Alexander Maxwell completed his Ph.D. at the University of Wisconsin, Madison in 2003. He has won a Merian postdoctoral...
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Alexander Maxwell completed his Ph.D. at the University of Wisconsin, Madison in 2003. He has won a Merian postdoctoral fellowship at Erfurt University, and a Europa fellowship at the New Europe College in Bucharest. He has taught at City University in Bratislava, the University of Wales at Swansea, and the University of Nevada at Reno. He is presently working at Victoria University in Wellington, New Zealand.
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37. Choosing Slovakia: Slavic Hungary, the Czechoslovak Language and Accidental Nationalism Alexander Maxwell 978 1 84885 074 3
38. Khatami and Gorbachev: Politics of Change in the Islamic Republic of Iran and the USSR Zhand Shakibi
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CHOOSING SLOVAKIA Slavic Hungary, the Czechoslovak Language and Accidental Nationalism Alexander Maxwell
TAURIS ACADEMIC STUDIES an imprint of I.B.Tauris Publishers LONDON • NEW YORK
With fond memories, · Β=0 Δ
Published in 2009 by Tauris Academic Studies, an imprint of I.B.Tauris & Co Ltd 6 Salem Road, London W2 4BU 175 Fifth Avenue, New York NY 10010 www.ibtauris.com Distributed in the United States and Canada Exclusively by Palgrave Macmillan, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010 Copyright © 2009 Alexander Maxwell The right of Alexander Maxwell to be identified as the author of this work has been asserted by the author in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patent Act 1988. All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in a review, this book, or any part thereof, may not be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the publisher. ISBN: 978 1 84885 074 3 International Library of Political Studies 37 A full CIP record for this book is available from the British Library A full CIP record for this book is available from the Library of Congress Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: available Printed and bound in India by Thomson Press camera-ready copy edited and supplied by the author
Contents
List of Figures and Illustrations
vii
Note on Conventions
ix
Acknowledgements
xiii
1. National Awakening and Contingency
1
2. The Hungarian Context
8
3. Hungaro-Slavism: Imagining a Slavic Hungary
34
4. Slovak Theories of Dual Nationality
56
5. The Slavic Language
79
6. Linguistic Czechoslovakism Before 1843
101
7. Ľudovít Štúr and Slovak Tribalism
117
8. The Dialect Argument and Slovak Literacy
141
9. Czechoslovakia as a Slovakizing State
166
Notes
187
Index
250
LIST OF FIGURES and illustrations
Figure 0.1: Ein Slovak Figure 0.2: Base Map Figure 2.1: Administrative Regions in Bach-Era Hungary (1850) Figure 2.2: The Slovak Okolie in the June Memorandum (1861) Figure 2.3: The Slovak Okolie in the December Memorandum (1861) Figure 3.1: Ethnonyms for Hungarian Figure 3.2: “Life of a Monk outside the Monastery,” verses 3 and 4 (1835) Figure 3.3: Magyarization Sites in Beschwerden und Klagen (1843) Figure 4.1: Hungaro-Slavic Theories of Dual Nationality Figure 5.1: The Bernolákovci (1800) Figure 6.1: Czechoslovak Grammar Book Production (1800) Figure 6.2: Subscribers to Gitřenka (1840) Figure 7.1: Living Hlasowé Contributors (1846) Figure 8.1: Literacy in the Kingdom of Hungary by Nationality Figure 8.2: Slovak Literacy by Age Cohort (1900-1910) Figure 8.3: Letters to the editor in Slovenské noviny (1855)
EIN SLOVAK Frontspiece to Jozef Dobrovsky, Slovanka (Prague: Herrlschen Buchhandlung, 1815), vol. 2
NOTE ON CONVENTIONS
Contemporary works on Central European history routinely begin with a brief discussion of nomenclature. Places in central Europe, as in other parts of the world, have different names in different local languages. Some of the largest cities have English names, notably Vienna, Prague and Warsaw. This posed few problems during the nineteenth century: the various languages of the Habsburg monarchy have their own word for “forest” (Wald, erdő, les etc.), why should they not also have a different word for “Vienna”? Twentiethcentury political propaganda, however, politicized city names: Central European authors writing in English insist on naming contested cities in their own language as a way of staking political claims. Hungarian authors, for example, often use Hungarian names (e.g. “Komarno” and “Kassa”) while Slovaks use Slovak names (“Komáron” and “Košice”). Scholars who wish to discuss national conflict without taking sides thus face a dilemma. While established English names are acceptably neutral, how can one discuss a given town without favoring one or another national claim? Some scholars list all possible variants, speaking e.g. of “Komarno/ Komáron” or “Cluj/Kolozsvár/Klausenburg.” Peter Fassler even exploited this convention to highlight the multiple national heritages of Galicia’s largest city his book: Lemberg-Lwow-Lviv.1 Jeremy King, observing that multiple national sentiments often coexisted in the same person, has extended this convention to personal names.2 Other scholars refer to cities by different names to mark historical turning points: when the Treaty of Trianon partitioned the city of Komarno/Komáron between Hungary and Czechoslovakia, for example, one might begin speaking of Komarno and Komáron as distinct cities. Referring to cities with multiple names, however, creates new difficulties. One must list the names in some order, how can one avoid giving precedence to the first ethnicity listed? More importantly, which languages and cultures deserve recognition? The Habsburg capital, for example, hosted communities
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Choosing Slovakia
from every nationality in the Empire. Without a principle for excluding some heritages, one would have to discuss “Beč/Vídeň/Wien/Bécs/Wiedeń/Беч/ Dunaj/Viedeň/Видень,” to give the Croatian, Czech, German, Hungarian, Polish, Serbian, Slovene, Slovak, and Ukrainian names for the city? And where should the list stop? Vienna’s Jewish history would justify both Hebrew “ ”װינהand Yiddish “װין.” The importance of Latin as a Habsburg administrative language might justify “Vindobna.” The city furthermore supported Greek language newspapers in the early nineteenth century, why not “Βιέννη”? And indeed, why not also Bulgarian “Виена,” Russian “Вена” or Ottoman Turkish “[ وﻳﺎﻧﺎViyana]”? Modern emigration might even justify Arabic “[ ﻓﻴﻨﺎFīnā],” Chinese “维也纳 [Weiyena],” or Japanese “ウィン [Win].” This book therefore follows an alternate convention: apart from wellestablished English names such as “Vienna” and “Prague,” I refer to cities with the name used by the government that administers the city at the time of writing: towns in Slovakia have Slovak names, towns in Hungary have Hungarian names. This convention has its drawbacks. It foreshadows the ethnic partitions of the twentieth century, obscuring the multi-national character of the Habsburg Empire. It also produces regrettable anachronisms. Budapest did not exist before 1874: one should properly discuss the separate cities of “Buda/Budin/Ofen” and “Pest/Pešt/Pesth,” to give respectively the Hungarian, Slovak and German names. Bratislava, a city that features prominently in this book, poses even bigger difficulties. The Hungarian and German names (“Pozsony” and “Pressburg”) are unproblematic, but Slovaks alternated between Prešpork and Prešporok under Habsburg rule: the name “Bratislava,” although foreshadowed as “Bratislav” in Šafařík’s Slovansé starožitnosti, only became widespread in 1919.3 Discussing “Bratislava” in the Habsburg era, as this book does, is therefore anachronistic. Nevertheless, I have rendered Prešpork as “Bratislava.” The main advantage of consistently using contemporary names is simplicity. This book already burdens the reader by discussing a host of terms in Latin, German, Slavic and Hungarian, including jazyk, řeč, náreč, natio, národ, národnost, nemzet, nemzetiség, Volk and kmen. Struggles for urban hegemony, however significant or interesting, do not play an important role in this particular study, and acknowledging them in their full complexity would distract from the main narrative. Contemporary names, finally, are most useful for readers who wish to consult an atlas. Similar considerations also justify the use of anachronistic maps. I assume that the reader is more familiar with contemporary political frontiers than the political structures of the Habsburg Empire. This book highlights Hungarian
Note On Conventions
xi
and Czechoslovak sentiments, so the base map used in this book depicts both the nineteenth-century Hungarian frontier (as a grey band) and modern political borders (as thin black lines). These maps do not do justice to the complexity of Habsburg political geography, but Habsburg political geography is not the central focus of this book.
The base map used in this book
While I have been tolerant of anachronistic geography, I have been as strict as possible about reproducing primary sources in the original spelling. Modern Slovak scholars routinely transliterate (translate?) primary sources into Hattala’s modern orthography, partly because modern Slovaks find the script easier to read, but also to claim historical texts for the modern Slovak linguistic tradition. This narrative, however, places great importance on orthographic questions, and thus insists on original spellings. I have, admittedly, transliterated Blackletter quotations into the more familiar Latin alphabet, but this is mostly because a Blackletter font with Slavic diacritics proved unobtainable. To discuss orthographic questions, finally, I have adopted a convention from linguistics that may be new to many readers. The symbols of an alphabetic script refer to sounds, technically to phonemes, but this book has occasion to distinguish phonemes from the symbols used to represent them. Phonemes are placed inside /slashes/ and graphic symbols inside {curly brackets}. Thus {t} refers to a letter in the Latin alphabet formed by a long vertical line and a short horizontal line, while /t/ refers to a voiceless dental stop.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This book is the culmination of many years of training and work, and many people have helped me while I was working on this project. I particularly wish to thank Stanley Payne, who generously shared his time and his experience. I also want to thank Rogers Brubaker for telling me that my work “was theoretically interesting,” or words to that effect: words of approval from so brilliant a theoretician sustained my morale at critical moments. David McDonald has also earned my respect and thanks for giving me good advice on both academic and professional questions. I also wish to mention Owen Johnson, Kemal Karpat, Yarslav Hrytsak, Hugo Lane, Tomasz Kamusella, Thomas Purnell, Holt Meyer, Alf Lüdke, Eva Kowalská, Jozef Tanzer, and several anonymous reviewers for sharpening my thinking. I also need to express my appreciation to people who have helped and encouraged me at a personal level. I owe a special debt to Kim Caisse, but also would also like to thank Cormac Harrington for listening, Jill Brady for proofreading, Nona Parry for patient and meticulous typesetting, and Don Becker for his tireless humor. Lastly and most importantly, I want to thank Carol Harrington for everything.
1 NATIONAL AWAKENING AND CONTINGENCY
This book tells a story about the emergence of Slovak particularist nationalism, here understood as the belief in a “Slovak nation” speaking a “Slovak language.” It reinterprets an established narrative known to historians of Central and Eastern Europe as “national awakening [národní obrození]”, which covers a historical period roughly approximating the so-called long nineteenth century. The ubiquitous metaphor of “awakening” has several problems and detractors, and if it were not so firmly established as a historical genre, I would compare this book to Rudyard Kipling’s “Just So” stories: where Kipling explained how the leopard got his spots, I explain how and why the Slovak nation came to be. As a study of nationalism, this study contributes to a gigantic scholarly literature that encompasses both theoretical works and numerous case studies. While seeking to engage with nationalism theory, I do not wish to begin with abstract definitions of key concepts such as “nation” and “language”: such terms will be discussed as they enter the narrative. This introduction will instead discuss “national awakening” as a historical narrative with distinctive conventions, problems and opportunities. Historians of Central and Eastern Europe have written many sophisticated works examining “national awakening,” but the most eloquent expression of the basic idea comes from Eugen Weber’s 1976 study of French national feeling. Weber observed that French nationalism in 1789 was mostly a Parisian phenomenon: French peasants gave their loyalties to king, church, or village; not to “the nation.” The general popular enthusiasm for the First World War, however, suggests that something important changed during the nineteenth century. Weber studied the nationalization of the peasantry in a series of thematic chapters, highlighting schools, military service, railroads, technological progress, changing consumption patterns, and so
2
Choosing Slovakia
forth.1 Weber’s descriptive gifts were ultimately undermined by his analytical dependence on an ill-defined “modernity,” but nothing can diminish the brilliance of Weber’s book title: Peasants into Frenchmen. Numerous scholars have adapted and copied this title for their own articles,2 book chapters,3 and full-length scholarly monographs.4 “Peasants into patriots”: this is the essence of national awakening. Most studies of national awakening belong to what might be called the “modernization theory” school of nationalism. Benedict Anderson and Eric Hobsbawm, the leading scholars in this school, do not share Weber’s fascination with the word “modernity,” but focus on a similar list of causal variables: industrialization, bureaucratization, mass education, improved living standards, and other mutually reinforcing processes.5 Scholars working in this school disagree about the relative importance of different variables, and their disagreement stems not only from differing theoretical approaches, but also from the diversity of research topics: the decisive variable in one case may not be particularly important in another. One scholar working in the modernist tradition, Czech theorist Miroslav Hroch, has developed a schematic and generalizable stage theory of “national awakening.” Hroch schematized the spread of nationalism into three phases imagined as steps in an evolutionary progression: (A) the “period of scholarly interest,” (B) “patriotic agitation,” and finally (C) “the rise of a mass national movement.”6 Hroch then compared various nationalist organizations in “Phase B” to see if they shared a common social basis; he found, mostly, that they did not. Hroch’s stage theory influenced many scholars of Central and Eastern Europe,7 and has also inspired some tinkering. Roman Szporluk reformulated Hroch’s theory into “academic, cultural, and political” phases. Paul Robert Magocsi has “heritage-gathering,” “organizational” and “political” stages, but denied that they represent an evolutionary process.8 Tomasz Kamusella has added a Phase (D) to discuss the moment “when the nation establishes its own nation-state in fulfillment of the equation of ethnic nationalism: language = nation = state.”9 At first glance, the stage theory approach would seem relevant to Slovak national awakening, and Hroch took Slovakia as one of his case studies. The narrative proposed here, however, differs considerably from Hroch’s, because it highlights two themes that have only rarely been discussed in the broader literature on nationalism: contingency and failure. This book takes the process of nationalization (and “modernization”) more or less for granted and focuses instead on the competition between different national concepts. The various academic heritage-gatherers and patriotic agitator-organizers working in
National Awakening And Contingency
3
Central and Eastern Europe promoted several different national concepts. Why did some succeed while others failed? Let us pose this question specifically and concretely for the Slovak case: Slovak nationalists began the nineteenth century as proud citizens of Hungary dreaming about an All-Slavic language and culture, and then spent the short twentieth century in Czechoslovakia. Why did the Hungarian, Slavic and Czechoslovak national projects fail? To explain the Slovak national awakening, this book tells a story about failed Hungarian, Slavic and Czechoslovak national awakenings. Indeed: this narrative consciously emphasizes those historical forces working to turn peasants into Hungarians, Slavs or Czechoslovaks, even at the risk of understating Slovak particularism. The chapter on Hungarian nationalism even invokes the Hroch schema. To explain why peasants became Slovaks, this book asks why peasants did not become Hungarians, All-Slavs, or Czechoslovaks. Contingency and failure imply discontinuity, which in turn leads to the “Warwick debate” about the merits of modernization theory. Anderson and Hobsbawm have their critics; and while “primordialism” sometimes serves as a generic term for alternatives to modernization theory,10 Anthony Smith, the leading critic of the modernist approach, distinguishes his own approach, “ethnosymbolism,” from both primordialism and “perennialism.”11 These other approaches, however, all emphasize what Smith has called “preexisting traditions and heritages which have coalesced over the generations.”12 The debate between modernism and its critics has become extensive, and it may be worth highlighting the common ground: all scholars agree that the last two hundred years have witnessed a dramatic transformation in national sentiment; disagreement concerns only the relative importance of continuity or change. Theorists on both sides of the debate routinely acknowledge each other’s arguments with appropriate caveats, and differ from each other mostly in emphasis, not substance.13 The “peasants into Slovaks” narrative, however, inevitably emphasizes discontinuity and transformation. During the “national awakening” process, historical actors selectively appropriated, reinterpreted, or discarded preexisting heritages in light of political goals. National traditions could acquire an air of timelessness in a short period, as shown in a memorable volume on the “invention of traditions.”14 The study of these processes is compatible with a continuity-emphasizing ethnosymbolism, but owes more to modernization theory. Perhaps, however, the study of failed nationalism can help break the deadlock between the two camps. This book examines several failed attempts to appropriate, reinterpret or discard existing traditions. The future, indeed,
4
Choosing Slovakia
depends on the legacy of the past. By emphasizing failed national concepts, this narrative delineates some of the limitations on imagination and invention. This book’s emphasis on failure and contingency has another advantage: it undermines problematic popular narratives of national awakening. All too often, historians describe national awakening as a triumphal morality tale in which heroic national awakeners found or redeem the nation, saving it from destruction. The national awakeners themselves, of course, understood their work in such heroic (and primordialist) terms. Nevertheless, historians who accept heroic narratives uncritically may go badly astray, treating failed national concepts as either pathetic objects of ridicule or existential threats. Theorists of nationalism, speaking in the abstract, realize that the possibility of an alternative national community is morally neutral. Ernst Gellner, for instance, wondered aloud whether minority intelligentsias “might not have done just as well out of assimilation.”15 Such equanimity, however, is rare among scholars examining concrete case studies, where heroic narratives remain perniciously hegemonic. Slovak-American Lev Dobriansky, for example, characterized “the story of Slovakia as a story of a nation’s fight for freedom and survival.”16 Stanislav Kirschbaum took survivalist rhetoric to the point of farce: each chapter of his book finds the Slovaks facing a new “struggle for survival.”17 His narrative has the false drama of a James Bond film: no matter how grim things may look for our heroes, somehow the Slovak nation always triumphantly escapes certain doom. I therefore justify my emphasis on failed national concepts as a corrective. Several authors have already traced the roots of modern Slovak nationalism for the Anglophone audience: the canonical Slovak success story needs critical debunking, not repetition or elaboration. This book therefore concentrates instead on the failure of Czechoslovakism, Slavism, and Hungarianism. Of these three themes, furthermore, only Czechoslovakism has received any serious attention in Anglophone scholarship. Indeed, few scholars of Central or Eastern Europe have examined failed national movements, and fewer still have placed contingency in the forefront of analysis. A brief summary of such works may be instructive. Andrew Wachtel has studied the failure of Yugoslavism, usefully replacing the normal heroic narrative with tragedy.18 Wachtel’s background, however, lies in literary theory: his focus on exceptionally gifted artists restricts his narrative to an unrepresentative cultural elite. Larry Wolff ’s Venice and the Slavs: The Discovery of Dalmatia in the Age of Enlightenment shows how the Morlacchi “vanished from the catalogue of nations”;19 in an intriguing reversal of Hroch’s schema, the Morlacchi made their last appearance on the public stage at a folklore exhibit. Wolff, however, worked almost exclusively from Italian
National Awakening And Contingency
5
sources: the Morlacchi themselves rarely appear in his narrative. Frederick Heymann attempted a joint history of Poland and Czechoslovakia, apparently seeking to explain why no common West-Slavic nation-state emerged, but his research seems to have persuaded him that Poland and Czechoslovakia were in fact quite different entities.20 Mary Fulbrooke examined “the necessary conditions for the construction of nations” taking East Germany “as an example of failure,”21 but her brief essay only discussed what Hobsbawm called “the government perspective”: she did not examine the character or extent of popular East German patriotism.22 Two further studies have highlighted both contingency and choice. In an excellent study of politics and culture in Moldova, Charles King asked the same theoretical questions that inspired this book: [ W]hat are the limits to which ethnic groups, nations and languages can be forged — in both sense of the term — out of heterogeneous cultural practices? In the marketplace of identities, why do only a few visions of the nation attract buyers? Why do some nationalisms fail?23 King, like Fulbrooke, examined these questions mostly from above, discussing successive Russian, Romanian and Soviet policies of state building. This book, by contrast, examines nationalism “from below.” While the final chapter discusses the first Czechoslovak republic, most of this narrative examines popular reactions to state policy during the nineteenth century. Finally, Paul Robert Magocsi’s classic study of Subcarpathia started from the observation that national awakeners “were not only faced with fostering a national consciousness among a particular ethnic group, they were also engaged in a struggle over which national orientation to accept.”24 Magocsi classified the Subcarpathian intelligentsia into Russophile, Ukrainophile and Rusynophile camps, and while he has subsequently worked to promote Rusyn-particularist sentiment, in 1978 he concluded that only the Ukrainian national orientation had proved “enduring.”25 This book differs from Magocsi’s in two important ways. Firstly, I found it impossible to divide the Slovak intelligentsia into camps: the same individuals who outspokenly proclaimed their loyalty to Hungary also proclaimed their passionate Slavdom; and while a party of interwar Slovak nationalists vigorously rejected Czechoslovakia, the majority of Slovaks combined Czechoslovak and Slovak loyalties. I have therefore introduced a theory of multiple and simultaneous national loyalties. Secondly, I have analyzed patriotic discussions of the “nation” separately from patriotic discussions of the “national language.” Magocsi equated linguistic and
6
Choosing Slovakia
national loyalties: in his narrative, belief in a Rusyn (or Ukrainian) language implied belief in a Rusyn (or Ukrainian) nation, and vice-versa. In Slovakia, national and linguistic concepts have diverged considerably, and influenced each other in a surprising fashion. This narrative pays particular attention to linguistic debates, which perhaps reflects the peculiarities of the Slovak case. Several scholars have highlighted the importance of linguistic loyalties in Slovak nationalism. Hugh Seton-Watson, for example, wrote that “the creation of a Slovak nation in the nineteenth century is essentially the emergence of a language group into national consciousness.” He saw Slovakia as an ideal type: “there is no more striking example than the Slovak case of the role of language in nation-forming.”26 Tibor Pichler made similar claims to Slovak exceptionalism: “All nationalisms in the Habsburg Empire had a very strong linguistic ingredient, but Slovak nationalism was entirely language based.”27 These remarkable assertions of linguistic monocausality are all the more extraordinary when juxtaposed with the conclusions of linguists working on the history of the Slovak language. Jaromír Bělič dated “the contemporary linguistic border” dividing Slovak from Czech to “the decisive age when modern nations crystallized,”28 and Ľubomír Ďurovič categorically claimed that “the formation of a [Slovak] literary language was the most evident symptom of the formation of their nation [emphasis added].”29 So did Slovak language loyalties generate Slovak nationalism, or did Slovak nationalism generate Slovak language loyalties? Clearly belief in a “national language” reinforces belief in a “nation” and vice-versa, but which came first: the nation or the language? The chicken or the egg? This apparent paradox probably arises from disciplinary divisions: neither linguists nor historians seem to reach each other’s works. Linguists understand that the creation of a Slovak “national language” is a contingent process, but sometimes seem to believe in a primordial Slovak nation. Conversely, serious scholars of nationalism, particularly those working in the modernist tradition, understand that peasants were not always Slovaks; yet they accept a crude popular linguistics that appears to take for granted the primordial existence of the Slovak language. I suggest, however, that interdisciplinary analysis can provide a solution to the chicken-egg paradox. The final chapters of this book, therefore, focus on the development of Slovak linguistic concepts. This narrative, finally, speaks to one of the great questions of history: the role of the individual, often reformulated in nationalism theory as the role of human will. “Human beings make their own history,” as Marx famously remarked, but “they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past.”30 This book highlights
National Awakening And Contingency
7
not external limits on human choices, but another less-explored difficulty: unforeseen ramifications and unintended consequences. The will to create or renew the “Slavic nation,” the “Hungarian nation,” and the “Czechoslovak nation” played an important role in the emergence of a “Slovak nation.” The title of this book is meant provocatively: my narrative of national awakening is neither heroic nor tragic, but ironic. The following chapter, chapter two, provides a brief survey of nineteenthcentury Hungarian history, the political context in which Slovak nationalism developed. The analysis proper begins in chapter three with a study of Slovak loyalties to Hungary. Confusingly, Slovaks invoked multiple nations simultaneously: they promoted a Hungarian “political nation” in which all “linguistic nations” would be free to speak their own language; chapter four examines the rhetoric of multiple nationality in detail. Chapter five then asks how Slovaks invoked the term “language” at the beginning of the nineteenth century, when the concept of a “Slavic language” dominated Slovak linguistic thinking. Chapter six documents Slovakia’s Czechoslovakist tradition in light of this hegemonic All-Slavism. Chapter seven examines the central figure of nineteenth-century Slovak history, Ľudovít Štúr, and his decision to codify a Slovak grammar. Chapter eight discusses the history of Slovak literacy to explain the impact of Štúr’s grammar. Chapter nine, finally, suggests that the Czechoslovak republic, while attempting to promote a Czechoslovak nation, created the social conditions that generated Slovak particularist nationalism.
2 THE HUNGARIAN CONTEXT
Before 1918, the territory of the present-day Slovak Republic belonged to the kingdom of Hungary. Slovak national ideologies thus developed within a Hungarian context. This chapter provides a brief overview of the social position of Slovaks within Hungary, and the key events of nineteenth century Hungarian history. The main theme of this narrative is the development of Hungarian nationalist ideas as they concerned Slovak interests. The key idea is a national concept that came to be known as the Magyar politikai nemzet, the “Hungarian political nation.” During the nineteenth century, Hungary was a kingdom ruled by the Habsburg dynasty. The relationship between Hungarian elites and the Habsburg family was often strained, but no foreign pretenders tarnished Habsburg legitimacy. Disputes over Hungary’s relationship to the rest of the Empire were perennial. The population of Hungary contained extraordinary ethnic and religious diversity, which several observers saw as uniquely characteristic. In 1795, Heinrich Grellman wrote that “the people in Hungary are very mixed. I know of no other land in Europe which has so many nations, and speaks so many languages, in so many dialects.”1 Ján Csaplovics, a polyglot Slovak author, wrote that “it seems as if nowhere of an equivalent area, in one country, are so many languages spoken as here or at least different types of languages, but also nowhere such diverse linguistic change, as here.”2 Several foreign travelers and geographers made similar comments.3 Ethnic Hungarians, also known as “Magyars,” were a minority of the kingdom’s population. In 1795, Grellman guesstimated that less than a 25 per cent of Hungary’s population were Magyars: “the non-Hungarian inhabitants of this country exceed the proper Hungarians at least three times.”4 The first statistical survey, from the late 1830s, suggested a figure of 37 per cent. By 1880, by which time census taking
The Hungarian Context
9
had become systematic and sophisticated, Hungarian speakers were 46.7 per cent of the population. The Magyars crossed the 50 per cent mark in 1900. Ethnic groups in the kingdom of Hungary, as in several multi-ethnic societies throughout the world, were often concentrated on specific rungs of the social hierarchy. Rusyns (Ukrainians)5 and Romanians were mostly peasants. Germans lived mostly in towns, dominating artisan trades and the mining industry of northern Hungary. Hungarian Jews, as elsewhere in Central Europe, worked as merchants, tailors, moneylenders and innkeepers. Roma (Gypsies), in addition to their proverbial talents as musicians, worked as blacksmiths or small traders. In the mountainous parts of northern Hungary that are now administered by the Slovak republic, the nobility was almost exclusively Magyar or Magyarized, though a few Slavic-speaking nobles lived in the high Tatras. Slovaks were mostly peasants, laborers, or petty manufacturers. The mountainous soil in Slovakia is comparatively barren, and Slovak men often migrated seasonally to the plains for the harvest. The stereotypical Slovak itinerant laborer and jack-of-all-trades was known as far away as Scotland: the August 1849 edition of the North British Review wrote that S lovacks of the northern districts [of Hungary], a branch of the Tchekhs of Moravia, are industrious cultivators of their Carpathian valleys, besides which … a detachment of them, after the manner of the Italian opera-boys, are perpetually perambulating Germany, with countenances and eyes the most magnificent in the world, selling mouse-traps.6 Though Slovak communities were typically poor, Slovaks enjoyed a good reputation for diligence and hard work. John Paget, an English immigrant to Hungary, described the Slovaks as “after the German, probably the most industrious of the inhabitants of Hungary, and perhaps the only one of whom a manufacturer could be made.”7 Before the abolition of serfdom in 1848, Hungary’s peasants owed labor, tax and social deference to members of the nobility. In 1813, English traveller Richard Bright, describing the services expected by Graf Hunyadi, compared the poverty and social exclusion of Hungarian serfs to that of American slaves. He described Slovak peasants as follows: From the same little hat, covered with oil, falls the same matted long black hair, negligently pleated or tied in knots, and over the same dirty jacket and trowsers, is wrapped on each a cloak of coarse woolen cloth, or sheep-skin still retaining its wool. Whether it be winter or summer,
10
Choosing Slovakia week-day or sabbath, the Sclavonian of this district never lays aside his cloak, or is seen but in heavy boots.
He also observed that Slovaks “never forgot to make submissive bows to the carriage.”8 Bright’s disapproving tone also hints that the legitimacy of serfdom was increasingly being called into question in the early decades of the nineteenth century: several plans for reforming agriculture and abolishing serfdom circulated in both government circles and the popular press. The vicissitudes of such plans are quite beyond the scope of this book; note merely that liberal Magyar noblemen were responsible for ending Hungarian serfdom. Some Slovaks voiced their opposition to serfdom, but none played an important role in its abolition. No large town on the territory of the future Slovak republic had a predominantly Slovak population before the twentieth century. Several towns in the north of Hungary had been founded with medieval royal charters based on German city law; these mostly had German populations. Germans not only dominated urban life near the German-speaking ethnoterritory in the west of Slovakia, but also in the High Tatras around Levoča (German: Leutschau, Hungarian: Lőcse), home of the so-called “Zipser Germans.” Other towns in the far east of Slovakia contained Hungarians instead of Germans, though ethnic mixture was the rule. The largest “Slovak town” for most of the nineteenth century was Budapest (in the nineteenth century two separate cities, Hungarian: Buda and Pest; German: Ofen and Pest; Slavic: Budin and Pešt). Located roughly where the Magyar, German, and Slavic ethno-territories meet, Bratislava (Hungarian: Pozsony, German: Pressburg, Pre-1918 Slavic: Prešpork or Prešporok)9 supplemented its German character with significant Magyar, Slavic and Jewish populations. Czechoslovak urbanization and ethnic cleansing have left the city overwhelmingly Slovak today, but Hungarian and German are still widely spoken. Slovakia’s second city, Košice (Hungarian: Kassa, German: Kaschau) was mostly Hungarian, and still boasts a significant Hungarian minority. Martin, the location of several nineteenth-century Slovak national institutions, had an overwhelmingly Slovak population throughout the nineteenth century, but was then and now a small provincial town. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, northern Hungary was an unusually urban part of Hungary. Štefan Janšák has calculated that 24 of Hungary’s 39 royal free cities (62 per cent) lay on the territory of the future Slovak Republic.10 As the nineteenth century progressed, however, Slavic northern Hungary experienced relative impoverishment. Hungarian industry followed the country’s rivers and railroads, and both were concentrated in the flatlands in the center of Hungary. Economic development had
The Hungarian Context
11
social consequences: modernizing Hungary acquired proletarian workers, professional middle classes and decadent aesthetes, but these new social types were concentrated in Budapest, not the territory of the future Slovak Republic. The large cities of the Habsburg Empire attracted Slovaks from the highlands by the tens of thousands; Slovaks contributed to the urban proletariat in Vienna, Budapest, Debrecen, and so on.11 But with the exception of Bratislava, the cities of the future Slovakia only experienced modest economic growth: proud medieval cities became quaint provincial towns. At the end of the eighteenth century, the only literate social class in Slavic northern Hungary was the clergy. A small secular Slovak intelligentsia, dominated by teachers, journalists, and lawyers, emerged in the second half of the nineteenth century. Slovak clerics, unsurprisingly, were divided along confessional lines; though Catholic-Protestant rapprochement for the sake of national solidarity proved a major theme of nineteenth-century Slovak history. Slovaks were mostly Catholic, with a Lutheran minority of around 15 per cent. Slovak patriots took the Christian character of their nation more or less for granted. Before the twentieth century, Jews in northern Hungary were not generally attracted to Slovak culture; Jewish assimilation in Hungary tended to produce Magyars. Hungarian domestic politics was dominated by the Hungarian nobility, which was unusually vigorous by European standards. Robert Kann’s memorable description bears repeating: “This was not a decaying and soonto-be-superseded aristocracy, it was a virile, daring, intelligent and ruthless class with every trump card in its hand except that of justice.”12 Its influence derived in part from its relative size: at roughly 10 per cent of the population, the Hungarian nobility was proportionally larger than most European aristocracies, even though some “sandaled nobles” lived in conditions all but indistinguishable from that of peasants. The eighteenth-century legal term for the Hungarian nobility was the natio Hungarica, Latin for “Hungarian nation.” This medieval and feudal concept of a “nation” differed dramatically from modern usage, not least because it excluded most of Hungary’s population. While the natio Hungarica saw itself as a sovereign political community, it was a social elite that excluded non-nobles.13 The natio Hungarica included representatives from most of Hungary’s ethnic groups; it was not Magyar-exclusive. Latin served as lingua franca for Hungary’s polyglot nobility; and note that in early modern Hungary Latin was not merely a language of scholarly refinement, but a medium of inter-ethnic communication in everyday situations, such as negotiating a fare with a coach-driver.14
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Choosing Slovakia
The event that set the narrative of Slovak nationalism in motion occurred at the Habsburg court in Vienna. In 1780, after a long and often strained apprenticeship under Maria Theresa, Joseph II finally ascended to the Austrian throne. Joseph genuinely desired to improve the lives of his subjects by increasing the efficiency of the imperial administration. Joseph can be counted among the Enlightened despots, but was not particularly successful: pedantic, tactless, and uncharismatic, he could not understand why his well-intentioned reforms provoked so much popular resistance. One of Joseph’s many schemes was a plan to use German instead of Latin in government administration.15 This reform has been described as “Josephinian German centralism,”16 but Joseph was not a German chauvinist. In the words of one contemporary commentator, the reform “had as its intention the simplification of government business. And only he who is inexperienced in matters of Austrian government says that he was mistaken.”17 No native speakers of Latin existed, so in all the provinces of the empire Latin was only accessible to an elite caste of the educated. By replacing Latin with German, Joseph hoped to make the imperial administration more efficient. Joseph chose German on utilitarian grounds. He treated his polyglot domains as a single unit, and on this basis German was the obvious choice for an official language. German was the language of several Habsburg provinces (Lower and Upper Austria, Tyrol) and the Habsburg capital city, and was also spoken by significant minorities in several others (Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia, Hungary, Transylvania). Even in provinces with small German populations (Galicia, Bukovina), what German population existed was urban, and thus better able to provide administrators than the local peasantry. No other language of the monarchy had anything approaching this geographic range, and no other language of the monarchy, except perhaps the demographically insignificant Italian, could boast equivalent literary achievements. The Hungarian nobility, however, restricted its horizons to the kingdom of Hungary. Inside the kingdom, German was the language of the highest aristocracy, which spent much of its time in Vienna, and of sundry merchants, soldiers, and officials. The nobility as a whole, however, mostly spoke Hungarian, and protested so vigorously against the introduction of German, that Joseph eventually backed down. This reform, however, had opened Pandora’s box: from this point on, the language of government administration remained an explosive and divisive political issue in the Habsburg Empire. The French Revolution temporarily put an end to Habsburg reforms, particularly in Hungary, where a Jacobin conspiracy was uncovered in 1795. Reform-minded circles and nervous monarchs cooperated during the Revolutionary wars, but when peace returned, so did the desire for reform.
The Hungarian Context
13
Hungarian liberals perceived their country as backwards in comparison to Britain, France, and even the more developed provinces of Austria.18 Various proposals to rationalize Hungarian agriculture, improve the Hungarian transport network, reform government administration and generally imitate the British model of “progress” inaugurated a period known as the Hungarian “Reform Era” (roughly 1820-1848). The Reform Era was an age of progress and development for Hungary. The central figure was the indefatigable count István Széchenyi, responsible for Hungary’s first railroad, first steamship line, and first Danube bridge. He matched economic innovation with cultural work: Széchenyi helped found Hungary’s Academy of Sciences by dramatically pledging a year’s income from his estates. Inspired by social organizations he had observed in England, he also founded a racetrack and casino in Budapest; both became important national institutions. Hungarian national concepts evolved considerably during these years. After the French Revolution, Hungarian liberals rejected the social elitism of the natio Hungarica for a class-inclusive national idea known as the “Hungarus” concept. The origin of this new nationalism was the desire to overcome confessional differences. In 1790, a contributor to Magyar Kurir [Hungarian Courier] characteristically called for Hungarians to be “not Calvinists, not Lutherans, not Papists, but to love one-another, … to be Hungarian brothers and patriots [Atyafiak és Hazafiak]!”19 The Hungari, as proponents of the Hungarus concept are known, celebrated Hungary’s ethnic diversity. Karl Georg Rumy’s 1808 Musen-Almanach [Muses’ Almanac] gathered together songs in Latin, Hungarian, Slovak, High German, and Transylvanian Dialect German as a “patriotic endeavor.”20 Rumy’s native language was German, yet he was willing to join the Spolok milovníkov řeči a literatury slovenskej [the Society for Lovers of the Slovak Language and Literature].21 Matthias Rát, founder of the first Hungarian-language newspaper, hoped that “none of the nations living in the two fatherlands [Hungary and Transylvania] will make its idiom common [universal]:”22 he promoted Magyar, but not at the expense of other Hungarian languages. In 1819, Pál Magda defended multilingualism while attacking national chauvinism: “I have the deepest disdain for every stuck-up nationalism, which splits Hungary into pieces … every citizen of Hungary should be [free] to choose, according to preference, whether to speak and write in Latin, Slovak or German.”23 In 1826, an anonymous contributor to Tudományos Gyüjtemény [Scientific Collections] wrote that he considered “as members of the nation not only the leaders and fathers of the people, the nobles, but also the serfs whose education has been very deficient so far in our country.”24 Horst Haselsteiner summarized
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Choosing Slovakia
that the Hungari “wanted neither to defend one-sidedly the old Hungarian class privileges of the ‘natio hungarica’ nor to engage solely in upholding the national language and culture.”25 Historian Samuel Harrison Thomson described the Hungarus concept as a phenomenon of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century: [W]ith the spread of ideas of nationalism after the French Revolution the various peoples of Hungary began to feel the racial differences between them. The Magyars, the dominant political group in the kingdom, began to emphasize their racial superiority. Hungarismus began to change into Magyarismus, and the less powerful groups — Slovaks, Rumanians, Croatians and Germans — were made to feel that they were inferior to the Magyar rulers.26 These claims are only valid for the Magyars, and reflect a certain inattention to non-Magyar Hungarians. Slovak thinkers continued to promote variants of the Hungarus concept throughout the nineteenth century, long after Magyars had discarded it. Thompson, however, expressed a consensus view: Haselsteiner also dismissed the Hungarus movement: The Hungarus idea did not, however, stand up to the popular efforts of the language reformers … The Hungari and their few followers were suspected of being ‘apatriotic’ and ‘anational,’ even of being ‘Austrians,’ or at least of working for Vienna. This sounded the death knell for the Hungarus concept as far as public opinion was concerned. It was discarded as a possible variant of Hungarian national concepts. With hindsight, it hardly stood a realistic chance of realization anyway.27 Haselsteiner’s counterfactual pessimism may be exaggerated, but the ultimate failure of the Hungari is beyond dispute. For the Magyar nobility, the Hungarian language became an important symbol of opposition to German-speaking Vienna, and the willingness to extend social rights to lesser nobles who lacked the advantages of a Latin (or German) education. For lesser nobles, patriotism and personal interest coincided: Hungarian language administration promised abundant administrative sinecures for Hungarian-speakers. Yet even aristocrats most comfortable in German, such as Széchenyi, switched to Hungarian out of patriotism. Hungarian reformers were only willing to accept into their ranks commoners who could display visible refinement and education. Miklós Wesselényi, a prominent Hungarian liberal, redefined Hungary’s ruling
The Hungarian Context
15
aristocracy as “the rule of the best,” arguing “it is equally wholesome and useful as it is natural that the best, i.e. those educated in customs and intellect, should attain supremacy.”28 This emphasis on “education” and “customs” as criteria of nationality, however, politicized cultural difference. The resulting pressure for cultural homogeneity came to permeate all facets of Hungarian public life. One Hungarian county considered passing a law requiring public balls to play a Hungarian dance after every Polka.29 The Hungarian nobility believed that its willingness to extend social privileges to educated Magyars demonstrated magnanimity and patriotism. But George Barany noted that while “replacement of Latin by the vernacular was one way of making Hungarian cultural life more democratic, the byproduct of the process was an ethnocentric provincialism.”30 László Kontler described “the tendency to transform the more comprehensive ‘Hungarus’ patriotism into narrower Magyar nationalism.”31 During the Reform Era, the Hungarian language replaced Latin in several official contexts. The Hungarian diet unsuccessfully sought to forbid the use of “foreign languages” as early as 1792.32 In 1830-31, knowledge of Hungarian became obligatory for public officials, lawyers, military officers, and appellate courts.33 No other language of the kingdom gained any equivalent recognition, though Latin maintained its official status in regions of Hungary where Hungarian was not widely spoken. In 1836, the kingdom’s laws began to be published in both Hungarian and Latin, fulfilling Széchenyi’s 1830 demand that only laws published in Hungarian should be valid in the kingdom. In 1840, Hungarian became obligatory for clergy, and the official language for royal petitions and communication between central and county authorities (except in Croatia). Finally, in 1844 Hungarian became the sole language of the Hungarian courts, chancery, and parliament. Deputies unfamiliar with Hungarian received a six-year grace period to learn the new language,34 but even this concession was granted only grudgingly and resentfully.35 Non-Magyars resisted this process and defended Latin as a unifying force: “We are still a Hungarian people [genus Hungaricum] and a single people,” wrote the Croat Juraj Rohoni in 1832, “so long as the communal Latin tongue remains.”36 Joseph II had chosen German for administrative efficiency, not the desire for assimilation. Accusations that centralization would lead to Germanization seem to have genuinely surprised him: “It has never been suggested that millions of people should change their mother tongue and acquire another.”37 The Magyar nobility during the Reform Era, by contrast, consciously promoted the ethnic assimilation. The ultimate goal was a monolingual nation-state on the French model, which implied that over half of Hungary’s population should switch languages.
16
Choosing Slovakia
Assimilating the non-Magyars to Magyar culture was an ambitious goal, to say the least. Initial steps were small: a German-language journal from Budapest reported that in Nitra, a city “inhabited by Slovaks and Germans,” Magyarization was being ardently promoted: streets had been given Magyar names, and shopkeepers advertised their wares in Hungarian. The results, however, were limited: “one still speaks, as before, Slovak and German.”38 Frustrated by this lack of progress, the Magyar press printed several proposals for accelerating the pace of linguistic assimilation. In 1840, for example, the following hare-brained scheme appeared in Hírnök [Herald]: The Hungarians must ask his majesty for permission to billet 60,000 Hungarian soldiers in regions where the common people do not speak Hungarian. These would be 60,000 teachers of the Hungarian language, and after three years, 60,000 houses and in them 300,000 souls would be Magyarized. After three years, these 60,000 soldiers would be billeted in another 60,000 houses, and if this process repeats for 12 years, then 1,200,000 souls can be Magyarized.39 Ethnic assimilation came to be known as “Magyarization,” and remained a key element in Hungarian politics until the collapse of the monarchy. The monolingual national concept of ethnic Magyars ultimately came to be known as the Magyar politikai nemzet [Hungarian political nation]. Since all citizens of the country would be members of the Magyar nemzet, all were expected to consider themselves Magyarok and speak magyarul (“in the Magyar fashion”). This reasoning required a somewhat dishonest attitude toward Hungary’s non-Magyar population: the nation was to include all inhabitants regardless of language or culture, but was simultaneously defined in terms of Magyar language and culture. This contradiction dominated the thought of Gustáv Szontágh, whom János Varga considers the key figure in the invention of the Magyar politikai nemzet. Szontágh initially defined a “political nation” in political and civic terms consistent with the Hungarus concept: A nation is the community of people living together in a common sovereign state and homeland; an independent civil society, it has a history of living its own political life as a morally responsible entity. ‘Nation’ is the totality of a country’s citizens; ‘people’ are its component parts, grouped according to their common race and language. Consequently, while a country can have only one nation, it can have a variety of peoples.40
The Hungarian Context
17
This initial formula is both class-inclusive and multi-ethnic: Szontágh apparently drew the distinction between “nation” and “people” specifically to include non-Magyars in the “nation.” But Szontágh then gave the Magyar people a privileged role: The founders of a nation are the people who occupy a nation and found a state. With this act they transform a people to a nation … likewise with this act, a people stamps its name, its character and its language on the land it settles, the society it establishes, and the political life it lives. It follows from this that in Hungary an aspect of political life is national only if it is Hungarian.41 This bait-and-switch characterized most formulae of the Magyar politikai nemzet: authors strategically conflated “citizen of Hungary” and “ethnic Magyar” in order to justify Magyar supremacy. The Magyar politikai nemzet nevertheless proved an effective rhetorical device for those Magyars who sought to justify Magyarization. Ferenc Pulszky expressed representative Maygar attitudes: What do we Hungarians demand of the Slavs … [?] We demand nothing more than what the English ask of the Celtic inhabitants of Wales and high Scotland, nothing more than the French ask of Brittany or Alsace. We want that all public documents in Hungary, including baptismal registries and assembly protocols, will be written in Hungarian, we want that the language of instruction will be Hungarian, which to some degree (in Protestant schools) has already been carried out in the course of this year, with a word, that the Hungarian language in every respect accepts all the rights of Latin; Slavic may be satisfied with those rights that it possessed earlier — Hungarian will however never violently force itself into the domestic circle. It is completely natural that this too, with increasing education, will also become slowly Hungarianized [hungarisiert] … the most enthusiastic Slav becomes a Hungarian when he becomes a lawyer.42 Peasants could remain Slavic, but members of the politically enfranchised middle classes had to speak Hungarian. Hungarian reformers believed, correctly, that a Slavic-speaking middle class would eventually challenge Magyar dominance of Hungary. They also feared, perhaps with justification, that an educated Slavic subculture posed a threat to the political unity of the kingdom. In 1840, Károly Zay, Inspector-General for
18
Choosing Slovakia
Hungary’s Protestant church and an “ardently enthusiastic Magyar patriot,”43 described the threat as follows: That it is suitable to hunt the Slavic language beyond the borders as quickly as possible is an obvious thing, the only question is of the feasible and unfeasible means to Magyarize the Slavs and to remove their nationality from them … We must rip the sapling up by its roots, so long as it is still weak, because we cannot treat the mature tree according to our will.44 Though this rhetoric of hunting beyond borders and ripping up by roots sounds frightening in light of subsequent ethnic cleansing, note that Zay’s hostility was directed against the Slavic educational institutions, not the Slavs themselves. The liberal Hungarian nobility welcomed assimilators into its ranks: several Magyar patriots had Slovak ancestors, including Hungary’s national poet, Sándor Petőfi.45 Jews were the main exception to this rule, and assimilated Jews continued to face Anti-Semitism. Yet even this exception proves the rule: assimilating Jews received a warmer welcome in Hungary than elsewhere in Central Europe.46 Zay set forth a detailed policy of Magyarization in his 1841 Protestantism, Magyarism, Slavism. Zay’s astonishingly long-winded prose is difficult to quote, but the following passage captures his essential argument: Neither the law, nor the representatives of the Magyar nationality, ever had the intention forcefully to rob Hungarian Slavdom of its nationality, to oppress it in religious and moral instruction; they only demand that every citizen, and therefore every Slav, makes his own the national language of the country … namely the Magyar language, because in this a warm feeling for the development of the nationality – in which the greatness and well-being of Hungary lies – is developed in all hearts, and will be inherited by later generations who, inspired by Magyarization’s blessings, will willingly become Magyars.47 The most striking word in this long-winded passage is the word “only,” to which I have added emphasis. Perhaps Zay did not appreciate how much he demanded: he sought the extinction of Hungary’s Slavic culture. Zay’s appointment as Inspector-General for the Hungarian Lutheran church sparked a period of confrontation between Slavs and Magyars, the 1841-1848 “Language War.”48 Zay sought to unify the Lutheran and Calvinist churches, and imposed Hungarian as the sole language of church administration. Slovak
The Hungarian Context
19
pastors responded with several tracts denouncing Magyarization; Ján Ormis described them as “national defenses.”49 These events will be discussed in detail below, for now note merely that the pressure to Magyarize prevented Slovak intellectuals from sharing in the optimism of the Reform Era. Slavs, no less than Magyars, had fought in Hungary’s wars and contributed to its economic development. Slavic intellectuals believed in their right to cultivate their language and literature, and bitterly resented all attempts at Magyarization. As the Hungarian diet Magyarized more and more spheres of public life, Slavic intellectuals reacted with alarm and panic, much as the Hungarian nobility had responded to Joseph II’s reforms a few decades earlier. The Language War soured Slovak-Hungarian relations, and while the conflict ebbed and flowed, zero-sum linguistic conflict has remained a permanent feature of Slovak-Magyar relations ever since. The Language War was overtaken by great events beyond the Hungarian frontiers. On 24 February 1848, the Bourbon monarchy was overthrown in Paris, and as the news reached Central Europe, a series of revolutions erupted in Italian, German, and Romanian lands. The Habsburg Empire was shaken to its foundations: the government of Klemens von Metternich fell, Emperor Ferdinand I abdicated, and National Guards took power in the main cities of the Habsburg Empire. A flood of patriotism and optimism inundated the monarchy. Serfdom was abolished, and freedom of the press proclaimed. The leading figure in the Hungarian revolution, Lajos Kossuth, had won his reputation and influence through his outstanding ability as a journalist. Kossuth was a Magyar chauvinist: he denied that Hungary’s minority groups had any claim to nationhood, and indeed claimed that their stubborn attachment to their languages was treasonous. He denied that the Slovaks formed a “nation” in 1842, saying: “verily, verily I say unto you that a Slovak nation has never existed even in a dream.”50 Elsewhere, he even denied nonMagyars the status of “nationality,” though he acknowledged the diversity of Hungary’s “people and races.” I shall never ever recognize any other nation and nationality [nemzetet és nemzetiséget] under the holy Hungarian crown than the Hungarian. I know there are people and races [népfajok] who speak other languages, but there is only one nation here.51 No space remained for Slovaks to claim any collective identity or collective rights within the Hungarian kingdom. Meanwhile Slavs from across the Habsburg Empire made their own revolution by forming a Pan-Slav Congress in Prague. The congress chairman
20
Choosing Slovakia
was Pavel Šafařík, known in Slovak historiography as Pavol Šafárik,52 a Slovak-born scholar who had written several important scholarly works on Slavic studies. Meetings were held in regional sections: Pavao Stamatović from Vojvodina chaired 42 south-Slavs, Karol Libelt of Poznań 61 Poles and Ruthenians, and Ľudovít Štúr 237 Czecho-Slovaks.53 Despite the heartfelt desire for unity, the Pan-Slav Congress showcased Slavic particularism and dissension. Polish and Ruthenian representatives from Galicia, with the peasant revolt of 1846 fresh in their minds, exchanged particularly harsh words. But no national group proved willing to sacrifice its particular interests in the name of Slavic solidarity. The longing for Slavic unity never fully recovered from the shock of this discovery. In the end, the congress was dissolved by imperial soldiers. Slovak leaders tried to reconcile Hungarian citizenship with Slavic loyalties. They initially sought accommodation with Kossuth’s government. The initial Slovak response to the 1848 Revolution was a mild document from 10 May known as the Mikuláš “Declaration of the Slovak Nation.” This included typical revolutionary demands: a free press, national schools, a national parliament, various language rights, solidarity with the oppressed Poles, and the release from prison of Slovak poet Janko Kráľ. Hungarian historian István Deák described the Mikuláš Declaration as “conciliatory,” and noted that the Slovaks refused to demand their territorial separation from Hungary at the Slavic Congress in Prague.54 The Hungarian government, however, proved completely intransigent. As Alice Freifeld put it, “Slovak demands were modest, but as the weakest they were also the ones the Magyars were least inclined to appease.”55 Kossuth replied to the Mikuláš declaration by issuing arrest warrants for the Slovak leadership, who then fled the country.56 Indeed, Kossuth’s government antagonized most of Hungary’s nonMagyar nationalities to armed resistance. A Croatian army stationed on the military border, led by Josip Jelačić, even forced the Hungarian government to vacate Buda and withdraw to Debrecen. Peasant uprisings in Transylvania caused great material destruction.57 Nationalist violence in the Banat involved several nationalities.58 The Rusyns did not organize any military forces, but a prominent Rusyn leader, Adolf Dobrians’ky, subsequently elected to parliament, received a decoration from the Russian emperor for welcoming the Russian army into Hungary. In July 1849, facing total military defeat, Kossuth’s government attempted to placate the nationalities by granting other languages of Hungary official status in local administration, but this deathbed conversion to multi-ethnic tolerance had little effect. In August 1849, the Hungarian army surrendered at Világos. Kossuth fled to the Ottoman Empire, thence to Britain and America, and eventually died in Italian exile.
The Hungarian Context
21
Slovak military resistance to the Kossuth government was the work of three men: Ľudovít Štúr, Jozef Hurban, and Michal Hodža. All three had actively participated in the Language War; all three will be discussed in great detail below. Fleeing arrest after the Mikulaš declaration, they attended the Slavic Congress in Prague. They then went to Vienna and formed the “Slovak National Council,” which raised a small army of Czech and Slovak students known as the “Slovak volunteers.” The volunteers proved an insignificant military force. Despite intermittent popular support,59 three attempts to instigate a general rising failed, and the volunteers were always defeated when they fought the Hungarian militia. Viennese-born Hungarian noblewoman Theresa Pulszky described them as “Prague students” leading “lawless bands” that only moved when unopposed; she also claimed that some weapons captured from the volunteers were loaded with the ball behind the gunpowder.60 The Habsburg central government saw them as anarchists, though the volunteers willingly disbanded when the Hungarian Revolution was defeated. This poor showing reflects Slovak military inexperience: the Slovak intelligentsia, recall, mostly consisted of priests and pastors. From a military perspective, the Hungarian Revolution had posed a bigger threat to Habsburg rule than any other national movement in the Empire. Hungarian patriots organized several armies to resist the Habsburg forces, and won their share of victories. Indeed, the Habsburg government felt compelled to ask Imperial Russia for military assistance.61 Modern Hungarians recall 1848 as a heroic national tragedy, and commemorate it with poetry readings and parades.62 Nevertheless, the Habsburg army had pacified Hungary by 1849, and the teenaged Franz Joseph, who would rule until his death during the First World War, sat nervously on the Habsburg throne. The restored Habsburg government centralized the Empire’s administration. The Habsburg Empire, in A.J.P. Taylor’s words, “became, for the first and last time, a fully unitary state.”63 Under the so-called Bach regime, named after interior minister Alexander Bach, the traditional Hungarian counties were abolished and new, larger administrative districts created. A new administration had to be appointed from scratch. Franz Joseph was understandably reluctant to entrust the Hungarian nobility that had led the Hungarian Revolution with much power. Magyars experienced neo-absolutism as German despotism, but Franz Joseph also dispensed with the assistance of Hungary’s minorities, relying mostly on administrative staff imported from other Austrian provinces. Kann concluded that “all nationalities charged to the German account either the indiscriminate, unwise and ruthless enforcement of a German administration
22
Choosing Slovakia
… or the betrayal of the national aspirations of the ‘loyal’ non-Magyar national groups.”64 Satisfying few, the Bach regime ultimately failed. Slovak memories of the Bach Regime are not nearly as dark as those of the Hungarians, since the pressure to Magyarize vanished. Nevertheless, Slovak national activity was forbidden, and members of the Slovak National Council were placed under house arrest. The strongly Catholic flavor of NeoAbsolutism also alienated the influential Slovak Lutheran intelligentsia. Nor did the new administration of Hungary create a Slovak autonomous region. The Bach-era frontiers disregarded ethnographic boundaries,65 though two northern provinces of Hungary somewhat correspond to the Slavic zone (see figure 2.1). All in all, Macartney’s summary is appropriate: “the Slovak nationalists found that they had got, after all, very little more out of Vienna than they had got out of Pest.” 66 In this period, Slovak leaders had only a vague sense of where the “Slovak” territory was. Bohemia, Moravia, Galicia and Croatia existed not only as imagined communities, but also as administrative units with distinctive legal traditions, providing Czech, Polish and Croatian politicians with an arena in which to fight the national struggle. Even the Rusyns of Subcarpathia briefly enjoyed an autonomous national district after the Revolution of 1848.67 Slovakia, by contrast, did not exist as an administrative concept until the twentieth century. When Michal Hodža demanded an autonomous Slovak district with its own parliament in 1848, he did not claim any specific territory, he merely suggested that “ethnographic borders should be determined.”68 Foreign policy failure caused the Bach regime to collapse. The 11 July 1859 treaty of Villafranca forced the Habsburg monarchy to cede Lombardy to France and Piedmont, destroying its hegemony in northern Italy. This defeat in Italy, combined with Prussian success in the perpetual scrimmage for influence in the German Confederation, led Franz Joseph to seek greater domestic support. He dismissed Bach, lifted restrictions on press freedom and, with the February Patent of 1861, created a parliament for the Empire. Hungary received 85 seats in this reformed Reichsrat, far more than any other province.69 The Hungarian liberal leadership, led by Ferenc Deák, nevertheless rejected the February Patent because it gave the federal Reichsrat final authority over Hungarian affairs. When Czech deputies began their own boycott in 1863, Franz Joseph was forced to acknowledge that he had not reconciled his reform-minded subjects. When war broke out with Prussia in 1865, the Reichsrat was suspended.
The Hungarian Context Figure 2.1: Administrative Regions in Bach-Era Hungary (1850)
Figure 2.2: The Slovak Okolie in the June Memorandum (1861)
Figure 2.3: The Slovak Okolie in the December Memorandum (1861)
23
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Choosing Slovakia
During this period of uncertainty and constitutional experimentation, the Hungarian liberal nobility took a soft line toward Hungary’s non-Magyars. “If we wish to win over the nationalities,” Deák wrote, “we must not seek at all costs to Magyarize them; this can only happen if we create in them love and attachment for Hungarian conditions.”70 József Eötvös, a Hungarian nobleman who took a special interest in nationality affairs, opposed the establishment of specifically national administrative subdivisions, but acknowledged the legitimacy of minority cultures inside Hungary and accepted the use of minority languages in local administration.71 Where Kossuth had named Slavs death-deserving traitors for having lived so long in Hungary without learning Hungarian, Deák and Eötvös expressed their willingness to accommodate the “justified demands” of Hungary’s nationalities. Slovak intellectuals shared in the hopeful atmosphere of the Bach regime’s collapse and responded to the moderation of Deák and Eötvös. Partly inspired by Hungary’s Serbs, who had gathered to formulate demands for political autonomy in April 1861, some five thousand figures from Slovak public life met in Martin in June 1861 to discuss national aims. The resulting document is known as the “Slovak Memorandum.”72 It demanded an autonomous Slovak territory in the north of Hungary, in which the Slovak language would used in local administration, schools, and court proceedings (see Figure 2.2). In December, Štefan Moyses presented a modified Memorandum to Franz Joseph. The December or Viennese Memorandum abandoned the claim to Zemplén county (Figure 2.3).73 The Memorandum was also the first serious attempt to delineate a Slovak territory in legal terms: it defined a Slovak okolie [region] in terms of Hungarian counties, some of which were proclaimed Slovak, others “partly Slovak.” The Memorandum also became a cultural event: Slovak patriots wore Memorandum-themed jewelry and drank from Memorandumthemed glasses.74 Slovak politicians also ran for parliament. Parliamentary politics, however, proved an ineffective means for promoting Slovak aims: the electoral law specified a property threshold so high that most Slovaks were disenfranchised. Slovaks attempted to compensate by seeking alliance with Rusyns in Subcarpathia, with whom they shared a Slavic language and social exclusion. Two Slovaks won seats in the 1861 elections, but in 1865, all Slovak candidates were defeated. The injustice of this complete disenfranchisement from Hungarian political life led Hurban to exclaim that Slovaks would defend their interests outside of parliament if denied representation inside it; this outburst cost him a fine and six months imprisonment.
The Hungarian Context
25
Political winds, however, blew against the Slovak movement. Defeated by the Prussian army in 1866, Franz Joseph, decided to make a deal with Hungarian liberals. He dismissed his centralizing secretary of state Anton Schmerling and on 15 March 1867 signed the famous “Ausgleich” [compromise], which ended the period of constitutional experimentation and transformed the “Austrian Empire” into the “Austro-Hungarian Dual Monarchy.” The Ausgleich granted the noble-dominated Hungarian parliament untrammeled authority over Hungary’s domestic policies, including educational policy, courts, county administration and church affairs. Matters that affected both halves of the empire, such as monetary policy, were dealt with by a complicated and constantly contested system of dual ministries. The emperor retained personal control over the army and foreign policy. Hungary’s historic counties were revived, and local administration placed in the hands of municipal assemblies under the supervision of the Ministry of Interior.75 The Ausgleich is one of the great controversies of Hungarian history.76 In the short term, it brought political stability to the Empire: reconciliation between the Habsburg monarch and Hungarian nobility removed the greatest domestic threat to Empire’s stability. Economically, the Ausgleich was also a success. Agricultural exports, in the words of Berend and Ranki, “grew by leaps and bounds.”77 Industrialization also accelerated, though Hungary lagged behind Bohemia and German Austria. During the Bach regime, an average of 250 kilometers of railroad were built each year, after the Ausgleich, the figure jumped to 600. The total assets in Hungarian banks more than tripled between 1866 and 1873. Nevertheless, many scholars hold the Ausgleich responsible for ultimate the collapse of the Habsburg monarchy by stifling Slavic aspirations. 1867 certainly marks an important watershed in the history of intra-Hungarian ethnic relations. During the 1860s, Magyar politicians had scrupulously acknowledged the multi-ethnic nature of Hungarian society. In 1866, the Journal Kisfaludy társaság “encouraged friends of literature not only to gather Magyar folk songs, but also those of other Hungarian peoples.”78 Gyula Andrássy, who helped negotiate the Ausgleich, had attended the Pest celebrations of St. Slava’s day, a Serbian holiday, during the 1860s. After the Ausgleich, Magyars lost the desire to make these symbolic gestures. Andrássy, for instance, stopped attending St. Slava celebrations in 1867.79 Slavs throughout the Empire interpreted the Ausgleich as a HungarianGerman alliance against the Slavs. This interpretation was not entirely unfounded: Friedrich Beust, whom Franz Joseph entrusted with much of the negotiations, justified the Ausgleich as follows: “We must stand, first of all, on solid ground … This solid ground, as things stand at present, is the
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Choosing Slovakia
co-operation of the German and Hungarian elements in opposition to Pan-Slavism.”80 Liberal Austrians also conflated Slavic nationalism inside the monarchy with Russophile Pan-Slavism.81 The revolutionary loyalty of kaisertreu Slovaks and Croats had been forgotten: in another instance of the notorious Habsburg ingratitude, they were placed at the mercy of the Empire’s most successful rebels. The Ausgleich gave the noble-dominated Hungarian parliament a free hand over nationality questions in the kingdom. They responded with the infamous Nationalities Law of 1868, law XLIV, which gave legal expression to the concept of the Magyar politikai nemzet. As Barany noted, “the demands of non-Magyar deputies were almost completely ignored in the final formulation of the Nationalities Law of 1868.”82 The Croats received the status of “a separate nation from a political point of view,”83 but the Slovaks were not even mentioned by name: they were simply one of many “nationalities” subsumed in “the indivisible Hungarian nation.” The key passage reads: According to the fundamental principles of the constitution all the inhabitants of the kingdom form one nation in the political sense, the indivisible Hungarian nation, of which each citizen, regardless of nationality, is an equal member, and enjoys the same rights as every other citizen. This equality of rights, insofar as it applies to the several languages in use in this country, may be modified by special dispositions only so far as these comport with the unity of the state, the practical necessities of government, and the administration of justice.84 Despite this theoretical equality, the law also granted a special place to the Hungarian language. It required all municipal governments to keep records in Hungarian, though such records could also be kept in minority languages if a fifth of the municipality’s members desired it (paragraph two).85 Minority languages could also be used in courts (paragraph seven) and church administration (paragraph 24). Though universities would be Hungarian, departments in minority literatures were permitted (paragraph 19). Yet paragraph 23 assured that “every state citizen may use his own language in petitions to the municipal government, church administration, county administration, or organs of the central government.”86 Eötvös had himself wanted to grant further concessions to Hungary’s non-Magyars: his draft law of 26 June 1867, for example, had allowed county assemblies to select their language of administration by simple majority vote.87 Historiography is as divided on the merits of the Nationalities Law of 1868 as it is on the Ausgleich itself. Arthur May described it as “one of the most
The Hungarian Context
27
enlightened measures of its kind ever adapted”;88 Kontler also emphasized its liberal features: It gave extensive opportunities for the use of the native tongue in the administration, at courts, in education and in religious life; the right of association made it possible to establish cultural, learned, artistic or economic societies and schools using any language; and the law even required the state to promote primary and secondary schooling in the mother tongue and the participation of the ethnic minorities in public service.89 The language of schooling, church and local administration had dominated national conflict since the Language War; the Nationalities Law made concessions in these crucial areas. Oscar Jászi, by contrast, described it as “a constitutional show-window for international use, whereas, at home, a policy was launched which was in flagrant antagonism both with the spirit and the positive statement of the nationality law.”90 Jászi was right to stress the discrepancy between theory and practice, since as Hugh Seton-Watson observed, “Eötvös’s Nationalities Law was honestly applied only for a few years.”91 The interpretation and implementation of the law was left entirely in the hands of Magyar politicians. After Deák retired from politics in 1872, Magyar ethnic chauvinism sharply increased. Kálmán Tisza, the main figure of this period, had originally rejected the Ausgleich. In the so-called Bihar points, he had insisted that Hungary retain an independent military and rejected any common ministries for the monarchy as a whole. In March 1875, however, Tisza abandoned the Bihar points and reconciled himself and the Balközép párt [Left Center Party] to the Ausgleich, and merged with Deák’s party, then in terminal decline after its leader’s retirement. Tisza became Prime Minister in 1875. One of Tisza’s first acts in power was to destroy the most important Slovak national institution. As with other Slavic groups of the Habsburg monarchy, in 1863 Slovaks had founded The Matica slovenská on the model of the Matica srpska. A “Matica” is a Slavic cultural organization that acts as a combined publishing house, cultural center, and scholarship-dispensing organization;92 Toma and Kováč described the Matica slovenská as the “Slovak Heritage Foundation.”93 In April 1875, declaring “there can be only one visible nation in the frontiers of Hungary,”94 Tisza confiscated the Matica slovenská’s funds and sold the library piecemeal. When a Serbian parliamentary deputy urged compensation for the Slovak nation, whose contributions had funded the Matica, Tisza responded simply “there is no Slovak nation,” a response which,
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Choosing Slovakia
in R.W. Seton-Watson’s words, “rendered all further discussion impossible.”95 Despite warnings from moderate deputies in parliament, Tisza passed laws to Magyarize Hungarian schools in 1879.96 Peter Sugar described Tisza’s fifteenyear administration as “crucial years, during which the relationship of the Magyars with the other nations living in Hungary deteriorated gradually and became antagonistic.”97 Tisza also dismantled the Slovak school system. The three Slovak lyceums in Revúca, Kláštor and Martin were closed in 1874 on charges of “PanSlavism.” Tisza made Hungarian the obligatory language of instruction in people’s schools, middle schools, and kindergartens (in 1879, 1883, and 1891, respectively).98 The 1868 Nationalities Law had explicitly endorsed education in languages other than Hungarian, but by the 1880s, state schools were exclusively Magyar. As Alan Palmer noted, Tisza “flagrantly ignored the principles of the Nationalities Law.”99 The educational struggle then turned to church schools. Károly Khuen-Héderváry, the Hungarian representative in Croatia, provides a representative statement of Magyar opinion: From the national point of view it is undesirable under all circumstances to permit the establishment of schools that are purely ethnic in character. This is especially the case in the northwestern Slovak counties, which are in any case the hotbed of Pan-Slavism.100 Though religious schools managed to stay open throughout the Ausgleich period; Slovak was almost entirely chased out of Hungarian classrooms in the last decades of the Habsburg monarchy.101 In short, the Ausgleich was a catastrophe for the Slovak national movement. Slovak historian Ľudovít Holotík called it a “fatal turning point”102 in Slovak history, the moment when “the fortunes of the Slovak people were at their lowest ebb.”103 Joseph Zacek described Slovak options as follows: Dispossessed of their schools and institutions, their Catholic hierarchy infiltrated with Magyarones, granted almost no parliamentary representation, and suffering crushing poverty, they had only two feasible alternatives: to accept Magyarization or to emigrate.104 This formula is exaggerated: Slovak patriots continued to operate during the Ausgleich period. But given the implacability of Magyar chauvinism, what was the best course of action for Slovak patriots? Answering this difficult question split the Slovak intelligentsia into two schools. One circle, daunted by the magnitude of defeat, argued that the
The Hungarian Context
29
Memorandum had made unproductively radical demands and that modest objectives stood a better chance of being achieved. This circle described itself as the nová škola [new school], accepted the Ausgleich, and sought to placate the Magyar leadership by abandoning the demand for an autonomous Slovak district. Slovaks who stood by the Memorandum thus became known as the stará škola [old school]. Many stará škola figures had been prominent in the Memorandist movement, including Štefan Daxner, Ján Francisci (both of whom had also been sentenced to death by the Hungarian revolutionary government for their role leading the Slovak volunteers),105 lawyer Viliam Pauliny-Tóth, and Hurban, the last surviving member of the Slovak National Council. However, the representatives of the nová škola, including Ján Bobula and Ján Palárik, also boasted impressive patriotic credentials. Both the nová škola and the stará škola formed political parties, and it is noteworthy that Slovak parties continued to participate in Hungarian elections after the Ausgleich. In the elections of 1872, the division of the Slovak vote meant that no Slovaks were elected to parliament at all, after which setback the nová škola, in Macartney’s words, “disintegrated altogether.”106 Continued Slovak participation in Hungarian political life contrasts strikingly with Czech boycott: František Palacký, declaring Dualism “geographical and political insanity,” threatened that Czechs would withdraw from the Austrian Diet “for all eternity” if the Ausgleich went through.107 Slovak politicians did not resort to parliamentary boycott until the Tisza years. Slovak historians have not been kind to the nová škola. Ľudovít Holotík uncharitably describes it as having attempted to take control of Slovak politics into their hands, and to accommodate the Hungarian state idea in such a way that the way to agreement with the ruling Magyars would be open. Step by step they accepted the Ausgleich and reduced Slovak demands up to the borders of collaboration.108 Milan Podrimavský wrote that the nová škola “could not bring productive and perspective values to the efforts for a national emancipation in Slovakia,” and denied that their program was “a real, possible alternative for solving the Slovak problem.”109 The failure of the nová škola is beyond question, but the stará škola proved equally ineffective. In light of Magyar hegemony, the conflict between the stará and nová škola became increasingly irrelevant. The political party based on the stará škola tradition, the Slovenská národná strana [Slovak National Party], even adopted the tactics of the nová škola: Podrimavský noted that its 1901 electoral platform: “did not embrace the principal claims of the Memorandum
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Choosing Slovakia
for tactical reasons.”110 Slovak disenfranchisement made political platforms irrelevant: Hungarian state institutions routinely refused to acknowledge legitimately elected representatives from ethnic minorities. One Ondrej Halas had his mandate rejected seven times.111 After Tisza’s fifteen-year rule ended, Hungary had a series of weak ministers who varied in their degree of hostility to non-Magyar nationalities. Dezső Bánffy openly propounded Magyar chauvinism: “without chauvinism it is impossible to found the unitary Magyar state.”112 His successor, Kálmán Széll, Deák’s son-in-law, curbed some of Bánffy’s excesses; R.W. Seton-Watson, a Slovakophile British historian, described Széll as “the only Hungarian Premier of recent times who tried to apply tact and humanity to the nationalities question.”113 But even Széll described the Hungarians as conquering lords: “The Magyars have conquered this country for the Magyars and not for others. The supremacy and hegemony of the Magyars is fully justified.” In the final years of the Habsburg monarchy, the Hungarian government remained extremely hostile to minority national aspirations. Jászi spoke of “an atmosphere of chauvinistic megalomania.”114 With the spread of education and the increasing reach of Magyarizing pressures, the Slovak national intelligentsia struggled to mobilize ordinary Slovaks. A significant and widely-publicized turning point was the so-called “Černová massacre.” Černová is a Slovak village in Ružemberok county. Andrej Hlinka, Černová’s parish priest, had long been active in local politics, so when Slovaks in his parish built him a church in 1906, the government declared Hlinka unsuitable for the post and attempted to install a Magyar priest. Černová’s Slovaks protested, and during a confrontation with police, twelve people were killed. The government then prosecuted Hlinka and his colleagues for provocation, which brought the matter to international attention. The Černová incident transformed Hlinka, in William Wallace’s words, “from a reasonable critic into a really bitter opponent, as well as making him a martyr.”115 Hlinka’s imprisonment made him a highly visible symbol of Slovak national oppression, and launched him on a dramatic political career. Slovaks also sought allies among Hungary’s Romanian and Serbian politicians, who faced a similar struggle against Magyarization. In the 1890s, Slovak politicians cooperated with South-Slav and Romanian parties attempting to widen the voting franchise, and in 1895 representatives of Romanian, Serbian and Slovak parties formed a “Congress of Nationalities” which demanded autonomous administration for Hungary’s nationalities. The following year, they issued a joint protest against the Millennium celebrations in Budapest.116 Magyars responded by intensifying their efforts at
The Hungarian Context
31
Magyarization: over 400 Magyar schools were founded in minority districts the following year.117 The collapse of the Habsburg monarchy in 1918 transformed Slovak politics. The political events that led to the creation of a Czechoslovak state have been well-documented elsewhere,118 and will be briefly discussed in the final chapter. The essential point is that the 1920 Treaty of Trianon detached Slavic northern Hungary from the kingdom of Hungary. Most Slovak leaders welcomed this as liberation from tyranny. Fear of Slavic disloyalty to the kingdom of Hungary had inspired the policy of Magyarization, but Magyarization had caused so much discontent that Slovak leaders, when presented with the choice of continued loyalty to Hungary or an untried Czecho-Slovak Republic, chose the devil they did not know: Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovak declaration of independence denounced the Magyars’ “unspeakable violence and ruthless oppression of their subject races.”119 Subsequent Slovak historians, commenting on the history of Magyarization, have generally adopted the same approach. In 1958, Socialist historian Ľudovít Holotík wrote that Hungary was “an agrarian, half-feudal land, in which the landowners and haute bourgeoisie ruled with violence.”120 In the post-socialist period, Vladimir Matula described nineteenth-century Slovaks as a “nationally and socially oppressed ethnic community, subject to systematic and forceful assimilation on the part of the ruling Hungarian nation.”121 Several western historians of Slovakia accept the rhetoric of victimization: Jozef Lettrich, for instance, concluded that “the balance-sheet of the thousand years of Magyar rule of the Slovaks is unbelievably in the red. The Slovaks suffered irreplaceable losses in their national potential.”122 Most historians who oppose this picture are either Hungarian patriots or foreign historians who openly sympathize with Hungary.123 Given this historiographic consensus, it is worth emphasizing that nineteenth-century Slovak-Hungarian history relations cannot be reduced to a morality tale in which wicked Hungarians oppressed poor Slovaks. History, despite a popular proverb to the contrary, is not always written by the victors; but can only be written by the literate. The policy of Magyarization antagonized precisely that section of Slovak society capable of recording its discontent for future generations. The Slovak intelligentsia unwaveringly opposed Magyarization and suffered persecution in consequence, but Slovak peasants, laborers, and craftsmen rarely felt persecuted by Magyarization because they were not seriously affected. Intellectuals frequently style themselves as the voice of “the nation,” but historians must treat this conceit skeptically. Even after the assassination of Franz Ferdinand, Slovaks composed and sang songs
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Choosing Slovakia
proclaiming their loyalty to the monarchy,124 and military historian Gunther Rothenberg also concluded that “soldiers of all nationalities, including even Czechs and Slovaks, displayed considerable enthusiasm for this war up to the late summer of 1918.”125 Slovaks only abandoned their Hungarian loyalties at the very end of the First World War. Throughout the nineteenth century, the Slovak peasantry showed a surprising quiescence, even by the lethargic standards of peasant populations. Consider the Slovak volunteers, the only Slovak organization to resist the Hungarian state with force of arms. When the Slovak National Council organized the volunteers in Vienna, it could only find 50 Slovak recruits, though many more Slovaks rallied to it after it crossed into Hungary. By contrast, the Slovak National Council found 250 Czech volunteers to fight for fellow “Slavo-Czechs” in Hungary.126 In other words, for every Slovak willing to defend their nation, however imagined, from Kossuth-style Magyarization, five Czechs were prepared to fight for Czechoslovak co-nationals: patriotic Czechs were more dedicated to liberating the Slovaks from “Magyar oppression” than the Slovaks themselves. Perhaps the most revealing statistic about the volunteers is the fact that more Slovaks joined the Hungarian Honvéd militia.127 And did not the leaders of Slovak National Council, even after having been sentenced to death in absentia, pointedly refrain from demanding separation from Hungary at the Prague Slavic Congress? The Slovak volunteers have entered into Slovak historical myth, thanks in part to Daniel Rapant’s meticulous five-volume history.128 Historians of Hungary, by contrast, usually ignore the Slovak volunteers as a negligible force during the Hungarian Revolution. Kann’s description of the Slovaks as “inconspicuous”129 captures their relative lack of impact, at least when compared to Jelačić’s Croatian army, or even Romanian peasant jaqueries. Most Hungarian and Anglophone histories of 1848 Hungary do not mention the Slovak volunteers at all, though Hugh Seton-Watson made a passing reference to “Slovak armed bands.”130 Perhaps the most important fact about Rapant’s history, however, is that it was published in the 1950s, immediately after the Hungarian occupation of southern Slovakia during the Second World War. Viewing the Slovak volunteers as independence fighters enabled Slovaks to refute an important claim of Hungarian revisionists, namely that “the Slovaks never wished to be detached from Hungary,”131 as Győrgy Lukács put it. A Slovak independence movement from the 1840s provided precedent and thus implicit justification for the ethnic partition of Hungary. Before the Treaty of Trianon, however, even Slovaks who had been radicalized in America expressed Hungarian loyalties. Slovenský Sokol boasted that Slovaks “had never rebelled, never revolted”132 against Hungarian
The Hungarian Context
33
rule; a New York Memorandum proclaimed “Away from Magyar domination, — but not from the Hungarian homeland!133 This striking convergence of views between post-war Hungarian revisionism and pre-war Slovak nationalism merely underscores the dramatic transformation Slovak thought underwent during the First World War. The following chapter will argue that Slovaks felt a genuine sense of loyalty and affection for the Hungarian homeland throughout the long nineteenth century. The ultimate goal of Slovak political agitation in the nineteenth century was not a Slavic nation-state, but rather what Will Kymlicka has called “poly-ethnic rights,” which are “usually intended to promote integration into the larger society, not self-government.”134 This idea had roots in Hungarian history: the Slovak struggle against Magyarization was predicated on the Hungarus concept: Slovaks saw themselves as Slavophone Hungarians.
3 HUNGARO-SLAVISM: IMAGINING A SLAVIC HUNGARY
This chapter examines Slovak visions of a multi-ethnic Hungary. Slovak nationalists vigorously resisted Magyarization and displayed tenacious loyalty to their own language, however imagined. Nevertheless, they sought to fulfill their national aspirations within the context of the Hungarian state. The most common tactic was to proclaim both autochthony and loyalty to the Hungarian kingdom. Since Slovak aims could only be achieved if Magyar policy makers were converted to a multi-ethnic vision of Hungary, Slovak patriots also sought reconciliation with ethnic Magyars. Slovak loyalties to Hungary drew on the Hungarus tradition, but I will describe Slovak Hungarianism as “Hungaro-Slavism.”1 Historians understand Hungarus patriotism as a trend in Magyar intellectual history; the term “Hungaro-Slavism” is intended to denote a peculiarly Slavic phenomenon. Hungaro-Slavism combined political loyalty to the kingdom of Hungary with cultural loyalty to a Slavic linguistic collective. These linguistic loyalties were very complex; subsequent chapters will discuss the interplay of All-Slavic, Czechoslovak, and Slovak particularist concepts. This chapter examines political arguments, cultural phenomena, and patriotic organizations inspired by Hungaro-Slavism. Several histories of Slovakia mistakenly equate opposition to Magyarization and opposition to the Hungarian state. To demonstrate the ubiquity of Hungaro-Slavic loyalties, this chapter errs on the side of excessive documentation, discussing the canonical figures of nineteenth century Slovak history perhaps at the cost of excessive repetition. The following chapter will examine Hungaro-Slavic national concepts as a form of nationalism. Hungaro-Slavism was an ideology of being Hungarian. For the sake of clarity, one might differentiate two meanings of the word “Hungarian”: [Hethnic]
Hungaro-slavism: Imagining A Slavic Hungary
35
“ethnic Hungarians, Magyars” and [Hterritorial] “inhabitants of the kingdom of Hungary.” English, like most European languages, rarely distinguishes between the two concepts.2 The Magyar politikai nemzet deliberately conflated them. Hungaro-Slavism, by contrast, proclaimed that one could be the latter without being the former. Let us begin by examining the Hungarian terminology in some detail. Magyars use the word Magyar, plural Magyarok, for both [Hethnic] and [Hterritorial], and also as the root of Magyarország [Hungary]. The Hungarian language, of course, potentially has linguistic resources to differentiate these two meanings: István Szamota’s 1902-06 multi-volume dictionary, the Magyar oklevél szótár, listed “magyër, magyor: ungarus, hungarus, panno, pannonius” 3 as synonyms for Magyar. Szamota treated all these terms as stylistic alternatives, though the word Pannonian, popular with Hungarian political writers, sometimes implied [Hterritorial].4 Hardly any European languages borrowed the word “Magyar.” The word “Onogur,” a medieval alliance of nomadic tribes, is the origin of the English word “Hungarian,” German Ungar (sometimes spelled Unger) and French hongrois.5 The Slovak word from this root is uhor, though in the nineteenth century, Slovaks frequently used the spelling uher ; the situation is comparable to grey and gray in English.6 The primary sources adduced below refer to Hungary as both Uhorsko and Uhersko,7 and describe a Hungarian as both uhor and uher (respective plurals uhri and uhři).8 Slavs living in Hungary, of course, also knew the Hungarian word magyar, and used it as the basis for loan-words spelled with Slavic orthography: maďar, Maďarorság, etc.9 Modern Slovak makes a lexical distinction between maďari and uhri, using the first word to mean “Magyars,” [Hethnic]. For example, the Hungarian language is maďarčina. However, this distinction between uher and maďar came into being through explicitly politicized language planning. Before the mid-nineteenth century, Slovaks used the term uhor/uher for both [Hethnic] and [Hterritorial]. In 1685, Jan Amos Komenský (Comenius) described the Hungarian language as uhersky.10 Anton Bernolák’s 1825 dictionary translated uher into German as ein Ungar and into Hungarian as Magyar; he also described the Hungarian language as uherčina. Bernolák gave no definition for the word maďar.11 Karl Bobok’s 1835 Hungarian grammar for Slovak speakers described itself as a Prakycká uherská gramatyka.12 Josef Jungmann’s 1835 Czech dictionary also treated uher and maďar as synonyms.13 The word uher also appeared in political writing. Michael Mossotcy’s 1793 tract against the French Revolution called for all nationalities of Hungary to rally around the king as loyal Christians:14 “Why would we want to be French apes when we can be brave Hungarians, Germans or Slavs!” [Uhře, Nemcy aneb
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Slowácy!]15 Finally, an 1804 school textbook Známost Wlasti [Knowledge of the Homeland], written by Juraj Palkovič, professor of Slavic literature at the Bratislava Lutheran lyceum, used the word uher for both meanings: Sedem milionů Uhry lidu magi Sto pak jest měst welkych w njchžto přebýwagj; … Uher, Slowan, Němec má zwlássť bydlo zdegssi Slowané wssak gsau snad w počtu neysylněssi. Hungary has seven million people A hundred great cities are enclosed with it, … The Hungarian, Slav, and German have a homeland here, but the Slavs are possibly the most powerful in number. 16 The first couplet uses the word Uhry to discuss Hungary’s total population, including all nationalities: Slavs, Germans, Magyars, Romanians, etc. The second couplet, claiming that Slavs have numerical superiority over other ethnic groups in Hungary, juxtaposes the Hungarian Slav with an ethnically Magyar Uher [Hethnic]. Slovaks only began to draw a lexical distinction between [Hethnic] and [Hterritorial] during the Reform Era. The earliest texts to make this distinction were written in German. Consider Ján Csaplovics’s 1820 “The Kingdom of Hungary is a Miniature Europe”: The word Ungarn implies all the peoples [Völker] living in Hungary; Slovaks as well as Wallachians, Germans as well as Vandals, etc., all are Ungarn, because they live in Hungary. Magyaren, on the other hand, are only those who form the main nation, those who call themselves the Magyarok.17 A footnote in Samuel Hojč’s influential 1833 pamphlet, “Should we become Magyars?” similarly explains that the author was obliged by the interests of precision to distinguish between ‘Magyaren’ and ‘Ungarn’, between ‘magyarisch’ and ‘ungrisch’: when he speaks of ‘die Ungarn,’ he understands with this term all the peoples living in the country and kingdom of Hungary; ‘Magyaren’, by contrast, are to him the Arpadier [i.e. descendents of Árpád, a medieval Magyar leader].18
Hungaro-slavism: Imagining A Slavic Hungary
37
Hojč’s work provoked discussion among Slavs and Magyars; it was even debated in the Hungarian parliament.19 Hojč also found readers in the Slavic south of Hungary. Consider how Zagreb journalist Bogoslav Šulek20 distinguished ugar and magjar in his 1844 booklet: Dear reader, please remember the difference between ugarskom and magjari. By ugarskom we understand the whole kingdom, including all peoples [narode], who live there; namely slavjane, magjare, Germans, Vlachs, etc. – Magjari are only one part of the ugarskih population, that is, they are the descendants of the Arpadovieh, Asiatic people…21 To the best of my knowledge, Hojč and Šulek are the only authors to speak of “Arpadians”; Šulek probably borrowed the term from Hojč.22 Every Slavic language in Hungary adopted this lexical distinction between [Hethnic] and [Hterritorial], though Romanian did so only intermittently.23 Figure 3.1: Ethnonyms for “Hungarian” Slovak Ukrainian Croatian Slovene Romanian
Hethnic Maďar Maďyar (Мадьяр) Mađar Madžar Maghiar
Hterritorial Uhor Uhorec (Угорец) Ugar Oger Ungur
All these words could be rendered in English as “Hungarian.” This lexical differentiation struck such deep roots that modern Slovaks have forgotten its nineteenth-century origins. Confusion can result when modern Slovaks read historical sources: a footnote in Ján Beňko’s collection of historical documents explained that when Ján Hrdlička used the word Uher in 1785, he really meant Maďar.24 Hojč also tried to introduce this lexical distinction into the Hungarian language. His 1843 Apologie des ungrischen Slawismus [Apology of Hungarian Slavism], a public appeal to Lajos Kossuth, suggested that conflict between Slavs and Magyars derived from the latter’s inability to distinguish [Hethnic] from [Hterritorial]: The whole dispute stems from a tautology in the Hungarian naming system, so, that one understands by the word “Magyar” those who speak this language, but also every inhabitant of Hungary; by the word
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Choosing Slovakia “Magyarország” the part of the country inhabited by Magyars, but also the whole country, and so one confuses these concepts.25
Observing that Hungarian poetry used Hunnia as a stylistic alternative for Magyarország, Hojč remarked hopefully that the Slavs “would have nothing against it if the term were used in Hungarian prose … one could call the totality of Hungary’s inhabitants “Hunnia népei or Hunniái.” 26 This distinction, of course, would have undermined the rhetorical bait-and-switch upon which the Magyar politikai nemzet rested. Kossuth unsurprisingly ignored Hojč’s proposal: on 8 April 1848, for example, he proclaimed, “it is impossible to speak a hundred different languages … There must be one language, and in Hungary this must be Hungarian.”27 Hungarian nationalists ignored the lexical differentiation cultivated in Slavic languages, but vigorously contested any attempts to make a similar distinction in German, the language in which it had first been drawn: German was the lingua franca of Habsburg interethnic communication and an important vehicle for political discussion. A notable instance of this contestation occurred in a famous correspondence, published in 1843, between Czech nobleman Leo Thun and Hungarian Count Ferenc Pulszky. Pulszky, noting that “for a while now it has become fashionable among the Slavs [Slavomanen] to make a distinction between the two concepts Ungar and Magyar,” described the difference as “petty.”28 Thun responded to this comment at length, citing a German newspaper to show that the terminological dispute was more than a “Slavic fashion.” Thun’s argument is too long-winded to reproduce here, but the German article Thun cited is worth repeating: I use the name Magyaren, even though they themselves reject it and wish to be called Ungarn. It may be that they originally had an equal right to both names, but the way things have developed, one understands with the word Ungarn all citizens without considering language or nationality; if we were therefore to fulfill the demands of the Magyaren, we would decide the question in advance to their advantage.29 Thun then urged Pulszky, as a representative of the Hungarian liberal nobility, to reconsider his attitude. Pulszky, however, refused to acknowledge that the topic was worth discussing. The philological dispute whether to say magyarisch or ungrisch always seems very peculiar, because I, accustomed to thinking in Hungarian, find no relevant expression for these divided concepts — seriously
Hungaro-slavism: Imagining A Slavic Hungary
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pursuing a dispute on this topic would be more appropriate, in my opinion, for the age of the Byzantine Greeks than for our own.30 This unwillingness to distinguish [Hethnic] and [Hterritorial] proved an enduring phenomenon of Hungarian thought. Franz Löher, who pointedly called his 1874 travelogue “The Magyars and other Hungarians,” reported that Hungarians found it a half-insult when a German calls them Magyaren. “What? It’s supposed to be your greatest pride that you can call yourselves Magyaren?” “Well, yes, for ourselves we are Magyaren, but for all others we are Ungarn.” 31 Hungarians achieved a certain notoriety for this stubbornness. In 1907, the British newspaper Spectator derived national conflict in Hungary in part from “the distinction between Magyars and Hungarians, or the refusal of Hungarian statesmen to admit that it exists.”32 In 1910, American author Emily Balch wrote that “the Magyar language only has one word for the two ideas, Magyar and Hungarian. Hungary is Magyarország (that is Magyar land), and one might almost say that the this whole wretched business reduces itself to a poor pun.”33 As late as 1946, a Hungarian émigré proclaimed it difficult “to decide whether we are Hungarians who speak Magyar or Magyars who speak Hungarian.”34 Just as conflating the inhabitants of Hungary and ethnic Magyars helped promote the Magyar politikai nemzet, distinguishing them facilitated HungaroSlavic political claims. The distinction between uhor/uher and maďar entered the Slovak language during the political conflicts of the Reform Era, and was developed in order to resist Magyarization. Indeed, Hojč’s Apologie not only felt the need to explain the difference between Ungaren and Magyaren, but provided a definition of Magyarisiren.35 This distinction allowed Slovaks to take pride in being uhri and praise their uhorský homeland, while rejecting maďarksý culture and Magyarization. Hungaro-Slavism was Uhorskoâ•‚Slavism. Hojč even claimed that Hungary was a predominantly Slavic country, and tried to derive the word Uhor from the Slavic phrase u hory [in the mountains].36 Perhaps Michal Hodža provided clearest articulation of the Hungaro-Slavic idea in 1847: “The Slovak is just as good a Uhor as the Maďar. [Uhor je tak dobre Slovák jako aj Maďar].”37 Note that unless the Hungarian ethnonym is differentiated, this claim becomes nonsensical: “The Slovak is just as good a Hungarian as the Hungarian.” The Hungaro-Slavic idea inspired patriotic poetry, songs, fiction, political pamphlets, and ultimately political organizations. Miroslav Hroch, recall, schematized a national movement as passing through a “period of scholarly
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interest” (Phase A) before turning to “patriotic agitation” (Phase B).38 Hungaro-Slavism fits the Hroch schema. One patriotic act characteristic of the “scholarly interest” phase is folk songs collecting. Ján Kollár’s two-volume Národinié zpiewanky čili pjsně swětské Slowákůw w Uhrách [National Songbook, or Secular Songs of the Slovaks in Hungary], written in collaboration with Pavel Šafařík, reflects a HungaroSlavic spirit. Kollár and Šafařík, both essential figures in Slovak life, will be discussed in detail below; for now observe that the Národinié zpiewanky combined Slavic and Hungarian affiliations in its title.39 Books, proverbially, cannot be judged by their covers, yet several songs in this work show an unmistakably Hungarian flavor. “Pest and Timişoara,” for example, expressed an unambiguously Hungarian geography: Moga milá w Pešti slúžj moga srdce za ňou túžj A ga gu tam nenechám čo ga puogdem newjm kam. [...] Temešwár je pekné mesto tam se pregde negedno sto Ach, nešťastný Temešwár, ked sem ga tam neostal. My sweetheart works in Pest my heart longs for her and I left her there I do not know where I am going. [...] Timişoara is a nice town hundreds stroll there all about Ach, unhappy Timişoara, When I do not remain there.40 The city of Timişoara is presently in Romania, two international borders removed from the present Slovak Republic. Both Timişoara and Pest are awkward locations for a “Slovak” ballad. The Národinié zpiewanky also contains a 1740 song about Arad, also in Romania, though admittedly near the Slovak colony in Békés.41 In Kollár’s day, however, both Timişoara and Arad were part of the Hungarian kingdom.
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Other songs in Kollár’s Národinié zpiewanky show their Hungarian character by including Hungarian words. The catchiest example is: Ei istenem, istenem Čo že si ga wystenem Ei či wdowa či diwoča čo mi bude fragerča? Ay, my God, my God What do I achieve by sighing? Ay, whether a widow or young girl, Who will be my sweetheart?42 Such a stanza would jar in a Slovak “national songbook” today, or even from the 1860s. As final example of “Hungaro-Slavic” folklore, consider “The Life of a Monk outside the Monastery.” In this fascinating relic from multinational Hungary, Slavic, Latin, Hungarian and German words coexist, though all non-Slavic words appear in italics (see Figure 3.2). My translation indicates the original languages: Slavic, Latin, Hungarian. Figure 3.2: “Life of a Monk outside the Monastery,” verse 4 (1835)
I am that sort of preacher, Who is Nejeldý, who is Ďatel? … What nonsense! Knowing a sermon is useful, The immature do not think about it … youth: All sermons have been published, if one would gain praise with them, The desire for praise makes the fruit go rotten and leads to lost merit … not intelligence.43
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It is difficult to imagine patriots in any successor state to the nineteenthcentury Hungarian kingdom viewing such songs as “national.”44 That said, Kollár’s Hungaro-Slavism lacked the truly multi-ethnic character of the Hungari.45 He concentrated on Slavic; indeed on specifically Slovak songs; he ignored, for instance, Croatian and Slovene. Rumy’s Musen-Almanach von und für Ungarn [Muses’ Almanac by and for Hungarians], by contrast, had included songs in Latin, Hungarian, Slovak, High German and Transylvanian German.46 Slovak literati used Hungarian imagery throughout the nineteenth century.47 Samo Chalupka, a national poet, clearly proclaimed his Hungarian loyalties. Admittedly, the opening stanzas of Chalupka’s 1875 “Revolt of the Merchants” bristle with Slovak particularism: the “Slovak people,” also explicitly described as a “Slovak nation,” stand on “Slovak hills” to fight an unspecified enemy, presumably the Ottomans: V tej slovenskej vlasti strašná surma stoji Verný slovenský ľud na voznu sa zbrojí Po slovenksých horách čierne mraky dymu Lunia sa deň po dni k nebo vysoknýmu Po slovenských horách, od Matry na Tatry Jasné noc po noci plápolaju vatry A s hory na horu znat’ dáva kraj kraju že slovenský národ na vojnu volajú On the Slovak homeland terrible forces stand, The faithful Slovak people defends itself. Above the Slovak hills, dark clouds are gathering; The moon, on this day after days, in the tall sky, Above the Slovak hills, from mother in the Tatras, On this clear night of nights, is flickering; And from hill to hill, the land knows to array the land, As the Slovak nation sends out the call to arms.48 Of all possible adjectives, however, Chalupka chose to describe the Slovaks as “faithful.” To whom do the Slovaks owe fidelity, if not the King of Hungary? Prijde to, bude to, že večnej pamäte meno štefan-kráľa ľud verný posväti … A ta verná Slovač Â�— radšej ona padne, lež by svojho kráľa odpustíla zradne.
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It will come, it shall be, that the faithful people Will bless the eternal memory of king Stephen’s name. … And that faithful Slovak — would rather fall in battle Than ever turn traitor against his king.49 Chalupka’s Hungarian patriotism was consistent with his love for — and contribution to — Slovak literature. Indeed, if an 1861 report in the newspaper Slovenské noviny can be believed, his personal slogan was: “long live Hungarian Slovaks, and Slovak Hungary!”50 Hungaro-Slavism also inspired Slovak political leaders: all three members of the Slovak National Council explicitly proclaimed their Hungarian loyalties on several occasions. Consider Miroslav Hurban, whom contemporaries saw as the main leader of the Slovak volunteers. Hurban, as Hroch might have predicted, had started his patriotic work editing volumes of poetry. He later participated in the Prague Slavic Congress. Of the Slovak leaders of his generation, Hurban paid the most attention to land reform, arguing that peasants should receive land with the abolition of serfdom. Gogolák described him as a “prophet of Slovak ethnopathos, and … dilettantish philosopher of history.”51 Hurban cannot possibly be considered a Magyarophile or Magyarone, but in 1840 he described himself as a “Hungarian” in the most explicit terms possible. Spending the night at a Moravian inn, the innkeeper asked him where he was from. He replied: “I am a Hungarian [som Uhor].”52 Hurban himself used this incident to discuss his national concept in some detail. When the innkeeper complimented him on his linguistic skills, Hurban “explained to him the distinction between Uhor and Maďar, which he quickly understood, and he rejoiced that the greater part of the Hungarian population is comprised of his brothers and sisters by nationality.”53 Hurban elsewhere described the Slovaks as “a tribe of the Hungarian state.”54 A second member of the Slovak National Council, Ľudovít Štúr, enjoys an even greater reputation as a Slovak patriot. Nevertheless, Štúr’s 1843 pamphlet, Beschwerden und Klagen der Slaven in Ungarn über die gesetzwidrigen Uebergriffe der Magyaren [Grievances and Accusations of the Slavs in Hungary about the Illegal Attacks of the Magyars] proclaimed Slovak loyalty to Hungary as follows: We Slavs form a special nationality [Völkerschaften] in Hungary, we are devoted to our country, and have made service to our fatherland from the earliest times up until today … We always fulfilled our obligations to the fatherland as Slavs, even because of this, we must possess full and equal rights with others, for obligations without rights is bondage.55
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Štúr wrote this passage in German for an inter-ethnic audience, but he expressed similar sentiments in his Slavic journalism. In an 1846 contribution to his Slovenskje národňje novini [Slovak National News], Štúr praised the ethnic diversity of Hungary, and described the Slovaks as an integral part of the kingdom: “Our homeland has many nations, one of the most important are we, who have lived in this land from time immemorial and are widely distributed over it.”56 Elsewhere, Štúr echoed Hojč and Palkovič by claiming Slovak primacy inside Hungary: “there is no elder nation on the uhorskej land than our Slovak nation.”57 Similar expressions of Hungarian loyalty pervade Orol Tatránsky [Eagle of the Tatras], the weekly literary supplement to Štúr’s newspaper. Bohuš Nosák wrote that “in these times our Hungarian homeland requires nothing more urgently than reciprocal confidence between all the classes and nations in Hungary.”58 Janko Kalinčjak has the hero of the short story Milkov hrob [Milko’s Grave] exclaim “My dear Mária! My love for you is great, but even greater is my love for the Hungarian homeland!”59 Another author expressed his willingness to die for multi-ethnic Hungary: Hungarian land! Sweetly pleasing is this name! How much blood has flown to the glory of this name! But that blood belonged not to one nation alone: for the holy Hungarian land streams of youthful blood have gushed … from the Tatras and the Carpathians, from … the shores of the Sava, from the Danube and Tisza and from the broad fields of the lowlands. Maďar and Slav, German and Vlach have as one sacrificed their lives for her. Oh my dear homeland, Hungarian land, my heart beats for you with an ardent love.60 In all of the passages cited above, the word “Hungarian” always glosses some variant of the root uhorský. Other examples would be easy to cite; such rhetoric was ubiquitous. Beschwerden und Klagen, furthermore, listed 22 incidents of “illegal Magyarization” by name, only a third of which occurred on the territory of modern Slovakia, suggesting that Štúr saw the question of Slovak linguistic rights as a question for the Hungarian state as a whole, not just for a specifically Slovak ethnoterritory, however imagined (see Figure 3.3). Michal Hodža, the last main figure in the Slovak National Council, also expressed Hungarus-style loyalties to Hungary. In 1848, Hodža wrote a German-language pamphlet called Der Slowak [The Slovak]. This described Hungary as a “holy land and mother country, the cradle of national traditions … where ancient ancestors and heroes bled for the crown of Hungary.”
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Figure 3.3: Magyarization Sites in Beschwerden und Klagen (1843)
Hodža complained that Hungary had “recently only been a stepmother, treating [the Slovak nation] without compassion, and enslaving its language and nationality with the chains of shame and abuse.” Hodža complained that Magyarization “silences two thirds of Hungary’s original inhabitants, two thirds of the fatherland’s children.” Like Palkovič, Hojč, and Štúr, Hodža accepted that Slavs were Hungarians, and like Hurban, he equated Magyarism with the class-exclusiveness of the natio hungarica: he attacked the “exclusively privileged nationalism” of the “Magyar Aristocratic Party of Linguistic Compulsion [Magyarische Sprachzwangsherrnpartei].”61 To defend Slavic linguistic rights, Hodža suggested an alliance between Hungary’s non-Magyars, specifically between Slavs and Germans. In 1847, he wrote that non-Magyar Hungarians should tell the upstart Magyars that “we do not wish to Magyarize, but we want to feel at home in our common homeland [našej vlasťi] in our own language, and remain by our own nationality [svojej národnosťi].”62 In Der Slowak, he even expressed solidarity with his “German brothers” while confronting the Magyars: Listen up, Magyar, you’re a guest here in our Europe, so don’t act like wild Tatars. Speak, sing, shout however you like your language, but don’t
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Choosing Slovakia hassle anybody who doesn’t speak the way you do. You can’t expect the rest of us to remain silent if we don't shout like you do.63
This sort of alliance between “non-Magyar” Hungarians eventually became an important theme in Slovak politics. As Hroch might have predicted, Hodža’s Hungaro-Slavism eventually led him to articulate political demands. During the Revolution of 1848, he came to believe that the protection of Slovak linguistic rights required Slovak administrative units, and proposed that each nationality in Hungary be governed by “special national parliaments [national-Landtage].” These national parliaments, however, would coexist with a “general parliament [allgemeiner Reichstag] of all the brother nations living under the Hungarian crown.” Curiously, Hodža showed little interest in demarcating the Slovak territory; he merely suggested that “ethnographic borders should be determined.” This disinterest is all the more striking given the loving detail with which Hodža describes his demands for Slovak educational facilities: “elementary schools, basic schools, citizen schools, daughters’ schools, teacher and priestly seminars, institutes of higher learning, gymnasia, lyceums, academies and a university.”64 Hurban took a similar approach at the Prague Slavic Congress. His 7 June manifesto issued in the name of the “Slovak and Rusyn nation in Hungary [národ slovenský a rusínský v Uhřích],” demanded: 1. That the Hungarian Rusyns and Slovaks should be recognized by the Magyars in parliament as a nation having equal rights as themselves. … 2. That they will have national parliaments with their own permanent Slovak-Rusyn committee, having the right and obligation to guard the national rights of Slovaks and Rusyns … 3. That there will be founded national schools, initially grade schools, urban institutes in the diocese, and foundations for educating teachers, further advanced literary institutes, namely gymnasia, lyceums, academies, polytechnical foundations, and a university. Let language learning be Slovak and Rusyn, and free learning the basis of national education … 5. That no nation in Hungary will be declared a ruling nation, and all will have equal rights.65 This position resembled Hodža’s: Slovaks would have an autonomous parliament under Hungarian sovereignty, which would defend Slavic linguistic rights against Magyarization.
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Even after the optimistic atmosphere of the March days gave way to paranoia and conflict, the Slovak leadership retained its Hungarian loyalties. In November 1848, the Slovak National Council’s “Challenge to the Slovak Nation” proclaimed that the Slovak volunteers were fighting for “the unity of the Hungarian monarchy,” though this Hungarian monarchy was to exist in a Habsburg context: the Magyars were accused of trying “to detach our land from Austria, so they can rule over us by themselves … let the king rule over us with law and justice.”66 Only on 19 March 1849 did Slovak patriots finally demand separation from Hungary: 28 Slovak leaders went to Olomouc and presented the Habsburg emperor with a petition demanding 1. That the Slovak nation, around 3 million strong, be recognized as a nation within well-defined state borders. We demand that country, which we have inhabited since the most ancient times, where our own language is normally used domestically and in public life, … be united from many countries into a united political whole which has never ceased to be called a Slovak country, Slovakia.67 The petition then proclaimed equality between the various nations in the Austrian Empire, and demanded the end of Hungarian-language administration and a Slovak constitution. Yet even this petition stressed the “most ardent wish to see the Austrian monarchy unified and powerful.”68 When Kossuth’s extremism forced Slovaks to choose between linguistic loyalties and Hungarian political loyalties, several Slovak patriots chose to break with Hungary. Nevertheless, they were only willing to make this choice when forced by extreme circumstances. Most Slovaks, through most of the Revolution, sought to secure linguistic rights within Hungary. Even the March 1849 petition shows no desire for Slovak statehood: the idea of an independent Slovak political unit apparently had not occurred to anyone. Instead, Hungaro-Slavism was briefly transformed into Austro-Slavism. After the revolutionary confrontation abated, however, Slovak nationalists returned to their traditional Hungaro-Slavism. One key figure in the postRevolutionary period was Daniel Lichard, a prolific journalist with Vienna’s Slovenské noviny [Slovak Newspaper], and author of literally hundreds of titles. In an 1865 pamphlet, Lichard has a fictional parson explain the necessity of supporting the Matica slovenská to various skeptics and doubters. Lichard makes clear that Slovaks were also Hungarians [uhri]. [A]ll the inhabitants of this country: we who are called Slovaks, additionally our brothers the Serbs, Croats, Russians; Magyars, Germans,
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Choosing Slovakia Romanians, who are commonly called Olasi if they live in Hungary — we are all Hungarians, because we live in the Hungarian country and live under the same laws.69
The fictional parson then contrasts “the political word Uhor and the national or linguistic concept of maďar. In this political sense, we Slovaks too are Uhri; but from the national point of view we cannot be and are nothing else but Slovaks.”70 Lichard was not the only intellectual attempting to teach Hungaro-Slavic concepts to Hungary’s Slovak peasantry. Ondrej Radlinský’s school primer, the 1871 Školník, described the Slovak homeland as follows: We Slovaks have in which state and country our homeland? In the state of Hungary-Austria, and particularly in the country of Hungary.71 Notice that while neither half of this two-tiered formula bears a Slavic ethnonym, both halves mention Hungary. Slovaks patriots saw no distinction between Slovak and Hungarian loyalties: the one implied the other. This is most clearly shown in the “Newest Slovak Song,” published in an 1871 Slovak Almanac: Uhorsko jest krajna krásna Hrom w ňej ljeta z€čísta, jasna Bo w ňej jesú dwe ďeťičky, Krásne, čo hore hwieyďičky … W tam Uhorsku jest Slovensko Slowákow wlastnje wlasťensko: Tam Maďar ňech ňepanuje. Nech sa swojim ukojuje Hungary is a beautiful land with thunder clean and clear There are two children in her beautiful, like stars above … In this Hungary lies Slovakia The Slovaks’ own homeland: There let the Magyar not rule Let him take care of his own affairs 72
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The desire for Slovak self-government, expressed in the final stanza, appears only after six stanzas in praise of Hungary. In the early twentieth century, František Sasinek’s 1904 Dejepis Slovákov [History of the Slovaks], a school textbook, conflated Hungaria, Pannonia, Uhor, and the Slovak ethnonym. Sasinek described the deeds of king Boleslav, who crossed over the Danube to Pannonia (in Hungariam) and victoriously entered into Belgrade, where he was crowned as king of Hungary [kráľa uhorského]. Then the crown of the Slovak king [koruna slovenského kráľa] was brought to Pannonia and became the crown of the king of Hungary.73 In effect, this series of equations (Slovak = Pannonian = Uhorský = Hungarian) made a familiar claim for Slovak primacy in Hungary: the Hungarian crown is “really” the crown of a Slovak king. If songbooks and textbooks are instances of Hrochian “scholarly interest,” almanacs and Lichard’s pamphlet might better be described as “patriotic agitation,” since they were attempts to mobilize public opinion for political ends. The Slovaks of Pest, however, provide an unambiguous instance of Hungaro-Slavic “patriotic agitation.”74 During the 1850s, Ján Palárik attempted to found a Matica slovanských národov v Uhorsku [Matica of the Slavic Nations in Hungary”].75 The Matica srpska, the first Matica, was then still located in Pest. Palárik’s concrete aims for the Hungaro-Slavic Matica were cultural: to edit books and journals, to support promising authors, and to provide educational assistance for poor youths, imagined both as Christian charity and national duty. The proposed statutes acknowledged the internal diversity of Hungary’s Slavs, but emphasized inter-Slavic cooperation inside the Hungarian kingdom: In order for the literature of the Slavic nations living under the rule of the Hungarian land of the Austrian crown, and the Slovaks, Rusyns, and Croato-Serbs [sic] can obtain a remarkable awakening, the amateurs in the literatures of these nations must … come to each other’s assistance with all their forces in common. For this reason, they have decided to found a Matica, all the Slavic nations of Hungary together. 76 Palárik proved unable to raise money and the organization failed. The urge to found it, however, suggests that Palárik and his backers saw themselves primarily as Hungarian Slavs, rather than Slovaks, and saw Budapest as “their”
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capital city. Certainly they extended their patriotic activity beyond the Slovak ethnoterritory, and sought to collaborate with Slavs other than Slovaks. The 1861 Slovak Memorandum, which demanded a Slovak administrative district, also proclaimed Hungarian loyalties. It insisted that creating a Slovak district would not harm “the unity and integrity of Hungary” and calling for “one, free, constitutional homeland, and inside it freedom, equality, and national brotherhood.”77 It also cited St. Stephen’s famous dictum that “the country with one language is weak and frail.”78 Štefan Daxner, a lawyer who had fought with the Slovak volunteers and drafted the Memorandum, campaigned for parliament on the promise to “work so that the integrity of St. Stephen’s crown, and the lands which belong to it, will be preserved.”79 Such declarations might be discounted as concessions to Magyar opinion, rather than evidence of genuine Hungarian loyalty. The leading figures of the Memorandum movement, however, expressed similar Hungarian loyalties when speaking to a Slovak audience. Daxner wrote in the Slovak press that “we honor and love our brother Magyars.”80 Even in private correspondence, Slovak patriots showed no hint of wanting to break with Hungary. With a certain resignation, Ján Mallý wrote to Ján Francisci that “we cannot be against the unity of the country, even if we wanted to.”81 These formulae, furthermore, do not come from the nová škola, whose acceptance of the Ausgleich has attracted such criticism in Slovak historiography. Both Daxner and Mallý belonged to the stará škola, which supposedly remained steadfast in defence of Slovak rights. Hungaro-Slavism survived in the early decades of the twentieth century. Milan Hodža (not to be confused with his uncle Michal Hodža) also expressed Hungarian loyalties in his political writings. Hodža began his career as a journalist and then served in the Hungarian parliament, proving one of the most vocal proponents of Czech-Slovak cooperation at the turn of the century. An outspoken proponent of Czechoslovak unity, he had a prominent political career in the first Czechoslovak republic. Since Czechoslovak statehood required the partition of Hungary, Hodža would seem an unlikely exponent of Hungaro-Slavic sentiment. Nevertheless, at a 1905 meeting between Slovak and Czech intellectuals, Hodža lectured the assembled Czechs about Slovak loyalty to Hungary: “we seek our freedom strictly in the framework of loyalty to the Hungarian state. We are in Hungary and we want to preserve our rights [there].”82 This meeting was an inter-Slavic affair: no Magyars were present. As late as 1905, Slovak politicians saw themselves as political Hungarians. I see little reason to doubt Hodža’s sincerity, and while this comment contradicted his postwar politics, it was well within the mainstream of pre-1918 Slovak thought.
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Hungarian loyalties also permeated the journal Hlas, Mesačník pre literatúru, politiku, a otázku sociálnu [Voice: Monthly for Literature, Politics, and the Social Question], which most historians treat as the primary organ of Czechoslovak feeling in the final years of the Habsburg monarchy.83 Hlas owes its Czechoslovak reputation partly from the fact that many of its contributors became prominent politicians in the first Czechoslovak republic. Vavro Šrobár, Slovakia’s minister for education in the first Czechoslovak republic, unsurprisingly rejected Magyarization, insisting that “the cultural and moral transformation of the Slovak nation into the Magyar … is an absolute impossibility, through any means.”84 Hlas, however, wanted to reform Hungarian administration, not escape it. As one anonymous article argued, the “chronic crisis of the Hungarian state” had its roots in the fact “that Uhorsko is not Maďarsko.”85 The crisis would only end, Hlas argued, when the Hungarian government abandoned Magyarization and acknowledged the national rights of non-Magyars. The consensus between all these sources suggests that Slovak politicians accepted the legitimacy of the Hungarian kingdom: as Robert Kann put it, “the majority of Slovak nationalists favored autonomy within Hungary rather than union with the Czechs.”86 Seen as a national movement, Hungaro-Slavism has a rather interesting history. It came into being in the early nineteenth century, in response to Magyarization, and disappeared in the early twentieth. The Hungaro-Slavic national ethnonym uhorský followed a similar trajectory. This picture contradicts Hroch’s narrative of nineteenth-century Slovak history, which interprets Slovak politics as a movement that ultimately sought a Slovak state, albeit stuck in Phases A or B. Applying Hroch’s schema to Hungaro-Slavism may be provocative. Other nationalism theorists, however, anticipate the phenomenon of Hungaro-Slavism. Will Kymlicka, for example, defines movements “intended to promote integration into the larger society, not self-government” as struggles for “poly-ethnic rights.”87 Demands for poly-ethnic rights are not an exotic phenomenon: nationalists in Quebec, Scotland, Wales, and Switzerland have sought to fulfill national goals within a multi-ethnic state. The attractions of Hungaro-Slavism are obvious: it offered Slovaks linguistic and cultural fulfillment without the threat of political or military conflict. Given Slovak weakness vis-à-vis the Magyars, a conciliatory approach might have seemed more promising than confrontation. After the collapse of the Habsburg Empire, of course, Slovak thought underwent a revolutionary transformation. Slovak politicians demanded Slovakia’s physical separation from Hungary, but accepted the right of Magyars to hegemony in rump Hungary, even though a considerable Slovak minority lived there. To symbolize this change, Slovaks abandoned the word
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Uhorsko and began referring to rump Hungary as Maďarsko, even proposing an equivalent neologism in English: documents submitted to the Paris Peace Conference refer to “Magyaria.”88 Other Slavic languages, incidentally, made similar transitions: in Serbo-Croatian (Serbian and Croatian), Mađarska replaced Ugarska; in Slovene, Madžarska replaced Ugerska. Contemporary Slovak political vocabulary thus resembles eighteenthcentury terminology in that it no longer draws a lexical distinction between [Hethnic] “Magyar” and [Hterritorial] “inhabitant of Hungary.” This terminological change reflects changing political aspirations: modern Slovaks no longer seek to integrate their culture into the Hungarian state. The main difference is that maďarský has replaced uhorský as the adjective of choice. Hungaro-Slavism transforms the story of Hungarian ethnic relations during the nineteenth century. Historians tend to let the Magyars monopolize “Hungarian” history. Since the Magyars developed the Magyar politikai nemzet early in the nineteenth century, Anglophone historians, who rarely read both Hungarian and Slovak, have dismissed multi-ethnic Hungarian loyalism as transient and insignificant. Slovak historians also date the decline of multi-ethnic Hungarian national concepts to the early nineteenth century. Ludwig Gogolák spoke of the “universal Hungarian Hungarus-Patriotismus, still clinging to life”89 in the eighteenth century, but replaced by ethnic nationalism in the early nineteenth. Daniel Rapant described “Hungarian patriotic [uhorsko-patriotická]” feeling as a relic of the eighteenth century while discussing a passage from Bernolák: Only somebody anchored in the [eighteenth] century by many ties, who had lived only a decade in the new century, who was more or less pulling against the new currents, could have written this. It could not in any way have been written in the years 1825-27.90 These chronologies match the decline of the class-exclusive, multi-ethnic natio Hungarica, and of the class-inclusive, multi-ethnic Hungarus concept among Magyar thinkers. The Magyars, however, were not the only Hungarians, and Slovak thinkers perpetuated multi-ethnic Hungarian national concepts for much longer. They replaced the natio Hungarica with what might be called the uhorský politický národ: a class-inclusive and multi-ethnic idea of Hungarian nationalism. Hungaro-Slavism was not a holdover from the eighteenth century, but a response to the Magyarization and the Magyar politikai nemzet. As evidence of this chronology, recall that Hojč still needed to explain the lexical distinction between uhor and maďar, both the defining idea and central political argument of Hungaro-Slavism, as late as 1833.
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The Slovak emphasis on Hungarian citizenship, invoked to win linguistic rights within a Hungarian context, explains why Slovaks expressed so little interest in Russia as a protector or political ally. Despite Hungarian and German fears, hardly any Slovaks showed an interest in becoming part of a Russian state. Hojč described Russia as “a colossus, powerful,” which would “be dangerous to small, weak, freedom-loving states.”91 This attitude should be considered typical. The most prominent exception, Štúr’s Slawenthum und die Welt der Zukunft [Slavdom and the World of the Future], which will be discussed in detail below, not only broke sharply with the otherwise consistent Hungaro-Slavism of Štúr’s career, but had little impact on Slovak thinking. Slavic loyalties were very important in Slovak thought, but Slovak All-Slavism, and thus Slovak interest in Russia, was restricted to a “linguistic” sphere. Even if one ignores political loyalties to focus exclusively on linguistic nationalism, Russians occupied a less important place in the Slovak imagination than Czechs, Rusyns and Croats. Given repeated Slovak declarations of loyalty to Hungary, the hysterical tone of Magyar rhetoric seems, at the very least, counterproductive. Magyar leaders chose to remain willfully unaware of Slovak loyalism, apparently because of their tremendous fear of Russia. In 1844, Miklós Wesselényi wrote that the Hungarians are ringed round, in the north-east from Pressburg along the whole north-eastern border up to the Radnauer pass in Transylvania, by mountains and the foreign peoples [fremde Völker] living there, who can easily become our enemies … they appear to be natural allies of any Russian-Slavic enemy that arrived from abroad, who would according to circumstances be greeted with open arms.92 Ferenc Pulszky similarly feared that the non-Magyars would bind their destiny with that of their tribe, that they would in a word consider themselves as Germans, Slavs, and Wallachians on foreign soil, that they would look not to Pest and Pozsony to decide their affairs, but to Vienna and Berlin, to Prague and Petersburg, to Iaşi and Bucharest …93 Nothing in Slovak thought justifies these fears. Neither author appears to have read any Slovak political thinkers, although Pulszky was familiar with Kollár’s poetry. Perhaps Magyar anxieties would be assuaged if Slovaks could simply explain their position more clearly? Slovak leaders thus tried to solve the problem of Magyarization through gentle persuasion until the First World
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War, by which time members of the Hungarian parliament had spent eight decades ignoring Slovak grievances. The Magyar leadership proved unwilling to grant even token or symbolic recognition that Slovaks were part of the Hungarian kingdom: in Macartney’s words, “the smear of treason attached even more to any attempt to give political expression to … the possibility of a Hungarian patriotism not identified with Magyarism.”94 Consider, as a straw in the wind, the banknotes of the “AustroHungarian” monarchy. One side was the Cisleithanian or “Austrian” side, representing the lands represented in the Austrian parliament; the converse was the Hungarian side. The Austrian side listed the denomination of the banknote in all the languages of the Austrian half of the monarchy: Czech, Polish, Romanian, Italian, Slovene, Croatian, Serbian (in Cyrillic, otherwise identical with the Croatian), and Ruthenian. The “Hungarian” reverse side, however, only showed Hungarian.95 Hungary’s Croats, Romanians and Germans, furthermore, were represented on the Austrian half of the banknote, making the Slovaks the largest ethnic group in the Habsburg Empire whose language was not represented on the currency. The interwar Hungarian government, by contrast, symbolically claimed the non-Magyar nationalities of former Hungary by printing German, Slovak, Serbian, Ukrainian and Romanian on its banknotes. As a gesture of respect for Hungary’s non-Magyars, however, this was too little, too late. Hungaro-Slavism was a form of nationalism, and even followed the Hroch schema. It informed cultural artifacts, such as the poetry of Kollár and Chalupka, and political agitation, such as the demands of the Slovak National Council, the campaign platforms of Slovak politicians, and the Slovak Memorandum. It affected members of the stará škola, the nová škola and the Hlasist movement. It appeared in German-language texts directed at an interethnic (read: Magyar) audience, but also in Slovak journalism and private correspondence. It endured to the end of the Habsburg monarchy. Nevertheless, Hungaro-Slavism has not received its due attention in Slovak historiography: to the best of my knowledge, only Theodore Locher has even attempted an analysis.96 The Hungaro-Slavic tradition might provide modern central Europeans with a useable past. Some distinguish the putatively liberal and tolerant “Western” nationalism from the illiberal and intolerant “Eastern” nationalism.97 This dichotomy perpetuates a double standard stigmatizing some expressions of national feeling as pernicious while permitting others as liberal and democratic. Yet it depends on a selective reading of the historical record. Solidarity and mutual respect were dominant themes in Slovak nationalism throughout the nineteenth century.
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Hungaro-Slavism might not qualify as a national movement according to what might be called the “high-political” school of nationalism. Several scholars have defined nationalism in terms of political sovereignty or the desire to achieve it. John Breuilly, for example, defines national movements through the claim that “the nation must be as independent as possible,”98 and while he cheerfully concedes that scholars “have achieved a great deal in the way of identifying and describing certain sorts of national consciousness,” he insisted that “this should not be confused with nationalism.”99 Dominique Schnapper similarly sees the nation as “a particular form of political unit” defined in part “by its sovereignty.”100 Hans Kohn wrote that “nationalism is inconceivable without the ideas of popular sovereignty,”101 and Benedict Anderson wrote that if “nations dream of being free,” then “the badge and emblem of this freedom is the sovereign state.”102 Since Hungaro-Slavism was the struggle for multi-ethnic Hungary, how does it qualify as nationalism? One answer to this question lies in the rhetoric of historical actors. Understanding nineteenth-century nationalism requires a study of nineteenth-century national concepts, and nineteenth-century Slovaks used the word “nation” to describe both their Slavic and their Hungarian loyalties. The next chapter examines theoretical formulations of HungaroSlavic nationalism, shifting the analysis from ethnonyms to the word “nation.” What did Slovaks mean when they used this key word?
4 SLOVAK THEORIES OF DUAL NATIONALITY
The previous chapter showed that nineteenth-century Slovak patriots repeatedly proclaimed their loyalty to Hungary. This chapter examines what might be called Hungaro-Slavic “dual nationalism,” a national concept in which different national loyalties operated within separate spheres. Specifically, Slovaks posited a Hungarian “political nation,” associated with the Hungarian state; and a Slavic linguistic nation, variously imagined. Slovak authors never developed a consistent terminology, so formulations of dual nationality varied. Nevertheless, Hungaro-Slovak dual nationality forms a coherent tradition, since similar national concepts justified similar political goals. The first important theorist of dual nationality was Samuel Hojč, who had played such an important role in distinguishing uhor and maďar. Hojč’s tremendous influence on subsequent Slovak thinkers justifies an extended summary of his thought. He discussed dual nationality at length in his 1843 Apologie des ungrischen Slawismus. This posited four different political collectives with a claim to the citizen’s loyalty; three of four were described in “national” terms. Hojč wrote this book in German, but translated his terminological distinctions into Latin, Hungarian and Slavic; the following discussion devotes special attention to Hojč’s Slavic terminology. Hojč began by defining the obsolete “diplomatic nation,” corresponding to the natio hungarica, as “the nation in Hungary, in the diplomatic sense … composed of four estates: the clergy, the magnates, the nobility and royal free cities.”1 Hojč invoked this “diplomatic nation” solely to emphasize its multiethnic character, since it contained all of the peoples which live in Hungary. If one asks which language they speak at home, what their mother language is, among which people they
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grew up and were educated? … say, all of them! One would find, next to the Magyars, also heaps of Slovaks, Serbs, Croats, and Germans.2 Hojč, however, treated this “diplomatic nation” as a legal archaism; his understanding of an unmodified “nation” was class inclusive. Hojč then defined “a people [národ]”3 as “a quantity of human beings who are bound to each other by the bonds of language, style of thought, customs and habits.”4 A people may be defined through its “people-ness [nàrodnost].”5 Hojč juxtaposed a people and its people-ness with the “nation [Národ]”6 and its accompanying “nationality.”7 While nation refers to the totality of citizens, to the totality of a country’s inhabitants who are bound by common laws, government and common well-being, so nationality is nothing more than observing the law, respecting the government, and eagerly striving to promote the well-being of the fatherland.8 Hojč finished his gaggle of definitions with a non-national political collective, the “Fatherland [wlast]:” the place which served our fathers as a place to live, where we and our ancestors were born, nourished, raised, and educated; where we find the love of our parents, friendship, the protection of laws, an inherited or self-made fame and privilege, a welcome profession, perhaps also a peaceful house and home, also the resting place of the grave. How many sweet and dear things this word contains!9 For Hojč, “the Sons of the Fatherland [kragané, obcané (sic)]”10 included “everyone who resides in the fatherland, considers it to be his own, lives as well under the same laws, is subordinated to the same ruler, has a common goal to strive for.”11 When examined closely, this complex taxonomy of civic loyalties contradicts itself. Both the “nation” and “fatherland,” for example, were defined by “respect for the law,” and Hojč confusingly described both with the Hungarian word nemzet and the German words Staatsbürger and Nation. Why did Hojč subdivide his political loyalties in such a complex manner? Political goals provide an answer: Hojč opposed the policy of Magyarization and defended Slovak linguistic rights. Since the “sons of the fatherland” are subordinated to the same ruler, the “fatherland” presumably refers to the Habsburg monarchy as a whole; the “nation” to the kingdom of Hungary. The monarchy and the kingdom made rather similar claims to Hojč’s loyalty: a
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good Slovak would obey both Hungarian law and the Habsburg monarch.12 Neither loyalty, however, prevented Slovaks from defending the language and customs of their “people.” Significantly, Hojč showed no interest in distinguishing Slovaks from Croats, Serbs or Rusyns: his “people” included the entire Slavic world: “not only the … Magyars are a people, in the sense I have described, but also … the Slavs and Wallachians in Hungary. … The Slav greets the land of the Slavs in all four regions of the world, from the White Sea to the Mediterranean he finds brothers.”13 Hojč carefully restricted his Slavism to a cultural sphere, and denied the very existence of political Pan-Slavism. “Unquestionably there are friends of the literary Panslavism in Hungary, but this is a world apart from the political sort,”14 he argued; “the political Pan-Slavism has no friends among us, but the literary has many, and wins ever more.”15 Hojč assured the Magyars that literary Pan-Slavs were loyal to Hungary: without damaging our Hungarian-national sympathies, we wish to hold tight to the unity which binds us with [other Slavs], so that in the wide north, as in the far south, we have brothers, in whose veins related blood flows. We would call this a Panslavism of love.16 Though Hojč failed to persuade the Magyars, these sentiments are entirely consistent with the Hungaro-Slavic tradition. Hojč’s complex theory of multiple national loyalty was less successful than his distinction between uhor and maďar, perhaps because his terminology was both confusing and confused. Only a capital letter distinguished the Slavic národ from the Hungarian Národ! Such fine distinctions stood little chance of winning a mass audience. Hojč’s terminological difficulties, however, seem mild in comparison to those of Michal Hodža, whose 1847 Dobruo slovo Slovákom [A Good Word as a Slovak] posed the following rhetorical question: Is it true that in our homeland, that is to say, Hungary, we cannot be any other nationality [národnosťi] than Hungarian [uhorská], that is to say, Magyar [maďarská]?17
Naturally, Hodža answered this question in the negative: “We do not want to Magyarize, we want to stand by our own language, by our own nationality, in our own homeland.”18 To justify his attachment to his language, Hodža invoked a linguistic nation [národ], claiming that since “every nation has the right to nationality [národnosti], and the Slovak has it too.”19
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And what is this nationality? This is the about the same as if we would say of a good man that he was a man of the people [ľudskí človek]. Though every man is indeed a man, not every man is a man of the people, and so not every nation is a national nation [je ňje každí národ národní národ].20 Hodža then distinguished a “national nation” from a mere “nation:” If a nation does not have nationality, we call it nation-ness [naroďenstvom] (with a short a); if it has nationality, we call it nátion-ness [nároďnenstvom] (with a long á). This is an important difference. Perhaps only for nátionness have the people and I struggled; it elevates no nation when, as frequently happens, nation-ness stupidly hates itself. Then the nation is merely an ape for other national nations. It would rather know every foreign language before its own, it works well, but it works on the publications of other nations, but not for its own movement.21 I assure the reader that this passage is as bizarre and incomprehensible in the original as in my translation; even a transliteration into modern orthography baffled my Slovak informants. The proposed distinction between naroďenstvom and nároďnenstvom also failed to strike root. The main point, however, was that Hodža’s Slavness coexisted with Hungarian citizenship: “every Slavic tribe in Hungary lives with the conviction that every human being, every Slavic tribe … can be as exemplary a Hungarian citizen [vlasťeňec Uhorskí] as the Magyar, if not better.”22 Like Hojč, Hodža also accepted a multi-ethnic state led by an “All-national ruler [Allvölker-Regierer],23 thus simultaneously proclaimed his loyalty to the Habsburg dynasty, cultural Slavness and Hungary. Hodža, like Hojč, also declared Hungary a “primeval Slavic country [Urslawenland],”24 implying that the Magyars, not the Slavs, should have their status as good Hungarians called into question. Hodža also followed Hojč in imagining not a Slovak nation, but an AllSlavic nation, “the Slavic [Slavjanskí] nation (by which we understand the Slovaks, Croats, Serbs, Rusyns).”25 We Slovaks, in our Slovak nationality [slovenskej národnosť], also have a Slavic nationality [slavjanskú národnosť], which is a world nationality, i.e. a great and special factor in European humanity; against which Magyar nationality [maďarská národnosť] has remained through the ages only a domestic, secondary, petty nationality.26
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Hodža invoked this Slavic nationality not to justify any claim for statehood, or even for administrative autonomy, but to express Slavic pride, and scorn for Magyar pretensions to cultural superiority. During the 1840s, then, Hojč and Hodža used variants of the word “nation” [národ] to describe both the Hungarian state and a Slavic linguistic community, resulting in a series of ineffectual and short-lived neologisms. Hojč contrasted a Slavic národ with the Hungarian Národ; Hodža distinguished lickspittle Magyarone narodnosti from proud Slavic národnosti. Hojč also posited a diplomatic nation and a multi-national fatherland. Hodža claimed that Slovak národnosť implied membership in a Slavic národnosť, praising nároďnenstvom over mere naroďenstvom. This bewildering terminology, however, obscured a straightforward political stance: both wanted the Hungarian government to stop the policy of Magyarization and accept Slavic cultural ambitions. To the best of my knowledge, theories of Hungaro-Slavic dual nationalism were not published in the 1850s, since discussions of nationality were interrupted throughout the Habsburg lands under the Bach regime. Slovak leaders, in Susan Mikula’s words, “spent most of the 1850s … in internecine battle over the language issue.”27 The 1850s were important years in the history of Slovak linguistic concepts, and will be discussed in detail below. Theories of Hungaro-Slavic nationality, however, lay fallow until the collapse of neoabsolutism. During the 1860s, however, thinkers in the HungaroSlavic tradition began to devise an effective terminology for articulating dual national loyalties. In Daniel Lichard’s 1861 pamphlet defending the Slovak Memorandum, “Conversation about the Memorandum of the Slovak Nation,” several different characters express different understandings of the “nation.” As with Lichard’s 1865 “Conversation about the Matica slovenská,” discussed above, the protagonist is a parson. The antagonist is a straw man named “Newolny [Unfree]”; other characters have the names of trees. When Newolny hears that the Memorandum has been issued in the name of the Slovak nation, he objects, giving a legalistic “Magyar” definition of the “Hungarian nation [národ uhorský].” A nation is a group of people who lives in one country, is a society of all inhabitants who may speak any language whatsoever, when a single law unites their country. So by us in Hungary [w Uhorskej], there can be no demands of a Slovak nation, even if these Slovaks were a hundred times as numerous, but there can only be a Hungarian nation.28
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The parson then defines the nation as “a society of people which speak one language, has its own habits and customs, and inhabit one unbroken region, etc.”29 Both definitions drew on existing precedent. Newolny is a caricature Magyarone: he counts non-Magyars as part of the národ uhorský, but accepts Magyars supremacy, granting the Hungarian language a hegemonic status in the Hungarian legal system. “Who wishes to use the courts,” Newolny argues, “let him learn Hungarian.”30 The parson’s definition, by contrast, followed Hojč’s Slavic “národ” not only by highlighting language, but also by including “habits and customs” as criteria. The parson does not juxtapose his Slovak “nation” with a Hungarian “nation”: here, only Slavic loyalties were “national.” The parson does, however, count the Slovaks as one of the “Hungarian nations [národy uhorské],” listed as “Slovaks, Magyars, Serbs, Rusyns, Romanians, Germans, etc.”31 Lichard thus remained part of the Hungaro-Slavic tradition: “We live in the Hungarian land and vote as Hungarians, but according to language, we are Slovaks, Magyars, Serbs, Rusyns, Rumanians, etc.”32 Lichard, like Hojč and Hodža, situated Slovaks in an All-Slavic context, but he granted more prominence to Slovak particularism and avoided the contentious word “Pan-Slavism.” Lichard’s parson defined the word “Slav” as follows: Slav [Slowan alebo slawian] refers to all members of the great Slavic nation … The greatness of this nation is divided according to dialect into greater or lesser tribes, or nations, such as the Russians, who are the biggest, then the Poles, Czechs, Croats, Serbs, we Slovaks, and so forth … all speak one and the same language, though with some variations, just the way it is among us. We Slovaks speak differently in Trnava or Skalica, differently in Liptov, and different again in Šariš or Spiš — but everybody understands each other fine. This is how it is among Slavs, which word designates the Russian, the Pole, the Czech, the Croat, the Serb, the Slovak; but if you say Slovak, then I know already, that this is a son of our Slovak nation which lives in Hungary between Bratislava and Košice.33 Two members of the parson’s audience respond to this speech with the following exchange: Hazel: So we are not only Slovaks, but also Slavs? Linden: I understand this to mean that all Slavs are our brothers. 34
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To be a Slovak was to be a Slav, and the linguistic diversity of the Slavic world is set as equal with the linguistic diversity within the Slovak zone. Indeed, Hazel’s question suggests that Slovak linguistic particularism, was gradually becoming distinct from All-Slavism in the 1860s. Lichard’s formula of “Hungarian nations” proved popular in the period of experimentation between the Bach regime and the Ausgleich. An essay about “the Austrian Lands and Nations,” written by “M.M.”, sought to claim Hungarian political institutions for non-Magyars: “the Hungarian constitution is not only Magyar, but just as much Slovak, Serbian and Romanian; the political nation in Hungary is not only Magyar, but all Hungarian nations [ungarische Nationen] have equal rights.35 To ensure these rights, M. M. argued for a federal Hungary with several national curia, granting administrative recognition to both the Hungarian “fatherland” and its constituent “nationalities.” The kingdom of Hungary is the fatherland and kingdom of Slovaks, Serbs, Rusyns [ungarische Kleinrussen], Magyars and Romanians; all of them together have the same Hungarian constitution, the same political rights, they must all settle their purely political affairs at the Hungarian parliament together. Yet their nationalities are different, and when one should deal with national-political affairs, with nationally organized communities, districts, local communities, with communal, district and local meetings, from national officials and professors, with schools in the mother tongue, then the Hungarian parliament must separate into national curia. This means that the following curia must be established: Serbian, Slovak, Magyar, and Romanian, and each of these curia should deal only with the national-political affairs of its own nation.36 Perhaps the most striking thing about this text is M. M.’s confidence that issues could be separated into the “purely political” and the “national-political.” After the Ausgleich, Hungarian law transformed the Magyar politikai nemzet from a national ideology into a legal concept. Slovak leaders then attempted to appropriate the phrase for their own ends. On 23 October 1870, for example, Viliam Pauliny-Tóth, a Slovak lawyer and member of the stará škola, proposed a new Nationalities Law that recognized simultaneous multiple nations: 1. In Hungary there is only one political nation, the uhorský nation, composed of the following genetic nations: Maďarov, Romanians, Slovaks, Serbs, Rusyns, and Germans. 2. All of these genetic nations, forming the political nation, are completely equal.
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3. In Hungary, there are two administrative languages: The state and the municipal. 4. The state language is exclusively Magyar. The municipal languages are: Magyar, Romanian, Slovak, Serbian, Rusyn and German. 5. The state language is used exclusively for every act of state, in other words in the parliament, in the ministries, and in the highest court. 6. Municipal languages are used in cities and counties. 7. In cities and counties the municipal language is the language in daily use by the absolute majority of the inhabitants. Pauliny-Tóth wanted municipal languages used in elementary and secondary schools, but conceded that gymnasia and universities would function in the state language; i.e. Hungarian.37 Note how the catastrophe of the Ausgleich had curtailed Slovak ambitions even among members of the stará škola: the Memorandum had demanded that Hungary’s highest court should hear cases in Slovak.38 Pauliny-Tóth ceded the courts, the parliament, government ministries, and universities to the Magyars, presumably in the hope that in return for these concessions Slovak would be introduced in the schools and local administration of a Slovak district. Although Pauliny-Tóth was willing to cede several spheres of public life to the Magyars and accepted the “political nation,” he broke with the Eötvös Nationalities Law by describing the Slovaks as a “genetic nation,” not a “nationality.” Jozef Hurban similarly rejected the status of “nationality”: We are to say nationality [národnosť] and not nation [národ] … The nation has nationality, but nationality is not there, where there is no nation. Slovaks are a nation by reason of their thoughts, language, life, poetry, literature, common life, virtues, piety, wisdom, glory; nationality, that is shame.39 Hurban’s passion hints at the tremendous political potency of the term “nation” in Habsburg Hungary. The status of nationhood apparently implied legitimate political sovereignty; to cede it would have meant abandoning the right to claim collective political rights. Slovak theories of multiple nationality culminated in 1870 with Karl Zmertych’s pamphlet Rhapsodien über die Nationalität [Rhapsodies on Nationality]. Zmertych formulated Hungaro-Slavic dual nationality so clearly that I have adopted his vocabulary.
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Choosing Slovakia Before we however begin a rational critique … of the nationality question, we must give a popular definition of the concepts of a country, fatherland and nation as science has taught us … Before we can step to the construction of the concept of a nation, we absolutely must draw the extremely important — yea, essential, if we wish to solve the nationality question with justice — distinction between a political and linguistic nation.40
While Zmertych achieved unprecedented analytical clarity, his ideas were wholly derivative: he juxtaposed the political with the linguistic and described both as “national.” He may have borrowed the idea of a “linguistic nation” from Lichard; the “political nation” had by then become ubiquitous. Zmertych also demarcated a clear border between the two different nations. A political nation, according to Zmertych, has five characteristics: A lawful leader, a well-defined fatherland, its own constitution and laws, its own customs and habits, and its own history. Zmertych insisted that all five characteristics were necessary: Members of a nomadic tribe, for example, “even though they possess a lawful leader, their own customs and habits, their own history and their own language, still do not make a political nation, because they have no well-defined fatherland.”41 A linguistic nation, by contrast, is “a totality of people who have a common origin, speak the same language, and consider themselves a family — in this sense, the Slovaks, the Serbs, the Romanians and so on are each a nation.”42 These definitions, of course, were tailor-made for promoting Slovak linguistic rights within the multi-ethnic Hungarian setting. Zmertych saw no need for linguistic nations to have political or administrative expression. He rejected an autonomous Slovak district in surprisingly forceful terms: “Confederation in Hungary would be an absurd monstrosity [ein Unding], reasonable Slovaks understand this very well … A confederation of thirteen linguistic nationalities [would be] an absolute impossibility, a voluntary collapse of Hungary and Austria.”43 Slovak autonomy may seem attractive, he conceded, but the consequences of a confederation adopted out of politically shortsighted philanthropy would be the same as the recognition of the Slovaks as an independent political nation, namely the political death of the Hungarian nation.44 Zmertych sought linguistic concessions in the name of the Slovak linguistic nation, but not at the expense of the Hungarian political nation.
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These formulae of Hungaro-Slovak dual nationalism may strike modern readers as exotic, but they represented the main stream of Slovak thinking in the nineteenth century. The continuity of Hungaro-Slavic theories throughout the nineteenth century is striking. Figure 4.1 summarizes those theories of dual nationality sufficiently detailed to be reproduced in chart form. None of the formulae match perfectly, but all defined one half, the “Hungarian” half, at least partially in legal terms. All make language a defining criterion of the other half, though this “language” was variously imagined as All-Slavic or Slovak-particularist. Further research would presumably uncover other similar formulae: theories of dual national loyalty accurately express the HungaroSlavism that dominated nineteenth century Slovak nationalism. The importance of “customs and habits” as criteria of nationalism deserves a brief comment: while Zmertych saw them as uniting the Hungarian political nation, Lichard and Hojč used them to distinguished Slavs from other linguistic nations. Zmertych’s belief that the Slovaks and Magyars shared the same customs and habits suggests that the primary function of this criterion was to exclude Jews or Roma (Gypsies) from the nation. Figure 4.1: Hungaro-Slavic Theories of Dual Nationality Hojč (1843)
Political Nation (Hungarian) Laws Government Common well being
Lichard Laws (1861) Politics
Linguistic Nation (Slavic) Language Customs and Habits Style of thought Language Customs and Habits Inhabit a common region
“M.M.” Constitution and Laws Education in mother language (1865) Political rights Communal and local affairs Pauliny-Tóth Parliament and Ministries Municipal administration (1870) Universities Elementary schools Highest courts Zmertych (1870)
Constitution and Laws Well-defined Fatherland Language Customs and Habits Common origin Common history “Consider themselves a family” Common leader
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The Slovak concept of a “political nation” developed in conjunction with Magyar political thinking; specifically the concept of the Magyar politikai nemzet with its constituent “nationalities” or “peoples.” Slovak thinkers partially appropriated Magyar terminology from the desire to persuade: they hoped to develop a pan-ethnic vocabulary for discussing Hungary’s national questions with the Magyars. While Slovaks expressed Hungaro-Slavic ideas in both the Slovak language press and private correspondence, their national discussions were most sophisticated and theoretical when written in German for a Magyar audience. But while the Magyar politikai nemzet was invoked to justify Magyar supremacy within Hungary, Slovaks hoped the uhorský politický národ would enable them to claim collective rights for Hungary’s non-Magyar nationalities. In light of this nationalized terminology, historians of the nineteenth century are correct to interpret the Slovak struggle against Magyarization as a “national” struggle. However, Slovak theories of dual nationality call for a substantial re-evaluation both of the traditional narrative of Slovak nationalism, and of the high-political school of nationalism discussed in the last chapter. The high-political school of nationalism, recall, equates “nationalism” with the desire for statehood. This definition, however, leads inevitably to the conclusion that the nineteenth century Slovak intelligentsia, which fought so tirelessly if ineffectively for Slovak rights, contained no Slovak nationalists! After all, the most radical Slovak demands from the Revolution of 1848 sought “only” the creation of an independent Crownland under the Habsburg monarch, not independence. Slovak patriots reaffirmed their loyalty to the Hungarian kingdom repeatedly and, I believe, sincerely. While they vigorously defended their language and consistently demanded an autonomous region, they explicitly disassociated the struggle for linguistic rights and autonomy from political independence. If nationalism implies loyalty to a state, then the nineteenth century Slovak intelligentsia, including Kollár, Hojč, Štúr, Hurban, Daxner, Pauliny-Tóth, Hodža and Hlinka, consisted of Hungarian nationalists. This conclusion is less absurd than it first appears and yields interesting new interpretations. The Slovak volunteers, for example, become a faction on the winning side of a Hungarian civil war. Many Slovaks interpret Štúr as the leader of an independence movement, as a would-be Slovak Garibaldi. Could he not also be a civil rights activist, a would-be Hungaro-Slavic Martin Luther King? Nevertheless, the nineteenth-century Slovak intelligentsia cannot be understood solely in Hungarian terms, and the desire for statehood thus does not explain the emergence of Slovak nationalism. Nineteenth-century Slovak nationalists were Hungaro-Slavs: they sought to combine political loyalty
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to Hungary with cultural loyalty to a Slavic culture, variously imagined. Furthermore, Slovak thinkers insisted on describing both Slavic and Hungarian loyalties as “national.” Why did Slovaks insist on using the word “nation [národ]” to describe both cultural and political loyalties? In the Habsburg political context, political action undertaken in the name of a “nation,” however imagined, was legitimate. Comparing the differing Slovak and Croatian experiences under the Ausgleich illustrates the irresistible potency of “nation” status; a brief comparison repays the effort. Before the Revolution of 1848, the Croatian national movement resembled its Slovak counterpart: both opposed Magyarization in the name of a linguistic collective, and both Croatian and Slovak nationalists participated in the same All-Slavic politics. Indeed, Ljudevit Gaj, the central figure in Croatian life during the 1830s and 40s, was a close friend of Kollár, corresponded with several Slovak literati, including Štúr, and published letters from Slovak readers in his newspaper.45 Gaj also promoted a Hungaro-Slavic ideology. In an 1845 tract addressed to Kossuth, Gaj expressed his desire to live “in complete harmony with all good-thinking Magyars.”46 Gaj’s collaborator Dragutin Rakovac, in his 1842 Mali katekizam za velike ljude [Small Catechism for a Great People] put itself even more firmly in a Hungaro-Slavic tradition: consider Rakovac’s first and last demands: What do we want? 1. We want to have our national language, given to us by nature itself. We know that when the language of a nation dies, the nation dies with it. 2. To have our national literature, because without national literature, the language must go down to ruin … 5. To remain, as we have been until now, brethren of the Magyars, under the Hungarian constitution.47 Hungaro-Slavism was not the only theme in Croatian thought, and Croatian nationalists adopted a more aggressively political stance than their Slovak counterparts. Nevertheless, Gaj’s motto, articulated in 1841, recalls HungaroSlavism: “May God preserve the Hungarian constitution, the Croatian kingdom, and Illyrian nationality.” 48 The Croatian and Slovak experiences, however, diverged sharply after the Ausgleich. In 1868, the Hungarian parliament negotiated its own miniature Ausgleich with Croatia, known as the Nagdoba [Croatian for “Compromise”]. The medieval Croatian kingdom had long enjoyed legal distinctiveness within the kingdom of Hungary, and Magyar liberal reformers were willing
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to grant Croatia a special status, not least because respect for Croatian legal rights legitimated their own demands against Vienna.49 The provisions of the Nagdoba declared the Croats “a separate nation from a political point of view,”50 and then established an autonomous Croatian-dominated province within Hungary, whose borders resembled those of the modern Croatian republic, minus Dalmatia.51 The Triune Kingdom was administered by a Croatiandominated parliament, the Sabor, which introduced the Croatian language into local administration, local courts and an educational system extending up to the university level. Nagdoba Croatia was not an independent state; it did not even have the authority of an Austrian Crownland. It did, however, possess all the powers demanded in the Slovak Memorandum. Compared to the Croats, Slovaks were disenfranchised. Slovaks lacked a political district, any school system beyond the elementary level, and the right to use their language in regional administration or local courts. This disenfranchisement was symbolized and justified by the claim that the Slovaks were not a “nation,” a claim that both the Hungarian government and Magyar public opinion vigorously expressed. This denial of nation status accompanied specific acts of oppression. In 1875, when Kálmán Tisza shut down the Matica slovenská and confiscated its funds, he justified his actions by declaring that “there can be only one visible nation in the frontiers of Hungary.”52 Indeed, in 1878 one Hungarian nationalist went so far as to deny Slovaks the status of “nationality”: Béla Grünwald’s A Felvidék [the Highlands,” i.e. the mountainous north of Hungary that is now the Slovak republic], claimed that “in Hungary there are households speaking the Slovak language, but there is no Slovak nationality [tót nemzetiség].’53 And when Ferdiš Juriga addressed the Hungarian parliament in Slovak on 19 October 1918, incidentally the only time Slovak was ever spoken in the Hungarian parliament, his reference to the Slovak nation was immediately interrupted by shouts of “where is this Slovak nation? In which province?”54 The contrast between Slovak and Croatian experiences suggests that in the last century of the Habsburg Empire, a “nation” received tangible political benefits that a mere “nationality” did not. It is therefore unsurprising that Slovaks consistently demanded the status of a “nation,” and equally unsurprising that the Magyars consistently refused to grant it. The extraordinary political importance of the word “nation” has consequences for its use as a term of political analysis. Clear terms for articulating one’s research interests are desirable, and the use of the word “nation” seems unavoidable in any discussion of nationalism. Many scholars have proposed many definitions, but any definition of nationalism, however elegant or concise, must be rejected if it hinders our ability to understand historical actors: as John
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Deutsch so memorably put it in another context, “no terminology should try to be more accurate than life.”55 Since Slovak political leaders invoked a Slovak “nation” while accepting the Hungarian state, a “high-political” definition of “nationalism” would be misleading. Striving for political independence must not be treated as a defining characteristic of nationalism. Rogers Brubaker provides a more profitable approach: he dispenses with the “nation” as an analytical term. “One does not have to take a category inherent in the practice of nationalism — the realist, reifying conception of nations as real communities — and make this category central to the theory of nationalism.”56 For Brubaker, the study of nationalism is the analysis of “appeals and claims made in the name of putative ‘nations’,” guided by research questions such as: “How does the nation work as a practical category, as classificatory scheme, as cognitive frame?”57 This approach can explain dual nationality. In the last century of the Habsburg Empire, the “nation” was a central category of political rhetoric; its function was to justify political claims to collective rights, such as linguistic rights. Living in Hungary and attempting to secure collective rights within the framework of the Hungarian constitution, Slovaks claimed membership in a Hungarian “political nation.” Hoping to defend their language and culture from Magyarization, they also proclaimed a Slavic “linguistic nation.” Analyzing the nation as a rhetorical device justifying political alliances raises interesting questions about Slovak political tactics. The Magyar political elite consistently opposed the development of Slavic culture in Hungary, hoping instead to assimilate the Slavs to Magyar culture. The Slovak political movement came into existence precisely to resist Magyarization. So why did Slovaks so consistently invoke a nation that united them with their primary enemies? What political alliance were Slovak thinkers hoping to promote with the concept of a Hungarian nation [uhorský národ]? Owen Johnson hinted at the answer to this question by referring to the “idealistic faith on the part of the Slovaks that the Hungarian rulers would see the error of their ways and come to a fair and rational resolution of the nationality question.”58 The ultimate goal of Slovak nationalist agitation, for most of the nineteenth century, was reconciliation between the “linguistic nations” of Hungary. As Štúr wrote in 1845, We still live in the hope that the Magyars will recognize our national right and understand the rule of the spirit or humanity of the nineteenth century, and recompense us for everything that has been done to our disadvantage.59
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Štúr’s dedication to Slovak national goals is beyond question, but he hoped to achieve them through Slovak-Magyar cooperation. This hope persisted during the early months of the 1848 Revolution. In April, Štúr wrote hopefully that “we do not believe that our fellow citizens, the Hungarians, would wish to destroy us. We believe that they want to direct every effort to solve the struggles between nationalities.”60 The desire for reconciliation is an unusual plank in a nationalist platform, and some scholars deny that it is compatible with “nationalism.” For example, Robert Pynsent remarked in his excellent study of Czech and Slovak national ideas that “Xenophobia may exist without nationalism, but hardly nationalism without xenophobia. A nationalist cannot have a lickspittle approach to his model.”61 Hojč’s Apologie, however, provides a counterexample: in 1843, he appealed to Kossuth in the following obsequious terms. Or are you, my Lord, for your own person, against the idea of Magyarization? Ei, if this were the case, so we beg you, that you make your thoughts clear as soon as possible, because your word is a talisman, and in its possession we would become more peaceful.62 A few years later, Štúr continued the tradition of “lickspittle” nationalism, which might better be described as “supplicant” nationalism, by praising Széchenyi as one of “those patriots, who, elevated above national vanity and not blinded by national prejudice, raise their voices for holy justice and fight injustice, on whoever’s side it may lie.”63 Zmertych also insisted that Hungarians felt no real ill will toward their Slovak co-nationalists. Slovak linguistic nationality, he wrote, has never been disputed by the Hungarians, even though it cannot be denied that in the previous thirty years — as the giant ghost of Panslavism appeared in the literature and the Hungarians, in the first stages of building their own nationality, afraid and the first to be threatened by this same ghost, were stunned; — and even later as well — and some things happened in which the linguistic national demands of the Slovaks were cut short; but today, by contrast, there are no longer any rational Hungarians who would not acknowledge the previous concepts with regret.64 Daniel Lichard’s pamphlet in support of the Slovak Memorandum ended with a Hungaro-Slavic fantasy of converting “our brother Magyars”65 to the cause: Newolny accepts the Slovak position completely.
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Mr. Pastor, your grace, I thank you from the heart … that you have brought me onto the path of righteousness, you may be certain that I see that the Slovak demands are just, and I am convinced that liberty, equality and fraternity will only reign in our country when they are fulfilled.66 Slovak leaders hoped not to vanquish the Magyars, but to persuade them through moral authority. If the Magyars would only recognize the injustice of Magyarization, they would appreciate the Slavic contribution to the Hungarian kingdom and willingly help Slovaks promote their culture. Thus Hungary’s nationalities would become reconciled and peace would be restored in the kingdom. Given the magnitude of Slovak disempowerment under Hungarian rule, this “supplicant” nationalism was probably a rational strategy for winning concessions from the Hungarian government. While the Polish, Czech and Croatian intelligentsias fought to control provincial governments that roughly corresponded to ethnic territories, the Slovak national territory was subsumed within Hungary. A Slovak administrative district featured prominently in Slovak political demands, including the Mikuláš Declaration of 1848 and the various Memoranda of 1861. Such a district never came into being, however, so Slovak leaders hoped to achieve their national goals through moral persuasion. Nevertheless, this strategy of nationalist supplication proved unsuccessful. Slovak demands mostly concerned language rights, which unfortunately are a zero-sum game: Slovak gains would necessarily come at Hungarian expense. Magyar pundits, journalists and policy makers ignored Slovak political appeals in the name of a multi-ethnic Hungary, and proved consistently unwilling to grant Slovaks any collective rights. No matter how the concept of dual national loyalty was presented, Magyar thinkers, even relatively accommodating figures like Deák and Eötvös, insisted that a “Hungarian” could not be a member of any other nation, or speak any language but Hungarian. Magyar stubbornness and chauvinism may have ultimately proved selfdefeating. It created bitterness and desperation among the Slovak intelligentsia. Slovak politicians had accepted the legitimacy of the Hungarian kingdom before the war, but their increasing disillusionment with the Magyars meant that when the emerging Czechoslovak republic promised to recognize them as a constitutive part of a state-forming Czechoslovak “political nation,” they leapt at the chance. That said, Slovaks might never have broken with Hungary had traumatic defeat in the First World War not shattered the legitimacy of the Habsburg imperial system. Special emphasis, however, must also be placed on the diversity of linguistic national concepts in nineteenth-century Slovakia. Theories of dual nationality
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consistently described the “political nation” in Hungarian terms: Slovaks were Hungaro-Slavs, not Austro-Slavs. Indeed, Slovak Austro-Slavism is conspicuous by its absence. The “non-political” half of dual nationality, however, was less stable. The demands justified with reference to these nations overwhelmingly concerned language rights, so the various formulae of “spiritual,” “genetic” or “cultural” nationality can be safely considered as terminological variants of “linguistic” nationality. The diversity of linguistic concepts, however, cannot be explained away. Hojč described his language in All-Slavic terms, while Pauliny-Tóth suggested a Slovak language. Michal Hodža, intriguingly, fudged the issue by claiming membership in both Slovak and All-Slavic nations: “we Slovaks, in our Slovak nationality [slovenskej národnosťi], also have a Slavonic nationality [slavjanskú národnosť], which is a world nationality.”67 Nor does a spectrum between Slovak particularism and All-Slavism exhaust the diversity of Slovak linguistic-national ideas: Slovak thinkers proved willing to entertain diverse new national concepts if the evolving political environment provided appropriate incentives. In 1861, for example, Slovak leaders briefly proclaimed themselves part of a “North Hungarian Slavic” linguistic nation. North Hungarian Slavism, in effect, combined Slovaks and Rusyns into a single collective. Štefan Daxner, a lawyer who had fought in the Slovak volunteers and played an important role in composing the Slovak Memorandum, appealed for the votes of “North Hungarian Slavs [severo-uhorských Slovanov]”68 while running for parliament. Daxner’s North Hungarian Slavism articulated recognizable Hungaro-Slavic themes, such as boasting of autochthony within Hungary: The truth is that we North-Hungarian Slavs in Hungary consider ourselves to be the oldest inhabitants of this country. We gave it Christianity — and the European name “Uhorska,” from which the names “Ungar, Hungarus” derive.69 Jan Francisci, a government official in Liptov county, used an almost identical ethnonym in an 1861 newspaper article about “Northslavs in Hungary, that is, Slovaks and Rusyns, and the Hungarian Parliament.”70 The North Hungarian Slavism of 1861, furthermore, drew on a precedent set during the revolutionary year of 1848: Jozef Hurban had issued a manifesto on 7 June, 1848 in the name of the singular “Slovak and Rusyn nation in Hungary [národ slovenský a rusínský v Uhřích].” The content of this manifesto called on the Magyars to recognize “Hungarian Rusyns and Slovaks” as a singular “nation having equal rights as themselves.”71
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Hungarian electoral politics provided Slovaks with the incentive to imagine this “North-Hungarian Slavic” nation. Several northern Hungarian counties contained both Slovak and Rusyn populations; by proclaiming the unity of North Hungarian Slavs, Slovaks hoped that Slovaks and Rusyns together could form a broader political base. Slovaks also hoped to cooperate with Rusyn politician Adolf Dobrians’kyi. A brief description of Dobrians’kyi’s career explains why he made an attractive ally for Slovak leaders. Dobrians’kyi, the son of a Greek Catholic priest, studied philosophy in Košice, law in Eger, and mining in Banská Bystrica. After becoming a mining engineer in Bohemia, he discovered the work of František Palacký and became interested in politics. A Slovak mining district elected him to the Hungarian parliament in 1848; he won electoral support from Slovaks on the basis of his education, Czech contacts, and possibly his Slovak spouse.72 He worked as a liaison and translator for the Russian army that intervened in Hungary, actions which won him a series of medals from the Russian Emperor Nicholas I and the undying enmity of Magyar politicians. In October 1849, the Austrian Emperor Franz Joseph appointed Dobrians’kyi to run a Rusyn administrative unit centered on the city of Uzhhorod.73 For five months, he was able to promote Slavic education, appoint Rusyns to government posts and support Rusyn publishing. Dobrians’ky governed, in the words of Ivan Žeguc, while “in direct contact with the political and spiritual leaders of the Slovak people,” specifically Kollár, Štúr, and publicist Ondrej Radlinský,74 and Slovak newspapers followed Dobrians’kyi’s efforts with admiration.75 Admittedly, the short-lived Uzhhorod district was abolished in March 1850, but no Slovak leaders could boast any equivalent achievement: while Dobrians’kyi experienced his brief stint in power, Štúr was under house arrest. In 1861, when Dobrians’kyi returned to politics and was elected to the Hungarian parliament, he made a natural Slovak ally. The North-Hungarian Slavic nation proved an ineffective political tool, Dobrians’kyi a disappointing ally. The Magyar elite had not forgotten his collaboration with the Russian army, proclaimed him a traitor and refused to recognize his mandate for parliament.76 Dobrians’kyi eventually despaired of Hungary and spent the rest of his career attempting to stimulate Russian nationalism in Subcarpathia.77 Additionally, Magyar domination of the electoral system was so overwhelming that Slovak leaders began to think of the Hungarian parliament not as a political arena where Slovak political goals could be achieved, but a hostile power center opposed to Slovak interests. North Hungarian Slavism was a fashion of 1861, vanishing when it ceased to yield political dividends. But so long as Slovaks sought to work
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with Rusyn leaders, they justified the alliance with an appropriately imagined national community. Assuming that Slovak leaders invoked whatever national concept promoted their political aims best explains nineteenth century Czechoslovakism. After a lengthy discussion on Hungaro-Slavic lines, Vavro Šrobár’s 1898 manifesto, published in the first issue of the journal Hlas, proclaimed Czechoslovak “cultural” nationality: In the Czechoslovak Question, finally, we stand by the position of our awakeners and contemporaries, who in every serious moment emphatically stressed the cultural unity of the Czechoslovak nation. On the ruins of all cultural centers in Slovakia we must doubly proclaim the inevitability of this unity, we must cultivate it with all our strength, sustain ourselves with the fruits of this our common culture.78 Since the Hlasist attempt to imagine a Slovak-Czech nation had more important consequences than the abortive Slovak-Rusyn nation, a full discussion will be deferred until later. Yet note that the Czechoslovak “cultural nation” fits neatly into Hungaro-Slavic dual nationality: Czechoslovakism existed within a cultural and thus non-political sphere. To understand the development of Slovak nationalism after 1919, therefore, requires a closer examination of Slovak linguistic nationalism. Slovak linguistic thought turns out to be even more complex than Slovak national thought. Many scholars have remarked upon the importance of language in Slovak nationalism,79 but mistakenly assume that Slovak nationalists promoted and defended “the Slovak language” as the national language. This is a mistake: as observed above, Slovak thinkers promoted diverse linguistic concepts. The intellectual history of Slovak linguistic loyalties has a complex trajectory with several phases, and its turning points differ from the milestones of Hungarian political history. A discussion of Slovak linguistic thought requires an appropriate analytical vocabulary. The main problem is the word “language.” This word enjoys widespread use as an analytical term, often modified with various adjectives: “written language,” “literary language,” “spoken language,” etc. However, this word is also polemical: political actors fight bitterly about whether a given group speaks a “language,” or merely a “dialect.” Inattention to the polemical nature of the word “language” causes endless trouble, and I have found it necessary to devise a new analytical vocabulary. This breaks with existing precedent, so this chapter ends with a critique of existing terminology and a plea for new analytical terms.
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Scholars use the term “language” to describe at least three separate things. It refers to (1) a series of standardized conventions for spelling and grammar, as codified in dictionaries and school primers. To specify this first meaning, scholars frequently use a modifying adjective, e.g. “literary language,” “standardized language” or “written language.” The word “language” may also denote (2) the speech varieties used by the people living a certain territory, in this case the territory of the future Slovak republic. Speech varieties exist, so this second meaning thus appears to have an objective referent, but a “spoken language” presupposes a classification system. Since every town or village has its distinctive speech peculiarities, the speech of any arbitrarily defined territory always differs from neighboring territories. Referring to the speech of a large territory with the term “language” implicitly defines a geographic zone in which speech varieties are supposedly homogenous, or at least relatively homogenous in comparison to the varieties of neighboring territories. Such claims become problematic if the speech of those neighboring territories is similar: in such cases, the second meaning depends on (3) the idea of the national language, juxtaposed implicitly with a mere “dialect,” understood as a linguistic collective that boasts a certain internal cohesion while yet being subsumed under some over overarching “language.” This third meaning of the word “language,” existing in binary opposition to the “dialect,” is most closely linked to national concepts, and most clearly claims a specific territory. Political actors typically conflate all three meanings of the word “language”: writing = speech = the national language (and thus national ethnoterritory). The analytical slippage between the scholarly study of speech varieties (2) and the polemical claims to national territories (3) causes particular confusion, since referring to speech or writing as “language” implicitly suggests that political claims to a linguistic territory have an objective factual basis. Analyzing political claims legitimated with linguistic arguments requires that all three concepts be distinguished with a neutral analytical terminology. The study of “national languages” should not be treated as a branch of linguistics, but as sub-field of intellectual history, comparable to the history of science.80 Regrettably, many scholars interested in the politics of “language” have chosen to participate in the debate rather than analyze it. Ján Kačala described the idea of a Czechoslovak language as a “fiction,” proclaiming: “the Slovak language is our national language.”81 Josef Kirschbaum wrote that “the claim that the Slovak language was never a part of the Czech or the so-called ‘Czechoslovak’ language was proven correct by scholarly research beyond any doubt.”82 Kačala and Kirschbaum both fall within the present scholarly consensus, but their claim to discern “fiction” from truth remains a polemical stance that impedes the historical analysis of causal relationships. If Slovak
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presently enjoys the status of “language” distinct from Czech, this status is something which scholarly research can not “prove,” but rather manufactures. Proper linguists, for their part, frequently declare the entire discussion pointless: as R.A. Hudson shouted in italic type, “There is no real distinction to be drawn between ‘language’ and ‘dialect’.” 83 Since the status of “language” is the object of political contestation, historians studying such political contests would do well to avoid using political slogans as analytical terms. Rogers Brubaker’s objections to the term “nation” apply with equal force to “language”: though appeals and claims made in the name of putative “languages” have been central to politics in the late Habsburg Empire and elsewhere, one does not have to use the “language” as an analytical category to analyze such appeals and claims. We should instead ask how language-hood, as a political and cultural form, has been institutionalized. How has it worked as a practical category, classificatory scheme and cognitive frame? Wishing to avoid the term “language,” I refer to standardized conventions for writing and spelling as a “script” or “orthography.” These terms advantageously emphasize writing. Several scholars have noticed that linguistic nationalism interacts with writing more than speech: Anderson speaks of “print language,”84 Hobsbawm of “elite administrative of literary language,”85 and Slovak scholars typically refer to spisovný jazyk [literary language]. I believe that the need to distinguish the object of linguistic standardization from the status of “language” disqualifies these terms, however, and thus prefer “script.” I will use the word “language” only to discuss a status claimed by historical actors, or in quotations from primary sources. A script, in this sense, is more than an alphabet: it also implies grammatical rules and a standardized vocabulary. This book, however, is not a linguistic study and does not pretend to provide a comprehensive treatment of Slovak linguistics. The narrative concentrates instead on the national meanings of script codifications. Standardized spelling and orthography depend on schooling, and thus on the idiosyncratic choices of individual grammarians and pedagogues. As the Prague Linguistic Circle noted in the 1930s, “the most powerful interventions by linguistic theory are in the area of orthography, less in the area of the grammatical structure of the language … and least in its lexical structure and content.”86 Gedrius Subačius has also pointed out that of all linguistic phenomena affected by codification, “spelling is the most obvious.”87 The need for anational descriptive terms has also led me to avoid describing any codified script as “Slovak.” Instead, I refer to these scripts with Slovak terms derived from the name of their codifier. This is less awkward than it sounds: Bernolák’s codification is “Bernolákovčina,” Štúr’s codification is
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“Štúrovčina.” Martin Hattala’s codification, which now enjoys widespread legitimacy as the “correct” way to write, and which is routinely referred to as “Slovak” or “modern Slovak,” becomes “Hattalovčina.” Understanding how and when Hattalovčina won the status of “the Slovak national language” requires an analytical distinction between Hattalovčina and its national associations, at least during the period when its status as a national script was still in question. Classifying the idiosyncratic texts from the “precodification eras”88 is the most difficult problem. Since most authors drew on the example of the Kralice Bible, one may describe their texts with the catch-all term “Bibličtina,” [Biblical script]. The Kralice Bible had a Moravian origin: it had been written in the Moravian town of Kralice and was most frequently published in Halle or Prague.89 Nevertheless, both Slovaks and Czechs published texts using Bibličtina’s conventions. Despite common usage, I argue that neither texts nor conventions should be described as “Biblical Czech.” An orthographic definition of Bibličtina might focus on Blackletter type and the use of six characteristic letters: {ě g j ř ů w}. Three of these letters, {ě ř ů}, remain in use in modern Czech; {ř} in particular has become a shibboleth distinguishing Czech from Slovak. The other three, {g j w}, are “old fashioned” letters that have fallen into disuse in both Slovakia and the Czech Republic; their decline thus lacks national significance. The letters {g j}, or rather {g j}, go together: Bibličtina {g} has been replaced with Latin {j}, Blackletter {j} with {í}. Bibličtina gelenj [deer] would now be written “jelení” throughout the former Czechoslovak republic. Both Slovaks and Czechs have replaced {w} with {v}, so this transition also lacks national significance. Bibličtina frequently used the digraph {\\} for modern {š}, but two additional Blackletter characters for {š} complicate matters.90 The hypothetical Bibličtina phrase Wjno a \\perk ge\t [there are jewels and wine] would be “Víno a šperk jest” throughout former Czechoslovakia. During the nineteenth century, many Slovaks with Bibličtina educations switched to Latin type and to the “modern” letters {j í} or {v}. Many scholars describe these texts as written in “Czech,” particularly if the letter {ř} is used. Others describe such texts as “Old Slovak.” To avoid using a national ethnonym, I classify such texts as part of a “Bibličtina tradition.” To see why, consider a prominent defence of Bibličtina, Hlasowé o potřebě jednoty spisowného jazyka pro Čechy, Morawany a Slowáky, a multi-authored anthology of essays opposing Štúrovčina. Orthographically, Hlasowé used Latin type, the old-fashioned {w}, the modern letters {j í}, and the “Czech” letters {ě ř ů}. Its orthography, therefore, closely resembled modern Czech, and several scholars treat it as a defence of “Czech.” Some contributors to Hlasowé indeed
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described themselves as defending as “Czech.” Others, however, defended “the Biblical language,” “Slavo-Bohemian,” “the Czechoslovak dialect,” “the Biblical or Czechoslovak language,” “our beautiful pure Biblical Slovak,” and “the Czechoslovak Biblical language … the true language of our forefathers.”91 This diversity of national associations shows the necessity of distinguishing the script from the Czech, Czecho-Slav, Slovak, and Czechoslovak national concepts invoked in its defence. Scripts have been distinguished from speech, and both script and speech have been distinguished from claims to language-hood and the rhetorical concept of the “national language.” I have described new conventions for naming scripts and justified my focus on orthographic questions. The narrative can now turn to the history of Slovak linguistic nationalism, and its complex interaction with the history of Slovak script codification. The next chapter examines Slovak All-Slavism, the dominant theme in Slovak linguistic nationalism for the first half of the nineteenth century.
5 THE SLAVIC LANGUAGE
This chapter examines Slovak linguistic ideologies in the first half of the nineteenth century. It emphasizes All-Slavism, the idea that all Slavs speak the same language, since this was the dominant theme in Slovak thought. All-Slavism led Slovaks to believe that a “language” could have different “literary dialects,” an idea which has subsequently been thoroughly rejected, but which would have profound consequences for Slovak history. Balancing the perceptions of nineteenth-century Slovaks with the linguistic reality of nineteenth-century Slovakia can be a delicate business. What can be said about the linguistic situation in 1800 on the lands which now constitutes the Slovak Republic? Apart from a Magyar-speaking fringe on the southern frontier with Hungary, German-speaking urban communities in the high Tatras, and assorted tiny linguistic minorities, the speech used on this territory belonged to the Slavic linguistic family. Slavic speech throughout this region showed continuous internal variation, as one would expect from “any region that has a long settlement history.”1 These speech varieties, furthermore, blended continuously with those to the immediate West, North and East, i.e. with Czech, Polish, and Rusyn (Ukrainian), all of which themselves contain continuous internal diversity. In short, the “Slovak” territory was part of a Slavic dialect continuum. Slovak linguistic ideology therefore addressed not only the Slovak-Hungarian relationship, but also the relationship between Slovak varieties and the rest of the Slavic world. The Slavic-speaking world contains considerable diversity in both speech (pronunciation, grammar, vocabulary) and script (alphabet, spelling). To acknowledge this diversity, most observers divide the Slavic dialect continuum into subcategories: usually into distinct “languages,” frequently into both “languages” and “dialects,” but sometimes only into “dialects.” At any given moment, a consensus may exist concerning the Slavic linguistic taxonomy, but this consensus changes over time. Reference works usually present their
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taxonomy as timeless and unchanging, though they sometimes acknowledge the presence of dissenting opinions. Nevertheless, one generation’s dissenting minority may later become an accepted orthodoxy. As the Slavic linguistic taxonomy evolves, the number of “languages” and “dialects” changes. Paul Selver’s 1919 summary of nineteenth-century Slavic experts illustrates the magnitude of the problem: in 1822 Dobrovský, the practical father of Slav philology, divided [the Slavic zone] into nine tongues, Šafařík in 1842 proposed six languages with thirteen dialects, Schleicher in 1865 proposed eight, Miklosich, a prominent Slovene scholar, decided on nine, Jagić, a Croat authority of European reputation, is in favor of eight.2 This passage is interesting not least because Selver described Josef Dobrovský’s taxonomy (“nine tongues”) differently from Endre Arató in a similar passage: F. Pelcl, professor of Czech language and literature at the University of Prague, spoke of five main dialects (Russian, Polish, Serbian, Croatian and Czech), while J. Dobrovský, the most outstanding scholar of Slavic linguistics of his age, spoke only of four (Czech, Polish, Russian and Illyrian.)3 My own count, from Dobrovský’s Lehrgebaeude der boehmischen Sprache, yields neither four nor nine but ten languages: Bohemian, Slovak, Croatian, Slovene, “Serbian (Illyrian),” Russian, Polish, Upper and Lower Sorbian, Slovene (with three subcategories), and Old Church Slavonic.4 Arguments about the status of Slovak within the Slavic world must be situated in the context of this general uncertainty about the subdivisions and classifications of the Slavic language family. Northern Hungary was relatively slow to develop important centers of Slavic literary life. Slavic documents from northern Hungary date back to 1422,5 but other parts of the Slavic world had already developed important traditions of scholarship and learning by this date. Relative provinciality persisted into the nineteenth century. Before 1800, most books published on the territory of the future Slovak republic were written in Latin. Taking the 753 “slovacikal” books in the Brno university library catalogue as a sample, we find that 80 per cent of books published before 1800 appeared in Latin. Another 9 per cent were published in Slavic, 9 per cent in German, 1 per cent in Hungarian, and 0.5 per cent in French.6 Indeed, the Jesuit press in Trnava printed seven Latin books for every Slavic book produced in all of Slovakia.
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The publishers of Levoča, according to Ján Mišianik, similarly preferred Latin, Hungarian and German to Slavic (respectively 39 per cent, 23 per cent, 22 per cent and 16 per cent of books published).7 Slovak men of letters received their educations abroad; Lutherans in particular studied in Saxony. Kollár and Šafařík, the greatest Slovak minds from the early nineteenth century, settled respectively in Pest and Prague: no town in the Slovak ethnoterritory possessed the necessary infrastructure to support their literary activities. Since print-culture came relatively late to Slavic north Hungary, it developed under the influence of external models. The Kralice Bible, whose orthography inspired the first attempts to render Slovak speech in print, had originally been imported from the Czech lands. This explains why a great deal of Slovak printing before 1800 used the letter {ř}: this letter represents a sound which does not occur in most Slovak speech, but which is common in Moravia and Bohemia. Slovak publishers also produced Slavic books in the Cyrillic alphabet, following both East Slavic and South Slavic conventions.8 Slovak Calvinists, furthermore, borrowed Hungarian orthography. Consider the Malý katechizmus of 1750, printed in Debrecen, the “Calvinist Rome”: Chto jest Jesus Kristus? SZIN BOSI … Tsi tu sszpravodlyivi BUOH zato ON jeszt? Tak jeszt. Who is Jesus Christ? GOD’S SON … Is HE then a just GOD? That’s right.9 The digraphs {sz} and {ssz} follow Hungarian orthographic conventions. Hungarian influence is even more dramatic on the length of time God required to create the universe: sésztzt dnyi (Hattalovčina: šesť dní).10 This catechism also illustrates the unstandardized character of Slovak printing: in this very brief excerpt, the word for “is” has been spelled in two different ways, jest and jeszt; the sound /s/ (the “s” in “snake”) in three ways: {s}, {sz}, and {ssz}. Experts have held many opinions about how to classify the speech varieties of the territory now administered by the Slovak Republic. The only point beyond controversy is that they belong to the Slavic language family. Several early modern observers were content to describe the speech of northern Hungary simply as “Slavic.” For example, Edward Brown’s 1673 account of his travels in Hungary reported that “in some parts of Hungary, many speak
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Schlavonian,”11 which he defines as any speech containing the words “Dobre and Nich Dobre, that is Good and not Good, which are expressive of approving or disapproving, in the Schlavonian language.”12 If the word “dobre” sufficed to define a single language, then all Slavs would indeed speak it. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, most Slovak literati agreed with Brown: Slovaks routinely described their language as “Slavic” and themselves as “Slavs.”13 The ethnonym Slovák, and its associated adjective slovenský had not yet distinguished from the name Slovan [Slav] and its adjective slovanský.14 All these words derive from the same root, as do the terms slovinský [Slovenian] and slavonský [Slavonian].15 This ambiguity between All-Slavism and Slovak particularism complicates the study of linguistic nationalism in the early nineteenth century.16 As Jozef Ambruš warned, scholars “have not paid enough attention to the coherent expressions Slávsky [Slavic], slovenský [Slovak], Slovensko [Slovakia], and Slovenčina [the Slovak language].17 In several otherwise nonsensical texts, geographic clues clearly fail to distinguish between slovenský [Slovak] and slovanský [Slavic]. Bohuslav Nosák’s poem “Slowenka [Slovak Girl],” published in Hurban’s 1842 anthology, uses the word slowenská to mean “Slavic”: i skály kavkasa slawii se kořj šjře slowenská řeč gak dennice zořj
And the rocky Caucasus Burn with glory; The broad Slavic tongue Shines like the day.18
The glory of the particularist Slovak tongue does not shine in the Caucasus: Nosák obviously referred to Slavic Russians. Yet another poem from the same anthology, August Škultéty’s “Kde wlast ge má? [Where is my homeland?],” used the word slovenský with its modern Slovak-particularist meaning: Kde zpustila hradba Děwjna na slawné wěky zpomjná Kde Nitra, Trenčjn, Hradowá slowenských reků hrob chowá: Tam wlast ge má, tam wlast ge má! Kde Hron i Wah i Rymawa čistau si wlnkau pohráwá, kde po šumjcj bystřině rychle slowenská plť plyne: Tam wlast ge má, tam wlast ge má!
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Where the ruins of Devín recall glorious ages, where Nitra, Trenčín, Hradová Slovak rivers tend the grave: That homeland is mine, is mine! Where Hron and Váh and Rymava sparkle in playful waves, where along the murmuring stream a Slovak raft rapidly flows: That homeland is mine, is mine!19 Since Nitra, Trenčín, the ruins of Devín, and the rivers Hron and Váh all lie in modern Slovakia, these geographic clues strongly suggest that Škultéty used the adjective slovenský (declined to slowenských and slowenská) to mean “Slovak.” An All-Slavic meaning, however, cannot be entirely excluded: Škultéty might theoretically have praised Devín as a “Slavic” castle, and the Hron as a “Slavic” river. The ethnonym Slowák (actually, the plural Slowáci) refers to both “Slav” and “Slovak” in Ján Kollár’s 1835 poem, “Chwála slowenského národu [Song of the Slovak/Slavic nation].” In verse five, the All-Slavic meaning of Slowáci could hardly be clearer, since Kollár describes the Poles and Russians as Slowáci: W Uhřjch gsau mnozj Slowáci Slowáci gsau i Poláci: Gsau w Morawě gsau i w Rusku i w Pomeranii I w Moldawě, i w Oláchoch, w Slezkn [sic] w Slawonii In Hungary there are many Slovaks/Slavs The Poles are also Slovaks/Slavs They are in Moravia, are also in Russia and Pomerania Also in Moravia, in Wallachia, in Silesia and in Slavonia In verse ten, however, the same word apparently refers only to the Slovaks of Hungary: Slowáci gsau Slawnj dosti Pro swých synů způsobnosti Progdi se, medle, po našj kragině uherské A plině phledni wšecky uřady kraginské.
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Kollár’s poem, furthermore, illustrates the free variation of vowel between slovenský and slovanský: the “Song of the slovenského Nation” proclaims, in verse six, the fame of the slovanský nation [slavný gest národ slovanský], presumably for the assonance with the word slavný [glorious]. Kollár apparently used the adjectives slovenský and slovanský interchangeably, much as with the English words grey and gray. The ambiguity of between these two meanings, finally, finds reflection in contemporary dictionary definitions. Anton Bernolák’s 1825 dictionary, which defined words with Latin, German, and Hungarian translations,21 gave two definitions for the word Slowák. Ignoring the Latin to focus on German and Hungarian, they are (1) “ein Slave, Slavack, tóth,” and (2) “ein Slavonier (schlavonier), Tóth, Horvath.”22 These in turn are, respectively, the German word for “Slav,” a German word closely resembling the modern word for “Slovak,” and an archaic Hungarian word for “Slovak” that can also refer to Slavonia, the German word for “Slavonian” with an alternate spelling in parentheses, the previously-mentioned Hungarian word for “Slovak/Slavonian,” only capitalized (!?), and finally the Hungarian word for “Croat.” In contemporary terms, Bernolák’s first meaning conflates “Slovak” and “Slav,” while the second meaning appears to be “Slavonian.” Josef Jungmann’s 1835 Czech-German dictionary, the Slownjk Českoâ•‚Německý, also gave two definitions for the word Slowák. The first gives the modern particularist meaning “Slovak,” complete with unambiguous geographical bounds: “Hungarian Slav above the Danube, around Bratislava, Nitra, etc., ein Sowak, Slawak (im nördlichen Ungarn).” The second definition is “anything that is Slavic, ein Slawe.”23 As if to stress that the concepts Slav and Slovak were interchangeable, Jungmann defined Slovan as “the name of a nation which today encompasses the Russians, Poles, Czechs, Serbs, Illyrians etc, der Slawe,” yet also used it as a stylistic alternative for Slowák: “The names Slovan (Slowák), Croat, Lech, Czech, Bres, etc., are ancient names of Slavic tribes.”24 At the beginning of the nineteenth century, then, the adjective slovenský/ slovanský possessed at least two conflated meanings and two spelling variants. The ethnonym Slovák similarly possessed what Charles Frake called “different levels of contrast”:25 it could mean both “Slovak” and “Slav,” depending on context. Attention to context, furthermore, explains how such dual meanings might persist: during intra-Hungarian ethnic encounters, Slovaks most
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frequently contrasted themselves with neighboring Germans, Magyars or Jews, a situation in which the distinction between “Slovak” and “Slav” was irrelevant. Slovaks traveling to other Slavic countries, however, described themselves as “Hungarians.” This ambiguity impedes the analysis of nineteenth century texts, but the difficulties could be overstated. After all, scholars easily cope with the ambiguity of the adjective “American,” which contrasts both United States against Mexico and Canada (e.g. “Mexican-American trade relations”), and both American continents against Europe (“Spanish explorers sought American gold”). The two separate meanings of slovenský/slovanský have subsequently been assigned to the two possible spellings, but applying this distinction retroactively leads to errors of anachronism. That said, my translations of primary sources obey modern conventions: slovenský will be rendered as “Slovak,” slovanský as “Slavic.” Readers must often supply the ambiguity themselves. When Slovak literati discussed the slovenský language at the beginning of the nineteenth century, they were usually thinking in All-Slavic terms. This point requires emphasis, because Slovak historiography often claims exclamations of slovenský patriotism or loyalty as examples of Slovak particularist nationalism in its modern form. The first Slovak grammarians and script codifiers, however, wholly lacked a sense of Slovak particularist nationalism: their linguistic loyalties were “Slavic,” though their organizational activities obviously concentrated on Slavs living in the Hungarian kingdom. Consider the linguistic work of Anton Bernolák, a Catholic priest who studied in Bratislava and spent most of his life in a village parish nearby. He wrote his first philological work in 1787 while a seminary student in Bratislava; this was subsequently published as a grammar textbook in 1790. In 1789, Bernolák also founded an organization to promote this script, the Slovenské Učené Tovarišstvo [Slovak Educational Society] which eventually opened branches in Vienna, Nitra, Banská Bystryca, Spiš, Rožnava, Košice, Eger, and Esztergom. Bernolák’s script, Bernolákovčina, is most remarkable for the absence of {j}. Where modern Slovak and modern Czech have jelení and Bibličtina gelenj, Bernolák suggested gelení. Bernolák dispensed with Bibličtina {ě ř ů}, but stuck with old-fashioned {w}. An author writing according to these conventions is known as a “Bernolákovec” (plural “Bernolákovci”). A united front of Slovak historians and linguists have described Bernolák as “the first codifier of the Slovak language,”26 and most interpret the Bernolákovci as a Slovak nationalist movement. Dušan Kováč, discussing Bernolák and his followers, claimed that “Slovak Catholics, from the very beginning, had the concept of an independent Slovak people.”27 Bernolák himself, however, described the Dissertatio as a grammar for “Pannonian Slavs [pannonii
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Slavi],”28 alternatively for the “Slavs of Hungary [Hungaria Slavorum].”29 Bernolák described the script he codified using several formulae, but none correspond to “Slovak”: he spoke of “Pannonian Slavic [Pannonia Slavorum],”30 “the Slavic language in Hungary [linguae slavonicae in Hungaria],”31 or simply “the Slavic language [slavicae linguae, linguam slavonicam].”32 In a German translation of his Grammar textbook, Bernolák specified an All-Slavic language with explicit geographic clues: “the ancient Slavic language … is one of the main languages of Hungary, Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia, Poland, Slavonia, Croatia, Dalmatia, Serbia, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Moldavia, Wallachia, Ukraine, Lithuania, and the great Russian empire.”33 In short, Bernolák described his language as the intersection between Slavdom and Hungary. Insofar as Bernolák's motives were national, they were, as Eugen Pauliny concluded, “Hungaro-Slavic [uhorskoslovansky].”34 Bernolák’s inspiration, however, came not from nationalism but from the desire for Catholic Enlightenment. He hoped to reduce illiteracy and raise educational standards among the Slavs in the Hungarian kingdom. Literacy enabled Hungarian Slavs to acquire Hungarian educations: in what Elisabeth Bakke calls “the infamous preface in Bernolák’s Slowár,” Bernolák claimed his linguistic work would help Slovaks learn to speak Hungarian.35 The Bernolákovci, furthermore, were mostly priests, and wrote mostly on Catholic topics. Although Slovak scholar Milan Pišút has claimed that the literature written in Bernolákovčina “would have also honored the great literatures [of the world],”36 very little has attracted the interest of translators. Of 326 non-anonymous books listed in Imrich Kotvan’s exhaustive bibliography, 257 (78 per cent) were liturgical works or prayer guides; this figure includes thirteen separate catechisms and at least twenty hymnals, and excludes eight works whose contents were not clear from the title. The works of Ondrej Mesaroš typify Bernolákovčina literature: Reč na deň svatého Matúša apoštola [Speech for the day of the apostle St. Matthew], Svatí Jan Nepomucký [St. Jan Nepomouk] and Modlitbi a pobožene cvičení [Prayer and Religious Education]. Indeed, the figure of 78 per cent understates the confessional character of Bernolákovčina literature: a marriage guide written by a priest, for example, will presumably have a religious dimension. The Bernolákovčina corpus is not entirely religious: Ján Hollý wrote poetry, and both Martin Matejovič and Jozef Šestalky wrote autobiographies. Nevertheless, the literary corpus written in Bernolákovčina was overwhelmingly Catholic and confessional. 37 This religious content of Bernolákovčina literature reflects the social composition of the Bernolákovci: of 105 Bernolákovci authors Kotvan mentions, a full 100 (95 per cent) had studied Catholic theology.38 Most were parish priests, though Juraj Sklendár was a Jesuit, Aleksandar Alagović died a
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bishop, and Alexander Rudnaj, whom Kotvan credits with two publications in Bernolákovčina, became the archbishop of Esztergom and died a cardinal. The lay Bernolákovci consisted of two Pest lawyers, two bureaucrats and a winegrower.39 Bernolák’s learned society, the Slovenské Učené Tovarišstvo, also had a strong Catholic character. Of its 350 of its 442 members were Catholic clergymen, 79 per cent.40 Bernolák’s publisher, Landerer, also lacked nationalist motives. In 1790, Landerer published two other books besides Bernolák’s Grammatica Slavica: a Hungarian edition of the Psalms and a Hungarian religious book. Neither are likely titles for a Slovak national press.41 Bernolák’s credentials as a Slovak nationalist rest mostly on a comment in the introduction to his grammar: he wrote that he “leaves fully to his own will he who wishes to write in the Czech fashion.”42 This remark has endeared Bernolák to subsequent Slovak nationalists, since it appears to foreshadow the Slovak-Czech linguistic conflict in the first Czechoslovak republic. Bernolák’s comments, however, were not directed against Czechs, but against Slovak Lutherans. As will be discussed below, several Slovak grammarians in Bernolák’s day saw the Bibličtina tradition as “Czech.” Pavel Doležal, for example, had published a Grammatica Slavico-Bohemica in Bratislava in 1746, and an Elementa Linguae Slavo-Bohemicae [Elements of the Slavo-Czech Language] in Levoča in 1752.43 Slovak scholar Juraj Ribay published a Bibličtina textbook “for learning the French and Bohemian language” in Prague in 1775.44 Juraj [ Jíří] Palkovič, a professor at the Lutheran lyceum in Bratislava who wrote several books in Bibličtina, described himself as a “Czecho-Slavic Language and Literature” on the title page of a polemic on script reform.45 By inventing a new script, Bernolák broke with a long tradition of Slovak publishing. This break reflected not Slovak nationalism, but Bernolák’s Catholic unwillingness to use a script strongly associated with a heretical Lutheran Bible. Bernolák then left fully to his own will any heretic who wished to write in Lutheran Bibličtina, but the Slavic Catholics of Hungary needed their own script. The schism between Bibličtina and Bernolákovčina was not national, but confessional. Bernolák’s national concept differed little from that of Slovaks writing “in the Czech fashion”: both Catholics and Protestants were Hungarian loyalists who believed in an All-Slavic language. Ribay, like Bernolák, believed in a “Slavic nation [slowanského národu],”46 and wanted to increase literacy among the common people “not only in Bohemia and Moravia, but also in Hungary and other regions where the Slavic language [slowanský gazyk] blooms.”47 Palkovič, an important defender of Czech-Slovak unity, claimed that “the Slavs” were the most important ethnic group in Hungary.48 Bernolák, Ribay
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and Palkovič, in short, were all Hungaro-Slavs promoting literacy in the “Slavic language” among the common people in Hungary. The most one can say is that the Bernolákovci formed a Slovak particularist script community in practice, since Bernolákovčina had no impact in Bohemia or Moravia. Insofar as its users formed, in Hobsbawm’s phrase, a “vested interest,”49 they were distinctively and exclusively Slovak. Figure 5.1 shows the residences of Bernolákovci in the arbitrarily-selected year 1800; their locations map out western Slovakia. The disproportionately represented city of Trnava was a major center for church education. Figure 5.1: The Bernolákovci (1800)50
Since the Bernolákovci formed an indigenous literary life in Slavic northern Hungary, they make good ascriptive forebears for subsequent generations of Slovak nationalists. Nevertheless, the Bernolákovci can hardly pose as a national movement. The desire to spread the Catholic faith is not a national desire, nor even, necessarily, is the desire to spread Catholic Enlightenment. Furthermore, Slovak society shows confessional diversity: how could a literary movement consisting mostly of Catholic catechisms hope to inspire Slovak Lutherans or Slovak Calvinists? Slavic grammarians and intellectuals in the Habsburg Empire began to write from consciously national motives in the early nineteenth century, setting themselves national goals. The most important was the reduction of orthographic diversity. Standardization was a pressing need: in the early nineteenth century, Slovaks lacked a clear picture of their alphabet. Consider a selection of “Alphabet songs” in Kollár’s Národnié zpiewanky, the verses of
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which take the form “A is for Apple, B is for Bear,” etc. Such songs implicitly define an alphabet, but the various songs in Kollár’s songbook do not agree on which letters to include. One might define a “Basic Latin” alphabet as the 26 letters for which Mozart wrote his famous melody.51 Three of Kollár’s songs subtract the letter {j} from this “Basic Latin,”52 while the “Abeceda mládenska [Alphabet Song of Youth]” subtracts {v} while adding the letters {č š ž}.53 The “Abeceda ženských gmen [Alphabet Song of Women’s Names]”, each verse of which describes a woman whose name begins with the relevant letter, includes {j} and {ž}, but omits {g u w x y}.54 The letters of a final song are anybody’s guess: the text gives verses for A, B, and C and then instructs the reader to continue “and so on until Ž.”55 A single alphabet became a national goal for both practical and symbolic reasons. Standardized orthographic and spelling conventions would facilitate publishing and education, and would also form a symbol of national unity. Given the common perception that all Slavic speech belonged to a single language, Slovakia’s first nationalist language planners sought to devise a script for all Slavs to use, or at least for as many Slavs as possible. Czech awakener Jozef Dobrovský and the Slovene linguist Jernej Kopitar “exchanged several possible alphabets throughout their correspondence,” and in 1789, Dobrovský lamented to Ribay that Slavic literary progress would be easier “if only all the Slavs had our own, truly good orthography!”56 This shows that several Slovak, Czech, Slovene and Croat literati, at the turn of the nineteenth century, essentially agreed with Edward Brown: they believed that all Slavs spoke a single language. This movement for All-Slavic orthographic unity inspired literati throughout the Slavic world, but given Slovakia’s relatively sparse and poorly educated population, Slovaks play surprising numerous roles. The term “PanSlavism” itself was coined by the curiously under-studied Ján Herkel, who defined it as “the unity in literature among all Slavs [italics in original].”57 In his 1826 Elementa Universalis Linguae Slavicae, Herkel sought to overcome “diversity of letters for spelling”58 with a single alphabet that could be used by all the “Slavic nations.”59 Though Herkel’s quirky script found no adherents, it nevertheless cast a long shadow and deserves a detailed technical description. Herkel’s alphabet was based on the Latin alphabet, and strictly avoided digraphs.60 Like most Slavic orthographers, Herkel saw no need for {q} or {w} and omitted them, but used the letter {x} as if it were Cyrillic, i.e. for the guttural fricative that contemporary Czech and Slovak represent as {ch}.61This substitution affected the order of the letters: in Czech and Slovak, the digraph {ch} is considered a single letter and follows {h}; Herkel also placed {x} directly after {h}. As a further concession to Orthodox script sensibilities, Herkel
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replaced the letters {č} and {š}, which follow immediately after {c} and {s}, with their Cyrillic equivalents {ч} and {ш}.62 Since Herkel saw {y} as a variant of {i}, he placed it directly after {j}. Finally, he invented the entirely new letter, {z}, for Latin/Cyrillic {ž/ж}. It is difficult to understand why Edward Stankiewicz wrote that Herkel’s plan “ignores the question of a common Slavic alphabet,”63 since it clearly proposed a common Slavic alphabet with 27 letters: {a b c ч d e f g h x i j y k l m n o p r s ш t u v z z}.64 The Elementa Universalis Linguae Slavicae included sample texts in Russian, Ukrainian (“Little Russian”), Polish, Serbian, Bohemian, Pannonian, Wendish and Croat (“Illyrian”), printed in the new alphabet. Herkel followed Ribay, Bernolák, and Palkovič in imagining a single “Slavic language,” and his script, had it been adopted, would have considerably simplified the orthographic complexity of the Slavic world. The {s}, {sz}, and {ssz} in the 1750 Malý katechizmus, mentioned above, would have been replaced with {s}. Herkel’s system would also have facilitated comprehension between Slavs in different countries. Comparing the 21 Slavic scripts listed in Michal Hodža’s 1847 Epigenes Slovenicus with the different 21 scripts listed in Ignac Brlić’s 1833 Grammar of the Illyrian Language reveals that the sound / tſ/ (the “ch” in English “cheese”) was written in at least eight different ways in various parts of the Slavic world: Croatian (before Ljudevit Gaj’s reforms) used {ch}, Polish {cz}, Czech {č}, Dalmatian, Bosnian and Slavonian {cs}, Russian and Serbian {ч}, Lusatian-Sorbian {cž}, Slovene/Wendish {zh} and SotacSlovene {tz}.65 The Malý katechizmus, furthermore, used {ts}.66 One might also expand this list by distinguishing the Blackletter {cˇ} from the normal Latin {č}. Herkel would have replaced all with a single letter: {ч}. Herkel, however, made allowances for sounds peculiar to specific regions of the Slavic world. For example, he permitted the letter {ć} in Illyrian and Sorbian, and replaced Polish {dz} and {szcz} with {∂} and {sć}. The Polish nasal vowels {ą} and {ę} and the digraph {rz} were to “be left to the Poles,” though Herkel, with his distaste for digraphs, advised that {rz} should be eliminated: “the Bohemians have already eliminated z with r, … we would not be discouraged if the same would happen with the Poles.”67 The Czechs had replaced {rz} with the letter {ř}, and while this letter did not occur in Herkel’s sample Czech text, its absence was probably an oversight. Herkel never wrote out his full Slavic alphabet, but it apparently contained 32 letters: {a ą b c ч ć d ∂ e ę f g h x i j y k l m n o p r ř s ш t u v z z}. Not all Slavs would use all these letters: Czechs and Russians, for example, would never use {ą ∂ ę}, since their speech does not contain the sounds these letters represent. This surprising tolerance for orthographic diversity within a single “language” means that Herkel’s alphabet would not have provided a standard
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spelling or vocabulary for the entire Slavic zone. Different “dialects,” such as Russian and Polish, would retain their own scripts, thus forming what might be called “literary dialects.”68 Instead of “Slovak,” Herkel imagined a “Pannonian” dialect.69 Herkel accepted grammatical and lexical differences in different literary dialects, which implies the eventual need for dialect-dialect dictionaries. Even if both Czechs and Croats had adopted Herkel’s script, for example, a Czech would need a dictionary to translate zohar into шvab (both meaning “cockroach”). The idea of a single Slavic language with multiple literary dialects also informed the work of Ján Kollár, the most important All-Slavic author in Slovak history. Kollár originally came to public attention as a poet, specifically as the author of the epic poem Sláwy dcera [The Daughter of Sláva], first published in 1824.70 Inspired by Kollár’s long courtship of his eventual wife, Mina Schmidt, this work sings the praises of the goddess Sláva, “glory,” thus conflating romantic love and patriotism. (Cyril Kraus has reworked the following excerpt into modern Czech orthography.) Ural, Tatra, Volga, řeka Savská a všech hor i krajin okolek, kde se koli mluva slyší Slavská: Zaplesejte, bratři, i vy, i já líbeme se při tom vespolek, to, hle, vlast je naše: Všeslávia! Urals, Tatras, Volga, the Sava river, And all mountains and lands around them, Wherever Slavic is spoken and heard, Shout, brothers, both you and me, Let us love each other, for it, Behold, this homeland is ours: All-Slavia!71 This poem immediately created an unprecedented literary sensation in Czech and Slovak literary circles; even Magyar chauvinists wrote that they “knew to prize the talent of a Kollár.”72 Kollár then wrote a series of pamphlets promoting All-Slavic unity under the slogan “Slavic reciprocity.”73 Like Herkel’s “Pan-Slavism,” which aspired to bring about “unity in literature,” Kollár’s reciprocity operated within a linguistic sphere: Slavic reciprocity was “not a political, but a literary joining
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of all four chief Slav tribes; each Slav tribe would retain its dialect, but it would know of, buy and read the books and literature of other Slav tribes.”74 In a longer German-language essay, seven years later, Kollár’s formula had become more mystical, but remained apolitical: reciprocity was “the common participation of all national branches in the spiritual achievements of their common nation.”75 The “nation” was the key historic agent in Kollár’s view of history: “The Slavic nation exerts itself to regain its original unity”76 since Slavs “awaken to national feeling and long for a closer unity.”77 The “national” unity Kollár proposed concerned the linguistic half of Hungaro-Slavic dual nationality: “the dispersed Slavic tribes look at themselves as one great people and at their various dialects as one language, awaken to national feeling, and long to bind themselves closer to each other.”78 Non-linguistic aspects of “national” life did not interest Kollár: he ignored politics, economics, and positively denigrated military affairs as “the spilling of blood, conquests and enslavement.”79 Kollár made his disinterest in politics absolutely explicit: Literary reciprocity can still exist there where a nation stands under many scepters, divided among many states, kingdoms, principalities, governments or republics. Reciprocity is also possible where many religions churches and confessions exist, where diversity of script and letters, climate and geography, and diversity of customs exist.80 Kollár saw the nation primarily as a vehicle for creating a literary canon: for him, “poets are the flowers of the nation, they are most deeply inspired by its spirit: they have the greatest audience of readers, which they can influence for the good.”81 Kollár’s essay on Reciprocity proposed a nine-point plan to promote cultural unity within the Slavic world. Kollár’s agenda was more comprehensive than Herkel’s. Like Herkel, Kollár wanted to decrease orthographic diversity, but he placed greater emphasis on literature: Slavs must read the novels and poetry written in other parts of the Slavic world, and to that end must study other Slavic dialects. To help educated Slavs learn other dialects, the 1836 version of Kollár’s essay advised travelling to “regions where other Slavic dialects are spoken.”82 The suggestions Kollár made in the final version of the essay, however, could all be accomplished with local action. Point one called for Slavic bookstores in “all capitals of our tribes, namely Petersburg, Warsaw, Kraków, Lviv, Prague, Vienna, Pest, Brno, Belgrade, Zagreb, etc.”83 Since this might prove expensive, Point two suggested that Slavic literati should “exchange their works with
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each other.” Point three suggested university departments with chairs devoted to the study of Slavic dialects; point four called for a Pan-Slavic literary newspaper “in which every new Slavic work should be shown and discussed in its original dialect, namely a Serbian book in Serbian, a Polish book in Polish, Russian in Russian, Czech in Czech.” Point five called for the creation of Slavic libraries organized “according to the four or five main dialects.” Kollár wanted these libraries to contain pedagogical works, and listed several grammars and dictionaries by name. Point six called for comparative textbooks “that show the formal and material difference between the dialects, and so facilitate the learning of the same. Specifically, we recommend good etymological works, which so terribly ease the study of dialects.”84 Point seven called for Slavs to publish folklore translations from other dialects, though Kollár showed less interest in translating novels or other belles lettres.85 While Kollár yearned to deepen Slavic literature, he did not concern himself with the details of script reform. He supported lexical purism; or as Point eight put it, “the general overcoming of words from foreign languages.” Point nine, an addition from the 1836 version, called for a “uniform, philosophic orthography, based on the spirit of the Slavic language, which all Slavs can use.”86 Kollár approvingly quoted Herkel on the advantage of a common script, but did not use or mention Herkel’s system. Nor did Kollár propose any specific orthography, though he condemned the imitation of foreign spelling. Sticking with the example of the sound /tſ/, mentioned above, Kollár would have refused to take sides between {ч} and {č}, but rejected {cs} because of its foreign origin.87 Kollár was most interested in issues that would today be interpreted as questions of “identity”: The Pole should not just be a Pole but a Slavo-Pole, and should study not just his own books, but also the Russian, Bohemian and Serbian dialects; the Russian should not just be a Russian, but a Slavo-Russian, he does not just know and read his own script, but also the Polish, Bohemian, Serbian dialect; the Bohemian is not just a Bohemian but a Slavo-Čech, he does not just learn Bohemian, but also Polish, Russian, Serbian; the Serbian or Illyrian should not just be a Serb, but a Slavo-Serb, buys and reads not just Serbian, but also Polish, Russian and Bohemian works. Only he who knows these main dialects should take pen in hand and be a Slavic author.88 This grandiose project to rename the Slavs had both predecessors and consequences. According to Albert Pražák, Martin Bél used the term “Slavi-
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Bohemi” in 1742, as did an 1780 geography.89 The “Slavo-” prefix also endured: Rudolf Bačkovský wrote a popular history of the “Slavo-Czechoslovaks” in 1919.90 The main point, however, is that Kollár saw all Slavs as a single nation, classified Slovaks as Czechs, and downplayed the “dialectical” loyalties of Poles, Russians, Czechs, etc. Kollár’s essay proved influential. A Russian teacher in Warsaw even published a multi-dialectical newspaper from 1841 to 1844, though the venture proved a financial failure.91 The various incarnations of the Slawisches Centralblatt,92 published from 1862 to 1868, created a similar forum for All-Slavic literary life, albeit through the medium of German. The Croatian journalist Ljudevit Gaj, who saw Kollár as a mentor and friend, translated Kollár’s essay on reciprocity in his newspaper, and followed Kollár’s precepts in his celebrated reform of Croatian orthography: The educated Bohemian and Pole feels Pan-Slavism (i.e. the inner desire to bring all Slavic brothers to linguistic-literary unity) too deeply for us to abandon hope that a Croatian book, written with this rational orthography, can be read in Bohemia and Poland as well.93 Gaj introduced several letters “used by our brothers the Czechs, Poles, Slovaks, and Moravians”94 into Croatian orthography, including {ď} {ľ} {ň} {ť}, since replaced by {đ}, {lj}, {nj} and {ć}, as well as {č}, {š} and {ž}, still in use.95 Kollár sharply distinguished Slavic literary nationality from politics. John Bradley wrote that “nationalism in central Europe, especially among the Slavonic nations, began by being purely cultural, though its ultimate aim was political, and in the absence of national states, assumed a linguistic form.”96 Kollár shows no trace of any “ultimate aims,” and also matched words with deeds during the Revolution of 1848: he publicly defended the legitimacy of the Habsburg monarch and refused to participate in any political meetings. In this, however, Kollár was exceptional: All-Slavic thought generally acquired a political dimension during the 1848 Revolution, which Václav Žáček described as the “high-water mark in the history of Austro-Slavism.”97 The key event was the Slavic Congress in Prague. On 20 April 1848, Croatian patriot Ivan Kukuljević suggested that the Slavs of the Habsburg monarchy should meet to discuss affairs of common interest; the idea found immediate approval in the heady Revolutionary atmosphere. Invitations were printed and distributed in eight different scripts, both Slavic and non-Slavic,98 but not in Russian: the organizers wished to demonstrate their loyalty to the Habsburg Empire.
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The congress assembled on 21 May and met for about three months. Officially, 340 delegates attended, but Stanley Pech estimates the true figure at 385: 317 official delegates and 68 guests and observers.99 Kollár excused his absence by claiming to have received death threats from “a Magyar soldier.”100 All-Slavic rhetoric dominated the congress: a typical pamphlet proclaimed, “we are one … we are brothers.”101 Slavic unity, however, proved elusive in practice. The deputies had hoped to conduct deliberations in Slavic, but quickly discovered that they did not really understand each other: everything important had to be translated into German. Slovak delegates at the Prague Congress remained faithful to the HungaroSlavic tradition, which put them at odds with other delegates. The Poles rejected Slovak demands for linguistic rights: they wanted to avoid setting a precedent for the Galician Ukrainians. The aristocratic Poles also sympathized with Kossuth’s efforts to protect Hungary’s autonomy within the Habsburg system. The Czechs similarly sought to defend Bohemian state right, and thus also sympathized with the Hungarian parliament. Some Czechs suggested that an autonomous Slovak territory should be detached from Hungary, but Slovak deputies were not yet ready for a complete break from Hungary, and instead proposed an autonomous parliament under Hungarian jurisdiction. Despite these internal divisions, the Prague Congress managed to terrify both Hungarians and Germans before its dissolution by Habsburg Imperial authorities. Non-Slavs usually equated “Pan-Slavism” with Russian expansion. Der Freimütige, a Viennese paper, accused the congress of hoping “for an outbreak of a revolutionary movement in Russia, … and then for the foundation of an almost unlimited Slavic republic which would dominate the shores of the Arctic and the banks of the Bosphorus.”102 The contents of another pamphlet, Franz Schuselka’s 1849 German or Russian? A Question of Life or Death for Austria, were accurately summarized in the title.103 Indeed, hysterical fear had characterized German and Hungarian attitudes toward Pan-Slavism from the very beginning. During the Language War, Magyar chauvinists accused Slovak literati of treason for any effort to cultivate Slavic culture. Šafařík scorned Magyar “storming and raging” in an 1841 letter: “Through such slanders they make themselves and their cause despicable.”104 Other Slovaks complied lists of the unpleasant names they had been called. Stěpan Launer complained in 1847 that he had been called a “Slavoman, Rusoman, Pan-Slav, God knows what sort of propagandist, traitor to the homeland, enemy of education, light and humanity, etc.”105 Michal Hodža’s 1848 list included “Rebel, incendiary, Pan-Slavist, Russianist, paid Muscovite agitator, etc.”106 Jonáš Zaborský wrote in 1851 that “the words ‘Pan-Slav’ and ‘Rusophile’ are now what the word ‘heretic’ once was, words of black magic.”107
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Hurban’s 1861 list, charmingly attributed to the “Satan of name-calling,” placed “Pan-Slavist” alongside “Absolutist,” “Mystic,” “Bigot [Finsterling],” “Papist,” “Crypto-Catholic,” “Traitor to the Fatherland [Vaterlandsverräter]” and “Rebel.”108 Slovak literati took these attacks not only as personal insults, but as affronts to their Hungarian patriotism. Slovaks initially sought to assure the Magyars that their “Pan-Slavism” only concerned linguistic questions, and did not damage their Hungarian political loyalties. Hojč, for example, wrote that Under the term Pan-Slavism one understands the striving of the Slavs toward a nearer unification among each other, the binding of the various tribes into one large whole … We Hungaro-Slavs stand accused that we strive for unification with Russia. … But a political Pan-Slavistic striving, where have we ever brought this to the light of day?109 Hojč elaborated that “unquestionably there are friends of the literary PanSlavism in Hungary, but this is a world apart from the political sort,”110 concluding that “the political Pan-Slavism has no friends among us, but the literary has many, and wins ever more.”111 Záborský similarly wrote in 1851 that he “did not seek any sort of Pan-Slavism,” nor “any civic union of All-Slavia [Všeslávie],” he only wanted “literary reciprocity to take root between Slavs.”112 In 1865, Daniel Lichard attempted to distinguish Pan-Slavism from “political Pan-Slavism,”113 and as late as 1875, Ján Palárik tried to conv