China's War on Terrorism: Counter-Insurgency, Politics and Internal Security (Asian Security Studies)

China’s War on Terrorism

China’s war on terror is among its most prominent and least understood of campaigns. With links to the global jihad, an indigenous insurgency threatens the government’s grip on a massive region of northwestern China known as Xinjiang. Riots, bombings, ambushes, and assassinations have rocked the region under separatist and Islamist banners. China acted early and forcefully, and although brutal, their efforts represent one of the few successes in the global struggle against Islamist terrorism. The effectiveness of this campaign has raised questions regarding whether China genuinely confronts a terrorist threat. In this book, based on extensive fieldwork, Martin Wayne investigates China’s counter-insurgency effort, highlighting the success of an approach centred on reshaping local society and government institutions. At the same time, he raises the question of what the United States may be able to learn from China’s approach, and argues that as important a case as Xinjiang needs to be fully examined in order for terrorism to be defeated. This book will be of interest to students of China, Asian politics, terrorism, and security studies in general. Martin I. Wayne is the China Security Fellow at National Defense University’s Institute for National Strategic Studies, Washington, DC. He holds a PhD in International Studies from the University of Denver.

Asian security studies Series editors: Sumit Ganguly Indiana University, Bloomington and

Andrew Scobell US Army War College

Few regions of the world are fraught with as many security questions as Asia. Within this region it is possible to study great power rivalries, irredentist conflicts, nuclear and ballistic missile proliferation, secessionist movements, ethnoreligious conflicts, and inter-state wars. This book series publishes the best possible scholarship on the security issues affecting the region, and includes detailed empirical studies, theoretically oriented case studies, and policyrelevant analyses as well as more general works. China and International Institutions Alternate paths to global power Marc Lanteigne

Taiwan’s Security History and prospects Bernard D. Cole

China’s Rising Sea Power The PLA Navy’s submarine challenge Peter Howarth

Religion and Conflict in South and Southeast Asia Disrupting violence Edited by Linell E. Cady and Sheldon W. Simon

If China Attacks Taiwan Military strategy, politics and economics Edited by Steve Tsang Chinese Civil–Military Relations The transformation of the People’s Liberation Army Edited by Nan Li The Chinese Army Today Tradition and transformation for the 21st century Dennis J. Blasko

Political Islam and Violence in Indonesia Zachary Abuza US–Indian Strategic Cooperation into the 21st Century More than words Edited by Sumit Ganguly, Brian Shoup and Andrew Scobell India, Pakistan and the Secret Jihad The covert war in Kashmir, 1947–2004 Praveen Swami

China’s Strategic Culture and Foreign Policy Decision-Making Confucianism, leadership and war Huiyun Feng Military Strategy in the Third Indochina War The last Maoist war Edward C. O’Dowd Asia Pacific Security US, Australia and Japan and the new security triangle William T. Tow, Satu Limaye, Mark Thomson and Yoshinobu Yamamoto

China, the United States and South-East Asia Contending perspectives on politics, security and economics Evelyn Goh and Sheldon W. Simon Conflict and Cooperation in MultiEthnic States Institutional incentives, myths and counter-balancing Brian Dale Shoup China’s War on Terrorism Counter-insurgency, politics, and internal security Martin I. Wayne

China’s War on Terrorism Counter-insurgency, politics, and internal security

Martin I. Wayne

First published 2008 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 270 Madison Ave, New York, NY 10016 This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2007.

“To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.” Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2008 Martin I. Wayne All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Wayne, Martin I., 1979– China’s war on terrorism : counter-insurgency, politics, and internal security / Martin I. Wayne. p. cm. – (Asian security studies) Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Terrorism–China. 2. Terrorism–Government policy–China. 3. Domestic terrorism–China. 4. Terrorism–China–Prevention. I. Title. HV6433.C55W38 2007 363.325'1560951–dc22 2007022105 ISBN 0-203-93613-2 Master e-book ISBN ISBN10: 0-415-45097-7 (hbk) ISBN10: 0-203-93612-2 (ebk) ISBN13: 978-0-415-45097-3 (hbk) ISBN13: 978-0-203-93613-9 (ebk)

Contents

List of figures Acknowledgments List of acronyms Introduction: morality and power in China’s Wild West

viii ix xi 1

1

Fighting terrorism: China’s bottom-up approach

10

2

Insurgency in Xinjiang

31

3

China’s “infinite” political will

55

4

The changing use of force in society

71

5

Grass-roots institutions and security

90

6

The war of ideas: reshaping society in Xinjiang

108

7

Conclusion: gauging effectiveness

127

Epilogue – the art of countering insurgency: from tactical to strategic efficacy

138

Notes Bibliography Index

152 174 192

Figures

1 2 3 4 5

CT and COIN: a tactical spectrum Twenty-two Chinese Uyghurs at Guantanamo Sources of China’s political will vis-à-vis Xinjiang China’s “four-in-one defense” Counter-insurgency

16 52 69 74 138

Acknowledgments

Simply, this work would not have been possible without the overwhelming support and backing of my parents to whom I am forever grateful. Much of my personal life was put on hold for my fieldwork and writing; and I thank my wife for her love and support. Several colleagues and friends generously commented on early drafts of chapters and offered sage council for my fieldwork; others contributed significantly in the field and in the academy. Because of the politically sensitive nature of this study, it may be best to here offer anonymous thanks to the individuals who, and institutions which, so graciously engaged, encouraged, critiqued, and empowered. To my doctoral committee at the University of Denver’s Graduate School of International Studies; Suisheng (Sam) Zhao, Jack Donnelly, and David Goldfischer; I owe a formative debt of gratitude. Assembled because you each demand excellence from your students, my work is infinitely better because of our interactions. I am grateful for the high-caliber training I received at GSIS, a school which has thrived under Tom Farer’s able leadership. Conversations with, and the critiques of, Peg Sanders, Thomas Marks, Philip Saunders, Joseph McMillan, Michael Bell, James Laughrey, four Sinologists, and five Xinjiang scholars were invaluable in this project’s many phases. Similarly, the Hampshire College community has continued to nurture my thinking long past my undergraduate days; I am proud to be associated with this sharp and innovating group. This project is substantially better because of these individuals’ valiant efforts; all remaining flaws are the author’s alone. National Defense University’s Institute for National Strategic Studies provided a generous post-doctoral fellowship which facilitated the transformation of this study into a complete manuscript. My work benefited greatly from my interactions at INSS; Stephen Flanagan’s enlightened leadership and James Schear’s sound advice substantially helped me clarify my argument. To my many colleagues at NDU, especially the China team and the counter-terrorism professionals of INSS and SNSEE, I offer deep-felt thanks. I hope this study moves us forward. People in China, and especially in Xinjiang, made this research possible by discussing their lives, memories, hopes, and dreams. For some this was a casual

x

Acknowledgments

and unconscious process; for others it involved acts of great courage. I hope that this analysis builds the understanding you risked so much to share. The ideas expressed in this study are the author’s and do not in any way represent those of National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or the United States Government.

Acronyms

AOR ASEAN C3(ISR) CCP CIA COIN CT ETIC ETIM ETLO FBI GWOT HUMINT IED IMU ISI (C3)ISR JI MSS PAP PLA PLAAF PRC PSB SIGINT SCO SUV UBL ULO URFET USSR WUYC

Area of Responsibility Association of South East Asian Nations Command, Control, and Communications Chinese Communist Party (aka CPC) Central Intelligence Agency (US) Counter-insurgency Counter-terrorism East Turkistan Information Center East Turkistan Islamic Movement (aka SHAT; IMU, al Qaeda affiliate) East Turkistan Liberation Organization Federal Bureau of Investigations (US) Global War on Terror (aka Global War on Terrorism) Human Intelligence Improvised Explosive Device Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (Central Asian al Qaeda affiliate) Inter-Services Intelligence (Pakistan) Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Jemaah Islamiyah (Indonesian al Qaeda affiliate) Ministry of State Security (PRC) People’s Armed Police (aka People’s Armed Police Force) People’s Liberation Army People’s Liberation Army Air Force People’s Republic of China Public Security Bureau (aka Ministry of Public Security) Signals Intelligence Shanghai Cooperation Organization Sport Utility Vehicle (a light truck) Osama bin Laden Uyghur Liberation Organization United Revolutionary Front for Eastern Turkistan Union of Soviet Socialist Republics World Uyghur Youth Council

xii

Acronyms

XPCC XUAR 055 Brigade 3/11 7/7 9/11

Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (aka bingtuan) Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region al Qaeda’s guerilla force in Afghanistan Attacks of March 11, 2004 (Madrid) Attacks of July 7, 2005 (London) Attacks of September 11, 2001 (New York and Washington, DC)

Introduction Morality and power in China’s Wild West

Too much sanity may be madness, and the maddest of all, to see life as it is and not as it should be. (Miguel de Cervantes)

“Responsibility begins at home” might be China’s counter-terrorism mantra if Beijing had any understanding of the darkly effective campaign unleashed in its name. In 2005, I traveled to Xinjiang to see for myself, if I could, what life was like inside China’s war on terrorism. Evening on Friday, September 23 came lightly in the heart of China’s Wild West, summer’s warmth mixing into cooling autumn air. Bussing down to Nanmen, the southern city center, for the year’s last night-market and a chance to say goodbye over a beer with assorted ex-pats was more than I bargained for. My mind clings to each feature along the route for a last look; I am ready to go home and am consciously being extra cautious: who wants trouble just as they are packing their bags? My evening’s preferences aside, Xinjiang’s problems found me. Locked in traffic, my city bus binds in a line of unmoving vehicles heading north, passing where Victory Road takes on a new name as it flows through the Uyghur districts toward Urumqi’s southern core. Only blocks away from the market I hop off the bus and walk. What is going on? A small red car diagonals out blocking one lane of traffic; two police vehicles (mini-vans, I believe) perpendicularly jut head-on to this car, though no contact is visible. A few people stand round, and a few police. In a flash more Uyghurs flow into the street, piling on the adjacent high-curbed sidewalk, everyone checking out the evening’s happenings. No one seems to understand what has happened, just crowding and watching, drawing more crowds watching the crowd; people with little else to do watching the people gathering round. With so many people the evening gains purpose, cause and effect: if it weren’t important why would everyone be there? Unseen at first, then the focus, more police flow in. First come more local cops then a larger group of them pulling in from their marches, coming across the situation as if by chance. People’s Armed Police, the paramilitary guys with

2

Introduction

real guns and training, soon march in; the first dozen also seems to have come here by chance. Carrying what to my untrained eyes look like AKs, these young men circle tight and stand firm, facing out. Large waves of police and paramilitaries continue to roll in. One hundred muster in silent, clear lines facing the crowd up on the raised sidewalk of the street’s other side. Calm rage and quiet domination, mixed with a twinge of fear, sparks bright in the paramilitaries closest to me; emotion buried by discipline shines in the evening’s fall to night. Young men sit rigid with discipline, their fancy old-style paramilitary green open-backed truck rolling in slow; so very, calmly, dominantly slow. Public Security SUVs sweep in front as if tenderly caressing long, flowing hair after a sinister embrace: “DON’T CROWD, DON’T CROWD” the speakers chant in a controlling Uyghur tone. Doing my best to stand a respectful distance I could see little, staying a line or two back from the paramilitary guys. Electricity lit the night, the distinctive whapping of an electric truncheon. Crowd surged back from a police rally – a rush into the sidewalk complete with beatings, public and brutal, I am told. A person with more sense would have departed earlier, I believe. Sixty large men pounded in jogging-march, unarmed, dressed in unmarked black fatigues as crisp as the sound of their boots hitting the pavement. Silent power pounding control; these men bring true shock and awe; they are here for business. Weapons, paramilitary forces, military, and police became a commonplace sight in Urumqi as the Autonomous Region’s fiftieth anniversary approached, but the men in black were new to my eyes. Paramilitaries rushing at the crowd was scary enough, but the men in black freaked me out. The night was escalating, and I move up the sidewalk and around the corner to an alley in case things got hot, in case someone started shooting. Waves of police washed up to my alley, marching in riot or SWAT gear with plodding force, slow and deliberate. A short, athletic Uyghur man stayed close to me, trying to remain unseen in the commotion, giving me space to reveal my hand. Whatever the danger to myself, the evening’s functionaries of authority knew acutely that foreigners were present. A young man introduced himself to me wanting to know who I am; amid hundreds of angry Uyghur men I switched from my well-worn “studying Chinese language” explanation. “I am studying Xinjiang” I replied, acutely aware of the heated, though visibly curious, excited, and innocent crowd engulfing. Bailing me out for the evening, this comment triggered, more than the simple fact of my witnessing the event, intense curiosity by the security guys into what I really was studying. Perhaps they had been wrong about me being just a language student, or perhaps they need to do some leg-work now to prepare for the future, in case I publish. Human rights discussions seem their greatest fear. Among the evening’s most fascinating things is the pace: slow. Driving in or marching up the street, the authorities rush nothing; not a move is undisciplined. This is crowd-control by the book. Whatever sparked the crowd to initially form, the Chinese police decided to camp out in the middle of a busy street and face

Introduction

3

down the entire region’s population if need be, rather than making an arrest and driving away, there-by avoiding the confrontation entirely. The authorities’ “face,” the Chinese concept of prestige, pride, and worth, might have been diminished. Instead of leaving early and tactically victorious, reinforcements pour in until the crowd can, literally, be beaten back and put in its place. Folks with nothing better to do on the season’s last Friday evening were shown Chinese education at its most revealed. Phonecalls and an email the next day rain in from my new friend, wondering what happened “after he left.” Playing-up my lack of Uyghur language, I honestly reply that there was much I didn’t really understand about the evening. In my mind I knew that, like meeting Uyghur Communists in the previous months, a pillar of China’s war on terrorism had presented itself. The hand of security services and surveillance is a key feature: not only can China pressure workgroups, neighbors, and families to police and report on their own members, but the Chinese have Uyghur operatives for all occasions, small and large. In 2005, as a doctoral candidate at the University of Denver, I packed my bags and headed off for the other side of the world, traveling through Nanjing – the cultural heart of China’s big-city east and finding my way into Xinjiang, an enormous and deeply troubled region in China’s far west. Even as a foreigner “studying language” and doing research for my dissertation, in Xinjiang I was not free to express myself. I was under occasional, and at times heavy, surveillance. For the Chinese no news is good news; they don’t want to, in one official’s words, “internationalize” Xinjiang’s problems. Western media reports are nearly uniform in their message: China is needlessly violating human rights and interfering with the free practice of religion. Local people are afraid to discuss politics with foreigners; several reporters document Chinese security men spiriting away their informants as they stepped away from interviews. Simply, China does not want Xinjiang to become a new Kosovo, where international forces intervene to assert human rights norms. Similarly, China must worry about the other side of international intervention. The last thing they want, I imagine, is for Xinjiang to be the new cause célébre among the jihadists. Keeping information from seeping out is to China’s great advantage. Unfortunately, China uses a system of authoritarian repression to achieve these ends. People watch foreigners in addition to officials; and locals fear that their neighbors or friends will be pressured to report on them by Chinese security forces. Fear of encountering the suspicion of security forces is very strong, and many locals stay away from having relationships with foreigners because it is simply too dangerous – even if you aren’t doing anything wrong. In China there is no presumption of innocence, nor are local security guys and gals influenced by any kinder-and-gentler stylings. Young men are routinely brought back to the station and roughed up by police over petty-theft, and spreading your thoughts on what the state would rather keep secret does not go over any smoother. China’s Wild West is at the confluence of two generational struggles: Orwellian repression, the challenge of previous generations, has not

4

Introduction

vanished. And terrorism is my generation’s challenge. If we are to defeat terrorism, I argue, we must approach the issue honestly and with open minds. North of Tibet in China’s extreme west, cut off the map of China in most atlases in the United States, is a region the size of Alaska known as Xinjiang. While subtle and unconscious, this goes beyond artistic cartography. Most foreign experts and scholars focus on China’s relations with Taiwan or Japan, the Korean Peninsula or Iranian nukes; but Xinjiang looms much larger in China’s security calculations. When senior American officials went to their Chinese counterparts in the wake of 9/11 and asked how China would contribute to the new Global War on Terror, China responded that it would take care of cleaning-house in Xinjiang. US officials describe this with a pointed, cross-chest wave of two hands which can only be described as the universal hand signal for two trains passing in the night. For the Chinese, responsibility begins at home: Xinjiang is the central front in China’s war on terrorism. The people, a Turkic and predominantly Muslim ethnic group called “Uyghurs,” are Central Asian in appearance, sharing more physical resemblance with their neighbors in Afghanistan, Pakistan, or most of the former Soviet republics in the region than people from eastern China. The name Uyghur refers to the unification of many Central Asian tribes through the historic formation, disintegration, and formation anew of various tribal kingdoms in the region. In China’s understanding, these folks are a happy, dancing, music-loving bunch. Or they are militant terrorists. While technically an autonomous region, “Xinjiang” in English translates roughly as “new frontier.” Since at least when the Communists took control of China, the Chinese pursued control of Xinjiang with a mix of political action and massive in-migration of Han from the east. Han are the ethnic group which reportedly constitutes 97 percent of China’s nearly 1.3 billion people. When China talks about fighting the three evil forces of extremism, splittism (separatism), and terrorism, these are code-words for Xinjiang’s troubles. Reasonable people understandably do not want to call China’s actions in Xinjiang part of the global struggle against terrorism. Morally minded Americans rightly do not want to needlessly legitimize a country’s suppression of an ethnic minority. America’s policy after 9/11 attempted to balance the fight against terror with the call of liberty: opening an FBI office in Beijing which reportedly includes a counter-terrorism mission, yet refusing to repatriate twenty-two Chinese Uyghurs collected from Afghan and Pakistani battlefields, imprisoned in Guantanamo because China would likely torture and then execute them. China’s actions in Xinjiang have been brutal and draconian, including credible reports of repression and torture. Yet these are symptoms of an un-free political system – a disease present across the country. Similarly, relatively few people have been killed in violence. This, I argue, is a sign of China’s effective campaign, a campaign which grew more effective as China pulled the military out of direct confrontation with society, reduced the brutality, and found tools to reshape society.

Introduction

5

Studying in Xinjiang I had the privilege of meeting many young men near my age who, at great personal risk, shared stories of their childhood, telling me of their friendships and of their futures. At times I was threatened by men afraid I would reveal their identities; other men simply and powerfully explained how personally dangerous it is to discuss sensitive issues – even with close friends. Over lamb kabobs, yogurt, nan (bread) and tea I promised to be an honest broker and take only their ideas into my research. With this relationship of trust a diversity of experience opened, revealing a world that at once paralleled and diverged dramatically from my own. While I was growing up in urban America, learning Spanish as a second language, and dealing with classmates running afoul of the law with weapons and drugs, some young men about my age in western China were learning Arabic, rioting and fighting against the Communists. While I trained outdoors and learned leadership skills with the Boy Scouts, some young men in China’s Wild West ventured farther afield – finding training camps, action, and adventure in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Civics for me came through leading small groups of classmates, usually enlisting my closest friends who in turn enlisted their friends. Our projects included Boy Scout carwashes to help finance summer camp, and a day of discussion when racial tensions flared in high school. For men about my age in Xinjiang local politics was a mix: some confronted the Communists with protest or violence – one of the leading students in Tiananmen Square was a Uyghur; other Uyghurs set bombs and ambushes or assassinated local officials. Other Uyghurs joined official and Communist ranks, becoming everything from school teachers to Party loyalists to direct involvement in the security services. And many Uyghurs, perhaps most Uyghurs, wanted to go about their lives and just be normal people – free of the plague of politics. Most Uyghurs I met were curious about America, and I was repeatedly shocked by their respect and deference. Some liked President Bush more than I; one lady hated America because of our sanctions’ impact upon Iraqi children; several young men asked me about 9/11 and, in return for my thoughts, described it as a “crime against humanity.” A man, in hushed tones, speaking of China’s excesses said “this place would be very different if there weren’t a country like the United States,” meaning a great power willing to pressure, cajole, and fight against repression. Within this population there are people who want to get rid of the Chinese, and some who are linked with the global jihad. China says some 1,000 Uyghurs trained to fight in Afghanistan. According to the Congressional Research Service, notably cool-handed in their reports, of the twenty-two Uyghurs once imprisoned at Guantanamo Bay, five were there by mistake (abducted from Pakistan by bounty hunters); ten were training to fight the Chinese; and seven were al Qaeda operatives, preparing for fights beyond Xinjiang.1 Root causes of Uyghur unrest are many, yet the current wave of unrest is best understood as a ripple radiating from the Soviet–Afghan war. While personality

6

Introduction

linkages are easier to trace, my argument is that of inspiration. Dean of American Terrorism Studies, Bruce Hoffman, cites T. E. Lawrence: All men dream: but not equally. Those who dream by night in the dusty recesses of their minds wake in the day to find that it was vanity: but the dreamers of the day are dangerous men, for they may act their dreams with open eyes, to make it possible.2 While at times personal, conceived by individuals acting alone or in small groups, these dreams consist of impacting the course of societies. Fundamentally, insurgency scholar J. Bowyer Bell argues that the idea of armed struggle, the dream of changing the future by fighting today, is the root of insurgency. I too am of this opinion. In my view, Xinjiang’s current problems trace to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. A brief turn to history is here in order and, as I will argue in a moment, which version of history you believe has a powerful impact upon what lessons you might learn. As Soviet helicopter gunships threatened utter military defeat of Afghan rebels, the United States began a massive covert campaign to frustrate the Soviet adventure – some say to explicitly let the Soviets have their own Vietnam. International volunteers flowed into Afghanistan along with a massive quantity of weapons. To preserve the fig-leaf of “plausible deniability,” disguising the role of the United States, Soviet-style weapons were purchased internationally – some from stockpiles in countries like Egypt. When these stockpiles ran dry, the United States secretly turned to the Chinese, whose factories manufactured Soviet weapons. American Stinger missiles had a profound effect upon Soviet helicopters, but these missiles were only one part of the weapons-mix introduced into the Afghan theater. Additionally, China secretly provided not only weapons and ammunition but mules – a key logistical asset – as well as training camps and perhaps fighters in southern Xinjiang, near China’s border with Pakistan and Afghanistan. Now, it sounds silly to say this to audiences in the United States and western countries, but not everyone believes this story – and this difference in perceptions holds considerable significance in understanding our current predicament. China does not publicly acknowledge that it played any role in Afghanistan; and some people in Xinjiang – along with populations elsewhere – have trouble believing that the United States played any part. In this view, men armed with Allah and an AK defeated one of the world’s superpowers, not simply pushing the Soviets out of Afghanistan but leading to the empire’s disintegration. This perception, this lesson of the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan, set the ball rolling. Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri sought uses for their new skills of insurgent leadership – in 1990 offering to defend Saudi Arabia and liberate Kuwait from Iraq’s invasion. Embittered at the Kingdom’s rejection of their holy warriors, bin Laden and Zawahiri began searching for other outlets. Eventually they formed “the Base” or al Qaeda, now known for international

Introduction

7

terrorism; but this international action was not their organization’s primary focus. Building connections with local Islamist insurgencies around the globe, giving guidance, advice, training, and minor financial assistance, was al Qaeda’s bread and butter. Importantly, al Qaeda did not start these many local insurgencies, and in some al Qaeda’s assistance is a tactically minor affair. Yet “support” for a local insurgency is far more than financial or material assistance. Al Qaeda’s spectacular terrorist attacks internationally emboldened or engendered local fights. Each attack against the United States demonstrated al Qaeda’s potency. By attacking the world’s greatest power, the al Qaeda terrorists asserted that they too were a powerful force in international and human affairs. The dream of fighting for an Islamic homeland, if a spark before the Soviet–Afghan war, was kindled into a flaming challenge against governments internationally. Today the dream of a unified Caliphate, an Islamist great power, seems for them more possible than at any time since the fall of the Ottoman Empire. In the Soviet–Afghan war’s wake, China’s grasp on Xinjiang looked newly vulnerable and society began to mount increasing challenges to the state’s authority. Under religious and ethnic banners, as well as others, Uyghurs began taking action. Something clicked: the insurgent dream awakened Uyghurs to action. As the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan and then collapsed, imperial Communist power no longer seemed invincible. Indeed, state power didn’t seem so tough. With this opportunity, new challenges to state power arose – sectarian and secular alike. While detailed reporting is scarce, massive public protests, some peaceful and others marked by violence, erupted throughout the province in the final years of the 1980s. In 1990, near Kashgar, a city in Xinjiang’s far southwest, some 200 men launched a large-scale uprising reportedly organized through the mosques, and foreign fighters may have entered China directly from Afghanistan. In 1992–3 bombings rocked a cinema, buses, a hotel, and stores. In the mid to late 1990s a series of riots, large and small, pressed through northern Xinjiang. The most famous among these was the 1997 uprising in Ghulja (Yining). Since the insurgency’s high watermark in the late 1990s, assassinations of local government and Communist officials, as well as Communistapproved imams, were among the most prevalent and persistent symptom. China asserts that terrorists have killed over 160 people and injured 440 in more than 200 incidents between 1990 and 2001. Perhaps 200 have been killed to-date. Now, some readers rightly might be questioning: “Wow, those numbers are really low. Iraq is a mess; how long does it take for that many people to be killed there – days, not years. Maybe China is just making this whole thing up, wildly exaggerating the threat so it can repress minority folks and take their land and oil. And that is a fair reaction. But I am going to argue that there is another way to look at these remarkably low statistics.

8

Introduction

Scholars looking back through history at the long list of failed efforts to snuff-out insurgencies find a pattern: failure to act early when warning signs are present. If you want to win, your best shot is taking care of the problem before it spirals out of control – before society thinks you might lose. China acted early, proactively and comprehensively, reshaping society, thus heading off what could likely have become a much graver situation. Explicitly, China acted brutally; yet, as the brutality was reduced, as the military was pulled out of direct confrontation with the population and other tools were built-up, the campaign’s effectiveness increased. Where early responses were primarily military affairs, China soon found more effective tools of coercion: strengthening the paramilitary People’s Armed Police, the Public Security Bureau (somewhat like China’s FBI), and local police. Local people working as police, spies, and informants are more effective tools because they do not necessarily aggravate the situation. Tanks patrolling streets is a demonstration of raw power, but it doesn’t necessarily make people feel safer; it can actually have the reverse effect of increasing the feeling of vulnerability. Who wants a tank parked on their soccer field? Violent resistance, including attacks and atrocities, are the visible symptoms of insurgents; yet for these social movements to persist they must represent a qualitatively significant segment of society. China’s grip on Xinjiang was threatened not by bombs or knives but by insurgent infiltration of grass-roots institutions. As a result, the connection between the Chinese government and Xinjiang’s society became increasingly tenuous. Without reliable grass-roots political tools to counteract separatist impulses and bring state power to bear on local situations, the government was being effectively severed from society. Recognizing this tenuous connection China cast a wide net, reconstituting local governance institutions: purging suspected insurgents and sympathizers from county, city, village, religious, and workgroup leadership. New, loyal cadres worked for China’s stability. Each grouping of society was made responsible for the actions of its members. Universities, for example, were held accountable for their teachers and students. In this fashion China not only retook its political institutions from the insurgency but turned the groupings of society against the insurgency itself. This tactic, reinforced by a robust intelligence and security apparatus, contained but did not eliminate the threat. Countering the insurgency required reshaping local society, creating a new dream of the future as part of China. Officials reinvigorated education, religion, economic, and governance policies. In each of these areas China worked to take the people out of politics, and politics out of the people. The costs of violent opposition, indeed any opposition, increased dramatically while the benefits of cooptation began to appear as something more than empty Party slogans, more than bankrupt rhetoric alone. In local schools students learn Beijing’s lessons from Uyghur teachers, having the option of studying in local language, though Mandarin is increasingly selected by parents because it is seen as the language of business and opportunity. Since 2000, China began curtailing the use of Uyghur language at the

Introduction

9

college level, demonstrating the state’s comfort and readiness to take further steps in its cultural project. Adults who do not hold positions of responsibility in government are free to worship as they please, and religion’s political application is forcefully prohibited; only spirituality is allowed. Though China focuses on economic development, the region’s material development may actually have aggravated society. The benefits are perceived as accruing mostly to Han Chinese invading from the east rather than local minority residents. Further, more than one-third of China’s oil, gas, and coal are extracted, Uyghurs say, without benefit to local society. Paradoxically, China’s “Xinjiang problem” is diminishing not only because the Chinese have changed the Uyghurs, but also because many Uyghurs feel like China itself is changing. People in their forties and older know that today is far better than the bad-old-days of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution; and locals thirty and under feeling that youthful call-to-adventure see opportunities opening, slowly at first and maybe increasing over time. While some of China’s tactics are reprehensible, others are adaptable to American interests and values. Where China found effective tools, we are obligated to study what worked and why. The use of force against demonstrating crowds and the suppression of all dissent are clearly not compatible with American values. Some Chinese tactics may point a road forward: though China’s controls of religion are wholly inapplicable to the United States, we must carefully consider the boundary between religion, politics, and instigation of violence. Focusing on society, forcing social groups to take responsibility for their members, along with trying to shift society’s support toward the state and away from the insurgency’s dream are important lessons which could save American lives as we pursue our interests abroad. Strong grass-roots institutions and a political path forward, not raw military might, let China begin to turn society against an insurgency. Our international challenges are many, yet we must look beyond the wealth of China’s big-city east and search for solutions in this least understood of theaters in the global war on terrorism. With Iraq’s dismal security situation and questions of a renewing insurgency in Afghanistan the United States can not afford to ignore these lessons. Wandering the corridors of power in Washington, DC, and offering my views on Xinjiang since my return I wonder: is there space in the debate for people who do not reflexively hate China or are simply interested in searching for understanding? Have we left analytic space for proactive counter-insurgency? Do we trust Chinese, and perhaps American, leadership so little that we are willing to permit governments only room for reaction to attacks and threats? Reasonable people may flinch at learning lessons from China’s dark, Orwellian Wild West; nevertheless, China’s actions in Xinjiang represent one of the few successes in the global struggle against Islamist terrorism. We must critically engage the really tough cases, of which Xinjiang is a prime example, if terrorism is to be defeated; and we can’t hope to truly understand China’s rise without an honest discussion of the state’s project in Xinjiang.

1

Fighting terrorism China’s bottom-up approach

Terrorism is a real threat against our country (Anonymous top official, Ministry of Public Security Xinhua, Washington Post, 1/26/2006)

Among the most prominent and least understood of campaigns in which the Chinese state is engaged is its war against terrorism. With pervasive jailing and summary executions, China’s “Strike Hard/Maximum Pressure” operation dates to the early-1990s, but it is not the first time Chinese Communists forcefully asserted control over Xinjiang, China’s massive northwestern “new frontier” which is the campaign’s primary theater. With broad brush-strokes the state, its institutions, and agents have tackled political unrest and violence, drug trafficking, and non-violent spiritual and religious movements under the same banner. China asserts that 1,000 ethnic Uyghurs from Xinjiang trained in Afghanistan’s camps, some of which returned home to begin a new jihad, a new fight against the Chinese government. The self-described problem of “splittism,” ethnic violence, and terrorism, ranks first among Beijing’s security concerns, yet how effectively has China addressed this problem? What can the China case add to the current debate about the sources of terrorism and how to effectively counter this threat? The approaches to counter-terrorism (CT) and counter-insurgency (COIN) can be viewed as a spectrum of tactics, with top-down and bottom-up poles. The ideal-type top-down approach focuses only on killing or capturing the individual terrorist leaders, and perhaps the terrorist cadres as well. Alternately, the idealtype bottom-up approach addresses socio-political root causes, running the gamut from addressing and countering specific radical ideologies to altering social-structural pathways to joining the “jihad” (global or more localized). Both types of tactics have important and unique effects upon an insurgency, ranging from stop-gap measures to durable political solutions. Real-world CT and COIN campaigns are often a mix of both top-down and bottom-up tactics. This manuscript investigates China’s CT and COIN efforts, highlighting the efficacy of a society-centric approach. In the attempt to achieve a baseline against which to analyze China’s COIN

Fighting terrorism

11

efforts this manuscript first asks: how real is the threat China is confronting? Scholars, including those who have interviewed Chinese separatists, have formed an odd consensus: while there have been a series of riots and bombings, calls for terrorist campaigns, and links to international “jihadists” (including training in Afghanistan’s camps), China is manically overreacting. China’s COIN effort has been brutal, yet these scholars deny that an underlying threat truly exists.1 In short, the current scholarly consensus holds that the people of Xinjiang have done nothing serious enough to provoke China’s disproportionate and draconian campaign. The scholarly consensus views insurgency more as schoolyard pranks and the actions of a few individuals pursuing violence for their own gain rather than as a serious form of warfare that is a threat to the state. This manuscript asserts that a real threat exists: contemporary international terrorism and the insurgency in Xinjiang are social processes; while individuals may seem to act alone their actions are products of a dynamic interplay within their society, both the constituency and the enemy.2 By all accounts the fighters in Xinjiang are ethnic Uyghurs from Xinjiang. Their causes include: relieving the oppressiveness of the Han Chinese state by increasing autonomy; expelling the Han from Xinjiang to give Uyghurs a chance to determine their own future; or, forcing the atheist Hans to withdraw from what will become part of an Islamist caliphate ruled by sharia (a strict interpretation of Islamic law). Tracing the multiple discourses of grievance is beyond the scope of this study for they are as numerous as the individuals participating. Yet taken as an organic whole, the insurgency is a phenomenon which exists beyond the individual level: it is a social movement unified by the dream that action will bring the ideal into existence. Despite popular and classical understandings of insurgency, the complexity of resistance movements in Xinjiang, with multiple causes, groups, and individual actors is actually a dynamic present in many arenas today and historically. The model of a binary struggle between a state and a unified revolutionary front has little relevance in today’s complex insurgencies.3 The insurgency in Xinjiang is fundamentally indigenous with connections to the global jihad and al Qaeda. These connections were made overwhelmingly in order to target and fight against China rather than fight in the global jihad itself. China’s counter-insurgency campaign is a mix of top-down and bottom-up tactics, yet on balance it is overwhelmingly a bottom-up campaign. Every location and history is unique: Xinjiang is not Chechnya. Nor is it Afghanistan for the British or the Soviets, Vietnam for the French or the Americans, Somalia for the US/UN, Iraq for the US, or even Colombia’s “War on Drugs.” Nevertheless, we can learn lessons about the phenomenon from every arena, continuing to build our knowledge of counter-insurgency warfare’s theory and practice. China acted early and repeatedly to put down insurgency in its nascent manifestations, halting the insurgency’s growth into what could have become an unmanageable problem. Violent outbreaks have occurred repeatedly throughout recent history, yet China’s COIN actions have prevented insurgents from

12

Fighting terrorism

working unopposed. Late recognition of, and action against, insurgency’s early conditions and manifestations are factors present in many costly and failed counter-insurgencies, for once an insurgency gains momentum it transforms from the ideas of the few to the will of the many; it changes from individuals’ actions into an adapting violent social movement.4 There are likely many reasons why real-world counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism campaigns have on balance leaned heavily, with poor results, toward top-down approaches. Poor understanding of insurgency’s incipient conditions and nascent manifestations couple with a hubristic disbelief that an insurgency can truly threaten a conventionally powerful military; the belief in military power alone is a hallmark of top-down logic. Lack of political will to face the seemingly large costs in blood and treasure, as well as the long timelines surpassing public or policy-makers’ attention spans, are frequently cited as primary reasons the United States has historically pursued top-down tactics. To this popular litany, insurgency expert Bruce Hoffman adds that lack of coordination between military and political elements can undercut efforts to achieve a comprehensive and successful COIN campaign. Further, even with adequate knowledge of COIN doctrine, on-the-ground implementation can be uneven or absent – especially when military units are structured and trained for the conventional battlefield.5 Perfect knowledge of an insurgency and COIN theory can do little if policymakers do not place COIN at the top of their priorities or fail to accurately diagnose the problem. Yet even among scholars, insurgency has not been seen as a potent form of warfare. In the popular understanding of Mao’s three necessary and progressive phases of a successful insurgency, phase one is political mobilization and terrorism, phase two is guerrilla warfare in preparation for phase three, conventional war. Only phase three is considered lethal, and the first two phases need only be held in check. Similarly, the United States Central Intelligence Agency’s “Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency” presents four stages: • • •

•

Preinsurgency – leadership emerges in response to domestic grievances or outside influences. Organizational – infrastructure built, guerrillas recruited and trained, supplies acquired, and domestic and international support sought. Guerrilla warfare – hit-and-run tactics used to attack government. Extensive insurgent political activity – both domestic and international – may also occur simultaneously during this stage. Mobile conventional warfare – larger units used in conventional warfare mode. Many insurgencies never reach this stage.6

This list is not à la carte; it is a sequential progression culminating in conventional battle – insurgency’s purported final stage. Further, western counterinsurgency literature has long acknowledged insurgency’s political nature yet politics has been misunderstood as the action of rational individuals rather than as a social process. Subsequently, counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency

Fighting terrorism

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theory has also been locked into a top-down framework highlighting the isolation of insurgents from external support and targeting insurgent leadership. A bottom-up approach takes seriously the threat insurgents and terrorists pose, even when they are few in number, because the phenomenon is primarily socio-political and conventional warfare is not truly needed to conquer territory. Insurgents seek society’s support, either through approbation or fear, and through this tactic territory eventually is pursued. Counter-insurgency scholar David Kilcullen argues that the taking of territory is less important in some contemporary insurgencies, writing The religious ideology of some modern insurgents creates a different dynamic. Particularly in al-Qaeda-linked insurgencies, the insurgent may not seek to do or achieve any practical objective, but rather to be a mujahid, earning God’s favor (and hope of ultimate victory through his intervention) through the act itself.7 Fundamentally, warfare is politics via alternate means; but politics is more than warfare. Insurgents engage in politics well beyond tactical violence. In the global jihad and many of its affiliated local jihads, even if you capture or kill today’s leaders others will fill the social vacuum.8 In his seminal Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice David Galula writes that “guerrillas, like the heads of the legendary hydra, have the special ability to grow again if not all destroyed at the same time.”9 While Galula contends that “the real purpose of the operation is to prepare the stage for further developments of the counterinsurgent action,” it is important to note the element, even in this foundational attempt to articulate a bottom-up approach, which focuses on the heads of the hydra.10 The bottom-up approach argued in this study seeks not to cut the hydra’s heads all at once but to exterminate the beast, largely through altering its habitat. Only when the evolving and social nature of warfare is taken seriously, as advocated by a bottom-up approach, can insurgency be defeated.

Terrorism and insurgency What is terrorism? Is a definition possible, or do we simply “know it when we see it?” Considerable ink has been spilled in search of an all-encompassing and ever-true definition.11 Rather than search for such eternal truth this book asserts that one definitive definition cannot exist.12 Terrorism is an evolving tactic, a form of warfare conducted to influence political will through dramatic and irregular attack. Fear is pernicious and fungible, effecting not only an enemy society’s will but an attacker’s “constituency” as well.13 Attackers pursue their vision of absolute truth: rescuing a homeland from invaders, acting as self-identified liberators or as spoilers of a “hostile” governance regime, and perhaps fighting for justice which they cannot achieve through society’s non-violent channels.14 The validity of the attackers’ claims is not

14

Fighting terrorism

normatively weighed here; this study notes only that perceptions and interpretations matter. Society’s rules are constantly in play, constantly being revised and rewritten not only by the formal processes of lawmaking but by the actions of acceptance, compliance, or resistance from the various social forces and coalitions there-of.15 Shared meaning comes to the fore, and here is the pivot of society. Terrorism is a violent pushback against the state, society’s primary institution, by ascendant and competing social forces. Social forces are groups, potential groups, constituencies, or potential constituencies within society. Here, terrorism is understood as the deliberate breaking of the state’s “non-violence in society” norm, and the adjustment of society’s previous acceptance of this norm. While terrorism may be heinous, shocking, and evil, it is also political. It is the attempt to steer social forces into particular coalitions – pull together a social force against an external evil, a dangerous other who, this force asserts, has committed or will commit intolerable acts against the group. More tangibly, insurgency expert Hoffman writes: A population will give its allegiance to the side that will best protect it. . . . Accordingly, the highest imperative of the insurgent is to deprive the population of that sense of security. Through violence and bloodshed, the insurgent seeks to foment a climate of fear by demonstrating the authorities’ inability to maintain order and thus highlight its weakness. . . . Here, the fundamental asymmetry of the insurgency/counterinsurgency dynamic comes into play: the guerillas do not have to defeat their opponents militarily; they just have to avoid losing. And, in this respect, the more conspicuous the security forces become and the more pervasive its operations, the stronger the insurgency appears to be.16 Reaction to attacks, perceptions, and interpretations, are an important component: to study attacks alone, isolated from the surrounding political drama, is the task of forensic experts and engineers. To work against such warfare isolated from a battlefield, in the attempt to create spaces in civilization where politics is not dictated by men with bombs, society must reject the tactic of terrorism in addition to the message. Because political will is the target, terrorism here is understood as the attempt to transform societies’ mutually constructed politics through violent means. What is insurgency? If terrorism is a single attack or series of attacks isolated from a conventionally understood battlefield, where soldiers wear camouflage fatigues and a flag sewn on the sleeve, insurgency is a campaign of such tactics which persists across time. Like terrorism, insurgency carries a dream of changing society, though the timetable is protracted. Insurgency scholar Thomas Marks writes: An insurgency is an armed political movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government, or separation from it, through the use of subversion

Fighting terrorism

15

and armed conflict. It is a protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken government control and legitimacy while increasing insurgent control. Political power is the central issue in an insurgency.17 Terrorism can be viewed as a tactic, one tool in the insurgent’s arsenal. Bombings, ambushes, infiltration, and small-unit warfare are all insurgents’ techniques, yet his greatest weapon is devotion to his cause, to the idea, to a particular vision of the absolute truth. Thus understood, if the cause lives on in the minds of men, the battle is infinite even if attacks are not launched, and because insurgency is the pursuit of politics by all available means Galula asserts that “insurgency can start long before the insurgent resorts to the use of force.”18 Insurgents, potential and actual, may simply be choosing the time of their attack – lying low until a vulnerability or opportunity is perceived.19 Insurgency today is not the tactic of the few but the strategy of the many, though it need not be understood only as a conscious, coordinated campaign. Forces and logics larger than individuals and groups are powerfully causal, though not necessarily uniquely so.20 Consequently, effective counterinsurgency is achieved over long timelines. Long timelines are, despite their chronologic sound, a relative concept and vary according to locality and level of analysis. While the perception of security as well as national governance, rule of law, legitimacy, and justice take significant time to establish deep roots in a society or within a social force, local governance can be achieved on much shorter timetables. Key counter-insurgent factors include establishing institutions which can respond to other forces within society and can reshape society beginning at the grass-roots level, achieving social consent for the state. Building security services capable of working within target societies, and being perceived as working to further these societies’ interests, is key. Partnerships between “occupying” and “indigenous” security forces, with emphasis on building up the proportion of personnel and genuine responsibility of the local elements, has achieved the greatest results to-date. With well-trained, respectful, and responsive constabulary forces the United States Marines historically, and Special Operations forces more recently, have achieved successful relationships with villages and communities. And despite numerous components of their campaign which have been counterproductive, China’s counter-insurgency has similarly contained strategic, operational and tactical innovations. China’s COIN has been far from perfect but it has mitigated unrest in a fracas region. Explicitly, China’s torture, human rights abuses, and excesses will not be glorified or brushed aside but where China is being effective we must search for solutions. Echoing Machiavelli, counter-insurgent Galula writes: All wars are cruel, the revolutionary war perhaps most of all because every citizen, whatever his wish, is or will be directly and actively involved in it by the insurgent who needs him and cannot afford to let him remain neutral. The cruelty of the revolutionary war is not a mass, anonymous cruelty but a highly personalized, individual one. No greater crime can be committed by

16

Fighting terrorism the counterinsurgent than accepting, or resigning himself to, the protraction of the war. He would do as well to give up early.21

As the United States confronts insurgencies, global and local, we must learn to do so effectively if we wish to succeed. This book investigates China’s war on terrorism in order to learn from another country’s operational and tactical innovations and mistakes.

CT and COIN: a tactical spectrum A spectrum of tactics can be employed to counter terrorism and insurgency, ranging from killing terrorists through addressing socio-political root-causes for a constituency’s supporting of an insurgency. This section builds ideal-type models of top-down and bottom-up approaches, acknowledging that real-world campaigns – while usually leaning toward the top-down pole of the spectrum – are often a mix of tactics. Decisions may be made either in the field or in the provincial or national capital; this would describe a chain of command. Rather than directionality of authority, this study asserts that the directionality of change in society is powerfully causal in effective counter-insurgency. For example, killing a terrorist leader attempts to incapacitate a movement by interrupting its plans and operations (top-down). Working with a population to see the terrorists as external usurpers, men who illegitimately attempt to lead their population, renders the insurgency ineffectual (bottom-up). After discussing varying approaches to CT and COIN, this section locates China’s remarkably effective CT and COIN solidly within the bottom-up range of the spectrum.

Kill/Capture

Coerce

Co-opt

FORCE

Figure 1 CT and COIN: a tactical spectrum.

Incorporate

Bottom-up

Top-down

CT and COIN: A tactical spectrum

Fighting terrorism

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Effecting change from the top down Isolate, kill or capture the insurgents The logic of top-down tactics is seductively simple: if insurgents are attacking your country what is your policy response? Stop them rapidly, expending as little blood and treasure as possible: find the individuals responsible; attackers, planners, financers, leadership. When your forces locate the perpetrators, you kill or capture them, depending on circumstances and your country’s unique situation. Some populations may cry for blood before justice, needing no further proof or process, and others may thirst for procedural justice before final judgments are rendered and pounds of flesh demanded. There may be very real reasons to believe that enemies, foreign and domestic, are secretly aiding attackers. Financial, material, and ideational trails may point directly or covertly, several layers obscured. On the warpath, politicians and their constituencies demand: how could anyone support our enemies? Having an external enemy to claim dramatically draws attention within an obscure and shadowy insurgent underground: a complex world becomes simpler. Insurgents are insurgents, terrorists are terrorists; you are either with us or you are with the enemy. In this view there are a fixed number of insurgents who need only be eliminated; a posse can ride rough into hostile lands and dispense with the danger. By force of words or arms, external support, perceived as key to sustaining the insurgency, must be cut. “Foreign fighters” and sanctuaries across the border become fixations of counter-insurgents. Top-down theories assert the quieting effect of removing trouble-making, assertive new elites and local cadres form contact with the otherwise apathetic and politically unengaged masses. The terrorist group’s organizational structure and cadre are assumed to be static, unchanging from the conflict’s outset. Such models advocate looking for and removing outside sources of support in conjunction with establishing units to move among the population and target insurgent leadership. Empirically there may be good reason to believe that only a small number of individuals are responsible for a disproportionate amount of violence in insurgencies. Providing context for the United States current22 COIN predicament in Iraq, Hoffman writes that: For 20 years, a hardcore of just 20 to 30 members of the Red Army Faction (Baader Meinhof Gang) effectively terrorized West Germany – a country far more stable and with more sophisticated, advanced, and reliable police, security, and intelligence services than Iraq is likely to possess for some time. Similarly, some 50 to 75 Red Brigadists imposed a reign of terror on Italy; its worst period (the late 1970s) is still referred to as the “years of lead.” And for more than 30 years, a dedicated cadre of approximately 200 to 400 IRA gunmen and bombers frustrated the maintenance of law and order in Northern Ireland, requiring the prolonged deployment of tens of thousands of British troops in that embattled province.23

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Fighting terrorism

In each of these situations insurgents adapted to their environment, finding sources of influence within strong societies. While a discussion of each insurgency is beyond the scope of the present discussion, it is important to note here that tactics which target the fighters based upon the premise that the fighters are few may not be wholly incorrect. Isolating insurgents from international support is step one; following this counter-insurgents can work through the territory section by section. This cordon-and-search tactic is a classic and, at face-value, practical technique. Ideally, fighters and supplies will be removed and the insurgents’ organization itself will be targeted. As Robert R. Tomes, a senior advisor within the US Intelligence Community, writes: Only by identifying and destroying the infrastructure of the subversive organization can the fledgling government persevere. Stated another way, just as the traditional war is not fought with the individual soldier or platoon in mind but rather the state’s capacity and will to continue hostilities, modern war seeks to destroy the organization as a whole and not simply its violent arms or peripheral organs.24 The insurgency is seen as an unconventional military force, an army fighting with non-traditional and innovative small group tactics within a territory occupied primarily by a civilian population. Countering insurgency becomes the task of fighting any other military force: attacking its logistics and supply capabilities (understood as material and finite).25 Military sweep-and-hold operations are combined with quickly paying civilians to repair any of their property damaged during the fighting. To be perceived as something other than an occupying power, troops should live like the population and not in barracks or housing distinct from locals. Tomes asserts that there are “three simple principles”: Separate the guerrilla from the population that supports him; occupy the zones that the guerrillas previously operated from, making them dangerous for him and turning the people against the guerrilla movement; and coordinate actions over a wide area and for a long enough time that the guerrilla is denied access to the population centers that could support him. This requires an extremely capable intelligence infrastructure endowed with human sources and deep cultural knowledge.26 Here Tomes moves considerably along the tactical spectrum toward a bottom-up approach, beginning with isolation of the insurgents from the population but engaging the idea that the civilian population must turn against the guerrilla movement. Again, the idea of working with populations over long timelines turns back to preventing the finite number of insurgents from receiving material support from civilians, or a population-group seen as innocent and unconnected to the insurgency itself, aside from being extorted-from and victimized. In sum, top-down operations described above can be imagined as removing

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19

shrapnel from an afflicted body-politic; the bottom-up operations described below see insurgency as a cancer: a disease where the body’s own cells turn against it.

Effecting change from the bottom up Turn society against the insurgency Insurgents are the fish and the people, Mao argued, are the sea. Where top-down approaches depict insurgents and terrorists as a discrete number of elites disconnected from mass support, bottom-up approaches view insurgency as a dynamic political process where leadership and institutions exist, but they exist in the broader context of a supportive society. Fighters, when killed or captured, are replaced and insurgent ranks may increase. Ideas, not the people, are the problem. Bottom-up approaches target not only the individuals and groups attacking but the society: the collective ideas, perceptions and beliefs of a population; which constitutes their movement’s lifeblood. Insurgents are seen as indigenous fighters who are best countered by indigenous security forces, or security forces with considerable local knowledge and the ability to permeate society. While fighters may enter the conflict from “abroad” their ability to move effectively within the arena demonstrates their “indigenousness” or at least gives lie to previous perceptions of the arena’s true geographic boundaries. In short, a state must not only defeat the flames of political violence but it must also tend to the embers from which flames could spring anew. Killing insurgents and their leadership and removing access to weapons and supplies may halt fighting temporarily but this is not true success. Where political will to fight against the state and other social forces persists in society, insurgents will find a means to orchestrate violence. The state must convince society not only that it is strong, capable, and legitimate, but also that the fighters are not. Society must come to believe that, in this form of militarized politics, the government and its backers have overwhelming political will and political capacity. Superior political will is built through more than simple slogans and flagwaving; patriotism and ethnic-nationalism can be important factors, but political will can also be achieved through more inclusive means. The state, as a force working among the many actual and latent forces of society, can reshape society in its favor: the state can erode and transform to its benefit what had been, or otherwise might be, the insurgency’s social support. As a form of warfare insurgency is a dynamic process which targets political will, though not through the traditional military force-on-force destruction of opposing armies. This warfare is an evolutionary process of political learning with insurgent and counter-insurgent each adapting to the situation’s unique political terrain and climate, and to the enemy’s actions, reactions, and counteractions. Politics is a dynamic process where successes, even if resounding, are often ephemeral. Crushing an insurgency by one strain of fundamentalists can engender a new generation of terrorists; witness Egypt’s defeat of the Muslim

20

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Brotherhood only to spawn al Qaeda from its prison cells. Further, the fungibility of successes is largely socially constructed. Insurgency is by its nature tactically amorphous, where mobility is an asset and territorial control can be a liability for insurgent and counter-insurgent alike. From a bottom-up perspective effecting insurgents’ political will means getting society to reject the insurgency, if not its aspirations (though as noted above, if an episode of insurgency, a rebellion, is put down and its ideas persist there is no guarantee that the insurgency will not rise anew when a new opportunity or vulnerability is perceived). Society must perceive the state as the unquestioned victor and the source of future hopes. When individuals tie their future to the state’s project, when society’s elements can form and re-form coalitions unhindered by security dilemma logic – absent the fear for physical or cultural survival – and when society becomes an overlapping, interwoven matrix of myriad interactions of competition and cooperation, the state has defeated the insurgency. This process can take decades. Types of actions that counter-insurgents can take include the following. The state must formulate a cohesive policy trajectory Correctly identifying the nature of the problem, of the struggle, is a key first step. Unifying command and control of security forces is an institutional step which begins the coordination of all the elements of national power.27 Further, the state must design a system of power and legitimacy with which to confront the insurgency. The state’s top leadership must address two fundamental questions: what are the state’s goals (e.g. ending violence; holding territory; creating a measure of just or seemingly legitimate rule)? Are there reforms of the state, its apparatus and actions, which can reduce support for the insurgency?28 Reforms must be taken with care to avoid weakening the state, or spreading the perception of a weakened state, while trying to hinder the insurgency. Tight political-military coordination is needed to maximize the state’s abilities against challengers already spurred to action by a perception of opportunity. Counterinsurgency scholar Marks writes: Historically, effective C2 [command and control] architecture has involved setting up local coordinating bodies with representation from all key parties. These run the counterinsurgency campaign in the AOR [area of responsibility] concerned, though one individual will have the lead. Minimally, such a coordinating body includes appropriate representatives from civil authority, the military, the police, the intelligence services, and (though not always) the civil population.29 Military and security forces must always act to support the state’s goals Killing and capturing insurgents, disrupting insurgent organization and decision cycles, as well as removing war materials from the battlefield are important

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pieces of the puzzle: an insurgency is militarized politics. Yet killing insurgents can not be the sole actions taken. Because an insurgency is ultimately a competition between insurgents and the state to provide meaningful security for society, the state must be sure it is providing the type of security society is demanding, and work to convince society that indeed the security demanded is being supplied (or else convince society that a more important type of security is being provided).30 Where some populations may be intolerant of bombings or shootings, others may care more about less tangible types of security, perhaps considering themselves only safe with a particular type of government (e.g. self-determined, Communist, or Islamic). Militaries are, at their best, designed to provide one type of security from insurgents. Wise states can work with society to search for a security meaningful to both; military and security forces are strong assets when perceived by society as part of the solution, otherwise they may be seen as a sign of state weakness or directly inflicting injustices against society. Forces which are perceived to be composed of indigenous members may inherently have greater legitimacy while others will have to do good local politicking to gain support, including working with local leaders at the lowest levels as well as grass-roots measures (such as doing good works; e.g. building wells, schools, or hospitals). Intelligence, including collection and analysis as well as psychological operations, must always support the state’s goals Insurgency is a war of the underground and penetration of this obscured component of society is key for tactical, operational, and strategic reasons: • • •

Tactically, intelligence lets counter-insurgents disrupt plots and eliminate terrorists. Operationally, insurgent organizations and decision-cycles can be interrupted or destroyed. Strategically, knowing the enemy and the society the insurgents wish to inspire are key to wisely leveraging the state’s resources (material and ideational) to counter the threat.

Enemy political will, and society political will, is constantly in play. Quality intelligence collection and analysis permits knowing how to most directly target enemy will while working to reinforce, build, or minimize erosion of allied society’s political will. Deep cultural and social knowledge may trump the utility of other intelligence disciplines in modern, complex insurgencies.31 Evolving tactics must be countered early or else the state will be perceived as weak and ineffectual, unable to cope with new challenges. Psychological operations also can be effective tools against an insurgency when they target either the insurgent organization or, more importantly, society’s support for the insurgency itself. Messages must be tailored to the local conditions and cultural preferences of society; bluffs may work in the short

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term, but the state’s goal is primarily regaining a position of strength within society’s perception. Even in the most closed of societies government lies make the state look weak and ineffectual, exactly the impression a state threatened by insurgency must counter. The state must work to reshape society Insurgencies arise at specific moments in a state’s history when, for whatever reason, the fortunes of the state seem dim and those of the fighter bright. Society’s perspective is the ultimate arbiter of the state’s future: if the society believes that security (material or ideational) lies with the insurgents then the world’s strongest army will not be enough to hold the land; enemies will be ever-growing. If a state can halt a nascent insurgency before momentum grows then a second task becomes primary: if the state wishes to avoid perpetually putting-down similar rebellions it must reshape its role in society and, perhaps, reshape society itself. While the measures taken and social forces built or destroyed will depend on local circumstances, history, and perception, the state must through the process of interaction show itself as strong and capable vis-àvis society’s other social forces. Education, economic development, and healthcare may be avenues for such grass-roots social change. Other states may seek to show that it is incorporating the voice of locals in its decision cycle, thus working to tie the fortunes of society most directly to the success of the state. In this way a state can turn society against the insurgency, for the insurgency becomes not a war of society against the state, but of the state and society against rogue elements who seek power through violence that could more effectively be gained through peace. Let us return now to the China case. As asserted above, China has effectively confronted an insurgency in Xinjiang, acting early before the insurgency gained momentum. While the causes are not yet fully removed, China has used its military and intelligence capabilities to keep a lid on the secessionist movement and international jihadi linkages while it works to strengthen its position vis-à-vis society in Xinjiang. Explicitly, this study seeks not to downplay the contention or violence within society but to put it in its broader, evolving context.

Insurgency in China The insurgency and terrorism confronting China in Xinjiang stems from an historic political process of the state asserting and consolidating its control over territory and society. This political history impacts the decision-making of the local population as to the best paths, tactics, and strategies available. Insurgencies arise when an element within society perceives the state as weak, vulnerable to the strategy of insurgency, and take action to capitalize on a unique political opportunity. Commonly states under threat attribute a hostile insurgency to the work of elements foreign to indigenous society. Often this attribution of cause is incorrect and is articulated because of poor intelligence, wishful thinking by

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government forces, or the government’s attempt to discredit the insurgency in society’s eyes (i.e. claiming that the insurgency is an external imposition and the state is the sole legitimate political representative and leader of society). China too seeks to cast the insurgency in Xinjiang as the work of external instigators: in the mid-1990s western elements were blamed; later, and especially after September 11, 2001, Islamist forces are a focal point. In reality, the insurgency in Xinjiang is primarily an indigenous affair. Uyghurs have pursued the assistance of powerful external actors, Islamist and western, yet this effort does not negate their primary intent: fighting the Chinese in Xinjiang. While insurgency has been endemic in Xinjiang throughout the region’s modern history (including variously termed revolts, rebellions, revolutions, and jihads), the present insurgency is historically contingent, connected, and unique. Where some scholars currently assert the primacy of China’s disingenuous policies of ethnic “autonomy” in Xinjiang in triggering revolts32 and others assert that violence has erupted as a result of security forces’ excesses, this study asserts that these are important pieces of a larger picture. An insurgency need not seem logical or connected at the micro-levels; insurgency is a social process which is most visible at macro-levels. These scholars may be correct about the proximate causes for individual events, yet there is reason to question the primacy of such narratives. An insurgency is a violent social movement; to view events or groups alone is to miss the phenomenon’s rich interplay and evolution. Individuals have multiple motivations for action just as individuals have multiple components of their identity, and identity is often oppositional. While groups are composed of individuals, they become an entity. Violence in Xinjiang may have spiked because the Chinese authority’s ethnicity policies have dramatically increased both ethnic and liberal nationalisms; indeed, these nationalisms are prevalent challenges to the Communist Party and to the Chinese state. In response to these threats, perceived or real, security services have at times been brutal and spurred retribution. Yet we must not ignore connections to the international ideational phenomenon of our time: the evolving norms of political violence, insurgency and terrorism (both approving and rejecting) in support of independence from colonial powers or invaders, assertion of human rights, or establishment of a new Islamic caliphate. Each generation which comes to an insurgency must find ideas, a dream, an absolute truth worth fighting for anew. The present insurgency in Xinjiang has roots in the Soviet–Afghan war of the 1980s, and has evolved since this grand spark. The Soviet–Afghan war provided not only training, and perhaps munitions, but also inspiration: Islamic insurgents were seen to have defeated an invading superpower. Since the Soviet defeat this model of insurgency has fanned embers around the world, at times with the direct breath of experienced veterans and at times simply stirred by the idea of the fighter victorious against seemingly overwhelming power. Struggle for causes, secular-national and religious, became glorious and honorable if underground in some societies. September 11, 2001, was a watershed moment for international norms, forcing many

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people to think about the Islamist social movement which had been slowly gaining momentum. All terror attacks aim to affect political will, and 9/11 did just that.

Counter-insurgency in China Recently in Xinjiang, violence has decreased dramatically: why did this happen? China has been waging a war on terrorism in the form of “Strike Hard” campaigns for nearly a decade, but these campaigns are insufficient explanation alone, having provoked violent reactions in addition to possibly disrupting separatist or terrorist intrigues. However, through a comprehensive approach of which the Strike Hard campaigns were the most visible component, China acted forcefully, early, and repeatedly to counter a nascent insurgency. As resistance to China’s rule spread, China adapted its tactics, building a force more capable of moving within society to manage unrest while other tools to reshape society were conceived and implemented. While the United States’ post-9/11 route of Afghani and Pakistani training camps and China’s Strike Hard campaigns together likely captured or killed many insurgents, dealing with individuals is a stop-gap measure. Insurgency, as discussed above, is a social phenomenon beyond the individuals involved. China’s achievement in fighting insurgency results to a great extent from the way in which the regime is working to incorporate the “autonomous region” into the country, making it truly a province autonomous only in name. Key factors include not only the seemingly infinite Chinese political will to fight and retain territory threatening to break from “the motherland,” cracking down heavily upon anyone or anything even hinting at separatist sentiments. Also important are the ways in which the Chinese regime affected Uyghur political will, ranging from the governance system to education, religion, and economic development policies. Additionally, Uyghurs traditionally live in communities isolated from each other having fierce loyalty to their cities (this phenomenon is elsewhere termed “oasis identities”). While these factors may have been designed or approved in Beijing, the parallel Chinese state and Communist system has impressively effected the grass-roots of society where insurgencies normally take hold. Paradoxically, at the same time the autonomy system is creating ethnic identity and nationalism which competes with the state, it also creates an outlet for ambitious individuals to pursue an identity not so parochially defined, gives them voice, and permits the possibility of effecting positive change for their localities. National education policies work to incorporate Uyghurs into Chinese society through language and skills training. These policies too are resented for disrupting traditional society, yet bright ambitious Uyghurs are given a ticket to training and socialization in China’s superior universities in the developed eastern cities. Also, China’s education system is built not to inculcate individual creativity and critical thinking skills but to build a “good” and quiescent society though

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rote memorization of formulas, mathematical and social. Economic development has been rapid in some sectors of Xinjiang’s cities, and the Han are perceived to be benefiting disproportionately – perhaps exclusively. Some Uyghurs are, however, growing rich. It is not surprising that these people are involved in searching for solutions to social problems since they have practice relying upon their own initiative. Geographic isolation and parochial oasis identities creates an enormous impediment for insurgents. How are they to gain social inroads, let alone safe haven, support, and recruits, within the region if they are seen as foreigners? Training in camps or fighting in various wars can provide just such a connection, but since the early 1990s China has learned to watch for men returning home from key countries. Religion too is circumscribed. People under eighteen years of age are not permitted to receive formal religious instruction, perhaps not even from their parents. China also benefits from the unique security apparatus in Xinjiang: there is an enormous military and paramilitary presence available to deter or crush uprisings; local and Public Security Bureau police abound; and fear of authority coupled with rampant superstitions create the perception, and perhaps the reality, that spies and informants are everywhere in society. Importantly, counter-insurgents, just as insurgents, can learn through creativity, or trial and error. China is going through such an evolution. China’s counter-insurgency effort, which focuses on demonstrating the state’s capability to lead, form, and re-form society when challenged by particular social forces, represents a bottom-up approach which has been largely effective. Explanatory variables in the China case are primarily societal factors such as the structure, dynamics, and interplay of the state in Chinese society (at all levels, national to local, family, and individual) and the changing aspirations of forces within Xinjiang’s society (e.g. ethnic identity groups, newly encouraged quest for autonomy, if not a state, armed with the ideological success and tactics of first forcing the Soviets out of Afghanistan and then seeing nation states form across Central Asia in the 1990s).

Studying China’s war on terrorism This book asks the questions: how effectively has China fought terrorism and insurgency? What tactics and strategies can we learn from the China case to augment or refine our arsenal in the contemporary global struggle against terrorism? Investigating these questions this chapter asks: what are terrorism and insurgency? Are there multiple responses to these problems? What can we learn from the China case? In answering these questions this book argues that terrorism is a tactic within the larger, strategic picture of insurgency. Insurgency too must be placed in its broader context: politics, however violent. To these ends, terrorism and insurgency are described as manifestations of a social movement, a social force within society competing against the state and other social forces, attacking when opportunities or vulnerabilities are perceived.

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China too has experienced the threat of insurgency within its claimed borders. In the wake of the Soviet–Afghan war (circa the 1980s), the international fighter’s image was ascendant, the dream that bands of men armed lightly with guns and Allah could bring down the world’s superpowers. While it has at times been slow to recognize threats, or has reacted disproportionately by nearly any definition, China has on the whole implemented a bottom-up approach to countering the threat of terrorism and insurgency in Xinjiang, demonstrating not only seemingly infinite political will and resolve but also finding instruments to fundamentally transform society’s political will to the state’s benefit. Research method This book explores several bodies of literature: terrorism; insurgency; counterinsurgency; China studies; and the “Xinjiang problem” to name the major ones. Each of these bodies of literature is enormous and growing rapidly. I have worked to engage the key arguments in each of these literatures as they apply to this book, often taking arguments and data from one body to push the analytic boundaries of another. As I analyze China’s war on terrorism, I attempt to clearly note where and how my argument diverges from other literatures and why it does so. While China studies are currently in-vogue because the country may become the world’s next great power; terrorism studies are a focal point in the wake of the September 11 attacks of 2001; and counter-insurgency has gained visibility once again with America’s troubles in post-Saddam Iraq, virtually nothing has been written regarding China’s war on terrorism from a security studies perspective. With a border on Afghanistan and an insurgency threatening its western frontier, China has been effectively confronting many of the problems with which the United States now struggles. This book aims to fill this gap. Data analyzed includes scholarly and popular works, including books and journal articles on China (e.g. its politics and policy, history, society, culture, military, and economy) as well as works specifically researching Xinjiang. International media reporting is also used. Where possible I turn to Chinese government white papers (official government documents) or news sources for information regarding China’s actions or intentions. Additionally, I seek multiple sources which, when used in concert, can together build a degree of veracity unavailable through the use of individual sources. When possible I rely upon peer-reviewed sources. At times these works are the original source of a fact or description, though predominantly I have sought reputable published sources to offer the reader rather than simply citing interviews and personal communications. Because information regarding Xinjiang is controversial and the sources of information are often as important as any facts contained within, copious notes are provided for the reader. The primary dataset for this book is fieldwork in Xinjiang and elsewhere in China. My fieldwork included nearly seven months of field research in China conducted in two trips, one of which included four months of study based at

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Xinjiang University in Urumqi. My fieldwork included formal and informal elements, most prominently networking with people across Xinjiang’s social spectrum and listening to people describe their lives, and – perhaps least traditionally for an academic – basic surveillance and situational awareness. For instance, watching people as they interact with security forces or noting the types of vehicles, uniform, and their markings around me in everyday life. Personally, a prominent feature of my fieldwork was becoming aware of the types of surveillance being run against me as well as understanding the impact of fear, and fear of suspicion, upon the society with which I interacted. In an essay published since my return from Xinjiang, counter-insurgent David Kilcullen eloquently argues: Secret intelligence is often less relevant than information which is not classified by any government, but is located in denied areas. Feedback of the effect of counter-insurgent operations on public perception may be critical. Human intelligence and tactical signals intelligence are clearly crucial, and additional effort in these areas would be valuable. But in modern counter-insurgency, where there is no single insurgent network to be penetrated but rather a cultural and demographic jungle of population groups to be navigated, “basic intelligence” – detailed knowledge of physical, human, cultural and informational terrain, based on a combination of open-source research and “denied area ethnography” – will be even more critical.33 While this work is not an ethnography per se, Kilcullen accurately describes the author’s method: social knowledge is key to understanding complex situations on which facts are murky or nonexistent.34 Owen Lattimore and David Galula each pursued this method in earlier eras of unrest in China.35 More recently, S. Frederick Starr et al., James Millward individually, as well as Michael Dillon each combined deep cultural knowledge and interviews with open sources.36 Extensive fieldwork is the basis for this study’s divergence from other scholars’ discussions of the nature and trajectory of society in Xinjiang. Because of extreme political sensitivities and sources’ requests for confidentiality I am able to provide little information as to the identity of sources within China and Xinjiang. However, I hope the reader can gauge my ability to vet human sources through noting the methodical care with which I have chosen materials from open sources. Understandably, some readers may wish for sources to be described in greater detail; the realities of scholarship on this subject make protecting sources’ identities a paramount responsibility. Simply, Xinjiang is among the most sensitive regions of China. People suspected of passing information to foreigners have no due-process of law available to them; even suspected sources have been subject to heavy retribution reportedly ranging from economic measures through prison, torture, and worse. Well beyond what is justified by necessity, much of what I am discussing easily falls into what China considers “state secrets.” For this reason alone I would have to be exceedingly careful for the

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safety of my sources, friends, as well as casual contacts. Further, my research was made possible because, as I describe in my introduction, I promised to be an honest broker taking only ideas and removing anything which might identify particular individuals. A final point on sources and methods: my sourcing is well within the standards established in Starr’s (2004) edited Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Borderland volume, a benchmark study which by design leaves the question of terrorism to future scholars. These scholars conducted fieldwork and point to it less frequently. While this book does not describe human sources in any detail, I do bring their thoughts into my analysis and, precisely because of my trust-based fieldwork combined with the counter-insurgency framework, my analysis differs dramatically from that which has come before me. In this fashion this study represents a step forward, the state of the art. Building upon the solid foundation of previous scholarship discussed throughout, this book presents more “evidence” than previously published. I regret that my protection of sources demands that I wash any identifying descriptions from my writing and ask my reader to trust that interviews indeed back my findings. This tactic is part and parcel of the cold pragmatism necessary for research in an Orwellian polity. I hope only that I have done enough. Contextual overview This study moves from the theoretical approach outlined in this chapter to an investigation in Chapter 2 (“Insurgency in Xinjiang”) of the threat confronting China in Xinjiang, real and perceived, asking: What are the dynamics of the insurgency in Xinjiang? The insurgency has evolved since the Soviet–Afghan war and has links to training camps in Afghanistan and perhaps Pakistan. Importantly, Chapter 2 assesses that the insurgency in Xinjiang is fundamentally an indigenous political competition rather than simple unrest stirred by external actors. Assistance and training was sought from external sources in order to more effectively fight the Chinese in Xinjiang. Chapter 3 (“Counter-insurgency: China’s infinite political will”) asks: what social forces, institutions, and ideas impact Chinese political will to confront insurgency in Xinjiang? Warfare is political violence which aims to effect an enemy’s will. More than simple public opinion, political will is an intangible collection of the society’s shared understandings, ideas, and dreams, and constitutes the core element being contested in an insurgency. Because of China’s political history and the structure of Chinese society the Chinese state has seemingly infinite political will with which to confront the insurgency in Xinjiang. In short, because the Party has based its claims to legitimacy upon preserving territorial integrity, and because the Chinese people demand internal stability, confronting the insurgency is imperative for state survival. China’s strong, early, and repeated response to revolt has kept insurgency from taking greater hold within Xinjiang’s society. Chapter 4 (“The changing use of force in society”) investigates the role of a distinct capability-set, as does

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Chapter 5 (“Grass-roots institutions and security”). While Xinjiang is a highly militarized society, the burden of response to incidents of rebellion shifted from the military to paramilitary forces, especially the paramilitary police. As the insurgency evolved the police and security forces adapted their tactics to become increasingly effective. Chapter 4 finds that the PLA, the military, has increasingly taken on a support function as China confronted a more durable insurgency. The military and paramilitary forces in Xinjiang have responded brutally to unrest under the banner of “Strike Hard” campaigns, aggravating the situation and violating basic human rights. Importantly, these actions also have cowed potential supporters for the insurgency into inaction for fear of useless death. Chapter 5 investigates the constitution, use, and effect of China’s intelligence and security apparatus in reaching deeply into Uyghur society, containing the insurgency while other tools (discussed in Chapter 6) reshape society. Finding its grass-roots institutions infiltrated and compromised by the insurgency, Chinese authorities reclaimed the Party-state’s local institutions and then began using society’s institutions to counter the insurgency. This tactic, here termed “society-centric warfare,” is a key feature of the China-case. Additionally, this chapter examines the types of intelligence collection and action available to the Chinese state within Uyghur communities perceived to be hostile to the state or most likely to be supporting the insurgency. Chapter 5 investigates the uses of intelligence and police forces rather than military-type forces moving within society. Chapter 6 (“The war of ideas: reshaping society in Xinjiang”) examines the social forces, institutions, and ideas which impact Uyghur political will. Chapter 6 questions what mechanisms has China used to greatest effect in altering society’s support for insurgency. Key factors include education, religion and culture, economic development, and governance. Where educational, as well as religious and cultural policies worked as intended, material economic development has backfired on the counter-insurgents engendering a perception of increasing vulnerability to a predatory state. The politics of governance too are paradoxical: while Uyghur society increasingly rejects insurgency as the path forward and tying its dreams of the future with the state, society perceives that the state itself is changing. Xinjiang’s society does not articulate the exact form the state is taking, yet subtly society is readying itself for an evolving though not revolutionary change. Chapter 7 (“Conclusion: gauging effectiveness”) returns directly to this manuscript’s central questions: how effectively has China confronted the threat of terrorism? Culling the analysis and lessons from previous chapters, this chapter aims to weave the pieces together into a tight fabric, an organic whole more than the individual strands of logic alone. This manuscript argues that by acting early and repeatedly with evolving tactics China implemented an overwhelmingly bottom-up campaign, effectively countering Xinjiang’s insurgency. The epilogue – “The Art of Countering Insurgency” – draws lessons from this case study for countering similar insurgencies in other theaters. Insurgency

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is countered most effectively by using force legitimately within society to reduce violence while other tools reshape society. Counter-insurgents must act early and comprehensively. Security, ultimately society’s dream of the future, must be built through an evolving state increasingly capable of meeting society’s demands and incorporating local society into the state’s project, the state’s dream. This chapter additionally questions: what are the unintended consequences of effective counter-insurgency? Are new actors or organizations, within the state or in opposition to it, gaining power? What are the impacts upon the core’s political will, political composition, and political nature? That is, do the nature, interests, and values of the state change through the struggle, even if an insurgency is effectively countered?

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Insurgency in Xinjiang

East Turkistan’ terrorist organizations pose a grave threat to people’s lives and property, and are an important part of international terrorist forces (People’s Daily, 12/18/2003)

Indigenous actors have used violence within Xinjiang in the attempt to alter the political wills of both the core and local societies. These indigenous actors worked alone and in groups, and some pursued assistance, ideological and material, from external actors. This chapter argues that there has been an insurgency in Xinjiang, at times nascent or simmering; currently it produces only a low level of violence relative to other recent international insurgencies.1 The socio-political and strategic environment in Xinjiang engendered an insurgency which persisted across time and in the face of harsh state action. Simply, a real threat confronted China in Xinjiang. Later chapters investigate how effectively China responded to this threat. This chapter analyzes the insurgency in Xinjiang, investigating causes, dynamics, evolution, and effect upon society. That is, why has violence been used, when, and to what effect? Causes including ethnic nationalism, the desire for greater autonomy or an independent state, and the desire to establish an Islamic caliphate stretching across Central Asia each have been prominently articulated, often at the same uprisings. Grievance articulation does not, however, show causation. Insurgencies are violent social movements which form and rise for myriad reasons which are not necessarily articulated through rational processes.2 Further, contemporary insurgencies are “complex conflict ecosystems” in which multiple actors, groups, and ideologies independently pursue their own agendas without necessarily having a formal or unified organizational structure, or indeed any substantive operational coordination.3 The insurgency in Xinjiang is not different: it contains myriad grievances for resistance to Chinese authority, personal and social. Simply, an insurgency forms when a force within society perceives a window of opportunity or vulnerability. The means are perceived as correct for the situation and the ends, the fighter’s dream, seem attainable by those means. Through the insurgent’s eyes society need only be set alight, society secretly craves to be set alight. Attacks

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are more than rational, they are emotional and ideational at the level of society – where meanings are shared.

Insurgency in context Attacking the United States on September 11, 2001, dramatically raised the profile of al Qaeda and terrorism in America’s consciousness and triggered a “global war on terror.”4 Many attacks by terrorists followed around the globe, if on smaller scales. The atrocities of 9/11 galvanized international ideas about terrorism: many rejecting, some supporting. Though ideas are fluid and socially constructed, terrorist attacks aim to polarize. At first al Qaeda was a network with considerable central direction which created connections to localized Islamist insurgencies round the world. Under pressure from counter-terrorist forces al Qaeda evolved into an inspiration and a movement more than a pure instigator of, or parasite on, local insurgencies. As these forces militarily lost nearly every battle in which they fought, they gained strength within the various local societies. China says it too is under attack from these same forces in its enormous northwestern province of Xinjiang (at times described as “East Turkistan”). This chapter, the insurgency’s story, investigates the plausibility of China’s claim in two stages: first, looking to the historic and evolving nature of the contemporary international jihad; second, evaluating the threat specifically confronting China.

Al Qaeda and the global jihad Al Qaeda began as an idea in the minds of men. Translated into English, al Qaeda roughly means “the base.” Conceived by Egyptian doctor Ayman alZawahiri and Saudi businessman Osama bin Laden (UBL) along with others, this group was designed to become the foundation for resistance against the enemies of their interpretation of Islam. While the movement’s ideology is today traceable by scholars and jihadists to the earliest events of Islam5 a more practical historiography would likely date the group’s inception to the era surrounding the Soviet–Afghan war. Late in 1979, in the midst of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union (USSR), the USSR invaded Afghanistan installing a puppet Communist regime in hopes of gaining a toehold on the edge of the oil-rich Middle East and gaining control of a restive neighbor. Against the invading army a war of resistance, or jihad, was being fought and lost by Afghan tribesmen and international volunteers.6 With indigenous resistance collapsing in the face of overwhelming force, provided largely by Soviet Hind helicopter gunships, the United States covertly began aiding the Mujahidin (rebels, Afghan and international). Perhaps to protect Middle Eastern oil, perhaps to protect American values of selfdetermination, or perhaps simply to stick-it-to the Soviets in a covert war far from America’s shores, the United States’ Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) secretly provided enormous amounts of weapons and munitions for the

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Mujahidin. For the Soviets, the war’s costs quickly began to mount as the rebel’s weapons-mix and tactics overtook their initial military superiority, and their once-invulnerable helicopters were under threat. Within a few years not only did the USSR withdraw from Afghanistan but the once proud superpower itself lay in ruins. The year was 1989.7 Learning that insurgency worked Afghan Mujahidin and the international volunteers saw this victory as their own: the hand of the United States and other powers, due to its covert nature and wishful thinking, remained hidden. The Muslim fighters, both the Afghans and the international volunteers, for the most part had no need to acknowledge, nor likely did they know of, the enormous roles played by the United States in funding the struggle from its own coffers and goading other states to contribute (notably Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Pakistan, and China), and providing ammunition and weapons, some manufactured in China to craft an air of plausible deniability.8 The most important resources the Mujahidin drew from their self-perceived victory in Afghanistan was less the physical weapons or finances, and more the intangible: training in guerrilla warfare tactics and group-leadership; a social network of men who had once volunteered to fight for the cause (a “rolodex”); confidence in the ability of the few and weak to successfully challenge a superpower in Allah’s name.9 Like civil-society groups in the United States, the Afghan war and later insurgencies provided a testing ground for new tactics and new leaders; young men came to fight for Allah, giving meaning to their lives. From the Afghan victory a boulder began to roll then tumble: the fighter became glorious victor, the instrument of Allah himself. In the following years the holy resistance fighter’s mission expanded rapidly to encompass all of the globe’s local Islamic insurgencies, at least in aspiration. Capability in search of a mission: finding new targets Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990 and seemed poised to continue its push southward into Saudi Arabia. To defend the land two disparate groups offered their assistance to the Saudi monarch’s throne. Osama bin Laden proposed that his Arab Afghan War veteran comrades spearhead a war of resistance against the Ba’athist (Iraq’s then ruling secular nationalist political party) invaders; the United States too dispatched a team to the house of Saud to offer a dramatically different military option. Accepting the American proposal, an enormous build-up of foreign military forces began within Saudi territory – an unthinkable betrayal, in bin Laden’s eyes, not only of the Afghan War veterans but, perhaps more importantly, the Saudi monarchy permitted a non-Islamic military to be stationed in-force within what was supposed to be sacred ground. While the Iraqi military was prevented from invading Saudi Arabia and was vanquished from Kuwait, the Saudi monarchy lost its legitimacy in bin Laden’s eyes: the kingdom failed in its fundamental

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mission, the holy land (containing Mecca and Medina) now was effectively occupied by a foreign, infidel military which had little intention of going home. Resisting the powerful foreign forces, specifically the American military, became a self-imposed obligation for jihadists, including bin Laden and his cohorts.10 Aiding local insurgencies While individuals have long felt the call to violent jihad, the transformation of this fight from internal or localized action to truly global proportions is a recent innovation.11 Bin Laden argues that al Qaeda is capable of defeating the United States, saying that the group has experience in using guerrilla warfare and the war of attrition to fight tyrannical superpowers, as we, alongside the Mujahideen, bled Russia for ten years, until it went bankrupt and was forced to withdraw in defeat. All Praise is due to Allah.12 Knowing they could not defeat the sole remaining superpower as individuals alone, they decided to set the world ablaze using terrorist attacks to craft support and aiding insurgencies where feasible. Early attacks included an attempt against a hotel in which American military forces were wrongfully believed to be staying in preparation for their deployment in Somalia (Yemen, 1992); perhaps the “Blackhawk Down” incident in Mogadishu (1993); the first attempt to destroy the World Trade Center, using a truck-bomb (1993). As the 1990s progressed al Qaeda evolved beyond a small cohort into a darkly reputable organization running training camps in Afghanistan as well as in Pakistan, the Sudan, Yemen, Kashmir, the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, and elsewhere.13 Conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, Chechnya, Algeria, the Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia, the Sudan, Yemen, and elsewhere provided training and proving grounds, additional fights to which international volunteers could aspire, participate, and return home with new knowledge and new connections.14 Importantly, these many conflicts engendered indigenous actors to seek support from the global jihad in order to better fight their chosen, local insurgency.15 Primary mission: training and aiding insurgents The Afghan camps provided training primarily in insurgency: how to fight in small wars, conducting ambushes and effectively use small-group tactics. A select minority of the international volunteers who trained in Afghanistan’s camps were invited to join al Qaeda’s terrorist corps. Additionally, al Qaeda itself maintained a guerilla force of an estimated 2,000 non-Afghan fighters who served as backbone for Taliban soldiers fighting to control Afghanistan or as shock-troops, in Afghanistan and internationally.16

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Contrary to popular understandings of these camps, to become an al Qaeda terrorist in this phase required a connection – a person already trusted by the network who could vouch for the credentials and reliability of potential recruits. The idea of fighting against the United States was increasingly popular, but to join the global jihad with full membership in its primary institution, al Qaeda, followed a few patterns, primary among them was this: recruits were found in clusters, groups of friends who had traveled to western countries and felt socially alienated. Wishing to return to imagined cultural roots in a more “just,” idealized traditional Islamic society, these young men found comfort in small groups of like-minded men. Sometimes the connection to the global jihad was familial. Often through a local mosque these groups of alienated individuals collected, bonds of friendship forming strong. Only after this initial phase did radicalization take greater hold, and an entree was required for formal association with the institutions of terror and training in its camps.17 The evolving international insurgency As the 1990s drew to a close and a new century began a new wave of terrorism was breaking across the globe.18 Attacks against Kobar Towers in Saudi Arabia, the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, and the USS Cole in Yemen were preludes to the destruction of 9/11. These attacks were perpetrated by terrorists connected in a network with a group, much like a corporate board, directing its actions. Funding came from crimes small and large, including drug trafficking; money was also raised through collection of donations from countries and Muslims living even in countries under attack (e.g. the US and the UK).19 Terrorist attacks spectacularly showed that a war of “resistance” was being waged against a world perceived to be hostile to Islam, just as local insurgencies struck back against “encroaching” or infidel regimes. The United States, similarly decried earlier by Iranian revolutionaries as the “great Satan” (meaning the great tempter, the country trying to pull Muslims away from their “true,” traditional and religious, path), was as vulnerable as the Soviets before them. A new caliphate, a land where Islamic law could purify the lives of its populace, became a prominent desire – at least of al Qaeda’s senior leadership. After 9/11 America and various coalition partners routed al Qaeda from Afghanistan (Operation Enduring Freedom), pursued numerous smaller overt and covert missions globally, and invaded Iraq (Operation Iraqi Freedom), all as part of America’s “Global War on Terror” (GWOT).20 As the intensity of the counter-terror efforts increased, the nature of al Qaeda consequently changed. Where international financing became more difficult and terror cells with strong links to the Afghan camps were rounded-up by security services, new groups emerged under the banner of “al Qaeda.” The United States removed Saddam Hussein’s Ba’athist regime in Iraq and an insurgency sprang-up in the invasion’s wake, complete with a new al Qaeda branch. Earlier a bomb exploded in a Bali nightclub. Chronologically after the invasion of Iraq the rail system in Madrid was attacked using backpack bombs; a

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cell of native-born British citizens detonated bombs on London’s underground system in al Qaeda’s name; and suicide bombers struck Bali again. These are but a few prominent examples of al Qaeda’s recent attacks. Other attacks occurred in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey, and elsewhere. Let us discuss these two patterns separately, first turning to al Qaeda in Iraq and then examining the bombings in Bali, Istanbul, Madrid and London as examples of the type of violence an increasingly global insurgency can inflict. Terrorism and insurgency in Iraq While a full assessment of insurgency in Iraq is beyond the scope of the present study a few key points are relevant: in the wake of America’s invasion into Iraq, a country where al Qaeda had not previously had a strong presence, a new al Qaeda organization formed, along with a complex indigenous insurgency. Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), suicide and car bombs, and beheading kidnapped hostages became horribly commonplace. Americans became accustomed to seeing large explosions on their television screens, even if the US media did clean much of the horror and blood from war. The Iraqi population experienced this savage trauma firsthand. As American and coalition troop deaths were reported openly, reaching one, then two, then 3,000 American lives taken, Iraqi civilian casualty reports were occasional, sporadic, and rarely comprehensive: private estimates spanned tens of thousands, growing incomprehensibly large. Iraqi security and government officials became primary targets and suffered heavily; prominent religious sites and civilians were later directly targeted in the attempt to spark intractable sectarian strife. The threat of “foreign fighters” danced across headlines, yet military officials in more candid moments admitted the insurgency was primarily a local affair.22 Iranian intervention and support for Shiite militias later supplemented or replaced this discourse, perhaps with some justification.23 Iraq’s conflict ecosystem became so complex that only counter-insurgent professionals seemed able to keep tabs on the players. The Iraqi insurgency posed threats not only to the stability of Iraq, or its neighbors if the country were to descend into “civil war,” but to international security. What happens when the conflict in Iraq cools and the men who have acquired urban combat, bomb-making, and various other terrorist expertises no longer have a medium in which to ply their trade; where will the next hotspot be; what local insurgency will next get an injection of this increasingly capable terrorist cadre? And what local insurgency will be inspired by the new archterrorist Zarqawi and those who come after him to try and transform their sideshow into the main event?24 Bali, Indonesia (October 12, 2002) A van packed with explosives detonated in a nightclub district, killing 202; the bomb was allegedly assembled by Dulmatin, who learned to build bombs in an

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al Qaeda camp in Afghanistan. An estimated 300 Indonesians trained in Afghan camps and an additional 300 are suspected of training in Philippine Jemaah Islamiyah (JI; Indonesian al Qaeda affiliate) camps. Amorzi, the JI member believed to have run the attack, said: “There’s some pride in my heart. For the white people it serves them right. They know how to destroy religion by the most subtle ways through bars and gambling dens.”25 Like the East Africa attacks in 1998, Bali (2002) demonstrated a willingness to attack targets around the world closer to, or within, the arena of local insurgencies. The bombings were perpetrated by a small number of al Qaeda-trained insurgents who found a tactic which, through target selection, magnified the visibility of their political agenda through violent action. Istanbul (November 15–20, 2003) Perhaps the last attack specifically authorized by bin Laden before 9/11, first on November 15 and then on November 20, 2003 four truck bombs detonated in Istanbul killing fifty-eight and wounding an estimated 750; two bombs on each date. The trucks carried some 4,000 pounds of explosives apiece. In an extensively researched article based on Turkish interrogation transcripts, Karl Vick of the Washington Post writes: Bin Laden’s breakfast guests had already organized themselves into a cell before they approached al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. There they specifically declined to pledge allegiance to the organization, but asked for itsss help and blessing. The only al-Qaeda operative charged in the case is a flamboyant Syrian, Louai Sakka, who delivered to the conspirators $100,000 rolled in a sock. But the youthful Turks who stealthily carried the plot forward were hardly international men of mystery. Those who agreed to die in the truck bombings first had to be taught how to drive.26 This money was in addition to the $10,000 presented by Muhammed Atef, al Qaeda’s then military commander, after the Turks met with UBL. The group, which vowed to “fight what they saw as the international oppression of Islam” included members who had received military training in Afghanistan in the 1990s, as well as at least one member who fought in Chechnya and Bosnia. The group first considered purchasing a mining operation to obtain explosives, later opting for an industrial workshop in which to manufacture explosives from commercial materials.27 The November 2003 attacks in Istanbul highlight several features of al Qaeda’s support for terrorism: while some of the conspirators had previously fought in other insurgencies, their most notorious and visible actions were terrorist attacks within their home country. Turkey is not known as a hotbed of radicalism or religious fundamentalism, yet this lack of reputation did not prevent locals from violently “struggling” against what they perceived as attacks against the Umma, the world’s Islamic community. Arguably, al Qaeda’s support for

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this group was more inspirational validation and training than even the cash provided. Madrid (March 11, 2004) Ten backpack-bombs loaded with twenty-two pounds of explosives, triggered by mobile phones, detonated on four trains in Madrid killing 191, wounding 1,000. A year after the attacks only one person had been convicted in association with the attacks, but seventy had been arrested and twenty-two detained during the investigation; two suspects were reportedly detained overseas. Seven suspects committed suicide in Leganes, a suburb of Madrid on April 3, 2004, as security forces closed in. Further bombings were reportedly planned by this cell; the train bombings being only one component of the operation. Upwards of eight suspects are still being sought by the authorities. The BBC reported that “Most of the suspects who have been provisionally charged are Moroccans, but they also include others from Spain, Algeria and Lebanon.” Importantly, several of the men suspected of involvement in supplying explosives are former miners and the explosives are believed to have been stolen (and perhaps later sold) from the Conchita mine. The uncle of two suspects is reportedly a spokesman for al Qaeda and is now in custody.28 The Madrid attacks were a turning point for al Qaeda and the international jihad: the organization itself reportedly had little direct involvement in the planning and execution. Instead, people with loose connections but considerable ideological affinity took action with locally acquired materials. Attacking in the heart of Europe demonstrated that, for anyone who questioned the veracity before, the movement was now truly a global insurgency. London (July 7, 2005) Four suicide bombers kill fifty-two and wound an estimated 700, attacking three tube (subway) trains and a double-decker bus. The train bombings occurred nearly simultaneously, detonating within one minute of each other. Three of the attackers were British-born men of Pakistani descent; the fourth was a Jamaicanborn Briton. Three of the bombers visited Pakistan within the previous year and perhaps previously as well, the BBC reported; two of the men stayed in Pakistan for three months. Pakistan arrested an unknown number of people suspected of involvement. The bombs were peroxide-based and were believed to be assembled in a number of West Yorkshire homes. On July 21 a second round of attacks was attempted but the bombs failed to detonate. The men charged with the July 21 attempt were all Londoners. On July 24 London police detonated a suspicious package, later said to be a similar bomb to those used in the failed July 21 attack. UBL lieutenant Ayman al-Zawahiri asserted that “Blair has brought you destruction to the heart of London, and he will bring more destruction, God

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willing.” Zawahiri’s videotape, aired on al-Jazeera in early August, claimed that Blair’s support for Iraq inspired a violent backlash. A second videotape was aired on al-Jazeera in September with messages from one of the 7/7 bombers and from Zawahiri, claiming that the bomber himself was inspired by UBL to avenge British atrocities against Muslims. Zawahiri claimed al Qaeda responsibility for the July 7 attacks, and stated: “This blessed battle has transferred – like its glorious predecessors in New York, Washington, and Madrid – the battle to the enemies’ land.” Zawahiri said al Qaeda will target the “lands and interests of the countries which took part in the aggression against Palestine, Iraq and Afghanistan.” Only later in September did Zawahiri claim full al Qaeda responsibility for perpetrating the 7/7 bombing.29 Like the Madrid attacks, London marked another evolution of al Qaeda: Britons now became a threat; the idea of insurgency had taken root where western ideals had failed to take hold. Vulnerability was perceived in the state, and terrorists arose and attacked. As the US, UK, and their coalition pursued al Qaeda with military and intelligence forces around the world, they had, to date, failed to crush the ideas of resistance’s virtue and success; this failure increased the perception of vulnerability. An incomplete campaign was being waged against terrorism internationally, focusing too heavily upon top-down tactics compromising the overall efficacy: more insurgents arose and new theaters of insurgency materialized as fighters were killed and cells rounded up. Bali (October 1, 2005) Three suicide bombers killed twenty-two people (including the bombers) and injured an estimated ninety more. According to a senior Indonesian counterterrorism official the bombers belonged to a small gang, had no previous criminal records, and no ties to Jemaah Islamiyah (an al Qaeda affiliate) or al Qaeda proper. The bombers were, in the official’s words, “jihadists” without previous ties to terrorist attacks. Two men are suspected of involvement with bomb-making: one is Axhari Husin, a former JI member; the other is Dulmatin, the man who allegedly built the 2002 Bali van-bomb. The backpack-bombs with detonation-wires reportedly sewn into the straps (showing the evolving nature and increased sophistication of terrorist tactics) are believed to have been assembled in the Philippines, where the bombers received an unknown amount of training. Counter-terrorism officials assert that additional bombs or materials are already within Indonesia, poised for the next attack. The explosives used in this attack still have not been publicly identified, and despite pictures of the bombers appearing across a broad spectrum of media the men have not been identified.30 The Bali attacks of 2005 demonstrated an al Qaeda trademark: returning to locations previously targeted. While the exact facilities were different, attacking tourism targets in Bali a second time is no coincidence, and the message is clear: even if at a low level, the insurgency will continue. The World Trade Center in New York was first attacked in 1993; it was brought down in 2001. Persistence

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is not lacking for al Qaeda: even when particular insurgents are killed or captured, the movement continues where those insurgents left off. If the insurgents are not killed or captured, they will continue planning and attacking; yet to stop the insurgency society must reject it. To date this has not happened; indeed, the reverse may be true. Lessons learned These attacks show a tactical and operational shift away from spectacular attacks with large operational footprints to smaller groups with reduced logistical needs, and perhaps no formal connections at all to al Qaeda proper beyond raw inspiration. Each of the attacks discussed above have a different operational design, but their perpetrators and conspirators share a similarly absolute devotion to the cause, to fighting in the name of Islam against perceived attacks. While support in bomb-making and recruitment may in some instances have come from operatives with more formal connections to al Qaeda and affiliated groups, the footsoldiers themselves are devotees of the cause, jihadists ready to die for the movement, for the idea. Elsewhere, as in Istanbul, Madrid, and London, the bomb material was local, as were the conspirators. In Iraq Islamist terrorists gain fame from what began and largely persists as an indigenous insurgency;31 nevertheless, perceptions matter – perhaps more than reality. Al Qaeda’s nature continues to evolve and today is probably best described as an ideology, a social movement and inspiration rather than the terrorist or military institution it had been at its inception.32 At its inception, al Qaeda was a vanguard of jihadists, a group of men with an idea which later sparked and fueled a global movement. Where al Qaeda once had provided considerable support in the forms of financing, training, and expertise (e.g. military advisors) to local insurgencies internationally, today its Afghan camps are largely closed for business. The Pakistani government claims that despite some border tribal regions remaining beyond the national government’s control, the camps inside geographic Pakistan too are out of commission. Reality on the ground seems to ebb and flow. Insurgents today must primarily travel to a hotspot for training; Iraq is a prime example. Importantly, however, the number of foreign fighters entering Iraq represents only a small amount of the Iraqi insurgency, perhaps only 4 percent. While the popular image, the socio-political demand for insurgents in local and global jihads has risen, an interruption in the supply line has been achieved by counter-insurgent forces; unfortunately this is likely but a brief snag.

Insurgency in Xinjiang China claims that the insurgency in Xinjiang is linked to the global jihad and al Qaeda. The following section investigates this insurgency, questioning its dynamics, scope, and connections (material, institutional, and ideational). Where

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the above discussion of al Qaeda’s history is now reliably documented through an enormous effort by scholars, reporters, and practitioners, Xinjiang’s insurgency presents an especially difficult dilemma: the paucity of credible, let alone consistent, information. A note on sources and methods Chinese sources, official and media (also heavily controlled by the government and Party), are unreliable at best. Repeatedly the government and Party position changes regarding what quantity and quality of information to release,33 depending partially upon the intended audience and the international mood.34 Beyond Xinjiang’s troubles Chinese discussions of security affairs do not behave as western observers think they ought to. When China conducted an anti-statilight test in January 2007, top China-watchers spent considerable analytic efforts deciphering why China waited so long to make boilerplate statements well after the United States presented information on the test, privately and then publicly.35 Further, it is unclear to this author what quality of information the Chinese government itself possesses on Xinjiang. When separatism, including both attacks and swift response, is a boon for a politician or bureaucrat it is conceivable that reports and repression might spike. When unrest is supposed to be already vanquished, reporting of attacks or response may be driven down. Regretfully, the present study lacks the quantitative evidence with which to assess and colorfully depict the reporting habits of Xinjiang and PRC leadership and security services. If Chinese sources can not be trusted about the actions, nature, and strength of Xinjiang’s insurgency, how are we to conduct the present study? In addition to the author’s fieldwork discussed at length in the previous chapter, two methods are employed: the first is to rely upon the trained eyes of western academics to filter media, government, and exile reports; the second is to look not at the specifics but at the big picture, knowing that the specifics of incident reporting are highly suspect. By imagining a plausible scenario which could roughly fit the facts’ trajectory this study will attempt to place flesh upon what is at best a rough skeleton. Said differently, insurgencies are actions of men in pursuit of a dream, an ideal.36 Studying tactics, attacks and the intervals between them offers a crude though dramatic and visual gauge of an insurgency’s strength; yet, counting the numbers of insurgents and their deeds does not reveal the insurgency itself.37 Facts can distract analysis, leading researchers into the belief that they know more than they really do. Even if the information on attacks against Chinese targets as well as proscribed-group membership and history were accurate, the facts alone could obscure as much as they illuminate. This study analyzes the information available on attacks, groups, and insurgents in order to begin crafting a portrait of the insurgency, its strength, dynamics, and evolution.

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Attacks, groups, and insurgents China asserts that terrorists have killed over 160 people and injured 440 in more than 200 incidents between 1990 and 2001.38 Unrest in Xinjiang since the 1949 “Liberation” or gentle-fall to the Communists has been episodic and has had numerous proximate causes. Rather than the single narrative produced above, historian James Millward depicts a Xinjiang troubled by sporadic and geographically disperse violence; Islamic and Uyghur nationalisms mix with security forces’ heavy handedness in engendering eruptions: a textbook complex conflict ecosystem. While an extensive list of violence in Xinjiang is available from Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Centre,39 the sourcing on some of the attacks listed are of questionable integrity; thus, this book charts a minimalist track, turning instead to the discussion of attacks and groups analyzed by historian Millward and parsing further. Beyond the social noise of a traditional society living under an imposing authoritarian system however, Millward writes that three clusters of attacks are at the core of PRC fears of extremism, “splittism,” and terrorism: • The first was an armed uprising in Baren (near Kashgar) in April 1990 whose planners employed religious rhetoric and used mosques to disseminate a call to arms. Some 200 men were apparently involved in the initial uprising; a Chinese dragnet and crackdown on the religious establishment later detained many others.40 While Xinjiang scholars uniformly assert that the Baren incident was a local affair, perhaps organized by veterans of the Soviet–Afghan war, senior diplomatic and counter-terrorism sources assert that there was direct intervention from Afghan militias, including a force lead by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. This push was repulsed not only with Chinese military force but also with American and international diplomatic efforts.41 Historian Millward continues: • The second was a series of explosions and attempted bombings in 1992–3 involving civilian targets (buses, stores, a cinema, an unoccupied hotel wing). Though some of the bombs were defused, several casualties resulted from these unclaimed attacks, including a few fatalities. • The third cluster, from spring 1996 until February 1997, corresponds chronologically with the inauguration of the “Shanghai Five” organization and a high-profile “Strike Hard” campaign to round up suspected separatists. Chinese reports indicate a wave of protests, explosions, and assassinations of ethnic Uyghur officials around this time, and large numbers of arrests were logged. The Ghulja (Yining) incident of early February 1997 began as a large-scale demonstration probably in response to Strike Hard arrests, which developed into clashes with police and attacks on Chinese civilians. After the repression of the unrest in Ghulja and a further wave of arrests, three bombs exploded on Urumqi buses later in February.42

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These three bombs on Urumqi busses exploded simultaneously,43 showing a significant level of expertise (simultaneous explosions were, in this period, a hallmark of al Qaeda internationally). Jane’s tabulation includes a March 1997 suicide bombing of a government building in Urumqi.44 Beyond the 1996–7 cluster, Millward continues, “Official Chinese sources report further attacks on economic targets in 1998–9, as well as occasional attacks on ethnic Uyghur officials in government and party positions since then.”45 Other sources tentatively report an attack upon a guided-missile or Air Force complex in 1999.46 Importantly, attacks since 1997 have been small affairs including the murders of local officials, one or two at a time.47 International incidents listed by Millward include only three successful attacks which seem credible to the present author: May 31 and June 1, 1998: Osh Bus Bombings. Two explosions, one on a bus and one in a piece of luggage that had been removed from a bus, killed five people in Osh oblast, Kyrgyzstan. Kyrgyz authorities apprehended and sentenced a Turk, a Russian, and two Uyghurs for the bombing. 1999: Series of Attacks on Chinese in Turkey. In October, Turkish police detained ten individuals, said to be members of ETLO, in connection with assaults on Chinese nationals. March 2000: Involvement with Chechens. Russia arrested two Uyghurs whom it charged with fighting for the Chechen terrorists. Extradited to the PRC for trial, they confessed to smuggling ammunition but denied joining the fighting.48 Other attacks abroad are claimed by the Chinese government to have been conducted by “East Turkistan” forces, yet the details stretch credulity as to the perpetrator’s affiliations or motivations. While the minimalist case presented above seems to depict relatively little threat, this study turns briefly to two additional types of evidence: an examination of fighters training in Afghanistan and a look to our knowledge about relevant groups, terrorist and separatist. First, let us turn briefly to a maximalist view of the “fighters” problem. Graham Fuller and Jonathan Lipman write: As early as 1999, a Chinese academic specialist on Xinjiang . . . had estimated that as many as 10,000 Uyghurs had traveled to Pakistan for religious schooling and “military training.” In May 2002, the Chinese government claimed that over 1,000 Uyghurs had been trained in Taliban camps and that many of them had returned to Xinjiang to participate in the separatist struggle. Beijing also claimed that approximately 20 Uyghurs were killed by U.S. forces in Afghanistan and that some 300 Uyghurs had been captured. . . . In June 2002, the Chinese military attaché in Washington reported that his government had identified some 400 Uyghurs as fighters in Afghanistan.49

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With the United States moving into Afghanistan, Fuller and Lipman assert, hundreds of Uyghurs fled the Afghan battlefield in search of refuge in northern Pakistan. The assumption embedded within this discussion, whatever its veracity, is that once a man is trained to fight he will do so: there is no rehabilitation, no renouncing of violence, no turn to mainstream politics that can alter his disposition to violence. China’s knowledge of the Afghan battlefield, numbers of Uyghurs killed, captured, or even trained, come from only a few possible sources; two seem most likely: either Chinese officials have invented the numbers or American officials have shared information with the Chinese.50 Yet even if China received information from the United States, this study lacks the information necessary to assess the veracity of the numbers claimed, knowing neither original information collection methodology nor the integrity of the information’s chain of custody. Explicitly, without this knowledge it is impossible to assess whether the numbers have been altered for political purposes at any step, from collection through analysis, dissemination, and eventual publication by Chinese authorities. Let us now examine associated and implicated groups. East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) The US State Department’s Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003 lists only one terrorist organization in Xinjiang with links to al Qaeda (recognized as such by the United States): the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM; aka SHAT).51 Accused of plotting an attack against the United States embassy in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, the ETIM today is something of an unknown. Where a January 2002 Chinese document, the first official systematic discussion of terrorism in Xinjiang, claims that about a dozen ETIM bases were established in Xinjiang, a People’s Daily report from September of the same year asserts that: “Chinese police have damaged 44 ETIM bases and confiscated a substantial amount of weapons and ammunition, including 4,500 grenades.”52 Evaluating the PRC’ 2002 report on terrorism in Xinjiang, historian Millward writes: “In February 1998 [ETIM leader] Hasan Mahsum . . . sent ‘scores of terrorists’ into China” establishing bases and training more than 150 terrorists. The ETIM also established “large numbers of ‘training stations’ in scattered areas, each consisting of three to five members, and workshops producing weapons, ammunition, and explosives.” Police reportedly also recovered detonators, grenades, and anti-tank grenades from these workshops.53 On January 5, 2007, China reportedly destroyed a terrorist camp, killing eighteen suspects and capturing seventeen, a stockpile of improvised explosive devices, material, and an unknown number of guns.54 The ETIM has not been credibly and publicly linked to any large-scale attack or series of attacks. In December of 2003 Hasan Mahsum was reportedly killed in Pakistan. Contrasting Millward’s circumscribed assessment other reputable Xinjiang scholars depict the ETIM in more certain terms. Justin Rudelson and William Jankowiak write that since the ETIM was listed by China, the United States, and

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the United Nations as an international terrorist group (August 26, 2002) a credible knowledge-base has emerged in open sources. Rudelson and Jankowiak argue: The ETIM Uyghur resistance began after the 1990 Baren uprising. Seeing the government’s readiness to use force against apparently peaceful students, Uyghur activists from the south of Xinjiang fled to a base at a religious school (madrassah) in Pakistan and there founded the ETIM. . . . The ETIM’s leadership is purported to have had close links to Osama bin Laden and to have sent agents and weapons into Xinjiang beginning in 1998. At least two of the Al-Qaeda fighters captured in Afghanistan and sent to Guantanamo, Cuba, were Uyghurs from the ETIM.55 Rudelson and Jankowiak’s final claim is problematic: likely, their intended meaning is that of the fighters captured in Afghanistan (of whom the majority were simple insurgents, not core al Qaeda terrorists and warriors), at least two were members of the ETIM. Alternately, perhaps these ETIM members belonged to al Qaeda’s “055 Brigade,” al Qaeda’s guerilla force. While the information’s original source is unclear, the story fits plausibly with more overtly sourced material. The ETIM highlights several key features of China’s war on terrorism: even when a link between Uyghur groups and al Qaeda may exist, the information China either has or releases is contradictory at best, and some is so obviously inconsistent, incorrect, or falsified that it greatly weakens the case China is trying to make. East Turkistan Liberation Organization (ETLO) According to Chinese authorities the ETLO has ties to the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), an ally of al Qaeda, and has links to training camps in Afghanistan and Chechnya.56 Military scholar Yitzhak Shichor writes that from early 1999 until the IMU’s routing from its Afghan camps in Operation Enduring freedom, IMU leader Tahir Yuladeshev was “training several hundred Muslim militants from Central Asia, including an unknown number of Uyghurs from Xinjiang.”57 Of the accusations levied against this group, those most credible include fifteen arsons in Urumqi, “a poisoning in Kashgar, a series of attacks on Chinese nationals in Turkey, arms smuggling, [and] shootouts with Chinese border guards . . . One source also credits ETLO with the ransom kidnapping of a Chinese businessman and bombing in Osh.”58 The present study lacks evidence to either confirm or challenge these assertions; importantly, Millward too presents these charges in uncertain and qualified terminology indicating his similar lack of substantive information on the ETLO and its actions. Millward includes in his assessment a number of attacks in Central Asia attributed to this group which, to this study, are more easily linked to causes other than terrorism or Uyghur separatism such as the background noise of corruption and crime

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endemic in Central Asia. As of this writing, it is difficult to discern whether the ETLO even exists. United Revolutionary Front of East Turkistan (URFET) URFET, also known as the United National Revolutionary Front of East Turkistan, this group began in the mid-1970s (and perhaps has roots in early resistance against the Chinese during the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution). The URFET’s leader, Yusupbek Mukhlisi, in the mid-1990s issued: A series of press releases from Almaty characterized by wild claims regarding the “real” size of the Uyghur population, the rate of Chinese immigration to Xinjiang, the number of uprisings and executions ongoing in Xinjiang, and his own supposedly vast organization of secret armed cells in China. These releases alone are largely responsible for creating the impression of an active, organized, violent resistance to Chinese rule in Xinjiang in the 1990s.59 Apparently at the time these press releases were originally circulating the Chinese authorities lacked either the ability to dispel their claims or the will to disseminate information which cast doubt upon the severity of threat in Xinjiang. Alternately, perhaps the self-perceived threat to the Chinese state is less that of bombs per se but the general perception of vulnerability and fragility. Simply stated, the threats of separating Xinjiang, along with Taiwan and Tibet, from the “motherland” have provided a boon of nationalism which surges CCP legitimacy, however temporarily. This theme is discussed in greater detail in the following chapter. Uyghur Liberation Organization (ULO) In 1996 this group’s founder, Hashir Wahidi, claimed “to have over 1 million supporters in Xinjiang and 12,000 more abroad in Central Asian countries.”60 In 1998, at the age of seventy-eight, Hashir Wahidi died following a severe beating by intruders in his home. Among the actions plausibly attributable to the ULO are an attack upon a Chinese delegation and a kidnapping of a Chinese businessman in Kyrgyzstan (spring, 2000).61 Millward writes that Ten Uyghurs, including Kyrgyz, Chinese, Uzbek, and Turkish nationals were arrested in connection with these events. They are said to have confessed to membership in ULO, connections with “similar Afghan and Uzbek organizations,” training in terrorist camps, fighting in Chechnya, and engaging in terrorist acts in Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and China.62 Forming the Uyghuristan People’s Party in September of 2001 by merging with the URFET, this group has sought legitimate participation in above-ground

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Central Asian politics. Importantly, the Uyghuristan People’s Party has equivocated in renouncing violence to achieve its political ends. Other groups Two additional types of groups are listed by the Chinese security authorities: those which are named but no external information is available, and those which are relatively well-known as advocacy groups and information clearinghouses. Analyzing the threat posed by both sets is difficult. China is an authoritarian state, especially in relation to Xinjiang’s problems; China can make wild claims unchallenged by facts, whose collection and transmission is dangerous (clearly illustrated by the case of Rebiya Kadir, a Uyghur businesswoman arrested and imprisoned for bringing local newspaper-clippings to an American Congressional delegation. Today in exile, she too is labeled a terrorist). Alternately, Chinese security services might actually have information regarding secret Uyghur groups. The East Turkistan International Committee; the East Turkistan Islamic Party; the East Turkistan Islamic Party of Allah (implausibly blamed for the 1997 Gulja/Yining uprising); the East Turkistan Opposition Party; and the Islamic Holy Warriors are all named by the Chinese as terrorist groups.63 There is little information available on these groups. Two groups added to China’s list of enemy groups are the World Uyghur Youth Congress (WUYC) and the East Turkistan Information Center (ETIC). China’s Public Security Ministry claims that these groups have ties to al Qaeda, including funding and contacts. The former is an exile-political-action group, the latter issues press releases from Munich and has a spokesman who frequently appears in media reporting (the ETIC’s website is www.uygur.org).64 The veracity of China’s claimed al Qaeda links are not possible for the present study to authenticate, though it seems at least equally plausible that blanket accusations are meant to smother embarrassing dissent.

Xinjiang’s insurgency Insurgency in Xinjiang is not a simple story of a few individuals or groups conspiring against the state, nor is it the story of linear ethnic conflict or Islamist intrigues alone. The insurgency is primarily an indigenous affair with many contributing and enabling socio-political factors. Unrest and social violence are not phenomenon present in Xinjiang alone. Year on year, political protests across China have dramatically increased throughout the 1990s and this trend has continued, spiking in 74,000 “mass incidents” reported in 200465 and 87,000 “mass incidents” in 2005.66 Chinese officials and open source media reports indicate that this number may have declined nearly 20 percent in 2006, yet this statistical change is likely a product of altered counting and reporting methods, official and media, rather than social changes resulting from deliberate policy.67 Yearly tabulations of unrest in China by province/region correlate closely with proximity to press freedom and the spectrum of social perceptions of

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political freedom.68 Simply stated, the reporting is best where reporters can work and people feel more free to protest, more free to document their resistance. Chinese authorities explicitly acknowledge the necessity of a prominent internal security mission for defense forces, military and paramilitary alike, in the official “China’s National Defense in 2006.” Whether this policy statement reflects changing defense policy priorities, an evolving threat, or is simply altered rhetoric remains open to debate as well as future study.69 Further, what may be simple unrest elsewhere may get labeled separatism in Xinjiang by ethnocentric or fearful security and government forces; alternately, political action in Xinjiang could take the form of separatism and terrorism (caused by similar or different factors). Sinologist Andrew Scobell70 provides an excellent discussion of violence elsewhere throughout China which would certainly be considered terrorism if it had occurred in Xinjiang or had been perpetrated by Uyghurs. Scobell writes that a wave of bombings rocked China in the wake of the 9/11 attacks: During a three-week period between late November and mid-December 2001, twenty-eight explosions reportedly occurred in various Chinese cities prompting a series of emergency high-level meetings in Beijing to consider countermeasures. . . . Probably “the worst terrorist act in the history of the People’s Republic” occurred in the city of Shijiazhuang, in central China, on March 16, 2001, when four bombs detonated within the space of one hour at separate locations killing more than one hundred persons and seriously injuring at least thirty-eight others. The authorities claimed that the destruction was the work [of] a lone forty-one-year-old unemployed male who was quickly identified and arrested after a brief manhunt. Reportedly his motivation was a bitter feud with relatives and former neighbors.71 Quickly rounding up suspects is a repeated feature of reports on Chinese security force reactions to bombings leaving western analysts wondering whether law enforcement authorities have truly identified the perpetrator of attacks let alone worked to understand the source of the grievance. Alternately, when such attacks are linked with a Uyghur or are conducted in Xinjiang authorities’ first instinct is to label this terrorism. Sinologist Scobell writes: In early 2002 a suicide bomber detonated explosives outside a department store in Urumqi, killing himself and a high-ranking policeman and injuring several other law enforcement personnel. According to the official China news service, the bomber was a disturbed Han Chinese afflicted with the AIDS virus, not a member of an ethnic minority favoring separatism.72 Like all reports of China’s security affairs, the accuracy of the Chinese reporting (as distinguished from Scobell’s analysis) must be considered suspect. With the Han population outnumbering Uyghurs in Xinjiang, continuing to grow in numbers and evolve politically along with Chinese people across the mainland,

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the Chinese government may need to prepare for a changing security environment in Xinjiang. Across China, bombings abound. No single comprehensive source documents and analyzes the bombings in China. While excellent open source and publicly available online databases from the Terrorism Knowledge Base and the National Counterterrorism Center list dozens of bus, building, and suicide bombings across China this analyst feels that these reported incidents could simply be hinting at a far larger and under-documented phenomenon. Photographs of bombed-out Chinese busses appear on defense and military enthusiast websites and message boards documenting events which are not recorded in the open source literature. Needless to say, this type of violence in China, beyond Xinjiang’s borders and unlinked with Xinjiang’s social pulse, deserves further study. Importantly, when all dissent is by definition outside of the system, when legitimate grievances have no political space to be aired, when society is given no mechanism to truly represent itself against the authorities and redress grievances, when all dissent and attempts to solve social problems is viewed as a threat to the government then all of politics is criminalized. Yet even in a country which attempts to so rigidly control and break the will of its population, violent dissent may have differing pathologies, causes, and effects.73 Building upon the above analyses of the global jihad as well as unrest elsewhere in China, let us attempt to tie these pieces together into a plausible narrative of Xinjiang’s troubles.

The Soviet–Afghan war Balancing against the mutual enemy, the United States and China cooperated to frustrate the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. In addition to thousands of mules sent from China through Pakistan into Afghanistan, key for supplying fighters across rugged mountainous terrain, China manufactured many of the weapons used in the war. Because these weapons were Soviet designs, their use created an air of plausible deniability for they were not too different from the materials collected off Soviet troops killed on the battlefield.74 Military scholar Shichor writes: At an estimated $100 million a year, the Chinese delivered small arms, assault rifles, mines, antitank and antiaircraft guns, rocket launchers, and 107-mm rockets by ship to Karachi. Xinjiang was also used as a base for training Afghan Mujahidin to fight the Soviet Union. With some 300 military advisers already at training facilities in Pakistan, in February 1985 the PLA opened additional training camps near Kashgar and Khotan in Xinjiang where Afghan rebels were introduced to the use of Chinese weapons, explosives, combat tactics, propaganda techniques, and espionage.75 While scholars and practitioners privately debate the extent of China’s training of fighters,76 Shichor asserts that China’s training facilities in Pakistan were

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located both in Peshawar and along the Pakistani-Afghan border. By the Soviet–Afghan War’s end China had provided an estimated $200 million to $400 million in weaponry to the Mujahidin.77 Supporting warfare against the Soviets alone might hold little significance, but al Qaeda scholar Rohan Gunaratna asserts a strong causal relationship: The fallout of this strategy was the return of “victorious Uighur jihadis to Xinjiang, where some of them fuelled the simmering insurgency” for an independent Uighuristan. Until October 2001 Al Qaeda camps also trained Uighurs, to fight not the Russians but the Chinese Communist rulers of the Muslim-majority province of Xinjiang. . . . Uighur discontent rumbled on for many years but the acknowledged turning point was the Barin uprising of 1990, when Afghan-trained Islamists [instigated mass unrest].78 Here blowback is clear and linear: China instigated a war-machine, building an insurgency against an enemy, and then some warriors returned home to ply their new trade; perhaps others were inspired by the victory of their self-perceived ethno-religious compatriots. Perhaps the threat facing Xinjiang, at least immediately following the Afghan War, was a spontaneous problem triggered by victorious warriors who had not yet demobilized and rejoined society. Anecdotal evidence provided by an anonymous senior CIA counter-terrorism official suggests otherwise: In the 1980s a junior American diplomat attended a meeting in Peshawar, Pakistan, of the military coordinators of the seven main Afghan resistance parties. . . . The meeting began at 2:10, and just before it did, the drapes were opened to reveal a wall-to-wall map. All of Afghanistan and bits of Iran and Pakistan were on the map; all three countries were labeled appropriately. Across the top of the map ran a swath of what was then Soviet Central Asia and China’s Xinjiang Province. Neither was labeled that way, however. Instead, the area was boldly labeled “TEMPORARILY OCCUPIED MUSLIM TERRITORY.”79 While a grand conspiracy is unlikely, aspirations and ideas of “liberating” a swath of Central Asia can transcend the individuals involved.80 The men at this meeting, and those who participated in the various components of resistance against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, could plausibly have instigated an initial resistance against China after the Afghan war ended. Importantly, this study contends that today we are facing a global social movement. Though individuals are a component of any movement, through membership and shared belief people transcend their individuality, and their group may do so as well, becoming an idea. This is likely the continuing leverage of the Soviet–Afghan war upon Xinjiang, as well as the international jihad.

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Insurgency in the 1990s Like many other local insurgencies, violence in Xinjiang ebbs and flows; in the early- and mid-1990s the tide was rising. Uyghurs rioted and rebelled and were suppressed under a harsh Chinese hand.81 Sensing their need of training and expertise in order to fight more effectively and not die in vain young Uyghur men traveled to camps in Afghanistan.82 Traveling across “the mountain route” to Afghanistan or via networks in Pakistan, perhaps 1,000 completed the journey to the Uyghur camp (or camps) with small groups of friends, some of which may have previously studied Arabic intensively in preparation for the journey.83 Where many Americans find the journey and life in Afghanistan’s camps hard to imagine, much of southern Xinjiang’s population likely would be more accustomed to this lifestyle: material possessions are few, and even for farmers today meat is an occasional luxury (perhaps consumed once a month and to celebrate special occasions). How exactly these young men funded their journey is unclear, but it is perhaps not irrelevant to note that families today, even poor ones, can often afford to send their children to universities in the distant provincial capital of Urumqi. Alternately, underground religious groups operating in Xinjiang may have provided key assistance and links to the global jihad.84 Military scholar Shichor unhesitatingly asserts that “funds for the Muslim resistance to Chinese rule in Xinjiang came from smuggled Afghan heroin.”85 While the exact mechanism is unknown to this author, my premise is that where there is a will, a way is found. Similarly, how these young men located the correct camp or camps is unclear, but it is not impossible for travelers with language skills to ask directions. In southern Xinjiang, as well as elsewhere in the province, men from the same hometown are strongly socially connected, sharing obligations and trust. Young men from Kashgar or Hotan, for example, could plausibly arrive at the appropriate Afghan camp and have men inside ready to vouch for their loyalty. Alternately, perhaps these young men had some more formalized contact, a person or network which provided logistical support in the journey and entry to Afghanistan’s underworld. Uyghurs have been found in fundamentalist madrassahs in Pakistan which could have provided the nexus.86 Additionally, camps in Pakistan or Pakistani-controlled Kashmir may have existed; Uyghurs have been found fighting in Kashmir – perhaps getting battle-hardened before the trip back to China, or perhaps defending their new home-base. Even while Pakistan was courting better relations with China to balance against India, openly disavowing any interest in China’s actions in Xinjiang, some Pakistani elements reportedly were secretly supporting their fellow Muslims in Xinjiang. Pakistan’s consulates in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan reportedly provided visas for Uyghur refugees to seek sanctuary in Pakistan.87 Official state policy and the actions of rogue elements may have diverged; alternately, the story is likely a complex mix of intentions, statements, and actions. When in Pakistan Uyghur community centers opened doors to madrassahs and

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guest houses, funneling recruits to Afghanistan. Based upon media accounts, military scholar Shichor writes of the mid-1990s: Indian intelligence often reported on the contents of interrogations of captured personnel of the Pakistan Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). These accounts suggest that the Pakistan army had trained Uyghurs in a camp near Mirpur across the Line of Actual Control (LAC) from India. Also, Pakistani pan-Islamic jihad groups were reportedly training Uyghurs in Baluchistan Province. A number of Pakistani militant groups such as Jamaat-e-Islami, Jamaat-e-Tablighi, and Lashkar-e-Toiba (or Tayyiba, “Army of the Faithful”) backed insurgents in southern Xinjiang. Many of these received training at the Al-Badr camp at Ooji, near the Afghan-Pakistani border. Some of these active Islamic fundamentalist movements have allegedly been supported and sustained by the ISI.88 Pakistani instigation and intervention may be a key factor to understanding unrest in Central Asia. The ISI actively assisted its allies in Afghanistan, including the Taliban and perhaps al Qaeda (living in Afghanistan at first with the Taliban’s blessing, then overwhelming and co-opting their ally). Pakistani assistance for Uyghur militants, as suggested by media reports and described by Shichor as well as other scholars and practitioners, is highly plausible. In Afghanistan’s camps young men were launched on one of two career tracks: one was insurgency, training to return home and fight against the government forces using acts of sabotage and ambush. The vast majority of Afghanistan’s students trained this discipline. The second career track is that of the terrorist; more than simple insurgent, this cohort trained to become sleeper or support cells and perform spectacular and shocking attacks. The terrorist discipline was a small group; a highly specialized and professionalized elite.89 By some accounts al Qaeda members were recruited from among the insurgent corps, the young men who proved themselves a cut above. Yet in other cases men were recruited directly into al Qaeda and traveled precisely to designated camps. 22 Chinese Uyghurs at Guantanamo

Five

Ten

Seven

Wrong place, Wrong time, Wrong bounty

Training to fight the Chinese in Xinjiang

Members of al Qaeda

Figure 2 Twenty-two Chinese Uyghurs at Guantanamo (source: Congressional Research).

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More recently the method of joining al Qaeda may have changed as the organization itself evolved from a tight and secretive network into not simply a franchised business model but more of a genuine social movement.90 Membership and recruitment may be becoming more flexible in light of the needs of the Iraqi insurgency; the two methods discussed above were likely the means of joining operating up until Operation Enduring Freedom (2001). While it is unknown to this author how many Uyghurs joined al Qaeda or truly received training in Afghan or other camps, at least twenty-two Uyghurs sat in the American military detention facility in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (see Figure 2, opposite).91 Uyghur participation in this global phenomenon, this multinational social movement seems undeniable.

Conclusion Even as links to the global jihad, material and ideational, have been formed by Xinjiang’s insurgency, this insurgency has remained at its core an indigenous phenomenon. As a wave of terrorism and insurgency spread across the globe Xinjiang too caught alight. Finding their tactics less than decisive in the face of state will and action (as the following chapters investigate), Xinjiang’s insurgents turned to international actors for support. Training in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and elsewhere became a critical component for Uyghurs who lacked military skills and material. The insurgency persisted across time in the form of low-level assassinations of local officials, though clusters of political violence have repeatedly occurred. As the following chapters argue, the state’s response to the insurgency is the key factor to understanding why this insurgency has remained at such a low-level of violence despite socio-political and strategic conditions existing which engendered an insurgency. While China’s information and claims regarding Xinjiang, Uyghurs, terrorism, and security affairs more broadly are highly problematic and thus lacking in credibility, this paucity of data does not alone reveal anything about the underlying insurgency. This chapter first examined the evolving global jihad and its primary institution or standard-bearer, al Qaeda. Next this chapter searched for the best available credible evidence on the insurgency in Xinjiang. Finding data on attacks and groups sparse, this study employed a second method: constructing a narrative of the social movement rather than individuals, groups, and actions alone. Strong links exist between Xinjiang’s troubles at the beginning of the 1990s and the Soviet–Afghan war. As the decade progressed new young men found their way into the fight. Some of this new generation sought training in Afghanistan and Pakistan’s camps. Uyghur men fought in local conflicts throughout Central Asia alongside other volunteers, and some likely returned home to Xinjiang. Importantly, not all violence in Xinjiang is separatism or terrorism, however much the Chinese authorities claim or believe this to be true; repetition of the same tired lines by authorities within China’s Party and government results in finding an echo, not underlying truth. Despite the rhetorical flair of China’s

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officials, this chapter assesses that a real threat, an insurgency with links to the global jihad, exists in Xinjiang – though it continues at a notably low level of violent action. In Xinjiang the targets are overwhelmingly the structures of Communist authority: Party, government, and military. Perhaps these are coping mechanisms to deal with the frictions of political life within a system in which the search for justice is prohibited, in which petitioning government for redress of grievances is a risky gamble at best, and in which the system attempts to resolve all frictions through power: facing down and overwhelming opposition long before addressing underlying problems. Or perhaps these are the actions of a movement within society dreaming of a Muslim land freed from Communist clutches, free from “occupation.” Though the causes are multiple and difficult if not impossible to parse, forces within Xinjiang’s society had considerable will to fight against Chinese rule. Attacks by insurgents are manifestations of this social will.

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China’s “infinite” political will

Xinjiang’s stability worries the whole country. We must continue to struggle hard against all criminal activities and to maintain social order. (Luo Gan, member of Politburo Committee of CCP)1

Confronting the insurgency in Xinjiang would be impossible without will to act, no matter how capable the forces, rich the country, or necessary the fight. Political will is the causal enabling factor for effective counter-insurgency. The core’s political will alone does not determine victory, but without will an abortive and failed COIN is likely: tactics and resources will not be found, and the forces within society will create myriad frictions with which to grind state actions to a halt. Society must support the state, either through cooperation or complacency; the greater social demand for action the more likely the state will supply an effective COIN. After an early stumble China quickly dusted itself off, crushing the nascent insurgency by force and fundamentally reshaping Xinjiang’s society. China’s massive resource commitment has not only persisted but steadily grown over the past decade and a half. Political will, an intangible and fungible core of collective spirit, is the target of insurgency and terrorism: the state’s constituents, actual and potential, must stand against the insurgency and permit the state to expend its power, material and ideational, in a protracted campaign. This chapter asks: what are the sources of China’s political will to confront the insurgency in Xinjiang? What causes political will to increase or decrease in the China case? Three forces within society are found to be the primary engines of political will: the state, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, aka the Party),2 and the people. The people’s demand for internal stability is found to be a powerful driver of state and Party actions, though the latter two social forces work toward this end to maintain their own largely intertwined existence. The forces within China’s core today produce a socio-political feedback loop which, because of the people’s fundamental demand for internal stability, increases institutional actions trying to supply the perception of stability. An important byproduct of the institutions’ production of internal stability is the motivation of the populace against potential threats, thus increasing demand, actual and potential.

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Political will is here understood as the willingness of a polity to support particular actions and institutions, such as the state generally or specific state campaigns. Insurgency is a competition between insurgent and state to provide more relative security to society using positive, negative, and informational tactics;3 thus, security is at the heart of political will. For society, security is not necessarily simple material or physical safety. Protection from physical assault is, in many societies, an important component; yet to focus on physical security alone is to miss the richer picture of society’s shared meanings. Society’s perception of security is fundamental. Identity politics are key, whether ethnic, geographic, cultural, religious, economic, political or other factors. Thus, security here is understood as a collective perception of material and ideational goods within society. Feeling secure or insecure is a powerful political driver in holding a society together or ripping states and civilizations apart.4 When conventional armies fight the aim is not simply to destroy the enemy’s military forces but to break the will of those forces to fight; in protracted engagements the goal is to convince the polity’s center of gravity that further pursuing the conflict is not in their interest.5 Each polity has a different center of gravity which is located somewhere among the state, society, and society’s many forces. This chapter investigates China’s political will for confronting the insurgency in Xinjiang, asking: what has motivated and enabled China to use a bottom-up approach in countering the nascent insurgency in Xinjiang? Where top-down approaches are often the result of flagging political will and a consequent disinclination to expend blood and treasure over extended periods, as well as a cultlike belief in the efficacy of military power,6 China has pursued a decidedly different tact. Examining the state, the Party, and the people, this chapter asks: why has China been able to effectively pursue its bottom-up counter-insurgency in Xinjiang?

Political will What is political will? Historically contingent and intangible, political will is a dynamic process of essentializing society’s political core, society’s political center of gravity. Because political will is always in play, momentum and reinvention are key factors. Rather than a static state, a society’s will is always in the process of becoming. Perceptions matter: political will is a social process, not individual. People can be individually attracted to the cause through logical, ethical, or emotional pathways yet individual thoughts mean little without the assumption and creation of shared belief – however fleeting or ephemeral. Political will is not synonymous with public opinion. In the United States, in policy, media, and academic circles alike, polling and surveys became a widely popular methodology used to gauge the population’s sentiments. Public opinion is fickle, malleable, and changeable, even fluctuating depending on the wording of questions, time of day, and the identity of the questioner.7 Political will is not significantly affected by such factors; it is deeply held beliefs and dispositions

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regarding politics which generally persist over longer periods of time and across many forces within society. These beliefs belong to the group, the society, not the individual or even to particular forces within society. Political will is held by society as an organic entity. Where does a society’s political will come from? How does a society collectively share a belief, a tolerance, or policy inclination? What influences a society’s interpretation of events, for example the rise of a violent political movement on the country’s periphery? Society is influenced by logical, ethical, and emotional factors interpreted through the lenses of society’s institutions and group psychology. The most common tools for creating and shaping political will include the media, education, government, political, and religious as well as secular civil society groups. These groups, where and when they are allowed by the state to function, provide a social venue for leadership at society’s smallest levels, potentially bonding individuals together. Groups can, at their best, aggregate members and advocate for their collective interests. For better and for worse, participation in social forces can achieve tight bonding of individuals who work together to solve their self-perceived problems.8 These mechanisms and organizations both build and build upon pre-existing causes. The state itself can build political will, for it too is a force within society. China’s political will for confronting the insurgency in Xinjiang is not a product of cultural factors alone, but rather of a situational and historic process which is still evolving. Primordial cultural factors are often reflexively called upon to explain a society’s actions, as if ancient history and supposedly longengrained behavioral patterns dictate today’s outcomes. Cultural factors are an important component of political will, yet culture is a malleable idea. Culture is as relevant, real, and useful today as we believe it to be. As an individual embedded within a rich series of interwoven group-memberships we work to understand our social surroundings. Identity and action depend upon the situation in which we operate, and are constructed in opposition to an “other.”9 Specifically, insurgency is a competition to provide security where some members of society may perceive an existential threat from one side’s victory and rally behind their own side. From this understanding, this chapter now examines China’s political will for confronting the insurgency in Xinjiang, investigating three engines which together demand and generate will to act: the state, the Party, and the people.

The state: delivering internal stability The perception of stability is the primary good the Chinese state delivers for society. Security is the first good a state must pursue for its society10 and, as discussed above, security is a relative concept. More subjective than objective hazard, an understanding of one’s situation, security is a perspective and an outlook. For many in the generation which now holds power in China, those forty years of age and upwards, today’s stability is a salient and tangible improvement upon their early years and the lives of their parents. Great political

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tumults swept China since the Communists ousted the Nationalists from power in 1949. The Great Leap Forward, beginning in 1958, ushered in a sprint for social and economic “progress” in which little was actually gained. The Cultural Revolution sent people back to the countryside for re-education from 1966 through 1976. Like the Great Leap Forward, the Cultural Revolution ripped apart China’s society in the name of “progress” though delivered only broken dreams and a broken society.11 For many outside of China it may be hard to imagine how deeply these times so long ago can shape outlooks today. For the people who lived through these traumatic events and their immediate aftermaths, the bad-old-days are not so distant at all. Despite the deep problems that exist in society today, despite the multiple dysfunctions the state inflicts upon society, today is considerably better than those dark yesterdays and tomorrow could be a little brighter.12 Reactions to the Tiananmen Square massacre follow this pattern,13 and are reinforced in retrospect as Chinese point to the Soviet Union’s disintegration and subsequent socio-political malaise. Currently lacking grand and salient external challenges,14 the Chinese state is pursuing domestic stability as its main security good provided to society.15 Studying China’s grand strategy, international relations scholars Michael D. Swaine and Ashley J. Tellis write: Despite the fact that China’s grand strategy has never been explicitly presented in any comprehensive manner by its rulers, there is little doubt that China, like any other state, has pursued a grand strategy conditioned substantially by its historical experience, its political interests, and its geostrategic environment. China’s grand strategy is keyed to the attainment of three interrelated objectives: first and foremost, the preservation of domestic order and well-being in the face of different forms of social strife; second, the defense against persistent external threats to national sovereignty and territory; and third, the attainment and maintenance of geopolitical influence as a major, and perhaps primary, state.16 Nationalism is a powerful tool being used by the state and the Party to rally support. Calling upon the historic wrongs perpetrated by the Japanese during World War II; the “Century of Humiliation;” or the fears of America trying to encircle, contain or constrain China have traction but lack the full immediacy of threat needed to unite the polity beyond the fleeting passions of particular crises.17 Much has been made in academic and media circles of economic development as the sole legitimating tool of the state, as well as the Party. Unfortunately the academic and media discussion has focused upon material wealth rationale as the driver of politics; China’s impressive economic development must be placed within the broader context of the state working salient domestic stability, or at least the perception thereof.

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Threats from the periphery In addition to self-inflicted wounds from great political upheavals, China’s security has repeatedly been threatened by conflicts on its periphery.18 Chronologically, Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang have challenged and contested PRC control of specific geography. Taiwan formed at the end of China’s civil war when the Nationalists were ejected from the mainland to the isle of Formosa, 100 miles offshore. In a twist of history, what would have been the Communist invasion force was disabled by a fluke-born disease acquired while training for amphibious assault. The force was infirmed long enough for an American fleet, on its way toward the Korean theater, to sail into position and protect their Nationalist allies on Formosa.19 Tibet was claimed by the Communists to have always been a part of China, but the Tibetans rejected this assertion. Tibetan political and religious leadership looked for external support in their bid to maintain independence from China and from the Communists. After a too-prolonged bureaucratic process and diplomatic buck-passing among India, the UK, and the US, covert military and political support began flowing to the Tibetans. With weapons, communication equipment, and training from the US, Tibetan guerillas conducted ambushes upon Communist military forces which were brutally taking control of the formerly independent land. These forces seem to have inflicted costs upon China’s expansion into Tibet but did not prevent the occupation and the casting of what now seems like a permanent and decreasingly contested claim upon Tibetan soil.20 Xinjiang did not initially contest Communist rule. Indeed, of the three hotspots Xinjiang is remarkable for its open-armed acceptance of the Chinese Communists. Where America’s covert actions and military weight explain much of the Taiwan and Tibet cases, the hidden Soviet hand is a significant factor in Xinjiang.21 Aside from simple ideological affinity between the “elder-brother” Soviet Communists and the “younger-brother” Chinese Communists (salient at the PRC’s founding even if it rapidly dissipated) and the Soviet desire to influence it’s near-abroad, Xinjiang grew into the pivot of Asian nuclear ambitions and competition. The Soviet Union’s early supply of uranium was mined near, and perhaps in, Xinjiang. Early Soviet atomic tests occurred at Semiplastik, not far into Soviet territory, and China tested atomic weapons at Lop Nor in Xinjiang.22 Large groups of ethnic Kazaks, Tajiks, and Uzbeks spanned the SinoSoviet border. These factors attracted a strong Soviet covert influence in Xinjiang, and local leaders headed Soviet advice to ally with China’s Communists, in expelling the Nationalists and afterwards. When Sino-Soviet relations soured, the underground Soviet influence in Xinjiang became a liability rather than an asset for the Chinese Communists and, with political troubles growing in Xinjiang in 1962, some 60,000 people fled Xinjiang for the Soviet Union.23 As frictions heated, Xinjiang was re-envisioned as strategic depth: the Soviets would be allowed to invade the region and then forced to confront a people’s war.

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The three “domestic” hotspots of Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang individually presented an ongoing challenge to Communist claims of legitimate authority over China. Until 1971 the China seat at the United Nations was held by Taiwan, and the now successful democracy currently serves as an example of what China could become without Communist rule. Tibetan independence has similarly long been a thorn in China’s side. Beyond the difficulties of ruling an unwilling and at times resisting society, China has faced international criticism for its repression of human rights in large part due to the publicity of the charismatic and media-savvy Dalai Lama, the exiled would-be leader of Tibet. Xinjiang lacked strong relations with the west, in governmental or public imagination. When compared to Taiwan and Tibet, Xinjiang’s dissent, both violent and non-violent, has received relatively little international notoriety outside academic circles. Lack of international notoriety does not change China’s rule over Xinjiang as well as Tibet. However, lack of international concern does not negate the significance of the threat perceived by the Chinese state. By the 1990s the Tibet problem had largely been dealt with and the Taiwan problem could be managed through threats of force along with diplomacy. Xinjiang remained the sole hotspot spitting flame.24 Threats from the strategic periphery Threats to the Chinese state from the strategic periphery exist beyond China’s claimed territory. Repeatedly since its founding China engaged in warfare or coercive diplomacy on its strategic periphery. Chinese military historian Allen S. Whiting writes that there have been eight engagements bearing upon his study of cross-Strait relations: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

major combat with the United States in Korea, 1950–3; offshore islands operations against Taiwan, 1954–5; deterrence deployment opposite Taiwan, 1962; limited combat with India, 1962; support for Vietnam against U.S. intervention, 1965–8; border clashes with the Soviet Union, 1969; limited combat with Vietnam, 1979; and, missile firings and joint exercises in the vicinity of Taiwan, 1995–6.25

Though this list looks heavily toward cross-Strait troubles it clearly highlights how China has engaged what were believed to be superior forces when they encroached within China’s strategic periphery. Deterrence, coercion, and coercive diplomacy may have been proximate goals in these engagements, but the grand strategy is to provide an active defense of the country using forces with limited power-projection capabilities.26 China’s lingering relationship with North Korea, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) which attempts to build a multilateral relationship among Central Asian countries under a Chinese umbrella, repairing neglected relations with Russia, trying to keep the Japanese

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down, and China’s attempts to be a powerful force in the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) also fit this model. Simply, China is trying to keep its head down as it seeks to grow geopolitically strong.27 Gaining political will through challenge What does it mean to have threats emanating from just beyond a state’s borders and from within the state’s claimed territory? The internal and external threats together comprise a security environment filled with multiple dangers for the core, each with different histories and pathologies.28 The three hotspots of Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang share a strong familial resemblance: while China claims all as its own territory, the dissidents are a different identity-group from the core (democrats, Buddhists, and Uyghur Muslims respectively). Because the state is guarding society from political instability and social tumult, delivering that fundamental political good for which the core’s society thirsts, the core’s society backs the state against peripheral threats. Indeed, more than simple societal acquiescence, peripheral conflict presents the state with opportunities to demonstrate that it is guarding society’s interests and society’s support for the state builds. While the pattern may have limits based upon the state’s successfully managing its security affairs, the greater the threat to the state emanating from its strategic periphery, the stronger the Chinese state becomes. Thus, the greater the threat the stronger the demand for state actions to secure stability at all costs. By 1990 the Chinese state had become accustomed to confronting threats from its strategic periphery, external and internal. This type of threat represents nearly all of the military actions in which the PRC has engaged in its brief political existence. China strikes with overwhelming force, proves its superiority, and lets diplomacy or civil government take the lead. Domestic unrest29 in any one hotspot can present existential challenges to the state for there is always the chance that others will perceive a window of state vulnerability and rise on a second front. Because the state and the Party are concurrently run at the highest level, threats to the Party can be misinterpreted as threats to the state – as arguably occurred during the Tiananmen incident, and many smaller incidents since. Internal anti-Party activity, for example a democracy movement, could erupt as conflicts occur with Xinjiang or Taiwan (Tibet now largely being a moot issue). The mixing of state and Party apparatus, discussed below, engenders mutual support between the two social forces yet it is not inconceivable that at some point the Party’s current disfavor among society will make it a drag upon the state’s longevity. The recent government white paper, “Building Democracy in China,” may be an early sign of such frictions. Calling the people to support the Party because it gave them reign over the state, this white paper asserts: Democracy is an outcome of the development of political civilization of mankind. It is also the common desire of people all over the world.

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China’s “infinite” political will Democracy of a country is generated internally, not imposed by external forces. In the course of their modern history, the Chinese people have waged unrelenting struggles and made arduous explorations in order to win their democratic rights. But only under the leadership of the Communist Party of China did they really win the right to be masters of the state. The Chinese people dearly cherish and resolutely protect their hard-earned democratic achievements.30

This white paper may actually reflect public sentiment and current political realities, being genuinely descriptive beyond its Orwellian and prescriptive sounds. Importantly, the document seeks to remind its reader of the leadership provided by the Party in taking control of the state from previous corrupt elites. The people are seen as the ultimate source of power in China, even if the Party is leading the state. The state is seen as something of a grand prize being contested, and the Party is claiming that it legitimately holds that prize in the people’s name. To assert these claims so forcefully means that there have been significant charges to the contrary against which the Party hopes to defend itself. Additionally, the state may not be able to effectively discern threats emerging from within the core society. The Falun Gong was not considered dangerous until 10,000 members assembled around a key government compound in Beijing to demand the release of a jailed leader. Some Hui Muslims in Xi’an, as well as Henan and Shanxi, are rumored to be radicalizing, and perhaps training against the state.31 It is unclear whether the Chinese state considers this prospect a genuine threat, or even whether it should. Considerable dissatisfaction exists within Chinese society against the Party. If this dissatisfaction were to mobilize in more than the increasing number of discrete episodes the state might have a serious problem continuing its support for the Party. Whether the state could extricate itself from the Party’s grips, even if confronted with an existential crisis, is far from certain. Protecting the Party remains a key strategy for the state’s survival vis-à-vis society.

The party: doing whatever it must to hold power What effect does the Communist Party have upon the core’s political will to confront the insurgency in Xinjiang? Where the previous section investigated the state, this section cuts one layer deeper into the unique aspects of the China case. Where nearly every insurgency is confronted by a government, the insurgency in Xinjiang must also compete with a political party with strong historical ability to reshape society in China, and in Xinjiang. This section first investigates the Communist Party in China; generally finding that the Party has evolved into a powerful social institution whose longevity is questionable for it has had to repeatedly find new ways to legitimate its rule. While the state provides stability the Party can claim only that it directs the state, thus leaving the Party vulnerable to threats from within the core (especially from those now underground demanding rule-of-law and democratic reforms to the state).

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Next, this section asks: how does the Party build political will from the insurgency in Xinjiang? Because the Party staked its claims of legitimacy upon the ability to deliver stability, this section paradoxically finds that, so long as the problem is eventually resolved, as threats increase the Party grows stronger visà-vis society; that is, the greater the threat, the greater the Party’s reward for handling it. However, the greater the threat emanating from the insurgency in Xinjiang, the more vulnerable the Party looks to potential challengers. Similarly, as other social forces threaten the Party’s rule in China, the greater the Party’s vulnerability vis-à-vis Xinjiang. China’s Communist Party China is ruled through a two-track system of state and Party structures that entwine at all levels, local to national, like the double-helix strands of DNA. At any given level there is a government post, such as a provincial governor, and a Communist Party secretary. While each position and location is unique and can achieve discrete levels of power based upon their circumstances and personalities, power is normally held by the Party’s representative. Deference to the Party’s position as the vanguard of society is ubiquitous. Even officials of the government itself may, and likely are, members of the Party as well. Today there are some seventy million Communist Party members in China out of a total population of roughly 1.3 billion people.32 Chinese Communist Party members and officials assert that there are eight political parties in addition to the Communists. Today these parties lack political power and have no significant impact upon Chinese politics. As Xinhua, the official news agency of the government, writes on its website: The Communist Party is the sole party in power in China. . . . [The Party] has established formal (through elections within the Party) and informal (appointed by the organizations of the higher level) organizations within the Chinese government and various levels and walks of life in the country. The Communist Party of China is the vanguard of the Chinese working class, the faithful representative of the interests of the Chinese people of all ethnic groups, and the core leadership of the Chinese socialist cause.33 The Communist Party is a powerful force within Chinese society, clutching the reigns of power. Nevertheless, Communism in China is not what it used to be. Capitalism, albeit with distinct Chinese characteristics, booms in the large eastern cities and is slowly seeping into rural areas and western provinces. To the detriment of China studies, foreign commentators and academics often miss the crucial point: capitalism is an economic system, not a political one. China is ruled not by laws but by the Party and its cadres. As in any one-party system, the mechanisms to check corruption are non-existent in practice, and often in design as well.34 The Communists came to power through war, routing the Nationalists from

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the Chinese mainland in 1949. The Nationalists had been weakened by a brutal war with the Japanese and by their own internal malaise, prominently featuring a widespread perception of corruption and kleptocracy. The Communists, lead by Mao Zedong, presented an alternate vision of politics for Chinese society, one where everyone would be equal. The country’s enormous troubles combined with the ideology’s promise attracted broad and enthusiastic support. Ideology’s luster lost Communism’s luster soon faded as political waves swept society and ravaged China. Through the travesties of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution the ideology of Communism discredited itself as a force which could uplift China. The country’s new leadership with Deng Xiaoping at the helm began opening the country to capitalism. After thirty years of promises China was left with a Communist Party whose ideas of proper governance were bankrupt but had nonetheless held the country together and protected it amid geostrategic threats on its borders from the United Nations during the Korean War, and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Through the hardest of times the people perceived the Communists as protecting them, even when society’s wounds were primarily inflicted by the Party. The delicate legitimacy of today’s Communists Communism today is different in various parts of China. In the big cities of the east the workings of politics are subsumed below the loud din of the churning economic engines. In the rural countryside, where 70 to 80 percent of China’s population lives, Communism is more than a light ordering system, it is a grid of power which reaches more directly into society and people’s lives at the discretion of those who hold power. Arbitrary actions have little recourse for China’s legal system can be described at best as nascent if weak, at worst the courts are seen as riddled with corruption and designed to reflexively support power, uninterested in matters of justice.35 Where membership in the Communist Party in the past denoted and conferred a privileged position as the vanguard of social progress, today many Chinese view membership as a mandatory step for career advancement. Ideology and approving prestige no longer are achieved by Party membership; the image of the Party and its members has lost its luster. Where the Party rose to power based upon an ideology which inspired the people, where the values built legitimate power, today power is all that is left. The Party seeks to appear legitimate through showing itself as directing the state’s successes, notably the perception of stability and hope in society, and the Party hopes that corruptions can be swept under the political rug through heavy propaganda and minor adjustments to the state’s apparatus.36

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Creating political will from Xinjiang Where the state can gain legitimacy through dealing effectively with Xinjiang, because of the Party’s more delicate position directing the state it stands to lose everything sooner; the Party today confronts more threats than the state. The perception of stability, the projection of the image of the Party as the great protector of the Chinese nation, is the sole good the Party is producing for society. Like the state, the Party can rally great popular support to its side through calls to Han nationalism or ending the humiliation of the Chinese by imperialist powers (British, Japanese, or American).37 Unlike the state, the Party is largely on the defensive. Activists are increasingly calling for change; wanting a voice in their own governance, activists of many varieties are calling for redress of grievances which were caused primarily by the corruptions of single-party rule. The Chinese people believe in the Chinese state, but many question the Party’s future in its current all-commanding role. For this reason, and perhaps to decrease the state’s perceived weakness or vulnerability, the Party has attempted to keep the people of China from knowing much about Xinjiang’s socio-political problems. China’s Communist Party stands to gain much from visibly crushing the insurgency in Xinjiang and being seen as a capable force within society. If the Party can lead the state in dealing with a threat from terrorists and separatists then it has tangibly delivered on its promises of governance beyond enriching the eastern elite. The greater the threat posed by terrorists to China’s core, the greater the rewards for the Party for effectively dispatching the problem. Paradoxically, the greater the threat of terrorism is perceived to be by society (and the greater the potential pay-off for the Party), the more vulnerable the Party looks to other potential challengers. If widespread unrest were to erupt in Xinjiang, Taiwan could perceive an opportunity to declare independence or democracy activists throughout the country could perceive that the Party is distracted, incapable, and vulnerable to challenge. Fortunately for the Communist Party, China’s actions are not transparent. China has no free press to conduct independent investigations and shape alternate and unfavorable images of the rulers and their actions. Media is the voice of the government and, like the government itself, the media is injected with Partymembers who are responsible for “correct” reporting of events. “Correct” understood, of course, as whatever the current Party stance dictates.38 For the Xinjiang case this translates into didactic and schizophrenic reporting: terrorists exist and China is crushing them, and everyone else in Xinjiang is content with Chinese rule. When successes are scored against terrorists, these can be covered though the widespread dislike of Chinese impositions can not be reported. The media’s implausible explanations are the Party’s best attempt to gain legitimacy without risking loss. Within the Party information and the “correct” understanding of political events flows down to the local levels through a series of documents and meetings, with each step down the chain seeking the “correct” interpretation of the

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national message for their level. This is a powerful process of active messageshaping, tailoring the national intent to the specifics of the local case through Party meetings, what Americans might understand better as studygroup/meeting hybrids. Once the “correct” message is produced, the message’s transmission becomes the Communist cadres’ responsibility. Thus, the message will be spun and re-spun as it moves from the national level down through provincial and county levels into the workgroup (e.g. a specific university, factory, or farm) and office levels. The bottom line of this odd information ballet is that the Communist Party knows that it must be perceived to be doing good, realities aside. As the state works to prevail over the insurgency in Xinjiang, the self-proclaimed vanguard of society stands permanently and immovably behind all state action. Thus, because of the Party’s unique history and political vulnerabilities, the Communist Party’s full will supports actively removing Xinjiang’s insurgency from the Party’s long list of problems.

The people: fearing instability, fearing the other Like the state and the Party, the Chinese people, the core of society, are also an important engine of political will for confronting the insurgency in Xinjiang.39 Two fears drive political will in society: fear of instability and fear of an ethnic other. With memories of the self-inflicted brutalities of China’s modern history, society fears internal strife enough to tolerate government excesses in fighting for stability even in the country’s capital. Witness the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989, where many of China’s best and brightest were killed as they pressed for democratic reforms to the state. Though their argument was with a corrupt system, the society tolerated a harsh crackdown which today is understood as necessary to preserve the country. Fear of an “other” is the second force producing political will to confront the insurgency in Xinjiang. Xinjiang’s population is undeniably different from that of the Chinese heartland in appearances and beliefs. Where the core is ethnically Han, atheist, and modernizing, Xinjiang’s indigenous population is ethnically Uyghur and other Turkic groups, Muslim, and rooted in traditional agrarian society. Importantly, identity is oppositional within a given situation; identity is based upon group membership; and identity is quickly changed based upon situational constructs.40 Fear of a domestic out-group, a group perceived by a segment of society to be an “other,” is a powerfully motivating situational factor engendering ethnic violence triggering domestic security dilemmas.41 Because state power resides overwhelmingly with the Han, even the whisper of a threat from a group on the periphery generates enormous will for confrontation. For the purposes of this section, fear is understood not in its most immediate and dramatic sense, that of a person involved in a death-struggle, but rather as a deep social process. Fear is a force motivating society for action. While individuals will have varying reactions to events and will likely hold a range of

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opinions, here fear is understood as a collective emotion, a shared meaning.42 Fear is understood as more than an average of a group’s individual’s emotions; among groups in society fear can unconsciously and un-self-reflexively drive a group to increasingly confrontational actions against competing out-groups. States, most commonly the strongest bridging institution within society, usually mitigate domestic security dilemmas through leveraging their power against the threat of violence by any of society’s groups. Legitimate violence is jealously guarded by the state as its sole province. Yet when one ethnic group takes hold of the state, or the state is seen as the tool of one group over that of another, this group may perceive an opportunity to increase its power within society. Otherwise, with one group perceived to control the state, out-groups can perceive increased vulnerability. For the purposes of this section fear is thus understood as social, oppositional, and situational. Fear of instability The great political waves which repeatedly churned through China’s society since the Communists gained control of the mainland left in their wake a traumatized polity. The elite in China today came of age while the society was systematically ripping itself apart under one or another Communist banner. Today these elite, and even some Party members, claim that the ideology is gone having been replaced by capitalism. As discussed in both previous sections of this chapter, despite these supposed changes in the nature of Communism in China, the Communist Party still retains the helm of China’s one-party state. The Party’s longevity is due to its ability to deliver order, a political good in great demand from the generations which lived in China when the Party delivered only ideology. Domestic instability is a salient concept for many middleaged Chinese, having lived through food shortages, re-education through labor, or outright purges of dissidents and elites. Simply, China’s society grants the Party and the state something of a blank check for stamping out instability. So long as the state is protecting society today, maybe tomorrow will be incrementally better. While society knows little about Xinjiang’s problems or the COIN campaign in Xinjiang, the state and the Party understand the political power they hold: their legitimacy is based upon delivering internal stability for the people. The greater the threat of unrest, even if known by the state but not the people, the greater the demand for action against that threat.43 Nationalist sentiment against Taiwan declaring independence from the mainland works in a similar way. While a full discussion of cross-Strait relations is beyond the scope of the present study, for our purposes here we must note how society on the mainland rallies together against this perceived threat of “splittism.” Society demands that its leadership prevent Taiwan’s separation from the mainland, large crowds taking to the streets publicly making their demands when the threat seems more salient. The state and the Party may sanction and instigate these sentiments, but over time these sentiments have taken hold in

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society to the point where the demand to prevent splittism has surpassed the state’s ability to turn off the spigot.44 Collectively, the state, the Party, and the people generate enormous political will for confronting threats to the territorial integrity of China in addition to threats against internal stability. Fear of an “other” Chinese know relatively little about the situation in Xinjiang. Children in eastern China’s best schools know about some of the types of food and have a cursory knowledge that the population is at least in part a Turkic Muslim group. The vast Han migration into Xinjiang and the Chinese colonial undertaking since 1949 are unsaid and unconsidered factors. Even within the same family, one spouse might consider Xinjiang economically booming, modern, and developed while the other spouse views Xinjiang as a dangerous no-man’s land, a backwater of China where the locals are ready to wield knives to protest or rob even warm-hearted Han. Xinjiang is viewed as beyond the countryside, occupying a space in some minds comparable to the Wild West in the American imagination. Xinjiang is seen as a borderland where dangers abound; or Xinjiang is seen as a land filled with happy and charming minority peoples who love to dance and sing.45 These two seemingly incompatible perceptions can even be expressed by the same person in the course of a single discussion. The story of danger generates political will through generating the perception of threat of internal instability. The story of harmony generates political will through validating the unknown policies of the Party and the state which could make this possible. When news of trouble in Xinjiang surfaces which seemingly contradicts the harmony discourse, the trouble appears as isolated incidents by a few bad apples, criminals or radicals or foreigners, and further legitimates the state’s and the Party’s actions: the world could be much more dangerous if the correct actions weren’t being taken. And news usually is released after an incident is resolved, thus the state and the Party can be seen as having protected not only China’s society from a threat to its internal stability but also having protected all those otherwise happily dancing and singing minorities from themselves, from their underlying element which could have caught alight from the now-extinguished spark of unrest. Fearing an “other” or an “out-group” is a powerful and pernicious driver of domestic security dilemma logics. In addition to the fear described above, a prideful and assertive Chinese nationalism abounds among the Han. The instruments of national power against which increasing demands for internal stability are being levied are controlled primarily by the Han. The greater the threat from Xinjiang, the more justified the people will feel in supporting the state against Xinjiang’s tumults – whatever their causes. Perceiving the Uyghurs as a threatening out-group generates political will within Chinese society to confront Xinjiang’s insurgency. Unrelated to the level of violence in Xinjiang, this threat perception has increased since September 11, 2001. While the core society does fear an ethnic other, China is working to build a

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space within society for diverse identities. The Chinese project is patronizing to minority groups, who are idealized into something of a fantasy world, yet it does attempt to bring together diverse nationalities and societies into one country. An ethnic conflict is a zero-sum competition for territory among identity groups defined by their birth. Once security dilemma logic takes hold, grievances come to the fore in public discourse, though often grievance discourses are constructed during the lead-up to outright hostilities.46 The situation in Xinjiang does display strong familial resemblances with ethnic conflict, yet the state and the Party have prevented this socio-political death spiral because of their fundamental interest in maintaining internal stability. The state and Party have prevented the fearful nationalisms and racisms of the people from escalating into an all-out ethnic conflict, at least within the core society.

Conclusion: China’s “infinite” political will Insurgency is a competition between insurgents and counter-insurgents to provide security to society, and the state’s most important asset in this struggle is political will. Like all warfare, insurgency is a battle of wills manifested through violent politics. China’s greatest asset, the piece which first sets the China case apart, is China’s seemingly infinite political will to confront the insurgency in Xinjiang. This factor is vitally important for understanding China’s war on terrorism, for having the best COIN methodology in the world will be rendered ineffective if the core’s society does not back the state’s actions (see Figure 3). The key engines of China’s political will to confront the insurgency in Xinjiang are the state, the Party, and the people. Each is fueled by the people’s demand for internal stability, properly understood, at any cost. While this chapter finds geographic, structural, institutional, and historical factors significantly in play, each are powerful in this case because of their impact upon State/Government Produce perception of stability

Chinese Communist Party Self-preservation

Political will

The Chinese People Demand internal stability

Figure 3 Sources of China’s political will vis-à-vis Xinjiang.

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society. Economic factors alone are not found to have any significant impact, thought economic development understood as a proxy for the state’s ability to bring security and internal stability saliently into the society is significant. The people demand the state to provide security; because of China’s history of repeated self-inflicted wounds this means internal stability. China is a oneparty state, thus the state and the Party have very similar and intertwined, though not identical, interests. Nevertheless, within China there is a socio-political feedback loop generating political will to confront the insurgency in Xinjiang. The people demand meaningful security: stability with increasing room to breathe. The institutions of state and Party try to supply society with stability, actual where the can muster it and perceptual elsewhere. Motivating the populace against potential threats increases these institutions’ ability to respond to the initial demand for action; consequently, the demand for counter-insurgency increases. China’s political will is cyclically produced by three engines in society: the state, the Party, and the people. The greater the perception of threat by any of these engines, the greater the polity’s cumulative will to counter the threat. Because of this greatest of assets, China is able to effectively confront the insurgency in Xinjiang through means which will increase the perceptions of security within China’s society. The tools and implementation of these means are the subject of the following chapters.

4

The changing use of force in society

To defeat many with few is not only a double gain, but shows also a greater, especially a more general, superiority, which the conquered must always be fearful of encountering again. (Karl von Clausewitz)1

China’s evolving use of military and paramilitary forces in Xinjiang is a key factor in understanding the counter-insurgency’s effectiveness. With its large endowment of political will, analyzed in the previous chapter, China undertook actions to counter the insurgency in Xinjiang ranging from direct use of the military to altering the region’s education and religion policies. The present chapter, assessing the changing use of force in society, is the first in a series of three chapters which together explore the tools through which China has attempted to counter Xinjiang’s insurgency. With each mechanism individually, and taken together as a whole campaign, China has implemented an overwhelmingly bottom-up approach. Xinjiang possesses a large number of the state’s agents yet the constitution and application of these forces against the insurgency changed repeatedly as the threat and the state each evolved and adapted. This chapter investigates what military and paramilitary resources are available to the Chinese state in Xinjiang and how these forces have acted as the state attempts to counter the insurgency. Fundamentally, this chapter argues that even in the reflexively top-down realm of military affairs China pursued an effective bottom-up approach, restraining society’s support for rebellion while additional policy instruments reshaped society. China’s campaign has been coercive, brutal, and excessive in the use of force; however, China has shifted actions down the spectrum of force away from direct military intervention and toward local policing. The intended and unintended social-psychological effects of coercion by state agents are a central feature of the use of military force, for the goal is to influence the enemy’s political will. Every action by government forces, however intentional, including their presence and existence, carries lessons for society about the nature of the state as well as the costs and benefits of resistance or cooperation.

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Military forces, while unique depending on capabilities and doctrine, are a tool generally designed to counter other militaries and are not known to interact with society with nuance or delicacy. The application of military and paramilitary force is discussed below; the policing of Xinjiang by local forces and domestic intelligence networks are analyzed in the following chapter.

Political will and the force of arms Political will alone does not counter an insurgency; the state must take action. Every policy tool imaginable and affordable is available to the state, yet the first and often the only instrument of power to which states turn to counter insurgency is the force of arms. Force has at least two intended effects: to kill or capture troublesome elites (variously termed criminals, terrorists, separatists, etc.); or, to coerce society into recalculating the risks and rewards of supporting an insurgency against the state. While both can be the effects of any given application of the military, the former is primarily a top-down approach, focusing on isolating and removing key people from the situation. The latter is primarily a bottom-up approach, focusing on adding a new pressure to the situation, temporarily altering society. Though it began as a heavily top-down campaign, China’s use of force in Xinjiang has evolved into a bottom-up approach. The preceding chapter argues that China has infinite political will to confront the insurgency in Xinjiang. With this infinite political will China is well positioned to use whatever tools and resources it deems necessary to achieve its goals. When a state is threatened or attacked the first tools of response are military, paramilitary, and police forces, no matter what later measures are brought to bear. The present chapter asks: how effectively has China used its military and paramilitary forces to counter the insurgency in Xinjiang? The next chapter studies the question of police forces application and utility. Before investigating the question of effectiveness, this chapter first asks: what types of military and paramilitary forces does China have? And, how have these forces been used to counter the insurgency in Xinjiang?

COIN from the bottom up: effecting enemy political will Assessing effectiveness is no easy task, for military and paramilitary actions do not occur in a vacuum. An insurgency adapts itself to its changing environment, often learning through trial and error. The counter-insurgency too must adapt if it is to be successful: even when methods are found useful, they may have their greatest effect for a limited amount of time. COIN tactics are thus contingent upon the evolution of a particular insurgency. Fortunately for counter-insurgents, insurgencies share considerable characteristics and insurgents tend to adapt tactics of other recent insurgencies. This presents great opportunity to learn lessons from successful COIN tactics and strategy, to learn not just the isolated tools and techniques but the social environment in which they were put to use. The Chinese case demonstrates that society’s reaction is a key factor in

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effective counter-insurgency: military forces alone are only part of the equation. As China confronted an evolving security environment in Xinjiang, the military and paramilitary forces were used not only for killing or capturing troublemaking elites but also for placing pressure upon society and changing society’s calculations of risk and reward for supporting an insurgency. This pressure itself fundamentally changed the dynamics within society, increasing the costs of militancy but also saliently increasing the perception of the state imposing its will by force upon an unwilling population. While the numbers are contested, China’s military and paramilitary forces together constitute an enormous proportion of Xinjiang’s total population and at locations deemed strategically significant these forces represent an even greater proportion of Xinjiang’s society. These forces are augmented by police as well as Xinjiang’s Han immigrant-residents who now compose upwards of 50 percent of the population and are perceived to be loyal to the state. Thus far, this study has investigated insurgency and COIN (Chapter 1); the specific threat which China is confronting (Chapter 2); and China’s willingness to counter this threat (Chapter 3). The present chapter investigates what military and paramilitary tools are available to the state, how these tools have been used in practice, and how effectively the use of these tools has countered the insurgency in Xinjiang.

Force of arms, force of bodies China has a changing mix of forces in Xinjiang with which it could potentially attempt to confront the insurgency. Where the following section discusses the application of force to specific episodes of unrest, this section asks: What forces does China have with which to influence the situation in Xinjiang? What are these forces built to do? How capable are these forces? Must they work in concert or close coordination, or are each type of force independent of the others? More than actual strength and capability, this section also investigates society and government perceptions of the military forces within Xinjiang. Four types of military force impact China’s ability to wage an effective COIN: the military, including the army and airforce; the paramilitary police; the paramilitary production group; and, the Han immigrants to Xinjiang. Whether intentional or not, China is aware that it has these four key types of “defense” forces active in Xinjiang. The official Xinhua news agency writes that China: has set up in frontier areas a “four-in-one” system of joint defense that links the PLA, the Armed Police, the XPCC and the ordinary people, playing an irreplaceable special role in the past five decades in smashing and resisting internal and external separatists’ attempts at sabotage and infiltration, and in maintaining the stability and safety of the borders of the motherland.2 This is more than mere hyperbole. While all COINs have military forces and many have paramilitary forces, the role of the paramilitary production group and

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PLA

50,000–100,000

PAP

China’s “Four-in-one defense” Estimated strength in numbers 2005 Xinjiang’s population in 2000 was 18.5 million

100,000

XPCC/Bingtuan 2,453,600 (933,000 workers)

Han residents and immigrants 9,000,000–10,000,000

Uyghurs in Xinjiang 8,000,000 (estimated)

Figure 4 China’s “four-in-one defense.”

the Han immigrants are unique and significant features of the China case. These interrelated features have aided in the creation of the perception within Uyghur society of a military fait accompli: China now holds the territory and forceful opposition results in death and harsh crackdowns; no political gains for insurgents and no gains for Uyghur society. Military: the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and Air Force (PLAAF) Popular perceptions and changing visibility Military presence in Xinjiang is numerically small relative to the vastness of the territory but is socially significant, giving the local population the impression of a strong military presence. China’s military is concentrated near Xinjiang’s key cities, especially the provincial capital of Urumqi for, as an academic expert explained, “if you lose Urumqi, you lose Xinjiang.”3 While the local population may not know numerical force strength, military vehicles and uniformed personnel move regularly through cities, seemingly performing a range of tasks: personal errands, construction and production, or proper military business. Olive-drab trucks are easily spotted even by an untrained observer, and China’s carefully coded license plates reveal a much larger diffusion of otherwise unmarked military vehicles throughout Xinjiang, with an especially heavy concentration in Urumqi.4 Evidence of the military’s visibility, if not raw numeric presence, abounds. A military radar installation sits prominently atop Yamalike hill to Urumqi’s west, visible throughout the city’s southern half; home to the majority of Urumqi’s Uyghur population. Many military facilities are visible within the Region’s cities directly from roads. Additionally, the military runs numerous hospitals

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open, I am told, to serve the people. These details are not lost upon locals sympathetic to the insurgency.5 After the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the subsequent US rout of Afghanistan, China moved an estimated 100,000 soldiers into Xinjiang, concentrating them on border regions.6 China claimed these forces were intended to keep Taliban forces from fleeing across the border from Afghanistan or Pakistan into Chinese territory; some 100 such fighters were reportedly captured. However, two other enemies may have been targets of this action: one, the United States military and intelligence community (both to keep them out and to gather intelligence against US operations, techniques and tactics); two, the Uyghurs (to keep them from rising against the Chinese, perhaps aided by fighters fleeing the Afghan battlefield). Power and purpose While the American public has grown accustomed to thinking of precision strike weaponry and network-centric warfare as the norm for contemporary military affairs, China’s military is only beginning its transformation into a smaller, modern military.7 The United States began its mission of international power projection during, at the latest, the world wars of the previous century. Today China’s military is starting its transformation from a Korean War-era force. David Shambaugh, one of America’s preeminent scholars on China’s military, writes: PLA ground forces are not deployed for the purposes of power projection, but rather in defensive positions: • To cover principal border regions and avenues of approach into eastern China • To defend the capital • To defend population and industrial centers • Near key internal lines of communication and transport (particularly rail networks) • In optimal locations for maintaining internal security.8 Though scholars of international security primarily study military power projection into the international arena, China’s forces project power internally. Defensive positions and maintaining internal security as discussed above by Shambaugh are today the same function.9 China is strong enough that no country will challenge its survival through military action. The military’s primary achievement is its interaction with society, even as the standing army shrinks and the force modernizes, updating technology and doctrine as well as increasing the quality of personnel by reducing conscription. The PLA still has a long road ahead before it is a capable modern force; it will have to divest itself of the many construction and production functions which are ancillary distractions from the workings of a professional military.

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Strength and capability The presence of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in Xinjiang is an estimated 50,000 to 100,000 troops.10 Further, all of the five11 divisions in Xinjiang may be of poorer quality, lacking adequate manpower, training, and modern equipment and weapons.12 Former military intelligence officer Dennis Blasko writes: PLA combat forces in the area have been reorganized within former headquarters, and their mobility has been increased with the addition of new equipment. Due to the threat [of terrorism, separatism, and extremism in Xinjiang] and its remote location, the Xinjiang Military District has been organized to operate more independently than most other provincial Military Districts, especially in the logistics and armament support it can provide units in the region.13 Qualitative improvement is, of course, a relative state; the new equipment Blasko describes may have been necessary to meet minimal requirements of operating in what was perceived to be a high threat environment spread across a geographically large territory.14 Military scholar Yitzhak Shichor writes that these forces “are mainly responsible for border defense, economic development, and internal security. . . . PLA units in Xinjiang, with few exceptions, are not only small but also professionally inferior.”15 The one exception to this pattern may be the Fourth Division, reconfigured under China’s military transformation program as a modern rapid reaction force capable of deployment within forty-eight hours. China has limited airlift capabilities, currently lacking sufficient helicopters for its rapid reaction forces, necessitating deployments via road or rail.16 With bases located near the province’s major cities (Urumqi and Korla), the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) maintains a division and roughly 100 planes including the J-7E (a fighter originally designed in the 1960s based upon incomplete plans for the MiG 21).17 Xinjiang is also home to the higher quality Third Army Aviation Regiment which is, Shichor writes: Equipped with U.S.-made Blackhawk S70C Sikorsky helicopters, as well as Russian-designed Mi-8 and Mi-17 and other transporters. In October 2001, following the U.S. offensive in Afghanistan, thirty WZ-9G – an armed version of an Aerospatiale Dauphine transport helicopters coproduced in Harbin – have been transferred to Kashgar for use in the border region.18 However, Shambaugh argues that “most of the 24 Sikorsky Blackhawk helicopters sold by the United States to the PLA in the 1980s are thought to be no longer functional, owing to a lack of spare parts as a result of the post-1989 sanctions.”19 This divergence in assessments highlights a key research problem: the strength, readiness, and overall capability of the PLA in Xinjiang today is not easily discerned from open sources.

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Uyghurs in the PLA Importantly for the insurgency in Xinjiang, while Uyghurs are allowed to join the military there are few Uyghurs in senior military posts. Because of antiUyghur ethnic discrimination or Uyghurs self-selecting away from participation in a “Han” institution, coupled with China’s lack of realistic training amid no recent military campaigns, there may also be relatively few Uyghurs who have combat skills relevant for conducting an insurgency.20 Military training in the use of weapons, tactics, and strategy are seen by sympathetic Uyghur elites as the key piece missing from the insurgency. Such military experience does more than present an insurgency with knowledgeable leadership. Militaries are like other institutions within society: they train individuals to participate as a representative of a social good greater than their self. More than tactics, military training cultivates important socio-political skills like camaraderie and teambuilding. Paramilitary: the People’s Armed Police (PAP) The People’s Armed Police (PAP; aka People’s Armed Police Force or PAPF) is an army designed to police society, create internal security, and crush unrest.21 In much of China PAP can be seen with pistols; in Xinjiang automatic weapons are the norm. Guns and ammunition are tightly controlled by the state. Local police in most of China do not carry guns, though some in Xinjiang carry what appear to be BB guns and shotguns; these officers are rumored to have no ammunition. Like the PLA, the PAP is under the leadership of the Central Military Commission and has symbiotic political and military leadership posts. Military scholar Shambaugh writes: In the 1990s, a large number of demobilized PLA forces swelled the PAP to about 900,000. The addition of Special Police units and new recruits has brought PAP totals today to approximately 1.5 million. Of these, the IISS estimates that approximately 800,000 are responsible for internal security and 100,000 are deployed in border defense and customs roles, while 69,000 work in communications, special operations, guard units, and other special functions. The principal functions of the PAP today are to perform routine border controls and to maintain internal security and quell civil disturbances.22 In early 2007 western analysis of PAP force strength was called into question with the release of China’s 2006 defense white paper. This official government document for the first time provided a raw number of armed police, claiming that the PAP “has a total force of 660,000.”23 This stands in stark contrast to the International Institute for Strategic Studies’ estimates, provided in the seminal IISS publication The Military Balance. IISS data for the past decade depicts estimated PAP force strength rising steadily from the 600,000 level in 1995–6 to a

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plateau of 1.5 million from 2000 onward.24 Further, Blasko argues “PAP internal security forces are estimated to number about 800,000, or over half the total PAP strength.”25 Thus, we must proceed with the understanding that force strength is an open question, even among top military scholars. The quantity and quality of PAP forces in Xinjiang is unclear, but if PAP presence parallels that of the PLA then there would be some 100,000 PAP troops in Xinjiang (allowing for a greater presence of PAP border guards, antiriot troops, and anti-terrorism forces).26 In Urumqi PAP presence is highly visible, complete with armed marches and vehicle patrols through the southern Uyghur district. Additionally, the PAP runs a hospital near the Agricultural University, to the west of the city’s center, and perhaps elsewhere. In 2005 anti-terror squads were established in thirty-six cities, though these squads may be of more use in riot control than direct terrorism-related actions. “The move,” Xinhua reported “is aimed at increasing police agencies’ capability to deal with terrorist crimes, riots and other emergencies.”27 The locations, composition, and capabilities of these forces are to-date unavailable in open sources. Paramilitary: Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC) The paramilitary Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC, or Xinjiang shengchan jianshe bingtuan; aka the bingtuan) is designed to claim Xinjiang’s land for Chinese production from nature and prevent hostile political forces from taking root.28 Though established in 1949 to hold the territory, the XPCC truly began when, in October 1954, most of the PLA forces in Xinjiang were ordered to begin civilian production and construction projects. Today as then, demobilized military elements are switched wholesale into paramilitary projects, whether police or production. XPCC duties are both civilian and military: through a series of construction projects as well as factor and farm villages the XPCC contributes both to the local economy and to security, protecting borders but also demonstrating a large long-term presence of China’s military in society.29 The XPCC is influenced by both central and provincial leadership. Reportedly, the XPCC has 2,453,600 people within its broad workgroup umbrella, 933,000 of which are workers.30 According to census data, Xinjiang’s total population in the year 2000 was 18,462,600 people;31 thus, the XPCC alone encompasses a remarkable 13.3 percent of Xinjiang’s population. This mass of people directly employed by the government to make the land produce for China’s interests is strategically concentrated in smaller clusters throughout the province. According to official media sources the XPCC is composed of: 14 divisions (reclamation areas), 174 regimental agricultural and stockbreeding farms, 4,391 industrial, construction, transportation and commercial enterprises, and well-run social undertakings covering scientific research, education, culture, health, sports, finance and insurance, as well as judiciary organs.32

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This list of XPCC holdings shows its variable forms within Xinjiang’s economy. The XPCC is a special organ of the state, holding the land within China’s borders against indigenous and imported ethnic claims. The XPCC was a significant feature of China’s strategy of response if the Soviet Union had invaded China: if the Soviets had invaded, the XPCC would help engage in a people’s war. Thus, the XPCC has a historic linkage to the concept of bringing warfare down to the local level (that is, insurgency and COIN). Short of invasion, the XPCC helped to defend the border areas and dissuade Soviet military action. As the United States escalated its involvement in Vietnam, the Soviets were escalating their military and covert actions against the Chinese in Xinjiang, including widespread propaganda and guerrilla raids by ethnic Kazaks against border posts. Responding to Soviet actions, Shichor writes: Ethnic populations were ordered to evacuate a strip of land nearly 200 km wide along the border, which was then settled in 1966–68 by Han farmers and bingtuan troops. As early as 1962, the XPCC had built fifty-eight state farms along the border with the Soviet Union. By the end of 1966, the bingtuan had organized 400 militia companies (minbing lian) and 180 core militia companies (jigan minbing lian), as well as special troops, tanks, cavalry, and artillery.33 While this early example demonstrates the clear military significance of the bingtuan, in 1995 China asserted to a World Bank investigative group assessing investment potentials (which would not be made if the military had a disproportionate influence within the economy) that the XPCC is now a corporation without funding from the PLA.34 Feeling pressure to explain its workings to an increasingly curious international audience in the wake of 9/11 and its response to the threat of Islamist terrorism, in 2003 China’s official state media, Xinhua, wrote: The XPCC has forged flesh-and-blood ties with the people of all ethnic groups in Xinjiang, and attained the aim of joint frontier defense, sharing of resources, mutual complementarity and common prosperity. As an important force for stability in Xinjiang and for consolidating frontier defense, the XPCC adheres to the principle of attaching equal importance to production and militia duties . . . playing an irreplaceable special role in the past five decades in smashing and resisting internal and external separatists’ attempts at sabotage and infiltration, and in maintaining the stability and safety of the borders of the motherland.35 Composed primarily of ethnic Han immigrants and demobilized PLA forces throughout its history, the XPCC’s “flesh-and-blood ties” here may be more of a propagandistic aspiration rather than reality. Nevertheless, situating forces within a region and, to a certain extent, integrating them with the local economy

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does create economic if not social ties. Since its founding the paramilitary XPCC’s heavy presence in Xinjiang has greatly increased the province’s stability. The XPCC also manages some informant reporting.36 Importantly, beyond the large numbers of personnel and their families associated with the XPCC, the bingtuan has demonstrated China’s long-term intentions for holding and transforming the land to China’s advantage. Paramilitary: the people and the police Han immigrants are perceived as a military force without guns by Uyghurs and the state; they are considered unchangeably loyal partisans because of their ethnicity and because they are working for China’s manifest destiny. Though the in-migration dates at least to the founding of the People’s Republic of China, it ebbs and flows; by force of bodies China is seeking to take and hold territory. While at first the land was taken from the Nationalists, the dramatic growth in Han immigrants from China’s eastern core helped defend the region first from Soviet then ethnic separatist designs and intrigue. Xinjiang today is perceived as a land with two populations, belonging to indigenous ethnic minorities though getting usurped by invading Han loyal to the Chinese state. Reality is a complex and messy affair, yet this basic dichotomy permeates Uyghur society (and perhaps the Han immigrant community as well in kinder light and muted tones). Chinese census data from the year 2000 asserts that Hans now compose 40.6 percent of Xinjiang’s population, all minorities together composing 59.4 percent.37 These data are misleading, for they do not include either the military serving in Xinjiang or the estimated 2.8 million uncounted migrants, the floating population composed primarily of Han workers from eastern China. As demographer Stanley W. Toops writes: “One could estimate the numbers show a 50:50 Han-minority distribution. In this scenario, one can state definitively that by 2000 the Han population of Xinjiang outnumbered the Uyghurs.”38 While the exact ratio of Han to Uyghurs within Xinjiang is unknown and perhaps unknowable, the perception by the state and Uyghurs alike is that the massive Han portion of Xinjiang’s population has nearly unshakable loyalty to the state. Han are concentrated in specific cities or portions of cities, but the government and Party both try to bring local cadres of all ethnicities into the system under the banner of the autonomy system.

China’s evolving use of force in Xinjiang The use of China’s force has evolved along with the insurgency, becoming increasingly effective as experience is gained. China has relied less upon the PLA for direct confrontation of the insurgency within Xinjiang, shifting the burden to the PAP and other locally rooted forces. In initial uprisings the PLA was called in as the primary response force and worked to crush the rebellion by finding the instigating leadership. As China gained experience

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countering the insurgency and had time to build a more effective response, paramilitary and local police were increasingly employed to move within society. Leadership was still targeted, but the PAP and other local forces were retooled to make the force look and feel less like an occupying army attacking society and more like an indigenous response to socio-political tumult. Building a force with increasing social legitimacy enabled the Chinese to manage incidents of unrest, construct an intelligence network, and keep the insurgency at a low simmer – thus buying time for long-term tools to take hold while the state reinvents society. This section analyzes the tactical progression from an initially top-down approach through its evolution into a predominantly bottom-up approach. As Chapter 2 argues, China was not confronted with less of a threat per se as time progressed; rather, consciously or unconsciously counter-insurgents in Xinjiang adapted their tactics to better fit an evolving security situation. In each of the engagements discussed below the counter-insurgent forces were victorious, yet victory in a particular battle does not determine victory in an insurgency. The insurgency, as a social movement and idea, need only survive to win. This section analyzes how Chinese counter-insurgent forces changed their tactics away from brute military force towards a more grass-roots effort. Notably, force is still present in later years yet armed police take the place of military forces in direct confrontations with the populace. PLA troops take on the role of support for domestically focused forces with arms that increasingly can reach into society; the PLA are the muscular back-up flexed only when there is very heavy lifting to do. The PLA becomes useful mostly for showing force, not for actually implementing force. Contrary to the assertions of other scholars,39 since 1990 the PAP in Xinjiang has become a more professional force increasingly capable of handling unrest within the province’s major population centers.40 1990: PLA directly fights against insurgents Unrest in Xinjiang has a long history, yet the insurgency’s first major postAfghan War uprising was in Baren on April 5, 1990. Even from America’s academic experts on Xinjiang, reporting is inconsistent: the event began as a peaceful protest within a mosque,41 or it involved a rebel plan for synchronized attacks throughout the Kashgar region organized through mosques.42 An estimated 200 armed men fought with police, killing as many as seven.43 Alternately, senior counter-terrorism and diplomatic sources assert that this incident was more than the events described above, including direct involvement of an Afghan militia.44 The PLA used either airpower directly45 or airlifted forces46 to put down the rebellion when the men fled into the mountains. Between the initial uprising and the ensuing police crackdown throughout southern Xinjiang,47 upwards of 3,000 Uyghurs may have been killed.48 This large number of killed hints at a government response far more active than the one recorded in

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international media and scholarly sources; a response probably involving active participation by the PLA. In later incidents, responding to the bombings of February 1992 through September 1993, arrests of five men were made. There is no evidence which suggests or refutes that the PLA had an active role in response; little detail is available in open sources. Investigations and arrests, coupled with defusing of bombs detected before detonation, are the tools suggested by the available data.49 Some sources report the positioning of PLA soldiers at bus and rail stations to help guard them against attack; PLA forces may also have been employed to guard rail lines from sabotage, as well as having greater presence within cities. 1995: PAP crush resistance to arbitrary local leaders Where the PLA had previously taken a more active role, 1995 marked the beginning of China’s adapting its response tactics to more effectively counter the threat to the regime’s grip on Xinjiang. The PLA took on a support function to the PAP as it engaged a group protesting the actions of local officials. In Hotan, (July 7, 1995) local authorities repeatedly arrested and replaced imams for discussing contemporary topics. When a crowd formed around a local government and Party installation: “Riot police . . . trapped the demonstrators in the compound, deployed tear gas, and arrested and beat many of them. Official reports mention injuries to 66 officials and police but supply no figures regarding demonstrator casualties.”50 It is unclear whether these “riot police” were local police or PAP. The policing tactic is also of note. Repeatedly the mosque’s imams were dismissed, removed, or perhaps incarcerated. When a crowd formed to confront the state’s local organs, force was used directly and brutally. Raw power was unleashed to first encircle and then beat the crowd into submission. When ideas can not be controlled through influencing the local leadership, ideas are controlled by force. In Yining, also in July of 1995, political unrest drew an official response. An Islamic group organizing around the Uyghur tradition of “maxrap” gatherings (which are social meetings involving both recreation and hazing of socioreligious rule-breakers) began mobilizing Uyghurs to act collectively to assert their beliefs in society. The following account by Xinjiang scholar Jay Dautcher highlights the government’s response: Maxrap in Yining also organized a boycott of alcohol that was so effective that they gained a new visibility as effective social activists. By July 1995, the government took notice and banned them. But maxrap activities continued underground, despite the ban. Maxrap participants proceeded to organize and launch a league of sixteen youth soccer teams, gaining access to a suitable playing field. Several days before the season’s grand opening tournament, however, local officials cancelled it, announcing that the field would be used instead for military exercises. To

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reinforce their decision, they immediately sent a number of tanks to occupy the site.51 Tanks occupying the soccer fields did not end the confrontation between the Islamic social organization and the local officials. The goals were removed from soccer fields throughout Yining.52 Two days later several hundred men quietly marched in protest. [CCP] committees had circulated advance warnings of demonstrations to local work units, giving emergency phone numbers of state security forces and military units. By 10:30 AM, a group of around 700 Uyghur men watched at a main plaza in the center of town as snipers took positions on surrounding rooftops. Paramilitary squads also installed themselves at the city’s main intersections, which they had blocked with barbed-wire barriers. Several hundred soldiers armed with assault weapons patrolled the streets on motorcycles and in personnel carriers. Despite the challenge posed by these forces, no violence erupted at any time, and within a few days Yining returned to its previous state of guarded tension.53 This case highlights several key features of unrest in Xinjiang: information may not be available unless western scholars are present or actively seek details during fieldwork; and, more directly significant to this chapter, the initial use of PLA forces failed to deal with the unrest and may have polarized the situation. PAP or other paramilitary squads were required to quiet the city. Unknown to or unreported by Dautcher, significant police and security work likely occurred, including infiltration, surveillance, and arrests. In 1995 a new highway crossing the Taklimakan desert opened to official traffic. This highway was more than a simple infrastructure project linking Xinjiang’s north and south. As one author suggests, in addition to economic ties later to be developed, this highway’s initial utility lay in “providing rapid transport in an emergency. Military and police reinforcements could now be sent down from the north in a matter of hours.”54 While this highway was not the first line of communication established in Xinjiang, massive transportation projects, especially the construction and upgrading of road and rail links, have become increasingly common since this project. The events of 1995 mark a shift in tactics: PLA and PAP forces are used in concert, yet only the PAP are effective in dealing with the population. When the PLA was used directly the situation was enflamed. The PAP was not necessarily less brutal in dealing with unrest, but placing PLA tanks on soccer fields did not end unrest. PAP troops and intelligence operatives were able to quiet dissent and put down uprisings.

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1996: police sweeps amid increasing violence Shootings, bombings and assassination attempts rocked Xinjiang in the spring and summer of 1996. The Xinjiang Party Committee looked to the XPCC as a major force for stability, yet local police bore the brunt of responding to, as well as being the target of violence. Local police-work, a vital component of China’s COIN campaign in Xinjiang, is discussed in greater detail in the following chapter. In June of 1996 local police worked with upwards of 10,000 troops (perhaps PAP)55 sweeping through Urumqi, arresting some 300 people suspected of being separatists or sympathizers. Fifty bombings are claimed by separatists in exile. Perhaps 10,000 people were arrested throughout the province;56 and, according to pro-independence sources, 450 military and police were killed and an additional 1,000 were injured.57 These numbers are disputed among exiles, Chinese authorities, and academic experts. Additionally, some communications between Xinjiang and eastern China were sabotaged; sinologist Michael Dillon writes, “special guard units drawn from the [XPCC] had to be formed to supplement police guarding the roads and railway lines.”58 China has announced campaigns against separatism, extremism, and terrorism in Xinjiang annually;59 1996 was the first such “Strike Hard” crackdown. Dillon writes: A systematic crackdown on crime throughout the whole of China was launched at the end of April 1996. It was known as the “Strike Hard” campaign (yanda, an abbreviation of yanli daji yanzhong xingshi fanzui huodong, or “Campaign to strike severely at serious criminal offences”) and was initiated after a working conference of the Bureau of Public Security, the date of which has not been made public.60 Elsewhere in China these crackdowns focus on the social ills of violent crime and drugs; in Xinjiang Strike Hard campaigns primarily target the insurgency.61 These crackdowns involve large numbers of arrests and convictions from expedited legal proceedings.62 In addition to the Strike Hard campaigns, or perhaps as a local component, historian Gardner Bovingdon asserts that “Public Security personnel have arranged periodic sweeps (zhonghe zhili, or ‘comprehensive management’) to shore up control in each locality.”63 These trips include Hans escorting Uyghurs on door-to-door propaganda missions in addition to increased surveillance. Pressure upon families and neighbors is applied directly through visits by various police and security personnel, as well as Residential Street Committees.64 Again, while the use of police and security forces is discussed in greater depth in the following chapter, here we must note that Strike Hard campaigns are primarily police affairs not involving the PLA, the military proper.

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1997: PAP with PLA backing tackle a rebellion In Yining, February of 1997, two initial arrests coupled with reports of secret, summary executions of Uyghur men accused of bombings spiraled into riots.65 Police arrested many from a group which gathered to demand the release of the two religious students. As protests spread over a series of days they turned violent. The PAP responded with anti-riot troops, and the PLA may have moved an army combat corps from Gansu to surround and seal the city.66 As many as 1,000 “young Uyghurs” rioted against the police attempting to control the uprising; also, Han residents report being attacked.67 Amid the climatologically worst winter in decades, the PAP responded harshly to the largest incident of unrest in decades. Historian Millward writes: Antiriot police and troops reportedly used dogs, tear gas, fire hoses, beatings, and live ammunition on demonstrators and bystanders. Rioters torched vehicles and attacked police and Chinese residents . . . Authorities sealed off Yining city for two weeks and in the aftermath reportedly arrested thousands of people, particularly those associated with Islam. . . . Trials, public sentencing, and executions of people allegedly involved in the Yining Incident continued for years after the event.68 With large numbers of PAP anti-riot police within the city and PLA surrounding it, “less-than-lethal” techniques began quickly to take lives. Sinologist Dillon writes: At first, the police and the army used high-pressure hoses, and tear gas, to try to disperse the demonstrators, but after some hours, they began to fire on the crowds. The weather was freezing, and . . . almost 150 people froze to death because their clothes were soaked.69 PAP worked to divide the demonstrators into manageable sections, and the political leaders took to media outlets claiming that they understood the riots were being caused by leaders and the vast majority of citizens had no ill-will towards the government. These citizens should peacefully return to their normal lives, local political leaders asserted. Dividing the rioters and arresting ringleaders began working, and troops were sent to protect critical infrastructure targets, including media and political installations.70 An American academic source asserts that “Chinese military forces killed 103 Uyghurs during the initial demonstration.”71 In all, Uyghur dissidents claim upwards of 300 people were killed, and police sources claim that nearly 500 were arrested.72 These included the alleged organizers who, in the following weeks were tried and/or executed.73 Eye-witness accounts place the killed, injured, and arrested figures several hundreds higher.74 Some 100 police and Han populace were injured.75 Elsewhere in Xinjiang in 1997 violent rioting threatened local Party and

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military installations. Armed rebels reportedly killed as many as thirty PLA soldiers in a shootout before a PLA rapid response unit was called in, martial law declared, and curfews imposed. Some guerrilla bands were reportedly forming and training in mountainous locations in northern Xinjiang.76 As the insurgency in Xinjiang worsened, China began to use the military and paramilitary forces available, but the tactics had changed. Rebellion in Yining was met with PAP forces backed by the PLA. Even as the situation escalated, the PLA was used to show force, parading through town with the PAP; PLA force was not reportedly used directly against the rioters. Direct action was, according to available reporting, the domain of the PAP. Fortunately for China, the military and paramilitary forces in Xinjiang are not the only tool to which Chinese authorities turned. When these military and paramilitary forces are engaged the situation can escalate into violence with PAP killing tens or hundreds of rioters. As the following chapters argue, China implemented a bottomup campaign which sought not only to find separatist elements within society but also to turn society against the insurgency. Military and paramilitary actions throughout the 1990s did achieve a dark goal: through the state’s demonstrated willingness to use force to brutally put down rebellions, Uyghurs today are see high costs toward participating in riots or joining the insurgency. Not only does China have enormous political will with which it could confront the insurgency in Xinjiang but in the 1990s China transformed this will into action. 2001–6: PLA and PAP shows of force In the month before September 11, 2001, China was conducting large military exercises on Xinjiang’s southwestern borders,77 and strengthening diplomatic relations with Afghanistan’s then-ruling Taliban regime. In Afghanistan, Chinese telecommunications companies were already building Kabul’s communications infrastructure and, to show their good-will for the Chinese diplomats, the Taliban reportedly turned two Uyghur fighters over to Chinese authorities.78 Chinese officials had previously purchased the remains of American ordinance, particularly cruise missiles, used to bomb terrorist training camps in 1998. When news of the attacks in New York and Washington instantly spread around the globe, China rushed an enormous military force toward its borders with Afghanistan and Pakistan. China did this to seal the border against fighters fleeing the battlefield, to facilitate surveillance of American military actions and deter a feared extension of the Afghan campaign into China’s territory, and, most importantly, as a show of force to the Uyghurs in southern Xinjiang. The colossal and highly visible PLA maneuver was a classic show of force, asserting that any uprising would be put down with extreme force. Internal surveillance of the Uyghur population also increased exponentially, according to Uyghur sources and media reporting.79 Since 9/11, Xinjiang’s troubles have received increased attention from international watchers, including those in academia and the media, as well as from

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China’s leadership. While it is hard to gauge whether the presence and activities of the PLA and the PAP has changed within society since 9/11, Chinese authorities are reportedly more aware of the types of challenges they confront. Not only must they deal with the threat of separatism, but the prospect of spectacular attacks by terrorists upon remotely located capital cities became more real.80 Whether China, because of the nature and dynamics of its political system, could survive such an attack is questionable though ultimately unknowable. Governments around the world committed themselves to America’s “Global War on Terror” (GWOT), and China too asserted its support. While the nature of China’s participation is not available in open sources, covert and clandestine actions abroad targeting Uyghur militants is a logical Chinese contribution81 in addition to signals intelligence (SIGINT), collected perhaps at the facilities in Xinjiang which had been initially established with American support.82 Representatives of the United States have complained publicly that the quantity and quality of intelligence shared by the PRC is unsatisfactory in comparison to other Asian allies with far more modest means.83 Nevertheless, in 2006 China ratified a UN treaty on combating terror financing. Domestically, China’s contribution to the GWOT includes cracking down on insurgents within its borders, a campaign which has been ongoing since at least 1990. Speaking of insurgent forces, Xinjiang’s Party Secretary Wang Lequan asserted to Agence France Presse: “We hit hard at those who have emerged,” . . . Wang confirmed a report that police have arrested 10 members of a separatist group in the Aksu district Monday which has allegedly carried out “violent activities” since the late 1990s. . . . “We need to be alert always and to pay careful attention to these activities. China is very much in need of a stable environment.”84 What arrests were actually made is unclear, yet as the fiftieth anniversary of the establishment of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region approached, calls for a crackdown increased. Luo Gan, member of China’s Politburo asserted: “Xinjiang’s stability worries the whole country. We must continue to struggle hard against all criminal activities and to maintain social order.”85 In addition to PLA forces, specially equipped PAP troops visibly flooded Urumqi, especially in the provincial capital’s predominantly Uyghur districts and tourist areas. As Chinese dignitaries came to town, streets were shut down with cars removed to prevent car bombs. Surrounding buildings were evacuated under threat of death for anyone who visibly violated the orders, likely as an anti-sniper tactic. Intelligence collection attempted to extend into dissident circles in search of specific threats or other tactical information.86

The efficacy of force in countering the insurgency China’s counter-insurgent tactics have been harsh and draconian throughout; the security forces responded at times with excessive, brutal, and lethal force. Yet

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wars are brutal affairs in which the niceties of peaceful life are traded for the horrors of violent politics.87 As Chapter 1 argues, insurgency is a potent form of warfare which can threaten the state. China initially lacked honed tools with which to counter the insurgency it faced, yet these tools have been built and tactics continue to evolve. The force discussed in this chapter is not the only tool to which China turned to counter its insurgency. Fundamentally, China moved away from the crude tactic of military intervention within its own territory and shifted toward a mix of forces which could potentially be perceived as more indigenous and legitimate to local society. The tools of local police-work and intelligence gathering, along with targeting and reshaping Uyghur society are discussed in following chapters. Importantly, China’s COIN shifted away from a military response toward paramilitary and civilian tools. Militaries can crush rebellions and at times influence enemy decision-making, yet to fight an insurgency the state must have not only superior will but also the ability to alter the enemy’s will. Military forces create the perception of occupation: a state which is powerful but brittle and disconnected; unable to provide meaningful security and which likely will soon become a threat to society itself. China’s COIN and human rights: a preliminary assessment China’s tactical evolution occurred as the international community, led by the United States and her European allies, became increasingly involved in the monitoring and enforcement of international norms of human rights. China vocally noted the shift away from previous normative constructions of the inviolability of sovereignty towards humanitarian intervention. Arguing that state security itself is the precursor to human rights, China engaged the insurgency in Xinjiang predominantly without external constraints. Two arguments predominate western discussions of the “Xinjiang problem” (explicitly, the “Xinjiang problem” so-termed is not a discussion of insurgency but of colonialism and repression): one, the Chinese response to unrest has been disproportionate, violating inalienable rights of its population;88 two, China’s draconian policies have spurred the population to revolt – the policies are seen as cause, not effect. “Severe restrictions on the practice of religion,”89 the collection and burning of Uyghur nationalist books in public bonfires90 coupled with the state violence discussed above are examples of the former. American scholars Rudelson and Jankowiak argue the latter: China’s Strike Hard, Maximum Pressure policy has spurred violent resistance and posed serious dilemmas to the government. For one thing, resistance is geographically focused. While the government plays up a general Islamic terrorist threat in Xinjiang, anti-Han sentiment is far stronger in Kashgar than elsewhere, mainly in response to the government’s own efforts to curtail Islamic practices there.91

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Here the crackdown on religion is depicted as the cause of resistance against the state. While it is true that the state and its local representatives do target political Islam as a threat, Islam as a religion is permitted within China. Islam as politics is harshly repressed. This distinction of mosque and state is not popularly believed among Muslims according to scholars of political Islam.92 This distinction is also lost upon western media, academic, and government sources who decry Chinese intervention in religion. Muslims in Xinjiang are allowed to pray and explore their religion as it relates to improving the human psyche; they are not allowed to use the mosque as a source of power with which to challenge the state’s control of the territory.93 Adapting force to counter threats Just as China is modernizing its military to have a force capable of dealing with the impact of modern technologies and tactics upon the battlefield, China also reconstituted its COIN forces within Xinjiang to be a tool more capable of positively impacting society. Today these forces are still brutal, but kill less often. While the PAP is a paramilitary force under much the same leadership authority as the PLA, they have increasingly received training and adapted lessons learned through engaging the insurgency in its many and evolving forms. The evolution in military and paramilitary tactics alone does not explain the effectiveness of China’s COIN campaign, but through keeping outright rebellion to a manageable level this evolution did enable other tactics to take hold. Political unrest simmered throughout China in the year 2004, a sharp increase according to reports,94 followed by a dramatic increase again in 2005.95 Whether, as a trend across a number of years, this unrest is truly increasing, whether the numbers are flawed or fabricated, or whether government reporting is becoming more accurate and transparent is unclear.96 Chinese officials recently began releasing statistical data on political unrest and an editorial in the official People’s Daily newspaper asserted that “Destabilizing factors must be resolved at the grassroots and nipped in the bud.”97 If unrest is on the rise, China may look to its experience in Xinjiang as a guide for future actions elsewhere. This strategy of building forces capable of managing unrest while the state attempts to reshape society, the strategy which has thus far proven effective against the insurgency in Xinjiang, may soon be tested in other Chinese theaters.

5

Grass-roots institutions and security

Destabilizing factors must be resolved at the grassroots and nipped in the bud. (People’s Daily editorial, 1/20/05)

Challenges to state power arise when states appear vulnerable.1 In the early 1990s China found itself weak, its organs lacking, under threat from Xinjiang’s insurgency. At first China’s institutions were incapable of effectively responding; they had been infiltrated and were under siege. The Party-state was being severed from society. Military and paramilitary forces could crush unrest when people took to the streets or insurgents attacked; yet preventing the insurgency from developing a greater traction within society, greater political will, required new socio-political tools as well as adapting old tools for the evolving situation. In response to the insurgency beginning to take hold within society China rebuilt its Party, government, and security forces at the grass-roots level. This chapter analyzes China’s effort to reclaim Xinjiang from the insurgency through establishing an apparatus capable of policing society (including the state’s institutions) at the most local levels.2 Insurgency succeeds when it severs the state from society, often achieving this goal by targeting the state’s local institutions – infecting them or disrupting their efforts. Xinjiang’s insurgency presents this pathology. The contested local institutions are the state’s best chance for combating the insurgency, for they carry the potential to be the most knowledgeable about local circumstances and needs, most capable of holding the line and turning society against the insurgency as the state works to reshape society. Beyond retaking the state’s institutions China pressed outwards, turning social institutions (e.g. family, workgroup, neighborhood, and also friendship) against the insurgency. The strategic use of society’s grass-roots institutions to directly effect enemy action, will, and in the case of COIN counter the insurgent dream3 is here termed “society-centric warfare.”4 Rebuilding the state’s institutions from the grass-roots achieves two interrelated objectives toward the ultimate goal of more effectively governing society: one, enhancing institutional capacity; two, enriching the state’s ability to reach deeply into society to detect and remove threatening elements. The role

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of these rebuilt institutions is not to eliminate the insurgency alone but simply, in concert with other coercive instruments discussed in the previous chapter, to keep the insurgency to a manageable level while other tools have a chance to take hold and reshape society (these tools are analyzed in the next chapter).

Intelligence and counter-insurgency Insurgency is grass-roots warfare; the ability to identify, understand, and counter an enemy at this level within society requires intelligence. Beyond data, intelligence is composed of a full array of information collection, analysis, and action, ranging from secretive dealings of a political underground through the attempt to understand and impact an enemy’s political intentions and will. China’s success in quelling the insurgency and keeping it at a manageable level of violence is a direct result of China’s construction of an intelligence apparatus capable of penetrating and operating effectively within society. Finding insurgents, disrupting their organizations, plots, and decision-cycle, and removing insurgent war-materials are important COIN endeavors, yet intelligence operations can do more than identifying and influencing enemy warmaking resources and capabilities. Analyzing and targeting the sources, as well as points for influence, of enemy will are core missions. Historically, conventional militaries have had considerable trouble adapting to insurgency as a form of warfare; it is far easier to locate a division on the battlefield or a munitions factory than it is to operate within a society sympathetic to the insurgency or supporting it outright.5 Men with guns in uniforms are not viewed by society as a part of normal life. Even armies loved by a population are seen as holding a special role as guardians of society. Insurgents are people who have taken up arms, or more generally begun the political fight, against the state in society’s name. The state must adapt its response, building a force capable of moving within society to press for the rejection of insurgent elements. Successful COIN involves pushing military force-posture and unit-structures into society, using or building local military and intelligence apparatus to do the bulk of the requisite work.6 Better yet, military forces would be drawn-down or reconfigured into a force more capable of interacting with society. While guns and violence are not an unimportant feature of many COIN campaigns, the skills of building indigenous forces are key.

Denying the insurgency safe haven within society Through strong, early, and repeated response to revolt China has thus far kept the insurgency form taking greater hold within Xinjiang’s society; local policing and intelligence capabilities are proven components of China’s success.7 Despite their sound, police forces can produce more than post hoc law enforcement.8 In Xinjiang, local police not only search for those who have perpetrated crime; because of the inchoate nature of China’s law today, legality is a performative

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exercise. Powerful Party, state, and police officials are relatively unrestrained by a weak court system; laws exist only when those enforcing them deem them important and/or useful. Police exist to support the state; principles of justice, procedural or otherwise, are largely absent. Police in Xinjiang are an active force within society: the local community knows who they are, and the society participates with its policing. Coercion and fear are primary motivators for the local community’s cooperation with authority’s system.9 Xinjiang’s society is heavily saturated with police, for even when the numerous personnel are not physically present, their presence is assumed. Beyond superstitions, informers are always a possibility even within close circles. In Xinjiang there is no right to remain silent; if suspected, compliance is compulsory. If compliance is believed to be withheld or not forthcoming, force is applied.10 While in other societies police have achieved community cooperation through far less coercive methods which do not violate international standards of human rights, this chapter examines what China has achieved with the approach it has implemented. Explicitly, examining the use of local policing in Xinjiang does not endorse the brutal aspects of Chinese police-work. The efficacy of China’s local police and intelligence capability rests not upon the coercive and brutal tactics employed; rather, China’s efficacy is due to the effective permeation of society and the ability of the state to turn society against the insurgency. When society polices itself, casting-out insurgent elements, the insurgency’s position vis-à-vis society is greatly reduced. The final element of effective COIN, reshaping society to reject the insurgency, is discussed in the next chapter. This chapter investigates how China began to turn society against the insurgency through retaking the state’s institutions and denying the insurgency safe havens within society. Perceiving itself under attack from forces making claims against the state, the state sought to reinforce its positions then pushed outward; a classic hold then attack defense. First the state rebuilt its institutions at the grass-roots level, reclaiming these institutions from the insurgency; next, the state used these institutions to police society. Let us now investigate how the state reclaimed its institutions from the insurgency.

Rebuilding grass-roots institutions When violent resistance erupted across Xinjiang the state and Party’s institutions were insufficient to the task of countering the insurgency. Institutions on the east had been rebuilt under Deng Xiaoping in the 1980s, yet in Xinjiang as in much of rural China the structures of governance remained weak or brittle, and in many cases both, from Mao-era internal socio-political tumults. In the early 1990s Xinjiang’s insurgency presented a unique and pressing challenge to the state: to develop its capacity to operate within society or risk the insurgency taking hold and thriving. Where other regions of China had simple resistance against the government’s

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weakness, Xinjiang had an ideology and a vision – a dream, however nebulous, nuanced, and varied – around which an insurgency could form.11 Whether the insurgency itself began overtaking the state’s institutions through infection or simply overwhelming and overpowering weak or brittle points of influence is unclear. Ultimately, the state and Party apparatus noted the failure of local institutions to perform their functions of leadership of society. Sinologist Michael Dillon writes: Party officials openly admitted that they had lost control of many of the grassroots organizations in rural Xinjiang to separatist and Islamist groups. [The official Xinjiang Daily wrote] “Some village-level organizations are but empty shells and are dominated and controlled by illegal religious forces. These localities have often become fortified villages of national splittist and illegal religious activities.”12 As increasing demands were placed against China (and state-ness more generally)13 China built and rebuilt local institutions able to manage political frictions at the local level. The insurgency began taking hold within the state itself, co-opting the state’s and the Party’s institutions. Perhaps China was weakening, or perhaps authorities to the east realized that as the apparatus of governance improved elsewhere in China, professionalization of the bureaucracy14 lagged far behind in Xinjiang. The structures of governance and enforcement were ill-suited to confront the increasing and evolving threats. Not only was society infected by the insurgency but the state’s weak apparatus in Xinjiang too was increasingly showing symptoms; the state’s weakness grew increasingly visible. Imams were preaching violent politics; dance and soccer groups began alcohol boycotts effective enough to threaten the industry; people began collectively demanding the redress of grievances committed by local officials. Whether incapable or unwilling, local government was simply unable to resolve society’s demands against the state. Local institutions not only lead society by advocating a political path, these institutions find methods to compete with other forces in society. Currently China is not a democracy for it lacks space for competition among organized social forces (i.e. civil society) and the state. China is a one-party state everfearful of threats to stability. Competition with local institutions (state and Party) is understood as a challenge to the Party’s unique role atop the state as the true guardian of China’s society. Challenges are met through a mix of coercive practices ranging across the spectrum of violence, from the appearance of voluntary compliance through summary executions.15 Command from the top, action from the bottom Beijing is in command of Xinjiang’s government and Party structure, effectively setting minimum requirements for action. When a policy is crafted at the

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national levels of governance it passes through a parallel, overlapping, and symbiotic chain of Party and state command, traveling through regional, provincial, county, city, or village levels on down into the workgroup and neighborhood until it reaches into every family.16 Through a sequence of documents and meetings, the leadership’s message is interpreted in relation to local conditions at each level. For example, city leadership, Communist and government, will meet and discuss a document passed to them from county or province level leadership. Once the meaning and intent is understood the leaders will discuss the message with their cadres and workers. In this manner direction flows from the core down through the periphery.17 While directions flow from the top down, implementation’s impact within society flows in the opposite direction. Once local levels have considered how a document relates to their circumstances and how they should implement its message within their realm these leaders take the initiative to implement beyond the minimal strictures of the document itself. Where laws in the United States are understood as explaining the parameters of action, in Xinjiang these documents are understood as the minimum requirements for performance.18 To be promoted, let alone keep their jobs, local officials must deliver results. Officials are not punished if they deprive the society of civil liberties or human rights; these are at best secondary concerns. Primary is the quest for stability: local officials must always attempt to manage local conditions so as to err on the side of increasing stability. Justice is primarily defined in relation to security, not the procedures or rule of law. Local officials are responsible for, at the very least, achieving the document’s intent as their boss understands it. By the time intent is interpreted and implemented by local leadership directions for achieving stability have, through the process of documents and meetings, expanded in scope and repressiveness.19 Because implementation rests upon strong and often stern local action, having capable local institutions is key. Without the local level the Party and its state apparatus is immediately disconnected from society. Severing the Chinese state from Xinjiang’s society is a battle which pivots on the quality of the local cadres in neighborhoods, workgroups, and villages.20 Without the city, village, and smaller levels legitimizing the state’s actions, the state is left only military force as a tool to influence society and is solely a military occupying force. This is not as strong or durable a position for any power. Purge and fill Purges of questionably loyal or publicly religious local leaders combined with bringing in new loyal Han cadres to reinforce grass-roots governance.21 Practicing Islam is not widely tolerated for Uyghur officials at the local levels. While technically allowed, Uyghur officials are forced out of their positions or are forced to abandon overtly practicing religion. Uyghur cadres and officials are a valued commodity for they legitimize China’s project in Xinjiang. The parallel tracks of government, usually headed by a Uyghur, and Party, normally with a

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Han cadre slightly more equal, produce incentives for cooperation within a system providing a certain degree of autonomy. Han cadres The Han Communist cadres officially have no religion and are therefore said to have no bias – they are claimed to have an increased capability to work for everyone’s interests because they lack particularistic identities.22 Local officials are charged with flavoring Beijing’s policies for local palates; “autonomy” as it is lived consists more as a slight decrease in acidity rather than a truly indigenous governance structure. Bringing in Han cadres loyal to the Party was a temporary fix to a system of authority in need of fundamental repair. While not all Hans are loyal to the Chinese state, the popular perception is that those willing to join the governance project are, because of their ethnicity, fundamentally more trustworthy to not rebel and seek to split Xinjiang from China.23 Hans have been imported and enticed to move to Xinjiang in recent years through various projects, ranging from resettlement of populations displaced by the Three Gorges Dam24 to something of a domestic Peace Corps where young teachers from the east are offered career advancement in return for a few years of service in China’s west.25 The promise of jobs in the construction and oil industries also has pulled many Han into Xinjiang. Uyghur cadres Han cadres from Xinjiang and from eastern China could fill posts opened through the purge of officials suspected of separatist ties, yet Han cadres do not achieve local legitimacy. Only Uyghur officials and cadres, along with other “Minzu” or minority nationality groups, can legitimate the Communist political regime to the fullest extent possible.26 Uyghur cadres can not simply be shipped en masse from eastern China; they must be cultivated. Fortunately for China, Xinjiang has a long history of connection with the current Chinese state. Just as there were Uyghurs who turned to the Communists at the creation of the People’s Republic, there are Uyghurs today who are willing to work with the Communists in hopes of producing a better life for themselves, their families, and perhaps even Xinjiang more generally. Violent resistance is not the only path for Uyghur men and women who are proud of their ethnicity. The Party and the state both have devoted considerable effort to finding Uyghur leaders who are willing to publicly and repeatedly endorse the Chinese project in Xinjiang. Beyond media events – which are perceived as forced, fixed, and not credible – smart, educated, and ambitious Uyghurs are sought for important public offices at the local level. To the detriment of China’s counterinsurgency, there is a significant sentiment within the Uyghur community which may be willing to grudgingly tolerate life within China’s borders but detests the Communist regime and its unique totalitarian excesses.

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The XUAR’s universities, especially Xinjiang University but also the business and agricultural universities, have produced Uyghurs interested in joining local government and Party institutions. While these posts may not offer high pay, they do allow educated individuals to pursue life as a professional, earning enough to comfortably support a family. More important than monetary compensation, becoming a local leader confers prestige within a proud society. Deference to authority is cultural, but it is also structural: there are no checks and balances on authority in Xinjiang. With power comes freedom. As an individual gains social rank and prominence they are indulged with friends and attention; they are able to create their own Caesar’s court in their home-town. For a sufficient number the gift of being a king within your realm balances favorably against the prospects of violent resistance against an infinitely motivated, powerful, and ruthless enemy. Xinjiang has not become so thoroughly polarized that the Chinese can not entice minority peoples into its institutions. Empowering grass-roots leadership In response to the perception of vulnerability, provincial leadership focused on rebuilding local institutions. Pulling from the XUAR’s institutions of higher learning, a new generation of leaders and bureaucrats was built to replace older or less trusted leaders. Due to increased educational standards and a flow of ideas and knowledge into Xinjiang from eastern China and even western countries, the new local leaders had an intellectual lineage which cultivated a greater professionalism. While these leaders are less driven by Communist ideology, they are more capable of tailoring China’s rigid governance structure to local conditions. Beyond adding a “Uyghur” face to Chinese colonial policies (as is so often claimed in American scholarly and media accounts) these Uyghurs consider themselves to be working for their people’s betterment. Though many today seem overwhelmed by their responsibilities, given the perception of tight command and control from senior leadership, limited resources, and limited freedom of action, the new generation of local leadership has begun to define their role. Stability in Xinjiang rests on their shoulders. The assassination of local leaders is a persisting tactic of the insurgency. According to the best information available, the leaders who are targeted are local tyrants. The system of governance in Xinjiang provides leaders with near absolute power within their fiefdom, so long as they rule within the general parameters of their superior’s desires and designs, until serious problems arise. Local leaders can adapt strategies ranging from minimal compliance with the demands placed upon them through creating a local version of Caesar’s court; those targeted for assassination stand accused of being exceptionally excessive and abusive of the local population.27 Strict, unflinching, and cold-hearted implementation of China’s policies or the local use of absolute power are the common threads linking Xinjiang’s endemic assassinations. Local leaders must find ways to flexibly implement

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China’s edicts within local society, else risk losing their lives. Until the system incorporates a mechanism whereby members of society can reasonably seek the redress of grievances inflicted by corrupt and tyrannical local leaders, assassinations will continue to have a powerful logic. Local leaders remain the most critical level of governance for countering the insurgency. If China has any hope of keeping Xinjiang under China’s national leadership, local leaders need to be capable of implementing national ideas tailored to local conditions. Driving implementation down to the level of governance which actually knows about the problem is what China achieved, though corruption of local officials is unchecked by the system. Assassinations and small-scale attacks are seen as the only remedy for those who lack political connections or wealth to leverage against the excesses of local tyrants. Increasing the quality of local leaders, constructing a professional corps of capable individuals rather than ideologues, has been an important step forward for governance in Xinjiang. The preceding section represents the civil equivalent of military Command, Control, and Communications (C3). The following section investigates the policing of society, the civil equivalent of military Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR).

Policing society When leadership fails to solve problems the state must be ready and willing to use coercion and violence, rapid and protracted to support its claim as the premier force within society. Local leadership can attempt to guide society and redress grievances, yet in nearly any society there will be those who wish to challenge the state and those commanding power. The state must be ever vigilant of challengers’ intrigues, large and small. Dissent can span a tactical spectrum ranging from non-violent methods of resistance through violent and organized action. Societies and states are each unique in the quantity and quality of dissent they are willing or able to tolerate, and this tolerance may change depending on situational, historic, and other factors. Response can also vary across a state’s territory based upon perceptions of threat, vulnerability, capability, or opportunity. Nevertheless, every state has a threshold past which dissent must be stopped else the regime will fall. Most states and societies will choose to quash dissent well short of this threshold. China tolerates little dissent in general, and dissent in Xinjiang is treated with extreme repression.28 Social forces and individuals wishing to influence politics are understood as a threat to the Party and the state. While Chapter 4 analyzes the use of force to crush larger outbursts of political violence, this chapter questions the use of institutional mechanisms to manage dissent before military and paramilitary anti-riot teams are necessary. Along with other local institutions, Xinjiang’s police and intelligence services were initially ill-prepared to counter the insurgency rising against the state.

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These security forces were reconstituted from the grass-roots and became increasingly capable of penetrating the insurgency. While dating the shift in force-structure is beyond the data available to this study, the latest this change can be dated is January, 1997. The proposals outlined below could already have been well underway in key localities as trial programs, for at least in recent years Xinjiang’s security officials have acted well before announcing or describing their actions to wider audiences. Sinologist Dillon writes: Xinjiang’s public security bodies held a high level conference from January 20–22nd 1997. Wang Lequan, the CCP regional secretary spoke about the “grass roots construction” of public security organizations and pledged to reorganize the entire police system of Xinjiang in the villages and small towns. He undertook to establish new police stations, send experienced police officers to the rural areas and revive militia organizations. He drew attention to the particular language problems faced by police in Xinjiang and promised to extend bilingual (Chinese and Uyghur) training and to deploy more bilingual officers to try to reduce the difficulties caused by language barriers.29 Penetrating and policing society is impossible unless security forces can communicate with society. Building a language-capable corps of officers is an important function, yet because of the structure of schooling in practice this means hiring Uyghurs. Only Hans with very low scores on the college entrance examination are assigned Uyghur and other minority languages as their major.30 Hiring Uyghurs does more than increase language capacity. Potentially, Uyghurs can soften the feel of imposition and occupation by applying China’s policies with increased cultural knowledge and sensitivity. For this to work however, China’s rigid tactics must allow for flexibility and listening to Uyghur input. Assessing the capability of Chinese officials to acquire assets within insurgent groups is beyond the data available in open sources, yet key capabilities have been demonstrated publicly. These capabilities include identifying and countering those actively supporting violence against the Chinese state; those who have traveled abroad for training; and, those forming into organized groups which could threaten the state. China’s net has been broad and draconian, but it has also been effective. Of the known tactics, this section investigates which have been effective and which have wasted China’s limited resources. Superstition is an important force-magnifier for China’s security apparatus in Xinjiang, and a few words on the topic are in order before we proceed further into our investigation. When society believes that spies are everywhere the quieting effect of spies upon dissident activities is magnified; the socialpsychological belief in the Chinese secret police’s capability extends the capability of these forces well beyond their initial material value. While secret police have a strong presence in Xinjiang tracking foreigners and dissidents alike, the secret police have taken on an omnipresent and mythological quality within Uyghur circles: the police are always watching,

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always waiting, always trailing and tracking; someone in the room could be an informer or could be turned. Reporting on friends is not an option which can be withheld when asked; and, Uyghurs believe, they are likely to be asked. Thus, in studying China’s intelligence and security forces we must investigate how these forces interact with society beyond the simple statistics of arrests, groups or cells disrupted, and materials seized. Society-centric warfare: China’s hidden hand in Xinjiang China has multiple and overlapping groups which operate intelligence-gathering operations within society, including: local police; the Public Security Bureau;31 the People’s Armed Police; the Bingtuan; and the Party members of local workgroups and neighborhoods. Due to the quantity and quality of information available in open sources internationally, it is difficult to discern which group is acting at a given time. This opaqueness is also present even for educated and aware Uyghurs within society. For the most part, discussions of secret police actions are not differentiated by which organization provides funding or direction; China’s hidden hand within society appears largely as a unified fist when it grabs or strikes – the identity of the fingers is rarely noted. When security forces act with Xinjiang they often assert a form of social responsibility: society is responsible for the actions of its members and must police itself or suffer consequences. Workgroups are responsible for their workers, neighborhoods their families, families their members. Individuals suspected of involvement in the insurgency are policed in relation to these social institutions, either being reminded of their loyalty and thus reined-in or depicted as rogues severed from their place in society and unable to return.32 Xinjiang’s security forces are pursuing society-centric warfare, enticing and coercing society to begin policing itself. Targeting individuals, families, workgroups, and villages which support the insurgency takes more than intelligence regarding the identity of insurgents. Security forces must penetrate and influence a unit of society which has produced, housed, or aided an insurgent. The unit of society to which the state turns for remedy is the same unit which has enabled the insurgency, actively or passively. Local security forces are best at this style of COIN – having the knowledge of society’s structure and points of influence. This style of local policing is best understood as society-centric warfare because society is central to the insurgent and counter-insurgent cause alike, and because society’s small components are the key mechanism of influence for both sides. Let us turn to a few examples of society-centric warfare by China’s security forces in Xinjiang. Note how in each the focus is always on an institution of society which is pressured to take responsibility for the actions of its members. Villages and towns When violence erupts on a large enough scale villages or towns are locked down. Military and paramilitary forces surround the municipality while other

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forces work to crush the resistance within the area. Officials of the local government and Party are held responsible for problems within their area of responsibility. Subsequently, these officials must hold their subordinate working units responsible for delivering results – or at least preventing failures from becoming known. Workgroups While the punishments and incentives are nebulously explained by knowledgeable locals, workgroups are held responsible for the actions and affiliations of their workers. Many workgroups are more than places of employment, providing healthcare at a central facility and residence within a compound or discrete area to workers’ families. The boss and Party secretary are accountable for their workers, though this is a double-edged sword. While leaders police their groups, they also protect their members from other security branches for any wrongdoing discovered also reflects poorly upon the leader and the institution.33 Suspicious activity including meeting in groups, meeting unknown or foreign persons, studying proscribed topics, or openly advocating insurgent causes would likely be detected and reported within the workgroup. Neighbors or coworkers might report such activity or suspicions based upon promises of benefits or fear of suffering consequences when the activity is eventually discovered and reported by another neighbor or co-worker. Universities and schools are particularly important workgroups because they teach people how to be members of society. Political meetings increase in frequency and length during times of increased threat-perception in the attempt to build a cohesive unit and engine of the Party-state working against the insurgency’s threat.34 Residential Street Committees In at least one instance (Yining, beginning in 1995), Residential Street Committees have been employed to counter what was perceived as political actions based upon Islamic social groupings. These committees were tasked with enforcing a ban on these activities and empowered to levy “a fine of 50 yuan ($6.25) on any man caught participating.”35 This amount can be a hefty fine for people who may lack monetary resources; paying such a fine could easily require contributions and loans from family and neighbors.36 While this study lacks the empirical data necessary to assess this tactic’s prevalence and impact against the insurgency, logically this would be a prime tactic for policing morerural Uyghurs in Xinjiang’s countryside.37 Families Security forces also turn to family loyalties to prevent family members from joining or supporting the insurgency and for reporting those who do. Examples

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include this account from Yining, 1996: following the arrest of thousands of Uyghurs around Xinjiang and some 400 in Yining, “the heads of 3,700 families had been obliged to sign statements that no member of their family would carry out any further activities against the Communist Party.”38 Pressure upon a family to keep its members quiescent is not the only action Chinese authorities have taken. Police reportedly used video images of a riot in a southern city to identify individuals involved in the violence. When normal police-work failed to yield all the suspects the security forces broadcast the images on local television, saying that the men should turn themselves in to authorities in order to prevent any ill consequences from befalling their families. Additionally, neighbors were pressured to watch for the return of these men.39 Enlisting neighbors through coercion or enticements to keep watch against the departure and return of young Uyghur men traveling abroad for Islamist military training has, according to Uyghur sources, proven to be a very effective tactic of China’s secret police. While numbers of arrests are unavailable in open sources, the possibility of capture upon return to a family home after training is likely a powerful obstacle for those working to building a durable insurgency. Neighbors are reportedly pressured and/or enticed to report when Uyghur men depart for training and return home. Because of the insular and stationary nature of society in Xinjiang, and in China more generally, newcomers to an area are noticed rapidly (or are perceived to be noticed). Thus, using family loyalty and neighbors to monitor families has proven to close one of few perceived opportunities for insurgents who have pursued training abroad. Coercion, influence, and society-centric warfare Employing the pressures of affection, responsibility, and fear at each of the levels of local society, where connections are most frequent and most strong, security forces in Xinjiang attempt to turn society against the insurgency and against the insurgents. For the most part this is quiet work, done not with lights and sirens but with knowledge of society’s structure and the pressures which can be brought to bear against the insurgency within society.40 Society-centric warfare in China’s case relies upon the security services’ ability to coerce or entice each social unit to police itself to the extent required. Each society is different, yet all societies have points and methods of influence. China has relied heavily upon a range of subtle to heavy coercion, yet this coercion itself is not what achieved results. Every society must decide for itself where the line between justice and security lies and what the appropriate mix is of coercion and enticement. Using social ties to place pressure upon a nascent and endemic insurgency, China achieved considerable success in curtailing the activities of insurgents attempting to set society alight. Employing the techniques of society-centric warfare, the security services pursued three interrelated categories of targets: individuals; organization and groups; and, ideas and ideology. Each target set contributes to the insurgency in different ways: individuals are the physical embodiment of the movement;

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organizations carry the potential for the insurgency to gain momentum within society; and, ideas and ideology are the insurgency’s lifeblood, for this collective consciousnesses and dream is the core point of contestation. Target: individuals Individuals embody the insurgency, contributing their unique resources – material and ideational. Some people are simple foot soldiers, muscle, while others provide brains. Specific training in weapon use and operational planning as well as those particularly capable of leading others are targeted by Xinjiang’s security forces. Gathering intelligence through the social groupings discussed above, the Public Security Bureau and police reportedly have grown particularly adept at discerning who has received international training and isolating these individuals from social support. Guns are not common in China, thus weapons smuggling and bomb-making are key insurgent knowledge-sets. According to Chinese media sources, the security forces have recently stemmed the flow of arms into Xinjiang.41 Discerning who is an insurgent has proven a difficult though not impossible task for security forces.42 The task here is separating sympathy for separatism and religious interest from engagement in political Islam and/or outright support of the insurgency. Indeed, China has failed to convince international human rights observers and scholars that it is performing the task in good faith, let alone with the necessary nuance. By holding society and social groups (e.g. family, neighborhoods, workgroups, and in many cases friends) responsible for the actions of their constituents, China makes an implicit claim that individuals are part of a larger phenomenon. Splitting the sympathizers from the activists is a vital step difficult to achieve without perfect knowledge of the battlefield. Security forces are tasked with eliminating elements which are driving the insurgency forward; they are not clairvoyant. Insurgents in the contemporary international jihad do not wear flags on the sleeve of uniforms. The insurgents live in an underground, revealing their identity only long enough to attack.43 Nevertheless, China stands accused of casting a very wide net in its sweeps for insurgents. These sweeps and large arrest-statistics demonstrate a lack of actionable intelligence about the identity of insurgents. Although those arrested could all be insurgents, this is assessed to be improbable. China’s threatperception surpasses the tactical-threat and the state is willing to err on the side of repression. While the threat-perception is correct strategically, tactically the threat is usually more diffuse than that claimed by authorities. Socio-political fear, reflexive repression, and a system which asserts stability without liberty or individual justice combine to produce arrests and punishment which likely reach well beyond the scope of tactical intelligence about individual insurgents.

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Target: organizations and groups Organizations and groups carry the inherent possibility for insurgency. Groups need not be dissident or insurgent when they form to become hubs or nurseries for insurgency. Social institutions devoted to one specific function have historically provided individuals with powerful training which is applied directly toward subsequent arenas.44 Beyond increasing an individual’s capacity to express opinions and advocate for social and political changes, civil society groups45 place individuals into contact with other group members. Coming into contact with people creates the possibility that they will exchange ideas and form into a more cohesive unit. Through bonds of friendship and trust, social groups can form and shape the perspective of group members. And groups can work to alter the balance of forces in society. Once formed, groups and organizations carry the potential for Xinjiang’s insurgency to establish itself within society and gain momentum. The Chinese one-party state does not allow social forces to rise unchecked from society lest their delicate grip on power be challenged. What would be considered civil society in the United States, and whose actions would strengthen the state through dissent and public discourse, is behavior that threatens China’s Partystate. Gathering intelligence on who is organizing and for what purposes is a key task for security forces. While preventing organization in general is standard operating procedure, in the course of the past decade restrictions on groups forming within society have slowly begun to loosen. This trend varies by location, proceeding faster in the region’s capital and northern Xinjiang; authorities in Kashgar are haltingly loosening their grip upon society. Organizations are by necessity secretive underground affairs; even if they intend no threat to the state, groups and networks fear arbitrary and draconian actions by Xinjiang’s security apparatus. Fear of harsh treatment raises the potential costs for organization, likely suppressing much of the social entrepreneurship which would otherwise materialize.46 Tactical intelligence must also be gathered amid riots and episodes of unrest. This is a different type of target than underground groups, for riots and unrest can range from spontaneous to meticulously planned, small and rapid to large and protracted affairs. Xinjiang’s security forces have built a capacity to move among mobs – at times using technology (e.g. video surveillance) but also using human assets who quietly blend in with the crowd and gather intelligence on the crowd’s dynamics. Leaders, provocateurs, and other instigating threats are sought in the attempt to affect the crowd’s disposition as a group (organized or ad hoc). Target: insurgent organizations abroad Insurgent organizations abroad, including dissidents, separatists, and terrorists, are a particularly difficult and important target for China’s security services.

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Based in cities of Central Asia, Turkey, Germany, and the United States among others, these groups run websites and work to raise international support against the Chinese in Xinjiang and assert that they are the only legitimate voice of Xinjiang’s Uyghurs. While many of these groups renounced violence after 9/11, some have claimed that resistance is a right of people under occupation. These organizations claim to have contacts, networks, or fighters within Xinjiang. Typically, organizations abroad are covered by the Ministry of State Security (MSS). The MSS conducts surveillance on, gathers intelligence from and against, and attempts to disrupt the workings of these groups.47 Perhaps because many of these dissidents can not return freely to Xinjiang there is a disconnection between those abroad who are publishing and advertising their views and those within Xinjiang. Exiles have given foreign scholars and governments dated, inaccurate, or fabricated information.48 In Xinjiang locals are not necessarily receptive to the exaggerated claims of those who now live in safety abroad, for when threats are levied against the government the situation on the ground tightens. China’s security forces in Xinjiang, it seems, are not able to accurately assess what role or impact these “cyber-dissidents” have in shaping local opinion.49 Alternately, their stern actions could be preventing these external ideas from taking hold. Perhaps China’s actions have driven a wedge between those abroad and their desired audience. Cyber-dissidents’ greatest impact has been in shaping the international public debate about Xinjiang in media and academic circles. Beyond gathering international condemnation of China’s repressive actions in Xinjiang, these efforts have had little tangible result. One analyst sympathetic to the insurgency’s dream argued that locals within Xinjiang suffer more repression in response to actions of the cyber-dissidents residing safely abroad. China’s political and security officials fear “internationalizing” Xinjiang’s problems.50 Added international attention has the potential to bring military consequences from at least two sources: in the wake of Kosovo and the new international interventionism as well as the waves of Muslim fighters willing to travel abroad and sacrifice themselves to fighting infidels. From China’s point of view, international attention which has nearly uniformly criticized China’s actions and downplayed the insurgency’s threat is itself a threat to the state’s freedom of action in countering the insurgency. Reporters and scholars who side with the insurgency are perceived to be part of the problem; thus, they are a threat to the state. Media and scholars who enter Xinjiang are also security service targets.51 Providing sensitive information to foreigners is considered spreading state secrets to foreign powers, also known as spying. Public Security Bureau officials reportedly arrest Uyghurs who are caught discussing the region’s socio-political situation with foreigners. Because of this dampening effect of secrecy and the arrest of reporters’ sources before their eyes, China has not received credit for the positive works and security conditions it has achieved in Xinjiang. Independent assessments of Xinjiang’s socio-political situation have been blocked visibly by draconian local authorities. This has led to a negative

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feedback loop of publicity and repression: as international interest in Xinjiang grows the story never changes because media reporters and academics alike, working on short visas, who are perceived to be under the watchful eyes of secret police, produce stories of Uyghurs discontent with China’s security officials. These reports lead to greater crackdowns on media and scholars while in Xinjiang,52 and their access decreases. Fresh situational assessments cannot be built upon stale information collected through the same sources or dissidents abroad that may or may not be genuinely connected to the pulse of society. Target: ideas and ideology Ideas and ideology are targeted by Xinjiang’s security forces through negative and positive tactics. Security forces work to deny religious extremism and other insurgent ideals safe haven within society while state agents assert a vision of unity among the nationalities under the Chinese banner. Together the positive and negative tactics form an attempt to use information and analysis to dominate the “cultural market.”53 The positive actions are analyzed in greater depth in the next chapter, though a few tactics bear mentioning here. Propaganda in the form of slogan-laden banners are used within elite institutions54 and on city streets alike to encourage residents to unite against social ills of insurgency or drugs (narcotics were identified, in a number of interviews including drug enforcement and local government officials as well as Uyghur men with no fondness for the Chinese, to be either a causal or strongly compounding factor of the insurgency).55 In addition to the mass-targeted tools of banners, posters and paintings of Xinjiang’s “happy” minority nationality members dressed in traditional costumes, often holding hands, are visible in many of the region’s cities and villages. Propaganda also flows down through the ranks of Communist organizations providing cadres with aid in finding the official and “correct” understanding of events, international, domestic, and local.56 After eruptions of unrest propaganda urging stability abounds.57 Islam is allowed as a religion yet prohibited in political form, and groups which teach or spread political Islam are not permitted. Islamic leaders undergo state-approved training; however, there are reports of underground groups which teach more fundamentalist and political Islam from homes. Religious leaders who are perceived to be advocating social or political actions have been removed from their posts (with unknown fates afterwards) and replaced. Spies and informants are believed to attend prayer services.58 Religious instruction is prohibited for anyone under the age of eighteen. Sinologists Graham Fuller and Jonathan Lipman write: The forces of law and order have focused their attention on preventing underground religious instruction, on carrying out neighborhood sweeps to catch suspected Uyghur nationalists, and on maintaining surveillance of religious professionals. Their goal is to ensure that imams do not teach Islam to children, do not advocate Islamic “fundamentalism” or radicalism

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Grass-roots institutions and security (however the state may define those terms), and do not encourage or create connections between Muslims in China and elsewhere. Several informants describe small social gatherings in private courtyards interrupted by inquisitive police because a religious professional was present. . . . The police squads, usually including Uyghurs, wanted to know what was being discussed, what books were on the table, and what the imam was teaching and to whom.59

While Fuller and Lipman seem to imply that this is an example of excessive action by officials reaching into the lives of individuals practicing religion, China treats ideological support for insurgency as a key element demanding counter-measures.60 Whether material or ideational tactics are employed, combating insurgent ideology is a vital component of COIN. This war of ideas is analyzed in the following chapter. China does place restrictions upon religion. In this new age of international terrorism and insurgency, there is no place for “free” expression of fundamentalist Islam. A political Islam which advocates the overthrow of secular governments is at its core a threat to international security. Dissent is an important part of a healthy society, but speech which ultimately advocates atrocity is itself illegitimate and must be combated by responsible authorities. In addition to policing religion, Xinjiang’s security services intercept communications – internally and from abroad. While the internal communications intercepts are easily understood, intercepting, interrupting, and blocking information from abroad is more problematic, hinting at being a symptom of illegitimate governance of a police-state. Blocking published western academic works from entering Xinjiang is a tactic unrelated to COIN, though it would be necessary in a totalitarian or colonial enterprise. Blocking access to information on human rights and democracy, transmitted via the Internet, email, letters, or packages from abroad are symptoms of China’s overall political disease; Xinjiang is but the most sensitive area in China.

Conclusion As Xinjiang’s insurgency evolved so to did China’s counter-insurgency. When the insurgency began claiming local institutions and further severing the state from society the state refocused its efforts at the grass-roots organizations of not only the state, but within society itself. To regain its grasp upon society China purged local state and Party organizations of those suspected of having ties to or sympathies with the insurgency. Rebuilding these institutions with loyal cadres who understood the local language, culture, and situation was a must but the most important step China took was a break with past precedent in Xinjiang. Rather than fill posts purely with loyal Communist ideologues, capable and educated people were sought for influential posts. Because of the structure and implementation of the political system, even when decisions are crafted at the heights of national leadership these decisions pass down through a chain of

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increasingly local Party and state institutions. Decisions are thus repeatedly reinterpreted and tailored to the nuances of the local situation by those with the best situational information available. China polices Xinjiang’s society through the use of shadowy security forces and, more visibly, pressuring social institutions to take responsibility for their members’ actions. Fear and coercion primarily motivate society’s compliance, yet voluntary cooperation is not wholly absent. Taken together, China’s strategy in Xinjiang is best described as a form of society-centric warfare, where the effort to effect enemy political will is contested directly within society; grassroots institutions of both state and society are at once mechanisms and locations of contestation. Counter-insurgency in Xinjiang rests upon China’s ability to effect society’s political will and, ultimately, turn society against the insurgency. Within each tactic and on the whole China’s campaign works to counter the insurgency by effecting change from the bottom of society upwards, attacking the insurgency rather than the insurgents per se. Chapter 4 examined the changing use of force in Xinjiang, assessing that military and paramilitary forces play a decreasing role in actual interaction with society. The present chapter analyzed the contestation for grass-roots institutions and the use of security services capable of operating within society, arguing that China’s use of society-centric warfare has been a key factor in the effectiveness of its COIN campaign. Chapter 6 investigates the tools China has used in the attempt to reshape Xinjiang’s society en masse: educational, religious and cultural, economic, and political.

6

The war of ideas Reshaping society in Xinjiang

The people of Xinjiang will never allow anyone to use any means or take any occasion to damage national security and the life and property of the people. (Ismail Tiwaldi [8/2005] Governor of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region)1

China countered Xinjiang’s insurgency by enhancing the state’s methods of coercing and leading society. In concert with the military and security policies discussed above, education, religion and cultural, economic, and governance policies were used to reshape society and remove support for the insurgency. Each of these policies attempt to intertwine society with the state, reshaping society’s perceptions of state and insurgent power. To counter the insurgent dream, a collective idea of future security through resistance against the state, the state engendered and allowed competing dreams to form within society – dreams achievable only through participation in the state’s project. This chapter analyzes China’s policies and their effectiveness as the state attempted to effect society’s political will for insurgency. Insurgency is a security competition in which a challenger confronts the state’s hegemony within society, where attacks seek to demonstrate the state’s inability to provide this most essential societal good. Popular discussions of the “war of ideas” in media and academic circles have focused on fixed identities, ethnic or religious, and on grievances (usually cultural-historical affairs) as the cause of contemporary low-intensity conflict. Recently new groups of scholars have successfully challenged the previous consensus, finding that varying identities and grievances are present in every society and other factors can better explain contemporary international conflicts.2 This chapter investigates the Chinese case using a power-based model of insurgency and intra-state conflict.3 Power here is understood not as simple, mechanical, and material but rather as evolving and fungible social perceptions. Importantly, changes in society’s perceptions of state and insurgent power, as well as state and insurgent perceptions of the changing power dynamics, explain much of insurgency. Additionally, society’s changing perceptions of the nature

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of power itself, especially the fear of violent coercion by state or insurgent, is assessed to be an important causal variable. The present chapter first investigates the use of reshaping society to counter insurgency, the need to create a meaningful security, and the use of effecting society’s perceptions of state power. From this theoretical base, this chapter analyzes four key policy areas of the China case: education, religion and culture, economics, and the politics of governance. While China has thus far achieved successes through educational as well as religious and cultural policies, its focus on delivering material economic development has alienated society. Though China may not be able to take credit, the politics of governance are assessed to be evolving to the counter-insurgent’s benefit.

Reshaping society to counter insurgency To counter insurgency the state must do more than respond to attacks, innovative political violence which draw attention to the insurgency’s strength and cast doubt on the state’s viability. The state must act early, proactively, before a nascent insurgency gains traction and momentum. When an insurgency arises from the dissent present in all polities the state must not simply be materially powerful, society must perceive it to be powerful. While power at first cut may sound like “deliverable military force,” in counter-insurgency its meaning spans far beyond. The use of military force alone is a hallmark of ineffective top-down COIN campaigns. Raw force can eliminate individuals and organizations, yet an insurgency is an idea residing within a social movement which acts as a force within society challenging the state’s primacy. Raw force can thus demonstrate, or increase society’s perceptions of, a state’s relative weakness and vulnerability. To counter insurgency a state must not only remove the organization’s roots from society but society itself must be transformed into a hostile environment for the insurgency as an organic entity.4 This strategy represents a bottom-up approach to countering insurgency. Tactics to reshaping society itself can be crafted and tailored to local conditions through a process of socio-cultural knowledge, trial and error, as well as historical learning. Bottom-up tactics for reshaping society itself are a contest of innovation between insurgent and counter-insurgent, like all the tactics of insurgency. Nevertheless, this study argues5 that insurgency is a security competition for and within society. The task of reshaping society may extend beyond this arena but this is the crucial area of contestation. Providing meaningful security The ideas which counter insurgency are those which impact society’s conceptions and perceptions of security. State and insurgent power, strength and capability, are the primary areas of contestation. The insurgent’s dream too is an important idea, yet convincing society that the insurgency’s future is untenable

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likely relies less on debating pros and cons of their political platform and more on each side’s ability to craft a meaningful security. Some societies are very poor environments for particular ideas, for the populations find the content of those ideas antithetical to their understanding of who they are. Insurgencies have little appeal to these societies and can gain little traction even with weak states. Fighters may linger, but this is type of fighting is unlikely to last long given even a limited military response by the state. Therefore, insurgencies which linger in society are those which have built a political program not incompatible with society’s self-perceptions.6 Importantly, societies vary in tolerance for the use and visibility of the state’s institutions of violence and coercion while countering an insurgency. Social structure, history, political debate, and society’s trust in its government may be important factors though further studies are needed to identify key variables and processes.7 Power relations within arenas experiencing insurgency are anarchic in nature; like in the international arena, a state seeks hegemony,8 though in this case over a particular society. As argued above, perceptions of power are a key factor. In his seminal study, Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict, Stephen Van Evera writes: States’ perceptions of the structure of international power strongly affect the risk of war. States fight when they think they will prevail, when they think the advantage will lie with the side moving first, when they believe their relative power is in decline, when they assume that resource cumulivity is high, and, most important, when they believe that conquest is easy. . . . The actual structure of international power also affects the risk of war, but it matters less because states often misperceive it and because they react only to what they perceive. . . . Many modern wars have been wars of illusions, waged by states drawn to war by misperceptions of international power realities.9 Applying Van Evera’s carefully derived international logic at the internal level, we find that society’s perceptions of the structure of power is a primary enabling variable for insurgency and counter-insurgency alike. In insurgency momentum also affects society’s perceptions of power. Actors (insurgent or counter-insurgent) move when they think they will easily prevail or when they fear their ability to prevail by force is declining. When the time seems right and momentum builds through a confluence of social forces joining as one cascade, society may rain down upon the state. As insurgency scholar J. Bowyer Bell writes: An armed struggle may arise among the many who had waited only for an opportunity to act, waited for a perceived vulnerability; suddenly national resistance is possible by all those who are nationalists, not just the few dedicated to an obscure vision.10

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Like modern wars in the international realm, insurgency too is a war of illusions11 waged by actors who underestimate the difficulty or simply disregard the costs of achieving their socio-political ends through violence. Wars’ sociopolitical effects are rarely if ever predictable before a conflagration. Effecting society’s perception of state power Primary to society’s ideas and perception of power is the conception of the state’s identity. In society’s eyes, does the state represent and/or help society: is the state a legitimate player in society? Alternately, are the state’s actions predatory or fundamentally threatening? If the state is defined as antithetical and intolerable to society then there is little choice for society but to resist; this is the role in which the insurgency attempts to cast the state. Overreaction and consequent brutal excesses of security forces are common traps, often deliberately provoked by insurgents, into which counter-insurgents fall. However, the state can work to redefine the perception of its identity: not as a threat to society but as society’s savior from a brutal insurgency, or simply as the society’s best shot at a better future. Casting the insurgency as an alien phenomenon unjustly invading a peaceful society is a common counter-insurgent tactic. Propaganda, pushed through media, educational, and cultural outlets is an important state tool for perceptionshaping. Propaganda aims to directly impact society’s perceptions without fundamentally changing an underlying “reality.” Reshaping society: creating hope through state ties Creating hope in society and linking society’s future success to that of the state is a strategy beyond superficial propaganda campaigns. It is not enough to do good works; the state must be widely perceived as doing good works for society. Broadcasting news of positive works will backfire if the messenger or media is perceived as illegitimate or otherwise simply lacking in credibility. As argued below, the lack of a credible media has been a significant problem for China. Through creating hope for society when it is linked with an organ of the state, the state can work to redefine the socio-political environment which initially engendered insurgency. Each society is different, holding a unique mix of needs and wants which must be addressed through various (and arguably unique) mixes of processes and deliverables. While propaganda disseminated through media, educational, and cultural outlets in society can be more easily rejected by societies used to the lies of authoritarian or dishonest states, changing society’s perceptions through creating new ties to the state is more fundamental. Done well, this strategy produces results which are difficult for society to ignore. Importantly, insurgencies do not occur in a vacuum. Societies look throughout the international arena and through history for comparisons to their current situation. As insurgency and terrorism look better or worse for societies internationally, this perception will also affect the state’s ability to counter the local

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insurgency.12 When a counter-insurgency triumphs in one arena, or when an insurgency in one arena outpaces others in atrocity and brutality and strips the cause of its perceived legitimacy and righteousness, insurgencies elsewhere may recoil. What society wants their homeland to look like Chechnya in the 1990s or Iraq c.2003–6? When insurgency leads to a promised land in this life the odds seem favorable, yet if the road to a better life lies in peace – a peace which the state is offering at little or lower relative costs – then warfare will seem decreasingly like an easy, desirable, or even viable path. Men and women of action will better themselves, their families, and their society (however defined) through the state rather than against it. Perceptions of identity and power in Xinjiang Xinjiang’s insurgency is not simply an Islamist Uyghur vs. infidel Han ethnic conflict, however much the insurgents would wish this perception to be the case.13 As the following sections argue, China has worked hard to prevent these identities from becoming socially fixed, though considerable problems persist. Identities are malleable, however unchanging they superficially appear.14 Ethnic identities fixed at birth are not causal variables even in traditional ethnic conflict.15 Identities are manipulated by political leaders to construct antagonism within society beneficial to their cause, be it ideology, grievance, or greed.16 Thus, identity manipulation is a tool and symptom rather than a cause of social frictions. While the machinations of rational and greedy elites are often blamed, this study asserts that these elites can better be understood as a component of society’s structure. When the state is weak, elites will rise and attempt to lead society, at times through particularistic and exclusive identity politics. To remedy this pathology, states must be perceived as powerfully working with society. Reversing particularistic identity politics is a method of treating a highly visible symptom which, if unchecked, can infect the entire polity. Crafting the right situation in which social forces push against the insurgency itself is the ultimate counter-insurgent task. These forces can be new organizations, movements, ideas, and hopes; alternately, elements of older forces can be refurbished and redirected. Through educational, cultural, economic, and political tools China has pushed for creating hope in Xinjiang’s society tied directly and intimately to the Chinese state. Not only have these ties been built but China is working to make these ties visible throughout Xinjiang. Bringing in massive infrastructure projects aimed at improving local conditions is but one example. Creating a track record of stability, or at least the perception of this, and avoiding repeats of China’s historic self-infliction of socio-political tumult have lead to greater perceptions of state strength. The following sections investigate how China has effected the perceptions of meaningful security for society in Xinjiang through educational, religious and cultural, economic, and political means. Explicitly, this study investigates not only the material and policy changes which China has affected but also

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investigates how these actions have effected society’s perceptions of state power and society’s own security. When all of these actions are taken together, this study argues that China has worked to fundamentally reshape society in Xinjiang. China’s effectiveness in countering Xinjiang’s insurgency has been greatly enhanced because of this bottom-up element within an overall bottom-up campaign. While the campaign’s other elements discussed in the previous chapters provided instrumental and social-psychological dampening down of the insurgency, China’s reshaping of society is the single element which may ultimately snuff out the insurgency.

Education: changing perceptions of power; creating hope and opportunity Countering insurgency requires creating dreams and hope for society when tied directly to the state, and visibly demonstrating the power of the state to begin making this dream reality. The insurgency can offer society a dream of life without the state; to counter this, the state can make a hopeful reality possible. Educating children is a unique claim the state can place upon society, for until the age of eighteen or twenty-four the state’s institutions can become the primary authoritative voice regarding, and site of, socialization.17 While all modern states attempt to perform this function, the content varies from state to state as well as within the state across territory and time. Education, including the socialization process itself, aims ultimately to produce people more capable of functioning within their society: better able to follow important rules and laws; better able to raise healthy families; and better able to contribute to the society to the greatest extent. China has built a comprehensive program of education which tailors the state’s agenda for local palates. Using local language and creating good jobs for educators China has reshaped ideas in Xinjiang’s society well beyond what China’s propaganda-makers could perform. Xinjiang scholar Dru C. Gladney writes: Although the state offers elementary and secondary education in Uyghur, it has made certain that Mandarin is the language of upward mobility in Xinjiang, as in the rest of China. . . . It is the secular intellectuals trained in . . . Chinese schools, as opposed to traditional religious elites, who are asserting political leadership in Xinjiang today. . . . [T]he overwhelming thrust of the state’s policy is to teach a centralized curriculum dominated by Han history and language. By this means it ensures that Uyghur children enter into the Chinese world and come to participate formally in the Chinese nation-state. Such a policy, aimed at inducting Uyghurs into the Han Chinese milieu, drives a wedge between the Uyghurs and their own traditions.18 While Gladney regrets the loss of local culture to that of the core, China’s education project has shifted society’s perceptions of state and insurgent power

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decidedly in the state’s favor. This section analyzes three primary factors of China’s education project in Xinjiang: the roles of students, teachers, and ideas in reshaping local society. Taken together, this section argues that China’s education project is among the most important facets of China’s bottom-up approach to counter-insurgency through reshaping society. Students: creating a pathway to opportunity Xinjiang’s schools are secular institutions which educate children in either Han (Hanyu is literally Han language; aka Mandarin) or Uyghur languages. Within Xinjiang’s cities there are separate schools for education in each language. Despite attempts to make parallel schooling equitable, the trajectories of students’ lives are in fact far from equal. Because Xinjiang is an autonomous region children are allowed education in their ethnic group’s language, yet the politics of choosing a school – parents reportedly have a general ability to choose which track their child will join – are more complex than a simple preference for education in the “native” language. Success for Uyghurs increasingly, Uyghurs across the social spectrum report, involves mastering the Chinese language.19 Uyghurs believe they face considerable discrimination in the post-graduation job market and must be exceedingly qualified in order to obtain decent jobs which will better their situation. Given the choice more and more Uyghur families are choosing to enroll their children in the Han schools, even in locations which have, to date, experienced some of the greatest uprisings. While there is stigma attached to being a “minority” student educated primarily in the Han language, nagging stigma is not enough to dissuade the growing trend of Uyghurs enrolling their children in schools which will provide their child a better chance in life. Indeed, so many Uyghurs are enrolling in the Han language schools that Han children are learning Uyghur language from classmates on the playgrounds – reportedly much to their parents’ chagrin.20 Students in China today are constantly tested, building towards the seemingly all-determining college entrance examination. Performance on this examination places students in a college and assigns the subject which they will study. With excellent scores Uyghur students are sent outside of Xinjiang for university, often to schools in eastern China’s large cities. Scores are adjusted positively for minority students in the attempt to increase the education level of targeted populations. In the year 2005 only half of China’s students testing for university entrance were offered a seat at any college, let alone one of their choosing.21 To receive points for being Uyghur aids these students immensely. The brightest Uyghurs, or those who test very well, are offered slots at prestigious eastern schools; their friends who remain in Xinjiang are very proud of their achievement (despite some resentments, whether from jealousy or other causes). Not only does this program aim to demonstrate the state’s helping hand toward bettering Uyghurs’ situation, but this program may carry hidden benefits for the state. Uyghurs who travel east can credibly report to their friends and

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family about the rapid development of the eastern cities – a state of economic development which is infinitely beyond that available even in Urumqi, the provincial capital. More immediately, these young men and women are removed from Xinjiang. Insurgencies often take this very segment of society as their leadership.22 Rather than inflaming the situation, these exceptional young Uyghurs are sent far from home to learn of a better life within the seeming wonderland of China’s big eastern cities. While some eventually reject the lures of big-city glitz and modern living, insurgencies are rooted in discrete places and times. Shuffling young Uyghur elites to points east – or even toward Urumqi’s universities – buys time for the Chinese to snuff out the insurgency. While comprehensive data is not available, China has had early success with Uyghurs sent out of the province for education – either returning to work peacefully for improving local conditions or migrating out. Uyghur language education in higher grades and at the college level is now being curtailed in a cultural assimilation project reminiscent of France’s recent school head-scarf debate, or perhaps more directly comparable is the United States’ contemporary bilingual education frictions. The US bilingual education debates center on education in primary grades, arguably a more impressionable age group for the state to dramatically influence cultural and social perceptions. Teachers: delivering visible local employment Schools are more than places where students are socialized; they are an enormous state-run industry with the ability to employ a large segment of society’s leadership within a highly structured project. Beyond sheer numbers, those Uyghur educators employed by the Chinese state are regarded with a social respect, deference, and prestige far beyond that found in the United States. Teachers in China have personal responsibility for their student’s learning, absorbing responsibilities which in the United States are left to parents or even the students themselves. Educators can be, and are, expected to place demands upon their students for performance; classes can become much tighter organic social units with the teacher as the leader. Delivering visible local employment, schools offer Uyghur educators social recognition and a decent salary on which they can live comfortably, though not lavishly, within their community. In fact and in perception the state is providing for educated Uyghurs to return to their communities and teach Uyghur students in the Uyghur language. While Uyghurs did report problems with this system, primarily the relative lack of opportunities for Uyghur students educated in the Uyghur language system, the same individuals also acknowledged that the parallel Han and Uyghur language schooling system gave autonomy some local flesh, however flawed.23 The Uyghur-language schools provide an employment opportunity for educated and nationalistic Uyghurs; that is, those Uyghurs who received higher education and are devoted to bettering their communities have a sanctioned and

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sponsored outlet. State sponsorship of this mission not only helps these individuals but, most importantly, provides a productive release of ethnic-nationalist and parochial sentiments while legitimating the state project. Xinjiang’s twotrack educational system thus achieves jujitsu-type results, turning what might otherwise be building energy for the insurgency into additional power for the state. Importantly, not only is the state’s power additional in fact, but because of the social deference for teachers in Uyghur society the state’s power is multiplied through local perceptions. Ideas: controlling the content, impacting perceptions The Chinese state’s agenda is drilled into young Uyghur consciousness through socialization in quasi-indigenous institutions. In their neighborhood schools,24 Xinjiang’s children are taught that Xinjiang has long been a part of China and ethnic tolerance is good by Uyghur educators in the Uyghur language. As in the United States and other countries, the state’s agenda of pursuing tolerance is legitimated using tools such as essay contests in which students take ownership of the ideas through situational stimuli and rewards. Autonomy as delivered in education is that of language rather than that of ideas. Curriculum is standard fare, reportedly developed and propagated by national authorities in Beijing for all of China’s schools. Beijing’s education agenda is presented in Uyghur language texts and lessons, yet the ideas are those disseminated by the core throughout China’s internal periphery. Local educators risk deviation from this regime at their own peril; teachers who deviate might lose their jobs or could face arrest. While the curriculum is that of the core, there may be some amount of local modification possible. Local initiative is lacking, however, for educators can not be sure their efforts will be tolerated by their bosses (including Party officials and members within every school) let alone local security officials. Spies and informers are feared present in educational settings as well as in the community at large. Flexibility to tailor Beijing’s policies and curriculum to local conditions and preferences, if it exists, may be going unused because of fear of arbitrary state power, including intolerance of differences in ideas or future shifts in political tolerances. Nevertheless, the extent of this flexibility is untested and thus unknown even to educators themselves. Understanding history History is perhaps the most contentious topic in Xinjiang today. Ethnicnationalist historians argued that Uyghurs have an 8,000-year history in Xinjiang, far surpassing China’s 5,000 years of civilization. While the question of whose history is bigger is beyond the scope of this study, China’s response is relevant. That author’s works were banned and, when found, burned. Advocating these views can land educators in considerable trouble with their bosses if not the local security apparatus.25

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History teaches not only about the past but attempts to imbue a sense of identity, responsibility, purpose, and place for individuals in the grand scheme of human existence.26 Lives come and go but the narrative of human progress makes our actions today seem somehow more significant. With knowledge of history individual actions link into a fabric and our experiences are more than isolated events. Controlling the story and teaching of history affects society’s self-understanding and, ultimately, potentially alters society’s perception of its situation. Students must have a working knowledge of China’s version of political history for the all-important college entrance examination. Similarly, China selects who will formally study history, what they research, and what they teach. Understanding international affairs International affairs are a particularly important sub-set of ideas for, like history, knowledge of developments abroad aids people in understanding and interpreting their own situation and opportunities for change. Without knowledge of developments and patterns elsewhere populations would be isolated, left unaffected by external ideas and trends. Shifts in power or the rise of new tactics or ideologies would be without impact. Yet Uyghurs are not isolated from information about developments beyond Xinjiang’s borders. As waves of democratization and terror round the globe, along with other changing norms like those of intervention and human rights, news of international developments could directly impact stability in Xinjiang. Nevertheless, there are chasms among information, interpretation, and understanding even if given complete and unhindered access to media and debate; lacking these resources the process of external ideas impacting the local situation becomes decreasingly potent. While the content of information regarding international affairs is censored and spun, information variously seeps and pours into the province for those interested in obtaining it. Newspapers as well as radio and television stations are now supplemented by the internet. China controls the flow of information on each of these media and reportedly, according to Uyghur sources, blocks Radio Free Asia’s Uyghur service. Nevertheless, educated Uyghurs today are generally aware of major international events, even if some of their information lacks the substantive depth needed to form the complete picture of cause and effect. Even with a free press building a picture of major international events can be regretfully difficult due to government secrecy or dangers in reporting, to name but a few hindrances. Even people who are educated within China’s institutions of higher learning are not necessarily able to transform the data provided by media into actionable understandings because the source of the information itself is not trusted. Further, because it is not safe to talk and freely debate ideas with friends, the transformation of raw information into new ideas and understandings is stifled. Discussions among friends, family members, or coworkers in free societies are more than simple fact-finding ventures. Together understandings are created through social interactions, individuals each bringing pieces to bear – some

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lingering and others being discarded; opinions about events’ meanings can and do change through discussion.27 This process is not wholly absent in Xinjiang, but it is present like a leaky faucet rather than the smooth flow of life in China’s large eastern cities or the easy and unnoticed cascading of free societies. News enters in rough form and is filtered through the coarse cloth of ethic-nationalist pride and prejudice. Education on international affairs means learning facts as presented by teachers who, for the most controversial issues, were instructed directly on what to teach by their school’s Communist overseers. Independent thinking is not a cultivated talent here, and unique thoughts are rare or perhaps rarely expressed for fear of punishment. Education and counter-insurgency China has countered insurgency in Xinjiang by reshaping society, a long-term project which begins with affecting and transforming hopes and dreams into those of a life within a society lead by the state. Training a rising generation is the state’s first step: children learn to dream of a positive future within the state’s umbrella, and parents dream of a life for their child better than their own. Because insurgency is a security competition based upon dreams and perceptions of power, counter-insurgents must convincingly demonstrate their power to create hope for society when and as it rejects the insurgency. While the insurgency can promise a better life once the state retreats, the state can deliver at least the first steps towards that better life today. This is the struggle in which China has been engaged. Education in Xinjiang socializes Uyghur students to life within China. The state unquestionably can take students into its institutions to be taught the state’s curriculum. While accommodations are made to make the state’s power tolerable for local palates, such as employing local educators who can teach in the local language, the effect is cumulative and simple: society is being reshaped from the bottom up. Educating new generations is a long-term investment in stability, but the process has had a rapid effect in Xinjiang as young men and women have gone from school age into their teens, twenties, or thirties since the insurgency erupted. Because of the socialization in China’s institutions these individuals are increasingly connected with China and less with parochial interests and local society alone. Through China’s education policies in Xinjiang, society’s perception of the state’s power increased as the perceived opportunity for the insurgency evaporated. Society’s hopes are now, however begrudgingly, increasingly tied through the state.

Religion and culture To counter Xinjiang’s insurgency China had to remove politics from religion for two reasons: first, the institutions of religion were being used as protected places

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within society from which to challenge the Party-state’s self-claimed unique role within society; second, the ideology of Islam can be used to focus on achieving access to paradise through struggle (jihad), thus redefining power in absolute and non-negotiable terms which can be resolved only through violence. This section analyzes how China attempted to remove religious-based political opposition not necessarily, or perhaps not solely, because they are an avowedly atheist regime: Religion was genuinely being used as a tool with which to challenge and change society’s perception of the state’s power. Severing politics from religion Xinjiang’s insurgency erupted in the 1990s from mosques and religious gatherings. Religious ideals were not necessarily the cause of insurgency, alone or in concert with other factors, but religious institutions were being used politically to challenge the state.28 State-granted freedoms to worship god and search for greater meaning in life beyond simple material existence were being abused; the physical and ideational spaces of religious exploration and community were being used to advocate socio-political actions which lead to boycotts, riots, and arguably to numerous terrorist attacks. China worked to remove political discourse and political power from Xinjiang’s religious institutions through defining who could study and practice religion, as well as tightening and enforcing the parameters of permitted discourse. Taken together these policy actions worked to decrease insurgent power, and perceptions thereof, within society while demonstrating state power.29 Defining who can worship Common people have the least constraints placed upon their ability to practice religion as an exploration of spiritual life; those who are leaders in society, especially those employed by the state, do not in practice have such freedom. Uyghurs in Xinjiang employed by the state are expected to be publicly secular, though private worship is not easily curtailed. If a person is perceived as being too religious their job may be in jeopardy – their advancement frustrated if they are not removed outright. In extreme cases local security officials might weighin, attempting to coerce offending officials away from proscribed behaviors.30 While China needs Uyghurs participating as part of its Party-state governance apparatus, atheist Hans are argued to be unaffiliated with particularistic interests and thus better able to serve all the people without ethno-religious bias. Further restrictions constrain the segment of society free to worship: people under eighteen years of age are forbidden from studying Islam in Xinjiang.31 This policy has been the source of considerable friction with more religiously concerned Uyghurs in recent years, reportedly being the source of unconfirmed riots when underground madrassas which had been educating underage students – particularly women – were raided by Chinese security authorities.32 While this tactic might be successful at decreasing the role of religion (political or secular

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alike) within society in the short to mid-term, the story of al Qaeda is replete with men of moderate faith finding a new religious fundamentalism through social connections in the decade after their eighteenth birthday.33 Other measures will have to address this problem. Policing ideas: removing dissent from religion To counter Xinjiang’s insurgency China has worked hard to separate mosque from Party-state while asserting the Party-state’s ability to shape mosque. While the Party-state’s officials are in reality prevented from practicing religion for their personal enrichment, the Party-state tightened its selection and control of religious leaders. Through educational institutions and professional organizations the Chinese cultivated Imams and other leaders receptive to the state’s agenda, or at least willing to not overtly challenge the state’s power from their leadership post within society.34 Religious leaders who challenge the Party-state’s self-claimed primacy within society and who are un-coerced by state power, such as local security or Communist officials’ backroom threats,35 can be removed from their posts or simply disappear (discussed in Chapter 5). Removing and replacing local religious leaders is done to quash discussions of politics and society which might challenge the Party-state. Though removing popular local leaders provoked “public security incidents,” the flaring of tensions in the short-term seems to weigh less for local officials than the more durable and growing threat of Islamic or Islamist groups in society gaining power with which the state will be challenged. Mosque discourse and the actions of religious leaders are policed using local informants and spies, or at least this is what Uyghurs argue is happening. The perception and belief that informants and spies abound may be as powerful as actually having a viable surveillance regime, for the perception itself is a forcemultiplier of the state’s raw tools of coercion. Similarly, dissent is interrupted through limitations on the size of unregistered public gatherings. Gatherings, religious or political, are dampened because of the perceptions that police are everywhere or will learn later of what they do not see today. Importantly, local implementation can vary dramatically: some local officials may be more tyrannical or simply corrupt; these officials might shun or reject even the state’s toleration of religion as spiritual enrichment. While numerous western and Middle Eastern media accounts depict this tyrannical control of religion in Xinjiang as the prevailing pattern, the knowledgeable Uyghurs who this author interviewed believe this to be more of an exception, occurring in a minority of cases, rather than the prevailing norm.36 Taken together the restrictions on who can worship as well as what ideas are permitted work to keep Islam in Xinjiang in a spiritual box from which it can not overtly threaten the state. Extremist elements, understood as those who advocate social and political agendas or simply grow too powerful, are exorcised from the state’s permitted religious circles.

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Power perceptions: paradise vs. the secular state Islamist terrorism has spread a grand perception that religion in-and-of-itself is sparking, as an educated twenty-year-old Uyghur man explained, a “clash of civilizations.”37 The global jihad is a social movement based upon common religious underpinnings,38 but more importantly, constituent local insurgencies are composed of a broader spectrum of beliefs – sectarian and secular. As Chapter 2 argues, the global jihad today began with a particular understanding or interpretation of Islam and set off to inflame Muslims around the world against their local secular governments. Once fighting begins, insurgencies evolve; in the global jihad itself and within its local affiliate insurgencies the milieu of agendas and ideologies expanded beyond particularistic interpretations of Islam, joining into something of a unified and nebulous insurgent dream. The spread of a particular interpretation of a religion is, this study argues, more a consequence than a cause of the global jihad writ large. Nevertheless, a note on these particular other-worldly visions and their impact upon perceptions of state power and society’s security are in order. Firm belief in achieving paradise through jihad – understood as a violent external struggle against infidel regimes rather than an internal spiritual quest – leads to a fundamental reinterpretation of security. The “jihadi’s” goal may be to revive the caliphate and bring Islamic law “back” to the societies and lands once ruled in this fashion.39 Alternately, the jihadi’s goal may simply be to fight in Allah’s name, giving one’s life over to the service of a greater force. Thus, the fighter is the tactician and the strategy is left to “Allah.”40 Such a vision is fundamentally incompatible with a secular society and its state. Those who either hold these absolutist religious beliefs or work alongside these soldiers as part of an insurgency are similarly a threat to the state, for if these ideas gain sufficient traction and momentum within society there is nothing the state can do to alter the society’s perceptions of security. Preliminary data suggests that security forces in Xinjiang pay special attention to those devout believers considered religious fundamentalists. Regretfully, the present study lacks sufficient data to offer substantial analysis of this effort’s effectiveness. While the differential impact upon Xinjiang’s insurgency appears minimal, the spread of radical Islamist ideas and ideals in Xinjiang’s society deserves further investigation.

Economics: engendering resentment despite material improvement Economic development is not a significant causal factor in explaining China’s counter-insurgency efficacy. There is considerable evidence to suggest that China’s economic efforts, which have focused on raising the level of material economic development while neglecting the social dynamics of this development, increased resentment within Uyghur society for it is perceived as a

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colonial project benefiting only the Hans. Despite material gains, society’s surprisingly uniform perception is that the state works only for the Hans; thus, the state arguably is perceived as weaker because development has been achieved without, and even imposed upon, local society. Though China publicly asserts that economic development is key to solving socio-political unrest, there is reason to doubt the positive effects, to date, of material development. President Hu Jintao asserted to the State Council in 2005 that economic “development is the key to all of China’s problems”41 and officials are returning to Marxism for guidance in the wake of increasingly frequent, and increasingly visible social unrest throughout the People’s Republic. Nevertheless, as a young, educated, and upwardly mobile Uyghur man asked in earnest: “What is economic development? . . . Really; I see the city and Xinjiang changing, but no one I know is benefiting.”42 This sentiment is muted and honest questioning. Nearly uniformly in my interviews and interactions in Xinjiang, Uyghurs expressed resentment against what they perceive to be colonial economic development which primarily benefits Han workers, businesses, and businessmen. The China case adds weight to the argument of ethnic conflict and insurgency scholars James C. Fearon and David D. Laitin who write: Economic variables such as per capita income matter primarily because they proxy for state administrative, military, and police capabilities. . . . Our theoretical interpretation is more Hobbesian than economic. Where states are relatively weak and capricious, both fears and opportunities encourage the rise of would-be rulers who supply a rough local justice while arrogating the power to “tax” for themselves and, often, for a larger cause.43 Fearon and Laitin’s conceptual model assumes a consistency across territory not present in the Chinese case, for the core has proven far more capable than simple economic measures alone might predict. As previous chapters discuss, the shift of resources from core to periphery to counter the insurgency is due in large part to China’s infinite political will. Nevertheless, the above logic neatly explains the perception of Xinjiang’s cognizant and questioning Uyghurs. In Xinjiang, society fears that the state is permitting ethnic (Han) elites to aggregate economic power by exploiting their indigenous lands. If anything, the process of economic development as China has thus-far achieved has increased the saliency of the threat – showing state power which Uyghur society has long perceived while highlighting a closing window of opportunity for Uyghur resistance. Uyghurs perceive the colonial noose tied and tightening. Uyghur perceptions of the economic situation are socially dire.44 Though Xinjiang is somewhere in the mid-range of China’s provinces on most key economic indicators, Uyghurs explain that oil, gas, and other extractive industries are owned and – more aggravatingly – operated and staffed primarily by Han immigrants from eastern China. Infrastructure, including massive road and rail construction, as well as telecommunications, exhibits the same staffing pattern.

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Banking and professional jobs too are filled prominently by Han workers (beyond society’s perceptions, head-counts at the Bank of China in Xinjiang’s largest cities revealed that well below 10 percent of the visible staff were Uyghurs). While robust and reliable empirical data is unavailable at the time of writing, educated and uneducated young Uyghurs alike report facing considerable discrimination in the job market. While Han women too report facing similar discrimination, the Uyghurs find the prospects of attaining what they consider a good job daunting if not nearly impossible. Where Uyghur clothing brands or musicians have succeeded, these companies and performers are seen as owing their success to Han manipulation of Uyghur nationalist emotions. Society paradoxically embraces and rejects such overt interventions. Tourism too follows this pattern. Where ancient central marketplaces once formed on public lands in Urumqi and Kashgar, “minority” style buildings now stand, erected by Han enterprises, charging Uyghur shopkeepers steep rents to conduct their unchanged business.45 Beyond the highly visible “minority” marketplaces, the tourism industry which has brought wealth into eastern parts of China is, as an American travel agent with considerable knowledge of China described areas off the well-beaten path, “not quite ready for the western market.”46 Tourists in Xinjiang are primarily wealthy Hans from the east on rapid jaunts; a far smaller, though perhaps not wholly insignificant, proportion monetarily is young and adventurous westerners. Economic development: making society’s vulnerability salient Xinjiang’s insurgency has not been reduced due to economic measures. Despite the common-sense logic of countering insurgency through improving economic conditions, the politics and perceptions of hope are complex. Even though Xinjiang’s overall economic situation has improved in the previous decades, and even with the benefits of increased opportunity which are accruing to young educated Uyghurs in the face of real discrimination, the perception of China’s actions as colonialist and predatory persists. Development thus far has increased society’s sense of vulnerability to state imposition. While this could be understood as a position of increasing power for the state, this study argues that increasing the sense that economic development is bypassing indigenous local society weakens the state’s relative position. Unless the state’s actions build hope for society linked through the state, economic development will be a wedge driving the state and society apart. Unless the state has a better vision, society’s security will seem to rest more with the dream of insurgency.

Governance politics: dreaming beyond the party-state Modifying politics in Xinjiang has countered the insurgency by decreasing the tyranny of Communist ideologues while increasing governance capacity. As the

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state worked to eliminate challenges from society; secular, religious, and economic; it also improved its ability to visibly govern society. This section builds upon Chapter 5’s analysis of the use of grass-roots institutions and societycentric warfare, investigating what additional factors influenced society’s political perceptions in Xinjiang. Perceptions of security are not only social in the aggregate: that is, when the state’s capacity is increased to a sufficient level society appears granular. Not everyone in Xinjiang, not every Uyghur, is a separatist or an insurgent, and they are happy to express this non-insurgent identity when given the opportunity to define themselves as such. To create security for society, the state must work with society – and society with the state. Politics can be understood as choice and action for actors (whether individuals, families, groups, societies, or countries); to counter insurgency the state must present elements within society the opportunity to join in securing its future, for the act of choosing allegiance is psychologically powerful in and of itself. Not only has China given Uyghurs the not-so-free (indeed, often highly coerced) choice as to whether to cooperate with security services, but also the opportunity to join in governance. While Uyghurs perceive that their voice is less equal than others47 at all levels, there is a sense building among local Uyghur leaders that their voice increasingly does matter. This process of increasing the voice of Uyghurs who freely work to better society through the state is an important change for Xinjiang’s prospects of having a healthy sociopolitical future. While Uyghurs are increasingly incorporated into local leadership and bureaucracy, there is reason to question whether a political system which is fundamentally un-free can create and sustain hope for society. As China has become less ideologically Communist over the previous two decades, the country has not relinquished its authoritarian Party-state nature in the countryside. Deng Xiaoping strategically chose to develop China’s east; Hu Jintao is now focusing on developing China’s west.48 As the previous section noted, economic development alone is not positively shifting society’s perceptions. Insurgency has brought increased oppression to Xinjiang and, more recently, devastation internationally. Hope for the future lies not in material changes alone but rather through a slow and steady progression toward free governance and freedom from state tyranny. While the Communist Party has voiced its intention to be the vanguard of a future democratic China,49 Uyghurs too seem to have their eyes set on playing a role in such a changing polity. Democracy here is understood not simply as elections but as a full and evolving matrix of forces within society peacefully competing, where identities are multiple, not unitary and sectarian. Bringing educated Uyghurs into the fabric of Chinese society is a step forward. Tyranny, often the arbitrary dictates of corrupt local officials, is the primary problem rocking rural China today; and so too in Xinjiang. This corruption is a threat because it caries the potential for weakening the state or making it appear unjust, illegitimate, thus brittle and vulnerable. Countering the insurgency will now mean attempting to rein in arbitrary actions by corrupt local officials. While

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the perception in society is that local officials are indeed arbitrary and corrupt, there is also a social understanding that the political climate is beginning to shift. Though local leaders may be nearly as bad as ever, if perhaps they are slightly better than a decade or two earlier, people believe the future will bring a system of governance which does protect against tyranny. The future system of governance is intangible and the process to obtain it is unclear, but working with the state now seems to be a viable path towards a better future. Not all Uyghurs experience or express this, indeed many would reject this claim, but the trend is subtle, psychologically deep, and undeniable: the dream of struggling for a better life is shifting. The state no longer is the death-enemy of society; though oppressive today, the state itself is not static. Politics in China can change rapidly, and Uyghurs seem to be preparing for the coming changes, however nebulous.

Conclusion Countering insurgency requires not only acting early and often to crush a nascent movement but also dealing comprehensively with the deep factors which engender rebellion over a protracted timetable. To counter Xinjiang’s insurgency China has begun to reshape society by employing educational, religious and cultural, economic, and political tools to various effects. This chapter finds that while the educational as well as religious and cultural practices have produced beneficial results which align neatly with the Party-state’s avowed goal of reshaping society in Xinjiang while maintaining power, economic and political processes are more complex. Though Chinese leaders claim that achieving greater stability requires economic development, this study argues that material development has thus far produced little effect upon Uyghur society and may actually be engendering ethno-nationalist resentment. Similarly, this study identifies political hope tied to the state subtly but deeply building within Uyghur society, yet the content of this hope is for reform or reinvention of the state’s political nature. Perceptions of power, prominently including windows of opportunity or vulnerability, are key explanatory variables in the China case. Insurgency, like conflicts in the international arena, is a security competition based upon power dynamics. Society’s perceptions of the state, primarily the state’s ability to secure the hopes for a meaningful future, are key to society’s rejection of insurgency. Countering insurgency comes when society’s dreams run through the state rather than against it. Shifting society’s perceptions of power through educational as well as religious and cultural practices has countered Xinjiang’s insurgency primarily with a bottom-up approach. Even the unsuccessful attempt at reshaping society through economic development is an attempt to effect change from the bottom up. The somewhat nebulous though surprisingly prevalent aspiration for, and dream of, a voice in politics too counters the insurgency by removing society’s full support and channeling it toward an evolving state.

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While the insurgent dream lives on today within society, the state is producing an alternative which a significant segment of society perceives as viable. Counter-insurgency is a long process, but China’s counter-insurgents have reason to be optimistic. Though the situation is dynamic and fluid, evolving with internal and international developments, society in Xinjiang is slowly but increasingly rejecting violence in pursuit of the dream.

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Conclusion Gauging effectiveness

We need to firmly trust and rely on the officials and masses of all nationalities and form a strong force in the fight against ethnic separatists. The cadres and the mass of all nationalities are the main force in the fight against the separatists.1 (Internal CCP Document, 1994, Pan-Turkism and Pan-Islamism Study)

The United States must learn to effectively counter terrorism; this is my generation’s challenge. We can wait no longer: 9/11 and 7/7 are powerful lessons of laxity. An international insurgency with local affiliates, local upswellings, is upon us. Scholars and statesmen can no longer turn away from unsavory campaigns in remote regions; we must critically investigate how other countries have worked to counter related terrorism and insurgencies. To-date the China case has been neglected by the security studies community. China acted early, repeatedly, and comprehensively to crush a nascent insurgency before it could gain momentum within society. While the Chinese campaign was brutal, the campaign’s effectiveness was due to social policies which reached deeply into society’s grass-roots and reshaped society from the bottom up. And the campaign’s effectiveness increased as brutality was reduced. Society in Xinjiang today increasingly rejects insurgency as the path forward, quietly looking to a future tied to a changing Chinese state. This chapter analyzes the effectiveness of the various elements of China’s COIN campaign, asking which elements alone or in concert countered Xinjiang’s insurgency. Also, this study assesses that China has wasted state resources, created ill-will and alienated forces within society through focusing on material economic development and harsh repression beyond that necessary to achieve counter-insurgent goals. Paralleling the study as a whole, this chapter analyzes the Chinese case, revisiting theories of insurgency and counterinsurgency; insurgency in Xinjiang; China’s “infinite” political will; the changing use of force in society; grass-roots institutions and security; and the reshaping of society in Xinjiang.

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Insurgency and counter-insurgency Insurgency is a campaign of innovative violence contesting political power within society. The state and insurgents battle to sway society to their cause: society joins the side which will provide it with meaningful security. While some societies will search for simple protection from physical assault or attack, other societies will tolerate considerable violence so long as the ideals, the dream of insurgent or state, align with and further society’s hopes. Miscalculation and skewed perceptions of power, state and insurgent, as well as tactical innovations, are important pieces of insurgencies. Perceptions of power, including windows of opportunity or vulnerability, explain much of insurgency, yet we cannot neglect the causal pathology of social movements. Social movements are the mechanism through which forces within society act upon and effect perceptions of state power, material and ideational. The contemporary global jihad is led by al Qaeda, once a network of cells and now a broader social movement, which at first worked to inspire a broader uprising through terrorist attacks internationally and supporting indigenous local insurgencies. Today al Qaeda may be more significant as a calling or inspiration than as the individuals, groups, or networks as a military organization per se. Terrorism is a tactic of insurgency where the force of an attack is, a terrorist hopes, multiplied through social-psychological fear. Terrorist attacks attempt to shift society’s perceptions of power, specifically regarding the nature of state power itself. Through bombing a building, bus, train, or marketplace the terrorist aims to convince society that the state is weak, its days numbered, and the future lies with the insurgency’s dream. Momentum within society is a key factor, for insurgency is a social phenomenon. Nothing succeeds like success, and everyone wants to be part of the winning team; not doing so may cost members of society their livelihood if not their lives. Terrorist attacks attempt to mobilize a quiescent society by sparking security dilemmas, forcing society to choose sides between the insurgency and the state. Insurgency is a contest to provide society with meaningful security, hope for the future locally understood. The insurgents aim not only to shift society’s perceptions of the state’s material power but also to show that the state is antithetical to society’s survival. Society, the insurgency argues, will no longer exist if the state has its way. Once an insurgency gains a foothold within society it can spread exponentially through social networks formed for purposes other than warfare against the state. Countering an insurgency requires acting early to prevent a nascent insurgency from taking hold within society, for once society begins to question the state’s power, and perceives the power resources which the state holds to be diminishing, a window increasingly opens through which a deluge of challenges flow. To counter an insurgency a state must convince society that it will not be defeated by the insurgents and that a state victory means hope for a better society in the future. The specifics of COIN campaigns vary according to local conditions. While some societies respond quickly to military coercion, others

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require more action by police and security forces, while still others demand alternate measures which demonstrate state power to affect society’s future by reshaping society itself. Historically, many COIN campaigns have reflexively focused on using military and security forces to target insurgent organization and leadership. Disrupting decision-making and operations, it is hoped, would counter the insurgency. This logic attempts to effect change upon society from the top down. Unfortunately, at best such top-down COIN treats the symptoms not the cause of the insurgency. In reality top-down approaches can enflame society by demonstrating that all the tools of conventional military coercion are ineffective against the insurgency, marking the state powerless against the threat despite likely having an overwhelming material advantage. As a state pursues ineffective approaches, the insurgency’s momentum within society can build dramatically. When people are killed others may take their place so long as society’s perceptions of power and security favor the insurgency. Bombs, tanks, and the state’s military forces alone are unlikely to convince society to reject the insurgency’s dream; indeed, state violence against society (insurgent or civilian) may increase society’s perception of threat. Insurgency is a contest for society’s perceptions and dreams; directly targeting society constitutes a bottom-up approach to countering insurgency. Realworld COIN campaigns are normally a mix of top-down and bottom-up tactics because of counter-insurgent decisions and capabilities as well as individual society’s dynamics. Nevertheless, this study assesses that, at least in the China case, bottom-up tactics as part of an overall bottom-up campaign can effectively counter the threat by using society itself against the insurgency. Key elements of a bottom-up approach, analyzed in Chapter 1, include these principles: • • • •

the state must formulate a cohesive policy-trajectory; military and security forces must always act to support the state’s goals; intelligence, including collection and analysis as well as psychological operations, must always support the state’s goals; the state must work to reshape society.

The state’s policy trajectory can be explicit or implicit, yet it must be understood throughout the state apparatus and at least tolerated if not supported by the state’s core constituency. Military and security forces, if they are to be instruments of state power and not state weakness, must not alienate society. Security forces, including various intelligence disciplines and local police, must work within society to not only prevent attacks but remove society’s support for the insurgent dream itself. Fundamentally, the state must reshape society away from the perceptions and dreams which have engendered insurgency. Tactical details may vary according to local society’s ideas and conditions, yet the key is to shift perceptions of power and the utility of insurgency toward achieving a meaningful security for society.

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Insurgency in Xinjiang Al Qaeda, a global network of terrorist cells and then a social movement, as well as affiliated insurgents and insurgencies, attempted to set the world alight and topple unbelieving governments in order to establish its version of Islamic law across a large swath of Eurasia. The United States was attacked because al Qaeda perceives the US to be a pillar of support for those governments it wishes to topple. Building upon its self-perceived victory of Islamic Mujahidin against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, al Qaeda established two operational tracks: terrorists and insurgents. Terrorists were recruited from and integrated themselves into target countries, planning, supporting, or executing attacks. Insurgents were trained by al Qaeda at camps in Afghanistan and Pakistan or within local arenas. Where al Qaeda conducted terrorism itself, its support for local insurgencies proved less dramatic though arguably more powerful of a political tool towards al Qaeda’s strategic goals. Funneling expertise, training, and support to local insurgencies brought the fight directly against governments “occupying” Muslim lands. Xinjiang’s insurgency is indigenous, yet it too has received external material and ideational support from the global jihad, and specifically from al Qaeda. The East Turkistan Islamic Movement is the most prominent al Qaeda ally in Xinjiang. Each insurgency is tactically unique. In Xinjiang violence persisted at a low level, with occasional rioting and attacks against government and military installations escalating through 1997, the period which has proven to be the insurgency’s high watermark. Bombing of busses and public spaces occurred, though assassination of local officials is currently the most prevalent symptom of insurgency in Xinjiang. China asserts that over 200 attacks occurred in Xinjiang in recent years. At least eight groups are described by Chinese, American, or scholarly sources as operating against the PRC in Xinjiang. While this study does investigate the group-activity data available in open sources, this study focuses on the trends of the insurgency taken as an organic whole. Insurgency, the dependant variable, is the idea of violence as a resolution to socio-political friction rather turning to the courts or quietly suffering. The search for granularity within the insurgency is important in gauging the threat, yet insurgencies are dynamic and evolving conflicts. Society’s perceptions of power and security in the contest between insurgency and state is assessed as the key variable. The 1990 Baren incident marked a qualitative difference in Xinjiang’s politics of dissent, ushering in the only period in recent history in which the state’s position was genuinely at risk. Anti-state and independence activities also contained religious elements. A wave of terrorism rose internationally in the Soviet–Afghan war’s wake; though unrest has been present in Xinjiang since before the PRC’s formation, Xinjiang’s indigenous insurgency in the 1990s infected society and began severing the state. Young men, along with their closest friends, pursued a path of violence in search of what they perceived as defending themselves from a predatory Chinese state.

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Society perceived the state’s grip to be weakening in the short-term, though the perceived colonial project would soon wipe out their culture if they did not act. The state was perceived as a threat to society and the state’s instruments of power, an aging conventional military less capable than the Soviet armies just defeated in neighboring Afghanistan, no longer seemed invincible. The age of the fighter had arrived; resistance to the state – by gun or bomb, boycott or protest – was now perceived to be more than viable options, they were required by the situation.

China’s “infinite” political will Insurgency, like all warfare, is a contest to impact enemy and constituent political will. Confronting an insurgency would be impossible without will to act, no matter how capable the forces, rich the country, or necessary the fight. Political will is the causal enabling factor for effective counter-insurgency. Political will is a set of deep beliefs and preferences held by society. Where public opinions are ephemeral and subject to the machinations of events and leaders, political will is a shared emotion within society that endures; it is a subterranean reservoir which supports or sustains a polity across tumultuous events. This reservoir is the center of gravity with which insurgents and the state must contend. Just as insurgents must convince local society that the insurgency represents the best path forward, states cannot long survive costly adventures and projects in the periphery which the core rejects. Simply, the greater the political will the greater the likelihood of successful COIN. China has an enormous and replenishing reservoir of political will with which to confront the insurgency in Xinjiang because of socio-structural and historic factors. China acted early to crush a nascent insurgency and reshape society; China’s massive commitment of resources has grown as the campaign evolved; the core’s political will made this possible. Three areas of the core’s society build this key enabling resource: the jealously guarded primary position of the Communist Party; the state’s pursuit of security; and the people’s demand for stability. Countering the insurgency in Xinjiang is a priority for the Chinese Communist Party because of the Party’s position in society’s structure, achieved through a hard fought historic struggle. The CCP anxiously sits atop a one-party state, ever-guarding its position of primacy within society. At each level of governance, from the grass-roots up through the top leadership, the CCP has a parallel and slightly more equal officer working in tandem with the state post. The luster of Communist ideals has faded from eastern China’s large cities, yet the appeal of power and privilege endures. Economic Communism has nearly vanished in China; a rough and rugged crony-capitalism is filling this void. Political Communism morphed into an authoritarian system: power for power’s sake. Maintaining its grip on the state’s power is the sole motivating force, and the sole ideology, left within the CCP. Countering Xinjiang’s insurgency serves this purpose by validating the CCP’s claim of effective leadership.

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The state must counter Xinjiang’s insurgency because threats from the periphery are multiple and linked: if one area of China secedes the country could disintegrate. While the details are different in each case, China perceives that Tibet and Taiwan (and perhaps other areas) have repeatedly come close to splitting from the mainland. The PRC’s claim to each of these locations is tenuous and a successful bid by one might trigger renewed pushes by other areas of China’s self-claimed periphery. Security is the fundamental job of any state; beyond preventing “renegade provinces” from splitting, the state must provide internal stability. The question of stability is particularly important in China today because the people demand it; domestic stability and steady progress toward a more healthy political life legitimizes the state. Insurgency in Xinjiang threatens the state by demonstrating the state’s inability to manage both unrest in the periphery and provide stability the core demands. If the state is perceived as weak challenges and challengers will rise. Because of these socio-structural and political-historic factors the state must strongly confront the insurgency in Xinjiang if it is to survive: failing this, not only would the periphery rupture but the core would rebel. Silently, the Chinese people demand that the state and the Party counter Xinjiang’s insurgency. While knowledge of Xinjiang is limited even among the most educated in China’s east, the Chinese people demand that their state hold the territory which it claimed decades ago. To back-peddle on this would be to relinquish claim to the entirety of China. After decades of socio-political tumult, most prominently the self-inflicted wounds of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, Chinese today are tired of unrest and crave security. Society demands a stability which can bring progress at a measured pace; the Chinese people have repeatedly seen the disastrous effects of revolutionary movements. The cry for incremental movement toward the dream of a better, unified and freer, future is the primary reason the core’s society demands effective COIN in Xinjiang – even if the people never know the details. Fear of an ethnic “other” is a powerful contributing factor. The Party’s desire to maintain its preeminent position atop the state and society, the state’s attempt to avoid disintegration, and the people’s thirst for stability combine into unified purpose: Xinjiang’s insurgency can not be tolerated. Not only does China, as a cohesive polity, have a large reservoir of political will with which to confront the insurgency but this reservoir is constantly replenishing if not expanding. The greater the challenge posed by Xinjiang’s insurgent forces the greater the core’s will to counter this threat. China’s political will to confront Xinjiang’s insurgency is seemingly infinite.

The changing use of force in society Empowered and driven by “infinite” political will, China’s use of force to counter Xinjiang’s insurgency has changed dramatically since 1990, shifting to an overwhelmingly bottom-up approach. China used brutal force to manage incidents of unrest while other tools could take effect within society. In this

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period the military took a support function to paramilitary and security forces in the management of unrest. China pushed responsibility down the spectrum of violence and into the hands of forces increasingly capable of tailoring responses to local conditions and an incident’s specific demands. Military force can be used to kill or capture insurgents; or, force can coerce society into rethinking the risks and rewards of insurgency. The first logic focuses on isolating troublesome elites from the situation. The second logic focuses on adding pressure to the situation and altering society, however temporarily. While China’s campaign began as an effort against troublesome elites, the use of force quickly evolved into an overwhelmingly bottom-up approach targeting society’s support for the insurgency itself. Pressure on society is achieved through the force of arms and the force of bodies. Militaries can kill, but their greatest role is that of quiet coercion. The numbers are disputed, yet China maintains what is perceived by Uyghurs as a considerable troop presence near or within Xinjiang’s major cities and other strategic locations. These forces are augmented not only by paramilitary forces but also, through Uyghur eyes, by the massive influx of ethnic Han immigrantresidents, now nearing 50 percent of the population. Chinese sources accurately speak of a “four-in-one” system of defense: the People’s Liberation Army (PLA); the People’s Armed Police (PAP); the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC); and the people. Together these forces have acted early against a nascent insurgency, repeatedly crushing revolts, and pressuring society to reject insurgency while other programs can take effect. China’s use of force in Xinjiang evolved since the insurgency began. In 1990 the PLA directly fought against insurgents. Though far from perfect, by 1995 the PAP had grown more capable and could crush local incidents of unrest, even revolts provoked by arbitrary local civilian leaders. Police sweeps and increasing violence marked 1996; in 1997 a rebellion rocked the city of Yining (Guljia) which the PAP crushed with PLA backing. The 2001 to 2006 period is marked by PAP and PLA shows of force, but dramatically less overt state violence. China’s force-mix shifted from military to paramilitary and local security forces in order to counter Xinjiang’s insurgency. While these forces have acted brutally and coercively throughout, the role of the military was scaled back and forces with local knowledge, local presence, and local membership were pushed to the fore. China at first lacked the tools necessary to counter the insurgency, yet more appropriate tools of state coercion were constructed and implemented; as the insurgency evolved so too did the counter-insurgency. The crude tools of military coercion were replaced with those more accepted as legitimate, or at least tolerable, by local society. Beyond local reasons for the evolution in China’s tools of coercion, international factors also must be considered. The United States lead an “international community” increasingly concerned about human rights and increasingly willing to intervene on behalf of oppressed peoples. Still under a post-Tiananmen massacre sanctions regime, the PRC aligned itself with those on the receiving end of the new norms of humanitarian intervention – that is, with

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the governments accused of atrocity. China’s leaders consciously did not want to have Xinjiang turn into, for instance, the next Kosovo. Adapting force down the military spectrum and toward civilian tools not only worked to counter the insurgency but also helped remove a degree of international heat. Though international human rights groups consistently document violations of basic human rights in Xinjiang, the Chinese government to-date has effectively achieved considerable freedom of action.

Grass-roots institutions and security As the insurgency began in earnest China found itself weak, its organs lacking, and under increasing threat. Through quiet and accruing actions the insurgency nearly severed the Party-state from society. China’s institutions in Xinjiang were incapable of effectively responding because they had already been infiltrated and were under siege. Military and paramilitary forces learned to crush unrest in the streets and respond to insurgent attacks; yet preventing the insurgency from taking greater hold within society, gaining political will and power, required new tools as well as adapting old tools for the evolving situation. In response to the insurgency beginning to gain traction within society China rebuilt its Party, government, and security forces at the grass-roots level. China reclaimed Xinjiang from the insurgency through establishing an apparatus capable of policing society (including the state’s institutions) at the most local levels. Beyond retaking the state’s institutions China pressed outwards, turning social institutions (e.g. family, workgroup, neighborhood, and also friendship) against the insurgency. The strategic use of society’s grass-roots institutions to directly effect enemy action, will, and in the case of COIN counter the insurgent dream, is here termed “society-centric warfare.” Local institutions (be they Party, government, security, educational, or religious) are the point of contact between the state and society; while terrorist attacks often are the primary if not sole focus of analytical energies, the infection and inoculation of local institutions is among the most important arenas of insurgency. Local institutions carry the potential for being most capable of holding the line, using knowledge of local circumstances and needs, and turning society against the insurgency. Rebuilding the state’s institutions from the grass-roots increases the perception of state power by creating the image if not the reality of more effective, and potentially more legitimate, local governance. Xinjiang’s grass-roots institutions were purged of those suspected of sympathizing with or participating in the insurgency; a new generation of educated Uyghurs was brought into the governance apparatus along with Hans who had credentials beyond simple ideological loyalty. Professionalization and deference to local decisions retooled the relationship of Xinjiang’s government both with society and with higher bureaucratic levels. State power increases through enhancing institutional capacity and enriching the state’s ability to reach deeply into society to detect and remove threatening

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elements. China’s rebuilt institutions did not eliminate the insurgency alone but simply, in concert with other coercive instruments discussed above, kept the insurgency to a manageable level while other tools take hold and reshape society. China built security services, including local police and networks of informants and spies, capable of operating within Xinjiang’s society. Together these forces collect intelligence and operate against individuals, organizations and groups, as well as ideas and ideology. Targeting individuals and organizations, both domestically and abroad, attempts to remove elites from society; targeting ideas and ideology works to diminish society’s support for insurgency by altering society’s perceptions of power and security. Simply, China’s agents fight against what they consider political, thus anti-state, uses of religion while putting forward a positive message of a better future through ethnic harmony. Xinjiang’s security services employed society-centric warfare whereby the state turned society’s institutions against the insurgency, and against the insurgents. Through coercion, threat or enticement, social units were held responsible for their members: towns and villages for their population; workgroups for their workers; neighborhoods for their residents; families for their sons and fathers. Social units were induced to police themselves or suffer the consequences, ranging from subtle to heavy coercion. Importantly, draconian coercion is not what made China’s society-centric warfare a viable strategy. Employing knowledge of society’s structure, China placed pressure upon a nascent insurgency achieving considerable results and curtailing insurgent attempts to set society alight.

The reshaping of society in Xinjiang Beyond coercion, China countered Xinjiang’s insurgency by creating hope for society tied to and intertwined with the state. In concert with the military, security, and institutional policies discussed above China used education, religion and culture, economic, and governance policies to reshape society and remove support for the insurgency. Together, these policies reshaped society’s perceptions of state and insurgent power. The state countered the insurgent dream through creating a competing dream, one more plausible and tangible, achievable only through participation in the state’s project. Transforming society into a hostile environment for insurgency, a society fundamentally incompatible with the dream of fighting against the state for a better future, is the strategic aim of a bottom-up approach. Each society is different and will vary in reaction to social-policy tools’ content and implementation; this section presents the successes and difficulties encountered in the China case. Educating children and young adults is a powerful state tool for impacting the ideas and conditions of society. In Xinjiang, education opens a pathway toward opportunity for students, a way out from farms or villages, towns, or the province. While most students will never see these benefits, the prospect of a better life is compelling and salient; students are striving toward this goal. Though education in Uyghur language is available in parallel schools, the Han

136 Conclusion language (Hanyu, aka Mandarin) schools are increasingly chosen by Uyghur families. Hanyu is the language of upward mobility in Xinjiang, like all of China; it is the language of the college entrance examination and it is the language of business. While the number of successful Uyghurs is perceived to be few, enough exist that many localities have their heroes who followed the state’s path. Educated Uyghurs are now employed as teachers in local elementary and high schools to teach the core’s ideas in Uyghur language. Employing educated Uyghurs to teach in Uyghur-language schools delivers visible local employment; teachers receive enough pay to live moderately but not lavishly, yet teachers hold a position of great respect within Uyghur society. Through jujitsulike style the state turned ethnic-nationalist sentiment against the insurgency, taking men and women who could have become anti-state elites and using them for the state’s project of reshaping society. The content of education also helps shape society’s perceptions. History is among the most contentious and controlled topics in Xinjiang, for history enables people to place their life’s events into a broader fabric of human experience and meaning. Insurgency in part is a discussion of where society has been and where it is going; to counter insurgency the state must construct and convince society of the state’s narrative. Like history, society’s understanding of international affairs can powerfully impact an insurgency. Tactics, military and political, can be learned from other arenas; yet most important for the Chinese case is local society’s understanding of the fortunes of various insurgencies abroad. Each society has different structures, tolerances, and dreams; Uyghur society on the whole has thus far rejected turning Xinjiang into another Chechnya or another Iraq. Uyghurs are cognizant of these arenas and do not see those fights as a viable path to adopt or adapt. China takes considerable international heat for its religion and culture policies in Xinjiang, yet these policies attempted to remove what the state perceived as threatening political content from religion. Using religious forums to challenge state policies, state power, or social conditions is not tolerated; pursuit of spiritual enlightenment is not blocked as a matter of policy. Simply, the Partystate removed dissent from religion through society-centric warfare, including the use of spies and informants, as well as training imams. The state also constrains who can practice and study religion. In Xinjiang people over eighteen are allowed to worship relatively freely in open forums which the government can monitor, should it so choose. Uyghurs with leadership positions in the state or society are heavily pressured to not practice religion publicly or else face retribution, either through their jobs or through shadow actions of the security services. Controlling, constraining, and steering Islam in Xinjiang is unpopular internationally yet it is an important feature of China’s counter-insurgency. While attempting to avoid undue, or perhaps uncontrollable, antagonism of society the state worked to remove sources and places of challenge within society. Religious leaders, facilities, events, and ideas were used against the Chinese in Xinjiang by the insurgency; it is illogical and irresponsible to think the Chinese

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would not counter this threat. China fought the dream of paradise through reining in fanatical religion and providing assistance to moderate voices. Economic development did not counter Xinjiang’s insurgency; if anything, China’s economic policies inflamed the situation. Economic development in Xinjiang demonstrated the state’s power yet made society’s vulnerability more salient. Despite China’s leadership’s cult belief in economics as the solution to all of the country’s problems, economic development in Xinjiang engendered resentment despite arguable material improvements. Uyghurs can see material changes yet even upwardly mobile Uyghurs express resentment: they perceive pervasive and overt discrimination in the job market coupled with Chinese firms bringing Hans from the east to work on infrastructure projects and in extractive industries. Xinjiang holds 30 percent of China’s domestic oil and gas, and nearly 40 percent of China’s coal; Uyghurs perceive the Chinese state extracting their land’s resources using an alien workforce while giving little to Uyghur areas. Governance politics too have a complex trajectory: as the state and Party each worked to increase the numbers and quality of Uyghur cadres and leadership, society began to reject the insurgency for other, non-institutional and noninstrumental, political reasons. As local governance became more capable, socially knowledgeable, and more representative, society in Xinjiang sought socio-political stability. While the content of this new and growing dream flows through the state, it rejects the authoritarian present where local tyrants have their way unchecked. Deep within Uyghur society today is a growing trend, a dream permeating society’s bedrock of life beyond the Party-state. Though nebulous and ill-formed, society seems readying for a change in the nature of the state itself. Society need not support an insurgency which might bring harsh Islamist dictates, violent chaos, or increased state repression; time and momentum is on society’s side. Suffering through tyrannical government today can be endured: just look at the freedoms of eastern China; witness the colored revolutions of Central Asia; consider the lifestruggles of Martin Luther King and Malcolm X.

Gauging effectiveness China has effectively countered Xinjiang’s nascent insurgency by acting early and comprehensively, crafting an overwhelmingly bottom-up approach. China’s actions included needlessly brutal measures which wasted state energy, yet the campaign succeeded where China focused on responsibly interacting with society. The insurgency in Xinjiang, the dream of evicting the Han and joining a new caliphate, has not disappeared; the counter-insurgency too continues to evolve. Now some seventeen years since the insurgency began in earnest, it is possible to draft an analysis of the counter-insurgency’s approach and policy-tools. Like all arenas, insurgency lives in society’s underground confronting the state when it perceives an opportunity or vulnerability. China’s effectiveness lies primarily in the state’s approach to insurgency as a battle for the soul and hopes of society. Rather than simply killing or capturing terrorists, China pursued a comprehensive bottom-up strategy to counter insurgency in Xinjiang.

Epilogue The art of countering insurgency: from tactical to strategic efficacy

D’Artagnan did exactly that. First he gave Planchet a cautionary but healthy drubbing; then, Planchet drubbed, he forbade him ever to leave his service, and, for good measure, he told him: “The future cannot fail to prosper me, I am but waiting for the better times that must inevitably come. If you stay with me, your fortune is made. I am much too good a master to allow you to forfeit it by granting you the dismissal you request.” (Alexandre Dumas, 2001, The Three Musketeers, New York: The Modern Library)

Soft power

Incorporate

Hard power

Countering insurgency requires turning societies against the idea, the dream, that politics can be affected by violence. Taking theories, tools, and techniques and crafting an effective campaign in a particular arena is an art; counter-insurgents must craft a comprehensive approach which not only suppresses proximate symptoms but treats the disease. While techniques such as killing or capturing insurgent leaders and fighters may be tactically effective, strategic efficacy lies

Coerce

Strategic efficacy

FORCE

Co-opt

Kill/capture

Tactical efficacy SOCIETY Individual

Figure 5 Counter-insurgency.

Small group

Institutions

Ideas

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in reshaping society’s ideas, making society resistant to the insurgency’s dream as well as its tactics. Insurgency is a dynamic political struggle, and counter-insurgents must work within core constituent audiences to inoculate society against psychological manipulation by terrorist attacks and propaganda. Guarding and reinforcing friendly audiences against the pernicious fear which can devour a society from within also empowers operations against the insurgency. Attacks will never be absolutely preventable; thus, from this base, an effective counter-insurgency can begin to collapse enemy will for political violence. Insurgencies share political pathologies, yet each case caries unique features – e.g. political, historic, cultural, geographic, and military. Assessing the nature of warfare and the unique local conditions will prove the key to effective counter-insurgency in particular situations. This essay suggests lessons from China’s counter-insurgency in Xinjiang which may be useful in the struggles to both understand and counter this evolving threat in other arenas.

Effective COIN: how do we know? Appropriate metrics for gauging a counter-insurgency’s effectiveness are notoriously problematic. The Vietnam-era insurgent body counts are now thoroughly discredited because the numbers were prone to wild exaggeration, and picking through human remains amid battle is rarely a priority. Even if precise numbers of insurgent casualties and mortalities were knowable in somewhat real-time, this quantitative information would be of questionable significance strategically. Insurgency – manifested today by the global jihad and its many local theaters – exists as an idea, a calling only temporarily embodied by individual combatants. Statistics of attacks committed or prevented are similarly problematic. In insurgency society will give its support to the side it perceives will win. Some have suggested that a better metric might be number of tips given to counter-insurgent forces. While this statistic may have much to contribute, there may be other factors which would complicate or override this variable. Counter-insurgents must do more than kill or capture fighters, for even failed insurgent actions demonstrate a degree of tactical capability, and thus strategic weakness of counter-insurgent forces. Once-insurgent turned politician Menachem Begin explains: The very existence of an underground must, in the end, undermine the prestige of a colonial regime that lives by the legend of its omnipotence. Every attack which it fails to prevent is a blow at its standing. Even if the attack does not succeed, it makes a dent in that prestige, and that dent widens into a crack which is extended with every succeeding attack.1 Not every insurgency confronts a colonial power, yet the pattern of insurgency confronting states attempting to claim power over territory gives this idea broader traction and applicability. Importantly, the global jihadists perceive that

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the west, especially the United States, is acting as something like a global colonial power within the lands of Islam. While people may at times fight, the trick is to shift society’s political support away from the insurgency.

Political will: unity of purpose and mission clarity China’s effective counter-insurgency stems from addressing the problem early and comprehensively. Throughout the political, governance, and security apparatus there was never a doubt about the country’s purpose. Success was the only option for survival was perceived to be at stake. Indeed, while the institutions of governance and various tools of power were ill-equipped to initially respond, there was considerable unity of purpose across the full spectrum of authority (in other conflicts this may be better understood as a single, unified understanding of the problem). Society would never forgive failure to counter this insurgency. The uprising was an existential threat to more than the Communist Party’s grip on power: with memories of the self-inflicted social upheavals and brutal chaos of China’s Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution resonating in the public’s consciousness, political disintegration of China – society perceives – would lead to yet another painful bloodletting and more historic humiliation for the Chinese people. Some polities may demand considerable debate, public or within a government, yet the outcome of this discussion is vital. Forces must understand their roles, strategically and tactically. Societies in which the purpose is unclear or lack a commitment across the society to produce effective counter-insurgency efforts will likely produce campaigns that fall short; flawed masterpieces at best, fiascos at worst. With will abundant and the mission clear, China’s approach to counterinsurgency was built from the ground up, authorities responding to the best of their abilities with the tools at hand. At first the toolset consisted of raw coercion alone, yet across the 1990s the toolset widened to encompass more refined instruments of coercive power as well as tools which could not only co-opt but eventually incorporate local society more fully into the country’s project. Failure was never an option. China’s political will tied directly to not only state but social and individual survival concerns. If the insurgency was allowed to take hold the state would crumble, consequently endangering the lives of the Chinese people across the country undercutting all they have achieved since scraping bottom in the 1950s and 1960s. China’s leaders acted upon their political mandate to provide internal order at any cost. While countering insurgency in Xinjiang, China expended enormous revenues in infrastructure projects and economic development as well as funding an equally robust military, paramilitary, and security apparatus. Simply, China was in it to win, and revolutionary impulses within Xinjiang’s society were subsumed under this tide. In insurgencies, society gives its loyalty to the side – insurgent or counterinsurgent – which society perceives will provide meaningful security. Some societies want temporary protection from violence while others take a longer

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view, searching for assurances of particular types of living (such as political or religious autonomy, promises of development assistance, or just incorporation into greater society). China’s forces opened the door for meaningful security for Uyghurs. Though brutal at first, the campaign’s effectiveness increased dramatically as the brutality was curtailed and other, more nuanced tools were created. While state violence and Orwellian repression are currently present throughout China’s countryside, the future promises to be a little better as part of China. Central Asia’s independent states seem increasingly less attractive as their luster fades – tarnished by multiple, repeated, and layered corruptions. Chechnya, Iraq, Palestine, and Afghanistan similarly serve as negative examples of lands made worse not better through insurgency.

Strategy: effecting change from the bottom up China’s approach to counter-insurgency in Xinjiang was effective because it was proactive, dynamic, and comprehensive. At the first sign of organized rebellion China responded with tactically overwhelming force, acting firmly before the problem spiraled out of control; and China stayed in the fight for the long haul, never backing off after tactical victories or setbacks. And China stood up other tools to reshape society, locking in tactical gains, building toward an effective campaign. Importantly, societies differ dramatically in their reactions to the use of forceful coercion and state violence. Local social psychology may be an important factor; this element deserves further study by war planners and social scientists alike. At the strategic level, China also employed overwhelming force, building an enormous presence of military, paramilitary, police, and security forces. China’s overwhelming force presence in Xinjiang also, in the perception of restive locals and government sources alike, consists of the flood of ethnic Han immigrants who now constitute approximately half of the region’s population. When the early efforts failed to halt society’s growing resistance to the state, counter-insurgents adapted their tactics down the spectrum of violence. When the tools of coercion proved ill-equipped for providing security meaningful for society the state again adapted. China eventually found tools to comprehensively reshape society in Xinjiang, creating opportunities for people, families, and organizations to move up, and at times out, towards a more promising future. China’s approach to counter-insurgency effected society from the bottom up: while official pronouncements may talk of militants killed or weapons captured, China’s true effectiveness rests elsewhere. Counter-insurgency scholars and practitioners have long discussed the difference between top-down and bottomup approaches, or in David Galula’s terminology the differing approaches of “war fighters” and “psychologists.”2 This tactical spectrum runs from the rawest tools of power used to kill or capture individuals through highly nuanced and culturally adept tools used to reshape societies away from insurgency.3 While China is infamous for its use of force to crush dissent, behind the

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scenes China’s approach comprehensively worked to turn society against and away from the insurgency. Groups which might have silently facilitated and supported resistance, and young men who had dreamed of taking the fight against the Chinese now, perhaps grudgingly, have and pursue new options moving forward as part of an evolving China, one opening, improving, and more plural. Not everyone is happy; indeed, considerable discontent endures. Nevertheless, the best option going forward seems to be incorporation into China rather than fighting a costly, useless, and increasingly bankrupt struggle.

Tactics: no silver bullets; comprehensive tactical mix Effective counter-insurgency requires continually building, retooling, and refining the tactics and techniques of interacting with society. Because insurgency is a strategy of violently contesting political power, taking politics seriously down to the micro levels allowed China to go beyond combating particular fighters or disrupting attacks. More than killing or capturing fighters, China found groupings in society to hold accountable for policing their members. China employed a technique here termed “society-centric warfare,” driving responsibility down to the lowest levels, whereby holding families, neighborhoods, workgroups, and towns responsible for their members. Each society has different components and constituent pieces; counterinsurgents will have to judge for themselves what the local social units are in a given arena as well as how best to exert influence upon each. Counter-insurgents must work to empower or coerce those units to work against the insurgency as well as the insurgents; this process either makes groups see that their fundamental interests lie in countering the insurgency, or it changes the group’s interest matrix. Fundamentally, this comes down to the hard work of effective local politicking.4 Tools of hard power figure prominently in China’s effective counterinsurgency, holding violence at bay at key moments. Ultimately, however, in most societies hard power alone will fail to produce durable results for raw power tends to rapidly undercut its own legitimacy. Societies rarely support political impositions by force alone. Soft power, tools ranging from co-optation through genuine incorporation of dissident groups, are key to building an effective counter-insurgency campaign which will endure beyond the fleeting moments of military force. Through a comprehensive approach, including a strategy of defense-in-depth, rather than individual cure-all tactics China put not only individual fighters but the insurgency itself on the strategic defensive. This tactical weapons-mix spanned the spectrum: killing militants and cutting external assistance; coercing society through shows of force and at times acting with massive force, even against unarmed unrest; co-opting key elites into at times toeing or shilling the official line; and incorporating society into a broader society, a broader dream of participation in an evolving China. Operational costs of insurgency increased dramatically for society while the benefits of co-optation and incorporation became viable if not immediately salient.

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Each society will respond differently to particular tactics, and a society’s response may vary across time and situational perceptions. A counter-insurgency must deliver security meaningful to society, in the society’s own terms. For example, some will have great aversions to perceived impositions, while others will vary in their reactions to the use of violence. Counter-insurgencies in the first case may have to tailor tools to press local police forces forward, while the society in the latter case may require a more robust presence by military forces. The surest way to know social preferences is to engage with indigenous political leaders at the local level. An effective tactic may be bringing locals into the security forces, for example standing up constabulary forces with strong local compositions or pairing local and external units in functionally oriented teams. The purpose of bringing local peoples into security forces or standing-up indigenous forces is to give locals genuine responsibility for creating their future as well as enhancing a security force’s ability to interface with society. Locals must become more than colonial puppets; these actors must be empowered to the fullest extent possible. Overall, a counter-insurgency’s goal is to make itself obsolete, returning an arena to relatively non-violent politics. Local participation in security is not the goal; the ultimate goal is genuine local responsibility for society’s security politics. Toward these ends counter-insurgents can use a tactical spectrum, ranging from: kill, coerce, co-opt, or incorporate society. Different instruments of state power tend to implement different types of tactics better than others. For instance, high-end militaries are built to kill or coerce5 whereas local police can enforce laws – at times a coercive practice, though at other times this can work to genuinely incorporate a restive society in to the counter-insurgent’s fold by demonstrating the state’s capacity for genuine protection from criminal or deleterious elements.

Hard power: kill (or capture) militants; coerce locals Counter-insurgents can employ a range of tools and tactics to coerce an enemy or hostile society into particular modes of action. Killing or capturing militants is a seductively simple solution to questions of terrorism or insurgency: if people violently rise and contest state control, eliminating these individuals seems like a clear answer. While some insurgencies may indeed bend to this tool alone, most require additional, and perhaps more prominently social, efforts. Decapitating movements’ leadership or military arms has rarely eliminated the movement itself, no matter how broad the sweep. Values and victory The use of particular tactics and tools depends upon not only force structure and capability, but also upon the polity’s values. Torture and brutal transgressions are unlikely to be effective counter-insurgency techniques for they rapidly alienate constituent as well as target societies, undercutting political will and fanning the flames if not stoking the social fires of insurgency. Even if these techniques

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were tactically effective (a proposition this study’s findings strongly refute), the extreme risk of strategic failure by undercutting political will and rallying support for the insurgency likely far outweigh the benefits. Force structure Building a force-mix capable of countering the evolving insurgency is an art, not a science. Typically, counter-insurgency theorists discuss three types of security forces: high-end combat; paramilitary or constabulary; and community-based law enforcement. High-end combat forces can deal with major incidents of unrest or assault and their forceful presence in an arena drives insurgents to tactically adapt, seeking tactics like ambushes and bombings rather than fixed-piece conventional battles. Paramilitary or constabulary forces combine policing and military functions, able to not only walk the streets but mix with the local population, genuinely interacting and potentially gathering intelligence. Strong paramilitary capabilities can overtake the key insurgent capability at this level of violence. Local police too are needed to represent not only the negative image of the state as fighting against insurgents who likely have some level of local support; local police can create a positive image of the state, solving difficult social problems of criminality and caustic disorder. Police are a necessity even in the most functional of free societies; dealing with social disruptions at this level opens space for less-violent politics. In Xinjiang China fields the People’s Liberation Army (PLA); the paramilitary People’s Armed Police, as well as the paramilitary farming and production group (Xinjiang Production and Construction Corporation, XPCC, or Bingtuan); Public Security Bureau (PSB), something like China’s FBI with a strong street presence; the local police; and Han settlers who have moved into the region en masse, providing a de facto force of bodies in addition to the military force of arms. Think small, win big: build local knowledge, remove weapons China initially responded with an ill-calibrated force-mix, yet counter-insurgents adapted, building increasingly capable paramilitary and police forces. These forces have acted to kill or capture fighters as well as control the weapons and materials which facilitate fighting an insurgency. Insurgencies can flourish given abundant weapons in society; weapons do not cause insurgencies, but easily obtainable war materials do facilitate violence, political and criminal. Further, China is reportedly cautious about bringing Uyghurs into its security services: building enough at the lower levels to be effective, yet slowing the progress of Uyghurs through the ranks for fear of giving away military training and perhaps this key pillar of society to the insurgency. Nevertheless, this may be changing as Uyghurs work their way up in rank, potentially blazing the way for other “loyal” Uyghurs to follow. Uyghur cadres in the security forces have the capacity to provide not only language capability but also cultural know-

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ledge; however, it is unclear to what extent these Uyghur cadres can impact operations and make them culturally appropriate. By whatever process, counter-insurgents in Xinjiang do seem to be relatively culturally cognizant; perhaps increasingly so. The massive, long-term presence of military, paramilitary, police, and Han settlers, provide overwhelming force which coerces Uyghurs into acquiescence, however begrudging, buying time and political space for the soft-power tools described below to take hold. Long timelines and overwhelming force are not numeric arguments, despite their numeric sound. They are psychological conditions and social perceptions. For example, a security apparatus can provide overwhelming force, both tactically and strategically, by qualitatively outmatching their opponents: outthinking the enemy.

Soft power: co-opt or incorporate Soft-power tools consist of less violent political measures, including issues of governance, religion and culture, economic development, and education. While violence is an insurgency’s visible element, insurgency is a strategic political campaign debating and contesting society’s future. Counter-insurgents must convince society that connection to the state is the only truly viable path forward. Each insurgency is unique in its claims against the state; some may claim that the state is corrupt, or predatory, or morally bankrupt. Counterinsurgents must use the tools of soft power to convince society that meaningful security, that a better future locally understood, resides with the state. Like hard power, soft power too can be leveraged against an insurgency, undercutting the insurgency’s social base. Where hard power tools, at their best, tend to momentarily hold an insurgency’s violent symptoms at bay, soft-power tools can ultimately cure society of the disease. Giving local society voice in governance, religion and culture, economic development, and education can turn society against the insurgency’s political mission, fundamentally reversing the insurgency’s momentum, and work toward strategic victory. Where hard-power tactics rely on overt force to effect change on hostile individuals and organizations, soft-power tactics effect society’s receptivity to insurgency by policing and pressing social groupings and fundamentally reshaping society. For example, hard-power tools can capture or kill religious leaders who use their posts to foment violent resistance against the government. Hard-power tools might also include using military force to coerce demonstrators to disperse. Soft-power tools attempt to steer that leader’s followers onto a peaceful course of spiritual enlightenment and religious worship minus the support for violent political resistance. Tools and tactics that co-opt and incorporate Institutions and ideas are the two primary soft-power tool types for countering insurgency. By institutions I mean formal organizations to which people

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routinely belong, like schools, mosques, or government entities. The categories of institutions and ideas are not mutually exclusive; for example, institutions often both embody and engender social ideas. Building or constraining institutions can strategically and tactically shape the content and perceived value of ideas permeating society. Institutions and ideas are the soft power tools used to either co-opt or incorporate restive societies into the state. Society-centric warfare In Xinjiang China turned the state’s weakness into an asset, turning institutions against the insurgency. When counter-insurgents perceived that the tools of local governance had been captured by individuals sympathetic to or participating in the insurgency, these institutions were purged of suspected elements. New, loyal cadres were infused throughout the region into government positions down to the most local levels. Second, the institutional groupings of society were held responsible for their members. In China, especially in rural and western China, society is highly organized and segmented based primarily upon where you work. Employment at a university, for example, often determines where you live, what you are paid, your position in society, as well as your access to key goods such as healthcare. Work bosses or residents’ committees take responsibility for their subordinates. Families are held accountable for their members; especially husbands and sons. Society-centric warfare is the process of tactically turning and focusing society’s groupings against an enemy – here an insurgency. Each society possesses unique groupings, yet all societies contain groups of various types and strengths of bonding. Tribes elsewhere may parallel workgroup, residential/geographic identities in China during this period. Understanding local society here is key to implementing effective society-centric warfare. Terrorism expert Bruce Hoffman advises: “Develop strong confidence-building ties with the communities from which terrorists are most likely to come or hide in, and mount communications campaigns to eradicate support from these communities.”6 This is the category of work achieved in Xinjiang through society-centric warfare. While the “strong confidence-building ties” envisioned by Hoffman may be tactically less darkly coercive in nature, the effect of co-opting society into the state’s counter-insurgent mission dovetails cleanly. Not every society will willingly switch sides or rally behind a counter-insurgency, no matter how good the communications campaign. For some societies a combined approach using incentives and threats to begin drawing key figures, groups, and institutions into the fold may be necessary. Co-opting society, steering it into a counter-insurgent struggle, is perhaps a more likely scenario than one in which society is apathetic to the strategic outcome or has not yet chosen sides. Insurgency, no matter how nascent its manifestations, is a political problem precisely because society begins to choose sides from the earliest moments. While coercion – violent and nonviolent – can start society’s political turn away from the insurgency, co-optation is necessary

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to hold progress as the counter-insurgency works for eventual incorporation of society into a broader community. The war of ideas and reshaping society Populations are the center of gravity in counter-insurgency warfare, and providing a rebellious society meaningful security requires both tactical and comprehensive measures. As insurgents argue, using words and violence, that fighting the state is the only viable path forward the state must convince society that the future lies elsewhere. This means discrediting the insurgency’s methods and dreams, and providing positive alternatives for society of both means and ends. Ideas can be powerfully used offensively and defensively to counter insurgency. Offensively, this means discrediting insurgency as a viable path forward. Defensively, this means building a robust society unafraid of attack; one which will be unsusceptible to the tactics of threat or violent intimidation.7 Education is an excellent tool for widely shaping the ideas present in society. While a long and difficult process, schools are a rare institution in society which demand children become members of the state’s society. High school essay contests pressing for ethnic tolerance are not instant cure-alls, yet successful counter-insurgency must implement a determined strategy which consistently presses for incorporation of rogue elements into a positive social fold. In Xinjiang, the school system hosts two parallel tracks – separate and rhetorically equal – between which parents can choose. One is Uyghur language, with Uyghur teachers. The other is Chinese language. The first creates prestigious jobs for Uyghurs in their local community, teaching Beijing’s lessons if in Uyghur language, adding legitimacy to China’s incorporation project. The second type of school, education in Mandarin Chinese, is increasingly selected by parents for their children because it builds fluency in the economy’s lingua Franca. History, civics, and international affairs are particularly important subjects, for each places individuals and groups in a broader context of human developments. With knowledge of history and international affairs society can search similar situations, building meaning and adapting tactics to local conditions. Civics lessons can pull society toward prescribed membership in the state’s project; on the other hand, the rhetoric of civics lessons must accord with reality of political participation. History, international affairs, and civics can potentially lift the eyes of individuals and social groups beyond parochial considerations. With this new awareness, society may find that insurgencies abroad damage or degrade society; the costs may appear too high. Alternately, society may find useful tactics from other situations, such as the struggles surrounding decolonization in Asia and Africa, desegregation in the United States, the defeat of the Soviet superpower in Afghanistan, or post-invasion Iraq. Media performs similar education and communication functions, yet is not directly controlled by the state in many arenas. Critically, audiences do not necessarily believe everything they see; perceptions are shaped by previous

148 Epilogue knowledge as well as group membership and the situation in which they sit. Developing tactics to disrupt insurgent communications is vitally important, though it is likely to be a technological treadmill: the better authorities are at controlling one technology, the more likely insurgents are to turn to another method of communication. Beyond tactical communication among insurgents, media transmits strategic ideas. Radio, television, audio and video, as well as the Internet are each important mediums in which the ideas of insurgency can rise or fall. Typically this is understood as public diplomacy, yet a proactive counter-insurgency media strategy could include neutering not only insurgent communication. Actively marketing the counter-insurgency to the population might include discrediting the tactic of insurgency by demonstrating its costs elsewhere, showing the resistance as corrupt and illegitimate, and providing a credible view of a positive future beyond the insurgency. Economic development is another key element of counter-insurgency. While material improvement is tactically important, material improvement must be driven by society’s desires. If the political nature of development is overlooked or ignored, any material gains can drive target societies further towards an insurgency. Xinjiang’s development is perceived as excluding Uyghurs and benefiting Han Chinese immigrating en masse from the east. Massive infrastructure projects such as roadways or projects associated with the oil and gas industry are seen as benefiting invading Han while Uyghurs feel shut out from the workforce. A better model of economic development might build upon the microfinance revolution, empowering local individuals to directly participate in creatively bettering themselves. Further, infrastructure projects such as roadways or schools can provide insurgents a new target-set which must be defended. These same projects can also provide insurgents with new lines of communication, easing the movement of fighters and weapons or facilitating the social networking which can fuse individuals into tactical groups. In short, material economic development is a double-edged sword; one which artful counter-insurgents must mind both edges. Religion is yet another social institution which shapes social perceptions, perceptions which are often more important than any tangible material reality. Religion helps believers filter the world and process events, and even in insurgencies which are not fundamentally religious these institutions can have a powerful counter-insurgent role. Perhaps unrepeatable elsewhere is China’s control or forced de-politicization of religion in Xinjiang. Interfering with religion is considered by some to be a violation of core human rights, and steps along these lines must be taken with circumspection. Nevertheless, China asserts that it is not interfering with the freedom of religion in Xinjiang but rather keeping religion free from elements that would use Islam and mosques for political purposes. Impacting the content of religious discourse may not be possible in all societies, yet where practicable and acceptable monitoring religion’s political content may be an exceptionally effective tool. Short of violating current understandings of human rights norms, effective tactics might include political out-

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reach with religious leaders: involving them in deep, ongoing discussions, as well as active monitoring for radicalizing individuals and groups. If religion’s political content is unavoidable, counter-insurgents would be wise to turn this liability into a tactical and strategic asset. Governance politics are often fodder for insurgent grievances: in some places these issues are genuine sources for social discord while in others the problem is more perceptual. In an insurgency, social perceptions are at least as important as any material reality. Society must be convinced that its voice is increasingly being heard, and not simply because the insurgency is forcing the state’s hand. Systemic adjustments are notoriously problematic, for they are seen as concessions and add to a perception of state weakness. Outside actors are rarely able to make appropriate decisions about local conditions; more importantly, regardless of reality, non-indigenous actors are seen as imposters taking what is not rightfully theirs, imposing their beliefs and values. Bringing locals into the political system and giving them local prestige, and perhaps local power, is among the most important steps a counter-insurgency can take. These people need not be insurgents or insurgent sympathizers; indeed, they can be ardent counter-insurgents. Nevertheless, having local faces and local minds navigating the often complex and nuanced politics present in counterinsurgency warfare may provide not only tactical but strategic successes. While things are far from perfect in Xinjiang, China is working to create respectable lives for Uyghurs as a people, a society within an expanded big-tent of China. Only this ultimate respect and incorporation will strategically undercut an insurgency, regardless of tactical victories. Through education, economic development, religion, and governance politics counter-insurgencies can work to incorporate dissident societies into the state’s project. Fundamentally, insurgency is a political struggle over society’s future. Tying society’s vision of the future through the state rather than against it is the crux of counter-insurgency; adapting society’s understanding of its security environment may at times be enough, while in other situations the security environment must fundamentally change. In Xinjiang, both pieces are present: society’s perception of the security environment is shifting, yet China itself is changing, evolving.

Feedback and blowback Countering an insurgency is no simple task, and politics often have consequences well beyond those imagined or even imaginable the outset of hostilities. If a counter-insurgency is effective, institutions may have been constructed which create new political pressures upon the state. Social groups may now have a seat at the political table from which they had been excluded, or the military and security forces hold new power. Simply, if it were possible to flag a date of strategic success, the implications and repercussions of the counter-insurgency effort would extend well beyond. Our purpose here is not to dwell on “unknown unknowns” or unknowable political developments, but simply to make the

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reader cognizant of the known unknowns – the pieces of the future we know we do not know. Feedback is present in nearly all political systems; yet some types of feedback are understood as neutral or positive. Blowback is a sub-category of feedback, indicating darkly negative consequences which typically undercut other national interests. Blowback from counter-insurgency could include a newly invigorated military, police, and security apparatus attempting to seize power from civilian leadership (e.g. France after Algeria). Conversely, blowback also includes the lessons drawn from conflict: after Vietnam and Somalia, some believed the United States was hyper-sensitive to taking casualties. This extreme casualty aversion was cited by President Clinton as the reason the United States did not intervene in the Rwandan genocide. In the process of countering an insurgency new political forces will come into existence and a new constellation of power will develop. While the outcome of this process is difficult to predict, always guarding the ends may be the most important axiom. Insurgency is both a threat to and an opportunity for the state. The nature of the state, its values and interests may all evolve. If the state can rally society it may gain considerable strength. In polities with multiple political parties, a political party may learn how to leverage the threat and response to its political gain. Indeed, all institutions tangentially involved in countering the insurgency may seek parochial gains or pursue pork-barrel projects under the banner of fighting terrorism. Leaders and polities must be aware of this feedback and use this knowledge to make critical decisions: countering insurgency is not the only threat states will ever face, nor will effectively countering insurgency be easy or cheap. Ideally, a state would end an insurgency stronger, more cohesive, and more free than before.

Elements unique to China’s COIN in Xinjiang Several elements are unique to China’s efforts in Xinjiang and may have little applicability or reliability in other counter-insurgencies. Among these is the massive government-led influx of ethnic Han Chinese from the east, shifting the population balance and taking the land by what is termed above as a “force of bodies” rather than the force of arms alone. The Chinese government’s seemingly unique ability to control or interrupt the flow of information into and out of Xinjiang relating to insurgency also may be difficult to replicate elsewhere; the technological genie may be out of the bottle. Geographic factors too are not insignificant: until recently Uyghur identity was less as a unified ethnic group, favoring parochial “oasis” identities.8 This geographic and social isolation of groups likely served as a buffer constraining, if not containing, the spread of insurgency. This social and geographic isolation likely also added costs to the flow of weapons and personnel within Xinjiang. Finally, the impact of 9/11 and America’s responses in Afghanistan (Enduring Freedom) and Iraq (Iraqi Freedom) changed the playing field at a critical juncture. After 9/11 the implications of al Qaeda’s international terrorism

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became obvious; many Uyghurs who may have been straddling the fence before soundly rejected the tactic. Also, for Uyghurs who hated the Chinese but looked to America as a refuge and beacon, 9/11 was an attack upon their dreams. American is seen by some Uyghurs as constraining China’s actions in Xinjiang; a forced restraint which, rightly or wrongly, is perceived as the source of whatever freedom and rights exists in Xinjiang today. Operation Enduring Freedom reportedly destroyed bases in Afghanistan, and perhaps elsewhere, in which Uyghurs were training to fight. While killing fighters, shutting down networks, and destroying training facilities and bases has tactical and operational impacts a further strategic blow was struck to Xinjiang’s insurgency: Operation Iraqi Freedom. The post-invasion chaos and insurgency served, many Uyghurs reported, as a negative example. Uyghurs could see how badly society might disintegrate into violence, how painful resistance might be once it takes hold. The demonstration effects of 9/11, Enduring Freedom, and Iraqi Freedom’s aftermath were unintended but are undeniable. These factors may not be easily replicated elsewhere.

The art of counter-insurgency Counter-insurgents would be wise to act early, dynamically, and comprehensively to build a campaign which effects change in society from the bottom up. Counter-insurgents must be prepared to stick in the game for the long haul. Understanding the counter-insurgents’ political base is key: societies’ preferences and tolerances vary widely. Some will permit great violence in their name with little need to know the details, while other societies will demand minimal or precisely targeted violence. Fundamentally, national leadership must manage the core’s political will. Insurgency is inherently a struggle for political power, and counterinsurgency is an art form. Knowing which tools of force, ranging from killing or capturing individuals through genuinely incorporating society, infusing it with new ideas, takes both strategic vision and a willingness to experiment. Society’s perceptions are fluid: tools may have different impacts even within the same arena at different times; forces once considered friendly or antagonists may alienate society or gain footholds once considered unthinkable. Politics are dynamic and insurgencies evolve; if they are to be effective, counter-insurgents must act proactively, dynamically, and comprehensively. Hopefully together my generation can learn the now vital art of countering insurgency, pressing forward and creating a safer, more free, and more just world.

Notes

Introduction: morality and power in China’s Wild West 1 Kan, Shirley A. (6/27/2006) “U.S.–China Counterterrorism Cooperation: Issues for U.S. Policy” CRS Report for Congress RL33001; Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. 2 Hoffman, Bruce (2006) Inside Terrorism, New York: Columbia University Press, p. 93. 1 Fighting terrorism: China’s bottom-up approach 1 For example, Chung, Chien-peng (July/August 2002) “China’s ‘War on Terror:’ September 11 and Uighur Separatism” Foreign Affairs, Volume 81, Number 4; Swaine, Michael D. (2004) “China: Exploiting a Strategic Opening” in Tellis, Ahsley J. and Michael Willis (2004) Strategic Asia 2004–05: Confronting Terrorism in the Pursuit of Power, Washington, DC: National Bureau of Asian Research. Compare with Starr, S. Fredrick (ed.) (2004) Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Borderland, Armonk: M.E. Sharpe. Indeed, one is hard pressed to find citations to, let alone substantive engagement with, the terrorism or counter-insurgency literature within the seminal works of top Xinjiang scholars even where these scholars are austensibly discussing terrorism in Xinjiang. Fundamentally, these scholars have been assessing the situation in Xinjiang without a scholarly understanding of the broader phenomenon to which they seek to prove or disprove relations, connections, similarities, or differences. See, for example: Millward, James A. (2007) Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang, New York: Columbia University Press; Millward, James A. (2004) “Violent Separatism in Xinjiang: A Critical Assessment” East-West Center; Gladney, Dru C. (2006) “Xinjiang” in Reveron, Derek S. and Jefferey Stevenson Murer (2006) Flashpoints in the War on Terrorism, New York: Routledge; Gladney, Dru C. (2004) Dislocating China: Muslims, Minorities, and Other Subaltern Subjects, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Terrorism analysts have similarly run into problems when wading into Xinjiang studies without engaging any credible literature on the topic. This study aims to bridge this gap, engaging theory and fact from multiple literatures to build upon fieldwork. 2 Tomes, Robert R. (Spring 2004) “Relearning Counterinsurgency Warfare” Parameters, e.g. p. 16; Hoffman, Bruce (9/29/2005) “Does our Counter-Terrorism Strategy Match the Threat?” Statement before the Committee on International Relations Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Nonproliferation United States House of Representatives; Hoffman (2006); Gunaratna, Rohan (Summer 2004) “The PostMadrid Face of Al Qaeda” The Washington Quarterly, 27:3; Marks, Thomas A. (2006) Maoist People’s War in Post-Vietnam Asia, Bangkok: White Lotus Press; Kil-

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cullen, David (Winter 2006–7) “Counter-insurgency Redux” Survival, 48:4; Galula, David (1964/2006) Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, Westport: Praeger Security International; Bell, J. Bowyer (1998) The Dynamics of the Armed Struggle, London: Frank Cass; Nasiri, Omar (2006) Inside the Jihad: My Life with al Qaeda, New York: Basic Books. Kilcullen (Winter 2006–7) p. 116. Al Qaeda itself follows this pattern, as discussed below. Hoffman (June 2004) “Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq” RAND National Security Research Division Occasional Paper OP-127-IPC/CMEPP, p. 3. Hoffman (June 2004) p. 9; similarly, Jeffrey Record has written several relevant volumes on America’s counter-insurgency efforts. The comments of Anthony Cordsman (3/15/2007) “The Long War: The United States as a Self-Inflicted Wound” at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University, conference on “Rethinking and Resourcing the ‘Long War’ ” are a powerful and honest dissection of America’s flawed or failed efforts in Iraq, Vietnam, and several other recent arenas. Central Intelligence Agency (no date) “Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency” U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, in Hoffman (June 2004) p. 17, punctuation of “preinsurgency” in original. Kilcullen (Winter 2006–7) p. 116, italics in original. See Benjamin, Daniel (11/18/2005) “A Breeding Ground in Iraq” The Boston Globe, A19; Hoffman (9/29/2005); Pillar, Paul R. (Summer 2004) “Counterterrorism after Al Qaeda” The Washington Quarterly, 27:3. Galula (1964/2006) p. 75. Galula (1964/2001), discussed in Tomes (Spring 2004) p. 24. For example, Pattnayak, Satya R. and Thomas M. Arvanites (1992) “Structural Determinants of State Involvement in International Terrorism” reprinted in Harvey W. Kushner (ed.). (2003) Essential Readings on Political Terrorism: Analyses of Problems and Prospects for the 21st Century, New York: Gordian Knot Books (e.g. pp. 187–8); Jenkins, Brian M. “International Terrorism” in Carlton and Schaerf (eds) (1975) International Terrorism and World Security, New York: John Wiley and Sons reprinted in Art and Waltz (eds) (2004) The Use of Force: Military Power and International Politics (sixth edition), Boulder: Rowman and Littlefield. Alternately, see Hoffman (2006) e.g. Chapter 1, “Defining Terrorism.” Hoffman (June 2004) p. 15. Bell (1998) e.g. p. 11; Kilcullen (Winter 2006–7) p. 115. Migdal, Joel S. (2001) State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute One Another, New York: Cambridge University Press, e.g. pp. 10–11. Hoffman (June 2004) pp. 15–16. Similarly, Galula (1964/2006, p. 8) writes “the population’s attitude . . . is dictated not so much by the relative popularity and merits of the opponents as by the more primitive concern for safety.” Marks (2006) also finds security central, a prime example being the case of Nepal. Marks (2006) “Insurgency in a Time of Terrorism.” Galula (1964/2006) p. 1. Bensahel, Nora (8/9/2005) “Gauging Counterinsurgency” Baltimore Sun, www.rand.org/commentary080905BS.html. Similarly, Galula (1964/2006, p. xi) writes that “war is not a chess game but a vast social phenomenon with an infinitely greater and ever-expanding number of variables.” Galula (1964/2006, p. 53). 2003–6 (time of writing). Hoffman (June 2004) pp. 13–14. Tomes (Spring 2004) p. 18. John A. Nagl’s (2005) Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, provides a compelling analysis of the failure of this approach in Vietnam.

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Tomes (Spring 2004) p. 19. See Kilcullen (Winter 2006–7) p. 122. See, for example, Marks (2006) p. 10; Frank Kitson in Tomes (Spring 2004) p. 25. Marks (2006) “Insurgency in a Time of Terrorism.” Similarly, Galula (1964/2006, p. 62) discusses the “primacy of the political over the military power.” Kilcullen (Winter 2006–7) p. 124. Bovingdon, Gardner (2004) “Autonomy in Xinjiang: Han Nationalist Imperatives and Uyghur Discontent” Policy Series 11, East-West Center, Washington, DC. Kilcullen (Winter 2006–7) p. 124; also, see Migdal, Joel S. (2001) State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute One Another, New York: Cambridge University Press; Migdal, Joel S. (1997, 2002) “Studying the State” in Lichbach and Zuckerman (eds) Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. For a broader description of this method and its critics see: Packer, George (12/18/2006) “Knowing the Enemy: Can Social Scientists Redefine the ‘War on Terror?’ ” The New Yorker. For example, Lattimore, O. (1929/1995) The Desert Road to Turkestan, New York: Kodansha International; Galula (1964/2006). Starr et al. (2004); Millward (2004); Dillon, M. (2004) Xinjiang – China’s Muslim Far Northwest, London: RoutledgeCurzon.

2 Insurgency in Xinjiang 1 What has been termed by western scholars “the Xinjiang problem” is the political situation resulting from the largely effective counter-insurgency analyzed in later chapters. e.g. Starr, S. Fredrick (2004) Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Borderland, New York: M.E. Sharpe, pp. 18–19; Chinese Communist Party, author unknown (2005) Zhongguo Gongchandang Yu Xinjiang Minzu Wenti. 2 See Fearon, James D. and David D. Laitin (Autumn 2000) “Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity” International Organization, Volume 54, Number 4; Fearon, James D. and David D. Laitin (2003) “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War” American Political Science Review, Volume 97, Number 1.; Berdal, Mats and David M. Malone (1999) Greed & Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars, Boulder: Lynne Reinner Publishers. 3 See Kilcullen, David (Winter 2006–7) “Counter-insurgency Redux” Survival, 48:4, pp. 122, 117; Nasiri, Omar (2006) Inside the Jihad: My Life with Al Qaeda, New York: Basic Books; Arquilla, John and David Ronfeldt (2001) Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy, Santa Monica: RAND. 4 While some readers steeped in previous Xinjiang scholarship may find the analysis of al Qaeda and the global jihad a somewhat jarring opening to a discussion of Xinjiang’s problems, this extended discussion analyzes the changing international ecosystem in which Xinjiang’s political violence developed. The evolving context of terrorism and insurgency internationally, as well as CT and COIN, is an important factor to understanding developments in any individual arena. See Hoffman, Bruce (2006) Inside Terrorism, New York: Columbia University Press; Rapaport, David C. (2004) “Four Waves of Modern Terrorism” in Cronin, Audrey Kurth and James M. Ludes (2004) Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy, Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press; Nasiri, Omar (2006) Inside the Jihad: My life with al Qaeda, New York: Basic Books; as well as the writings of Michael Scheuer. 5 Lewis, Bernard (2003) The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror, New York: Modern Library. 6 See, for example, Crile, George (2003) Charlie Wilson’s War: The Extraordinary Story of The Largest Covert Operation in History, New York: Atlantic Monthly

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Press. Another excellent source on the Soviet–Afghan war is Coll, Steve (2004) Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, From the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001, New York: The Penguin Press. See, for example, Crile (2003). For example Crile (2003) pp. 268–9; Lewis (2003); Clarke, Richard (2004) Against All Enemies: Inside America’s War on Terror, New York: Simon and Schuster. Anonymous/Scheuer (2002) Through Our Enemies’ Eyes: Osama bin Laden, Radical Islam, and the Future of America, Washington, DC: Brassey’s; Nasiri, Omar (2006) Inside the Jihad, New York: Basic Books; Gunaratna, Rohan (2002) Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror, New York: Columbia University Press; Sageman, Marc (2004) Understanding Terror Networks, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press; Lewis (2003). Lewis (2003); Anonymous/Scheuer (2002); Gunaratna (2002); Sageman (2004). See Nasiri (2006). Osama bin Laden, November 2004, “Transcript: Full Text From the 18 Minute Tape Released By Al-Jazeera from Osama Bin Laden” in Hoffman (9/29/2005) p. 14. See Gunaratna (2002) pp. 10–11. Anonymous/Scheuer (2004) Imperial Hubris: Why The West is Losing the War on Terror, Washington, DC: Brassey’s, p. 86. Nasiri (2006). Gunaratna (2002, p. 59) asserts that Uyghurs were among the members of al Qaeda’s 055 Brigade. Sageman (2004) p. 178. The movement from alienated Muslim to mujahed is a social process, and a member of the group must have a peripheral social acquaintance already in the jihad in order to join. A note of caution: Sageman’s study is an empirical work documenting the way al Qaeda and the international Salafi jihad functioned at one point in its history. Sageman’s account may not necessarily document the constraints of present-day or future engagement with the jihad. Rapaport (2004) e.g. p. 61. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (2004) pp. 115, 145, 169. NB In American official parlance, the “Global War on Terror” later became the “Global War on Terrorism” and then “The Long War.” Likely a final name for this conflict, and perhaps common definition of the problem, are yet to be settled upon. See Chehab, Zaki (2005) Inside the Resistance: The Iraqi Insurgency and the Future of the Middle East, New York: Nation Books; also, Kilcullen (Winter 2006–7). American military source (Fall 2004) personal communication. American military sources (2006–7) personal communication. A self-identified Jordanian scholar recently argued on a jihadi website that China is a logical next target. Hujazi, Akram (1/13/2007) “China under the Microscope of the Salafi Jihadist” al-ommh.net. Anonymous/Scheuer (2004) p. 94; Bonner, Raymond and Jane Perlez (10/3/2005) “Macabre Clues Advance Inquiry in Bali Attacks” New York Times; Bonner, Raymond (10/7/2005) “Bali Suicide Bombers Said to Have Belonged to Small Gang” New York Times; Bonner, Raymond and Carlos H. Conde (10/9/2005) “Fugitives Elude Wide Manhunt Over Bali Blasts” New York Times; Bonner, Raymond (10/27/2005) “Slow Progress in Bali Inquiry Hints at Wilier Terror Groups” New York Times. Vick, Karl (2/13/2007) “Al-Qaeda’s Hand in Istanbul Plot: Turks Met With Bin Laden” Washington Post, A01. Vick (2/13/2007). News.BBC.co.uk (3/12/2004) “Madrid Attacks Timeline”; News.BBC.co.uk (3/10/2005) “Madrid Bombing Suspects.” News.BBC.co.uk (7/9/2005) “Tube Bombs ‘Almost Simultaneous’ ”;

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News.BBC.co.uk (7/18/2005) “Three UK Bombers Visited Pakistan”; News.BBC.co.uk (8/4/2005) “Al Qaeda ‘Blames Blair for Bombs’ ”; News.BBC.co.uk (9/2/2005) “London Bomber Video Aired on TV”; News.BBC.co.uk (11/1/2005) “Timeline: London Bombing Developments”; News.BBC.co.uk (11/4/2005) “London Attacks: The Investigation: Bomb Cache.” Bonner, Raymond and Jane Perlez (10/3/2005) “Macabre Clues Advance Inquiry in Bali Attacks” New York Times; Bonner, Raymond (10/7/2005) “Bali Suicide Bombers Said to Have Belonged to Small Gang” New York Times; Bonner, Raymond and Carlos H. Conde (10/9/2005) “Fugitives Elude Wide Manhunt Over Bali Blasts” New York Times; Bonner, Raymond (10/27/2005) “Slow Progress in Bali Inquiry Hints at Wilier Terror Groups” New York Times. Iraqi political sources (2006) personal communication. Hoffman (9/29/2005) p. 4; alternately, Hoffman, Bruce (2006) Inside Terrorism, New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 285–9 argues for a more segmented description rather than an organic whole or movement presented here. See Open Source Center (1/9/2007) “FYI: Xinjiang Websites Not Observed to Report on Unrest After Terrorist Camp Destroyed” www.opensource.gov. For example Millward, James (2004) “Violent Separatism in Xinjiang: A Critical Assessment” East–West Center, Washington, DC, p. 11. For example Mulvenon, James (2007) “Rogue Warriors? A Puzzled Look at the Chinese ASAT Test” China Leadership Monitor, Number 20. A similar pattern presents more generally as well: for another example, Chinese media did not report on an uprising in Hunan province which reportedly involved over 20,000 protestors, some of which engaged in violence against police and other symbols of authority. See Kahn, Joseph (3/12/2007) “Police Restore Order in Hunan Province after Riots” New York Times. Bell, J. Bowyer (1998) The Dynamics of the Armed Struggle, London: Frank Cass, e.g. p. 8. Galula, David (1964/2006) Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, Westport: Praeger Security International. Galula suggests using tips from informants as a gauge for measuring a campaign’s efficacy. Lacking access to this data-set, this author is unable to here employ this methodology. Information Office of State Council (1/21/2002) “East Turkistan Terrorist Forces Cannot Get Away with Impunity.” Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Centre is part of the Jane’s defense group, a commercially available intelligence service. Multiple entries are directly relevant; the best is Jane’s (3/6/2006) “Uighur Separatists” Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Centre, accessed 11/8/2006. Millward (2004) pp. viii–ix. Diplomatic and senior counter-terrorism officials (2007) personal communications. Millward (2004) pp. viii–ix. Gladney (2004) p. 380. Jane’s (3/6/2006) “Uighur Separatists.” Millward (2004) p. ix; Jane’s (3/6/2006) “Uighur Separatists.” Shichor (2004) “The Great Wall of Steel: Military and Strategy” in Starr, S. Fredrick (2004) Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Borderland, Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, p. 412; Dillon, Michael (2004) Xinjiang – China’s Muslim Far Northwest, London: RoutledgeCurzon, p. 128; Jane’s (8/18/1998) “Uighur Muslim Separatists attacked targets . . .” Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Centre, accessed 10/3/2006. See Jane’s (3/6/2006) “Uighur Separatists.” Millward (2004) p. 20, emphasis in original. Fuller, G.E. and J.N. Lipman (2004) “Islam in Xinjiang” in Starr, S. Fredrick (ed.) Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Borderland, Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, p. 342. A well-connected US governmental source (2005) with unknown access to first-hand conversations and information exchanges firmly asserted this to be the case.

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51 Department of State (2004) Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003. This report acknowledges China’s claims against other groups and asserts that there is no credible information to persuade the United States. 52 People’s Daily (9/13/2002) “FM Spokesman: ETIM a Wholly Terrorist Organization.” 53 Millward (2004) p. 23; Information Office of State Council (1/21/2002) “East Turkistan Terrorist Forces Cannot Get Away with Impunity”; Xinhua (1/8/2007) “Chinese Police Destroy Terrorist Camp in NW Region” www.chinaview.cn; Cao Zhiheng (1/8/2007) “The Xinjiang Public Security Organ Destroys a Terrorist Training Camp” Xinhua Domestic Service,www.openssource.gov; Xu Jingyue and Cui Qingxin (1/9/2007) “China’s Ministry of Public Security Says: We Will Resolutely Crack Down on the East Turkistan Islamic Movement Terrorist Activities” Xinhua Asia Pacific Service, www.opensource.gov; Fan, Maureen (1/9/2007) “Raid by Chinese Kills 18 at Alleged Terror Camp” Washington Post, A12. 54 Wayne, Martin I. (2/25/2007) “Al Qaeda’s China Problem” PacNet, 8A; Xinhua (1/8/2007) “Chinese Police Destroy Terrorist Camp in NW Region”; Cao Zhiheng (1/8/2007); Xu Jingyue and Cui Qingxin (1/9/2007); Fan, Maureen (1/9/2007); Xinhua (3/6/2007) “Xinjiang People Volunteer in Raid on Terrorist Camp: Lawmaker” People’s Daily; Xinhua (3/9/2007) “Slimmer Possibility for Terrorism in Xinjiang”; Blanchard, Ben (3/9/2007) “Xinjiang Sees Less Terrorist Activity” Reuters. 55 Rudelson, Justin and William Jankowiak (2004) “Acculturation and Resistance: Xinjiang Identities in flux” in Starr (ed.) (2004) Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Borderland, Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, p. 318, emphasis in original. 56 Millward (2004) p. 24. 57 Shichor (2004) p. 158. 58 Millward (2004) p. 24; Information Office of State Council (1/21/2002) “East Turkistan Terrorist Forces Cannot Get Away with Impunity.” 59 Millward (2004) p. 25. 60 Millward (2004) p. 26. 61 Millward (2004) p. 26; see also, Information Office of State Council (1/21/2002) “East Turkistan Terrorist Forces Cannot Get Away with Impunity.” 62 Millward (2004) p. 26. 63 Millward (2004) p. 27; see Information Office of State Council (1/21/2002) “East Turkistan Terrorist Forces Cannot Get Away with Impunity.” 64 Millward (2004) p. 27–8. 65 Tanner, Murray Scot (2004) “China Rethinks Unrest” The Washington Quarterly 27:3, p. 137; Cody, Edward (8/1/2005) “ 74,000 Mass Incidents. Now that is something . . .” Washingtonpost.com; French, Howard W. (8/24/2005) “Land of 74,000 Protests (but Little Is Ever Fixed)” New York Times. 66 Buckley, Chris (1/26/2006) “China to ‘Strike Hard’ Against Rising Unrest” Reuters; Jackson-Han, Sarah (1/31/2006) “China Struggles to Keep Lid on Popular Unrest” Radio Free Asia; Kuhn, Anthony (2/11/2006) “Inside China’s Angry Villages” Los Angeles Times. 67 This period marked Hu Jintao’s push for a “Harmonious Society.” 68 For data on reported unrest by region see: Open Source Center (3/5/2007) “Statistics, Summaries of PRC Civil Disturbances in 2006”; Open Source Center (2/5/2007) “Highlights: Reports on PRC Civil Disturbances for 2005”; Open Source Center (12/23/2004) “Highlights: PRC Civil Disturbances 1 Jan–15 Dec 04.” 69 People’s Republic of China (December, 2006) “China’s National Defense in 2006.” 70 Scobell, Andrew (2005) “Terrorism and Chinese Foreign Policy” in Deng, Yong and Fei-Ling Wang (2005) China Rising: Power and Motivation in Chinese Foreign Policy, Boulder: Rowman & Littlefield. 71 Scobell (2005) pp. 308–9.

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72 Scobell (2005) p. 309. 73 Gladney, Dru C. (2004) “Responses to Chinese Rule: Patterns of Cooperation and Opposition” in Starr, S. Fredrick (2004) Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Borderland, Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, p. 379 discusses “voice” in Xinjiang. 74 Crile (2003) pp. 268–9. 75 Shichor (2004) p. 149. 76 Scholars and practitioners, including regional sources (2006–7) personal communications. 77 Shichor (2004) p. 158. Supposedly based upon the recollections of one of America’s ambassadors to China, a popular work places this figure closer to $600 million. While not impossible, this figure is far larger than the scholarly consensus provided within the text; this single-source’s veracity and precision are difficult for this author to vet using open sources. 78 Gunaratna (2002) p. 172, emphasis and spelling in original. As noted above, senior counter-terrorism officials indicate that not only were Afghan-trained fighters involved in or around this incident but also Afghan militia forces directly. 79 Anonymous/Scheuer (2002) p. 21, emphasis in original. 80 Alternately, the December 2006 statement of al Qaeda deputy Zawahiri indicates a return to publicly discussing Xinjiang as Muslim land under occupation. The rationale for inclusion of this discussion in some public statements and not others is unclear to this author and may be a productive avenue for further study by those who analyze Zawahiri’s as well as jihadi rhetoric more generally. See also Akram Hujazi (1/13/2007) “China under the Microscope of the Salfi Jihadist” al-ommh.net for a perspective on the future interest of China as a venue for and competitor with the global jihad. NB this website is assessed to be a militant radical Islamic web form. 81 NB While conducting fieldwork I encountered references or leads to incidents of resistance and repression not currently present in the literature; due to security concerns for sources and personal safety I have left full investigation of incidents to later scholars, though taken information from these encounters as I am able. Fieldwork fundamentally shaped this book’s argument as well as the descriptions employed, and I ask my readers to please tolerate the sourcing for I am obligated to say little more publicly. The current chapter, as well as the book, is based primarily upon fieldwork in Xinjiang and elsewhere in China. There are several times in this chapter in which specific interviews are cited, yet I am obligated to ask my reader to trust that interviews and social knowledge carefully back the story presented. Again, I understand that some readers may wish for a fuller description of sources, their positions and their words; I too regret that I must of necessity here err on the side of caution. 82 Scholars and practitioners (2006–7, personal conversations) familiar with Pakistan’s internal milieu believe Uyghurs likely received training and various types of support in Pakistan, perhaps without the official consent of the government. Other scholars assert that the ISI had either direct involvement or direct consent. Also see Jane’s (3/6/2006) “Uighur Separatists” Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Centre, accessed 11/8/2006; Davis, A. (4/1/2003) “Xinjiang Separatists Lose Ground” Jane’s Terrorism & Security Monitor. 83 Interviews (China, 2005). 84 Fuller, Graham E. and Jonathan N. Lipman (2004) “Islam in Xinjiang” in Starr, S. Fredrick (2004) Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Borderland, Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, p. 336. 85 Shichor (2004) p. 158. 86 Fuller and Lipman (2004) p. 341; Nasiri (2006) also describes his arrival in Pakistan as a key linkage to camps in Afghanistan, the global jihad, as well as a global network of terrorists. 87 Shichor (2004, p. 145); scholars and practitioners (2006–7) personal communications. 88 Shichor (2004) p. 145.

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89 Anonymous/Scheuer (2002); Gunaratna (2002); Nasiri (2006). 90 Hoffman (9/29/2005). 91 Kan, Shirley A. (6/27/2006) “U.S.–China Counterterrorism Cooperation: Issues for U.S. Policy” CRS Report for Congress, RL 33001, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. 3 China’s “infinite” political will 1 www.asianews.it (10/1/2005) “Maximum alert in Xinjiang against ‘separatism’ and ‘terrorism.’ ” 2 NB Some Chinese sources use CPC or Communist Party of China as the official translation of this entity’s name. CCP is standard nomenclature in American Chinascholarship; thus, CCP is used throughout this text. 3 Hoffman, Bruce (June 2004) “Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq” RAND National Security Research Division Occasional Paper OP-127-IPC/CMEPP, pp. 15–16. The perception of security is most important; for example, insurgents can use various violent techniques to make a population feel insecure, thus making the state appear weak. 4 See Migdal, Joel S. (2001) State in Society: Studying how States and Societies Transform and Constitute One Another, New York, pp. 141, 147. Also, Skocpol, Theda (1979) States and Social Revolutions: a Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Skocpol, (1979, p. 285) argues that states unable to deal with international military threats are overthrown through revolution. While decidedly structural, Skocpol’s argument parallels the logic presented above; see also Diamond, Jared (2004) Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed, New York: Viking; Weatherford, Jack (2004) Genghis Khan and the Making of the Modern World, New York: Three Rivers Press. 5 Clausewitz, Karl von (1943) On War, in Carr, Caleb (2000) The Book of War, New York: The Modern Library, p. 464. 6 Hammes, Thomas X. (2004) The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century, St. Paul: Zenith Press, p. 190. 7 Both major political parties in the United States, the Democrats and Republicans, have recently employed spokespeople and researchers to interface with media outlets and “spin” debates, speeches, and news events. While some denigrate this activity, internal research during the 2000 and 2004 election cycles shows that media discussions impact what viewers believe they witnessed, including such fundamental perceptions as who “won” a debate. Political partisans and national media sources (2003–6) personal communications. 8 Putnam, Robert D. (2000) “The Dark Side of Social Capital” in Bowling Alone: the Collapse and Revival of American Community, New York: Simon and Schuster, e.g. p. 355; Skocpol, Theda (2003) Diminished Democracy: From Membership to Management in American Civic Life, Norman: Oklahoma University Press; Sageman, Marc (2004) Understanding Terror Networks, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 9 Though there is a strong resemblance, the situation in Xinjiang is not an ethnic conflict. Ethnic conflicts are simple contests for territory where identities are fixed from birth. See Kaufmann, Chaim (1996) “Intervention in Ethnic and Ideological Civil Wars” Security Studies, Volume 6, Number 1 reprinted in Art, Robert J. and Kenneth N. Waltz (2004) The Use of Force: Military Power and International Politics (sixth edition), Boulder: Rowman & Littlefield, pp. 395–6. In Xinjiang, people can chose what side they are on, whether they will work for the state’s project or that of the insurgents. On situational effects upon identity see Zimbardo, Philip G., C. Maslach, and C. Haney (2000) “Reflections on the Stanford Prison Experiment: Genesis, Transformations, Consequences” in Blass, Thomas (ed.) (2000) Obedience to

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Authority: Current Perspectives on the Milgram Paradigm, Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. Mearsheimer, John J. (2001) The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, New York: W.W. Norton and Company, e.g. p. 2. Bovingdon, Gardner (2004) “Autonomy in Xinjiang: Han Nationalist Imperatives and Uyghur Discontent” East-West Center, Washington, DC (e.g. pp. 20–1) provides an excellent discussion of the impact of these policies within Xinjiang itself. Interviews (China, 2005, 2002). Lilly, James (2004) China Hands: Nine Decades of Adventure, Espionage, and Diplomacy in Asia, New York: Public Affairs, pp. 335–7. Swain, Michael D. (2004) “China: Exploiting a Strategic Opening” in Tellis, Ashley J. and Michael Wills (eds) (2004) Strategic Asia 2004–05: Confronting Terrorism in the Pursuit of Power, Seattle: National Bureau of Asian Research. Compare with Saunders, Philip C. (October 2006) “China’s Global Activism: Strategy, Drivers, and Tools” Washington, DC: National Defense University Press; People’s Republic of China (December 2006) “China’s National Defense in 2006.” Swaine, Michael D. and Ashley J. Tellis (2000) Interpreting China’s Grand Strategy: Past, Present, and Future, Santa Monica: RAND, p. x. See Zhao, Suisheng (2004) A Nation-State by Construction: Dynamics of Modern Chinese Nationalism, Stanford: Stanford University Press; Gries, Peter Hays (2004) China’s New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy, Berkeley CA: University of California Press. Whiting, Allen S. (Fall 2001) “China’s Use of Force, 1950–96, and Taiwan” International Security, Volume 26, Number 2, e.g. pp. 103–4. Kierman, Frank A. Jr. (1954) “The Fluke That Saved Formosa” Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge. Knaus, John Kenneth (1999) Orphans of the Cold War: America and the Tibetan Struggle for Survival, New York: Public Affairs. On America’s limited involvement see Laird, Thomas (2002) Into Tibet: The CIA’s First Atomic Spy and His Secret Expedition to Lhasa, New York: Grove Press. For an alternate view of Soviet involvement see Bovingdon (2004). Uyghurs, in Xinjiang and several countries abroad (2005–7, personal communications), list radiation poisoning, increased rates of cancers and birth defects as grievances against a Chinese state which tested weapons without concern for the surrounding population. Bovingdon (2004) p. 19. Inner Mongolia also joined the PRC under duress, and rumors of separatist intentions persist, e.g. Laird (2002). Whiting (Fall 2001) p. 104. Goodwin, Paul H.D.B. (1999) “Change and Continuity in Chinese Military Doctrine: 1949–1999” Conference on PLA Warfighting, 1949–99, Center for Naval Analysis, Alexandria, in Whiting (Fall 2001) p. 105. Mearsheimer (2001) e.g. pp. 373–7, 396–402; Swaine, Michael D. and Ashley J. Tellis (2000) Interpreting China’s Grand Strategy: Past, Present, and Future, Santa Monica: RAND. Opportunities and options, as well as perspectives and relationships, are also arguably key components of security environments. What is here discussed as “domestic unrest” is the same phenomenon discussed as “civil unrest” or “civil disturbances” by the Open Source Center and “social unrest” by major news outlets internationally. Each term is loaded with unintended arguments about source and nature of the unrest. Use of the term “domestic unrest” here does not in any way constitute or represent the author’s normative beliefs or judgments; it is used in the strict and narrow sense of being unrest within the PRC’s self-claimed territory.

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30 People’s Republic of China (10/19/2005) “Building of Political Democracy in China” Xinhua news agency, www.chinaview.cn; some spelling and punctuation changed from the original for clarity. 31 McDonald, Hamish (11/12/2005) “China Battles to Convince Terror Skeptics” www.theage.com.au. 32 China asserts that there are “more than 60 million members” of the Communist Party; other estimates are 70 or 77 million members. People’s Republic of China/Xinhua (2003) “Chinaview About China: CPC (The Party in Power)” www.chinaview.cn. 33 People’s Republic of China/Xinhua (2003) “Chinaview About China: CPC (The Party in Power)” www.chinaview.cn. 34 For example, see Kahn, Joseph (12/13/2005) “Legal Gadfly Bites Hard, and Beijing Slaps Him” New York Times; Huntington, Samuel P. (1968) Political Order in Changing Societies, New Haven: Yale University Press; Personal Interviews, China (2005); Zhao, Suisheng (ed.) (2006) Debating Political Reform in China: Rule of Law vs. Democratization, Armonk: M.E. Sharpe; Pei, Minxin (2006) China’s Trapped Transition: The Limits of Developmental Autocracy, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 35 For example, Pan, Philip P. (11/6/2005) “China Shutters Prominent Lawyer’s Firm: Rights Activist Had Refused to Disavow Letter Defending Religion, Falun Gong” The Washington Post, A15; Kahn, Joseph (9/21/2005) “Deep Flaws, and Little Justice, in China’s Court System” New York Times; Zhao (2006); Pei (2006). 36 In 2006 Hu Jintao began taking serious steps, yet it remains to be seen whether these were steps against official corruption or corruption of officials who were also political opponents. We must also consider the possibility that perhaps this distinction is more significant in more litigious, rigid, or honed political/legal systems or in scholarly queries. That is, in China today either cause may have systemic effects in fighting corruption, or at least raising its potential costs thereby decreasing its prevalence or visibility; alternately, publicly fighting corruption can increase the public’s perceptions of corruption’s pervasiveness. 37 See Zhao (2004). 38 Compare with Orwell, George (1949) 1984, New York: Penguin. 39 NB Here “the Chinese people” does not simply refer to a simple ethnic distinction but rather to the politics of identity and association. People can choose, consciously or otherwise, to which group they belong. Some of Xinjiang’s Uyghurs can be placed into this category while some of Xinjiang’s Han, and people elsewhere in China, may not so easily fit into this category. 40 Horowitz, Donald L. (1985/2000) Ethnic Groups in Conflict, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1 p. 84; Goffman, Erving (1963) Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, p. 130; Zimbardo, Philip G., C. Maslach, and C. Haney (2000) “Reflections on the Stanford Prison Experiment: Genesis, Transformations, Consequences” in Blass, Thomas (ed.) (2000) Obedience to Authority: Current Perspectives on the Milgram Paradigm, Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 41 For example Kasfir, Nelson (2004) “Domestic Anarchy, Security Dilemmas, and Violent Predation: Causes of Failure” in Rotberg, Robert I. (ed.) (2004) When States Fail: Causes and Consequences, Princeton: Princeton University Press; Kaufmann (1996); Horowitz 1985/2000). 42 Durkheim, Emile (2003) Suicide: A Study in Sociology in Emirbayer, Mustafa (ed.) (2003) Emile Durkheim: Sociologist of Modernity, Malden: Blackwell Publishing, e.g. pp. 45–7. 43 This contradicts a fundamental assessment of Galula, David (1964/2006, pp. 43–5) Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, Westport: Praeger Security International. Galula discusses how a state often recognizes a threat long before society and is consequently constrained because of lack of public support. In China today, this supposed constraint does not apply.

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44 See Zhao (2004); Gries, Peter Hays (2004) China’s New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy, Berkeley: University of California Press. 45 Personal interviews, China (2005); Gladney, Dru C. (2004) Dislocating China: Muslims, Minorities, and Other Subaltern Subjects, London: University of Chicago Press. 46 See, for example Fearon, James D. and David D. Laitin (2003) “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War” American Political Science Review, Volume 97, Number 1. 4 The changing use of force in society 1 Clausewitz, Karl Von (1943) On War, in Carr, Caleb (2000) The Book of War, New York: The Modern Library, p. 463. 2 Xinhua (5/26/2003) “Role of Xinjiang Production, Construction Corps Important: White Paper.” 3 Interview (China, 2005). 4 Personal observations (China, 2005); and interviews (China, 2005). 5 Interviews, China (2005). 6 Shichor, Yitzhak (2004) “The Great Wall of Steel: Military and Strategy” in Starr, S. Fredrick (2004) Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Borderland, Armonk: M.E. Sharpe; interviews, China (2005); Jane’s (1/13/1998) “Beijing has executed 16 people accused . . .” Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Centre. 7 For example Shambaugh, David (2002) Modernizing China’s Military: Progress, Problems, and Prospects, Berkeley: University of California Press, p. 8; People’s Republic of China, State Council Information Office (12/27/2004) “China’s National Defense in 2004” available at www.fas.org; Brown, Harold, Joseph W. Pruehes, and Adam Segal (2003) Chinese Military Power, New York: Council on Foreign Relations, p. 1; People’s Republic of China (2003) “China’s National Defense in 2002” news.xinhuanet.com. 8 Shambaugh (2002) p. 153, some capitalization added for grammatical purposes. 9 See Shichor (2004) p. 137. 10 Also, see Blasko, Dennis J. (2006, pp. 79–80) The Chinese Army Today: Tradition and Transformation for the 21st Century, London: Routledge. 11 Blasko (2006, p. 80) lists five divisions as well as two brigades and a regiment; further, Blasko lists a reserve infantry division. 12 Blasko (2006, pp. 186–8) asserts that raw numbers alone are misleading precisely because China’s forces are qualitatively different than a comparable number of western forces. This book’s argument does not dispute that in a force-on-force confrontation the qualitative difference may be significant; rather, in a COIN situation, the qualitative state of the PLA may actually push China to pursue alternate tools. 13 Blasko (2006) p. 73. 14 Blasko (2006) pp. 72–3. 15 Shichor (2004) pp. 122–3. 16 Shambaugh (2002) p. 158. 17 www.globalsecurity.org (accessed 1/8/2006) “J-7 (Jian-7 Fighter aircraft 7)/F-7.” 18 Shichor (2004) p. 125. 19 Shambaugh (2002) p. 158. 20 Interviews with academic experts and former military personnel, China (2005); also, Tyler, Christian (2004) Wild West China: The Taming of Xinjiang, New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, p. 220. Berntsen, Gary and Ralph Pezzullo (2005) Jawbreaker: The Attack on Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda, New York: Crown Publishers, discusses the enabling cross-over between people with battlefield experience, formal military training, and contemporary insurgency. Chehab, Zaki (2005) Inside the Resistance: The Iraqi Insurgency and the Future of the Middle East, New York: Nation Books (e.g. p. 7) also draws a direct connection between

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29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

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the abundance of men with military knowledge and/or battlefield experience, in this case in the Iran-Iraq war, and the ability to raise and form an effective insurgency. See Blasko (2006) p. 87; www.globalsecurity.org (accessed 1/8/2006) “Intelligence: People’s Armed Police.” Shambaugh (2002) p. 171; IISS refers to the International Institute for Strategic Studies. People’s Republic of China (12/2006) China’s National Defense in 2006. International Institute for Strategic Studies (annual publication, 1990 through 2006) The Military Balance. Blasko (2006) p. 23. After the white paper’s release Blasko seemed sympathetic to a re-evaluation of PAP force strength, and other prominent scholars and practitioners (2007, personal communications) suggested that the conventional thinking on this topic is now an open question demanding further research. This estimate is built upon Shichor’s (2004, p. 123) estimate of PLA force strength in Xinjiang, though this study diverges with Shichor’s, as well as Shambaugh’s, dim view of PAP readiness and capability in its internal security mission. While the PAP were unable or unwilling to control the demonstrators in Tiananmen Square in 1989 (necessitating PLA mobilization), the PAP have since proven lethally effective at crushing unrest, as they did, for example, in Dongzhou in 2005. See Cody, Edward (12/21/2005) “Chinese Police Bring Villagers to Heel After Latest Uprising” Washington Post. Riots may be primarily be the purview of PSB forces, yet in Xinjiang the PAP has a strong anti-riot function. Reuters (8/17/2005) “China Sets Up Anti-Terror Squads as Riots Spread” Reuters. Some Chinese and scholarly sources refer to the XPCC as a “corporation” rather than “corps” in an attempt to highlight its changing nature, away from military service and towards a more civilian future. This civil-military break is today at best an aspiration. Official Chinese media and government sources still highlight the important role the XPCC has in securing the province. Because this internal security function remains prominent, the XPCC is assessed to be at its core a paramilitary organization. Chinese Communist Party, author unknown (2005) Zhongguo Gongchandang Yu Xinjiang Minzu Wenti. Xinhua (5/26/2003) “Role of Xinjiang Production, Construction Corps Important: White Paper” www.xinhuanet.com. Toops, Stanley W. (2004) “The Demography of Xinjiang” in Starr, Fredrick S. (2004) Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Borderland, New York: M.E. Sharpe, p. 248. Xinhua (5/26/2003) “Role of Xinjiang Production, Construction Corps Important: White Paper.” Shichor (2004) p. 138, italics in original. Also see Tyler (2004) pp. 196–7. Xinhua (5/26/2003) “Role of Xinjiang Production, Construction Corps Important: White Paper,” some word spacing added, spelling in original. Dillon, Michael (2004) Xinjiang – China’s Muslim Far Northwest, London: RoutledgeCurzon, p. 100. Toops (2004) p. 248. Toops, Stanley W. (2004) p. 249; Toops continues his study using the census data itself rather than his own analysis of the data, its veracity and validity. For example Shichor (2004). For example, Lampton, David M. (2001) “China’s Foreign and National Security Policy-Making Process: Is It Changing and Does it Matter?” in Lampton, David M. (ed.) (2001) The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy, Stanford CA: Stanford University Press; Shambaugh (2002). Bovingdon, Gardner (2004) “Autonomy in Xinjiang: Han Nationalist Imperatives and Uyghur Discontent” East-West Center, Washington, DC, p. 8.

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42 Millward (2004) “Violent Separatism in Xinjiang: A Critical Assessment” East-West Center, Washington, DC, p. 14. 43 Millward (2004) p. 14. 44 Interviews and personal communications (2007) Washington, DC. 45 Millward (2004) pp. 14–15. 46 Rudelson, Justin and William Jankowiak (2004) “Acculturation and Resistance: Xinjiang Identities in Flux” in Starr, S. Fredrick (2004) Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Borderland, Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, p. 317. 47 Millward (2004) pp. 14–15. 48 Rudelson and Jankowiak (2004) p. 317. 49 Millward (2004) p. 15; State Council [People’s Republic of China] (1/21/2002) “East Turkistan Terrorist Forces Cannot Get Away with Impunity” Information Office of State Council. 50 Millward (2004) p. 15. 51 Dautcher, Jay (2004) “Public Health and Social Pathologies in Xinjiang” in Starr, S. Fredrick (2004) Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Borderland, Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, pp. 286–7. 52 Millward (2004) p. 17. 53 Dautcher (2004) p. 287. 54 Tyler (2004) p. 206. 55 Blasko (2006, p. 23) argues that not only do foreign observers often mistake PAP for PLA, but many Chinese have been observed to make the same mistake as well. I similarly found this to be the case in Xinjiang and elsewhere in China (Interviews, 2005–7, China and the US). 56 Dillon (2004) pp. 85–9; Millward (2004) p. 16 asserts that the number of arrests may be as high as 18,000. 57 Dillon (2004) pp. 85–9; Millward (2004) pp. 15–16 reports “injuries in the hundreds.” 58 Dillon (2004) p. 87. 59 See Becquelin, Nicolas (2004) “Criminalizing Ethnicity: Political Repression in Xinjiang” On The Margins, China Rights Forum, Number 1, 2004, p. 41. 60 Dillon (2004) p. 84, parentheses added. 61 Dautcher (2004, p. 293) asserts that the Strike Hard campaigns are used along with compulsory detoxification to tackle drug addiction, though this approach is not remarkably successful. 62 Interviews (China, 2005); also: Bovingdon (2004) p. 22; Millward (2004) p. 16. 63 Bovingdon (2004) p. 22, italics added. 64 Interviews (China, 2005); Dautcher (2004) p. 286. 65 Dillon (2004) p. 93; Millward (2004) p. 17. 66 Dautcher (2004) p. 287; Dillon (2004) pp. 94–5. 67 Interviews (China, 2005). 68 Millward (2004) p. 17. 69 Dillon (2004) p. 94. 70 Dillon (2004) pp. 97–9. 71 Dautcher (2004) p. 287. 72 Dillon (2004) pp. 93–5. 73 Dautcher (2004) p. 287. 74 Dillon (2004) pp. 93–4. 75 Dillon (2004) p. 94. 76 Dillon (2004) pp. 99, 112. 77 Gladney (2004) “Responses to Chinese Rule: Patterns of Cooperation and Opposition” in Starr, S. Fredrick (2004) Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Borderland, Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, p. 376. 78 Palmer, Ambassador Mark (2003) Breaking the Real Axis of Evil: How to Oust the World’s Remaining Dictators by 2025, Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, p. 4.

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79 Interviews (China, 2005). 80 In 1997 city busses were bombed. Initially, and in some credible sources still, these attacks were attributed to Uyghur separatist forces. Other groups which might have been responsible include Hong Kong independence activists. Alternately, there is a non-negligible background of bomb-attacks annually throughout China, a phenomenon which can not be ignored when assessing responsibility for any unclaimed bombings. For incident reporting see www.tkb.org/nctc (e.g. data for 2004) or www.tkb.org for previous if incomplete data on attacks in China. Also: Scobell, Andrew (2005) “Terrorism and Chinese Foreign Policy” in Deng, Yong and Fei-Ling Wang (2005) China Rising: Power and Motivation in Chinese Foreign Policy, Boulder: Rowman and Littlefield; Agence France Presse (1/29/1999) “Chronology of China Bombs and Mystery Blasts.” 81 Shanmei, Lin (1/4/2006) “Radio Taiwan International Hosts Former 610 Office Agent” The Epoch Times, www.theepochtimes.com; Chinese agents also busied themselves harassing the family of Rebia Kadeer as the Nobel Prize committee deliberated in 2006 whether she would receive a Nobel Peace Prize. 82 See Shichor (2004). 83 Kan, Shirley (12/7/2004) “U.S.-China Counter-Terrorism Cooperation: Issues for U.S. Policy” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, RS21995, The Library of Congress, pp. 3; Kyodo News International (4/26/2004) “FBI Director Seeks China’s Help on al-Qaida Crimes.” 84 Agence France Presse (8/25/2005) “China Steps up Pre-anniversary Crackdown on Xinjiang Separatists.” 85 www.asianews.it (10/1/2005) “Maximum alert in Xinjiang against ‘Separatism’ and ‘Terrorism.’ ” 86 Interviews (China, 2005). 87 Galula, David (1949/2006, p. 53) Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, Westport: Praeger Security International. One could also profitably turn to the writings of Hobbes and Machiavelli. 88 Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International each have published numerous reports, many of which are quite good, regarding the violation of political rights and human freedoms in Xinjiang available through their websites. Nicolas Becquelin’s (2004) “Criminalizing Ethnicity: Political Repression in Xinjiang” On the Margins, China Rights Forum, Number 1 2004 is an excellent primer on the topic. 89 Gladney (2004) p. 381. 90 Rudelson and Jankowiak (2004) p. 315. 91 Rudelson and Jankowiak (2004) p. 316. 92 See Lewis, Bernard (2003) The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror, New York: Modern Library. 93 For more on PRC policies as the source of unrest in Xinjiang see Starr, S. Fredrick (2004) Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Borderland, Armonk: M.E. Sharp, pp. 18–19; Rudelson and Jankowiak (2004) p. 308 in the same volume assert that China’s “joining the Shanghai Cooperation Organization radicalized some Uyghurs;” and, Bovingdon (2004) provides the historical case for this argument which rests heavily upon state actions during the era of Mao. 94 Cody, Edward (8/1/2005) “74,000 Mass Incidents. Now that is something . . .” Washingtonpost.com; French, Howard W. (8/24/2005) “Land of 74,000 Protests (but Little Is Ever Fixed)” New York Times; Tanner, Murray Scot (2004) “China Rethinks Unrest” The Washington Quarterly, 27:3, p. 137. 95 Buckley, Chris (1/26/2006) “China to ‘Strike Hard’ Against Rising Unrest” Reuters; Jackson-Han, Sarah (1/31/2006) “China Struggles to Keep Lid on Popular Unrest” Radio Free Asia; Kuhn, Anthony (2/11/2006) “Inside China’s Angry Villages” Los Angeles Times. 96 Also, see: Open Source Center (3/5/2007) “Statistics, Summaries of PRC Civil

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Disturbances in 2006;” Open Source Center (2/5/2007) “Highlights: Reports on PRC Civil Disturbances for 2005;” Open Source Center (12/23/2004) “Highlights: PRC Civil Disturbances 1 Jan.–15 Dec. 04.” 97 Reuters (8/17/2005). 5 Counter-insurgency: grass-roots institutions and security 1 See, for example, Van Evera, Stephen (1999) Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict, Ithaca: Cornell University Press; Kasfir, Nelson (2004) “Domestic Anarchy, Security Dilemmas, and Violent Predation: Causes of Failure” in Rotberg, Robert I. (ed.) (2004) When States Fail: Causes and Consequences, Princeton: Princeton University Press; see also Rotberg’s (2004) “The Failure and Collapse of Nation-States: Breakdown, Prevention, and Repair” in the same volume. 2 NB This chapter, as in this book’s entirety, draws heavily upon fieldwork and interviews in China and the United States. Where open sources are available they are cited to the best of my ability. In specific locations this chapter references “Interviews (China, 2005).” This is done to differentiate sources and remind the reader of sourcetype, limited though this description is. 3 In other campaigns “ideology” may compose part of this function, yet an insurgent’s dream reaches beyond strict interpretations of “ideology” in political science literature. Insurgent dreams are varied, amorphous affairs which include a nostalgic lust for the struggle itself [for more on the insurgent’s dream see Bowyer Bell, J. (1998, p. 6) The Dynamics of the Armed Struggle, London: Frank Cass. 4 A considerable amount of writing discussing “netwar” and network-centric warfare exists within the security-studies literature which builds upon the works of John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt [see, for example, Arquilla and Ronfeld’s (2001) Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy. Office of the Secretary of Defense, National Defense Research Institute, RAND]. The discussion of “society-centric warfare” presented in this study builds upon though diverges from Arqilla and Ronfeld’s investigations of netwars. 5 For example, Hammes, Thomas X. (2004) The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century, St. Paul: Zenith Press. Also, Hoyt, Timothy D. (2004) “Military Force” in Cronin, Audrey Kurth and James M. Ludes (eds) (2004) Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy, Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. On the use of intelligence see Pillar, Paul R. (2004) “Intelligence” in Cronin and Ludes (2004); Lowenthal, Mark M. (2003) Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy (second edition) Washington, DC: CQ Press; Powers, Thomas (2002) Intelligence Wars: American Secret History from Hitler to al-Qaeda, New York: New York Review of Books. 6 The Vietnam-era CAPs program is an early example of success using this tactic. See Boot, Max (2002) The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power, New York: Basic Books, pp. 304–7; see also Boot’s discussions of constabulary forces. 7 For more on the merits of local policing as a key CT and COIN tool in other insurgencies see Ensor, David (12/21/2005) “Winning the War on Terror” CNN Presents, transcripts.cnn.com. Notably, Ensor investigates the role of local policing in ending the age of the Jack-Boot in Northern Ireland and defusing the conflict through reducing the appearance of military occupation. 8 See Clutterbuck, Lindsay (2004) “Law Enforcement” in Cronin and Ludes (2004). 9 Interviews (China, 2005); Zimbardo, Philip G., C. Maslach, and C. Haney (2000) “Reflections on the Stanford Prison Experiment: Genesis, Transformations, Consequences” in Blass, Thomas (ed.) (2000) Obedience to Authority: Current Perspectives on the Milgram Paradigm, Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 10 Interviews (China, 2005); Kahn, Joseph (12/3/2005) “Torture is ‘Widespread’ in China, U.N. Investigator Says” The New York Times; Human Rights Watch

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(1/18/2006) Human Rights Watch World Report 2006, www.hrw.org; Human Rights Watch (12/31/2005) “Essential Background Overview of Human Rights Issues in China” www.hrw.org. See Chapter 2 of this book (above); similarly, this insurgent dream does not negate or minimize, to use David Kilcullen’s terminology, the complexity of this conflict ecosystem. For more on policy tools for shaping ideology and normative elements of terrorism, see McMillan, Joseph (ed.) (2006) “In the Same Light as Slavery:” Building a Global Antiterrorism Consensus, Washington, DC: NDU Press. Dillon, Michael (2004, pp. 85–6) Xinjiang – China’s Muslim Far Northwest, London: RoutledgeCurzon. For example Fukuyama, Francis (2004) State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century, Ithaca: Cornell University Press; Migdal, Joel S. (2001) State In Society: Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute One Another, New York: Cambridge University Press; Diamond, Larry (1999) Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press; Huntington, Samuel P. (1991) The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, Norman: Oklahoma University Press; Huntington, Samuel P. (1968) Political Order in Changing Societies, New Haven: Yale University Press. Lampton, David M. (2001) “China’s Foreign and National Security Policy-Making Process: Is it Changing and Does it Matter?” in Lampton, David M. (ed.) (2001) The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform, 1978–2000, Stanford: Stanford University Press. See also Huntington (1968). Interviews (China, 2005). Interviews (China, 2005). Interviews (China, 2005). Interviews (China, 2005). See Xinjiang Daily (5/10/1996) in Dillon (2004) p. 86. Dillon (2004) p. 86; Associated Press (6/26/1997) “China Counters Muslim [Unrest];” Jane’s (4/6/1998) “On 6 April the state-published Peoples . . .” Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Centre. Interviews (China, 2005). Chapter 3 also discusses this racial element as it builds Chinese political will vis-à-vis Xinjiang’s insurgency. The Economist Intelligence Unit (1/4/2002) “China: Don’t Forget the People” www.eiu.com. Interviews (US and China, 2001–5). NB “Minzu” can alternately be translated as ethnicity; a distinction and definition Chinese sources are beginning to push [This point is also discussed by James Millward (3/13/2007) Woodrow Wilson Center, lecture and book launch]. Corruption, real or perceived, by local leaders has recently caused rioting and violence across China as well. Premier Wen Jiabao recently argued against local corruption’s threat to China’s stability, saying “Some locales are unlawfully occupying farmers’ land and not offering reasonable economic compensation and arrangements for livelihoods, and this is sparking mass incidents in the countryside” [Buckley, Chirs (1/26/2006) “China to ‘Strike Hard’ Against Rising Unrest” Reuters]. Also, French, Howard W. (1/17/2006) “Police in China Battle Villagers in Land Protest” www.nytimes.com; Kahn, Joseph (12/12/2005) “Military Officer Tied to Killings is Held by China” www.nytimes.com. For example, BBC (3/7/2005) “China’s Intolerance of Dissent” news.bbc.co.uk; Ang, Audra (9/25/2005) “China Imposes New Rules on News Web Sites” Associated Press; Kahn, Joseph (9/26/2005) “China Tightens Its Restrictions for News Media on the Internet” www.nytimes.com; BBC (4/12/2005) “China ‘Crushing Muslim Uighurs’ ” news.bbc.co.uk.

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29 Dillon (2004) p. 93. 30 For example, see Bovingdon, Gardner (2004) “Autonomy in Xinjiang: Han Nationalist Imperatives and Uyghur Discontent” East–West Center, Washington, DC. 31 Blasko, Dennnis J. (2006) The Chinese Army Today: Tradition and Transformation for the 21st Century, New York: Routledge; Blasko, Dennis J. (2007) “People’s War in the Twenty-First Century” in Finkelstein, David M. and Kristen Gunness (eds) (2007) Civil–Military Relations in Today’s China: Swimming in a New Sea, Armonk: M.E. Sharpe; www.globalsecurity.org (1/7/2006) “Ministry of Public Security: Intelligence: Operations.” 32 This does not necessarily rule out repentance and return to society. Unfortunately this study lacks sufficient evidence to discuss with appropriate confidence the role of rectitude in Xinjiang’s socio-political affairs. 33 Modernizing reforms such as job mobility are eroding this social institution, yet throughout the 1990s the workgroup played an important role in the policing of Xinjiang. Uniquely within China, Xinjiang may have considerable economic activity outside that of the workgroup thus exempting segments of society from this form of institutional pressure. 34 Interviews (China, 2005); Dillon (2004) p. 88. 35 Dautcher, Jay (2004, p. 286) “Public Health and Social Pathologies in Xinjiang” in Starr, S. Fredrick (ed.) (2004) Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Borderland, Armonk: M.E. Sharpe. 36 This type of “Committee” enforcement, as well as that of the workgroup, achieved striking and effective results for imposing the one-child policy on society in the 1980s across China. 37 Bovingdon (2004) also reports finding Party-organized groups of Uyghurs sent on propaganda missions into the countryside with the explicit mission of influencing Uyghur society’s ideas of the state and the Party. With so few specifics known, the effectiveness of this tactic is difficult to assess. 38 Dillon (2004) p. 88 reports this citing an Urumqi radio broadcast on July 4, 1996. 39 Interviews (China, 2005). 40 On the other hand, authorities in Xinjiang do advertise their actions when it is perceived to be to their benefit, though the key details which could help Xinjiang analysts understand the veracity of their claims are lacking. For instance, Dillon (2004, pp. 99–100, some punctuation added) writes: The authorities in Xinjiang responded to the disturbances in Yining and the bombs in Urumqi by strengthening their control over the region . . . the powerful Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps launched a campaign to turn the population into informants, promising to respond to reports received, to protect the identity of informants, to give feedback to informants, and to reward those who informed. The corps claimed that it received over 8,000 reports from informants each year and that the numbers were constantly increasing. It is unclear whether these informants were newly acquired agents within society working as individuals or whether they were already working within the rubric of the society-centric warfare techniques described above. Without additional basic information on how these informants worked, it is difficult to gauge the existence of this program, let alone its effectiveness. 41 For example Reuters (10/19/2005) “China Arrests Foreign Militants in Restive West”; Blanchard, Ben (1/20/2006) “China Arrests Rise in Restive Xinjiang” Reuters; Shambaugh (2002) Modernizing China’s Military: Progress, Problems, and Prospects, London: University of California Press, p. 304. 42 See Agence France Presse (6/28/1997) “Hundreds Reportedly Denounced to Police in Xinjiang.” 43 For example, see Kean, Thomas et al. (2004) The 9/11 Commission Report: Final

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Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, New York: W.W. Norton; Wayne, Martin I. (2/23/2007) “Al Qaeda’s China Problem” PacNet 8a, CSIS Pacific Forum. For example Sageman, Marc (2004) Understanding Terror Networks, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press; Putnam, Robert D. (2000) Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community, New York: Simon & Schuster. i.e. social institutions within a political system which explicitly permits or grants space in society for governance outside narrowly confined role of official leadership – the state itself or an official party. Interviews (China, 2005). Radio Free Asia (1/5/2006) “U.S.-Based Uyghur Lashes Out at Pressure to Spy for China” www.rfa.org; Lin Shanmei (1/4/2006) “Radio Taiwan International Hosts Former 610 Office Agent” The Epoch Times, www.theepochtimes.com; also, www.globalsecurity.org (1/7/2006) e.g. “Ministry of State Security” and “Sixth Bureau: Counterintelligence Bureau”; Blasko, Dennis (2006, pp. 17–19) The Chinese Army Today: Tradition and Transformation for the 21st Century, New York: Routledge. Also, see Gladney, Dru C. (2006) “Xinjiang” in Reveron, Derek S. and Jeffrey Stevenson Murer (2006) Flashpoints in the War on Terrorism, New York: Routledge. For example, Rebiya Kadeer, perhaps the most prominent Uyghur exile, testified to the United States Congress about human rights abuses in Xinjiang highlighting her personal experiences with draconian Chinese policies of the 1960s [Islamonline.net (12/16/2005) “US Congress Told of Chinese Muslims’ Plight” www.islamonline.net]; Kadeer’s adult children now have firsthand experience of police persecution and brutality. Tyler (2004) and Dillon (2004) both interview exiles and go to lengths to caveat their claims which, each assert, are routinely exaggerated and are less than independently reliable about facts on-the-ground in Xinjiang. Gladney (2006) asserts that some of these claims are driven by a desire among particular Uyghur exiles to appear as more exceptional candidates for political asylum (i.e. leader of a dissident group fleeing persecution in China). Gladney, Dru C. [(2004, pp. 383–7) “Responses to Chinese Rule: Patterns of Cooperation and Opposition” in Starr (2004)]’s discussion of cyber-dissent similarly gives undue credit to the international dissidents who use the internet in the attempt to build a base constituency in Xinjiang. At best these cyber-dissidents call international attention to the abuses of security forces in Xinjiang. Importantly, Putnam (2000) provides considerable discussion of excessive optimism for the use of technological innovations to fundamentally alter or reshape politics. Also, see Gladney (2006). The term “internationalizing” is that of a Chinese military attaché in a western capital, relayed by an academic source (2005). See Laogai (1/19/2005) “A PBS Report on Xinjiang and the Arrest of a Uighur Citizen (PBS/Frontline World, 1/19/2005)” www.laogai.org; Aljazeera (1/11/2005) “Chinese Muslims Too Scared to Talk” www.aljazeera.net; Interviews (China, 2005). Interviews (China, 2005). Dillon (2004) p. 88. Such as Xinjiang University. Interviews (China, 2005) Given the limited data available to the present study regarding the availability of drugs in society, it is difficult to assess the veracity of this logic. Drugs are available in most societies, yet their presence or absence seems to have little direct correlation with insurgency when socio-political conditions which can engender insurgency are not present. While this study assesses “drugs” to be less than significantly causal in Xinjiang’s contemporary insurgency, the question of narcotics and insurgency is beyond the scope of the present study yet deserves further investigation. The process of documents flowing through Party organs is discussed in greater detail above, both within this chapter and in Chapter 3.

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57 See Dautcher, Jay (2004) “Public Health and Social Pathologies in Xinjiang” in Starr, S. Fredrick (2004) Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Borderland, Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, p. 287; interviews (China, 2005). 58 Fuller, Graham E. and Jonathan N. Lipman (2004, p. 324) “Islam in Xinjiang” in Starr, S. Fredrick (2004) Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Borderland, Armonk: M.E. Sharpe; Interviews (China, 2005); also, Gladney (2006). 59 Fuller and Lipman (2004) p. 325. 60 For a treatment of the spread of militant ideology in Central Asia as well as linkages to Xinjiang, see Burr, J. Millard and Robert O. Collins (2006, pp. 45–7, 156–80) Alms for Jihad: Charity and Terrorism in the Islamic World, New York: Cambridge University Press. 6 The war of ideas: reshaping society in Xinjiang 1 Joseph, Anil K. (8/27/2005) “Xinjiang Launches ‘People’s War’ Against Terrorism” Antara News (Indonesia). 2 For example, Fearon, James D. and David D. Laitin (February 2003) “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War” American Political Science Review, Volume 97, Number 1; Fearon, James D. and David D. Laitin (Autumn 2000) “Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity” International Organization, Volume 54, Number 4; Berdal, Mats and David M. Malone (1999) Greed & Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars, Boulder: Lynne Reinner Publishers; Kaufmann, Chaim (2004) “Intervention in Ethnic and Ideological Civil Wars” in Art, Robert J. and Kenneth N. Waltz (2004) The Use of Force: Military Power and International Politics (sixth edition), Boulder: Rowman and Littlefield; Posen, Barry R. (2004) “Military Responses to Refugee Disasters” in Art and Waltz (2004); Horowitz, Donald L. (2000) Ethnic Groups in Conflict, Berkeley: University of California Press; also see Rotberg, Robert I. (2004) When States Fail: Causes and Consequences, Princeton: Princeton University Press. 3 Indeed, Burr and Collins (2006, p. 156) quote Hasan al-Turabi: “Islamist movements are first of all about national liberation, not individual liberties; they are about power before politics; their populism is a form of mass mobilization, not participation.” 4 On the use importance of habitats for organisms see, for example, Manuel C. Molles’ (1999) Ecology: Concepts and Applications, pp. 434–8. 5 Building upon the research of Bruce Hoffman, J. Bowyer Bell, Thomas Marks, David Galula, Thomas X. Hammes, and David Kilcullen discussed in Chapter 1. 6 As noted above, this political program can include a negative element: terrorizing society, thus showing the state’s weakness and inability to provide security. The most successful insurgent groups have to date had on balance far more significant positive elements than counter-insurgents either perceive or are willing to attribute to hostile forces. 7 The United States’ discussion of civil liberties and security in the wake of 9/11, including the proposals for an American “MI5” might be a useful starting point. See, for instance, Chalk, Peter and William Rosenau (10/30/2003) “Intelligence, Police, and Counterterrorism: Assessing Post-9/11 Initiatives” RAND. 8 For example Ayoob, Mohammed (1998) “Subaltern Realism: International Relations Theory Meets the Third World” in Neuman, Stephanie G. (ed.) (1998) International Relations Theory and the Third World, New York: St. Martin’s Press; Mearsheimer, John J. (2001) The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, New York: W.W. Norton and Company; Van Evera, Stephen (1999) Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict, Ithaca: Cornell University Press; Migdal, Joel S. (2001) State in Society: How States and Societies Transform and Constitute One Another, New York: Cambridge University Press. 9 Van Evera (1999) p. 255.

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10 Bell, J. Bowyer (1998) The Dynamics of the Armed Struggle, London: Frank Cass, London, p. 43. 11 Bell (1998). 12 Rapaport, David C. (2004) “The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism” in Cronin, Audrey Kurth and James M. Ludes (eds) (2004) Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy, Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press; Bell (1998); Hoffman, Bruce (2006) Inside Terrorism, New York: Columbia University Press; Hammes, Thomas X. (2004) The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century, Zenith Press. 13 In fact, for whatever reason, many media reports and even some scholarly works on Xinjiang paint this dichotomous storyline without questioning its veracity. 14 Fearon and Laitin (2000, e.g. p. 857) write, in a review of recent works on ethnic conflict that “the books contain ample evidence rejecting the primordialist theses that ethnic identities are socially or genetically fixed and unchanging, and that ethnic violence results from received, immutable cultural differences.” 15 See Fearon and Laitin (2000); Fearon and Laitin (2003). 16 Fearon and Laitin (2000) e.g. p. 857; Kauffman (2004); Berdal and Malone (1999). 17 See Fukuyama, Francis (2004) State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century, New York: Cornell University Press. 18 Gladney, Dru C. (2004) “The Chinese Program of Development and Control, 1978–2001” in Starr, S. Fredrick (ed.) (2004) Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Borderland, Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, pp. 113–14. 19 Interviews (China, 2005); also see Benson, Linda (2004) “Education and Social Mobility among Minority Populations in Xinjiang” in Starr, S. Fredrick (2004) Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Borderland, Armonk: M.E. Sharpe. 20 Interviews (China, 2005). 21 CCTV9 (6/7/2005) [China Central Television 9]. 22 For example, Sageman, Marc (2004) Understanding Terror Networks, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press; Kepel, Gilles (2004) The War for Muslim Minds: Islam and the West, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 23 Interviews (China, 2005). 24 Some students board at schools when their families live far away in the countryside. Boarding at schools would seem to increase the saliency of the logic presented above, for teachers and school officials take on an increased socializing and parental role beyond the already significant one for non-boarding students. 25 Interviews (China, 2005); Also see Bovingdon, Gardner (2004) “Contested Histories” in Starr, S. Fredrick (2004) Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Borderland, Armonk: M.E. Sharpe. 26 See also Bell (1998) p. 44. 27 For example, Putnam, Robert D. (2000) Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community, New York: Simon and Schuster; also, Arquilla, John and David Ronfeldt (2001) Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy, Santa Monica: RAND, discuss how Serbs who watched CNN during the conflict in the former Yugoslavia did not believe the information, thus demonstrating the social shaping of perceptions. 28 Ideationally too, religion may in and of itself be used as a challenge to the state. See Fuller, Graham E. and Jonathan N. Lipman (2004, 336) “Islam in Xinjiang” in Starr, S. Fredrick (2004) Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Borderland, Armonk: M.E. Sharpe. 29 Considerable literature discusses these policies as a violation of human rights. Human Rights Watch (April 2005) “Devastating Blows: Religious Repression of Uighurs in Xinjiang” www.hrw.org; For more on this perspective see www.laogai.org (4/12/2005) “Religious Repression of Uighur Muslims, architecture of Xinjiang Suppression detailed [HRW/HRIC, 4/12/2005]” Laogai Research Foundation; Islamonline.net (11/30/2005) “Activist Slams China’s Anti-Muslims “Opportunistic Bid.”

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42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49

Notes

Interviews (China, 2005). Interviews (China, 2005). Interviews (China and US, 2005). For example, Sageman, Marc (2004) Understanding Terror Networks, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. Fuller and Lipman (2004). Interviews (China, 2005); Dillon, Michael (2003) Xinjiang – China’s Muslim Far Northwest, London: RoutledgeCurzon. Interviews (China, 2005). Interviews (China, 2005); Huntington, Samuel P. (1996) The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, New York: Simon and Schuster; also see Kepel, Gilles (2004) The War for Muslim Minds: Islam and the West, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. See Chapters 1 and 2 of this book; also, Sageman (2004); Gunaratna, Rohan (2002) Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror, New York: Colombia University Press; Burr, J. Millard and Robert O. Collins (2006) Alms for Jihad: Charity and Terrorism in the Islamic World, New York: Cambridge University Press; Nasiri, Omar (2006) Inside the Jihad: My Life with Al Qaeda, New York: Basic Books; Esposito, John L. (2002) Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Sageman (2004); Kepel (2004); Anonymous/Scheuer, Michael (2002) Through Our Enemies’ Eyes: Osama Bin Laden, Radical Islam, and the Future of America, Washington, DC: Brassey’s; Gutnaratna (2002). NB Kilcullen, David (Winter 2006–7) “Counter-Insurgency Redux” Survival provides a similar discussion. Hu Jintao (5/27/2005), speaking to the 4th Ethnic Working Meeting of the State Council, CCTV 9. Hu, it seems, is following in Mao’s footsteps. According to an internal CCP document Mao’s guidelines were: “In Xinjiang, economic task has to be given number one priority.” [Yang Faren, Li Ze, and Dong Sheng (eds) (1994) PanTurkism and Pan-Islamism Study. Turdi Ghoja et al. translation (8/17/2004) Uyghur American Association, www.uyghuramerican.org]. Interview (China, 2005). Fearon and Laitin (2003) p. 76. See Tyler, Christian (2003) Wild West China: The Taming of Xinjiang, New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, p. 207. Personal communication, academic expert (2005). Personal communication (US, 2005). NB Orwell, George (1946) Animal Farm, New York: Signet Classics. e.g. Xinhua (10/11/2006) “Communique of the Sixth Plenum of the 16th CPC Central Committee” www.chinadaily.com.cn. People’s Republic of China (10/19/2005) “White Paper: Building of Political Democracy in China” www.xinhuanet.com.

7 Conclusion: gauging effectiveness 1 Yang Faren, Li Ze, and Dong Sheng (eds) (1994) Pan-Turkism and Pan-Islamism Study. Turdi Ghoja et al. translation (8/17/2004) Uyghur American Association, www.uyghuramerican.org. Epilogue: the art of countering insurgency: from tactical to strategic efficacy 1 Begin, Menachem cited in Hoffman, Bruce (2006) Inside Terrorism, New York: Columbia University Press, p. 50. 2 Galula, David (Summer 2006/1963) “From Algeria to Iraq: All But Forgotten Lessons

Notes

3

4

5 6 7

8

173

from Nearly 50 Years Ago” RAND Review, Volume 30, Number 2. Alternately, Nagl (2005) discusses a tactical dichotomy of military annihilation vs. political actions. For lack of appropriate phraseology, this function has been cast in American popular discourse as winning “hearts and minds.” The contemporary British terminology of “trust and confidence” may have more social fines and much to recommend its adoption, yet even this phasing misses the comprehensive project necessary. Nevertheless, so long as we can create common understandings of the effort and its goals, perhaps we have fulfilled our immediate needs even if our language lags. One essay which consciously does this is Wayne, Martin I. (2/23/2006) “Al Qaeda’s China Problem” PacNet 8A, Pacific Forum/CSIS. For example, refer to Ricks, Thomas E. (2006) Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq, New York: The Penguin Press, pp. 155–64; also, Diamond, Larry (2005) Squandered Victory: The American Occupation and the Bungled Effort to Bring Democracy to Iraq, New York: Times Books. In fact, the case may be stronger: high end militaries are generally constructed with the intent of combating similar forces in high intensity warfare. Hoffman (2006) p. 169; italics in original. Brian Jenkins argues this point quite well in a number of sources. See, for example, Jenkins, Brian Michael (Summer 2006) “True Grit: To Counter Terror, We Must Conquer Our Own Fear” RAND Review, Volume 30, Number 2; Jenkins, Brian Michael (2006) Unconquerable Nation: Knowing Our Enemy, Strengthening Ourselves, Santa Monica CA: RAND. i.e. Rudelson, Justin (1997) Oasis Identities: Uyghur Nationalism Along China’s Silk Road, New York: Columbia University Press.

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—— (3/9/2007) “Slimmer Possibility for Terrorism in Xinjiang.” Xinxia, Yan (3/12/2002) “Anti-Terrorism ‘Takes Time,’ Xinjiang Leader Says” www.china.org.cn (accessed 10/11/2004). Xu Jingyue and Cui Qingxin (1/9/2007) “China’s Ministry of Public Security Says: We Will Resolutely Crack Down on the East Turkistan Islamic Movement Terrorist Activities” Xinhua Asia Pacific Service, www.opensource.gov. Yang Faren, Li Ze, and Dong Sheng (eds) (1994) Pan-Turkism and Pan-Islamism Study. Turdi Ghoja et al. translation (8/17/2004), Uyghur American Association, www.uyghuramerican.org. Yardley, Jim (12/21/2004) “The Great Divide: A Missing Generation: Rural Exodus for Work Fractures Chinese Family” NYTimes.com. Yom, Sean L. (posting date unknown, downloaded 7/16/2002) Uighur Muslims in Xinjiang www.selfdetermine.org/conflicts/uighur_body.html. Zhao Huanxin (11/22/2004) “Hu: We Support Battling Terrorism” www.chinadaily.com.cn. Zhao, Suisheng (ed.) (2000) China and Democracy: The Prospect for a Democratic China: New York: Routledge. —— (2004) A Nation-State by Construction: Dynamics of Modern Chinese Nationalism, Stanford: Stanford University Press. —— (ed.) (2006) Debating Political Reform in China: Rule of Law vs. Democratization, Armonk: M.E. Sharpe. Zimbardo, Philip G., C. Maslach, and C. Haney (2000) “Reflections on the Stanford Prison Experiment: Genesis, Transformations, Consequences” in Blass, Thomas (ed.) (2000) Obedience to Authority: Current Perspectives on the Milgram Paradigm, Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Index

“055 Brigade” 45 9/11 23–4, 39–40, 86–7, 150–1 activists, identification of 102 Afghan militia 81 Afghanistan: sealing of China’s border with 86–7; Soviet invasion of 32–3; training camps in 34–5, 36–7, 40, 49–50, 51–3; see also Soviet–Afghan war Agence France Presse 87 aid, insurgencies 34–5 al Qaeda: “055 Brigade” 45; focus of 6–7; and global jihad 32–40, 128, 130, 150–1; recruitment 50, 52–3 Al-Badr training camp 52 al-Jazeera 39 al-Zawahiri, Ayman 6–7, 32 assassination 96–7 Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) 61 Atef, Muhammed 37 authoritarian repression 3–4 authority, deference to 96 Baader Meinhof Gang 17 Bali bombings: 2002 36–7; 2005 39–40 Baren, armed uprising 42, 81–2, 130 Begin, Menachem 139 Bell, J. Bowyer 6, 110 bin Laden, Osama 6–7, 32, 33–4, 37–9 Bingtuan see Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC) Blair, Tony 38–9 Blasko, Dennis 76, 78 blowback 149–50 bottom-up: action 93–4, 129; approach 10–30, 72–3; change 19–22, 141–2 Bovingdon, Gardner 84

British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) 38 Building Democracy in China (Chinese white paper) 61–2 Bureau of Public Security 84 bureaucracy, professionalization of 93 capitalism 63 capture of insurgents 17–19, 143–5 Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict (van Evera) 110 censorship 117 Central Military Commission 77 challenge, political will through 61–2 Chechen terrorists 43 Clinton, Bill 150 co-opting societies 145–9 coercion 101–6, 143–5 coercive diplomacy, strategic periphery 60–1 cohesive policy trajectory, formulation of 20 Cold War 64 command and control (C2) 20 communications intercepts 106 Communist Party of China: mixing with state apparatus 61–2; political will 62–6; priorities for 131–2; Xinjiang Party Committee 84; Xinjiang’s acceptance of 59 contextual overview 28–30 corruption 124–5 counter threats, adapting force to 89 counter-insurgency (COIN) 106, 128–9, 131, 132, 134; art of 151; from bottom up 72–3; in China 24–5; conclusions 128–9; and education 118; effectiveness of 127–37, 139–40; elements unique to 150–1; and human rights 88–9; and

Index 193 intelligence 91; overview 10–13, 15–16; reshaping society to 109–13; from tactical to strategic efficacy 138–51 counter-terrorism (CT) 10–13, 16 Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (Galula) 13 Cultural Revolution 9, 58, 64, 140 culture 118–21, 136–7; knowledge of 98 Dalai Lama 60 Dautcher, Jay 82–3 democracy 61–2, 124 Deng Xiaoping 64, 92, 124 Dillon, Michael 27, 84, 85, 93, 98 dissent: removing from religion 120; tolerance of 97 East Turkistan Information Center (ETIC) 47 East Turkistan International Committee 47 East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) 44–5, 130 East Turkistan Islamic Party 47 East Turkistan Islamic Party of Allah 47 East Turkistan Liberation Organization (ETLO) 45–6 East Turkistan Opposition Party 47 economic development 58, 121–3, 137, 148 education: and counter-insurgency 118; in reshaping of society 113–18, 135–6, 147 employment 115–16; discrimination in 123 empowerment, grass-roots leadership 96–7 enemy, political will of 72–3 ethnic identity 24 ethnic other, fear of 66–9 ethnicity policies 23 exiles 103–5 Falun Gong 62 family loyalties 100–1 Fearon, James C. 122 feedback 149–50 fieldwork, Xinjiang 26–8 force: adapting to counter threats 89; changing use in society 71–89, 132–4; efficacy of 87–9; and political will 72; shows of 86–7; structure of 144 forces, China 73–80 Formosa 59 “four-in-one” joint defense system 73–4 Fourth Division, PLA 76 Fuller, Graham 43–4, 105–6 Galula, David 13, 15–16, 27, 141

Ghulja incident 42 Gladney, Dru C. 113 global jihad 32–40, 121, 128, 130 global war on terror 4–7, 87 governance politics 123–5, 137, 149 grass-roots institutions: rebuilding 92–7; and security 90–117, 134–5 grass-roots leadership 96–7 grass-roots social change 22 Great Leap Forward 9, 58, 64, 140 Guantanamo Bay 5, 52–3 Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency (CIA) 12 Gunaratna, Rohan 50 Han cadres 95 Han immigrants, Xinjiang 80 heroin 51 history, understanding of 116–17, 147 Hoffman, Bruce 6, 14, 17, 146 hope, creation of 111–12, 113–18 Hotan 82 Hu Jintao 122 human rights and COIN 88–9, 133–4 Husin, Axhari 39 ideas: controlling content/impacting perceptions 116; as targets 105–6; war of 108–26, 147–9 identity, perceptions of 112–13 ideology: Communist Party 64; as target 105–6 incorporating societies 145–9 individuals as targets 102 influence 101–6 instability, fear of 67–8 insurgency 13–16; 1990s 51–3; in China 22–4; conclusions 128–9; in context 32; efficacy in countering insurgency 87–9; international 35–6; in Iraq 36; local 34; new targets for 33–4; perceived victories from 33; training and aiding 34–5, 52–3; turning society against 19–22; in Xinjiang 40–7, 130–1 insurgent organizations abroad, as targets 103–5 insurgents: identification of 102; isolate, kill or capture tactics 17–19; organizations abroad 103–5; safe haven within society 91–2 intelligence 21–2; and counter-insurgency 91 intelligence-gathering operations 97–106 internal stability 57–62

194

Index

international affairs, understanding of 117–18, 136, 147 International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) 77–8 international insurgency 35–6 “internationalization” of terrorism problems 104 Iraq: invasion of Kuwait 33–4; terrorism and insurgency in 36 Islam: crackdown on 88–9; and culture 118–21; and reshaping of society 136–7, 148–9; study of 105–6; toleration of 94–5 Islamic Holy Warriors 47 Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) 45 isolation of insurgents 17–19 Istanbul bombings (2003) 37–8 Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Centre 42, 43 Jankowiak, William 44–5 jihad 32–40, 121, 128, 130 Kadir, Rebiya 47 Kashgar 7, 45, 81, 88–9, 103, 123 Kashmir, training camps in 51–3 Kilcullen, David 13, 27 killing of insurgents 17–19, 143–5 Korean War 64 Kuwait, Iraqi invasion of 33–4 Laitin, David D. 122 language: in education 8–9, 113–14, 135–6, 147; and employment 115–16; skills of officials 98 Lattimore, Owen 27 Lawrence, T.E. 6 leadership: empowerment of 96–7; targeting of 80–1 legal system 64 legitimacy, Communist Party 64 Lipman, Jonathan 43–4, 105–6 local culture, loss of 113–14 local employment 115–16 local insurgencies, aiding 34 local knowledge 144–5 local leaders, empowerment of 96–7 local officials: corruption amongst 124–5; purging of 94–6 local policing 90–107 London bombings (2005) 38–9 Luo Gan 87 Madrid bombings (2004) 38

Mahsum, Hasan 44 Mandarin Chinese 8–9, 113–14, 115–16, 135–6, 147 Mao Zedong 12, 19, 64 Marks, Thomas 14–15, 20 Marxism 122 “maxrap” gatherings 82–3 media 41, 48–9, 65–6, 117, 147–8; as target 104–5 message-shaping 65–6 Military Balance (IISS) 77–8 military forces 74–7; in support state goals 20–1 Millward, James 27, 42, 46, 85 Ministry of State Security (MSS) 104 monitoring 100–1 morality 1–9 Mujhadin 32–3, 49–50, 130 Mukhlisi, Yusupbek 46 Muslim Brotherhood 19–20 National Counterterrorism Center 49 nationalism 24, 58, 67–9 Nationalists 59, 63–4 North Korea 60 officials: corruption amongst 124–5; purging of 94–6 Ooji, training camp at 52 Operating Enduring Freedom 35, 53, 150–1 Operation Iraqi Freedom 35, 150–1 opportunity, creation of 113–18 organizations as targets 103 Osh, bus bombings 43, 45 “other” fear of 68–9 Pakistan Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) 52 Pakistan: sealing of China’s border with 86–7; training camps in 49–50, 51–3 paradise vs. secular state 121 paramilitary forces 77–80 People’s Armed Police (PAP) 8, 73–4, 77–8, 89, 99, 133; in Xinjiang 80–1, 82–3, 85–7 People’s Daily 31, 44, 89, 90 People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 81–2, 85–7, 89, 133; in mix of forces 73–4; perceptions and visibility 74–5; power and purpose 75; strength and capability 76; Uyghurs in 77; in Xinjiang 80–2, 83, 85–7 People’s Liberation Army Air Force

Index 195

radicalization 34–5 Radio Free Asia 117 rebellion, Yining 85–6 Red Brigade 17 religion: crackdown on 88–9; and culture 118–21; and reshaping of society 136–7, 148–9; study of 105–6 reporting 41, 48–9, 65–6 research method 26–8 resentment 121–3 Residential Street Committees 84, 100 Rudelson, Justin 44–5

sharia law 11 Shichor, Yitzhak 45, 49–50, 51, 52, 76, 79 Shijiazhuang, bombings in 48 signals intelligence (SIGINT) 87 society: changing use of force in 71–89, 132–4; co-opting/incorporating 145–9; denying safe haven within 91–2; fear of instability/“other” 66–9; perception of state power 111, 136; policing of 97–106; reshaping of 22, 108–26, 135–7, 147–9; safe haven for insurgents in 91–2; support for insurgency 19–22; vulnerability of 123 society-centric warfare 99–106, 135, 146–7 soft power 145–9 Soviet Union see USSR Soviet–Afghan war 5–6, 23, 32–3, 49–50, 130 stability, internal 57–62 Starr, S. Frederick 27, 28 state power: society’s perception of 111; Xinjiang 1–9, 112–13 state ties, creating hope through 111–12 state: delivering internal stability 57–62; formulation of cohesive policy trajectory 20; intelligence to support goals of 21–2; military/security forces to support goals of 20–1; mixing with Communist Party apparatus 61–2; working to reshape society 22 strategic peripheral threats 60–1 “Strike Hard/Maximum Pressure” campaign 10, 24, 42, 84, 88 students, creating opportunities for 114–15 Swaine, Michael D. 58

Sakka, Louai 37 Saudi Arabia 33–4 scholars, as targets 104–5 schools as workgroups 100 Scobell, Andrew 48 secular state vs. paradise 121 security forces, in support of state goals 20–1 security threats 59–62 security: and grass-roots institutions 90–107, 134–5; meaningful 109–11; perceptions of 124 Shambaugh, David 75, 76, 77 Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) 60 “Shanghai Five” organization 42

tactical mix 142–3 tactical spectrum 16 Taiwan 59–60, 61, 65, 67–8, 132 Taklimakan highway 83 Taliban 52, 75, 86 targets: categories of 101–6; for insurgency 33–4 teachers, delivering local employment 115–16 Tellis, Ashley J. 58 terrorism 13–16; China’s war on 25–30; in Iraq 36; lessons learned from 40; training 52–3 Terrorism Knowledge Base 49 Third Army Aviation Regiment, PLAAF 76

(PLAAF): in mix of forces 73–4; perceptions and visibility 74–5; power and purpose 75; strength and capability 76; Uyghurs in 77 perceptions, impacting 116 peripheral threats 59–61 police sweeps 84, 102 policies, implementation of 93–4 policing society 97–106 policy trajectory, formulation of 20 political perceptions 123–5 political will 55–70; conclusions 131–2; of the enemy 72–3; and force of arms 72; through challenge 61–2; unity of purpose and mission clarity 140–1 politics, severing from religion 119 power, perceptions of 112–13, 121 primordial cultural factors 57 propaganda 105 psychological operations 21–2 public opinion 56–7 Public Security Bureau (PSB) 8, 25, 99, 102, 104 purges 94–6

196

Index

threats: adapting force to counter 89; neighboring states 59–61 Three Musketeers (Dumas) 138 Tiananmen Square, massacre in 58, 66 Tibet 59–60, 61, 132 Tiwaldi, Ismail 108 Tomes, Robert R. 18 Toops, Stanley W. 80 top-down: change 17–19; command 93–4 training camps 25, 34–5, 36–7, 40, 49–50, 51–3 transportation projects 83 Turkey, attacks on Chinese in 43, 45 United Nations (UN) 60, 64, 87 United Revolutionary Front of East Turkistan (URFET) 46–7 universities as workgroups 100 Urumqi 42–3, 45, 48, 74–5, 78, 84, 87, 123 US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 12, 32–3, 50 US Marines 15 US Special Operations forces 15 US: aid to Mujahidin 32–3; bilingual education 115; COIN predicament 17; counter-terrorism 127; foreign policy 4, 6; global war on terror 87; involvement in Afghan war 49–50; public opinion polls 56; sensitivity to casualties 150; troops in Saudi Arabia 33–4; Uyghur views of 5; values 9 USSR: actions in Xinjiang 79; influence in Xinjiang 59; invasion of Afghanistan 32–3; strategic threats from 64; see also Soviet–Afghan war Uyghur cadres 77, 95–6 Uyghur ethnic group 1–9 Uyghur language 8–9, 98, 113–14, 115–16, 135–6, 147 Uyghur Liberation Organization (ULO) 46–7

Uyghuristan People’s Party 46–7 values and victory 143–4 Van Evera, Stephen 110 Vick, Karl 37 victory and values 143–4 Vietnam War 139 Wahidi, Hashir 46 Wang Lequan 87, 98 warfare, strategic periphery 60–1 Washington Post 10, 37 weapons, removal of 144–5 Whiting, Allen S. 60 workgroups 100 World Bank 79 World Trade Center 39–40 World Uyghur Youth Council (WUYC) 47 Xinhua news agency 73, 78, 79 Xinjiang Daily 93 Xinjiang Military District 76 Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC) 73–4, 78–80, 84, 133; police sweeps 84 Xinjiang University 27, 96 Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR): China’s hidden hand in 99–101; Chinese perceptions of 68–9; fieldwork in 26–8; insurgency in 40–9, 130–1; introduction to 1–9; perceptions of identity and power in 112–13; political will from 65–6; reshaping society in 108–26, 135–7; use of forces in 80–7 Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Borderland (Starr) 28 Yining 7, 82–3, 85–6, 100–1 Yuladeshev, Tahir 45