Classical Cynicism: A Critical Study

CLASSICAL CYNICISM A Critical Study Luis E. Navia

Contributions in Philosophy, Number 58

GREENWOOD PRESS Westport, Connecticut • London -iii-

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Navia Luis E. Classical cynicism: a critical study / Luis E. Navia. p. cm.--(Contributions in philosophy, ISSN 0084-926X; no. 58) Includes bibliographical references (p.) and indexes. ISBN 0-313-30015-1 (alk. paper) 1. Cynics (Greek philosophy) I. Title. II. Series. B508N37 1996 183ʼ.4 --dc20 96-22007 British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data is available. Copyright © 1996 by Luis E. Navia All rights reserved. No portion of this book may be reproduced, by any process or technique, without the express written consent of the publisher. Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 96-22007 ISBN: 0-313-30015-1 ISSN: 0084-926X First published in 1996 Greenwood Press, 88 Post Road West, Westport, CT 06881 An imprint of Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc. Printed in the United States of America ∞+⃝™ The paper used in this book complies with the Permanent Paper Standard issued by the National Information Standards Organization (Z39.48-1984). 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

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Contents Preface Chapter 1 - The Origins of Cynicism Chapter 2 - Antisthenes, the Absolute Dog Chapter 3 - Diogenes, a Socrates Gone Mad Chapter 4 - Crates, the Door-opener Chapter 5 - Hellenistic and Roman Cynicism Bibliography Index of Names Index of Subjects

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Preface The Cynic movement constitutes one of the most challenging intellectual phenomena in the history of the Western world. For eight hundred years the Cynics roamed the streets and roads of classical Greece and Rome, preaching what appears to have been a gospel of social and political protest, and acting in ways which seem to have been specifically designed to unsettle the customs and conventions of their contemporaries. From the first decade of the fourth century B.C., soon after the execution of Socrates, until the last moments of the Roman Empire, at a time when the last vestiges of the classical era were being erased by the Barbarians and overwhelmed by Christianity, the Cynics were a familiar presence in the classical world, and their message of revolt could be heard from the courts of emperors and rulers to the market places and taverns crowded with ordinary people. The aim of this book is to present a historical review of the Cynic movement in all its aspects, with critical documentation related to ancient sources and modern scholarship. Emphasis is placed, of course, on the three major Cynic philosophers, namely, Antisthenes, Diogenes of Sinope, and Crates of Thebes, for it is in them that we find the basis of everything that can be viewed as valuable in classical Cynicism. The many Cynics who emerged after these three philosophers merely carried on certain traditions, exemplified certain modes of living, and upheld certain convictions, all of which can be traced back in one way or another to the early stages of the Cynic movement, and these stages are well represented in Antisthenes, Diogenes, and Crates. As will be made clear in this critical study, classical Cynicism was not a monolithic ideological movement with set or well-defined philosophical tenets and dogmas, and was never what we might call a 'school' of philosophy. It constituted, more than anything else, an amorphous movement of intellectual and social rebelliousness against a great number of beliefs and practices. In the

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course of its development, it underwent transformations in direction and in content, as social circumstances changed throughout the centuries, for which reason, the Cynicism of the early Greek Cynics was bound to differ from the Cynicism of their Hellenistic and Roman descendants. I have endeavored to shed light on the relationship between classical Cynicism and what I call 'modern cynicism', and I hope to show that such a relationship is weaker and more tenuous than what we could initially gather from the common use of the terms 'cynic' and 'cynicism', which are often employed to designate both the classical Cynics and the modern cynics. In fact, it is my conviction that modern cynicism is in reality, all appearances notwithstanding, the antithesis of classical Cynicism. The modern cynical person stands in most respects in opposition to what the classical Cynics stood for. Modern cynicism, as will be seen in chapter 1, is characterized by a pervasive sort of ethical nihilism and by a permeating commitment to egoism, and is a social phenomenon from which any and every kind of human aspiration is lacking. Classical Cynicism, on the other hand, is based on a set of ethical and moral convictions, that, although poorly defined and indistinctly stated, can be discerned through the negativity apparent in its teachings and examples. In chapter 1, I address a number of important issues, such as the origins of the Cynic movement, dealing in particular with the question, interesting yet not decisive in significance, of who among the Greeks was the real 'founder' or originator of Cynicism. I also comment in this chapter on the problem of the sources of our information concerning the Cynic movement, a problem that, as will be seen throughout this book, plagues us everywhere and all the time as we endeavor to reconstruct the history of this movement. The nature of the sources is such that we are justified in affirming that on the one hand, we know a great deal about Cynicism and about the major Cynics, and, on the other hand, we know hardly anything about what Cynicism really was and about the ideas and lives of specific Cynics. The anecdotes and statements attributed to the Cynics are plentiful and colorful, the legends instructive and often amusing, and the reports edifying and substantive, but the actual facts are few and the teachings of the Cynics only partly elucidated. What I have attempted to create in chapter 1 is a frame of reference for our understanding of classical Cynicism, and for this purpose I have drawn what appears to me to be a generic portrait of a typical Greek or Roman Cynic philosopher, a portrait that, not paradoxically, fits well all the classical Cynics and yet not completely any of them. Chapters 2, 3, and 4 are devoted respectively to Antisthenes, Diogenes. and Crates. In them, I appeal to a variety of sources in order to reconstruct, in so far as this is possible, an adequate portrayal of these Cynic philosophers. In chapter 5, I offer a review of the history of Cynicism from the third century B.C. to the end of this movement in the fifth century A.D. In this chapter, I have approached the subject by selecting nine Cynic philosophers--Onesicritus of Astypalaea, Monimus of Syracuse, Bion of Borysthenes, Menippus of Pontus, Cercidas of Megalopolis, Meleager and Oenomaus of Gadara, Demetrius of

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Rome, and Peregrinus Proteus--as examples of the changes undergone by Cynicism in Hellenistic and Roman times. The constraints of time and space have forced me to treat, only in passing and marginally, certain other important figures in the history of Cynicism, for instance, Dio Chrysostom and Demonax of Cyprus. In all the chapters I have sought to clarify what I regard as the principal concepts that underlie the development of classical Cynicism. These concepts were emphatically and forcefully enunciated and defended by most of the Cynics, although it cannot be denied that in most instances they remained plagued by a certain kind of vagueness and by a frustrating lack of development. Concepts such as 'a life lived according to nature', rationality, lucidity, selfsufficiency, disciplined asceticism, freedom of speech, shamelessness, indifference, cosmopolitanism, philanthropy, and others, permeate in varying degrees the Cynics' Weltanschauung, and constitute, as it were, the foundations of their philosophy. Their substance, however, is in most cases more negative than positive, and is more an expression of protest than an affirmation of philosophical convictions, for which reason we might not be altogether mistaken in recognizing in Cynicism, regardless of its merit, a somewhat truncated or incomplete intellectual edifice. Despite its truncated and incomplete character, classical Cynicism has much to teach us in the late twentieth century. Diogenes of Sinope is reported to have once said that most people are nearly mad, and other Cynics would not have hesitated to echo such a pessimistic assessment of the human condition. One might venture to say that if Diogenes were to visit our own time, he would not recant in his affirmation about his own contemporaries. Madness and senselessness have remained salient characteristics of our history from his time to our own time. What Cynicism teaches us is, above all, to be able to recognize in ourselves and in the world around us those aspects that render human life unhappy and disoriented. According to the Cynics, the greatest problem of human beings is the fact that both through nature and through customs and conventions they are deeply immersed in what the Cynics called τυ + φος, a term of immense significance in Cynicism that can be rendered as 'illusion' or, more precisely, as 'intellectual and spiritual obfuscation'. For the Cynics, then, the purpose of philosophy is to h , which means, purely and simply, 'clarity of mind'. Once this condition is attained, all the other virtues of which the Cynics spoke flow naturally from it: we become indifferent to inconsequential things and circumstances; we develop in ourselves a great deal of selfsufficiency and independence from others we break asunder the fetters that tie us to the atavistic modes of thought and behavior manifested in blind political and nationalistic allegiances, in superstitious religious beliefs and practices, in the pointless pursuit of pleasures and wealth, and in many other manifestations of what the Cynics conceived of as human madness; we make a commitment to speak always freely and to speak only the truth, without ever seeking to deceive

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others; and we learn to view with disdain the attachment to traditions and conventions through which most people structure their lives. The idealistic aspirations of the classical Cynics--aspirations that set them so far apart from the cynics of modern times--must remain mostly inaccessible and impractical, for the τυ + φος that the Cynics sought to dissipate is pervasive and is inevitably entrenched in human existence. Not unlike the philosopher-kings of Plato Republic of Cynic philosophy must exist on a chimerical plane, but not for this should we cast it aside as a useless philosophical dream. It must be understood as an ideal towards which some of us should strive. For the preparation and completion of this study of classical Cynicism, I have been fortunate to have the assistance and support of my wife, Alicia Stella Navia, who has patiently read and reviewed every page, on numerous occasions making perceptive and pointed observations, setting me repeatedly aright with her remarkable store of knowledge and clarity of mind. The presence of my daughters has been decisive for my understanding and appreciation of the Cynics: Monica Stella, who has commented at length on every line of this book, has provided me with a living example of independence of judgment and steadfastness of purpose, reminiscent of the example set by Hipparchia; Olga Lucia has furnished me with invaluable lessons in the Cynic distrust of human appearances and pretensions; Melissa Celeste, with her unsurpassed knowledge of and appreciation for Hercules, has aided me in grasping the significance of this legendary hero for the Cynics; and Soraya Emilia, who began her journey through the world when I first conceived this project on classical Cynicism, has kept alive in me the hope of realizing, if only in a small measure, the Cynic dream of the utopian Island of Pera. To these five women, true and genuine Cynics, I wish to dedicate this book. Dr. Eugene Kelly, Professor of Philosophy at New York Institute of Technology, has been kind enough to read the manuscript, and has given me the benefit of his vast knowledge and critical mind. Professor Peter Voci, Director of Computer Graphics at New York Institute of Technology, has also given me a great deal of assistance. The perceptive comments of Dr. Anthony J. DiMatteo, Professor of English at New York Institute of Technology, have been most helpful. I wish to acknowledge my debt of gratitude to these three esteemed colleagues.

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CHAPTER 1 The Origins of Cynicism In modern times the word 'cynic' has various negative and unpleasant connotations. A cynical person is, for instance, someone who rejects ethical values and ideals, who questions or even dismisses modes of behavior such as honesty and truthfulness, and who reacts skeptically and sarcastically to even the most innocent and well-intentioned human actions. For such a person, most if not all human activities are suspect and unworthy of trust, since no one, according to the cynic, ever seeks or pursues anything except for the specific yet often secret purpose of benefiting himself. For the cynic, accordingly, hypocrisy and deceitfulness, primitive selfishness and unbounded egoism, and gross materialism and disguised ruthlessness are the hidden characteristics of all human behavior. Hence, the cynic does not believe in ideals or lofty aspirations, which are in his mind only linguistic and behavioral games promoted for the purpose of manipulating and duping people, or ways to hide the enormous state of confusion that permeates the average human consciousness. Modern cynicism has been the subject of numerous philosophical and psychological studies, and its relationship with related and similar attitudes has been explored in various forms of literature. Likewise, efforts have been made to shed light on the genealogy of modern cynicism, specifically regarding the relationship between the ideas and behavior of modern cynics and those of the Greek and Roman Cynics. 1 At the turn of the century, for instance, É. Tardieu undertook a detailed examination of the psychological and philosophical roots of cynicism and its various behavioral manifestations, noting that modern cynicism stands ultimately for everything that is ugly and repulsive in the human heart, and observing that the portrait of the modern cynic reveals an individual who is immersed in egoism, who is not ashamed of his selfishness, and who is even proud of his carelessness for society and for every person except himself. The

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cynic, argues Tardieu, promotes contempt for human nature and supports every imaginable kind of immoral instinct. The roots of Cynicism, he maintains, are traceable to Max Stirner's absolute egoism, Arthur Schopenhauer's pessimism, and what he takes to be Nietzsche's nihilism. 2 Cynicism, in Tardieu's view, constitutes the bankruptcy of ethical and social values, as it removes the individual from his social context, forcing him to break away from all traditional frames of reference, while providing for him no meaningful alternatives. It manifests itself in the cynic's private life, in his marital relations, in his behavior towards his children, in his professional activities, in his contemptuous regard for neighbors, and in his unbounded hedonism and lack of morals. Naturally, it appears with great intensity in the political world, in which nations are led aimlessly by cynical politicians--the sort of people who believe in nothing, whose only preoccupation is their own materialistic benefit, and who are obsessed with the need to control others. Cynicism, according to Tardieu, represents the final triumph of vulgarity over civilization, the ultimate victory of the vulgus, and is a clear indication of the collapse of culture and values. But probably the most extensive and documented analysis of modern cynicism as an allengulfing and universal phenomenon is Peter Sloterdijk Kritik der zynischen Vernunft. 3 In this voluminous book, Sloterdijk undertakes an examination of cynicism in its diverse manifestations, characterizing it as a malaise of culture, and defining it as that state of consciousness that follows after naive ideologies and their enlightenment, and as the twilight of false consciousness. Cynicism, contends Sloterdijk, is philosophy on its deathbed, since it stands for the absence of ideals, standards, values, aspirations, and reason. It has come to dominate contemporary art and music, and is found in religion, morality and ethics, military affairs, politics, and in modern life in general. Cynicism, as presented to us by Sloterdijk, is, not unlike the cynicism described by Tardieu, the final conquest of an all-embracing nihilism that announces and welcomes the bankruptcy of meaningful human existence. For both authors, the modern cynic recognizes no authority or higher standards than himself, and views his accomplishments, most if not all of them provided for him by technology, as the highest point in human evolution, for which reason he does not even envision the need or even the possibility of aspiring to a higher level of intellectual or moral development. He has broken away from all traditional norms and expectations, and in an attitude of sarcastic disdain, he proclaims himself independent and selfsufficient. His lack of reason and the weakness of his moral principles, as Sloterdijk suggests, make him easy prey to devouring political and social ideologies that he does not understand, but that abundantly fill the vacuum of his own confused and bewildered consciousness. Such ideologies, as exemplified by Nazism, Fascism, and Communism, are created and sustained by cynics who, only one step ahead of the masses, succeed in manipulating them for their own cynical purposes. It is difficult not to agree with Sloterdijk's assessment of the human condition in the twentieth century. Cynicism appears to have permeated every

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niche of human activity, especially in the realm of national and international politics, where the modern cynic emerges as the clever and unscrupulous politician, that species of humanity in which inveterate lying, gross yet generally well camouflaged egoism, superficial acceptance of poorly understood altruistic platitudes, and other such attitudes converge as if to create a dangerous monstrosity of unpleasant features. The present crisis in human values, the emergence of irrationalism so evident in certain types of popular music and entertainment, the contemptuous attitude towards traditions and established norms, the brutality exhibited by the behavior of nations towards one another, the dehumanization of human relations brought about by a blind and unbridled reliance on technology--all these and other characteristics of our times reflect the advent of universal cynicism that, as an offspring of nihilism, threatens to plunge the human species into a long era of barbarism and primitivism. It may be argued, on the other hand, that this pessimistic assessment of our present and future condition may be basically unjustified, for alongside all the manifestations of the ugliness of cynicism in our midst, there are promising signs of moral regeneration and spiritual health. For every modern cynic, we could argue, there may be numerous persons endowed with genuine positive human qualities, and for every cynical manipulator of the suffering human masses, there may be many people firmly committed to those principles of honesty and compassion that cynicism has rejected and abandoned. After all, the Nazis were defeated and the concentration camps were closed, and there appears to be a heightened awareness of the necessity to respect human rights. The world may be today what it has been for many centuries, at least since the time of the Greeks, namely, a battlefield in which conflicting ideas and ideals remain in a state of opposition, and in which cynicism exists in its extreme forms against the background of noncynical human sentiments. Examples of cynical attitudes and behavior can be found in every culture and in every age, both on the level of persons and on the level of nations, and cynical ideologies, precisely like those described by Sloterdijk, can be encountered everywhere and at all times. If the basis of modern cynicism is an abandonment of moral principles, a stance of unredeeming skepticism, and a commitment to the creed of gross egoism, then what better instance of cynicism can be adduced than Thrasymachus of Chalcedon, the Sophist who, in the testimony of Plato, insisted that the only purpose of human life--specifically his life--was to take advantage of others, who believed that justice is the advantage of the stronger and the ruler (Republic 1.343b), and who advanced the fundamental articles of faith of all subsequent cynics, namely, that "might is right," and that 'right' and 'wrong' are terms that have no meaning--articles that have been echoed countless times since his time, including in certain formulations of Machiavellian political philosophy. Cynicism emerges then as a recurrent aspect of human life, and as long as humanity remains in existence, there will be cynical people, cynics as described by Tardieu and Sloterdijk, cynics who will exemplify the most negative and distasteful elements of human nature, and who will assume a stance of

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negativism vis-à-vis the problems inherent in human life. For us, however, the first issue that needs to be addressed is related to the relationship between cynicism in the modern sense and the Cynicism of classical times, that is, the Cynicism associated with certain Greek and Roman philosophers with whom this monograph is concerned. When we speak of classical Cynicism what we have in mind is a philosophical movement that remained in existence from the beginning of the fourth century B.C. until the end of Roman times. More than a 'school' of philosophy with a defined set of beliefs and convictions, Cynicism constitutes an informal 'sect' of philosophers and philosophically oriented individuals who exhibited certain common behavioral attitudes and modes of life, who emphasized a number of important philosophical concepts, and who either designated themselves as 'Cynics' or were so named by others. We are then in the presence of a loosely linked movement of ideas and actions that lasted about eight hundred years, undergoing changes in ideology and behavior in response to altering cultural conditions. The list of identifiable Cynics is indeed long, although it is not always easy to determine the level of Cynicism found in individual Cynics, since there is among them a variety of idiosyncratic characteristics. The most ancient of them is Antisthenes, an associate of Socrates, while the latest is Sallustius, a fifth-century philosopher. Between them, we encounter a multitude of Cynics, mostly Greek and Roman, some of whom stand out as typical representatives of the Cynic movement: Diogenes of Sinope, Crates of Thebes, Hipparchia and Metrocles of Maroneia, Monimus of Syracuse, Menippus of Pontus, Bion of Borysthenes, Cercidas of Megalopolis, Meleager and Oenomaus of Gadara, Demetrius of Rome, Demonax of Cyprus, Dio Chrysostom of Prusa, Peregrinus Proteus, and many others. 4 Each one of them was surely influenced by the philosophical currents of his day, and each one of them developed and exhibited his own brand of Cynicism. Distinguishable by their customary attire and demeanor--a staff, a wallet or knapsack, a worn cloak, disheveled hair, bare feet, little concern for cleanliness, a loud and castigating voice, and a patent disregard for ordinary social conventions--the Cynics became in late classical times a familiar sight in cities and villages. We are told that in every spot in Roman Alexandria one was bound to come upon a group of noisy and disrupting Cynics, "bawling out the usual street corner invocations to Virtue in a loud, harsh voice, and abusing everyone without exception," as Lucian describes them ( The Passing of Peregrinus 3). Sometimes subsisting alone in some halfbroken tub or under the portico of a temple; sometimes, although rarely, living in conjugal union and surrounded by children; at other times, associated in Cynic communities; and still at other times, wandering from place to place, the Cynics became a sort of cultural ripieno amid the voices and noises of classical Greece and Rome. With the end of classical times, as Rome and its institutions were overcome by the Barbarians and subdued by the Christians, the Cynics, too, ceased to exist, at least as an identifiable philosophical sect. There must have been Cynics in medieval times, but neither names nor definite ideas can be associated

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with anyone in particular. In later times it is possible that Cynic ideas may have survived--one thinks of Montaigne and Voltaire, for instance--but no Cynic movement can be identified. It is, however, unquestionable that the influence of Cynic concepts and ways of life has been felt in many ways long after the extinction of the Cynic movement. The origins and development of Christian monastic traditions, for instance, appear to have been affected by Cynicism, as D. R. Dudley and others have maintained. 5 Cynic influences can also be detected in certain radical political movements and ideologies, such as anarchism, especially the sort of anarchism associated with nineteenth-century ideologists like Bakunin and Proudhon. It is more problematic to establish a link between classical Cynicism and certain forms of social and political protest particularly visible in recent times, such as the so-called beatniks and hippies of the 1960s and 1970s. It is true that, as J. Xenakis has observed, 6 there are similarities between them and the Cynics: in both we find long hair, shamelessness in performing private acts in public, and panhandling, as well as an anti-materialistic stance and a denunciation of consumerism, a rejection of racism and nationalism, and, above all, a spirit of rebelliousness vis-à-vis all forms of political authority. Still, the differences are greater than the similarities, and the social protesters of recent times do not appear to have the philosophical foundation on which classical Cynicism stood. Elements of that philosophical foundation could be found even before the beginning of Cynicism as a sect, as well as subsequently, since Cynic philosophy reflects certain universal aspects of the philosophical spirit. For this reason, vestiges of Cynicism can be found everywhere, although generally weakened and intermingled with beliefs and practices with which authentic Cynics would have probably have had little to do. What we do find abundantly and pervasively is cynicism in its modern manifestations, that is, the cynicism that was described at the outset of this chapter, one that is something altogether different from the Cynicism of classical times. The relationship between the two, that is, between modern cynicism and classical Cynicism, has been the subject of intense scholarly debate, and in this respect we come across a wide spectrum of views and conclusions. There are some who do not hesitate to affirm such a relationship, arguing that the ugliness of modern cynicism is precisely the offspring of classical Cynicism. In general, it seems that the deciding factor in the controversy is a function of the degree to which one is willing to emphasize the negative and destructive elements inherent in the classical Cynics, while overlooking or at least minimizing their positive and constructive contributions. G. H. Lewes, for example, who condemned Cynicism as "a very preposterous doctrine," 7 and who characterized Antisthenes, seen by him as the founder of Cynicism, as "careless and indecent in his gestures," as someone who "could preserve his virtue [only] by becoming a savage," 8 would have had little difficulty in recognizing in modern cynical people the reincarnations of the ancient Cynics. Simply stated, Lewes would have referred to the Cynics as 'cynical' persons, and to the hosts of cynical people of

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modern times as 'Cynics', but in reaching his conclusion it is possible that he may have overlooked or misunderstood the idealism of the Cynics, an idealism that is more substantial than their anti-social antics and their rebelliousness. The Cynics were not cynical, nor are modern cynics authentic Cynics. Sloterdijk assumes a more sophisticated stance than that of Lewes by recognizing the linkage between the classical Cynics and modern cynicism, while at the same time calling attention to significant behavioral and conceptual differences. He speaks of Diogenes as an "Urhippie und Proto-Bohemian," and as a man who sought to undo the European intellectual tradition. 9 Diogenes emerges as the first representative of the classical Cynicism and modern cynicism. Sloterdijk introduces the figure of Diogenes--"a dog-man, a philosopher, a good-for-nothing"-as the first among other figures who integrate the 'Cynical Cabinet', other figures being Lucian of Samosata, Mephistopheles, the Grand Inquisitor of Dostoyevski The Brothers Karamazov, and the Heideggerian das man. 10 What distinguishes him and other classical Cynics from modern cynics, Sloterdijk suggests, is the fact that whereas the former were the spokesmen of an impudent but honest reaction against a decadent set of ethical and social conventions and rules, the latter are the representatives of what may be called a 'falling-out' of consciousness, that is, an immersion into self-deception, which explains the reason why modern cynicism emerges generally in the garb of stupefying political and cultural ideologies that create in their adherents a false sense of purpose, while covering up their false consciousness with the illusion of meaningfulness. Accordingly, the ancient Cynics, regardless of their apparent 'cynical' stance towards practically everything, remained honest and truthful: they practiced, as perhaps no other human beings have, the art of truth-telling, and were, to use the appropriate expression employed by Michel Foucault, parrhesiasts, , that is, the freedom and commitment to speak always and only the truth. 11 The insolence and impudence of the classical Cynics can be interpreted only as a manifestation of their irrevocable decision to use language in the most truthful way. Their conscience was therefore clear of the deceptiveness and inauthenticity which, according to Sloterdijk, infect the conscience of modern cynicism. It may not be sufficient, however, to distinguish the classical Cynics from the modern cynics by merely contrasting the insolent authenticity and militant honesty of the former with the nihilistic deceptiveness and obfuscation of the latter. Something else needs to be said, for it is obvious that what distinguishes a philosopher like Diogenes from a modern cynic is more than a commitment or lack of commitment to truth-telling. Perhaps we could say, as Bertrand Russell suggested, 12 that unlike the modern cynics, the classical Cynics were possessed by a remarkable passion for virtue and moral freedom, for which reason, he added, "the teaching of Diogenes was by no means what we now call 'cynical'--quite the contrary." But if this is indeed the case, what we encounter is a curious historical situation: the classical Cynics and the modern cynics are

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related to one another mostly by a peculiarity of language, inasmuch as the same word ('Cynic' or 'cynical') appears to have undergone a reversal in meaning, so that to be cynical really means to be the opposite of being a Cynic, and being a Cynic has hardly any relationship to being cynical. Unfortunately, in order to shed light on this issue we would have to possess an ample store of historical knowledge that we do not possess. We know a great deal about modern cynicism, for, after all, we live among modern cynics and may even be at times infected in our own selves by their condition. Any daily newspaper today can give a discerning reader a good dosage of modern cynicism, and every television set is a sure source from which vast quantities of naked cynicism ooze abundantly day and night. The world of film and entertainment, with its fascination for nudity, perversion, vulgar language, violence, and, above all, appearance and dissembling, gives abundant testimony to the pervasiveness of an advancing cynical mood both on the part of those who peddle such forms of mindless amusement and on the part of the masses who thirst without restraints after such things. The so-called information superhighway could be crowded by millions of cynics who, like chattering zombies and recluses, duped by the false promises of a technology gone wild, create in virtual reality a maddening cacophony of discordant sounds and messages, meaning little and accomplishing hardly anything. If we want to understand what modern cynicism is and means, all we have to do is look around us and sometimes within our own selves, and there and everywhere, the modern cynic, with his sarcastic nihilism and sardonic indifference, looks back at us. But we cannot transport ourselves to the fourth century B.C. in order to follow Diogenes through the streets of Athens, or keep him company in his famous tub, to hear what he said and make sense of his bizarre behavior; neither can we visit imperial Rome, the Rome of Vespasian and Marcus Aurelius, in order to listen to the Cynics' public diatribes and denunciations of their cultural milieu. What we know about the Cynics is limited to what the scant primary sources reveal and to what the secondary sources, sketchy, fragmented, or biased as they are, communicate, and this knowledge is meager, so that all we can do is form hypotheses and manufacture reconstructions, always struggling with the unavoidable problem of separating the message from the noise, the fact from the legend, the reality from the fabrication. In the end, classical Cynicism emerges as a problematic philosophical movement about which much can be said but without much certainty, and about which much can be affirmed but without any assurance of accuracy. This explains at least in part the great number of interpretations and assessments of Cynicism that have surfaced and continue to surface in modern and contemporary literature. 13 A review of this literature reveals an assortment of views and conclusions related to the origins of Cynicism, the chronology and 'successions' of individual Cynics, the import and significance of the Cynics' ideas, the value or lack of value of their contributions, and the relationship between Cynicism and other philosophical schools and religious movements. At -7-

some point, for instance, Diogenes is extolled as a genuine embodiment of philosophy, and yet at another point, he is characterized as a charlatan and certainly not as a great philosopher. And a similar circumstance is encountered with respect to every known Cynic. Obviously, the problem arises to a great extent from the deficiency of the sources of information. These sources 14 can be classified into two groups: primary, that is, the actual works of the Cynics, and secondary, that is, works about Cynicism and specific Cynic philosophers, written before the end of classical times. The primary sources related to the Greek Cynics in particular are exceedingly thin, since only disjointed fragments have survived of what was an impressive and varied literary corpus. We have reports that the early Cynics wrote extensively. Ten volumes, containing sixty-two works, are attributed to Antisthenes, and Diogenes is credited with having composed thirteen dialogues, a collection of letters, and seven tragedies. Crates, too, and practically every other Cynic are said to have left many works, among which we would come upon dialogues, literary essays, poetical compositions, tragedies, comedies, and other forms of literature. But in every instance what remains of their writings is negligible in extent and in substance, and we are forced to reconstruct in our imagination a semblance of their complete works. The writings of the Greek Cynics suffered the same unfortunate fate as those of most of their contemporaries: they either were destroyed on purpose by Hellenistic ideologists or by religious zealots 15 on account of their offensive and unorthodox contents (and judging from the extant fragments, we can assume that such contents must have horrified the Alexandrian librarians), or were allowed to deteriorate and remain uncopied. Thus, by the end of classical times hardly anything could be found, except for occasional quotations and paraphrases, all of which can be contained in just a few pages. 16 Concerning the Hellenistic and Roman representatives of Cynicism, moreover, the situation with regard to the primary sources is not much better. With the exception of Dio Chrysostom (second half of the first century B.C.), from whom about eighty speeches have been preserved, there is hardly anything remaining of the writings of other later Cynics. Dio's speeches, however, may or may not be acceptable as genuine Cynic documents, for he was a Cynic--or rather a sort of Cynic--only during one phase of his life, and some of his otherwise valuable oratory pieces have little to do with Cynicism. Consequently, most of what may be affirmed about Cynicism must be based on testimonies, and these, naturally, are more extensive in volume and richer in content. But however illuminating and informative they may be, it must be borne in mind that they are generally the product of authors who often lived long after the Cynics about whom they wrote, or authors who wrote about Cynicism from a biased and inimical point of view. What Lucian, for instance, reveals about Peregrinus may be as close to the historical reality as Aristophanes' Clouds is to the historical Socrates. In other cases, on the other hand, for example in the writings of Epictetus and Julian, we are in the presence of

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edifying idealizations of what the early Cynics were or could have been. Julian, for instance, regrets that in his time ( fourth century A.D.) crowds of 'uneducated' Cynics have displaced what he regards as the true Cynics, and complains that "the rivers are flowing backwards" (Or. VI), by which he means that the Cynics of his time have made a travesty of Cynicism. Epictetus and Julian were committed to a reform of Cynicism, a reform that entailed a return to the rigorous discipline and clarity of purpose of the early Cynics. But it is clear that such a call for the resurrection of the original Cynic movement is based on the desire to idealize and canonize the ancient Cynics, especially in times of great social and political disorientation. We do not know how close to the historical reality is their representation of the early Cynics. The Cynic testimonies of Epictetus and Julian are important and enlightening, and are essential documents in understanding the cultural worlds in which they lived, and the sort of Cynicism that was common in their context. But we would be mistaken in using their testimony as a reliable source on the early Cynics. The most abundant source of information concerning the early Cynics is found in doxographical collections and biographical accounts, some of which were composed as early as the late fourth century B.C., but most of which appear to be original works or, more often, compilations belonging to writers of late Roman times. The Cynics developed a philosophical style in which actions and succinct declarations were the chief medium of the message that they sought to communicate. The Cynic philosopher taught, accordingly, by means of the example of his life and his immediate verbal and behavioral reactions to specific situations. His philosophy was more a commitment to a particular mode of life than an adherence to a set of universal notions, although these can always be discerned in his outward manifestations. Thus, it was in his life--in his daily activities, in his way of dressing and eating, in his demeanor, in his daily language--that his Cynicism was embodied and exhibited. His behavior was structured in terms of firmly held convictions and on the basis of philosophical concepts (unfortunately not always well developed), but these, according to him, had no meaning except in the context of particular modes of life. As we learn from Demetrius, a Cynic during the reign of Vespasian, the Cynic does not need to know many ideas, as long as he can put into practice a few firm principles. Beginning with Antisthenes, Cynicism had an aversion for universals and generalities. Ideas and things, the Cynics maintained, can be defined and clarified only by means of exemplifications, and virtue, for instance, is understood in terms of particular acts of virtue, not in terms of a general definition. Accordingly, those who sought to leave a record of Cynic philosophy did so by recounting endless concatenations of anecdotes and sayings attributed to some Cynic, because they were aware that for the Cynics, an act or can be defined as an anecdotal report about some famous person, noted and transmitted for the purpose of conveying a philosophical message of ethical

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significance. 17 Already by the time of Metrocles (towards the end of the fourth century B.C.), collections of Cynic κρεख0311αι were being compiled, Metrocles himself being the originator of the practice. What mattered above all, both for those who were well inclined towards Cynicism (or were at least impartial) and for those who sought to undermine its influence, was to maintain a graphic record of what Diogenes, Crates, and other Cynics did and said, precisely because what they did and said revealed the basis and the implications of their philosophical stance. Literally thousands of examples of the Cynics' concrete manner of philosophizing can be adduced, but two examples suffice to clarify this matter initially. It is reported by Diogenes Laertius ( VI, 37) that one day, after observing a child drinking out of his hand, Diogenes threw away the cup from his wallet, saying, "A child has given me a lesson in plainness of living." Again, according to Diogenes Laertius ( VI, 40), as Diogenes was leaving the public baths, somebody asked him whether there were many men bathing, to which he answered that there were few people but a large crowd of bathers. In the example of the child, we have a specific behavioral response-Diogenes throws away his own cup--and a succinct statement: "A child has given me a lesson in plainness of living." In the second example, we have a terse double reply: Few people were at the baths, but there was a large crowd of bathers. What do we learn from both examples? Plenty indeed, in fact more than we could learn from a treatise on the uselessness of most human inventions and practices, and on the brutal fact, recognized by the Cynics, that most people appear to be human but are not, that is, that most people deceive us into the belief that they are intelligent and decent, while in reality they are nothing but camouflaged rascals and ruffians, and are not therefore truly human. In the first example, Diogenes indicts much of what goes by the name of civilization, and in the second he condemns in no uncertain terms the condition in which most human beings live. Thus, philosophy assumed among the Cynics an ostensive inclination and an 'exhibitionist' bent. 18 The Cynics are comparable to artists who put themselves on exhibition and on occasion create out of their lives an entire performance for the expression of their ideas and sentiments. Diogenes has been referred to as "the great hero of this tradition, and arguably the great prototype of much performance art." 19 Through his often shocking acts and merciless language, he exhibited a certain philosophical stance, and his life, no less than the lives of other Cynics, became an earnest theatrical performance, which would be repeated countless times after him, and always in the same exaggerated exhib --to alter or deface the currency, 'currency' in the sense of moral and social norms and custom, 20 since the Cynics understood their mission in terms of the defacement of ordinary human values and modes of behavior, and the development of a rational arrangement of human affairs. When we hear that Crates, after listening to Diogenes speak, converted

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all his possessions into coins and proceeded to throw them all into the sea, we are witnessing an act of exhibitionist performance. Likewise, when we read about the spectacular selfburning of Peregrinus at the Olympic games in A.D. 165, we are once more in the presence of an exhibitionist performance, as much as when we read about how the Cynics traveled to the Olympic games for the purpose of hurling insults at the competitors (for the Cynics had no use either for athletic events or for athletes). But we would be mistaken in assuming that such performances, regardless of their roughness and primitivism, were designed as mere circus performances, created for the amusement of the unthinking rabble, or conceived only as a means to gain notoriety and personal advantage. We must reiterate Michel Foucaults' contention, which appears to hold its ground at least in the case of some of the Cynics: What the Cynics said and did was generally said and done with consummate deliberation and as an expression of powerful philosophical concepts. Beneath their often clownish antics and preposterous pronouncements, there lurks an air of earnestness and urgency, the like of which it is difficult to find in the annals of Western philosophy. We still have to face the problem that according to the secondary sources, what the Cynics said and did appears as a mass of often contradictory reports and discordant anecdotes which leave us baffled as to their content, and skeptical as to their historical value. The testimony of Diogenes Laertius, our greatest source of information concerning Cynicism, 21 was written hundreds of years after the time of the early Cynics, and is a compilation of materials taken from works which have not survived and whose authors, in some cases, we only know by name. What truth can be in his colorful reports about the Cynics, and how much reliability can be attached to his portrayal of early Cynicism? Among the doxographers and biographers of Cynicism, 'facts' seem to have been liberally invented in order to embellish and give substance to a particular philosophical position, 22 for which reason it was argued earlier in this chapter that although much can be said about the Cynics, there remains always a great deal of uncertainty, and this uncertainty affects not only our understanding of the origins and history of Cynicism, but also its philosophical import. "The problem of Cynicism," R. Hoïstad has noted, "is essentially a problem concerning the sources," since "our knowledge of Cynicism rests largely on quotations from late authors, on a rich profusion of anecdotes, and on late spurious letters." 23 These letters are pieces of epistolary literature, attributed to Heraclitus, Socrates and the minor Socratics, Diogenes, Crates, and others. 24 Such attributions remain questionable, and there is a great deal of uncertainty as to who their authors could have been. Some scholars have suggested the possibility of Jewish authorship for some of the letters, and have rejected any Cynic influence in their composition. 25 Others insist on accepting the letters as genuine Cynic documents. 26 Their contents are important for an understanding of Cynicism in general and of certain issues related to the relationship between Cynic ideas and practices, and the origins of Christianity in particular. But the major difficulty in understanding Cynicism remains unresolved,

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however the issue of the authenticity and value of the Cynic Epistles is finally settled. The letters, as much as the testimonies of biographers and doxographers, the statements of early philosophers and historians, and the few and disjointed fragments from the primary sources, leave us with the complex task of having to reconstruct a long and complicated movement, which lasted eight hundred years, which included numerous philosophers characterized by distinct idiosyncrasies, and which left a discernible mark on the culture of the ancient world, out of few 'facts', and out of stories and reports of varying reliability and value. Still, it would be ill-advised to opt for a stance of complete skepticism and say that nothing definite can be affirmed or denied about classical Cynicism, for this would imply a rejection of one of the wealthiest traditions of the ancient Western world. If we take into account all the sources, primary and secondary, and cautiously sift through the available evidence, allowing for instances of exaggeration, distortion, and fabrication, it is possible to reconstruct a portrayal of Cynicism, from its origins in the Socratic circle to its last manifestations in Roman times. Then, we would be able to compare this portrayal with the representation of modern cynicism, and be in a position to recognize the few superficial similarities and the many substantial differences between them. We would succeed in understanding why Diogenes and Crates, no less than their descendants of Hellenistic and Roman times, would have felt towards modern cynicism the same contempt that they felt towards the institutions and customs of their own times. Then, too, we would not hesitate to affirm that the Cynics of classical times, had they had the opportunity to visit the late twentieth century and witness the spectacle of its unfortunate condition, would have fled in horror back to their own bygone times, 27 convinced of the futility of their efforts to alter or deface the moral currency of their own and subsequent times, possibly repeating the words that R. Guérin attributes to Diogenes at the moment of his death: Having resigned myself to the extinction of my being, at least I had struggled without faltering against that permeating stagnation in which human beings find their joy, as they sink slowly into nothing. . . . I truly wondered to what extent my appeals to them and my warnings had remained futile and meaningless. 28 The portrayal of Cynicism could assume two superimposing representations: a historicobiographical account and a conceptual explication of the ideas and themes that permeated the movement. These two representations are intertwined, for the Cynics never separated practice from theory, and each one of them became an example of his convictions. Cynic deeds gave expression to Cynic ideas, and the latter were the foundation of the former. In the biography of every Cynic we encounter the kernel of his beliefs, and in every anecdote told or even invented about him, we come face to face with the concretization of a Cynic concept. The history of Cynicism can be divided into two unequal stages. The

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first stage includes the early Cynics, from the beginnings of the movement to the middle of the third century B.C., specifically, Antisthenes, Diogenes, Onesicritus, Monimus, Crates, Hipparchia, Metrocles, Bion, Menippus, Cercidas, and a few others. The second stage embraces the later Cynics, that is, from the middle of the third Century B.C. to the end of Cynicism in the fifth century A.D. To this second stage belong innumerable Cynics, not only Greek in origin and in language, but individuals representing many of the nations that integrated the Hellenistic world and the Roman Empire: Romans, Syrians, Palestinians, Phoenicians, Alexandrians, Pagans, Jews, Christians, and others. The first stage is historically short--about one hundred and fifty years, linguistically homogeneous, and dominated by the influence of the Antisthenes-Diogenes succession. The second stage is historically long--over six centuries, heterogeneous in language and tradition, and often intermingled with non-Cynic philosophies and with religious currents such as Judaism and Christianity. But the foremost difference between the early and the late Cynics is related to the varying degree of Cynicism found among them, so that we can refer to the former as strong in their Cynicism, and to the latter as weaker. Among the late Cynics, we notice that the heroic ideals of the early Cynics were often replaced with an ideological elasticity and an easy adaptability to all sorts of situations and circumstances. Some of the late Cynics either made accommodations to the style of life of their contemporaries, thereby becoming often indistinguishable from other philosophers, or concentrated on perpetuating merely the external aspects of Cynicism, without maintaining the intellectual basis of its tradition. It seems, then, that Cynicism eventually lost some of its initial impetus and strength, and became progressively weakened and diluted, until, in the end, many of the original ingredients of Cynicism disappeared from the selfproclaimed Cynics of late Roman times. With them, Cynicism as a sect ceased to exist, despite the fact that the appearance of Cynicism remained in vogue for a long time. We would be mistaken, however, were we to agree with Dudley in maintaining that after this point, "Cynicism had nothing further to offer mankind," 29 for it is undeniable that the concepts on which the Cynics built their movement of protest, as well as the memory and records of their sect, have had a lasting relevance, especially at a time when another kind of cynicism, modern cynicism, threatens to quell all forms of genuine and meaningful philosophical and spiritual protest against those aspects of human existence that, from the point of view of reason, make little or no sense. As we now endeavor to reconstruct the portrayal of Cynicism, we must begin by asking, who or what is a Cynic? What does the name denote and what connotations does it evoke? What is the etymological origin of the word 'Cynic'? With respect to this last question, two nonexclusive possibilities may be entertained, especially if we concede that it is Antisthenes with whom we must begin the history of Cynicism. 30 (Latin, caninus), which simply means 'like a dog'. Hence, a Cynic would be someone whose appearance and behavior resemble those of a

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dog. Animal traits and characteristics have always been associated with certain kinds of people, as there are persons who remind us of animals: a dirty and uncouth person is said to be a pig, a lazy character becomes a sloth, a sneaky and deceitful politician turns out to be a weasel, a crafty and calculating character is changed into a fox, a chattering fool is referred to as a parrot, a husky and rough type is transformed into a gorilla, and so on. In most instances, the association of human appearance and behavior with those of animals is an inverted form of anthropomorphism, and is meant to be insulting and demeaning, because of the inveterate and unjustified sense of superiority of humans over their evolutionary relatives. But as Schopenhauer once remarked, the truth is that in comparing human beings with animals, we may often be insulting and demeaning, not the members of our own species, but the animals themselves. It may also be added that as far as the Cynics were concerned, being called 'doglike', 'like a dog', or 'doggish'--that is, 'cynical'--was interpreted as a compliment, because for the Cynics, "animals are plainly models of 'natural' and therefore 'rational' behavior which men should heed." 31 After all, Diogenes is said to have learned how to live as a Cynic by observing the behavior of a mouse (D.L. VI, 22). "Better a dog than a general, a politician, a soothsayer, a financial speculator, a slave trader, a guard in a concentration camp, a government informer, a tax collector" mig ). We have an interesting anecdote about Diogenes' readiness to accept the designation that gave the name to his philosophy. Diogenes Laertius reports ( VI, 46) that once, as the philosopher passed in front of some men who were eating at a feast, they threw the bones at him, saying, "Here goes the dog!" In silence the philosopher picked up the bones, approached the men, and proceeded to urinate on them--just like a dog. Other such anecdotes can be recalled, not only about Diogenes but also about other Cynics after him. Thus, the Cynics acquired a permanent name for themselves, 'the doglike people', initially as a term of abuse used by others who reacted with shock and contempt to their primitive or animal-like behavior, which was typical of the sort of people whom we designate by the French word canaille. 32 In a short time, however, 'Cynic' transformed itself into a generic term, which the Cynics themselves adopted, and with much pride and self-assurance, in referring to themselves, for they recognized that the very name by which they became known revealed the original stance of their philosophy. They called themselves 'dogs' and their philosophical sect became known as 'the School of the Cynics' or, in Lucian's phrase, as 'the Army of the Dog'. Before Diogenes, however, the terms 'Cynic' and 'Cynic philosophy' are not encountered. There are no references to 'Cynics' either in Plato or in Xenophon, although Antisthenes, the reputed 'founder' of Cynicism, is mentioned explicitly by Aristotle and by Plato, and is given a prominent role in Xenophon Symposium. Antisthenes is said to have been known, perhaps even during his own time, as 'the Absolute Dog' (ʹ

), that is, 'the simple and pure

-14Dog', at least according to the testimony of Diogenes Laertius ( VI, 13). But still we do not hear anything about Cynics or about the philosophy of Cynicism until the time of Diogenes. With Diogenes and after him, however, the name 'Cynic' became firmly established as a way of designating a certain type of philosopher. In time, then, the name moved further and further away from its therioramphic beginnings, that is, away from its early connotation of 'dog-like',

so that by the time of Epictetus, it had come to be invested with an aura of spiritual and intellectual excellence and earnestness, as if it designated the very embodiment of philosophy. As Epictetus reminds us repeatedly, the Cynic is a messenger and scout of God on earth, his task being to lead human beings to virtue and reason through the example of his own virtuous and exceptional life. Thus, from a dog-man, the Cynic became, at least in the minds of those who idealized the Cynic way of life, a holy man devoted to the practice of philosophy. There is still another possible origin of the word 'Cynic'. This other origin would take us back at least fifty years before the time of Diogenes. Various sources, including Diogenes Laertius ( VI, 13), report that Antisthenes was in the habit of teaching in the Athenian Cynosarges, 33 a gymnasium and place of worship, the history of which is traceable at least to the sixth century B.C. Both the gymnasium and the temples were destroyed by Philip V of Macedonia in 200 B.C.; after this date, we hear about the Cynosarges from later sources only as a place that was once in existence. During the time of Socrates and Antisthenes, the Cynosarges played a significant role in Athenian civic life. Its name is curious, especially in the context of the history of Cynicism. 'Cynos' and 'arges' are derivations of two Greek words meaning respectively 'dog' and 'agile'. It was then the Park of the Agile Dog. Nothing is known, however, of the reasons that could have led the Athenians to give it such a name, except for a reference in Pausanias ( I, xix), where we are told about a certain oracle involving a 'white dog' which was somehow related to the Cynosarges. There are, nevertheless, two well-established facts about it. First, it functioned as a religious center for the worship of Hercules, the legendary hero admired for his indefatigable struggles on behalf of the needy, and for his enormous capacity to endure pain and hardship, who spent his earthly life wandering as an exile, recognizing no city or country as his own, accepting no political or social authority over himself, and who became a paradigm of virtue , that is, the bastards, who, since the middle of the fifth century as the result of a law passed at the request of Pericles, had been deprived of Athenian citizenship. Although suspended several times during the Peloponnesian War, this law remained in effect and was enforced well into the fourth century B.C. It stipulated that children born of an Athenian father and a foreign mother, or whose mother was a slave or a prostitute, or whose parents were not legally married citizens, did not qualify as Athenian citizens. This law is well documented, and Aristotle's testimony in this -15regard is clear ( Athenian Constitution XXVI, 3). Although such (citizens). Thus, the Cynosarges served as a place where noncitizens could congregate, and where they could exercise and worship. , or bastard, since his mother was a Thracian slave. What he taught or did in the Cynosarges is not known, but it is unquestionable that his reported presence in it was sufficient for various ancient traditions to have concluded that the Absolute Dog, who as a bastard frequented the Park of the Agile Dog, was the 'founder' of Cynicism, a philosophy whose advocates were invariably dog-like people and who were either actual bastards or self-proclaimed bastards, that is, men and women who were or felt illegitimate and foreign everywhere, and who lived ill at ease

within the established civic community. The presence of the Herculean shrine in the Cynosarges gave further support to such traditions, for Hercules, too, was believed to have been a legendary bastard par excellence. Aside from Antisthenes, there are no other philosophers directly associated with the Cynosarges, except for Ariston of Chios (c. 250 B.C.), a disciple of Zeno of Citium and a Stoic philosopher, who sought to bring Stoicism back to its Cynic foundations. Ariston's exclusive concern with ethical matters and his rejection of Stoic logic and physics, place him more within the Cynic movement than within Stoicism: his denunciation of logic as unrelated to human beings and his abandonment of physics as useless remind us of the Cynic stance found among Diogenes and his associates, and perhaps of statements attributed to Antisthenes. The question, however, whether the presence of two Cynic philosophers, Antisthenes and Ariston, justifies the assertion that Cynicism was born and flourished in the Cynosarges, and whether the word 'Cynic' is in fact the result of their association with the gymnasium reserved for bastards, is difficult to answer. Diogenes Laertius observes (VI, 13) that Antisthenes "used to converse in the gymnasium of Cynosarges at no great distance from the gates, and some think that the Cynic school derived its name from Cynosarges." In his reference to Ariston's having also lectured at the Cynosarges ( VII, 161), on the other hand, no mention is made of the Cynic movement; in fact, Diogenes Laertius classifies Ariston as a Stoic philosopher. We hear nothing from any of the sources about other Cynics having been associated with the Cynosarges, although we know that some, if not many, among them would have been the sort of people who would naturally be found there, since among them, we find exiles, foreigners, and bastards, marginal people enjoying the freedom for which the Athenian polity was renowned. In reality, what we have is a double doxographical and historical tradition, the two sides of which appear to have been mixed by the sources, or to have been interchangeably used to suit specific purposes, which, on reflection, does not force us to assume an either-or stand. The first side leads us to believe -16that Cynicism owes its name to the behavioral similarities discerned by its opponents betwe ) of the Cynics reminded people of similar canine traits: Cynics and dogs ate and urinated whenever and wherever they felt the need to do so, bit and barked at those whom they did not like, lived and slept in any indiscriminate place, gave the impression of being honest and sincere about their feelings and predilections, and pledged allegiance to no nation or political group. Cynicism, then, derives its name from a theriomorphic linguistic transformation, as the Cynics became universally known as the dog-like philosophers, 34 And then we have the second side: Antisthenes taught in the Cynosarges under the shadow of the shrine of Hercules, the legendary hero who was seen as an anticipation of what the Cynics would become one day. Both sides appear, therefore, to converge into a focal point that was and is best symbolized by the figure of a dog. Much controversy has surrounded the issue as to who the 'founder' of Cynicism was or who the Original Dog could have been. Older historians of philosophy, especially in the nineteenth century, generally asserted that the honor belongs to Antisthenes, while often conceding that

Diogenes still remains "the archetypal figure of the Cynic." 35 Hegel, for instance, began his account of Cynicism with Antisthenes, noting that "the attitude he adopted comes very near that of rudeness, vulgarity of conduct and shamelessness." and that these were precisely the traits inherited by later Cynics. 36 Zeller, Ueberweg, Grote, Gomperz, and Windelband, just to mention a few, supported Hegel's choice for the 'founder' of Cynicism, recognizing the close relationship between Socrates and Antisthenes, and accepting thereby the historical nature of the succession ' Socrates-Antisthenes-Diogenes'. In their view, the basis of Cynicism, the kernel of its teaching, and even the specific style of life of the Cynics, can be discerned in Antisthenes, despite the scantiness of our information about him. They conceded that Cynicism underwent a transformation as it passed from Antisthenes to Diogenes, just as the Socratic spirit changed as it moved from Socrates to Antisthenes. In philosophy one should not expect that in the relationship between master and disciple ideas be transmitted without change from the former to the latter, or that teachings be inherited verbatim from one person to another. On the other side of the controversy, we come upon those who view Diogenes as the real 'founder' of Cynicism. Already in the nineteenth century, Chappuis refused to classify Antisthenes among the Cynics, arguing that Cynicism had failed to keep alive the Socratic spirit that permeated Antisthenes' philosophy. 37 According to Chappuis, Diogenes exaggerated and distorted the philosophy of Antisthenes, and dismissed its major components, specifically those related to logic and physics. A few decades later, Joël would echo Chappuis' view, 38 insisting that there is no solid foundation for the suppositions that Cynicism can be traced back to Antisthenes and that Cynic ideas contain genuine elements of Socratic thought. More recently, the inclination to disassociate Antisthenes from Cynicism -17has been expressed by Dudley, Sayre, and Giannantoni, among others. Dudley maintains that the differences in doctrine between Antisthenes and Diogenes are greater and deeper than their similarities, and that the master-disciple relationship between them is a myth created out of the tendency of Diogenes Laertius to invent philosophical successions. He notes, moreover, that "it is most unlikely that Antisthenes and Diogenes can [sic] have been contemporaries in Athens." 39 Sayre, too, rejects the ideological and biographical bond between Antisthenes and Diogenes, and contends that there is no justification in seeking to trace back the origins of Cynicism to Antisthenes, who should be considered above all a Socratic philosopher. 40 Sayre goes even further by arguing that neither Antisthenes nor Diogenes should be associated with the Cynic movement, for its real originator was Crates. Giannantoni observes that in the fourth and third centuries B.C. Antisthenes was generally regarded as a Socratic philosopher, not as a Cynic, and that the linkage between Antisthenes and Diogenes is a late invention of doxographers and biographers. We must, Giannantoni insists, "set aside the image of Cynicism as a true and independent school of philosophy, established by Antisthenes, and characterized by a succession of scholars and by a substantial unity of a body of doctrines." 41 At least some aspects of this controversy are related to the historically interesting yet substantially inconsequential issue as to whether Antisthenes could have been Diogenes' teacher. We will deal in detail with this question in the subsequent chapters on Antisthenes and Diogenes, but let us note at this point that concerning the lives of Antisthenes and Diogenes, as Goulet-Cazé has stated, "it is impossible to separate the historical truth from the legends." 42 Obviously, for Diogenes to have been a disciple of Antisthenes, the former must

have arrived in Athens before the death of the latter. Now, by the time of Socrates' death, Antisthenes was a middle-aged man, so his birth can be placed between 455 and 450 B.C. If, as Seltman suggests on the basis of numismatic evidence, 43 Diogenes was exiled from Sinope around the year 360 B.C. for his alleged role in the defacement of currency, he could have then met Antisthenes, a man already very advanced in years. If we postpone Diogenes' exile ten or twenty years, then the meeting of the two famous Cynics would turn out to be a fiction. Nothing, however, should force us to disregard the testimony of Diogenes Laertius ( VI, 21 ) with respect to the master-disciple relationship between Antisthenes and Diogenes, because there is no contradictory evidence, while there is much supporting doxographical and anecdotal confirmation. While historically interesting, this issue is inconsequential with respect to the 'founding' of Cynicism. For even if Diogenes could have learned philosophy at Antisthenes' feet, he could have eventually walked away from his teacher with a philosophical outlook altogether different from his. On the other hand, if we imagine that Diogenes arrived in Athens after Antisthenes' death, it would still be conceivable that upon learning about Antisthenes' life and doctrines, and reading his writings, Diogenes could have inherited many of the components of his philosophy. -18But what is of greater significance is the question concerning the import of Cynicism in Antisthenes' philosophy. Was he a Cynic or was he only a Socratic philosopher, or could he have been both? This last possibility makes perfect sense, because there are ideas in Cynicism that can surely be traced back to Socrates himself or rather to a certain interpretation of the meaning of the Socratic presence. 44 The canonical succession ' Socrates-AntisthenesDiogenes' does not run contrary to what we know about the views of these three philosophers, particularly if we acknowledge that in the direct transmission of ideas from one person to another, transformations and even distortions are bound to take place. In philosophy, at least ideally, there are no infallible dogmas that are passed on to posterity. What Socrates taught and did became for Antisthenes a source of intellectual and spiritual stimulation that gave rise to his own idiosyncratic stance. Likewise, the Antisthenean stance provided the basis on which Diogenes developed his own ideas and style of life. In the end, then, we come upon three different yet related manifestations of the spirit of philosophy. Furthermore, there is the problem concerning the phrase 'the founder of Cynicism'. Certain 'schools' of ancient philosophy are associated with the name of a place and with a 'founder'. Thus, Platonism is linked to the Athenian Academy and obviously to Plato, and there is some justification in saying that Plato 'founded' Platonism in the Academy. Aristotelianism, for its part, evokes the memory of the Athenian Lyceum, where Aristotle taught after the year 350 B.C. and where he established his Peripatetic 'school'. The Stoics originated in the Athenian Stoa where Zeno taught, for which reason we speak of him as the 'founder' of Stoicism. Lastly, Epicurus is said to have taught in the Athenian Garden, where his 'school' of philosophy was established. In these four instances, we have a 'founder, a place, and a more or less structured 'school' of philosophy. In the cases of Plato's and Aristotle's 'schools' there is an identifiable structure and a line of succession in which a scholarch was chosen to succeed his predecessor: Speusippus succeeded Plato, Xenocrates succeeded Aristotle, and so on. There is also in these schools an element of accepted doctrine, not quite to the same degree as we find in religious sects, but still identifiable at least for two or three generations of scholarchs. 45

The association of Antisthenes with the Cynosarges, and the introduction of the masterdisciple relationship between Antisthenes and Diogenes, might have been the result of the need of ancient doxographers and biographers to establish a parallelism between Cynicism and the 'schools' of Greek philosophy. If Platonism had its Plato and its Academy, if Aristotelianism had its Aristotle and its Lyceum, why should not Cynicism have its Antisthenes and its Cynosarges? This question is raised by M. F. Billot, who notes that the story of Antisthenes teaching in the Cynosarges is "too beautiful to be credible," 46 since it betrays a character of edifying fabrication: Antisthenes, the Absolute Dog, teaches in the Park of the Agile Dog, where he instructs his disciples (presumably Diogenes among them) in ways to become and act like 'dogs' whose responsibility is to watch over the purity of moral values. 47 And yet, Billot herself, while admitting -19that there is nothing that confirms the presence of Antisthenes in the Cynosarges, concedes that there is nothing that contradicts the report of Diogenes Laertius. A review of the historical circumstances, Billot maintains, lends support to his report. 48 Sometimes classical scholarship becomes involved in disputes about the historical value of a report, but often we end up confronting an insoluble problem and are forced to reach only the most tentative of conclusions. Such is the case with respect to the historical origins of Cynicism. Whether it was Antisthenes or Diogenes, whether the Cynosarges played or did not play a role in the affair, whether Diogenes arrived in Athens before or after the death of Antisthenes--these are questions about which we are allowed to hold only informed opinions. To claim more or to speak with finality on such matters indicates a willingness to transcend the restrictions imposed by the poverty of the sources. Cynicism was never a 'school' in a formal sense. Hence, it could not have been 'founded' either by a philosopher or in a given place. It was a movement, or rather an attitude of amorphous contours and characteristics, accompanied by a set of convictions, for which reason it is futile to assign a beginning date or a single originator. It was already present in Socrates--to some extent and in some ways--and could even be discerned in some of the Presocratic philosophers. Heraclitus' contempt for the customs and opinions of the many, and his critique of religious beliefs and rituals, no less than his aloofness from the political world, reveal themes well exploited and fully expanded by the Cynics. The roots of certain Cynic ideas in the ethics of Democritus can be identified, 49 and other examples of the presence of Cynicism among the Presocratics can be adduced, including instances in which Sophistical thought anticipated Cynic ideas. Likewise, it is not difficult to establish connections between Cynicism and certain Indian doctrines and practices of great antiquity, from which the Cynics may have derived some of their ideas. The Indian pasupatas illustrate this point. Here we have an ancient ascetic Shivaite sect, the members of which practiced unusual austerities and mortifications, displayed a patently anti-social behavior, intentionally sought contempt and condemnation from others, performed offending actions, and, what is most interesting, were in the habit of imitating dogs both in sound and in deed. 50 The pasupatas, like the Cynics, preached acceptance of suffering, detachment from physical luxury and possessions, and simplicity of life, and insisted on a specific external mode of behavior. It has been suggested that even the presence of Hercules, the paradigm of Cynic behavior, can be detected in Indian 'cynic' traditions: 'Lakulisa', the name of the teacher of the pasupatas and possibly the author of the Pasupata Sutras, could be related etymologically to the Greek name for Hercules. 51

It is generally agreed that after Alexander's campaigns the Greeks became aware of Indian philosophies, as exemplified by the Gymnosophists (with whom the Cynics had much in common). 52 Since the time of Onesicritus, we come upon repeated comparisons between the Cynics and the Gymnosophists, -20who appear in the testimonies of the Greek reporters more like disguised Cynics than genuine Indian sages. 53 The exchange of ideas between Indians and Hellenistic Greeks seems to have been significant, for which reason we can infer that some of the late Cynics were influenced by Indian practices and beliefs. It is even conceivable that some of the anecdotes associated with Diogenes might have been Greek renditions of stories involving Indian Gymnosophists, or could have been at least linguistically shaped by traditions related to them. It has been suggested that in the encounter between Alexander and Diogenes, Buddhist ascetic elements are discernible. 54 It is, moreover, also possible that before Alexander, points of contact between Indians and Greeks could have existed, although here we find ourselves in a land of much heated controversy. Classical scholars and historians of philosophy, particularly in the nineteenth century, have been generally unwilling to allow for such a possibility, and have been anxious to maintain the 'purity' of Greek thought by denying any external influences on its early development. From the European perspective, it may seem almost blasphemous to imagine that the birth of philosophy among the Milesians and its development among their successors could have been affected by currents originating in the East. Such an attitude reveals itself, for instance, in Zeller's account of the origins of Greek philosophy. The then revolutionary ideas of A. Gladisch, 55 who insisted on discerning Oriental influences on the rise of philosophy among the Milesians, and who 'discovered' the presence of Egyptian, Israelite, Babylonian, Indian, and even Chinese ideas in the fragments of the Presocratics, as well as in Pythagorean traditions, were met with disbelief and were dismissed as absolute fantasy. 56 But in more recent times, as exemplified in Guthrie's account of the origins of Greek thought, 57 we have grown more accustomed to the idea that the Greeks did not create philosophy out of nothing, and that in their conceptual constructions they did make use of intellectual materials from non-Greek sources. With respect to the origins of Cynicism, then, we find that before Antisthenes, both in Greece itself and elsewhere, not only identifiably Cynic ideas and convictions but also Cynic practices and even Cynic-like sects were in existence, so that, assuming the exchange of ideas between the Greeks and other nations, it is conceivable that Greek Cynicism could have been shaped in part or at least stimulated by influences from the East. It is also conceivable, and somehow more intriguing, that a community of ideas and practices might have survived both among the Indians and the Greeks from some remote ancestral source: both 'cults', that is, Cynicism and the Shivaite pasupata sect, may be vestiges of some common ancestor. 58 But if this possibility is acceptable, then we must conclude that before there were Greek Cynics, there were indeed other 'Cynics', both in Greece and elsewhere, Cynics who only lacked the name that would identify their movement in classical times. This supposition would lead us to reassess the issue as to the origins of Cynicism, and would compel us to say that this movement has ultimately no known origins and has roots that are buried in times immemorial. In Greek times, it surfaced faintly among some of -21-

the Presocratics; it reappeared with greater distinctness among certain Sophists; it announced itself more clearly with the advent of the Socratic presence; and finally it fully revealed itself in Antisthenesand Diogenes. Thus, if we insist on naming a 'founder' of Cynicism, we can say that in a real sense, no one can be so named. After all, classical Cynicism is an expression of universal human tendencies that can claim neither a place nor a time as its own. Our subsequent characterization of the classical Cynic will reveal features that can be found among people of every age and of every culture, indeed rarely and exceptionally (for being a true Cynic is, as Epictetus reminds us, not an easy undertaking), and are not confined to a given historical period or to a specific cultural milieu. We could say, therefore, that Cynicism had no formal or absolute beginning, in the sense of having been invented or created ex nihilo, but that in a relative or weaker sense, at the origins of the traditional Cynic movement of classical times, we come upon the presence of two philosophers, Antisthenesand Diogenes, with whom the name 'Cynic' came into being. Surely, these two philosophers practiced Cynicism in different ways, for Cynicism is such that there cannot be two identical or even similar Cynics. But as A. H. Chroust has observed, "there exists a remarkable resemblance between the fundamental teachings of Diogenes of Sinope and those of Antisthenes," 59 so that there is a sense in which we are justified in saying that classical Cynicism came into existence either with Antisthenes or with Diogenes, or with both. What really matters at this point is the reconstruction of the portrayal of the Cynic of classical times. Who or what was he (or she, given the presence of Cynic women)? How did the Cynics differ from other philosophers and from ordinary people? In what ways did the Cynics' behavior and attire distinguish them from their contemporaries? What was their accustomed form of teaching and what did they teach? What ideas and convictions were at the basis of the Cynics' Weltanschauung, and how were they revealed in their behavior? Lastly, how can we account for the emergence and eclipse of classical Cynicism, or, more precisely, what was it that moved the Cynics to embrace what they viewed as their divinely inspired vocation, and what conditions led to the disappearance of the Cynics as a sect? As in the case of the history of art, and especially on account of the nature of Cynicism, such questions can best be answered by describing the Cynic philosophers. We come to know an artist by his works; likewise, we succeed in understanding Cynicism by reviewing the words and deeds of the Cynics. It is, therefore, useful to construct a sort of 'portrait' of the Cynic--a portrayal of the Cynic personality and ideology of classical times. This portrait will be necessarily a description that will fit, on the one hand, all the Cynics, but, on the other hand, none of the Cynics in their individuality. Cynicism is an idiosyncratic and personal philosophical response of protest in the context of specific circumstances, and these circumstances are hardly the same for two persons. Our Cynic is a man or a woman who lives sometime between the beginning of the fourth century B.C. and the end of Roman times. His language -22is generally Greek, either the elegant Attic Greek of Sophocles and Plato, or the common Greek of Hellenistic and Roman times. Sometimes he is fluent in another language, as when we find him delivering a speech in Latin before a Roman court, or when we hear him speaking Aramaic or Hebrew with his countrymen in Syrian Gadara. About his background,

nothing specific can be said, as he may come from a wealthy and noble family, or from a humble and broken home, and his parents may be people of social standing or lowly slaves. Often, however, we find some unhappy circumstance in his background, for which reason he is sometimes classed among what has been called "the failures of human history"-Antisthenes, the bastard son of a Thracian slave; Diogenes, the son of a corrupt banker and himself a counterfeiter or defacer of currency; Crates, a physically deformed man; Monimus, the servant of a banker; Bion, the son of a fishmonger and a prostitute; Peregrinus, a man accused of the murder of his father, and a man exiled from his country; and so on. But whatever his background might be, the Cynic has severed all bonds with it, and neither is he proud of his high ascendancy, nor is embarrassed about his humble origins or preoccupied with his tainted past: he often reminds people, as did Socrates when he replied to Zopyrus the physiognomist who expressed astonishment at his ugliness, that what a man was and what he now is are two very different things ( Cicero, Tusc. disp. iv, 37). He attaches no importance to names or titles, and smiles with disdain at those who claim some god as their ancestor. He maintains that he is what he is because he is what he is, not because of what his family and ancestors could have been. He has obliterated his own past and, after his initiation into the Cynic way of life, he has become a reborn man. His place of origin could be the shores of the Black Sea, Athens, Thebes, Syracuse, Rome, Megalopolis, Alexandria, or Syria. He insists that his place of birth and his upbringing are altogether inconsequential, and that it never makes any difference in the worth of a person where he was born and raised, because people do not choose either their parents or their birthplace. Neither is he concerned about his race and ethnicity, nor with those of other people, nor with what we nowadays call 'roots', and, whether Greek or Barbarian, Roman or Jew, light or dark, he recognizes in himself only a human being, and, oblivious of such distinctions in others, he views all people also only as human beings, sometimes actual human beings, but more often potential human beings. Likewise, he ignores differences of sex, and, if a man, he accepts the company of Cynic women, and, if a woman, she accepts the presence of Cynic men. He affirms that he has no country and that he is not a citizen of any place. He regards himself as an exile from all political and civic communities, and, as such, owes allegiance to no nation. Never, or hardly ever (to allow for the notable exception of Cercidas), will we find the Cynic fighting for his fatherland, or engaged in military affairs on behalf of his 'people', or expressing admiration for the achievements of the nation or city of his birth. To him, generals are nothing but donkey drivers, and soldiers are mindless fools led into battle by bigger fools. Never, then, will we hear him singing a national anthem, -23or pledging allegiance to a flag or banner, or puffing up with pride for the greatness of his country, and seldom will we find him serving as a juror in the courts or waiting to cast his vote. He is a foreigner regardless of his place of residence, and, when asked to what country or city he belongs, he points his finger to the sky, as if saying, "I am a citizen of the world," 60 by which he means, not that he is a member of a universal community or cosmic polity, but that he belongs to no nation or city. 61 And yet, perhaps surprisingly, this political and civic destitution does not make him a recluse or a pariah, and does not create for him a difficult predicament. He recognizes and accepts his condition as an exile and an expatriate, and rejoices in it--a condition that he has chosen, even

when it may have been forced on him. He is versatile and flexible, and maintains his peace of mind wherever he lives. In fact, he easily finds happiness and tranquility regardless of any external conditions, and is ready to move on from place to place when necessity arises. His existence within a given community is marginal, since he acts as if he did not belong to it, and yet, from another point of view, it is anything but marginal, since he becomes involved with the daily affairs of people, as a busybody and meddler, forever engaging everyone in conversation and argument, asking embarrassing questions, critically assessing and more often condemning all that he sees and hears, upsetting the status quo of those who surround him, invalidating and defacing in word and in action their moral and social currency, and acting as a social pest and as an examiner. We could surely say of him what Marcus Cato is said to have remarked about Socrates: he is "a mighty babbler, who tries to make himself king of his country" ( Plutarch, Cato xxiii). The idea of him wanting to be a king is appropriate, because the Cynic has the notion that he has been sent by God to govern people, and that if anyone wishes to secure the services of a ruler, it is he who should be chosen. 62 Amid the confusion in which people live, and in the midst of what he calls their inveterate τυϕς, 63 he proudly conceives of himself as a clearminded person, as a man of reason and understanding, and, therefore, as someone who should guide the affairs of others. Every morning he walks into the noisy market place, amid the deafening chattering and gossiping of the multitude, and strolling proudly among the crowd, like a Roman proconsul among a throng of slaves, he passes judgment and, to use Browning's phrase, "scenting the world, looking it full in the face," takes note of all that he sees and hears, as if he were "a recording chief-inquisitor" of God. 64 It would be absurd to imagine that in view of such an attitude of proud superiority--made worse by his habitual torn cloak, through which, as Plato once said to Antisthenes, his love of fame peeps at the world ( D. L.VI, 8), his disheveled hair, and the sarcastic humor that flows generously from his mouth, the Cynic is a welcome presence. He is generally disliked and distrusted, and is often shunned, although he remains a source of curiosity and even wonderment, for people fail to understand how a man who has so little can be so happy. On -24occasion, even an emperor or an imperial magistrate may come to look at him in astonishment and disbelief, as when Alexander visited Diogenes in Corinth, or when Aulus Gellius went to see Peregrinus in Athens. Children sometimes hurl insults and stones at him, and older folk refer to him as a dog. At best, he is ignored by others, but there are times when his very life is threatened or when he is thrown out of the city. At times, like "a voice crying in the wilderness," 65 he might even feel as the philosopher in Plato Republic (6.496d), that is, "a man who has fallen among wild beasts, and is unwilling to share in their misdeeds, and is unable to hold out singly against their savagery." To counterbalance the effect of the multitude, he has the recourse of his Cynic friends, his only friends, for a Cynic can only have friends who, like him, are Cynics. As Epictetus observed ( Discourses III, xxii, 63), a Cynic's friend must be another Cynic, in order to be worthy of being counted his friend. He must share with him his scepter and kingdom, and be a worthy friend, as Diogenes became the friend of Antisthenes, and Crates of Diogenes.

Although generally he prefers not to be a married man, for the distractions that accompany marriage (children, expenses, and the perennial in-laws) can often interfere with his kingly mission, he may on a rare occasion marry a woman, but she, too, must be another Cynic, just like Hipparchia of Maroneia, who became the wife of Crates; and his children also must grow up to be true Cynics, and, as Epictetus noted ( Discourses III, xxii, 69), if his father-in-law is not a Cynic, he must be converted into one. Otherwise, the life of the married Cynic would be hell on earth, and he would be caught between carrying out his duties as a loyal husband and loving parent, the government of his kingdom, and the fulfillment of his mission. The impositions of family life, unless wife, children, and in-laws are Cynics, would force him to make accommodations that are unacceptable violations of his commitment. He lives wherever he can find some privacy and rest. It could be in a tub, or in the vestibule of a temple, or even in some unassuming dwelling, or, on rare occasions, in the court of some monarch, or, in fact, just about anywhere, for his abode is as unimportant as his place of origin. He satisfies himself with the barest of necessities, and is unencumbered by possessions and wealth. His accustomed diet--the Cynic diet about which we have so many testimonies--is not the sumptuous meats and delicacies that wealthy gluttons require, but lentil soup, lupines, peas, lettuces, and water, that is, the food of the poor, which can be had for almost nothing. Unlike most of his contemporaries, and in fact most human beings after him, for whom the point is to grow richer and more powerful each day, to be surrounded by an ever increasing number of things, and to strive for an ever higher standard of living, the Cynic reduces his needs and desires to the minimum level that can sustain his life. Even the ordinary hope of most people, past, present, and future, to live the longest possible life and to have in their possession the illusion of a long time on earth, is absent from the Cynic. -25He lives as if today were the first and last day of his life, caring little for the past and unconcerned about the future. When old age announces itself with infirmities and weaknesses that render life unfruitful, or when it appears as if he is caught in some inescapable situation, the Cynic does not hesitate to bring his days to an end; for this reason there is in him a strange suicidal tendency, for, as in the instance of the proverbial scorpion that stings itself on the head when annoyed by people, the Cynic is always ready to take an early departure from this life. Sometimes he may even attempt to kill himself by holding his breath, and on occasion he my even burn himself in the presence of thousands of astonished witnesses. On occasion, too, even an inconvenience could plunge him into suicide. What we might call his uniform goes hand in hand with his mission: a simple cloak, old and torn, which gives him the appearance of what the French call un chiffonnier, 66 the Germans ein Lumpensammler, the English a ragpicker or even a ragamuffin, the Spanish un zarrapastroso; a staff or stick, the Cynic βάκτρον, which is a vestige of the Herculean club with which Hercules is said to have slain monsters and protected widows and orphans, 67 and which symbolizes the sce (in Latin pera), which is a sort of leathern pouch or a knapsack, in which he carries his victuals and few possessions, and which gives the name to his utopian state, the city of Pera; and bare feet, of course, and unkept long hair. Such is the Cynic's uniform, which he proudly wears, as a Roman legionary or a Christian monk wears his, whether among the Greeks, the Romans, or any other people, and which distinguishes him from everybody else.

The means of his livelihood are not difficult to imagine. On rare occasions he actually works for a living, like Simon the shoemaker and friend of Socrates, 68 or some of the Cynics of Roman times who were employed as teachers or tutors of young people. More often, however, the Cynic displays an aversion towards work, especially physical work and remunerated employment, the latter of which he regards as a part of the entrapment into which society seduces the masses into various forms of slavery. Why should the Cynic work if he has no need for money? Why should he employ himself, if he does not seek comforts and amenities? He takes care of his scant needs by begging for food, and eats whatever is given to him. He is, therefore, a mendicant living at the expense of others, and, as such, he could serve as a model for the orders of Christian mendicant monks that came into being in early medieval times. It must be noted, however, that the Cynic's aversion towards work should not be mistaken for a denigration of the value of work, or for a contemptuous attitude towards the working classes. With him, it is a matter of his own personal decision not to work for a living. A case can be made for the thesis that Cynicism, unlike other classical philosophies, extolled the value of work, whether intellectual or physical, and, appealing as it did to social classes that remained disenfranchised and oppressed throughout classical times, it recognized that in honest work a person may elevate his own human dignity. 69 -26With respect to religious beliefs and practices, the Cynic presents himself to us in an ambiguous light. On the one hand, he reiter ----to alter or deface the currency--a commandment allegedly given to Diogenes by the Delphic oracle. 70 Thus, his mission has a divine origin, and it is, as in the case of Socrates' mission ( Plato, Apology20c), in fulfillment of a command emanating from Apollo that the Cynic follows his path. If he stands in opposition to the State and its laws, and if he recognizes that there is a source of law higher than that from which human laws proceed, he acts, also like Socrates ( Plato, Apology30a), out of his conviction that God is the only foundation of human values, both private and public. When he encounters hostility and anger from those to whom he has been asked to deliver the divine message, he is mindful of the fact that such vicissitudes befall him precisely because he is carrying out his mission, again also like Socrates ( Plato, Apology 37e). If we ignore or minimize this aspect of the Cynic's portrait, we are bound to miss altogether his most distinct feature, a feature which places him in sharp contrast with the modern cynic. Guthrie has observed with respect to Socrates that "a belief in a special, direct relation between himself and divine forces must be accepted in any account of his mentality which lays claim to completeness." 71 The same can be said with respect to the Cynics. If this aspect of Cynicism is set aside in the interest of a positivistic interpretation of the history of ideas, then our Cynic turns out to be merely an anticipation of his illegitimate descendants of modern times. He would then convert himself into an ordinary troublemaker, a noisy ragamuffin, and an enemy of civilization. For our part, moreover, we would be blind to the religiosity that underlies his thoughts and actions. 72 And yet, there is the other side of the Cynic's attitude towards religion. He has no patience with polytheistic (and monotheistic) superstitions and beliefs. He looks with suspicion upon religious rituals, and sees in them games created for the amusement and consolation of the multitude. He allegorically interprets the writings of Homer and the other epic poets, from

whom the Greeks and Romans derived their religious traditions, and attaches no value to the theogonies and anthropomorphic tales of gods. In this respect he is an ally of the Skeptics, since one of the principal goals of Cynicism and Skepticism is to find a way to eliminate religious prejudices. 73 The Cynic endeavors to achieve this goal by sarcasm and ridicule, denunciation and condemnation, and by openly flaunting the religious beliefs and practices of the many, no less than by engaging in behavior that is contrary to those beliefs and practices. This negative stance towards religion converts the Cynic in the eyes of ordinary people into an atheist. Such, too, was the case with Socrates who assumed a stance far less offensive than that of the Cynic: Socrates was tried and convicted on a charge of atheism. The Cynic must appear to many as an atheist, for who could ridicule and reject religious traditions without undermining the -27belief in God or gods? Who could pour contempt on priests without denying the Being or beings whom the priests are supposed to serve? And who could deny the existence of God and gods, and claim to accept a set of moral values? For he who questions the hierarchy and the traditions of religion must be an atheist, and he who is an atheist must be an immoral person. It is, therefore, not by accident that various anecdotes about atheistic philosophers like Diagoras of Melos and Theodorus the Cyrenaic were foisted on Cynic philosophers such as Diogenes, 74 for public opinion confuses a critical and rationalistic attitude with an atheistic mind, and an atheistic mind with a morally perverted soul. Thus, the rationalism of the Cynics can be easily converted into a form of atheism, and, consequently, into a lack of moral values, a conversion that would transform the classical Cynic into a precursor of modern cynicism. But, in fact, the Cynic is neither an atheist nor a moral nihilist. He questions and rejects religion, with its atavistic paraphernalia of beliefs, rituals, and prescriptions, in the name of what he considers to be a higher form of religiosity. His critique of religion is caustic and uncompromising, and, as Goulet-Cazé observes, "one can surely affirm that the Cynics mounted a radical attack on religion, making on their part absolutely no concessions to traditional beliefs and practices." 75 But the Cynic's faith in a spiritual dimension is unshakable. To him we can apply the words of Dag Hammarskjöld: "The lovers of God have no religion but God alone." 76 For it is on account of his conviction that he has been given a special task by God, that he has cast away the bonds of every traditional religion. We might even say of his religiosity what Plato said of Socrates' political stance: Socrates, who always remained removed from the political world ( Apology32b) and who spared no words to condemn politicians, was truly the only political man in Athens ( Gorgias521d), because only he who is capable of making other people truly political deserves to be called 'political' ( Meno100a). Likewise the Cynic may turn out to be the only genuinely religious person in his world, because he devotes himself to the task of making others truly religious. And there is, of course, the Cynic's unwillingness to be tied by any form of bondage created by human beings. He has liberated himself from all bonds. Diogenes once asserted that he ) is the most beautiful thing in the world. But in religion, what does the Cynic find? Only a collection of bonds that bind the mind to beliefs and practices. The minds of people are like helium balloons, light in weight and fragile in constitution, that must be tied by strings, lest they become loose and, rising up in the sky, burst into pieces. This explains the need to belong, to be tied, to be

protected, and to remain emotionally and intellectually secure. But the Cynic's mind, at least in his self-assessment, is neither light nor fragile. He has structured his life by reference to clearly conceived goals, and is under the guidance of a freely chosen purpose. He is supported by an unshakable conviction of self-sufficiency (αὐ ) that makes him independent and -28self-governing. He needs no masters and no one can dictate his course of life, expect God or the god who whispers in the recesses of his consciousness. For him, the human world, with its rules and sanctioned customs, is to be ignored, except when, moved by his conscience, he feels the compulsion to pass judgment on it and when he attempts, by challenging his contemporaries, to alter its currency. The Cynic's condemnation of religion is a manifestation of his mood of protest, a protest that knows no limits with respect to its targets or to the extremes to which it is carried. Such extremes are responsible for his often being viewed, both by his contemporaries and by the students of Cynicism in later times, as a primitive type. A. O. Lovejoy and G. Boas, for example, maintain that "the Cynic ethics may be said to be reduced, in its practical outcome, almost wholly to primitivism." "Cynicism," they add, "was the first and most vigorous philosophic revolt against civilization in nearly all its essentials." 77 As such, then, the philosophical basis that underlies the Cynic's revolt constitutes a rejection of what most people regard as indispensable aspects of civilized life, and is the matrix from which a radical counter-culture springs. 78 The fountain from which Cynicism sprang among the Greeks is then an irresistible urge to say "no" to the world that human beings have constructed, because, in the light of reason such a world is built on faulty foundations. Still, we must delineate more precisely the nature and targets of this philosophical revolt, and the ways in which it differs from other movements of protest. Aside from religion, what else does the Cynic wish to invalidate? What currency does he feel compelled to deface or alter? And, perhaps of greater significance, in the name of what idea or ideal does he carry on his quixotic struggle against civilization? The answer to the first two of these questions is not difficult to find by reviewing the countless anecdotes about the Cynics and the many sayings recorded of them. The Cynic dismisses religion as a stupefying game, or, to use an image provided by Epictetus ( Discourses III, xxii, 106), as collections of clay masks with which children are easily scared. But the Cynic is no less reserved and unambiguous about his dismissal of other kinds of human activities and tendencies: politics, nationalism, militarism, racial and social prejudices, materialism and the need for possessions, hedonism and egoism, the abuse of language created by deception and lying, and slavery and oppression. The list would be interminable if we insisted on making it more complete. For the Cynic, the entire human world appears as an immense madhouse and a vertigo-producing series of circus acts, meaning nothing and accomplishing nothing. Empires rise and fall, nations conquer and obliterate other nations, while soldiers march never knowing the purpose of their marching; politicians shout nonsense in the ears of enthralled party members, while statesmen and leaders repeat worn-out platitudes that appease the multitudes; actors clown aimlessly on the stage for the entertainment of people afflicted by incurable boredom; religions come and go, each one claiming infallibility, while promising salvation to the faithful and damnation to -29-

all others; philosophers spin out of their heads amazing cobwebs of mystifying and empty ideas, creating the illusion of knowledge and understanding, but ultimately not meaning or saying anything; rhetoricians and speech writers create the semblance of language in order to confuse and manipulate the masses; scientists aim at the conquest of nature, pontificating about their always changing truths, as if they were a gift of the gods, and disrupting the balance of the natural world; athletes reap the financial benefits of their undeserved fame and their exalted reputation. In the background, millions upon millions of people live secret lives of quiet desperation, moving thoughtlessly from birth to death, and mechanically procreating countless similar millions of their likes, all running after empty illusions--the illusions of power, fame, pleasure, knowledge, a long life--and are captivated by blurry images that, like the shadows described by Plato in the Republic (7.514ff.), are thrice removed from what is real. If the Cynic had the opportunity of inspecting the world at large, he might say what Diogenes said about bathers in the public baths: The earth has billions of inhabitants but few human beings, for most people are only potentially human, that is, they have within their reach the capacity to become free from illusion and obfuscation (τυ + φος), but are unwilling to escape from their condition. Surely, the Cynic has much against which to revolt. But why revolt? Why not take the path suggested by Heraclitus and turn his back upon the human world and abandon it? Heraclitus, as Diogenes Laertius informs us ( IX, 5), became a misanthrope, abandoned the human world, and lived in the mountains feeding himself on grasses and plants. He refused to accept the kingly office that by birth belonged to him, and walked away from his compatriots in Ephesus, offering to them this brutal kind of advice: "Hang yourselves." The Cynic may on occasion give out the same unusual sort of advice, as when Diogenes is said to have replied to someone who asked him why he did not persuade him to give him some food, "Because if I could persuade you of anything, I would at once persuade you to hang yourself" ( D. L. VI, 59). But when the Cynic speaks in so harsh a fashion, and when he refers to people as scoundrels and thieves, or when he spits on a certain man's face, saying that he could not find a more execrable place to do it, he is often giving an exhibitionist performance: he aims at shocking and awakening his listeners. There is a clownish strain in him that is betrayed at times in his words and in his deeds. He is, however, not a misanthrope like Heraclitus, or even less like the greatest misanthrope of all times, Timon of Athens, who, as Montaigne describes him, "was an enemy to all mankind, who passionately desired our ruin, and avoided our conversation as dangerous, proceeding from wicked and depraved natures." 79 This far from social man, Plutarch informs us, one day got up in a full assembly on the speaker's place, and when there was a dead silence and great wonder at so unusual a sight, he said, "Ye men of Athens, I have a little plot of ground, and in it grows a fig-tree, on which many citizens have been pleased to hang themselves; and now, having resolved to build a house in that place, I wish to announce it -30publicly, that any of you who may be desirous may go and hang yourselves before I cut it down." ( Anthony lxx) On his grave, Plutarch adds, the following epitaph was written: "Here am I laid, my life of misery done. Ask not my name, I curse everyone of you."

This dreadful epitaph would not have been suitable for the grave of any among the Cynics. The epitaphs associated with them are of a different kind, for the typical Cynic is indeed far removed from the example of Heraclitus and even more from that of Timon. He may not always be the most pleasant person, and he could be as unfriendly as Antisthenes is said to have been, or as rough and insulting as Diogenes, or as vulgar in his language as Bion, but more often than not, he is, like Crates, a person of joviality and warmth, or like Demetrius, always ready and willing to make himself useful to people. Beneath his behavior, whether growling and biting passers-by like an angry hound, or kind and protective, there is in the Cynic a genuine desire to perform his duty as God's scout and messenger. But for this, he must somehow love people and think that their regeneration is possible. Somehow, he must be able to hate and despise the evil in his fellow human beings, but must neither hate nor despise them. He cannot desert them, for then, over whom will he be a king? If he turns his back on them, he might end his days in solitude and silence as the Emperor of the North Pole. His having coined the word 'philanthropy', that is, 'the love of people', is a testimony of his missionary commitment. We can now set aside this general portrait of the Cynic. We now have an idea as to who he is: a man (or woman) in a state of total rebellion. We even know something about his physical appearance: a torn cloak, a staff, and a wallet. We also know by what names he can be identified: Antisthenes, Diogenes, Crates, among others. Finally, we are aware that beneath his radicalism and primitivism, he is moved by a sense of intellectual and spiritual mission, a mission that he structures in terms of certain philosophical concepts that, while generally not well defined, are firmly held. This mission and these concepts set him far apart from the modern vulgar cynics. We will now descend to the level of the particular in order to gain some understanding of the principal Cynics of classical times, beginning with Antisthenes of Athens. NOTES 1. Throughout this book the capitalized words 'Cynic' and 'Cynicism' are used exclusively to designate the classical Cynics. In German, unlike in English, different words are normally used to refer to modern cynicism and to ancient Cynicism, namely, Zynismus and Kynismus. For a useful discussion of the various uses of 'cynic' and 'cynicism' in modern languages, see A. Lalande, "Cynisme", in Vocabulaire technique et critique de la Philosophie ( Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1972), pp. 220-201. -312.

É. Tardieu, "Le Cynisme: Étude psychologique". Revue Philosophique de la France et de l'Étranger 57 ( 1904), pp. 1-28.

3.

P. Sloterdijk, Kritik der zynischen Vernunft (Frankfurt/Main: Surkamp, 1983). Translated into English by M. Eldred under the title Critique of Cynical Reason ( Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987).

4.

M. O. Goulet-Cazé in L'Ascèse cynique. Un commentaire de Diogène Laërce VI 70-71 ( Paris: J. Vrin, 1986) provides a biographical repertory of 82 historically documented Cynics. The designation of individual philosophers as 'Cynic' is often a matter of controversy, and every Cynic philosopher has been excluded at one time or another from the list of the Cynics.

5.

D. R. Dudley, A History of Cynicism from Diogenes to the 6th Century A.D. ( Cambridge University Press, 1937), pp. 210ff.

6.

J. Xenakis, "Hippies and Cynics". Inquiry 16 ( 1973), pp. 1-15.

7.

G. H. Lewes, "The Cynics--Antisthenes and Diogenes", in The Biographical History of Philosophy from Its Origins in Greece Down to the Present Time ( New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1983), Vol. 1, p. 181.

8.

Ibid., Vol. 1, p. 178.

9.

Sloterdijk, Kritik der zynischen Vernunft, Vol. 1, pp. 300-301.

10. Ibid., Vol. 1, p. 296. 11. For a discussion of Foucault's views on the Cynics, see T. R. Flynn, "Foucault as Parrhesiast: His Last Course at the Collège de France (1984)," in The Final Foucault. Edited by J. Bernauer and D. Ramussen ( Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1991), pp. 102118. There are also comments on this matter in Flynn "Foucault and the Politics of Postmodernity." Nous 23 ( 1989), pp. 187-198. 12. B. Russell, A History of Western Philosophy ( New York: Simon & Schuster, 1972), pp. 231ff. 13. For a review of over six hundred modern and contemporary works on Cynicism, see L. E. Navia The Philosophy of Cynicism: An Annotated Bibliography ( Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1995). 14. Both primary and secondary Cynic sources have been variously edited, translated, and published on numerous occasions. The most comprehensive collection is L. Paquet Le Cyniques grecs. Fragments et témoignages ( Ottawa: Presses de l'Université d'Ottawa, 1975, 1988). This work includes French translations of fragments and doxographical information. 15. H. Ner in his Les Paraboles Cyniques ( Paris: Éditions Athéna, 1922) blames the Christians for the destruction of the works of the Cynics: "The Christians, who, both through indifference and in a systematic way, destroyed so great a number of ancient books, did not leave standing any monument which embodied the wisdom of Cynicism" (p. x). 16. The most complete collection of primary sources from the Greek Cynics is found in the work of H. Ritter and L. Preller, Historia Philosophiæ Græcæ-Romanæ ex fontium locis contexta ( Gotha: F. A. Perthes, 1913). This work was originally published by H. Ritter in 1838. It includes a section on the Cynic philosophers (pp. 217-223). An English translation was made by A. J. Robinson under the title The History of Ancient Philosophy ( Oxford: D. A. Talboys, 1838-1846). 17 J. F. Kindstrand, "Diogenes Laertius and the Chreia Tradition." Elenchos -327 ( 1986), pp. 219-243. 18. T. McEvilley, "Diogenes of Sinope (c. 410-320 B.C.): Selected Performance Pieces." Art

Forum 21 ( March 1983), pp. 58-59. 19. Ibid., p. 58. 20.

will reappear on numerous occasions throughout this monograph and will be explained in a subsequent context.

21. Goulet-Cazé maintains that Book VI of Diogenes Laertius' Lives of Eminent Philosophers remains, despite numerous internal problems, the wealthiest source of information about Diogenes and the development of Cynicism. Her "Le Livre VI de Diogène Laërce: Analyse de sa structure et réflexions méthodologiques," in Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt ( Berlin-New York: W. de Gruyer, 1990), Vol. 2, pp. 3880-4048, constitutes an illuminating analysis of the contribution of Diogenes Laertius for our understanding of Cynicism. 22. E. Schwartz, "Diogenes der Hund und Krates der Kyniker," in Characterköpfe aus der antiken Literatur ( Leipzig: Teubner, 1906- 1911), Vol. 2, pp. 1-23. 23. R. Hoïstad, "Cynicism," in Dictionary of the History of Ideas. Edited by P. P. Wiener ( New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1973), Vol. 1, p. 628. 24. The Cynic Epistles have been edited and translated in a variety of works, and have been the subject of a great deal of scholarship. They are included in R. Hercher's Epistolographi Græci ( Paris: F. Didot, 1873), with a Latin translation and annotations. V. E. Emeljanow "The Letters of Diogenes" ( Ph.D. diss. Stanford University, 1968) provides the Greek text of 51 letters with a commentary. A. J. Malherbe in his The Cynic Epistles: A Study Edition ( Missoula, Mont.: Scholars Press, 1977) provides the Greek text and an English translation, with an extensive analysis of their style and content. 25. J. Bernays, Die heraklitischen Briefe. Ein Beitrag zur philosophischen und religionsgeschichtlichen Literatur ( Berlin: Weidman, 1869). 26. H. W. Attridge, First Century Cynicism in the Epistles of Heraclitus ( Missoula, Mont.: Scholars Press, 1976). 27. On repeated occasions the Cynics have been resurrected and magically brought to the twentieth century. J. T. McGovern in his Diogenes Discovers Us ( Freeport, N.Y.: Books for Libraries, 1967) resurrects Diogenes and transports him to a land called 'America' where he is introduced to a number of prominent people. After becoming acquainted with various aspects of American life, Diogenes returns to his tub in ancient Greece, convinced that the present condition of the average person is better than in his own day. Writing in The Spectator ( 272 [ April 2, 1994], p. 39), Taki imagines Diogenes, wearing nothing but his lamp, protesting in front of the White House if Bill and Hillary Clinton are not thrown out and banished for their part in the Whitewater affair. 28. R. Guérin, La confession de Diogène ( Paris: Gallimard, 1947), p. 314. 29. Dudley, A History of Cynicism, p. 208. 30. The issue of whether Antisthenes or Diogenes should be viewed as the originator of the Cynic movement will be discussed later on in this chapter. 31. J. E. Gill, "Theriophily in Antiquity: A Supplementary Account." The Journal of the History of Ideas 30 ( 1969), p. 407.

32. G. Glotz, Histoire Grecque ( Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1941), Vol. 3, pp. 423ff. -3333. Two important works on the Cynosarges are M. F. Billot "Antisthène et le Cynosarges dans l'Athènes des Ve et IVe siècles," in Le Cynisme ancien et ses prolongements. Actes du Colloque International du CNRS ( Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1993), pp. 69-116, and, also by Billot, "Le Cynosarges. Histoire, mythes et archéologie," in Dictionnaire des Philosophes Antiques ( Paris: CNRS Éditions, 1994), pp. 917-966. 34. The word 'theriomorphic', which has been used in this chapter, conveys the transfer of animal characteristics and traits to human beings. 35. V. T. McKirahan, "Cynicism," in Ethics ( Pasadena, Calif.: Salem Press, 1994), Vol. 1, p. 208. 36. G. W.F. Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy. Translated by E. S. Haldane ( London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963), Vol. 1, p. 438. 37. C. Chappuis, Antisthène ( Paris: August Durand, 1854). 38. K. Joël, "Die Auffassung der kynischen Sokratik." Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 20 ( 1907), pp. 1-24, 147-170. 39. Dudley, op. cit., p. 2. 40. F. Sayre, "Antisthenes the Socratic." The Classical Journal 43 ( 1948), pp. 237-244; idem, Greek Cynicism and Sources of Cynicism ( Baltimore: J. H. Furst, 1948). 41. G. Giannantoni, "Antistene fondatore delle scuola cinica?" in Le Cynisme ancien et ses prolongements. Actes du Colloque International du CNRS. Edited by M. Goulet-Cazé and R. Goulet ( Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1993), p. 34. 42. M. O. Goulet-Cazé et al., "Diogène de Sinope, sumommé le Chien," in Dictionnaire des Philosophes Antiques. Edited by R. Goulet ( Paris: CNRS Éditions, 1994), Vol. 2, p. 814. 43. C. T. Seltman, "Diogenes of Sinope, Son of the Banker Hikesias," in Transactions of the International Numismatic Congress 1936. Edited by J. A.H. Mattingly and E. S.G. Robinson ( London, 1938). 44. E. Zeller and T. Gomperz are two among many scholars who have emphasized the philosophical relationship between Socrates and Antisthenes, and between Antisthenes and Diogenes. 45. For a discussion of the establishment of Plato's Academy, see L. E. Navia, The Socratic Presence: A Study of the Sources ( New York: Garland Publishing, 1993), pp. 127-130. H. Cherniss, The Riddle of the Early Academy ( Berkeley, Calif., 1947) provides extensive information on this matter. 46. Billot, "Le Cynosarges," p. 919. 47. L. Robin, La pensée grecque et les origines de l'esprit scientifique ( Paris: La Renaissance du Livre, 1923), pp. 199ff.

48. Billot, "Le Cynosarges," p. 919. 49. D. Stewart, "Democritus and the Cynics." Harvard Studies in Classical Philology 63 ( 1958), 179-191; I. Lana, "L'etica di Democrito." Rivista di Filosofia 42 ( 1951), pp. 1329. 50. For a comparison between the pasupatas and the Cynics, see A. Syrkin, "The Salutary Descent." Numen 35 ( 1988), pp. 1-23, 213-237; D. Ingalls, "Cynics and pasupatas: The Seeking of Dishonor." Harvard Theological Review 55 ( 1962), pp. 281298; and M. Hulin, "Doctrines et comportements 'cyniques' dans certaines sectes hindoues anciennes et contemporaines," in Le Cynisme ancien et ses prolongements. Actes duColloque International du CNRS -3450. Colloque International du CNRS ( Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1993), pp. 557570. Already in the nineteenth century, efforts were made to establish a relationship between Cynicism and various Oriental 'schools' of philosophy. See A. Gladisch, Einleitung in das Verständnis der Weltgeschichte ( Posen, 1841), especially pp. 356-377. 51. D. Ingalls, "Cynics and pasupatas: The Seeking of Dishonor." Harvard Theological Review 55 ( 1962), pp. 281-298. 52. C. Muckensturm, "Les gymnosophistes étaient-ils des cyniques modèles?" in Le Cynisme ancien et ses prolongements. Actes du Colloque International du CNRS ( Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1993), pp. 225-239. 53. Muckensturm, "Les gymnosophistes étaient-ils des cyniques modèles?" 54. A. M. Pizzagalli, "Influssi buddhistica nella leggenda di Alessandro." Rendiconti dell"Istituto Lombardo 76 ( 1942- 1943), pp. 154-160. 55. Gladisch advanced such ideas in a variety of works: e.g., "Die vorsokratische Philosophie." Jahrbuch für klassische Philologie 119 ( 1879), pp. 721-733; idem, Anaxagoras und die Israeliten ( Leipzig: J. Hinrich, 1864); idem, Empedokles und die Aegypter ( Leipzig: J. Hinrich, 1858); idem, Herakleitos und Zoroaster ( Leipzig: J. Hinrich, 1852); and idem, "Die aegyptische Entstellung des Pythagoras." Philologus 39 ( 1880), pp. 113-130. 56. A. Croiset and M. Croiset, Histoire de la littérature grecque ( Paris: E. Thorin, 1890), Vol. 2, p. 476. 57. W. K.C. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy ( Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), especially Vol. 1, pp. 33ff. 58. Ingalls, "Cynics and pasupatas: The Seeking of Dishonor," p. 298. 59. A. H. Chroust, Socrates: Man and Myth. The Two Socratic Apologies of Xenophon ( Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1957), pp. 101-102. 60. Such was the answer given by Diogenes to the question as to where he was from ( D. L. VI, 63). In so answering, then, it appears that he coined the word 'cosmopolitan' (κοσμοπολίτης.

61. H. C. Baldry in The Unity of Mankind in Greek Thought ( Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965), pp. 110ff., insists that the cosmopolitanism associated with Cynicism is a negative concept: the Cynic is simply a foreigner everywhere. 62. For a detailed study of the Cynic as a 'king', see R. Hoïstad, Cynic Hero and Cynic King: Studies in the Cynic Conception of Man ( Uppsala: C.W.K. Gleerup, 1948). 63. Τυ + ϕος literally means in Greek 'mist', 'fog', or 'cloudiness'. This important Cynic concept will be discussed in detail in chapter 4 (pp. 138-141). 64. R. Browning, "How It Strikes a Contemporary," in Robert Browning: The Poems. Edited by J. Pettigrew ( New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1981), pp. 605607. Various commentators, including Pettigrew, have suggested that the figure of the 'poet' in Browning' poem is the idealized figure of a Cynic philosopher. See also M. W. Schneider , "Browning's Spy." Victorian Poetry 17 ( 1979), pp. 384-388. 65. Isa. 40:3. This is quoted in Matt. 3:3 in reference to John the Baptist. 66. For a comparison between the Cynics and the Parisian chiffonnier, see D. Rieger , Diogenes als Lumpensammler. Materialen zu einer Gestalt der französischen Literatur des 19. Jahrhunderts ( Munich: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1982). -3567. For a study of the Cynic staff in relation to Hercules' club, see B. R. Voss, "Die Keule der Kyniker." Hermes 95 ( 1967), pp. 441-446. 68. For a discussion to the evidence related to Simon, see R. F. Hock, "Simon the Shoemaker as an Ideal Cynic." Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies 17 ( 1976), pp. 41-53. 69. H. Schulz-Falkenthal, "Zum Arbeitsethos der Kyniker." Wissenschaftliche Zeitschrift der Martin Luther Universität 29 ( 1980), pp. 91-101. For a discussion of the Cynics' appreciation of physical work, see A. C. Bayonas, "Travail manuel et esclavage d'après les Cyniques." Rendiconti dell'Istituto Lombardo 100 ( 1966), pp. 383-388. 70. For an account of the possible meanings of the phrase παραχάραττει , see I. Bywater and J. G. Milne, "ΙΙαραχάραζις." The Classical Review 54 ( 1940), pp. 10-12. 71. W. K.C. Guthrie, Socrates ( Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), p. 84. 72. For a discussion of Cynic religiosity and piety, see H. Rahn, "Die Frömmigkeit der Kyniker." Paideuma 7 ( 1959- 1961), pp. 280-292. 73. M. Luz, "Cynics as Allies of Scepticism," in Scepticism: Inter-Disciplinary Approaches ( Athens: The Ministry of Culture, 1990), p. 114. 74. For a discussion of this transference of anecdotes from atheistic philosophers to Diogenes, see M. Winiarczyk, "Diagoras von Melos und Diogenes von Sinope." Eos 64 ( 1976), pp. 177-184; and idem, "Theodorus ὁ ῞Αθεος und Diogenes von Sinope." Eos 69 ( 1981), pp. 37-42. 75. M. O. Goulet-Cazé, "Les premiers Cyniques et la religion," Le Cynisme ancien et ses prolongements. Actes du Colloque International du CNRS ( Paris: Presses Universitaires

de France, 1993), p. 141. 76. D. Hammarskjöld, Markings ( New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1971), p. 103. Hammarskjöld attributes these words to Rumi ( Maulana Jalal-uddin Rumi), the greatest Sufic poet of Persia. 77. A. O. Lovejoy and G. Boas, Primitivism and Related Ideas in Antiquity ( New York: Octagon Books, 1965), pp. 118-119. 78. C. Millares, "Los cínicos. Una contracultura en el mundo antiguo." Estudios Clásicos ( Madrid) 14 ( 1970), pp. 347-377. 79. M. E. de Montaigne, "Of Democritus and Heraclitus," in Essays. Translated by C. Cotton ( New York: Reeves and Turner, 1877), Book 1, Chap. 50. -36CHAPTER 2 Antisthenes, the Absolute Dog In his extensive biography of Antisthenes, Chappuis refers to him as "one of the most remarkable among the Socratic philosophers." and favorably compares the beauty of his works with those of Plato and Xenophon, and the austerity of his life and philosophy with that of Socrates. 2 This encomium of Antisthenes' worth as a man, a philosopher, and a writer has been echoed repeatedly in recent times, 2 and the genuineness with which he inherited and interpreted the philosophy of Socrates has been emphasized in many modern works. Gomperz, for instance, observed that "the historical Socrates stands closer to Antisthenes among all the other Socratics." 3 Grote, for his part, spoke of Antisthenes' ideas and life as having been "in many respects closer approximations of Socrates than either Plato or any other of the Sokratic companions," 4 and more recently it has been maintained that whereas the writings of Plato constitute a travesty of Socrates' thought, the fragments and traditions related to Antisthenes reflect a faithful representation of the Socratic presence. 5 Saint Jerome's praise of his excellence as a rhetorical writer (Adv. Jovinianum II, 14) has been reiterated by modern critics, and his two extant declamatory compositions Ajax and Ulysses, have been viewed as the works of an accomplished rhetorician, the language and style of which are among the best rhetorical pieces bequeathed to us by antiquity. 6 Already at the time of Augustus, Dionysius of Halicarnassus spoke of Antisthenes' literary style as one of the canons of pure Attic writing, comparable to the styles of Xenophon and Lysias. We also hear a high praises concerning his accomplishments as a logician, especially with respect to the foundations of his nominalism and to the relationship between his logic and his ethical ideas. 7 Antisthenes' importance as the originator of Cynicism has been affirmed in numerous works, and Diogenes Laertius' statement that it was indeed with -37Antisthenes that Cynicism came into being (VI, 2) has been accepted by many classical scholars and historians of philosophy. The canonical succession ' Socrates-AntisthenesDiogenes' has been supported by writers such as Gomperz, Grote, Zeller, and, with some reservations, Guthrie. 8 Antisthenes' role in the emergence of Cynicism is often taken as a

historical fact, regardless of how one resolves the issue concerning his biographical relationship with Diogenes. There is, however, another side to consider. Antisthenes has also been viewed as a minor philosopher who was unable to grasp the substance of Socrates' thought, and who reduced that thought to the one-sidedness of his own intellectual limitations. His logical ideas have been viewed as fruitless, for Antisthenes, we are told, "was no logician" in the proper sense of the word. 9 His alleged bluntness of judgment and his bent towards exaggeration have been also mentioned on occasion, and certain distasteful traits have been associated with his character: unfriendliness and lack of civility, among others. His name has been removed from the history of Cynicism, and every detail of his life and doctrines has been at one time or another relegated to the category of fabrication. Even his relationship with Socrates has been called into question, and the 'legend' of Antisthenes as a Socratic philosopher has been attacked from various points of view. In the estimation of some, we would be mistaken in regarding him as an original philosopher, either as a disciple of Socrates or as a Cynic. 10 Thus we find ourselves in the presence of two extreme positions, one of which would lead us to believe that Antisthenes was a major Socratic philosopher, more Socratic than Plato himself, a writer of great accomplishments, and the source from which Cynicism sprang; while the other would persuade us that there is more pious legend than verifiable fact in the traditions related to Antisthenes, that he was only a minor figure in the Socratic movement, and that he was unrelated to the emergence of Cynicism. Naturally, we could not say that both these extremes are correct, although we could argue that both may be the result of either an enthusiastic interpretation of the sources or an unjustifiably negative stance. The truth is possibly found somewhere between the extremes, and an unbiased reading of the sources and an unprejudiced appreciation of the traditions could lead us to conclude that Antisthenes was an important Socratic philosopher, neither as profound nor as influential as Plato, nor a logician comparable to Aristotle, but still a thinker of substance, whose thought left an imprint on the history of ideas and literature. His logical ideas, distasteful as they may appear from a Platonic or an Aristotelian point of view, are relevant and challenging, and his allegorical interpretation of the epic poets is not to be dismissed as inconsequential. His austere ethics, especially his understanding of virtue, and his reported lack of humor may not render him especially attractive as a writer and as a person, but he remains a figure of stature in the ancient world, a thinker who challenges us to rethink our own convictions. As we undertake the reconstruction of Antisthenes as a thinker linked to the origins of Cynicism, the first question is obviously related to our sources of information. From where do we derive our knowledge about him? What -39information about him can we view as reliable and authentic, and what ancient reports deserve to be classified as genuine testimonies? Once such sources are identified, we can undertake the task of delineating the man and the philosopher, and also the Cynic in him. Most of the works of the ancient Greek philosophers are not extant. Aside from Plato, whose writings appear to have been preserved, there is not a single philosopher of antiquity whose writings survived without major losses. The case of Antisthenes is no different. Diogenes Laertius credits him with having left ten volumes of writings, containing sixty-two works and representing varied literary genres. From the titles of those works, we can identify treatises on

logic, ethics, politics, history, music, biology, rhetoric, and other subjects, so that we would not be guilty of exaggeration in referring to him as an encyclopedic writer. He seems to have moved through distinct stages of development, and it is obvious that his interests changed from stage to stage, so that in the end he succeeded in embracing a great variety of philosophical and literary topics. Unfortunately, with the exception of Ajax and Ulysses, and a few fragments from other works, nothing has survived from his hand. Consequently, in considering him, we must remain within the parameters of the secondary sources, and these, too, are scanty, and inconsistent in their reports and in their estimation of his contributions. 11 We should comment initially on the three oldest secondary sources, specifically those that belong to Antisthenes' own time: Plato, Aristotle, and Xenophon. There is only one explicit reference to Antisthenes in Plato's dialogues. In the Phaedo (59b), he is mentioned as one of those present during Socrates' last hours: "Of native Athenians [says Phaedo to Echecrates] there was Apollodorus and his father, and Hermogenes and Epigenes and Aeschines and Antisthenes . . .; but Plato was ill." In the course of the conversation reported (or perhaps invented) by Plato in the Phaedo, Antisthenes does not intervene, nor do we hear about him anymore. 12 There is nothing surprising in Plato's nearly total silence about Antisthenes, and his absence from the dialogues should not be interpreted as an indication of Plato's lack of regard for him. Such a lack of regard might be inferred by considering the ideological and personal gap that separated them from each other, and by comments found in the secondary sources. But Plato's silence by itself does not mean anything. Explicit references to Plato's own contemporary philosophers are rare throughout the dialogues. We hear a great deal about the Sophists, but they taught in Athens during Plato's early years (which politely translated means The Pecker), was an attempt to ridicule Plato, Plato's own reaction might have been to ignore it. 13 What can be learned from Plato's only mention of Antisthenes, however, is that he was, along with others, close enough to Socrates to have been present during his execution. Whether there are tacit references in Plato's dialogues to Antisthenes, is an issue that has been resolved in various ways. It has been maintained that -40there are passages that carry on a sustained polemic against Antisthenes' doctrines, even though his name is not mentioned. 14 This view is supported by F. Decleva Caizzi, who discerns in the Theaetetus tacit references to Antisthenean ideas. 15 M. Guggenheim contrasts the utopia proposed by Plato in the Republic with the ideal community proposed by Antisthenes, and argues that significant elements of Plato's political writings were directed against Antisthenes. 16 F. Dümmler detects in the statements in the Republic (372d-373a) about "a city of pigs" veiled attacks on Antisthenes' ideal state, that is, a community where complete permissiveness prevails. 17 Other scholars read between the lines of the Protagoras, the Phaedrus, the Laches, and the Hippias Major comments directed at Antisthenes. On occasion, too, we come across the suggestion that the mere mention of dogs in Plato's dialogues is enough to make us suspect that it is Antisthenes who is alluded to, as when in the Republic (375c-e) Plato compares the guardians of the city to well-bred hounds whose "natural disposition is to be gentle to their familiars and those whom they recognize, but the contrary to those whom they do not know." 18

There is the other side of the controversy, as there are scholars who reject any allegation that Antisthenes appears in veiled references in Plato's dialogues. 19 Occasionally, scholars fall into the temptation of reading too much between the lines, 'discovering' allusions to their subject of interest that are unfounded. Still, we should bear in mind that Antisthenes must have been a wellknown philosopher during Plato's time and that his ideas, precisely on account of their extreme nature, must have been the sort of thing that Plato would have sought to combat. But whether or not such allusions to Antisthenes may be present in Plato's dialogues, the fact remains that even if they are, what we could learn from them is not very enlightening, because they provide pieces of information available and stated in other less ancient secondary sources: e.g., Antisthenes' conception of the impossibility of predication, his dissatisfaction with all political arrangements, and his anti-hedonistic stance. Some information can be gathered from Aristotle. There are in his works five explicit references to Antisthenes, and arguments and counterarguments can be constructed with respect to the presence of tacit references and allusions. In Topics (104b21), Aristotle mentions Antisthenes' view that "contradiction is impossible" as an example of what he calls a 'thesis', that is, a paradoxical opinion entertained by a philosopher. In Metaphysics (1024b32), Antisthenes is said to have foolishly claimed that nothing could be described except by its own formula--one formula to one thing; from which it followed that there could be no contradiction, and almost that there could be no error. This refers to the Antisthenean rejection of the possibility of predication and to his refusal to accept the value of universals: everything can only be defined in terms of itself, and the only possible 'definition' is exemplification. The same theme is raised in Metaphysics (1043b2428), where we hear about "the school -41of Antisthenes," more exactly, about "the Antistheneans" ('Aντσθἐτειοι), from which we can gather that Antisthenes did have at some point 'disciples' or 'associates', and which appears to contradict the report of Diogenes Laertius that Antisthenes "never welcomed disciples," and that it was by sheer stubbornness that Diogenes succeeded in becoming his associate. It is also interesting to observe that nowhere does Aristotle speak of 'Cynics' or 'the Cynic school' in connection with Antisthenes. This silence has been interpreted as an indication that Antisthenes had no connection with the Cynic movement, the origins of which, it is argued, can only be traced back to Diogenes, who is mentioned by Aristotle, albeit only once and marginally: in Rhetoric (1411a24), we are told that "Diogenes the Dog called taverns 'the mess-rooms of Attica'." In Politics (1284a15) we come again upon the name of Antisthenes, this time in the context of a discussion on the purpose of the laws. Should there be a person of great eminence, and intellectual and moral stature, then it would be foolish to create and enforce laws for him, because he would be a law unto himself. If subjected to the laws, which should be made only for those who are equal in birth and in capacity, the exceptional person could "retort what, in the fable of Antisthenes, the lion said to the hares, when in the council of the beasts the latter began haranguing and claiming equality for all." But what did the lion say to the hares? We do not have Antisthenes' actual words, but the answer is not difficult to surmise. The Cynic carries with him his staff as his symbolic scepter and his sign of supremacy over his generally

stupid and dense fellow human beings. As the lion rules over the hares and all other creatures by virtue of his power and intelligence, and is, accordingly, beyond the realm of the laws that bind other animals, so is the Cynic, precisely because of the extraordinary power of his mind, the natural ruler over people. Hence, the Cynic recognizes no human law and no social restriction that could possibly apply to him. As an example of the Aristotelian person of eminence, the Cynic cannot be subjected to the laws that bind the citizens. There is yet another explicit reference to Antisthenes, in Rhetoric (1407a9), where one of his similes is mentioned: "Antisthenes compared the lean Cephisodotus to frankincense, because it was his becoming each day thinner that gave one pleasure." We have no idea as to who Cephisodotus was, but we know that such a remark of Antisthenes is in keeping with what other sources reveal about him, that is, a man not very friendly or considerate in his remarks about others, almost as a dissatisfied dog is ready to snarl and snap at the slightest provocation: the disappearance from this world of the thin Cephisodotus, a worthless man in Antisthenes' eyes, could not be but a source of pleasure. Aside from these five passages, Antisthenes is not mentioned explicitly by Aristotle. There are other passages in which certain ideas of Antisthenes are explained and criticized, but again, even if such passages do refer to Antisthenes, they do not teach us much more than what we can gather from the five explicit references quoted above. It has been argued that in one of these references, namely, in Metaphysics (1024b32), Aristotle expresses contempt for his -42, commonly translated as 'foolishly'; but, as Sayre has observed, 20 this term can also be rendered as 'mistakenly', a translation which is more in line with the apparent respect with which Aristotle deals with Antisthenes' views elsewhere. More information can be derived from Xenophon, who, like Plato and Antisthenes, was an associate of Socrates. The influence of Antisthenes on Xenophon's interpretation of Socrates' philosophy and on his appreciation of Socrates' personality has been recognized by many scholars. Xenophon's testimony about Socrates has been viewed as a manifestation of Cynic influences, specifically emanating from Antisthenes, and the Socrates who emerges from Xenophon as an idealization of Antisthenes himself. 21 Xenophon's Socrates turns out to be a figure ultimately formed out of Xenophon's own acquaintance with Antisthenes. 22 But aside from the issue of the influence of Antisthenes on Xenophon's understanding of Socrates, an influence that has been disputed by some scholars, 23 it is unquestionable that Xenophon provides important information. In the Memorabilia, we hear Socrates remark that Antisthenes is constantly at his side (III, xi, 17), and we are made privy to a conversation between Socrates and Antisthenes on the subject of friendship (II, v, 1-5). But it is in the Symposium that we come upon extensive information. Written around 380 B.C., this work is reminiscent of Plato's Symposium, although it is not comparable to the latter either in literary merit or in philosophical depth. 24 But regardless of its merit, it provides us with details related to Socrates and his acquaintances. It allows us to witness a conversation that may have taken place between 424 and 421 B.C., in the house of a wealthy Athenian named Callias. Xenophon relates that he himself was present during the conversation (Symposium 1 ), although if we assign 431 B.C. as the year of his birth, and the year 424 or

421 B.C. as the dramatic date of the Symposium, we come to the conclusion that this Xenophontean piece constitutes, not a journalistic account of his recollections, but a literary creation partly based on the recollections of others. At any rate, against the background of music and entertainment provided by a buffoon and a group of Syracusan dancers and singers, and with plenty of wine and food, and, of course, the presence of an ensemble of flute girls for the amusement of the merry company, a group of Athenians converse at leisure throughout the night around the person of Socrates. Other characters include a general, several young men, a member of the oligarchy and Plato's relative, some of Socrates' friends, and Antisthenes. As in Plato's Symposium, the idea of love occupies the central position in Xenophon's work, but here, unlike in Plato's dialogue, we are invited to listen to a casual conversation, more ordinary and perhaps more realistic than that of the Platonic work, but less rich in philosophical substance. Socrates is described as an old man (ii, 18), which could make us hesitate in insisting on a dramatic date as early as 421 B.C., for at that time Socrates would have only been fortyeight years old--hardly an old man. Antisthenes is assigned an important role in the conversation, and although we learn nothing concerning his age or back-43ground, we gather valuable details about his ideas and about his relationship with Socrates. We also derive useful information about Socrates himself, although it is difficult to determine the historical value of any information about Socrates, whether from Xenophon or from any other source: the historical Socrates is ultimately an elusive figure that hides mysteriously behind the representations created by the sources. Antisthenes' first intervention is revealing. As a dancing girl throws hoops up in the air and keeps them in motion, Socrates observes: From many other things, my friends, and from what this girl is now doing, it is apparent that the talent of women is not at all inferior to that of men, although they may be wanting in physical vigor and strength; so that those of you who have a wife ought to teach her with confidence whatever you wish her to learn (ii, 9). To this, Antisthenes replies in his accustomed biting and caustic manner: How is it, then, my dear Socrates, that if you think so, you do not also educate Xanthippe, but instead you have a wife who is the most illconditioned of all existing women, and, as I believe, of all that ever were and ever will be? [To which Socrates replies:] Because I see that those who wish to be skilled in horsemanship do not choose the best tempered horses, but those of unruly temper, for they think that if they can master such animals, they will easily manage any other horses. So likewise, I, wishing to converse and associate with all kinds of people, have chosen this wife, knowing well that if I am able to endure her, I shall easily bear the society of all other people. (ii, 10) Socrates' reply, Xenophon adds, was deemed most appropriate. We do not know whether Xanthippe, the much maligned wife of Socrates, was as difficult a person as both Antisthenes and Socrates portray her, although it remains true that her character as a stereotype of impatience is reiterated by later secondary sources. Diogenes Laertius, for instance, describes

instances of Xanthippe's violent behavior towards Socrates, and repeats almost verbatim Xenophon's above-quoted lines (ii, 36-37). 25 After this exchange, and commenting on Socrates' admiration towards the courage of the dancing girl who is now displaying her expertise by manipulating a set of swords, Antisthenes suggests that she should be allowed to instruct the Athenian infantry in the art of handling swords, and that under her instruction the enemy could be easily defeated. Once more Antisthenes is true to his character: a dancing girl can give the brave Athenians a lesson in courage. One moment later his character emerges again as he asks the company whether any one of them can think of someone more foolish than the rhapsodists, that is, the reciters of poetry. They, Socrates agrees, are foolish because they do not know the meaning of what they recite. We then hear Antisthenes affirm that his greatest source of pride is his wealth, a wealth that does not consist of money and physical possessions, but -44only of virtue. He is a truly wealthy man even though he does not own anything. Money, Antisthenes says to Callias, can be used to secure the appearance of justice, virtue, and happiness, but never their reality. When asked to explain himself more clearly, he says that people should be considered rich or poor, not on account of their possessions, but only on account of the state of their minds. The love of wealth, he argues, is the cause of wars and misery, and is responsible for making people behave as if they were afflicted by some disease. For his part, he needs hardly anything. "If ever my feelings require me to seek their gratification," he notes, "whatever comes my way gives me so much satisfaction, that those with whom I wish to be associated treat me with the great affection, simply because there is no one else ready to ask from them as little as I do." 26 He concludes his speech observing that our friend Socrates here, from whom I have received my wealth, did not give it to me by measure but without limit--as much as I could take from him. Consequently, I am not stingy with anybody, but readily show off what I have, and I am more than happy to share my spiritual wealth with anybody who is willing to receive it. And leisure, too, is one of the most enjoyable possessions, and that is, as you can all see, always at my command, so that I can afford to go and see whatever is worth seeing, and I can go and hear whatever deserves to be heard, and what is most important to me, I can spend my time without being disturbed, day after day in the company of Socrates who does not look with admiration upon those who possess vast amounts of money, but who makes it the business of his life to converse with those whose company gives him the greatest pleasure. (iv, 34-44) In Antisthenes' speech we find important elements that relate to the essence of Cynicism: he is, by his own choice, a poor man; he despises wealth and possessions, and looks upon those who crave such things as persons afflicted by a disease, perhaps the τûφος of which the Cynics often spoke; he strives after simplicity and is satisfied with what he has; he values the wealth of his mind more than anything; he is always willing to share his 'wealth' with others who can profit from it; his poverty allows him to enjoy a great deal of leisure, because he does not have to work to support an expensive mode of living; he recognizes the fact that the hunger for wealth and power is at the base of people's inhumanity towards people; and he remains forever in a perfect state of absolute self-sufficiency. It is impossible to affirm whether these convictions and traits did in fact belong to Antisthenes, but it is unwise to reject

the probability that they did, especially after he came under the influence of Socrates, from whom, as he tells us, he derived his wealth. There are throughout the Symposium other references to Antisthenes and other statements attributed to him. Of particular importance is his answer to Socrates, who at one point asked him, "And you, Antisthenes, are you the only one [of those present here] who loves no one?" Antisthenes responds in a way that sums up his relationship with Socrates and, more generally, his exclusive -45attachment to the philosophical life: "No, by the gods, Socrates, I love you with all my heart!" (viii, 4). For the Cynic, contrary to all appearances, is capable of great love, and, in fact, loves a great deal, unlike his illegitimate descendants, the modern cynics. These, like the traditional pícaro (rascal or rogue) of the Spanish novela picaresca, 27 are neither able nor willing to love. They slink among people like weasels through the undergrowth, always seeking their own advantage, moved by appearances and shadows, hiding their cynical selves beneath all sorts of pretensions and deceptions, despising those who surround them. But the real Cynic, like Antisthenes, loves, and loves greatly, even if and actually precisely when his duty forces him to punish and chastise. For otherwise why should he care for the spiritual welfare of others? Why should he be, as Socrates says of Antisthenes, an expert in the art of seduction? (iv, 61-62). Of Socrates himself, as an antithesis of the modern cynic, we can say that it was love, the love of the souls, that moved him and gave direction to his life: "I cannot recall any period of my life," he says in Xenophon's Symposium, "when I was not in love with somebody" (viii, 2). In Plato's Symposium (177d) we hear from Socrates that love is the only thing that he understands. This capacity and this commitment to love were inherited by the Cynics, beginning with Antisthenes, from Socrates; and from him, too, they derived the idea of the divine origin of their mission. It was from what they understood as their union with God that they drew the strength that supported and guided their mood of protest, 28 which is not contrary to, but in accord with, their rejection of the ways in which traditional religions structure the relationship between human beings and God. The testimonies of Plato, Aristotle, and Xenophon furnish us with an idea concerning Antisthenes, at least the contours of his portrait. This portrait becomes enriched with details as soon as one begins to review later secondary sources. With each new testimony, we learn something new and more specific, except for the fact that on occasion we find ourselves compelled to choose between conflicting bits of information. Thus, for instance, Diogenes Laertius (VI, 1) informs us that Antisthenes took part in the battle of Tanagra in 426 B.C., and that Socrates praised his courage on that occasion. 29 There is, on the other hand, a contradictory 'report' from Lucian, who, in The Parasite (43), maintains that Antisthenes never fought in a battle, and that like other philosophers ( Plato, Diogenes, Crates, Aristotle, and others) he was a social parasite--a man unable and unwilling to assume any civic responsibilities. But whom are we to believe? Lucian was by no means well inclined towards the Cynics, in particular the Cynics of his time. In fact, he spared no efforts in ridiculing them and in exposing what he saw as their falsity. For Lucian, there were among the Cynics despicable people, whose intellectual capacities were weak and whose morals left much to be desired. 30 In The Runaways (16) he describes the Cynics of his own time as upstarts who, in the name of Diogenes, joined "the Army of the Dog," but who defiled the name of dogs

through their indiscriminate barking, their gluttony, their excessive interest in females, and their shameless begging, without -46maintaining any of the good qualities of dogs. Antisthenes is portrayed by Lucian in his Dialogues of the Dead (xxvii) as delighted when contemplating the sufferings of those who descend to Hades and are about to be punished. He makes Antisthenes say: Well, as for myself, when I was making the descent into Hades, I did not at all mix myself up with the rest, but, leaving them to lament, I ran forward to the ferry-boat, and took my place beforehand, that I might have a comfortable passage. In fact, during the voyage they were shedding tears, and suffering from sea-sickness, while I was exceedingly entertained by them all. The testimony of Lucian is suspect. He was a masterful satirist and an expert in finding appropriate subjects for his amusing tales. But he, too, perhaps like Aristophanes, appears to have been moved by a moralistic aim, namely, to expose the Cynic philosopher, whether Antisthenes or Peregrinus, or any other, "as a sham, whose zeal was not at all for truth but only for applause and renown." 31 31 Consequently, his testimony should be taken into account mostly as a barometer of the degree of social acceptance in which the Cynics were viewed by their contemporaries, and as an indication of the excesses into which late Cynicism fell. Furthermore, even in his most exaggerated satirical descriptions of the Cynic, there is bound to be some element of truth. Was then Antisthenes a social parasite? Was he a cowardly man who shunned his military responsibilities? In other words, did he or did he not fight at Tanagra? We observed in the previous chapter that the Cynics generally remained outside political and civic life. To find a Cynic joining a Greek phalanx, or even allowing himself to be forced into military service, would have been a surprising sight, the example of Cercidas being the great exception. In the instance of Antisthenes at Tanagra, however, we can appeal to a subterfuge in order to solve the problem of the contradictory nature of the sources. It is true that, as Diderot insisted, one does not generally choose to become a Cynic. Cynicism is neither a mode of life nor a set of convictions that one discovers one day and decides to adopt. As Diderot observed, "one may choose to become an Academic philosopher, or an Eclectic, or a Cyrenaic, or a Pyrrhoist, or a Skeptic; but one must be born a Cynic." 32 The nature of Cynicism is such that it is necessary to come into this world with a tendency towards it. Cynicism, then, comes with the package, so to speak, and we could go even further and repeat what Schopenhauer said: "A person does not choose his philosophy; it is his philosophy that chooses him." Temperament, Schopenhauer believed, is as inborn as one's physiognomy, which means, according to him, that "human characters are inflexible, and no entreaty, or representation, or example, or kindness can make them depart from their course." 33 This amounts to saying that every person must live throughout his life burdened with an unalterable set of intellectual, moral, and physical characteristics and predispositions. But obviously, aside from the philosophical difficulties inherent in this pessimistic and fatalistic view of human -47-

existence, it remains possible that such characteristics and predispositions, even if unchangeable, may or may not be actually perceivable in a person's behavior at all times. A person may be born with inclinations towards certain kinds of ideas and modes of behavior, but circumstances may affect their emergence or bring them to the surface at given times. A personal tragedy, a great disappointment, a moment of revelation, or the encounter with a charismatic mind may plunge a person into a different frame of mind, and may compel him to alter his life. Such an occurrence may have befallen some of the Cynics, so that in some of them we may be able to identify distinct stages of development or different styles of life at various times. In our subsequent discussions, we will come upon instances of Cynic 'conversions', and we will see how a man like Crates, attached to wealth and comfort for the greatest part of his life, one day, after listening to Diogenes speak, threw his possessions into the sea and became a Cynic. We will also see how Hipparchia, a young woman with no apparent Cynic traits about her, suddenly transformed herself into a Cynic after listening to the words of Crates, the aged and disfigured philosopher who became her husband. These are cases of genuine conversion, undoubtedly. They do not invalidate Diderot's contention, namely, that to be a Cynic one must be born a Cynic, and neither do they negate the truth of Schopenhauer's character determinism which maintains that, except for a miraculous occurrence, people never alter their innate personality. The presence of such cases, however, has two consequences: first, they point to the complexity of the psychology of Cynicism, and second, they allow us to resolve some of the contradictions found in the secondary sources, as in the instance of Antisthenes' reported presence and absence at the battle of Tanagra. Occasionally, the sources offer reports about the same person at two different stages of his life: a pre-Cynic stage, in which he remained enmeshed in the social and political nonsense in which most people live, and a Cynic stage in which he has at last "seen the light" and has liberated himself from the obfuscation of the rabble. Still, it may be affirmed that "to see the light" one must have the eyes with which to see it, and that such eyes were always part of the person. Diderot may be, after all, correct: to be a Cynic one must be born a Cynic--a Cynic at least potentially. Otherwise why should Diogenes' words, heard by many people, have affected Crates as they did? Why should Crates' presence have transformed and enraptured Hipparchia? And, more appropriate to our context, why should the example of Socrates have compelled Antisthenes to transform himself and alter the course of his life? The wealthiest source of information about Antisthenes is Diogenes Laertius' work. Its value is not due to its length or to the number of recorded 'facts' and anecdotes which it provides, but to the sources, mentioned and unmentioned, from which he derived his biographical sketch. Some of these sources have survived only in fragments. Among these, we come upon several explicitly mentioned: Hermippus of Smyrna, Neanthes of Cyzicus, Theopompus of Chios, Timon of Phlius, and Athenaeus the epigrammatist. Of others, also -48mentioned, we do not even have one genuine fragment, as for example Diocles of Magnesia, whom Diogenes Laertius credits with a work entitled Compendium of Philosophers , which is used throughout his biographies, for which reason Nietzsche referred to the latter as an epitome of Diocles' non-extant work. There are also statements in Diogenes Laertius that can be corroborated by reference to older sources not explicitly mentioned by him: Plutarch, Seneca, Saint Clement of Alexandria, and others. By means of a critical collation of the data provided by these sources, it is possible to reconstruct in rough outline the biography of

Antisthenes, bearing in mind that the historical facts are few indeed, the attributions many, the contentions about his ideas subject to diverse interpretations, and his relationship with the Cynic movement problematic. His place of birth was Athens, as Diogenes Laertius affirms ( VI, 1 ), and nowhere is this contradicted, except by Saint Clement of Alexandria ( Strom. I, xv), who refers to him as a Phrygian. His father, also named Antisthenes, was an Athenian citizen, and his mother is said to have been a Thracian slave ( D. L. VI, 1; Seneca, De constantia sapientis xix, 1). On occasion, we hear about his mother having been Phrygian ( Plutarch, De exilioxvii), but this is probably the result of misinterpreting a statement attributed to Antisthenes ( D. L. VI, 1), who, when reminded by someone that he was not of pure Attic blood, replied that the mother of the gods was also Phrygian. 34 , that is, a bastard. His civic status as such, however, would not have prevented him from functioning freely in Athenian society. Over and over again, we are exposed in ancient accounts to the intermingling of all sorts of people in Athens. Common law marriages were not uncommon even among the most influential citizens, as is clear from the relationship between Pericles and Aspasia, who was a metic from Miletus. Lysias, the orator and the son of Cephalus, a metic from Syracuse, not only moved at ease among the highest social and political circles, but, even before he was granted Athenian citizenship for his services to the State, took an active part in political affairs. In the writings of Plato and Xenophon, it is not rare to witness social and intellectual exchanges among Athenians and non-citizens, including foreigners and half-Athenians. Thus, we can remain convinced that Antisthenes' social status as a bastard did not interfere with his personal and intellectual activities. There were, however, certain restrictions with which the laws discriminated against noncitizens. One such restriction would have barred Antisthenes from political participation and would have prevented him from holding public office. Another restriction would have made him unwelcome in the gymnasiums and public baths reserved for citizens. But aside from these and a few other forms of discrimination, both metics and bastards, and, to a lesser extent, slaves, moved freely within Athenian society, which, unlike most other ancient societies, was open and welcoming to all sorts of people. The words attributed to Pericles by Thucydides ( II, xxxix) reveal the openness of Athenian society: "We maintain Athens open and accessible to everybody, and we do not turn back those who flee danger or who come to us moved by curiosity." Even -49military service was on occasion forced on non-Athenians, and, as Xenophon reports ( Hellenica I, vi, 24), as in the affair of the Arginusae islands in 406 B.C. even slaves were conscripted. Thus, the report about Antisthenes' part in the battle of Tanagra is not at odds with what we know about the Athenians. The date of his birth is uncertain, although some time between the years 450 and 445 B.C. seems acceptable. A much later date seems unreasonable, for it would make his presence at the battle of Tanagra impossible, no less than his participation in Xenophon Symposium. Furthermore, if Plato refers tacitly to Antisthenes in the Sophist (251b), when he speaks of those "elders who have taken to learning philosophy late in life," then, when Antisthenes made his acquaintance with Socrates, he must have already been already a grown man. This acquaintance, if Xenophon can be trusted, went back to at least 421 B.C. Moreover, if he was a student of Gorgias, who resided in Athens between 427 and 425 B.C., then the date for

Antisthenes' birth must be pushed back to at least the middle of the fifth century. At the time of Socrates' death in 399 B.C., he is described by Libanius ( Apology of Socrates v, 23) as γἀρων (an older man). There is equally some uncertainty, concerning the year of his death. Plutarch ( Lycurgusxxx) reports a statement made by Antisthenes after the battle of Leuctra in 371 B.C., a battle in which the Spartans were defeated by the Thebans: "Antisthenes said, in earnest, of the Thebans, when they were elated by their victory at Leuctra, that they looked like schoolboys who had beaten their master." An even later date is mentioned: Diodorus Siculus ( xv, 76, 4) says that Antisthenes was alive in the year 366 B.C. Thus, we can assign as his dates the years 450 to 366 B.C., with the understanding that there is nothing keeping such dates from being extended by a few years in either direction. The date of his death is important because it sheds light on the issue of his biographical relationship with Diogenes. This relationship has some significance for the resolution of the question as to who should be viewed as the originator of the Cynic movement. We say some significance in order to avoid falling into the temptation of regarding such a relationship as a decisive factor in the identification of the first and original Greek Dog. For whether in fact Diogenes met or did not meet Antisthenes, and whether the former was or was not a disciple of the latter, the succession Antisthenes-Diogenes, recognized in the sources, remains unaffected. Of Antisthenes' early years, we have no information. We know his father's name ( Antisthenes also) and his mother's social status (a slave from Thrace). Diogenes Laertius informs us ( VI, 1 ) that at some point he became a student of Gorgias, the renowned Sophist. Born around the year 483 B.C. in Sicily, Gorgias came to Athens in 427 B.C. as the head of an embassy from his native city for the purpose of securing the Athenians' protection against the Syracusans. He remained in Athens for two years, teaching rhetoric and earning a considerable amount of money, 35 as we learn from the Hippias Major (282b). It is possibly during this time that Antisthenes became Gorgias' student. Diogenes Laertius attributes the style of some of Antisthenes' works, especially -50his On Truth and his Exhortations, to the influence of Gorgias ( VI, 1). Certain scholars, moreover, discern in Antisthenes' logical ideas the presence of the skepticism associated with Gorgias. 36 There are also reports that link Antisthenes with other Sophists like Hippias of Elis and Prodicus of Ceos, as can be inferred from various statements in Xenophon Symposium, but specific details or confirming evidence cannot be adduced in this regard. It is, however, quite possible for a curious and intelligent man like Antisthenes to have been in close contact with the fashionable intellectuals of his time, and these were precisely the Sophists who had begun to arrive in Athens at the time of Pericles. It is, moreover, unquestionable that there are traces of Sophistical thought in Antisthenes' philosophy: there is a skeptical bent, a rejection of universals, an ostensive theory of definition, a refusal to place human custom and values on the same level as what is natural, and an insistence on interpreting mythological traditions in an allegorical way. These elements belong in some way or another to some of the Sophists who taught in the Athens where Antisthenes was a young man, and surely he must have assimilated some Sophistical notions into his own way of thinking. It is, therefore, justifiable

to assume that in him, we encounter initially a Sophistical stage of development: he enters the world of philosophy as a Sophistical apprentice. 37 We can imagine how easy it must have been to come across the fascinating person of Socrates in the social and intellectual world of the Sophists. As Plato and Xenophon make us aware in innumerable passages, Socrates did not waste one single opportunity to learn from the Sophists, to question their alleged wisdom and elusive knowledge, to engage them in elenchical disputations, and, on occasion, to expose what he perceived to be their emptiness before crowds of attentive young listeners. The Socratic presence, indeed, cannot be grasped if the Sophistical background of Socrates' intellectual excursions is not taken into account, for much of what Socrates thought and said was for the purpose of forcing his contemporaries to transcend the relativistic and nihilistic impasse that Sophistical philosophy had brought into the scene. Having much in common with the Sophists, Socrates turned out to be the antiSophist par excellence. 38 He spent his mature life, especially after the performance of Aristophanes' Clouds, 39 (custom) and their relativism, he opposed a realm of transcendent rational values; against their accommodations and compromises, he upheld a rigorous conception of civic virtue; and instead of their quest for wealth and their pretension of wisdom, he advocated a life of poverty and consistently professed his own ignorance. Much of what he said during his trial was designed, if Plato's testimony in this respect can be trusted, to underline the gap that, from his point of view, separated him from the Sophists. The description of Socrates' activities is graphically given to us throughout the Platonic dialogues and, to a lesser extent, in Xenophon's recollections. G. X. Santas gives us an adequate summation of such activities: -51He met, mixed, and talked with all manner of men: great statesmen Re Pericles, brilliant dialecticians like Zeno, clever and dazzling sophists like Protagoras, eminent generals like Nicias and Laches, and the greatest sculptors, architects, poets, and playwrights of Greece; he also crossexamined lesser know-it-alls like Euthyphro and Meno, silly jack-of-alltrades like Dionysodorus and Ctesippus, corrupt politicians like Critias, and dozens of ordinary citizens, clever and dull, honest and dishonest. He succeeded beyond any teacher's expectation in what has to be the most brilliant pupil of all time, Plato himself. In the midst of the terrible upheavals around him and the variety of his experiences Socrates displayed an awesome presence, maintained a vast philosophic calm. Day in and day out he went to the same places, talked to the same people, raised the same questions, discussed them in the same way, and ended up with the same mixture of success and failure. . . . Having the fortune of many brilliant pupils and at least one great one, Socrates created a revolution in Greek philosophy. 40

One among such "brilliant pupils" was Antisthenes, the Sophistical apprentice. He must have witnessed Socrates' pugilistic contests with the Sophists whom he himself admired. He must have understood that in challenging the Sophists, characters like Thrasymachus, for whom all ethical and moral values amount to nothing, Socrates was attempting to dissipate the atmosphere of nihilism that had become pervasive in the Athens of his time. Antisthenes must have also realized that in struggling against dishonest politicians, pretentious soothsayers, ruthless generals, hedonistic and egoistical citizens, and others of the same stamp, Socrates was seeking to undo the damage done by Sophistical nihilism.

It was Socrates' presence that was most probably responsible for Antisthenes' graduating from his first stage of intellectual development, and the impetus that took him onto his second stage, which we can call his Socratic stage. Sometime between 426 and 421 B.C. he became Socrates' disciple and subsequently his intimate friend. This parameter allows us to give credence to Xenophon's description of the relationship between them. It also lets us view as genuine Diogenes Laertius' comment ( VI, 1 ) about Socrates' praise of Antisthenes' courage in the battle of Tanagra. Also from Diogenes Laertius ( VI, 2) we have another bit of information: so impressed was Antisthenes with Socrates' teaching that he would urge his own disciples to leave him and become Socrates' pupils. Saint Jerome ( Adv. Jovinianum II, 14) gives us his own version: Hic certe est Antisthenes, qui, cum gloriose docuisset rhetoricam, audissetque Socratem, dixisse fertur ad discipulos suos: "Abite et magistrum quœrite, ego enim reperi"; statimque venditis quœ habebat, et publice distributis, nihil sibi amplius quam palliolum reservavit (It is a fact that Antisthenes, who had been teaching rhetoric in so excellent a manner, after he heard Socrates, said to his disciples: "Get yourselves going and find a teacher, for I have made a discovery." At once, then, he sold all his possessions and distributed the money among the people, keeping only a cloak for himself). -52This anecdote would be repeated in the context of Crates, who, just like Antisthenes, converted his possessions into coins, which he either gave to the poor or threw into the sea as soon as he had heard the words of Diogenes. But whatever truth there may be in the story of Antisthenes' reaction to Socrates, we can rest assured that the impression of Socrates upon him must have been overwhelming, indeed great enough to force him to alter the course of his life. Of Plato, too, we are told by Diogenes Laertius ( III, 5) that his encounter with Socrates made him alter his direction: after listening to Socrates, Plato consigned to flames a poetical composition with which he had hoped to win a prize at a festival. Like Plato, then, Antisthenes must have confined to the fire of oblivion his Sophistical and rhetorical interests, in order to become a companion of the formidable enemy of the Sophists. He had at last transcended the initial stage of his intellectual career, and had become a Socratic philosopher. The sources describe him as a close companion of Socrates. Even Plato does not fail to include him as one of those who were present at the moment of Socrates' death ( Phaedo59b), In Xenophon, too, his friendship with Socrates is painted in vivid colors. We are told that for him, there was no greater pleasure than to spend days without end in the company of Socrates ( Symposium iv, 44), a pleasure for which he would walk daily the five miles between the Piraeus, where he lived, and Athens, just to spend time with his friend. From Socrates he learned many ideas and a certain style of life. That virtue is the only thing in the world worth striving for and that virtue can be taught, these, too, he learned from him. That most of the things to which people attach importance are ultimately children's games, that, too, was part of the lessons. That life should be devoted to reason, self-control, and self-sufficiency and simplicity, that was yet another lesson. That neither wealth nor fame, nor pleasure, nor power, amounts to anything, that belonged to the curriculum. That an unexamined life is not worth living, that was an essential teaching to be learned and practiced. That language is to be used with the utmost care and only for the expression of the truth, that was still another lesson. In

less than twenty-five years, the disciple had succeeded in mastering his master's teachings both in theory and in practice. And then came Socrates' trial, conviction, and execution in the spring of 399 B.C. What, we could ask, were Antisthenes' feelings and sentiments upon seeing a man who, in the words of Plato ( Phaedo 118a), "was the bravest and also the wisest and most upright" publicly humiliated before an Athenian court and compelled to drink a cup of poisonous hemlock? What anguish, indeed, what frustration, what a sense of futility, must not have invaded his heart, at the sight of the man to whom he once said, "By the gods, Socrates, I love you with all my heart!" put to death by the Athenians? Plato and others among Socrates' associates left Athens immediately after Socrates' execution. Frightened by the cruelty of the tyrants, reports Diogenes Laertius ( II, 106), some left the city and took refuge in neighboring Megara, as was the case with Plato and Euclides, and did not return until the public controversy about Socrates' death had subsided. By 'tyrants' the biographer means the democratic government that, led by Anytus, -53had secured the execution of Socrates. Of Antisthenes, on the other hand, nothing is said concerning his flight. Perhaps he chose to stay and face the presence of Anytus, the chief architect of Socrates' indictment. 41 41 Antisthenes must have remembered that this solid and law-abiding citizen, a bulwark of democratic ideas and a champion of the people, had once uttered some ominous words to Socrates, as Plato reports in the Meno (94e): "My advice to you, if you will listen to it, is to be careful." Socrates, however, did not listen and was anything but careful , that is, the freedom to speak always the truth, for he invariably spoke his mind, and was able and willing to call things and people by the right name: when he saw a thief, he called him a thief; when he encountered a fool, he called him a fool; when he came across deceptiveness, he called it deceptiveness, and so on. Anytus' advice, then, fell upon deaf ears, and eventually Socrates had to pay a heavy price for his carelessness, the price of his life. There is a report, found in Diogenes Laertius ( VI, 10) and other places, that Antisthenes was responsible for the exile of Anytus and the execution of Meletus, the orator who spoke on behalf of the prosecution at the trial of Socrates. There is something suspicious about such a report, and the little that we know about Anytus' activities after 399 B.C. does not seem to support it. Concerning the alleged execution of Meletus for his part in Socrates' trial, nothing is historically known. What such a report involves is, it appears, the creation of an anecdote to illustrate a point: Antisthenes, viewed by many among the ancients as Socrates' closest associate, had to bring redress against the injustice committed against Socrates--banishment for Anytus (he was too valuable to the Athenians to merit execution) and death for Meletus (who was not a person of political weight). Socrates, then, was at last avenged by his closest friend. The truth of the report is, however, questionable, if nothing else because it would have been surprising for an Athenian court and even more for the Assembly to entertain a motion brought about by a man like Antisthenes, a half-Athenian, against pure-blooded citizens like Anytus and Meletus. And yet, there is another aspect connected to this story. The execution of Socrates must have convinced some of his associates that the political and social world in which Socrates moved, lived, and had his being was not worth preserving. By condemning to death "on a most sacrilegious charge," to use Plato phrase ( Seventh Letter325b), a man like Socrates, Athens

had revealed the sickness that afflicted it at its core, and if Athens was a moribund political state, so were all the others. Plato in particular has left for us a moving account of his feelings of disgust towards the then existing conditions. In his Seventh Letter (325d-326b) he makes it clear how he stood in relation to Athens and all other Greek polities after Socrates death: Finally I saw clearly in regard to all states now existing that without exception their system of government is bad. Their constitutions are almost beyond redemption except through some miraculous plan accompanied by good luck. Hence I was forced to say in praise of the -54correct philosophy that it affords a vantage point from which we can discern in all cases what is just for communities and for individuals, and that accordingly the human race will not see better days until either the stock of those who rightly and genuinely follow philosophy acquire political authority, or else the class who have political control be led by some dispensation of providence to become real philosophers. The language is heavy, indicting, and gloomy, as it unveils his perception of an unhappy human past, a miserable present, and an uncertain future. It is repeated in the Republic (473d): Unless philosophers become kings in our states or those whom we now call our kings and rulers take to the pursuit of philosophy seriously and adequately, and there is a conjunction of these two things, political power and philosophical intelligence, while the motley crowd who at present pursue either apart from the other are forcibly excluded, there can be no cessation of troubles, dear Glaucon, for our states, nor, I fancy, for the human race. Plato's prophetic words have been corroborated daily and everywhere during the twenty-four centuries that have elapsed since he wrote them: kings, rulers, and politicians--men and women of little mind and no moral fiber--have controlled the affairs of the world, while philosophers either have opted for political and social apathy, while making indecent accommodations with the corrupt status quo, or have remained men or women without any power. The result has been, as Plato predicted: no cessation of troubles. This sort of political radicalism, rightly interpreted by some as an avowed commitment to intellectual elitism, 42 must have been generated or at least exacerbated by the spectacle the execution of Socrates. What then, we must ask, could have been Antisthenes' reaction? Did he weep uncontrollably like the affectionate Apollodorus ( Phaedo117d)? Did he leave the city in a mood of dejection and disgust as Plato and others did? Did he vow to inflict vengeance on those responsible for Socrates' death? Did he entertain some hope of improving society and carrying out an experiment in political reform, as Plato did, quite unsuccessfully, in Syracuse? Did he join the court of some monarch, as Aristippus did, in order to spend the rest of his life seeking pleasures and chasing women? It is impossible to say with certainty what he did, although none of the sources unveils him to us as taking any of the above courses of action. But judging from the various traditions about him, it is reasonable to assume the following scenario: he transformed himself into a dog in a way that must have been more real and literal than Lucius' metamorphosis into Apuleius' famous golden ass, more lasting than the change of Zalmoxis, Pythagoras' slave, into a wolf, and more fruitful than the metamorphosis of Kafka's Gregory into a giant beetle. From a man,

then, Antisthenes changed himself into a ferocious hound, into the Absolute Dog mentioned by Diogenes Laertius ( VI, 13), and at that point -55he joined what Lucian called "the Army of the Dog," and then his barking and biting began, possibly in the shady groves of the Cynosarges, the Park of the Agile Dog. He now entered into his third stage of development: he became a Cynic. All the doggishness that had accompanied him since his birth, and that had occasionally surfaced in his behavior as early as 421 B.C., now rose to the surface. People do not become Cynics: a Cynic is born a Cynic. Antisthenes' mood of Cynical protest was directed at many targets. After the death of Socrates, as a scholar has noted, 43 "Antisthenes was subject to no restraints." He took on the Cynic uniform, and began at once his campaign against the world, a campaign which amounted to "hating all the order or structure achieved in the world," 44 His outward appearance is said to have undergone a radical change, as if he had transformed himself into someone else: Wearing only a cloak, barefoot, a beggar's wallet on his shoulder, his beard and hair in disarray, holding a walking stick, he sought, through his example, and offering no other attractive feature than such a miserable appearance, to ulead human beings to the simplicity of nature. 45 Perhaps this idealized picture of Antisthenes may contain an element of historical truth. But what it conveys is clear: Antisthenes was no longer the same man for he had undergone a conversion. Suddenly, the doctrines associated with Socrates became exaggerated and were carried to their extreme consequences. Socrates' ironic mood and good humor were replaced by an uninviting earnestness, and a frowning and unforgiving attitude of contempt. His uncertainties and hesitations were relegated to the background, in order to give place to an implacable stance of moral intransigence. His respect for the laws and his deference towards the State were buried under an avalanche of revolutionary sentiments, and the polity, in which Antisthenes had lived in relative freedom, became his enemy. In a word, Antisthenes the Cynic was born. The prophecy uttered by Socrates before the Athenian jury that sentenced him to death was about to be fulfilled. This prophecy, as stated by Socrates, was recorded by Plato ( Apology39c-d): younger critics, harsher than Socrates himself, would rise up in order to undermine the foundations of the Athenian world. Antisthenes now emerges as the relentless critic sent by God to punish the Athenians and indeed the entire world. He spares nobody, and no institution is sacrosanct or untouchable in his eyes. He rejects all political arrangements, and, considering himself to be above and outside of the law, proclaims himself king. His mission is none other than to destroy "the decrepit trappings of a dying society," 46 a dying society, at least from the perspective of a Cynic. For his task as a destroyer of his social and political world, Antisthenes has at his disposal several powerful weapons: first, his early training under the tutelage of the Sophists, from whom he learned to speak and write as an accomplished rhetorician, and from whom he received lessons in skepticism and in the logic that he would develop in his own radical way; second, his acquaintance with Socrates, from whom he received lessons in philosophy, and from whom -56-

he learned to distinguish what is real from what only appears real, as well as a host of ideas that he would incorporate into his own Cynic program; and third, his mood of disappointment with and estrangement from the world at large. He had never fit comfortably within the Athenian polity: as a bastard, he must have often felt out of place in the world in which he chose to live, but which he never accepted. This world, which had compelled him to remain an outsider, was, moreover, the same world that had sentenced Socrates, whom he loved so much, to an ignominious death. With these weapons, then, Antisthenes commenced his Cynic campaign. His targets were many and varied. The sources speak of him going after Socrates' prosecutors, although, as we saw, there may be more pious fabrication in these reports than actual facts. More historical import, however, is probably found in the numerous reports and anecdotes that speak of his condemnation of Plato, who could have appeared in his eyes as the kind of person least worthy of maintaining the movement of protest begun by Socrates. Plato's style of life, his aristocratic family and his political connections with the oligarchy; his presence in the court of rulers like Dionysius in Syracuse; his attachments to ritualistic religious traditions associated with his Academy 47 ; his ideological link with the Pythagoreans; his abstruse and idealistic metaphysics, and his low estimation of the value of the physical world; his insistence on 'using' the name of Socrates for the promulgation of his ideas, particularly those that outline the contours of a political State in which Socrates could not have survived even for one day 48 ; his alleged conceit and pride concerning his own literary and philosophical accomplishments--all these and other elements, rightly or wrongly connected with Plato, must have deepened the gap that, by temperament, may have separated the two philosophers even long before Socrates' death. The "beautified and rejuvenated Socrates" about whom Plato speaks in his Seventh Letter (341c) and who is presented there as the source of what Plato wrote, must have appeared to Antisthenes as an embarrassing travesty. We can imagine his delight on hearing Socrates once say of Plato Lysis, "By Hercules, what a number of lies this young man is telling about me!" ( D. L. III, 35). Although we do not have any statements of Antisthenes about Socrates, we can assume that in some of his writings he sought to correct what he interpreted as the Platonic deception about the Socratic philosophy. After all, for the Cynics, 'telling only the truth' was an inescapable duty. The anecdotes describing the enmity between Antisthenes and Plato are many. Some scholars have expressed doubts concerning their historical authenticity, and have argued that such anecdotes are fictional. 49 But it is unwise to reject so large and consistent a number of reports found in the secondary sources, especially in the absence of any clear contradictory evidence. In Diogenes Laertius, for instance, we come across several anecdotes. Antisthenes is told that Plato had been speaking ill about him, to which he replied that it is a privilege for kings to do good and be slandered (VI, 3). Again, Antisthenes is said to have accused Plato of being a conceited and arrogant man, and to have remarked to -57him, while both were watching a parade and at the moment when a spirited horse was passing in front of them: "It seems to me that you would have made just such a proud, showy steed." Diogenes Laertius adds that this was occasioned by Plato's taste for horsemeat (VI, 7). In still another case Plato comments on Antisthenes' torn cloak: "I spy your love of fame peeping through your cloak" (VI, 8). In another, a somewhat cruel and gross one indeed, we find Antisthenes visiting Plato, who is ill. Plato has just vomited in a basin. Antisthenes looks at the basin full of vomit and remarks: "The bile I see, but not the pride" (VI, 8), for even in

sickness and vomiting bile, Plato has remained a proud man. On another occasion (III, 35) we hear how Plato pointed out to him the absurdity of his view of contradiction. Diogenes Laertius adds that after this ϕων (The Pecker), in order to ridicule Plato. After this point, he notes, they continued to be estranged from each other. Some of these and similar anecdotes reappear in other secondary sources, sometimes in the context of Antisthenes, but at other times in the context of Diogenes, a circumstance that accounts for the suspicion with which they have been received in modern times. At times, it is Diogenes who speaks with contempt about Plato, at other times it is Plato who speaks with disdain about Diogenes, and, on occasion, what Plato is reported to have said to Antisthenes is attributed to Socrates. But it remains unquestionable that the political stance adopted by Antisthenes, no less than his logical views and his rejection of natural sciences and metaphysics, could not but have made him an implacable antagonist of Plato, and that in this antagonism we come upon the source of the opposition between classical Cynicism and any philosophical tendency that was even remotely related to Platonism. What has been called "the great aversion against Plato" on the part of Antisthenes, 50 remained alive for many centuries among the Cynics, many of whom discerned in Plato's political philosophy the ultimate stroke against the possibility of personal freedom. Plato, according to them, may have understood well the bankruptcy of his social and political world, and the calamitous condition of every human context, but his proposed solution was far worse than the original disease. For a rapprochement between Cynicism and Platonism we must wait until the last stages of the Cynic movement in the fourth and fifth centuries A.D., when some of the Cynics became eclectically oriented, and attempted to combine Cynic ideas with Neopythagoreanism and Neoplatonism. But at the sunset of classical Cynicism, the building of a bridge between Antisthenes and Plato was a futile undertaking of no lasting consequences. At this late point, as Dudley has observed, 51 Cynicism had lost its original fighting vitality and was willing to make accommodations, perhaps in the expectation that real redress for the absurdities of this world could be found in the transcendent sphere promised by Plato and by Christianity. Plato was by no means the only or even the most important target of Antisthenes' protest. Plato was significant because in him and in his writings Antisthenes found much of what, in his view, afflicted humanity, the τυ + ϕος of -58human existence: pride, falsehood, pretentiousness, arrogance, mystification, superstitious and religious humbug, the worship of the State, the contempt towards what is concrete, and the misuse of language for the purpose of hiding one's own confusion. Such manifestations of τυ + φος Antisthenes must have discovered everywhere in the Athenian world, and in fact everywhere else. It was against them, then, that he wrote, and it was to counterbalance their influence that he taught a few disciples--very few indeed, if we trust the testimony of the secondary sources. Antisthenes' writings were numerous and dealt with a vast number of subjects. In the case of most of them, it is only possible to advance hypotheses concerning their contents, for we only know the titles of most them. Their chronology is, moreover, difficult to establish. We suspect that many of them could have been written after the death of Socrates. In so doing we estimate the years between 399 and 366 B.C. to be the literary period of Antisthenes' life,

without excluding more generous parameters for individual works. What is important to bear in mind is that the three stages of Antisthenes' development that we have identified, namely, the Sophistical, the Socratic, and the Cynic, should not be understood as three consecutive and exclusive stages, but rather as three levels of intellectual growth in which earlier ideas and tendencies are subsumed and integrated into later ones. Thus, Antisthenes the Sophist is followed by Antisthenes the Socratic and the Sophist, and Antisthenes the Socratic and the Sophist is succeeded by Antisthenes the Cynic who is also both Socratic and Sophistical. There is, then, a line of ideological continuity, which explains how it was possible for him to write Sophistical tracts, Socratic dialogues, and Cynic diatribes during his last twenty or thirty years. Concerning his activities during his literary period there is hardly anything that can be affirmed. His teaching in the Cynosarges probably belongs to this period. The 'inauguration' of Cynicism, of which some of the sources speak, belongs also to this period. Diocles of Magnesia, as Diogenes Laertius reports (VI, 13), is supposed to have said that Antisthenes was the first among the Greeks to have adopted what we have referred to as the Cynic 'uniform': one cloak, a staff, and a wallet. Unlike Diogenes, who is said to have traveled extensively, we hear nothing about Antisthenes having been anywhere except in Athens. Plutarch's testimony concerning a comment made by Antisthenes after the battle of Leuctra in 371 B.C. ( Lycurgus xxx) does not necessarily imply that Antisthenes was in Leuctra at that time. From the many anecdotes and reports it is easy to place him in Athens from the time of his initial encounter with Socrates until his death. The date of his death is uncertain, although, as we noted earlier, the year 366 B.C. or some time later is a reasonable assumption. The manner of his death is also uncertain, except for the comment that he died of natural causes ( D. L. VI, 18). There is a revealing anecdote recounted by Diogenes Laertius ( VI, 18-19), who tells us that when Antisthenes was gravely ill, Diogenes visited him and offered him a dagger as a means to deliver him from his suffering, and that -59he refused his friend's offer, saying that what he needed was something to deliver him from pain, not from life. His attachment to life at that point, the biographer adds, was regarded by others as shameful. This anecdote is significant, regardless of its historical value. The younger Cynic approaches the older Cynic, as the latter is dying. The link between the two men is thereby affirmed and the succession ' AntisthenesDiogenes' is confirmed: at the moment of his death, Antisthenes is accompanied by the person who would be charged with the continuation of his ideas and style of life. Antisthenes, too, is portrayed as having been present at the moment of Socrates' death, while Plato, by his own admission, is said to have been absent. Again, some of the sources must have interpreted the presence of Antisthenes and the absence of Plato as an affirmation and confirmation of the succession ' Socrates-Antisthenes'. In the transition of ideas, then, Antisthenes would be the successor of Socrates, just as Diogenes would be Antisthenes' successor. Antisthenes, however, was by no means a replica of Socrates, and neither was Diogenes a duplication of Antisthenes. In some respects the differences that separate them from each other are substantial, and Dudley is correct in drawing attention to the gap that lies between Antisthenes and Diogenes. 52 Antisthenes was interested in logic, while Diogenes was not; Antisthenes wrote on rhetorical subjects, while Diogenes despised rhetoricians and

their writings; and Antisthenes attended the lectures of the Sophists, while Diogenes had no use for such things. Still, despite such differences, both philosophers were on the same ideological wavelength: they were both Cynics. Not much more can be said about Antisthenes' life and activities, but it is still possible to reconstruct his philosophical contributions on the basis of the fragments and the testimonies of the sources. Antisthenes' contributions can be classified into three categories: rhetorical, logical, and ethical. In the first two, we can detect the influence of the Sophists, while in the third, we discern the impact of Socrates' presence and his own shift in the direction of Cynicism. Several among his writings can be classified as rhetorical. Ajax and Ulysses, the two declamatory speeches that have survived and the authenticity of which is generally taken for granted, belong to the first group, 53 and Hercules, too, falls within this category. 54 The most significant contribution that emerges from these rhetorical pieces is the commitment to an allegorical interpretation of various mythological traditions, for instance those embodied in the Homeric poems. The Homeric heroes are transformed by Antisthenes into personified idealizations of ethical virtues, often into those paradigms of humanity that the Cynics would later extol. Such is the case, in particular, with Hercules and Odysseus. Antisthenes' Sophistical speeches are to be interpreted as devices through which he sought to support his ethical ideas, specifically his ideal of the virtuous man, who is represented, for instance, in the persons of Hercules and Odysseus. Mythology, then, appears to be for him a medium for the expression of ideas, especially those on which ethical values are founded; and by means , a rhetorical device closely allied to allegory, 55 Antisthenes continued the tradition originated by Xenophanes and the -60Sophists, which sought to demythologize the epic heritage in the name of rationalism. 56 Perhaps his theological convictions, which can be interpreted as monotheistic, or, in Guthrie's view, 57 as pantheistic, led him to question any literal value supposedly present in polytheistic and mythological traditions. 58 The gods converge into one universal God, unknown and unfathomable, infinitely removed from human existence, and yet somehow the source and basis of all things, a sort of rational structure of the cosmos. This aspect of Antisthenes' thought contains the seeds of the antireligious stance that constitutes one of the distinguishing

(custom or convention)," Antisthenes maintained, "there are many gods, but in nature there is only one." This theme presupposes a clear distinction between convention and nature: what is true according to custom and what is true according to nature may or may not be the same; the former is relative and ethnocentric, while the latter is one and universal. Beneath the myths and beliefs about the gods, bewildering and varied as they are, there may lurk a universal reality that is accessible only to reason. The Sophists recognized the relativistic value of all customs and beliefs--hence their skepticism towards religion, which is succinctly expressed in a fragment preserved from Protagoras' On the Gods: About the gods, I am not able to know whether they exist or do not exist, nor what they are like in form; for the factors preventing knowledge are many: the obscurity of the subject, and the shortness of human life.

The second part--the suspicion that a higher reality hovers above us and behind the myths of the poets--was generally not taught by the Sophists, who remained skeptical about such matters. But Antisthenes had the opportunity to learn it from Socrates. For beneath the apparent skepticism of Socrates, there is a conviction about the existence of God or some form of universal divine reality. Thus, the rhetorical and Sophistical lessons learned by Antisthenes were corrected and expanded upon by the lessons he learned from Socrates, and it is here that we find the source of the monotheistic (or perhaps pantheistic) frame of reference that sustained his philosophical activities. A second aspect of Antisthenes' contributions is found in his logical ideas. Several among his works seem to have been devoted to the exposition of such ideas, particularly his dialogue On Truth. As we noted earlier, Aristotle was well aware of the implications of Antisthenean logic, for which reason we come upon various Aristotelian passages in which explicit references to it are found. This logic is related to the investigations of the Sophists, particularly Gorgias and Protagoras, and, through them, to certain Eleatic propositions traceable to Zeno of Elea and to Parmenides. Antisthenes' logic includes two capital propositions: (1) that contradiction is altogether an impossibility, and (2) that definition, other than ostensive definition, is also an impossibility. 59 -61We come across various modern estimates of the value of Antisthenes' logic. Rankin, for instance, observes that it is fair to say that Antisthenes' reputation in the field of logic is probably injured by our lack of continuous material from his written works and the fact that [only] the apophthegmatic and quotable portions have tended to survive. It is certainly unfair to him on the evidence to say that he was 'no logician', but it is hard to say more than that he seems on the evidence to have been an acute 'near-logician'. 60 Other have argued that Antisthenes was simply not a logician. Grube maintains that his 'logical' works represent moral diatribes that are the product of "a man of no very deep philosophic understanding." 61 This estimate of Antisthenes as a logician had already been expressed in the nineteenth century by Henne, who spoke of his logic as worthless, so worthless indeed that even his own disciples had no choice but to set it aside. 62 Favorable assessments, however, can be found, especially those which take into account the relationship between Eleatic and Sophistical ideas, and Antisthenes' logical views, which then appear to be a natural extension of the former. Likewise, such views have been interpreted as a derivation of Socrates' skeptical stance and as an attempt to undermine Plato's theory of Ideal Forms. 63 loses its basis in Antisthenes' logic, as Plutarch observed ( Adv. Col., xxii). The relationship between Antisthenes' logic and the logical ideas associated with the Megarian and Stoic schools has also been explored, showing the solid foundation on which the former was grounded. 64 It has also been maintained that the impact of Antisthenes' logic on the thought of Stilpo of Megara shows the rigorous character of that logic. A balanced examination of the value of Antisthenes' logic is found in Chappuis' Antisthène. Here we come upon a documented review of the evidence, together with an analysis of the components of Antisthenean logical principles, an examination of their historical roots, a

study of their connection with his epistemology and concept of virtue, and an assessment of their weaknesses and truncated character. Chappuis notes that seen by itself and from a philosophical point of view, this logic is not valueless. Thus, Antisthenes was correct in affirming that contraries cannot coexist in one and the same subject, and cannot be asserted simultaneously by the mind. In the recognition of the idea of identity as an essential attribute of Being, and in the insistence of the natural truthfulness of the mind, he attempted to find certainty in the direct and immediate rapport between thought and the object of thought, and provided for science an unshakable foundation. 65 But the problem with any endeavor to present an account of Antisthenes' logic, and, even more, with every attempt to give an estimate of its value, is related to what Rankin calls "our lack of continuous material from [ Antisthenes'] written works." 66 How difficult it is indeed to seek the reconstruction of what -62appears to have been a complex logical theory, with epistemological and metaphysical ramifications, out of a meager collection of fragments, together with comments and reports that, as Guthrie has noted, are "second-hand and hostile"! Guthrie even admits of the possibility that some of the logical and epistemological views traditionally attributed to Antisthenesmay have never been truly his, at least not in the form in which they have come down to us. 67 It is possible, however, to make certain statements about Antisthenes' logic without transcending the limits imposed by the sources. We can say, for instance, that his logical ideas appear to have been shaped by his attempt to solve some of the paradoxes created by the Parmenidean view of thought and language. We can add that such an attempt followed the path suggested by Sophistical investigations with which Antisthenes must have been well acquainted. The name of Prodicus, the Sophist from Ceos, comes to mind in this context. His work On the Choice of Hercules (summarized for us by Xenophon in Memorabilia II, i, 2134) must have impressed Antisthenes for its ethical content: the young Hercules is described as having to choose between Virtue (or the hard and narrow road) and Vice (or the easy and pleasant road). But Prodicus' logical works, especially his treatise On the Correctness of Names, must have also had a significant formative effect on Antisthenes, because some of his own logical ideas, particularly those related to his understanding of language, give the impression of echoing those that are attributable to Prodicus. The similarities are so well marked that the two main tenets of Antisthenes' logic have been said to belong in reality to Prodicus, not to Antisthenes, as was the opinion of Zecheriah Didymus, a scholar of the first century B.C. 68 In Cratylus, too, we come upon anticipations of Antisthenean logic, for instance in his conviction that, as we read in Plato Cratylus (384a, 429b), every object can only be named by its own proper name. We have identified above two propositions in Antisth ἐ -'there is no contradiction', which is found, with some variations, in two of the Aristotelian references to Antisthenes quoted earlier in this chapter (Metaphysics 1024b32; Topics 104b21). What the phrase implies is that it is impossible to say what is not, for nothing or what is not cannot be either known or expressed, since nothing or what is not does not exist.

This sounds, of course, like certain lines of Parmenides' philosophical poem, and, in fact, it is precisely in that tradition that Antisthenes constructs his logical and epistemological theory. In the poem, as preserved by Proclus ( In Tim. I, 345), we read: Come now, and I will tell you, and do hearken and carry my word away: the only ways of enquiry that can be thought: the one way, that it is and cannot not-be, is the path of Persuasion, for it attends upon Truth; the other, that it is-not and cannot be, that I tell you is a path altogether unthinkable. For you cannot know that which is-not (that is impossible) nor utter it; for the same thing can be thought as can be. -63It is impossible to say whether Antisthenes developed a metaphysical theory along the lines drawn by Parmenides, although it is doubtful that he could have done so: his practical bent and his preoccupation with concrete ethical questions would have prevented him from following a theoretical path. There is, however, a relationship between Parmenides' contention, at least in regard to one of its implications, and Antisthenes' denial of contradiction: only what is can really be, can be thought, and can be expressed; what is not, on the other hand, cannot be, cannot be thought, and cannot be expressed. Hence, thought is truly thought only when its content is what is; when its content is what is not, it is only the illusion of thought, only mental obfuscation, for it is nothing. Likewise, language is language only when through it we express what is; if used to express what is not, it is only a collection of meaningless sounds, no more real than the chattering of monkeys or the sound of leaves moved by the ἐ conveys. For Parmenidesand for Antisthenes, then, only that language in which we utter what is, is language; the rest is empty sound and a source of confusion in which appearance takes the place of reality, and in which the meaning of things is altogether obscured. This extreme position concerning the function of language is reminiscent of what Jonathan Swift, a man of Cynic tendencies himself, wrote about the Houyhnhnms in Gulliver's Travels: in his fourth voyage, Gulliver finds himself among the Houyhnhnms, a race of intelligent horses, whose language he wants to learn. He soon discovers a problem: they, unlike the deceptive Yahoos or humans (of whom Gulliver is a specimen) cannot lie and cannot express what is not, because their language does not allow them to say "the Thing which is not." The Master Houyhnhnm explains this point in these words: The Use of Speech was to make us understand one another, and to receive Information of Facts; now if any one said the Thing which was not, these Ends were defeated; because I cannot properly be said to understand him; and I am so far from receiving Information, that he leaves me worse than in Ignorance; for I am led to believe a Thing Black when it is White. 69 ἐ

," that is, "that which is not cannot be and, therefore, cannot be said."

We come then to this hypothesis concerning the first proposition of Antisthenes' logic: language has only one function, namely, to unveil what I discover to be the truth about the world. As soon as this function is adulterated, as when I use language to cover up the truth, two inevitable consequences ensue: first, my language ceases to be language and becomes a concatenation of meaningless sounds, since what is not cannot be spoken because it does not

exist; and second, evil enters into my soul, for I have become a friend of what is not. It is for this reason that Socrates says to Cebes in the Phaedo (115e) that -64"inaccurate language is not only itself a mistake: it implants evil in the human soul." Inaccurate language, that is, falsehood and deception, beclouds the mind, and fills it with darkness, the τυ + φος that the Cynics sought to dissipate. It gives the appearance of knowledge and understanding, and creates, as the Master Houyhnhnm said to Gulliver, a condition worse than ignorance, since it furnishes us with nothing, that is, with what is not. Hence, in order to avoid this condition, in which most people live and which is at the root of all human troubles, it is necessary to deny even the possibility

, sometimes translated inadequately as 'freedom of speech'. This translation could imply the freedom to use language deceptively or falsely, and thus it is more appropriate to render the Greek term with the phrase 'truth-telling'. Thus, the first proposition of Antisthenes' logic, having traveled a long road from Parmenides, and through the Sophists and Socrates, arrives at last as the doorstep of Cynicism and enters into it in the garb of an ethical proposition. Having shed along the way its Eleatic metaphysical trappings, it announces now an ethical program of action: the Cynic will have nothing to do with nothing, will not speak nothing or what is not, will not even attempt to understand nothing, and will begin to speak only what is. He will have no dealings with the lies and deceptions that constitute the structure that supports practically all human relationships and activities, from politics to religion, from public affairs to the most intimate sexual relations, from the most sophisticated educational endeavors to the noisy shouting of the crowd in athletic events. The Cynic, then, will start calling things by their right and proper names. Indeed, if there is a persistent feature that accompanies all the Cynics during the many centuries of the life of their sect, it is their ability and willingness to express in clear and loud language the truth about people and situations, the truth at least from their point of view. Lying and deception, euphemisms and flattery, and all forms of speech designed to put a veil over what is are foreign to the Cynic mode of life. And now, as for the second proposition, namely, that definition is impossible unless it is ostensive, we can understand both its roots and its implications. 70 Antisthenes' conviction in this regard is that predication is impossible. I cannot define anything in terms of components or a universal concept. For instance, if asked, What is a man?, I cannot construct a general definition and say, "Man is a rational creature," or "Man is a featherless, biped animal," or anything of the sort. Man in a general sense is ultimately nothing, the Thing which is not, for nowhere in the world does Man exist. There are, on the other hand, people, individual persons, and each one of these is distinct and different from every other person and every other thing. Each has a proper name by which he or she is identified. Thus, when asked for a definition of Man, our only option is to say that such a thing does not exist, for persons, who obviously exist, can be 'defined' only ostensively, that is, by pointing to the individual persons. A definition, such as the one in which we list common denominators -65-

like 'rational', 'featherless', or 'biped', is useless, because it cannot include all the characteristics and features that constitute this man here and now. Diogenes Laertius ( VI, 40) recounts that when Plato once defined Man as biped and featherless animal, Diogenes proceeded to pluck a chicken, which he presented as Plato's example of a man. We could assume that Antisthenes would have proceeded in a similar way, because for him. too, a general definition is an empty definition; it says nothing and leaves the definendum undefined. Antisthenes' quarrel with any theory of general definition applies not only to persons, who can be identified by a proper name, but to every imaginable existing object, for every object also has a 'proper' name. A thing can only be itself and nothing else, and as such it cannot be subsumed under a general category or class. Thus, in order to 'define' a thing, we must be ready to use 'the finger method' and say, "Here is the thing; it is this-thing-here-now and cannot be anything else." Every other sort of definition, such as that in which a quality is predicated of a subject, , that is, a series of words or a long discourse that means nothing at all. In such an insistence, however, it is clear that we would be demonstrating our unwillingness or perhaps our incapacity to grasp the meaning of universals, and our commitment to remain entrenched in the realm of the concrete and the immediate, and this is precisely the stance adopted by Antisthenes and, after him, by many of the later Cynics. 71 It is an extreme form of logical nominalism that maintains that things can be named only by their 'proper' names. 72 It is not surprising that, armed with so radical a view, Antisthenes could not but have stood in opposition to Plato, specifically in regard to the latter's theory of Ideal Forms, and to Aristotle's theory of predication. This rejection of predication in any form, as well as this banishing of universal concepts, may have eventually led Antisthenes to an abandonment of metaphysical inquiries and scientific pursuits, if indeed such philosophical preoccupations had ever engaged his imagination. Rodier finds in his extreme nominalism both the cause and the consequence of the thoroughly anti-scientific and anti-speculative direction of his philosophy. 73 His refusal to entertain even the remotest possibility of defining anything in terms other than of itself could not but have resulted in his militant "contempt for science," according to Rodier. This contempt, already present in Socrates, especially as he is portrayed by Xenophon in Memorabilia I, i, 11, is undeniably found in Antisthenes and, through his influence, in Diogenes. Neither metaphysics nor physics, nor astronomy, nor mathematics, nor, in fact, any other scientific branch of philosophy has any relevance for him. His only concern, at least as he reached his Cynic stage of intellectual development, is exclusively in the domain of ethics, but not ethical theory in which universals and definitions play so great a role, but ethics understood as a concrete and ostensive mode of life in the individual human being. With Antisthenes, therefore, Cynicism sets its course in the direction of practical ethics. For him, accordingly, the key philosophical questions are not What is it that I can know about the world? or What is the structure of the -66universe? or What is the nature of reality? or even What does human existence mean?; but rather What is the best and most rational way for me to conduct myself in a world that is filled with confusion and obfuscation? How can I attain happiness and serenity in the midst of so much blind and uncontrolled striving on the part of those who surround me? How can I liberate myself from the social and political fetters with which the irrationality of the human world seeks to immobilize me? To what extent can my example as a free spirit illuminate the path of others, so that they, too, may set themselves free? How can virtue become actualized

in my daily actions? How is it possible to practice the art of truth-telling, an art that begins with the study of the meanings of words, and that compels me to call everything by the right name? 74 How is it possible "to break the thread which ties human beings to their illusions"? 75 These questions, not the others, are the kernel of Antisthenes' thought. We can now approach this kernel with the expectation of shedding light on its contents, and inquire as to what the essence of Antisthenean ethics is. But no less than in our previous endeavors to clarify the details of his life, and his rhetorical and logical contributions, the paucity of the sources stands on our way. We have reports and anecdotes, together with summaries and marginal comments from a variety of sources, but no direct statements from Antisthenes himself. Still, through the anecdotes and reports, a semblance of an ethical stance emerges, which can be enriched by assuming that at least some of the ethical elements associated with later Cynics can be traced back to Antisthenes. And this assumption is not entirely unjustified. Although there are significant differences in style and approach between Antisthenes and Diogenes, the common denominators between them are more numerous than the differences. Diogenes exaggerated the doctrines of Antisthenes, just as the latter had exaggerated the teachings of Socrates; nevertheless, in the attempt to recreate Antisthenes' ethics, we often find ourselves thinking of Diogenes, almost as if we were in the presence of the one and the same philosopher. This may be due in part to the limitations imposed upon us by the scanty and unreliable sources, which occasionally attribute anecdotes and ideas to either philosopher; but still the message that they convey is clear: in both Antisthenes and Diogenes we come upon one reaction to the problem of human existence, and one radical solution for it. Thus, the question raised in the previous chapter as to who the 'founder' of classical Cynicism could have been, that is, who was the original Greek Dog, can be answered by mentioning Antisthenes and Diogenes, for Cynicism emerged among the Greeks from both, as if from twin sources. Gomperz described Antisthenes' ethical stance in these words: An insatiable thirst for freedom, a profound sensitiveness to the ills of life, an unshakable faith in the majesty and all-sufficiency of reason, and a corresponding abysmal contempt for all traditional ideals, such are the mood and convictions which lie at the root of Cynicism. 76 Here we have the kernel of Antisthenes' thought. He presents himself to us as a -67man who experiences the suffocating effect of the atmosphere of his social and political world. On account of his illegitimate birth, he has always been an outsider, and he views the world in which he lives as a foreign land, a sort of wasteland. Beyond the frontiers of Attica, the wasteland extends itself in all directions. He is endowed with an unusual gift, which from another perspective can be regarded as a curse: a tremendous lucidity or clarity of mind. 77 This gift has been embellished and fortified by his Sophistical training and particularly by his experience of the Socratic presence. He looks around himself and recognizes hardly any redeeming features in the human world, which, as Schopenhauer would say, is bankrupt. Religious beliefs have no appeal for him; in fact, he finds them meaningless. The gods may not be more than expeditious inventions fabricated by the ruling class in order to control and stupefy the human herd. This idea he may have learned from Critias' Sisyphus. 78 The political world presents to him a sad spectacle: wars, factions, falsehoods, greed, cruelty, and, above all, profound stupidity. The social world, with its atavistic customs and irrational regulations,

is not much better. The speculations of the philosophers and the claims of the scientists leave him unimpressed; in fact, he is convinced that they amount to nothing, and are only linguistic games of no significance. Everywhere, then, nothing is worth anything. People rush as if on a race against time and death, grabbing and grasping anything that comes their way, trampling on one another, giving the impression of being awake, but in reality they are immersed in the stupor of intellectual obfuscation, blindly pursuing transitory pleasures--the illusion of happiness and, at the bottom, they are unhappy with themselves and generate unhappiness for one another. Antisthenes feels entrapped in so abominable a world. All around him there is senseless human noise. In whatever direction he turns, he finds inexorably the same enthroned nonsense. Even his best friend, Socrates, is gone, removed from life by a world that could not tolerate him. What, then, will he do? He may entertain the idea of ending his life right then and there, but he chooses to linger in the world for a while, because he thinks that despite of this, he can change the currency of the world, at least for himself, by declaring himself an absolute rebel, the Absolute Dog. Now then, a rebel, as Camus put it in The Rebel, is "a man who says 'no'," because "things have lasted just too long." 79 Antisthenes, just as Camus' rebel, realizes that "things have lasted just too long," and simply says "no," "No" to what? "No" to practically everything: "no" to religion and superstition, "no" to governments and politicians, "no" to social conventions and restrictions, "no" to the enticements of pleasure and power, "no" to the pretensions of society. What Gomperz called his "abysmal contempt for traditional ideals" appears to recognize no limits. He presents himself to us, therefore, as a thoroughly negative man. But the true rebel is he who refuses to accept the world but does not abandon the world. That is, in the act of refusal, and precisely because of the refusal, and while shouting "no," the rebel also says "yes." He is, therefore, all appearances notwithstanding, an idealist, that is, a man with a mission who is moved by ideals. He defaces and even throws away the existing currency in -68order to begin the process of minting and circulating some other currency, namely, his very own. And this is what Antisthenes intends to do and actually does. But what can his currency be? What new coins is this bastard son of a Thracian slave, who teaches in the Cynosarges and calls himself "the Absolute Dog," who walks about in a torn cloak and carries a staff and a wallet--what coins does he propose to circulate, now that he has thrown away the old ones? In raising this last question we are in fact searching for the positive elements of Antisthenes' revolt, that is, for the values and ideals that he seeks to put in the place of the unacceptable values and ideals of the world. Perhaps the most important of his ideals is the recognition of reason as the sole criterion of the worth of human actions, ideas, and feelings. Nothing can be undertaken and nothing can be even entertained until reason--personal reflection and thoughtfulness--has delivered a positive dictum. Hence, neither tradition nor emotion can have a determining role in human behavior. To do, to speak, and to think only that which, after rational consideration, appears to be the right thing, is his commitment. Evil lies in the state of obfuscation--weakened reason--that characterizes most people most of the time. Evil, therefore, is a sort of ignorance of what is right, an ignorance that allows persons, communities, and nations to grope aimlessly amid alternatives. For the development of reason, the individual needs only himself. The world can prove to be an obstacle, for which reason it is necessary to bracket away the world in order to neutralize

its influence. The Cynic must learn not to need the world, and to be willing and able to dispense with what the world offers, such as possessions, wealth, honors, positions, pleasures (which produce the illusion of happiness), and even knowledge. The Cynic must become, therefore, self-sufficient and must practice αὐ , that is, self-sufficiency and selfgovernment: he owes nothing to anyone, needs nothing from anyone, and is under the control of no one. He is the absolute monarch of himself. The practice of self-sufficiency requires a commitment to discipline, ἀσκησις, and this requires a willingness to accept and endure pains and suffering ( ), as was exemplified by the paradigmatic Hercules who endured and suffered so much without ever complaining or seeking to minimize his pains. 80 It is not that suffering and pain ought to be sought for their own sake, for that would convert Antisthenes into a masochist in the ordinary sense of the term. Antisthenes' asceticism is a rationalistic commitment to the practice of discipline for the purpose of strengthening character and assuring self-sufficiency, and this commitment requires the avoidance of excessive pleasures, including what we might call 'the easy life', which most people seek and cherish, because pleasures pervert the will and befog the mind. The imagery used by Antisthenes to convey his idea of asceticism involves the comparison of a philosopher and an athlete: both must renounce pleasure and the satisfaction of sensual desires, and both must train themselves in body and in mind for their contests. The "strict training" of which Saint Paul speaks in 1 Cor. (9:24-27) is not altogether unrelated to the ascetic discipline of Antisthenean ethics. 81 -69Diogenes Laertius reports (VI, 3) that Antisthenes used to say repeatedly, "I'd rather be mad than feel pleasure." Elsewhere we come upon an even more blunt statement: "If I were able to meet face to face with Aphrodite, I would break her neck." 82 Aphrodite, of course, was the goddess of love, pleasure. fertility, and beauty. It was she who moved men and women to love and to make love, and it was she, too, who blessed the pleasures that accompany sexual relations and all other sorts of pleasures related to the body, no less than the pleasures of friendship and human companionship. Could it then be that Antisthenes had so great an antipathy for pleasure that he was willing to break the neck of the goddess of love? Was he so removed from the world that he chose to abandon all the pleasant aspects of human existence, like the Christian anchorites of the Theban desert in Egypt, who would cut off their sexual organs, eat crickets and dirt, and flagellate themselves, and who would rather die than experience any kind of pleasure? The asceticism of Antisthenes and the asceticism of those Christian anchorites are vastly different for a simple reason: whereas the Christian anchorites knew (or thought they knew) that this temporal life is only a moment of trial that would be followed by an eternal life of blissfulness for the good and suffering for the wicked, Antisthenes and, with him, other Cynics were convinced that this physical life is the only life given to us. Thus, whereas the former renounced pleasure and punished the body in order to assure for themselves eternal happiness and pleasure (proving themselves to be ultimately hedonistic, for eternal pleasure was their real goal), the latter renounced some pleasures, and disciplined the body in order to strengthen their character and allow for their rational faculty to become liberated from desires and needs, and act as the only ruler of their lives. Antisthenes' asceticism, therefore, is not otherworldly, and is not based on the expectation of another life. Unlike the Christian anchorites, accordingly, Antisthenes loved and had his pleasures, including the satisfaction of his sexual needs. There is in him, moreover, an air of eroticism when he tells Socrates that he

loves him with all his heart, which means that he, too, like Socrates, 83 was well acquainted with love. But for him, "it is philosophy itself which dictates the rules of behavior and, so to speak, structures love." 84 In other words, love, which remains for Antisthenes, no less than for Socrates, the basis of human existence, must always remain under the control of 'philosophy', that is, of reason. Unguided and by itself, it transforms itself into a blind striving after sensual pleasure, and may bring about the dislocation of moral values. We cannot vouch for the authenticity of Antisthenes' comment about Aphrodite, although from a Cynic practically anything can be expected. Neither can we insist on the genuineness of his saying that he would rather be mad than experience pleasure. Both statements could be only hyperbolic pronouncements intended to shock his hearers. But what we can affirm is that his asceticism entails not the rejection of pleasure in general as an evil in itself, but the repudiation of a life given to pleasures as if these were the only or even the main -70goals of human existence. What Antisthenes could have meant by saying that he would prefer madness to pleasure, could be interpreted, as Chappuis does, 85 in this way: It would be better to lose one's mind than to become the victim of the dominion of pleasure, for such a dominion entails the total degradation of one's being as a rational person. If life becomes a blind and desperate search for pleasure, the mind becomes muddled with confusion and disappointment-for, as Schopenhauer noted, every pleasure dulls the intellect and brings about a greater disappointment than a satisfaction--and the person's character suffers from an increasing state of debility. This debility is itself at the root of the sorrowful state in which most people live. If the Cynic inflicts suffering on himself, if he avoids or postpones certain pleasures, and if he welcomes the sufferings that often accompany the fulfillment of his duties, it is only because he knows that through such a process of discipline his character grows in strength and he himself gains in self-sufficiency. The idea of strength is central to Antisthenes' ethics, as it was in all traditions about Hercules. This legendary hero is said to have been short in stature, ugly in physiognomy, and unrefined in his movements, but we never hear that he was either physically or mentally weak. On the contrary, he was a paradigm of strength: there was hardly anything he could not do, because he had more physical and mental power than anyone else. Whether struggling against monsters and beasts, or fighting evil people, or defending widows and orphans, or even defying the forces of nature, or in the endeavor to have mastery over himself, Hercules proved to be, as a man of unsurpassed strength, the rightful son of Zeus. This strength, which, according to the myth recounted by Prodicus, allowed Hercules to choose Virtue over Vice, is precisely what Antisthenes enthrones at the center of his ethics, a strength, not of the body, but of the mind or character. What we may call spiritual or intellectual strength is then conceived of by Antisthenes as the sufficient and necessary condition for the Cynic life and for the implementation of the Cynic program. This idea of strength is best understood in terms of the word 'virtue', expressed in Greek as ἀ (virtus in Latin). In it, we come upon the most critical of all the ideas of Antisthenes. If we insist on using the word 'virtue' to designate what Antisthenes had in mind, however, we must disassociate from it the connotations that have adhered to through it the influence of Judeo-Christian traditions. 'Virtue' in the Cynic context, and, in fact, in the context of Greek philosophy in general, is only marginally related to ideas such as purity or chastity, piety or religiosity, and is only a distant relative of the canonical virtues of Thomistic theology.

'Virtue' in the Greek and Latin sense conveys the idea of strength or mastery, for which reason we still speak of a great harpsichordist or pianist as a 'virtuoso', for he, through a painful and disciplined practice, develops mastery over his art as a performer, and is in control of all his movements; others may play on or with the keyboard, but the virtuoso controls it. This mastery, then, is what Antisthenes attempts to promote in himself and, through his example, in others. Virtue is, accordingly, best defined as the -71strength through which I am able to gain mastery over myself, that is, over my thoughts, feelings, desires, anticipations, relationships, internal and external circumstances. It is not a 'natural' condition, in the sense of being innate in me; on the contrary, by 'nature' I am at the mercy of my instincts and urges, and under the governance of the confused and disjointed social world into which I was thrown at the moment of my birth. Everything in me and outside of me conspires against my ability to control my life and my destiny. My physical and emotional needs are many and are always unsatisfied, and society, through clever manipulation, increases them tenfold, so that I am never fully at peace with what I have, and I must always have more things, more pleasure, more power, more information. Even the sexual urge, natural in human beings and in animals, is augmented by the world around me: mysteriously, it never fails to remind me that the ultimate and salient point of life is sexual satisfaction. But the same occurs in the case of every other urge or need. To attain the highest and most comfortable standard of living in the easiest and fastest possible way, that is the credo of the social world around me, and that has been the case both among the ancient Greeks and among people always and everywhere after them. Thus, it seems as if the world at large conspires to enfeeble my mind and stimulate my will, and the results are too obvious even to merit a description: the history of civilization bears ample and conclusive testimony about it. An enfeebled mind, moreover, is not a clear mind--it is obfuscated and immersed as if in some vapor, the Cynic τυ + φος. It is easily duped by others and is also in the business of duping others, which can be clearly seen in the domains of politics and religion. And this obfuscation is the source of evil and vice. Virtue, understood as the strength of character, can be taught. Through discipline and the right kind of education, a person can learn to be virtuous, since virtue is not inborn. Consequently, any human being can develop in himself or herself the conditions that lead to virtue and thereby become virtuous. In Diogenes Laertius (VI, 2) we are told that according to Antisthenes, virtue is the same for women as for men, because virtue can be acquired regardless of sexual, racial, or even the cultural differences. Whether Greek or Barbarian, man or woman, master or slave, virtue is accessible to every human being. The same can be said of vice, which is also taught: vicious people become vicious through their own choices and as a result of the pressures of the social world. Virtue, moreover, is neither understandable nor developed by means of theoretical constructions. For Antisthenes, ideas and concepts neither constitute the basis of virtue, nor can they actualize virtue in us. If virtue is to be attained, it must be through a commitment rooted in the will, not merely in the intellect, a commitment to cast away the fetters with which our 'natural' selves and the world around us hold us fast. We must be willing, as willing indeed as the man who breaks the chains that fasten him to the bottom of the cave about which Plato speaks in the Republic (7.514a ff.), to choose, as Hercules did, the narrow path of

virtue over the path of vice. The path of virtue does not lead to happiness, at least not to happiness in the ordinary sense of a life filled with -72pleasures. It may lead in fact to much suffering and tribulation, because it requires the abandonment of many of the accustomed things and ways of being that make people think that they are happy. 86 But choosing, at any rate, is the key element for the attainment of virtue. Antisthenean virtue, as "an uncompromising and proud virtue, free from all conventions, from all dogmas, and engaged only with the will," 87 is not an intellectual decision: it is purely a voluntaristic commitment to opt for a certain style of life. Antisthenean virtue cannot be defined in terms of universal notions, for, as we have seen in the context of Antisthenes' logic, nothing can be really defined in that fashion. Of virtue, we must say, that it can only be exemplified, for virtue as a universal concept does not exist and, therefore, cannot be even talked about. There are virtuous acts and actions, and there are instantiations of virtuous living, each one of them being unique and incapable of being universalized. We should not wonder, therefore, that in attempting to deal with Antisthenes' 'idea' of virtue, we often find ourselves at a loss for words, and that his ethics has been often seen as a truncated collection of moralistic and rebellious pronouncements, the negative components of which transcend by far the positive and substantive elements. The same can be said concerning Diogenes 'idea' of virtue: in him, too, there are examples, anecdotes, moments of virtuous choice, but no sustained theoretical constructs that expand on the nature of virtue. Cynic philosophy in general, on account of its impatience with universal and speculative ideas, exhibits in this regard a frustrating sort of incompleteness that can only be remedied by transcending Cynicism. Finally, Antisthenean virtue, while not itself the result of intellectual enlightenment or lucidity, is the necessary and sufficient condition for the advent of enlightenment or lucidity. In this sense, then, virtue precedes wisdom, for the wise person is wise because he is virtuous. The choice to live a certain kind of life, the ideal life of the Cynics, clears the mind of its inveterate fog and confusion, and then, and only then, do we become wise and are we allowed to enter, as self-sufficient monarchs of ourselves, the kingdom of the wise, the only community of which the Cynic can be a part. Antisthenes' view of virtue became the basis on which classical Cynicism developed. The self-sufficiency, the freedom, the rationality, the rebelliousness, and all the other features of Cynicism, all are a function of the conception of virtue, just as Antisthenes held it in his mind and exemplified it in his behavior. In our subsequent discussions of Diogenes and other Cynics, we will encounter again themes that are reminiscent of Antisthenes' ideas and example, and in each one of them, Antisthenean virtue will shine forth as a bright light. -73NOTES 1. A. Chappuis, Antisthène ( Paris: Auguste Durand, 1854). 2.

For instance by J. A. Hild, "Antisthène," In La Grande Encyclopédie. Inventaire des Sciences, des Lettres et des Arts ( Paris: H. Lamirault et Cie), Vol. 3, p. 240.

3.

H. Gomperz, "Die sokratische Frage als geschichtliches Problem." Historische Zeitschrift 129 ( 1924), pp. 395-419. For further comments on the relationship between

Socrates and Antisthenes, see H. Ner, Les véritables entretiens de Socrate ( Paris: Éditions Athéna, 1922). 4.

G. Grote, Plato and the Other Companions of Socrates ( London: John Murray, 1865), Vol. 1, p. 150.

5.

K. Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies ( New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1963), Vol. 1, pp. 95ff.

6.

G. Focardi, "Antistene declamatore. L'Aiace e l'Ulisse alle origini della retorica greca." Sileno 13 ( 1987), pp. 147-173.

7.

C. M. Gillespie, "The Logic of Antisthenes." Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 26 ( 1913), pp. 479-500; ibid., 27 ( 1914), pp. 17-38.

8.

Guthrie concedes that even though the succession ' Socrates-AntisthenesDiogenesCrates-Zeno' may not rest on a strong historical foundation, the transmission of ideas among those philosophers is undeniable. See Guthrie, The Sophists ( Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971).

9.

G. M.A. Grube, "Antisthenes Was No Logician." Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association 81 ( 1950), pp. 16-27.

10. U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, Platon ( Berlin: Weidman, 1920), Vol. 1, pp. 259ff. 11. The fragments of Antisthenes have been edited in various works. See F. Decleva Caizzi , Antisthenis fragmenta ( Milan: Istituto Editoriale Cisalpino, 1966), in which the text of 195 Antisthenean passages is given. An analysis of the sources is found in A. Patzer "Antisthenes der Sokratiker. Das literarische Werke und die Philosophie, dargestellt am Katalog der Schriften." ( Ph.D. diss. Ruprecht-Karl Universität: Heidelberg, 1970). 12. In L. E. Navia, The Epigenes, in The Socratic Presence: A Study of the Sources by L. E. Navia ( New York: Garland Publishing, 1993), pp. 317-343), a 'Socratic' dialogue written as a response to Plato Crito makes Antisthenes one of the chief conversants during Socrates' last hours. 13. For comments on this dialogue, see M. F. Burnyeat, "The Material and Sources of Plato's Dream." Phronesis 15 ( 1970), pp. 101-122. Burnyeat suggests that it was written as a response to certain sections of Plato Euthydemus, specifically 285d286b. He argues, moreover, that it is unlikely that Plato would have borrowed anything "from such a disrespectful source [as Antisthenes]" (p. 111). 14. G. Zuccante, "Antistene nei dialoghi di Platone." Rivista di Filosofia 19 ( 1916), pp. 551581. 15. F. Decleva Caizzi, "Antistene." Studi Urbinati di Storia, Filosofia e Letteratura 38 ( 1964), pp. 84-99. -7416. M. Guggenheim, "Studien zu Platons Idealstaat (Kynismus und Platonismus)." Neue Jahrbücher für das klassischen Altertum 9 ( 1902), pp. 521-539. 17. F. Dümmler, Antisthenica ( Halis: Typis Hendeliis, 1882).

18. C. C. Láscaris, "Los perros filosóficos de Platón," in Actas del Primer Congreso Español de Estudios Clásicos ( Madrid: Publicaciones de la Sociedad de Estudios Clásicos, 1958), pp. 338-342. 19. E. de Strycker, "Antisthène ou Thémistius." Archives de Philosophie 12 ( 1936), pp. 475500. 20. F. Sayre, "Antisthenes the Socratic." The Classical Journal 43 ( 1948), pp. 237-244. 21. K. Joël, Der echte und der xenophontische Sokrates ( Berlin, 1893). 22. A. H. Chroust, Socrates: Man and Myth. The Two Socratic Apologies of Xenophon ( Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1957). Of particular importance in this respect is the chapter "The Antisthenian Elements in the Two Apologies of Xenophon," pp. 101-163. See also T. Birt, "Zu Antisthenes und Xenophon." Rheinisches Museum für Philologie 51 ( 1896), pp. 153-157. 23. For instance by W. E. Higgins, Xenophon the Athenian: The Problem of the Individual and the Society of the Polis ( Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1977). Higgins notes that "if Joël had read more carefully the Symposium. . . he might have never conceived this theory that Xenophon's understanding of Socrates derives from Antisthenes" (p. 148). 24. Different conclusions have been reached concerning the value of Xenophon Symposium, as well as concerning its relationship with Plato Symposium. R. Flacelière in "Àpropos du Banquet de Xénophon." Revue des Études Grecques 74 ( 1961), pp. 93-118, argues that far from being a collection of unrelated anecdotal conversations, the Xenophontean Symposium is a unified and well-structured work. 25. Several writers have defended Xanthippe, arguing that her bad reputation needs to be corrected. See, for instance, Z. Cocke, "In Praise of Xanthippe." New England Magazine 37 ( 1907- 1908), pp. 241-246; B. L. Gildersleeve, "Socrates and Xanthippe." The Southern Review 2 ( 1867), pp. 172-200; and J. J. Reilly, "Women One Would Like to Have Known." The Catholic World 156 ( 1942), pp. 53-55. F. Mauthner Mrs Socrates ( New York: International Publishers, 1926) undertakes the re-creation of Xanthippe's biography in the form of a novel. There are numerous dramatic, poetical, and musical compositions in which Xanthippe's character is portrayed, both in agreement with and in opposition to Antisthenes' assessment. Perhaps the most famous musical composition in which Xanthippe is given a major part is Georg Phillipp Telemann opera in three acts Der geduldige Socrates, first performed in Hamburg in 1721, and recently made available in compact disc ( Hungaroton, 1987). 26. This sentence has been rendered differently by various translators; for instance: "If I ever feel a natural desire for a woman, I am so satisfied with whatever chance puts in my way. . . ." See P. Roy, "Antisthenes' Affairs with Athenian Women: Xenophon, Symposium iv, 38." Liverpool Classical Monthly 10 ( 1985), pp. 132-133. 27. An essential characteristic of the pícaro, that is, the rascal or rogue, is his incapacity to love. Hence the Spanish proverb, "elpícaro no ama." A review of the main character of any novela picaresca, like El lazarillo de Tormes, reveals the truth inherent in this proverb. It is said that Cervantes wanted to write a novel, perhaps on the scale of

-75Don Quijote, on the life and adventures of Ginés de Pasamonte. In the end, however, the great writer abandoned his project, because Ginés was a pícaro, that is, a man without heart, and therefore a man about whom there was nothing important to say or write. 28. J. Bernays, Lucian und die Kyniker ( Berlin: Verlag von Wilhelm Harts, 1879). Bernays stresses the almost mystical religiosity that lies at the heart of Cynicism. 29. This battle may be the one described by Thucydides ( IV, 90ff.) between the Athenians and the Boeotians at Delium ( 424/423 B.C.) Or the battle at Tanagra in Boeotia ( 427/426 B.C.), also reported by him ( III, 91). 30. For an examination of Lucian's testimony, see Bernays, Lucian und die Kyniker. 31. A. M. Harmon, Lucian with an English Translation by A. M. Harmon ( Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972), Vol. 5, p. 1. 32. "Cynique," in Encyclopédie ou Dictionnaire Raisonné des Sciences, des Arts et des Métiers. Compiled and edited by D. Diderot D. Diderot ( Paris, 1754), Vol. 4, p. 599. 33. According to Schopenhauer, "no one can alter his own peculiar individuality, his moral character, his intellectual capacity, his temperament or physique" ( Complete Essays. Translated by T. Saunders [ New York: Wiley Book Co., 1942], Book 2, p. 62). For a study of Schopenhauer's character determinism, see L. E. Navia, "Schopenhauer's Concept of Character." The Journal of Critical Analysis 5 ( 1974), pp. 85-91. 34. G. H. Lewes, The Biographical History of Philosophy from Its Origins in Greece to the Present Day ( New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1883), Vol. 1, p. 177. 35. For comments on Gorgias, see G. B. Kerferd, The Sophistic Movement ( London: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 44-45. 36. H. D. Rankin, "Irony and Logic: The άντιλέγειν Paradox and Antisthenes' Purpose," L'Antiquité Classique 43 ( 1974), pp. 316-320. 37. This possibility has been rejected by A. Patzer in his "Antisthenes der Sokratiker." He maintains that there is no reason to accept as historical a stage of Antisthenes' life in which we can speak of him as a Sophistical rhetorician: "The Presocratic Antisthenes never existed" (p. 248). 38. For a detailed study of the relationship between the Sophists and Socrates, see L. E. Navia, The Socratic Presence: A Study of the Sources ( New York: Garland Publishing, 1993), especially chaps. 6 and 7. 39. The suggestion has been advanced that the performance of Aristophanes' Clouds in 423 B.C. coincided with what has been called ' Socrates' conversion', his transformation from the Sophistical and natural philosopher into the philosopher with whom we are acquainted in Plato's and Xenophon's writings. It has also been suggested that Aristophanes' Clouds could have been the catalytic agent of his 'conversion'. Such is the thesis developed by L. E. Navia in The Socratic Presence. Comments on the subject are also found in J. Ferguson, "On the Date of Socrates' Conversion." Eranos ( 1964), pp. 70-73.

40. G. X. Santas, Socrates: Philosophy in Plato's Early Dialogues ( Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979), p. 3. 41. Anytus is known from Xenophon Hellenica ( II, iii, 42-44). He was a democrat who successfully fought against the Thirty in 404 B.C. For a review of the evidence of Anytus as the prosecutor of Socrates, see W. Aly, "Anytos, der Ankläger des Sokrates." Neue Jahrbücher für klassische Altertum 31 ( 1913), pp. 169-193. -7642. Such is the interpretation of K. Popper in The Open Society and Its Enemies ( New York: Harper-Torchbooks, 1963). 43. " Antisthène, in Dictionnaire des Sciences Philosophiques. Edited by A. Franck . Paris: Librairie Hachette, 1885, p. 76. 44. L. Chestov, "Sola fide, Philosophie grecque et philosoplue médiévale." Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie 7 ( 1957), pp. 81-94. 45. "Antisthène," in Dictionnaire des Sciences Philosophiques, Edited by A. Franck , p. 76. 46. J. Ferrater Mora, "Cyniques et stoïciens." Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 62 ( 1957), p. 23. 47. Zeller has called attention to the religious aspects of the activities of the Academy. See E. Zeller, Outlines of the History of Greek Philosophy. Translated by L. R. Palmer ( London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1948), p. 119. 48. F. M. Comford has created a fictional scene in which Socrates appears before the Nocturnal Council (proposed in Plato Laws) to be judged, just as he was by an Athenian jury: "Plato's Commonwealth," in The Unwritten Philosophy and Other Essays. Edited by W. K.C. Guthrie ( Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), pp. 47-67. 49. F. Sayre, "Antisthenes the Socratic." The Classical Journal 43 ( 1948), pp. 237-244. 50. G. J. de Vries, Antisthenes redivivus: Popper's Attack on Plato ( Amsterdam: NotthHolland Publishing Company, 1952), p. 1. De Vries argues that Popper was as unable as Amisthenes to understand Plato's idealistic political program. 51. D. R. Dudley, A History of Cynicism from Diogenes to the 6th Century A.D. ( Ares Publishers Inc., 1980), p. 208. 52. Dudley, A History of Cynicism, pp. 1-2. 53. See G. Focardi, "Antistene declamatore. L'Aiace e l'Ulisse alle origini della retorica greca." Sileno 13 ( 1987), pp. 147-173. 54. See F. Dümmler, "Zum Herakles des Antisthenes." Philologus 50 ( 1891), pp. 288-296. 55. For a discussion on Antisthenes' rhetoric, see R. Laurenti, "L'iponoia di Antistene." Rivista Critica di Storia della Filosofia 17 ( 1962), pp. 123-132. 56. J. Tate maintains that the fact that Antisthenes drew a 'moral' from mythological tales does not convert him into an advocate of an allegorical reading of the poets. See Tate

"Antisthenes Was Not an Allegorist." Eranos 51 ( 1953), pp. 14-22. 57. W. K.C. Guthrie, The Sophists ( Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 248ff. 58. "Antisthenes accepts the existence of only one God who is infinitely removed from human beings, and who is, for this reason, absolutely incomprehensible" ( Laurenti, "L'iponoia di Antistene," p. 124). 59. There are numerous studies on Antisthenes' logic, for instance, C. M. Gillespie , "The Logic of Antisthenes," Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 26 ( 1913), pp. 479-500; . La filosofia del ibid., 27 ( 1914), pp. 17-38; and A. Brancacci. Οἰκ∈ι+ liguaggio di Antistene ( Naples: Bibliopolis, 1990). 60. H. D. Rankin, "Antisthenes a 'Near-Logician'?" L'Anntiquité Classique 39 -77( 1970), pp. 522-527. 61. G. M.A. Grube, "Antisthenes Was No Logician." Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association 81 ( 1950), pp. 16-27. 62. D. Henne, "Cynique (École)," in Dictionnaire des Sciences Philosophiques ( Paris: Librairie Hachette, 1885), pp. 334-335. 63. H. D. Rankin, "That It Is Impossible to Say 'Not' and Related Topics in Antisthenes." International Logic Review 10 ( 1979), pp. 51-98. 64. See G. Vaccarino, "L'origine della logica." Scientia 55 ( 1961), pp. 103-109. 65. Chappuis, Antisthène, pp. 153-154. 66. Rankin, "Antisthenes a 'Near-Logician'," p. 527. 67. This idea is defended by Guthrie in The Sophists, pp. 209ff. and 304ff. 68. For a discussion of this issue, see G. Binder and L. Liesenborghs, "Eine Zuweisung der Sentenz οὐκ ἐστιν α+ντιλέγ∈ιν an Prodikos von Keos." Museum Helveticum 23 ( 1966), pp. 37-43. 69. J. Swift, Gulliver's Travels ( New York: The Heritage Press, 1940), p. 264. 70. For an examination of Antisthenes' view of definition, see A. Brancacci, Οἰκ∈ι+ . La filosofia del linguaggio di Antistene ( Naples: Bibliopolis, 1990). 71. L. François, "L'Hippias Major." Revue des Études Grecques 32 ( 1919), pp. LIII-LIV. François regards the Hippias Major as an authentic dialogue and contends that its direction and style can be appreciated if one assumes that its purpose is to demonstrate that the logical conclusions reached by Antisthenes are void and empty. 72. The comparison between Antisthenes and Hobbes has not been overlooked by some scholars. See, for instance, C. M. Gillespie, "The Logic of Antisthenes." Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 26 ( 1913), pp. 479-500; ibid., 27 ( 1914), pp. 17-38.

73. G. Rodier, "Antisthenes," in Études de philosophie grecque ( Paris: J. Vrin, 1927), pp. 25-36. 74. Y. Roucaute, "Antisthène," in Dictionnaire des Philosophes ( Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1984), Vol. 1, pp. 96-98, recognizes the link between Antisthenes' theory of language and the ethics of Cynicism. A. J. Festugière, "Antisthenica." Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques 26 ( 1932), pp. 345375, considers the relationship between Antisthenes' logic and his ethics an issue that cannot be settled. 75. Roucaute, "Antisthène," p. 97. 76. T. Gomperz, Greek Cynics: A History of Ancient Philosophy. Translated by G. G. Berry ( London: John Murray, 1964), Vol. 2, p. 150. 77. J. Ferrater Mora speaks of lucidity as the distinguishing mark of the Cynics. He recognizes in Cynicism an existential reaction to a human world that was in a state of collapse. Cynicism, he says, is a crisis solution through which certain philosophers, like Antisthenes and Diogenes, sought to survive intellectually and morally in a time of a social cataclysm. See in this regard his "Cyniques et stoïciens." Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 62 ( 1957), pp. 20-36. 78. Critias was one of the Thirty who ruled Athens in 404 B.C. His Sisyphus expounded a rationalistic theory of the origins of the belief in the gods. 79. A. Camus, Essais ( Paris: Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, 1965), p. 425. 80. For a discussion of the relationship between the idea of discipline and Antisthenes' rationalism, see A. Brancacci, "Askesis e Logos nella tradizione cinica." -7880. Elenchos 8 ( 1987), pp. 443ff. 81. See H. Funke, "Antisthenes bei Paulus." Hermes98 ( 1970), pp. 459-471. 82. For comments on this Antisthenean statement, see G. Glotz, Histoire Grecque ( Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1941), Vol. 3, pp. 423ff. 83. For a discussion of the role of love in Socrates' philosophy and personality, see L. E. Navia, The Socratic Presence: A Study of the Sources ( New York: Garland Publishing, 1993), pp. 259ff. 84. A. Brancacci, "Érotique et théorie du plaisir chez Antisthène," in Le Cynisme et ses prolongements. Actes du Colloque International du CNRS ( Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1993), p. 48. 85. Chappuis, Antisthène, p. 107. 86. This point is argued by L. Chestov in his "Sola tide, Philosophie grecque et philosophic médiévale." Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie 7 ( 1975), 81-94. 87. A. Comte-Sponville, Valeur et vérité. Études cyniques ( Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1994), pp. 31-32.

-79CHAPTER 3 Diogenes, a Socrates Gone Mad Upon the death of Diogenes in Corinth, we are told by Diogenes Laertius that the Corinthians buried him near the gate leading to the isthmus and placed a pillar and a statue of a dog in Parian marble over his grave ( VI, 78 ). The Anthology ( i, 285) provides the text of the epitaph engraved on the pillar: Εἰφέ, κύον, τίνος α+ ἐϕ∈ +μα ϕυλάσσ∈ις; Του+ . α+ ἠ +τος α+ ὁ Κύων; Διογένης. γένος ∈ ἰπέ. Σινωπύς. ὃς πίθον ὡ+κι; Κ , νυ+ ἰ+κον ἕχι. (Tell me, Oh Dog!, who is the man whose monument thou art guarding? He is no one but the Dog Himself! But who could have been this man, the Dog Himself? Diogenes, indeed! And what is his place of origin? He was a man from Sinope. He who used to live in a tub? Yes, indeed, he himself! But now, in his death, he lives among the stars! 1 The site of the grave is confirmed by Pausanias, who observes that "as you go up to the hill of Corinth there are several tombs on the sides of the road, and at the gate is buried Diogenes of Sinope, whom the Greeks nickname the Cynic" ( II, ii, 4 ). 2 The Anthology (xvi, 334) also includes the text of an epitaph inscribed by the inhabitants of Sinope in honor of Diogenes: Even bronze groweth old with time, but thy fame, Diogenes, not all Eternity shall take away. For thou alone didst point out to mortals the lesson of self-sufficiency, and the path for the best and easiest life. From the Anthology, too, we have the text of this epigram: "Oh Ferryman of the Dead, receive Diogenes the Dog, who laid bare the whole pretentiousness of life." -81The Corinthian and Sinopean epitaphs are significant, in that they reveal the admiration felt by many towards the famous Cynic. The reference to his living among the stars appears in one of the fragments of Cercidas, who speaks of Diogenes as "a true-born son of Zeus, a hound of heaven" (Frag. 54). 3 This epigram sums up what the ancients viewed as the Celestial Dog's greatest contribution: his laying bare the pretentiousness of human life. Few philosophers have enjoyed the fame of Diogenes, a fame that "not all eternity shall take away." His name has been mentioned countless times and in varied contexts, and the anecdotes about him and the apophthegms attributed to him have been repeated ad infinitum, learned by school children and studied and dissected by scholars. Who does not identify the bearded and bent philosopher who, carrying a lighted lamp in daylight, searched in vain for a man among the multitude? Who can fail to recognize the eccentric Greek who, surrounded by

dogs, lived placidly in a tub? Who has never heard of the insolent man who asked Alexander the Great to step out of his sunlight, as he was warming himself on a cold winter morning? The iconography of Diogenes of Sinope is probably the most extensive of that of all the philosophers of classical times. 4 M. C. Hellmann notes that "the out-of-the-norm personality of Diogenes impressed so much the ancients that he became the object of many artistic representations." 5 We find his face and figure in a great number of artistic works such as statues, busts, funeral decorations, medallions, coins, paintings, graffiti drawings, and other forms of art. Sometimes he is represented standing alone, or at other times accompanied by a dog, or lying in his tub, or meddling with the affairs of others in the Athenian Agora, or, as in Raphael School of Athens, reclining disdainfully below the imposing figures of Plato and Aristotle. In every instance, he is not difficult to identify, and neither archaeologists nor historians of art have had any difficulty in recognizing him. His personality, aptly referred to by Hellmann as "out-of-thenorm," is unforgettable and distinct, for he was, possibly in more ways than any other famous person of the Western past, an out-of-the-norm man. His physiognomy may have been less striking than that of Socrates. but in his behavior and demeanor, and in his thought and style of life, he exhibited traits and characteristics that are difficult, if not impossible, to find anywhere. He stands out as the exceptional man, as the Nietzschean philosopher who lives beyond good and evil. a man who constantly experiences, sees, suspects, hopes, and dreams extraordinary things; who is struck by his own thoughts as if they came from the outside, from above and below, as a species of events and lightning-flashes peculiar to him; who is perhaps himself a storm pregnant with new lightnings; a portentous man, around whom there is always rumbling and mumbling and gaping and something uncanny going on. 6 As one reviews the literature about Diogenes, one is impressed by its variety. One finds him in scholarly journals and monographs, in encyclopedia -82and dictionary entries, in popular accounts and works of fiction, in plays and poems, in children's tales, in newspaper editorials and commentaries, and in other forms of expression. Somehow, the presence of Diogenes the Cynic tends to reappear even in the most unexpected places, as if his strange personality and his bizarre ideas were a constant temptation for all those who find the world at large to be mostly unacceptable, or who are at war with one of its many unfortunate aspects. Somehow, the man in the tub who searched in vain for a man, who spoke with disdain to Alexander, who referred to people as "creatures-less-thanhuman," who shocked everyone by his praises of cannibalism and incest, who tried to escape from existence by holding his breath--this man, Diogenes the Cynic, lives secretly in the recesses of our own uneasy consciousness, as if he were a last recourse in impossible situations or a living reminder of the senselessness of the pretensions of human existence. Honored by many as a philosophical saint, praised by others as a great philosopher, examined by scholars and historians as a baffling anthropological curiosity, ridiculed by others as a fool and a crazed man, condemned still by others as a moral aberration and a perverse character, Diogenes has managed to remain alive for twenty-four centuries as a unique and strange phenomenon in the history of philosophy, and as a refutation of the transitory truths by which most of us manage to live.

Who was, then, this peculiar man who learned philosophy at the feet of Antisthenes and from whom classical Cynicism emerged?" What do we know about him, and what sense are we to make of the anecdotes and reports about him that have come down to us through the centuries? Should he be enthroned as a thinker whose "thoughts are beautiful, and very worthy of admiration and imitation"? 7 Or should he be viewed as "a 'Zen man', eccentric in his ways yet fundamental in his thought, vastly irritable yet suffocatingly funny, magnetic yet repulsive, a regal vagabond who was somehow in charge of the truth?" 8 Or should he be regarded as an idealistic rebel who "pisses against the wind," 9 a sort of "Socrates gone mad" (by his own admission)? Or should we dismiss him as a philosophical scandal, bitter, brutal, ostentatious, and abstemious; disgracing the title of "The Dog" (for a dog has affection, gratitude, sympathy, and caressing manners), yet growling over his unenvied virtue as a cur growls over his meatless bone, forever snarling and snapping without occasion?" 10 10 What, then, shall we make of him? Shall we refer to him as "one of the most original and spiritual human beings who have ever existed"? 11 Was Diogenes one of those who, as Nietzsche described the Cynics. simply recognize the animal, the commonplace, and 'the rule' in themselves, and at the same time still have that degree of spirituality and that itch which makes them talk of themselves and their likes before witnesses --sometimes they even wallow in books, as on their own dung? 12 We are at the mercy of the sources, and these, although more abundant -83than those which allow us to have a glimpse of Antisthenes, contain areas of obscurity and uncertainty. The sources attribute many writings to Diogenes. In Diogenes Laertius ( VI, 80 ), thirteen dialogues are listed, together with a collection of letters and seven tragedies. But we are also told that Sosicrates of Rhodes in his Successions maintained that Diogenes left no writings, and that, therefore, all his alleged works are spurious. Satyrus of Callatis Pontica, Diogenes Laertius adds, argued that the tragedies were not written by Diogenes but by a Cynic named Philiscus of Aegina. Furthermore, the biographer mentions Sotion's view that only some of the dialogues and the letters can be attributed to Diogenes. But be it as it may, none of the works listed by Diogenes Laertius is extant, and only fragments have come down to us. We have a summary of his Republic from Philodemus of Gadara, a philosopher of the first century B.C., in his On the Stoic Philosophers. 13 but even though from this summary, we can gather an idea concerning Diogenes' proposal for a utopian State, this is not equivalent to having at our disposal the original work or significant fragments from it. Our wealthiest source of information about Diogenes is the biography written by Diogenes Laertius. 14 In this valuable work, we come across the bulk of anecdotes and reports through which we have become acquainted with Diogenes. It includes also a summary of his philosophical principles, and makes abundant use of older, mostly non-extant sources. Diogenes' life, personality, and ideas appear in a variety, of ancient sources not mentioned or used by Diogenes Laertius. He is found in Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius, Dio Chrysostom and Lucian, the Fathers of the Church, and countless other sources, some of which may be

identified as non-Greek, as in the case of Arabic gnomologics of early medieval times. 15 Thus, it appears at first that we should not be at a loss as to where to find information about him. But the problem is not the paucity of the sources, but the bewildering and conflicting bits of information that they provide. Consequently, and paradoxically, the sheer volume of information seems to hinder us in the task of reconstructing his life and ideas. Also, the fact that most of that information comes to us in the form of anecdotes and apophthegms, as well as the circumstance that most of the reports disclose a biased inclination either in favor of the great Cynic or against him, create special problems in our endeavor to separate fact from fiction. The only facts about Diogenes that can be affirmed are these: (1) that his place of origin was Sinope, a Milesian colony on the southern coast of the Black Sea; (2) that he travelled to Athens and to Corinth, where he lived for a number of years; (3) that he was an older contemporary of Alexander the Great; and (4) that at some point he became known as 'the Dog'. Beyond these four facts it is unwise to affirm anything with certainty. There are other reported details about him, but their historical basis is unstable. In the fifth century B.C., Sinope was a flourishing Ionian city of eastern Greece. The town of Sinop in contemporary, northern Turkey, with its 20,000 -84inhabitants, located on the eastern side of a promontory at the center of the southern Turkish coast of the Black Sea, is the descendant of the Greek Sinope where Diogenes was born. Founded by Milesian pioneers early in the eighth century B.C., Sinope played an important role in the maritime affairs of the Greeks. Ships moving eastward or westward would normally set anchor in its harbor, and transportation to and from mainland Greece was an easy and ordinary matter. After the year 375 B.C., Sinope fell into the hands of the Persians, who controlled its affairs through various satraps, until it succeeded in recapturing and maintaining its independence under Alexander and his successors. In the latter part of the fifth century, its population was mostly Greek, as were its language and customs. There were the expected shrines and sanctuaries of the Greek gods and heroes, a theater, a market place, a gymnasium, fortifications, and other manifestations of Hellenism found in every other Greek citystate, some vestiges of which are still visible today (e.g., the foundations of the temple of Serapis built during Diogenes' time). Already in the fourth century B.C., its coinage circulated freely throughout Greek and non-Greek lands. That Diogenes was born in Sinope seems to be an incontestable fact, if nothing else, because there are no contradictory reports in the sources. He is invariably referred to as Diogenes of Sinope'. Concerning the date of his birth there is no certainty, except for the fact that he was an older contemporary of Alexander ( 356-323 B.C.). Suidas informs us that he was born at the time of the fall of the Thirty in Athens, that is, in the latter part of the year 404 B.C. If, however, this late date is accepted, certain problems rise to the surface, for instance, one in relation to the report that his name was already known as early as the year 396 B.C. in connection with the defacing or counterfeiting of Sinopean currency. If he was born in 404 B.C., then we would be in the unlikely presence of an eight-year-old child involved in some currency matter. 16 Thus, it might prove to be more sensible to push back the date of his birth to before 404 B.C., that is, at least to the year 413 B.C.

The date of his death is also uncertain. Suidas reports that he died in 323 B.C. on precisely the same day as Alexander. Such a coincidence, although possible, cannot but arouse feelings of suspicion. The relationship between the young emperor, a man full of splendor and the conqueror of many lands, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the mendicant and aged philosopher, who lived in poverty and simplicity--this relationship is a theme amply exploited in antiquity, no less than in modern times, as a subject worthy of much attention. 17 What could have been more appropriate for ancient biographers and reporters than to have them descend into Hades at the very same time? We can, then, assign the years 413-323 B.C. for the dates of Diogenes as reasonable parameters. One problem, however, that any such assignment creates is related to the variety of ages at which Diogenes is reported to have died. Diogenes Laertius ( VI, 76 ) notes, for example, that Diogenes was nearly ninety years old when he died. Censorinus ( De die natalixv, 2 ) makes him eighty-one years old, and other ages are suggested by other sources. If the year -85of his death is set at 323 B.C., then the year of his birth could fall between 415 and 404 B.C. In reality, we do not know, although we can affirm that upon his death, he was a man advanced in years and a recognized philosophical figure. Most reports mention Corinth as the place of his death. Diogenes Laertius ( VI, 77 ) indicates that at the time of his death, Diogenes was living in Corinth in a gymnasium known as 'the Craneum', and that the Corinthians honored his tomb with a marble statue of a dog and an inscription. The manner of his death presents certain difficulties because of the variety of divergent reports. These reports should be interpreted more as pieces of symbolic fiction that capture some element of Diogenes' life and personality than as journalistic accounts. 18 We hear, for instance, that he died by holding his breath or by selfasphyxiation ( D. L. VI, 76), as Cercidas noted in one of his poems: "He soared aloft with his lip tightly pressed against his teeth and holding his breath withal." Other reports describe his death as having resulted from eating a raw octopus, or from chewing the raw foot of an ox, or from being bitten by a dog in a dispute between him and the dog over the raw octopus, or from a fever caught on the eve of his departure to attend the Olympic games. Diogenes Laertius does not tell us which version he prefers, but the fact that he composed some poetic lines based on one of the versions leaves no doubt as to his preference: -- Diogenes, come and tell me, what fate took you to the world below? -- The savage tooth of a dog! Most appropriate indeed for the Celestial Dog to have been dispatched to Hades by the bite of an ordinary dog! Setting aside, however, what might be fiction, we could rest content with the more prosaic account of his dying of a fever, although the version of self-asphyxiation could be more tempting, if it were possible to commit suicide in that fashion. Sometimes even the most trifling inconvenience or the slightest provocation would send a Cynic to his death--by suicide. Menippus, for instance, having fallen into some financial bind, hanged himself. Metrocles is reported to have died by holding his breath, as did Zeno of Citium, the founder of Stoicism. Others did it by self-starvation, both among the Cynics and among the Stoics. Still others, like Peregrinus, burned themselves. Suicide was ingrained in the Cynic tradition,

and, through it, came to be a part of the Stoic way of departing from this world. A passage from Seneca ( De ira i, 15 ) comes to mind in this regard, a passage with which any Cynic would have felt perfectly at home: I will not relinquish old age if it leaves my better part intact. But if it begins to shake my mind, if it destroys my faculties one by one, if it leaves me not life but breath, I will depart from the putrid edifice. If I know that I must suffer without hope of relief, I will depart not through fear of the pain itself, but because it prevents all for which I would live. And then we have a statement from Epictetus ( Discourses I, ix, 16 ): "If the room is smoky, if only moderately, I will stay; if there is too much smoke, I will go. -86Remember this, keep a firm hold on it, the door is always open." There are statements attributed to Socrates by Xenophon that rehearse the same suicidal notes played by the Cynics and the Stoics. 19 The example of Socrates' death, and perhaps his ideas about suicide, as these were interpreted by Xenophon, might have impelled both Cynics and Stoics to end their lives at 'the right time'. Diogenes' disciples, we are told, understood well this notion of 'the right time', and did not doubt even for a moment that their teacher had chosen to die ( D. L. VI, 77), There is a moving comment in Diogenes Laertius ( VI, 76 ) that should not be left unquoted: When his friends came according to custom and found him wrapped up in his cloak, they thought that he must be asleep, although he was by no means of a drowsy or somnolent habit. They therefore drew aside his cloak and found that he was dead. There are conflicting reports concerning his final place of rest. He apparently cared little or nothing about it, for when Xeniades, the Corinthian who bought him as a slave, asked him where and how he should be buried, he replied jokingly, "On my face, because whatever is down goes up after a while" ( D. L. VI, 31). He was as careless about this matter as Socrates was. When asked by Crito what should be done with his body, Socrates' reply was, "Do with it whatever you please" (Phaedo 115d). Diogenes may have been buried by the Corinthians in the tomb over which a statue of a dog was placed, or he could have been thrown out of the city and been left unburied so that wild animals could feast on his corpse, or been dumped in a ditch and sprinkled with dust, or thrown into the river Ilissus, these last three options being his own predilections. Between his birth in Sinope and his death, Diogenes appears to have undergone a series of experiences, some of which seem to have led him inexorably to his transformation into a Cynic. Unlike Antisthenes, he traveled extensively, and various places are mentioned in his itinerary: Sinope, Athens, Corinth, Delphi, Delos, Aegina, Sparta, Olympia, and Crete, among others. Athens and Corinth, however, are said to be have been his accustomed places of residence. Three important incidents are repeatedly mentioned by the sources: his forced departure from Sinope, his visit to the Delphic oracle, and his capture by pirates in the Aegean Sea. The first two of these deserve careful consideration, since they provide the context in which we can begin to understand his mission.

, a banker ( VI, 1 ). What has been assumed to be his father's name is found as IKEΣIO on numerous Sinopean coins minted between 360 and 320 B.C. 20 The designation of Hicesias as 'a banker' needs some clarification. By 'banker' we mean in this context a person in charge of the issuing of the currency of a city. Among the Greeks, it was customary for a city to issue its own currency in coins made of metal or some other material. These coins would circulate freely not only in the city of issuance, but in other places as well, so that, for instance, it was common to find Athenian coins in circulation -87in places as remote as Egypt or Persia, as numismatic evidence clearly shows. There are at least five different versions of the story involving Diogenes and his father with the issuance of Sinopean currency, and the commentaries on them are numerous, for there are few stories from classical antiquity to which so much attention has been given. All the versions and variations of the story involve in one way or another the idea of counterfeiting, a term which can be understood in various senses: (1) to counterfeit or fabricate false currency; (2) to change the 'character' or inscription of circulating coins; and (3) to blunder the stamping of a coin, so as to produce a bad impression for the purpose of rendering it valueless. 21 In whatever sense we understand the word, we must realize that we are dealing with an illegal act punishable by exile or in some other way. Here, then, are some of the versions: (1) Diogenes is employed in the Sinopean mint under the supervision of Hicesias, his father. The youth decides to counterfeit, deface, or falsify, the currency. His action is discovered and he is banished from Sinope. (2) It is Hicesias himself who falsifies the currency, for which reason he is put in prison, while his son Diogenes flees from the city. (3) Diogenes is the one who falsifies the currency, and both he and his father are exiled from Sinope. (4) Diogenes, who is in charge of the mint. is persuaded by men working under him to falsify the currency; he does so, and is, therefore, banished. (5) Hicesias entrusts Diogenes with the task of minting the currency, and the son proceeds to falsify it. With these and other versions, moreover, an incident involving the oracle either at Delphi or at Delos is often connected. Either before the falsification of the currency or after it, Diogenes travels to , that is, "Falsify (or, depending on our choice of meaning, counterfeit, alter, or deface) the currency." If the oracle is thought to precede the act of falsifying the currency, then we can visualize the young Diogenes rushing back home to do precisely what Apollo commanded; if, on the other hand, the pronouncement is understood to have occurred after the act, then we can imagine that, taken aback by the oracular words, Diogenes endeavored to make sense of them in some way or another in order to reorient his life, just as Socrates did when he heard from Chaerophon the Apollonian statement about his wisdom. The scholarly and popular literature to which these two incidents have given rise is understandably significant. Surely, the falsification of currency by someone in charge of the state mint is always a scandalous act, and if we add to it the report of some divine pronouncement about it, then the act becomes a sensational event. As can be expected, moreover, the range of interpretations of these 'events' in the life of Diogenes has been varied

and wide. Extensive numismatic research, for instance, has been undertaken, beginning with the work of J. Babelon, and continued by the investigations of T. Reinach, C. T. Seltman -88and H. Bannert, 22 among others. This research has brought to light a number of incontrovertible facts: for instance, during the fourth century B.C., particularly between the years 360 and 320 B.C., a number of defaced or adulterated Sinopean coins, as well as numerous undamaged ones, bear the name of Diogenes' father. Also, as Seltman has shown, large quantities of false or counterfeited coins of Persian origin were in circulation in Sinope towards the middle of the century, some of which appear to have been defaced. These are facts that are as firmly established as numismatic scholarship can allow. Still, these facts do not shed light on the specific circumstances surrounding Diogenes' alleged participation in the alteration of Sinopean currency, and still less on the reported oracle about him. They do, however, strengthen the basis of the story concerning his father's role as the chief officer of the Sinopean mint and possibly concerning his assumed participation in some type of currency alteration. Perhaps, as Seltman suggests, Hicesias sought to put out of circulation large numbers of genuine and counterfeited Persian coins by defacing them with a chisel. With the accession to power of a pro-Persian political party about the time of his defacing of the coins, Hicesias' fate changed for the worse: he was either banished or imprisoned for having undermined the political strength of the Persians. But what about Diogenes? Perhaps he, too, was punished and exiled. If, however, his exile is placed around the year 350 B.C., as Seltman does, then his association with Antisthenes in Athens turns out to be questionable, since it is unlikely that Antisthenes was alive as late as 350 B.C. 23 Still, it remains possible that Hicesias' connection with the Sinopean mint could have antedated even by one or two decades the earliest year of any of the known coins that bear his name or of any of the known defaced coins. There are, moreover, reports that link Diogenes himself with some problem connected with currency as early as the first decade of the fourth century B.C., and thus his leaving Sinope does not have to be placed as late as Seltman and Dudley insist. If he abandoned his homeland even as late as 370 B.C., then his association with Antisthenes becomes a probable historical fact. But in this respect, just as much as in every other aspect of Diogenes' life, we are really in the dark. The allegations are many, the reports innumerable, but the verifiable facts very few. Ultimately we do not know what his part in the alteration or defacing of Sinopean currency was, nor can we fix a firm set of parameters for his departure from Sinope. What we do know, however, is that at some point he did leave the southern coast of the Black Sea and traveled west to Athens. We also know something else with certainty, and that is that already during his lifetime, he was associated with the alteration of currency, although the nature of the 'currency' that he sought to alter is a matter of diverse interpretations. The most common interpretation in modern literature would lead us to the conclusion that both in the stories about Diogenes and the Sinopean currency, and in the reports concerning the oracle, we come upon a classic example of the process by which a legend is created in order to account for certain acknowledged facts and doctrines associated with a famous person. Ancient biographies -89-

are filled with examples of such a process. Thus, for instance, Pythagoras, as Iamblichus reports ( The Life of Pythagoras2), was believed to have been begotten by God, a belief that was useful in accounting for his obviously great intellectual and spiritual endowments: a man so extraordinary and impressive could not have proceeded from two human parents. Socrates' mother, a woman named Phaenarete, is said to have been a midwife ( Theaetetus149a), that is, a woman who, while not giving birth to children herself, aided women in the process of childbirth, which is in a metaphorical way precisely what Socrates did: while he did not give birth to ideas, he was instrumental in helping others conceive thoughts and notions, as he tells us in Plato's testimony ( Theaetetus 149a-151e). Again, in the context of Socrates, an oracle declared him to be the wisest of men because he alone recognized the limitations of human knowledge, and because he confessed repeatedly that he knew hardly anything and believed that God alone is truly wise ( Plato, Apology21a ff.). Other illustrations can be adduced along these lines, in which a legend emerges in an anecdotal way in order to support and elucidate certain well attested facts and circumstances concerning a famous person. Thus, in the case of Diogenes' affair with the Sinopean currency and the Apollonian oracle about him, we may be in the presence of an instance of the phenomenon of legend formation. 24 All that we need is the right ingredients for the fabrication of a good legend: the probable fact that Diogenes' father had something to do with the Sinopean mint, Diogenes' own unexplained departure from Sinope, his possible visit to the Delphic oracle in order to ask for divine guidance, and a life devoted to the alteration or defacing of the moral and social 'currency' in circulation among his contemporaries. Out of these and other ingredients, then, the legend of Diogenes' alteration of actual currency, his exile for this crime, and Apollo's statement about him, neatly emerge as biographical 'facts'. Those scholars and hi ).The meaning of the legend, therefore, must be interpreted allegorically, as it merely points in a certain direction. What the alleged Pythian statement about Diogenes' 'alteration or defacing' of the currency means is simply this: "Test or re-strike all current usages and views to see if they are genuine; if they are, make them part of your own life," 25 and if they are not, throw them away and produce your own values. The alteration and defacing of 'currency' on Diogenes' part is for us a way of visualizing his actualization of the injunction that expresses in three words the essence of his moral mission. , so critical in any attempt to shed light on Diogenes' philosophical activities, gains in meaning and precision once its symbolic and metaphorical tenor is grasped, for it then conveys succinctly what the classical Cynic, as a cultural stereotype represented by Diogenes, sought to accomplish, namely, the rejection of all established bourgeois norms 26 and the introduction of values based on the pursuit of virtue. The -90designates customs, values, and conventions. 27 And it is true that the most distinctive 'fact' of Diogenes' biography and philosophy is his uncompromising stance of rebelliousness against the world at large. As soon as his figure enters the field of historical notice, he emerges as the defacer or destroyer par excellence of the Western world. Not one word from him, not an act or action on his part, can be interpreted

in any other way except as an effort to tear down the structure and the trimmings of his social world. Thus, the avalanche of anecdotes and apophthegms that even before his death began to , for which reason it is easy to conclude that many among such anecdotes and apophthegms were fabricated for the purpose of lending support to Diogenes' exclusive purpose. 28 'Facts', then, may have been liberally invented in order to embellish and give substance to such a purpose. There is even the possibility that the story of Diogenes' connection with the defacing of the currency may have been invented by himself as a means to create an understandable way for others to grasp the direction of his philosophical activities. Such an 'invention' may have first emerged in the context of his work Pordalus, where, as Diogenes Laertius notes ( VI, 20 ), he spoke in unambiguous terms about his part in the affair. The Delphic oracle, too, could have been 'invented' by Diogenes himself. His exile from Sinope, therefore, if it was an actual exile, could have been occasioned by factors unrelated to any currency affair, possibly as a consequence of the accession to power of a Persian satrap named Datames between 370 and 365 B.C. But this possibility constitutes a mere supposition for which no substantive evidence can be adduced. 29 The uncertain character of the testimonies should not compel us to dismiss as fiction or fabrication every biographical detail reported about Diogenes, for this would represent an unjustifiable attitude that would ignore, among other things, the fact that one of the salient features of Cynicism, what distinguishes the Cynics from other philosophers, is its conviction that ideas and beliefs cannot be defined or explained in general terms, but can best be communicated through the agency of living examples. The Cynic's life was the main textbook of ethics that he bequeathed to posterity. Thus, Diogenes taught by the example of his words and actions. Accordingly, it is not reasonable to conceive of the multitudes of anecdotes and apophthegms attributed to him as merely moralistic and symbolic inventions created by biographers to enrich his philosophical views. That enrichment was already taken care of by Diogenes himself by acting in certain ways and saying certain things. Surely, we must allow for an element of literary fabrication on the part of the biographers, as well as a generous dosage of exaggeration and distortion, for which Diogenes appears to have lent himself as an excellent subject. His exhibitionist behavior and unrestrained freedom of speech could have only been a temptation for exaggeration among those who were engaged in reporting about him. But even assuming the presence of fabrication and exaggeration, we -91must entertain the possibility that many of the anecdotes and apophthegms attributed to him may have been based on some historical deed or some real statement. This can be assumed in the context of Diogenes' affair with the Sinopean currency and the Delphic oracle about him. The numismatic evidence alone is sufficient to presuppose a historical basis for some connection between Diogenes and the defacing of Sinopean currency. 30 Hypothetically, the early life of Diogenes could have run along these or similar lines: he is born in Sinope around the year 414 B.C. Hicesias, his father, is employed in the Sinopean mint as early as 398 B.C. Diogenes, then a young man, works with his father, who, at some time or another, alters or defaces large quantities of Sinopean and Persian coins for the purpose of putting them out of circulation; this could have been for personal gain or out of some political consideration. Sometime around the year 380 B.C., both father and son are caught in the act, and while the

father is imprisoned, the son is banished. Later on in his life, Diogenes himself was willing to acknowledge his deed. The future Cynic, then, leaves his homeland, condemned by his countrymen to exile, while he himself, as he tells us, sentences them to remain in Sinope ( D. L. VI, 49). One day he would recognize that it was on account of his exile that he became a philosopher ( D. L. VI, 20), for true philosophers are sometimes forced into philosophy by the vicissitudes and tribulations of life. Diogenes could have said in his later years what, according to Plutarch ( Themistocles xxix), the great Themistocles would often repeat to his children in his old age: "My children, we would have been undone, had we not been undone." For Themistocles, too, was exiled and humiliated by his own people, but found a new and prosperous life among foreigners. Diogenes now travels to Athens and visits the oracle at Delphi, where he asks the q

that is, alter or deface the currency. The Delphic oracle had been delivering pithy answers to such questions long before the time of Diogenes, and philosophers were not strangers to such answers. Thales of Miletus, for instance, was once declared to be the wisest of men ( D. L. I, 28), as was Socrates himself, and other examples can be readily adduced. How, the Pythia was able to deliver such appropriate answers and make such pronouncements is not an easy matter to determine, and the opinions on this subject are many. 31 Possibly, the Pythia knew something beforehand about the inquiring pilgrims, and answered their questions in a way that would best suit them, 32 as often happens when psychics are consulted. It is possible that information about Diogenes' affairs in Sinope could have influenced the Pythia's answer. It could have also been a matter of coincidence. for the oracle would on occasion utter at random certain standard proverbial statements of great antiquity. There is, however, the fact that an answer such as that given to Diogenes is not found in the context of any oracle either before or after him; it was, therefore, something unique. But be it as it may, we can assume that on hearing the oracle, Diogenes -92must have felt a sense of perplexity. 33 He had participated in the defacing and adulteration of Sinopean currency, for which reason he now finds himself as an exile among strangers. What could be the hidden meaning of the Pythia's command that apparently advises him to do precisely what he did in Sinope? Could it be that God or the god approves of his criminal act and enjoins him to continue acting in the same fashion? At least one of the versions of the story suggests that the oracle anteceded Diogenes' defacing or adulteration of the Sinopean currency: he then is said to have done what he did because the oracle told him to do so. But it is more reasonable to assume the reverse, that is, that after the defacing or adulteration of the currency, Diogenes is forced to come to grips with the oracular pronouncement. His interpretation of the oracle leads him now to believe that its meaning is symbolic. The oracle takes on for him, therefore, a philosophical significance, for what he is told is not to go back to Sinope and undertake once more the defacing of coins. That belongs to his past. Diogenes Laertius reports ( VI, 56 ) that when someone once reproached Diogenes for having been a falsifier of currency, he replied that that was what he was once, not what he is now. In his youth, he was a greedy man, like most people, but now he is a philosopher, that is, a man of reason, something rarely found whether in Sinope, in Athens, or anywhere else. Thus, what

the oracle means is not that he should continue with his old habits and cater to his former desires, but that he should undertake a defacing of current human , that is, the currency, has a metaphorical meaning: it does not mean 'currency', that is, the coins that circulate in the market place: it stands for values and customs. Likewise, παραχάραττειν does not signify 'defacing with a chisel' but 'challenging', 'rejecting', 'throwing out' and 'invalidating'. Diogenes' mission is clearly defined in this way, and now he has succeeded in interpreting the enigmatic sense of the Pythia's answer. Instead of defacing or adulterating ordinary currency, Diogenes enters Athens with the express purpose of challenging and invalidating the moral and social 'currency' that circulates among people. He is ready to join what Lucian calls "the Army of the Dog." Historically, philosophically, and psychologically, the transformation of Diogenes from an exiled defacer of currency into a Cynic philosopher must have been more complex than the above account can suggest. From a historical point of view, we cannot be sure of the details, and the sequence of events is of a dubious character. Philosophically, moreover, we must rest uneasy in the presence of any explanation concerning the reason that could have led Diogenes either to interpret the oracle as he allegedly did or to declare war on the social world. To say that he did declare such a war in the name of reason is not to say very much. Lastly, from a psychological point of view, the transformation of any person into a Cynic or the emergence of Cynic tendencies in a person is a phenomenon that cannot be explained in the absence of a great deal of knowledge. Such a knowledge is mostly lacking: we know nothing about his ideas and -93way of life before he appeared in the midst of the Athenians, and when he comes into our notice, he is already a Cynic who is drawn to the company of another Cynic, Antisthenes. Of his life among the Athenians at first, and among the Corinthians subsequently, we have some information, mostly, however, in the form of anecdotes and reports, all of which, with one important exception, come from sources not contemporary with him, and which cannot be confirmed. The exception is Aristotle, who mentions him once. In the Greek text (Rhetoric 1411a24) the name of Diogenes is omitted, and all we read is that "ὁ κύων (the Dog) called taverns 'the mess-rooms of Attica'." The standard Latin translation has added the name of the philosopher: "Diogenes Cynicus autem [vocabat] cauponas 'Attica phiditia'," which is reflected in the vernacular translations, all of which include Diogenes' name. This is the oldest reference to him as a 'dog', in fact, so clearly that Aristotle did not have to add his actual name, for Diogenes had become known since his arrival in Athens simply as 'the Dog'. Antisthenes, who called himself 'the Absolute Dog', is not referred to as a 'dog' until later on, specifically in late biographical tracts. But in the case of Diogenes, there is no doubt as to how he became known among his contemporaries. The reasons that could have led to the designation of the Cynics as 'dogs', particularly Diogenes, are spelled out in a scholium on the above-quoted line from Aristotle: There are four reasons why the Cynics are so named. First because of the indifference of their way of life, for they make a cult of indifference and, like dogs, eat and make love in public, go barefoot, and sleep in tubs and at cross-roads. The second reason is that the dog is a shameless animal, and they make a cult of shamelessness, not as being beneath modesty, but

as superior to it. The third reason is that the dog is a good guard, and they guard the tenets of their philosophy. The fourth reason is that the dog is a discriminating animal which can distinguish between its friends and enemies. So do they recognize as friends those who are suited to philosophy, and receive them kindly, while those unfitted they drive away, like dogs, by barking at them. 34 These four reasons make sense at least in the instance of Diogenes, since they include in a succinct fashion the distinguishing characteristics of his ideas and mode of life. What needs to be emphasized is what was indicated in passing in chapter 1, namely, that, at least in his context, the designation 'dog' seems to have been a derogatory and hostile one, although, as Dudley notes, 35 it might not have had all the negative connotations that it may have among us. When A. Monterroso speaks of a certain dog (an actual dog) that was once named ' Diogenes' because once the philosopher himself was called a 'dog', this word signifying "the lowest and most despicable thing that one can imagine," 36 he seems to have exaggerated the insulting nature of the word. ) in connection with the Cynics is found in a line from Menander The Twin Sisters ( D. L. VI, -9493 ), where it refers to Crates: Wearing a cloak you will go about with me, As once with Cynic Crates went his wife. . . Menander, the most famous playwright of the New Comedy, was a contemporary of Crates. There is, however, no reason to believe that Antisthenes and especially Diogenes would not , since in Greek this is the adjectival form of the noun for 'dog', and 'dog', 'doggish', and 'dog-like' are interchangeable terms when used to attribute canine characteristics to a person. But as Dudley observes, 37 it is particularly in the context of Diogenes' behavior and ideas, especially his shamelessness (άναίδεια), that the theriomorphic usage of 'dog' emerges, for which reason it is he who is often regarded as the first Cynic, that is, the original Dog. Diogenes Laertius' biography of Diogenes contains numerous allusions to dogs, and in most of them, it is the 'doggish' traits of Diogenes that are underlined. "He described himself as a hound of the sort which all men praise," says the biographer, "but no one of his admirers, he added, dared go out hunting along with him" ( VI, 33 ). Again, when Plato called him a 'dog', Diogenes replied that it was appropriate, for dogs come back to those who have sold them ( VI, 40 ). Again, there is the anecdote mentioned in chapter I in which Diogenes is described urinating on those who threw bones at him and called him a 'dog' ( VI, 46 ). There is still another in which he hurls back at those who wished to insult him their demeaning designation. On one occasion ( II, 66 ), Diogenes calls Aristippus a 'dog', more precisely, 'a royal poodle', in order to draw attention to certain unpleasant traits found in him. Other similar anecdotes abound in Diogenes Laertius, and in all of them the same theme is encountered: Diogenes has turned himself into a 'dog' and has broken his ties with the human world. He has neither wife nor children, and his friends are, if any, very few. He stands before people in the garb of an uncompromising rebel, as a thoroughly primitive man, 38 for whom the accepted values no longer have any meaning. He chooses a life of poverty and destitution,

and lives in a tub ( VI, 23 ). He aims at possessing nothing, and regards the love of money as the source of all evils ( VI, 50 ). He opts for a life of simplicity and indifference towards human conventions and customs, arguing that it is from children and animals that we should learn to live a life according to nature. He states that he has learned simplicity of life by watching the behavior of a mouse running around in the market place ( VI, 22 ), and that from a child he once learned how to drink water from his hand, without the need for a cup ( VI, 37 ). 39 He misses no opportunity to violate every rule of decency, as if he were anxious to invalidate all the norms of social decorum. If eating is seen as an act that a person should do only in the privacy of his home, Diogenes eats wherever he feels hungry, even in the middle of the market place ( VI, 58 ). He behaves indecently in the presence of many, doing things that some men do only in -95private, but he does not care, saying that he wished that it would be as easy, as rubbing his belly, to satisfy his hunger ( VI, 69 ). He takes care of his bodily functions just about wherever he chances to feel the need. He is not afraid to eat raw meat ( VI, 34 ; also in Plutarch + ς ΣαρκοΦαγίας, where he is depicted swallowing an uncooked octopus), and has no objections to the consumption of human flesh ( VI, 73 ), although in this last regard there are no testimonies that indicate that he actually ate human flesh. He dispenses with formalities and social pleasantries, and does not hesitate to spit on a certain man's face, because he finds him despicable ( VI, 32 ). He recognizes no human distinctions, and is blind to notions such as rank and social status. To him, most people are rogues and scoundrels, creatures-less-than-human, and he maintains that there are hardly any human beings in Athens or anywhere else, but lots of inhabitants. He is unable to understand why some people are slaves and others are masters. He is merciless in his condemnation of temple-keepers, whom he regards as professional thieves, who are comparable to politicians, who are also thieves ( VI, 73 ), and ridicules superstitions and popular religious beliefs as sheer nonsense ( VI, 42, 59 ). He compares lawyers to venomous spiders ( VI, 51 ), and regards women as worthless creatures ( VI, 52 ), but men, too, in his view, are just as worthless, and his best advice to those who stand in his way is simply to hang themselves. For him, athletes are invariably stupid people, which he attributes to their habit of eating too much beef ( VI, 49 ). This list of typical Cynic antics and opinions on Diogenes' part could be enlarged tenfold, especially if we were to appeal to sources other than Diogenes Laertius. Of special interest, moreover, are two areas that should be singled out: Diogenes' stance towards the political establishment, specifically as this was embodied in the laws and in rulers and despots, and his views on intellectual pursuits in general and, in particular, on Plato. Concerning the Athenian laws, his views are not secret: he feels contempt towards the process through which such laws are made, towards the lawgivers, and towards the laws themselves. Whether in the domain of sexual behavior or in any other domain, laws are meant to be broken as often as possible, for they represent a sort of false or illegitimate currency that must be defaced until it is abandoned. He sees nothing wrong in stealing, since all things, he claims, belong to the gods, and the wise (presumably Diogenes is among them) are the friends of the gods, and friends, after all, own all things in common ( D. L. VI, 72). Stealing from temples, in particular, has his unqualified approval. And, along the same lines, all laws, in particular those that restrict the person's freedom, are to be dismissed as detrimental, and this, as he suggests in his Republic, includes laws that ban incest and cannibalism. Hercules, he notes, preferred his freedom to anything else in the world ( D. L. VI, 71).

The laws in democratic polities such as Athens, he would argue, are made by the majority of the people, but people are invariably devoid of reason, which can only mean that the laws themselves are devoid of reason; so, why should a reasonable person regard it as his duty to obey the laws? In other kinds -96of polities, as in those in which a monarch is the source of the laws, the situation is not different, because monarchs are also devoid of reason. Only a person of the most depraved human nature can aspire to and succeed in gaining power over his fellow human beings, and examples of this, Diogenes would maintain, are easy to find everywhere. There is Perdiccas of Macedonia, a king who ruled from 364 to 359 B.C., and who is mentioned by Diogenes Laertius ( VI, 44 ) as having invited Diogenes, under the threat of death, to visit him. This reference is important, because it allows us to place Diogenes in Athens as early as the year 360 B.C., for had he still been in Sinope during the short reign of Perdiccas, it would be difficult for us to make sense of his having been invited by the king to his court in Pella. It was probably after Diogenes' departure from Sinope that he gained for himself a sufficient renown to attract the attention of the Macedonian ruler. At any rate, Perdiccas' invitation and threat leave Diogenes unmoved, and, referring to him as a tarantula or a beetle, he dismisses them, saying that he would have expected the threat to be that Perdiccas would have been happy without his company. Dionysius of Syracuse fared not much better. He, too, like Perdiccas, is a worthless man, and Diogenes chastises Plato for having accepted his hospitality during his sojourn in Sicily. Plutarch ( Timoleon xv) has furnished us with an anecdote concerning a meeting in Corinth between Diogenes and Dionysius, who after his overthrow in Syracuse had taken refuge in that city: Diogenes of Sinope, at their first meeting in the street there, saluted him with the ambiguous expression, "O Dionysius, how little you deserve your present life!" Upon which Dionysius stopped and replied, I thank you, Diogenes, for your condolence." "Condole with you!" replied Diogenes; "Do you not suppose, on the contrary, that I am indignant that such a slave as you, who, if you had your due, should have been let alone to grow old and die in the state of tyranny, as your father did before you, should now enjoy the ease of private persons, and be here to sport and frolic in our society?" Other rulers also come under the attack of the uncompromising Diogenes, who is never weary of denouncing their arrogance and extravagance, their greed and avarice, and their cruelty and emptiness. We find him even in Hades, in the testimony of Lucian, carrying on his war against the political system, especially when this is subsumed under the power of one person. Thus, for instance, he ridicules Mausolus, a Persian satrap and the ruler of Caria from 377 to 353 B.C., for the enormous mausoleum 40 that his wife constructed for him as his final resting place in Halicarnassus. Such a gigantic tomb, says the dead Diogenes, is a useless and stupid thing for a dead man, and shows the arrogance and emptiness of the man for whom it was constructed. As for himself, Diogenes adds, he does not care where his tomb could be, and does not really know whether there is any tomb for his carcass, for, while alive, he did not waste one thought on the matter. Speaking about himself, Diogenes says to the ghost of Mausolus: "He has left behind, for the best part of mankind, the memory of him-97-

self as of a man who has lived a life much more sublime than your monument, greatest of Carian slaves, and built on a firmer foundation" ( Dialogues of the Dead XXIV). From all such rulers, then, even if deposed and after their deaths, and indeed from any other ruler, past, present, or future, there is nothing to expect: they do not deserve the Cynic's respect and still less his allegiance. His contempt for such men became legendary. Lucian notes that in Hades tyrants cannot stand his company, as we read in Menippus, Or the Oracle of the Dead: The great Diogenes resides near Sardanapalus the Assyrian 41 and Midas the Phrygian, 42 and certain other worthies of that sort; and when he hears them lamenting and remeasuring their ancient fortunes, he laughs and is delighted, and, for the most part, he lies upon his back and sings in a harsh and savage voice, drowning their wailing; so that these men are greatly annoyed, and are thinking about moving their quarters, as they cannot put up with Diogenes. His hatred of monarchs is so intense that at one point we find him expressing his approbation of tyrannicide: when asked by a tyrant what would be the best bronze to make a statue, he replied it would be the bronze of which Harmodius and Aristogiton were made ( D. L. VI, 50 ). These two men are known for their attempt to kill Hippias, an Athenian tyrant, and his brother Hipparchus in 514 B.C. Although their plot miscarried, the eventual overthrow of Hippias three years later was believed to have been made possible by their attempted tyrannicide. The meaning of Diogenes' reply to the tyrant is, therefore, this: the best material that can be used for a statue is the material out of which killers of tyrants are made, for such men are indeed real men. But it is in the context of the relationship between Diogenes and Alexander that his contemptuous attitude towards the State in general and towards monarchs in particular manifests itself with great vividness. As noted earlier, Suidas put a finishing touch on this relationship by reporting that both men died on the very same day in 423 B.C. The anecdotes that link them are many and varied, and the literature that has grown around them is extensive, including numerous artistic representations. 43 Fictional pieces, too, such as dramas, have been created around this theme, 44 for the juxtaposition between the aged and destitute philosopher and the young Alexander is a theme that cries out for commentary and embellishment. It is even conceivable that such a juxtaposition may have served as a paradigm for Shakespeare's creation of the scene in King Lear ( III, iv ), in which Lear approaches Edgar, the son of Gloucester: here, again, we witness a powerful king confronting a 'philosopher.' 45 An early account of the meeting between them comes from Plutarch (Alexander xiv): While Alexander stayed here at the Isthmus, many public officials and philosophers came from all parts to visit him and congratulate him on his election [as commander of the Greek and Macedonian armies], but contrary to his expectation, Diogenes of Sinope, who was then living in Corinth, thought so little of him, that instead of coming to compliment -98him, he never so much as stirred out of the suburb called the Craneum, where Alexander found him lying under the sun. When he saw so much company near him, he raised himself a little, and condescended to look at Alexander, and when he asked Diogenes whether he wanted anything, "Yes," said he, "I would that you stand from between me and the sun." Alexander was so struck at this answer, and was so surprised at the greatness of the man who

had taken so little notice of him, that as he went away he told his followers, who were laughing at the philosopher, that if he were not Alexander, he would choose to be Diogenes. The historical basis of this report has been often challenged. 46 Questions have also been raised concerning the sources of Plutarch's report, and the possibility of its having been derived from a non-extant work by Onesicritus, a Cynic who accompanied Alexander in his campaigns, has been entertained. 47 Also, it has been suggested that the report may have originated in certain Buddhist circles in India that maintained alive the memory of Alexander's meeting with the Gymnosophists. 48 If we assume the historical character of the encounter, we would then place it in 336 B.C., the year of the assassination of Philip, Alexander's father, when Alexander was twenty years of age. Once again, versions upon versions of this encounter exist. We find them meeting in Corinth outside the western walls, or in Athens in the Metroön by Diogenes' legendary tub, or elsewhere in those cities. In Diogenes Laertius, the anecdote is broken up into two parts, reported in different places: Alexander's initial comment ("Ask of me any gift you like") and Diogenes' reply ("Stand out of my light") appear at VI, 38 ; while Alexander's statement to his followers ("Had I not been Alexander, I should have liked to be Diogenes") is recorded at VI, 32. Diogenes Laertius also includes what appear to be variations of the episode: "Alexander once came and, standing in front of him, said, 'I am Alexander the Great King', to which Diogenes replied, 'And I am Diogenes the Dog'" ( VI, 60 ). There is another version in which Alexander says to Diogenes: "Are you not afraid of me?""Why, what are you," replied Diogenes, "a good thing or a bad thing?" When Alexander said, "A good thing," Diogenes countered, "Why should I be afraid of a good thing?" ( D. L. VI, 68 ) Other versions from other sources, as well as from modern works, could be quoted. There is, for instance, John Lyly's account, published in 1584, in which Alexander asks Diogenes, "How should one learn to be content?" to which Diogenes responds, "Unlearn not to covet." 49 We can easily discern that they all appear to constitute variations of the version reported by Plutarch, their theme being one and the same: the unbridgeable gap that separates the philosopher and the emperor, a gap that manifests itself in their opposite styles of life and in their mutually exclusive conceptions of what the good life is. For whereas Alexander stands for and, in his specific instance, is the political State, its laws and demands on the individual, Diogenes, for his part, stands for the person who has cast aside the bonds of political and social subjection, and is unwilling to integrate himself within the fabric of the State. In saying to Diogenes, "I am -99Alexander the Great Emperor," Alexander presents himself to the philosopher as the embodiment of the human world, which is precisely the world that Diogenes the Dog has bracketed away. In responding to Alexander, "I am Diogenes the Dog," the philosopher announces his challenge to the State: he recognizes no authority over him, and neither the grandeur of the emperor nor his name impresses him. He is the only monarch over himself. He stands altogether outside the political domain. Even the designation of Alexander as 'Dionysus' is countered by Diogenes with an ironical claim of his own divine origin: "You might as well call me 'Sarapis'" ( D. L. VI, 63 -γενης) 50 conveys in Greek the sense that he, too, comes directly from God. Diogenes is as much a king as Alexander, just as is every other human being who has attained autonomy of will and self-sufficiency. 51

To say merely, however, that Diogenes stands outside the political domain could lead us to misunderstand his stance. For it is one thing to stand outside or be removed from it, as Heraclitus is said to have been, or as the Christian anchorites of the Theban desert were, and it is something altogether different to be immersed in it, while completely rejecting it. This latter stance belongs to Diogenes. He chooses to remain in Athens and in Corinth, and he is compulsively drawn to the company of his fellow human beings, despicable and roguish as they may be, almost as if he were moved by his concern for the welfare of others. 52 As in the case of Socrates, Diogenes' world is the market place, the gymnasiums, and the places where people congregate. He does not even miss the opportunity of attending the games at Olympia, if not for any other purpose than to insult the beef-fed athletes who stupidly compete in physical prowess and win the undeserved admiration of the masses. There, where people live, we find him, teaching, shouting, sometimes cursing, gesturing, embracing statues, begging for food, and, above all, insulting those people and those things that he estimates worthy of being insulted. He seems to be consumed by a compulsion to alter people's values, especially those that tie them down to their political community. Once, Diogenes Laertius reports ( VI, 64 ), as Diogenes was going into a theater, meeting face to face those who were coming out, he said, "This is what I practice doing all my life." Meeting people face to face, yelping at them and sinking his teeth into them, as Diogenes Laertius also reports ( VI, 60 ), not leaving anyone alone, but pestering and almost persecuting them, until they gave up their false 'currency', that is exactly what Diogenes was all about. There is a report in which we are told that when once asked where he had come from originally, Diogenes succinctly replied, "I am a citizen of the world" ( D. L. VI, 63 ). This answer has given rise to a great deal of thought and controversy, for it contains the oldest occurrence of the word κοσμοπολΛτης, literally, 'a citizen of the universe'. The occurrence of this word, from which we form the word 'cosmopolitanism', at a time when profound changes were taking place in the political world of the Greeks, changes affecting the very survival of the concept of the city-state, and at the time when Alexander and his Macedonian phalanx were about to embark on the project of creating a universal empire -100without boundaries--this occurrence deserves to be taken into special account. We could then ask whether Diogenes and, after him, the Cynics did in fact reject the concepts of nationalism and citizenship, and put forward the notion of cosmopolitanism, which converts every person into a member of a universal human community. This question has been answered in different ways by many scholars, and is complicated by the fact that we cannot be certain as to whether Alexander himself can be held responsible for what W. W. Tarn called "one of the great revolutions in human thought," namely, the idea that the entire human race should belong to one universal family in which there would be no national, racial, or ethnic distinctions. 53 This interpretation has been rejected by some, as in the instance of E. Badian, who refers to it as a "phantom that has haunted the pages of scholarship." 54 The issue of the cosmopolitanism of Diogenes leads us back to Antisthenes, who would have been inclined to deny that he belonged to any specific country. Where he was born, and into what family context, were for him accidents of life which he learned to overcome. Born in Athens, he was not an Athenian, and born a Greek, he was not a Greek. He belonged to wherever at any given time he happened to be. The same type of cosmopolitanism appertains to Diogenes. This is a negative sort of cosmopolitanism, which, as H. C. Baldry has correctly maintained, "does not unite the human race, but draws a single great dividing line across it,

separating the few wise men from the many fools, whom Diogenes described as one finger removed from lunacy." 55 Tarn himself expresses a similar view when he speaks of Diogenes' term 'cosmopolite' as "a horrible word which he coined and which was not used again for centuries," a term, too, by which he meant, "not that he was a citizen of some imaginary world-state--a thing he never thought about--but that he was not a citizen of any Greek city," 56 or, we may add, of any other human city. For Diogenes, allegiance to a city or nation is a manifestation of sheer stupidity, Antisthenes once remarked that if the Athenians felt pride for having been born in Athens, the snails and wingless locusts also born on Athenian soil should feel the same senseless pride ( D. L. VI, 1 ). For the Cynics, the great pride that the Athenians and the Romans felt for their national origin and for the achievements of their nations had no rational foundation and was a socially fabricated farce. Such a pride, the Cynics argued, is not merely senseless, but is the fountain from which many of the ills and tribulations that have afflicted the human race have flowed in abundance. The political and social philosophy of Diogenes appears to have been stated by him in his Republic, a non-extant dialogue, various components of which are available in a summary left by Philodemus of Gadara. This work, which is regarded by many scholars as authentic, 57 seems to have included the expected dosage of shocking teachings, such as the approval of incest and cannibalism, teachings that, as Dudley has correctly observed, 58 could have been included by Diogenes, if, indeed, he included them, only for didactic purposes. We really are in ignorance concerning the context in which such extreme views -101were advanced. It has been argued that the embarrassing character of such teachings may explain why the Republic was removed from the list of Diogenes' works by the Stoics. 59 A review of what is available of Diogenes' Republic and other works confirms what was stated above: for Diogenes, the only acceptable commonwealth was that which is as wide as the universe ( D. L. VI, 72 ), and nothing else could have satisfied him. He could have repeated what is reported of Anaxagoras, who, when asked whether he had any ties to Clazomenae, his native city, replied, pointing to the sky, that he was greatly concerned with homeland ( D. L. II, 7 ), that is, with the universe at large. For the ideal republic envisioned by Diogenes is not one that is restricted to a geographical place, to a racial or ethnic group, or to a cultural or historical tradition, but is one of no boundaries. It is a republic in which there are no social distinctions, no slavery, no disparity in the possession of wealth, and, in fact, according to Athenaeus, not even any form of currency. 60 There are no laws and no government in Diogenes' utopia. But are we then in the presence of an anarchistic ideology? For the proposal to eliminate laws and government can only result in a condition of anarchy, which is itself the prelude of the triumph of barbarism, for, given the state of human nature, people act in civilized and harmonious ways only because they are compelled to do so by the brute force of the laws and the concomitant fear of punishment. As soon as there is a political vacuum, people, indeed like wild beasts, become barbaric and savage, which explains why anarchism, that is, the abolition of laws and government, conjures images of human self-destruction, in which, to quote Hobbes, "the life of man [is] solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short" ( Leviathan I, xiii, 62 ), a bellum omnium contra omnes. In order to prevent so lamentable a condition, some

form of a Hobbesian Leviathan must come into existence, either in the form of an absolute monarch, like Alexander, or in the form of the assemblage of the people, as in democratic states like Athens, but always with a system of laws and punishments that guard, control, and domesticate the unruly masses. Otherwise, a condition of social pandemonium will reign supreme. But, in rejecting the laws and all civil authority, did Diogenes, and before him, Antisthenes, and after them, later Cynics, wish for such a curse on human communities? Was Diogenes, then, an anarchist? The testimonies are unclear and the interpretations differ significantly in this regard. If a man breaks as many laws as possible, invites others to do likewise, rejects any authority over him, urges others to do and act in a similar way, disregards traditions and conventions, pours contempt on religion and even on learning, what else could he be but an anarchist? Could this man, Diogenes of Sinope, be, as Ortega y Gasset describes him, the saboteur of his civilization, the nihilist of Hellenism, the parasite of his culture, one who lives as if in a farce at the expense of those whose world he, as an anarchist, is determined to destroy? 61 There is, however, another side, which Ortega's description ignores. Diogenes' rebellion appears to have been based on philosophical convictions that -102emanated from his understanding of the meaning and role of reason in his life and in the lives of others, a circumstance that can lead us to believe that if he did call for the abolition of the political State, the abrogation of all laws, and the rejection of all civil authority, he did so in the name of a higher law and a higher authority, ignored and set aside by most people, and replaced by the transitory human arrangements and covenants that people call 'laws' and that are sometimes personified in individuals such as Alexander, and yet more real than the statutes enacted by the Athenian Assembly and the dicta of the emperor himself. From this perspective, then, Diogenes' apparent anarchism emerges in a different light. A nihilistic anarchist recognizes no values and no source of authority other than himself, and entertains no idealistic expectations concerning the improvement of the human condition. He, like the modern cynics, has lost all his faith in humanity, including in himself. He acts as if he were alone in the world, and in his solipsistic arrogance uses and abuses all those who cross his path. He is truly, to use Ortega's phrase, "the saboteur of civilization," and represents a manifestation of cultural decadence. But this is not what Diogenes was. In order to appreciate Diogenes as a man and as a philosopher, it is necessary to recognize the idealism and optimism that lived in him. Living, as we ourselves do, in a world where values resemble counterfeited and depreciated currency, and where in whatever direction we turn we find mostly pretentiousness and falsehood, what else can a genuine parrhesiast (to use Foucault's word 62 ) do except to carry on a campaign to deface the moral currency of his world? In the eyes of those who with astonishment look at him without understanding his burden and his mission, he is an eccentric and an aberration, a deranged man, a "Socrates gone mad" ( D. L. VI, 53 ), a saboteur of civilization. He moves among people like a madman, but his 'madness' is itself only the reflection of what Antonio Machado called "the terrible sanity of the idiot," 63 that is, the inevitable reaction on his part to the 'sanity' that permeates the human world, a 'sanity' that is itself a far greater madness than the 'madness' that the innumerable idiots who surround him discern in him. They, not he, are the crazy ones; they, not he, are the despicable dogs. Their idiocy is so extreme that they do not even deserve to be called human beings: the public baths and streets may be crowded with living bodies, but not with human beings, for which reason he once decided to walk the streets of Athens in broad daylight, carrying a lamp,

saying, when asked to explain his behavior, that he was looking for a man ( D. L. VI, 41 ). On another occasion, he called for people to come to hear him, and when a crowd assembled, he proceeded to strike those around him with his staff, saying that he had called for people, not for scoundrels ( D. L. VI, 32 ). These two curious anecdotes can serve as a point of reference in order to shed light on the nature of Diogenes' rejection of the social and political world. The story of the lamp is among the best known of all that antiquity has bequeathed to us. Countless articles and commentaries have been written about it, and poems, plays, paintings, and even musical compositions have been occasioned by it. 64 Of particular interest is the painting by Salvator Rosa, an -103Italian painter of the seventeenth century. His Diogenes in Search of an Honest Man, depicts the already aged Cynic with a lighted lamp and surrounded by a sneering and laughing crowd of people, in whose faces, illuminated by the philosopher's light, we can discern what Machado called "the terrible sanity of the idiot" or what Schopenhauer in one of his darkest moments referred to as "a beerhouse-keeper physiognomy on which nature had written, in her clearest characters, the familiar inscription, 'commonplace person'." 65 The only problem with Rosa's portrayal of the story is its title, for only in modern sources, never in the ancient sources, do we hear about Diogenes looking for an honest man. In the ancient versions of the anecdote, faithfully captured by Diogenes Laertius, Diogenes is simply looking for a man, not for an honest man. The difference is significant for our understanding of him. In his view, to be truly a human being, it is necessary to have attained an elevated state of virtue and to have allowed reason to reign unencumbered and unchallenged. Virtue and reason, however, manifest themselves in a commitment to honesty or truth-telling, and even the slightest deviation from such a commitment undoes the basis of true humanity in us, and plunges us, as Antisthenes would have said, into the world of notbeing or nothing. Since, however, it is easy to ascertain empirically that most people most of the time are given to dishonesty with themselves and with one another, we cannot but conclude, as Diogenes did, that in spite of the large crowds of human-like living bodies that fill our cities and fields, there are very few human beings indeed. Scoundrels and rogues--the pícaros of whom we spoke in chapter 1-can be counted in the billions, but not human beings, who are exceptional occurrences. In order to find and count human beings, one might need a lighted lamp and search for them in daylight, but probably in vain. It is, therefore, with the most common specimens of humanity, the scoundrels and rogues, that Diogenes must deal all the time. He may sometimes feel compelled to strike them with his staff, or insult or spit on them, or urinate on them, or make them look ridiculous, or attempt to awaken them by means of some terrible statement or exhibitionist act. Their world does not deserve to remain standing, and their currency is worthless. Their poorly conceived laws, their conventions and customs, their games and amusements, their kings and governments, their superstitions and religious humbug--all of that must be set aside and tossed into the sea, for it is not worth anything. Thus, Diogenes stands aside from his fellow human beings, and, as an enchanter and magician, casts upon them his terrible Cynic spell: he neutralizes their human existence in him and dematerializes their human world by becoming a dog among them. It would be a mistake to conclude that with Diogenes, we are now in the presence of a misanthrope, for it is not that he hates people. On the contrary, it is because he does not hate

them that he feels compelled to behave towards them as he does. He views himself as a physician who must inflict pain in order to heal, as a parent who must punish in order to teach. And if he is not a misanthrope, neither is he an anarchist. It was his rejection of the political structures of his time that led him to become a world citizen and an advocate of -104cosmopolitanism, which is correct if his cosmopolitanism is not understood as some sort of universal government under which all people are subsumed. That ideal, as noted above, is by no means what Diogenes had in mind. His was a negative cosmopolitanism: no less than Antisthenes and other Cynics, he did not belong and did not wish to belong to any nation. Intelligent people, that is, people endowed with lucidity, need no such association. The wise stand apart from the masses who urgently need laws to keep them from tearing one other to pieces, governments to guide them and dupe them, just as they need games and pastimes to alleviate their natural boredom. Diogenes does not need Alexander to discover who he is and what he should do with his life. Surely, there is arrogance and pride in him, and it is especially in this arrogant and proud behavior that his self-assurance best reveals itself. His contempt towards the pride of others is a testimony of his own pride. Diogenes Laertius ( VI, 26 ) recounts that once he trampled on the carpets in Plato's house, saying, "I trample on Plato's conceit," which elicited an appropriate response from Plato: "How much pride, Diogenes, you display in attempting not to be proud!" Plato was as perceptive on this occasion as when he remarked to Antisthenes that his pride was noticeable through his torn and ragged cloak ( D. L. VI, 8 ), for the Cynic shows his boundless pride precisely in those exhibitionist acts in which he either castigates others for what he regards as their pride or displays his humility in an ostentatious manner. In this Cynic pride we discover what we may refer to as the first tragic flaw of Cynicism. But the source of Diogenes' pride is his realization that he has attained an exceptional stage of self-sufficiency and independence from the world, a stage that he believes he has succeeded in reaching through the development of his reason and the practice of virtue, this latter understood in the sense of disciplined strength. On account of this, he does not hesitate to claim that he, more than anybody else, is entitled to rule over people. His lucidity and virtue confer upon him the royal right. The incident involving his capture by pirates is revealing in this respect. Based the testimonies of Menippus' Sale of Diogenes, Diogenes Laertius ( VI, 29ff., 74 ) recounts this incident. Once, on a trip to Aegina, Diogenes fell into the hands of pirates, after which he was taken to Crete, where he was put up for sale as a slave. There is nothing extraordinary in this incident: pirates were a common danger for travelers in the Aegean Sea, as much as they were in the Mediterranean Sea in Roman times. They would seize ships, dispose of whatever goods and money they found in them, kill some of the crew and passengers, and sell the survivors as slaves in the first port of call. This latter fate befell Diogenes: like Plato, he, too, found himself up for sale as a slave ( D. L. III, 19 ). A certain Corinthian named Xeniades, possibly the same Xeniades mentioned as a philosopher by Sextus Empiricus ( Adv. math. VII, 53 ), purchased Diogenes in the slave market. 66 At the sale of slaves Diogenes asked the announcer to present him as an expert in governing men. When Xeniades purchased him, he told him that henceforth Xeniades would have to obey him, just as a patient obeys his physician. Xeniades took him to Corinth and made him the -106-

teacher of his sons and put him in charge of his household. Diogenes lived in Xeniades' house for several years, during which time he taught his owner's sons to be satisfied with little, to do without luxuries and amenities, to walk barefoot, to speak only when necessary, and, generally, to be self-sufficient and independent. He instructed them, accordingly, in some of the elements of the Cynic discipline designed to strengthen their character, elements that were part of his own daily routine, for he was in the habit of going lightly dressed in the winter and rolling over hot sand in the summer in order to train himself to accept all sorts of hardships. Xeniades' sons are reported to have developed a great deal of affection and respect towards their harsh master, although we have no information as to what became of them. So well, moreover, did Diogenes manage Xeniades' household, that the latter would say that when Diogenes entered his house, a good spirit came to dwell within. The story is instructive, regardless of the degree of its biographical authenticity. As in the instance of other anecdotes, it could be mostly a romantic and edifying fiction, fabricated to convey a philosophical point. But, indeed, there is neither a need nor an advantage in reaching this conclusion. The point of the anecdote is clear and fits well within our conception of the Cynic. In this conception we view him as having the title of king or monarch over himself by virtue of the superb development of his mind and his ability to remain at all times in complete control of himself. But these philosophical endowments, at least from his point of view, confer upon him the right to govern others with greater justification than any inherited title or popular decision could confer upon a king or an elected politician. Diogenestruly knows, and, because of his rare knowledge, he can guide others just as he guides himself, and thus, when Epictetus describes him as a true king, "whose duty is to oversee the rest of human beings" ( Discourses III, xxii, 72 ), his meaning is in accord with what seems to have been Diogenes' own conception of himself, when he asked the announcer in charge of the sale of slaves to promote him as one who can govern human beings, obviously not, as with ordinary rulers, for the purpose of having power over them for his own designs, but only for the purpose of taking them along the philosophical path that he has discovered. On this path, there is neither anarchy nor nihilism, but only reason and the practice of virtue. The major problem that we encounter as we reflect on Diogenes' philosophy is that, whereas in what concerns its negative contributions there is a great deal of identifiable substance, in what pertains to its positive import there is much vagueness, as well as the impression of a truncated edifice left unfinished. We discern with clarity those components of Cynic theory and practice in which Diogenes stood as a rebel: we know what ideas, beliefs, conventions, practices, and modes of life he rejected, and for us to acquire this knowledge, we do not even need to have at our disposal any of his writings; all we need is to review the anecdotes recounted about him and the long list of apophthegms attributed to him. We understand reasonably well what it was that Diogenes wanted to deface or destroy, and this, as we have seen, includes -107practically everything that most of his contemporaries, and most human beings before and after him, have viewed and view as valuable. But the question that remains unanswered is related to the 'currency' he sought to mint and circulate in place of the old one. When we spoke of Antisthenes in chapter 2, we made statements about his concepts of virtue, nature, and reason, concepts that reappear in the teachings of Diogenes and later Cynics. But inevitably these concepts present themselves to us only in rough outline and indistinct contours. We said earlier that if Diogenes called for the abolition of laws and the elimination

of authority, it was because he was appealing to a higher law, by reference to which, ordinary laws and values prove to be worthless. But what is the nature of that higher law? By what means is it knowable and identifiable? What did he understand by the concept of nature, when he spoke of the need to live his life 'according to nature'? Likewise, what is entailed in his notions of virtue and reason? Perhaps if we had more substantive fragments from his works, we would be better prepared to answer these questions, but the surviving fragments leave us frustrated in our endeavors. And neither are the testimonies much more illuminating in this regard, for in them, too, the positive components of Diogenes' philosophy are generally left undefined. Only when we consult late sources, related to Cynicism but themselves not a part of this movement, like Epictetus and Julian, can we have at least the impression of understanding the meaning of the key concepts on which Diogenes seems to have hoped to establish the positive and constructive components of his philosophy. But in the context of such late sources, we can rest assured that we are dealing with idealizations that probably transcend the parameters of Cynicism in general and of Diogenes in particular. It is, for instance, hardly possible to make a convincing case for the presence of a clear idea of Natural Law in any of the fragments of Diogenes or even in any of the biographical and doxographical testimonies, and neither is it possible to decipher what he meant by 'nature' and 'reason'. When Epictetus speaks of the Cynics, specifically with Diogenes in mind, 67 as scouts, spies, and messengers of God ( Discourses III, xxii, 24 - 25 ), we are at a loss in trying to pin down precisely what the notion of God could have been, not for Epictetus, but for Diogenes, for nowhere does that notion lends itself to clarification in the context of anything said or written by Diogenes or about him. 68 Two possibilities can then be entertained in order to explain this distressing circumstance: we can either say that our lack of knowledge concerning the positive aspects of Diogenes' philosophy is the result of the poverty and paucity of the sources, or we can assume that Diogenes simply did not attain (or, rather, did not wish to attain) to the necessary level of conceptual sophistication that makes possible the development of clearly conceived philosophical concepts. From an intellectual point of view. it is always easier to destroy, negate, and reject than to create, affirm, and accept. Diogenes destroyed, negated, and rejected a whole world of ideas and institutions. But what did he create, affirm, and accept? -108It seems more reasonable to opt for the second possibility, for it would be surprising if Diogenes Laertius, who endeavored to give a detailed account of the positive and constructive elements of the philosophies of Plato, Zeno of Citium, and Epicurus, among others, would have omitted a similar account in his biography of Diogenes, if the latter had developed a positive and constructive philosophy. But the reality is that he did not or did not wish to do so. Like an explorer of unknown and vast seas, Diogenes traveled extensively through the world of ideas, casting aside as useless and detrimental practically everything that came his way, and discovered from afar immense and distant continents that he could not or did not want to explore. The little that we know about his ideal republic can convince us of this circumstance: it is a polity in which the 'currency' that circulates everywhere else has been eliminated, in which all restrictions have been removed, and in which all ordinary laws have been abrogated, but is one in which we are perplexed as to the principles by reference to which its inhabitants are expected to live and act. This circumstance can be explained in part by bringing to mind a characteristic that has often been identified as belonging to the essence of Diogenes' thought

and life, namely, his anti-intellectualism. 69 If correctly understood, this characteristic can disclose for us both the strengths and the weaknesses of classical Cynicism in general and of Diogenes' contributions in particular. Diogenes Laertius in his concluding comments about the Cynics ( VI, 103 - 105 ) gives us interesting hints concerning this issue. He suggests that the Cynics dispensed with the ordinary subjects of education (e.g., mathematics, literature, and music), and that they viewed such academic endeavors as detrimental pursuits. He observes, moreover, that Diogenes, having seen a clock, commented that its only purpose should be to keep us from being late for dinner. With Diogenes, then, the Cynic revolt, already commenced by Antisthenes, reaches its highest peak of intensity, and not only is the 'currency' of material goods, social conventions, and political institutions defaced and rejected, but also that other 'currency' which goes by the names of culture and learning suffers the same fate. For him, the luxury of intellectual culture is as reprehensible as the luxury of material possessions, with which it goes hand in hand. Such an intellectual luxury, stands accused of being responsible for removing human beings from their true nature and, consequently, for causing their unhappiness. 70 Following what seems to have been Antisthenes' footsteps, Diogenes turns, then, as furiously against culture and learning as he does against the material aspects of the human world. Science emerges as an enterprise that is not only useless but detrimental when it is not strictly pragmatic: the only purpose of a clock is to help us satisfy our physical needs. The same contempt for science which Rodier attributes to Antisthenes, 71 but more extreme, reappears in Diogenes. Rhetoric is transformed into a senseless linguistic game in which people learn to misuse language. Rhetoricians, we are told, he would call "three times wretched" ( D. L. VI, 47 ), and he would chastise those who study Homer and the poets for wasting time in such things while ignoring the task of -109correcting their own flaws of character ( D. L. VI, 27 ). Music and art turn out to be meaningless pastimes, and musicians and artists are repeatedly ridiculed. Philosophy itself, which since the time of the Milesian philosophers had moved among the Greeks along so many varied paths and had reached so high a plateau of development, is an object of his uncompromising condemnation, if it devotes itself to language games and intellectual distractions unrelated to the concrete world of physical existence. When philosophy becomes speculative and theoretical, it reveals in the philosopher a sure manifestation of madness or arrogance. 72 This condemnation of speculative philosophy appears with clarity in the various anecdotes that recount Diogenes' relationship with Plato. Such anecdotes are many and varied, and their historical genuineness is, of course, less than certain, although, regardless of their fictional ingredients, they do underline the gap that separated Plato from Diogenes. Diogenes Laertius' biography of Diogenes includes several of them. There is, for instance, the one in which Diogenes. counters Plato's definition of man as a biped and featherless animal by plucking a fowl and displaying it in the presence of Plato and his students ( VI, 40 ). 73 In another, quoted earlier in this chapter, Diogenes tramples on the carpets in Plato's house in a demonstration of proud humility or, we might say, humble pride ( VI, 26 ). In still another, the Cynic chastises Plato for eating olives at a costly banquet, asking him whether it was for the sake of eating olives that he visited Dionysius, the king of Syracuse ( VI, 25 ). Again, when Plato once found him washing lettuces and said to him that

if he had honored and shown respect for the right political people, he would not have had to wash lettuces, Diogenes countered with this comment: "If you had washed lettuces, Plato, you would not have had to pay your respects to Dionysius" ( VI, 58 ). Others could be mentioned, not only from Diogenes Laertius but from other sources, and we would discover that most of them are variations of the same theme. Perhaps the most compelling is the one in which Diogenes' concretistic philosophical stance is juxtaposed in the clearest light with Plato's idealistic metaphysics. Diogenes Laertius reports ( VI, 53 ) that once, when Plato was talking about his Ideal Forms and using words like 'tablehood' and 'cuphood', Diogenes said to him: "I can see, Plato, the table and the cup, but your tablehood and cup I see nowhere." Plato then replied that Diogenes lacked the intellectual vision to see anything beyond the physical world. In other words, for Diogenes, Plato's intelligible world of Ideal Forms, the kernel of his metaphysical view, where realities that transcend this visible world of tangible things exist in a far more real and substantive way than what our senses can reveal, that transcendent world simply does not exist because it cannot be sensed. Plato's reply is revealing: Diogenes cannot 'see' the Ideal Forms because he lacks the necessary understanding to grasp anything that transcends the particular things that make up this physical world. He is, therefore, blind to any and all transcendent reality. He understands neither concepts nor ideas, nor anything that is universal and eternal, and is, accordingly, a man of limited intellect who must invariably operate and function amid the collections of the particulars that integrate the -110perceptible world. Diogenes' response to Plato, found in Diogenes Laertius, is equally compelling: "Plato's lectures are a waste of time" ( VI, 24 ). It is not difficult to realize that so wide a gap between Diogenes and Plato, and between Cynicism and Platonism, cannot be bridged. We are dealing with a gap that had announced itself in the context of the ideological antagonism between Antisthenes and Plato, for there, too, we found two points of view about reality that could be reconciled. But this circumstance is even more extreme in this context than, for instance, in the context of the gap that separates Plato's metaphysical idealism from Aristotle's inclination towards empiricism, or in the context of the distance that lies between Plato's views and those of Kant. In this latter context, Kant could have said, as indeed he did, that Plato"left the world of the senses, as setting too narrow limits to the understanding, and ventured out beyond on the wings of ideas, in the empty space of pure understanding" ( Critique of Pure Reason B9), for which reason, among others, Kant found himself unable to endorse either the methodology or the conclusions that he interpreted as being integral components of Plato's metaphysics. But opposed as he could have been to such metaphysics, Kant remained able and prepared to debate it on an intellectual plane in which universal ideas and general concepts were employed as the instruments of argumentation. And the same can be said concerning Aristotle's polemic against Plato. Ideas and concepts, then, in these contexts were argued by means of other ideas and concepts, universals by means of universals, philosophical convictions by means of opposing philosophical convictions, without, as far as we can gather, any suspicion either on the part of Aristotle or Kant, that Plato was either a perfect fool or a deceitful Sophist. But as soon as we confront Diogenes' rejection of Plato's philosophy as "a waste of time," we sense that we are immersed in a different atmosphere. We suspect, for instance, that, perhaps as with Antisthenes, Diogenes' condemnation has two roots: first, there is his half-spoken

conviction that Plato is an ideological traitor who publicly betrayed the person whom Diogenes recognized as his paradigm of intellectual lucidity, namely, Socrates. In his view, Plato, as we can surmise from a comment in Diogenes Laertius, had "sold him out" ( VI, 40 ). There is, then, on Diogenes' part an unwillingness even to consider seriously what Plato was proposing when he spoke of such things as 'tablehood' and 'cuphood', an unwillingness made more pronounced by his suspicion that beneath Plato's philosophical jargon there was an intent to deceive his hearers. In Diogenes Laertius ( VI, 67 ) we come across a perplexing passage: "Being reproached with begging when Plato did not beg, 'Oh yes,' said Diogenes, 'but when he does so, he holds his head down close, that none may hear him.'" The quotation in Diogenes' response is from the Odyssey ( i, 157 ; iv, 70 ), and it refers to Telemachus as he speaks first to Athena and then to Pisistratus, the son of Nestor. It conveys the sense of someone who whispers secret words, as if in fear, who only utters half-truths, who says things that others should not hear, and so on. Obviously, the lectures and writings of such a person could only be a waste of time, and such was Plato for Diogenes. A meaningful dialogue between them -111could have never taken place, for their differences were irreconcilable. But the second root of Diogenes' rejection of Plato's philosophy is more complex although easier to document. There was in Diogenes, as we have seen, a contempt for the luxury of intellectual culture, which led him to cast aside various intellectual and artistic pursuits as valueless 'currency', indeed as valueless as material possessions and social conventions. He must have recognized that among such pursuits, probably the most important is philosophy, specifically speculative philosophy, an intellectual pursuit that creates ideas and is developed in terms of ideas, for ideas move the human world, give structure and meaning to the social and political world, and are the ground on which traditions and beliefs are planted. A call for the return to the 'natural world', thus, is what lies underneath Diogenes' war against culture and speculative philosophy. His designation of himself as a 'dog', his claiming to have learned to live well by observing a mouse, his consumption of raw meat, and other aspects of his life--they all point in the same direction, one which takes him to his utopian state of nature, where only physical things exist, where knowledge is gained only through direct acquaintance, where language is used only for the purpose of pointing things out (for definition, as Antisthenes said and Diogenes agreed, is impossible), where the immediate and 'natural' needs of the body should be the only concern, where the trappings of political restraints and social conventions are cast aside, and where even philosophy, as exemplified by Plato's intellectual activities, is finally understood as a waste of time. The problem with such a 'philosophical' stance is that it leaves undefined the very nature of the 'currency' that is supposed to take the place of the old one. And here we come upon what we might call the second tragic flaw of Cynicism. If we add to Diogenes' boundless pride (his first tragic flaw) his unwillingness or perhaps his inability to move beyond the realm of physical immediacy and at least conceive of the possibility of defining his constructive concepts (his second tragic flaw), then his philosophical contribution presents itself to us in the garb of a truncated mood of rebellion. Diogenes did surely deface the 'currency' of his contemporaries, and taught others to do the same; he gave us a magnificent and unforgettable lesson in honesty and courage, and showed us the way to become and remain authentic amid the suffocating pretentiousness and permeating falsity of the world in which we are

condemned to live. He insisted on the idea that philosophy, if it is to be worth anything, has to begin by instructing us in the art of calling things by the right name, and on a commitment to absolute honesty, without fear, without euphemisms, without accommodations or compromises. He taught us to imitate and emulate the famous Hercules, the legendary hero and patron saint of the Cynics, who lived a life of freedom and hardship, and who fought against all that was wrong and false in the world. Diogenes at least practiced what he believed, making of himself a living example of his negativism and rebelliousness. His philosophical contribution is enormous if seen as a series of words and acts of revolt that challenge us to rethink our commitments and our -112allegiance to our social, political, and religious world. His philosophical merit, on the other hand, in what concerns the development of clearly identified ideals and well-defined concepts, is not altogether impressive. Others after him, specifically his Cynic descendants of later classical times, carried on his mission to deface the 'currency' with varying degrees of success and in all sorts of different ways. Still others, not the later Cynics, but the Stoics, maintained alive some of the negativism of Diogenes but created positive ideas and ideals. His negative cosmopolitanism was transformed into the idea of the unity of humankind; his denunciation of polytheism and religious superstition became refined into the recognition of a divine presence that hovers over us and guides our destinies; his call for a return to a natural mode of life was raised to a higher plane in which rationality and 'a life lived in accordance with Nature' were merged by means of well-constructed ethical concepts; and his crudity and primitivism were converted into the ideal of the wise man that played so crucial a role among the Stoics. We now leave Diogenes of Sinope in order to comment on his most famous disciple, Crates of Thebes, and on his wife, Hipparchia of Maroneia, and her brother Metrocles. We can now close this chapter on the "Socrates gone mad," with a telling statement from Seneca in his De tranquillitate animi (viii): Diogenes effecit, ne quid sibi eripi posset, qui se fortuitis omnibus exuit. Videtur mihi dixisse: age tuum negotium, fortuna; nihil apud Diogenem iam tuum est ( Diogenes acted in such a way that he could not be robbed of anything, for he freed himself from everything that is fortuitous. It appears to me as if he had said: "Concern yourself with your own business, Oh Fate, for there is nothing in Diogenes that belongs to you"). From Stobaeus ( Eclogues ii, 7 ) we learn about Fate's response to Diogenes' challenge: "Diogenes said that he once saw Fate looking at him and saying to him: 'I am unable to touch this mad dog'." During the twenty-three centuries that have elapsed since his death, we can rest assured that the Celestial Dog, as Cercidas called him, has remained unconcerned and unmoved both about the encomium that his descendants and admirers have conferred upon him, and about the vituperation and ridicule that his detractors and critics have piled up so liberally on him. The man in the tub has probably not moved or stirred one bit on account of all the noise that has been made about him, just as when Alexander visited him in Corinth. He may experience today, even among the stars, a sense of tragedy on contemplating the sad spectacle of his posterity in the twentieth century, when different sorts of cynics abound everywhere and control the affairs of the world. Like the philosopher described by Nietzsche, he may, in his

heavenly above, occasionally "glisten in all the green and grey colors of distress, owing to disgust, satiety, sympathy, gloominess and solitariness," as he inspects the discouraging human scene. 74 And he may even shelter in his heart a sentiment of futility, for, in a sense, he may think his revolt, like all other revolts, did not amount in the end -113to anything lasting after all: people live today as immersed in τυ+ϕος as they did in his own time, and use precisely the same false 'currency' of his contemporaries. The names may have changed and the languages may be different; other Alexanders and other Platos have emerged, and the external appearance of the world may have undergone many transformations; but few indeed are the genuine human beings, while the scoundrels and rogues and the pícaros are legion. But then again, as Seneca phrased it, he could still be saying to Fate, in a perfect state of Cynic indifference: "Concern yourself with your own business, for there is nothing in Diogenes that belongs to you." NOTES 1. J. A. Symonds, Studies of the Greek Poets ( New York: Harper & Brothers, 1917), Vol. 2, p. 304. 2.

There are several studies on the Corinthian inscription. See H. Häusle, Sag mir, o Hund-Wo der Hund liegt. Das Grabepigram für Diogenes von Sinope ( Hildensheim: G. Olms, 1989); and G. Petzl, "Der begrabene Hund und andere Veroneser Fälschungen." Zeitschrift für Paryrologie und Epigraphik 84 ( 1990), pp. 79-80.

3.

For comments on Cercidas' designation of Diogenes as "the Celestial Dog," see G. Süpfle, "Zur Geschichte der cynischen Sekte. III: Ist Cercidas aus Megalopolis ein Cyniker?" Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 4 ( 1891), pp. 422-423; and J. L. López Cruces , "El epitafio de Diógenes de Sinope y Cerc. fr. 54 Livrea (Consideraciones en torno a un estudio reciente sobre el tema)." Epos 7 ( 1991), pp. 609-614.

4.

An account of Diogenes' iconography is given by M. C. Hellmann in Dictionnaire des Philosophes Antiques ( Paris: CNRS Éditions, 1994), Vol. 2, 821-823.

5.

Hellmann, p. 821.

6.

F. Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, ⌗ 292.

7.

J. A. Comenius, Diogenes the Cynic Back from the Grave ( New York, 1970), p. 7.

8.

R. Lipsey, "Diogenes, the Hound." Parabola 10 ( 1989), p. 52.

9.

P. Sloterdijk, The Critique of Cynical Reason. Translated by M. Elred ( London: The University of Minnesota Press, 1987), pp. 103ff.

10. G. H. Lewes, The Biographical History of Philosophy from Its Origins in Greece to the Present Time ( New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1883), Vol. 1, p. 184. 11. V. Brochard, "Diogène le Cynique," in La Grande Encyclopédie. Inventaire Raisonné des Sciences, des Lettres et des Artes ( Paris: Lamirault, n.d.), Vol. 14, p. 601. 12. Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, ⌗ 16. 13. Quotations from Philodemus' summary are included in T. Dorandi, "La Politeia de

Diogène de Sinope et quelques remarques sur sa pensée politique," in Le Cynisme ancien et ses prolongements. Actes du Colloque International du CNRS ( Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1993), pp. 57-68. 14. See M. O. Goulet-Cazé "Le Livre VI de Diogène Laërce," in Aufstieg undNiedergang der römischen Welt -114Niedergang der römischen Welt ( Berlin-New York: W. de Gruyter, 1990), Vol. 2, pp. 3880-4048, and K. von Fritz Quellenuntersuchungen zum Leben und Philosophie des Diogenes von Sinope ( Leipzig: Dietrich, 1925). 15. For an English translation and a commentary of various Arabic sources, see D. Gutas, "Sayings by Diogenes Preserved in Arabic," in Le Cynisme ancien et ses prolongements. Actes du Colloque International du CNRS ( Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1993), pp. 475-518. 16. See M. O. Goulet-Cazé, "Diogène de Sinope, surnommé le Chien," In Dictionnaire des Philosophes Antiques ( Paris: CNRS Éditions, 1994), Vol. 2, p. 813. 17. There are modern works that examine this relationship. See J. Servais, "AlexandreDionysos et Diogène-Sarapis. Àpropos de Diogène Laërce, VI, 63." L'Antiquité Classique 28 ( 1958), pp. 98-106. 18. E. Livrea, "La morte di Diogene cinico," in Filologia e forme litterarie. Studi offerti a Francesco della Corte. Edited by S. Boldrini et al. (Urbino: Università degli Studi di Urbino, 1987), Vol. 1, pp. 427-433. 19. For a discussion of this matter, see L. E. Navia, "A Reappraisal of Xenophon's Apology," in New Essays on Socrates. Edited by E. Kelly (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1984), pp. 47-65. 20. H. Bannert, "Numismatisches zur Biographie und Lehre des Hundes Diogenes," Litteræ Numismaticæ Vindobonenses 1 ( 1979), pp. 49-63. T. Reinach, "Sur le classement chronologique des monnaies de Sinope." Revue des Études Grecques 39 ( 1926), pp. xlvxlvi, identifies coins with the name of Diogenes' father issued between 360 and 350 B.C. 21. See I. Bywater and J. G. Milne, "ΙΙαραχάραξις." The Classical Review 54 ( 1940), pp. 1012. 22. J. Babelon, "Diogène le Cynique." Revue Numismatique 18 ( 1914), pp. 1419; Reinach, "Sur le classement chronologique des monnaies de Sinope," pp. xlv-xlvi; C. T. Seltman , "Diogenes of Sinope, Son of the Banker Hikesias," in Transactions of the International Numismatic Congress 1936 ( London, 1938); and H. Bannert, "Numismatisches zur Biographic und Lehre des Hundes Diogenes." Litteræ Numismaticæ Vindobonenses 1 ( 1979), pp. 49-63. 23. Dudley rejects as fiction the succession ' Antisthenes-Diogenes-Crates'. In A History of Cynicism (pp. 54ff.) he furnishes a summary of Seltman's numismatic research and uses his conclusions to support his own refusal to consider as a historical fact the association between Antisthenes and Diogenes.

24. P. Gardner, "Diogenes and Delphi." The Classical Review 7 ( 1873), pp. 437-439. 25. Gardner, "Diogenes and Delphi," p. 439. 26. G. Calogero, "Diogene di Sinope," in Enciclopedia Italiana di Scienze, Lettere ed Arti ( Rome: Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana, 1950), Vol. 12, pp. 928-929. 27. H. Diels, "Aus dem Leben des Kynikers Diogenes." Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 7 ( 1894), pp. 313-316. See also K. von Fritz, "Quellenuntersuchungen zum. Leben und Philosophie des Diogenes von Sinope." Philologus Supp. 18, No. 2 ( 1926). 28. Such is the opinion of E. Schwartz in "Diogenes der Hund und Krates der Kyniker," in Characterköpfe aus der antiker Literatur ( Leipzig: Teubner, 1906- 1911), -11528. Vol. 2, pp. 1-23. 29. For the suggestion that it was Diogenes himself who invented the story, see H. Bannert, "Numismatisches zur Biographie des Hundes Diogenes." Litteræ Numismaticæ Vindobonenses 1 ( 1979), pp. 49-63. 30. G. B. Donzelli, 96-107.

." Siculorum Gymnasium 11 ( 1958), pp.

31. For a review of various opinions about the Delphic oracle, see L. E. Navia, The Socratic Presence: A Study of the Sources ( New York: Garland Publishing, 1993), pp. 157ff. 32. J. B. Bury ( A History of Greece [ New York: The Modern Library, n.d.], pp. 564-565) observes that "the Delphic priesthood were skillful enough in adjusting their policy to the changing course of events; but they cannot be suspected of brooding over the mysteries of things to come, or feeling the deeper pulsations of the thoughts of men." 33. The historicity of the oracle has been the subject of much controversy. See, for instance, J. Daniel and R. M. Polansky, "The Tale of the Delphic Oracle in Plato's Apology." Ancient World 2 ( 1979), pp. 83-85. 34. Quoted in Dudley, A History of Cynicism, p. 5. 35. Dudley, A History of Cynicism, p. 5. 36. A. Monterroso, "Diógenes también," in Cuentos ( Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1986), p. 45. 37. Dudley, A History of Cynicism, pp. 5-6. 38. A. O. Lovejoy and G. Boas, Primitivism and Related Ideas in Antiquity ( New York: Octagon Books, 1965), pp. 117ff. 39. One of the most interesting works of art on Diogenes is Poussin's painting depicting him in the act of throwing away his cup after seeing how a child drank water from his hands. This painting, completed around 1645, is at the Louvre Museum in Paris. 40. The word 'mausoleum' is, of course, derived from Mausolus' name.

41. Sardanapalus was the last great king of Assyria ( seventh century B.C.). 42. King Midas was a legendary figure in Greek mythology. 43. For comments on such representation, see W. Amelung, "Notes on Representations of Socrates and of Diogenes and Other Cynics." The American Journal of Archaeology 31 ( 1927), pp. 281-296. Among the scholarly studies on Diogenes and Alexander, see M. Buora, "L'incontro tra Alessandro et Diogene. Tradizioni e significato." Atti dell'Istituto Veneto de Scienze, Lettere ed Arti 132 ( 1973- 1974), pp. 247ff. 44. For instance, D. Pinski, Aleksander un Dyogenes (Vilne: B. Kletskin, 1930). 45. S. Doloff, 'Let Me Talk with This Philosopher': The Alexander Paradigm in King Lear." The Huntington Library Quarterly 54 ( 1991), pp. 253-255. 46. G. E. Lynch argues that the encounter between Alexander and Diogenes, no less than the report that the latter lived in a tub, should be banished from the domain of history. See his "Diogenes," in Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology ( London: John Murray, 1853), Vol. 1, pp. 1021-1022. 47. S. L. Radt, "Zu Plutarchs Vita Alexandri." Mnemosyne 20 ( 1967), pp. 120126. 48. A. M. Pizzagalli, "Influssi buddhistica nella leggenda di Alessandro." Rendiconti dell'Istituto Lombardo 76 ( 1942- 1943), pp. 154-160. -11649. J. Lyly, Campaspe; Sappho and Phao ( New York: Manchester Press, 1991). There are numerous versions found in ancient sources. There is, for instance, Epictetus' account ( Discourses III, xxii, 92): Alexander, finding Diogenes fast asleep, wakes him up with these words, "Sleeping the whole night through does not befit a giver of counsel," to which Diogenes, still half asleep, replies with a Homeric quotation: "Who hath charge of the folk and for many a thing must be watchful" ( Iliad II, 24-25). 50. See J. Servais, "Alexandre-Dionysos et Diogène-Sarapis. À propos de Diogène Laërce, VI, 63". L'Antiquité Classique 28 ( 1958), pp. 98-106. 51. I. G. Kidd, "Diogenes of Sinope", in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy ( New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1967), Vol. 1, p. 410. 52. M. Fernández-Galiano, De Platón a Diógenes ( Madrid: Taurus, 1964), pp. 45-77. 53. W. W. Tarn, "Alexander the Great and the Unity of Mankind", in Makers of the Western Tradition. Portraits from History ( New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979), Vol. 1, p. 73. 54. E. Badian, "Alexander and the Unity of Mankind". Historia 7 ( 1958), p. 425. 55. H. C. Baldry, The Unity of Mankind in Greek Thought ( Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965), p. 110. 56. Tarn, "Alexander the Great and the Unity of Mankind", p. 75. 57. For instance, by K. von Fritz, "Quellenuntersuchungen zum Leben und Philosophie des Diogenes von Sinope". Philologus Supp. 18, No. 2 ( 1926); Dudley, A History of

Cynicism, pp. 26ff.; T. Dorandi, "La Politeia de Diogène de Sinope et quelques remarques sur sa pensée politique", in Le Cynisme ancien et ses prolongements. Actes du Colloque International de CNRS ( Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1993), pp. 5768. 58. Dudley, A History of Cynicism, pp. 30ff. 59. K. von Fritz, "Quellenuntersuchungen". 60. For comments on the proposal to abolish currency, see J. Babelon, "La monnaie de Diogène". Bulletin de la Société Nationale des Antiquaires de France ( 1933), pp. 179180. 61. J. Ortega y Gasset, La rebelión de las masas ( Madrid: Revista de Occidente, 1927). 62. Foucault uses this term to describe someone who, in the tradition of the Cynics, is committed to the use of language only for the purpose of speaking the truth. 63. Manuel y Antonio Machado. Obras Completas ( Madrid: Editorial Plenitud, 1962), pp. 749-750. 64. The story of Diogenes and his lamp appears prominently in practically all modern accounts of Diogenes' life. Poetical compositions on the subject include K. D. Düwell , Ich sehe hier Diogenes ( Vienna: Europäischer Verlag, 1975); and D. R. Innes, The Lamp of Diogenes and Other Poems ( Boston, 1935). A dramatic piece is exemplified by F. Duhomme, La lanterne de Diogène ( Paris: Marchant, 1846). T. Taylor, Diogenes and His Lantern, or, A Hue and Cry after Honesty ( London: Lacy, 1850) is an example of a musical composition on the story. The presence of Diogenes' lamp in literature is quite common. We find it in educational theory, articles, as in B. Lindsay, "A Lamp for Diogenes: Leadership Giftedness and Moral Education". Roeper Review 11 ( 1989), pp. -1178-11, where the true educator is compared to Diogenes carrying his lighted lamp. Newspaper editorials and commentaries also appeal with some frequency to the image of the Cynic philosopher carrying his lamp. Thus, in The Spectator ( April 2, 1994), the commentator notes that if Diogenes were to become acquainted with Bill and Hillary Clinton, he would once more carry his lamp in his futile search for an honest person in the White House. 65. A. Schopenhauer, Complete Essays of Schopenhauer. Translated by T. Saunders ( New York: Willey Book Company, 1942), Book 3, p. 70. 66. For the identification of Xeniades, see A. N. Zoubos, [ On Xeniades of Corinth] ( Athens, 1957). 67. For a discussion of the idea of Diogenes as a 'spy' of God, see M. W. Schneider , "Browning's Spy". Victorian Poetry 17 ( 1979), pp. 384-388. 68. Comments on Diogenes' theological views are found in M. Winiarczyk, "Diagoras von Melos und Diogenes von Sinope". Eos 64 ( 1976), pp. 177-184. 69. A balanced treatment of Diogenes' anti-intellectualism is J. M. Meilland, "L'anti-

intellectualisme de Diogène le Cynique". Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie 3 ( 1983), pp. 233-246. 70. Meilland, "L'anti-intellectualism de Diogène", p. 233. 71. G. Rodier, "Antisthène, in Études de philosophie grecque" ( Paris: J. Vrin, 1927), pp. 25ff. 72. For a discussion of the value of philosophy among the Cynics, see R. M. Wenley , "Cynics", in Encyclopœdia of Religion and Ethics ( New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, n.d.), Vol. 4, pp. 378-383. 73. The anecdote about Plato's definition of man and Diogenes' response to it has been seen as a possible source for the passage in Shakespeare's King Lear ( III, iv, 101-109) in which Lear offers his own definition. See J. Donawerth, "Diogenes the Cynic and Lear's Definition of Man, King Lear (III, iv, 101-109)". English Language Notes 15 ( 1977), pp. 10-14. 74. Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, # 26. -118CHAPTER 4 Crates, the Door-opener There is an interesting anecdote about Crates with which we can begin this review of his life and doctrines: It is well known that upon divesting himself of his possessions, he put a crown over his head, as if wishing to announce his victory over wealth and his conquest of freedom, appearing subsequently as a beggar, but celebrating his new life with much merriment and manifestations of joy. 1 There are several accounts that describe Crates' abandonment of his wealth and his conversion to the Cynic life. According to Diogenes Laertius (VI, 87), Crates converted all his property into coins and proceeded to distribute it among his fellow-citizens, immediately after seeing Telephus, the legendary son of Hercules, represented in a tragedy carrying a little basket and destitute of all goods. The example of the famous Telephus, the man who guided the Greeks to Troy, convinced Crates to part with all his wealth. In another version, also found in the testimony of Diogenes Laertius (VI, 87), it was Diogenes who persuaded Crates to convert his properties into gold and then to throw it all into the sea. In another, again from Diogenes Laertius (VI, 88), Crates entrusted a banker with his money with the instructions that it should be given to his children after his death, should they turn out to be ordinary people, but to give them nothing, should they grow up to be philosophers, for philosophers need nothing. In all versions, however, one thing is clear: Crates, once a wealthy man, gave up his possessions and became a poor man like Diogenes the Cynic. The anecdote with which we began this chapter adds one further note: his newly acquired poverty was for him the beginning of a new life of happiness. But who is this happy beggar, who, according to Cicero (Mor. 226e), "spent his entire life joking and laughing, as though on an endless holiday," and how is he related to the Cynic

-119movement? Who is this Cynic who, like Democritus, lived spreading peace and happiness among his fellow human beings? 2 Concerning the relationship between Crates and the Cynic movement, three conclusions have been suggested by scholars: (1) that Crates was not a Cynic philosopher but a precursor of Stoicism through his influence on Zeno of Citium 3 ; (2) that it was Crates who 'founded' the Cynic sect and gave expression for the first time to Cynic ideas and practices; and (3) that, as a disciple of Diogenes, Crates continued the Cynic style of life, and refined the ideas and teachings of his predecessor. This last conclusion is supported by most of the sources, in which the succession 'Antisthenes-Diogenes-Crates' is affirmed. Again, as has been reiterated in the previous chapters, Cynicism cannot be viewed as a monolithic structure characterized by dogmas or by an unchangeable mode of life, for which reason, neither was Diogenes a replica of Antisthenes, nor Crates a duplication of Diogenes. In these three philosophers, we come upon idiosyncratic philosophical types, so that it is ill-advised to expect the Cynicism of one philosopher to reappear unaltered in the others. Crates deserves to be classified as a Cynic, indeed as one of the three most important Cynics, but it would also be misguided to regard his Cynicism as the most genuine. In the endeavor to recreate Crates' philosophy and recount his life, we are hindered by the poverty of the sources. Many works are attributed to him, and it appears that in fact he was a prolific writer especially in poetic compositions. Poetry was regarded by him as an important instrument for the dissemination of ideas. 4 He composed a revision of Solon's elegiac poem to the Muses, a revision that is often taken by scholars to be a parody, and from which much can be learned concerning Crates' style of life. According to Julian ( Or. VI, 199 d- 200 a; cf. 213 b-d), this parody began with these lines: Glorious children of Memory and Olympian Zeus, ye Muses of Pieria, listen to my prayer! Give me without ceasing food for my belly which has always made my life frugal and free from slavery. . . . Make me useful to my friends, rather than agreeable. As for money, I do not wish to amass conspicuous wealth, but only seek the wealth of the beetle or the maintenance of the ant; nay, I desire to possess justice and to collect riches that are easily carried, easily acquired, and are of great avail to virtue. If I may but win these, I will propitiate Hermes and the holy Muses, not with costly dainties, but with pious virtues. Other poetical compositions also belong to him, in one of which ( The Wallet) he left us a description of his u in honor of one of the few possessions treasured by the Cynics, their leathern wallet. This poem is said to have begun with these lines: Pera, so name we an island, girt around by the sea of Illusion, Glorious, fertile, and fair, land unpolluted by evil; Here no trafficking knave makes fast his ships in the harbor, Here no tempter ensnares the unwary with venal allurements. Onions and leeks and figs and crusts of bread are its produce. -120Never in turmoil of battle do warriors strive to possess it; Here there is respite and peace from the struggle for riches and honor.

The phrase "the sea of Illusion" contains the first appearance of the notion of τ035+031103C5+03D5ος among the Cynics, which conveys the images of vapor, mist, fog, or smoke, and which was used metaphorically to describe the state of mental and spiritual obfuscation in which most people live. In the Greek text (Frag. 4, Diels, D.L. VI, 85 ), the city of Pera is said to lay in the midst of οίνοπιτ03C5+03CD03C5+03D51F30+0326, that is, "a wine-colored sea of fog." There is also a composition entitled In Praise of the Lentil, honoring one of the favorite foods of the Cynics, and a hymn to plain living (∈03C5+ ὐ ∈ια), which, according to Julian ( Or. VI, 199 a), began with these words: "Hail, Goddess and Queen, darling of wise men, Plain Living, child of glorious Temperance!" Several tragedies, reportedly of some literary merit, are also said to have been written by Crates, as well as other types of literature, but neither his poems, nor his tragedies, nor in fact anything else from him has survived, except for less than one hundred fragments in which his literary skill and philosophical depth can be vaguely discerned, and from which it is possible to form an idea of his doctrines. Such fragments permit us to develop a better idea of Crates than what can be gathered about Diogenes from his own fragments. In the case of Crates, as Dudley has pointed out, "we are less dependent on secondary sources for an estimate of Crates than was the case with either Antisthenes or Diogenes." 5 There is a collection of thirty letters attributed to him, from which a great deal can be learned about Cynicism, even though the letters may not be authentic. In fact, they seem to have been the work of Hellenistic writers, 6 and belong to a time after Philodemus of Gadara. 7 They include apophthegms that are attributed in more reliable sources to Antisthenes and Diogenes, and their content, as Gomperz observed, is barren and less instructive than what we find in letters ascribed to other Cynics. 8 References to Crates are numerous in the secondary sources, and commentaries on his life and teachings are found in various places, but, aside from Diogenes Laertius' short biography ( VI, 85-93), and certain passages from the surviving writings of Teles of Megara, 9 no substantial account of him has remained. Plutarch's biography of Crates, which seems to have served as a source for at least one of Julian's orations, would have given us important biographical and philosophical information. Julian himself observes that this biography should serve well anyone who truly wants to learn about Crates ( Or. VI, 200b). This lost work of Plutarch was used in late Roman times as the standard textbook for what we might call a philosophical 'course' on Cynicism. 10 Zeno of Citium, who was Crates' disciple, wrote a book entitled Recollections of Crates, which could have been the source from which many of the anecdotes and apophthegms associated with Crates were derived. Statements concerning his life and ideas are found in various sources, e.g., Plutarch, Cicero, Lucian, Seneca, Epictetus, Athenaeus, Saint Gregory Nazianzus, Origen, and Apuleius. From all these -121testimonies, as well as from the fragments of his works, it is possible to create an image, albeit blurry and rough, of the great Boeotian Cynic. Diogenes Laertius ( VI, 87) tells us that Crates flourished in Ol. CXIII, that is, 328-324 B.C. He was, therefore, a middle-aged man at the time of Diogenes' death. The generally accepted dates for him are 368/365-287/285 B.C. His place of birth was Thebes, the city where, as Apuleius reminds us ( Florida XIV), Hercules was believed to have been born. His father was

a wealthy Theban named Ascondas. Crates is reported to have met Alexander the Great sometime after the Macedonians destroyed Thebes in 335 B.C. Alexander, we are told, actually stayed in Crates' house in Thebes (D.L. VI, 87), where the young emperor asked Crates whether he wanted him to rebuild the city, to which Crates replied, in a way in which his incipient Cynicism is discernible: "Why should Thebes be rebuilt by you? Another Alexander will perhaps come to destroy it again." A different version of this incident comes to us from Philostratus' The Life of Apollonius of Tyana ( VII, ii). Here, when Alexander offered to rebuild Thebes for the sake of Crates, the philosopher responded that he wished that he would never stand in need of a country which anyone could devastate by the force of arms. There is also a report from Plutarch ( Demetriusxiv) concerning a meeting between Crates and Demetrius of Phalerum, who in 287 B.C. besieged Athens. The Athenians, we are told, sent the aged philosopher to persuade Demetrius not to invade the city, and to show him that it was to his own advantage to negotiate a peace treaty. Crates succeeded in his mission, and Demetrius concluded an agreement with Ptolemy, whereby, at least for a short time, everyone came out a winner. The meeting between Crates and Demetrius is important for two reasons: first, we know that the terms of the peace agreement were concluded in 287 B.C., which gives us the latest date at which Crates is known to have been alive; and, secondly, it reveals the respect with which he must have been viewed by the Athenians; a Theban negotiating for the Athenians must have been an unusual sight. It also gives us a glimpse of the conciliating and peace-making abilities of Crates. Information about the manner of his death is not available, although it is reasonable to lend credence to reports that inform us that he died of old age. Diogenes Laertius observes ( VI, 92) that when Crates realized that the time of his death was approaching, he would chant over himself this charm: "Bent and crooked by time, off to the kingdom of Hades you go, dear hunchback, you are off to Hades!" Some testimonies note that he was buried in Boeotia, the province of his origin. For the reconstruction of Crates' biography, we must appeal to hosts of anecdotes of varying degrees of reliability, although, as we said earlier, the fragments of his works, being more numerous, are of great assistance. 11 His birth in Thebes appears to be unquestionable, as is the fact that he came from an affluent family. Apuleius informs us that "his family was one of the best, his household numerous, and his dwelling adorned with an ample vestibule" ( Florida XIV). Also, on the testimony of Apuleius (ibid.), he is described as "well dressed -122cand well endowed with lands," presumably before his conversion to Cynicism. It is also certain that at some time or another he travelled to Athens, where he lived most of his life and where he became Diogenes' disciple. Possibly on account of Diogenes' influence he abandoned his wealth, chose poverty, and adopted the Cynic life (D.L. VI, 85 ), although Apuleius affirms that his 'conversion' to Cynicism was also the result of his own reflections. There is also a report from Diogenes Laertius ( VI, 85) that it was not from Diogenes that he learned philosophy, but from Bryson the Achaean (about whom there is hardly any information). This report may have been circulated by those who wished to disassociate Stoicism from its Cynic ancestry by denying any connection between Crates and Diogenes. If the testimonies concerning Crates' debt to Diogenes are correct, then the 'succession' Socrates-Antisthenes-Diogenes-Crates gains in historical value, and Cynicism appears more and more as an offspring of the Socratic presence. Zeno of Citium is said to have been related

to Crates, just as Crates was related to Diogenes, which, if true, would include Zeno as the last link in the 'succession' that began with Socrates. This, then, would allow us to speak of Stoicism as an offshoot of Cynicism. It would also permit us to say that after Crates, Cynicism developed along two distinct paths, one of which, through Zeno, led to Stoicism, and the other of which, through some of Crates' other disciples, led to the continuation of Cynic philosophy in Hellenistic times. Zeno, it seems, while learning a great deal from Crates, was unable to incorporate into his life some of the extreme elements of Cynicism, especially its rebelliousness and its shamelessness, on account of his "innate modesty" (D.L. VII, 2). Diogenes Laertius tells us ( VII, 2-3) that once, when Zeno was reading the second book of Xenophon Memorabilia in an Athenian bookstore, he asked the owner where men like Socrates could still be found. Crates happened to pass by, and the owner, pointing to him, said to Zeno: "There, just follow that man." Zeno did precisely that, and thus he became Crates' disciple. Crates tried to cure him of his modesty by asking him to carry a bowl of lentil soup through the streets. Zeno, in shame, sought to hide the bowl under his cloak as he walked, but Crates broke it with his staff. In greater shame Zeno ran away with the soup dripping down his legs, while Crates followed him shouting, "Why are you running, my friend? Nothing dreadful has happened to you!" This anecdote is filled with information, perhaps not genuinely biographical either about Crates or about Zeno, but information concerning various ideological details. The part about the embarrassment caused to Zeno by the bowl of lentil soup is a variation of two similar anecdotes told about Diogenes: he, too, like Crates, 'tested' his prospective disciples in order to see how far they were willing and able to display shamelessness in public places. Once he gave a man a large tuna and asked him to carry it with him wherever he went. The man, in embarrassment, threw away the tuna and left. Diogenes' comment was: "The friendship between us was spoiled by a fish" (D.L. VI, 36). In another anecdote, it is a piece of cheese that causes the flight of a disciple. In both cases, -123those seeking Diogenes' instruction had apparently not attained the necessary level of shamelessness, which was a requirement for the study of philosophy under him. With Crates and Zeno, however, things were not quite otherwise: the latter, possibly a man of modesty himself, felt embarrassed to be seen carrying a bowl of soup, and even more embarrassed to be seen in public with lentil soup dripping down his legs. The result was, then, that he could only learn some of the lessons taught by Crates. Zeno's visit to the bookseller's shop in Athens was not accidental. An oracle, similar to those given to Socrates and Diogenes, had been spoken about him when he asked for the god's guidance: "Take on the appearance of the dead," was the oracle, which he understood, not in the sense that he should die, but as a metaphorical utterance meaning that he should devote himself to the study of ancient authors. For this reason, then, he visited the bookseller's shop. There, he read about Socrates, and so impressed was he by his virtue and wisdom that he asked where such men could still be found, and its was thus that he discovered Crates, a disciple of another Socrates-like man, who, in his turn, had been associated with Antisthenes: the 'succession' Socrates-AntisthenesDiogenes-Crates-Zeno is affirmed once more. But there is more in the anecdote. The modesty of the founder of Stoicism is contrasted with the shamelessness of the Cynic philosopher. Shamelessness (àναíδ∈ια) was a distinguishing mark of Diogenes, his trademark, so to speak, but it was also present in Crates, as can be

learned from the testimony of Apuleius, who in his Florida ( XIV) gave us an account of one of the most curious and embarrassing moments in the history of Cynicism. This incident is related to the famous 'marriage' between Crates and Hipparchia, an unusual species of 'marriage' that is known by the term κυνογαμíα. 12 According to Apuleius, it was Zeno's sense shame that prevented a crowd of onlookers from witnessing the consummation of Crates' marriage with Hipparchia, for when they were about to engage in a public sexual act, Zeno sheltered them from view with his cloak. This story appears only in the writings of Apuleius, and it could be only an invention created for the purpose of laying bare the shamelessness of the Cynics. 13 There is a comment in Julian Or. VI (185cd) that could be interpreted as a tacit allusion to the story recounted by Apuleius. Julian observes that when Zeno and his disciples realized that people were generally averse to the shamelessness and simplicity of Crates, "they, so to speak, hedged him about with screens." The image of the "screens" with which Crates was "hedged about" by the Stoics could be taken to be an allusion to Zeno's cloak. But Julian proceeds immediately to clarify the sense of his image: "I mean with maxims on the management of the household and the relationship with one's wife and the rearing of children, to the end that they might make Crates the genuine guardian of the public welfare." This passage, therefore, should not be interpreted as an allusion to Apuleius' story, but as saying that the Stoics softened and polished some of the excesses of Cynicism. Apuleius' own story, the source of which we do not know, could have been derived from an -124older anecdote constructed as a symbolic representation of the relationship between the Cynics and the Stoics. In this case, then, its biographical value is minimal, but its ideological content is significant. There are other details about Crates that are known with some certainty. We know, for instance, that aside from Zeno, he had other disciples, among whom we could mention Hipparchia and her brother Metrocles. Theombrotus, Cleomenes, Monimus, Menippus, Cleanthes, and Cercidas, among others, are also mentioned by the sources as disciples, but in some of these cases the evidence for a relationship between them and Crates is weak. 14 From his marriage with Hipparchia he had a daughter and one or two sons, one of whom, according to Eratosthenes, was named Pasicles, who seems to have grown up to become an 'ordinary' man, and who, accordingly, was able to claim the money that his father had entrusted in the care of a banker. We are told by one of the sources that he once took one of his sons to a brothel for the purpose of showing him how he had been begotten, and how his father and mother were married (D.L. VI, 88), and another source tells us that he arranged for the marriage of his daughter on a thirty-day trial basis. He was hunchback, and his physical appearance is described as having been so ugly that people would laugh at him when he exercised in the gymnasiums. 15 His ugliness and his deformity, however, served to emphasize his other side, that is, his inner being, in which he proved to be a man of great spiritual beauty: as in the instance of Socrates ( Plato, Symposium 215 a- 222 b), who was compared to the Sileni and the Satyrs, so with Crates, too, an unpleasant appearance was paradoxically complemented by a beautiful soul, which can explains why a woman as beautiful as Hipparchia is said to have fallen in love with so ugly, old, and deformed a man. She, too, like Alcibiades in the case of Socrates, recognized the spiritual reality that was hidden beneath an unattractive exterior. According to Julian ( Or. VI, 201 b), Crates himself used to make fun of his own deformity.

If there is one biographical fact that can be affirmed about the famous Cynic hunchback, it is that, once he embraced the Cynic life, he became recognized as the embodiment of pleasantness, kindness, and virtue. Antisthenes may have been known for his stern behavior, for his adherence to a harsh form of virtue, and for his devotion to Socrates. Diogenes was famous for the vitriolic way in which he dealt with his contemporaries, and for his uncompromising mood of rebellion. But nowhere do we ever come upon any testimony related to Crates in which he is not praised for his seductive and enticing ability to make all those who crossed his path feel happy and at peace. Only Saint Francis of Assisi can be compared with him in this regard: the humble monk of Assisi exuded joy and peace wherever he went, and exhaled an air of tranquility among people and even among animals. But the very same thing can be said about the man who became known as 'the beloved hunchback'. In his case, then, Cynicism turned in a different direction from that of his predecessors. Again from Apuleius ( Florida XIV), we have a testimony that sheds light on this most significant aspect of Crates' life and philosophy: -125Crates, who was worshipped like a domestic Lar by the Athenians of his time, 16 was someone against whom no door was ever shut; nor had any father of a family a secret so profound as not to admit the seasonable interposition of Crates, the analyzer and arbitrator of all disputes and altercations between relations. . . . As the poets relate that in ancient times Hercules quelled by means of his courage and strength all sorts of horrid monsters and enormities, both human and brute, so was that philosopher a Hercules against anger and envy, avarice and lust, and other monsters and enormities of the human mind. All these pests he drove out from the minds of men, purged families of them, and quelled malevolence. He, too, was half-naked, and notable for his club; he was likewise a native of Thebes, whence Hercules is known to have derived his birth. Apuleius' statement includes several elements that deserve consideration. The connect

) in the case of Hercules, with which actual monsters and evil people were destroyed, and a staff or stick (βáκτρον) in the case of Crates, with which, as with a magic wand, vices, confusion, and unhappiness were exorcised from human dwellings. 17 Both for Hercules and for Crates, their clubs were their royal scepters, more genuine and in fact more powerful than the scepters of the monarchs of this world. 18 Significant, too, is the comment that Crates "was someone against whom no door was ever shut." Every door was, then, open for him, and every household in Athens welcomed him as a guest, for his presence alone was sufficient to fill those around him with peace and joy. Hence, we come upon the unique designation by which he became known, 'the door-opener' (Θυρ∈πανοικτης). Plutarch notes that Crates "would go into any house and people would receive him gladly and with honor." In fact, it is said that in many Athenian houses a sign could be seen hanging on the main door with the inscription AΤAΘΩΔ AIMONI, that is, 'Welcome be the Good Spirit. Such a sign, we presume, was meant for Crates, who, like a good spirit, would bring good things into every house in which he entered. Many could have said of Crates what Xeniades once said about Diogenes when he first went to live with him in Corinth: "A good spirit came to dwell within" (D.L. VI, 74).

If the testimonies are correct, and in this regard we have no reason to question them, then Crates' mission was to act as a scout and emissary of God among his fellow human beings, and to act as their spiritual physician, laughter and joy being his principal medicines, and reason and resignation his surgical instruments in the process of healing those who suffered from spiritual and emotional maladies. What a wonderful sight it must have been to see the Cynic hunchback, poor, unattractive, and unassuming himself, walk into houses, "invited and uninvited," as Julian reports ( Or. VI, 201b), and distribute his immense spiritual and intellectual wealth among the spiritually and intellectually destitute Athenian population, just as he is said to have distributed among the -126poor his physical wealth! Julian gives us this description of Crates at work: When his friends gave an entertainment he used to go, whether invited or not, and would reconcile his nearest friends if he learned that they had quarrelled. He used to reprove them not harshly but in a gentle manner, and not so as to seem to persecute those whom he wished to reform, but as though he wished to be of use both to them and to the bystanders. ( Or. VI, 201b-c) The phrase "not harshly but in a gentle manner" is important, because it underlines a major difference between Crates and his two predecessors. The castigating sarcasm of Antisthenes, and the condemning language and manners of Diogenes seem to have been replaced by a softer and refined approach to the shortcomings and flaws of people. With a smile, a joke, or some words of admonition, Crates would endeavor to clear the minds of his contemporaries from the τυ+U0302φος that enveloped those around him. If we had been able to observe him in the midst of his daily routines, in which, as a visiting nurse or an attending physician, he would seek out the spiritually sick among the Athenians in order to lend them his assistance, we would have noticed that the 'dog' in him, that is, his Cynicism, had undergone a transformation. He would not have said what Diogenes is reported to have said once: "Other dogs bite only their enemies, but I bite both my enemies and my friends." Crates had no enemies and his 'bite' was more gentle than, and yet as effective as, Diogenes' 'bite'. The image used by Saint Paul in 1 Thess. (2:1-8), where the preacher is asked to deal with his community as "a gentle nurse" treats those who are ill, 19 could have been used in the context of Crates. In him, then, we come upon a refining of the doctrines and example of his Cynic teacher, but in diminishing the extreme character of the latter's Cynicism, Crates did not adulterate or deface its philosophical essence. For which reason we are justified in identifying him as a true Cynic: Goulet-Cazé is correct in affirming that Crates "truly practiced the Cynic style of life." 20 We would be wrong in affirming that as a Cynic he contributed nothing of value, as some have suggested. 21 It makes more sense to agree with Calogero's estimate of Crates as a Cynic, when he observed that "on account of his innate temperament Crates was able to soften, with grace and nobility, the typical harshness of Cynicism, but in the content of his doctrines, his Cynicism remained strict and rigorous." 22 The grace and nobility of which Calogero speaks may account for the curious circumstance that, whereas it is easy to find testimonies in which the character and ideas of other Cynics are vilified or condemned, such is not the case in the instance of Crates. It is difficult to find statements in the sources in which either the personality of Crates or his ideas are condemned as outrageous or worthy of vituperation, or as detrimental to public morals, or as distasteful or unpleasant. There is an almost total silence concerning his alleged public nuptials with

Hipparchia, and even the story involving his introducing his son to manhood by taking him into a brothel is glossed over, as if it had never occurred, which -127can be regarded as quite possible, given the nature of our information. The portrayal of Crates created by the sources reveals a number of clear features. Undoubtedly, his Cynicism is authentic and rigorous. There is the expected dosage of shamelessness, and there is also an ingredient of selfsufficiency and a passion for freedom, as this fragment reveals: Bowed by no yoke of desire nor laden with fetters of Enslavement, One thing alone do we honor, immortal Freedom, our Mistress. There is contempt for wealth and the realization that to be happy, a person does not need many material things, just a well-developed mind and a controlled will. "Wisdom, selfsufficiency, truth, plain-speaking, and freedom," he says to Diogenes, while conversing with him in Hades, as Lucian tells us ( Dialogues of the Dead XI)--these are the only things that have satisfied him. As for those things that ordinary people covet, he tells Diogenes, I had no need of them; neither had you, Diogenes: for what we needed, you inherited from Antisthenes, and I from you, possessions far greater and more respectable than all the power of the Persians. ( Dialogues of the Dead XI) Thus, Crates can spend eternity in Hades, laughing and joking with Diogenes about all those people who, while alive, sought and amassed fortunes, but who, in death, own nothing, while he and Diogenes retain and even increase their wealth with every passing moment. A parallelism suggests itself between Crates' words and those of Saint Paul ( 2 Cor. 6:10), "poor, yet making many rich; having nothing, and yet possessing everything." 23 There is also in Crates a commitment to live a life of simplicity and frugality: water is preferable to wine, and bread to cakes, as he is reported to have said to Demetrius of Phalerum, who sent him wine and cakes ( D. L. VI, 90); and, in general, in regard to physical things, less is always better than more. There is also a desire, almost a compulsion, to be free from the encumbrances of social restrictions, and from the snares of uncontrolled sensual desires. This longing for freedom leads him, as in the case of Diogenes, to abandon the idea of citizenship. He could and, in fact, would render himself useful to the community in which he lived, as when he complied with the Athenians' request for him to act as their emissary, but he would have done the same for any other city, for he was a citizen of no country; in his own words: "I ant a citizen of the land of Obscurity and Poverty, impregnable to Fortune, a fellowcitizen of Diogenes" ( D. L. VI, 93). Only the utopian Island of Pera, the city of his dreams could command his complete and unfaltering allegiance. With this refusal to belong to an established social or political context, there is also the inevitable condemnation, not of people, but of institutions and conventions: generals are seen for what they really are, namely, only "donkey drivers"; marriages tainted by adultery and deception, tragic scenes; sexual promiscuity, the material for comedy and the prelude to madness; and so on. His

-128diatribes, however, as strong and cutting as they are, are not directed at individuals but at certain unworthy types of human conduct. Nowhere do we come across anecdotes or apophthegms connected with Crates in which the intended victim of his bite is a person. There is a statement attributed to him by Diogenes Laertius ( VI, 89 ) that reveals to us something new in Cynicism: Crates observed that it is impossible to find any human being who is free from flaws, and this, of course, includes himself. In every person, he added, just as in every pomegranate, one of the seeds is always going bad. The pride and self-assurance that we found earlier in Diogenes, as well as the self-righteousness of Antisthenes, are either absent or at least less noticeable in Crates. He recognizes the shortcomings and faults of all those around him, but does not fail to notice his own: like the rest, he, too, is in need of spiritual healing, for which reason he welcomes the opportunity of being healed by others, especially when they use the bitter medicine of insult, abuse, and ridicule. Like the ancient pasupatas, who were members of an Indian ascetic sect, Crates also appears to seek (or at least not avoid) contempt and condemnation from others as a means of cleansing himself from flaws and strengthening his character. 24 But the endurance of insults and mistreatment on his part discloses a certain humility in him, which absolves him from the first tragic flaw that we identified earlier as belonging to Cynicism, namely, pride. This absence of pride, however, does not lead Crates to relegate himself to the level of an inconsequential person, for with him, humility does not assume the form of self-effacement. On the contrary, it plunges him into an intense life of social activity, almost, as if he were moved by a spirit of missionary enterprise. 25 The kernel of this enterprise can be discerned in what he called his 'philanthropy' (ϕ ), a word that seems to have been coined by him, for at least it is not found in any context before him. It literally means 'the love of people' and, by association, it includes ideas such as kindness, benevolence, and clemency. Its modern cognates (e.g., 'philanthropy') convey, of course, a related meaning, but more in the sense of 'charity', as when we speak of wealthy people giving large contributions to a 'charitable cause' (which, in the language of the Cynics, would have been stated thus: "Rich people dumping their crumbs on the poor"). In English, the word 'philanthropy' appears to have been used for the first time in one of the sermons of Jeremy Taylor, an English preacher around 1650, and from this time on, its modern sense of 'charity' (both in English and in other languages) became established. The meaning of the Greek term, however, is somewhat different, as it stands for the love of persons, individual persons, or for the love of humanity in general. Undoubtedly, Diogenes, too, was philanthropic, for he loved human beings. The classical Cynics, quite unlike modern cynics and picaros of all sorts who are unable to love, were philanthropic, since they were able and willing to love people. But for Diogenes, the issue of love was a complex one, for while he may have loved human beings, as we can gather from his campaign to improve their spiritual and intellectual condition, he claimed repeatedly not to -129have been able to find any human being anywhere. We saw how, carrying a lighted lamp in broad daylight, he searched in vain for a human being, but what he found wherever he went was only the semblance of human beings, living things that resembled people but were not real human beings. Scoundrels and rogues, he would say, were everywhere, but genuine people nowhere. Hence, his philanthropy, that is, his love for people, was bound to remain

frustrated and unconsummated, and in the end he might not have succeeded in loving anybody, which may well account for the element of anger and bitterness that emerges so strikingly from some of the anecdotes and statements associated with him. Practically nobody escaped unharmed or unblemished from his caustic diatribes and merciless retorts. Even for Antisthenes, his own teacher, he had nothing kind to say. Nowhere do we come upon any report that links him with anybody: neither man nor woman, neither lover nor wife, neither children nor relatives, nor even an intimate friend, can be associated with him. Somehow, his philanthropy functioned in him as the underground and hidden force that impelled and guided him to deface the moral currency of his contemporaries, but it remained objectless, since there was nobody worthy of his love. As much as in his utopian political ideas, his philanthropy was undirected and thoroughly vague. His dislikes, on the other hand, were precisely aimed at certain individuals, and at certain classes and types of people, and these included practically everybody. It is indeed easy to identify who and what it was that Diogenes did not love, or who or what the objects of his contempt were. There is hardly any apparent love or compassion in him, for instance, when, as Diogenes Laertius reports ( VI, 52 ), on seeing some women hanged from an olive tree, he remarked, "I wish that every tree produced the same fruit!" Or when, seeing a woman carried in a litter, he remarked that "the cage did not correspond in quality with its load" ( VI, 51 ). Or when, as a woman was drowning in a river, he observed that there was no cause for alarm, because "a bad thing cannot happen to the worst of things." This last anecdote has given rise to much controversy, since, if genuine, it could force us to classify Diogenes and, by association, other Cynics, including Crates, as misogynists. 26 The anecdote is based in part on a graffito found in Herculaneum, in which the scene is described: Diogenes sees a woman drowning in a river and does not intervene, because he knows that something bad should happen to a bad person, and all women are bad, ergo. ὑ +--women are "the evil of evils." J. Moles has made a careful study of the issues involved in the anecdote, and has concluded that the graffito is fictitious and that it "travesties the bizarreness of Cynic behavior to the point of absurdity." 27 The historical Diogenes, Moles insists, would have never behaved in that fashion. Even if Diogenes did utter such a statement about women, a statement that is incidentally a sort of proverbial topos of ordinary parlance in classical times, it is possible to interpret it as nothing more than a typical exhibitionist outburst, something not rare with him. According to Moles, there is no evidence that could support the thesis that either the Cynics in general or Diogenes in particular were misogynists, and the -130suggestion that the case could be otherwise involves, he argues, a misconception about classical Cynicism. There is some weight in the argument that already in Antisthenes' thought the socially created distinctions that placed men and women on different levels were beginning to be questioned, for according to him, virtue is the same for men as for women, and since in his view virtue can be taught, men and women are virtuous or vicious because of the ways in which they have been educated. In Diogenes, too, virtue can be developed, and, at least in principle, women can attain the same heights of virtue or descend to the same depths of vice as men. What can perhaps be affirmed with some degree of certainty in regard to the anecdote disclosed by the Herculaneum graffito, is that if Diogenes did in fact see a woman drowning in a river, he would have probably been as moved or as unmoved as if he had seen a man in

the same predicament. Although for different reasons, he might have reacted not unlike JeanBaptiste Clamence, the protagonist in Camus' The Fall, when he hears a splash on the river Seine as a young woman jumps from a bridge, and is aware of her struggle to save herself, and then walks away. The indifference shown by Diogenes towards people, or actually towards those that merely resembled people, was sometimes plainly brutal: "Hang yourself" was occasionally his advice to those whom he met. If, on the other hand, the drowning woman was truly a human being (an unlikely possibility, not because she was a woman, but because true human beings are exceptional occurrences), then we could imagine that Diogenes might have made some effort to save her from death. In reality, the issue must remain unresolved. But in the presence of Crates, the issue could admit of some resolution. He, too, like Diogenes, recognized how deficient most people are in what concerns true humanity. He had to deal with the same sorts of people. Everywhere, too, he must have contemplated the same unhappy and discouraging spectacle: rascals, rogues, vicious characters, empty heads, and the like, that is, the very same human circus encountered by Diogenes. But the Cynic hunchback, possibly by temperament, or owing to the different set of circumstances of his life, reacted differently. He recognized, as much as Diogenes did, the flaws in others, but was well aware of his own. He embraced people around him, not only metaphorically but literally, and showed them the way to dissipate the τυ+ϕος from their lives. His kind and loving nature directed his Cynic activities in a special way. But love attracts love, and it was thus that Hipparchia became attached to him. Her entrance into the scene constitutes one of the most interesting moments in the history of Cynicism and, we may add, in the history of Western philosophy. There have been very few women who are known to have played a decisive part in the development of ideas in the classical world, which is readily explainable by reference to the social role generally accorded to women in ancient societies, and by reference to the probably biased tendencies of those who have written accounts of the history of Western philosophy. We have come to know about important women in ancient philosophy almost by accident and -131invariably as accompanying shadows behind some great male philosopher. We could mention, for instance, Theano, Pythagoras' wife, a mathematician herself; Aspasia, Pericles' companion and the mother of two of his children, who is said to have been Socrates' mentor in rhetoric ( Menexenus235e); Lasthenia of Mantinea and Axiothea of Phlius, two members of Plato's Academy; and Arete, the daughter of Aristippus, who headed the Cyrenaic school after her father's death. And then there is Hypatia of Alexandria, a Neoplatonic philosopher and the author of a work on Euclid and a commentary on the Almagest. This remarkable woman, who combined in herself many wonderful endowments such as beauty, modesty, chastity, and a superb intelligence, was torn to pieces by a fanatical mob of Christian zealots in A.D. 415. And, doubtlessly, there must have been other women of great achievements, about whom we do not even know the names, but who were an important part in the course of Western thought throughout classical times. 28 Hipparchia is one such woman. Information about her is scarce and vague, although, and not unexpectedly, the literature about her is not negligible. Her character, her association with Crates, and in particular the mode of her marriage with him, have attracted considerable attention both in literature and in art. There are, for instance, poetical compositions, 29 as well

as historico-fictional accounts. 30 There is a Roman fresco from the second century B.C. which depicts her in the company of Crates. 31 She is mentioned in scholarly works dealing with Cynicism, and various studies have been devoted to her. 32 Suidas speaks of three works written by Hipparchia, namely, Philosophical Hypotheses, Epichiremas, and Questions to Theodorus. Nothing, however, has survived from them, and it is neither possible to vouch for their authenticity nor to comment on their contents. Information about her, however, is furnished in many sources, and, as Diogenes Laertius notes ( VI. 98 ), the tales about the famous female philosopher were countless. Diogenes Laertius himself left for us a short biographical account in which various anecdotes are narrated ( VI, 96 - 98 ). An epigram on her, included in the Anthology under the name of Antipater of Sidon, is preserved: I, Hipparchia of Maroneia, have not followed the customs of women, but with a manly heart I have abided by the ways of the Cynics. I have never been fond of the brooch that fastens my garments, and neither have I been pleased with the bound foot and with the headband daubed with perfume. But a staff, and bare feet and whatever folded cloak clings from my limbs, and the hard ground instead of a bed, these I have chosen. My life is preferable to the life of the Menalian maiden [Artemis?], for hunting is not as good as seeking wisdom. Hipparchia was born in Maroneia, a Thracian town, of a wealthy family. Metrocles, her brother, was for some time a student of Theophrastus and Xenocrates. He was 'rescued' from such teachers and their luxurious mode of life by Crates in a curious way, as Diogenes Laertius informs us ( VI, 94 ). His character had become so enfeebled that once, while rehearsing a speech, he made a gross -132breach of good manners. This plunged him into despair and he decided to starve himself to death. An appeal was made to Crates, who went to visit him and prepared for him a meal of lupines. He told the young man that he had committed no crime at all, saying that if he had not relieved himself, he might have exploded. Crates then proceeded to demonstrate to him the insignificance of the offence by reproducing it himself. Metrocles was at last convinced and henceforth he became his disciple. This anecdote is indeed a jewel among anecdotes, and is a perfect example of . We witness the Cynic at work, as he lifts the dejection from the young man's mind, and both by feeding him the right kind of food (lupines) 33 and by demonstrating to him in words and in action that what he did in public was nothing of which to be ashamed, he gently leads him to a change of life. The 'weakness' that Metrocles had developed while under the tutelage of Theophrastus, was not, we can be sure, what caused him to make in public a breach of good manners, but rather what made him feel so embarrassed by his action that he was ready to kill himself. The point here is clear: philosophers, like Theophrastus, were men full of τ υ+ ϕ ο ς, a condition that was passed on to their disciples, and one of the manifestations of which was the senseless concern with conventions, including the adherence to 'good manners'. What it was precisely that Metrocles did as he rehearsed a speech, and what it was that Crates also did in the presence of Metrocles, can be left to the imagination of the reader, but we can be sure that it was not something socially acceptable. But whatever it may have been, after Crates' visit, Metrocles was a changed man: he joined the Army of the Dog and found true happiness, being able to relieve himself whenever he chose. Dudley speculates that it could have been

Metrocles himself who told his sister Hipparchia about his newly found happiness. 34 Gone from him now were all sorts of anxiety-creating concerns, related both to the mind and to the body, and gone, too, all unnecessary societal fetters and taboos, for, like Crates, he was now a free spirit, a Cynic. We have no idea as to what Hipparchia's situation in Maroneia could have been before she met Crates, but we do know that soon after her brother's conversion, she, too, succumbed to the irresistible magnetism of the Cynic hunchback. She decided to give herself completely to his ideas and mode of life, and, even more, fell desperately in love with him. The story sounds fantastic, but, strange as it may sound, it is as true and historical as anything that antiquity has bequeathed, if we cautiously remove from it the elements of mystification and romance that have accrued onto it throughout the ages. We have not only the testimony of Diogenes Laertius, but those of Suidas and Apuleius, among others, in practically the same identical language. Almost as if from some romantic tale that unravels the love affair between the Beauty and the Beast, the attachment of Hipparchia towards Crates unveils itself to us as a miraculous occurrence in the history of ideas. She is young and beautiful, and he is old, ugly, and deformed; she is virginal and pure, and he is a dog-like man and surely not a novice in the ways of the world; she is rich and aristocratic, and he is poor and -133a regular chiffonnier, 35 just like Diogenes; she is the Beauty, and he is the Beast. But the dialectical juxtaposition of their extremes is really reversed, and it is his beauty, and his purity, and his wealth that capture the girl. She tells her parents about her newly found love, and tells them that she has dismissed all eligible suitors, and that, should they not allow her to go with Crates, she would kill herself. That is how bad her problem is. The parents must have stood speechless, astonished and confused by such unusual kind of behavior for a girl. Among the Greeks of Crates' time, marriages, while generally not forced on daughters, were a matter of parental discretion. Also, it should be borne in mind that marriages do not appear to have resulted from what we call nowadays 'romantic attachments'. That a young woman from a decent family would fall in love with a man, and, regardless of his joviality and intelligence, a strange man who spoke about strange things and compared himself to a dog, and, to make things worse on her part, who threatened to take her own life if her wish was not satisfied--this must have been a scandalous situation. For this reason, the parents appealed to the Cynic to intercede on their behalf and dissuade Hipparchia from her designs. He, always willing to render himself useful, complies and does whatever he can, but fails in the end. In the presence of the parents, he speaks to her and asks her what it is that she wants. "You," she replies. Imagining, perhaps that she has not seen well who he is, Crates then undresses himself, and showing her his aged and deformed body, says to her: "Here is the bridegroom and here is what he owns. Make your choice, but remember that you cannot be my companion unless you share my pursuits." To the surprise of all, Hipparchia responds that it is Crates whom she wants. The parents, probably moved by her sincerity and persistence, accede, and the marriage takes place. Beneath his ugliness and deformity, she has recognized the exceptional beauty of the philosopher, and, hidden behind his poverty and shamelessness, she has discerned with clarity the splendor of a god, just as in the instance of Alcibiades who compared Socrates to the statuettes of Sileni sold in the market place: inside of them, there were jewel boxes where precious stones and gold pieces and figures of gods were hidden ( Plato, Symposium 251a-b).

For her, then, it is he who is beautiful, and it is he who is truly wealthy. Could she, therefore, not love him? Compared with his beauty, virtue, and wealth, all else is only an appearance. Then comes the scene in the public portico about which we spoke earlier, in which, only in the testimony of Apuleius, the marriage is consummated in the open. What follows next is confirmed by various sources, and we can rest assured that Hipparchia complied with Crates' condition: she shared his pursuits and became a Cynic. She adopted the same dress as her husband and accompanied him wherever he went, displaying everywhere the equanimity and self-sufficiency of her husband ( D. L. VI, 97-98). Her mode of life, as the epigram quoted earlier discloses, was perfectly in keeping with the demands of the Cynics: a staff, bare feet, a folded cloak, no ornaments, no perfumes. She abandoned the life of the typical Greek woman, and instead of "wasting further -134time upon the loom," as she said to Theodorus when he tried to strip her of her cloak, she spent it in education ( D. L. VI, 98). The marriage of Crates and Hipparchia constitutes a noteworthy incident in the history of Cynicism, because it challenges the spirit of independence and the rejection of attachments that characterize the Cynics throughout classical times. Aside from Crates, there are no other instances of marriages among the Cynics. Marriage is a human institution, invented by people, and sanctioned by the laws and by religious traditions, and a widely accepted form of human companionship. Marriage, moreover, entails a commitment of one person to another, and is undoubtedly an arrangement in which, by the mere act of accepting the married life, a person divides his or her rights by one-half, while doubling his or her responsibilities. And with the arrival of children, and the unavoidable presence of in-laws, one's rights become divided even further, while responsibilities increase enormously. The married person is never really free, but is caught, sometimes happily and sometimes unhappily, in a series of responsibilities and duties that are bound to diminish his or her ability to be and to act as an individual. It is for this reason that in creating the portrait of the typical Cynic, we insisted in chapter 1 that the Cynic is generally a stranger to the married life. A community of women for men and a community of men for women--these, according to Diogenes, are better than monogamous sexual arrangements among men and women of intellectual worth, a view which is not altogether different from what Plato, an unmarried man himself, proposed in his Republic (5.457d-e). Epictetus understood this matter perfectly well as he endeavored to make sense of Crates' choice of marriage for himself, for a philosopher as a married and family man is not an easy thing to imagine. In his Discourses ( III, xxii, 67 - 76 ), he left us a series of reflections on the value or rather the lack of value of marriage for a Cynic. The Cynic, Epictetus reminds us, is destined to be a king among human beings by virtue of his lucidity and virtue, and is a man "who hath charge of the folk and for many a thing must be watchful," to quote a line from Homer ( Iliad II, 25). But if he is to be a king not only over himself but over others, how can he be a married man? How can he who is expected to be the messenger, scout, and herald of God be expected to do his duty while attending to a demanding wife, to screaming children, to unreasonable in-laws, to the needs of the household, and to the innumerable distractions and chores that accompany family life? The Cynic, Epictetus insists, "ought to be free from distraction, wholly devoted to the service of God, free to go about among people, not tied down by the private duties of men, nor involved in relationships which he cannot violate" (

Discourses III, xxii, 69). Marriage can only destroy the Cynic's mission and render him an ordinary man among ordinary people. But then, what about Crates? To this question Epictetus answers in a curious way. Crates and Hipparchia were rightly joined in marriage because they were in love with each other, and this circumstance made their marriage something out of the ordinary. Why, however, did they love each other so much, if not because, and, this, we think, should be pondered with care, in marrying -135Hipparchia, Crates married another Crates, just as in marrying Crates, she married another Hipparchia? What this means is simply that if a Cynic man is to marry, his wife must be another Cynic, and if he has children, they too must be brought up to be Cynics like their parents. Even his in-laws, if they are to have any meaningful relationship with him, must be Cynics, and this must be so because the Cynic can only have other Cynics as friends. In Epictetus' words ( Discourses III, xii, 63-64): "Where will you find for me a Cynic's friend? For such a person must be another Cynic in order to be worthy of being his friend, as Diogenes became the friend of Antisthenes, and Crates of Diogenes." But who could have been Crates' closest friend, if not Hipparchia? For we cannot doubt that in a marriage, Cynic or otherwise, if the marriage is worth anything and is not just a temporary arrangement, true friendship should be the strongest bond between spouses, for the rest is romantic infatuation or utilitarian convenience, or, worse still, the decadent form of cohabitation that abounds everywhere. Crates' relationship with Hipparchia has been described as a "companionate marriage," in which husband and wife live as equal partners in a relationship of freely chosen companionship. 36 With regard to Hipparchia, at some point we lose her from the historical view. We know, as we said earlier, that she bore two or three children in her marriage with Crates, but more than this we cannot say. How and where she lived after Crates' death, for instance, is unknown, and the sources do not lend us any assistance in this matter. But meager as our information about her may be, her presence in the history of Cynicism remains significant, not only because of the light that her love for Crates casts on Crates himself, but because of what it teaches us concerning the role of women in the development of Cynicism. In later times there were other instances of women (whose identities, however, are unknown to us) who adopted the Cynic life, and who shared with Cynic men their style of life and their ideas. Cynicism destroyed or at least weakened in many among its adherents the social prejudices and misconceptions that since time immemorial had kept certain groups of people in a condition of cultural and social disenfranchisement, and those groups included women, foreigners, slaves, and men and women of diverse ethnic and racial backgrounds. By insisting on the valueless nature of appearances and conventions, and on the pretentiousness of societal arrangements, the Cynics paved the way for a re-assessment of the value of persons as individuals, regardless of any distinctions based on sex, race, and station in life. With respect to Crates himself, it remains for us to make some concluding comments on his idea of cosmopolitanism, an idea that we encountered previously in the contexts of Antisthenes and Diogenes. Also, we should add some more precise comments on the concept of τυϕος, which surfaces for the first time in its Cynic sense in a fragment of Crates, and which is so helpful for an adequate understanding of classical Cynicism.

The cosmopolitanism of Crates appears distinctly in various fragments of his and is attested to in many of the sources. At the conclusion of his -136biography of Hipparchia, for instance, Diogenes Laertius ( VI, 98 ) quotes the following lines from one of Crates' tragedies: Neither a tower nor a roof does my homeland have, For its citadel is indeed as wide as the world at large. Earlier we quoted the fragment in which he unveils for us his utopian Island of Pera, and another fragment in which he refers to himself as "a citizen of the land of Obscurity and Poverty." In these and other fragments, as well as in numerous statements in the secondary sources, Crates' cosmopolitanism surfaces with greater clarity than Diogenes' own conception. Diogenes rejected all forms of social and political association, and, in his Republic, proposed a utopia, but his utopia is one in which no clear modes of life are recommended. Gomperz suggests that the form of government proposed by Diogenes was a form of benevolent despotism, in which the few wise would rule over mindless masses, 37 but this is a conjecture that would make more sense in the context of Plato's utopia than in that of Diogenes. For in the latter, indeed, there is no room for the masses, and the Cynics, if a Cynic utopia became reality, would choose to live by themselves without the need for a ruler and away from ordinary people. Our problem with respect to Diogenes' utopia and cosmopolitanism is, however, not different from what we have encountered in relation to other ideas associated with him: a lack of definition and detail. With Crates, on the other hand, a somewhat better picture of his utopia is available, although this may only be a result of the nature of the sources at our disposal. Not unlike in Diogenes' utopia, there are no restrictions or laws in Crates' Pera, although we hear nothing about cannibalism and incest, or about free love, being permissible. In the delineation of his utopia, Crates remained true to his character as a less extreme Cynic than Diogenes. The air that we breathe in Crates' Pera is one of peaceful coexistence among all its happy inhabitants, for peace appears to be their ultimate goal. Philemon, the comic poet, also praised peace as the summum bonum of human existence, but did not fail to observe that, desirable as peace may be, it is in vain that the sages and philosophers, among whom, we may presume, he included Crates, search for it. 38 But the comic poet's pessimism does not deter Crates, who knows that Pera does not exist and can never exist, for it is an ideal construction and is truly a utopia, that is, a 'no place' republic (οὐ , hence 'utopia'). He seems to have understood that it is, more than an ideal political construction, a desirable and attainable state of mind, which the Cynic seeks for himself and can surely realize in his life. He does not even have to abandon physically his place of residence, and can well remain in Athens, or Corinth, or Maroneia, or Rome, or, in fact, everywhere in the world and at any time, for just as he (or she, if we remember Hipparchia) can carry his leath ) wherever he goes, likewise he can have within himself that other Leathern Wallet, the Island of Pera, every moment of his life and wherever he may happen to be. He does not have to -137search for it anywhere but within himself, for just as a clear and cheerful mind can dwell at peace within a deformed and ugly body, so can Crates and Hipparchia, and even their children

and relations, be the happy inhabitants of a utopian republic, for they themselves are that republic. His cosmopolitanism is not one that makes him a citizen of a universal human community, but is one that offers him citizenship in his own kingdom, and this kingdom is in himself and perhaps in those few that are like him and are close to him. In this blessed kingdom, there is always an abundance of food, only the kind preferred by the Cynics, that is, thyme, lentils, lupines, garlic, figs, loaves of bread, precisely because that is the food that is carried in the Cynic's wallet. There, and only there, external laws do not exist for him, and he recognizes his reason as the only source of authority. No fools ever land on the shores of his kingdom, and neither parasites nor lechers, nor politicians, nor preachers, nor speculative philosophers live on its fruitful fields, because the Cynic has bracketed away from his mind all those human types with their vices and madness. Neither the wantonness of sexual passions, nor the ambition for gold, nor the need to control other people, which underlie the lives of ordinary human beings, can be found in it, because the Cynic has parted company with such things. Reason and an ascetic mode of life are the guides that direct all affairs in Pera, and assure the constant and imperturbable possession of freedom and self-sufficiency, because that is what the Cynic has succeeded in achieving within himself. Surrounding the blessed island, there is a vast sea from which the Cynic and those like him have been saved, and in which they will never and would never set sail. Others live and navigate in that "wine-colored sea" (to use Crates' own phrase), struggling and drowning in its treacherous waves and storms. Those others are the many who pursue senseless goals, worship false idols, cater to unnatural desires, covet and treasure endless collections of things, and live immersed in a world of illusion. Those others, then, are not a part of Crates' utopia, for he does not belong to their world. It is true that he endeavors to rescue them and bring them ashore, as his missionary and philanthropic activities seem to suggest. But whether they are saved or not, he and those close to him are themselves secure in their utopian kingdom. They are truly the monarchs of themselves, and to them, and only to them, the titles of kings and queens really belong. They are, to borrow Whitehead's description of philosophers, "men individually powerless, but ultimately the rulers of the world." 39 To them, too, the inhabitants of Pera, we can apply the words of Horace ( Epist. I, 1, 106): Sapiens uno minor est Jove, dives, Liber, honoratus, pulcher, rex denique regum (The sage is second only to Jupiter, rich, Free, honored, beautiful, a King of Kings). The reference to the world of illusion as the vast sea that surrounds Pera brings us now to the conclusion of this chapter with some observations on one of the key concepts of classical Cynicism, the concept of τυ + φοζ. On various -138occasions we have mentioned this concept. We found it in one of the fragments of Crates, where he describes his utopian Pera as an island surrounded by a sea of τυ + φοζ. Let us now proceed to elucidate as precisely as possible its meaning and significance in classical Cynicism. The primary meaning of τυ + φοζ (fucus in Lat can be translated by phrases such as 'to raise a smoke' or 'to make a cloud of smoke' or 'to consume something with fire and smoke'. The

related verbal form τυ + yields a somewhat different meaning and can be rendered by phrases such as 'to wrap something in smoke or mist'. Τυ + φοζ and its verbal derivations are ordinary Greek words that are found in many places and contexts, where they are used in their primary denotations. Secondary meanings, however, can also be found, sometimes embedded in a name, as in the case of the legendary Typhon, a monster who, according to Hesiod ( Theog. 820ff.), was the offspring of Earth and Tartarus. With his one-hundred dragon-shaped heads, one-hundred hands, and one-hundred feet, and with his terrible might, Typhon would have wrought great calamities, had Zeus not plunged him into Tartarus, causing him to ignite Mount Aetna in his infernal descent. In another myth, Typhon is buried under Mount Aetna: the smoke produced by Aetna could probably be held responsible for the association of Typhon and the Sicilian volcano. In other accounts, Typhon is represented as one of the wind gods, in particular the god of destructive winds, which explains the derivation of modern cognates such as 'typhoon' in English, tifón in Spanish, typhon in French, Taifun in German, and tufao in Portuguese, among others. The Portuguese term appears to have influenced the Chinese taifung, a word that means 'great wind'. In another mythological tale, we learn about the Nemean lion, which was sent by Hera to inflict suffering on the people of the plain of Nemes. This lion was the offspring of Typhon. It was precisely this horrible beast that Hercules strangled with his bare arms, which is a story not without some interest for us, because what we find in it is Hercules, the paradigm of virtue and freedom for the Cynics, slaying the deadly offspring of Typhon, and it was against what Typhon stood for, namely, τυ + φοζ, that the Cynics also struggled. Also, Dio Chrysostom ( Or. LXI) has left for us a legend in which Hercules is also somehow related, surely as an enemy, to Typhon, who appears as the symbol of the darkness that causes confusion in the human mind. The association of spiritual confusion with evil may also explain the ancient connection between the Seb, the Egyptian god of evil, and the Greek Typhon. Aside from the etymological connection between the name of the smoke-producing and darkness-creating Typhon and the word τυ + φοζ, we come upon another interesting fact. In Hippocratic medical terminology, the word τυ + φοζ was originally used to designate the delirium caused by high fever. In time, however, the term was applied to the specific disease that we identify as typhoid fever, in which the patient suffers from delirium and mental confusion, and is afflicted by a host of physiological disorders. The patient's mind, it was -139believed, became filled with the gases produced by the disease, and on account of this, his ability to think clearly was destroyed or at least impaired. This mental impairment was noticed also among people in a state of intoxication, for which reason, Aristotle speaks of drunkenness as a form of τυ + φοζ. Certain connotations, however, became associated in very early times with τυ + conveys the senses of 'being shrouded in conceit and folly' and being stupid or mindless'. Hence, he who is immersed in τυ + φοζ is bound to be a conceited and stupid person, for his mind is filled with smoke and vapor, and he can hardly entertain one clear thought, which is precisely the way ordinary people were seen by the Cynics. The 'typhoid' person, then, is one whose mind has been made obscure and dense by his own uncontrolled desires and his own senselessness, and, above all, by the pernicious

influence of the social and political world of which he is a part. He is literally no better than a vulgar street drunk who knows not whence he comes or whither he goes, and is as unfortunate as a typhoid patient who utters nonsense and sees phantoms. And what is even worse, the 'typhoid' person suffers from a related condition: pride, conceit, insolence, and above all, arrogance, a condition that the Greeks called υ+βριζ, and at the basis of which, the Cynics would have said, lies a tremendous ignorance which is akin to a terrible mental disorder. This 'disease' the Cynics called τυ + φοζ acquired among them acquired a technical philosophical meaning, removed from, although not unrelated to, its ordinary, and mythological meanings. Thus, we can now understand how and why the Cynics in general and Crates in particular viewed themselves as 'physicians' of humanity, each one with his own idiosyncratic style of philosophical therapy: Diogenes appealed to various forms of confrontational challenge and vituperation, and, on occasion, even to physical blows, while Crates opted for jovial counseling and affectionate guidance. In all cases, however, the goal was one and the same, namely, to cure people from their τυ + φοζ, and for this reason the Cynics moved among people as physicians among patients, remaining, on account of their lucidity, immune from contagion. A phrase from the Gospels can be applied to them: "The physicians also go about among the sick, but are themselves whole" ( Matt. 9:11). The aim of philosophy, indeed its only purpose, Crates would have said, is to cure people from τυ + φοζ, that is, to bring them to the state of ἀ , a state in which all the Cynic ideal conditions of human existence are found, as if it were a summation of classical Cynicism: freedom from social and traditional restrictions (ἀ ), self-sufficiency (ἀ ), indifference to the vicissitudes of life (ἀ ), self-control and frugality (ἀ ), discipline and endurance (ἄ ), strength of character (ἀ ), and all the rest. In ἀ , then, we come upon the Cynics' summum bonum, as is especially evident in considering the doctrines and example of Crates. Decleva Caizzi states it succinctly, when she notes that "the goal of the philosopher is the attainment -140of atyphia." 40 This goal is in principle not altogether different from that which genuine philosophers, Cynics and otherwise, have sought. It stands for the cleansing of the mind of all unnecessary and disturbing thoughts, for the removal of inconsequential and poorly conceived ideas, for the abandoning of impediments and hindrances that clutter the human consciousness, and for attainment of a lasting state of intellectual and spiritual lucidity. That is, simply stated, the utopia about which Crates dreamed, his Island of Pera. With the departure of Crates, classical Cynicism came to the end of its first chapter of development, indeed its most fruitful chapter, albeit in terms of time its shortest. In only one century, the three major Cynic figures--Antisthenes, Diogenes, and Crates--came and went, but left behind them a legacy of protest and idealism that would influence philosophers for many centuries. If we give credence to Lucian, they are still in Hades, each one doing the same things that they did while in this physical life: Antisthenes congratulating himself for his clarity of mind and disdainfully glancing at others less fortunate than himself; Diogenes snarling and growling at the less-than-human-characters that cross his path; and Crates laughing and joking as if on an endless holiday, hoping always to be of assistance to anyone in need of his services. After them, classical Cynicism began a long and tortuous journey towards its own extinction in late Roman times.

NOTES 1 "Crates de Tebas," in Enciclopedia Universal Ilustrada Europeo-Americana ( Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 1909, 1978), Vol. 15, p. 1523. 2

For comments on the influence of Democritus on various Cynics, see D. Stewart, "Democritus and the Cynics." Harvard Studies in Classical Philology 63 ( 1958), pp. 179-191, and P. Philippson, "Verfasser und Abfassungszeit der sogenannten Hippokratesbriefe." Rheinisches Museum fur Philologie 77 ( 1928), pp. 318-319.

3

F. Sayre, "Greek Cynicism." The Journal of the History of Ideas 6 ( 1945), pp. 113-118.

4

See U. Criscuolo, "Cratete di Tebe e la tradizione cinica." Maia 22 ( 1970), pp. 360-367.

5

D. R. Dudley, A History of Cynicism from Diogenes to the 6th Century A.D. ( Chicago: Ares Publishers, 1980), p. 44. The Greek text of the fragments is given (with a Latin translation) in F. G.A. Mullach Fragmenta Philosophorum Græcorum ( 1857-1865; reprint, Darmstadt: Scientia Verlag, 1968), Vol. 2, pp. 261-395.

6

R. Olivieri, "Le epistole del Pseudo-Cratete." Rivista di Filologia 27 ( 1899), pp. 406421.

7

K. von Fritz, "Quellenuntersuchungen zu Leben und Philosophie des Diogenes von Sinope." Philologus Supp. 18, No. 2 ( 1926).

8

T. Gomperz, Greek Thinkers: A History of Ancient Philosophy. Translated by G. G. Berry ( London: John Murray, 1905), Vol. 3, p. 288. -141-

9

For a collection of the fragments of Teles, with a commentary and a study of the sources, see P. P. Fuentes González, "Las diatribas de Teles. Estudio introductorio y comentario de los textos conservados" (Ph.D. diss. Universidad de Granada, 1990). The standard edition of the fragments was published in 1889 by O. Hense in his Teletis reliquiæ (reprint, Hildesheim, 1969). A study of Teles (including his fragments) is E. N. O'Neil's in Teles: The Cynic Teacher ( Missoula, Mont.: Scholars Press, 1977).

10 J. Bouffartigue, "Le Cynisme dans le cursus philosophique au IVe siècle," in Le Cynisme ancien et ses prolongements. Actes du Colloque International du CNRS ( Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1993), pp. 339-358. 11 Various modern reconstructions of Crates' biography have been created. The earliest is included in W. Baldwin A Treatise of Morall Philosophie, Wherein Is Contained the Worthy Sayings of Philosophers, Emperours, Kings, and Orators ( 1547; reprint, Gainesville, Fla.: Scholars' Facsimiles & Reprints, 1967). 12 Literally, a 'dog marriage', that is, the 'marriage' between two dogs. 13 Dudley, A History of Cynicism, pp. 50-51. 14 For a review of the names of Crates' disciples, see M. O. Goulet-Cazé, "Une liste des disciples de Cratès le cynique en Diogène Laërce 6, 95." Hermes 114 ( 1986), pp. 247252. 15 See R. Eisler, "Sur les portraits anciens de Cratès, de Diogène et d'autres philosophes

cyniques." Revue Archéologique 33 ( 1931), pp. 1-13. 16 A lar was conceived among the Romans as a tutelary and protecting deity. 17 For a discussion of the Herculean club and the Cynic staff, see B. R. Voss, "Die Keule der Kyniker." Hermes 95 ( 1967), pp. 441-446. 18 For a discussion of Herculean legends in the Cynics' conception of the ideal king, see R. Höistad, Cynic Hero and Cynic King: Studies in the Cynic Conception of Man ( Uppsala: C.W.K. Gleerup, 1948). 19 For a discussion of the influence of Cynic ideas on this Pauline image, see A. J. Malherbe, "Gentle as a Nurse." Novum Testamentum 12 ( 1970), pp. 203-217. 20 M. O. Goulet-Cazé, "Cratès de Thèbes," in Dictionnaire de Philosophes Antiques. Edited by R. Goulet ( Paris: CNRS Éditions, 1994), Vol. 2, p. 497. 21 For instance, "Cratès de Thèbes," in Dictionnaire des Sciences Philosophiques. Edited by A. Franck ( Paris: Librairie Hachette, 1885), p. 315. 22 G. Calogero, "Cratete di Tebe," in Enciclopedia Italiana de Scienze, Lettere ed Arti ( Rome: Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana, 1950), Vol. 11, p. 805. 23 See D. L. Mealand, "As Having Nothing, yet Possessing Everything, 2 Cor. 6,10c." Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft und die Kunde der älteren Kirche 67 ( 1976), pp. 277-279. 24 Various attempts have been made to establish a connection between the Indian pasupatas and the Cynics. See, for instance, A. Syrkin, "The Salutary Descent." Numen 35 ( 1988), pp. 1-23, 213-237. 25 T. Gomperz, Greek Thinkers: A History of Ancient Philosophy, Vol. 2, p. 152. 26 See G. Giangrande, "Diogenes' Apophthegm from Herculaneum in the Light of the Ancient topai." Museum Philologum Londiniense ὑ + . Zu einem weibfeindlichen Diogenesspruch aus Herculaneum." Hermes 95 ( 1967), pp. 253-255. -14227 J. Moles, "The Woman and the River: Diogenes' Apophthegm from Herculaneum and Some Popular Misconceptions about Cynicism." Apeiron 17 ( 1983), p. 126. 28 G. Ménage published in 1690 a work entitled Historia mulierum philosopharum ( Lyons: Posuel & Rigaud), in which short biographies of 71 women philosophers of antiquity are provided. An English translation by B. H. Zedler was published in 1984 ( Lanham, Md.: University Press of America). 29 P. Petit, Cynogamia, sive de Cratetis et Hipparches amoribus ( Paris: A. Cramoisy, 1676). 30 C. M. Wieland, Krates und Hipparchia. Ein Seitenstück zu "Menander und Glycerion" ( 1804; reprint, Leipzig: Edition Leipzig, 1983).

31 For comments on this Roman fresco, see H. Fuhrmann, "Gespräche über Liebe und Ehe auf Bildern des Altertums." Mitteilungen des deutschen archäologischen Instituts (Römische Abteilung) 55 ( 1940), pp. 86-91. 32 For instance, J. Garcia González, "Hiparquia, la de Maronea, filósofo cínico," in Studio Græcolatina Carmen Sanmillan in memoriam dicata ( Granada, 1988), pp. 179-187. 33 Lupine (or lupin) is a leguminous herb that is cultivated for green manure, fodder, or its edible seeds. It was in ancient times the sort of food eaten by poor people. 34 Dudley, A History of Cynicism, p. 47. 35 As noted in chapter 1, chiffonnier means 'ragpicker' or 'ragamuffin', and is equivalent to the German Lumpensammler. D. Rieger compares Diogenes and the Cynics to the Parisian chiffonnier who is portrayed in nineteenth-century French novels. See his Diogenes als Lumpensammler. Materialen zu einer Gestalt der französischen Literatur des 19. Jahrhunderts ( Munich: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1982). 36 R. Eisler, "Crates the Cynic, First Advocate of Companionate Marriage." Search ( October 1932), pp. 309-317. 37 Gomperz, Greek Thinkers: A History of Ancient Philosophy, Vol. 2, pp. 161ff. 38 For a discussion of the fragments of Philemon, see J. A. Symonds, Studies in the Greek Poets ( New York: Harper & Brothers, 1917), Vol. 2, pp. 255ff. 39 A. N. Whitehead, Science and the Modern World ( New York: Mentor Books, 1958), p. 208. 40 Decleva Caizzi, "Τυ + φοζ. Contributo alla storia di un concerto." Sandalion 3 ( 1980), pp. 53-66. -143CHAPTER 5 Hellenistic and Roman Cynicism Emperor Julian opens his discourse "To the Uneducated Cynics" ( Or. VI) by quoting a proverb found already in Euripides' Medea (413): "Behold the rivers are flowing backwards." Seven centuries before Julian, Xeniades, the Corinthian who purchased Diogenes as a slave, is reported to have uttered the same proverb, when Diogenes asked him to stand ready to obey his orders. What the proverb means is clear: things are topsy-turvy and the world is standing on its head. The sense of the proverb as uttered by Xeniades refers to the fact that Diogenes, his newly purchased slave, treats him as if he, not Diogenes, were the slave. In Julian's discourse, the proverb lays bare what for him was an unfortunate fact: those who during his time called themselves 'Cynics' were for the most part people of no intellectual value and no moral ca ---and instead of defacing the old 'currency' and putting in circulation a higher kind of 'currency', were using and abusing the name of Diogenes as an excuse for their license and immorality. After seven centuries of Cynicism, according to Julian, the Cynicism once exemplified by Antisthenes, Diogenes, and Crates had been reversed and made to stand upside down by the

new Cynics, who were as distant from their sources as Diogenes' contemporaries were from him. Cynicism, then, in the eyes of the philosophical Roman emperor, had lost its roots and needed a complete overhauling. For this reason he felt compelled to write his diatribes against the new Cynics and his encomia of the founders of the movement, hoping to revitalize a style of life that he felt could counterbalance the influence of those whom he called 'Galileans' ( Or. VII, 224b). In this concluding chapter, we will review the major moments in the history of Hellenistic and Roman Cynicism. Obviously, in a review of almost -145seven hundred years of philosophical developments, it would be impossible to achieve even the semblance of completeness. The number of late Cynics is large, and we can actually name close to one hundred identifiable philosophers who can be referred to as 'Cynics'. The variety of Cynic doctrines and styles of life in Hellenistic and Roman times makes it difficult to speak of this period in terms of distinguishable principles and modes of life. The Hellenistic world was characterized by a mixing of cultures and by a steady decline of Hellenic traditions. With the advent of the Roman Empire, new frontiers were opened, and foreign ideologies swept through the lands that had been inhabited by the Greeks and the early Romans. The late Cynics faced challenges more complex than those confronted by their progenitors. The Athens in which Diogenes lived, the Gadara of Meleager and Oenomaus, or the Rome of Demetrius were altogether different places, for while the former was a homogenous community with a distinct tradition, the latter two were cauldrons where all sorts of religions, philosophies, traditions, and languages coexisted in an uneasy arrangement. The late Cynics had to deal with Indian Gymnosophists, with Persian adherents of the cult of Mithra, with emperors who deified themselves, with Jewish rabbis who taught a strange monotheistic faith, with Christian preachers whose God had become flesh, and with hosts of beliefs and customs with which the early Cynics were not acquainted. The Hellenistic and Roman worlds, therefore, elicited from the Cynics a multitude of reactions far more pluralistic than would have been conceivable from the point of view of Diogenes. The mission of Diogenes included now new forms of 'currency', some of which the new Cynics were unwilling to deface. For this and other reasons, therefore, late Cynicism presents itself to us as a multi-colored mosaic of a bewildering variety. Still, it is possible to discern certain recurrent themes and practices among the late Cynics, and the presence of such themes and practices justifies us in referring to them as soldiers in the Army of the Dog, although arguments can be adduced against the classification of some of them as Cynics. Possibly the best way to approach the task of commenting on the history of late Cynicism is to select from the multitude of Cynics a small number of important figures, specifically those of whom we possess some primary sources, or about whom credible testimonies are found in the secondary sources. Such figures can furnish us with examples of Cynicism, and can help us appreciate its development. Thus, we will comment on the following late Cynic philosophers: Onesicritus, Monimus, Bion, Menippus, Cercidas, Meleager, Oenomaus, Demetrius, and Peregrinus Proteus. This list includes some of the Cynics who maintained alive some of the traditions that are traceable to the early Cynics. In practically all of them, Cynicism became intermingled with other tendencies and ideologies, and was tainted with some admixture of what Diogenes would have referred to as shameful accommodations with the social and political world. Given the different contexts of late Cynicism, the Cynics'

reactions to their specific situations were bound to differ from those of the early Cynics. There is much truth in the assertion that every form of Cynicism is "a reaction in the -146presence of a historical situation involving a crisis." 1 The late Cynics faced a unique historical crisis, and responded accordingly in their own unique ways. Diogenes Laertius left for us biographical accounts of some of the disciples of Diogenes and Crates, specifically, Onesicritus, Monimus, Hipparchia, Bion, and Menippus, as well as a short biography of Menedemus. With his account of this latter Cynic, Diogenes Laertius closes his review of Cynicism, and nowhere are other Cynics mentioned in his writings. And even his biographies of the Cynic philosophers just mentioned, with the exception of that of Bion (whom the biographer does not classify as a Cynic), are brief and sketchy. Little, therefore, can be learned from them. Thus, in order to gain some sense about their ideas and styles of life, we must appeal to other sources, both primary (in rare cases) and secondary. We could begin with Onesicritus, whose name is sometimes found as 'Onesicratus'. Astypalaea, his place of origin, was possibly the 'old city' on the island of Aegina. Nothing is known about his life, except in relation to his association with Alexander. Diogenes Laertius ( VI, 84 ) limits himself to mentioning his place of birth, his relationship with Diogenes, and the similarity between him and Xenophon, for both joined military expeditions, the former with Cyrus and the latter with Alexander, and both left testimonies about the leaders of such expeditions. Mention, too, is made of a work by him on the education of Alexander. He is said to have written one book, possibly in the style of Xenophon Cyropaedia, in which not only Alexander's education but also his exploits are described. He completed this book after Alexander's death, while living in the court of Lysimachus, the successor of Alexander in Thrace. Strabo judged it to be nothing but a fable about the Macedonian conqueror. Fragments from this lost work emerge in Strabo's commentary and in other scattered sources, and it is thus that we learn about its author's observations on the habits of elephants and other animals and on plants that the Greeks encountered during Alexander's campaigns, and about the character of Alexander himself. There are references, too, about Onesicritus having collected for Alexander geographical information concerning "islands further south" of India. We can also gather some information from Onesicritus' book about the Indian Gymnosophists and about his endeavors to establish a parallelism between them and the Cynics. Modern estimates of Onesicritus as a historian vary, but the trend has been to regard him as a less than trustworthy witness of Alexander's life and campaigns. There appears to be in his reports an element of exaggeration and fabrication, probably directed towards the aggrandizement of Alexander. The reputation of Onesicritus as an inventor of fables and outright lies is, however, unjustified, because in writing about Alexander, it was never his intention to compose a historical treatise but rather a panegyric portraying the emperor as an ideal ruler. 2 It has also been argued that some of the anecdotes and apophthegms related to Diogenes, as well as certain statements found in the letters ascribed to Diogenes, may have been derived from Onesicritus' work. 3 But while such a -147-

supposition may be well grounded, it remains difficult to ascertain its value, especially in the absence of primary materials.

, a term that means the 'chief pilot' and that for us would be equivalent to 'captain of the ship'. Plutarch's passage is as follows: Then having besought the gods that no other man might ever go beyond the bounds of this expedition, Alexander ordered his fleet, of which he made Nearchus admiral and Onesicritus pilot, to sail round about, keeping the Indian shore on the right side, and returned himself by land. Plutarch's report is confirmed by other sources of greater historical value. The year is 326 B.C., when Alexander decides to leave India. A formidable fleet is assembled for him by Craterus on the Jhelum river, in the heartland of India. It includes over eighty triakontors (ships with thirty oars), several hundred small warships, horse transports, supply vessels, and many native boats carrying food. The aim is to divide the army into two parts, one of which would embark on the fleet, while the other (with elephants, war machines, and an innumerable multitude of auxiliaries, women, and even children) would march on land, first southward towards the sea along the banks of the Jhelum and Indus rivers, then westward and finally northward. And thus the journey begins. Alexander goes aboard his own flagship, with Onesicritus at the helm and Nearchus of Crete in command of the fleet. The prayers and libations to the gods are said and offered, and at the sound of the trumpets and amid the joyful shouting of a virtual sea of humanity, the formidable fleet begins its descent towards the Indian Ocean, accompanied on both sides of the river by an immense multitude. After reaching the stormy waters of the ocean, into which, again guided by Onesicritus, Alexander makes a brief excursion, he returns to the land army and guides it back to Babylonia. The fleet proceeds, keeping the Indian continent on the right, enters the Persian Gulf, and disembarks at the mouth of the Tigris. To assume the position of chief pilot of Alexander's own vessel, and to guide the fleet to its destination, must be viewed as a remarkable accomplishment for Onesicritus, one that shows convincingly his ability as a navigator and Alexander's high regard for him. But such ascertainable circumstances do not seem to speak well of Onesicritus' character as a Cynic, at least as a Cynic in the tradition of Diogenes. A Cynic in the employment of Alexander and, even worse, in charge of guiding his fleet across the oceans, would have certainly surprised and actually distressed Diogenes! Still, there is something symbolic about Onesicritus' role in Alexander's expedition. He, a Cynic, controls the helm that stirs the emperor's flagship, and is the man in charge of carrying the emperor to the Indian Ocean, the first leg of the journey that would take him to Babylonia, where he would attempt to establish a true cosmopolitan empire. Somehow, it is difficult not to see Onesicritus' role as a symbolic bridge between the negative -148cosmopolitanism of Diogenes, which led him to declare himself a citizen of no polity, and the positive cosmopolitanism of Alexander, which announced the advent of universal citizenship.

In a second passage, Plutarch recounts ( Alexander lxv) the meeting between the emperor and ten Indian Gymnosophists whom he had imprisoned for their alleged activities against him. Alexander poses ten questions to them, and asks each one of them to answer one of the questions, for instance, "Who are more numerous, the living or the dead?" to which the answer is, "The living, because the dead no longer exist." After rewarding the Gymnosophists for their wisdom with gifts and releasing them, Alexander commissions Onesicritus to interview other Gymnosophists to find out from them more details about the philosophical life that they practice. The choice of Onesicritus for this task, Plutarch suggests, was influenced by his reputation as a disciple of Diogenes. The interview takes place, and during its course, Onesicritus speaks to the Indian sages about Pythagoras, Socrates, and Diogenes, as extraordinary examples of the philosophical life among the Greeks, and one of the Gymnosophists, a man named Dandamis, replies that those philosophers, great as they may have been, erred in one thing, namely, "in having too great a respect for the laws and customs of their country." This report, the sources of which might be traceable to Onesicritus' own book, is the oldest reference to a meeting between a Greek Cynic and the Indian Gymnosophists. The story contains a disturbing detail: if Onesicritus extolled the respect with which Pythagoras and Socrates viewed the laws and institutions of their country, he could have been justified; but if he did the same in relation to Diogenes, he could not have been but mistaken, for Diogenes, as the sources affirm. had no respect for any human laws--indeed he was just like the Gymnosophists, for they, too, were rebellious and recalcitrant vis-à-vis such things, and expressed contempt for the laws of their own nation. 4 Their nakedness, to which they owe their designation as 'Gymnosophists'(γμνός, which means 'naked' or 'lightly clad'), was the outward symbol of their rebelliousness. We are, therefore, left with an unsettling representation of Onesicritus as a Cynic. He is presented to us as a direct disciple of Diogenes, from whom, we might assume, he must have learned some elements of Cynicism, such as a disdain for authority, a contempt for people like Alexander, self-sufficiency, and the rest of the Cynic virtues. And it is precisely because of his association with Diogenes that he became known as a Cynic. But beyond this, there appears to be no other reason for referring to him as a Cynic. His only book was a semihistorical panegyric on Alexander. And to make things w αρον ), and whose style of life and ambitious nature emulated all the excesses and debaucheries of Alexander himself. We are even told that the Greeks regarded him as a god, and erected altars and sacrificed to him. Such was -149Lysimachus, the king with whom Onesicritus lived in his old age. It is unwise, however, to pass judgment on Onesicritus for his choice of lifestyle. The circumstances of his life are unknown to us, and we are ignorant about the reasons that might have led him to accompany Alexander, and we do not know why he lived in Lysimachus' court after Alexander's death. But what we do know is that, regardless of his reasons and motives, his mode of life was fundamentally removed from even the vaguest resemblance of the man who was his teacher in philosophy. Diogenes in the tub and Onesicritus at the helm of Alexander's flagship are two images as mutually exclusive as we can imagine. Their

disparity, however, reveals for us an important historical fact: with very few exceptions, the austerity and strictness of the original Cynics were rarities among the late Cynics. What we find in them is either a softening of the strictures of the teachings and examples of Diogenes and Crates, or an immersion in other forms of philosophical doctrines and modes of life. The case of Monimus is interesting, especially if contrasted with that of Onesicritus. Although little is known with assurance concerning this disciple of Diogenes, some details about his life and doctrines can be rescued by reviewing the sources. Diogenes Laertius left for us a short biography ( VI, 82 - 83 ), which follows immediately that of Diogenes. Some revealing comments are also furnished by Stobaeus. From these and other sources, we learn, for instance, that Monimus was born in Syracuse and came to live in mainland Greece, either in Corinth or in Athens, where he was a servant or slave of a banker. Xeniades, whom we encountered earlier as the man who purchased Diogenes after his capture by pirates, often visited Monimus' master, and spoke so highly of Diogenes that Monimus developed a fervent admiration for the Cynic philosopher. In time, then, he became Diogenes' disciple and an associate of Crates. He secured his freedom from his master by pretending to be insane and by following the style of life of the Cynics. We are told that he was the author of two works, On Impulses and Exhortation to Philosophy. Of these books, nothing has survived, although from other sources a vague idea can be gathered concerning some of the ideas advanced in them. 5 He maintained that all human knowledge is only illusion, illusion understood in the sense of τυ+ϕος. Neither through reason nor through thinking can we be expected to understand either the world or ourselves, for understanding and truth are attainable only through impulse or instinct (expressed in Greek by the word ὀ ), an idea possibly traceable to Diogenes. 6 Diogenes' insistence on the primacy of 'nature', as exemplified in animal behavior, may have led Monimus to abandon reason for the sake of primary impulses and instincts. Laws, conventions, traditions, and all sorts of 'invented' ways of being, have neither meaning nor value for him, for which reason he sought to live a life of simplicity and self-sufficiency, clearly in the tradition of Diogenes and Crates. Marcus Aurelius implies ( Meditations II, 15) that one of the sayings of Monimus was 03A4υ+ϕοςεἰ --"everything is illusion," a saying found in one of Menander's fragments (249), and which Sextus Empiricus ( Adv. log. ii, 1) specifically attributes to Monimus. Thus, not -150only knowledge, but indeed everything else is illusory and unreal. More cannot be said with certainty about Monimus. Although his name is mentioned in many modern works on classical Cynicism, there are no extended discussions of his life and ideas. What is clear, however, is that Diogenes and Crates were not left without at least some disciples who endeavored to emulate and imitate their teachers, both in doctrine and in action. Monimus, like Metrocles and Hipparchia, maintained intact the doctrines of his teachers and followed rigorously their style of life. This included even the carrying of the leathern wallet, as can be gathered from some lines of Menander The Groom, where he is described as a mendicant philosopher who carries not one but three such wallets. As an adherent of Cynicism, then, he stands in contrast with Onesicritus, who appears to have been a Cynic mostly in name and on account of his reputation as an associate of Diogenes. A more interesting example of Cynicism is that of Bion, who both in terms of his influence and on account of the complexity of his ideas, towers above other Cynics of the third century

B.C. There are important modern works devoted to him that provide his collected fragments. 7 Bion is known to have been a prolific and accomplished writer, both in poetical and in prose writings. Although none of his works are extant, there are numerous fragments from them, and from these, as well as from numerous references to him in the secondary sources, it is possible to form a clear idea about this complex and colorful philosophical figure. An important source of information concerning the doctrines and the stylistic characteristics of Bion is found in the preserved fragments of Teles of Megara, who appears to have made ample use of Bion's writings in the composition of his own. 8 Among the secondary sources, the most significant is Diogenes Laertius' biography ( IV, 46 - 58 ). Bion's approximate dates are 335- 245 B.C. 9 His place of origin was Olbia, a town in Scythia on the banks of the Borysthenes river (modern Dnieper in Ukraine), on the northern coast of the Black Sea. Details about his background are given 'autobiographically' by Diogenes Laertius ( IV, 46 ). Bion's words, in answer to a question posed to him by Antigonus Gonatas deserve to be quoted: My father was a freedman, who wiped his nose on his sleeve, a native of Borysthenes, with no face to show, but only the markings on his face, a reminder of his master's cruelty. My mother was the type of woman whom only my father would choose for a wife, a whore from a brothel. Later on, my father, who had cheated on his taxes in some way, was sold as a slave along with family. And I, then a not ungrateful youth, was bought by some teacher of rhetoric, who left me all his possessions when he died. I burnt his books, collected a few things, and came to Athens to study philosophy. "This is the stock and this the blood from which I boast to come" [Iliad VI, 211]. Such is the tale of my life. This is undoubtedly quite an introduction of himself! The reference to his father wiping his nose on his sleeve is related to his father's occupation: he was a dealer in salt fish, for which reason his nose was constantly dripping. The -151'markings' on his father's face refer to the scars left on it by the blows inflicted by his master. Bion holds two things in common with Diogenes: in both cases, their fathers were involved in some sort of fraudulent affair with the State revenue, and both philosophers originated in Pontus. And if we add to these details the occupation of Bion's mother, a whore whose name was Olympia, we then have all the ingredients necessary for the eventual production of a Cynic: like other Cynics, Bion began his course through life as one of those men "rejected by men and by fate," 10 who had no other option but to undertake the defacing of the values and customs of their milieu. Bion's arrival in Athens must have occurred before 314 B.C., the year of Xenocrates' death. His coming to Athens was for the purpose of studying philosophy. and various testimonies indicate that he was a student at the Academy under Xenocrates and subsequently under Crates of Athens. After this, Bion attached himself to the Cynics, possibly under Crates of Thebes, although his association with the famous Cynic is an undocumented supposition. Diogenes Laertius ( IV, 51 ) tells us that while among the Cynics, Bion adopted certain Cynic traits, "donning cloak and wallet," while expressing contempt for the doctrines of the Academy. 11 From the Cynics, he moved on to settle among the Cyrenaics, becoming a disciple of Theodorus of Cyrene. Finally, Bion came under the influence of the Peripatetics, specifically Theophrastus. Whether this sequence corresponds to the facts of his life is

difficult to say, but it is generally in accord with the testimonies. His association with Theodorus is important, because it must have been from him that he inherited his atheism. 12 Theodorus' atheism was occasionally foisted on the Cynics, especially on Diogenes. 13 In various sources, too, we learn about his travels, which included sojourns in various places, for which reason he was regarded as an itinerant philosopher. He gave instruction wherever he went, and was paid for his pedagogical activities. The sources also give us some details about his character and style of life, and about his ideas. Diogenes Laertius ( IV, 47 ) portrays him as "a shifty character and a clever sophist," and as someone who had given ammunition to the enemies of philosophy. His arrogance and pompous demeanor ϕος), as if indeed there was no moral worth in him. His atheism, about which there is no reason to entertain any doubts, prejudiced Diogenes Laertius so much that he found nothing positive to report about him. The description of his last days in Chalcis, whatever historical value there may be in it, is revealing, for it depicts for us how the raving atheist is supposed to have confronted his end. For many years he had thundered against religion and had denied the existence of the gods. He had refused even to look at a temple, and had ridiculed prayers and sacrifices as manifestations of ignorance. But now he sensed that his end was near, and a change--a conversion--came over him. He wasted no time in erecting altars to the gods, and asked for their forgiveness. -152Even more: he allowed an old woman to put an amulet round his neck, and burning incense and laurel, he prayed for his safe journey to the other world. This description, given to us by Diogenes Laertius ( IV, 55 - 57 ), presents a discomforting picture of Bion, but is in accord with what elsewhere he reports about him, an uncontrollable homosexual, an ostentatious flippant, a man who could only describe things by means of the most vulgar expressions, a teacher who could not retain serious students, a crafty and opportunistic fellow, a flatterer at the court of Antigonus Gonatas, and someone who, terrified at the prospect of his own imminent death, underwent a cowardly last-minute conversion, as was also reported maliciously about Voltaire. 14 Seldom do we find Diogenes Laertius assuming so negative an attitude in his biographies, but Bion had to be the great exception. What veracity there may be in this description of Bion is difficult to say, although we suspect that it must have been influenced by much intentional maligning on the part of the enemies and detractors of Cynicism. In the instance of Bion, such maligning could have sprung from many quarters, not only from the established philosophical schools, but also from other sources, because if there was ever an unforgiving Cynic whose diatribes knew no bounds and spared no victims, that Cynic was Bion. Both in speaking and in writing, he succeeded in combining elegance, wit, and sarcasm which was directed at all sorts of people and customs, for which reason, as Strabo informs us ( I, ii, 2 ). his victims reacted with the comment that in him, philosophy presented itself in the cloak of a prostitute. 15 He was unwilling or perhaps unable to feel respect for just about anyone or anything. His statements about the gods were brutal and blunt. He regarded God and the gods as perverse fictions, and temples and rituals as senseless inventions. The statement of Diogenes Laertius mentioned above, that Bion would not even look at a temple, is not farfetched, given what we gather from other sources. Plutarch ( Mor.561c), for instance, provides us with this report: "Bion says that in punishing

the children of the wicked, God is more ludicrous than a physician who administers medicine to a grandson or son for a grandfather's or father's illness." In vain shall we search other Cynics for a more damaging condemnation of a popular religious belief than what is entailed in this apophthegm of the man from Borysthenes. In just two lines he overthrows with one sarcastic blow the theological edifice that had been erected and fortified by hundreds of years of religious traditions around the idea that the sins of the parents are inherited by their children, and would reappear in Judeo-Christian theology in the doctrine of original sin. 16 That, Bion would have said, is the climax of absurdity, and if it were a real fact, then God would be as ludicrous as the physician mentioned in Plutarch's report. This is indeed unsettling language even to the ears of a lukewarm believer, and outright blasphemous words to a pious believer. It is for this reason that Bion had to appear in as bad a light as that in which Diogenes Laertius presents him. Bion's association with the atheistic Theodorus could explain the embittered animosity with which his ideas were dealt in antiquity. 17 The lessons that Bion learned from Theodorus, -153as these may have been expressed in the latter's On the Gods, were well expressed in his teachings. His eventual 'conversion' could be viewed as an example of literary inversion, 18 in which Bion's own ridicule and rejection of religious superstition are turned against him when he is about to die. The disrespectful atheist is converted into a frightened believer. A review of the information concerning Bion life raises questions about the justifiability of treating him as a Cynic, at least in the tradition of his predecessors. His wearing the Cynic cloak and his carrying the Cynic wallet, about which we have a marginal comment ( D. L. IV, 51), do not make him a Cynic, and, besides, it appears that he adopted these external features of Cynicism only during a short period of his life. As Julian insisted, such outward characteristics alone do not confer on anyone the right to be called a Cynic ( Or. VI, 201b). Epictetus had already warned prospective Cynics not to confuse the external appearance with the true character of Cynicism. In his Discourses ( III, xxii, 10 - 12 ), he advises anyone who wishes to become a Cynic "to stay at a prudent distance from it," if he imagines that wearing a torn cloak and carrying a wallet are all that are required for a Cynic. In the instance of Bion, there are various behavioral traits and actions that show that he parted with the older Cynics. Such traits and actions reflect the changes that Cynicism was already undergoing in the third century B.C. His sexual habits, for instance, especially his rampant need for male partners, whom he would use for the gratification of his sexual appetites, disclose a character that lacks even the barest requirements of discipline, which the earlier Cynics preached and practiced. His comment about Socrates is revealing in this regard: "If Socrates felt desire for Alcibiades and abstained, he was foolish; and if he did not abstain, his conduct was not reprehensible" ( D. L. IV, 49). Likewise, his relationship with Antigonus Gonatas seems to leave much to be desired in what concerns Cynic behavior. This relationship is well attested to by various sources, including Diogenes Laertius ( IV, 46) and Stobaeus ( IV, 29 a). We know that Antigonus supported Bion and took care of his needs. Plutarch informs us ( Mor. 531) of Bion's way of pestering this king with constant requests for favors, again a behavior that stands in contrast with the self-sufficiency and frugality of earlier Cynics. The transformation of the original mendicant Cynic into a regular court philosopher should convince us that within decades after Diogenes' death, the intensity of the Cynic fervor had diminished considerably. Gomperz, nevertheless, was willing to view Bion as a Cynic; actually, he admits, "three-quarters of one," 19 and other scholars have not hesitated to defend the

genuineness of his Cynicism. 20 The uncomplimentary description of his character given by Diogenes Laertius must be examined in the context of the possibility that it may have been influenced by exaggerations and distortions coming from hostile sources. The great Eratosthenes of Cyrene, who probably knew Bion, left of him a characterization far less negative, insisting that underneath the exterior that Bion presented to the world, there was in him "a true Odysseus," which is as complimentary a comment as can be imagined. -154In order to recognize Bion's Cynicism, then, we do not have to turn our eyes necessarily away from the example of his life. If, moreover, we concentrate our attention on the statements attributed to him, then it is obvious that there is much real Cynicism in them. There is in that he encountered in Athens, in Rhodes, or in any other place. Whether in regard to religious beliefs and practices, or in regard to social conventions, including marriage, or in regard to people, Bion felt free to discharge his Cynic thunders without compunction or timidity. Even Archytas of Tarentum, a universally admired and respected Pythagorean mathematician, was mercilessly ripped to pieces, as can be learned from a fragment of his poetry. And Antigonus Gonatas, the very man who provided for his needs, was not spared. Surely, the vestiges of the Cynic snarling and growling, which are associated with Diogenes, remained alive in his Cynic-like spirit. The appreciation of Bion as a Cynic presupposes the acceptance of the fact that in him, Cynicism became mixed with a type of hedonism of Cyrenaic and Epicurean roots, which allowed him to behave and think as he did. Thus, while still rejecting the world as a Cynic should always do, Bion recognized the necessity of entering into a series of compromises with the political world as embodied in a reigning monarch, with the appetites of the body, and with those unavoidable factors and circumstances in which fate had placed him. Perhaps the most illuminating statement from him, as reported by Teles, is this: "Adapt yourself to conditions as sails to the wind." Life, he reminds us elsewhere, is ultimately a drama in which we all play a part which is given to us and about which all we can alter is our attitude towards it. We must always understand the senselessness of the drama of human existence, a drama in which nothing really means anything, and in which in the end death plunges us into eternal oblivion. We cannot appeal either to God or the gods, for such beings do not exist. Hardly anything can be done about anything, except, perhaps, in regard to our responses to situations, for happiness does not consist in what we have and where we are, but rather in our reactions to our circumstances. Let us, then, be like the sails of ships in stormy seas: if they adapt themselves to the winds, they maintain the ship afloat; if they do not, the ship will perish sooner and more tragically than necessary, for in the end all things must perish. Obviously, the missionary spirit of Crates has transformed itself into a hedonistic pessimism, for which reason Diogenes Laertius may have been correct when he spoke of the selfishness that permeated Bion's life ( IV, 53 ). Bion expected to save no one from τυ+ϕος, no one, that is, except himself. He succeeded in converting in his mind all things and all people into objects to be used (probably not abused) for his gratification or for some personal advantage. An element of compassion may have still lived in him, as one of the fragments shows, in which he comments sympathetically on the suffering of a frog that was being tortured, and in which his realization of the madness of human beings comes clearly to the surface. In a world in which madness and absurdity prevail everywhere, what else could a Cynic do but seek the peace that comes from an

-155adaptability to changing circumstances, as sails to changing winds? In chapter 3 we came across an apophthegm of Diogenes in which he speaks of all people as being mad or nearly mad. We now come upon another Cynic who devoted himself to capturing in his satirical writings the madness and absurdity of human existence. His name was Menippus. The sources refer to him by the traditional Cynic appellation 'Dog', as we find in Lucian's dialogues or in Diogenes Laertius' biography, where he is called a "Cretan hound." His response to the maddening τυϕος that he found everywhere was not the insults of Diogenes, or the jovial laughter of Crates, but a sarcastic laughter, the like of which may be difficult to find in the annals of philosophy and literature. Lucian refers to him as "the secret dog who bites as he laughs" ( Twice Accusedxxxiii), and in his Dialogues of the Dead (I) we are told of a certain message that Diogenes sent to Menippus from Hades:

21

Diogenes bids you, Menippus, if things above ground have been sufficiently ridiculed by you, to come here to laugh at many more matters. For there, your laughter was yet questionable, and frequent was the objection, for who knows with certainty what is to come after life? But here you will not cease laughing on firm ground, as I do now, and most of all when you see the rich and the viceroys and the princes to be so humble and obscure, and distinguishable only by their lamentations, being now soft-hearted, recollecting their life above. Menippus, at least according to Lucian, did join Diogenes and Crates in Hades, where his laughter continued, and perhaps, we may add, continues and gets louder with each passing day. A contemporary of Bion and a disciple of Metrocles, Menippus was born in Gadara and became at some point a citizen of Thebes. Hardly anything else is known about his life, and Diogenes Laertius' brief biography of him ( VI, 99 - 101 ) does not lend us much assistance. We learn from it that he was of Phoenician descent and that originally he had been a slave, but that being an expert at begging, he succeeded in gaining Theban citizenship: that is, through his love of money, he became wealthy and was able to persuade the Thebans to grant him citizenship. We also learn from Diogenes Laertius that Menippus acquired his wealth by lending money, and that when his financial affairs went bad, he hanged himself. The dates of his birth and death are not known. Diogenes Laertius notes that there was nothing serious in him and that his writings overflowed with jokes. This assessment is contradicted by various other sources that recognize the seriousness and depth of his thought: Cicero, for example, spoke of him as a philosopher who combined a profound understanding of human life with much wit, and Varro referred to him as "nobilis quidem canis" (a certain noble dog). Many writings are attributed to him. Diogenes Laertius, for instance, mentions thirteen books ( VI, 101 ). But of such writings, nothing has survived, except for very few fragments, fewer in his case than those of other Cynics. But the absence of primary materials is compensated for by the abundance of -156references in the secondary sources. Menippus' style and choice of subjects were imitated by important classical writers, Varro and Lucian being only two examples. Varro Saturæ Menippeæ, a collection of humorous poetical essays of which we have ninety titles and over

600 fragments, is a clear example of Menippus' influence on the development of a certain literary genre, known appropriately as 'Menippean satire'. Also, Seneca Apocolocyntosis, a biting skit on the deification of Emperor Claudius, is written in a Menippean style. It is unquestionable, moreover, that Lucian derived many of his themes from Menippus' writings, and that his style turned out to be thoroughly Menippean. 22 Menippus' ubiquitous presence in Lucian's writings points to the fact that the great literary satirist had much in common with the Cynic philosopher. Both recognized the nonsensical character of most human institutions and activities and wasted no time in ridiculing them. Menippus' The Sale of Diogenes appears to have been the model used by Lucian for his own Sale of Creeds, and is the source from which later reports about Diogenes' abduction by pirates and his sale as a slave originated. On a general plane, then, the 'serious-satirical' character of Menippus' writings proved to be irresistible as a paradigm worthy of imitation, and many attempts to emulate his style can be mentioned. 23 William Blake An Island on the Moon, for example, can be cited as a modern work written in the Menippean tradition. Written around the year 1784, this work exemplifies what has been called the "virulent post-classical survival" of Menippus' style and thought. 24 In Blake, we come across recognizable elements associated with Menippus: an extraterrestrial or otherworldly setting, a cast of characters who are engaged in sarcasm and ridicule, a heavy dosage of social criticism, a contempt for pretentiousness and academic arrogance, and, above all, an abundance of freedom of speech. 'Quid', a character in Blake's piece, has been seen as a reincarnation of Diogenes, but a Diogenes who is tainted with some of the traits of modern cynicism, such as opportunism and a lack of idealism. What is it, then, that makes Menippus so attractive a figure in the history of Cynicism? What is it that makes him so worthy of imitation? The reconstruction of his ideas is not an easy task, although a reading of Lucian's dialogues can put us on the right track, for it is in Lucian's satires that we hear the distinct echoes of Menippus' voice. 25 Menippus was a true Cynic at least in his attitude towards the world, if not in his mode of life, for nowhere do we hear about him carrying a staff and a wallet, or about him begging for food. On the contrary, he appears to have been a clever speculator who was fond of making money, 26 that he found everywhere was worthless and worthy of the most decisive defacing, and this defacing he undertook by writing mordant satires. He stood, therefore, before a world that caused him laughter and amusement, and he wrote about that world precisely in that mood, not for the purpose of ridiculing it, but as a "versifying moralist" with a moralistic purpose in mind. 27 -157As we review Menippus' presence in Lucian's dialogues, we begin to understand at once the extent of his Cynicism. He is invariably portrayed as an inhabitant of Hades, or, as in Menippus, or the Oracle of the Dead, as a visitor. He himself wrote a book entitled ΝεκυƖ + α--a title rendered sometimes as Necromancy, the contents of which remind us of Homer νεκυƖ + αι in the Odyssey (XI), where the descent of Odysseus to Hades is described, and where his encounters with the ghosts of Agamemnon, Achilles, and Ajax, among others, are recounted. For just as for Homer, both for Menippus and Lucian, too, the meaning of human life is discovered by questioning those who are no longer alive and who now live in the underworld. Menippus' characters either live in Hades or travel to Hades, and so do those

created by Lucian, and in the latter, it is Menippus, who, following the advice of Diogenes, has descended to Hades, where, amid much laughter and joking, he questions the dead. We find him jeering and ridiculing men who were once powerful and wealthy, like Croesus, Midas, and Sardanapalus. Croesus, the fabulously rich Lydian king of the sixth century B.C., points to Menippus and complains bitterly to Pluto, the prince of the underworld, saying: We can't endure, Pluto, this dog here, Menippus, dwelling near us. So either establish him somewhere else, or we shall change our habitation to another spot. . . . Whenever we groan and lament, remembering our possessions above--Midas here, his gold coins, and Sardanapalus his abundant luxury, and I, Croesus, my treasures--he laughs at and upbraids us, calling us names such as 'slaves' and 'castaways'. ( Dialogues of the Dead II) In another passage we find Menippus questioning and reviling no less than Trophonius and Amphilochus, his son, two characters who, while alive, enjoyed a great reputation as prophets and seers. The oracle of Trophonius, located near Lebadeia in Boeotia, was for religious Greeks a place of special significance and was held in great reverence. Devout inquirers would enter a sacred cave in which it was believed that they were miraculously transported to Hades, where Trophonius himself would answer their questions. But for Menippus, all this, as much as other religious beliefs, was superstitious humbug fabricated by "the foolish triflers of men" with the encouragement of characters as deceptive as Trophonius and his likes while they were alive. Other manifestations of Menippus' critical attitude towards religion abound in Lucian's testimony. Menippus' rationalistic critique of religion in general and oracles in particular would reappear with great intensity 250 later in the writings of his compatriot Oenomaus of Gadara. On the basis of the titles of Menippus' works and the observations found in the secondary sources, we can form a general picture of the targets of his ridicule and sarcasm, and an idea about the extent and intensity of his Cynicism. Like his predecessors, he attacked and sought to deface all sorts of things: people's attachment for life, the worship of wealth and honors, religious beliefs -158and practices, and social restrictions. Disguising his inflexible rationalism and philosophical earnestness beneath a mantle of amusing and satirical language, he challenged the world around him, as few Hellenistic Cynics were able to do, remaining faithful to the traditions that go back to the early Cynics. The concluding lines of Lucian Menippus, or the Oracle of the Dead are revealing in regard to Menippus' Cynicism. In this dialogue, Menippus tells a man named Philonides about his experiences in Hades, where, while alive, he was miraculously allowed to be a visitor. He tells his interlocutor about a certain decree passed by the judges of the underworld concerning the fate of the rich and the powerful. On the advise of Dryskull, the son of Skeleton, a citizen of Deadborough and of the tribe of Corpseland, the following decree was agreed upon: Whereas the Plutocrats perpetrate a number of iniquities in life, by plunder, by violence, and in every way utterly despising the Poor, be it enacted by the Senate and the People that when they die, their bodies undergo punishment, just as do those of other worthless people, but that their souls be sent up above again into life, and enter into asses, until they have, in such state, passed through two hundred and fifty thousand years, becoming asses from generation to

generation, and carrying heavy burdens, and driven by the poor laborers; and after that period, that they be permitted finally to die. On the assumption that this passage reflects Menippus' sentiments, we can conclude that the proverbial Cynic contempt for wealth and power was intertwined in him with a feeling of compassion for the poor and the suffering of human beings. More complex in this regard is the presence of yet another figure in the Cynic movement, Cercidas of Megalopolis, a remarkable man who combined in himself the expertise of a persuasive diplomat, the courage of a patriotic general, the practical wisdom of a legislator, the eloquence of an accomplished poet, the moral earnestness of a socially concerned citizen, and, in some way or another, the mind of a Cynic. In him, we come across so great a number of features that give at first the impression of a man so far removed from the Cynic canons of conduct, that the very idea of referring to him as a Cynic appears to be farfetched and unjustifiable. If Onesicritus' participation in Alexander's campaigns and his friendship with Lysimachus made us hesitate in calling him a Cynic, and if Bion's style of life caused for us uncertainty in identifying his Cynicism, in the case of Cercidas the situation is even more complicated. And yet, his Cynicism was real, if we are willing to accept the fact that in the time between Diogenes and him, Cynicism had undergone a series of irreversible transformations. To refuse to associate him with Cynicism, as Sayre does, 28 entails an ignoring of important aspects of his thought, as these are revealed in the fragments of his poetry. The historical identification of Cercidas as a Cynic initially posed certain problems. Demosthenes ( On the Crown295) mentions an Arcadian statesman named Cercidas, whom the orator condemns in the severest language for his -159support of the Macedonians and for the betrayal of Greece, for which he, along with others, was supposedly responsible. In the nineteenth century various scholars were inclined to regard this Cercidas as the Cynic poet mentioned by various sources such as Diogenes Laertius (VI, 76). 29 But the discovery of an Egyptian papyrus at Oxyrhynchus in 1906 ( P. Oxy.1082), 30 settled the matter conclusively in another direction, and convinced scholars that the Cercidas mentioned by Demosthenes and the Cynic Cercidas were two different persons who, although possibly related by family ties, were separated from each other by a century. The Oxyrhynchus papyrus includes seven fragments attributable to the Cercidas of the late third century. B.C., who is identified in it as "Cercidas the Dog," and to whom the poetical lines revealed in the papyrus are ascribed. 31 Aside from the primary materials contained in the papyrus, there is information about Cercidas in the secondary sources, both in the form of quotations and in accounts that deal with his political and military activities. Among the secondary sources, the testimony of Polybius, a historian from Megalopolis and a younger contemporary of Cercidas, is of special value. Later secondary sources also mention him, as is the case with Aelian, among others. 32 Cercidas' dates cannot be fixed with certainty, although we know that it is to the last quarter of the third century B.C. that his political and military activities belong. His place of birth was the Arcadian city of Megalopolis in the Peloponnesus. Nothing is known about his family or background, although a comment in Frag. 4 indicates that he did not belong to the oligarchy: at least at the time when the lines of this fragment were written, Cercidas was not blessed by

fortune with great possessions, for which reason he asks himself, "Why does the impartial balancer [God] never incline the scales to me?" Still, his participation in the affairs of the State could indicate that his family was prominent in some way. No information is available concerning his education, and nothing is known with certainty about any possible contacts with Cynic philosophers, although there are reports that he was acquainted with Crates. The fragments of his poetry, however, reveal a man with considerable knowledge of philosophy and literature. We learn from one of the secondary sources that he left instructions for the first two books of the Iliad to be buried with him. Also, we have this statement from Aelian ( Hist. xiii, 20): Cercidas of Megalopolis, when he was close to his death, told his saddened family that he was happy to depart from this life in the expectation of meeting on the other side Pythagoras among the philosophers, Hecataeus among the historians, Olympus among the musicians, and Homer among the poets. After speaking these words, he died. One thinks at once of the words spoken by Socrates in Plato Apology (41a): "How much would one of you give to meet Orpheus and Musaeus, Hesiod or Homer? I am willing to die ten times over if this account is true."Cercidas' wishful thought about meeting Pythagoras in Hades should not lead us to the conclusion that he was a Pythagorean, any more than Socrates' expectation of -160being with Hesiod and Homer should suggest to us the idea that he was especially attached to the epic poets. 33 On the other hand, one might wonder why, if Cercidas was indeed a Cynic, he did not wish to find himself, once in Hades, among Cynics like Diogenes and Crates. Cercidas appears for the first time on the historical stage in the year 225 B.C. At that time, the political situation of the Peloponnesus was dominated by one overriding factor, namely, the designs of the Spartans under Cleomenes III to gain control over their neighboring cities, Megalopolis among them. Aratus, a statesman from Sicyon, a northwestern Peloponnesian city, had guided since 245 B.C. the affairs of the Achaean League, a confederacy of Peloponnesian cities, in its efforts to contain the influence of the Macedonians. Megalopolis became a member state of the Achaean League in 235 B.C., a few years before it had become obvious to Aratus that the major threat to the united states of the league was Sparta. Thus, in 227 B.C. he commissioned two prominent citizens from Megalopolis to travel to Macedonia as ambassadors of the Achaean League in order to secure from Antigonus Doson, the Macedonian king, his commitment to assist the Peloponnesians in their struggle against Sparta. The two men chosen for this mission were Nicophanes and Cercidas. After visiting the Macedonian king, they returned with his promise of assistance. In 223 B.C. Cleomenes and the Spartans seized, plundered, and eventually destroyed Megalopolis. Many of its citizens, however, managed to flee to neighboring Messene, Cercidas presumably among them, where they prepared themselves to strike back at the Spartans with the support of the Macedonians. One year later, the combined forces of the Achaean League, led by Antigonus Doson, and with Cercidas as a general leading a contingent of one thousand Megalopolitans, defeated the Spartans in the hills of Sellasia, only a few miles north of Sparta. Soon after, the first foreign conqueror to have ever entered Sparta up to that time marched into the city, restructured its government, and reduced to ashes its legendary reputation of invincibility. Megalopolis was then rebuilt and resettled, and by the year 217 B.C. we find that the man chosen to resurrect

its political structure and create a new code of laws was Cercidas. Such are in outline the historical details provided by Polybius. Within the span of eight years, then, that is, from 225 to 217 B.C., Cercidas presents himself to us as ambassador, general, and lawgiver. Before and after these dates, however, nothing is known about his activities or about his character. The question is, of course, in what way is it possible to make his known activities conform to the Cynic requirements of his predecessors. The obvious answer is that such conforming is hardly possible, if we keep our eyes fixed on Diogenes and Crates as the stereotypes of a Cynic. It is true that Crates himself once served as ambassador on behalf of the Athenians, but aside from this moment of political participation, we hear nothing else about any other similar situation either on his part or on that of Diogenes. Cercidas' role in the battle of Sellasia is even more unique in the history of Cynicism. Generals were viewed by Crates as nothing more than donkey drivers, but now we are in the -161presence of a Cynic who leads an army into the battlefield. And a ), 34 we face again a perplexing issue, for the only 'laws' that could have satisfied Cercidas' Cynic predecessors were those of their utopian Cynic republics, with which ordinary laws had nothing in common. Yet, Cercidas did create a code of laws for his native city, a code which in the testimony of Polybius was found satisfactory and agreeable by all the citizens. What basis, then, is there for including Cercidas in the list of Hellenistic Cynics? Cynicism, as Oenomaus of Gadara would remind us ( Julian, Or. VI, 187c), is neither Antistheneanism nor Diogenism. The worlds of Antisthenes, Diogenes, and Crates on the one hand and, on the other hand, the world of Cercidas were different in many respects, and their personal circumstances were just as different. Diogenes' reaction to his social and political situation was one in which all conventions had to be defaced, and he acted accordingly. Thus, he rejected the : on this basis, he proudly announced, "I am a citizen of the world," which meant, "I am a citizen of nowhere," for he had no country and did not want to have a country. But Cercidas did have a country, and a country that had been ruined by the Spartans, and which after the battle of Sellasia was left in urgent need of laws and a civic structure. Hence, he acted as he thought he was morally obliged to act. Dudley is correct in contending that "there [was] nothing of the Cynic cosmopolitanism about Cercidas' conduct in standing so resolutely by his country in her misfortunes, and in being so concerned about the right ordering of her political affairs." 35 But cosmopolitanism is only one aspect of Cynicism that furnishes us with a truncated solution to the social and political problems of existing human arrangements. It has also been argued, although with less justification, that "the real trouble with Cynicism was that it consisted of little more than a stream of insecurely based moral obloquy directed against a faulty but stable social system." 36 The early Cynics were able to afford the luxury of calling for the elimination of all social and political structures precisely because the civic contexts in which they lived were not in danger of falling apart. As Aalders has noted, "the Cynics can live and preach in the Cynic fashion only because the loathed establishment continues to exist, and only by the grace of the liberal attitude of the Greek poleis which they detest." 37 But what happens when that establishment collapses altogether, either as a result of a devastating war or as a consequence of internal social disintegration? We have reports of Cynics hurriedly fleeing from cities in danger, unwilling or perhaps unable to lift one finger to

lend any sort of assistance, as in the sack of Corinth in 146 B.C. At least in the instance of Cercidas, the accusation leveled by Lucian against the Cynics, namely, that they were parasites living at the expense of the State, and that they would not hesitate to abandon it when conditions became bad--that accusation cannot be sustained. Cercidas understood the urgency of the needs of his country, and chose to put aside whatever cosmopolitanism he could have inherited from the Cynic tradition. Generals, he might have said, are practically always donkey -162drivers and politicians are most of the time incorrigible rogues; and yet, there are situations when generals and even politicians are needed, and when even the most intransigent among Cynics may have to abandon his tub, put aside his staff, hang his wallet, and, wearing a war helmet and carrying sword and shield, act in the name of his moral principles, not for love of money or fame, not for securing control over others or out of personal fear, but as a result of his moral convictions. It is unreasonable to interpret Cercidas' intervention in politics and military affairs as disclosing "just one more parish-trump politician, whose horizons, far from reaching out to embrace the cosmos, extended no farther than the Peloponnese." 38 We can now turn our attention to the fragments of the Oxyrhynchus papyrus. The fragments come from poetical compositions, written in a style known as 'meliambic', which, judging from the extant lines, must have been considerable literary value. Cercidas' knowledge of the Homeric poems must have been decisive in the shaping of his own poetical talents. A report informs us that as part of his legislation for Megalopolis, he made it mandatory for children to memorize the Catalogue included in Book II of Homer' Iliad. Modern prose translations of Cercidas' fragments fall short in conveying their beauty in the original Greek. 39 Among them, Frags. 4, 8, and 9 are particularly revealing. Frag. 4 ( Knox, "Meliamb II"), the longest fragment, belongs to a period before the destruction of Megalopolis, when the tyrannical policies of Cleomenes were exacerbating the already difficult social conditions throughout the Peloponnesus. This fragment, which reveals a great deal of anguish and bitterness, comes from a work written after the events of 223 B.C. 40 It begins by asking why God has chosen to distribute wealth and property in so unfair a way among his children. Men who are immersed in licentiousness and depravity, who commit hideous crimes, who deserve neither praise nor respect, are blessed by fortune and live at ease and in comfort, while others, who are virtuous and prudent, are compelled to live in poverty and destitution. The evil and wicked enjoy abundance and live in luxury, while the good and honest barely have enough to eat. God obviously inclines the scales of his favor to the side of "the dregs of humanity," and abandons the poor and those who suffer: "For Zeus, father of us all, verily is the father to some, but to others only a step-father." What we, as human beings, must do, Cercidas continues, is to care for Paean, and for Sharing--she is truly a goddess--and for Retribution that walks upon the earth. While God blows a favorable wind astern, hold him in honor, but though mortals fare well, yet shall a sudden wind blow away vaunted wealth and proud fortune. Who then shall vomit them back to you from the deep? Although the themes unveiled in this and other fragments are not exclusively Cynic, 41 it remains true that they are typically Cynic, and that on account of this, the designation of

Cercidas as a Cynic philosopher is not unjustified. In Frag. 4, we encounter, for instance, a series of questions -163concerning God's justice in dealing with human beings: Why, if God exists, is there so much rampant injustice everywhere? Why so much suffering? Why so much inequality and unfairness in rewards and punishments? Are some of us children of God, while others only his step-children? Should we then leave aside such questions, which "astrologers" (meaning what we would call today 'theologians') can conveniently answer, and devote ourselves to the worship of three deities, namely, Paean, Sharing, and Retribution? The introduction of these three deities is revealing. Paean was not strictly a deity, but a name given to invocational hymns of praise with which symposia were begun. Normally, such hymns were sung in honor of Apollo the Healer (as we learn from Iliad I, 473), and were believed to bring health and prosperity to those assembled for special occasions. Paeans were also s ) was the goddess of divine retribution whose mission was to inflict punishment on those who through pride or cruelty brought suffering to others and disrespect to the gods. If we now reflect on the meanings of the three deities, to whom, on the advice of Cercidas, we ought to turn our attention. his moralistic program, a genuinely Cynic program, becomes clear. The land has been devastated by a lasting war; the cities are in shambles; thousands of people have lost their homes and have become displaced; poverty and disease abound everywhere; the ambitions and cruelty of the tyrants have plunged the Peloponnesus into an abyss of misery, spiritual and material; and even the laws of cities have ceased to exist. Should we not, in this time of desolation, invoke the names of the three deities who could render to us their much needed assistance? We are in need of health and prosperity, as the Cynics, who often conceived of themselves as the physicians of humanity, could well understand. We must abandon the passion for wealth, and we must begin by sharing what we have with the poor and the destitute, as the Cynics, who looked with contempt upon riches, could also understand. Finally, we need to warn people, especially those in control of the cities, that Nemesis still walks on the earth and is ready to administer the divine vengeance with which the gods punish the wicked. We must, therefore, recognize human suffering, sympathize with those in pain, share our possessions and work towards an equitable distribution of goods, and warn everybody of the impending doom that awaits us, should we remain spiritually blind and deaf. For such blindness and deafness are the τυ + φοζ that befogs the mind. Cercidas, then, emerges, in his threefold role as ambassador, general, and lawgiver, as a Cynic who translated the virtues of Cynicism into an agenda for action. Unlike other Cynics, he came close to being an actual king. When Diogenes asked the announcer at the slave market to present him as someone who could govern people, he spoke in metaphorical language; Cercidas, on the other hand, had one opportunity, short and limited as it may have been, to act as an actual king in his capacity as lawgiver. His horizon was surely not as wide -164-

as the cosmos of Diogenes, and neither were his laws intended for the inhabitants of Crates' utopian Pera. But they were real laws, which included real reforms such as land and wealth distribution. We are correct, therefore, in summing up his mission as "preaching philanthropy and exhorting his fellows to heal the sick and give to the poor while they had time, otherwise the social revolution might be upon them and their wealth taken away." 42 Frags. 8 and 9 furnish us with glimpses of other ideas and sentiments of Cercidas that also reveal Cynic themes. In Frag. 8 ( Knox, "Meliamb VI"), we hear him condemn Sphaerus od Bosporus, possibly the philosopher-advisor of Cleomenes, 43 as a degenerate man. Sphaerus was a disciple of Cleanthes, who left works on dialectics and logic ( D. L. VII, 177-178), and who, in Cercidas' opinion, was an example of the decadence into which Stoicism had fallen. In Frag. 9 ( Knox, "Meliamb VI"), Cercidas specifically inveighs against the useless academic and speculative endeavors on the part of writers like Sphaerus: Of idle jesting pettifogging lawyers they are, Disaster [bringing with their sharp and prickly thorns] To babbling of pitiful nonsense [whetting well their pointed tongue]: Nor habit of discipline blunts or fatigues its bitter edge. 44 Certain poetical statements, attributed to Cercidas since the fifth century A.D., give us a somber representation of the sentiments that in his old age filled his spirit as a wave of despair about the possibility of dissipating the τυ + φοζ that enveloped his contemporaries: There is no one who has glanced for a moment on the character of humanity at present, without cursing humanity. . . . From human beings shame has departed and in no respect is considered fair: while people themselves with crooked fingers like Harpies seek from every stone an unholy gain, and each, hunting for a stretch to pillage, dives thither and swims to his prey, destroying comrade, brother, or wife, but preserving his own thrice wretched life. To them nothing is sacred, and by such people the sea is trodden under foot and the land sailed over, all alike, they carry on their lips this saying: "Win, my friend, summer and winter alike; from everywhere win gain; have no reverence or shame of any man, for he will merely mock you for it. . . . If you are poor, even your mother will hate you, and if you are rich, even the gods will love you, but if you are poor, not even your relatives will love you." I, my comrade, curse the lives people lead now, and hate all human beings who live thus, and shall always hate them. For these have overturned life. Justice, holy until now, has departed without recall. . . . Such goad of avarice is in their souls: they drag gain from every source, and there is neither kin nor friend but ventures all in quest of gain. . . . I wonder only how one should live among these beasts, for among them life is unlivable. 45 Here we encounter the Cynic contempt at its highest point. In an explosion of Cynic pessimism, Cercidas appears to have been unable to find a true human being anywhere, and to have given up even the slightest hope of finding one: -165there was for him no longer the need to carry a lighted lamp in daylight, for there was nothing to find, except an answer to the dilemma, "How one should live among these beasts." Between the death of Cercidas in the early second century B.C. and the beginning of the first century B.C., Cynicism subsided as a philosophical force, for no important figures can be

cited during that time. But with the coming of the first century B.C., we notice a rebirth of Cynic ideas and modes of life, and the man who typifies this revival was the philosopher-poet of Gadara, Meleager. Gadara was also the birthplace of Menippus and Oenomaus. There is some evidence for the existence of an actual Cynic community in Gadara, the roots of which are traceable to the third century B.C. and which survived until late Roman times. Gadara (modern Mukes) was located about five miles southeast of the Sea of Galilee, and was one of the cities that integrated what was known as the Decapolis, a group of ten Greek settlements that were established under the Ptolemies and Seleucids, and that were during Meleager's time under the jurisdiction of the Roman Senate. About twenty miles north of Gadara, on the shores of the Sea of Galilee, was Gerasa (possibly modern Kersa), which was also part of the Decapolis. Some confusion has arisen concerning various references to 'Gadarenes' and 'Gerasenes' in the New Testament, these two terms being used in different manuscript traditions to identify the same people on the eastern shores of the Sea of Galilee, whom Jesus visited at least on one occasion. We come across such references, for instance, in Mark 5:1, Luke 8:26, and Matt. 8:28. It was in the region of Gadara (or Gerasa) that some of the most spectacular manifestations of Jesus' exorcistic powers were revealed, In Mark 5:1-20, for instance, we find Jesus, after having gone across the Sea of Galilee "to the region of the Gerasenes [or Gadarenes, depending on which manuscript tradition we use]," finding a man possessed by an evil spirit, whom Jesus casts away. The evil spirit, whose name, as he tells Jesus, is 'Legion' ("for we are many"), begs Jesus"again and again not to send them out of the area," but to "send us among the pigs," for which reason Jesus allows them to enter the bodies of some two thousand unfortunate and unsuspecting pigs that are feeding nearby. The pigs, possessed now by the Devil, "rushed down the steep bank into the lake [the Sea of Galilee] and were drowned." This amazing story is repeated with certain variations by Luke and Matthew. One wonders naturally what there could have been in the region of Gadara (or Gerasa) that attracted the Devil so much, and whether the "herd of swine" might not be a theriomorphic way of referring to the Cynics, who among the Greeks were called 'dogs'. Pigs, as is well known, were thought to be exceptionally repulsive animals to the Jews ( Isa. 65:4; 66:3), and strict prohibitions concerning the consumption of their flesh were enforced ( Lev. 11:7). What better way to characterize the 'Syrian' Cynics than as 'pigs' possessed by the Devil who deserved to be drowned? One wonders, too, if some wandering and curious Cynic from Gadara had witnessed such a dreadful spectacle--two thousand terrified pigs flying off a cliff straight into the sea--what his reaction might have been! 46 -166The identification of Gadara is important, especially in view of the allegation of some scholars that the Essenes and, through them, Jesus himself could have been influenced by the Cynics of Gadara. F. G. Downing, for instance, notes that "a Galilean peasant such as Jesus of Nazareth" could have been acquainted with and influenced by the Cynic community at Gadara, a town only twenty miles of Nazareth, 47 a circumstance that could explain in part the recurrent parallelism between certain teachings of Jesus and the doctrines of the Cynics, as well as the similarities between the Essenes and early Christians, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the Cynics of Hellenistic and Roman times. Little is known with certainty concerning Meleager's life. His birth has been set around 135 B.C. and his death in 50 B.C. 48 After spending his early years in Gadara, he settled in Tyre, and then on the island of Cos, where he died. The Anthology has preserved for us numerous

statements from him in the form of epigrams, some of which shed light on his background: he speaks, for example, of Gadara as a town "in the midst of the Assyrians," but to him "an Attic homeland." Gadara, we should point out, was known as 'the Syrian Athens'. Meleager's cultural roots were, therefore, thoroughly Greek, and so probably was his native language, 49 although both in Gadara and in the two other places associated with him, there was the mixture of cultures and languages that was so characteristic of many Hellenistic places. Cos in particular was a center of much cultural diversity: there were Greeks from neighboring Halicarnassus and from other Greek cities, expatriate Syrians, Nabateans, Palestinian Jews, Phoenicians, and Gadarenes like Meleager himself. But it is clear from one of the epigrams found in the Anthology that Meleager was not overly preoccupied with the identification of himself with any one cultural background: whether he was viewed as a Greek or as a Syrian, or as anything else, made no difference to him. In a spirit of Cynic cosmopolitanism, he remarks in an epigram: Island Tyre was my nurse, and Gadara, which is Attic, but lies in Syria, gave birth to me. From Eucrates I sprung, Meleager, who first by the help of the Muses ran abreast of the Charites of Menippus. If I am Syrian, what wonder? Stranger, we dwell in one country, the world: one Chaos gave birth to all mortals. In my old age I wrote these lines in my tablets before my burial; for old age and death are near neighbors. Speak a word to wish me, the loquacious old man, well, and may you reach a loquacious old age yourself? 50 From this epigram, we learn that his birthplace was Gadara, that it was in Tyre that he reached manhood, and that his father's name was Eucrates. We learn also about his debt to Menippus in composing his Charites (on which we will comment presently). But, above all, we learn from it what his true country was: "We inhabit only one homeland, the cosmos." This cosmopolitan sentiment is also given expression in another epigram, the most famous among Meleager's epigrams, in which he reveals certain details of his life, and in which, as it was intended to be an epitaph, he greets in three different languages those who one -167day might perhaps pass by his grave: Go noiselessly by, stranger, here among the pious dead, sleeps old Meleager, son of Eucrates, who linked sweet tearful love poetry and the Muses in his merry Charites. Though heavenly Tyre and Gadara's holy land made a man of him, Cos saw him old, the Meropians' lovely nurse for age. If you be a Syrian, I bid you' Salam'! If you be a Phoenician, I say to you 'Naidios'! And if you be a Greek, I greet you with 'Chaire'! And you then respond to me in kind! 51 We learn from this epigram that Gadara and Tyre were his early homes, and that he lived to an advanced age in Cos. We are also told about his "sweet tearful love poetry" and about his Charites. 'Salam' is a common form of salutation in Aramaic and in other Semitic languages, while 'Naidios' is presumably a Phoenician expression. 'Chaire'(χαîρε) is equivalent to our 'hello'. He, a citizen of the cosmos, wishes after his death to greet passers-by in their own languages, as if to remind everyone of the inconsequential character of the cultural barriers that artificially divide humanity. The Charites ) that are mentioned in both epigrams are his early literary works, which we assume were satirical pieces written in the style of Menippus, and in which his Cynicism

must have revealed itself with enough clarity for him to have deserved the title of "Dog" given to him by some sources. Of these pieces, unfortunately, nothing has survived, except for one short fragment. The titles of some of these satirical pieces are known: there was, for example, a Symposium and a work on the recommended Cynic diet, namely, lentil soup. But more cannot be said in this regard, except that on the basis of what we know about the satires of Menippus, we can assume that those of Meleager were not altogether different from them, and that it is in them that his Cynic temperament must have come to the surface. 52 What is preserved from Meleager, on the other hand, are abundant fragments from his poetical compositions, which he compiled into a collection entitled Garland, and which was dedicated to his friend Diocles of Magnesia. 53 A review of these fragments does not reveal a particularly Cynic poet. 54 The "sweet tearful love poetry" of which he speaks in the epigrams quoted earlier discloses for us a man of extraordinary sensitivity and unparalleled limpidity (to use J. A. Symonds' phrase 55 ), a poet filled with a restrained amorous passion, able and willing to experience great love, and a writer of the highest poetical caliber. Three examples from his poems will suffice to exemplify these aspects of his character and of his writings. Evoking the memory of his beloved Heliodora, he left us these beautiful lines: I will twine white violets, and the myrtle green; Narcissus will I twine, and lilies sheen; I will twine sweet crocus, and the hyacinth blue; And at last I will twine the rose, love's token true: That all may form a wreath of beauty meet To deck my Heliodora's tresses sweet. 56 -168Again, with the image of his departed Heliodora present in his heart, he writes: Tears, the last gift of my love, even down through the earth I send to thee in Hades, Heliodora--tears ill to shed, and on thy much-wept tomb I pour them in memory of longing, in memory of affection. Piteously, piteously doth Meleager lament for thee who art still dear to him in death, paying a vain tribute to Acheron. Alas! Alas! Where is my beautiful one, my heart's desire? Death has taken her, has taken her, and the flower in full bloom is defiled by the dust. But Earth my mother, nurturer of all, I beseech thee, clasp her gently to thy bosom, her whom we all bewail. 57 In another poem, the shifting and uncertain nature of love is stressed: My love is like an April storm upon a false and fickle sea: One day you shine, and sunny warm are those clear smiles you shower on me; Next day from cloudy brows you rain your anger on the ruffled main. Around me all the deeps are dark; I whirl and wander to and fro, Like one who vainly steers his bark amid winds that battle as they blow, Then raise the flag of love or hate, that I at last may know my fate! 58 What incomparable beauty, gentle sweetness, and inflamed passion in Meleager's soul! His poetry, as Symonds observed, "has the sweetness and the splendor of the rose, the rapture and full-throated melody of the nightingale," 59 His early Cynicism, which had manifested itself in thundering satires, transformed itself, as the philosopher-poet aged on the placid island of

Cos, into an expression of love, probably not for all human beings, for not all people deserve to be loved, but for certain persons, like Heliodora, who was once the object of his love. One century after Meleager, another important Cynic, also from Gadara, emerged into the scene. His name was Oenomaus. Practically nothing definite is known about his life, and only short fragments from his writings have survived. We gather from certain statements in the secondary sources that he did not study philosophy under any specific teacher and that he was truly a self-taught man. We hear about a visit to the oracle of Apollo in Colophon, from which he sought to find guidance for his life. The oracle obviously was a source of disappointment for him, and from this time on his faith in oracles and other such religious traditions was shattered. His name is mentioned in various secondary sources, as in Julian's orations and Eusebius' Præparatio evangelica from which much can be learned about his critique of religion. From these references, as well as from the fragments of his works, it is possible to reconstruct some of the aspects of his thought. 60 His works included tragedies, a treatise on Homer, a 'republic', a book on the value of oracles, a work on what we might call 'a dog's private revelation', and several tracts on Cynic themes, including a work on Diogenes. One of the issues that has arisen in modern scholarship is related to the identification of Oenomaus with a certain philosopher named Abnimos ha-Gardi who is mentioned in Talmudic traditions and in Hebrew midrashim. In the opinion of some scholars it seems reasonable, on the basis of a linguistic analysis of the names (' Oenomaus'→' Abnimos' and' from Gadara'→' ha-Gardi'), and also on -169the basis of what is known about Oenomaus, to assume that Oenomaus and Abnimos were one and the same philosopher. 61 Other scholars, on the other hand, have argued that the Abnimos of Talmudic traditions does not represent a specific Hellenic philosopher such as Oenomaus, but stands for a general philosophical type, that is, the typical pagan philosopher. 62 Still, the proximity of Gadara to Jewish towns to the west of the Sea of Galilee, and the reported closeness between Oenomaus and certain Jewish circles in Palestine, should lead us to the assumption that the portrait of Abnimos ha-Gardi may have been drawn by Jewish writers after the image of the Greek philosopher. The friendship between Oenomaus and a certain Rabbi Meier, a relationship that Gomperz called "a unique incident in the history of civilization," 63 is itself an indication of the high regard in which Oenomaus was held among some of the Jews of his time, something that is surprising for two reasons: first, Oenomaus' stance towards religion was negative and condemning; and, second, in some Jewish traditions, the portrayal of Cynic philosophers was far from positive, as can be learned from the Jerusalem Talmud, where we read that "the one who sleeps in the graveyard, burns incense to the demons, rends his clothing and destroys what people give him, is a kinukos [sic]." 64 Such characteristics were conceived of as being indications of mental derangement or of demonic possession. The possessed man, mentioned in Mark (5:2ff), is described as living in graveyards: "Night and day among the tombs and in the hills he would cry out and cut himself with stones." If the Cynics, however, were viewed as deranged and possessed, how can we account for the high regard with which Oenomaus was allegedly held by some of the Jews? We could argue that among the Jews and the Christians, there was much ambivalence towards Cynicism. In certain manifestations of Hellenistic Judaism and in early Christianity, the influence of Cynicism is detectable, and Cynic ideas and practices were sometimes appreciated even by the most fervent adherents of Judaism and Christianity, although the

stringent Cynic critique of religion could not have but forced religious Jews and devout Christians to reject and condemn Cynicism. 65 As we consider both the fragments of Oenomaus and the testimonies about him, several salient points emerge at once. That he was a Cynic is not something about which there were any doubts in antiquity, if not perhaps on the basis of his mode of life, at least with respect to his ideas. Julian speaks of him as a Cynic whose example is to be neither praised nor emulated by true Cynics, for he was "shameless and impudent" and "a scorner of everything human and divine" ( Or. VI, 199). Diogenes, argues Julian, had shown respect for things divine, but Oenomaus recognized no limits in his campaign to deface the values of his contemporaries, and did not hesitate to attack the gods. For Julian, as a pious polytheist, Oenomaus was an example of the decadence into which Cynicism had fallen. The new Cynics, whom he called "uneducated," had forsaken the ancient canons of Cynic thought preached by Antisthenes, Diogenes, and Crates, and had assumed that Cynicism was only an easy way of avoiding civic responsibilities, or had plunged themselves into excesses of moral impudence and -170shamelessness, Oenomaus being an example of this transformation. But Oenomaus' contention, quoted by Julian himself, was this: "Cynicism is neither Antistheneanism nor Diogenism" ( Or. VI, 187). This statement, if authentic, reveals a great deal about Oenomaus himself and, more generally, about the meaning of classical Cynicism. We are thereby reminded that Cynicism is not a collection of dogmas or a prescribed set of rules of conduct established by some infallible founder. Antisthenes and Diogenes were Cynics, and so was Crates, but not for this, can we say that any one of them, or, in fact, any Cynic, represents all that Cynicism is and can be. Cynicism is, more than anything else, an attitude of protest, born out of an exceptional state of intellectual lucidity and nourished by a tremendous amount of personal courage, which the Cynics inherited, Oenomaus suggests, from the example of Hercules: "It was he who bequeathed to humanity the noblest example of this mode of life" ( Or. VI, 187). The nature of this attitude varies from person to person, and is different at different times, since the 'currency' in circulation varies depending on the place and the time at which the Cynic may find himself. Thus, each Cynic responded and reacted to his specific crisis in life in his own distinctive way. The efforts of Epictetus and Julian to 'canonize' Antisthenes, Crates, and especially Diogenes, and to hold them up as the paradigms of Cynicism, while understandable in the context of the riotous decadence into which some minor Cynics of late times fell, were unnecessary and even ill-advised with regard to Cynics such as Oenomaus, for he pursued his own idiosyncratic style of Cynicism independently of the examples set by his predecessors. In Julian Or. VII, we come across a statement that discloses his unhappiness about the turn taken by Cynicism in Roman times: "Cynicism is a sort of madness, a method of life not suitable for a human being, but rather a brutal attitude of mind which deems nothing to be beautiful, honorable, or good." This statement is both revealing and distressing, for it announces unequivocally the arrival of something somber and ominous in the world of Cynicism in particular and, to some extent, in the world of classical philosophy in general, something like the prelude of the end of an era. The Barbarians are now at the gates and the Christians are about to overturn the very foundations of the GrecoRoman cultural structure. Despair, madness, and senselessness (ideas that are conveyed by the word used by Julian, ἀ ) are all that is left, "an attitude of mind which deems nothing to be beautiful,

honorable, or good." Almost two hundred years before Julian wrote these fateful lines, Peregrinus, the last of the great Cynics, would burn himself in the presence of thousands, as if to bring to closure with his self-immolation the history of Cynicism, for there was nothing else to do about anything. The protest and rebellion which the Cynics had promoted for several centuries had eventually proven to be futile. It is difficult to determine whether Julian's assessment of Oenomaus' Cynicism is accurate. Oenomaus' critique of religion, precisely the kind of religion that Julian was attempting to maintain alive against the onslaught of Christianity, must have led him to view Oenomaus' ideas as detrimental and -171nocuous. Indeed, for Oenomaus there was something against which the Cynic protest had to be maintained in its full vigor: the need for human intermediaries between human beings and God or gods, and the blind faith in oracles and divination, which permeated the classical world. The scanty, fragments of his works and the testimonies of the secondary, sources show that Oenomaus' rationalism emerged in this regard with extraordinary clarity and strength. Two of his works were devoted to exposing what he viewed as a manifestation of the τυ + φοζ of his time: the nonsensical character of religions that fostered such ideas. Among the works attributed to Oe (A Dog's Private Revelation). 66 In it, Oenomaus probably included with some dosage of sarcasm and wit the 'revelations' that he claimed to have received directly from God about the norms that ought to guide human beings. The Dog, that is, Oenomaus himself, announces to the world the ultimate truth. Neither soothsayers, nor oracular priestesses, nor temple priests, nor holy books, therefore, are needed for God to communicate with human beings, as is proven by the fact that God can communicate directly with the Dog from Gadara. Possibly imitating a similar work by Alexander of Abonutheichus, a contemporary of Lucian, who had alleged to be the recipient of private messages from Asclepius, Oenomaus now poses as a messenger of God who hears locutions from the divine realm. We can assume that this work was a collection of half-serious and half-satirical pieces, the aim of which was to deal one more blow to certain religious traditions. For in these traditions the presence of intermediaries between God or gods and ordinary human beings is an essential component. At Delphi, for instance, the Greeks heard the 'voice' of Apollo only from the lips of the Pythia, and in other oracles and places of revelation the situation was not different. The Christians, too, following the footsteps of the Jews, needed (and still need) a hierarchy of human intermediaries to serve as a ladder between themselves and their God. Thus, traditionally, private revelations were rare in polytheism, and have remained exceptional and generally unacceptable occurrences in Judaism and Christianity. But what Oenomaus proposed is something altogether different, namely, the abolition of all intermediaries between God and his creatures. A second work dealing with a related subject, and one about which, mostly through the testimony of Eusebius, we have more adequate information, was entitled Γοἠ ( The 67 Sorcerers Detected). In this work, Oenomaus mounts a polemic against the belief in oracles and divination. But it is obvious that in attacking this aspect of religion, the Cynic writer was interested in dealing with a far wider philosophical issue. Eusebius in his Præparatio evangelica left for us a number of paraphrases from this work. According to Eusebius, Oenomaus lists and quotes a variety of oracular pronouncements, both among those that claimed to prophesy the future and among those that dispensed advice to the inquiring

believers, and in every single instance, he demonstrates their absolute worthlessness: they, he argues, have never amounted to anything more than lucky guesses, traditional platitudes, ambiguous statements, and occasionally simply -172unintelligible utterances. There is no value in them, and the belief in them reveals intellectual obfuscation or plain idiocy. The intermediaries of the gods stand, therefore, "detected" and convicted of falsity and cruel deceptiveness, and for this, they deserve to be cast into oblivion. Oenomaus' own experience with the Apollonian oracle at Colophon must have convinced him of the worthlessness of oracles. As noted earlier, he visited the oracle at Colophon early in his life in order to ask for guidance. We do not know what precisely Oenomaus asked the oracle, for he merely tells us that it was "a question about wisdom," but we do have the oracle's response: "Seek in the land of Trachis," he was told, "the garden of Hercules, where nothing is lacking." Trachis is the city that in mythological legends is linked with Hercules. Oenomaus interpreted the oracle as meaning that wisdom can only be found by imitating the examples of Hercules, that is, visiting the 'place' that Hercules used to frequent--specifically in regard to discipline, renunciation of pleasure, strength of character, and the acceptance of suffering, all of which spelled out for him the program for following the Cynic path. The problem was, however, that the same oracular answer had been given moments before to a certain Callistratus, a businessman from Pontus, who made sense of the oracle in a different way: to him, what the god meant was that he should work hard in his business, make money, and then enjoy a life of pleasure. One platitudinous oracular answer, Oenomaus concluded, and two diametrically opposed interpretations, can only point to the senselessness of the belief in oracles. On a more general philosophical plane, Oenomaus proceeds to argue against the possibility of knowing the future and against the Stoic doctrine of predestination. Neither the gods nor human beings can have any knowledge of future events, for if they did, we would not be able to make any free choices. If the gods knew the future, as is claimed by those who appeal to oracles and divination, the future would be already set and unchangeable, for the gods cannot be mistaken in what they know. But in this case, what advantage can there be in seeking the guidance of oracles and adjusting our course of action by reference to oracles and divination? Human behavior, Oenomaus contends, is determined only by our will and by external circumstances, and is not predestined in any way. It is we who carve out our own future through our choices. Neither God, nor gods, nor soothsayers, nor oracles can know the future, because the future is mostly undetermined. Oenomaus displays in his book on oracles a considerable acquaintance with substantive philosophical issues and an impressive intellectual depth. He is possibly one of the few Cynics who dealt at length with speculative philosophical matters, although, here, too, his immediate preoccupation was a practical one, namely, the defacing of certain kinds of customs and conventions. What he substitutes in their place is plainly the ability of the person to make intelligent and considered choices without any reliance on external sources of authority, whether of this world or of another, exemplifying for us the meaning of the concept of self-sufficiency, which is at the heart of classical Cynicism: the Cynic -173-

does not need either gods or oracles to structure his own life. Biographical information concerning Oenomaus is meager. The testimony of Suidas would lead us to believe that he flourished in the third century A.D., but it would make more sense to push his floruit one hundred years earlier, that is, during the reign of Emperor Hadrian. 68 In the century that preceded Oenomaus' time, and during his own time, other important Cynic philosophers, now living in the midst of Roman times, made their appearance. Dio Chrysostom of Prusa, Demonax of Cyprus, Demetrius of Rome, and Peregrinus Proteus are probably the most significant among them. They exemplify clearly the most salient characteristics of late Cynicism at its best. At its worst, on the other hand, Cynicism at that time was exemplified by countless nameless Cynics, both men and women, who, if we accept the testimonies of Epictetus and Julian, crowded the Roman Empire in a mood of riotous rebelliousness, retaining from the older Cynics only their external mode of life, and embodying in themselves the decay of Cynicism. Demetrius of Rome, a man who "was remarkable for personal austerity and for brutal outspokenness rather than for comprehensive or original thought," 69 is the first major Cynic known to have lived in Rome. Nothing definite is known about his background, including his place of birth. We refer to him as ' Demetrius of Rome' simply because of his association with that city. The dates of his birth and death are also unknown, although he was already a person of some note during the time of Caligula. There are no primary source materials related to him, although it is not unreasonably to assume that he left writings, but of these, nothing has survived, except for certain statements found in Stobaeus and Marcus Aurelius that could be interpreted as being fragments from his writings. The short dialogue between Courage and Cowardice found in Stobaeus under Demetrius' name is of doubtful authenticity. References to Demetrius are found in Seneca, Suetonius, Tacitus, Epictetus, and Philostratus. This last writer left for us various details concerning him, but these are less than trustworthy because they are included as bits of information designed to strengthen the portrayal of Apollonius. 70 Philostratus' bent towards exaggerated reporting is evident, for instance, in his account of how a disciple of Demetrius, a young man named Menippus, was saved by Apollonius at the moment he was about to marry a ghost-like woman who was in reality a vampire, one of "those beings whom many regard as lamias 71 and hobgoblins" ( Life of Apollonius of Tyana IV, xxv). In the same context, Philostratus tells us that Demetrius lived in Corinth, and that it was there that he became a follower of Apollonius. Other stories are recounted by Philostratus, for instance, Demetrius' condemnation of the baths (the Thermæ) built by Nero in A.D. 66. Public bathing, Demetrius is supposed to have argued, was immoral and enfeebling, and a source of pollution. For this reason, Philostratus reports, he was banished from Rome ( ibid. IV, x1ii ), upon which he moved to Athens. Elsewhere we come across a more interesting report, in which we learn that through the agency of Apollonius, -174Demetrius became the teacher of Titus, the future emperor: "I propose to associate with you [said Apollonius to Titus] my own companion Demetrius, who will attend you as much as you like and instruct you in the whole duty of a good ruler.""And what sort of wisdom [said Titus], does this person possess?""Courage," he

replied, "to speak the truth unabashed by anyone, for he possesses the constancy and strength of character of a dog." And as Titus did not seem very pleased to hear the reference to a dog, [ Apollonius added,] "you will have a dog to accompany you who will bark in your behalf not only at other people, but at yourself in case you go wrong, and he will bark indeed wisely, and never irrationally.""Well," replied Titus, "give me your dog to accompany me, and I will even let him bite me, in case he feels I am committing injustice." ( ibid. VI, xxxi ; cf. VI, xxxiii) The story is probably apocryphal, for it is difficult to imagine Titus, or Caligula, or Nero, or even Vespasian, allowing an accompanying 'dog' to bite him whenever he committed an act of injustice, or barking at him whenever he stepped beyond the bounds of civility. But still, it portrays Demetrius in a way that is in agreement with what more reliable sources convey to us, as a 'dog' who was willing and able to speak his mind, and utter only the truth, that is, as Philostratus calls him elsewhere "the boldest of the philosophers" ( ibid. VII, x ). From Suetonius ( Vespasianxiii) we have an anecdote that is reminiscent of the encounter between Diogenes and Alexander: " Demetrius, the Cynic philosopher, who had been sentenced to banishment, meeting Vespasian on the road and refusing to rise up or salute him, and even snarling at him in scurrilous language, he [ Vespasian] only called him a dog." Demetrius remained unmoved in the presence of the monarch, reminding himself and all others by his behavior that the Cynic has no other ruler than himself, and showing off the same arrogance before men in power that Diogenes had displayed. And again, in the testimony of Epictetus ( Discourses I, xxv), we find him challenging the authority of Nero, who had threatened him with death: "You threaten me with death," exclaimed Demetrius, "but nature threatens you." Seneca reports ( De beneficiis VII) once having heard Demetrius say to Caligula, who had offered him a large amount of money if he would abandon his Cynic ways, that it would cost Caligula his entire empire to persuade him to change his mode of life, for which reason Seneca developed a great deal of respect and admiration for him, calling him "non præceptor veri, sed testis" (not a teacher of truth, but a witness to the truth): for Seneca, Demetrius' selfsufficiency was the only credible testimony of the true pursuit of philosophy ( Epist. XX). In his De vita beata (xviii), moreover, the Roman Stoic describes Demetrius in these terms: "This boldest of heroes, fighting against all the desires, and poorer than the rest of the Cynics in that, while they banned possessions, he banned even the desire of them." The friendship between Seneca and Demetrius is a well-established historical fact. It was surely based on Seneca's high regard for the character and -175mode of life of Demetrius, whom he calls, again in De beneficiis ( VII), "a great man in my opinion, greater in fact that most other philosophers." Worthy also of note is Demetrius' association with the great Roman Stoic Publius Thrasea Paetus, who succumbed under the outbursts of Nero, and who embodied in himself the most exalted virtues of the Romans. Thrasea Paetus, we know from Tacitus ( Annals XVI, xxxiv), was condemned to death in A.D. 66. We also learn from Tacitus (ibid.) that when Thrasea Paetus received the news of his sentence, he was conversing with Demetrius "about the nature of the soul and its disjunction from the body." Then, taking Demetrius into his private chamber, Thrasea Paetus slashed his own wrist. His last words, directed at Demetrius, are unrecoverable, for at this point Tacitus' Annals comes to an abrupt end.

The reported conversation between Thrasea Paetus and Demetrius has given rise to the idea that the latter allowed for certain accommodations between his Cynicism and Pythagorean notions concerning the immortality of the soul. 72 There is nothing surprising in such an accommodation, for one of the characteristics of late Cynicism was its ability to become intertwined with all sorts of philosophical and religious ideologies and beliefs. Moreover, Philostratus' allegation that Demetrius was a follower of Apollonius of Tyana, while probably fictional in essence, becomes less fantastic if we are willing to assume a modicum of Neopythagoreanism in Demetrius, for Apollonius himself was a man much given to that sort of philosophy. An incident in the life of Demetrius has attracted considerable scholarly attention. It involves the part played by Demetrius in the trial of a Stoic philosopher named Publius Egnatius Celer. Under the prosecution of Musonius Rufus, a Stoic philosopher, the trial took place in A.D. 70, Celer being charged with capital offenses punishable by death. He had acted as a witness for the prosecution in the trial of Barea Soranus in A.D. 66. In his report of Celer's trial, Tacitus ( Hist. IV, x1) condemns him as a treacherous man of no moral principles, this condemnation being echoed by Juvenal ( Sat. iii, 1). Demetrius appears in the testimony of Tacitus as the defender of Celer, and is there charged with being more ambitious than honest ("ambitiosius quam honestius") in his willingness to participate in the trial. J. L. Moles has undertaken a thorough investigation of the matter, arguing that it is both legitimate and worthwhile to attempt to understand the reasons why Demetrius, a Cynic philosopher of (on the normal view) high moral character, should have defended Celer, a Stoic philosopher who (again on the normal view) had revealed himself to be a complete scoundrel. 73 M. Billerbeck has called attention to the bizarre and mysterious nature of Demetrius' role in the trial, arguing that his behavior in it appears impossible to reconcile with the portrayal of his character given by the sources. 74 How could a man as upright as Demetrius, we could ask, defend a man like Celer? Was his Cynicism suspended temporarily for a 'secret' purpose that moved him to participate in the trial? J. F. Kindstrand has responded by insisting that the -176evidence leads us to conclude that the motives that impelled Demetrius were honorable, and that he must have been convinced that he was defending a just cause, even though he might have known or at least suspected that the accusations against Celer were justified. 75 Moles, for his part, contends that in Demetrius' behavior at the trial we encounter a manifestation of the traditional Cynic spirit of concern for human values. In Demetrius' defense of Celer, Moles argues, we come across, not an abdication of moral principles, but, quite to the contrary, an example of the Cynics' intransigent reaction against certain accepted moral and social opinions and practices. The portrait of Demetrius that emerges from the secondary sources is not difficult to reconstruct, for its features are clearly drawn. Among these sources, the testimony of Seneca is significant, not only on account of its length, but also on account of its apparent depth, not to mention the seriousness of its author. Billerbeck has suggested 76 that there is in this testimony an element of idealization, and this is quite possible: Seneca saw in Demetrius a sort of paradigmatic Cynic and Stoic philosopher. For, according to Seneca, Demetrius' philosophical strength was manifested in the way in which he lived, not in the realm of

speculative ideas, for which the Cynic had little or no use. At the beginning of De beneficiis VII, Seneca tells us that according to Demetrius, it is more important to know a few things that are actually put into practice than lots of things that are only understood: as in wrestling, where the moves and maneuvers necessary to secure a victory are not many, likewise in life, the truths that are requisite for attaining happiness and virtue are very few indeed. In her review of the reception of Cynic ideas in imperial Rome, Billerbeck describes Demetrius in these terms: "An extraordinary man, endowed with an active and bellicose character, and remarkable pedagogical abilities." 77 Demetrius, she adds, typified in a clear way the ideas and mode of life of the ancient Greek Cynics. She contrasts him with other Cynics of his time, whom we could refer to, echoing Julian, as "the uneducated Cynics," and who probably were far more numerous than the genuine Cynics of the time. Billerbeck observes that "the majority of the so-called Cynics found it easier and more attractive to live like 'dogs' rather than like 'emissaries of Zeus'." 78 There is ample evidence for supporting the contrast between Demetrius and the 'uneducated' Cynics of his time. In him, we find all the virtues of Cynicism. In the others, on the other hand, we encounter a weakening of the Cynic rigor. Demetrius practiced the poverty and detachment from the physical world once taught by Diogenes; he spent his life, as Seneca puts it, "scattering advice by the handful," and rendering himself useful, precisely as Crates once did, even by defending in court a man of questionable character like Celer and ignoring his own reputation; he stood firmly against the political system embodied in the person of the emperor, creating in himself (along with a few other genuine Cynics like Dio Chrysostom) a veritable disloyal opposition to the power of Rome, 79 literally barking unabashedly at those in power, and displaying his contempt for them and his disregard for their threats; he spoke his mind always -177and on every occasion, manifesting in his behavior the attachment of classical Cynicism for speaking only the truth; and in all this he proved himself, like Hercules, to be a man made of steel and fire. In him, then, the traditions that go back to the early Cynics lived well and untainted. A few decades after Demetrius, during the reign of Marcus Aurelius, another Cynic emerged onto the historical scene, a man whose life and example will allow us to conclude this sketchy review of late Cynicism: in him, as if in a summation, various elements of classical Cynicism converged, including those that contributed to its eventual extinction. His name was Peregrinus, a native of Parium, a town on the eastern entrance to the Hellespont. At some point in his life, possibly in his later years, he was called Proteus, as we gather from Philostratus ( Lives of the Sophists II, 1, 33; cf. Aulus Gellius, XII, 11) and from Lucian. The appellation 'Proteus' may have been related to the similarity between him and the Homeric Proteus, a mythological Egyptian sea-demon and a servant of Poseidon, who had the ability to assume at will all kinds of shapes, especially in order to escape from his enemies and avoid having to tell the truth ( Odyssey IV, 385ff., 454-459); for Peregrinus also altered his 'shape' several times during his life and underwent various transformations. The name ' Peregrinus' could also bear some relationship to his mode of life: originally peregrini were in Roman times citizens of any state other than Rome, and peregrinus or peregrinator meant 'traveler'. In Peregrinus, there was much wandering and traveling from place to place. The date of his birth is unknown, although, knowing as we do the exact date of his death ( A.D. 165), 80 and assuming that he was then an old man, as Lucian informs us ( The Runaways1, where he is referred to as "quite an elderly man" at the time of his death), we can surmise that he must

have been born sometime during the last two decades of the first century A.D. Whether or not he left any writings cannot be ascertained, despite Lucian's allegation that he wrote books for the Christian community of Palestine. At any rate, there are no extant primary source materials related to him. Other than Lucian's extensive treatment of Peregrinus, the secondary sources are few and not very enlightening. 81 He is mentioned, for instance, by Aulus Gellius ( VIII, 3 ; XII, 11 ), who refers to him as a "vir gravis et constans" (a man of seriousness and constancy). Aulus Gellius, a respectable writer himself, states that he used to visit Peregrinus in his hut outside of Athens, and that he heard from him many statements reminiscent of those of Socrates. Ammianus Marcellinus, Tertullian, Tatian, Athenagoras, Philostratus, Eusebius, and other authors also mention him in passing. Were it not for these references, it would be tempting to conclude that Peregrinus was in reality only a fictional character created by Lucian. But the historical character of Peregrinus stands on the firmest of grounds, and about that we cannot entertain any doubts. We enter, however, into the realm of doubts as soon as we endeavor to delineate his character, teachings, and wanderings, and the extraordinary manner of his death, for concerning these matters we are mostly at the mercy of the masterful Lucian, who was a contemporary of Peregrinus and, in his own -178testimony, a witness to his death, and who wrote extensively on Peregrinus, but with an ideological purpose in mind. Lucian's relationship with the Cynic movement is itself complex: towards the older Cynics he showed as much admiration and respect as his own Cynic-like satires would allow, but towards some of the 'newer' Cynics, he was unforgiving. We have from him The Passing of Peregrinus, a 'biography' of Peregrinus, focusing on his death and emphasizing his intellectual vacuity and moral degeneracy. There are also references to him in other works of Lucian, as in his biography of Demonax and in his The Runaways, where, although not mentioned by name, it is obvious that both the matter of his suicide and his "hocus-pocus" activities are discussed at length. It is, then, from Lucian that most of our information about Peregrinus is derived. Concerning the reliability of that information various views have been advanced. A. M. Harmon, for instance, was inclined to accept it in essence, for which reason, he argues, "it is impossible to see in him [ Peregrinus] the 'earnest and steadfast man' that Aulus Gellius thought him." 82 Gomperz, for his part, noted that Lucian's treatment of Peregrinus displays "more zeal than wit," 83 meaning that the anti-Cynic enthusiasm of Lucian might have led him to write more than was reasonable or accurate about Peregrinus. Bernays and Dudley also express reservations concerning the reliability of Lucian's testimony, Bernays observing that Lucian's animosity towards Cynicism might have colored unfavorably his treatment of Peregrinus, 84 while, according to Dudley, in the few instances in which we can check the accuracy of Lucian's description by reference to other sources, we realize at once "how distorted a picture he presents." 85 The truth of the matter may lie somewhere in the middle: in Lucian's account, fiction and fact become mixed in a complex fashion. In his The Passing of Peregrinus, Lucian tells us that he was present when the Cynic burned himself at the Olympic games of A.D. 165. On his way to Olympia, he informs us, he "overheard a Cynic bawling out the usual streetcorner invocations to Virtue in a loud, harsh

voice, and abusing everyone without exception" ( The Passing of Peregrinus3). 86 The screaming Cynic turns out to be Theagenes of Patras, a disciple of Peregrinus, who is alerting all passers-by about the imminent suicide of his teacher: "Before long," he says, while tearing out his hair (but only gently), " Proteus will burn himself at the Olympic festival." Peregrinus, Theagenes continues, can only be compared in greatness with Antisthenes and Diogenes, and indeed with Zeus himself, for he is truly one of the most wonderful masterpieces in the world. When his holy image will be borne away on the wings of fire, he adds, we will all be left abandoned. At this point, another man, an unnamed man who is really the spokesman for Lucian himself, amid much laughter but in great earnestness, proceeds to recount the story of Peregrinus and explain the motives of his intended suicide. What, he asks the crowd, are we supposed to do in the presence of old men standing on their heads in public for the sake of a bit of shameful notoriety? For that is, he claims, all that Peregrinus has always sought and is now seeking by announcing his public suicide. The masterful creation of nature of whom Theagenes just spoke is far -179from masterful, but is only the image of a perfect dog-like scoundrel who deserves to be unmasked. As a young man, he was caught in an act of adultery, for which he was flogged; then he seduced a boy and had to pay his parents a large amount of money to persuade them not to denounce him before the Roman governor. Then, bored and annoyed with his aging father and unwilling to let him live past his sixtieth year, he strangled him, for which reason he was forced to flee from his homeland and begin a life of aimless wandering. At last he found himself in Palestine, where he discovered the strange legends of the Christians, the people who worship a crucified sophist. What a discovery this must have been for the wandering rascal! He became at once a Christian, in fact, more of a Christian than the Christians themselves, and emerged in no time as the head of their cult in Palestine, so that its uneducated adherents practically worshipped him as a god, for he led them, preaching to them and even writing books for them. For reasons which the speaker does not disclose, Peregrinus was at last thrown into prison by the Roman authorities, but the Christian community of Palestine went at once to his defense, and even Christians from distant lands journeyed to Jerusalem to assist their imprisoned leader. These Christians are a strange sort of folk: they have persuaded themselves that they are immortal and are always ready to die, and following the teachings of their crucified leader, insist on dealing with one another as if they are brothers and sisters. They reject the gods, and have developed the notion that they own all things in common. In this revealing description we come upon a terse statement concerning the way in which an educated classical 'pagan' of the middle of the second century A.D. must have viewed the Christians. It also brings to the surface certain similarities between the Christians and the 'new' Cynics, at least as far as Lucian himself was concerned. Both despised death and displayed indifference towards physical possessions, believing that all things ought to be the property of all; both were inclined to regard one another as brothers and sisters; both rejected the gods; and both were willing to accept ideas and take on practices irrationally and without reflection. Their lack of sophistication made them both an easy prey to "charlatans and tricksters," such as the one who died on the cross and the Cynic from Parium. The narrative continues, letting us know further details of Peregrinus' life. Aware of his recklessness and deeming him not even worthy of being scourged, the Roman governor of Syria (a man inclined to philosophical studies) eventually freed Peregrinus, who wasted no

time in finding his way back to Parium. There, the strangling of his father still remained a public issue, and he would have found himself thrown into prison once more, and even tried and executed, had he not deceived the assembled citizens by appearing in the Cynic uniform, that is, a dirty cloak, a wallet, a staff, long hair, and so on, and offering to bequeath whatever possessions were left to him to the people of Parium. Impressed or rather deceived by his generosity and by his Cynic appearance, they shouted, "He is truly a philosopher and a genuine patriot who stands side by side with Diogenes and Crates!" His accusers were silenced and even the mention of -180his having strangled his father was put down by the will of the people. From Parium, then, he returned to Palestine, where he continued to exploit the simple-minded Christians, until at last, having committed some unspecified transgression against their cult, he was expelled from the Christian sect. He traveled thence to Egypt where he became a disciple of Agathoboulus, the famous Cynic who had been the teacher of Demonax, from whom Peregrinus received lessons in asceticism, such as shaving one half of his head, covering his face with mud, living in the streets, distributing blows on passers-by, and other similar kinds of behavior, always outdoing the excesses of others. Rome itself would then be his next destination. There, he announced his presence by abusing in public the very imperial embodiment of Stoic philosophy in the person of the gentle Marcus Aurelius, who, unwilling to punish him in a severe way as was his due, chose merely to banish him from the city, saying that Rome had no need of such a philosopher. Greece would now be his next and last abode. At first he lived in Athens and then among the Eleans, whom he urged to revolt against the power of Rome. Few among the Greeks escaped from his insults and abuse. He did not even spare the generous Herodes Atticus, whom he ridiculed for having built an aqueduct in Olympia, the very same aqueduct that supplied water to the athletes and spectators at the games--and the same water that Peregrinus happily drank. At last, crowds of angry people rose up against him, and he barely succeeded in remaining alive by seeking sanctuary in the temple of Zeus at Olympia when he was about to be stoned to death. At this point, and this must have been during the Olympiad of A.D. 161, he conceived of his ultimate plan: to burn himself four years later at the main Olympic festival of A.D. 165, in the presence of the thousands of spectators who would normally come to see the games. Any other sort of death, he said, would not have been suitable for him. In fact, even a change of name would be appropriate for him: instead of ' Proteus', he would now like to be called ' Phoenix', like the Indian phoenix, a bird that, as legends teach us, would burn itself in its old age only to be born again from its own ashes. The announcement was made and the news of the forthcoming fiery attraction traveled in all directions: Peregrinus Proteus, the famous Cynic, would burn himself on a pyre set up by himself, under the bright full moon, and his soul would ascend to the heavenly spheres, precisely as the oracular Sibyl had prophesied: But the time shall come that Proteus, noblest of Cynics, Kindles fire in the precinct of Zeus, our Lord of the Thunder, Leaps into the flame, and rises to lofty Olympus. Peregrinus did exactly as he said he would. On a clear night in the spring of the chosen year, at the end of the Olympic games, he burned himself before the eyes of a multitude of witnesses, some of them his own distraught disciples, others curious spectators, and others, like Lucian, skeptical and suspecting observers.

Lucian's testimony about the last moments of Peregrinus' life is memorable. At the conclusion of the Olympic games--the most magnificent -181witnessed by him-- Peregrinus, who had kept making postponements, announced the exact time and place of his burning. The pyre, made up of torchwood and brush, had been set in a pit about six-feet deep, in a place known as 'Harpina', three miles from Olympia. At the rising of the moon, the procession of Cynics marched towards the pyre, headed by Theagenes and Peregrinus, all carrying torches. At the appointed time, which must have been midnight, and with a great silent crowd surrounding the pyre, Peregrinus undressed, laying aside his wallet and his staff. Incense was thrown onto the pyre, and the fire was lit, while he, looking towards the south, invoked the spirits of his father and his mother, saying, "Receive me with favor on the other side!" Having said this, he jumped into the fiery pit and in a moment disappeared from view, enveloped in flames and smoke. We could wonder how the spirit of his father must have received him, if he was truly strangled by his strange son. Such is, in essence, the account of Peregrinus given by Lucian. Intermingled with various biographical facts, there is, of course, a great deal of caustic sarcasm (cynical sarcasm, we might add), for to Lucian, Peregrinus was a farce and a sham, a common criminal who had taken advantage of opportunities and of the gullibility of people. Cowardice (as when he wept and wailed during a storm in the Aegean Sea), craftiness and lust (as when he seduced a boy while on a ship), deceitfulness and dissembling (as when he lied to his compatriots in Parium), brutal and cruel (as when he strangled his aging father), arrogant and senseless (as when he abused Marcus Aurelius and Herodes Atticus), theatrical and exhibitionist (as when he staged and carried out his own death), superstitious and unsophisticated (as when he fell in with the Christians)--these and other unworthy qualities belonged to the famous Cynic. Not tears and anguish, but laughter and scorn are what his self-burning brings to Lucian and, in his view, what it should bring to us, too. As the other Cynics gazed at the fire, speechless and filled with grief, Lucian's only words to them were: "Let us get going, you simpletons." For him, Peregrinus' life and particularly his selfimmolation were explainable only in terms of his uncontrollable love of glory. There was nothing else in him, and neither was there anything in his followers. Thus ended Peregrinus, Lucian tells us, a man who never cared for the truth but only for the praise of the masses, as was shown in his choice of death. Still, it seems appropriate to consider another side to this strange story. Somehow it is difficult to avoid the suspicion that there was more to Peregrinus than Lucian was willing to see and concede, and that his great antipathy towards the Cynics of his own time might have blinded him to the evidence which he had in front of his eyes. His account of Peregrinus cannot be verified wholly by reference to other sources, because what we gather from these is not sufficient. It is possible, perhaps probable, that Peregrinus was born and raised in Parium, and that as a youth, he became involved in love affairs with men and women, for which in due time he had to pay dearly. Possibly, too, he could have strangled his father, although it is difficult to accept the reason for the strangling given by Lucian. The 'falling in' with the Christians of Palestine is not -182necessarily absurd. There were significant parallels between the emerging Christian sect and the aging Cynic movement, so that the Christians must have attracted some Cynics, just as the

Cynics must have attracted some Christians. 87 Aelius Aristides, a contemporary of Peregrinus, called attention to the similarities between the Cynics of his time and the Christians ("the impious sect in Palestine"), one such similarity being, he noted, their common lack of respect for the gods. The writings of Peregrinus on behalf of the Christians are mentioned in a third-century catalog of Christian apologies. Peregrinus' imprisonment in Palestine, moreover, is understandable, for the Roman authorities would often throw into prison the leaders of Christian communities. The 'falling out' from the Christian sect is likewise readily understandable: for how long can a Cynic remain faithful to the beliefs and practices of a sect that demanded unwavering allegiance to dogmas entrenched in Jewish traditions, and was based so much on rituals and ceremonies, many of which were (and are) fundamentally foreign to the classical heritage? The passage from Christianity to the circle of Agathoboulus, furthermore, is not impossible to imagine. This Cynic, about whom, unfortunately, we know not much more than his name, taught and practiced a strict kind of Cynicism in Alexandria, and it must have been easy for disenchanted Christians and other wandering folk to become his disciples. We then move onto Rome. There, he did what other Cynics had done, namely, insult the head of the State, as did Demetrius and Dio Chrysostom, for that was what Cynics, beginning with Diogenes, were supposed to do. Peregrinus' banishment from Rome also makes sense: other Cynics had been banished before him. Then comes Greece, where Peregrinus is said to have lived the last ten or fifteen years of his life, and where, specifically in Athens, he was visited by Aulus Gellius. It was there, too, that he is reported to have abused Herodes Atticus in a "semi-barbarous dialect," according to Philostratus ( Lives of the Sophists363). That people should have risen against him, should not surprise us either, for people cannot tolerate for too long a Cynic, like a barking dog, shouting unto them the same attacks and insults: who can withstand being called stupid and wicked over and over again? So, at last, Peregrinus Proteus made up his mind: he would kill himself. Other Cynics had reportedly committed suicide for all kinds of reasons and in various ways: Diogenes, perhaps, because he was old; Menippus, when some business venture of his went bad; others, possibly, to avoid physical or spiritual suffering, and so on. Why, then, he might have thought, not follow their worthy examples, no less than the paradigmatic example of Hercules? Why put up with the idiocy of people, with their inveterate τυ + φος, with their senseless ridicule? He had already gone through a great deal: his past was dark and embarrassing, as much as the past of other Cynics, and his search for truth and understanding had turned out to be mostly futile, as was also the case with some of his predecessors. The Cynic revolt has invariably a limit, and its inevitably truncated nature reaches a point beyond which it cannot progress. Death would then be the only honorable exit. Then, too, there is the strange connection between the Cynics and the -183Indian Gymnosophists. As much as with the Essenes and the Christians, there are identifiable parallels between the Cynics and the Gymnosophists, parallels recognized already in the time of Onesicritus and fully exploited by Lucian in his treatment of Peregrinus. The Gymnosophists' proverbial contempt for conventions and customs, their detachment from political and social entanglements, and their austere and ascetic mode of life are found in different degrees among the classical Cynics, from Antisthenes to Peregrinus. Furthermore, their scorn towards the attachment for life that characterizes most people is repeated, here and there, among the Cynics, which accounts in part for their persistent suicidal tendency. When

life proved to be not worth living, Gymnosophists and Cynics would often leave the world of the living with the greatest of ease. Among the Gymnosophists, moreover, departing from life was occasionally a grand event, carefully staged and meticulously carried out. Their deaths, like that of Peregrinus, were often a source of wonderment, as they calmly climbed on the pyre, showing no signs of discomfort or hesitation ( The Runaways6). The example of Calanus comes at once to memory. This famous Gymnosophist was one of those philosophers who met with Onesicritus during Alexander's campaign in India, the one who refused to speak with the Cynic unless he removed his clothes ( Plutarch, Alexander1xv; Strabo XV, i). This Calanus, whose actual name was Sphines, accepted Alexander's invitation to join his entourage, and, reportedly displaying no self-control (according to Arrian, Anabasis VII, 1), became a regular attendant to the emperor. 88 A few months before the death of Alexander, afflicted by some illness and being already a man over seventy years of age, he staged and carried out his spectacular suicide, hoping thus to emulate the manner of Hercules' own death. 89 Calanus, then, in the presence of Alexander and the army, either jumped on horseback and rode into the pyre, or ran by himself into it, or simply and calmly walked into it (depending on what source we use). At any rate, he burned himself. Alexander, impressed by the courage of the Gymnosophist, ordered a magnificent funeral celebration in his honor, which culminated in a riotous drinking contest, in which dozens of Macedonian officers died of intoxication. Such is the story of the famous Gymnosophist seen by some as a precursor of Peregrinus. As we take leave of Peregrinus literally falling to pieces amid the smothering flames of the pyre in Harpina, it is not easy to suppress the thought that he must have been more, much more, than what Lucian made of him. A wandering and tortured soul in his youth, still a wandering but searching soul in his manhood, a rebellious and diatribal spirit in his advanced years, and a disappointed Cynic in the end, forever oscillating, Peregrinus' death stands at the point where classical Cynicism would enter its final stage of development, a stage characterized by increasing decadence and anonymity. For few indeed are the Cynics who can be identified by name, or whose contributions can be singled out for recognition, between the middle of the second century A.D. to the end of Roman times. That as an increasingly amorphous movement it remained alive and noticeable until the time of Julian is clear from his own unsuccessful -184attempts to reinvigorate it and set aright its adherents, who were found in every corner and niche of the Roman world, endeavoring in every imaginable way to deface the 'currency' of those around them, and gnawing at the foundations of a world that was already beginning to collapse. For the most part, the names of the many Cynics of late Roman times are unknown. Occasionally, one hears, for instance, of Maximus of Tyre in the fourth century and of Sallustius of Syria in the fifth. The former had sufficiently close ties with the Christians even to have been ordained bishop in Constantinople, 90 and to have given Saint Gregory Nazianzus the hope of creating a synthesis of Christianity and Cynicism. 91 But this Church Father was mistaken in even entertaining such a hope: Maximus appears to have been far less saintly than Gregory imagined. Furthermore, the gap that separated the decrepit Cynic movement from the ever-growing politicized Christian Church proved to be unbridgeable. As for Sallustius, little is known about him, except for his having been in the early part of his life a wandering philosopher who taught doctrines and exemplified a mode of life reminiscent of those of the earlier Cynics, and for his having adopted in the latter part of his life Neoplatonic

ideas. Information about this last among the classical Cynics comes to us from Damascius, the last scholarch of the Platonic Academy in Athens, who in his biography of Isidorus of Alexandria, left for us some details concerning Sallustius' philosophy. In him, as R. Asmus has noted, one senses the nostalgic advent of the end of classical Cynicism and indeed of classical philosophy in general: "His name belongs to the last page of the history of Greek philosophy." 92 With the closing of the Academy by Justinian in A.D. 529 and the death of Sallustius about the same time, both classical philosophy and classical Cynicism became part of the annals of Western thought. Judging from the testimony of Julian, the late Cynics were only shadows of what their predecessors had been: they may have kept up the appearance of Cynicism, but not the substance; in fact, they were often the very antithesis of what the earlier Cynics had been, for which reason, in the line quoted at the beginning of this chapter, Julian spoke of the world of Cynicism as running backwards: "Behold the rivers are flowing backwards." Neither the principles nor the style of life of the older Cynics remained standing, and we can affirm that as the era of classical times drew to a close, the Army of the Dog was finally disbanded, notwithstanding the presence of undisciplined irregulars and vaguely identifiable militiamen who kept up some of the external features of Cynicism. The harsh barking of the ancient Cynics was at last drowned, first under the shouting and cursing of the hordes of Barbarians who invaded the Roman empire, and then under the ritualistic and lulling Gregorian chants of Christian Europe. Here and there, in medieval times and even in later ages, vestiges of Cynicism survived in monastic orders, whose mendicant monks maintained alive certain Cynic-like ideals and types of life, but philosophically and theologically, these had hardly anything in common with the Cynics. Today, many centuries after the last classical Cynic walked the streets of ancient Alexandria, wearing a simple cloak, carrying a wallet, and brandishing -185a staff, classical Cynicism presents itself to us in a threefold garb. First, it is undoubtedly a wealthy collection of memories from which philosophers, philologists, theologians, sociologists, historians of ideas, and even historians of art can still learn a great deal. Second, it provides us with a point of reference to understand some of the characteristics of what we referred to in chapter I as a widespread phenomenon of recent times, namely, modern cynicism, with which classical Cynicism has in reality not much in common, except for the name. And, third, it furnishes us with a variety of examples of ways in which the senselessness of our own human world can and should be opposed: the austerity and earnestness of Antisthenes and his faithfulness to Socrates' example, the impudence and selfsufficiency of Diogenes, the joviality and philanthropic usefulness of Crates, the resoluteness and enthusiasm of Hipparchia, the commitment to own as few things as possible of Monimus, the fearlessness and bluntness of Bion, the unerring eye for the absurdities of life and society of Menippus, the genuine social concern and compassion of Cercidas, the controlled passionate nature of Meleager, the rationalistic dismissal of superstitious humbug of Oenomaus, the incredible freedom of speech and the absolute rectitude of Demetrius, the courage and searching nature of Peregrinus, and, indeed, the many other virtues displayed and actualized by these and other Cynics of classical times, whose ideas and modes of life belong to the heritage of the Western world. Above all, as truncated and incomplete as their doctrines may have been, and as exaggerated and exhibitionist as their behavior often was, the Cynics' insistence on reaching and maintaining a condition of intellectual lucidity, clarity of mind, as

the most basic requirement for meaningful human existence, and their paradigmatic ability to speak freely and loudly only the truth--that rare gift to be committed to παρρησíα, from which Michel Foucault derived so much inspiration--should give us the courage to stand against the many aspects of our late twentieth century world that exhibit so much deception, so much political and social silliness, so much superficiality, so great an attachment to appearances and false expectations, in sum, so much τυ + ϕος. The search for a true human being, which has been at least at times the principal concern of philosophy, and which was literally carried out by Diogenes through the streets of Athens, and which lies at the heart of classical Cynicism, has not come to a happy end, because that which has been sought has not been found. Goya may have been correct in entitling his representation of Diogenes with his lamp No lo encontrarás (You will not find him). Neither has Crates' utopian Pera been found or established, and we remain immersed in the same τυ + ϕος that enveloped the contemporaries of the classical Cynics. The Cynic of classical times could have said of his contemporaries and of all their descendants what Nietzsche's Zarathustra said of the masses: "They understand me not: I am not the mouth for these ears." Still, short of opting for the final solution chosen by Peregrinus and by some of the other Cynics, what other avenue is there for us than to learn some lessons from Cynicism and begin at once our struggle against the world? -187NOTES 1. "Cínicos", Diccionario de Filosofía ( Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana, 1971), Vol. 1, p. 291. 2.

W. W. Tarn, "Onesicritus", in The Oxford Classical Dictionary ( Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1953), p. 622.

3.

S. L. Radt, "Zu Plutarchs Vita Alexandri". Mnemosyne 20 ( 1967), pp. 120126.

4.

For comments on the Gymnosophists in relation to the Cynic philosophers, see C. Muckensturm, "Les gymnosophistes étaient-ils des cyniques modèles?" in Le Cynisme ancien et ses prolongements. Actes du Colloque International du CNRS ( Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1993), pp. 225-239; and M. Hulin, "Doctrines et comportements 'cyniques' dans certaines sectes hindoues anciennes et contemporaines", ibid., pp. 557-570.

5.

The fragments of Monimus are included in F. G.A. Mullach Fragmenta Philosophorum Grœcorum ( Darmstadt: Scientia Verlag, 1968), Vol. 2.

6.

Dudley, A History of Cynicism, p. 41.

7.

J. F. Kindstrand, Bion of Borysthenes: A Collection of Fragments with Introduction and Commentary ( Uppsala: Acta Universitatis Uppsalensis, 1976); also Kindstrand , "Bion de Borysthène", in Dictionnaire des Philosophes Antiques ( Paris: CNRS Éditions, 1994), Vol. 1, pp. 108-112.

8.

The fragments of Teles are collected in O. Hense Teletis reliquiœ ( 1889; reprint, Hildesheim: Olms, 1969). His fragments are also provided (with an English translation and commentaries) in E. N. O'Neil Teles: The Cynic Teacher ( Missoula, Mont.: Scholars Press, 1977). There are comments on Bion in the introduction of Hense's work, as well as a listing of the fragments (pp. 100-102). L. Paquet Les Cyniques grecs. Fragments et

témoignages ( Ottawa: Presses de l'Université d'Ottawa, 1988) provides a French translation of 66 fragments (pp. 121-133), while an English translation of 77 fragments is furnished in F. Sayre The Greek Cynics ( Baltimore: J. H. Furst, 1948), pp. 102-109. 9.

Kindstrand, Bion of Borysthenes, pp. 5-6.

10. D. Henne, "Cynique (École)", in Dictionnaire des Sciences Philosophiques ( Paris: Librairie Hachette, 1885), p. 335. 11. For an annotated discussion of the chronology of Bion' s teachers, see T. Gomperz , Greek Thinkers: A History of Ancient Philosophy, Vol. 3, p. 300. 12. For comments on the relationship between Bion and Theodorus, see A. Brancacci , "Teodoro l'Ateo e Bione di Boristene fra Pirrone e Arcesilao". Elenchos 3 ( 1982), pp. 55-85. 13. See M. Winiarczyk, "Theodorus ó Αθεος und Diogenes von Sinope". Eos 69 ( 1981), pp. 37-42. 14. The alleged last-minute conversion of Voltaire in 1778 is a fable of no historical substance. For an account of various last-minute conversions, see G. Stein, "Deathbeds of Unbelievers", in The Encyclopedia of Unbelief. Edited by G. Stein ( Buffalo: Prometheus Books, 1985), Vol. 1, pp. 129-131. -18815. According to Eratosthenes, the sense is that Bion's flowery style in presenting philosophical ideas made philosophy comparable to a woman who seduces men by wearing flowers and ornaments. 16. The doctrine of the transmission of sin is critical in Jewish theology, as well as in Christian theology. In Ecclesiasticus (25:24) we read: "From a woman [Eve] was the beginning of sin, and because of her we all die." Saint Paul ( Rom. 5:12) reiterates the point: "Therefore, just as sin entered the world through one man, and death through sin, and in this way death came to all men, because all sinned. . . ." 17. Dudley, A History of Cynicism, p. 65. 18. T. Gomperz, Greek Thinkers: A History of Ancient Philosophy, Vol. 3, p. 300. 19. Ibid., Vol. 2, p. 243. 20. For instance, Dudley and Kindstrand. 21. An investigation of this reference to Menippus is made by J. C. Relihan in "Menippus, the Cur from Crete." Prometheus 16 ( 1990), pp. 217-224. Relihan argues that this reference should not be interpreted as implying that Menippus was a true Cynic, but as a derogatory remark about his character. In Relihan's view, out of several possible interpretations, the one that makes the most sense is the one in which Menippus is seen as a dog-man, that is, a man who is affected by the sort of melancholy that ancient medical terminology designated as cynanthropy or lycanthropy. 22. For an analysis of the influence of Menippus on Lucian, see F. Martínez García , "Los cínicos en Luciano de Samósata". Archivo de la Historia de la Filosofía 2 ( 1907), pp.

48-61. An even more comprehensive work on the subject is R. Helm Lucian und Menipp ( Leipzig, 1906). Helm deals with Lucian's relationship with various schools of thought, including Cynicism, in "Lucian und die Philosophenschule". Neue Jahrbücher für das klassische Altertum 9 ( 1902), pp. 351-369. 23. See E. Kirk, Menippean Satire: An Annotated Catalogue of Texts and Criticisms ( New York: Garland Publishing, 1980). Kirk's bibliography includes almost a thousand annotations. 24. E. Kirk, "Blake's Menippean Island". The Philological Quarterly 59 ( 1980), pp. 194215. 25. Dudley argues that it is not quite possible to reconstruct any of the details of Menippus' writings by reviewing Lucian's dialogues ( A History of Cynicism, p. 70). 26. In Dudley view ( A History of Cynicism, p. 70), any account based on the testimony of Hermippus is not trustworthy. 27. A. Barber, "Alexandrian Literature", in Cambridge Ancient History ( Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1964), Vol. 7, p. 274. 28. F. Sayre, "Greek Cynicism". The Journal of the History of History of Ideas 6 ( 1945), pp. 113-118. 29. A. Meineke, "Kerkidas, der Dichter und Gesetzgeber von Megalopolis", Abhandlungen der königlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin No. 1 ( 1832), pp. 91-93. 30. The Oxyrhynchus papyrus was edited by A. S. Hunt, "P. Oxy. 1082. Cercidas, Meliambi", in The Oxyrhynchus Papyri VIII ( London: Heinemann, 1911), pp. 20-59. 31. The fragments of Cercidas are presented in J. U. Powell, Collectanea Alexandrina. Reliquiœ minores poetarum grœcorum œtatis ptolemicœ ( Oxford: The -189Clarendon Press, 1925, 1970), pp. 201-219. 32. For a review of the sources, see M. O. Goulet-Cazé and J. L. López Cruces , "Cercidas de Mégalopolis", in Dictionnaire des Philosophes Antiques ( Paris: CNRS Éditions, 1994), Vol. 2, pp. 269-281. 33. Cf. F. Sayre, "Greek Cynicism". The Journal of the History of Ideas 6 ( 1945), p. 118, specifically his contention that Cercidas was a Pythagorean. 34. For a discussion of the dates for this role of Cercidas, see Dudley, A History of Cynicism, pp. 92-93. 35. Dudley, A History of Cynicism, p. 78. 36. P. Green, Alexander to Actium: The Historical Evolution of the Hellenistic Age ( Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1990), p. 615. 37. G. J.D. Aalders, Political Thought in Hellenistic Times ( Amsterdam: Hakkert, 1976), p. 63.

38. Green, Alexander to Actium, p. 616. 39. The primary materials related to Cercidas have been edited and translated by A. D. Knox in Cercidas and the Choliambic Poets ( Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1929, 1993). 40. Dudley, A History of Cynicism, pp. 79-80. 41. M. O. Goulet-Cazé and J. L. López Cruces, "Cercidas de Mégalopolis". 42. Tarn, "The Greek Leagues and Macedonia", in The Cambridge Ancient History, Vol. 7, p. 274. 43. As suggested by Dudley, A History of Cynicism, p. 82. 44 Adapted from Knox, Cercidas and the Choliambic Poets, pp. 431-432. 45. Adapted from Knox, Cercidas and the Choliambic Poets, pp. 448-449. 46. David Strauss spoke about this narrative as "a scandal and stumbling block" to the historicity of the Gospels. He wondered, as perhaps a Gadarene Cynic would have, "what then did the demons gain by entering into the animals, if they immediately destroyed the bodies of which they had taken possession, and thus robbed themselves of the temporary abode for which they had so earnestly entreated?" ( The Life of Jesus Critically Examined. Translated by G. Eliot [ London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1898], p. 429). 47. F. G. Downing, "Cynics and Early Christianity", in Le Cynisme ancien et ses prolongements. Actes du Colloque du CNRS ( Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1993), pp. 281-304. 48. Dudley, A History of Cynicism, pp. 121-122. 49. The suggestion put forward by G. Murray, that Aramaic could have been Meleager's native language does not appear to hold ground. See his The Literature of Ancient Greece ( Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), p. 394. 50. Adapted from W. R. Paton ( The Greek Anthology [ London: William Heinemann, 1925], Vol. 2, p. 225). 51. A detailed and documented analysis of this epigram was made by M. Luz in his "Salam, Meleager!" Studi Italiani di Filologia Classica 6 ( 1988), pp. 222-231. 52. For an examination of the satires of Meleager, see C. Radinger, Meleagros von Gadara ( Innsbruck: Wagener, 1895). For a review of the evidence related to Meleager, with observations about his place in the development of late Greek literature, -19052. see E. Ermatinger, Meleagros von Gadara, ein Dichter der griechischen Décadence ( Hamburg: Verlagsanstalt, 1898). 53. For a review of the evidence of dedication of Meleager's Garland, see R. Goulet , "Dioclès de Magnésie", in Dictionnaire des Philosophes Antiques. Edited by R. Goulet ( Paris: CNRS Éditions, 1994), Vol. 2, pp. 775-776.

54. Dudley, A History of Cynicism, p. 122. 55. J. A. Symonds, Studies of the Greek Poets ( New York: Harper & Brothers, [ 1917]), Vol. 2, p. 316. 56. Translated by G. Smith ( J. A. Symonds, Studies of the Greek Poets, Vol. 2, p. 317). 57. Translated by W. R. Paton ( The Greek Anthology, Vol. 2, pp. 259-261). 58. Translated by J. A. Symonds ( Studies of the Greek Poets, Vol. 2, p. 327). 59. Symonds, Studies of the Greek Poets, Vol. 2, p. 321. 60. The fragments of Oenomaus are presented with a Latin translation and commentaries in P. Vallette De Oenomao Cynico ( Paris: Klincksieck, 1908). 61. See S. J. Bastomsky, "Abnimos and Oenomaos: A Question of Identity". Apeiron 8 ( 1974), pp. 57-61, and M. Luz, "Abnimos, Nimos, and Oenomaus: A Note". The Jewish Quarterly Review 77 ( 1986-1987), pp. 191-195. 62. M. Luz, "Oenomaus and Talmudic Anecdote". Journal for the Study of Judaism 23 ( 1992), pp. 42-80. 63. T. Gomperz, Greek Thinkers, Vol. 3, p. 290. 64. M. Luz, "A Description of the Greek Cynic in the Jerusalem Talmud". Journal for the Study of Judaism 20 ( 1989), pp. 49-60. 65. For a documented study of the attitudes of the Church Fathers vis-à-vis classical Cynicism, see G. Doribal, "L'Image des Cyniques chez les Pères grecs", in Le Cynisme ancien et ses prolongements. Actes du Colloque International du CNRS ( Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1993), pp. 419-443. 66. For a discussion ϕωνíα des Oinomaos". Rheinisches Museum für Philologie 44 ( 1889), pp. 309-312. 67. For an examination of this work of Oenomaus, see J. Hammerstädt, Γοήτωνϕρα. Die Orakelkritik des Kyniker Oenomaus ( Frankfurt am Main: Athenaeum, 1988). 68. For a discussion of Oenomaus' floruit, see Dudley, A History of Cynicism, p. 184. 69. F. H. Sandbach, "Demetrius", in Encyclopœdia Britannica ( 1960), Vol. 7, p. 175. 70. Commenting on the testimony of Philostratus, M. Billerbeck notes that "the romantic fiction surpasses the historical character of the narrative" ( Dictionnaire des Philosophes Antiques, Vol. 2, p. 623). 71. Lamia, the daughter of Belus and Libya, became in mythology a bisexual vampire-like creature who would abduct children. A 'lamia' was, therefore, a sort of bogy that appeared in a ghost-like form. 72. See R. Joly, Le Tableau de Cèbes et la philosophie religieuse ( Brussels: Latomus, 1963). 73. J. L. Moles, "'Honestius quam ambitiosius?' An Exploration of the Cynic'sAttitude toward Moral Corruption in His Fellow Men"

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