Chrysippus' on Affections: Reconstruction and Interpretations (Philosophia Antiqua)

C H R Y S I P P U S ' ON AFFECTIONS PHILO S Ο PHI A ANTIQUA A SERIES OF STUDIES ON ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY F O U N D E D B...

Author: Teun Tieleman

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C H R Y S I P P U S ' ON AFFECTIONS

PHILO S Ο PHI A ANTIQUA A SERIES OF STUDIES ON ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY F O U N D E D BY J. H. W A S Z I N K | AND W.J. VERDENIUSf EDI TED BY

J. MANSFELD, D.T. RUNIA J.C.M. VAN WINDEN

VOLUME XCIV T E U N TIELEMAN

CHRYSIPPUS' ON AFFECTIONS

' '6 8 V

CHRYSIPPUS' ON AFFECTIONS RECONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION

BY

T E U N TIELEMAN

' 6 S ^

BRILL LEIDEN · B O S T O N 2003

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Tieleman, Teun. C h r y s i p p u s ' O n affections : reconstruction a n d interpretation / by T e u n T i e l e m a n . p. cm. — (Philosophia a n t i q u a , I S S N 0 0 7 9 - 1 6 8 7 ; v. 94) Includes bibliographical references a n d indexes. I S B N 90-04-12998-7 1. Chrysippus, ca. 280-207 or 6 B.C. O n affections. 2. Stoics. 3. E m o t i o n s (Philosophy) I. Title. II. Series. B 5 4 1 . 0 5 3 8 2003 128'.37-dc21 2003040330

ISSN ISBN

0079-1687 90 0 4 12998 7

© Copyright 2003 by Kortinklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands Cover illustration: Alje Olthof Cover design: Cédilles/Studio Cursief, Amsterdam All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy itemsfor internal or personal use is granted by Brill provided that the appropriatefees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910 Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change. p r i n t e d in t h e

netherlands

TABLE O F C O N T E N T S

Preface Abbreviations — Notice to the Reader

ix xi

General I n t r o d u c t i o n 1. Chrysippus' On Affections a n d How Von Arnim Dealt with It 2. Aims a n d Methods. O t h e r Studies 3. Chrysippus' On the Soul: Looking Back o n an Earlier Study 4. Pathos: A Terminological N o t e

12 15

C h a p t e r O n e PHP books 4 a n d 5: Aims a n d M e t h o d s 1.1. P r e a m b l e 1.2. T h e m e 1.3. O p t i o n s 1.4. Authority Tradition T r u t h 1.5. Galen the C o m m e n t a t o r 1.6. Galen's Working Method: T h e Selection of Texts 1.7. Conclusion

17 17 19 34 39 46 51 58

C h a p t e r Two Doxography 2.1. Galen a n d the Planta 2.2. Ps. Plutarch a n d T h e o d o r e t 2.3. Tertullian 2.4. Ps. Galen 2.5. Nemesius 2.6. Plutarch 2.7. Porphyry 2.8. Conclusion: Galen Again

61 61 65 66 70 72 76 78 80

C h a p t e r T h r e e Chrysippus' On Affections: T h e Theoretical Books (I-II) 3.1. N u m b e r of Books, L e n g t h a n d C o n t e n t s 3.2. Z e n o ' s Definitions of Affection 3.3. T h e Causes of Affection

1 1 4

89 89 94 102

3.4. 3.5. 3.6.

T h e Four Generic Affections Book 2: P r o b l e m s C o n c e r n i n g Affections T h e Origins of Evil

114 122 132

C h a p t e r Four T h e Therapeutics (Book IV) 4.1. Title, Subject-matter, A u d i e n c e 4.2. T h e Medical Analogy 4.3. T h e Roots of Affection 4.4. Regimen 4.5. Emotional O p p o n e n t s 4.6. T u r n i n g O n e ' s Back o n Reason 4.7. Madness a n d Mental Blindness 4.8. T h e Medical Backdrop: Hippocratic a n d O t h e r Writings 4.9. Conclusion

140 140 142 157 162 166 170 178

C h a p t e r Five Posidonian Puzzles 5.1. I n t r o d u c t i o n 5.2. Did Posidonius Speak of Psychic Powers? 5.3. T h e ' A n c i e n t A c c o u n t ' 5.4. C h i l d r e n a n d O t h e r Animals 5.5. Posidonius o n the Causes of Affection 5.6. Intermezzo: Diogenes of Babylon a n d Panaetius 5.7. Posidonius a n d Chrysippus' apcmai 5.8. Cleanthes' Dialogue between Reason a n d A n g e r 5.9. Two F u r t h e r Witnesses: Seneca a n d ps. Plutarch 5.10. Conclusion

198 198 202 206 220 231 242 250 264 277 284

C h a p t e r Six Cicero o n Affections 6.1. Preamble 6.2. Tusculan Disputations Books 3 a n d 4: Overview 6.3. Cicero's logika (4.11-33) 6.4. W h a t d o e s Cicero add? 6.5. Chrysippean Reflections in O t h e r Sections of Book 4 6.6. T h e T h i r d Tusculan 6.7. Conclusion

288 288 290 296 304

General Conclusion

321

190 196

305 309 317

Appendix: Overview of the Evidence

325

Bibliography

327

Index Locorum Potiorum Index N o m i n u m et Rerum

340 345

PREFACE

T h e writing of this b o o k has taken m e l o n g e r t h a n I a n d , I fear, o t h e r s h a d a n t i c i p a t e d . In t h e process I have i n c u r r e d d e b t s of g r a t i t u d e to several institutions a n d persons. T h e f o u n d a t i o n s were laid while I held a research fellowship of the Royal Dutch Academy of Arts a n d Sciences (1993-6) at U t r e c h t University. D u r i n g L e n t T e r m of t h e course 1993-4, I h a d the h o n o u r of working at the Faculty of Classics in C a m b r i d g e University. In C a m b r i d g e I e n j o y e d t h e hospitality of Professor Malcolm Schofield at St J o h n ' s College. A p e r i o d of t e a c h i n g Classics at Lauwers College, B u i t e n p o s t (Friesland) followed, d u r i n g which the work c a m e to an almost c o m p l e t e halt. It was given new i m p e t u s by a sabbatical leave s p e n t at t h e N e t h e r l a n d s Institute f o r A d v a n c e d Study in the H u m a n i t i e s a n d Social Sciences (NIAS) at Wassenaar, t h e N e t h e r l a n d s (2000-1). I want to r e c o r d my g r a t i t u d e to NIAS, t h e Dutch O r g a n i z a t i o n f o r Scientific Research (NWO) as well as the Board of Lauwers College f o r facilitating this invaluable p e r i o d of reflection a n d writing. In the years I worked o n this book I also p r o f i t e d f r o m the e x p e r t assistance of Luc d e Vries a n d A m a r e n s H i b m a in the best classical library of the N e t h e r l a n d s , the Buma Bibliotheek in L e e u w a r d e n . An e m b r y o n i c version of C h a p t e r 4 was delivered at t h e IX^™ Colloque Hippoaratique International (Pisa, S e p t e m b e r 1996) a n d subsequently p u b l i s h e d in its p r o c e e d i n g s (= T i e l e m a n 1999, see Bibliog r a p h y ) . S o m e of my ideas on Z e n o of Citium a n d psychological m o n i s m received a preliminary airing at the International Z e n o Conf e r e n c e , L a r n a c a Cyprus 9-11 S e p t e m b e r 1998 (see T i e l e m a n , forthcoming 1 ). An ancestor of C h a p t e r 1 will a p p e a r in the p r o c e e d i n g s of t h e VII Jornadas Internacionales, Estudios actuates sobre textos grìegos: Galeno, composiciôn literarìa y estilo (Madrid, O c t o b r e 1999; see Tielem a n , forthcoming 2). In r e c e n t years I discussed o t h e r aspects of this book b e f o r e a u d i e n c e s in Wassenaar, Leiden a n d Utrecht. T h e past years have n o t always b e e n the easiest, both privately a n d professionally. For the successful o u t c o m e of this project it was essential to have f r i e n d s a n d colleagues a r o u n d who kept their faith in it a n d actively h e l p e d create the circumstances which r e n d e r e d completion possible. A m o n g t h e m , J a a p Mansfeld played a crucial role b o t h

in instigating the project a n d in providing stimuli d u r i n g its gestation. His work and personality provide a model of scholarship which I feel very privileged to have h a d b e f o r e my eyes. I also owe warm thanks to my friend a n d colleague Keimpe Algra for his encouragem e n t and help over the years. It is a real pleasure to be able to work together again at the Utrecht D e p a r t m e n t of Philosophy, to which I am p r o u d to be affiliated. It is difficult to d o justice in a few words to everything my wife Linda H a z e n k a m p has d o n e for me d u r i n g these years while having a d e m a n d i n g j o b of her own a n d sharing with me the care of o u r two sons, Laurens a n d Sebastiaan. T o t h e m this book is dedicated with love. Leeuwarden, 13 May 2002

ABBREVIATIONS

ANRW

W. Haase, H. T e m p o r i n i (eds.), Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt, Berlin 1972-

CHHPh

K. Algra, J. Barnes, J. Mansfeld, M. Schofield (eds.), The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy (Cambridge 1999) H. Diels, Doxographi Graeci, Berlin 1976 (=1879) H. Diels, W. Kranz, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, 3 vols., Berlin I960 1 0

DG DK FHSàfG

W.W. F o r t e n b a u g h - P.M. H u b y - R.W. Sharpies - D. Gutas, T h e o p h r a s t u s of Eresus: Sources for his Life, Writings a n d Influence, 2 vols., Leiden etc. 1992

LS

A.A. L o n g & D.N. Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, 2 vols., C a m b r i d g e 1987.

LS)

H. G. Liddell, R. Scott, H. Stuart J o n e s , A Greek-English Lexicon, O x f o r d 1968 (=1940 9 ) Galenus, Deplacitis Hippocratis et Piatonis Pauly's Real-Encyclopädie d e r Altertums-Wissenschaft, herausg. von G. Wissowa, Stuttgart 1894 etc. J. von Arnim, Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta, 3 vols., Leipzig 1903-5; vol. 4, indexes by M. Adler, Leipzig 1924

PHP RE

SVF

N O T I C E T O T H E READER

W h e n q u o t i n g G r e e k texts, I have u s e d , u n l e s s it is o t h e r w i s e indicated, t h e m o d e r n s t a n d a r d editions: the O x f o r d Classical Texts (OCT) f o r Plato a n d Aristotle, t h e L o e b e d i t i o n s f o r Plutarch a n d Sextus Empiricus a n d the Berlin edition of the Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca for the G r e e k c o m m e n t a t o r s o n Aristotle. For Diogenes Laertius I have used the T e u b n e r e d i t i o n by Marcovich. For o t h e r a u t h o r s see the editions r e f e r r e d to in the I n d e x l o c o r u m . For Galen I have used t h e editions available in t h e Corpus Medicorum Graecorum (CMG). References to the Deplacitis Hippocratis et Piatonis (PHP) give

xii

ABBREVIATIONS — NOTICE TO T H E READER

book-, c h a p t e r - a n d p a r a g r a p h - n u m b e r s in t h e De Lacy's edition in t h e CMC series (Berlin 1978-84). F u r t h e r I have used t h e T e u b n e r e d i t i o n s of the Scripta Minora by M a r q u a r d t , von Müller a n d Helmreich a n d that of t h e De usu partium by H e l m r e i c h . In all o t h e r cases t h e still i n d i s p e n s a b l e Opera Omnia e d i t i o n by K.G. K ü h n (Κ.) (20 vols. Leipzig 1821-33, repr. Hildesheim 1964-5) has b e e n used. In g e n e r a l t h e n a m e s of a n c i e n t a u t h o r s a n d t h e titles of their works are abbreviated a c c o r d i n g to LSJ a n d the O x f o r d Latin Dictionary. For Galen I use the abbreviations p r o p o s e d by R.J. H a n k i n s o n (1991), A p p e n d i x 2 ( Ά g u i d e to the editions a n d abbreviations of the Galenic c o r p u s ' ) . Most of these are self-explanatory; b u t if n e e d e d s o m e assistance is given by the Index locorum at the e n d of this volume.

GENERAL I N T R O D U C T I O N

1. Chrysippus'On

Affections and Hoiu Von Arnim Dealt ivith It

Chrysippus of Soli (c. '280-204 BCE), the third h e a d of the Stoa, may c o u n t as o n e of the greatest p h i l o s o p h e r s of Graeco-Roman antiquity. His role in t h e history of his school was c o n s i d e r e d pivotal. ' W i t h o u t Chrysippus t h e r e would be n o Stoa', it was said (D.L. 7.183). M o d e r n studies have c o n f i r m e d the a n c i e n t verdict. But his stature stands in m a r k e d contrast to t h e fate s u f f e r e d by his v o l u m i n o u s writings. As the Stoic schools closed down in t h e course of t h e third century CE his works, like those of the o t h e r f o u n d i n g fathers of Stoicism, were n o l o n g e r preserved. 1 Today we study their t h o u g h t o n the basis of q u o t a t i o n s a n d r e p o r t s f r o m a diverse a s s o r t m e n t of later a u t h o r s — very m e a g r e r e m a i n s i n d e e d , involving a c o m p l i c a t e d Rezeptionsgeschichte. A m o n g o u r losses is Chrysippus' On Affections (Περί παθών). For m o r e than t h r e e centuries Stoics a n d o t h e r s t u r n e d to this treatise as the classic s t a t e m e n t of the Stoic d o c t r i n e of t h e affections or e m o tions of t h e soul. 2 Its vogue may have c o n t r i b u t e d to t h e relatively favourable state of o u r evidence. S o m e seventy verbatim q u o t a t i o n s a r e e m b e d d e d in t h e polemical discussion c o n d u c t e d by the philosopher-cum-physician Galen of P e r g a m o n (129-c.213 CE) in books 4 a n d 5 of his great work On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato (which I shall r e f e r to as PHP f r o m the initial letters of its Latin title). This material can b e s u p p l e m e n t e d f r o m t h e discussion of the affections o f f e r e d by C i c e r o (106-43 BCE) in b o o k s 3 a n d 4 of his Tusculan Disputations. In addition two intriguing verbatim f r a g m e n t s have b e e n preserved by t h e Christian theologian O r i g e n (c. 185-254 CE) in his Against Celsus (VIII, 51). Witnesses of a less direct n a t u r e , t h o u g h by n o m e a n s i n d i s p e n s a b l e , a r e D i o g e n e s L a e r t i u s (c. 200 CE) a n d Stobaeus (early 5th c e n t CE), w h o p r e s e n t or reflect scholastic systématisations of what Chrysippus originally wrote. F u r t h e r , we should n o t e t h e On Moral Virtue by Plutarch (c.45-125 CE), who m o u n t s a 1

This provides j u s t o n e e x a m p l e of t h e loss of large parts of Hellenistic philosophical literature, see the Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy (1999) 3 ff. 2 O n the terminology see infra section 4.

well-informed p o l e m i c against Stoic psychology that can be usefully c o m p a r e d with G a l e n ' s PHP. This list may b e a u g m e n t e d , e.g. with Calcidius' Latin c o m m e n t a r y on the Platonic Timaeus (c. 350 CE) as well as o t h e r treatises by Galen. 3 T o t h e u n i n i t i a t e d this may s e e m impressive; b u t in fact o u r evidence is miserably defective. T h e original text of t h e On Affections e n c o m p a s s e d f o u r books, each of which, Galen tells us, was twice the size of a b o o k of his PHP.4 W h a t Galen has p r e s e r v e d may (on a r o u g h estimation) a m o u n t to n o m o r e t h a n 20 p e r c e n t of t h e original text. Substantial sections a r e completely lost. Of o t h e r s we get m e r e glimpses. Even so, the On Affections has fared m u c h b e t t e r than most o t h e r C h r y s i p p e a n works (which n u m b e r e d m o r e t h a n 200, several of t h e m quite long). 5 So when H a n s von Arnim c o m p i l e d his still s t a n d a r d collection of f r a g m e n t s of t h e Early Stoa, h e m a d e an e x c e p t i o n to his t h e m a t i c p r i n c i p l e of a r r a n g e m e n t 6 a n d b r o u g h t t o g e t h e r the material relating to On Affections in o n e separate section {SVF 3.456-490). T h e only o t h e r treatise to receive such privileged t r e a t m e n t was the On the Soul (Περι ψυχής, SVF 2.879-910). From this work G a l e n in PHP bks. 2 a n d 3 f u r n i s h e s so m a n y v e r b a t i m q u o t a t i o n s t h a t V o n A r n i m felt a b l e to r e c o n s t r u c t t h e a l m o s t c o n t i n u o u s text of t h e p a r t thus preserved, viz. m o s t of t h e s e c o n d half of the first b o o k ( o u t of two), w h e r e Chrysippus d e m o n s t r a t e d that the intellect resides in the h e a r t (SVF2.911). 7 C o n t i n u o u s r e c o n s t r u c t i o n of o n e or m o r e extensive sections of the On Affections is impossible because of the way the original text has 3

For an overview see I n d e x . I n s o f a r as this b o o k involves t h e p r o c e d u r e of sifting a n d inventorizing the evidence for the On Affections I would like to refer t h e r e a d e r to t h e new edition of Stoic f r a g m e n t s that is in statu nascendi in U t r e c h t . It will include a fresh p r e s e n t a t i o n of t h e evidence f o r this treatise in t h e light of the results o b t a i n e d by the research of which this b o o k is t h e written record. 4 PHP 5.6.45, p.336 De Lacy. 5 For the evidence a n d f u r t h e r details see my article on Chrysippus in D J . Zeyl (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Classical Philosophy (Westport C T 1997). 6 This is loosely based on original Stoic divisions of philosophical topics. In view of Chrysippus' s u p p o s e d i n f l u e n c e Von Arnim p r i n t e d explicitly attested Chrysipp e a n material t o g e t h e r with texts taken to r e p o r t ' g e n e r a l Stoic d o c t r i n e ' . In compensation h e provided an Appendix listing sets of verbatim f r a g m e n t s f r o m n a m e d treatises by Chrysippus (SVF3, p p . 194-205). A glance at this a p p e n d i x reveals how widely m a n y of these f r a g m e n t s have c o m e a p a r t in the p r e s e n t collection. In fact, their diversity as to philosophical c o n t e n t was o n e of t h e reasons why Von Arnim o p t e d f o r a t h e m a t i c a r r a n g e m e n t ; see his observations in his ÄE-article 'Chrysippos' (nr. 14), vol. Ill (1899) col. 2505. 7 T h e s e f r a g m e n t s a n d G a l e n ' s t r e a t m e n t a r e t h e subject of an earlier study, T i e l e m a n (1996a), on which see f u r t h e r infra, section 3.

b e e n e x c e r p t e d a n d p r e s e n t e d by Galen a n d o u r o t h e r sources. Still, t h e s h e e r a m o u n t of textual evidence justifies Von A r n i m ' s decision to devote a separate section of his fragment-collection to this particular treatise. However, t h e c o u r s e taken by Stoic studies since t h e a p p e a r a n c e of his Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta (1903-5) seems to have proved him wrong. No separate study has sofar b e e n dedicated to the treatise. Historians of Stoicism have b e e n quick to c o n c l u d e that its r e m a i n s (like t h o s e of o t h e r C h r y s i p p e a n treatises) p r o v i d e t o o m e a g r e a basis for the r e c o n s t r u c t i o n of his doctrines, let a l o n e for t h e study of m e t h o d o l o g i c a l , literary or o t h e r aspects of his argum e n t . Von A r n i m may n o t have b e e n over-optimistic in conceiving t h e idea of a separate section f o r t h e On Affections. But t h e way h e actually h a n d l e d t h e m a t e r i a l also c o n t r i b u t e d to the s u b s e q u e n t neglect of the treatise. H e i n c l u d e d several relevant testimonies f r o m Cicero in t h e m a t i c sections elsewhere in SVF, thus m a k i n g the body of evidence look smaller than it is. Following Von A r n i m ' s lead, s t u d e n t s of Stoicism have o n t h e whole a d o p t e d a t h e m a t i c a p p r o a c h with only a few e x c e p t i o n s of little i m p o r t . 8 T h e direct q u o t a t i o n s to be f o u n d in Galen, Plutarch a n d o t h e r a u t h o r s are treated not as a privileged source of i n f o r m a tion b u t as j u s t o n e a m o n g several—a practice reflecting the j u m b l e of sources characteristic of Von A r n i m ' s m o d e of p r e s e n t a t i o n . 9 In this respect his collection is certainly o p e n to criticism. Most of his c h a p t e r s o p e n with derivative reports, with precious ipsissima verba of C h r y s i p p u s t u c k e d away a m i d later i n f e r i o r m a t e r i a l — a m o d e of presentation calculated to p r o m o t e a distorted picture of the relative value of t h e sources involved. In partial apology it must be said that the S. V.F. necessarily mirrors the state of knowledge of Stoicism at the t i m e of its p u b l i c a t i o n (1903-5). Since t h e n t h e r e have b e e n c o n s i d e r a b l e advances in research which (it is only fair to say) were certainly facilitated a n d stimulated by Von A r n i m ' s collection. And it

8 Bréhier (1951) ch. II p r e s e n t s brief surveys of t h e c o n t e n t s of a n u m b e r of Chrysippean treatises, including On Affections, a n d so does Steinmetz (1994) 586 ff. O n Fillion-Lahille (1984), see infra, pp. 6 f. Much earlier Alfred G e r c k e (1885) assembled a n d discussed f r a g m e n t s f r o m On Providence a n d On Fate. In his preface, t h o u g h , h e criticized Von A r n i m ' s predecessor, F. Baguet, De Chrysippi vita, doctrina et reliquis commentatio (Louvain 1822) f o r having assigned f r a g m e n t s to individual treatises on t h e basis of d o c t r i n a l c o n t e n t a l o n e : G e r c k e (1885) 691. O n t h e h a n d f u l of studies devoted to individual treatises cf. also the bibliography in Flashar (1994) 619 f. 9 See supra, n. 6

is only in t h e past t h r e e o r f o u r d e c a d e s t h a t t h e study of early Stoicism g a i n e d real m o m e n t u m in t h e c o n t e x t of t h e g e n e r a l u p s u r g e of interest in Hellenistic philosophy. T h e v e r b a t i m f r a g m e n t s have s u f f e r e d a c o m p a r a t i v e n e g l e c t . T h e r e a r e g o o d m e t h o d o l o g i c a l r e a s o n s to r e d r e s s t h e b a l a n c e in favour of this category of textual evidence wherever this seems feasible. I have studied the rich evidence for the On the Soul in an earlier m o n o g r a p h (1996), m o r e o n which see below (section 3). T h e present study aims to d o the same for the On Affections.

2. Aims and Methods. Other Studies In this b o o k the comparatively rich material f r o m a n d relating to the On Affections will be subjected to a closer scrutiny t h a n has sofar b e e n u n d e r t a k e n . This should lead to answers o n the following questions: J u s t how far can t h e treatise b e r e c o n s t r u c t e d ? W h a t d o e s such an inquiry a d d to o u r knowledge of t h e theory of e m o t i o n p r o p o s e d by Chrysippus? W h a t d o e s it tell us a b o u t his relation to his predecessors? And a b o u t his influence o n later developments? In addition, the textual e v i d e n c e may even p e r m i t us to study his p h i l o s o p h i c a l m e t h o d . H o w d i d h e d e v e l o p his p o s i t i o n with a n eye o n t h e philosophical c o m p e t i t i o n of his day? In studying these aspects, we may achieve a fuller u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e Stoic p h i l o s o p h y of e m o t i o n a n d its t h e r a p e u t i c t r e a t m e n t . It is well k n o w n that Chrysippus took t h e b o l d step of identifying e m o tions with j u d g e m e n t s , i.e. m i s t a k e n j u d g e m e n t s o n t h e value of things. Accordingly h e saw e m o t i o n s as t h e d i s t u r b a n c e s of a wholly rational intellect. Scholars o f t e n characterize this c o n c e p t i o n of t h e intellect as ' m o n i s t i c ' (a m o d e r n c o i n a g e ) as o p p o s e d to Platoniccum-Aristotelian dualism with its distinction b e t w e e n rational a n d n o n - r a t i o n a l f u n c t i o n s . T h i s o p p o s i t i o n s e e m s clear e n o u g h ; yet it leaves o p e n i m p o r t a n t q u e s t i o n s a b o u t the precise n a t u r e o f — a n d r a t i o n a l e b e h i n d — t h e Stoic i n n o v a t i o n . It is o f t e n insufficiently realized that the m o n i s m / d u a l i s m polarity is taken f r o m two of o u r m a i n s o u r c e s — G a l e n a n d P l u t a r c h — w h o are n o t historians (or at least n o t in o u r sense) b u t e n g a g e d in a t r e n c h a n t anti-Stoic polemic g o v e r n e d by rules a n d conventions radically d i f f e r e n t f r o m ours. S t u d e n t s of a n c i e n t p h i l o s o p h y a r e b e c o m i n g i n c r e a s i n g l y — t h o u g h slowly— sensitive to t h e m e t h o d o l o g i c a l issues involved in

c o l l e c t i n g a n d s t u d y i n g p h i l o s o p h i c a l f r a g m e n t s . 1 0 O u r existing collections, however c o n v e n i e n t a n d i n d e e d indispensable, p r e s e n t material f r o m sources which d i f f e r widely in date, literary g e n r e , philosophical or religious affiliation, intelligence, reliability a n d so o n . T h e r e is an obvious t e n s i o n l u r k i n g h e r e . W h e r e a s so-called f r a g m e n t s are b r o u g h t t o g e t h e r u n d e r the h e a d i n g of o n e particular d o c t r i n e , they o f t e n serve q u i t e d i f f e r e n t p u r p o s e s in t h e original expositions f r o m which they have b e e n culled. N o n e of t h e a n c i e n t sources was in the business of historiography in its present-day sense. In c o n s e q u e n c e , we have to take their specific aims a n d p u r p o s e s into a c c o u n t in o r d e r to assess the n a t u r e a n d reliability of their r e p o r t s a n d even quotations. In sum, the c o n t e x t of the so-called f r a g m e n t s c o m e s into play. By ' c o n t e x t ' I d o n o t merely m e a n the i m m e d i a t e context, i.e. the kind of f o r m u l a s sandwiching q u o t a t i o n s in sources like Galen a n d P l u t a r c h which even scissors-happy Von A r n i m includes. C o n t e x t should also be taken in a wider sense, i.e. t h e c o m p l e t e treatise that is used as a source or p e r h a p s even t h e c o m p l e t e oeuvre of the a u t h o r c o n c e r n e d . T h u s we may a c q u a i n t ourselves with the habits of m i n d of these sources a n d the peculiarities of the literary a n d philosophical traditions whose s t a m p they b e a r . " Clearly fragment-collections can be of little use here. But t h e n they n e e d n o t be. T h e i r f u n c t i o n is to provide a sort of data-base, i.e. an overview of the relevant texts a n d sources. We s h o u l d j u s t use t h e m in full awareness of t h e issues involved in working with a n c i e n t sources. Collections such as Von A r n i m ' s SVF o r Edelstein-Kidd's P o s i d o n i u s (to take an arbitrary sample) are the materializations of a host of decisions a n d p r e f e r e n c e s — s o m e of which m i g h t b e idiosyncratic or e p h e m e r a l — w i t h r e g a r d to t h e n a t u r e a n d reliability of t h e sources involved. T h e s e c o l l e c t i o n s o f t e n b e c o m e a u t h o r i t a t i v e — w h i c h may b e g o o d — o r i n d e e d achieve canonical status—which is decidedly d u b i o u s . T h e SVF provides a fine e x a m p l e , as d o e s Diels' Vorsokratiker. Both collections a r e o f t e n used as if they c o n s t i t u t e t h e definitive b o d y of evidence. T h i s t e n d e n c y towards c a n o n i z a t i o n s h o u l d be resisted, however. F r a g m e n t - c o l l e c t i o n s s h o u l d signal a n d g u i d e us toward 10

Cf. e.g. t h e studies assembled by Most (1997), Burkert et al. (1998). I h e r e subscribe to a principle u n d e r l y i n g m u c h of the work of J. Mansfeld a n d D.T. Runia; cf. Schofield, Phronesis 36.2 (1991) 235-9. Kidd (1998) t o o makes valuable observations—supported by e x a m p l e s — on how to study the Stoic material o f f e r e d by Plutarch, a r g u i n g that o n e s h o u l d a c q u a i n t oneself with his habits of m i n d by r e a d i n g his vast oeuvre as a whole (esp. 288 f.). 11

t h e s o u r c e s i n s t e a d of p r o v i d i n g a j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r leaving t h e m unopened. But if o u r p u r p o s e is to r e c o n s t r u c t the On Affections by tracing a n d analyzing relevant sources, an obvious q u e r y arises. Does n o t this project involve a r e t u r n to s o m e t h i n g awful called Quellenforschung, or source-criticism? T h e 19th a n d early 20th c e n t u r y variety of this m e t h o d e a r n e d itself a r e p u t a t i o n f o r b a r r e n speculation a n d circular r e a s o n i n g (things c a n n o t have b e e n all that bad: it is precisely to this p h a s e of classical s c h o l a r s h i p that we owe s o m e of t h e f r a g m e n t collections still in u n q u e s t i o n e d use). 1 2 But, I would like to c o u n t e r , it r e m a i n s legitimate a n d feasible to o p e r a t e with t h e c o n c e p t of source or t h e m o r e flexible o n e of tradition provided we steer clear of the pitfalls of Quellenforschung in the a n t i q u a t e d m o d e . 1 3 S o m e of its p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s have now b e e n r e m o v e d o r m o d i f i e d . We n o l o n g e r treat a u t h o r s such as P l u t a r c h a n d C i c e r o as m e r e m o u t h pieces f o r o n e or m o r e lost m o d e l s that are standardly taken as m o r e i m p o r t a n t f r o m a p h i l o s o p h i c a l p o i n t of view. We m a k e full allowa n c e f o r their i n d e p e n d e n c e in the light of their theories a n d practices as philosophical authors. Obviously this r e n d e r s the question of t h e i n f l u e n c e s inspiring t h e m m o r e c o m p l i c a t e d . S o m e consolation may be derived f r o m the r e c o g n i t i o n that t h e results p r o d u c e d by a m o r e sophisticated a n d up-to-date a p p r o a c h rest o n a f i r m e r basis than those p r o d u c e d by the c r u d e r type of source-hunting. T h e question will c o m e to the f o r e especially in c o n n e c t i o n with Cicero who a p p a r e n t l y did n o t draw directly o n Chrysippus' treatise b u t seems to have used an i n t e r m e d i a r y source. Galen could a n d did use the On Affections directly. In his case p r e s s i n g q u e s t i o n s arise as to t h e t r a d i t i o n , o r t r a d i t i o n s , o n w h i c h h e d e p e n d s in h a n d l i n g his Chrysippean material. Surprisingly little work has b e e n d o n e o n o u r sources f o r Chrysippus' treatise—despite t h e increasing appraisal of c o n t e x t u a l factors we have j u s t n o t e d . T a k e o u r m a i n source—Galen in PHP4-5. Fillion-

12 For a r e c e n t a c c o u n t of Quellenforschung i n c l u d i n g its s t r e n g t h s a n d limitations, see Mansfeld (1998). 13 Sallmann (1971) 1 ff., 31 ff., 165 ff. makes several excellent observations o n Quellenforschung a n d how an e n l i g h t e n e d f o r m of it should b e practised today. T h e responsible source critic d o e s n o t o p e r a t e on t h e basis of preconceived ideas a b o u t t h e lost s o u r c e so as to avoid circular r e a s o n i n g . Instead h e starts f r o m (1) t h e literary p u r p o s e of t h e a u t h o r of t h e extant work; (2) his working m e t h o d ; (3) his relation to bis source; (4) his c o n c e p t i o n of his subject-matter. All these aspects are adverted to in t h e course of this book.

Lahille (1984) has m a d e some way towards a reconstruction of Chrysippus' treatise t h r o u g h a c o m p a r i s o n between Galen a n d Cicero. She includes s o m e C i c e r o n i a n material unjustifiably o m i t t e d by Von A r n i m . However, she is c o n c e r n e d with the On Affections (as well as Chrysippus' On the Soul a n d P o s i d o n i u s ' On Affections) primarily as source f o r Seneca's On Anger, which constitutes h e r main subject. In c o n s e q u e n c e , the material is p r e s e n t e d b u t n o t studied in a systematic m a n n e r involving G a l e n ' s aims a n d m e t h o d s . 1 4 N o n e t h e less, Fillion-Lahille makes s o m e useful observations on Galen as a source a u t h o r a n d she is rightly suspicious of his story of a dramatic controversy between Chrysippus a n d Posidonius. Yet I have to disagree with some of h e r solutions as to the reconstruction of the On Affections a n d shall indicate the points at issue as the occasion arises. O t h e r scholars too have grown suspicious of Galen's claims. T h u s Gill (1998) argues that Galen takes a r a t h e r one-sided view of Platonic psychology, involving clearly d e m a r c a t e d psychic functions, which may or may n o t co-operate. In the latter case an o u t b u r s t of e m o t i o n e n s u e s . However, Galen s e e m s less sensitive to o t h e r f e a t u r e s of Plato's theory on the emotions. Plato increasingly stressed their cognitive n a t u r e as well as t h e i n t e r a c t i o n between the soul-parts r a t h e r than their separation. In fact, Gill suggests, Plato's t e n d e n c y to conceive of t h e psychic f u n c t i o n s in terms of (often c o m p e t i n g ) sets of beliefs is far m o r e similar to, a n d presumably influenced, Chrysippus' view of e m o t i o n (viz. as a kind of psychological division). 1 5 Galen suppresses this similarity because of t h e obvious fact that h e is conc e r n e d to play off Plato against Chrysippus. Clearly this r e a d i n g would also p u t a d i f f e r e n t c o m p l e x i o n o n Posidonius' role. Insofar as h e is drawing on Plato, h e is merely following Chrysippus' lead. Gill provides stimulating a n d o f t e n plausible suggestions, but, as h e himself acknowledges, o n e would like to have f i r m e r g r o u n d f o r t h e m , especially w h e r e Chrysippus' s u p p o s e d r e a d i n g s of Plato are c o n c e r n e d . 1 6 We n e e d n o t d o u b t that Chrysippus knew a n d used the relevant Platonic works b u t the precise ways in which h e did are m o r e difficult to establish. 1 7 Gill u n d e r t a k e s to study the relations between 14 T h e same holds for Graver (2002) 203 ff., who also notes t h e c o r r e s p o n d e n c e b e t w e e n C i c e r o ' s a c c o u n t a n d t h e C h r y s i p p e a n f r a g m e n t s p r e s e n t e d by Galen ( t h o u g h without r e f e r e n c e to Fillion-Lahille). 15 See esp. Gill (1998) 114 f. 16 See esp. Gill (1998) 135. 17 Gill (1998) esp. 135 ff. suggests that Chrysippus did n o t explicitly criticize P1ato(a fact a b o u t which Galen c o m p l a i n s ) because of his d e p e n d e n c e on Plato.

t h e t h e o r i e s of Galen, Chrysippus, Posidonius a n d Plato within the compass of a single article. So, naturally e n o u g h , h e covers only part of t h e relevant evidence. W h a t we n e e d is a m o r e c o m p r e h e n s i v e scrutiny of t h e relevant texts. In particular, we should study Chrysippus' position b o t h in its complete Galenic context a n d in relation to its own c o n t e m p o r a r y b a c k d r o p . In so d o i n g I h o p e to show that we should c o m p a r e Chrysippus n o t only with Plato b u t also with Aristotle a n d medical literature. In the relevant c h a p t e r s of his g r a n d m o n o g r a p h o n the emotions, Sorabji (2000) takes a c c o u n t of G a l e n ' s m o d e of p r e s e n t a t i o n , t h o u g h n o t u n d e r t a k i n g a systematic t r e a t m e n t of this aspect either. 1 8 Overall, h e leans heavily o n S e n e c a ' s On Anger, a r g u i n g t h a t this a u t h o r reconciles the differences that existed between Zeno, Chrysippus a n d Posidonius—according to Galen. For reasons to be a r g u e d in t h e m a i n b o d y of this b o o k I shall d i s a g r e e with Sorabji o n t h e positions of each of these Stoics. Unlike him, I d o n o t accept Galen's claim that t h e r e was an i m p o r t a n t d i f f e r e n c e between Chrysippus o n t h e o n e h a n d a n d Z e n o a n d Posidonius o n t h e o t h e r . Accordingly I take a d i f f e r e n t view of Seneca's role as well. T h e Stoic p h i l o s o p h e r Posidonius (c. 135-c.51 BCE) is also a source f o r Chrysippus' treatise, albeit o n e in a special sense. In his own On Affections Posidonius r e s p o n d e d to Chrysippus a n d in d o i n g so quoted f r o m the latter's work. Galen in his turn used Posidonius against Chrysippus, claiming that Posidonius h a d criticized a n d a b a n d o n e d Chrysippus' u n i t a r i a n c o n c e p t i o n of the soul in favour of t h e o l d e r Platonic tripartition. Galen backs u p this claim with p a r a p h r a s e s a n d direct q u o t a t i o n s f r o m Posidonius. S o m e of these q u o t a t i o n s contain Chrysippean material as used by Posidonius. So what we have h e r e is Chrysippus in Posidonius in Galen. Clearly we n e e d s o m e certainty as to Posidonius' real motivation in citing Chrysippus. Is Galen right in p r e s e n t i n g Posidonius as a full-blooded dissident? It is a m o o t question w h e t h e r a n d how far this was t h e case a n d (which is a n o t h e r question) what Posidonius himself t h o u g h t h e was doing. T h e most

But this (not c o m p l e t e ) lack of explicitness can be explained by r e f e r e n c e to Chrysippus' c o n c e p t a n d use of dialectic, see T i e l e m a n (1996a) 265. Apart f r o m that, Chrysippus did a r g u e against t h e Platonic tripartition, as is witnessed by his On the Soul, o n which see f u r t h e r infra, p p . 12 ff. O n Gill's view Chrysippus even d r e w inspiration f r o m Plato's a c c o u n t of t h e tripartition-cum-trilocation of t h e soul as e x p o u n d e d in t h e Timaeus, see also Gill (1997) 18 Ch. 6 d o e s f o c u s o n G a l e n ' s r e p o r t , albeit in c o n n e c t i o n with P o s i d o n i u s ' position only.

authoritative collection of P o s i d o n i a n f r a g m e n t s — t h a t of Edelstein a n d Kidd (1972)—goes a l o n g with Galen in this respect, i n c l u d i n g g e n e r o u s c h u n k s of t r e n c h a n t p o l e m i c as based o n P o s i d o n i u s ' critique of Chrysippean psychology—so m u c h so that c o n s i d e r a b l e parts of PHP4-5 would have to be read as paraphrases of this critique. In c o n s e q u e n c e , we c a n n o t d o d g e the question of Posidonius' role. Cicero, Tusculan Disputations b o o k s 3 a n d 4 d o e s n o t p r o v i d e verbatim q u o t a t i o n s b u t a c o m p a r i s o n with Galen shows that several passages in these books reflect, in o n e way or a n o t h e r , Chrysippus' original text. O n e e x t e n d e d section, Tusc. 4.11-33, seems particularly close to the Chrysippean original ( t h o u g h , as we have seen, t h e r e is r o o m f o r d o u b t w h e t h e r Cicero ever saw t h e original text himself). Cicero's testimony is all the m o r e useful for o u r p u r p o s e s since h e is f r e e of t h e polemical c o n c e r n s that i n f o r m G a l e n ' s p r e s e n t a t i o n of the evidence. T h o u g h n o t a Stoic himself Cicero expresses a predilection f o r the Chrysippean theory of e m o t i o n (4.10-11). T o be sure, h e d o e s n o t s u r r e n d e r himself to Chrysippus. But his selections a n d e m p h a s e s may be e x p e c t e d to differ f r o m Galen's in ways that e n a b l e us to s u p p l e m e n t a n d check the latter's assertions. Since Von Arnim a n d his g e n e r a t i o n t h e r e have b e e n m a r k e d advances in o u r knowledge of Cicero's o u t l o o k a n d p r o c e d u r e s . It was an article by Boya n c é (1936) which m a r k e d the e n d of old-fashioned (Quellenforschung as a p p l i e d to Cicero. 1 9 However, s u b s e q u e n t study of Cicero as a p h i l o s o p h e r in his own right has c o n c e n t r a t e d on o t h e r works a n d o t h e r books of t h e Tusculans. For the third a n d f o u r t h books of this treatise we still have to turn to studies as old as Pohlenz (1906) a n d Philippson (1932), whose main o c c u p a t i o n was to c o m b a t even m o r e enthusiastic source-hunters. T h e lack of r e c e n t work stands in awkward contrast to Cicero's i m p o r t a n c e b o t h as a source a n d a philosop h e r in his own right. 2 0 W h a t we n e e d are m o r e studies c o n c e n t r a t ing o n the interaction between this a u t h o r a n d his Stoic material, j u s t as in Galen's case. Although I set out to c o n c e n t r a t e on Galen a n d in 19 Boyancé was by n o m e a n s t h e First to criticize t h e excesses of traditional Quellenforschung. T h e criticism levelled at so-called Pan-Posidonianism by such scholars a s J . F . Dobson, R.M. J o n e s a n d L. Edelstein a r o u n d t h e same time also h e r a l d e d a new era. 20 Graver (2002) provides a new translation of t h e two b o o k s with a comm e n t a r y a n d a p p e n d i x e s d e a l i n g with t h e sources f o r Cicero's a c c o u n t i n c l u d i n g Chrysippus a n d Posidonius. T h e main c o n c e n t r a t i o n of this book, however, is on t h e translation. T h e concise discussion of possible sources necessarily r e m a i n s at the surface of t h e questions to be solved. Obviously, Graver is m o r e c o n c e r n e d with Cicero's aims a n d m e t h o d s than with reconstructing Chrysippus' On Affections.

t h e p r e s e n t b o o k still d o , I c o u l d n o t b u t e n g a g e m o r e fully with C i c e r o t h a n I h a d initially a n t i c i p a t e d . I h o p e to have d o n e j u s t e n o u g h to be able to p r e s e n t a few r e s p o n s i b l e c o n c l u s i o n s a b o u t how to assess the evidence provided by Cicero in relation to Galen. T h e r e is n o shortage of historical studies c o n c e r n e d with e m o t i o n — a situation which reflects t h e lasting fascination e x e r t e d by this subject o n p h i l o s o p h e r s a n d psychologists alike. N o r has t h e Stoic theory g o n e u n n o t i c e d . My justification f o r a d d i n g a m o n o g r a p h will have e m e r g e d f r o m the p r e c e d i n g pages. It is largely methodological: n o t only d o e s this b o o k deal with astonishingly u n d e r u s e d material b u t it also takes an a p p r o a c h that differs f r o m that taken by o t h e r studies b u t that is n e e d e d f o r a fuller u n d e r s t a n d i n g of what Chrysippus a n d o t h e r Stoics originally m e a n t to a r g u e . Because this is a p r o j e c t of historical r e c o n s t r u c t i o n , I have k e p t r e f e r e n c e s to e m o tion t h e o r i e s by c o n t e m p o r a r y p h i l o s o p h e r s to t h e b a r e s t minim u m — w h a t e v e r g e n e r a l i n s p i r a t i o n I may have drawn f r o m t h e m while working o n the intricacies of a n c i e n t texts. 21 O n e should n o t try to d o too many d i f f e r e n t things within t h e compass of a single book. My p u r p o s e is t h e m o r e down-to-earth o n e of p r o v i d i n g a f i r m e r f o u n d a t i o n f o r c o n c l u s i o n s o n t h e Stoic t h e o r y a n d its historical d e v e l o p m e n t . In this r e s p e c t it can be seen as p r e l i m i n a r y to any comparison between this theory a n d c u r r e n t ideas a n d debates. T h e s t r u c t u r e of t h e p r e s e n t study reflects my p u r p o s e of u n d e r taking a systematic a n d contextual a p p r o a c h to the material f r o m t h e On Affections, ' c o n t e x t u a l ' b e i n g taken in b o t h t h e wider a n d n a r r o wer sense I have e x p l a i n e d above. I shall take my p o i n t of d e p a r t u r e f r o m t h e aims a n d m e t h o d d e t e r m i n i n g G a l e n ' s overall a r g u m e n t in PHP b o o k s 4-5 ( c h a p t e r s 1 a n d 2). In t h e light of this discussion I shall take a closer look at t h e material deriving f r o m the On Affections in its m o r e i m m e d i a t e Galenic context. H e r e b o t h lesser sources f o r On Affections (such as O r i g e n ) a n d Stoic texts will be called u p o n to elucidate Chrysippus' m e a n i n g ( c h a p t e r s 3 a n d 4). N e x t I shall address Posidonius' p r e s e n c e in PHP 4-5 ( c h a p t e r 5). T h e final c h a p t e r is c o n c e r n e d with Cicero, f o r the reasons a n d with the disclaimers I have j u s t expressed ( c h a p t e r 6). I shall c o n c l u d e with an Epilogue in which I a s s e m b l e t h e c o n c l u s i o n s f r o m t h e individual c h a p t e r s ,

21

T h e c o n c e r n with c o n t e m p o r a r y topics is m o r e p r o m i n e n t in Sorabji (2000). N u s s b a u m (1994) too is strongly motivated by t h e relevance of Hellenistic philosophical therapy f o r us h e r e a n d now.

drawing an overall picture of the position of Chrysippus a n d the other Stoics concerned. This book takes the form of an extensive a r g u m e n t in support of a few related theses. For the convenience of the reader I had better lay my cards on the table b e f o r e e m b a r k i n g on it. I shall argue that Galen misrepresents the relations between the philosophers whom h e discusses in i m p o r t a n t respects. Moreover, his main points of criticism against Chrysippus involve gross distortions of the latter's position. Exactly how and to what extent this is the case can only be established by taking full account of the aims and m e t h o d s of Galen as a philosophical a u t h o r a n d polemicist of the second century CE. T h e picture that emerges f r o m this inquiry is o n e of basic harmony f r o m Zeno u p to and including Posidonius. This continuity contrasts sharply with Galen's t h e m e of disagreement. In fact, it also corrects o u r own expectation that shifts and divergences will have occurred in the course of t i m e — d e v e l o p m e n t s i m p o r t a n t e n o u g h to justify periodisations such as the distinction between Early a n d Middle Stoicism. In reality the Stoics r e m a i n e d within the basic framework left by their f o u n d e r , Zeno, each of t h e m c o n t r i b u t i n g to the mainstream Stoic position. Of special i m p o r t a n c e was Chrysippus, who grafted his conception of affection firmly on to his causal theory. T h e r e is an important physical basis underlying his theory, which has been largely suppressed by Galen (at least in PHP 4-5) as well as by Cicero. Yet it remains possible to clarify this aspect by means of the evidence supplied by these sources malgré eux and by taking account of the medical backdrop to the Chrysippean theory. Posidonius was not the dissident portrayed by Galen. Posidonius' r e f e r e n c e to Plato in his discussion of the ' a n c i e n t a c c o u n t ' (ό π α λ α ι ό ς λόγος) should not be taken to imply that h e r e p u d i a t e d Chrysippean monism in favour of the Platonic tripartition. Rather he a p p r o p r i a t e d Plato a n d o t h e r s as f o r e r u n n e r s of the mainstream Stoic position. But his role was not very significant from a philosophical point of view. H e merely contributed a few doctrinal refinements and technical terms. From a historiographical perspective, however, the extensive use m a d e by Galen of Posidonius' treatise is quite valuable. T h e evidence thus transmitted sheds welcome light on some of the distinctive features and motives of the Stoic 'monistic' position. Thus, Cleanthes' versified dialogue between Reason a n d Anger as q u o t e d by Posidonius attests to the way the Stoics r e s p o n d e d to the faculty approach to the soul of their adversaries.

3. Chrysippus' O n the Soul: Looking Back on an Earlier Study This v o l u m e is designed as a sequel to my Galen and Chrysippus on the Soul. Argument and Refutation in the De Placitis Books //-/// (1996). In what follows I will s u m m a r i z e t h e m a i n c o n c l u s i o n s of this earlier m o n o g r a p h because they h e l p explain s o m e of t h e q u e s t i o n s raised h e r e as well as my m e t h o d of d e a l i n g with t h e m . But t h e results p r e s e n t e d in 1996 a r e n o t used in such a way as to m a k e t h e argum e n t of this volume vitally d e p e n d e n t u p o n t h e m . In t h e first t h r e e books of PHP (of which t h e first is largely lost) Galen d e f e n d s his scientifically u p d a t e d version of the Platonic (and, h e claims, H i p p o c r a t i c ) trilocation of the soul: reason in the brain, a n g e r in t h e h e a r t a n d desire in the liver. His o p p o n e n t s are the Peripatetics a n d most Stoics, w h o assign all these f u n c t i o n s to the heart. As in the later books, a distinctive f e a t u r e of Galen's t r e a t m e n t is his insertion in his a r g u m e n t of substantial q u o t a t i o n s f r o m the principal a u t h o r i t i e s of these schools—Aristotle a n d Chrysippus. T h u s , as we have noticed in section 1, h e pillages the relevant part of the latter's On the Soul. T h e s e q u o t a t i o n s serve as p r o o f - t e x t s s u b s t a n t i a t i n g G a l e n ' s criticisms of t h e Stoic ( a n d Aristotelian) position a n d t h e a r g u m e n t s s u p p o r t i n g it. His t r e a t m e n t is n o t exclusively o r even primarily polemical, however. Galen presses Chrysippus' words into t h e service of a dialectical p r o c e d u r e a i m e d at arriving at positive results. T h u s h e also d r u m s u p scientific p r o c e d u r e s such as dissection a n d vivisection e x p e r i m e n t s . 2 2 By these m e a n s h e succeeds in showing t h e s t r u c t u r e a n d workings of the nervous system including t h e central role played by t h e brain. O t h e r a r g u m e n t s which a p p e a l to t h e a u t o m a t i s m of t h e h e a r t - b e a t or physical effects r e l a t e d to e m o t i o n s s u c h as f e a r a n d e r o t i c d e s i r e (which h a d also b e e n a d d u c e d by Chrysippus) are taken to p o i n t to t h e location of t h e Platonic spirited part in t h e heart. I also m a d e a foray into PHP b o o k 6, which b e l o n g s with this a r g u m e n t . H e r e Galen advances a n a t o m i cal insights to d e m o n s t r a t e that the liver is the seat of the principle of growth a n d n o u r i s h m e n t a n d h e n c e of the Platonic third part of the soul, i.e. appetite. This c o m p l e t e s his vindication of the tripartitioncum-trilocation of t h e soul.

22

In T i e l e m a n (1996a) I showed how t h e e x p e r i m e n t s fit i n t o t h e whole of Galens d e m o n s t r a t i o n . For a discussion that focuses on these e p o c h a l e x p e r i m e n t s themselves see T i e l e m a n (2002).

Galen's project involves a massive e f f o r t of r e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the original positions of Plato a n d H i p p o c r a t e s . Plato did n o t assign appetite to the liver. More problematically still, ' H i p p o c r a t e s ' did n o t a n t i c i p a t e t h e Platonic tripartition-cum-trilocation of t h e soul. Yet this is what Galen sets o u t to show, c o r r o b o r a t i n g his claims by m e a n s of q u o t a t i o n s , j u s t as h e d i d in r e g a r d to o p p o n e n t s s u c h as Chrysippus. But this time we a r e in a position to c h e c k G a l e n ' s q u o t a t i o n s a n d claims against t h e e x t a n t works of the a u t h o r i t i e s c o n c e r n e d . Galen's m e t h o d in PHP 1-2, it has t u r n e d out, involves a large d e g r e e of distortion of what his predecessors h a d said. T h e i r words a r e mercilessly e x p l o i t e d in s u p p o r t of p r e c o n c e i v e d theses a n d options. Obviously Galen in PHP 1-3 a n d 6 e x p o u n d s a c o h e r e n t a n d powerful d e m o n s t r a t i o n based o n philosophy a n d empirical science. But w h e r e does this leave Chrysippus? Why did h e c h o o s e to i g n o r e t h e discovery of the nervous system by the great Alexandrian scientists H e r o p h i l u s a n d Erasistratus (first half of the third cent, B C E ) ? A n d what a b o u t his naive (or so it seems) a p p e a l to c o m m o n parlance, p o p u l a r n o t i o n s a n d the poets? J u d g i n g f r o m Galen's a c c o u n t this type of a r g u m e n t m u s t have taken u p t h e m a j o r p a r t of Chrysippus' a r g u m e n t . O u r j u b i l a t i o n o n t h e large quantity of preserved text is immediately d a m p e n e d by o u r d i s a p p o i n t m e n t at the a p p a r e n t i n e p t i t u d e of Chrysippus' p r o c e d u r e . An assessment based u p o n uncritical a c c e p t a n c e of Galen's argum e n t is h a r d to s q u a r e with Chrysippus' r e p u t e d a c u m e n . I n d e e d , the above picture is superficial a n d anachronistic. In o r d e r to explain how a n d why this is so, I took a contextual a p p r o a c h akin to the o n e p u r s u e d in the p r e s e n t study. I f o u n d that Galen follows a traditional p r o c e d u r e of d e f i n i t i o n - c u m - d i a e r e s i s as it h a d t a k e n s h a p e in c o n t e m p o r a r y Platonism (so-called 'Middle P l a t o n i s m ' ) . His version of this p r o c e d u r e is f u r t h e r e n r i c h e d by t e c h n i q u e s b e l o n g i n g to the exegetical tradition c o n c e r n e d with t h e Aristotelian Topics. T h e s e historical affiliations could be established t h r o u g h a c o m p a r i s o n of his theoretical passages a n d actual p r o c e d u r e with a wide r a n g e of sources i n c l u d i n g Cicero, Alcinous, C l e m e n t a n d Boethius. O n e of the most salient features of Galen's m e t h o d is a s h a r p differentiation between real attributes of t h e thing u n d e r e x a m i n a t i o n (such as t h e h e a r t or the brain) a n d the beliefs of experts (philosophers, scientists a n d even poets) as well as p e o p l e in general, i.e. the whole r a n g e of w h a t Aristotle h a d r e f e r r e d to as endoxa ( έ ν δ ο ξ α ) , i.e. received or

r e p u t a b l e o p i n i o n s that are suited as the starting points f o r dialectical disputation. Galen, however, declares this type of e x p e r i e n c e to b e r h e t o r i c a l a n d f o r e i g n to scientific a n d dialectical p r o c e d u r e . This position motivates his dismissal of large parts of Chrysippus' argum e n t as b e l o n g i n g to this category. T h i s is to i g n o r e t h e fact t h a t C h r y s i p p u s took r e f e r e n c e s to c o m m o n n o t i o n s a n d p o p u l a r parlance as his point of departure a n d to attack t h e m as if they r e p r e s e n t e d the definitive conclusions of Chrysippus' a r g u m e n t . But in fact, they c o n s t i t u t e d t h e raw c o n c e p t u a l m a t e r i a l f r o m which t h e g r e a t s c h o l a r c h d e v e l o p e d p r o o f s of a m o r e t e c h n i c a l k i n d , i n c l u d i n g scientific insights. If o n e takes d u e a c c o u n t of t h e level a n d spread of anatomical knowledge at the time, Chrysippus' p r o c e d u r e a p p e a r s in a completely d i f f e r e n t light. I p r o p o s e d a reconstruction of Chrysippus' a r g u m e n t which differs in certain respects f r o m that o f f e r e d by Von Arnim. It shows Chrysippus d e v e l o p i n g a few a r g u m e n t s in a s e q u e n c e of fields of r e f e r e n c e m a r k e d by an increasing level of c o n c e p t u a l articulation: c o m m o n e x p e r i e n c e , poetical statements, science a n d philosophy. T h e integrative c o n c e p t of t h e whole p r o c e d u r e is that of t h e plausible or persuasive (τό πιθανόν). Its role in Hellenistic dialectic e m e r g e s f r o m a comparison between Chrysippus and Carneades. Here, then, the recovery of t h e original c o n t e x t d o e s m u c h to explain Chrysippus' p r o c e d u r e , f o r instance his sophisticated a n d powerful attack o n the Platonic separation of psychic parts. B e h i n d Galen's m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s lies n o t so m u c h a blatant lack of professional morality b u t a set of entirely d i f f e r e n t conventions of d e a l i n g with o t h e r p e o p l e ' s words in written philosophical disputation. A central role is played by t h e s c h e m a of options. Authorities a n d their p r o n o u n c e m e n t s (i.e. the quotes) are so to speak plugged into t h e pre-existing schema. We f o r o u r p a r t would use a n d e x p e c t of o t h e r s t h e reverse p r o c e d u r e : first study t h e literature a n d n e x t c o n d e n s e your findings into a s c h e m a . T h u s G a l e n ' s p r o c e d u r e cuts across o u r own habits a n d expectations. If we are n o t sensitive to this fact we r u n a serious risk of b e i n g f o o l e d i n t o believing w h a t h e tells us a b o u t t h e s e v e r b a t i m f r a g m e n t s which h e has so kindly preserved.

4. Pathos: A Terminological Noté13 At least since t h e days of Plato a n d Aristotle t h e t e r m πάθος could i n d i c a t e e m o t i o n as a g e n e r i c c o n c e p t covering c o m m o n m e n t a l p h e n o m e n a such as a n g e r , fear, distress, j o y a n d t h e like. 2 4 It is clearly what Chrysippus is talking a b o u t . ' E m o t i o n ' is t h e r e f o r e used by Sorabji. 2 5 O n t h e o t h e r h a n d t h e r e n d e r i n g ' p a s s i o n ' is m o r e firmly e n t r e n c h e d in the Western philosophical tradition. It is used by e x p e r t s o n Stoicism s u c h as I n w o o d (1985) a n d Long-Sedley (1987). In present-day English, however, this t e r m usually bears the specific sense of very strong e m o t i o n , in particular (sexual) desire. As a very s t r o n g f e e l i n g a b o u t s o m e t h i n g , it m i g h t seem particularly a p p r o p r i a t e to t h e Stoic ideal of t h e extirpation of all π α θ ή on t h e s u p p o s i t i o n t h a t t h e Stoics c a n n o t have m e a n t to e r a d i c a t e all feelings. As an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e d o c t r i n e c o n c e r n e d , this is contentious. T h e p r o t r a c t e d controversy between the Stoics a n d their P e r i p a t e t i c o p p o n e n t s (who a d v o c a t e d m o d e r a t i o n of e m o t i o n ) would boil down to a q u e s t i o n of terminology. 2 6 So if 'passion' is a d o p t e d as a translation, n o such c o n n o t a t i o n s h o u l d be taken f o r granted. 'Passion' is derived f r o m Latin passio, which, like the Greek πάθος, c o n n o t e s passivity. 27 Yet the m o d e r n t e r m retains this c o n n o t a t i o n only f o r those w h o a r e sensitive to its etymology. N u s s b a u m uses ' s u f f e r i n g ' ( t h o u g h with special r e f e r e n c e to Epicurus) 2 8 . But this is to overemphasize the e l e m e n t of passivity to the exclusion of others. T o limit ourselves to the Stoics, it would o b f u s c a t e the active aspect involved in the technical Stoic definition of πάθος, viz. as a particular kind of conation, or impulse (ορμή). Moreover, the Stoics class πάθη as morally wrong. It s h o u l d however be said that with r e f e r e n c e to

23

O n t h e translation of πάθος see also Inwood (1985) 127 ff., Vegetti (1995), Nussbaum (1994) 13, 102, 319 n.4 . 24 See PI. Phaedr. 265b, Tim. 86b; Arist. EN B.5. 1105b21-23, De an. A . l . 403a2-18, Rh. 1418a12, Pol 1287b; cf. also Demoer. Β 31 DK. 25 See esp. Sorabji (2000) 7, 17; likewise, t h o u g h with some hesitation, A n n a s (1992) 103 f., 114n.77. 26 O n this question see Frede (1986) 84; Dillon (1983); Sorabji (2000) 206 ff. 27 For this reason by A q u i n a s p r e f e r r e d ' p a s s i o n ' (i.e. Latin passio), see ST IaIIae.22.2. It s h o u l d be n o t e d that A q u i n a s ' view of passion (or e m o t i o n ) as a passive potency is m o d e l l e d on Aristotle's a c c o u n t of t h o u g h t r a t h e r than that of e m o t i o n . In fact Aristotle, like the Stoics, recognized both active a n d passive aspects of e m o t i o n , see De an. A 1: 403a5-8. 28 Nussbaum (1994) 13, 102.

Stoicism Nussbaum uses, more or less interchangeably, 'emotion' and 'passion'. 2 9 T h e r e n d e r i n g 'affection'—preferred by Frede (1986) and others —may not be so fashionable as ' e m o t i o n ' but this can be turned into an advantage. It preserves the aspect of passivity. But it also does justice to that other c o m m o n m e a n i n g of the Greek word πάθος, viz. disease or illness. 30 As will transpire in the course of my a r g u m e n t , it is this sense that conditions Chrysippus' a r g u m e n t in important ways, as when h e exploits it in drawing his detailed analogy between philosophy and medicine (ch. 4). So with some hesitation a n d with the other possible renderings in mind, I shall mostly use 'affection' as p e r h a p s best suited to preserve the d i f f e r e n t shades of m e a n i n g of πάθος in its Stoic usage.

29

Cf. N u s s b a u m (1994) p.319 n.4. O n this sense cf. Pl. Ti. 86b a n d t h e translator's n o t e issued by Cic. Tusc. 4.5, who himself p r e f e r s ' d i s t u r b a n c e ' (perturbatio) to 'disease' (morbus); cf. also ibid. 3.7, Fin. 3.35. See f u r t h e r , with special r e f e r e n c e to t h e Corpus Hippocraticum, Vegetti (1995). 30

CHAPTER O N E

GALEN, PHP 4-5: AIMS AND M E T H O D S

1. Preamble Galen's insistence o n empirical verifiability m a d e h i m disinclined to p r o n o u n c e o n a n u m b e r of issues which divided t h e p h i l o s o p h i cal schools of antiquity. 1 Until n o t quite so l o n g ago, this a t t i t u d e legitimated his exclusion f r o m the p a n t h e o n of philosophy. Historians of a n c i e n t p h i l o s o p h y r e a d h i m mainly as a s o u r c e f o r t h e d o c t r i n e s of o t h e r p h i l o s o p h e r s h e h a p p e n s to speak a b o u t . Meanwhile n o t i o n s of w h a t p h i l o s o p h y is, o r s h o u l d be, have s h i f t e d , trailing along o u r perspective o n o u r philosophical pedigree. Today, ironically, it is precisely G a l e n ' s scientific c o n c e r n s which boost his a p p e a l for historians of philosophy. It has b e c o m e possible to welc o m e him as a e x c e p t i o n to the metaphysicists crowding t h e philosophical scene of his day. This re-appraisal is to be a p p l a u d e d , n o t least because h e was taken seriously as a p h i l o s o p h e r in his own day a n d beyond. In fact, o u r earliest e x t a n t testimonies—a m e r e h a n d f u l — c o n c e r n his i n f l u e n c e in r e g a r d to p h i l o s o p h i c a l n o t m e d i c a l matters. 2 A fuller u n d e r s t a n d i n g of Galen's position, his purposes, habits of m i n d , priorities a n d b l i n d spots h e l p s to explain his r e s p o n s e to Chrysippus a n d the o t h e r p h i l o s o p h e r s w h o m h e quotes or refers to. O n this a s s u m p t i o n I shall u n d e r t a k e to p r e s e n t in t h e following pages an a c c o u n t of his a r g u m e n t in PHP books 4 a n d 5. Obviously e n o u g h , t h e r e are several ways of discussing the ideas a n d a r g u m e n t s of Galen (or any o t h e r p h i l o s o p h e r ) . O n e could, for instance, analyse the logical structure of his a r g u m e n t s m o r e or less in isolation. This is n o t the line taken h e r e . I shall a t t e m p t to study Galen as m u c h as possible against t h e b a c k d r o p of his p h i l o s o p h i c a l , m e d i c a l a n d

1 O n this peculiarity of G a l e n ' s b r a n d of p h i l o s o p h i c a l eclecticism, see t h e p i o n e e r i n g study by Frede (1981). T h e s e speculative questions include that of t h e substance of t h e soul a n d the n a t u r e of God. 2 See t h e testimonies a d d u c e d a n d discussed by N u t t o n (1984) 316 ff. Cf. also T e m k i n (1973) 51 ff., Frede (1981) 66.

literary environment. T h e motivation b e h i n d this strategy is simple but, I believe, appropriate and rewarding. When we identify the various literary a n d philosophical influences present in Galen's argument, we put ourselves in a better position also to isolate what is peculiar to him. So to which traditions was he indebted? What does this mean for his representation of the positions of Stoics such as Chrysippus and Posidonius? O r those ascribed by him to Plato and Aristotle? I h o p e to show that we would grossly oversimplify the actual situation if we were to picture Galen as conversing directly with a few past masters—however hard he himself may try to have it seem that way. T o be sure, he had read several of their original works. But o n e should never u n d e r e s t i m a t e the role of traditional ways of reading classical authors which had developed in the schools in the course of c e n t u r i e s a n d which may h e l p explain certain peculiarities of exegesis. O n e first came to such an a u t h o r u n d e r the guidance of a t e a c h e r a n d with prior knowledge of their t h o u g h t derived f r o m traditional h a n d b o o k s a n d compilations—a fact of life (in Dillon's apt words) which is often overlooked. 3 T h e universality of Galen's interests and c o m p e t e n c e is well known. In practical terms, it means that we have to take account of a variety of literary a n d intellectual traditions as possible influences on his work. In the following section I shall explore several of them in the h o p e of d o i n g justice to those viewpoints that seem relevant to his treatment of the Stoics. I shall first set Galen's subject-matter in its historical context, starting from the way he himself has defined and o r d e r e d the questions he tackles (§ 2). In addition, it is worth studying the way in which Galen presents the options at issue in the debate (§ 3). As an extension of this aspect, I shall continue to discuss relevant ideas on authority, tradition a n d truth (§ 4). Next, I will move on to some aspects of a m o r e technical and practical nature: the procedures c u r r e n t in the c o m m e n t a r y tradition a n d Galen's own relation to this tradition (§ 5) as well as the working m e t h o d of ancient authors like Galen, notably the technique of excerpting (§ 6). Finally I shall present a few general observations about the relevance to PHP 4-5 of the genres and techniques surveyed in the main body of this chapter (§ 7).

3

Dillon (1977) xv.

2. Theme PHP books 1-6 were the fruit of Galen's t u m u l t u o u s first stay in R o m e (162-166 CE).4 His c o n c e r n with philosophical issues in these books suited the c a m p a i g n of self-advertisement h e h a d m o u n t e d . C o m p e t e n c e as a p h i l o s o p h e r would e n h a n c e his s t a n d i n g as a doctor. O n a n o t h e r , less m u n d a n e level, h e was keen to d e m o n s t r a t e the relevance of medical t h e o r e m s to questions that h a d traditionally divided t h e p h i l o s o p h e r s . T h u s t h e a n a t o m i c a l e x p e r i m e n t s r e p o r t e d in books 1-3 are designed as a c o n t r i b u t i o n to the long-standing d e b a t e c o n d u c t e d by p h i l o s o p h e r s over t h e seat of t h e intellect a n d everything implicated by it. 5 But t h e r e is m o r e to Galen's b l e n d of philosophy a n d m e d i c i n e than the o p p o r t u n i t y for occasional cross-fertilisation, however topical or i m p o r t a n t the issues c o n c e r n e d . T h e r e is a distinctly p r o g r a m m a t i c side to PHP i n s o f a r as it p r o m u l g a t e s a unitary p r o j e c t of s o u n d medicine-cum-philosophy, with Plato a n d Hippocrates as its fountain-heads. 6 Medicine is so r e d e f i n e d by Galen as to a b s o r b those traditional parts of philosophy which h e takes as useful f o r scientific a n d m o r a l progress." This includes ethics a n d what we m i g h t call moral psychology. T o this last field b e l o n g PHP 4 a n d 5, dealing with the affections of t h e soul. 8 Of the n i n e books of t h e work these a r e p e r h a p s t h e least m e d i c a l in its c o n v e n t i o n a l sense. 9

4

Books 7-9 were c o m p l e t e d after 176 CE. See Ilberg (1889) esp. 217 f. 228 f., De Lacy (1978) 46-8. 5 O n t h e significance of these e x p e r i m e n t s cf. Lloyd (1979) 167; Mansfeld (1991) 128, 131; T i e l e m a n (2002). O n G a l e n ' s public p e r f o r m a n c e s of these a n d o t h e r e x p e r i m e n t s see D e b r u (1995); cf. also Von Staden (1995a). 6 Of course philosophy a n d m e d i c i n e had always to some extent overlapped, as is witnessed, a m o n g others, by Plato in his TimaeuY, see f u r t h e r infra, p. 39 n. 77. 7 See in particular his m a n i f e s t o That the Best Doctor Is Also a Philosopher, I 53-63 K. (= SM II, pp. 1-8 Müller), in which h e argues that the ideal d o c t o r has a t h o r o u g h c o m m a n d of t h e t h r e e traditional parts of p h i l o s o p h y (logic, physics, ethics). O n G a l e n ' s view of t h e n a t u r e a n d mission of m e d i c i n e see f u r t h e r Isnardi P a r e n t e (1961); Vegetti (1981), (1986). 8 Many treatises on moral philosophy listed at Libr. prop, c.12, XIX pp. 45 f. K. (SM II pp.121-122 Müller). Most relevant to t h e subject-matter of PHP A a n d 5 a r e the twin essays A f f . Dign. a n d Pecc. Dign. (V 1-57; 58-103 K., CMC V 4,1,1 De Boer) as well as t h e On Moral Dispositions (Περί ηθών, f o u r b o o k s ) , e x t a n t in an Arabic e p i t o m e only (transi, by Mattock 1972); cf. Walzer (1962). 9 But cf. 5.2.10, w h e r e Galen draws o n his medical expertise in o r d e r to correct Chrysippus a n d even Posidonius on their use of the m e t a p h o r of disease to explain psychic affections.

W h i c h q u e s t i o n s can t h e r e a d e r e x p e c t G a l e n to tackle? T h e c e n t r a l issue can be s u m m a r i z e d as follows: Do a f f e c t i o n s causally involve o n e or m o r e non-rational functions? O r are affections purely cognitive, b e i n g perverted states of the wholly rational intellect? T h e field was d o m i n a t e d by t h e o p p o s i t i o n b e t w e e n t h e Platonic-cumAristotelian tradition, which p o s t u l a t e d non-rational faculties alongside reason, o n t h e o n e h a n d , a n d Stoicism, which d e n i e d t h e presence of such faculties in the h u m a n intellect, o n the o t h e r . This was t h e t r a d i t i o n a l issue t h e n u m b e r of t h e faculties of t h e soul. It features in d o x o g r a p h i c compilations such as the Aëtian Plaâta, IV 4 (§ 5 is c o n c e r n e d with t h e r e l a t e d issue of t h e seat of t h e m i n d discussed in PHP 1-3 a n d 6 ) 1 0 as well as t h e De anima literature. 1 1 Separate tracts were devoted to the question, e.g. Plutarch's On Moral Virtue, which, like PHP 4-5, is d e s i g n e d as an attack o n t h e Stoic c o n c e p t i o n of the unitary intellect. A later t h o u g h i m p o r t a n t witness to this traditional d e b a t e is Porphyry's essay On the Powers of the Soul, of which a h a n d f u l of f r a g m e n t s have b e e n preserved. 1 2 In fact, Galen too wrote a m o n o g r a p h in t h r e e b o o k s (now lost) e n t i t l e d On the Parts and Powers of the Soul, which in his c o n s p e c t u s On My Own Books is listed u n d e r t h e h e a d i n g 'Treatises p e r t a i n i n g to Plato's philosophy'. 1 3 At PHP 9.9.42 h e refers to t h e same tract, using t h e variant title On the Forms [or: Parts] of the Soul (Περί των της ψυχής ειδών). 1 4 H e r e , G a l e n tells us, h e p r o c e e d e d 'in a c c o r d a n c e with P l a t o ' s inquiry'—which must primarily r e f e r to Republic 4, f r o m which Galen quotes substantial passages in PHP 5.7. PHP b o o k s 4 a n d 5 can b e r e a d as a m o r e or less self-contained c o n t r i b u t i o n to t h e traditional issue of t h e n u m b e r of psychic faculties. But they are n o t completely u n r e l a t e d to t h e rest of the work. It

10

I shall deal with the relevant passages from the doxographic traditions separately below Ch. 2. 11 The issue can be traced back to Aristotle, see esp. De an. A 1.402bl-3: σκεπτέον δε καί εί μεριστή ή άμερής , καί πότερον ομοειδής ίίπασα ψυχή ή οΰ · ει δε μή ομοειδής, πότερον ε'ίδει ή γένει. cf. Mansfeld (1990b) 3087 and further infra, p. 22. 12 See Frs. 251-255 Smith; on this treatise cf. also Beutler (1953) 289; Dörrie (1959) 158 n . l . On the position taken by Porphyry (232/3-c.305 CE) in the debate as compared with Galen's, see further infra, pp. 78 ff. 13 Lib. Prop. 13, SM II p. 122.14 f. Müller; cf. Ilberg (1897) 595 ff. 14 That is, if one accepts the plausible addition of <καί> (ibid. p.608.8) proposed by Einarson and De Lacy; see De Lacy ad loc. At Foet. Form. IV pp. 701-2 K. Galen refers twice to this tract in a context similar to our section, viz. PHP9.9.6 ff.. On its contents see esp. 9.45-46.

may t h e r e f o r e b e worth c o n s i d e r i n g briefly t h e i r place within t h e overall f r a m e w o r k of PHP. Due to t h e loss of a large p a r t of b o o k 1, we d o n o t possess Galen's initial s t a t e m e n t of his p u r p o s e in writing PHP.15 But in the e x t a n t books h e declares a few times that h e a i m e d to e x a m i n e the principal d o c t r i n e s of H i p p o c r a t e s a n d Plato with a view to proving their truth a n d basic a g r e e m e n t . " ' Which doctrines of H i p p o c r a t e s a n d Plato h e has singled o u t for t r e a t m e n t first is stated in t h e following passage, which a p p e a r s to b e r e p e a t e d f r o m t h e preface to the whole work in the lost b e g i n n i n g of Bk. 1 (2.1.1 = Test. Bk. 1, f o u r t h text) : H a v i n g p r o p o s e d to i n v e s t i g a t e t h e d o c t i n e s o f H i p p o c r a t e s a n d Plato, I b e g a n with t h e d o c t r i n e that is first in i m p o r t a n c e , f r o m w h i c h I s h o w e d that very nearly all particular details follow; 1 7 this is their d o c t r i n e a b o u t t h e p o w e r s ( δ υ ν ά μ ε ω ν ) that g o v e r n us, their n u m b e r , the nature of e a c h , a n d the place that e a c h o c c u p i e s in the animal (τα περί των διοικουσών η μ ά ς δ υ ν ά μ ε ω ν ό π ό σ α ι τέ είσι τόν άριθμον ο π ο ί α τέ τις ε κ ά σ τ η καί τ ό π ο ν ο ν τ ι ν ' έν τω ζωω κατείληφεν).18

It is easy to recognize h e r e an e c h o of t h e Aristotelian categories of quantity, quality a n d place. But it is m o r e a c c u r a t e to say that t h e types of q u e s t i o n listed by Galen b e l o n g with t h e rhetorical-cumdialectical c o n c e p t of the 'theoretical q u e s t i o n ' or thesis (θέσις, Latin quaestio), which a r o s e u n d e r t h e i n f l u e n c e of Aristotle's work in p a r t i c u l a r . 1 9 Aristotle h a d d i s t i n g u i s h e d t h e s e question-types in theoretical contexts 2 0 a n d applied t h e m in a r g u m e n t . This is how h e i n t r o d u c e s his own m o n o g r a p h on the soul: W e s e e k to study a n d u n d e r s t a n d its [seil, t h e s o u l ' s ) n a t u r e a n d b e i n g a n d t h e n its a c c i d e n t s (On the Soul A 1.402a7 f.).

15

Of Book 1 we possess only the closing sections, which on De Lacy's estimation a m o u n t to about o n e third of the original whole, which must have been rather long; see De Lacy (1978-84) vol. 1, 12-13. 16 O n the harmonization of Plato and Hippocrates as Galen's t h e m e see 6.8.76, 9.1.1 = Book 1, Test. I a, b (p.64.6-14 De Lacy); the t h e m e of the accuracy of their doctrines is made explicit at 5.6.40-41, which should be a d d e d to the two testimonies for book 1 printed by De Lacy; cf. also De Lacy (1978 etc.) vol. 1, 48. 17 I.e. ethical subjects such as the e m o t i o n s and the virtues addressed in PHP 4 and 5; cf. supra, n. 19. 18 Similarly 3.1.1 (= Test. II, second text). 19 Its role in dialectic as well as its relation to the Placita literature has b e e n studied by Mansfeld (1990b), esp. 3193 ff. For their use as items on the check-lists of Cicero, Lucretius and Sextus see Mansfeld (1990b) 3125 ff, 3149 ff, 3161 f. 20 See esp. APost. Β 1.89b24-35; Rhet. Γ 16.1416b20-l; cf. Alex. Aphr. In Top. p. 63.13-9.

T h e soul's existence is taken for g r a n t e d ; its definition (i.e. its being) a n d accidents are discussed f r o m A 2 onwards. W h a t we have h e r e is Aristotle's celebrated distinction between categories, i.e. b e i n g ('subs t a n c e ' ) a n d t h e so-called accidental categories. C o m p a r e also t h e following passage: Perhaps it is first necessary to determine in which of the genera it [seil, the soul] belongs, and what it is. I mean whether it is a particular thing (τόδε τι), i.e. a substance (ουσία), or a quality (ποιόν) or quantity (ποσόν) or belongs to any other of the distinguished categories (διαιρεθεισών κατηγοριών), and furthermore, whether it has potential or actual existence. 21 For this makes no small difference. And also we must inquire whether it has parts or not and whether each soul is of the same kind or not; and if not of the same kind, whether the difference is one of species or genus... (On the Soul A 1.402a23-b3; cf. ibid. 402b10-403a3). Galen d o e s n o t ask in which particular category the soul belongs. O n the o t h e r h a n d Aristotle d o e s anticipate the question w h e t h e r or n o t t h e soul has p a r t s (cf. On the Soul Γ 9 ) . Since this q u e s t i o n h a d b e c o m e traditional well b e f o r e Galen, we n e e d n o t assume that h e a r r a n g e d his material in t h e light of Aristotelian passages such as these ( a l t h o u g h h e will have k n o w n t h e m ) . R a t h e r these passages were used in a systematized f o r m in t h e schools as a check-list of q u e s t i o n s a n d o p t i o n s of t h e k i n d k n o w n f r o m various sources. C o m p a r e also the way in which his y o u n g e r c o n t e m p o r a r y A l e x a n d e r of Aphrodisias (flor. ca. 200 CE) o p e n s his On the Soul: Our theme is to discuss the soul belonging to the body in growth and decay: what is its being (substance) and which are its powers and how many, and what is their difference from each other (p. 1.2-3 Bruns). 22 H e r e we have b e i n g / quality / quantity again. A l e x a n d e r omits t h e question of place but h e discusses this question after the questions h e d o e s list h e r e (94.7-100.17 Br.). In g e n e r a l , these later a u t h o r s stuck to this list of question-types far m o r e systematically t h a n Aristotle himself h a d ever d o n e . T h e i r a g e n d a broadly c o n f o r m s to the division a n d o r d e r i n g of issues in t h e so-called Placita tradition, which 21

This particular problem is not addressed by Galen. ή μεν πρόθεσις ήμίν περί ψυχής ειπείν τής (του) έν γενέσει τε καί φθορά σώματος, τίς τέ έσχιν αυτής ή ουσία και τίνες αί δυνάμεις καί πόσαι, καί τις αυτών ή προς άλλήλας διαφορά. In addition see Cic. Tusc. 1.60 (quoted infra, n. 25); ps. Alex. Mantissa, p. 101, 1 f. as well as the section headed "Οτι πλείους ai τής ψυχής δυνάμεις καί ού μία (ibid. pp. 118.5-119.20 Br.); Porphyry ap. Stob. Ecl.phys. I p.353.2, 353.13, 14 W. (= Fr. 253 Sm.). For their use as items on the check-lists of Cicero, Lucretius and Sextus see Mansfeld (1990b) 3125 ff., 3149 ff., 3161 f. 22

since Diels has b e e n associated with the n a m e of Aëtius in particular. T h u s the division into c h a p t e r s of the relevant section of t h e f o u r t h b o o k of the reconstructed Aëtian Planta runs: IV, 2-3 (substance of the soul); IV, 4 (its parts); IV, 5 (location of regent part); IV, 6 + 8-13 (various functions: sense-perception, imagination, thought, speech). 23 T h e Placita tradition provides f u r t h e r p o i n t s of c o n t a c t with PHP A a n d 5, especially w h e r e t h e a u t h o r i t i e s are c o n c e r n e d (see c h a p t e r 2). But for the m o m e n t it may suffice to n o t e the questions at issue. Of these t h e ' h o w many?' a n d 'of what kind?' are clearly o n t h e a g e n d a in PHP books 4 a n d 5, which are c o n c e r n e d with the n u m b e r a n d n a t u r e of the soul's parts, while the 'where?' is discussed in books 1-3 a n d 6. T h e question of being, by contrast, does seem to provide a p o i n t of d i f f e r e n c e between Galen a n d b o t h the Placita a n d De anima traditions. It is conspicuously absent f r o m his a g e n d a as cited above. But in practice Galen d o e s n o t , i n d e e d c a n n o t , avoid the aspect of ' b e i n g ' in every sense of the term. First, t h e r e is the preliminary issue of b e i n g in the sense of existence, i.e. w h e t h e r t h e r e is such a thing as a soul. For Galen, in line with the large majority of a n c i e n t a u t h o r s , takes t h e soul's existence as evident f r o m t h e body's m o t i o n s a n d processes. Since in o t h e r s works h e is explicit o n this point, h e may have m a d e it in the lost o p e n i n g of PHP 1 as well. 24 Of g r e a t e r i m p o r t a n c e is t h e q u e s t i o n of b e i n g in the sense of substance: if t h e soul exists, is it e i t h e r i n c o r p o r e a l or c o r p o r e a l ? If

23

What a p p e a r s to be roughly t h e same s e q u e n c e h a d already b e e n followed by Chrysippus in his On the Soul: (1) its substance; (2) t h e n u m b e r of its parts; (3) its r e g e n t part a n d its f u n c t i o n s , see ibid. Chrys. ap. Gal. PHP3AA6 (SVF 2.885) with Mansfeld (1990b) 3168 ff., T i e l e m a n (1996) 134 ff., 154 ff. D i o d e s Magnes ap. D.L. 7.50 (SVF II 55). In the long passage cited at PHPÌ. 10-15 (SVF II 885) Chrysippus in fact draws on t h e Placita tradition, see Mansfeld (1990b) 3168 ff. T h e fixed o r d e r of subject relating to t h e soul may have b e e n part of t h e traditional o r d e r i n g of physical subjects in general; for some a t t e m p t s at reconstruction see f u r t h e r Festugière (1945), Mansfeld (1971) 130 f., Giusta (1986) 149-70, but t h e issue n e e d s f u r t h e r study. 24 Cf. Propr. Plac. 14.1 N u t t o n , w h e r e Galen a p p e a r s to b e looking back to t h e PHP in particular. Similarly Atticus, a Platonist a n d c o n t e m p o r a r y of Galen, ap. Eus. ΡΕ XV 9.10-11 (= Fr. 7 Des Places, 11.51-64); ps. Alex. Mantissa p . 1 0 1 . 3 4 Br. Sextus, M. VIII 155 is n o d o u b t using a stock e x a m p l e w h e n h e calls bodily m o t i o n an 'indicative sign' (τό ένδεικτικόν σημεΐον) of soul, i.e. a sign which signifies s o m e t h i n g directly a n d out of its own n a t u r e .

corporeal, of what substance? T h e omission of this equally traditional question has a d i f f e r e n t , m o r e peculiarly Galenic b a c k g r o u n d . It is o n e of those e t e r n a l q u e s t i o n s which Galen c o n s i d e r e d insoluble in default of empirical evidence a n d so chose n o t to p r o n o u n c e u p o n . 2 5 Yet it is i m p o r t a n t to realize that the positions h e takes o n related issues b r i n g h i m close to o n e particular o p t i o n in this debate, viz. the Aristotelian c o n c e p t i o n of t h e soul as the f o r m of t h e body (On the Soul B . l ) . 2 6 This is because h e t e n d s to link the c o n c e p t of t h e soul's parts o r f o r m s with their b e i n g situated in separate bodily organs. 2 7 I n d e e d , h e a p p r o a c h e s t h e q u e s t i o n of t h e location of t h e psychic f u n c t i o n s by i n q u i r i n g i n t o t h e f u n c t i o n of the organs p r o p o s e d , i d e n t i f y i n g f u n c t i o n with b e i n g or essence a n d invoking Aristotle (e.g. PHP 1.8.7 ff.). From h e r e it seems b u t a small step to identify the parts (or ' f o r m s ' , ε'ιδη) of t h e soul with the f o r m s of the organs. 2 8 In PHP h e n e v e r m a k e s this last step, however. In spite of c e r t a i n passages w h e r e h e s e e m s to c o m e close, h e has n o t yet a c c e p t e d reductionism in the h y l o m o r p h i c m o d e (see 9.9.7-9). 29 In fact, he still considers c o r p o r e a l i s m an o p t i o n in view of t h e s u p p o s e d existence of psychic πνεύμα. At 3.8.32, f o r e x a m p l e , h e associates intelligence

25

See PHP 9.9.7-9; Hipp. Epid. p. 271.5 ff. Wenkebach-Pfaff; Foet. Form. IV pp. 699-702 K, Prop. plac. 13.7, 15.2, pp. 108.11-110.3, 116.20-118.10 N u t t o n . Likewise Cicero, Tusc 1.60 opts f o r suspension of j u d g e m e n t as to t h e soul's s u b s t a n c e — t h o u g h h e p r e f e r s t b e view that it is divine a n d u n c o r p o r e a l in view of its power of m e m o r y : si quid sit, non vides, at qu a I e sit vides; si ne id quidem, at quantum sit profecto vides. H e r e we have t h e same s e q u e n c e substance—quality —quantity as in the parallel passages. For o u r p u r p o s e s it d o e s n o t m a t t e r that Cicero h e r e uses t h e 'how many?' question with r e f e r e n c e to the soul's powers of memory. 26 This of c o u r s e left o p e n m a n y questions, notably what this m e a n t f o r t h e h e a r t as an individual o r g a n which Aristotle h a d elsewhere described as central to t h e f u n c t i o n i n g of t h e w h o l e o r g a n i s m , e.g. PA Γ 4 a n d luv. 3-4. T h e later d o x o g r a p h i c tradition seems to have entailed an increasing c o n c e n t r a t i o n o n o n e o r m o r e organs as o p p o s e d to t h e body as a whole. 27 T h e linking as such can be paralleled f r o m Alcin. Did. 24, p. 176 H. so was n o longer an exclusively Peripatetic move. 2 ® See PHP5.7.50, 6.2.5; cf. In Tim. pp.11.25-30, 12.15-18 S c h r ö d e r . 29 For this we have to t u r n to t h e treatise of his old age, The Powers of the Mind Follow the Temperaments of the Body, w h e r e h e assigns great weight to t h e d e p e n d e n c e of m e n t a l p h e n o m e n a on bodily factors such as d r u g s a n d alcohol. In this light h e actually submits that t h e parts of t h e soul a r e t h e f o r m s (είδη) of the organs, i.e. t h e m i x t u r e (κράσις) of t h e e l e m e n t a r y qualities o r c o r p o r e a l elements, QAM c.3, IV p p . 774 ff., 782 ff. K. = S M II p p . ' 3 7 - 8 , 44-8 Müller. Cf. D o n i n i (1974) 134 ff., M o r a u x (1984) 774ff. This is m e a n t to qualify t h e view—held by Peripatetics like A n d r o n i c u s of R h o d e s a n d A l e x a n d e r of A p b r o d i s i a s — t h a t t h e soul is t h e power (δύναμις) supervening on t h e bodily m i x t u r e . See Alex. De an. pp.2.25-11.13, ibid. 24.15-26.30. Cf. M o r a u x (1984) 784 f.

with the psychic πνεύμα in the middle ventricle of the brain. 3 0 His promise (ibid. 29) to provide a fuller physiological account is fulfilled only partially in book 7 (3.19-36). H e r e h e reports certain experimental observations: an animal only looses consciousness when o n e lets its psychic πνεύμα escape by incising the ventricles of its brain. Moreover, the same animal regains sensation a n d motion when the ventricles have been closed up. In the light of these observations he prefers to call the psychic πνεύμα not the soul's substance n o r its dwelling but, with an Aristotelian touch, its 'first instrument'. 3 1 In sum, in PHP the question of the soul's substance, though surfacing here and there, remains undecided (esp. ibid. 21). But if we think we can understand why Galen skips the issue of the soul's substance, it is less easy to see why he includes the discussion of the n u m b e r of faculties after having discussed their location in books 1-3 (though not the Platonic appetitive part, which he discusses in book 6)—a discussion which also involves their differentiation. This c a n n o t merely have been a matter of working o n e ' s way t h r o u g h a traditional check-list. Galen subscribes to Posidonius' view that a p r o p e r understanding of the cause of the affections may also teach us how to conceive of the virtues, or moral excellences; and knowledge of the cause of the affections in turn d e p e n d s on that of the powers of the soul (e.g. 5.5.36-6.4). 32 T h u s on m o r e than o n e occasion we find him wavering between p r o l o n g i n g the discussion of the trilocation and addressing the t h e m e of virtue (e.g. 3.1.6). T h e subject of virtue is a n n o u n c e d for book 6 (5.7.73; 6.1, 7.11) but taken u p only in book 7 (1.9-2.17). 3 3 H e r e , in a p r e d o m i n a n t l y polemical section, he summarily explains the virtues in terms of the Platonic 30 This point comes up in the context of an allegorical interpretation of a myth, viz. Hesiod's account of the birth of the goddess Athena f r o m Zeus' head. Galen's interpretation is m e a n t to c o u n t e r the reading proposed by Chrysippus in support of the cardiocentric position (quoted 8.3-19 = SVF2.908). 31 See esp. MA c. 10 (on role of the σύμφυτον πνεΰμα); cf. De an. Γ 433b18 ff., Cael. Δ 301b20 ff. 32 But the point is made elsewhere as well, see e.g. Iambi. De an. ap. Stob. Eel. I 369.12-13 W., Plut. Virt. Mor. 441C-D. For Posidonius cf. Kidd (1971) 202 f. 33 Galen tells us that lack of space keeps him f r o m refuting, in the wake of Posidonius, what Chrysippus said in his On the Difference of the Virtues (7.1.10). At 7.3.1 he a n n o u n c e s his intention to d o so in a separate work (cf. 4.4.1); a n d at 8.1.47-48 he i n f o r m s us that h e has c o m p l e t e d this work, which, he says, also includes an exposure of f u r t h e r self-contradictions in Chrysippus' On Affections not dealt with in PHP either (Books 7-9 were written some time after 1-6, in the period between 169 and 176 cf.; cf. De Lacy (1978) 46-8). This latter, projected treatise c a n n o t be identified. Galen may have been inspired by the g e n r e exemplified by such works as Plutarch's On the Self-Contradictions of the Stoics, cf. infra, p. 44.

tripartition (7.1.22-3; cf. Plato, Rep. 442b-d; 443c-444a)—hardly a proper treatment. A n o t h e r aspect, too, calls f o r s o m e c o m m e n t . In b o o k s 4 a n d 5 G a l e n focuses o n t h e q u e s t i o n of t h e n u m b e r of psychic faculties (5.7.2), regardless of their ontological status as e i t h e r parts (μόρια, μ ε ρ ή ) or powers ( δ υ ν ά μ ε ι ς ) — a n o t h e r scholastic question. 3 4 Galen takes t h e status of t h e faculties as parts in t h e above sense to b e implied by their spatial separation, viz. t h e Platonic trilocation established in PHP 1-3 a n d 6. 3r ' T h e exclusive c o n c e n t r a t i o n in b o o k s 4 a n d 5 o n t h e d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n of faculties brings h i m t h e dialectical advantage of b e i n g able to align Aristotle a n d Posidonius with Plato in a c o n c e n t r a t e d assault o n t h e Stoic u n i t a r i a n c o n c e p t i o n . For Aristotle a n d , Galen argues, Posidonius h a d accepted the celebrated Platonic division into reason, a n g e r a n d a p p e t i t i o n , t h o u g h conceiving of t h e m as powers r a t h e r t h a n separately located parts. In fact, Galen o f t e n takes the perspective of powers in speaking o n behalf of himself, or of Plato. T h e c o n c e p t of power is of course central to his physiology, b u t in the c o n t e x t of ethics, as Galen repeatedly makes clear, o n e may as well, o r even preferably, speak of powers. T h u s Plato, w h o in Republic 4 was c o n c e r n e d with t h e m o r a l issue of t h e virtues, was c o n t e n t to prove that ' t h e powers (δυνάμεις) which govern us a r e t h r e e ' , 3 6 o r t h a t we have ' t h r e e powers d i f f e r e n t in k i n d ' (δυνάμεις ετερογενείς) (5.7.7, 7.9). 3 7 Likewise, h e has n o q u a l m s 34 Porphyry ap. Stob. Eel. I, 350.9-12 (Fr. 253 Smith): 'Tfie ancients a r e divided (διαπεφώνηται) [...] also a b o u t t h e parts (μερών) of t h e soul, a n d in general what a part (μέρος) is a n d what a power ( δ ύ ν α μ ι ς ) a n d w h e r e i n their d i f f e r e n c e lies.' Cf. Iambi. Dean. ap. Stob. I 49.33, p.367.10ff. (Περί δυνάμεων ψ υ χ ή ς ) , 34, p.369.5ff. (Περί πλήθους δυνάμεων); translation a n d n o t e s by Festugière (1953) 190-93. Cf. also t h e ps. P l u t a r c h e a n tract Ει μέρος τό παθητικόν τής άνθρωπου ψυχής ή δύναμις, o n e of t h e two 'Tyrwhitt's F r a g m e n t s ' ( T h o m a s Tyrwhitt [ e d . ] , Fragmenta duo Plutarchi, 1773); best m o d e r n edition S a n d b a c h (1969) 60-71. For t h e same issue in t h e d o x o g r a p h i c tradition cf. infra, pp. 72 ff. 35 Cf. supra, n. 24. 36 Cf. the f o r m u l a at 2.1 (Test. Book I, f o u r t h text), cited supra, p. 21. 37 For powers in c o n n e c t i o n with Plato 5.4.3, 7.2, 70.50 (= Posid. Frs. 142-145 E.K.) ; cf. In Hipp. lipid, pp.272.22-273.2 Wenkebach-Pfaff, esp. 272.25 ff: ' Α ρ ι σ τ ο τ έ λ η ς μεν ούν καί Π λ ά τ ω ν υπό μίαν προσηγορίαν [seil, ψυχήν] άμφοτέρας άγουσι τάς δ υ ν ά μ ε ι ς , ού μόνον ή λογιζόμεθα καί μεμνήμεθα ψυχήν καλούντες, ά λ λ α καί τήν έν τοις φυτοίς, ή τρέφεται [...]. Cf. Deuse (1983) 101 n. 28, who rightly points o u t that what matters in this c o n t e x t is the opposition to the c o r p o r e a l a n d unitary c o n c e p t i o n of t h e Stoa. This is of course also t h e situation in PHP 4 a n d 5. D e u s e d o e s n o t however n o t e t h e close r e s e m b l a n c e s in w o r d i n g a n d c o n t e n t between this Galenic passage a n d t h e m o r e extensive abstract f r o m Iambi. De an. ap. Stob. Eel I, pp.367.10-368.11 W. Cf. Gal., ibid. p. 273.15-19, In Tim. p.12.15-21 S c h r o e d e r : Πλάτων δε ονομάζει τάς ά ρ χ ά ς τ α ύ τ α ς είδη ψυχών, ού μιάς ο ύ σ ί α ς

a b o u t assimilating t h e c o n c e p t of p o w e r a n d t h e originally Stoic c o n c e p t of ορμή ( ' c o n a t i o n ' ) , as when h e says that each of the Platonic parts is m a r k e d by its own ορμή (5.7.1). 3 8 T h e n o t i o n of power a n d even m o r e that of c o n a t i o n a d m i t s of translation in t e r m s of desire a n d its subspecies a n d is t h e r e f o r e especially suited to ethical c o n t e x t s (see below § 3). T h e assimilation of c o n a t i o n a n d power h e r e is of crucial i m p o r t a n c e f o r G a l e n ' s p r o j e c t of playing off P o s i d o n i u s against Chrysippus. I shall r e t u r n to this p o i n t in d u e course (see below, p. 37f.). But the dialectical a d v a n t a g e of a l i g n i n g Plato a n d Aristotle is b o u g h t at the price of an incongruity of structure. As we saw, Galen has n o l o n g e r any n e e d of a separate a r g u m e n t f o r d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n , having established the tripartition-cum-trilocation in books 1-3. T h e logical s e q u e n c e would have b e e n first to discuss t h e n u m b e r of faculties (regardless of their status as e i t h e r powers or parts) a n d next to d e t e r m i n e t h e i r status. But n o t h i n g p r e p a r e s us f o r G a l e n ' s a n n o u n c e m e n t that h e will establish the d o c t r i n e of tripartition a n d trilocation in the next b o o k (viz. 6), as if h e h a d n o t d o n e so already (5.7.7). 3 9 T h e p r o b l e m is also r e f l e c t e d in t h e p r e f a c e to b o o k 6, where h e indicates a c h a n g e of plan: 4 0 It was my purpose at the beginning to inquire about the powers that govern us, whether they all have the heart as their base (όρμώνται), as Aristotle and Theophrastus believed, or whether it is better to posit three sources (άρχάς) for them, as Hippocrates and Plato held. But since Chrysippus disputed with the ancients (τους παλαιούς) not only about the sources but also about the powers (δυνάμεων) themselves, admitting neither the spirited nor the desiderative I decided that I must first [i.e. in books 4-5] examine his opinion and then return to my original plan, which was to show that the brain, the heart and the δυνάμεις μόνον, οντος ουν του καί τάς ο ύ σ ί α ς αυτών διαφερούσας είναι και την έν τοις είρημένοις σπλάγχνοις οϊκησιν, έ ξ έ σ τ ω τ ω β ο υ λ ο μ έ ν ω δ υ ν ά μ ε ι ς . . . . όνομάζειν ο ύ ψ υ χ ά ς · ούδέ γ α ρ ο ΰ τ ' εις ί α τ ρ ι κ ή ν ο ΰ τ ' εις φ ι λ ο σ ο φ ί α ν βλαβησόμεθα, διοικεΐσθαι τί ζώον υπό τριών άρχών είπόντες ... For Plato on psychic faculties as powers cf. Re/). 5.477c. 38 Galen m e n t i o n s ορμή alongside p e r c e p t i o n as a d e f i n i n g characteristic of t h e regent part at 2.3.4. O n t h e m o t i o n s of t h e psychic faculties see Manuli (1988), esp. 207 ff. who stresses early Stoic influence. Cf. Mansfeld (1991) 135 ff., who stresses Posidonian i n f l u e n c e ( t h o u g h also with r e f e r e n c e to such passages as Rep. 9.580d ff.). 39 It might be supposed that this passage was written b e f o r e books 1-3, o r at any rate b e f o r e these books were d e s t i n e d to b e c o m e t h e first t h r e e of t h e whole treatise. But I know of n o o t h e r indication to this effect, a n d t h e r e are many passages in PHP which tell against it, e.g. 3.7.53, even if allowance is m a d e f o r later a d d i t i o n s etc. 40 Which is b u t o n e of many such cases, cf. De Lacy (1978-80) 48-50.

liver are the sources of the powers that govern us (6.1.1-2 = Test. lib. 2, first text, transi. De Lacy, modified).

prìmi,

Galen claims that Plato m a d e the very same proviso with regard to the parts/powers distinction in Republic 4, where he proved 'cogently and irrefutably' that the soul has three sections. According to Galen, this proof does not include their n a t u r e as parts differing in essence (ούσίαις, 5.7.2, 8). 4 1 In s u p p o r t of this r e a d i n g h e a d d u c e s Rep. 435c9-d3 (5.7.6). But Plato's proviso here concerns the cogency of his a r g u m e n t for tripartition. 4 2 This has n o t h i n g to d o with the part vs. power issue which arose u n d e r t h e i n f l u e n c e of critique of t h e Platonic tripartition as f o r m u l a t e d by Aristotle in his On the Soul A 5 a n d Γ 9. 4 3 Galen a n n o u n c e s that h e will explain exactly what kind of demonstration is m e a n t by Plato's 'longer a n d fuller way' in the next book (5.7.7). But in book 6 this promise is f o r g o t t e n , or at least n o t really kept. 4 4 Instead we are given an overview of passages illustrating Plato's use of the terms f o r m ' a n d ' p a r t ' with r e f e r e n c e to the soul (6.2). 4 5 Of course Galen could find in Plato n o d e m o n s t r a t i o n of tripartition which would have satisfied his own professed standards. Republic 4 discusses the threefold division into purely functional categories with

41

In his treatise On Moral Disposition (extant in an Arabic abstract only) Galen makes t h e same qualification; p. xxvi Walzer: 'It makes n o d i f f e r e n c e how I r e f e r to these things in this b o o k [viz., in t h e On Moral Dispositions], w h e t h e r as separate souls, as parts of t h e o n e h u m a n soul, o r as t h r e e d i f f e r e n t powers of t h e same essence.' For t h e division of o p t i o n s , cf. 6.2.5 (see infra, p. 34). In this treatise, Galen d o e s n o t appeal to physiological insights, such as that into the nervous system, n o t even w h e n discussing t h e psychology of action, see pp. xxvi, xlv. O n these passage see f u r t h e r Mansfeld (1991) 140-2, w h o observes t h a t Galen in On Moral Dispositions 'silently d r o p s o n e of t h e main points proudly established in t h e PHP. Yet this should n o t be taken to imply a c h a n g e of o p i n i o n but r a t h e r a d i f f e r e n c e in dialectical c o n t e x t f r o m PHP. Cf. G a l e n ' s a t t i t u d e , In Tim p. 12.15-21 S c h r ö d e r q u o t e d supra, n. 37. In t h e On Moral Dispositions, too, Galen considers t h e tripartite s c h e m e as a moral t h e o r e m u n r e l a t e d to t h e parts-powers issue; h e thus makes his exposition a c c e p t a b l e f o r o t h e r s (notably Peripatetics). But it r e m a i n s t r u e , as Mansfeld p o i n t s o u t , t h a t Galen faces t h e p r o b l e m in r e c o n c i l i n g t h e Platonic tripartition q u a moral d o c t r i n e with t h e physiology of the nervous system. 42 καί εύ γ' ϊσθι, ώ Γ λ α υ κ ώ ν , ώς ή έμή δ ό ξ α α κ ρ ι β ώ ς μεν τούτο έκ τοιούτων μεθόδων ο ϊ α ι ς δή ν υ ν έν τοίς λόγοις χρώμεθα, ού μή ποτε λ ά β ω μ ε ν ά λ λ η γαρ μακροτέρα και πλείων οδός ... For similar disclaimers see 504b, 534a, 612a. 43 This question — first raised at 4 0 2 b l - 3 (see supra, n. 11) — is also c o n s i d e r e d at 402b9-16, 413a4-10, 413b11-414a3, 429al-2, 43219-b7, 433bl-4. Aristotle's view is that in c o n t r a s t with νους t h e o t h e r sections of t h e soul a r e n o t s e p a r a b l e b u t theoretically (λόγφ) different, Β 2.413b27-30. 44 As is observed by De Lacy ad he. (338.3-6); cf. also De Lacy (1972) 32 n.28. 45 Cf. In Tim. p. 11.21 ff. S c h r o e d e r .

a repeatedly stated proviso 4 6 that is most unwelcome to Galen. For trilocadon based on anatomy o n e has to turn to the Timaeus. But its mythical m o d e of p r e s e n t a t i o n could n o t pass for the r e q u i r e d demonstrative proof either. 4 7 T h e only thing Galen is able to do is to show that Plato, in Republic 4 and Timaeus, spoke of parts and forms. Proof is what he has to provide himself (viz. in bks 1-3 and 6), though h e of course claims it to be based on Platonic methodology, notably the m e t h o d of diaeresis as explained in PHP book 9. By Galen's day soul-partition had become increasingly problematic for those who wished to u p h o l d the soul's unity and immortality. Some Platonists were persuaded to a b a n d o n the notion of parts in favour of that of powers. W h e n Galen presents his r a t h e r forced reading of Republic 4.435c9-d3, which, as we saw, contradicts rather than supports his case, this may represent his attempt to counter-act those who had used the same passage to show that Plato had not been dogmatic about tripartition. Omission of this awkward passage, o n e supposes, would have been a m o r e attractive option had it been open to him. Galen, then, vindicates a radical variety of soul-partition with an eye not only on his Stoic a n d Peripatetic adversaries but also on a g r o u p of Platonists who had taken over the Peripatetic conception of powers (δυνάμεις). Exactly whom he has in mind remains uncertain, but a version of the view u n d e r attack was advanced by the Platonist Severus, who was a c o n t e m p o r a r y of Galen's. 4 8 Versions of it are moreover attested for Nicolaus Damascenus (c. 5 BCE- 64 CE)49 as well as Porphyry's teacher Longinus (early 3rd c. C E ) . 5 0

46

See supra, n. 42. ' Galen elsewhere stresses that Plato qualifies his account as merely 'probable' (είκώς, 29c4-d3, 72d4-8). But this c o n c e r n s issues Galen himself m a d e a point of refraining from: the substance and immortality of the soul, God, etc. See PHP9.9.3, 6, 7 (p.298.9, 20, 26). That this emphasis on Plato's proviso is not e x t e n d e d to the issue of location runs parallel to Galen's treatment of Rep. 435c9-d3 as discussed in the text. Both passages are at o d d s with Galen's belief that the tripartition can be d e m o n s t r a t e d . So o n e passage is misrepresented, a n d the o t h e r is n o t applied to the issue concerned. 48 See Eus. .PĒXIII 17.1-6; II, p.239.9 ff. Mras; with Deuse (1983) 102-108, esp. 104 ff. Cf. Dillon (1977) 262-64. 49 See Porph. ibid, (see n. 34) p. 353.12-354.6 W. (= F 7 R o e p e r / T 9 Lulofs) with Moraux (1973) 481-7. 50 Porph. ibid. p. 351.11-19 W. (Fr. 253, p. 272.32 ff. Sm.), cited infra, p. 35; cf. also ibid. p. 353.1-11 W. (Fr. 253, ρ.274.77 ff. Sm.). Highly relevant in this connection is also Tert. De an. c. 14, insisting that the idea of powers (as opposed to parts) is f u n d a m e n t a l to that of the soul's unity and immortality. 4

The Structure o / P H P 4 and 5: Synopsis It may b e c o n v e n i e n t to take stock of t h e overall c o n t e n t s of these books. It s h o u l d be n o t e d that t h e c h a p t e r s m a r k e d off by G a l e n ' s Renaissance editors d o n o t always coincide with the real a r r a n g e m e n t of subject-matter, w h e t h e r o r n o t as i n d i c a t e d by Galen himself. At the same time, it is clear that n o alternative a r r a n g e m e n t will reveal t h e s e b o o k s as a m o d e l of t r a n s p a r e n t o r g a n i z a t i o n , as will n o t surprise those familiar with G a l e n ' s work. Yet, for all his repetitions a n d vagaries, an overall a p p r o a c h is discernible: most space in these two b o o k s is d e v o t e d to a critique of C h r y s i p p e a n m o n i s m , which revolves a r o u n d two m a i n objections: first, Chrysippus' self-contradictions; second, his failure to explain the cause of the affections of t h e soul (parts A a n d Β of Book 4 a n d part A of 5, see below). T h e m e t h o d followed in these parts is n o t wholly destructive, however. T h e Stoic's self-contradictions, as we have seen, are o f t e n caused by what Galen p r e s e n t s as isolated a c k n o w l e d g e m e n t s of n o n - r a t i o n a l factors in the soul which have b e e n f o r c e d u p o n Chrysippus' m i n d by t h e plain facts of n a t u r e . 5 1 T h u s h e p r e p a r e s t h e g r o u n d f o r t h e vindication of t h e Platonic tripartition in t h e s e c o n d half of Book 5 (part B, below). In t h e following synopsis, Chrysippus is i n d i c a t e d by C. T h e pres e n c e of Posidonius [P.] is i n d i c a t e d by m e n t i o n of t h e f r a g m e n t s a c c o r d i n g to Edelstein-Kidd's edition. N o t e that these ' f r a g m e n t s ' d o n o t only o f f e r clearly r e c o g n i z a b l e v e r b a t i m passages f r o m P. b u t o f f e r m u c h larger stretches of Galenic exposition. I have also indicated by m e a n s of dots (·) the verbatim proof-texts of various authorities p r e s e n t e d in these books, w h e t h e r directly by Galen [G.] o r f r o m an i n t e r m e d i a t e source (e.g. P.).

BOOK FOUR (A) CHRYSIPPUS' SELF-CONTRADICTIONS (chs. 1-4) 1. C.'s inconsistencies i n t r o d u c e d (ch. 1.1-6) a n d illustrated by: — proof-text f r o m C.'s On the Soul (SVF 2.905): C. effectively accepts the Platonic parts in his exegesis of H o m e r i c passages (1.7-13). 51

See infra, p. 43.

— b e g i n n i n g of the On Affections: exegesis of Z e n o ' s definitions (1.14-2.44): C. admits irrational e l e m e n t . · Proof -text: 2.9-12; 14-18 ( r u n n e r s simile, SVF3.462). — sequel in C. Affections: s u p e r v e n i n g o n j u d g m e n t s (view ascribed to Zeno) o r j u d g m e n t s tout court? P. i n t r o d u c e d . P. follows ancients (T 102 E.-K.); asks C. what the cause of affections is (see f u r t h e r B) (3.1-5) — C.'s u n c o m m o n a n d a m b i g u o u s use of l a n g u a g e (3.6-4.34) • e.g. sense o f ' i r r a t i o n a l ' (αλογον) (4.9-34): proof-texts: 16-17, 24-25, 30, 31, 32 (SVF3.476).

(B) T H E CAUSE O F AFFECTION (ch. 5.1-46) 2. Objections against C.'s monist theory : — Affections c a n n o t be u n c a u s e d , contrary to what C. says. • Proof-text: 5.6, f r o m On Affections 1 (SVF3.476) — Reason c a n n o t be the cause. • P r o o f - t e x t : 13-14, f r o m Therapeutics (SVF 3.479): a f f e c t i o n contrary to reason. — S o m e non-rational power must be t h e cause. • Proof-text: 21-2, f r o m Ther. (SVF 3.480): view of psychic weakness (άρρωστήμα) as m a d n e s s implies non-rational power (23). — magnitude of a p p a r e n t g o o d o r evil as a d e t e r m i n a n t of weakness (C.). • Rejoinder with quotes f r o m P. (F 164, part) (24-35). — Psychic p h e n o m e n a that are inexplicable on C.'s account. • More texts f r o m Posidonius (F 164, part) (36-44). — Conclusion with quotation f r o m P. (T 60 E.-K.) (45-46). 3. Elaboration on some of the points raised (chs. 6-7): — T h e p r e s e n c e of a non-rational e l e m e n t in the soul. F u r t h e r admissions with r e g a r d to psychic s t r e n g t h / w e a k n e s s a n d tension (6.1.48) • Proof-texts f r o m Therapeutics 5-9, 11, 19 (SVF3.473). (Further ' P o s i d o n i a n ' criticisms, ch. 7.1-45 = P. F 165 E.-K.) — problematic notion of affection as ' f r e s h ' o p i n i o n (2-11) • 10-11: quotation f r o m Euripides (fr. 964 Nauck, Ale. 1085) — cessation in time

• prooftexts f r o m C. On Aff. bk. 2: 12-17 (SVF 3.476); 26-27, 30-31 (SVF 3.467). (7.45-46: E p i l o g u e to bk. 4: p r e s e n t line of criticism to b e c o n t i n u e d in bk. 5).

B O O K FIVE (A) T H E C R I T I Q U E O F MONISM, C O N T I N U E D 1. Introduction: t h e m e of bks. 4 a n d 5 justified ( c h . l ) — relation of subject-matter to question of seat of r e g e n t part as treated in bks. 1-3 (§ 1-3). — diaeresis of tenets c o n c e r n e d with the affections (C., Zeno, P.- cum-Plato, § 4-7) — Stoics c o n t r a d i c t obvious p h e n o m e n a as well as themselves (§8-11) 2. The Stoic body/soul analogy (chs. 2 a n d 3) — P.'s criticism of C.'s analogy in terms of health a n d illness (17) • q u o t a t i o n f r o m P. at 2.7 (3-12 - Posid. F 163) — G.'s criticism of b o t h C. a n d P. (8-12) — Criticism of C.'s c o m p a r i s o n with fever (13-19) • Proof-text f r o m Ther. at 2.14 (SVF3.465). — F u r t h e r evidence f o r C.'s use of analogy (2.20-34): • Proof-texts f r o m Ther. at 2.22-24, 26, 27, 31, 32, 33 (SVF3.471) — Criticisms against C.: (a) inconsistency vis-à-vis On Aff. bk. 1 ; (b) his failure to i m p l e m e n t the analogy (2.34-52). — physical a n d psychic beauty as right p r o p o r t i o n (2.46-3.11). • Proof-texts f r o m Ther. at 2.47 a n d 49 (SVF3.471, first text). 3. Various points repeated (ch. 4.1-17) (diaeresis of views, beauty a n d ugliness of the soul, e m o t i o n as o p p o s e d to purely cognitive e r r o r )

4. Evidence provided by children; implications for education (ch. 5.1-40; 1-29 = Posid. F 169 E.-K.). — children (and animals) display anger and desire (1-8) — origin of vice in children u n a c c o u n t a b l e on monist view (9-21) — Posidonian physiognomies (22-29) — P. and Plato on pre- and post-natal child-raising (30-35) (P. F 31 E.-K).

(B) TRIPARTITION VINDICATED 5. Posidonius on the cause of affection (ch.5.36-6.46; 6.3-36 = P. F 187 E.-K.) (cf. Book four, section B) — Implications of P.'s acceptance of the Platonic tripartition: = for virtue and the end (5.36-6.12) = for therapy of the soul (6.13-22) — some difficulties raised earlier (book Four, section B) now soluble (6.23-32) — P. could claim support of Zeno and Cleanthes (6.33-36) • Proof-text at 35 (SVF 1 Cleanthes 570); n o text of Zeno (cf. 40). — implications for scala naturae (37-39) (P. F 33 E.-K.) — concluding remarks (40-46): the views of Hp., Pl., Pyth. as compared with those of Zeno and C. 6. Plato's Proof in Rep. 4 (ch. 7): — Plato's a r g u m e n t introduced (question of its status) (1-11) — c o m m e n t s on Platonic passages on reason vs. desire (12-43) • proof-texts: Rep. 436b, 437b (12, 13); 439a-d (36-40). — comments on Platonic passages featuring anger. • proof-texts: Rep. 439e-440a (45-47), 440a-b (53-54), 440c-d (6263), 440e-441a (72), 441a-c (75-76), i n c l u d i n g H o m e r , Od. 20.17, leading to — comments on p r o p e r use of poetic witnesses.

3. Options This is how Galen distinguishes t h e options, a l o n g with their m a i n representatives: 5 2 Plato, holding that they [i.e. the forms, εϊδη, of the soul] are separated by their location in the body and differ greatly in essence (ταΐς ούσίαις πάμπολυ διαλ(λ)άττειν), has good reason to call them both forms and parts (εϊδη τε και μέρη). 53 But Aristotle and Posidonius do not speak of forms or parts of the soul but say that there are powers of a single essence which has its base at the heart (δυνάμεις ... μιας ουσίας έκ τής καρδίας ορμώμενης). 54 Chrysippus not only subsumes anger (θύμος) and desire (επιθυμία) under one essence (ουσία) but also one power (δύναμις) (PHP6.2.5 = Posid. F. 146 E.-K.). T h e t h r e e doctrines c o n c e r n e d are given in o r d e r of correctness. T h e position ascribed to Aristotle a n d Posidonius is neatly i n t e r m e d i a t e in b o t h merit a n d c o n t e n t : t h r e e essences t h r e e parts o n e essence t h r e e powers

brain, heart, liver heart

o n e essence

heart

o n e power

Plato Aristotle-cumPosidonius Chrysippus

As we have n o t i c e d , Galen links t h e n o t i o n s of essence, p a r t a n d bodily o r g a n . T h e n o t i o n of a plurality of powers d o e s n o t involve a division a c c o r d i n g to essence a n d location. This conceptual s c h e m a is Platonist a n d Peripatetic. 5 5 Galen's division of options, then, provides c o m m o n g r o u n d b e t w e e n at least t h e Platonists a n d Peripatetics. How far the r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of t h e Stoic position, or r a t h e r positions, is accurate, seems m o r e problematic. As to t h e a p p o r t i o n m e n t of o p t i o n s a n d authorities a c c o r d i n g to this s c h e m a we may c o m p a r e a few e x c e r p t s f r o m Porphyry's aforem e n t i o n e d On the Powers of the Soul preserved by Stobaeus. T h e first of these reads: 52 That the diaeresis set out here underlies the discussion in books 4 and 5 is further borne out by its more concise version at 5.4.3; cf. also the partial parallel at 6.1.1-2, cited. 53 Ct. PI. Tim. 73b-d, Rep. 504a, 580d-581e, 590c, Phaeár. 253c.265a ff. 54 For this phrasing see also 6.1.1; cf. Porph. ap. Stob. Eel. I p. 349.3-4 (= Fr. 251 Smith, p. 269.31 f.): μίαν μεν τήν ούσίαν λογικήν ού ... έκ μιας ή τε νόησις ούσίας δ ρ μα τα ι καί ή αϊσθησις ... 55 Cf. Alex. Aphr. De an. p.94.1-3 Bruns: πάσαι γαρ αύται μία ούσαι κατά τό ύποκείμενον, ταίς διαφοραΐς των δυνάμεων αύταΐς διήρηνται. Themist. De an. p.l 17.1-3 Heinze.

It should be said what is the difference between power and part: parts differ from one another in character and kind, whereas powers pertain to the same kind. This is why Aristotle declined to speak of parts with respect to the soul, but not of powers. For partition entails at once a change of substrate, while difference in power also occurs in a single substrate. 56 Longinus holds that not even animals have a plurality of parts but rather are without parts while having a plurality of powers, saying that, as Plato says,57 the soul receives a plurality of parts when embodied but lacks parts when it is on its own; but the mere fact that it has no parts does not make it single-powered; for it is possible for one entity without parts to have more than one power (Eel. I p. 351.8-19 W. = Porph. Fr. 253, p.272.32-42 Smith, Longinus Fr. 22 Patillon - Brisson). 58 It is easy to see that Porphyry avails himself of the same conceptual schema as Galen does at PHP 6.2.5. At the same time his account differs f r o m it in such a way that he c a n n o t d e p e n d on Galen. Both a u t h o r s draw on the same traditional division of options between Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics (or Chrysippus) in terms of the p a r t s / power distinction. 5 9 It interesting to n o t e how each of the two authors adapts this schema to his own purposes. In Porphyry's account his teacher Longinus occupies a compromise position between Plato and Aristotle. This is the main point. T h e Chrysippean option of o n e power only is merely m e n t i o n e d as n o t necessarily entailed by L o n g i n u s ' position. Porphyry does n o t t r o u b l e to identify it as Chrysippean, but it is easy to recognize as such in the light of the Galenic parallel. Nevertheless h e handles the schema the way that

56

I omit to translate the phrase τό δέ έτεροδύναμον καί περί εν υποκείμενου παραλλαγην είσάγειν inserted by Smith at p. 273.35 f. but probably d u e to a printer's error. It is entirely absent f r o m the edition of Wachsmuth and c a n n o t be a c c o u n t e d for by what is to be f o u n d in the critical apparatus of either Smith or Wachsmuth. 57 This is based on an exegesis of Tim. 35a: τής αμέριστου καί άεί κατά ταύτα έχούσης ουσίας καί τής αύ περί τα σώματα γιγνομένης μεριστής τρίτον έξ άμφοίν έν μέσω συνεκεράσατο ούσίας είδος, τής τε ταύτοΰ φύσεως [αύ περί] και τής του ετέρου, καί κατά ταύτα συνέστησεν έν μέσω του τε άμερούς αύτών καί του κατά τα σώματα μεριστού. 58 'Ρητέον δε ως δύναμις μέρους διήνεγκεν, οτι τό μεν μέρος έκβέβηκε κατά γένος τόν χαρακτήρα του άλλου μέρους, αί δέ δυνάμεις περί τό αύτό στρέφονται γένος. Διό τα μεν μέρη παρητεΐτο 'Αριστοτέλης έπί τής ψυχής, τάς δέ δυνάμεις ούκέτι- τό γαρ έτερομερες εύθύς υποκειμένου παραλλαγην είσάγειν, τό δέ έτεροδύναμον καί περί εν ύποκείμενον ένίστασθαι. Λογγινος δέ ούδέ τό ζώον πολυμερές είναι ά λ λ ' άμερές, πολυδύναμον δέ, τό του Πλάτωνος έν τοις σώμασι πολυμερή φάσκων τήν ψυχήν γίγνεσθαι, καθ' έαυτήν ούσαν άμερή. οτι δέ ού πολυμερής, ού δια τούτο καί μονοδύναμος· ένδέχεσθαι γαρ εν άμερές δυνάμεις πλείους έ'χειν. 59 See also Iambi. De an. ap. Stob. Eel. I, p.368.12-369.4 W. Cf. ibid. p.367.11-20; Alex. De an. p.94.1-3 Br. Cf. the interpretation by Dörrie - Baltes (1990), Β. 46.7.

Galen does, viz. as providing t h e t h r e e m a i n possible o p t i o n s (save for c o m p r o m i s e ) . N o innovative genius, L o n g i n u s e s p o u s e d w h a t was p r e s u m a b l y o n e of the o p t i o n s o p e n to Platonists w h o wished to r e s p o n d to the Peripatetic c r i t i q u e of soul-partition a l o n g Platonic lines. 6 0 O n the o n e h a n d , h e accepted a plurality of powers in t h e Aristotelian sense as basic; b u t the soul also has parts w h e n it resides in t h e body (and h e n c e n o parts b e f o r e or a f t e r e m b o d i m e n t ) . As we have n o t i c e d , Galen too linked the psychic parts to bodily parts. But the motivation seems entirely d i f f e r e n t . Platonists like L o n g i n u s s o u g h t to m a i n t a i n t h e unity ( a n d h e n c e immortality) of t h e soul in t h e f a c e of t h e Aristotelian critique. H e makes his qualified a c c e p t a n c e of a plurality of powers palatable to his fellow-Platonists by seeking s u p p o r t f r o m the ipsissima verba of Plato. 6 1 Galen took over the Platonist association of the c o n c e p t s of psychic a n d bodily parts b u t lost sight of the unity of the soul—so m u c h so that it b e c o m e s problematical. His position, with its b l i n d spot f o r t h e c o h e r e n c e a n d i n t e r a c t i o n s between t h e parts of t h e soul, resulted f r o m a c o m b i n a t i o n of his physiological notion of the power of individual o r g a n s a n d the Platonic tripartition a n d trilocation. J u s t as P o r p h y r y h a d an i n t e r e s t in a t t a c h i n g t h e n a m e of his m e n t o r to the traditional division of the options, so Galen a p p e n d e d Posidonius' n a m e to t h e s t a n d a r d Aristotelian position. This move is entirely motivated by t h e role assigned by Galen to Posidonius in b o o k s 4 a n d 5. As I have already indicated, t h e c o n c e p t u a l s c h e m a applied h e r e is i n c o m m e n s u r a t e with Stoic distinctions. First of all, it entails an equivocation with respect to the sense of being, i.e. ούσία. For P o s i d o n i u s , like t h e o t h e r Stoics, it d e n o t e s n o t Aristotelian essence b u t c o r p o r e a l substance, viz. the psychic pneuma.62 In his On 60

See supra, p. 29. Note that the same position is ascribed by Porphyry to a plurality of Platonists, ibid. p. 353.1 ff. 61 Cf. supra, pp. 29, 34 for Galen's similar appeal to Plato. 62 D.L. 7.157 = Pos. F 139 E.-K. Cf. Kidd ad 6.2.5 (Fr. 146), Comm. vol. Il.i, p.543 f., who speaks of a confusion on Galen's part as to the sense of ούσία, but it may be m o r e accurate to speak of distortion. Galen s h o u l d be taken to use the t e r m consistently in the sense of 'essence'. Kidd argues that this sense is impossible in view of the difference between έπιθυμείν, θυμοΰσθαι and λογίζεσθαι. But in speaking of three δυνάμεις of a single ούσία Galen's point is precisely that as far as ethics is c o n c e r n e d t h e r e is n o essential difference between tbe Platonic a n d Aristotelian conceptions. Accordingly, Aristotle also conceives of mental conflict in a Platonic way. This view has good credentials f r o m passages in the Aristotelian corpus, notably De an. 3.10.433b5-13, presenting the same t h r e e desires as conflicting as are at issue at PHP 6.2.5; cf. ENA 13.1102bl4-18. Admittedly Aristotle is less unambiguous

the Soul h e said that psychic pneuma is diffused in the b o n e s a n d in his On the Gods that t h e soul p e r v a d e s t h e b o n e s a n d sinews. 6 3 Galen however effectively saddles h i m with Aristotelian b e i n g or essence. T h e r e is n o g o o d reason to d o u b t that Posidonius c o n c u r r e d with Chrysippus a n d m o s t o t h e r Stoics in situating intelligence in t h e heart. O n this p o i n t at least the c o n j u n c t i o n with Aristotle involves n o distortion. 6 4 Does Chrysippus fare any b e t t e r in this Platonist-Peripatetic f r a m e work? Hardly, of course. Galen ascribes to Chrysippus o n e p o w e r ( δ ύ ν α μ ι ς ) only, j u s t as Plutarch h a d d o n e b e f o r e him a n d Porphyry was to do. 6 5 This p o i n t clearly refers to t h e Stoic c o n c e p t i o n of t h e wholly a n d h o m o g e n e o u s l y rational ήγεμονικόν or διάνοια, which was c o m m o n l y assimilated to the Platonic λογιστικόν. 6 6 I n d e e d , the Stoics

on o t h e r occasions, cf. Price (1994) 104 f. Likewise Dörrie (1959) 170, in characterizing Galen's position, says that parts can oppose o n e a n o t h e r whereas δυνάμεις cannot. But this does not follow f r o m the passage f r o m Porphyry ap. Stob. Eel. I p. 352.7 ff. (= Fr. 253 Sm.) to which h e refers. This does not of course alter the fact that the use in this context of the essence/powers scheme, which is absent from the relevant Aristotelian passages, seems to have arisen in the parts vs. powers debate in the post-Aristotelian era. 63 Posid. Fr. 28a, b, p.21.5 f. E.-K. In the latter testimony the word νεύρων in the phrase κεχώρηκεν δια των όστών καί των νεύρων must m e a n 'sinews': see Mansfeld (1991) 137, who inter alia compares Sext. M. VII 19 (Posid. F 88 E.-K). We may take his point that if Posidonius had assigned any function to the nervous system, Galen would surely have played off Posidonius against Chrysippus on this score as well. But in fact, Posidonius and Chrysippus were in essential a g r e e m e n t on voluntary motion a n d perception. For Chrysippus see e.g. Calc. In Tim. 220 (SVF 2.879); Gal. PHP3.1 Λ0 (SVF2.885); and Sen. Ep. 113..23 (SVF 1.525 = 3.836, second text). 64 See the text referred to supra, n. 62. Mansfeld's observation (1991) 122 that 'Galen is ... r a t h e r coy a b o u t the fact that Posidonius did not assign d i f f e r e n t locations in the body to different functions' is not entirely justifiable. True, he says so only at 6.2.5 a n d 5.4.3 a n d it is obvious that he has an interest in aligning Posidonius as m u c h as possible with Plato. But on the other h a n d the books where Posidonius is present (4 and 5) are c o n c e r n e d solely with the n u m b e r of the soul's functions (cf. 5.7.1 ff.). And as to the points on which he criticizes the Stoics, he emphatically singles out Chrysippus as representative of the Stoic school as a whole: PHP 4.1.3; 5.6.41. 65 Cf. also PHP 4.5.4, 5.1.3; a n d , for Plutarch, Virt. Mor. 441C with Babut (1969a) 4 f. 66 See esp. 2.5.81, w h e r e Galen aligns these two terms a n d several others, including the Aristotelian νοοΰν. O n their provenience see De Lacy ad, loc. (144.36); cf. also De Lacy (1988) 51. Galen typically insists that the terms we use are not what matters as long as their r e f e r e n c e remains constant. T h a t the ήγεμονικόν was regularly identified with the λογιστικόν is stated explicitly in Alcinous' Platonist h a n d b o o k , Did. 182.24-26 H. (cf. 173.1-2). Alexander too uses both λογιστικόν and ήγεμονικόν to r e f e r to the intellect, see De an. pp. 39.21-2, 98.24 f. 99.14-5; cf. Mansfeld (1990b) 3109 n.222. Cf. also V a n d e r Waerdt (1985b) 377 n.16 with f u r t h e r passages; cf. (1985a) 293 n.27.

d o n o t recognize desire a n d a n g e r as separate powers b u t as excessive manifestations o f ' c o n a t i o n ' (ορμή). 6 7 Importantly, conation is n o t an Aristotelian power alongside reason. Chrysippus d e f i n e d c o n a t i o n as 'reason (λόγος) c o m m a n d i n g m a n to act'. 6 8 In o t h e r words, conation is reason in a particular role, viz. as the initiator of action. Did the Stoics use the c o n c e p t of ' p o w e r ' (δύναμις) in this context a n d , if so, how? A few sources ascribe to the Stoic r e g e n t part several d i f f e r e n t powers, viz. φαντασία, συγκατάθεσις, όρμή, λόγος (Iambi, ap. Stob. Eel. I p.368.19-20 W„ SVF 2.826, s e c o n d text). 6 9 But arguably this list may also have arisen f r o m t h e wish to c o m p a r e t h e Stoic c o n c e p t i o n with those of o t h e r schools in t h e c o n t e x t of scholastic d e b a t e . T h e inclusion of λόγος o n a par with the o t h e r s is suspect. In fact, this usage of the t e r m ' p o w e r ' ( δ ύ ν α μ ι ς ) is n o t reliably attested as early Stoic. But Aët. Plac. IV 21.1 (SVF 2.836) seems to provide a m o r e a c c u r a t e a c c o u n t . H e r e ' t h e Stoics' are said to d e s c r i b e t h e r e g e n t p a r t as that which produces τάς φ α ν τ α σ ί α ς καί συγκαταθέσεις καί αισθήσεις και ορμάς· καί τούτο λογισμόν καλούσιν. T h e r e is n o m e n t i o n of 'powers' h e r e . 7 0 Moreover, this notice fits in b e t t e r with Chrysippus' own definition of conation (όρμή) I have j u s t r e f e r r e d to. T h u s w h e n Inwood argues in favour of viewing these δυνάμεις as e n d u r i n g dispositions of t h e t h e r e g e n t part, 7 1 h e r u n s t h e risk of i m p o r t i n g into his a c c o u n t a viewpoint which is f o r e i g n to t h e Stoic c o n c e p t i o n . In fact, it stems f r o m t h e traditional Platonist m o d e of schematization. T h e crucial p o i n t h e r e is n o t w h e t h e r o r n o t conation a n d t h e like r e p r e s e n t e n d u r i n g capabilities of the m i n d ; t h e p o i n t is w h e t h e r these capabilities r e p r e s e n t a plural aspect which served to a c c o u n t for such m e n t a l p h e n o m e n a as weakness of the will (άκρασία). In fact, the original Stoic usage of the t e r m δ ύ ν α μ ι ς is n o t that of p o w e r in t h e sense of faculty o r capacity, as e.g. in Aristotle. It is power in t h e sense of strength, which d e p e n d s o n t h e a p p r o p r i a t e d e g r e e of physical tension (τόνος) of the psychic p n e u m a . 7 2 As such, 67 O n the affinities with certain Aristotelian concepts, notably όρεξις, επιθυμία and θύμος, see infra, pp. 272 f., 275 f. 68 Plut. De Stoic. Rep. 1037F (SVF3.175); see f u r t h e r infra, p. 125, 276. 69 In addition, separate powers are assigned to the seven other parts of the Stoic soul: the five senses and the reproductive and phonetic functions; cf. ibid., p. 368.6 ff. (SVF2.826, second text). 70 See f u r t h e r Chr. ap. Gal. PHP 3.5.31 (SVF 2.896); D.L. 7.159. Cf. also the definition of φαντασία as an alteration of the soul, SVF2.55, 56. 71 Inwood (1985) 33ff. Cf. Voelke (1973) 29. 72 Plut. Virt. mar. 441C (SVF 1.202; 3.459); Stob. Eel. II p. 74.1-3 (SVF3.112) ; cf.

it d e t e r m i n e s w h e t h e r a soul is characterized by weakness of will or self-control. 7 3 This idea of psychic strength—which is n o t c o n f i n e d to t h e Stoics—is a b o u t equivalent to o u r c o n c e p t of 'will'. 74 Its import a n c e f o r t h e Stoics is, a m o n g o t h e r things, clear f r o m C l e a n t h e s ' m o v e to r e p l a c e practical w i s d o m ( φ ρ ό ν η σ ι ς ) with self-control (εγκράτεια) as o n e of the primary virtues. 7 5 Clearly this is s o m e t h i n g d i f f e r e n t f r o m δύναμις as used at PHP6.2.5.

4. Authority, Tradition, and Truth In PHP 4-5, Galen identifies a basic insight into the n a t u r e of e m o tion c o m m o n to Plato, Hippocrates, Pythagoras, Aristotle, C l e a n t h e s a n d Posidonius. Z e n o is an a m b i g u o u s case, 7 6 b u t C h r y s i p p u s is u n d e n i a b l y deviant. T h i s g r o u p i n g of a u t h o r i t i e s is n o t a purely dialectical move. It f o r m s p a r t of his vision of a tradition of s o u n d philosophy-cum-medicine deriving f r o m H i p p o c r a t e s a n d Plato a n d f u r t h e r e n r i c h e d by o u t s t a n d i n g r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of later g e n e r a tions. 7 7 This betrays a reconciliationist t e n d e n c y n o t u n c o m m o n in Galen's day. Its hallmark is an i m p a t i e n c e with terminological differe n c e s between schools a n d t h i n k e r s when a case can be m a d e f o r their substantial a g r e e m e n t . Galen m o r e o v e r glorifies past masters at t h e e x p e n s e of their self-styled followers. Accordingly, h e carefully avoids personal association with any of the sects or schools of his day a n d expresses his i n t e n t i o n only to select what is best f r o m t h e m . 7 8 W h e r e v e r possible, t h e Stoics t o o are i n c o r p o r a t e d into t h e g r a n d tradition, with or without complaints a b o u t their p e n c h a n t for empty

Alex. Aphr. De an. Mantissa p. 118.6 ff. Br. (SVF2.823). 73 Cf. Plut. Wirt. mar. 446F-447A (SVF3.459, second text). 74 O n the tension a n d strength in ancient representations of psychic p h e n o m e n a see Vegetti (1993); on strength and the will see Mansfeld (1991), esp. 114 ff. 75 Plut. De Stoic. Rep. 1034D (SVF 1.563). 76 See f u r t h e r infra, pp. 85 f. 77 O n this and related aspects of PHP see Vegetti (1986); on Galen's ideas on scientific progress as an aspect of tradition see also De Lacy (1972), esp. 33 ff., Hankinson (1994b). T h e association of philosophy and medicine is by no means novel; cf. Plato's Timaeus 81-89 and the r e c o m m e n d a t i o n of Hippocrates' m e t h o d , Phaedr. 269e ff. Cf. Lloyd (1991), esp. 403. Arist. at De resp. 480b23-30 a n d De sensu 436a17b l p o i n t s o u t that t h e m o r e a c c o m p l i s h e d p h i l o s o p h e r s c o n c l u d e with t h e principles of health a n d disease, whereas the m o r e sophisticated d o c t o r s say something about n a t u r e a n d derive their principles t h e r e f r o m . For Galen a n d the doxographic tradition, see infra pp. 61 ff. 78 Cf. Lib. Prop. p. 94.26 ff. Müller with Mansfeld (1994) 171 f.

terminological innovation (καινοτομία). 7 9 T h o s e who, like Chrysippus, are too obviously deviant to be thus enlisted are castigated for their sectarian contentiousness (φιλονεικία). T u r n i n g their back on the tradition, they have set u p philosophical sects of their own—an attitude which Galen puts down to m e g a l o m a n i a c lust for glory. Galen's own Platonism a n d Hippocratism shielded him f r o m the charge of contentiousness, since it marked him out as a true a d h e r e n t of the ancients while leaving ample room for innovations. 8 0 This orientation towards philosophical a n d cultural origins is not peculiar to Galen. Platonists such as Porphyry likewise appeal to what they call the 'old account', the παλαιός λόγος, i.e. the body of insights e n t e r t a i n e d by the m e n of old. 8 1 Galen too uses the expression π α λ α ι ό ς λόγος (or similar formulas) with r e f e r e n c e to his unitary tradition, or at least in its earlier stages. 82 What marks him out is his firm exclusion of pre-philosophical t h o u g h t a n d poetic myth. 8 3 Accordingly, h e d o e s n o t associate the π α λ α ι ό ς λόγος with any thinkers before Hippocrates a n d Plato. 84 Furthermore, he insists that 79 Similarly e.g. Plotinus, Enn. II 9.6.1, who associates καινοτομείν, ιδία φιλοσοφία a n d εξω τής αληθείας. 80 See Lloyd (1991), esp. 411 f. 81 See H a d o t (1987), esp. 23 ff., Dörrie (1967) esp. 406 f. O n the παλαιός λόγος a n d its epistemic value in Plato (e.g. Phae. 70c, Tim. 20c-d, 21a) see A n d r e s e n (1955) 111-14. T h e fact that the π α λ α ι ό ς λόγος of Tim. 20 c-d is also an α λ η θ ή ς λόγος appears to have stimulated the equation of the two notions by Platonists such as Celsus, who wrote an anti-Christian work entitled 'Αληθής λόγος, cf. Andresen (1955) 117. 82 PHP 2.8.20, 3.1.30, 4.3.3, 7.1.9; παλαιόν δόγμα or π α λ α ι ά δόξα, e.g. 4.6.31; 5.1.5, 8; 4.7; 4.6.30, 42; h e also speaks of οί παλαιοί, referring to Hippocrates and Plato but also Pythagoras, Aristotle a n d Theophrastus, see 4.2.44-3.1, 7.38 f., 5.2.2, 6.1.1-2, 2.3.12. In these passages Galen is bent on playing Chrysippus off against the ' t h e ancients'; the derogatory label typically used in c o n n e c t i o n with Chrysippus' divergence is φιλονεικία, see f u r t h e r De Lacy's Index n o m i n u m s.v. παλαιοί. 83 See esp. his reaction to Chrysippus' allegorical interpretation of the myth of A t h e n a ' s birth f r o m the crown of the h e a d of Zeus, q u o t e d 3.8.3-19 (SVF2.908). Having submitted an alternative i n t e r p r e t a t i o n c o n f o r m i n g with anatomical fact (ibid. 29-32), h e points o u t that allegoresis is n o substitute for scientific premises based on sense-perception and experience, and adduces Plato's rejection of allegoresis, Phaedr. 229d3-e4 (ibid. 33-37). O n the classification of poetic testimonies as rhetorical a n d unscientific see also PHP2.4.4, 3.2.18, 7.47. 84 See the passages referred to supra, n. 82; Pythagoras is an exception but it was Posidonius who m e n t i o n e d him as anticipating Plato's psychology; a n d Galen, t h o u g h citing this view of Posidonius with n o sign of disapproval, gives Pythagoras n o role to play in the rest of his a r g u m e n t ; see f u r t h e r pp. 77 f. T h e idealized vision of early man enjoying a larger share of insight—accepted by many Stoics (but cf. also PI. Phil. 16c-e, Pit. 272b-c), is absent f r o m Galen. In Galen the nearest we have to this idea would a p p e a r to b e his idyllic vignette of H i p p o c r a t e s a n d his entourage, AA III 2: II 346.15-347.2 Κ; IV 2: II 421.18-422.6, IV 4: II 439.18-440.3 K.;

tenets s h o u l d n o t be a c c e p t e d o n a u t h o r i t y b u t tested in i n d e p e n d e n t - m i n d e d r e s e a r c h . I n p r i n c i p l e , t h e d o c t r i n e s of Plato a n d H i p p o c r a t e s stand in n e e d of justification as well. 85 This position is also reflected in the classification of f o u r types of a r g u m e n t in b o o k s 2 a n d 3. H e r e ( u n t e s t e d ) r e f e r e n c e s to philos o p h e r s a n d o t h e r authorities are classed as rhetorical. Unlike b o t h d e m o n s t r a t i v e (apodeictic) a n d dialectical premises, they d o n o t p e r t a i n to actual f e a t u r e s of t h e subject u n d e r investigation a n d so are i n a p p r o p r i a t e to scientific discourse (2.3.8-11; 4.3-4). T h e use of e x p e r t authorities is aligned with t h e testimony of n o n - e x p e r t s like poets a n d with c o m m o n o p i n i o n . Galen cites with approval a view expressed by Plutarch in his Homeric Studies that the poets can be m a d e to speak in favour of all d o c t r i n e s (3.2.18, fr. 125 S a n d b a c h ) . 8 0 In books 2 a n d 3 h e r e p r i m a n d s Chrysippus f o r attaching i n d e p e n d e n t value to what classical p o e t s a n d o t h e r n o n - e x p e r t s say. Yet t h e r e is also a n o t h e r side to Galen's attitude which is particularly relevant to his a r g u m e n t in books 4 a n d 5. Galen also claims that the poets, if called u p o n , actually testify in favour Plato r a t h e r than the Stoics. 87 At 2.2.5 h e even envisages a contest to decide who—Plato or Chrysippus — h a s a majority of poetical a n d o t h e r n o n - e x p e r t testimonies o n his side. A n d when h e summarizes his a r g u m e n t in PHP at On the Affected Parts III 5, h e d o e s n o t fail to i n c l u d e a few lines of verse which l e n d s u p p o r t to Plato. O n e of t h e passages c o n c e r n e d — H o m e r ' s

IX 2: II 716.8-13 Κ O n Galen's Hippocratism see Lloyd (1991), Harig and Kollesch (1975). O n his Platonism see the preliminary survey by De Lacy (1972). 85 E.g. P H P 3 A . 3 1 (the intelligent person does not believe the mere statements of even the wisest m e n , but 'waits for the p r o o f ) ; Nat. Fac. Ill 10, SM III, p.231 Helm.; Hipp. Epid. II 27, p. 91 Wenkeback-Pfaff; QAM9, SM II, ch. 9 p.64.9 ff., with Walzer (1949b) 51; Lloyd (1988) 15. In this last tract, however, the appeal to authority in practice provides the main backing for his own positions; cf. also Lloyd (1988) 38. O n PHP see esp. Vegetti (1986) 236 ff., esp. 239 f. A similar attitude is sometimes a d o p t e d by authors such as Cicero, cf. ND 1.10, Luc. 8-9; 7'use. 5.83; cf. 4.7 (stating an eclectic attitude in terms closely similar to Galen, Lib. Prop. 1 p.94.26 ff.). Cicero was n o d o u b t inspired by such earlier Academics as Arcesilaus a n d Carneades, who could point to the spirit of o p e n - e n d e d debate to be f o u n d in Plato's Socratic dialogues; cf. Sedley (1989) 102. 86 Conversely, the a u t h o r of the ps.Plutarchean De Homero takes the fact that H o m e r has provided the 'seeds and starting points' for all philosophical schools as evidence of the poet's wisdom (B 92). In its present f o r m , this tract c a n n o t be by Plutarch himself but it may at least in part be based on a collection of material m a d e by Plutarch for his Homeric Studies and o t h e r works; see Kindstrand (1990) p. VIII; cf. Babut (1969) 162, who less plausibly suggests that Galen refers to the De Homero but is mistaken as to the title. 87 E.g. PHP 2.2.5, 3.3.1-2, 3.7.47, 3.8.37.

description of Tityos' p u n i s h m e n t in Hades (Od. 11.576-81)—serves as the finale of his proof c o n c e r n e d with the liver (PHP 6.8.77-83). Some theoretical p r o n o u n c e m e n t s at the e n d of book 5 f u r t h e r explain his attitude to the use of poetry in scientific, or philosophical, contexts (7.83-88). Having j u s t cited Rep. 441a, containing a quotation of Od. XX. 17, Galen is led to p r o n o u n c e on the p r o p e r use of witnesses like H o m e r which, he says, is exemplified by Plato. H e distinguishes (1) timing: o n e should n o t begin by calling u p o n witnesses but only do so after full proof has been delivered (cf. 3 8.35); (2) subject-matter: witnesses should n o t be called u p o n 'to testify a b o u t matters that are utterly o b s c u r e b u t e i t h e r a b o u t evident p h e n o m e n a or about things the indication (ενδειξις) 8 8 of which lies close to sense-perception' (84). T h e e m o t i o n s are a case in point. H e r e no e x t e n d e d or detailed proofs (αποδείξεων) are called for; a simple r e m i n d e r of what we e x p e r i e n c e (πάσχομεν) is adequate. 8 9 I n d e e d , the d i f f e r e n c e between the soul's powers as such (i.e. the Platonic tripartition) is obvious for all m e n (cf. p.358, 13, 29: ένάργειαν). 9 0 T h u s Plato q u o t e d H o m e r merely to illustrate the opposition between anger and reason; h e consistently r e f r a i n e d f r o m the quotation of verse with regard to their location, which is not obvious and so does not m e e t condition (2). 91 88

I.e. an inference which is not merely empirical, but proceeds from the 'actual n a t u r e of the thing', see MM II 7, X pp. 126-7 K„ Nat. Fac. II 9, II p. 124 K. Subfig. Emp. 1-2 Walzer. Cf. the c o n c e p t of indicative sign, which Sextus regards as the invention a n d hall-mark of dogmatic p h i l o s o p h e r s a n d rationalist physicians, M. VIII 154-6. Galen, Inst. Log. 11.1, p. 24 Kalbfleisch sharply differentiates between ενδειξις and άπόδειξις on the g r o u n d that the f o r m e r does n o t p r o c e e d by the rules of the syllogism. Pace De Lacy ad loc., the fact that c o n c e p t of ενδειξις at PHP 5.7.84 has its technical m e a n i n g is s u p p o r t e d by Galen's e x a m p l e of the bodily effects of the affections of the soul, e.g. the h e a r t ' s palpitation, which Galen considers an indication as to the location of some of the f u n c t i o n s of the soul: 2.7.17 ( n o t e p.154.32 ένδείξεται a n d the r e f e r e n c e to the h e a r t ' s natural—κατά φύσιν—state, ibid. 1.29); cf. PHP2.8.24; 3.1.26-33; 8.1.23. 89 T h e whole passage (7.83-84) is printed as Posidonius F 156 E.-K (cf. Τ 87). Yet the precise extent of the Posidonian reference must remain uncertain—except p e r h a p s for the point a b o u t o u r experiencing the passions immediately; Kidd ad F 156 (Vol. II (ii) 566-8) is strongly in favour of taking the whole passage as Posidonian. 90 7.86, p. 358.13 f. δια ... την ένάργειαν του πράγματος ουδείς εστίν δς ούχ οΰτω γιγνώσκει. 87, ρ. 358.20: τοΰτο ... άπαντες άνθρωποι γιγνώσκουσι... 91 Cf. 5.7.75-6. Galen does not say h e r e that Plato also q u o t e d H o m e r at the e n d of his a r g u m e n t : condition (1). But he probably takes him to satisfy this condition as well; cf. § 82. Note, however, that at 6.8.80 (on which see supra in text) Galen, c o n c l u d i n g his proof a b o u t the f u n c t i o n of the liver with a H o m e r i c quotation, clearly means to comply with condition (1) (cf. 77), but flouts condition (2), if the seat of the mind is considered unclear, as it is according to 5.7.87 (and many others

A well-established tradition of anti-Stoic polemic s o u g h t to prove the Stoics at variance with t h e c o m m o n notions, which they used as their 'natural criteria of t r u t h ' 9 2 in virtue of their clarity (ένάργεια) 9 3 An e x t a n t treatise d e d i c a t e d to this line of criticism is Plutarch's On the Common Notions Against the Stoics.94 C o m p a r i s o n is surely e n c o u r aged by Galen's discussion of the criterion of truth at 9.7.2-4, where h e aligns t h e Stoic c o m m o n n o t i o n s (κοιναί εννοιαι) with his own c o n c e p t of p h e n o m e n a evident to all m a n k i n d , which is also at issue at 5.7.84. 9 5 T h u s Chrysippus' s t a t e m e n t (4.5.6 = SVF I5.476, fifth text) that t h e a f f e c t i o n s move at r a n d o m (είκη), i.e. without a cause, is d e n o u n c e d as conflicting with the c o n c e p t i o n s (εννοιαι) of all men. 9 6 Galen c o n s i d e r s t h e fact in q u e s t i o n ( ' n o t h i n g h a p p e n s w i t h o u t a cause') logically obvious (ibid. 7). In PHP 4-5, t h e evident facts a b o u t m e n t a l life are for t h e most part a d d u c e d by Chrysippus. Evident, universal truth o b t r u d e s itself even on the m i n d s of those who try to deny it. T h u s Chrysippus (who gives Plato's arguments less t h a n their d u e 9 7 ) o f t e n c o n t r a d i c t s his professed d o c t r i n e by m a k i n g s t a t e m e n t s c o n s o n a n t with the teachings of Plato a n d Hippocrates. 9 8 Conversely, he c a n n o t p r o p o u n d his own d o c t r i n e without c o n t r a d i c t i n g his t r u e statements as well as the obvious facts. 9 9 T h e way clear a n d c o m m o n p e r c e p t i o n a n d selfpassages). H e n c e either only o n e of the conditions of 5.7.84 suffices or Galen is simply inconsistent; cf. also Loc. Aff. Ill 5, referred to supra in text. 92 So Alex. Aphr. Mixt. p. 218.10-21 (not in SVF). 93 O n clarity (ενάργεια) as characteristic of the c o m m o n conceptions cf. Alex. Mixt. pp. 217.32-218.1 Bruns (SVF2.473, p. 155.24-30) and ibid. p. 227.12-17 (SVF 2.475, p. 156.19-23); cf. ibid. 227.20-22; cf. Plut. Comm. Not. 1074B, 1079A, F. 94 On this treatise see Babut (1969a) 34 ff., Cherniss (1976) 397 ff., 622 ff 95 T h e Stoic c o n c e p t of ' c o m m o n notions' in the technical sense, which the Stoics saw as the 'seeds' of their system, is not co-extensive with c o m m o n opinion; cf. T o d d (1973), who takes a rather ( p e r h a p s too) restrictive view; cf. also Schian (1973) 134-74. But if t h e r e is a d i f f e r e n c e , it is b l u r r e d by the polemicists; cf. Cherniss (1976) 625 ff. 96 These conceptions are aligned with Aristotle a n d Plato, who are said to represent the 'ancient a c c o u n t ' (see supra, p. 40) a n d to reflect ' t h e n a t u r e of things' (4.5.7). 97 O n Chrysippus' reticence about Plato's doctrine see e.g. 4.1.15, 2.1, 3.6; his omission of an exposition of views and a r g u m e n t of o p p o n e n t s can be related to the principles of his dialectic as r e c o r d e d elsewhere, see e.g. SVF 3.271 with Tieleman (1996a) 140 f., 264 f. Galen's view that Chrysippus completely failed to engage with Plato is false, see e.g. 4.1.7-13, f e a t u r i n g Platonic terminology in an antiPlatonic a r g u m e n t . In such cases Galen seizes on the Platonic terms to argue that Chrysippus is supporting Plato instead of refuting him. 98 See PHP4.1.5, 1.14 (where note the term έπαμφοτερίζω); 2.28; 3.6, 4.1, 4.3, 4.38; 5.1.9, 4.8, 4.14. 99 E.g. 5.4.7-8, w h e r e n o t e also the relation with the παλαιόν δόγμα, which

c o n t r a d i c t i o n are linked h e r e is familiar f r o m Plutarch's On Common Notions too. 1 0 0 Plutarch also devoted a separate treatise to the e x p o s u r e of Chrys i p p e a n inconsistencies, t h e On Stoic Self-Contradictions.101 Indeed, Galen too c o n t e m p l a t e s m a k i n g Chrysippus the b u t t of a similar treatise (4.4.1). 1 0 2 Interestingly e n o u g h , h e presents an h o r s d'oeuvre: h e plays off Chrysippus' definition of desire (ορεξις) in the first b o o k On Affections against a n o t h e r o n e which was to be f o u n d b o t h in the sixth b o o k of his Generic Definitions103 a n d his On Conation (or: On Desire, Περί ορμής, ibid. 2). 1 0 4 We h e a r n o t h i n g a b o u t the orginal c o n t e x t of the latter definition, a n d the two works f r o m which they are taken are m e n t i o n e d n o w h e r e else in t h e Galenic corpus. It is t h e r e f o r e likely t h a t G a l e n draws h e r e u p o n a lost s p e c i m e n of t h e t r a d i t i o n of c o m p i l a t i o n s of Stoic self-contradictions. An a n a l o g o u s case is pres e n t e d by t h e solitary d e f i n i t i o n of r e a s o n f r o m C h r y s i p p u s ' On Reason (Περί λόγου, 5.3.1). 1 0 5 A related p o i n t of criticism raised by b o t h Plutarch 1 0 6 a n d Galen c o n c e r n s Greek usage. Chrysippus can only escape the c h a r g e of selfChrysippus, Galen says, s o u g h t to discredit, thereby misusing his own intelligence. F u r t h e r 5.1.8, 2.1; cf. 6.5.21; 4.2.44; 4.8; cf. 3.3.23 on the relation of poetic testimony to evident p h e n o m e n a , o n which see also supra in text. Cf. 5.1.10, w h e r e Chrysippus is said to r e f u t e himself a n d at t h e same time contradicts τα έναργώς φαινόμενα, taken u p at 11, p. 294.21 as τα π ά σ ι ν ά ν θ ρ ώ π ο ι ς έναργώς φαινομένα. 100 See esp. 4.4.38, 5.1.9, 4.8 a n d cf. Plut. De comm. not. 1068D, 1070E; 1062A-B; 1084D, with Cherniss (1976) 626, 629 f. 101 O n t h e n a t u r e of P l u t a r c h ' s treatise see esp. B a b u t (1969a) 24 ff. a n d Cherniss (1976) 369-406, w h o a r g u e s that a failure to a p p r e c i a t e t h e s e q u e n c e of t h o u g h t of t h e treatise has o f t e n led to an overestimation of Plutarch's d e p e n d e n c e on sources, w h e r e a s in fact his direct knowledge of Chrysippus' writings was intim a t e a n d extensive (p.396); cf. Babut (1969a) 235-38. O n the o t h e r h a n d , if Galen used a compilation, such a s o u r c e m u s t have b e e n available f o r Plutarch too. Still, c o m p a r i s o n with Galen is j u s t i f i a b l e a n d r e w a r d i n g in view of t h e t r a d i t i o n a l c o m p o n e n t in the works of both authors. 102 H e seems eventually to have written such a tract, see 8.1.47-48 a n d supra, n. 33. 103 έν έ'κτφ τών κατά γένος ορων, which must refer to a separate work r a t h e r than p e r t a i n i n g to what at 4.2.1 are called t h e όρισμοις τών γενικών παθών, ους πρώτους έξέθετο—i.e. t h e definitions p r e s e n t e d by Chrysippus in t h e first book On Affections. Cf. De Lacy ad 250.8, who, t b o u g h inclining to t h e alternative view, suggests as t h e s e p a r a t e work r e f e r r e d to t h e "Ορων τών προς Μητρόδωρον τών κατά γένος (six books), listed in D.L.'s Catalogue, see SVFII p.8.36; cf. SVF3, A p p e n d i x II, nr. XLI, where two o t h e r possible r e f e r e n c e s are m e n t i o n e d . 104 This work is, it seems, attested only o n e o t h e r time in a n c i e n t sources: see SVT"" III, App. II, nr. XL, w h e r e Von Arnim gives Epict. Diss. I 4.14, b u t omits o u r passage. 105 O n this work cf. SVF III, App. II, Nr. XXXIV. 106 See e.g. De comm. not. 1073. Cf. Cherniss (1976) 641.

contradiction if we take his words in a sense different from c o m m o n usage. Apparently, so Galen intimates, this is what Chrysippus expects us to do. This leads Galen to criticize his bad linguistic m a n n e r s in general (4.3.6-4.34; cf. 5.7.26-33). This traditional motif fits in with some of Galen's f u n d a m e n t a l intuitions about p r o p e r usage in scientific (and other) contexts: o n e should use ordinary Greek words (the συνήθεια τών Ελλήνων) in a consistent and unambiguous manner. 1 0 7 T h e r e is a characteristic grumble at 4.4.8 with respect to the sense of άλογον in Chrysippus: He could have avoided all these ambiguities, fabricated so inappropriately and contrary to Greek usage (6 τών 'Ελλήνων έ'θος), and made his argument exact and articulate in plain Greek words. Likewise, at 4.3.4: Right from the start one should avoid the kind of discourse that makes it necessary for one's audience to understand each word not in its usual meaning but according to certain other meanings. T h e polemical edge h e r e lies in the Stoics' claim that their concepts were firmly rooted in c o m m o n usage (cf. 4.4.15; 2.12 = SVF 3.462). With regard to introducing novel meanings, Galen warns us, the utmost restraint is due. In fact, it is justifiable only in those cases where c o m m o n parlance lacks a p r o p e r term. But even so, new terms should always be modelled on it. 108 Galen's remark that Chrysippus apparently expects us to take his words in a m e a n i n g diverging f r o m standard usage is striking. 1 0 9 It recalls the Stoic acceptance of 'misuse' (κατάχρησις) in its strong sense, i.e. not j u s t e x t e n d e d usage but ' t h e transference of a wordusage f r o m an object which is properly (κυρίως) signified to a n o t h e r object which has no p r o p e r n a m e (κύριον δνομα)'. 1 1 0 Galen n o d o u b t 107

O n Galen's views on language see Von Müller (1892) 84 ff., Manuli (1986), H a n k i n s o n (1994a), von Staden (1995b). 108 Cf. Morb. Temp. VII p.417 Κ. νόμος έστι κοινός άπασι τοις "Ελλησιν ών μεν αν εχωμεν ονόματα πραγμάτων παρά τοις πρεσβυτέρους είρημένα, χρήσθαι τούτοις, ών δ ' ούκ εχωμεν, ήτοι μεταφέρειν άπό τίνος ών εχομεν ή ποιεΐν αύτούς κατ' ά ν α λ ο γ ί α ν τινά τήν πρός τά κατωνομασμένα τών πραγμάτων ή καί κ α τ α χ ρ ή σ θ α ι τοις έφ' ετέρων κειμένοις. εξεστι μεν τω μηδέ φυλάττειν τά συνήθη τοις "Ελλησιν ... καί πολύ τοΰτ' εστι π α ρ ά τοις νεωτέροις ίατροΐς ώς άν μή παιδευθείσι τήν έν παισί παιδείαν... Cf. MM Χ ρ.55 Κ., PHP5.7.26 ff. I0fl It is r e p e a t e d at 4.3.5 with r e g a r d to Chrysipus' d e f i n i t i o n s of a p p e t i t i o n (ορεξις) a n d desire ( έπιθυμία) ; cf. infra, pp. 120 f. 110 Definition given by ps.Plut. De Homero Β 18; see Barwick (1957) 88-97, esp. 90 f., A t h e r t o n (1993) 162-7. Chrysippus wrote on ' Z e n o ' s correct usage of words' (Περί τού κυρίως κεχρήσθαι Ζήνων τοις όνόμασι, D.L. 7.122 = SVF3.617). This title

knows a b o u t a n d r e s p o n d s to this Stoic position. But it should also b e n o t e d that the principle f o u n d its way into the c o m m e n t a r y tradition at large. H e r e the appeal to i n c o r r e c t usage serves to resolve a p p a r e n t self-contradictions instead of h a m m e r i n g t h e m out. 1 1 1 I n d e e d , t h e p o l e m i c a l p r o c e d u r e of t r a c i n g ( a p p a r e n t ) inconsistencies in o n e a n d the same a u t h o r can also b e viewed as an application of the timeh o n o u r e d Homerum e Homero-rule in a polemical context. 1 1 2

5. Galen the Commentator This brings us to G a l e n ' s affiliations with the g e n r e of c o m m e n t a r y . Galen n o t only wrote c o m m e n t a r i e s himself 1 1 3 b u t also reflected o n exegetical principles a n d m e t h o d s involved in their c o m p o s i t i o n . It may b e worth o u r while to c o m p a r e his views in this a r e a with his p r o c e d u r e s in PHP4-b. T h o u g h n o t constituting a c o m m e n t a r y in the f o r m a l sense, these books, with their extensive q u o t a t i o n s , certainly b e a r comparison with the c o m m e n t a r y g e n r e .

suggests that Galen's c h a r g e was levelled at Z e n o in Chrysippus' time already. 111 Cf. e.g. Philo, De mut. nom. 11-14, P o r p h . In Cat. p.55.10-14 Busse with Whittaker (1992) 67 f., 73 f. Similarly P o r p h . ap. Simpl. In Cat. p.30.13-15 Kalbfleisch (= Fr. 220 Smith); cf. also H a d o t (1987) 19 ff. See Barwick (1957) 88-97; Runia (1988) 82-89, w h o traces t h e creative use of i n t e n t i o n a l κ α τ ά χ ρ η σ ι ς in t h e theological a r g u m e n t s of Philo; b u t cf. Whittaker (1992), esp. 70-1, w h o raises strong d o u b t s as to w h e t h e r t h e c o n c e p t ever f u n c t i o n e d in this sense outside Stoic circles. In t h e c o m m e n t a r y tradition t h e appeal to κατάχρησις was m a d e to h a r m o n i z e apparently conflicting passages in a u t h o r s such as Plato; cf. Whittaker (1987) 109 f. with furt h e r references. Likewise the s u p p o s e d unanimity of Plato a n d Aristotle was illustrated, cf. e.g. Alcin. Did. 25 with Whittaker (1989) 90 f.; cf. also Moraux (1986) 138 ff. 112 For G a l e n ' s k n o w l e d g e of this exegetical p r i n c i p l e see Dign. Puls. VIII p.958.6 ff. K , Hipp. Vict. pp. 183.15-184.2 H e l m r e i c h ; cf. Mansfeld (1994) 148 f. U3 p//f> a n t e d a t e s t h e m a j o r c o m m e n t a r i e s o n t h e Hippocratic treatises, t h o u g h h e may have b e g u n t h e c o m m e n t a r y o n t h e Aphorisms a n d h a d c o m p l e t e d at least two works o n H i p p o c r a t e s : On the Elements according to Hippocrates a n d On Hippocrates' Anatomy (lost), see De Lacy (1978) 55 f., 48, w h o shows that in PHP Galen q u o t e s f r o m t h e Hippocratic c o r p u s with less discrimination than in his later works. While a y o u n g m a n , Galen h a d written υ π ο μ ν ή μ α τ α o n logical works of Aristotle, T h e o p h r a s t u s a n d Chrysippus, see Lib. Prop. chs. 14-15, SM II p. 122.19 ff. Müller; cf. Ilberg (1897) 591 ft. O n υ π ο μ ν ή μ α τ α as collections of n o t e s n o t i n t e n d e d for publication see e.g. Hipp. Fract. Ill 32, XVIIIA, p. 529 Κ with Skydsgaard (1968) 107 ff. N o t e however that at 8.2.14, p.294.33 it refers at least to t h e p u b l i s h e d treatise Hipp. Elem. O n G a l e n ' s practices as a Hippocratic c o m m e n t a t o r see f u r t h e r Manuli (1984), Manetti-Roselli (1994), Mansfeld (1994) 131 ff. Cf. Sluiter (1995), Vallance (1999). At 6.8.76, Galen points to t h e d i f f e r e n c e between the selective p r o c e d u r e of PHP a n d t h e style of a r u n n i n g c o m m e n t a r y ; cf. 8.2.13, f o r which see infra, p. 49. For his selective p r o c e d u r e in regard to Chrysippus, cf. 3.1.3.

A c o m m e n t a r y , Galen a r g u e d in his (lost) On Exegesis (Περί έξηγήσεως), is n o t the place to test each t e n e t as to truth a n d to d e f e n d it against sophistic criticisms. Its p r o p e r goal ( σ κ ο π ό ς ) is r a t h e r to clarify what is unclear. 1 1 4 Clearly, the question of truth was raised by many o t h e r c o m m e n t a t o r s (including, in practice, Galen himself)· 1 1 5 Similarly, in his c o m m e n t a r y o n the third b o o k of the H i p p o c r a t i c Epidemics116 he criticizes those who c o n f u s e c o m m e n t a r y a n d instruction ( δ ι δ α σ κ α λ ί α ) . T h e latter is c o n c e r n e d with explaining the facts in a detailed a n d precise m a n n e r , whereas c o m m e n t a r i e s d o n o t provide p r o o f (άπόδειξις). But they d o p r e s u p p o s e it: the c o m m e n t a t o r brings to the Hippocratic texts a f r a m e w o r k of theories (θεωρήματα, p.22.20 W e n k e b a c h ) a n d c o n c l u s i o n s (συμπεράσματα, p.22.6 W.). T h e medical texts c o n t a i n i n g these are logically a n d chronologically p r i o r to the c o m m e n t a r i e s . T h e latter provide t h e c o n t e x t f o r t h e discovery (εϋρεσις) n o t of t r u t h , but of o p i n i o n (δόξα, p.22.13 f.). If Galen in his H i p p o c r a t i c c o m m e n t a r i e s d o e s advert to the question of t h e t r u t h of t h e d o c t r i n e s u n d e r discussion, this is b e c a u s e H i p p o c r a t e s e m b o d i e s his m e d i c a l ideal in all respects. Yet o n occasion he m e n t i o n s truth (but n o t proofs) as o n e of the two main goals of the exegete (i.e. alongside a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n c o n s o n a n t with the i n t e n t i o n s of the a u t h o r ) . 1 1 7 His r e m a r k s recall the t h r e e successive stages of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n (viz. of the Platonic dialogues) listed at D.L. 3.65: (1) the m e a n i n g of what is said; (2) the a u t h o r ' s intention in saying it (e.g. constructive, or in r e f u t a t i o n a n d ad hominem)·, (3) the correctness of what has b e e n said. 1 1 8 T h e first two stages were to b e c o m e s t a n d a r d in N e o p l a t o n i s t c o m m e n t a r i e s b u t can be traced back to at least the first century CE.119 In Neoplatonist exegesis, obviously, the second stage b l e n d s into the third o n e , Plato's philosophy

114 See esp. t h e p r o g r a m m a t i c s t a t e m e n t s in Hipp. Fract. XVIII.2 pp.318.1-22.2 K. s u m m a r i z i n g what h e h a d said in Iiis On Exegesis. Cf. Roselli (1990) 121, Barnes (1992) 271, Mansfeld (1994) 136 f., 149 ff. For the p r o c e d u r e of clarification see f u r t h e r Diff. resp. VII p.825.6-7; Hipp. Vict. pp. 183.15-184.2 Helmreich. 115 Cf. Hipp. Aph. XVII.2 pp. 561.4 ff. K. with Mansfeld (1994) 135 f. 116 Hipp. Epid. Ill, CMC V 10,2,1 p. 22 ff. Cf. D e i c h g r ä b e r (1930) 24, Manuli (1983) 476 f. 117 Hipp. Epid. Ill, p. 17.16-18 W e n k e b a c h ; cf. ibid. p.6.11, w h e r e the instruction into useful t h i n g s a p p e a r s instead of t r u t h w i t h o u t any real d i f f e r e n c e b e i n g implied; cf. Deichgräber (1930) 24. 118 Cf. Dörrie - Baltes (1993) 3, 169 f., 353 ff. 119 Cf. D ö r r i e - Baltes (1993) 3, 170, w h o trace t h e s c h e m e (which b e c a m e s t a n d a r d in N e o p l a t o n i s m ) back to Dionysius of Halicarnassus, De comp. verb. 3, II 4.6 f f , Ad Pomp. Gem. 2,13 II 230.13 ff. U.-R.; cf. Dionysius T h r a x ap. Sext. M I 59 (cf. ibid. 301), Gal. In Tim. p. 10.31 ff. Sehr.

r e p r e s e n t i n g truth. Clearly Galen is in a similar position in regard to Plato a n d H i p p o c r a t e s . In t h e case of Chrysippus a n d o t h e r o p p o n ents, m o r e o v e r , t h e test as to t r u t h o f t e n leads to negative results t h o u g h n o t invariably so. As to Chrysippus, Galen states a twofold p u r p o s e : first, to explicate his m e a n i n g ; secondly, to show how far h e is mistaken. 1 2 0 T h e a d d i t i o n , now a n d t h e n , of the question of t r u t h shows t h a t t h e r e is n o u n b r i d g e a b l e g a p s e p a r a t i n g c o m m e n t a r i e s a n d dialectical discussions involving t h e ipsissima verba of philosophers. So it should occasion little surprise to find Galen applying exegetical principles in philosophical contexts. T h e exegetical c o n c e r n with clarity o f t e n takes t h e guise of a c h a r g e of unclarity (ασάφεια). 1 2 1 This usually c o n c e r n s obscurity in malam partem—i.e. the intentional variety. But at times an o p a q u e passage of Chrysippus encapsulates a valuable e l e m e n t waiting to b e u n c o v e r e d by an insightful p e r s o n such as G a l e n . 1 2 2 In a d d i t i o n , we s h o u l d n o t e a few cases w h e r e Chrysippus is credited with clarity of expression (3.1.18, 5.38). A n o t h e r exegetical p r i n c i p l e relevant to o u r p u r p o s e s is that of selection. In PHP 4 a n d 5 Galen is quite explicit a b o u t his intention to limit himself to Chrysippus a m o n g t h e Stoics 1 2 3 a n d , within t h e c o m p a s s of t h e latter's work, to w h a t h e c o n s i d e r s his m a i n arguments. 1 2 4 This c o n f o r m s to his characterization of his p r o c e d u r e in his On the Elements According to Hippocrates, which is an exegesis of the Hippocratic On the Nature of Man: 120

See esp. 4.1.5, w h e r e G a l e n specifies as his aim as twofold: τήν γνώμην έρμηνεΰσαι τάνδρός [seil. Chrysippus; cf. (1) a n d (2)] ... οπ-η σφάλλεται δεικνύναι (cf. 3). 121 ρΗρ 2.5.54, 3.3.5,4.7, 4.8, 4.10, 4.4.8. Cf. also 2.3.1, where Galen refers to his 'clear a n d full' explanation in t h e On Demonstration of the ' r a t h e r unclear a n d b r i e f s t a t e m e n t s of t h e a n c i e n t s , i.e. in p a r t i c u l a r Aristotle in his Analytics. O n t h e clarification of what is unclear as o n e of Galen's exegetical principles see esp. Hipp. Fract. XVTIIB 318-19, 327-8 K., Diff. Resp. VII 825 ff. K. with Barnes (1992) 269 ff., Mansfeld (1994) 148 if. 122 2.5.71, 5.94 f. o n ibid. 69-70 (= SVF 2.898). Of course this kind of assistance to an a u t h o r w h o is thus shown to b e on the right track is even m o r e c o m m o n in the case of Plato a n d Hippocrates. O n Galen's m e t h o d of creative exegesis see also Mansfeld (1994) 155 ff. 123 P H P 4.1.3; 5.6.40-42. 124

Cf. 3.1.8: a l t h o u g h Galen, in c o n n e c t i o n with b o o k 2, speaks of a selection of Chrysippus' a r g u m e n t s o n t h e basis of their relative strength, it is clear that h e h a d i n t e n d e d to limit himself to this selection in b o o k 2 (3.1.6 ff.) a n d devote book 3 to an entirely d i f f e r e n t subject (apparently not involving Chrysippus). As it was, h e was c h a l l e n g e d by a Stoic to r e f u t e all C h r y s i p p u s ' a r g u m e n t s a n d this is what h e e m b a r k s u p o n in b o o k 3, this time following t h e o r d e r of t h e a r g u m e n t s as h e f o u n d t h e m in Chrysippus' text.

It d o e s n o t e x p l a i n e v e r y w o r d as w r i t e r s of e x e g e s e s c o m m o n l y d o ; r a t h e r it c o m m e n t s o n l y t h o s e s t a t e m e n t s w h i c h c o n t a i n t h e d o c t r i n e , a l o n g with t h e p r o o f s b e l o n g i n g with it ( P H P 8 . 2 . 1 3 ) .

This is c o n f i r m e d by a few passages f r o m PHP. At the b e g i n n i n g of book 3 Galen a n n o u n c e s that h e will treat those a r g u m e n t s of Chrysippus which h e h a d o m i t t e d f r o m b o o k 2 a n d would never have c o n s i d e r e d in b o o k 3 were it n o t for the fact that h e was challenged by an ' e m i n e n t sophist' to r e f u t e t h e m as well. In line with the same p r o c e d u r e as h e h a d followed with r e g a r d to the Hippocratic On the Nature of Man, Galen had initially c o n c e n t r a t e d o n what was strongest in the p r o o f p r e s e n t e d by Chrysippus in his On the Soul, that is to say o n t h e most i m p o r t a n t a r g u m e n t s (PHP 3.1.5-8). Similarly h e says that h e will c o n c e n t r a t e o n the m a i n points of Plato's a r g u m e n t in the f o u r t h book of the Republic, that is to say h e intends to q u o t e only those passages which h e believes c o n t a i n these highlights. Interestingly h e adds that everyone can easily read the full text for himself if h e so wishes (5.7.34). S o m e of the Stoic treatises exploited by Galen may have b e e n less accessible than Republic 4 a p p e a r s to have b e e n f r o m the passage j u s t r e f e r r e d to. But it seems d o u b t f u l that even the possibility of checking certain claims m a d e by Galen against the statem e n t s of Chrysippus or o t h e r Stoic scholarchs in their original contexts would have served as some g u a r a n t e e that Galen's presentation r e m a i n e d reasonably balanced. Galen's orientation towards the philosophical past (on which see § 3) tends to e n h a n c e the philological streak of PHP 4 a n d 5, with their extensive q u o t a t i o n s f r o m p h i l o s o p h e r s a n d poets. 1 2 5 In a sense, Galen is e n g a g e d in d e t e r m i n i n g , on the basis of his quotations, who b e l o n g s to t h e g r e a t tradition a n d who d o e s not. Real or a p p a r e n t discrepancies of d o c t r i n e a n d terminology are e x p l a i n e d or h a r m o nised; obscurities clarified; alleged misinterpretations set straight. 1 2 6 His t r e a t m e n t of Chrysippus, however devastating as to its conclusions, is p r e s e n t e d as a c o m p a r i s o n of his exact words with those of Plato a n d Hippocrates, i.e. an e x a m i n a t i o n of what the Stoic actually

125

O n this aspect of t h e work see esp. Vegetti (1986) 230 ff. Vegetti rightly points to G a l e n ' s selective p r o c e d u r e in citing texts, but his suggestion that Galen offers a kind of anthology for an a u d i e n c e — c o n s i s t i n g largely of practitioners of the τ έ χ ν α ι — w h o did not possess t h e original works themselves is at least in Plato's case incompatible with 5.7.34 (see in text). 126 O n e of t h e many g r u d g e s Galen bears against t h e m e m b e r s of t h e philosophical a n d medical sects of his day is that they m i s r e p r e s e n t what their f o u n d e r s actually said in their written works; cf. De Lacy (1972) 27.

wrote (4.1.3, 6; 5.6.40-2) a n d an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n or exegesis of his m e a n n g (τήν γνώμην έρμηνεΰσαι τάνδρός, ibid. 1.5, τήν ρήσιν έξηγησάμενος αύτοΰ, ibid. 1.15, 4.10). This exegetical style of philosophizing had developed u n d e r the i n f l u e n c e of such c o m m e n t a t o r s as A n d r o n i c u s of R h o d e s a n d Boethus of Sidon (first century BCE).127 Systematic philosophy was taught mainly on the basis of the major works of the great classical philosophers—Plato, Aristotle, Chrysippus. 1 2 8 Accordingly, authors wishing to make a philosophical point o f t e n did so t h r o u g h citation. 1 2 9 T h a t philosophical discussion could b e c o m e predominantly exegetical a p p e a r s f r o m those passages where Galen speaks of his dispute with o p p o n e n t s on obscure textual details. 130 Naturally e n o u g h , t h e n , philosophical polemic o f t e n took the form of criticism of the writings of the f o u n d e r (or most authoritative p h i l o s o p h e r ) of the school of o n e ' s o p p o n e n t s , who were thus involved in the attack without being separately or explicitly refuted. In the 2nd century CE Chrysippus was the recognized authority for Stoic doctrine; his treatises were still studied a n d used for teaching purposes in the Stoic schools. 131 In consequence, as we have seen, h e is singled out by Galen for criticism, just as he had been Plutarch's favourite butt (4.1.3; 5.6.40-42). 132 127 Seneca complained: 'quae philosophia fuit facta philologia est' (Ep. 108.23). For the philosophical a n d exegetical traditions of Later Antiquity in the light of educational practice (esp. the preliminary stage in the study of an a u t h o r ) see Mansfeld (1994); cf. also Gottschalk (1985) 65, H a d o t (1987) 14 ff. 128 Of course the c o m m i t m e n t of a school to the scriptures of o n e or m o r e f o u n d e r s was essential to its cohesion and survival; cf. Sedley (1989) 100. 129 C o m p a r e Seneca's homily against excessive reliance on quotations f r o m philosophical authorities (Ep. 33). According to Seneca, o n e can only acquaint oneself with great minds by studying their texts as a whole, not just a limited n u m b e r of highlights (4-6). Cf. also Iren. Adv. haeres. I 9.3-5, on which see also infra, p. 88 n. 97. Moreover, the use of their statements tends to come in the place of i n d e p e n d e n t t h o u g h t (7-9). But Seneca could be quite irreverent when he f o u n d the arguments of Z e n o a n d o t h e r scholarchs useless for moral progress; cf. Ep. 82.9; 83.9; Otio 3.1. 130 T h u s he quarelled with a Stoic on the correct m e a n i n g of the verb χωρεί in Zeno's syllogism c o n c e r n e d with spoken language (PHP2.5.22). So Galen decides to q u o t e and examine not only Zeno's original a r g u m e n t (ibid. 8) but also its m o r e elaborate versions by Diogenes of Babylon a n d Chrysippus (ibid. 9-13, 15-20), which prove his r e a d i n g of Z e n o ' s a r g u m e n t correct. Cf. also 3.4.12-13, w h e r e Galen reports on a difference of opinion between him and certain Stoics on the o n e h a n d a n d o t h e r Stoic i n t e r p r e t e r s on the o t h e r with respect to an obscure passage in Chrysippus' On the Soul. 131 O n the evidence (mostly f r o m Epictetus) that Chrysippus was the prime authority in Stoic circles of the time see Babut (1969a) 17-18; cf. Gould (1970) 12-14. 132 Cf. Babut (1969a) 19 f. Cherniss (1976) 397 f.

6. Galen's Working Method: The Selection of Texts Given t h e p a r t played in o u r study by s o u r c e analysis, it is worth c o n s i d e r i n g Galen's p r o c e d u r e f r o m a m o r e practical angle as well. How did h e actually go a b o u t c o m p o s i n g PHP books 4 a n d 5? This question r e q u i r e s an answer which takes a c c o u n t of what is known a b o u t t h e working m e t h o d s of a n c i e n t scholars. Explicit testimonies are however small in n u m b e r a n d in s o m e cases o p e n to d i f f e r e n t interpretations. Galen himself is o n e of o u r main sources in this area. In a d d i t i o n , s o m e e x t a n t papyri are silent witnesses to t h e stages followed in t h e process of c o m p o s i t i o n a n d h e n c e have a d d e d considerably to o u r knowledge. M o d e r n research has s u c c e e d e d in r e c o n s t r u c t i n g f r o m this d i s p a r a t e a n d sparse material a plausible picture of what authorial practice may have looked like. 133 Ancient a u t h o r s used a working m e t h o d which differs in i m p o r t a n t respects f r o m that of m o d e r n scholars. This d i f f e r e n c e is largely d u e to practical circumstances a n d constraints. Ancient scrolls were difficult to h a n d l e a n d less accessible than present-day books. Books were p r o d u c e d in small n u m b e r s . If o n e wished to r e f e r to a particular passage in the work of a n o t h e r a u t h o r , o n e served o n e ' s r e a d e r s b e t t e r by q u o t i n g it in full t h a n to give j u s t t h e r e f e r e n c e . It was i n c o n v e n i e n t to have to look u p each passage in the original work. A scholar did not write with a n u m b e r of scrolls spread out b e f o r e t h e m or having t h e m within reach. As a rule, he would first read a n d m a k e e x c e r p t s f r o m a fairly up-to-date s t a n d a r d work. Having worked it t h r o u g h , h e would move on to o t h e r relevant ones, both m o r e r e c e n t a n d o l d e r than t h e first o n e . H e would c o n t i n u e to m a k e excerpts b u t gradually h e would e x c e r p t less, only m a k i n g notes of what was d i f f e r e n t or new. 1 3 4 Accordingly Galen in PHP refers repeatedly to t h e p r o c e d u r e of e x c e r p t i n g ( ε κ λ έ γ ε ι ν ) t h e Stoic treatises by Chrysippus a n d Posidonius he has singled out f o r use. 1 3 5 A scholar did n o t always d o the e x c e r p t i n g himself. More o f t e n h e would dictate t h e selected passages to a slave, w h o collected t h e

13S p o r t | l e f 0 i i 0 W i n g ι d r a w on the researches by Dorandi (1991), with special reference to the important papyrological evidence, and id. (1993); see now also his m o r e comprehensive discussion in Dorandi (2000). In addition I f o u n d m u c h of use in Skydsgaard (1968) 101-16, who is c o n c e r n e d with Varro and other historians, Mejer (1978) 16 ff., who applies the results of Skydsgaard and others to Diogenes Laertius, as well as Van den Hoek (1996) (Clement of Alexandria). 134 See Skydsgaard (1968) 105. 135 PHP3.3.1, 2.18, 2.40; 4.6.47, 7.1.

e x c e r p t s o n a s e p a r a t e scroll. Alternatively, h e c o u l d m a r k t h e passages in the original text a n d h a n d it over to t h e scribe to d o t h e e x c e r p t i n g . T h e r e s u l t i n g c o l l e c t i o n s of e x c e r p t s c o n s t i t u t e d t h e material f o r a d r a f t o u t of which a publishable work could grow. An e x t a n t text of this kind is P h i l o d e m u s ' Academicorum philosophorum index Herculanensis ( ΡH 1012). W h a t we have h e r e is a disorderly collection of notes, m a n y of t h e m j o t t e d down in the m a r g i n s a n d even o n t h e back of t h e sheet. 1 3 6 T h e s e n o t e s are n o t only excerpts f r o m existing works b u t i n c l u d e i n t r o d u c t i o n s a n d t r a n s i t i o n a l c o m m e n t s — p o s s i b l y also d i c t a t e d — b y t h e a u t h o r of t h e work in progress. 1 3 7 Dictation seems to have b e e n c o m m o n , in particular d u r i n g t h e e a r l i e r stages of c o m p o s i t i o n . 1 3 8 G a l e n even r e p o r t s o n e n t i r e treatises h e dictated to a s t e n o g r a p h e r without going himself t h r o u g h the text o n a later occasion. 1 3 9 But in these cases the circumstances were u n u s u a l a n d led to a d e p a r t u r e f r o m regular p r o c e d u r e — w h i c h m a d e it worthy of m e n t i o n in t h e first place. Usually, his w o r k i n g m e t h o d passes w i t h o u t c o m m e n t . N o n e t h e l e s s , it surfaces in a few passages in his On My Own Books, f o r instance w h e r e h e says that h e h a d g e n e r o u s l y l e n t to f r i e n d s a n d p u p i l s n o t e s , o r n o t e b o o k s (υπομνήματα). 1 4 0 T h e s e were n o t i n t e n d e d for publication a n d so did n o t b e a r his n a m e . G a l e n c o m p l a i n s t h a t they w e r e stolen a n d p u b l i s h e d u n d e r o t h e r n a m e s a n d / o r u s e d by o t h e r s f o r t h e i r lectures. Nonetheless a n u m b e r of t h e m were r e t u r n e d to him so that h e could u n d e r t a k e their c o r r e c t i o n (διορθώσις) a n d provide t h e m with a title a n d his n a m e , t h u s a u t h o r i s i n g t h e views p r o f e s s e d in them. 1 4 1 Correction t h e n constituted the final stage of composition. 136

See D o r a n d i (1991) 15 ff. Cf. Plin. Ep. Ill 5.10-17 with D o r a n d i (1991) 14; cf. also 16 f. 138 Cf. Dorandi (1991), esp. 25., id. (2000) 51 ff. 139 See Wen. Sect. Er. XI pp. 19 f., 16 ff. K., Praev. 5.20-1. pp. 98 ff. with N u t t o n ad loc. Cf. also D o r a n d i (1991) 22. 140 O n the r a n g e of m e a n i n g of t h e term ύπομνήμα see esp. Skydsgaard (1968), esp. 110 f., D o r a n d i (1991), esp. 26 f. Galen, Hipp. Art. Ill 32, XVIIIA p.529 f. K. calls t h e s e c o n d b o o k of t h e H i p p o c r a t i c Epidemics a υ π ό μ ν η μ α as o p p o s e d to t h e first a n d third books ( ' σ υ γ γ ρ ά μ μ α τ α ' ) , whose m o r e polished state marks t h e m as finished p r o d u c t s i n t e n d e d for p u b l i c a d o n . Note, however, that f r o m t h e e n d of t h e Hellenistic p e r i o d onwards the term is also used f o r published treatises m a r k e d by a loose s t r u c t u r e . I n d e e d , s o m e a u t h o r s t h o u g h t t h e less p o l i s h e d style well suited to t h e i r subject-matter, e.g. p h i l o s o p h i c a l c o n t e m p l a t i o n , as C l e m e n t of Alexandria did, see Van d e n H o e k (1996) 225. 141 Lib. Prop. 1, p. 92.13 ff. Cf. ibid. 1, p.94.16 f., p.95.21 ff., 11. p . l 17.24 ff., p.118.13 f. Müller. See t h e discussion of these a n d o t h e r related testimonies in D o r a n d i (2000) 78 ff. 137

H o w f a r G a l e n ' s c o r r e c t i o n s w e n t will have d i f f e r e d in e a c h individual case. This seems clear f r o m a c o m p a r i s o n between e.g. his h i g h l y p o l i s h e d a u t o b i o g r a p h i c a l s h o w - p i e c e On Prognosis a n d m e d i c a l tracts of a m o r e technical k i n d which were less a m b i t i o u s f r o m a stylistic p o i n t of view. O n the whole Galen is n o t o r i o u s f o r his repetitiveness a n d incongruities of s t r u c t u r e — a n d large parts of PHP d o little to improve this reputation. 1 4 ' 2 T h e s e compositional flaws are at least to s o m e e x t e n t explicable o n t h e a s s u m p t i o n that Galen h a d d i c t a t e d his e x p o s i t i o n s — i n line with t h e w i d e s p r e a d p r a c t i c e we have j u s t n o t e d . In particular, his repetitiveness seems to be a m a r k of orality, especially w h e n t h e stage of d i c t a t i o n was n o t followed by r i g o r o u s editing. Presumably Galen did n o t always devote m u c h time to polishing his writings himself. H o w else, o n e may well ask, c o u l d h e have c o m p o s e d his p r o d i g i o u s o e u v r e while at t h e s a m e t i m e fulfilling his professional a n d social duties ? Let us take a closer look at t h e p r i n c i p l e , o r principles, which g o v e r n e d t h e selection of e x c e r p t s in t h e first stage of c o m p o s i t i o n . S o m e h e l p is provided by o n e of the key passages o n a n c i e n t m e t h o d s of c o m p o s i t i o n . T h i s t i m e it is n o t to b e f o u n d in G a l e n b u t in A m m o n i u s , On Aristotle's Categories 4.3-13 Busse: Of the general treatises [seil, by Aristotle] 1 4 3 some are syntagmatic (συνταγματικά), while others are hypomnêmatic (ύπομνηματικά). Hypomnêmatic are called those in which only main points are noted down; for one should know that in the past if one chose to compose a [publishable] treatise (συγγράψασθαι), 144 they recorded along main lines their individual findings which contributed to the demonstration of their thesis and they took many ideas from older books in order to strengthen those which were correct and to refute those which were not; in a later stage, however, bringing also a certain arrangement to their material and adorning it with beautiful expressions and stylistic elaboration they composed their treatises (συγγράμματα). And herein lies the difference between hypomnêmatic and syntagmatic treatises, viz. in order and beauty of expression. T h i s d e s c r i p t i o n , t h o u g h associated with t h e n a m e of Aristotle in particular, fits i n t o t h e g e n e r a l p i c t u r e we have s k e t c h e d , i n c l u d i n g t h e relevant s t a t e m e n t s of Galen. 1 4 5 A m m o n i u s c o n f i r m s that it was 142

O n t h e work's compositional flaws see De Lacy (1978-80) 51 ff. In t h e c o n t e x t A m m o n i u s p r e s e n t s a m a i n division of t h e Aristotelian treatises i n t o t h r e e classes, viz. g e n e r a l ( κ α θ ό λ ο υ ) , special ( μ ε ρ ι κ ά ) a n d interm e d i a t e (μεταξύ) 144 Cf. G a l e n ' s usage as q u o t e d supra, n. 140. 145 O n this a n d r e l a t e d t e s t i m o n i e s see now D o r a n d i (2000) 84 ff. Cf. also 143

n o t necessary f o r a n a n c i e n t a u t h o r to g o t h r o u g h b o t h stages of c o m p o s i t i o n ; t h e first c o u l d s u f f i c e — a s we have s e e n in G a l e n ' s case. 1 4 6 F u r t h e r m o r e , A m m o n i u s provides u s e f u l i n f o r m a t i o n conc e r n i n g t h e p r i n c i p l e of s e l e c t i o n of e x c e r p t s . C o n c e n t r a t i o n is f o c u s e d o n t h e m a i n thesis a l o n g with t h e p r o o f s b a c k i n g it u p . This b e a r s c o m p a r i s o n with w h a t G a l e n in PHP says a b o u t his p r e f e r r e d style of exegesis as p r a c t i s e d in his On the Elements according to Hippocrates (see above, p. 48 f.). By o u r s t a n d a r d s , a n c i e n t c o n v e n t i o n s of q u o t a t i o n p a i d little r e g a r d to c o n t e x t — w h e t h e r in p o l e m i c o r praise. As it was, m a n y b o o k s were r a r e a n d difficult to consult; h e n c e t h e n e e d to m a k e e x c e r p t s in t h e first place. Posidonius' On Affections, which plays such a p r o m i n e n t role in the attack l a u n c h e d by Galen against Chrysippus, was a case in p o i n t . T h i s treatise is r e f e r r e d to by G a l e n only. 1 4 7 Explicitly a t t e s t e d views of P o s i d o n i u s o n t h e a f f e c t i o n s o r o t h e r ethical subjects c o m e a l m o s t exclusively f r o m G a l e n . A few o t h e r s o u r c e s c o n t e m p o r a r y with o r later t h a n G a l e n , if they c h o o s e to m e n t i o n P o s i d o n i u s in c o n n e c t i o n with m o r a l topics at all, d o so in clusters of tenets, taken f r o m c o m p i l a t i o n s a n d n o t directly f r o m t h e original e x p o s i t i o n s of P o s i d o n i u s a n d t h e o t h e r p h i l o s o p h e r s conc e r n e d . 1 4 8 Later a u t h o r s such as Strabo, C l e o m e d e s a n d A l e x a n d e r of A p h r o d i s i a s treat P o s i d o n i u s as a t h i n k e r w h o was primarily k n o w n f o r his detailed investigations in such areas as m e t e o r o l o g y a n d geography. 1 4 9 His philosophical i n f l u e n c e in later antiquity has certainly b e e n overestimated, n o t least b e c a u s e of his p r o m i n e n c e in the PHP. T h e Stoics themselves at any r a t e d o n o t s e e m to have b e e n t o o impressed by Posidonius' alleged critique of Chrysippean psychology. G a l e n c o m p l a i n s t h a t P o s i d o n i u s ' a t t e m p t to assimilate Z e n o ' s

Lucian, On How History Should Be Written 47-8, with Skydsgaard (1968) 107 f. 146 As observed by D o r a n d i (1991) 29. 147 See Frs. 30-35 E.-K. 148 T h e r e l e v a n t m a t e r i a l f r o m G a l e n (mostly) a n d t h e s e o t h e r s o u r c e s is collected as Frs. 150-187 E.-K, i.e. in t h e section ' f r a g m e n t s n o t assigned to books'. P o s i d o n i u s a p p e a r s relatively o f t e n in t h e clusters of Stoic a u t h o r i t i e s a n d t h e i r treatises m e n t i o n e d in c o n n e c t i o n with a particular t e n e t by Diogenes Laërtius, see Edelstein-Kidd's i n d e x , vol. 1, p. 259. But obviously these r e f e r e n c e s d o n o t pres u p p o s e direct i n s p e c t i o n of t h e original treatises. D i o g e n e s Laërtius, m o r e o v e r , t h o u g h usually d a t e d to t h e 2 n d o r 3rd cent. CE., reflects t h e Hellenistic stage of a n c i e n t h i s t o r i o g r a p h y a n d c o n s e q u e n t l y reveals little to n o t h i n g a b o u t t h e standing e n j o y e d by P o s i d o n i u s in t h e I m p e r i a l era. See M e j e r (1978); cf. Mansfeld (1986) 300 ff. 149 Cf. t h e assessment by K. Algra, s.v. ' P o s i d o n i u s ' in t h e Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

position to that of t h e Platonists did n o t p r e v e n t 'nearly all o t h e r Stoics' f r o m clinging to Chrysippus' errors (4.4.38, Posid. Τ 59 E.-K.) a n d h e is even m o r e explicit a b o u t P o s i d o n i u s ' lack of i n f l u e n c e a m o n g later Stoics in his The Powers of the. Soul Follow the Temperaments of the Body (pp. 77.17-78.2 Müller ~ Posid. Τ 58 E.-K.). But if G a l e n s e e m s e x c e p t i o n a l in d r a w i n g o n o n e P o s i d o n i a n treatise in the original, this should not lead us to think of his project as historiographical a c c o r d i n g to present-day standards. H e does n o t seem to have consulted any o t h e r works of Posidonius. Conspicuously a b s e n t is a n o t h e r treatise of direct relevance to the issues raised in PHP—Posidonius' On the Soul, in at least t h r e e books. 1 5 0 It is difficult to decide w h e t h e r Galen was simply u n a b l e to take hold of a copy or had some less i n n o c e n t reason to omit any m e n t i o n of this treatise. 1 5 1 Likewise Galen, while r e f e r r i n g to books 1, 2 a n d 4 of Chrysippus' On Affections, is silent o n its t h i r d book. 1 5 2 His r e m a r k c o n c e r n i n g the length of each of the f o u r books On Affections (5.6.44) suggests that he h a d seen t h e m all. Why h e used t h e o t h e r t h r e e is n o t so difficult to see. T h e first b o o k c o n t a i n e d an exposition a n d exegesis of Z e n o ' s d e f i n i t i o n s a n d was f u n d a m e n t a l . T h e s e c o n d was m o r e a p o r e t i c , dealing as it did with ill-explicable p h e n o m e n a , a n d so was useful as a quarry for self-contradictions a n d admissions of the truth on Chrysippus' part. T h e f o u r t h , separately entitled the Therapeutiken, seems to have b e e n a rather p o p u l a r guide in m o r a l self-improvement. 1 5 3 Chrysippus' standing a m o n g the Stoics of the first two centuries CE e n s u r e d his role as the favourite target of critics such as Plutarch a n d A l e x a n d e r of Aphrodisias. By this time, it seems, his treatises h a d almost completely eclipsed those of Z e n o a n d Cleanthes. Galen too c o n c e n t r a t e s o n Chrysippus, as h e explicitly a n n o u n c e s (4.1.3). But, as we have seen (chs. 1.5, 2), this d o e s n o t prevent him f r o m m a k i n g c o n f i d e n t a n d far-reaching claims a b o u t Z e n o a n d Cleanthes, telling us t h a t C h r y s i p p u s ' i m m e d i a t e p r e d e c e s s o r s h a d a c c e p t e d n o n 150

See Posid. Frs. 28a-b E.K. Cf. Mansfeld (1991) 122 f., 136 f., who notes t h e striking contrast with Galen's extensive dealings with Chrysippus' On the Soul. 151 T h e f r a g m e n t s of this treatise (see previous n.) as well as F 21 (D.L. 7.138) strongly indicate that Posidonius followed Chrysippus a n d his o t h e r predecessors in taking t h e soul's substance to be pneuma a n d assigning n o role to t h e nerves. See f u r t h e r , supra p. 36 f. 152 C o m p a r e G a l e n ' s c o m p l e t e silence on t h e first of t h e two books of Chrysippus' On the Soul, even t h o u g h h e inserts a g r e a t n u m b e r of q u o t a t i o n s (some of t h e m extensive) f r o m t h e second half of its second b o o k in PHP books 2 a n d 3; cf. supra, pp. 12 ff. 153 See infra, p. 141.

r a t i o n a l f a c t o r s in t h e soul a n d i n d e e d t h e full-fledged Platonic tripartition. 1 5 4 T h e only textual s u p p o r t — t a k e n by Galen f r o m Posidonius—consists of a versified d i a l o g u e between a n g e r a n d reason c o m p o s e d by C l e a n t h e s (5.6.35 ~ SVF 1.570). But it is d o u b t f u l w h e t h e r this proves that C l e a n t h e s h a d subscribed to s o m e f o r m of psychological d u a l i s m at o d d s with C h r y s i p p u s ' position. 1 5 5 As to Z e n o , G a l e n excuses himself o n g r o u n d s of lack of space f o r n o t p r o d u c i n g a separate proof-text in his case; that is to say, h e admits to n o t having l o o k e d u p Z e n o ' s position in an original treatise of his (ibid. 40-2). 156 We should now try to derive some conclusions f r o m this picture of G a l e n ' s w o r k i n g m e t h o d . First, we are to a g r e a t e r e x t e n t t h a n we m i g h t like at the mercy of Galen as to what h e considers i m p o r t a n t in an a u t h o r a n d h e n c e suitable f o r inclusion in his discussion. A n e a t illustration of this fact is the a r r a n g e m e n t of subject-matter over PHP books 2 a n d 3. W h e r e a s Galen, as we have seen (see supra in text), says that h e has selected a n d discussed the most i m p o r t a n t a r g u m e n t s of Chrysippus in b o o k 2 (e.g. t h e c e l e b r a t e d a r g u m e n t f r o m spoken language, 2.5), it is the q u o t a t i o n s p r e s e n t e d in the first two c h a p t e r s of b o o k 3 which reveal a few crucial facts a b o u t the line of a p p r o a c h followed by Chrysippus, especially as c o n c e r n s the status a c c o r d e d to n o n - e x p e r t witnesses—one of the main targets of Galen's criticism. 1 5 7 Marginal points, m i n o r concessions, r e m a r k s o n the difficulty of t h e p r o b l e m u n d e r discussion—all such cases could be easily exploited by skillful polemicists such as Galen (cf. Plutarch in his On Stoic SelfContradictions). N o n e t h e l e s s t h e r e may have b e e n certain factors which may, at least to s o m e extent, c u r b e d t h e t e n d e n c y to irresponsible m a n i p u l a tion. Galen took part in oral d e b a t e s with his Stoic c o n t e m p o r a r i e s on the questions at issue in PHP. Substantial sections may be taken to reflect these discussions. In c o n s e q u e n c e , Galen may be e x p e c t e d to r e s p o n d to those a r g u m e n t s of Chrysippus a n d o t h e r Stoics which their followers still f o u n d p o w e r f u l e n o u g h to use. T h u s t h e argum e n t f r o m s p e e c h was used by m a n y Stoics as o n e of their t r u m p -

154 5.6.33, 36 (Zeno and Cleanthes accepted the Platonic postulate of a παθητικόν in the soul, a point which Galen says had already been made by Posidonius); cf. ibid. 6.42, 8.1.15 (the Platonic tripartition). 155 On this passage, see further infra, p. 264 ff. 156 On this startling passage, see supra, p. infra, pp. 85 f. 157 See further Tieleman (1996a).

c a r d s in t h e d e b a t e o n t h e seat of t h e soul. In c o n s e q u e n c e , it p r o m p t s an extensive r e f u t a t i o n o n Galen's part. 1 5 8 T h e preliminary stage of r e a d i n g a n d e x c e r p t i n g described above s h o u l d warn us n o t to b e t o o quick in positing o n e m a i n source. M o r e o f t e n t h a n not, t h e situation is c o m p l e x . T h e s a m e original could reach an a u t h o r by m o r e than o n e way. An a u t h o r could first c o m e across a n d e x c e r p t a q u o t a t i o n f r o m X in a work by Y h e h a d c h o s e n to r e a d first of all. L a t e r h e c o u l d d e c i d e to e x p a n d a n d d e e p e n his r e a d i n g by t u r n i n g to the original exposition of X a n d cull f r o m it m o r e excerpts which s u p p l e m e n t e d that drawn earlier f r o m Y. T h e r e is thus n o t h i n g u n u s u a l a b o u t an a u t h o r using the same sources b o t h directly a n d indirectly. 1 5 9 This is c o n f i r m e d by a few passages in PHP books 4 a n d 5. O n o n e occasion Galen fabricates a c o n t r a d i c t i o n between definitions in Chrysippus' On Affections a n d two o t h e r works. T h e definitions f r o m these two o t h e r works (which a r e m e n t i o n e d n o w h e r e else in t h e Galenic c o r p u s ) are n o d o u b t derived f r o m an a d d i t i o n a l s o u r c e . A n d , I would suggest, G a l e n f o u n d t h e m played off against the definition f r o m the On Affections in the same source as well. 160 Likewise, his i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t Chrysippus' On Affections may in s o m e passages be derived f r o m Posidonius' work of t h e same title even if Galen h a d also read the f o r m e r work directly himself a n d is drawing u p o n it on o t h e r occasions in PHP. This f e a t u r e will be of relevance o n c e we take a closer look at Galen's use of Posidonius in discussing the Chrysippean doctrine a n d text. T h e a n c i e n t practice of e x c e r p t i n g m a k e s it all too likely t h a t passages were q u o t e d o u t of context. T h e n u m b e r of collected excerpts is limited in principle a n d o n e could n o t easily, or at any rate o f t e n did not, check t h e original context. Moreover, collections of excerpts were o f t e n used some time after they h a d b e e n compiled. By that time the original reason why passages h a d b e e n e x c e r p t e d might have b e e n f o r g o t t e n . In c o n s e q u e n c e , s o m e were used for d i f f e r e n t p u r p o s e s which h a d little to d o with their original context. At PHP 6.2.7 we have an instance of an e x c e r p t b e i n g used in such a way. H e r e Galen p r o d u c e s Timaeus 77b3 f. as evidence that Plato spoke of ' f o r m s ' (ε'ιδη) r a t h e r than 'powers' (δυνάμεις) with r e f e r e n c e to the soul. However, this q u o t a t i o n d o e s n o t d o this duty particularly well,

158 159 159 160

See esp. PHP2.5.7, 22, 3.1.8. Cf. Gal. Hipp. Epid. I, p. 43.21 ff. W„ Hipp. O f f . Med. Ill 22, XVIIIB p.863 K. Cf. Skydsgaard (1968) 105; Mejer (1978) 18 f. See supra, p. 44.

while constituting a clear illustration of the central thesis d e f e n d e d by Galen in PHP 6, viz. that the liver is the seat of desire. We need not d o u b t that it was first excerpted for this purpose when book 6 was projected. In sum, the a n c i e n t m e t h o d of c o m p o s i n g treatises like PHP involves a fair a m o u n t of selectivity and makes it highly likely that the original context of quoted passages is lost sight off. In addition Galen is seen to be selective when it comes to choosing Stoic treatises or individual b o o k s — t h e r e are striking a n d u n e x p l a i n e d omissions, which may be related to the limited availability of certain works or books. Add these facts to Galen's polemical style and motives and it becomes clear that we should expect grave distortions of Chrysippus' original a r g u m e n t . O n the o t h e r h a n d , Galen could not, i n d e e d would not, leave undiscussed those doctrines a n d a r g u m e n t s that were believed to be distinctive of the Stoic position a n d were still cited by the Stoics. Thus in regard to Chrysippus' On Affections, Galen singles o u t for criticism the central thesis that the affections are j u d g e m e n t s and some of the main arguments supporting it (PHP4.2 ff.). H e r e not his selection of material but interpretation of it may entail distortion f r o m a present-day historiographical point of view. But when Galen proceeds to argue that Zeno and Cleanthes had said something significantly different f r o m Chrysippus, it is the textual evidence again which seems very slim indeed. No original expositions by Zeno and Cleanthes have been used.

7. Conclusion This c h a p t e r sets the stage for o u r detailed t r e a t m e n t of Galen's quotations f r o m Chrysippus' On Affections (chs. 3-5). T o this e n d I have sketched his overall aims and m e t h o d s in the light of the traditions to which he is indebted. I have considered the general contents of PHP books 4-5 and their place in the structure of the treatise as a whole ( § 1 ) ; the philosophical and scholastic backdrop (§ 2-3); the polemical and exegetical literary traditions (§ 4-5) as well as Galen's technique of excerpting (§ 6). It is difficult, and probably pointless, to assign PHP 4-5 to a single g e n r e m a r k e d by a specific set of rules. Galen was a many-sided author, who practised various genres. So it is n o t surprising to see that elements f r o m various genres a n d traditions are traceable in

these pages. T h e different genres themselves were not self-contained entities but may overlap and interact. Thus, as we have noticed, the ways in which he responded to the text of Chrysippus and others also owes something to his work as a c o m m e n t a t o r , in particular his m e t h o d of creative exegesis (§ 5). In criticizing Chrysippus Galen provides himself with the context for developing positive doctrines (cf. also § 4). Particularly important in this respect are those Chrysippean passages which according to Galen point to an irrational e l e m e n t in the mind alongside a rational one. T h u s he not only chides Chrysippus for denying this obvious truth but isolates useful insights, e.g. by clarifying what the Stoic said obscurely. In studying the Stoic fragments we should therefore be prepared to face a large degree of distortion from a present-day historiographical point of view. This is not so much a matter of low professional morals as of different conventions when it comes to dealing with texts. We shall encounter similar instances of creative exegesis in Galen's attribution of Platonic and Aristotelian ideas to Zeno, Cleanthes and Posidonius (chs. 2.8, 5.6, 5 passim).^ Of particular interest for our purposes is the fact that Galen follows procedures distinctive of later ancient philosophical literature. He is unmistakably indebted to the same tradition of Platonist scholasticism as is reflected by such authors as Clement, Porphyry, Alcinous, particularly where the essence/attributes and e s s e n c e / powers distinctions are c o n c e r n e d . His d o d g i n g of the parts vs. powers issue, moreover, could be related to current debates between Peripatetics and Platonists as well as among the Platonists themselves

(§2). Further, Galen used, and expected others to use, the m e t h o d of division (διαίρεσις) of available options in any given debate. This practice is related to his use of schémas, some of which can be paralleled from the relevant sections in extant doxographic texts. It is a fair assumption that such schémas determined the expectations an a u t h o r like Galen b r o u g h t to the original expositions (§ 3). In addition the actual mode of composition of treatises encouraged a disregard for the original context of passages borrowed from other sources (§ 7). O u r survey points to an intricate interplay between memory, intermediate sources, direct consultation of texts, and note181

Cf. also his ascription of t h e Platonic tripartition-cum-trilocation to H i p p o crates a n d t h e interpretative effort r e q u i r e d by this move in PHP books 1-3 a n d 6; see also supra, p. 39.

taking. Galen's use of a limited n u m b e r of options a n d authorities can be related to his projection into the past of a tradition of good philosophy and science (§ 4). T h e traditional ways in which the views themselves were phrased a n d assigned to authorities should also be studied against the b a c k d r o p of d o x o g r a p h i c literature. Given the i m p o r t a n c e a n d complexity of the relevant evidence, the next c h a p t e r is entirely devoted to the d o x o g r a p h i c tradition c o n c e r n e d with the parts of the soul.

CHAPTER T W O

DOXOGRAPHY

1. Galen and the Placita T h e t e r m ' d o x o g r a p h e r ' is a m o d e r n coinage. 1 Its Latin c o u n t e r p a r t ' d o x o g r a p h u s ' was first used by H e r m a n n Diels in his m o n u m e n t a l Doxographi Graeci ( p u b l i s h e d in 1879) with r e f e r e n c e to ps.Plutarch's Placita, p s . G a l e n ' s Historia philosopha a n d c o g n a t e abstracts to b e f o u n d in S t o b a e u s ' Eclogae physicae as well as T h e o d o r e t ' s Graecarum affectionum curatio. T h e s e , t h e n , a r e e x t a n t s p e c i m e n s of t h e ' d o x o g r a p h i c ' tradition r e c o n s t r u c t e d , at least in its m a i n outlines, by Diels a n d traced back to T h e o p h r a s t u s ' Physical Opinions,2 It was typical of Diels' style of working to p i n p o i n t milestones o n t h e way along which t h e doxai were t r a n s m i t t e d . T h u s Diels p l a c e d m u c h e m p h a s i s o n specific sources such as T h e o p h r a s t u s , Aëtius a n d , s o m e w h e r e halfway b e t w e e n t h e m (first c e n t , BCE), a work h e called t h e Vetusta Placita, reflected by passages in Cicero a n d Varro {ap. C e n s o r i n u s ) . In w h a t follows I shall speak of t h e Placita t r a d i t i o n to d e s i g n a t e t h e family of texts f e a t u r i n g in Diels' work. At face value, t h e a p p e l l a t i o n ' d o x o g r a p h y ' seems quite a p p o s i t e f o r t h e s e j e j u n e c o m p i l a t i o n s of physical t e n e t s labelled with t h e n a m e s of authorities a n d a r r a n g e d a c c o r d i n g to traditional questiontypes. 3 In antiquity such c o m p i l a t i o n s were used by a great variety of a u t h o r s with d i f f e r e n t axes to grind. S o m e drew f r o m t h e m preliminary overviews of available o p t i o n s in the c o n t e x t of a systematic treatm e n t of a particular issue. O t h e r s used t h e m to create, in a Sceptical 1

O n the origin, use a n d abuse of the term see Mansfeld & Runia (1997) 101 f. Cf. also Mejer (1978) 81 ff. 2 T h e details of this reconstruction n e e d not concern us here. Diels' reconstruction of the Placita tradition as set o u t in the labyrinthine Prolegomena of the D. G. is conveniently summarized by Runia (1989) 245 ff. O n the origins of Diels' theory see Mansfeld a n d Runia (1997) ch. 1 . 3 But note that the text of Diels' reconstructed Aëtius has preserved objections a n d traces of objections to a small n u m b e r of the tenets. T h e s e t h e n must have b e e n a f e a t u r e of the collection at an earlier stage of its transmission; cf. Mansfeld (1990b) 3206 ff. (= XIII 2: 'Dialectic in Aëtius'). Galen attests to the dialectical use to which doxographic texts put, see infra in text.

vein, a s t a l e m a t e b e t w e e n c o m p e t i n g d o c t r i n e s . This last possibility was facilitated by the a r r a n g e m e n t of t h e tenets to be f o u n d in m a n y sections. O f t e n a m a i n o p p o s i t i o n is p r e s e n t e d b e t w e e n two schools of t h o u g h t , followed by f u r t h e r divisions a n d r e f i n e m e n t s within each of t h e two camps. O f t e n this diaeretic p a t t e r n is c o u n t e r b a l a n c e d by i n t e r m e d i a t e o r c o m p r o m i s e positions. 4 This schematization, with its stress o n tenets r a t h e r t h a n n a m e s , 5 inevitably entailed distortions of t h e original d o c t r i n e s . P h i l o s o p h e r s (or physicians) a r e m o r e o v e r m a d e to p r o n o u n c e o n issues which arose w h e n they were long d e a d ; f o r e x a m p l e , ' H i p p o c r a t e s ' a n d several Presocratics are c r e d i t e d with views o n t h e seat of t h e ' r e g e n t p a r t of t h e s o u l ' in its o r i g i n a l Hellenistic sense (e.g. Aët. Plac. IV 5). 6 G a l e n was o n e a m o n g m a n y a u t h o r s w h o knew a n d u s e d t h e Placita tradition. A key text in this c o n n e c t i o n is On the Affected Parts III 5 (VIII, p. 157.3 ff. K.). 7 H e r e G a l e n c h a r g e s t h e P n e u m a t i s t physician A r c h i g e n e s of A p a m e a (flor. c. 100-120 CE) with contradicting himself in r e g a r d to m e n t a l afflictions a n d diseases: h e believed t h e h e a r t to b e t h e a f f e c t e d p a r t b u t at t h e s a m e time p r e s c r i b e d treating t h e h e a d . 8 Archigenes, Galen claims, t h u s neglects the many s t a t e m e n t s (or a r g u m e n t s , λόγοι) a b o u t the r e g e n t part which are t h e s u b j e c t of dialectical d e b a t e ( δ ι α λ ε κ τ ι κ ώ ς ερωτηθέντες, 157.17-18) a n d which indicate (ένδεικνύμενοι, 158.1) that m e n t a l disease should b e c u r e d by t e n d i n g to t h e h e a r t . T h u s , A r c h i g e n e s unjustifiably i g n o r e s t h e c a r d i o c e n t r i c view as o n e of t h e o p t i o n s which a r e at stake in this dialectical d e b a t e . 9 T h a t t h e o p t i o n s at issue b e l o n g to what we today r e f e r to as t h e Placita tradition b e c o m e s a p p a r e n t f r o m G a l e n ' s s u b s e q u e n t discussion. Dogmatists like A r c h i g e n e s , h e c o m p l a i n s , cling to u n t e n a b l e positions b e c a u s e of t h e i r a s s u m p t i o n that t h e whole body of tenets

4

Cf. supra, pp. 34 f. Cf. the c o m m e n t s o n tenets and 'labels' by Mansfeld (1990b) 3058. 6 This is merely c o n f i r m e d by the Aristotelian anticipations (esp. PA Γ 4) pointed o u t by Mansfeld (1990b) 3212 ff. T h e opposition between Aristotle a n d Plato may have originally stimulated the inclusion of a separate section on this issue. For a relatively early Hellenistic witness, see Chrys. ap. Gal. P / / P 3.1.10-15 ( SVF 2.885) with Mansfeld (1990b) 3167 ff., who speaks in this c o n n e c t i o n of the 'Vetustissima Placita', thus capping Diels' 'Vetusta Placita'. 7 For what follows cf. the survey by Mansfeld (1990b) 3141-43. 8 For the same point m a d e against Pneumatist doctors a n d others, cf. MM XIII, X 928.2-932.17 K. with Mansfeld (1990b) n. 225 with text thereto. 9 For a similar criticism as levelled at Chrysippus, see PHP 3.1.20 ff., 4.1.15 f. a n d cf. supra, p. 43 n. 97. 5

(δόγματα) of t h e i r school o r sect will b e wrecked by t h e a b a n d o n m e n t of a single o n e of t h e m . This a s s u m p t i o n is foolish, since many of the tenets involved are n o t mutually consistent, so these dogmatists may give t h e m u p without betraying their sect as a whole. T h e seat of the soul's leading part is a case in point. W h e t h e r o n e locates it in the b r a i n o r t h e h e a r t , 1 0 o n e is f r e e to o p t f o r various tenets o n o t h e r physical q u e s t i o n s w i t h o u t r u n n i n g i n t o inconsistencies. Such questions i n c l u d e g e n e r a t i o n a n d decay, t h e soul's substance, t h e gods, t h e creation of the world a n d still o t h e r s (ibid. 158.14-159.9). T h e s e questions, like that of t h e seat of t h e r e g e n t part, all c o r r e s p o n d to c h a p t e r s in t h e Aëtian Planta,11 as d o e s t h e m o d e of f o r m u l a t i o n in terms of polarities (e.g. 'Is t h e world c r e a t e d or n o t ? ' ) . T h e fact that Galen separates topics which have b e e n c o m b i n e d in Aëtius suggests that his i n f o r m a t i o n derives f r o m a fuller version of the Planta, which devoted separate c h a p t e r s to these topics. 1 2 I shall revert to this p o i n t in d u e course. G a l e n ' s r e f e r e n c e to dialectical d e b a t e s a f f o r d s a r a r e glimpse of what may be called the Sitz im, Leben of d o x o g r a p h i c compilations. It is a fair assumption that this type of d e b a t e , with its traditional s c h e m e s of o p p o s i n g tenets, is r e f l e c t e d by t h e relevant b o o k s of PHP, to which h e r e f e r s in t h e following c o n t e x t (159.15-16). 1 3 It is noteworthy that h e links these s c h e m e s to what h e calls the 'rational (or dogmatist) m e t h o d ' (της λογικής οδού, 158.7), thus u n d e r l i n i n g their i m p o r t a n c e f o r his m e t h o d o l o g y , notably t h e p r o c e d u r e of m a k i n g an a c c u r a t e division of relevant d o c t r i n e s w h e n o n e starts an inquiry. A r c h i g e n e s flouts this p r o c e d u r e , j u s t as Chrysippus fails to draw u p a c o m p l e t e diaeresis at t h e o u t s e t of his On Affections or to apply his own i m p e c c a b l e diaeresis in the On the Soul,14 10

I.e. t h e m a i n diaeresis of Aët. Plac. IV 5 a n d t h e relevant passages in related sources; cf. Mansfeld (1990b) 3092 ff. Cf. UP I p.15.2 f. H e l m r e i c h , reflecting t h e same d o x o g r a p h i c schema; cf. Mansfeld (1990b) 3094 n.143. 11 Cf. Aët. Plac. IV 5 (seat of t h e r e g e n t p a r t ) ; I 24 ( g e n e r a t i o n a n d decay), IV 23 (the soul's s u b s t a n c e ) , I 7 (gods), II 4 (creation of t h e world), a n d f o r a full a n d detailed c o m p a r i s o n Mansfeld (1990b) 3142. Against Mansfeld, N u t t o n (1999) 142 f. a r g u e s that ' t h e r e is n o reason to think that Galen was h e r e relying directly on a h a n d b o o k to o r g a n i s e his t h o u g h t s ' . But w h a t M a n s f e l d m e a n s is r a t h e r t h a t a u t h o r s such as Galen were so familiar with the d o x o g r a p h i c tradition that they did n o t n e e d to look u p things every time. 12 As observed by Mansfeld (1990) 3142. 13 Cf. also PHP 2.8.47 f., w h e r e h e uses a l e m m a a b o u t t h e soul's s u b s t a n c e derived f r o m t h e P/««7a-tradition: cf. Aët. Plac. IV 3.3, 14 with Mansfeld (1990b) 3073 n. 48. 14 See 4.1.14 ff„ 3.1.20 ff. Cf. also 5.3.18 f., w h e r e Galen raises t h e question of

Elsewhere I have shown that t h e p a t t e r n of o p t i o n s in PHP 1-3 a n d 6 c o n f o r m s to t h e s c h e m a k n o w n f r o m t h e Placita tradition, viz. its section o n t h e location of t h e r e g e n t p a r t of t h e soul (e.g. Aët. Plac. IV 5). 1 5 This explains such f e a t u r e s as his a l i g n m e n t of H i p p o c r a t e s a n d Plato, o r his b l i n d spots in r e g a r d to c e r t a i n a u t h o r i t i e s a n d doctrines, o r to alternative i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of e x p e r i m e n t a l results. 1 6 So it seems worth c o n s i d e r i n g b o o k s 4 a n d 5 against t h e b a c k d r o p of t h e Placita tradition as well, particularly since it i n c l u d e s a s e p a r a t e section devoted to the issue of t h e ( n u m b e r of) parts of t h e soul (Aët. Plac. IV 4). T h e m a i n q u e s t i o n s are: H o w c o u l d Galen align Plato, Aristotle a n d Posidonius (with Pythagoras a n d H i p p o c r a t e s a d d e d ) ? W h a t d o e s this tell us a b o u t t h e r e c e p t i o n of these p h i l o s o p h e r s in a n c i e n t d o x o g r a p h y ? An answer to these q u e s t i o n s may throw m o r e light o n G a l e n ' s h a b i t s a n d p r o c e d u r e s a n d h e n c e o n w h a t these a u t h o r i t i e s h a d m e a n t in t h e i r original expositions. T h i s is particularly i m p o r t a n t in t h e case of t h e r e l e v a n t d o c t r i n e s of t h e Stoics, n o t a b l y C h r y s i p p u s a n d P o s i d o n i u s , f o r w h o m G a l e n is o u r m a i n source. As I have n o t e d , t h e study of d o x o g r a p h i c r e p o r t s s h o u l d n o t limit itself to individual tenets, b u t also c o n s i d e r t h e way these have b e e n a r r a n g e d in e a c h s e p a r a t e section. T h e ' p r o s o p o g r a p h i c ' a p p r o a c h , with its a t t e n d a n t d i s r e g a r d f o r aspects of schematization, is familiar e n o u g h f r o m o u r present-day collections of f r a g m e n t s . But its drawbacks s h o u l d b e a p p a r e n t . In this light, I shall b e studying t h e way relevant d o x o g r a p h i c s o u r c e s treat t h e cast of c h a r a c t e r s staged by Galen (Plato a n d Pythagoras, Aristotle, t h e early Stoics, Posidonius). T h a t is to say, I shall p r o c e e d by d e a l i n g with these sources separately instead of o r g a n i z i n g my discussion a r o u n d t h e individual philosop h e r s involved. 1 7 I shall a p p e n d a brief discussion of two relevant passages in Plutarch a n d Porphyry, w h o c o m b i n e t h e use of similar d o x o g r a p h i c s c h e m e s with t h e i r own r e a d i n g of t h e o r i g i n a l expositions. In this r e s p e c t they w e r e like G a l e n a n d so o f f e r us an

t h e s u b s t a n c e of living b o d i e s as r e l e v a n t to t h e c o n c e p t i o n of b e a u t y as a p r o p o r t i o n of their elements. 15 T i e l e m a n (1996a) xxxiv ff. 16 See T i e l e m a n (2002); cf. also Mansfeld (1991) 139. Of course Galen also felt j u s t i f i e d to cling to t h e Platonic trilocation by certain physiological observations a n d considerations, notably t h e a u t o m a t i s m of t h e heart-beat. 17 T h i s a c c o u n t develops f u r t h e r t h e observations m a d e by Mansfeld (1990b) 3085-89 o n t h e section in t b e Placita c o n c e r n e d with t h e parts of t h e soul.

o p p o r t u n i t y to c o m p a r e their r e c e p t i o n of the d o c t r i n e s involved with the latter's m o d e of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . O u r textual evidence is slim a n d derivative. It is even m o r e fragm e n t e d t h a n in t h e case of the seat of t h e soul. H e r e , as elsewhere, the n a t u r e of the various sources involved requires special attention. Yet I believe that a small d e t o u r will prove rewarding. In fact, t h e r e is still r o o m for m o r e work o n the influence of d o x o g r a p h y on accounts of the soul in antiquity a n d in Middle Platonism in particular. 1 8

2. Ps. Plutarch and Theodoret A section e n t i t l e d ' O n t h e parts of t h e soul' is to be f o u n d at ps. P l u t a r c h , Plac. IV 4. T h e parallel section in S t o b a e u s is lost 1 9 b u t T h e o d o r e t in his Cure for the Greek Affections (Graec. ä f f . cur.), V 19-21, clearly d e p e n d s o n t h e s a m e s o u r c e as ps. P l u t a r c h , viz. Diels' r e c o n s t r u c t e d 'Aëtius' (to be d a t e d to the first or second cent, C E ) . 2 0 Ps.Plutarch r e p o r t s that Pythagoras a n d Plato posited two parts, o n e rational (λογικόν), the o t h e r irrational ( α λ ο γ ο ν ) . This is called t h e 'highest e x p l a n a t i o n ' . A c c o r d i n g to the ' e n s u i n g a n d precise' explanation, the soul is tripartite (τριμερή): ' f o r they divide the irrational part into t h e spirited (θυμικόν) a n d appetitive (έπιθυμητικόν) parts' (IV 4.1). 2 1 T h e tripartite a n d bipartite schemes are thus explained in terms of o n e a n o t h e r . 2 2 18

But cf. Mansfeld (n. 7); Vander Waerdt (1985a), (1985b). For a trace of it, see however infra, n. 35. 20 Mansfeld and Runia (1997) 319 ff. For doubts abouts the value of T h e o d o r e t as a witness to 'Aëtius' see however Frede (1999), esp. 138 ff., 147 f. 21 T h e terms θυμικόν and, it seems, λογικόν as referring t o soul-parts are not Platonic but Aristotelian in origin; cf. Arist. De an. 432a25, 433b4, Top. 12912-19. O n the early Peripatetic interpretation of the Platonic tripartition cf. ps. Arist. MM 1182a24 f. Πλάτων διείλετο τήν ψυχήν εϊς τε τό λόγον εχον καί εις τό άλογον όρθώς, και άπέδωκεν έκάστψ [τάς] άρετάς τάς προσήκουσας. T h e reference to the virtues is remarkable since Plato in Rep. 4 specifically grafts the four primary virtues o n t o the tripartite structure of the soul. 22 Similarly Posid. ap. Gal. PHP4.7.39 (= Posid. Test. 95 E.-K.), Cic. Tusc. 4.10, on which parallel passages see infra, p. 77 f., 293. Alcin. Did. ch. 17, p.173.5 ff.; cf. 24, 176.12; 5, p.156.35-6 H e r m a n n ; cf. also Anon. Lond. col. XV.26-30; XVI.33-44 Diels. A n o t h e r tripartition is given to Pythagoras at D.L. 8.30: νους, θυμός and φρένες. (Since the first two are shared by man with animals and the third possessed by m a n alone, the c o r r e s p o n d e n c e with the Platonic s c h e m e extends somewhat beyond the m e r e fact of there being three faculties). M. Giusta (1964-7) vol. 1, 57 f. compares the Aëtian lemma and Cicero with Tusc. 4.10 (on Plato and Pythagoras) and D.L. 7.110 (on the eight parts of the soul according to the Stoics), explaining the c o r r e s p o n d e n c e by reference to a lost d o x o g r a p h i c manual which dealt first 19

T h e familiar Stoic c o n c e p t i o n of t h e e i g h t parts of t h e soul 2 3 is ascribed to t h e Stoics in g e n e r a l by b o t h ps. P l u t a r c h (IV 4) a n d T h e o d o r e t (V 20), w h o b r i n g s it m o r e i n t o line with t h e o t h e r d o c t r i n e s by r e f e r r i n g to t h e f u n c t i o n s of the r e g e n t p a r t as well. 24 Aristotle receives n o l e m m a in ps.Plutarch, 2 5 b u t T h e o d o r e t r e p o r t s that ' t h e son of N i k o m a c h o s ' posited five ένεργείαι, viz. τήν όρεκτικήν τήν θρεπτικήν τήν αίσθητικήν τήν μεταβατικην τήν διανοητικήν, which coincides with Aristotle's list at On the Soul Β 3.414a31 f.

3.

Tertullian

Galen's y o u n g e r c o n t e m p o r a r y Tertullian (c. 160-240 CE), On the soul 14.2 provides a glimpse of the Placita tradition at a stage o l d e r t h a n that r e p r e s e n t e d by ps. Plutarch a n d T h e o d o r e t 2 6 . In t h e p r e c e d i n g c o n t e x t (ch. 14.1) Tertullian draws on t h e same d o x o g r a p h i c source w h e n h e a p p e a l s to t h e Sceptic A e n e s i d e m u s as well as Strato a n d Heraclitus for his view that t h e soul is indivisible. As we shall see, this

with t h e division of t h e soul a n d next with its affections, i.e. t h e o r d e r followed by Cicero, ibid. 10-32. However, his reconstruction of what h e calls a 'Vetusta Placita di Etica' (an allusion to o n e of t h e lost sources posited by Diels in D.G.), as part of his e n t e r p r i s e of u n c o v e r i n g a tradition of m o r a l d o x o g r a p h y , is now generally rejected; cf. e.g. Mansfeld (1998) 26. A m o n g o t h e r things, Giusta c o n f u s e s d o x o g r a p h y in t h e strict sense (e.g. Aëtius) with t h e On sects literature instantiated by Diogenes Laertius a n d Arius Didymus. O n Cicero (who is in many ways sui generis) a n d Tusc. 4.10-32, see f u r t h e r infra, p p 296 ff. T h e soul, i n c l u d i n g its location a n d division, traditionally belongs with physics r a t h e r than ethics. 23 See Chrys. ap. Gal. PHP 3.1.10-15; D.L. 7.157 (generally Stoic). Cf. also P o r p h . De an. ap. Stob. Eel. I p.350.13-18 (SVF 2.830); cf. Iamblichus, De anima ap. Stob. Eel. I, p.368.12-16 W. (SVF2.826, second text). 24 T h a t t h e Stoic a n d Platonic p a r t i t i o n s a r e n o t c o m m e n s u r a t e is n o t e d by Porphyry ap. Proclus In remp. I 234.9-17 Kroll (cf. ibid 1-9 = P o r p h y r y Fr. 263 Smith), with Dörrie (1959) 107 f. 25 I fail to see o n what evidence Diels, D.G. p.46 bases his r e m a r k that ps. Plutarch has conflated the l e m m a t a on Plato a n d Aristotle in his sources as o p p o s e d to T h e o d o r e t , Graec. a f f . cur. V 29. 26 Diels, D. G. 203 ff. derived t h e s c h e m e p r e s e n t e d by Tertullian f r o m t h e socalled Vetusta Placita via Soranus, t h e Sceptic A e n e s i d e m u s b e i n g involved as well. O n the c o m p l e x relations between this a n d o t h e r d o x o g r a p h i c schemes c o n c e r n e d see f u r t h e r Mansfeld (1990b) 3085 ff. T h e text of De An. 14.2 p r e s e n t s various difficulties, notably t h e fact that Posidonius is said to have a d d e d two parts to a n u m b e r of twelve as r e c o g n i z e d by ' c e r t a i n Stoics' b u t s u b s e q u e n t l y is given seventeen. Kidd (1988) (i) 547 may be right to suggest that this reflects a confusion between two systems of division in Tertullian himself a n d / o r his i m m e d i a t e source, which t h e r e f o r e may b e u n d e r s t o o d b u t n o t e m e n d e d (e.g. so as to read ' f i f t e e n ' instead o f ' t w e l v e ' ) .

preliminary issue—which goes back to Aristotle 2 7 —is left o u t by almost all parallel passages as the result, n o doubt, of a process of epitomization. Starting with Plato, whose n a m e is associated with bipartition, 2 8 the reader is led through a numerically m o u n t i n g series climaxing in seventeen parts distinguished by Posidonius (F 147 E.K.). T h e parts themselves are not specified; several m o d e r n attempts —all m o r e or less speculative, some downright frivolous—have been m a d e to supply them. T h e quintet of faculties given to Aristotle, 2 9 however, must be identical to those listed in o t h e r d o x o g r a p h i c reports in accordance with Aristotle's list at On the Soul Β 3.424a31. This differs f r o m Galen's attribution of three powers, but, as we shall see, it is a moot point how far we are entitled to speak of a g e n u i n e discrepancy. 3 0 Views ascribed to Stoics p r e d o m i n a t e . Interestingly, Zeno, who is second on the list, is given three parts (SVF 1.144). Again, the parts are not specified and o n e would have liked to know what could have occasioned this number. 3 1 But it is noteworthy that Galen, taking his cue f r o m Posidonius, is quite p r e p a r e d to suggest that Zeno a n d Cleanthes had accepted bipartition along Platonic lines, i.e. a bipartition admitting of f u r t h e r subdivision so as to yield three parts. 32 This, then, constitutes an important parallel between Galen and the Placita tradition as reflected by Tertullian. Indeed, when the latter ascribes three parts to Zeno, it is highly likely that reason, anger and desire are meant, i.e. those three faculties which are elsewhere ascribed to Plato as well as Aristotle. Galen, as we have seen, excepts only Chrysippus from the general consensus in favour of the Platonic tripartition. Tertullian (or rather the tradition to which he is i n d e b t e d ) , by contrast, is c o n c e r n e d to convey the impression of disagreement a m o n g pagan philosophers, most notably the Stoics or (anonymous) groups of Stoics. 33 This may

27

De an. A 1.402b1f., Γ 9.432a20 ff. Cf. supra, p. 22. See supra, n. 21; infra, pp. 77 f. 29 Pamelius' insertion of after quinque has f o u n d general acceptance; cf. Diels, Ü.G. p.205 and Waszink ad loc. 30 See infra, pp. 74 f., 78 f. 31 Zeno is on record as having posited the familiar conception involving eight parts; cf. supra, 38 n. 69. However, some caution is due, since sources may use his n a m e merely to label the doctrine at issue as Stoic and so do not warrant firm conclusions about his position: see e.g. Stob. Eel. I 49.34, p. 369.6 ff. W., Nem. Nat. horn. c.15, 72.7-9 (SVF 1.143). 32 PHP5.6.34 (Posid. T 9 3 / F r . 166 E.-K.); cf. 8.1.14-15 (Fr. 38 E.-K.). 33 Kidd ad loc. (p.545) observes that the particular form of this report—a series 28

explain why the division into eight parts—elsewhere given as generally Stoic—appears h e r e as exclusively Chrysippean. 3 4 A few contributions f r o m m i n o r Stoics are added. 3 5 T h e details of Posidonius' original scheme too will have to remain uncertain. 3 6 But that does n o t mean that we can discount the report altogether. Of particular importance is the fact that he is said to have p r o c e e d e d f r o m two headings, the ήγεμονικόν a n d λογιστικόν. Do these headings c o r r e s p o n d to the g o v e r n i n g / s u b o r d i n a t e a n d ration a l / i r r a t i o n a l distinctions familiar f r o m the Posidonian material in Galen? 37 I d o u b t that this distinction is particularly relevant here. At any rate, the h e a d i n g of λογιστικόν suggests the familiar Platonic division into λογιστικόν, θυμοειδές and έπιθυμητικόν, whereas a wider range of powers related to bodily functions (nutrition, motion) may have been subsumed u n d e r the ήγεμονικόν. 38 This pair of series yields a parallel to the two series of psychic faculties attributed to Aristotle in o t h e r sources (see f u r t h e r below). We are strongly r e m i n d e d of

of conflicting d o g m a t i c t e n e t s — h a s a Sceptical ring. Note t h e m e n t i o n of Aenesid e m u s at De an. 14.1 (see above in text). 34 Cf. supra, n. 31. 35 T e r t u l l i a n says t h a t A p o l l o p h a n e s , a m i n o r f i g u r e w h o h a d s t u d i e d with Ariston of C h i u s ( S V F 1.408), divided t h e soul into n i n e parts (SVF 1.405). His a d d i t i o n of o n e part to t h e canonical e i g h t — h a r d l y a m o m e n t o u s e v e n t — h a s n o parallel in o u r sources. But it is interesting to n o t e that his n a m e occurs in o n e ms. of Photius' list of p h i l o s o p h e r s treated by Stobaeus in his lost section o n t h e parts of t h e soul. T h e r e f e r e n c e in Photius bears out t h e d e p e n d e n c e o f T e r t . De an. 14.2 on t h e Placita tradition; cf. Stob. Eel. phys. 49.7a (where W a c h s m u t h has inserted a l e m m a with A p o l l o p h a n e s ' view) a n d Mansfeld (1990b) 3085. A p o l l o p h a n e s ' n e a t little move was i m m o r t a l i z e d , p r e s u m a b l y b e c a u s e it c o u l d be blown u p into an instance of dissent f r o m o t h e r Stoic opinions. F u r t h e r , certain Stoics ( a n o n y m o u s ) are said to have o p t e d f o r twelve parts. T h i s n u m b e r may result f r o m a d d i n g t h e traditional q u a r t e t of f u n c t i o n s of t h e ήγεμονικόν (φαντασία, συγκατάθεσις, όρμή, λόγος o r αϊσθησις) to t h e eight parts of the d o m i n a n t school doctrine; cf. Iambi. De an. ap. Stob. Eel. II p.368.19-20 W. (SVF2.826); ibid, p.369.6-9 W. (SUF2.831); Aët. IV 21.1 (SVF2.836), w h e r e n o t t h e sequel listing t h e eight parts (ibid. 21.2). This a n d t h e anonymity of t h e r e f e r e n c e d o n o t inspire c o n f i d e n c e as to its historicity; see also supra, p. 38. 36

Cf. t h e critical survey of proposals by Waszink (1974) 209 ff. a n d see now also Kidd (1988) (i) esp. 547 f. T h e i l e r ' s suggestions ( C o m m e n t a r y ad 396, pp. 329-334) are vitiated by a characteristic use of n o t explicitly attested material as Posidonian. 37 As is suggested by Kidd (1988) (ii) 547 f. 38 Kidd (1988) (ii) 548 refers to Sen. Ep. 92.1: partes ministras, per quas movemur alimurque, propter ipsum principale nobis datas. Cf. P o r p h . De an. apud Stob. Eel. I, p. 350.13 ff. W a c h s m u t h ( SVF 2.830) : oi μεν από τής Στοάς όκταμερή τήν ψυχήν θέντες καί πέντε μεν μέρη τά α ι σ θ η τ ι κ ά λαβόντες, έκτον δέ τό φωνητικόν καί εβδομον τό σπερματικόν, τό λοιπόν τό ήγεμονικόν ά ς άν άρχοντος χώραν εγειν ϋπετίθεντο, τά δέ ά λ λ α μέρη έν ύπηρέτου τάξει ά π ε δ ί δ ο σ α ν , ωστε τό αυτό έξ άρχοντος καί αρχομένων συνεστάναι.

the fact that Galen too ascribes t h e tripartition to Posidonius ( t h o u g h without r e f e r e n c e to any o t h e r division). T h e i m p r e s s i o n o n e gets f r o m PHP b o o k s 4 a n d 5 is t h a t t h e g o v e r n i n g / s u b o r d i n a t e d i s t i n c t i o n is identical with t h e r a t i o n a l / irrational o n e a n d has a m o r a l p o i n t . H e r e , m o r e o v e r , P o s i d o n i u s seems n o t to have kept t h e two series s e p a r a t e a c c o r d i n g to t h e contextual e t h i c a l / p h y s i c a l distinction. T h u s h e is c r e d i t e d with a rudim e n t a r y scala naturae in t e r m s of t h e P l a t o n i c t r i p a r t i t i o n : n o n rational animals posses only t h e spirited a n d appetitive p a r t s — e x c e p t f o r a n i m a l s t h a t a r e h a r d to move ( δ υ σ κ ί ν η τ α ) a n d a r e like plants a t t a c h e d to rocks: these are g o v e r n e d by desire alone. Man stands o u t as the sole possessor of reason (5.6.37-9). T h e same s c h e m e u n d e r l i e s his distinction of t h r e e f o r m s of οίκείωσις, e x p l a i n e d by r e f e r e n c e to t h e b e h a v i o u r of a n i m a l s a n d c h i l d r e n b e f o r e t h e age of r e a s o n (5.5.1-8 = F 169 E.-K.). H e r e , too, P o s i d o n i u s is said to e x p l a i n m o v e m e n t a n d n u t r i t i o n in t e r m s of t h e Platonic tripartition, assigning these f u n c t i o n s to the two non-rational parts. Posidonius' hierarchy of t h e animal k i n g d o m seems to b e inspired by such P l a t o n i c passages as Tim. 76e-77d a n d Rep. 441a7-b3. But certain features, notably t h e r e f e r e n c e to l o c o m o t i o n , indicate that A r i s t o t e l i a n passages may b e involved as well. At On the Soul Β 3.414a29 ff 3 9 Aristotle charts his well-known scale of living beings in t e r m s of a n i n c r e a s i n g n u m b e r of p o w e r s ( δ υ ν ά μ ε ι ς ) , viz. t h e θρεπτικόν, όρεκτικόν, αίσθητικόν, κινητικόν κατά τόπον, διανοητικόν. Plants have only t h e θ ρ ε π τ ι κ ό ν ; a n i m a l s posses t h e αίσθητικόν in a d d i t i o n . 4 0 A n d , if t h e latter, t h e n t h e όρεκτικόν as well. T o facilitate this last i n f e r e n c e , Aristotle divides ορεξις ( ' d e s i r e ' ) i n t o επιθυμία, θυμός a n d β ο ύ λ η σ ι ς , a r g u i n g that these f u n c t i o n s a r e m o r e readily seen to p r e s u p p o s e t h e α ί σ θ η τ ι κ ό ν t h a n t h e g e n e r a l c o n c e p t of όρεξις. In o t h e r passages Aristotle attributes, of the t h r e e f o r m s of ορεξις, επιθυμία or b o t h επιθυμία a n d θύμος to animals. 4 1 T h e s c h e m e ascribed by G a l e n to P o s i d o n i u s t h u s r e p r e s e n t s a conflation of Platonic a n d Aristotelian elements. W h e t h e r it is d u e to 39

As observed by De Lacy ad loc. (= ad p.334.4-8); cf. f a e g e r (1914) 63-4, 104

n.2. 40

Cf. Dean. Β 2.413 b 2-11: s e n s e - p e r c e p t i o n is characteristic of a n i m a l s n o t local m o t i o n , f o r even animals that do not move have sensation; plants have only t h e nutritive faculty (θρεπτικόν). 41 De an. 413b20-4, 414b3-6, 11-12, 414a29-bl9; EN 1111a24-6, b6-13, 1116b231117a5, 1118al6-26; HA 448b21; De sensu 4 3 6 a 8 - l l . Of c o u r s e Aristotle was influe n c e d by Plato as well; see f u r t h e r Solmsen (1955).

Posidonius himself is m o o t p o i n t . In s o m e sources a p p a r e n t l y related to the Placita tradition, t h e ethical a n d psychological ('physical') lists of faculties are, o n behalf of Aristotle, linked by the subdivison of t h e όρεκτικόν into a n g e r a n d desire. I shall r e t u r n to this p o i n t presently.

4. Ps. Galen T h e section o n t h e s o u l ' s p a r t s in o u r n e x t s o u r c e , t h e p s e u d o Galenic tract Philosophos histona (ch. 24, p.615.1-10 Diels), is clearly related to that by ps.Plutarch, t h o u g h it exhibits certain peculiarities which m u s t b e d u e to t h e use of o t h e r sources. 4 2 Like Tertullian, On the Soul 14.1, its a u t h o r begins by raising t h e preliminary question as to w h e t h e r o r n o t o n e s h o u l d a s s u m e parts of t h e soul at all. T h e Stoics in g e n e r a l a r e said to have d i s t i n g u i s h e d four parts, viz. t h e λογικόν 4 3 αίσθητικόν φωνητικόν σπερματικόν. Since t h e α ί σ θ η τ ι κ ό ν e n c o m p a s s e s t h e five sensory parts, this notice seems to constitute an abbreviation of t h e division i n t o e i g h t parts ascribed by Aëtius a n d T e r t u l l i a n to t h e Stoics in g e n e r a l a n d C h r y s i p p u s respectively. Ps.Galen n e x t ascribes to Plato t h e t h r e e p a r t s λ ο γ ι κ ό ν θ υ μ ι κ ό ν έ π ι θ υ μ η τ ι κ ό ν , in a c c o r d a n c e with p s . P l u t a r c h , t h o u g h w i t h o u t r e f e r e n c e to t h e ' h i g h e r ' twofold division. T h e r e is a s e p a r a t e notice o n Aristotle, w h o is said to have a d d e d t h e φυσικόν a n d the ζωτικόν to Plato's t h r e e parts. 4 4 In a sense, t h e n , we have h e r e a n o t h e r instance of t h e ascription of t h e Platonic tripartition to Aristotle. But it seems h a r d to parallel this a n d o t h e r f e a t u r e s of ps. G a l e n ' s survey f r o m the o t h e r r e p o r t s . T h e λογικόν a n d φυσικόν c o r r e s p o n d to T h e o d o r e t ' s δ ι α ν ο η τ ι κ ή a n d θρεπτική ενέργεια respectively. Arguably, a similar c o r r e s p o n d e n c e h o l d s b e t w e e n t h e ορεκτική ενέργεια a n d t h e θυμικόν + έπιθυμητικόν. 4 5 But if so, we are still left with two f u n c t i o n s

42

On this particular section see Mansfeld (1990b) 3086 f. On the nature of ps.Galen's tract and its relation to the Pladta tradition see now Mansfeld and Runia (1997) 141 ff. Cf. Mansfeld (1990b) 3069, 3164. 43 On the assimilation of the rational parts and the ηγεμονικών, see supra, p. 37. 44 For the ζωτικόν μέρος of the soul cf. Nemesius, Nat. horn. c. 22, p. 82.21-2, from a closely related context (see infra in text): καλείται δέ φυσικόν μεν τό θρεπτικόν .... ζωτικόν δέ τό σφυγμικόν, further explained pp. 84.25 ff. Cf. ibid. 2, p.27.11 ff. (in connection with Aristotle particular); cf. Aët. IV 5.10 (ζ. placed by Pythagoras in the heart); Epiph. Adv. haeres. Ill 21 (DG p. 591.16). 45 As suggested by Mansfeld (1990b) 3086 n. 116. This assumption can be shored up by reference to Calcidius, In Tim. c.223, p.238.10-11 Waszink (... appetitum qui in perfectioribus invenitur animalibus, in quibus est cupiditas et iracundia ... ) and

specified by T h e o d o r e t (viz. the αισθητική a n d the μεταβατική έν έργεια) and o n e by ps.Galen (viz. the ζωτικόν). 4 6 Α closer parallel is provided by a few passages f r o m Plutarch, w h e r e the αϊσθητικόν a n d θρεπτικόν (or φ υ τ ι κ ό ν ) are a d d e d to Plato's three canonical parts. 4 7 T h e harmonization of psychological terms of different provenance is typical of d o x o g r a p h i c literature. Assimilation a n d modernization of terminology were b o u n d to occur o n c e tenets of various provenance were accomodated within a single diaeretic scheme. Moreover, s o m e of o u r e x t a n t witnesses, such as ps.Plutarch a n d ps.Galen, betray the h a n d of the epitomator. Hence, in this section of ps.Galen, we find a c o n d e n s a t i o n of the canonical Stoic list of functions. In regard to the l e m m a on Aristotle, it should be n o t e d that the two f u n c t i o n s a d d e d to the tripartition are at h o m e in the context of physics r a t h e r than ethics. It would t h e r e f o r e seem that the division presented by ps.Galen a n d Plutarch results f r o m a conflation of two original series of faculties, o n e ethical (the Platonic-cum-Aristotelian tripartition), the o t h e r physical a n d including functions such as the natural or nutritive (φυσικόν/θρεπτικόν), the perceptive (αϊσθητικόν) a n d / o r vital (ζωτικόν). This conflation is m a d e possible by the fact that both series feature a function covering cognition a n d appetition (ορεξις) in the physical series is analysable into the spirited a n d desiderative faculties of the ethical tripartition. Such an e t h i c a l / physical distinction may, as we have noticed, be presupposed by the two headings associated with the n a m e of Posidonius in the abstract preserved by Tertullian (see above, p. 68). Not only this distinction but also two full lists are to be f o u n d in o u r next witness, Nemesius.

Nem. Nat. horn. p. 73.8-12 Morani dividing the όρεκτικόν into the θυμικόν and έπιθυμητικόν. The latter two passages are from contexts are related both to one another and to the Placita tradition; see further infra in text. 46 Mansfeld (1990b) 3086 n. 116 argues that a correspondence obtains between θρεπτική + μεταβατική έν έργεια on the one hand and the φυσικόν and the ζωτικόν on the other. He argues that ps. Galen offers what seems a simplification of the account from which both his and that of Aëtius' source are derived and that in a later stage the Platonic tripartition was ascribed to Aristotle in order to fill out the quintet traditionally attributed to him. But even so, the μεταβατική έν. remains without a proper counterpart in ps. Galen (on the ζωτικόν see next, n.) and the αισθητική remains. 47 De Ε apud Delphos 390F, De def. orac. 429E.

5. Nemesius T h e essay in Christian Platonism On the Nature of Man by Nemesius of Emesa (c. 400 CE) is r e m a r k a b l e f o r its wide r e a d i n g in philosophical a n d m e d i c a l l i t e r a t u r e . In chs. 15 a n d 16 (72.3 ff. M o r a n i ) t h e l e a r n e d b i s h o p p r e s e n t s a d o x o g r a p h i c a c c o u n t of t h e parts of t h e soul which unmistakably b e l o n g s with t h e Placita tradition. 4 8 Interestingly, we find h e r e c o m b i n e d a n u m b e r of e l e m e n t s f r o m the various s o u r c e s we have b e e n reviewing. N e m e s i u s d o e s n o t disclose his s o u r c e , b u t we m u s t n o t e t h a t 72.7-73.7 r u n parallel to t h e e x c e r p t f r o m Porphyry's On the Powers of the Soul (ap. Stob. Eel. I p. 350.9-351.1 W. = Fr. 253 Smith; see f u r t h e r below). But at t h e s a m e time this e x c e r p t is in s o m e respects less d e t a i l e d t h a n N e m e s i u s ' a c c o u n t . 4 9 Presumably, t h e n , N e m e s i u s draws o n a f u l l e r a c c o u n t by P o r p h y r y than t h e o n e preserved by Stobaeus. 5 0 N e m e s i u s first a d d r e s s e s a p r e l i m i n a r y q u e s t i o n (which is n o t identical to that f o u n d in T e r t u l l i a n a n d p s . G a l e n ) , viz. w h e t h e r t h e non-rational e l e m e n t (ή άλογία) s h o u l d b e seen as a p a r t of the soul or as a soul in its own right. T o those 5 1 w h o p o i n t to n o n - r a t i o n a l See D. G. 49-50, taking Nemesius to have known the doxographic work by Aëtius (mentioned by the only other witness, Theodoret, CAG 2.95, 4.31, 5.16). See further Mansfeld and Runia (1997) 291 ff. 49 But Porphyry, unlike Nemesius, links Plato's name to the tripartition and reports that Numenius assumed two souls (viz. a rational and an irrational one) rather than parts, cf. infra, n. 51. 50 Porphyry often repeated himself; see Waszink (1962) p. ι,χχιι (on Porph. as the source of Calcidius, In Tim. cf. 214-235). Which treatise this was must remain uncertain—the Mixed Questions or the On the Soul to Boethus come to mind; for the former see De nat. horn. 3, pp.38.12-42.9, 42.22-43.8 Morani (Περί ενώσεως ψυχής καί σώματος) = 259-261 F Smith; cf. also ibid. 2, p.34.18-35.11 M. = Porphyry 447 F Smith (on the immortality of the soul). The explicitly attested fragment from the same work found at Proclus, In remp. I 233.29-234.8 (263 F) deals with the issue of the division of the soul, opposing the Stoic and Platonic conceptions. On Nemesius and the Σύμμικτα ζητήματα see further Dörrie (1959) 99 ff, 111 ff. Cf. Cale. In Tim. 223, p. 238.5-13, whose account of Aristotelian soul-division is closely similar to Nem. De nat. horn. p. 72.12 ff. and likely to derive from Porphyry, see Waszink (1962) l x x v - l x x v i i . For Porphyry's On the Soul see De nat. horn. 3, pp.38.12-42.9, 42.22-43.8 Morani (259-261 F Smith); cf. also ibid. 2, p.34.18-35.11 M. (Fr. 447 Smith). Another apparent possibility would seem to be Porphyry's (lost) Φιλόσοφος ιστορία ('Philosophical History'), which Theodoret aligns with Aëtius' τήν Περί άρεσκόντων ξυναγωγήν and (pseudo-) Plutarch's Περί τών τοις φιλοσόφοις δοξάντων έπιτομήν, saying that Porphyry not only presented an account of the life of the Greek philosophers but added their tenets as well, Graec. a f f . cur. II 95, p.62.4-7 (Porph. Τ 195 Smith); cf. ibid. IV 31, V 16. But the extant Life of Pythagoras, which was part of this work of Porphyry, shows that it cannot have been a member of the Placita family, see Porph. Frr. 193-224 Smith with Segond (1982). 51 These people remain anonymous (τίνες), but cf. Porph. ap. Stob. Eel. I,

animals in s u p p o r t of the latter option, Nemesius opposes Aristotle as having c o n s i d e r e d t h e non-rational e l e m e n t to be b o t h a part a n d a power (p.73.3-7 M o r a n i ) . This may seem suprising in view of Aristotle's seminal critique of soul-partition—especially its Platonic variety —delivered at On the Soul Γ 9 a n d reflected by such later a u t h o r s as Galen who distinguish the respective positions of Plato a n d Aristotle in terms of the p a r t s / p o w e r s distinction (e.g. PHP 6.2.5). In practice, however, Aristotle's terminology fluctuates. T o be sure, the fact that h e o n occasion speaks of 'parts' d o e s n o t imply c o m m i t m e n t to t h e Platonic doctrine; h e uses t h e term merely to r e f e r to the divisions of the soul regardless of their ontological status. 5 2 Nemesius attests to the exploitation of the terminological variation to c o n s t r u e a comp r o m i s e position typical of d o x o g r a p h i c schématisations. 5 3 As such, t h e notice originally b e l o n g e d to the traditional section ' w h e t h e r the soul has parts or not?' preliminary to the o n e a b o u t the n u m b e r a n d identity of t h e parts themselves. Being preliminary, it was o m i t t e d by e p i t o m a t o r s such as ps.Plutarch a n d others responsible for o u r extant witnesses to the Placita tradition. But, as we have noticed, Tertullian, w h o reflects an earlier stage of t h e same tradition, has preserved a d o x o g r a p h i c notice c o n c e r n e d with the parts vs. powers issue. 54 As to t h e faculties of t h e soul, Aristotle a p p e a r s m o r e regularly in an i n t e r m e d i a t e position, n o t a b l y b e t w e e n Plato a n d t h e Stoics. In G a l e n ' s s c h e m e of options, as we have n o t i c e d , Aristotle sides with Plato as to t h e n u m b e r of faculties ( w h e t h e r parts or powers) b u t with the Stoics as to their seat. 55

p.350.25 f. W. (= Fr. 253 [p.272.19-21] Smith = N u m e n i u s Fr. 44 Des Places): "Αλλοι δέ, ών καί Ν ο υ μ ή ν ι ο ς , ού τρία μέρη ψυχής μιας ή δύο γε, τό λογικόν και αλογον, ά λ λ α δύο ψυχάς εχειν ημάς οϊονται, την μεν λογικήν, την δέ άλογο v. Those p r o p o n e n t s which remain u n m e n t i o n e d may include Galen, who too diffentiated sharply between the parts or f o r m s of the soul a n d on occasion, in a way not warranted by the Platonic text, referred to them as souls. 52 O n this later issue see supra, p. 34 ff. 53 For an example f r o m PHP5 see 6.42, where Zeno appears in a position intermediate (μέσος) between the worst (Chrysippus) a n d the best view (Hippocrates and Plato) on the affections, or emotions. 54 A f u r t h e r point of contact is noteworthy as well. Both Nemesius a n d Tertullian record that Panaetius modified the Stoic c o n c e p t i o n of eigth parts (which however Nemesius gives to ' Z e n o ' a n d Tertullian to Chrysippus) by d e m o t i n g the reproductive part to ' n a t u r e ' (φύσις) instead of soul a n d s u b s u m i n g the vocal function u n d e r the will (ή κατ' όρμήν κινήσεως) and h e n c e the ήγεμονικόν), which resulted in a total n u m b e r of six parts (p.72.7-11 = fr. 86 Van Straaten; cf. p. 73.17 ff. = fr. 86a v. Str.). See Tieleman (1996a) 99 with f u r t h e r references. Tertullian, as we have seen, presents still m o r e deviant Stoic views. 55 See supra, p. 34.

W h e r e a s in related sources t h e opposition between Plato a n d the Stoics is most p r o m i n e n t , it is Aristotle who receives t h e lion's share of a t t e n t i o n f r o m Nemesius. T h u s h e is also c r e d i t e d with a n o t h e r reconciliatory view. In his physical works, Nemesius affirms, h e posited five d i f f e r e n t parts [sic\, that is to say t h e o n e s listed at On the Soul Β 414a31f. a n d also m e n t i o n e d by T h e o d o r e t (Aëtius). In his ethical works, Aristotle d i s t i n g u i s h e d b e t w e e n λογικόν a n d α λ ο γ ο ν as t h e primary a n d most g e n e r i c (πρώτα καί γενικώτατα) parts, subdividing the αλογον into o n e part o b e d i e n t a n d a n o t h e r d i s o b e d i e n t to reason (cf. Nicomachean Ethics A. 13.1102b27-35). In t h e n e x t section (§ 16) Nemesius identifies the o b e d i e n t part of the αλογον as the όρεκτικόν, which h e f u r t h e r s u b d i v i d e s i n t o t h e έ π ι θ υ μ η τ ι κ ό ν a n d θυμικόν (p.73.11 f. Cf. 75.8 f. M o r a n i ) . This division is a t t r i b u t e d to Aristotle a n d to h i m only (p.73.7). But of c o u r s e t h e ' e t h i c a l ' division is identical to t h e familiar Platonic o n e . In particular, we s h o u l d n o t e that ps.Plutarch presents o n behalf of Plato this division in the same way, viz. in b o t h b i p a r t i t e a n d t r i p a r t i t e t e r m s . 5 6 Again we recall Posidonius' two series of f u n c t i o n s in T e r t u l l i a n , o n e of which may have b e e n identical to t h e trifold ethical division in N e m e s i u s (see above, pp. 68 f.). T h e r e p o r t o n Aristotle may b e p r e s e n t e d in d o u b l e columns: Science:

Ethics:

τό διανοητικόν

τό λογικόν

, , , το όρεκτικόν κ

τό θυμικόν ν > n > το επιουμητικον

τό κινητικόν κατά τόπον τό φυτικόν τό αίσθητικόν While, as n o t e d , t h e left 'scientific' c o l u m n reflects Aristotle, On the Soul 414a31 f., the s c h e m e as a whole s h o u l d b e c o m p a r e d with t h e final c h a p t e r (13) of t h e first b o o k of t h e Nicomachean Ethics. H e r e Aristotle argues that in ethical analysis (i.e. as o p p o s e d to t h e scientific psychology of On the Soul) o n e should isolate the specifically hum a n f u n c t i o n s , f o r m o r a l virtue is peculiar to m a n . In c o n s e q u e n c e , 56

See supra, p. 65.

the principle of n o u r i s h m e n t a n d growth, being c o m m o n to all living things, can be dispensed with (ibid. 13.1102a32 ff., esp. b 11-12). T h e division of the όρεκτικόν—the non-rational part relevant to ethics— into the θυμικόν a n d the έπιθυμητικόν is implied, or may easily have b e e n taken to be implied, at 1102b27 ff. 57 Since the όρεκτικόν is also said to be o b e d i e n t to reason (λόγος), we have the same bipartite a n d tripartite s c h é m a s in the same relation to o n e a n o t h e r as we have e n c o u n t e r e d in o t h e r witnesses to the Placita tradition. T h e n o t i o n that tripartition along Platonic lines was accepted by Aristotle f o u n d s u p p o r t in m a n y passages w h e r e h e a d o p t s a distinction b e t w e e n t h r e e f o r m s of a p p e t i t i o n (ορεξις) which were generally taken to c o r r e s p o n d to t h e t h r e e Platonic parts, viz. βούλησις, θύμος, επιθυμία. 5 8 T h e c o n t e x t u a l distinction is in fact i n d i c a t e d by Aristotle himself, w h o hints at t h e possibility to e x p a n d t h e 'ethical' list to include the f u n c t i o n s of growth a n d nutrition, which are non-rational in an absolute sense. Of course, o n e uses t h e e x p a n d e d list w h e n e m b a r k i n g o n a scientific a c c o u n t such as r e p r e s e n t e d by Aristotle's own On the Soul.59 H e r e all f u n c t i o n s constituting the scala naturae are relevant. I now p r o c e e d to two Platonists f r o m t h e Imperial p e r i o d , w h o show familiarity with the Placita tradition as well. Since they also knew t h e original expositions directly, their situation is n o t dissimilar to Galen's. As will be shown, they felt obliged to a c c o u n t f o r certain a p p a r e n t a n d real discrepancies between the classical texts a n d the 57

Just a f t e r a r e f e r e n c e to the state of m i n d of t h e m o d e r a t e (σώφρονος) a n d t h e brave ( α ν δ ρ ε ί ο υ ) m a n , Aristotle speaks of t h e 'desiderative a n d in g e n e r a l appetitive faculty' (το δ ' έπιθυμητικόν καί δλως όρεκτικόν μετέχει πως) of the soul. T h e virtues of m o d e r a t i o n a n d c o u r a g e b e l o n g to t h e appetitive a n d spirited parts respectively; cf. Resp. 441c2, 604d9; Lg. 863; cf. also Def. 415e7; T h e o p h r . Fr. 577B FHS&G. O n t h e Platonic b a c k d r o p of E N A 13 see f u r t h e r Dirlmeier (1956) 293; cf. also V a n d e r W a e r d t (1985a) 299 f. A little earlier Aristotle says h e bases himself in r e g a r d to t h e s t r u c t u r e of t h e soul on his f u l l e r a c c o u n t in t h e e x o t e r i c works (1102a25 ff.). This is o f t e n taken to r e f e r to t h e Protrepticus in view of fr. 6 Ross, w h e r e t h e bipartition is m e n t i o n e d . However this may be, h e may have given a m o r e precise analysis of the όρεκτικόν elsewhere. We may t h e r e f o r e have to reckon with tbe influence of this a n d o t h e r lost works on such later schematizations as have b e e n preserved. 58

For these t h r e e f o r m s of a p p e t i t i o n see De an. Β 3.414b2, Γ 9.432b5-8; 10.433a23-8; Rh. A 10.1369a1-4; MA 6.700b22; Pol. 1334b6-28, esp. 22-3; cf. also De an. A 5 . 4 1 1 a 2 7 f f , E N H 7.1149bl-3 (where n o t e t h e inspiration of Pl. Resp. 441a-c); cf. also T h e o p h r . fr. 441 FHG&S. 59 Cf. Arist. De an. A 1.402bl-5: 'We m u s t [...] i n q u i r e w h e t h e r it has parts o r n o t , a n d w h e t h e r every soul is of the same kind o r not; a n d if not, w h e t h e r t h e d i f f e r e n c e is o n e of species o r of genus. For today those who p r o n o u n c e o n a n d investigate the soul a p p e a r to c o n f i n e their attention to t h e h u m a n soul ...'

t r a d i t i o n a l view as solidified a n d t r a n s m i t t e d in t h e d o x o g r a p h i c schémas. I am r e f e r r i n g to Plutarch (c. 45-125 CE) a n d Porphyry (234c. 305 C E ) .

6. Plutarch I have already t o u c h e d u p o n P l u t a r c h ' s use of t h e Planta tradition c o n c e r n e d with the faculties of the soul in t h e section devoted to ps. Galen (see above, p. 71). In a d d i t i o n , it is worth c o n s i d e r i n g how P l u t a r c h p r e s e n t s t h e views of t h e Stoa, Plato-eim-Pythagoras a n d Aristotle in his On Moral Virtue, 440E - 442B. P l u t a r c h b e g i n s by positing a m a i n o p p o s i t i o n b e t w e e n t h e Stoic u n i t a r i a n c o n c e p t i o n a n d those theories which involve an irreducibly non-rational e l e m e n t (αλογον) of t h e soul (440E-441D). H a v i n g a t t r i b u t e d t h e latter position to Pythagoras a n d Plato, h e t u r n s to Aristotle (442B): A r i s t o t l e m a d e m u c h [ o r : l o n g , έπί π λ έ ο ν ] 6 0 u s e o f t h e s e p r i n c i p l e s , 6 1 as is c l e a r f r o m w h a t h e w r o t e . L a t e r h e a s s i g n e d t h e s p i r i t e d p a r t t o t h e a p p e t i t i v e o n t h e g r o u n d t h a t a n g e r is a f o r m o f d e s i r e a n d a n a p p e t i t i o n towards v e n g e a n c e . 6 2 But until t h e e n d h e u s e d t h e affective a n d n o n - r a t i o n a l e l e m e n t as d i f f e r i n g f r o m t h e r a t i o n a l ...

Plutarch tells us that t h e affective e l e m e n t ( π α θ η τ ι κ ό ν : bipartition again), t h o u g h devoid of a rationality of its own, is capable of obeying reason, as o p p o s e d to the sensory or the nutritive-cum-vegetative part which, b e l o n g i n g to t h e body, are deaf to t h e c o m m a n d s of reason (442B-C; cf. Arist. ENA 13.1102b28 f. a n d above). This of course conf o r m s to the distinction drawn at Nicomachean Ethics A 13, t h o u g h we h e a r n o t h i n g f r o m Plutarch a b o u t the contextual d i f f e r e n c e between morally a n d psychologically relevant faculties. 6 3 H e refers to ' w h a t 60 T h e sense of έπί πλέον is d i s p u t e d . W h e n it is taken in t h e sense a d o p t e d in t h e text, this r e p o r t provides an i n t e r e s t i n g case of an a n c i e n t a u t h o r positing a Platonic p h a s e in Aristotle's d e v e l o p m e n t . As such, it has even f o u n d its way into m o d e r n developmental accounts of Aristotle; see esp. Verbeke (1960) 238 f. Düring (1957) 354 f. translates έπί πλέον as ' f u r t h e r ' ('We may f u r t h e r observe that ...'); similarly Babut (1969) 137-41; D o n i n i (1974) 68-9; S a n d b a c h (1982) 215-17. 61 I.e. t h e t h r e e Platonic parts. 62 Cf. t h e well-known d e f i n i t i o n of όργή as ορεξις άντιλυπήσεως, Arist. De an. A 403a30-l; cf. Top. 156a31-b4. By now it was c o m m o n currency, cf. ps. Plut. De Lib. et aegrit. c h . l , Sen. De ira 1.3 with S a n d b a c h (1982) 219; see f u r t h e r infra, pp. 277 ff. 63 Cf. Plut. De Ε 390F a n d Def. vrac. 429E, o n which supra, n. 71. Cf. also Arius Did. ap. Stob. Eel. II 7.20, p. 137.15-7 W., in a section e n t i t l e d Περί της ήθικτης αρετής, ότι μεσάτης (which parallels t h e title a n d o n e of t h e m a i n theses of P l u t a r c h ' s tract): ταύτην [seil, τήν ήθικήν άρετήν] ύ π ο λ α μ β ά ν ο υ σ ι περί τό αλογον

Aristotle wrote', b u t w h e t h e r h e is directly drawing o n o n e or m o r e A r i s t o t e l i a n texts is d o u b t f u l . 1 ' 4 P l u t a r c h ' s exclusive a n d d i r e c t d e p e n d e n c e o n the Aristotelian c o r p u s has t o o o f t e n b e e n taken f o r g r a n t e d . But p e r h a p s t h e choice is n o t o n e between an i n t e r m e d i a r y s o u r c e o r t h e original Aristotelian e x p o s i t i o n . C o m p a r i s o n with t h e d o x o g r a p h i c texts I have sofar b e e n reviewing suggests a t h i r d possibility, viz. that P l u t a r c h is r e c o n c i l i n g a d o x o g r a p h i c s c h e m e with w h a t h e h a d f o u n d in t h e original expositions. 6 5 T h i s a s s u m p t i o n receives s o m e s u p p o r t f r o m a c o n s i d e r a t i o n of his t r e a t m e n t of Plato a n d Pythagoras. In the Placita tradition, Pythagoras a n d Plato are conj o i n e d as c h a m p i o n i n g bipartition ( a n d at least Plato as also positing tripartition, see above p. 65). Plutarch takes over this scheme, 6 6 a n d assigns to Plato t h e b i p a r t i t e a n d tripartite divisions: Plato disting u i s h e d between a rational a n d a non-rational part (τό παθητικόν m i άλογον) a n d t h e n subdivided t h e latter into the spirited a n d desiderative parts (441E-442C). Plutarch draws textual s u p p o r t f r o m Plato's a c c o u n t of the g e n e r a t i o n of t h e World-Soul at Tim. 35a ff. (cf. De gen. an. in Tim. 1012B ff.). 6 7 But w h e n it c o m e s to finding an a p p r o p r i a t e p r o o f - t e x t f o r Pythagoras, t h e r e is n o t e x t u a l e v i d e n c e . P l u t a r c h t h e r e f o r e resorts to a r e m i n d e r of Pythagoras' r e p u t e d interest in music, which, h e claims, p r e s u p p o s e s his a c c e p t a n c e of a non-rational e l e m e n t of t h e soul (441E). 6 8 In fact, P o s i d o n i u s f a c e d t h e s a m e difficulty as Plutarch w h e n h e wished to a c c o u n t f o r the attribution of bipartition to Pythagoras. His solution is d i f f e r e n t : Posidonius infers

μέρος γίνεσθαι τής ψυχής, επειδή δ ι μ ε ρ ή π ρ ό ς τ ή ν π α ρ ο ΰ σ α ν θεωρίαν ύπέθεντο τήν ψυχήν, ιό μεν λόγον έ'χουσαν, τό δ' άλογον. 64 T h a t Plutarch uses a traditional account r a t h e r than any original Aristotelian text is a r g u e d by D ü r i n g (1957) 353 ff. a n d S a n d b a c h (1982) 218 f. For a n o t h e r ( a p p a r e n t ) r e f e r e n c e to Aristotle's writings in a very similar context cf. Porphyry F 251 Smith, discussed infra, pp. 78 ff. 65 I have to disagree with V a n d e r W a e r d t (1985b) 379n.23 who considers this o p t i o n a case of 'having it b o t h ways' a n d as such suspect. T h e most economical explanation f r o m a logical p o i n t of view is not necessarily the most plausible o n e f r o m a historical point of view. 66 Pace V a n d e r W a e r d t (1985b) 380 n.25, who dismisses the possibility of Plutarch using the Planta with respect to Plato: 'It goes without saying that o n e would not expect Plutarch to resort to a d o x o g r a p h y for information a b o u t Plato.' Note the deliciously pejorative intonations with respect to doxography. 67 Babut (1969b) 136 n.28 suggests that Plutarch also bases himself on o t h e r passages in the Tim. viz. 41c ff., 69c ff., as well as Pit. 309c. 68 For music as used by the Pythagoreans to influence the non-rational part of the soul, see also De Is. et Os. 384A. T h e link between musical therapy a n d psychological dualism is also m a d e by Galen a n d still exerts a bad influence on presentday studies, see infra, pp. 242 ff.

t h e view of Pythagoras f r o m t h e e x t a n t writings of his pupils (who r e m a i n a n o n y m o u s ) . Presumably h e used p s e u d e p i g r a p h i c tracts prod u c e d in t h e late Hellenistic e r a when t h e r e was a g e n e r a l r e s u r g e n c e of i n t e r e s t in all t h i n g s P y t h a g o r e a n . 6 9 H o w e v e r this may be, t h e p r o c e d u r e s of Plutarch a n d Posidonius reveal the i m p o r t a n c e b o t h of d o x o g r a p h i c p a t t e r n s a n d of t h e wish of t h e s e a u t h o r s to a d d u c e proof-texts illustrating t h e tenets involved. T h e s e traditional p a t t e r n s could n o t simply be d r o p p e d or revised, it seems. Still it is noteworthy that P l u t a r c h h a d q u a l m s a b o u t t h e d o x o g r a p h i c ascription of t h e Platonic t r i p a r t i t i o n to Aristotle. If my r e a d i n g is c o r r e c t , h e h a d r e c o u r s e to a d e v e l o p m e n t a l s o l u t i o n . A n o t h e r l e a r n e d a u t h o r , t h o u g h , d i d r e f e r to t h e d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n ethics a n d scientific psychology as a m e a n s of m a k i n g s e n s e of this a s c r i p t i o n . I a m speaking of Porphyry.

7. Porphyry P o r p h y r y — t h e a u t h o r i t y we have sighted b e h i n d N e m e s i u s ' On the Nature of Man chs. 15 a n d 16—is an extremely valuable source f o r t h e p r e c e d i n g scholastic (notably Platonist) t r a d i t i o n . We a r e in a position to m a k e direct use of s o m e of his observations o n t h e parts a n d powers of t h e soul. An e x c e r p t f r o m his (lost) On the Powers of the SouP0 addresses the same subject-matter: In Plato and Aristotle in the ethical works [or: in ethics], the soul is said to be tripartite (τριμερής), and this (seil., opinion) has prevailed among the majority, who are unaware that the division of the structure (seil, of the soul) has been made because of the virtues; for [it has] not [been made] to capture all the parts. For obviously the imaginative (φανταστικόν) and perceptive (αίσθητικόν) and cognitive (νοερόν) and vegetative (φυτικόν) [seil, parts] have not been included in this division (Stob. Eel. I 49.25 a , p.350.19-25 = Fr. 253 Smith, in part). P o r p h y r y attests to t h e p r e v a l e n c e of t h e view t h a t Aristotle h a d e s p o u s e d t h e Platonic tripartition tout court—i.e. t h e view as it also a p p e a r s Galen in PHP b o o k s 4 a n d 5. Like P l u t a r c h , P o r p h y r y corrects this qualification with an a p p e a l to Aristotle's original writings. 7 1

69 70 71

Posid. ap. Gal. PHP5.6.43 = Test. 91/Fr. 151 E.-K. See supra, p. 40 n. 84. On this treatise see supra, p. 20. On Porphyry's study of Aristotle's writings see Beutler (1953) 282 fT.

H e e c h o e s t h e critique of t h e Platonic partition at On the Soul Γ 9.432a22 ff, in p a r t i c u l a r Aristotle's p o i n t t h a t t h e imaginative, perceptive a n d nutritive (θρεπτικόν, ο καί τοις φυτοίς υπάρχει καί πάσι τοις ζωοις) 7 2 faculties would have j u s t as strong a claim to the status of p a r t as the t h r e e parts singled o u t by Plato. 7 3 T h e psychic faculties m e n t i o n e d are j u s t examples: the faculties, Aristotle says, 'in a way seem infinite' (ibid. 432a24). In d u e course I shall r e t u r n to Aristotle's critique of soul-division which I take to be have b e e n highly influential in s h a p i n g the positions of s u b s e q u e n t p h i l o s o p h e r s of various d e n o m i n a t i o n s (see infra, pp. 274 ff.). W h e r e a s Plutarch a p p e a l e d to a d e v e l o p m e n t a l e x p l a n a t i o n , Porphyry relates Aristotle's criticism to a contextual d i f f e r e n c e between two sets of psychic f u n c t i o n s : (1) a tripartite or bipartite division b e l o n g i n g to t h e m o r a l a n d exclusively h u m a n sphere; (2) a n o t h e r division involving a larger ( p e r h a p s even infinitely large) n u m b e r , which b e l o n g s in the c o n t e x t of scientific psychology. As we have n o t e d in c o n n e c t i o n with Nemesius (above, p. 74), this p o i n t is anticipated by a passage in Nicomachean Ethics A. 13 where Aristotle makes t h e p o i n t — e c h o e d by P o r p h y r y — t h a t t h e virtues d e t e r m i n e t h e scope of psychological analysis in an ethical context (1102b11-12; b u t cf. also De an. A 1.402bl-5, q u o t e d n. 59). Moreover, Porphyry's surprising m e n t i o n of the νοερόν ('cognitive' 7 4 ) a m o n g the f u n c t i o n s n o t covered by the Platonic tripartition c a n n o t be paralleled f r o m the On the Soul passage b u t m a k e s excellent sense in the light of Aristotle's removal of purely intellectual t h o u g h t f r o m moral discourse in t h e s a m e c h a p t e r f r o m Nicomachean Ethics A (ibid. 1103a2). O n e m i g h t say that Porphyry read the passage f r o m the On the Soul in the light of Nicomachean Ethics A 13. 75 For o u r p u r p o s e s it is i m p o r t a n t to note, first, that Porphyry attests to the widespread idea that Aristotle, like Plato, h a d accepted the tripartition. Moreover, we must n o t e that Porphyry's r e m a r k s a r e motivated by the failure of his c o n t e m p o raries (or at any rate the later i n t e r p r e t e r s of Plato a n d Aristotle) to take a c c o u n t of the contextual distinction. W h o are they? O n e of the most influential d e f e n d e r s of the scientific (as well as moral) accuracy 72

In fact Plato does assign the nutritive function to the έπιθυμητικόν, Tim.

70d-e. 73

The same criticism applies to the division into τό λόγον εχον and τό άλογον, propounded by an anonymous group of Academics, cf. ibid. 24 ff. 74 On the sense of this term see PA 648a3; Pr. 954a35 /5 If we may believe Arabic catalogues, Porphyry wrote a commentary—now completely lost—in twelve books on the EN, see e.g. Bender (1953) 284 (nr. [16]).

of the Platonic tripartition was of course Galen. In t h e PHP h e even explicitly aligned the t e r m s s e p a r a t e d by Porphyry. 7 6 In view of t h e i n f l u e n c e e x e r t e d by this treatise in the 3rd c e n t u r y d e b a t e o n the location a n d s t r u c t u r e of the soul, it is extremely likely that h e is in the f o r e f r o n t of Porphyry's mind. 7 7

8. Conclusion: Galen Again T h e r e are g o o d s reasons f o r c o m p a r i n g t h e p a t t e r n of o p t i o n s a n d authorities in PHP 4-5 with relevant passages deriving f r o m the doxog r a p h i c tradition ( § 1 ) . U n f o r t u n a t e l y , the evidence f o r d o x o g r a p h i c s c h e m e s c o n c e r n e d with t h e ( n u m b e r of the) soul's f u n c t i o n s is f r a g m e n t a r y , s c a t t e r e d a n d derivative. It is n o l o n g e r possible to r e c o n s t r u c t a c o m p l e t e p i c t u r e of t h e relevant sections in the Planta tradition at a particular stage. Nonetheless, o u r survey has revealed a few facts of i m m e d i a t e relevance to G a l e n ' s h a n d l i n g of tenets a n d thinkers in PHP 4-5. O n the whole, the d i f f e r e n c e s a n d c o r r e s p o n d e n c e s between the various related sources we have b e e n reviewing suggests that a fairly c o m p r e h e n s i v e a n d d e t a i l e d version m u s t have b e e n available by G a l e n ' s time. 7 8 An impression of its elaborate quality is still conveyed by Tertullian in the case of t h e Stoics (§ 3) a n d by N e m e s i u s in the case of Aristotle (§ 5). T h e Placita at a certain stage p r e s e n t e d two c o l u m n s of faculties o n behalf of Aristotle (as well as Posidonius; see T e r t u l l i a n , § 3), o n e f o r ethics, a n o t h e r f o r scientific psychology. 7 9

76 Thus Galen identifies the Platonic appetitive part with Aristotelian nutritivecum-generative function (as well as Stoic 'nature'), holding the desirative part in the liver is the cause both of the digestive process and of conscious desires in a more morally relevant sense, see PHP6.3.7; cf. also 8.57, 77. 77 Cf. Tieleman (1996b), id. (1998). 78 Cf. Mansfeld (1990b) 3086. 79 It might be objected that Porphyry Fr. 253 indicates that it was he who introduced the contextual difference out of dissatisfaction with the attribution of tripartition tout court to Aristotle, which, unlike many authors who adopted it, he knew was not warranted (or at least was only the partial truth) from his own reading of the Aristotelian works; hence the presence of two lists of functions in Nemesius (chs. 15-6). Againt this proposal, one could point to (1) the traces of conflation of the two lists in authors like ps. Galen (supra, pp. 70 f.); (2) the indication for an analogous pair of series ascribed to Posidonius by Tertullian's source (supra, pp. 66 ff.); (3) the fact that the contextual difference is intimated by Aristotle himself and other authors who lived well before Porphyry, e.g. Arius Didymus (supra, pp. 74, 76 f. n. 63).

A desire for simplification p r o m p t e d the conflation of the two lists, or simply the selection of o n e of t h e m . E x a m p l e s are e p i t o m a t o r s as p s . P l u t a r c h (§ 2) a n d ps.Galen (§ 3) o r t h e i r sources, notably 'Aëtius'. 8 0 In this c o n n e c t i o n it should be recalled that the reflections of t h e Placita in G a l e n ' s own On Affected Parts III 5 indicate that h e was familiar with a c o m p i l a t i o n that was f u l l e r than Diels' r e c o n structed Aëtius a n d may have r e s e m b l e d the passage f r o m Tertullian m o r e closely than those f r o m T h e o d o r e t , ps.Plutarch a n d ps.Galen. 8 1 T e r t u l l i a n , On the Soul 14.2 illustrates o n e of the uses to which d o x o g r a p h i c s c h e m e s were put, viz. the tack of playing off against e a c h o t h e r t h e views of a g r o u p of p h i l o s o p h e r s (the Stoics in this particular case), i.e. the Sceptical t e c h n i q u e of διαφωνία. Christian apologists such as Tertullian o f t e n recycled this t e c h n i q u e as a m e a n s of b r i n g i n g o u t t h e prevailing d i s a g r e e m e n t a m o n g t h e i r p a g a n o p p o n e n t s . Galen a n d o t h e r s conveyed the impression of disagreem e n t a m o n g a m o r e specific g r o u p of o p p o n e n t s while at the same time using d o x o g r a p h i c s c h e m e s as overviews of t h e o p t i o n s that stood in principle o p e n to anyone who took part in the debate. It has already transpired that d i f f e r e n c e s such as those c o n s t r u e d between the Stoics in Tertullian's s c h e m e go back to shifts of e m p h a sis or r e f i n e m e n t s r a t h e r than f u n d a m e n t a l d e p a r t u r e s in the (often lost) original expositions. T h e s c h e m a t i z a t i o n involved (viz. t h e a s c e n d i n g n u m b e r of p o s t u l a t e d faculties) s h o u l d warn us against taking r e p o r t s of this kind f o r g r a n t e d . In this case, o t h e r sources p o i n t to u n a n i m i t y a m o n g the Stoics with respect of the c o n c e p t i o n of the p n e u m a t i c soul. Posidonius, it has to be stressed, is n o exception. 8 2 I n d e e d , the differences we have n o t e d between the ascriptions in a n u m b e r of particular cases attest to the fluidity of d o x o g r a p h i c s c h e m e s h a n d e d down in o n e a n d t h e s a m e tradition. No d o u b t s c h é m a s were f u r t h e r e l a b o r a t e d t h r o u g h t h e a d d i t i o n of intermediate or c o m p r o m i s e views. T h u s the view ascribed by Tertullian to Posidonius seems to be i n t e r m e d i a t e between the Stoic a n d Platonic positions. A n d if o u r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s a r e c o r r e c t , a very similar position is ascribed by N e m e s i u s to Aristotle. Such c h a n g e s of the n a m e s a t t a c h e d to certain tenets show o n c e m o r e that the pattern of o p t i o n s r a t h e r than the authorities involved d e t e r m i n e the resulting

80 81 82

See supra, p. 65 f., 70 f. See supra, p. 62 ff. See supra, p. 36 f.

s c h e m e . In s u m , it is necessary to c h e c k individual l e m m a s very carefully against o t h e r sources. Now exactly which c o r r e s p o n d e n c e s can be n o t e d between Galen a n d t h e s p e c i m e n s of t h e Placita tradition we have b e e n reviewing? First, b o t h Galen a n d t h e d o x o g r a p h i c r e p o r t s distinguish between t h e p a r t s vs. p o w e r issue o n t h e o n e h a n d a n d t h e issue of t h e n u m b e r of faculties on the o t h e r . O n e could say that PHP 4-5 is to be s u b s u m e d u n d e r the latter h e a d i n g . Secondly, G a l e n ' s attribution of the Platonic tripartition to Z e n o a n d Aristotle can b e paralleled f r o m the d o x o g r a p h i c tradition. A n d t h e s a m e p r o b a b l y h o l d s f o r his association of P o s i d o n i u s with Aristotle. We should note, t h o u g h , that we h e a r n o t h i n g f r o m Galen a b o u t any contextual d i f f e r e n c e such as u r g e d by Porhyry in line with the d o x o g r a p h i c schemes preserved by Nemesius a n d Tertullian (§ 7; cf. Plutarch, § 6). In ch. 5 I shall e x a m i n e the Galenic text with a view to answering t h e question w h e t h e r Galen is correct in ascribing his own scientific r e a d i n g of the tripartition to Posidonius. 8 3 A f u r t h e r p o i n t of c o n t a c t between Galen a n d the sources I have b e e n discussing lies in the assimilation of the Aristotelian bipartition a n d the Platonic tripartition which a p p e a r s to have o c c u r r e d n o t long a f t e r Aristotle's d e a t h . 8 4 In fact, this process of h a r m o n i z a t i o n may have b e e n stimulated, o r at least a p p e a r e d to be w a r r a n t e d , by the original texts themselves a n d Platonic passages implying bipartition. 8 5 83

See infra, pp. 198 ff. An early instance is ps. Arist., MM 1182a24 f. attributing the Aristotelian division into τό αλογον αλογον a n d τό εχον λόγον to Plato; cf. Vander Waerdt (1985a). This division as such was well-established d u r i n g Plato's lifetime, see e.g. Arist. Protr. frr. Β 23 f., Β 59-70, with discussion a n d f u r t h e r r e f e r e n c e s in V a n d e r W a e r d t (1985a) 283 f. 85 E.g. those passages in the Tim. where distinction between an immortal a n d mortal part is drawn, e.g. 35a-b, 41c-d, 69c, 69e, 72d, 90a-c. Galen, PHP9.9.8 refers to the view of certain Platonists who explained the use of ' m o r t a l ' for two of the soul's parts as p e r t a i n i n g to their inferiority vis-à-vis the rational part—which a m o u n t s to the rational/non-rational distinction ( u n d e r which n o special position is taken by the spirited part). Contrast V a n d e r W a e r d t (1985a) 299 ff., who dismisses as irrelevant the above passages f r o m the most influential Platonic dialogue; instead he emphasizes Resp. 441a ff. where θύμος is introduced as an ally of reason (after an initial bipartition into the rational a n d desiderative part). According to V a n d e r Waerdt, the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the Platonic tripartition in terms of the Aristotelian bipartition (viz. τό λόγον εχον and τό αλογον, cf. EN A 13) by the Middle Platonists and many others entailed a substantive deviation f r o m Plato's original position, there being n o special, intermediate role left for the spirited part. Nonetheless his admission ([1985b] 375η.8) that Galen was an exception because h e u p h e l d the original (anatomically based) version of the Platonic tripartition is odd, since Galen does speak in the same bipartite terms as his c o n t e m p o r a r i e s do: see 84

And, as we have seen, t h e r e are Aristotelian texts c o r r e s p o n d i n g to t h e Platonic tripartition insofar as t h e f o r m s of a p p e t i t i o n a r e conc e r n e d . 8 6 T h e b i p a r t i t i o n of Nicomachean Ethics A 1 3 - a n influential key p a s s a g e — c o u l d l e n d itself easily to a subdivision of t h e n o n r a t i o n a l part, r e s u l t i n g in tripartition in m u c h t h e s a m e way as at Aëtius, Placita IV 4.1. 8 7 I n d e e d , s o m e Aristotelian passages f e a t u r e tripartition w i t h o u t any sign of d o u b t o r disapproval. 8 8 T h a t Galen a c c e p t s t h e e q u i v a l e n c e of t h e b i p a r t i t e a n d tripartite s c h e m e s is b o r n e o u t by PHP 9.6.61. R e c o m m e n d i n g diaeresis as an indispensable m e t h o d f o r settling p r o t r a c t e d controversies, h e gives t h e n a t u r e of t h e virtues as an e x a m p l e . P h i l o s o p h e r s w h o q u a r r e l a b o u t this topic w o u l d have d o n e b e t t e r 'if they h a d divided ( δ ι ή ρ η ν τ ο ) t h e f o r m s [or: parts, ε ϊ δ η ] of t h e soul a n d clearly r e c o g n i z e d that t h e rational (λογιστικόν) is o n e a n d t h e n o n - r a t i o n a l (άλογον) a n o t h e r , a n d that the latter can be split u p in two sections as well.' O n c e again, b i p a r t i t i o n l e a d s t h e way, with t r i p a r t i t i o n r e s u l t i n g f r o m t h e s u b s e q u e n t subdivision of the αλογον. 8 9 Likewise Galen, s u m m a r i z i n g bks. 4 a n d 5, draws a distinction between o n e divine f o r m (είδος) a n d two affective ( π α θ η τ ι κ ά ) o n e s (9.9.7). 9 0 T h e division m a d e a n d

below in text. In fact Galen, as well as many others, employ a bipartite interpretation which is fully compatible with the intermediate role of the spirited element, and they were encouraged to do so by a number of Platonic passages.. There is no real difficulty here. The bipartite interpretation of Plato's psychology highlights the rational/non-rational aspect—the role of the spirited part is another matter. In this light, we need not take recourse to developmental solutions to explain both bipartite and tripartite formnulations in Plato, cf. e.g. Rees (1961). The fact that several other sources give the tripartition without the preliminary dichotomy should not be taken to point to the existence of a serious opposition between two schools of interpretation; cf. Vander Waerdt (1985b) 389 n.56. 86 See supra, p. 69. 87 See supra, p. 74. 88 Top. Ε 133 a 30-32 where 'having a tripartite (τριμερή) soul' serves as an instance of a property (seil, of man); cf. 113 a35, 126 a 6, 129 a 12 if., 136 b 10. Of course, passages such as these have stimulated developmental solutions; cf. von Arnim (1927). Today we prefer to regard these passage as giving merely dialectical examples which warrant no conclusions about any doctrinal commitment on Aristotle's part. 89 Similarly Alcin. Did. 5, 156.34-7 Η.: διαίρεσις μεν τοίνυν εστίν ή μεν γένους εις εϊδη τομή, ή δέ ολου εις μέρη · ώς ήνίκα τέμνομεν τήν ψυχήν εις τε τό λογικόν καί εις τό παθητικόν, και αύ πάλιν τό παθητικόν ε'ίς τε τό θυμικόν καί τό έπιθυμητικόν. 90 These Galenic passages refute the view taken by Vander Waerdt (1985b) 375 n.8 that Galen was exceptional in upholding the original Platonic version of tripartition with the spirited part in a truly intermediate position , see esp. RepublicA 441a ff. O n e of Vander Waerdt's main claims is that the ancient interpretation of the Platonic tripartite scheme in bipartite terms seriously distorts Plato's original intention but came to prevail among Platonists and others under Peripatetic influence.

justified in this context is entirely functional, i.e. non-anatomical. But that its influence could e x t e n d to anatomical contexts is clear f r o m o n e passage in book II, where Galen e n t e r t a i n s the possibility that both the spirited a n d desiderative parts reside in heart (2.7.17). This isolated passage illustrates a f u n d a m e n t a l weakness of Galen's project, viz. his failure to a c c o u n t satisfactorily for the interactions between the parts of the soul (most notably, that between the two nonrational ones) at the anatomical a n d physiological level. At any rate it seems clear that in passages like the o n e f r o m book 9 we have j u s t cited it is the traditional d o x o g r a p h i c division r a t h e r than Galen's own anatomical researches which d e t e r m i n e his m o d e of presentation, a n d that his overall treatment reveals that h e r e lies a problem of reconciliation between the two spheres which h e never adequately solved, or indeed faced. A u t h o r s such as Galen, Plutarch a n d Posidonius c o m e to the original expositions of classical authors with an expectation of which opinions are to find there. They had b e e n i n t r o d u c e d to these texts by their teachers a n d with the assistance of manuals a n d doxographic compilations. Obviously, they did n o t shed off this e d u c a t i o n when they became teachers of philosophy a n d authors in their own right. If only for reasons of convenience or simply out of habit, they may have c o n t i n u e d to follow their h a n d b o o k s alongside their reading of the classics. So when it comes to assessing their response to past philosophers such as Plato, Aristotle or Zeno, we should take a c c o u n t of the d o x o g r a p h i c tradition as well as t h e original texts (insofar as available). In addition, it should be said that n o t only tenets, but also a r g u m e n t s were lifted f r o m the original text a n d , o f t e n in a somewhat simplified f o r m , h a n d e d down b o t h in oral t e a c h i n g a n d in h a n d b o o k s and compilation. 9 1

But he gives too little weight to passages from other dialogues (Phaedr., Tim., Lg.) which tell in favour of a basic bipartition; when viewed in this light, Peripatetic influence appears to have been less crucial. The interfacing between the conception of the two schools also led to the ascription of tripartition to Aristotle—which could also be justified by reference to certain Aristotelian passages; see previous p. Cf. Arius Didymus' account of Peripatetic ethics: after describing the λογικόν as κριτικόν and the αλογον as όρμητικόν (a typically Stoic term), he divides the αλογον: καί του άλογου τό μεν όρεκτικόν των έφ ήμίν έπιθυμητικόν· τό δέ πρός τους πλησίον οίον άμυντικόν θ υ μ ι κ ό ν (EcL II ρ.117.12-18 W.). 91 Cf. Alcin. Did. c. XIV pp. 176-7 H.; ps.Plut. Utrum pars an facultas animi affectilms subiecta sit c. 2; Plut. Virt. Mor. 442B. A further parallel between Alcinous (ibid. 177 H.) and Galen (PHP 4.6.19 ff.) is their treatment of Euripides, Medea 1078-9.

T h e i m p o r t a n c e of t h e s c h e m e s p r o v i d e d by this tradition s h o u l d n o t b e u n d e r e s t i m a t e d . I n d e e d , original passages are q u o t e d to fill o u t a n d justify these schemes. T h e passages f r o m Plutarch (§ 6) a n d Porphyry (§ 7) we have discussed are highly interesting in this regard. T h e s e a u t h o r s try to c o r r e c t t h e a p p a r e n t discrepancy b e t w e e n t h e d o x o g r a p h i c ascription of tripartition tout court to Aristotle a n d what they r e a d in t h e original writings: Plutarch assumes a real discrepancy between t h e tripartition a n d bipartition which can only be solved by ascribing t h e f o r m e r to an early stage in Aristotle's career. Porphyry, as we have noticed, is motivated by passages f r o m t h e Aristotelian On the Soul a n d Nicomachean Ethics to insist o n a c o n t e x t u a l distinction. Both, it s h o u l d be e m p h a s i z e d , d o n o t dismiss t h e ascription of t h e tripartition to Aristotle altogether. So t h e fact that Galen q u o t e s so extensively f r o m the original expositions d o e s n o t p r e c l u d e his use of d o x o g r a p h i c s c h e m e s . O n t h e contrary, these s c h e m e s largely d e t e r m i n e t h e p a t t e r n of allegiances a n d silences to be f o u n d in PHP 4 a n d 5 a n d it is this p a t t e r n which is filled o u t by passages f r o m t h e original expositions of t h e authorities c o n c e r n e d . G a l e n ' s f o r c e d exegesis of Republic 4.436-440 in PHP5.7 is a case in p o i n t insofar as it shows Galen i m p o s i n g o n the Platonic text t h e d o x o g r a p h i c a l d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n two issues: (1) p a r t s o r powers? a n d (2) how many faculties? (see also above, p. 28 f.). T h a t pre-existing s c h e m e s r a t h e r t h a n i n d e p e n d e n t - m i n d e d study of primary sources largely d e t e r m i n e s G a l e n ' s t r e a t m e n t may also be i n f e r r e d f r o m 5.6.40-42. In t h e p r e c e d i n g c o n t e x t Galen has a r g u e d that C l e a n t h e s a c c e p t e d t h e Platonic tripartition, q u o t i n g a versified dialogue between reason a n d a n g e r c o m p o s e d by the latter (ibid. 35 ~ SVF 1.570). 9 2 H e i n t r o d u c e s this d i a l o g u e as evidence f o r the original view of b o t h C l e a n t h e s a n d his predecessor Zeno. This agrees with his attribution of t h e tripartition to these philosophers. 9 3 H e r e , however, his s o u r c e — P o s i d o n i u s — d o e s n o t provide a separate proof-text f r o m Z e n o a n d Galen is n o t able to p r o d u c e o n e either. A l t h o u g h at first h e takes t h e passage f r o m C l e a n t h e s as a d e q u a t e e v i d e n c e f o r t h e view of Z e n o t o o , h e e x c u s e s h i m s e l f a little f u r t h e r o n f o r n o t p r o v i d i n g a passage f r o m Z e n o (ibid. 40). 9 4 H e r e h e a p p e a l s to his 92

For a full discussion f r o m the Stoic perspective see infra, pp. 264 ff. See PHP 5.6.33, 34, 42; cf. 4.2.6, 4.38. Galen o n c e says that Chrysippus too admitted that the soul has three powers, 3.7.53; cf. 4.1.14. 94 T h a t is to say, he excuses himself for n o t looking u p a relevant passage in an original work by Zeno. T h a t Z e n o ' s treatises were still read in the second century c e is also attested by Epictetus, see Diss. 1.20.15, 4.9.6. 93

d e c i s i o n — d i c t a t e d by t h e c o n s t r a i n t s of t i m e — t o c o n c e n t r a t e o n Chrysippus. This is strange b e c a u s e h e has j u s t i n t r o d u c e d a passage f r o m C l e a n t h e s , in s u p p o r t of his claims a b o u t t h e latter as well as Z e n o . But it is n o less r e m a r k a b l e t h a t Galen h e r e says that t h e view of Z e n o stands in n e e d of e x a m i n a t i o n o n t h e basis of his own words. But Z e n o , h e goes o n to a r g u e , will have taken o n e of t h e following t h r e e views {ibid. 42): (1) Z e n o h e l d that a f f e c t i o n s a r e j u d g e m e n t s — t h e view of Chrysippus. If so, Z e n o is liable to t h e same r e f u t a t i o n as Chrysippus a n d n e e d s n o separate r e f u t a t i o n . (2) Z e n o a c c e p t e d Platonic p r i n c i p l e s — t h e view of C l e a n t h e s a n d Posidonius. If so, h e subscribes to t h e position d e f e n d e d by G a l e n a n d n e e d s n o r e f u t a t i o n either. (3) Z e n o t o o k a position i n t e r m e d i a t e b e t w e e n t h e best (2) a n d t h e worst (1) view, viz. t h a t a f f e c t i o n s supervene on j u d g e m e n t s . Alt h o u g h h e d o e s n o t explicitly say so, G a l e n a p p a r e n t l y takes this o p t i o n to have b e e n r e f u t e d a l o n g with (1). I n any case G a l e n says h e r e t h a t h e believes this was Z e n o ' s original view. O f c o u r s e this conflicts with t h e o t h e r passages w h e r e Z e n o is c r e d i t e d with t h e Platonic tripartiton, i.e. o p t i o n (2). In this passage G a l e n e n t a n g l e s himself in various self-contradictions. But what it shows above all is t h e d o m i n a n t role of s c h e m e s such as t h e p r e s e n t o n e . PHP 5.6.40-42 is striking precisely b e c a u s e Galen diverges f r o m his g e n e r a l p r o c e d u r e : instead of a p p o r t i o n i n g t h e o p t i o n s a m o n g t h e a u t h o r i t i e s a c c o r d i n g to a pre-existing diaeretic s c h e m a , h e now declares himself in favour of taking his p o i n t of d e p a r t u r e f r o m the original exposition. H e claims that Z e n o ' s original position s h o u l d be e x a m i n e d o n t h e basis of his own words, even t h o u g h h e has a t t r i b u t e d views to h i m in t h e p r e c e d i n g discussion w i t h o u t revealing any d o u b t s whatsoever. T h e views earlier ascribed to Z e n o are identical to two of t h e o p t i o n s in t h e above s c h e m a . T h e s a m e s c h e m a , t h e n , u n d e r l i e s t h e discussion as a whole. T h e only d i f f e r e n c e with t h e earlier passages is that h e r e Galen shows himself u n d e c i d e d as to which of t h e t h r e e o p t i o n s is t h e correct o n e (but, as e x p l a i n e d above, in all t h r e e cases h e can dispense with an i n d e p e n d e n t inquiry c o n c e r n i n g Z e n o ) . But as a rule, it clearly is the s c h e m e of o p t i o n s which c o m e s first a n d its c o r r o b o r a t i o n by m e a n s of prooftexts next. As a third e x a m p l e , it is instructive to c o m p a r e PHP 7.3, w h e r e we have s o m e t h i n g similar to P l u t a r c h ' s r e s p o n s e to t h e a t t r i b u t i o n of

t h r e e p a r t s to Aristotle. H e r e G a l e n a r g u e s t h a t Erasistratus first located the source of the nerves in the so-called thick m e m b r a n e (i.e. t h e d u r a m a t e r ) b u t that, w h e n later in his life h e p e r f o r m e d his dissections with greater care, h e discovered that the nerves grow f r o m t h e b r a i n itself, viz. f r o m t h e c e r e b e l l u m . T h i s later view is d o c u m e n t e d by the q u o t a t i o n of a relevant r e p o r t of a dissection (7.3.811). T h e earlier view ( ' n e r v e s grow f r o m t h e m e n i n x that encloses t h e b r a i n ' ) is said to be f o u n d in ' m o s t of his writings' b u t is n o t illus t r a t e d t h r o u g h citation. Did Erasistratus really c h a n g e his m i n d a b o u t t h e seat of t h e intellect? In t h e text q u o t e d by Galen this is n e i t h e r said n o r implied. T h e i n f o r m a t i o n given by Galen that Erasistratus at first h a d n o leisure to p e r f o r m his dissections with a d e q u a t e care (ibid. 7.3.7) looks g r a t u i t o u s . But it is worth n o t i n g that this alleged initial view can be paralleled f r o m t h e section in t h e Aëtian Placita c o n c e r n e d with t h e seat of the r e g e n t p a r t (ps.Plut. Plac. IV 5.3; cf. T h e o d . GACV 22): Ε ρ α σ ί σ τ ρ α τ ο ς περί τήν μήνιγγα του έγκβράλου, ήν έ π ι κ ρ α ν ί δ α λέγει. T h e t e r m μήνιγγα h e r e m e a n s t h e o u t e r m e m b r a n e or d u r a m a t e r , while έπίκρανις ('against the skull') d e n o t e s t h e p o s t e r i o r ventricle of t h e b r a i n which lies under t h e c e r e b e l l u m . 9 5 W h a t is m o r e , this l e m m a f r o m t h e Placita is e c h o e d by Galen himself in t h e first b o o k of his On the Use of Parts (p. 15.2 f. H e l m r e i c h : 6 μεν γ α ρ τήν κ α ρ δ ί α ν , ό δε τ ά ς μήνιγγας, ό δέ τον έγκέφαλον έν έαυτω φησιν έ'χειν τό τής ψ υ χ ή ς ήγεμονοΰν). T h e r e can be n o d o u b t that Erasistratus lurks b e h i n d t h e s e c o n d tenet. Galen merely selects f r o m a fuller s o u r c e ( f e a t u r i n g the n a m e s of a u t h o r i ties) what h e d e e m s sufficient in a p a r t i c u l a r c o n t e x t . 9 6 It is a fair a s s u m p t i o n that PHP 7.3 r e p r e s e n t s G a l e n ' s a t t e m p t to s q u a r e t h e t e n e t of Erasistratus h e knew f r o m t h e Placita with a passage f r o m Erasistratus himself which l e n d s s u p p o r t to G a l e n ' s own a n a t o m i c a l findings. In o r d e r to r e c o n c i l e t h e d o x o g r a p h i c ascription with his own r e a d i n g , G a l e n has r e c o u r s e to t h e s a m e ploy as we f o u n d Plutarch using (see above, p. 76), viz. the d e v e l o p m e n t a l solution. T o c o n c l u d e . O n the basis of the p r e c e d i n g overview the following e x p e c t a t i o n may be f o r m u l a t e d with r e g a r d to PHP 4 a n d 5. Galen derives d i a e r e t i c s c h é m a s f r o m t h e Placita t r a d i t i o n o r a p p l i e s a n a l o g o u s s c h é m a s of his own m a k i n g . W h e n it c o m e s to o p p o n e n t s such as t h e Stoics, h e employs these s c h é m a s in o r d e r to fabricate 95

Cf. Pollux, Onom. II 226; cf. II 46, p. 95.20-23, N e m e s . Nat. Morani with Mansfeld (1990b) 3093 n.143. 96 See supra, p. 63.

hom. 69.19-20

discrepancies between invididual Stoics or between the statements of one of them such as Chrysippus, who is his main target. In general the quotes from their original expositions, if available, are adduced to flesh out and illustrate the pre-existing schema. 97 Yet all kinds of interactions and some amount of wavering between the schémas and the original passages might occur because of certain differences between them. To be sure, these are assumptions that stand in need of further corroboration and explanation in each separate case. This further step crucially involves the study of the Stoic material itself. It will be taken in the next three chapters dealing with Chrysippus (chs. 3, 4) and Posidonius (ch. 5).

97

Cf. the 'plot' or 'argument' (ϋπόθεσις) which serves as the basis of a cento (Gr. κέντρων, 'patchwork', 'rag'). Here statements from an existing text are assembled in such a way that an entirely different story is created. Such a patchwork may serve a plurality of purposes. A prose cento may explicitly mention the source, or sources, used, or at least some of them. Comments of various sorts may be interspersed etc. It is often difficult to distinguish between a cento in the strict sense and a concatenation of quotes that have been assembled to serve a particular purpose. On the genre of cento, which in Galen's day had become quite popular, see Mansfeld (1992) 152 ff., id. (1999) 28, with further references. Mansfeld also notes the similarities between the cento and certain forms of philosophical and religious polemic as practised in Galen's day. On the possibility of relating the cento to doxography see Diels, D. G. 171 f. Cf. also Schoedel (1959) 23 f., who points to the issues listed at Irenaeus, Adv. haeres. II 28.2, which correspond to some of the material to be found in ps. Plutarch/Aëtius, Plac. III.

CHAPTER THREE

CHRYSIPPUS' ON AFFECTIONS·. T H E T H E O R E T I C A L B O O K S (I-II)

1. Number of Books, Length and Contents T h e a n c i e n t s saw t h e idea of a f f e c t i o n s as j u d g e m e n t s as t h e m a i n thesis of Chrysippus' On Affections. N o t only d o e s it provide t h e focal p o i n t f o r G a l e n ' s critique, it also t h e thesis f o r which t h e treatise is cited by D i o g e n e s Laertius (7.111 ~ SVF 2.456). O n its overall contents we are f u r t h e r i n f o r m e d by Galen a n d Cicero, a l t h o u g h their i n f o r m a t i o n is n o t as clear a n d precise as we would like it to be. C h r y s i p p u s ' work, Galen tells us, consisted of f o u r books, e a c h of which was twice t h e l e n g t h of a b o o k of his own PHP (5.6.45 ~ SVF 3 . 4 5 8 ) . 1 T h i s p o i n t is m a d e in s u p p o r t of t h e c h a r g e of verbosity Galen o f t e n levels against his o p p o n e n t s , contrasting this f e a t u r e with t h e ideal of scientific ( ' g e o m e t r i c a l ' ) brevity (cf. e.g. 8.1.17-48). But even allowing f o r s o m e d e g r e e of e x a g g e r a t i o n , we n e e d n o t d o u b t t h a t t h e treatise as a w h o l e was substantial. F u r t h e r , f r o m a n o n p o l e m i c a l passage in G a l e n ' s On Affected Parts we learn s o m e t h i n g a b o u t Chrysippus' aims a n d m e t h o d s : ... t h e o r e t i c a l are all t h o s e [ s t u d i e s ] w h i c h g o i n g b e y o n d practical utility c o n s i d e r t h e n a t u r e o f things, o f w h a t e v e r kind they are with r e s p e c t to their o w n e s s e n c e : thus, for instance, Chrysippus the philos o p h e r , t o o , wrote o n the a f f e c t i o n s o f the soul o n e b o o k Therapeutics, w h i c h w e u s e a b o v e all with a view to their c u r e , a n d t h r e e o t h e r s c o n t a i n i n g theoretical (λογικάς) i n q u i r i e s .(Loc. A f f . Ill, 1: VIII p. 138 Κ. ~ S V F 3 . 4 5 7 ) . 2

1

.. ώς τοΰτο γε [seil, how to speak more briefly without omitting anything essential] καί έξ αύτών ών εγραψε Χρύσιππος Περί παθών ενεστι καταμαθεΐν. τεττάρων γαρ βιβλίων οϋτω μεγάλων αύτφ γεγραμμένων ώσθ' εκαστον είναι διπλάσιον των ημετέρων, ομως ημείς ούδ' έν ολοις δύο την περί των παθών αύτοΰ γνώμην έξητάκαμεν. 2 τα μέν ούν τοιαύτα λογικώτερά πως εφην είναι · λογικά γαρ όντως εστίν οσα της χρείας έπέκεινα προερχόμενα την φύσιν άθρεί τών πραγμάτων, οποία τις υπάρχει κατά την οίκείαν ούσίαν · οϋτως γοΰν καί Χρύσιππος ό φιλόσοφος έγραψεν περί τών της ψυχής παθών εν μέν τό θεραπευτικόν βιβλίον, ού μάλιστα χρήζομεν εις την ϊασιν αύτών, έτερα δέ τρία λογικάς έχοντα ζητήσεις.

Galen uses t h e division of subject-matter e x e m p l i f i e d by Chrysippus' treatise to illustrate a p o i n t of his own. I n d e e d , h e a p p e a r s to r e c o m m e n d t h e Stoic's n e a t a r r a n g e m e n t a n d speaks in t h e first plural almost as if h e a n d m a n y o t h e r s use t h e Therapeutics as an authoritative g u i d e in m o r a l affairs. I shall r e t u r n to its s u p p o s e d popularity in t h e separate c h a p t e r devoted to the Therapeutics.3 But a few q u e s t i o n s r e m a i n : Is t h e d e s i g n a t i o n of t h e first t h r e e as λογικά C h r y s i p p e a n o r at least early Stoic in origin? 4 A n d if so, is G a l e n ' s gloss ' t h e o r e t i c a l ' correct? W h e n we t u r n to t h e PHP, we f i n d that Galen employs the same g e n e r a l characterization of the books of Chrysippus' treatise: '.... h i s e n t i r e treatise On Affections, t h e t h r e e b o o k s in w h i c h h e investigates theoretical (λογικά) q u e s t i o n s a b o u t t h e m a n d m o r e o v e r 5 t h e Therapeutics, w h i c h is a l s o e n t i t l e d Ethics by s o m e ...' ( 4 . 1 . 1 4 , p . 2 3 8 . 4 - 6 - SVF3.461).6

In r e g a r d to t h e f o u r t h a n d last b o o k Galen implies that Therapeutics was t h e title given by Chrysippus, a n d Ethics that e m p l o y e d by certain o t h e r s (see also 5.7.52, q u o t e d b e l o w ) . But it r e m a i n s u n c e r t a i n w h e t h e r Chrysippus himself r e f e r r e d to t h e first t h r e e b o o k s as t h e λογικά, t h o u g h this would seem plausible given his use of a s e p a r a t e title f o r t h e last o n e . O n t h e o t h e r h a n d t h e fact that o t h e r s t h a n Chrysippus are responsible f o r an alternative title f o r t h e Therapeutics urges us to exercise c a u t i o n . A l t h o u g h in t h e f r a g m e n t s themselves t h e t e r m d o e s n o t f e a t u r e , G a l e n r e f e r s f o u r m o r e times to t h e first t h r e e b o o k s as λ ο γ ι κ ά in a casual way s u g g e s t i n g t h a t it was t h e i r s t a n d a r d designation (4.5.10, 4.7.21, 5.7.52, 8.1.47). This b r o a d characterization of t h e books, at any event, seems to be b o r n e o u t by t h e f r a g m e n t s . Galen directly q u o t e s several passages f r o m b o o k s 1 a n d 4 a n d a few f r o m b o o k 2 as h e f o u n d t h e m in P o s i d o n i u s ' On Affections. H e d o e s n o t q u o t e f r o m o r r e f e r to b o o k 3—a silence c o m p a r a b l e to that s u r r o u n d i n g t h e s e c o n d b o o k On the Soul a n d s h a r e d by o u r o t h e r m a i n source, Cicero. 7 Book 1 o f f e r e d a 3

See infra, pp. 140 f. Fillion-Lahille (1984) 82 ff. takes it thus, using the appellation 'Logikon' as if it were a separate title for the first books on a par with Therapeutics. 5 De Lacy prints the word concerned with a capital Θ yet translates 'the book on their cure'. 6 τά Περί παθών άπαντα, τά τε τρία δι' ών έπισκέπτεται τά λογικά περί αυτών ζητήματα καί προσέτι τό Θεραπευτικόν, δ δή καί 'Ηθικόν έπιγράφουσι τίνες ... 7 On this silence see supra, p. 55 (ch. 1); on Cicero see further, infra, pp. 302 ff. (ch. 6). 4

discussion of Zeno's definitions of affection a n d its main species and so was c o n c e r n e d with their nature, including their cause. Book 2 discussed at least a series of difficulties (άπορίαι) posed by certain everyday p h e n o m e n a a n d featuring prominently the question of the cause, i.e. w h e t h e r the p h e n o m e n a c o n c e r n e d can be causally explained within the f r a m e w o r k of the Stoic unitary theory. This overall a r r a n g e m e n t can be paralleled f r o m medical literature, where we e n c o u n t e r the same sequence of nature-cum-cause and therapy. 8 Closer inspection of the evidence indicates that the Therapeutics o f f e r e d far m o r e theory than Galen's distinction might suggest. It offered a summary of the o p e n i n g section of book l. 9 T h e r e are some indications that this f e a t u r e is d u e to the fact the Therapeutics was designed to stand on its own feet, that is to say for use by those, Stoics a n d others, who were m o r e interested in the practical side of Stoic moral thought. In this light it would have m a d e sense for Chrysippus to r e p e a t t h e gist of the theoretical discussion a n d show what practical consequences might follow f r o m it. A different reason—not necessarily e x c l u d i n g the f o r m e r — m a y lie in the role played by 'theoretical' e l e m e n t s such as definition in the Stoic conception of therapy. C o m p a r e what o u r o t h e r main source, Cicero, has to say with reference to Chrysippus' treatise: ... w h e n C h r y s i p p u s a n d t h e S t o i c s 1 0 d i s c u s s t h e s o u l ' s a f f e c t i o n s , t h e y a r e in l a r g e p a r t e n g a g e d in d i v i d i n g a n d d e f i n i n g t h e m ; q u i t e b r i e f is that exposition of theirs o n h o w they c u r e t h e souls a n d d o n o t 8 Thus Diocles of Carystus {/lor: c. 350 bce) wrote a treatise entitled Πάθος αιτία θεραπεία (Gal. Loc. ä f f . VIII p.186 K.) and Praxagoras of Cos (Jlor. c. 300 b c e ) an Α'ίτια πάθη θεραπείαι (from Cael. Aurel. Ac. morb. Ill 17.163[Fr. 109 St.]: 'libris de causis atque passionibus et curationibus', cf. Steckerl (1961) 5: Πάθη Αίτίαι Θεραπείαι). Caelius also ascribes to Praxagoras a 'quarto libro Curationum' (Ac. morb. Ill 4.32 = fr. I l l St.) and knows about a 'tertio libro de morbis' (Chron. morb. V 2.50 = fr. 81 St.). Pace Steckerl (1961) 5 and Bardong, ßEXXII.2 (1954) 1736, these three references may be to one and the same original work. On Praxagoras and Stoicism see infra, p. 192 n. 174 and text thereto. Of course the sequence in which an affection was described first and then its cure prescribed is fairly general and encountered also in such treatises as Philodemus' On Anger and Plutarch's On Garrulity and On Bad Shame. De Lacy ad 238.4-6, who notes the correspondence, suggests that Chrysippus set the pattern for many subsequent moral essays. 9 Thus the two substantial fragments from book 1 presented at PHP 4.2.10-12, 14-18 (SVF 3.462) can be paralleled from 4.4.16-17 and 24, 30, 31, 32 (SVF 476, omitting 30), all from book 4. Two further fragments from book 4 also e c h o Chrysippus' explanation at the beginning of book 1: 4.5.13-14 (SVF479) and 4.6.35 (SVF478). Galen explicitly remarks on two such correspondences, 4.4.23, 4.5.10. On these passages see further infra, nn. 51, 63 and text thereto. 10 This formulation amounts to 'Chrysippus as followed by other Stoics', see Dougan and Henry ad loc. On the context in Cicero, see further infra, pp. 292 ff.

permit them [i.e. the souls] to be disturbed (Cicero, Tusc. 4.9 ~ SVF 3.483)." Cicero is h e r e r e f e r r i n g to a particular f e a t u r e of t h e Stoic a p p r o a c h , viz. t h e fact that definition h a d a role to play in therapy a n d t h e r e f o r e even l o o m e d large in t h e separately e n t i t l e d t h e r a p e u t i c a l b o o k . At 4.53 h e himself indicates very clearly that t h e study of (Stoic) m o r a l d e f i n i t i o n s is c o n d u c i v e to m a s t e r i n g affections. I shall r e t u r n to this p o i n t presently. But C i c e r o will h a r d l y have s p o k e n of t h e Stoic therapeutical discourse as 'quite b r i e f w h e n it o c c u p i e d a whole ( a n d a c c o r d i n g to G a l e n long) b o o k . W h a t may also have struck h i m was t h e e m p h a s i s p l a c e d by t h e Stoic o n t h e preventive side of t h e r a p y ( h e r e p e r h a p s i n d i c a t e d by t h e p h r a s e nec ... patiantur, ' a n d d o n o t p e r m i t t h e m ...'). 1 2 T h e q u e s t i o n of t h e role played by t h e o r y in C h r y s i p p e a n t h e r a peutics gains a d d i t i o n a l weight in t h e light of t h e m o d e r n view that Hellenistic m o r a l t h e o r y ( i n c l u d i n g Stoic ethics) t o o k its starting p o i n t f r o m t h e individual with his or h e r needs, feelings a n d o p i n i o n s without o b t r u d i n g a d o g m a t i c world-view. 13 T h a t t h e Therapeutics may also have b e e n i n t e n d e d f o r separate use may b e s u g g e s t e d — i n a d d i t i o n to its s e p a r a t e title 1 4 a n d t h e above passage f r o m G a l e n — b y t h e following testimony: Not only in this book [seil, the first book On the soul] was he [seil. Chrysippus] completely silent about Plato's arguments, 1 5 but also in his writings On Affections, both the three theoretical ones and that which was written by him separately and apart from these, that which is entitled Therapeutics and Ethics (PHP 5.7.52 ~ SVF 3.461; cf. 4.1.14). 16 T h i s t e s t i m o n y c o n f i r m s t h e division b e t w e e n t h e first t h r e e a n d t h e final b o o k s of t h e t r e a t i s e a n d p e r h a p s even s u p p o r t s t h e 11

Chrysippus et Stoici cum de animi perturbationibus disputant, magnam partem in his partiendis et definiendis occupati sunt; ilia eorum perexigua oratio est qua medeantur animis nec eos turbulentos esse patiantur. 12 See further infra, pp. 141, 167 ff. 13 See further infra, pp. 141 ff., 167. 14 Origenes, Contra Celsum I 64, VIII 51 (vol. 1, p. 117.16 ff., vol. 2, p. 266.18 ff. Kö. ~ SVF 3.474) too uses the separate tide Therapeutics but refers to it as part of the A f f . Cf. also Philod. De ira Col. I . 11-19 Indelli. 15 The silence about Plato may not have been as complete as Galen claims but the objection appears to reflect an authentic feature of Chrysippean dialectic, see Tieleman (1996a) 141,256. 16 ού μόνον δέ κατά τούτο έσιώπησε τούς τού Πλάτωνος λόγους άλλα και κατά τά περί παθών συγγράμματα, τά τε τρία τά λογικά καί χωρίς αύτών ιδία γεγραμμένον ύπ' αύτοΰ, τό Θεραπευτικόν τε και 'Ηθικόν έπιγραφόμενον.

assumption that the Therapeutics was d e s i g n e d to be m o r e or less selfcontained. It is t e m p t i n g to s u p p o s e that C h r y s i p p u s himself h a d u s e d t h e t e r m λογικά to c h a r a c t e r i z e certain parts of his treatise. But did h e m e a n t h e s a m e by it as G a l e n did in t h e passage f r o m On Affected Parts? A n o t h e r s n i p p e t of e v i d e n c e is especially valuable since it c o m e s f r o m a n o t h e r source, viz. Cicero. C o n c l u d i n g his a c c o u n t of t h e c o n t e n t s of the On Affections, h e says: H e r e y o u h a v e w h a t t h e S t o i c s d i s c u s s in p l a i n t e r m s a b o u t t h e a f f e c t i o n s . T h e y call t h e s e t h i n g s λ ο γ ι κ ά , b e c a u s e t h e y a r e e x p o u n d e d in a r a t h e r u n a d o r n e d f a s h i o n . A n d s i n c e o u r e x p o s i t i o n h a s s a i l e d away f r o m t h e s e t h i n g s as f r o m r o u g h cliffs, let u s h o l d o u r c o u r s e f o r t h e r e s t of o u r d i s q u i s i t i o n , p r o v i d e d t h a t w e h a v e s p o k e n a b o u t t h o s e t h i n g s with s u f f i c i e n t l u c i d i t y g i v e n t h e o b s c u r i t y of o u r s u b j e c t - m a t t e r ( Tusc. 4 . 3 3 ) .

Cicero m a k e s it clear that the Stoics themselves spoke of λογικά a n d this m u s t i n c l u d e Chrysippus whose treatise h e has j u s t s u m m a r i z e d a n d whose n a m e h e used at the outset of his s u m m a r y (4.9). However C i c e r o takes t h e t e r m λογικά in t h e sense of ' p l a i n ' , ' u n a d o r n e d ' , w h i c h is r a t h e r d i f f e r e n t f r o m G a l e n ' s ' t h e o r e t i c a l ' . C i c e r o has c h o s e n to r e p r o d u c e the Stoic a c c o u n t b e c a u s e of its terseness a n d precision, t h i n k i n g primarily of the d e f i n i t i o n s in b o o k I b u t also, it seems, of t h e c o n t e n t s of t h e Therapeutics. T h e above observation is m e a n t to c o n c l u d e t h e s u m m a r y of C h r y s i p p u s ' whole treatise, i.e. i n c l u d i n g t h e section covering t h e Therapeutics (4.23-32). 1 7 T h i s last b o o k , as we n o t i c e d , r e p e a t e d m u c h of t h e t h e o r y i n c l u d i n g t h e definitions e x p o u n d e d in t h e first book. But t h e n f o r Cicero the term λογικά s e e m s to have a stylistic a p p l i c a t i o n . H e uses this t e r m to o p p o s e t h e C h r y s i p p e a n t r e a t m e n t to t h e m o r e expansive style o n which h e e m b a r k s in what follows. Accordingly h e d o e s n o t apply it to b o o k s o r sections, b u t r a t h e r to their c o n t e n t s (using, r a t h e r vaguely, p r o n o u n s in t h e n e u t r e p l u r a l ) . It is h a r d to believe that h e simply l u m p s t o g e t h e r t h e o r y a n d (Stoic) dialectic (as c o n c e r n e d with d e f i n i t i o n ) . It is however also possible that Cicero used an abstract, or r e p o r t , in which t h e division of s u b j e c t - m a t t e r a m o n g the original books was b l u r r e d (see f u r t h e r below, p p . 302 ff.). But d o e s Cicero's mistake, or p r o b a b l e mistake, a b o u t the sense of λογικά, m e a n t h a t Galen is right? W h a t is k n o w n a b o u t its original Stoic m e a n i n g ? T h e Stoics used t h e t e r m λ ο γ ι κ ό ς in t h e sense of 1

' Pace H e i n e ad loc.

logical, p e r t a i n i n g to logic, o r in t h e sense of r a t i o n a l (as in t h e expression 'rational a n i m a l ' ) . T h e first sense could b e related to what is k n o w n a b o u t b o o k I if we take it to p e r t a i n to t h e p a r t of logic ( a n d , m o r e specifically, d i a l e c t i c ) d e a l i n g with d e f i n i t i o n s a n d partitions. T h e use of these m e t h o d s is particularly evident in ethical texts. 1 8 In On Affections b o o k 1 we c o m e across Z e n o ' s d e f i n i t i o n as t h e result of t h e p r o c e d u r e of articulation of c o m m o n c o n c e p t i o n s , t h e latter r e p r e s e n t i n g t h e stage c h a r a c t e r i z e d as t h e ' a c c o u n t in o u t l i n e ' (see below). Moreover, we find h e r e t h e division of affection a c c o r d i n g to g e n e r a a n d species. However, t h e aporiai of b o o k 2 clearly b e l o n g to a d i f f e r e n t b r a n c h of logic t h a n t h e c o n c e p t u a l articulation of b o o k 1, a n d it is difficult to t h i n k of a sense of λογικά a p p l i c a b l e to b o t h books. In s u m , G a l e n ' s e x p l a n a t i o n may b e t h e correct one.

2. Zeno 's Definitions of Affection M o d e r n r e s e a r c h has s o m e w h a t n e g l e c t e d t h e Stoic c o n c e p t — a n d m e t h o d — o f definition. 1 9 Yet t h e r e can be n o d o u b t as to its centrality to Stoic p h i l o s o p h i c a l m e t h o d . D e f i n i t i o n starts f r o m t h e ' o u t l i n e ' (υπογραφή), which a c c o r d i n g to Diogenes is a ' s t a t e m e n t i n t r o d u c i n g us to things by m e a n s of a sketch, or which conveys t h e f o r c e of t h e definition m o r e simply t h a n a definition d o e s ' (7.60). In o t h e r words, it is t h e f o r m u l a used f o r t h e p r e l i m i n a r y step of m a r k i n g off a defin i e n d u m , p r i o r to the c o n s t r u c t i o n of a t r u e d e f i n i t i o n . T h e a c c o u n t in o u t l i n e states a g e n e r a l c o n c e p t i o n ( έ ν ν ο ι α ) ; t h e d e f i n i t i o n c o n verts this into a philosophical c o n c e p t . T h u s a n o t h e r witness states: The Stoics [...] affirm that from the senses the intellect forms conceptions—which they call εννοιαι—viz. of those things which they articulate by definition. The entire method of learning and teaching, they say, stems and spreads from here (Augustine, Ci v. dei 8.7 ~ SVF 2.106). 20

18

See from the Tusc. itself 4.53 (LS 32 H); cf. also the list of ethical works with the heading 'Ethical theory concerning the articulation of moral conceptions', D.L. 7.199-200. 19 But Long-Sedley (1987) 190-5 assemble and excellently discuss a number of texts concerned with division and definition; cf. also Rieth (1933) 36-54. 20 Cf. D.L. 7.199, ps. Gal. Def. med. XIX p. 348.17-349.4 K., Plut. De comm. not. 1059C (SVF 2.33); cf. also Stob. Eel. II p. 67.11-12 Wachsmuth = SVF 3.294). Both the notion of 'account in outline' and the related procedure of articulation are

T h e reference to learning shows that definition as conceived by the Stoics is aimed at articulating what is true (cf. D.L. 7.42). After all, c o n c e p t i o n s are the very stuff of rationality a n d , when naturally e m b e d d e d in us, a primary criterion of truth. 2 1 This also holds good for the sphere of moral action. Accordingly, Cicero c o m m e n d s definitions of courage advanced by Chrysippus and other Stoics as follows: ' [ . . . ] I ' m a f r a i d t h e y m a y b e t h e o n l y r e a l p h i l o s o p h e r s . F o r w h i c h of t h o s e d e f i n i t i o n s d o e s n o t u n c o v e r t h e t a n g l e d c o n c e p t i o n of c o u r a g e w h i c h lies b u r i e d w i t h i n us all? A n d o n c e t h i s h a s b e e n u n c o v e r e d , who would require anything m o r e for the warrior, the general, or the o r a t o r , a n d n o t t h i n k t h e m c a p a b l e of p e r f o r m i n g any c o u r a g e o u s act w i t h o u t r a g e ? (Tusc. 4 . 5 3 ) . 2 2

T h u s the Stoics a d o p t e d the intellectualist position—here endorsed by Cicero— that to know a particular virtue r e n d e r s us capable of p e r f o r m i n g it. But this knowledge is in n e e d of articulation and, as Cicero indicates, should be b r o u g h t to full consciousness. O n e may assume that an analogous position was a d o p t e d with respect to the affections: to know them is a m e a n s of preventing them to strike h o m e . If o n e is able to recognize which condition is at the verge of taking hold of us, it may still be stopped through rational means, i.e. by letting o n e ' s better self persuade us to respond differently to the mental presentation in question. T h e long lists of affections, each carefully defined and subsumed u n d e r o n e of the four generic affections (pleasure, appetite, distress, fear), that have been preserved in sources such as Diogenes Laertius, Stobaeus or ps.Andronicus, for all their a p p a r e n t aridity, reflect an a u t h e n t i c f e a t u r e of the original expositions which was geared to a therapeutic purpose. 2 3 T h u s the division between the theoretical a n d practical sides of the Stoic doctrine of the affections should not be exaggerated. In Chrysippus' treatise, too, the definitions of the first books did not only belong to a strictly theoretical sphere, but were also designed to influence moral Aristotelian in origin, see e.g. ENA 7.1098a20-9, Met Ζ 3.1029a7, ibid. 1028b31; De an. Β 1.413a9-10; cf. EE 1248b 10. On the affinities with Stoicism see also Rieth (1933) 176 f. 21 Aet. IV 11.3-4 (SVF2.83), D.L. 7.54 (SVF2.105) with Long-Sedley (1987), vol. 1, 194. 22 Metuo ne soli philosophi sint. Quae enim islarum definitionum non aperil notionem nostram quam habemus omnes de fortitudine tectam atque involutam ? Qua aperla quis est qui aut bellatori aut imperatori aot oratori quaerat aliquid neque eos existumet sine rabie quicquam fortiter faeere posse? 23 See the evidence collected, SVF3.391-430.

a c t i o n . A n d t h e s t i p u l a t i o n s of t h e Therapeutics r e m a i n e d firmly r o o t e d in the Stoic d o c t r i n e a b o u t the n a t u r e a n d cause of t h e affections. 2 4 But t h e n Stoic philosophy in g e n e r a l was never theoretical in this strict sense b u t m e a n t to b e relevant to living a well-reasoned life. 25 Let us now take a closer look at t h e evidence in PHP relating to Chrysippus' use of definitions. First o n e may ask w h e t h e r t h e r e are any i n d i c a t i o n s that Chrysippus e m p l o y e d t h e distinction b e t w e e n ' a c c o u n t in o u t l i n e ' a n d technical d e f i n i t i o n in t h e c o n t e x t of t h e p r o c e d u r e of articulation. Chrysippus employed such a m e t h o d when h e set o u t to establish t h e location of t h e intellect in the s e c o n d half of the first b o o k of his On the Soul—the t h e m e of the p r e d e c e s s o r of t h e p r e s e n t study ( T i e l e m a n 1996a, Pt. II). As to t h e a f f e c t i o n s , Chrysippus could avail himself of the technical definitions laid down by Z e n o in t h e l a t t e r ' s own On Affections26 o r p e r h a p s e x p r e s s e d orally. 27 I n d e e d , taking o n e ' s starting p o i n t f r o m Z e n o seems to have b e e n de rigoeur f o r any Stoic. In a d d i t i o n to c u r r e n t ideas o n philosophical allegiance, 2 8 it was also i m p o r t a n t to d e m o n s t r a t e t h e unity a n d continuity of o n e ' s school. T h u s a d d i t i o n s a n d i n d e e d adjustm e n t s — o f t e n occasioned by d e b a t e a n d criticism—were c o u c h e d in t h e f o r m of t h e exegesis of t h e f o u n d e r ' s ipsissima verba. Anti-Stoic a u t h o r s such as Galen a n d Plutarch provide m a n y e x a m p l e s showing that this did n o t prevent Stoics f r o m b e i n g played off against Zeno or o n e a n o t h e r . For the m o m e n t suffice it to observe that t h e t e c h n i q u e of s t a r t i n g f r o m Z e n o ' s d e f i n i t i o n s was s t a n d a r d p r o c e d u r e , p e r p e t u a t e d by later Stoics i n c l u d i n g P o s i d o n i u s w h o also t o o k Chrysippus' exegesis into account. 2 9 Chrysippus first t u r n e d to Z e n o ' s g e n e r a l definition of ' a f f e c t i o n ' , viz. as a n ' i r r a t i o n a l a n d u n n a t u r a l m o t i o n of t h e soul a n d an

24

I shall justify this statement more fully when dealing with the Therapeutics in ch. 6 below. 25 Aetius, Praef. 2 (SVF2.35): 'The Stoics said that [...] philosophy is the practice of expertise in utility.' Cf. Long-Sedley (1987), vol. 1, 161. 26 D.L. 7.4. It is referred to ibid.. 110 (SVF 1.211) in connection with Zeno's fourfold classification of affections. 27 Galen presents what looks like a verbatim fragment from Posidonius saying that the definition of άτη ('baneful blindness') and 'many other affections' were pronounced by Zeno but recorded by Chrysippus (PHP4.6.2, p. 280 De Lacy, SVF 3.481, Posid. fr. 165 E.-K.); cf. De Lacy ad loc. On the 'blindness' at issue here see further infra, pp. 178 ff. 28 On which see Sedley (1989). 29 See infra, pp. 116 ff.

excessive c o n a t i o n ' (άλογον τε και π α ρ ά φύσιν κίνησιν ψυχής [...] καί π λ ε ο ν ά ζ ο υ σ α ν όρμήν, 4.2.8, ρ. 238 De Lacy). 3 0 It is a fair a s s u m p t i o n that this d e f i n i t i o n , like those of t h e f o u r g e n e r i c affections, 3 1 h a d b e e n a d v a n c e d by Z e n o in his On Affections. In o u r parallel passages t h e two parts of this d e f i n i t i o n a r e p r e s e n t e d as alternative descriptions by m e a n s of t h e disjunctive ' o r ' instead of ' a n d ' b u t it is n o t impossible that G a l e n ' s καί is to be r e a d as explicative, with 'excessive' e x p l a i n i n g 'irrational a n d u n n a t u r a l ' a n d ' c o n a t i o n ' specifying t h e k i n d of m o t i o n m e a n t . 3 2 O n t h e o t h e r h a n d Galen also distinguishes b e t w e e n ' i r r a t i o n a l a n d u n n a t u r a l m o t i o n ' a n d 'excessive c o n a t i o n ' , t h u s suggesting that we a r e d e a l i n g with two d e f i n i t i o n s (ibid. 13, p.240, 11.30-33). In his exegesis of these two definitions Chrysippus successively addressed t h e e l e m e n t s of 'irrational', ' u n n a t u r a l ' a n d 'excessive'. F r o m this c o n t e x t Galen q u o t e s t h e following substantial passage, 4.2.10-12: 33 ( 1 0 ) First it s h o u l d b e k e p t in m i n d t h a t t h e r a t i o n a l a n i m a l is by n a t u r e s o m e t h i n g t h a t f o l l o w s r e a s o n a n d a c t s in a c c o r d a n c e w i t h r e a s o n as its g u i d e . (11) O f t e n , h o w e v e r , h e m o v e s d i f f e r e n t l y t o w a r d s c e r t a i n t h i n g s a n d away f r o m c e r t a i n t h i n g s in d i s o b e d i e n c e to r e a s o n w h e n h e is p u s h e d t o o m u c h . T o t h i s m o v e m e n t b o t h d e f i n i t i o n s r e f e r , b e c a u s e t h e u n n a t u r a l m o t i o n a r i s e s i r r a t i o n a l l y in t h i s way a n d s o d o e s t h e e x c e s s in o u r c o n a t i o n s . ( 1 2 ) F o r t h e w o r d ' i r r a t i o n a l ' s h o u l d b e t a k e n as d i s o b e d i e n t t o r e a s o n a n d h a v i n g t u r n e d away

30

This double definition is also given by D.L. 7.110; cf. Cic. Tusc. 4.11: est igitur Zenonis haec definitio ut perturbatio sit, quod πάθος ille dicit, aversa a recta ratione contra naturam animi commotio. Quidam brevius, perturbationem esse appetitum vehementiorem. Ibid. 47: definitio perturbationis, qua recte Zenonem usum puto; ita enim définit ut perturbatio sit aversa a ratione contra naturam animi commotio, vet brevius, ut perturbatio sit appetitus vehementior, vehementior autem intellegatur is qui procul absit a naturae constantia. Note that the second passage corrects the information in the first that the second definition was used by others than Zeno. Cicero's translation of άλογος (aversa a recta ratione) reflect Chrysippus' exegesis, on which see infra in text. A similar e c h o is found in the version presented by Stob. Eel. II p. 88.8-11 Wachsmuth: πάθος δ' είναι φασιν όρμήν πλεονά+ζουσαν καί ά π ε ι θ ή τ ψ α ί ρ ο υ ν τι λ ό γ ω ή κίνησιν ψυχής (άλογον) παρά φύσιν. είναι δέ πάθη πάντα του ήγεμονικοΰ τής ψυχής, διό καί πάσαν πτοίαν πάθος είναι (καί) πάλιν (πάν) πάθος πτοίαν. Cf. ibid. p.39.5 ff. (mentioning Zeno), 44.4 ff. W. Plut. Virt. mor. 441D: τό ήγεμονικόν [...] πρός τι τών άτοπων παρά τόν αίρούντα λόγον έκφέρηται. The definition of affection as a πτοία of the soul is Zenonian as well. It was discussed by Chrysippus in the same context, see below. Plut. Virt. mor. ch. 3, 441C-D (SVF3.459) presents an accurate account which appears to be based on Chrysippus. 31 Cf. D.L. 7.111. 32 Conation (όρμή) is itself defined as a movement (φορά) of the soul towards something, Stob. Eel. II p. 86,1.19 (SVF3.169). 33 Compare the summary Chrysippus offered of this passage in book 4, i.e. the Therapeutics, as quoted /7/P4.4.16-17 (SVF3.476).

from reason, in accordance with which movement we say in ordinary usage that certain persons 'are pushed' and 'moved irrationally', 'without reason and judgement'. For when we use these expressions it is not as if a person is carried away by error and having overlooked something according to reason, but especially with reference to the motion which he [seil. Zeno] outlines, since it is not the nature of a rational animal to move thus in his soul but in accordance with reason (p.240,11.18-29, SVF3.462; transi. De Lacy's, modified). 34 Chrysippus' point of d e p a r t u r e is empirical. Affections are observed to deviate f r o m the natural pattern of action of h u m a n s as rational beings. 3 5 This typical behaviour results f r o m o u r i n n a t e ability to assess a p p e a r a n c e s as e i t h e r beneficial or d e t r i m e n t a l to o u r constitution. 3 6 T h e resulting pattern of responses was expressed by the Stoic in terms of conation, ορμή, which was d e f i n e d as a m o v e m e n t (φορά) of the intellect towards or away f r o m s o m e t h i n g . 3 7 This definition clearly underlies the description of action (with n o differentiation between the m e n t a l a n d its outward m a n i f e s t a t i o n ) 3 8 in terms of m o v e m e n t (viz. ώθεΐσθαι, 3 9 φέρεσθαι/φορά 4 0 a n d κινεΐσθαι/ 34

(10) δει δέ πρώτον έντεθυμήσθαι ότι τό λογικόν ζώον άκολουθητικόν φύσει έστί τω λόγω καί κατά τον λόγον ώς αν ηγεμόνα πρακτικόν. (11) πολλάκις μέντοι και άλλως φέρεται έπί τινα καί άπό τίνων άπειθώς τω λόγω ώθουμενον έπί πλεΐον, καθ' ην φοράν άμφότεροι έχουσιν οί οροι, της παρά φύσιν κινήσεως άλόγως οϋτως γινομένης καί του έν ταίς όρμαίς πλεονασμού. (12) τό γάρ άλογον τουτί ληπτέον άπειθές λόγφ καί άπεστραμμένον τόν λόγον, καθ' ήν φοράν καί έν τω έ'θει τινάς φαμεν ώθείσθαι καί άλόγως φέρεσθαι άνευ λόγου (καί) κρίσεως· (ού γάρ) ώς εί διημαρτημένως φέρεται καί παριδών τι κατά τόν λόγον, ταύτ' έπισημαινόμεθα, ά λ λ ά μάλιστα καθ' ήν υπογράφει φοράν, ού πεφυκότος του λογικού ζφου κινεΐσθαι οϋτως κατά την ψυχήν, άλλά κατά τόν λόγον. 35 Cf. 4.7.32 (SVF 3.476) (from the Therapeutics): διό καί αί οϋτως άλογοι κινήσεις πάθη τε λέγονται καί παρά φύσιν είναι ά τ ' ε κ β α ί ν ο υ σ α ι την λ ο γ ι κ ή ν σύστασιν. 36 As expounded in the theory of familiarization (οίκείωσις), e.g. D.L. 7.85-89 (SVF 3.178). 37 Cf. Stob. Eel. II p. 86, 1.19 (SVF 3.169); Clem. Al. Strom. II, 13.57.6, p. 145 Stählin (SVF3.377) 38 This was peculiar to Chrysippus, as appears from Seneca's account of the Stoic theory of action, Ep. 113.18 ff. esp. 23: inter Cleanthen et disdpulum eius Chrysippum non convenit quid sit ambulatio. Cleanthes ail spiritum esse a principali usque in pedes permissum, Chrysippus ipsumprincipale (SVF 1.525; § 18 is printed as 3.169, second text) 39 Cf. the term προωθοΰντα in the fragment preserved by Plut. Virt. mor. 450C, quoted infra, p. 180. 40 Chrysippus often uses φέρεσθαι/φορά for psychic phenomena and especially affection on account of its sense of 'being carried away' which connotes the loss of controll he considers typical of affection (as is also evident from his simile of the runners, PHP4.2.14-18, to be quoted and discussed shorüy); for more instances see 4.6.8-9 (SVF 473), 23 (SVF 3.475). Accordingly, the term indicates the impulse aspect of behaviour in particular. Our φοραί ('impulses', 'impeti') fluctuate or alternate, causing changes of attitude and especially affection, e.g. Schadenfreude

κίνησις) 4 1 t h r o u g h o u t this passage. T h e terms φέρεσθαι and ώθεΐσθαι ('being p u s h e d ' ) especially indicate the uncontrolled and undirected quality of emotional action. 4 2 These observations are p r e s e n t e d as c o m m o n a n d so reflected in c o m m o n parlance, witness the expressions m e n t i o n e d (12). In o t h e r words, Z e n o ' s definitions were r o o t e d in c o m m o n e x p e r i e n c e a n d discourse: the c o m m o n expressions ' b e i n g moved irrationally' a n d 'without reason' or 'without j u d g e m e n t ' are represented by the 'irrational m o t i o n ' in the technical definition a n d ' b e i n g p u s h e d (too m u c h ) ' by the term 'excessive ( c o n a t i o n ) . ' Of course this does not imply that expressions such as 'without r e a s o n ' or 'without j u d g e m e n t ' c o u n t as a d e q u a t e technical descriptions. They belong to the s p h e r e of c o m m o n inarticulate reason. H e n c e Chrysippus stresses that we use t h e m 'in ordinary usage'. In addition, the verbal f o r m ' ( h e , seil. Zeno) outlines' reminds us that Chrysippus is speaking of a preliminary determination, i.e. the 'outline account', not the technical definition resulting f r o m the p r o c e d u r e of conceptual articulation (see above, p. 96). T h e main point of the c o m m o n expressions cited seems to be that people in general distinguish the kind of irrationality involved in behaviour or action f r o m purely cognitive mistakes (where the relation to action is absent or at least less direct). 4 3 turns into its opposite, pity, when persons change καθ' ετέρας φοράς: Chrys. ap. Plut. Stoic Rep. 25, 1046B (from the second book On the Good); we turn away from reason and fall prey to affection άλλη βιαιοτέρα φορά χρωμένους, Chrys. ap. Plut. Virt. mor. 450D (SVF 3.390), quoted' infra, p.180. Cf. PHP 4.6.29 (SVF 3.475), a passage from On Affections where φοραί refers to the impulsive, emotional behaviour expected of lovers. But Chrysippus also used φέρεσθαι/φορά in the more widely attested sense of a tendency of thought or opinion, as in the On the Soul for the c o m m o n view that the heart is the seat of the intellect, PHP3.1.22 (φορά), 23 (ένηνέχθαι), 25 (φέρεσθαι) (SVF 2.886); cf. 298a, p. 107.26 (indicating an instance of c o m m o n parlance in his Logical Inquiries); cf. Tieleman (1996a) 160 ff. Yet for Chrysippus this usage remained linked to that of a (spontaneous) tendency of behaviour, no doubt because thought is expressed through action, see esp. PHP 3.7.25 (SVF 2.903): κατά τοιαύτην δέ μοι δοκοΰσι μάλιστα φ ο ρ ά ν καί οί τιμωρητικώτερον πρός τινας φ ε ρ ό μ ε ν ο ι όρμάν έπί τό ταύτην [seil, καρδίαν] έκσπασαι, καθ' ήν φ ο ρ ά ν έπιτείνοντες καί πρός τά λοιπά τών σπλάγχνων όμοειδώς φ έ ρ ο ν τ α ι . In addition compare the use of φέρεσθαι in the account (no doubt Chrysippean) of affection, Plut. Virt. mor. 446F (where note that the motion occurs between two opposite affections, or between affection and reason). 41 Cf. Alex. Aphr. Fat. ch. 13, p.181.13 ff. Bruns (SVF 2.979, 11. 27-9): πάν γάρ ζώον ώς ζώον κινούμενον κινεισθαι (την) καθ' όρμήν κίνησιν, υπό τής ειμαρμένης διά ζφου γινομένην. 42 Cf. Chrysippus definitions as preserved by Stobaeus, Eel I, p. 165 Wachsmuth: κίνησιν μεταλλαγην κατά τόπον ή σχήμα· φοράν δέ μετέωρον κίνησιν όξεΐαν. 43 Cf. PHP4.2.23 ff. The same distinction was made by the Stoics on a technical level between two kinds of appearances, viz. conative and non-conative ones, see

Galen presents the expressions 'without reason' and 'without j u d g e m e n t ' as flatly c o n t r a d i c t i n g t h e Stoic view ( i n c l u d i n g t h e Z e n o n i a n o n e ) of a f f e c t i o n s as j u d g e m e n t s . 4 4 T h u s h e c h o o s e s to i g n o r e n o t only t h e c o n t e x t in which they are located (a preliminary survey of c o m m o n n o t i o n s ) , 4 5 b u t also t h e n o r m a t i v e sense in which t h e t e r m reason (λόγος) is used t h r o u g h o u t this passage. This is why it is called a g u i d e which is r e j e c t e d o r d i s o b e y e d . But a f f e c t i o n s r e m a i n rational in t h e descriptive sense involved in t h e d e t e r m i n a tion of m a n as a rational (λογικόν) a n i m a l . Still, it m i g h t b e a r g u e d that Galen is e x p l o i t i n g a p o i n t which Chrysippus h a d left less t h a n crystal-clear. L a t e r scholastic e l a b o r a t i o n s of this section of Chrys i p p u s ' treatise d o p r o v i d e t h e d e s i r e d clarity by s p e a k i n g of preferential reason (ό αίρών λόγος) 4 6 o r correct reason (recta ratio, i.e. όρθός λόγος). 4 7 But it c a n n o t b e e x c l u d e d that Chrysippus used o n e or b o t h these expressions himself in the wider c o n t e x t of t h e passage q u o t e d . Chrysippus e c h o e s t h e above passage in his On Disharmony (or: On Inconsistency, Περί ά ν ο μ ο λ ο γ ί α ς ) . T h e following f r a g m e n t has b e e n preserved by Plutarch: ... Chrysippus [...] says: "Although the rational animal naturally avails himself of reason for each and every action and lets itself be guided by it, we often turn away from it, following another more forceful movement" (On Moral Virtue, ch. 10, p.450C, SVF3.390).48 T h i s s n i p p e t of text clearly r e f l e c t s t h e first two s e n t e n c e s of t h e passage f r o m t h e On Affections. W h a t c o m e s b e f o r e c o n t a i n s f u r t h e r e c h o e s , m o s t notably t h e p u s h i n g i m p a c t ascribed to t h e affections, b u t a d d s t h e e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l a s p e c t r e p r e s e n t e d by t h e m e n t a l a p p e a r a n c e s involved. In c o n j u n c t i o n t h e two passages show clearly how the a c c o u n t of e m o t i o n a l b e h a v i o u r is carefully g r a f t e d o n t o t h e Stob. Eel. II p. 86.17-19 (SVF 3.169): τό δέ κινούν τήν όρμήν ουδέν ετερον είναι λέγουσιν άλλ' ή φαντασίαν όρμητικην του καθήκοντος αύτόθεν, τήν δέ όρμήν είναι φοράν ψυχής έπί τι κατά τό γένος. On this passage see also supra, nn. 32, 37 with text. 44 E.g. PHP 4.2.8, 4.5.4, 7. 45 The same contextual distinction is ignored and misrepresented by Galen in dealing with Chrysippus' On the Soul, see Tieleman (1996a) Pt. II, esp. 183 f., 258, 288. 46 Stob. EcL II p. 88.9 Wachsmuth (SVF3.378), quoted supra, n. 30. 47 Cic. Tusc. 4.11, 47, quoted supra, n. 30. 48 ό Χρύσιππος « του λογικού » φησι (( ζφου φύσιν έχοντος προσχρήσθαι εις έκαστα τφ λόγω καί ύπό τούτου κυβερνάσθαι πολλάκις άποστρέφεσθαι αύτόν ήμάς άλλη βιαιοτέρα φορά χρωμένους ». Plutarch goes on to make the same point as Galen, viz. that Chrysippus admits that reason and affection are different. See further, infra, pp. 180 ff.

Stoic theory of h u m a n action c e n t r e d o n t h e c o n c e p t s of c o n a t i o n a n d a p p e a r a n c e . An affection such as a n g e r mentally blinds us, so as to r e n d e r us u n a b l e to perceive obvious a p p e a r a n c e s as such. In c o n s e q u e n c e we n o l o n g e r m a k e t h e obvious choices, b u t o t h e r s we t h e n c o m e to regret. T h u s fits of a n g e r may lead us into d a n g e r , or m a k e us loose things or p e r s o n s d e a r to us. In g e n e r a l , t h e kind of irrationality involved in affection prevents us f r o m selecting what are technically called ' p r e f e r r e d i n d i f f é r e n t s ' a n d avoiding t h e i r o p p o sites. We n o l o n g e r act in t h e way to which N a t u r e has p r e d i s p o s e d us. 4 9 H e r e t h e e m p h a s i s lies o n m a k i n g t h e w r o n g choices in t h e s p h e r e of t h e i n d i f f é r e n t s , w h e r e a s t h e passage f r o m On Affections highlights t h e aspect of excess involved in affection. Galen presents a n o t h e r l o n g passage w h e r e Chrysippus says m o r e a b o u t Z e n o ' s s e c o n d d e f i n i t i o n . In Chrysippus' original exposition, Galen tells us (4.2.13, p.240.31-3), this passage directly followed t h e o n e h e q u o t e d first: (14) The excess of conation has also been meant 5 0 in this sense, on account of exceeding the measure of themselves and nature. (15) What is meant could become clearer by these things, for instance in the case of walking in accordance with conation the motion of the legs is not excessive but somehow commensurate with the conation, so that one may also stop when one wishes, and change one's pace. (16) But in the case of persons running in accordance with conation this sort of thing no longer happens but the movement of the legs exceeds the conation, and they do not obediently change their pace as soon as they have started. (17) Something similar to these [seil, movements of the legs] happens, I think, also in the case of the conations because of an excess of the measure of reason, so that when (a person) exercises conation he is not obedient to it [seil, reason], if in the case of running the excess meant goes beyond conation and in the case of conation beyond reason. (18) After all, natural conation is measured in terms of reason and goes only so far as reason itself thinks right. Thus when excess arises in this respect and in this manner, it is said to be an excessive and an unnatural and irrational movement of the soul {PHP4.2.14-18, W 3 . 4 6 2 ) . 5 1 49

See supra, n. 36 with text thereto. Seil, by Zeno. 51 (14) κατά τοΰτο δε καί ό πλεονασμός τής όρμής εϊρηται, δια τό τήν καθ' αύτους καί φυσικήν τών όρμών συμμετρίαν ύπερβαίνειν. (15) γένοιτο δ' αν τό λεγόμενον δια τούτων γνωριμώτερον, οίον έπί του πορεύεσθαι καθ' όρμήν ού πλεονάζει ή τών σκελών κίνησις ά λ λ ά συναπατίζει τι τή όρμή ώστε καί στήναι, οταν έθέλτ|, καί μεταβάλλειν. (16) έπί δέ τών τρεχόντων καθ' όρμήν ούκέτι τοιούτον γίνεται, ά λ λ ά πλεονάζει παρά τήν όρμήν ή τών σκελών κίνησις ώστε έκφέρεσθαι καί μή μεταβάλλειν εύπειθώς οϋτως εύθύς έναρξαμένων. (17) αίς οίμαι τι παραπλήσιον καί έπί τών όρμών γίνεσθαι δια τό τήν κατά λόγον ύπερβαίνειν συμμετρίαν, ώσθ' οταν 50

Chrysippus' G r e e k is at times difficult a n d o p a q u e . Yet t h e last sent e n c e m a k e s clear that t h e analogy of r u n n i n g is also relevant to the first ( p a r t of the) d e f i n i t i o n f o r m u l a t e d by Z e n o . F u r t h e r we have again t h e idea of d i s o b e d i e n c e to Reason. Rationality is o n c e again l i n k e d to n a t u r e , i.e. n o r m a l b e h a v i o u r , b u t n o w it is f u r t h e r e x p l a i n e d in t e r m s of m e a s u r e a n d c o n t r o l . Affection is an excessive i m p u l s e i n s o f a r as t h e soul transgresses t h e m e a s u r e set by r e a s o n a n d can n o l o n g e r be m a d e to c o n f o r m to this m e a s u r e . Chrysippus c o m p a r e s excessive c o n a t i o n to r u n n i n g legs which have a c q u i r e d an i m p e t u s of their own a n d so a r e n o l o n g e r s t o p p a b l e by a simple act of t h e will. In c h o s i n g this p a r t i c u l a r i m a g e C h r y s i p p u s r e t a i n s t h e idea of m o t i o n which was so p r o m i n e n t in t h e first q u o t a t i o n . Psychic acts like c o n a t i o n a r e m o t i o n s , o r processes, n o less t h a n acts like walking a n d r u n n i n g which involve t h e whole o r g a n i s m , i.e. body as well as soul. 5 2

3. The Causes of Affection Chrysippus explains Z e n o ' s first two d e f i n i t i o n s of affection t h r o u g h his striking analogy of t h e r u n n e r s . His a p p r o a c h in this stage of his a r g u m e n t seems predominantly descriptive and empirical. H e describes t h e p h e n o m e n o n of affection as involving an i n t e r r u p t i o n , or divergence, f r o m t h e n a t u r a l flow of m o v e m e n t typical of rational ορμά μή ευπειθώς έχειν πρός αυτόν, έπί μέν του δρόμου του πλεονασμού λεγομένου παρά την όρμήν, έπί δέ της ορμής παρά τόν λόγον. (18) συμμετρία γάρ έστι φυσικής όρμής ή κατά τόν λόγον καί έ'ως τοσούτου έ'ως αύτός άξιοι, διό δη καί τής υπερβάσεως κατά τούτο καί οϋτως γινομένης πλεονάζουσά τε όρμή λέγεται είναι καί άλογος κίνησις ψυχής. Cf. the excerpts from Chrysippus' own summary in the Therapeutics quoted at 4.4.24-25, 30, 31 (SVF 476). From these partly overlapping excerpts the following continuous text can be reconstructed: οίαι καί άκρατεΐς αί τοιαΰται καταστάσεις είσίν, ώς άν ού κρατούντων έαυτών, άλλ' έκφερομένων, καθάπερ οί τω τόνφ τρέχοντες προσεκφέρονται, ού κρατούντες τής τοιαύτης κινήσεως, οί δέ κατά τόν λόγον κινούμενοι ώς άν ηγεμόνα καί τούτω οίακίζοντες, καν όποιοσούν ή, κρατούσιν ήτοι άπαθείς είσι τής τοιαύτης κινήσεως καί τών κατ' αύτήν ορμών [24. κρατούσιν τών κινήσεων τών κατ' αύτάς ορμών, 31], ώστε πεισθήναι έάνπερ ένδεικνύηται αύτός, παραπλησίως [άνάλογον, 31] τοις περιπατούσιν, άλλ' ούχ ύπ' αύτών έκφέρονται βιαίως, ώσπερ οί κατά πρανούς θέοντες. As is indicated, Galen presents slightly different versions of the same text at 24 and 31. Such small differences (which in other cases might affect our interpretation) occur more often and may be due to Galen's own carelessness a n d / o r way of inserting his quotations. More serious is the fact that the quotation at 30—translated in the text below—is omitted by Von Arnim. 52 For affection as motion cf. also Arist. Phys. Γ 3.

beings. H e is n o t explicit a b o u t the cause. Unsurprisingly Galen makes m u c h of this omission, asking how reason could exceed its own measure and in general how something irrational could come from pure reason. On Chrysippus' behalf o n e might counter that this omission suits his approach at this stage. T h e question of the cause, as we shall see, receives ample attention in book 2. So it would be unfair to press for a causal explanation here. Yet the idea of motion central to the analogy may provide a clue. When the act of r u n n i n g (i.e. moving the whole body) becomes excessive and uncontrollable, the cause lies in the corporeality a n d weight of the body. This had also been pointed out by Posidonius (4.3.4-5 = Fr. 34 E.-K.). 53 But Galen t u r n s this into an instance of t h e criticism d i r e c t e d by Posidonius against Chrysippus: just as the weight of the body is (part of the) cause of the excess in the act of r u n n i n g , so Chrysippus s h o u l d — b u t fails to—specify the cause of the excess of psychic movement (ibid, and 4.5.12). Of course, Galen wants to h e a r only o n e answer to the question about the cause—a non-rational power. He constantly intimates that this is what Posidonius argued too. But he fails to produce any direct evidence that Posidonius criticized Chrysippus on this score. All movements or processes (κινήσεις), including those of the soul, are of a corporeal nature, since what moves or is moved are bodies. 5 4 This is presumably what Chrysippus meant. But then Galen systematically suppresses elements pertaining to the soul's corporeality from his presentation of Chrysippus' a r g u m e n t . 5 5 Posidonius n o t only c o n c u r r e d with Chrysippus on the soul's substance, 5 6 but, as we have seen, also i n c o r p o r a t e d it in his own ideas on character, the affections and their therapy. So he seems to be a more reliable witness on this passage from Chrysippus. T h e r e is a f u r t h e r indication that Chrysippus thought along these lines. Affections, t h o u g h excessive conations, vary in intensity, or excess, f r o m o n e p e r s o n to a n o t h e r , or f r o m o n e occasion to a n o t h e r . This was explained by the Stoics in physical terms, viz. as varying degrees of contraction and relaxation of the corporeal soul. 57 53

See infra, pp. 250 f. Aet. Plac. IV 20,1 (SVF 2.387). On the soul in particular see Iamblichus ap. Stob. Eel. I, p. 371.22 ff. (SVF2.801): οί σώμα τήν ψυχήν ύπολαμβάνοντες, οϊον ο'ι Στωικοί [...] Πάντες γαρ ούτοι σ ω μ α τ ο ε ι δ ε ΐ ς τάς κ ι ν ή σ ε ι ς αύτή άποδιδόασιν. 55 See further infra, pp. 114, 121 f. 56 See infra, p. 36. 57 See Plut. Vin. mor. ch. 10, 449D (SVF3.468). 54

Galen brings t h e same a t t i t u d e to b e a r o n a passage f r o m Chrysippus c o n c e r n e d with the third definition of affection f o r m u l a t e d by Z e n o ( P H P 4.5.3-8). Z e n o also d e f i n e d a f f e c t i o n as a ' f l u t t e r i n g ' (πτοία) of the soul. 5 8 T h r o u g h this t e r m t h e irrationality of affection is likened to the r a n d o m m o v e m e n t s of a flock of birds in panic. T h e use of this n o u n ( a n d its c o g n a t e verb) f o r states of e x c i t e m e n t a n d in particular fear a n d t e r r o r is attested f o r poets a n d o t h e r s well bef o r e Zeno. 5 9 Epicurus used it with r e f e r e n c e to sexual arousal (fr. 458 Us.). 6 0 Plato, moreover, used the t e r m in a relevant c o n t e x t (Republic 439D). In the case of Stoics such as Z e n o a n d Chrysippus we should b e a r in m i n d that t h e t e r m ' f l u t t e r i n g ' d e n o t e s t h e physical motions characteristic of t h e e m o t i o n a l soul. As such, it is ideally suited to convey the idea that affection interrupts, or diverges f r o m , the natural p a t t e r n of b e h a v i o u r as e x p l a i n e d by Chrysippus in c o n n e c t i o n with Z e n o ' s first two definitions. 6 1 H e r e is t h e relevant Chrysippean passage with its i m m e d i a t e Galenic c o n t e x t (4.5.5-7, p. 260 De Lacy ~ SVF 3.476): ... (5) On occasion he [seil. Chrysippus] also falls into the assertion that the movements related to the affections occur 'at random', which is by no means different from 'uncaused', if one weighs the word exactly. 62 (6) Thus directly after the passages I quoted a little earlier, 63 58

As explained by Stob. Eel II, p. 39.8-10 W. (SVF 1.206); cf. ibid p.88.11-12. See LSJs.v. 60 One might also hear here a—more distant and less certain—echo of Plato's comparison of the human intellect with an aviary, with elements of knowledge being represented by the birds, Theaetetus 196c-199c. Plato introduces this image shordy after that of the wax-tablet (ibid. 191a-195b), which was taken over by the Stoics; cf. Aet. IV 20.2, D.L. 7.50, Sext. M 7.228, 372. 61 Sorabji (2000) 57 takes the fluttering to indicate the mind's oscillation, too rapid to notice, between two alternative options on the basis of Plut. Virt. mor. 446F447A (SVF3.459). But Plutarch is not talking about affection in general but about mental conflict in the specific sense explained by the Platonists and Aristotelians in terms of a conflict between reason and an irrational power and by the Stoics in terms of the wavering of the rational intellect, i.e. the phenomenon of doing wrong while being simultaneously conscious of a better alternative (the Stoics, then, deny the simultaneity, arguing that there is in fact a succession of options too rapid to notice). 62 The phrase echoes PI. Theae. 184c. 63 This must refer to the passages quoted ibid. 24-25, 30, 31, 32 (pp. 256-8 De Lacy) which are all from the (opening?) section of book 4 (i.e. the Therapeutics, ibid. 23, p.256,11.2-3) where Chrysippus offered a summary of his treatment of Zeno's definitions in book 1; cf. supra, n. 9. The present passage must be from the same original context, as is also indicated by the και ('also') before πτοία and the reference to τφ τών παθών γένει ('the affections as a class'). Von Arnim was therefore right to print these quotations all under SVF 3.476. In this case, however, there is no corresponding passage from book 1. 59

h e says: ' " F l u t t e r i n g " t o o h a s b e e n a p p r o p r i a t e l y u s e d t o d e s c r i b e t h e a f f e c t i o n s as a class in r e s p e c t of t h i s " b e i n g a g i t a t e d " 6 4 a n d " m o v i n g a t r a n d o m " '. (7) B u t if by " r a n d o m " y o u m e a n " u n c a u s e d " , C h r y s i p p u s , y o u a r e in c o n f l i c t b o t h with y o u r s e l f a n d with A r i s t o t l e a n d P l a t o a n d t h e n o t i o n s of all m e n a n d l o n g b e f o r e t h a t y o u a r e in c o n f l i c t with t h e very n a t u r e of t h i n g s given t h e f a c t t h a t n o t h i n g c a n h a p p e n w i t h o u t a c a u s e ,.. 6 5

A p a r t f r o m failing to identify o n e or m o r e causes of affection, Chrysippus is said to fly in the face of Stoic determinism, i.e. the idea of the causal nexus, or Fate, to which h e surely subscribes. 6 6 By the 64

The composite verb ένσοβέω is rare; for the passive voice LSJ only gives this occurrence in the meaning 'agitation' (no doubt in view of the article το), but it is more likely that it indicates that it is used to refer to the expression as used in the context preceding the quotation, which is how De Lacy apparently takes it, putting τό ένσεσοβημένον τοΰτο and εική φερόμενον between inverted commas. This suggests that these terms too had been used by Zeno or, more likely, had been adduced by Chrysippus himself as items of common parlance supporting Zeno's definition of affection as a fluttering of the soul. De Lacy's translation of ένσεσοβημένον as 'being ruffled' seems less apposite, however. The meaning of ένσοβέω seems identical to that of the simple verb σοβέω, whose primary meaning is 'causing a violent movement', i.e. 'drive away' or 'scare away'. The focus on movement again. The passive voice also bears the metaphorical sense 'to be excited' or 'to be agitated' and is used in connection with various forceful affections. See LSJ s.v. σοβέω II. 65 (5) έμπίπτει δέ ποτε καί εις τό φάσκειν είκη γίνεσθαι τάς κατά τά πάθη κινήσεις, όπερ ουδέν άλλο έστίν ή άναιτίως, εϊ τις άκριβώς έξετάζοι τό ρήμα. (6) αίς γούν ολίγον έμπροσθεν γέγραφα ρήσεσιν έφεξής φ η σ ι ν · οίκείως δέ τω τών π α θών γ έ ν ε ι ά π ο δ ί δ ο τ α ι καί ή π τ ο ί α κ α τ ά τό έ ν σ ε σ ο β η μ έ ν ο ν τ ο ΰ τ ο καί φ ε ρ ό μ ε ν ο ν εική. (7) άλλ' εί μέν τό άναιτίως (τό) εική λέγεις, ώ Χρύσιππε, καί σεαυτώ μάχη καί Άριστοτέλει καί Πλάτωνι καί ταΐς απάντων άνθρώπων έννοίαις καί πολύ πρότερον αύτη τών πραγμάτων τή φύσει μηδενός άναιτίως γίνεσθαι δυναμένου. 66 O n e of the fullest expositions of the principle is Alex. Aphr. Fat. pp. 191.30192.28 Bruns (SVF2.945); cf. Gal. Plenit. VII, p. 526 K. (SVF2.440); Sext. M 9.75 (SVF 2.311). Indeed, Galen's phrase 'Nothing happens without a cause' (μηδέν άναιτίως γίγνεσθαι) reflects a distinctively Stoic dictum, see Chrys. ap. Plut. De Stoic. Rep. ch. 23, 1045C (SVF2.973); ps.Plut. Fat. 11, 574D (SVF2.912), Alex. Aphr. ibid. p. 191 Bruns; cf. Cic. Fat. 41. Chrysippus also defended it in the case of the choice between apparently indistinguishable things: just as weight always determines to which side the balance will tip, so there must always be a cause (whether internal or external) for our decision, even if we are not aware of the factors directing our conation o n e way or the other, Plut. De Stoic. Rep. ch. 23, 1045B-C (SVF 2.97). Accordingly the Stoics denied the existence of completely indistinguishable appearances, Sext. M 7.252 (SVF 2.65), Plut. De comm. not. 1077B, just as there cannot ever be two or more discrete objects that are exactly alike, Cic. Ac. Pr. 2.54, 85 (SVF2.113, 114). Similarly the choice for one of two similar drachmas, Sext. M XI 59 (SVF3.122), i.e. the same principle applies as in all other cases. On the Stoic causal theory in general see the classic article by Frede (1980; repr. 1987); see also Hankinson (1998b) 238 ff. On Chrysippus in particular see Bobzien (1999); for Galen see Hankinson (1998a). It is important to realize that the principle 'nothing happens without a cause' applies to antecedent causes, i.e. fated external events. The soul as the locus our moral responsibility is seen as a sustaining or complete cause, see Frede (1980) 234 ff. (repr. 1987: 138 ff.), Bobzien (1999) 208 ff.

s a m e t o k e n h e is played off against t h e c o n s e n s u s view of Plato, of Aristotle a n d of p e o p l e in g e n e r a l , t h e last category b e i n g i n c l u d e d b e c a u s e of t h e familiar Stoic a p p e a l to c o m m o n n o t i o n s . As Galen p o i n t s o u t , t h e thesis of an u n c a u s e d m o t i o n is typical of Epicurus, w h o h a d b e e n c e n s u r e d by t h e Stoics themselves o n this score (4.356, p.258 De Lacy). This yields the ironic vignette of Chrysippus contra mundum, t h o u g h with E p i c u r u s as his sole c o m p a n i o n . Of course this dialectical g r o u p i n g of authorities c a n n o t be justified f r o m a m o d e r n h i s t o r i o g r a p h i c a l p o i n t of view. C h r y s i p p u s associated πτοία with o t h e r c o m m o n expressions such as ' b e i n g agitated' (ένσεσοβημένον) a n d ' m o v i n g at r a n d o m ' (φερόμενον εική) in o r d e r to b r i n g o u t t h e fact that t h e e m o t i o n a l soul moves w i t h o u t plan or p u r p o s e , j u s t as birds in panic d o . Accordingly, t h e a d v e r b εική h e r e d o e s n o t m e a n , at least as far as C h r y s i p p u s is c o n c e r n e d , ' w i t h o u t c a u s e ' . In fact, C h r y s i p p u s h a d b r o a c h e d t h e s u b j e c t of causes himself, i n d i c a t i n g two factors. C o n s i d e r t h e following f r a g m e n t f r o m t h e Therapeutics (5.2.14, SVF 3.465): It must be supposed that the disease of the soul is most similar to a feverish state of the body in which fevers and chills do not occur at regular intervals but irregular and at random, from the condition [seil, of the ill person] and at the incidence of small causes. 67 T h i s passage, too, is c o n c e r n e d with t h e r a n d o m k i n d of m o t i o n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of a f f e c t i o n . H e r e C h r y s i p p u s c o m p a r e s it with a particular type of fever in t h e c o n t e x t of t h e analogy 6 8 b e t w e e n soul a n d b o d y d e v e l o p e d at l e n g t h in t h e Therapeutics b u t a l r e a d y u n d e r l y i n g t h e a r g u m e n t of b o o k l. 6 9 In this b o o k a similar passage almost certainly f e a t u r e d . 7 0 A l t h o u g h Chrysippus' m a i n c o n c e r n h e r e is n o t with t h e cause, o r causes, of affection, we get a glimpse of t h e twofold causal e x p l a n a t i o n u n d e r l y i n g his a c c o u n t . Chrysippus dist i n g u i s h e s b e t w e e n two causes: (1) t h e (physical) c o n d i t i o n of t h e intellect a n d (2) e x t e r n a l i n f l u e n c e s . If t h e soul is diseased, small i n f l u e n c e s f r o m o u t s i d e p r o d u c e an o u t b r e a k of a f f e c t i o n c o m p a r able to fever, a n d of o n e type in particular, viz. that distinguished by

67

ύπονοητέον τοίνυν την μέν τής ψυχής νόσον όμοιοτάτην είναι τη του σώματος πυρετώδει καταστάσει καθ' ήν ού περιοδικώς άλλ' άτακτώς πυρετοί καί φρίκαι γίνονται καί άλλως άπό τής διαθέσεως καί μικρών έπιγινομένων αιτίων. 68 On the sense of'analogy' in this connection, see infra, pp. 142 ff. 69 ΡΉΡ5.3.12; cf. 5.2.43. 70 See PHP5.3.12, quoted infra, p. 107.

a n c i e n t physicians o n t h e basis of its i r r e g u l a r o c c u r r e n c e . 7 1 In t h e case of the soul, this u n d e r l i n e s the irrationality of its affections. C h r y s i p p u s also e m p h a s i z e s t h e fact t h a t small causes suffice to trigger bursts of fever. T h a t is to say, t h e a p p e a r a n c e ( φ α ν τ α σ ί α ) to the weak, or diseased, intellect of even relatively u n i m p o r t a n t events triggers an excessive, i.e. e m o t i o n a l m o v e m e n t . H e called this t h e intellect's proneness ( ε ύ ε μ π τ ω σ ί α ) 7 2 to a f f e c t i o n a n d u s e d it in t h e c o n t e x t of the above passage: Chrysippus in the first b o o k On Affections c o n f u s e d the n o t i o n o f disease by saying that disease in the soul is a n a l o g o u s to the state of the body, in which it is p r o n e to fevers or diarrhoea or s o m e t h i n g of the kind (PHP 5.3.12, not in SVF).

Galen takes the idea of p r o n e n e s s to imply health p r o n e to disease b u t Chrysippus consistently speaks of a c o n d i t i o n of soul a n d body that is diseased already. T h e distinction, t h e n , is that b e t w e e n t h e u n d e r lying diseased c o n d i t i o n a n d certain crises arising f r o m it u n d e r the i n f l u e n c e of i n c i d e n t s f r o m outside. Galen glosses over this distinction. 7 3 In Ch. 5 below I shall r e t u r n to this passage in c o n n e c t i o n with the pathology u n d e r l y i n g Chrysippus' a r g u m e n t . 7 4 T h e e x t e r n a l factors r e c u r elsewhere as o n e of t h e two causes of evil, i.e. affection. In this c o n t e x t Chrysippus refers to t h e m as ' t h e 71

As opposed to 'periodical' fevers, which e.g. occur each third or fourth day, see e.g. Galen, PHP 5.2.7, ibid. 13; cf. 8.6.23; and the full account in Galen's On Crises (IX, pp.550-760 K.) and On the Different Kinds ofFeuer (VII, pp.273-405 K.). For the Corpus Hippocraticum see Langholf (1990) 82-110, 120; Jouanna (1992) 215 f. On this Chrysippean passage and Galen's comments on it, see further infra, p. 155. 72 See the later scholastic systematizations of Chrysippus' account preserved at D.L. 7.115, Stob. Eel. II p.93 Wachsmuth and, with reference to Chrysippus, Cicero, Tusc. 4.23-31 (see esp. 23). According to Stobaeus (ibid. 11.1-4): 'Proneness is the propensity to slip easily (εύκαταφορίαν) into affection or one of the unnatural actions, such as tending to distress, irascibility, enviousness, quickness to anger and the like; but proneness also concerns acts that go against nature such as theft and adultery and insolence, from which thieves and adulterers and insolent men derive their name, (cf. ibid. 70.21 ff., where proneness is classed as a state, or εξις, which means that it permits of gradations). The Chrysippean analogy between soul and body is echoed by D.L. 7.115: 'And just as certain types of proneness are mentioned in the case of the body, e.g. catarrh and diarrhoea, so propensities (εύκαταφορίαι) exist in the case of the soul, e.g. enviousness, compassion, competitiveness and similar things.' Manifest affections like anger and pity and hate are thus distinguished from our propensity to each of them; hence the close link made by Stobaeus between affections and actions—a feature that we have found in Chrysippus also, see supra, p.98. On the concept of proneness see further Kidd (1983). 73 See further infra, pp. 155 ff. 74 See infra, pp. 155 ff.

very nature of the things' (5.5.14) or 'persuasive appearances' (φαντασίαι) 7 5 (5.6.19, p.320 De Lacy, SVF 3.229a). 7 6 It is a fair assumption, then, that Chrysippus took more account of the causes of affection and did so more systematically than Galen allows us to see. This would be in line with his interest in affections as motions or processes (κινήσεις)—an aspect which, as we have seen, he stresses constantly. In fact, the same two causes may be involved in the image of the people walking—a stock example standing for all kinds of action. First, there has been a 'preliminary' cause (προκαταρκτικών αίτιον) setting them in motion, viz. an (externally prompted) mental appearance inducing the conation to walk. 77 The 'sustaining' (συνεκτικόν) or 'complete' (αυτοτελές) 78 cause of this action lies within the soul, viz. the (persisting) decision to walk. 79 In general, any event lasts as long as the sustaining cause is present. Hence the soul is the locus of moral responsibility. 80 T h e related image of the runners might seem to introduce what the Stoics call an auxiliary cause, viz. the slope of the hill. Auxiliary

75

Strictly, of course, an appearance is a mental phenomenon but it presupposes, and is defined by reference to, external objects. 76 See on this passage also infra, pp. 160 f. " Stob. Eel II p.86.17-18 (SVF3.169): τό ... κ ι ν ο ύ ν την όρμήν ουδέν ετερον είναι λέγουσιν άλλ' φ α ν τ α σ ί α ν όρμητικήν του καθήκοντος αύτοθεν. On this passage see further supra, n. 43. The whole process is a matter of certain configurations being transmitted in the pneumadc continuum that exists between external objects and the intellect; see Frede (1980/7), esp. 145 f., Bobzien (1999) 204 ff. Accordingly, the mental presentation can also be viewed as an imprint (τύπωσις) or an affection (πάθος); but the presentation in turn stirs (κινεί) the conation; see esp. Aet. IV 12.1 (SVF 2.54); in addition D.L. 7.46, 50; Sext. M 7.242 (SVF 2.65): πιθαναί [seil, φαντασίαι].. είσιν αί λεΐον κίνημα περί ψυχήν έργαζόμεναι. Cf. Cic. Ac. Pr. 2.37 (SVF2.116) 78 Complete in the sense of sufficient for causing the action in question, see the explanation by Frede (1980) 236 ff. (repr. 1987: 140 fî. ); cf. Long-Sedley (1987) vol. 1, 340 f. '!l Indeed, the capacity of movement from within is held to be characteristic of animals. According to the Stoic distinction between kinds of movement preserved by Origenes, Orat. 6., vol. II p.311.16ff. Kö. (SVF2.989): τρίτη δέ έστι κίνησις ή έν τοις ζωοις, ήτις ονομάζεται ή άφ' αύτοΰ κίνησις. οΐμαι δέ οτι ή τών λογικών κίνησις δι' αυτών έστι κίνησις. έάν δέ περιέλωμεν άπό του ζφου την άπ' αύτοΰ κίνησιν, ούδέ ζώον έτι öv ΰπονοηθήναι δύναται... Alex. Aphr. Defato ch. 13, p. 182.6-7 Bruns: πάν .. ζώον ώς ζώον κινούμενον κινεΐσθαι (την) καθ' όρμήν κίνησιν. Cf. also the passages from Origenes printed as SVF2.988, 989. 80 A full discussion of Stoic ideas on this problem goes beyond the scope of the present study, although its relevance should be kept in mind. On this problem in connection with some of the texts referred to here see e.g. Long-Sedley (1987), vol. 1, 386 ff.

causes typically intensify an e f f e c t which w o u l d o c c u r anyway (e.g. walking). 8 1 T h e p o i n t of c o m p a r i s o n b e t w e e n t h e r u n n i n g a n d the soul's e m o t i o n a l r e s p o n s e lies precisely in t h e aspect of intensification o r excess a n d t h e c o n s e q u e n t loss of c o n t r o l . T h e walking m o v e m e n t is accelerated by the slope. But t h e sustaining cause of t h e r u n n i n g m o t i o n m u s t be t h e r u n n e r s t h e m s e l v e s . I n d e e d , t h e e x a m p l e of t h e r u n n e r s recalls a n o t h e r o n e , viz. t h e cylinder rolling f r o m a slope used by Chrysippus to illustrate t h e d i f f e r e n c e between ' p r e l i m i n a r y ' a n d 'sustaining' causes, r e p r e s e n t e d by the push downhill a n d t h e cylindrical s h a p e respectively. 8 2 In m u c h t h e same way, Chrysippus a r g u e d , t h e c o m p l e t e o r sustaining cause of o u r action is t h e c o n d i t i o n of o u r souls, i.e. o u r m o r a l qualities. T h e following testimony preserved by C l e m e n t takes fever as an illustration of these two kinds of cause in line with above passage f r o m Chrysippus: Causes are not of each other, but there are causes to each other. For the pre-existing condition of the spleen is the cause, not of fever, but of the fever's coming about; and the pre-existing fever is the cause, not of the spleen but of its condition's being intensified (Strom. VIII, 9.30.1 -SVF2.349) 8 3 Causes (or 'things responsible', Gr. αιτία) are bodies, 8 4 whereas their effects a r e classed as predicates, i.e. what t h e Stoics called 'sayables' ( λ ε κ τ ά ) , a n d h e n c e i n c o r p o r e a l . 8 5 In t h e above passage ' c o m i n g a b o u t ' a n d ' b e i n g intensified' are given as e x a m p l e s of effects in the sense of i n c o r p o r e a l predicates. For o u r p u r p o s e s it is i m p o r t a n t to n o t e h e r e t h e role of t h e causes, viz. t h e spleen a n d t h e feverish spleen respectively. T h e s e two c o r p o r e a l substances f u n c t i o n as t h e pre-existing (in this case sustaining) causes of their effects. In t h e light of t h e analogy postulated by Chrysippus between affection a n d

81

See Clement, Strom. VIII, 9.33.1-9 (SVF2.351). See Cic. Fat. 43 (SVF2.974) with Frede (1980) 234 ff. (repr. 1987: 138 ff.), Bobzien (1999) 204 ff. Cf. also Rolke (1975) 330 f. Both Frede and Bobzien point out that the term 'sustaining' or 'cohesive' (συνεκτικόν, συνεχής) refers to the pneuma as holding together objects. On the sense o f antecedent' (προκαταρκτικός) see Frede (1980) 243 n. 6 (repr. 1987: 369 n.7). 83 αλλήλων ούκ έστι τα αϊτια, άλλήλοις δέ α'ίτια. ή γαρ σπληνική διάθεσις προυποκειμένη ού πυρετού αϊτιος, ά λ λ α τοΰ γίνεσθαι τόν πυρετόν· καί ό πυρετός προυποκειμένος ού σπληνός, άλλά τού αϋξεσθαι τήν διάθεσιν. 84 Aët. I, 11.5 (SVF2.340), Stob. Eel. I pp. 138.14-139.4 W„ Sext. M 9.211, Clem. Strom. VIII, 9.26.3-4, ibid. 30.1-3 (= SVF2.340, 1.89/2.336, 2.341, 2.349). 85 See Clement, Strom. VIII, 9.26.3-4; Sext. M 9.211 (SVF 2.341) with LongSedley (1987) vol. 1, 340. 82

fever, 8 6 we may i n f e r t h a t t h e soul plays an a n a l o g o u s causal role in r e g a r d to its own παθή, viz. t h e affections. Analogously, the same causal analysis is illustrated by g o o d actions, with t h e virtuous soul as its sustaining or ' c o m p l e t e ' cause. 8 7 T h e soul can only fulfil this causal role o n a c c o u n t of its c o r p o r e a l substance, since a c c o r d i n g to Stoic d o c t r i n e all causes a r e c o r p o r e a l . T h e Stoics were primarily interested in t h e implications of this analysis f o r m o r a l responsibility, so it s h o u l d n o t occasion s u r p r i s e if it was m a d e to apply n o t only virtue b u t also its opposite, affection. 8 8 P o s i d o n i u s took over t h e Early Stoic distinction b e t w e e n types of cause. 8 9 In addition, we have f o u n d that his position o n t h e affections a n d their cause c a n n o t have d i f f e r e d significantly f r o m that of Chrysippus. Like Chrysippus, h e stressed the role of motions, or processes, in t h e c o r p o r e a l soul. W h a t is m o r e , h e took over Chrysippus' analogy between soul a n d body w h e r e disease a n d illness a r e c o n c e r n e d — an analogy which is n o t merely a m e t a p h o r used for didactic or o t h e r p u r p o s e b u t the expression b u t an actual c o r r e s p o n d e n c e existing in physical reality. 90 In this light a passage f r o m G a l e n ' s theoretical tract On Sustaining Causes deserves special a t t e n t i o n , since it n o t only r u n s parallel to t h e above passages f r o m C h r y s i p p u s a n d C l e m e n t b u t f u r t h e r bears o u t the a s s u m p t i o n that this causal analysis was applied by t h e Stoics to their pathology: As for Athenaeus of Attaleia, he founded the medical school known as the Pneumatists. It suits his doctrine to speak of a sustaining cause in illness, since he bases himself upon the Stoics, and he was a pupil of Posidonius .... Athenaeus [holds that] there are three primary and most universal types of cause .... first that of the sustaining causes, then that of the antecedent causes, while the third type is comprised of the matter of preliminary causes. T h e last term is applied to externals whose function is to produce some change in the body, whatever this change may be. If what is thus produced in the body belongs to the class of what causes disease, then, while it has not yet actually given rise to the disease, it is known as an antecedent cause. 8,)

That this correspondence holds good in a literal and physical sense I argue further infra, pp. 142 ff. 87 Stob. Eel. I, p. 138.17-22 (SVF 1.89); cf. Sext. AÍ 9.211, Clem. Strom. VIII, 9.26.3-4. 88 Stob. Eel I p.138.14-139.4 Wachsmuth (SVF 1.89). 89 See esp. Stob. Eel. I, pp. 138.14-139.8 (= Arius Didymus fr. 18 Diels)—a testimony which is taken apart in our collections of fragments but presents the Stoic doctrine on the concept of cause with reference to Zeno, Chrysippus and Posidonius (fr. 95 E.-K.). The views given to these three partly overlap and are clearly identical. On this passage see now Mansfeld (2001). 90 See infra, pp. 142 ff.

A l t e r a t i o n s a r e p r o d u c e d in t h e n a t u r a l b r e a t h [i.e. t h e pneuma] by t h e s e c a u s e s a n d a l s o by t h o s e w h i c h a r e e x t e r n a l , l e a d i n g t o m o i s t u r e , d r y n e s s , h e a t o r c o l d , a n d t h e s e a r e w h a t h e calls t h e s u s t a i n i n g c a u s e s of d i s e a s e s ( C C 1.1-2.4; t r a n s i . L o n g - S e d l e y , slightly modified).

Ironically, Galen himself is o n e of o u r m a i n sources o n Stoic causal theory, a l t h o u g h h e i g n o r e s it c o m p l e t e l y in his PHP—a striking t h o u g h n o t u n c o m m o n c o n t e x t u a l d i f f e r e n c e . In the above passage t h e r e is n o sign of any d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n P o s i d o n i u s a n d o t h e r Stoics f o r that m a t t e r either. In fact, Posidonius features as the p r i m e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of t h e Stoic d o c t r i n e of c a u s a t i o n — r e g a r d l e s s of t h e fact t h a t h e h a p p e n e d to b e t h e t e a c h e r of t h e f o u n d e r of t h e P n e u m a t i s t school of medicine, Athenaeus. 9 1 This constitutes a n o t h e r d i f f e r e n c e f r o m PHP, w h e r e G a l e n p r e s e n t P o s i d o n i u s as t h e only Stoic with a k e e n interest in t h e causes of things (in m o s t b l a t a n t contrast with Chrysippus, of course). Nonetheless, a closer inspection of the P o s i d o n i a n material in PHP (ch. 5) will reveal that Posidonius c o n f o r m e d to t h e d o c t r i n e of t h e a f f e c t i o n s of t h e m i n d h e h a d i n h e r i t e d f r o m his predecessors, most notably Z e n o a n d Chrysippus. T h e p a t h o l o g y o u t l i n e d in t h e above passage also c o n f o r m s to t h e ideas of these Stoics. In particular we may n o t e the p r o m i n e n c e given to d i s t u r b a n c e s of the p n e u m a a n d the theory of the f o u r e l e m e n t a r y qualities. This is f o u n d in t h e f r a g m e n t s relating to Chrysippus (most notably the Therapeutics) a n d Z e n o as well. 92 In the above passage c h a n g e s in t h e pneuma may upset the b a l a n c e b e t w e e n t h e e l e m e n t a r y qualities, causing o n e of t h e m to b e c o m e d o m i n a n t . T h e resulting physical c o n d i t i o n is t h e sustaining cause of disease in a way c o m p a r a b l e to t h e feverish c o n d i t i o n of t h e spleen a c c o r d i n g to C l e m e n t a n d of the soul a c c o r d i n g to Chrysippus. T h e r e p o r t o n A t h e n a e u s a n d his Stoic aetiology also c o n f i r m s t h a t e x t e r n a l f a c t o r s a r e d e s c r i b e d as p r e l i m i n a r y causes, a n d a d d s a f u r t h e r distinction between the external factors and the inner c h a n g e s e f f e c t e d by t h e m . T h e latter a r e t h e m o r e i m m e d i a t e cause of t h e diseased c o n d i t i o n a n d a r e separately classed as ' a n t e c e d e n t ' causes. 9 3 If we a r e e n t i t l e d to r e l a t e this d i s t i n c t i o n to m e n t a l 91

This is even clearer from the preceding context, where Galen refers repeatedly to the Stoics in general as defenders of the causal theory he has begun to expound there. 92 On this subject see further chs. 5.2-4 below. 93 On this term see Long-Sedley (1987) vol. 1, 342, who note that in Stoicism the term may indicate all causes (i.e. of various kinds) which pre-exist their effects

affections, we may see that it makes sense to distinguish between the external object and the mental appearance of it, the latter being an alteration in the mind and hence internal. I take it that Chrysippus has carefully designed his account of the nature and genesis of affection in the light of Stoic causal theory, viz. the distinction between sustaining and preliminary causes in particular. T h e first is represented by the physical condition of the soul, the second by the incoming impressions (i.e. mental appearances). Since the f o r m e r does not carry the cause of corruption in itself, the latter are vital to the Stoic account of the origin of evil. But once the soul has become weakened or diseased, it functions as the main or 'sustaining' cause of affections, i.e. excessive and unnatural and irrational responses to mental appearance. O u r response then d e p e n d s on the state of our intellect, on what Chrysippus and the o t h e r Stoics identify with the degree of its physical tension (τόνος). 94 This determines whether we are able to resist a particular impression and prevent our response f r o m being excessive or give in to it, i.e. be weakwilled. This idea, along with the twofold causal schema, also underlies Chrysippus' discussion in t h e Therapeutics of examples such as Menelaos abandoning his intention to kill Helen: One person desists when danger arises, another became slack and gave in when a reward of penalty was brought, another on encountering other such things, which are not few in number. For each of such things defeats and enslaves us, so that by yielding to it we betray friends and cities and give in to many shameful acts once the former impetus 95 has become slack. Euripides has presented Menelaus as this kind of person. He drew his sword and rushed at Helen to kill her but on seeing here and being struck by her beauty he let the sword drop, no longer able even to keep his hold on it. He was accordingly rebuked with these word: 'When you caught sight of her breast, you dropped your sword and accepted her kiss, fawning on the treacherous bitch.' 96 .... Therefore, since all inferior men act in this way, abandoning their course and yielding for many causes, it might be said that they act in every case weakly and badly [PHP4.6.7-9, 11 ~ SVF3.473).97

but that the narrower usage found here may be peculiar to Athenaeus; cf. Bobzien (1999) 233. 94 PHP4.5.5 (from the Therapeutics) ~ SVF3.473. 95 On the term 'impetus' (φορά) see supra, pp. 98 f. 96 Euripides, Andromache 629-630. 97 (7) 6 μέν δειμών έπιγινομένων άφίσταται, ό δέ κέρδους ή ζημίας φερομένης έξελύθη καί ένέδωκεν, 6 δέ καθ' έτερα τοιαύτα ούκ ολίγα. (8) έ'καστον γάρ τών

This example should be read in the light of Chrysippus' idea of physical tension (τόνος) which he had introduced in the preceding context, as we know from Galen who quotes a few observations from it before presenting the above passage (ibid. 5-6). A soul which lacks tension, or is slack, is weak. Such a person cannot keep to his or her intentions and so a b a n d o n s the most reasonable course of action. Apparently Chrysippus believes that Helen had deserved to die, and so did, initially, h e r deceived husband. But when Menelaus sees her beautiful body, he instantly drops his sword, being overcome by lust. T h e action that would have b e e n preferable from a rational and moral point of view is broken off. Here, then, we have the same twofold causal schema: mental condition (sustaining cause) and externally p r o m p t e d presentation (preliminary cause) explain in conjunction the mental response—in this case the affection of appetite ( ε π ι θ υ μ ί α ) — a n d the resulting action. T h e 'many causes' m e n t i o n e d at the e n d of this f r a g m e n t refer to the many a n d various preliminary causes (i.e. m e n t a l appearances) which may trigger an emotional response, as is clear from its beginning (where Chrysippus also seems to take account of the aspect of susceptibility or proneness which varies from person to person). 9 8 To c o n c l u d e . Galen's oft-repeated c o m p l a i n t that Chrysippus failed to give a causal explanation is entirely beside the point. Given the causal factors designated by Chrysippus, Galen's polemical τοιούτων τρέπεται τε καίδουλούται ήμάς, ώς ενδίδοντας αύτοΐς καί φίλους καί πόλεις προδιδόναι καί αύτούς εις πολλάς καί άσχήμονας πράξεις έπιδιδόναι τής πρόσθεν φοράς έκλυθείσης. (9) οίος είσήκται καί τω Ευριπίδη ό Μενέλαος - σπασάμενος γάρ τήν μάχαιραν φέρεται έπί τήν Έ λ έ ν η ν ώς άναιρήσων, ίδών δέ καί καταπλαγείς [εις] τό κάλλος έξέβαλε τήν μάχαιραν, ούδέ ταύτης έτι δυνάμενος κρατείν, καθά καί ή έπιπληξις αύτη εϊρηται αύτφ: « σύ δ' ώς έσεΐδες μαστόν [έκείνης] έκβαλών ξίφος / φίλημ' έδέξω προδότιν αίκάλ(λ)ων κύνα. )) .... (11) διό πάντων τών φαύλων οϋτω πραττόντων άποστατικώς καί ένδοτικώς κατά πολλάς αιτίας, άσθενώς καί κακώς έκαστα πράττειν άν λέγοιτο. 9S For once Galen seems accurate when h e too takes this expression in this way, ibid. 15. But h e r e too h e fails to give a p r o p e r account of the Stoic analysis in terms of the soul's weak condition on the o n e h a n d a n d the many incoming impressions on the o t h e r . Instead Galen plays off Chrysippus' r e f e r e n c e to many causes against the soul's weakness as c o m m o n to all the affections (ibid. 14). T h e cause c a n n o t be both o n e a n d many. As to the many causes, Chrysippus should have b r o u g h t t h e m u n d e r a few main heads, as Plato did in laying down his tripartition (ibid. 16-17). Of course, we may feel, Chrysippus did just that by positing his concept of preliminary cause. And the weakness of the soul's condition is not treated by him as o n e a n d the same in all individual cases but, as we have noticed, f u r t h e r differentiated in terms of varying propensities. Yet, for all his distortion, Galen h e r e effectively recognizes the twofold Stoic schema.

a p p r o a c h has o b s c u r e d an i m p o r t a n t i n g r e d i e n t of the theory, viz. the fact that the Stoic assigned an all-important role to the physical condition of the soul. It may seem surprising that the medical man Galen glosses over the physical a n d nosological aspects of Chrysippus a r g u m e n t . But his a p p r o a c h is exclusively c o n c e r n e d with t h e question of the n u m b e r of psychic powers—in a c c o r d i n g with a traditional o r d e r i n g of topics which can be paralleled f r o m extant doxographic texts (see above, pp. 23, 64 ff.).

4. The Four Generic Affections Having offered an exegesis of Zeno's three definitions of affection in general Chrysippus p r o c e e d e d to d o the same for his definitions of the f o u r ' g e n e r i c ' affections u n d e r which all o t h e r affections were subsumed: distress (λύπη), pleasure (ηδονή), fear (φόβος) a n d appetite (επιθυμία). These f o u r are arrived at by taking a pair of affections directed to the present a n d a pair directed to the future, o n e of each pair involving a p p a r e n t goods, the o t h e r a p p a r e n t evils: 99 Time:

Present

Future

Object:

Pleasure

Appetite

A p p a r e n t good

Distress

Fear

A p p a r e n t evil

T h u s distress consists in t h e ( e r r o n e o u s ) o p i n i o n that an evil is p r e s e n t . Given this s c h e m a a n d the g e n u s / s p e c i e s structure, t h e Stoics t e n d to explain irrational behaviour in terms of transitions b e t w e e n distinct a n d o p p o s i t e a f f e c t i o n s r a t h e r t h a n r a n d o m mixtures between them. 1 0 0 T h e relevant passages in PHP c o n c e r n e d with the generic affections have o f t e n b e e n taken to attest to a significant innovation on the part of Chrysippus. This however is based on Galen's r e p e a t e d claim that Zeno saw the affections as psychic motions supervening on j u d g e m e n t s , whereas Chrysippus straightforwardly equated the affections with j u d g e m e n t s (see above, ρ 86). But this claim, it has t u r n e d 99

Cf. Sorabji (2000) 29. In these respects their account is anticipated by that of Aristotle, Rhetoric Β 111, though the Stoics are more systematic. On the transitions between opposite affections, see also supra, p. 98 n. 40. 100

o u t , follows e n t i r e l y f r o m G a l e n ' s own d i s t i n c t i o n s b e t w e e n t h e o p t i o n s t h a t a r e o p e n in t h e d e b a t e o n t h e n u m b e r of psychic faculties. G a l e n ' s a s s i g n m e n t of o n e of these o p t i o n s (which in fact c o n s t i t u t e s a c o m p r o m i s e b e t w e e n two of t h e m ) to Z e n o is n o t w a r r a n t e d by the d o c u m e n t e d evidence, as we would be led to e x p e c t in view of present-day c o n v e n t i o n s a n d practices. In o n e striking passage as we have n o t i c e d G a l e n actually a d m i t s to n o t having c h e c k e d his claim, simply because h e h a d n o t b e e n able to get h o l d of any treatise by Z e n o {PHP 5.6.40-42; see above, p. 86). I am n o t sure w h e t h e r h e h a d tried very h a r d . A f t e r all, h e also says that h e h a d d e c i d e d to focus exclusively o n Chrysippus {ibid. 41; cf. 4.1.3). Still, o n e m i g h t r e a d this admission as e v i d e n c e that Galen h a d at least s o m e sense of h i s t o r i o g r a p h i c a l responsibility. Yet this is an isolated case. In t h e r e m a i n d e r of b o o k s 4 a n d 5 h e shows absolutely n o c o m p u n c t i o n a b o u t ascribing t h e view of affections as e p i p h e n o m e n a of j u d g e m e n t s to Z e n o . In g e n e r a l G a l e n ' s s c h e m a of o p t i o n s prevails over historiographical accuracy in a m o d e r n sense. 1 0 1 T h e first relevant f r a g m e n t is n o t taken directly f r o m Chrysippus' treatise, b u t c o m e s f r o m P o s i d o n i u s ' discussion of s o m e p r o b l e m s (άπορίαι) c o n c e r n i n g a f f e c t i o n s t h a t h a d also b e e n discussed by Chrysippus in On Affections, Book 2. T h e fact that P o s i d o n i u s w e n t t h r o u g h these p r o b l e m s again could easily b e p r e s e n t e d as p r o o f that h e was dissatisfied by C h r y s i p p u s ' s o l u t i o n , o r t h e very lack of a solution. At any rate Galen claims that P o s i d o n i u s actually r e f u t e d Chrysippus o n f u n d a m e n t a l points, a n d h e works h a r d trying to m a k e it look that way. I shall deal with the c o n t e n t s a n d p r o c e d u r e of b o o k 2 in t h e n e x t section. Suffice it to n o t e h e r e t h a t P o s i d o n i u s , o n w h o m Galen bases himself, h e r e a p p e a r s to r e f e r back to Chrysippus' exegesis of Z e n o ' s definitions in b o o k 1. At PHP4.7.1-11 (1-7 ~ SVF3.481, Posid. F 165 E.-K.) we are dealing with C h r y s i p p u s ' e x p l a n a t i o n of Z e n o ' s d e f i n i t i o n of distress as an o p i n i o n t h a t o n e is in t h e p r e s e n c e of evil. C h r y s i p p u s m a d e this m o r e precise by a d d i n g ' f r e s h ' to ' o p i n i o n ' to explain why after s o m e time distress f a d e s away. T h e passage follows o n G a l e n ' s own discussion of f r a g m e n t s f r o m C h r y s i p p u s ' Therapeutics which b r i n g h o m e t h e s h e e r irrationality a n d repulsiveness of e m o t i o n a l b e h a v i o u r (see ch. 4.7). T h e passage which c o n c e r n s us h e r e reads as follows:

101

See supra, pp. 34, 80 ff.

(1) ... I proceed to some of Posidonius' answers to Chrysippus: (2) This definition of distress, 102 he [seil. Posidonius] says, and also many others [seil, definitions] that were pronounced by Zeno and recorded by Chrysippus clearly refute his [seil. Chrysippus'] view. (3) Indeed he says that distress is a fresh opinion that one is in the presence of evil. Sometimes they express it even more briefly: distress is a fresh opinion of the presence of evil. (4) He [seil. Posidonius] says that what is fresh is recent in time, and he asks that they tell him why it is that when the opinion of evil is fresh it contracts the soul and produces distress, but that after an interval it either does not contract it [seil, the soul] at all, or no longer to the same extent. (5) And yet, if Chrysippus' teachings were true, the words 'fresh' should not even have been included in the definition. It would have been more consistent with his view to call distress an opinion of the presence of a great or intolerable or unbearable evil—this is his [Chrysippus', apparently] 103 usual term, rather than a fresh evil.104 Galen t h e n r e n d e r s what Posidonius m u s t have said. But are we dealing with a verbatim quotation? And if so, how far exactly does it extend? 1 0 5 De Lacy's inverted c o m m a s indicate that h e regards both 102

The mss. give the rather improbable άτης ('baneful blindness') which is rejected by most editors in favour of λύπης but retained by De Lacy ad 280.21 on the grounds that the sentence in which it occurs may be transitional so that Posidonius may turn to distress only in the next sentence. But this seems less likely. De Lacy, following Pohlenz (1898) 616, points out that 4.5.42-44 dealing with persons who choose harmful things of their own accord may have led Posidonius to a discussion of άτη. But apart from the fact that nothing indicates that this passage preceded Posidonius' discussion reflected at 4.7.1 ff., the point (echoing Chrysippus, see ch. 4.6, infra pp. 170 ff.) at 4.5.42 ff. is precisely that the emotional people at issue are perfecdy aware that what they prefer is harmful to them and so are not blinded at all. Blindness (τυφλότης) is however at issue in the section directly preceding 4.7.1 ff. But here it features in Chrysippean fragments from the Therapeutics, see infra, p. 178 ff. This seems a more likely cause for the mistaken reading of άτης instead of λύπης. In that case the mistake may already have been made by Galen. If so, the reading άτης would have to be preserved. 103 However, as De Lacy notes, the terms άνυπομόνητος and άκαρτέρητος are not elsewhere attested for Chrysippus. 104 Although the phrasing is presumably Galen's (see below in text), the use of the adjective 'fresh' for the bad entity instead of the opinion entails no significant distortion of the Stoic position. In fact, it is also encountered in Stoic accounts, see Stob. Eel. II, p.90.14-16 Wachsmuth {SVF 3.394): λύπην δ είναι συστολήν ψυχή$ άπειθη λόγψ, αίτιον δ' αύτης το δοξάζειν π ρ ό σ φ α τ ο ν κ α κ ό ν παρείναι, έφ' φ καθηκει συστέλλεσθαι. Lists of Stoic definitions such as preserved by Stobaeus on the whole conform to the Chrysippean material transmitted by Galen. They give the appearance of being based on Chrysippus' version of Zeno's definitions as expounded in works like On Affections. Such compilations of Chrysippus' definitions were intended for scholastic use. 105 j n w hat follows I disagree with Kidd who regards the whole passage as Posidonian (albeit not wholly a verbatim quotation), see Commentary II (ii) 598 ff. Kidd's acceptance of Galen's presentation of the views of Posidonius and Chrysippus at issue is consistent with his overall conviction that Posidonius discerned and

§ 2 a n d § 3 as a direct q u o t a t i o n b u t this s e e m s arbitrary. T h e addition of an alternative version of the d e f i n i t i o n of distress which 'they' use looks m o r e like an i n t e r p o l a t i o n by G a l e n t h a n a r e f e r e n c e by Posidonius to his fellow Stoics. 106 My impression is that this q u o t a t i o n is n o t verbatim at all. At any rate we s h o u l d be extremely cautious in a c c e p t i n g t h e s t a t e m e n t in (2) that it was P o s i d o n i u s w h o explicitly c h a r g e d Chrysippus with self-contradiction. But when, as seems plausible, we take (3) as a r e p o r t o n Posidonius' view, t h e r e is clearly n o d i r e c t attack o n Chrysippus whatsoever. P o s i d o n i u s ' e x p l a n a t i o n of ' f r e s h ' as ' r e c e n t in t i m e ' n e e d n o t conflict with a n d i n d e e d s e e m s f a i t h f u l to what Chrysippus m e a n t . 1 0 7 M o r e o v e r , t h e e x p l a n a t i o n of freshness in terms of the physical contraction (συστέλλει) p r o d u c e d by t h e o p i n i o n in q u e s t i o n suits C h r y s i p p u s ' p o s i t i o n a n d can b e paralleled f r o m sources which are generally taken to state the g e n e r a l Stoic d o c t r i n e . 1 0 8 W h a t d o e s seem to preserve P o s i d o n i u s ' own distinctive c o n t r i b u t i o n to t h e d e b a t e is that h e pressed t h e question of exactly why the freshness disappears, a n d h e n c e the distress vanishes. T h i s a p p r o a c h was typical of h i m a n d did n o t lead to significant m o d i f i c a t i o n s of t h e view taken by C h r y s i p p u s (who h a d m o r e o v e r raised m o s t of t h e s a m e q u e s t i o n s a l r e a d y ) , b u t m o r e o f t e n to specifications u n d e r t h e i n f l u e n c e of r e c e n t philosophical a n d m e d i cal d e v e l o p m e n t s . T h i s is n o t to say t h a t C h r y s i p p u s p r o v i d e d n o e x p l a n a t i o n s at all—merely that Posidonius m a d e t h e m m o r e precise o r b r o u g h t t h e m up-to-date (see f u r t h e r c h . 5.5). A c c o r d i n g to C h r y s i p p u s , m e n t a l a p p a r e a n c e s loose t h e i r physical i m p a c t a f t e r s o m e time. How l o n g this takes will vary f r o m case to case, b u t will at any rate d e p e n d o n t h e d e g r e e of tension of t h e soul receiving t h e a p p e a r a n c e s , as well as o n t h e a p p a r e n t m a g n i t u d e 1 0 9 of t h e evil or g o o d in question.

hammered out real difficulties in Chrysippean psychological monism; cf. supra, pp. 8f„ infra, pp. 198 f. 106 Galen may have taken such definitions from a philosophical lexicon. For a very similar example see PHP 2.5.17. Similarly Reinhardt (1921) 291. 107 It cannot even be excluded that it is Chrysippus himself who is the 'he' who says so. On this pont see Kidd, Commentary II (ii), p. 599. 108 Cf. Stob. EcL II, p.89.2-3 (SVF 3.378): τό δέ πρόσφατον άντι του κινητικού συστολής άλογου (ή) έπάρσεως (the latter in the case of pleasure, ήδονή); on the physical reactions typical of the affections, see further supra, pp. 112 ff.; infra, pp. 145 ff. 109 On the importance attached by Chrysippus and the other Stoics to the magnitude of the good or evil, see PHP4.5.27, 29; Cic. Tusc. 3.25, 28 (for which see infra, p. 313).

W h e n we arrive at (5) it would be rash to a s s u m e that t h e r a t h e r l a m e criticism voiced h e r e stems f r o m P o s i d o n i u s . 1 1 0 In fact, w h a t follows f r o m 6 o n w a r d s strongly tells against this a s s u m p t i o n . Having inserted two d i f f e r e n t p r o b l e m s first raised by Posidonius c o n c e r n i n g affections in wise a n d p r o g r e s s i n g persons, Galen r e t u r n s to Chrysippus' a d d i t i o n of ' f r e s h n e s s ' to Z e n o ' s d e f i n i t i o n (7). O n c e again we learn that P o s i d o n i u s raised t h e question why all that is u n p r e p a r e d a n d s t r a n g e may trigger an a f f e c t i o n w h e r e a s familiar or p r o l o n g e d m e n t a l a p p e a r a n c e s d o n o t cause an e m o t i o n a l m o v e m e n t (this t e r m at least is P o s i d o n i a n ) , o r d o n o t d o so to t h e same e x t e n t . W h a t we get is n o t an answer to this q u e s t i o n , b u t Posidonius' t h e r a p e u t i c , o r r a t h e r preventive, advice that we s h o u l d 'dwell in advance' (προενδημειν) o n images that m i g h t otherwise trigger an e m o t i o n a l response: by a c c u s t o m i n g ourselves to t h e m we may b e b e t t e r able to withstand t h e m w h e n we e x p e r i e n c e t h e m in real life. P o s i d o n i u s may have b e e n t h e first to use t h e term 'dwelling in a d v a n c e ' f o r this m e n t a l exercise. But f r o m a d o c t r i n a l p o i n t of view t h e r e is n o d e p a r t u r e f r o m t h e C h r y s i p p e a n position h e r e . 1 1 1 In fact, P o s i d o n i u s ' advice m e r e l y c o n f i r m s t h a t C h r y s i p p u s was r i g h t to qualify ' o p i n i o n ' t h e way h e did, i.e. by a d d i n g ' f r e s h ' to it. Pace G a l e n , P o s i d o n i u s a n d Chrysippus were basically in a g r e e m e n t as to t h e factors involved in the o c c u r r e n c e a n d d e v e l o p m e n t of e m o t i o n a l responses. But what is left that can b e ascribed to Chrysippus? First, h e explicated the definition of distress a n d t h e t h r e e o t h e r g e n e r i c affections as laid down by Z e n o . This n e e d n o t suprise us since it was c o m m o n p r a c t i c e to start f r o m t h e d e f i n i t i o n s of t h e s c h o o l ' s f o u n d e r , as C h r y s i p p u s h a d already d o n e with r e g a r d to Z e n o ' s d e f i n i t i o n s of a f f e c t i o n in g e n e r a l (see above, p. 96). Secondly, we know that h e specified that t h e o p i n i o n in q u e s t i o n h a d to b e fresh, i.e. r e c e n t in time. Of course o t h e r factors also explain t h e intensity a n d d u r a t i o n

110

Reinhardt (1921) 292 sees this as a Galenic addition too; Kidd, Commentary II (ii), 600 considers it to be part of the argument directed by Posidonius against Chrysippus. 111 Once again it is instructive to compare the parallel account offered by Cicero, Tusc 3.24 ff. At 28-29 he discusses the 'freshness' of the appearance which causes and maintains an affection and the need to familiarize ourselves beforehand with it in a way that runs closely parallel to PHP4.7.6 ff. Even Posidonius' examples (Anaxagoras and Euripides) can be paralleled from Cicero. In fact, the only significant difference between the account in Galen and Cicero is the fact that the former posits a disagreement between Posidonius and Chrysippus (they are not mentioned by Cicero).

of t h e affection in question: t h e soul's resilience a n d t h e d i m e n s i o n s of t h e e x p e r i e n c e , quite in line with t h e causal theory u n d e r l y i n g his g e n e r a l c o n c e p t i o n of affection (see above, p. 102 ff.). T h a t G a l e n ' s a c c o u n t stresses t h e factor time ( ' f r e s h ' as ' r e c e n t in time') d o e s n o t m e a n that these o t h e r factors are e x c l u d e d . T h e r e f e r e n c e to physical contraction at any rate points to t h e c o n d i t i o n of the psychic pneuma, to its d e g r e e of physical tension. T h e scale (or t h e d e g r e e to which it is b e a r a b l e ) of t h e e x p e r i e n c e of evil is m e n t i o n e d as well, b u t is played off against the factor of freshness. This, typically, is how Galen b e h a v e s w h e n d e a l i n g with a s o p h i s t i c a t e d analysis by C h r y s i p p u s involving various factors. 1 1 2 This is c o n f i r m e d by Cicero's less partisan a c c o u n t in Tusculan Disputations b o o k 3, w h e r e we f i n d scale a n d freshness c o m b i n e d in the e x p l a n a t i o n of distress. 1 1 3 T h e s e c o n d m a i n passage c o n c e r n e d with Chrysippus' a c c o u n t of t h e so-called ' g e n e r i c a f f e c t i o n s ' (γενικά παθή) is f o u n d n e a r t h e b e g i n n i n g of b o o k 4, at 2.1-7 (SVF 3.463). In part, it r u n s parallel to 7.1-6, b u t a p p e a r s to b e b a s e d o n G a l e n ' s own r e a d i n g of t h e C h r y s i p p e a n text. This passage d o e s n o t c o n t a i n a verbatim q u o t a t i o n . W h a t C h r y s i p p u s said h a s to b e e x t r i c a t e d f r o m G a l e n ' s polemical discussion: (1) [...] in t h e first d e f i n i t i o n s t h a t h e gives of t h e g e n e r i c a f f e c t i o n s h e c o m p l e t e l y d i s t a n c e s h i m s e l f f r o m t h e i r [seil, t h e a n c i e n t s ' ] 1 1 4 view, d e f i n i n g d i s t r e s s as a f r e s h o p i n i o n t h a t evil is p r e s e n t . (2) F o r in t h e s e ( d e f i n i t i o n s ) h e o p e n l y m e n t i o n s o n l y t h e r a t i o n a l ( p a r t ) of t h e soul, o m i t t i n g t h e a p p e t i t i v e a n d s p i r i t e d ; f o r h e b e l i e v e s t h a t o p i n i o n a n d e x p e c t a t i o n arise o n l y in t h e r a t i o n a l p a r t . (3) N o n e t h e l e s s , in his d e f i n i t i o n of a p p e t i t e , w h i c h h e calls a n i r r a t i o n a l d e s i r e , 1 1 5 h e t o u c h e s in a way, v e r b a l l y at least, o n t h e i r r a t i o n a l p o w e r of t h e s o u l ; b u t h e r e t o o h e d i v e r g e s f r o m it in h i s e x p l a n a t i o n of it [i.e. o f a p p e t i t e ] , s i n c e e v e n t h e d e s i r e h e i n c l u d e s in t h e d e f i n i t i o n b e l o n g s

112

The definition of affection in general is another example, see supra, p. 97 ff. Tusc. 3.25: ... aegritudo est opinio m a g n i mali praesentis, et quidem r e c e n s opinio talis mali, ut is qui doleat oportere opinetur se dolere (note that the M<-clause adds the second judgement-type of Chrysippus' analysis, see infra, pp. 169 f.); ibid. 28: tum aegritudinem existere cum quid ita visum sit ut m a g n u m quoddam malum adesse et urgere videatur .... non omni malo aegritudinem efßci censent [seil. Cyrenaici], sed insperato et necopinato (cf. PHP 4.7.7, p.282.7) malo. In spite of the attribution of this view to the Cyrenaics and Epicurus, Cicero's text runs closely parallel to PHP 4.7 and should be taken to expound the Stoic position; cf. also infra, pp. 123 ff. 114 I.e. primarily Plato and Hippocrates. On the preceding context see further supra, p. 31 ff. 115 For the same definition see ps. Andronicus, De a f f . 1 ( .SW*· 3.391 ). 113

t o t h e r a t i o n a l p o w e r . (4) T h u s h e d e f i n e s d e s i r e as ' r a t i o n a l c o n a t i o n f o r s o m e t h i n g t h a t gives p l e a s u r e t o t h e e x t e n t it s h o u l d . . . ' , 1 6

G a l e n p r o v i d e s n o e v i d e n c e w h a t s o e v e r t h a t C h r y s i p p u s s p o k e of a n y t h i n g like a r a t i o n a l p a r t o r p o w e r . In a l m o s t all cases w h e r e Chrysippus d e f i n e s an a f f e c t i o n as an o p i n i o n o r j u d g e m e n t , Galen saddles h i m with t h e Platonic rational part. It is a telling witness to t h e m a c h i n a t i o n s of G a l e n ' s p o l e m i c that h e can say that Chrysippus r e f e r r e d to t h e rational part. Likewise, the m e r e inclusion of t h e t e r m ' n o n - r a t i o n a l ' is h e r e p r e s e n t e d as p o i n t i n g to t h e irrational power of the soul, even t h o u g h h e r e Galen is a bit m o r e restrained, qualifying his p o i n t with t h e e x p r e s s i o n s 'in a way' a n d 'verbally'. His r e m a r k c o n c e r n i n g Chrysipus' d e f i n i t i o n of a p p e t i t e (επιθυμία) as a n irrational desire (ορεξιν αλογον) is s o m e w h a t d i f f e r e n t because h e i m p u t e s an inconsistency to C h r y s i p p u s with r e g a r d to this t e r m . Since t h e latter also d e f i n e d desire (δρεξις) as a rational c o n a t i o n , h e t r e a t e d desire as b o t h i r r a t i o n a l a n d rational. 1 1 7 But this strains credulity. Galen m u s t b e c o n f o u n d i n g a wider a n d a m o r e specific usage of t h e t e r m , viz. desire as r a t i o n a l c o n a t i o n p e c u l i a r to a d u l t h u m a n s (as o p p o s e d to that of non-rational animals) o n the o n e h a n d a n d morally correct desire o n t h e o t h e r (as o p p o s e d to w r o n g a p p e t i t e , επιθυμ ί α ) . 1 1 8 In fact, t h e Stoics h a d a s e p a r a t e t e r m f o r desire (ορεξις) in its n o r m a t i v e sense, viz. will (βούλησις), which is elsewhere d e f i n e d as a ' r e a s o n a b l e desire' (εύλογος ορεξις). 1 1 9 T h e r e are m o r e e x a m p l e s of 116 (1) έν τοις όρισμοΐς τών γενικών παθών ους πρώτους έξέθετο, τελέως αποχωρεί τής γνώμης αυτών, τήν λύπην οριζόμενος δόξαν πρόσφατον κακοΰ παρουσίας, τόν δέ φόβον προσδοκίαν κακοΰ, τήν δ' ήδονήν δόξαν πρόσφατον άγαθοΰ παρουσίας. (2) άντικρυς γαρ έν τούτοις τού λογιστικού τής ψυχής μόνου μέμνηται παραλείπων τό τ' έπιθυμητικόν καί τό θυμοειδές- καί γαρ τήν δόξαν καί τήν προσδοκίαν έν τφ λογιστικφ μόνω συνίστασθαι νομίζει. (3) κατά μέντοι τόν τής έπιθυμίας δρον, ην ορεξιν άλογον είναί φησιν, έφάπτεται μέν πως όσον έπί τή λέξει τής αλόγου κατά τήν ψυχήν δυνάμεως, άποχωρει δέ κάνταύθα κατά τήν έξήγησιν αύτής, εϊγε καί ή ορεξις ήν κατά τόν όρισμόν παρέλαβε τής λογικής έστι δυνάμεως. (4) ορίζεται γούν αύτήν όρμήν λογικήν έπί τίνος δσον χρή ήδοντος. 117 For the same alleged inconsistency, see PHP5.7.29-30. 118 Note that Stob. (Arius Didymus), Eel. II p.86.17 ff. (SVF 3.169) only recognizes the more restricted, normative sense of appetition, which, he says, is only a species of rational conation (λογική όρμή), i.e. the conation typical of (adult) humans. But the denial by Stobaeus (or his source) that appetition should not be used to designate rational conation (i.e. the kind typical of adult humans) strongly suggests that others did use it in the latter, more descriptive sense. So implicitly the two sense at issue in Galen's discussion are to be found in Stoabaeus' abstract as well. 119 See D.L. 7.116 (SVF 3.431), Cic. Tusc 4.12, 14-15, ps.Andron. De a f f . 6 (SVF 3.432). Βούλησις is also the counterpart of the affection (πάθος) έπιθυμία by being a εύπαθεία ('good feeling').

the use of a particular term in both a general a n d a m o r e specific sense. This seems to have been particularly o f t e n the case in Stoic classifications of moral a n d psychological concepts. 1 2 0 In the case of desire, its use as an abstract term applying to both will and appetite is justified by the fact that both kinds of desire are directed towards the a p p a r e n t good. 1 2 1 T h u s at 4.2.4-7 we read: (4) ... In t h e s e d e f i n i t i o n s h o w e v e r h e s u p p o s e s t h a t t h e a f f e c t i o n s a r e c o n a t i o n s a n d o p i n i o n s a n d j u d g e m e n t s ; b u t in s o m e o f t h e very n e x t d e f i n i t i o n s h e w r i t e s t h i n g s t h a t a r e c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e d o c t r i n e s of E p i c u r u s a n d Z e n o r a t h e r t h a n h i s o w n . (5) F o r in d e f i n i n g d i s t r e s s h e says it is a s h r i n k i n g b e f o r e w h a t is t h o u g h t to b e a t h i n g to a v o i d a n d p l e a s u r e h e d e f i n e s as a s w e l l i n g a t w h a t is t h o u g h t to b e a t h i n g t o c h o o s e . (6) B u t t h e s h r i n k i n g s a n d swellings a n d c o n t r a c t i o n s a n d expansions—for these too he mentions sometimes—are affections ( π α θ ή μ α τ α ) of t h e i r r a t i o n a l p o w e r w h i c h s u p e r v e n e o n t h e o p i n i o n s . E p i c u r u s a n d Z e n o h o l d t h a t t h e a f f e c t i o n s h a v e s u c h a n a t u r e as t h i s b u t C h r y s i p p u s d o e s n o t . (7) A n d it s t r i k e s m e as a s t o u n d i n g t h a t t h e m a n w h o p r o f e s s e s t o b e g i v i n g b o t h logical a n d p r e c i s e i n s t r u c t i o n is not precise.122

This s e c o n d passage d e a l i n g with Chrysippus' d e f i n i t i o n s of t h e generic affections reiterates the t h e m e of 4.1.14-16, viz. the fact that Chrysippus did not operate with the correct division of options that are available in the debate. In consequence, things are m u d d l e d up, because now h e takes this side, then the other, without even being aware of this tergiversation. According to this division, Chrysippus a n d Zeno b e l o n g in d i f f e r e n t camps, in the way indicated in the above passage. I have dealt with this schema of options a n d the way it functions in Galen's discussion above (ch. 2.8). Suffice it to note h e r e 120

E.g. conation (όρμή) designates both the psychic motion opposed to avoidance (αφορμή) and an abstract term applying to both, see Orig. In Matth. III p.446 Delarue (SVF 3.170). Likewise the term conation may indicate the soul's motion towards something (the general sense) and that of non-rational animals (the specific sense), for which no separate appellation exists, Stob. (Arius Didymus), Eel. II p. 86.17 ff. (SVF3.169). 121 See Cic. Tusc. 3.24, 4.12, ps. Andron. De a f f . 1, cf. SVF 3.386 with Inwood (1985) 236. 122 (4) ... Έν μέντοι δή τούτοις τοις δροις όρμάς και δόξας καί κρίσεις ύπάρχειν οϊεται τά πάθη, κατά δέ τινας τών έφεξής 'Επικούρω καί Ζήνωνι μάλλον ή τοις έαυτοΰ δόγμασιν άκόλουθα γράφει. (5) τήν τε γάρ λύπην οριζόμενος μείωσιν είναί φησιν έπί φευκτώ δοκούντι ύπάρχειν τήν θ' ήδονήν έπαρσιν έφ' αίρετώ δοκούντι ύπάρχειν. (6) καί γάρ αί μειώσεις καί αί έπάρσεις καί αί συστολαί καί αί διαχύσεις καί γάρ τούτων ένίοτε μέμνηται - τής άλογου δυνάμεως έστι παθήματα ταίς δόξαις έπιγιγνόμενα. τοιαύτην δέ τινα τήν ούσίαν τών παθών 'Επίκουρος καί Ζήνων, ούκ αύτός ύπολαμβάνει. (7) ο καί θαυμάζειν επέρχεται μοι τάνδρος έν έπαγγελία λογικής τε άμα καί άκριβούς διδασκαλίας ούκ άκριβούντος.

how it is used to play off against e a c h o t h e r t h e psychological a n d physical t e r m s which w e r e e m p l o y e d by t h e Stoics in d e s c r i b i n g affection. In fact, as t h e above d e f i n i t i o n s show a n d as is c o n f i r m e d by Diogenes Laertius a n d Cicero, 1 2 3 t h e Stoics cheerfully i n c l u d e d the c o r p o r e a l a n d i n t e n t i o n a l aspects in o n e a n d t h e s a m e d e f i n i t i o n . G a l e n ' s text reveals that Chrysippus in On Affections b o o k 1 did so too. In o t h e r words, t h e d e f i n i t i o n s as r e c o r d e d in (5) a p p e a r to be an a c c u r a t e reflection of what h e actually wrote. Since Galen invariably takes r e f e r e n c e s to t h e s o u l ' s c o r p o r e a l n a t u r e as p o i n t i n g to a n irrational p o w e r or part, we g e t t h e p i c t u r e p r e s e n t e d in t h e o t h e r s e c t i o n a b o v e : t h a t of C h r y s i p p u s b e i n g c o n f u s e d a n d at t i m e s effectively o p p o s e d to t h e s c h o o l ' s f o u n d e r whose ipsissima verba h e explains. 1 2 4

5. Book 2: Problems Concerning Affections In b o o k 2 of his treatise C h r y s i p p u s t r e a t e d p r o b l e m s raised by certain o b s e r v e d p h e n o m e n a , f o r e x a m p l e t h e fact that a f f e c t i o n s a b a t e as time goes o n while t h e j u d g e m e n t s r e m a i n t h e same. How is this possible if, as t h e Stoics affirm, affections are j u d g e m e n t s ? Galen c o m p l a i n s t h a t C h r y s i p p u s m e r e l y raised s u c h p r o b l e m s b u t was u n a b l e to p r o d u c e solutions. In this c o n n e c t i o n h e r e p e a t e d l y employs the t e r m απορία a n d the c o g n a t e verb άπορειν with r e f e r e n c e to C h r y s i p p u s ' a r g u m e n t . D o e s this m e a n t h a t h e p o s e d q u e s t i o n s w i t h o u t a i m i n g at definitive solutions? O n o n e occasion Galen says that Chrysippus confessed to b e i n g p e r p l e x e d (άπορείν όμολογήσας) in r e g a r d to t h e m a i n causes of affection. 1 2 5 Apparently, Galen exploits a t e r m used by Chrysippus to c h a r a c t e r i z e his discussion in b o o k 2. But if h e u s e d it, it is n o t at all necessary to i n f e r that h e suspend e d his j u d g e m e n t o n t h e q u e s t i o n s at issue. 1 2 6 In fact, far f r o m 123 Cf. Cic. Tusc. 4.66-67; cf. D.L. 7.114. This combination of intentionalist and physical language is also noted by Sedley (1993) 329. 124 A similar attitude is adopted by Galen at PHP4.3.2, 5.1.4; cf. 4.7.19. 125 4.7.16; 5.4.16, p.316.16; in addition see e.g. 4.7.23. p.284.31; 5.2.45, 47, p.304.5, 7; 5.5.9, p.318.20. At 4.5.46, p.270.8 Galen speaks of άπορίαι raised by Posidonius which Chrysippean Stoics of Galen's own day were unable to solve. This represents the same motif because Posidonius had merely discussed again the socalled άπορίαι treated by Chrysippus; see infra, pp. 250 ff. 126 Galen himself presents a Stoic άπορία together with its solution at Mot. muse. I 7-8, IV pp. 400-1 (SVF2.450). That the Stoics in employing άπορίαι followed a Peripatetic rather than Sceptical paradigm (indeed Aristotle) is suggested by Simpl.

a c k n o w l e d g i n g d e f e a t , h e f o r m u l a t e d answers to t h e q u e s t i o n s h e raised. T h a t Galen did n o t like t h e answers is quite a n o t h e r matter. Having discussed Z e n o ' s definitions in b o o k 1, Chrysippus in b o o k 2 treats certain p r o b l e m s left, or insufficiently faced, by Zeno. In the process h e a d v a n c e s b e y o n d t h e s c h o o l ' s f o u n d e r by i n t r o d u c i n g certain r e f i n e m e n t s while r e m a i n i n g within t h e Z e n o n i a n f r a m e w o r k . T h e u p s h o t is a s t r e n g t h e n i n g of Z e n o ' s d o c t r i n e r a t h e r t h a n its revision, let a l o n e an admission of an inability to solve the p r o b l e m s raised. T h e direct evidence f o r b o o k 2 is slim—two verbatim fragments. 1 2 7 Matters are f u r t h e r complicated by t h e fact that these are transmitted to us at s e c o n d h a n d , i.e. taken by Galen f r o m Posidonius. This d o e s n o t p r e c l u d e t h e possibility that Galen h a d also r e a d b o o k 2 himself, a n d was a b l e to b e n e f i t f r o m his own a s s e s s m e n t of its c o n t e n t s . However, t h e r e is n o sign that this was t h e case. T h u s Galen a p p e a r s to have r e a d only t h e first of t h e t h r e e b o o k s h e designates as t h e ' t h e o r e t i c a l o n e s ' (see above, p. 89 f f ) . Of t h e c o n t e n t s of t h e third b o o k , as n o t e d , we h e a r n o t h i n g m o r e . T h e f r a g m e n t s f r o m b o o k 2 seem to be i n c l u d e d f o r n o o t h e r reason t h a n that they were part of Posidonius ' a r g u m e n t. T h e first of t h e two f r a g m e n t s , with G a l e n ' s i n t r o d u c t o r y f o r m u l a , reads as follows {PHP4.7.12-17 ~ SVF3.466): (12) C h r y s i p p u s , t o o , a t t e s t s in t h e s e c o n d b o o k On Affections t h a t t h e a f f e c t i o n s a r e s o f t e n e d in t i m e , e v e n t h o u g h t h e o p i n i o n s r e m a i n t h a t s o m e evil h a s b e f a l l e n t h e m , 1 2 8 w r i t i n g as follows: ( 1 3 ) ' O n e m i g h t a l s o i n q u i r e h o w t h e a b a t e m e n t of d i s t r e s s c o m e s a b o u t , w h e t h e r b e c a u s e s o m e o p i n i o n c h a n g e s o r w h i l e a l l 1 2 9 persist, a n d why t h i s will o c c u r . ' (14) T h e n h e c o n t i n u e s : ' I t s e e m s to m e t h a t a n o p i n i o n of t h i s s o r t r e m a i n s , viz. t h a t w h a t is p r e s e n t is evil, b u t as the o p i n i o n grows o l d e r t h e c o n t r a c t i o n slackens a n d , I believe, t h e c o n a t i o n d i r e c t e d t o w a r d s t h e c o n t r a c t i o n . (15) B u t p e r h a p s e v e n if t h i s 1 3 0 p e r s i s t s , t h e t h i n g s t h a t f o l l o w will n o t c o n f o r m t o

In Arist. Cat. pp.387.17-388.24 Kalbfleisch (SVF2.172); cf. ibid, pp.214.24-215.7 (SVF 2.391); cf. Long (1983b) 86 ff. A few testimonies indicate that Chrysippus and other Stoics used άπορίαι against their opponents, Plut. De comm. not. 107IF (SVF 3.26), Sext. M 7.435 (SVF 3.657). The importance of puzzles within Stoic logic has often been observed. Twenty-eight works in Chrysippus' bibliography (D.L. 7.189ff.) were devoted to them; cf. Barnes, CHHPh 71. Cf. also Cleanthes' book-title Περί τών άπορων (D.L. 7.175) as well as Zeno's Λύσεις (D.L. 7.4). 127 / W 4 . 7 . 1 2 - 1 7 (SVF3.466), ibid. 26-7, 30-1 (SVF3.467). 128 I.e. the people concerned 129 Seil, opinions. 130 Seil, the conation last mentioned.

it, b e c a u s e o f a n o t h e r s u p e r v e n i n g c o n d i t i o n o f s o m e sort w h i c h is n o t easily r e a s o n e d out. (16) T h u s p e o p l e c e a s e w e e p i n g , a n d p e o p l e w e e p against their will, w h e n e x t e r n a l o b j e c t s 1 3 1 d o n o t create similar a p p e a r a n c e s a n d s o m e t h i n g o r n o t h i n g stands in t h e way. (17) For in t h e s a m e way that c e s s a t i o n f r o m l a m e n t a n d o u t b r e a k s o f w e e p i n g o c c u r , so it is r e a s o n a b l e that t h i n g s o f this sort s h o u l d also o c c u r in t h o s e o t h e r cases, 1 3 2 b e c a u s e t h i n g s cause greater m o t i o n initially, as I said said with r e f e r e n c e to t h e t h i n g s that stir l a u g h t e r , a n d t h i n g s similar to t h e s e . ' 1 3 3

We e n c o u n t e r h e r e the twofold analysis of the cognitive structure of affection which Chrysippus seems to have i n t r o d u c e d . Two types of j u d g e m e n t are involved: (1) that s o m e t h i n g (very) g o o d or evil is present or i m m i n e n t ; (2) that a particular conation is appropriate. 1 3 4 In the case of distress we have the j u d g e m e n t s (1) that something evil is present a n d (2) that it is a p p r o p r i a t e to react t h r o u g h the contraction of the soul. Apparently, this involves n o t only the i n n e r feeling but also such outward manifestations as weeping. O n e may think of the e x a m p l e of being bereaved of a loved o n e — n o t an evil because involving the loss of what is a p r e f e r r e d indifferent f r o m the technical Stoic point of view. Wise Anaxagoras (also cited by Posidonius, ibid. 4.7.9) said, when s o m e o n e b r o u g h t him the new of his son's d e a d : Ί knew I h a d b e g o t t e n a m o r t a l ' . Most p e o p l e in the same

131

De Lacy translates 'underlying circumstances' but the word is attested in Hellenistic philosophical texts in the sense of objects as opposed to how things may appear to us, see e.g. Epicurus, On NatureXl, PHercl. 1042 fr. K. col. 1,14-16 Sedley; cf. also Gal. Dign. puls. VIII p. 793 K. (SV^2.79), Sext. M9.352 (SVF2.80). The term ύποκείμενον is also used for one of the four Stoic 'genera' or 'categories' of being, see e.g. SVF2.369, 371, with Long-Sedley (1987) vol. 1, 172 ff., but this sense seems less apposite here, since υ π ο κ ε ί μ ε ν α are said to bring about (ποιεί) mental impressions and this is usually said about external objects, see e.g. Aët. IV 12,1 (SVF 2.54). 132 Chrysippus must refer to other irradonal reactions, e.g. laughing against our will, as is suggested by the subsequent reference to laughter. 133 (12) ... καί 6 Χρύσιππος έν τφ δευτέρω Περί παθών μαρτυρεί γράφων ώδε· (13) « ζητήσαι δ' άν τις καί περί της άνέσεως τής λύπης, πώς γίνεται, πότερον δόξης τινός μετακινουμένης ή πασών διαμενουσών, καί δια τί τούτ' έσται. )) (14) είτ' έπιφέρων φησί (( δοκει δέ μοι ή μέν τοιαύτη δόξα διαμένειν, οτι κακόν αύτό δ δή πάρεστιν έγχρονιζομένης δ' άνίεσθαι ή συστολή καί ώς οίμαι ή έπί τήν συστολήν όρμή. (15) τυχόν δέ καί ταύτης διαμενούσης ούχ ύπακούσεται τά εξής, διά ποιάν άλλην έπιγινομένην διάθεσιν δυσσυλόγιστον τούτων γινομένων. (16) οϋτω γάρ καί κλαίοντες παύονται καί μή βουλόμενοι κλαίειν κλαίουσιν, όταν μή όμοίας τάς φαντασίας τά ύποκείμενα ποιή καί ένιστήταί τι ή μηθέν. (17) δν τρόπον γάρ ή θρήνων παύσις γίνεται καί κλαυθμοί, τοιαύτα εΰλογον καί έπ' έκείνων συντυγχάνειν έν ταΐς άρχαΐς μάλλον τών πραγμάτων κινούντων, καθάπερ έπί τών τόν γέλωτα κινούντων γίνεσθαι έφην, καί τά δμοια τούτοις)). 134 On this distinction (though largely based on Cicero) see esp. Donini (1995).

circumstances, however, lack his c o m p o s u r e . T h e y think an evil has befallen t h e m ( j u d g e m e n t - t y p e 1) a n d that a display of m o u r n i n g is a p p r o p r i a t e ( j u d g e m e n t - t y p e 2). T h e s e c o n d type of j u d g e m e n t is h e r e r e p r e s e n t e d by t h e conation towards t h e c o n t r a c t i o n . It may seem a bit o d d that c o n a t i o n s ( w h e t h e r excessive or not) can b o t h be d e s c r i b e d in t e r m s of physical m o t i o n t o w a r d s o r away f r o m s o m e t h i n g a n d b e e q u a t e d with j u d g e m e n t s . But we may recall what Chrysippus wrote in his On Lam. c o n a t i o n is reason c o m m a n d i n g us to act. 1 3 5 In o t h e r words, t h e t e r m c o n a t i o n d e n o t e s r e a s o n in its motive aspect. 1 3 6 In fact, given Stoic materialism, it s h o u l d c o m e as n o surprise that the physical a n d intentional are two sides of the same coin. T h e r e is social pressure to e n t e r t a i n t h e two j u d g e m e n t s t h u s dist i n g u i s h e d — i n line with t h e Stoic view that o n e of t h e sources of evil is social, viz. 'what p e o p l e say'. 1 3 7 However, it is a c o m m o n e n o u g h e x p e r i e n c e that, while t h e first j u d g e m e n t persists, t h e f e e l i n g a n d display of grief d i s a p p e a r in time. For cases like this C h r y s i p p u s p o i n t e d to t h e s e c o n d type of j u d g e m e n t : o n e may c o n t i n u e to believe that t h e d e a t h of a loved o n e r e m a i n s an u n m i t i g a t e d evil, b u t stop m o u r n i n g o n t h e g r o u n d s that this is n o l o n g e r a p p r o p r i a t e a f t e r a given a m o u n t of time—again a socially acceptable a n d i n d e e d e n c o u r a g e d attitude. C h r y s i p p u s ' d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e s e two kinds of j u d g e m e n t s e e m s to c o r r e s p o n d to p h e n o m e n a such as t h e a b a t e m e n t of distress. Still, C h r y s i p p u s also a c k n o w l e d g e s cases w h e r e b o t h j u d g e m e n t s a r e in place, yet t h e c o n t r a c t i o n a n d a c c o m p a n y i n g o u t w a r d signs of distress d o n o t e n s u e . This p h e n o m e n o n is less f r e q u e n t , b u t certainly known to most of us a n d h e n c e inescapable f o r Chrysippus: s o m e t i m e s we think it would b e a p p r o p r i a t e to grieve b u t s o m e h o w d o n o t succeed in m u s t e r i n g the p r o p e r feelings a n d behaviour. H e r e Chrysippus i n t r o d u c e s t h e ' s u p e r v e n i n g [or: ' a d d i t i o n a l ] c o n d i t i o n of s o m e sort which is n o t easily r e a s o n e d o u t ' — a p o i n t inflated by G a l e n i n t o an admission of i g n o r a n c e of why a f f e c t i o n s arise a n d subside. But h e is clearly b e i n g u n f a i r here. 1 3 8 Still, it casts s o m e light o n s o m e of C h r y s i p p u s ' w i d e r c o n c e r n s , m o s t n o t a b l y his causal

135

As quoted by Plutarch, De Stoic. Rep. 1037F (SVF3.175). Cf. Stob. Eel. II p.88,1-2 W. (SVF3.171): πάσας δέ ορμάς συθκαταθέσεις είναι, τάς δέ πρακτικάς καί τό κινητικόν περιέχειν. Cf. Sorabji (2000) 44. 137 See infra, p. 134. 138 See further infra, p. 260. 136

analysis in t e r m s of the soul's physical c o n d i t i o n a n d the impressions i m p i n g i n g o n it f r o m outside. We s h o u l d n o t b e misled by G a l e n ' s p o i n t that C h r y s i p p u s confesses that h e d o e s n o t know t h e cause. O n t h e contrary, the fact that C h r y s i p p u s i n c l u d e s a r e f e r e n c e to an a d d i t i o n a l b u t u n s p e c i f i e d c o n d i t i o n d e m o n s t r a t e s his insistence o n causal analysis. T h e s a m e trick is used by Plutarch with r e f e r e n c e to a passage f r o m Chrysippus' On Appropriate Action (Περί καθήκοντος) c o n c e r n e d with c h o o s i n g b e t w e e n two very similar things, f o r e x a m p l e d r a c h m a s : having received contradictory advice o n their respective merit, Chrysippus says, we give u p f u r t h e r investigation a n d j u s t take o n e of t h e m ' a c c o r d i n g to s o m e o t h e r r e a s o n ' [or p e r h a p s 'principle', λόγον] (Plut. Stoic. Rep. 23, 1045E-F, SVF3.174). T h e last p h r a s e recalls t h e r e f e r e n c e to the 'additional c o n d i t i o n that is n o t easy to reason o u t ' . Chrysippus b o t h times considers it a p p r o p r i a t e to r e f e r to an u n s p e c i f i e d factor determ i n i n g o u r action. Plutarch, like Galen, exploits this by p r e s e n t i n g it as an admission that t h e c h o i c e is m a d e at r a n d o m , i.e. is u n c a u s e d , o r r e p r e s e n t s a ' c h a n c e i n c l i n a t i o n ' . But h e cites o t h e r passages which show that t h e c h o i c e b e t w e e n very similar things m u s t always involve causal factors, even if we a r e n o t aware of t h e m . T h u s h e r e p o r t s t h a t C h r y s i p p u s insisted t h a t in such cases ' u n c l e a r causes ( α ι τ ί α ς ά δ ή λ ο υ ς ) 1 3 9 i n s i n u a t e themselves a n d w i t h o u t b e i n g n o t i c e d by us direct o u r c o n a t i o n in o n e way o r t h e o t h e r ' (Stoic. Rep. 1045C). C h r y s i p p u s d i r e c t e d his a r g u m e n t against c e r t a i n p h i l o s o p h e r s 1 4 0 w h o postulated within t h e soul's r e g e n t p a r t (ήγεμονικόν) an 'adventitious m o t i o n ' . A c c o r d i n g to P l u t a r c h ' s r e p o r t , they t h o u g h t to ' p r o v i d e t h e c o n a t i o n with release f r o m t h e c o n s t r a i n t of e x t e r n a l causes' (ibid. 1045B). Plutarch continues: ' C h r y s i p p u s in m a n y p l a c e s cites as e v i d e n c e d i c e a n d scales a n d m a n y o f t h e t h i n g s t h a t c a n n o t fall o r i n c l i n e n o w o n e way a n d n o w a n o t h e r w i t h o u t s o m e c a u s e a n d v a r i a t i o n o c c u r r i n g e i t h e r e n t i r e l y in t h e t h i n g s t h e m s e l v e s o r t h e t h i n g s f r o m o u t s i d e ' (ibid. 1 0 4 5 C ~ SVF 2 . 9 7 3 ; cf. 1 0 4 5 D , SVF 3 . 1 7 4 ) .

So, d e s p i t e t h e d i f f e r e n c e of c o n t e x t , t h e f r a g m e n t s f r o m P l u t a r c h a n d G a l e n attest to a causal e x p l a n a t i o n of m e n t a l p h e n o m e n a . At t h e s a m e time Chrysippus is c a u t i o u s in t h o s e cases w h e r e n o clear 139

Likewise chance (τύχη) is called a 'unclear cause', i.e. unclear to the human intellect, see the texts assembled as SVF2.965-7, 970-1. 140 These have often been thought to have been Epicurus and his followers but the case for the Stoic Aristo has been revived by Boys-Stones (1996).

cause presents itself. Both choices that seem arbitrary a n d e m o t i o n a l b e h a v i o u r which seems inexplicable fall into this category. H e r e we n e e d to r e m i n d ourselves of t h e advice o f f e r e d by Chrysippus in his Physical Questions r e g a r d i n g q u e s t i o n s n e e d i n g e x p e r i e n c e a n d res e a r c h : we s h o u l d k e e p silent if t h e r e is n o obvious e v i d e n c e . 1 4 1 A l t h o u g h I believe that Galen systematically e x a g g e r a t e s t h e differe n c e between Posidonius a n d Chrysippus, the f o r m e r h a d the r e p u t a tion that h e always w a n t e d know 'why?' a n d h e may have b e e n less restrained than Chrysippus in this respect. 1 4 2 T h e p h e n o m e n o n in question is illustrated by ceasing to w e e p or w e e p i n g against o u r will. This h a p p e n s ' w h e n external objects d o n o t create similar impressions'. Sorabji has s u b m i t t e d that Chrysipus may be a p p e a l i n g to conflicting a p p e a r a n c e s as to w h e t h e r c o n t r a c t i o n is a p p r o p r i a t e (i.e. j u d g e m e n t - t y p e 2). P e r h a p s t h e a p p e a r a n c e s conc e r n e d a r e n o t yet those a c c o m p a n i e d by j u d g e m e n t s in t e r m s of a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s . T h e p o i n t may b e that t h e s a m e e x t e r n a l o b j e c t s o m e t i m e s p r o m p t s an a p p e a r a n c e of evil b u t at o t h e r times an a p p e a r a n c e of non-evil, i.e. o n e c o n c e p t u a l i z e d as ' t h e r e is (no) evil' p r e s e n t . ' This t h e n causes c o n t r a d i c t i o n s in t h e next stage of j u d g i n g which r e s p o n s e is a p p r o p r i a t e ( j u d g e m e n t - t y p e 2). At any rate o n e a n d t h e same e x t e r n a l o b j e c t may p r o m p t d i f f e r e n t a p p e a r a n c e s in t h e same p e o p l e at d i f f e r e n t times (just as it may p r o m p t d i f f e r e n t a p p e a r a n c e s in d i f f e r e n t p e r s o n s at t h e same time). I shall r e t u r n to this question in d u e course. It is t r u e that C h r y s i p p u s d o e s n o t specify w h e t h e r y o u r assent oscillates between b o t h a p p e a r a n c e s , or w h e t h e r the rival a p p e a r a n c e (viz. that contraction « a p p r o p r i a t e ) r e m a i n s without assent. 1 4 3 In t h e latter case Chrysippus will have postulated a physical first m o v e m e n t , that is, tears p r o d u c e d by the a p p e a r a n c e i n d e p e n d e n t l y of assent. I d o n o t believe t h a t Chrysippus s t u m b l e d i n t o t h e m a t t e r as a side issue, because t h e role assigned to the a p p e a r a n c e c o n f o r m s to Chrysippus' twofold causal analysis. I n d e e d , a p p e a r a n c e as the preliminary cause is far f r o m u n i m p o r t a n t precisely b e c a u s e it shocks t h e intellect a n d t h e resulting m o v e m e n t may d r a g t h e soul a l o n g a n d c a u s e it to a b a n d o n pre-existing j u d g e m e n t s — d e p e n d i n g o n its

141

Plut. De Stoic. Rep. 1047C (SVF 2.763); see further Tieleman (1996a) 191 ff. On this difference between Chrysippus and Posidonius cf. also Frede (1980) 224 f. (1987: 130 f.) 143 Sorabji (2000) 71. 142

physical w e a k n e s s . 1 4 4 T h e t e c h n i c a l e x p r e s s i o n 'first m o v e m e n t ' d e s i g n a t i n g t h e initial shock caused by a p p e a r a n c e s may have b e e n post-Chrysippean. Sorabji may have a p o i n t in a r g u i n g that first movem e n t s did n o t have t h e centrality they a c q u i r e d later, as is shown by S e n e c a ' s On Anger,145 T h i s may b e correct, b u t t h e basic idea is to be f o u n d in Chrysippus a n d can, o n t h e testimony of Seneca (On Anger I, 16.7 ~ SVF 1.215) even b e t r a c e d back to Z e n o . Cicero, whose acc o u n t is C h r y s i p p e a n (see below, p p . 288 ff.), p r o v i d e s s o m e a d d i t i o n a l e v i d e n c e f o r t h e i d e a of e m o t i o n a l m o v e m e n t s such as c o n t r a c t i o n s existing i n d e p e n d e n t l y of j u d g e m e n t (Tusc. 3.83). 1 4 6 A l t h o u g h h e d o e s n o t s e e m to t h i n k of initial s h o c k s only, t h e i m p o r t a n t p o i n t is that these physical effects a n d feelings p r e s u p p o s e (involuntary) a p p e a r a n c e s . In sum, I hesitate to subscribe to Sorabji's suggestion that Chrysippus will have s t u m b l e d i n t o t h e m a t t e r of the first m o v e m e n t s as a side issue. 1 4 7 T h e idea is integral to t h e overall f r a m e w o r k h e d e s i g n e d . Sorabji traces t h e physiological p h e n o m e n a which later Stoic were to call first m o v e m e n t s back to Aristotle r a t h e r t h a n Z e n o a n d C h r y s i p p u s . 1 4 8 I have to d i s a g r e e with h i m o n this score too. T h e related ideas of physical tension a n d weakness—which a r e q u i t e p r o m i n e n t in C h r y s i p p u s — p r e s u p p o s e a p a r t i c u l a r physiology consistent with t h e thesis of t h e soul's corporeality. 1 4 9 In the n e x t c h a p t e r I shall f u r t h e r explain t h e n a t u r e a n d p r o v e n a n c e of this physiology. A few f u r t h e r observations may b e m a d e . Chrysippus attributes t h e e x a m p l e s of u n v o l u n t a r y b e h a v i o u r to ' s o m e t h i n g o r n o t h i n g t h a t stands in t h e way', i.e. of w e e p i n g . T h e ' s o m e t h i n g o r n o t h i n g ' form u l a clearly takes u p t h e ' s u p e r v e n i n g c o n d i t i o n of s o m e sort which is n o t easily r e a s o n e d o u t ' . T h e fact that h e speaks of a ' c o n d i t i o n ' (διάθεσις) 1 5 0 suggests that t h e cause m u s t lie in t h e soul's (physical) 144 T h ^ influence of appearances is confirmed by the Chrysippean view of the origin of evil, see infra, p. 137. 145 Sorabji (2000) 66 ff. referring to On Anger, 2.2.2; 2.2.4; 2.3.1; 2.3.4; 2.3.5; 2.4.1;2.4.1. 146 '... If this [seil, judgement] which is wholly voluntary is removed, that grieving distress will be removed, though bites and certain little contractions of the intellect mil remain. ' 147 Sorabji (2000) 71. 148 Sorabji (2000) 71f. 149 Cf. Sorabji (2000) 71: 'Aristotle too would have rejected the Stoic view that the soul is physical and substituted a physiological interpretation of the phenomena.' But the soul's corporeality according to the Stoics made the soul part of the physiology of the whole organism. 150 Or perhaps 'diseased condition', cf. Ackerknecht (1982).

weakness. After all, we are dealing with emotional behaviour. But at t h e same time it is clear that t h e p h e n o m e n o n in q u e s t i o n is problematic to the extent that it is n o t covered by Chrysippus' general analysis, which involves two causes, viz. both the mental impression a n d the pre-existing condition of the soul. In fact, the responses in question react directly against the impressions received. This does not entail that Chrysippus' general m o d e l of explanation is u n d e r m i n e d . T o a surprising extent, h e succeeds in accomodating the p h e n o m e n o n at issue into this model. This is clear f r o m the last section of the f r a g m e n t (§ 17), where h e extends the p h e n o m e n o n to many m o r e cases, a m o n g which h e m e n t i o n s what might be called the opposite of weeping, viz. laughter. We learn that h e treated of its causes in a n o t h e r section of book 2, which is not represented by any quotation in Galen, or a n o t h e r source for that matter. But Galen has fortunately preserved Chrysippus' r e m a r k that h e explained the causes of laughter by p o i n t i n g o u t that ' t h e things cause greater motion initially'. This must refer to external objects stirring o u r minds when we receive, or form, an impression of these objects. 1 5 1 T h e s u d d e n impact of an object may trigger a first response which on closer view appears wholly inappropriate. Alongside weeping against o u r will, there are many familiar cases of laughing against o u r will, i.e. against o u r j u d g e m e n t on what is an appropriate response to a particular situation. T h u s the first response to s o m e o n e hurting himself may be laughter when in fact we j u d g e it m o r e appropriate to c o m e to his aid. In addition, we must n o t e the i m p o r t a n c e assigned to the soul's motions. T h e motions caused by impressions are initially stronger—with the implication that after some time they calm down a bit a n d r e n d e r a m o r e a p p r o p r i a t e response possible. This point constitutes a n o t h e r piece of evidence for the physical basis for the Stoic theory of action (including affection). O n c e more, o n e is r e m i n d e d of the fact that for the Stoics psychology was a part of natural philosophy. Chrysippus was deeply interested in all forms of h u m a n behaviour. In exploring some of them h e reached the limits of his causal analysis. But, contrary to what the polemicists tell us, he did n o t a b a n d o n the idea of causality. Rather h e s u s p e n d e d j u d g e m e n t as to the precise identity of some of the causes involved in the cases u n d e r examination. Such exceptions and b o r d e r l i n e cases bring out the fact that

151

For t h e idea of moving o r stirring in this c o n n e c t i o n , cf. infra, ρ 193.

Chrysippus was n u a n c e d a n d intellectually honest. It is difficult to see how a simple reference to o n e of the Platonic parts of the soul would be m o r e illuminating as a causal explanation of the problems at issue here. Let us now take a look at the second f r a g m e n t f r o m book 2 q u o t e d by Galen f r o m Posidonius (4.7.26-7, 30-1 ~ SVF 3.467). I a d d the immediately preceding context (ibid. 24, p.385, 1.7-25): ( 2 4 ) A n d h e [seil. P o s i d o n i u s ] h i m s e l f s h o w s t h a t t h e a f f e c t i o n s a r i s e f r o m a n g e r a n d d e s i r e , a n d h e gives t h e r e a s o n w h y t h e y s u b s i d e in t i m e , e v e n t h o u g h t h e o p i n i o n s a n d j u d g e m e n t s still c o n t i n u e t h a t a n evil is p r e s e n t o r h a s a r i s e n f o r t h e m [i.e. f o r t h e p e r s o n s in q u e s t i o n ] , (25) In s u p p o r t of t h i s p o i n t h e e v e n u s e s C h r y s i p p u s h i m s e l f as a witness, w h o w r i t e s as f o l l o w s in t h e s e c o n d b o o k of his On Affections: (26) ' I n t h e c a s e of d i s t r e s s s o m e p e o p l e a p p e a r similarly t o a b a n d o n it a l s o as t h o u g h t h e y a r e s a t e d . T h u s t h e p o e t says t h e f o l l o w i n g a l s o a b o u t Achilles grieving for Patroklos: " B u t w h e n h e h a d his fill of w e e p i n g a n d r o l l i n g o n t h e g r o u n d , a n d t h e l o n g i n g h a d g o n e f r o m his c h e e k s a n d limbs... [//. X X I V . 5 1 4 , Od. 4 . 5 4 1 ] . " H e d e s i r e d t o c o m f o r t P r i a m by s h o w i n g h i m t h e i r r a t i o n a l i t y of his d i s t r e s s . ' ( 2 7 ) T h e n h e [seil. C h r y s i p p u s ] c o n t i n u e s : 'By t h i s a c c o u n t o n e w o u l d n o t give u p h o p e t h a t w i t h t h e p a s s a g e of t i m e a n d w h e n t h e e m o t i o n a l i n f l a m m a t i o n a b a t e s , r e a s o n , m a k i n g its way in a n d as it w e r e f i n d i n g r o o m , e x p o s e s t h e i r r a t i o n a l i t y o f t h e a f f e c t i o n . ' (28) H e r e C h r y s i p p u s clearly a d m i t s that the i n f l a m m a t i o n of affection s u b s i d e s in t i m e , w h i l e t h e s u p p o s i t i o n a n d o p i n i o n still p e r s i s t ; m e n g e t t h e i r fill of t h e e m o t i o n a l m o v e m e n t s , a n d w h e n b e c a u s e of t h i s t h e a f f e c t i o n h a s a k i n d of r e s p i t e a n d g r o w s q u i e t , r e a s o n s g a i n s t h e u p p e r h a n d . (29) T h i s is t h e t r u t h , if a n y t h i n g is, b u t it is in c o n f l i c t with his p r e m i s e s , j u s t as t h e n e x t p a s s a g e w h i c h g o e s as follows: ' S u c h w o r d s a r e a l s o s p o k e n w i t h r e f e r e n c e t o t h e a l t e r a t i o n of t h e a f f e c tions: "Swift is t h e satiety of h a t e f u l d i s t r e s s [Od. 4 . 1 0 3 ] , " (30) a n d m o r e o v e r w o r d s like t h e s e a b o u t t h e a t t r a c t i o n of distress: "Somehow for unfortunate people it is p l e a s a n t t o w e e p a n d m o u r n t h e i r l o t , " 1 5 2 (31) a n d n e x t a f t e r t h e s e C h r y s i p p u s cites: " T h u s h e s p o k e a n d in all o f t h e m h e s t i r r e d a l o n g i n g f o r l a m e n t a t i o n [Od. 4 . 1 1 3 ] , " and

152

Cf. Eur. fr. 563 Nauck (p. 537); Aesch. Prom, vinct. 637.

"Raise u p t h e s a m e l a m e n t r e n e w t h e t e a r f u l j o y " [ E u r . Electra 1 2 5 - 6 ] . 1 5 3

T h e first passage q u o t e d (26-27) seems to s u p p o r t G a l e n ' s p o i n t that t h e affection (in this case distress) may subside while the j u d g e m e n t still persists. But t h e crucial q u e s t i o n is: which j u d g e m e n t ? Chrysipp u s d o e s n o t c o n t r a d i c t himself w h e n h e is taken to m e a n that the j u d g e m e n t that l a m e n t a t i o n is a p p r o p r i a t e (type 2) may fade, while t h e j u d g e m e n t that evil is p r e s e n t (type 1) persists. Affection, t h e n , also r e q u i r e s j u d g e m e n t s of type 2. T h e C h r y s i p p e a n passage a f t e r the first q u o t a t i o n is clearly c o n c e r n e d with the reason why affection abates a n d we u n d e r s t a n d that l a m e n t a t i o n is n o l o n g e r a p p r o p r i a t e . Chrysippus explains this in terms of the a b a t e m e n t of i n f l a m m a t i o n . T h i s idea suits t h e view of affection as a kind of fever we have c o m e across m o r e than o n c e (above, pp. 106 f.). A n c i e n t m e d i c i n e posited a close c o n n e c t i o n between t h e two, 1 5 4 s o m e t i m e s r e g a r d i n g inflamm a t i o n as a sign of fever. 1 5 5 It lies in the n a t u r a l course of fever a n d i n f l a m m a t i o n to subside a f t e r s o m e time—usually it is only t h e n that reason will re-enter t h e stage. T h e same a c c o u n t u n d e r l i e s Chrysippus' t h e r a p e u t i c advice in the Therapeutics (i.e. b o o k 4) as preserved by O r i g e n (SVF 3.474, s e c o n d text; O r i g e n , Against Celsus VIII 51 = vol. II, p. 266.18 Kö.). I shall

153

(24) αύτός [seil, ό Ποσειδώνιος] τε δείκνυσιν ώς ύπό θυμού καί έπιθυμίας γίγνεται τά παθή και δια τίνα την αίτίαν έν τω χρόνω καθίσταται καν αί δόξαι τε καί αϊ κρίσεις έτι μένωσι τού κακόν ύπάρχειν αύτοίς ή γεγονέναι. (25) προσχρήται δ' εις τούτο μάρτυρι καί αύτφ τω Χρυσίππφ κατά τό δεύτερον Περί τών παθών ώδε πως γράφοντι· (26) (( έπί δέ τής λύπης καί ώς αν έμπλησθέντες τινές ομοίως φαίνονται άφίστασθαι, καθάπερ καί έπί Άχιλλέως ταύτα λέγει ό ποιητής πενθούντος τόν Πάτροκλον- "άλλ οτε δη κλαίων τε κυλινδόμενος τ' έκορέσθη I καί οί από πραπίδων ήλθ' ϊμερος ήδ' άπό γυίων", έπί τό παρακαλειν ώρμησε τόν Πρίαμον την τής λύπης άλογίαν αύτφ παριστάς.)) (27) είτ' έφεξής επιφέρει καί ταύτα - <( καθ' δν λόγον ούκ άν άπελπίσαι τις οϋτως τών πραγμάτων έγχρονιζομένων καί τής παθητικής φλεγμονής άνιεμένης τόν λόγον παρεισδυόμενον καί οιονεί χώραν λαμβάνοντα παριστάναι τήν τού πάθους άλογίαν )) (28) έναργώς γάρ έν τούτοις ό Χρύσιππος ομολογεί τήν τε παθητικήν φλεγμονήν άνίεσθαι κατά τόν χρόνον, έτι τής ύπολήψεως τε καί δόξης μενούσης, έμπίπλασθαί τε τών παθητικών κινήσεων τους άνθρώπους καί διά τούτο παύλαν τινα λαμβάνοντος τού πάθους καί ήσυχάσαντος τόν λόγον έπικρατέστερον γίνεσθαι. (29) ταύτα γάρ άληθή μέν έστιν ε'ίπερ τινά καί άλλα, μάχεται δέ ταΐς ύποθέσεσιν αύτού καθάπερ καί τά έπιφερόμενα τόνδε τόν τρόπον έχοντα· (30) (( λέγεται δέ και τοιαύτα εις τήν μεταβολήν τών παθών· "λαιψηρός δέ κόρος στυγεροΐο γόοιο" καί έτι τά τοιαύτα εις τό κατά τήν λύπην άγωγόν · "τοις δέ δυστυχούσι πως I τερπνόν τό κλαύσαι κάποδύρασθαι τύχας"» (31) καί έτι τούτων έφεξής, "ώς φάτο, τοίσι δέ πάσιν ύφ' ϊμερον ώρσε γόοιο" )) καί (( "τόν αύτόν έγειρε γόον I άναγε πολύδακρυν άδονάν " )) 154 For the Hippocratic authors see the series of articles by Sticker (1928-30). 155 Ps. Plut. (Aët.) Plac. philos. 5.29 (= Diodes fr. 56a-b Van der Eijk).

discuss t h e view of t h e r a p y i m p l i e d by it in d u e c o u r s e (see below, p. 166). Suffice it to n o t e h e r e that t h e idea of i n f l a m m a t i o n (φλεγμονή) r e c u r s in this passage as a d e s c r i p t i o n of t h e o u t b u r s t of a f f e c t i o n , d u r i n g which it is pointless to try to h e l p t h e p a t i e n t by attacking t h e value j u d g e m e n t u n d e r l y i n g t h e a f f e c t i o n (viz. type 1), f o r e x a m p l e t h e E p i c u r e a n d o g m a t h a t p l e a s u r e is g o o d . But it r e m a i n s possible to calm even an e m o t i o n a l E p i c u r e a n by showing t h e i n a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s ( j u d g e m e n t type 2) of his b e h a v i o u r in t h e light of his own principles. In o t h e r words, o n e s h o u l d e x p o s e t h e irrationality ( c o n c e i v e d as i n c o n s i s t e n c y with o n e ' s p r e m i s e s ) by s h o w i n g t h a t i n d u l g i n g in a f f e c t i o n is i n a p p r o p r i a t e . It is easy to r e g a r d a t e r m like i n f l a m m a t i o n as a m e t a p h o r indicating t h e peak of affection. N o n e t h e l e s s , it is e m b e d d e d in a p a t t e r n of medical t e r m s which m a k e sense in t e r m s of the corporeality of t h e soul posited by t h e Stoics. A f f e c t i o n s o r m e n t a l a f f e c t i o n s a r e t r e a t e d as a c u t e s y m p t o m s , o r illnesses, c a u s e d by a n u n d e r l y i n g diseased o r weak c o n d i t i o n . I shall discuss this p a t t e r n m o r e fully in Ch. 4. T h e o t h e r lines of verse a r e cited to illustrate t h e e l e m e n t s of d e s i r e a n d satisfaction involved in a f f e c t i o n . T h i s c o n c e r n s t h e motivational a s p e c t of a f f e c t i o n , i.e. its c h a r a c t e r as an (excessive) c o n a t i o n , o r desire ( n o t e in t h e above f r a g m e n t ώρμησε, ' d e s i r e d ' , § 26 [= p.286, 1.17 De L a c y ] ) . It is n a t u r a l to s u p p o s e t h a t e a c h c o n a t i o n c o m e s to a n e n d w h e n its t a r g e t is r e a c h e d , in this case i n d u l g i n g in a c o n t r a c t i o n of t h e intellect a n d t h e a c c o m p a n y i n g r e p e r t o i r e of outward manifestations.

6. The Origins of Evil156 A l o n g section in PHP 5 c o n c e r n e d with t h e origin of evil (5.5.1-26) is p r i n t e d , with s o m e omissions, by Von A r n i m as SVF 3.229a in t h e section e n t i t l e d 'De perversione rationis ( δ ι α σ τ ρ ο φ ή ) ' , i.e. a p a r t f r o m the f r a g m e n t s f r o m t h e On Affections. But since t h e Stoics e q u a t e d evil with a f f e c t i o n , it is a fair a s s u m p t i o n t h a t t h e C h r y s i p p e a n ideas reflected h e r e originally b e l o n g e d with the discussion of t h e causes of affection in b o o k 2. Moreover, as we have seen, Chrysippus in b o o k 2 discussed c e r t a i n p r o b l e m a t i c p h e n o m e n a a n d t h e ideas a b o u t t h e ultimate cause of m e n t a l c o r r u p t i o n a p p e a r to have b e e n d e v e l o p e d

156

For what follows cf. Kerferd (1977/8), Long (1968).

by Chrysippus in d e a l i n g with such a p r o b l e m , viz. the question why even a p e r f e c t e d u c a t i o n d o e s n o t p r e v e n t c h i l d r e n f r o m b e c o m i n g c o r r u p t e d a n d h e n c e p r o n e to e m o t i o n . In this m a t t e r t o o Chrysipp u s is said to have b e e n p e r p l e x e d ( ά π ο ρ ε ι ν ) a n d to have b e e n criticized by P o s i d o n i u s (5.5.9). 1 5 7 T h e material f r o m Galen can b e s u p p l e m e n t e d f r o m a r a t h e r full a c c o u n t in Calcidius, In Tim. 165167 (SVF3.228; cf. also D.L. 7.89, SVF3.229). T h e i n f o r m a t i o n supplied by Galen o n this p o i n t d o e s n o t c o m e in t h e s h a p e of o n e or m o r e v e r b a t i m f r a g m e n t s . We have to cull t h e bits a n d pieces f r o m his polemical discussion. Nonetheless, it is worth trying to establish what Chrysippus said o n t h e origin of vice since this will cast f u r t h e r light o n t h e question of the causes of affection. I h o p e to show that Calcidius' r e p o r t n o t only c o r r e s p o n d s to the relev a n t p a g e s in G a l e n b u t also p r o v i d e s crucial i n d i c a t i o n s as to Chrysippus' a r g u m e n t a n d P o s i d o n i u s ' r e s p o n s e to it. A c c o r d i n g to G a l e n , P o s i d o n i u s a p p e a l e d to t h e p r o b l e m of vice as o n e of t h e reasons why Chrysippus' monistic a c c o u n t was u n t e n a b l e . But in t h e light of Calcidius' testimony an alternative i n t e r p r e t a t i o n suggests itself. For reasons which I h o p e b e c o m e m o r e obvious as we p r o c e e d , I shall first discuss Calcidius. H e r e we have a quite full a c c o u n t which may reflect certain c o n c e r n s p e c u l i a r to this source, b u t is a far cry f r o m t h e polemical discussion served u p by Galen (which is f u r t h e r c o m p l i c a t e d by t h e latter's use of P o s i d o n i u s ) . Calcidius d o e s n o t m e n t i o n C h r y s i p p u s b u t s p e a k s of t h e Stoics in g e n e r a l . Yet t h e affinities between his a c c o u n t a n d Galen's (or r a t h e r that reflected by G a l e n ) a r e u n m i s t a k a b l e . Calcidius b e g i n s by r e m a r k i n g that e a c h intellect, taking p a r t of G o d , seeks t h e g o o d by n a t u r a l c o n a t i o n (naturali adpetitu). N o n e t h e l e s s , it s o m e t i m e s errs in t h e j u d g e m e n t of what is g o o d a n d bad. S o m e of us c o n s i d e r pleasure the s u p r e m e g o o d , o t h e r s wealth, a n d a g r e a t m a n y p e o p l e covet f a m e a n d all o t h e r things m o r e than the t r u e g o o d (ch. 165, p. 53, 11.11-15 vA). W h a t we have h e r e is the tripartition of values in relation to t h e h u m a n soul that is also f o u n d in Galen. However, the same e l e m e n t s have b e e n m a d e to play a d i f f e r e n t role. T h e predilection for pleasu r e a n d f a m e is p r e s e n t e d by Calcidius as a d e g e n e r a t i o n of t h e primal desire for the g o o d . Galen for his part presents the last kind of striving as p e c u l i a r to C h r y s i p p u s yet treats t h e first two n o t as

157

Cf. supra, p. 122.

s y m p t o m s of vice b u t as natural. T h u s h e arrives at t h e full Platonic t r i p a r t i t i o n — a c o n c l u s i o n a n t i c i p a t e d , G a l e n intimates, by Posidonius. In the s e c o n d section of his a c c o u n t Calcidius e x p o u n d s the cause of e r r o r , i.e. why p e o p l e c o m e to mistake p l e a s u r e a n d f a m e f o r t h e s u p r e m e g o o d (ch.165-7, p.53, 1.16 - p.54, 1.18). T h e cause, h e says, is m a n i f o l d . But m o s t of t h e e n s u i n g e x p l i c a t i o n is taken u p by two causes, o r ' w h a t t h e Stoics call t h e d o u b l e p e r v e r s i o n ' (duplicem perversionem, which c o r r e s p o n d s to t h e p h r a s e διττήν τής διαστροφής τήν α ί τ ί α ν in t h e C h r y s i p p e a n original, 5.7.14, pp.320-2): t h e things t h e m s e l v e s a n d w h a t is c o m m o n l y said (rebus ipsis ... divulgatione famae). T h i s c o r r e s p o n d s to t h e two factors specified by Galen a n d Diogenes Laertius. In what follows t h e distinction of t h r e e kinds of valuables (pleasu r e , f a m e a n d t h e g o o d ) is m a i n t a i n e d : first Calcidius explains how t h e physical sensations to which we are e x p o s e d as new-born babies give rise to ' a n , as it were, n a t u r a l o p i n i o n t h a t everything pleasant a n d a g r e e a b l e is g o o d a n d , by contrast, what brings pain, is b a d a n d to b e avoided.' T h e t e r m n a t u r a l h e r e has to b e q u a l i f i e d because, strictly speaking, only t h e striving a f t e r t h e g o o d is i n n a t e : we a r e b o r n i m m a c u l a t e . Yet the h a n k e r i n g a f t e r pleasure a n d t h e avoidance of pain arises, u n d e r t h e i n f l u e n c e of t h e midwives' bath, so early in o u r lives as to m a k e it almost natural. T h e p o i n t as such takes u p t h e observation m a d e in t h e o p e n i n g section t h a t s o m e p e o p l e o p t f o r p l e a s u r e as t h e h i g h e s t g o o d . 1 5 8 T h e b a t h d i s p e n s e d by t h e midwives is a striking e l e m e n t in this a c c o u n t . A l t h o u g h it s e e m s a bit o d d , it c o h e r e s with f u n d a m e n t a l physical a s s u m p t i o n s u n d e r l y i n g t h e Stoic c o n c e p t i o n of t h e c o r p o r e a l soul a n d in particular t h e role played by t h e e l e m e n t a r y qualities h o t a n d cold. I shall r e t u r n to this aspect in t h e c o u r s e of a fuller t r e a t m e n t of t h e medical b a c k g r o u n d to Chrysippus' psychology (see f u r t h e r below, p p . 160 f f ) . Suffice it to n o t e h e r e that the baby right a f t e r birth is first e x p o s e d to t h e cold a n d dry outside air. T h e c o m p e n s a t o r y bath provided by t h e midwives aims to r e s t o r e t h e w a r m a n d wet c o n d i t i o n s prevailing in t h e w o m b . T h i s well-meant action has an u n s e t t l i n g effect o n t h e soul of t h e babies since they are in quick succession e x p o s e d to opposite c o n d i t i o n s a n d sensations. T h e physical pain a n d pleasure involved f o r m t h e basis of 158

Likewise in his On Ends Chrysippus sought to differentiate carefully between the 'first conation' (πρώτη όρμή) towards which nature has predisposed us and pleasure which he describes as an epiphenomenon (D.L. 7.85-89 ~ SVF3.178)

t h e a d h e r e n c e to t h e h e d o n i s t c r e d e f o u n d a m o n g many p e o p l e in later life. T h e n e x t subsection (ch. 166, p. 53, 1.27 - p. 54, 1.2) c o n c e r n s the pursuit of wealth a n d fame. Wealth is an ' i n s t r u m e n t of pleasure' (11. 32-33). It is coveted o u t of a primal avoidance of want a n d pursuit of satisfaction. In short, it s e e m s an e x t e n s i o n of t h e t e n d e n c y internalized in o u r first stage of d e v e l o p m e n t , viz. that of avoiding pain a n d seeking pleasure as b e i n g b a d a n d g o o d respectively. T h e predilection f o r f a m e a n d glory, too, is seen as an extension of the pursuit of pleasure. It arises at a m o r e a d v a n c e d age u n d e r t h e i n f l u e n c e of t h e c o m p l i m e n t s a n d r e p r o b a t i o n s d i s p e n s e d to us by o u r e d u c a t o r s (ibid. 11. 27-33). In a d d i t i o n , Calcidius describes the lust for glory as a d e g e n e r a t i o n of the natural pursuit of praise a n d h o n o u r , f o r h o n o u r attests to virtue. T h e last p o i n t c o n f i r m s that the d i f f e r e n t mistaken v a l u e - j u d g e m e n t s are c o n s i d e r e d to be a b e r r a t i o n s in t h e process of a p p r o p r i a t i o n (οίκείωσις) w h i c h ideally leads us towards virtue. Calcidius indicates that the a c h i e v e m e n t of this e n d marks t h e wise (prudentes), f o r they d o possess an accurate p e r c e p t i o n of virtue ( ibid. 11. 11.35-36). Just t h e c o m m o n r u n mistake glory f o r h o n o u r , they mistake p o w e r f o r m a n ' s e m i n e n c e above all c r e a t i o n , w h e n t h e u n i n h i b i t e d exercise of p o w e r is merely a m a t t e r of lust. Likewise, they mistake pleasure for the agreeable life b e l o n g i n g with h a p p i n e s s (ibid. 11. 3 - p. 54.1). T h i s c o n c l u d e s Calcidius discussion of t h e h u m a n e r r o r d u e to the things themselves. N e x t Calcidius t u r n s to t h e p a r t of h u m a n e r r o r d u e to w h a t p e o p l e say (ch. 167, p. 54, 11.2-9). H e r e too t h e Platonic tripartition l o o m s in the b a c k g r o u n d . M o t h e r s a n d n u r s e s inculcate i n t o intellects t h a t a r e still y o u n g a n d i m p r e s s i o n a b l e t h e values associated with Plato's two non-rational parts: they wish for their children wealth a n d glory a n d their h a b i t of c o m f o r t i n g t h e m is a particularly nasty source of m e n t a l d i s t u r b a n c e (ibid. 11. 2-6). But t h e t e n d e n c y to seek physical pleasure a n d avoid distress also receives m e n t i o n as e n c o u r a g e d by c o m m o n e d u c a t i o n a l practice (ibid. 1.8). In a d d i t i o n poetry a n d p a i n t i n g are listed as inculcating the same values. But, Calcidius c o n t i n u e s (ibid. 11.9 ff.), t h e greatest source of faults lies in the c o n j u n c t i o n of body a n d soul: their interaction d e t e r m i n e s w h e t h e r individuals a r e m o r e inclined to lust o r to a n g e r — t h e Platonic non-rational parts again. T h i s observation refers back to the first m a i n cause of evil—the ' t h i n g s t h e m s e l v e s ' , since o u r p r o p e n s i t y towards lust a n d a v o i d a n c e of pain directly results f r o m physical

s e n s a t i o n s which p r e s u p p o s e t h e c o n t i n u i t y of b o d y a n d soul. It would be n a t u r a l to say s o m e t h i n g a b o u t t h e relative i n f l u e n c e of t h e two m a i n sources of evil a f t e r t h e s e c o n d has b e e n treated. T h e p o i n t as such reflects Chrysippus' belief that even a p e r f e c t e d u c a t i o n d o e s n o t p r e v e n t evil, i.e. a f f e c t i o n , f r o m arising. H e n c e t h e w e i g h t a t t a c h e d to ' t h e things themselves'. After p o i n t i n g to the c o n j u n c t i o n of body a n d soul Calcidius a d d s a s o m e w h a t motley set of o t h e r distractions involved in t h e genesis of evil, e.g. t h e vicissitudes of life (ibid. 11. 12-15). T h i s c o r r e s p o n d s to t h e o b s e r v a t i o n m a d e at t h e b e g i n n i n g t h a t t h e cause of e r r o r is m a n i f o l d (p. 53.16). Calcidius e n d s with t h e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t prospective Sages s h o u l d b e e d u c a t e d in isolation f r o m t h e c o m m o n r u n a n d t h r o u g h m e a n s that aid t h e n a t u r a l progress towards wisdom (p. 54.15-18). Let us now t u r n to Galen (5.5.1 ff.). C h i l d r e n , h e notes, a r e seen to e x h i b i t all k i n d s of a f f e c t i o n s that they s h o u l d n o t possess o n C h r y s i p p e a n premises, such as t h e a s s u m p t i o n that their c o n a t i o n is n o t yet supervised by reason, 1 5 9 o r that they have n o n a t u r a l affinity (οίκείωσις) with p l e a s u r e o r a l i e n a t i o n ( ά λ λ ο τ ρ ί ω σ ι ν ) f r o m p a i n . 'For all c h i l d r e n rush u n t a u g h t ( ά δ ι δ ά κ τ ω ς ) toward p l e a s u r e s a n d t u r n away a n d flee f r o m p a i n s ' (5.5.3). G a l e n lists a n u m b e r of affections typical of c h i l d r e n a n d animals, e x p l a i n e d in terms of their natural affinity. T h e s e affections n o t only reveal a natural affinity with p l e a s u r e . O t h e r s such as a n g e r a n d t h e a m b i t i o n to win p o i n t to a n a t u r a l affinity with victory (ibid. 4-6). L a t e r , as they grow o l d e r , c h i l d r e n develop an affinity toward what is right a n d h o n o u r a b l e (i.e. t h e καλόν, ibid. 6, p. 318.7). T h e y rejoice in n o b l e acts a n d lay claim to justice a n d t h e o t h e r virtue. Galen c o n c l u d e s ( ibid. 8-9): Thus there are these three things with which we feel a natural affinity, corresponding to each form of the soul's parts: pleasure, through the appetitive (form); victory, through the spirited; and what is right and honourable through the rational part. Epicurus saw only the affinity felt by the worst part of the soul, Chrysippus only that felt by the best, saying that we have a kinship only with what is right and honourable (καλόν), which, he believes, is obviously also good. The ancient philosophers were the only ones who saw that we have a kinship with all three. But since Chrysippus omitted two of them, it is not surprising that he was perplexed (άπορεΐν) about the origin of vice.

159 -phe Chrysippean way of p h r a s i n g t h e relation between reason a n d c o n a t i o n , see O.L. 7.86 fin.

T h e above discussion seems to b e based o n t h e C h r y s i p p e a n argum e n t the On Affections, s u p p l e m e n t e d with G a l e n ' s own observations o n t h e b e h a v i o u r of animals ( i n c l u d i n g little c h i l d r e n ) a n d g e n e r a l k n o w l e d g e a b o u t views o n t h e summum bonum. T h e r e is n o trace of d e p e n d e n c e on Posidonius. In w h a t follows (ibid. 9 ff.) G a l e n c o n f i r m s his p o i n t — q u o t e d a b o v e — t h a t Chrysippus was at a loss a b o u t the causes of affection, i.e. m o r a l c o r r u p t i o n . H e r e f e r s to a few facts a c k n o w l e d g e d by C h r y s i p p u s in t h e light of his d o c t r i n a l p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s . A l t h o u g h Galen d o e s n o t p r e s e n t verbatim q u o t a t i o n s , it is clear that h e draws o n C h r y s i p p u s ' On Affections. Given t h e h u m a n affinity (οίκείωσις again) with m o r a l e x c e l l e n c e , m i s c o n d u c t c a n n o t arise internally. T h e conclusion m i g h t t h e n b e that all c o r r u p t i o n m u s t have a social origin. But Chrysippus did n o t take this view. We learn f r o m Galen that t h e Stoic f u r t h e r g r a n t e d that c h i l d r e n , even if raised u n d e r the exclusive c a r e of a p h i l o s p h e r a n d never h e a r i n g or s e e i n g an exa m p l e of vice, would nevertheless n o t necessarily b e c o m e philosop h e r s , i.e. attain m o r a l e x c e l l e n c e o r s o m e t h i n g close it (ibid. 13). This t h e n m u s t have b e e n said by Chrysippus himself. But t h e r e is an even weightier a n d m o r e obvious reason why m o r a l c o r r u p t i o n cann o t b e i m p u t e d to social factors only—we are left with t h e question h o w t h e earliest h u m a n s b e c a m e c o r r u p t e d in t h e first place, as Galen is quick to p o i n t o u t (ibid. 15). Chrysippus t h e r e f o r e p r o p o s e d two causes, o n e physical, the o t h e r social: ' O n e arises f r o m t h e c o n v e r s a t i o n of t h e majority of m e n , t h e o t h e r f r o m t h e v e r y n a t u r e o f t h e t h i n g s ' (ibid. 1 4 ) . '

A little f u r t h e r o n , t h e s e c o n d c a u s e a p p e a r s u n d e r a s o m e w h a t d i f f e r e n t description: '... H e says t h a t c o r r u p t i o n a r i s e s in i n f e r i o r m e n in r e g a r d t o g o o d a n d evil b e c a u s e o f t h e p e r s u a s i v e n e s s o f a p p e a r a n c e s a n d c o n v e r s a -

t i o n ' (ibid. 19)

T h e above i n f o r m a t i o n is n o t f u r t h e r e x p l a i n e d b u t merely criticized: G a l e n c o m p l a i n s twice t h a t C h r y s i p p u s d o e s n o t say why it is t h a t a p p e a r a n c e s cause us to r e g a r d p l e a s u r e as g o o d a n d pain as evil (ibid. 16, 19). If we possessed Galen as o u r only source, we m i g h t b e t e m p t e d to believe that Chrysippus really gave n o f u r t h e r e x p l a n a tion. As it is, we also have Calcidius. We may now p r e s e n t a few conclusions a b o u t the relation between t h e two sources a n d t h e original d o c t r i n e d e f e n d e d by Chrysippus.

First, t h e s t r u c t u r e of t h e a r g u m e n t is recognizably identical: Chrysippus e x p l a i n e d t h e origin of evil in t h e c o n t e x t of his well-known d o c t r i n e of a p p r o p r i a t i o n , o r 'familiarization' (οίκείωσις). O u r natural d e v e l o p m e n t leads ideally towards virtue a n d h o n o u r . Evil is n o t i n n a t e . Yet physical f a c t o r s — n o t a b l y s e n s a t i o n s of p l e a s u r e a n d p a i n — c o n t r i b u t e to t h e c o r r u p t i o n of o u r souls f r o m t h e earliest possible stage onwards. In a d d i t i o n , social sources of perversion c o m e into play. Physical a n d social causes c o n s p i r e to h a m p e r o u r natural psycho-moral d e v e l o p m e n t , causing us to mistake pleasure a n d glory f o r virtue a n d their o p p o s i t e s f o r evil. T h e p a t t e r n of this a r g u m e n t has clearly b e e n m o d e l l e d o n t h e P l a t o n i c t r i p a r t i t i o n — t h e values listed c o r r e s p o n d to each of t h e t h r e e parts. T h e Platonic postulate of two n o n - r a t i o n a l parts of t h e soul which feel a natural inclination towards p l e a s u r e a n d victory respectively is e x p o s e d as a concession to h u m a n e r r o r . Pleasure a n d lust f o r glory a r e a b e r r a t i o n s of t h e n a t u r a l ( a n d n o r m a t i v e ) p r o c e s s d i r e c t e d towards virtue a n d t r u e h o n o u r . T h u s Chrysippus' a c c o u n t n o t only establishes t h e causes of evil in t h e c o n t e x t of Stoic d o c t r i n e b u t also r e f u t e s t h e Platonic position. I n s o f a r as t h e inclinations towards p l e a s u r e a n d avoidance of p a i n a r e stressed as early f o r m s of m o r a l d e g e n e r a t i o n this a c c o u n t , obviously, is also a i m e d against Epicurus. I n this p a r t i c u l a r c o n t e x t Calcidius supplies far m o r e d o c t r i n a l c o n t e n t t h a n Galen, b u t t h e latter c o n f i r m s that t h e ideas c o n c e r n e d are C h r y s i p p e a n . In t h e light of Calcidius' a c c o u n t , we may now also see in what way Galen has distorted Chrysippus' a r g u m e n t . A familiar p a t t e r n presents itself. Chrysippus o f f e r e d an alternative to the Platonic position by acknowledging the obvious fact that p e o p l e o f t e n seek p l e a s u r e , likewise avoid p a i n , a n d covet h o n o u r a n d wealth while avoiding their opposites. Galen highlights Chrysippus' acknowledgem e n t of t h e s e c o m m o n p h e n o m e n a o n which h e a n d Plato were a g r e e d , b u t suppresses t h e crucial d i f f e r e n c e of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . O n c e again h e o b t r u d e s o n t h e r e a d e r t h e Platonic tripartition as t h e only viable m o d e l which can m a k e sense of t h e p h e n o m e n a . Galen a d d s t h e p r o b l e m a t i c d e n i a l by C h r y s i p p u s that c h i l d r e n a n d o t h e r n o n rational animals exhibit a f f e c t i o n s — a direct c o n s e q u e n c e of his view of affections as j u d g e m e n t s . F u r t h e r , Galen has Posidonius e n t e r t h e stage. This Stoic, h e tells us, e s p o u s e d Plato's d o c t r i n e in t h e light of t h e empirical facts with which C h r y s i p p u s h a d also g r a p p l e d . His p h y s i o g n o m i c e x a m p l e s p e r t a i n to w h a t Chrysippus a c c o r d i n g to Galen a n d Calcidius called

t h e 'things themselves', i.e. physical reality as o n e of the two sources of m o r a l c o r r u p t i o n . T h e s a m e p o i n t , as we have seen, is also indicated by Calcidius as t h e c o n c r e t i o n of b o d y a n d soul (in corporis et animae concretione, p. 54, 1.10), which m a k e s t h e relevance of Posidonius' physiognomic c o n c e r n s even clearer. If the same cause of evil is stated with r e f e r e n c e to m e n t a l a p p e a r a n c e s , we n e e d a s s u m e n o d i s c r e p a n c y b e c a u s e o u r physiological m a k e - u p directly affects t h e quality of o u r a p p e a r a n c e s a n d so o u r r e a c t i o n s to e x t e r n a l events a n d circumstances. P o s i d o n i u s ' p h y s i o g n o m i c observations c o n c e r n precisely t h e g e n e r a l h u m a n propensity towards pain a n d pleasure, a n g e r , d a r i n g a n d cowardice, i.e. the p h e n o m e n a which Galen takes to necessitate the Platonic tripartition of t h e soul, b u t which Chrysipp u s e x p l a i n e d as a b e r r a t i o n s f r o m n o r m a l m e n t a l d e v e l o p m e n t . P o s i d o n i u s s e e m s to have r e f e r r e d to Aristotle a n d H i p p o c r a t e s in this c o n n e c t i o n — a n o t h e r exquisite o p p o r t u n i t y f o r Galen to a r g u e that P o s i d o n i u s h a d d i s t a n c e d himself f r o m C h r y s i p p u s a n d h a d j o i n e d t h e ranks of p h i l o s o p h e r s a n d scientists of a b e t t e r sort (PHP 5.5.21-27; see also infra, p. 241). Yet t h e r e may b e a n o t h e r way of c o n s t r u i n g t h e set of Posidonian passages at issue h e r e . T h e points of c o n t a c t between Posidonius a n d Chrysippus as to t h e sources of perversion n e e d n o t imply disagreem e n t b u t c o u l d also have resulted f r o m an a t t e m p t o n P o s i d o n i u s ' p a r t to e x p a n d a n d r e f i n e a n d so to c o r r o b o r a t e t h e Stoic position as f o r m u l a t e d by Chrysippus. It seems to have b e e n typical of Posidonius to d o so by r e f e r e n c e to d a t a f r o m m o r e specialized disciplines i n c l u d i n g p h y s i o g n o m y . T h e a p p e a l to a u t h o r i t a t i v e p r e d e c e s s o r s such as H i p p o c r a t e s a n d Aristotle may also b e l o n g in this c o n t e x t . But this d o e s n o t c o m m i t P o s i d o n i u s to a c c e p t a n c e of t h e psychological t h e o r y of these a u t h o r i t i e s as a whole. Is t h e case d i f f e r e n t with Plato? Clearly an answer to this q u e s t i o n r e q u i r e s a systematic e x a m i n a t i o n involving the role played by what Posidonius called t h e ' a n c i e n t a c c o u n t ' . Moreover, P o s i d o n i u s as cited by Galen is o n e of o u r m a i n sources f o r Chrysippus' On Affections. For this reason I shall evaluate the Posidonian material in a separate c h a p t e r (6).

CHAPTER FOUR

T H E T H E R A P E U T I C S ( B O O K IV)

1. Title, Subject-matter, Audience T h e majority of f r a g m e n t s f r o m t h e On Affections c o m e f r o m its f o u r t h a n d last b o o k k n o w n by its s e p a r a t e title Θεραπευτικόν ( ' T h e r a p e u tics') or, less o f t e n , t h e 'Ηθικόν ( ' E t h i c s ' ) , b u t t h e c o m b i n a t i o n τό Θεραπευτικόν τε καί 'Ηθικόν is also f o u n d . 1 T h e s e c o n d c o n c e p t , τό 'Ηθικόν, may d e f i n e the field of application of t h e therapy at issue. It may also r e f e r to disposition o r c h a r a c t e r ( ή θ ο ς ) , o n which, as we have s e e n , Chrysippus, like Aristotle a n d o t h e r p r e d e c e s s o r s , laid s t r o n g e m p h a s i s . C o n s i d e r e d in this light, t h e twofold title w o u l d neatly cover b o t h s i d e s — t h e r a p e u t i c a n d t h e p r e v e n t i v e — o f his m o r a l psychology. 2 But, as I have already r e m a r k e d in i n t r o d u c i n g t h e f r a g m e n t s f r o m Galen, this may also have involved a large theoretical c o m p o n e n t , i.e. technical d e f i n i t i o n s of e m o t i o n a c c o r d i n g to g e n u s a n d species (see above, p. 92). At t h e b e g i n n i n g of t h e Therapeutics C h r y s i p p u s r e p e a t e d a n u m b e r of theoretical points m a d e in the first two books. 3 But in t h e f r a g m e n t s n o r e f e r e n c e is m a d e to these earlier books. 4 Galen, while leaving n o d o u b t a b o u t t h e b o o k b e i n g the f o u r t h of t h e treatise, tells us that it h a d b e e n written 'separately f r o m t h e rest' (PHP 5.7.52). In a n o n - p o l e m i c a l c o n t e x t , h e refers to t h e Therapeutics almost as if it were b e d s i d e r e a d i n g of m a n y p e o p l e i n c l u d i n g himself. Did Chrysippus diverge f r o m his usual style a n d m a n n e r to p r e s e n t a s u m m a r y of Stoic m o r a l d o c t r i n e suitable f o r a wider a u d i e n c e ? 5 A u t h o r s of so 1

The title Θεραπευτικόν or τό θεραπευτικόν βιβλίον is found at Gal. Loc. a f f . 3.1, VIII p. 138 K. (SVF3.457); ΡΗΡ4.5Λ0, 13; 5.2.21, 30 (SVF3.471). Philod. De ira Col. I .11-20 Indelli (SVF3.470), Origenes, Contra Celsum I 64 (vol. 1, p. 117.16ff. Kö., SVF3.474, first text), ibid. VIII 51 (vol. 2, p. 266.18ff. Kö., SVF3.474, second text, quoted infra, p. 166 f.). The combined title is given at PHP5.7.52 (SVF3.461, third text). On the relation of the Therapeutics to the first three books see supra, pp. 89 ff. 2 But prevention received far more space. See supra p. 91 f., infra pp. 179, 305, 320. 3 See supra, p.91, n. 9 with text thereto. 4 As pointed out by Pohlenz (1906) 353. 5 Loc. a f f . III 1, VIII p. 138 Κ . (SVF 3.457), quoted supra, p. 89. Cf. Pohlenz (1906) 355: '... und wenn auch Galen in der Hitze der Polemik ihn in Grund und

diverse a philosophical persuasion as Galen, P h i l o d e m u s , Cicero a n d O r i g e n knew a n d used t h e Therapeutics. O n e m i g h t t h e r e f o r e be forgiven f o r s u p p o s i n g that Chrysippus was i n d e e d successful in f i n d i n g this wider a u d i e n c e . 6 T h e f o u r t h b o o k , with its s e p a r a t e title, may i n d e e d have b e e n d e s i g n e d to be r e a d a n d used in isolation f r o m t h e rest. N o n e t h e less, o u r evidence r e m a i n s slim. Caution is n e e d e d , n o t least because t h e p i c t u r e of t h e b o o k as i n t e n d e d f o r Stoics a n d non-Stoics alike m i g h t i n f l u e n c e o u r view of t h e original n a t u r e a n d motivation of Stoic t h e r a p y . T h u s it has b e e n t a k e n to o f f e r its r e a d e r s m o r a l g u i d a n c e w i t h o u t o b t r u d i n g Stoic d o g m a . 7 T o be sure, t h e very idea of a m o r e or less p o p u l a r i z i n g b o o k implies that t h e r e is a n o t h e r , m o r e t h o r o u g h - g o i n g m o d e of t r e a t m e n t s u i t a b l e — a n d r e q u i r e d — f o r m o r e a d v a n c e d students. But it would b e i n a c c u r a t e to s u p p o s e that Chrysippus s u s p e n d s all Stoic theory. T h e theoretical passages p r e s u p p o s e t h e Stoic c o n c e p t i o n of t h e soul as well as t h e Stoic evaluation of things (viz. as g o o d , bad, or i n d i f f e r e n t ) . As to style, the f r a g m e n t s f r o m the Therapeutics d o n o t noticeably d i f f e r f r o m those f r o m t h e o t h e r books. T h e extensive use m a d e by C h r y s i p p u s of poetic q u o t a t i o n f o r m e d a distinctive a n d i n d e e d n o t o r i o u s f e a t u r e of all his writing. It was n o t just an e m b e l l i s h m e n t . 8 O n e of the m o s t striking f e a t u r e s of t h e Therapeutics is t h e p r o m i n e n c e of m e d i c a l t e r m i n o l o g y . H e r e t h e q u e s t i o n arises how far C h r y s i p p u s has systematically m o d e l l e d his t h e o r y o n any existing m e d i c a l d o c t r i n e . It w o u l d h e l p e x p l a i n c e r t a i n f e a t u r e s of his a c c o u n t if we could r e c o n s t r u c t this m o d e l a n d identify it o n the basis of what r e m a i n s of t h e medical tradition. T h e medical b a c k d r o p of Chrysippus' a r g u m e n t has o n t h e whole b e e n neglected. 9 Part of t h e p r o b l e m lies in a general failure to a p p r e c i a t e the status of the important analogy between philosophy a n d m e d i c i n e drawn by Chrysippus.

Boden verdammt, wo die Waffen ruhen erklärt er von Chrysipps Therapeutikos: "... es is ein Buch, nach dem wir vor allem greifen wenn es gilt, die seelischen Leiden zu helfen" '. De Lacy ad PHPp.238.4-6 (on which see below in text): 'Even Galen admits to using the Cure for treatment of affections.' 6 Pohlenz (1906) 355 n.l even knows that 'Das dreibändige Werk περί παθών ist gerade durch den θεραπευτικός verdrängt worden.' 7 See Pohlenz (1906) 354; Nussbaum (1994) 318, 378, 391; cf. 322, 357. The fragments from Origen have been taken to support this reading, see infra, pp. 166 ff. 8 See supra, p. 13 f. 9 This holds good for Kudlien (1968), Pigeaud (1981), Voelke (1993), Nussbaum (1994).

This is a kind of n o m a n ' s land. Historians of a n c i e n t p h i l o s o p h y d o n o t normally v e n t u r e into t h e field of a n c i e n t m e d i c i n e . Historians of a n c i e n t m e d i c i n e d o n o t c o n c e r n themselves with Stoic ethics. In view of t h e q u e s t i o n s raised above, I shall first evaluate t h e m e t h o d a n d a i m s of C h r y s i p p u s ' a r g u m e n t as m u c h as possible within its Stoic c o n t e x t . First, I shall a t t e m p t to achieve a p r o p e r a p p r e c i a t i o n of t h e so-called medical analogy which is so p r o m i n e n t a p a r t of t h e a p p r o a c h a d o p t e d by Chrysippus (§ 2). In the m a i n body of this c h a p t e r I shall review sets of f r a g m e n t s b o t h as e m b e d d e d in their c o n t e x t (for the most p a r t Galen) a n d in relation to o t h e r Stoic f r a g m e n t s , as well as a few relevant texts f r o m Plato a n d Aristotle (§ 34, 6-8). Two r e l a t e d f r a g m e n t s p r e s e r v e d by O r i g e n a n d a r e l a t e d passage in C i c e r o ' s Tusculans have b e c o m e t h e f o c u s of a scholarly discussion o n t h e overall o r i e n t a t i o n of Stoic t h e r a p y (§ 5). In all these sections I shall n o t avoid p o i n t i n g to m e d i c a l parallels with a view to i l l u m i n a t i n g C h r y s i p p u s ' m e a n i n g . But a f u l l e r a n d m o r e systematic discussion of t h e m e d i c a l b a c k d r o p is p o s t p o n e d to t h e final section. This will c o n c e r n t h e Corpus Hippocraticum, Praxagoras of Kos, a n d the so-called Anonymus Londinensis (§ 9).

2. The Medical A nalogy T h e idea of t h e p h i l o s o p h e r as t h e d o c t o r of t h e soul can b e traced back to Plato a n d Aristotle a n d beyond. 1 0 But it b e c a m e p r o m i n e n t in t h e Hellenistic p e r i o d . 1 1 In t h e Stoa t h e m e d i c a l analogy was first u s e d by Z e n o . 1 2 W h e n Chrysippus in t h e Therapeutics p r e s e n t e d t h e analogy, h e h a d its Z e n o n i a n version in m i n d — i n line with his r e g u l a r p r o c e d u r e . 1 3 T h e analogy has b e e n p u t in the c e n t r e of scholarly d e b a t e by M a r t h a N u s s b a u m , a c c o r d i n g to w h o m it expresses o n e of t h e d e e p e s t c o n c e r n s of Hellenistic p h i l o s o p h y as a whole. T h e schools ' d e b a t e with o n e a n o t h e r in t e r m s o r g a n i z e d by t h e analogy, c o m m e n d i n g themselves to prospective p u p i l s as d o c t o r s b e l o n g i n g to rival schools of m e d i c i n e would d e b a t e , p r o c l a i m i n g the 10 See e.g. Democr. fr. 31 DK, Pl., Lg. 720a-e, 857c-d; see further Kudlien (1968); for Plato, seejouanna (1978); for Aristode see next p. and Jaeger (1957). 11 In addition to the Stoic evidence, see Epicurus fr. 221 Usener (Porph. Ad Marc. 31, p. 209.23 N.) and, for the Sceptics, Sext. PH 3.280-1. 12 Stob. IV 34.68, p. 845 H. (SVF 1.323). 13 PHPV 2.31 (SVjF3.471); on the Stoic habit of starting from Zeno, see further supra, p. 96.

merits of their d i f f e r i n g c o n c e p t i o n s of the arts.' 1 4 T h e analogy, Nussbaum argues, d e t e r m i n e d the way the philosophers styled their procedures. In this connection she speaks of therapeutic arguments, i.e. a r g u m e n t s designed to p u r g e the soul of its affections but also taking their starting p o i n t f r o m the e x p e r i e n c e of the individual patient. 1 5 O n e r e m e m b e r s Aristotle's comparison of ethics with medicine precisely in view of the fact that both disciplines are c o n c e r n e d with individuals (EN A 5.1097a11-14). T h u s the Stoic therapist will not c o n f r o n t the patient with Stoic value judgements, at least not in the earlier stages of treatment. Obviously this would set therapy apart f r o m o t h e r c o m p a r t m e n t s of philosophy—despite the claims of the Stoics as to the systematic a n d i n d e e d o r g a n i c quality of their philosophy. 1 6 This r e a d i n g also sits u n c o m f o r t a b l y with r e p e a t e d statements by Chrysippus to the effect that morality trickles down f r o m the cosmic o r d e r a n d that philosophical ethics starts f r o m theology. 1 7 Still, the emphasis in therapy as applied ethics may be different. I shall r e t u r n to these questions in d u e course. But exactly what status a n d function did the medical analogy have? H e r e we instantly r u n into the problems of transmission a n d presentation peculiar to o u r main sources, Cicero a n d Galen. Cicero takes an interest in the medical analogy as a m e a n s of m a k i n g certain points a b o u t moral psychology. 18 T h e spirit of Chrysippus seems to h a u n t the o p e n i n g section of the third book of the Tusculans. At § 6 we read: T h e r e is s u r e l y a m e d i c a l a r t o f t h e s o u l — p h i l o s o p h y . A n d its a i d n e e d n o t b e s o u g h t , as in b o d i l y d i s e a s e s , f r o m o u t s i d e o u r s e l v e s . W e m u s t e n d e a v o u r w i t h all o u r r e s o u r c e s a n d s t r e n g t h t o b e c o m e c a p a b l e of d o c t o r i n g o u r s e l v e s .

It is noteworthy that Cicero ascribes a curative function to philosophy as a whole, not ethics alone. 1 9 This seems to exclude an i n d e p e n d e n t role for ethics or applied ethics. But even if Cicero employs the medical analogy, h e dissociates himself f r o m its peculiarly Chrysippean version:

14 15 16 17 18 19

Nussbaum (1994) 14. Nussbaum (1994) e.g. 16 ff. Similarly Sorabji (2000), e.g. 8, 178. See the texts assembled as L-S: 26A-D with commentary. Plut. De Stoic. Rep. 1035A-C (SVF 3,326, 3.68, 2.42). He employs it himself, e.g. Tusc. 3.5ff. Accordingly he speaks of universel philosophia in what directly follows.

... much effort is spent by the Stoics, most notably Chrysippus, in establishing the similarity between illnesses of the soul and those of the body. Let us omit these passages as wholly superfluous and investigate the substance of their doctrine (Tusc. 4.23). 20 C i c e r o j u d g e s t h e m e d i c a l a n a l o g y solely o n its literary m e r i t s , criticizing t h e Stoic—notably Chrysippean—version as over-elaborate (cf. also § 27). H e himself will state t h e c o m p a r i s o n in g e n e r a l t e r m s only, as at 3.6. In c o n s e q u e n c e , h e thinks it possible to o m i t m a n y passages without losing sight of t h e gist of t h e Stoic d o c t r i n e . This is clearly t h e p o i n t of his distinction b e t w e e n f o r m a n d substance. But o n e may well ask w h e t h e r Cicero d o e s n o t throw o u t t h e baby with t h e b a t h w a t e r . Is t h e a n a l o g y as d e v e l o p e d by C h r y s i p p u s j u s t a stylistic device which outstays its w e l c o m e ? At any r a t e , C i c e r o ' s decision has led to t h e c u t t i n g o u t of medical a n d physical aspects in particular (see below, p p . 304, 310). It is time to t u r n to PHP. At t h e b e g i n n i n g of t h e Therapeutics analogy as follows:

Chrysippus introduced the

It is not true that whereas there is an art, called medicine, concerned with the diseased body, there is no art concerned with the diseased soul, or that the latter [art] is necessarily inferior to the former in the theory and therapeutic treatment of particular cases. Therefore, just as the physician of the body must be 'inside', 21 as people are wont to say, the affections that befall the body and the proper cure for each, so it falls to the physician of the soul to be 'inside' both of these (things) in the best possible way. And one could understand that this is the case, since the analogy with these things 22 was drawn from the beginning. For the parallel appropriateness 2 3 with respect to these terms will also make clear to us, I believe, the similarity of the cures and in addition the analogy that the two kinds of medicine have with each other {PHP5.2.22-4 ~ SW3.471). 2 4 20 Hoc loco nimium operae consumitur a Stoicis, maxime a Chrysippo, dum morbis corporum comparatur morborum animi similitude, qua oratione minime necessaria ea quae rem continent pertractemus. 21 I.e. knowledgeable a b o u t . 22 I.e. t h e theory a n d t h e r a p e u t i c m e t h o d s of m e d i c i n e a p p l i e d to t h e body. 23 De Lacy translates ά ν τ ι π α ρ α τ ε ί ν ο υ σ α οίκειότης 'correlative affinity' b u t this seems less clear. 24 οΰτε γάρ περί τό νοσούν σώμά έστί τις τέχνη ήν προσαγορεΰομεν ίατρικήν, ούχί δέ καί περί τήν νοσούσαν ψυχήν έστί τις τέχνη οΰτ' έν τή κατά μέρος θεωρία τε καί θ ε ρ α π ε ί α δει λείπεσθαι τ α ύ τ η ν έκείνης. διό καί καθάπερ τω περί τά σ ώ μ α τ α ίατρώ καθήκει τών τε συμβαινόντων αΰτοις παθών έντός είναι ώς είώθασι τοΰτο λέγειν, καί τής έ κ ά σ τ φ οικείας θεραπείας, οϋτω καί τω τής ψ υ χ ή ς ίατρώ έ π ι β ά λ λ ε ι , άμφοτέρων τούτων έντός ε ί ν α ι ώς ένι ά ρ ι σ τ α , καί οτι οϋτως έχει μάθοι άν τις τής προς τ α ΰ τ ' ά ν α λ ο γ ί α ς παρατεθείσης ά π ' άρχής. ή γάρ πρός τ α ύ τ α ά ν τ ι π α ρ α τ ε ί ν ο υ σ α οίκειότης παραστήσει, ώς οϊομαι, καί τήν τών θεραπειών ομοιότητα καί έτι την άμφοτέρων τών ιατρειών πρός ά λ λ ή λ α ς ά ν α λ ο γ ί α ν .

Chrysippus says that the medical analogy was set u p ' f r o m the beginn i n g ' , that is to say, it arises naturally in h u m a n t h o u g h t a n d language, n o t as a purely mental construct b u t as a reflection of reality. 25 T h e term a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s indicates that t h e words at issue h e r e are natural or literal in this sense. 2 6 Although c o m m o n language exhibits anomalies, it r e m a i n s a useful tool f o r u n c o v e r i n g the s t r u c t u r e of reality. 27 This includes the c o m p a r i s o n s or analogies drawn by p e o p l e in g e n e r a l . 2 8 This is f u r t h e r b o r n e o u t by t h e following f r a g m e n t which must derive f r o m the same context: 'Just as s t r e n g t h a n d w e a k n e s s , g o o d t e n s i o n a n d s l a c k n e s s are o b s e r v e d in t h e case o f t h e b o d y a n d m o r e o v e r h e a l t h a n d d i s e a s e , r o b u s t n e s s a n d sickliness', a n d all the o t h e r affections, infirmities a n d i l l n e s s e s h e g o e s o n to list. 2 9 'In t h e s a m e way,' h e says, ' t h e r e are certain t h i n g s in t h e rational soul that exist a n d are n a m e d analogously to all o f these.' H e t h e n c o n t i n u e s : Ί s u p p o s e that this sort o f a n a l o g y a n d similarity has l e d to t h e s a m e n e n e s s o f their n a m e s [or: s y n o n y m y ] . For we d o in fact say that s o m e p e r s o n s are strong or weak also in r e s p e c t o f their soul, a n d firm o r soft, a n d m o r e o v e r ill o r healthy; a n d we speak in this way o f e m o t i o n , infirmity a n d the like in

the Sû ul' {PHP5.2.26-7, SVF3.471).30 T h e n a t u r a l basis of the analogy is crucial. W h e n it is said that the soul's e m o t i o n o r affections (e.g. fear, desire) are like those of the 25 Likewise Chrysippus in his On the Soul said that people have believed 'from the beginning' (άπ' αρχής) that the intellect resides in the heart; that is to say, the belief in question is 'natural' and hence true, albeit inarticulate (Gal. PHP 3.1.23, SVF 2.886); cf. Tieleman (1996a) 174 ff. 26 For this use in Chrysippus see PHP5.2.33 (quoted infra), 4.6.35 (both pertaining to common usage); 4.5.6, 4.5.13-4 (Zeno's definitions), in the first of which quoted supra, p. 104; further examples relating to ordinary discourse come from the fragments On the Soul preserved by Galen, see PHP 3.5.5 (SVF 2.891); 3.5.15 (SVF 2.892) cf. 2.2.10, p.104.31 (SVF2.895: the pointing gesture accompanying the word Τ is directed 'naturally and appropriately' towards the chest; cf. 3.7.45 = SVF 2.903); cf. Atherton (1993) 96; Tieleman (1996a) 206 ff. 2 ' Cf. Atherton (1993) 92 ff. and, with special reference to Chrysippus' On the Soul, Tieleman (1996a) 174 ff. 28 Cf. Rolke (1975) 502-3. 29 This insertion by Galen is worth retaining since it shows the scope of Chrysippus' analogy :i
body, this should be taken to apply in an objective, physical sense. As we shall see, this analogy is based on the fact t h a t the soul is c o r p o r e a l like the body. This p o i n t — a l r e a d y well b r o u g h t o u t by Rolke in his m o n o g r a p h on Stoic imagery 3 1 —has i m p o r t a n t implications for the therapy of the soul. We should also note the concept of synonymy employed here. Galen correctly explains its Stoic sense as entailing that the mental a n d bodily states listed not only have the same n a m e but also the same definition (ibid. 28). 3 2 Chrysippus was keenly interested in linguistic ambiguity a n d related p h e n o m e n a including m e t a p h o r a n d o t h e r figures of speech. 3 3 In this area h e may be expected to choose his terms carefully. In the above passage h e speaks n o t of m e t a p h o r , b u t of analogy a n d parallellism a n d appropriateness. By contrast, h e once uses the term 'metaphorically' with r e f e r e n c e to the expressions 'without sinew' and 'having sinew' said of persons without a n d with mental stamina. 3 4 In this case, obviously, there is no physical correspondence. 3 5 What t h e n is the physical basis legitimizing the analogy between body a n d soul? First, we n e e d to r e m i n d ourselves of his view that h e soul is n o t only c o r p o r e a l like the body, but consists of the same

31

Rolke (1975) 315 ff. See esp. his conclusion: 'Daraus geht eindeutig hervor dass die Vorstellung von den Affekten als Krankheiten kein Bild darstellt, sondern dass die Affekte als reale Krankheiten des körperlichen Seelenpneumas aufgefasst wurden' (p. 318). 32 Cf. Simpl. In Arist. Cat. p.36.8-11 Kalbfleisch (SVF2.150). 33 He devoted one separate treatise to the type of ambiguity involved in figures of speech and several to ambiguity in general, see D.L. 7.193 (SVF 2.14); cf. Atherton (1993) 163 ff. 34 4.55-.6 (SVF3.473) : έτι δέ καί κατά τοΰτ' 'ίσως (ώς) οί έπί του σώματος λέγονται τόνοι άτονοι καί εΰτονοι είναι κατά τό νευρώδες τω δύνασθαι ημάς ή άδυνατεΐν έν τοις δια τούτων έπιτελουμένοις έργοις, καί ό έν τή ψυχή λέγεται τόνος ώς εύτονία καί ατονία, ώσπερ γαρ έν δρόμω καί άνθέξει τινός καί τοις παραπλησίοις ήδη, à δια τών νεύρων ένεργεΐται, έστι τις έπιτελεστική κατάστασις καί ένδοτική, τών νεύρων προεκλελυμένων καί άνειμένων, αναλόγως καί έπί ψυχής έστι τοιούτον νευρώδες, καθό καί κ α τ ά μ ε τ α φ ο ρ ά ν άνεύρους τινάς λέγομεν καί νεύρα έ χ ε ι ν . The first plural λέγομεν shows that Chrysippus appeals to ordinary usage. Note that the adverb αναλόγως pertains only to the mental strength indicated by the expression τοιούτον νευρώδες ('something sinewy of this kind'), not to the words άνεύρους and νεύρα έχειν. On the not exclusively Stoic metaphor 'the sinews of the mind' see Vegetti (1993). On the Stoic idea of mental strength, or will-power, as instantiated by this fragment, see supra, pp. 38 f. 35 According to the Stoic distinctions recorded by Simplicius, Cat. p.32.12 ff. a new name is used metaphorically if the thing receiving it has its own name as well. This too seems to apply here, since the terms strength and weakness are the proper names which are applied to the soul in the two respective conditions; cf. Atherton (1993) 164.

physical elements, in particular fire a n d air. T h u s Chrysippus wrote in his On the Soul: T h e s o u l is b r e a t h c o n n a t e 3 6 w i t h us, e x t e n d i n g as a c o n t i n u u m t h r o u g h t h e w h o l e b o d y as l o n g as t h e f r e e - f l o w i n g b r e a t h of life is p r e s e n t in t h e b o d y (PHP 3 . 1 . 1 0 ~ SVF2.885).37

Alongside t h e c o m m o n e x p e r i e n c e that life a n d respiration are coe x t e n s i v e , 3 8 we f i n d h e r e t h e m o r e t e c h n i c a l p o i n t t h a t t h e soul n o u r i s h e s a n d m a i n t a i n s itself t h r o u g h inhalation (in addition to t h e e x h a l a t i o n — ά ν α θ υ μ ί α σ ι ς — f r o m t h e b l o o d in t h e h e a r t ) . 3 9 Accordingly, the soul's disposition, i n c l u d i n g its m o r a l quality, d e p e n d s o n physiological processes in the body. T h e relevance of these processes is also indicated by Chrysippus' p o i n t (as q u o t e d above, p. 144) that, w h e r e a s m e d i c i n e in its ordinary sense obviously p r e s u p p o s e s e x p e r t k n o w l e d g e of t h e body, m e d i c i n e of t h e soul r e q u i r e s k n o w l e d g e of both b o d y a n d soul. T h e least we can say is that this tells strongly against t a k i n g t h e analogy in a g e n e r a l m e t a p h o r i c a l sense only, justifying ' t h e r a p e u t i c a l a r g u m e n t s ' . In a d d i t i o n , we should n o t e that Chrysippus s e e m s to p o i n t to t h e n e e d of a fairly detailed level of knowledge of bodily processes a n d diseases. As we have seen, t h e great literary stylist Cicero has n o time f o r t h e physical, or physiological, basis of the analogy. But t h e d o c t o r Galen too has q u a l m s a b o u t t h e analogy, albeit d i f f e r e n t o n e s . H e c o m plains that Chrysippus, having majestically i n t r o d u c e d the analogy in t h e above passage, fails to b r i n g it to b e a r o n his m a t e r i a l (PHP 5.2.30-38). If bodily h e a l t h consists in t h e c o r r e c t p r o p o r t i o n of its parts (μόρια), this should hold g o o d f o r psychic health also. Chrysippus however fails to specify what are the parts in the case of t h e soul. Stoic psychology d o e s n o t r e c o g n i z e psychic parts in t h e r e q u i r e d sense. Of course, Plato o p e r a t e s with parts. In sum, t h e analogy as :,<

' This refers to the Stoic view that the physical pneuma characteristic of the embryo turns into psychic pneuma under the impact of the cold air, which falls upon it when respiration starts, see SVF 2.802-806 and further testimonies and fragments assembled and discussed in Tieleman (1991). In fact, the pneuma is transmitted by both parents in the form of semen, which is secreted by the reproductive part (σπερματικόν) of the soul, see e.g. PHP 3.1.11 (SVF 2.885); cf. SVF 1.518, third text; 2.806, 873, 874. 37 ή ψυχή πνεύμα έστι σύμφυτον ήμίν συνεχές παντί τω σώματι διήκον έστ' άν ή τής ζωής εϋπνοια παρή έν τω σώματι. 38 This idea is exploited in Chrysippus' syllogistic proof that the soul is pneuma preserved by Calcidius, In Tim. 220 (SVF"2.879), which may well derive from the On the soul as well. 39 See SVF3 Diog. 30.

such is u n o b j e c t i o n a b l e a n d i n d e e d h e l p f u l since it c o n f i r m s the Platonic r a t h e r t h a n the C h r y s i p p e a n c o n c e p t i o n of t h e soul ( ibid. 30). But is Galen justified in claiming that Chrysippus did n o t apply the analogy? In o r d e r to s u b s t a n t i a t e this a r g u m e n t G a l e n p r e s e n t s t h e following proof-texts (5.2.31-33 ~ SVF3.471): ( 3 1 ) '... T h a t is i n d e e d w h y Z e n o ' s a r g u m e n t p r o c e e d s as it s h o u l d . D i s e a s e o f t h e s o u l is m o s t s i m i l a r t o a n u n s e t t l e d s t a t e o f t h e b o d y . D i s e a s e o f t h e b o d y is s a i d t o b e t h e l a c k o f p r o p o r t i o n o f t h e [ t h i n g s ] in it, h o t a n d c o l d , d r y a n d w e t . ' ( 3 2 ) A n d a l i t t l e f u r t h e r o n : ' H e a l t h i n t h e b o d y is a k i n d o f g o o d b l e n d a n d p r o p o r t i o n of t h e [things] specified.'40 A n d again subseq u e n t l y : ' F o r in m y view a g o o d c o n d i t i o n o f t h e b o d y r e s i d e s in t h e best b l e n d of t h e [things] m e n t i o n e d . ' 4 1 (33) A n d a f t e r that: ' A n d t h e s e t h i n g s t o o a r e said n o t i n a p p r o p r i a t e l y o f t h e b o d y , b e c a u s e p r o p o r t i o n o r l a c k o f p r o p o r t i o n in its c o m p o n e n t s , h o t , c o l d , w e t a n d d r y is h e a l t h o r d i s e a s e ; p r o p o r t i o n o r its r e v e r s e in t h e s i n e w s is s t r e n g t h o r w e a k n e s s , f i r m n e s s o r s o f t n e s s ; a n d p r o p o r t i o n o r t h e l a c k o f it in t h e l i m b s is b e a u t y o r u g l i n e s s . ' 4 2

A l t h o u g h C h r y s i p p u s o m i t s any m e n t i o n of ' p a r t s ' , his use of t h e n e u t r e plural ( h e r e translated ' t h e things in it', ' t h e things specified', etc.) is exploited by Galen to m a k e us believe that 'parts' are at issue. In reality, C h r y s i p p u s viewed t h e c o r r e c t p r o p o r t i o n to t h e soul as o n e b e t w e e n physical e l e m e n t s , o r e l e m e n t a l qualities. T h e analogy as e m p l o y e d by C h r y s i p p u s is c o n c e r n e d with t h e physical similarity b e t w e e n b o d y a n d soul. Remarkably e n o u g h , in § 33 t h e analogy is d r a w n f r o m t h e soul to t h e body, that is to say a s t a t e m e n t o n t h e f o r m e r (viz. t h a t its c o n d i t i o n is d e t e r m i n e d by t h e physical elements) is d e c l a r e d applicable to t h e latter. H e r e , as elsewhere, Chrysippus presents his d o c t r i n e as an exegesis of Z e n o ' s ipsissima verba. Both Stoics t h e n a t t a c h e d g r e a t weight to t h e f o u r e l e m e n t s in e x p l a i n i n g m e n t a l life. But this f e a t u r e is s u p p r e s s e d by Galen. His silence o n t h e e l e m e n t a l qualities is typical

40

Viz. t h e e l e m e n t a r y qualities, hot, cold, dry a n d wet. See previous n. 42 (31) διό και κ α τ ά τρόπον π ρ ο ή κ τ α ι Ζήνωνι λόγος, ή δε τής ψ υ χ ή ς νόσος όμοιοτάτη έστι τή του σώματος α κ α τ α σ τ α σ ί α , λέγεται δέ ε ί ν α ι σώματος νόσος ή ασυμμετρία τών έν α ύ τ φ . θερμού καί ψυχρού, ξηρού καί υγρού. (32) καί μετ' όλίγα· ή δ ' έν τω σώματι ύ γ ί ε ι α ε ύ κ ρ α σ ί α τις καί σ υ μ μ ε τ ρ ί α τών διειρημένων. καί π ά λ ι ν έφεξής· οίμαι γάρ είναι εύεξίαν σώματος τήν άρίστην τών ρηθέντων εύκρασίαν. (33) καί π ά λ ι ν έφεξής· λέγεται δέ καί τ α ύ τ α ούκ άπό τρόπου έπί τού σώματος, διότι ή έν θερμοΐς καί ψυχροίς καί ύγροΐς καί ξηροις γενομένη συμμετρία ή άσυμμετρία έστίν ύγίεια ή νόσος, ή δ ' έν νεύροις συμμετρία ή άσυμμετρία ισχύς ή άσθένεια καί εύτονία ή άτονία, ή δ ' έν τοις μέλεσι συμμετρία ή άσυμμετρία κάλλος ή αίσχος. 41

of his r e s p o n s e to C h r y s i p p u s ' a r g u m e n t in PHP.43 T h i s b e c o m e s clearer f r o m a c o m p a r i s o n with a long passage f r o m his The Capacities of the Soul Follow the Mixtures of the Body ( h e r e a f t e r QAM), which is u n d o u b t e d l y b a s e d o n t h e s a m e section of t h e Therapeutics 44 T h i s Galenic tract, as its title indicates, is devoted to a d e f e n c e of t h e thesis that m e n t a l p h e n o m e n a d e p e n d o n bodily states—in a sense left fairly indeterminate. 4 r ' This facilitates G a l e n ' s ploy of s u m m o n i n g a variety of a u t h o r i t i e s — H i p p o c r a t e s , Plato, Aristotle b u t also the Stoics 4 6 — in s u p p o r t of his c o n c e p t i o n of the soul as a m i x t u r e or t e m p e r a m e n t (κρασις) of the body. T h e r e p o r t o n the Stoics r u n s as follows: F o r t h e y h o l d t h a t t h e s o u l , like n a t u r e ( φ ύ σ ι ν ) , is a k i n d of b r e a t h ( π ν ε ύ μ α ) b u t t h a t [seil, pneuma] o f n a t u r e is m o r e h u m i d a n d c o l d e r , w h e r e a s t h a t o f t h e s o u l is d r i e r a n d h o t t e r . T h a t is why t h i s pneuma, t o o , is a k i n d o f m a t t e r ( ΰ λ η ) a p p r o p r i a t e t o t h e s o u l a n d t h e f o r m ( ε ί δ ο ς ) of t h e m a t t e r is s u c h - a n d - s u c h t e m p e r a m e n t ( κ ρ α σ ι ς ) consisti n g in a p r o p o r t i o n of t h e airy a n d t h e fiery s u b s t a n c e ( ο υ σ ί α ς ) . F o r o n e c a n n o t say t h a t t h e soul is j u s t a i r o r j u s t fire. I n d e e d , it w o u l d n o t b e p o s s i b l e f o r t h e b o d y of a n a n i m a l t o b e c o m e excessively h o t , o r e x c e s s i v e l y c o l d , n o r t o b e d o m i n a t e d by e i t h e r of t h e s e by l a r g e e x c e s s , s i n c e , e v e n if it e x c e e d s t h e r i g h t m e a s u r e (του σ υ μ μ έ τ ρ ο υ )

43

Of course he knows full well about the Stoic acceptance of the four elements. Indeed at / W 5 . 3 . 1 8 he commends the doctrine as common to Chrysippus and the rest of the Stoics, Aristode-cum-Theophrastus, Plato and Hippocrates; that is to say, it is included in his vision of a grand tradition of good philosophy and science; cf. supra, p. 39. His posture at 5.3.18 is similar to that in QAM, on which see further in text. But this makes it all the more significant that he does not relate elementary theory to Stoic psychology and confirms the explanation for this silence I put forward in the text. 44 This is not acknowledged by Von Arnim in the SVF, though the text is printed as SVF 2.787. To the best of my knowledge the affinities have not been noted in subsequent scholarship either. The QAM may have been written some fourty years later than PHP I-VI, i.e. some time after 200 CE. In the Galenic corpus, as a glance at the index of the SVF shows, there are hardly any verbatim fragments of Chrysippean treatises other than the On the Soul and the On Affections. Galen, having once digested their contents at the time of wridng PHP I-VI, continued to draw on them until the end of his career. In so doing he did not necessarily return to the original text but may have worked from memory or on the basis of abstracts. The subjectmatter of QAM in particular invited him to reconsider some of the issues raised in PHP. Thus ch. 11, p.77.15 ff. is a reworking of PHP 5.5 and 7.1, with the Stoics again as the principal opponents. Stoic doctrines not covered by PHP I-VI but found in other Galenic tracts are almost invariably based not on direct quotation but what look like scholastic manuals and doxographies or whatever Galen had retained in the form of notes from his philosophical education. As a student of philosophy Galen may indeed have read and excerpted more Chrysippean treatises, especially on logical subjects; cf. Libr. Propr. c. 15. 45 On the nature and purpose of the QAM see Lloyd (1988). 46 On Galen's use of authorities in QAM see Garcia Ballester (1971), Lloyd (1988), both of whom however concentrate on Plato, Aristotle and Hippocrates.

j u s t a little bit, t h e a n i m a l , w i t h its s u r p l u s o f f i r e b e y o n d m e a s u r e , b e c o m e s f e v e r i s h . By c o n t r a s t , it b e c o m e s c o l d a n d livid a n d n e a r l y o r i n d e e d c o m p l e t e l y s e n s e l e s s w h e n e v e r a i r p r e v a i l s b e c a u s e this, i n s o f a r as t h i s d e p e n d s o n it a l o n e , is c o l d in itself, a n d by b e i n g m i x e d w i t h t h e f i e r y e l e m e n t it b e c o m e s w e l l - t e m p e r e d . It h a s , t h e n , b e c o m e c l e a r t o y o u n o w t h a t in t h e view o f t h e S t o i c s t h e s u b s t a n c e of t h e soul c o m e s to be a c c o r d i n g to a p a r t i c u l a r m i x t u r e ( κ ρ ά σ ι ς ) of air a n d fire. A n d Chrysippus has b e e n m a d e intelligent b e c a u s e of the w e l l - t e m p e r e d b l e n d o f t h e s e two [ e l e m e n t s ] , w h i l e t h e s o n s o f Hippocrates w h o m the comic poets47 mock for their foolishness, [ h a v e b e e n m a d e ] swinish b e c a u s e of t h e b o u n d l e s s h e a t ( Q A M c h . 4, p p . 4 5 . 5 - 4 6 . 1 M ü l l e r ~ SV? 1 2.787) 4 8

Galen wants to show that these past masters f i n d themselves in b r o a d a g r e e m e n t over m i x t u r e . His a c c o u n t s e e m s a c c u r a t e e n o u g h . Yet n o t h i n g p r e p a r e s us f o r t h e h o n o r i f i c m e n t i o n of t h e bête noire of the PHP—Chrysippus. T h i s startling d i f f e r e n c e of a t t i t u d e reveals t h e workings of Galenic dialectic in d e a l i n g with a u t h o r i t i e s in d i f f e r e n t contexts. In c o n s e q u e n c e , t h e QAM a f f o r d s a less biased glimpse of t h e relevant section of t h e Therapeutics. It c o n f i r m s o u r a s s u m p t i o n that Chrysippus e x p l a i n e d t h e analogy of body a n d soul in t e r m s of t h e e l e m e n t a l qualities. T h e r e is a n o t h e r p o i n t to b e m a d e . G a l e n ' s criticism that Chrysipp u s o m i t t e d to specify t h e 'parts' of the soul involved in the analogy is n o t merely beside t h e p o i n t . It is simply i n c o r r e c t . H e e x p l a i n e d t h e soul's beauty a n d ugliness in terms of its parts: T h e r e f o r e by a n a l o g y t h e s o u l will a l s o b e c a l l e d b e a u t i f u l o r ugly in t e r m s of t h e p r o p o r t i o n o r d i s p r o p o r t i o n of c e r t a i n p a r t s of s u c h a n d 47

Cf. Aristophanes fr. 116 Kassel - Austin (= fr. 112 Kock). For other references to comedy by Chrysippus, see infra, p. 177, 180, 258. But it is not certain that this reference comes from Chrysippus since Galen intimately knew the poets of the Old Attic comedy, including Aristophanes, in whose Greek he was keenly interested: see Lib. Prop. ch. 17, p.124.7ff. 48 πνεύμα μέν γαρ τι τήν ψυχήν είναι βούλονται καθάπερ καί τήν φύσιν, ά λ λ ά ύγρότερον μέν καί ψυχρότερον τό τής φύσεως, ξηρότερον δέ καί θερμότερον τό τής ψυχής, ώστε καί τοΰθ' ύλη μέν τις οικεία τής ψυχής έστι τό πνεύμα, τό δέ τής ϋλης είδος ή ποιά κράσις έν συμμετρία γιγνομένη τής άερώδους τε και πυρώδους ουσίας· ούτε γάρ άέρα μόνον οίόν τε φάναι τήν ψυχήν ούτε πύρ, ότι μήτε ψυχρόν άκρως έγχωρεί γίγνεσθαι ζώου σώμα μήτ' άκρως θερμόν ά λ λ ά μηδ' έπικρατούμενον ύπό θατέρου κατά μεγάλην ύπεροχήν, οπου γε, κάν βραχεί πλεΐον γένηται τού συμμέτρου, πυρέττει μέν τό ζώον έν ταΐς τού πυρός άμέτροις ύπεροχαις, καταψύχεται δέ καί πελιδνούται καί δυσαίσθητον ή παντελώς άναίσθητον γίγνεται κατά τάς τού άέρος επικρατήσεις· ούτος γάρ αύτός, όσον μέν έφ' έαυτώ, ψυχρός έστιν, έκ δέ τής πρός τό πυρώδες στοιχείον έπιμιξίας εύκρατος γίγνεται. δήλον ούν ήδη σοι γέγονεν, ώς ή τής ψυχής ούσία κατά ποιάν κράσιν άέρος τε καί πυρός γίγνεται κατά τους Στωικούς· καί συνετός μέν ό Χρύσιππος άπείργασται δια τήν τούτων εΰκρατον μίξιν, οί δ' 'Ιπποκράτους υίεις (ύώδεις), οΰς έπί μωρία σκωπτουσιν οί κωμικοί, διά τήν άμετρον θέρμην.

such a kind [...] They are the parts of the soul of which its reason and its condition consist. And a soid is beautiful or ugly in virtue of its regent part being in this or that state with respect to its own proper divisions (5.2.47, 49 ~ SVF3.471a). 49 Does 'parts' (μέρη) refer to the physical e l e m e n t s in which the soul's h e a l t h has b e e n said to reside? T h e way t h e s e c o n d s n i p p e t (49: 'They are the parts ...') o p e n s indicates that the subject of its first sent e n c e h a d b e e n m e n t i o n e d by Chrysippus in the immediately p r e c e d ing context. In o t h e r words, Galen has suppressed its identity o n purpose. H e himself suggests an answer by p r o d u c i n g a s t a t e m e n t f r o m another treatise by Chrysippus, viz. his On Reason (5.3.1 ~ SVF2.841): Reason is a collection of certain notions and conceptions. Galen rejects this, a r g u i n g that n o t i o n s a n d c o n c e p t i o n s are activities, n o t parts, a n d that n o t h i n g can b e c o m p o s e d of its activities. F r o m the Stoic p o i n t of view, however, n o t i o n s a n d c o n c e p t i o n s a r e those a p p e a r a n c e s that have b e e n stored in t h e soul a n d h e n c e c o n f i g u r a tions ( ' i m p r i n t s ' ) in its p n e u m a t i c s u b s t a n c e r a t h e r t h a n its activities. 50 In this light, o n e could say that n o t i o n s or c o n c e p t i o n s are t h e stuff of reason, or that they constitute reason. T h e Stoics (including Chrysippus) r e f e r r e d to the e l e m e n t s as that of which things are c o m p o s e d (συνέστηκε), i.e. the t e r m used h e r e . T h e y are called the smallest ' p a r t ' (μόριον) of a whole. 5 1 Conversely, in the c o n t e x t of logic, Chrysippus spoke o f ' e l e m e n t s of s p e e c h ' (του λόγου στοιχεία) with r e f e r e n c e to what were m o r e usually called ' t h e parts of s p e e c h ' (μέρη του λόγου, PHP 8.3.12 ~ SVF2.148). 5 2 W h a t is m o r e , Stoic e l e m e n t s are constitutive of quality—as is indicated h e r e by t h e r e g e n t p a r t b e i n g in a p a r t i c u l a r c o n d i t i o n (τό ήγεμονικόν μόριον εχον (οϋτως) ή οϋτως, 48), or its parts b e i n g of such-or-such a kind (τοιώνδέ, 49). 5 3 49

διό καί καλή ή αισχρά ψυχή άνάλογον ρηθήσεται κατά συμμετρίαν ή άμετρίαν τοιώνδέ τίνων μερών [...] έστι δέ τής ψυχής μέρη δι' ών ό έν αύτη λόγος συνέστηκε καί ή έν αύτώ διάθεσις. καί έστι καλή ή αισχρά ψυχή κατά τό ήγεμονικόν μόριον έχον (οϋτως) ή οϋτως κατά τούς οικείους μερισμούς. 50 Cf. Plut. De Comm. Not. 1084F (SVF 2.847), Aet. IV, 11 (~SVF 2.83). 51 Gal. HNH I, XV p. 30 K. (~ SVF2.409). 52 Thus diverging from the general use of στοιχεία to refer to the more basic level of the letters. For this Chrysippean usage see also D.L. 7.192 (~ SVF2,13, p.6, 11.17,19, 20). 53 See Plot. Enn 2.4.1 (~ SVF2.319), D.L. 7.137 (SVF2.580), Sext. M 10.312 (~ SVF2.309), ps. Gal. Qual. incorp. 5, XIX p. 477 K. (~ SVF2.327); cf. Gal. CAM 8, I pp. 251 ff. (~ SVF 2.405) and the Galenic text printed as SVF 2.408, 409, 410, presenting qualitative change in terms of the varying blend of elements.

Startlingly, Galen gives away t h e c o r r e c t r e a d i n g . A b a n d o n i n g his e a r l i e r suggestion t h a t C h r y s i p p u s m u s t m e a n c o n c e p t i o n s o r n o tions, h e m e n t i o n s t h e parts of t h e psychic pneuma distinguished by Chrysippus, i.e. t h e r e g e n t p a r t and t h e rays of pneuma e x t e n d i n g f r o m it. 54 F r o m G a l e n ' s p o i n t of view this is a correct use of t h e t e r m ' p a r t ' , a l t h o u g h of c o u r s e t h e Stoic c o n c e p t i o n entails a d i f f e r e n c e f r o m his own Platonic a n d Aristotelian use of t h e same t e r m . Yet this s e n s e t o o c a n n o t have b e e n w h a t C h r y s i p p u s m e a n t , since h e is c o n c e r n e d with t h e h e a l t h a n d b e a u t y a n d t h e i r o p p o s i t e s of t h e r e g e n t part, o r intellect, only: ... a n d y o u 5 5 say t h a t it is a b o v e all w i t h r e f e r e n c e t o t h i s [seil, r e g e n t ] p a r t o f t h e s o u l t h a t b e a u t y a n d u g l i n e s s a r e f o u n d in it. N o w t h i s pneuma h a s two p a r t s ( μ ό ρ ι α ) , e l e m e n t s ( σ τ ο ι χ ε ί α ) , o r states, t h a t a r e b l e n d e d with o n e a n o t h e r t h r o u g h a n d t h r o u g h , t h e h o t a n d t h e c o l d , o r , if y o u wish t o call t h e m by d i f f e r e n t t e r m s d e r i v e d f r o m t h e i r s u b s t a n c e s , a i r a n d fire; a n d it a l s o t a k e s s o m e m o i s t u r e f r o m t h e b o d i e s in w h i c h it d w e l l s (5.3.7-8).

W h a t Galen says a b o u t t h e physical constitution of t h e r e g e n t part is a c o r r e c t r e n d e r i n g of t h e Stoic d o c t r i n e . H e a r g u e s that Chrysippus c a n n o t seriously have m e a n t that t h e right p r o p o r t i o n of such parts o r e l e m e n t s c o n s t i t u t e s t h e h e a l t h o r b e a u t y of t h e g o v e r n i n g part: B u t I w o u l d b e s u r p r i s e d if y o u s h o u l d wish t o call t h e p r o p o r t i o n o f t h e s e t h e h e a l t h o r b e a u t y o f t h e g o v e r n i n g p a r t . F o r t h e h e a l t h of its b o d y is p r o p e r l y a s s i g n e d t o t h e m , b u t as t o t h e g o v e r n i n g p a r t of t h e s o u l , its h e a l t h d o e s n o t r e s i d e in t h e m , e v e n o n y o u r view. T h u s t h e w h o l e p a t t e r n is d e s t r o y e d a n d t h e c l a i m t o t h e s a m e n a m e is c o m p l e t e l y g o n e if w e c a n n o t s h o w t h a t d i s e a s e a n d h e a l t h , b e a u t y a n d u g l i n e s s , a r e c o n s t i t u t e d in t h e s o u l ' s r e g e n t p a r t in t h e s a m e way as in t h e w h o l e b o d y {ibid. 9 - 1 0 ) . 5 6

But this was exactly what Chrysippus wishes to d o . A n d in d o i n g so, h e t o o k a c c o u n t of t h e Stoic a s s u m p t i o n t h a t b o d y a n d soul a r e

54

Galen seems to think of the opening section of Chrysippus' demonstration concerning the location of the regent part in the On the Soul, a passage he quoted at PHP3.1.10-15 (SVF2.886). In total Chrysippus distinguished eight such parts of which Galen mentions five only: the regent part, the vocal and generative parts and parts corresponding to the five senses. Cf. also D.L. 7.110 (SVF2.828), Aët. IV 4,4 (SVF2.827). 55 Seil. Chrysippus. 56 I.e. not the soul's corporeal substance but the body with which the soul is connected.

i n t e r r e l a t e d bodies, b o t h of which a r e c o n s t i t u t e d o u t of t h e s a m e e l e m e n t s ( t h o u g h of c o u r s e in a d i f f e r e n t b l e n d ) . T h e weakness of G a l e n ' s a r g u m e n t reveals itself now h e has given away t h e c o r r e c t r e a d i n g , having first i n t i m a t e d that Chrysippus was reticent a b o u t the identity of the parts. G a l e n ' s m a n o e u v r i n g h i d e s an awkward t r u t h : h e was n o t only familiar with the part played by t h e e l e m e n t s in Stoic physiology, b u t d e e p l y i n f l u e n c e d by it. H e o p e n l y a c k n o w l e d g e s this d e b t in his treatise Against Julian ch.4, pp.42.9-44.5 W e n k e b a c h (SVF 1.132, 2 . 7 7 1 ) . 5 7 H e r e t h e f o u r qualities a r e specified in t e r m s of t h e f o u r h u m o u r s , which a r e a f f e c t e d — a n d h e n c e c a p a b l e of b e i n g c o n d i t i o n e d — b y r e g i m e n ( δ ί α ι τ α ) . Galen tells us h e r e that he cotdd, b u t lacks t h e space to, illustrate this d o c t r i n e with c o p i o u s excerpts f r o m t h e work of Chrysippus ' a n d all t h e o t h e r Stoics' (ibid. p. 43.3ff.). 5 8 Given his usual practice, this m u s t m e a n that h e h a d read Chrysippus a n d trusted that the same d o c t r i n e could be f o u n d when he took the t r o u b l e to go t h r o u g h works by o t h e r Stoics such as Z e n o as well. 5 9 Accordingly, h e m e n t i o n s Z e n o a n d Chrysippus t o g e t h e r when referr i n g to t h e Stoic d o c t r i n e b u t n e x t speaks of Chrysippus only w h e n t u r n i n g to t h e q u e s t i o n of d o c u m e n t e d evidence in what follows. 6 0 This d o c t r i n e c o h e r e s with what we have l e a r n e d f r o m the verbatim f r a g m e n t s f r o m the Therapeutics a n d the testimony f r o m QAM we have b e e n discussing. It is a fair a s s u m p t i o n that t h e passage f r o m t h e Against Julian e c h o e s G a l e n ' s r e a d i n g of Therapeutics as well. It is i m p o r t a n t to n o t e t h a t this passage a d d s a r e f e r e n c e to r e g i m e n which is lacking f r o m the o t h e r q u o t a t i o n s a n d testimonies reviewed sofar. T h e r e f e r e n c e to Z e n o s e e m s to reflect a n a u t h e n t i c f e a t u r e of Chrysippus' p r o c e d u r e of starting f r o m views a n d statements of Zeno,

57

Cf. ibid. 8, p.70.6 ff. (SVF2.355, second text). The motive for presenting these citations lies in his wish to refute Julian who invoked the Stoics as well as Plato and Aristotle, but whose Methodist views in fact were contrary to the view of those authorities. Note that at p. 43.9 f. Galen says it would have been wiser to content oneself to quote from Plato only, thus hinting at PHP (viz. book 8, which is concerned with the elements, in particular; see esp. eh. 4). 59 At PHP 5.6.40-41, for example, in a context concerned with the structure of the soul, Galen adopts the precisely same stance when he declines to look into Zeno's position 'in order to avoid excessive length' and contents himself with referring to what he had read in Chrysippus' On Affections. See further supra, p. 85 f. 60 See ibid. pp. 42.18-19, 43.4, 43.12 W. 58

which was precisely what we saw him d o i n g at PHP 5.2.31. In QAM, by t h e way, Z e n o m a k e s his a p p e a r a n c e too, viz. in an a n e c d o t e a b o u t his use of wine as a m e a n s of i n f l u e n c i n g his own m e n t a l disposition (ch. 3, p. 39.22 ff.). It may n o t b e t o o f a n c i f u l to s u p p o s e t h a t this derives f r o m t h e Therapeutics as well. 61 At any rate, it also p e r t a i n s to r e g i m e n (i.e. diet a n d exercise). Elsewhere G a l e n p u t s t h e Stoics o n a p a r with H i p p o c r a t e s in c o n n e c t i o n with t h e t h e o r y that pneuma p e r v a d e s t h e body, causing sympathy between its parts. Again the p n e u m a d o c t r i n e is c o n n e c t e d with t h e f o u r f o l d division of e l e m e n t a r y qualities. T h e s e passages have every a p p e a r a n c e of b e i n g based o n a Stoic source, including the r e f e r e n c e to H i p p o c r a t e s . 6 2 At any r a t e , they attest to G a l e n ' s p r o f o u n d i n d e b t e d n e s s to Stoic physiology.

61

Cf. the anecdotal reference to a bon mot of Zeno made by Chrysippus in his On the Soul, PHP3AA (SVF 1.282/2.891) with Tieleman (1996a) 215. 62 See esp. (1) MM I 2, X p. 15 K. (SVF2.411): the Stoics are closer than Aristotle to Hippocrates, because they, i.e. the Stoics, posited the complete intermingling of corporeal substances (the doctrine of κράσις δι' δλων, SVF 2.463 ff.) whereas Aristotle held that only qualities intermingle. Further, pneumatic doctrine is ascribed to Hippocrates, who said that the whole body is σύμπνουν καί σύρρουν, which may be translated as 'held together by one pneuma and one flow'. Similarly Nat. Fac. II, p. 29.17 K.. On the idea of continuity of the pneumatic soul, see PHP 3.1.10 (SV7^ 2.885), quoted supra, p. 147. In the Hellenistic period pneumatology was seen as distinctive of Hippocratic medecine see infra, p. 195. The noun cognate with σύμπνουν was used by Chrysippus to characterize the (coherence of the) macrocosm, i.e. in a way that corresponds to its usage on the microcosmic level in Galen, see D.L. 7.140 (SVF2.543). The second qualification, σύρρουν, recalls the Heraclitean flux-doctrine, which lends further weight to the assumption that Galen is drawing on a Stoic source. (2) At Trem. palp. VII, pp. 616-618 K. (printed, with some minor omissions, as SVF 2.446) Galen presents on his own behalf a Stoic account of human physiology, which may be based on the same source as the passage from MM. Here, too, the body is described as σύμπνουν και σύρρουν, these two qualifications being explained by reference to Heracl. DK Β 60 and 30 (~ frr. 51d and 33 Marcovich) respectively (p.616.10). The soul is described as a blend of the hot and the cold, which explains its cohesive nature. Digestion is explained by reference to the absorbing capacity of the innate heat or psychic pneuma (on the identity of which see SVF 1.127); that is to say we are dealing here with the Stoic doctrine of exhalation (άναθυμίασις), although the term is not used; cf. SVF1.141 ff. For the relation construed by the Stoics between their doctrine of exhalation and Heraclitus' flux see esp. Euseb. PE 15.20.2 (Ar. Did. fr. phys. 39 Diels, SVF 1.141, from Cleanthes, though printed by Von Arnim among the fragments of Zeno): see Long ( 1 9 7 5 / 6 ) 150ff. Gal. Trem. palp. VII, pp. 616-618 K. is strongly reminiscent of Cleanthes' Wärmelehre expounded at Cic. ND 2.23-4. The expression σύμπνουν καί σύρρουν can also be paralleled from the Stoic cosmology offered by Synesius, Aegyptii sive de Providentia 2,7, 1. 21; cf. ps.Plut. Fat. 574E. On the physiological scheme involved see further Tieleman (1991), esp. 114 f., 120 ff. Id. (1996a) 87 ff.

At this p o i n t we may answer t h e q u e s t i o n why Galen a d o p t s such curiously d i f f e r e n t a t t i t u d e s to Stoic e l e m e n t a r y t h e o r y . In t h e psychological a n d m o r a l c o n t e x t of PHP a h a r m o n y between H i p p o crates a n d the Stoics is the last t h i n g Galen could use. In PHP books 4 a n d 5 h e is c o n c e r n e d with t h e cause of affection a n d his overriding c o n c e r n is to d e m o n s t r a t e t h e i n a d e q u a c y of t h e Stoic ' m o n i s t i c ' e x p l a n a t i o n . Only partition along Platonic lines will d o . Moreover, h e claims that Plato a n d H i p p o c r a t e s were in a g r e e m e n t o n t h e struct u r e of t h e soul as well. So Galen intimates that Chrysippus has no answers to t h e questions p u t to him. Developing his analogy b e t w e e n m e d i c i n e a n d philosophy, Chrysippus, like Z e n o b e f o r e h i m , saw t h e soul's health as a m a t t e r of the right b l e n d of the f o u r physical e l e m e n t s . An affection, πάθος, of t h e soul results f r o m a d i s t u r b a n c e of t h e e q u i l i b r i u m b e t w e e n these e l e m e n t s . Of special i m p o r t a n c e is t h e p r o p o r t i o n between t h e h o t a n d t h e cold. Consider the following f r a g m e n t : It must be supposed that the disease of the soul is most similar to a feverish state of the body in which fevers and chills do not occur at regular intervals but irregularly and at random from the condition [seil, of the patient] and at the incidence of small causes (PHP5.2.14 ~ S VF 3.465). 63 Galen (ibid. 13-19) c o m p l a i n s t h a t Chrysippus ' d o e s n o t even g r a n t that the disease of t h e soul is c o m p a r a b l e to the state of a person w h o is s u f f e r i n g f r o m certain periodical diseases (περιοδικούς νόσοις), like tertian or q u a r t a n fevers ( τ ρ ι τ α ί ο ι ς ή τεταρταίοις πυρετοίς) (Und. 14).' But his use of t h e t e r m 'diseases' (νόσοις) h e r e blurs the distinction i n t e n d e d by Chrysippus, w h o calls t h e e n d u r i n g diseased condition of t h e soul 'disease' (νόσος) a n d correlates its affections (παθή) to fits of fever a n d shivering. 6 4 T h e latter, as is clear f r o m the text q u o t e d by Galen, occur at irregular intervals. Clearly Chrysippus wishes to b r i n g o u t t h e u n p r e d i c t a b l e a n d a p p a r e n t l y r a n d o m quality of e m o t i o n a l

63 ύπονοητέον τοίνυν τήν μέν νόσον τής ψυχής όμοιοτάτην είναι τή του σώματος πυρετώδει καταστάσει καθ' ήν ού περιοδικώς άλλ' ατάκτως πυρετοί καί φρίκαι γίνονται καί άλλως άπό τής διαθέσεως καί μικρών έπιγινομένων αιτίων. 64 At Loc. a f f . I 3, VIII p.32 (SVF 3.429), in a non-polemical context, Galen follows Chrysippus' distinction, opposing νόσημα/διάθεσις and πάθος/φορά. On the difference between the disease (νόσος, νόσημα) of the soul as an enduring state and affection (πάθος) as its 'motion' or 'action' see further SVF 3.421, 422, 423, 424, 425, all of which are no doubt reflect On Affections. Diseased souls are marked by their proneness (εύεμπτωσία) to particular affections, see SVF 3.421 with Kidd (1983).

c o n d u c t . M o r e or less t h e s a m e p o i n t is m a d e in t e r m s of t h e soul's fluttering (πτοία): 'Fluttering' too has been appropriately used to characterize the affections as a class in view of this instability and moving at random (PHP4.5.7 ~ SVF3.476). 65 A n o t h e r f e a t u r e s u p p r e s s e d by G a l e n is t h e physical basis of t h e d o c t r i n e . At PHP 5.2.13-14 t h e a l t e r n a t i o n of fever a n d shivering involves t h e o p p o s i t i o n b e t w e e n the h o t a n d t h e cold. This irregular a l t e r n a t i o n m a r k s a soul in w h i c h t h e p r o p o r t i o n b e t w e e n t h e e l e m e n t a l qualities is u n e v e n . Several passages tell us t h a t t h e soul expands in lust a n d desire, a n d contracts in f e a r a n d grief {PHP 4.3.2, Tusc. 4.15). We n e e d n o t d o u b t that these two physical reactions coincide with t h e p r e v a l e n c e of t h e h o t a n d t h e cold respectively. T h e p r o m i n e n c e given to t h e o p p o s i t i o n b e t w e e n t h e h o t a n d t h e cold a n d t h e i r a l t e r n a t i o n r e f l e c t t r a d i t i o n a l m e d i c a l lore. 6 6 T h e t e r m s used to describe t h e physical reactions of t h e soul in a state of affection are derived f r o m descriptions of diseases in medical literature. 6 7 T h e weak a n d d i s e a s e d soul typically switches b a c k a n d f o r t h between two o p p o s i t e poles. 6 8 A c c o r d i n g to Chrysippus, Schadenfreude (a species of lust) naturally t u r n s i n t o pity (a species of g r i e f ) — a n a l t e r n a t i o n b e t w e e n h o t a n d cold e m o t i o n s . 6 9 Likewise P l u t a r c h in 65 οίκείως δέ τφ τών παθών γένει άποδίδοται καί ή πτοία κατά τό ένσεσοβημένον τούτο καί φερόμενον εική. See also Stob. Eel. II p.39.7-9 {SVF 1.206): ώρίσατο δέ κάκείνως· πάθος έστί πτοία ψυχής, άπό τής τών πτηνών φοράς τό εύκίνητον του παθητικού παρεικάσας. Cf. ibid. ρ.88.6 ff. (SVF 3.378). Plut. Virt. mor. 446F (SVF 3.459, second text) uses a different metaphor, viz. the random and impulsive way in which little children move about. 66 See infra, p. 192. 67 For 'expansion' or 'relaxation' (διαχύσις, see also PHP 4.2.5-6, 5.1.4, D.L. 7.114) during pleasure compare Hp. Morb. Sacr. 6, p. 378.6, Vict. II 6, 574.14; for contraction (συστολή) as characteristic of grief and fear see further PHP 4.7.13-17, 5.1.4, 3.5.43 and compare Morb. Ill 7.132, VM 1.626.20, Epid. VII 5.376.3. Grief is typically accompanied by a 'bite' (δήξις): see PHP 2.8.5-6, 4.3.2; cf. Hp. VM 1.618.13, A f f . 6.238.7, 248.13, 254.21, 266.1, 268.19. Related to the contraction is the 'shrinking' (ταπεινώσις, μείωσις) see PHP 4.3.2, 5.1.4, cf. 4.2.5-6 and compare Hp. Epid. //5.92.10; cf. ibid 5.114.10, Morb. 1.6.114.10. Related to expansion is the reaction called 'rising' (or perhaps:'elation': έπαρσις) associated with pleasure in particular, PHP 4.3.2, 4.2.5-6, 5.1.4; cf. Hp. Epid. / / 5 . 1 0 8 . 1 0 , 110.5.7, Epid. TV 5.188.2 ,Prorh. 119.205. 68 Likewise Plut. Virt. mor. 446F (SVF 3.459): τό πάθος ... ένός λόγου τροπήν έπ' άμφότερα (ρ. 111.28-9). 69 Plut. Stoic. Rep. ch. 25, 1046B (SVF3.418), describing this as a natural process: καθ' έτέρας φυσικάς φοράς έκτρεπομένων [seil, the persons concerned] . The reference to nature in connection with affection here is quite remarkable; but cf. Plot. Enn. Ill 2.16. Chrysippus discussed contradictory attitudes typical of affectionate

his On Moral Virtue p r e s e n t s a n u m b e r of t h e psychic r e a c t i o n s in t e r m s of t h e following polarities: 'desiring a n d r e p e n t i n g , b e c o m i n g angry a n d fearing, b e i n g driven to evil by lust a n d , b e i n g driven back again, r e g a i n i n g c o n t r o l of itself (446F ~ SVF 3.459). Plutarch, like Chrysippus, also brings out t h e pettiness of the external factors which may t h r o w t h e soul off b a l a n c e . T h e u n s t a b l e soul is s u s p e n d e d b e t w e e n two o p p o s i n g states, viz. the excesses of h o t a n d cold. Seen in this light, t h e ideal of a ' g o o d m i x t u r e ' ( ε υ κ ρ α σ ί α ) seems h a r d to attain, or to preserve. T o c o n c l u d e this section: t h e evidence we have discussed so far reveals t h e i m p o r t a n c e of physical factors in t h e aetiology a n d p h e n o m o n o l o g y of affection. Of cardinal i m p o r t a n c e is the assumption that h e a l t h resides in a g o o d p r o p o r t i o n b e t w e e n t h e f o u r e l e m e n t a l qualities in body a n d soul alike. T h e so-called medical analogy is n o formalistic, let a l o n e d e c o r a t i v e m e t a p h o r . It is based o n physical realities to which the c o r p o r e a l soul is n o less subject than t h e body. In c o n s e q u e n c e , we may e x p e c t that s o m e a t t e n t i o n is paid to ways of c o n d i t i o n i n g a n d c u r i n g t h e soul t h r o u g h c o r p o r e a l m e a n s . We have a l r e a d y c o m e across a few i n d i c a t i o n s a b o u t Z e n o ' s i n t e r e s t in r e g i m e n . As we shall see, t h e r e is f u r t h e r evidence to this effect. But b e f o r e t u r n i n g to this material, I shall c o n s i d e r a few texts f r o m the Therapeutics a n d elsewhere which c o m p l e m e n t t h e p i c t u r e of Stoic physical psychology.

3. The Roots of Affection In his On the Soul Chrysippus a r g u e d that p e o p l e are dimly aware of the fact that psychic affections arise in their hearts: T h e c o m m o n r u n s e e m t o m e t o b e i n c l i n e d t o t h i s view s i n c e t h e y h a v e , as it w e r e , a n i n n e r a w a r e n e s s of t h e a f f e c t i o n s of t h e i n t e l l e c t o c c u r r i n g in t h e r e g i o n of t h e c h e s t , m o s t n o t a b l y t h e p l a c e t o w h i c h t h e h e a r t is a s s i g n e d , e s p e c i a l l y in t h e c a s e o f s o r r o w s a n d f e a r s a n d a n g e r a n d i n f l a m e d a n g e r m o s t of all; f o r a n i m p r e s s i o n arises in u s as if it [seil, i n f l a m e d a n g e r ] w e r e e v a p o r i z e d f r o m t h e h e a r t a n d w e r e p u s h i n g o u t against some parts a n d were blowing into the face a n d h a n d s ( PHP 3 . 1 . 2 5 ~ SVF 2 . 8 8 6 ) , 7 0

conduct in the second book of the On Affections, see PHP 4.7.12-17, 25-7 (SVF3.466, 467) and further supra, p. 123 f. 70 Κοινή δέ μοι δοκοΰσιν οί πολλοί φέρεσθαι έπί τοΰθ' ώσανεί αίσθανόμενοι περί

It is especially t h e p o i n t m a d e in the last s e n t e n c e a b o u t the physical i m p a c t of i m p r e s s i o n s which c o n c e r n s us h e r e . E v a p o r a t i o n occurs u n d e r t h e i n f l u e n c e of t h e h e a t of t h e soul. Elsewhere it figures as t h e physical m e c h a n i s m ( a l o n g s i d e i n h a l a t i o n ) w h e r e b y soul n o u r ishes itself; that is to say, its p n e u m a t i c s u b s t a n c e is r e p l e n i s h e d by the vapours rising f r o m the p u r e b l o o d in the heart. 7 1 I n f l a m e d a n g e r is r e p r e s e n t e d as a p e r v e r s i o n of this physiological process. T h e u n d e r l y i n g a s s u m p t i o n a p p e a r s to be that an excess of psychic h e a t causes a s u r p l u s of v a p o u r to arise f r o m t h e h e a r t ' s b l o o d . This gets c o m p r e s s e d a n d seeks a way o u t , p u s h i n g 7 2 a n d blowing i n t o t h e h e a r t (which s u f f e r s f r o m p a l p i t a t i o n ) as well as t h e f a c e a n d t h e h a n d s , which t u r n r e d u n d e r its impact. This is quite in k e e p i n g with the expansive physical reaction (i.e. of the psychic pneuma) typical of a p p e t i t e ( έ π ι θ υ μ ί α ) , a h o t a f f e c t i o n , of which i n f l a m e d a n g e r is a species. 7 3 Likewise Nemesius, On the Nature of Man ch. 21, p.81 M o r a n i (SVF 3.416) describes a n g e r (θυμός) as t h e boiling of the b l o o d a r o u n d the h e a r t , which o c c u r s t h r o u g h a process of evaporization ( ά ν α θ υ μ ί α σις) o r b u b b l i n g u p ( ά ν α θ ό λ ω σ ι ς ) 7 4 of t h e bile (χολή). This process, N e m e s i u s tells us, also e x p l a i n s why a n g e r ( θ υ μ ό ς ) is s o m e t i m e s called 'bile' o r 'gall' (χολή, χ ό λ ο ς ) . T h i s etymological p o i n t shows how l a n g u a g e may c o n t a i n physiological truths which, t h o u g h h i d d e n f r o m view, a r e n o n e t h e l e s s d i m l y r e f l e c t e d in p e o p l e ' s awareness. S u c h a n awareness, as we have s e e n , is also at issue in t h e

τόν θώρακα αϋτοίς τών κατά τήν διάνοιαν παθών γιγνομένων καί μάλιστα καθ' δν ή καρδία τέτακται τόπον, οίον μάλιστα έπί τών λυπών καί τών φόβων καί έπί τής οργής καί μάλιστα του θυμοΰ. (ώσανεί γάρ) έκ τής καρδίας άναθυμιωμένου καί ώθουμένου εκτός έπί τινα καί έμφυσώντος τό πρόσωπον καί τάς χείρας γίγνεται ήμίν έμφασις 71 Cf. e.g. PHP 2.8.44 (SVF 3 Diog. Bab. 30) and supra, p. 147. The theory probably derives from Praxagoras, see Fr. 32 Steckerl. 72 A typical medical term in this connection, see infra, p. 193. 73 Nemesius, De nat. horn. c. 21, p. 21,1.4 (SVF3.416). The same defmidon of the closely related term όργή ('wrath') features in scholastic collections of Stoic definitions with θυμός being defined as 'incipient wrath (όργή)' and bile (χόλος) as 'swelling wrath (όργή)', see Stob. Eel. II p.91.10 ff., D.L. 7.113, ps. Andren. De aff 4 (SVF 3.395, 396, 397). But it was of course quite widespread, see e.g. Arist. De an. A 1.403a29-32, who, much like Nemesius, gives the same definition as 'dialectical' alongside a 'physical' one in terms of the boiling of the 'blood and the hot' in the heart; ps. PI. Def. 415e. Cf. also the influential account of anger at PI. Ti. 70a7-d7. ' 4 A medical and in particular Praxagorean concept. When in certain diseases bubbles arise from the humours, this is only a special morbid case of what happens as a rule in digestion (viz. air developing from the humours): see fragment 13 of Praxagoras' pupil Phylotimus with Steckerl (1958) 19 f.

C h r y s i p p e a n f r a g m e n t . W h a t N e m e s i u s a d d s to this f r a g m e n t is an explicit r e f e r e n c e to bile as involved in psychic disease. We n e e d n o t d o u b t t h a t t h e c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n bile a n d a n g e r g o e s back to Chrysippus as well. Galen 7 5 r e p o r t s that Chrysippus illustrated a n g e r (θυμός) by citing H o m e r , Iliad XVIII, 108-110: A n d gall w h i c h d r i v e s e v e n t h e very s e n s i b l e t o h a r s h n e s s Far sweeter than d r i p p i n g h o n e y It rises in m e n ' s b r e a s t s like smoke. 7 * 1

T h e p a r t of t h e On the Soul in which these lines f i g u r e d was devoted to a d e f e n c e of t h e Stoic c a r d i o c e n t r i c p o s i t i o n . Iliad win, 110 unequivocally locates m e n t a l life, or at least a n g e r , in t h e chest. But the first two lines neatly illustrate a few o t h e r f e a t u r e s of Chrysippean m o n i s m as well. H e r e we also have t h e p o w e r of bodily factors to i n f l u e n c e even t h e intellect of sensible p e o p l e (108) 7 7 as well as its gratifying aspect (109). 7 8 T h e p i c t u r e of a n g e r as waxing in the chest like s m o k e a n t i c i p a t e s t h e a c c o u n t s of t h e c o m m o n awareness by Chrysippus a n d Nemesius. As G a l e n himself is q u i c k to p o i n t o u t , C h r y s i p p u s ' a c c o u n t r e s e m b l e s t h e p i c t u r e of b o i l i n g a n d u p s u r g i n g a n g e r at Timaeus 70c 1-5 (cf. PHP 3.1.30-33). But what n e i t h e r Galen n o r later r e a d e r s have seen is that o t h e r e l e m e n t s can b e paralleled f r o m 86e-87a. In the p r e c e d i n g c o n t e x t Plato designates a b a d i n h e r i t e d c o n d i t i o n of t h e b o d y a n d ill-informed u p b r i n g i n g (άπαίδευτον τροφήν) 7 9 as t h e two m a i n s o u r c e s of m o r a l c o r r u p t i o n . T h i s is taken to prove t h e Socratic adage that ' n o b o d y is willingly bad.' Plato illustrates his p o i n t by t h e e x a m p l e of m e n t a l a g o n i e s ( λ ύ π α ς ) , which h e has p r e s e n t e d (86b5-6) as o n e of t h e two m a i n diseases of t h e soul a l o n g s i d e excessive pleasures (ήδοναί):

75 PHP 3.2.12, 7.52; cf. 2.2. Chrysippus consistently took χόλος in the sense of anger as distinguished from Homeric θυμός which he took, mostly correcdy, in the wider sense of 'spirit' or drive of the soul; see further Tieleman (1996a) 236 ff. 76 και χόλος ος τ' έφέηκε πολύφρονά περ χαλεπήναι II δς τε πολυ γλυκίων μέλιτος καταλειβομένοιο II ανδρών έν στήθεσσιν άέξεται ήύτε καπνός. 77 Compare the representation of Zeno as a melancholic counteracting some innate traits of character, infra, pp. 165 f. 78 This paradoxical feature of affection was much stressed by Chrysippus, see supra, pp. 130 ff. In these lines this very feature is encapsulated by the opposition between the bitterness of gall and the sweetness of honey. 79 This is somewhat expanded at 87a-b, where Plato refers to the bad influence of evil forms of government on citizens in addition to bad education on the part of the parents.

Again where mental agonies are concerned, the soul likewise derives much badness from the body. When acid and salt phlegms or bitter and bilious humours roam about the body and, finding no outlet, are pent up within and fall into confusion by mixing the vapour that arises from them with the motion of the soul, 80 the induce all manner of diseases of the soul of greater or less intensity and extent. 81 Making their way to the three seats of the soul, according to the region they severally invade, they beget many divers types of ill-temper and despondency, of rashness and cowardice, dullness and oblivion (86e287a7. Transi. Cornford, slightly modified). 8 2 T h e affinities between this passage a n d t h e C h r y s i p p e a n a c c o u n t a r e very close i n d e e d . We c a n n o t dismiss t h e m as c o i n c i d e n t a l . 8 3 In fact t h e whole Platonic a c c o u n t of m o r a l c o r r u p t i o n — T i m . 86b-89c—invites c o m p a r i s o n with Stoic a n d in particular Chrysippean doctrines. I shall r e t u r n to in t h e section c o n c e r n e d with t h e Stoic linking of affection a n d insanity ( μ α ν ί α ) (§ 7). Suffice it to observe h e r e that Plato's two sources of involuntary c o r r u p t i o n recall the two sources of evil distinguished by Chrysippus. At PHP 5.5.14 (SVF 3.229a) we learn that h e h a d said that t h e soul—which is still u n p e r v e r t e d at birth—is c o r r u p t e d by c o m m u n i c a t i o n with t h e m a j o r i t y of m e n a n d by t h e very n a t u r e of t h e things (see above, p. 132 ff.). 8 4 A l t h o u g h Galen d o e s n o t explicitly say f r o m which treatise this view of Chrysippus is taken, t h e c o n t e x t m a k e s it e x t r e m e l y p r o b a b l e that it was Aff. a n d m o r e in particular t h e Therapeutics Galen raises t h e obvious o b j e c t i o n as to how we b e c o m e susceptible to c o r r u p t i o n in t h e first place, i n t i m a t i n g that Chrysippus h a d n o answer (for want of a n o n - r a t i o n a l p a r t of t h e soul). O n c e again

80

Chrysippus, too, speaks of the soul's motion, see supra, p. 99 n. 40 (φέρεσθαι); cf. also PHP3.1.22 (~ SVF2.886) with Tieleman (1996a) 160 ff.; Plut. Virt. mor. 450C (SVF 3.390) and Stoic. Rep. ch. 25, 1046B (SVF3.418). 81 Cf. the explanation of epilepsy as due to a mixture of phlegm and black bile confusing the revolutions of the soul, Ti. 85a. 82 καί πάλιν δή τό περί τάς λύπας ή ψυχή κατά ταύτα δια σώμα πολλήν 'ίσχει κακίαν. ότου γάρ άν ή τών όξέων καί τών άλυκών φλεγμάτων καί όσοι πικροί καί χολώδεις χυμοί κατά τό σώμα πλανηθέντες έξω μέν δή λάβωσιν άναπνοήν, έντός δέ είλλομενοι τήν άφ' αύτών άτμίδα τή τής ψυχής φορά συμμείξαντες άνακερασθώσι, παντοδαπά νοσήματα ψυχής έμποιοΰσι μάλλον καί ήττον καί έλάττω καί πλείω, πρός τε τούς τρεις τόπους ένεχθέντα τής ψυχής, πρός δν άν έκαστ' αύτών προσπίπτη, ποικίλλει μέν εϊδη δυσκολίας καί δυσθυμίας παντοδαπά, ποικίλλει δέ θρασύτητός τε καί δειλίας, έτι δέ λήθης άμα καί δυσμαθίας. 83 It is certain that Chrysippus was influenced by the Timaeus; see e.g. ReydamSchills (1999) 65 ff., Gill (1997) 84 Cf. D.L. 7.89 speaking of 'the persuasivenes of external things'. Compare the persuasive presentations, which may be but need not be true, see e.g. Sext. M 7.169172 with Tieleman (1996a ) 277 ff.

he glosses over the physical explanation. This has been preserved in the parallel a c c o u n t in Calcidius' c o m m e n t a r y on the Platonic Timaeus (chs. 165-168, printed as SVF 3.229, b u t without ch. 168). 85 Of special interest is ch. 165: T h e c a u s e of e r r o r is m a n i f o l d . T h e first is t h e o n e w h i c h t h e S t o i c s call t h e d o u b l e p e r v e r s i o n . T h i s a r i s e s b o t h f r o m t h e t h i n g s t h e m selves a n d f r o m t h e d i s s e m i n a t i o n of w h a t p e o p l e say. F o r t o t h o s e t h a t h a v e j u s t b e e n b o r n o r fall f r o m t h e w o m b b i r t h o c c u r s w i t h a c e r t a i n a m o u n t of p a i n , s i n c e t h e y m o v e f r o m a h o t a n d h u m i d dwelli n g i n t o t h e c o l d a n d d r y n e s s of t h e a i r t h a t e n g u l f s t h e m . D i r e c t e d a g a i n s t this p a i n a n d c o l d n e s s s u f f e r e d by t h e c h i l d r e n is, by way of a n a n t i d o t e , t h e a r t i f i c i a l m e a s u r e t a k e n by t h e m i d w i v e s , viz. t h a t t h e n e w l y b o r n a r e c h e r i s h e d by m e a n s o f w a r m w a t e r a n d a l t e r n a t i n g b a t h s a r e u s e d a n d a l i k e n e s s o f t h e m a t e r n a l w o m b [is c r e a t e d ] through the warming u p and the cuddling, whereupon the tender body relaxes a n d b e c o m e s calm. T h u s f r o m both these sensations, of p a i n as well as p l e a s u r e , a r i s e s a c e r t a i n n a t u r a l 8 6 o p i n i o n t h a t everyt h i n g p l e a s a n t a n d a g r e e a b l e is g o o d a n d t h a t e v e r y t h i n g w h i c h by c o n t r a s t b r i n g s s o r r o w is b a d a n d t o b e e s c h e w e d .

Plato, too, had stressed the weak condition of the infant soul and in particular that of the newly born (44a-b). But in his account of the origins of evil, as we have noticed, he had spoken of congenital d e t e r m i n a n t s alone, stressing their involuntary character (86c387b7). T h e emphasis placed on the process of birth and what follows directly, with the conspicuous role for the midwives, seems original with the Stoics. Presumably this difference results from their (i.e., probably, Chrysippus') wish to dissociate divine providence f r o m moral evil: nature provides us with unperverted starting points on the road towards virtue, but the basis of psychic weakness is laid at the d o o r of h u m a n i g n o r a n c e at the earliest possible occasion, viz. directly after birth. 8 7 Nature as such is not to be blamed. Inspired by medical practice, 8 8 the midwives try to reduce the unpleasant experience of birth by bathing the infant, i.e. restoring the 85

On this passage see also supra, pp. 132 ff. Waszink (ad 198.20) rightly points out that the account of Stoic doctrine extends to c. 168, p.199,6 numen. 86 On this term (which is here weakened by quaedam) in a similar context, see supra, n. 69. 87 This is made clear at the outset of the Calcidius account, ch. 165: dicunt porro non spontanea esse delieta, ideo quod omnis anima partieeps divinitatis naturali adpetitu bonum quidem semper expetit, errat tarnen aliquando in iudido bonorum et malorum. Cf. the way this account summarised by D.L. 7.89 (SVF 3.228): διαστρέφεσθαι δέ τό λογικόν ζωον ποτέ μέν δια τάς τών έξωθεν πραγμάτων πιθανότητας, ποτέ δέ διά τήν κατήχησιν τών συνόντων, έπεί ή φ ύ σ ι ς ά φ ο ρ μ ά ς δ ί δ ω σ ι ν άδιαστρό φ ου ς. 88 Note loco medicinae (SVF, p. 53, 1. 21).

conditions prevalent in the womb. T h e babies thus u n d e r g o a violent transition c o m i n g on top of the first o n e (from a warm e n v i r o n m e n t to a cold o n e a n d back again), which upsets their susceptible souls. T h i s e x t r e m e e x p e r i e n c e leaves its marks in later life: they will mistake physical pleasure for good, a n d pain for evil. It seems to be taken for g r a n t e d h e r e that physical instability in terms of h o t a n d cold persists. T h e p r o m i n e n t role i m p u t e d to the midwives may seem a bit odd. Perhaps it b e c a m e overemphasized as a result of the selections m a d e by Calcidius or his source f r o m a fuller original account. But it c a n n o t be d e n i e d that birth is a particularly critical m o m e n t . T h e midwives intervene in a natural process involving the h o t a n d the cold. T h e physical p n e u m a of the embryo solidifies on cooling at the first intake of air after birth, thus acquiring the characteristics of psychic p n e u m a , in particular t h e p r o p e r d e g r e e of tension a n d strength. 8 9 By c o u n t e r a c t i n g this n a t u r a l process of cooling the midwives, with the best intentions, weaken the soul's strength at the outset. Stoic moral theory, with its emphasis on responsibility, holds that o n e can in principle s t r e n g t h e n o n e ' s soul the better to respond to all kinds of e x p e r i e n c e s — w h e t h e r physical or social—in an a p p r o priate m a n n e r . But how could this be effected? T h r o u g h therapeutic argument? T h e 'healing' impact of rational a r g u m e n t c a n n o t be disc o u n t e d , especially where socially imparted forms of c o r r u p t i o n are c o n c e r n e d . But t h e r e is a n o t h e r , less familiar side to Stoic therapeutics, m o r e closely related to sensory experience a n d the 'external things' m e n t i o n e d by o u r sources as the second factor involved in the initial corruption of o u r souls.

4. Regimen T h e soul's d e p e n d e n c e on the body for its n o u r i s h m e n t lends crucial i m p o r t a n c e to the care for o n e ' s bodily health; this, indeed, effectively coincides with the care for o n e ' s soul. Accordingly, the Stoics were keenly interested in regimen, that is to say in diet a n d exercise—an area which was subsumed u n d e r ' a p p r o p r i a t e actions' (καθήκοντα). T h e s e also included all sorts of m u n d a n e activities, which yet possessed moral value. Still, their significance is indicated by the detailed

89

SVF2.806 with Tieleman (1991)

a n d i n d e e d o v e r e l a b o r a t e quality of t h e practical i n j u n c t i o n s p r e served by o u r sources. It is n o t a l t o g e t h e r surprising that this aspect of Stoic m o r a l theory—attesting to a souci de soi in a wider sense—has b e e n largely o b s c u r e d in the course of transmission, a n d in particular t h e exact f u n c t i o n of r e g i m e n in the c o n t e x t of Stoic m o r a l t h o u g h t as a whole. 9 0 An interest in r e g i m e n is attested f o r Chrysippus, b u t o u r sources a r e s e l d o m explicit a b o u t its t h e o r e t i c a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n . C h r y s i p p u s a d v o c a t e d a plain a n d simple diet, citing o n m a n y occasions a few E u r i p i d e a n lines (fr. 892 Nauck 2 ) to this effect {SVF3.706). H e f o u n d it necessary to excuse t h e p r e d i l e c t i o n of H o m e r i c h e r o e s f o r m e a t , a r g u i n g that a d i f f e r e n t m e n u would have b e e n u n s u i t a b l e in their special case. In a d d i t i o n , h e p o i n t e d to their p r i d e in c o o k i n g their own meals, setting t h e i r simplicity against t h e r e l i a n c e o n servant l a b o u r p r e v a l e n t in his day (SVF 3.708). 9 1 O n e may feel that this is fairly trivial stuff, or that it is far r e m o v e d f r o m t h e central c o n c e r n s of philosophy. Still, we s h o u l d n o t dismiss too quickly the remarkably large n u m b e r of texts d e a l i n g with care f o r the body. Chrysippus may have r e c o m m e n d e d it in c o n s c i o u s o p p o s i t i o n to t h e Cynics, or to Cynicizing Stoics like Ariston of Chios. 9 2 A related set of f r a g m e n t s deals with i n e b r i a t i o n — a stock topic in discussions a b o u t t h e relation b e t w e e n b o d y a n d soul. C h r y s i p p u s called d r u n k e n n e s s ( μ έ θ η ) 'little m a d n e s s ' (μικράν μ α ν ί α ν , SVF 3.713). T h e s a m e assessment is attested by D.L. 7.127 {SVF 3.237),

90

Many relevant testimonies and fragments have been assembled by Von Arnim as chapter X (nrs. 685-768: Vitae agendae praecepta, i.e. de singulis mediis officiis) of the third volume of the SVF, one of its seldom frequented slum areas. The injunctions extend as far as table manners, see SVF 3.717, 711 (note in both cases the reference to the καθήκοντα). 91 The preference for simple food also appears from the praises of lentil-soup he sang, in a light-hearted tone, in the wake of Crates of Thebes and Zeno, see Athen. Deipn. IV p. 158a (SVF 3.709a, Timon of Phlius fr. 787 Lloyd-Jones-Parsons). 7.26. On the Stoic ideal of simplicity in general cf. Vischer (1965) 61-71. 92 The view that a bodily condition harms our soul (including its moral wellbeing) was famously anticipated by Plato, Ti. 86el-2: κακός μέν γαρ έκών ούδεις, δια δέ πονηράν έξιν τινά του σώματος και άπαίδευτον τροφήν ό κακός γίγνεται κακός. It is likely that the section on psychic disease in this dialogue influenced Chrysippus' treatment of the same subject, cf. supra, pp. 159 f. Note that τροφήν in the sentence from Plato most probably designates nourishment only (not education, since social factors are introduced only at 87a7), and that Plato goes on to present an account of bodily induced psychic affections like distress (λύπη) in terms of morbid humours like bile, whose vapour interferes with the soul's movements; no doubt this part of his account too influenced the Stoics, see supra, pp. 159 ff.

where we read that he differed f r o m Cleanthes in holding that virtue could be lost d u e to d r u n k e n n e s s a n d melancholia. 9 3 This r e p o r t may also b e taken to attest Chrysippus' p r o n o u n c e d interest in bodily factors. 9 4 All h u m a n k n o w l e d g e — i n c l u d i n g its p e r f e c t e d condition e m b o d i e d by the Sage—remains subject to limitations a n d liabilities beyond o u r control or responsibility. Accordingly, a parallel r e p o r t adds loss of virtue d u e to medical d r u g s (SVF 3.238, έν φαρμάκων λήψεσι): the Sage will take m e d i c a m e n t s to restore his health or prevent illness, b u t u n d e s i r a b l e side-effects may ensue. 9 5 So when Chrysippus allows f o r the possibility of the Sage getting d r u n k , h e may be thinking of the analogous situation that h e lapses u n i n t e n tionally into intoxication because of certain u n p r e d i c t a b l e causes, w h e t h e r arising f r o m his own body or the wine. By envisaging the situation that the sage drinks wine, Chrysippus implies that it is a normal, indeed usually wholesome, habit. 9 6 It was the prevalent medical o p i n i o n of his day that wine s t r e n g t h e n s body a n d soul alike, provided o n e exercises p r u d e n c e as to a m o u n t a n d quality. In terms of elemental qualities, wine is h o t a n d capable of c o n d i t i o n i n g of the t e m p e r a t u r e of the organism for better or for worse, d e p e n d i n g on

93

καί μην τήν άρετήν Χρύσιππος μεν άποβλητήν, Κλεάνθης δέ άναπόβλητον· ό μέν άποβλητήν διά μέθην καί μελαγχολίαν, 6 δέ άναπόβλητον διά βέβαιους καταλήψεις. 94 See also SVF 3.238, second text, and 239, adding further kinds of mental disorders—e.g. lethargy and stupor—which lie clearly beyond the wise person's control. Note that SVF 3.28, first text, as well as 241 (a testimony from the comic poet Theognis) present the earlier, Cleanthean position as distincdvely Stoic. 95 Health counts as a preferred indifferent (άδιάφορον προηγμένον), SVF 3.117, 127,191. 96 A compromise between the positions of Cleanthes and Chrysippus is struck by the source of D.L. 7.118: 'And he [seil, the sage] will drink wine but not get drunk, nor will he go mad either. Nonetheless strange impressions will on occasion befall him due to melancholy or delirium, which do not belong by definition to things to be chosen but which are contrary to nature.' It should be noted that (whatever its possible consequences) wine-drinking is here ascribed to the Sage, i.e. recommended to all of us. This is no doubt common ground between the Stoics and fits the stories about Zeno's use of wine, for which see infra in text. The positions ascribed to Cleanthes and Chrysippus are also opposed in the final part of Philo's On Noah's Work as a Planter (§§ 142-177, a few excerpts of which are printed as SVF 3.712): 'Whether or not the wise man will get drunk'. The first view expounded by Philo takes drunkenness (μέθη) in the sense of'foolish talk' (ληρεΐν). Drunkenness in this sense certainly involves the loss of virtue. Accordingly, the wise man avoids heavy drinking since this may result in drunkenness even against his will. The opposite view holds that the wise man will not get drunk, since his virtue is proof against all affections, including those produced by alcohol in other people (142-144).

t h e d i s p o s i t i o n of t h e d r i n k e r as well as e n v i r o n m e n t a l c i r c u m stances. 9 7 T h a t C h r y s i p p u s discussed t h e s e m a t t e r s in t h e On Affections follows f r o m D.L. 7.111 (SVF3.456): They hold the affections (πάθη) to be judgements, as is stated by Chrysippus in his On Affections: avarice being a belief that money is a good, while the case is similar with drunkenness (μέθη) and licentiousness (ακολασία) and likewise the other affections. H e r e d r u n k e n n e s s is associated with affective dispositions like g r e e d (a species of desire, έπιθυμία); a n d the related idea that d r u n k e n n e s s is said to be a (wrong) j u d g e m e n t , which is c o n s o n a n t with its definition in t e r m s of m a d n e s s (3.713, see above) as well as its association with foolish talk (λήρειν) at Philo, Plant. Noe% 142. 98 In view of t h e rest of o u r e v i d e n c e , we s h o u l d n o t dismiss this r e p o r t as b e i n g garbled. Rather, it presents several c o n c e r n s discussed in Chrysippus' treatise in a c o n d e n s e d fashion. In t h e Therapeutics, as we have n o t i c e d , Chrysippus invoked Z e n o ' s a c c o u n t of disease in t e r m s of e l e m e n t a l qualities (PHP 5.2.31, SVF 3.470, see a b o v e ) . His treatise On Impulse (Περί ορμής) b o r e t h e alternative title On the Nature of Man (Περί άνθρωπου φύσεως). 9 9 This title, with its H i p p o c r a t i c ring, expresses his aim to set the t r e a t m e n t of m a n ' s m e n t a l life firmly in t h e c o n t e x t of his whole physique, i.e. t h e c o n j u n c t i o n of body a n d soul. T h e testimonies c o n c e r n e d with t h e i n f l u e n c e of bodily factors o n m e n t a l life (SVF 1.285-7) a r e all a n e c d o t a l . Still, they may be taken to attest to his conviction that o n e can, a n d should, i n f l u e n c e o n e ' s m e n t a l a n d h e n c e moral disposition t h r o u g h diet a n d exercise. Z e n o e m e r g e s as a m e l a n c h o l i c trying to c o u n t e r a c t certain u n p l e a s a n t traits of his character. 1 0 0 L e a d i n g t h e life of an ascetic, h e was o p p o s e d to heavy d r i n k i n g . But as h e was h a r s h 1 0 1 of t e m p e r a n d irritable, h e u s e d to c o n s u m e m o d e r a t e a m o u n t s of wine, w h e r e u p o n h e would grow m o r e mellow. T h u s diet

97

SeeJouanna (1996), esp. 434. Similarly Stob. Eel II 7, p. 109.5 ff. (SVF3.643). 99 SVF 1.179; cf. Inwood (1985) 1. Zeno was the first to define (mental) affection or affection as excessive impulse (ορμή), see SVF 1.205 ff. I(, ° The portrayal of Zeno as a melancholic is no doubt intended to mark him out as a man of genius, in accordance with current views as reflected by [Arist.] Probt. XXX. 1, where outstanding philosophers receive separate mention. On ancient conceptions of melancholy see e.g. Muri (1953); Flashar (1966); on Probt. XXX. 1 cf. Van der Eijk (1990). 101 Cf. IL xviii. 108-110 as quoted by Chrysippus, see supra, p. 159. 98

may serve to r e d u c e c e r t a i n excesses a n d d e f i c i e n c i e s i n h e r e n t in o n e ' s physique: Z e n o ' s t o o dry a n d cold soul is b r o u g h t into b a l a n c e by m e a n s of wine (which was g e n e r a l l y c o n s i d e r e d a h o t l i q u i d ) . Later s c h e m a t i z a t i o n s n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g , his g e n e r a l a t t i t u d e to alcohol seems n o t to have d i f f e r e d all that m u c h f r o m Chrysippus'. O t h e r attested s t a t e m e n t s of Z e n o b e a r o u t his wide-ranging interest in m e d i c i n e (SVF 1.286-287). We s h o u l d n o t b r u s h these testimonies aside as p u r e l y a p o c r y p h a l . In d e f a u l t of b i o g r a p h i c a l d a t a a n e c d o t e s of this sort were o f t e n c o n c o c t e d o n t h e basis of t h e e x t a n t writings of a p h i l o s o p h e r . T h e u n d e r l y i n g a s s u m p t i o n is that a philos o p h e r ' s life is, o r s h o u l d , b e c o n s o n a n t with his t e a c h i n g . 1 0 2 O n e could characterize testimonies of this kind as ' p e r s o n i f i e d d o c t r i n e ' . As s u c h , they reflect d o c t r i n e s actually h e l d by t h e p h i l o s o p h e r in question.

5. Emotional Opponents It is a witness to t h e l o n g - s t a n d i n g i n f l u e n c e of t h e Therapeutics that O r i g e n in his Against Celsus (written c.249 CE) q u o t e s two passages f r o m it which seem to derive f r o m the same original context: 1 0 3 B u t in m y view C h r y s i p p u s h a s a c t e d m o r e h u m a n e l y t h a n C e l s u s in h i s Therapeutics Concerning the Affections, w h e r e h e w i s h e s t o c u r e t h e a f f e c t i o n s as p r e s s i n g o n a n d t r o u b l i n g t h e h u m a n s o u l , p r e f e r a b l y by m e a n s of a r g u m e n t s w h i c h s e e m s o u n d t o h i m b u t in t h e s e c o n d a n d t h i r d i n s t a n c e e v e n by m e a n s of d o c t r i n e s w h i c h h e d o e s n o t h o l d : ' F o r e v e n if,' h e says, ' t h e r e a r e t h r e e k i n d s of g o o d t h i n g s , e v e n so t h e affections have to b e c u r e d ; b u t o n e s h o u l d n o t at the m o m e n t of i n f l a m m a t i o n of t h e a f f e c t i o n s b o t h e r a b o u t t h e d o c t r i n e w h i c h h a s p r e v i o u s l y w o n o v e r t h e p e r s o n t r o u b l e d by t h e a f f e c t i o n : t h e a v a i l a b l e t h e r a p y s h o u l d by n o m e a n s at a n i n c o n v e n i e n t t i m e b e wasted o n overthrowing the doctrines which have occupied the s o u l first.' A n d h e says: ' E v e n if p l e a s u r e is t h e g o o d a n d this is t h e view t a k e n by t h e p e r s o n c o n t r o l l e d by t h e a f f e c t i o n , n o n e t h e l e s s

102

On this ancient assumpdon see Mansfeld (1994) 183 ff. Cf. Origen's paraphrase at I 64, vol. I, p.117.16 ff. Kö. = SWF3.474, first text); a few other snippets from Origen's commentary on the Gospel According to Matthew are also printed by Von Arnim among the fragments from the Therapeutics (vol. Ill Delarue, pp. 591-2 = SVF 3.477). These attest to Origen's knowledge of the wellknown Stoic (and Chrysippean) tenet that children, being not yet completely rational, do not exhibit emotions in the full sense but something analogous to them. But we are not dealing with verbatim fragments and nothing compels us to ascribe the information contained in these texts to Origen's reading of the Therapeutics. 103

he should be helped and it should be shown to him that even for those who consider pleasure to be the good and indeed the end any affection is inconsistent' (VIII, 51: vol. II, p.266.18 ff. Kö. ~ SW 3.474, second text). 104 As I have indicated in the o p e n i n g section of this chapter, far-reaching conclusions have been drawn f r o m this text. Nussbaum takes it to confirm h e r thesis that Stoic therapy starts f r o m the individual with her own views and needs. It does not o b t r u d e a dogmatic world-view on the sufferer f r o m e m o t i o n . In particular it does not p r e s u p p o s e the Stoic d o c t r i n e of what is g o o d , bad a n d i n d i f f e r e n t . This last implication is also accepted by Sorabji. 1 0 5 It follows f r o m this reading that therapy was or could be divorced from the o t h e r c o m p a r t m e n t s of Stoic philosophy, even t h o u g h Chrysippus elsewhere posits a c o n n e c t i o n between ethics a n d physics, most notably the crowning science of theology. 1 0 '' We should think twice b e f o r e accepting this reading a n d all that it implies as to the overall orientation of Stoic therapy. We have already c o m e across a few indications f r o m Cicero that the whole of philosophy remains involved (see above, pp. 91, 95). Clearly we are dealing with two d i f f e r e n t t h o u g h related snippets of Chrysippean text. T h e first seems to take an a d h e r e n t of the Peripatetic 1 0 7 but later m o r e general position that there three kinds of g o o d things—psychic, bodily a n d external—whereas the Stoics accepted only the first. T h e way the f r a g m e n t o p e n s strongly suggests that ideally the patient is to be r e m i n d e d of the Stoic doctrine of the value of things. Of course this could take the form of a r e f e r e n c e to

104 ά λ λ ά φιλανθρωπότερον οίμαι Κέλσου Χρύσιππον πεποιηκέναι έν τώ Περί παθών θεραπευτικφ, βουλόμενον θεραπεύσαι τά πάθη ώς κατεπείγοντα καί ένοχλούντα τήν άνθρωπίνην ψυχήν, προηγουμένως μέν τοις δοκοΰσιν αύτφ ύγιέσι λόγοις, δευτέρως δέ καί τρίτως κάν τοις μη άρεσκουσι τών δογμάτων · (( Κάν γάρ τρία )), φησίν, (( ή γένη τών άγαθών, καί ούτω θεραπευτέον τά πάθη · ού περιεργαζόμενον τφ καιρφ τής φλεγμονής τών παθών τό προκαταλαβόν δόγμα τόν ύπό τού πάθους ένοχλούμενον · μή πως τή άκαίρω περί τήν άνατροπήν τών προκαταλαβόντων τήν ψυχήν δογμάτων σχολή ή έγχωρούσα θεραπεία παραπόληται. }} Φησί δέ ότι (( κάν ήδονή ή τό άγαθόν καί τούτο φρονή ό ύπό τού πάθους κρατούμενος· ούδέν ήττον αύτφ βοηθητέον καί παραδεικτέον, οτι καί τοις ήδονήν τάγαθόν καί τέλος τιθεμένοις άναμολογούμενον έστι πάν πάθος.}} 105 Sorabji (2000) e.g. 2, 8, 178; however cf. 169 ff. for doubts. By contrast Donini (1995) 305 ff., esp. 308, starting from the parallel at Cic. Tusa 3.76-77, argues that the injunctions issued by Chrysippus do not form a complete therapy. Earlier Inwood (1985) 300 (n.110) had made more or less the same point by speaking of 'first aid.' As will transpire in the course of my argument I side with Donini and Inwood. 106 Plut. Stoic. Rep. 1035A-C ~ .SVF3,326, 3.68. 107 Cf. e.g. D.L. 5.30.

the Stoic definition of the affection f r o m which h e or she is suffering. Knowing that what is h a p p e n i n g to you results f r o m a wrong value j u d g e m e n t can be therapeutic. W h e n the text starts Chrysippus next raises the question which line should be taken in regard to s o m e o n e who does n o t accept the Stoic doctrine in the first place, for example because h e is an Aristotelian. In envisaging an emotional Peripatetic Chrysippus is having a bit of f u n . As is well known, Aristotle saw the e m o t i o n s or affections ( π α θ ή ) as natural e l e m e n t s of o u r psychic make-up. H e h a d even a r g u e d that a n g e r could be useful (EN Γ 11: 1116b24 ff., Δ 11: 1126a 20 ff.). 10 « In the case of an angry or otherwise e m o t i o n a l Peripatetic, offering him an elementary course in Stoic philosophy is clearly n o use. Affection is e x p l a i n e d in terms of i n f l a m m a t i o n (φλεγμονή). This recalls the f r a g m e n t where Chrysippus explains that with the passage of time the 'affective i n f l a m m a t i o n (παθητικής φλεγμονής) abates, w h e r e u p o n reason may re-enter the m i n d (PHP 4.7.27 ~ SVF 3.467, q u o t e d above, p. 130). In the light of this passage it is easy to see that Chrysippus sees little prospect for t r e a t m e n t by philosophical instruction, because h e sees affection as a m o m e n t of crisis in which o n e is unreceptive to reason. H e n c e h e says that this would c o m e at 'an inconvenient time.' It is implied that there will be a convenient time when the affection has abated. T h e n the doctrine that there are three kinds of good things can be subverted. Chrysippus' point is that something should a n d can be d o n e at the height of emotion as well. What this is we do not learn in connection with the Peripatetic but this may be d u e to the way the first f r a g m e n t has been marked off. For this we have to turn to the second one. H e r e the n e x t representative of a c o m p e t i n g school e n t e r s the stage. T h e Epicurean creed is equally incapable of preventing emotion. H e r e the underlying belief is that pleasure is the good. (Indeed it is the highest good, or E n d , τ έ λ ο ς ) . According to the Stoic doctrine, pleasure is either bad if the generic affection is m e a n t or something indifferent if it refers to an e p i p h e n o m e n o n of corporeal wellbeing. 1 0 9 W h a t shall we d o a b o u t an E p i c u r e a n whose pleasure-directed actions are thwarted so that affection ensues? T o be sure, the good 108 p o r ( j ^ r e a s o n Seneca in books 1 and 2 of his On Anger directs several of his arguments at the Aristotelian position in particular. 109

See above, p. 114 (the affection); D.L. 7.85-6 (the e p i p h e n o m e n o n ) , where note the anti-Epicurean purport.

Stoic s h o u l d h e l p h i m . I find h e r e n o t so m u c h evidence f o r Nussbaum-style compassionate philosophy b u t r a t h e r a piece of irony. H e r e t o o it is pointless to a d d r e s s t h e u n d e r l y i n g p h i l o s o p h i c a l conviction. I n s t e a d we s h o u l d show t h a t t h e a f f e c t i o n is n o t conducive to a t t a i n i n g pleasure; that is to say, we s h o u l d inculcate t h e insight that t h e affection is inconsistent (άναμολογούμενον) with his E p i c u r e a n position o n t h e End. 1 1 0 Apparently, an a p p e a l to inconsistency may still p e n e t r a t e t h e e m o t i o n by which t h e E p i c u r e a n is c o n t r o l l e d ; his irrationality is n o t so c o m p l e t e as to p r e c l u d e this possibility. In addition, we n o t e that h e r e , as elsewhere, inconsistency a p p e a r s as t h e h a l l m a r k of affection (see p p . 98 n. 40, 100, 170 ff.). F u r t h e r , it is i m p l i e d t h a t t h e realization of this inconsistency is sufficient to p u t an e n d to the crisis, viz. t h e e m o t i o n a l outburst. As D o n i n i (1995) a n d o t h e r s have shown, t h e p r o p o s e d t h e r a p e u tic m e a s u r e p r e s u p p o s e s t h e twofold distinction b e t w e e n types of j u d g e m e n t necessary for the o c c u r e n c e of an affection. What Chrysipp u s in e f f e c t p r o p o s e s is to subvert type 2, viz. t h a t an e m o t i o n a l r e s p o n s e is a p p r o p r i a t e . T h e reason is that o n e c a n n o t d o the same f o r t h e j u d g e m e n t of type 1, which in this case is the w r o n g value j u d g e m e n t that p l e a s u r e is t h e g o o d . T h i s b o r n e o u t by a relevant passage in Tusculan Disputations b o o k 3. S p e a k i n g a b o u t grief a n d consolation, Cicero tells us: C h r y s i p p u s h o l d s t h a t t h e m a i n p o i n t (caput, G r . κ ε φ ά λ α ι ο ν ) in c o n s o l i n g is to t a k e away f r o m t h e g r i e v i n g p e r s o n t h a t o p i n i o n w h i c h m a k e s h i m b e l i e v e t h a t h e is f u l f i l l i n g t h e r i g h t a n d d u e o b l i g a t i o n

(3.76). H e r e it is spelt o u t that t h e o p i n i o n of type 2 is a mistaken choice of a p p r o p r i a t e action, i.e. what the Stoics f r o m Z e n o onward technically call a κ α θ ή κ ο ν a n d d e f i n e as a n a c t i o n t h a t has a r e a s o n a b l e justification (see D.L. 7 . 1 0 7 - SVF 3.493). In what follows C l e a n t h e s is criticized f o r o f f e r i n g consolation to those w h o are already wise a n d so d o n o t n e e d consolation in the first place (§ 77). Cleanthes, Cicero explains, wants to convince m o u r n e r s that t h e r e is n o u n h a p p i n e s s a p a r t f r o m m o r a l vice. C i c e r o ' s p o i n t

110

T h e counterpart of this argumentative move is found in a passage from Chrysippus' On Justice, which is transmitted by Plutarch, On Stoic Contradictions 1040E (SVF 3.24), arguing that the choice of pleasure as the end for man does not entail the removal of all the virtues: these are not choiceworthy in themselves but by being related to the end, even if one identifies this as pleasure. Analogously, what is opposite to virtue should be avoided in the light of the same end.

that C l e a n t h e s o f f e r s c o n s o l a t i o n to t h e wise s e e m s to be mistaken. N o n e the less, we may infer that C l e a n t h e s still addressed j u d g e m e n t s that Chrysippus was to assign to type 1; in o t h e r words C l e a n t h e s still lacked this distinction. T h a t this d o e s n o t work f o r p e o p l e w h o a r e u n d e r g o i n g an e m o t i o n may i n d e e d have i n s p i r e d C h r y s i p p u s ' r e f i n e m e n t . But it c a n n o t have b e e n t h e only r e a s o n . We may recall t h e p r o b l e m discussed by Chrysippus in On Affections b o o k 2 as to why a f f e c t i o n s o f t e n f a d e in time while t h e mistaken value j u d g e m e n t is still in place (e.g. that t h e d e a t h of a loved o n e is a g r e a t evil). This too can b e solved by r e f e r e n c e to t h e distinction b e t w e e n t h e two types of j u d g e m e n t . F u r t h e r , C i c e r o g o e s o n to p o i n t to a n o t h e r p r o b l e m f o r which C l e a n t h e s h a d n o answer, n a m e l y t h e case of Alcibiades w h o was c o n v i n c e d by Socrates that h e was a b a d p e r s o n yet did n o t lapse i n t o distress (ibid. 77). W h e n o n e realizes o n e is a b a d p e r s o n , o n e e n t e r t a i n s t h e k i n d of j u d g e m e n t stipulated by t h e Stoic d e f i n i t i o n of distress, viz. t h a t o n e takes onself to b e in t h e p r e s e n c e of evil, viz. o n e ' s own b a d soul. This too is a type 1 j u d g e m e n t , of course. 1 1 1 But as it is, p e r s o n s in Alcibiades' situation typically d o n o t f i n d an e m o t i o n a l r e s p o n s e a p p r o p r i a t e (judgement-type 2) a n d h e n c e are incapable of b e c o m i n g e m o t i o n a l . T o c o n c l u d e . T h e passages we have reviewed p e r t a i n to o n e specific stage of t h e r a p e u t i c t r e a t m e n t a n d even p o i n t to t h e n e e d f o r instruction in Stoic p h i l o s o p h y a f t e r t h e affection is over. Philosophy aims to s t r e n g t h e n t h e soul by i n c u l c a t i n g c o r r e c t beliefs a b o u t t h e value of things, a n d so may h e l p p r e v e n t o u t b r e a k s of e m o t i o n . T h e s e passages p r e s u p p o s e t h e distinction b e t w e e n affection as a m o m e n tary crisis a n d t h e u n d e r l y i n g diseased c o n d i t i o n of t h e soul, as well as t h e distinction between t h e two types of j u d g e m e n t which we have already f o u n d to have b e e n i n t r o d u c e d by Chrysippus in b o o k 2.

6. Turning One's Back on Reason A n o t h e r set of f r a g m e n t s is c o n c e r n e d with t h e c o n t r a d i c t o r y b e h a viour of p e o p l e in e m o t i o n a l c o n d i t i o n s . C h r y s i p p u s cites familiar situations a n d e x p r e s s i o n s — o f t e n illustrated by m e a n s of lines f r o m c o n t e m p o r a r y d r a m a — s h o w i n g p e o p l e a c t i n g against t h e i r b e t t e r j u d g e m e n t b u t persisting in t h e i r a t t i t u d e t h o u g h a n d b e i n g fully

111

On this and related problems, see also infra, pp. 315 ff.

aware of their emotional state. For Galen such cases of mental conflict are only explicable by reference to two different psychic forces or entities, the o n e rational, the o t h e r non-rational. T h u s Chrysippus can be said to contradict himself. T h e first text to be considered is 4.6.19-20 (SVF 3.473). I add the immediate Galenic context: ... t h u s t h e soul o f M e n e l a u s , as p r e s e n t e d d e c i s i o n 1 1 2 b e c a u s e it was b e g u i l e d by b e c a u s e it was f o r c e d by a n g e r . S o m e h o w unaware that that h e cites Euripides' w o r d s

in tragedy, a b a n d o n e d its his d e s i r e , M e d e a ' s s o u l in h e r case C h r y s i p p u s is against himself:

I u n d e r s t a n d what kind o f evils I a m g o i n g to d o But a n g e r is s t r o n g e r than my [ s o u n d ] c o n s i d e r a t i o n s

[Medea 1078-9],113 If E u r i p i d e s was to give e v i d e n c e in s u p p o r t o f t h e d o c t r i n e s o f Chrysippus, h e s h o u l d n o t have said that s h e u n d e r s t a n d s but the very o p p o s i t e , that s h e d o e s n o t k n o w a n d d o e s n o t u n d e r s t a n d what kind o f evils s h e will d o . But k n o w i n g this a n d b e i n g o v e r c o m e by a n g e r — w h a t is that but the act o f a m a n w h o i n t r o d u c e s two c a u s e s (princip l e s , s o u r c e s , ά ρ χ ά ς ) f o r M e d e a ' s c o n a t i o n s ( ό ρ μ ω ν ) (transi. D e Lacy's, m o d i f i e d ) .

T h e above lines by Euripides f o r m the conclusion of Medea's great speech. From the same original context, Galen cites a few f u r t h e r passages, the first of which affords a glimpse of how Chrysippus may have read these lines: But Chrysippus d o e s n o t n o t i c e t h e c o n t r a d i c t i o n h e r e , a n d h e writes i n n u m e r a b l e o t h e r s t a t e m e n t s o f this k i n d , as w h e n h e says: 'This m o v e m e n t , irrational a n d t u r n e d away f r o m r e a s o n , is, as I think, 112

I.e. to kill his unfaithful wife Helen. Menelaus' case is discussed from 4.5.7 onward (including Chrysippus' quotation of E. Andromache, 629-630), see supra, p. 112. 113 καί μανθάνω μέν οία δράν μέλλω κακά, / θυμός δέ κρείσσων τών έμών βουλευμάτων. Some scholars have argued that κρείσσων means 'is master of, controls' and that βουλευμάτων means here what it means elsewhere in the Medea, namely, her plans, i.e. to kill her children (see e.g. 372, 769, 772, 1044, 1048); see Diller (1966), Gill (1983). However, all ancient authors who quote or parody these lines clearly speak of the opposition of reason and emotion, see e.g. Epict. Diss. 1.28.7, Lucian, Apol 10, Clem. Alex. Stromal. II, 15.63.3, Greg. Naz. (?), Christus patiens (λύπη δέ κρείσσων τών έμών βουλευμάτων). Moreover, Euripides always uses κρείσσων with the genitive in the sense of 'better than' or 'stronger than', see e.g. Med. 965, Or. 806, Hec. 608. Even so, the alternative reading would not rule out an interpretation on Platonic lines, i.e. o n e which sees here a conflict between two distinct elements in Medea's soul. In particular, one may see the conflict between reason and emotion as expressed here by the opposition between μανθάνω and θυμός.

s o m e t h i n g very c o m m o n , by r e f e r e n c e t o w h i c h w e say t h a t s o m e p e o p l e a r e m o v e d by a n g e r ' ( 4 . 6 . 2 3 ~ SVF3.475).114

A l t h o u g h Galen p r e s e n t s this as o n e a m o n g m a n y such statements, it gives every a p p e a r a n c e of b e l o n g i n g with C h r y s i p p u s ' exegesis of Medea, 11. 1078-9 ( n o t e t h e r e f e r e n c e i m p l i e d by ' / W j m o v e m e n t ' ) . Apparently, these two lines a n d t h e above e x c e r p t f r o m Chrysippus' exegesis b e l o n g e d to a section c o n c e r n e d with t h e p h e n o m e n o l o g y of a n g e r . 1 1 5 In this c o n t e x t , t h e n , t h e i d e a of t u r n i n g away f r o m r e a s o n f e a t u r e d . C h r y s i p p u s e x p l a i n s M e d e a ' s a n g e r in t e r m s of i n c o n t i n e n c e ( ά κ ρ α σ ί α ) . 1 1 6 F u r t h e r , h e d e s c r i b e d it as an incontrollable type of m o v e m e n t , in line with t h e p r o m i n e n c e given to t h e latter c o n c e p t t h r o u g h o u t t h e On Affections. In particular o n e recalls the analogy of the r u n n e r s (see above, p. 101). T h u s M e d e a is ' m o v e d by a n g e r ' , i.e. a n g e r at J a s o n ' s injustice towards her. Since this is a case of i n c o n t i n e n c e , t h e b e t t e r course of action still p r e s e n t s itself to h e r m i n d . In o t h e r words, ' c o r r e c t ' reason r e m a i n s p r e s e n t s i m u l t a n e o u s l y with w r o n g r e a s o n . T h i s e x p l a i n s why h e r m i n d is said to have ' t u r n e d away f r o m ' reason ( r e p r e s e n t e d by the ' c o n s i d e r a t i o n s ' as well as h e r words Ί u n d e r s t a n d ' ) , j u s t as elsewhere e m o t i o n is said to involve d i s o b e d i e n c e to ( r i g h t ) r e a s o n . 1 1 7 Of course this s i m u l t a n e o u s o p p o s i t i o n between a n g e r o n t h e o n e h a n d a n d r e a s o n o n t h e o t h e r p r o v i d e s G a l e n with a m m u n i t i o n f o r his p o i n t t h a t C h r y s i p p u s a b a n d o n s , i n d e e d is f o r c e d to a b a n d o n , his thesis that e m o t i o n s a r e j u d g e m e n t s (ibid. 26). But clearly these two lines r e p r e s e n t t h e e m o t i o n a l intellect j u d g i n g a n d a r t i c u l a t i n g its options. As precisely these lines m a k e clear, M e d e a ' s giving in to h e r a n g e r is a c o n s i d e r e d choice a n d in this sense fully rational. I n d e e d , Chrysippus speaks of h e r m e n t a l state as b e i n g very c o m m o n . 1 1 8 Still, 114

(Only Chrysippus' words:) έστι δέ ώς οίμαι κοινότατον ή άλογος αΰτη φορά καί άπεστραμμένη τόν λόγον, καθό καί θυμώ φαμέν τινας φέρεσθαι. 115 Gill (1983) 139 f. alternatively submits that Chrysippus used these lines in his explanation of the difference between emotion and an error of reasoning (αμάρτημα), as quoted and paraphrased at PHP4.2.1-27 from the beginning of On Affections book 1. 116 Note that this term is cognate with Euripides' κρείσσων. For emotion as incontinence, 4.4.24, quoted supra, p. 102 n. 51. 117 See from the same original context, 4.6.43, quoted infra, p. 178; see supra, pp. 97 ff. Similarly Gourinat (1996) 102, 105 f., who argues that the conflict is between her preconceptions about what is morally right and her mental appearance that revenge is appropriate. 118 O n e may suppose that Medea is rather exceptional for the articulate selfconsciousness with which she reflects on her deliberate plunge into anger and vengeance. As a rule people do not seem capable of this state of mind. So Medea

the idea of t u r n i n g away f r o m reason leaves a few pressing questions unanswered. But the piece of text next presented by Galen seems to have followed in Chrysippus' discussion as well: A n d a g a i n : ' T h e r e f o r e we b e h a v e in t h e c a s e of t h e s e p e r s o n s w h o a r e in a s t a t e of e m o t i o n as w e d o t o w a r d s p e r s o n s w h o a r e o u t of t h e i r m i n d s a n d w e s p e a k t o t h e m as t o p e r s o n s w h o a r e twisted a n d a r e n o t in t h e i r r i g h t m i n d s o r in c o n t r o l o f t h e m s e l v e s . ' T h e n , e x p l a i n i n g a g a i n t h i s last p o i n t : ' T h i s twisting a n d w i t h d r a w i n g f r o m o n e s e l f o c c u r s in a c c o r d a n c e w i t h n o t h i n g o t h e r t h a n t h e a c t o f t u r n i n g away f r o m r e a s o n ' (PHP4.6.24-5 ~ SVF3.475).119

T h e terms a n d expressions used by Chrysippus h e r e all point to the fact that we behave towards emotional people as c h a n g e d and somehow not their normal selves. T h u s Chrysippus once again appeals to c o m m o n p a r l a n c e as consistent with o u r b e h a v i o u r towards the p e o p l e in question. Since e m o t i o n a l p e o p l e are not receptive to reason, we d o n o t even a t t e m p t to inculcate sense into t h e m b u t r a t h e r wait until their e m o t i o n s abate. This seems to confirm Gill's view that Chrysippus did n o t r e a d M e d e a ' s speech in t e r m s of d i f f e r e n t e l e m e n t s in the soul b u t in terms of the whole p e r s o n alternating between two sides a n d supporting either with both reason and emotion. 1 2 0 A little f u r t h e r down (ibid. 34, p.276.33 ff.) Galen r e p o r t s that Chrysippus explained the c o m m o n expressions ' n o t in their right minds' (ού παρ' έαυτοίς) a n d ' ( n o t ) in control of themselves' (οΰδ' έν αΰτοίς οντάς) as follows: P e r s o n s t h u s a n g e r e d a r e a l s o a p p r o p r i a t e l y said t o b e c a r r i e d away, like t h o s e w h o a r e c a r r i e d t o o f a r o n w a r d in r a c e s , t h e similarity b e i n g in t h e e x c e s s , w h i c h in t h e r u n n e r s g o e s c o u n t e r t o t h e i r c o n a t i o n in r u n n i n g a n d in t h e p e r s o n s a n g e r e d c o u n t e r to t h e i r o w n r e a s o n . F o r t h e y c o u l d n o t b e s a i d , like t h o s e w h o a r e in c o n t r o l o f t h e i r m o v e m e n t , t o b e m o v i n g in c o n f o r m i t y w i t h t h e m s e l v e s b u t i n s t e a d t o b e

may seem an inappropriate illustration of the general truth Chrysippus wishes to analyze, see Gill (1983) 144. Nonetheless, Chrysippus did maintain that emotion often occurs in the way and for the reasons illustrated by these two lines. In addition, as Gill (1983) 144 acknowledges, Chrysippus also discussed 'blind' emotion, in which people are not aware of, let alone capable of articulating, the mental state they are in, see infra, pp. 178 ff. 119 « διό καί έπί τώνδε τών έμπαθών ώς περί έξεστηκότων έχομεν καί ώς πρός παρηλλαχότας ποιούμεθα τόν λόγον καί ού παρ' έαυτοίς ούδ' έν αύτοΐς όντας. )) καί έφεξής δέ πάλιν έξηγούμενος αύτά ταύτα, (( ή δέ παραλλαγή γίγνεται καί ή έξ αύτού άναχώρησις ού κατ' άλλο τι ή τήν τού λόγου άποστροφήν, ώς προείπομεν. )) 120 Gill (1983) 138, 141.

m o v i n g in c o n f o r m i t y with s o m e f o r c e e x t e r n a l t o t h e m s e l v e s {ibid. 3 5 ~ SVF 3.478; t r a n s i . D e L a c y ) . 1 2 1

T h i s e x p l a n a t i o n in t e r m s of excessive a n d u n c o n t r o l l a b l e m o t i o n picks u p the image of p e o p l e r u n n i n g down a slope which Chrysippus first used at t h e b e g i n n i n g of Book 1 to illustrate Z e n o ' s definition of e m o t i o n as an excessive c o n a t i o n ( π λ ε ο ν α ζ ο ύ σ α ό ρ μ ή ) . 1 2 2 I have discussed t h e m a i n c o n c e p t s (e.g. Stoic causal t h e o r y ) e m p l o y e d h e r e in c o n n e c t i o n with the relevant f r a g m e n t s f r o m the first b o o k of t h e On Affections (see above, p p . 102 ff.). This précis of t h e r u n n e r analogy brings o u t the idea of a p e r s o n ' s own reason (λόγος) as n o r m a t i v e in a c c o r d a n c e with t h e sense b o r n e by reason in t h e o t h e r f r a g m e n t s f r o m this particular c o n t e x t of t h e Therapeutics But t h e r e is a n o t h e r p o i n t to be m a d e . In t h e o p e n i n g section of b o o k 1, Chrysippus h a d described e m o t i o n as an i n t e r r u p tion of o u r n o r m a l , p u r p o s e f u l b e h a v i o u r — i . e . a p a t t e r n of action that is rational in t h e descriptive sense applicable to all m e m b e r s of o u r species. H e r e Chrysippus i n t r o d u c e s t h e idea of t h e self, that is, t h e individual p e r s o n , which h e links to r e a s o n in t h e n o r m a t i v e sense, that is to say w h a t o t h e r Stoic sources call ' r i g h t ' (ορθός) or ' p r e f e r e n t i a l ' (προηγούμενος) 1 2 3 r e a s o n . I n o r d e r to drive h o m e his point, Galen coalesces these two senses of reason: '... all such expressions clearly testify against the view that t h e e m o t i o n s are j u d g e m e n t s a n d that they arise in t h e rational powers of t h e soul' (ibid. 26). But Chrysippus a d d s to t h e idea of e m o t i o n as a species of m a d n e s s (see below, p p . 178 ff.) a new a n d i m p o r t a n t insight, which, h e claims, is w a r r a n t e d by t h e opinio communis i n c l u d i n g c o m m o n p a r l a n c e : w h e n we t u r n away f r o m reason in t h e n o r m a t i v e sense, we so to speak loose ourselves (cf. 4.6.46). Accordingly, we are n o l o n g e r t r e a t e d by o t h e r s as t h e p e o p l e we normally are, i.e. p e r s o n s w h o are capable of following right r e a s o n . T h e r e is a cosmic d i m e n s i o n involved in r e a s o n in this s e c o n d , n o r m a t i v e sense. T h e self is r o o t e d in cosmic r e a s o n , e a c h individual b e i n g a particle of t h e g r e a t e r whole. It is a f u n d a m e n t a l t e n e t of Stoic t h e o l o g y t h a t t h e cosmic intellect, which is 121

οίκείως δέ και έκφέρεσθαι λέγονται οί οϋτως όργιζόμενοι τοις έπί τών δρόμων προεκφερομένοις παραπλησίως κατά τό πλεονάζον τών μέν παρά τήν έν τω τρέχειν όρμήν, τών δέ παρά τόν 'ίδιον λόγον. ού γάρ άν οϋτως (ώς) οϊ γε κρατούντες τής κινήσεως καθ' έαυτούς άν κινεΐσθαι λέφοιντο, ά λ λ ά κατ' άλλην τινά βίαν έξωθεν αύτών. 122 See supra, pp. 101 ff. 123 On this term see Plut. Virt. mor. 9: 449C (SVF3.384); Stob. Eel. II, p.85.1 (SVF 1.192 = 3.128).

equivalent to G o d a n d Nature, c a n n o t be but g o o d . B e i n g off-shoots o f universal nature, we are d i s p o s e d towards rather than against the w h o l e , t h a t is d i s p o s e d t o v i r t u e r a t h e r t h a n v i c e . 1 2 4 A c c o r d i n g l y C h r y s i p p u s d e f i n e d t h e h u m a n E n d as b r i n g i n g o n e ' s nature in a g r e e m e n t with universal N a t u r e (D.L. 7.85-89).

individual 125

From the same original context we have the following fragments, all o f w h i c h p o i n t t o t h e s e l f - c o n s c i o u s r e j e c t i o n o f r i g h t r e a s o n , o r o n e ' s b e t t e r s e l f , s h o w n b y p e o p l e w h e n in a s t a t e o f a n g e r , l o v e o r related e m o t i o n s . I o m i t the i m m e d i a t e G a l e n i c c o n t e x t , b e c a u s e this c o n t a i n s n o t h i n g new. G a l e n indicates that these f r a g m e n t f o r m e d a c o n t i n u o u s , o r very nearly c o n t i n u o u s , text ( w h e r e a small g a p s e e m s p r o b a b l e , t h i s is i n d i c a t e d by d o t s ) : ( 4 . 6 . 2 7 ) T h i s is why it is possible to h e a r u t t e r a n c e s o f this kind b o t h in t h e case o f p e o p l e in love a n d p e r s o n s with o t h e r fervent desires, a n d o f angry p e r s o n s , that they want to gratify their drive a n d to let t h e m be, w h e t h e r it is better o r n o t , a n d to say n o t h i n g to t h e m , a n d that this m u s t b e d o n e by all m e a n s , e v e n if they are w r o n g a n d if it is d i s a d v a n t a g e o u s to t h e m ... ( 2 9 ) ... L o v e d o n e s e x p e c t that t h e i r lovers have i m p u l s e s o f especially this kind towards t h e m , that their attitude s h o u l d b e rather ill-considered a n d with c o n c e r n for r e a s o n a n d f u r t h e r m o r e that they s h o u l d d e f y a d m o n i t o r y d i s c o u r s e [or: reason, λόγος] or rather d o by n o m e a n s whatsoever bear h e a r i n g any discourse [or: r e a s o n ] o f that kind. (30) T h e y k e e p so far away f r o m t h e ( a d m o n i t o r y ) d i s c o u r s e [or: r e a s o n ] that it is n o t o u t o f p l a c e to say to t h e m such things as these: 'For e v e n w h e n c e n s u r e d Cypris d o e s let go; i n d e e d , if y o u use force, s h e loves to strive even m o r e . Eros, w h e n c e n s u r e d presses m o r e heavily.' 1 2 6 (31) F u r t h e r m o r e they reject t h e ( a d m o n i t o r y ) discourse [or: r e a s o n ] as an u n t i m e l y c e n s o r , u n s y m p a t e t i c to the affairs o f love, like a m a n w h o is h e l d to a d m o n i s h u n s e a s o n a b l y , at a time w h e n e v e n the g o d s are t h o u g h t to p e r m i t t h e m to swear false oaths. (32) Permit us - they say - to d o what o c c u r s to us a n d follow o u r desire (SVF3.475).127 124

O n the relation between right reason and God see e.g. Gourinat (1996) 108; cf. also Scott (1995) 201 ff. and esp. 209, on God-given (moral) p r e c o n c e p t i o n s as typical of Stoic 'dispositional innatism'. 125 T h e two aspects of reason—descriptive a n d normative—coincide with the first two roles o r personae distinguished by Cicero in his On Duties 1.110-4. Cicero is very likely drawing on Panaetius but this does not make Panaetius the inventor of this theory. T h e material we are reviewing strongly indicates that this doctrine was well u n d e r way by Chrysippus' time. 126 Euripides, Fr. 340 Nauck. 127 ( 27) διό και τοιαύτας εστίν άκοΰσαι φωνάς έπί τε τών έρώντων καί τών άλλως σφόδρα έπιθυμούντων καί έπί τω θυμώ θέλουσι χ α ρ ί ζ ε σ θ α ι καί έάν αύτούς, ε'ίτε

T h e persons c o n c e r n e d are all capable of recognizing right reason as such. It is typical of their m e n t a l state that even so they reject it. Chrysippus' main point must have been that it is difficult, and indeed o f t e n useless, to o f f e r s o u n d advice to s o m e o n e at the h e i g h t of e m o t i o n . H e presents his examples as warranted by e x p e r i e n c e a n d c o m m o n parlance. Far f r o m subverting the idea of the therapeutic t r e a t m e n t of emotion, Chrysippus may have wished to bring out the n e e d for preventive measures, a n d at any rate for applying at the right time whatever t r e a t m e n t is d e e m e d fit. His examples provide a vivid illustration of the irrationality a n d force of emotion (cf. also the f r a g m e n t s following at ibid. 43-46). Erotic i n f a t u a t i o n may even b e c o m e stronger when thwarted (30). O n e theoretically interesting point stands out, if only because it is h a r p e d on by Galen, viz. the fact that persons overcome by emotion decline right reason—even t h o u g h this does not imply the presence of a non-rational faculty simultaneous with a n d o p p o s e d to reason. T h u s p e o p l e in love self-consciously decline the good advice offered by others, whatever the price may be (27). Here, clearly, the voice of (right) reason is represented by o t h e r m e m b e r s of the community. 1 2 8 It should however be n o t e d that as the text p r o c e e d s the notion of admonitory λόγος ( r e a s o n / d i s c o u r s e ) gets m o r e a n d m o r e divorced f r o m o t h e r people actually offering it. In section 31 it is conceived of as an entity in its own right to such a degree that it is actually compared to a person offering advice. Clearly the emphasis is n o t on the o t h e r persons who offer counselling, but on the emotional person's capacity of recognizing right reason as such, even when rejecting it. T h e r e is n o difficulty in the idea that this person may also r e m i n d him or herself of the proposals of right reason. In fact, this holds also good

άμεινον εϊτε μή, και μηθέν λέγειν αύτοίς, και ώς τούτο έκ παντός γε τρόπου ποιητέον, και ει διαμαρτάνουσι καί εϊ άσύμφορόν έστιν αύτοίς ...(29) οι'ας μάλιστα φοράς καί οί έρώμενοι άξιούσι πρός έαυτους έχειν τούς έραστάς, άπερισκεπτότερον καί άνευ έπιστροφής λογικής ισταμένους καί έτι τού παραινούντος λόγου αύτοίς υπερβατικούς όντας, μάλλον δ' ούδ' δλως ύπομονητικούς άκούσαι τίνος τοιούτου ... (30) οϋτως τε μακράν άπέχουσιν άπό τού λόγου, ώς άν άκούσαι ή προσέχειν τινί τοιούτφ, ώστε μηδέ τά τοιαύτα άπό τρόπου έχει(ν) γ' αύτοίς λέγεσθαι- (( Κύπρις γάρ ούδέ νουθετουμένη χαλά- / άν γάρ βιάζη, μάλλον έντείνειν φιλεί. / ... νουθετούμενος δ' "Ερως / μάλλον πιέζει ».... (31) έτι δ' ώσπερ άκαιρον έπιτιμητήν καί ούκ έπιγνώμονα τοις γινομένοις έν τω έράν άποκλίνουσι τόν λόγον, καθάπερ άνθρωπον άκαίρως δοκούντα νουθετεΐν, ήνικα δή καί οί θεοί δοκούσιν αύτοίς έφιέναι έπιορκεΐν ... (32) έξείη - φασίν - αύτοίς τό έπιόν ποιειν άκολουθούσι τή έπιθυμία ... 128 Here Long's idea of the Stoic 'community of reason' applies, see Long (1983).

for M e d e a w h o h a d k e p t h e r plans all to herself a n d d e l i b e r a t e s by herself. Both solitary d e l i b e r a t i o n a n d advice p r o c u r e d by o t h e r s a r e at issue in the q u o t a t i o n s drawn by Chrysippus f r o m M e n a n d e r , Euripides a n d H o m e r a n d preserved by Galen in the section which c o m e s a f t e r the f r a g m e n t s we have j u s t b e e n discussing: I g o t my i n t e l l e c t in h a n d a n d s t o w e d it in a p o t . (4.6.34, SVF3.478,

M e n a n d e r fr. 7 0 2 K ö r t e - T h i e r f e l d e r . )

Two E u r i p i d e a n lines are p r e s e n t e d by Galen a little f u r t h e r , ibid. 38 (SVF3.478). Euripides, Alcestis 1079, has Heracles say to t h e bereaved Admetus: W h a t w o i d d y o u g a i n if y o u let y o u r s e l f g r i e v e f o r e v e r ?

A c c o r d i n g to Stoic m o r a l t h e o r y t h e loss of a relative technically c o u n t s as ' d i s p r e f e r r e d ' i n d i f f e r e n t . H e r e , t h e n , Heracles r e p r e s e n t s t h e voice of right r e a s o n . His advice, however, is ill-timed, witness A d m e t u s ' answer: I t o o k n o w t h a t b u t a c e r t a i n love d i s t r a c t s m e ( 1 0 8 0 ) .

Galen goes o n to r e p r o d u c e a similar passage f r o m H o m e r used by Chrysippus (ibid. 40). At II. XXIV549-551 Achilles offers consolation to Priam, saying: B e a r u p a n d d o n o t let t h e g r i e f in y o u r spirit b e i n f l e x i b l e . You will a c h i e v e n o t i n g by m o u r n i n g f o r y o u r s o n . You will n o t m a k e h i m rise u p ; s o o n e r y o u will s u f f e r yet a n o t h e r evil

Galen adds: ' H e [seil. Chrysippus] says that Achilles says these things ' s p e a k i n g in his right m i n d ' (παρ' α ύ τ ω διαλεγόμενον) 1 2 9 —these are t h e very words h e w r o t e — b u t that Achilles n o t i n f r e q u e n t l y a b a n d o n s these same j u d g e m e n t s in adverse c i r c u m s t a n c e s a n d d o e s n o t have power over himself w h e n o v e r c o m e by e m o t i o n s ' (ibid. 40-41 ~ SVF 3.478). This last piece of i n f o r m a t i o n may be somewhat m o r e h e l p f u l t h a n may a p p e a r at first sight. H e r e n o t w r o n g timing is at issue b u t s o m e t h i n g else. P e o p l e may r e p r e s e n t right reason in their advice to others, b u t this d o e s n o t of course m e a n that they always b r i n g their advice i n t o practice themselves, witness Achilles' own o u r b u r s t s of e m o t i o n , in particular his excessive grief over the d e a t h of Patroclus. 129 -phis expression is the opposite to that employed for p e o p l e in a state of emotion, see supra, p. 173.

But since it d o e s n o t o f t e n h a p p e n t h a t e v e r y o n e a r o u n d is in an e m o t i o n a l state at t h e s a m e time, it r e m a i n s possible to listen to t h e voice of r e a s o n as r e p r e s e n t e d by p e r s o n s s p e a k i n g o n e a f t e r t h e other. Having discussed rejection of right reason in t h e case of a n g e r a n d erotic desire, Chrysippus t u r n e d to pleasure (ηδονή): That in us which is agitated a n d c h a n g e d a n d d i s o b e d i e n t to reason arises n o less in the case of pleasure (ibid. 43, SVF 3 . 4 7 8 ) . 1 3 0

T h e s u m m a r i z i n g r e m a r k e n c a p s u l a t e s t h r e e related key e l e m e n t s in C h r y s i p p u s ' p o r t r a y a l of e m o t i o n : a g i t a t i o n , loss of o u r ( b e t t e r ) selves, a n d d i s o b e d i e n c e to correct reason.

7. Madness and Mental Blindness In e m o t i o n we cut ourselves off f r o m right reason, thus loosing something essential to o u r t r u e identity as h u m a n beings a n d forsaking the role N a t u r e has o r d a i n e d f o r us. A few f r a g m e n t s f r o m t h e Therapeutics b r i n g o u t yet a n o t h e r aspect of Chrysippus' analysis of e m o t i o n that has n o t received t h e a t t e n t i o n it deserves, viz. its epistemic side, in line with the cognitive n a t u r e of e m o t i o n a n d t h e causal explanation we e n c o u n t e r e d in t h e 'logical' books. T h i s epistemic aspect is e x p r e s s e d in t e r m s of m a d n e s s a n d a c o n c o m i t a n t m e n t a l blindness (τυφλότης) to w h a t is obvious. In w h a t follows I shall c o n s i d e r t h e relevant f r a g m e n t s in t h e light of b o t h G a l e n ' s t r e a t m e n t a n d relevant C h r y s i p p e a n m a t e r i a l f r o m o t h e r sources. In a d d i t i o n , t h e s e f r a g m e n t s invite c o m p a r i s o n with m e d i c a l a n d o t h e r p h i l o s o p h i c a l sources, notably Plato a n d Aristotle. T h e set of r e l a t e d f r a g m e n t s to b e e x a m i n e d f o l l o w e d t h o s e discussed in t h e previous section, that is to say, Chrysippus w e n t o n to explain t h e idea of losing oneself in t e r m s of m e n t a l b l i n d n e s s a n d , what a m o u n t s to t h e same thing, of m a d n e s s . This a p p e a r s f r o m the following t h r e e snippets of text, which a c c o r d i n g to Galen f o r m e d a c o n t i n o u s w h o l e (4.6.44-6, SVF 3.478; G a l e n ' s transitional f o r m u l a s a r e indicated by dots) : (44) We take such leave o f o u r s e l v e s a n d g e t so far o u t s i d e o f o u r s e l v e s a n d are so c o m p l e t e l y b l i n d e d in our frustrations that 130 τό γάρ δή σεσοβημένον καί παρηλλαχός έν ήμΐν καί άπειθές τώ λόγψ οϋχ ήττον έπί τής ήδονής καταγίνεται.

s o m e t i m e s if w e h a v e a s p o n g e o r a p i e c e o f w o o l in o u r h a n d s we lift it u p a n d t h r o w it as if we w o u l d t h e r e b y a c c o m p l i s h a n y t h i n g . If we h a d h a p p e n e d to h a v e a k n i f e o r s o m e o t h e r o b j e c t , we s h o u l d h a v e u s e d it in t h e s a m e way [....] ( 4 5 ) O f t e n i n this k i n d of b l i n d n e s s w e b i t e keys a n d b e a t a g a i n s t t h e d o o r s w h e n t h e y a r e n o t q u i c k l y o p e n e d , a n d if w e s t u m b l e o n a s t o n e w e t a k e p u n i t i v e m e a s u r e s , b r e a k i n g it a n d t h r o w i n g it s o m e w h e r e , a n d all t h e w h i l e we u s e t h e s t r a n g e s t l a n g u a g e . [...] (46) F r o m s u c h a c t i o n s o n e w o u l d g r a s p b o t h t h e irrational n a t u r e of t h e a f f e c t i o n s a n d h o w b l i n d e d we a r e o n s u c h o c c a s i o n s , as t h o u g h we h a d b e c o m e d i f f e r e n t p e r s o n s f r o m t h o s e w h o h a d e a r l i e r e n g a g e d in p h i l o s o p h i c a l c o n v e r s a t i o n s . 1 3 1

Galen ( ibid. 48) tells us that Chrysippus s u b s u m e d such instances of irrational b e h a v i o u r u n d e r the h e a d i n g of ' m o v i n g a b o u t like a m a d m a n ' (κινεΐσθαι μανιωδώς). His vivid portrayal of a n g e r a n d o t h e r e m o t i o n s is clearly d e s i g n e d to b r i n g h o m e their repulsiveness a n d s h e e r foolishness. In fact similar d e s c r i p t i o n s are o f t e n e n c o u n t e r e d in Stoic a n d non-Stoic tracts alike. 1 3 2 P h i l o d e m u s (De ira, col. 1.10-20) r e p o r t s that they took u p a lot of space in Chrysippus' Therapeutics This is very valuable i n f o r m a t i o n . As we have seen (§ 5), p e o p l e in an e m o t i o n a l crisis a r e n o t (or less) receptive to reason, a n d c a n n o t b e easily h e l p e d . T h i s l e n d s a d d i t i o n a l weight to preventive measures, like these r e p e l l e n t descriptions of e m o t i o n a l p e o p l e which are calculated to c h a n g e o u r j u d g e m e n t s of the s e c o n d type, viz. that a particular e m o t i o n a l r e s p o n s e is a p p r o p r i a t e in a given situation s h o u l d it befall us. T h e y advise us to b r a c e ourselves f o r the onset of e m o t i o n by a d o p t i n g b e t t e r j u d g e m e n t s . In the passage q u o t e d above t h e s h e e r irrationality of e m o t i o n is illustrated by a failure to grasp t h e identity of things: o n e mistakes a sponge for s o m e t h i n g suitable for throwing, or a d o o r for a 131

(44) οΰτω γάρ έξιστάμεθα και έξω γινόμεθα εαυτών καί τελέως άποτυφλούμεθα έν τοις σφαλλομένοις, ώστε έστιν ότε σπόγγον έχοντες ή έριον έν ταις χερσί τοΰτο[ν] διαράμενοι βάλλομεν ώς δή τι περα[ι]νοΰντες δι' αυτών, εί δ' έτυγχάνομεν μάχαιραν έχοντες ή άλλο τι, τούτω άν έχρησάμεθα παραπλησίως. (45) πολλάκις δέ κατά τήν τοιαύτην τυφλότητα τάς κλεις δάκνομεν και τάς θύρας τύπτομεν ού ταχύ αύτών άνοιγομένων πρός τε τούς λίθους έάν προσπταίσωμεν, τιμωρητικώς προσφερόμεθα καταγνύντες καί ριπτούντες αύτούς ε'ίς τινας τόπους καί έπιλέγοντες καθ' έκαστα τούτων άτοπώτατα. (46) έννοήσειε δ' άν τις έκ τών τοιούτων καί τήν έν τοις πάθεσιν άλογιστίαν καί ώς έν τοις τοιούτοις άποτυφλούμεθα καιροΐς ώς άν έ'τεροι τίνες γεγονότες τών προ[σ]διαλελογισμένων. Cf. Cic. Tusc. 3.11. 132 For blindness in anger cf. Philod. De ira col. XXXIII.3 Indelli. The example of biting the key of a closed door and that of throwing a piece of wool are also mentioned by Philodemus (Fr. 8 Indelli). On injuries inflicted in anger cf. Gal. A f f . Dig. 4, p. 13 De Boer and the further references collected by De Lacy ad PHP 278.32-280.1. A prime Stoic example is the preface to Seneca's On Anger expounding the horrors of this affection (I, 1). See also infra, p. 320 n. 69 with text thereto.

p u n i s h a b l e living being. Reason m a l f u n c t i o n s in n o l o n g e r recognizing t h e obvious as such. This is c o m p a r e d to blindness. T h e epistemic p u r p o r t of this simile b e c o m e s c l e a r e r f r o m a p r e c i o u s f r a g m e n t f r o m his On Inconsistency o r On Disharmony (Περί ά ν ο μ ο λ ο γ ί α ) 1 3 3 q u o t e d by Plutarch. H e r e Chrysippus a p p e n d s a g e n e r a l observation to the m o r e traditional p h e n o m e n o l o g y of a n g e r : '... Anger is something blind and often it does not allow us to see what is obvious and often it stakes out a screen before what is grasped....' And a little further on he says: 'The ensuing emotions expel the calculations and what appears differently, pushing us forcibly toward the opposite course of action.' Next he avails himself of Menander as a witness saying: 'Oh how wretched am I: where in my body was my wit at that time when I chose not this but that?' 134 And again a little further on he says: 'Even though what has the nature of a rational animal uses its reason in each individual instance and is steered thereby, we often turn our backs on it, being subject to another, more powerful motion [seil, than that of reason].' (Plutarch, On Moral Virtue450C, SVF3.390). 135 T h i s f r a g m e n t a d d s a few clues as to how Chrysippus conceived of e m o t i o n f r o m an epistemological p o i n t of view. A n g e r obscures what is 'obvious' (έκφανή), 1 3 6 i.e. n o obvious p r e s e n t a t i o n s o c c u r that can b e reliably a c c e p t e d . T h e i m a g e of t h e screen p u t in f r o n t of t h e 133

I.e. at once with oneself and with cosmic reason (λόγος). With reference to the end (τέλος) Zeno spoke of 'living consistently' or 'harmoniously' (ομολογουμένως) tout court, see SVF 1.179 ff, cf. 3.2 ff. With what follows also keep in mind that the noun ομολογία could be equivalent to αρμονία and συμφωνία; cf. Pl. Sym. 187b with Long (1991) 97 f. 134 Fr. 567 Kock/743 Körte. 135 έν δέ τοις Περί άνομολογίας ό Χρύσιππος ειπών ότι τυφλόν έστιν ή όργή καί πολλάκις μέν ούκ έά όράν τά έκφανή, πολλάκις δέ τοις καταλαμβανομένοις έπιπροσθεΐ. μικρόν προελθών • τά γάρ έπιγιγνόμενα, φησί, πάθη έκκρούει τους λογισμούς καί τά ώς έτέρως φαινόμενα, βιαίως προωθούντα έπί τάς έναντίας πράξεις, είτα χρήται μάρτυρι τω Μενάνδρι λέγοντι· Οϊμοι τάλας έγωγε, πού ποθ' αί φρένες I ήμών έκεΐνον ήσαν έν τω σώματι I τόν χρόνον, οτ' ού ταύτ', άλλ' έκείν' ήρούμεθα; καί πάλιν ό Χρύσιππος προελθών τού λογικού, φησι, ζφου φύσιν έχοντος προσχρήσθαι εις έκαστα τφ λόγω καί ύπό τούτου κυβερνάσθαι, πολλάκις άποστρέφεσθαι αύτόν ημάς, άλλη βιαιοτέρα φορα χρωμένους. As we have noticed, the last quotation reiterates a passage from the opening section of book I: see supra, p. 100. A few further echoes in the Plutarchean context are included by Von Arnim among the fragments of the On Affections, viz. at 450b and 449d (~ SVF3.468). 136 The typically Chrysippean term έκφανής refers to the clarity distinctive of cognitive presentations, see e.g. PHP 3.1.15 (SVF 2.885) with Tieleman (1996a) 143f.

things that are normally grasped (τοις καταλαμβανομένοις) illustrates this m e n t a l c l o u d i n g , or blindness. E m o t i o n prevents the o c c u r r e n c e of c o g n i t i o n ( κ α τ α λ ή ψ ι ς ) in its technical sense of assent to an obvious, o r 'cognitive', p r e s e n t a t i o n . Given t h e latter's status as criterion of t r u t h , o n e c o u l d also say that we n o l o n g e r perceive t h e t r u e as true. This serious d i s o r d e r t h e n explains t h e irrational b e h a v i o u r o n which Chrysippus is so e l o q u e n t in On Affections. Secondly, e m o t i o n puts an e n d to d e l i b e r a t i o n , expelling alternative p r e s e n t a t i o n s ( φ α ι ν ό μ ε ν α ) a n d leaving only o n e o p t i o n which ipso facto b e c o m e s irresistible—a p o i n t which recalls t h e c o n c e p t i o n of r a t i o n a l t h o u g h t as an i n t e r n a l d i a l o g u e b e t w e e n two m e n t a l voices, o n e of which r e p r e s e n t s 'right r e a s o n ' (see below, pp. 268 ff.). T h e p h r a s e ' t h e ... e m o t i o n s expel t h e calculations' can be paralleled almost exactly f r o m Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics Γ .12: 1119b10. A coincidence? T h a t seems unlikely. 1 3 7 It is worth q u o t i n g the p h r a s e in its Aristotelian c o n t e x t . Having d e s c r i b e d i n c o n t i n e n c e in r e g a r d to desire as peculiar to c h i l d r e n , Aristotle continues: If, t h e n , it [seil, d e s i r e ] is n o t g o i n g t o b e o b e d i e n t a n d s u b j e c t t o w h a t r u l e s [ o r : t h e r u l i n g p r i n c i p l e ] , it will g o t o g r e a t l e n g t h s ; f o r in a n u n t h i n k i n g b e i n g t h e d e s i r e f o r p l e a s u r e is i n s a t i a b l e a n d t r i e s every s o u r c e of g r a t i f i c a t i o n , a n d t h e e x e r c i s e of a p p e t i t e i n c r e a s e s its i n n a t e f o r c e , a n d if a p p e t i t e s a r e s t r o n g a n d v i o l e n t t h e y e v e n e x p e l c a l c u l a t i o n . H e n c e t h e y s h o u l d b e m o d e r a t e a n d few, a n d s h o u l d in n o way o p p o s e r e a s o n [...] t h e a p p e t i t i v e s h o u l d live a c c o r d i n g t o r e a s o n ... H e n c e t h e a p p e t i t i v e in a t e m p e r a t e m a n s h o u l d h a r m o n i z e w i t h r e a s o n .... (ibid. 1 1 1 9 b 7 - 1 5 ; N e w O x f o r d t r a n s l a t i o n , m o d i fied).138

Chrysippus would surely n o t have used t h e substantivized n e u t r e ' t h e appetitive' (which o u r translators usually s u p p l e m e n t with ' p a r t ' or 137 j a g r e e vvith Sandbach (1985) e.g. 57 that we should never proceed on the assumption that the Stoics will have known Aristotle and so must have been influenced by him. However, I consider it legitimate to adduce Aristotelian passages in those cases where this seems to provide the best explanation of a particular feature of Stoic philosophy (whether we assume direct dependence on Aristotle's original exposition or an intermediary source or tradition); in other words, Aristotelian influence should not be precluded in principle. For responsible comparisons of Aristotle and Stoic ethics and psychology see Long (1968), Rist (1969) ch. 1 and Inwood (1985) ch. 1. For further discussion of possible Aristotelian influence see infra, pp. 273 ff. 138 εί οΰν μή έσται εϋπειθές καί υπό τό αρχον, έπι πολυ ήξει- άπληστος γαρ ή του ήδέος ορεξις καί πανταχόθεν τφ άνοήτφ, καί ή τής επιθυμίας ένέργεια αΰξειτό συγγενές, καν μεγάλαι καί σφοδραί ώσι, καί τόν λογισμόν έκκρούουσιν. διό δει μετρίας είναι αύτάς καί ολίγας, καί τω λόγω έναντιοΰσθαι. [...] ξήν [...] καί τό έπιθυμητικόν κατά τόν λόγον. διό δει του σώφρονος τό έπιθυμητικόν συμφωνείν ...

' e l e m e n t ' ) o n his own behalf. 1 3 9 This t e r m clearly b e l o n g s to Aristotle's dualistic m o d e l . But in all o t h e r r e s p e c t s this passage closely r e s e m b l e s t h e Stoic a c c o u n t , b o t h in its p i c t u r i n g of desire a n d the n e e d to achieve psychic h a r m o n y a n d in t h e very terminology used. C h r y s i p p u s , too, d e f i n e s d e s i r e ( ο ρ ε ξ ι ς ) as t h e c o r r e c t f o r m of c o n a t i o n (όρμή) a n d a p p e t i t e (επιθυμία) as its a b e r r a n t a n d excessive f o r m (see above, p. 120). H e t o o explains a p p e t i t e a n d o t h e r e m o tions in t e r m s of d i s o b e d i e n c e to r e a s o n . For h i m r e a s o n is n o t a s e p a r a t e faculty, as f o r Aristotle, b u t t h e d i s c r e p a n c y is surely mitig a t e d by t h e fact t h a t a c c o r d i n g to t h e latter h u m a n desire t o o is rational in t h e sense that it is in p r i n c i p l e receptive to t h e voice of reason (Aristotle explains this in t h e final c h a p t e r of t h e first b o o k , A. 13). Clearly this lends a n o r m a t i v e value to reason. As all r e a d e r s of Aristotle know, its o p t i m a l f u n c t i o n i n g r e p r e s e n t s t h e virtue of practical wisdom (φρόνησις). But a n o t h e r way of r e f e r r i n g to this aspect is in terms of ' r i g h t r e a s o n ' (ό όρθος λόγος). This is reason d e t e r m i n i n g t h e r i g h t m e a n b e t w e e n excess a n d deficiency. 1 4 0 It constitutes t h e ' m e a s u r e ' in terms of which t h e excess is d e f i n e d : h e n c e desire in the t e m p e r a t e m a n s h o u l d h a r m o n i z e with r e a s o n . For Chrysippus a n d o t h e r Stoics, too, the virtuous m a n lives 'in h a r m o n y ' a n d h e d o e s so w h e n h e obeys right reason, an expression they adopted. 1 4 1 T h e term λόγος is h e r e (as o f t e n elsewhere) translated as ' r e a s o n ' b u t its r a n g e of m e a n i n g i n c l u d e s t h e i d e a of m e a s u r e , as is also clear f r o m t h e Aristotelian passage. This s h o u l d also be k e p t in m i n d with respect to t h e Stoic c o n c e p t of right reason a n d t h e h a r m o n y it brings. 1 4 2 Being t h e r i g h t m e a s u r e , it p r e c l u d e s t h e excess which m a r k s e m o t i o n a c c o r d i n g to t h e Z e n o n i a n d e f i n i t i o n . It seems to b e this c o m p l e x of ideas o n which C h r y s i p p u s f o c u s e d in his On Inconsistency (or On Disharmony).

139 He does so ap. Gal. PHP 4. 1.7-10 (SVF 2.905), but this is in an argument directed against Plato, turning the latter's terminology against him. The Stoic τό ήγεμονικόν is one of the soul's parts according to the Stoic division, see e.g. Chrys. ap. Gal. P//P3.1.10-15 (SVF2.885). The Stoics also used terms with the same root as Aristotle's τό αρχον for their ruling part, see e.g. Chrys. ap. Gal. PHP 2.2.19 (SVF 2.895, i.e. from the On the Soul) : έν ταΐς συγκαταθέσεσιν έπινεύοντες τήν κεφαλήν, έφ' δ φέρομεν αυτήν μέρος, έν έκείνω α ρ χ ή ν τής ψυχής ΰπάρχειν ένδεικνύμεθα. Cf. ibid. 2.3.4: έστι δέ τό ήγεμονικόν, ώς καί αύτοι βούλονται, τ ό κατάρχον αίσθήσεως τε καί όρμής. 140 See esp. FW Ζ. 1: 1138b 18-34 141 See D.L. 7.88; Stob. Eel. II, 75.11 ff. W. and supra, n. 133. 142 On the term λόγος as 'measure' in connection with psychic harmony, see Long (1991), esp. 102 f.

T h e q u o t a t i o n f r o m M e n a n d e r r e p r e s e n t s the t h i r d stage of e m o tion: t h e recovery f r o m t h e m e n t a l c l o u d i n g . By t h e same t o k e n we regain o u r capacity f o r the i n t e r n a l d i a l o g u e that m a r k s t h e p r o p e r f u n c t i o n i n g of r e a s o n . T h u s two alternative o p t i o n s again p r e s e n t themselves for c o m p a r i s o n , a n d the speaker now w o n d e r s why at the crucial m o m e n t h e h a d lost sight of t h e r e a s o n a b l e a n d p r e f e r a b l e o n e . In the last s n i p p e t of text, which seems to state a general conclusion, we m u s t n o t e an additional r e f e r e n c e to a n o t h e r motion that can be m o r e p o w e r f u l t h a n t h a n of reason which normally rules. This is t h e kind of e l e m e n t which, if f o u n d in Z e n o or Posidonius o r even Chrysippus, would have b e e n seized u p o n by Galen to a r g u e that a non-rational power of s o m e sort is a c k n o w l e d g e d . But of course this is n o t what Chrysippus m e a n t . T h e intellect is c a p a b l e of processes which are irrational in the normative sense, i.e. f r o m the perspective of c o r r e c t or right reason. T h e answer to t h e question why a n d how this is possible s h o u l d in my view be f o u n d in t h e soul's corporeality. Indications to this effect have b e e n e n c o u n t e r e d in o u r t r e a t m e n t of f r a g m e n t s f r o m the earlier books (see above, pp. 102 ff., 132 ff.). In what follows we shall have to k e e p this physical basis of the Stoic c o n c e p t i o n in m i n d . But in t h e set of f r a g m e n t s at issue h e r e t h e e p i s t e m i c a s p e c t — l a c k i n g f r o m Aristotle's a c c o u n t of e m o t i o n — s e e m s p r e d o m i n a n t . T h i s b e c o m e s clear f r o m t h e aspect of t h e obviousness of m e n t a l a p p e a r a n c e s t h a t is r e p e a t e d l y r e f e r r e d to. Obviousness is t h e m a r k of the class of a p p e a r a n c e s called 'kataleptic' or 'cognitive' (φαντασίαι καταλεπτικαί). 1 4 3 This technical c o n c e p t , in c o m m o n with all a p p e a r a n c e s , e n c a p s u l a t e s b o t h an objective a n d a subjective aspect. It p r e s u p p o s e s an actual state of affairs i n d e p e n d e n t of us a n d a c o n t r i b u t i o n o n o u r part, viz. t h e m e n t a l assent we normally g r a n t such p r e s e n t a t i o n s . P e o p l e w h o suffer m e n t a l disease are typically u n a b l e to have such p r e s e n t a t i o n s owing to the defective quality of their souls. T h i s s e e m s to b e t h e m a i n symptom of what Chrysippus u n d e r s t o o d by m a d n e s s ( μ α ν ί α ) . T h e topic of m a d n e s s also f e a t u r e s in epistemological contexts a n d in p a r t i c u l a r in a c c o u n t s of m e n t a l a p p e a r a n c e ( φ α ν τ α σ ί α ) in its various f o r m s . Madness may involve the f o r m a t i o n of an a p p e a r a n c e w i t h o u t t h e r e b e i n g a o b j e c t o u t s i d e us causing it (i.e. what we call hallucination). 1 4 4 T h i s is e x p l a i n e d by o u r s o u r c e s in t e r m s of ' t h e 143

See supra, n. 136. Sext. M 7.249 (,S'V7'"2.65). On the modern distinction between hallucination and illusion (on which see further below in text), Pigeaud (1987) 97 144

affections within us' (τών έν ήμίν παθών) 1 4 5 or ' m o v e m e n t s of the m i n d itself, 1 4 6 for which p h e n o m e n o n the Stoics used the technical expression 'vacuous a t t r a c t i o n ' or 'vacuous pull' (διάκενος ελκυσμός). 1 4 7 This was also called u p o n to explain situations in which an external object exists but is perceived incorrectly, i.e. what we would r a t h e r call 'illusion'. O n e of the Stoics' favourite examples was the passage f r o m Euripides' Orestes w h e r e its insane h e r o mistakes his own sister Electra for a Fury (Or. 264 ff.). 1 4 8 For o u r p u r p o s e s this type of situation is m o r e interesting than hallucination. Affections in the sense of violent e m o t i o n s also involve m i s j u d g e m e n t d u e to a weak, diseased condition of the soul—indeed o n e to which according to the Stoics the majority of h u m a n k i n d is all too p r o n e . I believe that we s h o u l d n o t dismiss s t r o n g t e r m s such as ' m a d n e s s ' as m e r e rhetoric. These terms stand for theoretical concepts belonging to the epistemological framework I have indicated. T h e r e can be n o d o u b t that both the epistemological account of madness a n d the characterization of the affections in terms of this a c c o u n t go back to Chrysippus. 1 4 9 Of p a r t i c u l a r interest is the r e f e r e n c e to the vacuous attraction or pull as s o m e t h i n g the weak or diseased soul may u n d e r g o . This idea was to be picked u p by Posidonius in his elaboration of the c o n c e p t of'affective pull'. 1 5 0 Madness as ignorance with r e f e r e n c e to moral action is at issue in a passage f r o m Arius Didymus, which may be taken to be indebted to 145 Sext. M 7.241 (SVF 2.64); cf. 245. This expression is taken up by κατά παθός said of melancholy and phrenitis, ibid. 247; it is not feasible to take the expression κατά παθός as referring to the passivity which is at issue as a feature of presentations in the preceding context; cf. e.g. Bréhier (1951) 88. Rather the term must cover affections in the broad sense covering anger, fear and other emotions as well as inebriation, melancholy and frenzy. 146 Cic. Luc. 48: mens moveatur ipsa per sese ... per se motu mentis aliquo ... 147 Sext. AÍ 7.241, 245 (SVF2.64, 65); Aëtius IV, 12.1 (SVF2.54). 148 Sext. 7.244 -5 (SVF2.65); Aëtius IV, 12.1 (SVF2.54); cf. Gourinat (1996) 40-2 (note that Gourinat subsumes cases where an external object is present but incorrectly represented under 'hallucination'). 149 Our two main sources Aëtius IV, 12.1 and Sextus M 7.241-249 run closely parallel. But Aëtius, unlike Sextus, refers to Chrysippus and preserves two quotations from Euripides and a reference to Homer (Od. υ 350-7). This feature may reflect the original Chrysippean exposition. From which treatise it derives is a moot point. The On Affections cannot be ruled out but it is worth noting that the second book of the On the Soul contained a discussion of mental appearance (see D.L. 7.50 ~ SVF 2.55). In typical fashion Chrysippus also derived the term for appearance (φαντασία) from that for light (φάος/φως), an etymology anticipated by Aristotle, De an. 429a (Aēt. ibid Cf. Sext. M 7.162). As to the Early Stoic provenance of this material see also Sextus M 7.255 (referring to the older Stoics); cf. ibid. 8.67 ff. 150 See infra, pp. 231 ff.

Chrysippus (note also the presence of Zeno's definition of affection as a 'fluttering' of the soul): ... Further, they say that every inferior person is mad, 151 being ignorant of himself and of the things that concern him—which is what madness is. 152 [They hold that] ignorance is the vice opposite to wisdom: this [seil, ignorance] is madness, because, being disposed in relation to something, renders the conations disorderly and fluttering; this is why they give this outline of madness: fluttering ignorance (Arius Didymus ap. Stob. Eel. II 7.5b p.68.18-23 Wachsmuth = SVF 3.663). 153 Madness, then is an ignorant condition as o p p o s e d to the irregular c o n a t i o n s arising f r o m it, i.e. the affections or emotions. This of course agrees with Chrysippus' likening of affections to irregular fevers as opposed to the underlying diseased state (see above, p. 155). F u r t h e r m o r e , the Chrysippean ontological genus of 'being disposed in relation to something' is used to relate the ignorant condition to a specific object of conation a n d h e n c e action. 1 5 4 Indeed, the genus of relative disposition f e a t u r e s m o r e o f t e n in t h e Stoic a c c o u n t of ' a p p r o p r i a t i o n ' (οίκείωσις), that is to say, how we naturally choose or avoid (the two main kinds of conation) particular things. 1 5 5 H e r e , then, the Stoics a p p e a l e d to o u r soul being disposed, favourably or otherwise, in relation to these objects. This disposition explains natural a n d appropriate actions (i.e. the so-called καθήκοντα). 1 5 6 T h e 151 Cf. Plut. Stoic. Rep. 31; 1048E, D.L. 8.124, Cic. Tusc 4.54; cf. 3.10. 152 p i g g e d (1987) 86 points to a very similar definition from Aretaeus of Cappadocia, SD 1.3.2, p.38.6-7 Hude. Yet Aretaeus (c. 150-200 cf.) is an exponent of the Pneumatist school of medicine which drew on Stoicism for much of its physiology. In consequence, it is more likely that Aretaeus' definition reflects the Stoic one than that the latter reflects a common medical tradition. 153

"Ετι δέ λέγουσι πάντα φαΰλον μαίνεσθαι, άγνοιαν έχοντα αύτοϋ καί τών καθ' αυτόν, δπερ έστί μανία. Τήν δ' άγνοιαν είναι έναντίαν κακίαν τή φρονήσει· ταύτην δέ πρός τί πως έχουσαν άκαταστάτους καί πτοιώδεις παρεχομένην τάς ορμάς μανίαν είναι - διό καί ύπογράφουσι τήν μανίαν οϋτως· άγνοιαν πτοιώδη. 154 For an excellent account of this Stoic 'genus', with a transladon of the most important texts, see Long and Sedley (1987) vol. 1, 176-179, who argue cogently that all four genera were introduced by Chrysippus (p. 178 f.). 155 Hierocles 2.1-9; Hierocles ap. Stob. IV p.671.7-9, Anon, in Plat. Theaet. 5.186.31. 156 N o t e (hat t h e formulation τών καθ' αυτόν in the second part of the definition echoes the explanation given by Zeno of the technical term καθήκον he coined: κατωνομάσθαι δέ οϋτως υπό πρώτου Ζήνωνος τό καθήκον, άπό του κ α τ ά τ ι ν α ς ή κ ε ι ν τής προσονομασίας είλλημμένης. ένέργημα δέ αύτό είναι ταΐς κατά φύσιν κατασκευαΐς οίκείον (D.I.. 7.107). Assessing what is or is not appropriate to one's constitution presupposes the self-knowledge referred to in the first part of the definition. On self-knowledge or self-perception in the doctrine of

c o n d i t i o n of insanity m e a n s that t h e process of a p p r o p r i a t i o n has b e c o m e d i s t u r b e d . H e n c e t h e d e f i n i t i o n of insanity as i g n o r a n c e b o t h of oneself a n d t h e things t h a t c o n c e r n o n e . O n e is n o l o n g e r able to relate external things to oneself a n d assess t h e m as to w h e t h e r they a r e conducive or h a r m f u l to o u r well-being. T h e vices that c o u n t as f o r m s of m a d n e s s are characterized by their p r o n e n e s s to o n e kind of external thing. E x a m p l e s are n o t given, in line with t h e c o n d e n s e d n a t u r e of S t o b a e u s ' e x p o s i t i o n . But w h a t is lacking can b e easily s u p p l e m e n t e d f r o m t h e On Affections itself: F o r t h e s e i n f i r m i t i e s a r e n o t s p o k e n of as b e i n g in t h e j u d g e m e n t t h a t e a c h of t h e s e t h i n g s is g o o d b u t also in r e s p e c t o f b e i n g g i v e n t o t h e m b e y o n d w h a t is n a t u r a l , f o r w h i c h r e a s o n it is q u i t e r e a s o n a b l e t h a t s o m e a r e c a l l e d ' w o m a n - m a d ' a n d ' b i r d - m a d ' ( P H P 4 . 5 . 2 1 - 2 ~ SVF 3.480).157

Chrysippus p o i n t s to c o m m o n expressions such as ' w o m a n - m a d ' as r e f e r r i n g to t h e m o r b i d state of b e i n g excessively a t t r a c t e d to o n e particular kind of object. 1 5 8 T h e excess which m a r k s t h e m a d n e s s is o n c e again m e a s u r e d in t e r m s of t h e n a t u r a l (see above, p. 101). Of c o u r s e value j u d g e m e n t s of type 1 a r e involved (even t h o u g h Galen tries to play d o w n this aspect in o r d e r to i n t i m a t e t h a t Chrysippus c o n t r a d i c t e d himself). T h e t e r m infirmity, o r weakness (άρρώστημα), refers to the lack of physical s t r e n g t h o r of ' t e n s i o n ' of t h e c o r p o r e a l soul. 1 5 9 T h i s e x p l a i n s its excessive b e h a v i o u r , t h o u g h n o t t h e p a r t i c u l a r p r e dilection involved. This was d e s i g n a t e d as a 'disease' (νόσημα) of the c o r p o r e a l soul. 1 6 0 Disease is a state in which t h e mistaken j u d g m e n t

appropriation, see D.L. 7.85, Hierocles 1.34-9, 51-7 (= LS 57C), 9.3-10 (LS 57D); cf. Pint. Stoic. Rep. 1038B. 157 ού γάρ έν τω κρίνειν άγαθά έ'καστα τούτων λέγεται άρρωστήματα ταύτα, ά λ λ α καί κατά τό έπί πλέον έκπεπτωκέναι πρός ταύτα τού κατά φύσιν. όθεν ούκ άλόγως γυναικομανεΐς τίνες λέγονται καί όρνιθομανεΐς 158 Chrysippus made the same point in a work entitled Introduction to the Treatise [or: Study] Concerned with Good and Bad Things, see Athen. Deipn. XI, 464d (~ SVF 3.667). He listed pairs of commonly used synonyms, o n e of each pair having the prefix φιλο- ('-loving'), the other ending on -μανής ('mad for'), e.g. the doublet φίλοινος / οίνομανής. The name madness, he affirms, is used 'not inappositely' in the case of these people, 'erring as they do in a mad way (μανικώς) and being to a greater extent [seil, than others] disconnected from the truth'. 159 See the fragment quoted at 5.2.27 (SVF 3.471), where άρρώστημα is associated with mental strength and tension analogous to those of the body. 160 The corporeal nature and causes are indicated by the fact a physical addiction such as alcoholism is listed among its species.

about something becomes a strong a n d persistent desire for it. Lack of the power to resist makes the disease an intimity as well. 161 Chrysippus' appeal to c o m m o n parlance in justifying his use of the term 'madness' for emotional dispositions is a typical e l e m e n t of his philosophical m e t h o d . But n o t only did h e link u p with c o m m o n experience; h e also modelled his d o c t r i n e on c o n t e m p o r a r y medicine. In medical authors f r o m the Hellenistic period onwards madness or insanity ( μ α ν ί α ) is d e f i n e d technically as a c h r o n i c mental disorder without fever (as o p p o s e d to so-called phrenitis). 1 6 2 Fever may supervene, however. 1 6 3 A n o t h e r point worth noting is the fact that m a d n e s s n o t only disturbs the capacity for j u d g e m e n t but is linked to e m o t i o n , or at least to certain emotions. It is m a r k e d by e i t h e r elation or d e p r e s s i o n , i.e. p l e a s u r e o r pain a c c o r d i n g to a n c i e n t classifications. 1 6 4 Chrysippus may well have m o d e l l e d his distinction b e t w e e n m a d n e s s as an e n d u r i n g disease a n d t h e emotions as its feverish outbursts on medical sources. If so he was not the first philosopher to d o so. An earlier example of the philosophical use of the idea of m a d n e s s occurs in a key lfil

Chrysippus' doctrine is no doubt reflected at D.L. 7.115 (SW 3.422): ώς δέ λέγεται τινα έπί του σώματος άρρωστήματα, οίον ποδάγρα καί αρθρίτιδες, οϋτω κάπί τής ψυχής φιλοδοξία καί φιληδονία καί τά παραπλήσια, το γάρ άρρώστημά έστι νόσημα μετά άσθενείας, τό δέ νόσημα ο'ίησις σφόδρα δοκοΰντος αίρετοΰ. See also Stob. EcL II p.93.6-10 (SVF3.421): νόσημα δ' είναι δόξαν έπιθυμίας έρρυηκυίαν εις έ|ιν καί ένεσκιρωμένην, καθ' ην ύπολαμβάνουσι τά μή αιρετά σφόδρα αιρετά είναι, οίον φιλογυνίαν, φιλοινίαν, φιλαργυρίαν· είναι δέ τινα καί έναντία (τούτοις) τοις νοσήμασι κατά προσκοπήν γινόμενα, οίον μισογυνίαν, μισοινίαν, μισανθρωπίαν. τά δέ νοσήματα μετ' άσθενείας συμβαίνοντα άρρωστήματα καλεΐσθαι. See the parallel treatment in Cic. Tusc. 4.23-31 (SVF 3.424, 427, 425, 426). The diseased state was also designated by the term διάθεσις, on whose medical provenance see Ackerknecht (1982). What Galen, Aff. I, 3, VIII p.32 K. (SVF 3.429) says about διάθεσις in a different context in a different work conforms to the above Stoic definitions of the soul's diseases: κινήσεως δ' ούσης κατά γένος διττής, άλλοιώσεώς τε καί φοράς, δταν εις μόνιμον άφίκηται διάθεσιν ή άλλοίωσις, ονομάζεται νόσημα, παρά φύσιν ούσα δηλονότι διάθεσις· καταχρώμενοι δ' ένίοτε καί τήν τοιαύτην διάθεσιν όνομάζομεν πάθος. The last is exactly what Galen does with respect to a Chrysippean passage where the διάθεσις/πάθος distinction is used in the proper sense. Disease and infirmity in the above senses are treated by the same sources inconjunction with 'proclivity' (εύεμπτωσία), viz. to species of distress (e.g. pity) or anger; on which see further Kidd (1983). 162 Cf. ps. Gal. Def. med. XIX, p.416 K., Aretaeus SD 1.6.1, p.41.12-18 Hude, Caelius Aurelianus AÍ.C. I 5, 146, 150, all of which, though dating from the Imperial period, no doubt reflect an earlier stage of the history of medicine. See Pigeaud (1987) 67 ff. 163 Cf. Pigeaud (1987) 34. 164 An early witness is the Hippocratic tract The Sacred Disease, ch. 17. From a much later date but important in view of its probable connection to Stoicism (cf. supra, n. 152) is Aretaeus of Cappadocia, SDp. 41 Hude; cf. Pigeaud (1987) 74 ff.

passage in the Platonic Timaeus, 86b-88d. I believe that this passage, too, looms b e h i n d some of the Stoic texts we are considering. In what follows I h o p e to show that the resemblances c o n c e r n e d are sufficiently close a n d n u m e r o u s to warrant this assumption. Again, my aim is n o t mindless source-hunting b u t drawing comparisons which would bring into relief the specific n a t u r e and motivation of the Stoic position. In o t h e r words, o n c e the resemblances have b e e n established, the differences stand out m o r e clearly. At 8 6 b l - 2 Plato turns to diseases of the soul (τά ... περί ψυχήν νοσήματα), which h e straightforwardly ascribes to the condition of the body (δια σώματος εξιν). T h e issue of the soul's (according to Plato incorporeal) substance is left out of account. Plato continues: It m u s t b e g r a n t e d , t h e n , t h a t folly ( ά ν ο ι α ) is t h e d i s e a s e ( ν ό σ ο ν ) o f t h e s o u l , a n d of m i n d l e s s n e s s t h e r e a r e two k i n d s . O n e is m a d n e s s ( μ α ν ί α ν ) , t h e o t h e r is i g n o r a n c e ( ά μ α θ ί α ν ) . S o w h e n s o m e o n e s u f f e r s f r o m a n y a f f e c t i o n ( π ά θ ο ς ) t h a t i n v o l v e s e i t h e r o f t h e s e , it m u s t b e c a l l e d a d i s e a s e ( ν ό σ ο ν ) ; a n d as t h e g r a v e s t d i s e a s e s f o r t h e s o u l w e m u s t r a n k e x c e s s i v e p l e a s u r e s a n d ( m e n t a l ) p a i n s ( ή δ ο ν ά ς ... κ α ί λύπας) (86b2-7).

A Stoic reader would find little to object to here. H e r e too madness is classed as a f o r m of i g n o r a n c e , viz. in the s p h e r e of action. It is moreover the underlying condition causing affections, i.e. outbursts of e m o t i o n , j u s t as those described in the passage f r o m Arius Didymus we have quoted. I n d e e d this anticipation of the Stoic equation of mental affection, folly a n d madness is so complete as to make Platonic i n f l u e n c e fairly plausible. Plato also anticipates the distinction drawn by Chrysippus between affection a n d ignorance as two differe n t kinds of irrationality (see above, p. 98). Moreover, we should n o t e the distinction between m a d n e s s as an u n d e r l y i n g c o n d i t i o n a n d affection as its manifestation. T h e similarities can be multiplied f r o m what follows. Plato goes on to explain the n a t u r e of excessive pleasure and pain as follows: W h e n a m a n e n j o y s h i m s e l f t o o m u c h o r , in t h e o p p o s i t e c a s e , w h e n h e s u f f e r s p a i n , a n d h e e x e r t s h i m s e l f t o seize t h e o n e a n d a v o i d t h e o t h e r in i n o p p o r t u n e ways, h e c a n n e i t h e r s e e o r h e a r a n y t h i n g a r i g h t b u t g o e s r a v i n g m a d a n d is a t t h a t m o m e n t l e a s t c a p a b l e o f r a t i o n a l t h o u g h t ( λ ο γ ι σ μ ο ύ ) (ibid. b 7 - c 3 ) .

This too is very similar to how Chrysippus describes the effects of mental affection in the passages we have j u s t q u o t e d a n d elsewhere. A f f e c t i o n is d e s c r i b e d in t e r m s of excess. It causes i r r a t i o n a l

a p p e t i t i o n (in t h e case of p l e a s u r e or e n j o y m e n t ) a n d avoidance (in t h e case of m e n t a l p a i n ) . It affects his p e r c e p t i o n — a p o i n t also stressed by C h r y s i p p u s b u t a b s e n t f r o m Aristotle. F u r t h e r , Plato r e p e a t s t h a t it r e p r e s e n t s m a d n e s s a n d t h a t it k n o c k s o u t rational thought. In what follows Plato expatiates o n t h e bodily causes of such m e n tal states, focusing o n sexual i n c o n t i n e n c e . At 86d7-e2 h e c o n c l u d e s that ' n o o n e is willfully bad, b u t t h e bad m a n b e c o m e s b a d as a result of o n e o r a n o t h e r c o r r u p t c o n d i t i o n of his body 1 6 5 a n d an u n e d u cated u p b r i n g i n g . ' T h i s a m o u n t s to associating t h e Socratic a d a g e that n o o n e errs willingly with the medical a n d physical a c c o u n t that is b e i n g o f f e r e d . T h e c o r r e s p o n d e n c e b e t w e e n t h e two causes of c o r r u p t i o n m e n t i o n e d h e r e c o r r e s p o n d to those m e n t i o n e d by Chrysippus, viz. physical o n e s c o n n e c t e d to how we a r e b o r n a n d social influences, starting f r o m o u r e d u c a t o r s (see above, pp. 132 ff.). Plato d o e s n o t m e a n to absolve a n y o n e f r o m m o r a l responsibility f o r his or h e r m o r a l s t a t e — a n d of course Chrysippus d i d n ' t either. 1 6 6 C o m m o n to t h e m seems to be wish to identify those causes which may explain d i f f e r e n c e s between individuals a n d which may g u i d e o u r efforts in r e m o v i n g the deficiencies in question. Plato g o e s o n to explain first t h e physical cause in t e r m s of t h e familiar m e d i c a l theory of t h e bodily h u m o u r s (86e5-87a7). W h e n these t u r n p a t h o g e n i c , they cause evaporations to rise f r o m t h e m a n d m i n g l e with t h e s o u l ' s m o v e m e n t s , t h u s b r i n g i n g a b o u t m e n t a l diseases—a m e c h a n i s m which strongly recalls Chrysippus' a c c o u n t of a n g e r as q u o t e d f r o m his On the Soul by G a l e n , PHP 3.1.25 (SVF 2.886). 1 6 7 T h e s e are again specified: various kinds of bad t e m p e r a n d d e p r e s s i o n , recklessness a n d cowardice a n d m o r e o v e r f o r g e t f u l n e s s a n d i g n o r a n c e . Clearly this a c c o u n t a m o u n t s to t h e s a m e as t h a t a d u m b r a t e d at t h e b e g i n n i n g of t h e section (86b), w h e r e we have f o u n d t h e s a m e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n i g n o r a n c e a n d e m o t i o n as disposition a n d m o m e n t a r y o u t b u r s t s respectively. Secondly, Plato dwells a bit o n the social causes of m o r a l badness, distinguishing between e d u c a t o r s in the d o m e s t i c s p h e r e a n d society at large. H e c o n c l u d e s t h a t j u s t as t h e b e a u t y a n d f u n c t i o n a l i t y of 165

This repeats 86bl-2, from the beginning of the section, referred to supra in text. 166 p o r p ] a t o s e e e S p what follows at 87b, where he urges that each person must do his utmost 'both by nurture and intellectual pursuits to escape from badness and seize the contrary' (87b7-8). 167

See supra, p. 157.

bodies d e p e n d o n the g o o d p r o p o r t i o n of their parts, so a p r o p o r t i o n s h o u l d reign b e t w e e n body a n d soul, as these are closely interwoven a n d given t h e i r intensive i n t e r a c t i o n — a fact which b r i n g s o u t t h e n e e d of g o o d r e g i m e n ( δ ι α ί τ α ) (ibid. 87b-c). Soul a n d body, as h e expresses t h e p o i n t a little f u r t h e r o n , a r e ' g r o w n t o g e t h e r ' ( σ υ μ φ υ έ ς ) , 88a8. Exactly t h e s a m e is said a b o u t t h e i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n b o d y a n d soul by C h r y s i p p u s ap. Gal. PHP 3.1.10 (SVF 2.885), w h o likewise d r e w c o n c l u s i o n s as to t h e i m p o r t a n c e of diet a n d exercise—how u n p h i l o s o p h i c a l we m i g h t consider this side of his d o c t r i n e today. I have discussed this aspect above (p. 162 ff.). But h e r e it is even m o r e i m p o r t a n t to c o n s i d e r the role played by the idea of p r o p o r t i o n , symmetry, o r m e a s u r e . T h i s t o o can b e paralleled f r o m t h e C h r y s i p p e a n f r a g m e n t s we have b e e n discussing. T h e m a i n d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n Plato a n d C h r y s i p p u s is of c o u r s e t h a t Plato a p p l i e s this i d e a to t h e r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n soul a n d b o d y w h e r e a s Chrysippus applies it to the parts of the soul itself (see above, p p . 145 ff.). But it s h o u l d b e r e c a l l e d t h a t f o r C h r y s i p p u s t h e soul itself is c o r p o r e a l m a k i n g a possible an analogy b e t w e e n it a n d t h e b o d y in terms of their parts. T h e n e e d to b r i n g b o d y a n d soul i n t o m u t u a l h a r m o n y is n o t the only m o r a l lesson drawn by Plato f r o m his physiological a c c o u n t of m e n t a l disease. H e c o n c l u d e s by p o i n t i n g to a cosmic perspective w h e n h e u r g e s us to m o d e l t h e m o v e m e n t s a n d processes of b o t h body a n d soul to those of t h e universe at large, stressing the fact that as individuals we a r e parts of this g r e a t e r whole (ibid. 88c7-8, d6, e23). O n e c a n n o t fail to b e r e m i n d e d of t h e s a m e parts-and-whole s c h e m a Chrysippus e x p o u n d e d to draw t h e s a m e c o n c l u s i o n a b o u t t h e h u m a n E n d (D.L. 7.87-8). T h i s last p o i n t of c o n t a c t a n d t h e o t h e r s constitute a p a t t e r n of d e p e n d e n c e a n d inspiration. Even if we p r e f e r to be m o r e c a u t i o u s o n this score, it r e m a i n s i m p o r t a n t to a c k n o w l e d g e that t h e Stoic a p p r o a c h to m e n t a l affection in terms of m a d n e s s was u n d e n i a b l y a n t i c i p a t e d by e a r l i e r m e d i c i n e a n d philosophy alike.

8. The Medical Backdrop: Hippocratic and Other Writings T o p r e v e n t a n a l r e a d y d e n s e d i s c u s s i o n of Stoic m a t e r i a l f r o m b e c o m i n g too c u m b r o u s , I have sofar avoided a full-scale discussion of t h e m e d i c a l b a c k d r o p . At this j u n c t u r e we may c o m p a r e s o m e

r e l e v a n t d o c t r i n e s which b e l o n g to t h e m e d i c a l t r a d i t i o n . In t h e p r o g r a m m a t i c p a s s a g e f r o m t h e b e g i n n i n g of t h e Therapeutics Chrysippus a f f i r m e d t h a t t h e p h i l o s o p h e r o u g h t to be familiar with affections of t h e body also (PHP 5.2.23, q u o t e d above, p. 144). 1 6 8 This s h o u l d occasion n o s u r p r i s e given t h e literal sense in which his version of t h e m e d i c a l analogy s h o u l d be t a k e n . Accordingly, it is r e a s o n a b l e to e x p e c t Chrysippus n o t to have r e m a i n e d c o n t e n t to m o d e l his discussion loosely o n c u r r e n t medical theories b u t to have taken t h e m into a c c o u n t in a m o r e integral fashion. Chrysippus will have taken his own e x h o r t a t i o n to h e a r t a n d to have s t u d i e d t h e medical literature of his day. T h e r e is n o explicit evidence c o n n e c t i n g Chrysippus to any of the writings of t h e Corpus Hippocraticum as it survives today. 1 6 9 Z e n o , anticipating Chrysippus' medical analogy, 1 7 0 applied t h e f a m o u s first s e n t e n c e of the Aphorisms ('Life is short, b u t art long') to the 'art capable of c u r i n g t h e diseases of t h e soul'. 1 7 1 A b o u t t h e g e n e r a l Rezej)tionsgeschichte of the Corpus Hippocraticum in its Hellenistic fase we know very little. 172 But it seems certain that t h e n a m e of H i p p o c r a t e s h a d g a i n e d ever m o r e prestige since his own lifetime. As a repository of G r e e k medical tradition we c a n n o t dispense with the Corpus w h e n it c o m e s to f o r m i n g a impression of t h e kind of i n f l u e n c e s to which 168 Accordingly, the sage is also his own best doctor, Stob. Eel. II p. 109.1 ff. W. (SVF 3.656, that this concerns both body and soul is implied by the term φύσις, the health of which he is said to take care of); cf. ibid. 114.10 ff. (SVF 3.602), according to which he speaks about healthy and morbid conditions as well as things to do with dietetics. 169

A scholion in Urbinas ms. 68 fol. 24v.—first published and accepted as reliable by Ch. Daremberg (Notices et extraits des manuscrits médicaux [Paris 1853] 200ff) refers to a gloss made by Chrysippus on the distinction between καιρός and χρόνος at Praec. 30.2 Heiberg. But today this scholion is generally regarded as a Renaissance fabrication inspired by Galenic passages, see Diller (1933) 174 ff. Galen, Hipf). Epid. XVIIB, p.246 K. (SVF2.782) refers to interpreters who explained the Epidemics in line with Stoic and Praxagorean physiology. But since their identity must remain uncertain, this does not prove anything about Chrysippus or any of the other luminaries of the early Stoa; cf. Steckerl (1958) 20. There are a few more passages in Galen where the name ofHippocrates is associated with essentially Stoic physiological doctrines: see supra, pp. 154 f. But it is difficult to decide in these cases whether the reference to Hippocrates was inserted by Galen or already made in his source. It seems impossible to establish the precise identity of this source anyway. 170 See supra, p. 148. 171 See Stob. Flor. IV 34.68, p.845 Hentse (SVF 1.323); cf. Kassel (1958) 21. 172 Most evidence discussed by Kudlien (1989) pertains, despite its title, not to the Hellenistic era but to the 5th and 4th centuries b c e and to the Imperial era. Langholf (1986) demonstrates the use made of Flat, by Anonymus Londinensis, Callimachus (c.305-340 bcf.) as well as the comic poet Antiphanes (c.400-330 b c e ) .

C h r y s i p p u s may have b e e n e x p o s e d . But it s h o u l d b e stressed t h a t c o m p a r i s o n s f r o m a d o c t r i n a l p o i n t of view n o t b a c k e d u p by explicit a t t r i b u t i o n i m p o s e t h e n e e d to b e e x t r e m e l y c a u t i o u s in d r a w i n g conclusions a b o u t i n f l u e n c e s a n d historical relations. In a d d i t i o n we s h o u l d certainly c o m p a r e t h e f r a g m e n t s of Praxagoras of Kos (flor. later 4th century BCE), 1 7 3 whose i n f l u e n c e o n Stoic physiological i d e a s — i n r e l a t i o n to t h e soul in p a r t i c u l a r — i s well known. But h e wrote extensively o n t h e r a p y a n d r e g i m e n as well. 174 So o n e may b e excused f o r feeling e n c o u r a g e d to c o m p a r e t h e Therapeutics with his d o c t r i n e s (or r a t h e r w h a t can still be k n o w n a b o u t t h e m , since t h e state of transmission of his work is n o less f r a g m e n t ary a n d derivative t h a n that of Chrysippus). Moreover, it is p e r t i n e n t to ask h o w original o r distinctive t h e t h e r a p e u t i c a l ideas of Praxag o r a s himself were. A native of Kos, h e firmly b e l o n g e d with t h e H i p p o c r a t i c t r a d i t i o n especially w h e r e clinical m e d i c i n e was c o n c e r n e d . 1 7 5 I n any case, a c a r e f u l inventory of all m e d i c a l e l e m e n t s s h o u l d p r e c e d e any conclusions a b o u t t h e authorities inspiring t h e m . Like a n u m b e r of Stoic texts we have b e e n reviewing, t h e H i p p o cratic writings treat affections like f e a r a n d grief in close c o n n e c t i o n with disorders like m e l a n c h o l i a or p h r e n i t i s as well as bodily illnesses. T h u s in ch. 17 of the On the Sacred Disease (VI 386 ff. L.) a wide variety of m e n t a l affections i n c l u d i n g lust (ηδονή) a n d grief (λυπή) a r e said to b e a m e n a b l e to the same e x p l a n a t i o n as epilepsy. This e x p l a n a t i o n is based o n t h e s a m e b r o a d m o d e l as we have e n c o u n t e r e d in t h e C h r y s i p p e a n f r a g m e n t s : e l e m e n t s , h u m o u r s a n d pneuma. T h u s t h e a u t h o r of On the Sacred Disease holds that t h e o c c u r r e n c e a n d intensity of lust a n d grief are d e t e r m i n e d by t h e e l e m e n t a r y qualities, with an i m p o r t a n t i n t e r m e d i a t e role b e i n g played by p h l e g m a n d bile. H e m o r e o v e r relates fear (φόβος) to t h e cold a n d shivering (φρίκη) (13, VI 380 L.). 1 7 6 Elsewhere in t h e H i p p o c r a t i c c o r p u s t h e same physical effects a l t e r n a t e with ' h o t ' s y m p t o m s in descriptions of fever. 1 7 7 This 173

On the question of his dates see now Von Staden (1989) 44 ff. See the fragments edited by Steckerl (1962), Bardong (1954), Capriglione (1983). On Praxagoras' views on regimen see in particular Wöhrle (1990) 170-3. On Praxagoras and Stoicism see Tieleman (1991) 122 f. with further references. 175 He was the most famous representative of the Coan school after Hippocrates. Cf. Steckerl (1958) 1, Capriglione (1983) 13. 176 Cf. ibid. 9, VI 370 L. But the idea is common in the C.H. Cf. e.g. Epid. 7.45 (V 412ff. L.) and elsewhere, see Zink (1962). 177 Epid. 1.2 (II 608 L.), 3.4 (III 116 L.),3 (III 142 1.), where note also the occurrence of λυπή, Aphor. 7.4 (IV 578 L.). The swiftness of the alternation between the hot and cold states is stressed by the Hippocratic authors and the Stoics alike, see 174

is exactly what we find in the f r a g m e n t w h e r e Chrysippus explains t h e physical effects a t t e n d a n t u p o n affection ( P H P 5.2.14, q u o t e d above, p. 106). It is also worth c o m p a r i n g Chrysippus' a c c o u n t of i n f l a m e d a n g e r (PHP 3.1.25, SVF 2.886, see above, p. 157) with passages such as On Winds 7-9 (VI.98-104 L.). H e r e fever is said to o c c u r b e c a u s e of a s u r p l u s of n u t r i m e n t relative to bodily exercise. T h e f o o d obstructs the whole a b d o m i n a l region, a n d the winds which normally circulate freely a r e t r a p p e d a n d c o m p r e s s e d in t h e o t h e r parts of t h e body. T h e c u r r e n t s of air cool t h e b l o o d in these organs, w h e r e u p o n the b l o o d retracts towards t h e h o t t e s t r e g i o n s of t h e body. W h e n t h e b l o o d is c o n c e n t r a t e d , it b e c o m e s h o t again. It evaporates as pneuma, which p u s h e s violently against the skin, causing transpiration. 1 7 8 T h i s a c c o u n t p r e s e n t s t h e h o t a n d t h e cold as o c c u r i n g simultaneously o r in quick a l t e r n a t i o n . It is closely similar to the description of a n g e r by Chrysippus, particularly w h e r e t h e role of pneuma a n d its evaporation a n d blowing a n d p u s h i n g effects o n t h e body are c o n c e r n e d . N o t e also t h e p a t h o l o g i c a l role of ill-functioning digestion. T h e a u t h o r of Flat, d o e s n o t assign any role to bile o r o t h e r h u m o u r s , stressing the role of air or b r e a t h instead. But in the Nature of Man a n d t h e Diseases179 t h e p r o p o r t i o n of t h e h u m o u r s — o f t e n in r e l a t i o n to t e m p e r a t u r e — h o l d s c e n t r e - s t a g e in t h e aetiology of disease. T h e a u t h o r of t h e H i p p o c r a t i c On Affections (Περί παθών) a r g u e s that bile a n d p h l e g m p r o d u c e diseases w h e n o n e of t h e m b e c o m e s t o o moist, t o o dry, t o o h o t , o r t o o c o l d — t h e i m b a l a n c e of t h e e l e m e n t a l qualities again. As the causes of the h e a t i n g a n d chilling h e specifies—apart f r o m internal o n e s such as f o o d a n d d r i n k — s e n s o r y e x p e r i e n c e s such as sight, smell, a n d h e a r i n g . 1 8 0 Elsewhere psychic affections such as fear, lust a n d a n g e r , i n c l u d i n g their a t t e n d a n t bodily effects, are said to result directly f r o m b o t h sight a n d h e a r i n g . 1 8 1 For o u r p u r p o s e s this is very i n t e r e s t i n g i n d e e d . We may recall t h e causal role a c c o r d e d by C h r y s i p p u s to m e n t a l a p p e a r a n c e s in t h e

e.g. Vet. med. 16, SVF3.459, cf. 2.405. 178 Cf. also Hp. Epid. II, 3.11 with Langholf (1990) 357f. and the Chrysippean fragment quoted supra, p. 157. 179 Morb. 1.24, p. 162 Potter (VI, 188ff. L.) 1.2 (VI, 142 L.); Nat. horn. chs. 4, 15 (pp. 172.13ff., 202.tOff. Jouanna). 180 Aff. f, p.6 Potter (VI, 208 L.); cf. Flashar (1956) 31. 181 Hum. 9 (V, 488 L.), Epid. 5.81 (V, 250 L.) = 7.86 (V, 44 L.); see further Flashar (1956), esp. 26 ff.

genesis of a f f e c t i o n (above, p p . 137, 124 ff., 137). H e also spoke of t h e persuasiveness of p r e s e n t a t i o n s as a cause of psychic c o r r u p t i o n . P e r c e p t i o n may trigger an o u t b r e a k of a f f e c t i o n directly, o r it may w e a k e n t h e soul in t h e l o n g t e r m . 1 8 2 T h e l a t t e r possibility is instantiated by t h e n o t o r i o u s midwives' bath (above, p. 161 f.). In the H i p p o c r a t i c treatises b a t h s a r e r e p e a t e d l y m a d e t h e s u b j e c t of m e d i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . T h e y a p p e a r b o t h as potentially u n h e a l t h y a n d as t h e r a p e u t i c . In On the Nature of Man ch. 21, we g e t a piece of advice o n how to b a t h babies. This advice is d e s i g n e d to m a i n t a i n a m o d e r a t e t e m p e r a t u r e a n d avoid drastic c h a n g e s in this respect. This c o h e r e s with t h e p a s s a g e f r o m C a l c i d i u s ( w h e r e also n o t e t h e r e f e r e n c e to m e d i c i n e , above p. 161). Its p i c t u r e of birth as a h a r s h e x p e r i e n c e liable to cause disease strongly recalls On Eight Months Children chs. 2-3. 183 T h e testimony of Cicero, On Fate, chs. 7-9 (SVF2.950-1) proves that Chrysippus a c k n o w l e d g e d t h e i n f l u e n c e of e n v i r o n m e n t a l a n d climatic c o n d i t i o n s o n t h e f o r m a t i o n of intellect a n d character. 1 8 4 W h e t h e r h e t o u c h e d o n this idea in t h e Therapeutics c a n n o t b e a s c e r t a i n e d . Still, it is worth observing that h e was, in principle, p r e p a r e d to taken e n v i r o n m e n t a l factors into a c c o u n t . This side of his psychophysics (to b o r r o w Sedley's a p t t e r m ) 1 8 5 also reveals t h e i n f l u e n c e of c u r r e n t medical theories. An obvious e x a m p l e is t h e H i p p o c r a t i c Airs Waters Places whose a u t h o r explains m e n t a l disposition as d u e to t h e differi n g ratios b e t w e e n t h e h o t a n d t h e cold t h a t a r e p e c u l i a r to t h e various climates in which p e o p l e live; h e n c e t h e d i f f e r e n c e s of national mentality. 1 8 6 C i c e r o ' s testimony ascribes to Chrysippus t h e same line of e x p l a n a t i o n , t h o u g h with even g r e a t e r emphasis o n the quality of t h e air peculiar to certain places. In particular we may recall t h e r o l e a s s i g n e d by C h r y s i p p u s a n d o t h e r Stoics to t h e very first T h e quality of t h e i n h a l a t i o n in s h a p i n g t h e psychic pneuma,187 outside air b r e a t h e d in at this crucial m o m e n t will have b e e n o n e of t h e d e t e r m i n a n t s of the resulting m e n t a l disposition. 1 8 8 T h e role of t h e pneuma in t h e Corpus Hippocraticum, as c o n n e c t e d with h u m o r a l t h e o r y , is o f t e n u n d e r e s t i m a t e d in p r e s e n t - d a y 182 183 184 185 186 187 188

See Sedley (1993) 325. See esp. p. 86.4-12 Grensemann. See Chr. ap. Cic. Fat. 7-9; cf. M ) 2.17. Sedley (1993). See esp. Aer. 16.1, 24.3, pp. 62.1-5, 78.17-23 Diller. See supra, p. 162. Esp. Fat. 7. Cf. Sedley (1993) esp. 319, 331.

r e c o n s t r u c t i o n s . 1 8 9 But it received g r e a t e m p h a s i s in t h e Hellenistic reception of Hippocratic m e d i c i n e . This is particularly clear f r o m t h e medical papyrus known as A n o n y m u s Londinensis. 1 9 0 This a c c o u n t is largely based o n t h e On Winds, which was r e g a r d e d as authentically H i p p o c r a t i c in Hellenistic times a n d b e y o n d . 1 9 1 T h e c e n t r a l concept 1 9 2 of H i p p o c r a t i c m e d i c i n e is taken by A n o n y m u s to be b r e a t h , πνεύμα o r φυσα, 1 9 3 for Breath (πνεύμα) is the m o s t necessary a n d s u p r e m e c o m p o n e n t in us, s i n c e h e a l t h is t h e result o f its free flow ( ε ΰ ρ ο ι α ) , a n d d i s e a s e o f its impeded passage. W e in fact present a likeness to plants. For as they are r o o t e d in t h e earth, so w e t o o are r o o t e d in the air by o u r nostrils a n d by o u r w h o l e body ( A n o n . L o n d . col. VI. 13-21; cf. 3 0 - 1 ) . 1 9 4

Disease is caused by φΰσαι arising f r o m residues of food; that it to say, it arises f r o m difficulty of digestion, w h e t h e r d u e to t h e quantity or n a t u r e of t h e f o o d taken (V.37-V1.12). F u r t h e r , the b r e a t h s rising f r o m the u n d i g e s t e d f o o d are described as vapours ( ά ν α θ υ μ ι α θ ε ΐ σ α ι ) causing diseases. This causes t h e m to be t r a p p e d inside the o r g a n s so t h a t they start pressing violently against o r g a n s in t h e b o d y in an a t t e m p t to find an outlet (VI.35). This c o n f o r m s to the a c c o u n t of On Winds (see above). But, unlike its a u t h o r a n d in a g r e e m e n t with Chrysippus (see above, p. 158), A n o n y m u s stresses c h a n g e s in the breaths themselves:

189 T h e balance has to some extent been redressed by Langholf (1990). 190 Presumably a draft rather than the remains of a published treatise. It was written somewhere between the later first cent. BCE and the middle of the second cent. CE. Cf. Manetti (1990). 191

Its author (who is presumably to be dated to the first cent, c e ) says that he draws the first part, i.e. cols. IV.18-XXI.9, from 'Aristotle' (col. V.37), which has traditionally been taken to mean the 'Ιατρικά by Aristotle's pupil Menon. There is a flood of literature on this matter. See now Manetti (1999) esp. 128, 139 ff., who shows that Anonymus is here drawing on an early (i.e. pre-third century b c e ) Peripatetic account. 192 The prominence accorded to the pneuma as a mainstay of Hippocratic medicine may seem less obvious to us, yet it is more often found in ancient sources, see e.g. Celsus, Prooem. 15 with Langholf (1986) 17 n.60. In fact, pneumaAore and humoral theory are often part of the same theoretical framework in many Hippocratic treatises, including the older ones. In other words, in the Hippocratic writings the pneuma is more important as a theoretical concept than has often been supposed: see Langholf (1990). 193 Anonymus uses the two terms interchangeably. In Flat, φΰσα is defined, more specifically, as πνεύμα within the body; outside the body it is called air, ό άήρ, Flat. 3 (VI 94.1 L.). 194 Cf. Flat. 4 (VI 96.1 L.), 5 (VI 96.13 L.).

T h e c h a n g e o f b r e a t h s t o o gives rise t o d i s e a s e s ; t h e y c h a n g e in two d i r e c t i o n s , e i t h e r t o w a r d s excessive h e a t o r t o w a r d excessive c o l d (col. VI. 3 8 - 4 0 ) .

A n o n y m u s goes o n (VI.43 ff.) to i n t r o d u c e bile a n d p h l e g m as factors which cause disease t h r o u g h excessive h e a t i n g a n d chilling. 1 9 5 But in this passage b r e a t h ( π ν ε ύ μ α ) a n d r e g i m e n retain t h e i r i m p o r t a n c e f o r the aetiology of disease. T h u s A n o n y m u s refers to t h e distinction d r a w n in Nat. Horn, b e t w e e n i n t e r n a l a n d e x t e r n a l s o u r c e s of t h e p n e u m a , viz. t h e f o o d a n d t h e outside air respectively. 1 9 6 This recalls t h e d u a l origin of παθή a n d , c o r r e s p o n d i n g l y , t h e d u a l m o d e of t h e soul's n o u r i s h m e n t postulated by Chrysippus (see above, p. 147). In fact, t h e A n o n y m u s c o m b i n e s all t h e m a i n e l e m e n t s e n c o u n tered in the Chrysippean f r a g m e n t s : the relation between u n i m p e d e d flow of b r e a t h a n d h e a l t h (above, p p . 147, 190); v a p o r i z a t i o n in digestion a n d its m o r b i d variety (above, p p . 157 f.); t h e p u s h i n g ( ω θ ο υ μ έ ν ο υ ) a n d b l o w i n g ( έ μ φ υ σ ώ ν τ ο ς ) i m p a c t of t h e m o r b i d p n e u m a o n o r g a n s as r e m o t e f r o m t h e h e a r t as t h e face a n d t h e h a n d (above, p p . 98 f., 157, 180); t h e p r o p o r t i o n between t h e h o t a n d t h e cold as t h e m a i n d e t e r m i n a n t of h e a l t h o r disease (above, pp. 148 ff., 158, 161 f.). T h e s e close similarities—which m a k e u p a c o h e r e n t set of d o c t r i n e s — i n d i c a t e that Chrysippus reflects t h e Rezeptionsgeschichte of H i p p o c r a t i c m e d i c i n e in t h e Hellenistic p e r i o d . In d e s i g n i n g his m o r a l theory, Chrysippus availed himself of a c o h e r e n t a n d a u t h o r i tative p a r a d i g m of m e d i c i n e .

9.

Conclusion

O u r m a i n s o u r c e s f o r t h e Therapeutics, Galen a n d Cicero, have obscured its physical a n d medical basis. T h e i r one-sidedness is reflected in m o d e r n discussions. We may c o n c l u d e , however, that Chrysippus' m e d i c a l analogy rests o n t h e a s s u m p t i o n that t h e body a n d t h e soul are g o v e r n e d by t h e same physical principles. This is b o r n e o u t by the c o n s t a n t e m p h a s i s p l a c e d by Chrysippus o n physical factors. Psychic h e a l t h , s t r e n g t h , beauty a n d t h e i r o p p o s i t e s a r e d e f i n e d in t e r m s of t h e f o u r e l e m e n t a l qualities, particularly t h e h o t a n d t h e cold as constituents of t h e psychic pneuma. T h e r a p y is a i m e d at restoring a n d m a i n t a i n i n g t h e b a l a n c e b e t w e e n t h e s e f a c t o r s . Given t h e close 195 196

See esp. Morb. 1.2 (VI 142 L.). Nat. horn. 9.3, p.Î88.10 ff. Jouanna (Vf 52, 54 L.).

c o n n e c t i o n between b o d y a n d soul, it also involves preventive measures in t h e s p h e r e of r e g i m e n based o n t h e same physical principles. Stoic t h e r a p y a n d r e g i m e n were g r a f t e d o n physiology i n c l u d i n g embryology. T h u s t h e cause of affection was e x p l a i n e d in relation to t h e o r i e s o n t h e digestive process a n d c h i l d b i r t h . In the a c c o u n t of a n g e r a distinctive role was assigned to o v e r h e a t i n g as a c o n s e q u e n c e of a surplus of bile. All this is n o t to deny the therapeutical value of philosophical argum e n t s . T h e p o i n t is that in Stoic ethics t h e m e n t a l a n d t h e physical a r e really two sides of t h e s a m e coin. T h i s e x p l a i n s why t h e Stoics used intentional a n d physical terms interchangeably. 1 9 7 It is typical of polemicists such as Galen to exploit the aspectual distinction involved by playing t h e two aspects off against o n e a n o t h e r a n d t r e a t i n g t h e physical e l e m e n t s as if they p e r t a i n e d t o — u n a c k n o w l e d g e d — n o n rational powers. A n u m b e r of H i p p o c r a t i c writings deal with m e n t a l a f f e c t i o n s in terms similar or identical to the Chrysippean f r a g m e n t s we have b e e n reviewing. Of course, t h e c e n t r a l n o t i o n of t h e b a l a n c e of t h e f o u r e l e m e n t s a n d its t h e r a p e u t i c r e l e v a n t a r e fairly c o m m o n n o t i o n s . W i t h o u t a d o u b t , it h a d b e c o m e a b s o r b e d by intellectual circles well b e f o r e Chrysippus, as is clear f r o m Plato, Aristotle a n d o t h e r authors. But we have b e e n able to trace m o r e specific c o r r e s p o n d e n c e s , in p a r t i c u l a r with On Winds a n d On the Nature of Man. T h e relevant passages in the A n o n y m u s L o n d i n e n s i s suggest that Chrysippus' view of H i p p o c r a t i c m e d i c i n e , with its stress o n pneuma, reflects a g e n e r a l f e a t u r e of its r e c e p t i o n in t h e Hellenistic era. Even if it is n o t feasible to identify o n e o r m o r e H i p p o c r a t i c writings as Chrysippus' i m m e diate source, it r e m a i n s useful, i n d e e d m a n d a t o r y , to take t h e m into a c c o u n t as an i m p o r t a n t part of the medical traditions to which h e was indebted.

197

See Sedley (1993) 329.

CHAPTER FIVE

P O S I D O N I A N PUZZLES

1.

Introduction

T h e real h e r o of G a l e n ' s cast of c h a r a c t e r s is Posidonius of A p a m e a (c. 135-55 BCE), t h e Stoic w h o valued t r u t h m o r e highly t h a n t h e d o g m a s of his own school. If we may believe G a l e n , h e a b a n d o n e d t h e unitary c o n c e p t i o n of t h e intellect a n d r e t u r n e d to t h e ' a n c i e n t a c c o u n t ' , i.e. t h e Platonic tripartition. I n d e e d , Galen tells us, h e h a d formally d i r e c t e d his On Affections (Περί παθών) against Chrysippus' treatise of the same title. 1 Galen m o r e o v e r a p p e a l s to the authority of P o s i d o n i u s in c l a i m i n g t h a t C l e a n t h e s a n d Z e n o h a d p o s t u l a t e d p e r m a n e n t n o n - r a t i o n a l f a c t o r s in t h e soul. A m o n g t h e Stoics f e a t u r i n g in PHP 4 a n d 5 C h r y s i p p u s e m e r g e s as an isolated case, t h o u g h an admittedly influential o n e . T h e great majority of the Stoics G a l e n h a d e n c o u n t e r e d c l u n g to t h e C h r y s i p p e a n m o d e l — w h i c h explains why Galen deals with Chrysippus so extensively. 2 Two substantial f r a g m e n t s of Chrysippus' On Affections are q u o t e d by Galen n o t directly f r o m that work b u t f r o m that of Posidonius (see above, p p . 8 f.). In a d d i t i o n we f i n d in PHP4-5 l o n g stretches of text in w h i c h G a l e n q u o t e s f r o m , o r at least f r e q u e n t l y r e f e r s to, Posidonius—so m u c h so that a great n u m b e r of these passages (some several m o d e r n p a g e s l o n g ) have f o u n d t h e i r way i n t o EdelsteinKidd's Posidonius. G a l e n ' s obvious interest in playing off Posidonius a n d Chrysippus against each o t h e r d o e s n o t entail that h e is unreliable. T h e evidence h e p r o d u c e s n e e d s to b e assessed bit by bit. I n d e e d it has convinced m a n y m o d e r n s t u d e n t s that the above p i c t u r e of the d e v e l o p m e n t of

1

See F/iP5.6.45. Cooper (1998), 89-90, 101 n.10 tends to subscribe to this view but admits that it depends entirely on information supplied by Galen. Gill (1998) 129 f., too, argues that Posidonius was concerned to address real problems in Chrysippean thinking (viz. through his introduction of the concept of 'affective movements'), though this did not amount to the root-and-branch rejection of Chrysippean psychology claimed by Galen. 2 PHP4A.38 = Posid. Τ 59 E.-K. quoted infra, p. 207.

early Stoic psychology is broadly c o r r e c t . 3 H e r e , as elsewhere, t h e v e r b a t i m q u o t a t i o n s p r o d u c e d by G a l e n have l e n t an irresistible plausibility to his case. PHP b o o k s 4 a n d 5 were influential, if n o t decisive, in t h e elevation of P o s i d o n i u s to t h e status of t h e pivotal thinker, who b r o u g h t about the transition between the school's f o u n d i n g f a t h e r s a n d Imperial Stoicism. 4 This assumption also served to justify t h e p e r i o d i s a t i o n in which P o s i d o n i u s a n d his t e a c h e r P a n a e t i u s f e a t u r e as t h e m a i n r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of so-called M i d d l e Stoicism. Today, however, the picture c o n s t r u c t e d by Galen in PHP 4-5 is n o l o n g e r a c c e p t e d w i t h o u t reservations. T h e e v i d e n c e f o r Z e n o a n d C l e a n t h e s to be f o u n d in o t h e r sources is slim, b u t most historians d o u b t w h e t h e r C h r y s i p p u s d i f f e r e d f r o m t h e m to any significant d e g r e e . 5 F u r t h e r , t h e alleged ' u n o r t h o d o x y ' of Posidonius has b e e n q u e s t i o n e d by Fillion-Lahille ( 1 9 8 4 ) 6 a n d C o o p e r ( 1 9 9 8 ) . 7 In g e n e r a l , o t h e r s o u r c e s t h a n G a l e n a r e b r o u g h t to b e a r o n t h e question. Fillion-Lahille is right in p o i n t i n g out that Posidonius o f t e n d e f e n d e d other Stoic d o c t r i n e s f o r m u l a t e d by t h e first g e n e r a t i o n s of Stoics. 8 (I m i g h t a d d that sources such as Diogenes Laertius f r e q u e n t ly list h i m as a witness to t h e Stoic position tout court, a n d alongside 'early Stoics' a c c o r d i n g to t h e m o d e r n p e r i o d i s a t i o n ) . 9 C o o p e r , t h o u g h a c c e p t i n g s o m e f o r m of d i v e r g e n c e o n P o s i d o n i u s ' part, points o u t s o m e far-reaching a n d , for a Stoic, awkward c o n s e q u e n c e s f o r ethical theory, if Galen's claims a b o u t his psychology are taken f o r

3

See supra, n. 2 and e.g. Reinhardt ( 1 9 5 3 / 4 ) 662, Laffranque (1964) 395 ff., Kidd (1971) 203 ff., Glibert-Thierry (1977) 423ff., Long-Sedley (1987), vol. 1, 422, Mansfeld (1991) 119 ff., Gourinat (1996) 27, Boys-Stones (2001) 46. 4 Today few would subscribe to Theiler's (1935) view that Posidonius was the crucial link in the evolution of Neoplatonism; yet Posidonius is still widely assumed to have been syncretistic in outlook. 5 As was influentially defended by Pohlenz (1933) and anew, in certain ways, by Sorabji (2000). Long-Sedley (1987) vol. 1, 321 express scepticism about the possibility of tracing Chrysippean monism back to his predecessors. 6 Fillion-Lahille (1984) 153 ff. 7 A rather different line of interpretation is taken by Stevens (1995). Although his approach is promising insofar as he takes dialectical moves on Posidonius' part into account, I am not convinced by his thesis that Posidonius' strategy is to attribute to Chrysippus 'subtly altered representations of Carneades' views' (322), that is to say, to parody Academic attacks on the Chrysippean theories in order to strengthen the Stoic position—while at the same lime adopting tripartition as more in line with common sense. 8 See Fillion-Lahille (1984) 153, 316 n. 5, pointing to F 170, 175, 187 E.-K. 9 E.g. D.L. 7.39, 40, 41, 54, 60; see further Kidd-Edelstein's Index of sources (vol. I, p. 259).

g r a n t e d . 1 0 Moreover, it is a signal, t h o u g h o f t e n d i s r e g a r d e d fact that his secession is n o t m e n t i o n e d by s o u r c e s s u c h as C i c e r o a n d Plutarch. 1 1 O n e testimony (ps. P l u t a r c h , Whether Appetite and Distress Belong to the Soul or the Body, ch. 6 = F 154 E.-K.) ascribes to Posidonius t h e view that affections such as desires, fears a n d fits of a n g e r d e p e n d u p o n j u d g e m e n t s a n d a s s u m p t i o n s ' — i . e . t h e view t h a t G a l e n p r e s e n t s as t h e distinctively C h r y s i p p e a n position a b a n d o n e d by Posidonius. I shall r e t u r n to this r e p o r t in d u e course (below, p. 278). F u r t h e r , t h e e x t e n t to which Galen m i s r e p r e s e n t s t h e a r g u m e n t of C h r y s i p p u s ' On the Soul has b e e n u n d e r e s t i m a t e d . 1 2 Even so it has never b e e n d o u b t e d that Galen m i s r e p r e s e n t s t h e m a i n a r g u m e n t of Chrysippus' On Affections. Why, t h e n , have i n t e r p r e t e r s so eagerly a n d uncritically a c c e p t e d his assertions with respect to Posidonius? 1 3 Can it b e that we t e n d to sympathize with any a t t e m p t — s u c h as ascribed by G a l e n to P o s i d o n i u s — t o m i t i g a t e h a r d c o r e m o n i s m a n d to d o m o r e justice to the irrational side of m e n t a l life? 14 Both Fillion-Lahille a n d C o o p e r a r g u e t h a t G a l e n ' s evidence, if carefully e x a m i n e d , d o e s n o t s u p p o r t his f a r - r e a c h i n g claims a b o u t P o s i d o n i u s ' d i v e r g e n c e . P o s i d o n i u s r e m a i n s firmly within t h e Stoic c a m p i n s o f a r as h e views a f f e c t i o n s ( π α θ ό ς ) as excessive i m p u l s e s (όρμαί) c a u s e d by an act of assent a n d h e n c e typical of t h e rational (i.e. a d u l t h u m a n ) soul. Yet, a c c o r d i n g to t h e i r r e a d i n g , h e also allowed a causal role for certain non-rational factors o r powers, which s h o u l d n o t b e identified with powers o r parts in t h e Platonic sense as d e f i n e d by G a l e n , i.e. as involving i m p u l s e s of t h e i r o w n — a sense which results in an a l t o g e t h e r d i f f e r e n t c o n c e p t i o n of m e n t a l p h e n o m e n a such as w e a k n e s s of will. In s u m , P o s i d o n i u s t o o k a n interm e d i a t e position b e t w e e n t h e t h e o r i e s of Plato a n d C h r y s i p p u s — theories which, o n e agrees with C o o p e r , are so c o m p l e x a n d intricate that it would b e surprising if t h e r e were n o interesting a n d plausible alternative positions to b e f o u n d s o m e w h e r e b e t w e e n t h e two. 1 5 T o c o m p l i c a t e m a t t e r s f u r t h e r : h o w c e r t a i n can we b e t h a t we u n d e r stand these two, Chrysippus a n d Plato, o r at least u n d e r s t a n d t h e way they were r e a d by t h e a n c i e n t s themselves? At any rate b o t h Fillion10

Cooper (1998) 94 ff. Mentioned by Cooper (1998) 72. 12 This follows from the conclusions of my study of PHP 2-3 in Tieleman (1996a); see supra, pp. 12 ff. 13 Cooper (1998) 103. 14 Cf. Price (1995) 175 ff. 15 Cooper (1998) 72 f. 11

Lahille a n d C o o p e r a r g u e that Posidonius, t h o u g h c o n s i d e r i n g reason basic, recognized non-rational 'forces' or 'sorts of power' that are causally involved in the genesis of affection. 1 6 However, o n e w o n d e r s w h e t h e r P o s i d o n i u s c o u l d really have g o t away with i n d e t e r m i n a t e e x p r e s s i o n s of this sort in this l o n g - s t a n d i n g d e b a t e , which was m a r k e d by well-defined options. T h e d i s a g r e e m e n t o n P o s i d o n i u s ' position still persists. Sorabji 1 7 argues in favour of an i m p o r t a n t d i f f e r e n c e of position between Z e n o a n d C h r y s i p p u s with r e s p e c t to t h e s t r u c t u r e of t h e soul. In this r e s p e c t his m o n o g r a p h c o n s t i t u t e s a r e t u r n to t h e r e a d i n g of an earlier g e n e r a t i o n of scholars w h o were willing to swallow G a l e n ' s a c c o u n t . Sorabji also goes a l o n g with Galen by taking Posidonius to differ f r o m his predecessors as to t h e irrational forces in t h e soul. In t h e case of Plato, of c o u r s e , t h e e v i d e n c e is n o t f r a g m e n t a r y a n d permits us to read t h e same works as t h e a n c i e n t s did. But in exactly what way was Plato r e a d by t h o s e a n c i e n t r e a d e r s w h o i n t e r e s t us most—Chrysippus a n d Posidonius? 1 8 In what follows I shall e x a m i n e G a l e n ' s t r e a t m e n t of Posidonius in o r d e r to throw m o r e light o n t h e positions n o t only of P o s i d o n i u s a n d Galen b u t also of Chrysippus. I shall a r g u e n o t merely that t h e d i f f e r e n c e between Posidonius a n d Chrysippus ( a n d o t h e r predecessors) is less significant than Galen claims, i.e. the line taken by FillionLahille, C o o p e r a n d Gill (1998). Pace these scholars a n d Sorabji, I believe that t h e r e is n o d o c t r i n a l d i f f e r e n c e between t h e m c o n c e r n ing t h e non-rational factors. Part of t h e solution, I believe, is to realize that we are d e a l i n g with a s c h e m e in which authorities a n d views have b e e n a r r a n g e d in a d e f i n i t e p a t t e r n — a s c h e m e in which, as we have seen (above, p. 34) P o s i d o n i u s t o o was given a place. G a l e n could saddle Posidonius with the Platonic tripartition (albeit in terms of powers r a t h e r t h a n parts) by seizing an o p p o r t u n i t y p r o v i d e d by t h e Stoic's r e f e r e n c e s to Plato. I shall a r g u e that Posidonius saw t h e Platonic m o d e l as an ( i m p e r f e c t ) a n t i c i p a t i o n of t h e a c c u r a t e d o c t r i n e as it h a d b e e n first f o r m u l a t e d by Z e n o a n d C l e a n t h e s a n d f u r t h e r d e v e l o p e d by Chrysippus. T h i s yields a p i c t u r e c o m p l e t e l y d i f f e r e n t f r o m Galen's story a b o u t Posidonius' transfer f r o m the Stoic to t h e Platonic c a m p . 16 Fillion-Lahille (1984) 154, Cooper (1998) 73; cf. also Gill (1998) 127 ('kinds of function'), Boys-Stones (2001) 46 n. 4 ('kinds of desire'). 17 Sorabji (2000). 18 Cf. Gill (1998).

In o r d e r to e x p o u n d a n d d e f e n d this thesis I shall first c o n s i d e r a few q u e s t i o n s of t e r m i n o l o g y in c o n n e c t i o n with t h e p o s i t i o n a s c r i b e d by G a l e n to P o s i d o n i u s (§ 2). N e x t I shall study t h e use m a d e by Posidonius of the so-called ' a n c i e n t a c c o u n t ' as r e p r e s e n t e d by Plato a n d o t h e r p r e d e c e s s o r s (§ 3-5). M o r e i m m e d i a t e predessors c o m e next: D i o g e n e s of Babylon a n d P a n a e t i u s are directly relevant to t h e question of P o s i d o n i u s ' place in t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of t h e Stoic d o c t r i n e of t h e soul (§ 6). T h e r e u p o n I shall try to assess t h e evid e n c e f o r his alleged criticism of Chrysippus c o n c e r n i n g t h e cause of affections (§ 7). Posidonius' a p p e a l to C l e a n t h e s is e x a m i n e d o n t h e basis of t h e latter's versfied d i a l o g u e b e t w e e n Reason a n d A n g e r (§ 8 ) . Finally I shall a d d u c e two i m p o r t a n t t e s t i m o n i e s f r o m o t h e r sources, o n e f r o m Seneca, a n d that f r o m ps. Plutarch I have j u s t m e n tioned (§ 9). Conclusions will be drawn in the final section (§ 10).

2. Did Posidonius Speak of Psychic Powers'? T h e views c o n c e r n i n g t h e soul a n d t h e a f f e c t i o n s ascribed by Galen to P o s i d o n i u s f o r m p a r t of a s c h e m a of possible o p t i o n s u n d e r l y i n g Galen's a r g u m e n t in PHP4-5 as a whole. I have discussed this s c h e m a in C h . l (see above, p. 34 ff.) . As we have seen, it is based o n a scholastic P l a t o n i s t - c u m - P e r i p a t e t i c c o n c e p t u a l a p p a r a t u s involving t h e t e r m s p a r t (μορίον, μέρος), f o r m (είδος), power (δύναμις) a n d b e i n g (or essence, ο υ σ ί α ) . T h e division i n t o parts o r f o r m s p r e s u p p o s e s their spatial separation, a n d conversely, as in t h e case of the Platonic tripartition-cum-trilocation. Galen m a n a g e s to ascribe this position to H i p o c r a t e s as well. T h o s e p h i l o s o p h e r s w h o assign a plurality of psychic f u n c t i o n s to o n e particular bodily o r g a n ipso facto take t h e m to b e powers (δυνάμεις) of a single f o r m or essence. This holds g o o d f o r Aristotle, whose f o r m a l position is taken to b e that t h e soul has powers, n o t parts, a n d that their c e n t r e is t h e h e a r t . Chrysippus also assigns t h e psychic f u n c t i o n s to t h e h e a r t , b u t since h e s u b s u m e s all of t h e m u n d e r r e a s o n , h e is taken to a c c e p t this as t h e only power. P o s i d o n i u s a g r e e d with his fellow-Stoics a b o u t t h e h e a r t b e i n g t h e central o r g a n , b u t since h e d i f f e r e n t i a t e d b e t w e e n reason a n d o t h e r n o n - r a t i o n a l f a c t o r s (or ' m o v e m e n t s ' ) in t h e soul, his position is linked to that of Aristotle n o t Chrysippus. I have p o i n t e d to the diaeretic a n d h e n c e schematic n a t u r e of this description a n d its relation with certain traditional p r o c e d u r e s a d o p t e d by Galen. Moreover, we

have n o t i c e d t h a t it d o e s less t h a n j u s t i c e (to say t h e least) to H i p p o c r a t e s a n d Chrysippus, while saddling Plato with an e m p h a s i s o n spatial separation which goes f u r t h e r than what is to be f o u n d in the relevant dialogues, most notably the Timaeus. T h e presentation of Aristotle's position d o e s justice to his f r e q u e n t , t h o u g h by n o m e a n s exclusive, use of the c o n c e p t of power. But Galen's inflated claim that t h e powers d i s t i n g u i s h e d by Aristotle c o r r e s p o n d to t h e Platonic trifold division (i.e. r e a s o n , a n g e r a n d desire) is at best based o n a h a n d f u l of passages f r o m ethical c o n t e x t s . H e links P o s i d o n i u s to Aristotle as r e p r e s e n t i n g t h e s a m e position, viz. t h a t t h e soul has t h r e e powers:, reason, a n g e r a n d desire. 1 9 A n d h e repeatedly speaks of powers in c o n n e c t i o n with Posidonius. 2 0 O t h e r sources attest P o s i d o n i u s ' Aristotelizing t e n d e n c i e s in t h e field of causal theory a n d physics (T 85, 100; cf. Τ 42, 73 E.-K.). But f r o m G a l e n we h e a r little m o r e a b o u t P o s i d o n i u s ' use of Aristotle, w h e t h e r in psychology o r otherwise ( b u t h e may have r e f e r r e d to Aristotle in c o n n e c t i o n with physiognomy, see infra, pp. 240 f., supra p. 139). In books 4 a n d 5 t h e focus is n o t o n the ontological status of t h e psychic f u n c t i o n s , i.e. t h e p o w e r / p a r t distinction, b u t o n t h e i r division. 2 1 Accordingly, h e t e n d s to stress t h e a g r e e m e n t of Posidonius ( a n d Aristotle) with Plato. I n d e e d , h e supplies e v i d e n c e as to Posidonius' direct use of Platonic dialogues. T h e relevant f r a g m e n t s d o n o t explain how this relates to his alleged p r e f e r e n c e f o r Aristotle w h e r e t h e p a r t s / p o w e r distinction is c o n c e r n e d . In fact, Posidonius in t h e v e r b a t i m q u o t a t i o n s never t h e uses t h e t e r m p o w e r ( δ ύ ν α μις), 2 2 while t h e terms affective m o t i o n s (κινήσεις) a n d ' t h e affective' (? e l e m e n t ?aspect) (τό παθητικόν) d o a p p e a r to b e originally Posid o n i a n . T h u s G a l e n may well have f o i s t e d t h e t e r m p o w e r o n Posidonius. W h e t h e r or n o t h e was justified in d o i n g so will d e p e n d o n o u r f i n d i n g s in r e g a r d to t h e P o s i d o n i a n c o n c e p t s of psychic m o t i o n s a n d the παθητικόν. Most m o d e r n a c c o u n t s take Posidonius' use of t h e t e r m δ ύ ν α μ ι ς f o r g r a n t e d . Edelstein-Kicld's g e n e r o u s i n c l u s i o n of e x t e n s i v e passages f r o m PHP s u p p o s e d l y r e f l e c t i n g Posidonius' discussion may have m a d e those w h o use t h e m less alert 19

See esp. supra pp. 36 ff. Cf. p. 83 f. ΡΗΡ5ΑΛ-3, 6.2.5; cf. Frs. 32, 34, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 157 E.-K. 21 At 5.7.1 ff. Galen argues, rather lamely, that Plato in Republic book 4 drew the same distinction, i.e. differentiated the powers but did not yet establish their status as separate essence or parts. Accordingly, he may use the term powers to describe the position of Plato, see 5.4.3; cf. supra, p. 28. 22 As noted by Cooper (1998) 106 n.32; Gill (1998) 141 n.58. 20

to this than is a p p r o p r i a t e . Galen's failure to p r e s e n t a proof-text with the term in the relevant sense is really remarkable. For what is at issue is the main p o i n t of d i f f e r e n c e between Posidonius a n d Chrysippus, which is crucial to Galen's case. T h a t it was G a l e n w h o associated P o s i d o n i u s ' affective m o t i o n s (παθητικαί κινήσεις) with the c o n c e p t of power (δυνάμεις) is strongly suggested by the following passage: C h r y s i p p u s in t h e first b o o k o f h i s t r e a t i s e On Affections a t t e m p t s t o p r o v e t h a t t h e a f f e c t i o n s a r e c e r t a i n j u d g e m e n t s of t h e r e a s o n i n g part. Zeno however held that the affections are not the j u d g e m e n t s themselves b u t t h e c o n t r a c t i o n s a n d e x p a n s i o n s , risings a n d shrinkings of the soul that s u p e r v e n e o n j u d g e m e n t s . Posidonius disagreei n g w i t h b o t h , p r a i s e s a n d a c c e p t s t h e P l a t o n i c view a n d a r g u e s against Chrysippus, showing that the affections are not j u d g e m e n t s a n d d o not supervene on j u d g e m e n t s ; they are certain motions (κινήσεις) of o t h e r , irrational powers (δυνάμεων), which Plato called d e s i d e r a t i v e ( έ π ι θ υ μ η τ ι κ ή ν ) a n d s p i r i t e d ( θ υ μ ο ε ι δ ή ) (PHP 5.1.5; cf. 4.2.4-6).

Elsewhere we get a straightforward ascription of the c o n c e p t of δύναμις to Posidonius (F 32, F 34 = PHP8.1.14-15, 4.3.3). But in the above passage (which is n o m o r e verbatim than the o t h e r passages f e a t u r i n g t h e t e r m ) G a l e n ' s p h r a s i n g f o r o n c e is a bit m o r e c i r c u m s p e c t . I n d e e d , it implies that Posidonius did n o t use the term (nor 'desiderative' a n d 'spirited') o n his own behalf, i.e. in a f o r m a l s t a t e m e n t of his own position. T h e i n d e t e r m i n a t e expression "certain m o t i o n s " is strikingly at o d d s with the simple ascriptions of t h e Platonic tripartition to P o s i d o n i u s elsewhere. We n e e d n o t d o u b t , however, that Posidonius m e n t i o n e d Plato in a relevant context, viz. as part of what I h o p e to show was his a t t e m p t to p r e s e n t the Platonic tripartition as an anticipation of the Stoic d o c t r i n e . Galen seizes the o p p o r t u n i t y to sell this as a full-blown i d e n t i t y of t h e two p o s i t i o n s a n d an unqualified a c c e p t a n c e of the Platonic d o c t r i n e on Posidonius' part. T h e c o m m o n e l e m e n t h i g h l i g h t e d by Posidonius was clearly that of t h e s o u l ' s m o t i o n s — a linkage certainly e n c o u r a g e d by Plato's r e f e r e n c e s to the desire a n d i n d e e d conation of the parts of the soul. T h e Platonic t e r m f o r t h e soul's motive aspect, at least in G a l e n ' s eyes, is έπιθυμία, which, in its wider sense, is applicable to each of the t h r e e parts. 2 3 At 5.5.1-9, however, Plato's attribution to each part of 23 Cf. esp. Quod, animi mores, SM II, c.2, p. 35.3-36.8 Müller. In fact, as Rep. 9.580d ff. and other passages show, Plato's vocabulary for voluntary motion is

its own kind of motivation is c o u c h e d in the (originally Stoic !) terms of όρμή ('conation') and οίκείωσις ('familiarization'). I shall return to this passage in d u e course. 2 4 T h e e m p h a s i s placed by P o s i d o n i u s on t h e motive aspect is r e f l e c t e d in G a l e n ' s discussion in PHP 4-5. 2 5 T h i s s h o u l d b e recognized whenever h e speaks of powers (δυνάμεις)—a term which he identifies with the Stoic term impulse, or conation (όρμή) (PHP 5.7.1). Plato in Rep. IX uses the c o g n a t e verb ό ρ μ ή σ θ α ι when h e argues that each of the t h r e e parts of the soul has its own specific desire a n d pleasure (580d ff., cf. 4.436b2). A passage (581e6-582a2) f r o m precisely this Platonic context is q u o t e d at 6.2.12, i.e. in connection with the schema of options underlying Galen's discussion (6.2, see above). 2 6 In his description of Posidonius' view ( o n e central organ and three δυνάμεις) Galen uses the verb cognate with the Stoic term for conation, or impulse, namely ορμώμενης (6.2.5, p. 368, 1.24). This striking usage is absent f r o m the parallel version of the schema of options. It seems to r e p r e s e n t an originally Posidonian e l e m e n t which facilitated Galen's translation of the Stoic's position in terms of δ ύ ν α μ ι ς a n d his c o n c o m i t a n t a l i g n m e n t with Aristotle. But there is even a passage where Galen says that Chrysippus a n d the ancients c o n c u r r e d in taking πάθος as an u n n a t u r a l a n d irrational motion of the soul (5.2.2). This statement (which is f o u n d just before the text printed as Posid. F 163) may stand as a r e m i n d e r that when Posidonius considered earlier views f r o m the angle of the motive power of the soul, i.e. what the Stoics called its όρμή, this in itself n e e d not imply that h e disagreed with Chrysippus. Chrysippus a n d other Stoics of the first generations, after all, d e f i n e d όρμή in terms of a motion (κίνησις, φορά) of the soul. 27 In Galen's conceptual a p p a r a t u s δύναμις is the power (or potential) to d o or bring about something. A key passage from book 6 does m u c h to explain the conceptual links involved: rather varied. Galen himself applauds Plato for not being a stickler for words on this very point (5.7.32). 24 Incidentally, it should also be noted that Galen provides no explanation as to how the assignment of όρμαί to each of the separately located parts can be squared with the central role of the nervous system in his theory of voluntary movement On this problem see Mansfeld (1991) 136 ff. 25 Similarly his ethical tract De moribus, p. xxviii Kraus; QAM ch. 2, pp. 35-6 Müller. 26 The same conjunction is found at De moribus p.xxvi Kraus, a passage no doubt based on the relevant section of PHP·, cf. also supra, p. 28 n. 41. 27 SVF2.458, p. 150,1.22-3; 3.169, 377.

... Anger and desire will be called both affections (παθη) and actions (ένέργειαι); for since they are certain immoderate and unnatural motions (κινήσεις) of the innate powers (δυνάμεις) of the soul, they are actions of the powers because the powers have their motions from themselves; but because the motions are immoderate, they are affections ... (PHP6.1.21). T h e p o i n t at issue in this c o n t e x t is t h e ambiguity of t h e t e r m πάθος. It may d e n o t e an affection in t h e sense of u n d e r g o i n g an action; b u t it can also m e a n an u n n a t u r a l m o t i o n or action, as in t h e case of the a f f e c t i o n s of t h e soul. T h e above q u o t e explicates this latter sense. W h e t h e r Galen is right to apply it to Posidonius as categorically as h e d o e s is a m o o t point, especially in view of t h e P o s i d o n i a n c o n c e p t of t h e π α θ η τ ι κ ό ν . T h e t e r m παθητικόν h a d b e e n used by Posidonius. 2 8 However, we s h o u l d n o t be too quick to u n d e r s t a n d it in the sense in w h i c h it is t a k e n by G a l e n , i.e. as a n o n - r a t i o n a l ' p a r t ' (as it is translated h e r e ) o r power in a Platonic or Aristotelian sense. 2 9 As we shall see, t h e r e a r e g o o d r e a s o n s to take π α θ η τ ι κ ό ν as u s e d by Posidonius in a n o t h e r sense (see below, p p . 211 ff.).

3. The 'Ancient Account' In his On Affections a n d o t h e r works Posidonius showed a p r o n o u n c e d interest in what the ' t h e a n c i e n t s ' (οί π α λ α ι ο ί ) h a d said: n o t only the f o u n d e r s of his own school, b u t also Pythagoras, Plato, Aristotle a n d o t h e r s . As we have seen, G a l e n a r g u e s t h a t P o s i d o n i u s actually ret u r n e d to t h e ' a n c i e n t a c c o u n t ' (6 π α λ α ι ό ς λόγος) a c c o r d i n g to which the soul c o n t a i n e d non-rational elements, or powers. This, Galen tells 28 See esp. 5.5.21 (Posid. Fr. 169), 5.6.31, 33, 36 (Fr. 166); on the last text see infra, pp. 223 ff. 29 See 2.7.18, where Galen links it with τό άλόγιστον and τό πάσχον, opposing them to τό λογιζόμενον; similarly 3.2.8, 3.7.23, 4.7.33 (Posidonian context, Fr. 158 E.-K.), 5.5.32 (Posid. F 31), 5.6.22 (Posid. Fr. 168), 5.5.21 (Posid. Fr. 169). However, it is worth noting that the term παθητικόν is more often used in a sense that is non-committal with regard to the question of the soul's division and so can also be used to describe the Early Stoic view of affection, as at Stob. Ed. 2, p.39.5 ff (SVF 1.206, first text), where the definition of the soul's fluttering (see supra, pp. 105 ff.) is said to have been picked by Zeno in view of the 'mobility of the παθητικόν'. Here the term indicates the soul's emotional state (unless one wishes to side with the old view of Pohlenz and treat this as evidence for Zeno's division of the soul). Likewise Plutarch, Virt. mor. 441C (SMF3.459) uses the expresion τό παθητικόν καί αλογον in an accurate account of Stoic monism. He may be imposing his Platonic-Aristotelian outlook on the Stoic material but it seems more likely that he has deliberately chosen non-committal terminology.

us, was t h e position taken by all i m p o r t a n t p h i l o s o p h e r s b e f o r e Chrysippus, that is to say also that d e f e n d e d by the f o u n d e r of Stoicism, Zeno, a n d his pupil Cleanthes. In this context, to j u d g e f r o m Galen's account, he appealed to Plato in particular (though, as we have noticed, Galen also links Posidonius to Aristotle, see above, pp. 34 ff.). But can we believe Galen's claims a b o u t Posidonius' relation to Plato a n d o t h e r predecessors? In this section I shall discuss part of the evidence c o n c e r n e d with ' t h e ancients'. What exactly was involved in Posidonius' appeal to them? First consider this passage: Now Posidonius, a man reared in geometry, as I believe, and trained more than the other Stoics to follow demonstrative proofs was ashamed of Chrysippus' conflict with the evident phenomena and of his self-contradictions and he attempts (πειράται) to bring over not only himself but also 7j>no of Citium to the side of the Platonists. Just about all the other Stoics, however, somehow endure following Chrysippus' errors rather than choose the truth (PHP 4.4.38, Posid. Τ 83, 99 59 E.-K.). This testimony is usually glossed over, but its cautious wording is exceptional. T h e verb πειράται is striking since it suggests that the Z e n o n i a n / P o s i d o n i a n a n d Platonist positions are in fact different. Still, on the positive side, Galen refers to what could have been a g e n u i n e attempt on Posidonius' part to c o m p a r e and indeed reconcile the Stoic a n d Platonic positions. Now c o m p a r e the following passage: ... the best [view] Hippocrates and Plato were the very first to expound. Posidonius says that Pythagoras also held this view; he infers this from the writings of some of Pythagoras' pupils, as no work of Pythagoras has been preserved up to our time {PHP 5.6.42-3 = Posid. Τ 91 E.-K.). In a n o t h e r passage Posidonius is said to have pinpointed Pythagoras as the first to differentiate between the rational a n d the non-rational in the h u m a n soul. This division, h e a d d e d , 'was m a d e complete' by Plato (ibid. 4.7.39 ~ Τ 95 E.-K.). A d o x o g r a p h i c parallel strongly suggests that what Posidonius m e a n t was that Plato had p r o c e e d e d to divide the non-rational part into a n g e r a n d appetite. 3 0 Not only does his term παθητικόν imply the same basic bipartition, but so does his substitution of Plato's image of the chariot (Phaedrus 246a6 ff.) for that of a rider on a horse (5.6.31 ~ F 166 E.-K.). 31 W h e t h e r this 30

Rep. 4.436b ff., esp. 439e2 ff. Posidonius' discussed this passage from the Phaedrus in the context of Plato's views on the proper education of the soul, see 5.5.34-35 (F 31 E.-K). Here too the 31

r e a d i n g of Plato d o e s justice to the latter's i n t e n t i o n is q u e s t i o n a b l e . Yet t h e parallel f r o m the Placita a n d o t h e r s indicate that it was quite common.32 Posidonius, t h e n , i n c l u d e d a survey of earlier views, in line with what seems to have b e e n his m o r e regular p r o c e d u r e . 3 3 T h e inclusion of Z e n o a n d C l e a n t h e s m a d e sense b e c a u s e h e c o u l d t h e n trace a c o n t i n u o u s t r a d i t i o n f r o m P y t h a g o r a s - c u m - P l a t o via t h e s c h o o l ' s f o u n d e r s to c o n t e m p o r a r y Stoicism. ( O n C l e a n t h e s ' d i a l o g u e between Reason a n d A n g e r , see below § 5). T h e views of these f o r e r u n n e r s testify to a particular view of t h e progression of science a n d p h i l o s o p h y , a view in which t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g of earlier t h e o r i e s c o n t r i b u t e s to o n e ' s own d e v e l o p m e n t . T h e a t t e m p t to a p p r o p r i a t e G r e e k paideia was typical of Stoicism right f r o m t h e start. Chrysippus a n d o t h e r e a r l i e r Stoics formally c o n c e i v e d of t h e i r p r o j e c t as an articulation of existing n o t i o n s — a c o n c e p t i o n based o n their views a b o u t universal t r u t h as r e f l e c t e d in t h e m i n d of laymen a n d e x p e r t s alike. 3 4 But Stoic epistemology aside, t h e r e lies an obvious dialectical a d v a n t a g e in a c c o m m o d a t i n g rival d o c t r i n e s i n t o o n e ' s own, t h u s effectively n e u t r a l i z i n g t h e m — a ploy by n o m e a n s c o n f i n e d to t h e Stoics. But in n e i t h e r case would a r e f e r e n c e to Plato entail u n c o n d i tional a g r e e m e n t o n t h e p a r t of Posidonius (see below, o n his having written an ' e p i t o m e ' ) . T h u s we know that o n certain physical matters h e took his starting points (άφορμαί) f r o m Aristotle a n d T h e o p h r a s tus (T 42, 73, 100 E.-K.). This did n o t , of course, p r e c l u d e disagreem e n t with t h e s a m e p h i l o s o p h e r s o n o t h e r p o i n t s (F 49, 1.17 ff., F 220). T h u s h e praised a n d s u m m a r i z e d what Plato wrote o n r e g i m e n in t h e Laws (F 31, see below), b u t criticized t h e s a m e d i a l o g u e o n a n o t h e r occasion (F 178). Posidonius' interest in what Galen calls the ' a n c i e n t a c c o u n t ' was g e n u i n e a n d based o n specific ideas o n knowledge a n d history. 3 5 But this by n o m e a n s implied an u n d i s c r i m i n a t i n g

main point is the distinction between rational and irrational. On this passage see further below. 32 See supra, p. 65. 33 For Posidonius' reference to Plato see also the Galenic passage printed as Posid. F 31 E.-K. discussed infra in text. In addition, the long overview of geographical tenets held by Posidonius' predecessors, Frs. 285 (natural philosophy, from Strabo); 49 (Strabo); F 130, F 131a-b (cosmology), 137a (meteorology). The same kind of Posidonian overview may be reflected in Frs. 139, 149 (psychology) 200a-b, 216, 222. 34

On this procedure as exemplified by the fragments from the On the Soul see Tieleman (1996a) 201,268. 35 Relevant testimonies are Seneca's 90 lh Letter; which in large part draws on

a c c e p t a n c e of what the a n c i e n t s h a d said o r written. In his On Affections his c o n c e r n with t h e a n c i e n t s b e l o n g s firmly in the c o n t e x t of a preliminary p r o c e d u r e of reviewing relevant theories. H e r e , it seems, their relevance was assessed primarily in terms of their anticipation of t h e Stoic d e f i n i t i o n of affection as an excessive c o n a t i o n (όρμή). So t h e r e is g o o d reason to b e cautious w h e n Galen says that Posidonius accepts the a n c i e n t a c c o u n t or follows it in everything. 3 6 In line with a n c i e n t c o n v e n t i o n s , his exegesis may have involved t h e assimilation a n d i n d e e d o u t r i g h t a d a p t a t i o n of Platonic ( a n d o t h e r ) d o c t r i n e s to Stoicism. In o t h e r words, the situation may have b e e n q u i t e t h e reverse of w h a t G a l e n suggests at 4.4.38 ( q u o t e d above) a n d elsewhere. C o r r o b o r a t i o n f o r this assumption c o m e s f r o m a few o t h e r sources, which attest P o s i d o n i u s ' i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e Platonic Timaeus in t h e c o n t e x t of t h e q u e s t i o n of t h e s u b s t a n c e of t h e soul. Galen c o n v e n i e n t l y glosses over t h e fact that P o s i d o n i u s a c c e p t e d t h e traditional Stoic view that the soul consists of h o t pneuma (D.L. 7.157, F 139, w h e r e also n o t e that P o s i d o n i u s is c o n j o i n e d with Z e n o ) , i.e. is c o r p o r e a l . N o t only d o e s Galen have n o use f o r instances of a g r e e m e n t between Posidonius a n d earlier Stoics in this m a t t e r , b u t the d o c t r i n e would greatly c o m p l i c a t e his case in PHP 4 a n d 5 a n d in particular his linking of Posidonius a n d Aristotle with respect to the powers of t h e soul. Moreover, it would reveal that t h e Stoic c o n c e p t of c o r p o r e a l ο υ σ ί α ( ' s u b s t a n c e ' ) d o e s n o t fit his s c h e m a of o p t i o n s in which the same term is e m p l o y e d in the Aristotelian sense of substance, viz. b e i n g or essence (see above, p. 34). But Posidonius also did s o m e t h i n g which completely subverts t h e image of h i m cast by Galen in PHP 4-5. H e set o u t to reconcile t h e Platonic Timaeus with the Stoic d o c t r i n e of t h e psychic pneuma. T h u s we read in a scholion o n t h e H o m e r i c Iliad that a c c o r d i n g to Posidonius in t h e t h i r d b o o k On the Soul, t h e psychic pneuma is scattered t h r o u g h o u t t h e b o n e s — a n insight a n t i c i p a t e d by H o m e r . H e r e h e also r e f e r r e d to Plato's s t a t e m e n t ( Tim, 73b) that t h e soul's ' c h a i n s ' Posidonius' Kulturgeschichte marked, among other things, by a rule of sapienles and a generally higher level of wisdom at the beginning of time (cf. also Sext. M 9.28, referring to 'some of the later Stoics'). As Kidd remarks (Comm. II.ii, p. 971), this need not have precluded a view of philosophy as the end to which mankind progresses. Posidonius' ideas about pristine wisdom may help explain his interest in the wisdom of thinkers preceding those whom we call philosophers. Thus he traced the atom theory back to one Mochus, a Sidonian who lived before the Trojan war (F 285, 286). Also he anachronistically explained Homer in a way congenial to the Stoic doctrine of pneuma·, see infra in text. 36 See Τ 101, 102

are 'in the roots of the b o n e ' as a m o u n t i n g to t h e same thing (F 28a, cf. 2 8 b ) . In s u m , P o s i d o n i u s t r a c e d a n t i c i p a t i o n s f o r t h e Stoic position o n t h e soul's s u b s t a n c e in a way involving an in o u r eyes r a t h e r f o r c e d exegesis of such a u t h o r i t i e s as H o m e r a n d Plato. T h e a p p e a l to H o m e r was as old as Stoicism. T h a t to Plato may have b e e n m o r e p r o m i n e n t in Posidonius t h a n in o t h e r Stoics. I n d e e d , these testimonies seem to imply that Posidonius foisted o n t o Plato t h e Stoic ( a n d his o w n ) view of t h e s o u l ' s p n e u m a t i c s u b s t a n c e . T h i s w o u l d b e startling since it would s t a n d t h e Platonic key d o c t r i n e of t h e soul's incorporeality o n its h e a d . Yet that Posidonius went sofar is strongly s u g g e s t e d by his i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Tim. 35a-b as p r e s e r v e d by Plutarch, On the Creation of the Soul in the Timaeus 1023B (1023B-D = Posid. F 141a E.-K.). H e r e Plutarch has preserved an intriguing piece of P o s i d o n i a n exegesis of w h a t Plato in t h e Timaeus said o n t h e n a t u r e a n d status of the soul. This text, which is p r i n t e d by EdelsteinKidd as Fr. 141a, is d e n s e a n d difficult, n o t least b e c a u s e P l u t a r c h o f f e r s n o t a r e p o r t b u t a c r i t i q u e of w h a t P o s i d o n i u s said. In o t h e r words, w h a t P o s i d o n i u s originally said o r m e a n t m u s t b e i n f e r r e d f r o m P l u t a r c h ' s critical r e m a r k s . N o n e t h e l e s s , this testimony, if used with c a u t i o n , may aid o u r u n d e r s t a n d i n g of how P o s i d o n i u s r e a d Plato. In a d d i t i o n , it provides an i m p o r t a n t indication with respect to his c o n c e p t of the so-called παθητικόν. First of all, it is i m p o r t a n t to see why Plutarch i n t r o d u c e s Posidonius in t h e first place. In t h e text i m m e d i a t e l y p r e c e d i n g Fr. 141a P l u t a r c h p o i n t s to t h e fact t h a t Plato in t h e Timaeus discusses t h e c r e a t i o n of soul b e f o r e i n t r o d u c i n g his t h e o r y of m a t t e r . T h i s is b e c a u s e Plato h a d n o n e e d of m a t t e r w h e n h e was g e n e r a t i n g t h e soul (1023B; t h e p o i n t is r e p e a t e d at 1023C). In o t h e r words, t h e soul is i n c o r p o r e a l . T h e n t h e text of t h e so-called f r a g m e n t b e g i n s as follows: S i m i l a r o b j e c t i o n s c a n b e m a d e also t o P o s i d o n i u s a n d his f o l l o w e r s , 3 ' f o r t h e y d i d n o t w i t h d r a w f a r f r o m m a t t e r ...

Posidonius, unlike Plutarch, a s s u m e d that m a t t e r was involved in t h e creation of soul. A l t h o u g h P l u t a r c h ' s w o r d i n g is r a t h e r c i r c u m s p e c t (especially w h e n h e says 'did n o t withdraw far f r o m m a t t e r ' ) , this can 37 This expression translates τοις περί Ποσειδώνιον. The standard formula with περί may mean Posidonius, his followers or both, see Cherniss' discussion ad loc. (note g, p. 218). As Cherniss indicates, the phrase may betray the fact that Plutarch simply drew on an intermediate source for the Posidonian interpretation of Tim. 35a-b.

only m e a n that Posidonius took t h e soul as d e s c r i b e d by Plato to be corporeal. P l u t a r c h ' s s u b s e q u e n t discussion is d e n s e a n d at times h a r d to follow, n o t least because Posidonius' original i n t e r p r e t a t i o n has to be e x t r a c t e d f r o m his critical t r e a t m e n t . An e x a m p l e of h o w h e m i s r e p r e s e n t s P o s i d o n i u s ' m e a n i n g is w h e n h e says that P o s i d o n i u s r e g a r d e d the soul as ' t h e idea of what is every way e x t e n d e d ' (τήν ... ίδέαν ... του π ά ν τ η δ ι α σ τ α τ ο υ , 1023Β), taking idea in the sense of P l a t o n i c I d e a o r F o r m (cf. 1023C). T h i s i n f o r m a t i o n is n o t only highly unlikely in itself b u t also i n c o m p a t i b l e with his s u b s e q u e n t observation that t h e soul a c c o r d i n g to Posidonius (quite in line with Plato) is intermediate between t h e intelligibles a n d t h e perceptibles. Presumably, P o s i d o n i u s used t h e t e r m in t h e s a m e sense as Plato himself at Tim. 35a7 ( ' f o r m ' , ' e n t i t y ' ) . 3 8 I n d e e d , an admittedly late testimony ascribes the d e f i n i t i o n of soul as an idea to Posidonius (F 140; f o r the usage as f o r m cf. 256, ad fin.). This difficult passage f r o m P l u t a r c h has received various m o d e r n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s . Yet a few p o i n t s that are directly relevant to o u r p u r p o s e s may be taken to b e certain. 3 9 Posidonius a r g u e d that, like the mathematicals, 4 0 the soul is situated b e t w e e n t h e intelligible a n d p e r c e p t i b l e realms, 'possessing (in P l u t a r c h ' s words) t h e everlastingness of t h e intelligibles a n d t h e passivity of t h e p e r c e p t i b l e s . ' T h e word I have r e n d e r e d 'passivity' (following Cherniss) is to παθητικόν. 4 1 Obviously it c a n n o t m e a n t h e non-rational section of the soul h e r e . But we n e e d n o t d o u b t that it indicates t h e soul's passive aspect which in t h e c o n t e x t of (early) Stoic p h i l o s o p h y is related to corporeality. T h u s in his On Affections P o s i d o n i u s raises t h e question of what causes the excessive c o n a t i o n (όρμή). How could reason exceeds its own acts a n d measures? (4.3.45 ~ F 34 E.-K.). In this c o n t e x t h e p o i n t e d n o t to non-rational powers in t h e soul but to Chrysippus' image of t h e r u n n e r s : h e r e , in G a l e n ' s report, ' t h e cause that makes t h e r u n n i n g exceeds the m e a s u r e set by 38

See Cherniss ad 1023C (n. c) and at 1012C (n. b). See esp. Cherniss' comments ad loc. in the Loeb Plutarch (XIII, part 1) as well as Kidd ad loc. (II. 1, 529 ff., both with ample discussion and further references. 40 Plutarch objects that Plato regarded the soul not as number but as being ordered by number (1023D), thus implying that Posidonius had argued otherwise. Plutarch, then, suggests that Posidonius considered, or at least interpreted, the (Platonic) soul as a body, a transcendent Idea and a number. 41 Similarly Kidd ad loc. (= Commentary, p. 536): 'Posidonius was appealing to the authority of Plato [...] for the soul having characteristics both of permanency and of affection or passivity (παθητικόν).' 39

c h o i c e is irrational, n a m e l y t h e weight of t h e body.' T h e c o r p o r e a l soul behaves analogously. Its excesses are d u e to its corporeality. Posidonius links the soul's passivity (παθητικόν) to its perceptibility as well as its c o r p o r e a l i t y . T h i s is c o n s o n a n t with g e n e r a l Stoic d o c t r i n e as laid down by t h e school's f o u n d e r s . Like Plato, t h e Stoics linked b o d y a n d perceptibility (SVF 2.794), which they c o n t r a s t e d with intelligibility (SVF 2.81, 195). T h u s if t h e soul is c o r p o r e a l it is also p e r c e p t i b l e (think of t h e distinctive Stoic idea of self-perception, i.e. t h e soul's p e r c e p t i o n of itself), t h e n this holds g o o d especially f o r t h e s o u l ' s πάθη (SVF 3 . 8 5 ) . T h a t P o s i d o n i u s s u b s c r i b e s to this c o m p l e x of ideas is c o n f i r m e d by G a l e n ' s testimony at PHP5.7.84 (F 156), w h e r e we have the same c o n n e c t i o n between t h e affections a n d perceptibility. H e r e t h e a f f e c t i o n s illustrate a m e t h o d o l o g i c a l , o r epistemological, p o i n t m a d e by Posidonius: obvious p h e n o m e n a or things 'which provide an indication lying close to p e r c e p t i o n such as the affections of the soul d o n o t n e e d l e n g t h y discourses o r d e t a i l e d d e m o n s t r a t i o n s , b u t a s i m p l e r e m i n d e r of w h a t we e x p e r i e n c e o n each occasion.' Moreover, it is n o t h a r d to recognize in Posidonius' i n t e r p r e t a t i o n an e c h o of t h e Stoic d e f i n i t i o n of b o d y as t h a t which is c a p a b l e of a c t i n g ( π ο ι ε ΐ ν ) a n d b e i n g a c t e d u p o n o r a f f e c t e d (πάσχειν) (SVF 1.90, 98, 2.387). In a d d i t i o n , we find three-dimensionality as a d e f i n ing characteristic (SVF 2.315, 381, 357). T h e d e f i n i t i o n was used in proofs of t h e soul's corporeality (SVF 1.518). I n d e e d , when applied to t h e soul a n d t h e cause of its π ά θ η , it goes s o m e way to explain t h e dual origin of evil, i.e. a b a d soul, specified by Chrysippus a n d Posidonius alike, viz. t h e i n f l u e n c e of impressions c o m i n g f r o m outside a n d what o t h e r p e o p l e say. I shall r e t u r n to this p o i n t presently . But how c o u l d Posidonius a d v a n c e a credible interpretatio Stoica of the Platonic d o c t r i n e that t h e soul is i n t e r m e d i a t e b e t w e e n t h e perceptibles a n d intelligibles? As a Stoic, h e may have i n t e r p r e t e d t h e Platonic intelligibles in t e r m s of t h e Stoic lekta ('sayables'), which exist (or, as t h e Stoics said, 'subsist', t h e t e r m existence b e i n g confined to c o r p o r e a l reality) only in relation to the h u m a n soul. In this sense t h e intellect can b e said to b e i n t e r m e d i a t e b e t w e e n t h e two realms. 4 2 T h e lekta are t h e h a l l m a r k of its rationality, which derives f r o m t h e e t e r n a l cosmos, i.e. its intellect which is identified with G o d . 42 On the contrast drawn between what is perceptible (αίσθητόν) and what is intelligible (νοητόν) see SVF 2.81 (Chrysippus). On the intelligibles as 'sayables' (λεκτά) see SVF2.195.

T h i s c o n n e c t i o n is r e f e r r e d to by Posidonius w h e n h e speaks of o u r intellect b e i n g o r i e n t e d towards the 'daimôn within us.' (Fr. 187, 11. 67). Admittedly, Plutarch fails to m e n t i o n Posidonius' view c o n c e r n i n g t h e k i n d of c o r p o r e a l s u b s t a n c e of which t h e soul consists. O t h e r sources unequivocally c o n f i r m that h e subscribed to the g e n e r a l Stoic view that the soul is pneuma,43 But t h e r e is o n e Platonist source which n o t only reflects the Posidonian exegesis at issue in Plutarch b u t also i m p l e m e n t s t h e P o s i d o n i a n d e f i n i t i o n of t h e t e r m of pneuma: D.L. 3.67 gives as P l a t o ' s d e f i n i t i o n of t h e soul: ' t h e f o r m of pneuma e x t e n d i n g to all sides' (ίδέαν του πάντη διεστώτος πνεύματος). T h e pneumarâocxx'me is also crucial to t h e Stoic scale of n a t u r e . T h i s t o o was b r o u g h t by P o s i d o n i u s to b e a r o n his r e a d i n g of t h e Timaeus, viz. in a passage which is o n e of G a l e n ' s main-proof-texts in his a t t e m p t to attribute t h e Platonic tripartition to Posidonius. A related piece of exegesis of t h e Platonic Timaeus may have b e e n preserved by Achilles, Introduction to Aratus 13 (Posid. F 149 E.-K.), o n the c o n c e p t i o n of t h e stars as living things ( ζ ώ δ ι α ) , i.e. possessed of a soul. This view is a t t r i b u t e d to Plato in t h e Timaeus (40b), Aristotle in t h e s e c o n d b o o k of his On the Universe (292b) a n d Chrysippus in t h e On Providence and the Gods (SVF2.687).44 Achilles t h e n continues: T h e E p i c u r e a n s say t h a t t h e y [i.e. t h e s t a r s ] a r e n o t living b e i n g s ( ζ φ δ ι α ) , 4 5 s i n c e t h e y a r e c o n t a i n e d by b o d i e s , b u t t h e Stoics h o l d t h e o p p o s i t e view. P o s i d o n i u s says t h a t t h e E p i c u r e a n s d o n o t k n o w t h a t t h e bodies d o n o t c o n t a i n t h e souls b u t t h e souls contain t h e bodies, j u s t as g l u e h o l d s b o t h itself a n d t h i n g s e x t e r n a l t o it.

As in D i o g e n e s Laertius a n d elsewhere, P o s i d o n i u s r e p r e s e n t s t h e g e n e r a l Stoic position, j u s t as Chrysippus d o e s a little earlier in t h e s a m e passage. T h e view in q u e s t i o n , viz. that t h e soul c o n t a i n s t h e body a n d n o t vice versa, also derives f r o m theTimaeus (34b, 36d-e). 4 6 T h e simile of glue however is n o t Platonic a n d may well be Posidonian. O n e recalls εξις, the Stoic p r i n c i p l e of c o h e s i o n which, b e i n g

43

See Frs. '28a+b, 21,11.5-6 E.-K. (= D.L. 7.138). A work of this title is not attested elsewhere, though Chrysippus wrote treatises known as On Providence (SVF 3, App. II, nr. XLVIII) and On the Gods (ibid. nr. XXIII). The phrasing in Achilles might represent either a conflation of these two, or perhaps an alternative title of the former. On the Stoic doctrine of the stars as ensouled and rational see e.g. Stob. Eel. I 25.3 (Arius Didymus,/r. phys. 33 Diels, SVFL120). 45 I.e. the demunitive which is used to indicate the signs of the Zodiac. 46 Cf. Plut. Degen, an. in Tim. 1023A-B. 44

the lowest level of pneuma, is also i n c l u d e d in soul. In early Stoic texts, t o o , its f u n c t i o n is o f t e n d e s c r i b e d in t e r m s of c o n t a i n m e n t . 4 7 Posidonius himself, m o r e o v e r , is o n r e c o r d as subscribing to the early Stoic scale of n a t u r e in t e r m s of t h r e e kinds, or levels, of pneuma— cohesive, physical a n d psychic (i.e. πν. έκτικόν, φυσικόν, ψυχικόν). 4 8 P o s i d o n i u s , t h e n , u s e d a P l a t o n i c view in t h e service of a Stoic doctrine; that is to say, h e assimilated Plato to Stoicism. T h e relevance of t h e c o n c e p t of c o n a t i o n (ορμή) to P o s i d o n i u s ' position can also be i n f e r r e d f r o m two passages c o n c e r n e d with t h e scale of n a t u r e , o n e f r o m Diogenes Laertius (7.85-87; 86-87 ~ Posid. F 185), t h e o t h e r f r o m Galen (PHP 5.6.37-38 ~ Posid. F 33 E.-K). T h e f o r m e r p r e s e n t s a c o n c i s e t h o u g h i n t e g r a t e d a c c o u n t of m e n t a l d e v e l o p m e n t in terms of t h e Stoic idea of familiarization (οίκείωσις), f r o m the so-called 'first c o n a t i o n ' (πρώτη ορμή) directed towards selfpreservation to t h e p u r s u i t of virtue as t h e E n d (τέλος) of m a n . In this c o n t e x t t h e c o n c e p t of ορμή is u s e d to e x p l a i n t h e d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n living c r e a t u r e s . T h e p r i n c i p l e g o v e r n i n g t h e existence of p l a n t s is φ ύ σ ι ς ( ' n a t u r e ' ) , i.e. t h e p r i n c i p l e of n o u r i s h m e n t a n d growth. 4 9 Animals ( ζ φ α ) are m a r k e d by their possession of c o n a t i o n (as well as p e r c e p t i o n ) . 5 0 In a n i m a l s plant-like processes d o o c c u r , b u t f o r t h e m c o n a t i o n c o m e s o n t o p of it (έπιγενομένης), e n a b l i n g t h e m to move themselves towards what is a p p r o p r i a t e (viz. to t h e i r n a t u r e ) . We m u s t k e e p in m i n d this r e f e r e n c e to l o c o m o t i o n (πορεύεται). In rational c r e a t u r e s (i.e. a d u l t h u m a n s ) reason (λόγος) ' t h r o u g h a m o r e p e r f e c t d i s p e n s a t i o n ' (viz. of divine N a t u r e ) c o m e s

4/

On έξις, i.e. πνεύμα έκτικόν, containing (συνέχειν) bodies see SVF2.368, 473 (p.155.29-30), 540, 716; cf. 2.439; on the hierarchy of levels of pneuma see e.g. 2.458. 48 Fr. 21 = D.L. 7.138, linking Chrysippus' On Providence (SVF 2.634) and Posidonius' On the Gods. Here the levels of pneuma are explained in terms of the difference in quality or intensity of the divine intellect. At its lowest level it is hexis, at its highest human intellect. Although the levels of physis and psyché do not receive separate mention, it is clear that Posidonius drew on the threefold hierarchy of kinds of pneuma developed by his predecessors. Cf. also F 23 on the cosmos as ensouled and the heaven as its hêgemonikon. The reference to Chrysippus may indeed be due to the fact that Posidonius included it in his treatise. 49 Plants therefore have no soul: see PHP6.3.7 (SVF 2.710), where note that Galen nonetheless proceeds to equate Stoic physis with the Platonic appetitive part and the Aristotelian nutritive power of the soul; cf. also SVF 2.708-13, 718. In addition, we may note that the mode of being indicated by the term physis is often explained as a principle of κίνησις, a term which is often rendered as modon but can be used in the wider sense of 'process', see the rather full scala naturae presented by Philo, SVF2.458, 1133. 50 Similarly the fuller account of Philo printed as SVF 2.458

o n t o p of c o n a t i o n ; it takes over as a ' c r a f t s m a n (τεχνίτης) of conation'. T h e last p o i n t serves to indicate an entirely d i f f e r e n t relation between reason a n d c o n a t i o n than is expressed in terms of powers or parts of the soul. This scala naturae can be s u m m a r i z e d as follows: Class of living things:

M o d e of being:

Plants Non-rational animals

N a t u r e (physis) N a t u r e a n d soul with c o n a t i o n a n d perception N a t u r e a n d soul with rational conation a n d p e r c e p t i o n

Rational a n i m a l s ( h u m a n s ) 3 1

This a c c o u n t serves to u n d e r p i n the Stoic f o r m u l a of the h u m a n End, 'living a c c o r d i n g to n a t u r e ' , as b e i n g e q u a l to 'living a c c o r d i n g to virtue'. Since N a t u r e has bestowed intelligence u p o n us, it also leads us to virtue; h e n c e it is a p p r o p r i a t e a n d n a t u r a l f o r us to p u r s u e virtue. This latter p o i n t is established with r e f e r e n c e to Z e n o in his On the Nature of Man ( SVF 1.179), C l e a n t h e s in his On Pleasure {SVF 1.552) a n d Posidonius a n d H e k a t o n in their On Ends. In o t h e r words, Posidonius f e a t u r e s (as so o f t e n in Diogenes) as o n e of the a u t h o r i ties w h o may be called u p o n to attest a particular d o c t r i n e distinctive of Stoic philosophy in general. In this case h e subscribes to the above scale of n a t u r e t u r n i n g o n the c o n c e p t of conation. 5 2 51

The Stoics considered the soul of children still non-rational, thus putting them on a par with animals, see SVF3.477, 512, 537. (In consequence, they have no real affections—a point much criticized by Galen, e.g. PHP5.1.10 = SVF3.476 and cf. supra, p. 138 ff.). Children b e c o m e rational at about the age of fourteen (although seven is also mentioned), see SVF2.764, 149 (from the texts assembled here it is also clear that the Stoics stressed that this was a gradual process). In fact, the development of a human being from conception onwards may be formulated in terms of the scala naturae, since the embryo is governed by physis, see SVF 2.756761, 806 with Tieleman (1991). The process of growth, then, for the human being traverses the stages of physis-psychê-reason (i.e. rational psyché). 52 Not only this cluster of references is included by Edelstein-Kidd but (in view of διόπερ, 1.7) also the text of § 86 from έκ περιττού onwards. However, this breaks the scale of nature into two. In consequence F 185 begins with the animals and omits the plants. It is therefore more preferable to include the preceding sentence as well, i.e. from ουδέν τε, φασί, διήλλαξεν ή φύσις έπί τών φυτών κτλ. The plural verb φασί (if correct) suits the plurality of authorities concluding the passage, underlining that we are dealing with a general Stoic view. So it is preferable to keep the exposition of the scale of nature intact and together with the authorities mentioned in conclusion. Accordingly the scale of nature is attributable to Posidonius as well.

Galen ascribes a similar scala naturae to P o s i d o n i u s alone, b u t his r e p o r t serves as a n o t h e r p i e c e of e v i d e n c e t h a t t h e Stoic h a d e s p o u s e d t h e Platonic tripartition: C h r y s i p p u s d o e s n o t b e l i e v e t h a t t h e a f f e c t i v e p a r t of t h e s o u l is o t h e r t h a n t h e rational a n d h e deprives t h e irrational a n i m a l s of their affect i o n s , a l t h o u g h t h e y a r e clearly g o v e r n e d by d e s i r e a n d a n g e r , as Posid o n i u s t o o e x p o u n d s a b o u t t h e m a t l e n g t h . H e says t h a t all a n i m a l s t h a t a r e n o t easily m o v e d a n d a r e like p l a n t s 5 3 a t t a c h e d t o r o c k s o r t h e like, a r e r u l e d by d e s i r e a l o n e ; b u t all o t h e r a n i m a l s m a k e u s e of both powers, the appetitive a n d the spirited; a n d only m a n employs t h r e e ( p o w e r s ) , f o r in a d d i t i o n h e h a s a c q u i r e d t h e r a t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e . 5 4 P o s i d o n i u s was c o r r e c t in w h a t h e said a b o u t t h i s a n d a b o u t m u c h else in t h e w h o l e of his t r e a t i s e On Affections (5.6.37-8 = P o s i d . F 33).55

It may be h e l p f u l to s c h e m a t i z e t h e scala naturae ascribed to Posidonius as follows: Class of animals:

Parts of the soul:

i m m o b i l e animals a n d plants (?) mobile non-rational animals rational animals (= h u m a n s )

appetitive p a r t appetitive a n d spirited parts appetitive a n d spirited a n d rational parts

A p a r t f r o m the obvious p o i n t that this hierarchical s c h e m a has b e e n m o d e l l e d o n t h e Platonic tripartition, a few t e r m s e c h o t h e Timaeus

53 Plato ascribed (a rudimentary form of) desire as well as sensation to plants, Tim. 77b. The Stoa by contrast differentiated sharply between plants and animals: plants are not ensouled (έμψυχα) but have nature (φύσις); they lack the defining characteristics of soul and hence animals, viz. perception (or presentation, α'ισθησις or φαντασία) and conation (όρμή), including desire: see SVF 2.458, 2.708, 2.177.32 f. and esp. PHP 6 3.7, where Galen notes that the Stoics do not give the governing principle of plants the name 'soul' at all but 'nature', but nonetheless equates Stoic nature with the Platonic appetitive soul and the Aristotelian nutriuvecum-generative soul. The same equation seems to be behind the present passage. 54 Similarly Plato, Lg. 897b. Ό δέ Χρύσιππος οΰθ' έτερον είναι νομίζει τό παθητικόν τής ψυχής τού λογιστικού καί τών άλογων ζώων άφαιρείται τά πάθη φανερώς έπιθυμία τε καί θυμώ διοικουμένων, ώς καί ό Ποσειδώνιος ύπερ αύτών έπί πλέον διεξέρχεται. όσα μέν ούν τών ζφων δυσκίνητα τ' έστί καί προσπεφυκότα δίκην φυτών πέτραις ή τισιν έτέροις τοιούτοις, έπιθυμία μόνη διοικεΐσθαι λέγει [αύτά], τά δ' ά λ λ α τά άλογα σύμπαντα ταΐς δυνάμεσιν άμφοτέραις χρήσθαι, τη τ' έπιθυμητική καί τή θυμοειδεί, τόν άνθρωπον δέ μόνον ταΐς τρισί, προσειληφέναι γάρ καί τήν λογιστικήν άρχήν. ταύτα τε ούν όρθής εϊρηται τω Ποσειδωνίω καί ά λ λ α πάμπολλα καθ' ολην τήν Περί τών παθών πραγματείαν.

a n d o t h e r dialogues, t h u s l e n d i n g t h e passage a Platonic colouring. 5 6 Yet this h i e r a r c h y c a n n o t b e paralleled directly f r o m Plato. Plato's a t t r i b u t i o n of t h e s o u l ' s t h i r d p a r t to p l a n t s (Tim. 77b) is h e r e a p p l i e d to i m m o b i l e animals, e.g. sponges, shell-fish a n d t h e like. In o t h e r words these animals a r e plant-like insofar as they are immobile. Still, Plato in t h e Timaeus m a k e s a few r e m a r k s a b o u t animals which can b e c o n n e c t e d to o u r passage. A l t h o u g h h e d o e s n o t explicitly a t t r i b u t e o n e , or two, n o n - r a t i o n a l parts to animals, this can be inf e r r e d f r o m two passages. First, in discussing the n a t u r e of m a n (69d72b), h e i n t r o d u c e s the two non-rational f u n c t i o n s as necessary conc o m i t a n t s of m a n ' s earthly existence, which involves self-preservation, n o u r i s h m e n t , p r o c r e a t i o n , etc. 5 7 H u m a n s are given these f u n c t i o n s in a d d i t i o n to t h e i m m o r t a l (i.e. rational) p r i n c i p l e . T h i s m i g h t have b e e n taken by a n c i e n t i n t e r p r e t e r s to imply that t h e soul of t h e n o n rational c r e a t u r e s has the two non-rational parts only. We e n t e r firmer g r o u n d when we take a look at the g r a n d carousel of m e t e m p s y c h o s i s e x p o u n d e d by Plato at Tim. 91d-92c. Terrestrial a n i m a l s d e s c e n d f r o m m e n w h o n e g l e c t e d t h e 'circuits in t h e h e a d ' (i.e. r e a s o n ) in favour of ' t h o s e p a r t s of t h e soul t h a t a r e in t h e breast' (91e). So in their n e x t lives they c o m e back in a f o r m that is d e g r a d e d , b u t a p p r o p r i a t e to t h e i r previous lifestyle. T h e r e f e r e n c e to t h e breast may b e taken to m e a n that l a n d a n i m a l s possess t h e spirited part. A n d if they a r e animals, o n e may f u r t h e r infer, they are b o u n d to possess t h e appetitive p a r t as well, if only b e c a u s e of its nutritive f u n c t i o n . H e r e as elsewhere in t h e Timaeus, Plato is m o r e c o n c e r n e d with morality t h a n with biological t a x o n o m y . But t h e u n d e r l y i n g h i e r a r c h y of living c r e a t u r e s in t e r m s of the distribution of the t h r e e parts is easy to discern. T h e following p o i n t is of special i m p o r t a n c e . Plato s u b s e q u e n t l y (92b) states that aquatic animals, notably fish a n d shell-fish, a r e t h e most inferior kind a n d c o m e f r o m t h e stupidest type of h u m a n s . It is natural to infer that fish a n d shell-fish have n o spirited part, b u t only t h e appetitive. After all, they m u s t stem f r o m p e o p l e w h o lived acc o r d i n g to a p p e t i t i o n , as distinguished f r o m o t h e r s who lived according to the spirited part. This i n f e r e n c e too seems unavoidable. In sum, whatever its precise p r o v e n a n c e , t h e scale of n a t u r e ascribed by Galen to Posidonius r e p r e s e n t s a systematization (involving

56 57

See Kidd ad loc (= Comm., pp. 164 ff.) and supra, n. 31, pp. 208, 210. Cf. Tim. 9fc2.

interpretative i n f e r e n c e ) of t h e relevant s t a t e m e n t s in the Timaeus,58 However, t h e r e is also an i m p o r t a n t p o i n t of d i f f e r e n c e between his a c c o u n t a n d t h e Platonic text. T h e case of t h e shell-fish m a k e s this clear. Being i m m o b i l e , they a r e r a n k e d with plants which a c c o r d i n g to Plato ( n o t the Stoics) posses a p p e t i t e (επιθυμία), i.e. the third part of the soul. By the same token t h e perfectly mobile fish m u s t have the spirited p a r t (in a d d i t i o n to t h e appetitive p a r t ) a c c o r d i n g to t h e Posidonian s c h e m a a n d contrary to the Platonic text. This a d a p t a t i o n of t h e Platonic s c h e m a in t e r m s of l o c o m o t i o n s e e m s to reflect t h e e m p h a s i s p l a c e d u p o n this f u n c t i o n in t h e Stoic scala naturae as p r e s e n t e d by D i o g e n e s Laertius, 7.85-87. H e r e , as we have n o t i c e d , animals a r e m a r k e d by sensation, b u t above all by c o n a t i o n , viz. όρμή, e x p l a i n e d in t e r m s of l o c o m o t i o n . 5 9 Since c o n a t i o n a n d p e r c e p t i o n a r e t h e d e f i n i n g c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of soul, p l a n t s have n o soul b u t physis—the principle g o v e r n i n g growth a n d g e n e r a t i o n . Plato h a d a c c o r d e d p l a n t s (a limited f o r m of) desire-cum-sensation a n d h e n c e soul (Tim. 77b). P o s i d o n i u s is primarily c o n c e r n e d with classes of animals. Shell-fish a r e a n i m a l s a l t h o u g h they a r e said to be like plans o n a c c o u n t of their immobility. Strictly speaking, h e d o e s n o t say that plants have desire, a l t h o u g h t h e Platonic c o n t e x t of the passage seems to m a k e this i n f e r e n c e p r o b a b l e . As we have seen, t h e Stoics did n o t even use t h e t e r m soul in t h e case of plants b u t p r e f e r r e d ' n a t u r e ' o r ' p h y s i q u e ' (Long-Sedley). 6 0 Desire has n o t h i n g to d o with this. For t h e m desire is a f o r m of c o n a t i o n a n d as such involved in m a n y types of action a n d l o c o m o t i o n . 6 1 In this respect, t h e n , P o s i d o n i u s p r e s e n t e d t h e Platonic position as d i f f e r e n t f r o m t h e Stoic o n e . Still P o s i d o n i u s m u s t have b e e n attracted to t h e relevant Platonic passages. Why? I submit that Posidonius, in line with the 58 Nemes. De nat. horn. ch. 1, pp. 3-4 Morani presents a similar (though much fuller) scala naturae. Unsurprisingly, the similarities between this text and PHP 5.6.38 have been taken to point to Posidonius as their c o m m o n source. Yet the similarities are only superficial: although Nemesius too pays much attention to immobile animals, it should be noted that he credits them with the sense of touch, i.e. a limited form of sensation, whereas Galen/Posidonius ascribes to them desire. On the question of the source of this account in Nemesius see Reinhardt (1954) 777 with further references. It is worth noting that the wording of the passage is strongly reminiscent of Galen. Nemesius is agreed to have used the PHP, so he may have drawn this account from the lost section of book 1. There, Galen tells us at PHP 4.7.35, he discussed the psychic functions of the lower animals. (Other Galenic works cannot be excluded, of course). 59 SVF2.458, 2.708, 2.177.32f., PHP6.3.7 (on which see in text) and infra in text. 60 See supra, n. 53. 61 See SVF2.458, 2.708, 2.177.32 f., PHP 6.3.7.

g e n e r a l Stoic schema, r e i n t e r p r e t e d Platonic a p p e t i t e (έπιθυμία) a n d drive (or a n g e r , θύμος) in t e r m s of Stoic c o n a t i o n ( ο ρ μ ή ) . W h e n Plato assigned these to animals, h e was a s s u m e d to have merely anticipated the Stoic position o n this matter. But this is n o t how G a l e n wishes to r e a d P o s i d o n i u s . If t h r e e d i f f e r e n t kinds of a n i m a l s (two classes of n o n - r a t i o n a l animals, viz. mobile a n d immobile, a n d h u m a n s ) are each m a r k e d by o n e psychic f u n c t i o n which t h e lower kind lacks, these f u n c t i o n s m u s t r e p r e s e n t separate powers. 6 2 This r e a d i n g r e p r e s e n t s a stock a r g u m e n t f r o m the t r a d i t i o n a l r e p e r t o r y of anti-Stoic p o l e m i c . As such, t h e a r g u m e n t instantiates the tack of 'inversion' (περιτροπή), since it t u r n s the Stoic scala naturae against Stoic psychology as e x p o u n d e d by Posidonius. G a l e n f o u n d this ploy irresistible w h e n h e c a m e across P l a t o n i c terminology in Stoic authors. 6 3 Posidonius' e m p l o y m e n t of the terms b e l o n g i n g with t h e Platonic tripartition is j u s t such a case. W h a t is m o r e , t h e a r g u m e n t as such is traditional. This can be i n f e r r e d f r o m t h e following passage f r o m Plutarch's On Moral Virtue.64 In g e n e r a l t h e y t h e m s e l v e s s a y — a n d t h i s is o b v i o u s — t h a t of e x i s t i n g t h i n g s s o m e a r e g o v e r n e d by c o h e s i o n , o t h e r s by n a t u r e , o t h e r s by n o n - r a t i o n a l s o u l a n d a g a i n o t h e r s by a s o u l t h a t a l s o h a s r e a s o n a n d i n t e l l e c t , of all of w h i c h m a n p a r t a k e s at o n c e a n d h e exists in all t h e d i f f e r e n t k i n d s m e n t i o n e d ; f o r h e is b o t h h e l d t o g e t h e r by c o h e s i o n a n d n o u r i s h e d by n a t u r e a n d u s e s r e a s o n a n d i n t e l l e c t . I n c o n s e q u e n c e , h e also p a r t a k e s o f t h e n o n - r a t i o n a l a n d h e h a s t h e p r i n c i p l e of a f f e c t i o n w i t h i n as s o m e t h i n g i n n a t e , b e c a u s e it is n o t a d v e n t i t i o u s b u t n e c e s s a r y , a n d n o t t o b e e r a d i c a t e d c o m p l e t e l y b u t in n e e d o f t h e r a p y a n d e d u c a t i o n ( c h . 12, 451B-C ~ S V F 2 . 4 6 0 , p a r t ) . 6 5

This s c h e m a resembles the Stoic chain of b e i n g as p r e s e n t e d by Diogenes. P l u t a r c h even o f f e r s all t h r e e m a i n varieties of all-pervading pneuma, a d d i n g εξις, i.e. the cohesive principle, to the vegetative a n d

62

This is accepted by Cooper (1998) 106 n.32 (though he is generally reluctant to accept that Posidonius spoke of powers in the sense indicated by Galen, see infra, p. 201). 63 See infra, p. 274. 64 For a fuller discussion of this treatise and the history of its interpretation see Babut (1969b). 65 καθόλου δέ τών όντων αύτοί τέ φασι καί δήλον ότι τά μέν έξει διοικείται τά δέ φύσει τά δ' άλόγω ψυχή τά δέ καί λόγον έχούση καί διάνοιαν, ών ομού τι πάντων ό άνθρωπος μετέσχηκε καί γέγονεν έν πάσαις ταΐς είρημέναις διαφοραΐς· καί γάρ έξει συνέχεται καί φύσει τρέφεται καί λόγω χρήται καί διανοία. μέτεστιν ουν αύτώ καί τού άλογου, καί σύμφυτον έχει τήν τού πάθους άρχήν, ούκ έπεισόδιον ά λ λ ' άναγκαίαν ούσαν, ούδ' άναιρετέαν παντάπασιν ά λ λ ά θεραπείας καί παιδαγψγίας δεομένην.

psychic o n e s . T h e G a l e n i c t e s t i m o n y deviates f r o m t h e o t h e r two t h r o u g h its P l a t o n i c c o l o u r i n g b u t this results f r o m t h e P l a t o n i c exegesis by Posidonius. Of t h e Stoic s c h e m a , t h e i m p o r t a n t e l e m e n t of l o c o m o t i o n has b e e n p r e s e r v e d . T h e basic s c h e m a is t h e s a m e in all t h r e e accounts. Moreover, it is clear that Plutarch a n d Galen p u t it to t h e same polemical use. Like Galen, Plutarch t u r n s t h e Stoic scala naturae-Against t h e Stoics by d e d u c i n g f r o m it that h u m a n s also have a n o n - r a t i o n a l ( p a r t of t h e ) soul. It is inessential to t h e gist of t h e a r g u m e n t t h a t G a l e n divides this p a r t f u r t h e r i n t o a n g e r a n d desire as characteristic of two classes of non-rational animals. Both a u t h o r s use t h e scale of b e i n g to m a k e a special p o i n t a b o u t the m a k e - u p of t h e h u m a n soul in particular, viz. t h a t it has a n o n - r a t i o n a l p a r t in a d d i t i o n to and separate from r e a s o n . T h i s n o n - r a t i o n a l p a r t is t h e cause of a f f e c t i o n s in t h e full sense as applicable to a d u l t h u m a n s . In actual fact, however, t h e Stoics are n o t vulnerable to this p a r t of the a r g u m e n t because they d o n o t accept t h e c o n c e p t of p a r t of t h e soul, a n d have a d i f f e r e n t view of t h e a f f e c t i o n s a n d t h e i r c a u s e . T h e y claim t h a t n o n - r a t i o n a l a n i m a l s ( i n c l u d i n g c h i l d r e n ) exhibit n o affections in t h e strict sense at all, b u t merely s o m e t h i n g analogous.

3. Children and Other Animals I now t u r n to a n o t h e r class of non-rational animals, at least a c c o r d i n g to t h e Stoics—children (5.5.1-29). T h i s whole section is p r i n t e d by Edelstein a n d Kidd as a f r a g m e n t of P o s i d o n i u s ' On Affections. But again it is worth asking to w h a t e x t e n t this g e n e r o u s d e m a r c a t i o n is w a r r a n t e d . T h a t c h i l d r e n e x h i b i t a n a t u r a l k i n s h i p to p l e a s u r e a n d victory, Galen argues, is evident f r o m their affections. A n d t h e same holds g o o d f o r animals. C h i l d r e n develop a natural kinship to virtue w h e n they r e a c h t h e age of reason (1-7). 6 6 At t h e e n d of t h e passage {ibid. 9) P o s i d o n i u s is said to have ' c a s t i g a t e d a n d r e f u t e d ' Chrysippus. I d o n o t believe t h a t we s h o u l d take s t a t e m e n t s like this f o r g r a n t e d . T e r m s such as 'castigate' a n d ' r e f u t e ' in c o n n e c t i o n with Chrysippus, like ' a d m i r e ' a n d ' a c c e p t ' in c o n n e c t i o n with Plato, may result entirely f r o m G a l e n ' s creative i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of P o s i d o n i u s . W h a t exactly is g o i n g o n in this passage?

66

See supra, n. 51.

T h e term translated h e r e as 'natural kinship' is the Stoic technical term οίκείωσις. As we have seen, it is a well-attested early Stoic doctrine that non-rational animals exhibit a 'first conation' towards selfpreservation, i.e. they feel a natural kinship towards themselves. Chrysippus specifically a r g u e d that it was self-preservation not pleasure which motivated them (D.L. 7.85-6, on which see above, p. 214). This applies to animals and to children until their reason reaches maturity. This last element of the early Stoic account has been preserved in Galen's testimony. However, the fact that non-rational animals are said to display affections r u n s c o u n t e r to the early Stoic position. What lurks b e h i n d this p o i n t is of course the Platonic tripartition: pleasure would indicate the existence of the appetitive p a r t a n d ambition that of the spirited. When Galen at PHP 5.6.38 argues f r o m the affections displayed by animals to the presence of c o r r e s p o n d i n g powers in their souls, his strategy is the same. In both cases the point is clear: attaining the age of reason does n o t remove the appetitive a n d spirited parts that cause the typical patterns of behaviour a n d affections evident b e f o r e that age. But the early Stoics conceived differently of the way reason takes control over o u r souls. With them, the d i f f e r e n c e is that between non-rational a n d rational conation. T h e affections play no part whatsoever. T h e affections are constantly stressed by Galen, but in fact n o t h i n g compels us to assume that Posidonius was c o n c e r n e d with affection r a t h e r than conation. In o t h e r words, what interested him in Plato was the fact that this past master foreshadowed the Stoic a p p r o a c h to the soul in terms of conation. This of course did not commit him to the acceptance of Platonic-style tripartition. Galen even goes so far as to speak o f ' p a r t s ' (μορίων) a n d ' f o r m ' (είδος) in this connection (8, p.318.12). Kidd ad Fr. 33, p.165 says that Galen foists the term 'parts' on Posidonius here. But then this not a ' f r a g m e n t ' , in however wide a sense o n e chooses to use the term. It is a piece of devious polemic. If Galen is capable of foisting the Platonic concepts of part and form on Chrysippus, then, why, should he be incapable of foisting the Aristotelian c o n c e p t of power on him too? In o u r passage he also ascribes to him the view that o u r only οίκείωσις is directed towards virtue, i.e. the morally g o o d — a gross oversimplification. 6 7 In adult h u m a n s too the idea of οίκείωσις covers all types of behaviour which are reasonable a n d a p p r o p r i a t e even in non-rational animals, for example self67

As is also pointed out by Cooper (1998) 107 n.35, with whose conclusion that §§ 1-8 do not give us Posidonius' position I find myself in agreement.

preservation. O r d o we stop e a t i n g o n c e we have b e c o m e fully rational at t h e a g e of f o u r t e e n ? Did P o s i d o n i u s o f f e r this p i c t u r e of οίκείωσις ? I believe not. T h a t the a r g u m e n t of 11. 1-8 is Galenic a n d n o t P o s i d o n i a n is f u r t h e r i n d i c a t e d by t h e fact that G a l e n says that t h e ' a n c i e n t p h i l o s o p h e r s ' were t h e only o n e s w h o h e l d that we have affinity (οίκείωσις) with all t h r e e things, viz. p l e a s u r e , victory a n d virtue. T h e expression ' a n c i e n t p h i l o s o p h e r s ' must r e f e r to Plato a n d Aristotle; it c a n n o t p e r t a i n to Posidonius. 6 8 So Galen s e e m s to stop p r e t e n d i n g that Posidonius ever s h a r e d this view. W h a t a p p e a r s to be t h e case is t h a t f o r o n c e G a l e n r e p r o d u c e s w h a t P o s i d o n i u s said a b o u t t h e ancients without m a k i n g it look like wholesale a n d unqualified s u p p o r t f o r the latter. Still, t h e m e n t i o n of Posidonius' n a m e in what follows has led most i n t e r p r e t e r s to ascribe t h e i d e a of t h r e e οίκείωσεις to Posidonius, which is especially t e m p t i n g o n c e we have b o u g h t G a l e n ' s story that Posidonius h a d a c c e p t e d the Platonic tripartition, albeit in t e r m s of powers. 6 9 As such, this idea b e c o m e s a c o r n e r s t o n e in the reconstruction of P o s i d o n i a n ethics. I a s s u m e t h a t it is merely an i n a c c u r a t e r e f l e c t i o n of his r e a d i n g of Plato in t h e c o n t e x t of a p r e l i m i n a r y investigation i n t o a n t i c i p a t i o n s of t h e basic a n d distinctive Stoic d o c t r i n e , which dispenses with separate powers or parts. W h a t interested Posidonius in Plato was n o t only the latter's anticipation of t h e Stoic c o n c e p t of c o n a t i o n (όρμή). Plato h a d also spoken a b o u t t h e i m p a c t of c o r p o r e a l factors o n m e n t a l p h e n o m e n a . For Posidonius this f o r e s h a d o w e d a n o t h e r Stoic c o n c e r n . O n e of clearest testimonies o n this p o i n t is f o u n d at PHP 5.5.30-40, p r i n t e d whole by Edelstein-Kidd as Posid. F 31. T h i s is a motley collection of various a n t i - C h r y s i p p e a n p o i n t s , only s o m e of which in o n e way o r o t h e r exploit things Posidonius said. A c c o r d i n g to Galen P o s i d o n i u s in t h e first b o o k of his work adm i r e d Plato f o r what h e said a b o u t t h e care r e q u i r e d f o r t h e seed a n d t h e e m b r y o , i.e. a b o u t t h e r e g i m e n of t h e p r o s p e c t i v e f a t h e r a n d m o t h e r alike ( ibid. 30). R e g i m e n as a way of c o n d i t i o n i n g t h e soul t h r o u g h physical m e a n s h a d b e e n advocated already by Z e n o (see p. 165). F r o m a Stoic p o i n t of view care f o r t h e s e m e n of prospective f a t h e r s m a k e s p e r f e c t s e n s e b e c a u s e s e m e n is a p o r t i o n of soul (secreted by t h e p a r t of t h e soul called σπερματικόν). 7 0 68 69 70

Similarly Cooper (1998) 107 n.35. Thus influentially Kidd (1971) and (1988) 616-618, See Chrys. ap. Gal. PHP3.1.11 (SVF2.885).

Posidonius, Galen tells us, wrote 'a kind of e p i t o m e ' of what Plato h a d said 7 1 a b o u t raising a n d e d u c a t i n g c h i l d r e n 'in o r d e r that t h e affective a n d n o n - r a t i o n a l [aspect] of t h e soul (το παθητικόν τε καί αλογον τής ψ υ χ ή ς ) may e x h i b i t d u e m e a s u r e in its m o t i o n s a n d o b e d i e n c e to t h e c o m m a n d s of t h e r a t i o n a l (τό λ ο γ ι σ τ ι κ ό ν ) ' (ibid. 32). 7 2 T h e t e r m ' m o t i o n s ' can only apply to what Posidonius called t h e affective m o t i o n s (παθητικαί κ ι ν ή σ ε ι ς ) . In o t h e r words, h e was i n t e r p r e t i n g Plato in his own Stoic t e r m s ( r a t h e r than t h e o t h e r way r o u n d , as Galen would have it). Posidonius may well have used t h e s u b s t a n t i a t e d n e u t r e f o r m s τό παθητικόν τε και αλογον as well as t h e Platonic t e r m τό λογιστικόν. Even so, these t e r m s a r e n e u t r a l with r e g a r d to t h e n u m b e r a n d o n t o l o g i c a l status of t h e sections i n t o which t h e soul is divided. Galen of c o u r s e invites us to r e a d these expressions in t e r m s of separate a n d p e r m a n e n t powers (δυνάμεις). But Posidonius m o r e o f t e n used the s u b s t a n t i a t e d n e u t r e to distinguish o u r rationality a n d its opposite, using various t e r m s (PHP5.5.4 = F 187 E.-K.). Galen may have substituted these with m o r e theoretically laden terms such as τό λογιστικόν. This t e r m may have f e a t u r e d in t h e o r i g i n a l P o s i d o n i a n e x p o s i t i o n , b u t G a l e n s e e m s to have blurred the distinction between Posidonius' report on Plato—ref e r r e d to as an ' e p i t o m e ' — w i t h his Stoicizing i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . But certainty is h a r d to achieve, since we are d e a l i n g with an indirect a n d biased reflection of t h e original exposition. § 35 attests to P o s i d o n i u s ' view that 'this' (seil, t h e λογιστικόν) b e c o m e s m a t u r e a r o u n d t h e f o u r t e e n t h y e a r — a well-attested early Stoic view. 73 T h e n it takes control over the two non-rational parts j u s t as a c h a r i o t e e r rules two h o r s e s — t h e c e l e b r a t e d image of t h e Platonic Phaedrus (246a6 ff.). T h i s is c o n n e c t e d with a p o i n t a b o u t t h e p r o p e r e d u c a t i o n of t h e soul; w h e r e a s t h e c h a r i o t e e r b e n e f i t s f r o m r a t i o n a l i n s t r u c t i o n , his h o r s e s receive t h e i r p r o p e r virtue f r o m a k i n d of n o n - r a t i o n a l h a b i t u a t i o n . T h a t G a l e n b l u r s t h e distinction 71

PI. Lg. VII, 789a-e, 792e. The next explanatory sentence (ibid. 33) is taken by Edelstein-Kidd as a direct quotation from Posidonius: αϋτη γάρ άριστη παίδων παιδεία[ς], παρασκευή του παθητικού τής ψυχής, ώς άν έπιτηδειοτάτη ή προς τήν άρχήν του λογιστικού. But one cannot be sure whether the γάρ signals direct quotation. Cooper (1998) 91 follows Edelstein-Kidd in taking the statement as a direct quotation (91) and hence λογιστικόν as deriving from Posidonius (p.106 n.32). Cooper infers that if Posidonius used this rather archaic Platonic term, he will also have used the standard Platonic terms for the other two powers. But even if this were the case, it remains crucial to take account of the original context in which these terms were embedded. 73 See e.g. SVF 1.149, 3 Diog. 17 and supra, n. 51. 72

b e t w e e n Plato a n d P o s i d o n i u s with r e s p e c t to imagery a n d t h e doctrines t h u s illustrated is strongly i n d i c a t e d by t h e latter's simile of a runaway h o r s e carrrying off its r i d e r until it is b r o u g h t u n d e r c o n t r o l (5.6.31 = F 166.10 ff.). It is h a r d n o t to see in this simile a d e l i b e r a t e substitution f o r Plato's, which of c o u r s e suits a tripartite c o n c e p t i o n of t h e soul. F r o m § 36 o n w a r d s Galen is n o l o n g e r r e n d e r i n g what h e has read in P o s i d o n i u s . But d o e s h e still d e p e n d o n t h e l a t t e r ' s a r g u m e n t ? Edelstein-Kidd p r i n t a n o t h e r five p a r a g r a p h s (36-40) dealing with the plurality of virtues a n d Chrysippus' inability of a c c o u n t i n g f o r t h e m — a traditional anti-Stoic p o i n t which can be paralleled f r o m Plutarch, On Moral Virtue 441 (SVF3.255). But t h e r e is n o t h i n g in this section to prove Posidonian p r o v e n a n c e . 7 4 A n o t h e r passage in G a l e n , r e f e r r i n g to Plato's discussion in t h e Republic of t h e virtues as r e l a t e d to t h e d i f f e r e n t powers of t h e soul, has b e e n p r i n t e d by Edelstein-Kidd a m o n g t h e f r a g m e n t s illustrating P o s i d o n i u s ' ' r e l a t i o n to o t h e r p h i l o s o p h e r s ' (5.7.9-10 = Posid. Τ 96 E.-K.). But Galen merely says that Posidonius a g r e e d with Plato ( a n d Aristotle!) a n d d i s t a n c e d himself f r o m Chrysippus in these matters. T h i s passage d o e s certainly n o t reflect ( n o r is it even m e a n t to reflect) an original s t a t e m e n t of passage in Posidonius l e n d i n g explicit s u p p o r t to t h e Platonic tripartition, let a l o n e attesting his use of t h e Republic. But its inclusion a m o n g this particular g r o u p of f r a g m e n t s attests to t h e t e n d e n c y of i n f e r r i n g too m u c h f r o m G a l e n ' s r e p e a t e d talk of P o s i d o n i u s 'following' o r ' a g r e e i n g with' Plato w h e n we a r e mostly d e a l i n g with dialectical g r o u p i n g s b a s e d o n a pre-existing s c h e m a of o p t i o n s (see above, p. 34). In c o n s e q u e n c e , t h e very status of such passages as testimonies is d u b i o u s . Edelstein-Kidd p r i n t t h e passage as a ' f r a g m e n t ' b e c a u s e of their criterion of t h e p r e s e n c e of t h e n a m e Posidonius, b u t (as they realized only too well) this leaves o p e n quite a few possibilities. We s e e m to b e o n slightly f i r m e r g r o u n d w h e n we c o m e to PHP 4.7.23, p r i n t e d by Edelstein-Kidd as their n e x t testimony attesting to P o s i d o n i u s ' r e l a t i o n to Plato (T 97). H a v i n g said t h a t C h r y s i p p u s failed to indicate t h e cause of t h e affections a n d so the m o d e of their therapy, Galen continues:

/4 Kidd, in his commentary, p. 161 f. expresses doubt about the provenance of this section.

A n d yet P l a t o d e s c r i b e d t h e s e m a t t e r s a d m i r a b l y , as P o s i d o n i u s t o o p o i n t s o u t , a d m i r i n g t h e m a n a n d c a l l i n g h i m d i v i n e s i n c e h e h e l d in h o n o u r P l a t o ' s d o c t r i n e s a b o u t t h e a f f e c t i o n s a n d t h e p o w e r s of t h e s o u l a n d all t h a t h e w r o t e o n t h e s u b j e c t of t h e s o u l ' s a f f e c t i o n s n o t a r i s i n g at all, o r , o n c e h a v i n g a r i s e n , c e a s i n g very q u i c k l y . 7 5

T h i s is n o t a v e r b a t i m f r a g m e n t e i t h e r , t h o u g h t h e p o i n t a b o u t Posidonius calling Plato 'divine' s e e m s reliable. But t h e implication of t h e rest f o r t h e m o d e l of t h e soul d e f e n d e d by P o s i d o n i u s is u n c l e a r . T h e only t h i n g we may take f o r g r a n t e d is that Posidonius m a d e use of Plato in t h e c o n t e x t of t h e a f f e c t i o n s a n d spoke q u i t e favourably a b o u t h i m . T h e phase of the history of t h e Stoic school called by the m o d e r n historiographical t e r m ' M i d d l e Stoicism' is k n o w n f o r its receptiveness to Platonic a n d Aristotelian c o n c e p t s — t h e i m p l i c a t i o n b e i n g that this m a r k e d a turn towards a m o r e syncretistic attitude. However, we m u s t realize t h a t this p i c t u r e is largely b a s e d o n t h e G a l e n i c passages at issue h e r e . If the Stoics r e f e r r e d to Plato, what exactly did this imply? Professed a d m i r a t i o n d o e s n o t p r e c l u d e assimilation to o n e ' s own d o c t r i n e . O n many p o i n t s we d o n o t even know f o r sure how t h e Stoics r e a d Plato. T h e e m p h a s i s p l a c e d by P o s i d o n i u s o n P l a t o ' s c o n c e r n with p r e n a t a l r e g i m e n is i n d e e d an u n e x p e c t e d p o i n t . T h e r e may b e e n m o r e in Plato which could be seen as anticip a t i n g Stoic corporealist psychology. T h i n k f o r e x a m p l e of Tim. 8688, with its similar stress on the i n f l u e n c e exercised by t h e body u p o n m e n t a l p h e n o m e n a (see above, p p . 188 ff.). In t h e c o n t e x t of his i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e Timaeus, as we have n o t i c e d , Posidonius seems to have a r g u e d t h a t a c c o r d i n g to Plato t h e soul is c o r p o r e a l , or at least e x p l a i n e d t h e P l a t o n i c text in a way c o n g e n i a l to t h e Stoic position (see above, p. 209 ff.). But is t h e r e any evidence f r o m o t h e r sources c o n c e r n i n g Stoic attit u d e towards Plato a r o u n d this time? C l e m e n t , Strom. V, 97.6 (SVF3 Ant. 56) tells us that A n t i p a t e r d e v o t e d t h r e e b o o k s to t h e thesis that Plato subscribed to the Stoic thesis of the self-sufficiency of virtue a n d ' p r e s e n t e d m o r e d o c t r i n e s [viz. of Plato] as c o n s o n a n t with the Stoic o n e s ' . H e r e too we have n o r e t u r n to Plato b u t r a t h e r an assimilation of Plato to t h e Stoic position. If we a b a n d o n o u r supposition that t h e early Stoics were always categorically hostile to Plato, 7 6 it b e c o m e s 75 On these p h e n o m e n a as discussed by Posidonius and Chrysippus see infra, pp. 225 f. 76 See Barnes (1991), esp. 120, who, in a review of Dörrie (1990), argues persuasively that the conventional story of an early Hellenistic hostility towards Plato

possible to see Posidonius' use of Plato as an instance of t h e s t a n d a r d Stoic p r o c e d u r e of a p p r o p r i a t i n g earlier wisdom. 7 7 O n o t h e r issues, as we have n o t i c e d , P o s i d o n i u s c h o s e o t h e r past masters as his p o i n t of d e p a r t u r e , notably Aristotle. Let us now draw a few t h r e a d s t o g e t h e r . We have f o u n d n o direct e v i d e n c e in s u p p o r t of G a l e n ' s claim t h a t P o s i d o n i u s e n d o r s e d t h e P l a t o n i c t r i p a r t i t i o n a n d p a r t e d c o m p a n y with C h r y s i p p u s . Still, Posidonius did r e f e r to Plato a n d Galen may have capitalized o n the fact t h a t h e did so m o r e e x t e n s i v e l y — a n d m o r e f a v o u r a b l y — t h a n Chrysippus a n d o t h e r Stoics h a d d o n e . Yet the motivation b e h i n d this c o n c e r n with Plato was crucially d i f f e r e n t f r o m w h a t G a l e n would have us believe. Posidonius i n t e r p r e t e d t h e Platonic soul as an anticipation of the Stoic g o v e r n i n g p a r t of the soul, that is to say, h e took t h e latter as c o m p r i s i n g all t h r e e Platonic parts. Given his m o r a l subject-matter Posidonius was c o n c e r n e d with c o n a t i o n in particular, i.e. with t h e motive aspect of t h e soul. T h i s is also clear f o r m his interest in affinity or a p p r o p r i a t i o n (οίκείωσις), which constitutes a p a t t e r n of c o n a t i o n a n d was a s s o c i a t e d by P o s i d o n i u s with t h e P l a t o n i c t r i p a r t i t i o n . T h u s h e u n d e r s t o o d t h e m o v e m e n t s of t h e Platonic n o n - r a t i o n a l parts as p r o t o t y p e s of Stoic c o n a t i o n . As we have seen, t h e r e are Platonic passages which e n c o u r a g e such a connection. 7 8 I n d e e d , as to human c o n a t i o n — d e s c r i b e d by t h e Stoics as c o n a t i o n d i r e c t e d by r e a s o n (see D.L. 7.85-89, discussed a b o v e ) — Posidonius could also have f o u n d s u p p o r t in Platonic passages which ascribe beliefs to the non-rational parts. 7 9 C o n t r a s t G a l e n ' s version of t h e Platonic tripartition. This involves a s h a r p s e p a r a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e parts of t h e soul which is n o t unlike t h e s c h e m a given by later P l a t o n i s t h a n d b o o k s b u t g o e s b e y o n d

(which ended by the time of so-called Middle Stoics such as Posidonius) does not stand up in the light of an unbiased scrutiny of the evidence. 7 ' Panaetius is called Φιλοπλάτων (as well as Φιλαριστοτέλης) and said to have 'relaxed' some Zenonian doctrines, Philod. Stoic, hist. Col. LXI.1-6 Dorandi (= fr. 1 van Straaten/T 1 Alesse); cf. Cic. Fin. 4.79 (= fr. 55 v. Str./T 79 Alesse). But Philodemus' report may be biased the same way Galen's is. See further Barnes (1991) 120, cited in the previous n. This means that the so-called Middle Stoics do not mark the end of a period of hostility and the beginning of o n e of admiration. Testimonies attesting to the knowledge of Plato a m o n g earlier Stoics usually concern criticism of Platonic views, see Plut. Stoic Rep. 1034E, D.L. 7.36, Gal. PHP 3.1.14 and the other references collected by Barnes (1991) 122. 78 See supra, p. 205. 79 Plato, Rep. 442b-d, 574d, 603A, Laws 644c-d, 645a. They are described as counsellors at Timaeus 77a-c; cf. Sorabji (1993) 10-12.

a n y t h i n g to b e f o u n d in t h e Platonic texts, which are m o r e c e n t r e d o n t h e i n t e r a c t i o n between t h e parts. 8 0 T h i s is s o m e t h i n g of a blind spot in Galen, linked, it would a p p e a r , to his a n a t o m y with its t h r e e m a i n archai : b r a i n , h e a r t a n d liver. Secondly, Galen focuses o n t h e affections — a n g e r a n d desire—typical of t h e n o n - r a t i o n a l parts a n d i n d e e d establishes their status as powers distinct f r o m reason. 8 1 N o such i n f e r e n c e is c o g e n t f r o m t h e Stoic p o i n t of view a d o p t e d by P o s i d o n i u s . A n d G a l e n distorts t h e l a t t e r ' s i n t e r e s t in t h e motive aspects of the Platonic soul in o r d e r to p r e s e n t it as b e i n g c o n c e r n e d with t h e a f f e c t i o n s a n d n o n - r a t i o n a l powers. As we have seen (ch. 2.3.), t h e r e is s o m e evidence that Posidonius p o s t u l a t e d a scientific division of psychic f u n c t i o n s which suited his a c c e p t a n c e of the Stoic view of t h e soul's p n e u m a t i c s u b s t a n c e a n d involved a n u m b e r of parts d i f f e r e n t f r o m t h e Platonic triad. In his On Affections t h e Platonic tripartition f u n c t i o n s in a moral c o n t e x t c o n c e r n e d with h u m a n c o n a t i o n . Posidonius' r e m a r k s a b o u t Plato in this text are n o t a m e n able to c o n c l u s i o n s a b o u t t h e s t r u c t u r e of t h e soul. This c o n t e x t u a l distinction, as we have n o t i c e d , is f l o u t e d by G a l e n — m u c h in t h e same way as h e d o e s in respect of Aristotle. A p a r t f r o m t h e c o n a t i o n / a f f e c t i o n s ambiguity involved, I s h o u l d p o i n t to a n o t h e r f e a t u r e of P o s i d o n i u s ' exposition which may have given Galen an o p p o r t u n i t y to p r e s e n t him as a Platonist of sorts. In Posidonius we c o m e across t e r m s f o r psychic p h e n o m e n a or states— especially s u b s t a n t i a t e d n e u t r e adjectives such as παθητικόν—which can easily b e s u p p l e m e n t e d by t e r m s such as ' p a r t ' , b u t which in themselves are n e u t r a l as to ontological status. In fact, we have seen t h a t they can b e e x p l a i n e d in t h e c o n t e x t of t h e Stoic d o c t r i n e of P o s i d o n i u s ' p r e d e c e s s o r s , viz. of t h e i r c o r p o r e a l i s t a c c o u n t of t h e soul. In this c o n n e c t i o n it is i n t e r e s t i n g to c o m p a r e t h e τέλος-formula ascribed by C l e m e n t of A l e x a n d r i a to P o s i d o n i u s {Strom. 11.21.129. 1-5 ~ Posid. F 186 E.-K.). A m o n g o t h e r things, it says that we s h o u l d n o t allow ourselves to b e led by ' t h e n o n - r a t i o n a l p a r t ( ά λ ο γ ο υ μέρους) of t h e soul.' This unmistakably e c h o e s Posidonius' own form u l a t i o n in t h e verbatim f r a g m e n t p r e s e n t e d by Galen, PHP 5.6.4-5

80 See esp. PI. Ref). 438a-444b. But Galen and the handbooks reflect in particular the account of the soul's trilocadon at Tim. 67c-72d; cf. also supra, p. 7. 81 It is indeed a problem how Galen accounted for the coherence and interaction between the three parts, upon whose separation he insists so strongly; cf. Mansfeld (1991) 139 ff.

(Fr. 187). T h e r e is however o n e crucial d i f f e r e n c e : Posidonius uses the substantivated n e u t r e f o r m s αλόγου (as well as κακοδαίμονος και άθέου), i.e. without the addition of μέρους or any o t h e r n o u n . It is Galen who adds this term (ibid. 8), thereby assimilating the position of P o s i d o n i u s to t h a t of Plato. But in his f o r m a l s t a t e m e n t o n Posidonius' position h e declares that Posidonius posited Aristotelian powers as o p p o s e d to Platonic parts (6.2.5; see above, p. 34). Such fluctuations o n Galen's part b r i n g h o m e the n e e d to be extremely cautious in using his words to draw i n f e r e n c e s as to t h e ontological status a n d division of psychic faculties advocated by Posidonius. We may assume that Posidonius treated the relation between the rational a n d the irrational; b u t as to the terms in which h e did so a n d what is implied by t h e m , we had better stick to his own words as q u o t e d verbatim by Galen in the passage I have j u s t m e n t i o n e d , a n d elsewhere. Accordingly, C l e m e n t ' s use of t h e term ' p a r t ' is n o surer g u i d e to Posidonius' view on the soul's structure than Galen's. If we t u r n to t h e verbatim q u o t a t i o n s , we f i n d that Posidonius consistently uses substantivated n e u t r e adjectives, n o t 'powers' or 'parts'. H e d o e s so in contexts w h e r e h e could hardly have failed to use o n e of the latter terms if they h a d b e l o n g e d to his terminological apparatus. 8 2 It is worth q u o t i n g o n e of the key passages, PHP5.6.4-5 (part o f F r . 187 E.-K.), in full: T h e c a u s e of t h e a f f e c t i o n s , i.e. of i n c o n s i s t e n c y a n d t h e u n h a p p y life, is n o t t o f o l l o w in e v e r y t h i n g t h e divinity [ o r ' g u a r d i a n s p i r i t ' ] w i t h i n o n e s e l f w h o is o f t h e s a m e s t o c k a n d h a s a s i m i l a r n a t u r e t o t h e o n e w h o g o v e r n s t h e w h o l e c o s m o s b u t at times to allow oneself to b e d i s t r a c t e d a n d c a r r i e d a l o n g by w h a t is w o r s e a n d beast-like. B u t t h o s e w h o o v e r l o o k t h i s h a v e n e i t h e r g o t t h e c a u s e of t h e a f f e c t i o n s r i g h t in t h e s e m a t t e r s n o r t h e c o r r e c t view w i t h r e s p e c t t o h a p p i n e s s a n d c o n s i s t e n c y ; f o r t h e y d o n o t s e e t h a t t h i s c o n s i s t f i r s t o f all in n o t b e i n g l e d in a n y t h i n g by w h a t is i r r a t i o n a l a n d u n h a p p y a n d g o d l e s s in t h e s o u l . 8 3

82

Another important witness in this matter is to be found at 5.6.28 (F 174 E.K.), where Galen presents a direct quotation from Posidonius: καί μην oì προκόπτοντες μεγάλα κακά δοκοϋντες έαυτοΐς (παρείναι) ού λυπούνται · φέρονται γάρ ού κατά τό άλογον τής ψυχής οϋτως, ά λ λ ά κατά τό λογικόν. Here too Posidonius' neutre adjectival phrases can be easily construed as evidence for psychological dualism; but this is by no means compelling. Kidd's cautious rendering '(irrational ... rational) aspect' is therefore to be preferred to De Lacy's 'part'. Cf. also 5.6.22 (F 168), 24 f. (F 162). 83 τό δή τών παθών αϊτιον, τουτέστι τής τε άνομολογίας καί τού κακοδαίμονος βίου, τό μή κατά πάν επεσθαι τω έν αύτφ δαίμονι συγγενεΐ τε δντι καί τήν όμοίαν φύσιν έχοντι τώ τόν ολον κόσμον διοικούντι, τω δέ χείρονι καί ζφωδει ποτέ συνεκ-

Galen c o m m e n t s : ' H e r e P o s i d o n i u s has clearly e x p o u n d e d how far Chrysippus a n d his a d h e r e n t g o astray, n o t only in their a r g u m e n t s c o n c e r n i n g t h e affections b u t also in r e g a r d to the e n d . ' In light of the o t h e r f r a g m e n t s a n d testimonies, Kidd a n d earlier c o m m e n t a t o r s see n o o p t i o n b u t to subscribe to this i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . 8 4 Accordingly Kidd identifies t h e a n o n y m o u s o p p o n e n t s w h o overlook t h e crucial p o i n t at issue as ' t h e Chrysippeans'. 8 5 In fact, that Posidonius is referring to Chrysippus a n d his followers (or just Chrysippus) 8 6 has b e e n a c c e p t e d ever since t h e s e n t e n c e was p r i n t e d by Von A r n i m in t h e t h i r d v o l u m e of his c o l l e c t i o n , i.e. a m o n g t h e C h r y s i p p e a n - c u m g e n e r a l Stoic f r a g m e n t s o n ethics (SVF 3.460). T h e criticism h e is s u p p o s e d to b r i n g to b e a r u p o n t h e C h r y s i p p e a n line is that they d o n o t r e c o g n i z e a s e p a r a t e n o n - r a t i o n a l p a r t of t h e soul, so d o n o t r e c o g n i z e that u n h a p p i n e s s consists in b e i n g carried a l o n g by this part. But is this really t h e only possible r e a d i n g of this passage? Let us s u p p o s e that t h e a n o n y m o u s o p p o n e n t s a r e n o t Posidonius' fellowStoics, as Galen claims, b u t a d h e r e n t s of a dualist c o n c e p t i o n of t h e soul, i.e. Platonists a n d Peripatetics. In that case Posidonius criticized t h e m f o r i n c l u d i n g t h e irrational, 'godless' aspect of t h e soul (i.e. what they call ' p a r t ' or ' p o w e r ' ) in their c o n c e p t i o n of h a p p i n e s s , or the e n d . A c c o r d i n g to b o t h Plato a n d Aristotle h a p p i n e s s consists in b r i n g i n g t h e non-rational parts (Plato) or powers (Aristotle) in t u n e with reason; if desire or a p p e t i t e obeys reason t h e soul is h a r m o n i o u s a n d h a p p y . T h a t this m o d e l is P o s i d o n i u s ' t a r g e t e x p l a i n s why h e argues that h a p p i n e s s consists in b e i n g led in no way by t h e irrational; t h a t u n h a p p i n e s s consists in n o t following o u r g u a r d i a n spirit in everything b u t b e i n g led by w h a t is worse a n d animal-like from time to time. T h e translated expressions I have italicized b r i n g o u t t h e fact t h a t P o s i d o n i u s a n d t h e Platonic-cum-Aristotelian o p p o s i t i o n a r e a g r e e d insofar as r e a s o n ' s l e a d i n g role is c o n c e r n e d . T h e d i f f e r e n c e is that t h e latter still a c c o m m o d a t e t h e irrational in their c o n c e p t i o n

κλίνοντας φέρεσθαι. οί δέ τοΰτο παριδόντες οΰτε έν τούτοις βελτιοΰσι τήν αίτίαν τών παθών οΰτ' έν τοις περί τής εύδαιμονίας καί ομολογίας όρθοδοξοΰσιν· ού γαρ βλέπουσιν δτι πρώτον έστιν έν αύτή τό κατά μηδέν αγεσθαι ύπό τού αλόγου τε καί κακοδαίμονος καί άθέου τής ψυχής. 84 Kidd ad toc. (= vol. Il.ii, pp. 677 f.) with further references. 85 Cf. also Kidd, vol. Ill, p. 248 n. 157. 86 The combination oi περί plus name may stand for just the person indicated by that name, see Dubuisson (1976/7). But the ambiguity does not affect our argument.

of t h e h a r m o n i o u s soul. Posidonius by c o n t r a s t d e f e n d s an exclusive c o n c e p t i o n of reason which s h o u l d b e followed absolutely. This also e x p l a i n s why h e can say t h a t his o p p o n e n t s d o n o t u n d e r s t a n d t h e real cause of t h e affections. T h i s is b e c a u s e they a t t r i b u t e t h e m to non-rational parts o r powers. I s u b m i t t h a t P o s i d o n i u s ' a r g u m e n t is t h e exact o p p o s i t e of t h e a r g u m e n t a t t r i b u t e d to h i m by G a l e n . It closely r e s e m b l e s Chrysippus' exposition in t h e first b o o k of his On Ends as p r o d u c e d by Diog e n e s Laertius (7.87-8). H e r e we find the same e m p h a s i s o n a t t u n i n g o u r i n n e r daimôn to t h e g o v e r n o r of t h e universe. 8 7 We may c o m p a r e Plato's description at Tim. 90a of o u r intellect as an i n n e r daimôn, in r e c o g n i t i o n of o u r k i n s h i p with t h e heavenly r e a l m . We n e e d n o t d o u b t that b o t h C h r y s i p p u s a n d P o s i d o n i u s were familiar with this p a s s a g e . 8 8 For t h e m , as Stoics, in Kidd's a p t words, ' t h e d e m o n i c aspect of o u r m i n d is actually a c o n c e n t r a t i o n of t h e active creative rational p r i n c i p l e t h a t directs t h e universe, a n d which is physically i m m a n e n t t h r o u g h o u t it ( t h e Stoic g o d ) . ' 8 9 T h e t e r m ' a s p e c t ' is apposite because t h e Stoic texts p r e s e n t t h e soul tout court as d a i m ô n , n o t o n e p a r t i c u l a r p a r t o r f u n c t i o n of it. 9 0 T h e Platonic b a c k d r o p lends additional p o i n t to Chrysippus' a n d Posidonius' e m e n d a t i o n of t h e d u a l i s t m o d e l a n d its i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r t h e e n d . T o r e a d e r s familiar with the same Platonic passage it will have b e e n obvious that Posidonius, as Chrysippus b e f o r e h i m , was improving o n Plato. In sum, Posidonius is advocating t h e Chrysippean position without a d d i n g any d o c t r i n a l e l e m e n t s of his own. A c c o m o d a t i n g o n e o r m o r e non-rational parts o r powers as p e r m a n e n t c o m p o n e n t s of o u r natural psychic m a k e - u p leads to a w r o n g view o n t h e e n d a n d o n t h e h a p p y life.

87

Kidd ad loc. (vol. II.ii, p.676) discerns 'a slightly different emphasis; the Diogenes passage seems to stress the outside agency and its will ...., the law of Zeus. Posidonius stresses the internal daimon.' But as to the point at issue here, Kidd ibid. acknowledges: 'Both agree on the relationship.' 88 As also noted by Kidd ad loc. (vol. II.ii, p.675) 89 Kidd (1995) 223, referring to Marcus Aurelius, V.27 (the soul as 'offschoot' (απόσπασμα) of the divine mind), Epictetus I, 14.1 ff., Sen. Ep. 41.2; on Epictetus cf. also Bonhoeffer (1894) 81 ff. 90 See esp. Sextus, M. IX.74, with Kidd (1995) 223; Long-Sedley (1987) vol. 2, p. 391 (ad63C).

4. Posidonius on the Causes of Affection f}HP 5.5.21 is b u t a small section of t h e c o n s i d e r a b l e c h u n k of Galenic text p r i n t e d by Edelstein-Kidd as F 169. But it stands o u t as what seems to be a p a r a p h r a s e of how Posidonius himself e x p l a i n e d affection: 9 1 ... Indeed, Posidonius censures [seil. Chrysippus] also in these matters, and he tries to show that the causes of all false assumptions lie in the theoretical sphere through the affective pull, but that false opinions precede this [i.e. the pull], because the rational has weakened with respect to judgement. For conation is generated in the animal sometimes as the result of the rational but often as the result of the movement of the affective (5.5.21 ~ F 169 E.-K., 11. 77-84). 92 This is a difficult passage. Most scholars are a g r e e d that it n e e d s supp l e m e n t i n g at o n e particular point, a s s u m i n g that Posidonius disting u i s h e d between e r r o r in the purely cognitive sense, indicated by the p h r a s e έν τω θεωρητικω ('in t h e t h e o r e t i c a l s p h e r e ' ) , f r o m w r o n g j u d g e m e n t in t h e s p h e r e of action, i.e. the type of j u d g e m e n t which may trigger affection. Kidd, De Lacy a n d others, following Pohlenz, 9 3 posit a l a c u n a after έν μεν τω θεωρητικω a n d p r o p o s e additions which would c o n f i n e t h e working of the affective pull to practical r e a s o n i n g as o p p o s e d to 'theoretical' t h o u g h t . T h u s De Lacy adds: (γίγνεσθαι δι' ά μ α θ ί α ς , έν δε τω πρακτικώ ), which would yield: '...the causes of all false a s s u m p t i o n s arise in the theoretical s p h e r e t h r o u g h i g n o r a n c e , b u t in t h e practical s p h e r e t h r o u g h t h e affective pull ...' But as Fillion-Lahille 9 4 rightly points out, we n e e d n o t assume a l a c u n a o n c e we see that t h e expression πασών τών ψευδών υπολήψεων ('all false s u p p o s i t i o n s ' ) d o e s n o t m e a n all false s u p p o s i t i o n s in g e n e r a l , b u t those at issue in this particular context, viz. t h e suppositions which involve action i n c l u d i n g s o m e t i m e s affective reactions. 9 5 So we s h o u l d try to m a k e sense of t h e text as it stands. H e r e t h e central issue, it

91 On this passage see also Pohlenz (1898) 560; 564-5; 621 n.l; id. (1948) vol.. II, p. 113; Gill (1998) 126 f., Sorabji (2000) 118. 92 καί γάρ καί ταΰθ' ό Ποσειδώνιος μέμφεται καί δεικνύναι πειράται πασών τών ψευδών υπολήψεων τάς αιτίας έν μέν τω θεωρητικω διά τής παθητικής ολκής, προηγεΐσθαι δ' αυτής τάς ψευδείς δόξας άσθενήσαντος περί τήν κρίσιν του λογιστικού· γεννάσθαι γάρ τω ζφω τήν όρμήν ένίοτε μέν έπί του λογιστικού κρίσει, πολλάκις δ' έπί τή κινήσει του παθητικού. 93 Pohlenz (1898) 560 ff. 94 Fillion-Lahille (1984) 156, followed by Cooper (1998) 107 n.37. 95 Midler's addition of γίνεσθαι after ολκής makes the text smoother, but is not necessary either; γίνεσθαι or είναι is to be understood; cf. Cooper (1998) 107 n.37.

s e e m s to m e , is t h e m e a n i n g of t h e p h r a s e έν τω θεωρητικώ in t h e i n d i s p u t e d p a r t of o u r text. Does it express t h e idea of theoretical, as o p p o s e d to practical, t h o u g h t ? As is well k n o w n , Aristotle u s e d t h e same t e r m s in distinguishing between t h e contemplative a n d practical intellect. But if we p r e f e r to look f o r Stoic parallels, t h e c o n t r a s t i n g pair θεωρητικώ/πρακτικώ also o c c u r s in Stoic a n d C h r y s i p p e a n texts o n t h e c o n t e m p l a t i v e a n d practical life (e.g. D.L. 130 ~ SVF 3.687). This distinction, however, is n o t relevant to the q u e s t i o n of t h e soul's structure, a n d so d o e s little to illuminate t h e P o s i d o n i a n passage at issue h e r e . It seems m o r e a p t to c o m p a r e D.L. 7.125 (5VF3.295) r e f e r r i n g to Chrysippus' On Virtues (Περί αρετών), H e c a t o n ' s On Virtues as well as t h e Physics96 of Apollod o r o s of Seleucia, w h o was a p u p i l of D i o g e n e s of Babylon a n d so b e l o n g e d to t h e s a m e g e n e r a t i o n as Panaetius. H e c a t o n of R h o d e s , like Posidonius, was a p u p i l of P a n a e t i u s (c. 185-109 BCE) (Cic. Off. 3.63 ~ f r . 1 G o m o l l ) . 9 7 T h e r e f e r e n c e at issue is f o u n d in t h e s e c o n d half of D.L. 7.125 a n d o p e n s a section o n virtue (or ' e x c e l l e n c e ' , αρετή) (125-9), which is a p p e n d e d to a list of p r o p e r t i e s of t h e Sage (ibid. 117 ff.). According to Diogenes, Chrysippus a n d H e c a t o n h e l d that the virtues entail o n e a n o t h e r o n t h e g r o u n d s t h a t they have t h e i r θ ε ω ρ ή μ α τ α (concepts, ideas) in c o m m o n . 9 8 Right a f t e r t h e s u p p o r t i n g cluster of r e f e r e n c e s it is e x p l a i n e d ( n o t e γ ά ρ ) t h a t t h e e x c e l l e n t p e r s o n is c a p a b l e b o t h of c o n t e m p l a t i n g (? c o n s i d e r i n g ? ) a n d of d o i n g what o u g h t to be d o n e (τόν γάρ ένάρετον θεωρητικόν τ' είναι καί πρακτικόν τών ποιητέων). 9 9 I take it that t h e genitive τών ποιητέων also d e p e n d s o n θεωρητικόν. Clearly, t h e d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n t h o u g h t a n d action indicates two d i f f e r e n t aspects, o r stages, of t h e s a m e p r o c e s s of m a k i n g a c o r r e c t decisions a n d a c t i n g accordingly. O n e recalls t h e

96

The Physics and Ethics to which Diogenes repeatedly refers were presumably secdons of the work entitled Introductions to the Doctrines (7.39), which seems to have offered a comprehensive and standard exposition of Stoic philosophy. The evidence (in large part from D.L.) is collected by Von Arnim, SVF3, pp. 259-61. 97 The evidence does not permit a more exact dating of Hecaton; cf. Dorandi, s.v. Hecato, Encyclopedia of Classical Philosophy. The most recent collection of his fragments (with discussion) is Gomoll (1933); cf. the critical review article by Pohlenz (1935). See further Philippson (1935) 385 ff., Pohlenz (1948), vol. 1, 240 f., vol. 2, 123 f. 98 Similarly Stob. EcL II p. 63.6-8 (SVF3.280); cf. Mansfeld (2003). 99 In Stobaeus' account (cf. previous n.) the same is said, in slightly different words, in explanation of the virtue of practical wisdom (φρόνησις) in particular, ibid. 11-12.

Chrysippean distinction between two types of j u d g e m e n t s , o n e purely cognitive, the other involving conation (see above, p. 169). No difference between psychic f u n c t i o n s is at issue here. On the contrary, the unity of the virtues is based on the unitary intellect. T h e r e f o r e the main point at issue c a n n o t be the difference between contemplative a n d active lifestyles ( t h o u g h the c o n n e c t i o n between the two terms may include the suggestion that f r o m the Stoic point of view the two are n o t d i f f e r e n t i a t e d at all, as is proved by the Sage c o m b i n i n g them). This a r g u m e n t , it has to be recalled, is attributed to both Chrysippus a n d Hecaton. An analogous difference between between theoretical a n d practical excellence (or virtue) is ascribed to H e c a t o n ' s teacher Panaetius (D.L. 7.92 ~ Fr. 67 Alesse: Παναίτιος ... δύο άρετάς, θεωρητικήν καί πρακτικήν). Does this distinction presuppose a differe n c e between p e r m a n e n t functions? It is legitimate in principle to use evidence c o n c e r n i n g the virtues to draw inferences c o n c e r n i n g the underlying c o n c e p t i o n of the soul. Posidonius said that the inquiry into the virtues d e p e n d s directly o n that of the affections ( P H P 5.6.2 = F 30 E.-K. Cf. 4.7.24 ~ F 150a E.-K, where Galen ascribes to Posidonius the conviction that all ethics d e p e n d s on o n e ' s view on the soul's δυνάμεις). But in fact Panaetius' distinction is not decisive for any particular position as to the soul's structure on his part, let alone for that of Posidonius. After all Aristotle too ascribed the practical and contemplative virtues to o n e function. O n the basis of other texts Panaetius is often taken to have espoused a dualist model but, as I shall argue presently (below, p. 245 ff.), these texts warrant n o such assumption. T h a t we have to look in a d i f f e r e n t direction is indicated by a f u r t h e r testimony on Hecaton. At 7.90 Diogenes Laertius turns to the Stoic a c c o u n t of virtue, a n d Hecaton is a m o n g the first authorities q u o t e d (89 goes back to Chrysippus). Hecaton counts as o n e of the representatives of so-called Middle Stoicism. Yet in the context Diogenes cheerfully draws on him (90, 91), Cleanthes (89) Chrysippus (89, 91) a n d Posidonius (91) alike, p r e s e n t i n g a picture of Stoic unanimity. T h e section deriving f r o m Hecaton reads as follows: ( 9 0 ) V i r t u e is in o n e s e n s e t h e p e r f e c t i o n o f e a c h t h i n g in g e n e r a l , say, of a s t a t u e ; 1 0 0 a n d t h e r e is n o n - t h e o r e t i c a l p e r f e c t i o n , s u c h as h e a l t h , a n d t h e o r e t i c a l s u c h as w i s d o m . F o r H e c a t o n in t h e first b o o k 100

At this point Von Arnim, followed by Marcovich, assumes a lacuna, see SVF vol. I, p. xxxix, in my view unnecessarily (Diogenes' style is often rather jerky).

of h i s On Virtues says t h a t s c i e n t i f i c a n d t h e o r e t i c a l a r e t h o s e [ v i r t u e s ] w h i c h c o n s i s t o f t h e o r e m s , s u c h as w i s d o m a n d j u s t i c e ; n o n - t h e o r e t i cal a r e t h o s e t h a t a r e r e g a r d e d as c o e x t e n s i v e with t h o s e c o n s i s t i n g of t h e o r e m s , s u c h as h e a l t h a n d s t r e n g t h . F o r it is t h e c a s e t h a t h e a l t h is c o n c o m i t a n t a n d c o - e x t e n s i v e w i t h t e m p e r a n c e , w h i c h is t h e o r e t i c a l , j u s t as s t r e n g t h s u p e r v e n e s o n t h e b u i l d i n g of a n a r c h . ( 9 1 ) T h e y a r e c a l l e d n o n - t h e o r e t i c a l i n s o f a r as t h e y d o n o t involve acts o f a s s e n t b u t s u p e r v e n e , a n d o c c u r e v e n in t h e c a s e of t h e n o n - w i s e , s u c h as h e a l t h a n d c o u r a g e ... 1 0 1

First of all it should be n o t e d that Diogenes must be talking about the health a n d strength of the soul as o p p o s e d to that of the body. But health a n d strength are physical characteristics related to the soul's corporeal nature. T h e addition of courage is less o d d than it might seem at first glance. Whereas the o t h e r three generic virtues (practical wisdom, t e m p e r a n c e a n d justice) a p p e a r h e r e as 'theoretical' (or p e r h a p s 'cognitive'), courage is different insofar as it pertains to the soul's physical strength. O n e recalls Panaetius' substitution of magnanimity for c o u r a g e in the traditional q u a r t e t of principal virtues a n d his ascription of courage to non-rational animals. 1 0 2 H e c a t o n ' s t r e a t m e n t of the same virtue c o h e r e s with the relevant testimonies c o n c e r n i n g Panaetius. 1 0 3 T h e same Panaetian line of t h o u g h t seems to be reflected by the point that the non-theoretical virtues occur in the non-wise also. T h e theoretical virtues by contrast presuppose the non-theoretical o n e s , t h e l a t t e r ' b e i n g co-extensive w i t h ' a n d 'supervening o n ' the f o r m e r . T h e application of the concept of virtue to the non-wise (and by Panaetius apparently even the n o n - h u m a n , see above) represents a striking d e p a r t u r e f r o m Chrysippus. O n the o t h e r h a n d , the latter had already spoken of the strength a n d beauty of the soul (see above, p. 145). I n d e e d , Chrysippus too used the

101 'Αρετή δ' ή μεν τις κοινώς (έν) παντί τελείωσις, ώσπερ άνδριάντος· καί ή αθεώρητος, ώσπερ ύγίεια· καί ή θεωρηματική, ώς φρόνησις. φησί γαρ ό Έκάτων έν τφ πρώτω Περί αρετών έπιστημονικάς μέν είναι καί θεωρηματικάς τάς έχουσας τήν σύστασιν έκ θεωρημάτων, ώς φρόνησιν καί δικαιοσύνην· άθεωρήτους δέ τάς κατά παρέκτασιν θεωρουμένας ταΐς έκ τών θεωρημάτων συνεστηκυίαις, καθάπερ ύγίειαν καί ίσχύν. τή γάρ σωφροσύνη τεθεωρημένη ύπαρχούση συμβαίνει άκολουθείν καί παρεκτείνεσθαι τήν ύγίειαν, καθάπερ τή ψαλίδος οίκοδομία τήν ίσχύν έπιγίνεσθαι. καλούνται δ άθεώρητοι δτι μή έχουσι συγκαταθέσεις, άλλ' έπιγίνονται καί περί φαύλους γίγνονται ώς ύγίεια, άνδρεία. 102 Cic. De off. I 50 (fr. 91 Alesse); cf. ibid. 15 (fr. 56 Α.). In Early Stoic schémas magnanimity features as subspecies of courage, e.g. SVF 3.264. Since Diogenes indicates that each non-theoretical virtue was made to correspond to a theoretical o n e (e.g. psychic strength is linked to temperance), we may assume that courage and magnimity remained thus linked as well. 103 Similarly Gomoll (1933) 38 ff.

terms 'supervening o n ' a n d ' b e i n g co-extensive' to explain the relation of 'theoretical' to physical aspects of the soul. Hecaton seems to have elevated the n o n - t h e o r e t i c a l aspects to t h e status of virtue without altering the substance of the doctrine he had inherited f r o m Chrysippus (whether or not directly). 1 0 4 In fact, the account offered by Diogenes gives every a p p e a r a n c e of being grafted on to Chrysippean doctrine. If o n e should characterize H e c a t o n ' s c o n t r i b u t i o n , o n e could say that he e x p a n d e d a n d formalized the position of his great predecessor. These assumptions are b o r n e out by the parallel account o f f e r e d by Stobaeus, Eel. II pp. 62.15-63.5 W a c h s m u t h (which directly precedes a notice on the unity of all virtues c o r r e s p o n d i n g to D.L. 7.125, see above, p. 232). Wbereas Diogenes lumps together so-called 'Early' a n d so-called 'Middle Stoics', Stobaeus m e n t i o n s n o n a m e s at all. T h i s may explain why his a c c o u n t has on t h e whole n o t b e e n contested as evidence for Early Stoic a n d in particular Chrysippean doctrine (cf. SVF3.278). 1 0 5 T h e parallel with Hecaton did not escape W a c h s m u t h 1 0 6 a n d others, 1 0 7 t h o u g h it plays n o part in m o r e recent attempts at reconstructing Posidonius' position against the b a c k d r o p of contemporary Stoicism: T h e s e ... virtues, t h e y [seil, t h e Stoics] say, a r e c o m p l e t e in t h e s p h e r e o f life a n d c o n s i s t of t h e o r e m s ( θ ε ω ρ η μ ά τ ω ν ) ; b u t o t h e r s s u p e r v e n e o n these b e c a u s e they are n o l o n g e r f o r m s of expertise b u t certain powers that are acquired t h r o u g h training, for instance the soul's h e a l t h a n d s o u n d n e s s as well as its s t r e n g t h a n d b e a u t y . F o r j u s t as b o d i l y h e a l t h is a g o o d b l e n d of t h e h o t , c o l d , d r y a n d w e t e l e m e n t s in t h e b o d y , so t o o p s y c h i c h e a l t h is a g o o d m i x t u r e of t h e d o c t r i n e s in t h e s o u l . A n d in t h e s a m e way t h a t b o d i l y s t r e n g t h c o n s i s t s in suffic i e n t t e n s i o n in t h e n e r v e s , s o t o o p s y c h i c s t r e n g t h is s u f f i c i e n t s t r e n g t h in j u d g i n g a n d a c t i n g o r n o t a c t i n g . J u s t as t h e b e a u t y o f t h e b o d y is t h e s y m m e t r y of its m e m b e r s e x i s t i n g in it with r e g a r d t o b o t h o n e a n o t h e r a n d t o t h e w h o l e , s o t o o t h e b e a u t y of t h e s o u l is t h e s y m m e t r y o f t h e r e a s o n (του λ ό γ ο υ ) 1 0 8 a n d its p a r t s 1 0 9 in r e s p e c t of t h e w h o l e of it [seil, t h e s o u l ] a n d t o w a r d s o n e a n o t h e r .

104

Similarly Pohlenz, vol. 1, 240 f. But cf. Gomoll (1933) 38 ff. 106 in apparatu ad loc. 107 Philippson (1930), esp. 374 ff., Gomoll (1933) 38 ff. Cf. Pohlenz, GGA (1935) 108. 108 I.e. reason in the sense of doctrine or theory incarnated; cf. Epict. Diss. 4.8.12 with Mansfeld (2003). 109 I.e. the theorems of which 'reason' (see prev. n.) consists, see the first sentence of this passage. 105

T h i s e x p l a n a t i o n of t h e soul's s t r e n g t h a n d beauty in analogy to the b o d y was also given by Chrysippus in his On Affections, as is witnessed by b o t h Galen a n d Cicero (see above, p p . 148 ff., below 301). H e r e , as in H e c a t o n ap. Diogenes, t h e s u p e r v e n i n g qualities or powers of t h e soul f e a t u r e as virtues. This constitutes a p o i n t of d i f f e r e n c e f r o m Chrysippus, t h o u g h o n e that is less significant t h a n it m i g h t seem at first glance. H e r e too we are dealing with the systematization based by H e c a t o n o n C h r y s i p p u s ' On Virtues.110 W h a t is said a b o u t t h e soul's s t r e n g t h a n d beauty c o u l d have b e e n r e p e a t e d by Chrysippus in t h e f o r m e r work, in which it will have c o m e u p naturally. W h a t Stobaeus a d d s to t h e t e s t i m o n y of D i o g e n e s is t h e c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n of t h e s o u l ' s s t r e n g t h , s o u n d n e s s etc. as powers ( δ υ ν ά μ ε ι ς ) in t h e Stoic sense of this t e r m , as d i f f e r e n t f r o m Aristotelian-style faculties. H e r e t h e powers are c o n t r a s t e d with t h e virtues as f o r m s of expertise (τέχναι). This is in k e e p i n g with t h e Stoic d e f i n i t i o n of expertise (τέχνη) as a c o l l e c t i o n of t h e o r e m s , o r c o n c e p t i o n s ( θ ε ω ρ ή μ α τ α o r κ α τ α λ ή ψεις). 1 1 1 This particular e l e m e n t is n o t b r o u g h t o u t by Diogenes, b u t h e d o e s m a k e clear t h a t ' t h e o r e m a t i c a l ' virtues s u c h as practical wisdom a n d t e m p e r a n c e p r e s u p p o s e assent, a c o n c e p t which in Stoic e p i s t e m o l o g y is linked to that of c o g n i t i o n o r c o n c e p t i o n ( κ α τ ά λ η ψις) since it is said to lead to t h e latter. In a d d i t i o n we may n o t e that t h e soul's powers a r e said to c o m e a b o u t t h r o u g h training, i.e. g o o d h a b i t o r t h e c o n s t a n t practising of virtue in t h e p r o p e r sense. T h i s too c o n f o r m s to s t a n d a r d d e f i n i t i o n s of expertise, which i n c l u d e t h e e l e m e n t of t r a i n i n g (i.e. of t h e c o n c e p t i o n s o r t h e o r e m s ) . 1 1 2 Galen a n d o t h e r s o u r c e s s t a n d a r d l y associate t r a i n i n g with psychological d u a l i s m . T h e p r e s e n t p a s s a g e shows t h a t it c o u l d b e , a n d was, a c c o m o d a t e d within t h e Stoic monistic f r a m e w o r k as well. T h a t t h e Stoic c o n c e p t of expertise l o o m s b e h i n d this passage is f u r t h e r b o r n e o u t by t h e ' t h e o r e m a t i c a l ' v i r t u e s b e i n g said to b e ' c o m p l e t e '

no p o r e x a m p i e 0 f Hecaton's use of Chrysippean ideas in a different context, see Seneca, De benefidis I 3,9. 111 S W 3 . 2 1 4 (Anecdota graeca Paris, ed. Cramer, vol. I, p. 171) (on how people b e c o m e g o o d and bad): 'Αριστοτέλης δέ φύσει και έθει καί λόγφ· άμέλει καί οί Στωικοί· τέχνη γαρ ή αρετή, πάσα δέ τέχνη σύστημα έκ θεωρημάτων συγγεγυμνασμένων· καί κατά μέν θεωρήματα ό λόγος; κατά δέ τήν συγγυμνασίαν τό εθος· φύσει δέ πάντες προς άρετήν γεννώμεθα, καθ' δσον άφορμάς έχομεν. Sextus, Μ 8.280 (SVF 2.223): θεώρημα τέχνης 'ίδιον. Cic. Defato 11 (.SW 2.954): etenim si est divinatio, qualibusnam a perceptis artis profiscitur (percepta appelle quae dicuntur Graeee θεωρήματα). For expertise as a σύστημα καταλήψεων (συγγεγυμνασμένων), see SVF2.93-97. 112 See prev. n.

(τελείας) with a view to life. This recalls t h e last e l e m e n t of the standard d e f i n i t i o n s which also specify that expertise is g e a r e d towards a useful e n d (τέλος) in life (SVF2.93-97). T h e s e passages are n o t c o n c e r n e d with t h e o p p o s i t i o n b e t w e e n psychic f u n c t i o n s in the sense i n t e n d e d by any of the c u r r e n t dualist models. N o r d o they postulate a distinction between theoretical a n d practical reason. R a t h e r they reveal a distinction between the intentional a n d t h e physical in the c o n t e x t of t h e Stoic m o n i s t a n d c o r p o realist c o n c e p t i o n of the soul. Certain qualities of t h e soul c a n n o t be directly i n f l u e n c e d by r e a s o n , i.e. t h r o u g h acts of assent. S t r e n g t h of c h a r a c t e r a n d i n n e r h a r m o n y l e n d an a d d i t i o n a l quality to m e n t a l life; h e n c e they are said to ' s u p e r v e n e o n ' the theoretical virtues. But it d o e s n o t s t a n d to r e a s o n t h a t this d i s t i n c t i o n was d r a w n with r e s p e c t to virtue only. In fact we already e n c o u n t e r e d it w h e n we n o t i c e d how t h e cognitive, ' j u d g m e n t a l ' side of a f f e c t i o n was distinguished f r o m the physical effects ' s u p e r v e n i n g ' o n it. We have also seen that Galen c o n s t r u e d these two aspects as psychic f u n c t i o n s or faculties—one rational, the o t h e r non-rational—thus fabricating c o n t r a d i c t i o n s between the s t a t e m e n t s of Chrysippus or between h i m a n d Z e n o (above, p. 86). W h e r e d o e s this b r i n g us with r e g a r d to Posidonius? T h e text of PHPb.b.2\ as it stands b e c o m e s m o r e u n d e r s t a n d a b l e in t h e light of t h e distinction drawn by o t h e r Stoics in t h e texts I have r e f e r r e d to. T h e p h r a s e έν τω θεωρητικω b e l o n g s to this distinction. It should n o t be translated 'in t h e theoretical s p h e r e ' b u t r a t h e r 'in t h e s p h e r e of k n o w l e d g e ' . T h e p r o p o s e d a d d i t i o n s involving έν τω πρακτικω ( ' i n t h e s p h e r e of action') yield a d i f f e r e n t distinction a n d so o b s c u r e the real sense of θεωρητικω. T h e idea o p p o s e d to έν τω θεωρητικω is twice expressed by the t e r m 'affective' as used in t h e expressions 'affective pull' a n d ' t h e m o v e m e n t of t h e affective' (παθητικής ολκής, τή κινήσει του π α θ η τ ι κ ο ύ ) . This t e r m i n d i c a t i n g t h e soul's susceptibility to external influences, its passive side, whereas t h e active aspect is r e p r e s e n t e d by t h e act of giving or w i t h h o l d i n g assent to m e n t a l a p p e a r ances. T h e c o r p o r e a l soul may yield u n d e r the impact of a p p e a r a n c e s e n t e r i n g f r o m outside: w h e t h e r it d o e s or n o t d e p e n d s o n t h e soul's capacity to give or withhold assent. T h e train of t h o u g h t expressed may be s u m m a r i z e d as follows. T h e w r o n g j u d g e m e n t s of o u r conscious m e n t a l f u n c t i o n i n g are caused by t h e affective pull. But w h e n t h e i n t e l l e c t is weak already, w r o n g j u d g e m e n t may lead t h e way, i.e. s o m e a f f e c t i o n s a r e t r i g g e r e d by

decisions m a d e in full consciousness. This m u c h is stated by the first sentence. It may have b e e n clearer in the Posidonian original, since Galen has an interest in intimating that the affective pull represents a non-rational psychic faculty o p p o s e d to the λογιστικόν, or 'rational part', the distinctively Platonic term h e uses. But what Posidonius himself must have wished to bring out a n d is still clear f r o m Galen's r e n d e r i n g is the intricate interplay between the mental a n d physical. T h u s if wrong j u d g e m e n t s may initiate the affective pull sometimes, these j u d g e m e n t s themselves result f r o m the physical weakness of the soul. This merely underlines that the mental and the physical are two sides of the same coin. This is the traditional Stoic schema. P o s i d o n i u s was n o t t h e only Stoic to distinguish between t h e theoretical a n d physical aspects of Galen p r e s e n t s an interesting observation on how Chrysippus conceived of the relation between these two aspects, or factors, involved in the genesis of affection, at PHP4.6.2-3 (SVF3.473, part; cf. LS 65 Τ): S o m e o f m e n ' s w r o n g a c t i o n s h e [seil. C h r y s i p p u s ] refers to w r o n g j u d g e m e n t s , o t h e r s to the soul's lack o f t e n s i o n a n d its w e a k n e s s , j u s t as their c o r r e c t a c t i o n s are g u i d e d by right j u d g e m e n t t o g e t h e r with t h e soul's g o o d t e n s i o n . In p e r s o n s o f t h e latter sort, as t h e j u d g e m e n t is the work o f t h e rational p o w e r , so t h e g o o d t e n s i o n is t h e s t r e n g t h a n d the virtue o f a p o w e r o t h e r than rational. T h i s p o w e r Chrysippus h i m s e l f calls ' t e n s i o n ' [ o r : ' t o n e ' ) ; a n d h e says that at t i m e s w e let g o o f c o r r e c t j u d g e m e n t s b e c a u s e t h e t e n s i o n o f t h e s o u l gives in a n d d o e s n o t persist to the e n d or carry o u t fully the c o m m a n d s o f reason.

This is a revealing passage. It appears to reflect what Chrysippus said a b o u t the interplay between two factors: physical tension a n d j u d g e m e n t . Of course Galen interprets this as a m o u n t i n g to an admission of two separate powers. This is a familiar motif, since h e often takes Stoic references to the soul's corporeal substance—here represented by the soul's physical tension—as p o i n t i n g to the p r e s e n c e of an irrational power. T h e similarity between this r e p o r t on Chrysippus a n d that on Posidonius (5.5.21) is very striking. It s t r e n g t h e n s the assumption that what Posidonius was talking a b o u t was the interplay between 'theoretical' a n d physical factors in a way very similar to Chrysippus. Posidonius' affective pull or m o v e m e n t simply results f r o m a lack or insufficient degree of tension. 1 1 3 113

For this reason I cannot agree with Gill (1998), 127, that Posidonius' concept of 'affective' or 'emotional movements' constitutes a real innovation. According to Gill, the view that belief-based explanations need to be combined with these move-

E n o u g h u n a d u l t e r a t e d Chrysippean d o c t r i n e shimmers t h r o u g h in the above passage to enable us to see that h e o f f e r e d a clear alternative to the 'faculty a p p r o a c h ' in e x p l a i n i n g the o c c u r r e n c e of mental affections. This reveals that Chrysippus was p r e p a r e d to refer to the soul's physical constitution as initiating an affective response, causing o u r m i n d to a b a n d o n its initial j u d g e m e n t . As Galen subseq u e n t q u o t a t i o n shows, Chrysippus m e n t i o n e d t h e e x a m p l e of Menelaos forgetting a b o u t his intention to punish Helen as soon as he saw her. H e was struck by her beauty a n d fell into love again. In Stoic technical terms: his soul lacked the tension to resist the impact of this mental a p p e a r a n c e a n d was swept along by desire. In Posidonian terms, this affection was initiated by the 'affective pull'. We may safely assume that Chrysippus m e a n t that the initial j u d g e m e n t was replaced by a n o t h e r one, e.g. that Helen was still worth loving. Galen plays off against o n e a n o t h e r the two factors by intimating that the difference pertains to two different g r o u p s of people. But his immediately following testimony that c o r r e c t , persisting j u d g e m e n t s a c c o r d i n g to Chrysippus are based on a c o m b i n a t i o n of physical strength a n d s o u n d j u d g e m e n t (as of course it has to be on Chrysippus' monistic premises) indicate that in weak souls a n d in states of affection the physical a n d mental aspects correspond to o n e a n o t h e r . T h e p o i n t is that the soul's physical c o n d i t i o n is called u p o n to explain how a correct initial j u d g e m e n t can be a b a n d o n e d . O n e could perhaps speak h e r e of an irrational factor, though non-rational would be preferable. At any rate this has n o t h i n g to d o with Platonic(or Aristotelian-)style powers. As to the relation between Chrysippus and Posidonius we may note that Galen's testimonies on what each has to say on the way affection comes about are closely similar. Both Stoics operate with two aspects — t h e intentional a n d the physical—and a close c o r r e s p o n d e n c e and intricate interaction between these. In the case of Chrysippus Galen uses this account to argue that this Stoic contradicts himself; in the case of Posidonius that he sides with the d e f e n d e r s of the dualistic model of mind.

m e n t s is a 'limited view' as c o m p a r e d to t h e p i c t u r e of his wholesale rejection of Chrysippus' theory drawn by Galen. Moreover, it was 'inserted into a basically Chrysippan f r a m e w o r k ' (p. 126). I would suggest that we should go f u r t h e r a n d say that what was Posidonian in origin was t h e technical term r a t h e r than the idea.

T h e picture of overall Stoic unity is b o r n e out f u r t h e r by the evidence relating to Hecaton. This minor Stoic was no innovator. He seems to have remained m o r e faithful to the Chrysippean formulation of the Stoic creed than his teacher Panaetius did. He reconciled certain Panaetian modifications (e.g. concerning the status of courage) with what he had read in Chrysippus. He belonged to the generation of epigons who systematised Chrysippus' arguments, producing a more easily digestible body of Stoic doctrine for teaching and missionary purposes. It is the work of Stoics such as he that underlies m u c h of what we find in the extant texts of, say, Diogenes Laertius and Stobaeus. T h a t such was H e c a t o n ' s historical place may seem surprising in view of the role traditionally assigned to his teacher Panaetius as having inaugurated a new period in the school's history called Middle Stoicism. Are we to believe that just after the turning point b r o u g h t about by Panaetius the decidedly second-rate figure Hecaton bypassed his master and harked back to the latter's predecessors? Of course not, but for the reason that there was n o such dramatic turning point. Panaetius too, like Posidonius, stayed within the overall framework as it has been laid down by Zeno and Chrysippus. 114 I a p p e n d a few f u r t h e r testimonies which illuminate the role of corporeal factor in Posidonius' a c c o u n t of the genesis of mental affection. T h e first of my passage immediately follows the important passage at PHPb.b.2\ (note the first sentence): Posidonius plausibly attaches to this discussion [seil, the argument paraphrased at § 21] the observations of the physiognomist: men and 114

With reference to the development of Stoic philosophy after Panaetius Pohlenz says in his review of Gomoll (1933), GGA 197 (1935), p. I l l : 'Es ist merkwürdig, daß trotz des Wirkens so stärker Persönlichkeiten, wie es Panaitios und Poseidonios waren, sich allmählich Chrysipps Rechtglaübigkeit wieder durchsetzte. Verständlich wird das nur dadurch, daß auch in der Zeit der mittleren Stoa die echten Scholastiker es als ihre Aufgabe betrachteten, so viel wie möglich vom alten Stoa zu retten und weiterzugeben. Unter ihnen hat Hekaton den hervorragendsten Platz gehabt.' Pohlenz was too familiar with the evidence to miss Hecaton's dependence on Chrysippus, but he clung to the idea that Panaetius and Posidonius, both 'strong personalities', had diverged from the latter in fundamental ways. So he had to invent this weak explanation of the motivation of Hecaton and other Stoics younger than Panaetius for retaining the Chrysippean formulations. Ironically, Pohlenz in the same review points to the fact that our sources do not know about Middle Stoicism, but uses this insight to issue a warning against taking the agreement between the two 'Middle Stoics' Panaetius and Posidonius for granted. In fact, the testimony of our sources issue an equally strong warning against taking for granted the disagreement between Chrysippus and Zeno on the o n e hand and Panaetius and Posidonius on the other (ibid. p. 104).

a n i m a l s t h a t a r e b r o a d - c h e s t e d a n d w a r m e r a r e all by n a t u r e m o r e irascible b u t those that have wide hips a n d are c o l d e r are m o r e c o w a r d l y . H e a l s o says t h a t a c c o r d i n g to h a b i t a t p e o p l e ' s c h a r a c t e r s d i f f e r g r e a t l y in c o w a r d i c e a n d d a r i n g , in love of p l e a s u r e a n d of toil, o n t h e g r o u n d s t h a t t h e a f f e c t i v e m o t i o n s o f t h e s o u l in e a c h c a s e f o l l o w t h e d i s p o s i t i o n of t h e b o d y , w h i c h is a l t e r e d in n o small d e g r e e by t h e m i x t u r e [seil, of e l e m e n t s ] in t h e e n v i r o n m e n t . F o r i n d e e d t h e b l o o d in a n i m a l s , h e says, d i f f e r s in w a r m t h a n d c o l d n e s s , t h i c k n e s s a n d t h i n n e s s a n d in m a n y o t h e r p r o p e r t i e s , w h i c h A r i s t o t l e d i s c u s s e d at l e n g t h (PHP5.5.22-3 ~ Posid. F 169 E.-K.).

Galen o n c e again associates t h e affective m o t i o n s with n o n - r a t i o n a l psychic p o w e r s b u t t h e r e is n o t r a c e of t h e m in t h e P o s i d o n i a n passage h e is r e p r o d u c i n g . Now see t h e following passage: ... m y a r g u m e n t is w i t h C h r y s i p p u s a n d h i s f o l l o w e r s , w h o k n o w n o t h i n g else t h a t p e r t a i n s to t h e a f f e c t i o n s , n o r yet t h a t e a c h m i x t u r e in t h e b o d y p r o d u c e s its o w n set of a f f e c t i v e m o t i o n s : f o r t h i s is h o w P o s i d o n i u s is w o n t t o c a / / t h e m (5.5.26; my italics).

So P o s i d o n i u s s p o k e of affective m o t i o n s . If h e h a d called t h e m irrational powers, Galen would have h a d every reason to say so. But h e d o e s n o t . T h i s l e n d s a d d i t i o n a l w e i g h t to my a s s u m p t i o n t h a t w h e n Galen d o e s ascribe powers to Posidonius, this entirely results f r o m his creative exegesis. G a l e n ' s late treatise The Powers of the Soul Follow the Temperaments of the Body picks u p several t h e m e s f r o m PHP 5 b u t is devoid of t h e p o l e m i c c o n c e r n s p e r v a d i n g t h e latter tract. It has b e e n h e l p f u l b e f o r e (see above, p. 149 f.). O n p.78.8 ff. Müller we read: ... n e i t h e r d o e s P o s i d o n i u s h o l d t h a t vice e n t e r s h u m a n s f r o m o u t s i d e , h a v i n g n o r o o t of its o w n in o u r s o u l s s t a r t i n g f r o m w h i c h it s p r o u t s a n d g r o w s b u t q u i t e t h e o p p o s i t e ...

From t h e c o n t e x t it is clear that Posidonius ascribed t e m p e r a m e n t a l flaws a n d affections to t h e m i x t u r e of c o r p o r e a l e l e m e n t s . In o t h e r words, the same d o c t r i n e u n d e r l i e s b o t h t h e latter testimony a n d t h e passage f r o m PHP. T h e t e r m i n o l o g y of vice ' s t a r t i n g ' o r ' a r i s i n g ' (όρμωμένη) f r o m within as well as t h e h e r b a l m e t a p h o r s of 'sprouting' ( β λ α σ τ ά ν ε ι ) a n d ' g r o w i n g ' ( α υ ξ ά ν ε τ α ι ) recall f u r t h e r passages e c h o i n g P o s i d o n i u s ' original position. T h e First r e c u r s in G a l e n ' s version of a traditional s c h e m a of o p t i o n s to which the view of Posid o n i u s is tagged o n (PHP6.2.5, o n which see above, pp. 34 ff.): ... A r i s t o t l e a n d P o s i d o n i u s ... say t h a t t h e r e a r e p o w e r s o f a s i n g l e b e i n g (or ' s u b s t a n c e ' , ουσίας) which arises (ορμώμενης) f r o m t h e heart...

Obviously this r e f e r s to t h e soul's p n e u m a t i c substance with its close physical relation a n d interaction with the h e a r t — s t a n d a r d Stoic doctrine f r o m Z e n o onwards. O u r translation however fails to r e n d e r the a m b i g u i t y of ο ύ σ ί α , viz. b e t w e e n Stoic ( c o r p o r e a l ) s u b s t a n c e a n d Aristotelian essence or b e i n g which makes it possible to align Posidonius a n d Aristotle a n d p r e s e n t their c o m m o n view as it is given h e r e (see above, p. 34 ff.). Still t h e c o n s p i c u o u s p h r a s e that t h e substance of t h e soul arises f r o m t h e h e a r t m u s t preserve a crucial f e a t u r e of P o s i d o n i u s ' original viewpoint. So o n c e again we c o m e across t h e soul's corporeality a n d its physical continuity with the body. A n d a similar P o s i d o n i a n c o l o u r i n g is f o u n d in t h e ps.-Plutarc h e a n , Whether Appetite and Distress belong to the Soul or the Body, ch. 9 (p. 47.24 ff. S a n d b a c h ) : All a f f e c t i o n s a n d w e a k n e s s e s s p r o u t f o r t h f r o m t h e flesh as f r o m a r o o t (τά δέ π ά θ η π ά ν τ α καί τ ά ς ά σ θ ε ν ε ί α ς ώ σ π ε ρ έκ ρ ί ζ η ς τής σ α ρ κ ό ς ά ν α β λ α σ τ ά ν ε ι ν ).115

N o w h e r e else is t h e c o n c e p t i o n of t h e soul as organically c o n n e c t e d to t h e body associated with n o n - r a t i o n a l powers. This t h e n is a Galenic move. P o s i d o n i u s r e p r e s e n t s t h e s t a n d a r d Stoic position, using s o m e new t e r m s of his own. His p l a n t imagery brings o u t t h e soul's a t t a c h e m e n t to t h e body. A c c o r d i n g to Stoic physical d o c t r i n e this continuity is based o n t h e pneuma which pervades h u m a n animals in d i f f e r e n t g r a d a t i o n s of purity, thus e x p l a i n i n g t h e h i e r a r c h y of vital a n d psychic f u n c t i o n s : vegetative, perceptive-cum-motive a n d rational. T h i s h i e r a r c h y of f u n c t i o n s c o r r e s p o n d s to t h e Stoic scala naturae. Seen in this light, t h e vegetative m e t a p h o r s in fact p o i n t to physical reality, i.e. express an actual c o r r e s p o n d e n c e or analogy.

6. Intermezzo: Diogenes of Babylon and Panaetius At this j u n c t u r e it is worth saying s o m e t h i n g a b o u t Posidonius' i m m e diate p r e d e c e s s o r s . T h e i r position o n these issues f o r m s t h e i m m e d i a t e b a c k d r o p a g a i n s t which P o s i d o n i u s ' c o n c e p t i o n of t h e soul s h o u l d be c o n s i d e r e d . I n d e e d , Posidonius a n d his t e a c h e r Panaetius are believed to have e n t e r t a i n e d the same d o c t r i n e of t h e soul a n d its 115 Cf. the Posidonian fragment at ch. 6 (= Posid. Fr. 154 E.-K.), for a full discussion of which see infra, pp. 278 ff. The same Posidonian botanic terminology describing the relation of the soul to the body is also found (though admittedly without mention of Posidonius) at Plutarch, On Moral Virtue 451a as well as Marcus Aurelius V, 26.1. On these parallels cf. Theiler (1960) 79; Babut (1969) 57.

affections. I n d e e d , t h e view that they are t h e m a i n e x p o n e n t s of a d i s t i n c t p h a s e in t h e history of Stoicism, viz. so-called M i d d l e Stoicism, is mainly based o n this assumption. Galen c o m p l a i n s that most Stoics of his day cling to Chrysippus' m o d e l of t h e soul instead of following t h e lead of that o t h e r g r e a t Stoic, P o s i d o n i u s . 1 1 6 H e says n o t h i n g a b o u t Panaetius, t h o u g h t h e latter is today usually c r e d i t e d with having i n t r o d u c e d psychological dualism in Stoic philosophy a n d thus to have anticipated Posidonius. In fact, p r e m o n i t i o n s of psychological dualism have b e e n traced back f u r t h e r to P a n a e t i u s ' t e a c h e r D i o g e n e s of Babylon. From the reflections of t h e latter's On Music in t h e o f t e n badly d a m a g e d papyrus of P h i l o d e m u s ' treatise of t h e s a m e title, it e m e r g e s that D i o g e n e s a c c o r d e d to music a salutary i n f l u e n c e a n d described it as conducive to the virtues; music 'by n a t u r e moves' us (IV.5, cols. VII.22-9, VIII 1517 N e u b e c k e r ) . Galen standardly associates music a n d o t h e r f o r m s of non-verbal c o n d i t i o n i n g of t h e soul (e.g. diet a n d exercise) to t h e dualistic m o d e l , viz. that which a c c o m o d a t e s n o n - r a t i o n a l faculties. H e r e f e r s to t h e t h e r a p e u t i c role a c c o r d e d to music by Plato a n d P o s i d o n i u s (PHP 5.6.19-23 ~ F. 168 E.-K.). I n d e e d , P h i l o d e m u s ' a c c o u n t indisputably resembles what Galen says a b o u t Posidonius o n this p o i n t . So N u s s b a u m 1 1 7 sees D i o g e n e s as a n t i c i p a t i n g what she, like others, believes to be the dualistic psychology of Posidonius. A n d O b b i n k a n d V a n d e r W a e r d t 1 1 8 take h i m to have b e e n a d u a l i s t 116 pup4 4 38. In other passages he says that 'almost all' or 'many' Stoics rejected the idea of separate psychic faculties, but here he may be thinking of the scholarchs and their books rather than of contemporary Stoics whom he knew and with whom he discussed these books; cf. also 3.3.27, 5.7.42 2.5.7, 22, 47, 74; 3.4.12, 7.16; 4.1.3 117

Nussbaum (1993) 115 ff., esp. 120 f. ('a Posidonius in the making'). Obbink and Vander Waerdt (1991) 355 n. 2, adducing four passages from the final part of Philodemus' On Musicbook IV as restored by Delattre (1989), viz. cols. 56, 57.40-1, 69.3, 73. But none of these is conclusive (in most cases the crucial terms moreover are conjectural): if Philodemus in these passages referred to the parts of the soul or the affections (though this is by no means certain), this does not prove that Diogenes abandoned the Chrysippean model. Janko (1992) restores an intriguing passage from book IV (on the basis of PHerc. 411 and 1583) which though not explicitly mentioning Diogenes may be taken to describe his position as well. In any case the argument rendered clearly is Stoic. Two points are worth noting. First, Diogenes spoke of the natural affinity we feel towards certain types of music, comparing other sensible things. As Janko rightly points out (p. 126), Chrysippus associated natural affinities (οίκείωσεις) with sensation, see Plut. De Stoic. Rep. 1038B-C ~ SVF 2.724; cf. Sen. Ep. 121.21, Porph. De abstin. Ill, 19. Similarly Cornutus, ch. 32 speaks of the close connection between music and our faculty of hearing in connection with an allegorical interpretation of myth known to have been advanced by Cleanthes, see infra in the text. Secondly, Diogenes said that 118

t h r o u g h o u t . This is a mistake, however. It has b e e n pertinently asked why t h e Stoic unitary m o d e l s h o u l d p r e c l u d e t h e i n f l u e n c e of music o n t h e m i n d . 1 1 9 In fact, P h i l o d e m u s criticizes D i o g e n e s precisely f o r m a k i n g t h e intellect ( δ ι α ν ο ί α ς ) c e n t r a l to his e x p l a n a t i o n of how m o t i o n s a r e caused by music (ibid. col. VIII 26-7). We h e a r n o t h i n g a b o u t any a p p e a l to n o n - r a t i o n a l powers o n D i o g e n e s ' part. So h e s e e m s to have e x p l a i n e d t h e i n f l u e n c e of m u s i c in t e r m s of t h e intellect a n d auditory p e r c e p t i o n (cf. ibid. col. VIII.43). His e m p h a s i s o n t h e physical i m p a c t of a u d i t o r y p e r c e p t i o n involved recalls passages f r o m Chrysippus' On Affections d e a l i n g with m e n t a l f u n c t i o n i n g a n d the genesis of affection in particular. This i m p a c t can be h a r m f u l in stirring t h e a f f e c t i o n s , b u t c a n also b e u s e d in a salutary a n d t h e r a p e u t i c m a t t e r . Plato, in t h e Republic, h a d e x p r e s s e d a similar view, b u t this d o e s n o t c o m m i t D i o g e n e s a n d Posidonius to a similar m o d e l of the soul. H e r e , as elsewhere, Galen is an u n r e l i a b l e guide. T h e m a r r i a g e b e t w e e n psychological m o n i s m a n d music has early credentials. Already Z e n o a n d his i m m e d i a t e successors d e f i n e d t h e soul's virtue in t e r m s of a musical ' h a r m o n y ' or 'symphony'. 1 2 0 Cleanthes—whose m o n i s m is u n c o n t r o v e r s i a l — r e c o m m e n d e d poetry a n d music (i.e. p r e s u m a b l y poetry s u p p o r t e d by music) as m o r e suitable f o r t h e m o s t elevated t h e m e s t h a n p h i l o s o p h i c a l p r o s e . For this reason h e is attacked by P h i l o d e m u s (col. XXVIII.1-14 N e u b e c k e r ~ SVF 1.486). 1 2 1 C l e a n t h e s also o f f e r e d an allegorical (i.e. cosmic) e x p l a n a t i o n of Apollo's (i.e. t h e sun's) cithara-playing which b r i n g s o u t its h a r m o n i o u s a n d rational aspect (SVF 1.502, 503).

'enjoyments, affections and sensations' arise through music. Janko suggests that this looks like a departure from 'orthodox Stoic theory' on the grounds that these mental p h e n o m e n a are 'irrational and therefore hostile to virtue'. But this suggestion is by no means compelling—as Janko (p. 126 n.18) acknowledges with reference to Posidonius, fr. 168 E.-K. (i.e. bringing in Posidonius as a representative of orthodoxy !). In fact, the reference, once again, to sensation (if Asmis' conjecture followed by Janko, though not in the text he prints, is correct) points in a different direction. Through sensation music may exert a forceful impact upon the mind, which may be either salutary and conducive towards virtue (see supra in text), or harmful and triggering affections. Hence the affection of enchantment is defined in pseudo-Andronicus' lexicon of affections as 'pleasure enchanting through hearing; or pleasure occurring through speech and music or through deceit' (κήλησις δέ ηδονή δι' άκοής κατακηλοΰσα ή ήδονή έκ λόγου τε καί μουσικής ή δι' απάτης γινομένη), SVF3.401. 119 Cf. Reydam-Schils (1999) 102 n. 42. 120 See e.g. D.L. 7.88, Stob. Eel II, p. 75.11 ff. with Long (1991b) 97 f. Cf. also Aristo ap. Clem. Alex. Strom. II.20.108.1 (SVF 1.370) with Ioppolo (1980) 247, Long (1991b) 104 ff. 121 Cf. Neubecker (1956) 84 f.

D i o g e n e s ' pupil, P a n a e t i u s of R h o d e s (c. 185-109 BCE), too, is c r e d i t e d with an i n d e p e n d e n c e of o u t l o o k . In line with his c o n c e r n with a p p l i e d ethics, h e is o n r e c o r d as having a b a n d o n e d o r quest i o n e d a few theologico-physical tenets which h a d b e e n distinctively Stoic f r o m Z e n o onwards. 1 2 2 This suits the notice by P h i l o d e m u s that Panaetius was f o n d of Plato a n d Aristotle a n d u n d e r t h e i r i n f l u e n c e revised s o m e of Z e n o ' s d o c t r i n e s . 1 2 3 But P h i l o d e m u s was an Epicur e a n , w h o in his On Music a n d e l s e w h e r e , d i r e c t e d an extensive critique against Panaetius' m e n t o r D i o g e n e s of Babylon. Like Galen, h e was o u t to e x p o s e alleged deviations f r o m t h e offical Stoic line. C i c e r o too has b e e n used too quickly as a witness in favour of t h e a s s u m p t i o n that Panaetius was a dualist. O t h e r passages f r o m Cicero however d o seem to state a dualist position. But can we ascribe this to Panaetius? T h e question of his position b e a r s directly o n that of his p u p i l P o s i d o n i u s . If P a n a e t i u s a b a n d o n e d m o n i s m in f a v o u r of d u a l i s m o r i n d e e d its Platonic t r i p a r t i t e variety, we m o r e readily believe G a l e n ' s claims a b o u t Posidonius. Galen in PHP never m e n tions Panaetius but h e may have seen n o t h i n g of him. 1 2 4 T h e g e n e r a l view 125 that Panaetius' a c c e p t e d s o m e f o r m of dualism is mainly based o n a few passages f r o m C i c e r o ' s On Duties. First we m u s t n o t e t h a t C i c e r o m e n t i o n s P a n a e t i u s ' On Appropriate Action (Περί καθήκοντος) as his m a i n m o d e l , ' w h o m in these books I have largely followed, n o t translated (quem multum in his libris secutus sum, non interpretatus, Off. II, 60). 1 2 6 Cicero makes it clear that h e d o e s n o t translate Panaetius. N o r did h e slavishly follow Panaetius ( n o t e t h e qualification multum). Given his g e n e r a l w o r k i n g m e t h o d ( m o r e o n which see below, p. 289) h e may be e x p e c t e d f r o m time to time to

122

Panaetius preferred the idea of the indestructability of the cosmos to periodical conflagration and eternal recurrence: Philo, On the Eternity of the World 76 (Test. 131 Alesse); he is said to have voiced doubts about astrology: Cic. Div. 1.67 (Test. 137 Α.), or to have rejected it outright, ibid. 2.88 (Test. 140 Α.). Criticism of divination is also implied, itnd. 1.12 (Test. 138 Α.). But in other cases his admiration for Plato did not prevent him from sticking to the Stoic view, for instance that the soul is not immortal, see Cic. Tusc. I, 79-80 (Test. 120 A.) 123 Stoic, hist., PHerc. 1018 col. LXI Dorandi; cf. Cic. Tusc. I, 79 (Test. 120 Α.). 124 Panaetius is never mentioned in the entire Galenic corpus. 125 See Alesse (1997) 194 if. with further references. Alesse is among those who assume that Panaetius accepted some form of psychological dualism. The wide support still enjoyed by this assumption is surprising in view of the argument advanced by Van Straaten (1976). 126 Other tesdmonia on this work are collected by Alesse, Test. 92-103; cf. also Dyck (1996) 18 ff. On Cicero's general attitude to (naming) sources see further infra, p. 290.

diverge f r o m P a n a e t i u s a n d follow his own p r e d i l e c t i o n s as to doctrine or f o r m u l a t i o n . F u r t h e r , t h e fact that Cicero o p t e d f o r a work by P a n a e t i u s r a t h e r than a n o t h e r Stoic as his chief Vorlage s h o u l d n o t in itself be taken to imply that P a n a e t i u s d i f f e r e d f r o m his p r e d e c e s s o r s o n the subject at issue. Cicero simply t u r n e d to this work as o n e of t h e most up-to-date t r e a t m e n t s available. 1 2 7 T h i s was c o m m o n practice a m o n g a n c i e n t a u t h o r s of works of a scholarly n a t u r e . In fact Panaetius' work stands in a l o n g line of Stoic treatises of t h e same title, 1 2 8 which followed t h e well-worn p r o c e d u r e of starting f r o m t h e d e f i n i t i o n s a n d a r g u m e n t s of the f o u n d e r s , explicating, r e f i n i n g a n d u p d a t i n g t h e m . H e n c e t h e r e f e r e n c e s in C i c e r o ' s work to Z e n o a n d C l e a n t h e s m o s t p r o b a b l y derive f r o m Panaetius' work. T h e m a i n witness in favour of the a s s u m p t i o n that Panaetius was a dualist is On Duties Book 1, 101 (Test. 122 Alesse): F o r t h e p o w e r a n d n a t u r e o f s o u l s is t w o f o l d : o n e p a r t is l o c a t e d in a p p e t i t e , w h i c h is horme in G r e e k , w h i c h d r a g s a m a n b a c k a n d f o r t h , t h e o t h e r ( p a r t ) (is l o c a t e d ) in r e a s o n , w h i c h t e a c h e s a n d e x p l a i n s what should be d o n e and what should be avoided.129

At f a c e value this s e e m s to b e an e x p o s i t i o n of p s y c h o l o g i c a l dualism. 1 3 0 C o n a t i o n is d e s c r i b e d as an irrational p a r t s e p a r a t e f r o m reason. H u m a n action involves b o t h a n d ideally they act in c o n c e r t , with r e a s o n b r i n g i n g o r d e r a n d g u i d a n c e to a p p e t i t e a n d a p p e t i t e l e n d i n g motive power to reason. T h e picture of reason as teaching a n d explaining t h e p r o p e r course of action to a p p e t i t e invites c o m p a r i s o n with Aristotle's a c c o u n t of their i n t e r a c t i o n in the final c h a p t e r (13) of t h e first b o o k of t h e Nicomachean Ethics. H e r e , it may b e recalled, the appetitive or desiring e l e m e n t , t h o u g h irrational, is said n o n e t h e less to s h a r e in r e a s o n i n s o f a r as it listens to a n d obeys r e a s o n ' s i n s t r u c t i o n s ( 1 1 0 2 b 2 9 - 1 1 0 3 a 3 ) . 1 3 1 But Z e n o a n d C h r y s i p p u s t o o 127

On this compository practice see supra, p. 51. Zeno, Cleanthes and Chrysippus all wrote an On Appropriate Action (Περί καθήκοντος, i.e. the term translated by Cicero as 'officium', 'duty'): see D.L. 7.4 (cf. 7.107 f.), 7.174; Sextus, M 11.194; cf. DPhA II 358, nr. 184, 411, nr. 15. 1211 Duplex est enim vis animorum atque natura: una pars in appetitu posita est, quae est horme Grace, quae hominem huic et illuc rapit, altera in ratione, quae docet and explanat quid faciendum fugiendum sit. 130 For what follows see also Van Straaten (1976) 104 ff., who argues that this passage does not permit us to ascribe to Panaetius a non-rational faculty distinct from reason. 131 In § 102 (= Panaetius Test. 123 Alesse) Cicero takes up the last sentence of the text of 101: appropriate action requires that appetite is obedient to reason, i.e. it 128

e x p l a i n e d the irrationality of the e m o t i o n a l response as d i s o b e d i e n c e to right reason (above, p. 97). Such r e s e m b l a n c e s d o n o t p r e c l u d e f u n d a m e n t a l differences, b u t they will have facilitated t h e syncretist t e n d e n c i e s of Cicero ( a n d of o t h e r s whose works h e may have consulted). T h u s we also find Stoic e l e m e n t s h e r e . In a d d i t i o n to hormê, t h e expression 'what s h o u l d be d o n e a n d w h a t a v o i d e d ' recalls t h e Stoic d e f i n i t i o n of practical wisdom (φρόνησις) . 1 3 2 Moreover, t h e r e f e r e n c e to a single power recalls t h e Stoic usage of the t e r m , viz. in t h e sense of the soul's ' s t r e n g t h ' . 1 3 3 In fact, Cicero's division of this p o w e r (vis) into two parts (partes) m a k e s a m u d d l e of the technical a n d p r e c i s e d i s t i n c t i o n s u s e d by a n c i e n t s o u r c e s to d e f i n e t h e respective p o s i t i o n s of Platonists, Aristotelians a n d Stoics o n t h e s t r u c t u r e of the soul. 1 3 4 So is this Cicero's formal p r e s e n t a t i o n of the position of Panaetius? T h e lack of explicit a t t r i b u t i o n s h o u l d m a k e us pause, especially in t h e light of C i c e r o ' s own a t t i t u d e to t h e traditional question of t h e p a r t s of t h e soul. T h i s a t t i t u d e is clearly illustrated by Tusculan Disputations 4.10-11. H e r e C i c e r o e x p r e s s e s a p r e d i l e c t i o n f o r t h e Platonic (and, h e says, P y t h a g o r e a n ) tripartition, which h e p r e s e n t s as a specification of t h e bipartite division in t e r m s of r a t i o n a l / n o n rational. H e t h e n c h e e r f u l l y p r o c e e d s to r e c o n c i l e this bipartitioncum-tripartition of t h e soul with a predilection f o r the Stoic monistic a c c o u n t of its affections, p r e s e n t i n g a version based o n Chrysippus' On Affections (ibid. 10-33; see ch. 6.3). I m p a t i e n t with what h e sees as m e r e technicalities, C i c e r o sees n o s e r i o u s d i s c r e p a n c y f r o m t h e perspective of his overriding m o r a l p u r p o s e s . From the e x p l a n a t i o n of t h e affections as c o n t r a r y a n d hostile to reason a c c o r d i n g to t h e tripartite s c h e m a h e passes o n smoothly to Z e n o ' s d e f i n i t i o n of affection as contrary to right reason a n d involving particular j u d g e m e n t s (ibid. 11). In sum, h e t e n d s to assimilate the two psychologies a n d to speak of the cause of affection in bipartite terms. If we want to look for a m o d e l or p r e c u r s o r f o r this type of assimilation of Platonism a n d

should do what reasons tells it to seek or avoid. 132 SVF 3.262, 268. 133 See supra, p. 38. 134 Cf. e.g. the scholastic schémas used by Galen (PHP6.2.5) and others, on which see supra, pp. 34 ff. Dyck ad loc. accepts the dualist reading of Panaetius' psychology but notes that 'Cicero would have been more accurate to speak of vires (= δυνάμεις) of the soul, as Panaetius doubtless did after Chrysippus; cf. SVF 2.220.23 ... '. Dyck's view that Panaetius must have agreed with Chrysippus in speaking of two powers (rational and non-rational) is remarkable.

Stoicism, it is n a t u r a l to t h i n k of A n t i o c h u s of Ascalon (see f u r t h e r below, p p . 294 ff.). On Duties I, 101 is c o m p a r a b l e with Tusculan Disputations 4.10-11 i n s o f a r as it shows t h e s a m e facility in c o m b i n i n g positions whose d i f f e r e n c e is central to G a l e n ' s a r g u m e n t . I n d e e d , Cicero a n d Galen a r e at t h e o p p o s i t e e n d s of o n e a n d t h e s a m e s p e c t r u m , with t h e f o r m e r playing down a n d t h e latter e x a g g e r a t i n g t h e d i f f e r e n c e s at issue. C i c e r o is i n t e r e s t e d in t h e g e n e r a l d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e rational a n d t h e irrational f r o m a m o r a l p o i n t of view. I take it that On Duties I, 101 is his own peculiar expression of this distinction. T h e passage s h o u l d n o t be used as a reliable a n d precise testimony f o r the position taken by Panaetius. Look at t h e way how h e explains t h e twofold division later o n in b o o k 1. H e r e we d o n o t h e a r a b o u t parts o r powers b u t a b o u t two kinds of m o t i o n : T h e m o t i o n s o f s o u l s are o f two kinds: o n e is that o f t h o u g h t , t h e o t h e r o f c o n a t i o n . N o w t h o u g h t is primarily c o n c e r n e d with s e e k i n g t h e truth w h e r e a s c o n a t i o n i n d u c e s to a c t i o n . W e s h o u l d take care t h e n that w e u s e t h o u g h t f o r t h e b e s t o f p u r p o s e s w h i l e we m a k e c o n a t i o n o b e d i e n t to reason (Off. I, 132 ~ Τ 121 A . ) . 1 3 5

H e r e again reason a n d c o n a t i o n are o p p o s e d — n o t as two parts b u t as two kinds of m o t i o n : t h e t e r m p r e f e r r e d by P o s i d o n i u s (see above, p. 204), a n d already p r o m i n e n t in the Chrysippean f r a g m e n t s (above, p. 97 f.). F u r t h e r , we again c o m e across the aspect of o b e d i e n c e or its o p p o s i t e , which also b e l o n g in C h r y s i p p u s ' e x p l a n a t i o n of w h a t it m e a n s to have t u r n e d away f r o m r e a s o n , as Z e n o h a d stated in his definition. 1 3 6 In sum, we s h o u l d n o t b e t o o quick to ascribe psychological dualism to P a n a e t i u s o n t h e basis of w h a t C i c e r o tells us. A closer look reveals that his evidence is less u n a m b i g u o u s than is o f t e n s u p p o s e d . T h e r e is C i c e r o ' s own dualist t e n d e n c y , which h e d o e s n o t c o n s i d e r 135 Motum autem animorum duptices sunt: alten eogitationis, alteri appetitus. Cogitatio in vero exquirendo maxime versatur, appetitus impellit ad agendum. Curandum est igitur ut eogitatione ad res quam optimas utamur, appetitum rationi oboedientem praebemus. 136 Cic. Off. I, 90 (Test. 124 A.) is associated by Alesse (1994) 196 f. with the metaphor of the horse disobedient to its rider—a metaphor which suits the dualist schema; cf. supra, p. 207. But what Panaetius is reported to have said is: just as unruly horses are turned over to tamers, so too incontinent and uncontrolled people should by listening to reason and philosophical doctrine come to see the frailty of human affairs and the vagaries of fortune: both the description of their plight and the therapy are thoroughly rationalist and monistic and hence conform to Chrysippus' position.

i n c o m p a t i b l e with i m p o r t a n t Stoic m o r a l doctrines, such as that conc e r n e d with t h e affections. A n d t h e e m p h a s i s h e r e , as elsewhere in Cicero's philosophical work, is o n morality, n o t o n t h e intricacies of scientific psychology. Van Straaten may have hit the nail o n the h e a d w h e n h e a r g u e d that Cicero merely wishes to m a k e t h e m o r a l p o i n t t h a t t h e a p p e t i t e s s h o u l d b e s u b o r d i n a t e d to r e a s o n , so t h a t t h e C i c e r o n i a n passages d o n o t p e r m i t us to draw i n f e r e n c e s as to t h e n a t u r e of ορμή a c c o r d i n g to P a n a e t i u s . 1 3 7 In fact, as we have seen, Chrysippus too spoke in t e r m of o b e d i e n c e to reason a n d its reverse in t h e same c o n n e c t i o n . But fortunately Cicero is n o t o u r only source in this matter. Nemesius, having d e s c r i b e d t h e early Stoic division—attested f o r Chrysippus—of the soul i n t o eight parts, i.e. t h e r e g e n t part a n d the rays of psychic p n e u m a e x t e n d i n g f r o m it, goes o n to m e n t i o n two c h a n g e s p r o p o s e d by Panaetius: t h e p h o n e t i c p a r t s h o u l d b e subs u m e d ' u n d e r m o v e m e n t a c c o r d i n g to c o n a t i o n ' (τής καθ' όρμήν κ ι ν ή σ ε ω ς ) ; a n d t h e r e p r o d u c t i v e p a r t b e l o n g s n o t to t h e soul b u t to physis, i.e. t h e physical p n e u m a ('vegetative p n e u m a ' ) responsible for d i g e s t i o n a n d g r o w t h . 1 3 8 T h i s leaves six p a r t s of t h e o r i g i n a l schema. 1 3 9 T h e m o v e m e n t of c o n a t i o n is an action of the r e g e n t part, o r intellect. T h e close c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n speech o n t h e o n e h a n d a n d t h e intellect as t h e s o u r c e of m e a n i n g o n t h e o t h e r may have motivated Panaetius. This c o n n e c t i o n was stressed by Zeno, Chrysippus a n d Diogenes of Babylon in their a r g u m e n t which linked the seat of the intellect to t h e source of s p e e c h , viz. t h e h e a r t (see PHP 2.5). His a d j u s t m e n t is m o r e o v e r c o n g e n i a l to advances m a d e in c o n t e m porary medical science, which e x p l a i n e d t h e m e c h a n i s m of speech by r e f e r e n c e to t h e n e r v o u s system r a t h e r t h a n t h e transmission of i m p r i n t s in t h e pneuma.140 But essentially t h e Stoic f r a m e w o r k has r e m a i n e d intact. Given t h e relation b e t w e e n h u m a n rational s p e e c h a n d t h e intellect it is difficult to follow Alesse w h o sees in t h e refere n c e to t h e m o v e m e n t of c o n a t i o n h e r e a n o t h e r witness to a n o n rational psychic f u n c t i o n . N o r d o e s t h e relegation of r e p r o d u c t i o n to

137

Van Straaten (1946) 106 f. Similarly Voelke (1973) 116, w h o acknowledges t h e lack of clear evidence b u t believes that Panaetius must have b e e n a dualist all t h e same. 138 p o r ^ow t h e Stoics conceive of t h e relation b e t w e e n soul (ψυχή) a n d n a t u r e (φύσις) in individual animals see T i e l e m a n (1996a) 98 f. 139 Panaetius is also credited with six parts by Tert. De an. 14 (= Panaetius Τ 128 Α.), discussed supra, pp. 66 ff. 140

Cf. T i e l e m a n (1996a) 191, 51 ff.

n a t u r e ( φ ύ σ ι ς ) have a n y t h i n g to d o with n o n - r a t i o n a l f u n c t i o n s typical of h u m a n s a n d associated with affection. 1 4 1 N e m e s i u s (or his source) is clearly following t h e tack of n o t i n g a dissident within the Stoic c a m p , a n d all h e c o m e s u p with a r e these fairly m i n o r adjustments. If t h e r e was a r e t u r n to t h e Platonist a n d Aristotelian dualistic s c h e m a , this is a b o u t t h e m o s t u n c l e a r way of r e p o r t i n g it. Panaetius' a d j u s t m e n t of the i n h e r i t e d s c h e m a was of quite a d i f f e r e n t o r d e r . In sum, t h e evidence relating to P a n a e t i u s d o e s n o t tell in favour of a dualistic r e a d i n g . O n t h e c o n t r a r y , t h e r e a r e g o o d r e a s o n s to a s s u m e that h e r e m a i n e d within t h e C h r y s i p p e a n f r a m e w o r k . W h a t we k n o w a b o u t D i o g e n e s a n d P a n a e t i u s t h e r e f o r e p r o v i d e s n o c o r r o b o r a t i o n f o r t h e a s s u m p t i o n that P o s i d o n i u s a b a n d o n e d t h e unitary m o d e l of t h e m i n d of the f o u n d i n g f a t h e r s of their school.

7. Posidonius and

Chrysippus'Aporiai

Like Chrysippus, P o s i d o n i u s took his starting p o i n t f r o m t h e Zenon i a n d e f i n i t i o n of a f f e c t i o n as an excessive i m p u l s e (όρμή πλεονάζουσα, 4.3.4). 1 4 2 Given this definition, h e pressed t h e question what is t h e cause of t h e excess c o n c e r n e d . It is w o r t h q u o t i n g t h e relevant passage: P o s i d o n i u s [ . . . ] d o e s n o t r e g a r d t h e a f f e c t i o n s as j u d g e m e n t s o r as s u p e r v e n i n g o n j u d g e m e n t [i.e. t h e views a s c r i b e d by G a l e n t o C h r y s i p p u s a n d Z e n o r e s p e c t i v e l y ] b u t h e b e l i e v e s t h a t t h e y c o m e a b o u t by the spirited a n d appetitive power, thus following the ancient account in every r e s p e c t . A n d o n n o f e w o c c a s s i o n s in his t r e a t i s e On Affections h e asks C h r y s i p p u s w h a t is t h e c a u s e o f t h e e x c e s s i v e c o n a t i o n . F o r r e a s o n c o u l d n o t e x c e e d ( π λ ε ο ν α ζ ε ί ν ) its o w n r e a l i t i e s a n d m e a s u r e s 141 Pace Alesse (1994) 202 ff. That this modification should not be taken as evidence for his supposed dualism has been argued by Van Straaten (1976) 95 ff., followed by Gourinat (1996) 26. 142 The agreement between the Chrysippus and Posidonius on this point is rightly stressed by Kidd (1971) 204. Cf. PHP 5.2.2: T h a t affection is an unnatural and irrational motion of the soul is acknowledged not only by the ancients but also by Chrysippus.' This statement presumably goes back to Posidonius whose views are discussed in what immediately follows (ibid. 3 ff. = F 163 E.-K). The definition in question is the standard Stoic one, although Galen makes it appear as though Chrysippus took it over from the ancients, i.e. most notably Plato; see SVF 3.377, 378. That it is Zenonian may be inferred from the fragments from Chrysippus' exegesis of this definition, 4.2.10 ff. (SVF3.462). The statement at 5.2.2 thus reflects Posidonius' concern with laying bare a continuous tradition from the ancients—notably Plato—to the founders of the Stoa and up to himself. It moreover confirms his particular interest in the soul's motive aspect, i.e. what the Stoics called conation (όρμή).

( π ρ ά γ μ α τ α τε καί μ έ τ ρ α ) . T h u s it is e v i d e n t t h a t s o m e o t h e r i r r a t i o n a l p o w e r c a u s e s c o n a t i o n t o e x c e e d t h e m e a s u r e s s e t by c h o i c e is n o n r a t i o n a l , viz. t h e w e i g h t of t h e b o d y (PHP 4.3.3-5, P o s i d . Frs. 157, 3 4 part).143

T h e expression ' s o m e o t h e r irrational p o w e r ' in the p a r t of this q u o t a t i o n which is based on Posidonius' treatise is o d d a f t e r the c o n f i d e n t attribution of the Platonic non-rational powers to Posidonius ( t h o u g h n o t e that Galen h e r e too speaks of the spirited a n d appetitive power in the singular). 144 It m i g h t be t h o u g h t that it reflects a passage where Posidonius had i n f e r r e d the n e e d to postulate an irrational power, b u t had n o t yet revealed this as the power, or powers, postulated by Plato. But if so, why did n o t Galen turn to o n e of the passages where Posidonius was m o r e explicit about his prefere n c e for the Platonic tripartition? T h e reason seems to be that there simply was n o such passage. W h e r e Posidonius was c o n c e r n e d with the 'ancient account' (i.e. most notably Plato), h e did n o t 'follow it in every respect' b u t merely looked for anticipations of the official Stoic doctrine. Remarkably e n o u g h , the only thing said h e r e to explain the power Galen wanted to find is that it resembles the weight of the body in the act of r u n n i n g . But this is an e l e m e n t f r o m the image of the r u n n e r s used by Chrysippus precisely to illustrate the n o t i o n of excess in Zeno's definition ( P H P 4.2.14-18 ~ SVF3.462). It is ill-suited to serve as an analogy f o r a psychic power in the Platonic-cumAristotelian sense, i.e. as existing next to a n d distinct f r o m o t h e r such powers. In fact, Chrysippus used his analogy to illustrate the opposite idea, viz. that the soul is a unity a n d so b e c o m e s wholly disturbed a n d u n c o n t r o l l a b l e when in a state of affection. 1 4 5 T h e r u n n e r s ' bodies stand for the irrational aspect involved. As such they are suggestive of

143

Fr. 34 extends from the immediately preceding context of the quoted passage to a somewhat arbitrarily choosen point in the following discussion, i.e. 4.3.110. Galen uses Posidonius' name at § 8 but the very phrasing here (with the future tense) indicates that he is not rendering what Posidonius actually said but continuing his polemic in his spirit ('Posidonius will again ask what is the cause of the excess .. '). The point at issue is Chrysippus' alleged contradiction that both he called the affections judgements and said they occur 'without judgement'. But, as I have shown, the latter expression is an item of common parlance explained by Chrysipus in a different context, see supra, pp. 98 ff. Seen in this light, the section following the passage quoted in the text (§ 6-9) should not be part of any reconstruction of what Posidonius actually said. On Edelstein-Kidd's editorial principles, see pp. XV ff. of their edition. 144 Elsewhere however Galen does maintain that Posidonius distinguished between, and accepted, Plato's three parts, see supra, p. 34, 204. 145 See supra, pp. 101 ff.

the soul's own corporeality. So I d o u b t whether the expression 'some irrational power' is actually derived f r o m Posidonius at all. After all, we are dealing n o t with a verbatim quotation but with an indirect r e n d e r i n g in Galenic terms. Nonetheless, the question of the cause of the excessive movement seems to reflect an authentic and well-known interest of Posidonius (cf. Τ 85). According to Galen, Chrysippus was really at a loss to explain the cause of affection: on occasion he a d m i t t e d this b u t bypassed most of the awkward questions which Posidonius had the courage to raise. It was these questions which, Galen claims, pointed to the o n e correct answer, viz. Platonic-style powers. We may be sceptical a b o u t Galen's claim that Posidonius espoused the Platonic tripartition warts a n d all. But he c a n n o t have entirely m a d e u p this part of his story. Posidonius raised problems (άπορίαι) 1 4 6 concerning p h e n o m e n a that had n o t been sufficiently explained by Chrysippus. Most of the relevant passages are to be f o u n d in the large section PHP 4.5.24-46, p r i n t e d whole by Edelstein-Kidd as f r a g m e n t 164. H e r e we do find verbatim fragments f r o m Posidonius, together with their i m m e d i a t e Galenic context. We may contrast the e x t e n d e d stretches of Galenic text that have also f o u n d their way into the Edelstein-Kidd collection on account of their invocation of Posidonius' name, but whose relation to the original Posidonian exposition is much thinner. 1 4 7 T h e first point at issue is the addition o f ' g r e a t ' to 'good' and 'evil' in the definition, advanced by Chrysippus (§ 26, 11.18-19), of psychic infirmity (άρρώστημα) as the belief that something (money, women) is a great good or evil. T h e addition was necessary for Chrysippus in o r d e r to explain the obsessive behaviour typically designated by such expressions as madness a n d love (e.g. ' w o m e n - m a d ' a n d 'love of m o n e y ' ) . In the b a c k g r o u n d looms Chrysippus' twofold analysis of the cognitive structure of affection. If o n e considers women to be not a good, but the greatest good in the world (judgement-type I), o n e considers it appropriate to be moved (κινεΐσθαι, i.e. to act or behave) passionately when they a p p e a r a n d o n e refuses to accept any reason (or a r g u m e n t , λόγον) for behaving otherwise (judgment-type II). 148

146 147

PHP4.5.26,

41, 46 (Fr. 164, e.g. 11. 12, 85, 108).

This holds good for parts of the texts printed as fragments 31 and 34, see supra, p. 272 and n. 143. 148 See § 27, 11.22-25, which clearly constitutes the Chrysippean premise on which Posidonius bases his aporia concerning the wise and those making progress.

In o t h e r words, C h r y s i p p u s i n t r o d u c e d a q u a n t i t a t i v e f a c t o r to explain t h e step f r o m j u d g e m e n t type I to that of type II: it is t h e ' m a g n i t u d e ' of t h e a p p a r e n t g o o d which is said to ' m o v e ' o r 'stir' (κινεί) this s e c o n d j u d g e m e n t , i.e. which causes o n e to m a k e it. In a d d i t i o n , o n e s h o u l d n o t e b o t h t h e role of a p p e a r a n c e ( φ α ί ν ε σ θ α ι ) 1 4 9 a n d t h e idea of m o v i n g a n d b e i n g moved 1 5 0 h e r e . F r o m t h e passive p o i n t of view it is also e x p r e s s e d by t h e verb 'to be a f f e c t e d ' , i.e. πάσχειν. T h a t t h e m i n d ' s πάθος or affection is described as something o n e u n d e r g o e s is a p o i n t to b e n o t e d . In o t h e r words, the sense o f ' a f f e c t i o n ' should n o t be lost sight of. (See also above, pp. 211 ff., below p. 281.) This a c c o u n t is based o n t h e v e r b a t i m f r a g m e n t f r o m Posidonius o f f e r e d by Galen at PHP 4.5.26-28. It f o r m s t h e basis of t h e άπορία raised by Posidonius a n d d o e s n o t seem to c o n t a i n any serious distortions of C h r y s i p p u s ' i n t e n t i o n . In t h e s a m e f r a g m e n t P o s i d o n i u s discusses certain p r o b l e m s a t t a c h e d to t h e n o t i o n of t h e Sage. H e a r g u e s t h a t if C h r y s i p p u s is right, t h e n Sages w h o m u s t c o n s i d e r themselves in t h e p r e s e n c e of t h e greatest g o o d (viz. their own virtuous soul) will also react emotionally, i.e. they will take excessive delight in their situation. Likewise those m a k i n g progress would realize that they are in the p r e s e n c e of t h e greatest evil (their still i m p e r f e c t soul) a n d r e s p o n d by falling i n t o excessive grief. T h a t is to say, they would r e g a r d i n n e r sinkings as an a p p r o p r i a t e r e a c t i o n to t h e i r situation. Obviously, this would r e m o v e t h e m still f u r t h e r f r o m b e i n g a Sage. But this, P o s i d o n i u s n o t e s , is n o t o b s e r v e d to h a p p e n . But is this really a devastating p o i n t scored against Chrysippus? Did Chrysippus have an answer to these cases or did h e ignore them? Historians have tried to i n f e r C h r y s i p p u s ' answer, t h o u g h mostly o n t h e basis of C i c e r o ' s a c c o u n t in t h e Tusculan Disputations, w h e r e we c o m e across the s a m e απορία c o n c e r n e d with t h e p e r s o n m a k i n g progress w i t h o u t r e f e r e n c e to Posidonius. 1 5 1 White a n d Sorabji have a r g u e d that t h e novice, t h o u g h h e is right as to t h e first j u d g e m e n t , would be w r o n g to a d d t h e s e c o n d j u d g e m e n t , viz. that it is a p p r o priate to r e s p o n d with a sinking. 1 5 2 Even the novice, Sorabji adds, can r e c o g n i z e a sinking as s o m e t h i n g it would ideally b e b e t t e r n o t to

149

ibid.. 1..23 φαινομένων; cf. 1.24.

150

11.21,25 Cic. Tusc. 3.61; 3.68; 3.70; 3.77-78; 4.61. See White (1995) 219-46; Sorabji (2000) 32f.

151 152

have. 1 5 3 I n d e e d , o n e of t h e m a i n r e a s o n s Sorabji believes why Chrysippus i n t r o d u c e d t h e s e c o n d type of j u d g e m e n t was that it e n a b l e d h i m to h e l p t h e distressed. It is t r u e that Chrysippus believed that o n e can c o n v i n c e a p e r s o n in a state of a f f e c t i o n t h a t his r e a c t i o n is i n a p p r o p i a t e even while h e c o n t i n u e s to e n t e r t a i n a w r o n g o p i n i o n a b o u t the moral value of what has befallen h i m or h e r (see above, pp. 166 ff.). T h u s t h e distinction between the two types of j u d g e m e n t has t h e r a p e u t i c r e l e v a n c e . But this still d o e s n o t a n s w e r t h e p o i n t a d v a n c e d by Posidonius. C i c e r o d o e s n o t i n d i c a t e h o w C h r y s i p p u s m e t this p r o b l e m n o r d o e s h e p r e s e n t a n a n s w e r o n t h e Stoic's b e h a l f . Is t h e r e any i n f o r m a t i o n to be g l e a n e d f r o m t h e Posidonian material preserved by Galen? At PHP 4.5.29-33 h e goes o n to q u o t e the text that followed in P o s i d o n i u s . T h e discussion f o c u s e s o n t h e d e g r e e of e m o t i o n a l b e h a v i o u r involved. Psychic infirmity o r disease is t r a n s l a t e d i n t o excessive b e h a v i o u r in respect of o n e particular t h i n g that is s u p p o s e d to b e a great g o o d or evil. In o t h e r words, t h e excessive d e g r e e of e m o t i o n a l b e h a v i o u r c o r r e s p o n d s to t h e m a g n i t u d e of t h e s u p p o s e d g o o d or evil. (Apparently such b e h a v i o u r is j u d g e d excessive in comparison with o t h e r affections of t h e same p e r s o n o r t h e same kind of a f f e c t i o n by others.) So t h e p r o b l e m raised by P o s i d o n i u s is that o n C h r y s i p p e a n p r e m i s e s t h e p r o g r e s s i n g p e r s o n would fall n o t merely i n t o distress b u t immoderate distress (ibid. 28). N e x t h e r e c o r d s a riposte by a plurality of a n o n y m o u s Stoics w h o r e p r e s e n t the Chrysipp e a n position: in a d d i t i o n to t h e m a g n i t u d e of what a p p e a r s (φαινομένων), weakness ( α σ θ έ ν ε ι α ) of t h e soul is also to b l a m e (ibid. 29). T h i s explains why the Sage is f r e e f r o m affections a l t o g e t h e r whereas t h o s e with a 'large d e g r e e of weakness' a r e not. T h o u g h t h e text of this last p o i n t a b o u t all non-Sages is u n c e r t a i n , t h e d e f e n s e m u s t a m o u n t to saying that a m o n g t h e m t h e r e exist d e g r e e s of weakness. In this case those s u f f e r i n g f r o m an infirmity (άρρώστημα) are at o n e e x t r e m e of t h e scale w h e r e t h e affective r e s p o n s e is excessive. T h o u g h it is n o t m a d e explicit by Posidonius, this seems to imply that t h o s e w h o have m a d e p r o g r e s s f i n d themselves in a section of t h e scale w h e r e t h e e m o t i o n a l r e s p o n s e , t h o u g h p e r h a p s inevitable, is m o r e m o d e r a t e . I take it that this would also m e a n that these p e r s o n s have a c o r r e s p o n d i n g l y lesser estimate of t h e m a g n i t u d e of the g o o d or evil that h a p p e n s to t h e m .

153

Sorabji (2000) 33.

For Posidonius, however, the Chrysippeans d o d g e the question at issue: 'For all a g r e e that p e o p l e fall into a f f e c t i o n s b e c a u s e of an illness of the soul; b u t the question asked is how the soul has b e e n m o v e d a n d w h a t m o t i o n it causes, b u t this is n o t i n d i c a t e d ( P H P 4.5.30).' This a m o u n t s to saying that the appeal to varying degrees of weakness is unsatisfactory a n d u n i n f o r m a t i v e . But it does seem to be what Chrysippus said, or would have said. Posidonius n e x t r e j o i n d e r is beside the point: ' T o s u p p o s e t h a t a p e r s o n h a s b e e n m o v e d in this way i n a c c o r d a n c e with his e s t i m a t e of e v e n t s , so t h a t t h e r e j e c t i o n of r e a s o n i n d i c a t e s a g r e a t a f f e c t i o n , is t o s u p p o s e w r o n g l y ; f o r this also h a p p e n s t h r o u g h a m o d e r a t e a n d small o n e ' ( 3 2 ) .

But Chrysippus h a d in m i n d only those who suffer f r o m an infirmity ( ά ρ ρ ώ σ τ η μ α ) in its technical sense, which involves the j u d g e m e n t that a particular thing is a great g o o d or evil. In r e g a r d to t h e Sage, the C h r y s i p p e a n riposte would b e even simpler: an affection is a wrong belief a b o u t t h e value of indifférents, whereas the Sage is right to c o n s i d e r himself in the p r e s e n c e of the greatest g o o d , viz. his own perfect soul. What h e feels are called εύπαθείαι ( ' g o o d feelings') that are designed as a n a l o g o u s to but crucially d i f f e r e n t f r o m the παθή. In what follows (§ 33-36) P o s i d o n i u s posits a situation w h e r e p e o p l e who have t h e same weakness a n d receive a similar presentation r e s p o n d differently: the o n e t u r n s e m o t i o n a l (έν παθεΐ γίγνεται), whereas the other does not. Further the same person responds d i f f e r e n t l y o n d i f f e r e n t occasions (ibid. 33). A p p a r e n t l y h e r e t o o P o s i d o n i u s s u p p o s e s t h a t t h e d e g r e e of weakness of this p e r s o n r e m a i n s constant. F u r t h e r h e notes the a p p a r e n t influence of habituation: o n e is seized m o r e easily by affection w h e n c o n f r o n t e d by an u n a c c u s t o m e d thing . A C h r y s i p p e a n m i g h t r e s p o n d by d e n y i n g that these d i f f e r e n c e could o c c u r if the d e g r e e of weakness is exactly t h e same. In o t h e r words, n o two persons are exactly alike in terms of psychic weakness. T h e r e is m o r e o v e r n o n e e d to assume the psychic weakness in individuals r e m a i n s at a constant level. 154 F u r t h e r , a soul m o r e h a b i t u a t e d to situations w h e r e t h e r e is a g r e a t e r risk of r e s p o n d i n g emotionally

154 This becomes even more obvious in the light of the physical processes involved in the organism. For their influence on the mental and moral condition of humans see supra, pp. 162 ff.

may c o u n t as stronger. 1 5 5 This time, however, we h e a r n o t h i n g a b o u t such a response. Posidonius p r o c e e d s to a H o m e r i c e x a m p l e illustrating the differe n c e b e t w e e n p e o p l e of e q u a l weakness n o t in t h e way a f f e c t i o n strikes t h e m b u t in t h e way a f f e c t i o n abates. Because of a r o u t all G r e e k h e r o e s h a d b e e n struck by ' u n s p e a k a b l e g r i e f (II. ix, 3,9). But A g a m e m n o n , w h e n this a f f e c t i o n a b a t e d , w e n t to see N e s t o r f o r advice (x. 17-20). Still, w h e n h e addresses t h e old m a n , h e speaks of his f e a r a n d its physical effects (his h e a r t leaps, his limbs t r e m b l e , x.91-95). Posidonius a p p e a r s to indicate that Chrysippus' explanation of this passage is unsatisfactory so these q u o t a t i o n s f o r m e d part of the latter's discussion, i.e. o n the irrational a n d o f t e n contradictory behaviour typical of affections in b o o k 2 of his On Affections. Posidonius infers: If h e is p r e s e n t t a k i n g c o u n s e l w h i l e his h e a r t is t h u s s h a k i n g w i t h f e a r , t h e n p e o p l e in e m o t i o n a l [ o r : a f f e c t i v e ] states w h o d o n o t t h i n k it is in a c c o r d w i t h t h e i r e s t i m a t e of w h a t h a s h a p p e n e d t o a c c e p t n o r e a s o n i n g a r e b e i n g m o v e d affectively (PHP4.5.40).

A l t h o u g h the H o m e r i c passage stresses t h e physical effects a t t e n d a n t u p o n fear, 1 5 6 Nestor also says ' / f e a r ' (x.18)—so Posidonius is probably c o r r e c t in his analysis of what h a p p e n s h e r e a c c o r d i n g to t h e C h r y s i p p e a n analysis, m o s t notably the distinction between t h e two types of j u d g e m e n t . A g a m e m n o n , t h e n , still m a k e s j u d g m e n t - t y p e o n e : h e fears, that is to say h e considers himself in the proximity of a g r e a t evil, viz. a n o t h e r setback suffered by t h e Greek army. But what a b o u t t h e s e c o n d j u d g e m e n t ? In his a c c o u n t of t h e C h r y s i p p e a n position (see above, p. 252), Posidonius h a d designated the rejection of r e a s o n as a distinctive f e a t u r e of j u d g e m e n t - t y p e II. T h e o t h e r distinctive f e a t u r e was that of b e i n g moved affectively, or e m o t i o n a l behaviour. In grief this is m o r e internal; in fear which is at issue h e r e this will b e expressed in o u t w a r d action as well. Posidonius r e g a r d s t h e physical effects d e s c r i b e d by A g a m e m n o n as indicative of his ' b e i n g m o v e d e m o t i o n a l l y (or affectively)'. Is this c o r r e c t f r o m a C h r y s i p p e a n p o i n t of vi'.-w? O t h e r sources are keen to d i f f e r e n t i a t e affective, o r e m o t i o n a l , m o v e m e n t s b o t h f r o m t h e j u d g e m e n t s a n d

155

Remarkably enough Posidonius seems to indicate so himself according to § 34: the more vicious (or weaker) differ from the more experienced ones by being more quickly seized by their affections. 156 These are differentiated by the Stoic from the affecdon itself (i.e. the judgement) so need not by themselves imply the full-fledged affection, see infra, p. 282 ff.

f r o m the bodily effects. 1 5 7 At any rate Posidonius' point is clear: the two distinctive features of judgement-type II d o not a p p e a r in conj u n c t i o n in A g a m e m n o n ' s case: on the o n e h a n d he is receptive to counselling but on the other he is still 'emotionally moved'. In other words, Chrysippus' analysis would seem to be too crude to cover cases like this. In the latter's d e f e n s e it might be c o u n t e r e d that it is d o u b t f u l whether he would characterize A g a m e m n o n ' s state as still 'being emotionally moved'. In this case h e would have a b a n d o n e d j u d g e m e n t type II. His soul is no longer being emotionally moved—it is only his body that suffers f r o m the after-effects. A g a m e m n o n ' s behaviour indicates that he is n o longer moved by grief or fear. T h e fear-related physical effects suffered by A g a m e m n o n are in fact what are technically called 'first movements' 1 5 8 caused by mental appearances of past events. But did Posidonius read his Chrysippus in this way? And did he find this solution satisfactory? H e r e t u r n e d to the point raised at the outset of this discussion of A g a m e m o n ' s behaviour: why do people of equal mental strength react so differently? But why, one may well ask, d o we need to suppose that Agamemon was just as weak as the other heroes? His behaviour befitted the c o m m a n d e r of the army and is explicable by reference to his habituation in this capacity. Besides, Chrysippus had raised the issue of the soul's weakness in connection with the n a t u r e of infirmity, which is marked by an intensified propensity to a particular affection in some people. T h e soul of these p e o p l e , t h e n , is assumed to be weaker. However, the affections (distress, fear) of A g a m e m n o n and the o t h e r heroes do not seem to result f r o m psychic infirmity in this technical sense. Chrysippus may have discussed the H o m e r i c passages to illustrate a different point, viz. the contradictory elements in emotional behaviour, for instance when affection abates a n d reason gradually gains g r o u n d again. 1 5 9 Nonetheless, Posidonius says: ' H e [i.e. probably Chrysippus] has not given the cause of the affection in its entirety'. Chrysippus, then, left something unexplained. But is this serious e n o u g h to a b a n d o n the monistic model and go over to Platos? Nothing in these passages suggests so—in accordance with o u r assumption t h a t the c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n Posidonius and 157

See the Posidonian classification presented by ps. Plutarch, Whether Distress and Desire Belong to the Soul or Body, quoted infra, p. 278 ff. 158 On this concepts see infra, pp. 282 ff. 159 On this process see also supra, p. 183.

Plato argued by Galen always goes back to, and d e p e n d s on, Posidonius' dialectical overview of his predecessors. In h a r p i n g on the account of the cause Posidonius rode his hobby horse. H e may have f o u n d the Chrysippean a p p e a l to m e n t a l strength insufficiently specific. But would his queries be m e t by appealing to non-rational powers in the soul? T h e answer formulated in terms of powers would have been liable to the same criticism. Would it make things better to submit that A g a m e m n o n ' s spirited power was better (one almost says stronger) than that of the o t h e r heroes? Some forms of behaviour, even typical ways, are best left to individual make-up. If affections are irrational, o n e should not expect a full rationalization. Chrysippus a p p e a r s to have u n d e r s t o o d this better than both Posidonius a n d Galen. T h a t Posidonius' prime concern was m o r e with raising interesting problems than with d e n o u n c i n g Chrysippus also follows from the last example he presents of irrational behaviour (ibid. 42-43. Chrysippus may have been his point of reference h e r e as well, if the latter quoted and discussed the following line f r o m comedy (anonymous): L e t m e p e r i s h : t h i s is n o w b e n e f i c i a l to m e (ibid. 43, fr. 217, III, p . 4 5 0 Kock).

H e r e Posidonius sees a contradiction similar to that in the case of A g a m e m n o n . T h e affection in question is desire. T h e c h a r a c t e r speaking h e r e wishes to pursue the object of his or her desire a n d is in no state to listen to reason. Thus, the speaker clearly adopts j u d g e m e n t of type II. H e or she also considers the object a benefit, i.e. a good or even a great good—which involves judgement-type I. At the same time, however, the first part of the line allows for the possibility that h e or she is drawn to an unmitigated evil, or at least (from a Stoic point of view) something n o t to be preferred (technically death counts as an indifferent to be avoided u n d e r normal circumstances). T h u s the contradiction concerns an ambivalence at the level of valueassessment, i.e. the first j u d g e m e n t . Despite this ambivalence the second j u d g e m e n t follows: the object is pursued come what may. In consequence, Posidonius remarks, the cause cannot lie in j u d g e m e n t type I. T h e r e is no criticism of Chrysippus here. T h e question simply r e m a i n s o p e n (44). Galen has n o answer either. But n e i t h e r d o others, distinguished Stoics a m o n g them (45). Posidonius insisted on knowing the cause. This recurrent feature is inflated by Galen into a f u n d a m e n t a l attack on Chrysippus. That, on

t h e c o n t r a r y , P o s i d o n i u s r e m a i n e d within t h e C h r y s i p p e a n f r a m e work is b o r n e o u t f u r t h e r by a l o n g text p r i n t e d as F 165 E.-K, viz. PHP 4.7.1-45. A l t h o u g h we are d e a l i n g with a reasonably c o h e r e n t p i e c e of text, large p a r t s can best b e c h a r a c t e r i z e d as a G a l e n i c discussion based o n Posidonian ideas. H e r e too we find strong terms u s e d to c h a r a c t e r i z e P o s i d o n i u s ' r e s p o n s e to Chrysippus (e.g. 'refutes', 4.7.2, 'contradicts doubly', ibid. 6) b u t little in the way of direct e v i d e n c e s u p p o r t i n g t h e s e t e r m s . A few p r o b l e m s a r e r a i s e d . Posidonius took his starting-point f r o m Z e n o ' s definitions, a n d in this c o n t e x t criticized Chrysippus' explication in the On Affections. Z e n o h a d d e f i n e d distress as 'a f r e s h o p i n i o n t h a t evil is p r e s e n t ' a n d Chrysippus h a d explained t h e adjective ' f r e s h ' (πρόσφατος) as ' r e c e n t in time'. H e r e Posidonius h a d e x p e c t e d learn why it is that w h e n t h e o p i n i o n is fresh, it contracts the soul a n d p r o d u c e s evil (ibid. 3-5). But we d o n o t h e a r what e x p l a n a t i o n h e favours—only that h e r e c o m m e n d e d to 'dwell in a d v a n c e ' ( π ρ ο ε ν δ η μ ε ί ν ) , i.e. to i m a g i n e in advance what m i g h t h a p p e n a n d b r i n g a b o u t a g r a d u a l h a b i t u a t i o n to it, as to s o m e t h i n g that h a d h a p p e n e d b e f o r e (ibid. 8). But this is n o cause b u t a m e a n s of p r e v e n t i o n b e l o n g i n g to t h e r e p e r t o i r e of therapy (cf. below pp. 311 ff.). Chrysippus discusses p r o b l e m a t i c types of affectional b e h a v i o u r in a l o n g verbatim f r a g m e n t f r o m b o o k 2 of his On Affections (ibid. 12-17 ~ SVF3.466), 1 6 0 which has b e e n lifted whole by Galen f r o m its Posid o n i a n c o n t e x t . F r o m this f r a g m e n t it is clear that Chrysippus d o e s explain why affections such as distress a b a t e over time. H e refers to the a b a n d o n m e n t of t h e c o n a t i o n (which is also a j u d g e m e n t of type II) 1 6 1 towards t h e c o n t r a c t i o n . A n d h e even p r o c e e d s to explain why it is a b a n d o n e d : t h r e e f u r t h e r q u o t a t i o n s f r o m Chrysippus (ibid, 1033 ~ SVF 3 . 4 6 7 ) 1 6 2 d e m o n s t r a t e t h a t h e s o u g h t a n a n s w e r by a p p r o a c h i n g distress in t e r m s of l o n g i n g a n d satiety—an idea h e illustrates with H o m e r i c passages (see above, p p . 130 ff.). So it is simply u n f a i r to c h a r g e Chrysippus with saying n o t h i n g or b e i n g at a loss a b o u t t h e causes—which is all t h e m o r e u n j u s t i f i e d since h e m a d e t h e discovery of t h e causes of affection t h e unifying perspective in b o t h theory a n d t h e r a p y (ibid. 21). Of course Chrysipp u s was n o t that sloppy. T r u e , his explication of Z e n o ' s definition in 160 161

On this fragment see further supra, p. 123. On conation as judgement, see Plut. Stoic. Rep 1037F (SVF3.175) and supra,

p. 276. 162

On this fragment see further supra, p. 130

b o o k 1 did n o t i n c l u d e a causal analysis. H e m e r e l y e x p l a i n e d t h e t e r m ' f r e s h ' , a m o n g others. But h e did address causal factors in b o o k 2, i n t r o d u c i n g a new analysis of his own. H e only d e s i g n a t e d as m o r e p r o b l e m a t i c certain less f r e q u e n t p h e n o m e n a such as p e o p l e weeping, o r ceasing to weep, against t h e i r will. H e m a d e a similar p o i n t a b o u t l a u g h t e r (ibid. 17-18). H e r e t h e twofold s c h e m a of j u d g e m e n t types is insufficient. Chrysippus a p p e a l s to ' a n o t h e r diseased c o n d i tion ( δ ι ά θ ε σ ι ς ) 1 6 3 of s o m e sort which c o m e s in a d d i t i o n a n d is n o t easily r e a s o n e d o u t ' a n d ' u n d e r l y i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s c r e a t i n g u n l i k e p r e s e n t a t i o n s ' (ibid.). Both expressions p o i n t , it seems, to t h e c o r p o real n a t u r e of t h e soul. G a l e n f o r his p a r t blows this u p i n t o an admission of c o m p l e t e i g n o r a n c e of t h e 'causes', t h e 'causes of such t h i n g s ' (ibid. 19) a n d , a little later o n , simply ' t h e c a u s e ' (i.e. of a f f e c t i o n tout court, ibid. 20). A r e l a t e d e x a m p l e of t h e w o r k i n g of Galenic polemics is his t r e a t m e n t of the t e r m 'difficult to reason o u t ' said by C h r y s i p p u s of t h e disposition involving certain p h e n o m e n a such as w e e p i n g against o u r will which seem to lie outside t h e scope of t h e e x p l a n a t i o n in t e r m s of two types of j u d g e m e n t . First h e applies this to t h e a b a t e m e n t of affection in time (ibid. 18), a l t h o u g h C h r y s i p p u s c o n s i d e r s this e x p l i c a b l e in t e r m s of t h e two types of j u d g e m e n t . A little later o n (ibid. 34) h e goes a step f u r t h e r , saying t h a t C h r y s i p p u s in t h e q u o t e d passage c o n s i d e r s t h e cessation of affections 'incapable of b e i n g r e a s o n e d o u t ' , substituting t h e privative p r e f i x a - f o r σ υ ν - A n d h e r e p e a t s this m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o n e m o r e time (ibid. 38). This is very naughty. T h e r e is o n e s n i p p e t of text which may c o u n t as a testimony a b o u t w h a t P o s i d o n i u s actually said o n t h e p r o b l e m raised in c o n n e c t i o n with his twofold cognitive analysis, viz. t h e case of p e o p l e w e e p i n g or ceasing to w e e p against their will: P o s i d o n i u s a g a i n asks w h y o r d i n a r y m e n o f t e n w e e p w h e n t h e y d o n o t wish t o a n d a r e u n a b l e t o c h e c k t h e i r t e a r s , w h i l e in o t h e r s t h e t e a r s s t o p b e f o r e t h e w i s h — o b v i o u s l y b e c a u s e t h e a f f e c t i v e m o t i o n s p r e s s so h a r d t h a t t h e y c a n n o t b e c o n t r o l l e d by t h e will, o r a r e b r o u g h t t o so c o m p l e t e a h a l t t h a t it c a n n o l o n g e r a r o u s e t h e m (PHP4.7.37).

G a l e n takes this as a s t a t e m e n t a b o u t t h e conflict b e t w e e n r e a s o n ( h e r e r e p r e s e n t e d by t h e will) a n d a f f e c t i o n a l o n g dualist lines. But t h e i d e a of t h e will, as several o t h e r e l e m e n t s h e r e , takes u p t h e idea of c o n a t i o n in t h e C h r y s i p p e a n passage q u o t e d at § 13-17: t h e 163

De Lacy translates 'disposition'. But the term διάθεσις also has the more specific medical meaning 'affection', 'diseased condition', see Ackerknecht (1982).

p h e n o m e n a in q u e s t i o n d o n o t c o n f o r m to t h e conation, viz. t h e s e c o n d type of j u d g e m e n t . But w h e r e P o s i d o n i u s d o e s a d v a n c e b e y o n d Chrysippus is in t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n of the expression 'affective m o t i o n s ' as a substitute f o r t h e 'disposition which it is difficult to reason o u t ' . T h u s Posidonius can be said to have m a d e Chrysippus' r e m a r k o n t h e p h e n o m e n a in question m o r e specific. But it r e m a i n s to b e seen w h e t h e r this constitutes a real modification of the latter's d o c t r i n e . As C o o p e r h a s o b s e r v e d , 1 6 4 t h e fact t h a t P o s i d o n i u s i n t r o d u c e d t h e t e c h n i c a l e x p r e s s i o n 'affective m o t i o n ' i n s t e a d of o p t i n g f o r o n e of t h e available Platonic o r Aristotelian alternatives certainly seems significant. But t h e e x p l a n a t i o n ascribed to Posidonius alongside habits m e n tions also time. W h a t h e m e a n s b e c o m e s clear f r o m the s e c o n d half of this passage: desires a b a t e in time by b e i n g satisfied. A p p a r e n t l y t h e a s s u m p t i o n is that e a c h a n d every affection involves an e l e m e n t of desire. Still, as a causal a c c o u n t it is weak a n d certainly n o improvem e n t o n t h e a c c o u n t o f f e r e d by Chrysippus, who in fact said m o r e or less t h e s a m e t h i n g . G a l e n ' s elevation of time as o n e of t h e m a i n causes f o r the a b a t e m e n t of affection in the course of time constitutes n o high p o i n t in the history of philosophical analysis. A h a n d f u l of testimonies c o n c e r n i n g m e n t a l p r e s e n t a t i o n (φαντασία) likewise points to h a r m o n y b e t w e e n t h e two Stoics. C o n s i d e r this passage, p r e s e n t e d by Galen in t h e s e c o n d half of b o o k 5 b u t which in its original P o s i d o n i a n c o n t e x t directly followed u p o n t h e t r e a t m e n t of t h e aporiai, viz. PHP 5.6.17-26 ( o m i t t i n g c o m m e n t s inserted by G a l e n ) : ... (17) And the discovery of the cause of the affections taught (us) the sources of distortion in what is to be sought and avoided. ... (19) When the cause of the affections was recognized it distinguished the methods of training ... (22) It cleared up the difficulties about the conation that arises from affection. ... (24) For I suppose that you have long observed how men do not experience fear or distress when they are rationally persuaded that evil is present or is approaching, but they do so when they receive a mental presentation of those same things. (25) For how could you stir the irrational by means of reason, unless you place before it a picture, as it were, that resembles a picture perceived by the eye? (26) Thus some people fall victim to desire as a result of a verbal account, and when realistically ordered to flee the charging lion, even though they have not seen it, they are afraid (transi. De Lacy's, modified). 1 6 5 164 165

Cooper (1998) 89 f. Though it is not entirely beyond doubt that the pieces of text translated here

Given t h e fact that a c c o r d i n g to Stoic d o c t r i n e a f f e c t i o n a n d virtue a r e mutually exclusive, t h e discovery of t h e causes of affection may c o n t r i b u t e to t h e virtuous life. T h e g e r u n d i v e s in t h e technical expressions 'what is to be s o u g h t ' (αίρετοίς) a n d 'what is to b e avoided' (φευκτοίς) indicate the types of c o n a t i o n distinctive of virtuous action. H e n c e t h e cause of a f f e c t i o n reveals also ' t h e sources of d i s t o r t i o n ' (διαστροφή), which distracts t h e soul f r o m virtue. All this is s t a n d a r d Stoic d o c t r i n e a n d t e r m i n o l o g y . 1 6 6 E l s e w h e r e t o o P o s i d o n i u s h a d p o i n t e d to t h e relevance of his analysis of affection to the subject of virtue (4.7.24 = fr. 150a E.-K.) T h e expression ' t h e discovery of t h e cause of t h e affections' m u s t r e f e r back to P o s i d o n i u s ' discussion of Chrysippus causal analysis a n d its limitations. In a d d i t i o n to t h e two types of j u d g e m e n t e m p l o y e d by Chrysippus, c e r t a i n p r o b l e m s (in p a r t raised by C h r y s i p p u s as well) h a d led P o s i d o n i u s to i n t r o d u c e t h e c o n c e p t of 'affective m o t i o n s ' o r ' p r o c e s s e s ' ( π α θ η τ ι κ α ί κινήσεις). L o o k i n g back at this discussion, h e can hardly s u p p r e s s his p r i d e at this feat. T h e s e c o n d s n i p p e t of text, d e a l i n g with training, e c h o e s G a l e n ' s r e l a t e d discussion o n h a b i t u a t i o n , which is i n s p i r e d by what h e r e a d in Posidonius (4.7.40 ff.). ' T h e difficulties a b o u t the c o n a t i o n that arises f r o m a f f e c t i o n ' pertain to the cases of involuntary b e h a v i o u r as w e e p i n g against y o u r will discussed in t h e p r e c e d i n g context. Posidonius r e g a r d s his idea of affective m o t i o n as an a p p r o priate solution to these cases in particular. Having t h u s c o n c l u d e d his earlier discussion, P o s i d o n i u s f u r t h e r develops t h e t h e m e of t h e soul's perversion by f o c u s i n g o n a p p e a r a n c e ( φ α ν τ α σ ί α ) as a key f a c t o r in irrational b e h a v i o u r . T h e p o i n t c a m e u p earlier in Galen's discussion w h e n h e m e n t i o n e d Posidonius advice to train o n e ' s m i n d a n d so p r e v e n t o u t b r e a k s of affection by 'dwelling in a d v a n c e ' o n a m e n t a l p i c t u r e of s o m e t h i n g terrible o r distressing. T h i s preventive m e a s u r e is n o t loosely based o n c o m m o n e x p e r i e n c e b u t g r a f t e d o n t o a n o t h e r Stoic d o c t r i n e t h a t a n t e d a t e s Posidonius, viz. that certain a p p e a r a n c e s set t h e intellect in m o t i o n

formed one continuous passage (hence the dots between them), they are clearly derived from the same context. My impression is that Galen cannot have omitted much that was in between. Edelstein-Kidd however present them separately as Frs. 161, 168, 162 respectively. 166 The phrase used by Posidonius echoes the school definition of one virtue in particular, viz. moderation (σωφροσύνη), see SVF3.262; cf. 1.563 (Cleanthes). On the concept of άίρεσις as directed to the good/virtue in particular, see SVF3.88, 89, 91, 92, 131, 208; on άίρεσις as a type of όρμή (conation), see SI-F3.173; cf. Inwood (1985) 239f. On διαστροφή: SVF3.228-236

a n d , if assented to, trigger c o n a t i o n a n d action. This is explicitly expressed in the philosophical manual of Arms Didymus as preserved by Stobaeus: What stirs conation is nothing else, they say, but the conative 167 appearance of what is immediately 168 appropriate, and in general conation is a movement of the soul towards something in general (Stob. Eel II, p. 86.17-19 Wachsmuth, SW3A69, part). 169 Arius Didymus goes on to specify the terminology used for (adult) h u m a n s in particular: ' r a t i o n a l c o n a t i o n ' , ' d e s i r e ' (ορεξις) a n d 'intellect' (διάνοια). T h u s a 'rational conation' is 'a movement of the intellect towards s o m e t h i n g in the s p h e r e of action (πράττειν). 1 7 ° Obviously its very rationality entails p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t a n d j u d g e m e n t . T h e physical process involved is indicated by the terms 'stirs' a n d ' m o v e m e n t ' . These terms indicate that n u m e r o u s mental a p p e a r a n c e s are directly caused by external stimuli. As these appearances seem directly relevant (καθήκον) to o u r well-being, they invite a response, i.e. a conation. W h e t h e r the p r o p e r response is given dep e n d s on o u r m e n t a l c o n d i t i o n , or 'conative disposition', as it is labelled a little f u r t h e r on (ibid. p. 87,11). H e n c e the n e e d for preparation, training 1 7 1 as well as regimen 1 7 2 stressed by Posidonius. O n e form of conditioning, which according to Galen Posidonius derived f r o m Plato, 1 7 3 is music, i.e. auditory a p p e a r a n c e s (5.6.20-2 = Posid. F 168; see above, p. 243). But again it is highly d o u b t f u l whether there is reason to assume any substantial doctrinal divergence f r o m his predecessors. Posidonius' concept of 'affective movements' seems to cover the m o t i o n s strirring a n d c o n d i t i o n i n g o u r conation in the account offered by Stobaeus. This impression is c o n f i r m e d by a few related testimonies f r o m Galen c o n c e r n e d with the p r o b l e m of the origin of evil, i.e. the soul's distortion t h r o u g h affection, which is

167

Or: 'motivating', asόρμητιιcήv is aptly translated by Sorabji (2000) 43. 168 Q r : 'obviously'.

169 τό δέ κινούν τήν όρμήν ούδέν έτερον είναι λέγουσιν άλλ' ή φαντασίαν όρμητικήν τού καθήκοντος αύτόθεν, τήν δέ όρμήν είναι φοράν ψυχής έπί τι κατά τό γένος. 170 T h e verb πραττειν strictly speaking applies to humans only, see Inwood (1985) 52, 227. 171 See infra, p. 312. 172 See supra, p. 222 f. 173 There is no exact parallel in Plato for this passage on music but the idea as such is certainly traceable, see Rep. Ill: 411a5-412a. Posidonius moreover referred to Plato in connection with other means of regimen as well, see F31 E.-K.

m e n t i o n e d by P o s i d o n i u s as cited at PHP 5.6.17 ( q u o t e d above, p. 261).

8. Cleanthes 'Dialogue Between Reason and Anger A c c o r d i n g to Galen at PHP 5.6.33-39, Z e n o a n d C l e a n t h e s e x p l a i n e d t h e a f f e c t i o n s in t e r m s of a n 'affective e l e m e n t ' ( π α θ η τ ι κ ό ν ) in t h e soul—a position crucially d i f f e r e n t f r o m that of Chrysippus. G a l e n ' s only piece of evidence are f o u r lines of verse c o m p o s e d by Cleanthes, c o n s t i t u t i n g a d i a l o g u e b e t w e e n r e a s o n (λογισμός) a n d a n g e r (θυμός) 1 7 4 (PHP5.6.35, p.332.25-28 De Lacy ~ SVF 1.570, Posid. F 166 E.K„ F 4 1 7 T h e i 1 e r ) : 2 4

Τί ποτ' εσθ' δ β ο ύ λ ε ι , θυμέ; τοΰτο μοι φ ρ ά σ ο ν . Έγώ, λογισμέ; π ά ν ο β ο ύ λ ο μ α ι ποιείν. (Νή) 1 7 5 β α σ ι λ ι κ ό ν γε· π λ η ν ομως είπον π ά λ ι ν . Ώ ς ά ν έπιθυμώ, τ α ΰ θ ' οπως γενησεται. 'What', A n g e r , 'is it that y o u want? Tell m e that.' Ί , Reason? T o d o everything I wish.' 'Why that is royal; but still, say it o n c e again.' 'In whatever way I desire, that this will c o m e about.'

This vignette of m e n t a l conflict is q u o t e d n o t directly f r o m C l e a n t h e s b u t via Posidonius. A c c o r d i n g to Galen, this d i a l o g u e p r e s u p p o s e s a d i s t i n c t παθητικόν, ' s i n c e C l e a n t h e s p o r t r a y e d r e a s o n t a l k i n g to a n g e r , as two d i f f e r e n t things' (ibid. 36). Again, o n e may ask w h e t h e r a dualistic r e a d i n g involving s e p a r a t e parts o r powers is c o m p e l l i n g , or at least m o r e plausible t h a n a monistic o n e . T o d a y m o s t scholars d o n o t treat t h e d i a l o g u e as conclusive p r o o f that C l e a n t h e s was n o t a m o n i s t t h e way Chrysippus was—whatever i n t e r p r e t a t i o n Posidonius may have a t t a c h e d to it. Usually they leave it at that. So we s h o u l d raise two m a i n questions: w h a t did C l e a n t h e s wish to d e m o n s t r a t e ? a n d : Why did Posidonius q u o t e these lines? S t u d e n t s of a n c i e n t Stoicism have usually t a k e n C l e a n t h e s as a q u i t e docile follower of Z e n o . G a l e n is n o e x c e p t i o n . N o s e p a r a t e 174

Long-Sedley (651) translate 'passion'. Of course, θυμός covers a wider semantic field than 'anger', see—with special reference to PHP— Manuli (1988); Tieleman (1996a) 236 ff. But in view of Cleanthes' allusion to the Aristotelian (and Platonic) tripartition, 'anger' is more apposite here; see infra in text. 175 (Νή) Prosopopoiie in Marc. gr. 11.22 Nod Prosopopoiie in Par. gr. 2465 (Meineke coni.)·, cf. Kotzia-Panteli (1981) 178 ff. De Lacy (whose text I follow in all other respects) prints a blank here.

proof-text is given o n behalf of Z e n o ; that f r o m C l e a n t h e s serves to illustrate t h e position of b o t h . G a l e n says that Posidonius says that Z e n o sided with Plato (5.6.34, 4.4.38, Posid. Test. 59 E.-K.). Yet Galen apologizes f o r n o t b e i n g in a position to inspect t h e textual evidence r e g a r d i n g Z e n o (5.6.40 ff.). Apparently, Posidonius failed to p r o d u c e any proof-text f r o m Zeno. T h e verse dialogue of C l e a n t h e s f e a t u r e d p r o m i n e n t l y in P o h l e n z ' r e c o n s t r u c t i o n of Stoic psychology, which resembles G a l e n ' s story in a n u m b e r of ways: 176 Z e n o a c k n o w l e d g e d a s e p a r a t e n o n - r a t i o n a l power, viz. impulse (ορμή), whose excessive o r u n n a t u r a l manifestations are the affections (παθή) of the soul. 1 7 7 However, P o h l e n z did n o t follow Galen in ascribing t h e Platonic tripartition to Z e n o ( a n d C l e a n t h e s ) , relying o n P o s i d o n i u s ' r e f e r e n c e to t h e παθητικόν instead. 1 7 8 T h e tripartite s c h e m e has b e e n read into the p o e m by o t h e r m o d e r n exegetes. I shall r e t u r n to this p o i n t in d u e course. A c c o r d i n g to P o h l e n z , t h e ' h a r d l i n e ' m o n i s m which was to bec o m e s t a n d a r d Stoic d o c t r i n e was i n t r o d u c e d by Chrysippus, w h o however m a d e his deviation r e s e m b l e a faithful elaboration of Z e n o ' s position. A serious weakness of P o h l e n z ' a c c o u n t is that it c a n n o t b e based o n straightforward evidence r e g a r d i n g Zeno. In particular, it is f a r f r o m obvious that Z e n o ' s use of t h e c o n c e p t of ορμή implies a p o w e r in t h e sense r e q u i r e d by P o h l e n z ' thesis. So P o h l e n z highlighted o u r d i a l o g u e as implying a dualistic m o d e l of t h e soul taken over by C l e a n t h e s f r o m Z e n o , in line with t h e f o r m e r ' s traditional r e p u t a t i o n as a loyal, n o t too bright, pupil. 1 7 9 We s h o u l d also b e a r in m i n d that the p u r p o r t e d Posidonian s u p p o r t for the dualistic r e a d i n g (ibid. 5.6.36) c o u n t e d f o r a great deal with P o h l e n z a n d his c o n t e m poraries.

176

Pohlenz (1938) 195 f., id. (1948-9) 89 ff. See D.L. 7.110 (.SVF 1.205), Cic. Tusc. 4.11, 47 (SVF 1.205), Stob. Eel. II p.39.5ff. W. (SVF 1.206); cf. Chrysippus exegesis of Zeno's definitions, PHP4.2.8, 14 (SVF3.462). 178 For Galen's reading, see also, with reference to Posidonius, PHP8.1.14 (SVF 1.571, Posid. Τ 92 E.-K.); cf. also supra, pp. 34, 204. 179 This reputation stems in large part from the hostile biographical traditions as represented by our main source, Diogenes Laertius, 7.168 ff. (Cleanthes a dunce at school) and 179 (outshone by his star pupil Chrysippus). The dominant trait emerging from D.L. is cowardly obtuseness. A rather different note is struck by Timon of Phlius, who alludes to a bent for dialectic involving an over-subtle and devious cast of mind, see D.L. 7.170 (Timon Fr. 41, p.87 Di Marco; SVFI Cleanthes 463) with Lapini (1995), esp. 297, 299. 177

T o d a y m o s t e x p e r t s in t h e field c o n s i d e r t h e case f o r Z e n o n i a n d u a l i s m w e a k . 1 8 0 As usual, C l e a n t h e s is c o n s i d e r e d i n c a p a b l e of i n d e p e n d e n t b e h a v i o u r vis-à-vis Z e n o . His individual position has s e l d o m b e e n studied. A few testimonies however tell clear in favour of his s u b s c r i b i n g to h i m t h e m o n i s t p o s i t i o n . 1 8 1 In p a r t i c u l a r , a n e g l e c t e d f r a g m e n t f r o m his Physical Notebooks preserved by Plutarch, On Stoic Self-Contradictions 1034D (SVF 1.563) shows how h e e x p l a i n e d t h e plurality of virtues by a p p e a l i n g n o t to divisions within t h e soul b u t to o n e psychic power 1 8 2 which is a p p l i e d to d i f f e r e n t s p h e r e s of action. 1 8 3 This position is clearly d e s i g n e d as a monistic r e s p o n s e to t h e P l a t o n i c a n d Aristotelian a c c o u n t s . I n fact, we k n o w t h a t t h e plurality of t h e v i r t u e s was a p r o b l e m r a i s e d a g a i n s t t h e Stoic u n i t a r i a n c o n c e p t i o n by its o p p o n e n t s . 1 8 4 A n o t h e r such challenge was the p h e n o m e n o n of m e n t a l conflict. It will n o t be necessary to dwell o n t h e d e b a t e that r a g e d over the views of Pohlenz, a l t h o u g h they still cast their shadow h e r e a n d there. T h u s Inwood, t h o u g h rejecting P o h l e n z ' ascription of a dualistic m o del to Zeno, nevertheless a r g u e s that we may have to see capabilities such as c o n a t i o n (όρμή) a n d r e p r e s e n t a t i o n (φαντασία) as e n d u r i n g powers ( δ υ ν ά μ ε ι ς ) of t h e soul which r e p r e s e n t an aspect of plurality involved in m e n t a l conflict. Clearly, this r e - i n t r o d u c e s an e l e m e n t familiar f r o m P o h l e n z ' a c c o u n t of pre-Chrysippean Stoicism, e x t e n d ing it to t h e p e r i o d a f t e r Chrysippus as well. T h e u p s h o t is a kind of soft m o n i s m as o p p o s e d to t h e strictly m o n o l i t h i c variety ascribed by

180 ]yjot o n j y j s jbere no compelling evidence in regard to Zeno's alleged dualism, there are positive counter-indications: see esp. Cic. Ac. 1.39, Tusc. 3.74-5, Plut. Virt. men. 440E-441D, where Zeno (whose name is here clearly not a label for the Stoic school as a whole) is associated with the monistic view. In his own day Pohlenz' reconstruction met with criticism from Philipsson (1937), reiterated more recently by Inwood (1985) 27 ff. Cf. also Long-Sedley (1986) vol. 1, 422, Donini (1995). 181 In addition to SVF 1.563, see SVF 1.576-577 (Cic. Tusc. 3.76-7) pointed out by Von Arnim (1921) cols. 572f.: Cleanthes gave the advice to persuade mourning people that what has happened to them is no evil. SVF I 526, 563, 573—also referred to by Von Arnim —are to my mind unconclusive with respect to the monist/ dualist distinction. 182 The term δύναμις here designates the soul's physical (tensional) strength rather than an Aristotelian-style 'faculty'. See supra, p. 38. 183 Cf. also Chrys. ap. Gal. PHP 7.2.9-11 (SVF 2.256). Cleanthes' recasting of Zeno's definitions of the cardinal virtues in terms of wisdom (φρόνησις) was meant to bring out the mind's rationality: see Plut. SR 1034C-D (SVF 1.200; cf. Plut. Virt. mor. 441 A, SVF 1.201). Mental strength (or 'will-power') reflects an emphasis peculiar to his moral thought, see infra, pp. 271 f. 184 See Plutarch., Virt. mor. 440e ff., Galen, PHP7.2.

P o h l e n z to Chrysippus a n d his successors. 1 8 5 As I have e x p l a i n e d in o n e of t h e earlier chapters, I believe that t h e r e is insufficient textual s u p p o r t f o r this i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , a n d several indications against it, particularly where the early Stoic c o n c e p t of δύναμις is concerned. 1 8 6 I n w o o d ' s a c c o u n t at least illustrates t h a t the f u n d a m e n t a l questions raised by Pohlenz are still with us today. They require an answer based o n a careful sifting of all the available textual evidence, including t h e d i a l o g u e between reason a n d a n g e r by Cleanthes. But can these lines really cast m o r e light o n the monistic position? This question is usually answered in t h e negative. In most cases, the dialogue is disarmed as a piece of poetic dramatization, or simply ignored; that is to say, it is d e e m e d of little, if any, evidential status in r e g a r d to d o c t r i n a l issues. 1 8 7 If this is t r u e , we are u n d e r n o obligation to subscribe to the dualist reading. Meanwhile, Pohlenz' reading, in o n e version or a n o t h e r , c o n t i n u e s to attract defenders. 1 8 8 C l e a n t h e s r e c o m m e n d e d poetry as a m e d i u m f o r philosophical insights in virtue of its clanty.m H e followed his own advice, as most famously in his Hymn to Zeus (SVF 1.537). Pohlenz rightly insisted that t h e d i a l o g u e between reason a n d a n g e r s h o u l d be taken seriously f r o m a doctrinal p o i n t of view. 190 In particular, we face the challenge p o s e d by Posidonius, viz. how to conceive of t h e p r e s e n c e of two i n t e r l o c u t o r s within a monistic f r a m e w o r k . T h e dialogue, in o t h e r words, s e e m s to p r e s u p p o s e s o m e f o r m of m e n t a l division which seems i n c o m p a t i b l e with the c o n c e p t i o n of the m i n d ascribed to the early Stoics. As is well known, the early Stoics are credited with a view of weakness of will ( ά κ ρ α σ ί α ) as an oscillation of t h e single a n d h o m o g e n e o u s l y rational ήγεμονικόν, or δ ι ά ν ο ι α , as o p p o s e d to t h e

185

Inwood (1985) 33 ff. Cf. Voelke (1973) 29. See supra, p. 38. 187 See Zeller (1963/1921) p. 203 n.l., Bonhoeffer (1890) 46, Pearson (1891) 307, Von Arnim (1921) 572f., Rist (1969) 29f„ Voelke (1973) 83, Kerferd (1978) 486. Cf. also Long-Sedley (1986) vol 1, 422: '... Cleanthes' verses ... do not prove that he distinguished reason and passion in the way Posidonius alleged'. 188 Kidd ad Posid. Τ 92, F 166 (pp.79 f., 608 ff.) ascribes to Cleanthes 'a kind of Platonic psychology'. De Lacy ad loc. says that the dialogue between reason and anger represents 'a kind of Platonic allegory in which the irrational θυμός opposes reason by aligning βούλησις with έπιθυμία.' Cf. also Verbeke (1949) 167f. and Theiler, Comm. vol. 2, p. 359 {ad Posid. Fr. 417); Sandbach (1975) 65. 189 Sen. Ep. 108.10 {SVF 1.487); cf. SVF 1.486 (verse especially suited to theology) with Von Arnim (1921) 560; Pohlenz (1949) ii, 16. Other examples of poems by Cleanthes are printed as SVF 1.557 and 559, both of which are concerned with ethics. 190 Pohlenz (1938) 195 f. 186

dualistic model of two m e n t a l faculties—rational a n d irrational— pulling in different directions. 1 9 1 T h e Stoic monistic position concerning weakness of will is still not fully understood. We d o seem to be aware of a synchronous conflict. Did the Stoics acknowledge this experiental fact and, if so, how did they meet it? In addition to Inwood's account (see above), I pick out two o t h e r r e c e n t solutions As usual, these d o n o t r e f e r to t h e dialogue between reason a n d anger. 1 9 2 O n e of the most ingenious suggestions ever made, n o d o u b t , is that advanced by A.W. Price in his m o n o g r a p h on mental conflict. H e distinguishes between present thoughts a n d memories: 'Vacillation permits a memory of a conflicting j u d g e m e n t , a n d even a recognition of its rationality ... T h r o u g h memory, the Stoics h o p e d to reconcile awareness of conflict with an a b s e n c e of s y n c h r o n o u s conflict.' 1 9 3 C o n t e m p l a t i n g a particular course of action about, say, the desirability of vengeance consists in reactivating a particular j u d g e m e n t m a d e previously u n d e r similar circumstances. This suits the Stoic view of reason as a collection of conceptions a n d preconceptions, 1 9 4 with memory (μνήμη) as 'a store of presentations' (i.e. conceptions). 1 9 3 In this sense reason is a unityin-plurality. Mental conflict t h e n results f r o m a lack of h a r m o n y between past and present conceptions. Price, then, takes d u e note of the attested Stoic view of reason. Yet on closer inspection his explanation is not without its weak spots. H e sacrifices the idea of synchronous conflict in its strict sense, t h o u g h o u r inner awareness tells us that there is such a situation. This would be strange, particularly in the light of the value attached by the Stoics to self-perception. Further, Price's solution lacks any u n d e r p i n n i n g f r o m texts c o n c e r n e d with the p h e n o m e n o n of mental conflict. In fact, he brings it to bear on that old favourite, Euripides, Medea 1078191

Most explicit in this regard is the testimony on the Stoic position offered by Plut. Virt. mor. 7, 446F (SVF3.459). 192 Cf. also Gosling (1987). 193 Price (1995) 160. 194 PHP5.2.27, 49 (SVF 3.471a), V 3.1 (SVF2.841), Cic. Tusc. 4.31 (SVF 3.95), with Price (1995) 159. 195 syp· ι 54 (2.56). Is also defined as imprints which have become 'permanent and steadfast' ( SVF 2.847). Memory is an essential link in the process of the formation of concepts and their systématisation as expertise (τέχνη) or knowledge (SVF 2.56, 83, 115); hence its frequent and close connection with cognition (κατάληψις, cf. also SVF 3.213). When Chrysippus modified Cleanthes' crudely corporealist account of presentation (φαντασία), he did so in order to provide a more credible account of memory (SVF 2.56). The Stoics dealt separately with the question of selecting and evaluating memories (CN1061C = SVF3.213); cf. Long (1991) 116 f.

9 (quoted above, p. 171). But it is not clear what role could be played by memory here. Nor is memory involved in the lines of Cleanthes, which are similar to those of Euripides insofar as both pit a n g e r against reason and portray reason as remaining fully aware of the evil n a t u r e of its o p p o n e n t . In fact, the c o n c e p t of m e m o r y never functions in the context of affection—at least not in the way required by Price's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . 1 9 6 It is an i m p o r t a n t epistemological concept but only after Chrysippus had refined the cruder conception held by Cleanthes. 1 9 7 I n d e e d , the idea of reason as a collection of concepts is not attested before Chrysippus either. So in the event Price's solution does not carry conviction. Nor is the similar suggestion recently made by Joyce, which does maintain s i m u l t a n e o u s conflict by allowing for two or m o r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s receiving attention at o n e and the same time. 198 This too presupposes the idea of the collection of concepts in the mind. T h e r e is however no textual evidence for this problematic idea (which is also based on the Medea passage). We cannot advert to two or more inner voices at the same time; rather o u r inner perception points to an alternation between them. Indeed, it is this p h e n o m e n o n which is adequately expressed in the model of an internal dialogue between two voices. So it may be expected that a closer scrutiny of the dialogue by Cleanthes may also contribute to a fuller u n d e r s t a n d i n g of how the Stoics conceived of mental p h e n o m e n a such as weakness of will. Let us first try to d e t e r m i n e what these f o u r lines really are about; that is to say, to make more of the clues contained in them. Firstly, it may be observed that the e x c h a n g e of viewpoints does not refer to any external cause of anger (such as being slighted) but is c o n c e r n e d with the appropriate response. This seems to imply the distinction between affection as a (mistaken) view on how one ought to act a n d affection as a (mistaken) view on the value of certain things. 1 9 9 T h e f o r m e r aspect c o n c e r n s what the Stoics f r o m Zeno 196 A false judgement turned into a memory may on the contrary co-exist with the abatement of affection, see supra, p. 124 f. 197 See supra, n. 195. 198 Joyce (1995) esp. 334 f. 199 On this distinction, see further supra, pp. 169 ff. It is true that Cic. Tusc. 3.76 (SVF 1.576) ascribes this twofold analysis to Chrysippus, as opposed to Cleanthes. But Seneca's account of Cleanthes' position, Ep. 94.4 does seem to distinguish between precepts about how to act and propositions about what is the case. Differently Donini (1995) 328, who suggests that Chrysippus formulated the doctrine of the twofold proposidonal structure of affection out of dissatisfaction with Cleanthes' riposte to Aristo as reported by Seneca, Ep. 94.18 ff.

o n w a r d s called t h e κ α θ ή κ ο ν τ α ( ' a p p r o p r i a t e a c t i o n s ' ) d e f i n e d as t h o s e which a d m i t of a ' r e a s o n a b l e j u s t i f i c a t i o n ' (εύλογος απολογ ί α ) . 2 0 0 Arguably, this is also i m p l i e d by t h e fact t h a t a n g e r is c o n n e c t e d twice with t h e v e r b c o g n a t e with β ο ύ λ η σ ι ς , which is t h e Stoic technical t e r m f o r r e a s o n a b l e a p p e t i t i o n (εύλογος ορεξις). 2 0 1 Anger, in o t h e r words, presents its viewpoint as reasonable, assuming t h e voice of c o r r e c t r e a s o n . A w e a k e n e d intellect is m a r k e d by its f a i l u r e to distinguish b e t w e e n real a n d s e e m i n g κ α θ ή κ ο ν τ α (see above, p p . 185 f., 263). Reason asks A n g e r to disclose its wish a n d to r e p e a t what it has said. Reason has h e a r d perfectly well a n d yet of its own a c c o r d 2 0 2 exposes itself o n c e again to the persuasive voice of anger. 2 0 3 T h a t is to say, t h e will to resist has b e e n w e a k e n e d ; an a m o u n t of psychic strength has already g o n e over to t h e o t h e r side. It may b e implied that this dialogue m i g h t be r e p e a t e d a n u m b e r of times b e f o r e a n g e r takes over completely, thus illustrating t h e wavering which a c c o r d i n g to t h e Stoics is characteristic of passionate c o n d u c t . T h e e m p h a t i c p h r a s e π λ η ν όμως ( ' a n d yet', ' n o n e t h e l e s s ' ) expresses a m a r k e d inconsistency in reason's behaviour: a l t h o u g h a n g e r ' s claim is prepost e r o u s (cf. β α σ ι λ ι κ ό ν ) , r e a s o n is i n t e r e s t e d a f t e r all. O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , reason is still able to see that it would b e b a d if a n g e r took over. In short, t h e dialogue shows a weak reason a b o u t to s u r r e n d e r to a n g e r ' s persuasive voice r a t h e r than an intellect still strong e n o u g h to c o n j u r e u p an affection a n d test its own strength in an act of selfexamination. 2 0 4 It has n o t b e e n seen, or so I believe, that a few f u r t h e r e l e m e n t s nicely illustrate the monistic c o n c e p t i o n , while being r a t h e r pointless f r o m a dualistic p o i n t of view. Twice θυμός claims t h e r i g h t to d o whatever it wants in whatever way it wants (1.2 πάν ο βούλομαι..., 1.4 Ώ ς αν έπιθυμώ ... ), i.e. it desires a b s o l u t e c o n t r o l over t h e soul. This brings o u t t h e exclusivity of e m o t i o n , its m o n o p o l i z i n g tendency. 2 0 5 I n d e e d , t h a t t h e w h o l e self is at stake also follows f r o m a closer

200 This concept goes back to Zeno, see SVF 1.230ff. For Cleanthes see SVF 1.576 ff. Cf.also 3.491 ff. 201 See further infra, p. 272. 202 Likewise Chrysippus in his Περί παθών mentions cases where people selfconsciously choose to follow their desire or anger, ap. Gal. PHP3.6.32 (SVF3.475). 203 On the often underestimated role of persuasiveness (τό πίθανον) in Stoic thought, cf. further Tieleman (1996a) 255 ff. 204 On this exercise see infra, p. 3f2; cf. Epict. 3.3.14-19. 205 Cf. Seneca, De ira I, 8.1.

consideration of the t e r m βασιλικόν ('royal'). This term recalls Platonic passages such as Rep. 473c-d, w h e r e royal r a n k a n d knowledge are c o n j o i n e d in the ideal of the philosopher-kings. 2 0 6 Given t h e analogy drawn by Plato between t h e individual a n d society at large, the t e r m may b e applicable to t h e r u l i n g e l e m e n t in t h e individual soul. T h a t this passage is relevant h e r e is shown by t h e fact t h a t P o s i d o n i u s ascribed to Plato the view that u n d e r s t a n d i n g (επιστήμη) is a 'royal a n d despotic t h i n g ' (βασιλικόν ... τι ... και δεσποτικόν, PHP 4.6.17 = Posid. Fr. 164 E.-K.). But t h e closest parallel c o m e s f r o m Aristotle, Politics A.5: 1254b5-10, w h e r e t h e intellect is said to govern t h e a p p e tites with a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a n d royal ( β α σ ι λ ι κ ή ν ) rule. If we assume t h a t t h e s e parallels p r o v i d e t h e b a c k d r o p against which to r e a d C l e a n t h e s ' e x c h a n g e , we c o u l d say t h a t r e a s o n in u s i n g this t e r m implies that a n g e r a p p r o p r i a t e s t h e role which rightfully b e l o n g s to it, reason itself. C l e a n t h e s ' depiction of m e n t a l conflict strongly recalls o n e of t h e sayings of Heraclitus, t h e original version of which has b e e n preserved by Plutarch, Coriolanus 22.2 (B 85 DK): Θυμω μάχεσθαι χαλεπόν · ο γάρ αν θέλη, ψυχής ώνεΐται

It is difficult to fight against anger 2 0 7 ; for whatever it wants, it buys at the cost of soul Most of o u r a n c i e n t s o u r c e s a n d present-day h i s t o r i a n s c o n c u r in taking this to pertain to i n n e r conflict. It is so difficult to fight a n g e r precisely b e c a u s e it involves loss of psychic s t r e n g t h . 2 0 8 In G r e e k t h o u g h t in g e n e r a l t h e h u m a n will is very m u c h a m a t t e r of psychic 206

Cf. also 499b-c; Lys. 207d-210a. De Lacy ad loc. points to PI. Grg. 492b2, where Callicles refers to kings as capable to the highest degree of indulging their pleasures and as despising the virtues. This would seem to fit the present context too, but the Platonic passages referred to in the text show that Plato's notion of kingship is not in itself pejorative. 207 On the possible ambiguities involved see now Mansfeld (1992c), who suggests that 'θυμός is a manifestation of one's ψυχή, or rather that when one is angry one's rationality has become weaker precisely because part of one's vital psychic strength has already been converted into anger. The idea of strength is connected with the idea of the will. Consequently, it is difficult to fight one's won anger precisely because ,one's strength (or will) may be already on the side of anger rather than on that of reason ...' (p. 18) 208 Cf. Arist. EE Β 7.1223b 18-27: Heraclitus refers to the ίσχύν τού θυμού. Similarly EN Β 2.1105a7f. At Pol. Ε 11.1315a24-31, however, he takes θυμω as someone else's anger; cf. Mansfeld (1992c) 15 ff. Aristotle does not explicitly mention reason as the faculty which, if unassailed by affection, exercises control over one's actions. This aspect is however made explicit in the version of Democritus, Β 236 DK: θυμω μάχεσθαι μεν χαλεπόν · άνδρός δε τό κρατέειν εύλογίστου.

strength,209 T h e latter n o t i o n was given special p r o m i n e n c e by Cleanthes. 2 1 0 Its presence in this Heraclitean dictum may have been what attracted his interest in the first place. Cleanthes was keenly interested in tracing Heraclitean anticipations of Stoic doctrines. 2 1 1 In his dialogue the will is represented, in three out of four lines, by the verbal forms βούλει, βούλομαι, έπιθυμώ (11. 1, 2, 4). Heraclitus refers to the will (o ... άν θέλη) in a way that resembles the d e m a n d s of θυμός in Cleanthes' p o e m (11. 2, 4). T h e s e affinities are close enough to warrant the assumption that Cleanthes is inspired by—and alludes to—this saying of Heraclitus. But this Heraclitean parallel is by no m e a n s the only possible allusion to be detected. Above all, there is an unmistakable echo of the Platonic tripartition of the soul and, even more prominently, of its Aristotelian version. This feature enables Galen to credit Cleanthes with the Platonic tripartition in the first place. Apart from θυμός and λογισμός, we have έπιθυμώ, i.e. the verb cognate with έπιθυμία, as well βούλει a n d βούλομαι, which are forms of the verb cognate with βούλησις, the term standardly used for 'rational' (i.e. correct) wish in philosophical contexts, which thus is related to the rational faculty in particular. In fact, this presence of the tripartition is too obvious to go unnoticed. 2 1 2 Yet its implications have sofar not been sufficiently pursued. It strains credulity that the three terms belonging to the Platonic-cum-Aristotelian tripartition are re-united h e r e by sheer coincidence. First, έπιθυμώ as said by θυμός in 1.4 agrees with Stoic definitions t h a t m a k e θυμός—as incipient όργή ( ' w r a t h ' ) — a subspecies of έπιθυμία ('desire'), which is o n e of four primary affections. 2 1 3 This confines θυμός to a strikingly narrow sense as compared to its role in Plato. Similarly, 11.1-2 go against the tripartition by relating wish 209

See Mansfeld (1991), esp. 114 ff. According to Plut. De Stoic Rep. 1034D (SVF 1.563) he replaced φρόνησις as one of the primary virtues with εγκράτεια ('self-control'), which he defined in terms of mental strength, i.e. pneumatic tension, τόνος. Cf. also Plut. Virt. mor. 446F-447A (SVF 3.459, second text); Clem. Strom. II 18.80.4 (SVF 3.275, second text). The tensional strength was indicated by the term δύναμις ('power') see Plut. Virt. mor. 441C (SVF 1.202; 3.459); Stob. Eel. II p.74.1-3 W. (SVF 3.112); cf. Alex. Aphr. Dean. Mantissa p. 118.6ff. Br. (SVF2.823). 211 See Cleanthes ap. Euseb. PE 15.20 (SVF 1.519) with Long (1975/6), esp. 54. He devoted a separate study in no less than four books to the sage of Ephesus, viz. his Exegeses of Heraclitus (D.L. 7.174). 212 See supra, n. 188. 213 See the scholastic definitions, SVF 3.395 ff. The same hierarchy is implied by Chrysippus ap. Gal. PHP3.1.25 (SVF2.886); cf. Pohlenz (1938) 195 f. 210

(βούλει, βούλομαι) to a n g e r . In 1.1 reason r e f e r s to t h e claim of irrational θυμός by using precisely the verb (βούλει) that, as we have n o t e d , is r e l a t e d to t h e s t a n d a r d t e r m f o r rational m o t i v a t i o n — βούλησις. In 1.2 θυμός takes over the verb f r o m reason to refer to its intentions. This f e a t u r e may be m e a n t to imply that b o t h reason a n d a n g e r p r e s e n t a n g e r ' s claim as rational—in full a c c o r d a n c e with the monistic c o n c e p t i o n of weakness of will, with its a t t e n d a n t idea of self-delusion (see below). In sum, C l e a n t h e s has reason a n d a n g e r r e f e r to each o t h e r a n d itself in terms which cut across t h e Platonic-cum-Aristotelian tripartition. T h e p o i n t is a very subtle o n e , b u t n o t to be missed by any r e a d e r familiar with the traditional divisions of the soul a n d the terms in which they were stated. C l e a n t h e s effectively a m a l g a m a t e s , o r implodes, the parts or faculties at issue, thus m a k i n g n o n s e n s e of any division which sees t h e m as manifestations of distinct a n d p e r m a n e n t psychic powers. 2 1 4 But what can be l e a r n e d a b o u t the position which C l e a n t h e s himself advocates? Faculty psychology is replaced with an a c c o u n t along nominalist lines; that is to say, t h e t h r e e key-terms now f u n c t i o n as alternative descriptions for the course of action c o n t e m p l a t e d by t h e intellect, i.e. the two interlocutors—in line with what we have f o u n d o u t a b o u t t h e linguistic a n d dialogic n a t u r e of deliberation, a n d in particular the role assigned by Cleanthes to the 'sayables' (λεκτά), i.e. in the particular p r e d i c a t e s (κατηγορήματα) βούλει, βούλομαι a n d έπιθυμώ. 2 1 5 T h e passionate intellect may d e l u d e itself into describing to itself a particular r e p r e s e n t a t i o n as a p p r o p r i a t e a n d reasonable, as w h e n a n g e r presents itself in t h e guise of rational wish in t h e way explained. Aristotle had always b e e n u n c e r t a i n w h e t h e r to assign wish to reason o r to a p p e t i t i o n . 2 1 6 C l e a n t h e s resolves this p r o b l e m by 214

Cleanthes did not defined the powers in terms of distinct qualities (ποιότητες) separable in thought but not in fact. This analysis originates with his successor Chrysippus, who not only used it to differentiate between the soul's powers (see SVF 2.826) but also the virtues, see Plut. Virt. Mor. 441a. Quality of course features as one of the four so-called Stoic categories from the perspective of 'the qualified' (seil, material entity, the ποιόν, further subdivided into ιδίως and κοινώς ποιόν): see the evidence collected by Long-Sedley 28 and 29. For Chrysippus as the instigator of the four categories, see Long-Sedley (1986) 172 ff., 178 f. 215 Cf. the tantalizingly brief notice in Cicero's summary of Chrysippus' On Affections M Tusc 4.21 ad fin. (SVF 3.398), that appetite (libido, i.e. έπιθυμία) is intended at 'predicates' (κατηγορήματα), i.e. sayables, as opposed to real objects. 216 See e.g. De an. Γ 9.432b4-7, with Price (1995) 108 ff. who argues that this wavering is caused by Aristotle's failure to distinguish clearly between faculties as either parts or factions of the soul. Voelke (1973) 58 f. points to Alex. De an. p.74.3

taking the predicate 'wishing' as a descriptive label used by the rational m i n d in a particular state, w h e t h e r appropriately or inappropriately. T h u s u n d e r s t o o d , the strategy followed by Cleanthes is directed primarily against Aristotle, although of course Plato is included in the attack as well. Cleanthes has used the ploy of turning the terms of his o p p o n e n t s against them. 2 1 7 Galen simply turns the tables back again on the Stoics by arguing that the presence of these terms proved Cleanthes to have been committed to the Platonic tripartition. Likewise at PHP 4.1.6 ff. he imputes to Chrysippus the Platonic tripartition a n d trilocation. 2 1 8 Cleanthes' p r o c e d u r e invites comparison with Aristotle's seminal critique of the Platonic tripartition (as well as bipartition 2 1 9 ) at De an. Γ 9-10. 220 After an initial distinction between two functions in living creatures, viz. (i) j u d g i n g (an act of the intellect a n d sensation combined) and (ii) locomotion, Aristotle raises the question what it is that causes m o v e m e n t ? H e presents two main alternatives, the f o r m e r of which is f u r t h e r subdivided: motion is caused by (1) a part of the soul that is separable either ( l a ) in extension (i.e. in the Platonic sense of a part—μόριον, μέρος—with separate location and being) or ( l b ) in definition (i.e. as a δύναμις, 'power', in the Aristotelian sense); (2) the soul as a whole. We must in particular note this last option, since it is the o n e the Stoics were in effect to adopt.

ff. Bruns, whose explanation of the status of βούλησις shows that the ancient exegetical tradition considered it problematic. 21 ' I.e. the widespread dialectical technique of 'reversal' (περιτροπή) in its broader sense; see Burnyeat (1976), esp. 65. Galen's taste for this mode of argumentation is probably reflected by the title of his (lost) Περί τών εαυτούς περιτρεπόντων λόγων, Lib. prop. 11, SM II p.l 19.23-4 Müller. 218 See esp. PHP 3.1.10-15 ( W 2 . 8 8 5 ) , where Chrysippus presents the Platonic position in its original terminology. In book 4 Galen goes on to argue that Chrysippus changed his mind and ended up with Aristotle's view. Here his proof-text is an excerpt where Chrysippus argues that Homer located the Platonic parts, or rather the corresponding functions, in the heart (4.1.5-10 = SV7^2.905). Here too Galen exploits the fact tbat Chrysippus uses, for polemical purposes, the original Platonic terms. Two points may be noted: first, Galen's extreme literal-mindedness and total disregard for the original context of his quotations; secondly, his tendency to ascribe to his adversary the doctrines of rival schools. 219 I.e. the division into a rational and non-rational capacity, which is also Platonic or at any rate considered equivalent with the Platonic tripartition by Aristotle's time, as is—pace Vander Waerdt (1987)—clear from Aristotle's own treatment. Cf. Rees (1957). 220 On its persisting influence, see supra, p. 28.

Aristotle raises a p r e l i m i n a r y p r o b l e m ( α π ο ρ ί α ) : 'In what sense s h o u l d o n e speak of parts a n d how m a n y are t h e r e ? ' (432al5-23; cf. 4 0 2 b l - 5 ) . His s u b s e q u e n t t r e a t m e n t r e m a i n s p r e d o m i n a n t l y a p o r e t i c (cf. 432a22, 432b2, 12-13). 2 2 1 O n e n e e d n o t b e as o p i n i o n a t e d a c o m m e n t a t o r as D.W. Hamlyn to sympathize with his r e m a r k that the difficulties raised by Aristotle m i g h t 'rightly provoke d o u b t s o n t h e w h o l e faculty a p p r o a c h to t h e s o u l ' . 2 2 2 T h u s , h a v i n g raised t h e q u e s t i o n of t h e n a t u r e of t h e faculties a n d t h e i r n u m b e r , Aristotle says that 'in a way they seem infinite' (ibid. 24); a n d , with r e g a r d to t h e perceptive power (αίσθητικόν), o n e may d o u b t ' w h e t h e r to view it as rational or n o n - r a t i o n a l ' . 2 2 3 At face value, these c o n s i d e r a t i o n s actually tell in favour of the s e c o n d o p t i o n , i.e. that of o n e indivisible soul. T h i s o p t i o n is n o t p u r s u e d in what follows however. Aristotle's c r i t i q u e is d e s i g n e d to pave t h e way f o r his own division i n t o five m a i n powers (δυνάμεις). 2 2 4 T h u s h e c o n c l u d e s that m o t i o n is explicable in t e r m s of powers that a r e 'distinct in d e f i n i t i o n b u t spatially inseparable'—i.e. o p t i o n ( l b ) (10.433b24 f.). O n Plato's loose criterion of d i f f e r e n t a t i o n , Aristotle argues, m u c h m o r e parts would result t h a n t h e t h r e e h e (Plato) postulates, e.g. we would have to posit t h e nutritive (θρεπτικόν) a n d perceptive parts, which a r e even m o r e d i f f e r e n t f r o m t h e Platonic parts t h a n these d i f f e r a m o n g themselves. But the following p o i n t is m o r e i m p o r t a n t for o u r p r e s e n t purposes. Bipartition a n d tripartition, Aristotle holds, involve the splitting u p of t h e appetitive faculty which seems d i f f e r e n t f r o m all others, f o r 'wish (βούλησις) is in the rational part, a n d desire (έπιθυμία) a n d a n g e r (θυμός) in the non-rational; a n d if the soul has t h r e e parts, d e s i r e ( δ ρ ε ξ ι ς ) will b e f o u n d in e a c h o n e of t h e m ' (432b4-7). But this implication, h e says, is wholly implausible (άτο221

On Aristotle's critique of the soul-partition in this chapter see also Fortenbaugh (1970) and Vander Waerdt (1987). 222 Hamlyn (1968) 150. Vander Waerdt (1987) 627-43, in contrast, argues that Aristotle in mainly concerned with self-criticism, viz. by confining tripartition to the sphere of ethics and preferring the division into five powers in the context of scientific psychology. But this distinction (rather than self-criticism) hardly needs to be argued: it is clearly indicated at e.g. De an. A 1.402b3ff. and EN A 13. Cf. also Porph. ap. Stob. EcL I 49.25a, p. 350.19 ff. = Fr. 253 Smith; and supra, pp. 78 ff. 223 The Stoics were to describe perception as one of the four main activities of their unified rational soul: see Aëdus, cited supra, n. 38. 224 See esp. Β 3.414a31f. δυνάμεις δ' ε'ίπομεν θρεπτικόν, αίσθητικόν, όρεκτικόν, κινητικόν κατά τόπον, διανοητικόν. For Aristotle, this list is, so to speak, axiomatic: some people acknowledge all these functions, others only some of them; there are even people who accept one only, ibid. 29-31. The last option is identical to the view that was later ascribed to the Stoics, cf. e.g. Gal. PHP6.2.5.

π ο ν , 4 3 2 b 4 ) . T h a t is to say, Aristotle h o l d s t h a t d e s i r e has to b e a c c e p t e d as a distinct power. However, a p r o b l e m r e m a i n s as to t h e relation between desire a n d the rational faculty, since h e has said that w h e n we split u p desire p a r t of it will reside in r e a s o n . Later t h e Stoics will m a i n t a i n j u s t this: that reason has a will a n d motive power of its own a n d has n o n e e d of s e p a r a t e n o n - r a t i o n a l parts o n this score. Aristotle l u m p s t o g e t h e r t h e t h r e e P l a t o n i c p a r t s i n t o a single faculty, wrecking the Platonic partition b u t r e t a i n i n g a p p e t i t i o n as a s e p a r a t e power. C l e a n t h e s ' p r o c e d u r e is similar to Aristotle's in that it brings t h e t e r m s at issue u n d e r o n e h e a d i n g , viz. by r e p r e s e n t i n g t h e m as voiced (literally) by a single intellect. In so d o i n g C l e a n t h e s can b e said to cap Aristotle's critique of Plato. T h e u p s h o t is a m o d e l of m e n t a l conflict that t h e Chrysippus a n d o t h e r Stoics took also to b e e x e m p l i f i e d by M e d e a ' s d e s c r i p t i o n of h e r p l i g h t (see above, p. 171). T h e y did n o t conceive of e m o t i o n a n d m e n t a l conflict in t e r m s of separate faculties b u t r a t h e r in t e r m s of roles, o r selves, o n e of which r e p r e s e n t s cosmically r o o t e d 'right r e a s o n ' . As we have n o t i c e d , Aristotle raises several serious q u e r i e s a b o u t t h e faculty a p p r o a c h to t h e soul w i t h o u t following t h e m u p . T h e points raised could be taken to tell in favour of Aristotle's o p t i o n (2), which suits Stoic m o n i s m . It s e e m s feasible to c o m p a r e Chrysippus' d e f i n i t i o n in his On Law of c o n a t i o n (όρμή) as ' r e a s o n (λόγος) comm a n d i n g m a n to act. 2 2 5 T h i s m o d e of f o r m u l a t i o n s e e m s likewise d e s i g n e d to drive h o m e t h e essence of m o n i s m as o p p o s e d to comp e t i n g c o n c e p t i o n s . Also, it is p e r t i n e n t to p o i n t o u t t h a t — a s is also clear f r o m what seems to have b e e n t h e c o n t e x t of Chrysippus' defin i t i o n — c o n a t i o n a n d a p p e t i t i o n ( ό ρ ε ξ ι ς ) a r e closely r e l a t e d concepts, a p p e t i t i o n b e i n g d e f i n e d as rational c o n a t i o n a n d thus in effect the only kind of c o n a t i o n which really matters, a n d that m o r e o v e r t h e d e f i n i t i o n s of a p p e t i t i o n a n d its subspecies in Aristotle a n d Stoicism in several cases d o overlap. 2 2 6 225

Plut. Stoic. Rep. 1037F (SVF3.175). The following context, featuring Chrysippean definitions of forms of conation, notably ορεξις, should be compared as well. 226 According to Stoic definitions, έπιθυμία is an άλογος δρεξις and βούλησις an εύλογος δρεξις. The generic (and morally neural) term ορεξις is defined as 'a (rational) conation (όρμή) directed at an apparent good'. SVF3.495; cf. 493, 494; cf. 3.431, 432 (βούλησις as one of the three εύπαθείαι), 169; 173; 391. Chrysippus also fixed the meaning of ορεξις more narrowly as a 'rational conation towards something that gives pleasure to the extent it should'. PHP4.2.3-4 (SVF3.463); 4.2 (SVF 3.464); cf. ibid 5.7.29-30. (Whether he intended this normative sense to coincide with that of βούλησις according to the above definition is a difficult point).

As to C l e a n t h e s , t h e stark q u e s t i o n now raises itself w h e t h e r h e h a d actually r e a d De an. Γ 9. I take t h e similarities I have n o t e d between his d i a l o g u e a n d this Aristotelian c h a p t e r to b e significant, in p a r t i c u l a r w h e r e t h e i r m o d e of a r g u m e n t a t i o n is c o n c e r n e d . T h e r e is o n e testimony a b o u t C l e a n t h e s ' a t t i t u d e to t h e Peripatetics of his day which lends f u r t h e r weight to my i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . C l e a n t h e s used to say that the Peripatetics were 'in a p r e d i c a m e n t similar to that of lyres, which give f o r t h beautiful s o u n d s b u t never h e a r themselves' (D.L. 7.173). T h i s m u s t m e a n t h a t t h e P e r i p a t e t i c s left t h e full u n d e r s t a n d i n g of their words to others, like Cleanthes. T h i s can only m e a n that C l e a n t h e s used Peripatetic d o c t r i n e s for his own purposes. T o c o n c l u d e this section, we may n o t e , first, that t h e d i a l o g u e is designed as a response to the positions of Plato a n d Aristotle a n d that the Aristotelian p r e s e n c e is particularly n o t a b l e . It is a fair assumption t h a t t h e d i a l o g u e is i n s p i r e d by A r i s t o t l e ' s c r i t i q u e of t h e Platonic tripartition in his On the Soul Γ 9. In sum, the Stoics carry this critique to its logical conclusion, i.e. t h e a b a n d o n m e n t of t h e whole faculty a p p r o a c h , w h e r e a s Aristotle h a d c h o s e n to cling to t h e basic division b e t w e e n a rational c o m p o n e n t a n d a motive or appetitive o n e . 2 2 7 So Aristotle may have c o n t r i b u t e d to t h e genesis of Stoic psychological m o n i s m . 2 2 8

9. Two Further Witnesses: Seneca and ps. Plutarch Lactantius, On God's Anger 17.13 has preserved a cluster of definitions of a n g e r which have b e e n derived f r o m Seneca's On Anger b u t c a n n o t

Arist. De an. Γ 10.433a23-31 defines βούλησις and έπιθυμία as correct (όρθός) and incorrect ορεξις respectively. Elsewhere he subsumes θυμός under έπιθυμία (De an. A 1.401a30f.). Likewise the pseudo-Platonic Definitiones (of uncertain date) defines βούλησις as ορεξις εύλογος (413C8f.). For further parallels with Stoicism see Ingenkamp (1967) 106 ff. esp. 109 f., who sticks to the traditional view that this tract is Academic. For anticipations of the definitions at issue here cf. also Pl. Ch. 167el-5, Prot. 340a8-bl. 227 See esp. 432b26-33a9: pure reason is incapable of causing movement whereas desire (έπιθυμία, ορεξις) is not responsible for its movement but follows or should follow reason. Here Aristotle uses the same schema, with its moral implications, that he had proferred at fiVA.13. 228 To be sure, the resulting position also held its attractions for the Stoics. Frede (1986) 98 rightly points to the emphasis placed upon the affections being voluntary so that we are responsible for them. This is quite in line with the Socratic dictum that no one errs willingly (as expressed e.g. at PI. Tim. 86el-2 in a section that profoundly influenced the Stoics as well, see supra pp. 188 ff.)

b e paralleled f r o m the e x t a n t MSS of this work. In his O C T e d i t i o n Reynolds p r i n t s these d e f i n i t i o n s at a p o i n t n e a r t h e b e g i n n i n g of b o o k I w h e r e the MSS f e a t u r e a lacuna, viz., I, 2.3b: Anger is 'the desire (or 'appetite', cupiditas) to avenge an injustice' or, as Posidonius says, 'the desire to punish him by who you consider yourself to be unjustly h a r m e d ' (F 155 E.-K.). Some define it as follows: anger is an incitement of the mind to damage him who has done damage or wished to do damage'. In fact Lactantius cites a n o t h e r d e f i n i t i o n of a n g e r f r o m Seneca, 2 2 9 3,3: 'Aristotle's definition is not far from ours; he says that 'anger is a desire to pay back pain' (Cf. De an. A 1.403a29-bl ). T h e first d e f i n i t i o n is c o m m o n Stoic (cf. Cic. Tusc. 3.11, 19; 4.44), while t h e third a p p e a r s to b e E p i c u r e a n . 2 3 0 P o s i d o n i u s ' d e f i n i t i o n is clearly a r e f i n e m e n t of t h e g e n e r a l Stoic o n e ( r e f l e c t i n g a m o r e g e n e r a l a t t i t u d e vis-à-vis his p r e d e c e s s o r s ) , b u t like t h e latter wholly m o n i s t i c , a n d i n c o m p a t i b l e with t h e P l a t o n i c t r i p a r t i t i o n . Like Aristotle b e f o r e t h e m , t h e Stoic r e l e g a t e d a n g e r to t h e status of a subspecies of desire. T h e tract Whether Appetite and Distress Belong to the Soul or the Body is a s c r i b e d to P l u t a r c h b u t c e r t a i n l y s p u r i o u s . Its s u b j e c t - m a t t e r is directly relevant to many of t h e issues raised in the p r e s e n t study. In chs. 4-6 ps.Plutarch sketches the t h r e e m a i n positions that have b e e n a d o p t e d by d o g m a t i s t p h i l o s p h e r s : first, a f f e c t i o n s (i.e. in t h e wide sense c o m p r i s i n g b o t h m e n t a l a n d bodily affections) all b e l o n g to t h e soul—a position d e f e n d e d by Strato (ch.4 ~ Strato fr. I l l Wehr1i)); secondly, a f f e c t i o n s ( a n d i n d e e d all m e n t a l activities) a r e bodily processes; t h e r e is n o such a t h i n g as a soul—a position instantiated by the a u t h o r of a b o o k entitled On the Underworld, whose a u t h o r may b e H e r a c l i d e s of P o n t u s (ch. 5). Thirdly, t h e r e are those who, strike an awkward (as ps.Plutarch o p i n e s ) c o m p r o m i s e b e t w e e n these two o p p o s i n g positions. This holds g o o d for Posidonius: Posidonius divides them [seil, the affections] into (1) those of the soul; (2) those of the body; (3) cthose of the body> and involving, although not being of, the soul; <(4) those of the soul and involving, although not being of, the body. Of the soul> without qualification he

229 230

As noted by Cooper and Procopé in their translation ad loc. Cf. Procopé (1998) 176 f.

calls t h o s e w h i c h consist o f (1) j u d g e m e n t s a n d a s s u m p t i o n s , e.g. desires, fears, fits o f anger; (2) o f the b o d y w i t h o u t qualification are fevers, chills, c o n t r a c t i o n s a n d o p e n i n g up o f the pores; (3) o f the b o d y but involving the soul are cases o f lethargies, d e r a n g e m e n t s arising f r o m black bile, m e n t a l pangs, m e n t a l a p p e a r a n c e s a n d feelings o f relaxation; (4) o f the soul but involving the b o d y are tremors, pallors a n d o t h e r c h a n g e s o f a p p e a r a n c e related to fear o r distress (ch. 6 ~ F 154 E.-K.). 2 3 1

T h e way in which d i f f e r e n t kinds of affection are a p p o r t i o n e d to either body or soul or both strongly recall the options indicated by Aristotle in response to the question 'whether the affections of the soul are also shared by that which contains the soul [i.e. the body] or any of t h e m is peculiar to the soul itself (De an. A 1.403a3-b19). Whatever their precise relation to the body, the affections are inseparable f r o m it; they are ' f o r m u l a e expressed in m a t t e r ' . Definition should c o n f o r m to this. Here Aristotle introduces his two definitions of anger as (i) a desire for retaliation or (ii) the boiling of the blood a n d heat a r o u n d the heart, calling the f o r m e r typical of the dialectician and the latter of the physicist. This distinction corresponds to that between form and matter. T h e Stoics, including Posidonius, as we have seen, took over both definitions, or accounts, 2 3 2 though obviously for them the difference could not be o n e between form and matter. Form was corporeal and this held good for the soul as well. In Posidonius' case, this point is illustrated by the way he dealt with Platonic form (see above, p. 211). So if Posidonius' category (1)—affections of the soul only—has n o counterpart in Aristotle, it does suit his r e q u i r e m e n t (403al0-12) that any affection peculiar to the soul would have to be separable f r o m the body in the light of the Stoic position on the relation of the soul to the body as two separate corporeal substances. Moreover, Aristotle allows for the possibility that thinking (νοείν) is peculiar to the soul, h e n c e separable from the body as o p p o s e d to anger, desire and the like (403a7-8). But if these are taken in purely cognitive terms, they can be taken to b e l o n g exclusively to the soul even on Aristotle's terms. In general the careful way in which Aristotle distinguishes 231 δ γε τοι Ποσειδώνιος τά μέν είναι ψυχικά τά δέ σωματικά, και τά μέν ού ψυχής περί ψυχήν δέ (σωματικά, τά δ' ού σώματος περί σώμα δέ ψυχικά φησι· ψυχικά μέν) άπλώς λέγων τά έν κρίσεσι και ύπολήψεσιν, οίον φόβους όργάς, σωματικά δ'άπλώς πυρετούς περιψύξεις πυκνώσεις άραιώσεις, περί ψυχήν δέ σωματικά λήθαργους μελαγχολίας δηγμούς φαντασίας διαχύσεις, άνάπαλιν δέ περί σώμα ψυχικά τρόμους καί ώχριάσεις καί μεταβολάς τού είδους κατά φόβον ή λύπην. 232 See for the physical definition supra pp. 157 ff. Cf. also PI. Ti. 70cl-5.

between the aspects involved in affection a n d their relation to either body or soul or both is strikingly similar to the above passage. T h e testimony in ps. Plutarch has always been a stone in the shoe of all those who accepted Galen's testimony that Posidonius attrib u t e d the affections to two non-rational powers in the soul, viz. Platonic anger (or 'spirit') a n d desire. Category (a)—the affections themselves—is d e s c r i b e d in a c c o r d a n c e with the C h r y s i p p e a n position which Posidonius is supposed to have abandoned. 2 3 3 In fact, Posidonius represents here, as elsewhere, the general Stoic view— although ps. Plutarch seems primarily interested in this distinction of kinds of affections because h e can present it as intermediary between the two o t h e r positions he has listed (that affections belong to the soul only and that they belong to the body only). Yet his report makes clear that Posidonius saw the affections in the sense at issue as primarily cognitive, having n o need of separate psychic powers of the kind assumed by Galen. 2 3 4 Indeed, ps.Plutarch's testimony conforms to the distinction drawn by Chrysippus between the following aspects of affection: (i) a j u d g e m e n t (ii) a physical state or effect of the soul (iii) physical symptoms of the body related to certain affections

—all three of which aspects are related to one a n o t h e r by Chrysippus and used to d e m o n s t r a t e that the intellect resides in the heart in a verbatim f r a g m e n t q u o t e d by Galen at PHP 3.7.2-4 (SVF 2.900) 235 233

In Tieleman (1996a) 229 I submitted that Posidonius' name had got wrongly attached to this account, taking this position in view of Galen's testimony as well as other problematic attributions made by ps.Plutarch. Sorabji (2000) 104 n. 67, 120 n. 66 was unconvinced. In line with my argument as set out in the text, I retract my earlier suggestion. Meanwhile Sorabji has adopted the view that according to Posidonius judgements are not necessary for emotions, see Sorabji (2000) ch. 8. But this is to ignore the clear testimony of ps. Plutarch. Elsewhere in his book, however, Sorabji argues that for Posidonius 'at least standardly in adult humans, emotions involve judgements' (p.104 n.67). 234 The two terms 'judgements and assumptions' are also used in Galen's report on Posidonius' view on the genesis of affections, PHP 5.5.21 (F 169), see supra, pp. 231 ff. I take it that these terms reflect what Posidonius actually said. Note that Galen also includes a reference to the logistikon in his report. I assume that Posidonius did not use this Platonic term on his own behalf, though perhaps in his summary of Plato's view. 235 Cf. Frede (1986) 102; Tieleman (1996a) 188.

Posidonius' f o u r t h category—purely somatic diseases—are r e p r e s e n ted in Chrysippus' analogy between t h e m a n d m e n t a l affections. F u r t h e r c o r r e s p o n d e n c e s with early Stoic texts can be p o i n t e d out. T h e word we have translated as ' a n g e r ' h e r e is όργή n o t θυμός. Atrabilious d e r a n g e m e n t of m i n d , o r melancholy, f e a t u r e s in Stoic texts c o n c e r n e d with t h e question w h e t h e r or n o t the Sage is e x e m p t f r o m a f f e c t i o n (i.e. α π α θ ή ς ) . 2 3 6 A n o t h e r way of p u t t i n g this was to ask w h e t h e r virtue, o n c e a c q u i r e d , c o u l d b e lost again. For i n s t a n c e , D i o g e n e s Laertius r e p o r t s that Chrysippus a s s u m e d that virtue could b e lost b e c a u s e of melancholia o r a l c o h o l i s m , w h e r e a s C l e a n t h e s t h o u g h t n o t (D.L. 7.127 ~ SVF3.237). Melancholia presents a particularly i n t e r e s t i n g case b e c a u s e it was c o n s i d e r e d b o t h a type of m a d ness a n d a m a r k of genius. 2 3 7 But w h e n Posidonius spoke of melancholy, h e r e f e r r e d to a pathological c o n d i t i o n related to black bile ( S a n d b a c h ' s translation 'atrabilious d e r a n g e m e n t ' is t h e r e f o r e a p t ) . W h e n o n e is a f f e c t e d by it, o n e ' s soul is involved b u t o n e d o e s n o t s u f f e r f r o m a π ά θ ο ς in t h e crucial m o r a l sense of a f f e c t i o n , i.e. an a f f e c t i o n r e s u l t i n g f r o m j u d g e m e n t . W h e t h e r o r n o t o n e believed that virtue could thus be lost, it m a d e sense to distinguish the type of a f f e c t i o n i n s t a n t i a t e d by lethargy a n d m e l a n c h o l y f r o m a f f e c t i o n . T h u s Posidonius classed it as bodily t h o u g h affecting the soul, quite in line with earlier Stoic ideas. A n o t h e r m e n t a l disease we find in t h e relevant early Stoic texts is lethargy, which f e a t u r e s in P o s i d o n i u s ' classification too. Moreover, b o t h Posidonius a n d C l e m e n t (in o n e of t h e parallel passages, Strom. IV 22 ~ SVF 3.240) r e f e r to m e n t a l impressions o r p r e s e n t a t i o n s , i.e. φ α ν τ α σ ί α ι . T h e c o n c e p t of p r e s e n t a t i o n is d e f i n e d by t h e Stoics n o t only as an i m p r i n t in the intellect b u t also as πάθος, i.e. an affection, s o m e t h i n g o n e e x p e r i e n c e s o r u n d e r g o e s involuntarily. 2 3 8 So t h e

236 237

SVF 3.237-241.

In ancient sources the term does not stand for one of the four charactertypes or temperaments corresponding to the four humours in the body (black and yellow bile, blood and phlegma). This classification appears to originate in the Early Middle Ages, see Schöner (1964). The most comprehensive treatment of melancholy in antiquity is Flashar (1966); cf. also Klibansky el al. (1964). On Aristotle's influential concept of melancholy see Van der Eijk (1990). In the biographical tradition the founder of the Stoa, Zeno, in a way that suggests that he was a melancholic too, as befits a man of genius; see supra, p. 165. 238 A.ët. IV 12.1 (πάθος έν τη ψυχή γίγνομενον), D.L. 7.49 (διάνοια πάσχει... ύπό φαντασίας). On Zeno's definition of presentation as an imprint (τύπωσις) and its explanation as a qualitative change by Chrysippus, see D.L. 7.46, 50, S. AÍ. 7.227. These texts have been assembled as SVF2.52-56.

c o n c e p t of presentation firmly belongs in the a c c o u n t of various kinds of affections a n d their influence on the intellect and in particular their detrimental effect. T h e presence of this neutral and wider concept suggests that what is involved in melancholy, alcoholism and the like are the p r e s e n t a t i o n s involved in these conditions, viz. a particular, distortive type of presentation. This is strongly suggested by Clement's account which refers in the same connection to mental disease a n d dreams, i.e. mental presentations received while asleep (cf. lethargy). Clearly the c o n d i t i o n s m e n t i o n e d , w h e t h e r pathological or otherwise, affect the quality of our mental presentations. Nonetheless, the Stoics held that virtue c a n n o t be lost by presentations alone. After all, having a presentation does n o t necessarily involve assent and h e n c e j u d g e m e n t . An affection may occur only if a n d when assent is given, a n d wrongly given. T h u s the separate mention of presentations in category (c) balances that of j u d g e m e n t s in c o n n e c t i o n with affections in category (a). Posidonius too lists them alongside cases of mental d e r a n g e m e n t such as melancholy and lethargy. It may n o t be too far-fetched to c o m p a r e the Stoics' reference to (a particular kind of) presentations as o n e of the sources of evil (see above, p. 137). In fact, it would seem that the 'bites' h e r e merely exemplify an unpleasant type of presentation associated with grief (λύπη) in particular. O u r sources list the bite as o n e of the physical reactions accompanying emotion. But there is n o contradiction with the alternative description as a mental a p p e a r a n c e , which after all is an imprint in the psychic pneuma,239 T h e Stoics drew a crucial distinction: the bite is n o t yet the affection of grief. It may a n n o u n c e grief but n e e d n o t develop into it. This requires assent to the accompanying presentation, i.e. j u d g e m e n t . Analogously, relaxation is a mental reaction

239

See Cic. Tusc. 3.83 (not in SVF), bringing out the involuntary nature of the bite (morsus) as opposed to the affection of grief as involving judgement. The Greek terms δήξις or δήγμος are also found in this sense; see Plut. Virt. Mor. 10, 449D (bites, contraction and relaxations); PHP 4.3.2 (SVF 1.209), where it is aligned with relaxations and contractions (cf. Plutarch as cited in the text). Galen says these mental phenomena are irrational and attendant upon judgements, that is to say, we here have the same distinction between ps.Plutarch's categories (a) and (c) again. The difference between these categories is no less crucial for Galen than for the Stoics themselves, because Galen argues that Zeno regarded these nonrational bites and contractions, etc. rather than the judgements as the pathê. This is clearly unfounded—as Galen himself clearly knows, see PHP 5.6.40-42. Cf. also 2.8.4 ('the bite in cases of g r i e f ) , not in SVF, but clearly referring to a Stoic argument designed to locate the intellect.

c o n n e c t e d with p l e a s u r e (ηδονή), t h o u g h n o t i d e n t i c a l to it. 2 4 0 A n o t h e r way of p u t t i n g it would be to say that it is a particular feeling typical of p l e a s u r e . T h i s f e e l i n g r e p r e s e n t s t h e quality of o u r p r e s e n t a t i o n s w h e n t h e soul is r e l a x e d a n d h e a t e d u p . 2 4 1 T h u s Plutarch in his On Moral Virtue (ch. 9, 449A-B ~ S VF3.439) f o r m u l a t e s the traditional c h a r g e of word-splitting against the Stoics as follows: But when they, though refuted by tears and tremors and changes of complexion, speak of certain bites and concentrations 2 4 2 instead of grief and fear and camouflage desires as inclination 243 , they appear to fabricate sophistic rather than philosophical subterfuges and evasions from the realities by means of words. T h e Stoics insisted o n t h e distinctions criticized h e r e b e c a u s e they f o u n d t h e m indispensable f o r d e l i n e a t i n g their c o n c e p t of affection: grief, f e a r a n d desire o c c u r only if a particular j u d g e m e n t is m a d e . Feelings such as m e n t a l stings a n d c o n t r a c t i o n s a r e n o t affections, t h o u g h they may h e r a l d t h e latter. But n o t only d o we f i n d h e r e ps.Plutarch's categories (a) a n d (c). Plutarch pokes f u n at t h e Stoics by t u r n i n g category (d) against t h e m : t h e bodily effects indicative of t h e soul in a state of affection: n o t only t h e tears, b u t also the t r e m o r a n d c h a n g e s of c o m p l e x i o n can be paralleled f r o m ps.Plutarch's list. T h i s is hardly a c o i n c i d e n c e . T h e g e n u i n e P l u t a r c h o r his s o u r c e m u s t have d r a w n o n a classification very similar to t h e P o s i d o n i a n o n e used by ps.Plutarch. P l u t a r c h ' s o b j e c t i o n is n o t u n l i k e the p o i n t m a d e by ps.Plutarch, viz. that t h e distinction is oversubtle. 2 4 4 240 Plut. Virt. Mor. 449D (SVF 3.468): relaxation admits of gradations; Gal. PHP 4.2.6 (SVF 3.463), 5.1.4 (SVF 1 Zeno 209) lists mental relaxation alongside other physical reactions of the soul such as the bite and contraction. D.L. 7.114 (SVF 3.400) subsumes διάχυσις under ηδονή (lust, pleasure) and defines it as an άναλυσις τής αρετής. The second point is inaccurate in view of its alignment with δήξις in our other texts. In this light διάχυσις cannot count as affection in the sense of a full-fledged affection and hence it cannot subvert virtue. It can merely initiate the loss of virtue. Nonetheless, the reference to virtue interestingly reflects the original context of Diogenes' notice, viz. an account of various kinds of affection and their effects upon virtue. 241 Plutarch, De primo frigido 948D (SVF 3.430) says that the heat relaxes the sense-perception of the one who touches, just as brilliance does the same for the one wlio sees. For the role of the hot and the cold in percepdon and affection, see supra, p. 160 ff. 242 Reading with Sorabji (2000) 40 συνθρόησεις for the otherwise unknown συνεόρσεις. Whereas the bite is typical of distress, the retreats towards the centre, i.e. the heart, in fear, see Cic. Tusc. 4.15, Gal. PHP 3.5.43-44. 243 On προθυμία as an acceptable mental reaction different from appetite (έπιθυμία) see now Sorabji (2000) 52f. 244 In fact, ps. Plutarch's tract exhibits more parallels with the genuine Plutarch's writings—so much so that some scholars waver as to the tract's inauthen-

10.

Conclusion

Galen fails to p r o d u c e any verbatim q u o t a t i o n in s u p p o r t of his cont e n t i o n that Posidonius saw desire a n d a n g e r as i n d e p e n d e n t powers alongside r e a s o n . O n t h e contrary, P o s i d o n i u s was at pains to avoid t e r m s like power or p a r t with r e f e r e n c e to t h e m e n t a l p h e n o m e n a h e discusses. Galen however o p e r a t e s with a s c h e m a of o p t i o n s in which P o s i d o n i u s is linked to Aristotle a n d c r e d i t e d with t h e Aristotelian version of t h e Platonic tripartition (6.2.5, see above, ch. 1.3, p. 34). This version involves a division of psychic faculties in t e r m s of powers (δυνάμεις) n o t P l a t o n i c p a r t s (μερή, μ ό ρ ι α ) — a d i s t i n c t i o n w h i c h r e p r e s e n t s o n e of t h e issues in t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l d e b a t e in G a l e n ' s day (ch. 1.2). However, this s c h e m a divides t h e available o p t i o n s in t e r m s of Platonist-cum-Peripatetic c o n c e p t s (being, part, f o r m a n d power) that a r e i n c o m m e n s u r a t e with Stoic usage. I have p o i n t e d to the role of such s c h é m a s G a l e n ' s m e t h o d , in particular w h e n it c o m e s to r e p r e s e n t i n g t h e positions of o t h e r p h i l o s o p h e r s a n d even their actual words as culled f r o m their expositions. Posidonius reserved t h e t e r m affection (πάθος) f o r t h e c o m p l e t e d c o n a t i o n (ορμή) which, pace Sorabji, always involved a j u d g e m e n t a n d to which a c o n t r i b u t i o n is m a d e by what h e called affective movements (παθητικαί κ ι ν ή σ ε ι ς ) . T h e s e a r e m a n i f e s t a t i o n s of t h e affective side o r a s p e c t (παθητικόν) of t h e soul. T h i s c o n c e r n s its passivity as a f e a t u r e (alongside t h e capability to act) of any c o r p o r e a l substance. T h e passive m o m e n t in t h e genesis of e m o t i o n occurs w h e n a m e n t a l a p p e a r a n c e is f o r m e d ( w h e t h e r as a d i r e c t result of p e r c e p t i o n or f r o m an act of r e a s o n i n g ) a n d its i m p a c t causes a physical process. W h e n t h e soul's physical tension is weak, t h e 'first m o v e m e n t ' t h u s caused may slip into t h e excessive m o t i o n that is technically a m e n t a l a f f e c t i o n or e m o t i o n . T h e s a m e m e c h a n i s m can b e d e s c r i b e d in intentional terms. Given Stoic psychological c o r p o r e a l i s m , it m a k e s n o sense to play off against o n e a n o t h e r t h e m e n t a l a n d physical aspects involved in this process—which is exactly w h a t Galen is d o i n g . It is a telling witness to t h e workings of his dialectic that h e i n t e r p r e t s t h e παθητικόν as a kind of super-division of t h e soul covering b o t h Platonic non-rational parts, t h e anger-like (τό θυμοειδές) a n d appetitive (τό έπιθυμητικόν). T h i s r e a d i n g is based o n a d o x o g r a p h i c s c h e m a a n d can b e paralleled f r o m m o r e o r less c o n t e m p o r a r y Platonist sources.

ticity, see e.g. Sandbach (1969a) 35

T h o u g h Galen links Posidonius to Aristotle, Posidonius was m o r e c o n c e r n e d with Plato, viz. in t h e c o n t e x t of his discussion of the ' t h e a n c i e n t a c c o u n t ' (ό π α λ α ι ό ς λόγος). T h e whole p o i n t of this exercise was n o t to a b a n d o n C h r y s i p p e a n m o n i s m in favour of this a n c i e n t a c c o u n t , b u t to trace the p e d i g r e e of the Stoic m o d e l of the m i n d back to earlier thinkers such as Pythagoras, Plato a n d Aristotle. T h a t is to say, h e p r e s e n t e d their ideas as i m p e r f e c t anticipations of the m a i n s t r e a m Stoic d o c t r i n e , to which h e himself subscribed. Stoic p r e d e c e s s o r s such as Z e n o a n d C l e a n t h e s were also b r o u g h t in to illustrate the continuity of this tradition. This t e c h n i q u e of a p p r o p r i a t i o n has old c r e d e n t i a l s in a n c i e n t , including Stoic, dialectic. It involved an effort of reinterpretation a n d assimilation which o f f e r e d Galen the o p p o r t u n i t y to p r e s e n t Posidonius as r e t u r n i n g to the b o s o m of his g r a n d old tradition of g o o d p h i l o s o p h y a n d m e d i c i n e — o n e of t h e m a i n t h e m e s of t h e PHP. H e r e , as elsewhere, h e seized o n t h e p r e s e n c e of Platonic t e r m i n o logy to illustrate his claim, notably in C l e a n t h e s ' d i a l o g u e between reason a n d a n g e r as cited by Posidonius. In truth Posidonius worked the o t h e r way r o u n d : t h e ideas of t h e predecessors c o n c e r n e d were a p p r o p r i a t e d by h i m a n d served to s t r e n g t h e n t h e traditional Stoic d o c t r i n e . Of course, this claim should be rested o n real textual evid e n c e . T h e most plausible r e a d i n g of t h e relevant passages is that Posidonius p r e s e n t e d Plato a n d Aristotle as discoverers of a prototype of the Stoic technical c o n c e p t of c o n a t i o n (όρμή). This resulted f r o m their d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n between reason a n d e m o t i o n (with Plato m a k i n g the f u r t h e r distinction between two kinds of e m o t i o n ) . This is r e a d i n g their positions f r o m a Stoic p o i n t of view, since the Stoics d e f i n e d e m o t i o n as a kind of c o n a t i o n ( t h o u g h it should be r e m e m b e r e d that in this respect the Stoics f o u n d s o m e f o o t i n g in the Platonic texts as well, for e x a m p l e when Plato assigns appetition to each of the t h r e e parts of the psyché). Posidonius showed that the Platonic scale of n a t u r e in particular to s o m e e x t e n t a n t i c i p a t e d t h e Stoic c o n c e p t of conation If P o s i d o n i u s wished to p r e s e n t t h e Stoic position as a developm e n t f r o m earlier ideas, h e h a d to pay attention to both revision a n d c o n t i n u i t y . P o s i d o n i u s t h e r e f o r e also p o i n t e d to t h e d i f f e r e n c e s between the Stoic position a n d its rivals. T h e precursors of Stoicism h a d b e e n c o r r e c t in identifying c o n a t i o n as a s e p a r a t e aspect b u t wrong in according to it the status of a separate psychic faculty, be it a p a r t or a power. Aristotle h a d m a d e s o m e progress toward a m o r e

c o r r e c t m o d e l by s u b s u m i n g a n g e r u n d e r a p p e t i t e . T h u s t h e Stoics i n c l u d i n g P o s i d o n i u s took over Aristotle's d e f i n i t i o n of a n g e r as a subspecies of desire. This abolishes the Platonic tripartition. In spite of his f u n d a m e n t a l a n d devastating criticism of t h e Platonic souldivision (De an. Γ 9), Aristotle did n o t take the obvious f u r t h e r step of a b a n d o n i n g t h e faculty a p p r o a c h , t h o u g h h e c o n s i d e r e d this as an o p t i o n . H e r e t a i n e d a basic division between reason a n d desire (e.g. EN A 13). O n o u r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of C l e a n t h e s ' dialogue, it reflects a n d caps t h e Aristotelian critique of soul-division—and this was of c o u r s e t h e r e a s o n why P o s i d o n i u s h a d q u o t e d it, n o t b e c a u s e it d e m o n s t r a t e d t h a t t h e v e n e r a b l e C l e a n t h e s h a d b e e n a Platonist. T h a t is to say, Posidonius p r e s e n t e d C l e a n t h e s as having taken t h e step Aristotle h a d b e e n r e l u c t a n t to take. This agrees fully with what we have f o u n d a b o u t t h e relation b e t w e e n c o n a t i o n a n d reason in t h e Stoic a n d P o s i d o n i a n scale of n a t u r e (ch. 5.3), as well as with C h r y s i p p u s ' d e f i n i t i o n of c o n a t i o n as r e a s o n in its c o m m a n d i n g capacity (see above p. 276). Posidonius p r e s e n t e d this p a r t of t h e history of p h i l o s o p h y as a series of a t t e m p t s to establish t h e correct relationship between h u m a n reason a n d motivation (or desire). H e also showed its moral relevance by r e f e r r i n g to the e n d of h u m a n life, o r h a p p i n e s s , a n d e x p l a i n i n g t h e superiority of t h e Stoic m o d e l to those c o m p e t i n g d o c t r i n e s which involved non-rational parts of the soul (above, p. 228). In assimilating Platonic ideas to the Stoic position Posidonius also discussed t h e t h e r a p e u t i c t r e a t m e n t of the affections. T o this subject Chrysippus h a d d e v o t e d a s e p a r a t e b o o k of his On Affections, which stood m o d e l for Posidonius' work of the same title. J u s t as in the case of Chrysippus, the t h e r a p e u t i c application of t h e Stoic d o c t r i n e by P o s i d o n i u s reveals t h e i m p o r t a n c e of t h e soul's corporeality. This e m e r g e s f r o m the interest taken by Posidonius in diet a n d r e g i m e n in general, in line with predecessors such as Z e n o a n d Chrysippus. H e r e t o o h e traced Platonic a n t i c i p a t i o n s a n d even f o u n d it possible to associate Plato with Stoic corporealism. This may seem surprising b u t we did f i n d s o m e evidence f o r Posidonius' corporealist r e a d i n g of the Platonic Timaeus (see above, p. 210). In fact, Stoic psychology in its Chrysippean phase also betrays a discriminating use of Plato a n d in particular of those Platonic passages which suit Stoic c o r p o r e a l i s m (see above, p. 187 ff.). I d o n o t wish to imply that Posidonius a n d o t h e r Stoics ruthlessly p u t the Platonic text o n their Procrustean bed. But n e i t h e r s h o u l d we follow G a l e n in believing that P o s i d o n i u s

represents a r e t u r n to Plato, if this should mean that he distanced himself f r o m Chrysippus. Posidonius' admiration for Plato was no d o u b t g e n u i n e . But this does not preclude adaptation a n d selective use. H e stayed within the Chrysippean f r a m e w o r k , c o n t r i b u t i n g r e f i n e m e n t s of technical terminology, in part in the light of the άπορίαι first raised by Chrysippus (ch. 5.7). This conclusion is not jeopardized by the positions of his immediate predecessors Panaetius and Diogenes of Babylon (ch. 5.6) or for that matter Hecaton. We have f o u n d that their supposed psychological dualism is based on an uncritical reading of the sources who are either not interested in the opposition between dualism a n d monism (Cicero), or hostile to Stoicism ( P h i l o d e m u s ) . In this light it would be b e t t e r to stop thinking in terms of a Middle Stoic period since this creates all kinds of misunderstanding.

CHAPTER SIX

C I C E R O O N AFFECTIONS

1. Preamble In the p r e c e d i n g c h a p t e r s Cicero has repeatedly t u r n e d u p as o n e of o u r sources. In his Tusculan Disputations b o o k s 4 a n d , to a lesser extent, 3, we f i n d substantial passages which clearly r u n parallel, b o t h in c o n t e n t a n d in wording, to those cited by Galen f r o m Chrysippus' On Affections. O f p a r t i c u l a r i m p o r t a n c e is 4.11-33, w h e r e C i c e r o presents what a p p e a r s to b e an e p i t o m e of Chrysippus' treatise. This extensive a n d clearly d e m a r c a t e d section offers, it seems, a welcome o p p o r t u n i t y to c h e c k a n d s u p p l e m e n t t h e e v i d e n c e f r o m G a l e n . Admittedly, Cicero provides n o verbatim q u o t a t i o n s b u t evidence of an indirect kind, whose n a t u r e a n d p r o v e n a n c e are o p e n to question a n d have i n d e e d b e e n i n t e r p r e t e d in various ways. O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , h e is quite unlike Galen in o f f e r i n g a fairly unbiased a c c o u n t of parts of Chrysippus' work: h e even p r e f e r s it to that of o t h e r schools (4.9, 11). Add t h e a l t o g e t h e r d i f f e r e n t historical a n d literary ambie n c e of Cicero's writings, a n d we seem to be in a position to m a k e all sorts of illuminating c o m p a r i s o n s between h i m a n d Galen. W h e n Von Arnim used these books f o r his collection of fragments, various p r o p o s a l s h a d a l r e a d y b e e n m a d e as to t h e identity of C i c e r o ' s source, o r sources. In t h e SVF we f i n d a m e r e h a n d f u l of passages in t h e section c o n c e r n e d with the On Affections (SVF 3.483488), t h o u g h — a s a quick glance at his Index shows—several passages f r o m these two C i c e r o n i a n b o o k s f o u n d their way into t h e t h e m a t i c sections c o n c e r n e d with ethics. Even the c o h e r e n t a n d explicitly attrib u t e d a c c o u n t at 4.9-33 has b e e n b r o k e n u p a n d scattered all over SVF III ( a n d even, in o n e instance, I). Von Arnim did n o t u n d e r t a k e a systematic study of the text, a l t h o u g h h e r e s p o n d e d to s o m e of the p r o p o s a l s o n o f f e r , a n d s u b m i t t e d a few of his own. 1 Both his

1

See SVF vol. I (1905), pp. XX-XXVIII. In opposition to Hirzel (1883), 414 ff., 479 ff., who sees Philo of Larissa as the source of Tusc. as a whole, Von Arnim is confident that Cicero's source for much of book 3 must be Andochus of Ascalon (cf. 3.59). In his view (p. XXVI), the account of Cicero/Antiochus comes close to

reluctance to p r e s e n t sections of Cicero's text as evidence f o r the On Affections a n d his f r a g m e n t e d m o d e of p r e s e n t a t i o n t e n d to o b s c u r e its i m p o r t a n c e as a source. M o r e recently, however, J e a n i n e FillionLahille has r e c o n s i d e r e d t h e relation b e t w e e n Cicero a n d G a l e n , p r e s e n t i n g a n u m b e r of relevant texts in parallel columns. 2 This o n c e m o r e d e m o n s t r a t e s Cicero's d e p e n d e n c e — w h e t h e r direct or n o t — o n Chrysippus, especially f o r t h e i m p o r t a n t section 4.11-33. FillionLahille's t r e a t m e n t , however, is far f r o m exhaustive, b e i n g part of a larger study focused o n S e n e c a ' s On Anger a n d its sources. S o m e of h e r proposals (as I h o p e to show) a r e m o r e o v e r d u b i o u s . W h a t we n e e d is a m o r e c o m p r e h e n s i v e a p p r o a c h , which is n o t limited to tracing parallels between Cicero a n d Galen, b u t uses these parallels to reach clearer conclusions a b o u t Chrysippus' original exposition. Little work has b e e n d o n e o n Tusculans 3-4 since t h e heyday of Quellenforschung. In fact, s o m e of t h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t q u e s t i o n s r e m a i n m o r e or less as they were left by Pohlenz (1906) a n d Philippson (1932). 3 Both these scholars r e f u t e d s o m e of t h e less plausible s p e c u l a t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g sources, in t h e process m a k i n g valuable observations o n t h e C i c e r o ' s aims a n d m e t h o d s . But their studies

the original Chrysippean doctrine but book 3 is not a particularly valuable source of fragments (though he culls a dozen texts from it). Similarly Rabbow (1914) 142 ff., 186 ff. For book 4 Von Arnim assumed a few sources: § 11-33 record Chrysippean doctrine from all four books of the On Affections, but was not taken by Cicero directly from Chrysippus whose style he found difficult and uncouth. Even so, there remain many affinities of both content and wording to the original text of the On Affections. Hence Cicero used an epitome made by a Stoic. § 11-33 may be used to study Chrysippus' doctrine provided one is wary of later accretions (p. XXVII f.). M. Giusta argues that Tusc 4.11-32 is based on the same doxographic manual that he believes Cicero used for Fin. 3, pointing to correspondences as to both content and structure between Cicero's text and accounts in Arius Didymus (ap. Stob. Eel II, pp. 88-93) and D.L. (7.110-6). See Giusta (1964-7) vol. 1, 45 ff. However, the correspondence between these texts is by no means close enough to warrant this assumption. The indisputable affinities between the relevant texts can be explained most easily by the fact that all three of them ultimately go back to Chrysippus' On Affections—a possibility Giusta does little to refute. On Giusta's speculations about an ethical doxographic tradition to match the physical one reconstructed by Diels, see further supra, p.65 n. 22. Graver (2002) 187 ff. presents an overview of a number of parallels in four (possible) sources or traditions: Crantor and the consolatory tradition, Epicurus and the Cyrenaics, the Early Stoics and Chrysippus, and Posidonius. She is rightly cautious in assuming Posidonius as one of Cicero's main sources on the basis of parallels with PHP 4-5 (though she does not refer to FillionLahille (1984)). On Graver (2002) see also supra, p. 7 n. 14. 2 Fillion-Lahille (1984) 82-93, 112 f. 3 Görler (1974) has useful remarks on pp. 49 ff., 55 ff. Douglas' far from exhaustive treatment of Tusc. (1995) contains little on books 3 and 4, and Bringmann (1971) does not deal with them at all.

inevitably b e a r the s t a m p of a traditional line of a p p r o a c h still very m u c h f o c u s e d o n individual sources. T h e m o s t salient d e v e l o p m e n t since their work is an increased a p p r e c i a t i o n of Cicero's i n d e p e n d e n c e as a philosophical a u t h o r . A l a n d m a r k was Boyancé (1936), w h o d e m o n s t r a t e d t h e i n a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s of t r e a t i n g Cicero as a parap h r a s e r of a single or a few sources (except f o r easily recognizable R o m a n exempla, i n t r o d u c t i o n s etc.). 4 C i c e r o works far m o r e indep e n d e n t l y , that is to say, o n the basis of p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s peculiar to himself. H e may use several s o u r c e s at t h e s a m e time. W h e n h e decides to follow o n e particular source, as in t h e On Duties Books 1 a n d 2 Panaetius' On Duty,5 h e says so explicitly. 6 W h e n h e d o e s not, h e is likely to draw o n a variety of sources, a m o n g which summaries, lecture-notes, h a n d b o o k s , m e m o r a n d a a n d so o n . 7 T h e first kind of text, as we shall see, may u n d e r l i e the a c c o u n t of Chrysippus' λογικά (Tusc. 4.11-33). In what follows I shall exploit s o m e of t h e insights achieved by rec e n t studies of o t h e r works by Cicero, while raising the question what Tusc. 3 a n d 4 have preserved of Chrysippus' original exposition. Boya n c é ' s p o i n t 8 that Cicero always tells us when h e follows a particular source is c o n f i r m e d by a r e f e r e n c e to the On Affections (or at least its b o o k s called λογικά) at 4.33 (cf. ibid. 11). Even t h o u g h this leaves o p e n several questions as to the n a t u r e of t h e preserved material, we seem to b e on reasonably firm g r o u n d when using Cicero as a source. 9

2. Tusculan Disputations Books 3 and 4: Overview Obviously the Tusculan Disputations are an a l t o g e t h e r d i f f e r e n t work f r o m PHP with respect to aims a n d m e t h o d s as well as literary f o r m .

4

Repr. in id. (1970) 199-221. In addition see the excellent observations by Görler (1989) 253 ff., id. (1994) 1026-8, and CHHPh, 15 f. On Cicero's self-image as a philosophical author see also Graff (1963) 58-62. 5 Off. II 17, 60 ( ... Panaetius quem multum his libris secutus sum, non interpretatus ...). Note also that Cicero makes clear that he is not in the business of translating; similarly ibid. Ill 2,7. At Off. I 2,6 and Fin. Ill, 7 he also stresses that he makes his own decisions in keeping with his customary procedure. 6 Boyancé (1936) 308; cf. id. (1962/1970) 331 f. This point is accepted by Görler (1994) 1028. 7 Cf. Görler (1989) 253-6; and in Flashar (ed.) (1994) 1028, further developing observations made by Boyancé 8 See supra, n. 6. 9 Cf. the nuanced positions adopted by Dyck (1996) 18-21; Mansfeld (1999) 15.

Cicero, unlike Galen, d o e s n o t p r e s e n t (translated) verbatim fragm e n t s b u t uses Chrysippus a n d several o t h e r sources in a way that leaves a m p l e r o o m for his own a d d i t i o n s (notably R o m a n exempla) a n d literary stylisation in g e n e r a l . It has b e e n q u e s t i o n e d w h e t h e r Cicero h a d direct access to the On Affections or followed o n e or m o r e i n t e r m e d i a r y sources—with all possibilities of a d u l t e r a t i o n entailed by such a relation of d e p e n d e n c e . Posidonius, Philo of Larissa, Antioc h u s of Ascalon as well as a n o n y m o u s s o u r c e s — o f t e n in varying c o m b i n a t i o n s — w e r e successively put forward as candidates. 1 0 Most of these p r o p o s a l s were m a d e in t h e heyday of Quellenforschung a n d strike m a n y of us today as speculative or u n i l l u m i n a t i n g . O n t h e whole they p r e s u p p o s e a r a t h e r slavish d e p e n d e n c e of Cicero o n his Vorlage, t h o u g h it is fair to say that s o m e participants in the d e b a t e did acknowledge the role played by Cicero's authorial decisions. In spite of their d i s a g r e e m e n t s , m o r e o v e r , most of the s o u r c e - h u n t e r s a c c e p t e d as c o r r e c t G a l e n ' s d e p i c t i o n of Posidonius as a dissident Stoic w h o espoused the Platonic tripartition. Accordingly, they ruled o u t Posidonius as an inspiration f o r those sections of Cicero's text which f e a t u r e t h e view of a f f e c t i o n s as j u d g e m e n t s a n d h e n c e a r e labeled ' o r t h o d o x ' .

10 O. Heine (1863) argued that Cicero in book 4 used an epitome of the On Affections by an unknown Stoic (11-33) and some rhetorical work (58 ff.), omitting book 3 from consideration. R. Poppelreuter (1883) posited Posidonius as the source for both 3 and 4. For the proposals by Hirzel and Von Arnim see supra, n. 1. Following Von Arnim's lead Pohlenz (1906) points to numerous and close affinities between Cicero's account in Tusc 3 and the Chrysippean fragments from the On Affections. These similarities presuppose the use (alongside other sources) of a book by Antiochus, who is mentioned at § 59 and is known to have espoused the Chrysippean doctrine of the affections (cf. his defence of απάθεια, Ac, Pr. 44.135). Indeed, '... im ganzen hat sein Buch aber wohl nur eine Art Neuauflage von Chrysipps Werk gebildet.' He goes even further in the case of in book 4. Here the large Chrysippean presence, which is clear from parallels with fragments in Galen and Origen, warrants the assumption that Cicero directly used Chrysippus' Therapeutics. Like Hirzel, Philippson (1932) postulated a single Vorlage for the two books but characterized its author as a 'younger Stoic' who used Chrysippus' in the On Affections while making subtle concessions to Posidonius' criticism, but only insofar as these did not conflict with the fundamental positions of the Altmeister. On older scholarship in this area cf. also Dougan and Henry (1934) pp. xxx ff., xlii ff., Giusta (1964-7) vol. 1, 45 ff. Fillion-Lahille (1984) 82 ff. differs from Pohlenz in ascribing 4.11-33 to the first three books of the On Affections in view of 33 ('habes ea quae ... Stoici... λογικά appellant'; for the full text see infra in text). She discerns reflections of the Therapeutics at the beginning of book 3 and of the final section of 4 (i.e. § 58), where Cicero employs the medical analogy in its Chrysippean version, ibid. 112 ff. Clearly, the Therapeutics plays a smaller role in her explanation than in Pohlenz'.

In t h e five b o o k s of the Tusculan Disputations Cicero discusses an equal n u m b e r of m o r a l theses. In On Divination 2.2 Cicero says that Book 3 of the Tusculans is ' a b o u t relieving distress' (de aegntudine lenienda) a n d characterizes Book 4 as ' d e a l i n g with t h e r e m a i n i n g affections' (de reliquis animi perturbationibus). In fact t h e actual division of subject-matter is n o t as n e a t as this. T h e p r o l o g u e of b o o k 3 presents the g e n e r a l t h e m e of philosophy as t h e therapy of t h e soul a n d h e n c e as b e i n g m o r e i m p o r t a n t , t h o u g h in practice less a p p r e ciated, t h a n m e d i c i n e ( l - 7 a ) . Clearly this t h e m e applies to all t h e affections. It anticipates C h r y s i p p e a n passages in b o o k 4 (58, cf. 9, 23) a n d actually e c h o e s Chrysippus' p r o g r a m m a t i c s t a t e m e n t at t h e b e g i n n i n g of his Therapeutics,u This p r o l o g u e t h e n seems to introd u c e b o t h books. W h a t is m o r e , having laid down t h e thesis to be r e f u t e d , viz. that the Sage is subject to distress (7b), Cicero goes o n to p r e s e n t a r g u m e n t s that m a k e clear its relation to o t h e r m e n t a l disturb a n c e s (7c-21), in particular t h e terse Stoic syllogisms h e r e p r o d u c e s (14-21). This wider scope also holds g o o d f o r t h e b e g i n n i n g of t h e e n s u i n g section which is d e v o t e d to d e m o n s t r a t i n g t h e cause of distress (24-27 as p a r t of 24-75a). In the s h o r t e r final sections Cicero discusses various m e a n s of consolation, i.e. t h e therapies p r o p o s e d by Stoics a n d o t h e r s (75b-79), a n d delivers the peroratio (80-4). Cicero treats distress as m u c h as possible in isolation, b u t his material o f t e n s e e m s to have b e e n c o n c e r n e d with a f f e c t i o n in all its f o u r chief varieties. As h e himself indicates, h e has c h o s e n to deal with distress separately f r o m the o t h e r affections because h e considers it to be the greatest evil of all (4.82): it m a k e s us u n h a p p y , w h e r e a s t h e o t h e r s merely d i s t u r b o u r p e a c e of m i n d . This decision was n o d o u b t occas i o n e d by his grief over his d e c e a s e d d a u g h t e r Tullia (cf. 3.71, 76; 4 . 6 3 ) . 1 2 In t h e c o u r s e of his a r g u m e n t C h r y s i p p u s is r e p e a t e d l y m e n t i o n e d in a way that suggests a c q u a i n t a n c e with his writings. T h e passage that is crucial to any a t t e m p t to d e c i d e w h e t h e r this was the case is f o u n d in b o o k 4, viz. 11-33. It will t h e r e f o r e b e m o s t convenient to start there. T h e P r o l o g u e to b o o k 4 c o n s t i t u t e s a brief e x c u r s u s o n t h e position o c c u p i e d by philosophy in R o m a n society until Cicero's day (§ 1-7). Next (§ 8-10a) the thesis to be r e f u t e d is chosen, viz. that the Sage c a n n o t b e f r e e of each a f f e c t i o n — a n e x p a n s i o n of yesterday's

11 12

Quoted at PHP5.2.22-24; see supra, p. 144. Good on this point Philippson (1936) 275 f.

discussion which was solely c o n c e r n e d with distress. Two larger sections p r e s e n t a Stoic division of the affections (§ 11-33) a n d a critique of t h e P e r i p a t e t i c d e f e n c e of e m o t i o n s (§ 34-57). Finally C i c e r o discusses this therapy (58-81; 82-4 constitute the peroratio). Having stated the t h e m e f o r b o o k 4 Cicero p r e f e r s the dialectical terseness o f ' C h r y s i p p u s a n d the Stoics': C h r y s i p p u s a n d t h e Stoics, 1 3 w h e n d i s c u s s i n g t h e s o u l ' s d i s t u r b a n c e s [i.e. e m o t i o n s o r a f f e c t i o n s ] , d e v o t e m o s t s p a c e t o d i v i d i n g a n d d e f i n i n g t h e m ; t h a t a c c o u n t of t h e i r s t h r o u g h w h i c h t h e y c u r e t h e a f f e c t i o n s of souls a n d p r e v e n t t h e m f r o m b e i n g a f f e c t e d is q u i t e b r i e f (Tusc. 4.9, SVF3.483).

But to his Stoic a c c o u n t Cicero prefixes t h e following r e m a r k a b l e n o t e c o n c e r n i n g the structure of the soul: S i n c e I w o u l d like t o call t h o s e t h i n g s w h i c h t h e G r e e k s call π ά θ η d i s t u r b a n c e s r a t h e r t h a n d i s e a s e s , I shall in e x p l i c a t i n g t h e m f o l l o w t h a t o l d d i s t i n c t i o n , first of P y t h a g o r a s a n d s u b s e q u e n t l y of P l a t o , w h o d i v i d e t h e s o u l in two p a r t s , m a k i n g o n e p a r t a k i n g of r e a s o n , t h e o t h e r d e v o i d of it; 1 4 in t h a t w h i c h p a r t a k e s of r e a s o n t h e y l o c a t e t r a n quillity, i.e. p e a c e f u l a n d c a l m c o n s t a n c y , in t h a t o t h e r t h e d i s t u r b e d m o t i o n s of b o t h a n g e r a n d a p p e t i t e , c o n t r a r y a n d h o s t i l e t o r e a s o n (10).

T h e causal relation between t h e s u b o r d i n a t e clause i n t r o d u c e d by ' s i n c e ' a n d t h e m a i n s e n t e n c e is n o t i m m e d i a t e l y t r a n s p a r a n t . Presumably Cicero m e a n s that he translated πάθη as 'disturbances' in view of t h e d i s t u r b e d m o t i o n s of t h e two non-rational parts of the soul with ' t u r b i d o s ' clearly picking u p ' p e r t u r b a t i o n e s ' . But of course this i n a d e q u a t e l y explains his p r e f e r e n c e f o r the Pythagorean-cumPlatonic dualist s c h e m a , which is f u r t h e r specified in t e r m s of t h e well-known tripartition. What we have h e r e is the bipartite-cum-tripartite schema as presented a n d ascribed to the same two authorities in the Placita tradition. 1 5 T h e passage is often said to be motivated by Cicero's wish to show his Platonic c o l o u r s b e f o r e e m b a r k i n g u p o n his Stoic a c c o u n t of t h e affections (11-33). 16 But it has b e e n insufficiently n o t e d that the schema in its Ciceronian version exhibits a distinctively Stoic c o l o u r i n g . Its description of mental affections as irrational motions goes back to 13

I.e. Chrysippus as followed by later Stoics. On this locution cf. Dougan and Henry ad loc, 14 Similarly, though without reference to Pythagoras a n d / o r Plato, Tusc. 2.47. 15 See supra, p. 65. 16 See e.g. the line taken by Dougan and Henry (1934), pp. xliii ff.

Z e n o . 1 7 Moreover, a n g e r a n d a p p e t i t e are described as affections of t h e non-rational p a r t r a t h e r t h a n as soul-parts themselves. As such, they go against reason, i.e. they are w r o n g in themselves. This conf o r m s to Stoic d o c t r i n e , w h e r e a s t h e Platonic non-rational parts are c o m p o n e n t s of o u r m e n t a l m a k e - u p a n d r e s p o n s i b l e f o r c e r t a i n physiological f u n c t i o n s . T h e spirited p a r t is r e a s o n ' s n a t u r a l ally r a t h e r than its e n e m y (cf. Cicero's inimicos)·, its a n g e r fulfils a wholes o m e f u n c t i o n , viz. in s u b d u i n g excessive claims of appetite. F u r t h e r , 'constancy' (constantia) is Cicero's s t a n d a r d translation of t h e Stoic technical t e r m ευπάθεια ( ' g o o d e m o t i o n ' ) , which is t h e c o u n t e r p a r t of πάθος. Its p r e s e n c e h e r e anticipates t h e brief e x p l a n a t i o n of the c o n c e p t o f f e r e d a little f u r t h e r o n in t h e Stoic a c c o u n t at 4.14 (SVF 3.438). In fact, t h e latter passage describes the d i s o b e d i e n c e of o n e a f f e c t i o n , viz. distress, to r e a s o n (ratio) in t e r m s similar to § 10, t h o u g h within the Stoic f r a m e w o r k of § 14 reason should b e read in its n o r m a t i v e sense ( ' c o r r e c t r e a s o n ' ) . 'Tranquillity' (tranquillitas) stands f o r o n e of t h e Stoic g o o d e m o t i o n s , viz. ευθυμία (a subspecies of g o o d joy, i.e. χ α ρ ά ) . 1 8 So even if Cicero bows to Plato's authority, h e certainly p r e s e n t s an interpretatio stoica of t h e c e l e b r a t e d tripartition. T h i s Stoic dress-up n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g , C i c e r o is sensitive to t h e incongruity involved between his p r e f e r e n c e f o r the Platonic tripartition a n d his Stoic d e f i n i t i o n s . H e r e all a f f e c t i o n s a r e j u d g e m e n t s r a t h e r than d i s t u r b e d m o t i o n s g o i n g against reason. This is precisely what attracts him in these definitions, for it implies that disturbances are voluntary a n d h e n c e (at least in his eyes) controllable; h e n c e h e lays particular stress on this aspect t h r o u g h o u t Tusc. 3 a n d 4: Let this [i.e. the Pythagorean-cum-Platonic division of the soul] then be the starting point; all the same let us, in describing these disturbances, avail ourselves of the definitions and partitions of the Stoics, who I believe deal with this question most intelligently (ibid. 4.11). Still it r e m a i n s startling to see that Cicero p r o c e e d s as h e does. In the days of Quellenforschung this was s u f f i c i e n t to posit two d i f f e r e n t sources, since o n e could n o t have c o m m i t t e d such an inconsistency.

17

See supra, p. 98. D.L. 7.115 (SVF3.431), Sen. De tranq. an. 1.2.3: hanc stabilem animi sedem Graerí εύθυμίαν voeant ... ego tranquillitatem voeo, where again the aspect of mental calm and stability (as well as inward joy) is brought out, cf. ibid. § 4: animus semper aequali secundoque eursu eat... laetus ... gaudium ... placido statu maneaL 18

It was c o n s i d e r e d less disturbing that Cicero saw n o u n s u r m o u n t a b l e p r o b l e m h e r e . In those days lost sources were always s m a r t e r t h a n extant authors. Readers of Galen may be surprised to find n o trace of the dramatic choc des opinions u n f o l d e d o n t h e pages of PHP 4 a n d 5, with o n e Stoic, Posidonius, c h a n g i n g sides in equally d r a m a t i c fashion. O n e would expect Cicero, who h a d even known Posidonius personally (T 30-34 E.-K.), to show s o m e familiarity with this d e b a t e a n d Posidonius' salient role in it. I d o n o t wish to a r g u e f r o m silence. But if we are essentially right a b o u t Posidonius—viz. that h e assimilated the Platonic psychology to t h e Chrysippean (ch. 5 ) — t h e r e h a d b e e n at least o n e Stoic p h i l o s o p h e r who may have e n c o u r a g e d Cicero to treat the two o p t i o n s as compatible. But can we go f u r t h e r a n d even posit Posidonius as t h e o n e f r o m w h o m Cicero has taken this Stoicizing version of t h e tripartition at 7use. 4.10 a n d 2.47? This q u e s t i o n is difficult to answer, b u t merits c o n s i d e r a t i o n in view of a few f u r t h e r i n d i c a t i o n s a n d its i m p o r t a n c e f o r t h e relations b e t w e e n Cicero, Galen a n d o t h e r sources we are trying to d e t e r m i n e . First, Galen, too, tells us that Posidonius designated Pythagoras as the first a m o n g the a n c i e n t s to have d i f f e r e n t i a t e d b e t w e e n the rational a n d t h e n o n rational in the h u m a n soul. Posidonius had explained that Plato h a d f u r t h e r d e v e l o p e d this division a n d m a d e it m o r e c o m p l e t e ( P H P 4.7.38-9 ~ Posid. Τ 95 = F 165, 11. 165 ff. Cf. 5.6.42-43 ~ Τ 91, E.-K.). T h i s is an u n m i s t a k a b l e parallel to Tusc. 4.11. N o t e especially the s e q u e n c e Pythagoras—Plato, with the tripartition as a r e f i n e m e n t of the basic bipartion. F u r t h e r , it may n o t be too fanciful to h e a r in the expression veterem discriptionem an e c h o of the Posidonius' ' a n c i e n t a c c o u n t ' (παλαιός λόγος), which provided the context of his observations o n Pythagoras a n d Plato. 1 ·' O n the o t h e r h a n d Posidonius' presence in the Tusculan Disputations is marginal. H e is never m e n t i o n e d in c o n n e c t i o n with t h e a f f e c t i o n s (i.e. in bks. 3 a n d 4). 2 0 A n d of course the parallel may be explicable by a c o m m o n d e p e n d e n c e on the Planta tradition where we find the original basic schema. 2 1 In that

19

See further supra, pp. 207 ff. Cf. 2.61 (Posid. Τ 38 E.-K.), on his endurance of severe pain; 5.107 (T 3). 21 Cf. the doxographic overview concerning the soul at Tusc 1.18 ff., which is extensively discussed by Mansfeld (1990b) 3122 ff. At Tusc 1.20 we read: eius [seil. Pythagorae] doctor Plato triplicem finxit animum, cuius principatum, id est rationem, in capite sicut in arce posuit, et duas partes parere voluit, ham et cupiditatem, quas locis disclusit: iram in pectore, cupiditatem supterpraecordia locavit... 20

case Cicero's own synthesis of the Platonic tripartition of the soul a n d Stoic d e f i n i t i o n s of its a f f e c t i o n s may have b e e n inspired by Stoics such as Posidonius in a m o r e general way. O n the Platonist side, a p h i l o s o p h e r w h o merits c o n s i d e r a t i o n is Antiochus of Ascalon (c. 130-68 BCE), whose philosophical project of f o r g i n g a coalition of Platonism, Stoicism a n d Aristotelianism is well known. Moreover, h e is known to have b e e n o n e of the m a i n influe n c e s o n C i c e r o ' s p h i l o s o p h i c a l writing. A survey of C i c e r o n i a n passages w h e r e his inspiration is d e t e c t a b l e shows that h e c o n c e p tualized the soul in Stoic t e r m s b u t used o t h e r m o d e l s at t h e same time. 2 2 T h e m a i n i m p r e s s i o n is t h a t of t h e translatability of o n e m o d e l i n t o a n o t h e r . It is a fair a s s u m p t i o n t h a t A n t i o c h u s took Plato's tripartite soul as a poetical expression of t h e truth which was later f o r m a l i z e d scientifically by C h r y s i p p u s . 2 3 T h i s superficially resembles the Posidonian a p p r o a c h , while contrasting again sharply with Galen. In regard to Cicero's attitude we may recall the distinctly Stoic terms in which h e casts his version of t h e Platonic tripartition. In sum, Cicero could have derived f r o m his philosophical education e x a m p l e s a n d considerations, which go a long way to explain the peaceful co-existence—despite f u n d a m e n t a l differences—of Platonist a n d Stoic c o n c e p t i o n s in Tusc. 4.11. O n t h e whole h e seems n o t very i n t e r e s t e d in t h e m o n i s t / d u a l i s t controversy staged by Galen with such fervor.

3. Cicero's logika

(4.11-33)

T h e first section ( Tusc. 4.11-14) r u n s closely parallel to the Galenic a c c o u n t of Chrysippus' treatise. This can b e i n f e r r e d f r o m t h e two parallel c o l u m n s p r e s e n t e d by Fillion-Lahille, t h o u g h h e r overview is far f r o m exhaustive a n d s o m e of h e r parallels are n o t entirely a p p o site. 24 I shall indicate the d i f f e r e n c e s between h e r overview a n d m i n e as I p r o c e e d . First of all C i c e r o p r e s e n t s Z e n o ' s two d e f i n i t i o n s of e m o t i o n , viz. as an irrational a n d u n n a t u r a l m o t i o n of the soul a n d as an excessive c o n a t i o n (aversa a recta ratione contra naturam animi commotio ... adpetitum vehementiorem). Both t h e i r w o r d i n g a n d their 22

See e.g. Luc. 30. See Dillon (1977) 102. Note however that Dillon (p. 101 n. 1) finds Posidonius behind Tusc. 4.10-1 and hence the whole of Tusc 4 24 Fillion-Lahille (1984) 84-7. 23

position at the b e g i n n i n g c o r r e s p o n d to what we find in Galen ( P H P 4.2.8 ~ SVF 3.462). 2 5 Cicero omits t h e r u n n e r s m e t a p h o r used by Chrysippus to explain t h e aspect of excess involved in e m o t i o n a l m o t i o n (PHP4.2.14-18).26 Cicero a p p e n d s the definitions of the f o u r so-called generic e m o t i o n s in terms of the distinction between g o o d / bad a n d between p r e s e n t / f u t u r e (see above, p. 114). At 4.2-4 Galen bears witness to this section b e f o r e h e starts discussing the Z e n o n i a n d e f i n i t i o n of e m o t i o n in g e n e r a l a n d their exegesis by Chrysippus. Clearly Galen has reversed t h e original o r d e r . H e presents ( t h o u g h n o t in d i r e c t q u o t a t i o n ) t h e s a m e d e f i n i t i o n s of distress, f e a r a n d pleasure (omitting a p p e t i t e ) . H e also differs f r o m Cicero in a d d i n g ' f r e s h ' (πρόσφατος) to the beliefs in q u e s t i o n — a p o i n t which is h e r e omitted by Cicero. A little f u r t h e r on Cicero too supplies this e l e m e n t (§ 14). At 12-13 Cicero p r o c e e d s to give the rational c o u n t e r p a r t s of the affections ( m i n u s that of distress, which d o e s n o t exist), i.e. the three so-called 'good e m o t i o n s ' (εύπαθείαι, Cicero's constantiae). This section as such is lacking in the PHP b u t t h e r e can be n o d o u b t that it was in t h e On Affections for in the same c o n t e x t Galen has preserved the definition of o n e of the g o o d e m o t i o n s , viz. wish as the c o u n t e r p a r t of a p p e t i t e (4.2.3-4, p.238.35-37). 2 7 Cicero e c h o e s Chrysippus' appeal to the p h e n o m e n o l o g y of rational behaviour (esp. 13 init. cum ita movemur, ut in bono simus aliquo ... cum ratione animus moveturplacide atque constanter ... ut bona natura adpetimus, sic a malis natura declinamus), which c o r r e s p o n d s to t h e l a t t e r ' s exegesis of Z e n o ' s first general definition, q u o t e d at PHP4.2.10-11.28 T h e same Chrysippean passage c o n t a i n s t h e explication of affection as d i s o b e d i e n t to, a n d

25 §§ 12-14 are printed as SVF3.438, that is to say, not among the fragments of the On Affections 26 There is a parallel case where Cicero outdoes his Stoic model with respect to a terse style, viz. when he decides to leave out large parts of Chrysippus' medical analogy as unnecessary for conveying doctrinal content, Tusc 4.23, discussed supra, p. 144. But if he used an abstact, the runners metaphor may of course have already been omitted from it. 27 4, p. 238.36 f. όρίξεται [...] αύτήν [seil, όρεξιν] όρμήν λογικήν έπί τι(νος) όσον χρή ήδον(τος). Here Cicero's reference to the Sage is not found but see the Galenic parallel passage, 5.7.29; a second parallel, 4.4.2 confirms that Chrysippus defined wish (βούλησις) in conjunction with desire (έπιθυμία). From Cicero (not from Galen) we may infer that Chrysippus also delineated the concept of caution (cautio, i.e. ευλάβεια) as the correct form of avoidance, the incorrect one being of course fear (φόβος) as well as correct vs. incorrect joy (gaurlium vs. laetitia, i.e. χαρά vs. ήδονή), Tusc. 4.13. For these positive emotions (the so-called εύπαθείαι) see further SVF 3.431-442. 28 See supra, pp. 96 ff.

t u r n e d away f r o m , (right) reason which is used by Cicero in the same passage (§ 13-4) as well. 29 T h e first half of § 14 (praesentis ... opponitur) wraps u p the overview of t h e f o u r affections a n d t h e t h r e e g o o d e m o t i o n s , stressing that n o g o o d e m o t i o n c o r r e s p o n d i n g to distress exists in t h e Sage. T h e s e c o n d half (sed .. adesse) lays particular e m p h a s i s o n the Stoic doctrine that all affections are b r o u g h t a b o u t by j u d g e m e n t a n d o p i n i o n , so that they are w r o n g a n d lie in o u r power. Cicero indicates that t h e r e was a s e c o n d series of d e f i n i t i o n s a n d what h e has preserved shows that they a d d e d to t h e earlier o n e s the view that it is right f o r the soul to c o n t r a c t in t h e face of a supposedly b a d thing. In § 15 Cicero lists the f o u r physical effects, or feelings, c o r r e s p o n d i n g to the f o u r g e n e r i c affections: 'as it were some bite of p a i n ' (quasi morsus aliquis dolorìs) ~ distress 'a certain withdrawal a n d flight of the soul' (recessus quidam animi et fuga) ~ fear ' e x u b e r a n t hilarity' (profusa hilaritas) ~ pleasure ' u n i n h i b i t e d impulse (effrenata adpetentia) ~ appetite Cicero c o n c l u d e s by c h a r a c t e r i z i n g t h e o p i n i o n r e f e r r e d to in t h e definitions as weak assent, implying that 'weak' indicates the physical weakness a p p a r e n t f r o m the effects h e has j u s t described. W h e n we c o m p a r e Galen, we f i n d indications in two passages that C h r y s i p p u s said m o r e a b o u t t h e a f f e c t i o n s b e i n g j u d g e m e n t s . At 4.1.17 h e is said to have raised t h e q u e s t i o n of w h e t h e r they are j u d g e m e n t s o r s u p e r v e n e o n j u d g e m e n t s (cf. 5.1.4; Fillion-Lahille aptly c o m p a r e s b o t h passages with Tusc. 4.14). T h e latter o p t i o n is associated by Galen with the physical effects i n c l u d e d by Cicero in his e x a m p l e s of t h e s e c o n d a n d m o r e precise type of Stoic d e f i n i t i o n (4.2.4-7). Like C i c e r o at § 15, G a l e n c o m e s u p with a q u a r t e t of effects. H e lists shrinking, rising u p , c o n t r a c t i o n a n d e x p a n s i o n corr e s p o n d i n g to distress, pleasure, f e a r a n d a p p e t i t e respectively. N o t e that Cicero's translation less clearly express physical effects, b e i n g of a m o r e psychological n a t u r e (especially hilarity a n d impulse). Galen also says t h a t Z e n o i d e n t i f i e d t h e a f f e c t i o n s with t h e s e physical effects, which s u p e r v e n e o n particular j u d g e m e n t s ( n o t in Cicero). Chrysippus in o p t i n g f o r t h e e q u a t i o n of j u d g e m e n t with affection 29

The passages from PHP adduced by Fillion-Lahille (1984) 85 (4.2.8, 4.1.14, 4.4.16-7 ~ SVF3.462, 461, 476) are less apposite.

would effectively have a b a n d o n e d Z e n o ' s original position. Clearly C h r y s i p p u s did n o t p r e s e n t himself as d i s a g r e e i n g with Z e n o . In c o n s e q u e n c e Galen charges him with n o t distinguishing adequately between the two o p t i o n s at issue h e r e ( a n d h e n c e b e i n g a bad logician). W h a t h e omits to m e n t i o n is the c o n c e p t of weak assent. But Fillion-Lahille appositely p r o d u c e s G a l e n ' s testimony at 4.6.1 (§ 2-3 should be a d d e d ) that Chrysippus repeatedly assigned a crucial role to t h e soul's lack of tension a n d weakness a n d to their o p p o s i t e s in e x p l a i n i n g i n c o r r e c t a n d c o r r e c t b e h a v i o u r respectively. Of course Galen in his usual way speaks of an additional (non-rational) power acknowledged by Chrysippus a n d c o n t r a d i c t i n g his official position. But it is worth n o t i n g that Galen despite Chrysippus' r e p e a t e d appeal to this factor pays relatively little attention to it. However this may be, this testimony c o n f i r m s that Cicero too has preserved an e l e m e n t of the a r g u m e n t of On Affections book 1. If we c o m p a r e the section Tusc. 4.11-5 with the relevant passages in Galen, we may c o n c l u d e that Cicero r e p r o d u c e s in a fairly c o h e r e n t way what m u s t have b e e n t h e gist of Chrysippus' a r g u m e n t in t h e o p e n i n g sections of the first b o o k On Affections. Galen presents substantial f r a g m e n t s f r o m t h e exegesis c o n c e r n e d with Z e n o ' s definition of affection (featuring the simile of t h e r u n n e r s ) b u t h e is decidedly less informative as to the dual cognitive structure of e m o t i o n in relation to t h e physical effects involved in the soul's affection a n d as to the m e a n i n g a n d role of so-called 'weak assent'. It is also worth n o t i n g that Chrysippus, as is attested by Cicero, at an early stage discussed the d i f f e r e n c e between affections a n d good emotions. A l t h o u g h § 11-5 follows Chrysippus' a r g u m e n t r a t h e r faithfully, Von Arnim does not add this section to the evidence for the On Affections (SVF 3.438, 380; cf. 393) ( H e d o e s i n c l u d e o t h e r non-verbatim material f r o m Cicero a n d o t h e r sources). Chrysippus i n t r o d u c e d the physical effects characteristic of certain affections because they h a d b e e n r e f e r r e d to by Zeno as well. Further, h e a r g u e d that these feelings too p r e s u p p o s e a second type of judgem e n t , viz. a b o u t the p r o p e r reaction to a certain situation. 3 0 Cicero's second set of definition c o m b i n e the two types o f j u d g e m e n t involved. H e r e , t h e n , we already e n c o u n t e r the twofold cognitive structure of m e n t a l affection. T h e s e c o n d type was d e v e l o p e d by Chrysippus as part of his exegesis of Z e n o ' s definitions in terms of physical effects. 30

On the cogntive structure of emotions and the question how far Chrsyippus was innovative vis-à-vis Zeno and Ceanthes see Donini (1995), esp. 326 ff.

T h e s e d o n o t p r e s u p p o s e a n o n - r a t i o n a l p a r t or p o w e r b u t a r e cognitive as well. T h e n e x t section in Cicero (16-22) p r e s e n t s d e f i n i t i o n s of affections s u b s u m e d u n d e r each of the f o u r principal ones, i.e. subspecies of fear, a n g e r , pleasure a n d desire. It is r e a s o n a b l e to s u p p o s e that this is how Chrysippus p r o c e e d e d — a f e a t u r e r e f l e c t e d by Cicero's c o m m e n t s as to the space devoted to the m a t t e r by Chrysippus. This time t h e r e is n o t h i n g c o m p a r a b l e in Galen, b u t Galen is c o n c e r n e d with t h e causes of a f f e c t i o n in g e n e r a l , a n d so has n o interest in r e p r o d u c i n g Chrysippus' swarm of m i n o r emotions. For parallels we have to t u r n to t h e lists to b e f o u n d in such s o u r c e s as p s e u d o A n d r o n i c u s , D i o g e n e s Laertius a n d Stobaeus, all of which may b e taken to go back to Chrysippus, p r e s u m a b l y t h r o u g h abstracts based o n his original exposition a n d d e s i g n e d for use in the schools. Von A r n i m cut u p the section in Cicero a n d m i x e d the pieces with t h e relevant texts f r o m these o t h e r sources (SVF3.391-430). At t h e e n d of § 21 (~ SVF 3.398) we c o m e across a n o t i c e that a p p e t i t e is i n t e n d e d at ' p r e d i c a t e s ' ( κ α τ η γ ο ρ ή μ α τ α ) , i.e. what were technically called 'sayables' (λεκτά), while a lack (indigentia) is of the things themselves, such as h o n o u r , money. O t h e r sources explain the κ α τ η γ ο ρ ή μ α τ α as t h e o b j e c t of c o n a t i o n (όρμή), which c o h e r e s with t h e C i c e r o n i a n notice insofar as a p p e t i t e , b e i n g an affection, is an excessive conation. 3 1 T h e notice in Cicero d o e s n o t seem to b e l o n g with the definitions p r e c e d i n g it. It c a n n o t be paralleled f r o m Galen, which is hardly surprising. It looks like a r e m a i n d e r of the process of epitomization which the original exposition u n d e r w e n t at the h a n d s of Cicero or r a t h e r his source. It is certainly n o t an e l e m e n t d r a g g e d in f r o m elsewhere b u t m u s t have b e e n p a r t of a fuller a r g u m e n t by Chrysippus. But since we lack any indication as to its original context we can only guess w h e t h e r it was p a r t of book 1 or of a n o t h e r book. § 22 (SVF 3.379) highlights i n c o n t i n e n c e (intemperamentia) as the s o u r c e of all a f f e c t i o n s . T h i s t h e m e a p p e a r s in s o m e f r a g m e n t s derived f r o m the f o u r t h a n d last b o o k of t h e On Affections, the Therapeutics, especially PHP 4.4.17 a n d 24 (SVF 4.476; cf. above p p . 97 f.), n o t m e n t i o n e d by Fillion-Lahille, w h o u n a c c o u n t a b l y assigns Tusc. 4.22 ff. to b o o k 3, i.e. t h e third of t h e λογικά. 3 2 In b o t h Galen a n d Cicero it is c o n n n e c t e d with t h e d i s o b e d i e n c e to r i g h t reason a n d with having t u r n e d o n e ' s back to it, in k e e p i n g with the definitions in 31 32

See e.g. Stob. Eel II pp. 88.1-3, 97.15 ff. Wachsmuth (SVF3.171, 91) Fillion-Lahille (1984) 88.

book 1. Moreover, Chrysippus spoke of incontinent or uncontrolled states (κατάστασεις) of the soul—a point reflected by Cicero's animi statum. T h e close c o r r e s p o n d e n c e between the two texts is f u r t h e r illustrated by the language of controlling and steering used for the opposite state of mind (Cicero: regi ... contineri, Galen: οίακίζοντες ... κρατούσιν). What follows also contains m u c h that can be paralleled from the Therapeutics, with Chrysippus being m e n t i o n e d at the e n d of § 23 in connection with his medical analogy (see supra, p. 144). T h e correspondences can be tabulated as follows: Cicero:

Galen:

§ 23: mental affection is like that of the body: 5.2.32 (SVF3.471) the soul is disturbed by conflicting 5.4.14 (5VF3.471), 10 (not in opinions SVF) § 24: affections can b e c o m e inveterate 5.2.26 (SVF3.471) diseases § 25: examples: lust for glory, love of w o m e n 4.5.21-2 (SVF3.480) but also opposite states such as hate of women § 26: definition and more examples of mental disease, i.e. types of inveterate love and hate. § 2 7 / 8 : analogies between body and soul: —proneness to disease 5.2.3, 14 (SVF3.465) - d i s e a s e and health § 2 8 / 9 : morbus, aegrotatio, vitium 5.2.27 (SVF3.471); cf. 4.5.31 [(Posid.) § 30: vitia vs. adfectiones § 3 0 / 1 : g o o d things mental: 5.2.33 (SVF3.471), 47, 49 (SVF - health, strength and beauty 3.471a) § 31: limitations of the analogy: - a healthy soul, unlike a healthy body, cannot be affected by disease cf. 5.2.5 (Posid.), 10-1 - b o d i l y disease is without blame, mental is not - n o n - r a t i o n a l animals d o not exhibit mental affections but s o m e t h i n g similar 4 . 5 . 4 , 5 . 1 . 1 0 (SVF3.476) § 32: intelligent persons are less p r o n e to ?5.1.2 ( o n Sages, SVF3.465) disease Galen, QAM ch. 4, pp.45-46.1 Müller (SVF2.787). 3 3 vitia are less easily cured than morbi

33

See supra, pp. 149 ff.

T h e above overview proves beyond d o u b t that Cicero r e p r o d u c e s part of the c o n t e n t s of Chrysippus' Therapeutics. All t h e passages for which we have f o u n d n o precise Galenic parallels are b o u n d u p with those which can actually be paralleled f r o m PHP. T h e s e passages are clearly integral to Cicero's exposition, h e n c e b e l o n g to t h e same original exposition, i.e. the Therapeutics. Von A r n i m fails to p r i n t any part of this section as evidence f o r the On Affections, a n d treats the passage in his usual scissor-happy fashion (see SVF 3.279, 423, 424, 425, 427, 430). This is how Cicero c o n c l u d e s his Stoic a c c o u n t of the affections: Here you have what the Stoics in unadorned fashion expound about the affections, i.e. the things they call λογικά, 34 because they argue in rather plain terms (4.33). As we have n o t i c e d (above, p. 93), Cicero takes t h e t e r m λογικά as p e r t a i n i n g to t h e plain a n d abstract w o r d i n g typical of technical definitions such as those h e has j u s t r e p r o d u c e d . 3 5 But this c a n n o t be correct. Galen by contrast uses the term to characterize the first t h r e e b o o k s of t h e On Affections as theoretical in o p p o s i t i o n to t h e therapeutic last b o o k (above p. 89). Cicero's use of t h e t e r m c a n n o t b e correct. T h e first t h r e e books were n o t all c o n c e r n e d with definitions c o u c h e d in terse l a n g u a g e . As far as we know, only t h e first b o o k c o n t a i n e d d e f i n i t i o n s . T h e s e c o n d , as we have s e e n (ch. 3.5), discussed p r o b l e m s of a causal n a t u r e within the f r a m e w o r k provided by b o o k 1. For b o o k 3 we have n o explicitly a t t r i b u t e d f r a g m e n t s . Cicero's account, as we have noticed, r u n s parallel to books 1 a n d 4. It is r e m a r k a b l e that Cicero includes t h e c o n t e n t s of the Therapeutics a m o n g what h e calls λογικά, t h o u g h this is p e r h a p s n o t inconsistent with his own stylistic e x p l a n a t i o n of this t e r m . At § 9 h e t o o distinguishes between d e f i n i t i o n s a n d t h e r a p e u t i c a l passages, saying that t h e Stoics, u n l i k e t h e Peripatetics, d e v o t e m u c h space to t h e f o r m e r at the e x p e n s e of the latter. This could m e a n that the λογικά o u t n u m b e r e d t h e t h e r a p e u t i c s . But if Cicero also drew λογικά, i.e. d e f i n i t i o n s a n d distinctions, f r o m t h e Therapeutics h e may simply m e a n t h a t in t h e Stoic a c c o u n t d e f i n i t i o n s w e r e also u s e d f o r t h e r a p e u t i c a l p u r p o s e s a n d as s u c h r e p l a c e d d i f f e r e n t k i n d s of a r g u m e n t such as o t h e r s w o u l d use. We may have to a c c e p t that

34

On the sense of this term, see further supra, pp. 89 ff. Cf. his intial announcement that he will use the oars of the 'dialecticians' (dialectici), Tusc 4.9. 35

Cicero m a d e a mistake, p e r h a p s u n d e r the influence of what h e read in his abstract. However this may be, that h e did not draw directly on Chrysippus, or did n o t d o so in a systematic fashion, is quite possible in t h e light of what we know a b o u t a n c i e n t m e t h o d s of literary c o m p o s i t i o n a n d those of Cicero in particular. 3 6 T h u s h e availed himself of a s u m m a r y (called by Cicero τά κ ε φ ά λ α ι α ) of a work by Posidonius m a d e by his f r i e n d , the Stoic A t h e n o d o r u s the Bald, with a view to writing the On Duties31 T h e fact that we o f t e n h e a r distinct e c h o e s of the original Chrysippean w o r d i n g does n o t tell against his use of an e p i t o m e , since t h e a n c i e n t p r o c e d u r e of e p i t o m i z i n g was o f t e n m o r e a m a t t e r of selective copying t h a n of s u m m a r i z i n g a n d r e f o r m u l a t i n g a c c o r d i n g to present-day practice a n d c o n v e n t i o n . 3 8 O n the other h a n d , ancient compository practice includes the possibility that an a u t h o r may use the original exposition in addition to an e p i t o m e o r an i n t e r m e d i a r y source of a n o t h e r kind. 3 9 In fact, Galen himself provides an e x a m p l e of this practice, for we know that h e b o t h r e a d a n d used C h r y s i p p u s ' On Affections Books 1 a n d 4 directly a n d drew his i n f o r m a t i o n for Book 2 f r o m Posidonius. 4 0 Still, the similarities between Tusc. 4.9-33 a n d the verbatim material preserved by Galen are sufficiently close to feel c o n f i d e n t that C i c e r o ' s a c c o u n t is based o n On Affections Moreover, we may feel certain Cicero presents us with an o n the whole accurate picture the original C h r y s i p p e a n exposition which is f r e e f r o m the polemical a p p r o a c h a n d c o n c o m i t a n t selectivity peculiar to Galen's t r e a t m e n t . Cicero even r e f r a i n s f r o m his habit to e m b r o i d e r his philosophical m o d e l with R o m a n exempta o r literary q u o t a t i o n s . H e wants to r e p r o d u c e the Chrysippean λογικά in all their dialectical terseness (cf. § 9, 33)

36

S e e c h . 1.8. AdAtt. 16.11.4 (Posid. F 4 1 a / T 44 E.-K, Panaet. Test. 92 Alesse). In 16.14.4 (Posid. F 41b) Cicero reports that Athenodorus has sent him a nice υπόμνημα. It is not wholly clear whether this is something different from what he had earlier called κεφάλαια. But clearly Cicero asks for, and receives, material which makes it unnecessary for him to go through the original exposition himself. The term υπόμνημα is notoriously flexible. On it and ancient methods of composition of this genre of treatises, see supra, p. 52. 38 Mansfeld and Runia (1997) 182 ff. 39 See supra, p. 57. 40 See supra, p. 57. 37

4. What Does Cicero Add ? If we accept that Tusc. 4.11-33 offers a fairly accurate r e n d e r i n g of a n u m b e r of passages f r o m books 1 a n d 4 of the On Affections, the next step should be to answer the question what profit can be gained f r o m this insight. I should like to m e n t i o n the following points. T h e r e is n o significant d i f f e r e n c e between Chrysippus a n d Z e n o over the physical effects a n d their relation to t h e c o n c e p t of m e n t a l affection. At most Chrysippus r e f i n e d t h e cognitive s t r u c t u r e of a f f e c t i o n by m a k i n g explicit the j u d g e m e n t a b o u t a p p r o p r i a t e b e h a v i o u r p r e s u p p o s e d by the feelings a t t e n d a n t u p o n the main kinds of m e n t a l affection. This tells strongly, if n o t decisively, against any r e a d i n g of Z e n o ' s position in t e r m s of t h e faculty a p p r o a c h , w h e t h e r Aristotelian, Platonic or other. O p i n i o n , as we have noticed, is also described by Cicero in physical terms, namely as weak. H e r e h e adds an i m p o r t a n t e l e m e n t to Galen's a c c o u n t . But o n t h e whole C i c e r o exhibits a m a r k e d t e n d e n c y to s u p p r e s s physical aspects. By e m p l o y i n g i n d e f i n i t e p r o n o u n s like aliquis (as in 'a kind of bite') a n d quidam (in 'a certain withdrawal') a n d especially adverbs like quasi ('so to speak') as well as his choice of Latin t e r m s (hilaritas, adpetentia) h e t u r n s Z e n o ' s dry physical language into a m o r e literary m a n n e r of speech. Cicero's u n c o m f o r t a b l e a t t i t u d e to t h e physical aspects can be illustrated by his fluctuation with r e g a r d to this 'bite'. At Tusc 3.61 the bite is n o l o n g e r directly c o n n e c t e d with grief (aegritudo) b u t e x p l a i n e d as a manifestation of pain of the body (dolor corporis). In r e g a r d to G a l e n ' s t r e a t m e n t of the f r a g m e n t s f r o m the Therapeutics we have seen that h e too suppressed c e r t a i n physical aspects of Chrysippus, t h o u g h f o r r e a s o n s q u i t e d i f f e r e n t f r o m Cicero's stylistic c o n c e r n s (see above, p. 93). A comparison of Cicero with Galen d o e s however b r i n g o u t t h e i m p o r t a n c e of t h e soul's c o r p o r e a l n a t u r e , w h e r e Chrysippus located b o t h the dynamic a n d passive aspects of e m o t i o n . This side of his psychology is n o t subject to r e a s o n ' s assent in any direct sense; r a t h e r it d e t e r m i n e s t h e soul's i m m e d i a t e r e a c t i o n s to e x t e r n a l stimuli. T h e a f f e c t i o n s p r o p e r are m o m e n t a r y crises. Cicero's text bears o u t that Chrysippus focused o n the dispositions a n d habits f r o m which they arise. H e n c e t h e c a r e f u l distinction b e t w e e n morbus ( ν ό σ η μ α ) , aegrotatio (άρρώστημα) a n d vitium (κακία).

5. Chrysippean Reflections in Other Sections of Book 4 Tusc. 4.11-33 is by n o m e a n s the only section in which to look f o r material deriving f r o m the On Affections. T h u s in the s u b s e q u e n t section (34-57) Cicero m o u n t s a polemic against the Peripatetic d e f e n c e of the usefulness ( m o d e r a t e ) emotions. His p o i n t of view is of course Stoic b u t we c a n n o t Find f u r t h e r certifiable e v i d e n c e f o r t h e On Affections (or any o t h e r Chrysippean treatise f o r that matter), t h o u g h on occasion h e avails himself of ideas h e (or his source) h a d f o u n d in this treatise. 4 1 T h e reverse would have b e e n r a t h e r suprising. An extended p o l e m i c against the Peripatetics or o t h e r s a b o u t m o d e r a t e e m o t i o n s s e e m s n o t to have b e e n p a r t of C h r y s i p p u s ' treatise ( t h o u g h cf. above, p. 167). This is c o n s o n a n t with what we know a b o u t his dialectic a n d in particular his way of dealing with o p p o n ents. 4 2 Closer to the t h e m e of the Therapeutics is the final section o n the r e m e d i e s f o r e m o t i o n a l disturbances (58-84). 4 3 This section o p e n s in the same way as Chrysippus' Therapeutics (as well as the third book of Tusculans), viz. with a solemn s t a t e m e n t that t h e r e exists an art of m e d i c i n e for the soul n o less than for the body (§ 58). This passage is clearly inspired by the Chrysippean original b u t a d d s n o t h i n g to the verbatim f r a g m e n t preserved by Galen (5.2.22-5, q u o t e d supra, p. 144). In what follows Cicero also includes Peripatetic ideas, in line with his a n n o u n c e m e n t at § 9 that the Peripatetics, unlike the Stoics, o f f e r m u c h in t h e s p h e r e of t h e r a p e u t i c t r e a t m e n t (Peripatetici ad placandos animos multa adferunt, cf. vanne curationes, § 59). N o n e t h e less Cicero c o n t i n u e s to use C h r y s i p p e a n ideas a n d a r g u m e n t s . In particular we should note § 59-62, where we c o m e across the idea that it is b e t t e r to d i r e c t o n e ' s t r e a t m e n t at t h e a f f e c t i o n t h a n at its external cause. 4 4 T h e latter option m e a n s explaining that an external

41

See esp. Tusc. 4.47 (SVF 1.205) repeats Zeno's two definitions of emotion from § 11; 53 (SVF 1.628, 3.285) is concerned with the virtue of courage and cannot be from the On Affections. § 54 (SVF 3.665) is diatribe-like passage on the difference between irascibility and anger, i.e. between the permanent diseased state (νόσημα ~ morbus) and the affection (πάθος ~ perturbatio). Although the distinction was important in the Therapeutics, and as such is reflected at § 23 ff., this passage is not directly related to the orginal work. 42 See (with special reference to the On the soul) Tieleman (1996a) 265. 43 Surveys in Fillion-Lahille (1984) 112 f., MacKendrick (1989) 159 f. 44 See also the discussion by Donini (1995) 313 f. I agree that 'L'intera pagina di TD IV 60-2 riproduce L'ispirazione coerente di un solo filosofo stoico, Crisippo' (p.314).

object is n e i t h e r g o o d n o r bad. T a k i n g o n e ' s starting p o i n t f r o m the individual m e a n s e x p l a i n i n g to h i m or h e r t h e irrationality of t h e affective r e s p o n s e . Cicero takes t h e irrationality involved, as d e f i n e d by Z e n o , as s o m e t h i n g that is, or at least s h o u l d be, a g r e e d by all ( inter omnes convenire oportet commotiones animorum a recta ratione aversas esse vitosas, § 61), even if o n e considers the external cause of e m o t i o n g o o d or b a d . In t h e n e x t section Cicero m a k e s essentially t h e same point, u r g i n g that we speak of t h e affection itself irrespective of what we take the summum bonum to be. T h u s a p p e t i t e has to b e r e m o v e d , n o m a t t e r what t h e e n d of life is believed to be—even if pleasure is t h e e n d (§ 62; cf. SVF 3 . 4 8 8 ) . A little later o n C h r y s i p p u s is m e n t i o n e d , w h e n Cicero says that in writing his (lost) Consolatio h e himself h a d i g n o r e d Chrysippus' p r o h i b i t i o n to apply a r e m e d y to fresh swellings ( vetat Chrysippus ad recentis quasi tumores animi remedium adhibere, § 63 ~ SVF 3.484). Clearly, Cicero is drawing h e r e on Chrysippus' words in the passage f r o m t h e Therapeutics preserved by O r i g e n , Contra Celsum VIII 51 ( q u o t e d a n d discussed above, p p . 166 ff.). C i c e r o ' s proximity to t h e original text p e r m i t s us to a d d it to t h e o t h e r instances we have f o u n d . In § 64 Cicero wraps u p his discussion of those affections that are t r i g g e r e d by s u p p o s e d l y b a d things. Distress, h e explains, has received sufficient a t t e n t i o n in b o o k s 3 a n d 4, a n d t h e first two books have b e e n devoted to those things which o n e fears most, viz. d e a t h a n d pain. Next (§ 65) h e t u r n s to pleasure a n d desire, i.e. the w r o n g o p i n i o n s we f o r m of s u p p o s e d l y g o o d things a n d h e n c e entirely voluntary a n d d e p e n d e n t u p o n ourselves. A l t h o u g h this position as such is Stoic, Cicero uses it f o r a m o r e g e n e r a l a c c o u n t to which p h i l o s o p h e r s of d i f f e r e n t b a c k g r o u n d s s h o u l d be able to subscribe. T h u s h e r e t u r n s to the motif of the irrelevance of the value assigned to things, e x p l a i n i n g that h e now speaks a c o m m o n l a n g u a g e (sed loquimur nunc more communi). Accordingly, h e also r e t u r n s to the idea of the affection in question as s h a m e f u l , m a k i n g clear the distinction between affections a n d g o o d e m o t i o n s (§ 67, init.). T h u s it is only excessive j o y that is wrong. In a way familiar f r o m Chrysippus Cicero quotes verses f r o m R o m a n poetry in dealing with two f u r t h e r kinds of appetite, erotic love (amor, 68-76) a n d a n g e r (ira, 77-81; cf. the various types distinguished in his so-called a c c o u n t of the λογικά, § 21). O n e s h o u l d warn against these two a f f e c t i o n s as b e i n g varieties of m a d n e s s (furor, insania). All this unmistakably e c h o e s the Therapeutics (see ch. 4.7).

In the case of love, Cicero recalls t h e Stoic tenet that the Sage will fall in love—a surprising position f o r ' t h e teachers of virtue', as h e h e r e calls t h e m , to hold. 4 5 No d o u b t the Stoics were attacked on this point. Cicero approvingly notes Epicurus' rejection (§ 70 ~ SVF3.653, Ep. Fr. 483b U s e n e r ) . But a little f u r t h e r o n h e explains that the Stoics must m e a n a d i f f e r e n t kind o f l o v e , i.e. n o t the m a d affection, 4 6 inserting a Stoic definition to s u p p o r t his p o i n t (§ 72 ~ SVF3.653). 4 7 T o p o i n t o u t to the lover how insane his behaviour really is looks like a distinctively Stoic a r g u m e n t . But we m u s t n o t e that Cicero also includes remedia amoris which c a n n o t be tied to any particular school, let a l o n e Chrysippus' Therapeutics: all kinds of distractions, substituting a new love for the old one, etc. (§ 74-75). They may b e l o n g to the n u m e r o u s Peripatetic cures m e n t i o n e d by Cicero (see above, p. 305). A n g e r is a particularly f o r c e f u l affection. Plato a n d Aristotle h a d a r g u e d that it may occur in a n a t u r a l a n d useful variety. But Cicero sides with Chrysippus. How, h e rhetorically asks, can any f o r m of insanity be natural or useful? (§ 79, init. Cf. 3.22). O n e of the stock e l e m e n t s of treatises in the On Anger tradition, b u t also p r o m i n e n t in Chrysippus' Therapeutics (see above, p. 179) were vivid descriptions designed to b r i n g o u t how horrifying a n g e r looks. T o this e n d Cicero supplies a n d c o m m e n t s o n a few poetic q u o t a t i o n s (§ 76-7). M o r e specifically Chrysippean is t h e s u b s e q u e n t passage (78) e x p l a i n i n g that t h e r e is n o cure for an o u t b u r s t of anger; o n e can only wait until the angry persion stops raging. T h e measures p r o p o s e d are suited to the impossibility to apply a r e m e d y to the inflamed a n g e r itself: in the m e a n t i m e o n e may remove the p e o p l e at who are the object of anger, or p e r s u a d e t h e angry p e r s o n to p o s t p o n e revenge until h e r a n g e r has a b a t e d . In a n g e r ' t h e parts soul of the m i n d are scattered'. T h e e n r a g e d soul is physically d e s c r i b e d as all ' f i r e ' (ardorem) until it ceases to boil (defervescat, defervescere). A l t h o u g h it might be a r g u e d that the picture of boiling a n g e r was widespread (see above, pp. 157 ff., 279), the p a t t e r n of ideas at § 78-9 leaves little d o u b t that the main inspiration is Chrysippean. I take the r e f e r e n c e to the i n c o h e r e n c e between the parts of the intellect to be 45 On this Stoic thesis see further SVF 3.716-22; further discussion in Inwood (1997), Sorabji (2000) 280 ff. Cf. also Schofield (1991) ch. 2. 46 Thus at Fin. 3.68 he says: Ne amores quidem sanctos a sapiente atienos arbitrantur. 4 ' This definition (amorem ipsum conatum amicitiae faeiendae ex pulchritudis specie) is an exact translation of the Greek version at Stob. Eel. p. 115.1-2 W. (SV7*" 3.650). Stobaeus reflects the scholastic systematization of Chrysippean doctrine, see supra,

p . 1.

particularly valuable in view of the p r o b l e m how far a n d in which sense Chrysippus employed an idea of 'parts' in this connection. As we have seen, Galen's coverage of this point is m a r r e d by his polemical manipulations. 4 8 I n c o h e r e n c e , or inconsistency (άνομολογία), is for Chrysippus the mark of affection. 4 9 In addition, we e n c o u n t e r ano t h e r example of the limitations of a therapeutic treatment of affection to be c o m p a r e d with Cicero's remark a b o u t the impossibility of curing grief when the swelling is still fresh (§ 63, see above, p. 306). But t h e n Chrysippus saw the affections (i.e. the παθή) as feverish outbursts symptomatic of a m o r e e n d u r i n g diseased condition of the soul. 5 0 If t r e a t m e n t of these outbursts is impossible or difficult, this does not m e a n the e n d of all therapy. O n the contrary, this merely u n d e r l i n e s the i m p o r t a n c e of t h e r a p e u t i c action in the intervals between outbursts of emotion when the patient is m o r e receptive to rational a r g u m e n t . H e n c e the distinction between affection (πάθος) and the underlying diseased state (νόσημα) was an important o n e for Chrysippus. Its significance is reflected in the large section conc e r n e d with the distinction between these a n d related terms presented by Cicero in his a c c o u n t of the λογικά (4.24-29). Thus, h e explains, we have to distinguish between irascibility (iracundia) and anger ( ira), that is to say between the disposition a n d the activation arising f r o m the disposition (§ 27). At § 78 h e is clearly speaking about the latter. T h e conception of affection as madness is itself Chrysippean too. I n d e e d , we have f o u n d Chrysippus arguing that this idea is firmly rooted in c o m m o n experience a n d c o m m o n parlance. 5 1 Apart f r o m its unattractive aspect, it brings o u t the irrationality involved in affection—a point also t o u c h e d u p o n by Cicero (§ 79). Yet n o n e of the passages f r o m Cicero merits adds anything new to o u r evidence. T h e s e reflections r a t h e r c o n f i r m a n d illustrate the material f r o m

48

On the parts of the soul according to Chrysippus, see supra, p. 152 n. 54. PHP 5.4.14: 'Chrysippus said ... that the diseases and affections of the soul consist in the mutual inconsistency (άνομολογία) of the judgements'; cf. Posidonius ap. Gal. PHP 5.5.4 and 6.12 (Posid. Fr. 187 E.-K., SVF 3.12; a very Chrysippean passage, on which see also supra, p.228 ff.). In the verbatim fragment from the Therapeutics preserved by Origen, Contra Celsum VIII, 51 (quoted supra, p.166 f.), Chrysippus recommends demonstrating to the emotional Epicurean that each affection is άνομολούμενον even for those who take pleasure to be the end. Cf. also the Stoic telos-formula 'living ομολογουμένως', see e.g. Stob. Eel. II p. 76.3 ff., 16 ff., Cic. Fin. 3.31, 4.14. For Chrysippus' tract Περί άνομολογίας, see supra p. 180. 50 See supra, p. 155 f. 51 See supra, p. 186. 49

o t h e r sources. What Cicero offers is a kind of g e n e r a l philosophical c u l t u r e including Stoic elements. O n e of the most salient of these is his conviction that all lies in o u r own h a n d s because affection d e p e n d u p o n , i n d e e d are, j u d g e m e n t s a n d o p i n i o n s . T o this idea h e r e t u r n in t h e closing section (79 fin-83). In c o n s e q u e n c e , Cicero stresses, o u r m e n t a l well-being lies in o u r power (potestas) or d e p e n d s on o u r will (voluntas). This insight is the b e g i n n i n g of recovery (ibid. 83).

6. The Third Tusculan T h e third b o o k c o n c e n t r a t e s , t h o u g h far f r o m exclusively, o n o n e particular affection, viz. distress o r m e n t a l pain (aegritudo, λ υ π ή ) , r e f l e c t i n g a p e r s o n a l interest o n Cicero's part. As we have already noticed (above p. 292 f.), its t h e m e a n d structure are closely related to b o o k 4, in which Cicero p r o c e e d s to e m o t i o n in g e n e r a l a n d its species. At this p o i n t we have to take a closer look at the c o n t e n t s of b o o k 3 in o r d e r to d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r we may find anything to add to o u r evidence for Chrysippus' On Affections.52 In the p r o l o g u e (1-7) Cicero o p e n s with the medical analogy, j u s t as in book 4. Although h u m a n s consist of body a n d soul, m e d i c i n e is in h i g h e r r e p u t e , t h o u g h less i m p o r t a n t , than the therapy of the soul (cf. 4.58; cf. 23). We are all capable in principle to follow N a t u r e , which has created us, as o u r guide t h r o u g h life. O u r minds carry little sparks of light, which are however easily extinguished by wrong habits a n d opinions, a n d the seeds of the virtues which, if allowed to grow, may lead us toward happiness. As it is, perversion occurs as soon as we a r e b o r n t h r o u g h bad social i n f l u e n c e s such as n u r s e s p a r e n t s , teachers, poets a n d public o p i n i o n . Philosophy is n e e d e d to h e l p the soul to heal itself. This o p e n i n g is quite Chrysippean: t h e medical analogy at § 1 is clearly inspired by the Therapeutics. It is followed by t h e p i c t u r e of providential N a t u r e setting us o n the p a t h towards virtue (which is t h e c u l m i n a t i o n of o u r n a t u r a l psycho-moral d e v e l o p m e n t 5 3 a n d h e n c e in p r i n c i p l e a t t a i n a b l e ) . All this r u n s closely parallel to D i o g e n e s Laertius' a c c o u n t of o n e section in Chrysippus' On Ends, 52

See the convenient summaries in MacKendrick (1989) 154-6, Fillion-Lahille (1984) 112. 53 I.e. the process described by the Stoics as one of our familiarization (οίκείωσις) with people and things in an increasingly rational maeer

i n c l u d i n g t h e p o i n t m a d e a b o u t t h e perversion of r e a s o n a n d t h e i m p e c c a b l e starting points provided by N a t u r e (7.85-89). 54 T h e perversion of reason o p e n s the d o o r to the e m o t i o n s . It occurs because we are f r o m the b e g i n n i n g exposed to the w r o n g value-judgements of others. This is t h e social cause of c o r r u p t i o n . T h a t Cicero dishes u p this Stoic view u n a d u l t e r a t e d may reflect his s o m b r e m o o d at the time of writing t h e Tusculans. T h i s is a f a r cry f r o m t h e political e n g a g e m e n t a n d patriotism which h e elsewhere associates with Stoic ideas. However, alongside t h e social cause of evil, t h e r e is a n o t h e r , viz. a physical o n e . It is indicated in t h e a c c o u n t s of b o t h Galen a n d Calcidius, namely the sensations which weaken t h e soul a n d m a k e it u n d u l y impressionable to a p p e a r a n c e s r e a c h i n g us. 55 In t h e a c c o u n t p r e s e r v e d by Calcidius, as we have n o t i c e d , a large s h a r e in t h e responsibility was a t t r i b u t e d to t h e b a t h p r e p a r e d by t h e nurses. 5 6 H e r e t h e n u r s e s r e c u r b u t C i c e r o says n o t h i n g a b o u t the physical sensations we u n d e r g o at their h a n d s . Instead h e intimates that it is the nurses' talk which c o r r u p t s us right f r o m the b e g i n n i n g . T h u s we have a n o t h e r e x a m p l e of C i c e r o ' s t e n d e n c y to s u p p r e s s physical aspects in the Chrysippean account. W h e t h e r t h e r e f e r e n c e to virtue a n d o u r providentially o r d a i n e d End also f o r m e d part of it we c a n n o t know. Posidonius in his On Affections was explicit a b o u t the relevance of t h e study of the e m o t i o n s for Virtue a n d the e n d (PHP 5.6.1-2 ~ F 30, 150a E.-K., see above p. 233). Moreover, h e spoke o n the n e e d to b r i n g o u r i n n e r d a e m o n in t u n e with universal n a t u r e which steers all. In t h e light of Diog. Laert. 7.85-9 (esp. 87), we may consider this C h r y s i p p e a n d o c t r i n e too. T h a t P o s i d o n i u s p u t t h e subject of t h e e m o t i o n in t h e wider f r a m e w o r k of moral theory may or may n o t be occasioned by his Chrysippean m o d e l . Galen (5.6.1-2) n o t only m e n tions Posidonius b u t also Chrysippus as having discussed the virtues in opposition to Plato ( t h o u g h admittedly without clear r e f e r e n c e to the On Affections). At any rate, we have shown that h e took u p again many t h e m e s dealt with by Chrysippus (see above, esp. chs. 5.4, 5.5, 5.7). But t h e r e is m o r e material that reflects t h e On Affections. Having stated t h e thesis f o r today's discussion ( ' t h e Sage is subject to distress') (7), C i c e r o discusses distress as o n e of several m e n t a l disorders, all of which can be viewed as f o r m s of insanity, t h o u g h only in 54 55 56

On which see further supra, p. 160. See supra, pp. 132 ff., 157 ff. See supra, p. 134.

t h e light of t h e G r e e k t e r m π ά θ ο ς , which m e a n s disease. C i c e r o discusses a few relevant words a n d expressions in Latin. Insania is an a p p r o p r i a t e term since it is related to foolishness (§ 7-13). W h a t we have h e r e c o r r e s p o n d s exactly to w h a t C h r y s i p p u s says a b o u t e m o t i o n s as madness, including his appeal to c o m m o n parlance (see above, p. 178 ff.). Particularly striking is a p r o t r a c t e d series of Stoic syllogisms proving the central thesis of the book, viz. that the Sage is i m m u n e to m e n t a l pain (§ 14-21). Cicero voices the same p r e f e r e n c e for Stoic terseness that inspired his inclusion of Stoic d e f i n i t i o n s in b o o k 4 (11-33). But t h e r e are n o indications that this long section is based on Chrysippus' treatise. T u r n i n g to the question of t h e cause of anxiety, Cicero discusses its relation ot o t h e r affections. H e presents the definitions of the f o u r m a i n kinds as f o r m u l a t e d by Z e n o a n d r e f i n e d by Chrysippus, viz. as w r o n g o p i n i o n s d i f f e r e n t i a t e d in t e r m s of their object being p r e s e n t or f u t u r e a n d g o o d o r b a d (24-27; cf. 4.11, o n which see above, p. 114). In o t h e r words, t h e cause resides in false o p i n i o n . T h u s distress is a fresh o p i n i o n that evil is present. In sum, he espouses the Stoic position (Cicero has j u s t rejected the Peripatetic theory of the M e a n o n t h e g r o u n d s t h a t t h e r e is n o such t h i n g as m o d e r a t e madness; cf. 4.79, on which see above). In the long s u b s e q u e n t section (28-61a) Cicero dwells on the phen o m e n o l o g y of anxiety. A large part is taken u p with a tirade against E p i c u r u s a n d his pleasure principle (36-51). T h e Stoic p r e s e n c e is clearly less p r o n o u n c e d t h a n in t h e p r e c e d i n g sections. This, however, c h a n g e s w h e n Cicero approvingly cites the Cyrenaic view that u n e x p e c t e d blows hit us h a r d e r t h a n those we foresee. At this p o i n t h e a d d s that Chrysippus was of the same o p i n i o n (52, SVF 3.417). Of course, the observation in question pertains to the idea of 'dwelling in a d v a n c e ' (praemeditatio, προενδημεΐν) in o r d e r to fortify the soul against m e n t a l a p p e a r a n c e s which could otherwise trigger an e m o tion. T h e way in which Cicero a d d s this p o i n t a b o u t the Stoic ( n o t e esp. t h e words etiam Chrysippo videri scio ... ) indicates that we a r e dealing with an insertion into an a c c o u n t which for the rest is largely based by Cicero o n o t h e r , non-Stoic sources. It is worth c o m p a r i n g PHP 4.7.6-11 (SVF 3.481-2, Posid. F 165 E.K.), where Galen speaks a b o u t an alleged d i f f e r e n c e between Chrysippus a n d Posidonius in respect of the definition of distress (λυπή) being, or b e i n g caused by, a fresh belief. Posidonius, Galen tells us,

questioned the addition of 'fresh' on the g r o u n d that it is not clear why only fresh belief would cause distress (ibid. 7, p.282, 11.5-7). Clearly 'fresh' is taken by Posidonius, and apparently also Chrysippus, in the sense of sudden and unexpected: it is occurrences of this kind which cause us to forget o u r earlier (good) j u d g e m e n t (ibid. 11. 7-10). Galen intimates that Posidonius disagreed with Chrysippus (cf. 6, p. 282,1.1: Ποσειδώνιος αντιλέγει τω Χρυσίππω). He continues: That is why he [Chrysippus? Posidonius?] says that one should dwell in advance on and behave towards thing not yet present as though they were present. The word προενδημεΐν (dwell in advance) means according to Posidonius to imagine, as it were, in advance and to bring about a gradual habituation to it, as to something that has happened before. Distress may befall us because of an unexpected experience. This was the whole point of having 'fresh' a d d e d to 'belief in the definition. Clearly it can be prevented by realizing that such a thing is possible in principle a n d might occur at any time, and f u r t h e r by reflecting on what it would be like. So it would fit the view ascribed to Chrysippus that h e would prescribe us 'to dwell in advance'. If we take the subject of 'says' (φησι, ibid. 1.10) to be Chrysippus, this is exactly what h e does. In that case Posidonius would merely have provided an explanatory gloss on the unusual term προενδημεΐν. However, taking Chrysippus as the subject would involve a switch of subject: t h o u g h not specified, the subject of the preceding sentence (1.7 καί φησι - 1. 10 κομιδή) must be Posidonius, or else Galen's line of reasoning would n o longer be intelligible. But if Posidonius is the subject, it is h e who exhorts us to dwell in advance on the disasters that may h a p p e n to us. But if this is the case, h e wil hardly have criticized the addition of ' f r e s h ' in the definition simply because 'dwelling in advance' should prevent 'fresh' beliefs. In sum, Galen has attempted to make what in fact was a piece of explanation look like a refutation of Chrysippus by Posidonius. In that case, Posidonius may have raised the general question why u n e x p e c t e d blows of f o r t u n e hit us h a r d e r than expected ones—a fact which h e acknowledged as c o m m o n l y known and o n e on which h e did not disagree with Chrysippus. In fact, the addition of 'fresh' was n o t even a Chrysippean innovation but featured already in Zeno's version. 57 57

This follows from what Galen quotes Posidonius as saying in the preceding context, 7.2-3. The definitions featuring the phrase 'fresh belief are those which according to this passage Zeno pronounced and Chrysippus wrote down. This also

G a l e n ' s travesty of t h e relations between Z e n o , Chrysippus a n d Posidonius is f u r t h e r revealed when we look at the rest of Tusc. 3.52. H e r e Chrysippus provides a d e c e n t answer to the question which, if we are to believe Galen, Posidonius h a d devastatingly p u t to h i m . Chrysippus gives two reasons f o r t h e i m p a c t of u n e x p e c t e d events, e x p l a i n i n g why they trigger the psychic d i s t u r b a n c e n a m e d distress. First, u n e x p e c t e d experiences hit us h a r d e r because we have n o time to assess the m a g n i t u d e of the disadvantage (a p o i n t which refers to a n o t h e r e l e m e n t of the definition: the belief is that of the p r e s e n c e of a great evil). T h i s m a k e s us liable to m i s j u d g e its real e x t e n t . Secondly, o u r distress is all the greater since we feel guilty a b o u t n o t having f o r e s e e n it a n d n o t having taken precautions. W h a t kind of p r e c a u t i o n s are m e a n t is left unclear. P e r h a p s this could be anything d e p e n d i n g o n the kind of disaster in question. Obviously we simply c a n n o t know everything which the f u t u r e h o l d s in store f o r us. But n o n e t h e l e s s we feel guilty a b o u t what has h a p p e n e d to us. This is just the irrationality typical of e m o t i o n . For o u r p u r p o s e s it is i m p o r t a n t to n o t e that Chrysippus neatly links t h e aspects o f ' f r e s h ' (said of the o p i n i o n ) a n d that of 'great' (said of the evil believed to be p r e s e n t ) : the evil seems so great, h e explains, precisely because we have had n o time to think properly. So w h e n Galen plays these two aspects off against each o t h e r , we should n o t be led into supposing that he, let a l o n e Posidonius to w h o m Galen assigns t h e role of criticizer, h a d really e x p o s e d a weak s p o t in C h r y s i p p u s ' a u t h e n t i c p o s i t i o n (4.7.5). 5 8 Chrysippus suggests that the only t h i n g we can d o is 'to dwell in a d v a n c e ' — t o try to foresee a n d realize what might h a p p e n , given the seems to imply that Posidonius in discussing Zeno's definitions based himself on Chrysippus in the first book of his On Affections only. Further, Cicero specifically says that it was Zeno who included the adjective 'fresh' in the definition, Tusc. 3.75 (SVF 1.212). (Cicero's phrasing here is infelicitous insofar as he says that Zeno added 'fresh' to the definition featuring the twojudgement-types, but an overall consideration of the evidence shows that this formulation was Chrysippean and cannot be ascribed to Zeno; cf. Donini (1995) 326 η.42. This report too must be based on Chrysippus' treatment of the Zenonian definitions in the first book of his treatise. 58 Cf. Kidd ad toe (p. 600) who notes that Tusc. 3.25, 28, too, combine magnitude and freshness but nonetheless seems to accept Galen's claim that Chrysippus' stressed the former idea only and really had a problem when it came to accounting for the freshness: 'Posidonius does not wish to challenge or reject the definition here, but to show that it creates difficulties for Chrysippus himself, because of his psychology' (p. 599). I hope to have shown that a closer analysis of this Galenic passage makes clear that we cannot be sure that Posidonius criticized Chrysippus in any way. For further interpretations (all of which follow Galen on this point) see Hirzel (1882), vol. 3, 428-434, Pohlenz (1898) 552 f., 616 f., Reinhardt (1921) 292.

condition humaine a n d its n u m e r o u s liabilities. H e r e , admittedly, Cicero d o e s n o t refer to 'dwelling in advance' as a preventive measu r e a r m i n g us against t h e blows of fate. But h e d o e s so at Tusc. 3.29, speaking of the praemeditatio futurorum malorum, which clearly r e n d e r s προενδημεΐν. It is t h e p r o p e r r e s p o n s e to t h e p h e n o m e n o n t h a t distress is n o t b r o u g h t a b o u t all bad things b u t only by unexpected bad t h i n g s (ibid. 28). A n d at ibid 52 t h e c o n c e p t of praemeditatio is ascribed to Chrysippus. We may c o m p a r e the position of Chrysippus as described by Galen. This is c o n f i r m e d by the fact that Cicero goes o n to p r e s e n t t h e s a m e two illustrations of t h e value of m e n t a l p r e p a r a t i o n f o r disaster that are p r e s e n t e d by Galen, 4.7.6-11: t h e u n f l i n c h i n g r e s p o n s e of the p h i l o s o p h e r Anaxagoras o n h e a r i n g the news of his son's d e a t h ( Ί knew I h a d b e g o t t e n a moral being!') a n d a line f r o m Euripides' Phúxus (Fr. 821 Nauck: T h e s e u s saying h e h a d i m a g i n e d all diasters in advance so as b e t t e r to be able to e n d u r e them). W h a t are we to conclude? Both Tusc. 3.52 a n d 29 are to be a d d e d to o u r dossier of materials deriving f r o m On Affections a n d probably the Therapeutics, since they a r e c o n c e r n e d with t h e p r e v e n t i o n of affections like grief. PHP 4.7.6-11 supplies the Greek terminology but w h e n taken o n its own is c o m p l e t e l y m i s l e a d i n g o n t h e relations between the Stoics involved. Tusc. 3.59 (SVF 3.487) attests t h e fact that Chrysippus habitually (cf. solebat) q u o t e d a passage f r o m Euripides—which is also given— o n t h e liabilities of t h e condition humaine. Clearly, this q u o t a t i o n fits Chrysippus' e x h o r t a t i o n to dwell in advance o n t h e terrible things that m i g h t h a p p e n so as to p r e - e m p t grief. T h e n e x t passage o n o u r list is f o u n d at Tusc. 3.61 (SVF 3.485), p r e s e n t i n g the etymological derivation—explicitly ascribed to Chrysippus—of λύπη as a λύεσθαι or p e r h a p s r a t h e r παράλυεσθαι of the whole person. 5 9 (Cicero's Latin has solutionem totius hominis: a 'dissolution', or 'loosening'.) Given Cicero's attested use of the first t h r e e books On Affections (the so-called λογικά, 4.33; see above, p. 302) a n d the fact that this time h e d o e s n o t m e n t i o n an i n t e r m e d i a t e source, o n e feels t e m p t e d to ascribe this derivation to that section of the On Affections, b o o k 1, which c o n t a i n e d C h r y s i p p u s ' p r e s e n t a t i o n - c u m e x p l a n a t i o n of Z e n o ' s definitions, a l t h o u g h it c a n n o t be paralleled

59 Cf. also Pohlenz (1906) 335, who is also in favour of the Chrysippean provenance of this and the related passages.

f r o m the Galenic material. T h e r e is a notice in Stobaeus' anthology ascribing the definition of λύπη as a π α ρ ά λ υ σ ι ς to Cleanthes, which certainly s t r e n g t h e n s the possibility that Chrysippus re-used it in the first book. 6 0 T h e fact that this etymological p u n was m o r e c o m m o n l y m a d e (e.g. PI. Crat. 419c) may only have e n c o u r a g e d Chrysippus to take it into account. In addition Tusc. 3.61 refers to the Chrysippean analysis of affection (in this case distress) in t e r m s of two types of j u d g e m e n t (see above, p. 169). Literary a n d historical e x a m p l e s follow, describing in what ways p e o p l e c o n s i d e r it a p p r o p r i a t e to i n d u l g e in r e p u g n a n t f o r m s of grief. We must n o t e the conclusion h e draws f r o m these instances at 3.64 (not in SVI·): the fact that p e o p l e believe they o u g h t to act in the ways j u s t illustrated proves that affection is voluntary. H e a d d s two f u r t h e r examples. M o u r n i n g p e o p l e are o f t e n seen to forget t h e m selves, w h e r e u p o n they starting displaying grief again. They feel guilty a b o u t having ceased m o u r n i n g . Children who behave inappropriately d u r i n g the p e r i o d of m o u r n i n g are even p u n i s h e d a n d m a d e to wail. Cicero e n d s with the observation that as time passes grief fades. T h e n it is u n d e r s t o o d that m o u r n i n g is pointless. This c o m m o n e x p e r i e n c e c o n f i r m s that grief d e p e n d s u p o n o u r will f r o m its inception. T h e c o h e r e n t section § 61 (sed ad hanc opinionem ... ) - 64 presents the position taken by Chrysippus o n an i m p o r t a n t aspect. Can it be paralleled f r o m G a l e n ' s v e r b a t i m f r a g m e n t s of t h e On Affections? T h e r e a r e b u t few relevant f r a g m e n t s r e f e r r i n g to t h e aspect of a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s . S o m e o t h e r s c o n c e r n p e o p l e e x p e c t i n g certain f o r m s of e m o t i o n a l behaviour f r o m themselves or others. 6 1 Galen is 60

Stob. Floríl. p. 108.59 Meineke ~ SVF1.575. See PHP4.5.27, 40 (Posid. F 164). In addition we should note several quotations from the poets showing people who self-consciously decide upon emotional behaviour: PHP 4.5.43, 4.6.19 (the famous final lines of Medea's grand decision speech, E. Med. 1078-9), 4.6.34, 4.6.38, 4.6.40 (SVF 3.475). In addition there is an important fragment at 4.6.29 (SVF3.475), where Chrysippus explains that lovecl ones expect lovers to behave in a uncalculated, non-rational way and they themselves do not want to listen to advice. This explanation evidently belongs in the same context, viz. the thesis defended by Chrysippus that emotional behaviour presupposes a mistaken view about which actions are appropriate. In addition, 4.7.1217 (SVF3.466), which is also concerned with the gradual abatement of grief: when this occurs, three factors can be distinguished (1) the opinion that grief is (still) present; (2) the contraction that slackens (άνίεσθαι ή συστολή), i.e. the physical reaction of the soul: see supra, p. 298; and (3) 'the conation towards the contraction' (ή έπί τήν συστολήν όρμήν). I shall deal with the relations between these three factors more fully below. Suffice it to observe here that factor (3) must be the determinant and so corresponds to the second opinion distinguished in the Chrysippean analysis, viz. that it is appropriate to indulge in a particular affection. 61

o u t to show that Chrysippus again a n d again η spite of himself employs the idea of the non-rational with r e f e r e n c e to involuntary causes of e m o t i o n a l responses. Obviously h e has n o interest in highlighting the aspect of voluntariness in the Stoic's theory . In a f r a g m e n t f r o m the s e c o n d b o o k q u o t e d ( f r o m Posidonius) at PHP 4.7.26-36 (SVF 467, Posid. F 165) we f i n d a few H o m e r i c quotations which are m e a n t to illustrate t h e c o m m o n fact that grief subsides in t h e course of time a n d p e o p l e b e c o m e s sated with it. This is essentially t h e same observation as o n e at the e n d of Tusculans 4.64. According to Galen, this can only b e e x p l a i n e d on the assumption of n o n - r a t i o n a l f a c t o r s in t h e m i n d b e c a u s e t h e ' s u p p o s i t i o n a n d o p i n i o n ' persist (ibid. 28). T h e o p i n i o n which Galen m e a n s is t h e o p i n i o n that what has h a p p e n e d is evil, f o r instance the d e a t h of a loved o n e , as in t h e case of Achilles a n d Patroclus (cf. PHP 4.7.14 ~ SVF 3.466). 6 2 So why d o p e o p l e a f t e r s o m e t i m e a b a n d o n t h e i r sorrow? In G a l e n ' s a c c o u n t C h r y s i p p u s p o i n t e d to t h e fact t h a t reason finds its way into o u r m i n d again a n d shows the irrationality (άλογίαν) of t h e affection ( ibid. 27). Likewise Chrysippus a c c o r d i n g to Cicero says that a f t e r s o m e time p e o p l e realize that m o u r n i n g is pointless. But h e r e t h e o p i n i o n which they a b a n d o n is n o t t h e o p i n i o n that s o m e t h i n g evil has h a p p e n e d — t h i s o p i n i o n arises f r o m a flawed value-system which is n o t r e p l a c e d o v e r n i g h t a n d i n d e e d is still in place. Persons w h o stop m o u r n i n g give u p the second type of o p i n i o n distinguished by Chrysippus: the o p i n i o n that it is a p p r o p r i ate to m o u r n . This explains what Chrysippus m e a n s by irrationality: g o o d sense is partially r e s t o r e d w h e n p e o p l e realize t h e i n a p p r o p riateness of their behaviour. 6 3 T h u s Galen coaslesces t h e two kinds of o p i n i o n distinguished in t h e C h r y s i p p e a n analysis, o r r a t h e r suppresses o n e of t h e m . T h i s m a k e s it o n c e again possible f o r h i m to claim t h a t C h r y s i p p u s p o i n t e d to f o r m s of n o n - r a t i o n a l b e h a v i o u r f o r which h e a d m i t t e d having n o e x p l a n a t i o n . O n c e again h e uses Posidonius as his p r i m e witness. In the light of o u r Ciceronian parallel, o n e may well ask what it m e a n s w h e n Galen says that ' P o s i d o n i u s himself shows t h a t t h e According to Chrysippus conation is 'reason commanding man to act' (Chrys. ap. Plut. SR 1037F, SVF3.175) and the concept is closely related to that of appropriate action (καθήκον): see e.g. Stob. EcL 86,17 (SVF3.169): τό δέ κινούν την όρμήν ούδέν ετερον είναι λέγουσιν άλλ' ή φαντασίαν όρμητικήν τοΰ καθήκοντος αύτόθεν. 62 See supra, pp. 123 f. 63 Appropriate action is defined as that having a 'well-reasoned justification', D.L. 7.107 (SVF493).

affections arise f r o m anger a n d desire' (ibid. 24)? Nowhere in the ensuing quotation do we find Posidonius' own words, let alone his criticism of Chrysippus. But we d o know that Posidonius showed full awareness of the role of appropriateness in Chrysippus' account of grief. 6 4 Did h e go on to suppress this point to attack Chrysippus in the way Galen tells us? At § 76 and 796r> the aspect of the appropriateness of an emotional response is once again associated with the n a m e of Chrysippus. H e r e we also have its therapeutical application: o n e should convince a m o u r n i n g person that he m o u r n s because he thinks it his duty to do so, that is to say, that he wants to m o u r n . T h u s we may speed u p a natural process, viz. the fact that almost everyone sees after a period of time that protracted expression of grief is irrational. It is very likely that these two passages go back to the Therapeutics. Interestingly, these passages sandwich a critical c o m m e n t on Cleanthes (§ 77 on which see supra, pp. 169 f.). 66

7. Conclusion In the p r e c e d i n g pages I have u n d e r t a k e n to provide a complete survey of the Ciceronian evidence which can be related to the On Affections a n d , consequently, be used in the r e c o n s t r u c t i o n a n d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of this treatise. T h e basis for attribution has b e e n twofold. First, I argued that the long section Tusc. 4.11-33 based on the so-called λογικά r u n s parallel, both as to c o n t e n t and (often) as to wording, to a comparatively large n u m b e r of verbatim quotations provided by Galen. In addition, the two sets of texts exhibit an unmistakable correspondence as to what must have been the original order of themes treated by Chrysippus (on which we are also informed by some explicit remarks by Galen). T h e testimony of Galen also reveals that certain passages offered by Cicero as part of the λογικά (i.e. the first three 'theoretical' books) were really f r o m the f o u r t h book, entitled Therapeutics (Θεραπευτικόν). This mistake—which led Cicero also to attach a different m e a n i n g to the term λογικά as well

64

See PHP4.5.27, 40 (Posid. F 164). Cf. (,SV/·'3.486). On this passage cf. Donini (1995) 305 ff. 66 On this passage see further Philippson (1932) 272 ff. and, more recently, White (1995). 65

(i.e. 'abstract' instead of ' t h e o r e t i c a l ' ) — m a y have arisen because of his use of an intermediary source, p e r h a p s an e p i t o m e f o r 4.11-33. T h e identification of Tusc. 4.11-33, at any rate, as a r e n d e r i n g , albeit in Latin, of the gist of Chrysippus' a r g u m e n t in the On Affections invites a scrutiny of o t h e r related related material f o u n d scattered in o t h e r sections of b o o k 4 as well as o t h e r books. It proved possible to track down s o m e f u r t h e r parallels between t h e C i c e r o n i a n material a n d explicitly attested f r a g m e n t s f r o m G a l e n . This p r o c e d u r e has e n a b l e d us to a d d several C i c e r o n i a n passages to o u r dossier o n Chrysippus' treatise. 6 7 So what does this a d d u p to when it c o m e s to r e c o n s t r u c t i n g Chrysippus' original position? A few times we have seen that Chrysippus in t h e C i c e r o n i a n a c c o u n t did p r o v i d e answers to q u e s t i o n s which a c c o r d i n g to Galen (with f r e q u e n t a p p e a l to Posidonius) h e could n o t resolve. A p r i m e e x a m p l e is the role a c c o r d e d by Chrysippus to j u d g e m e n t s o n how to r e s p o n d a p p r o p r i a t e l y to certain events—an i n g r e d i e n t which G a l e n s u p p r e s s e s as m u c h as h e c a n . C i c e r o c o n f i r m s that the affections involve two kinds of (wrong) j u d g e m e n t : (1) that a t h i n g is e i t h e r g o o d or bad; (2) that it is a p p r o p r i a t e to r e s p o n d to it in an e m o t i o n a l way. At the same time Cicero is n o t without his p r e f e r e n c e s a n d blind spots either. H e has little p a t i e n c e with the physical side of the Stoic theory. H e r e p e a t e d l y c o u c h e s t h e ' s h r i n k i n g s ' , ' e x p a n s i o n s ' a n d o t h e r physical effects involved in e m o t i o n in figurative l a n g u a g e . H e r e Galen r e m a i n s o u r m a i n s o u r c e of i n f o r m a t i o n , t h o u g h his a c c o u n t is p r o b l e m a t i c o n this p o i n t as well. Cicero is clearly m o r e i n t e r e s t e d in t h e social aspect of e m o t i o n , viz. ideas o n the a p p r o p riateness of certain types of b e h a v i o u r — i d e a s largely d e t e r m i n e d by o n e ' s c h a r a c t e r a n d social r e l a t i o n s or place in society, as in t h e e x a m p l e s drawn f r o m family life (3.64). H e n c e the g r e a t e r p r o m i n e n c e of j u d g e m e n t s of type 2 in C i c e r o ' s a c c o u n t . But insofar as c h a r a c t e r is a m a t t e r of t h e soul's physical s t r e n g t h , we hardly f i n d anything in Cicero that we did n o t already know f r o m Galen. T h e r e is however a n o t h e r aspect of Cicero's a c c o u n t where h e is of greater h e l p than Galen could ever be. Galen, at least in PHP 4 a n d 5, is n o t i n t e r e s t e d in t h e r a p y in t h e sense of t h o s e t e c h n i q u e s a n d exercises d e s i g n e d to treat a n d p r e v e n t a f f e c t i o n s of t h e soul. H e focuses on the m o r e theoretical passages which illustrate what h e sees

67

See also the overview, infra, pp. 325 ff.

as the i n a d e q u a t e c o n c e p t i o n of the soul advocated by Chrysippus— i n a d e q u a t e insofar as it fails to a c c o u n t for the cause of e m o t i o n . For therapy p r o p e r we have to t u r n to Cicero a n d a few testimonies f r o m o t h e r sources, notably Origen a n d Philodemus. Unlike Galen, Cicero is interested in therapy. Having a r g u e d that the Sage is e x e m p t f r o m distress a n d o t h e r emotions, h e disertis verbis t u r n s to the t h e r a p e u t i c t r e a t m e n t of those who are not yet Sages in both books (3 a n d 4). So what is t h e p i c t u r e of t h e t h e r a p e u t i c a l side of Chrysippus' treatise which e m e r g e s f r o m Cicero? O n a few occasions, as we have noticed, Cicero observes that Chrysippus a n d o t h e r Stoics, unlike the Peripatetics, in fact o f f e r little in t h e way of t h e r a p e u t i c measures. Cicero must think of those m e n t a l t e c h n i q u e s a n d exercises which h e l p persons who are in a state of e m o t i o n . T h i n k of such r e m e d i e s as c u r i n g erotic passion by realizing that the object of o n e ' s feelings really is n o t so beautiful after all.'' 8 T h a t Chrysippus h a d little therapy of this kind on o f f e r b e c o m e s m o r e u n d e r s t a n d a b l e in the light of a few o t h e r passages w h e r e Cicero r e p o r t s that Chrysippus believed e m o t i o n to be incurable—save f r o m a few e m e r g e n c y measures (cf. O r i g e n , Contra Celsum 3.51, Tusc. 4.69-70). This p o i n t bears directly o n the distinction drawn by Chrysippus between affection or e m o t i o n (πάθος, perturbatio animî) a n d disease (νόσημα, morbus), o n which we are i n f o r m e d by b o t h Galen a n d Cicero. Chrysippus saw the affection as a m o m e n t a r y o u t b r e a k , or a m o m e n t of activation arising f r o m an underlying condition, viz. the diseased state of the soul. C h r y s i p p e a n t h e r a p y would b e virtually n o n - e x i s t e n t if it was directed only at affection is this narrowly d e f i n e d sense—a hopeless task, as Chrysippus himself stressed, for obvious reasons: a persion at the climax of affection is particularly unreceptive to reason. In conseq u e n c e Stoic therapy is d i r e c t e d largely at t h e u n d e r l y i n g diseased c o n d i t i o n of the soul. T h e r e is thus an i m p o r t a n t preventive side to it. O n e n e e d s to s t r e n g t h e n the soul b e f o r e h a n d , so that it can withstand the impact of mental a p p e a r a n c e s that would otherwise d r a g it towards an e m o t i o n a l response. T h e n a m e f o r o n e of the m a i n techniques designed for this p u r p o s e is what Cicero calls praemeditatio, the ' c o n t e m p l a t i o n in a d v a n c e ' (προενδημεΐν in G r e e k ) . Mentally o n e invokes a p p e a r a n c e s of the above kind, thus training a n d improving t h e soul with a view to the possible o c c u r r e n c e of real objects which w o u l d cause t h e m . T h e r e l e v a n t passages of C i c e r o a n d G a l e n

68

For a general survey of such ancient techniques see Sorabji (2000) 211 if.

c o m b i n e d indicate that Chrysippus h a d r e c o m m e n d e d this technique. It was not a Posidonian invention. In addition Cicero provides a few indications that the definitions of the emotions were given therapeutic a n d preventive significance. Given the Stoic monistic c o n c e p t i o n of the soul, these definition teach us that the e m o t i o n s are misguided j u d g e m e n t s a n d h e n c e entirely voluntary. Since they are u p to us, they can be withstood in principle. Since they describe j u d g e m e n t s as a wrong evaluation, which mistakes an indifferent thing for something good or evil, it is the task of Stoic philosophy to teach us the correct value of things. Clearly this type of therapy concern j u d g e m e n t s of type 1 as distinguished above. Finally, the s h e e r ugliness a n d irrationality of e m o t i o n was depicted. T h u s it e m e r g e d as s o m e t h i n g to be avoided at all costs. This is also reflected in Philodemus' report that the Stoics did not d o m u c h m o r e than censure emotion. 6 9 This also should be c o m p a r e d with Cicero's testimony that the Stoics offer little to n o t h i n g in the way of therapy. T h e description of emotion as repulsive pertains to the second type of j u d g e m e n t , since it makes clear that u n d e r no circumstance such behaviour can be considered appropriate.

69

Philod. De ira col. 1.10-20 Indelli (cf. SVF 3.470 based on Gomperz' older transcription), who, referring to criticism levelled against Chrysippus by one Timaxagoras (on whose identity cf. Indelli, p. 142 f.) says: εί μέν ούν έπετίμα [seil. Timaxagoras] τοις ψέγουσιν μ[ό]νον, άλλο δέ μηδέ εν ποιούσιν ή βαι[ό]ν, ώς Βίων έν τώι Περί της όργης καί Χρύσιππος έν τ[ώ]ι Πε[π]ί παθών θεραπευ[τι]κώι, κάν μετρίως ϊστατο.

GENERAL C O N C L U S I O N

I have r e a c h e d the e n d of my discussion of the evidence relating to Chrysippus' On Affections. It is time to look back a n d p r e s e n t a general p i c t u r e of t h e position d e f e n d e d by Chrysippus, his p r o c e d u r e a n d arguments, as well as the relations between him a n d others philosophers, most notably t h e Stoics with w h o m h e is said by Galen to have disagreed. In line with the ' c o n t e x t u a l ' a p p r o a c h e x p l a i n e d in t h e G e n e r a l I n t r o d u c t i o n , I have paid considerable attention to the aims a n d m e t h o d s of o u r sources, most notably Galen a n d Cicero. My principal aim in d o i n g so was to establish the e x t e n t a n d n a t u r e of t h e evidence o n which any reconstruction of the On Affections should b e based. It has proved possible to m a k e several a d d i t i o n s (mostly f r o m Cicero) to t h e evidence assembled by Von Arnim f r o m Galen, Cicero a n d Calcidius. (A survey of the evidence is p r e s e n t e d in t h e A p p e n d i x , below, p. 325). Even so the assembled material is insufficient to u n d e r t a k e a c o n t i n u o u s reconstruction of c o m p l e t e sections. O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , Galen a n d Cicero c o m b i n e d cover substantial sections of Books 1 a n d 4. In a d d i t i o n , G a l e n ' s evidence for Book 2 gains m u c h interest o n c e t h e real role played by Posidonius is u n d e r stood. Studying t h e relevant f r a g m e n t s a n d testimonies t o g e t h e r as deriving f r o m this particular treatise p e r m i t s us to see c o n n e c t i o n s that Chrysippus was c o n c e r n e d to make. Moreover, we may grasp the original c o n t e x t a n d sense of many snippets of preserved text which otherwise would be easily overlooked or n e g l e c t e d — a s in fact they o f t e n are. T h e main impression e m e r g i n g f r o m Galen, Cicero a n d o u r additional sources is of a Chrysippus w h o f u r t h e r develops Z e n o ' s doctrine. In so d o i n g h e takes full a c c o u n t of the soul's corporeal n a t u r e , witness his m e d i c a l analogy a n d o t h e r a r g u m e n t s . Overall, his a p p r o a c h is far m o r e p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l a n d empirical than would at first sight a p p e a r f r o m the a c c o u n t s of Galen a n d Cicero. F u r t h e r m o r e , we have noticed e c h o e s f r o m Plato's Timaeus (86-88) as well as Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics (ch. 4.7). Chrysippus can be shown to develop his position with an eye o n these predecessors, using t h e m as well as improving u p o n t h e m (cf. also ch. 5.7 o n Platonic a n d Aristotelian e c h o e s in Cleanthes' dialogue between Reason a n d A n g e r ) . In

addition, we have f o u n d several points of contact with the medical traditions such as represented by the Hippocratic corpus—a feature which suits the p r o m i n e n c e given by Chrysippus to the medical analogy (4.8). O n e of the main tasks we have set ourselves was to understand the workings of Galen's dialectic. Most of his cast of characters, it has t u r n e d out, played a rather different role in real life. Zeno did not identify the affections with the physical effects of the corporeal soul. In reality he used intentional as well as physical terms to refer to what were two aspects of o n e a n d the same p h e n o m e n o n . T h e r e is n o d i f f e r e n c e with Chrysippus (or for that matter Cleanthes) on this score. Chrysippus advanced beyond Zeno and Cleanthes in his analysis of the types of j u d g m e n t involved in emotion: (1) a false j u d g e m e n t on the value of a particular thing; (2) a false j u d g e m e n t that a particular emotional response is appropriate. We have devoted ample space to the motivation a n d application of this r e f i n e m e n t . From Galen's text we learned that Chrysippus introduced this distinction to tackle certain problems arising from the phenomenology of emotion, e.g. its a b a t e m e n t when the relevant value-judgements are still in place. Cicero's account shed light on its therapeutical relevance. T h e cure of an affection is primarily directed at j u d g e m e n t s of type (2), i.e. o n e may try to convince the patient of the inappropriateness of his response. However, affection is understood as a momentary crisis arising f r o m an underlying diseased condition marked by mistaken judgements of type 1. A complete and successful therapy is therefore aimed at this type of j u d g e m e n t s as well. But it can correct these judgements only in the intervals between emotional crises. In fact, since the patient is unreceptive to reason d u r i n g an emotional crisis, it is often difficult to convince him even of the inappropriateness of his behaviour. Many of Chrysippus' examples and poetic quotations, as we have noticed, capture the sheer irrationality and inconsistency of emotional behaviour. T h e ideal therapy t h e r e f o r e places m u c h emphasis on preventive measures, i.e. it seeks to s t r e n g t h e n the underlying mental condition from which the affections arise. It does so t h r o u g h philosophical instruction and t h r o u g h regimen aimed at physical factors. In addition, it consists of mental exercises and techniques (e.g. dwelling in advance on certain mental a p p e a r a n c e s ) . Chrysippus d e n o u n c e d affection as a f o r m of insanity, employing vivid depiction as a d e t e r r e n t . H e r e too the importance attached to prevention emerges.

A n o t h e r of o u r f i n d i n g s is t h e sustained physicalism u n d e r l y i n g Chrysippus' a p p r o a c h , a f e a t u r e which we have b e e n able to situate against the c o n t e m p o r a r y medical b a c k d r o p (ch. 4.8). His so-called medical analogy was n o t a m e r e m e t a p h o r b u t t h e expression of a m e a n i n g f u l physical c o r r e s p o n d e n c e between body a n d soul, most notably the physical tension in b o t h . Chrysippus explained this m o r e fully in t e r m s of t h e e l e m e n t a l qualities, following Z e n o in this respect as well. T h e c o r p o r e a l basis of his theory also surfaces in his c o n c e p t of 'first m o v e m e n t s ' , which may trigger a f u l l - f l e d g e d e m o t i o n . C o n s i d e r e d in this light, the soul's c o r p o r e a l n a t u r e helps explain t h e e l e m e n t of passivity in the e x p e r i e n c e of e m o t i o n , viz. insofar as it involves b e i n g a f f e c t e d by a m e n t a l i m p r i n t , i.e. t h e a p p e a r a n c e (φαντασία). But of course t h e r e is an i m p o r t a n t active aspect as well, in line with the Chrysippean c o n c e p t of the c o r p o r e a l cause. In e x p l a i n i n g t h e o c c u r r e n c e of e m o t i o n s Chrysippus employed his distinction b e t w e e n a n t e c e d e n t cause (~ t h e e x t e r n a l object a p p e a r i n g to us) a n d sustaining cause (~ the soul responsible f o r t h e a f f e c t i o n ) . G a l e n ' s c o m p l a i n t that Chrysippus provided n o p r o p e r causal a c c o u n t is u n j u s t i f i e d . Accordingly, his a p p e a l to Posidonius as the o n e Stoic who did press for such an explanation is equally misleading. T h e r e may have b e e n a d i f f e r e n c e between the two Stoics c o n c e r n i n g the limits of the causal explanation. This however shows Posidonius developing a Stoic line of explanation f u r t h e r than Chrysippus had d o n e . Contrary to what Galen alleges, Posidonius was n o dissident b u t merely c o n t r i b u t e d s o m e terminological p o i n t s a n d c o n c e p t u a l r e f i n e m e n t s . W h a t Galen tells us a b o u t his attitude to Chrysippus should n o t be taken at face value. It provides n o reliable g u i d e to possible weak spots in t h e Chrysippean theory b u t should be carefully a n d critically e x a m i n e d (see also the conclusion to ch. 5). O n e of the m a i n points resulting f r o m o u r inquiry is that o u r two principal s o u r c e s — G a l e n a n d C i c e r o — s h o w little interest in what m i g h t be called the physical-cum-theological basis of the Stoic theory of t h e emotions. Stoic corporealism was n o t c o n f i n e d to the h u m a n m i c r o c o s m . Each individual intellect is p a r t of t h e m a c r o c o s m i c whole e n s o u l e d by the divine intellect. T h u s o u r intellect is continuous n o t only with the lower levels of reality t h r o u g h its c o n n e c t i o n with the body. It is also r o o t e d in the higher, divine realm t h r o u g h its share in divine reason. This divine e l e m e n t of o u r being is referred to by b o t h Chrysippus a n d Posidonius (as it h a d n o d o u b t b e e n by Z e n o

b e f o r e t h e m ) as o u r g u a r d i a n spirit, t h e daimôn. T h i s Stoic m o d e l provides an alternative to t h e Platonist-cum-Peripatetic faculty app r o a c h , since it serves to explain p h e n o m e n a such as mental conflict a n d the status of so-called right reason. O u r own way of thinking is closer to the faculty a p p r o a c h since the Stoic parts-and-whole s c h e m a r e q u i r e s a drastic d e p a r t u r e f r o m o u r t e n d e n c y to conceive of t h e subjective a n d objective in t e r m s of a s h a r p i n t e r n a l / e x t e r n a l distinction. 1 T h e o p p o s i t i o n e r e c t e d by o u r m a i n s o u r c e s b e t w e e n t h e Stoic ' o n e - f a c u l t y ' a p p r o a c h a n d t h e Platonist-cum-Peripatetic multi-faculty a p p r o a c h has d o n e m u c h to o b s c u r e t h e d i f f e r e n t k i n d of d i s t i n c t i o n u n d e r l y i n g t h e Stoic a p p r o a c h — w h i c h , confusingly, takes a c c o u n t of t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l a n d especially Aristotelian heritage in o t h e r i m p o r t a n t respects. T h e view of e m o t i o n as cognitive was n o t a Stoic i n n o v a t i o n . It goes back to Plato a n d Aristotle. T h e Stoics f u r t h e r d e v e l o p e d their insights a n d f o r m u l a t e d the most radically cognitive theory o n o f f e r in a n c i e n t philosophy. But t h e Stoic position resists rough-and-ready classification in m o d e r n terms. It is t h e r e f o r e potentially misleading to c h a r a c t e r i z e it as a cognitive theory tout court. T h e Stoic theory comprises various aspects, i n c l u d i n g physical ones, not least because of their view of t h e soul as pneuma. In c o n s e q u e n c e , they use intentional a n d physical t e r m s i n t e r c h a n g e a b l y . P h e n o m e n a such as the intensity or d u r a t i o n of t h e e m o t i o n a l impulse or t h e quality of t h e m e n t a l a p p e a r a n c e s a r e also e x p l a i n e d in c o r p o r e a l terms. Chrysippus also addressed elusive p h e n o m e n a of this sort. If h e did n o t press a few r e m a i n i n g questions, it was because t h e r e was as yet n o compelling answer. T h e Stoic Sage r e m a i n s silent in such cases, a l t h o u g h it is possible that Posidonius in revisiting s o m e of t h e same q u e s t i o n s pressed t h e m f u r t h e r . Chrysippus' willingness to leave the irrational a n i c h e of its own within t h e g e n e r a l Stoic f r a m e w o r k e a r n e d him the scorn of polemicists such as G a l e n . But G a l e n ' s u n s o p h i s t i c a t e d a p p e a l to irrational soul-parts is n o t in t h e slightest bit m o r e illuminating. Chrysippus f o r his part saw that e m o t i o n is n o t only cognitive (which holds g o o d for all h u m a n t h o u g h t ) b u t is also m a r k e d by a particular kind of impulse a n d c o n c o m i t a n t feelings. It seems theref o r e apposite to characterize his a p p r o a c h to e m o t i o n as conative n o less than cognitive.

1

On the difference between our own and other cultures in this respect see Taylor (1988).

APPENDIX

T H E TEXTUAL EVIDENCE RELATING T O CHRYSIPPUS' ON AFFECTIONS

In what follows I inventorize the textual evidence I have established as deriving f r o m Chrysippus' On Affections in chs. 3-6 of this book. T o locate t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o n t h e f r a g m e n t s a n d t e s t i m o n i e s conc e r n e d see the Index. Most of the texts are q u o t e d in the main body of the book. A full p r e s e n t a t i o n of the texts will be given in the new edition of Early Stoic f r a g m e n t s that is b e i n g p r e p a r e d at U t r e c h t University. For this reason r e f e r e n c e s to the SVF have b e e n omitted.

Overall contents, length: F o u r long books: the first t h r e e theoretical, the f o u r t h a n d last o n e therapeutical: Cicero, Tusc. 4.9, 4.33; PHP ΑΛΛΑ, 4.5.10, 4.7.21, 5.7.52, 8.1.47;Loc. Aff. Ill, 1, VIII p. 138 K. B O O K 1: Exegesis of - Z e n o ' s two d e f i n i t i o n s of a f f e c t i o n . PHP 4.2.10-12, 4.2.14-18 ( r u n n e r simile), 4.5.3-8; Tusc. 4.11-14, 4.22. - Z e n o ' s d e f i n i t i o n s of t h e f o u r ' g e n e r i c ' affections: PHP 4.2.1-7, 4.2.4-7; Tusc. 4.11-14 (cf. 3.24-7). - P h y s i c a l d e f i n i t i o n ( c o n t r a c t i o n , e x p a n s i o n ) . P H P 4.3.2, 4.15; Tusc. 4.15; cf. 3.61, 83. - S u b s p e c i e s of t h e g e n e r i c a f f e c t i o n s : Tusc. 4.16-22 ( n o t in Galen). Cf. Diogenes Laertius 7.111 (affections are j u d g e m e n t s as main thesis of the treatise). BOOK 2: p r o b l e m s (aporiai): - the a b a t e m e n t of a f f e c t i o n / t w o types of j u d g e m e n t : PHP 4.7.1-17 (distress, a ' f r e s h ' j u d g e m e n t ) ; 4.7.26-7, 30-1 (id,.)·, cf. Tusc. 3.614; cf. 76, 79.

- t h e origin of evil: PHP 5.5.1-26; Calcidius, In Tim. 165-168; Tusc. 3.2; cf. D.L. 7.89.

BOOK 3: N o attested evidence. BOOK 4 ( T h e Therapeutics) • T h e 'medical analogy': - t h e analogy e x p o u n d e d : P H P 5.2.22-4, 26-7, 31-33, 47, 49; cf. Cic. Tusc. 3.6, 4.23, 30-31; cf. ib. 58. - health, strength a n d beauty: PHP 5.2.33, 47, 49, Tusc. 4.30-1. - e l e m e n t a l q u a l i t i e s : / 5 / ^ 5.3.7-8, 9-10, \2;QAM 4, pp.45.5-46.1 Müller; cf. Tusc. 4.32. - disease, fever (disposition vs. activation) P/iP5.2.13-14; cf. 5.3.12, 5.4.14; Tusc. 4.24-30. - p r o n e n e s s to disease, health: PHP5.2.3, 14;7msc. 4.27-8. - d i s e a s e , infirmity, badness: Tusc. 4.28-29, PHP 5.2.27; cf. 4.5.31 (Posid.) • definitions of affection ( r e p e a t e d f r o m Bk. 1): 5.2.14; cf. Tusc. 4.22. • weakness of the will, or t u r n i n g o n e ' s back o n (right) Reason: - a n g e r PHP 4.6.7-9, 11 ( M e n e l a o s a n d H e l e n ) , 19-20, 23, 24-25, 34-5 (Medea) - (erotic) desire: ib. 4.6.27-32 , 40-41. - grief: ib. 38, 40 - pleasure: ib. 43; cf. 30 • Affection as i n s a n i t y / m e n t a l blindness: PHP 4.5.21-2, 4.6.44-46; Tusc. 4.24-6, 79; cf. Philod.On Anger, col. 1.10-20, Tusc 4.76-7. • Therapy proper: - treating an e m o t i o n a l E p i c u r e a n o r Peripatetic: O r i g e n , Against Celsus VIII 51, vol. II, p. 266.18 ff. Kö. (cf. ib. I 64, vol. 1, p. 117.16 ff.). - Tusc. 4.59-63; cf. ib. 3.76, 79 (show that the e m o t i o n , t h o u g h considered a p p r o p r i a t e , is in fact i n a p p r o p r i a t e : o n e of the two types of j u d g e m e n t involved), 4.78-9 (no cure f o r o u t b u r s t of a n g e r ) ; - prevention: 'dwelling in advance': Tusc. 3.52 (cf. ib. 29); cf. PHP 4.7.6-11.

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INDEX LOCORUM

AËTIUS Placita (DieLs) IV 2-6 IV 21.1 IV 4

CALCIDIUS

23 38 65 ff.

ALEXANDER APHRODISIENSIS De anima (Bruns) p. 1.2-3

22

AMMONIUS In Arist. Cat. (Busse) 4.3-13 53

ANONYMUS LONDINENSIS Iatrica (Jones) col. VI. 13-21 col. V.37-VI.12 col. VI.38-40

195 195

ARISTOTELES De anima A 1.402a7 f. A 1.402a23-b3 Β 3.414a31 f. Β 3.414a29 ff. Γ 9-10

21 22 66, 67 69 28, 274 ff.

Ethica Nicomaehea A 13 A 5.1097a11-14 A 13.1102b29-1103a3 Γ.12.1119b7-15 AUGUSTINUS De civitate dei 8.7.

POTIORUM

83 143 246 181

In Timaeum (Waszink) c. 165-7 133 ff. c. 165 161

CICERO De fato c. 7-9

194

De offidis I, 101 246 I, 132 II,60

248 245

Tusculanae 3.6 3.52 3.61 3.76 4.9 4.14-15 4.10 4.11 4.21 4.22 4.33 4.53

Disputationes 143 311 314 169 91 f., 293 298 293 294 300 300 93, 302 95

CLEMENS ALEXANDRINUS Stromata (Stählin - Früchtel • Treu) 11,21.129.1-5 227 V, 97.6 225 VIII, 9.30.1 109

DIOGENES LAËRTIUS 7.89 7.90 7.92 7.111

161 233 f. 233 89, 165

EURIPIDES

Medea 1078-1080

171

Alcestis 1079-80

177

Andromache 629-30

112

Fr. 340 Nauck

175

Orestes 264 ff.

184

GALENus De causis contentivis 1.1-2.4 110 f. De locis affectis III 1, p. 138 III 5, p. 157 III 5, pp. 158-9

89 62 63

De Placitis Hippocratis et Piatonis (De Lacy) 2.1.1 21 2.2.5 41 3.1.10 3.1.25 3.2.18 3.8.32

147 157 f. 41 24 f.

4.1.14 4.3.4 4.4.1,2 4.4.38 4.4.8 4.5.32 4.5.40 4.5.6 4.5.7 4.6.23 4.6.34 4.6.35 4.7.23 4.7.37 4.2.1-4 4.2.4-7 4.3.3-5

90 45 44 207 45 255 256 43 156 171 f. 177 173 f. 224 f. 260 119 f. 121 250 f.

4.5.5-7 4.6.2-3 4.6.7-9, 11 4.2.10-12 4.2.14-18 4.5.21-2 4.6.19-20 4.6.24-5 4.6.27-32 4.6.44-8 4.7.1-11 4.7.12-17 4.7.24-31

105 f. 238 112 97 f. 101 f. 186 171 f. 173 175 178 f. 115 f. 123 f. 130 f.

5.1.5 5.2.13-14 5.2.14 5.2.22-4 5.2.26-7 5.2.31-33 5.2.47, 49 5.3.1 5.3.12 5.3.7-8 5.3.9-10 5.5.1-8 5.5.1-26 5.5.1-29 5.5.8-9 5.5.22-3 5.5.14 5.5.19 5.5.21 5.5.26

204 155 106 144 ff. 145 148 150 f. 151 107 152 152 69 132 ff. 220 ff. 136 f. 240 f. 107 f., 137, 160 19 231 241

5.6.1-2 5.6.4-5 5.6.17-26 5.6.19 5.6.19-23 5.6.20-2 5.6.35 5.6.37-38 5.6.37-9 5.6.40-42 5.6.42-3 5.7.52 5.7.84

310 228 261 108 243 263 56, 264 214, 216 69 85 ff. 207 92 43

6.1.1-2 6.1.21 6.2.5 6.8.77-83

27 f. 206 34 42

8.2.13

49

9.7.2-4 9.9.7-9

43 24

NEMESIUS

De usu partium (Helmreich) p. 15.2 f. 87 In Hippocratis Epidemiarum Libros III (Wenkebach) p. 22 47 Quod Animi Mores Corporis Temperamenta Sequuntur (Müller) 45.5-46.1 149 f. 77.17-78.2 55 78.8 ff. 241

De natura hominis (Morani) 15-16, p.72.3 ff. 72 ff. 15, p.72.7-73.7 72 ff. 15, p. 73.3-7 73 21, p. 81 158

ORIGENES Contra Celsum (Kötschau) VIII, 51, vol. II, p. 266.18 ff. 166 f.

PANAETIUS (Alesse) HERACLITUS Fr. Β 85 DK

Fr. 67 Test. 122 Test. 121

271 f.

233 246 248

HIPPOCRATES

PHILODEMUS

De morbo sacro (Grensemann) ch. 17 192 ch. 13 192

Academicorum philosophorum index PH 1012 52

De ventis VI.98-104 Littré

De musica Neubecker IV. 5 243 col. VIII.26-7 244 col. VIII.43 244

193

HOMERUS PLATO

Ilias XVIII. 108-110 XXIV. 549-551

159 177

Odysseia 20.17

42

LONGINUS F 22 Patillon - Brisson 35

MENANDER Fr. 702 Körte-Thierfelder Fr. 743 K.-T.

177 180

Phaedrus 246a6 ff.

223

Respublica 4.435c9-d3 4.441a 9.581 e6-582a2

29 42 205

Timaeus 77b3 f. 70c 1-5 86e-87a 86b2-7 86b7-c3 77b

57 159 159 f. 188 188 218

INDEX LOCORUM PLUTARCHUS CHAERONENSIS

PS.GALENUS

De animi procreatione secundum 210 f. 1023B-D

Philosophas Historia (Diels) 70 24, p. 615.1-10

Timaeum

De Stoicorum repugnantiis 126 f. 1045C De virtute morali 440E-442B 442B 450C 451B-C 449A-B

76 76 ff. 100, 180 219 283

Ps.PLUTARCHUS De libidine et aegritudine (Sandbach 200, 278 f. ch. 6 242 ch. 9 Planta IV 4

Fragmenta (Sandbach) 41 125

SENECA

PORPHYRIUS

De ira (Reynolds) I, 2.3b

65 ff.

278

Fragmenta (Smith) STOBAEUS (Wachsmuth): Fr. 253

35, 78

POSIDONIUS (Edelstein-Kidd) F Τ F F F F T T T T F F F F T F F F F F F F F F

146 58 147 169 165 154 83 59 99 91 141a 149 185 33 97 186 187 169 168 157 34 166 30 150a

34 55 67 69, 231 115 200, 278 ff. 207 207 207 207 210 213 214 214 ff. 224 f. 227 228 240 f. 243, 263 250 f. 250 f. 264 310 310

Eel. Eel. Eel. Eel. Eel. Eel.

I, p. 350.19-25 78 ff. I, p. 351.8-19 35 I, p. 368.19-20 38 II, pp.62.15-63.5 235 f. II, p. 68.18-23 185 II, p. 86.17-19 263

STOICORUM VETERUM FRAGMENTA (Von Arnim) 1.144 1.570 2.106 2.349 2.456 2.460 2.787 2.841 2.885 2.886 2.911 2.973 3 Antipater 3.169 3.228 3.229a 3.379 3.390 3.398

67 56, 85, 264 ff. 94 109 89 219 149 f. 151 147 157 f. 2 126 56 263 161 n. 87 107 f., 132 ff. 300 100, 180 300

3.416 3.417 3.439 3.456 3.457 3.461 3.462 3.463 3.465 3.466 3.467 3.471 3.471a 3.473 3.473 3.473 3.474 3.475 3.476 3.478 3.480

158 311 283 165 89 90,92 45,98,101 119 106, 155 123 130 f. 144 ff., 148 150 f. 112 171 238 131 f., 166 f. 171 f., 173, 175 43, 105 f., 156 174, 177 ff. 186

3.481 3.483 3.483 3.485 3.663 2.879-910 2.950-1

115 91 f. 293 314 185 2 194

TERTULLIANUS De anima (Waszink) 14.1 66 14.2 66 ff, 81

THEODORETUS Graecorum affectionum curatio γ 19-21 65

INDEX NOMINUM ET RERUM

affective pull (παθητική όλκή) 184, 231, 237 f. ambiguity, Stoic concept of 146 anatomy 19 Anaxagoras 124 ancient account, see παλαιός λόγος Andronicus of Rhodes 50 anger 157 ff., 264 ff., 277 ff., 307 Annas, J. 15 n. 25 appearance, mental (φαντασία) 38, 107, 108, 127, 183, 262, 282, 323 appetite (έπιθυμία) e.g. 113,114, 119 ff., 158, 181,278 appropriate actions 162,169,185, 263 appropriation (οίκείωσις) 185 Aquinas 15 n. 27 Archigenes of Apamea (physician) 62 Ariston of Chius 163 Aristotle 21 f f , 76, 181, 275 ff., 279, 321, 324 and passim Arnim, Mans von 2 ff. Athenaeus of Attaleia 110 Baguet, F. 3 n. 8 being, see ούσία Boetnus of Sidon 50 Boyancé, P. 9 , 2 9 0 cause, preliminary 108 ff., 113 cause, sustaining (or complete) 108 ff. cento (κέντρων) 88 n. 97 children 220 f f , 315 Cicero 9, 13, 91 f., 95, 144, 248 f., 288 ff., 323 clarity (ένάργεια) 43 Cleanthes 207, 264 ff. conation (όρμή) 38, 44, 97 f f , 214 and passim context of fragments 5 Cooper,J.M. 199 correction 52

doxography 20, ch. 2 passim dwelling in advance (προενδημείν) 259, 31 I f f . Edelstein, L. 9 n. 19 elements, physical (see also hot and cold) 166, 193 ff. endoxa (ένδοξα) 13 f. end (τέλος) 168, 175, 214 Epicurus 106 έπιθυμία see appetite Erasistratus (physician) 87 Eros, see love εύπαθεία ('good emotion') 294, 297 excerpting, practice of 51 ff. experimentation 19 fear (φόβος) 114, 192, 256 f. fever 106 f., 131,155 Fillion-Lahille, J. 6 f., 199 first movements 128, 257, 284, form 3 4 , 8 3 form as equivalent to part 83 Frede, M. 16 Gercke, A. 3 n. 8 Gill, C. 7 f. god 1 7 5 , 2 3 0 , 3 2 3 Graver, M. 9 n. 20 grief, see distress Hecaton 232 ff. Hippocrates 12, 19, 40, 43, 154, 191 ff. hot and cold 1 5 6 , 1 6 2 , 1 9 6 impression, mental, see appearance inconsistency 180 incontinence (άκρασία) 170, 102 n. 51, 189, 300 f. insanity (μανία) 160, 163, 170 ff., 306 Inwood, B. 15 Jones, R.M. 9 n. 19

definition 94 ff. diaeresis 83 dictation 52 Diels, H. 5 Diogenes of Babylon 242 ff. distress (λύπη) 1 1 4 , 1 5 9 , 1 6 9 , 1 9 2 , 282, 304, 311, 314 Dobson, J.F. 9 n. 19

καθήκοντα, see appropriate actions Long, A. 15 Longinus 29 love 175,307 lust, see pleasure

Mansfeld, J. 5 n. 11 metaphor, Stoic view of 146 Middle Stoicism 199, 225, 233 monism, psychological 4, 244, 324 mixture (κράσις) of elemental qualities 148, 149 f., 235, 241 music, psychotherapeutic power of 77, 243 ff.

Posidonius 8 f., 54 f., ch. 5 passim power (δύναμις) 29, 34 ff., 203 and passim Praxagoras of Kos 192 proneness (εύεμπτωσία) 186, 187 n. 161 Pythagoras 65, 76, 77, 206 f., 293 Quellenforschung

Nicolaus Damascenus 29 nature 96, 97, 101, 175, 214 f. nurture 159 Nussbaum, M, 10 n. 21, 15 f., 142 οίκείωσις see appropriation ουσία (being, substance) 36 ff. On the Soul (Περί ψυχής), treatise by Chrysippus 12 ff. παλαιός λόγος ('ancient account') 40, 285, 295 Panaetius 233, 243 ff., 290 parts (of the soul) vs. powers 26, 28 ff., 202 pathos (πάθος), translation of 15 f. Philippson, R. 9, 289 Philoclemus 52 physiognomy 240 f. Plato 12 ff., 19, 28 ff., 34, 39,43, 65, 76, 294 f., 321, 324 and passim pleasure (ηδονή) 1 1 4 , 1 5 9 , 1 6 6 , 1 7 8 , 192, plot (ύπόθεσις) 88 n. 97 Plutarch 2 0 , 5 0 pneuma ('breath') 111, 154, 192, 194 f., 209 f., 214, 219 f. Pohlenz, M. 9, 289 Porphyry 20, 34 f., 40, 78 ff.

6, 9, 291

reason 96 ff., 174, 180 ff., 214 f., 248, 264 ff. Runia, D.T. 5 n. 11 Sedley, D. 15 Seneca On Anger 7, 128 shell-fish 217 ff. Sorabji, R. 8, 10 n. 21, 15, 167 source criticism see (Quellenforschung Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta, the editorial principles of 2 f. temperament, see mixture tension (τόνος) 112, 113, 238 theology 174 therapy, general ch. 4 passim therapy, in reladon to theory 89 ff., 140 ff., 166 ff., 179, 305, 320 θύμος see anger trilocadon, of the soul 1 2 , 2 7 , 2 2 7 tripartition 27, 204, 216, 274 ff. virtue 232 ff. weakness, psychic 128, 186 f., 237, 238, 255, 242, 254 Zeno of Cidum

85 ff., 165 f., 207, 312

P H I L O S O P H I A ANTIQUA A SERIES OF STUDIES O N ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY EDITED BY

J. M A N S F E L D , D.T. R U N I A AND J . C . M . VAN W I N D E N 13.

14. 17. 18. 20. 21. 23.

24. 26. 27. 28.

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Nicolaus Damascenus. On the Philosophy of Aristotle. Fragments of the First Five Books, Translated from the Syriac with an Introduction and Commentary by H. J. Drossaart Lulofs. Reprint of the 1st (1965) ed. 1969. ISBN 90 04 01725 9 Edelstein, L. Plato 's Seventh Letter. 1966. ISBN 90 04 01726 7 Gould, J. B. The Philosophy of Chrysippus. Reprint 1971. ISBN 90 04 01729 1 Boeft, J. den. Calcidius on Fate. His Doctrine and Sources. 1970. ISBN 90 04 01730 5 Bertier, J. Mnésithée et Dieuchès. 1972. ISBN 90 04 03468 4 Timaios Lokros. Uber die Natur des Kosmos und der Seele. Kommentiert von M. Baltes. 1972. ISBN 90 04 03344 0 Iamblichus Chalcidensis. In Piatonis dialogos commentariorum fragmenta. Edited with Translation and Commentary by J. M. Dillon. 1973. ISBN 90 04 03578 8 T i m a e u s Locrus. De natura mundi et animae. Uberlieferung, T e s t i m o n i a , Text und Übersetzung von W. Marg. Editio maior. 1972. ISBN 90 04 03505 2 Gersh, S. Ε. Κίνησις άκίνητος. A Study of Spiritual Motion in the Philosophy of Proclus. 1973. ISBN 90 04 03784 5 O'Meara, D. Structures hiérarchiques dans la pensée de Plotin. Étude historique et interprétative. 1975. ISBN 90 04 04372 1 Todd, R. B. Alexander of Aphrodisias on the Stoic Physics. A Study of the De Mixtione with Preliminary Essays, Text, Translation and Commentary. 1976. ISBN 90 04 04402 7 Scheffel, W. Aspekte der platonischen Kosmologie. Untersuchungen zum Dialog 'Timaios'. 1976. ISBN 90 04 04509 0 Edlow, R.B. Galen on Language and Ambiguity. An English Translation of Galen's De Captionibus (On Fallacies), With Introduction, Text and Commentary. 1977. ISBN 90 04 04869 3 Epiktet. Vom Kynismus. Herausgegeben und übersetzt mit einem Kommentar von M. Billerbeck" 1978. ISBN 90 04 05770 6 Baltes, M. Die Weltentstehung des platonischen Timaios nach den antiken Interpreten. Teil 2. Proklos. 1979. ISBN 90 04 05799 4 Tarán, L. Speusippus of Athens. A Critical Study with a Collection of the Related Texts and Commentary. 1982. ISBN 90 04 06505 9 O'Brien, D. Theories of Weight in the Ancient World. Four Essays on Dcmocritus, Plato and Aristotle. A Study in the Development of Ideas 2. Plato: Weight and Sensation. The Two Theories of the 'Timaeus'. 1984. ISBN 90 04 06934 8 Aujoulat, N. Le Néo-Platonisme Alexandrin: Hiéroclès d'Alexandrie, Filiations intellectuelles et spirituelles d'un néo-platonicien du Ve siècle. 1986. ISBN 90 04 07510 0 Kai, V On Intuition and Discursive Reason in Aristotle. 1988. ISBN 90 04 08308 1 Evangeliou, Ch. Aristotle's Categories and Porphyry. 1988. ISBN 90 04 08538 6 Bussanich, J. The One and Its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus. A Commentary on Selected Texts. 1988. ISBN 90 04 08996 9 Simplicius. Commentaire sur les Catégories. Traduction commentée sous la direction

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de I. Hadot. I: Introducdon, première parue (p. 1-9, 3 Kalbfleisch). Traduction de Ph. Hoffmann (avec la collaboration d'I. et P Hadot). Commentaire et notes à la traduction par I. Hadot avec des appendices de P. Hadot et J.-P. Mahé. 1990. ISBN 90 04 09015 0 Simplicius. Commentaire sur les Catégories. Traduction commentée sous la direction de I. Hadot. III: Préambule aux Catégories. Commentaire au premier chapitre des Catégories (p. 21-40, 13 Kalbfleisch). Traducüon de Ph. Hoffmann (avec la collaboration d'I. Hadot, P. Hadot et C. Luna). Commentaire et notes à la traduction par C. Luna. 1990. ISBN 90 04 09016 9 M a g e e J . Boethius on Signification and Mind. 1989. ISBN 90 04 09096 7 Fortenbaugh, W.W., et al. (eds.) Theophrastes of Eresos. Sources for His Life, Writings, Thought and Influence. 1992. ISBN 90 04 09440 7 set Shankman, A. Aristotle's De insomniis. A Commentary. ISBN 90 04 09476 8 Mansfeld, J. Heresiography in Context. Hippolytos' Elenchos as a Source for Greek Philosophy. 1992. ISBN 90 04 09616 7 O'Brien, D. Théodicéeplotinienne, théodicéegnostique. 1993. ISBN 90 04 09618 3 Baxter, T. M. S. The Cratylus. Plato's Critique of Naming. 1992. ISBN 90 04 09597 7 Dorandi, T. (Hrsg.) Theodor Gomperz• Eine Auswahl herkulanischer kleiner Schriften (1864-1909). 1993. ISBN 90 04 09819 4 Filodemo. Storia deifilosoß. La stoä da Zjnone a Panezio (PHerc. 1018). Edizione, traduzione e commento a cura di T. Dorandi. 1994. ISBN 90 04 09963 8 Mansfeld, J. Prolegomena. Questions to be Settled Before the Study of an Author, or a Text. 1994. ISBN 90 04 10084 9 Flannery, S.J., K.L. Ways into the Logic ofAlexander ofAphrodisias. 1995. ISBN 90 04 09998 0 Lakmann, M.-L. Der Platoniker Tauros in der Darstellung des Aulus Gellius. 1995. ISBN 90 04 10096 2 Sharpies, R.W. Theophrastus of Eresus. Sources for his Life, Writings, Thought and Influence. Commentary Volume 5. Sources on Biology (Human Physiology, Living Creatures, Botany: Texts 328-435). 1995. ISBN 90 04 10174 8 Algra, K. Concepts of Space in Greek Thought. 1995. ISBN 90 04 10172 1 Simplicius. Commentaire sur le manuel d'Epictète. Introduction et édition critique de texte grec par Ilsetraut Hadot. 1995. ISBN 90 04 09772 4 ClearyJ.J. Aristotle and Mathematics. Aporetic Method in Cosmology and Metaphysics. 1995. ISBN 90 04 10159 4 Tieleman, T. Galen and Chrysippus on the Soul. Argument and Refutation in the De Placitis Books II-III. 1996. ISBN 90 04 10520 4 Haas, F.A.J. de. John Philoponus' New Definition of Prime Matter. Aspects of its Background in Neoplatonism and the Ancient Commentary Tradition. 1997. ISBN 90 04 10446 1 Andia, Y. de. Henosis. L'Union à Dieu chez Denys l'Aréopagite. 1996. ISBN 90 04 10656 1 Algra, K.A., Horst, P.W. van der, and Runia, D.T. (eds.) Polyhistor. Studies in the History and Historiography of Ancient Philosophy. Presented to Jaap Mansfeld on his Sixtieth Birthday. 1996. ISBN 90 04 10417 8 Mansfeld, J. and Runia, D.T. Aetiana. The Method and Intellectual Context of a Doxographer. Volume 1: The Sources. 1997. ISBN 90 04 10580 8 Slomkowski, R Aristotle's Topics. 1997. ISBN 90 04 10757 6 Barnes, J. Logic and the Imperial Stoa. 1997. ISBN 90 04 10828 9 Inwood, B. and Mansfeld, J. (eds.) Assent and Argument. Studies in Cicero's Academic Books. Proceedings of the 7th Symposium Hellenisticum (Utrecht, August 21-25, 1995). 1997. ISBN 90 04 10914 5 Magee, J. (ed., tr. & comm.) Anicii Manlii Severini Boethii De divisione liber. Critical Edition, Translation, Prolegomena, and Commentary. 1998. ISBN 90 04 10873 4

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Oiympiodorus. Commentary on Plato's Gorgias. Translated with Full Notes by R.Jackson, K. Lycos & H. Tarrant. Introduction by H. Tarrant. 1998. ISBN 90 04 10972 2 Sharpies, R.W. Theophrastus of Eresus. Sources for his Life, Writings, Thought and Influence. Commentary Volume 3.1. Sources on Physics (Texts 137-223). With Contributions on the Arabic Material by Dimitri Gutas. 1998. ISBN 90 04 11130 1 Mansfeld, J. Prolegomena Mathematica. From Apollonius of Perga to Late Neo-platonism. With an Appendix on Pappus and the History of Platonism. 1998. ISBN 90 04 11267 7 Huby, R Theophrastus of Eresus. Sources for His Life, Writings, Thought and Influence. Commentary Volume 4. Psychology (Texts 254-327). With Contributions on the Arabic Material by D. Gutas. 1999. ISBN 90 04 11317 7 Boter, G. The Encheiridion of Epietetus and Its Three Christian Adaptations. Transmission and Critical Editions. 1999. ISBN 90 04 11358 4 Stone, M.E. and Shirinian, M.E. Pseudo-^eno. Anonymous Philosophical Treatise. Translated with the Collaboration o f j . Mansfeld and D.T. Runia. 2000. ISBN 90 04 11524 2 Bäck, A.T. Aristotle's Theory of Predication. 2000. ISBN 90 04 11719 9 Riel, G. Van. Pleasure and the Good Life. Plato, Aristode, and the Neoplatonists. 2000. ISBN 90 04 11797 0 Baltussen, H. Theophrastus against the Presocratics and Plato. Peripatetic Dialectic in the De sensibus. 2000/ ISBN 90 04 11720 2 Speca, A. Hypothetical Syllogistic and Stoic Logic. 2001. ISBN 90 04 12073 4 Luna, C. Trois Etudes sur la Tradition des Commentaires Anciens à la Métaphysique d'Aristote. 2001. ISBN 90 04 120074 2 Frede, D. & A. Laks (eds.) Traditions of Theology. Studies in Hellenistic Theology, its Background and Aftermath. 2001. ISBN 90 04 12264 8 Berg, R.M. van den. Proclus'Hymns.. Essays, Translations, Commentary. 2001. ISBN 90 04 12236 2 Rijk, L.M. de. Aristotle - Semantics and Ontology. 2 volumes. Volume I. General Introduction. The Works on Logic. 2002. ISBN 90 04 12324 5 Volume II. The Metaphysics. Semantics in Aristotle's Strategy of Argument. 2002. ISBN 90 04 12467 5 Finamore, J.F. &J.M. Dillon. lamblichus De Anima. Text, Translation, and Commentary. 2002 ISBN 90 04 12510 8 Fortenbaugh, W.W., R.W. Sharpies, & M.G. Sollcnberger. Theophrastus of Eresus. On Sweat, on Dizziness and on Fatigue. 2003. ISBN 90 04 12890 5 Tieleman, T. Chrynppus'On affections. Reconstruction and Interpretation. 2003. ISBN 90 04 12998 7

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