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Chomsky, Noam (Author). Chomsky on Anarchism. Oakland, CA, USA: AK Press, 2005. p i. http://site.ebrary.com/lib/dominicanuc/Doc?id=10407946&ppg=1
Chomsky, Noam (Author). Chomsky on Anarchism. Oakland, CA, USA: AK Press, 2005. p 1. http://site.ebrary.com/lib/dominicanuc/Doc?id=10407946&ppg=2
CHOMSKY ON ANRRCHISM
SELECTED AND EDITED BY
BRRRY PRTEMRN
EDINBUR:GH, OAKLAND AND WEST VIRGINIA
AK PRESS
2005
COPYRIGHT@1969, 1970, 1976, 1986, 1990, 1995, 1996, 2004,2005 NOAM CHOMSKY
CHOMSKY ON ANARCHISM
ISBN: 1-904859-20-8 9781904859260 LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CONTROL NUMBER: 2005923315
AK PRESS
AK PRESS
674 A 23RD STREET
PO Box 12766
OAKLAND CA
EDINBURGH, SCOTlAND
94612-1163 USA
EH8 9YE
Interior layout and design: Fran Sendbuehler Chomsky, Noam (Author). Chomsky on Anarchism. Oakland, CA, USA: AK Press, 2005. p 2. http://site.ebrary.com/lib/dominicanuc/Doc?id=10407946&ppg=3
Cover design: John Yates
CHOMSKY ON AN ARCHISM PREFACE
5
INTRODUCTION
7
ONE. OBJECTIVITY AND LIBERAL SCHOLARSHIP
11
TWO· LANGUAGE AND FREEDOM
101
THREE. NOTES ON ANARCHISM
118
FOUR· THE RELEVANCE OF ANARCHO-$VNDICALISM (INTERVIEW)
133
FIVE. PREFACE TO ANTOLOGIJA ANARHIZMA
149
SIX· CONTAINING THE THREAT OF DEMOCRACY
153
SEVEN· ANARCHISM, MARXISM AND HOPE FOR THE fUTURE
178
Chomsky, Noam (Author). Chomsky on Anarchism. Oakland, CA, USA: AK Press, 2005. p 3. http://site.ebrary.com/lib/dominicanuc/Doc?id=10407946&ppg=4
(INTERVIEW)
EIGHT. GORLS AND VISIONS
190
NINE· ANARCHISM, INTElLECTUALS AND THE STATE (INTERVIEW)
212
INTERVIEW WITH BARRY PATEMAN
221
ELEVEN. INTERVIEW WITH ZIGA VODOVNIK
234
TEN
•
Chomsky, Noam (Author). Chomsky on Anarchism. Oakland, CA, USA: AK Press, 2005. p 4. http://site.ebrary.com/lib/dominicanuc/Doc?id=10407946&ppg=5
PREFACE I was a teenager when I first learned that Chomsky was an anarchist. The dis covery had a powerful effect. This was around 1980 and, while "anarchy" was proclaimed loudly from the stages of some punk rock shows I attended. I felt isolated in my beliefthat there was something profound, and profoundly seri ous, about the doctrine I had adopted-something beyond easy exhortations to "smash the state," without any suggestion of how, or what to replace it with. I'd read the dassics-Proudhon. Bakunin, Kropotkin-but they were hard to find, 110( to mention dead. Chomsky was not only alive, he was a widely-read, well-respected intellectual, who weme his first pro-anarchist essay at (he age of ten, hung our at anarchist newsstands and bookshops on 4th Avenue in Manhanan as a teenager (not far from my punk stomping grounds), and still maintained his anti-authoritarian beliefs as an adult. Despite the connadiction my peers might have seen in appealing to the aurhority of such a public figure, I felt validated, and much less alone.
Chomsky, Noam (Author). Chomsky on Anarchism. Oakland, CA, USA: AK Press, 2005. p 5. http://site.ebrary.com/lib/dominicanuc/Doc?id=10407946&ppg=6
Part of the reason we at AK Press are publishing this book is to inspire that same sense of excitement and discovery. It's much harder to pull off today, of course, at least within the anarchist movement itself Anarchism is more wide spread and visible-validation and community within it much easier to find. Chomsky's version ofliberrarian socialism is somewhat better known. Bm per haps that very familiarity is dangerous. We think we know what anarchism is. We think we know who Chomsky is. And, in that knowing, we miss a lot of nuance and complexity. The essays and interviews collected in this book, writ ten between 1 969 and 2004, will hopefully hold surprises and raise productive questions for even the mOSt self-assured anarchist. We're also publishing this book for the many people our there who don't know what anarchism is, or whose knowledge of it is mostly limited to sensa tionalist newspaper headlines. For them, we see Chomsky as a bridge to a new set of ideas about the means and ends of social change, to a I 50-year tradition of revolutionary thought and practice that has sought social and economic jus tice without the mediation of bosses, politicians or bureaucrats. Outside the anarchist movement, many are completely unaware of the libertarian socialist roots of Chomsky's work, how they relate not only to his social criticism, bm also to his linguistic theory. For them, the surprises in this book will be greater. What, after all, could such a reasonable and intelligent man have to do with people the nightly news tells us are the very antithesis of Reason? Quite a bit, as this book will make abundantly dear. Chomsky's well known critiques-of the media, o f US foreign policy, of exploitation and oppression in all their forms---don't come out of nowhere. They're based on his fundamental beliefs about what it means to be human: who we are, what we're capable of becoming, how we might organize our lives, and how our
5
PREFACE
pmential is stunted and deformed by hierarchical social relationships. Critique without an underlying vision is mere complaint, which is precisely how politi cians and Fox News anchors portray all social protest. To understand Chomsky, one must understand his vision-which is to say one must under stand anarchism. If this book serves its purpose, you'll be well on your way. As Barry Pateman suggests in his introduction, there is no single definition of anar chism. Certainly, some anarchists will take issue with d ifferent aspects of Chomsky's version-especially, for instance, his refusal to deny the importance of reformist political victories (however dear he is about their limitations). But, whether they know nothing about anarchism or think they know every thing, everyone who reads this book will learn something valuable. And then, hopefully, go on to learn more, enough to eventually build the sort of world Chomsky envisions, a world where every person participates directly in the decisions that affect their daily lives and illegitimate authority is consigned to its proper place: a sad historical footnote about the days before we got our act together and set things righc.
Chomsky, Noam (Author). Chomsky on Anarchism. Oakland, CA, USA: AK Press, 2005. p 6. http://site.ebrary.com/lib/dominicanuc/Doc?id=10407946&ppg=7
6
Charles Weigl for the AK Press Collective March 2005
INTRODUCTION The purpose of this volume is to present some of Noam Chomsky's ideas and thoughts on anarchism. Chomsky is regularly identified by the media as a prominent anarchisrllibertarian communist/anarcho-syndicalisr {pick as many as you like}. More importantly he places himselfwithin this political spectrum. Regardless of whether any of these labels fits him perfecrly, there can be no doubt that his ideas on social change and the re-srmcnlfing of society are wor thy of consideration and discussion. We have selected a variety for the reader [Q consider and, through which, to hopefully gauge boch Chomsky's contri bmion (Q anarchism and anarchism's contemporary relevance as a means of interprering and changing rhe world. Some of these talks and interviews are published here for the first time and, combined with more familiar material, they reinforce and elaborate Chomsky's sense of what anarchism is and what it could be. Inevitably, there is some rep etition among the pieces, specific themes and theorists to which Chomsky often returns. Trying to get the same message across tends to make one repet itive! That said, though, as each idea is revisited, both clarity and nuance are added to some challenging ideas.
Chomsky, Noam (Author). Chomsky on Anarchism. Oakland, CA, USA: AK Press, 2005. p 7. http://site.ebrary.com/lib/dominicanuc/Doc?id=10407946&ppg=8
Chomsky's introduction to Daniel Guerin's Anarchism ( 1 970), which he later revised for publication in for Reasons of State ( 1 973) as "Nmes on Anarchism," is importanr in crystallizing his sense of anarchism as bmh an historical force and a way of bringing about conremporary social change. It was an essay that was criticized by some anarchists. George Woodcock, an anarchist historian, argued that it was one-dimensional. Chomsky, said Woodcock, was a left-wing Marxist (as was Guerin) who wished to use anarchism to soften and clarify his own Marxism. His work was mired in the nineteenth century language of anarchism. At best it was anarcho-syndicalism; at worst simple economic determinism. There was no reference to Kropotkin, Malatesta, Herbert Read. For Woodcock, Chomsky equates anarchist struggle with a single class and fails to see that anarchism appeals to "those people of all classes who seek a society where the potentialities of existence are varied and liberated, a society to be approached by lifestyle rebellion as well as economic struggle." Woodcock's criticisms are interesting and nOt without their ironies. To be sure, there is in Chomsky's work a certain blurring of terms, as well as the sug gestion that left-wing communism, council communism and anarchism have much in common as tools with which to critique state socialism and capital ism. This idea is repeated in varying forms throughout this book. Chomsky remains as equally impressed by Pannekoek as by Rudolph Rocker or Diego Abad de Santillan. In his interview with Barry Pateman in 2004, he argues that there are differences between this left strand of communism and anarchists, but that "they are the kind of differences that ought to exist when people are
7
INTRODUCTION
working together in comradely relationships." Equally important is Chomsky's perceprion of class as the central tenet of anarchism. It's a theme he will keep returning to and a theme that is out of synch with both Woodcock and some elements of contemporary anarchism. For Chomsky, it is quite straightfor ward: within modern capitalism we see matters of class arising all the time. To deny or minimize them is nonsensical. Such a position can lead him to harsh criticisms of anarchists like Srirner, primitivists, and all those who cannot see the importance of solidarity and community in a class-based way. Woodcock and Chomsky are nO( roo far apart however on the central ques rion oEhow an anarchy can be brought about. Both seem to shy away from the idea of a single revolutionary moment that will ovenhrow capitalism. Rather, they imagine it could well be a long, drawn-out process. It's an idea shared by other anarchists such as Colin Ward who, in his Anarchy in Action (I 973), argues that: an anarchist society, a society that organizes itself without authority, is always in existence... buried under the weight of the state and its bureaucracy, capitalism and its waste, privilege, reli gious differences, nationalism and its suicidal loyalries, religious differences and their superstitious separatism.
Chomsky, Noam (Author). Chomsky on Anarchism. Oakland, CA, USA: AK Press, 2005. p 8. http://site.ebrary.com/lib/dominicanuc/Doc?id=10407946&ppg=9
B
h is an idea that has always had resonance with some anarchists-Rocker is a notable example-and perhaps allows us to understand some of Chomsky's
ideas more clearly. Surely, like Ward, he sees a fundamental human decency in
people. A decency that has somehow survived, and will continue to survive, all the weapons that capitalism can throw at it. From this decency comes ways of being that can operate within capitalism and point the way to a future of anar chy. Hence, Chomsky can argue that progressive taxation and Social Security are created by attitudes which, if pushed a little more, would be anarchist. It's a little bit reminiscent of Kropotkin arguing that lifeboatmen were an example of anarchist communism in action, or the syndicalist idea the certain kinds of unions could become the source of a new society-the new in the shell of the old. Such an attitude certainly answers the problem of how we create anarchy in our day-to-day lives. It also explains the myriad of examples Chomsky gives of how to move towards anarchy, many of which implicitly suggest the rich ness of character and ability to provide mutual aid prevalent in many people. A cynical reader may well want ro ask how long one must wait for the state to be eroded by these examples of anarchy in action, or might point our the sup pleness and malleability of capitalism in incorporating many of these ideas as its own. But, as Woodcock argues of anarchists: "h is to liberating the great network of human co-operation that even now spreads through all the levels of our lives than to creating or even imagining brave new worlds that they have bent their efforts." Chomsky's anarchism has always been grounded in history. It might be hard for liS now, in an era where there are numerous sympathetic accounts of
CHOMSKY ON A N ARCHISM
the anarchist experience in the Spanish revolution, to realize how important his essay "Objectivity and Liberal Scholarship" was in 1969. To be sure, there was Vernon Richard's excellent Lessons ofthe Spanish Revolution, but Chomsky went further. He clinically dissected Gabriel Jackson's The Spanish RepubLic and the Civil War:1931-1939 and linked it to the liberal ideology prevalent in America in the 1960s, an ideology that reflects "an antagonism to mass move ments and to social change that escapes the control of privileged elites," which in Jackson's work reveals itself through a regular use of negative language to describe the actions of the anarchists. Chomsky, using a rich array ofhisrorical texts, brought his points to a wide audience and influenced a new generation of researchers and militants, inspiring them to probe deeper and further. In his portrayal of Jackson's work as representing contemporary American liberal thinking on Vietnam, Chomsky impressively linked past and present, making a shrewd and disturbing commem on liberalism in general. In the words of Peter Werbe: "As Chomsky amply and admirably demons nates, when the major issues of an era are settled in blood, liberalism's pretense to humane ends or means crumbles under the demands of an implacable state." So here are some key components of Chomsky's anarchism: an awareness of anarchist history and how it still retains a freshness and urgency in the light of today's challenges; a broad and generous definition of anarchism that links left and council communists in its critique of capitalism and sees them as nat ural allies; the central importance of class in any critique of capitalism and in creating anarchy; and a belief in people's innate goodness, which is reflected in
Chomsky, Noam (Author). Chomsky on Anarchism. Oakland, CA, USA: AK Press, 2005. p 9. http://site.ebrary.com/lib/dominicanuc/Doc?id=10407946&ppg=10
actions and structures that contribute to what Rocker, in Anarcho-Syndicalism, calls "a definite trend in (he historic development of mankind, which ... strives for the free, unhindered unfolding of all the individual and social forces in life." All of this is allied to a flexible methodology through which to accom plish this unfolding, a willingness to change tactics, to consider a variety of strategies, and a reluctance to speak with too much certainty or rigidness. Chomsky expresses these ideas in clear and straightforward language, arguing strongly against the mystifying nature of much inrellecrual writing and the feelings of powerlessness caused by unnecessarily complex and elliptical lan guage. There are some questions that we can still raise. One has the sense that Chomsky's ideas about class could be a little tighter. Yes, class is manifestly an economic state. It is, however, also a cultural state. To be working class is not just to be part of an hierarchy: it is to be part of an experience, something that is lived. Just what that experience is and how it is realized may well have impli cations for the anarchism that Chomsky champions. Of course, all writing is a form of shorthand, bur one would very much like to see him discuss this rich er and more complex picture of class at greater length. Secondly, and perhaps more controversially (to anarchists at least), is Chomsky's claim that the state can be used to move towards a more equitable anarchical society. He sees the libertarian movement as sometimes "pursuing doctrine in a rigid fashion with-
9
INTRODUCTION
out being concerned about the human consequences," when simply opposing the state might mean placing even greater power in the hands of reactionary forces, private (usually corporate) powers that would reinforce inequality and hardship. He goes on, in one interview, to suggest that "protecting the state sector today is a step towards abolishing the state." He also adds that, in the process of p ursuing so cial ch ange though the mechanisms of the state, p eople will inev itably run up against the inherent limits of such reformist tactics and, eventually, understand that the system itself must be changed.
Such arguments, of course, do challenge accepted anarchist theory. For people like Emma Goldma n all states were CO be done way with. The "demo cratic state," she suggested, once it was challenged, would become as oppres sive as the most totalitarian state. For Chomsky. the state can maintain "a pub lic arena" where there is still some room in which people can operate and bring about change. It's a position that will spark debate and, in the eyes of some, question his whole conception of anarchism.
Chomsky, Noam (Author). Chomsky on Anarchism. Oakland, CA, USA: AK Press, 2005. p 10. http://site.ebrary.com/lib/dominicanuc/Doc?id=10407946&ppg=11
More could be said. For instance, Chomsky has a flexible view of voting. He suggests that, like some other anarchists, he does vote on local matters. In terms of national elections, he suggests that if M assachusetts were a swing state he would vote. If not, "there are a variety of possible choices, depending on one's evaluation of the significance." Such flexibility of approach to these mat ters, which can be interpreted as mere common sense, could also raise (he question of what anarchist p ractice actually is, and how it differs from that of, say, social democ rats. Arg umen ts such as these will not go away. Tensions will continue. Attitudes will solidify, shift and change. The consistency between theory and practice will continue to be worked our. Chomsky has much to contribute to that process and there is much for us to admire in both his opti mism and his clear sense of the difficult struggles ahead: The record of anarchist ideas, and even more, of the inspiring struggles of people who have sought to liberate themselves from oppression and domination must be rreasured and preserved, not as a means of freezing thought and conception in some new mold but as a basis for understanding of the social reality and committed work to change it. There is no reason to suppose that history is at an end, that the currem structures of authority and domination are graven in StOne. It would also be a great error to underestimate the power of social forces that will fight to main tain power and privilege.
Barry Pateman March 2005
ONE OBJECTIVITY AN D LIBERAL SCHOLARSHIP
(1969) I
In a recent essay, Conor Cruise O'Brien speaks of the process of "collnterrev oiurionary subordination" which poses a threat (Q scholarly integrity in om own counterrevolutionary society, just as "revolutionary subordination," a phe nomenon ohen noted and rightly deplored, has undermined scholarly integri ty in revolutionary situations. 1 He observes that "power in our time has more intelligence in its service, and allows that intelligence more discretion in its methods, than ever before in history," and suggests that [his development is not alwgether encouraging, since we have moved perceptibly towards the state o["a society maimed through the systematic corruption afits intelligence." He urges that "increased and specific vigilance, not just [he elaboration of general principles, is required from the inrellectual communiry toward specific grow ine; danr;er.� to its inter;riry."
Chomsky, Noam (Author). Chomsky on Anarchism. Oakland, CA, USA: AK Press, 2005. p 11. http://site.ebrary.com/lib/dominicanuc/Doc?id=10407946&ppg=12
Senator Fulbright has developed a similar theme in an important and per ceptive speech. 2 He describes the failure of the universities to form "an effec tive counterweight to the military-industrial complex by strengthening their emphasis on the traditional values of our democracy." Instead they have "joined (he monolith, adding greatly to its power and influence." Specifically, he refers to the failure of the social scientists, "who ought to be acting as responsible and independenr critic; of the governmenr's policies," bur who instead become the agents of these policies. "While young dissenters plead for resurrection of the American promise, their elders continue to subvert ir." With "the surtender of independence, the neglect of teaching, and the distor tion of scholarship," the university "is not only failing to meet its responsibil ities to its students; it is betraying a public trust. The extent of this betrayal might be argued; its existence. as a threatening tendency, is hardly in doubt. Senator Fullbright mentions one primary cause: the access to money and influence. Others might be mentioned: for example. a highly restrictive, almost universally shared ideology, and the inherent dynamics of professionalization. As to the former, Fulbright has cited else where the observation of De Tocqueville: "I know of no country in which there is so little independence of mind and real freedom of discussion as in America." Free institutions certainly exist, bur a tradition of passiviry and con formism restricts their use-the cynic might say this is why they continue to
11
OBJE CTIVITY A N D LIBERAL SCHOLARSHIP
exist. The impact of professionalization is also quite clear. The "free-floating intellectual" may occupy himself with problems because of their inherent interest and importance, perhaps to little effect. The professional, however, tends to define his problems on the basis of the technique that he has mastered, and has a natural desire to apply his skills. Commenting on this process, Senator Clark quotes the remarks of Dr. Harold Agnew, director of the Los Alamos Laboratories Weapons Division: "The basis of advanced technology is innovation and nothing is more stifling to innovation than seeing one's prod uct not used or ruled out of consideration on flimsy premises involving public world opinion"3_"a shocking s(atement and a dangerous one," as Clark right ly comments. In much the same way, behavioral scientists who believe them selves to be in possession of certain techniques of control and manipulation will tend CO search for problems to which their knowledge and skills might be relevant, defining these as the "important problems"; and it will come as no surprise that they occasionally express their contempt for "flimsy premises involving public world opinion" that restrict the application of these skills. Thus among engineers, there are the "weapons cultists" who construct their bombs and missiles, and among the behavioral scientists, we find the techni cians who design and carry our "experiments with population and resources control methods" in Viemam.4
Chomsky, Noam (Author). Chomsky on Anarchism. Oakland, CA, USA: AK Press, 2005. p 12. http://site.ebrary.com/lib/dominicanuc/Doc?id=10407946&ppg=13
1. 2
These various factors-access to power, shared ideology, professionalization-may or may not be deplorable in themselves, but there can be no doubt that they interact so as to pose a serious threat to the integrity of scholarship in fields that are struggling for intellectual content and are thus particu.larly susceptible to the workings of a kind of Gresham's law. What is more, the sub version of scholarship poses a threat to society at large. The danger is particu larly great in a society that encourages specializ.ation and stands in awe of tech nical expertise. In such circumstances, the opportunities are great for the abuse of knowledge and technique-to be more exact, the claim to knowledge and technique. Taking note of these dangers, one reads with concern the claims of some social scientists that their discipline is essential for the training of those to whom they refer as "the mandarins of the furure."5 Philosophy and litera ture still "have their value," so Ithiel Pool informs us, but it is psychology, soci ology, systems analysis, and political science that provide the knowledge by which "men of power are humanized and civilized." In no small measure, the Vietnam war was designed and executed by these new mandarins, and it testi fies to the concept of humanity and civiliz.ation they are likely to bring to the exercise of power.6 Is the new access to power of the technical intelligentsia a delusion or a growing reality? There are those who perceive the "skeletal structure of a new society" in which the leadership will rest "with the research corporation, the indusuial laboratories, the experimental stations, and the universities," with "the scientists, the mathematicians, the economists, and the engineers of the
CHOMSKY ON A N ARCHISM
new computer technology"-"not only the best talents, but eventually the entire complex of social prestige and social stams, will be rooted in the intellectual and scientific communities."7 A careful look at the "skeletal structure" of this n ew society, if such it is, is hardly reassuring. k Daniel Bell points out, "it has been war rather than peace that has been largely responsible for the acceptance of planning and technocratic modes in government," and our present "mobilized society" is one that is geared to the "social goal" of "military and war prepared ness." Bell's relative optimism regarding the new society comes from his assump tion that the universiry is "the place where theoretical knowledge is sought, test ed, and codified in a disinterested way" and that "the mobilized postures of the Cold War and the space race" are a temporary aberration, a reaction to Communist aggressiveness. In contrast, a strong argument can b e made that the universiry has, to a significant degree, betrayed its public trust; that matters of foreign policy are very much "a reflex of internal political forces" as well as of economic institutions (rather than "a judgment about the national interest, involving strategy decisions based on the calculations of an opponent's strength and intentions"); that the mobilization for war is not "irony" but a natural devel opment, given our present social and economic organization; that the technolo gists who achieve power are those who can perform a service for existing insti tutions; and {hat nothing but catastrophe is to be expected from still funher cen
tralization of decision making in government and a narrowing base of corporate affiliates. The experience of the past few years gives little reason to feel optimistic about these developments.
Chomsky, Noam (Author). Chomsky on Anarchism. Oakland, CA, USA: AK Press, 2005. p 13. http://site.ebrary.com/lib/dominicanuc/Doc?id=10407946&ppg=14
Quite generally, what grounds are there for supposing that those whose claim to power is based on knowledge and technique will be more benign in their exer cise of power than those whose claim is based on wealth or aristocratic origin? On the contrary, one might expect the new mandarin to be dangerously arro gant, aggressive, and incapable of adjusting to failure, as compared with his predecessor, whose claim to power was not diminished by honesry as to the lim itations of his knowledge, lack of work to do, or demonstrable mistakes. S In the Vietnam catastrophe, all of these factors are detectable. There is no point in overgeneralizing, bur neither history nor psychology nor sociology gives us any particular reason to look forward with hope to the rule of the new mandarins. In general, one would expect any group with access to power and affiuence to construct an ideology that will justifY this state of affairs on grounds of the general welfare. For JUSt this reason, Bell's thesis that intellectuals are moving closer to the center of power, or at least being absorbed more fully into the deci sion-making structure, is to some extent supported by the phenomenon of coun terrevolutionary subordination noted earlier. That is, one might anticipate that as power becomes more accessible, the inequities of the society will recede from vision, the status quo will seem less flawed, and the preservation of order will become a matter of transcendent importance. The fact is that American intel lectuals are increasingly achieving the status of a doubly privileged elite: first, as
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OBJE CTIVITY A N D LIBERAL SCHOLARSHIP
American citizens, with respect to the rest of the world; and second, because of their role in American society, which is surely quite central, whether or not Bell's prediction proves accurate. In such a situation, the dangers of counter revolutionary subordination, in both the domestic and the international arena, are apparent. I think that O'Brien is entirely correct in pointing to the neces sity for "increased and specific vigilance" towards the danger of counterrevolu tionary subordination, of which, as he correctly remarks, "we hear almost nothing." I would like to devote this essay to a number of examples.
Chomsky, Noam (Author). Chomsky on Anarchism. Oakland, CA, USA: AK Press, 2005. p 14. http://site.ebrary.com/lib/dominicanuc/Doc?id=10407946&ppg=15
Several years ago it was enthusiastically proclaimed that "the fundamental political problems of the industrial revolution have been solved," and that «this very triumph of democratic social evolution in the West ends domestic politics for those intellectuals who must have ideologies or utopias to motivate them to social action."9 During this period of faith in "the end of ideology," even enlightened and informed commentators were inclined to present the most remarkable evaluations of the state of American society. Daniel Bell, for exam ple, wrote that "in the mass consumption economy all groups can easily acquire the outward badges of stams and erase the visible demarcarions." 1 0 Wriring in (:(}mmmtary in O..roh�r 19(}4, h� m<1inr<1in�rl rh<1T w� h<1vf: in dff:o already achieved "the egalitarian and socially mobile society which the 'free floating intellectuals' associated with the Marxist tradition have been calling for during [he las t hundred years." Granting [he obvious general rise in stan dard of living, the judgment of Gunnar Myrdal seems far more appropriate to the actual situation when he says: "The common idea that America is an immensely rich and affluent country is very much an exaggeration. American affluence is heavily mortgaged. America carries a tremendous burden of debt to its poor people. That this debt must be paid is not only a wish of the do gooders. Not payinr it implies a risk for the social order and for democracy as we have known ir." 1 Surely the claim that all groups can easily enter the mass consumption economy and "erase the visible demarcations" is a considerable exaggeration. Similar evaluations of American society appear frequently in contemporary scholarship. To mention just one example, consider the analysis rhat Adam Ulam gives of Marx's concept of capitalism: "One cannot blame a contempo rary observer like Marx for his conviction that industrial fanaticism and self righteousness were indelible traits of the capitalist. That the capitalist would grow more humane, that he would slacken in his ceaseless pursuit of accumu lation and expansion, were not impressions readily warranted by the English social scene of the 1 840's and '50's." 1 2 Again, granting the important changes in industrial society over the past century, it still comes as a surprise to hear that the caritalisr has slackened in his ceaseless pursuit of accumulation and expansion. 3
CHOMSKY ON A N ARCHISM
Chomsky, Noam (Author). Chomsky on Anarchism. Oakland, CA, USA: AK Press, 2005. p 15. http://site.ebrary.com/lib/dominicanuc/Doc?id=10407946&ppg=16
Remarks such as these illustrate a failure to come to grips with the reality of contemporary society which may not be directly traceable to the newly found (or at least hopefully sought) access to power and affluence, but which is, nevertheless, what one would expect in the developing ideology of a new privileged elite. Various strands of this ideology are drawn together in a recent article by Zbigniew Brzezinski, 1 4 in which a number of the conceptions and attitudes that appear in recent social thought are summarized-I am tempted ro say "parodied." Brzez;inski too sees a "profound change" taking place in the intel lectual community, as "the largely humanist-oriented, occasionally ideological ly-minded intellectual-dissenter, who sees his role largely in terms of proffer ing social critiques, is rapidly being displaced either by experts and specialists, who become involved in special governmental undertakings, or by the gener alists-integrators, who become in effect house-ideologues for those in power, providing overall intellectual integration for disparate actions." He suggests that these "organisation-oriented, application-minded intellectuals" can be expected to introduce broader and more relevant concerns imo the political system-though there is, as he notes, a danger that "intellectual detachment and the disinterested search for trurh" will come to an end, given the new access of the "application-minded intellectuals" to "power, prestige, and the good life." They are a new meritocratic elite, "taking over American life, utilising the universities, exploiting the latest techniques of communications, harnessing as rapidly as possible the most recent technological devices." Presumably, their civilizing impact is revealed by the great progress that has been made, in this new "historical era" that America alone has already entered, with respect to the problems that confounded the bumbling political leaders of past eras-the problems of the cities, of pollution, of waste and destruc tiveness, of exploitation and poverty. Under the leadership of this "new breed of politicians-intellectuals," America has become "the creative society; the others, consciously and unconsciously, are emulative." We see this, for example, in mathematics, the biological sciences, anthropology, philosophy, cinema, music, hisrorical scholarship, and so on, where other cultures, hopelessly out distanced, merely observe and imitate what America creates. Thus we move rowards a new world-wide "'super-culture,' strongly influenced by American life, with its own universal electronic-computer language," with an enormous and growing "psycho-cultural gap" separating America from the rest of the "developed world." It is impossible even to imagine what Brzezinski thinks a "universal elec tronic-computer language" may be, or what cultural values he thinks will be created by the new "technologically dominant and conditioned technetron" who, he apparendy believes, may pl"ove ro be (he true "reposirory of that inde finable quality we call human." lr would hardly be rewarding to try to disen tangle Brzezinski's confusions and misunderstandings. What is interesting,
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rarher, is the way his dim awareness of current developments in science and technology is used to provide an ideological justification for the "increasing role in the key decision-making institutions of individuals wirh special intel lectual and scientific attainments," the new "organisation-oriented, applica tion-minded imellectuals" based in rhe university, "the creative eye of the m as sive communications complex."
i. 6
Parallel (Q the assumption that all is basically well at home is the widely articulated belief that the problems of internarional society, too, would be sub ject to intelligent management were it not for the machinarions of the Communists. One aspect of this complacence is the belief thar the Cold War was entirely the result of Russian (later Chinese) aggressiveness. For example, Daniel Bell has described rhe origins of the Cold War in the following terms: "When the Russians began stirring up the Greek guerrilla EA1vl in what had been tacitly acknowledged at Teheran as a British sphere of influence, the Communists began their cry against Anglo-American imperialism. Following the rejection of the Marshall Plan and the Communist coup in Czechoslovakia in February, 1948, the Cold War was on in earnest." I 5 Clearly, this will hard ly do as a balanced and objective statement of the origins of the Cold War, but the distonion it reflects is an inherent element in Bell's optimism about the new society, since it enables him to maintain that our Cold War posture is purely reacrive, and that once Communist belligerence is tamed, the new technical intelligentsia can turn its attention to the construction of a more decent socIety. A related element in the ideology of the liberal intellectual is the firm belief in the fundamental generosity of Western policy towards the Third World. Adam Ulam again provides a typical example: "Problems of an international society undergoing an economic and ideological revolution seem to defy. . the generosity-granted its qualifications and errors-that has characterized the policy of the leading democraric powers of the West. " ! 6 Even Hans Morgemhau succumbs to this illusion. He summarizes a discussion of inter vention with these remarks: "We have intervened in the political, military and economic affairs of other countries to the tune of far in excess of $1 00 billion, and we are at present involved in a costly and risky war in order to build a nation in South Vietnam. Only the enemies of the United States will question the generosity of these efforts, which have no parallel in history."!7 Whatever one may think about the $100 billion, it is difficult to see why anyone should take seriously the professed "generosity" of our effort to build a nation in Somh Vietnam, any more than the similar professions of benevolence by our many forerunners in such enterprises. Generosity has never been a commodity in shon supply among powers bent on extending their hegemony.
Chomsky, Noam (Author). Chomsky on Anarchism. Oakland, CA, USA: AK Press, 2005. p 16. http://site.ebrary.com/lib/dominicanuc/Doc?id=10407946&ppg=17
.
Srill another strand in the ideology of the new emerging elite is the concern for order, for maintaining the status quo, which is now seen to be quite favor able and essentially just. An excellent example is the statement by fourteen
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leading political scientists and historians on United States Asian policy, recent ly distributed by the Freedom House Public Affairs Institute. 18 These scholars designate themselves as "the moderate segment of the academic community." The designation is accurate; they stand midway between the two varieties of extremism, one which demands that we destroy everyone who stands in our path, the other, that we adopt the principles of international behavior we require of every other world power. The purpose of their statement is to "chal lenge those among us who, overwhelmed by guilt complexes, find comfort in asserting or implying that we are always wrong, our critics always right, and that only doom lies ahead." They find our record in Asia to be "remarkably good," and applaud our demonstrated ability to rectifY mistakes, our "capaci ty for pragmatism and self-examination," and Out "healthy avoidance of nar row nationalism," capacities which distinguish us "among the major societies of this era."
Chomsky, Noam (Author). Chomsky on Anarchism. Oakland, CA, USA: AK Press, 2005. p 17. http://site.ebrary.com/lib/dominicanuc/Doc?id=10407946&ppg=18
The moderate scholars warn that "to avoid a major war in the Asia-Pacific region, it is essential that the United States continue to deter, restrain, and counterbalance Chinese power." True, "China has exercised great prudence in avoiding a direct confrontation with the United States or the Soviet Union" since the Korean War, and it is likely that China will "continue to substitute words for acts while concentrating upon domestic issues." Still, we cannot be certain of this and must therefore continue our efforts to tame the dragon. One of the gravest problems posed by China is its policy of "isolationist fanaticism"--obviously a serious threat to peace. Another danger is the terrifYing fIgure of Mao Tse-tung, a romantic, who refuses to accept the "bureaucratism essential to the ordering of this enormously complex, extremely difficult society." The moderate scholars would feel much more at ease with the familiar sort of technical expert, who is committed to the "triumph of bureaucratism" and who refrains from romantic efforts to undermine the parry apparatus and the discipline it imposes. Furthermore, the moderate scholars announce their suppOrt for "our basic position" in Vietnam. A Communist victory in Vietnam, they argue, would "gravely jeopardize the possibilities for a political equilibrium in Asia, serious ly damage our credibility, deeply affect the morale-and the policies of our Asian allies and the neutrals." By a "political equilibrium," they do not, of course, refer to the status quo as of 1945-1946 or as outlined by internation al agreement at Geneva in 1954. They do not explain why the credibility of the United States is more important than the credibility of the indigenous ele ments in Vietnam who have dedicated themselves to a war of national libera tion. Nor do they explain why the morale of the military dictatorships of Thailand and Taiwan must be preserved. They merely hint darkly of the dan gers of a third world war, dangers which are real enough and which are increased when advocates of revolutionary change face an external counterrev olutionary force. In principle, such dangers can be lessened by damping revo-
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lurionary ardor or by withdrawing the counterrevolutionary force. The laner alternative, however, is unthinkable, irresponsible. The crucial assumption in the program of the moderate scholars is that we must not encourage "those elements commined to the thesis that violence is the best means of effecting change." It is important to recognize that it is not violence as such to which the moderate scholars object. On the connary, they approve of our violence in Vietnam, which, as they are well aware, enormous ly exceeds that of the Viernamese enemy. To further underline this point, they cite as our greatest triumph in Southeast Asia the "dramatic changes" which have taken place in Indonesia-the most dramatic being the massacre of sev eral hundred thousand people. But this massacre, like our extermination of Vietnamese, is not a lise of violence to effect social change and is therefore legitimate. '\X'hat is more, it may be that those massacred were largely ethnic Chinese and landless peasants, and that the "countercoup" in effect re-estab lished traditional authority more firmly. 1 9 If so, all the more reason why we should not deplore this lise of violence; and in fact, the moderate scholars del icately refrain from alluding to it in their discllssion of dramatic changes in Indonesia. We must conclude that when these scholars deplore the lise of vio lence to effect change, it is not the violence bur rather steps toward social change that they find truly disturbing. Social change that departs from the course we plot is not to be tolerated. The threat to order is too great. So great is the importance of stabilicy and order that even reform of the sort
Chomsky, Noam (Author). Chomsky on Anarchism. Oakland, CA, USA: AK Press, 2005. p 18. http://site.ebrary.com/lib/dominicanuc/Doc?id=10407946&ppg=19
that receives American authorization must often be delayed, the moderate scholars emphasize. "Indeed, many cypes of reform increase instabilicy, howev er desirable and essemial they may be in long-range terms. For people under siege, there is no substitute for securicy." The reference, needless to say, is not to securiry from American bombardmem, bur rather to securiry from the wrong sorts of political and social change. The policy recommendations of the moderate scholars are based on their particular ideological bias, namely, that a certain form of stability-not that of North Vietnam or North Korea, but that of Thailand, Taiwan, or the Philippines-is so essential that we must be willing to lise our unparalleled means of violence to ensure that it is preserved. It is instructive to see how other mentors of the new mandarins describe the problem of order and reform. Ithiel Pool formulates the central issue as follows: In the Congo, in Vietnam, in the Dominican Republic, it is clear that order depends on somehow compelling newly mobi lized strata to return to a measure of passiviry and defeatism from which they have recently been aroused by the process of modernization. At least temporarily, the maintenance of order requires a lowering of newly acquired aspirations and levels of political activity. 20
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This is what "we have learned in the past thirty years of intensive empirical study of contemporary societies." Pool is merely describing facts, not propos ing policy. A corresponding version of the facts is familiar on the domestic scene: workers threaten the public order by striking for their demands, the impatience of the Negro community threatens the stability of the body politic. One can, of course, imagine another way in which order can be preserved in all such cases: namely, by meeting [he demands, or at the very least by remov ing the barriers that have been placed, by force which may be latent and dis guised, in the way of attempts to sarisfy the "newly acquired aspirations." Bur this might mean that the wealthy and powerful would have to sacrifice some degree of privilege, and it is therefore excluded as a method for maintenance of order. Such proposals are likely to meet with little sympathy from Pool's new mandarins. From the doubly privileged position of the American scholar, the transcen dent importance of order, stability, and nonviolence (by the oppressed) seems entirely ohvious; to others, the matter is not so simple. If we listen, we hear such voices as this, from an economist in India: It is disingenuous to invoke "democracy," "due process of law," "non-violence," to rationalise the absence of action. For mean ingful concepts under such conditions become meaningless since, in reality, they justifY the relentless pervasive exploitation
of the masses; at once a denial of democracy and a more sinister form of violence perpetrated on the overwhelming majority through contractual forms. 2 1
Chomsky, Noam (Author). Chomsky on Anarchism. Oakland, CA, USA: AK Press, 2005. p 19. http://site.ebrary.com/lib/dominicanuc/Doc?id=10407946&ppg=20
Moderate American scholarship does not seem capable o f comprehending these simple truths. It would he wrong to leave the impression that the ideology of the liberal imelligentsia translates itself into policy as a rain of cluster bombs and napalm. In fact, the liberal experts have been dismayed by the emphasis on military means in Vietnam and have consistenriy argued that the key to our effons should be social restructuring and economic assistance. Correspondingly, I think that we can perceive more clearly the attitudes that are crystallizing among the new mandarins by considering the technical studies of pacification, for example, the research monograph of William Nighswonger, cited earlier (see note 4). The author, now a professor of political science, was senior United States civilian representative of the Agency for International Developmem in Quang Nam Province from 1962 to 1964. fu:, he sees the situation, "the knot ty problems of pacification are intricately intertwined with the issues of polit ical development and they necessitate-at this time in history-intimate American involvement." Thus Americans must ask some "basic questions of value and obligation-questions that transcend the easy legalisms of 'self determination' and 'nonintervention.'" These easy legal isms have little rele vance to a world in which the West is challenged by "the sophisticated method-
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ology and quasi-religious motivation of Communist insurgency." It is our dmy, in the interest of democra cy and freedom, to apply our expertise to these twin goals: "w isolate the enemy and desrroy his influence and control over the rural population, and to win the peasant s willing support through effective local administrarion and programs of rural improvement." "An underlying assumption is that insurgency ought to be defeated-for the sake of human rights .... " Despite the "remarkable achievements in economic and social devel opment" in Russia and China, "The South Vietnamese peasant deserves some thing better," and we must give it w him-as we have in Latin America and the Philippines-even if this requires abandoning the easy legalisms of the past and intervening with military force. '
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Of course, it won't be easy. The enemy has enormous advamages. For one thing, "as in China, the insurgents in Vietnam have exploited the Confucian tenets of ethical rule both by their attacks on governmem corruption and by exemplary Communist behavior"; and "the Viet-Cong inherited, after Geneva, much of the popular support and sympathies previously attached to the Viet Minh in the Somh." After the fall of Diem, matters became still worse: " ...vast regions that had been under government control quickly came under the influ ence of the Viet-Cong." By late 1964 the pacification of Quang Nam Province had become "all but impossible," and the worst of it is that "the battle for Quang Nam was lost by the governmem to Viet-Cong forces recruited for the most part from within the province."22 By 1966, the Vietcong seem so well emrenched in rural areas that "only a highly imaginative and comprehensive counterinsurgency campaign, with nearly perfect execution and substantial military support, would be capable of dislodging such a powerful and exten sive insurgent apparatus."
Chomsky, Noam (Author). Chomsky on Anarchism. Oakland, CA, USA: AK Press, 2005. p 20. http://site.ebrary.com/lib/dominicanuc/Doc?id=10407946&ppg=21
A major difficulty we face is [he "progressive social and economic results" shown by the Vietcong efforts. An AID report in March 1 965 explains the problem. Comparing "our 'new life hamlets' " to the Vietcong hamlets, the report comments as follows: The basic differences are that the VC hamlets are well organized, clean, economically self supporting and have an active defense system. For example, a conage industry in one hamlet was as large as has been previously witnessed anywhere in Chuong Thien province. New canals are being dug and pineapples are under cultivation. The VC also have a relocation program for younger families. These areas coincide with the areas JUSt outside the planned GVN sphere of imeresL Unless the USOM/GVN accivicies exhibit a more qualitative basis [sic], there is little like lihood of changing the present anirudes of the p eople For example, in one area only five kilometers from the province cap ital, the people refused medical assistance offered by ARVN medics. .
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However, all is not lost. Even though "the Viet-Cong strength in the country side has made a 'quamum leap' from its position of early 1962," there is a com pensating factor, namely, "the counterinsurgent military capability was revolu tionized by substamial American troop inputs." This allows us emirely new options. For example, we can implement more effectively some of the "exper iments with population and resources control methods" that were tried by the USOM and the National Police as early as 1961, though with little success. Given the new possibilities for "material and human resources control," we may even recapture some of the population-a serious maHer; "Given the enormous numbers of South Vietnamese citizens presently allied with the Viet-Cong (for whatever reason), rhe recovery of these peasants for the nation al cause must be made one of the central tasks of the pacification enterprise." If we are going to succeed in implementing "material and human resources comrol," we must moderate ARVN behavior somehow. Thus, according to an AID report of February 1965, "A high incidem rate of stealing, robbing, rap ing and obtaining free meals in the rural areas has nor endeared the popularion towards ARVN or Regional Forces." Nor did it improve maners when many civilians witnessed a case in which an ARVN company leader killed a draft dodger, disemboweled him, "took his hean and liver our and had them cooked at a restaurant," after which "the heart and liver were eaten by a number of sol diers." Such acts cause great difficulties, especially in trying to combat an enemy so vile as (Q practice "exemplary Communist behavior." More generally, "the success of pacification requires that there be survivors to be pacified," and given "the sheer magnitude of American, Korean, Australian and indigenous Viemamese forces," which has so severely "strained the economic and social equilibrium of the nation," it is sometimes difficult to ensure this minimal condition.
Chomsky, Noam (Author). Chomsky on Anarchism. Oakland, CA, USA: AK Press, 2005. p 21. http://site.ebrary.com/lib/dominicanuc/Doc?id=10407946&ppg=22
There are other problems, for example, "the difficulty of denying food to the enemy" in rhe Mekong Delta; "the hunger for land ownership," which, for some curious reason, is never satisfied by our friends in Saigon; the corruption; occasional bombing of the "wrong" village; the pervasive "Vier-Cong infiltra tion of military and civilian government organization"; the fact that when we relocate peasants to new hamlets, we often leave "the fox still in the henhouse," because of inadequate police methods; and so on. Still, we have a good "pacification theory," which involves three steps: "elimination of the Viet-Cong by search-and-destroy operations, protection and control of the population and its resources by police and military forces, and preparing and arming the peasants to defend their own communiries." If we rarely reach the third stage, this is because we have not yet learned to "share the sense of urgency of the revolutionary cause," or "to nourish these attitudes" among our "Vietnamese associates." Thus we understand that the "real revolu rion" is the one we are implementing, "in contrast to the artificially stimulat ed and controlled revolution of Diem and the Communists," but we have dif-
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ficulries in communicaring this fan w the Vietnamese peasant or w our "Vietnamese associates." What is needed, clearly, is better training for American officials, and of course, true national dedication w this humanitari an task. A grave defect in our society, this political scientist argues, is our tendency avoid "an active American role in the fostering of democratic institutions abroad." The pacification program in Vietnam represents an attempt to meet our responsibility to foster democratic institutions abroad, through rational methods of material and human resources control. Refusal [Q dedicate our selves to this task might be described as "a policy more selfish and timid than it was broad and enlightened"23 to use the terminology of an earlier day. [Q
When we strip away the terminology of the behavioral sciences, we see revealed, in such work as this, the mentality of the colonial civil servant, per suaded of the benevolence of the mother country and the correctness of its vision of world order, and convinced that he understands the true interests of the backward peoples whose welfare he is to administer. In fact, much of the scholarly work on Southeast Asian affairs reflects precisely this mentality. As an example, consider the August 1967 issue of Asian Survey, fully devoted to a Vietnam symposium in which a number of expens connibure their thoughts on the success of our enterprise and how it can be moved forward.
Chomsky, Noam (Author). Chomsky on Anarchism. Oakland, CA, USA: AK Press, 2005. p 22. http://site.ebrary.com/lib/dominicanuc/Doc?id=10407946&ppg=23
22
The introductory essay by Samuel Huntingwn, chairman of the depanment of government at Harvard, is entitled "Social Science and Vietnam." It emphasizes the need "w develop scholarly study and understanding of Vietnam" if our "involvement" is to sllcceed, and expresses his judgment that the papers in this volume "demonstrate that issues and wpics closely connect ed to policy can be presented and analyzed in scholarly and objective fashion." HuntingtOn's own contribution to "scholarly study and understanding of Vietnam" includes an article in the Boston Globe, February 17, 1968. Here he describes the "momentous changes in Vietnamese society during the past five years," specifically, the process of urbanization. This process "struck direcdy at the strength and potential appeal of the Viet Cong." "So long as the over whelming mass of the people lived in the countryside, the VC could win the war by winning control of those people-and they came very close w doing so in both 1961 and 1964. But the American sponsored urban revolution under cut the VC rural revolution." The refugees fleeing from the rural areas found not only security bur also "prosperity and economic well-being." "While wanime urban prosperity hun some, the mass of the poor people benefitted from it." The sources of urbanization have been described clearly many times, for example, by this American spokesman in Vietnam: "There have been three choices open [Q the peasanny. One, [Q stay where they are; two, to move into the areas controlled by us; three, to move off into the interior towards the
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Vietcong.... Our operations have been designed to make the first choice impossible, the second attractive, and to reduce the likelihood of anyone choosing the third to zero."24 The benefits accruing to the newly urbanized elements have also been amply described in the press, for example, by James Doyle of the Globe, February 22, 1 968: Saigon "is a rich city, the bar owners, B-girls, money changers and black marketeers all making their fortunes while it lasts. It is a poor city, with hundreds of thousands of refugees crammed into thatched hurs and tin-roofed shacks, more than two million people shoe horned inro 21 square miles." Or Neil Sheehan, in a classic and olten-quoted article (New York Times. October 9. 1 966): A drive through Saigon demonstrates another fashion in which the social system works. Virtually all the new construction con sists of luxury apartments, hotels and office buildings financed by Chinese businessmen or affiuenr Vietnamese with rdatives or connections within the regime. The buildings are destined to be rented to Americans. Saigon's workers live, as they always have, in fetid slums on the city's outskirrs .... Bars and bordellos, thou sands of young Vietnamese women degrading themselves as bar girls and prostitutes, gangs of hoodlums and beggars and chil dren selling their older sisters and picking pockets have become ubiquitous features of urban life. Many have remarked on the striking difference between the way in which the
press and rhe visiting scholar describe what they see in Vietnam. It should occasion no surprise. Each is pursuing his own craft. The reporter's job is to describe what he sees before his eyes; many have done so with courage and even brilliance. The colonial administrator, on rhe other hand, is concerned to justifY what he has done and what he hopes to do, and-if an "expert" as well-to construct an appropriate ideological cover, to show (hat we are just and righteous in what we do, and to pur nagging doubts to rest. One sees moral degradation and fetid slums; the other, prosperity and well-being-and if kindly old Uncle Sam occasionally flicks his ashes on someone by mistake, that is surely no reason for tantrums.
Chomsky, Noam (Author). Chomsky on Anarchism. Oakland, CA, USA: AK Press, 2005. p 23. http://site.ebrary.com/lib/dominicanuc/Doc?id=10407946&ppg=24
Returning to the collection of scholarly and objective studies in Asian Survey, the first, by Kenneth Young. president of the Asia Society, describes our
difficulties in "transferring innovations and institutions to the Vietnamese" and calls for the assistance of social scientists in overcoming these difficulties. Social scientists should, he feels, study "the intricacies that effectively inhibit or transfer what the Americans, either by government policy or by rhe techni cian's action, want to introduce into the mind of a Vietnamese or into a Vietnamese organization." The problem, in short, is one of communication. For this objective scholar, there is no question of our right to "transfer innova tions and institutions to the Vietnamese," by force if necessary, or of our supe rior insight into the needed innovations or appropriate institutions. In JUSt the
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same way, Lord Cornwallis understood the necessiry of "transferring the insti mtion" of a squirearchy to India-as any reasonable person could see, this was the only civilized form of social organization.
Chomsky, Noam (Author). Chomsky on Anarchism. Oakland, CA, USA: AK Press, 2005. p 24. http://site.ebrary.com/lib/dominicanuc/Doc?id=10407946&ppg=25
24
The "scholarly objectiviry" that Huntington lauds is further demonstrated in the contribution by Milton Sacks. entitled "Restructuring Government in South Vietnam." As Sacks perceives the siwation, there are two forces in Somh Vietnam, the "nationalists" and the "Communists." The "Communists" are the Vietminh and the NLF; among the "nationalists," he mentions specifical ly the VNQDD and the Dai Viet (and the military). The "nationalists" have a few problems; for example, they "were manipulated by the French, by the Japanese, by the communists and latterly by the Americans," and "too many of South Viemam's leading generals fought with the French against the Vietnamese people. "25 Our problem is the weakness of the nationalists, although there was some hope during General Khanh's government, "a most interesting effort because it was a genuine coalition of representatives of all the major political groups in South Vietnam." Curiously, this highly representative government was unable to accept or even to consider "a proposal for what appeared to be an authentic coalition government" coming from the National Liberation Front in mid-1 964.26 According to Douglas Pike, the proposal could not be seriously considered because none of the "non-Communists" in South Vietnam, "with the possible exception of the Buddhists, thought themselves equal in size and power to risk entering into a coalition, fearing that if they did the whale would swallow the minnow." Thus. he continues. "coalition government with a strong NLF could not be sold within South Vietnam," even to the government which. as Sacks informs us. was "a genuine coalition" of "all the major political groups in South Vietnam." R.'lther, the GVN and its suc cessors continued to insist that the NLF show their sinceriry by withdrawing "their armed units and their poli6cal cadres from South Vietnamese territory" (March I , 1965). According to Sacks, "the problem which presents itself is to devise an insti mtional arrangement that will tend to counteract the factors and forces which are conducive to that instability" that now plagues Vietnamese political life. This problem. of course, is one that presents itself to us. And, Sacks feels, it is well on its way to solution, with the new constitution and the forthcoming (September 1967) elections, which "will provide spokesmen who claim legiti macy through popular mandate and speak with authoriry on the issues of war and peace for their constimency." Although this "free election ...will still leave unrepresented those who are fighting under the banner of the South Vietnam National Liberation Front and those whose candidates were not permitted to stand in the elections." we must, after all, understand that no institution in the real world can be perfect. The il1l.porrant thing, according to Sacks, is that for the first time since the fall of Diem, there will be elections that are not seen by the government in power simply "as a means of legitimating the power they
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already had, using the governmental machinery to underwrite themselves." Putting aside the remarkable naivete regarding the forthcoming elections, what is striking is the implicit assumption that we have a right to continue our efforts to restructure the South Vietnamese government, in the interests of what we determine to be Viemamese nationalism. In just the same way, the officers of the Kwantung Army sought to support "genuine Manchurian nationalism," thirty�five years ago.
Chomsky, Noam (Author). Chomsky on Anarchism. Oakland, CA, USA: AK Press, 2005. p 25. http://site.ebrary.com/lib/dominicanuc/Doc?id=10407946&ppg=26
To understand more fully what is implied by the judgment that we must defend the "nationalists" against the "Communists," we can turn again to Pike's iIHeresting srudy. The nationalist groups mentioned by Sacks are the VNQDD and the Dai Viet. The former, after its virtual destruction by the French, was revived by the Chinese Nationalists in 1 942. "It supported itself through banditry. It executed traitors with a great deal of publicity, and its vio� lent acts in general were carefully conceived for their psychological value." Returning to Vietnam "with the occupying Chinese forces following World War II," it "was of some importance until mid� 1946, when it was purged by the Vietminh." "The VNQDD never was a mass political parry in the Western sense. At its peak of influence it numbered, by estimates of its own leaders, less than 1,500 persons. Nor was it ever particularly strong in either Central or South Vietnam. It had no formal structure and held no conventions or assem� blies." As to the Dai Viet, "Dai Viet membership included leading Vietnamese figures and governmental officials who viewed japan as a suitable model for Vietnam [N. B . fascist japan]. The organization never made any particular obeisance either to democracy or to the rank�and�file Vietnamese. It probably never numbered more than 1,000 members and did not consider itself a mass� based organizarion. It turned away from Western liberalism, although its economic orientation was basically socialist, in favor of authoritarianism and blind obedience." During World War I I , "it was at all times strongly pro japanese." In contrast to these genuine nationalists, we have the Vietminh, whose "war was anticolonial, clearly nationalistic, and concerned all Vietnamese," and the NLF, which regarded the rural Vietnamese not "simply as a pawn in a power struggle bur as the active element in the thrust," which "maintained that its contest with the GVN and the United States should be fought our at a politi cal level and that the use of massed military might was in itself illegitimate," until forced by the Americans and the GVN "to use counterforce to survive." In its internal documents as well as its public pronouncements the NLF insist ed, from its earliest days, that its goal must be to "set up a democratic nation al coalition administration in South Vietnam; realize independence, demo cratic freedoms, and improvement of the people's living conditions; safeguard peace; and achieve national reunification on the basis of independence and democracy." "Aside from the NLF there has never been a truly mass-based political party in South Vietnam." It organized "the rural population through
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the instrument of self�conrrol-victory by means of the organizarional weapon," setting lip a variety of self-help "functional liberation associations" based on "associational discipline" coupled with "the right of freedom of dis cussion and secret vote at association meetings," and generating "a sense of community, first, by developing a pattern of political thought and behavior appropriate to the social problems of the fUral Vietnamese village in the midst of sharp social change and, second, by providing a basis for group action that allowed the individual villager to see that his own efforts could have meaning and effed' (obviously, a skilled and treacherous enemy). This was, of cou rse, prior to "the advent of massive American aid, and the GVN's strategic hamlet program." With the American takeover of the war, the emphasis shifted to mil itary rather than political action, and ultimately, North Vietnamese involve menr and perhaps con nol ; "begi n ning in 1 965, large numbers of regular army troops from North Vietnam were senr inro South Vietnam." In short, what we see is a contrast between the Dai Viet and VNQDD, rep resenring South Vietnamese nationalism, and the NLF, an extrinsic alien force. One must bear in mind that Sacks would undoubtedly accept Pike's factual description as accurate, bm, like Pike, would regard it as demonstrating noth ing, since we are the ultimate arbiters of what COlints as "genuine Vietnamese nationalism. "
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26
An inreresting coun rerpoi m to Sacks' expositio n of narionalist versus
Communist forccs is providcd in David Wurfcl's careful analysis, in the samc
issue of Asian Survey, of the "Saigon political elite." He argues that "this elite has not substantially changed its character in the last few years" (i.e., since 1962), though there may be a few modifications: "Formerly, only among the great landlords were there those who held significant amounts of both politi cal and economic power; grandiose corruption may have allowed others to attain that distinction in recent years." Continuing, "the military men in pOSt Diem cabinets all served under Bao Dai and the French in a civil or military capacity." Under the French, "those who felt most comfortable about entering the civil service were those whose families were already part of the bureaucrat ic-intellectual elite. By the early 1 950's they saw radicalism, in the form of the Viet Minh, as a threat to their own position. The present political elite is the legacy of these developments." Although, he observes, things might change, "the South Vietnamese cabinets and perhaps most of the rest of the political elite have been constituted by a highly westernized intelligenrsia. Though the people of South Vietnam seem to be in a revolutionary mood, this elite is hard ly revo l utionary " The NLF constitures a "counter-elite," less Westernized: of the NLF Central Committee members, "only 3 out of 27 report studying in France." .
The problem of "restructuring governmenr" is further analyzed by Ithiel Pool along lines that parallel Sacks's contribution to this collection of "schol arly, objective studies." He begins by formulating a general proposition: "I rule ,
CHOMSKY ON A N ARCHISM
out of consideration here a large range of viable political settlements," name.iy, those that involve "the inclusion of the Viet Cong in a coalition government or even the persistence of the Viet Cong as a legal organization in South Vietnam." Such arrangements "are not acceptable"-to us, that is. The only acceptable settlement is one "imposed by the GYN despite the persisting great political power of the Viet Cong." There is, of course, a certain difficulty: " ...the Viet Cong is too strong to be simply beaten or suppressed." It follows, then, that we must provide induce ments to the Vietcong activists to join our enterprise. This should not prove roo difficult, he feels. The Vietcong leadership consists basically of bureaucrat ic types who are on the make. Cognitive dissonance theory suggests that this "discontented leadership" has "the potential for making a total break when the going gets too rough." We must therefore provide them with "a political rationalization for changing sides." The problem is ideological. We must induce a change in the "image of reality" of the Vietcong cadres, replacing their "naive ideology," which sees the GVN as "American puppets and supporters of exploiters, the tax collecrors, the merchants, the big landlords, the police, and the evil men in the villages," by a more realistic conception. We can do this by emphasizing hamlet home rule and preventing the use of military forces ro col lect rents, a suggestion which will be greeted with enthusiasm in Saigon, no doubt. The opportunity ro serve as functionaries for a central government which pursues such policies will attract the Vietcong cadres and thus solve our problem, that of excluding from the political process the organization that contains the effective political leaders.
Chomsky, Noam (Author). Chomsky on Anarchism. Oakland, CA, USA: AK Press, 2005. p 27. http://site.ebrary.com/lib/dominicanuc/Doc?id=10407946&ppg=28
Others have expressed a rather different evaluation of the human quality and motivation of these cadres. For example, Joseph Buttinger contrasts the inability of the Diem regime ro mobilize suppOrt with the success of the NLF: " ...that people willing to serve their country were to be found in Vietnam no one could doubt. The Vietminh had been able to enlist them by the tens of thousands and to extract from them superhuman efforts and sacrifices in the struggle for independence."27 Military reports by the dozens relate the amaz ing heroism and dedication of the guerrillas. Throughout history, however, colonial administrarors have had their difficulties in comprehending or com ing to grips with this phenomenon. In the course of his analysis ofOllr dilemma in Vietnam, Pool explains some of the aspects of our culture that make it difficult for us to understand such matters clearly. We live in "a guilt culture in which there is a tradition of belief in equality." For such reasons, we find it hard to understand the true nature of Vietcong land redistribution, which is primarily "a patronage operation" in which "dissatisfied peasants band together in a gang to despoil their neighbors" and "then reward the deserving members of the cabal." This terminology recalls Franz Borkenau's description of the "streak of moral indifference" in the history of Russian revolutionism, which permitted
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such arrocities as the willingness "to 'expropriate,' by means of robbery, the individual property of individual bourgeois."28 Our side, in contrast, adheres to the "tradition of belief in equality" when we implement land reform. For example, the New York Times, December 26, 1 967, reports a recent conference of expens studying the "Taiwan sllccess in land reform," one of the real suc cess stories of American intervention. "The Government reimbursed the for mer landlords in part (30 per cent) with shares of four large public enterprises taken over from the Japanese. The remainder was paid in bonds .... Many speakers at the conference singled om the repayment as the shrewdest feature of the Taiwan program. It not only treated the landlords fairly, they said, but it also redirecred the landlords' energies and capital towards industry," thus advancing the "wholesale restructuring of society" in the only healthy and humane direcrion.
Chomsky, Noam (Author). Chomsky on Anarchism. Oakland, CA, USA: AK Press, 2005. p 28. http://site.ebrary.com/lib/dominicanuc/Doc?id=10407946&ppg=29
28
In a side remark, Pool states that "in lay public debates now going on one often hears comments to the effect that Viemamese communism, because it is anti-Chinese, would be like Yugoslav communism." It would, of course, be ridiculous to argue such a causal connection, and, in fact, I have never heard it proposed in "lay public debate" or anywhere else. Rather, what has been maintained by such laymen as Hans Morgenthau, General James Gavin, and others is that Vietnamese Communism is likely to be Titoist, in the sense that it will strive for independence from Chinese domination. Thus they reject the claim that by attacking Vietnamese Communism we are somehow "containing Chinese Communism"-a claim implied, for example, in the statement of the "Citizens Commiuee for Peace with Freedom in Viemam," in which Ithiel Pool, Milton Sacks, and others, speaking for "the understanding, independent and responsible men and women who have consistendy opposed rewarding international aggressors from Adolf Hitler to Mao Tse-tung," warn that if we "abandon Vietnam," then "Peking and Hanoi, flushed with Sllccess, [will] con tinue their expansionist policy through many other 'wars of liberation. '" By misstating the reference to Titoist tendencies, Pool avoids the difficulty of explaining how an anti-Chinese North Vietnam is serving as the agent of Hitlerian aggression from Peking; by referring ro "lay public debate," he hopes, I presume, to disguise the failure of argument by a claim to expertise. Returning again [Q the Asian Survey Vietnam symposium, the most signif icant contribution is surely Edward Mitchell's discussion of his RAND Corporation study on "the significance ofland tenure in the Vietnamese insur gency." In a study of twenty-six provinces, Mitchell has discovered a significant correlation between "inequality of land tenure" and "extent of Government [read: American] control." In brief. "greater inequality implies greater control." "Provinces seem to be more secure when the percentage of owner-operated land is low (tenancy is high); inequality in the distribution of farms by size is great; large. formerly French-owned estates are present; and no land redistrib ution has taken place." To explain this phenomenon, Mitchell (Urns to histo-
CHOMSKY ON A N ARCHISM
ry and behavioral psychology. As he notes, "in a number of historical cases it has been the bener-to-do peasant who has revolted while his poorer brothers actively supported or passively accepted the existing order." The "behavioral explanation" lies "in the relative docility of poorer peasants and the firm authority of landlords in the more 'feudal' areas... the landlord can exercise con siderable influence over his tenant's behavior and readily discourage conduct inconsistent with his own interests." In an imerview with the New York Times (Ocrober 15, 1967) Mitchell adds an additional explanation for the fact that the most secure areas are those that remain "essemially feudal in social structure": when the feudal structure is eliminated, "there's a vacuum and that is ideal for the Vietcong because they've gOt an organization (0 fill the vacuum." This observation points (0 a difficulty that has always plagued the American effort. As Joseph Buttinger points out, the Diem regime (00 was unable (0 experiment with "freely cOl1Stinned organ izations" because these "would have been captured by the Vietminh."29 Mitchell's informative study supports an approach (0 counterinsurgency that has been expressed by Roger Hilsman, who explains that in his view, mod ernization "cannot help much in a counterguerrilla program," because it "inevitably uproots established social systems [and] produces political and eco nomic dislocation and tension." He therefore feels that popularity of govern ments, reform, and moderniz.ation may be "important ingredients," bur that their role in counterinsurgency "must be measured more in terms of their con
Chomsky, Noam (Author). Chomsky on Anarchism. Oakland, CA, USA: AK Press, 2005. p 29. http://site.ebrary.com/lib/dominicanuc/Doc?id=10407946&ppg=30
tributions to physical security."30
Before leaving this symposium on social science and Vietnam, we should take note of the scholarly detachment that permits one not to make certain comments or draw certain conclusions. For example, John Bennett discusses the important matter of "geographic and job mobility": "Under the dual impact of improved opportunities elsewhere and deteriorating security at home, people are willing to move to a hitherto unbelievable extent." No fur ther comment on this "willingness," which provides such interesting new opportunities for the restructuring of Vietnamese society. John Donnell dis cusses the unusual success of pacification in Binh Dinh Province, particularly in the areas controlled by the Koreans, who "have tended ro run their own show with their own methods and sometimes have not allowed the RD teams sem from Saigon all the operational leeway desired," and who have been "extremely impressive in eliminating NLF influence." Again, no commem is given on these methods; amply reponed in the press,3l or on the significance of the fact that Koreans are eliminating NLF influence from Vietnamese vil lages, and nor allowing the Vietnamese governmem cadres the leeway desired. Mitchell draws no policy conclusions from his study, but others have seen the point: recall the remarks of the moderate scholars on the dangers of social reform. Other scholars have carried the analysis much further. For example, Charles Wolf, senior economist of the RAND Corporation, discusses the mat-
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30
rer in a recem book.32 Wolf considers (WO "theoretical models" for analyzing insurgency problems. The first is the approach of the hearts�and-minds school of coumerinsurgency, which emphasizes (he importance of popular support. Wolf agrees that it is no doubt "a desirable goal" to win "popula r allegiance to a governmem that is combating an insurgent movemenr," but this objective, he argues, is nO( appropriate "as a concepmal framework for counterinsurgency programs." His alternative approach has as its "u nifying theme" the concept of "influencing behavior, rather than attitudes." Thus, "confiscation of chickens, razing of houses, or destruction of villages have a place in counterinsurgency efforts. but only if they are done for a strong reason: namely, to penalize those who have assisted the insurgenrs . . .whatever harshness is meted out by govern ment forces [must be] unambiguously recognizable as d eliberately imposed because of behavior by the popula tio n that con tributes to the insu rgent move ment." Furthermore, it must be noted that "p olicies that would increase rural income by raising food prices, or projects that would in crease agricultural pro ductivity thro ugh distribmion of fertilizer or livesrock, may be of negative value during an insurgency...since they may actually facili tate guerrilla opera tions by increasing the availability of inputs that the guerrillas need." More gene rally: "In setting up economic and social i m provem en t programs, the cru cial point is to connect such programs with the kind of population behavior the government wants ro promote." The principle is to reward the villages that cooperate and to provide penalti es for the behavior that the government is uy ing ro discourage. ''At a broad, concepmal level, the main concern of coun terinsurgency efforts should be to influence the behavior of the population rather than their loyalties and attitudes"; "the primary consideration should be whether the proposed measure is likely (Q increase the cost and difficulties of insurgent operations and help to disrupt the insurgent organization, rather than whether it wins popular loyalty and SUppOH, or whether it contributes to a more productive, efficient, or equitable use of resources." Other scholars have elaborated on the advantages of Wolf's "alternative approach," which concerns itself with control of behavior rather than the mys tiq ue of popular support. For example, Morton H. Halperin, of the Harvard Center for International Affairs, writes that in Vietnam, the United States "has been able to prevent any large-scale Vietcong victories, regardless of the loyal ties of the people." Thus we have an empirical demonsuation of a certain prin ciple of behavioral science, as Halperin notes: The events in Vietnam also illustrate the faCt that most people tend to be motivated, not by abstract app eals, but rather by their perception of the course of action that is most likely to lead to their own personal security and to the satisfaction of their eco nomic, social, and psychological desires. Thus, for example, large-scale American bo mbing in South Vietnam may have antagonized a number of people; bur at the same time it demoll-
CHOMSKY ON A N ARCHISM
strated to these people that the Vietcong could not guarantee thei r security as it had been able to do before the bombing and that the belief i n an imminent victory for the Vietcong might rum out to be dangerously false}3 In short, along with "confiscation of chickens, razing of houses, or destrucdon
ofvillages," we can also make effective use of I 00 pounds of explosives per per son, 1 2 tons per square mile, as in Viemam, as a technique for controlling behavior, relying on the principle, now once again confirmed by experiment, that satisfaction of desires is a more imponant motivation in human behavior
than abstract appeals to loyalty. Surely this is extremely sane advice. It would, for example, be absurd to try to control the behavior of a rat by winning its loyalty rather than by the proper scheduling of rei nforcement .
An added advantage of this new, more scientific approach is that it will "modify rhe arrirudes with which counterinsurgency effons are viewed in the United States"34 (when we turn ro the United States, of course, we are con cerned with people whose attitudes must be taken into account, nor merely their behavior). It will help us overcome one of the main defects in the American character, the "emotional reaction" that leads LIS to side with "cru saders for the common man" and against a "ruthless, exploitative tyrant" ("that there may be reality as well as appearance in this role-casting is not the point"). This sentimentality "frequently i n terferes with a realistic assessment of alter natives, and inclines LIS instead toward a carping righteousness in our relations with the beleaguered government we are ostensibly supporting"; it may be overcome by concentration on control of behavior rather than modification of attitudes or the winning of hearts and minds. Hence the new approach to counterinsurgency should not only be effective in extending the connol of American-approved governments, but it may also have a beneficial effect on LIS. The possibilities are awe inspiring. Perhaps in (his way we can even escape th e confines of our "guilt culture in which there is a tradition of belief in equali-
ry. "
Chomsky, Noam (Author). Chomsky on Anarchism. Oakland, CA, USA: AK Press, 2005. p 31. http://site.ebrary.com/lib/dominicanuc/Doc?id=10407946&ppg=32
It is extremely imponant, Wolf would claim, that we develop a rational understanding of insurgency, for "insurgency is probably the most likely type of politico-military threat in the third world, and surely one of the most com plex and challenging problems facing United States policies and programs." The primary objective of American foreign policy in the Third World must be "the denial of communist control," specifically, the suppon of counrries that are defending their "independence from external and internal communist domination." The latter problem, defending independence from internal Communist domination, is the crucial problem, particularly in Latin America. We mUSt counter the threat by a policy of promoting economic growth and modernization (making sure, however, to avoid the risks inherent in these processes-cf. Mitchell), combined with "a responsible use o f force." No ques
tion is raised about the appropriateness of our use of force in a country threat-
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coed by insurgency. The justification, were the question raised, is inherent in the assumption that we live "in a world in which loss of national independence is often synonymous with communist control, and communism is implicidy considered to be irreversible." Thus, by Orwellian logic, we are actually defending national independence when we intervene with military force to proteC[ a ruling elite from internal insurgency.35 Perhaps the most interesting aspect of scholarly work such as this is the way in which behavioral-science rhetoric is llsed to lend a vague aura of respectabil ity. One might construct some such chain of associations as this. Science, as everyone knows, is responsible, moderate, unsentimental, and otherwise good. Behavioral science tells us that we can be concerned only with behavior and control of behavior. Therefore we should be concerned only with behavior and control of behavior;36 and it is responsible, moderate, unsentimental, and oth erwise good to comrol behavior by appropriately applied reward and punish ment. Concern for loyalties and attitudes is emotional and unscientific. As rational men, believers in the scientific ethic, we should be concerned with manipulating behavior in a desirable direction, and not be deluded by mysti cal notions of freedom, individual needs, or popular will.
32
Let me make it clear that I am not criticizing the behavioral sciences because they lend themselves to such perversion. On other grounds, the "behavioral persuasion" seems (0 me co lack merit; it seriously mistakes the method of science and imposes pointless methodological strictures on the
study of man and society, bur this is another matter e ntirely It is, however, fair to inquire to what extent the popularity of this approach is based on its demonstrated achievements, and to what extem its appeal is based on the ease with which it can be refashioned as a new coercive ideology with a faintly sci entific tone. (In passing, I think it is worth mention that the same questions can be raised outside of politics, specifically, in connection with education and therapy.) .
The assumption that the colonial power is benevolent and has the interests of the natives at heart is as old as imperialism itself. Thus the liberal Herman Merivale, lecturing at Oxford in 1840, lauded the British policy of colonial enlightenment" which "stands in contrast to that of our ancestors," who cared little "about the internal government of their colonies, and kept them in sub jection in order to derive certain supposed commercial advantages from them," whereas we "give them commercial advantages, and tax ourselves for their ben efit, in order to give them an interest in remaining under our supremacy, that we may have the pleasure of governing them."3? And our own John Hay in 1 898 outlined "a partnership in beneficence" which would bring freedom and civilization to Cuba, Hawaii, and the Philippines, just as the Pax Britannica had brought these benefits to India, Egypt, and South Africa.38 But although the benevolence of imperialism is a familiar refrain, the idea that the issue of benevolence is irrelevant, an improper, sentimental consideration, is some-
Chomsky, Noam (Author). Chomsky on Anarchism. Oakland, CA, USA: AK Press, 2005. p 32. http://site.ebrary.com/lib/dominicanuc/Doc?id=10407946&ppg=33
"
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thing of an innovation in imperialist rhetoric, a contribution of the SOrt one might perhaps expect from "the new mandarins" whose claim to power is based on knowledge and technique.
Chomsky, Noam (Author). Chomsky on Anarchism. Oakland, CA, USA: AK Press, 2005. p 33. http://site.ebrary.com/lib/dominicanuc/Doc?id=10407946&ppg=34
Going a step beyond, norice how perverse is the entire discussion of the "conceptual framework" for counterinsurgency. The idea that we must choose between the method of "winning hearts and minds" and the method of shap ing behavior presumes that we have the right to choose at all. This is to grant us a right that we would surely accord to no other world power. Yet the over whelming body of American scholarship accords us this right. For example, William Henderson, formerly associate execmive director and Far Eastern spe cialist for the Council on Foreign Relations, proposes that we must "prosecute a constructive, manipulative diplomacy" in order (Q deal with "internal sub version, particularly in the form of Communist-instigated guerrilla warfare or insurgency"-"internal aggression," as he calls it, in accordance with contem porary usage.39 Our "historic tasks," he proclaims, are "nothing less than to assist purposefully and constructively in the processes of modern nation build ing in Southeast Asia, to deflect the course of a fundamental revolution into channels compatible with the long range interests of the United States." It is understood that true "nation building" is that path of development compati ble with our interests; hence there is no difficulty in pursuing these historic tasks in concert. There are, however, two real stumbling-blocks in the way of the required manipulative diplomacy. The first is "a great psychological barrier." We must learn to abandon "old dogma" and pursue a "new diplomacy" that is "frankly interventionist," recognizing "that it goes counter to all the traditional conventions of diplomatic usage." Some may ask whether "we have the moral right to interfere in the properly autonomous affairs of others," bur Henderson feels that the Communist threat fully justifies such interference and urges chat we be ready to "use our 'special forces' when the next bell rings," with no moral qualms or hesitation. The second barrier is that "our knowledge is pitifully inadequate." He therefore calls on the academic community, which will be only roo willing ro oblige, to supply "the body of expertise and the corps of specialists," the knowledge, the practitioners, and the teachers, to enable us to conduct such a "resourceful diplomacy" more effectively. Turning ro the liberal wing, we find that Roger Hilsman has a rather simi lar message in his study of the diplomacy of the Kennedy administration, To Move a Nation. He informs us that the most divisive issue among the "hard headed and pragmatic liberals" of the Kennedy team was how the United States should deal with the problem of "modern guerrilla warfare, as the Communists practice it." The problem is that this "is internal war, an ambigu ous aggression that avoids direct and open attack violating international fron tiers" (italics his). Apparently, the hardheaded and pragmatic liberals were never divided on the issue of our right to violate international frontiers in reacting to such "internal war." As a prime example of the "kind of critical,
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searching analysis" that the new, liberal, revitalized State Department was try ing to encourage, Hilsman cites a study directed to showing how the United States might have acted more effectively to overthrow the Mossadegh govern ment in Iran. Allen Dulles was "fundamentally right," according to Hitsman, in judging that Mossadegh in Iran (like Arbenz in Guatemala) had come to power (to be sure, "through the usual processes of government") with "the intention of creating a Communist state"-a most amazing statement on the part of the State Department chief of intelligence; and Dulles was fundamen tally right in urging suppOrt from the United States "to loyal anti-Communist elements" in Iran and Guatemala to meet the danger, even though "no invita tion was extended by the government in power," obviously. Hilsman expresses the liberal view succinctly in the distinction he draws betv{een the Iranian sub version and the blundering attempt at the Bay of Pigs: "It is one thing...to help the Shah's supporters in Iran in their struggle against Mossadegh and his Communist allies, but it is something else again to sponsor a thousand-man invasion against Castro's Cuba, where there was no effective internal opposi tion." The former effort was admirable; the latter, bound to fail, "is something else again" from the point of view of pragmatic liberalism.
34
In Vietnam liberal interventionism was not properly conducted, and the situation got out of hand. We learn more about the character of this approach to international affairs by studying a more successful instance. Thailand is a case in point, and a useful perspective on liberal American ideology is given by the careful and informative work of Frank C. Darling, a Kennedy liberal who was a CIA analyst for Somheast Asia and is now chairman of the political sci ence department at DePauw University. 40
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The facts relevant to this discussion, as Darling outlines them, are briefly as follows. At the end of World War II the former British minister, Sir Josiah Crosby, warned that unless the power of the Thai armed forces was reduced, "the establishmem of a constitutional governmem would be doomed and the return of a military dictatorship would be inevitable." American policy in the posrnrar period was to support and strengthen the armed forces and the police, and Gosby's prediction was borne out. There were incipiem steps towards constitutional governmem in (he imme diate posrnrar period. However, a series of military coups established Phibun Songkhram, who had collaborated with the Japanese during the war, as pre mier in 1948, aborting these early efforts. The American reaction to the liber al governmems had been ambiguous and "temporizing." In contrast, Phibun was immediately recognized by the United States. Why? "Within this increas ingly turbulent region Thailand was the only nation that did not have a Communist insurrection within its borders and it was the only country that remained relatively stable and calm. As the United States considered measures to deter Communist aggression in Southeast Asia, a conservative and anti Communist regime in Thailand became increasingly attractive regardless of its
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internal policies or methods of achieving power." Phibun got the point. In August 1949, "he stated that foreign pressure had become 'alarming' and that internal Communist activity had 'vigorously increased.'" In 1950, Truman approved a $ 1 0 million grant for military aid. The new rulers made use of the substantial American military aid to con ven the political system into "a more powerful and ruthless form of authori tarianism," and to develop an extensive system of corruption, nepotism, and profiteering that helped maintain (he loyalty of their followers. At (he same time, "American corporations moved in, purchasing large quantities of rubber and tin ...shipments of raw materials now went direcrly to the United States instead of through Hong Kong and Singapore. "4 1 By 1958, "the United States purchased 90 per cent of Thailand's rubber and most of its tin." American investment, however, remained low, because of the political instability as well as "the problems caused by more extensive public ownership and economic planning." To improve matters, the Sarit dictatorship (see below) introduced tax benefits and guarantees against nationalization and competition from gov ernment-owned commercial enterprises, and finally banned trade with China and abolished all monopolies, government or private, "in an attempt to attract private foreign capital." American influence gave "material and moral suppOrt" to the Phibun dic tatorship and "discouraged the political opposition." It strengthened the exec utive power and "encouraged the military leaders to take even stronger meas
Chomsky, Noam (Author). Chomsky on Anarchism. Oakland, CA, USA: AK Press, 2005. p 35. http://site.ebrary.com/lib/dominicanuc/Doc?id=10407946&ppg=36
ures in suppressing local opposition, using the excuse that all anti-government activity was Communist-inspired." In 1954, Pridi Phanomyong, a liberal intel lectual who had been the major participant in the overthrow of the absolute monarchy in 1932, had led the Free Thai underground during the war, and had been elected in 1946 when Thai democracy reached "an all-time high," appeared in Communist China; the United States was supporting Phibun, "who had been an ally of the Japanese, while Pridi, who had courageously assisted the OSS, was in Peking cooperating with the Chinese Communists." This was "ironic." It is difficult to imagine what sort of development towards a constitution al, parliamentary system might have taken place had it nor been for American supported subversion. The liberals were extremely weak in any event, in par ticular because of the domination of the economy by Western and Chinese enterprises linked with the corrupt governmental bureaucracy. The Coup Group that had overthrown the government "was composed almost entirely of commoners, many of whom had come from the peasantry or low-ranking mil itaryand civil service families," and who now wanted their share in corruption and authoritarian control. The opposition "Democrats" were, for the most part, "members of the royal family or conservative landowners who wanted to preserve their role in the government and their personal wealth." Whatever opportunities might have existed for the development of some more equitable
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sociery disappeared once the American presence became dominant, however. Surely any Thai liberal reformer must have been aware of this by 1950, in the wake of the coups, the farcical rigged elections, the murder and torture of lead ers of the Free Thai ami-Japanese underground, the takeover by the mili£ary of the political and much of rhe commercial system-particularly when he lis tened to the words of American Ambassador Stamon as he signed a new aid agreement: "The American people fully support this program of aid to Thailand because of their deep interest in the Thai people whose devotion to the ideals of freedom and liberty and wholehearted support of the UN have won the admiration of the American people."
36
"A notable trend throughout this period was rhe growing intimacy bervveen rhe Thai military leaders and rhe top-level military officials from rhe United Srates," who helped them obtain "large-scale foreign aid which in turn bol stered their polirical power." The head of the American military mission, Colonel Charles Sheldon. stated that Thailand was "threatened by armed aggression by people who do nor believe in democracy, who do nor believe in freedom or rhe digniry of rhe individual man as do the people of Thailand and my counrry." Adlai Stevenson, in 1953, warned the Thai leaders "that their country was the real target of the Vietminh." and expressed his hope that they "fully appreciate the rhreat." Meanwhile, United States assistance had built a powerful army and supplied the police with tanks, artillery, armored cars, an air force, naval patrol vessels, and a training school for paratroopers. The police achieved one of the highest ratios of policemen to citizens in the world-about 1 to 400. The police chief meanwhile relied on "his monopoly of the opium trade and his extensive commercial enrerprises for the income he needed to suppOrt his personal political machine," while rhe army chief "received an enormoliS income from the national lottery."
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Ir was
later discovered that the chief of police had committed indescribable arroci(ies; "rhe extent of (he tonure and murder commi((ed by rhe former police chief will probably never be known." What is known is what came to light after Sarit, the army chief. took power in a new coup in 1957. Sarit "stressed rhe need to maintain a stable government and intensify rhe suppres sion oflocal Communists to 'ensure continued American trust, confidence and aid.'" The Americans were naturally gratified, and the official reaction was very favorable. When Sarit died in 1963 it was discovered that his personal fortune reached perhaps $ 1 37 million. Both Darling and Roger Hilsman refer to him as a "benevolent" dictator, perhaps because he "realized that Communism could not be stopped solely by mass arrests. firing squads. or threats of bcutal punishment, and launched a development projecr in the Nonheast regions," along with various other mild reforms-without, however, ceasing the former practices, which he felt might "irnpress the Americans again with the need for more military and economic aid ro prevent 'Communist' subversion." He also imposed rigid censorship, abolished trade organizations and labor unions and
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punished suspected "Communists" without mercy. and. as noted earlier, took variolls steps to attract foreign investment. By 1960, "twelve percent of American foreign aid to Thailand since the beginning of the cold war had been devoted to economic and social advance ment." The effect of the American aid was clear. "The vast material and diplo matic SUppOH provided w the military leaders by the United States helped to prevent the emergence of any competing groups who might check the trend wward absolme political rule and lead the country back w a more modern form of government" (italics mine). In fiscal 1963. the Kennedy administra tion tried w obtain from Congress $SO million in military aid for Thailand. perhaps w commemorate these achievements. The Kennedy administration brought "good intentions and well-founded policy proposals," bur otherwise "made no significant modifications in the military-oriented policy in Thailand." These excerpts give a fair picUire of the American impact on Thailand, as it emerges from Darling's account. Naturally, he is not too happy about it. He is disUirbed that American influence frustrated the moves wwards constitu tional democracy and contributed to an autocratic rule responsible for atroci ties that sometimes "rivaled those of the Naz.is and the Communists." He is also disturbed by our failure w achieve real control (in his terms, "security and stability") through these measures. Thus when Sarit took power in the ] 957
coup, "the Americans had no assurance that he would nor orient a new regime
towards radical economic and social programs as Castro, for example, had done in Cuba.... At stake was an investment of about $300 million in military equipment and a gradually expanding economic base which could have been used against American interests in Southeast Asia had it fallen into unfriendly hands." Fortunately, rhese dire consequences did nor ensue, and in place of radical economic and social programs there was merely a continuation of the same old terror and corruption. The danger was real. however.
Chomsky, Noam (Author). Chomsky on Anarchism. Oakland, CA, USA: AK Press, 2005. p 37. http://site.ebrary.com/lib/dominicanuc/Doc?id=10407946&ppg=38
What conclusions does Darling draw from this record? As he sees it, 42 there are four major alternatives for American foreign policy. The first would be to "abolish its military program and withdraw American trOOps from the country." This, however. would be "irrational," because throughout the non-Communist world "respect for American patience and tolerance in dealing with nondemocratic governments would decline"; fur thermore, "Thailand's security and economic progress would be jeopardized." To the pragmatic liberal, it is clear that confidence in our commitment to mil itary dictatorships such as that in Thailand must be maintained, as in fact was implied by the moderate scholars' document discussed earlier; and it would surely be unfortunate to endanger the prospects for further development along the lines that were initiated in such a promising way under American influ ence, and that are now secured by some 40,000 American troops.
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A second alternative would be neutralization ofThailand and orher nations in Southeast Asia. This also is irrational. For one thing. "the withdrawal of the American military presence would not be matched by the removal of any Communist forces"-there being no nonindigenous Communist forces-and therefore we would gain nothing by this strategy. Furthermore. we could never be certain that there would not be "infiltration of Communist insurgents in the future." And finally, "the Thai leaders have decided to cooperate with the United States," for reasons that are hardly obscure. A third alternative would be [0 use our power in Thailand to "push politi cal and economic reforms." Bur this policy alternative would "do great dam age to American strategy in Thailand and other non-Communist nations." And what is more, "extensive interference in the domestic affairs of other nations, no maHer how well imentioned, is contrary to American uaditions," as our pOSl:War record in Thailand clearly demonstrates.43 Therefore, we must turn to the fourth alternative, and maimain our pres ent policy. "This alternative is probably the most rational and realistic. The military policy can be enhanced if it is realized that only American military power is capable of preventing large-scale overt aggression in Southeast Asia, and the proper role for the Thai armed forces is to be prepared to cope with limited guerrilla warfare."
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This exposition o f United States policy in Thailand and the directions it should take conforms rather well to the general lines of pragmatic liberalism as drawn by Hilsman, among others. It also indicates clearly the hope that we offer today to the countries on the fringes of Asia. Vietnam may be an aberra tion. Our impact on Thailand, however, can hardly be attributed to [he poli tics of inadvertence. An imeresting sidelight is Darling's explanation in Thailand and the United States of how, in an earlier period, "the Western concept of the rule of law" was disseminated through American influence. "Evidence that some officials were ob£aining an understanding of the rule of law was revealed" by the statement of a Thai minister who poimed out that "it is essemial to the prosperity of a nation that it should have fixed laws, and that nobles should be restrained from oppressing the people, otherwise the laner were like chickens, who instead of being kept for their eggs, were killed off." In its international behavior as well, the Thai government came to understand the necessity for the rule of law: "A growing respect for law was also revealed in the adherence of the Thai govern ment to the unequal restrictions contained in the treaties with the Western nations in spite of the heavy burden they imposed on the finances of the king dom." This is all said without irony. In fact, the examples clarify nicely what the "rule of law" means to weak nations, and to the exploited in any society. Darling, Hilsman, and many others whom I have been discussing represent the moderate liberal wing of scholarship on international affairs. It may be use-
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ful to sample some of the other views that appear in American scholarship. Consider, for example, the proposals of Thomas R. Adam, professor of politi cal science at New York University. 44 Adam begins by outlining an "ideal solution" to American problems in the Pacific, towards which we should bend our efforts. The ideal solution would have the United States recognized as "the responsible military protagonist of all Western interests in the area" with a predominant voice in a unified Western policy. United States sovereignty over some territorial base in the area would give us "ideal conditions for extending power over adjoining regions." Such a base would permit the formation of a regional organization, under our domi nance, that would make possible "direct intervention in Korea, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia" without the onus of unilateral imervemion ("in the face of brazen communist aggression, it is not the fact of intervemion as such that constitutes the issue but rather its unilateral character").
Chomsky, Noam (Author). Chomsky on Anarchism. Oakland, CA, USA: AK Press, 2005. p 39. http://site.ebrary.com/lib/dominicanuc/Doc?id=10407946&ppg=40
We must understand that for the preservation of Western imerests, there is no reasonable alternative to the construction of such a base of power in terri tories over which we possess direct sovereignty. We cannot maimain the "his toric connection" between Asia and the West unless we participate in Asian affairs "through the exercise of power and influence." We must accept "the fact that we are engaged in a serious struggle for cultural survival that involves that continuous presence of Wesrern-oriemed communities" in Asia. It is an illu sion to believe that we can retreat from Asia and leave it to its own devices, for our own Western culture must be understood as "a minority movement of recent date in the evolution of civilization," and it cannot be taken for grant ed that Asia will remain incapable of imervening in our affairs." Thus (0 defend ourselves, we must imervene with force in the affairs of Asia. If we fail to establish "our industrial enterprise system" universally, we will have (0 "defend our privileges and gains by means of the continuing, brutalizing, and costly exercise of superior force in every corner of the globe." Why are we justified in forceful imervemion in the affairs of Asia? "One obvious justification for United States intervention in Asian affairs lies in our leadership of the world struggle against communism. Communist political and economic infiltration among a majority of the world's peoples appears to American political leadership to be fatal to our safety and progress; this atti tude is supported almost unanimously by public opinion." Pursuing this logic a few steps further, we will soon have the same "obvious justification" for tak ing out China with nuclear weapons-and perhaps France as well, for good measure. Further justification is that the defense of our western seaboard "requires that the North Pacific be controlled as a virtual American lake," a fan which "provides one basis for United States intervention in power struggles through out the region," to preserve the security of this mare nostrum. Our "victory over Japan left a power vacuum in Southeast Asia and the Far East that was tempt-
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ing to communist aggression; therefore, we had to step in and use our military power." "Island possessions, such as Guam, those of the strategic trust territo ries, and probably Okinawa, remain indispensable, if not to the narrow defense of our shores, certainly [0 the military posture essential to our total security and world aims." 45 Apart from the magnificent scope of this vision, rarely equaled by our forerunners, the terminology is not unfamiliar. There are, to be sure, certain restraints that we must observe as we design our policy of establishing an "operational base" for exercise of power in the Far East; specifically, "policy must rest on political and social objectives that are acceptable to, or capable of being imposed upon, all participating elements." Obviously, it would not be pragmatic to insist upon policies that are not capa ble of being imposed upon the participating elements in our new dominions. These proposals are buttressed with a brief sketch of the consequences of Western dominion in the past, for example, the "Indian success story," in which "enterprise capital proved a useful incentive to fruitful social change in the subcontinent ofIndia and its environs," a development flawed only by the passivity shown by "traditional Asian social systems" as they imitated "the industrial ideology of their colonial tutor." An important lesson to us is the success of the "neutral Pax Britannica" in imposing order, so that "commerce could flourish and its fruits compensate for vanished liberties."
Chomsky, Noam (Author). Chomsky on Anarchism. Oakland, CA, USA: AK Press, 2005. p 40. http://site.ebrary.com/lib/dominicanuc/Doc?id=10407946&ppg=41
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Adam spares us the observation that the ungrateful natives sometimes fail to appreciate these centuries of solicitude. Thus [0 a left-wing member of the Congress party in India: "The story is that the British, in the process of their domination over India, kept no limits to brutality and savagery which man is capable of practicing. Hitler's depredations, his Dachaus and Belsens...pale into insignificance before this imperialist savagery.... "46 Such a reaction to cen turies of selfless and tender care might cause some surprise, until we realize that it is probably only an expression of the enormous guilt felt by the beneficiary of these attentions. A generation ago, there were other political leaders who feared the effect of Communist gains on their safety and progress, and who, with the almost unanimous support of public opinion, set out to improve the world through forceful intervention-filling power vacuums, establishing territorial bases essential to their toral security and world aims, imposing political and social objectives on participating elements. Professor Adam has little to tell us that is new. II
The examples of counterrevolutionary subordination that I have so far cited have for the most part been drawn from political science and the study of international, particularly Asian, affairs-rather dismal branches of American
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scholarship, by and large, and so closely identified with American imperial goals that one is hardly astonished to discover the widespread abandonment of civilized norms. In opening this discussion, however, I referred to a far more general issue. If it is plausible that ideology will in general serve as a mask for self�interest, then it is a natural presumption that intellectuals, in interpreting history or formulating policy, will tend to adopt an elitist position, condemn ing popular movements and mass participarion in decision making, and emphasizing rather the necessity for supervision by those who possess the knowledge and understanding that is required (so they claim) to manage soci� ety and control social change. This is hardly a novel thought. One major ele� ment in the anarchist critique of Marxism a century ago was the prediction that, as Bakunin formulated it: According co the theory of Mr. Marx, the people not only must not destroy [the state] but must strengthen it and place it at the complete disposal of their benefactors, guardians, and teach� ecs-the leaders of the Communist parry, namely Mr. Marx and his friends, who will proceed to liberate [mankindJ in their own way. They will concentrate the reins of government in a strong hand, because the ignorant people require an exceedingly firm guardianship; they will establish a single state bank, concentrat� ing in its hands all commercial, industrial, agricultural and even scientific production , and then divide the masses into two armies-industrial and agricultural-under the direct command of the state engineers, who will constitute a new privileged sci� entific-political estate.47
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One cannot fail to be struck by the parallel between this prediction and that of Daniel Bell, cited earlier-the prediction that in the new postindustrial soci ety, "not only the best talents. but eventually the entire complex of social pres� tige and social status, will be rooted in the intellectual and scientific comm u nities."48 Pursuing the parallel for a moment, it might be asked whether the left-wing critique of Leninist elitism can be applied, under very different con ditions, to the liberal ideology of the intellectual elite that aspires to a domi nant role in managing the welfare state. Rosa Luxemburg, in 1 9 1 8, argued that Bolshevik elitism would lead to a state of society in which the bureaucracy alone would remain an active element in social life-though now it would be the "red bureaucracy" of that State Socialism that Bakunin had long before described as "the most vile and terri ble lie that our century has created. "49 A true social revolution requires a "spir itual transformation in the masses degraded by centuries of bourgeois class rule";5 0 "it is only by extirpating the habits of obedience and servility to the last root that the working class can acquire the understanding of a new fo rm of discipline, self-discipline arising from free consent."5! Writing in 1904, she p redicted that Lenin's organizational concepts would "enslave a young labor
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movement to an intellectual elite hungry for power... and turn it into an automaton manipulated by a Central Committee." 52 In the Bolshevik elitist doctrine of 1 9 1 8 she saw a disparagement of the creative, spontaneous, self correcting force of mass action, which alone, she argued, could solve the thou sand problems of social reconstruction and produce the spiritual transforma tion that is the essence of a true social revolmion. As Bolshevik practice hard ened into dogma, the fear of popular initiative and spontaneous mass action, not under the direction and control of the properly designated vanguard, became a dominant e1emenr of so-called "Communise' ideology. Antagonism to mass movemems and (0 social change that escapes the con trol of p rivileged elites is also a prominem feature of contemporary liberal ide01ogy. 53 Expressed as foreign policy, it takes the form described earlier. To con clude this discussion of counterrevolutionary subordination, I would like to investigate how, in one rather crucial case, this particular bias in American lib eral ideology can be detected even in the interpretation of events of the past in which American involvement was rather slight, and in hismrical work of very high caliber.
Chomsky, Noam (Author). Chomsky on Anarchism. Oakland, CA, USA: AK Press, 2005. p 42. http://site.ebrary.com/lib/dominicanuc/Doc?id=10407946&ppg=43
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In 1966, the American Historical Association gave its biennial award for rhe mosr outstanding work on European histOry to Gabriel Jackson, for his study of Spain in the 1930s. 54 There is no question that of the dozens of books on this period, Jackson's is among the best, and I do nor doubt thar the award was well deserved. The Spanish Civil War is one of [he crucial evems of mod ern histOry, and one of the mosr extensively studied as well. In it, we find the interplay of forces and ideas that have dominated European history since the industrial revolution. What is more, rhe relationship of Spain to the great pow ers was in many respects like that of the countries of what is now called the Third World. In some ways, then, the events of the Spanish Civil War give a foretaste of what the future may hold, as Third World revolutions uproot tra ditional socieries, threaten imperial dominance, exacerbate great-power rival ries, and bring the world perilously close to a war which, if not averted, will surely be the final catastrophe of modern history. My reason for wanting to investigate an outstanding liberal analysis of rhe Spanish Civil War is therefore twofold: first, because of the intrinsic interest of these events; and second, because of the insight that this analysis may provide with respect to the under lying elitist bias which I believe to be at the root of the phenomenon of coun terrevolutionary subordination. In his study of the Spanish Republic, Jackson makes no attempt to hide his own commitment in favor of liberal democracy, as represented by such figures as Azana, Casares Quiroga, Martinez Barrio, 55 and the other "responsible national leaders." In raking this position, he speaks for much of liberal schol arship; it is fair m say that figures similar to those just memioned would be supported by American liberals, were this possible, in Larin America, Asia, or
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Africa. Furthermore, Jackson makes little attempt ro disguise his antipathy rowards the forces of popular revolmion in Spain, or their goals. It is no criticism of Jackson's study that his point of view and sympathies are expressed with such clarity. On the contrary, rhe value of this work as an interpretation of historical events is enhanced by the fact that the author's commitments are made so clear and explicit. Bur I think it can be shown that Jackson's account of the popular revolution that rook place in Spain is mis leading and in part quire unfair, and thar the failure of objectivity it reveals is highly significant in thar it is characteristic of the attitude taken by liberal (and Communist) intellectuals towards revolutionary movements rhar are largely spontaneous and only loosely organized, while rooted in deeply felt needs and ideals of dispossessed masses. It is a convention of scholarship that rhe use of such terms as those of the preceding phrase demonstrates naivete and muddle headed sentimentality. The convention, however, is supponed by ideological conviction rather than history or investigation of the phenomena of social life. This conviction is, I think, belied by such events as the revolution that swept over much of Spain in the summer of 1936. The circumstances of Spain in the 1 930s are not duplicated elsewhere in the underdeveloped world today, to be sure. Nevertheless, the limited infor mation that we have about popular movements in Asia, specifically, suggests certain similar features that deserve mllch more serious and sympathetic srudy
than (hey have so far received. 56 Inadequate information makes i( hazardous
Chomsky, Noam (Author). Chomsky on Anarchism. Oakland, CA, USA: AK Press, 2005. p 43. http://site.ebrary.com/lib/dominicanuc/Doc?id=10407946&ppg=44
to try to develop any sllch parallel, but I think it is quite possible to note long standing tendencies in the response of liberal as well as Communist intellectu als to such mass movements.
A5 I have already remarked, the Spanish Civil War is not only one of the critical events of modern hisrory bur one of the most intensively studied as well. Yet there are surprising gaps. During the months following the Franco insur rection in July 1 936, a social revolution of unprecedented scope rook place throughout much of Spain. It had no "revolutionary vanguard" and appears to have been largely spontaneous, involving masses of urban and rural laborers in a radical transformation of social and economic conditions that persisted. with remarkable success, until it was crushed by force. This predominantly anarchist revolution and the massive social transformation to which it gave rise are treat� ed, in recent historical studies. as a kind of aberration, a nuisance that stood in the way of successful prosecution of the war to save the bourgeois regime from the Franco rebellion. Many historians would probably agree with Eric Hobsbawm57 that thefailure of social revolution in Spain "was due to the anar chists," that anarchism was "a disaster," a kind of "moral gymnastics" with no "concrete results," at best "a profoundly moving specracle for the student of popular religion." The most extensive histOrical study of the anarchist revolu� rion58 is relatively inaccessible, and neither its author, now living in southern France, nor the many refugees who will never write memoirs bur who might
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provide invaluable personal testimony have been consulted, apparently, by writers of the major historical works.59 The one published collection of docu mems dealing with coliectivizationGO has been published only by an anarchist press and hence is barely accessible to the general reader, and has also rarely been consulted-it does not, for example, appear in Jackson's bibliography, though Jackson's accoum is imended to be a social and political, not merely a military, history. In fact, this astonishing social upheaval seems to have largely passed from memory. The drama and pathos of the Spanish Civil War have by no means faded; witness the impact a few years ago of the film To Die in Madrid. Yet in this film (as Daniel Guerin points out) one finds no reference to the popular revolution that had transformed much of Spanish society.
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44
I will be concerned here with the events of 1936-1937,6 1 and with one particular aspect of (he complex struggle involving Franco Nationalists, Republicans (including the Communist pany), anarchists, and socialist work ers' groups. The Franco insurrection in July 1936 came against a background of several months of strikes, expropriations, and banles between peasants and Civil Guards. The left-wing Socialist leader Largo Caballero had demanded in June that the workers be armed, but was refused by Azana. When the coup came, the Republican government was paralyzed. Workers armed themselves in Madrid and Barcelona, robbing government armories and even ships in the harbor, and put down the insurrection while the government vacillated, tOrn between the twin dangers of submitting to Franco and arming the working classes. In large areas of Spain effective authority passed into the hands of the anarchist and socialist workers who had played a substantial, generally domi nant role in putting down the insurrection. The next few months have frequently been described as a period of "dual power." In Barcelona, industry and commerce were largely collectivized, and a wave of collectivization spread through rural areas, as well as towns and vil lages, in Aragon, Castile, and the Levant, and to a lesser but still significant extent in many parts of Catalonia, Asturias, Estremadura, and Andalusia. Military power was exercised by defense committees; social and economic organization rook many forms, following in main outlines the program of the Saragossa Congress of the anarchist CNT in May 1 936. The revolution was "apolitical," in the sense that its organs of power and administration remained separate from the central Republican government and, even after several anar chist leaders entered the government in the autumn of 1 936, continued to function fairly independently until the revolution was finally crushed between the fascist and Communist led Republican forces. The success of collectiviza tion of industry and commerce in Barcelona impressed even highly unsympa thetic observers such as Borkenau. The scale of rural collectivization is indi cated by these data from anarchist sources: in Aragon, 450 collectives with half a million members; in the Levant, 900 collectives accounting for about half the -
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agricultural production and 70 percent of marketing in this, the richest agri cultural region of Spain; in Castile, 300 collectives with abom 1 00,000 mem bers.62 In Catalonia, the bourgeois government headed by Companys retained nominal authority, bur real power was in the hands of the anarchist-dominat ed committees. The period ofJuly through September may be characterized as one of spon taneous, widespread, b m unconsummated social revolution.63 A number of anarchist leaders joined the government; the reason, as stated by Federica Montseny on January 3, 1 937, was this: " ... the anarchists have entered the gov ernment to prevenr the Revolurion from deviating and in order to carry it fur ther beyond the war, and also to oppose any dictatorial tendency, from wher ever it might come."64 The central government fell increasingly under Communist control-in Catalonia, under the control of the Communist dominated PSUC-largely as a result of the valuable Russian military assis tance. Communist success was greatest in the rich farming areas of the Levant (the government moved to Valencia, capital of one of the provinces), where prosperous farm owners flocked to the Peasant Federation that the party had organized to protect the wealthy farmers; this federation "served as a powerful instrumenr in checking the rural collectivization promoted by the agricultural workers of the province. "65 Elsewhere as well, counterrevolutionary successes reflected increasing Communist dominance of the Republic.
Chomsky, Noam (Author). Chomsky on Anarchism. Oakland, CA, USA: AK Press, 2005. p 45. http://site.ebrary.com/lib/dominicanuc/Doc?id=10407946&ppg=46
The first phase of the counterrevolution was the legalization and regulation
of those accomplishments of the revolution that appeared irreversible. A decree of October 7 by the Communist Minister of Agriculture, Vicente Uribe, legal ized cenain expropriations-namely, of lands belonging to participants in the Franco revolt. Of course, these expropriations had already taken place, a fact that did not prevent the Communist press from describing the decree as "the most profoundly revolutionary measure that has been taken since the military uprising."66 In fact, by exempting the estates of landowners who had not directly participated in the Franco rebellion, the decree represented a step backward, from the standpoint of the revolutionaries, and it was criticized not only by the CNT but also by the Socialist Federation of Land Workers, affili ated with the UGT. The demand for a much broader decree was unacceptable to the Communist-led ministry, since the Communist party was "seeking sup port among the propertied classes in the anti-Franco coup" and hence "could not afford to repel the small and medium proprietors who had been hostile to the working class movement before the civil war. 67 These "small proprietors," in fact, seem to have included owners of substantial estates. The decree com pelled tenants to continue paying rent unless the landowners had supported Franco, and by guaranteeing former landholdings, it prevented distribution of land to the village poor. Ricardo Zabalza, general secretary of the Federation of Land Workers, described the resulting situation as one of "galling injustice"; "the sycophants of the former polirical bosses still enjoy a privileged position "
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at the expense of those persons who were unable to rent even the smallest par cel of land, because they were revolutionaries. "68 To complete the stage of legalization and restriction of what had already been achieved, a decree of Ocrober 24, 1 936, promulgated by a CNT mem ber who had become Councilor for Economy in the Catalonian Generalitat, gave legal sancrion CO the collectivization of industry in Catalonia. In this case toO, the step was regressive, from the revolutionary point of view. Collecrivizacion was limited to enterprises employing more than a hundred workers, and a variety of conditions were established that removed control from the workers' comminees ro the state bureaucracy.69
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4.
The second stage of the cOllnterrevolution, from October 1 936 through May 1937, involved the destruction of the local committees, the replacement of the militia by a conventional army, and the re-establishment of the prerev olutionary social and economic system, wherever this was possible. Finally, in May 1 937, came a direct attack on the working class in Barcelona (the May Days))O Following the success of this attack, the process ofliquidation of the revolution was completed. The collectivization decree of October 24 was rescinded and industries were "freed" from workers' control. Communist-led armies swept through Aragon, destroying many collectives and dismantling their organizations and, generally, bringing {he area under the control of the central government. Throughout the Republican-held territories, the govern ment, now under Communist domination, acted in accordance with the p lan announced in Pravda on December 1 7, 1 936: "So far as Catalonia is con cerned, the cleaning up of Trotzkyist and Anarcho-Syndicalist elements there has already begun, and it will be carried out there with the same energy as in the U.S.S.R."71-and, we may add, in much the same manner. In brief, the period from the summer of 1 936 to 1 937 was one of revolu tion and counterrevolution: the revolution was largely spontaneous with mass participation of anarchist and socialist industrial and agricultural workers; the counterrevolution was under Communist direction. the Communist parry increasingly coming to represent the right wing of the Republic. During this period and after the success of the counterrevolution. the Republic was waging a war against the Franco insurrection; this has been described in great detail in numerous publications. and I will say little about it here. The Communist-led counterrevolutionary struggle must, of course, be understood against the back ground of the ongoing antifascist war and the more general attempt of the Soviet Union to construct a broad anti-fascist alliance with the Western democracies. One reason for the vigorous counterrevolutionary policy of the Communists was their belief that England would never tolerate a revolution ary triumph in Spain. where England had subs(antial commercial interests, as did France and to a lesser extent the United States.72 I will rerurn to this mat ter below. However, I think it is important to bear in mind that there were
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undoubtedly other factors as well. Rudolf Rocker's comments are, I believe, quite to the point: ... the Spanish people have been engaged in a desperate struggle against a pitiless foe and have been exposed besides to the secret intrigues of the great imperialist powers of Europe. Despite this the Spanish revolutionaries have nOt grasped at the disastrous expedient of diccatorship, but have respecced all honest convic tions. Everyone who visited Barcelona after the July battles, whether friend or foe of the C.N.T., was surprised at the free dom of public life and the absence of any arrangements for sup pressing the free expression of opinion. For two decades the supporters of Bolshevism have been hammering it into the masses that dictatorship is a vital necessi ty for the defense of the so-called proletarian interests against the assaults of the coumer-revolution and for paving the way for Socialism. They have not advanced the cause of Socialism by this propaganda, but have merely smoothed the way for Fascism in Italy, Germany and Austria by causing millions of people to for get that dictatOrship, the mOSt extreme form of tyranny, can never lead to social liberation. In Russia, the so-called dictator ship of the proletariat has nOt led to Socialism, but to the dom ination of a new bureaucracy over the proletariat and the whole people....
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What the Russian autocrats and their supporters fear most is that the success of libertarian Socialism in Spain might prove to their blind followers that the much vaunted "necessity of a dic tatorship" is nothing but one vast fraud which in Russia has led to the despotism of Stalin and is to serve today i n Spain to help the counter-revolution to a victory over the revolution of the workers and peasants. ?3
After decades of anti-Communist indoctrination, it is difficult to achieve a per spective that makes possible a serious evaluation of the extent to which Bolshevism and Western liberalism have been united in their opposition to popular revolution. Howeve r I do not think that one can comprehend the events in Spain without attaining this perspective. ,
With this brief sketch-partisan, but I think accurate-for background, I would like to turn to Jackson's account of this aspect of the Spanish Civil War (see note 54). Jackson presumes (p. 259) that Soviet SUppOH for the Republican cause in Spain was guided by two factors: first, concern for Soviet security; second, the hope that a Republican victory would advance "the calise of worldwide 'peo ple's revolution' with which Soviet leaders hoped to identify themselves." They
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did not press their revolutionary aims, he feels, because "for the moment it was essential not to frighten the middle classes or the Western governments ."
As to the concern for Soviet security, Jackson is no doubt correct. It is clear that Soviet support of the Republic was one aspect of the anempt to make common cause with the Western democracies against the fascist threat. However, Jackson's conception of the Soviet Union as a revolutionary power hopeful that a Republican victory would advance "the interrupted movement toward world revolurion" and seeking to identify itself with "the calise of the worldwide 'people's revolution'''-seems to me entirely mistaken. Jackson pres ems no evidence to Sllpport this interpretation of Soviet policy, nor do I know of any. It is imeresting to see how differently the evems were interpreted at the time of the Spanish Civil War, not only by anarchists like Rocker bur also by such commemators as Gerald Brenan and Franz Borkenau, who were imi mateiy acquainted with the simation in Spain Brenan observes that the coun terrevolutionary policy of the Communists (which he thinks was "extremely sensible") was .
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4.
the policy mOSt suited to the Communists themselves. Russia is a totalitarian regime ruled by a bureaucracy: the frame of mind of its leaders, who have come through the mOSt terrible upheaval in history, is cynical and opportunist: the whole fabric of the state is dogmatic and authoritarian. To expect such men to lead a social revolucion in a cOllmry like Spain, where the wildest ide alism is combined with great independence of character, was our of the question. The Russians could, it is true, command plenty of idealism among their foreign admirers, but they could only harness it to the creation of a cast-iron bureaucratic state, where everyone thinks alike and obeys the orders of the chief above him.74 He sees nothing in Russian conduct in Spain to indicate any imerest in a "peo ple's revolution." Rather, the Communist policy was to oppose "even such rural and industrial collectives as had risen spomaneously and flood the coun try with police who, like the Russian Ogpu, acted on the orders of their party rather than (hose of (he Ministry of (he Interior." The Communists were con cerned to suppress altogether the impulses towards "spontaneity of speech or action," since "their whole nature and history made them distrust the local and spontaneous and put their faith in order, discipline and bureaucratic unifor miry"-hence placed them in opposition to the revolutionary forces in Spain. As Brenan also notes, the Russians withdrew their support once it became clear that the British would not be swayed from the policy of appeasement, a fact which gives additional confirmation to the thesis that only considerations of Russian foreign policy led the Soviet Union to support the Republic. Borkenau's analysis is similar. He approves of the Communist policy, because of its "efficiency," but he points out that the Communists "put an end
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to revolmionary social activity, and enforced their view that this ought not to be a revolution but simply the defence of a legal government...communist pol icy in Spain was mainly dictated not by the necessiries of the Spanish fight but by the interests of the intervening foreign power, Russia," a country "with a revolutionary past, nO( a revolmionary present." The Communists acted "not with the aim of transforming chaotic enthusiasm into disciplined enthusiasm lwhich Borkenau feels to have been necessary] , but with the aim of substi(llt ing disciplined military and administrative action for the action of the masses and getting rid of the latter entirely." This policy, he points our, went "direct ly against the interests and claims of the masses" and thus weakened popular support. The now apathetic masses would not commit themselves to the defense of a Communist-run dictatorship, which restored former authority and even "showed a definite preference for the police forces of the old regime, so hated by the masses." It seems to me that the record strongly supportS this interpretation of Communist policy and its effects, though Borkenau's assumption that Communist "efficiency" was necessary to win the anti-Franco struggle is much more dubious-a question to which I return below/5
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It is relevant to observe, at this point, that a number of the Spanish Communist leaders were reluctantly forced to similar conclusions. Bolloten cites several examples, 76 specifically, the military commander "EI Campesino" and Jesus Hernandez, a minister in the Caballero government. The former, after his escape from the Soviet Union in 1 949, stated that he had taken for granted the "revolutionary solidarity" of the Soviet Union during the Civil War-a most remarkable degree of innocence-and realized only later "that the Kremlin does not serve the interests of the peoples of the world, but makes them serve its own interests; that, with a treachery and hypocrisy without parallel, it makes use of the international working class as a pawn in its political intrigues." Hernandez, in a speech given shortly after the Civil War, admits that the Spanish Communist leaders "acted more like Soviet subjects than sons of the Spanish people." "It may seem absurd, incredible," he adds, "bur om education under Soviet tureiage had deformed us to such an extent that we were completely denationalized; our national soul was rorn our of us and replaced by a rabidly chauvinistic internationalism, which began and ended with the rowers of the Kremlin." Shortly after the Third World Congress of the Communist International in 1 9 2 1 , the Dutch "ultra-leftist" Hermann Gorter wrote that the congress "has decided the fate of the world revolution for the present. The trend of opinion that seriously desired world revolurion ...has been expelled from the Russian International. The Communist Parties in western Europe and throughout the world that retain their membership of the Russian International will become nothing more than a means to preserve the Russian Revolution and the Soviet Republic."77 This forecast has proved quite accurate. Jackson's conception that rhe Soviet Union was a revolutionary power in the late ] 930s, or even that the
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Soviet leaders truly regarded themselves as identified with world revolution, is without factual support. It is a misinterpretation that runs parallel to the American Cold War mythology that has invented an "international Communist conspiracy" directed from Moscow (now Peking) to justify its own interventionist policies. Turning ro events in revolutionary Spain, Jackson describes the first stages of collectivization as follows: the unions in Madrid, "as in Barcelona and Valencia, abused their sudden amhoriry to place the sign incautado [placed under workers' control] on all manner of buildings and vehicles" (p. 219). Why was this an abuse of amhority? This Jackson does not explain. The choice of words indicates a reluctance on Jackson's part to recognize the reality of the revolutionary situation, despite his account of the breakdown of Republican authority. The statement that the workers "abused their sudden authority" by carrying om collectivization rests on a moral judgmem that recalls that of llhiel Pool, when he characterizes land reform in Vietnam as a matter of "despoiling one's neighbors," or of Franz Borkenau, when he speaks of expropriation in the Soviet Union as "robbery," demonstrating "a streak of moral indifference."
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Within a few momhs, Jackson informs us, "the revolmionary tide began to ebb in Catalonia" after "accumulating food and supply problems, and the experience of administering villages, frontier POStS, and public utilities, had rapidly shown the anarchists the unsuspected complexity of modern society" (pp. 13-14). In Barcelona, "the naive optimism of the revolutionary conquests of the previous August had given way to feelings of resentment and of some how having been cheated," as the cost of living doubled, bread was in short supply, and police brutality reached the levels of the monarchy. "The POUM and the anarchist press simultaneously extolled the collectivizations and explained the failures of production as due to Valencia policies of boycotting the Catalan economy and favoring the bourgeoisie. They explained the loss of Milaga as due in large measure to the low morale and the disoriemation of the Andalusian proletariat, which saw the Valencia government evolving steadily toward the right" (p. 368). Jackson evidently believes that this left-wing inter pretation of events was nonsensical, and that in fact it was anarchist incompe tence or treachery that was responsible for the difficulties: "In Catalonia, the CNT factory committees dragged their heels on war production, claiming that the government deprived them of raw materials and was favoring the bour geoisie" (p. 365). In fact, "the revolutionary tide began to ebb in Catalonia" under a middle class attack led by the Communist party, not because of a recognition of the "complexity of modern society." And it was, moreover, quite true that the Communist-dominated cemral government attempted, with much success, to hamper collectivized industry and agriculture and to disrupt the collectiviza tion of commerce. I have already referred to the early stages of counterrevolu tion. Further investigation of the sources to which Jackson refers and others
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shows that the anarchist charges were not baseless, as Jackson implies. Bolloten cites a good deal of evidence in support of his conclusion that In the counrryside the Communists undertook a spirited defence of the small and medium proprietor and tenant farmer agai nst the collectivizing drive of the rural wage workers, agains t the policy of the labour unions p roh ibiti ng the farmer from holding more land than he could cultivate with his own hands, and against the practices o f revol utionary committees, wh ich requisi tioned harvests, imerfered with private trade, and collect ed rents from tenant farmers 78 -
.
The policy of the government was clearly enunciated by the Communist Minister of Agriculture: "We say that the property of the small farmer is sacred and that those who attack or attempt to attack this property must be regarded as enemies of the regime."79 Gerald Brenan, no sympathizer with collectiviza tion, explains the failure of collectivization as follows (p. 321 ) : The Central Government, and especially the Communist and Socialist members of it, desired to bring [the collectives] under the direct control of the State: they therefore failed to provide them with the credit required for buying raw materials: as soon as the supply of raw conan was exhausted the mills stopped working... even [the munitions i ndus try in Catalonia] were harassed by the new bureaucratic organs of the Ministry of o Supply .'
51
He quotes the bourgeois President of Cataloni a, Co mpanys, as saying that "workers in the arms factories in Barcelona had been working 56 hours and more each week and (hat no cases of sabocage o r i ndiscipl ine had taken place," until the workers were demoralized by the bureaucratization-later, militariza tion-imposed by the central governmem and the Communist party S I His own conclusion is that "the Valencia Government was now using the P.S.U.C. against the CN.T.-bur nOL..because (he Catalan workers were giving trou ble, but because the Communists wished to weaken them before destroying them." Chomsky, Noam (Author). Chomsky on Anarchism. Oakland, CA, USA: AK Press, 2005. p 51. http://site.ebrary.com/lib/dominicanuc/Doc?id=10407946&ppg=52
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The cited correspondence from Companys to Prieto, according [Q Vernon Richards (p. 47), presents evidence showing (he success of Catalonian war industry under collectivization and demonstrating how "much more could have been achieved had the means for expanding the industry not been denied them by the Cemral Government." Richards also cites testimony by a spokesman for the subsecretariat of munitions and armament of the Valencia government admitting that "the war industry of Catalonia had produced ten times more than the rest of Spanish industry put together and [agreeing] ... that rhis Output could have been quadrupled as from begi nning of September'" if 'The quoted testimony is from September I ,
1936 .
1937; presumably, the reference is to September
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Catalonia had had access to the necessary means for purchasing raw materials that were unobtainable in Spanish territory." It is imporrant to recall that the central government had enormous gold reserves (soon to be transmitted to the Soviet Union), so that raw materials for Catalan industry could probably have been purchased, despite the hostility of the Western democracies to the Republic during the revolutionary period (see below). Furthermore, raw mate rials had repeatedly been requested. On September 24, 1 936, Juan Fabregas, the CNT delegate to the Economic Council of Catalonia who was in part responsible for the collectivization decree cited earlier, reported that the finan cial difficulties of Catalonia were created by the refusal of the central govern ment to "give any assistance in economic and financial questions, presumably because it has little sympathy with the work of a practical order which is being carried out in Catalonia"82-that is, collectivization. He "went on to recoum that a Commission which went to Madrid to ask for credits to purchase war materials and raw materials, offering 1 ,000 million pesetas in securities lodged in the Bank of Spain, met with a blank refusal. It was sufficiem that the new war industry in Catalonia was controlled by the workers of the C.N.T. for the Madrid Government to refuse any unconditional aid. Only in exchange for governmem control would they give financial assistance. "83
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Sroue and Temime take a rather similar position. Commenting on the charge of "incompetence" leveled against the collectivized industries, they poim out that "one must not neglect the terrible burden of the war." Despite this burden, they observe, "new techniques of management and elimination of dividends had permitted a lowering of prices" and "mechanisation and ration alization, introduced in numerous enterprises... had considerably augmented production. The workers accepted the enormous sacrifices with enthusiasm because, in most cases, they had the conviction that the factory belonged to them and that at last they were working for themselves and their class broth ers. A truly new spirit had come over the economy of Spain with the concen tration of scanered enterprises, the simplification of commercial patterns, a significant structure of social projects for aged workers, children, disabled, sick and the personnel in general" (pp. 1 50-5 1 ) . The great weakness of the revolu tion, they argue, was the fact that it was not carried through to completion. In part this was because of the war; in part, a consequence of the policies of the central governmem. They too emphasize the refusal of the Madrid govern ment, in the early stages of colleC(ivization, to grant credits or supply funds to collectivized industry or agriculture-in the case of Catalonia, even when sub stantial guarantees were offered by the Catalonian government. Thus the col lectivized enterprises were forced to exist on what assets had been seized at the time of the revolution. The comrol of gold and credit "permitted the govern ment to resrrict and prevent the function of collective enterprises at will" (p. 144).
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According (Q Broue and Temime, it was the restriction of credit that final ly desnoyed colleC[ivized indusny. The Companys governmem in Caralonia refused (Q create a bank for industry and credit, as demanded by the CNT and POUM, and the cemral governmem (relying, in this case, on control of the banks by the socialist UGn was able (0 control the flow of capital and "(0 reserve credit for private emerprise." All attempts to obtain credit for collec tivized industry were unsuccessful, they maintain, and "the movemenr of col lectivization was restricted, then halted, the government remaining in control of industry through the medium of the banks... [and later] through its control of the choice of managers and directors," who often turned out to be the for mer owners and managers, under new titles. The situation was similar in the case of collectivized agriculture (pp_ 204 0.
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The situation was duly recognized in the West. The New York Times, in February 1938, observed: "The principle of State intervention and control of business and industry, as against workers' control of them in the guise of col lectivization, is gradually being established in loyalist Spain by a series of decrees now appearing. Coincidentally there is to be established the principle of private ownership and the rights of corporations and companies to what is lawfully theirs under the Constitution."84 Morrow cites (pp. 64-65) a series of acts by the Catalonian governmem restricting collectivization, once power had shifted away from the new institu tions set up by the workers' revolution of July 1936. On February 3, the col lectivization of the dairy nade was declared illegal.85 In April, "the Generalidad annulled workers' control over the customs by refusing to certifY workers' ownership of material that had been exported and was being tied up in foreign courts by suits of former owners; henceforth the factories and agri cultural collectives exporting goods were at the mercy of the government." In May, as has already been noted, the collectivization decree of October 24 was rescinded, with the argument that the decree "was dictated withom compe tency by the Generalidad," because "there was not, nor is there yet, legislation of the [Spanish] state to apply" and "article 44 of the Constitution declares expropriation and socialization are functions of the State." A decree of August 28 "gave the government the right to intervene in or take over any mining or metallurgical plant." The anarchist newspaper Solidaridad Obrera reported in October a decision of the department of purchases of the Ministry of Defense that it would make conrracts for purchases only with enterprises functioning "on the basis of their old ownets" or "undet the corresponding intervention controlled by the Ministry of Finance and Economy."8G Returning to Jackson's statement that "In Catalonia, the CNT factory com mittees dragged their heels on war production, claiming that the government deprived them of raw materials and was favoring the bourgeoisie," J believe one must conclude that this statement is more an expression of Jackson's bias in favor of capitalist democracy than a description of the historical acts. At the
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very least, we can say this much: Jackson presems no evidence to suppOrt his conclusion; there is a factual basis for questioning it. I have cited a number of sources that the liberal historian would regard, quire correctly, as biased in favor of the revolution. My point is that the failure of objectivity, the deep seated bias of liberal historians, is a matter much less normally taken for grant ed, and that there are good rounds for supposing that this failure of objectivi ty has seriously distorted the judgments that are rather brashly handed down about the nature of the Spanish revolution.
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Continuing with the analysis of Jackson's judgmems, unsupported by any cited evidence, consider his remark, quoted above, that in Barcelona "the naive optimism of the revolutionary conquests of the previous August had given way to feelings of resemmem and of somehow having been cheated." It is a fact that by January 1 937 there was great disaffection in Barcelona. But was this simply a consequence of "the unsuspected complexity of modern society?" Looking imo the matter a bit more closely, we see a rather different picture. Under Russian pressure, the PSUC was given substantial control of the Catalonian governmem. "putting into the Food Ministry [in December 1 936] the man most to the Right in present Catalan politics, Comorera"87-by virtue of his political views, the most willing collaborator with the general Communist party position. According to Jackson, Comorera "immediately took steps to end barter and requisitioning, and became a defender of the peasants against rhe revolution" (p. 3 1 4); he "ended requisition, restored money payments, and protected the Catalan peasants against further collectivization" (p. 361). This is all that Jackson has to say about Juan Comorera. We learn more from other sources: for example, Borkenau, who was in Barcelona for the second time in January 1937-and is universally recognized as a highly knowledgeable and expert observer, with strong anti-anarchist sen timents. According to Borkenau, Comorera represented "a political attitude which can best be compared with that of the extreme right wing of the German social-democracy. He had always regarded the fight against anarchism as the chief aim of socialist policy in Spain. . . . To his surprise, he found unex pected allies for his dislike [of anarchist policies] in the communists."88 It was impossible to reverse collectivization of industry at that stage in the process of counterrevolution; Comorera did succeed, however, in abolishing the system by which the provisioning of Barcelona had been organized, namely, the vil lage committees, mostly under CNT influence, which had cooperated (per haps, Borkenau suggests, unwillingly) in delivering flour to the towns. Continuing, Borkenau describes the situation as follows: ... Comorera, starting from those principles of abstract liberalism which no administration has followed during the war, but of which right-wing socialists are the last and most religious admir ers, did not substitute for the chaotic bread committees a cen tralized administration. He restored private commerce in bread,
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simply and completely. There was, i n January, not even a system of rationing in Barcelona. Workers were simply left to get their bread, with wages which had hardly changed since May, at increased prices, as well as they could. In practice it meant that
the women had to form queues from four o'clock in the morn� ing onwards. The resentment in the working-class districts was
naturally acute, the more so as the scarcity of bread rapidly increased after Comorera had taken office. 89
In short, the workers of Barcelona were not merely giving way (Q "feelings of resentment and of somehow having been cheated" when they learned of "the unsuspected complexity of modern society." Rather, they had good reason (Q believe that they were being cheated, by the old dog with the new collar.
George Orwell's observations are also highly relevant: Everyone who has made twO visits, at intervals of months, ro Barcelona during the war has remarked upon the extraordinary changes that rook place in it. And curiously enough, whether they went there first in August and again in January, or, like myself, first in December and again in April, the thing they said was alway.s the same: that the revolutionary atmosphere had van ished. No doubt ro anyone who had been there in August, when the blood was scarcely dry in the streets and militia were quar
tered in the small hotels, Barcelona in December would have
seemed bourgeois; to me, fl."esh from England, it was liker to a
workers' city than anything I had conceived possible. Now [in
April] the tide had rolled back. Once again it was an ordinary city, a little pinched and chipped by war, but with no ourward
sign of working�class predominance.... Fat prosperous men, ele�
gam women, and sleek cars were everywhere.... The officers of the new Popular Army, a type that had scarcely existed when I left Barcelona, swarmed in surprising numbers... [wearing] an
Chomsky, Noam (Author). Chomsky on Anarchism. Oakland, CA, USA: AK Press, 2005. p 55. http://site.ebrary.com/lib/dominicanuc/Doc?id=10407946&ppg=56
elegant khaki uniform with a tight waist, like a British Army
officer's uniform, only a little more so. I do not suppose that more than one in twenty of them had yet been to the front, but all of them had automatic pistols strapped to their belts; we, at the front, could not get pistols for love or money '" A deep change had come over the town. There were twO facts that were the keynote of all else. One was tha t the people-the civil pop ulation-had lost much of their interest in the war; the other was that the normal division of society into rich and poor, upper class and lower class, was reassening itsel f.90 ....
'Orwell had JUSt returned from the Aragon front, where he had been serving with the POUM militia in an area heavily dominated by left-wing (POUM and anarchist) troops.
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Whereas Jackson anributes the ebbing of the revolutionary tide to the discov ery of the unsuspected complexity of modern society, Orwell's firsthand obser vations, like those of Borkenau, suggest a far simpler explanarion. What calls for explanation is not the disaffection of the workers of Barcelona but the cu ti ous constructions of the historian.
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Let me repeat, at this point, Jackson's comments regarding Juan Comorera: Comorera "immediately took steps to end barter and requisitioning, and became a defender of the peasants against the revolution"; he "ended requisi tions, restored money payments, and protected the Catalan peasants against further collectivization." These comments imply that the peasantry of Catalonia was, as a body, opposed to the revolution and that Comorera put a stop to the collectivization that they feared. Jackson nowhere indicates any divisions among the peasantry on this issue and offers no support for the implied claim that collectivization was in process at the period of Comorera's access ro power. In fact, it is questionable that Comorera's rise to power affect ed the course of collectivization in Catalonia. Evidence is difficult to come by, bur it seems that collectivization of agriculture in Catalonia was not, in any event, extensive, and that it was not extending in December, when Comorera rook office. We know from anarchist sources that there had been instances of forced collectivization in Catalonia,9 1 but I can find no evidence that Comorera "protected the peasantry" from forced collectivization. Furthermore, it is misleading, at best, to imply that the peasantry as a whole was opposed to collectivization. A more accurate picture is presented by Bolloten (p. 56), who points out that "if the individual farmer viewed with dismay the swift and widespread development of collectivized agriculture. the farm workers of the Anarchosyndicalist CNT and the Socialist UGT saw in it, on the contrary. the commencement of a new era." In short, there was a complex class struggle in the countryside, though one learns little about it from Jackson's oversimplified and misleading account. It would seem fair to suppose that this distortion again reflects Jackson's antipathy towards the revolution and its goals. I will rerum to this question directly, with reference to areas where agricultural col lectivization was much more extensive than in Catalonia. The complexities of modern society that baffled and confounded the unsuspecting anarchist workers of Barcelona, as Jackson enumerates them, were the following: the accumulating food and supply problems and the administration of frontier posts, villages, and public utilities. As JUSt noted. the food and supply problems seem ro have accumulated most rapidly under the brilliant leadership of Juan Comorera. So far as the frontier posts are con cerned, the situation, as Jackson elsewhere describes it (p. 368), was basically as follows : "In Catalonia the anarchists had, ever since July 18, controlled the cusroms stations at the French border. On April 1 7, 1 937, the reorganized carabineros, acting on orders of the Finance Minister, Juan Negrin, began to reoccupy the frontier. At least eight anarchists were killed in clashes with the
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carabineros." Apart from this difficulty, adminedly serious, there seems little reason to suppose that the problem of manning frontier posts contributed to the ebbing of the revolutionary tide. The available records do not indicate that the problems of administering villages or public utilities were either "unsus pected" or too complex for the Catalonian workers-a remarkable and unsus pected development, but one which nevertheless appears to be borne out by the evidence available to us. I want to emphasize again that Jackson presents no evidence to support his conclusions about the ebbing of the revolutionary tide and the reasons for the disaffection of the Catalonian workers. Once again, I think it fair to attribute his conclusions to the elitist bias of the liber al intellectual rather than ro the historical record. Consider next Jackson's comment that the anarchists "explained the loss of Malaga as due in large measute to the low morale and the disorientation of the Andalusian prole(ariat, which saw the Valencia government evolving steadily toward the right." Again, it seems that Jackson regards this as just another indi cation of the naivete and unreasonableness of the Spanish anarchists. However, here again there is more to the story. One of the primary sources that Jackson cites is Borkenau, quite naturally, since Borkenau spent several days in the area just prior to the fall of Milaga on February 8, 1 937. But Borkenau's detailed observations tend to bear out the anarchist "explanation," at least in part. He believed that Malaga might have been saved, but only by a "fight of despair" with mass involvement, of a sort that "the anarchists might have led." But twO factors prevented such a defense: first, the officer assigned to lead the defense, Lieutenant Colonel Villalba, "interpreted this task as a purely military one, whereas in reality he had no military means at his disposal but only the forces of a popular movement"; he was a professional officer, "who in the secrecy of his heart hated the spirit of the militia" and was incapable of comprehending the "political factor." 92 A second facror was the significant decline, by February, of political consciousness and mass involvement. The anarchist committees were no longer functioning and the authority of the police and Civil Guards had been restored. "The nuisance of hundreds of independent village police bodies had disappeared, bur with it the passionate interest of the village in the civil war.... The short interlude of the Spanish Soviet system was at an end" (p. 2 1 2) . After reviewing the local siwation in Milaga and the conflicts in the Valencia government (which failed to provide suppOrt or arms for the militia defending Malaga), Borkenau concludes (p. 228): "The Spanish republic paid with the fall of Malaga for the decision of the Right wing of its camp to make an end of social revolution and of its Left wing not to allow thaL" Jackson's discussion of the fall of M a.laga refers to the terror and political rivalries within the town but makes no reference to the fact that Borkenau's description, and the accompanying interpretation, do support the belief that the defeat was due in large measure to low morale and to the incapacity, or unwillingness, of the Valencia government to fight a popular war. On the contrary, he concludes that Colonel Villalba's lack of means for "controlling the bitter
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political rivalries" was one factor that prevented him from carrying out the essential military tasks. Thus he seems to adopt the view that Borkenau con demns, that the task was a "purely military one." Borkenau's eyewitness account appears to me much more convincing. In this case too Jackson has described the situation in a somewhat mislead ing fashion, perhaps again because of the elitist bias that dominates the liber al-Communist interpretation of the Civil War. Like Liemenanr Colonel Villalba, liberal historians often reveal a strong distaste for "the forces of a pop ular movement" and "the spirit of the militia." And an argument can be given that they correspondingly fail to comprehend [he "political facror."
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In the May Days of 1 937, the revolution in Catalonia received the final blow. On May 3, the councilor for public order, PSUC member Rodriguez. Salas, appeared at the central telephone building with a detachment of police, without prior warning or consultation with the anarchist ministers in the gov ernment, to take over the telephone exchange. The exchange, formerly the property of IT&T, had been captured by Barcelona workers in July and had since functioned under the control of a UGr·CNT comminee, with a gov ernmental delegate, quite in accord with the collectivization decree of October 24, 1 936. According to the London Daily Worker (May 1 1 , 1937), "Salas sent the armed republican police to disarm the employees {here, most of them members of the CNT unions." The motive, according to Juan Comorera, was "to put a stop to an abnormal situation," namely, that no onc could spcak ovcr
Chomsky, Noam (Author). Chomsky on Anarchism. Oakland, CA, USA: AK Press, 2005. p 58. http://site.ebrary.com/lib/dominicanuc/Doc?id=10407946&ppg=59
the telephone "without the indiscreet ear of the controller knowing it."93 Armed resistance in the telephone building prevented its occupation. Local defense comminees erected barricades throughout Barcelona. Companys and the anarchist leaders pleaded with the workers to disarm. An uneasy truce con tinued umit May 6, when the first detachments of Assault Guards arrived, vio lating the promises of the government that the truce would be observed and military forces withdrawn. The troOps were under the command of General Pozas, formerly commander of the hated Civil Guard and now a member of the Communist party. In the fighting that followed, there were some five hun dred killed and over a thousand wounded. "The May Days in reality sounded the death-knell of the revolution, announcing political defeat for all and death for certain of the revolutionary leaders."94 These events-of enormous significance in the history of the Spanish rev olution-Jackson sketches in bare outline as a marginal incident. Obviously the historian's account must be selective; from the left-liberal point of view that Jackson shares with Hugh Thomas and many others, the liquidation of the rev olution in Catalonia was a minor event, as the revolution itself was merely a kind of irrelevam nuisance, a minor irritant diverting energy from the struggle to save the bourgeois government. The decision to crush the revolution by force is described as follows:
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On May 5, Companys obtained a fragile truce, on the basis of which the PSUC councilors were to recire from the regional gov· emmell(, and the question of the Telephone Company was left ro furure negotiation. That very night, however, Anronio Sese, a UGT official who was about to enter the reorganized cabinet, was murdered. In any event, the Valencia authorities were in no mood to temporize further wich the Catalan Left. On May 6 several thousand asaltos arrived in the city, and the Republican Navy demonstrated in the pon.95 What is interesting about this description is what is left unsaid. For example, (here is no comment on the fact that the dispatch of the asaltos violated the "fragile truce" that had been accepted by the Barcelona workers and the anar chist and the POUM troops nearby, and barely a mention of the bloody con· sequences or the political meaning of this unwillingness "to temporize further with the Catalan Lerr." There is no mention of the fact that along with Sese, Berneri and other anarchist leaders were murdered, not only during the May Days bur in the weeks preceding.96 Jackson does not refer to the fact that along with the Republican navy, British ships also "demonstrated" in the port.97 Nor does he refer to Orwell's telling observations aboU( the Assault Guards, as com· pared to the trOOps at the from, where he had spem the preceding momhs. The Assault Guards "were splendid troops, much the best I had seen in Spain... I was used to the ragged, scarcely-armed militia on the Aragon from, and I had not known that the Republic possessed troops like these .... The Civil Guards and Carabineros, who were not imended for the from at all, were better armed and far better clad than ourselves. ] suspect it is the same in all wars-always the same contrast between the sleek police in the rear and the ragged soldiers in the line. "98 (See page 6 1 below.)
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.
The contrast reveals a good deal about the namre of the war, as it was understood by the Valencia government. Later, Orwell was to make this con clusion explicit: ''A governmenr which sends boys of fifteen to the front with rifles forry years old and keeps its biggest men and newest weapons in the rear is manifestly more afraid of the revolution than of the fascists. Hence the fee· ble war policy of the past six months, and hence the compromise with which the war will almost certainly end. "99 Jackson's account of these events, with its omissions and assumptions, suggests that he perhaps shares the view that the greatest danger in Spain would have been a victory of the revolution. Jackson apparently discounts Orwell's testimony, to some extent, com menting that "the readers should bear in mind Orwell's own honest statement that he knew very little about the political complexities of the struggle." This is a strange comment. For one thing, Orwell's analysis of the "political com· plexities of the struggle" bears up rather well after thirty years; if it is defective, it is probably in his tendency to give too much prominence to the POUM in comparison with the anarchists-not surprising, in view of the fact that he was
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with the POUM militia. His exposure of the fatuous nonsense that was appearing at the time in the Stalinist and liberal presses appears quite accurate, and later discoveries have given little reason to challenge the basic facts that he reported or the interpretation that he proposed in the hear of the conflict. Orwell does, in fan, refer ro his own "political ignorance." Commenting on the final defeat of the revolution in May, he stares: "I realized-though owing to my political ignorance, not so clearly as I ought [Q have done-that when the Government felt more sure of itself there would be reprisals." But this form of "political ignorance" has simply been compounded in morc recent hismci cal work. Shortly after the May Days, the Caballero government fell and Juan Negrin became premier of Republican Spain. Negrin is described as follows, by BrOllt� and Temime: "... he is an unconditional defender of capitalist property and res olme adversary of collectivization, whom the CNT ministers find blocking all of their proposals. He is the one who solidly reorganized the carabineros and presided over the transfer of the gold reserves of the Republic to the USSR. He enjoyed the confidence of the moderates... [and] was on excellent terms with the Communists."
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The first major act of the NegrIn government was the suppression of the POUM and the consolidation of central control over Catalonia. The govern menr next turned to Aragon, which had been under largely anarchist control since the first days of the revolution, and where agricultural collectivization was quite extensive and Communist elemenrs very weak. The municipal coun cils of Aragon were coordinated by the Council of Aragon, headed by Joaquin Ascaso, a well-known CNT militant, one of whose brothers had been killed during the May Days. Under the Caballero government, the anarchists had agreed (Q give representation to other antifascist panies, including the Communists, but the majority remained anarchist. In August the Negrfn gov ernment announced the dissolmion of the Council of Aragon and dispatched a division of the Spanish army, commanded by the Communist officer Enrique Lister, to enforce the dissolution of the local committees, dismantle the collec tives, and establish central government COntrol. Ascaso was arrested on the charge of having been responsible for the robbery ofjewelry-namely, the jew elry "robbed" by the Council for its own use in the fall of 1936. The local anar chist press was suppressed in favor of a Communist journal, and in general local anarchist centers were forcefully occupied and closed. The last anarchist stronghold was capmred, with tanks and artillery, on September 2 1 . Because of government-imposed censorship, there is very little of a direct record of these events, and the major histories pass over them quickly. 100 According to Morrow, "the official CNT press...compared the assault on Aragon with the subjection of Asturias by Lopez Ochoa in October 1 934"-the laner, one of the bloodiest acts of repression in modern Spanish history. Although this is an
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exaggeration, it is a fact that the popular organs of administration were wiped out by Lister's legions, and the revolution was now over, so far as Aragon was concerned. About these events, Jackson has the following comments: On August I I the government announced the dissolution of the Consejo de Aragon, the anarchist-dominated administration which had been recognized by Largo Caballero in December, 1 936. The peasants were known ro hate the Consej o, the anar chists had deserted the from during the Barcelona fighting, and the very existence of the Consejo was a sta nding challenge ro the authority of the central government. For all these reasons Negrin did not hesitate ro send in troops, and to arrest the anarchist officials Once their authority had been broken, however, they were released. 10 I .
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These remarks are most interesting. Consider first the charge that the anar chists had desened the front during the May Days. It is true that elements of certain anarchist and POUM divisions were prepared ro march on Barcelona, but after the "fragile truce" was established on May 5, they did nor do so; no anarchist forces even approached Barcelona ro defend the Barcelona proletari at and its institutions from attack. However, a motorized column of 5,000 Assault Guards was sent from the front by the government ro break the "fragile truce." I 02 Hence the only forces to "desert the front" during the Barcelona fighting were those dispatched by the government to complete the job of dis mantling the revolution, by force. Recall Orwell's observations quoted above, page 59. What about Jackson's statement that "the peasants were known to hate the Consejo?" fu in the other cases I have cited, Jackson gives no indication of any evidence on which such a judgment might be based. The most detailed inves tigation of (he collectives is from anarchist sources, and they indicate that Aragon was one of the areas where collectivization was most widespread and successful. 1 03 Both the CNT and the UGT Land Workers' Federation were vigorous in their suppon for collectivization, and there is no doubt that both were mass organizations. A number of nonanarchists, observing collectiviza tion in Aragon firsthand, gave very favorable repons and stressed the voluntary character of collectivization. 1 04 According ro Gaston Leval, an anarchist observer who carried out detailed investigation of rural collectivization, "in Aragon 75 percent of small proprietors have voluntarily adhered to the new order of things," and others were not forced to involve themselves in collec tives. 1 05 Other anarchist observers-Augustin Souchy in particular-gave detailed observations of the functioning of the Aragon collectives. Unless one is willing to assume a fantastic degree of falsification, it is impossible to recon cile their descriptions with the claim that "the peasants were known to hate the Consejo"-unless, of course, one restricts the term "peasant" to "individual
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farm owner," in which case it might very well be true, but would j ustify dis banding the Council only on the assumption that the rights of the individual farm owner must predominate, not those of the landless worker. There is little doubt that the collectives were economically successful, \ 06 hardly likely if col lectivization were forced and hated by the peasantry.
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I have already cited Bolloren's general conclusion, based on very extensive documentary evidence, that while the individual farmer may have viewed the development of collectivized agriculture with dismay, "the farm workers of the Anarchosyndicalist CNT and the Socialist UGT saw in it, on the contrary, the commencement of a new era." This conclusion seems quite reasonable, on the basis of the materials that are available. With respect to Aragon, specifically, he remarks that the "debt-ridden peasants were strongly affected by the ideas of the CNT and FAl, a factor that gave a powerful spontaneous impulse (Q col lective farming," though difficulties are cited by anarchist sources, which in general appear to be quite honest about failures. Holloten cites two Communist sources, among others, to the effect that about 70 percent of the population in rural areas of Aragon lived in collectives (p. 7 1 ) ; he adds that "many of the region's 450 collectives were largely voluntary," although "the presence of militiamen from the neighbouring region of Catalonia, the immense majority of whom were members of the CNT and FAI" was "in some measure" responsible for the extensive collectivization. He also points out that in many instances peasant proprietors who were not compelled to adhere to the collective system did so for other reasons: " ... not only were they prevented from employing hired labour and disposing freely of their crops... but they were often denied all benefits enjoyed by members" (p. 72). Bolloten cites the attempt of the Communists in April 1 937 to cause dissension in "areas where the CNT and UGT had established collective farms by mutual agreement" (p. 1 95), leading in some cases to pitched barrles and dozens of assassinations, according to CNT sources. \ 07
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Bolloten's detailed analysis of the events of the summer of 1937 sheds con siderable light on the question of peasant attitudes towards collectivization in Aragon: It was inevitable that the attacks on the collectives should have had an unfavorable effect upon rural economy and upon morale, for while it is true that in some areas collectivization was anath ema to the majority of peasants, it is no less true that in others collective farms were organized spontaneously by the bulk of the peasant population. In Toledo province, for example, where even before the war rural collectives existed, 83 per cent of the peas ants, according to a source friendly to the Communists, decided in favour of the collective cultivation of the soil. As the cam paign against the collective farms reached its height JUSt before the summer harvest [1937] ..a pall of dismay and apprehension .
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descended upon the agricultural labourers. Work in the fields
was abandoned in many places or only carried on apathetically, and there was danger that a substantial portion of the harvest, viral for the war effort, would be left to rot. [po 196]
It was under these circumstances, he points out, that the Communists were forced to change their policy and-temporarily-to tolerate the collectives. A decree was passed legalizing collectives "during the current agricultural year" (his italics) and offering them some aid. This "produced a sense of relief in the countryside during the vital period of the harvest." Immediately after the crops had been gathered, the policy changed again to one of harsh repression. Bolloten cites Communist sources to the effect that "a short though fierce cam paign at the beginning of August" prepared the way for the dissolution of the Council o f Aragon. Following the dissolution decree, "the newly appointed Governor General, Jose Ignacio Mantec6n, a member of the Left Republican Parry, but a secret Communist sympathizer [who joined the party in exile, after the war] ... ordered the break-up of the collective farms." The means: Lister's division, which restored the old order by force and terror. Bollmen cites Communist source conceding the excessive harshness of Lister's methods. He quotes the Communist gene ral secretary of the Institute of Agrarian Reform, who admits that the measures taken to dissolve the collectives were "a very grave mistake, and produced tremendous disorganization in the countryside," as "those persons who were discontented with the collectives... took them by assault, carrying away and dividing up the harvest and farm implements without respecting the collectives that had been formed without violence or pressure, that were prosperous, and that were a model of organization .. A.. a result, labour in the fields was suspended almost entirely, and a quarter of the land had not been prepared at the time for sowing" (p. 200). Once again, it was necessary to ameliorate the harsh repression of the collectives, to prevent ..
disaster. Summarizing these events, Bolloten describes the resulting situation as
follows:
But although the situation in Aragon improved in some degree,
Chomsky, Noam (Author). Chomsky on Anarchism. Oakland, CA, USA: AK Press, 2005. p 63. http://site.ebrary.com/lib/dominicanuc/Doc?id=10407946&ppg=64
the hatreds and resentments generated by the break-up of the collectives and by the repression that followed were never whol ly dispelled. Nor was the resultant disillusionment that sapped
rhe spirit of the Anarchosyndicalist forces on the Aragon front ever entirely removed, a disillusionment that no doubt con tributed to rhe collapse of that from a few months later... after the destruction of the collective farms i n Aragon, the Communisr Parry was compelled to modify its policy, and sup
porr collectives also in other regions against former owners who sought the rerurn of confiscated land .... [pp. 200-201]
Retu i g to Jackson's remarks, I think we must conclude that they seriously misrepresent the situarion.108 The dissolution of the Council of Aragon and rn n
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the large�scale destruction of the collectives by military force was simply anmh er stage in the eradication of the popular revolution and the restoration of the old order. Let me emphasize that I am not criticizing Jackson for his negative attitude towards the social revolution, but rather for the failure of objectivity when he deals with the revoimion and the ensuing repression. Among historians of the Spanish Civil War, the dominant view is that the Communist policy was in essentials the correct one-that in order to consolidate domestic and international support for the Republic it was necessary ro block and then reverse the social revolution. Jackson, for example, states that Caballero "realized that it was absolmely necessary to rebuild the amhoriry of the Republican state and to work in close co-operation with the middle-class liber als." The anarchist leaders who entered the government shared this view, pmting their trust in the good faith of liberals such as Companys and believing-naive ly, as events were to show-that the Western democracies would come to their aid.
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A policy diametrically opposed to this was advocated b� Camillo Berneri. In his open lener to the anarchist minister Federica Montseny 09 he summarizes his views in the following way: "The dilemma, war or revolmion, no longer has meaning. The only dilemma is this: either victory over Franco through revolutionary war, or defeat' (his imlics). He argued that Morocco should be granted inde pendence and that an anempt should be made to stir up rebellion throughout North Africa. Thus a revolutionary struggle should be undertaken against Western capitalism in North Africa and, simultaneously, against the bourgeois regime in Spain, which was gradually dismantling the accomplishments of the July revolution. The primary front should be political. Franco relied heavily on Moorish contingents, including a substantial number from French Morocco. The Republic might exploit this fact, demoralizing the Nationalist forces and perhaps even winning them to the revolmionary cause by political agitation based on the concrete alternative of pan-Islamic-specifically, Moroccan-revo lution. Writing in April 1 937, Berneri urged that the army of the Republic be reorganized for the defense of the revolution, so that it might recover the spirit of popular participation of the early days of the revolution. He quotes the words of his compatriot Louis Bertoni, writing from the Huesca front: The Spanish war, deprived of all new faith, of any idea of a social transformation, of all revolutionary grandeur, of any universal meaning, is now merely a national war of independence that must be carried on to avoid the extermination that the international plu cocracy demands. There remains a terrible question of life or death, but no longer a war to build a new society and a new humanity. In sllch a war, the human eiemem that might bring victory over fascism is lost.
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In retrospect, Berneri's ideas seem quite reasonable. Oelegarions of Moroccan nationalists did in fact approach the Valencia government asking for arms and materiel, but were refused by Caballero, who actually proposed ter ritorial concessions in North Africa to France and England to try to win their suppOrt. Commenting on these facts, Broue and Temime observe that these policies deprived the Republic of "the instrument of revolutionary defeatism in the enemy army," and even of a possible weapon against Italian intervention. Jackson. on the other hand. dismisses Berneri's suggestion with the remark that independence for Morocco (as for that maHer, even aid to the Moroccan nationalists) was "a gesture that would have been highly appreciated in Paris and London." Of course it is correct that France and Britain would hardly have appreciated this development. As Berneri points out, "it goes without saying that one cannot simulcaneously guarantee French and British interests in Morocco and carry out an insurrection." But Jackson's comment does not touch on the central issue, namely, whether the Spanish revolution could have been preserved, both from the fascists at the front and from the bourgeois Communist coalition within the Republic, by a revolutionary war of the sort that the left proposed-or, for that matter, whether the Republic might not have been saved by a political struggle that involved Franco's invading Moorish troops, or at least eroded their morale. It is easy to see why Caballero was not attracted by this bold scheme, given his reliance on the eventual backing of the Western democracies. On the basis of what we know today, however, Jackson's summary dismissal of revolutionary war is much too abrupt. Furthermore, Bertoni's observations from the Huesca front are borne our by much other evidence. some of it cited earlier. Even those who accepted the Communist strategy of discipline and central control as necessary concede that the repressions that formed an ineliminable part of this strategy "tended to break the fighting spirit of rhe people. " I I O One can only speculate, bur it seems to me that many commentators have seriously underestimated the sig nificance of the political factor, the potential strength of a popular struggle to defend the achievements of the revolucion. It is perhaps relevant that Asturias, the one area of Spain where the system of CNT-UGT committees was not eliminated in favor of central control, is also the one area where guerrilla war fare continued well after Franco's victory. Broue and Temime observe ! ! ! that the resistance of the partisans ofAsturias "demonstrates the depth of the revo lutionary eian, which had nor been shattered by the reinstitution of state authority, conducted here with greater prudence." There can be no doubt that the revolution was both widespread and deeply rooted in the Spanish masses. It seems quite possible that a revolutionary war of the sort advocated by Berneri would have been successful, despite the grearer mili(ary force of the fascist armies. The idea that men can overcome machines no longer seems as romantic or naive as it may have a few years ago.
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Funhermore, the trust placed in the bourgeois government by the anarchist leaders was not honored, as the history of the counterrevolution clearly shows. In retrospect, it seems that Berneri was correct in arguing that they should not have taken part in the bourgeois government, btl[ should rather have sOll�hr to replace this government with the institutions created by the revolurion.11 The anarchist minister Garcia Oliver stated that "we had confidence in the word and in the person of a Catalan democrat and retained and supported Companys as President of the Generalitat," 1 1 3 at a time when in Catalonia, at least, the workers' organizations could easily have replaced the state apparams and dispensed with the former political parties, as they had replaced the old economy with an entirely new structure. Companys recognized fully that there were limits beyond which he could not cooperate with the anarchists. In an imerview with H. E. Kaminski, he refused to specifY these limits, bur merely expressed his hope that "the anarchist masses will nOt oppose the good sense of their leaders," who have "accepted the responsibilities incumbent upon them"; he saw his task as "directing these responsibilities in the proper path," not fur ther specified in the interview, but shown by the events leading up to the May Days. 1 1 4 Probably, Companys' attitude towards this willingness of the anar chist leaders to cooperate was expressed accurately in his reaction to the sug gestion of a correspondent of the New Statesman and Nation, who predicted that the assassination of the anarchist mayor of Puigcerda would lead to a revolt: "[Companys] laughed scornfully and said (he anarchists would capitu late as they always had before." 1 1 ) As has already been pointed out in some
detail, the liberal-Communist Parry coalition had no intention of letting the war against Franco take precedence over the crushing of the revolution. A spokesman for Comorera pm the matter clearly: "This slogan has been attrib uted to the I�S.U.C.: 'Before taking Saragossa, it is necessary to take Barcelona.' This reflects the situation exactiy.... " I 1 6 Comorera himself had, from the beginning, pressed Companys to resist the CNT. I I I The first task of the antifascist coalition, he maintained, was to dissolve the revolutionary com mittees. 1 1 8 I have already cited a good deal of evidence indicating that the repression conducted by the Popular Front seriously weakened popular com mitment and involvement in the antifascist war. What was evident to George Orwell was also clear to the Barcelona workers and the peasants in the collec tivized villages of Aragon: the liberal-Communist coalition would not tolerate a revolutionary transformation of Spanish sociery; it would commit itself fully to the anti-Franco struggle only after the old order was firmly re-established, by force. if necessary. I 1'9 There is linle doubt that farm workers in the collectives understood quite well the social content of the drive towards consolidation and central control. We learn this not only from anarchist sources bm also from the socialist press in the spring of 1 937. On May l , the Socialist party newspaper Adelante had the following to say:
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At the outbreak of the Fascist revolt the labor organizations and the democratic elements in the country were in agreement that the so-called Nationalist Revolution, which threatened to plunge our people into an abyss of deepest misery, could be haIr ed only by a Social Revolution. The Communist Parry, however, opposed rhis view wirh all irs might. It had apparently com pletely forgotten its old theories of a "workers' and peasants' republic" and a "dictatorship of the proletariat." From its con stant repetition of its new slogan of the parliamentary demo cratic republic it is clear that it has lost all sense of reality. When the Catholic and conservarive sections of the Spanish bour geoisie saw their old system smashed and could find no way our, the Communist Party instilled new hope into them. It assured them that the democratic bourgeois republic for which it was pleading put no obstacles i n the way of Catholic propaganda and, above all, that it stood ready to defend the class interests of the bourgeoisie. 1 20
That this realization was widespread in the rural areas was underscored d ra matically by a questionnaire sent by Adeumte to secretaries of the UGT Federation of Land Workers, published in June 1937. 1 21 The results are sum marized as follows:
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The replies to these questions revealed an astounding unanimi· ty. Everywhere the same story. The peasant collectives are today most vigorously opposed by the Communist Party. The Communists organize the well-to-do f.'umers who are on the lookout for cheap labor and are, for this reason, outspokenly hostile to the cooperative undertakings of the poor peasants, It is the element which before the revolution sympathized with the Fascists and Monarchists which, according to the testi mony of the trade-union representatives, is now flocking into the ranks of the Communist Parry. As to the general effect of Communist activity on the country, the secretaries of the U.G.T. had only one opinion, which the representative of the Valencia organization put in these words: "It is a misfortune in the fullest sense of the word." 122 It is not difficult to imagine how the recognition of this "misfortune" must have affected the willingness of the land workers to take part in the antifascist war, with all the sacrifices that this enta iled.
The attitude of the central government to the revolution was brutally revealed by its acts and is attested as well i n i ts propaganda. A former minister describes rhe s ituation as follows:
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The face that is concealed by the coalition of the Spanish Communist Party with the left Republicans and right wing Socialises is thac there has been a successful social revoimion in half of Spain. Successful, that is, in the collectiviz.1.tion of facto ries and farms which are operated under trade union control, and operated quite efficiently. During the three months that I was director of propaganda for the United States and England under Alvarez del Vayo, then Foreign Minister for the Valencia Government, I was instructed not ro send our one word abom this revolution in the economic system of loyalist Spain. Nor are any foreign correspondents in Valencia fermincd to write freely of the revolution that has taken place.l 3 In shon, there is much reason ro believe that the will to fight Franco was sig nificantly diminished, perhaps destroyed, by the policy of amhoritarian cen tralization undertaken by the liberal-Communist coalition, carried through by force, and disguised in the propaganda that was disseminated among Western intellectuals l24 and that still dominates the writing of history. To the extent that this is a correct judgmem, the alternative proposed by Berneri and the left "extremists" gains in plausibility. 68
As noted earlier. Caballero and the anarchist ministers accepted the policy of counterrevolution because of their trust in the Western democracies, which they felt sure would sooner or later come to their aid. This feeling was perhaps understandable in 1 937. h is strange, however, that a historian writing in the 1 960s should dismiss the proposal to strike at Franco's rear by extending the revolutionary war to Morocco, on grounds that this would have displeased Western capitalism (see page 65 above)
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.
Berneri was quite right in his belief that the Western democracies would not take part in an antifascist struggle in Spain. In fact, their complicity in the fascist insurrection was not slight. French bankers, who were generally pro Franco, blocked the release of Spanish gold to the loyalist government, thus hindering the purchase of arms and. incidentally. increasing the reliance of the Republic on the Soviet Union. l25 The policy of "nonimervention," which effectively blocked Western aid for the loyalist government while Hitler and Mussolini in effect won the war for Franco, was also technically initiated by the French government-though apparently under heavy British pressure. 1 26
As far as Great Britain is concerned, the hope that it would come to the aid of the Republic was always unrealistic. A few days after (he Franco coup. the foreign editor of Paris-Soir wrote: "At least four countries are already taking active interest in the baule-France. which is supporting the Madrid Governmem, and Britain, Germany and haly, each of which is giving discreet bur nevertheless effective assistance to one group or another among the insur gents." 1 27 In fact, British suppOrt for Franco took a fairly concrete form at the very earliest stages of the insurrection. The Spanish navy remained loyal to the
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Republic,* an d made some attempt to prevent Franco from ferrying trOOps from Morocco to Spain. Italian and German involvement in overcoming these efforts is well documented; 1 28 the British role has received less attention, but can be determined from contemporary reports. On August 1 1 , 1936, the New York Times carried a front�page report on British naval actions in the Straits of Gibraltar, commenting that "this action helps the Rebels by preventing attacks on Algeci ras , where troops from Morocco land." (A few days earl ier, loyal ist warships had bombarded Algeciras, damaging the British consulate.) An accompanying dispatch from Gibraltar describes the situation as it appeared from there : Angered by the Spanish factions' endangering of shipping and neutral Gibraltar ter ri tory in their fighting, Great Britain virtu� ally blockaded Gibraltar Harbor last night with the huge battle ship Queen Elizabeth in the center of the entrance, constantly playing searchlights on nearby waters. Many British warships patrolled the entire Strait today, determined to prevent interference with Britain's control over the entrance to the Mediterranean, a vital place in the British "lifeline to the East."
Th is action followed repeated warnings to the Spanish Government and yesterday's decree that no more fighting would be permitted in Gibraltar Harbor. The British at Gibraltar had become increasingly nervous after the shelling of Algeciras by the Loyalist battleship Jaime 1. Although British neutrality is still maintained, the patrol ofthe Strait and the closing of the harbor will aid the military Rebels because Loyalist warships cannot attempt to take Algeciras, now in Rebel hands, and completely isolate the Rebels from Morocco. The Rebels now can release some troops, who were nuhed back to Algeciras, for dury further north in the drive for Madrid
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It was reported in Gibraltar tonight that the Rebels had sent a transport across the Strait and had landed more troops from Morocco for use in the columns that are marching northward from headquarters at Seville.
This was the second time this year that Britain warned a power when she believed her measure of Mediterranean control was threatened, and it remains to be seen whether the Madrid Government will flout the British as the Italians did. If it attempts to do so, the British gunners of the Gibral tar fort have "'-0 be more precise, pro-Franco officers were killed, and the seamen remained loyal to the Republic, in many instances.
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auchority (0 fire warning shots. What will happen if such shots go unheeded is obvious. All the British here refer ro the Madrid Government as the "Communists" and there is no doubt where British sympathies now lie, encouraged by the statement of General Francisco Franco, leader of the Rebels, that he is not especially cooperat ing with Italy. The British Government has ordered Spaniards here to cease ploning or be expelled and has asked Brirons "loyally to refrain from either acting or speaking publicly in such a manner as to display marked partiality or partisanship." The warning, issued in the official Gibraltar Gazette, was signed by the British Colonial Secretary here. The warning was issued after reports of possible Communist troubles here had reached official ears and after strong com plaints that Spanish Rebels were in Gibraltar. It was said Rebels were making headquarters here and entering La Linea to fight. [Italics mine]
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I have quoted this dispatch in full because it conveys rather accurately the char-
acter of British "neutrality" in the early stages of the war and thenceforth. In May 1938, the British ambassador to Spain, Sir Henry Chilton, "expressed the conviction that a Franco victory was necessary for peace in Spain; that there was not the slightest chance that Italy and/or Germany would dominate Spain; and that even if it were possible for the Spanish Government to win (which he did not believe) he was convinced that a victory for Franco would be bener for Great Britain."129 Churchill, who was at first violently opposed to the Republic, modified his position somewhat after the crushing of rhe revolution in the summer of 1937. What particularly pleased him was the forceful repres sion of the anarchists and the militarization of the Republic (necessary when "the entire structure of civilization and social life is destroyed," as it had been by the revolution, now happily subdued).130 However, his good feelings towards the Republic remained qualified. In an interview ofAugust 14, 1938, he expressed himself as follows: "Franco has all the right on his side because he loves his country. Also Franco is defending Europe against the Communist danger-if you wish to pur it in those terms. But 1, I am English, and I prefer the triumph of the wrong cause. I prefer that the other side wins, because Franco could be an upset or a threat to British interests, and the others no." 1 3 1 The Germans were quite aware o f British sentiment, naturally, and there fore were much concerned that the supervisory committee for the noninter vention agreement be located in London rather than Paris. The German Foreign Ministry official responsible for this matter expressed his view on August 29, 1936, as follows: "Naturally, we have to count on complaints of all
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kinds being brought up in London regarding failure to observe the obligarion not to intervene, but we cannot avoid such complaints in any case. It can, in fact, only be agreeable to us if the center of graviry, which after all has thus far been in Paris because of the French initiative, is transferred to London."132 They were not disappointed. In November, Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden stated in the House of Commons: "So far as breaches [of the nonintervention agreement] are concerned, I wish to state categorically that I think there are other Governments more to blame than those of Germany and Italy." 133 There was no factual basis for this statement, but it did reflect British attitudes. It is interesting that according to German sources, England was at that time sup plying Franco with munitions through Gibraltar and, at the same time, pro viding information to Germany about Russian arms deliveries to the Republ ic.134 The British left was for the most part in support of the liberal-Communist coalition, regarding Caballero as an "infantile leftist" and the anarchists as gen erally unspeakable. The British policy of mild support for Franco was to be successful in pre serving British interests in Spain, as the Germans soon discovered. A German Foreign Ministry nOte of OctOber 1 937 to the embassy in Nationalist Spain included the following observation: "That England cannot permanently be kept from the Spanish market as in the past is a fact with which we have to
reckon. England's old rclations with (he Spanish mines and the Generalissimo's
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desire, based on political and economic considerations, to come to an under standing with England place certain limits on our chances of reserving Spanish raw materials to ourselves permanently."l3; One can only speculate as to what might have been the effects of British suppOrt for the Republic. A discussion of this matter would take us far afield, into a consideration of British diplomacy during the late 1930s. It is perhaps worth mention, now that the "Munich analogy" is being bandied about in utter disregard for the historical facts by Secretary Rusk and a number of his academic supporters, that "containment of Communism" was not a policy invented by George Kennan in 1 947. Specifically, it was a dominant theme in (he diplomacy of the 1 930s. In 1 934, Lloyd George stated that "in a very short time, perhaps in a year, perhaps in two, the conservative elements in this coun try will be looking to Germany as the bulwark against Communism in Europe.... Do not let us be in a hurry to condemn Germany. We shall be wel coming Germany as our friend."l3 6 In September 1 938, the Munich agree ment was concluded; shortly after, both France and Britain did welcome Germany as "our friend." As noted earlier (see note 99), even Churchill's role at this time is subject to some question. Of course, the Munich agreement was the death knell for the Spanish Republic, exactly as the necessiry to rely on the Soviet Union signaled the end of the Spanish revolution in 1 937.
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The United States, like France. exhibited less iniriarive in these events than Great Britain, which had far more substantial economic interests in Spain and was more of an independent force in European affairs. Nevertheless, the American record is hardly one to inspire pride. Technically, the United States adhered (Q a position of strict nClI(raliry. However, a careful look raises some doubts. According to information obtained by Jackson, "the American colonel who headed the Telephone Company had placed private lines at the disposal of the Madrid plotters for their conversations with Generals Mola and Franco, " 1 37 just prior to the insurrection on July 17. In August, the American government urged the Martin Aircraft Company not to honor an agreement made prior [Q the insurrection ro supply aircraft to the Republic, and it also pressured the Mexican government not to reship to Spain war materials pur chased in the United States.138 An American arms exporter, Robert Cuse, insisted on his legal right to ship airplanes and aircraft engines to the Republic in December ] 936, and rhe Stare Departmen t was forced to grant authoriza tion. Cuse was denounced by Roosevelt as unpatriotic, though Roosevelt was forced to admit that the request was quite legal. Roosevelt contrasted the atti rude of orher businessmen (0 euse as follows:
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Well, these companies went along with the request of the Government. There is the 90 percen t of business that is honest, r mean ethically honest. There is the 90 percent we are always pointing at with pride. And then one man does what amounts to a perfecriy legal but thoroughly unpatriotic act. He represents the 10 percent of business that does not live up to the best stan dards. Excuse the homily, but I feel quite deeply about it. 139
Among the businesses that remained "ethically honest" and therefore did not incur Roosevelt's wrath was the Texaco Oil Company, which violated its con tracts with the Spanish Republic and shipped oil instead to Franco. (Five rankers that were on rhe high seas in July 1936 were diverted to Franco, who received six million dollars worth of oil on credit during the Civil War.) Apparenriy, neither the press nor the American government was able to dis cover this fact, though it was reported in left-wing journals at the time. 140 There is evidence that the American government shared the fears of Churchill and others about the dangerous forces on the Republican side. Secretary of State Cordell Hull, for example, informed Roosevelt on July 23, 1936, that "one of the most serious factors in this situation lies in the fact that the [Spanish] Government has distributed large quantities of arms and ammuni tion into the hands of irresponsible members of left-wi ng political organiza tions."141 Like Churchill, many responsible Americans began to rethink their attitude towards the Republic after the social revolurion had been crushed. 142 However, relations with Franco continued cordial. In 1957, President Eisenhower congratulated Franco on the "happy anniversary" of his rebel-
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lion, 143 and Secre£ary Rusk added his tribute in 1961. Upon criticism, Rusk was defended by the American ambassador to Madrid, who observed that Spain is "a nation which understands the implacable nature of the communist threat," 144 like Thailand, South Korea, Taiwan, and selected other countries of the Free World . 1 4 5 In the light of such facts as these. it seems to me that Jackson is not treat ing the historical record seriously when he dismisses the proposals of the Spanish left as absurd. Quite possibly Berneri's strategy would have failed. as did that of the liberal-Communist coalition that took over the Republic. It was far from senseless, however. I think that the failure of historians to consider it more seriously follows, once again, from the elitist bias that dominates the writing of his wry and. in this case, from a certain sentimentality about the Western democracies. -
The study of collectivization published by the CNT in 1937 146 concludes with a description of the village of Membrilla. "In its miserable huts live the poor inhabitants of a poor province; eight thousand people, but the streets are not paved, the town has no newspaper. no cinema, neither a cafe nor a library. On the other hand, it has many churches that have been burned." Immediately after the Franco insurrection. the land was expropriated and village life collec tivized. Food, clothing, and tools were distributed equitably to the whole population. Money was abolished. work collectivized, all goods passed to the LUIIIIIIUllity, COIlSUlllpliulI waS suciali·.led . I t waS, huwever, IIUt a suciali'.latiull of wealth but of poverty." Work continued as before. An elected council appointed committees to organize the life of the commune and its relations to the outside world. The necessities of life were distributed freely, insofar as they were available. A large number of refugees were accommodated. A small library was established, and a small school of design. "
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The document closes with these words: The whole population lived as in a large family; functionaries, delegates, the secretary of the syndicates, the members of the municipal council, all eiecced, acced as heads of a family. But they were controlled, because special privilege or corruption would not be wlerared. Membrilla is perhaps the poorest village of Spain but it is the most just. ,
An account such as this, with its concern for human relations and the ideal of a just society, must appear very strange to the consciousness of the sophisticat ed intellectual, and it is therefore treated with scorn, or taken to be naive or primitive or otherwise irrational. Only when such prejudice is abandoned will it be possible for historians to undertake a serious study of the popular move ment that transformed Republican Spain in one of the most remarkable social revolutions that history records.
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Franz Borkenau, in commenting on the demoralization caused by the authoritarian practices of the central government, observes (p. 295) that "newspapers are written by Europeanized editors, and the popular movement is inarticulate as to its deepest impulses. . . [which are shown only] ... by acts." The objectivity of scholarship will remain a delusion as long as these inarticu late impulses remain beyond its grasp. As far as the Spanish revolution is con cerned, its history is yet to be written. I have concentrated on one theme-the imerpretation of the social revolu tion in Spain-in one work of history, a work that is an excellent example of liberal scholarship. It seems to me that there is more than enough evidence to show that a deep bias against social revolution and a commitment to the val ues and social order of liberal bourgeois democracy has led the author to mis represent crucial events and to overlook major historical currents. My inten tion has not been to bring into question the commitment to these values-that is another matter entirely. Rather, it has been to show how this commitment has led ro a striking failure of objectivity, providing an example of "counter revolutionary subordination" of a much more subtle and interesting sort-and ulrimately, I believe, a far more important one-than those discussed in the first part of this essay.
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III
In opening this discussion of the Spanish revolution I referred to the classical left-wing critique of the social role of intellectuals, Marxist or otherwise, in modern society, and ro Luxemburg's reservations regarding Bolshevism. Western sociologists have repeatedly em,hasized the relevance of this analysis to developments in the Soviet Union, 14 with much justice. The same sociol ogists formulate "the world revolution of (he epoch" in the following terms: "The major transformation is the decline of business (and of earlier social for mations) and the rise of intellecruals and semi-intellectuals ro effective power." 148 The "ultra-left" critic foresaw in these developments a new attack on human freedom and a more efficient system of exploitation. The Western sociologist sees in the rise of intellectuals to effective power the hope for a more humane and smoothly functioning society, in which problems can be solved by "piecemeal technology." Who has the sharper eye? At least this much is plain: there are dangerous tendencies in the ideology of the welfare state intel ligentsia who claim to possess the technique and understanding required to manage our "postindustrial society" and to organize an international society dominated by American superpower. Many of these dangers are revealed, at a purely ideological level, in the study of the counterrevolutionary subordination of scholarship. The dangers exist both insofar as the claim to knowledge is real and insofar as it is fraudulent. Insofar as the technique of management and control exists, it can be used to consolidate the authority of those who exercise
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it and to diminish spontaneous and free experimentation with new social forms, as it can limit the possibilities for reconstruction of society in the inter ests of those who are now, to a greater or lesser extent, dispossessed. Where the techniques fail, they will be supplemented by all of the methods of coercion that modern technology provides, to preserve order and stability. For a glimpse of what may lie ahead, consider the Godkin lectures of McGeorge Bundy, recently delivered at Harvard. 1 49 Bundy urges that more power be concentrated in the executive branch of the government, now "dan gerously weak in relation to its present tasks." That the powerful executive will act with justice and wisdom-this presumably needs no argument. As an example of the superior executive who should be attracted to government and given still greater power, Bundy cites Robert McNamara. Nothing could reveal more clearly the dangers inherent in the "new society" than the role that McNamara's Pentagon has played for the past half-dozen years. No doubt McNamara succeeded in doing with utmost efficiency that which should not be done at all. No doubt he has shown an unparalleled mastery of the logistics of coercion and repression, combined with the most astonishing inability to comprehend political and human factors. The efficiency of the Pentagon is no less remarkable than its pratfalls. 1 50 When understanding fails, there is always more force in reserve. As the "experiments in material and human resources control" collapse and "revolutionary development" grinds to a halt, we simply resort more openly to the Gestapo tactics that are barely concealed behind the facade of "pacification."151 When American cities explode, we can expect the same. The technique of "limited warfare" translates neatly into a system of domestic repression-far more humane, as will quickly be explained, than massacring those who are unwilling to wait for the inevitable victory of the war on poverty.
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Why should a liberal intellectual be so persuaded of the virtues of a politi cal system of four-year dictatorship? The answer seems all too plain.
Source: Noam Chomsky, "Objectiviry and Liberal Scholarship," in American Power and the New Mandarins (New York: New Press, 2002), pp. 23-158. First edi tion Pantheon, 1 969.
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NOTES I "Politics and the Morality of Scholarship," in Max Black, ed., The Morality of
Scholarship (Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1 967), pp. 59-88.
2 "The War and Its Effects-II," Congressional Record, December 13, 1967. 3 Congressional Record, July 27, 1967.
4 William A. Nighswonger, RumL Pacification
;'1 Viemam (Praeger Special Studies; New York, Fredrick A. Praeger, Inc., 1967)-one of a series of "specialized research monographs in U.S. and international economics and politics."
5 Ithiel de Sola Pool, "The Necessity for Social Scientists Doing Research for Governments," Background, Vol. 1 0 (August 1 966), p. I l l .
6 Max Ways writes in Fortune that "McNamara, his systems analysts, and their com
puters are not only contributing to the practical effectiveness of U.S. action, but rais ing the moral level ofpolicy by a more conscious and selectivc anenrion to thc defini tion of its aims." litalics mine]. Cited by Andrew Kopkind, "The Future-Planners," New Republic, February 25, 1967, p. 23. Comment would be superfluous.
7 Daniel Bell, "Notes on the Post-Industrial Society: Part I," The Public Interm, No. G, 1 967, pp. 24-25. 76
8 Some of the dangers are noted by Richard Goodwin, in a review of Thomas Schelling's Arms and Influence in the New Yorker, February 1 7, 196�, pp. 1 27-34. He
observes that "the most profound objection to this kind of strategic theory is not its limited usefulness but its danger, for it can lead us to believe we have an under standing of events and a control over their flow which we do not have" A still more profound objection, 1 think, is that the pretended objectivity of"strategic theory" can be used to justify the attempt to control the flow of events.
9 Seymour M. Lipset, Political Man (Garden City, N.W., Doubleday Inc., 1 960), p. 406.
& Company,
10 "Status Politics and new Anxieties," in The End of Jdeowgy (New York, The Free Press, 1960), p. 1 19.
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I I "The Necessity and Difficulry of Planning the Future Society," address given at lite
American Institute of Planners Conference, Washington, D.C., October 3, 1 967. Citing this, Senator Fulbright (op. cit.) comments apliy that "poverty, which is a tragedy in a poor country, blights our affiuent society with something more than tragedy; being unnecessary, it is deeply immoral as well" He also compares ''the $904 billion we have spent on military power since World War II" with "the $96 billion we have spent, our of our regular national budget, on education, health, welfare housing, and community development" In his Challenge to Affluence (New York, Pantheon Books, 1 963), Myrdal concludes that "In society at large there is more equality of opportunity today than there ever was. But for the bottom layer there is less or none" (p. 38). He questions the assumption that "American is still the free and
CHOMSKY ON A N ARCHISM open society of its cherished image and well-established ideals" and remarks that "as less and less work is required of the type that people in the urban and rural slums can offer, they will be increasingly isolated and expose ro unemployment and plain exploitation. There is an ugly smell rising from the basement of the stately American mansion" (p. 49).
12 Adam Ulam, The Unfinished Revoution (New York, Vimage Books, 1964), p. 97. 13 In 1965, 20 companies out of 420,000 made 38 percent of profits after taxes, and earnings on foreign investments were well over three times what they were 1 5 years earlier. The sales ofGM exceeded the GNP of all but nine foreign countries. The 10 largest companies reported profits equal to the next 490. On thousand companies disappeared through merger. 14 "American in rhe Technetronic Age," Encounter, Vol. 30 Uanuary 1968), pp. 16-26. 1 5 "Marxian Socialism in the United States," in Donald D. Egbert and S. Persons, eds., S(lcialism and American Lift (Princeron, N.j., Princeton University Press, 1952), Vol . ! , p. 329.
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16 Op. cit. , p. 5. Less typical, and more realistic, is his belief that these problems also "seem to defy the social scientist's expertise." For some general discussions of this "generosity," see, for example, David Horowitz, Hemispheres North and S(luth (Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1 966), and many special studies. American public officials do not share this faith in our generosity, by and large. For example, the Assistant Secretary of State for La.tin American affairs observed bluntly that "the State Department is nOt disposed to favor large loans of public funds to countries not welcoming our private capital" (State Department Bulletin No.22, 1950, cited in Fredrick Clairmonte, Economic Liberalism and Underdevelopment [Bombay and London, Asia Publishing House, 1960], p. 248). Eugene Black, testifying before Congress on the Asian Development Bank, pointed out that "when the Bank makes loans you have international bids, and I am sure that with our ability and ingenuity in this country, we will get our share of the business. We certainly ought to get more than the small amount we contribute" David Bell testified that "the Bank will play a major role in carrying forward anmher policy of our own assistance program strengthening the role of the private sector. . . by identifying panicular projects which can anract private capital to this region." Nothing here about "the generosity that characterizes our policy." Equally revealing is the histOry of programs such as the Alliance for Progress. As SenatOr Gore commented, this program "has in large measure come to be subsidy for American business and American exponers" (Congressi(lrJal Record, July 22, 1 966) a fairly accurate judgment, so it appears. For example, the AID lending program in Latin America, according to former Alliance for Press official William Rogers (The 1i�!ilight Struggle [New York, Random House, 1967], p. 205), is based on twO ele ments: "a demonstrated balance of payments needed to increase the nation's ability to import U.S. goods and services, and the adoption of public policies and programs which would insure against capital flight on the international account side or the misuse of domestic resources through inefficient budgeting, reducing local savings or
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OBJE CTIVITY A N D LIBERAL SCHOLARSHIP inflation." Commenting on this, Robert Smith notes that "the latter standard includ ed increased tax revenues, reduction of budget deficit, elimination of 'distorting sub sidies to public activities,' and the adoption of 'state incentives to private sector investment and growth.'" (New Politics, Vol. 6 [Spring 1967], pp. 49-57. For some remarks on the other side of our assistance program, military aid, see the articles of James Perras in this and the preceding issue.)
1 7 To Intervene or Not to Intervene," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 45 (April 1967). pp. "
425-36. 18 New York Times, December 20, 1 967. The Times refers to what is printed as "excerpts," but it is not materially different from the full document. I understand that it has since been signed by many other scholars.
1 9 See the reviews by Coral Bell and B. R. O'G. Anderson in the China Quarterly, No.
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28 (October-December 1 966), pp. 140-143. It should be noted that opposition to social change, and supporr for the counterrevolutionary violence that is used to sup press it, are the longstanding features ofAmerican cultural history. Thus according to American historian Louis Hartz, "there is no doubt that the appearance of even a mild socialism in 1848, of ledru Rollin and the national workshops, was enough to produce general American dismay. There was no outcry in America against the sup pression of the June revolt of the workers in Paris, as there was none over the sup pression of the Communards in 1 8 7 1 . Here was violence, and plenty of it, but it was being used for order and law, as one editorial writer PUt it [in the New York journal o/Commerce] ," ( The Nantre o/Revolution, Testimony before rhe SenJ.te Committee on Foreign Relations, February 26, 1968 [Washington, Government Printing Office, 1968]).
20 "The Public and the Polity," Ithiel de Sola Pool, ed., Contemporary Political Science: Toward Empirical Theory (New York, McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1967), p. 26.
2 1 Clairmonte, op. cit. , p. 325. 22 Recent confirmatory evidence is given by George M. Kahin, in a memorandum of April 13, 1 967, in the Congressional Record. He cites the marine Corps estimate that in this province, the principal area of marine strength, 1 8 out of 549 hamlets had been secured. " "
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23 Albert Shaw, editor of the American Review ofReviews, commenting, in 1893, on
American's failure to acquire colonies. Cited in Ernest R. May, Imperial Democracy (New York, Harcourt, Btace & World, Inc., 1961), p. 23.
24 Quoted by Roben Guillain in Le Monde, May 25, 1 966; reprinted, in English [rans !ation, as Vietnam, the Dirty war (London, Housmans, 1 966).
25 According to Jonathan Randal (New York Times, June I I , 1 967), "only one officer above the rank of lieutenant colonel did not serve in the French army agains[ the Vietminh in the French Indochina war."
26 Douglas Pike, Viet Cong, (Cambridge, mass., The M.I.T. Press, 1 966), pp. 361-62.
CHOMSKY ON A N ARCHISM 27 Viemam: A Dragon Embattled (New York, Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1967), Vol. 2, p. 952. See also note 29. 28 World Communism (1 939; reprinred Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1962), p. 24. 29 Op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 856. fu Buttinger explains, "Local elections would have given the Vietminh control of most of the rural communities. The Vietminh was not only pop ular and in effective political control of large regions, but it alone had people with lile requisite organizational skills to exploit whatever opportunities for democratic self-expression the regime opened up." He adds that "the NLF was truly the Vietminh reborn," and speaks of "rhe similarity, or bener, near identity, of the Vietminh and the NLF." 30 Roger Hilsman, "Internal War: The New Communist Tactic," in Franklin Mark Osanka, ed., Modern Guerilla Warfare (New York, The Free Press, 1962), p. 460. 3 1 Alastair Buchan, directOr of the Institute for Strategic 5[t1dies in London, describes
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the South Koreans as an "organization of fuian 'black and tans'" ("Questions about Vietnam," Encounter, Vol. 30 Uanuary 1968], pp. 3-12).
On the reasons for the remarkable success of pacification success of pacification in Sinh Dinh Province, see Bernard Fall, Last Reflections on a Wtir (Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1967), p. 1 967), p. 1 59. This was one of "the areas where American-Korean multidivision operations have literally smothered the oppo sition" with vast search-and-destroy operations" and continuing "tight military con trol"-or so it seemed, until late 1967, and finally February 1968, when the lid blew of( A report on Binh Dinh Province, the "showcase" province for pacification, in the New York Times, February 20, tells the stOry. "The enemy moves in December which several military men called a 'softening up' for the offensive-resulted in a wave of allied air strikes on villages. Hundreds of homes were destroyed"-rhe stan dard American response. An American official reports: "What the Vietcong did was occupy the hamlets we pacified JUSt for the purpose of having the allies move in and bomb them out. By their presence, the hamlets were destroyed." No doubt our psy chological warfare specialists are now explaining to the Vietnamese, who seem to have some difficulty understanding these subtleties, that the destruction of the vil lages is the fault of the Vietcong. In any event, the report continues, "the entire 1968 program for the province has now been shelved" and "the program is now set back anywhere from 14 to 1 8 months"-that is, back to the time of the initial saturation with American and Korean troops. "It has all gone down the drain," said one gloomy American official. 32 United States Policy and the Third World (Boston, Little, Brown, and Company, 1 967), Ch. 3. 33 Morton H. Halperin, Contemporary Military Strategy (Boston, Little, Brown, and Company, 1967), pp. 141-2. I am indebted to Herbert P Bix for bringing this con tribution to the social sciences to my attention. 34 Wolf, op. cit. , p. 69.
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35 There is little point in a lengthy discussion of Wolf's concept of international affairs
or his empirical smdies. To take a few examples, he assumes without question that North Vietnam's willingness to "disrupt the regime" in the South was motivated in part by "the marked economic and social improvemems accomplished by rhe Diem regime from 1955 to 1960-dramatic by comparison with the economic stagnation in North Vietnam" (for faCt rather than fancy on relative developmem, see Burtinger, op. cit., Vol. 2, pp. 928, 966 () ; and also thar India's "moderarely successful growth" was part of the mOtivation behind "China's aggressive actions in October 1962." See also nOte 36. As to the solidiry of Wolf's empirical srudies, it is perhaps enough to note that his most significant result, the correlation between higher GNP and high er level of political democracy in Latin America, arises principally from the conclu sion (based on dara from 1950 to 1960) that Brazil and Argentina (along with Mexico and Chile) rank high on the scale of polirical democracy (c( p. 124). The general level of sophistication is illustrated, for example, by a solemn reference to a consultant for having explained that in determ ining the "rotal military value" of a set of alternatives, it is not enough to sum up the separate values; one must also weiglu responses by probabiliry of occurrence.
36 "But in all cases, the primary consideration should be whether the proposed meas
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ure is likely to increase the COSt and difficulties of insurgent operations and help to disrupt the insurgent organization. rather than whether it wins popular loyalty and suppOrt, or whether it contributes to a more productive, efficient, or equitable use of resources" (Wolf, op. cit., p. 69). We must understand that "successful counterinsur gency programs can be conducted among a rural populate thar is passive or even hos tile, rather than loyal, to the government." AIl evidence, Wolf cites his belief that "The growth of the Viet Cong and of the Parher Lao probably occurred despite rhe opposition of a large majority of the people in both Vietnam and Laos" (ibid, p. 48). If they can do ir, so can we.
In contrast, Robert Scigliano (of rhe Michigan State Universiry Vietnam Advisory Group) reported that "using the estimate of American officials in Saigon at the end of 1962, about one-half of the South Vietnamese support the NLP" (South Vietnam: Nation Under Stress {BostOn, HoughtOn Miffiin Company, 1963], p. 145). Arthur Dommen reportS (Conflict in Laos: The Politics of NeutrnliZiltion {New York, Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1964 1) that "the Pathet Lao needed no propaganda to rurn the rural population against the tOwnspeople" (p. 107). The American Mission tOok care of this, with its lavish aid (1/2 of 1 percent of which was spent on agriculture, the livelihood of9G percent of the population) leading to immense corruption, the proliferation of luxurious villas and large automobiles alongside of grinding poverryj and with its constant subversion in suppOrt, first of the "pro-Wesrern neutralist" Phoui Sannankone, and then of the military dictator Phoumi Nosavan. AIl Roger Hilsman PUtS it, the real Pather Lao "threat" was "expansion of political control based on winning peasant support in the villages" (To Move a Nation, [Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1 967], p. 1 12). The lack of suppOrt for rhe Pather Lao was amply demonstrated in the 1958 elections, in which 9 of their 13 candidates won, and Souphanouvong, the leading rathet Lao figure, received more vores than
CHOMSKY ON A N ARCHISM any other candidate in the country. It was this election victory that set off the American attempts at subversion. As Dommen says, "once again the United States threw its support to the mOst feudal elements of the society." To Charles Wolf, all of this demonstrates that counterinsurgency, like insurgency, can succeed without concern for popular loyalty and participation. 37 Cited in Clairmonte, op. cit. , p. 92. The ancestors of whom Merivale speaks are those who crushed the Indian textile industry by embargoes and import duties, as was quite necessary. "Had this not been the case, the mills of Paisley and Manchester would have been stopped in their outset, and could scarcely have been against set in motion, even by the power of steam. They were created by the sacrifice of Indian manufacturers" (Horace Wilson, 1826, cited by Clairmonte, p. 87).
This is the classic example of the creation of underdevelopment through imperi alism. For a detailed study of this process see Andre Gunder Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America, (New York, Monthly Review Press, 1967). 38 See Robert E. Osgood, !deals and Selfinterest in America's Foreign Relations (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1953), pp. 72-73.
39 "Some Reflections on U.S. Policy in Southeast Asia." In William Henderson, ed., Southeast Asia: Prob/ems of United States Policy (Cambridge, Mass., The M.I.T. Press, 1963), pp. 249-63. This collection of papers was published with the encouragement of the Asia Society because of "the scholarly quality of the papers and their enlightening contribution to the formulation of United States policy in the area." 40 Thailand and the United States (Washington, Public Affairs Press, 1965). 41 The Bank of America placed a full-page ad in the Fourth of July edition, 1 9 5 1 , of lIle Bang/mit Post saluting the kingdom of Thailand with these words: "In both Thailand and America democracy has gone hand in hand with national sovereignty. Today both nations stand in lIle forefront of world efforts to promote and defend the democratic way of life."
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42 Tn an article on "U.S.-Thai links" in the Christian Science Monitor, October 1 4 , 1967. 43 JUSt a few paragraphs earlier we read that in the postwat period "the Americans rap idly expanded the Thai armed forces from 50,000 to 100,000 men . . . the United States quickly incteased the policy forces, and this helped suppress opponents of the government. The technical assistance program was largely converted to military objectives. The internal impact of this policy further strengthened the power and prestige of the Thai military leaders who had seized the government in 1947. The effort to move toward some form of constitutional rule was halted, and the demo cratic institutions inaugurated by civilian leaders just after the war were abolished. Political parties were suppressed. The press was censored. Power became increasingly centralized in the hands of a few military leaders." All of this, however, did no con stitute "inrerference in the domestic affairs of orher nations," and is not "contrary to American traditions." 44 Westem Interests in the Pacific Realm (New York, Random House, 1 967).
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4 5 Of what importance, then, is the fact that the overwhelming majority of Okinawans, including 80 percent of (hose whose business would be impaired or destroyed by this move, want the island returned to Japan, according to the Asahi polls (sec japan Quarterly, Vol. 1 5 [January-March 1968], pp. 42-52)? As [Q (he "strategic trust territories," Adam says, we must also not become overly sentimental: "A strategic trust is based on the assumption of [he overriding importance of nation al defense and the preservation of world order as against the cultural and political freedom of the indigenous inhabitants."
46 H.S. Malaviya, quoted in Clairmome (op. cit., p. 1 14), who cites subsranrial evi
dence in support of the following evaluation of the consequences of Western domi nance: "The systematic destruction of Indian manufacturers; the creation of lite Zemindari [landed aristocracy] and its parasitical outgrowths; the changes in agrari an structure; the financial losses incurred by tribute; the sharp transition ftom a pre monetised economy to one governed by the international price mechanism-these were some of the social and institutional forces that were to bting the apocalypse of death and famine to millions-with few or no compensatory benefits to the ryot [peasant]" (p. 107). See also note 37.
47 Cited in Paul Avrich, The Russimt Anarchists (Princeton, N.J., Princeton University
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Press, 1967), pp. 93-94. A recent reformulation of this view is given by Anton Pannekoek, the Dutch scientist and spokesman for libertarian communism, in his Workers Counc;!s (Melbourne, 1950), pp. 36-37: It is nOL for the first lime lhal ruling class lries lO explain, and. so La perpetuate, its rule as the consequences of an inborn difference between two kinds of people, one destined by nature to ride, the other to be ridden. The landowning aristocracy of former centuries defended their privileged position by boasting their extraction from a nobler race of conquerors that had subdued the lower race of com mon people. Big capitalists explain their dominating place by the assertion that they have brains and other people have none. In the same way now especially the iIHellectuals, considered themselves rhe rightful rulers of to-morrow, claim their spiritual superiority. They form the rapidly increasing class of university-trained officials and free professions, specialized in mental work, in study of books and of science, and they consider themselves as the people mOst gifted with intellect. Hence they are destined to be leaders of the produc tion, whereas the ungifted mass shall execute the manual work, for which no brains are needed. They are no defenders of capitalism; not capital, but intellect should direct labor. The more so, since now society is such a complicated structure, based on abstract and difficult science, that only the highest intellectual acumen is capa ble of embracing, grasping and handling it. Should the working masses, from lack of insight, fail to acknowledge this need of supe-
CHOMSKY ON A N ARCHISM rior intellectual lead, should they stupidly try to take the direction into their own hands, chaos and ruin will be the inevitable conse quence. 48 See note 7. Albert Parry has suggested that there are important similarities between
the emergence of a scientific elite in the Soviet Union and the United States, in their growing role in decision making, citing Bell's thesis in support. See the New York Times, March 27, 1 966, reporting on the Midwest Slavic Conference.
49 Letter to Herzen and Ogarett, 1866, cited in Daniel Guerin, }eunesse du socialisme lihertnire (Paris, Librarie Marcel Riviere, 1959), p. 1 19.
50 Rosa Luxemburg, The Russian Revolution, trans. Bertram D. Wolfe (Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1961), p. 7 1 . 5 1 Luxemburg, cited by Guerin, Jeunesse de socialisme libertaire, pp. 1 06-7. 52 Leninism or Marxsm, i in Luxemburg, op. cit. , p. 102. 53 For a very enlightening study of this matter, emphasizing domestic Issues, see Michael Paul Ragin, The Intellectuals andMcCarthy: The Radical Specter (Cambridge, Mass., The M.LT. Press, 1 967). 54 The Spanish Republic and the Civil Wtlr: 1931-1939 (Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1965). 55 Respectively, Presidenr of the Republic, Prime Minister from May until the Franco insurrection, and member of the conservative wing of the Popular Front selected by kana to try to set up a compromise government after the insurrection.
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56 It is interesting that Douglas Pike's very hostile accoull( of the National Liberation Front, cited earlier, emphasizes the popular and voluntary element in its striking organizational successes. What he describes, whether accurately or not one cannot tell, is a structure of interlocking self-help organizations, loosely coordinated and developed through persuasion rather than force-in certain respects, of a character that would have appealed to anarchist thinkers. Those who speak so freely of the "authoritarian Vietcong" may be correct, but they have presented liale evidence to support their judgment. Of course, it mUSt be understood that Pike regards the ele ment of voluntary mass participation in self-help associations as the most dangerous and insidious feature of the NLF organizational structure. Also relevant is the history of collectivization in China, which, as compared with [he Soviet Union, shows a much higher reliance on persuasion and mutual aid than on force and terror, and appears ro have been more successful. See Thomas P Bernstein, "Leadership and Mass Mobilisation in the Soviet and Chinese Collectivization Campaigns of 1929-30 and 1955-56: A Comparison," China Quarterly, No. 31 Guly-September 1 967), pp. 1-47, for some interesting and sug gestive commeIHS and analysis. The scale of the Chinese Revolution is so great and reports in depth are so frag mentary that it would no doubt be foolhardy to attempt a general evaluation. Still, all the reports that I have been able to study suggest that insofar as real successes were
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OBJECTIVITY A N D LIBERAL SCHOLARSHIP achieved in the several stages of land reform, mutual aid, collectivization, and for mation of comm