed power shortly before the start of the Iran-Iraq War. They each represented a grand ideology that sought to project itself beyond its own borders. Caught in between these two aspiring regional powers, the Gulf states sought to protect themselves from the consequences of a dominant imperial threat at their doorsteps. The Gulf states feared Iran more than Iraq at the outset of the war, but they generally hoped for a resolution that would balance regional power between the two countries. The Islamic revolution and Ba’athist pan-Arabism presented ideological threats to the conservative monarchical Gulf regimes. Saddam and Iraq initiated the fighting in _________________________________________________ 93 Furtig, p. 97; al-sharq al-awsat, 15 May 1989; al-Majalla, 26 December 1989; Beirut al-Masa, 3 July 1989; Al-Dustur (London), 3 January 1989.

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1980, hoping to defeat the nascent Khomeini revolution before it could stabilize and continue to sow dissension in Iraq. Iraq feared a more mature and consolidated power structure in Iran, and hoped its initial military strikes would bring about a change of leadership in Iran. Iran, for its part, saw Iraq’s holy cities and its Shi‘i population as a natural extension of its Islamic revolution, and viewed its secular Ba’athist regime as an obstacle to regional Islamic rule.

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Iraq’s Passage to War

The reasons for Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 can be explained by several factors. This chapter will address the links between the immediate factors that caused Iraq’s invasion, and the historical forces that were underlying the developing threat during 1990-1991. Specifically, the chapter will trace (a) Iraq’s passage to war and the issues that surrounded Saddam’s surprising invasion of Kuwait; (b) Kuwait’s historical relations with Iraq and its dealings with Saddam’s regime prior to the invasion; (c) the failure of Arab mediation during the diplomatic build-up prior to Iraq’s invasion; (d) the salient characteristics of the war; (e) the international community’s effort to develop a consensus and enforce a post-war accord with Iraq; and (f) developments in the Gulf community’s security environment in the aftermath of the 1990-1991 war. The common denominator underlying the several factors that led to Iraq’s invasion was Iraq’s need for cash to fund its state-building after the end of the Iran-Iraq War in September 1988. Iraq was beset by economic difficulties typical of a post-war period: it owed about 45 billion dollars to Saudi Arabia, $15 billion to Kuwait, and another $10 billion to international banks. Iraq began releasing some tens of thousands of its circa 400,000 soldiers, which resulted in large numbers of young men in the marketplace and few jobs for them. Unemployment became a big problem. Furthermore, the situation was exacerbated by the fact that there were about a million Egyptian workers that had taken the place of Iraqis while the Iraqis had been recruited to fight the Iran-Iraq War, and now the Egyptians had to be dismissed back to Egypt, causing friction between the two Arab communities.1 Iraq was also seeking to lower the oil production of oil exporting states, most of whom had been neighboring Gulf states. Iraq believed that by enacting a low oil production, it would enable a major increase in its own oil production rate and create more reasonable prices, which had been relatively low at around $20 to $25 per barrel. However, the Gulf states which had their own interests were reluctant to lower their own oil production and were interested in selling as much oil as possible for the highest possible price (Kuwait was permitted by the _________________________________________________ 1 Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, The Gulf Conflict 1990-1991, Diplomacy and War in the New World Order (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993), p. 39.

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Organization of Petroleum-Exporting Countries, OPEC, to produce 2.03 million barrels per day). Moreover, Iraq accused Kuwait of pumping oil from underneath the Rumayla oilfield, which belonged to Iraq.2 Iraq’s goals can also be understood in strategic terms, and related to its position as a major actor in the region. Iraq ended the Iran-Iraq War without any direct access to the Gulf waters, while its opponent, Iran, controlled the entire Eastern shore of the Gulf. Iraq’s nearest port to Gulf waters was Umm-Qasr, which is located on the Shatt al-Arab waterway south of the Gulf waters. Baghdad was therefore looking for a site that could become an Iraqi port in the Gulf waters. Iraq’s idea was to develop such a port to enable its own forces to have more control in the Gulf itself. In Iraq’s assessment Kuwait was in a position to allow Iraq to have its small islands Bubiyan and Warba, which were located near the crossing point of Shatt al-Arab and the Gulf waters. These islands were not settled when the Iran-Iraq War ended and therefore, in Iraqi perception, Kuwait should have no reason not to lease them to Iraq. However, Kuwait’s reluctance to oblige Iraq on that matter (see below) made Iraq feel itself inferior to Iran in any future reference. Another reason for Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, which is again related to its leaders’ state-building images, concerns Iraq’s interest in obtaining major subventions of finance, or at least a compensation from their neighboring Gulf states. To be sure, when Iraq started the war against Iran it did so under the belief that it could smash the unprepared and uncultivated Iranian army, as well as the young regime of the Islamic Revolution. Iraq did not consult any Arab neighbors prior to its invasion. However, once the war-tide had turned against Iraq (notably from 1982 to 1986), it developed a policy of trying to end the war and of enlisting most Arab states to support this policy. Iraq then started posing as the savior of the Arab states from the wrath of the imperialist Iranian Revolution. They claimed to be the first and ultimate buffer, sheltering the Arab world from Iran. The fact that most Arab states agreed to assist Iraq during these years and supported its policies, gave the Iraqi leaders the sense that they could also bank on Arab support after the war ended. In Saddam Hussein’s view, states such as Kuwait and Saudi Arabia should be grateful for Iraq’s assistance in preventing the Iranian forces from harming these states. The Iraqis naturally expected that Kuwait and Saudi Arabia would agree to abolish their debt and even increase the subventions that Iraq now required once the war was over and it was seeking

_________________________________________________ 2 Ibid, pp. 40-41, 48; Majid Khadduri and Edmund Ghareeb, War in the Gulf, 1990-1991, The IraqKuwait Conflict and Its Implications (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 8687.

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economic development. Kuwait’s rejection of these demands (see below) was a major trigger that angered Saddam and provoked his will to invade.3 These goals can all be understood in terms of Realpolitik and rational terms of state-building. Saddam actually added to these goals and terms aspects of grandeur and of brinksmanship policies, which entangled him in conflicts and misunderstandings way beyond his original intentions. It should be mentioned that in the Arab world different states have developed for themselves different roles to play in the inter-Arab system and Saddam chose for himself the role of the ultimate hero-warrior. Saddam portrayed himself as a leader of the type presented in the mythology of “Thousand and One Nights“ or a new Salah al-Din (the leader who defeated the Crusaders in the year 1187): a leader of an entire Arab-Muslim region who strikes major strategic marks, without caring about the borders of a small and unimportant state. Saddam’s dialogue was consistent with his view of history, demonstrated by his focus on the fate of the entire Arab nation. Kuwait could be sacrificed for such a major ambition, and thus Saddam tried to pull himself above the immediate context of his entanglement with Kuwait. As some researchers point out, Saddam Hussein had also tried to emulate modern Arab leaders, such as Gamal ‘Abd al-Nasser, the president of Egypt during the height of pan-Arabism (he was president between 1954 and 1970). As such, he engaged in charismatic and sweeping policies which shocked other states in the region and put Saddam in a position of someone to be both revered and feared.4 Saddam therefore relied on his ability to generate support through myths, and he cultivated the general myth of pan-Arabism, namely finding a way of turning the Arabs into being great once more, like they had been in the Middle Ages. Then he further cultivated the myth of the need to compensate the Arab poor states, notably those who do not possess oil wealth. He was of course disregarding the fact that Iraq was a rich oil producing state, and instead he magnified Iraq’s economic hardships of the past Iran-Iraq War period. Thereby, he thought to win over the poor parties in the Arab world: Jordan, Yemen and the Palestinians, whose populations had no oil and lived in miserable conditions in their own states or as guest workers of the wealthy oil states, such as Kuwait. Another myth that Saddam hoped to try to employ was to act in a swift manner, pulling a strategic surprise. His cabinet minister Tariq ‘Aziz later explained that Saddam and his associates were aware that they could start a border _________________________________________________ 3

Freedman and Karsh, pp. 45-50 and 55-61; Charles R. H. Tripp, “Symbol and Strategy: Iraq and the War for Kuwait,” in The Iraqi Aggression Against Kuwait, Eds. Wolfgang F. Danspeckgruber and Charles R. H. Tripp (Boulder, Colorado and Oxford, U.K.: Westview Press, 1996), pp. 25-28. 4 Efraim Karsh and Inari Rautsi, Saddam Hussein: A Political Biography (London: Macmillan, 1991), p.241.

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skirmish with Kuwait that would cause a regional crisis, just by invading a small territory in Kuwait or taking over a Kuwaiti oilfield. The Iraqi leaders understood that they could get away with these tactics and then negotiate the withdrawal of their forces in return for financial subventions, which would have helped the Iraqi economy, but only to a small extent. Saddam therefore, chose to exercise a stunning maneuver, namely, to occupy Kuwait entirely, swiftly and dramatically.5 It is just possible to understand that Saddam was motivated both by state-building interests and Realpolitik on one hand, and by tactics of a cavalier shrouded in myth and fueled by his charisma, on the other. It is hard to distinguish what motivation led him more decisively between these two. Saddam tried to calculate realistically, but took too many risks and probed unclear edges in his politics. One can point out a few risks which already in the outset of the conflict were too complicated and hazardous. Thus, he started threatening the Gulf states that they must compensate him, but did not make a clear claim as to what he was after, at the inter-Arab summit in April 1990. On 22 April, he met the United States Ambassador to Iraq, April Glaspie, and talked to her about Iraq’s border problems with Kuwait, as well as with other states. Ambassador Glaspie’s conciliatory tone during that meeting was perceived by Saddam as U.S. indifference to Iraq’s border disputes in the Gulf. Saddam and his associates may have believed that the United States would actually comply with an Iraqi occupation of Kuwait and would not counteract it. Clearly, this was not what Glaspie had meant and surely it did not reflect U.S. policy. However, the way Iraq construed the Ambassador’s response attests to Saddam Hussein’s own misperception of the decision makers in Washington and U.S. policy making as a whole. Saddam thought that United States would gain nothing from defending Kuwait and would, therefore, leave it to be occupied by him. Saddam believed that Washington would not engage in fighting openly against Iraq, the fact that 12 U.S. Senators visited Baghdad on 12 April 1990 convinced that there was enough good-will towards him in the U.S. capital; and that in any case the U.S. was still under the Vietnam syndrome and would not react with a military response. He was sure to promise Ambassador Glaspie that there was not going to be any attack and that there would be negotiations with Kuwait, thereby engaging himself in a lie which only added to his misperception of the U.S. leaders’ propensity to fight back.6 Another entanglement concerned Saddam’s pledge to other Arab states, notably Egypt, to maintain a diplomatic course in regards to Iraq’s crisis with Ku_________________________________________________ 5

Tripp, pp. 25-29.

6

Freedman and Karsh, pp. 52-54; Khadduri and Ghareeb, pp. 110-114.

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wait. Saddam made this promise to the Egyptian president Mubarak in early May 1990, after his first threats against Kuwait had been voiced. His disregard for the Egyptian president, as well as for other major Arab parties, such as Saudi Arabia, led to the downfall of Saddam’s credibility in some important Arab eyes and denied him the support of these parties when he needed them most.7 This entanglement, however, was not as blunt as that which he had started escalating with Israel during late spring 1990. It is clear that Saddam used the Arab-Israeli issue as a means of diversion from the main arena of conflict in the Gulf and as a way to obtain legitimacy in the opinions of other Arab states, mainly to strengthen his position when criticized by the pro-Kuwait states. However, his pledge made already in April to incinerate”half of Israel“ in case Israel would attack Iraq had much ambivalent meaning: it sounded defensive, but also reflected Saddam’s continuing readiness for aggression and preparation for a possible real showdown. From an Israeli viewpoint, Saddam started preparing himself for a war with Israel. The fact that he had already developed long-range missiles that were able to carry chemical, as well as conventional warheads, and that he had envisioned the construction of the foiled “supergun,” by the Canadian weapons engineer Gerald Bull (Bull was killed in 1989 and according to Western Press reports by Israeli agents) suggested to some Israeli observers that Saddam was ready to embark on a war with Israel that would widely overshadow his Kuwaiti occupation. On 10 August, at an Arab League summit, following Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait, Saddam sought to ‘Zionize’ the crisis and rally the Arab masses behind him by portraying himself as the champion of the Palestinians and Pan-Arabism. Saddam was using the Arab-Israeli issue to legitimize his invasion of Kuwait within the community of Arab and Islamic states. Saddam had hoped to quickly invade and occupy Kuwait and then let everybody digest and accept the occupation. A different scenario would have been difficult for Saddam to imagine or even cope with.8

2

Kuwait: Confusing Friend and Foe

Kuwait’s relations with Iraq played an important role in Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. The crisis, after all, arose partly from the two states’ interactions and mutual perceptions, leading to the questions of whether Kuwait’s policies stimulated Iraq’s invasion and whether Kuwait failed to recognize or better defend itself from Iraq’s aggressive intentions. We should not, however, underestimate the _________________________________________________ 7 8

Freedman and Karsh, pp. 97-99. Freedman and Karsh, pp. 34-35, 99-102.

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astuteness and resourcefulness of Kuwait’s leaders, which often helped them steer their country safely through surrounding dangers.9 Their policies challenging Iraq should therefore not be attributed to mere incompetence or ignorance of Iraqi politics. Rather, they stemmed from a view of Kuwait’s own national goals and security interests. By attempting to fulfill its national interests, Kuwait rivaled and challenged Iraqi interests. Kuwait’s problems in state-building formed the foundation for these goals. Kuwait originated from a chieftaincy, a loose tribal confederacy based on nomad groups and townsmen. The town-based al-Sabah family played a leading role, with other groups enjoying a considerable amount of political independence.10 Kuwait’s course of state-building evolved according to two principles. First was a trend toward government centralization, essential for establishing stability among nomadic and town-based groups. After the al-Sabahs established their borders in the 1920s, they developed an administration to run Kuwait and a military force to defend it. By using British assistance and oil wealth, the al-Sabahs succeeded in controlling Kuwait’s territory, devising a successful petroleum and commercial economy. From the 1950s, they started vigorously developing towns and infrastructure.11 The other principle, in keeping with tribal traditions, was the distribution of benefits among citizens to maintain internal social stability. The government subsidized business enterprises and the citizens’ welfare, including rights for almost free education, free health insurance, and no income taxes. A "distributive coalition of Kuwaitis widely sharing Kuwaiti wealth” (to apply Mancur Olsen’s phrase) evolved. The government focused on improving the position of the rich merchant families by treating them the way elders had once been treated in the tribe. They were given chances to engage in finance, trade, and real estate businesses. Following some fierce encounters with the authorities in 1921 and 1938, they also gained the right to advise and even criticize the government. This prerogative was institutionalized after Kuwait’s independence in 1961 in the National As-

_________________________________________________ 9

Hassan A. Al-Ebraheem, Kuwait: A Political Study (Kuwait, 1975). Philip S. Khoury and Joseph Kostiner, “The Complexities of Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East,” in Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East, Eds. Philip S. Khoury and Joseph Kostiner (Berkeley, Calif., 1990), pp. 1-24; Jacqueline S. Ismael, Kuwait: Social Change in Historical Perspective (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1982), pp. 17-80. 10

11

Ismael, pp. 59-101.

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sembly, a 50-member elected, advisory body that functioned from 1962 to 1976 and again from 1981 to 1986.12 The 1980s brought security and economic crises that challenged Kuwait’s state-building principles and the government’s control over the country. Despite the government’s efforts, Kuwait was beset by repeated acts of Shi‘i terrorism perpetrated by foreign, professional hit squads and occasionally by Kuwaiti citizens. There were also continuous, mostly Iranian attacks on Kuwaiti oil tankers in Gulf waters. It became evident that the government had a hard time defending Kuwait and keeping the Iran-Iraq War from spilling over onto its territory.13 The government’s resources and control was also affected by the mounting oil recession of the 1980s which brought a decline in Kuwait’s (and other oilstates’) production and income. The government was both forced to cut its own economic and development activities and face a recession. Thus, the development budget in 1986 was only 694 million Kuwaiti Dinars (1 KD = c. U.S.$3.20) of a total of KD 3.4 billion; in 1988, the overall budget deficit was KD 1.4 billion.14 In the mid-1980s declining international interest rates also cut the earlier high Kuwaiti income by 17 percent from its huge foreign investment (KD 1.7 billion in 1980–1981).15 Political and economic problems also affected the business elite, which challenged Kuwait’s other main state-building principle, social stability. Businessmen were hit by a crash in the unofficial stock market (Suq al-Manakh16) in 1982; a decline in the activity of government-employed contractors; a fall in the rent values of real estate; and losses resulting from overextended loans in bank investments.17 _________________________________________________ 12 J.E. Peterson, The Arab Gulf States: Steps Toward Political Participation, The Washington Papers No. 131 (Washington, D.C., 1988), pp. 27-61. 13 On the atmosphere of declining security in Kuwait, see Milton Viorst, “A Portrait at Large (Kuwait),” The New Yorker, 16 May 1988, pp. 43-79. 14 Financial Times, 11 February 1985; 25 February 1986; al-Anba’ (Kuwait), 26 April 1988; Kuwait News Agency (KUNA), 26 June, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), 27 June 1988. 15 Financial Times, 22 February 1984. 16 In 1982, the Suq al-Manakh, Kuwait's alternative bourse, or stock market, crashed. The Suq alManakh was largely unregulated and highly speculative. This unofficial market emerged in the later 1970s after the government imposed stricter trading regulations on Kuwait's primary stock market. Shares in the Suq al-Manakh were traded in companies banned from Kuwait's official stock market. Many of these companies were owned by Kuwaitis but registered and domiciled outside of Kuwait. There was little transparency in the companies traded on the Suq al-Manakh, and it was difficult to determine if the companies that were traded had any real assets. The market's crash in 1982 hurt the Kuwaiti economy and damaged its international reputation as a stable climate for investment. – See Jill Crystal, Oil and Politics in the Gulf, Rulers and Merchants in Kuwait and Qatar (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 97-100. 17 Al-Anba’, 26 April 1988.

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In the face of burgeoning security and economic problems, the government decided to disperse the National Assembly in August 1986, dealing a direct blow to the elite, whose members from different political convictions had constituted its majority. Motivated by a sense of political deprivation, former leading assembly members formed a "parliamentary movement” and, when the Iran-Iraq War ended in September 1988, demanded the assembly’s restoration.18 However, the immediate postwar period saw a serious attempt to recover from the previous crises and reestablish state-building strategies. This period offered new opportunities and brought about an atmosphere of optimism and vigor. Kuwait developed several avenues to improve its economic situation. The relative improvement and stability in oil prices (that is $17-$18 per barrel compared to $15 in the mid-1980s) enabled the oil minister, ‘Ali Khalifa al-Sabah, to breach the oil quotas of OPEC for Kuwait by producing considerable higher quantities to compensate for the former lean years. Already in 1989, Kuwait produced about 500,000 barrels per day above OPEC’s quota. The government’s oil revenue in 1989 was $9.3 billion, the highest since 1983 and 66 percent higher than in 1988.19 At OPEC’s meeting in Vienna in November 1989, Kuwait received 6.79 percent of OPEC’s production, equivalent to a quota of 1.5 million barrels per day (mbd) but Kuwait kept exceeding that limit to a level of 2.03 mbd. (Kuwait announced a reduction of about 200,000 barrels a day for May 1990).20 Higher oil revenue promoted economic activity in other areas. The government was especially keen to improve Kuwait’s traditional sources of wealth, namely, trade and financial business, and to turn Kuwait once more – as it had been until 1982 – into the main Gulf business center.21 Non-oil revenues for 1989 were estimated at KD 228.5 million, up by KD 176.5 million over the previous year.22 While the official budget deficit was up by 11 percent, in early 1990 government spending increased by 7 percent – the highest level in three years. In April 1990, the Central Bank manager ‘Abd al-Salim al-Sabah, expressed Kuwait’s confidence in public investment to stimulate economic activities.23 _________________________________________________ 18

Financial Times, 28 November 1989. Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) – Country Report, Kuwait, No. 2, 1990, pp 8-9; Middle East Economic Digest (MEED), 27 April 1990. 20 Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) – Country Report, Kuwait, No. 1, 1990, p. 11; EUI-Country Report, Kuwait, No. 2, 1990, p. 11; Financial Times, 13 March 1990. 21 International Herald Tribune, 13 March 1989. 22 KUNA, 3 July 1989, in FBIS, 6 July 1989. 23 EIU Country Report, Kuwait, No. 2, 1990, p. 9; MEED, 27 April 1989; al-Sabah’s interview, AlAnba’, 14 April 1989. 19

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The policy of investment and increased public spending was mainly aimed at enhancing socio-political integration and tranquility. The "private sector” – that is, wealthy businessmen – were offered tempting investment terms and urged to invest in Kuwait’s economy. In December 1989, 1,350 of the main debtors of the al-Manakh collapse (about 54 percent of all debtors) whose debts had been covered by collateral were allowed to write off up to KD 250,000 of debt to let them resume activities and enter new business enterprises.24 The government also aimed at integrating other echelons in society: In July, expatriates were permitted to invest in Kuwait through local representatives acting on their behalf; non-Kuwaiti shop owners and craftsmen were permitted to conduct business without a Kuwaiti partner.25 Subsidies for food, education and health insurance were kept up to protect "the peoples’ needs,” namely, to keep the lower strata, notably the Shi’a, pacified.26 The government accompanied these measures by strengthening its rule and control of the Shi’a community. Thus, it occasionally cracked down on Shi’a to prevent terrorist activities. But after the war – as relations with Iran gradually improved – Kuwait’s leaders also tried to mend fences with local Shi’a. In June 1990, for example, a state security court acquitted four Shi’a accused of plotting to overthrow Kuwait’s political system. During 1989 the government increased its efforts to strengthen its grip on the country by appointing new governors and provincial councils to Kuwait’s five provinces.27 When members of the elite demonstrated demanding restoration of the national assembly and new elections, however, the government forcefully dispersed these gatherings and arrested participants. However, in April 1990, the emir, Jabir al-Ahmad, tried to meet the elite halfway, by announcing that a new national assembly would be elected on 10 June to include 25 appointed and 50 elected members. This plan fell short of the elite’s expectations but signified the authorities’ intention to ease tensions.28 What should therefore be kept in mind is that during the Gulf War’s aftermath, Kuwait was trying to rehabilitate its economy and ensure control over a society shaken by the events of the last decade. Rising economic opportunities met rising expectations for higher living standards. Kuwaiti authorities, keen to utilize their economic resources to the utmost and exert full control of their territory, were therefore inclined to refuse Iraqi demands for Kuwaiti territorial and economic concessions. _________________________________________________ 24

Financial Times, 13 March 1989. Arab Times, 22 January and 24 July 1989. 26 Finance Minister’s Jasim al-Khurafi’s interview, al-Ra’y al-’Amm, 30 July 1989. 27 Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, September 27, 1989. 28 KUNA, April 23, 1990, in FBIS, April 24, 1990. 25

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In late 1988 and throughout 1989, Iraq insisted that Kuwait cease pumping oil from the disputed Rumayla oil field on the border and lower oil production to the OPEC quota to reduce the world oil glut and increase prices, and hence Iraqi profits. Yet Kuwaiti leaders deemed an economic upswing vital for social cohesion and were eager to take advantage of what they considered to be an era of "prosperity and growth.”29 Oil production was the key to this process. Kuwaiti leaders such as former minister of oil ‘Ali al-Khalifa regarded the oil-quota system, which set a limit to Kuwait’s production, as outdated. When asked about his OPEC colleagues’ different view, he replied, "I am not paid to make everybody happy”.30 Kuwait also disagreed with Iraqi territorial demands. It was reluctant to give up economic assets (such as Rumayla) or strategic ones such as Bubiyan Island. Iraq wanted to take over or lease this mostly unpopulated island due to its location at the Gulf’s northern end, but Kuwaiti authorities then redefined Bubiyan as a new development region. The government planed to build a new city, alSabiya, and link it through a causeway to the mainland. In 2015, it was supposed to have 250,000 people. By 1990, its planning had begun and a power station was built.31 2.1 Kuwait’s Security: The Attitude Towards Iraq Kuwait’s attitude toward Iraq was shaped by security considerations. Its leaders’ basic assumption was that the aftermath of the Iran-Iraq War presented no danger of a new full-scale war since both protagonists, having suffered so heavily, were incapable and uninterested in resuming military activities. Crown Prince Sa’d ‘Abdallah stressed that the superpowers and international community had produced a cease fire between Iraq and Iran and would continue to guarantee peace in the Gulf.32 This perception was widely shared, and echoed by an academic, ‘Abd al-Reda Assiri, in his 1990 book predicting Iran and Iraq would be preoccupied with reconstruction. Assiri concluded that they posed only "minimal direct threats to the Gulf states in the short and medium terms. As a result, no hegemonic power may appear in the Gulf in the immediate future”.33 Given this basic assumption, Kuwaiti leaders believed that neutrality was the best security strategy suited for the postwar situation. In principle, Kuwait _________________________________________________ 29

Sa’d ‘Abdullah’s interview, Arab Times, December 12, 1989. Financial Times, March 13, 1990. 31 Al-Qabas, 25 March 1989; al-Siyasa, 7 February 1990; al-Qabas, 17 March 1990. 32 Sa’d ‘Abdullah’s interview, al-Watan al-’Arabi, 27 January 1989. 33 ‘Abd al-Reda Assiri, Kuwait’s Foreign Policy (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press 1990), p. 199. 30

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had been following this approach for three decades. Being a small state (17,500 square kilometers) with only 40 percent indigenous population (of a total 2 million before August 1990), Kuwait had to keep good relations with all its bigger, more powerful neighbors. This attitude developed into a nonaligned policy among the superpowers and a strategy of mediation in Arab affairs. Kuwait’s neutrality was active, utilizing its financial abilities and its leaders’ shrewdness.34 Moreover, Kuwait’s tilt toward Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War was no complete change of Kuwait’s neutrality. In Kuwait’s perception, Iraq was worth supporting as an essential security buffer against Iranian expansion but not as a full ally. Kuwait could not afford to take a totally pro-Iraqi partisan policy that would provoke Iran into retaliation. It thus tried to be cautious in assisting Iraq: taking a pro-Iraqi line in its media, using its ports to import and deliver to Iraq essential supplies and export small amounts of Iraqi oil, giving Iraq about $14 billion, and resisting Iranian-backed Shi‘i terrorism. But Kuwait did not join a defense pact with Iraq and maintained diplomatic relations with Iran for most of the war’s duration. Kuwait joined in founding the Gulf Cooperation Council in 1981 because its leaders were determined not to be an Iraqi satellite.35 When the war ended, Kuwait wanted to return to a balanced neutrality. Its leaders believed Kuwait could best benefit by getting along with all regional state, including Iraq and Iran, and mediating among them. Already in February 1988, Kuwaiti Ambassador to Washington Sa’ud Nasir al-Sabah tried to dissociate Kuwait from Iraq’s current offensive against Iran by declaring: "We are playing the role of a mediator between Iraq and Iran and we have never taken sides with one Islamic country against another.”36 In spring 1988, Minister of State Sa’ud al-’Usaymi played down the aid to Iraq: "We are giving aid to 64 Third World Countries. Why not Iraq?”37 Kuwait went on to normalize relations with Iran, restored to ambassadorial level in September 1989.38 Moreover, a high-ranking Kuwaiti delegation visiting Baghdad in February 1989 suggested to its hosts that the GCC states could bring Iran and Iraq together and stimulate postwar reconstruction.39 Kuwait also took other mediation tasks: leading Arab arbitration efforts among Lebanese factions and playing go-between for Turkey and Bulgaria over the expulsion of Muslims from Bulgaria. Kuwaiti leaders believed these activi_________________________________________________ 34

Ibid., pp. 32-91; Viorst, “A Portrait At Large.” On Kuwait-Iraq relations, see Assiri, Kuwait’s Foreign Policy, pp. 69-98; R.K. Ramazani, Revolutionary Iran (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988), pp. 76-80, 126130; Gerd Nonneman, Iraq, The Gulf States and The War (London: Ithaca Press, 1986). 36 KUNA, 3 February 1988, in FBIS, 16 February 1988. 37 Viorst, “A Portrait At Large.” 38 KUNA, 29 September 1989, in FBIS, 29 September 1989. 39 Al-Anba’ (Kuwait), 8 February 1989, quoted by Assiri, Kuwait’s Foreign Policy, p. 135. 35

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ties would make their country so highly valued and well connected as to enhance its security. In Assiri’s words, Kuwait’s survival depended "on a combination of domestic support and its external role as donor/mediator. Kuwait’s political support for a variety of Arab causes, its political structure, its financial capabilities and its sense of mission make it a candidate to mediate interregional disputes, simultaneously neutralizing foes and acquiring friends.”40 Kuwait’s strategy of neutrality thus reinforced its assessment that there was no immediate serious danger. Iraq seemed no threat, Kuwait’s leaders reasoned, because – like themselves and Iran – it was too weak to embark on a new military adventure and had no reason to do so. They saw Baghdad’s main emphasis as economic growth facilitated through regional cooperation. Moreover, rather than viewing Iraq as a potential regional leader, Kuwait’s suggestions for regional economic cooperation show that its leaders thought that Iraq needed its help and thus did not want to antagonize Kuwait. At worst, Iraq might provoke a petty border dispute. But such issues were considered soluble through the same methods Kuwait was applying elsewhere – inter-Arab mediation in a spirit of compromise. A Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) official, Khalid alHasan, called this approach "the old, Arab Bedouin way”.41 Kuwait believed that any problem it might have with Iraq could be handled by relying on neutralism and Arab solidarity. 2.2 Kuwaiti Responses to Iraq’s Demands Thus, Kuwait’s premises reflected several principles. First, it was not ready to accept Iraq’s territorial and economic demands. Second, while Kuwait objected to Iraq’s demands, it did not express a final refusal to negotiate the issues involved. This practice was in keeping with the common "Bedouin way” permitting both sides to bargain and yet stick to their policies without fearing serious escalation. Third, Kuwait offered Iraq cooperation in economic projects as a means of showing friendship to all regional states. Kuwait’s responses to Iraq’s demands in 1988 and 1989 succeeded in fending off these pressures without provoking Iraqi retaliation. During this period, Iraq focused particularly on renting or obtaining the islands of Warba and Bubiyan and on writing off its financial debt to Kuwait. Kuwait answered by asking Iraq for a comprehensive border settlement (during Sa’d ‘Abdallah’s visit in Baghdad in February 1989) and by announcing the development of al-Sabiya. Iraq, unprepared to give up any territorial demands, refused to make a comprehensive border settlement, and the issues were left pending. _________________________________________________ 40 41

Assiri, Kuwait’s Foreign Policy, p. 133. Newsweek, November 5, 1992.

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Kuwait also raised plans for development projects: the above-mentioned proposal of Iran-Iraq cooperation with the GCC states and a plan signed in March 1989 (set during Sa’d ‘Abdallah’s visit in February 1989) to supply Kuwait with fresh irrigation water from the Shatt al-’Arab. Kuwait undertook to finance the $1.4 billion pipeline to carry the water.42 According to some reports, Kuwait also continued providing Iraq with some financial aid – albeit far less than during the Iran-Iraq War – into 1989.43 In Kuwaiti eyes, the mix between postponing the border dispute, proposing economic projects, and maintaining some economic help for Iraq seemed to be working. During the Amir Jabir al-Ahmad’s September 1989 visit to Baghdad, he inaugurated the water project and was awarded an Iraqi medal for Kuwait’s assistance during the war. The border problem was not even mentioned during his visit.44 Kuwait felt so confident that it did not even conclude a nonaggression agreement with Iraq, like the Iraq-Saudi agreement of February 1989. Iraq started escalating its pressure on Kuwait in the spring of 1990. Now no longer satisfied with asking the Gulf states to cancel its debt to them, it demanded from Kuwait an additional $10 billion. Iraq also accused Kuwait of waging economic warfare by overselling its OPEC quota in order to swamp the market with cheap oil and rob Iraq of needed income. Iraq also demanded $2.4 billion for Kuwait’s alleged theft of its oil from Kuwait’s side of the vase Rumayla oilfield.45 Kuwaiti responses during this period indicate only small tactical shifts but no strategic sea of changes. Kuwait kept viewing its dispute with Iraq as soluble according to the "Bedouin way,” and responded accordingly. The Kuwaitis thus gave only partial responses, avoiding a definite reply to Iraq’s demands and refusing to concede territories or forego loans. Yet Kuwait still avoided delivering a final refusal and Jabir promised negotiations with Iraq once it officially recognized Kuwait’s sovereignty. In addition, Kuwait announced in May a reduction of about 200,000 barrels per day in its oil production (which had been 2.03 mbd, 500,000 over quota), but its oil minister al-Amiri further stated in July that Kuwait would propose scrapping the quota system altogether at OPEC’s October 1991 meeting.46 _________________________________________________ 42

Middle East Economic Survey, March 20, 1989; al-Siyasa, September 13, 24, 1989. See Gerd Nonneman, Iraq and the Arab States in the Gulf: Modified Continuity Into the 1990s. Paper presented at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 9 May 1990, p. 13. 44 Al-Siyasa, 13 and 24 September 1989. 45 See Richard Schofield, Kuwait and Iraq: Historical Claims and Territorial Disputes (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1991), pp. 126-128; Milton Viorst, “Report From Baghdad,” The New Yorker, 24 June 1991. 46 Financial Times, 13 March 1990; EIU-Country Report, Kuwait, No. 2, 1990, p. 11; al-Qabas, 16 July 1990. 43

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Kuwait’s perception of the dispute, even after Iraq made it public and official, also tallied with the traditional Arab outlook. In a cabinet meeting two weeks before Iraq’s invasion, Kuwait’s ministers stated that Iraq was either making threats merely in order to extort money, or, at worst (as Sa’d ‘Abdallah asserted) aiming to send troops into Kuwait in disputed border areas, namely, in Warba and Bubiyan islands or the Rumayla oilfield.47 They thought in terms of traditional border disputes, not envisioning a full-scale occupation. Kuwait’s response to Iraq’s mounting threats (and, after July 24, its heavy military buildup on the border) also reflected the perception that a common border dispute should be resolved through negotiations in a traditional inter-Arab framework. Kuwait first labored to display its inclination to Arab solidarity. Before Iraq made public the dispute, Kuwait defended Iraqi actions against nonArab parties, such as the execution for alleged spying of the British journalist Bazoft in March, or Saddam Hussein’s threat in early April to destroy half of Israel.48 After Iraq went public about its conflict with Kuwait, the latter stressed its generous contribution "to Arab causes, notably against Iran during the war without expecting anything.” Kuwait equally stressed”the need to adhere to the principles of consultation and understanding and holding a dialogue”.49 Kuwaiti leaders and newspapers urged Iraq to resolve problems through a peaceful dialogue.50 Kuwait thereby tried to set the rules as its leaders had perceived them. In practice, the Kuwaitis appealed for mediation to other GCC states, Arab League security-general Shadhli al-Qulaybi, UN Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar, and individual Arab states such as Egypt. Kuwait tended to rely on Saddam Hussein’s promise to President Mubarak of Egypt to avoid any attack as long as Iraq and Kuwait negotiated, and it put great hope on resolving the conflict at a 31 July meeting in Jidda.51 Although Kuwaiti cabinet members still disputed Iraq’s charges of stealing oil from Rumayla or waging economic warfare and did not agree to write off Iraq’s debt, they also did not reject any concession officially and finally.52 Hence, according to the "Bedouin way,” the Jidda meeting was perceived in Kuwait as a start for a long process of bargaining, displaying intransigence, and perhaps making some concessions. Kuwait did show some flexibility at Jidda. It did not send Foreign Minister Sabah al-Ahmad, whose hard line toward Iraq made Baghdad denounce him as _________________________________________________ 47

Financial Times, 18–19 August 1990. Iraqi News Agency, 19 March (quoting Kuwait’s minister of information, Dr. Jabir Mubarak, 22 March); al- Ra’y al-Amm, 29 June 1986. 49 KUNA, 18 July 1990, in FBIS, 19 July 1990; al-Qabas, 16 July 1990. 50 KUNA, 24 July 1990, in FBIS, 25 July 1990. 51 KUNA, 26 July 1990, in FBIS, 26 July 1990. 52 Financial Times, 18–19 August 1990. 48

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"an American agent.” Sa’d ‘Abdallah later recounted that he, as head of the Kuwaiti delegation, agreed to write off Iraq’s debt and to lease Iraq the island of Warba (but not Bubiyan).53 He attributed the breakdown to the fact that Iraq’s delegation came only to deliver an ultimatum, repeat all the old Iraqi demands, and insist on total surrender in order to prepare the ground for an invasion.54 It seems logical that Kuwait – which believed that talks would continue and that bargaining was legitimate – was trying at the last minute to pull Iraq into a border agreement. Iraq, however, played according to different rules by delivering nonnegotiable demands and when its delegates were dissatisfied with the results, walked out. On 2 August, one day after the Jidda meeting ended, Iraq invaded Kuwait. To what extent did Kuwait provoke Iraq into the invasion? The "provocation” argument is not convincing.55 Kuwait’s sovereignty gave it a right to refuse Iraq’s demands.56 Moreover, Kuwait’s stand was not shaped by mere caprice but by what it considered essential to state interests and objectives. In addition, accusations of Kuwait’s provocation, when later made by Iraqi opponents such as former foreign minister Tariq ‘Aziz, focused on Kuwait’s style rather than Iraq’s demands: delays on writing off the loan or the effort to change OPEC’s quota rules. ‘Aziz further explained that the Kuwaiti policy of waging "economic warfare,” that is, overproducing oil became acute for Iraq only in December 1989.57 Therefore, even from an Iraqi viewpoint, Kuwait’s policy of overproduction was too short-lived to be really damaging. Hence, Kuwait’s policies were an irritant to Iraq but were partly changeable and accommodating. Kuwaiti policies can hardly be regarded a cause for Iraq going to war. Iraq’s decision to occupy Kuwait grew out of its belief that this would bring the financial and strategic assets needed to solve its economic and strategic problems. The fact that Kuwait refused to meet Iraq’s demands was not the cause of the invasion, but only a pretext for it. Why did Kuwait fail to prepare for an Iraqi invasion? Kuwait believed that Iraq preferred economic development to foreign adventures; that its security strategy of neutrality was effective; and that its reliance on negotiations, Arab mediation, and abstention from military preparations would avoid war and invasion. Following these assumptions instead of the evidence, Kuwait was strategi_________________________________________________ 53

Ibid. Financial Times, 18–19 August 1990; Minister of Defense Nawwaf al-Sabah’s interview, Der Spiegel, 24 September 1990. 55 This argument was raised, though not as a central theme, in Viorst, “Report from Baghdad.” 56 Uriel Dann, The Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait: Historical Observations, (Tel Aviv: The Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Shiloah Institute, August 1990). 57 Viorst, “Report from Baghdad.” 54

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cally surprised, like the Soviet Union in June 1941, the United States in December 1941, or Israel in October 1973. Kuwaiti post-invasion statements attest to this blunder. To give one example, Defense Minister Nawwaf al-Sabah said, "We simply could not imagine that the Iraqi head of state would lie to Egypt’s President… [and] Jordan’s King…. Furthermore, we did not want to inflame Saddam Hussein with a mobilization of our troops.”58 In Kuwait’s defense, most Arab parties shared its expectations that Iraq would not attack and that the "Bedouin way” would work. Even after Iraq’s occupation, its allies and apologists continued to state this line. After all, never in the Arab League’s history had one Arab state simply occupied another. A limited Iraqi-initiated skirmish was expected, but a full-scale invasion was Saddam’s real surprise, which cost Kuwait its independence.59 Finally, although Iraq later claimed that Kuwait had planned to bring in U.S. forces to fight it, Kuwait’s abstention from such alliance and over-reliance on neutrality and mediation was the factor that left it unable to deter or rebuff an Iraqi attack.

3

Inter-Arab Mediation of the Iraq-Kuwait Conflict

The task of containing the Iraq-Kuwait crisis within manageable proportions during June-July 1990, when it first broke into the open, fell primarily on the shoulders of other Arab states. A combination of factors – the historical legacy of inter-Arab mediation, the intimacy of leading Arab statesmen with one another, the supposed familiarity of Arab mediators with the dispute, expectations that Iraq’s past behavior towards Kuwait would serve as a precedent for the present, and Saudi Arabia’s presumed economic leverage – resulted in a nearly unanimous belief in both the Arab world and the West that they would succeed in defusing the crisis. Even after Iraq’s invasion on 2 August, certain Arab parties continued to seek an exclusively "Arab solution” to the conflict. The failure of Arab mediation thus warrants analysis, specifically the unfolding of the crisis and the unsuccessful attempts made to mediate it satisfactorily. It is a common contention that numerous mistakes were made during the crucial gestation period of the crisis, June-July 1990, which, far from defusing the crisis, had the effect of exacerbating it. These mistakes derived from a fundamental misreading of the situation, a mistaken (albeit understandable and not unreasonable) belief that Saddam Hussein would conduct his foreign policies in accordance with a long-established inter-Arab "rule of the game”: that conflicts _________________________________________________ 58 59

Nawwaf’s interview, Der Spiegel, 24 September 1990. Viorst, “Report from Baghdad.”

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between Arab parties were rarely, if ever, zero-sum. Arab mediators were thus working from a false premise, namely that the Kuwait-Iraq dispute, like all other inter-Arab conflicts, was amenable to deal-making. To be sure, a different sort of mediation, accompanied by serious efforts to deter Iraq or by greater pressure on Kuwait to satisfy Iraqi demands, would not ipso facto have guaranteed better results. The sort of inter-Arab mediation employed, however, devoid of sufficient pressure on either party, ensured failure. 3.1 The Legacy of Mediation The management of inter-Arab conflicts over the past half-century has been marked by a number of enduring features: (1) a strong propensity to contain the Arab states’ myriad disputes with one another within the”family,” often resulting in a readiness to compromise in return for an appropriate compensation or tradeoff; (2) the prominent involvement of one or more Arab mediators, whose activities have ranged from serving as "postmen” to leveraging agreements through a range of incentives and disincentives, providing appropriate trade-offs and collective face-saving mechanisms and conferring legitimacy on the outcome; and (3) the construction of flexible coalitions in order to strengthen the position of one side or provide a counterweigh against another. This "balancing” against a third party, often under urgent conditions, frequently compels the parties within a coalition to compromise their own bilateral disputes for the sake of the larger, coalition interest. The inter-Arab mediation dynamic has itself contributed on occasion to the formation of balancing alignments, or in certain cases functioned in lieu of balancing coalitions in order to manage the challenges of the hour. The social origins of inter-Arab mediation can be traced to wasta, a traditional, semi-institutionalized mechanism for settling conflicts between individuals, families or tribal groups in the pre-modern Middle East which is still practiced today. In its classical form, it enabled the weaker party to avoid being shamed, compensated the aggrieved parties for lost honor, and involved a variety of outside parties whose very presence both legitimized and guaranteed the outcome. To be sure, regional and international contexts had changed a great deal since 1945, the year in which a fully fledged Arab state system, with its own regional organization, the League of Arab States, came into being.60 Many of the old regimes and accompanying socioeconomic order were swept away, for example those in Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Yemen and Libya. The establishment of Israel and the subsequent protracted conflict with it both promoted inter-Arab coopera_________________________________________________ 60 Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, The Crystallization of the Arab State System, 1945-1954 (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1993).

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tion and heightened inter-Arab divisions. Since 1955, Arab states such as Egypt, Syria and subsequently Iraq have promoted the ideology of radical pan-Arabism (al-qawmiyya al-‘arabiyya). At the same time, pan-Arabism completely dominated the intellectual discourse during the 1950s and 1960s, which in turn decisively influenced the political agenda. Repeated unification attempts, most notably the 1958-61 Egyptian-Syrian United Arab Republic which exacerbated interArab tensions further, and the years between 1958 and 1970 came to be known as”the Arab Cold War.”61 This period was marked by intense political struggles, both between conservative regimes and revolutionary, anti-Western regimes, and within the revolutionary camp. The extension of Soviet-American rivalry to the Middle East further exacerbated domestic and interstate conflicts, as did the growing power of Iran. Oil revenues altered capabilities and expectations, transformed labor and capital flows, and further raised the stakes in regional politics. The power of the state apparatus expanded significantly. By the 1980s, disappointment with state performances and prevailing ideologies, continued demonstrations of weakness towards the West, Israel and Iran, and a generation of rapid population growth and the accompanying strains on existing institutions, combined to provide fertile ground for a new-old phenomenon which challenged the status quo – Islamic fundamentalism. Notwithstanding these myriad changes, Arab politics and society were still heavily shaped by the combination of primordial sentiments (loyalties to subnational foci of identification such as family, clan, and tribe) and a political culture which placed great emphasis on personal, face-to-face diplomacy.62 Primordial sentiments often provide social change and expanding, heavy-handed state bureaucracies and are thus clung to by individuals and groups alike. Indeed, after almost half a century of independence, political and social development in the Arab world was still not behaving like Clifford Geertz’s hypothetical "integrative revolution,” in which primordial sentiments are transformed into the basis of civil society. Rather than being transformed, primordial sentiments had remained an integral part of the value system and continued to play an important role in domestic political life, notwithstanding the creation of "modern,” bureaucraticstate institutions. As for the modern Arab state system in the post-Nasser era, it was characterized by a combination of intensive conflictual and cooperative elements, with no single party able to impose its will. The combination of elements which _________________________________________________ 61

Malcolm Kerr, The Arab Cold War, 1958-1970 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970). For valuable analyses of Arab culture and society, see Hisham Sharabi, Neopatriarchy: A Theory of Distorted Change in Arab Society (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), and Halim Barakat, Arab Society (New York, 1988).

62

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would allow for real hegemony (a charismatic leader, unlimited resources, a strong military and a stable sociopolitical order) was lacking. Consequently, systematic constraints and limitations generated a perpetual need for mediators to play stabilizing roles, a need which was reinforced by the prevailing "tribal” norms of Arab societies. Thus, underlying domestic political modes of behavior were replicated, to a considerable degree, in interstate relations, even among socalled "revolutionary” regimes. The employment of pressure and threats, and the ultimate attainment in nearly all cases of an agreement to avoid overt armed conflict, closely resembled traditional tribal norms of conduct. As a result, within the inter-Arab state system, in spite of demands, pressures, and criticisms inherent in a system marked by high levels of conflict, Arab leaders were generally able to recognize what their Arab rivals and antagonists were seeking, and to find ways to accommodate them in part. The prevailing atmosphere was one of continuous bargaining under nearly all circumstances, without resorting to actual physical conquest of the rival party. As part of this ongoing, complex process, certain Arab states developed specializations as mediators, and the possibilities for brokering fruitful trade-offs between the protagonists in a particular conflict were magnified. These underlying patterns survived, and even increased in significance, during the profusion of changes that the Middle East as a whole and the inter-Arab system in particular has undergone during recent decades. At times they even served as a kind of early-warning system, identifying trouble spots and enabling them to be addressed in a reasonably effective manner. Whether one looks at matters from a societal-cultural angle or from a more conventional international relations perspective, then inter-Arab mediation stood out as a central component of the Arab regional system’s modus operandi. The importance of inter-Arab mediation was highlighted by two examples during the 1980s. Egypt’s return to the Arab fold was brokered by Jordan and Iraq as part of their efforts during the Iran-Iraq War to congeal a broad-based anti-Iranian wartime coalition, and in 1989 Saudi Arabia, assisted by Algeria, Morocco and Kuwait, nudged Syria and the feuding factions in Lebanon into signing the Ta’if framework agreement providing for the reconstruction of the Lebanese polity after fifteen years of civil war. 3.2 Background to the Gulf Crisis The origins of the Kuwaiti-Iraq dispute are bound up with the creation of the modern entities of Kuwait and Iraq in formerly Ottoman lands. Kuwait was established as a British protectorate in 1899 and unilaterally served from the last vestiges of Ottoman control in 1913. Mandatory Iraq emerged as part of the post-

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World War I territorial redefinition of the Middle East. The 1990-1991 crisis had its immediate origins in the two years following the end of the Iran-Iraq War in the summer of 1988. Kuwait escaped from the Iran-Iraq War relatively unscathed, and hoped that its $14 billion of wartime aid to Iraq would be properly appreciated, and concluded that a more stable era in the Gulf was in the offing. A number of outstanding bilateral disputes between Iraq and Kuwait quickly intruded, however: border problems, notably Iraq’s desire to improve its access to the Persian Gulf by annexing or leasing the Kuwaiti island of Bubiyan, Iraqi demands for Kuwait to abide by OPEC production quotas63 and support a rise in the price of oil in line with Iraq’s economic requirements, Iraq’s accusations that Kuwait was illegally pumping oil from Iraq’s share of Rumayla oilfield astride their common border, and acute Iraqi financial needs, encompassing not only the forgiving of debts, but also new large-scale capital infusions. The two parties held a number of high-level meetings on these issues, but achieved no results. The larger postwar geopolitical context contributed to the failure of Kuwait and Iraq to resolve their dispute. During the Iran-Iraq War, Kuwait had gradually become a full participant in the broad Arab coalition supporting Iraq. With the end of the war in July 1988, however, Kuwait returned to its traditional policy of balancing between its two stronger neighbors to the north. Predictably, Kuwait’s overtures to Tehran aroused considerable ire in Baghdad.64 Ironically, developments in the overall inter-Arab system were thought to portend well for the postwar era. Two Arab sub-regional groupings were established at the beginning of 1989, officially aimed at promoting economic integration in the face of the challenge posed by the European Community’s unity measures: the Arab Cooperation Council ("ACC”, see Box 7), composed of Iraq, Egypt, Jordan, and Yemen, and the Arab Maghreb Union ("AMU”), consisting of Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia, and the eight-year-old Gulf Cooperation Council, composed of Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. Inter-Arab affairs now seemed to be organized along more ‘rational’ lines, based on concrete economic, political and sociocultural interests rather than on empty ideological bombast.

_________________________________________________ 63

OPEC’s official quota for Kuwait was approximately 1.6 million barrels per day, whereas Kuwait was pumping approximately 2 million barrels a day. 64 Mohamed Heikel (Muhammed Haykal), Illusions of Triumph (London: HarperCollins, 1992), p. 162.

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Box 7:

Arab Cooperation Council

A regional bloc created in 1989 and composed of Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, and North Yemen. It was a formalization of the alliance between Egypt and Iraq that was revived during the Iran-Iraq War. In some respects it was developed to rival and compete with the Gulf Cooperation Council. The regional alliance was ruptured by the Iraqi-Kuwait crisis of 1990-1991, during which Egypt was aligned against Iraq and contributed forces to the international coalition.65

In fact, the new regional groupings were largely ineffective in promoting their goals. Moreover, the overall inter-Arab ‘structure’ was now even less amenable to the mediation of the inter-Arab disputes. Apart from Egypt’s reconciliation with Syria and Libya, neither ACC nor GCC members placed a high priority on additional coalition-building with other Arab states. The absence of a wider rapprochement process was significant, for the emergence of regional blocs only exacerbated Kuwaiti-Iraqi tensions further. Whereas the GCC was formed primarily to bolster its own members against its northern neighbors through the promotion of common foreign and economic policies derived from the underlying common interests of the Gulf states, Iraq viewed the ACC primarily as a vehicle to advance its regional ambitions. Consequently, Kuwait and Iraq did not enjoy the benefit of belonging to a larger, common political coalition which could encourage bilateral fence-mending. The absence of effective coalition-building processes reinforced the initial tendencies of both Iraq and Kuwait to avoid involving in the dispute other Arab parties who, had they been furnished with the proper information about the burgeoning conflict, might have been able to navigate the conflict towards calmer waters. In light of their past successes in deflecting Iraqi pressure, the Kuwaitis were confident that they could again mange adroitly. They preferred to maintain an aura of calm over their security problems, and adopted a low profile so as not to irk the Iraqis unduly. For their part, the Iraqis had an overriding interest in avoiding outside Arab involvement, which they feared would bolster the Kuwaiti side and deflect their demands. Thus for almost two years, until the spring of 1990, potential Arab mediators were kept away from the deteriorating situation. Instead of ripening towards a solution, the dispute ripened towards disaster. In sum, the period predating the outbreak of the crisis was characterized by the following relevant features: (1) the simmering conflict was kept off the inter_________________________________________________ 65 Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, “Continuity and change in the inter-Arab system,” in The Gulf Crisis and its Global Aftermath, Eds. Gad Barzilai, Aharon Klieman, and Gil Shidlo (London and New York: Routledge, 1993), pp. 33-50.

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Arab stage by both Iraq (in order to advance its still-hidden agenda of domination) and Kuwait (which sought to avoid compromising any of its assets); (2) potential mediators of the dispute were uninvolved and uninformed as to details; (3) no inter-Arab coalition framework existed within which any kind of rapprochement between Kuwait and Iraq could be promoted. The Arab League, which was theoretically supposed to function in this manner, was in practice incapable of doing so. 3.3 Approaching Mediation The crisis began to gestate during the early months of 1990, and Iraq and Kuwait slowly departed from their previous aversion to outside involvement. However, bona fide mediation, in other words any mediation which would entail significant compromises in order to reach an agreement satisfactory to both sides, remained out of the question. Mediation was acceptable only as an evasive tool, in order to mask their real intentions. At the same time, it could serve to legitimate their positions and achieve the support of other Arab parties. To Saddam Hussein, the Arab world could be useful only insofar as it provided appropriate forums within which to press and legitimate his demands. Saddam apparently hoped to obtain understanding of Iraq’s needs, and to raise sufficient alarm among Arab leaders as to the consequences of inaction to compel them to apply pressure on Kuwait to accede to Iraq’s demands. At the very least, a more favorable regional atmosphere might be created for the realization of those demands. The Kuwaitis, for their part, were unbending in their refusal to compromise any financial or territorial assets. For them, mediation could be successful only if it left these assets undamaged. Their confidence regarding Kuwait’s place in the inter-Arab system was high.66 During the winter and spring of 1990, Iraq was extremely vocal in challenging what it characterized as a combined Western-Israeli conspiracy to rob Iraq, and the Arab nation as a whole, of the fruits of its victory over Iran, and prevent Arab scientific, technological and military advancement. In retrospect, it seems that Iraq’s broadsides were designed to create an atmosphere of gathering regional crisis within which Iraq was being unfairly deprived of its just rewards, to legitimize its ambition to be seen as the guardian of the Arab nation, and to divert attention from its more immediate intentions.67 In May 1990, Baghdad indirectly linked Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates to this ‘conspiracy’ for the first time. Speaking to a closed session at the _________________________________________________ 66

Assiri, p. 117. Ofra Bengio, ‘Iraq’ in Middle East Contemporary Survey (MECS) (Boulder: Westview, 1992), pp. 387-395. 67

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Arab summit conference in Baghdad on May 30, Saddam Hussein issued a thinly veiled warning that Iraq was being subjected to economic warfare by the actions of unnamed "Arab brothers.” He was referring to the precipitous drop in the price of oil during recent months, occasioned by the widespread violation of OPEC quotas and the resulting glut in the oil market. It was the first time that Iraq had mentioned its "Kuwaiti problem” to other Arab parties.68 The Iraqis may have believed at this stage that their demands would be met: their Foreign Minister, Tariq ‘Aziz, subsequently stated that Saddam had not even considered employing military force against Kuwait before the end of June.69 To bring further pressure to bear, the Iraqis concurrently pushed for a Saudi-Iraqi-Kuwaiti-UAE summit to be convened. Arab leaders believed that they were capable of managing the conflict, and thus regarded Saddam’s bellicose statements merely as a prelude to mediation. However, they were not completely of one mind regarding the desirable outcome. For example, Jordan’s King Hussein was more sympathetic than were other Arab leaders to the Iraqi position, having long viewed Kuwait as miserly towards its poorer Arab brethren. The Kuwaitis, for their part, were incapable of recognizing the Iraqi threat for what it was. Hence, as the crisis evolved, Kuwait viewed Arab mediation in terms of process: the goal was not to have it broker a solution, but to initiate an extended process of negotiations which would be sufficient to defuse the crisis. It was only in mid-June that Kuwait began addressing the matter even in a bilateral context, indicating that negotiations to resolve the Kuwaiti-Iraqi border dispute would soon commence.70 The Kuwaitis clearly did not grasp the imminence of the threat, or view it in existential terms. Kuwaiti leaders understood Iraqi warnings as simply another attempt at economic blackmail. At worst, they believed Iraq might provoke a military skirmish along their common border which could then be adjudicated by Arab mediation.71 The task at hand, in Kuwaiti minds, was to foster an atmosphere in inter-Arab cooperation within which Kuwait’s traditional status as an inter-Arab mediator and supporter of all-Arab causes (for example, in the struggle against Israel and against the challenge posed by Iran) would be remembered favorably. Before the summer of 1990, Kuwait, along with Saudi Arabia, had cultivated the status of inter-Arab mediation par excellence. Now the Kuwaitis’ own direct interests seemed to necessitate an atmosphere of calm, goodwill and security, something that inter-Arab mediation, they _________________________________________________ 68 Radio Baghdad, 18 July – Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Near East and South Asia (FBIS-NES), Daily Report, 19 July 1990. 69 Viorst, p. 66 70 For example, al-Bayadir al-Siyasi, 12 June 1990. 71 Financial Times, 18 September 1990.

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believed, would foster. They appeared to have had no intention of making major concessions to the Iraqis, but were interested in initiating a period of prolonged bargaining during which pressure would be brought to bear on Baghdad to water down its demands. Kuwaiti vital interests would thereby be ensured. The wide gap between the positions of Iraq and Kuwait was highlighted by a meeting between Saddam and Kuwait’s Amir Sheikh Jabir on the sidelines of the May 1990 Baghdad Arab summit. According to Mohamed Heikel, the veteran Egyptian journalist and former confidant of Gamal ‘Abd al-Nasser, Saddam’s requests for additional economic aid from Kuwait were, subsequently, countered by Jabir’s references to Iraq’s $14 billion debt to Kuwait, a legacy of the Iran-Iraq War. Both sides spoke in muted tones of their outstanding border issues and of the need to breathe new life into various joint committees discussing the matter. In doing so, they reinforced the feeling among other Arab parties that no real crisis existed, and that the two countries would settle their dispute amicably. In fact, however, Saddam and Jabir had agreed on nothing.72 The Kuwaiti leadership’s approach to the problem was further illustrated by its discussions with Iraq’s deputy Prime Minister, Sa’dun Hammadi, in Kuwait City on 25-26 June. Hammadi left believing that Kuwait was ready to accept Iraq’s demand that it should abide by OPEC production quotas and agree to a rise in the price of oil from $18 to $25 a barrel.73 The Kuwaitis, however, had understood this meeting to be only the first of many. On 10 July Kuwait’s promise to Hammadi was ostensibly confirmed at an OPEC ministerial meeting in Jidda, but the Kuwaitis immediately let it be known that they would observe OPEC price and production stipulations only until the autumn. The Iraqi pressure, according to Kuwaiti thinking, was quite containable, and other GCC leaders were of similar mind. According to the Iraqis, during a 9 July telephone conversation between Saudi Arabia’s King Fahd and the Amir of Qatar (neither of whom ever denied the assertion) Fahd assured Qatar’s ruler that the Iraqis could adroitly be soothed by means of proper expressions of identification with their position, without requiring substantive concessions.74 During the first half of July, the Iraqis put their diplomatic campaign into a higher gear, sending Hammadi to Riyadh, Abu Dhabi and Kuwait again, as well as firing off a number of diplomatic messages to Arab leaders. Their efforts peaked on 16 July when Tariq ‘Aziz sent a long memorandum to the Arab League’s Secretary General, Chedli Klibi, for circulation amongst League members, detailing the alleged crimes of Kuwait and the UAE against Iraq. (Like _________________________________________________ 72 73 74

Heikel, p. 169. KUNA, 26 June 1991, FBIS-NES, 27 June 1991. Al-Tadamun, 29 October 1990, FBIS-NES, 30 October 1991.

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Kuwait, the UAE was accused of producing excessive amounts of oil and thereby driving down its price.)75 Iraq’s use of an all-Arab forum was designed not to encourage genuine mediation, but to fulfill three purposes: (1) to emphasize the justice of Iraq’s assertion that it deserved to be rewarded by the Arab world for defending the GCC states against Iran, rather than receiving a "poisoned dagger in our back;” (2) to alert the Arab "majors,” particularly Egypt and Saudi Arabia, to the fact that a serious inter-Arab crisis could be avoided only if they acted swiftly to press Kuwait into concessions; and (3) to prepare public opinion in the region for further Iraqi action in the event of failure. One day later, on the anniversary of the Ba’ath party’s seizure of power in Iraq in 1968, Saddam went public with a blistering attack upon Kuwait and the UAE.76 Kuwait was now compelled to confront the Iraqis more directly, but did so in line with its existing strategy. On 18 July, Kuwait and the UAE attempted to neutralize Baghdad’s pitch to the Arab League by dispatching their own detailed memoranda to Klibi, rebuffing Iraq’s accusations and tendering some of their own, including Iraq’s continuous ‘transgressions on Kuwaiti territories,’ and called for an Arab League arbitration committee to demarcate the Iraqi-Kuwaiti border.77 Kuwait also dispatched envoys to a number of Arab capitals to explain its position. But the Iraqi verbal campaign escalated further, in order to increase Baghdad’s pressure on Kuwait. Another letter ‘Aziz to Klibi accused Kuwait of neglecting all of Iraq’s past attempts to solve their territorial dispute.78 As reports of large-scale troop movement southward began to filter out at the beginning of the last week of July, Kuwait finally began to grasp the seriousness of the dispute. But it is difficult to argue that Kuwait’s underlying posture changed substantively as a result of Iraq’s escalation. As part of Kuwait’s belated effort to check the Iraqis, it launched a media campaign emphasizing the need to adhere to "Arab principles of consultation and dialogue, not threats,” and the hope that the "geographical proximity and past experience” of the two countries would result in an amicable settlement.79

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Iraqi News Agency (INA), 18 July 1990, FBIS-NES, 18 July 1990. Radio Baghdad, 17 July 1990, FBIS-NES, 17 July 1990. KUNA, 20 July 1990, FBIS-NES 23 July 1990. 78 INA, 24 July 1990, FBIS-NES, 24 July 1990. 79 KUNA, 18 and 20 July 1990, FBIS-NES 19 and 20 July 1990; al-Anba (Kuwait) 26 July 1990; Milton Viorst, “After the Liberation,” The New Yorker, 30 September 1991, pp. 63-64. 76 77

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3.4 The Mediators and Their Actions At this point, the time-honored ‘mechanisms’ of inter-Arab mediation swung into high gear. In retrospect, however, the mediators were neither particularly creative nor resourceful, or in possession of any practical incentive to influence the disputants. As befitted his status as the senior "pan-Arab” civil servant, Chedli Klibi visited Kuwait on 21 July, Baghdad on 24 July and Kuwait again on 26 July. Klibi was, however, only a reporter of current thinking in each capital. His weakness reflected the Arab League’s inherent institutional weakness. Klibi’s lack of clout also stemmed from the fact that, as a Tunisian national, he did not have the support of a leading Arab state (by contrast, all other Arab League Secretary Generals have been Egyptians). Saudi Arabia was universally expected to play a leading role in mediating the dispute. Even more than the Kuwaitis, the Saudis had several qualities suitable to inter-Arab mediators. They often engaged in "checkbook diplomacy,” in other words defusing a dispute by using financial incentives to influence protagonists and maintain a universal image as a party genuinely interested in conflict resolution. The main thrust of Saudi Arabia’s promotion of inter-Arab consensus derived from its geopolitical and social vulnerabilities: lengthy borders, a large, thinly populated territory, only a small army to protect its oil wealth from potentially predatory neighbors, and a traditional tribal society experiencing the stresses of modernization. The promotion of inter-Arab conflict management was vital to keeping more powerful states at bay, and to preventing the pernicious influence of radical Arab nationalism (embodied by Ba’athists, Nasserists and Marxists of various stripes) from penetrating into Saudi society. The Saudis had logged considerable experience as mediators in many of the major inter-Arab conflicts of the preceding two decades.80 In this case, however, they chose not to assume their traditional self-designated role of mediator. Although Fahd was critical of Kuwait’s obstinacy at several points, the Saudis supported Kuwait’s oil policy, which was in line with their own. Active mediation would have had one of two effects: either it would have exposed them to Iraq’s anger and to charges of betraying a 1989 Iraqi-Saudi non-aggression pact,81 or it would have forced the Saudis significantly to modify their support of _________________________________________________ 80 For example, between Syria and Egypt in 1975-1976; between Syria and various factions in Lebanon over the past fifteen years between Syria and Yasir Arafat’s al-Fatah, assisting, for example in Arafat’s evacuation from Syria’s besieging forces in Tripoli in 1983; between Algeria and Morocco during the early and mid-1980s. It also took leading roles in formulating broadly based agreements at a number of inter-Arab conferences: the Arab summits held in Riyadh in 1976 and Fez in 1982, and the Ta’if meeting of Lebanese factions in 1989. 81 The initiative for the pact apparently came from the Iraqi side. The Saudis nevertheless hoped that it would help to moderate Iraqi behavior in the aftermath of the Iran-Iraq War.

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Kuwait. The Saudis therefore preferred to adopt a low profile, which in this case could not affect the actual dynamic of the conflict. Their minimal and essentially meaningless involvement during the first half of July was demonstrated by their willingness to hold a Kuwaiti-UAE-Iraqi-Saudi meeting on oil pricing policies. To Iraq’s great disappointment, the meeting was for oil ministers only, rather then taking place at a more appropriately senior level.82 At the end of July, the Saudis provided the venue, Jidda, for the last pre-invasion Kuwait-Iraq meeting. At bottom, the Saudis simply did not believe that Saddam would attack Kuwait.83 Whereas the Saudis had material incentives to offer but shied away from too much involvement, the Egyptians had nothing to offer in the way of sweeteners but sought a central mediating role. They were motivated by a desire to demonstrate Egypt’s crucial role in promoting regional stability, and to reconfirm the image of Cairo as self-styled "first among equals” in the Arab world. The Egyptian leadership, however, miscalculated doubly. First, it overestimated Egypt’s weight. Egypt’s contribution (in manpower and surplus Soviet-made weapons) to Iraq’s survival during the Iran-Iraq War, and its much publicized but untested commitment to the security of the GCC states in the face of the Iranian threat during the war’s latter stages, had reinforced Egypt’s image as a regional balancer. The result was an unjustified belief that its very involvement in mediation effort would ipso facto have an adequate stabilizing effect. Cairo’s second error was to underestimate the severity of the crisis, failing to recognize Iraq’s a