Cognitive Developments in Economics
Cognitive economics proposes an interdisciplinary approach to the study of human p...
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Cognitive Developments in Economics
Cognitive economics proposes an interdisciplinary approach to the study of human problem-solving, choice, decision-making and change, to explain economic transactions, the nature and evolution of organizations and institutions. This book contains some of the most cutting-edge research in economics. Leading scholars, including Ulrich Witt, Stanley Metcalfe, Massimo Egidi, Nicolai Foss, Richard Arena and Bart Nooteboom, cover such topics as: • • • •
economic methodology bounded rationality learning and cognition in firms institutional economics
Cognitive economics contributes to a large spectrum of economic fields such as consumer theory, economics of the firm, economics of innovation, evolutionary economics and experimental economics. This book is particularly pertinent given the recent award of the Nobel Prize to Daniel Kahneman – evidence that this is one of the true frontiers of economic theory today. Salvatore Rizzello is Professor of Economics and coordinator of the Centre for Cognitive Economics at the University of Eastern Piedmont, Italy.
Routledge frontiers of political economy
1 Equilibrium Versus Understanding Towards the rehumanization of economics within social theory Mark Addleson 2 Evolution, Order and Complexity Edited by Elias L. Khalil and Kenneth E. Boulding 3 Interactions in Political Economy Malvern after ten years Edited by Steven Pressman 4 The End of Economics Michael Perelman 5 Probability in Economics Omar F. Hamouda and Robin Rowley 6 Capital Controversy, Post Keynesian Economics and the History of Economics Essays in honour of Geoff Harcourt, volume one Edited by Philip Arestis, Gabriel Palma and Malcolm Sawyer
9 New Keynesian Economics/Post Keynesian Alternatives Edited by Roy J. Rotheim 10 The Representative Agent in Macroeconomics James E. Hartley 11 Borderlands of Economics Essays in honour of Daniel R. Fusfeld Edited by Nahid Aslanbeigui and Young Back Choi 12 Value, Distribution and Capital Essays in honour of Pierangelo Garegnani Edited by Gary Mongiovi and Fabio Petri 13 The Economics of Science Methodology and epistemology as if economics really mattered James R. Wible
7 Markets, Unemployment and Economic Policy Essays in honour of Geoff Harcourt, volume two Edited by Philip Arestis, Gabriel Palma and Malcolm Sawyer
14 Competitiveness, Localised Learning and Regional Development Specialisation and prosperity in small open economies Peter Maskell, Heikki Eskelinen, Ingjaldur Hannibalsson, Anders Malmberg and Eirik Vatne
8 Social Economy The logic of capitalist development Clark Everling
15 Labour Market Theory A constructive reassessment Ben J. Fine
16 Women and European Employment Jill Rubery, Mark Smith, Colette Fagan and Damian Grimshaw
26 Political Economy and the New Capitalism Edited by Jan Toporowski
17 Explorations in Economic Methodology From Lakatos to empirical philosophy of science Roger Backhouse
27 Growth Theory A philosophical perspective Patricia Northover
18 Subjectivity in Political Economy Essays on wanting and choosing David P. Levine 19 The Political Economy of Middle East Peace The impact of competing trade agendas Edited by J.W. Wright, Jnr 20 The Active Consumer Novelty and surprise in consumer choice Edited by Marina Bianchi 21 Subjectivism and Economic Analysis Essays in memory of Ludwig Lachmann Edited by Roger Koppl and Gary Mongiovi 22 Themes in Post-Keynesian Economics Essays in honour of Geoff Harcourt, volume three Edited by Peter Kriesler and Claudio Sardoni 23 The Dynamics of Technological Knowledge Cristiano Antonelli
28 The Political Economy of the Small Firm Edited by Charlie Dannreuther 29 Hahn and Economic Methodology Edited by Thomas Boylan and Paschal F. O’Gorman 30 Gender, Growth and Trade The miracle economies of the postwar years David Kucera 31 Normative Political Economy Subjective freedom, the market and the state David Levine 32 Economist with a Public Purpose Essays in honour of John Kenneth Galbraith Edited by Michael Keaney 33 The Theory of Unemployment Michel De Vroey 34 The Fundamental Institutions of Capitalism Ernesto Screpanti 35 Transcending Transaction The search for self-generating markets Alan Shipman
24 The Political Economy of Diet, Health and Food Policy Ben J. Fine
36 Power in Business and the State An historical analysis of its concentration Frank Bealey
25 The End of Finance Capital market inflation, financial derivatives and pension fund capitalism Jan Toporowski
37 Editing Economics Essays in honour of Mark Perlman Hank Lim, Ungsuh K. Park and Geoff Harcourt
38 Money, Macroeconomics and Keynes Essays in honour of Victoria Chick, volume one Philip Arestis, Meghnad Desai and Sheila Dow 39 Methodology, Microeconomics and Keynes Essays in honour of Victoria Chick, volume two Philip Arestis, Meghnad Desai and Sheila Dow 40 Market Drive and Governance Reexamining the rules for economic and commercial contest Ralf Boscheck 41 The Value of Marx Political economy for contemporary capitalism Alfredo Saad-Filho
42 Issues in Positive Political Economy S. Mansoob Murshed 43 The Enigma of Globalisation A journey to a new stage of capitalism Robert Went 44 The Market Equilibrium, stability, mythology S.N. Afriat 45 The Political Economy of Rule Evasion and Policy Reform Jim Leitzel 46 Unpaid Work and the Economy Edited by Antonella Picchio 47 Distributional Justice Theory and measurement Hilde Bojer 48 Cognitive Developments in Economics Edited by Salvatore Rizzello
Cognitive Developments in Economics
Edited by Salvatore Rizzello
First published 2003 by Routledge 11 New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 29 West 35th Street, New York, NY 10001 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2004. © 2003 editorial matter and selection, Salvatore Rizzello; individual chapters, the contributors All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Cognitive developments in economics / [edited by] Salvatore Rizzello. p. cm – (Routledge frontiers of political economy ; 48) Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Economics–Methodology. 2. Institutional economics. 3. Cognitive science. I. Rizzello, Salvatore, 1963– II. Series. HB131.C64 2003 330'.01–dc21 2003043149 ISBN 0-203-57990-9 Master e-book ISBN
ISBN 0-203-33950-9 (Adobe eReader Format) ISBN 0-415-30620-5 (Print Edition)
Contents
List of figures List of tables List of contributors Acknowledgements Introduction: towards a cognitive evolutionary economics
ix x xi xii 1
SALVATORE RIZZELLO
1 Discrepancies: competing theories and ideologies as cognitive traps: the scientific discovery as puzzle-solving
20
MASSIMO EGIDI
2 Cognitive science meets evolutionary theory: what implications does evolutionary psychology have for economic theorising?
53
JACK J. VROMEN
3 Towards a cognitive experimental economics
82
MARCO NOVARESE
4 Accounting for social knowledge in economic analysis: the relevance of Adam Smith’s framework
107
PIER LUIGI PORTA AND ROBERTO SCAZZIERI
5 The making of a behavioural economist: Herbert A. Simon and the early evolution of bounded rationality
133
MIE AUGIER
6 The rhetorical dimensions of bounded rationality: Herbert A. Simon and organizational economics NICOLAI J. FOSS
158
viii
Contents
7 Cognition, entrepreneurial conceptions and the theory of the firm
177
ULRICH WITT
8 Knowledge, understanding and the epistemology of innovative firms
193
J. STANLEY METCALFE
9 Managing exploitation and exploration
218
BART NOOTEBOOM
10 The epistemic foundations of social organizations: a game theoretical approach
243
CHRISTIAN SCHMIDT
11 Interactive learning and technological knowledge: the localised character of innovation processes
268
CRISTIANO ANTONELLI, JEAN-LUC GAFFARD AND MICHEL QUÉRÉ
12 Cognitive economies and the ‘nature of the district’
281
MARGHERITA TURVANI
13 Learning in economics: some Austrian insights
302
PIERRE GARROUSTE
14 Beliefs, knowledge and equilibrium: a different perspective on Hayek
316
RICHARD ARENA
15 Guesswork and knowledge in evolutionary economics: Veblen revisited
338
FRANCESCA LIDIA VIANO
16 Problem complexity and problem representation: some implications for the theory of economic institutions
371
LUIGI MARENGO
Index
389
Figures
1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 1.10 1.11 1.12 3.1 3.2 9.1 9.2 10.1 10.2 10.3 16.1 16.2 16.A1 16.A2
The comparative efficiency of two strategies that solve the same problem Rubik cube: a sub-problem ‘Target the Two’: landscape of the efficiency of strategies ‘Target the Two’: routinized behaviours ‘Target the Two’: single-player routinization Minirubik Minirubik: the exchanging of tiles Minirubik: example of a condition–action instruction Minirubik: example of a starting configuration and the goal Minirubik: an array of elementary instructions Minirubik: ‘First A’ representation Minirubik: initial position which is suboptimally played with the ‘First A’ strategy The game played by one of the teams in the experiment ‘sum 10’ The game played by another team in the experiment ‘sum 10’ Cycle of exploitation and exploration Cycle of integration and disintegration Borel’s and Volterra’s problem Nash situation example Goal orientation Fitness landscape with independent components Fitness landscape with interdependent components Tower of Hanoi: the winning configuration Tower of Hanoi: two starting configurations
35 36 39 40 41 43 43 43 44 45 46 46 100 101 226 229 249 257 263 375 375 385 385
Tables
3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.8 3.9 10.1 16.1 16.2 16.A1
Logical relationships between combinations and results An example of confirmation of wrong answers and change of right choice Distribution of the mean ratio of wrong answers confirmed by players Number of right answers ‘forgotten’ Percentage of rules developed by experimental players Detailed analysis of player behaviour System of rules developed by a player Analysis of the variance for the estimation of equation (1) Parameters estimation for equation (1) The Robinson Crusoe and social exchange economies A landscape with local optima A derived landscape with local optima States and transitions of the Tower of Hanoi
88 89 90 90 91 93 94 98 98 246 382 383 386
Contributors
Cristiano Antonelli, University of Torino, Italy Richard Arena, University of Sophia-Antipolis, Nice, France Mie Augier, Stanford University, USA Massimo Egidi, University of Trento, Italy Nicolai J. Foss, Copenhagen Business School, Denmark Jean-Luc Gaffard, University of Sophia-Antipolis, Nice, France Pierre Garrouste, ATOM, Paris, France Luigi Marengo, University of Teramo, Italy J. Stanley Metcalfe, University of Manchester, UK Bart Nooteboom, Erasmus University Rotterdam, the Netherlands Marco Novarese, University of Piemonte Orientale, Italy Pier Luigi Porta, University of Milano-Bicocca, Milano Michel Quéré, CNRS-IDEFI, Nice, France Roberto Scazzieri, University of Bologna, Italy Christian Schmidt, University of Paris-Dauphine, France Margherita Turvani, University of Venezia, Italy Francesca Lidia Viano, University of Perugia, Italy Jack J. Vromen, Erasmus University Rotterdam, the Netherlands Ulrich Witt, Max Planck Institute for Research into Economic Systems, Jena, Germany
Acknowledgements
This volume contains the invited lectures and selected papers presented at the International Workshop on Cognitive Economics held in Torino and Alessandria (Italy) during November 2000, organised by the Centre for Cognitive Economics of the University of Piemonte Orientale (Alessandria) and by the Fondazione Rosselli of Torino, as the fifth workshop of the Network Human Reasoning and Decision Making of the European Science Foundation. I wish to acknowledge help from the sponsor of the workshop: Regione Piemonte, Comune di Alessandria, Provincia di Alessandria, Società per l’insediamento e lo sviluppo universitario in Alessandria e Asti and the Fondazione CRT di Torino. My debts go also to the other members of the scientific committee of the workshop: Giuseppe Clerico, Massimo Egidi, Marco Novarese and Riccardo Viale and to an exceptional set of people that spurred me to edit this book. Among them, I must particularly acknowledge for their support Cristiano Antonelli, Richard Arena, Stan Metcalfe, Roberto Marchionatti, Roberto Panizza, Pietro Terna, Christian Schmidt and Ulrich Witt. Finally, I address very special thanks to Elena Pasquini for his outstanding revision of my English. S.R.
Introduction Towards a cognitive evolutionary economics Salvatore Rizzello
After the dissolution of the Neoclassical theory as the exclusive reference paradigm in economics, various approaches have come to the forefront in the research in the economic field. Cognitive economics stands out from them, being one of the most fertile. It is an interdisciplinary approach concerned with the following subjects: problem-solving, choice and change in the explanation of economic transactions, the nature and evolution of organizations and institutions in a context characterized by structural uncertainty, scarcity and incentives. The economic agents’ behaviour has psycho-neurobiological foundations and is analysed in the light of bounded information, bounded and procedural rationality and satisficing behaviour. Cognitive economics contributes to a large spectrum of economic fields, such as consumer theory, economics of the firm, economics of innovation, evolutionary economics, institutional economics and experimental economics. This book illustrates the most recent developments in this field. The aim of this introduction is twofold: supplying the reader with a general survey of the transversal subjects dealt with in the various chapters; sorting out the future perspectives which can be perceived in this field of research. For the first point, we will refer to the key words of this book – cognition, evolution, learning, uncertainty and path-dependence – and we will analyse them in detail. As concerns the second, this introduction will try to illustrate the ‘cognitive evolutionary approach’, which satisfactorily summarizes the future perspectives of cognitive economics, especially in the field of the analysis of endogenous change processes in dynamic economic systems. From the point of view of its historical evolution, cognitive economics is certainly linked to the cognitivist revolution of the 1950s (Rizzello 1999: ch. 8); still, the development of this discipline has its own history. Alfred Marshall can be considered one of the founders of this approach, thanks to his views on the profound connection between the structure of organizations and the workings of the mind and the role and structure of the brain (Raffaelli 1994). In the nineteenth century an important role in the
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emergence of this approach was also played by Carl Menger, especially by means of his studies on the spontaneous nature of norms and institutions and their role as social binding agents. Furthermore, following Menger, norms are now directly linked to the limits of the human mind in its handling of complex environmental variables.1 Also Thorstein Veblen is to be mentioned among those who were aware of the connection between mental mechanisms, evolution and the role of norms, as recently pointed out in a series of papers published on the Cambridge Journal of Economics (July 1998: Vol. 22, No. 4). The history of the twentieth century follows with its major representatives in this field: Hayek with his development of a model of mind aimed at explaining the role of bounded information and the nature of institutions in economic processes; Simon, who highlighted the connection between mental processes and the nature of human rationality and organizations; Boulding (1956), who shed light on the role of the image in the production of knowledge on the part of individuals, and on its relevance in decision-making and more generally in economic processes; Allais, Kahneman and Tversky and those researchers in the field of experimental economics who study individual and organizational learning processes and the processes of coordination of agents in a condition of uncertainty and bounded information, and who have stressed the limits of the expected utility theory and developed alternative theories. Moreover, in this field of research we will mention the recent contributions of the agent-based simulation approach in economics (Luna and Perrone 2001), which are being developed along with the development of computer technology and of systems using artificial agents. Such contributions are more and more often proposing very interesting exchanges of ideas with experimental economics. All these subjects will be dealt with in the following chapters. Coherent with its aims, this introduction is organized as follows: the first section deals with the connection between cognition and evolution. By integrating the cognitive and the evolutionary approaches to economics, the main purpose of this section is to demonstrate that the new self-organizing approach to explain the dynamics of change in economics is very relevant and compatible with cognitive economics. The next section concerns this relevance and presents economic systems as cybernetic ones. It introduces the relatively new concepts of exaptation and neurognosis, used in biology and anthropology, which give us new tools to explain the nature and role of learning in evolution. The third section outlines the compatibility of this approach with the nature and workings of the mind. In particular, it describes the affinity of these concepts with Hayek’s psychological foundations of the concept of evolution. As will emerge, all these processes are path-dependent. To this purpose, the fourth section describes path-dependence as resistance to change. This relatively new concept is compatible with Paul David’s and Brian Arthur’s idea of path-dependence, and it seems to be most appropri-
Introduction 3 ate in explaining the evolutionary dynamics of self-organizing systems. The penultimate section takes into consideration the relevance of this approach for organizational and institutional change. The final section offers some concluding remarks.
Cognition and evolution Cognition and evolution are two relevant features of economics. To support this point of view it is enough to consider that individual behaviour is the analytical unit to understand economic systems, such as markets, organizations and institutions. Moreover, the latter are dynamic systems, characterized by feedback, change, time irreversibility and development. When considering individual behaviour, it is very important to take into account what psychology and neurobiology teach us. It is also relevant to model choice by taking into consideration how the human mind works and which role is played by learning in decision-making. Furthermore, to describe the dynamics of change, innovation and development of economic systems it is advisable to assume an evolutionary approach to economics. Whereas the evolutionary approach is emerging as an almost consolidated new strand, the cognitive perspective is relatively new in economics. In the first instance, it is necessary to point out that both – cognition and evolution – are wide theoretical concepts which tend to resist satisfactory definition. In fact, although a growing number of economists use them, it is still possible to register different theoretical positions. Let us consider evolutionary economics. Half a century after its foundation (Alchian 1950), the evolutionary approach to economics presents a very large spectrum of application. Gradually this paradigm – which was traditionally confined to explain the dynamics of competition from a Darwinian and Schumpeterian point of view – has been extended to many other ambits, the most relevant of which are endogenous change, pathdependent dynamics, and organizational learning (Dosi 1991; Witt 1991; Dosi and Nelson 1994; Nelson 1995). It is not within the scope of this introduction to reconstruct the history of evolutionary economics, yet it may be appropriate to indicate briefly the relevant passages of the development of evolutionary economics.2 Nelson and Winter’s (1982) book represents both one of the most relevant contributions to the comprehension of the dynamics of change and a bridge that links different analytical traditions. In fact, on the one hand, following Alchian’s (1950) seminal work, it clusters the Darwinian theory on natural selection and competition and the Schumpeterian ideas on technological change and economic dynamics. On the other hand, though it is mainly confined to the explanation of exogenous dynamics, this book contains analytical insights which allow the integration of different tradition in the explanation of the dynamics of change.
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In the last decade of the twentieth century it was easy to find many contributions stressing the relevance of endogenous and path-dependent dynamics for economic change. Yet some problems had to be coped with in order to reach such integration. Next to Schumpeterian tradition, a new alternative approach arose. This can be synthesized as the Marshallian approach to economic change, stressing the relevance of endogenous change and self-organization analysis (Foster 1993, 1997; Hodgson 1997a; Foss 1997; Witt 1997).3 The latter rejects the use of biological analogies and gives prominence to the fact that the interpretation of Schumpeter’s ideas on evolution is mainly the fruit of a misconception (Andersen 1997; Hodgson 1997b; Foster 2000). The self-organizing approach is very relevant for evolutionary economics because economic systems are mainly time-irreversible and dissipative structures.4 Evolutionary analysis and cognitive economics should be integrated.5 Cognitive economics considers the relevance for economics of human cognitive aspects. In particular, it stresses that ‘economics implies choices. A choice is the result of psycho-neurobiological acts. The assumptions that are at the basis of economic theory, therefore, must be consistent with the mechanisms that guide the workings of the human mind’ (Rizzello 1999: xv). A relevant part of heterodox literature presents a very interesting approach that stresses the relevance of the mind’s workings in explaining economic behaviour.6 Although one may think that the cognitive approach to economics is very recent, we can find some relevant contributions in the past, starting from Marshall’s 1867 writings on the relevance of the mind to analyse organizations (Marshall 1867–8; [1871] 1961: ch. IX).7 Starting from Marshall’s early writings, this tradition has continued with the contributions of the Austrian school – Menger and Hayek in particular – on the subjectivist theory of perception, knowledge and cultural evolution (Menger 1883; Hayek 1937, 1952, 1963, 1973, 1979). The 1950s cognitive revolution integrated these theories with Simon’s works on rationality and Knight’s concept of structural uncertainty (Knight 1921; Simon 1957), and finally it enabled them to be integrated into the behavioural economics of the firm (March and Simon 1958), into the experimental economics approach to decision-making (Kahneman and Tversky 1979), and into the path-dependence literature on technological, organizational and institutional change (see, respectively, David 1985, 1997; Antonelli 1999; Denzau and North 1993; Witt 1993). A common element in this literature is that the microfoundations of economic behaviour are directly linked to the nature and role of the human mental mechanisms in charge of the production of knowledge and the emergence and use of rules, routines and their evolution. This point of view affects and tries to integrate both the neurobiological and the psychological human dimension, and learning is its analytical corner-
Introduction 5 stone; learning is also the main bridge between cognitive and evolutionary economics. Learning is crucial, in fact, in understanding how people choose, but also in explaining how routines and rules emerge in an organizational and institutional context, and the way in which the individual–environment feedback occurs.
Self-organization, neurognosis and exaptation The self-organization approach is emerging as a new promising branch of evolutionary economics, which differs in some respects from the most traditional models of evolution, applied to economic change. By proposing a new point of view on evolution, such an approach seems able to answer some open relevant questions in evolutionary economics that invest the nature, role and dynamics of economic change. Such an approach is typical of time-irreversibility and dissipative structures in which change is not linear, and uncertainty, creativity and novelty matter. The analytical foundations of time-irreversibility are based on the second law of thermodynamics (the principle of increasing entropy) that considers the capacity of the systems to acquire free energy and to promote structural evolution (Foster 1993; Hodgson 1995; Lesourne 1997; Witt 1997). Therefore, timeirreversible systems are non-equilibrium open thermodynamics ones and can be defined as dissipative structures which, in Prigoginean tradition, ‘are able to achieve a degree of “self-organization” (or autopoiesis) which enables them to export entropy and import free energy to maintain themselves’ (Foster 1993: 985).8 The evolutionary aspects of these systems rely on the fact that if these structures cannot reverse easily, they can only change by evolving. The self-organization approach presents a wide range of applicability that also includes socioeconomic systems, characterized by their informational rather than energetic nature. The most important units of analysis in economic systems are active agents and their intelligent nature, which produce knowledge (creativity) and informational flows. From a very general point of view, the main question to be answered concerns how change happens. Usually, standard evolutionary economics presents two distinct levels of analysis to explain change (i.e. an endogenous and an exogenous level). Most recently, evolutionary economists tried to integrate these levels (the first contributions in this direction are Silverberg et al. 1988; Lane 1993a, 1993b; Dosi and Kaniovsky 1994). The major tools used are directly borrowed from biology and consist mainly of evolution by means of natural selection (in a Darwinian or Lamarckian tradition). They use biological analogies to explain the relationship between agents (or firms) and environment, or to model the evolution of routines like genes.9 The point of view here presented considers the relevance of the internal
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dynamics of the evolution of systems, as human beings, organizations and institutions. Because of their entropic and cybernetic nature, it is advisable to study the dynamics of these systems by means of new analytical tools like neurognosis and exaptation, which emerged in biology and anthropology. Because of their informational nature, economic systems are entropic. They produce, use and waste information. Yet they are also cybernetic systems. The latter are characterized by their capacity to self-regulate and evolve in a mutable environment. This implies the presence of channels of communication, allowing the systems to react to changeability. Usually this happens by means of ‘negative feedback’.10 Many examples of this kind are easily found in living organisms, as well as in organizations and institutions. The reference here is not only to the capacity to regulate the temperature of the body, for example, but also to some interesting psychological cybernetics mechanisms, which sometimes allow us to ‘deny the validity of information which is too upsetting to our identity or to our existing images of the world’, as Boulding suggests (1992: 289; see also Boulding 1956).11 This aspect is particularly relevant. Human mind is in fact able to build images of the world. This characteristic of the mind allows human beings to adapt these images to changes. As the cognitive sciences suggest, mind is the product of brain activity. The human brain can be easily described as a cybernetic structure. To describe how it works, it may be appropriate to explore how the mechanisms of perception, learning and adaptation function. The traditional answer that biology gives us (evolution by means of selection) is not completely satisfying. Certainly it is a good tool to explain how organisms adapt themselves to the changing environment, but it is not able to explain the functioning of the polarity between environmental adaptation and the protection of their internal integrity. Individuals do not simply ‘adapt’ themselves to the changing environment – they resist these changes as long as possible by interpreting and selecting external data in a way that they deem to be the most appropriate for their cognitive maps. If we take into consideration that evolution does not occur only by means of an adaptation mechanism, but that in the process of change and development the cognitive innate structures prevail,12 we can find a better answer by using the new analytical tools mentioned above. Let us consider neurognosis. When an organism faces new information its capacity to give significance to this information depends on its previously stored experience and on its innate neurognostic structures.13 Experience, in fact, is the result of active interaction between associative structures (neurobiological) and sensorial data. ‘The neural networks comprising the cognized environment have their developmental origin in initial neurognostic structures that are generally present before, at, or just after birth. The initial organization of neurognostic structures is primarily determined by the genotype’ (Laughlin 1996: 365). Since our birth we are
Introduction 7 therefore structured to explore and model the world. The brain, at every moment, ‘imposes its relatively conservative order upon the experience it constructs’ (ibid.). The main characteristic of our brain is its capacity to evolve in a self-regulated way, including a degree of elasticity that allows it to explore, and interpret its world actively. Mental structures play a central role in the process of perception, and in that of giving significance and of constructing knowledge, and neurognosis seems to be able to offer a good tool to explore this dimension. The human brain and mind evolve by following a path that strongly depends on innate pre-existing structures. Because of this dependence on its previous experiences and its innate structures, this can be clearly described as a path-dependent process. But it is important to stress that path-dependence emerges here more as a mechanism of resistance to change, rather than as a simple influence of the previous path on the development of organisms. The human mind tends to preserve itself, as much as possible, from change.14 In the evolution of nervous systems a double mechanism works simultaneously: path-dependence and feedback. The brain collects external stimuli and the mind gives them significance. The brain associates the new stimuli by following its structures and it continuously tries to verify – by means of a feedback mechanism – the reliability of its classification. The mind gives significance to the stimuli it receives by using feedback and path-dependence. The question arising at this point is: which is the mechanism that can explain how brain and organisms evolve? We can find the answer by considering exaptation. The term ‘exaptation’ was coined by biologists to design the situations in which evolutionary systems discover new uses for old inventory (Varela 1979; Gould and Vbra 1982; Gould 1991). This happens when organisms become able to use, for a novel function, something which arose for some other reasons.15 Following Gould, major innovations in evolution are all the fruits of an exaptation process. ‘The human brain is, par excellence, the chief exemplar of exaptation’ (Gould 1991: 55). It continuously builds models of the world and of itself and, in doing so, new neuronal structures emerge in order to give significance to the sensorial data from old ones. Exaptation is not predictable because it is an act of co-optation for the new function of something which evolved for different reasons. Apparently exaptation is irreconcilable with neurognosis. The latter, in fact, stresses the relevance of innate structures in explaining evolution. The former does not consider innateness explicitly and it does not clearly underline the role of path-dependence. But the point of view here proposed supports these two analytical categories as complementary, by presenting Hayek’s idea of evolution, selection and change. Hayek’s surprising concept of evolution has psycho-neurobiological foundations. As will emerge, this is very close to the above-mentioned biological and anthropological literature.16
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Salvatore Rizzello
Hayek’s psycho-neurobiological concept of evolution Although the interpretation of Hayek’s ideas on cultural evolution and group selection is still a controversial issue among his scholars (Caldwell 2000; Witt 2000), there is wide evidence that by means of this concept he refers to how learnt rules, group norms of conduct, habits, routines and institutions emerge and evolve. Furthermore, the role played by the human mind’s nature and its limits appears evident in Hayek’s conception of evolution of rules and institutions. Briefly, we can state that rules of conduct, habits and routines emerge from human limits in interpreting the very complex external world. Following rules and codifying them in institutions is an ‘economic way’ to act successfully. Rules and organic institutions, in fact, standardize the world and in so doing they simplify the ambit in which humans use their limited cognitive capacity. In the last decade a growing number of scientific contributions stressed the relevance of Hayek’s book on psycho-neurobiology, which for many years was neglected by scholars. The Sensory Order was conceived by Hayek in the 1920s but only published in 1952, thirty years later. The late acknowledgement of the relevance of this book permits us to revisit some central concepts of Hayek’s thought.17 As he stressed many times, The Sensory Order is a cornerstone to understand Hayek’s thought on knowledge, competition and cultural evolution (Hayek 1979: 199–200; Hayek 1994). It may be appropriate to illustrate here a brief summary of the model of the mind found in his book.18 In Hayek’s conception, the mind is a framework that orders perception through acts of interpretation. The human neuronal structure classifies external sensorial data by means of a process of association of classes of stimuli into classes of responses. The significance that we give to each perception depends upon the genetic characteristics of the individual and upon his/her previous activity of classifications of external stimuli (experience). The mind does not receive sensations in a passive way. On the contrary, it is an active tool that interacts with the external environment. The mind also continuously builds an image of itself and of the world and rebuilds them in a tacit and unconscious way. This image of itself and of the world is the framework that allows us to give significance, by means of personal and idiosyncratic interpretation, to external information. More important, this allows us to construct the knowledge – the product of an internal and subjectivist process – which we use to act. Being based on the person’s genetic traits and on his/her personal experiences, every person acts after performing a process of ‘interpretation’ of the external (objective) information, which is transformed into subjective knowledge which is unique and original. Through a learning process that takes place over the years, genetic traits and personal experiences continuously redesign the neuronal circuitry that represents
Introduction 9 our image of ourselves and of the external world, depending on both personal activities and the action of innate bioregulatory circuitry. This mechanism explains how brains assure the polarity between environmental adaptation and the protection of its internal integrity. As is emerging, neurognosis and exaptation are evident in Hayek’s conception of the human brain. The evolution of the mind – i.e. the evolution of our capacity to build and process images and symbols to generate knowledge – happens, in fact, by means of a balance between ontogenesis and phylogenesis. Starting from its native structures, the brain evolves by building new nervous circuitry. It results from the feedback with the relatively inelastic (but not completely rigid) nature of our a priori mental schemes which interpret external information in a path-dependent way. This interpretation is carried out by means of exaptation. In other words, previous neuronal structures built and developed to solve problems of interpretations of the external world effectively, reveal their capacity to co-opt new configurations and functions when the individual faces new problems.19 After this process, these new modified neuronal configurations, in turn, are ready to co-opt new unfamiliar external data, and so on. Some cerebral circuitry remains stable, and the brain builds up its balance between stable and unstable circuitry. When faced with a problematic new situation, individuals generally refer to previous successful schemas of action that permit an interpretation of new phenomena (Butos and Koppl 1997). Classification through individual association of stimuli leads to interpretative outcomes and action, which can vary greatly from one individual to another. At any given point in an individual’s life, a great part of his cerebral circuitry is personal and unique, since it reflects his genetic characteristics, and the history and events of that particular organism (Witt 1992; Vanberg 1994: ch. 6), which is also the result of the interactive process which takes place – by means of exaptation and feedback – with his/her cultural and social context (Hayek 1963). Therefore, Hayek emphasizes the importance of the connection between the evolution of the mind and the evolution of institutions. Even if it is beyond the scope of this introduction to consider the controversial debate on Hayek’s concept of evolution, it is certainly worth pointing out that this particular conception – so strongly linked to the role and function of the mind seen as a self-regulating mechanism – seems to be a useful tool to extend the analysis of the evolution of self-organizational structures. All these aspects of Hayek’s thought are, in fact, surprisingly coherent with the biological and anthropological micro-foundations of the analysis of self-regulating systems. This represents a good reason to make an attempt to integrate this ‘evolutionary’ literature with the cognitive tradition, and in particular with Hayek’s ideas. To this purpose, we need to take two more steps. Since path-dependence seems to play a crucial role for understanding these processes, the first step concerns the explanation
10 Salvatore Rizzello of how path-dependent analysis is coherent both with Hayek’s ideas and with the neurognostic biological tradition. The second one consists in illustrating the new perspectives of economics of the firm and institutional economics introduced by this approach.
Path-dependence in human cognition Path-dependence is a relevant analytical tool for economic theory. In the last two decades, a growing literature has dealt with this topic. It is not within the bounds of this introduction to propose a review of this interesting literature. But, in spite of the unconvincing criticisms by Leibowitz and Margolis (1995),20 it is possible to make an attempt to summarize, in a few sentences, the main points introduced by this literature into economics. Two basic ideas are central in path-dependence: (1) history matters in determining the dynamics of social and economic processes; (2) the passage from one state to another of an economic system depends on the previous paths. The first idea conveys the principle that historical events (even small ones) condition the system’s evolution with some rigidities that the economic action can modify only in part. The second one stresses the aspect that the outcome of a path-dependent process is not foreseeable at all. The final equilibrium reached by the system can be a suboptimal one. As David and Arthur demonstrated, the path of dynamic systems depends on a stochastic and self-reinforcing mechanism that usually conducts to ‘lockin’ the system into a trapping region, i.e. the basin of attraction that surrounds a locally (or globally) stable equilibrium.21 These kinds of equilibrium are stable but not (necessarily) optimal, and they often result to be multiple equilibria. A relevant aspect that is usually neglected in this literature is that the early mechanism of path-dependence is founded in the human brain (Rizzello 1997). The dynamics of economic systems depend, in fact, on the interaction among individuals and on their choices. The latter depend on the way agents acquire information and produce and use knowledge. This is a crucial process for economic theory, which Hayek clearly supported. Moreover, it is coherent with the idea that economic systems (from individual to institutional dimensions) are cybernetic and neurognostic. Not only that – if we assume the central role of the human mind and brain to explain economic processes, exaptation becomes a better tool to explain how these systems evolve. Let us explain this point in depth. Following Hayek’s insights and the more recent neurobiological and cognitive teachings,22 we can note that the human brain presents a particular pre-natal structure allowing it to interpret and give significance to the external world. This neuronal structure evolves by means of exaptation in classifying new external stimuli in its pre-existing nets. The actions which
Introduction 11 can solve problematic situations successfully are interpreted to satisfice (in Simon’s sense) choices. They depend on four aspects at least: the genetic neurobiological dimension of the individual; his/her previous experience; historical stochastic accidents; the feedback with the environment. It is easy to picture the brain as a neurognostic mechanism which tries to perceive external data by balancing its pre-existing neuronal structure, so as to interpret and use the new stimuli effectively. The interpretation of external stimuli generates an action. If this is successful – in satisficing terms – it reinforces the perception mechanism that reduces the neurobiological elasticity to interpret (to exapt) the same situation in a different way when it recurs. Or, in other words, it increases the resistance of our (neurognostic) brain to change. This mechanism of perception and feedback is coherent with the ‘lock-in’ idea. But, whereas path-dependence literature usually refers in general to this mechanism of economic systems, the point of view supported here is to extend the idea of the ‘trapping states’ to individual decision-making, starting from the brain’s processes of perception and the mind’s mechanisms of representation. The image of the external and internal world, which each individual constructs, depends both on his/her innate neurobiological perceiving structures and on the evolution of these structures that exapt themselves following previous experiences. The fact that the evolution of the brain is path-dependent means that it certainly depends on its history, but also on its neurognostic structure, which in turn resists continuous changes. The image of the self and the external world tends to preserve the previous one as long as possible. In a sense, neuronal structures have a conservative nature, but they are not completely rigid. As is emerging, when the brain processes information and produces knowledge it acts in a dimension characterized by structural uncertainty. It clusters four kinds of uncertainty that we can summarize as follows: human genetic features are stochastic; previous experiences are idiosyncratic; historical accidents are not forecasting; and successful feedback processes depend on the combination of the other three levels, and interindividual communication takes place thanks to a common institutional framework, education, language and the rules of conduct that individuals share.
Evolution and organizational and institutional change Up to now we have applied this model to decision-making processes, which combine Hayek’s view on perception and knowledge, the tradition on pathdependence, and the new biological conception of evolution. However, it might be possible to extend its applicability to organizational and institutional levels. The latter are the object of a wide literature on pathdependence and evolution. It might be fruitful to consider, in industrial and institutional economics, the dynamics of change as characterized by
12 Salvatore Rizzello exaptation, taking into account, for example, that innovation depends both on a firm’s history and on its resistance to change; or, similarly, the evolution of institutions as linked to history paths and also to cultural rigidities. On the industrial economic side, this idea could improve the models of the creation and control of demand by the firm, proposing a different and integrating point of view as compared to the literature that stresses exogenous change in particular. As Momigliano (1975) stressed twenty-five years ago, firms not only meet existing needs, they also create new ones. Research, innovations and inventions become more and more important within production processes. This view implies a concept of the competition process in which firms, instead of meeting the needs arising on the demand side, try to ‘frame’ the market ad to create their own demand artificially. Such strategies are strongly dependent on the firm’s specific characteristics and on its role in the market, its organizational structure, its history, previously adopted strategies, on how quickly it can get access to credit, on the process of learning in the use of scientific research and also on positive externalities due to economic policy. In other words, Momigliano proposes a (self-organizing) model of innovation and the development of dynamic structuralism (Antonelli 1995), stressing the relationship between a firm’s structure, the characteristics of the economic system it works within, and its performance. As regards the institutional side, the above proposal could further reinforce the models that consider the link between mind and institutions in explaining institutional change (Hayek 1942; Denzau and North 1994; Rizzello and Turvani 2000, 2002). More generally it could represent a step to explain further the relevance of endogenous dynamics in the evolution of economic systems by offering the new concept of evolution proposed by Hayek which is different from that of Nelson and Winter (Rizzello 2000). Stressing the role of evolution in the human mind and brain, and the link between mental mechanism and the emergence and nature of rules and institutions, Hayek gives us a model of evolution in which both ontogenesis and phylogenesis played a balanced role. In this light, the evolutionary cognitive approach could fill in the gap between the cognitive individual dimension and the holistic one. Let us consider this aspect very briefly. As suggested above, individual cognitive maps evolve by exaptation. But it is relevant to consider also that it mainly happens in a ‘cultural’ context. From a cognitive point of view, culture is an ensemble of representations shared by all the members of a group. This kind of representation is not ‘perfectly’ shared, because what individuals share are not mental facts but an ‘epidemiological’ distribution of casually linked mental and public facts in a human population (Sperber and Hirschfeld 1999: cxxii). Human cognitive dispositions allow individuals to adopt spontaneously cultural representations that are reinforced by previously acquired institutional constraints.23 Because of the neurognostic structure of their brains and their ability to exapt, humans continuously evolve both
Introduction 13 by resisting change and by adopting changes. Moreover, cognitive processes, involved in most relevant activity, do not take place just in one single mind but are distributed throughout many members. Since there is still a very big open problem in neoinstitutional literature, this could be a simple suggestion to address further developments.
Concluding remarks With reference to the key words of this book, one of the main purposes of this introduction was to stress the relevance of the integration of the cognitive approach to change and decision-making in evolutionary economics, with particular reference to self-organizing models. By introducing the concepts of neurognosis and exaptation it has tried to show that a unifying mechanism of evolution exists at every level of analysis, and it reinforces the idea that economic systems evolve in path-dependent terms. The introduction has not attempted to supply a wide discussion on all the aspects concerning evolutionary economics, as the reader will gain a good knowledge of them in the following chapters. On the contrary, it has focused on the microfoundations of evolutionary dynamics. By doing so, it has tried to show the affinity of this approach – which tries to combine neurognosis, exaptation and path-dependence – with the neuropsychological foundations of Hayek’s conception of evolution. Summing up, the self-organization approach to evolutionary economics seems to be particularly relevant in explaining endogenous change. The point of view here proposed analysed the cognitive aspects of this approach and some evolutionary implications. Following Hayek’s insights, it is time to go beyond the endogenous/exogenous dichotomy, taking into account the views which biology, anthropology and psychology propose on the same issues. In such an interdisciplinary perspective, cognitive evolutionary economics seems to offer good tools in order to improve the research into the dynamics of economic systems.
Notes 1 These subjects were further dealt with by Hayek (Rizzello 1999). 2 Hodgson (1995, 1999) offers a wide reconstruction of the history of evolutionary economics. 3 Some authors try to integrate these two traditions. In particular, Silverberg et al. (1988) maintained that competitive selection and the self-organizing approach could coexist in a neo-Schumpeterian model. But, as Foster pointed out (2000: 325), ‘they do not employ an economic self-organizing approach, in the sense of Schumpeter, but, rather, a more complex form of competitive selection’. Following Foster (1994, 2000), Schumpeter offers good insights to integrate competitive selection in a wider self-organizing approach. Schumpeter, in fact, conceives development and evolution as joint processes in the economic domain.
14 Salvatore Rizzello 4 Foster (1993) considers economic systems as dissipative structures, which usually have the peculiarity to be non-equilibrium open systems (see Mori and Kuramoto 1998). In Prigogine’s conception a dissipative structure is a thermodynamic system, ‘whose behaviour is determined by its boundary conditions, in contrast to what he defines as a dynamic system which is determined by its initial condition’ (Foster 1993: 985). Economic systems are also characterized by time irreversibility, which differentiates them from mechanical models. Foster (1993: 982) proposes to revisit Marshall’s thought. ‘Marshall was all too aware that evolutionary economics could not be possible until time irreversibility was properly understood.’ Furthermore, Foss (1997), Foster (1993: in particular p. 976) and Hodgson (1999) stress the relevance of Marshall’s ideas on time irreversibility, which contrast with the economic mechanical paradigm, whose introduction in economics is erroneously addressed to Marshall. More generally, Witt (1991: 87) indicated in time irreversibility and in endogenous change two structural aspects of evolution. 5 About the relevance of cognition for economics, the point of view here presented follows in particular the Austrian tradition on knowledge, creativity and novelty and it stresses the importance of these aspects for evolutionary economics, as Witt (1995, 1999) pointed out. 6 Rizzello (1999) offers, among other things, an overview of this literature. 7 As Raffaelli (1994) suggests, Marshall’s account of the economic system (especially in Book IV of the Principles) was significantly influenced by his early encounters with problems of knowledge. 8 Humberto Maturana coined the term ‘autopoiesis’ in about 1960. Maturana and Varela use the term to refer to the fundamental process of living systems. Autopoiesis is essentially the mechanism by which living systems continually produce themselves as autonomous unities. 9 The use of biological analogies in economics and the criticism of their use is a controversial issue. In the 1950s, Alchian’s (1950) paper primed a debate between Armen Alchian and Edith Penrose, who criticized the use of biological analogies (see Hodgson 1999 and Rizzello 2000). Likewise, Rizzello (2000) directed to Nelson and Winter’s 1982 book some remarks of Penrose’s criticism to Alchian. For other criticism about the use of biological analogies in evolutionary economics see Mirowski (1983), Witt (1996, 1999) and Foster (2000). 10 As Boulding (1992) pointed out, next to classical cybernetics, characterized by negative feedbacks, creodic processes and positive feedbacks play an important role in evolutionary processes. A creodic process is typical of a system that evolves following a blueprint or a design. As a good example of creodic processes, one can consider the construction of a building or the evolution of an egg. Positive feedbacks work in the opposite way of the negative ones. Far from moving systems into equilibrium, they increase the forces of disruption. Usually they concern the drastic and catastrophic changes, and in referring to economic systems they can be utilized to describe, for example, technological crisis in Schumpeterian terms. 11 In the literature this interesting aspect of human behaviour is referred to as cognitive dissonance, which describes how people are emotionally averse to cognitive inconsistencies and seek to reduce them. Economics also offers some application of cognitive dissonance (for a short description see Rizzello 1999: 80–81). 12 Reber (1993: 148–149) emphasizes that the existence and the relevance of some forms of nativism in the development of mind/brain is almost uniformly recognized, and that no one today defends a pure empiricism in the sense of Locke’s tabula rasa.
Introduction 15 13 The notion of neurognosis is linked to the idea that knowledge is constructed in cognitive frameworks. This aspect is not new at all in the literature on organization and management of ‘absorptive capacity’ (see Cohen and Levinthal 1990). From this perspective, firms have been theorized as ‘sensemaking systems’, a ‘focusing device’, ‘systems of shared meanings’ (Smircich 1983; Weick and Roberts 1993; Weick 1995; Choo 1998; Nooteboom 1999). 14 In this context it is interesting to point out that this idea of mental mechanisms, seen in path-dependent terms as resistance to change, is quite similar to the theory of personality, proposed by George Kelly (1995), which was based on the idea that interpretative systems are resistant to change and might be overwhelmed by major departures from familiar circumstances. 15 A famous example in this literature concerns penguins’ wings. Usually wings arose in birds in the context of flight, but it was an exaptation process that conferred advantages to penguins in swimming (Gould and Vrba 1982). 16 This problem is linked to another well-known problem in organizational literature, that of combining ‘exploitation and exploration’ (March 1991). 17 In two recent papers Caldwell (2000) and Horwitz (2000) underlined once more the relevance of The Sensory Order for the understanding of the Hayekian conception of evolution and for the spontaneous construction of a liberal order, respectively. Caldwell, in particular, describes the centrality of this book in the emergence of Hayek’s ideas on evolution, demonstrating the link between the human mind and the role of cultural evolution (on this issue see also Rizzello [2000] and Rizzello and Turvani [2000]). 18 A more comprehensive description can be found in Rizzello (1999). 19 Gould (1991) has stressed the relevance of exaptation for evolutionary psychology. 20 See also Paul David’s reaction to the criticism by Leibowitz and Margolis (David 1997). 21 ‘When a dynamical economic system enters such a region, it cannot escape except through the intervention of some external force, or shock, that alters its configuration or transforms the underlying structural relationships among the agents’ (David 1997: 34). 22 For a complete overview, see Wilson and Keil (1999). Liepert et al. (2000) offer, among other things, an empirical confirmation of the neuronal plasticity, of the continuous transformation and reorganization of the brain, and of its physiological sensibility to the experience. 23 The social cognitive learning theory (Bandura 1986) seems to offer good analytical tools in understanding the behavioural foundation of cultural evolution, as suggested by Witt (2000) and Rizzello and Turvani (2002).
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Discrepancies: competing theories and ideologies as cognitive traps The scientific discovery as puzzlesolving1 Massimo Egidi
Introduction In some contexts, like for example complex games and puzzles, the search for solutions to problems leads to the discovery of different procedures, none of which can be considered ‘the best’ one. In these contexts, in fact, the different solutions can be compared only in some specific well-known domain of application, while in other domains the comparison is incomplete or vague, or the domain may have imperfectly known boundaries; it is therefore impossible to put the different procedures in a precise preference order over the entire domain of applicability. Moreover, these procedures may be ‘locally stable’ because small local changes in the instructions that define them do not lead to any improvement, and therefore individuals that discover one solution may remain locked in it without trying to search for alternative solutions. The search for solutions to puzzles shows striking analogies with the search for new theoretical approaches that take place when a consolidated theory fails to explain new phenomena. The properties of search in puzzlesolving – multiplicity, local stability and incompleteness of solutions – also affect the new theoretical approaches (i.e. the new solutions to a scientific puzzle that emerge to challenge a dominant theory). Interestingly, the state of the art of new theoretical proposals in the field of decision-making interestingly illustrates this situation. After the numerous violations of traditional expected utility theory discovered since the experiments by Maurice Allais in the 1950s (Allais and Hagen 1979), new proposals, such as regret theory and others, have contended with it for the status of the ‘right’ theory. To date, comparisons among the competing theoretical proposals have singled out none of them as unequivocally preferable (Hey 1991). This situation, which has persisted for many years, prompts explanations which work in two directions: on the one hand, it suggests that epistemological elements relating to the existence and permanence of
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competing theories should be rethought; on the other, it suggests that cognitive aspects of human thinking should be examined in order to explain why alternative solutions to a problem may persist and stabilize and thereby provide a cognitive foundation for decision theory. The chapter explores both questions. The first four sections examine some epistemological consequences of the coexistence of different theories, suggesting a revision of the notions of ‘error’ in these contexts, mainly with reference to Popper’s and Lakatos’s methodological approaches. The remaining sections analyse the process by which players in complex games construct solutions – by editing the problem, decomposing it into basic building blocks, and defining the categories that represent the problem. Experiments show that players may discover different solutions according to the training that they have received, and that they may remain locked in these solutions even though this proves to be suboptimal. This lock-in effect is explained in terms of ‘routinized thinking’, and it is shown to be due to imperfect categorization of the problem. In order to discover new solutions, individuals must redefine the categories with which they describe the problem; this requires a process of abstraction and specification involving the old categories, and allowing the creation of new basic categories. It will be shown that this process is constrained and driven by the emergence of unexpected exceptions, and therefore that, given the random emergence of anomalies, the reconstruction of new categories is intrinsically biased. The search for solutions is therefore described as an adaptive process driven by perceived errors and essentially based on prejudices and their revision. These results are closely related to Popper’s and Lakatos’s views of the creation of knowledge, and they also entail that a new definition must be given to rationality in evolutionary contexts, a definition that will be discussed in the conclusions.
Human decisions that deviate systematically from optimal behaviour In recent decades, extremely fruitful reconciliation has taken place between economics and psychology, inducing the former to accept more stringent criteria – compared to those of the past – of empirical validation. These criteria are based on recognition of the relevance of experiments which, especially in the field of individual decision-making, have led to a rethinking of the role of decision theory after a time in which this theory, and in particular expected utility theory, was largely ascribed a normative role as ‘logic of action’. As Langlois (1998) writes: Although we may trace this tendency to Menger . . . , it was probably Lionel Robbins’s Nature and Significance of Economic Science (1932) that fully ensconced in the minds of economists the idea that their
22 Massimo Egidi science is about the logic of means and ends rather than about the psychology of utility. (Langlois 1998: 57) This view of the economic discipline had a particularly critical shortcoming: it assumed that the majority of individuals always behave according to rational strategies, disregarding the limits to agents’ rationality. By introducing the notion of ‘bounded rationality’ at the beginning of the 1960s, H. Simon emphasized that it is unrealistic to attribute full rationality to decision-makers when the computation of their strategies is complex and requires great skill (which we cannot as a rule attribute to all individuals). The most notable and most successful attempt to overcome this difficulty was made by Milton Friedman in the 1950s, with his proposal of the ‘as if’ assumption. Friedman (1953) claimed that the large majority of individuals in economic institutions behave according to the fully rational strategies formulated by expected utility theory, even if they do not possess the necessary calculation abilities. They do so because competition induces them to behave ‘as if’ they know the best course of action. Individuals learn optimal behaviours by trial and error; they ‘discover’ increasingly efficient strategies because of the effect of competition, which favours those subjects whose behaviour comes closest to the optimal one. On this view it was implicitly assumed that individual deviations from optimal behaviour within a population were ‘errors’ distributed according to the Gaussian distribution. Because it was presumed that those adopting inefficient strategies would be progressively eliminated by economic competition, behaviours were supposed to concentrate around the optimal one. As economic theory attributed ever-greater importance to expectations, Friedman’s ‘as if’ assumption relegated observation of the mental processes underlying economic decisions to a very marginal position – despite the fact that the expectations that play a fundamental role in Friedman’s view are originated by agents on the basis of their mental representations of the economy. The most important challenge against this account was raised by March and Simon’s organizational studies, which sought to understand how human rationality effectively operates by conducting empirical observation of managers’ behaviours, expectations and opinions (see March and Simon 1958). Despite the strong emphasis on the importance of observing behaviours rather than mental processes, in the years that followed Simon developed methodologies with which to observe and simulate the mental processes involved in decision-making and, in particular, strategy-building. By gradually shifting the focus from real organizational contexts to ‘artificial’ environments like the game of chess, Simon proposed with Newell (1958, 1962),2 an analysis of strategic action which, on the one
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hand, gave rise to the theory of ‘problem-solving’, and, on the other, served as a platform for the empirical observation of players’ decisions and thoughts. The game of chess was chosen for experimentation because it required a very high capacity for strategic calculation and could thus be used to establish the limits of human rationality and of computation in artificial programs. In the 1970s, Simon developed his Protocol Analysis to investigate the problem-solving activities of players engaged in a game. An experimenter employing this methodology records the symbolic mental activity of a chess player by asking him to describe his thoughts in detail as he constructs his strategies. Empirical research in the directions opened up by Simon has demonstrated that the ‘as if’ assumption is untenable because its main argument does not stand up to the facts. Indeed, it can be shown that in conditions of high uncertainty, players’ strategies are not distributed around a single optimal strategy. Rather, they are fully differentiated, so that it is impossible to identify the optimal strategy by means of competition: in fact, competition in tournaments does not elicit the best strategy. Analysis of chess, and of the way in which the players construct their strategies, thus introduces two well-known relevant aspects. The first, as is well known, is that in many circumstances it is not possible to calculate the optimal strategy, given the computational complexity of the problem.3 The second is that the strategies chosen by the players differ greatly: there is, for example, a wide variety of openings which cannot be compared in terms of optimality. A first significant consequence thus emerges: even if an optimal strategy does exist, we are at present unable to determine which opening comes ‘closest’ to the optimal strategy. Masters and skilled players choose from a wide variety of openings, without there being a preference order among them. Hence, even if we were to record the strategies used by the grandmasters who win international tournaments, we could not determine what the optimal strategy is. Consequently, one assumption implicit in Friedman’s position is no longer valid; namely, that real behaviours are distributed ‘normally’ around a behaviour taken as optimal by the theory. On the contrary, what we observe, at least in sufficiently complex games, are systematic and permanent discrepancies amongst the various strategies used by the players. This phenomenon is very pervasive and can be found in many other fields where human decisions are subjected to empirical verification. Systematic and permanent discrepancies from the behaviour predicted by the theory have been revealed by experiments on deduction, reasoning and choice in conditions of uncertainty. The experimental study of these activities is therefore important if we wish to understand how individuals develop their strategies and apply
24 Massimo Egidi them to real contexts. Cognitive psychology, and the study of learning in particular, have thus become frames of reference for the study of rational choice; for in order to understand how decisions are taken it is necessary to understand how human beings acquire information and knowledge, and how they use them to build up their strategies. The highly differentiated behaviour observed in many important experimental situations has given rise, since the 1970s, to further theoretical proposals for explaining human decision-making. Regret theory and other proposals were first attempts to establish decision-making theory on new and different bases. As we noted at the beginning, empirical comparisons of the predictions of these new theories have not convincingly shown that one of them has greater explanatory capacity than the others: each of them makes fairly accurate predictions in some experimental areas but fails to make good predictions in others (Hey 1991). Each of the new theories therefore has a limited domain of validity. Moreover, on the one hand there are overlaps between the domains in which the predictions of individual theories prove to be accurate, while on the other there are domains in which no single theory furnishes satisfactory predictions. Attempts to construct a new theory of decisions on the same epistemological criteria that defined expected utility theory, by slightly modifying some of its axioms, have failed to achieve clear and definitive results. The proposed generalization of expected utility theory, where some axioms are weakened or replaced, is still based on the epistemological assumption that decision theory is a ‘logic of action’. As said, this was the position defended from Robbins to Friedman, on the belief that it is possible to understand, and eventually to predict, real decisions, regardless of the psychological features of mental activity. I submit that these attempts have been unsuccessful because they ignore a profound characteristic of decision-making activity: the interdependence between the decision-making process and the mental representation of the elements that give rise to the decision. The progress made in understanding the main cognitive processes – induction, learning, categorization, framing, etc. – involved in human decision-making suggests that clearer light can be shed on the process by investigating cognition. Little modifications of the axioms of the expected utility theory seem unable to obtain the success desired, or to hold out the prospect of a future overall theory of decision-making, because they ignore the complexity of the underlying psychological phenomena. The cognitive processes involved in decision-making should not be ignored because in many respects they determine the decision itself. The foremost example of this connection has been provided by Kahneman and Tversky’s experiments on ‘framing effects’, the best-known of which, verified by an extremely wide range of experiments, shows that individuals are averse or favourable to the risk inherent in a decision according to how
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this decision is presented to them. If it is presented in such a way that they codify it as a loss situation, they are favourable to risk, and, vice versa, they are averse to risk if they perceive it as a gain. A potentially successful research strategy is therefore one which acknowledges the importance of the mental representations of the elements on which individuals decide.4 In order to understand the individual decision-making process, therefore, it is essential to understand how the elements of the decision are codified and represented in a ‘mental model’, and how knowledge is organized by individuals and used in decisionmaking. The most promising point of departure is thus the field of problem-solving, reasoning, representation and categorization. This chapter will not attempt to address these topics, which are extremely broad in their scope. Rather, it will concentrate on a point that appears to have a close bearing on how the representation of problems can be characterized. It will examine the problem of ‘cognitive traps’, i.e. those situations in which different individuals faced with the same problem discover and adopt different solutions and persist in the use of those solutions even when they prove to be inefficient.
Competing solutions in problem-solving and competing theoretical approaches I have suggested that competing theories with regard to the same domain display many similarities with a situation that typically arises in problemsolving. Complex problems may be amenable to numerous alternative solutions, and comparison among them is incomplete or excessively demanding in computational terms, and is therefore ‘practically’ imprecise. As previously mentioned, this is the distinctive feature of the game of chess, which is an ideal artificial setting for the investigation of decisionmaking processes in complex situations, as well as for evaluating the epistemological implications of situations in which there are numerous different solutions to a problem which cannot be ordered in terms of their greater or lesser efficiency. When the ‘best course of action’ cannot be computed and cannot be tested, and when there is a variety of possible strategies that can be only ‘vaguely’ compared in terms of their efficiency, we are in the particularly interesting situation of what we may call ‘procedural uncertainty’ (Dosi and Egidi 1991). This, moreover, is the situation typical of high-level managerial decisions in evolutionary contexts.5 The multiplicity of solutions to a complex game – solutions that are supposedly difficult to discover and to compare in terms of efficiency – prompts three related questions: 1
The lock-in question: what are the elements that prevent or at least make it difficult for a player to escape from a suboptimal solution and
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3
search for more efficient procedures? This point, which links with the question of routinization, will be explored later (see pp. 42–48) with the support of experimental data. Assuming that alternative solutions have been discovered, what are the factors that make comparison among different solutions difficult or impossible? We shall see that there are two main possibilities: (a) the computational and statistical difficulty of comparing two solutions in the same domain; (b) the impossibility of exploring all domains of application, and in consequence the unexpected increase in exceptions, i.e. never previously explored points in the domain where a solution fails. What is the epistemological status of ‘errors’ and ‘biases’ when it is impossible to determine the best solution?
These three questions also arise when the more general issue of competing theories is addressed. In fact (point 2), when there are several competing theories – as happens in the field of decision-making – it may be difficult to determine which of them best explains all the facts under examination, and it is only the unexpected appearance of exceptions that lets individuals revise their theoretical approaches. Here again (point 1), either it may happen that, starting from a multiplicity of theoretical proposals, a transition process leads to convergence on a single (temporarily) dominant theory, or, on the contrary, the differences among approaches become permanent, which seems to be the typical characteristic of clashing ideologies. Finally (point 3), it is difficult to establish the significance of such terms as ‘error’ or ‘deviation’, given that a dominant theory to which to refer does not exist in this case. We start the discussion from point 3. What is meant by the word ‘error’? The question is intriguing because of its epistemological status. In many fields the very notion of ‘error’ as deviation from the ‘truth’ is contested. Politics is a typical domain in which there are frequently wide discrepancies among the strategies of decision-makers: democracy is an institution rooted in the principle that individuals usually have different and contrasting opinions on the same subject and that all opinions have the same legitimacy. A theory of rational political decision-making cannot assume that all citizens share the same view of society, and that the differentiation amongst political strategies originates only from a different ordering of preferences. The differentiation lies at a deeper level and involves non-shared principles and ‘visions’. Deviation is here considered to be a legitimate and natural difference of opinion on the same problem, so that no one is surprised that differences in visions may become permanent, also giving rise to opposed ‘ideologies’. The question of divergence between different solutions to the same problem, or between differing theories offering alternative explanations
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for the same group of facts, is therefore particularly delicate when it is applied to social phenomena. Hayek and Popper confronted this problem, the crux of which is how the social division of knowledge occurs, and how either recognition of a single shared theory or the permanent opposition of theories comes about. Their position, to which I shall return in the following section, is that only if the respective proposals are subjected to a continuous critical process will the community be able to secure – temporarily – a certain amount of convergence in some areas of its beliefs and knowledge, and to discriminate, when possible, between different theoretical proposals. This raises a background question: what is the difference between an authoritarian and a pluralist conception of the sources of knowledge?
Deviation as error: an authoritarian conception of knowledge What are the origins of the authoritarian view of knowledge? One of its principal sources lies in Plato’s thought. For Plato the origin of our knowledge is divine; in his celebrated theory of anamnesis, set out in Meno, he claims that when we know we simply remember what our immortal soul already knew prior to our birth: knowledge is therefore re-cognition. Since this myth attributes man with the capacity to achieve the truth, Karl Popper (1960) considers it an optimistic account of the sources of knowledge. But he notes that Plato’s vision later grew pessimistic: Yet disappointment must have come to Plato; for in The Republic (and also in the Phaedrus) we find the beginnings of a pessimistic epistemology. In the famous story of prisoner in the cave he shows that the world of our experience is only a shadow, a reflection, of the real world. And he shows that even if one of the prisoners should escape from the cave and face the real world, he would have insuperable difficulties in seeing and understanding it . . . The difficulties in the way of an understanding of the real world are almost super-human, and only very few, if anybody at all, can attain to the divine state of understanding the real world – the divine state of true knowledge, of episte¯me¯ . . . Thus we find in Plato the first development from an optimistic to a pessimistic epistemology. Each of them form the basis of one of the two diametrically opposed philosophies of the state and of the society: on the one hand an anti-traditionalist, anti-authoritarian, revolutionary and Utopian rationalism of the Cartesian kind, and on the other hand an authoritarian traditionalism. (Popper 1960: 48)
28 Massimo Egidi According to Popper, it was the dispute between empiricism and rationalism that crucially freed philosophers from the need to acknowledge God as the authority guaranteeing the validity of human knowledge: The problem which I wish to examine . . . may perhaps be described as an aspect of the old quarrel between the British and the Continental schools of philosophy – the quarrel between the classical empiricism of Bacon, Locke, Berkeley, Hume and the classical rationalism or intellectualism of Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz. In this quarrel the British school insisted that the ultimate source of all knowledge was observation, while the Continental school insisted that it was the intellectual intuition of clear and distinct ideas. (Popper 1960: 40) The Continental school assumed that truth could be discovered through the use of reason; Descartes based his epistemology on the optimistic idea that what we understand clearly may not be true, because otherwise God would be deceiving us. The Cartesian doctrine held that our intellect does not deceive us if we are able to formulate clear and distinct ideas, since intellect is created by God, the source of all knowledge. This is the doctrine of Veracitas Dei. The Cartesian position had immense emancipatory power in Western culture because it transferred to man, and thus to his own reason, the authority on which the validity of knowledge was based. God was still the final authority, but it was no longer necessary to consult the Scriptures in order to attain truth; instead, one could appeal to the human intellect. The British school attributed the source of knowledge to empirical observation. Bacon considered induction to be the key method with which to infer general rules and laws from observation of specific elements of experience. Here again the question of the certainty of knowledge was crucial: Bacon claimed in the Novum Organum that if individuals were to be able to ‘read the book of Nature’, they had to purify their minds from the prejudices and conjectures that could cast a veil over their minds and prevent them from achieving the truth. When our minds have been purged of false beliefs and prejudices, we are ready to read the book of nature, i.e. to induce general laws from the facts of experience. Bacon envisaged two methods of induction: the true method, ‘interpretatio naturae’, which I have illustrated thus far; and the false method, ‘anticipatio mentis’, which was a method based on prejudice. Popper notes: This latter method, rejected by Bacon, is in fact a method of interpretation, in the modern sense of the word. It is the method of conjecture or hypothesis (a method of which, incidentally, I happen to be a confirmed advocate). (Popper 1960: 52)
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In some sense, Popper tells us that Bacon’s idea of purging the mind of prejudices is not a prerequisite for the achievement of knowledge but the true essence of the process of acquiring knowledge. As Thornton (1997) remarks: Scientific theories, for him, are not inductively inferred from experience, nor is scientific experimentation carried out with a view to verifying or finally establishing the truth of theories; rather, all knowledge is provisional, conjectural, hypothetical – we can never finally prove our scientific theories, we can merely (provisionally) confirm or (conclusively) refute them; hence at any given time we have to choose between the potentially infinite number of theories which will explain the set of phenomena under investigation. Faced with this choice, we can only eliminate those theories which are demonstrably false, and rationally choose between the remaining, non-falsified theories. Hence Popper’s emphasis on the importance of the critical spirit to science – for him critical thinking is the very essence of rationality. For it is only by critical thought that we can eliminate false theories, and determine which of the remaining theories is the best available one, in the sense of possessing the highest level of explanatory force and predictive power. This view of rationality is a fundamental aspect of Popper’s epistemology. In the next section of this chapter I shall compare this view, suggesting that knowledge is based on the critical capacity to revise and modify our conjectures, with experiments on human problem-solving which have shown that revising the solution to a problem and searching for a new one are based on imperfections in induction and categorization. In some sense, I shall undertake an exercise in ‘experimental epistemology’.
Analogies between problem-solving and building-up theories It is well known that when individuals solve a problem, they decompose it into in sub-problems on the basis of ‘heuristics’. In the next section (pp. 33–38) I shall show that – at least for some classes of problems – heuristics are generated on the ground of a representation of the problem. The revision of a given solution requires a different and new representation and categorization of the problem which display striking similarities with the way in which scientists revise theories as the consequence of emerging anomalies. Before exploring these similarities, which are rooted in the cognitive aspects of intellectual activity, I would emphasize one difference: the fact that the scientific enterprise is based on a social division of knowledge, while problem-solving is or may be an individual activity. The question is
30 Massimo Egidi therefore how the community verifies and validates new emerging ideas and theoretical approaches, given the wide division of knowledge and the limited domain of a single scientist’s expert knowledge. This question again elicits the contrast between the authoritarian and the critical role of scientific activity briefly discussed in the following sub-sections. Settling controversies within the scientific community One wonders whether the process of critical revision that, following Popper, should ensure serious comparison among theories really takes place in the scientific community. An observer able to participate directly in these activities would note many dissimilarities between the Popperian protocol and actual practice. These differences are due not only to a lack of completeness and rigour in practical procedures, but also to the nature of the problem. Who is it that guarantees the convergence of different opinions and assessments in the scientific community on a single, shared opinion? Following Popper, we can only hope that all the critical aspects of the theory debated in the scientific community have been raised and solved by reducing disagreements as far as possible. This is a modest requirement, but it is the only one that can be fulfilled, because more stringent tests have shown serious shortcomings. How to eliminate disagreements by reducing all scientific statements to a formal system in which all statements can be compared via pure computation was a central issue of scientific debate at the end of the nineteenth century. The solution proposed was to axiomatize the scientific disciplines, which meant reducing the scientific statements of a discipline, say physics, to logical derivations from a limited number of axioms. Some scholars suggested that this could be done by creating a language to describe scientific statements rigorously and non-ambiguously, so that the scientific community could communicate, evaluate problems and reach a shared opinion. Given that mathematics plays an essential role of in all scientific disciplines, it was the first candidate for formalization. This was the project undertaken by Giuseppe Peano, whose Formulario Matematico (1894) set out a meta-language for converting any discussion on mathematical issues into a formal calculus. By means of this cryptic but – for experts – ‘clear and distinct’ meta-language, pure mathematicians would supposedly acquire and share mathematical truths simply via calculus. But besides the difficulties to learn and use Peano’s meta-language, it was no guarantee that scientific debates could be resolved by means of pure calculus. This non-guarantee is a major property of formal systems discovered by Kurt Gödel, who, in his famous ‘On Formally Undecidable Propositions in Principia Mathematica and Related Systems’ (1931), demonstrated that within a formal system there exist questions that are
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neither provable nor disprovable on the basis of the axioms that define that system. Thus, the scientific community contents itself with a ‘reasonably thorough’ but not fully formalized language – which in any case offers no protection against making errors. Since the 1930s the members of a scientific community have therefore abandoned the use of a meta-language, reinforcing the practice of the critical interaction to avoid discrepancies and errors. However, there is still a wide margin for unexpected errors to occur, as the following story illustrates. Around 1630 the French mathematician Pierre August de Fermat conjectured that the equation xn yn zn has no integer solutions for x, y and z (different from zero) when n 2. He wrote: ‘I have discovered a truly remarkable proof which this margin is too small to contain.’ The conjecture, called Fermat’s Last Theorem, resisted any attempt to prove (or falsify) it for four centuries. In 1993 Andrew Wiles submitted a highly complex proof of the conjecture to The Annals of Mathematics. Validating his demonstration took hundreds of mathematicians more than one year of work, during which many errors were discovered and corrected. But even if every reviewer has thus far agreed with the corrections, no one can guarantee that a new defect will not appear in the proof. O’Connor and Robertson (1997) give an interesting reconstruction of the facts, and in conclusion they write: No proof of the complexity of this can easily be guaranteed to be correct, so a very small doubt will remain for some time. However, when Taylor lectured at the British Mathematical Colloquium in Edinburgh in April 1995 he gave the impression that no real doubts remained over Fermat’s Last Theorem. This story is an interesting example of how human knowledge is constructed and acquired through a method that displays fallibility and opinion discrepancies in many ways. Discrepancies may be at least partially irreducible due to the complex activity required to converge towards a shared system of opinions; on the one hand, there is in fact an heavy individual mental effort required of each of the scientists involved in the process, in his limited domains of knowledge; on the other hand, there is the need to reduce disagreements among the members of a large group, who only partially and imperfectly share a common language and a common knowledge. Sociological aspects: how the authoritarian concept of knowledge filters into conventions and routines Since knowledge is imperfectly shared among experts, and the extension of the individual’s domains of knowledge is limited, in many conditions the
32 Massimo Egidi power of the critical, Galilean method, on which modern science is founded, is severely weakened. An overall application of the critical method only takes place in specialist contexts, and this seriously jeopardizes the development of knowledge. Indeed, in a highly segmented, hierarchical structure of knowledge like that of modern society, the ‘authoritarian’ nature of knowledge processes constantly reproduces itself. It resides in the ‘automatic’ way in which we learn the majority of our experiences, without subjecting them to critical discussion. We accept the authority of anyone deemed more competent than we are, and we often accept new notions and ideas without discussion or argument, even if we are not convinced by them, given our haste to acquire the skills that the modern world demands of us: we cannot critically analyse everything that is propounded to us. The huge division of mental labour that characterizes society counsels us not to ‘waste time’ on discussion of each and every new idea or notion: we are secure in the knowledge that what we learn is true – because it has been subjected to critical analysis by experts, who have done the critical work necessary to validate it. The contexts in which the principle of authority is rejected, and use is made of the critical method, are confined to relatively restricted areas of competence in which the experts are able to understand each other and thus be critical of each other’s work. Expert areas of competence are relatively narrow because acquiring thorough competence in a certain field of knowledge takes an extremely long time, precisely because it is based on the critical method. Outside these specific areas, most of the knowledge acquired is based on mixed forms of learning, which partly involve critical capacity but mostly the passive acquisition of notions seen as ‘consolidated’. This learning method is based on delegation. Essential for the functioning of all complex societies, delegation involves trust and acceptance of authority. It is necessary within the scientific community as well, given the extraordinary division of scientific work into the distinct disciplines that characterize modern science. As we learn and assimilate new ideas, we reproduce a permanent tension between implicit acceptance of the principle of authority (and of the division of mental work) and the Galilean principle based on critical capacity and experimentation. Thus, recourse to authority is not completely abandoned but becomes a hidden defect, one implicit in the scientific protocol that we use because, although we may exercise our critical capacity, our knowledge and the cognitive domain in which we operate are incomplete: we are thus forced to trust others and to import their errors into our system of knowledge.
A ‘pluralistic’ approach: theories on comparison How can different competing theories be compared in an authentically pluralistic view of the science? Popper’s approach is based upon the idea
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of a logical asymmetry between verification and falsification. Thornton (1997) comments: For Popper . . . it is logically impossible to conclusively verify a universal proposition by reference to experience (as Hume saw clearly), but a single counter-instance conclusively falsifies the corresponding universal law. In a word, an exception, far from ‘proving’ a rule, conclusively refutes it. In line with remarks by the physicist Pierre Duhem (1906) – see Motterlini (1999) – the question can be set in a subtly different manner: in general an exception, instead of definitively refuting a general proposition, simply reduces its domain of applicability and points up that the categorization upon which the proposition is based must be redefined. It is slightly misleading to define scientific propositions or rules as ‘universal’ ones. What does ‘universal’ mean with regard to a proposition defined by a theory? It means that the proposition holds true when applied to all contingencies defined by the theory. The domain of validity of a proposition is limited by the theory itself. It is therefore convenient to introduce the notion of the ‘domain’ of applicability of a proposition or a rule. We can discriminate among competing theories when they are applicable to the same domain of data and empirical facts, and when comparison can be made among the different predictions or explanations that they yield on the basis of the facts pertaining to that domain. The argument can be outlined by starting from an analogous question: comparison between different solutions of a problem. Note that the requirements for comparison between theories also hold for human problem-solving activity: science is such an activity, so we can use the structure of problem-solving to understand how to compare different theories. Categories and abstractions in the description of problems Abstraction and classification are crucial elements in the process of building mental representations of problems; we will discuss them in this section, avoiding formalizations as much as possible. When a solution to a problem is defined in a given context, it is usually defined on a ‘domain’ that comprises more than one simple element. For example, the definition of ‘winning configuration’ in chess implies a large (and unknown) number of different configurations, all of which have the same property: the king must be under definitive attack, i.e. unable to avoid attack in one move. Finding a solution to a problem – for example, finding a winning strategy in chess – means discovering a procedure to achieve one element in a set of final winning positions whatever strategy the opponent chooses. A
34 Massimo Egidi similar and simpler definition holds for puzzles, the Rubik cube for example: here, finding a solution requires finding a procedure with which to achieve one element in the set of final winning configurations starting from the initial configuration. In the case of the Rubik cube, the final winning configuration may be one specific configuration: for example, the one in which every face (side) consists of tiles of the same colour. Or it may be defined as a class of configurations: for example, configurations in which every face is composed half by tiles of one colour and half by ones of another. The level of abstraction at which the problem is defined has an important relation with the level of abstraction at which a procedure to solve the problem may be defined. It is important, in fact, to understand under what conditions it is possible to define procedures that apply to the full domain of the problem; indeed, one of the main aspects of the ‘art’ of a programmer is the ability to construct a procedure whose degree of abstraction fits perfectly with the domains of the problem. Some definitions will help clarify the matter. A puzzle is a game in which an individual must achieve a given goal, usually by making changes to an initial configuration according to a system of rules and constraints. The rules state what actions may be made for each state of the game, and what their effects will be. A puzzle is therefore defined by the configurations, and by the rules that operate on the configurations. An important type of problem in the world of puzzles consists in achieving a given configuration (or a configuration that belongs to a class characterized by some property). A problem can therefore be defined by the rules of the puzzle and a pair of sets: the set of initial I and the set of final F configurations. A solution is a procedure (or a program, i.e. a set of condition–action rules coherent with the rules of the puzzle) that enables some element of F to be achieved starting from I. The question of representation immediately arises in these contexts. Assuming that we discover a strategy S(x, y) that solves the problem, S is a program that enables the player to achieve the configuration y 僆 F starting from x 僆 I. It may happen that S holds for only one pair x, y 僆 FxI, for many pairs, or for all pairs x, y 僆 FxI. The art of a good programmer consists in constructing S in such a way that the ‘domain of applicability’ of S is perfectly coincident with the two sets I, F that define the problem. Without loss of generality we can assume that every state of the game, excluding the goal configuration(s), may be a starting state. A case in point is the Rubik cube, a game in which the player must be able to achieve a final configuration whatever the starting configuration may be. There are millions of configurations in this game, and a program consisting of one instruction for each configuration would be accordingly enormous. A desirable program is one composed by a relatively small set of abstract instructions each of which is applicable to a group of configuration. The creation of a program is then limited by two important desirable properties: on the
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one hand, the simplicity of representation: the program should be composed by as low as possible number of instructions. On the other, the efficiency: the number of steps to execute a program should be as small as possible. We will show in the following example that, at least in puzzles, there is a trade-off between simplicity and efficiency. This trade-off defines the constraints on which the discovery of new solutions proceeds. Assume that, given a problem I, F we discover a strategy S(x, y) that solves the problem for all x 僆 F, y 僆 F. With each pair x, y 僆 IxF we can associate a payoff, a measure of the efficiency of the problem-solving strategy. A very elementary measure is a (monotonically decreasing) function of the number of steps executed by applying the procedure: the higher the number of steps, the less efficient the procedure. Figure 1.1 depicts two strategies S and S* which solve the same problem with different degrees of efficiency: in some sub-areas of the set, S is more efficient than (preferable to) S*, (S 傻 S*), while in the complementary areas S* is vice versa preferable to S. In these conditions, which frequently occur in games and puzzles, there are two different strategies applying to different sub-domains. Players must pay the price of greater mental effort to learn one more strategy if they want to achieve optimality in execution of the procedure. Of course this situation can be generalized, in the sense that it may
6 4 1
2 0 0 1 0
1 1
Figure 1.1 The comparative efficiency of two strategies that solve the same problem
36 Massimo Egidi happen that many different strategies, S. S, . . . Sn can be defined, each of which is optimal only in one limited part of the domain of applicability. Returning to the Rubik cube, it is evident that an optimal solution exists, i.e. a path of minimal length connecting every initial configuration with the goal configuration. This optimal program can be described at ‘ground level’, i.e. by detailing an instruction for every configuration, and of course this description would imply an enormous number of instructions. Despite this obvious disadvantage, however, if a program is described with this ‘ground’ representation, its efficiency can be improved very simply. In fact, it can be shown (see Egidi 2002: appendix 3) that – despite a positive level of interaction (epistasis) – the optimal program can be found by simple ‘mutations’; i.e. by modifying every instruction sequentially until the optimal set of instructions is discovered. Of course this is not the way individuals proceed when constructing a program to play Rubik, or to solve similar puzzles. They try to compact the representation, i.e. to find rules that are applicable to classes of configurations. At the ground level an instruction consists of a configuration of the game and the action to be taken; at a more abstract level, we can identify classes of configurations with the same role in the game, i.e. to which we want to apply the same action. Assume that we want to construct a program compactly, i.e. by identifying classes of configurations to which appropriate actions apply. These classes can be called ‘building blocks’ constructed by abstraction or codification from the game properties. In the case of the Rubik cube, for example, in order to achieve the final position in which every face has tiles of the same colour, a player may try first to put the top corners in their right places. Given the disposition of the colours of one of the top corners, the player tries to put the second one in a position coherent with the first corner (see Figure 1.2). It is clear that the directions to move the
Figure 1.2 Rubik cube: a sub-problem
Theories and ideologies as cognitive traps
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second top corner to its right position disregard all the positions of the other tiles. This means that players consider an enormous number of configurations – all those with the second top corner in the same position – to be equivalent. They will define the rules to apply only looking at the position of the second top corner, and will therefore consider all the configurations with the first and the second top corners in the same position as a single building block. The players will consequently perform the same action for every configuration of the same building block. A strategy S (or program) can therefore be described compactly as a list of building blocks, to each of which is attached an action. Thus a complete program consists of a list of relatively few instructions defined by the building blocks. Of course, the definition of the building blocks relates to the division of the original problem into sub-problems. A given set of building blocks describes the problem in its parts with some degree of abstraction: it is therefore the basic component of a representation. As we shall see in detail on pp. 44–48, constructing a basic system of building blocks enormously simplifies the representation of the problem, and enormously reduces the number of instructions. In so doing, it may introduce hidden errors, i.e. inefficiencies in the program that solves the game due to the way in which the problem has been decomposed into building blocks. To see briefly how a wrong decomposition introduces errors, assume that we know the optimal program described at the ground level: we have the list of the best actions to be performed for every configuration of the system. Assume that the best action for configuration xi is action ai, and the best action for configuration xj is action aj; and assume that ai aj. For a given decomposition of the problem, the two configurations xi xj may belong to the same building block. In this case, the same action must be applied to both of them, and it therefore will be impossible to achieve the optimal solution. When a player modifies one instruction in a ‘compacted’ description of the program, he changes the action to be performed in relation to a given building block. The change is therefore applied to an entire set of configurations. Therefore, by introducing building blocks, we restrict the set of possible elementary modifications (mutations) that can be applied to a program. Hence, as we have shown, some decompositions of the problem necessarily lead to descriptions that do not incorporate the optimal solution. This implies that for any given problem there are many ‘wrong’ decompositions. These decompositions are in some sense the result of an excessive abstraction, or extrapolation. This explains how it is possible for many suboptimal strategies S, S, . . . to coexist: these strategies are simplified descriptions of the problem based on ‘wrong’ decompositions of the problem. As we shall see in more detail in the next sections, these strategies are locally stable and suboptimal for
38 Massimo Egidi some configurations of the domain. Therefore players that learn and adopt one of them may remain trapped in this representation. Cognitive traps at individual and team level I have shown that suboptimal strategies S, S, . . . in puzzles originate from ‘wrong’ decompositions of the problem, and that only changes in representations enable players to achieve the optimal solution in the full domain of applicability. Moreover, the players may not perceive the errors (suboptimalities) introduced by the decomposition that they discover. The domain from which they induce a decomposition may in fact be restricted to configurations for which the decomposition is optimal, as we have seen in Figure 1.1. These properties of problem-solving can be experimentally explored. The experiments now briefly described illustrate biases in human behaviours on the basis of the theoretical approach previously outlined. In the experiments described, groups of players were exposed to different sets of configurations for a training period. For each set of configurations Di it was possible to discover a simplified strategy which was optimal in that limited domain. Each group of players learnt the simplified strategy in the particular domain to which they were exposed, and remained locked in its specific strategy, using it beyond the domain of optimality. The first example of this kind of experiment was proposed by Luchins (1942) and Luchins and Luchins (1950): individuals exposed to simple mathematical problems admitting different solutions, S and S* tended to use the strategy that they learnt first (in a context in which it was efficient) even in sub-areas in which a better strategy could be found. These experiments suggest that the automaticity with which players repeat the same sequences of actions, solving a problem with a procedure that they have learnt in a particular domain even in conditions in which that procedure is clearly suboptimal, can be explained in terms of automaticity in their mental processes. Luchins and Luchins have argued in fact that routinized behaviours are based on routinized thinking – the socalled ‘Einstellung effect’ – or the automatic use of ‘chunks’ which enables individuals to save on mental effort (Weisberg 1980) but which at the same time induces them to cling to solutions for problems even when they prove to be suboptimal. These findings have close analogies with the properties of problemsolving in team contexts explored by Cohen and Bacdayan (1994) and Egidi and Narduzzo (1997) on the basis of experiment using the game ‘Target the Two’. These experiments suggest that the ‘Einstellung effect’ holds even with regard to team decision-making: when solving a repetitive task, for example by repetitively playing the same game, groups of players adopt routinized behaviours and persist in their use with remarkable stability even when they are clearly suboptimal. The routinization of behaviour may be considered the outcome of a
Theories and ideologies as cognitive traps
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process of mental effort-saving that originates in the process of discovering and representing a strategy. During this process, individuals make systematic use of default classifications to reduce the short-term memory load and the complexity of symbolic manipulation. The result is the construction of an imperfect mental representation of the problem that nevertheless has the advantage of being simple and yielding ‘satisficing’ decisions. This view is illustrated by the previous example in which we supposed that if many strategies S, S, . . . , Sn apply with different degrees of efficiency to subdomains of a given problem, a trade-off will arise between the simplicity of the problem’s representation and its efficiency. The existence of this trade-off has been experimentally confirmed by some of the results obtained using the game ‘Target the Two’, which I now briefly describe. ‘Target the Two’ is a card game in which the two players must cooperate in order to achieve the final result. Each pair receives a reward proportional to the efficiency of their play: that is, the fewer the moves made by a pair to achieve the result, the higher its reward. Tournaments are organized in which pairs of players compete against each other. In each round of the tournament the cards are distributed randomly, and the players must learn how to co-ordinate themselves in the most efficient manner, but without communicating verbally. There are two suboptimal strategies, which I shall call A and B, each of which is optimal with respect to a restricted domain of initial configurations. For games which begin with initial configurations belonging to a certain set , strategy A dominates strategy B; while for games that begin with initial configurations belonging to a certain set , strategy B dominates strategy A. The two domains and have a part in common: that is, there are initial configurations with respect to which the two strategies are equally efficient. Figure 1.3 shows the number of moves required by each strategy for
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 1
5
9
13 17 21 25 29 33 37 41 45 49 53 57 61 65 69 73 77 81 85 89 93 97 101 105 109 113 117
Figure 1.3 ‘Target the Two’: landscape of the efficiency of strategies
40 Massimo Egidi every configuration of the game. Arranged along the horizontal axis are the different game configurations (there are 124 structurally different configurations), and along the vertical one the number of moves required to achieve the result using strategy A and strategy B. Immediately apparent are the three domains in which A dominates B (from configuration 1 to 40), in which B dominates A (from 80 to 124), and in which A and B are equivalent (from configuration 40 to 80). An experiment conducted by the present writer with A. Narduzzo (1997) showed that pairs of players may become trapped in a suboptimal strategy, without learning the optimal one, even in conditions where the optimal strategy is easy to discover. Two groups of players – Ga and Gb – were formed, and each of them participated in a tournament consisting of two parts. In the first part, group Ga was exposed to hands in which strategy A was dominant and also easy to learn. Likewise Group Gb was given hands that could be easily played with strategy B, which was dominant. In the second part of the tournament both groups were given the same configurations, chosen at random. The results showed a persistent difference in behaviour: the players in group Ga used strategy A much more frequently than did players in group Gb, even when the strategy was dominated by the other one, and vice versa. Figure 1.4 shows this persistence of behaviour. The horizontal axis shows the runs (after the training period) in which both groups were given the same game configurations. The vertical axis shows the percentage of pairs which used strategy A in group Ga and group Gb, respectively. (On the horizontal axis are the different runs.) In each of the two groups there was a rather high percentage of players who consistently used a single strategy, the one learnt during the game training phase, so that the figures continued to differ throughout the rest of the tournament.
100 90
Ga
80 70 60 50 40
Gb
30 20 10 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
Figure 1.4 ‘Target the Two’: routinized behaviours
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With regard to the behaviour of individual pairs, a relevant percentage of pairs in group Ga only used strategy A in all game conditions, and the same behaviour was displayed by group Gb (Egidi and Narduzzo 1997: 699). Consequently, we may call the behaviours of these players ‘routinized’ because they invariably used the same strategy, without learning the alternative strategy even though it was more appropriate. This experiment raises the question of whether the systematic bias was caused by an interaction effect – for example, elements due to the difficulty of cooperating – or whether it was the result of individual routinized thinking. In order to clarify the matter, I conducted an experiment identical to the previous one in which the sample was similarly structured and the same sequence of games was played, but with the difference that only single players, instead of pairs, played the game. The coordination problem, and implicit communication between the players (they were not allowed to communicate explicitly), were thus eliminated. In this experiment, too, there were two groups of players – Ga and Gb – who were initially given fifteen card sequences in which strategy A and strategy B were respectively dominant, and then both groups were exposed to the same sequence of randomly selected hands. The results were quite clear (Figure 1.5). In this game, too, players in group Ga continued to prefer strategy A even when it was dominated by strategy B, and vice versa the players in group Gb. The ‘lock-in’ effect therefore affected single individuals also. The findings of Luchins and Luchins are thus confirmed in this particular context as well. However, routinization was less marked than in the case of cooperating pairs, and the number of routinized individuals was much lower and differently distributed than in the previous experiment with pairs. At least in 90 80 Ga
70 60 50 40
Gb
30 20 10 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
Figure 1.5 ‘Target the Two’: single-player routinization
42 Massimo Egidi this context, therefore, the coordination process reinforces ‘deviations’ from the Olympic rationality that characterizes individual behaviours. In a context of tacit knowledge in particular, the difficulty of coordination is largely responsible for the persistence of cognitive and behavioural biases in a team. Although generalizing this result would require a much larger body of empirical data, we nevertheless have interesting evidence of the considerable extent to which difficulties in coordination reinforce the barriers that individuals encounter when trying to get out of a cognitive trap. It is interesting to note that the difficulties of team problem-solving seem analogous to those observed in the above story about Fermat’s Last Theorem. Building blocks, local stability, suboptimality of representations The extrapolation evidenced by the experiments on ‘Target the Two’ is a general feature of the problem–representation process which gives rise to systematic imperfections and biases. The imperfections originate from the process of constructing the categories which represent the building blocks of the problem’s solution. To find a solution, in fact, individuals normally try to decompose a problem into parts to be solved separately. Every decomposition is based on a categorization of the problem, so that different decompositions may be characterized by different abstraction levels of the categories (some abstraction levels may ignore some of the interdependencies among the sub-problems). In analogy with the example of many strategies S, S, . . . , Sn, raising the level of abstraction with which a sub-problem is represented means extending the domain of validity of the categories and their relations even beyond the field in which it has been experienced by the individual, with the consequence that domains in which the solution is inefficient may be unintentionally included. The onset of errors in the mental representation of a problem may therefore be the ‘natural’ effect of attempts to simplify the categorization and identification of the building blocks of a problem. Moreover, experiments on individual and team behaviour provide a basis on which the persistency of biases can be explained. Persistency of biases can be interpreted as the existence and stability of suboptimal solutions to problems due to the difficulty of redefining the sub-problems that constitute the elementary building blocks of the problem’s representation. These elementary building blocks are based on systems of categories that, as will be shown in the next section, focus the players’ attention and drive the construction of their mental models. The division of knowledge derives from the way in which individuals categorize problems during the training or learning phase. It should be stressed that a given problem may be decomposed in a large variety of different ways which also give rise to different levels of abstraction in the categorization of sub-problems. Every decomposition pattern results
Theories and ideologies as cognitive traps D C
43
B A
Figure 1.6 Minirubik
from a different manner of codifying information at different levels of abstraction. In Egidi (2002) the optimal decomposition of a problem – the discovery of a strategy for playing the game Minirubik – is compared with other decompositions which are simpler and easier to learn but suboptimal. We describe again the example of Minirubik, to show the properties of local stability and suboptimality of the solutions. Minirubik is a sort of Rubik square. The player has a square consisting of four differently coloured tiles denoted by the letters A, B, C, D (Figure 1.6). The tiles can be exchanged horizontally or vertically, as shown in Figure 1.7, and players must exchange them until they have achieved a final configuration. Players are rewarded according to the number of moves that they make to achieve the goal: the higher the number of the moves, the lower the payoff. With this simplified representation, a strategy can be represented as a list of condition–action instructions of the type exemplified in Figure 1.8. D C
B A
UP
B C
D A
D C
B A
DOWN
D A
B C
D C
B A
RIGHT
D C
A B
D C
B A
LEFT
C D
B A
Figure 1.7 Minirubik: the exchanging of tiles Condition D A
B C
Action Up
Figure 1.8 Minirubik: example of a condition–action instruction
44 Massimo Egidi To simplify the description, a configuration can be written as a sequence of four letters (or colours), rather than as a square of four letters (or colours), by applying the following rule: start from the upper-left corner of the square and list the elements of the square, moving clockwise. With this rule the square in Figure 1.6, for example, is transformed into the list DBCA and the instructions for Figure 1.8 can be written as DBCA → Up. Following Holland (1975), the symbol # is used synonymously with ‘don’t care’, which means that a configuration like A##C is an abstract configuration representing the set of configurations in which A is in the first position (upper-left corner) and C in the last one (lower-left corner). The symbol # allows us to represent sets of configurations, i.e. to represent configurations at some level of abstraction. Suppose that the initial and the final configurations are given, respectively, by the two strings BDAC and ABCD, as in Figure 1.9. A program with which to move from this particular starting configuration to the final goal configuration consists of the following instructions: 1 2 3
Move A from the initial position clockwise to the final position. If B it is not yet in the final position, move it to the upper-right corner leaving A in its position. If C and D are not yet in the required final positions, exchange them.
It is clear that we have constructed this set of instructions by following a heuristic, or in other words by following criteria for the decomposition of the original problem into sub-problems involving related levels of abstraction and categorization of the problem. These criteria are based on the idea of focusing on the position of one tile at a time (first we move A, then B and finally C). This implies the following two points: 1
2
Categorization: we have implicitly adopted a ‘categorization’ of the problem: the elements of our reasoning are the categories A###, #A##, ##A#, ###A, A#B#, . . . and we mentally manipulate them. Interdependence: the instructions proposed are based on the conjecture that it will be possible to solve the problem by considering the movement of each tile, disregarding the effects that the change of position of one tile has on the others and therefore detecting rules that apply to the simple categories defined above. Starting configuration B C
D A
Goal configuration A D
B C
Figure 1.9 Minirubik: example of a starting configuration and the goal
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By decomposing each of the three above instructions into elementary actions, we can rewrite it as an array of elementary instructions (in the form of conditions–actions) as is illustrated in Figure 1.10. We may wonder whether it is possible to arrange these instructions into a more general format, maintaining the solution criteria that we have adopted (i.e. focusing on the positions of one tile at time) and successfully applying them to all starting configurations of the game. The answer is positive: by means of simple reasoning (see Egidi 2002: 140) it is possible to extend the previous instructions to a broader domain; namely, the set of all initial configurations. We obtain the array of Figure 1.11, which applies to every initial configuration and enables players to achieve the goal configuration. The first specific system of instructions (Figure 1.10) drawn up to solve the initial, specific problem is a sub-set of the new system of instructions, which applies to every initial condition. The system of abstract rules in Figure 1.11 is therefore complete, because the abstractions allow us to cluster and classify all specific rules of the system into a few sub-sets: it is a compact representation of the rules of action. I have called this representation ‘First A’ because the ‘heuristic’ of this system is to move first A, then B and finally C into their goal positions. We thus have simplicity in the representation of the procedure with which to solve the entire class of problems. Unfortunately, however, we do not have full efficiency; in fact, for some initial conditions, the procedure is suboptimal (see Egidi 2002: appendix 2), as the example in Figure 1.12 shows. Conditions
Actions
# #
# A
Right
# #
A #
Up
A #
# B
Right
A D
B C
Down
Figure 1.10 Minirubik: an array of elementary instructions
46 Massimo Egidi Conditions
Actions
# #
# A
Right
# #
A #
Up
A #
# B
Right
A D
B C
Down
A B
# #
Down
# A
# #
Left
Figure 1.11 Minirubik: ‘First A’ representation D B
C A
A D
B C
Figure 1.12 Minirubik: initial position which is suboptimally played with the ‘First A’ strategy
The optimal sequence here, in fact, is DCBA → Right → DACB → Left → BACD → Up → ABCD, whereas the rules prescribed by our procedure generate the sequence DCBA Right → DACB → Left → BACD → Up → ADCB → Down → ADBC → Right → ABDC → Down → ABCD, which is obviously made up of more steps. The simplified procedure S(x, y) that we have defined is optimal only in a sub-domain of the initial conditions. Therefore, when adopting this procedure, players have the advantage of a representation which is very simple and abstract and complete, but at the price of inefficiencies because the number of moves required to achieve the goal is higher than the optimal number. Moreover, the ‘First A’ representation is a compact list of instructions that is suboptimal and locally stable: 1
Local stability. The reader may like to perform the exercise, modifying the actions corresponding to the list of conditions in Figure 1.11, and
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2
47
verifying that the efficiency of the programs worsens. This means that, given the representation of the problem defined by the building blocks ###A, ##A#, #A##, A##B, A#B#, ABDC, the instructions in Figure 1.11 are a local optimum. When the instructions in the figure are modified, the program worsens; i.e. the number of moves required to achieve the goal increases. Suboptimality. As shown in correspondence to some configurations (for example DCBA), the program in Figure 1.11 is suboptimal; i.e. there exists a path to the goal that is shorter than the path defined by Figure 1.11. We have seen that (local stability) every list of instructions obtained by modifying the figure worsens the situation. Therefore, however we modify the instructions in the list – changing the actions to be performed in relation to the conditions described in abstract in Figure 1.11 – we will never achieve the (ground) optimal program.
This is therefore a clear example of the trade-off between simplicity of representation and the efficiency of the program: the programs generated by Figure 1.11 show inefficiencies in correspondence to some configurations, and a player adopting this representation cannot avoid making these errors (inefficiencies), even if he tries to modify some of the actions. The only way to improve the efficiency of the program is to change the representation. Preliminary experiments confirm that a large number of players exposed during the initial runs of the game to configurations optimally solved by the strategy illustrated in Figure 1.12 will adopt this strategy, thereby committing systematic errors perfectly in line with the figure’s instructions. Therefore biases emerge from induction: players make a default classification of the configurations to which they want to apply a rule (for example, ##A# → Right). Put otherwise, they conjecture a rule that is supposed to apply to the entire domain defined by a category (##A#), without perceiving that the rule has, on the contrary, a more limited domain of application. Perception of this limitation can only come with experience, because the rule has been conjectured by a process of induction whereby a player extends a rule discovered in a particular context to the entire domain. It is evident that any division of a problem into sub-problems is based on a structure conjectured in accordance with certain decomposition principles. The classifications and abstractions elicited by these principles may embody hidden errors which cannot be perceived without direct inspection. Finding these hidden errors, in fact, would require detailed examination of all the existing rules: an extremely time-consuming task which would nullify all the advantages of a concise representation. Consequently,
48 Massimo Egidi individuals, precisely because of the inductive nature of their search, do not actively seek to find exceptions to the rules that they have established to solve the problem. We can see from the Minirubik example (see Egidi 2002: appendix 2) that, in order to correct the errors hidden in abstract rules, it is necessary to be guided by emerging exceptions. Any attempt to discover those errors actively would require a fully detailed description of the game configurations that nullified the ‘parsimony’ of the induction-based inference and pre-empted the effort to express the strategy simply. The locally optimal (globally inefficient) solutions in which individuals may remain trapped while analysing a problem are therefore created by the limits to their capacity to falsify the rules that they have conjectured in all relevant domains and to discover hidden errors. Precisely because they cannot discover exceptions, it is highly unlikely that they will actively redefine the basic categories on which they have constructed the solution, so they may remain trapped in the given representation.
Conclusions In the latter sections I have described experiments which shed light on the features of the human search for solutions in complex artificial environments such as complex games and puzzles. These characteristics are strikingly similar to the features of the human activity of theory creation and modification. I shall therefore conduct further comparison between the two intellectual domains of problem-solving and epistemology. In problem-solving, two basic elements drive the search for solutions: (a) induction – based on conjectures – by which individuals extend specific cases to wider domains, and (b) specification, the opposite process elicited by emerging errors. Players in complex games do not represent all possible configurations in their minds. Rather, they usually proceed by generalization on the basis of examples – which means that they seek to induce general rules from specific experiences, as happens for example with children naturally learning a new language. Induction is closely related to default classification (Holland et al. 1988). When a player extends the domain of the validity of a rule discovered in a specific domain as widely as possible, he classifies by extension all conditions that match the specific example by assuming that they are the right conditions for application of the given rule. This procedure enables players to create a complete – albeit highly suboptimal – initial strategy, in which the rules of action for a large number of configurations are defined ‘by induction’ from examples. The extrapolation can also be viewed as a default classification. When a new configuration occurs, eliciting a new rule as an exception, in general it gives rise to a new rule that is more specific than the default
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one. A problem arises in extending the new specific rule, i.e. in extrapolating to larger domains, because this extrapolation will conflict with the previous system of rules. The problem is that adding one exception to a system of abstract rules does not yield a new, compact representation of the strategy, because if individuals transform a specific exception into a new rule with some degree of generality, the new rule may conflict with many other pre-existing rules of the strategy. It follows that individuals may prefer to maintain the old system, perhaps adding a few exceptions, rather than devising new abstract rules, because the mental effort required to redefine a sub-problem system is greater than that required to memorize an exception. If the number of ‘exceptions’ grows too large, and if they systematically occur during the game, the players cannot simply continue to memorize new exceptions; they must instead restructure the space of the rules, re-codifying information. In other words, they must change the representation – a change which may be highly discontinuous because it generally entails destructuring the division of problems and redesigning the problem with new building blocks. (Changing the representation may be particularly difficult if it requires redefinition of too many basic sub-problems.) This is, of course, an extremely onerous mental task, so that it is likely that the new example will be treated as an anomaly, without prompting re-categorization of the problem. Suboptimal solutions are therefore stable under the emergence of exceptions because changing the representation while maintaining a limited number of general rules requires radical modifications to the building blocks – the elementary sub-problems – of which a strategy is composed. I have suggested that the properties of problem-solving illustrated in this chapter can be extended by analogy to the world of competing theories. When we compare the explanatory capacities of two competing theories (for example, expected utility and regret theories), we do so in the area where the domains of the two theories overlap: that is, we conduct the comparison by referring to the ‘facts’ to which both theories apply. Comparison between two theories in a domain in which both are applicable should normally be feasible. The only serious problem that may arise concerns the difficulty of determining which theory is best solely on the basis of statistics – as happens, for example, in certain comparisons between expected utility and regret theory (Hey 1991: ch. 5), when the statistical tests are of insufficient power to yield clear-cut results. More interestingly, it may happen that the core statements of a theory have domains to which they have never been applied: the emergence of anomalies, i.e. unexpected examples in the theory’s domain of applicability that contradict it, giving rise to a dynamic of change analogous to the dynamic of problem-solving. As illustrated earlier, this process of revision requires a
50 Massimo Egidi new decomposition based on a new categorization of the elementary building blocks of the problem (the theory). I have suggested that the failure (to date) of attempts to find a satisfactory new theory of decisionmaking, on the basis of slight modifications to the classical axioms of expected utility theory, has been due to the extreme simplification of the basic axioms, which do not take serious account of the main features of human thinking. Turning to epistemology, insofar as the modification of a theory is similar to problem-solving, the features displayed by the search for new solutions in problem-solving entail critical revision of Popper’s idea of falsifiability in the light of Lakatos’s position: any anomaly, or element of falsification, reduces a rule’s domain of applicability, but it does not necessarily allow redefinition of all the sets of interrelated abstractions (a hierarchical system of categories) that made up the previous solution. This may come about as a result of the cumulative effect of the random emergence of many anomalies. In this case, anomalies drive the process of recategorization and induce individuals to adopt new solutions which are once again locally stable, though imperfect. The experiments described in this chapter may aid understanding of why theories and ideologies persist over long periods of time with remarkable stability when they have been largely falsified, and of what processes induce individuals to discard previous theoretical approaches. Redefinition of the categories constituting the building blocks of a solution (a theoretical approach) requires the complex process – what Popper calls ‘critical thinking’ – that I have tried to describe. Prejudices and erroneous simplifications are therefore natural and necessary for the creation of new solutions. Rationality emerges essentially as the capacity to get rid of our prejudices.6
Notes 1 I am grateful to Matteo Motterlini for his brilliant and helpful remarks on the draft version of this chapter. The usual disclaimers hold. 2 See also Newell et al. (1962). 3 Even though the existence of a best strategy can be demonstrated mathematically. 4 Of course, it is necessary to abandon the ingenuous idea that decision-making is based only on the capacity of individuals to order their preferences and to select the preferred option, taking any possible connections into account. 5 This is the condition in which Simon’s idea of ‘bounded rationality’ achieves full significance, because the limits of rationality emerge substantially, so that the human process of problem-solving is described not as an approximation to classical Olympian rationality but in terms of the properties of mental processes based on the division of knowledge and categorization. 6 In 1994, Popper defined rationality as the attitude of eliminating errors in a critical way.
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References Allais, M. and Hagen, O. (eds) (1979) Expected Utility Hypothesis and the Allais Paradox: Contemporary Discussions of Decisions Under Uncertainty with Allais Rejoinder, Dordrecht: D. Reidel. Cohen, M.D. and Bacdayan, P. (1994) ‘Organizational Routines are Stored as Procedural Memory: Evidence from a Laboratory Study’, Organization Science, 5(4): 554–568. Cohen, M.D., Burkhart, R., Dosi, G., Egidi, M., Marengo, L., Warglien, M. and Winter, S. (1996) ‘Routines and Other Recurring Action Patterns of Organizations: Contemporary Research Issues’, Industrial and Corporate Change, 5(3): 653–698. Cyert, R.M., Simon, H.A. and Trow, D.B. (1956) ‘Observation of a Business Decision’, Journal of Business, no. 29: 237–248. Denzau, A.T. and North, D.C. (1994) ‘Shared Mental Models: Ideologies and Institutions’, Kyklos, 47(1): 3–31. Dosi, G. and Egidi, M. (1991) ‘Substantive and Procedural Uncertainty: An Exploration of Economic Behaviors in Changing Environments’, Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 1(2) (April): 145–168. Duhem, P. (1906) La Théorie physique. Son objet et sa structure, Paris: Chevalier and Rivière. Egidi, M. (2002) ‘Biases in Organizational Behavior’, in M. Augier and J.J. March (eds), The Economics of Choice, Change and Organization: Essays in Memory of Richard M. Cyert, Aldershot: Edward Elgar. Egidi, M. and Narduzzo, A. (1997) ‘The Emergence of Path Dependent Behaviors in Cooperative Contexts’, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 15(6) (October): 677–709. Ericsson, K.A. and Simon, H.A. (1984) Protocol Analysis: Verbal Reports as Data, Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press. —— (1985) ‘Protocol analysis’, in T.A. Van Dijk (ed.), Handbook of Discourse Analysis: Vol. 2, Dimensions of Discourse (ch. 14). New York: Academic Press. Faltings, G. (1995) ‘The Proof of Fermat’s Last Theorem by R. Taylor and A. Wiles’, Notices of the AMS, 42(7): 743–746. Friedman, M. (1953) ‘The Methodology of Positive Economics’, in Essays in Positive Economics, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Gödel, K. (1931) ‘Über formal unentscheidbare Sätze der Principia Mathematica und verwandter Systeme I’ (On Formally Undecidable Propositions in Principia Mathematica and Related Systems), Monatshefte für Mathematik und Physik, 38: 173–198. Hey, J. (1991) Experiments in Economics, London: Basil Blackwell. Holland, J.H. (1975) Adaptation in Natural and Artificial Systems. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Holland, J.H., Holyoak, K.J., Nisbett, R.E. and Thagard, P.R. (1988) Induction – Processes of Inference, Learning, and Discovery, Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press. Kahneman, D. and Tversky, A. (1979) ‘Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decisions Under Risk’, Econometrica, 47: 313–327. —— (2000) Choices, Values and Frames, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
52 Massimo Egidi Lakatos, I. (1974) ‘Popper on Demarcation and Induction’, in P.A. Schlipp (ed.), The Philosophy of Karl Popper, La Salle, Ill.: Open Court. Langlois, R. (1998) ‘Rule-following, Expertise, and Rationality: A New Behavioral Economics?’, in K. Dennis (ed.), Rationality in Economics: Alternative Perspectives, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Luchins, A.S. (1942) ‘Mechanization in Problem-Solving’, Psychological Monograph, 54: 1–95. Luchins, A.S. and Luchins, E.H. (1950) ‘New Experimental Attempts in Preventing Mechanization in Problem-Solving’, The Journal of General Psychology, 42: 279–291. March, J.G. and Simon, H.A. (1958) Organizations, New York: Wiley. Motterlini, M. (ed.) (1999) For and Against Method. Including Lakatos’s Lectures on Method and the Lakatos–Feyerabend Correspondence, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Newell, A. and Simon, H.A. (1962) ‘Computer Simulation of Human Thinking and Problem Solving’, in M. Greenberger (ed.), Management and the Computer of the Future, New York: Wiley. Newell, A., Shaw, J.C. and Simon, H.A. (1958) ‘Chess-playing Programs and the Problem of Complexity’, IBM Journal of Research and Development, 2: 320–335. —— (1962) ‘The Processes of Creative Thinking’, in H.E. Gruber, G. Terrell and M. Wertheimer (eds), Contemporary Approaches to Creative Thinking, New York: Atherton Press. O’Connor, J.J. and Robertson, E.F. (1997) Fermat’s Last Theorem: http://wwwgroups.dcs.st-and.ac.uk/~history/HistTopics/Fermat’s_last_theorem.html#75. Popper, K. (1959) The Logic of Scientific Discovery (translation of Logik der Forschung), London: Hutchinson. —— (1960) Philosophical Lecture ‘On the Sources of Knowledge and of Ignorance’, Proceedings of the British Academy 1960, London: Oxford University Press. —— (1963) Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge, London: Routledge. —— (1994) ‘The Self, Rationality and Freedom’, in K. Popper, Knowledge and the Body–Mind Problem. In Defence of Interaction, London and New York: Routledge. Simon, H.A. (1963) ‘Problem Solving Machines’, International Science and Technology, 3: 48–62. —— (1979) ‘Rational Decision Making in Business Organization’, American Economic Review, 69: 493–513. —— (2002) ‘Science Seeks Parsimony, Not Simplicity: Searching for Pattern in Phenomena’, in A. Zellner, H.A. Keuzenkamp and M. McAleer (eds), Simplicity, Inference and Modeling: Keeping It Sophisticatedly Simple (ch. 3), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Simon, H.A. and Newell, A. (1972) Human Problem Solving, Englewood Cliffs, Calif.: Prentice-Hall. Thornton, S. (1997) ‘Karl Popper’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2002 edition), URL: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/popper/. Weisberg, R. (1980) Memory: Thought and Behavior, New York: Oxford University Press.
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Cognitive science meets evolutionary theory What implications does evolutionary psychology have for economic theorising? Jack J. Vromen
Introduction Cognitive science meets evolutionary theory – that is how evolutionary psychology (henceforth: EP) often is characterised. And indeed, as we shall see, one of EP’s main objectives is to point out the evolutionary raison d’être of information-processing modules in the human mind. EP not only sets out to explain why we have the modules that we have, but also aims to facilitate the identification of hitherto unknown modules. In this chapter I try to explore what potential contributions EP can make to economics. As a starting-point I take two recent attempts made by economists to connect evolutionary theory in general, and EP in particular, with economics. First Oliver Williamson’s (1998) argument is addressed that EP supports the ‘transaction cost triple’ for describing human agents: opportunism, bounded rationality and farsighted contracting. The second attempt to relate evolutionary theory to economic theory is made in the so-called indirect evolutionary approach. This approach aims to explain what basic preferences evolutionary processes have endowed us with. The indirect evolutionary approach assumes that the insights of evolutionary theory can readily be accommodated within the analytical framework of standard economic theory. After a brief discussion of EP’s essential features an effort is made to find out which of the two attempts gets the main thrust of EP right.1 It is argued that after having had a first, superficial glance it seems that each of the two attempts is partly right and partly wrong. But if we dig deeper it turns out that at a more fundamental theoretical level they both got it wrong. It will be pointed out that EP’s basic presuppositions are incompatible with presuppositions underlying both Williamson’s transaction cost economics and the indirect evolutionary approach. The chapter concludes with a few speculations about alternative ways to link EP with economics.
54 Jack J. Vromen
Williamson on EP’s vindication of the transaction cost triple Williamson (1998) claims that the transaction cost triple for describing human agents – bounded rationality, farsighted contracting, and opportunism – finds support in the EP literature. Let us have a closer look at the argument that Williamson develops to back up this claim. What exactly is Williamson’s ‘transaction cost triple’? For reasons that will soon become clear it is instructive to distinguish between the meaning of the elements and their respective roles in the transaction cost economics (henceforth: TCE) framework. For Williamson ‘bounded rationality’ essentially is a negative concept. It basically says that in contrast to ‘perfect rationality’ agents do not have boundless or limitless capacities to acquire, store and process information, do not have boundless computational capacities, and so on. This is not to say that in problem-solving and decision-making agents cannot try to find and implement optimal solutions or try to make the best possible decisions. They can try to do all this. It is just that in their attempts to do so the capacities of agents are limited in various ways. Agents are intendedly rational, but only limitedly so, as Williamson has it. In Williamson (1998) it is argued in particular, first, that boundedly rational agents are prone to make judgement errors and, second, that boundedly rational agents employ decision-making heuristics. ‘Farsighted contracting’ refers to the capacity of agents, their bounded rationality notwithstanding, to foresee general consequences of different types of contract. Agents capable of farsighted contracting do not suffer from myopia. Because of this capacity to look ahead in time agents know when to expect harmful consequences from existing contract forms. They can devise or choose contract forms that avoid such harmful consequences. Williamson, finally, sees ‘opportunism’ as an extension of the standard assumption of self-interested behaviour in economic theory. To be more precise, he defines it as self-interest seeking with guile. We get a better view on how Williamson puts together these notions when we consider the role they play in the TCE framework. The main implication of bounded rationality in the TCE framework is that complete contracting is not a feasible option. Boundedly rational agents lack the capacity to foresee all possible future contingencies. Allowance should be made in contracts for flexible responses to unforeseen future events and developments. That is why we have incomplete contracts only. If only agents were not opportunistic, this would not pose a serious problem. But if agents (or at least a few of them) are opportunistic, as typically is assumed in TCE, then contract enforcement and contract compliance problems can be expected to arise. These problems cannot be solved just by contractants making promises to abide to the contract. As Williamson puts it, ‘mere promise, unsupported by credible commitments, is not selfenforcing’ (Williamson 1998: 3). Here, finally, the assumption of farsighted contracting comes in. Agents capable of farsighted contracting can foresee
Cognitive science meets evolutionary theory 55 that mere promises have unfortunate consequences in the form of conflicts. Relying on mere promises may stand in the way of fully exploiting all potential mutual gains. Agents will sooner or later realise that the missing credible commitments can be provided by governance structures (such as hierarchical ‘hands-on’ governance). To sum up then, Williamson argues that EP vindicates all three elements of his ‘transaction cost triple’ separately and subscribes to the way in which the three elements are linked with one another in his TCE. Not only is EP taken to endorse the view that opportunism and bounded rationality, understood in the way Williamson does, are two essential behavioural characteristics of human beings, EP is also taken to underwrite Williamson’s view that individuals can overcome contract compliance problems resulting from them by finding suitable governance structures.
The Indirect Evolutionary Approach (IEA) on the evolution of basic preferences Ben-Ner and Putterman (1998, 2000) argue that the promise EP holds out for economics is that it can identify our preference profiles in a nonarbitrary way. Zywicki (2000) voices the same expectation. EP can explain why we have the preferences that we have. Both Ben-Ner and Putterman (2000) and Zywicki (2000) note that EP suggests that humans are naturally endowed with altruistic inclinations (or, more generally, with otherregarding preferences). But they are quick to add that the altruism involved (of the Tit-for-Tat variety, for example) is of a reciprocal or conditional type. This means, they go on to argue, that the altruism EPists talk about really is some sort of enlightened egoism: individuals are only willing to give others a helping hand (or to co-operate with them) that reciprocate this favour. Only then is helping others out conducive to their own self-interest. Thus they take EP to be supporting the assumption often made in economic analyses that individuals are led by self-interest (if not selfishness). Gintis (2000) disagrees. Gintis grants that there are forms of reciprocal altruism that really are instances of self-interested co-operation. But EP indicates that there are also forms of ‘strong’ reciprocity to be observed;2 forms that cannot be reduced to self-interest. The image of human nature and of the human behavioural repertoire that EP comes up with considerably goes beyond Homo economicus, Gintis argues. Gintis introduces three new evolutionary models of human behaviour. The first one is that of Homo reciprocans: Homo reciprocans exhibits what may be called strong reciprocity, by which we mean a propensity to cooperate and share with others similarly disposed, even at personal cost, and a willingness to punish those
56 Jack J. Vromen who violate cooperative and other social norms, even when punishing is personally costly, and even when there are no plausible future rewards or benefits from so behaving.3 (Gintis 2000: 288) The other two models are that of Homo egualis4 – exhibiting an urge to reduce inequality, a weaker one when on top and a stronger one when on the bottom (Gintis 2000: 284) – and that of Homo parochius – exhibiting a tendency to divide the world into insiders and outsiders, and a tendency to favour insiders and to disfavour outsiders. Gintis’s view that evolution has endowed Homo sapiens with a motivational and behavioural repertoire that far exceeds that of the Homo economicus model seems to be shared by proponents of the so-called ‘Indirect Evolutionary Approach’ (IEA). Consider for example Güth and Yaari (1991), the paper in which the IEA was introduced.5 Güth and Yaari (1991) set out to show how a genetically determined preference for reciprocal behaviour could possibly have survived ruthless selection processes. In order to do this, Güth and Yaari consider a simple game in extensive form with two players. They confine their attention to an analysis of two different ‘gene types’ (as players): one player is assumed to be genetically disposed to reciprocate harm with harm, whereas the other player is assumed to be genetically disposed to yield to a harming opponent. Assuming in addition complete information and individual rationality, Güth and Yaari show that the reciprocating type is the only Evolutionarily Stable Strategy in the game. The interesting thing about this result is that, appearances notwithstanding, a preference to reciprocate is reproductively successful, not despite but because of its determined reciprocating nature. People genetically endowed with a preference to reciprocate can avoid being exploited by others – precisely because they are determined, regardless of the personal costs involved in doing so – to harm others if these others harm them (and the others know this).6 Thus like Gintis, Güth and Yaari also argue against the view that processes of biological evolution could possibly have led only to conditional or weak forms of reciprocity. It is entirely possible that a genetically encoded preference for unconditional or strong reciprocity, that guides behaviour also if that comes at a personal cost, has evolved. What sets the IEA apart from direct evolutionary approaches in economics is that evolution is believed to bear on human behaviour indirectly, via preferences, rather than directly.7 In the direct evolutionary approach of evolutionary game theory it is assumed that the behaviour of individuals is selected more or less directly in evolutionary processes. Environmental factors and variables, for example, or conscious thought are assumed not to intervene in processes in which what is selected (genes, for example) translate into overt behaviour. By contrast,
Cognitive science meets evolutionary theory 57 the guiding idea in the IEA is that while our present preferences bear witness of our evolutionary past as a species, our evolutionary past as a species does not fully determine how we behave nowadays. Our capacity to act rationally allows us to act flexibly and in accordance with our expectations about the future. Even though we may be called prisoners of our preferences, the IEA ‘does not neglect individuals’ ability to adjust their behavior in different environments when studying a selection process’ (Huck 1997: 777). The IEA’s basic logic, Huck writes, is that ‘preferences guide behavior, behavior determines fitness, and fitness drives the evolution of preferences’ (Huck 1997: 773). We have a sequence here of successive stages of interaction. In each stage preferences directly affect behaviour. But fitness differences ultimately determine what sorts of preferences tend to dominate the population and hence also indirectly what sort of behaviour survives in the long run.8 If preferences and fitness differences would coincide completely right from the start, then results like Güth and Yaari’s (1991) cannot be obtained. What gives the IEA its bite is that it investigates what happens if preferences differ from fitness differences. In a game like the trust game, analysed in Güth and Kliemt (1998), trust could never evolve if preferences were identical to fitness differences. It is only if we introduce players with different preference profiles, among them trustworthy players – players who do not take much pleasure in exploiting the trust put in them by others – and ‘sadist’ players – who take much pleasure in doing so, that trust can get off the ground. The IEA seems to be developed mainly to construct simple models capable of covering ‘the bewildering variety of evidence’ (Fehr and Schmidt 1999: 818) obtained in experimental game theory. In games such as the ultimatum and dictator games, for example, experiments consistently violate the prediction of perfect-equilibrium analysis (namely, that the proposer keeps virtually all the money to be divided). But in simple auction-market game experiments, play of the predicted subgame-perfect equilibrium is robustly observed after a few repetitions. Proponents of the indirect evolutionary approach typically reject positing different motives for the different sorts of games. Instead they argue that the same motivations hold across different games. A concern for relative payoff is included in the motivation function (Bolton and Ockenfels 2000), for example, or self-centred inequity aversion is assumed (Fehr and Schmidt 1999). What makes people’s behaviour different in different sorts of games, they argue, is not that people are led by different (mixes of) motivations, but by the different opportunities the different sorts of games offer for strategic manoeuvring.
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The bones of contention Williamson and the IEA seem to draw quite different, if not opposite conclusions from evolutionary theory. Whereas Williamson argues that EP supports his view that individual human beings are opportunistic, proponents of the IEA maintain that dispositions to engage in unconditional reciprocal and trustworthy behaviour are part of the encompassing preference profiles of individuals. And while Williamson argues that his assumption that individuals are boundedly rational (yet capable of farsighted contracting) is sustained, the IEA sticks to the assumption that individuals can and do act fully rationally on the basis of their preference profiles. Who is right? Who is closer to what evolutionary theory in general, and EP in particular have to say about these issues, Williamson or proponents of the IEA? Let us not rush to overhasty answers, but have a closer look at EP first.
Evolutionary psychology (EP) in a nutshell What is EP? In Vromen (1999) I argue that the following two claims put forward by EP can be seen as its essential features (see also Kennair 2002): 1
2
The human mind and its workings can best be understood in terms of a repertoire of separate modules. These modules are psychological mechanisms that are domain-specific (or special-purpose), contentspecialised and context-sensitive (this is sometimes called the Swiss army knife model of the human mind). Each psychological mechanism is an adaptation to a particular subset of evolutionary pressures prevailing in the Pleistocene era’s huntergatherer society (this is sometimes phrased as: our skulls house a Stone Age mind).
The second claim states that each psychological mechanism evolved as a solution to some particular adaptive problem in the distant past. There is no general presumption that our psychological mechanisms are well adapted to the circumstances prevailing in our present society.9 If our present society differs markedly from the hunter-gatherer’s society in which our ancestors lived in relevant respects, then it may well be the case that our ‘stone age’ mechanisms prevent us from arriving at optimal solutions to problems we are faced with now. To understand what is meant by the first claim better, it is instructive to turn to the pioneering work of Cosmides and Tooby that is perhaps still the most exemplary work in EP to date.10 A discussion of Cosmides and Tooby’s research probably also best brings out the gist of what is going on in EP. The issue preoccupying Cosmides and Tooby (1992) is that of cooperation.11 Individuals who in early times of mankind have been relat-
Cognitive science meets evolutionary theory 59 ively successful in engaging in mutually advantageous forms of co-operation, Cosmides and Tooby argue, have had an evolutionary advantage over those who have been less successful. Cosmides and Tooby rely on game-theoretic treatments as to what type of co-operative behaviour might possibly have evolved. In their view these treatments have culminated in Axelrod’s (1984) computer tournaments showing that Tit-for-Tat is a superior decision rule for a wide class of repeated PDs. If all individuals in a population play Tit-for-Tat, Cosmides and Tooby argue, then they can all be said to abide to a social contract. For they all can be said then to subscribe to the unwritten rule not to give in to the temptation to defect. If all play Tit-for-Tat, no one cheats on the social contract. Or, as Cosmides and Tooby put it, everyone incurs the cost (by not defecting) to reap the benefits of the social contract. Cosmides and Tooby spell out the requirements that are to be met for Tit-for-Tat to be feasible (or computable) for individual agents. They put these requirements in terms of algorithms (that are mostly related to numerical estimates agents make and to comparisons of these estimates) and decision rules (that link comparisons to particular types of actions to be taken). In the case of Tit-for-Tat they list fourteen algorithms and decision rules in total. The algorithm that captures Cosmides and Tooby’s particular attention is the one enabling agents to detect cheaters. For Titfor-Tat to work, agents must be able to register who is cheating. Otherwise they would not be able to retaliate selectively against those who have defected on the last occasion. Thus Tit-for-Tat entails the hypothesis that agents master the cheaters’ detection algorithm. Cosmides and Tooby subsequently report the empirical work that they themselves and others conducted to test this hypothesis. The Wason Selection Task is of particular importance here. Peter Wason was interested in the issue whether everyday learning corresponds to Popperian hypothesis testing – that is, whether people look for empirical evidence contradicting a hypothesis in their everyday learning. In order to find this out, Wason presented a formal representation of a conditional hypothesis to persons (‘If P then Q’) and confronted them with a choice between four cards. (The cards are said to contain all information about a case under consideration.) Each card has on the one side either P or not-P and on the other side Q or not-Q. Of each card only one side is showed to the persons. The first card has P, the second has not-P, the third has Q and the fourth has not-Q on top. The persons are asked what cards they have to check (to inspect their reverse) in order to find out whether the conditional hypothesis is violated. It should not be too difficult for people (especially for those who had some training in first-order logic), Wason thought, to figure out the right answer: the first and fourth cards have to be examined. For only a card with P on the one side and not-Q on the other can possibly contradict the hypothesis. But to his surprise less than 25 per cent of the respondents
60 Jack J. Vromen gave the right answer. Subsequent experiments in which persons were provided with real-to-life examples (rather than a formal representation of them) showed that the percentage of respondents giving the right answer is rather sensitive to the type of propositional content given to the conditional hypothesis. Changes in this percentage due to changes in the type of propositional content given to the hypothesis are called content effects. It turned out that the percentage raises to the highest level (75 per cent) if the terms in which the hypothesis is put is recognisably related to a ‘standard social contract’ problem. Thus, if the conditional hypothesis is presented as ‘If you take the benefit, then you pay the cost’, most respondents give the right answer and inspect the first and fourth card. Cosmides and Tooby take this as prima facie empirical support for their hypothesis that people indeed follow a cheater detection algorithm when faced with recognisable social contract problems.12 General-purpose rules, such as modus ponens and modus tollens in first-order logic, are not flawlessly applied by people across all domains. Rather, people follow specialpurpose rules that have evolved to solve specific problems in specific domains such as social interaction. These rules are content-specialised (or content-dependent) rather than content-independent: they are activated only by particular content domains (Cosmides and Tooby 1992: 166). Only in particular content domains certain special representational formats (in terms of costs incurred and benefits reaped, for example) do suggest themselves that direct the attention of the individuals involved to certain relevant factors and actions. In social contract problems, for example, people are particularly keen to spot people who reap benefits without incurring the corresponding costs. What we see here is that EP need not bring in evolutionary theory and evolutionary insights just as an add-on to (or rationale for) already and independently identified modules and mechanisms. Evolutionary theory and evolutionary insights may also provide a heuristic for identifying modules and mechanisms. This is what Cosmides and Tooby do: on the basis of evolutionary game-theoretic analyses Cosmides and Tooby hypothesise that humans avail of a specific cheater detection algorithm. Buss (1995: 12) calls this the function-to-form direction in which evolutionary analysis of psychological mechanisms can (and does) proceed. In a function-to-form analysis one starts by identifying a function (or adaptive problem, or ‘a lock’) and then searches for the form (or solution, or a key) that might fit. Alternatively, one could start with already and independently identified forms (mechanisms) and look for functions that these forms could serve. This is the form-to-function direction in which evolutionary theory can be brought to bear on the study of psychological mechanisms. Buss argues that EP proceeds in both directions. Cosmides and Tooby conclude that there is a special-purpose, contentspecialised algorithm for detecting cheaters in social contract problems. The cheater detection algorithm is just one of the algorithms, or modules,
Cognitive science meets evolutionary theory 61 our human mind is equipped with, EPists argue. Many more have evolved in the evolution of our species. Each of them evolved in a special domain of life, ‘designed’ by natural selection to solve a particular evolutionary problem within that domain.13 One of the distinguishing features of EP within evolutionary theory, it can be argued, is its fine-grained partitioning of the ultimate desideratum in biological evolution, relative reproductive success, into particular evolutionary pressures. This is what ‘specialpurpose’ and ‘domain-specificity’ are all about: they refer to the special purpose for which and the specific domain in which our ‘Darwinian’ algorithms originally evolved way back in time. ‘Content-specialised’ refers to the special content that informational input now has to have in order to activate some particular algorithm (or modules). A module is triggered only if stimuli with the right propositional content are provided. What about the third property EP assigns to our mind’s modules? What does it mean to say that our modules are ‘context-sensitive’? It basically means that our modules produce different representational and behavioural outputs in different contexts. Modules do this if they have a conditional form. People with such conditional modules who are exposed to different local circumstances will exhibit different representational and behavioural patterns.14 In this way, proponents of EP try to explain how cultural diversity comes about even if people across different cultures share the same repertoire of modules. After having elucidated the meaning of the three essential properties that EP ascribes to the mind’s modules, one may still be left wondering what modules (or, for that matter, psychological mechanisms) are. What stuff are they made of? Are they spatially separable brain circuits? No, strictly speaking they need not coincide with separate brain circuits.15 In EP’s scheme of things, mechanisms are functionally defined. In line with its overall evolutionary problem-solving orientation, mechanisms are identified by the tasks they perform. On Cosmides and Tooby’s own selfunderstanding EP engages in task analyses. What EP has to offer is a computational theory in David Marr’s terms (Cosmides and Tooby 1992: 178, 205). According to Marr, ‘an algorithm is likely to be understood more readily by understanding the nature of the problem solved than by examining the mechanism (and the hardware) in which it is embodied’ (Marr 1982: 27). Similarly, Cosmides and Tooby aim at the cognitive level of explanation: ‘the cognitive level of explanation describes psychological mechanisms in functional terms, as programs that process information’ (Cosmides and Tooby 1987: 283–284). Insofar as Cosmides and Tooby have something to say at all about brains and neurosciences, they do so in cognitive terms: ‘Because the function of the brain is informational in nature, its precise functional organization can be described accurately only in a language that is capable of expressing its informational functions – that is, in cognitive terms, rather than in cellular, anatomical, or chemical terms’ (Tooby and Cosmides 1995: 1190).
62 Jack J. Vromen EP believes that our psychological mechanisms dispose us to think, learn and behave in certain pre-formatted or pre-programmed ways. It is stressed in EP that we are often not aware of this. But this does not mean that EP holds that engagement in deliberate and purposeful thought and action is denied by our mechanisms. Buss (1995) argues that EP is fully consistent with the idea that individual human beings are (or at least can be) involved in goal-directed behaviour.16 But Buss also remarks that when we engage in goal-directed behaviour, underlying psychological mechanisms may affect the goals that we pursue and the ways in which we try to accomplish our goals without us knowing this. EP emphatically does not rule out the possibility that a lot of our behaviour is learnt rather than genetically instructed (Symons 1979: 9). EP does not want to be drawn into traditional nature versus nurture debates (Cosmides and Tooby 1987, 1992: 209). EPists rather want to transcend such traditional dichotomies. What EPists emphasise is that any learning effort always requires an evolved capacity to do so and that learning efforts always are directed or guided by psychological mechanisms to some degree. EP is quite controversial. It has been criticised from many different angles. Indeed, it can be argued that almost any aspect of EP is contested. EP’s alleged adaptationist overtones are criticised (Gould 1991, 1997), its hypothesis that there is ‘massive modularity’ is contested on both theoretical and empirical grounds (Samuels 1998; Fodor 2000), its lack of sufficiently carefully conducted empirical research and tests is criticised (Lloyd 1999; Downes 2001), its failure to connect with frontiers in the brain and neurosciences is criticised (Buller 2000). There are also criticisms that culture (and especially cultural transmission) is given short shrift by EP (Tomasello 1999), that EP neglects the role of ontogenetic development (Stotz and Griffiths 2001; Griffiths 2002), and that the claims made in EP transcend what can be substantiated by science (Dupré 2001). But, of course, the mere fact that EP is accused by many does not yet establish that it is ‘guilty’. The present author, who does not feel fully competent to adjudicate these debates, got the impression that many of the accusations made are heavily ideologically charged (which, of course, also does not by itself prove the accusations wrong). Furthermore, in order to get a more balanced picture it must also be acknowledged that EP seems to gain momentum in psychology (Kennair 2002). At any rate, it is too early to tell what the fate of EP in Academia will be.
The bones of contention I: motives Armed with at least a preliminary understanding of EP, we are better prepared now to answer the question who is closer to the general thrust of EP, Williamson or the IEA? Let us consider the motivational or affective aspect of behaviour first. What sorts of motivations, preferences, ‘passions’, feelings and the like are we equipped with, according to evolution-
Cognitive science meets evolutionary theory 63 ary theory in general, and EP in particular? This for sure is not the type of question that can be answered in a simple and straightforward way. What can be argued, however, is that several arguments and assertions put forward by both Williamson and proponents of the IEA are flawed and misguided. Williamson approvingly quotes Dawkins in order to find support for his view that opportunistic agents can find farsighted solutions for the problems they have to cope with: ‘One unique feature of man . . . is his capacity for conscious foresight.’ Indeed, Williamson goes on to argue, it is the ‘capacity to simulate the future in imagination . . . [that saves] us from the worst excesses of the blind replicators’ (Dawkins 1976: 200). Williamson takes Dawkins to be arguing that the worst excesses have their origins in our selfishness. There is no doubt that proponents of EP share the view that we can escape the tyranny of our selfish genes if we want to (Symons 1979). We are not the passive slaves or obedient executors of the genes that we carry. Williamson seems to attribute two features to Dawkins’s ‘selfish gene’ perspective, however, that neither Dawkins himself nor proponents of EP would accept. First there is the idea that unless counteracted by other forces such as farsightedness, our selfish genes would inflict myopic excesses upon us. The second feature is that these excesses have their origins in our selfishness. Dawkins does not assume that selfish genes necessarily lead to myopic behaviour. If we are organisms capable of farsighted behaviour and contracting, as Williamson assumes, then there must be selfish genes that make this possible. ‘Selfish genes’ are a prerequisite of farsighted behaviour rather than one of the forces competing with farsighted contracting in determining behaviour. The point Dawkins is trying to make is not that our selfish genes are blind, myopic forces that can be put on a par with other capabilities or forces that determine our behaviour. Genes do not affect our behaviour directly. Genes affect our behaviour only indirectly. Genes code for certain capabilities. These capabilities can develop into mechanisms that affect behaviour directly. The point Dawkins wants to make is that we can use our capability for farsighted behaviour to interfere in processes of biological evolution if we do not like the course biological evolution would be running without interference of this capacity. Dawkins does not argue that organisms hosting selfish genes must themselves be or behave selfish too. Dawkins calls genes selfish not because he ascribes some hidden agenda to them that they pursue secretly, inducing the organisms that they inhabit to behave accordingly. The notion of a selfish gene Dawkins coined as a convenient shorthand for expressing that no matter what are the immediate, proximate causes determining biological evolution’s course, what ultimately counts in biological evolution is relative reproductive success of genes in a population’s gene pool.17 The fact that in biological evolution a trait can only evolve if the ‘selfish genes’ of the vehicles (or interactors) having the trait are
64 Jack J. Vromen propagated in subsequent generations, does not imply that any such trait itself (or the vehicles having the trait) must be selfish too. Assuming that it does amounts to conflating two different levels of biological organisation. Selfish genes can make for genuine non-selfish organisms at a higher level of organisation. To acknowledge that such organisms are products of biological evolution (and, in a sense, vehicles of selfish genes) does not imply that these organisms cannot but be selfish ‘deep down below’. Dawkins makes it perfectly clear that he believes that biological evolution can bring about genuine altruism. In certain evolutionary settings the genes of genuine altruists are reproductively more successful than non-altruist organisms.18 Thus Williamson is wrong in arguing that evolutionary theory in general, and EP in particular, supports his assumption that individuals are opportunistic. As EP predicts, and as experimental evidence seems to substantiate, individuals go to great length (and even at considerable personal costs) in detecting and punishing those who threaten the prevailing social contract, for example. One could object here that ‘the iron logic’ of evolutionary theory demands that this eventually should bring the detectors – punishers (or at least their ‘selfish genes’) personal benefits. But this does not imply that the detectors – punishers (let alone their ‘selfish genes’) detect and punish because they expect to benefit from doing so. Evolutionary theory leaves room for the possibility that individuals who are committed to co-operate (or at least to reciprocate co-operation by others) for non-instrumental reasons have an evolutionary edge over others, not despite, but precisely because of their commitment (see, for example, Frank 1988). In this respect proponents of the IEA seem to have the better arguments. Proponents of the IEA do acknowledge our ability to engage in genuinely altruistic behaviour. What about the cognitive aspect of behaviour? What does evolutionary theory in general and EP in particular have to say about rationality?
The bones of contention II: rationality There does not seem to be a consensus in evolutionary theory whether or not human behaviour falls short of the ideal of perfect rationality. Some argue that natural selection has endowed us with a general-purpose device that enables us to find perfectly rational, optimal solutions to problems across the board. In economics, for example Aumann (1997) and Robson (2001) hold this view. This is emphatically not how EPists look at the relation between rationality and evolution, however. As noted above, one of the characteristic features of EP is precisely its argument that natural selection must have equipped human beings with a multitude of specialpurpose psychological mechanisms. There has never been such a thing as a general adaptive problem, it is argued. In ancestral environments there only have been special adaptive problems, and special problems call for
Cognitive science meets evolutionary theory 65 special solutions: a multitude of special-purpose devices make for more efficient solutions for these problems than one general-purpose device. Now how rational are these alleged special-purpose psychological mechanisms? Such mechanisms may well have outcompeted rival mechanisms in the distant past, as EPists argue, but do they still yield optimal solutions for the problems we face today? Not necessarily, as EPists themselves acknowledge. It depends. If our present environment is sufficiently similar to the ancestral environment in which our mechanisms emerged (often called the EEA: the environment of evolutionary adaptedness), then we may expect the mechanisms to still perform well (Kennair 2002: 24). But if that is not the case, then the mechanisms may prompt us to go and search in the wrong directions. Sometimes our evolved psychological mechanisms enable us to perform even better than rational (Cosmides and Tooby 1994). This is because the mechanisms often act as shortcuts. The mechanisms often generate behaviour quite quickly and effortlessly. They thus save on time and energy. A general-purpose device by contrast may engender behaviour only after having conducted a time- and energy-consuming search process. In general, whereas a general-purpose device is slow but ‘clean’, a specialpurpose device is quick but dirty (see also LeDoux 1996). This means that having a system of special-purpose mechanisms can also have its drawbacks. The system only yields good solutions if the problems still resemble the problems that gave rise to its emergence. Only then does the dirtiness of the system not bring about poor performance. It is perfectly possible that because of its ‘cleanness’ (or precision, or accuracy) a generalpurpose mechanism, though slower, does better in unprecedented environments. But if EPists are right, this option is simply not available to us. We simply do not possess a general-purpose mechanism. Let us get back to Williamson and the IEA now. Williamson argues that EP supports TCE’s assumption of bounded rationality. More specifically, he argues that EP endorses the view that in decision-making agents are guided by search heuristics and that because of this they are at least sometimes prone to make judgement errors. Williamson here refers to work in the so-called ‘Heuristics and Biases Program’ in experimental psychology. In their experiments, people like Daniel Kahneman, Amos Tversky and Richard Thaler have collected many biases, puzzles, and effects that they take to be anomalies for standard expected utility theory. It seems that Williamson is prepared to go along with the conclusions drawn in the ‘Heuristics and Biases Program’. On the other hand, Williamson takes sides with Gigerenzer (1996) in his critique of this program. Gigerenzer accuses Kahneman and Tversky of paying insufficient attention to the fact that some biases and puzzles may disappear if the problems subjects in experiments are confronted with are put in different terms. For example, if problems of choices under uncertainty are put to subjects in point estimates they appear to be poor statisticians. If
66 Jack J. Vromen the same problems are put to them in frequentist terms, however, they perform much better. Gigerenzer (1996) and especially Cosmides and Tooby (1996) argue that this remarkable difference in performance is due to the fact that problems of choice under uncertainty that our hominid ancestors had to deal with presented themselves in frequentist terms and not in terms of point estimates. A specialised frequentist mechanism evolved, they go on to argue, that is subsequently activated only if the right sort of informational input is provided. The conclusion Williamson seems to draw from this is that if there is something that is to be called irrational in Kahneman and Tversky’s experiments it is not the behaviour of the subjects in Kahneman and Tversky’s experiments but Kahneman and Tversky’s experimental design. As Williamson sees it, the problem with Kahneman and Tversky’s experimental design is that it is not informed by evolutionary considerations. Apparently Williamson believes that experimental results are more reliable if circumstances are approximately rebuilt in the experimental design that our hominid ancestors were faced with and in which our psychological mechanisms took shape. But this of course begs the question. It begs the question whether our present-day conditions and environmental circumstances ‘in the wild’ (that is, outside laboratory-like experimental settings) resemble the EEA closely enough to warrant the expectation that our evolved mechanisms bring about rational behaviour. After all, what is the point of attempts to recreate ancestral conditions in experiments if current conditions in actual life are markedly different from these conditions? If a lot of information in relevant real-to-life choice situations now comes to us in terms of point estimates, we are poor statisticians in these actual choice situations. It does not help to argue then that we once were reasonably good statisticians in the then prevailing conditions and that we can still be good statisticians if conditions are suitably altered.19 At any rate, Williamson’s take on the Gigerenzer–Kahneman and Tversky debate seems to reflect his overall attitude towards the issue of rationality. Although Williamson assumes bounded rationality, he does not believe that the bounds on and limitations in decision-making and problem-solving are very tight and restrictive. Individuals are assumed not to be able to foresee all possible future contingencies (hence complete contracting is impossible), but they are able to foresee possible hazards and take precautionary measures to prevent them from occurring (in the form of farsighted contracting). While Williamson accepts bounded rationality, he does not accept what Simon appeared to take as an integral part or as a corollary of it: satisficing. It seems that Williamson always regarded accepting satisficing in economic theorising as one step (or even a few steps) too far on the slippery slope to irrationality. All this shows that Williamson does not only cling to full or perfect rationality as some sort of self-evident benchmark in economic theorising, he also believes that the
Cognitive science meets evolutionary theory 67 degree of rationality to which actual individuals are capable in contracting falls short of this benchmark by only a tiny little bit. Like Williamson, Gigerenzer and his ABC group (the Center for Adaptive Behavior and Cognition; Gigerenzer et al. 1999; Todd and Gigerenzer 2000; Gigerenzer and Selten 2001) also accept bounded rationality. But unlike Williamson, Gigerenzer argues that a further theoretical elaboration of the notion of bounded rationality only can take either of the following forms: either models of satisficing are to be developed further (as Selten has been doing), or our ‘adaptive toolbox’ of fast and frugal heuristics is to be explored further (as Gigerenzer himself and his ABC group are doing). Both of them take a classic text of Simon as their starting-point.20 Models of satisficing primarily draw on Simon (1955), in which Simon concentrated on the limitations of actual decision-making organisms. Simon (1956) views decision-making from a complementary perspective. Here the focus is on the structure of the organism’s environment. Simon points out that the action-guiding principles of an organism need not be complex or sophisticated for the organism to satisfy its basic needs. The organism can succeed in doing this if it exploits clues in the environment to orient its search efforts. Gigerenzer’s ABC group’s notion of fast and frugal heuristics builds upon this idea: ‘fast and frugal heuristics employ a minimum of time, knowledge, and computation to make adaptive choices in real environments . . . the purest form of bounded rationality is to be found in fast and frugal heuristics, which employ limited search through objects (in satisficing) or cues and exploit environmental structures to yield adaptive decisions’ (Todd and Gigerenzer 2000: 731). Note how similar the ideas of Gigerenzer’s ABC group are to EP in this respect. Like EP’s psychological mechanisms the ABC group’s fast and frugal heuristics short-circuit decision-making, enabling individuals to make decisions with little sacrifice of time and energy. Indeed, the similarity between the two groups goes further than this. When proposing to replace traditional definitions of rationality by the new conception of ecological rationality, Todd and Gigerenzer draw on Cosmides and Tooby. The guiding idea behind ‘ecological rationality’ is that there are many environmental structures, each calling for a particular structure of heuristics. This also brings Todd and Gigerenzer to the notion of the adaptive toolbox: ‘the collection of specialized cognitive mechanisms that evolution has built into the human mind for specific domains of inference and reasoning, including fast and frugal heuristics’ (Todd and Gigerenzer 2000: 740). Their obvious disagreements notwithstanding, both Williamson and proponents of the heuristics and biases program accept full or perfect rationality as the benchmark.21 Williamson seems to believe that the degree to which actual individuals behave rationally pretty close approximates full or perfect rationality. Kahneman, Tversky and their pedigree claim that actual individuals behave much more irrationally. Despite these differences, all of them seem to share the view that the distance or
68 Jack J. Vromen deviation from full or perfect rationality indicates the degree to which individuals behave irrationally. In this view bounded rationality always involves some degree of irrationality. Todd and Gigerenzer disagree: ‘Bounded rationality is neither limited optimality nor irrationality’ (Todd and Gigerenzer 2000: 739). Instead, for them bounded rationality signifies a qualitatively different notion of rationality, ecological rationality, in which the focus is on the match between different specific environmental structures and the structure of the fast and frugal heuristics in the adaptive toolbox. What about the IEA? We saw that typically in the IEA full or perfect rationality is assumed. The idea is that when our basic preferences evolved long ago our ancestors acted rationally. That is, they acted in accordance with their preferences at that point in time and with the then prevailing circumstances. Thus proponents of the IEA apparently believe that a long time ago, before our current basic preferences evolved, our ancestors were already equipped with a general capability to behave optimally, given their preferences and circumstances at that time. This seems to be a highly improbable historical scenario. If there is a chronological order here, the general consensus in evolutionary theorising seems to be that it is more probable that our current capabilities to act rationally, whatever their precise nature and character, evolved only after our basic preferences were established. Proponents of the IEA have turned out to be sensitive to this criticism. Güth and Kliemt accept that ‘ “rationality” itself is the outcome of natural selection’ (Güth and Kliemt 1998: 379). Güth and Kliemt want to show that this insight can be accommodated within the IEA. Given this ambition, one would perhaps expect Güth and Kliemt to engage in an attempt to point out how rationality could have evolved before our basic preferences took their definitive shape. What they set out to do instead, however, is to demonstrate that there can be a two-tiered dynamic process in which short cycles, in which people learned how to adapt their behaviour to their then prevailing preferences, are embedded in long cycles, in which our basic preferences evolved. Güth and Kliemt argue that if the time and costs involved in the short cycles are negligible, the short cycles do not disturb the long cycles of preference formation that proponents of the IEA envision. On the basis of this ‘argument’, Güth and Kliemt can maintain that the IEA does not need to assume perfect rationality. People need not be endowed with a general capability to display optimal behaviour instantaneously for the general historical scenario depicted in the IEA about the evolution of our basic preferences to be sustained. What Güth and Kliemt tacitly assume, however, is that when our current basic preferences evolved, people were already endowed with a general capacity to learn relatively easy (or effortlessly) in a relatively short period of time how to adjust their behaviour to their preferences. This assumption runs counter
Cognitive science meets evolutionary theory 69 to one of the most essential ingredients of EP. EP holds that we do not avail ourselves of a general problem-solving or a general all-domain learning device. We only possess an array of special problem-solving and domain-specific learning devices. In some problem situations these devices enable us to arrive at good or even optimal solutions in a relatively short, costless and reliable learning process. In other problem situations, however, in situations in which we encounter unprecedented problems, for example, our devices may rather stand in the way of finding good solutions. Let us recapitulate the findings about the cognitive aspects of human behaviour that we have gathered so far. Like Williamson, proponents of the IEA retain perfect rationality as a useful benchmark. In this respect, both camps are equidistant from what especially Gigerenzer and his ABC group recommend: reject the demon-like notion of perfect rationality as a benchmark and replace it with a more realistic one. Unlike Williamson, however, proponents of the IEA seem to be blind to the possibility that at least sometimes our evolved search heuristics disable us to find optimal solutions for present-day problems. Sometimes we may be able to arrive at an optimal solution only after having gone through a time- and energyconsuming search or learning process. Sometimes we may even be unable to ever find an optimal solution. In this regard, Williamson seems to be closer to EP than the IEA.
Does EP call for a radically different view on human behaviour? Our results so far have been mixed. It was argued that, with respect to the motivational or affective component of behaviour, proponents of the IEA seem to be closer to EP than Williamson. There are situations in which individuals are led by genuinely altruistic (and hence non-self-interested and non-opportunistic) motivations. But with respect to the cognitive component EP seems to vindicate Williamson’s rather than the IEA’s assumptions about rationality. There are situations in which individuals are unable to arrive at perfectly rational choices. EP suggests that the degree to which individuals are able to behave rationally depends on the psychological mechanisms (and associated search heuristics) available and on the environmental circumstances that activate them. Yet it can be argued that the real message that EP entails for economic theory is less reconciliatory with either Williamson or proponents of the IEA than indicated so far. EP, it can be argued, suggests an altogether different view on how individual behaviour is generated, and how environmental circumstances affect this, than the view that Williamson and the IEA endorse. Beneath the disagreements between Williamson’s and the IEA’s view (as outlined above) there seems to be a basic agreement about how
70 Jack J. Vromen individual behaviour is generated. Williamson and proponents of the IEA disagree on whether appearances of altruistic behaviour are illusory or real and on whether individuals arrive at perfectly rational choices. But underlying these disagreements there is an agreement about the major constituents of individual behaviour and their basic properties. Both Williamson and proponents of the IEA assume that preference profiles and some degree to which individuals are able to act rationally are the major constituents of individual behaviour. Furthermore, they all assume that these two sorts of constituents are separable elements or components in decision-making processes. Finally, they all assume not only that different individuals have (roughly) the same preference profiles and the same degree of rationality, but also that the individuals’ preference profiles and degree of rationality are invariant across various environmental circumstances. Differences in behaviour between different individuals are accounted for in terms of different opportunities and different prices and costs. The same holds for differences in behaviour that the same individual displays in different environmental circumstances. Here too the differences are accounted for in terms of different configurations of opportunities and costs. EP seems to suggest a view that is markedly different from this. The only point of convergence, it seems, is that EP also assumes that when it comes to understanding how individual behaviour is generated, differences between individuals can be glanced over. EP focuses on psychological mechanisms that individuals have in common with each other. In this sense EP rehabilitates the notion that human nature is the same everywhere. But this does not mean that EP supports the notion of a unitary self. Quite to the contrary (see also Field 2001: 58). Unlike Williamson’s TCE and the IEA, EP does not subscribe to the view that the major behaviour-generating constituents are invariant across various environmental circumstances. As was already argued above, EP holds that the degree to which individuals are able to arrive at rational choices varies from the one sort of environmental circumstances to the other. If situated in the one sort of environmental circumstances, the psychological mechanisms that we are equipped with facilitate quick and optimal responses. If other sorts of circumstances obtain, our mechanisms enable us to arrive at optimal responses, but only after having gone through a laborious learning process. In yet other sorts of circumstances, we may never be able to find optimal responses. The sorts of environmental circumstances that EPists have in mind are quite unlike those that the economic theorists discussed above have in mind. According to the economic theorists, the essential dimensions of environmental circumstances relate to opportunities and costs. The general idea is that given their fixed preference profiles and fixed capability to act rationally, individual behaviour responds flexibly to changes in configurations of opportunities and costs. The image that EP suggests is
Cognitive science meets evolutionary theory 71 quite different. For EPists, the essential dimensions of environmental circumstances do not relate to present opportunities and costs but to the specific psychological mechanisms that they activate. The general idea here is not that the same psychological mechanisms are at work no matter what environmental circumstances prevail, but rather that different mechanisms are at work, depending on what sort of circumstances prevail. On the basic view of the economic theorists, it can be argued, prevailing opportunities and costs determine the particular sort of environmental circumstances that individuals are confronted with. Each different configuration of opportunities and costs makes for a different sort of environmental circumstances. By contrast, the partitioning of environmental circumstances into different sorts in EP is based on the specific psychological mechanism that is activated. Environmental circumstances belong to the same sort if they activate the same mechanism; they belong to another sort if they activate different mechanisms. EPists argue that environmental circumstances of the same sort are all in some way reminiscent of the original evolutionary problem that once gave rise to the mechanism in question. Yet, as Sperber (1996) emphasises, the environmental circumstances that now activate some mechanism may also be very different in many respects from the ones in the Pleistocene era responsible for the evolution of that mechanism. In particular, the ways in which environmental circumstances are now organised and categorised culturally may be quite unlike how environmental circumstances presented themselves to our ancestors.
An untidy bunch of input–output flow charts Sperber argues that the issue at stake can be put in terms of input conditions. Each mechanism or module has its own specific input conditions. Only if information is provided that meets its input conditions will a mechanism be activated. Given that EP adopts a computational approach towards psychological mechanisms, an input–output flow chart indeed seems to be well suited to visualise the workings of a psychological mechanism. The input to some mechanism is some piece of information satisfying its input conditions. Its output again consists of a piece of information or of overt behaviour. In between, which can be called the functioning of the mechanism proper, we have information-processing. Although EPists do not descend to the algorithmic level, and hence does not go into the details of the algorithms involved (Marr 1982: 24–27; Kennair 2002: 23), it is clear that EPists conceive of information-processing in terms of algorithms. In particular, they assume that inference rules and decision rules take care of the production of output, given some input. Now ‘inference rules’ and ‘decision rules’ may suggest that for EP the workings of a psychological mechanism are an altogether cognitive affair in which affective elements have no part to play. But this impression is
72 Jack J. Vromen misleading.22 EP maintains that affective and cognitive components are inextricably intertwined in the operation of psychological mechanisms. Economists who believe that psychological mechanisms can be treated as basic preferences may be wrong (for reasons that we are currently discussing), but they are on to something. Psychological mechanisms do relate to what we want, what we like, what we find agreeable and beautiful and the like. But the manner in which our desires and tastes affect the ways in which we process information (and, ultimately, our behaviour) differs from how economists see the relation between (basic) preferences and behaviour. Our desires and tastes are not homogenised in some preference ordering from which some goal can be derived that we pursue under all conceivable circumstances.23 Our desires, tastes, passions and instincts are more like predispositions (or inclinations, or propensities). They are not all active all of the time. Typically only one (or at most a few of them) manifests itself at a time. If manifested, they pull our learning efforts (including the inferences that we make), and our behaviour most of the time, unconsciously in certain directions. They colour our perceptions and bias what we do on the basis of them. The image of an input–output flow chart can also be fruitfully put to use to sum up the profound differences between Williamson’s TCE and the IEA on the one hand, and EP on the other. The input–output chart representing how Williamson and proponents of the IEA believe individual behaviour is generated is relatively simple (but quite demanding of humans). There is only one general-purpose, domain-unspecific algorithm linking informational input to behavioural output. On the input side, all information is assumed to satisfy the input conditions for the algorithm. The algorithm pays attention to opportunities and costs as the crucial variables in the environment. The algorithm (doing the information processing) itself reflects the interaction of two distinguishable constituents: a preference profile, as the affective or motivational constituent, and a general capacity to act rationally (at least to some degree) on the basis of the specific informational input provided and the preference profile, as the cognitive constituent. Given the specific informational input provided (some configuration of opportunities and costs), the algorithm directly produces behaviour as output. Differences in output are thus entirely due to the differences in environmental circumstances. It is always the same algorithm that is operating over and over again. Compare this with the input–output flow chart (or, rather, flow charts) in EP. There are many special-purpose, domain-specific algorithms.24 Each algorithm has its own input conditions. An algorithm is only triggered if some piece of information satisfies its input conditions. What aspects or variables of the environment an algorithm pays attention to depend on the algorithm in question. Differences in algorithms reflect different mixtures of affective and cognitive elements. It is hard, if not impossible, to disentangle these elements. Algorithms need not produce behaviour as output. They may also produce
Cognitive science meets evolutionary theory 73 new pieces of information that meet the input conditions of other algorithms. Thus there may exist sequences of algorithms in which the output of the one algorithm serves as input to another algorithm. We may conclude that the input–output flow charts of EP are considerably more complex and less neat than the economists’ flow chart. This is so for two reasons. First of all, instead of one algorithm having no input conditions, we have many algorithms all having their own input conditions. Second, instead of one algorithm leading linea recta to behaviour, we typically have sequences of interlocked algorithms. This means that we need to know a good deal more about the algorithms, their workings, their respective input conditions and the ways in which they are interlocked in order to tell what output is produced if some input is provided.
What difference does it make? At this juncture one may wonder what difference it makes whether the neat and simple flow chart of the economists or the messy and complex flow charts of EP are approximately right. What implications do any of these have for the types of individual behaviour that we can expect under various environmental circumstances? If the charts have the same implications, economists may not be terribly interested in replacing their own neat and simple chart by the messy and complex charts of EP. There are good reasons, both theoretical and empirical ones, however, to expect that the charts have different implications. The theoretical reason stems from the fact that the economists and EP envision different keys for the partitioning of sorts of environmental circumstances. For the economists each configuration of opportunities and costs constitutes a sort of its own. For EP there are as many sorts of environmental circumstances as there are psychological mechanisms. There is no a priori reason to assume that the sorts of environmental circumstances that economists envision coincide with those envisioned by EP. In fact, there are good reasons to assume that the two do not coincide since EPists argue that the partitioning of current sorts of environmental circumstances is reminiscent of the partitioning of evolutionary problems that our ancestors faced. This assumption seems to be supported by experimental findings. As Cosmides’s version of the Wason selection task shows, a different framing of what appears to be the same chunk of information may lead to a very different performance. If we look at this from the perspective of the economists’ flow chart this is a miracle. After all, the difference in framing has no consequences for the opportunities and costs that individuals are faced with. And, as we have seen, a difference in performance can only be forthcoming in the economists’ scheme of things if there are changes in the configuration of opportunities and costs. EP is tailor-made to explain findings
74 Jack J. Vromen like Cosmides’s. EP explains why output may be very sensitive to seemingly minor, if not negligible modifications of inputs: a slightly modified input may satisfy the input conditions of a different mechanism. In other words, a modification of informational input that seems to be negligible from the perspective of the economists’ partitioning may from the perspective of EP’s partitioning imply the transition to a new sort of environmental circumstances. Conversely, significant changes in the configuration of opportunities and costs (significant, that is, from the perspective of economic theory) need not lead to significant changes in behaviour. Experimental findings in co-operative and bargaining games suggest that subjects are willing to reciprocate co-operative behaviour of others even at a considerable personal cost. Reciprocation of co-operative behaviour is only intelligible in the economists’ scheme of things if environmental circumstances are such that there are (expectations of) personal benefits involved. It is a miracle if environmental circumstances are such that there are personal costs involved. EP suggests that in cases like this the relevant environmental circumstances did not change significantly. They still belong to the same sort: the same mechanism remains activated. This may have consequences also for policy issues. What appears to be a rational policy from the perspective of economic theory may not be rational at all from the perspective of EP. In order to achieve some social goal, for example, economists may count on the price effect and advise a suitable adjustment of the incentive structure. EP may help explain, however, why this sometimes yields adverse effects. EP may help explain, for example, when and why crowding out of intrinsic by extrinsic motivation (or the justification effect; see Frey 1997) can be expected. Empirical evidence indicates that sometimes adverse effects are produced when some authority manipulates the incentive structure in order to enhance contributions of individuals (to produce more public goods, for example). An explanation of this in line with the overall thrust of EP’s framework is that because of the changes in the incentive structure (and presumably also because of the way in which this is presented) another, more self-serving mechanism is activated than the less selfserving mechanism (based on a sense of civic duty, for example) activated so far.
Concluding remarks EP, we have seen, allows for the possibility that individual human beings are led by non-opportunistic considerations. In this respect, the IEA seems closer to EP than Williamson. But in another respect Williamson seems to be closer to EP than the IEA: EP suggests that at least sometimes our stone-age psychological mechanisms produce behaviour that is ill-adapted to current circumstances. But we have also seen that it is doubtful whether
Cognitive science meets evolutionary theory 75 EP allows for such a conceptual distinction between motivational and affective aspects of behaviour on the one hand and cognitive aspects on the other. EP seems to imply a view on human behaviour in which motivational (and emotional) and cognitive aspects are inextricably intertwined. One of the exciting features of EP is that it holds out the hope of transcending traditional dichotomies. Instead of assuming that behaviour is based on either emotion or cognition, EP assumes that behaviour always reflects both. Likewise, instead of assuming that either nature or nurture must have the greater effect on human behaviour, EP assumes that both are always involved in human behaviour in a way that makes it impossible (or at least silly) to assign relative weights to either of them. Strong cultural or environmental influences on human behaviour presuppose rather than defy ‘nature’: they presuppose a strong innate susceptability in human beings to these sorts of influences. This also implies that the dichotomy innate versus learned is misconceived as well. Any learning effort presupposes an innate capacity for making the effort and, furthermore, will be guided by pre-formed heuristics.25 It was also argued that EP might entail revolutionary implications for economic theorising. EP’s view that our psychological mechanisms are domain-specific (or special-purpose) and content-specialised seems to imply an understanding of human behaviour that is radically different, not just from both Williamson and the IEA but from almost any kind of economic theorising that we have witnessed so far. It can be argued that EP supports the notion of the fragmented or multiple self that has received only scant attention in economics (Elster 1979; Schelling 1984; Kuran 1995). EP conceives of the human mind in terms of a multitude of psychological mechanisms, each of which is activated only under suitable circumstances. What is more, EP suggests that the relevant dimensions in environmental circumstances that determine which mechanism is activated may be quite different from the dimensions standard economic theory focuses on (to wit, personal benefits and costs). Thus, EP may be able to explain why individual behaviour sometimes is much less sensitive to changes in opportunities and costs than standard economic theory predicts. It may well be the case that many economists find such implications of EP too radical. They may not be ready yet to abandon their beloved theoretical framework. They may also find some theoretical justification for their resistance in the fact that EP is quite controversial and that it is still in its infancy.26 But if EP makes some headway, and if puzzling experimental evidence and anomalous empirical data accumulate, the time may be ripe for a wholesale reconsideration of the economic theory’s edifice.
76 Jack J. Vromen
Notes 1 For other interesting investigations of the relation between EP and economics, see Hodgson (1998a, 1998b) and Twomey (1998), Hoffman et al. (1998) and Friedman (2001). See also Frank (1988, 1999) for interesting attempts to infuse insights from evolutionary theory in general and EP in particular into economic theory. 2 According to Gintis, this is borne out in the experimental psychology literature. 3 See also Fehr and Gächter (2002) on the related notion of altruistic punishment. 4 The equality sought can pertain to chances, opportunities and treatment of the individuals involved. If so, Gintis’s Homo egualis is similar to what Ben-Ner and Putterman call process-regarding preferences. 5 See also Güth and Kliemt (1994, 1998), Güth (1995), Huck (1997), Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), Bolton (2000). 6 The crux of the matter here, it can be argued, is that ‘subjective’ valuations (determining what the players do) are different from ‘objective’ results (determining what type has survival value). 7 Güth and Kliemt argue that what makes the IEA indirect is that preferences influence evolutionary success indirectly (Güth and Kliemt 1998: 384). This suggests that in a direct evolutionary approach, such as evolutionary game theory, preferences influence evolutionary success directly. This suggestion is misleading, I think. In evolutionary game theory either preferences are not taken to be part of evolutionary processes at all (and then they do not influence evolutionary success at all), or they are taken into account, but then they must be at least part of what ‘evolutionary success’ means. In either way, it is misleading to say that preferences influence evolutionary success directly. This is why I opt for a somewhat different interpretation of ‘indirect’. 8 See also ‘while choices are motivated by the preferences, which may include an internal commitment to norms, objective evolutionary success of preference types depends on “external incentives” ’ (Güth and Ockenfels 2000: 336). 9 Some hold that EP is sociobiology dressed up with a new label. It can be argued, however, that there is at least one significant difference (Vromen 2001). Whereas sociobiology assumes that evolutionary forces directly impinge on manifest behaviour, EP assumes that evolutionary forces in a distant past influence our behaviour indirectly via psychological mechanisms that are adapted to the then prevailing circumstances (and not necessarily also to circumstances prevailing now). 10 It was Leda Cosmides who started this line of research in her Harvard University Ph.D. dissertation (see Cosmides 1989). 11 Cosmides and Tooby take co-operation to be an evolutionary problem falling under the more general rubric of social interaction. Other problems falling under the same rubric are those of mate selection, threat and coercion. Besides the rubric of social interaction Cosmides and Tooby also distinguish between the rubrics of food acquisition and disease avoidance, for example. 12 Cosmides and Tooby do not rest content with this result. They consider several rival explanations of the experimental findings at length. Several modified versions of the experiment are run in order to tell which explanation gets it right. On the basis of the results obtained the rival explanations are rejected. 13 In fact one can say that in EP’s scheme of things, domains are identified by the evolutionary problems to be solved. 14 EP’s notion of culture accompanying this is ‘evoked culture’. 15 In philosophical jargon this point is sometimes put in terms of multiple realis-
Cognitive science meets evolutionary theory 77
16 17 18
19
20 21
22
23
24 25 26
ability: one and the same algorithm can be instantiated in different material substrata. For a more elaborate discussion of this issue, see Vromen (2001). For a further discussion of this, see also Vromen (1995: ch. 7, sect. 5). Furthermore, as Sober and Wilson (1998) convincingly point out, even if it were true that biological altruism cannot evolve, there might still be psychological altruism. Even if there were only selection processes at the level of genes, ruling out the possibility of biological altruism, that is, people might still be willing to sacrifice some of their belongings out of a concern with the wellbeing of others. For a more elaborate discussion of Sober and Wilson’s notion of group selection, see Vromen (2002). For normative purposes this information may be very relevant, of course. In general, if we think we know in what conditions our performance would be improved, we could try to change conditions in that direction. This line of thought is perfectly compatible with EP (see Buss 1999: 18–19). Simon himself once wrote that ‘I would send these two publications to another galaxy’ (Simon 1982: 204). This benchmark of perfect rationality seems similar to what Simon (1978) calls substantive rationality: it focuses on how well the behaviour displayed meets some optimality or efficiency standards. By contrast, EP and the ABC group seem to invoke a notion of procedural rationality. Here the focus is on the process (and not on the outcomes) of decision-making and problemsolving. This need not be misleading if ‘cognitive’ is taken to include possible affective components (as often is done in cognitive science). For economists (and many others as well) cognitive and affective components are assumed to exclude each other. It should be noted here, however, that ‘preferences’ sometimes are interpreted as mere behavioural dispositions (see Sugden 1991). On this ‘minimalist’ interpretation preferences seem to be quite similar to what EPists call modules (or mechanisms, or epigenetic rules). The economists discussed in this chapter do not seem to subscribe to this minimal interpretation, however. It would be more appropriate to talk of sets of algorithms, as a psychological mechanism typically involves several algorithms. To avoid cumbersome phrases, however, I will simply talk of algorithms. It is tempting to add the mind–body dichotomy here. But this may be a bit premature, as EP does not have terribly much to say about the ways in which the mind’s mechanisms are instantiated in brain processes. For a more elaborate related discussion about the vicissitudes of crossdisciplinary learning, see Vromen (2003).
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78 Jack J. Vromen Preferences and Institutions’, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 43: 91–99. Bolton, G.E. (2000) ‘Motivation and the Games People Play’, in Leonard D. Katz (ed.), Evolutionary Origins of Morality, Thorverton: Imprint Academics, 285–291. Bolton, G.E. and Ockenfels, A. (2000) ‘ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition’, The American Economic Review, 90(1): 166–193. Buller, D.J. (2000) ‘A Guided Tour of Evolutionary Psychology’, in Marco Nami and Massimo Marraffa (eds), A Field Guide to the Philosophy of Mind, Department of Philosophy, University of Rome (http://www.uniroma3.it/kant/field/) Buss, D.M. (1995) ‘Evolutionary Psychology: A New Paradigm for Psychological Science’ Psychological Inquiry, 6: 1–30. —— (1999) Evolutionary Psychology: The New Science of the Mind, Boston: Allyn & Bacon. Caporael, L.R. and Brewer, M.B. (eds) (1991) Issues in Evolutionary Psychology. (Special Issue of the Journal of Social Issues, 47(3).) Cosmides, L. (1989) ‘The Logic of Social Exchange: Has Natural Selection Shaped How Humans Reason?’, Cognition, 31: 187–276. Cosmides, L. and J. Tooby (1987) ‘From Evolution to Behavior: Evolutionary Psychology as the Missing Link’, in J. Dupré (ed.), The Latest on the Best, Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 277–306. —— (1992) ‘Cognitive Adaptations for Social Exchange’, in J.H. Barkow, L. Cosmides and J. Tooby (eds), The Adapted Mind, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 163–228. —— (1994) ‘Better than Rational: Evolutionary Psychology and the Invisible Hand’, American Economic Review, 84: 327–332. —— (1996) ‘Are Humans Good Intuitive Statisticians After All? Rethinking Some Conclusions from the Literature on Judgment Under Uncertainty’, Cognition, 58: 1–73. Dawkins, R. (1976) The Selfish Gene, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Downes, S.M. (2001) ‘Some Recent Developments in Evolutionary Approaches to the Study of Human Cognition and Behavior’, Biology and Philosophy, 16(5): 575–595. Dupré, J. (2001) Human Nature and the Limits of Science, Oxford: Clarendon Press. Elster, J. (1979) Ulysses and the Sirens: Studies in Rationality and Irrationality, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Fehr, E. and Schmidt, K. (1999) ‘A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114: 817–868. Fehr, E. and Gächter S. (2002) ‘Altruistic Punishment in Humans’, Nature, 415: 137–140. Field, A.J. (2001) Altruistically Inclined? The Behavioral Sciences, Evolutionary Theory, and the Origins of Reciprocity, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press. Fodor, J. (2000) The Mind Doesn’t Work That Way, Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press. Frank, R.H. (1988) Passions within Reason, New York: W.W. Norton & Company. —— (1999) Luxury Fever: Why Money Fails to Satisfy in an Era of Excess, New York: Free Press.
Cognitive science meets evolutionary theory 79 Frey, B.S. (1997) Not Just for the Money: An Economic Theory of Personal Motivation, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. Friedman, D. (2001) ‘Economics and Evolutionary Psychology’, Indret, Working paper no. 48: http://www.indret.com/eng/artdet.php?ed53&Idioma eng&IdArticulo392) Gigerenzer, G. (1996) ‘On Narrow Norms and Vague Heuristics: A Reply to Kahneman and Tversky’, Psychological Review, 103: 592–596. Gigerenzer, G., Todd, P.M. and the ABC Research Group (1999) Simple Heuristics That Make Us Smart, New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press. Gigerenzer, G. and Selten, R. (eds) (2001) Models of Bounded Rationality, Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press. Gintis, H. (2000) Game Theory Evolving, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. Gould, S.J. (1991), ‘Exaptation: A Crucial Tool for an Evolutionary Psychology’, in Caporael and Brewer (1991): 43–65. —— (1997) ‘Darwinian Fundamentalism’, The New York Review of Books, 44: 34–37. Griffiths, P.E. (2002) ‘Evo-Devo Meets the Mind: Towards a Developmental Evolutionary Psychology’, in R. Brandon and R. Sansom (eds), Integrating Evolution and Development, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Güth, W. (1995) ‘An Evolutionary Approach to Explaining Cooperative Behavior by Reciprocal Incentives’, International Journal of Game Theory, 24(4): 323–344. Güth, W. and Kliemt, H. (1994) ‘Competition or Cooperation: On the Evolutionary Economics of Trust, Exploitation and Moral Attitudes’, Metroeconomica, 45(2): 155–187. —— (1998) ‘The Indirect Evolutionary Approach: Bridging the Gap Between Rationality and Adaptation’, Rationality and Society, 10(3): 377–399. Güth, W. and Ockenfels, A. (2000) ‘Evolutionary Norm Enforcement’, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 156(2): 335–347. Güth, W. and Yaari, M.E. (1991) ‘Explaining Reciprocal Behavior in Simple Strategic Games: An Evolutionary Approach’, in U. Witt (ed.), Explaining Process and Change: Approaches to Evolutionary Economics, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 23–34. Hodgson, G. (1998a) ‘The Approach of Institutional Economics’, Journal of Economic Literature, 36: 166–192. —— (1998b) ‘Thorstein Veblen’s Evolutionary Economics’, Cambridge Journal of Economics, 22: 415–431. Hoffman, E., McCabe, K.A. and Smith, V.L. (1998) ‘Behavioral Foundations of Reciprocity: Experimental Economics and Evolutionary Psychology’, Economic Inquiry, 36: 335–352. Huck, S. (1997) ‘Institutions and Preferences: An Evolutionary Perspective’, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 153(4): 771–779. LeDoux, J. (1996) The Emotional Brain: The Mysterious Underpinnings of Emotional Life, New York: Simon & Schuster. Kennair, L. and Ottesen, E. (2002) ‘Evolutionary Psychology: An Emerging Integrative Perspective Within the Science and Practice of Psychology’, Human Nature Review, 2: 17–61. Kuran, T. (1995) Private Truths, Public Lies, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
80 Jack J. Vromen Lloyd, E. (1999) ‘Evolutionary Psychology: The Burdens of Proof’, Biology and Philosophy, 14: 211–233. Marr, D. (1982) Vision: A Computational Investigation into the Human Representation and Processing of Visual Information, San Francisco: Freeman. Robson, A.J. (2001) ‘The Biological Basis of Economic Behavior’, Journal of Economic Literature, 39: 11–33. Samuels, R. (1998) ‘Evolutionary Psychology and the Massive Modularity Hypothesis’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 49: 575–602. Schelling, T. (1984) Choice and Consequence, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Simon, H.A. (1955) ‘A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 69: 99–118. —— (1956) ‘Rational Choice and the Structure of the Environment’, Psychological Review, 63(2): 129–138. —— (1978) ‘Rationality as a Process and as Product of Thought’, American Economic Review, 68: 1–16. —— (1982) Models of Bounded Rationality: Vol. 2, Behavioral Economics and Business Organization, Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press. Sober, E. and Wilson, D.S. (1998) Unto Others: The Evolution and Psychology of Unselfish Behavior, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Sperber, D. (1996) Explaining Culture: A Naturalistic Approach, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Stotz, K.C. and Griffiths, P.E. (2001) ‘Dancing in the Dark: Evolutionary Psychology and the Argument from Design’, in S. Schwer and M. Rauscher (eds), Evolutionary Psychology: Alternative Approaches, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Sugden, R. (1991) ‘Rational Choice: A Survey of Contributions from Economics and Philosophy’, Economic Journal, 101: 751–785. Symons, D. (1979) The Evolution of Human Sexuality, New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press. Todd, P.M. and Gigerenzer, G. (2000) ‘Précis of Simple Heuristics that Make us Smart’, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 23: 727–780. Tomasello, M. (1999) The Cultural Origins of Human Cognition, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Tooby, J. and Cosmides, L. (1995) Mapping the Evolved Functional Organization of the Mind and Brain, in M.S. Gazzaniga (ed.), The Cognitive Neurosciences, Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1185–1197. Twomey, P. (1998) ‘Reviving Veblenian Economic Psychology’, Cambridge Journal of Economics, 22: 433–448. Vromen, J. (1995) Economic Evolution: An Enquiry into the Foundations of New Institutional Economics, London: Routledge. —— (1999) ‘Evolutionary Psychology and Economic Theory’, Paper presented at the annual ISNIE Conference, Washington, D.C., 17–19 September. —— (2001) ‘The Human Agent in Evolutionary Economics’, in J. Laurent and J. Nightingale (eds), Darwinism and Evolutionary Economics, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. —— (2002) ‘Stone Age Minds and Group Selection – What Difference Do They Make?’, Constitutional Political Economy, 13(2): 173–195. —— (2003) ‘What Can Be Learnt from “Serious Biology and Psychology”?’ (To
Cognitive science meets evolutionary theory 81 appear in Proceedings of Annual EAEPE Conference, 2001 in Berlin, edited by Klaus Nielsen and Stavros Iaonnides.) Williamson, O.E. (1998) ‘Human Actors and Economic Organization’, Paper presented at ISNIE Conference, Paris. Wilson, E.O. (1998) Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge, New York: Alfred A. Knopf. Zywicki, T. (2000) ‘Evolutionary Biology and the Social Sciences’, Human Studies Review, 13(1): http://libertyguide.org/libertyguide/hsr/hsr.php/36.html
3
Towards a cognitive experimental economics Marco Novarese
Introduction For the last few years, economic literature has shown a new stream of analysis, at the crossroads of the heterodox tradition and cognitive sciences. A new approach is born, called cognitive economics, since attention is focused on the study of individual and organizational learning, seen as a key factor in shaping social phenomena (Rizzello 1999). This new stream of analysis aims at refunding economic methodologies, starting from more realistic hypotheses than those at the basis of the mainstream. Therefore, empirical observation of learning and decision-making is necessary. Experimental economics, as the main way to gather data on these aspects, is essential for the development of such an approach. At the moment, though, there is still a lack of methodological discussion on how to perform experiments. This chapter aims at analysing the relation between experimentalism and the cognitive approach in economics. As will be shown, cognitivism implies and requires methodological and procedural peculiarities – as compared with the mainstream – in the realization of experiments and in the analysis of the relative data. These differences depend, first of all, on the fact that, though it is deeprooted in social sciences, this can be considered a new-born discipline with obvious different necessities from those of an older science. At the moment, in fact, empirical analysis should here be directed mainly towards the gathering of empirical evidence, instead of comparing alternative models to find the best one. The importance of this descriptive interest is also related to the goal of understanding reality, and not just building models with predictive capacity. One of the main questions suggested by the cognitive literature, a question which raises many theoretical and empirical problems, is the heterogeneity of human agents. Ceteris paribus hypotheses cannot be simply posed and accepted, but should be tested and verified. Differences among subjects should, in fact, be studied and understood. But this goal requires new instruments and new kinds of analysis. For example, individuals,
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because of their differences, can react in different ways to the same experimental treatment. A macro analysis could then lead to conclude that a variable is not relevant, because positive and negative effects can compensate each other at a mean level. But the ‘mean agent’ might make no sense. Some new devices and tools are available to carry on the study. New kinds of experiments, psychological tests and interviews have been recently developed and tested. Also the interaction between experimentalism and computational economics and its simulations can be very useful. Simulations with artificial agents is a growing and promising area of research; but the heterogeneity of human agents makes it difficult, at the moment, to perform such models without looking at the real world. The risk would be, again, that of a science disconnected from reality. The following discussion is necessarily of a preliminary nature. At the moment there are many questions asked and few definite answers, but some early results are encouraging. This chapter also aims at raising a necessary methodological discussion on the general experimental methods. Some of the problems which emerge while conducting experiments based on a cognitive approach can, in fact, be relevant in more general terms. This work is organized in the following way. The first section proposes some methodological and historical notes on experimental economics and singles out a specific newborn cognitive stream of studies. Some peculiarities seem to characterize papers that can be related to this approach. Then a series of methodological and procedural problems and results are discussed through the presentation of two experiments conducted at the Centre for Cognitive Economics in Alessandria. The first one is designed to study individual learning. It helps us demonstrate that a detailed analysis of each player’s individual data is necessary and useful. The second one is directed to investigate team learning and to show two possible tools: psychological tests and interviews.1 The penultimate section proposes some considerations on the relationship between simulations with artificial agents and experiments. Conclusions follow.
Experimental economics and cognitive economics: some historical and methodological notes A historical perspective Usually three main areas of research are supposed to characterize the development of experimental economics (see, for example, Roth 1993): • • •
experiments on markets; experiments on human reasoning and decision-making (mainly focused on von Neumann and Morgenstern’s theory of expected utility); experiments on the theory of games.
84 Marco Novarese Novarese and Rizzello (1999) individuate a fourth, very recent and – at the moment – less developed, stream: the one focused on individual and organizational learning and, more generally on cognitive economics. The main papers concerning this are by Cohen and Backdayan (1991), Egidi and Narduzzo (1997) and Novarese and Rizzello (2003). This classification is obviously arbitrary, as is common in this type of case. Consider two examples, showing how a different classification could be used: 1
2
The theory of games has been used to model market mechanisms or individual decision-making and learning (i.e. the issues that define the other areas). Cognitive economics is strictly related to important experiments classified in the stream on decision-making (see Rizzello 1999), such as Allais (1953), or Kahneman and Tversky (1979, 1992).
Yet the proposed classification is useful to evidence origins and specificity of the different disciplinary areas that gave birth and favoured the development of experimental economics, influencing its methodological evolution. In this sense, for example, the theory of games had a fundamental role in stimulating the realization of experiments and the debate on them during the 1950s, thanks to the Rand Association (see Innocenti 1995). Similarly, then, it seems useful to separate the fourth stream from the others, because of its novelty, in terms of methodological and procedural aims and problems, and also because of the hypothesis under investigation. A methodological perspective Even if sometimes the mainstream has considered it as a minor discipline, experimental economics has often been, directly or indirectly, put at the service of the neoclassical approach, that has also affected its methodological development. Different examples could be proposed. Consider the ones presented here; others will follow. John Hey (1991), one of the most important scholars in this field, states that experimentalism allows the testing of economic models under ceteris paribus hypotheses. Then economics can test its models just as sciences such as physics and chemistry do. Hey and Darnanoni (1988) show that, even if subjects use rules of thumb to take decisions in an experiment on consumer behaviour, they make the optimal choice ‘as if’ they were able to maximize. The theoretical model under analysis seems perfectly able to survive the test of the real world; experiments are used to test this fact.2 In introducing one of the first papers of the new approach, Egidi and Narduzzo (1997) underline a different point: experiments make it possible
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to gather empirical evidence (for example, on learning processes) on aspects otherwise almost impossible to observe in the field. One of the main difficulties is the tacitness and opacity of mental mechanisms for the individual. For this reason, there are problems in the use of standard psychological experimental tools (like protocol analysis, for example), and different tools are required. Since the cognitive approach aims to be close to reality, experimental contests are here usually more complex. As Hey (1991) suggests, in fact, experimental economics usually deals with simple situations because that is the requirement of the theories. Take the studies of Allais (1953) and Kahneman and Tversky (1979, 1992). They are interested in criticizing the theory of expected utility. This model represents the main point of reference in their experimental setting, but it also becomes the cornerstone on which the performance of their alternative model (the prospect theory) is built and compared. Individuals are called upon to face different kinds of (implicit or explicit) lotteries and similar situations, of which they are generally perfectly informed on all relevant probabilities and on the numerical data necessary to choose. In the real world, these situations – that according to Knight (1921) are characterized by risk, as opposed to uncertainty – are still very uncommon. Novarese and Rizzello’s or Egidi and Cohen’s experiments are very different, as individuals build their knowledge in a context characterized by uncertainty and, even if well-defined hypotheses are tested, there is no model to which the laboratory framework is designed. Other differences inevitably follow. In what I call ‘traditional experiments’, attention is usually focused on the possible differences among treatment groups. In the other stream, even if there are treatments, there is also a strong descriptive stress. As subjects face complex tasks (and not just simple hypothetical market or game sets), and as the experimenter aims at building models of the real learning processes and decision-making (and not just to compare different theories), players’ behaviour is seen as interesting in itself and is also analysed beyond treatment groups. These practices are coherent with the recalled idea of experimental economics as a means to gather data on aspects otherwise difficult to study. The researcher is interested in understanding why subjects behave in the way they do, so attention is also focused on individual data and not just on macro phenomena. Probably, these differences also reflect the different stages in the development of the two approaches and the resulting differences in their needs: on the one hand there is the mainstream, with long years of development, on the other hand there is a newborn discipline. The following sections show some examples of analyses, results and problems related to the new ‘cognitive experimental economics’. It is useful to anticipate the main methodological problems faced and their major effects. These problems are suggested both by the empirical
86 Marco Novarese practice and by the cognitive science itself. While they are probably more important in relation to the new approach, they have also a more general applicability. The laboratory, even with all precautions taken, can hardly be a neutral place in which individuals forget the lives they usually lead (as sometimes some experimentalists seem to hope). Their lives are not those of neoclassical agents. On the contrary, lives are full of ideas, beliefs, knowledge and information. All of these elements differ in different players, as they are linked to and dependent on their personal attitude, experiences, studies, jobs, and so on. And all of these differences enter the laboratory with the players and guide their behaviour.3 Furthermore, if players were the agents of neoclassical economics, experiments would be useless as results would be identical to those reached in the models! As we will see, many different factors influence players’ behaviour. All these factors cause loss of control and increase variability among players. It should be underlined that people can react in different ways to the same treatments because of problems related to social experimentation, and also because of their personal differences; experiments (luckily) cannot cancel this fact. As we will see in the following sections, aggregated data can sometimes be inevitably misleading, as they picture a mean player that is different from each real player. To understand how people behave, it then becomes necessary to study each individual case. The following methodological remarks on the analysis of the firm by Herbert Simon (1992: 20) seem useful in relation to experiments: If you are trying to understand what firms are and how they operate, you will learn a lot from this kind of very detailed study of the processes of decision . . . Of course, we should not stop with five firms. Biologists have described millions of species of plants and animals in the world, and they think they’ve hardly started the job. Now, I’m not suggesting that we should go out and describe decision making in a million firms; but we might at least get on with the task and see if we can describe the first thousand. That doesn’t immediately solve the aggregation problem, but surely, and in spite of the question of sampling, it is better to form an aggregate from detailed empirical knowledge of a thousand firms, or five, than from direct knowledge of none. But the latter is what we have been doing in economics for too many years.
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Learning, individual behaviour and methodological problems in experiments An experiment on individual learning The first example proposed is an experiment on individual learning. Additional notes and results on this experiment and on its theoretical framework are presented in Novarese and Rizzello (2003), on which this section is partly based. Here the attention is focused mainly on its methodological aspects. In particular, two issues are dealt with: • •
significant differences among individuals can arise even within the same treatment group; an individual-based descriptive analysis can be very useful to understand macro results.
The experiment Participants were given the following instructions: A subject has to take a series of exams. Each of these exams should be evaluated as: very good, good, middle, bad, very bad. If the subject scores ‘very good’ or ‘good’, he or she will pass the exam. If he/she scores ‘bad’ or ‘very bad’ he/she will not pass the exam. If he/she scores ‘middle’ he/she will have to repeat the exam. Each exam is evaluated with a new system of scoring; it receives: • • •
a colour (black, blue, white or yellow); a shape (heart, circle, square or rectangle); a dimension (big or small).
Then, for example, an exam could be evaluated as ‘blue–heart–small’. The connection between shapes–colours–dimensions and the final result of the exam is not known. The game worked in this way (through specific software): • • • •
the subject was presented with the first combination of shape–colour– dimension; he/she had to choose one of the possible scores; he/she was informed whether the answer is right or not and which is the right solution; he/she was presented with another combination;
and so on for 231 rounds.
88 Marco Novarese Between the combinations of information and the right answer there is a logical relation, stable for all rounds, described in Table 3.1.4 At the beginning of the session players did not know the relationship between information and results, so they have to find it. As the game is based on a relatively small number of sequences of information (there are 4 4 2 32 different combinations of shapes– colours–dimensions, and the same combination appears many times during the game), subjects might try to remember them. In this case, the results of the experiment would scarcely be interesting – more artificial and conditioned by the fact of being in a laboratory. Therefore subjects were not explicitly told that there were fixed and repeated sequences (they were informed, though, of the existence of a logical relation between information and results). Remembering 32 sequences is, besides, not easy. This experiment presents a few similarities with those belonging to the so-called ‘diagnostic task’ series. Kelley and Friedman (1999), for example, asked the participants in their experiment to forecast the price of a good. The price was determined according to a linear stochastic process with two independent variables. Players know the model, but ignore its parameters. In each of the 480 rounds of the experiment they have to forecast the price, after seeing the changing values of the independent variables. After each round they get information on the real value of the price. Kelley and Friedman’s experiment is built to test the ‘least square’ models of learning (see, for example, Marcet and Sargent 1989), where economics agents are expected to be able to estimate the parameters of known models. According to their goal, then, Kelley and Friedman test the accuracy of their players’ implicit estimates. In Novarese and Rizzello (2003) there is a quite different idea of learning, seen – as in the psychological literature – as the human capacity to modify behaviour in a more or less permanent way, whenever new experience is acquired. Table 3.1 Logical relationships between combinations and results Score
Colour
Shape
Dimension
Very good
Bad
Bright (white and yellow) Dark (black and blue)
Very bad
Dark (black and blue)
Not angular shapes (circle and heart) Not angular shapes (circle and heart) Not angular shapes (circle and heart) Angular shapes (square and rectangle) Angular shapes (square and rectangle) Angular shapes (square and rectangle)
Big
Middle
Bright (white and yellow) Bright (white and yellow) Dark (black and blue)
Good
Small Small or big
Small Big
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Then, as a first point, experimental subjects do not know the model used in the experiment (as usually happens in the real world), but they have to create their own knowledge. Moreover, subjects are not expected to understand the real relationships in Table 3.1, as, in our view, there is learning even if they develop a wrong system of rules. Even a wrong model of the world, in fact, allows them to face a given environment. Data are then analysed in a different manner. There is no model to test and there is no analysis of the convergence on true parameters. The aim is mainly that of collecting empirical evidence and looking for eventual regularities among subjects, at the most guided by some theoretical hypothesis. Results The experiments were realized at the Centre for Cognitive Economics in Alessandria in October 2000. Sixty-four subjects (students in law, with no economics background) participated.5 Three main aspects can be detected among subjects: 1 2 3
the tendency to confirm wrong answers to given combinations of information; the tendency to change right answers, even after many right choices; the tendency to develop (right and also wrong) rules.
These features characterize all subjects, but their specific content differs. In other words, not all subjects confirm the same wrong choice or change the same right one. Table 3.2 helps us to understand the first two points. As said, a single combination of shape–colour–dimension appears many times during the game (but never in two rounds running). By taking into account all the answers a subject gives to a particular combination, we can count the number of wrong answers and the number of times wrong choices are confirmed. For example, the sequence yellow–square–small (bold type in Table 3.2 An example of confirmation of wrong answers and change of right choice Round
Colour
Shape
Dimension
Correct result
Subject’s result
9 16 33 43 50 60 67
Yellow Yellow Yellow Yellow Yellow Yellow Yellow
Rectangle Square Square Rectangle Square Rectangle Square
Big Small Small Big Small Big Small
Middle Middle Middle Middle Middle Middle Middle
Middle Good Good Very good Good Very good Good
90 Marco Novarese Table 3.3 Distribution of the mean ratio of wrong answers confirmed by players Percentage
No. of players
0–25 25–50 50–75 75–100
13 38 13 0 64
Total
Table 3.2) appears four times in the part of the game shown. The participant in the experiment exemplified here confirms the same wrong answer after the three errors in the table. We can then say that he confirms three errors after three wrong choices (100 per cent of confirmation). It is possible to calculate a similar rate for all the combinations faced by a player and to determine a mean individual value. Table 3.3 shows the distribution of this rate among players6 and the relevance of the phenomenon under examination. Table 3.2 also shows the sequence yellow–rectangle–big. At its first appearance, player 1 gives a right answer (round 9) but in the following one he makes a wrong choice. Then we can say that (at round 43) he does not confirm a right solution. Many other players show a similar behaviour in many cases and for different combinations. There are players who give a right answer to the same sequence for four or five (or even more) rounds, and then change it until the end of the game. Table 3.4 shows, for the whole of the players, the number of right answers ‘forgotten’ in at least two following appearances. For example, there are thirteen cases in which some players give the right answer to a given sequence in four subsequent rounds, but later, in the following two (or more) appearances, they make a wrong choice. It is useful, now, to concentrate on the last part of the game, and see if players develop regularities of behaviour and an understanding of the rationale of the game.
Table 3.4 Number of right answers ‘forgotten’ in at least two following appearances related to the number of right answers in following appearances 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
332 85 27 13 7 5 0 2
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As a first step it is necessary to give a definition of the rules specific to this experiment. Take into account the third part of the game (the last 77 rounds), where many sequences appear three or four times. For each sequence we can count how many times a subject gives the same answer: • •
‘rule 75’ means that the subject gives the same answer 75 per cent of the times; ‘rule 100’ means that the subject gives the same answer 100 per cent of the times.
The idea is that if a player always, or almost always, gives the same answer when faced with the same sequence, he has probably developed a kind of routine.7 There is wide heterogeneity among players, but most of them develop very routinized behaviour. At a mean level, 70 per cent of the possible ‘rule 100’ are developed. Some players develop all possible rules. Does this mean that most of the subjects have understood the game? No, because players tend also to develop wrong rules (15 or 16 per cent of the total), as shown in Table 3.5. It is interesting to see that the mean time taken to answer to ‘rule 100’ (wrong or right) is lower than the overall mean time. The mean time for a reply to a rule is, in fact, about six seconds, while the overall mean time is about ten seconds. A shorter reaction time is one of the features that denote a routine (Cohen et al. 1996). Understanding the empirical findings Is it possible to understand why players behave in this apparently strange way? Why do they seem to act so irrationally? Are the three tendencies related? To try to give an answer to such questions it is necessary to look at each player. A generalized analysis is, in fact, incomplete, as the development of each experiment is very different from the others. Instead, in many cases, an individual analysis seems to allow a full comprehension of the cognitive processes undertaken by the player.
Table 3.5 Percentage of rules (total and wrong) developed by experimental players, mean values*
Total percentage of rules developed Percentage of wrong rules developed
Rule 75
Rule 100
75 16
70 15
Note *Values are computed only for the sequences that appear at least four times during the whole game.
92 Marco Novarese Take into account the player in Table 3.2. As seen, he confirms several times the wrong answer ‘good’ to the sequence yellow–square–small. He does not confirm the right answer to the sequence yellow–rectangle–big. Table 3.6 helps us to understand the link between these facts. It shows the answers given by this individual to some selected sequences in the first 77 rounds (period I) and in the last 77 rounds (period III). For example, in the first period, the subject answers in all cases (100 per cent) ‘very good’ to the sequence yellow–circle–big. This sequence appears three times in the period (as we can see in the last column, where frequency is equal to three). The shaded cell indicates the right answer. The answer ‘good’ (confirmed even if wrong) to the sequence yellow–square–small is coherent with the routines developed (from the very beginning) for the sequences yellow–circle (or heart)–small. On the contrary, the right answer (not confirmed) ‘middle’ for the sequence yellow– rectangle–big is not coherent with the system of rules emerging in the last part of the game, when ‘square’ and ‘rectangle’ are compared to ‘circle’ and ‘heart’. The system of rules developed (also the part which is not shown here) is then wrong, but has an evident and intelligible internal coherence. Table 3.6 also shows answers to the sequence where the colour black appears. There is an evident analogy with sequences characterized by yellow. The sequences with blue (not shown) are similar to the black ones, and the white ones are analogous to those with yellow.8 This is just an example, but a similar system of rules emerges in many cases, and it is probably related to the order of appearance of the information during the experiment. In fact, at the beginning of the game there are many cases of bright unangular shapes and of dark angular shapes (i.e. the ones that receive a higher number of right answers). In this perspective, then, this result is coherent with the hypothesis of path-dependence in individual learning, stated at a theoretical level by Rizzello (1999) and by Egidi and Narduzzo (1997) in experiments on team organization.9 Apart from those who understand the right logical system, there are players who develop a set of rules that is partially different from the one evident in Table 3.6 (in other words, they build a different knowledge of this experimental environment), though they start from the same configuration of the game and on the basis of similar cognitive devices. Consider in Table 3.7 the final part of the game of another player. There is more variance in the answers, but there are also some clear differences from Table 3.6. Black and blue (the latter not shown in table) are generally associated with the answer ‘bad’ (the last choices shown in the table in bold enforce the idea that this is the path of convergence), while the sequences with a yellow are almost always understood. Both systems of rules in Tables 3.6 and 3.7 are not optimal, as in some cases they lead to wrong choices. Yet both of them have an important feature: they are easy to remember and apply (and this is important, as people have bounded rationality).
III
Yellow
I
Black
Yellow
Black
Colour
Period
Rectangle
Square
Heart
Circle
Rectangle
Square
Heart
Circle
Rectangle
Square
Heart
Circle
Rectangle
Square
Heart
Circle
Shape Big Small Big Small Big Small Big Small Big Small Big Small Big Small Big Small Big Small Big Small Big Small Big Small Big Small Big Small Big Small Big Small
Dim.
67%
100%
100%
100%
50% 67% 75%
Very bad
75% 33% 100%
100%
100%
40%
50% 33%
Bad
Table 3.6 A more detailed analysis of the behaviour of the player analysed in Table 3.2
25%
25% 20%
50%
Middle
100%
100%
100%
100%
40%
100%
80%
100%
Good
100%
100%
100%
100%
50%
100% 20%
100%
Very good 3 5 2 5 0 4 4 0 0 0 0 0 4 3 4 5 3 4 1 3 1 4 3 1 1 2 2 1 3 4 3 4
Freq.
Yellow
III
Rectangle
Square
Heart
Circle
Rectangle
Square
Heart
Circle
Shape Big Small Big Small Big Small Big Small Big Small Big Small Big Small Big Small
Dim.
Note *Bold characters show the last answer given to each sequence.
Black
Colour
Period
50%
Very bad
100% 50% 100% 67% 25% 67% 100%
Bad
Table 3.7 The system of rules developed by a player different from those in Table 3.6*
33% 25% 33%
50%
100% 33% 100% 100%
Middle
67%
100% 100%
100%
Good
100%
100%
Very good
3 4 1 3 1 4 3 1 1 2 2 1 3 4 3 4
Freq.
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An experiment on team learning This section describes the results of an experiment on team learning (see Novarese 2003 for more details and results). The experiment under examination is called ‘sum 10’, and aims at analysing if and how teams reach coordination in a situation of partially opposite incentives. ‘Sum 10’ presents elements from games on both organizational learning and cooperation (trying to go beyond the simple traditional prisoner’s dilemma). Two aspects emerge: • •
a strong effect of individual psychological traits (as measured by personality tests) on the behaviour in the experiment; the usefulness of the interview realized at the end of the experiment to understand players’ behaviour, motivations, aims, etc.
Both this points question, again, the ceteris paribus assumption. The experiment Teams of three players are, anonymously and at random, built among participants. The game has 36 rounds. Teams are stable throughout the game. Each of the players has a set of numbers. This set remains unchanged in every round and is composed of the values: 0, 1, 3, 4, 10. In every round each player has to declare one of the numbers in his set. The numbers of the three people playing together are then summed. According to the sum, each player receives a payoff, following this rule: • • •
if S(i) 10, I(i) 40 D(i) if S(i) 10, I(i) 30 D(i) if S(i) 10, I(i) 0 D(i)
where S(i) sum of the team I, of which player i is a member I(i) player is: individual payoff D(i): number declared by player i Then subjects have to co-operate to reach a sum equal or higher than ten, by using the lowest possible number. In treatment group one, players know the total number of rounds; while in treatment two they do not receive such information. The players’ behaviour can be influenced by many interrelated elements. These considerations have general applications to almost all experiments, but for some of them (as this one) they are probably more important: •
The first and obvious element is their actual comprehension of the experiment. Even if the game is not difficult some players show very
96 Marco Novarese
•
strange behaviour; sometimes, the interview after the game indicated that their comprehension or interpretation of the game was flawed (apparently this problem did not emerge in the example shown in the previous section). Subjects can participate in the experiment with many and different motivations. The introduction of remuneration (as prescribed in the most important handbooks, such as that by Hey (1991)) is supposed to stimulate at least a reasonable degree of care, since subjects should have the same motivations which are presumed in the theory to test. Sometimes this reward can be unnecessary. In fact, important results (for example, Allais 1953) have been reached in experiments with no reward. Sometimes students (the main experimental subjects) attend experiments with motivations different from monetary reward (for example, their interest in the subject or just their curiosity). Besides, during the game they can be involved in the accomplishment of that peculiar task, independently of the reward. But these facts, inevitably, lead to a loss of control, at least in relation to the standard view of the laboratory. Besides, experiments are usually similar to games, and people like games. It is not impossible that they react and behave differently from experimenters’ and theories’ hopes (making more points as possible and getting the highest reward). On the contrary they can play just for fun or even to experiment with the behaviour of their partners: •
•
•
The attitude towards other players can be seen in terms of dichotomies: altruism vs. egoism, freeriding vs. giving, rationality vs. emotionality and the desire of reciprocation.10 The attitude towards other members of the team (and, as a consequence, altruism or egoism) can depend on each subject’s motivation in participating in the experiment. A player interested in ‘making money’ will probably behave differently from one who is enjoying the game. Subjects should be able to co-ordinate their choices by communicating their own eventual strategies and/or understanding those of the others. Using the language of game theory, we could say that the experiment has many possible equilibria (like a game or a super-game). Subjects should co-ordinate to reach one of these.
All such (different) behaviours and motivations emerge from the interview conducted before the end of the experiment. Usually experimental papers seem to neglect this problem, though it has important effects on behaviour during the game. We will now analyse this issue in detail.
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Psychological traits and behaviour in the experiment This experiment was conducted in Alessandria, at the Centre for Cognitive Economics, in May 2000; 36 subjects (students in law) participated. The software used was developed by Swiee (Boero 2001). The effects of personality traits on individual economic behaviour have been studied in relation to egoist/altruist behaviour by Boone et al. (1999), for example. They propose a survey and new empirical evidence leading to the conclusion that the personalities of the players matter. In this and other papers, players’ personality is analysed with appropriate psychological tests and related to the behaviour in the experiment (usually the prisoner’s dilemma or similar games). In many cases a relation between attitude to cooperation and psychological traits emerges. A similar analysis is proposed here, connecting the behaviour in the game ‘sum 10’ with individual extroversion, measured with Eysenck and Wilson’s test (1975). This aspect of human personality, as recalled by Boone et al. (1999), could influence behaviour in experiments on cooperation. The most important result is that introverted individuals get a higher mean score in the game. The variable ‘extroversion/introversion’ accounts for about 25 per cent of the variance in the score among individuals. This individual psychological trait, then, has an important role in determining individual (but also organizational) performance in this experiment. Eysenck and Wilson’s test measures extroversion and introversion along seven dimensions, defined by the following dichotomies: • • • • • • •
dynamism/passivity sociability/unsociability boldness/caution impulsiveness/self-control expressiveness/inhibition practicalness/reflectiveness irresponsibility/responsibility
For each of these dichotomies, the test, based on 210 questions, proposes a score ranging from zero to 30. As specified by the authors, individual scores should be compared with those of a reference population. The absolute level of the variables has, in fact, for itself, low significance. According to the position in each of the seven distributions, it is possible to state whether an individual is extroverted or introverted. Introversion is related to the predominance of high values of the first term of each of the dichotomies. Subjects were first assigned to one side of the distribution (above or below the appropriate median) for each of the seven dichotomies. Then subjects with values above the median in the distribution of at least four of the seven variables were classified as ‘extroverted’.
98 Marco Novarese This procedure obviously has its limits (for example, it does not account for possible differences in the variables that define extroversion), but it is coherent with the ideas of Eysenck and Wilson. Besides, it allows us to build two groups composed of individuals with significantly different psychological traits. The group of extroverted individuals was composed of twelve subjects (six from each of the treatment). Different analyses are possible on the two groups. Here attention is focused on differences in the score (i.e. the main measure of performance) realized in the experiment. Tables 3.8. and 3.9. propose the results of the analysis of the variance aimed at comparing mean scores among extroverted and introverted subjects, controlling for the treatment group. The following equation was then estimated: score (i) intercept a* extroversion b* treatment
(1)
where: • •
extroversion 1 if the individual is classified as ‘extroverted’; 0 elsewhere knowing_rounds 1 if treatment group is 1 (subject knows the number of rounds); 0 elsewhere.
The group composed of extrovert individuals has a mean score significantly lower than the introverted one. On the contrary, there are no Table 3.8 Analysis of the variance for the estimation of equation (1)
Model Error Total
df
Sum of squares
Mean square
F value
P value
2 29 31
1,434,118.8 1,313,530 1,747,649
217,059.4 45,294.14
4.792218
0.01
Table 3.9 Parameters estimation for equation (1)
Intercept Extroversion Knowing_rounds R squared 0.25
Coefficient
Standard error
Stat t
P value
1,079.76 29.13 29.125
60.66 77.71 75.24
17.79 3.07 0.39
0.0001 0.0045 0.7015
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significant differences among treatments related to the information on the number of rounds. At first glance this result might seem surprising. Extroversion, in fact, is supposed to be associable to a tendency to co-operate. In this experiment, the extroverted get worse results. It is necessary to observe that ‘sum 10’ is also a game of coordination. The attitudes of some extroverted individuals (such as activity, impulsivity, irresponsibility . . .) can hinder the attachment of this goal. These individuals, in fact, either try to impose their own focal points and strategies, or react in an adverse way to others’ choices. Introverted individuals are, on the contrary, more adaptive and more likely to understand the behaviour of other players (in certain respects, it is comparable to a rational behaviour). Besides, as in this game there is no direct communication, results from extroverts might be less useful. In other kinds of organizational tasks, personal psychological traits can have different effects on the performance. Interviews on the behaviour in the game After the end of the game ‘sum 10’, players were required to describe, in a written interview, their strategies, their perception of the other members of their group (partners or rivals?) and of their behaviour. While similar interviews are probably quite common among experimentalists, there are no standards in their realization and presentation. Normally, then, the results are not proposed at all in the papers.11 Why? The reasons are probably related to the recalled applications and aims of experimental economics in the traditional approach. If scientists are interested in testing theories and their validity, moving from the paper to reality, interviews become useless. Their interest, in fact, is not focused on understanding players’ behaviour but on testing a theory or hypothesis in a more realistic environment. The problem is that differences among players (even if not under analysis) can make the same test of theories more difficult, introducing variance and ‘errors of measure’. Consider the following examples. Figure 3.1 shows one of the team playing the game, reporting individual choices in every round and the relative sum. The team under examination gets a sum equal to ten only in a few rounds of the game. In other rounds they go above or below this number. Yet in the interview all players express their satisfaction in quite similar words: ‘We were able to reach ten in some of the rounds, without using costly strategies (i.e. strategies requiring to declare ten).’ These players’ expectations, then, were not those of always reaching the maximum goal. This is important information that can be useful to explain their performance in relation to other groups which were able to reach ten for almost all the game. These other players, in fact, show generally very different goals, sometimes declaring regret for the few rounds in which they have not been able to get the best result.12
100
Marco Novarese
12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36
Rounds Player 1
Player 2
Player 3
Sum
Figure 3.1 The game played by one of the teams in the experiment ‘sum 10’
Many problems and risks are related to the use of this kind of interview. In relation to the example: subjects might have changed their level of expectation during the game, and in the interview they might have expressed only their final opinions (it would be necessary13 to test satisfaction also before and during the game). Besides, some players’ statements result in completely useless information. In other cases it is not easy to link interview and real behaviour (because people did not express their ideas clearly). Then, there could be a possible distortion in using only the part of the interview that seems useful. It seems undeniable, however, that sometimes these statements give useful information and allow a better comprehension of players’ behaviour in the game; therefore it would be absurd to ignore them. Another example is shown in Figure 3.2. The main obstacle to the reaching of a stable equilibrium, for this team, seems the behaviour of player 1. He changes his strategies many times and breaks the equilibria. The interview gives interesting insights. His strange behaviour originates from the willingness to play and reach the goal in different ways and not just in one. He is not so interested in getting top scores, but he likes playing, and he tries to avoid repetitiveness. In other cases (not shown here), the reasons behind the difficulties in getting a stable equilibrium rely on the willingness of some players to reciprocate others. These players cannot accept that one of the other members of the team is forced to play a more costly strategy. These examples show the variety of motivations and the usefulness of
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18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36
Rounds Player 1
Player 2
Player 3
Sum
Figure 3.2 The game played by another team in the experiment ‘sum 10’
interviews (as, like psychological tests, they can help to better understand players’ behaviour and also to create appropriate ‘control variables’), and so the necessity to develop scientific criteria and appropriate methodologies to perform them (on this, see also Simon 2000).
Experiments and simulations While there are relatively few papers focused on ‘cognitive experimental economics’, recently there has been a growing diffusion of papers on agent-based simulations (Gilbert and Terna 2000). Sometimes the term ‘experiment’ is used also for simulations with artificial agents, as they show many features usually related to scientific empirical analysis. In fact, these models allow observing emergent unpredictable phenomena, starting from a population of e