CONCEPTUAL RELEVANCE
JOSEPH GRONFELD
B.R. Gruner Publishing Co., Amsterdam, 1989
INTRODUCTION
Consistency is only c...
342 downloads
1442 Views
30MB Size
Report
This content was uploaded by our users and we assume good faith they have the permission to share this book. If you own the copyright to this book and it is wrongfully on our website, we offer a simple DMCA procedure to remove your content from our site. Start by pressing the button below!
Report copyright / DMCA form
CONCEPTUAL RELEVANCE
JOSEPH GRONFELD
B.R. Gruner Publishing Co., Amsterdam, 1989
INTRODUCTION
Consistency is only contextual. One of the fundamental constraints imposed upon accurate thought is the avoidance of mixing distinct semantic fields. Poorly resolved paradoxes that undernline set theory are there to remind the mathematician of the dangers that await him in the injudicious use of these seemingly innocent symbols. Quasi-empiricists view mathematics as a social product, and some have argued that the very search for foundations in mathematics is misguided. Mathen1aticians disagree, n1ake n1istakes and correct them, and are uncertain whether a proof is correct or not. The criterion of truth in mathematics, just as much as in physics, is success of our ideas in practice. As writing has changed the practice of mathematics, computers are likely further· to modify it more than we can envisage. Butchvaraov holds that the distinctness of material identicals (' 'x = y' ') is a fact about the world quite independent of language. But the power to impose identity enables us to focus on some perceptions while ignoring others as unnecessary and irrelevant; it makes concept formation a selective process. What Butchvarov takes to be the "foundational level of metaphysics," a world composed of units of whatever nature, is due to the way our language divides into selfcontained words and sentences. The verbal, piecemeal, and analytical mode of describing experience has blinded us to the fact that but for language, objects do not maintain their distinct existence either. Miller documents the gradual reduction of visualizability in theories of modern physics. There is less reliance on visual thinking and an awareness that in the subatomic domain we increasingly are unable to explain or even describe phenomena in a consistent fashion. Realism in truth-conditional semantics is the doctrine that the truth conditions of sentences, conditions that determine their meanings, can transcend speakers' capacities to obtain them. We do not know the limits of what we meaningfully can say anymore 9
than we know the limits of what we are capable of understanding. This is why we opt for realism in epistemology and in semantics. But since the information processing model of language mastery is itself largely metaphorical, some sort of antirealist view, involving nonassertion of bivalence, seems unavoidable. Pollock proposes an analysis of possible words in terms of maximal possible states of affairs. But while states of affairs are said to be de re, possible or maximal states of affairs remain inevitably de dicto. He fails thus to provide a workable notion of a possible world that is able to solve the problem of transworld identity. Since our intuitions do not settle this, it is misleading to talk about the "truth" of statements at possible worlds in the usual sense. In Hintikka's game theoretical semantics processes are conceptualized as games against a recalcitrant Nature that tries to frustrate my attempts. But this amounts to identifying Nature with a Cartesian "malignant demon," and under such conditions Hintikka's language game is no longer winnable in principle, i.e. it is not a game worth playing. What seems to be emerging from his assumption is a modernized version of Aristotle's doctrine of categories. It is not accidental, however, that Aristotle found it difficult to accommodate change and motion - as does Hintikka. Kelley cannot know either how reality operates behind the scenes to produce perception. Being real is thus a matter of degree and context. Objectivity consists not in any relations between our judgments and the world independently of them, but rather in a relation of coherence among our judgments. There is no way to get outside of our beliefs and our language so as to find some test other than coherence. Changing purposes and shifts in background knowledge result in an unstable environment for what we perceive and take to be real. Hacking argues that it is not thinking about the world bu~ changing it that in the end must make us realists. What counts in science is instrumental success, yet this is not anymore selfexplanatory than are representations. Thus the contrast that the word "real' makes in science remains problematic and controversial. What is taken to be real in science depends on specific theoretical assumptions, not mere background knowledge. We infer to the best explanation that the theory is true, and the question whether it is true finally cannot be separated from whether the ob-- -
10
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
jects it refers to are real. Ackermann argues that as instruments are improved, a succession of data domains can be used as an objective standard for progress in science. Latet and more refined instruments are always preferable to older and primitive ones, and progress in science is thus largely a matter of technology. The historical character of data precludes anything like a logic of scientific research, since there is a sense in which we can understand a discovery only after its potential consequences have been realized. The present status of either fact or theory does not permit us to anticipate its future significallce. Facts in the history of science do not speak for themselves because they invariably depend on other relevant data and theories. Such domains of science are likely to be reevaluated radically only when more powerful instruments provide unanticipated findings. Glymour holds that hypotheticodeductivism is inadequate as a model of scientific method because it fails to account for the condition of relevance between hypotheses and evidence. Instances of a hypothesis in a theory, whether positive or negative are obtained by "bootstrapping," that is, by using the hypothesis itself (or conceivably some other) to make computations. What to retain and what to discard depends on what else we believe or disbelieve, and assessment of whether a theory provides more information, or whether we have more reason to believe it, is always made in the light of fuzzy background assumptions. Kripke questions the prevailing interpretation of Wittgenstein as a common sense philosopher who is anxious to defend our ordinary conceptions and dissolve traditional philosophical doubts. But only with reference to the Tractatus does it make sense to talk of "a skeptical solution to a skeptical paradox" in the manner of Kripke, while the later Wittgenstein most likely would have rejected all such talk as meaningless. In the Investigations, Wittgenstein never doubts that we can understand a language game merely by participating in it. Focusing on the intellectual environment, Toulmin treats science as a self-contained social ritual, subject only to internal constraints. But the rationality of a mature science cannot be separated efficiently from the specific language in which it is expressed and the logic that governs it. If a given context lacks both logical and syntactical consistency, we face a semantically segmented domain that is no longer coherent. Only if we admit 11
partial agreements between concepts does it become possible to link logic with historical method. Since Goodman's irrealism cannot prevent worlds from "melting" <jnto versions, it is not apparent how they are supposed to "make" worlds. It seems that this is largely a metaphor, which he somehow takes literally. Davidson's truth theory is also like an equation we know not to be satisfiable by standard logic, while he tries to extend the notion of satisfaction to cover such cases. His merging of meaning and belief into background knowledge prevents him from identifying either. In this manner the very idea of truth becomes metaphorical. The price to be paid for such "weak" logic lies in a diminished capacity to produce nontrivial results. According to Davidson, by just having reasons for acting in a certain way, I accept prima facie evaluative propositions. An allout judgment that some action is desirable is identical with the intention to perform it. But no matter how elaborately detaild an intention is, there are certain to be endless ways in which it could be realized that are unwanted and unintended by the agent. We are reduced to treat inconsistency as merely apparent and once more we are driven back to interpreting behavior by means of the normative idea of rationality. Brand cannot say to what extent his definition and analysis of desiring and intending reflect psychological reality, since what he calls "psychological reality" permits divergent interpretations in different theoretical terms. His very distinction between folk psychology and what he calls "scientific psychology" is thus questionable both with regard to content and method. It is mainly because of this that he fails to "naturalize" action theory. Notturno defends psychologism by accepting the justification of statements by sense perception as natural. Such as solution, however, is not unproblematic because it disregards the theory dependence of observation. Perceptions have to be interpreted, and how they are interpreted begs the question of rationality. Notturno's version of psychologism fails to explain how sense perceptions become reasons. Laudan agrees with Kuhn that at least some controversies in science cannot be resolved because of underdetermination of theories by data. While clashes between rival theories are for Kuhn always inconclusive, Laudan proposes a hierarchical model to provide a piecemeal justification of progress in science. It is designed to refute Kuhn's claim that advocates of one paradigm cannot 12
understand their rivals. But all Laudan offers us as an explanation of how consensus in science comes about is justification by hindsight. Niiniluoto proposes a theory of 'truthlikeness' that is close to Popper's notion of verisimilitude. He aims at accounting for progress across scientific revolutions by means of agreed upon meaning postulates that represent cluster concepts. However, since such a weak notion of progress cannot make any valid claims about particular cases, it seems to lack definite applications. Partial consistencies can be justified only by hindsight and they typically are expressed by means of metaphors. The crucial issue with all such talk is how to deal with inconsistencies and avoid becoming vacuous and pointless. While mathematics always has prohibited inconsistency altogether, some philosophers since Plato have opted for dialectics, that is, for conceptual relevance converging over time. The trouble with such arguments is that their final verdict is never in, and that even whether something is useful or works can be decided only contextually. Such background knowledge does, however, guide the invention of new hypotheses in science. Lacking a timeless conceptual framework, we go by contextual proximity, and as a result our standards of clarity and coherence vary. They reflect the relative entrenchment of a network of concepts subject to change even in mathematics. What Newton and Euler took for proof is frequently no longer acceptable today, and such shifts in standards reveal a surprising looseness in the metalanguage of even mathematical logic. What we take to be real in mathen1tics thus also becomes a manner of speaking. At the conceptual level, it is not the species-specific language capacity that is decisive but the particular idiom and culture in which we happen to grow up. Since these undergo continuous transformation, conceptual relevance is largely a matter of timing and becomes unpredictable. This accounts for the wellknown phenomenon of conceptual breakthrough in science and in the arts. The "softness" of such logic invites intuitionist interpretations where insight is relative to perspective, and conceptual relevance dominates understanding. Shifts in perspective may bring about conflicting interpretations because wl1at is accepted as a reason changes as well.
13
CHAPTER I
QUASI-EMPIRICAL MATHEMATICS
Foundation studies have formed a major part of modern mathematics but more recently their very need has been called in question l • By the late 1930's, Wittgenstein 2 had developed a view of philosophy that simultaneously eliminated the idea of foundations and focused philosophical concern on the actual practice of mathematicians. By 1950 Quine had become skeptical of the very possibility of drawing a satisfactory distinction between mathematics and science. His point was that the contrast between analytic truths, statements true solely by virtue of their form or meaning, and synthetic statements, true in part because of facts about experienced reality, was untenable. Logic is in principle no less open to revision than quantum mechanics or the theory of relativity 3. The mathematician Polya argued that observation was an everyday feature in mathematical practice, which had many other features in common with natural science, features such as induction, plausible reasoning, guesses, and ambiguities 4 • Quasiempiricists like Putnam push Polya's analysis one step further and question the assumption of completely secure proofs 5 • According to the quasi-empiricists, it is our informal proofs, the kind investigated by Polya, that are often safer than any derivable for1. Thomas Tymoczko (editor), New Directions in the Philosophy of Mathematics, Birkhauser, Boston, Base, Stuttgart 1985, p. 95. 2. L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, Oxford: Blackwell, 1951, sections 124-5. 3. W.V. Quine, Philosophy of Logic, Prentice Hall 1970, pp 98-9. 4. George Polya, How to Solve It, Princeton University Press 1945; Induction and Analogy in Mathematics, Princeton University Press, 1954. 5~ H. Putnam, "Mathematics Without Foundations," Journal of Philosophy 64 (1967), p. 5.
15
malization of truth. The standards of plausible reasoning are fluid, and there is no theory of such reasoning that could be compared to demonstrative logic in clarity or could command a comparable consensus 6 • Mathematics in finished form appears as purely demonstrative, consisting of proofs only. But one has to guess a mathematical theorem before one proves it, and one has to combine observations and follow analogies to accomplish this. In plausible reasoning, the principal thing is to distinguish the more reasonable guess from the less reasonable one; there is, however, no foolproof method of learning how to guess. Plausible reasoning is a practical skill, and it is learned, as any other practical skill, by imitation and experience. Thus, these philosophers conclude that it is the practice of mathematics that holds the key to our philosophical perplexities. When philosophers and philosophically minded mathematicians reflect on ordinary proofs, they realize that such proofs are still far removed from idealized formal proofs that foundations require. But it is the ordinary proofs, the informal ones, that are the real focus of many familiar aspects of mathematical experience. Such basic concepts as lemma, counterexample, explanation, and development have their roots in ordinary proofs and apply only derivatively, if at all, to formal proofs. Since development or change is an essential aspect of informal proof, anyone who wants to understand mathematics must come to terms with them. Any serious attempt to understand the evolution of mathematics should begin by locating the practicing mathematician in a socia-historical context. No account of mathematics can be adequate if it leads to the conclusion that no one in the twentieth century knows any real mathematics. Any acceptable account of mathematics must explain the bulk of mathematical practice, and the most obvious characterization of mathematical practice is that it is essentially a justification of mathematicians' claims to knowledge. Many relevant features were ignored by the foundationalists, such as informal proofs, historical development, the possibility of mathematical error, mathematical explanation (in contrast to proofs), communication among mathematicians, and the use of computers in 6. G. Polya, From the Preface of Induction and Analogy in Mathematics, in Tymoczko, Ope cit. p. 100.
16
modern mathematics. To foundationalists, the activity of mathematics was just the discovery of truths about sets, and the verification of formal proofs. Quasi-empiricists,~by contrast, view mathematics more as a social product, and Putnam has argued that the very search for foundations is misguided 7 • But Putnam's rejection of the search for foundations in mathematics ignores in effect a long-standing mathematical practice and to that extent is selfdefeating. In the nineteenth century, mathematicians were shifting from studying only "the natural Ilumbers given by God" to a consideration of arbitrary number systems, and from solving equations to solving groups. In order to make sense of these changes, nineteenth- and early twentieth-century mathematicians needed a new set of criteria for assessing mathematics and mathematical proof. Frege offered an alternative characterization of Aristotelian logic in terms of what we no'w call quantification theory, together with elements of type theory and set theory. His main point was that arithmetic, unlike geometry, needed no appeal to intuition it could be described solely from logical principles. But very early on Frege's system of logic was discovered to be inconsistent. Russell's paradox threatened the very concept of foundations for mathematics, and his goal was to reconstruct foundations in such a way as to avoid the paradoxes. Since, however, there is no one way of doing this, there resulted a proliferation of logical theories. An alternative to logicism was constructivism, which replaced Russell's characterization of logic with metamathematics, the logical manipulation of formal systems. According to such a formalism, mathematical theories are merely the results of logical deductions from arbitrary axioms. However, formalism's hope of finding the consistent and complete formal theory was dashed by Godel's discovery of the inevitable incompleteness of mathematical reasoning. Quine concluded that set theory is more conjectural than the classical mathematical superstructures that can be founded upon its. The so-called logical or set theoretical "foundations"
7. Putnam, Ope cit. 8. W.V. Quine, Elementary Logic, Revised edition, New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1965, p. 125.
17
for number theory or any other well-established mathematical theory is explanatory rather than really foundational, exactly as in physics. Lakatos likewise pointed out that mathematical experience and induction (not only as regards the origin and n1ethod, but also the justification of n1athematics) is more alive and widespread than many seem to think. Classical epistemology has for two thousand years modeled its ideal of a theory, whether scientific or mathematical, on its conception of Euclidean geometry. It was a major shock for rationalism that science - in spite of immense efforts could not be organized in such Euclidean theorems. Scientific theories turned out to be arranged in inductive systems. A Euclidean theory may be claimed to be true, while a quasi-empirical theory will - at best - only be well-corroborated 9 At the beginning of this century, foundational studies unexpectedly led to the conclusion that a Euclidean reorganization of mathematics as a whole may well be impossible. It turned out that the sophisticated second generation of logical or set theoretical axioms designed to avoid the ~nown paradoxes - even if true - were not indubitably true, and not even indubitably consistent. Comprehensive logical systems cannot be proved either to be true or consistent; they can only be shown to be false or inconsistent. Comprehensive axiomatic set theories and systems of metamathematics can be, and indeed have been, refuted. The idea that logic must have a standard model, if it is to be ac~eptable as a framework for mathematical reasoning, is a vestige of the old idea that there is such a thing as absolute mathematical truth 1 o. The battle between rival mathematical theories most frequently is decided by their relative explanatory power l l • Theories that looked counterintuitive or even perverted when first proposed did nevertheless sometimes assume authority when they proved to be explanatorily fruitful. Hersch, therefore, proposes an explanation of the foundational concerns in terms of the historical development of mathematics. o
9. Imre Lakatos, "A Renaissance of Empiricism in the Recent Philosophy of Mathematics?" in Tymoczko, Ope cit, p. 34. 10. J.B. Rosser and H. Wang, "Non Standard Models for Formal Logics," Journal of Symbolic Logic, 15 (1950), PP 113-129. 11. Lakatos in Tymoczko, Ope cit. p. 43.
18
To philosophize about mathematics, we begin with the ongoing concerns of mathematicians. It becomes, then, easier to see that mathematical knowledge is inherently fallible, and that no founda-, tion can make it infallible. Mathematical practice is essentially a public activity, not a private one. The focus on mathematical practice brings with it an emphasis on the mathematical community as the ultimate source of mathematical activity l2. Most writers on the subject, however, seem to agree that the typical "working mathematician" is a platonist. When he is doing mathematics, he is convinced that he is dealing with an objective reality whose properties he is attempting to determine. But when challenged to give a philosophical account of this reality, he finds it easier to pretend that he does not believe in it after all! 3. The question of what is interesting in mathematics is a practical question. At the same time, the dominant style of exposition in mathematical journals and texts has been to insist on precise details of definitions and proofs, and to exclude or minimize discussion why a particular method of proof is used. Until well into the nineteenth century, geometry was regarded as the foremost, most reliable branch of knowledge. It was the discovery of non-Euclidean geometries that revealed that there is more than just one possible geometry. When, therefore, analysis took the place of geometric intuition, this brought about a crisis because geometry had served since the time of Plato as the supreme example of the possibility of certainty in human knowledge. Dedekind and Weierstrass turned from geometry to arithmetic as the foundation of mathematics. But it gradually became apparent that in reducing the continuum to arithmetic, we require a kind of mathematics that had hitherto been unnoticed - set theory l4. Set theory first seemed to be identical with logic, and it was hoped that it could serve as the foundations for all of mathematics. But by the time set theory had been patched up to exclude the paradoxes, it had become a complicated structure that one
12. Reuben Hersch, "Some Proposals for Reviving the Philosophy of Mathematics," in Tymoczko, op. cit. p. 10. 13. ibid. p. 11. 14. ibid. p. 15.
19
could no longer identify 'Nith "logic" in the philosophical sense of "rules of correct understanding." Hersch argues that we do not need either platonism or formalism once we abondon the search for absolute certainty in mathen1atics. The checking of an analytic algebraic proof as it is actually done by a mathematician is primarily a piece of intuitive reasoning. Mathematicians disagree, make mistakes and correct them, and are uncertain wether a proof is valid or not 15 • A doubtful proof does not become true by being formalized, and although there is no formal definition of "understandable," in practice it is understanding that verifies the correctness of formal computations - not only the other way around 16. The kinds of valid reasoning that are called "proof" are not universal; they differ from one branch of mathematics to another, and from one historical epoch to another 1 7. It was Putnam who termed ordinary mathematics, even number theory, "quasi-empricial." He concluded th·at the criteria of truth in mathematics, just as much as in physics, are success of our ideas in practice, and that mathematical knowledge is corrigible and not absolute 18 • What has been "verified" at a given time might later tllrn out to be false. Intuitively plausible, though not certain, analogies lead to results, which are then checked "empirically". It is important to realize just how much classical mathematics has been developed for physical application (the calculus, variational methods, the current intense work on nonlinear differential equations, etc.). Empirical and quasiempirical inferences support the claim that mathematics is largely true, and place constraints on interpretations under which it could be true. Proof has the advantage of not increasing the risk of contradiction, and for this reason proof will continue to be the primary method of mathematical verification. But we will have to face the fact that "empirical" versus "mathematical" is only a relative distinction, and that in a looser and more indirect way
15. 16. 17. 18. cit. p.
20
ibid. p. 20. ibid. p. 21. ibid. p. 24. Hilary Putnam, "What is Mathematical Truth?" in Tymoczko, Ope 51.
much of mathematics is "empirical." 19 In the last few years the view has become prevalent that we just happen to live in a world that does not obey the laws of Boolean logic 20 • The fact is that if quantum logic is right, not only the propositional calculus used in physics is affected but also set theory itself. Thorn points out that an adequate philosophy of mathematics will have to deal with methods such as analogy, which are ignored by foundation studies. What foundations promise but never deliver is general rigor in mathematics realized once and for all. By contrast, what our experience actually reveals is local rigor - rigor as a local property of mathematical reasoning 21 • A proof is accepted as rigorous if it obtains the endorsement of the leading specialists. The axiomatic work resulting from Hilbert's Grundlagen der Geometrie has shown that the alleged rigor of the Elements of Euclid is in large part compromised by frequent appeals to intuition. As a consequence, the argument goes, it is better to avoid Euclidean geometry by developing the ideas of algebra in which a rigorous presentation is possible. But the argument of the utility of algebra is not as compelling as it appears, and with more complex situations the advantage of algebra tends to disappear. The strictly formal view fails - paradoxically for formal reasons associated with G6del's theorem. If mathematics is only an arbitrary game, how can we explain its unquestioned success in describing the universe? There is no rigorous definition of rigor that is essentially a local property of mathematical reasoning. No compelling argument has been advanced to discard the geometric continuum as fundamental. The naive belief that every deduction finds its model in set theoretic assumptions was shared by the neopositivists. But one of the fundamental constraints imposed by accurate thought is precisely the avoidance of mixing distinct semantic fields. Nicholas D. Goodman rightly concludes that each foundational
19. ibid. p. 63. 20. "The Laws of Quantum Mechanics," in H. Putnam, Philosophical Papers, Cambridge University Press, vol. 1. 1975, ch. 10. 21. Rene Thorn, "Modern Mathematics: An Educational and Philosophic Error," in Tymoczko, Ope cit. p. 67. 21.
theory is rooted in some deep asr:fect of mathematical experience: formalism in formal languages and symbol manipulation, intuitionism in the feasibility of certain constructions, logicism in the framework of logic, and platonism in the discovery of mathematical objects. The problem is that, as a foundation of mathematics, each theory claims to be exhaustive. Goodman argues that these claims require each theory to ignore and rule out some practically real aspect of mathematical experience 22 • Mathematics is a public activity that functions in a social context and has social consequences. Posing a problem, formulating a definition, proving a theorem are none of them private acts. A working mathematician is aware of the work of other mathematicians, has his work published, and expects other mathematicians to take his work into account. Goodman emphasizes that by embracing intuitionism, the mathematician is giving up the most powerful motive for his work - the search for publicly validated truth. Mathematics, after all, is part of science, and the main purpose of doing mathematics is to discover new truths. If that concepti9n is given up, mathematics is reduced to a kind of play. There is a sense in which intuitionisnl is inadequate on its own terms, for it overlookes what is introspectively obvious: that I am interested in any mathematical constructions not for their own sake but for the sake of new truths they enable me to find. Mathematical truth is not something I can hope to find by introspection, for a mathematical theory, like any other scientific theory, is a social product. It is created and developed by the dialectial interplay of many minds. It is an everyday occurrence that a mathematician knows "intuitively" that something must be the case but does not know how to go about proving it. Some of the axioms, such as the axiom of order, are so evident to the intuition that the need for them was not noticed until the nineteenth centruy. The reduction of all mathematics to set theory entails a narrowing of the subject matter of mathematics, and recently moreover set theory has encountered difficulties roughly of the same kind that geometry faced a hundred years ago. The prolifera-
22. Nicholas, D. Goodman, "Mathematics as an Objective Science," in Tymoczko, Ope cit. p. 79.
tion of non-standard models of set theory has made mathematicians realize how feeble their set theoretical intuition really is. Increasingly one hears the suggestion that there is not just one set theoretical universe but many. Wang shows that actual proofs (informal and usable proofs) must be "perspicuous," "surveyable," or capable of being taken in. The basic concepts, he suggests, will not be set or structure, but the existing body of mathematics, and as foundation serves the sociological fact that it is so accepted. That pencil and paper are indispensable to complicated calculations is certainly an important fact about the calculating activity. Logic is primarily interested in the analysis of a proof into as many different steps as possible, and not, as mathematics, in different methods of reasoning, which can produce remote consequences in one swoop or unravel an involved entanglement. We synthesize and abbreviate as we make progress. Definitions reveal new aspects and thereby help to direct the course of our thinking into certain channels. The word "can," "decidable," etc. mean different things in pure mathematics and in applied mathematics; in actual mathematical activities, and in the discussions of mathematical logicians. There is a great gap between what can be done in principle and between what can be done in practice. In broadening the scope of the latter, such techniques as the use of Arabic notation, logarithmic tables, and computing machines are important. A basic difficulty facing the attempt to reduce mathematics to logic is the accompallying increase in complexity. We understand arithmetic better than set theory since interpreting the axioms of set theory involves considerably greater conceptual difficulties. The view that identifies mathematics with set theory leaves unexplained why, for all possible consequences of set theory, we select only those that happen to be our mathematics today, and why certain mathematical concepts and results are more interesting than others. Relative to different concepts of set and proof one could reconstruct most of mathematics in several different ways23. Following Polya, Lakatos stresses the importance of informal
23. Hao Wang, "Theory and Practice in Mathematics," in Tymoczko, Ope cit. p. 148.
23
proofs in mathematics. Such proofs are not infallible, for they occasionally are refuted by some hitherto unthought of possibility. Lakatos calls this common method of estabishing mathematical facts "thought experiments," a term that goes well with quasiempiricism 24 • He stresses that formal proofs do not eliminate the possibility of doubt and error. On the face of it, there should be no disagreement about mathematical proof, btlt in fact there is a considerable amount of controversy. Pure mathematicians disown the proofs of applied mathematicians, and logicians in turn reject those of pure mathematicians. Logicians do not allow the proof of formalists, and some intuitionists dismiss the proofs of both logicists and formalists 25 • Formalists look for criteria distinguishing those formal systems that are "interesting" or "acceptable," and so on, thus betraying their bad consciences in accepting the strict formalist view according to which mathematics is the set of all consistent formal systems. In a genuine preformal theory, proof cannot be defined, but while there may be no method of verification, there certainly is a method of falsification. We can point out some hitherto unthought of possibilities. Davis concludes that there is no perfect fidelity in mathematics, only sufficiently good approximations 26 • In the presence of potential error the methodology of a mathematical proof ceases to be absolute and becomes only probabilistic. The belief that mathematics exists apart from the human beings that do mathematics in thus an illusion. The arithmetic of excessively large numbers may be carried out only with diminishing fidelity. As we get away from trivial sums, mathematical operations become enveloped in uncertainty. Skipping invariably occurs in very long proofs as it becomes necessary to keep down their length. The inevitable conclusion is that the authority of mathematical proof is not absolute but only probabilistic. Proofs must not be too long, for else their probabilities go down, and they baffle the decision process. Conven-
24. Tymoczko, Ope cit. p. 153. 25. Imre Lakatos, "What does Mathematical Proof Prove?" in Tymoczko, Ope cit. p. 154. 26. Philip. J. Davis, "Fidelity in Mathematical Discourse: Is One and One Really Two?" in Tymoczko, Ope cit. p. 164.
24
tional (precomputer) mathematics developed under conditions in which proof lenghts were suffiently short, so that fidelity could be considered absolute as long as the laws of information were irrelevant. But modern mathematics aquires more and more aspects of empirical science. In spite of all this, the typical mathematician regards his work as containing truth that will last forever. He relies on rigorous proof and believes that the difference between a correct proof and an incorrect one is an unmistakable and decisive difference. He is, however, unable to give a coherent explanation of what is meant by rigor, or of what is required to make a proof rigorous. To understand his proofs, one must be privy to a whole subculture of structured arguments, examples, habits of thought, and agreedupon modes of reasoning. While the mathematician usually assumes that his own view of himself is the only one that need be considered, to an outsider he seems to be engaged in an esoteric communication with friends 27 . Once we attend to mathematical practice, however, we can recognize that, like any other sophisticated human activity, it is largely a product of culture. Some of our philosophical perplexities can be resolved, Wilder argues, by learning how mathematics changes, how it came to be what it is today, given what it was in the past 28 " Such a view stands in sharp contrast with foundationalism whose central epistemological project is to justify mathematical knowledge once and for all starting from scratch. But as D.l. Struik has pointed out, mathematics has been influenced by agriculture, commerce and manufacture, by warfare, engineering and philosophy, by physics and by astronomy29. Even the mathematical genius can only carryon from the point that mathematical knowledge within his culture has already reached. Indeed, when a culture or a mathematical element has developed to a point where it is ready for important innovation, the latter is likely to emerge at more than one spot. The inter-
27. P.l. Davis and R. Hersch, "The Ideal Mathematician," in Tymoczko, Ope cit. p. 184. 28. Raymond L. Wilder, "The Cultural Basis of Mathematics," in Tymoczko, Ope cit. p. 185. 29. D.l. Struik, Concise History ofMathematics, New York: Dover 1967.
25
national character of contemporary mathematics is due in a large measure to the standardization of symbols and procedures. But what was called mathematics in one culture hardly would be recognized as such in certain others. Mathematics is not a fixed entity; it is subject to constant change, and insofar as the search for satisfactory foundation theories aims at absolute criteria for truth in mathematics or at the fixation of mathematical method, it appears doomed to failure. While Kuhn 30 had exempted mathematics from his theory of revolution in science, Garbiner insists that there are revolutions in the history of mathematics as well. She points out that the shift in standards of rigor between eighteenth- and nineteenth-century mathematics amounts to a change of "world view." The need to avoid errors became more pressing as mathematicians developed more complex calculations. Teaching in a university also became an important component of mathematical practice, and brought with it more rigorous standards of mathematical explanation. There have been several major upheavals in the history of mathematics, such as the axiomatization of geometry in ancient Greece that transformed mathematics from an experimental science into an intellectual one. Another example is the history of non-Euclidean geometries and noncommutative algebras in the nineteenth century. These were revolutions that changed mathematicians views on the nature of mathematical truth, and about what could and should be proved 31 • The primary concern of eighteenth-century mathematics was to get results, but such results were often obtained in ways that today would be considered altogether illegitimate. The calculus was an instrument for deriving new results even though many mathematicians were not able to explain why this instrument worked 32 • The need to avoid errors became more important at the end of the eighteenth century, when there was increasing interest in complex functions, in functions of
30. T. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1962. 31. Judith V. Garbiner, "Is Mathematical Truth Time Dependent?" in Tymoczko, op. cit. p. 202. 32. ibid. p. 204.
26
several variables, and in trigonometric series. In these subjects there are many plausible conjectures wh0se truth is difficult to decide. On the other hand, the discovery of non-Euclidean geometries did not force mathematicans to choose between them and Euclidean geometry. As in the natural sciences, the new observations were often concerned with some familiar phenomenon whose significance had not hitherto been appreciated 33. One difficulty for the historian had been the prevailing view that mathematics is a body of a priori knowledge because this diverted attention from rejected theories, plausible but not rigorous reasoning and intertheoretical struggles 34 • However, it can hardly be denied that vastly more of ancient mathematics than of ancient science has survived. Mathematics is commutative in a way natural science is not because threats of competition are often resolved by reinterpretation. Mathematical knowledge develops through a rational modification of mathematical practices. Such conceptual change is to be understood as the modification of reference potentional. One special feature of the concern about complex numbers was the felt need for a concrete interpretation of them. Natural number operations obtain their physical interpretation in the process of counting, and real number operations found theirs in the process of measurement. Proponents of complex numbers had ultimately to agree that the new operations shared with the original paradigm a susceptibility to construal in physical terms. Computers have been used in calculations for several decades. In the 1950s Wang programmed a computer to prove many elementary theorems of Principia Mathematica. Indeed, a few mathematical topics were relegated entirely to computers, such as the search for the highest known prime or the largest decimal expression of pP5. However, the mathematical legitimacy of computer use remained an open question. The practical setting of this debate changed dramatically in 1976 when K. Appel, W. Haken, and K.
33. Philip Kitcher, "Mathematical Change and Scientific Change," in Tymoczko, op. cit. p. 221. 34. ibid. p. 222. 35. Thomas Tymoczko, "The Four Color Problem and Its Philosophical Significance," in Tymoczko, op. cit. p. 243.
27
Koch 36 offered what was accepted as a proof of the four color conjecture - that four colors suffice to color every map in such a way that neighboring regions are never colored alike. The problem was that this theorem was essentially dependent on computer use. Tymoczko argues that the acceptance of such computer proofs forces us to adopt a quasi-empirical account of mathematics. As writing has changed the 'practice of mathematics, computers are likely to change it further and far more than we can envisage at present. If we accept the four color solution as a theorem, we are committed to change the sense of the relevant concept of "proof" . Modern high-speed computers were used to verify some crucial steps in an otherwise mathematically acceptable argument in favor of the four color theorem, and other computers were used to check the work of the first 37 • The most natural interpretation is that computer-assisted proofs introduce experimental methods into pure mathematics. Wittgenstein had all along argued that what makes a proof is that it is convincing to mathematicians, and that this is to be taken as a brute fact, something for which no explanation can be given and none is necessary. Still many philosophers felt that there must be some deeper characterization of mathematical proofs, e.g. that proofs are surveyable and that they are formalizable 38 • It is well-known, however, that no single theory isrsufficient to formalize every proof, and that given any sufficiently rich theory, we can find a surveyable proof of a statement of that theory, which has no formal proof. Since there is no one system in which any proof can be formalized, formalization is at best only a local characterization of proofs. We also know that there exist formal proofs, which cannot be surveyed because the proofs are too long or invoke formulas that are too long. At the same time, the mathematician can derive the existence of the required formal proof in effect by presenting a surveyable proof that the formal proof exists. Indeed, this sort of thing is standard practice in proof theory. 36. K. Appel,W. Haken, K. Koch, "Every Planar Map is Four Colorable," Illinois Journal of Mathematics, xxi 84 (September 1977), pp. 429-567. 37. Tymoczko,op. cit. p. 246. 38. ibid. p. 247.
28
The four color theorem, however, can be considered a wedge between the criteria of surveyability and formalizability. For there is no surveyable proof in the traditidnal sense of the four color theorem, nor is there likely to be one. The appeal to computer computation is ultimately a report on a successful experiment, and what makes the use of computers so dramatic is that it leads to a genuine extension of our knowledge of pure mathematics. But the fact that computer-based argument in favor of the four color theorem is convincing does not make it a proof. The four color theorem has no surveyable proof since it cannot be surveyed step by step. Thus, the appeal to computers is not a proof at all, and the mistaken view that it is a proof arises from a confusion between a proof and the mere description of a proof. The point is that surveyability is preserved in traditional descriptions of proof, but not in the appeal to compllters 39 • Tymoczko concludes that the appeal to computers does introduce a new method in mathematics; one in which the appeal is surveyable, but what it appeals to is not 40 • The work of the computer is not surveyable, for its truth depends on the reliability of the program. Even if we grant that the machine does what it is supposed to do - follow the program there remains the question of whether the program does what it is supposed to do, and this question may be difficult to answer. Programs are written in special "languages" and many of them can be quite complex. They may contain "bugs' and flaws that go unnoticed for a long time. The reliability of the computer rests ultimately on such diffuse grounds. It is natural for mathematicians, at least for those educated after the development of highspeed computers and pocket calculators, to accept the truth of the four color theorem. Its reliability, however, is not of the same degree as that guaranteed by traditional proofs, for this reliability rests on the assessment of a complex set of empirical factors 41 • While in the four color theorem we do understand the general shape of the computer proof, it is questionable whether we would be prepared to rely on computers even when we could not perceive
39. ibid. p. 256. 40. ibid. p. 257. 41. ibid. p. 258.
29
the general shape of their work. If, for example, a super computer were set to work on the consistency of Peano's arithmetic, and it registered a proof of consistency, but one that was so long and complex that no mathematician could understand it beyond the most general terms, it is unlikely that we would have sufficien~ faith in computers to accept such a proof. A widely shared conviction among philosophers is that there is a significant gulf between mathematical knowledge on the one hand and scientific knowledge on the other. Thoroughgoing empiricists like Mill have denied that such a gulf exists and have tried to explain mathematical truth as a very general kind of empirical truth. But such explanations have not been very persuasive, and most philosophers have characterized the different kinds of knowledge involved by some contrasting pair, like a prioriaposteriori, innate-learned, formal-empirical, analytic-synthetic, and the like. Thus, the four color theorem is an aposteriori truth, and such knowledge is always qualified by the uncertainty of our instruments, computers, and programs. Yet the four color theorem, we n1ight say, records an essential property of planar maps. It could be an example of an aposteriori necessary truth, and a counterexample to the claim that all necessary truths are known a priori 42 • Accepting the four color theorem forces us to modify our concept of proof, as such probabilistic arguments always admit the possibility of error, and because they can go wrong in ways strict proofs cannot 43 • The old idea that proof is a thought experiment again offers itself here. Describing proofs in terms of general features of mathematical practice, the suggestion is that program verification is more like engineering and less like mathematical logic than is usually supposed. Conviction in mathematics is obtained by a highly involved set of social processes. Indeed, we can argue they are actually more reliable than strictly formal proofs which often are quite long, lack perspicuity, and whose potential for error consequently might be quite· considerable. Contrary to what the name suggests, a proof is only one step in the direction of confidence, and in the end it is always a social process that determines whether mathematicians feel confi42. ibid. p. 261. 43. ibid. p. 263.
30
dent about a theorem. Insofar as program verification is successful, it is a social, informal, intuitive, human process - a community project. Russell showed in the Principia Mathematica what can be done in principle, but thereby he also unintentionally revealed what cannot be done in practice. The point is that n1athematicians' errors are corrected not by formal symbolic logic but by other mathematicians 44 • Proofs consisting entirely of calculations are not necessarily correct. The probabilist argues that since any very long proof can be at best only probably correct, we should state theorems probabilistically and give probabilistic proofs to begin with. This may even lead to a more plausible classical proof. Made in the real world, the kind of input-output specifications that accompany production of software are seldom simple. Even if alltomatic verification were feasible, the programmer does not know to what extent the program is reliable and safe, and what happens when he exceeds these limits. A program is a complex human artifact, and any human artifact of sufficient size and complexity is imperfect. Chaitin has applied the methods of thermodynamics and statistical mechanics to Godel's theorem, and uses such concepts as probability, randomness, entropy, and information in the study of incompleteness phenomena 45 • Revealing how widespread incompleteness is, he suggests that mathematics is more akin to physics than mathematicians have been willing to admit. Indeed Godel hin1self has expressed the view that axioms need not be evident in themselves, and that their justification lies (exactly as in physics) in the fact that they make it possible for "sense perceptions" to be derived. Under these conditions, mathematics may lose a great deal of its "absolute certainty," and under the influence of modern criticism this has indeed happened to a large extent 46 • 44. R.A. De Millo, R.J. Lipton and A.J. Perlis, "Social Processes and Proofs of Theorems and Programs," in Tymoczko, Ope cit. p. 270. 45. Gregory Chaitin, "G6del's Theorem and Inforn1ation," in Tymoczko, Ope cit. p. 301. 46. K. G6del, "What is Cantor's Continuum Problem?" in Philosophy oj Mathematics, ~. Benacerraf and H. Putnam (eds.), Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1964, pp. 258-273.
31
CHAPTER II
BUTCHVAROV ON IDENTITY
Russell l and Wittgenstein in the Tractatus 2 maintained that th apparent distinctness of material identicals (that is, " x = y" as opposed to formal identical, "x = x") arises out of certain features 0 language, and consequently explained material identity by considerations about language. Butchvarov, on the other hand, argues that such distinctions is a fact about the world, quite independent of language 3 • The difficulty in sustaining such a counterclaim lies in separating human perception from language. Quine has shown 4 that we cannot explain synonymy in purely behavioral terms but Butchvarov insists that this can be done for the noncoincidence of objects. Since he believes the distinctness of colors and of planets to be a matter of experience prior to language, he considers formal identity statements ("x:::: x") to be degenerates. Formal identity statements, though, are essential for logic, including the logic that establishes objects as separate entities. The formula "x = y" reflects not only the power of our perceptual apparatus to abstract from distinctness that are taken to be irrelevant; it also projects accepted distinctions by means of language as categories on further perceptions, and thus creates a "world." 1. B. Russell, Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy, New York, 1971, p. 175.
2. 2.242 and 5.533. 3. Panayot Butchvarov, "Identity," in Peter A. French, Theodore E. IUehling, Jr., and Hoard K. Wettstein (eds.), Contemporary Perspectives in (he Philosophy of Language, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1979, p. 168.
I
4. W.V.O. Quine, The Ways of Paradox, Random House, New Yrok
11966, p. 122.
5. Butchvarov in French,
Ope
cit. p. 169.
33
Butchvarov has no room for self-contradictory concepts 6 ; he excludes internal developn1ent or change in the units out of which our world is composed. He rigidly separates perceptual indiscernibility from linguistic identity, but since different degrees of discernibility are admitted for different purposes and in different contexts, he cannot help feeling that material identity is somehow "imposed" on reality. As his world is not composed of some uniform identifiable stuff, he has to maintain ontological status for the principle of material identity. Leibniz had formulated the principle of the identity of indiscernibles according to which, if there were two objects qualitatively identical with one another, they are also numerically identical, that is, they are the same object. To suppose two indiscernible things is to suppose the same thing under two names. Even when a new instrument, such as a microscope is discovered, and a new set of facts is made accessible, what is revealed to us is that the dissimilarities are even greater than we had supposed 7 • Butchvarov retains Leibniz's model of a world composed of qualitatively heterogeneous units but does not accept Leibniz's preestablished harmony between them. That is why he requires ontological status for his principle of material identity, even when he has to impose it on recalcitrant objects, as it were. He recognizes that if we are indiscriminate in our application of the principle of identity, there will be no limits to our application of the concept of indiscriminability 8 either. It would t11us appear that indiscriminability and identity, or perception and language, presuppose each other in their application. Lacking the principle of identity, Butchvarov believes, we would be left without the idea of a world 9 • This amounts to saying that without a language in which perceptions are verbally represented, they must remain fragmentary and unstable. It comes thus to admitting how essential language is for anything we can call a human world. Before being verbalized, our perceptions retain a dreamlike quality, objects lack a stable identity and may change or disappear
6. ibid. 7. Ruth Lydia Saw, Leibniz, Penguin, London 1954, p. 55. 8. Butchvarov in French, Ope cit. p. 169. . 9. ibid.
34
without reason or cause. Only when it is expressed in language do we regard the world as "given," for only then can objects be singled out and repeatedly referred to. Another role of identity, according to Butchvarov, is "ontological simplification." 10 Without a conceptual framework, however, provided by some language (natural or mathematical), the notion of simplicity lacks any ascertainable meaning. An essential point in any such simplification is the "enforcement of indiscernibility. "11 Even with an improved microscope we have to stop making further distinctions at some point, not just for perceptual but for conceptual reasons. Our language ensures that complexity of concepts be kept at a manageable level. Our human world reflects thus not only what we are capable of perceiving (with or without instruments) but also the degree of complexity we can handle. To reject discernibility is to deprive ourselves of the primary tool of conceptual understanding; this, however, is always subject to the need for simplicity. The power to impose identity enables us to focus on some perceptions while ignoring others as unnecessary or irrelevant; it makes concept formation a selective process. Any verbal description of our experience is a choice out of a host of possible identifications; this is what makes the notion of a possible world plausible. There always remain unrealized identities that might have been imposed on the objects, and this amounts to saying that the objects themselves and the world composed out of them could have been different. Butchvarov rejects such an interpretation by arguing that material identity should not be regarded as a relation 12. Once, however, he accepts identity as imposed, he implicitly admits the possibility of divergent identities. What he takes to be the "foundational level of metaphysics," i.e. a world composed of units of whatever nature, is due to the way our language divides into self-contained words and sentences. Whatever we say of the world is composed of units that can be singled out and thus treated as entities. The domain of distinct objects, which Butchvarov takes to be the logically first picture of the
10. ibid. 11. ibid. 12. ibid.
35
_
world, is a projection of language. Our perceptions are not separate from our concepts; discernibility and identity are like two sides of the same coin in anything we can rightly call a human world. Butchvarov, on the other hand, considers the distinction between perceived objects and merely conceived entities to be "two sides of the frontier of c·onceptualization." This, he believes, is due not to any psychological, or phenomenological, or epistemological, or metaphysical arguments 13. But by thus rejecting any possible argument in support of his thesis, he is left with nothing more than a dogmatic assertion. Since he likewise repudiates any criterion for the identity of nonexistent objects 14 , no explanation in terms of a universe of discourse or possible world is open to him either. His "object" is "anything that might be referred to, singled out for our attention, whether in perception, thought, or discourse; it is anything that might be classified and is subject to conceptualization."15 All this, however, would be impossible without language; nothing can be conceptualized or be subject to logic apart from language. Neither can he draw the distinction between how we know an object and how we describe it. He claims that the classification achieved does not amount to a full recording or regrouping of the subject matter: it consists merely in our coming to see, to understand, what the concept is applied to in terms of some but not others, of the similarities and differences between it and other things 16. But lacking a language, not only would it be impossible to establish identity, there would likewise be no objects to be perceived as different. The verbal, piecemeal and analytic mode of describing our experience has blinded us to the fact that, but for language, objects do not exist separately.
13. 14. 15. 16.
36
ibid. p. 173. ibid. p. 170. ibid. p. 171. 173.
CHAPTER III
REDEFINING VISUALIZABILITY
Miller traces the origins of modern physics to its philosophical roots 1 • He shows that in accordance with his neo-Kantian premises, Poincare emphasized that if our experiences were different, our reflections would be different too. If there would be no solid bodies in nature, there would be no geometry 2. Like Poincare, Einstein started from a Kantian framework in maintaining that a good ~oncept is one that enables us to organize perceptions into knowledge. But although Einstein's "concepts" playa role analogous to Kant's categories, they are not unalterably fixed. The picture serves as an "ordering element" and this is what Einstein calls a "concept."3 Discoveries are never made by scientists focusing merely on the data at hand, and in the special relativity theory (1905) he demonstrated that only by disassociating our everyday perception from our concepts do we come to recognize the relativity of simultaneity. By taking seriously the high but finite velocity of light, he came to realize the limitations on some of our visual thinking. Even more fundamental and less intuitive was the second axiom of special relativity, which states that the velocity of light c is a definite velocity, no matter what the relative motion between the observer and the source of light is. Such modifications in our visual imagery changed in a fundamental way what we take physical reality to be. Einstein's principle of relativity rejects a
1. Arthur I. Miller, Imagery in Scientific Thought Creating 20th-Century Physics, Birkhauser, Boston, Basel, Stuttgart 1984. p. 5. 2. Henri Poincare, Science and Hypothesis, New York, Dover 1952. 3. Albert Einstein, "Autobiographical Notes," in P .A. Schilpp, (ed.), Albert Einstein: Philosopher - Scientist, Evanston, Illinois, 1949.
37
priori the possibility of detecting motion relative to the ether, and for this no reasons need to be given 4 • Taking rigid bodies as irreducible elements, he sets up a physics in which the failure of the ether shift need not be accounted for, nor are we required to explain why the measured velocity of light always turns out to be c. Contrary to Poincare, Einstein associated the concept of a practically rigid body with satisfying the meaning stipulation of axiomatic geometry, and in this manner his theory of knowledge became part of special relativity 5. A consequence of this approach is that simultaneity is at variance with our prescientific notions. Newton's mechanistic world picture had been widely influential, and the frequently expressed attitude was that science must not go beyond experience, and should introduce only such abstractions that can before long be tested by experience. Hertz and Boltzmann used the term "picture" or "image" to refer to the whole of Newtonian mechanics. But Hertz realized that in Newtonian mechanics we do not understand matter in motion merely by restricting ourselves to what directly can be observed 6 • Boltzmann likewise pointed out that what was really lacking was an argument that nature could be represented by such a picture 7 • Since he denied the existence of atoms, the long-range outcome of these discussions was to discredit the phenomenalists and to demonstrate the need to go beyond direct experience in formulating scientific theory. Boltzmann represented a visual style of thinking that was very prevalent at the beginning of this century among Germanspeaking scientists and engineers. Thus, he criticized deductivism for failing to produce an explanation of how the pictures in question come to be framed. It was Einstein who provided new images of simultaneity and time by means of thought experiments. These made him conclude that such issues could not be settled by means of ideal chronometers and imaginary reference systems as had been used by Boltzmann and Hertz 8 • Einstein pointed out that there is 4. Miller, Ope cit. p. 52. 5. ibid. p. 54. 6. Heinrich Hertz, The Principles ofMechanics, New York, Dover 1956. 7. Ludwig Boltzmann, Theoretical Physics and Philosophical Problems. B. McGuiness (ed.), Boston, Reidel 1974. 8. Miller, op. cit. p. 87.
38 _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
no inductive method that leads us to the basic physical concepts, and that failure to understand this was the fundamental philosophical error of nineteenth-century investigations 9 • He rejected mere accommodation of the facts as advocated by Mach, and concluded that only by means of speculation would: it be possible to make further progress 1 o. In his Science of Mechanics (1893) Mach had attacked the Newtonian concepts of absolute space and time. According to Newton, absolute space was the ultimate receptacle in which all phenomena occur, and absolute time flowed independently of what we measure by clocks. As a result, Mach also disagreed with Kant who in his Critique of Pure Reason (1781) had adopted Newton's absolute space and time as a priori forms of visuability (Formen der Anschauung) that precede all empirical knowledge. According to Kant, these intuitions serve as basic organizing principles that enable our nlinds to construct knowlegde from the medley of sense perceptions . Thus, we arrive at three-dimensional Euclidean geometry and the law of causality, and finally at such higher order organizing principles as Newton's physics. Although the discovery of non-Euclidean geometry in 1827 had dealt the Kantian view a serious blow, Kant's emphasis on the role of a priori organizing principles was considered essential to our understanding of how exact laws of nature are at all possible. A priori principles of this kind played a major role in the neoKantian system of such influential philosopher-scientists as Helmholtz, Hertz, and Poincare whose writings impressed Einstein no less than did Mach 11. Both Mach and Poincare considered time to be independent of motion, and they merely replaced Newton's motion in absolute space by motion relative to distant stars or relative to ether. But while in Newton's mechanics disturbances propagate instantaneously through empty space, according to Maxwell they spread at the very high but still finite velocity of light through ether-like ripples in a pond. So pervasive had Newton's physics 9. Albert Einstein, "Physics and Reality," Journal of the Franklin Institute, 221, pp. 313-347, (1936) 10. Letter to M. Besso, 8 October 1952, in Albert Einstein - Michele Besso, Correspondence 1903-1955, Paris: Hermann 1972. 11. Einstein, in Schilpp, Ope cit.
39
become that scientists attempted to reduce all physical theory to it and pursue a mechanical world picture. However, all such attempts were eclipsed by the success of Lorentz's electromagnetic theory. Thus in 1900 Wilhelm Wien proposed an electromagnetic basis for mechanics, i.e. an electromagnetic world picture derived from Lorentz's equations. An important result of this program was that the electron's mass originated in its own electromagnetic field, and was, therefore, a velocity relative quantity. Einstein's findings on the nature of light had convinced him that theories of matter could lead neither to exact explanations of the ether drift experiments nor to a consistent world picture 1 2 • The transformation rules for the laws of mechanics and electrodynamics were dependent on two different notions of time and Lorentz failed to combine the two. Thus, while most physicists in 1905 considered the tension between mechanics and electromagnetism to be due to the inability of mechanics to explain the measured velocity of light, Einstein came to the conclusion that current physics rendered mechanics and electromagnetism incompatible 13 • To his surprise he discovered that the very notion of time turned out to be problematic in the dynamics of moving bodies. Hume's analysis of causality helped him realize that the very high velocity of light relative to the velocities we are accustomed to in our daily activities, prevents us from realizing the relativity of simultaneity. Thus, Einstein's analysis of physical theory went far beyond science as it was generally understood. He pointed out that the customary notions of simultaneity and of time result in asymmetries, unobservable quantities and ad hoc hypotheses in physics. In the special relativity paper he concluded that the basic problem in physical theory was not the constitution of matter but realizing the equivalence in the points of view of different moving observers. By means of further thought experiments he demonstrated how imprecise the prevalent notions of time and distance were and thus revealed their accurate nature. Still, prior to Niels Bohr's 1913 atomic theory, all physical systems were taken to be based on perceptions as a matter of course and subject to the
12. Albert Einstein, The Principle of Relativity, New York, Dover 1952. 13. ibid.
40
ordinary space and time categories. Allied with such visual thinking in physics was the realist view of atoms moving in space and changing over time in a continuous fashion. But by 1923 it generally was realized that such pictures do no(':apply to quantum theory. Nevertheless, the need for some sort of visualizability persisted even when in 1927 Heisenberg began to regard the mathematical formulations per se as representing the atomic entities. This consequently led to the highly controversial practice of denying in quantum mechanics the validity of maps and of pictures of any kind. It turned out that nothing less was at stake than the representation of physical reality beyond what we could perceive directly by our senses. The uniformity and continuity of laws in classical physics was replaced in Bohr's 1913 atomic theory by the Planck constant, which served both to set the scale of the atom and to account for the emission of homogeneous radiation 14. While classical mechanics cOllld be used to calculate the stationary states of the atom, the discontinuities inherent in atomic processes rendered classical electromagnetics inadequate. The symbols adopted from traditional mechanics permitted the atom in the stationary states to be visualizable as a miniature Copernican system. But the transitions of an atom between its "waiting states" was no longer visualizable 1 5. Einstein, on the other hand, regarded the probabilities that quantum mechanics produced as a weakness. Rutherford's law, for example, of how many of a large number of atoms will undergo radioactive decay during a given time is a statistical probability, and classical physics took such probabilities to reflect merely our ignorance of the true dynamics of individual processes. Physicists like Einstein, therefore, clung to the belief that somehow phenomena at every level should be described by a yet to be formulated version of classical physics that was based on the customary notions of causality and continuity 16. They tended to interpret Bohr's probability equations as a prescription for dealing 14. Niels Bohr, On the Constitution ofAtoms and Molecules, New York, Benjamin 1963. 15. Niels Bohr, The Theory of Spectra and Atomic Constitution, Cambridge University Press 1924. 16. Miller, Ope cit. p. 176, n 3.
41
with non visualizable quantum jumps whose causes were not known. Bohr's picture had to be abandoned anyway because it proved to be inadequate for atoms more complex than the hydrogen atom. The correlation of bound electrons with radiation could not be squared with continuous motion in Keplerian stationary states, nor with representation as Planckian oscillators. In Bohr's view, such difficulties were due to a mistaken model for the interaction of light and atoms 17 • By 1916 the usefulness of light quanta for discussing photoelectric effects had led some physicists to accept them as real, and this in turn led to various attempts to reconcile the particle and the wave models of light. Yet, by giving up a unified picture of light, it proved impossible to preserve the conservation laws of energy and momentum. Virtual oscillators emitted a field subject merely to probabilities of possible atomic transitions. Consistent with his realist view, Einstein did not want to give up strict causality 18. While Pauli opposed what he called the "virtualization of physics," Heisenberg opted for a redefinition of visualizability. Bound electrons lost the capacity to be visualized in the usual sense and free electrons were denied individuality altogether 19 , and such limiting of intuitiveness paid off. Bohr was able to show how electron spin was needed for a more adequate account of the properties of elements, even though the notion of an electron in the degenerative state could not be linked with any particular stationary state. Consequently the electron could not be uniquely assigned quantum numbers. By July)925 Heisenberg had given up not only the picture of Keplerian stationary states but also the image of a bound electron as a localized entity. He came to identify the electron by its radiations and the probabilities of transition, that is, the coefficients in its virtual oscillator expressions. Heisenberg admitted that the new theory labored under the disadvantage of there being no directly intllitive (anschaulich) geometrical interpretation since an electron in it could not be 17. Niels Bohr, "On the Application of Quantum Theory to Atomic Structure," Proc. Camb. Soc. 1924. 18. Letter to N. Bohr, 29 April 1924, in Max Born, The Born - Einstein Letters, New York: Walker 1971. 19. Miller, Ope cit. p. 137.
42
described by the familiar space and time concepts 20 • Schrodinger consequently complained that it was "extremely difficult" to explain such processes as collision phenomena in terms of a theory of knowledge in which we suppress intuition (Anschauung) and operate only with abstract concepts such as transition probability, levels of energy, and the like. He preferred a continuum-based theory to the one of Heisenberg 21 , even though it turned out that such a theory did not provide a visualizable model. Schrodinger had to admit that his visual interpretation was inadequate for systems containing two or lTIOre electrons. Miller rightly points out how such personal differences about the meaning and visualizability of key terms such as energy levels and partition possibilities played a crucial role in the development of modern physics 22 • By 1926 there were two seen1ingly dissimilar theories. Wave mechanics was adopted by the more continuum-oriented physicists who were intent on preserving pictures of processes inside the atom and were clinging to classical realism (e.g. Einstein). On the other hand, Heisenberg emphasized that we simply cannot follow our ordinary perceptions or intuitions when dealing with penomena like the spinning electron 23 • Born likewise concluded that dealing with problems of scattering and transition requires new concepts, such as light quanta, which are subject to precise laws. He was, therefore, prepared to give up determinism when dealing with phenomena inside the atom. Since quantun1 jun1ps defy all attempts at visualization, it would seem that for such atomic transactions causality turned out to be meaningless 24 • Heisenberg 25 maintained that according to our 20. Werner Heisenberg, "Mehrkorperproblem und Resonanz in der Quantenmechanik," Zeitschrijt fur Physik, 38, pp. 411-426 (1926) 21. Erwin Schrodinger, "On the Relations of the Heisenberg - Born - Jordan Quantum Mechanics to My Own," in G. Ludwig, Wave Mechanics, New York: Pergamon 1968. 22. Miller, Ope cit. p. 144. 23. Heisenberg, Ope cit. 24. Max Born, "Physical Aspects of Quantum Mechanics," Nature. 119, pp. 354-357 (1927). 25. Werner Heisenberg, "Uber den anschaulichen Inhalt der quantentheoretischen Kinematik und Mechanik," ZeitschriJt .rur Physik, 40, pp. 501-506 (1926).
43
customary intuition both space and matter are imagined to be divisible into arbitrary small parts. Previously we had attributed to electrons the same kind of reality as to the objects of our ordinary sense experience. We visualized them as very small particles of known charge and mass but unknown internal structure that proceed according to iscoverable precise laws. They thus complied with the intuitions of familiar continuity in our ordinary space and time world. But this picture had to be given up when it turned out that the electron and atom do not possess the kind of physical reality we associate with the objects of our daily experience. The previous theory had the advantage of both visualizability and being subject to accepted physical laws. Since it admitted, however, relations that were not testable, Heisenberg rejected it and concluded that nature within the atom was not subject to our customary intuitions. But he realized that even this modified scheme in quantum mechanics led to contradictions in our intuitive interpretations, and that tllis was unacceptable. In a letter to Pauli he admitted that what the words "wave" and "corpuscle" mean we no longer kno\v 26 • Heisenberg quoted Einstein to the effect that it is the theory that finally decides what is visualizable. Since the product of the uncertainties in measurements of an electron's position and momentum is a small but non zero number (Planck's constant), the more precisely the electron's position is known, the less accurately can its momentum be ascertained. In this manner, uncertainty relations impose limits on the accuracy to which initial conditions can be determined. The uncertainty relations can no longer be criticized as being counterintuitive. Bohr, on the other hand, considered the wave-particle duality and not the unavoidable discontinuities to be the root of the problem. Unlike Heisenberg, Bohr did not permit the theory to determine what is visualizable, and by separating causality from the space-time description of the electron, he was able to regain perceptual imagery in a suitably restricted form. According to the principle ofcomplementanlty, the mathematical formulations cannot dictate what is to be t(\ken as intuitive, e.g. a formalism that
26. Wolfgang Pauli, Wissenschajtlicher Briejwechsel mit Bohr, Einstein, Heisenberg V.A., Berlin: Springer 1979.
44
prefers discontinuities and particles over waves. Dirac in due course developed a form of quantum theory in which the wave and particle aspects of matter can be tranformed mathematically into one another, and yet remain essentially exlusive 27 • Within atomic dimensions, visualization is an act of cognition based upon Heisenberg's realization that our intuitions of uniformity cannot be extended to cover quantum mechanics 28 • While Bohr was at first uncomfortable with such a style of thinking, the notion of isotopic spin permitted Heisenberg to describe the nucleus as if it were composed of identical particles of spin. Thus, in Heisenberg's new formalism, which includes the image of migrating electrons, the neutron and positron are two different states of the nuclear particle or nucleon. Miller considers this an example of how in nuclear physics metaphor becomes physical reality 29. One reason why physicists accepted this metaphor was, of course, that Heisenberg's notion of a nuclear exchange force with something exchanged turned out to be fruitful. It led to Enrico Fermi's 1934 theory of beta decay, which rendered the existence of such exchange forces in the nucleus visualizable. According to Fermi, just as the light quantum emitted by an atom in an atomic transaction was not present in the atom prior to the transaction, neither was the electron present in the nucleus prior to beta decay 30. The new level of intuitivity achieved by complementarity became the basis for a correspondence principle in quantum electrodynamics and nuclear physics. In this manner the mental imagery of modern physicists underwent a variety of profound transformations. Classical physics fails for velocities approaching the speed of light, and for atomic dimensions where Planck's constant can no longer be ignored. One result is that terms like Schrodinger's picture, Heisenberg's picture, and interaction picture have no representation or image content in the usual sense - they refer on27. Paul A.M. Dirac, "The Physical Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics," in Julian Schwinger (ed.) Selected Papers in Quantum Electrodynamics, New York: Dover 1958. 28. Heisenberg,op. cit. 29. Miller, op. cit. p. 155. 30. Enrico Fermi, "Attempt of a Theory of Beta Radiation," in R. Beyer (ed.), Foundations oj Nuclear Physics, New York: Dover 1949.
45
ly to symbols. According to quantum theory, the particles are representations of symmetry groups, and to that extent they resemble the symmetrical bodies of the Platonic doctrine 31 • In the mechanics of the atom intuition had to be abandoned, and Heisenberg adopted a more intellectual Platonic version of what can be visualized. His elementary particles are, like the regular solids of Plato's Timaeus, archetypes of the idea of matter 32 • Einstein's visual imagery was likewise an essential factor in his framing the special (1905) and general (1915) theories of relativitiy. The radical transformations these theories brought about in our concepts of space and time prepared the way for further changes due to Heisenberg's quantum mechanics. By 1925 all attempts to provide a plausible imagery for the new atomic theory had failed. We can in fact trace a successive reduction in visualizability from the sensual images of Poincare, to Einstein's intuitions based on objects that actually can be observed, to Bohr's restrictions on Einstein's imagery when reduced to subatomic dimensions, and finally to Heisenberg's visualizability that is restricted by the mathematics of subatomic particles. But since these mathematical symbols gain their meaning in a variety of different contexts, they still allow a number of diverse interpretations. The primitive image of a water wave is transformed into the picture of light as a wave phenomenon. In this manner Einstein can speculate how the nature of light affects our image of physical reality. But by rejecting the hypothetical medium of ether he liberated physicists from the primitive analogy of light as something requiring support in space like a wave in water or sound in air. At the same time, Bohr and Heisenberg provide an illuminating example of the scientist's persistent need for some sort of visualizability. Heisenberg demonstrated the failure of our customary intuitions when reduced to subatomic dimensions, and the inability of ordinary experience to guide us in such cases. His quantum mechanics restricts itself to quantities that actually can be measured, such as spectral lines, which serve to identify the atom,
31. Werner Heisenberg, "Was ist ein Elementarteilchen," Die Naturwissenschaften 63, pp. 1-7 (1976). 32. Werner Heisenberg, "The Part and the Whole," in A.J. Pomerans,
46
and does away with unobservable electron orbits. However, without some sort of mental imagery about how the inside of the atom looks, physicists are at a loss how to proceed doing research. Schrodinger proposed a wave mechanics in which the intuition of waves is associated with electrons moving in orbit and refused to give up visualizability 33. It was Bohr who realized that the intuitions imposed by language on our capacity to form images for theories of the atom were due to our everyday language, and reflected inevitably a quite different experience. The high velocity of light produces unperceived effects under ordinary conditions, which turned out to be the key to Einstein's theory of relativity. Einstein was the first to realize that it was the high velocity of light that induces us mistakenly to accept simultaneity as instantaneous. Bohr similarly came to see that ordinary language and the intuitions it reflects is inadequate to deal with the discontinuity due to Planck's constant. In the subatomic domain Planck's constant can be said to combine wave and particle modes of representation into a wave-particle entity that is no longer visualizable 34 Bohr explained that such counterintuitiveness comes about because we inevitably formulate these entities in a language shaped by ordinary experiences since this is the only language we have. He concludes that pictures derived from ordinary experience do not apply to subatomic dimensions, and that consequently the laws of quantum mechanics are not visualizable in the usual sense 35 How such an atomic entity comes to be perceived depends on the experin1ental arrangements in use. Wave and particle models cannot be exhibited in a single arrangement; but while they exclude each other by our intuitive criteria, they still are demanded by the mathematics of quantum mechanics. Thus, it becomes evident that in the subatomic domain we are unable to describe and explain the phenomena in a fully consistent fashion. 0
0
Physics and Beyond, New York: Harper 1971. 33. Erwin Schr6dinger, Ope cit. 34. Niels Bohr, "The Quantum Postulate and the Recent Development of Atomic Theory," Nature, pp. 580-590 (1928). 35. ibid.
47
CHAPTER IV
REALIST SEMANTICS
People say things without, in general, working out what has been said and how it was said. Ordinary linguistic competence is shown by unreflective appropriate verbal and nonverbal response to the behavior of others. Knowledge of the truth conditions attributed to competent English speakers in virtue of their understanding a sentence is such that they would not, even in principle, be recognized by any speaker as obtainable. Realism in truth-conditional semantics is the doctrine that the truth conditions of sentences, conditions that determine their meanings, can transcend speaker's capacities to obtain them. We can only have a partial knowledge of truth conditions that apply to an epistemologically independent reality. If there is intersubjective agreement or emergent consensus, there are many other possible explanations besides the realist one. The philosophic significance of Tarski's truth characterization is that it reduces the semantic notions to some others. It explains what it is for a sentence to be true in terms of the primitive components of the sentence - in terms of what is for a predicate to apply to something, and what it is for a function symbol to be fulfilled by some pair of things. Tarski's theory was restricted to languages in which the sense of every expression is determined unambiguously by its form. But natural languages are full of expressions that do not meet this requirement. This raises the question of whether Tarski's type of semantic theory is applicable to languages in which the sense is not determined by the form. For if the answer is no, then Davidson's project of giving a truth characterization for natural languages seems 49
doomed from the startle Tarksi required that the vocabulary of the language be fixed once and for all, but for natural. languages this is unnecessary; all that is required is that the general structure of the language be fixed, e.g. that the semantic categories (name, oneplace predicate, etc.) be held constant. In other words, if a language already contains proper names, the mention of a new name will not invalidate the old truth conditions, though the introduction of a name into a hitherto nameless language will. The notion of an adequate translation is a semantic notion that Tarski did not reduce to new semantic terms. On Tarski's view, we need translate adeqllately the object language into the metalanguage theory of truth. This means that the notion of an adequate translation is employed in the methodology of giving truth theories but it is not employed to the truth theories themselves 2 • Field concludes that empiricism has been empirically refuted; its heir is physicalism, which allows as basic not only facts about mechanics, but facts about the other branches of physics as well. The disagreement is between those who would look for a nonsemantic basis for terms in the theory of meaning and those who would follow Quine in simply throwing out those terms. To see what a theory looks like when all semantic terms are eliminated, we must appreciate how "satisfaction" is defined. The project is to explain how names refer, yet this is precisely to ignore Frege's distinction between use and mention. The notion of truth serves, of course, a great many purp9ses, but its original aim was to aid us in utilizing the utterances of others in drawing conclusions about the world. In order to make such inferences, we have to have a pretty good grasp of the circumstances under which what another says is likely to be true. Also, how to get from a belief in the truth of what one says to belief about the extra linguistic world 3 • These two features of truth are bound up intimately with the purposes to which the notion of truth is put: the attempt to tell
1. Hartry Field, "Tarski's Theory of Truth," in Mark Platts (ed.), Reference, Truth and Reality, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, Boston and Henley, 1980, p. 87. 2. ibid. p. 90. 3. ibid. p. 103.
50
the truth, and succes in doing so play in social institutions. Normally one is in a position to assert that a sentence is true in just those cases where one is in a position to assert the sentence or a paraphrase of it. The matter might thus be explained in terms of assertability conditions in the manner of Quine 4 • Our accounts of primitive reference and of truth are not to be thought of as something that could be given by philosophical reflection prior to scientific information. The reason why accounts of truth and of primitive reference are needed is not to tack our conceptual scheme onto reality from the outside; the case, rather, is that without such accounts our conceptual scheme breaks down from the inside.. Tarski claimed that his work on truth made semantics respectable from a physicalist standpoints. McDowell points out, however, that physicalism requires something more, which Tarski did not offer, namely, explanation of these primitive terms 6 • With quantification, the straightforward procedure is blocked since the constituents of complex sentences are no longer necessarily sentences. Tarski attempted to circumvent this obstacle with the concept of satisfaction, but as in all such attempts, there was an epistemological price to be paid. In the truth-functional case, the semantic impact of sentence forming operations is captured in a recursive characterization of truth itself. Truth as such is defined as satisfaction by, or relative to, every sequence whatever. With sufficient set theory, we could convert the recursive characterization of the auxiliary notion into a "normal" or eliminative definition 7 • But the result would still contain no suggestion for eliminating the evidently semantic terminology of "applies to," and "is fulfilled by."8 Tarski announced that he would not make use of his semantic concepts if he were not able previously to reduce them to other
4. W.V. Quine, From a Logical Point of View, New York, Harper and Row 1961, p. 138. 5. A Tarski, "The Establishment of Scientific Semantics," in Logic./ Semantics, Metamathematics, Oxford, Claredon 1956, p. 406. 6. John McDowell, "Physicalism and Primitive Denotation: Field on Tarski," in Reference, Truth and Reality, Ope cit. p. 111. 7. A. Tarski, "The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages," in Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics, Ope cit. p. 193, n. 1. 8. John McDowell, "Physicalism," Ope cit. p. 114.
j1
concepts 9 , for only in this way would the notion of truth become respectable from a physicalist standpoint. But we are not told what it is for a simple expression to have semantic properties. Tarski has two prerequisites for acceptability in truth characterizations: formal correctness and material adequacylO. "Convention T" is his condition for material adequacy, but truth characterization could conform to convention T while being, because of sparseness of set theory, incurably recursive in its account of satisfaction. Two interlocking requirements, system and psychological adequacy, could form the fit between the truth characterization and the physical facts.. That requires locating it suitably against a background of propositional attitudes - beliefs and desires - in terms of which the behavior seems to make sense. The kinds of physical facts, then, which restrain the construction of a truth characterization for a language actually spoken are the structural properties that permit the language to be given a systematic description, and the complex relations between behavior and the environment that permit (some of) the behavior to be described and understood in intentional terms ll . It is at the level of its theories that a truth characterization makes contact with the hard physical facts. The distinctive apparatus used in describing the theorem needs no anchoring in the physical facts independently of the overall acceptability of the derived assignments of truth. We potentially are liberated from much bad philosophy about truth by seeing that sentences need no special extra linguistic items of their own (states of affairs, facts, or whatever) to be related to. Talk of facts is only a lacon de parler 12 .. The truth characterization has its relation to the realm of the physical governed by conditions that direct the relation of intentional to physical discourse. But the nature of these conditions makes it quite in1plausible that the relation of semantics to physics should be anything like the relation of chemistry to physics 13 • If we are 9. A. Tarski, "The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages," Ope cit. pp. 152-3. 10. ibid. p. 256.
11. McDowell, "Physicalism," Ope cit. p. 122. 12. ibid. p. 129; n. 9. 13. ibid. p. 125.
52
physicalists, we hold that physics can, in principle, give a complete account of all events. Intentional explanation, on the other hand, makes an action unsurprising, not a~1 an instance of the way the world works, but as something that the agent can be considered to have some point in going in for. Because of the different explanatory pretensions of the intentional and the physical, they do not compete directly. Assignments of truth conditions are partly confronted by the possibilities of belief ascription, and belief ascription is governed in part by principles about how the content of belief is sensitive to the causal impact of their subject matter. There need not be a physically describable relatioll that obtains between any occurrence of a name and its denotation. Any instance of denotation will have a physical realization, which will differ from one case to another. But the real question is about the principle on which the members of the set are collected. If the point of the grouping cannot be given in purely physical terms, then there is no justification for claiming that an induction has been offered 14. McDowell concludes that denotation is a nonphysical relation. Yet central to a theory of meaning is the task of explaining language and communication by appeal to simpler, or at least different, concepts. Truth clearly depends on the semantic features of the elements, and when the elements are names or predicates, reference seems to be the relevant feature. Such a truth theory does show how the truth conditions of each sentence are a ftinction of the semantic features of the items in the basic vocabulary. But this theory fails to explain the semantic features of the basic vocabulary. Satisfaction, in the opinion of Davidson, is much like reference for predicates: he defines the reference of a predicate as the class of those sentences that satisfy it ls • The problem is that, if one imagines a new predicate added to the language, the accounts of truth and satisfaction already given do not suggest how to go on to the next case. A Tarski-style theory of truth gives us no insight into the concept of truth itself. The reason convention
14. ibid. p. 127. 15. D. Davidson, "Reality Without Reference," in Reference, Truth and Reality, Ope cit. p. 133.
53
T is acceptable as a criterion of theories is that T-sentences are clearly true (preanalytically) - something we can recognize only if we already (partly) understand the predicate "is true." The interest of a theory of truth viewed as an empirical theory of a natural language is not that it tells us what truth is in general, but that it reveals how the truth of every sentence of a particular language depends on its structure and constituents 16. Davidson emphasizes that the theory does not explain or analyze the concepts of reference. Like Quine, he attempts to provide a radical analysis of language and rejects the building block model in favor of an approach that makes the sentence the focus of empirical investigation 17. But such holism operates by a merely weak principle of individuation, which turns it often inconclusive. A proper theory of truth should let us answer the underlying question how communication by language is possible. What is essential is that the theory be related to behavior and attitudes described in terms not specific to the language or sentences involved. A Tarski-style truth theory establishes this relation by means of the T-sentences. The theory contains a recursion on concepts like satisfaction and reference similar to the logical forms attributed to sentences, and the whole machinery of terms, predicates, connectives and quantifiers. Davidson believes that none of this is open to direct confrontation with the evidence: the theory gives up reference as part of the cost of going empirical's. But the kind of empiricism to which we have been reduced after giving up reference remains at least in part undecidable. What Davidson seems to mean by "going empirical" is inevitably language-relative, and is, therefore, inadequate for revealing the structure of human communication as such. This study ignores the intentional quality of all meaning ascription in which reference plays a crucial role. To eliminate reference is to ignore not only what goes on between speakers but also to disregard the physical circumstances under which communication takes place. While Davidson's theory gives up reference, he is anxious to retain ontology'9, but it is difficult to see how he can do this. It is 16. 17. 18. 19.
54
ibid. p. 134. ibid. p. 135. ibid. p. 138. ibid.
by no means clear how Davidson can relate a singular term to an object without assuming implicit reference. Neither can he tell which entities will satisfy each predicate without taking some sort of reference for granted. Davidson concludes that the relation between his theory and the evidence will not amount to anything approaching induction or definition 20 • But this makes his theory largely self-defeating, and he appeals, therefore, to a preanalytic notion of reference corresponding to Tarski's preanalytic notion of truth. Davidson postulates a "loose connection" between a name and its object or between a function and the range of variables that satisfy it, yet this inevitably begs the question. Without an adequate criterion of satisfaction, Davidson's T-sentences relativized to context do not meet even Tarski's test for adequacy. Davidson emphasizes that there is more than one way of ascribing entities to expressions that yield acceptable results with respect to the truth conditions of sentences. But if there are endless other ways that do as well, the very notion of satisfaction becomes highly problematic. The right way to investigate this question would be to ask whether the empirical and formal constraints on the truth theory sufficiently limit the range of acceptable theories. Davidson admits that different theories will assign different truth conditions to the same sentence, and this goes considerably farther than Quine's indeterminacy of translation, which, after all, assumes a common truth standard reflected in basic logic. Unlike Quine, Davidson makes the notion of truth itself recursive even at the metalanguage level. An interesting way to raise questions about the relation between language and reality is to ask: how would we state a theory of knowledge that would suffice for understanding a language? The point of the notion of sense is tied to an interest in understanding people's behavior. Frege's notion of sense belongs with understanding, but such understanding has the character of "knowing how" rather than of "knowing that." One has the ability to tell that a seen object is the bearer of a familiar name without having the slightest idea how one recognizes this. Understanding a language involves knowing what speakers of it are doing, even though such
20. ibid.
55
knowledge cannot as a rule explicitly be formulated. A model for the sense of a word of some particular kind dos not seek to explain how we are able to use the word as we do: it merely forms part of an extended description of what that use consists of. Lacking such an explanation, we might not be able to see why speakers think fit to act as they do. To explain why they act intentionally in these ways presupposes a psychological mode of explanation. A person who knows the sense of a name must have some beliefs about its bearer. This second order belief is manifested by the subject's actions, not explained by his words. The Fregean view would have to seek its support in the idea that thought relates to objects with an essential indirectness. Davidson indeed emphasizes that we are asked to make sense of a judgment of synonymy between utterances, but not as a foundation for a theory of language. It is merely as an unanalyzed part of the content of the familiar idiom of indirect discourse that synonymy is introduced. When I say that Galileo said that the earth moves, I represent Galileo and myself as samesayers. To effect samesaying, I do not necessarily have to use his words, but I have to use words the same in import here and now as his then and there. Yet this is just what on the standard theory of quotation I cannot do. For the theory introduces the content sentence sealed in quotation marks, and on any standard theory of quotation this means that the content sentence is mentioned and not used. An utterance of a content sentence will not in general be an assertion. We cannot first construct a theory about conditions under which utterances are true, and then draw conclusions about what speakers are saying. Dealing with fornlal languages, Tarski . could take the notion of translation for granted, as determined by stipulation, and work from there to a characterization of truth. But we do not know independently what a truth characterization of the appropriate kind is, and cannot therefore use the intuition of such a truth characterization as a route to judgments of samesaying (judgments about what people are saying). Constructing a truth characterization of the appropriate kind, and putting oneself in a position systematically to interpret what people say are a single activity. If the identity of words depends on the identity of languag~s, then, as Quine has pointed out, words become problematic as objects of reference. From a Quinean standpoint, 56
languages as a kind of entity should be no more acceptable than meanings. Indeed, the ideas seem interdefinable: two speakers speak the same language when a sufficient number of their equation utterances have the same meaning. Intuitively speaking, quotation is a device for talking about words in abstraction from the circumstances in which the words happen to be produced. There is no way to explain what samesaying is except in terms of a prior intuition of meanings as objects of reference. Such a claim however does not survive appreciation of Quine's argument about translation 21 • We have no more an identification principle for languages than for meanings. In the familiar languages for which we know how to define truth, the basic iterative devices are reducible to the semantical connectives, the apparatus of quantification, and the description operator, if it is primitive. Adding to the list of logical constraints will increase the inventory of logical truths and consequence beyond anything a truth definition demands, and will, therefore, yield richer versions of logical form. Certain semantical purposes will suggest that we should attempt an external standpoint outside the logical predicament that Russell and Frege accepted as inevitable. Wiggings argues that it would be a great pity to talk ollrselves out of the unstructured natural language quantifier 22 , for example. To describe a natural language quantifier like "most" or "all" as starting_ from a preexisting unspecified mass of entities, one does not even need to treat it as a set or determinate totality of any kind. Wiggins concludes that truth-theoretical semantics cannot be a complete theory of meaning. Davidson likewise admits that metaphor is directed to what language is about. The point of the concept of linguistic meaning is to explain what can be done with words. But there are no restrictions for deriving metaphors and there is no manual for what a metaphor "means" or "says." There is no test of metaphor that does not call for taste. Davidson's analysis of metaphor - and
21. W.V. Quine, Word and Object, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass, 1960, Ch.2. 22. David Wiggins, "Most and All," in Reference, Truth and Reality, Ope cit. p. 332.
57
thus of truth-theoretical semantics - depends on the distinction between what words mean and what they are used to do. But while metaphor belongs exclusively to":: the domain of use, there are aspects of language that are not merely metaphorical. Literal meaning is at least partly independent of use, and this is what makes the device of quotation philosophically interesting. Literal meaning and literal truth conditions can be assigned to words and sentences apart from particular context of use. This is why adverting to them has genuine explanatory power 23 • The common error is to fasten on the contents of the thoughts a metaphor provokes, and to read these entities into the metaphor itself. What we attempt in paraphrasing a metaphor cannot be to give its meaning, for that lies on the surface; rather, we attempt to evoke what a metaphor brings to our attention. Yet it is hard to decide even in the case of the simplest metaphors exactly what the content is supposed to be. In fact, there is no limit to what a metaphor calls to our attention, since much of what we are called to notice is not propositional in character. When we try to say what a metaphor "means," we soon realize that there is no end to what we want to mention, and Davidson emphasizes that this is true for any use of language 24 • Peacocke consequently points out that we are required to make sense of the possibility that a counterfactual is well supported by the evidence but is nevertheless false. Our picture of the world is a representation not only of actual events but also of imaginary events that branch out from the actual ones. Logically speaking, the requirement that our beliefs be factually true leaves us free to characterize the imaginary events in any way we please. But in practice we limit our freedom by adopting principles of construction that apply to the whole picture 25 • Perception cannot fail to play an essential part in gaining knowledge about what is actually the case. The fact that perceptual sentences require for their truth some causally modalized sentences is linked with the
23. D. Davidson, "What Metaphors Mean," in Reference, Truth and Reality, Ope cit. p. 240. 24. ibid. p. 254; n. 16. 25. A.J. Ayer, Probability and Evidence, London, Macmillan, 1972, p.124.
58
fact that to perceive an objct is a way of gaining knowledge of it. We form hypotheses about what is causally necessary and what is not on evidence much less than conclusive. A man can have a general belief, yet fail to instantiate it with respect to a particular object, much as he may fail to connect two of his beliefs that entail a third. In the case of counterfactuals, we do not obtain a condition that is decidable or can be observed to be true. What is actually the case fails to settle the truth of causally modal sentences but does not fail to settle those of universal generalization 26 • According to Michael Dummett, a truth condition theory of sense for a class of sentences is equivalent to realism with respect to their subject matter. The property of truth reflects the realist convention embodied in our customary linguistic practices that the world, or a given sector of it, determinably is constituted quite independently of any limitations on our capacity to come to know truth concerning it. Since, for the realist, truth value may thus transcend our power to discover its constitution, the principle of bivalence is regarded as generally assertable, whether or not we are equipped to determine even in principle what truth value a sentence has. Dummett holds that we must be able as theorists to relate to ascribed semantic knowledge the same specific practical capacity or capacities to use the language. Plainly, if sense is to fulfill its communication function, it must be a publicly ascribable entity. But then semantic knowledge must of necessity be manifestable in and recoverable from observable features of the language. What Dummett claims is that a theory of meaning framed in terms of a relative notion of truth precisely fails to forge the required connection 27 • It is clear that we cannot in general equate knowledge of truth conditions with the capacity simply to state these conditions. Dummett suggests that knowledge of truth conditions be identified or correlated with a certain kind of recognitional capacity, viz~ the 26. Christopher Peacocke, "Causal Modality and Realism," in Reference, Truth and Reality, op. cit. p. 59. 27. M. Dummett, "Truth," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, vol 59 (1958-59); "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in Mind and Language, edited by S. Guttenplan, Oxford, Claredon 1975; Elements of Intuitionism, Oxford, Claredon 1977.
59
capacity to recognize, or come to know, the truth value of sentences. It is only because the possession of such an effective decision procedure for truth value is a practical capacity that it provides the needed link between the knowledge of sense and use. Trouble sets in, according to Dummett, when we inquire with what generality this account can be applied. Obviously in the case of undecidable sentences, an alleged grasp of transcendent truth conditions cannot be associated with possessing an effective method for handling truth value. Lacking that, Dummett concludes, a realist theory cannot represent sense as determining and being determined by use. But if truth and use fall thus apart, the sense of a sentence cannot consist in its having truth conditions subject to bivalence. It follows that the semantic content of a sentence .cannot represent conditions as they might obtain in some recognition transcedent reality, and so realism is false. We must, accordingly, only assign such conditions to sentences as deternlining their sense as are comprehensible by our actual recognitional capacities - e.g. verification conditions - and face the antirealist consequences 28 • McGinn argues against Dummett that speakers of what appears a common language may differ in their powers of truth recognition. Sentences concerning regions of space and time might be decidable for one speaker and undecidable for another, depending on how wellequipped they are to inspect the region in question. On such a view, it is not the individual speaker to whom we should look for a manifestation of his semantic knowledge; rather, we should require, for sense to be manifest, only that there should exist, within the community, some speakers whose powers of recognition match the truth conditions of the sentences in question. A truth conditions theory of sense for a language would then connect with sense only for the community as a whole. Since the individual speaker has to rely on the recognitional capacities of his co-speakers, a variability of semantic properties has to be acknowledged. But this involves crediting speakers with conceptions of states of affairs of a kind not available to them during the course of their linguistic training, and not such as to be manifestable in their linguistic prac-
28. Colin McGinn, "Truth and Use," in Reference, Truth and Reality, cit. p. 21.
Ope
60
tice - it already concedes something to the realist 29 • It appears that the realist is unable to supply the appropriate recognitional capacity, and so, by Dummett's argument,~ cannot relate semantic knowledge to linguistic use 30 • The theory of sense consists in a recursive specification of truth conditions for sentences in the object language it represents: what it is a speaker knows in knowing the meaning of sentences. According to Dummett, it is not enough that a theory of language mastery merely records what a speaker knows - e.g. that "snow is white" if and only if snow is white - there is the further obligation reaching beyond pure description to supply an explanation of what possessing a language consists in; or else, it is claimed, no adequate mesh with use is achieved. We can think of such a complete routine for a whole sentence as constituting its direct method of verification. But knowing the truth conditions of sentences dealing with quantification over infinite or unsurveyable domains, past-tense sentences, reference to remote regions of space and time, and the like, does not confer upon speakers a practical grasp to establish their truth value . In this way, Dummett suggest, the realist cannot discharge his obligation to the theory of understanding. And this may reduce us to opt for a verificationist theory of meaning, according to which knowledge of a sentence just consists in a practical grasp of which states of information would warrant assertion of the sentence. It does not follow, however, that speakers cannot extract from their training conceptions that transcend these conditions, as McGinn has it 31 • What makes human language different from mere animal communication is precisely its creative potential, Le. the ability to use sentences and form concepts not previously encountered. We do not know the limits of what we meaningfully can say anymore than the limits of what we can know - and that is why we opt for realism in epistemology as well as in semantics. We grasp the meanings of our native tongue quite independently of a truth theory or a knowledge of truth conditions, however primitive. We
29. ibid. p. 22. 30. ibid. p. 23. 31. ibid. p. 26.
61
cannot explain our actual use 'of language apart fronl its counterfactual components. But semantic realism, like epistemic realism generally, cannot explain undecidable sentences in ternlS of what it would be for a speaker to observe that they are true. The realist, accepting the presuppositions of Dummett's argument, finds himself forced to acknowledge that he cannot explain knowledge in the only way available. Like Hume, we wonder how there could be more to our "ideas" than can be extracted from our "impressions." McG-inn concludes that it is only an empirical dogma that makes us disposed to deny the possibility of acquiring conceptions of reality that transcend our recognitional capacities 32 • We cannot acquire a conception of reality that is separate from language because we do not know the lin1its of what we meaningfully can say or understand. The proper object of acquiring mastery of language and of knowing the meaning of sentences is communication, the business of interpreting the speech of others and of having one's own interpreted. It is not quite consistent to construe a theory of meaning as empirically testable, and at the same time underdetermined by the evidence, as Davidson proposes. The point is to sho\\' in what ways linguistic behavior interlocks with the psychological properties of the speaker and his dispositions to action. Since we cannot separate linguistic knowledge from other knowledge of a speaker, some sort of realist semantics seems to be called for. Linguistic theory forms an inseparable part of a more general theory of action of persons; a theory that relates meanings, propositional attitudes, and intentional behavior. One's knowledge of meaning is manifestable in one's capacity to interpret the speech behavior of others. A central ability is correctly ascribing beliefs to a speaker that agree, in combination with suitable devices, in explaining his behavior. But such reference may transcend recognition, as truth transcends recognition of truth. The cardinal principle of Dummett's conception of language mastery is that it consists solely in, and so cannot go beyond, sensitivity to the evidence. Yet what constitutes evidence in such circumstances is itself language relative. Quine's idea 33 that 32. ibid. p. 29. 33. W.V. Quine, "Epistemology Naturalized," in Ontological Relativity, New York, Columbia University Press 1969.
62
the content of our general conceptionpf the world is underdetermined by the evidence can no longer be "considered empirical in the standard sense. Only under a realist interpretation of discourse (whether scientific or comn10nsense) is it possible to make sense of such underdetermination. That is why Quine accepts a realist semantics: undecidability is due to underdetermination. But McGinn rightly insists that the sensory underdeterminacy thesis is itself a form of antirealism about meaning 34 • One can see the underdeterminacy thesis as Quine's attempt to resolve the deep tension between a realist face value interpretation of scientific common sense discourse and his doctrine that there can be no more to meaning than is recoverable from dispositions to assent and dissent under sensory stimulation. What would take up the resulting slack is adherence to some form of mentalistic semantics, which repudiates the doctrine of empirical n1eaning altogether. Dummett finds it incredible that meaning should outrun linguistic dispositions and so prefers to relinquish realism, thereby restoring the exhaustive manifestability of sense. Both Quine and Dummett are motivated by the underlying assumption that the capacity to use a language must be represented fundamentally as the possesion of a complex of dispositions to verify and falsify sentences. Both take it for granted that knowing a language is an information processing capacity. But they ignore the fact that such a model is largely metaphorical. In consequence, some sort of antirealist view, involving nonassertion of bivalence seems to be unavoidable.
34. McGinn, Ope cit. p. 29.
63
CHAPTER V
POLLOCK'S STATE OF AFFAIRS SEMANTICS
The basic tool of Pollock's philosophical semantics is the concept of a possible world. Carnap began it all by talking about state descriptions, but it was Kripke who made talk of possible worlds respectable in his 1959 completeness proof for modal talk 1. While possible world talk served originally heuristic purposes, it recently has been taken more seriously. Lewis 2 argues that possible worlds are real entities that actually exist and to which we can appeal in philosophical analysis. Pollock however believes that we should distinguish carefully between formal and realist semantics in such discussions. Realist semantics makes explicit appeal to possible worlds and identifies necessary truth with truth in all possible worlds. Formal semantics, by contrast, is carried on entirely within set theory. The basic tool of formal semantics is the concept of a model, which is a set theoretic structure. Models are said to "correspond to" possible worlds but it is by no means clear what this alleged correspondence amounts to. Thus, the philosophical foundations of formal semantics remain in doubt. There is no agreement on the nature of possible worlds and on how they are related to necessary truth, propositions or meaning. Pollock's philosophical semantics presupposes certain views about the nature of language, and the relationship between language and various logical entities like propositions as possible objects of belief. We want it to be the case that people believe the same thing if they believe the
1. S. Kripke, "A Completeness Theorem in Modal Logic," The Journal of Symbolic Logic, 24, (1959), pp. 1-14. 2. David Lewis, Counterfactuals, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1973.
65
same proposition, but there is the obstacle that under different circumstances we adopt different criteria for believing the same thing. Pollock assumes that there must be a finest possible criterion for deciding that two people (or even one person in different situations) believe the same thing 3 • This, however, would require them to think of objects in precisely the same way, and to hold such beliefs at exactly the same time - and this is something we can never really know to be the case. Pollock therefore concludes that we can only identify more or less coarse-grained objects of belief with a given set of propositions. The resulting structure of such a semantics cannot be spelled out in any precise fashion. While objects involve some mode of representation, there is more than just one mode of representation available. What else should be included in an inventory of propositional designators remains a n1atter of dispute. Pollock maintains that we can think about an object without necessarily thinking about it under a description 4 , but the ways in which we refer to ourselves or to the present, for exan1ple, are certainly not invariant to the manner of description adopted. The view associated with Frege and Russell (perhaps unfairly) was that, when one makes a statement uttering a sentence containing a proper name, the function of the name is to express a definite description that becomes a constraint on the proposition asserted. Kripke s and Donnellan 6 , on the other hand, have argued persuasively that one can rarely find a definite description that is a plausible candidate for the sense of the use of a proper name. They instead have championed the historical connection theory according to which the referent of a name is determined by a chain of historical connections between particular uses of the name. They coupled this view of reference with the semantical thesis that sentences containing proper nan1es are used to express directly 3. John L. Pollock, The Foundations of Philosophical Semantics, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1984, p. 9. 4. ibid. p. 11. 5. S. Kripke, "Naming and Necessity," in Davidson and Harman (eds.), Semantics of Natural Language, Dordrecht, Reidel 1972, pp. 253-335. 6. K. Donnellan, "Proper Names and Identifying Descriptions," in Semantics of Natural Language, Ope cit. pp. 356-379.
66
referential properties, and this is known as the denotation theory 7. The claim that proper names are used. to state directly referential propositions means that it makes no difference how the speaker and his audience thi11k about the referent of a name. Members of the audience have understood the speaker just as long as they come to think of the correct object of the referent and understand what the speaker is saying about the object. The traditional view was that, for communication to be successful, the sent and received propositions must be the same. The denotation theory can be regarded as relaxing this requirement by pointing out that successful communication occurs just as long as the sent and received propositions are about the same object and attribute the same thing to its. The historical connection weakens our criteria of identity: we are no longer dealing with exactly the same object, merely with a coarse-grained resemblance adequate for ascribing belief. The ways in which speakers and hearers think about an object typically will reflect their idiosyncratic relationships to it and neither side will know exactly how the other side is thinking of the object. This does not preclude successful communication in most cases. There must be some connection between the sent and received propositions, but they need not be identical. Having specified the range of possible sent and received propositions, we can characterize only roughly the content of the communication or determine what statement has been made. Different features of the circumstances are invoked in determining the possible sent and acceptable received properties for different statements. Donnellan and Kripke argue that the historical connection theory provides a theory of reference, while the denotation theory represents a theory of meaning. Pollock points out, however, that these two theories are not really compatible. One would naturally expect internal and external necessity to coincide, but Pollock shows that they do not. He largely accepts the view of Kripke 9 and Putnam 10 that no distinction can be made between pl1ysical 1
7. Pollock, Ope cit. p. 20. 8. ibid. p. 21. 9. Kripke, "Nanling and Necessity," Ope cit. 10. H. Putnam, "The Meaning of "Meaning", in Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 2, R. Cohen and M. Wartofsky (eds.) 1975, Humanities Press, pp. 205-222.
67
necessity and logical necessity as they apply to "natural kinds." They have argued that if water is HzO (as a matter of physical necessity) there can be no possible world in which water is not HzO. Pollock identifies Kripke's epistemic necessity with internal necessity and external necessity with metaphysical necessity. But he admits that both internal end external necessity are species of de dicta necessity! I • The adverb "necessary" occurs in English as a de re modal operator when we say, "Two is necessarily the square root of four." While English provides us with devices for distinguishing between de re and de dicta necessity, there is the tendency to express de re necessity instead of de dicta necessity by ignoring the role our language plays in the identification of (especially abstract) objects. One way to make us sensitive to such background knowledge is to explain necessary truth in terms of truth in all possible worlds. Still, it has never been entirely clear just what possible worlds are supposed to be. David Lewis 1z argues that possible worlds are "ways things could have been,' and Saul Kripke describes possible worlds as "counterfactual situations."l3 While there is some intuitive appeal to such constructions, there is also considerable disagreement about how the concept of a possible world is to be understood. Lewis maintains that the concept is primitive and unanalyzable but this makes it of questionable utility in the analysis of other concepts. Pollock proposes an analysis interms of maximal possible state of affairs, which he identifies with maximal consistent sets of propositions 14. States of affairs are de re rather than de dicta, but possible or maximal states of affairs are inevitably de dicta. Pollock certainly does not solve the problem of transworld identity by postulating maximal possible states of affairs. He claims that no nonessentialist theory of transworld identity can be correct, while admitting that foundations are ultimately always de dicta. He fails thus to provide a workable notion of a possible world, for there is no way for him to identify objects across worlds in terms of qualities they have at worlds.
11. 12. 13. 14.
68
Pollock, op. cit. p. 31. Lewis, op. cit. Kripke, "Naming and Necessity," op. cit. Pollock, op. cit. p. 43.
One alternative to this is to make the identity of an object part of the specification of the world as proposed by Kripke 15 • Pollock interprets this to mean the identification of possible worlds with maximal possible states of affairs l6 , but this introduces a concept that is used at the same time both de re and de dicto. States of affairs can never be literally true or false, for two distinct states of affairs are not logically equivalent. Pollock fails to show that one state of affairs obtains if and only if another obtains; his states of affairs semantics does not, therefore, satisfy the axioms of the propositional calculus. He wants only nontransient states of affairs to enter into the construction of a possible world, but this can be done only by stipulation. To be directly referential, states of affairs must be "maximal," Le. "combine descriptions of everything." 1 7 The trouble is that there cannot be a literal description of everything, and it is, th.erefore, misleading to talk about the "truth" of statements at possible worlds in the usual sense. Lacking an adequate principle of identification, Pollock permits possible or maximal states of affairs to be identified with their extensions l8 , and they thus become members of themselves and subject to the well-known set theoretical paradoxes. No such concept can be very helpful in analyzing necessary truth. The disagreement between Lewis and Pollock on whether possible worlds or necessity is to be regarded as primitive l 9, cannot be settled by an appeal to intuition, as Pollock proposes. While he maintains that the way things could have been are states of affairs and not just possible worlds, he is unable to tell at what point states of affairs become maximal or nontransient. When proposing states of affairs as primitive, he fails to give a noncircular account of necessity in terms of possible worlds. He wants necessary truth to be generated from a priori truth by closure conditions 20 while all such conditions remain strictly de dicto. His contention that possible worlds have
15. Kripke, "Naming and Necessity," Ope cit. 16. Pollock, Ope cit. p. 52. 17. ibid. p. 57. 18. ibid. p. 61. 19. ibid. p. 65. 20. ibid.
69
necessary existence is by no means universally shared, for he cannot decide whether possible wQrlds are internally or externally possible. Since he ascribes to states of affairs a directly referential character, their modal operators are more simple than for either propositions or statements 21 • But the price for such apparent simplicity is his inability to identify particular states of affairs. Pollock attempts to settle this by stipulation, that is, by arguing that in philosophy "property" has become a term of art, and that we consequently can have properties be anything we want them to be. Such an approach, however, becon1es useless for the purposes of semantical analysis, as when he permits (3 x) to range over merely possible worlds by stipulation. The appeal to intuition fails in such cases because it cannot tell us at what point merely possible objects become a possible world. He defends possibilism by permitting the philosopher (Le. himself) to speak a language significantly different from ordinary English. But in this manner his argument becomes circular. Philosophical analysis has to discover the constraints inherent in ordinary discourse, not simply to in1pose them, and the problem is that ordinary discourse lacks precise limits on the use of concepts dealing with what is possible or necessary. Pollock believes that it is only when we turn to sets built in part from contingently existent objects that the axiom scheme of replacement will fail for possibilistic set theory. He considers this to be only a minor failing 22 , while it plausibly may be argued that contingently existing sets reflect the "essence" of our actual world. It is indeed this fundamentally contingent character of the actual world that renders possible worlds and possible states of affairs de dicto. Possible worlds (Le. things that are possible at the actual world) either require that some currently existing objects do not exist, or that some additional objects exist. Being thus contingent, they are no longer "possible worlds" in Pollock's sense 23 • He take~ such modal knowledge to be of abstract entities 24 , but here everything depends on what we mean by "abstract." We
21. 22. 23. 24.
70
ibid. ibid. ibid. ibid.
p. p. p. p.
71. 97. 100. 102.
know not only that all bachelors are unmarried but also that it is necessary that bachelors are unmarried. This latter kind of knowledge he believes to be not about (de dicto) propositions but about (de re) bachelors. However, when asked to explain why it is necessary that all bachelors are unmarried, he inevitably appeals to what the word "bachelor" means, Le. to the workings of our language. Thus, the foundation of our knowledge of (abstract as well as nonabstract) entities is finally always de dicto. Modal analysis cannot explain what (de re) numbers are, for the very question is obscure. All it can do is to explain what it is to be a real, irrational or transcendental number by describing their properties. Pollock wants all talk of abstract entities to be analyzable in terms of purely modal talk of nonabstract entities. But he proposes such an analysis not in terms of truth conditions but in terms of justification conditions 25 . All such justification, however, remains relative to what we take the trllth to be. To say, as Pollock does, that it is true that there are numbers (e.g. that there is a number between 1 and 3) and that no amount of logical analysis is going to make this fact go away26, is to adopt a position of logical intuitionism, which he claims to reject 27 . Similarily, to claim that states of affairs and possible worlds exist necessarily, may merely reflect the "fact" that our ordinary use of language takes such expressions for granted, and that we find it, therefore, difficult to imagine otherwise. The reason Pollock is dissatisfied with modal logic may be that his expectations of what a realist semantics can accomplish are really unrealistic. Most recent theories of counterfactuals are based on the idea that the nearest possible worlds are worlds resulting from minimally altering the actual world in order to accommodate possibilities being true. OUf final standard for doing this, however, remains the actual world and how we take it to be. The novelty in all such theories lies in how they make precise the notion of minimal alteration implicit in the concept of a possible world. The problem is that we have no intuitive standards for such minimal changes anymore
25. ibid. p. 102n. 26. ibid. p. 103. 27. ibid. p. 17.
71
than for maximal states of affairs. Pollock emphasizes that in talking about the inclusion of such changes, we should not look at logical compounds (such as P and Q changing each other simultaneously) but at states of affairs that he takes to be logically simple 28 • It should be noted, however, that the whole point of talk in terms of possible worlds is largely its not being logically simple. On the one hand he believes that there are possible worlds that get closer and closer to the actual world without limit, while at the same time he has to admit that such limit assumptions fail for both minimal change and for comparative change. 29 Lewis argues that ordinarily counterfactuals require only a comparison of worlds with a great deal in common (from the standpoint of the worlds of the sort we might inhabit). The advocates of comparability of different worlds have to admit that the ordinary frame of reference of such talk is left underdetermined by linguistic practice and context. Practice and context determine the class of frames each.satisfying comparability, not a single frame that fails to satisfy it 30 • Pollock, by contrast, appeals to what gives intuitively correct truth values for the counterexamples in actual cases 31 ; and the trouble is that such intuitions do not seem to converge. Counterfactual conditionals tell us what would have been the case if something else had been the case, but this does not necessarily enable us to analyze them in terms of the nearest possible world. He takes states of affairs to be the most fundamental causal relation, while admitting that we have quite unclear intuitions about complicated cases of causation. Claiming that whether one state of affairs causes another cannot be relative to a frame of reference 32 , he realizes that causation is relative to the flow of time. We seem unable at this point to give any simple answer to the question of how formal semantics represents the notion of truth in all possible worlds. Likewise, there is no single right answer to what the notion of
28. ibid. p. 116. 29. ibid. p. 133.
30. David Lewis, "Ordering Semantics and Premise Semantics for Counterfactuals," Journal of Philosophical Logic, 10, (1981) pp. 217-234. 31. Pollock, Ope cit. p. 137. 32. ibid. p. 161.
72
logical validity is supposed to be. It is apparent that formal semantics and the resulting logical theories can be intended to serve different purposes. A fruitful formulation of our concept of validity proceeds in terms of the interpretation of a language. But while the notion of a form of a proposition or of statement makes literal sense because of their having structure and constituents, we cannot make analogous sense of the notion of a form of a state of affairs or of a possible world. Pollock cannot show equivalent states of affairs to be identical. It is often thought that formal senlantics gives us insight into the logical concepts themselves, or that it provides us with an analysis of logical concepts. This claim is particularly prevalent in connection with possible world semantics. Models are thought of as simultaneously interpreting the language and as providing a possible world in which to evaluate the truth of a proposition, statement, or state of affairs. While the standard view is that models are formal surrogates of possible worlds, Pollock insists that a model should be regarded simultaneously as a formal surrogate and as an interpretation because it takes both to yield the truth value for a formal semantics. Contrary to what it usually claimed, Pollock points out that such relations do not correspond to pairs of possible worlds and interpretations. He rejects models as formal surrogates of possible worlds and insists that they are surrogates for ordered pairs (w,11) of possible worlds and interpretations, or in linguistic logics, for triplets, (w,l1, a)33. It is finally the interpretation that makes a formal semantics philosophically significant.
33. ibid. p. 229.
73
CHAPTER VI
HINTIKKA'S GAME THEORETICAL SEMANTICS
Hintikka argues that the most interesting and succesful theories of meaning have been truth-conditional. The paradigm of such theories is usually taken to be Tarski's recursive characterization of truth for certain formal languages. I Davidson has sought to provide a foundation for truth-conditional semantics of the kind proposed by Tarski in the requirement of learnability of the language in question. 2 According to Davidson, theories of meaning for learnable languages are supposed to become so many truth theories for these languages. The mediating link between learnability and the recursive truth theory is what Davidson calls the Frege Principle, which says that the meaning of a complex expression is a function of the meaning of its constituent parts. Linguists know the Frege Principle as the principle of Compositionality. Learnability is supposed to bring us close to the Frege Principle, and the Frege Principle to make possible a Tarski type definition 3 • Hintikka insists, however, that compositionality fails in natural languages in a wide variety of ways. What the learnability requirement really brings about is a theory of truth different from Tarski's, and not subject to compositionality. The crucial step in this argument is the identification of the meanings of component part
1. A. Tarski, Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics, Claredon Press, Oxford 1956, pp. 152-278. 2. D. Davidson, "Theory of Meaning and Learnable Languages," in Y. Bar Hillel (ed.), Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, Proceedings of the 1964 International Congress, North Holland, Amsterdam, 1966, pp. 383-394. 3. Jaakko Hintikka and Jack Kulas, The Game of Language, Reidel, Dordrecht 1983, p. 260.
75
e with its contribution to the meanings of the larger complex expressions E in which it can occur. This ary.ounts to a reification of use into meaning. It is largely to safeguard this step that Frege introduced the other principle frequently associated with him, namely that a word or other simple grammatical expression has meaning only in context. Contrary to Davidson, Hintikka concludes that learnability is not sufficient to justify the Frege Principle. Hintikka, therefore, developes an alternative approach which he calls Ganle Theoretical Semantics (GTS), according to which the meaning of a complex expression E is typically analyzed in ternlS of the meanings of certain simple expressions El, E2 ... Ei. But these simpler expressions are obtained from E through certain game rules that are not always themselves parts (constitutive components) of E in any natural sense of the word. Hence, Game Theoretical Semantics violates the invariance thesis. At the same time, however, Hintikka seems to preserve the assumption of parallelism between the syntax and semantics of a natural language. 4 He believes that such parallelism is our best bet to approximate Tarski-type truth conditions. Hintikka shows how the English quantifier "allY" interacts with its context, and why we can expect to find counterexamples to cOlnpositionality in such contexts. Their explicit treatment depends on one's theory of anaphora. In a natural language, quantifier scopes extend arbitrarily far, and tend to branch instead of being hierarchically ordered. The most persuasive examples of branching 'quantifiers in natural languages deal with so called nonstandard quantifier words ("many," "few," "most," etc.) as distinguished from logicians' standard quantifiers (the existential and universal quantifier). It is significant that the counterexamples to the Frege Principle cover some of the most interesting and pervasive semantical phenomena. Hintikka emphasizes that the difficulties of translating natural languages into quantificational notation are much greater than most contemporary logicians and linguists realize. The failure of compositionality means that there are a large number of sentences in natural languages like English, for which no Tarski-type recursive characterization is possible. 4. ibid. p. 264.
76
The paradigm problem for Game Theoretical Semantics is the treatment of quantifiers, primarily logicians' existential _and universal quantifiers. Hintikka argues thaNhe most natural way to make this terminology explicit is to envisage each choice of the value of an existentially bound variable to be my own move in a game, and each choice of the value of a universally bound variable a move in the same game by an imaginary opponent. The basic idea of Game Theoretical Semantics is introduced by reference to first order (quantificational) languages. We assume that L is an interpreted language, for otherwise we cannot meaningfully speak of the truth or falsity of its semantics. A two-person, zero-sum game, G(S), is associated with each well-formed sentence, S, of my language L. Hintikka calls the two players Myself (or I) and Nature. These games can be brought to bear on semantics by showing how they can be used to define the crucial concept of truth. GTS is truth-conditional, even though it works in a way different from Tarski-type theories. 5 The truth of a sentence S of L is defined by Hintikka as the existence of a winning strategy G(S) for Myself, i.e. a way of choosing my moves such that I end up winning no matter what Nature does. Falsity means that there is such a strategy for my opponent, Nature. The law of the excluded middle expresses the conviction that either one of us has a winning strategy. It is, of course, not a forgone conclusion that there should be a winning strategy for either one of the players in a zerosum, two-person game. Only where one exists can the game said to be determinate. Hintikka thinks of the players' strategies as being formed move by move and not once and for all. Classical logic presupposes that semantical games are characterized by perfect information. This assumption has to be modified, however, in the case of quantifier rules, and the result is a new kind of logic that has been independently studied: the logic of finite, partially ordered (e.g. branching) quantifiers. The usual Tarski-type truth definitions do not work in the case of partially ordered quantifiers. 6
5. ibid. p. 4. 6. ibid. p. 7.
77
Since Hintikka's game rules are rules of semantical analysis, he cannot define truth recursively from the bottom up, as Tarski does, for there is no bottom on whi~h to build such a definition. This is no obstacle, however, to game theoretical truth definitions because it leaves open possibilities for setting up the definition of winning and losing (or neither) of such a game. However, the informative sets involved may not always be ordered transitively by class inclusion, and thus even branching structures may not suffice for many of such sentences. At each of the games, some sentence S' is being considered, on which the player's next move depends. Some primitive vocabulary is assumed to be given and itlterpreted, but contrary to Hintikka, the domain is not given 7 and turns out to be problematic, as we shall see. In formal languages, the sentence reached at a certain stage of a ganle always determines what happens next, while in natural languages, by contrast, several different rules may apply to the same sentence. The general ordering principles depend only on the syntactical structure ~f the sentence to which the rules are to be supplied, and the crucial issue in formulating general ordering principles concerns the way syntactical structure governs rule ordering. Hintikka's ordering conventions admit exceptions;8 they are considered approximations, which may be overruled by special conventions. A difference between formal and natural languages is that in the former the scope of each quantifier is indicated explicitly. In natural languages, on the other hand, the sort of ranges that belong to different quantifiers have to be gathered from diverse syntactical as well as semantical clues. Thus, some of our semantical rules apply much more widely than merely to well-formed (acceptable) strings of English words. Hintikka's GTS recognizes that syntactical wellformedness and semantical interpretability frequently do not go together, yet he nevertheless assumes a general parallelism between them. Since the set of acceptable English sentences is not recursively enumerable, it cannot be generated by grammar alone. In the opinion of Hintikka, this shows the limitations of Chomsky's generative grammar as a universal explanation of acceptability in
7. ibid. p. 11. 8. ibid. p. 29, n33.
78
a striking fashion. While Chomsky has tried to shrug off such results as turning merely on various "imperfections" of natural languages, Hintikka insists that the absence of scope indicators implies that natural language discourse carfhot always be analyzed into components with notable meanings. That is why Hintikka rejects the Principle of Composionality (the Frege Principle) in the semantics of natural languages. Compositionality presupposes the kind of semantical context independence that would enable us to carry out the semantic analysis of a sentence from the inside out. Since the game rules of GTS operate from the outside in, they allow us to account for these context differences that violate compositionality. Among the approaches that rely on compositionality are Tarski-type truth definitions or so-called T-schema. Hintikka points out, however, that such approaches are unsatisfactory because they fail to account for bral1ching quantifiers. In formal languages there are, as Frege and Russell emphasized, at least four different counterparts to "is" in English. They include (1) the "is" of identity, exemplified by "Sue's brother is Jack," and formalized by" = "; (2) the 'is' of predication (the copula), exemplified by "Sue is blonde," and formalized by predicate juxtaposition; (3) the "is" of existence, exemplified by "There is money in the till," and formalized by the existential quantifier; (4) the "is" of general explication (or class inclusion), exemplified by "A whale is a mammal," and formalized in this example by (x) (x is a whale therefore x is a mammal).9 The Frege Russell ambiguity claim of "is" is codified in the usual formalism of first-order languages, and in this formalism the four a~legedly different senses of "is" are expressed in entirely different ways. Hence, all those who are using such first-order languages (quantification theory) as their framework of semantical representation are committed to the Frege - Russell ambiguity claim. This includes such diverse philosophers and linguists as Quine, Davidson and Chomsky. Hintikka nevertheless insists that the most central concepts of semantics - ambiguity and synonymy - turn out to be relative to a preferred framework of semantical representation. In
9. ibid. p. 15.
79
GTS, too, distinctions have to be made between different kinds of primitive sentences containing "is." But such differences are not due to different meanings of 'is,' but to the diverse contexts in which it occurs. The importance that Russell ascribes to the different meanings of "is" can be realized in his Our Knowledge of the External World (1914) where it is introduced as the first serious advance in real logic since the time of the Greeks. This distinction is for Russell not just a 'feature of his notation but reflects important semantical and ontological differences. As a result of the formulation of Russell and Peano, and even to a greater extent through the notation of the Principia by Russell and Whitehead, this emphasis on the different meanings of "is" becomes a central part of contemporary first-order logic. Hintikka, on the other hand, rejects the distinction between the various meanings of "is" on the basis of his Game Theoretical Semantics. His game theoretical rules are said to correspond to recursive classes of a Tarski-type definition. The information a player has, or does not have, is seen by Hintikka as part of the specification of the situation. The problem is that such choices based on incomplete information do not always determine the course of a game, as Hintikka claims. 10 They may not be able to specify what it means for Myself or for Nature to win the semantical game because the game rules apply to sentences where truth values are subject to conflicting interpretations. It is thus questionable w11ether Hintikka can legitimately claim the benefit of the doubt, Le. that his conclusions are valid as soon as it is admitted that Game Theoretical Semantics is a possible framework, even if it is not the orl1y one. For what he claims to have established is not the incorrectness of Frege's multiplicitly of meanings of "is," but its idiosyncracy. Hintikka emphasizes that his Game Theoretical Semantics is much closer to traditional theories of logic than is Frege's notation. Many of the older treatments of "is" and its synonym go back ultimately to Aristotle, who in effect considered the difference between "=" and the copula to be an instance of his own distinction between essential and accidental predication, respectively. The most natural treatment of the traditional
10. ibid. p. 163.
80
syllogism takes the form of some sort of calculus of equations of both identities and nonidentities between quantifier phrases. But the task of developing an account of syllogism along equational lines is impeded by the generic uses of some quantifier words in English, such as "any". Hintikka follows Kant in demanding that our ways of reasoning about existence be grounded in the human activities through which we come to know the existence of such individuals. But he thinks that Kant mistakenly located these activities in sense perception, and that in so doing, was following a tradition dating back to Aristotle. Hintikka points out that it is only in rare cases that we can wait until the· relevant individuals prove their existence by showing up in our passive sense perception. Since normally we do not look for them, the true basis of the logic of existence and universality lies in the human activities of seeking and finding Wittgenstein's "language games" - not in the structure of our sense perceptions. 11 Logical and mathematical inferences do not reflect the structure of our internal end external senses, as Kant mistakenly claimed, but the structure of our language games of seeking and finding. Such games, conceived against Nature, are Hintikka's model of semantical investigation. His basic idea is to focus on the activities through which we come to know the relevant propositions. These propositions are the ones studied in quantification theory, and the activities in question are our processes of verifying such propositions. What emerges is a modernized version of Aristotle's doctrine of categories. Aristotelian scholars have found the combination of different ideas in Aristotle's categories puzzling and some have argued that Aristotle's theory is based on the structures of the Geek language. Hintikka, in effect, aClJepts such an interpretation and extends it to natural languagt~' inV4 general. He rejects the Fregean version of logical type, wich has been central to modern mathematics and logic. But he admits that the individuals over wich quantifiers range can no longer be taken for granted. Thus, in Hintikka's Game Theoretical Semantics these verification processes are conceptualized as games against a recalcitrant
11. ibid. p. 33.
81
Nature that tries to frustrate my attempts. 12 But this amounts to identifying Nature with a Cartesian "malignant demon,"13 and under such conditions Hintikka's semantical game is not winnable in principle, Le. it is a game no longer worth playing. To ascribe to Nature deliberate intentions to deceive us is a form of animism. The language Hintikka proposes cannot provide a foundation for the kind of semantics he is advocating because it remains an interlinguistic activity, it does not create or maintain the links between language and reality. He lacks a theory of concept formation that justifies his Game Theoretical Selnantics as a zero-sum, twoperson game. Strategies are determined by the features that tell the players how to move, given the earlier history of the game. If these theories are to be usable, they must be recursive, and Hintikka fails to show that they are. Following such a nonrecursive strategy amounts to having one's move not really determined at all. There are features in natural language semantics that have no counterpart in the semantics of the conventional formal languages, e.g. anaphora. Hintikka's treatment of the role of pronomial anaphora is admittedly incomplete, however. 14 By proceeding in his semantical analysis from the outside in, he has a more manageable translation problem than either Frege or Russell. But the price of such gain is a fatal weakening of the decision procedures of his semantical game. By making his negation rules more context sensitive, they lose logical bite. There are no exceptionless negation forming rules for all English sentences. To have something that amounts to a game, Hintikka has to assunle that the semantics of a natural language parallels its syntax, There is indeed a temptation to interpret the semantical equations of negation as a simple syntactical operation, and cases where such an interpretation is not possible are easily considered as deviant. 15. But in a natural language, such incomplete specification of negation rules do not amount to a parallelism of syntax and semantics, unless we assume
12. ibid. p. 34. 13. R. Descartes, Meditations I, Everyman's Library, London 1957, p.84. 14. Hintikka, Ope cit. p. viii. 15. ibid. p. 96.
82
some sort of generative grammar in the manner of Chomsky and this is rejected by Hintikka. He in fact enlphasizes how differently negation is treated in formal anct natural languages. But if the negation rules by which he is playing his semantical game cannot be made explicit, the whole point of Game Theoretical Semantics becomes questionable. It has often been argued that natural languages are not logical because the rules that govern them are ambiguous anct admit of many exceptions. The applicability of semantical game rules ctepend on factors that are not purely syntactical. Hintikka's game rules leave open the question what player (Myself or Nature) is to make the next move because he claims that 'this is how our language works."16 The question then becomes what kind of game we are actually playing uncter such conditions. To ensure communication, Hintikka insists that Occam's razor applies to the kind of entities he assumes to exist,17 even when they become partly indeterminate. But it then becomes impossible to minimize the number of entities (or interpretations) of a given fragment of natural language discourse. Once Tarski's inside out procedure has been given up, standards of simplicity become blurred. The idea of logical form was introduced for the very purpose of uncovering, underneath the multiplicity of various grammatical forms, a unique structure that correctly displays 'the meaning of a sentence. For Hintikka, however, so-called logical form is merely a reflection of the semantical properties of sentences on the syntactical level. If these properties are conceptualized in a different way, our ideas of logical form will change correspondingly. At the same time, Hintikka emphasizes that his game theoretical treatment is closer to the intuitions of the man in the street, who would never say that "is" is ambiguous. He concludes that people's alleged intuitions reflect some semantical theory tacitly presupposed. He also emphasizes how easily affected, and, therefore, how frequently nlisleading, our so-called intuitions are. 18 In order to appreciate
16. ibid. p. 115. 17. ibid. p. 124. 18. ibid. p. 199, n39.
83
the semantics of a word, or any other primitive expression, we should study its function in the rule-governed human activities that serve to connect the language with the world. In this sense, Game Theoretical Semantics claims to be an extension of Wittgenstein's language games, but a different kind of language would inevitably require different semantical game rules as well. Unlike Wittgenstein, Hintikka does not play his semantical game on the assumption that our language is "in order" because it reflects a certain life form. Our information about Nature, or lack of it, inevitably reflects the way we conceptualize a given scientific or philosophical problem. In languages with infinitely deep logics, i.e. languages where atomic sentences cannot be reached by a finite number of analytical steps, we cannot be said to know what kind of strategy to adopt. We simply no longer may be able to make any sense of the issue, and become unable to decide what our next step should be. Since the rules of such a game rapidly become uncertain and ineffective, it is only to a limited degree that partial information can be handled by a semantics of branching (partially ordered) quantifiers. 19 The language to which Hintikka's game rules apply is a formalized version of English, and in this manner the problenl of translating English into game theoretical notation crops up again. Such a version is closer to the surface forms of English than the usual canonical notations of logical symbolism,20 but the price for this is an increased complexity'and loss of applicability of the game rules. The behavior of "is" in Game Theoretical Semantics is seen by Hintikka to be merely a function of its status as an auxiliary in grammar. But English grammar is not directly formalizable because it is not recursive. If the primitives of such a model are taken as those of Eglish, and the expressions have the same surface form as those of a class of English expressions, the formal properties become unmanageable (as they are in Aristotle). The viability of Hintikka's model depends on the conceptual question of how precisely the limits of language are drawn. He treats the metalogical and metasemantical parts of English separately,
19. ibid. p. 203. 20. ibid. p. 204.
84
while at the same time assuming a pre-established harmony between them. It was Tarski who realized that no coherent truth definition is possible for a natural language in its entirety, whereas Hintikka proposes a hierarchical structure as the basis for his semantical analysis of natural languages. 21 The trouble is that he cannot draw in natural languages a consistent demarcation line between the object language and the metalanguage anymore than Tarski. In the many-sorted logic Hintikka proposes for this purpose, the relationship between first-order logic (quantification theory) and the required higher order logics becomes itself manysorted, and, therefore, undecidable. He is thus unable, by means of his Game Theoretical Semantics, to capture the complexity of an actual natural language, anymore than Aristotle did by categories. What seems to be emerging as a consequence of Hintikka's assumptions is a modernized version of Aristotle's doctrine of categories. But Aristotle's scheme of a finite number of fixed, coordinated categories, largely because it fails to account adequately for change, is an inadequate model for a natural language. It was primarily the logic of relations and functions that led logicians to abandon Aristotelian categories. As Hintikka hin1self recognizes, it is not accidental that Aristotle found it difficult to accommodate cl1ange, and that the overthrow of his philosophy began with the analysis of motion. 22 This is where Frege and Russell have an edge over Hintikka.
21. ibid. p. 215. 22. ibid. p. 227.
85
CHAPTER VII
KELLEY'S PERCEPTUAL· REALISM
Kelley maintains that in perception we directly are aware of physical objects and their properties, and that perceptual judgments are therefore self-evident. The integrative process that produces a percept is automatic; it is a preconceptual mode of direct awareness of physical objects. Thus, it provides adequate evidence or justification for our beliefs about these objects, even though such evidence is not propositional. He rejects the prevalent assumption that a belief can be justified only by another belief, judgment or other propositional state. The closest position to common sense about the nature of sense perception and its objects is realism 1. Realism holds that we perceive physical objects directly existing independently of the nlind, and that the senses are an open window in a world that is what it seems to be. But Kelley realizes that since Descartes realism has been a poor third (after idealism and representationalism) in terms of popularity among philosophers, and that most of them have accepted the philosophy of consciousness in some form. Trutll for Descartes consists in the correspondence between the ideas in the mind and the external objects , they represent. Only God's warranty provides an external link between ideas and their ultimate objects. The idealists of the nineteenth century relativized such forms of perception (e.g. the Kantian categories) and considered them as products of historical circumstances, pragmatic convenience or linguistic practice. Kelley points out, however, that if the objects of knowledge depend on the subject, the truth (if one retains that concept at all) must be
1. David Kelley, The Evidence of the Senses, A Realist Theory of Perception, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge and London 1986, p. 2.
82
something other than correspondence, and that idealists typically prefer some form of coherence theory of justification. Representationalists assumed that consciousness is metaphysically alltonomous, and that our mental life could go on exactly as it does even if there were no external reality. His thesis on the primacy of existence, on the other hand, emphasizes that however active consciousness may be in processing information, the mind can only work on information derived from its response to objects outside it. He denies that consciousness is in any sense an autonomous realm of inner content. Awareness essentially is directed toward external objects, and there is no way to have knowledge of consciousness before one has knowledge of the world. Kelley points out that a consciousness conscious of nothing but itself is a contradiction in terms, since before it could identify itself as something it has to be conscious of something 2 • He has to admit, however, that there is no way to prove realism, Le. to show that the objects of awareness exist independently of consciousness. The primacy of existence is not a conclusion but serves as an axiomatic foundation for any inquiry into the nature and function of our cognitive capacities 3 • All Kelley can really show is that it is possible to describe and explain the world in terms of the assumption of real objects. It is not possible to refute realism, but by the same token it is impossible to refute idealism or representationalism either. While the statement "the world is real" is presumed to be self-evident by Kelley 4, everything here depends on what he means by "real." As he himself recognizes, all that he claims for the primacy of existence also can be said about Descartes' cogito. It is one thing to argue that awareness is epistemologically relational, and quite another to draw conclusions from this about the nature of reality. The identity we ascribe to things we experience may be supplied by our language and social conventions. Whether something is taken to be an entity, a process or a relation depends on context and purpose. The idealist's claim that the objects of awareness depend on consciousness, or the
2. ibid. p. 29. 3. ibid. p. 30. 4. ibidem.
88
skeptic's worry that they might so depend, are not any less intelligible than is Kelley's contention that reality exists "out there" independently of consciousness. There is no clear-cut phenomenological distinction to be drawn between what is real and what is not. What it makes sense to say depends on what is taken to be real, and vice versa. We know consciousness primarily from the inside as its subjects, and from this perspective our awareness of an object seems transparant. Unaware as we are of the way our cognitive faculties operate to produce our awareness, it seems as if nothing but the object itself determines the way we grasp it, the way it appears. It is the possibility of error that forces us to distinguish between appearance and reality. To preserve the primacy of existence, realists traditionally have resisted the facts of perceptual relativity. Idealists take the failure of this approach as a proof for the primacy fo consciousness, holding that consciousness creates its own contents. Kelley points out, however, that to do this they must step outside the confines of their theory to observe how consciousness operates behind the scenes. But by the same token, Kelley himself cannot know how reality operates behind the scenes anymore than the idealist can know this ab01Jt consciousness or the representationalist about representations. In defining awareness as relational he essentially attempts to sidestep the epistemological issue and this is why he cannot provide a theory of conceptual knowledge. He claims that to perceive an object is to discriminate it from other objects, to isolate its background as a unit, a distinct wholes. All this, however, may be due to mind or language, and to say that it is due to the "nature of things" is not really to offer an explanation at all. There can be little doubt that human perception is shaped at every turn not only by our physiological perceptual capacities but also by social and linguistic conventions. Kelley isn't able even to provide genuine examples of sensations as such 6 because sensations and perceptions are not phenomenologically different; they are merely diverse modes of describing and explaining what we experience. Entities are not given once and for all but
5. ibid. p. 45. 6. ibid. p. 47.
89
change with our theories and terminology. What we are aware of is largely irrelevant to what we take to be real as we progress from common sense to scientific knowledge. This is why realism became increasingly discredited with the invention of powerful and sophisticated scientific instruments. In modern science, what is or is not real can no longer be settled by an appeal to common sense conventions. There is no way to separate interpretation from discrimination, since perceptual capacities invariably are integrated with other cognitive skills so that seemingly direct observations already contain some interpretative elements. Kelley has to admit that nothing we discover about the process could in itself show that personal awareness is indirect 7 • But by making the findings of perception irrefutable, he renders them altogether unscientific and ultimately incomprehensible from an experiental perspective. That is, of course, why the phenomenological grounds of perception are in dispute. Kelley denies that the relativity· of appearances can ever place the existence of an object in doubt, but he cannot tell us what the constancy conditions for an object are, or how illusions come about. Thus, nothing is either obviously normal or obviously real. The kind of phenomenalism he advocates would rightly have been rejected by Husserl as a species of dogmatic metaphysics. Claiming that when we perceive an object, it is the object itself that appears, Kelley reintroduces the diaphanous model of knowledge at the conceptual level once again. The metaphysical issues between idealism, representationalism, and realism cannot in any case be settled merely by epistemological arguments because such different theories of knowledge finally proceed from different assumptions. Normal perception cannot guarantee realism because what is taken to be normal is as controversial as what is taken to be real. The actual shape of an object can, therefore, never be known merely by inspection. Different forms of perception make different axes of similarity accessible at the perceptual level, so that perceivers with different sense organs will form different concepts and classify objects in different ways. They can, therefore, no longer be said to
7. ibid. p. 69.
90
deal with the same "objective" reality in Kelley's sense. He likewise cannot show that "consciousness has no identity of its own" because such a statement lacks experiential significance. He claims to reject the naive realism that regards perception as the awareness of what exists independently of the perceivers, but by failing to provide a theory of conceptual knowledge he, in effect, retreats to some such position. Kelley simply postulates that it is the object that appears, the object we discriminate by means of its appearance 9 • However, that the subject may not be aware of the means by which he perceives the object may well be altogether irrelevant to the metaphysical issues connected with realism. Thus, he himself repeats the attempt to step out from behind our senses to see the world diaphanously, as it really is, and how it looks apart from any effect it might have on us. While he criticizes this attitude as the basic mistake of idealism and representationalism, his own kind of realism implicitly uses a diaphanous model to explain the conceptual level of knowledge. That colors do not exist as objects apart from us has been a common view since the Renaissance. This was formulated in Locke's distinction between primary and secondary qualities, and it is probably still shared by a majority of scientists and philosophers. Kelley on the other hand denies that color is in the mind because as with other relational properties, there is no reason to locate them at all 10 • But by the same token, if awareness is inherently a relational property, there would be no need to postulate realism to begin with. We cannot step out from behind our concepts anymore than from behind our percepts (or awareness) to determine how the world really is. Kelley thus cannot establish that we perceive the real shape of objects as quite similar to their apparent shapes, or that "objects are the way they appear in all respects." 11 Arguing in this manner he faces considerable difficulties in explaining how imagination, dreams, and hallucinations come about. According to his realist view, that of which we are directly aware of is the ex-
8. ibid. p. 104. 9. ibid. p. 108. 10. ibid. p. 110. 11. ibid. p. 119.
91
ternal object itself. But this begs the question of what relation obtains between experience and its external object and turns the act of perception into a complete mysfery. Kelley's realism fails to account for the causal sequence of perception, Le. that in the case of seeing distant galaxies it may take millions of years for their light to reach us. This refutes the realist claim that we see things as they really are, because the things we see may no longer exist. Something is present to my perceptual awareness now, but it cannot be the galaxy because that galaxy may have disintegrated long ago. Modern science has largely discredited what Kelley takes to be normal experience and the kind of reality postulated by it. While he rejects a linguistic analysis of metaphysical issues, his own major argument in favor of realism is derived from the logic of conceptual justification. He argues that the claim that hallucinated objects are not real can only be understood and justified by contrast with the assumption that the objects of perception are real 12 • Yet Kelley himself admits that we can create new quasi-perceptual scenes in imagination, recognizing sensory materials from past perceptions, and experience them as more or less vivid images of things, as they might be or might have been 13 • Being real is thus a matter of degree and context. Olle is not always aware in imagination of making it up since the process of imagination routinely makes use of materials from past perception of objects whose reality may be in doubt. How the ways an object appears depend on the object itself is consequently left unexplained by Kelley. Neither is he successful in showing that what is perceived depends on what is there to be perceived 14 • What is real thus becomes a mystery. That our survival as a species proves the real existence of the environment we adjust to is likewise not a convincing argument because such adjustment remains forever incomplete. Indeed, there can be no local argument in favor of realism, and no particular perceptual phenomenon can in itself justify the realist model (or refute it, for that matter). All such phenomena presup-
12. ibid. p. 135. 13. ibid. p. 137. 14. ibid. p. 141.
92
pose an interpretation that has already settled the issue of realism one way or another. Thus, Kelley regards the mind as a faculty for "grasping reality," yet this metaphor raises far more questions than he is able to answer. We may regard awareness as a relation, a process, or as an entity depending on text and purpose, and there is no intelligible answer to the question of what awareness "inherently" is. Neither idealism nor representationalism can be refuted by Kelley merely by the device of rejecting the diaphanous model of perception. He himself admits that we bring to perception an enormous amount of background knowledge l S but fails to realize that this effectively prevents him from isolating perceptions in the required manner. The history of what a person attends to affects what it is possible for him to perceive. A scientist and a layman may look at the same laboratory setup but the scientist will perceive much more than does the layman. Kelley declares attention to be noninterpretative l6 , an incorrigible intuition into what is real. But this is much less plausible than is the diaphanous model of knowledge. He claims that when one perceives an object, one's awareness of it does not depend on knowing its relation to other objects or facts 17. Yet supposedly isolated perceptions of this kind invariably are contaminated by background knowledge, and consequently no perception can be detached effectively from its context and purpose. What Kelley considers to be the direction of perception is the product of a sophisticated skill of abstraction due largely to language acquisition and the mastering of relevant concepts. This is how the child learns deliberately to concentrate on one object and ignore its background and context. It is this conceptual skill that enables Kelley to focus on entities and on what he takes to be essential. But having mastered it, we may focus equally on attributes, relationships or processes, and then we will regard entities as mere "snapshots" of such projections. Kelley has to admit that our awareness of entities is by no means uniformly clear and discriminatory, and that there are alternative ways of describing and explaining phenomena. It is thus our focus of attention
15. ibid. p. 147. 16. ibid. p. 149. 17. ibid. p. 150.
93
that determines the relevant context, i.e. what is real, and not the other way round. There is no direct perception of features of entities as such. Kelley simply expects us to accept his version of "cognitive integration" without argument. His realism amounts to a decision to describe the world in a certain manner. But this manner is not mandatory, for idealism and representationalism remain as irrefutable as admittedly is realism. The substance-attribute relationship is not a product of sensory stimulation but a joint product of our senses and our concepts. Kelley appeals to common sense in denying that conceptual organization is due to language, and insists that the perception of things as things is given directly18. However, since the question about the nature of reality is not a common sense question, it naturally enough does not admit a common sense answer. What counts as an entity depends on what substance and sortal concept we have in mind. Since there are no discoverable units for what is possible, all awareness requires conceptual orgal1ization of some sort. This is very obvious in speech perception where the ability to pick out individual words from the optical or auditory array depends on and develops with an understanding of what the words mean. How we pick out units from the background very much depends on what we are looking for, and on what we intend to do. A prelinguistic awareness is unable to identify objects, and facts do not exist prior to being stated in language. That space must have three dimensions is taken for granted by common sense but this has to be revised when we deal with very small or very large objects. Different dimensions permit us to talk about different types or patterns of similarities, and thus of objects we would not perceive otherwise. It also permits us to detect the existence of novel sorts of lawful behavior. Such open-ended concepts alert us to the existence of other as yet unknown objects and facts. Apart from the conceptual framework, no entities of any kind can be said to be given in any absolute sense. Since our language is underdetermined by experience, our awareness of identity is not sharp, and there is often more than just one way to make sense of a statement. Kelley is not anymore successful than Descartes was in in-
18. ibid. p. 167.
94
tegrating his internal and external perspectives of consciousness, and so he decides that it lacks identity. But in this manner he fails to provide answers to most of the traditioJlal concerns of justification of perceptual judgments. If we directly perceive external objects and sense their attributes as he claims, realism should be selfevident. Since this is clearly not the case, coherence theories hold that basic knowledge of this sort is neither possible nor necessary. It is not possible because any judgment can only be justified in the context of a conceptual framework, and it is not necessary because the real unit of justification is the context of the conceptual network itself. Kelley's claim that phenomenological knowledge is epistemologically prior to conceptual judgment is a species of discredited foundationalism. While rejecting a linguistic approach to these issues, his argument in favor of the priority of perception is based on the asymmetry in the logic of justification 19. He clain1s that in order to designate anything as "unreal," we have first to assume that some things are real. However, given the inherent ambiguity in designating anything as "real," suc11 an argument doesn't carry much force. What is taken to be real in one context may well turn out to be unreal in another context, and nothing is real under all conceivable circun1stances. Thus, from the way something appears to us, very little can be known about how it really is. Kelley's attempt to define what is real by reference to "normal" vision, therefore, begs the question. ·There are indeed good reasons for the prevalent view that knowledge does not have nor does it need incorrigible foundations. Such diverse thinkers as Wittgenstein, Quine, and Rorty agree that questions of justification, evidence, and truth arise only within Ollr conceptual scheme itself. The scheme is a social product, instilled in us chiefly through the process of learning a language. Objectivity consists not in any relation of correspondence between our judgments and the world independently of them, but rather in a relation of coherence among our judgments. The standards of coherence and of objectivity are set by the scheme itself. In spite of his proclaimed realism, Kelley conducts his conceptual analysis in terms of ideas, judgments, and
19. ibid. p. 182.
95
conscious states. He rejects materialist and behaviorist views of the mind because they lead in his view ~to a reduction of the mind to pieces of linguistic behavior 20 • But while he regards the world as a framework of objects in terms of which we pursue our investigations, this can only mean that it is the set of things posited by theories not in question at tIle moment 21 • We cannot step out from behind our theories to achieve a diaphanous view of reality. Quine has shown that there is no way to establish the relation between any terms and items outside language altogether. It makes sense to apply' 'true" only to a sentence couched in terms of a given theory and seen from within the theory complete with its posited reality 22. Even Kelley has to admit that questions of justification, meaning, knowledge, and truth arise only where our utterances are seen as actions within a social practice governed by rules 23 • An utterance can be evaluated cognitively as meaningful and justified only by reference to the rules legislated by practice. The rules themselves have no basis in reality beyond the fact that the practice does legislate them. Outside human thought and speech there are no independent objective points of support, and meaning as· well as necessity are preserved only in the linguistic practices which embody them. There is no independent objective basis that will justifiy logical inference, and the only possible justification of it is that this is how people think and speak. Each mode of human thought is accepted on its own terms and justified by its own internal standards 24 • There is no way to get outside our beliefs and our language so as to find some test other than coherence. All such rules of justification are thus social, unstable, and pragmatic. As Rorty n1akes clear, all that language acquisition does is to let us enter a community where members exchange justifications of assertions and other actions with one another. What has happened is a shift inside the person, which now enables him to enter new
20. ibid. p. 186. 21. ibid. p. 188.
22. W.O. Quine, Word and Object, Cambridge, Mass. 1960, p. 24. 23. Kelley, Ope cit. p. 190. 24. David Pears. L. Wittgenstein, New York, 1970, pp. 179, 183, 184.
96
relations 25 • Kelley points out, however, that these writers find it difficult to explain progress in science. Some have argued that although truth and justification are relative to conceptual schemes, there is nevertheless some sense in which our conceptual scheme is preferable to that of our predecessors and in which that of our successors will be preferable to our own. They thus implicitly take it for granted that conceptual schemes progress in the direction of greater adequacy to reality. Yet if there is no way for idealists to step outside our theories of the world to see their connection with the world itself, as Rorty maintains, there is, for the same reason, no way to step outside and see their relation to a transcendental knower. Kelley argues that, without assuming the primacy of existence, we cannot account for progress in any objective manner. Thus, on the one hand, he admits that any simple-minded realist theory that treats our knowledge as a mirror of reality can easily be shown to be false. On the other hand, he nevertheless insists that the conceptual identification of perceived objects as being of certain types or possessing certain properties is based directly on the perception of the objects themselves. While holding that perceptual awareness is direct, Kelley distinguishes it from conceptual awareness, and part of what he means by this is that it is not propositional in form, and that it does not involve the predication of the subject 26 • His realism, therefore, proceeds on the assumption of a nonverbal grasp of reality. But since justification takes place only at the propositional level of knowledge, perception, as Kelley understands it, cannot be a source of justification. Any answer to a request for justification has to be a statement, while no statement can in prin- . ciple justify realism. Kelley has to assume that basic noninferential knowledge is self-justificatory, and the very notion of such selfevident axiomatic truth has been exploded in modern non-Euclidean geometry and in non-Aristotelian logic. His phenomenological judgments, by contrast, claim self-justification and, therefore, infallibility 27, and they run thus counter to very deeply 25. R. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton 1979, pp. 185, 187.
26. Kelley, op. cit. p. 197. 27. ibid. p. 199.
97
entrenched trends in modern science. Kelley admits that the concept of justification requires that what justifies a statement must be something in the cognitive realm. Thus a noncognitive fact may be the object of some sort of knowledge but it cannot itself serve to justify. The mere rejection of the diaphanous model of perception, therefore, does not as such vindicate realism. Indeed, while repudiating the diaphanous model on the perceptual level, he in effect reintroduces it at the conceptual level of knowledge. At the same time he admits that he lacks a theory of knowledge to substantiate realism. His "synthetic" view of awareness is but a version of the idealist "spectator" or "mental eye" model of knowledge. Awareness is inevitably judgmental if it identifies knowledge with some sort of seeing, or as Kelley has it, as being inherently the relation to an object 28 • It should thus be possible to form a single judgment standing alone as an isolated cognition. Indeed, a world standing independently from us does not require any synthesizing on our part. Kelley has no theory of conceptual knowledge because he cannot explain why concepts are necessary for understanding reality in the first place. His notion of a nonpropositional and noninferential mode of justification 29 is much more problematic than is the diaphanous model of perception. He himself admits that in the absence of an adequate account of conceptual thinking he cannot even address the whole issue of realism. He fails to provide us with a theory of natural kinds, and cannot thus explain how he recognizes features directly and automatically, as he claims 30 • There is no such tIling as labeling an attribute by being directly aware of it, so that it does not require any further explanation. No belief about experimental states is incorrigible, and all phenomenal judgments presuppose some sort of conceptualization. To identify an object as red is to recognize it as possessing the same color in other objects one has seen. But given the existence of other shades of red, the object is at best similar to most of the other red things one has noticed. The recognition of it as red,
28. ibid. p. 205. 29. ibid. p. 207. 30. ibid. p. 220.
98
therefore, involves the isolation of a relevant dimension of similarity. What we see depends on what we are able to identify and this, in tllrn, on the range of shades we call red. To be able to discriminate, we need to know what it is in the object that makes it an instance of the relevant attribute, yet what is relevant depends on what we are looking for. Dimensions of similarity change with our interest and perspective. The "nature of things" is what we have grouped together by means of language and social convention, and that is how properties come to be identified. As our theories change, so do also our ideas about what is real. l'lothing can be said a priori to be real, for there is no way to isolate the aspect of content that depends on the perceiver (or the conditions of perception) from those aspects that depend on the nature of the object. There is no privileged form of perception that has the unique capacity to reveal the object as it really is. Reality is inherently unstable because there is no norn1al set of conditions for any concept or sensory quality. Hun1an perception is conditioned not only by its specific physiological faculties but also by our social and linguistic conventions. Changing purposes and shifts in background knowledge result in an unstable environment for what we perceive and take to be real. Contrary to Kelley, perceiving is by no means "child's plaY,"31 and to assume this is to revert to the level of naive realism, which he supposedly rejects. Objects have identities that are not exl1austed by our conceptual knowledge of them, and this is how they can run counter to our expectations. Their coherence remains incomplete as is our evolutionary adaption to any specific environment. This tends to explain why such realist positions largely have been questioned by contemporary philosophers.
31. ibid. p. 244.
99
CHAPTER VIII
HACKING'S INSTRUMENTAL REALISM
Hacking emphasizes that experimentation has a life of its own in science, interacting with speculation, calculation, model building, invention and technology. While the speculator, calculator and model builder can be antirealist, the experimenter must be a realist. Electrons become tools whose reality is taken for granted. It is not thinking about the world but changing it that in the end must make us scientific realist'sl. The more we come to understand some of the causal processes of electrons, the more we can build devices that achieve well-understood effects in other parts of nature. By the time we can use the electron to manipulate other parts of nature in a systematic way, the electron has ceased to be something hypothetical, something inferred. It has ceased to be theoretical and has become experimental 2 • The vast majority of experimental physicists are realists about the theoretical entities they use, and Hacking claims that they cannot help doing so. It is, however, questionable whether in the process they dispense with theoretical knowledge, as he claims 3 • To "read" what we see as an ion would seem to presuppose quite a lot of theory embedded in a specific conceptual framework. Thus, contrary to Hacking, the ways in which experimenters are scientific realists about entities is not essentially different from the manner they might be realists about theories. There are a lot of theories, models, approximations, pictures, formalisms, methods, and so on, involving electrons, and
1. Ian Hacking, Representing and Intervening, Cambridge University Press 1983, p. xiv. 2. ibid. p. 262. 3. ibid. p. 263.
101
they presuppose shared beliefs that amount to implicitly held theories. Scientific teanlS tend to be forme,p from like-minded people, and there is necessarily some shared theoretical basis to their work. But like Kuhn, Hacking considers this to be a mere sociological fact 4 , while all the same arguing the realists case on just such a basis. Hacking disparages explanation in sciences, yet the fact remains that scientific experiments do not explain themselves. What is implicit in all experimental evidence remains always at least potentially controversial. Although realism and antirealism have been with us since antiquity, our present versions mostly started with debates about atomism at the end of the nineteenth century. Assumptions about the minute structure of matter could not be settled then (as they cannot be settled now), and the only possible proof is thus indirect, i.e. that the hypothesis seems to provide some explanation and helps to make good predictions. Hacking has to admit, however, that such inferences cannot produce conviction in the philosopher inclined to instrumentalism or some other brand of idealism 6 • To argue for scientific realism at the level of theory, testing, explanation, predictive success, and the like, is to be locked into a world of representations. That is why scientific antirealism has never been conclusively refuted. Hacking follows Dewey in attacking antirealism as a variant of the "spectator theory of knowledge."7 Skeptics have always challenged the complacent vision of accumulating human knowledge, but more recently they have taken ammunition from the details of scientific history largely under the influence of Kuhn. It was Kuhn who suggested that "truth" in'science is merely a social product with no claim to universal validity or even relevance. Hacking follows Kuhn and Feyerabend in disparaging the role of reason in science, but he fails in his attempt to isolate questions about what is real from those abollt what is rational. In The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962) Kuhn showed that there is no sharp distinction between observation and theory.
4. 5. 6. 7.
102
ibid. ibid. ibid. ibid.
p. p. p. p.
264. 271. 273. 274.
Science is not cumulative, and a live science does not have a tight deductive structure. Rather there are lots of disconnected tools for various kinds of inquiry. The science§ are composed of a large number of loosely overlapping little disciplines, many of which in the course of time cannot even comprehend each other. Hacking accepts all this and yet wants to save scientific realism by an appeal to a pretheoretical awareness. According to Feyerabend 8 , there are many rationalities, many styles of reasoning, and also many good modes of life where nothing worth calling reason matters very much. On the other hand, Feyerabend does not preclude the use of any style of reasoning and he certainly has his own 9 • Hacking proposes realism as an alternative to rationalism in science. He agrees with Laudan that theory transitions are as a rule noncumulative. Theories are not usually rejected merely because they have anomalies, nor are they accepted simply because they are empirically confirmed. Changes in and debates about scientific theories often turn on conceptual issues rather than on questions of empirical support. The coexistence of rival theories is the rule rather than the exception 10 • While Hacking denies that we can compare problem-solving capacity, he also thinks that this does not matter much since rationality is of little moment in science anywayl!. What counts according to Hacking is instrumental success,and his notion of reality has more to do with what we do in the world than with what we think about it 12. Yet instrumental success in science is finally not anymore self-explanatory than are representions. We can never know that our present state of knowledge has got things right, or even that we are getting closer to the truth. Hacking claims to be a realist about entities but not about theories, while what entities are accepted as real cannot be isolated from our theoretical knowledge. He is an instrumentalist in his approach to reality, but
8. P.K. Feyerabend, Against Method, London 1977. 9. Hacking, Ope cit. p. 14. 10. L. Laudan, "A Problem Solving Approach to Scientific Progress," in I. Hacking, (ed.) Scientific Revolutions, Oxford 1981, p. 144f. 11. Hacking, Ope cit. p. 15. 12. ibid. p. 17
----------------------
103
he nevertheless insists that a satisfact~ry theoretical entity must be one that actually exists, and not merely one that is a handy intellectual tool. He believes that when we turn from representation to interaction, antirealism has somehow less of a grip, yet what "works" in science in this manner is inevitably also a matter of interpretation. J.L. Austin 13 pointed out that in discussing the word "real" we must not dismiss such Ilumble but familiar phrases as "not real cream." We must not look for one specifiable, always-tIle-same meaning. There need not be different kinds of reality just because the word "real" is used in so many ways. As Hume showed, we never really know why a certain type of event regularly produces an effect. Even when we use events of one kind to produce some effect, such understanding does not reveal to us any knowledge of some inner and necessary connection in reality. Instead, what our sophisticated instruments increasingly show is that the claimed regularities are merely features of the ways in which we C011struct theories in- order to think about phenomena. Hacking consequently is never able to use the word "real" in a way Austin claims is standard. The contrast that the word "real" is supposed to make in science remains problematic and controversial. Because of a new theory and the different context it created, such entities as "phlogiston" and "ether" no longer were considered to be real, and there is no way of knowing that the same might not happen to "electron" one day. The post-Newtonian attitude in science was that we should not seek causes in nature but only regillarities. We should not think of laws of nature as revealing what must happen in the universe but only what does happen. To say that we have found the explanation of an event is only to say that the event can be deduced from a general regularity 1 4 • Recently Van Fraassen convincingly has argued that there is no need to believe that either theories are true or that the entities they postulate are real. Theories are intellectual instruments for speculation and control I 5 • Hacking, on the other hand, downplays the role of explanation in
13. J.L. Austin, Sense and Sensibilia, Oxford 1963, ch. 7. 14. Hacking, Ope cit. p. 47. 15. B. Van Fraassen, The Scientific Image, 1980, p. 12.
104
science and emphasizes how it is always relative to what we are interested in. The ground for believing a theory is its predictive success, not its explanatory power '6 • Yet this is not self evident either but requires theoretical justification. While some have argued that science is successful because it is converging on the truth 17, Hacking insists that the phenomenon of growth is at most a monotone increase in knowledge, not a convergence. His realism, however, should suggest otherwise, for not only the history of mathematics clearly reveals a convergence of underlying structure with the accumulation of specific knowledge, but so do the other mature sciences such as physics, chemistry and biology. He does, however, realize that there is a continuity in styles of scientific reasoning, which in fact readmits rationality into the history of science. We have indeed gradually amassed a host of methods, including the geometrical, the postulational, statistical, model building, hypothetico-deductive, genetic, evolutionary and historicist. Our talents of forming roughly the right expectations might be accounted for by the theory of evolution. If we regularly formed the wrong expectations, we would all be dead. This would seem to revive the assumption that we are rational people living in a rational universe after all. Peirce pointed out that what we mean by "real" is a conception that we must first have when we discovered that there was an unreal, an illusion, that is, when we first corrected ourselves 18. Peirce took it for granted that process and the possibility of progress are essential characterists of human knowledge. But while Hacking accepts this Hegelian doctrine, he attempts to reduce it to an instrumentalist level. Whereas Peirce believed that measurement in science converges, and that what it converges upon is true, Hacking, like Kuhn, denies this. Thus, contrary to Peirce, Hacking rejects the idea that inquiry continued long enough will lead to a stable opinion about any issue at hand. This is why he adopts Lakatos's strategy to substitute method for truth in order to save scientific objectivity. Unlike Peirce, Lakatos attends to the variety of scientific practices, and
16. Hacking, op. cit. p. 53. 17. W. Newton Smith, Rationality, 1982. 18. The Philosophy oj Peirce, J. Buchler (ed.) pp. 247f.
105
so does not have the simplistic picture of knowledge settling down by a repeated process of trial and error 19 • But Hacking fails to reconcile his proclain1ed realism with his instrumentalism. The immediate challenge for his realism is Kuhn's treatment of science as a historical phenomenon. With each paradigm, Kuhn originally argued, not only do we see the world differently, but we actually come to live in a different world. Thus, we do not converge on the true picture of the world for there is none to be had. There is no progress towards the truth because successive and competing theories, even within the same domain, speak different languages. They cannot be compared strictly to each other or translated into each other. We pass from one world or one language to another by a gestalt switch, not be a process of understanding 20 • Hacking argues against Kuhn that while, for example, J .A. Millikan and Niels Bohr had quite different ideas about the electron, they were nevertheless talking about the same thing. Hacking agrees, however, with Kuhn that radical shifts in theory may turn earlier work unintelligible to a later scientific audience. Thus, an interesting proposition is in general true or false only if there is a style of reasoning that helps one to settle its value 21 • The historian discovers that old texts conceal from us the extent to which they are dissociated from our ways of thinking. "Planet" in Copernican theory does not mean the same as "planet" in Ptolemaic theory, for the sun is a planet for Ptolemy but not for Copernicus. Hacking considers the whole idea of meaning incommensurability incoherent. He admits than astronomy and genetics are incommensurable because they are about different domains. But he argues against Kuhn that competing or successive theories cannot be incommensurable because they would not be competing or successive if we did not recognize them as being about the same objects. Hacking, therefore, concludes that we need an alternative account of meaning, which allows that people holding competing or successive theories still may be talk-
19. Hacking, Ope cit. p. 90. 20. ibid. 21. I. Hacking, "Truth and Reason," in M. Hollis and S. Luke (eds.) Rationality and Relativism, Oxford 1982, pp. 48-66.
106
ing about the same thing. But he does admit that meaning incommensurability creates difficulties for his version of scientific realism. The way in which speculation about electrons and experiments on electrons come to mesh is itself a matter of interpretation - and so, of course, is Hacking's defense of scientific realism as a whole. Practice is not anymore self-explanatory than are representation, and what in science (as distinct from common sense experience) is considered a natural kind inevitably is affected by current theory. Putnam riglltly points out that objects do not exist independently of conceptual schemes 22 • Hacking has finally to admit that his doctrine of scientific realism does not amount to a nontrivial general theory of the world. Neither is Hacking successful in his attempt to refute Quine's arguments in favor of the inscrutability of reference which, as Putnam points out, is bad for realism. Hacking simply claims that in order to refer, we need no theory of reference, but this hardly can be considered a philosophically adequate explanation. He agrees with Kuhn that we can never get outside our own system of thought while his own version of realism attempts to bring about something just like this. He realizes that new theories create novel objects and thus a different reality in which our prescientific categories and natural kinds are superseded. Thus, there is no uniquely right organization of any aspect of nature; the categories have changed in the past, and there is no reason to believe that they will not change further in the future. We cannot avoid approaching nature with our present categories, problems, systems of analysis, and evaluative technology. While we may think that we are using natural kinds, some historical reflection reveals that even the entities most acceptable to us may be replaced some day. In admitting that there is no right final representation of the world 23 , Hacking in effect renounces traditional realism. No more than Lakatos is he able to decide what would be reasonable to believe or to do right now in science. His attempts to change the world even when he is not being able to understand it are doomed to
22. H. Putnam, Realism, Truth and History, Cambridge 1982, p. 52. 23. Hacking, Ope cit. p. 110.
107
failure because what is real in science is finally decided by hind sight. Hacking is unable to refute Kuhn's contention that knowledge changes by irrational conversions from one paradigm to another. Thus, while accepting Feyerabend's rejection of method, he retains an accumulation of "styles of reasoning" to preserve some sort of underlying historical continuity for science. But this amounts to a mere proliferation of conceptual tools, not a conceptual growth of knowledge or a general theory of truth and reality 24. Hacking agrees with Kuhn that there is no external way to evaluate our own tradition; he foregoes any epistemological justification of his realist ontology, and thus renders it a species of dogmatic philosophy. Rejecting what he takes to be a singleminded obsession with representation, thinking, and theory at the expense of interaction and experiment, he has to admit, however, that his concept of reality if after all a byproduct of a fact about human beings 25 • He thus fails to reconcile his instrumentalism with his scientific realism. While the basis of Hacking's realism is man as the maker of tools 26 , realism is, of course, precisely the doctrine that reality is not manmade. According to Hacking, as man's tools change, so does his reality; yet this is something never open to direct inspection. He argues that what is important in science is not what our theories say but what we do with them; however, these two aspects obviously are not unrelated. We may not always take our theories to be literally true, but when we work with them they have to be true as far as they go. Interaction with theoretical entities and their use inevitably depends on the way they come to be represented. Hacking's notion of reality is a second-order concept that remains parasitic on representation. Since there is no representation without style, Hacking's scientific reality is subject to fashion. It is a generalized notion of likeness, and he claims that we recognize human artifacts as likeness even when we do not know what they are likeness of27 • But this is not a likeness of some specific object
24. 25. 26. 27.
108
ibid. ibid. ibid. ibid.
p. p. p. p.
128. 131. 132. 137.
or other and thus is useless for science. There can be in science no reality as such, separate from specific prq,cedures, yet governed by technology. Hacking treats "truth" in science as a metaphysical concept different from particular tradition and method, and achieved by an inarticulated observational skill. But if Feyerabend is right, and there is no rational method anywhere, nothing in science can be said to be real either. Still Hacking is out to refute Kuhn's contention that after a scientific revolution people come to inhabit "different worlds" a view that in the meantime Kuhn himself largely has abandoned. Hacking's realism can be taken as an attempt at a literal refutation of Kuhn's metaphor. This in turn leads Hacking to worry about the "inner constitution of things", which is somehow revealed in practice and is said to exist beyond mere theory and representation. It appears, however, that the study of nature provides us with alternative pictllres, and that neither prediction nor simplicity nor fertility are quite adequate to settle our choices among them. Duhem and Quine, therefore, concluded that there is simply no truth of the matter, while Hacking points out that they thereby fail to explain why some representations are nevertheless better than others. When science became the orthodoxy of the modern world, we were for a while made to believe that there is one truth at which we aim and which is the correct representation of the world. It turned out, however, that alternative representations could finally not be eliminated, and that is why Kuhn takes revolution as his model for science. Hacking, on the other hand, insists that how the world really is becomes something that we cannot fully articulate. Thus, in science there is no final truth, only a knowledge of more or less constructive representations. These are after all our own creations, and what we have made once in the past, we are free to remake or unmake later on. Moreover, reality as interaction did not even begin to mesh with reality as representation until the advent of modern science. It turns out, therefore, that Hacking's model of science is not any less historical than is Kuhn's, and while his realism claims to be derived from pretheoretical observation, it is at the same time supposed to mesh with modern experiment and technology. He admits that experimental work could not exist indepently of theory, yet insists that much fundamental research 109
precedes any relevant theory whatsoever 28 • He does realize, however, that a phenomenon is not noteworthy without some sort of theory. Like Lakatos, he is unable to predict how observation and theory are going to mesh,'iand thus to decide what is going to be acccepted as real in science. He emphasizes that technological inventions proceed at their own practical pace, but fails to see that they become relevant for science only after they mesh with theory. In Hacking's scheme, the role of observation in science is relatively unimportant. Observation is a skill that can be improved by training and practice; it is not merely the philosopher's reporting what one sees. Modern scientists usually observe objects and events by n1eans of instruments, and the things that are "seen" in twentieth-century science seldom can be observed by the unaided human senses 29 • Hacking rejects positivism because the positivist constructs the real to be observable; like Grover Maxwell, he considers the contrast between the observable and the merely theoretical to be vague. It often depends more on technology than on anything in the constitution of the wo.rld. Objects like genes, which once were theoretical, are transformed into observable entities; hence observability does not provide a good way to sort the objects of science into real and nonreal 30 • While Hacking agrees with N.R. Hanson 31 that we notice things only when we have expectations that will n1ake them seem interesting, he rejects the idea that all observation is theory-Ioaded 32 • Popper and Hanson include implicit and partly unconscious assumptions in their definition of theory while Hacking demands that theories be explicitly formulated. That is why he follows Lakatos in rejecting the simplistic form of Popper's falsificationism, which treats the theoryobservation distinction as unproblematic. Hacking emphasizes that there is no simple mechanism by which we propose theories 28. ibid. p. 158. 29. ibid. p. 168. 30. G. Maxwell, "The Ontological Status of Theoretical Entities in the Philosophy of Science," Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 3 (1962), pp. 3-27. 31. N .R. Hanson, Patterns of Discovery, Cambridge University Press 1958. 32. Hacking, Ope cit. p. 172.
110
and nature disposes of them. Observational propositions cannot be verified merely by looking at the facts, and no factual proposition can be proven directly from experience. Hacking attempts to sidestep that issue by arguing that experimenting is not stating or reporting but "doing". But what we do in science has invariably to be reported and explained, and the way it is reported and explained certainly makes a difference. He wants to reserve the word "theory" to a specific body of knowledge and to propositions with a definite subject matter 33 • However, what goes into a theory and what is merely background knowledge is by no means easy to determine. Hacking himself admits that unconscious expectation and hunches of all sorts playa significant role in discovery, yet he criticizes Feyerabend for using the word "theory" to denote all kinds of implicit or in1puted beliefs. If we call every belief that could be invented "a theory", the claim that beliefs are theory-loaded becomes insignificant. But his claim that important observations in the history of science have included no theoretical assumptions at all is certainly controversial. Thus, he denies that anyone who reports upon looking at a photographic plate, "this is a positron," is thereby employing or asserting a lot of theory 34. There can be little doubt, however, that different theoretical assumptions will make us "read" the same photographic plate quite differently. Indeed, if what we "see" by means of our equipment happens to conflict with our conscious or unconscious theories and expectations, we will as a rule tend to ignore it or explain it away. Hacking rejects what he considers Quine's displacement of observation by observation sentences 35 , but there is no denying that the manner in which we report our observations in science, the terminology or notation we use, do make a crucial difference. Shapere rightly points out that whether or not something is observable depends upon the current state of knowledge. Our views on the workings of receptors or the transmission of information by neutrinos all
33. ibid. p. 175. 34. ibid. p. 179. 35. W.V. Quine, The Roots of Reference, pp. 36-39.
111
assume massive amounts of theory 36. For Hacking, on the other hand, it is precisely the diversity of science that allows us to observe, deploying one massive batch of theoretical assumptions to another aspect of nature about which we l1ave an unconnected bunch of ideas 37 • Hacking's argument depends thus crucially on the extent to which different domains of science can be said to be really separate. Inductive and inferential procedures cut across specific domains, and so does after all his own claim in favor of scientific realism. According to Hacking, first we "guess" that there is such and such a gene, and then we develop instruments to let us see it. At the same time he maintains that scientific invention is independent of theoretical development. He rejects the positivist contention that only theory makes us suppose that what the lens reveals is real, arguing that while you need theory to make a microscope, you do not need theory to use one 38 • But in scientific research, the theoretical knowledge of what a microscope can or cannot ~o is an integral part of our skill to use ito Theories about moleclLles are parf of the picture of what our equipment tells us about them. Visible displays will be interpreted differently as theory changes, and some data may be ignored altogether, as Kuhn has shown. What we see through the lens cannot thus be separated from how it is being interpreted. What is taken to be real in modern science crucially depends on specific theoretical assumptions, not mere background knowledge, as Hacking in effect argues. We infer to the best explanation that the theory is true, and the question whether it is true finally cannot be separated from whether the objects it refers to are real. Such entities as phlogiston and ether were abandoned largely because of theoretical and conceptual shifts. Similarly, we became convinced of the existence of genes because they fitted in well with the rest of our biological knowledge. Like Feyerabend, Hacking believes that the best way to maximize phenomena on the one hand, and have the simplest law on the other, is to have
36. D. Shapere, "The Concept of Observation in Science and Philosophy," Philosophy of Science 49 (1982), pp. 231-67. 37. Hacking, Ope cit. p. 183. 38. ibid. p. 191.
112
the laws inconsistent with each other 39 • The trouble with this is that an inconsistent theory is useless not only for explanation but also for "changing the world." Thus, in science we are not only making the keys that unlock our knowledge of nature but also the locks in .which they turn. What Hacking calls "the experimenter's triumph"40 is never conclusive because all such data remain open to further interpretation.
39. ibid. p. 219. 40. ibid. p. 258.
113
CHAPTER IX
ACKERMANN'S DIALECTICAL INSTRUMENTALISM
In the work of Popper, Kuhn und Lakatos, there is a tendency to Sl:lppose that theoretical attitudes must control the direction of experiment, and that the history of science revolves around these theoretical structures. Ackermann rejects this idea and offers a dialectic of instrumentalism as a model for scientific progress. He argues that the root failure of traditional methodologies was the attempt to trace scientific knowledge to the epistemological activities of the individual scientist. His philosophy of science, therefore, calls for a shift towards a more historical and sociological approach. Scientists are presented with both theories and complex data, and are required to fit the two together. Rationalism in the philosophy of science results when theory is thought primarily to guide data, and empiricism when data are said to determine theory. Ackermann admits that both fornls of guidance occur, but he insits that neither can be a conlplete characterization of progress in science. He maintains that it is scientific instruments that break the connection between theory and observation, and in this manner allow the dialectic of theory and data to take place. The use of instruments establishes data domains, which are what theories adapt tole But when new data domains are established by the use of modern instruments, older data domains and the theories that are adapted to them do not necessarily disappear. As instruments are improved, a succession of data domains can be used as an objective criterion for scientific progress, much as adaptive biological forms are selected out of the
1. Robert John Ackermann, Data, Instruments, and Theory, A Dialectical Approach to Understanding Science, Princeton University Press 1985, p. x.
115
varieties of possibilities. The continuous adjustment of theory to data means that successful science may not be recognizable immediately. The attempt to fit resulta~t theory and data is a matter of trial and error, but the interaction of theory and data results in facts that have survived controversy and are not to be taken as an unchallenged access to the real world. Facts in science appear only as data text requiring interpretation. This means that facts and theories may equally be modified in the dialectic of progress; facts becoming irrelevant to new domains, and theories turning inadequate for the data domains for which they had been originally intended. Ackermann stresses that much of what scientists accept at any point is later found out to be modified or abandoned. In particular, he challenges the Cartesian assumption that the isolated scientist is the appropriate basis for understanding the nature and scope of scientific knowledge. The institutional character of science requires the rational scientist to react not only to the available evidence but also to what other scientists are doing in the field. Both rationalism and empiricism presuppose that a solitary individual isolated from his fellows could in principle observe the world and reason about it in terms of his own ideas. What neither can satisfactiorily explain are sufficiently rapid theoretical changes in the sciences (i.e. Kuhnian "scientific revolutions"). This is because both rationalism and empiricism consider the object of knowledge to be unaffected by the process of aquiring knowledge (that is, learning). Such epistemologies are serviceable only as long as the world studied by science remains stable, but when the perceived properties of the world change rapidly, both rationalism and empiricism turn out to be inadequate. The fit between established terminology and new scientific data constantly is disrupted by new information provided by improved technology. Ackermann thus rejects the rationalist assumption that knowledge can be grounded on clear and distinct ideas or be derived directly from sense perceptions. Only when language sufficiently often has been used successfully in interacting with the world, and thereby been modified to produce this success, do the ideas it expresses seem to reveal the precise structure of the real world. All that the Cartesian example and classical empiricism show is that our everyday language fits the world fairly well as a result of a long process 116
of adaption to human observations and interests. A great deal of knowledge about the world has already been coded by an evolutionary process into our vocabulary and the ways we use language. Early scientists required little more than this everyday language to describe the world and speculate about it since experimentation did not play any significant role in the advance of knowledge. Serious problems for rationalism and empiricism arose only with the rapid contemporary advances. The early positivists in the 1920s believed that science could be distinguished sharply from theology, common sense, and even logic and mathematics. They intended to show that science was superior as a means of acquiring empirical knowledge. Early positivists such as Neurath construed science as resting on paradigmatically clear, carefully prepared observation and experiment, and they tended consequently to downplay the role of imagination in theorizing. They were out to discredit the rational status of theology and aesthetics, and to restrict all knowledge to scientific knowledge. But since no one ever discovered an adequate way to draw that distinction, positivist philosophy of science in the end became self-defeating. Many positivist philosophers also drew a distinction between the context of discovery and the context of justification, claiming that their logical methods could be realized orlly within the context of justification. i.e. after sufficiently sharp statements of theory were available for logical treatment. In the heuristics of theory proposal, on the other hand, scientists were supposed to be free to draw on any sources, no matter how arbitrary or counterintuitive. The process of discovery was thus regarded to be impervious to rational argument. Ackermann by contrast emphasizes that the proposal of hypotheses is highly dependent on context at any given stage in the development of science. It is determined by the current state of scientific knowledge and the relevant space of scientific possibility. He argues that philosophical accounts of scientific explanation would be more illuminating if philosophers were to study the local contextual constraints rather than promoting an excessively idealized logical paradigm. Scientists as a rule are likely to assume that only a few explanatory possibilities exist, and discuss which of these is most likely, given the evidence. They are just as likely to try what has worked in what they see as similar situations. Ackermann 117
agrees with Kuhn that scientists are constrained by considerations of scientific plausibility, but points out that this constitutes a threat to scientific objectivity. That is also why many experimental scientists have been suspicious of all philosophical speculation to begin with. Kuhn's treatment of the history of science as a series of paradigms has been disliked by empiricists because it renounces the continuous accumulation of scientific data. It reduces facts to observations that are determined by background assumptions (i.e. paradigms). Ackermann rejects both Popper's falsifiability thesis that permits one single counterexample to overthrow an established theory, as well as Kuhn's model of scientific revolutions, which typically regards anomalies as sufficient ground for the adoption of a new paradigm. Both fail to account for the rapid accomodation of theory to experiment and of experiment to theory when scientific instruments are markedly improved. What a fact is will depend on the availability of theory to give it significance, and vice versa. Our discoveries describe the world most adequately at the rough level of ordinary experience and discourse, not at the level of the very large or the very small. That is why Ackermann rejects both ordinary realism and instrumentalism 2 and calls for a dialectical approach to science that focuses on historical data domains. As instruments become refined, so are the data, and our theories reflect such improvements. A good fit with the improved data constitutes success for a theory, and continued success of this kind is an objective criterion of progress in science. But such judgments will be possible only for specific domains, and more often either progress or falsification remain inconclusive because the significance of the relevant data will not always be apparent. When novel data are produced from improved instruments, a new domain may be created for which different kinds of theories are needed. In many cases, an observation is of no significance until a relevant theory has been developed that renders it meaningful. Such a theory constrains observation by determining what to look for, but the data are not determined in every detail by prior theory. Only the kind of data is specified by theoretical expectation. Ackermann argues that the advantage of a specific instrument is that it does not by itself modify theories; 2. ibid. p. 30.
11
the instrument will show the same reading, but now the scientist will no longer take it to be important, or he will consider it to be telling him something altogether different. Since the data text is not fixed before interpretation, a clash of interpretations can usually be resolved. Popper's hypothetico-deductive method fails to produce an adequate explanation of the interplay between theory and data. Because he takes the objectivity of data for granted, he always considers them to be the test of theory, but this considerably oversimplifies the actual process of how we judge scientific progress from a historical perspective. Ackermann concludes that the history of instrumentation provides us with a real standard of progress for science because later and more refined instruments are always preferable to older and primitive ones. The creation of data domains precedes that of scientific theory, and the real progress of science is largely due to improved technology. Ackermann denies that the internal practice of the great scientific innovators reveals any unifying theme. Scientists who disagree will often make quite different simplifying assumptions from which they draw their conflicting conclusions. Like members of any culture, the members of a research group cannot anticipate fully the sources of their unity of outlook, and this inevitably defeats all attempts to describe scientific practice in neutral terms. Following Kuhn, many philosophers no longer regard scientific practice as altogether rational and autonomous. What scientists see as plausible or relevant is determined by the space created by a paradigm, not by mere logic. Ackermann criticizes Kuhn's account, however, for making research groups seem more uniform internally and more distinct externally than the historical facts warrant. When anomalies pile up against a paradigm, a ,scientific revolution will not necessarily result, and rational communication across different paradigms still as a rule will be possible. The history of science, including its revolutionary shifts, has to be seen as a process in which scientists are not quite sure where they are going, or what the significance of their work really is. He emphasizes that a variety of divergent practitioners may be quite essential to the stimulation leading to creative advance 3 • Kuhn's
3. ibid. p. 47.
119
account overemphasizes the power of a paradigm to shape scientific thought. If theory determines oDservation, and paradigm forms theory, how can anomalies be noted in the first place? The answer to this puzzle lies with the human ability to grasp and adhere to several paradigms simultaneously. Ackermann points out that what seems possible or impossible to scientists is linked to actual experiments and agreed upon results of thought experiments. Such constraints will not appear explicitly in the theories or publications of a research group, nor need they be agreed on by all members of that research group. An important feature of scientific instruments and of experimental techniques is that they reduce the variety and complexity of actual situations to a few manageable results, most of which can be recorded numerically. Instead of responding to a complex situation or process, the scientist will react to some numbers or features that he will accept in common with other scientists who may have quite different interpretations for them. Instruments and techniques assure scientists that they are talking about the same phenomenon even when they disagree. Better instruments and techniques tell us more about the same universe, and in this manner force changes in our theories when they reveal unanticipated facts or aspects of the world. But this also explains why progress in science is not always cumulative, and how past data may become irrelevant. Against Kuhn, Ackermann argues that the new paradigm need not arise from a revolutionary crisis and a break with older science. Rather, it typically will appear as a locus of new interest within an already established discipline. What in the end unites different scientists in considering the same theory is an orientation toward a certain range of data gathered in certain ways, and an agreement that the data constrain scientific thought along certain lines. The individuality of scientists explains why theories cannot be falsified easily by counterexamples or completely be eliminated even by a scientific revolution. While the majority may revise their views drastically, some will work at conservative revisions, thus preserving a wide potential variety of ideas. Ackermann, therefore, denies the existence of scientific method in the traditional sense. When a new piece of information is offered, it is not first known whether it can be fitted into the framework of existing science. Since the significance of scientific evidence is not open to immediate inspec120
tion, this provides a cognitive role to controversy. It is the struggle to establish that some new piece of information is significant, Le. that it deserves to play a role in the thinking of other scientists engaged in the same problem 4 • At any given time, apparently contradictory pieces of information may all be judged significant. An established body of techniques, instruments, theories and data may acquire new meaning and present new linkages because of a seemingly modest new theoretical outlook. In order to understand the succession of theories, one must take into account the data base to which these theories attempt adaptation. Ackermann points out that underlying the history of theory is the history of data text. What is accumulative in the history of science is the gradual refinement of scientific instruments once they have been introduced. A changing data environment for scientific theories is like a changing environment for biological species. Concentration on internal theoretical change cannot by itself lead to an adequate understanding of scientific progress, nor does mere focusing on the problems that such theories solve because it is impossible to inviduate problems properly and thus to assess their relative significance. Since there is no common core of rationality in the recognized achievements of the great scientists, instances of bad science or of pseudoscience cannot be identified merely by methodological criteria. Ackermann emphasizes that the historical character of science precludes anything like a logic of scientific research. The distinctions that we can locate in the past from our present perspective are not likely to be adequate representations of the past as it appeared to its participants. For the same reason, most revolutionary new theories were at first regarded as completely wrong by contemporaries. We, therefore, don't want a sharp boundary around what counts as science, since it is often impossible to tell of fledgling disciplines whether or not they are scientific. Such judgments only come later and largely are made by hindsight. Good science cannot be separated from bad merely by the logic of the situation because in the evaluation of a scientific theory or fact there is a time factor that cannot be ignored. While recognized
4. ibid. p. 66.
121
groups define common problems and techniques, a perceived deviance at some time should not be taken as an indication that the deviant practice is unscientific. Ackermann emphasizes that we have to look to history to make these discriminations. Even deviant science sometimes can make contributions to the progress of genuine science. Traditional philosophy, on the other hand, has been dominated by a quest for certainty, the pursuit of permanent knowledge, and much of the prevalent philosophical picture of science tends to reflect this attitude. For such philosophers as Carnap, for example, the ideal scientist deals only with facts and calculations. Since achievement in contemporary science depends largely on the technology available to produce the data, it would be possible to write the history of science in terms of instruments that were at the disposal of scientists at the time. Philosophers of science, however, have as a rule tended to stress the independence of scientific knowledge from social, economic and technological conditions. While classical science indeed may have seemed to be largely autonon10us, modern science increasingly has been threatened by corporate and governmental funding. Ackermann emphasizes that there can be no altogether neutral description of the past, and that consequently philosophers of science have been too naive about history. There is a sense in which we can understand a discovery only after its potential consequences have been realized. At any given time there will be assimilated fact and theory, but also newly proposed facts and theories. Ackermann agrees with Popper that science is interested only in significant facts, he points out, however, that in this evaluative process neither fact nor theory will always have precedence. The present status of either fact or theory does not permit us to anticipate its future significance. Even the great scientific innovators at first could not grasp the full importance of their own discoveries since this comes only with the construction of related facts and theories. Both rationalism and empiricism wrongly assumed that we can describe contemporary events completely, and accepted, therefore, either theory or fact respectively to be settled. Ackermann argues, however, that the pool of all relevant historical data is neither identifiable nor surveyable. In his historical work even Kuhn takes it for granted that facts speak for themselves, and like Hume, he suppresses his philosophical doubts 122~
-
to make room for a historical narrative:>. Ackermann, on the other hand, insists that facts in the history pf science do not speak for themselves because they depend on other relevant data and theories (Le.. "factual domains"). There is always the possibility that they be eliminated from a future history of science. While some areas clearly can be regarded as science, any attempt to separate sharply science from nonscience is based on the mistaken assumption that the significance of new work, its more permanent place is history, can be established at the time it is proposed. All such attempts ignore the essentially historical character of scientific progress. There can be no guarantee for the individual scientist that he has avoided error. He cannot know whether his new data are constant under slight perturbations of the experimental conditions, what exactly the relevant data are, and what is evidence for what. Since what is considered science takes on its familiar routines only after these issues have been settled, the craft activity of experimental practitioners is largely unnoticed by many philosphers of science who consider only what passes as scientific language. This is also why scientists are not as a rule much disturbed by philosophical attacks. At any given time, the set of possible facts will be enormous, and a theory typically will reduce this set by discriminating between relevant facts and features, and those it will ignore. Popper's theory of falsification turns out to be misleading to the extent that he ignores the historical and institutional character of scientific facts. An isolated fact typically will be insufficient to overthrow an established theory, and to accomplish this requires a great many adverse facts whose significance is taken for granted. The objectivity of certain features of the world is established in science as it is in ordinary experience by the robustness and repeatability of our perceptions. But telescopes and microscopes extend human vision, and provide Ilew objects that science can see, describe and theorize about. In this extended and argumented scientific field, neither the robustness nor the repeatability of data can be taken for granted as they are in common sense. Scientists with different interpreta-
5. Joseph Griinfeld, "On the Relation between Hume's Philosophical and Historical Writings," The Hebrew University, Jerusalem 1959.
123
tions and theories will tend to see different things. There is in scientific perception no common-sense level at which everybody can be said to see the same thing, so that differences can be explained as variations of interpretation at this common level. The absolutely neutral observation of fact assumed by classical empiricism is shown by Ackermann to be an illusion. Especially at the growing edge of science, the data are usually in doubt and disputed, and, therefore in such cases perception can be seen to be guided by theory. An improvement in instrumentation will often remove such ambiguity, but what is then seen as a new kind of data, such as the data first revealed by a new instrument, must still be described graphically, as like what is already known. In this manner, instruments, data, theories and terminology tend to evolve in close consonance. But in such a process, instruments playa crucial role of initially separating data from tlleory. Instruments like eyeglasses are used to see things, but they tend not to be noticed unless they malfunction or break. What is seen through their use, however, takes an independent existence. The feel of such an instrument and an adequate explanation of its working are not easily accomplished verbally. Theory and data can be described, but one must learn to operate an instrument. It refines the kind of data it is possible to obtain, yet once the data have been legitimized, they tend to be taken for granted. How great a change is required before we recognize a new domain or a new theory is a matter of conceptional convenience. Galileo's use of the telescope clearly opened up a new domain in which, for example, the phases of Venus and the existence of sunspots called for new kinds of theory. The telescope thus makes a sharp break in our scientific knowledge and illuminates how what has been settled in science can again become unsettled. Ackermann shows that Kuhn's account misses the impact of new instruments on the historical development of science that create novel data domains. He likewise considers Feyerabend's call for new theories ,and research programs to be unrealistic in the absence of some perceived data domain. It is only the discovery of new entities that will change sufficiently the domain of what was thought to be understood. Domains of science are likely to be reevaluated radically only when more powerful and sophisticated instruments provide unanticipated findings. But once consonance of language 124
and fact has been achieved in science or mathematics through social legislation, it may seem quite marvellous that language should fit reality so closely. The traditional correspondence theories trade on the fit between ordinary language and the world, or between the contrived calculus and an idealized domain. In mathematics and science the process of achieving this consonance is more open to inspection because new data domains are always undergoing development. Both facts and the language in which they are described may become underdetermined when there are historical shifts in established data domains. In such a process of adaptation either theory or experiment may advance independently, and it is the consequent time lag that renders such a logical structure inexact. Ackermann, therefore, rejects the goal of unified science and the related view that there is only one way the world is as remnants of theology. But he then has difficulties to explain why the drive for more general theory plays such a dominant role in the evolution of science and mathematics.
125
CHAPTER X
GLYMOUR'S BOOTSTRAPPING FUZZINESS
Glymour points out that hypothetico-deductivism is inadequate as a model of scientific method because it fails to account for the condition of relevance between hypotheses and evidence. Hempel's notion of instance confirmation comes closer to captivating the sorts of structured relations between evidence and hypotheses, which lies at the heart of theory testing l • But Hempel's original account was too narrow in not permitting hypotheses stated in theoretical terms to be combined with evidence stated in observationallanguage. Glymour proposes to remedy this defect with the idea of "bootstrapping": the basic relation of confirmation is three place (E confirms H relative to T) and auxilliary assumptions drawn from Tmay be used in deducing instances from E(x). While rejecting the traditional Bayesian approach, Glymour wants to combine bootstrapping relations with a partial knowledge of probabilities. What hypotheses mean has something important to do with what evidence is relevant to them, even though he rejects the suggestion that meaning is to be explained in terms of assertability conditions or confirmation conditions. Contrary to Quine, Glymour argues that no working scientist acts as though the entire sweep of scientific theory faces the tribunal of experience as a single undifferentiated whole, nor do we act in this manner with regard to our beliefs. Much of the scientist's business is to construct arguments that aim to show that a particular piece of observation or experiment bears on a particular piece of theory, and such arguments are among the most celebrated accomplishments in
1. Clark Glymour, Theory and Evidence, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1980, pp. 26, 42.
127
the history of our sciences. When we understand what went wrong with the positivist program, we cannot help but see that the same problems threaten to make the·,various systems of the "new fuzziness" either inadequate to save the phenomena, arbitrary, or incoherent 2 • Empiricist theories of knowledge during the first half of this century were vexed by the problem of how to make an inference from statements in the narrower sense to statements in the broader language. The hypothesis in the broader language cannot be confirmed in their instances. Much of the later methodologist work, therefore, focused on finding a precise criterion of empricist significance that could distinguish ordinary scientific discourse from metaphysics and nonsense. In the opinion of Glymour, however, what the positivists really sought in proposing a criterion for "empirical meaningfulness" were criteria for evidential relevance 3 • The bootstrap method holds that theoretical hypotheses are confirmed by deducing them, or positive instances of them, from observation statements. Because the vocabulary of the theory exerts beyond the vocabulary of the observation statements, the deduction requires hypotheses containing both theoretical and observational predicates. Typically these theories assume that there is a conditional probability for any hypothesis given any evidence statement. But Glymour claims that this makes an utter mystery of how it is that people are able to use theoretical expressions reliably and with mutual comprehension. It is important to realize the central function the notion of analytic truth played in positivist lore: analytic truth establishes the connection between evidence and theory, and thereby makes the confirmation or disconfirmation of the theory possible. Analytic truth prevents our hypotheses about the natural world from being underdetermined in principle by all possible evidence. It is no wonder, therefore, that as philosophers have come to reject analytic truth, they have come also to advocate holism, and to believe that even all possible evidence could fail to determine a unique theory.
2. ibid. p. 7. 3. ibid. p. 11.
128
This point seems first to have been made by P. Duhem 4 who argued that theoretical claims are radically underdetermined by the evidence, so that theoretical sentences cannot be said to have such properties as truth or falsehood. Quine, following Duhem, attacked the doctrine that individual sentences determine a characteristic range of possible sensory events that could constitute evidence for or against them, and the related doctrine that pieces of evidence bear on individual sentences in isolation from vast domains of belief. The natural response to the difficulties that hypotheticodeductive approaches have with relevance is to suppose that there is some other kind of constraint on our theories besides these deductive constraints that require special logical connections with the evidence. Almost everyone believes nowadays that confirmation proceeds through the formation of conditional probabilities of hypotheses on evidence. Yet Glymour insists that probabilistic analyses remain at too great a distance from the history of scientific practice. We certainly have grades of belief, degrees that can have any value between zero and one, and that might, if we are rational, be representable by a probability function. Betting odds, however, would fail to measure degrees of belief for a variety of reasons; for example, we may place either a positive or a negative value on risk itself. Thus, what we want is an explanation of scientific argument, while what the Bayesians offer us is a theory of personal learning. It is not the case that scientists have their prior degrees of belief distributed to any plausible simplicity ordering, nor would it be rational for them to do so. There are always consequences to our theories that we do not know to be consequences. This lack of consistency was also discovered by KuhnS in the historical evidence. He questioned all scientific claims to knowledge that pretend to be independent of social context or convention. What is a good argument in one scientific tradition or epoch may not be considered to be one in another. Even scientists who share such values as simplicity, accuracy and consistency, may
4. P. Duhem, The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory, New York, Atheneum, 1974. 5. T. Kuhn, The Structure oj Scientific Revolutions, Chicago, University of Chicago Press 1962.
129
ascribe different importance to each of the,Pl. But there is nevertheless in scientific work a central core of theory and practice that is the last to be touched by contrary evidence. That is why Kuhn's arguments throughout The Structure of Scientific Revolutions when dealing with historical cases, seem to appeal to a fairly standard hypothetico-deductive account of theory testing 6 • Glymour shows, however, that questions relating to evidential relevance are central to the claim of fuzziness. A satisfactory account must explain how it is possible to have grounds for theories at all, al1d it must be historically faithful. Glymour denies that there is a special privileged class of theoretical claims - the analytical truths or the coordinating definitions that connect evidence with theory. Any hypothesis can be used to deduce an instance, and the same hypothesis may be tested by means of different auxilliary hypotheses by different pieces of evidence. There is always some other theory with respect to which the evidence confirms or disconfirms the hypothesis. Instances of a hypothesis in a theory, whether positive or negative, are obtained by "bootstrapping," that is, by using the hypothesis of that theory (or conceivably some other) to make computations. A standard methodological principle is that a theory is better supported by a variety of evidence than by a narrow spectrum of facts. The substance of this principle is, however, unclear so long as we lack some account of what constitutes relevant variety. Glymour argues that if we reject the supposition that parts of our theories are analytic, truth by convention, then any of the definitions of which Quine writes 7 are simply further hypotheses, and not definitions at all. Although the bootstrap strategy is also holistic in its way, the heart of the matter is that the use of the strategy involves denying so radical a holism 8 • When scientists reject previously accepted theories, they often refuse to accept only parts of them, and retain other parts. Newton rejected Kepler's explanations while accepting his laws. Thus, beliefs forming a system or theory need not be accepted or rejected as a whole, and
6. Glymour, Ope cit. p. 95, n4. 7. W. Quine, Word and Object, Cambridge, Mass. MIT Press 1960, p. 21. 8. Glymouf, Ope cit. p. 145.
130
Glymour finds it surprising that many prominent epistemologists hold views that seem to contradict such truisms. Kuhn writes of competing scientific theories as competing "paradigms" that are accepted or rejected as a whole, and between which ordinary criteria of evidence and support cannot be used to decide. Quine condemns what he calls the second dogma of empiricism, the dogma of reductionism that survives in the supposition that each statement taken in isolation can admit of confirmation or disconfirmation. His countersuggestion is that our statements about the external world face the tribunal of sense experience not individually but only as a corporate body9. Glymour points out, however, that different things mayor may not have to be taken as a whole. What hypotheses in a theory are tested by what pieces of evidence depends on the structure of the hypotheses, the theory, and the evidence I 0. Because our faith in the instances of any hypothesis depends on our faith in the linkages used in obtaining these instances, the hypotheses of a theory are interlocked, woven together. This does not mean, however, that a piece of evidence cannot bear on a piece of the theory without bearing on all of it. Nor does it mean that we cannot accept or reject part of a theory without accepting or rejecting it all. When something goes wrong, we may retain the best tested part of the theory and reject the rest. What to retain and what to discard depends on what else we believe or question. That we test our theories in the way described, explains a great deal about our historical practice, our methodology, and our judgments of relevance. What evidence bears on a claim depends on what other claims we make in a given context. Giving up analytic truth leads to holism, to the realization that we cannot assess hypotheses in a complex theory in isolation. from other hypotheses. Glymour concludes, therefore, that holism is true only in part l ). He points out that what makes a theory better is not something that can be measured appropriately on a single scale. Not all
9. W. Quine, "Two Dogmas of Empiricism," in From a Logical Point oj View, Cambridge, Mass. Harvard University Press 1953, pp. 40-41.
10. Glymour, op. cit. p. 151. 11. ibid. p. 152.
131
hypotheses in a theory are of equal importance. There are at any time substantive beliefs about what kind of hypotheses are relevant to what kind of evidence. These beliefs~ are not due to the logical structure of hypotheses and evidence but are largely a matter of content. Textbook traditions have a tendency to eliminate such subleties, and as a result, arguments and discriminations that were framed quite differently come to be characterized in hypotheticodeductive terms. Indeed many of the difficulties of the hypothetico-deductive method could be eliminated if certain axiom systems could be characterized as "naturaL" But Glymour shows that the hypothetico-deductive method cannot itself provide such a description, and the bootstrap strategy suggests more than one such characterization as intuitively plausible. Newton's laws, for example, function in some contexts like definitions and in others like empirical generalizations. Glymour explains that the diffenrence is simply that in some contexts the law is being tested, while in other cases it is used to test other claims. Newton consistently maintained that this method was not hypothetico-deductive, yet most philosophers and critical historians of science have tended to reject this claim. Given Glymour's confirmation theory, however, Newton assertions begin to n1ake sense, for in his theory, confirmation is the coherent deduction of instances of hypotheses from observational data and other laws and theories. What Newton did, according to Glymour, was to pick a mathematically treatable description of data that was later corrected by theory - yet that was all the while compatible with the accepted observations. When dealing with the descriptions of such magnitudes, Duhem distinguishes between theoretical and what he calls "practical facts."I2. He contends that true precise quantitative descriptions of phenomena are, because of the complexity of nature, either unavailable or impossible to use. So science must do with theoretical facts, i.e. idealizations that are usually not compatible with ex;perimental error but that are justified in part by their logical attachability to scieIltific theories. Truth in description can be achieved only at the cost of vagueness, yet science demands
12. Duhem, Ope cit. pp. 132-138.
132
precision. The problem is thus a species of curve fitting l3 • A theory is confirmed with respect to idealized, but strictly speaking, false data, even when it satisfies the hypothetico-deductive account or Glymour's bootstrap strategy of confirmation. But this is achieved only at the cost of idealized evidence, i.e. evidence simplified for theoretical convenience, and not consistent with observational error. Glymour concludes that the holism of Duhem and Quine is right in maintaining that hypotheses can be used jointly in a test, but mistaken in holding that the test is, therefore, an indescribable one of the entire set. Duhem argues that the evidence of positional astronomy did not offer grounds for preferring the Copernican over the Ptolemaic model of the universe. Glymour points out, however, that this conclusion was due to the hypothetico- deductive view, and that it was adopted by Duhem because he regarded it as the only rational one. The same holds for Kuhn's treatment of the Copernican revolution 14. Glymour emphasizes that the vagueness of the notion of simplicity adopted with the hypothetico-deductive view have led to a number of counterintuitive and conflicting consequences. To claim that we prefer the simplest hypothesis consistent with the data explains very little since observations and measurements are always open to error. One way to characterize error of measurements is to suppose that our measurements are uncertain but bound by error. But then the rule of simplicity fails to determine a unique curve from among the members of the simplest family of curves that fits the data. If our data consist not of exact points but rather of three regions, then there are an infinity of curves that pass through all these regions I 5. Glymour thus realizes that the principles of comparison are vague, and that we lack means to determine which of these considerations take precedence should they conflict, and how they are weighted. He
13. Ronald Laymon, "Newton's Demonstration of Universal Gravitation Philosophical Theories of Confirmation," in John Earman (ed.), Testing Scientific Theories, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol x, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis 1983, p. 192. 14. T. Kuhn, The Copernican Revolution, Cambridge, Mass. Harvard University Press, 1957, p. 171. 15. Glymour, op. cit. p. 377. ~nd
133
has to admit that his views about confirmation and theoretical equivalence do not guarantee that for a" given body of evidence there is a unique theory best confirmed by that evidence. Nor is there any assurance that with a definite class of competing theories there will be one that is best supported by the evidence. Glymour explains that if we had the probabilities of all things, good thinking would be apt calculation, and the proper subject of theories of good reasoning would be confined to artful and efficient assembling of judgmel1ts in accordance with the calculus of probabilities. In fact, however, we have the probabilities of very few things, and to account for inductive acceptance, we must construct theories that will explain how preferences among hypotheses may be established in the absence of such knowledge. The recent predominance of a personal and subjective interpretation of probability as a degree of rational belief requires only that belief intensities be so distributed as to satisfy the axioms of probability. Thus, when we reason about things in the absence of knowledge of objective chances, we still retain degrees of belief, and hence if we are rational, our reasoning is an application of the calculus of probability or of the principles of changing probabilities l6 • Yet philosophers of science concerned with theories and the nature of evidence tend to believe that there is a "logic" in the relation between theories and evidence. They largely have derived their inspiration from the historical criticism of Feyerabend, Hanson, Kuhn, and Toulmin. Partly because their roots tend to be in intellectual history, and partly in reaction to logical empiricism, they emphasize the evolution of scientific ideas and downplay the role of empirical data in the development of science. They reject the assumption that one can reduce the rationality of the scientific process to the rationality of individual agents. The rationality of science is to be found not so much in the heads of scientists as in the objective features of its methods and institutions l7 • The secret of the hypothetico-deductive method is to focus not on major logical relations between hypotheses and data, but in the
16. Glymour, "On Testing and Evidence," in Earman, Ope cit. p. 4. 17. Ronald N. Giere, "Testing Theoretical Hypotheses," in Earman, Ope cit. p. 270.
134
notion of a test of the hypothesis. We now tend to accept the idea that no empirical data possibly could determine with certainty that any theoretical hypothesis is true. Most students of scientific method would agree that the relevant notion of reliability is to be understood and explained using concepts of probability. But just what role probability plays is a matter of deep disagreement. At least some of the classical astronomers may be viewed as advocating a testing procedure that recommended calling a hypothesis true if and only if it "saves the phenomena." The defect of this procedure is that the changes of calling a false hypothesis true are simply not known. There are many, perhaps infinitely many, false hypotheses that could also save the phenomena. The scientific enterprise is not merely a matter of evaluating hypotheses in the light of available information, rather it is an active seeking out of information to answer definite questions 1 8 • What determines the satisfaction level is not a function of individuals but the institution of science. This institution decrees that tolerating some error is preferable to having no theoretical conclusions at all. It also appears that different fields, or even the same field at different stages of maturity, have different tolerances for the risk of error ,Garber points out that the Bayesian framework is intended, at least in part, as a formalization and systematization of the sort of reasoning that we all carry out at a rational level. One of the most attractive features of the Bayesian approach is the apparent ease and elegance with which it can deal with typical strategies for the confirmation of hypotheses in science. lJsing the apparatus of mathematical theory of probability, the Bayesian can show how the acquisition of evidence can result in increased confidence in accord with our best intuitions. Most of the objections have centered on the unrealistic nature of the assumptions required to establish the appropriateness of an in-' dividual's beliefs by way of a point-valued additive function. Glymour emphasizes that there is an important class of scientific arguments, cases in which we are dealing with the apparent confirn1ation of new hypotheses by old evidence, for which the Bayesian 0
18. ibid. p. 290.
135
account of confirmation seems logically inadequate. The problem of old evidence is generated by the requirement that the Bayesian agent be logically omniscient, a requirement normally thought to follow from coherence. The basic concept for the Bayesian is that of degree of belief. The degree of belief that a person S has in the sentence P is a numerical measure of S's confidence in the truth of P, and is manifested in the choices S makes among bets, actions, etc. What differentiates the Bayesian account from idealized psychology is the imposition of rationality conditions on S's beliefs, Le. coherence. Garber points out that such a coherence condition amounts to a requirement of logical omniscience 19 • The fact is that we have to discover logical and mathematical relationships between hypotheses and evidence just as we have to find out what the empirical evidence is . Closely related to the problem of old evidence is the question how the Bayesian is to deal with the introduction of new theories. This is especially a problem for global Bayesianism (e.g. Carnap's) where the enterprise is to determine the changes that would occur in an ideally rational individual's degrees of belief as he acquires additional experience. Global Bayesianism assumes that the degrees of belief functions are defined over a maximally rich global language capable of explaining all possible evidence and hypotheses. The coherence of such a language seems to preclude the possibility of S's accepting a bet against logical truth. No hypothesis ever enters S's serious consideration without his knowing explicitly just which of his past observations it entails. What the problem of old evidence shows is that we cannot have a fully adequate theory of empirical reasoning either. The Bayesian account makes it irrational to be anything but logically omniscient, since the Bayesian agent who is not logically omniscient becomes inevitably incoherent. We might adopt an evolving probability model, but this requires a major change in the way we think about coherence. The best we can say is that an individual ought to regard coherence as an ultimate goal. However, if it is not required that an individual be
19. Daniel Garber, "Old Evidence and Logical Omniscience in Bayesian Confirmation Theory," in Earman, Ope cit. p. 128, n5.
136
coherent at any given time, it would seem that nothing conclusive can be said about a rational individual's beliefs at any such time. Eliminating coherence as a condition of rational belief reduces the Bayesian framework to idealized psychology. This has the unfortunate consequence of allowing us to say nothing of interest about the characteristics that a rational person's beliefs would have to exhibit at any given time. Typically when scientists or decision makers apply Bayesian methods to the classification of inferential probabilities, they do so in a much more restricted scope than global Bayesianism suggests. To apply the Bayesian framework to some particular situation, we enter in only what we need to deal with in the context of the problem at hand, i.e. the particular sentences and beliefs (prior probabilities) we have with respect to these sentences 20 • Indeed one of Glymour's main complaints about the hypothetico-deductive method to be rectified by means of the bootstrap strategy is that it fosters a misleading and unnecessary holism. Horwich points out, however, that as far as relevance is concerned, bootstrapping is in the same boat as Bayesianism or the hypothetico-deductive method 21 • The core of these views it that a system of rational beliefs must confirm to the probability calculus. But it seems unlikely that coherence on its own is sufficient for establishing rationality. Further constraints are needed to characterize completely our inductive practice, and until they are supplied, the Bayesian approach cannot do much better than the competition in systematically accounting for our intuitions of relevance. Thus, confirmation turns out to be neither necessary nor sufficient for the enhancement of credibility. Glymour's chief objection to hypothetico-deductivism and Bayesian approaches is that they are too liberal, admitting as confirming items of evidence some that we should not admit as such. A similar previous attempt to show that Bayesian methodology is too liberal comes from Popper. His chief criticism is that Bayesians cannot account for the demand of content. For if high probability is the aim of inquiry, it is best attained by putting forward
20. ibid. p. 111. 21. Paul Horwich, "Explanations of Irrelevance," in Earman, Ope cit. p. 62.
137
theories of low content that run minimum risk of exposure to contrary and falsifying evidence. Rosenkrantz argues that this criticism applies equally to the Hempelian instance confirmation that Glymour adopts 22 • For if consistency with our hypotheses is all we demand, then confirmation is easy to come by. We complicate a theory when we enlarge its stock of adjustable parameters, for each parameter we add extends the range of possible findings that they can accommodate. Granted that probability is the yardstick by which Bayesians compare rival conjectures, it does not follow that high probability is the goal of scientific inquiry. Highly truthlike theories are just those that combine a high degree of content with a high degree of accuracy. Contrary to Popper, Rosenkrantz claims that Bayesian confirmation or support is not easily obtained, for it requires both accuracy and simplicity. Bayesians may, therefore, legitimately speak of support reducing changes in the theory. One is interested at bottom in the hypothesis that there exists a (not unduly complicated) theory of such and such a form capable of accomodating the data from a certain class of experiments, only some of which have already been performed. A good theory can explain the salient facts without recourse to special assumptions of an arbitrary kind. Although most criticism of Bayesianism focuses on the alleged arbitrariness of prior probabilities of theoretical hypotheses, the real difficulty more frequently is to compute the relevant likelihoods. In case in which likelihoods cannot be computed, we may still have an intuitive rank ordering of experimental outcomes as agreeing more or less well with the theoretical conjecture and interest. As for prior probabilities, admittedly they are of little importance in preliminary investigations where we lack a sharply determined set of theoretical alternatives. But informal counterparts of these major elements of formal Bayesian analysis - prior probabilities, likelihoods, and alternative hypotheses - figure importantly in nearly all informal assessments of evidence. Jeffrey emphasizes that the emergence of probability during the mid-seventeenth century was part of a general appearance of concepts and theories that made essential
22. Roger Rosenkrantz, "Why Glymour Is a Bayesian," in Earman, op. cit. p. 73.
138
use of what came to be recognized as real variables. These concepts and theories were quite alien to ancientJhought, and even today this sort of mathematical probabilistic thinking remains less natural than reasoning from definite hypotheses. Thus, one reasons about estimates of truth values, i.e. probabilities, in many situations in which an argument in terms of truth values is unproductive. The step from two-valued functions (zero and one) to probability functions, and hence to estimates of functions that need not be two valued, brings with it a very considerable increase in range and sublety. To take full advantage of the scope, one must resist the temptation to suppose that a probability statement that is not a unity set must be a blurry representation of a sharp state of belief23 • Assessment of whether a theory provides more information or whether we have more reason to believe it, is always made in the light of background assumptions. Van Fraassen points out that there is in general a conflict between the need for information and the desire for truth. Thus, the problem of theory acceptance has the structure of a practical decision making problem in which conflicting considerations must be weighted against each other 24 • Since we never get a truly universal scope and completeness in our theories, a belief that a theory is empirically adequate will not lead necessarily to a commitment to the use of the theory's conceptual scheme. It may be more natural to pursue a theory that is capable of being tested in the short run or capable of being combined with other theories already being pursued.
23. Richard Jeffrey, Bayesianism with a Human Face," in Earman, Ope
cit. p. 155. 24. Bas C. van Fraassen, "Glymour on Evidence and Explanation," in Earman, Ope cit. p. 168.
139
CHAPTER XI
KRIPKE ON WITTGENSTEIN AS A SKEPTIC
Kripke claims that in the Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein has raised a new "skeptical paradox." According to Wittgenstein, we follow a rule as we do, without reason or justification. This Kripke considers to be similar to the strategy followed by Hume in explaining causation by "custom," since custom is something we follow blindly. Consequently, "we have no choice left but between a false reason and none at all." 1 Kripke points out, however, that there are two areas in which the form both of the paradox and its solution are most likely to be ignored, and with respect to which Wittgenstein's basic approach is most likely to remain unconvincing. One such area is the notion of mathematical rule, such as the rule of addition. The other is our talk of our inner experience of sensations and other inner states. In Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein says, "this is our paradox: no course of action could be determined by a rule because every course of action can be made to accord with a rule." 2 This "paradox" is in the opinion of Kripke the central problem of Philosophical Investigations. He takes it to be a new form of philosophical skeptisffi. 3 Following Wittgenstein, Kripke develops this problem initially with respect to a mathematical example, thougl1 the relevant skeptical problem applies to al meaningfull rules of language. Like
1. David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, L.A. Selby-Bigge ed, Oxford, Clarendon 1955, p. 268. 2. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, Oxford, Blackwell 1953, par. 201. 3. Saul A. Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, Harvard University Press 1982, p. 7.
141
almost all English speakers, we use the word "plus" and the symbol "+" to denote the well-kno~n mathematical function, addition. This function is defined for all pairs of positive integers. Although I myself have computed only finitely many sums in the past, the rule determines my answer in infinitely many sums that I have never previously considered. This is the whole point of the notion that in learning to add, I grasp a rule. Now according to Kripke, the skeptic's hypothesis is that it is not logically impossible that in the past I used "plus" and "+" to denote a function he calls "quus" and symbolizes (±). It is defined by x(±)y == x + y if x, y < 57, and otherwise x + y == 5. If this hypothesis is false, there must be some fact about my past usage that can be cited to refute it. For although the hypothesis is wild it does not seem a priori impossible 4 • In computing' '68 + 57" as I do, I do not simply make an unjustified leap in the dark. I follow directions I previously gave myself which uniquely determine that in this new instance I should say" 125" because I am confident that this answer also accords with what I meant. Neither the accuracy of my computation nor of my meaning is under dispute. Kripke emphasizes that the "directions" determing what I should do in such instance must somehow be "contained" in my candidate for the fact as to what I meant. Otherwise the skeptic has not been answered when he holds that my present response is arbitrary. In order for the skeptic to converse with me at all, we must have a common language. He merely questions whether my present usage agrees with my past usage, whether presently I am conforming to my previous linguistic intentions. If the skeptic is right, there can be no fact about which particular function I meant in the past', and there can be none in the present either. The evidence is not to be confused, however, with that available to an external observer who can observe my overt behavior but not my internal mental states. While Wittgenstein's philosophy of mind has often been characterized as behavioristic, Kripke emphasizes that no hostility to the "inner" on the part of Wittgenstein need to be assumed as a premise; at most it may be argued as a conclusion. This feature of Wittgenstein contrasts with Quine's discussion of the indeter-
4. ibid. p. 9.
142
minacy of translation. 5 Quine is more content to assume that only behavioral evidence is to be admitted into his discussion. Wittgenstein by contrast undertakes an extensive introspective investigation. He makes use in his discussion of our own memories and knowledge of our "inner" experiences 6 , whereas Quine posits the problem of meaning in terms of the linguist, trying to guess what someone else means by his words on the basis of his behavior. Wittgenstein's challenge can be presented to me as a question about myself. The skeptic can question my present interpretation of my past usage of "count" as he did with "plus." It is indeed tempting to answer the skeptic by appealing from one rule to another more basic rule. But Kripke shows that the skeptical move can be repeated at the more basic level also. Eventually the process must stop - "justification come to an end somewhere" - and I am left with a rule that is completely unreduced to any other. 7 However, it would seem that such rules may support each other partially as do definitions in a dictionary. If this is correct, Kripke's skeptical problem no longer arises, for I then no longer follow a rule altogether blindly. His "paradox" is that there can be no fact as to what I mean by "plus" or by any other word at the time. There is no fact about me that distinguishes between my meaning a definite function by "plus" (which determines my responses in new cases) and my meaning nothing at all. 8 In this manner the crucial idea of meaning vanishes altogether, and this would render pointless Wittgenstein's discussion of both following a rule and of the impossibility of a private language. Kripke attempts to meet this objection by arguing that the dispositional account misconstrues the skeptic's problem. His point is that the intelligibility of the notion of "competence" is dependent on our understanding of the idea of "following a rule." The relation of meaning and intention to future action is normative, not descriptive. 9 The skeptic's problem is not merely
5. W.V. Quine, Word and Object, MIT Cambridge, Mass. 160, ch. 2. 6. Kripke, op. cit. p. 14, nIl. 7. ibid. p. 17. 8. ibid. p. 21. 9. ibid. p. 37.
143
epistemic; rather he argues that there is no fact as to what I meant by addition, whether plus or quus. Against such a claim, issues of behavior are irrelevant. The skeptic does not argue that our limitations of access to the facts prevent us from knowing something hidden. Rather he claims that there is no fact to be known that differentiates between the plus and the quus hypotheses. It is, however, possible to argue that meaning addition by "plus" denotes an irreducible experience with its own special quale known directly to each of us by introspection (headaches, tickles, nausea are experiences of inner states with such qualia). This type of view is characteristic of Hume's philosophy 1 0 • The idea that each of my inner states - including presumably what I mean by "plus" - has its special discernible quality is indeed one of the cornerston