China - Central Asia Countries: Making New Partnership

China-Central Asian Countries: Making New Partnership

China - Central Asian Countries: Making New Partnership ISBN 978-1-84464-055-3 This section is taken from pages 244- 324 of the text Making New Partnership CONTENTS 12. The Evolution of China-Russia-US Triangular Relationship Zheng Yu Ⅰ. China-Russia-US Triangular Relationship after the “9·11” Event 245 Ⅱ. Readjustment and Change of the Triangular Relationship 254 13. Russia and China: Consolidating the Strategic Partnership Vladimir Portyakov Ⅰ. Evolution of Russia-China Relations 262 Ⅱ. International Dimension of Russia-China Relations 268 Ⅲ. Challenges to Russia-China Relations 273 14. Central Asian Countries and China: Managing the Transition Venera Galyamova Ⅰ. Overview of Central Asia-China Relations 288 Ⅱ. Central Asian Views on a Rising China 296 Ⅲ. Emerging Interests between Central Asia and China 304 Ⅳ. The Role of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 314 Ⅴ. Future Perspective 321

12 The Evolution of China-RussiaUS Triangular Relationship Zheng Yu  A Introduction In the mid-1990s, the contradictions between Russia and the United States on the issue of NATO’s eastward expansion brought to a halt of the bilateral honeymoon relationship which was formed after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The Clinton administration gave the green light to Taiwan’s leader, Li Denghui, to visit the United States in 1995, which infuriated Mainland China. Besides, The actions of the United States engendered Mainland China’ s deterrent military exercises adjacent to the Taiwan Straits in 1996. These two events severely exacerbated the US-China relations. In such a context, Russia and China began to see their common ground and interests in terms of opposing US hegemony. It was in this context that the China-Russia-US triangular relationship in the post Cold War era began to come into being. After that, Russia and China conducted a close strategic coordination in such areas as opposing US-NATO’s bombing of Yugoslavia, promoting the authority of the United Nations in settling international disputes, objecting to the US deployment of the National Missile Defense system, preserving global strategic stability, etc. After the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001, Russia dramatically  A  Zheng Yu, Professor at the Institute of Russian, Eastern European and Central Asian Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.

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12  The Evolution of China-Russia-US Triangular Relationship  /  245 improved its relationship with the United States in the fight on terrorism, and loosened its relations with China. Hence, the China-Russia-US triangular relationship at the new century posed a completely different posture. However, in the era when anti-terrorism has become America’s urgent task, the United States has not relinquished the efforts of maintaining its hegemonic power and its containment of Russia and China. On the one hand, the United States pinned down Mainland China’s policy towards Taiwan by enhancing its military cooperation with Taiwan, strengthening its long distant striking deployment. On the other hand, the United States conducted a second round of the NATO’s eastward expansion, consolidated its legal and infrastructure preparation for a longterm stationing its troops in Central Asia, supported the anti-Russia elements within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), particularly plotting and funding a series of “the colorful revolution” in some CIS countries. These events seriously damaged the anti-terror partnership between Russia and the United States in the fight on terrorism. In this historical background, Russia and China formed a new common ground and interests in terms of opposing the US export of western style democracy, and the two countries counteracted the US diplomatic efforts in Central Asia by the mechanism of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization(SCO), thus severely balancing the US policy in Central Asia. Russia, with the rapid increase of its national strength, quickly strengthened its strategic coordination with China and began to adopt hard-line policy towards the United States in a series of issues, which intensified the US global diplomatic dilemma after the war over Iraq. All this brought about a new face to the China-Russia-US Triangular Relationship in the new century, and transformed the global strategic posture and strategic environment. The socalled “colorful revolution” played an important role in reshaping the ChinaRussia-US triangular relationship,

Ⅰ. China-Russia-US Triangular Relationship after the “9·11” Event The direct impact of the September 11 terrorist attacks in 2001 is that it completely destroyed the basis of the US unilateral policy. The United

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246  /  Making New Partnership States can no longer do whatever it likes without having to worry about its consequences. It also ended the history that mainland American had never been attacked since the founding of the USA. America’s homeland security continued to face the most serious, realistic threat from the outside of the North American Continent. The United States has to put the homeland security as the top priority of its national security strategy, which is unprecedented in American history. Now the US global strategy has to focus on two major aims: one is to maintain its global hegemony, and the other is to protect its homeland security. 1. New Trend of the Triangular Relationship The September 11 terrorist attacks also have a direct impact on the ChinaRussia-US triangular relationship. The Bush administration, considering the formulation of the global cooperation in the fight against terrorism, has to dramatically improve its relations with Russia and to adjust its high pressure policy on China in the aftermath of the aircraft collision incident in April 2001. Although Russia took strong measures to counteract the US unilateral hegemonic policy after the war in Kosovo, it had actually been trying to seek the most favorable opportunity to improve its relations with the United States, considering the gulf of comprehensive strength between Russia and the United States as well as Putin’s efforts to put economic development as the top priority. In the immediate aftermath of the September 11 event, Russia’s policy towards the United States entered a stable period, characterized by the strategic comprise in exchange for the stability of bilateral relations. This feature has several manifestations: ——Russia’s support of US global anti-terror war which was centered on the Afghanistan war by agreeing the United States troops to enter and be stationed in Central Asia. ——Russia’s moderate and calm attitude towards a second round of NATO’s eastward expansion. ——Russia’s acquiesce in the US withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972 on December 13, 2001. ——Russia’s great compromise on the issue of disarmament, its signing of the Moscow Pact with the United States in 2002, which has no any sanctions.

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12  The Evolution of China-Russia-US Triangular Relationship  /  247 ——Russia’s approval of expanding US initiative of the “cooperation reduction threats” to other countries. ——Russia’s participation in the “non-proliferation security initiative” launched by the United States in May 2003, initially strongly criticized by Russia. ——Russia’s selective acceptance of the multilateral talks on nonproliferation dominated by the western powers, etc. The United States also reacted positively to Russia’s cooperative policy: ——Bush administration quickly reduced its criticism on Russia’s policy on Chechnya. ——Recognized Russia as a market economy, actively explored the opportunities to expand bilateral energy cooperation. ——Moderately enhanced Russia’s role in dealing with NATO by agreeing to establish “Russia-NATO 20 Countries Mechanism”. In the late April, 2002, Bush and Putin met in Moscow, signed several documents and established the partnership in the war on terrorism. The Bush administration changed its previous stance on refusing to sign any new document on the disarmament of the nuclear weapons and signed with Russia the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (which is also called the Moscow Treaty), no longer insisting that Russia should destroy all land-based multihead missiles stipulated in the second Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II). The Bush administration also dramatically enhanced its financial support to Russia in the field of the nuclear security. “US President George W. Bush requested $1 billion in the 2003 Financial Authorization Act to support ‘the Nann-Lugar Initiative’.Besides, at the G8 Summit, held in Canada in June 2002, the United States and the European Union (EU) promised to provide $20 billion ($10 billion on each part) to help nuclear disarmament, nonproliferation, counterterrorism, and nuclear security.”  A All these events brought about the great improvement of bilateral relation between the United States and Russia. Indeed, the US unilateral action of waging the war on Iraq on March 20, 2003, regardless of the violent opposition from Russia, did not fundamentally upset the Russia-US partnership in the war  A  J. M. Goldgeier and M. McFaul, Power and Purpose, US Policy toward Russia after the Cold War, Washington, 2003, p.324.

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248  /  Making New Partnership on terrorism. At the end of August in 2003, President Putin, during his visit in Italy, expressed Russia’s willingness to play a more active role in the Iraqi postwar stability and reconstruction and support to send to Iraq a multi-nation peacekeeping force under the leadership of the United Nations, namely, under the leadership of the United States. A Meanwhile, the Bush administration also sought to improve its relations with China, particularly the damaged bilateral relations after the aircraft collision incident on April 1, 2001,and ended its short-term containment policy towards China: ——In October 2001, President Bush attended the APEC Summit héld in Shanghai. ——The Bush administration declared to support China’s bid for the entry into the WTO. ——President Bush visited China in February 2002 to mark the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the signing of the Shanghai Communiqué and reiterated that the US “one China” policy remains unchanged. One American scholar commented, “After the attacks of the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the Bush administration began to view global terrorism instead of China as the biggest threat to the US national security. First the war on Afghanistan, and then the removal of Saddam regime, and other efforts intended to root out terrorist networks .With all these actions the Bush administration began to put countering global terrorism and the proliferation of the mass destruction weapons and the political reconstruction in the Middle East as the top strategic priority.” B The dramatic improvement of the Russia-US relations also greatly impacted on the development of Russia-China relations. On one hand, since the United States lowered its tone in the criticism of Russia’s policy on Chechnya in the context of the global war on terrorism, Russia’s need to join China against the United States in the Kosovo greatly reduced. On the other hand, after  A  A. Cohen,“The Bush-Putin Summit Agenda: Russian Peacekeepers for Iraq?”http:// www.heritage.org/Research/MiddleEast/EM901.cfm.  B  J. D. Pollack, ed.,Strategic Surprise? U.S.-China Relations in the Early Twenty-first Century, Newport, 2003, p.3.

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12  The Evolution of China-Russia-US Triangular Relationship  /  249 the Bush administration declared to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, China-Russia strategic coordination against US deployment of the National Missile Defense (NMD) began to focus on how to prevent the United States from developing defense or offensive arms in outer space in the years to come. Thus, the urgency of Russia’s joining China against the United States on NMD issue was also dramatically weakened. Both events will have certainly loosened the China-Russia strategic coordination relations in this period, which will have further affected Russia’s policy tendency to promote the bilateral cooperation. For example, although Russia and China signed the Bilateral Friendly Neighborhood Cooperation Treaty in July 2001, the border issues between the two sides were temporarily put aside. Russia was not very active in promoting bilateral economic cooperation. At the end of 2002, China Petrol and Gas Corporation failed to buy the stocks of Russia’s Slavic Petrol. The petrol pipeline from Russia’s Angarsk to China’s Da Qing also failed as a result of Russia’s renege. Between the end of 2003 and the beginning of 2004, Russia’s antitrust department laid obstacles to China Petrol’s efforts to buy 61.8% of the stocks of one of Russian oil corporations. However, because the United States supported Georgia’s “Rose Revolution” at the end of 2003, and “Orange Revolution” in Ukrainian presidential election in 2004 and further focused “colorful revolution” on the countries in the Central Asia area, the anti-terrorism partnership between Russia and the United States was fundamentally damaged which also brought about an increasing volatile situation in the China-Russia-US triangular relationship. 2. The Effects of the “Colorful Revolution” Plotting“colorful revolution” within the Commonwealth of Independent States is a new strategic step taken by the Bush administration in consolidating US unipolar hegemonic power and continuing to contain Russia and China. In order to fight against terrorism, the Bush administration abandoned its repressive policy towards China in the aftermath of the aircraft collision incident and promoted an anti-terror partnership with Russia. However, it is impossible for the US government to give up its basic policy of containing Russia and China. Therefore, immediately after the Afghanistan war and the gradual stability of the country, the Bush administration quickly shifted

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250  /  Making New Partnership its national security priority to the consolidation of unipolar hegemonic position. The United States, regardless of the strong opposition of Russia and China, declared to withdraw from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty on December 13, 2001, signed a Presidential Directive in December 2002 to start the deployment of the National Missile Defense and to quicken its steps in the research and development of intercepting weapons in outer space, the purpose of which is to seize and maintain the military supremacy in preserving the US unipolar hegemony. The United States peremptorily waged a war on Iraq without the authorization of the United Nations, regardless of the lack of solid evidence to prove Saddam’s possession of weapons of mass destruction and Saddam’s connection with Al Quaeda, and the strong opposition from its allies France and Germany, as well as its anti-terrorism partners, Russia and China. Apparently, the US strategic goal is not to counter terrorism but to achieve other aims. For example, the United States purported to dramatically promote the US leverage in controlling Iraq’s oil production and exportation through the control of Iraqi reconstruction whereby the United States is in a more advantageous position to contain the gradual increase of the the oil prices, to acquire cheaper energy, to weaken OPEC’s manipulation of the international energy market, to contain Russia’s rapid economic revival through restricting the rapid increase of oil prices, because Russia ( to a great extent, was dependent upon the export of energy) controls the energy lifeline of the European Union, thus weakening the leverage of Euro in its competition with the US dollar. Clearly, “the Oil War” launched by the US is designed to establish the global energy framework and mechanism by which America’s supreme economic position will be consolidated. By the Iraqi War, the Bush administration promoted the so-called “the Great Middle East Democracy Initiative” and “Advance Democracy ” around the world (The US Congress passed Advance Democracy Act of 2005) in order to establish a geopolitical order that favors the maintenance of the US hegemonic position in the unipolar world. The United States initiated a second round of NATO’s eastward expansion.

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12  The Evolution of China-Russia-US Triangular Relationship  /  251 The member countries of the NATO occupied the northwestern, western and southwestern part of the Commonwealth of the Independent States and are integrated into a whole area in geographic terms, which restricted Russia’s security and strategic space to the eastern part of Europe. During the first term, the Bush administration continued to carry out an ambiguous strategy on Taiwan issue, and gradually expanded the US military cooperation with Taiwan. It is self-evident that the Bush administration intends to manipulate the Taiwan issue to contain China. Closely related to its strategy of promoting democracy across the world, the Bush administration supported Georgia’s “Rose Revolution” in 2003, the “Orange Revolution” in Ukrainian presidential election in 2004 and intended to further expand “colorful revolution” to other countries in Central Asia in 2005. All these attempts were designed to disintegrate the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), thus destroying Russia’s last geopolitical base to balance the United States. The US plotting of “the colorful revolution” in some CIS countries threatened Russia’s core interests, which led Putin to rethink about Russia’s policy towards the United States. Although Putin made no comment in his State of the Nation Address in April 2005 on the political turmoil in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan, Russia’s domestic public opinion on the issue of “colorful revolution” revealed the consensus held by the Russian government and the civil society. The Russian analyst argued that the essence of “the colorful revolution” is to wipe out any vestige of the Russian culture and civilization in the domain of the former Soviet Union and to transform the CIS countries into an anti-Russian frontline and finally to get the CIS countries into the hands of the West. When talking about the “Orange Revolution” in Ukraine, Russian political commentator Nikonov pointed out, Kremlin tended to view this revolution as a “carefully plotted action” or an anti-Russia movement directed by the outsiders, with the purpose of eliminating Russia’s influence in the CIS and finally replacing Russia by American presence. Prof. Pushkov of the School of International Relations in the University of Moscow viewed the incident in Ukraine as a continuation of the Western efforts in the political takeover of the strategic space of the

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252  /  Making New Partnership former Soviet Union. A On May 20, 2006, Russian President Putin quoted a Russian fable “Comrade Wolf ” to allude to the United States, which reflected Russia’s recognition of the core of the US policy of democracy promotion, that is, to advance US interests in the name of democracy promotion. Putin said, “If Comrade wolf wanted to swallow anyone, he would simply do it without caring about anything else… When they feel it necessary to seek their own interest, who cares about human rights and democracy? At that time, it seems that they can do anything.” B Mr. V. Falin, a very experienced diplomat in the Soviet era, and G. Evstafef, also the former chairman of Russian foreign Intelligence Office, submitted a report to Kremlin and the Russian National Duma, in which he clearly stated that “the colorful revolution” shocked the Russian government to the realization of the necessity to adjust its policy towards the United States. The report, entitled The Possible Ways of the US Actions to Russia between 2006 and 2008, stated that “the Bush administration, dominated by the neoconservatives and continuing Reagan’s tough policy, successfully initiated colorful revolution in Georgia and Ukraine, and ‘made a final judgment’ to Russia in 2004 and 2005. The essence of the judgment is to renounce the validity of the secret agreement made between the White House and the Kremlin in 2003-2004. In other words, Russia agreed to form a unified, friendly partnership with the United States in the war on global terrorism in return for the promise of the United States to recognize the CIS countries as Russia’s sphere of influence. The Bush administration also attempted to monitor the shift of the Russian policy and to conduct an ‘orange project’ within Russia itself. Obviously, the United States has never formulated a partnership with Russia on an equal footing, in the context that there has been plan seeking that Russia’s current policy will be replaced by pro-US one .” C Hence, it is safe to conclude that “the colorful revolution”, urged and  A  Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press(Henceforth CDPP), LVI, No. 48, Dec.29, 2004, p. 10.  B  MosNews, Vladimir Putin’s State-of-the-Nation Address, http://www.mosnews.com/ column/2006/05/11/PutinAddress.shtml.  C  Валентин Фалин, Геннадий Евстафьев, О вероятном сценарии действий США в отношении России в 2006-2008 годах, http://www.mediacratia.ru/owa/mc/ mc_project_news.

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12  The Evolution of China-Russia-US Triangular Relationship  /  253 supported by the United States, has threatened Russia’s core interest and surpassed Russia’s bottom line in its compromising with the United States that forced Putin to consider adjusting its policy towards the United States and set out to counteract the United States in Central Asia on the diplomatic front. 3. Russian and China’s Joint Opposition Russia perceived US strategic intention of persisting containing Russia through “the colorful revolution”, likewise, the Kyrgyzstan event with the nature of the colorful revolution in March 2005 gave the same image to China. Apparently, if the cases in Georgia and Ukraine expand to the Central Asia region, the multi-fields cooperation within the framework of Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) will suffer seriously. Furthermore, Chinese government worried the potentiality that the Central Asian region would become the frontline under the west support for the anti-government forces in the regions of Xinjiang and Tibet, which would damage the core interest of China. Thus, Russia and China have shared interests over “colorful revolution” issue, for which a new field of strategic coordination was established. During Moscow Summit in July 2005, leaders of both China and Russia made a joint statement illustrating the theoretical foundation of the two nation strategic coordination, which is dedicated to oppose the importation of the western social system by external forces. The joint statement put an emphasis on the needs to respect historical traditions and to promote various nationalities in one country to live in harmony, to maintain country unification and to combat against the actions disuniting the state sovereignty, provoking hatreds among peoples, disregarding of the objective process of social development, imposing of social political system model on other countries. In addition, it also focused on some other issues, for example,the foundation of both the world culture and the diversity of civilization should be complementary, but not colliding;the mainstream of contemporary world should be global cooperation, but not the clash of civilization;the diversity of the model of culture and civilization should be respected and preserved; and the differences of historical background, cultural tradition and social political system, value doctrine and developing path should not be the excuse of intervention into domestic

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254  /  Making New Partnership politics. A In the meantime, the new collaborative mechanism between the two governments has been established as well. In October 2004, leaders of both China and Russia jointly announced the establishment of national security consultation mechanism. In February 2005, immediately before the general elections in Kyrgyzstan, Tang Jiaxuan and Ivanov launched this mechanism jointly. They agreed that establishment of national security consultation mechanism between China and Russia symbolizes a further step to the bilateral security cooperation. The functions of this mechanism and other security consultation mechanisms between the two countries’ related government departments will be fully employed to jointly deal with new challenges and new threats and to uphold the mutual interests. A few days later, during 2005 SCO Summit in Astana, the capital of Kazakhstan, the issue of the deadline of US troops withdrawal, which was initiated by Uzbekistan and Russia, was echoed by China and other member states and was recorded in the Presidential Declaration of the SCO. On July 29, 2005, Uzbekistan government officially requested that the US troops withdraw from its military base in Hanabad within half a year. By November 2005, the withdrawal of US troops from Uzbekistan had been completed.

Ⅱ. Readjustment and Change of the Triangular Relationship 1. Post “Colorful Revolution” Readjustment After Russia, in cooperation with members of the SCO, forced US troops to withdraw from Uzbekistan in the early July of 2005, the Putin Administration began either to adopt the stance of non-cooperation with US or to conduct direct diplomatic counteraction towards US on a series of fields and regional issues. Meanwhile, the Putin Administration actively sought to multi-field cooperation with China. And thus China-Russia-US triangular relationship st  A  “China and Russia Signed the Joint Statement on World Order for 21 Century”, July 1, 2005, http:// news.sohu.com /20050701/n226160126.shtml.

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12  The Evolution of China-Russia-US Triangular Relationship  /  255 began to take up a new face: exacerbation of Russia-US relationship, extensive development of the strategic coordination between Russia and China, and the attempts of the Bush Administration to adopt the conciliation policy towards China after US finds its global policy in the mire in a series of fields. After the US troops withdrew from Uzbekistan, the Russia-US relationship did not show any signs of mitigation and reconciliation in 2006. On the contrary, reprimand between top leaders of the two countries outstripped any time in the past. Except for the temporary tranquility maintained in the Central Asia, diplomatic conflicts between the two countries have been increasing, and Russia began to challenge the US policies in some areas. Some Western analysts even argued that a new round of the Cold War between Russia and the US come in sight. At the end of 2005, when the Iranian nuclear crisis escalated and the risk of air attacks by Western countries, led by the US, further increased, Russia signed an agreement involving the sales of 29 sets of “Tor-M1” air defense missiles to Iran with a total value of $700 million. The delivery of which would began in September 2006, with the purpose of helping Iran strengthen its air defense. During the year of 2006, the Russian government objected to the US plan of imposing severe sanctions against Iran by means of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). While after the Iranian government refused to construct uranium enrichment facilities in the Russian territory, Russia’s stance of the sanctions loosened. However, after UNSC passed the sanction resolution of forbidding transportation of enriched uranium and missile technologies to Iran in December of 2006, Russia finished the execution of this agreement with Iran in January of 2007 and insisted that implementation of the agreement not go against the UNSC resolution. Amongst the advocacy wave of blockade and isolation by the Western countries, on March 4-5 of 2006, a Hamas delegation of Palestine accepted the invitation of the Putin Administration to visit Moscow. The Russian academia considered that “the upcoming talks may be part of a Russia larger strategy to undermine Washington’s dominance in global affairs.” “The fact that Putin is not united with the United States on this issue but, on the contrary, is against what the United States would have preferred, of course represents a blow to

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256  /  Making New Partnership the US position.” A The Putin Administration imposed sanctions on the CIS governments that came into power by the means of “colorful revolution”. At the beginning of 2005 and 2006, Russia raised the prices of energy it sold to Ukraine several times, and imposed many sanctions, including communication blockade, on Georgia in the “Russian officer hostage incident” of September 2006. In July 2006, Russia signed an agreement with Venezuela in which Russia agreed to sell warplanes and helicopters totalling $1 billion. In the late July, the Bush Administration required Russia to reconsider this deal. Mr. Ivanov, Russian Vice Premier & Minister of the Department of Defense, immediately refused. He reiterated that “reconsideration of the agreement is absolutely out of the question. In my opinion, the 24 airplanes and some helicopters stipulated in the agreement do not exceed the national defense need of small country like Venezuela. We will abide by the agreement.” B With the further deterioration of the Russia-US relationship, conflicts between the two countries in the energy area also escalated, with the cooperation in this area showing a backward sign. On October 9, 2006, Aleksei Miller, President of Russian Gazprom declared “we have decided that the exploration of the Shtokman gas field will be conducted with no international participation, so we will own 100% stock right of the gas field.” The Shtokman field lies in the Russian portion of Barents Sea, which has a proven natural gas reserve of 3.7 trillion cubic meters and is the individual gas field with the largest proven reserve in the world. Prior to the remark, five international energy magnates, including Chevron Corporation, Conoco Phillips Inc., Norsk Statoil, Norway Water Power Company and Total, have all successfully entered the last round of competitive tender for the exploration of the Shtokman gas field, who hoped that they could share at most 49% of overseas equity of the field. Мiller further pointed out that the natural gas coming from the development of the Shtokman gas field would be transported to Germany via the gas pipeline  A  Claire Bigg,“Russia: What Is Moscow Expecting From Hamas Visit?” http://www.rferl. org/featuresarticle/2006/03/html.  B  MosNews, “Russia Rejects U.S. Call to Reconsider 1 bn. US$ Military Contracts With Venezuela”, http://www.mosnews.com/news/2006/07/26/ruschavesus.shtml.

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12  The Evolution of China-Russia-US Triangular Relationship  /  257 running through the Baltic Sea, “Europe is the first choice of destination for our energy supply”,while according to the former plan, the natural gas would be transported to the US after being liquefied. In the meanwhile, strategic coordination between Russia and China since October of 2004 has seen further development. The strategic coordination between China and Russia has been more harmonized and balanced. Since the end of 2004, governments of the two countries have made persistent efforts in consolidating the strategic coordination. In October 2004, leaders of the two countries ratified Compendium for the Implementation of Sino-Russian GoodNeighborly, Friendship and Cooperation Treaty (2005-2008), which is in essence a concrete plan of mid-term cooperation between the two countries, stipulating important cooperation contents in various areas and fields in the following 4 years. In the meantime, the issue of borderline was ultimately settled through signing the Complementary Protocol between the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation on the Alignment of the Eastern Section of the China-Russia Boundary. In August 2005, Joint Military Maneuvers between China and Russia, “Peace mission-2005”, were held in the sea area of Shandong Province, near the Yellow Sea and Bohai Sea. Development Plan for the Economic and Trade Cooperation between China and Russia in 2006-2010 was signed during the tenth regular meeting between premiers of China and Russia in the early November of 2005. On April 28, 2006, the first stage of the Russian Far East oil pipeline project kicked off. This pipeline will provide oil to China via the construction of the branch line leading to China. At the same time, close attention has been paid to the construction of the natural gas pipeline between China and Russia, and the matters concerning the implementation are under way. The above facts intensify the strategic demand and strategic dependence between the two countries, and provide a deeper and broader operation basis for the strategic cooperation relationship. In 2006 and 2007, China and Russia initiated activities related to the Year of Russia and the Year of China, demonstrating that the two countries are pressing on building the social, cultural and psychological foundation for their long-term strategic coordination.

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258  /  Making New Partnership 2. New Changes Since 2005, the United States has entered into a series of strategic dilemmas because of the stalemate in the Iraqi war. Although the Iraqi war has ended for over three years, the democracy system which US expects failed to be established in Iraq yet. The United States was cornered with the dilemma for heavy war debts, increasing casualties and the anti-war protests from its own land. US military and financial strengths were halted in Iraq.The US didn’t get wide support from the international community on the Iraqi war as it once had on the Afghanistan war. Its relations with Russia, China, France and Germany were damaged. Its relations with the Islamic nations also deteriorated. The validity and righteousness of its major diplomatic and military actions in the name of anti-terrorism began to be increasingly questioned. Its strategy of reintegrating global political and economic interest in the name of anti-terrorism received more and more resistances. Its relation with Russia has dramatically deteriorated. The anti-terrorism partnership between the US and Russia in the aftermath of the attacks on September 11, 2001,has shattered. It is considered that Russia’s non-cooperative posture is one of the major reasons that the United States cannot solve the Iranian nuclear crisis. As a matter of fact, the United States didn’t achieve its anticipated political goals in the 2005 elections in Central Asian countries. The new government in Kyrgyzstan has, instead, more inclined to Russia and the SCO. Even worse,the US troops, under the pressure of Uzbekistan government had to withdraw from Uzbekistan in November 2005, and then Uzbekistan and Russia immediately established military alliance relationship. All this made US policy in Central Asia severely set back and difficult to continue. The US hegemonic policy made the strategic coordination relationship between China and Russia became even closer. The different voices of China and Russia on the Iran and the North Korea issues make it impossible. The US is actually in a dilemma when it cannot launch military strikes. In such strategic context, the China-Russia-US triangular relations have evolved into a new situation. Firstly, among the triangular relations, the static and dynamic disadvantages of strategic coordination between China and Russia

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12  The Evolution of China-Russia-US Triangular Relationship  /  259 both have changed subtly. The continued rapid economic growth in China and Russia, to some extent, has changed the static disadvantage of the balance of the national strengths between China, Russia and the US. The bilateral economic cooperation between China and Russia also reduced the dynamic disadvantage that either side was not able to provide market and investment support for each other, which therefore made their strategic cooperation less affected by the US. The passive roles of China and Russia among the triangle relations have begun to change. Secondly, the Putin administration has gotten out of the strategic puzzle. Putin metaphorically referred the US to“Comrade Wolf ”in his State of the Nation Address on May 10, 2006, which shows the Putin administration’s new thinking. Thirdly, the strategic coordination between China and Russia reveals some unprecedented practical functions, which affectively changed the strategic situation in related regions. The China-Russia cooperation in Central Asia in 2005, for example, has effectively set back the US strategic offensives and put the United States in a diplomatic dilemma. The cooperation between China and Russia on the issues of North Korean and Iranian nuclear crisis made the US difficult to adopt unilateral policy in the two regions, that is, it cannot launch military strikes or implement strict sanctions. Fourthly, the Bush administration adopts the policy of stabilizing US-China relations and keeping on containing Russia among the triangular relations. In September 2005, Mr. Robert Zoellick, then US Undersecretary of State, signaled in his speech the adjustments of policy towards China by saying that the two nations have comprehensive and long-term common interests and a wide range of cooperative fields. The Unite States “hopes along with China to manage the global order and shoulder risk and responsibility”. A The Bush administration’s US National Security Strategy reiterated Zoellick’s concept that China is a “responsible stakeholder”. B Meanwhile, although the United States will not take momentous  A  Robert B.Zoellick,“Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility?” Remarks to National Committee on U.S. -China Relations on September 21, 2005, http://www.state. gov/s/d/rem/53682.htm.  B  George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy, March 2006, http://www.whitehouse. gov/nsc/nss/2006/.

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260  /  Making New Partnership actions in Central Asia recently, the US State Department provided financial support for Ukraine and Georgia’s entry into NATO in September 2006. On September 21, the meeting of NATO foreign ministers initiated the “intensified dialogue” mechanism with Georgia. In January 2007, the United States decided to deploy anti-Ballistic Missile System in Poland and Zech. These all demonstrated that the United States sticks to its “disintegrate the CIS led by Russia and contain Russian geopolitical space” policy. 3. China-Russia Strategic Coordination The overall global strategic situation and the development of the ChinaRussia-US triangular relations have demonstrated that the unipolar global structure, which has started after the Soviet Union dissolved, has entered into a collapsing process. It is impossible for the US to deal with the major global issues on its own will as before. The important role of the China-Russia strategic coordination relationship in various global and regional affairs can not be ignored any more. The attitudes of China and Russia on the promotion of multilateral economic cooperation within the framework of the SCO need to be further reconciled. For six years since the SCO established, the Russian side has initiated a few multilateral cooperation plans. The Russian government particularly chose such projects that would benefit its own interests and took limited cooperative attitudes towards those programs in which it has no or little interests.Russia virtually holds a relatively passive posture on the establishment of a free-trade zone in the SCO, which was initiated by China. Considering the possibility of itself being foreclosed the cooperation, Russia has to unwillingly participate in some of the cooperative projects between China and some of the Central Asian countries. It is absolutely necessary for both China and Russia to jointly advance the economic cooperation in the Central Asia region from the strategic point of view. It is important to promote the mutual direct investments and further consolidate their social, political and economic foundations between China and Russia. While bilateral trade between China and Russia has dramatically developed in the 21st century, mutual direct investments between them, for various reasons, increased slowly. According to statistic data from China, by the

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12  The Evolution of China-Russia-US Triangular Relationship  /  261 end of 2006, Chinese investment projects in Russia only amounted to 736, the size of non-financial direct investment from China in Russia only totaled $935 million. The accumulation amounts of Russian investment projects in China are 1975, real investments only $610 million. A Hard work needs to be done to further promote bilateral economic and trade cooperation between China and Russia. On the whole, the current China-Russia bilateral trade is relatively small. In 2006, the amount of China-Russia bilateral trade accounted only for 1.8% of the total amount of Chinese foreign trade, for 7.7 % of the total amount of the Russian foreign trade. While the amount of the China-Russia bilateral trade is continuing to increase, the speed of the growth slowed down evidently. Besides, for over a decade, the structure of the bilateral trade between China and Russia has remained the same, that is, China mainly exports textile goods to Russia and imports raw materials and resource goods from Russia. The severe unbalance of the China-Russia bilateral trade has made Russian government earnestly hope to change, which needs great effort and longer time to realize it. It is evident that the economic foundation of China-Russian relations should be further strengthened, otherwise, the political foundation may be weakened.

 A  Han Lihua, “China-Russian Economic-Trade Cooperation has Fine Prospective”, http://www.crc.mofcom.gov.cn/crweb/crc/info/Article.

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13 Russia and China: Consolidating the Strategic Partnership Vladimir Portyakov  A The disintegration of the USSR and the formation of the Russian Federation (RF) as an independent state have been the starting point of shaping and developing the present-day Russian-Chinese relations. This process has been going on for fifteen years according to its own logic and is largely determined by the modern national-state interests of Russia and China, as well as their place in the international division of labour and their geopolitical position. At the same time,many important specific features of the modern Russian-Chinese relations can adequately be understood and interpreted only in the context of the preceding intensive interaction of the two countries, whose history goes back about four hundred years.

Ⅰ. Evolution of Russia-China Relations Although in the almost 400-year experience of the interethnic contacts of Russia and China,there has been everything, both good and bad, according to the view of one of the leading Russian experts on China, M.L. Titarenko, a member of RAS, “ these relations were dominated by good-neighborhood, mutual influence and mutual cultural enrichment.” B  A  Vladimir Portyakov, Senior Fellow, Deputy Director of Institute of Far Eastern Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow.  B  Titarenko M.L. Foreword. In the book Russian-Chinese Relations. State, Prospects. Moscow. RAS. IFES. 2005. 412 pp. Here: p.12.

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13  Russia and China: Consolidating the Strategic Partnership  /  263 Despite all complex developments in the relations between Qing China and tsarist Russia, as the Russian expert on China A.D. Voskresensky maintains, “for almost three hundred years peace reigned supreme: Russia and China had never been at formally declared war, and they always succeeded in restoring stable equilibrium through diplomatic negotiations”.2 It was during that period that the Russian-Chinese border was established, which exists to this day, with certain corrections. A The opening of the Russian Religious Mission in Beijing in 1715, which existed up to 1954, laid the foundation for contacts between the two countries and the deeper mutual knowledge of their people’s culture and religions.  B The dramatic world collisions of the first half of the 20 th century predetermined a quite complex and multifaceted character of the Russo-China interaction during the 1911-1949 period. Perhaps, new research conducted on the basis of previously inaccessible archives materials will make it possible to learn more precisely the still dubitable assessments of many nuances and general results of these relations. C However, in our view, despite any modifications and revision of the views on the events of those years, the assistance rendered by Soviet Russia to the revolutionary struggle and the anti-Japanese war of the Chinese people is a serious contribution to the positive results in our bilateral relations. The relations of the USSR with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) proclaimed on October 1, 1949, have passed the stages of “eternal friendship” in the 1950s, increasing interparty and interstate discord and even open hostility in the 1960s-1970s, and difficult normalization in the 1980s. Scientific communities of the two countries often assess rather differently the principal  A  Voskresensky A.D. Russia and China: Theory and History of Interstate Relations. Moscow. Moscow Public Scientific Foundation. 1999. 408 pp. Here: p.184. See also: Voskresensky Alexei. Russia and China. A Theory of Inter-State Relations. London and New York. RoutledgeCurzon. 2004. p. 122.  B  See: Russian-Chinese Legal Acts. 1689-1916. (Ed. V.S. Myasnikov). Moscow. Monuments of Historical Thought. 2004. 696 pp.; Myasnikov V.S. Treaty Articles Endorsed: Diplomatic History of Russian-Chinese Border, 17th-20th Centuries. Moscow. Print Publishers. 1996.  C  See: History of Russian Religious Mission in China. Collection of Articles. Moscow. Publishers of Svyato-Vladimirskoye Bratstvo. 1997. 416pp.

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264  /  Making New Partnership reasons for the emergence and broadening of the Soviet-Chinese split. In China it is claimed that it was mainly due to the actual inequality in the bilateral relations of the two countries, with a more favourable attitude to the USSR, A whereas in Russia the main responsibility is placed on Mao Zedong with his leftism and enormous ambitions. B However, it’s much more important that both Moscow and Beijing could draw the necessary historical lessons and were able, as Deng Xiaoping put it, “to close down the past and open the future”. The normalization of the RussianChinese relations symbolically proclaimed by M.S. Gorbachev’s visit to China in May 1989, gave a powerful and long-term impetus to them, enabling the partners to switch over smoothly from the Soviet-Chinese to Russian-Chinese interaction after the disintegration of the USSR. The Protocol of the negotiations between the deputy foreign minister of the Russian Federation G.F. Kunadze and the deputy foreign minister of the People’s Republic of China Tian Zengpei on the interstate Russian-Chinese relations, which were held in Moscow on December 27, 1991, noted that the basic principles determined in the two Soviet-Chinese communiqués of 1989 and 1991 (on the results of the visit of the General Secretary of the CCCPC Jiang Zeming to the USSR in May) remained the leading ones in the development of Russian-Chinese relations. Both sides expressed readiness “to develop the relations of friendship and cooperation in the political, trade-economic, military-technical, scientific-technical, cultural and other spheres”. C  A  First of all, mention should be made of the publication of archives materials in the series “Russian-Chinese Relations in the 20th Century. Documents and Materials”. Vol. 4-Soviet-Chinese Relations, 1937-1945 (in two volumes). Moscow. 2000. Vol. 5-SovietChinese Relations, 1946-February 1950 (in two volumes). Moscow 2005. Besides, publication of archives materials will soon be completed in five-volume series “VKP(b), Comintern and National-Liberation Movement in China: Documents” also prepared by IFES RAS. See, for example: Shen Zhihua zhubian. Zhongsu guanxi shigang (1917-1991). Beijing.  B  Xinhua chubanshe. 1997 (Shen Zhihua, Ed.). History of Chinese-Soviet Relations (1917-1991). 489pp.  C  See, for example: Kulik B.T.Soviet-Chinese Split: Reasons and Consequences. Moscow. RAS IFES. 2000. 640pp.

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13  Russia and China: Consolidating the Strategic Partnership  /  265 The signing of a whole series of important agreements on cooperation in trade, the military-technical sphere, the principles of drawing Chinese citizens to temporary work in Russia, on Russia’s assistance in the construction of a nuclear power plant in China proved to be the firm foundation of bilateral relations in a new format in 1992. The initial stage of the interaction of post-Soviet Russia with China was summed up during the visit of President B.N. Yeltsin of the Russian Federation to the People’s Republic of China in December 1992. The joint declaration on the foundations of the mutual relations between the two countries proclaimed that “they regard each other as friendly states”. Basic directions of cooperation between the RF and PRC in the international arena and bilateral interaction were mapped out, and the task of further strengthening the relations between them and bringing them “to a new level” was set up. A The successful progress of their practical bilateral cooperation gave Russia and China the ground in 1994 to describe their relations as “the new relations of constructive partnership, the genuinely equal relations of goodneighbourliness, friendship and mutually advantageous cooperation based on the principles of peaceful coexistence”. It was stated that “these relations were not of an alliance character directed against any third countries”. B In the Joint Declaration of April 25, 1996, Russia and China proclaimed their readiness “to develop the relations of equal and trusting partnership aimed at strategic interaction in the 21st century” C. The Treaty on good-neighborhood, friendship and cooperation between the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China signed by the heads of state of the two countries, V.V. Putin and Jiang Zemin in Moscow on July 16, 2001, was a result of the development of their bilateral relations during the 1992-2000 period and at the same time the orientation point to their progress  A  See: Collection of Russian-Chinese Treatries. 1949-1999. Moscow. Terra-Sport. 1999. pp. 132-133. See: Collection of Russian-Chinese Treatries. 1949-1999. Moscow. Terra-Sport. 1999.  B  pp.150-152.  C  Joint Russian-Chinese Declaration. Signed in Moscow on September 3, 1994, by President of Russia B.N. Yeltsin and Chairman of PRC Jiang Zemin. Collection of Russian-Chinese Treaties. 1949-1999. Moscow. 1999. pp. 271-273.

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266  /  Making New Partnership for the next twenty years. The Treaty summed up the Russian-Chinese relations as “equal trusting partnership and strategic interaction” (Article 10).  A This is true of today, too. The results achieved in the interaction of Russia and China within the framework of strategic partnership are quite impressive. The leaders of the two countries have declared the closeness of Russia’ s and China’s positions on the major world problems time and again as also in the joint declarations “On the multi-polar world and the formation of new world order” (1997) and “On the world order in the 21st Century” (2005). The similar positions of Russia and China on important international problems have been tested by practice during the crisis situations around former Yugoslavia and Iraq, and also in the course of the discussions of the reform of the UN.Today consultations on international problems are carried on within the framework of most departments of the ministries of foreign affairs of the RF and PRC. The weighty impact of the Russian-Chinese relations of strategic partnership can be seen and felt ever more noticeably in the entire system of international contacts, especially due to their active role in such a representative body as Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and in such major multilateral dialogue mechanisms as the Six-Party negotiations on the nuclear program of the People’s Democratic Republic of Korea (PDRK), the Six-Party consultations on Iran’s nuclear program, and the tripartite dialogue between Russia, China and India. Perhaps, it can be said without exaggeration that the concept of “Great Central Asia” put forward recently in the United States and prompting Australia to join the Japanese-US Defence Alliance are called upon to neutralize, or at least counterbalance, the consolidation and strengthening of the positions of China and Russia, and the influence of Russian-Chinese cooperation on the Asian continent.  A  Joint Russian-Chinese Declaration. Signed in Moscow on September 3, 1994, by President of Russia B.N. Yeltsin and Chairman of PRC Jiang Zemin. Collection of Russian-Chinese Treaties. 1949-1999. Moscow. 1999. pp. 333-337.

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13  Russia and China: Consolidating the Strategic Partnership  /  267 The multilevel mechanism of bilateral Russian-Chinese cooperation has been set up and is constantly improved. Annual meetings of the leaders of the two countries are held in different formats. In 2006 V.V. Putin and Hu Jintao met, apart from the official visit of the Russian President to the PRC, at the G-8 summit in St.Petersburg and also at the summits of APEC, SCO and the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia. The Russian-Chinese strategic dialogue between the member of the State Council of the PRC Tang Jiaxuan and the Secretary of the Security Council of the RF I.S. Ivanov has become quite regular. Financial and economic dialogues between the two countries have begun between their ministries of finance as well as between the Committee on Development of the PRC and the Ministry of Economy and Trade of the RF. The first sessions of the subcommittee on the protection of the environment and cooperation in civil aviation and aircraft building and the working group on migration have been held. Major subcommittees on cooperation in the trade-economic and humanitarian spheres work regularly. Since 1996 heads of government meetings have been held annually devoted, first and foremost to the development of mutual trade, whose volume has increased tenfold as against the early 1990s. The geography of interregional bilateral cooperation becomes ever broader. Most subjects of the RF and practically all provinces of the PRC have been drawn in trade-economic, educational and cultural exchanges. It would be difficult to overestimate the significance of the final solution of the border question between Russia and China. By the end of 2007, work on the demarcation of the border between the two countries on stretches along the islands near Khabarvosk and on the Argun River, according to the agreement of October 14, 2004, will have to be finished. An important role in the strengthening of the social basis of strategic partnership is played by holding national years——the Year of Russia in China in 2006 and the Year of China in Russia in 2007. Along with extensive political and economic agendas, the programs of the national years are oriented to giving a strong long-term impetus to the better understanding and broader familiarization of the people of the two countries with their traditional and

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268  /  Making New Partnership modern cultures and the creation of a stable climate of mutual trust in the Russian-Chinese relations. It can safely be said that the Russian-Chinese relations continue to progress, yielding more and more positive results. It is indicative that experts of the Institute of international Studies of Qinghua University (Beijing) gave the highest evaluation (7.7 points) to the present-day Chinese-Russian relations in the first quarter of 2007, compared with 6.3 points given to the ChineseFrench relations, 5.3 points to the Chinese-Indian relations and 2.1 points to the Chinese-US relations. The latter were characterized as “normal”, in contrast to “friendly” relations with Russia.  A

Ⅱ. International Dimension of Russia-China Relations At the same time, in our view, there are considerable reser ves for improving the bilateral relations between the RF and the PRC. Their practical implementation, however, is not free from some frictions and smoothness, which, if unattended, could cause some damage to the established model of Russian-Chinese strategic partnership. This is why these circumstances have been taken into account when the Chairman of the PRC Hu Jintao during his negotiations with the President of the Russian Federation V.V. Putin on March 26, 2007, suggested that Russia and China “become sincere partners in political cooperation, trusting each other”, “become partners in trade-economic cooperation aimed at mutual benefit”, “become partners in cooperation in the sphere of security on the principles of cohesion and mutual assistance”. B In this context mention should be made of the Joint Declaration of the RF and the PRC of March 26, 2007 which proclaimed the intention of both sides “to adhere to the line of coordination and broadening of their strategic interaction in foreign-policy matters with a view to creating a favourable international situation for the development of the two countries.” It is  A  RCh: Russia-China. Mass Newspaper. Moscow. 2001. August.  B  Zhongguo yu daguo guanxi yuce (Forecast of Relations of China with Leading Countries). Xiandai guoji guanxi. Beijing. 2007. No 1. p.63.

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13  Russia and China: Consolidating the Strategic Partnership  /  269 principally important to emphasize that, first, such interaction cannot be achieved automatically, but, on the contrary, has to be realized through the constant purposeful efforts of both countries, and, secondly, it is quite natural that Russia and China have their own national interests which do not always coincide, including those in different regions of the world, which make the task of coordinating the policies of the two states on concrete matters far from simple. It seems that recently the Russian-Chinese interaction has been the most fruitful within the SCO framework. This can be explained by the profound interest of both Russia and China in the strategic stability in Central Asia in the face of the challenge presented by the threat of “colour revolutions” and the presence of the NATO military contingent in Afghanistan, and also by the operation of the effective mechanism of economic cooperation in SCO, and finally, by the socio-economic development of the Central Asian countries and their better relations with one another. China’s readiness to take into account the objective political realities and Russia’s special interests in the post-Soviet states of Central Asia is shown by the inclusion in the Joint Declaration of March 26, 2007, of the premise about the intention of the RF and the PRC “to contribute in every way possible to the broadening of the ties of SCO with the Eurasian Economic Community and the Collective Security Treaty Organization”, in which Russia plays the leading role. At the same time,the West and the Russian mass media continue to speculate about the allegedly inevitable exacerbation of the Russian-Chinese contradictions in Central Asia. In view of this, Russia and China should discuss the problems facing them in Central Asia, which are fraught with a conflict of interests. (Among them are the agreements on the deliveries of Turkmen gas to Russia and China. Does Turkmenistan indeed have enough gas resources to fulfil its obligations to both partners? Is the construction project of a gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to China technically feasible? Does China really need Turkmen gas? Finally, how should the two countries act to minimize the conflict of interests if it really arises?) Judging by certain formal aspects, the development of cooperation between

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270  /  Making New Partnership China, Russia and India proceeds quite successfully. In July 2006, the first tripartite summit meeting was held in St.Petersburg, close to the G-8 Summit, and in the early 2007 a new meeting of the ministers of foreign affairs of the three countries took place. However, concrete discussions and the drawing of conclusions from the same proceed slowly. Moreover, tensions emerge now and then in the tripartite relations. India reacts negatively to the construction of sea ports in Pakistan and Myanmar with Chinese assistance, as well as to China’s delivery of aircraft to Pakistan equipped with engines manufactured on a Russian license. In turn, China was displeased with the launching of “BraMos” missiles of joint Indian-Russian make. It expressed a negative reaction to an increase in the export customs duties on the iron ore exported from India to China, which is one of its main importers. The Chinese side also suspects that Russia is allegedly supplying (or intends to supply) more modern military hardware to India than to China. A In our view, closer cooperation and interaction in the tripartite format would make it possible to remove these and other obstacles and mutual suspicions. Apart from that, the broader Russian-Chinese-Indian interaction would make it less vulnerable to the corroding influence of the external forces and temporary factors. Russian-Chinese interaction in Northeast Asia is somewhat one-sided. Although the legitimate emphasis is laid on a solution of the situation around the nuclear programme of the People’s Democratic Republic of Korea (PDRK), it cannot compensate the actual absence of Russia and its Far Eastern part in the integration processes in the region which have good chances for fruitful development, following the improvement of Chinese-Japanese relations after Shindzo Abe came to head the government of Japan.  A  Negotiations between Hu Jintao and V.V. Putin, http://russian1.people.com. cn/31519/5523236.html. The Chairman of the PRC proposed “to carry on jointly innovation work in scietific-technical cooperation” and “become harmonious and friendly partners in humanitarian cooperation”. Hu Jintao’s proposals outlined in a compressed form, which were put forward as the common position of the two countries, are reflected in Paragraph 1 of the first section of the Joint Declaration of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China signed by President V.V.Putin and Chairman Hu Jintao on March 26, 2007, in Moscow.See: http://www.kremlin.ru/text/docs/2007/03/120807.shtml.

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13  Russia and China: Consolidating the Strategic Partnership  /  271 Naturally, Russia, which has until recently been rather indifferent toward regional integration, should make up for its loss. The new strategy and longterm purposeful Development Program of the Far East and Transbaikalia, which should be endorsed by the Government of the RF in 2007, envisage a considerable intensification of the interaction of the Russian Far East with its Northeast neighbours. Indicative in this respect is the proposal made by V.V. Putin to Hu Jingtao “to work out a plan of bilateral cooperation in the Far East and East Siberia” A, a development strategy which could be coordinated, as it was noted in the Joint Declaration of the RF and the PRC of March 26, 2007, with the revival of old industrial bases of Northeast China. Along with this, China could make its contribution to the creation of a more favourable atmosphere in the region for the realization of the integration potential of the Russian Far East. At first, the minister of foreign affairs of Russia could take part in the annual meetings of his colleagues from Japan, China and the Republic of Korea, as an experiment. The forms of the implementation of the strategic partnership relations between Russia and China at a global level should not remain unchangeable. On the contrary, they should react to the general changes of the international situation, as well as any progress in the foreign-policy concepts and practical course of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China. In our view, the task is to adapt the bilateral interaction at the global level to the more precise orientation of Russia to an independent foreign policy, on the one hand, and on the other, to the evident strengthening of the comprehensive power and international influence of China. One can see that China thoroughly analyses the trends of increasing toughness of Russian foreign policy and its growing determination to uphold its interests, including in its relations with the United States and in the postSoviet area. Yet, China avoids assessing these changes in an one sided manner.  A  Sometimes this premise is directly developed by the Russian mass media. In the article “Armed Friendship” by K. Lantratov published in “Kommersant guide” “Kitai”, it was stated that Russia “retains political restrictions on the deliveries of arms and military technology and equipment to China”. On the contrary, there are no such restrictions in cooperation with India, with which “there is not a single controversial question”.see “Kommersant guide”, No. 40, March 14, 2007, p. 35.

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272  /  Making New Partnership Indicative in this respect is rather unclear reaction of official Beijing to President Putin’s statement at the Munich conference on the questions of security on February 10, 2007. In reply to numerous requests of journalists to comment on the critical remarks of the President of Russia concerning the United States, Jiang Yu, a representative of the foreign ministry of China, confined herself to saying that all countries of the globe “should exert efforts jointly to create a harmonious world”. A The more detailed comment of the Xinhua News Agency entitled “In what direction do American-Russian relations develop?” pointed out that the American-Russian relations would not return to the time of the Cold War, and that in the relations between these two countries the spirit of cooperation would be preserved, although there would be certain tension. B Thus, China gave it to understand that it was not ready to side with Russia openly in its tension with the United States. Possibly, it is due to Beijing’s unwillingness to exacerbate its already difficult relations with the United States, and also its wish not to emphasize the international tendencies which do not fully coincide with the concept of a “harmonious world” put forward by the Chinese leadership. In this connection one cannot but notice the absence in the two latest Russian-Chinese high-level documents——the Joint declarations of the RF and PRC of March 21, 2006, and March 26, 2007——of a clear cut premise about the adherence of both countries to “the formation of a multi-polar world order”, which was contained, for example, in the Joint Russian-Chinese communiqué of July 3, 2005. The calls “to contribute to the collective principles and democratization of international relations” and “preserve the diversity of cultures and civilizations”, which are close in essence to the idea of a multi-polar world, are expressed in a milder tone, in our opinion. The above-mentioned analysis is not aimed at reproaching the Chinese side for its insufficient support of Russia in the conditions of a certain aggravation of its relations with the United States (there are simply no formal reasons for  A  Negotiations between Hu Jintao and V. Putin, http://russia1.people.com.cn/ 31519/5523236.html.  B  Representative of the Foreign Ministry of the PRC about V. Putin’s criticism of the United States, http://russian1.people.com.cn/31521/5398816.html.

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13  Russia and China: Consolidating the Strategic Partnership  /  273 this, because Russian-Chinese strategic partnership has no alliance character and is not directed against any third countries), it is only meant to emphasize the idea that both China and Russia should constantly watch their positions on the questions of strategic stability and bring them in line with changes in the international situation.

Ⅲ. Challenges to Russia-China Relations At present, changes in the international situation and the alignment of forces are largely connected with the growing influence and constant progress of China. The PRC now holds fourth place in the world in the annual GDP (about $2.7 trillion in 2006), third place in the foreign trade volume ($1760 billion), and has good prospects for further enhance its role in the world economy and trade. Although, from the point of view of international positions, certain Chinese experts modestly assess their country as a “regional power with a degree of global influence” A, its presence in new geographical zones and spheres of international politics is seen and felt more noticeably with every passing year. The question about the long-term prospects and possible consequences of China’s progress and the attitude to this phenomenon have caused heated discussion in the world recently, just as the choice of one or another version of political or economic reaction to it. Russia also takes part in these discussions, and, judging by the general tone of public opinion, a positive attitude to China prevails, and it is regarded as a present and future strategic partner, and a friend or ally of the RF. B This is why it is quite natural that the leadership of Russia and a considerable part of the intellectual section of Russian society regard dynamic and stable China as a serious factor of the development and solution of the socio-economic problems of the RF itself. It is important to emphasize that not only a considerable number of Russian  A  In what directions do American-Russian relations develop? http://russian.xinhuanet. com/russian/2007-04/24/content 420126.htm.  B  Zhongguo shi ge “daguo” ma (Is China a “great power”)? Shijie zhishi. Beijing.2007. No 1, pp.16-27.

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274  /  Making New Partnership sinologists, but also the forces of the left and right-liberal wings of the political spectrum, A approve the course aimed at the long-term joint development of the two countries. B At the same time, part of the Russian society is cautious, and sometimes displays a negative attitude to China getting stronger and more influential. It is largely due to a psychological discomfort felt by some people in Russia, which is caused by the great difference in the number of the population of the two countries (correlation 1:9) and the scope of the economy (GDP correlation about 1:3 and foreign trade volume 1:4); our neighbour China has only recently been behind us in all basic socio-economic parameters. Usually, such socioeconomic-psychological discomfort is not expressed openly, but camouflaged with calls to protect the national market and producers from the flood of Chinese commodities and demands to prevent Russia from turning into a resource-raw-material appendage of China. We think that the full-fledged mutually advantageous bilateral cooperation, with due account of the interests of the partner and a consistent work aimed at improving the image of China in Russia and the stable development of Russia itself, will make it possible to eliminate prejudices and delusions of this kind. However, this process will hardly be rapid because of the regular attempts of the quite influential prowestern forces in Russia to form a distorted and negative image of China among the Russian public, the development of which would allegedly mean “the  A  According to public opinion surveillance, carried out by VTsIOM in summer, 2005, 34 percent of the Russians polled characterized China as a strategic and economic partner, 22 percent as an ally or a friendly state. China was regarded as a rival by 24 percent and as a possible enemy by four percent. The same view on China will persist for a longer period. Politichesky zhurnal. Moscow. 2005, August 15, p. 67. For comparison’s sake: similar poll carried out by the Chinese sociological centre showed that in March 2006 Russia was regarded as a friend or ally by 11 percent, as a good neighbour by 38 percent and as a strategic partner by 42 percent of the Chinese polled. On the contrary, six percent spoke about rivalry between Russia and China and one percent about strategic confrontation. S. Kovalyov. The Year of Russia in China in the Mirror of Public Opinion.-Russia-China. 21st century. Moscow. 2007. No 3. pp.22-25.  B  See, for example: Kuzyk B.N., Titarenko M.L. China-Russia 2050: Codevelopment Strategy. Moscow. Institute of Economic Strategies. 2006. 656 pp; Russia and China: Cooperation in Conditions of Globalization. Moscow. IFES RAS. 2005. 400pp.

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13  Russia and China: Consolidating the Strategic Partnership  /  275 end of Russia as an independent world power” A. Quite a few new factors and trends have appeared in the RussianChinese trade and economic relations in recent years. Although the volume of bilateral trade turnover in 2006 grew, according to the Chinese customs statistics, to $33.386 billion, as against $29.103 billion in 2005, it should be noted that the growth rates of Russian-Chinese trade have noticeably diminished. In 2003-2005 its annual growth rates exceeded 30%, in 2006 they dropped to 14.7%. This figure is lower than the growth rates of China’s foreign trade turnover (23.8%) and those of Russia (29.2%), which shows a certain downfall in the partner’s share in the foreign trade of each country. The lower growth rates were also registered in Russian export (increment in 2006 was 10.5% as against 31% in 2005, and 24.7% in 2004), and import—— correspondingly 19.8% in 2006 as compared to 45.2% in 2005, and 51% in 2004. B Thus the task to increase the bilateral trade turnover in 2010 to $60 billion as a minimum (1.8 times greater than in 2006; the average annual increment in 2007-2010 should reach 13.8%) may seem quite difficult to reach. Definite defaults and discrepancies remain (even have increased) in the structure of mutual trade. In its export to Russia, China steadily increases the share of machines and equipment——from 8.2% in 2000 to 20% in 2005, and 29% in 2006, whereas in the Russian export to China the share of machines and equipment dropped from 28.7% in 2005 and 20.1% in 2002 to 1.2% in 2006, but the share of oil and oil products grew from 10.2% in 2001 to 53.9% in 2006 (the physical volume of oil deliveries from Russia to China comprised about 16 million tons, China’s total import of oil being 145.18

 A  See, for example: Lukin Alexander. Facing China. Russians Cannot Give Up Their Habit to Look Down Upon Their Neighbour. Kommersant. Moscow. 2006. November 9. p. 8. The essence of the problem is aptly expressed in the title of a book by well-known expert on China V.L. Larin, “In the Shadow of the Awakened Dragon” (Vladivostok. Dalnauka. 2006. 242pp.).  B  Tsygichko Vitaly. Foreword to the Russian edition. In the book: Menges Constantine. China: The gathering Threat. Moscow. Nezavisimaya gazeta Publishers. 2006. 608 pp. Here: p.20.

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276  /  Making New Partnership million tons). A However, Russia still intends to diversify the structure of bilateral trade by offering high-tech commodities to the Chinese market, primarily, machines, equipment and civil aviation technique. The Chinese side demonstrates its readiness to meet Russia halfway in this respect. According to Hu Jintao, an agreement has been reached on the setting up of Chinese-Russian chambers of trade in the sphere of machines and equipment trading. And according to V.V.Putin, in the course of the Russian-Chinese high-level negotiations in March 2007,questions of joint work in the sphere of high-tech, power production and engineering, including nuclear and aircraft industries were discussed. B The Russian side exhibits more and more samples of the latest civil aviation technique at the aircraft salon in Zhuhai, believing that they can well compete with “Boeings” and “Airbuses” dominating the Chinese market. In our view, positive shifts in the structure of Russian export to the PRC are quite possible, but it takes time and effort for improving the structure of Russian economy and foreign trade. Russian-Chinese cooperation in the sphere of extracting and transporting hydrocarbons is developing quite well. In 2006 the construction of the East Siberia-Pacific Ocean oil pipeline began which largely contributed to improving not only the trade and economic relations but also the general climate of Russian-Chinese relations. A thorough preparatory work is going on for the construction of a branch of the abovementioned oil pipeline from Skovorodino to China. The ecological substantiation of the Russian part of the future pipeline stretching for 70 kilometers to the Chinese border has been approved. In China, on the Mohe-Daqing branch of the pipeline stretching for 965 kilometers preparatory topographic work is going on. In view of the additional geological prospecting for oil in East Siberia and the Far East definitely lagging behind the planned target, apprehensions began  A  Data of Chinese and Russian customs statistics. See: Foreign Trade of Russia in 2006. Bulletin of Foreign Commercial Information (BIKI). Moscow. 2007. Febriary 20. p. 2; Special issue “China”. Rossiiskaya gazeta. Moscow. 2007. March 26. p. A4.  B  Haiguan Tongji (Customs Statistics). Beijing. 2006. No.12. pp. 27, 47-48, 69-70; Special issue “China”. Rossiiskaya gazeta. 2007. March 26. p. A12.

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13  Russia and China: Consolidating the Strategic Partnership  /  277 to be voiced that the East Siberia-Pacific Ocean pipeline would not reach the projected capacity of 50 and then 80 million tons of oil. However, the “Rosneft” Company declares that because of the exploitation of Vankor deposit, it will be able to ensure up to 50% of oil for the pipeline (the remaining quantity will be provided by the TNK-BP and “Surgutneftegaz” companies). A On the whole, the situation with the supply of oil for the future pipeline looks quite optimistic. More profound forms of cooperation between the oil companies of the two countries are implemented. “Rosneft” has set up, together with the Chinese company “Sinopec”, a joint company-operator “Venin Holding” for developing the Sakhalin-3 project, that is, the Venin deposit with reserves amounting to about 170 million tons of oil and 258 billion cubic meters of gas. B As to the natural gas deliveries from Russia to China, the situation is rather less definite, despite the signing of the agreements on the two routes of gas pipelines——from Sakhalin and via Altai. The latter, according to experts, may be fraught with a real ecological catastrophe. Besides, there is no clear view regarding the development of the gas consumption market in China, and regarding the price of gas acceptable to both sides. Differences persist in the price formation for electric energy supplies which are planned for a considerable increase——from 3.6--4.5 billion kw/h in 2008 to 60 billion kw/h in the future. C In our view, it is easier to reach agreement on the price of electric energy than gas, because China is especially interested in the former, which will make it possible to reduce the amount of oil to be purchased and to improve the ecological situation. Despite the overall successful development of Russian-Chinese cooperation in the fuel-and-energy sphere, it should be clearly realized that the two sides  A  China prepares for laying out a connecting branch oil pipeline within the framework of ESPO project, http://russian1.people.com.cn/31518/5380322.html.  B  “Rosneft” hopes for success in pipeline business. It is ready to provide oil for another section of ESPO (East Siberia-Pacific Ocean Pipeline). Kommersant. Moscow. 2007. April 21.  C  Experts believe that European price level at 280-300 dollars per 1000 cubic metres of gas is not acceptable to China. See: Grib N. Gas in exchange for time. The “Altai” gas pipeline may not start operating in 2011. Kommersant. Moscow. 2006. September 16.

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278  /  Making New Partnership are guided by their own interests, which do not fully coincide. In this context, attention should be drawn to the meeting of the ministers of energy of the world’s leading consumers of energy——China, India, Japan, the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the United States, held in Beijing at the end of 2006, which was oriented to searching for interaction in the reduction of the excessive dependence on the import of oil. A This meeting showed that the model of Russian-Chinese cooperation in the fuel-and-energy sphere needs constant corrections and improvement. Investment cooperation still lags behind the general level of the RussianChinese trade and economic cooperation. In 2006, investments from Russia comprised but 0.1% of the total volume of the foreign capital drawn by China, and the Chinese share in the total volume of foreign investments drawn by Russia amounted only to 0.9%. By the end of 2006 there were 730 projects in Russia with the participation of Chinese capital, the total volume of investments being $935 million. Russia has invested about $600 million in the Chinese economy.  B Meanwhile, certain positive shifts can be observed in this promising sphere. In November 2006,an agreement was signed on the mutual protection of investments. An intergovernmental working group has been set up for investment cooperation, which determined 29 priority projects of interaction in real estate and woodworking and chemical industries with a suggested total volume of Chinese investments of over $3 billion. C Production cooperation between the two countries has become more active. Several projects of assembling Chinese cars in Russia are underway. Cooperation in the bank sphere also is developing well, in which the Chinese State Development Bank and its Russian partners, Vneshekonombank and Vneshtorgbank play the leading role. Bilateral cooperation in developing new high-tech spheres has considerable prospects and needs improved financing (at least from the Russian side).  A  Drachevsky Leonid. Interview to “Interfax-China” News Agency. http://www.interfax. ru/r/B/exclusive/260.html?menu=8&id-issue=11680013.  B  http://russian1.people.com.cn/31521/5177559.html.  C  http://russian1.people.com.cn/31519/5498582.html.

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13  Russia and China: Consolidating the Strategic Partnership  /  279 Questions of the protection of intellectual property and the improvement of the mechanism of assessing and introducing technologies also need a more thorough elaboration. A Substantial movement is going on or is planned in such traditional spheres of bilateral cooperation as the deliveries of arms and round timber from Russia to China, and the import of Chinese consumer goods to Russia. After 15 years of the massive import of Russian arms and military equipment for the Chinese air force and Navy, China sharply reduced their purchases. During the 1992-2006 years period, Russia supplied China with arms and military equipment to the sum of $26 billion, from the total volume of Russian export of these commodities worth of $58.4 billion. The share of deliveries to China was reduced from 70% in the latter half of the 1990s to the expected level of 17%-20% percent in 2007. B Some experts regard this as the longterm curtailment of the import of arms from Russia by China. Others prefer to see this as a temporary measure caused by the need to master the arms and equipment acquired and determine the strategy of further technical equipment of the Chinese army. In our view, the volumes, priorities and suppliers of arms and equipment depend on many factors, and so far it is too early to anticipate the results of their influence on Beijing’s decisions in this matter. However, the great political and technical wealth and experience in the sphere of RussianChinese military-technical cooperation allow us to view its prospects quite optimistically. The export of round timber from Russia to China which was worth some $2 billion in recent years can diminish in the near future. The main reason for this is the elaboration and introduction of a complex of measures in Russia initiated by President V.V.Putin with a view to reducing the export of unprocessed  A  See: The PRC and RF are ready to increase cooperation in technical innovations, http:// russian1.people.com.cn/31517/4763521.ttml. According to Russian experts’ estimates, the potential of bilateral cooperation in the sphere of technical innovations amounts to three to five billion dollars. Within the framework of the national exhibition of the PRC in Moscow in March 2007 there was an “Exhibition of scientific-technical achievements and innovations of China”.  B  Gritskova A. and others. China put aside Russian arms. Military-technical cooperation slows down. Kommersant. Moscow. 2007. May 7.

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280  /  Making New Partnership wood and encouraging its processing on Russian territory. A decree of the government of the RF, which came into force in March 2007, envisages the annual 30% increase of customs duties on the export of unprocessed timber until 2010. A At the beginning of 2006 serious restrictions were introduced on the “shuttle” trade carried on by individual entrepreneurs. The tariff-free weight was reduced from 50 to 35 kilograms and the frequency of border crossings was fixed from once a week to once a month. The Russian law-enforcement and customs agencies now impose customs duties on consumer goods from China according to their real price, which dealt a blow at “shuttle” traders. China understood the timeliness of these measures and at the same time stated that there should be a certain transition period for properly regulating such trade. B The question of the temporary stay of working migrants from China in Russia is partly connected with this trade. At the beginning of 2007 the Russian legislation on immigration was revised, according to which foreign citizens were prohibited from carrying on trade operations on the Russian retail markets. Thus, part of the Chinese citizens engaged in this trade had to leave Russia. However, quite a few of these people stayed on in this country. In December 2006 three hundred Chinese citizens left the Khabarovsk Territory for home and in January 2007 there were 550 such people. Last January 117 Chinese illegal immigrants were expelled from the Khabarovsk Territory. C On the other hand, the revision of the legislation on immigration will not prevent the development of civilized forms of drawing foreign workforce, including Chinese citizens. It is no secret that the present-day images of Russia in China and of China in Russia in the mass consciousness of the two people are still based on the stereotypes and clichés of the past years (“great friendship” in the 1950s and confrontation in the 1960s-1970s), and also on the simplified definitions such  A  Sharipova A. Finland will quit Russian forest. Importers threaten Russia with problems connected with WTO due to higher export customs duties on timber. Kommersant. Moscow. 2007. March 19.  B  China’s deputy minister of trade called on Chinese businessmen in Russia to change economic methods and strive for long-term business. http://russian1.people.com. cn/31519/5432686.html. Priamurskiye vedomosti. Khabarovsk. 2007. February 27.  C 

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13  Russia and China: Consolidating the Strategic Partnership  /  281 as “China is Confucian” and “Russia is Orthodox Christian”; such perceptions could only prevent proper understanding and objective evaluation of the complex, multi-level specific features, aims and interests of both partners. In order to form a correct image of the respective country among the Chinese and Russian citizens, it is necessary to broaden and diversify the forms of mutual cooperation in the humanitarian sphere. The holding of the National Year of China in Russia and the National Year of Russia in China is a step in the right direction, which should be continued and developed. Summing up, we should note that the mutual relations of Russia and China are of great importance for both today and tomorrow. As strategic partners, China and Russia objectively contribute to the preservation and strengthening of the independent foreign-policy course of the two countries. Russia is one of the few countries displaying a tolerant attitude to the domestic political system of the People’s Republic of China and objectively contributes to the continuation of the path of social development chosen by China. The same is true of China’s attitude toward Russia. Russia is a major trade and economic partner of China helping it raise the level of its energy security and defense capacity. For Russia,the trade and economic ties with the PRC are the important alternative to the European direction and contribute to the great broadening of its economy. Being partners within the SCO framework, Russian and China help each other oppose national separatism, religious extremism and terrorism and fight drug trafficking, as well as preserve strategic stability in the critically important region of Central Asia. Being independent cultural-civilization areas of world importance, Russia and China are objective allies in ensuring the cultural-civilization diversity of the world and opposing any unification of the world community. The Russian-Chinese relations of strategic partnership have all objective grounds to broaden and develop on a long-term basis, provided the two countries exert constant and persistent efforts in this direction.

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14 Central Asian Countries and China: Managing the Transition Venera Galyamova  A

Introduction There is first a need to admit that the use of the term “transition” within the social sciences can be heavily laden with methodological assumptions now compounded further by the widening internationalism of research. Proceeding from an assumption of placing great significance on understanding transitional periods in social evolution, it is the concepts that were developed by Soviet academics during their apparent “stagnation” years that are supported and applied here as advanced and heuristic.  B According to these theories,the meaning of a “transition” or “transformation” cannot be understood without understanding the meaning of “formation”: transformation is the process of the formation of a new quality within society upon its transition from one step to  A  Venera Galyamova, Research Analyst for Center for Chinese Studies under the Institute of World Economy and Policy at the First Kazakhstan President Foundation.  B  To learn more about these concepts see: Evolution of Eastern Societies: Syntheses of Traditionalism and Modernity (an English translation is now available published in the USA); “Эволюция восточных обществ: синтез традиционного и современного”. М., “Наука”, 1984; Oleg Nepomnin, Menshikov, Synthesis in Traditional Society. China on the Verge of Epochs (Непомнин О.Е., Меньшиков В.Б. “Синтез в переходном обществе. Китай на грани эпох”. Москва, Восточная дитература, 1999, 334 с.); or the works of Nodar Simonia (Н.Симония), or Leonid Vasilyev (Л.Васильева).

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14  Central Asian Countries and China: Managing the Transition  /  283 another in its evolution. In this way the idea of transition is directly connected with the idea of a progression and replacement of stages (formations) during a society’s history. As a matter of principle,any society at any time in its history can be defined as transitional since it is continually being reinvented with new ideas moderated by old.“Progress”never stops, but it is argued that it is only the four stages A well-known by adepts of historical materialism that should be identified as universal stages in a society’s evolution. Thus it is argued that we cannot define “democratisation” in any of its senses as a form of transition. Transition is a very significant process; it is a social revolution providing a fundamental transformation of the principles through which a society and state function. If capitalism (probably in its different forms) is to be considered the last stage in a society’s evolution, B then the history of many societies reveals a transition to capitalism dragging on for over a century and Chinese and Central Asian C societies are amongst them. Witness to different political regimes, step by step they manage their transformation from traditionalism to modernity, but transition can still not be considered complete. Under the Russian Empire and then as part of the Soviet Union, Central Asian countries successfully made a big part of their transformation. Though the industrialisation and modernisation of Central Asia’s traditional and patrimonial societies can certainly not be considered painless, Russia’s influence across Central Asia should not be considered in a purely negative light. Russia’s predominance in the history of the region allowed for newly independent Central Asian states to greet their contemporary world with a semblance of industrialised countries. Many today forget about that role, and should perhaps consider Afghan society if they are to understand how Central Asia may have developed without its longterm Russian influence.  A  With contemporary debate continuing on any further stages, no fifth stage has been mentioned.  B  Any big reasons to reject Francis Fukuyama’s theory on evolution and modernisation, that human societies end up with any form of bourgeois democracy, are not found yet.  C  The Central Asian region comprises of five post-Soviet republics——Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Though there is no unique approach to the issue: “Big Central Asia” as American politicians have defined, also includes Afghanistan.

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284  /  Making New Partnership As for China’s transition, it has to be considered that despite modifications beginning in the late 19th century, an exceptionally efficient and solid traditional social system has maintained its potential throughout the last century. It is argued that the new forms that have been implemented in China since the late 19th century did not significantly change the essence of social relationships, and they have continued to remain traditional until very recently. A It is only since the “Policy of Openness and Reform” that the traditional social system has finally fractured, with new elements customised into Chinese society, allowing change from within pushing transition forward. It is the end of the 20th century therefore that can be considered to have brought in a new wave of transformation both in Central Asia and China. By this time (Chinese by the late 1970s with new policies, Central Asian in the early 1990s with independence) our societies finally realised the necessity of transition from a continuing semi-traditional condition to a new system including a market economy and democracy in its politics. What is important in terms of our subject is to understand the adoption of such characteristics as a part of the larger process of the formation of a new social system. Within this new system, and particularly an eastern one, market economies and democratic mechanisms will exist with their own particular features: they are the results of and not the mechanisms for modernisation. Such characteristics will develop in relation to a specific cultural diversity, every piece of which deserves to be researched and learned. In starting to manage their transition, China and the new independent countries of Central Asia face problems and challenges that are similar in many ways. Sharing and exchanging particular transit experiences can be of little use due to the specific context of every single society. Experiences can still be compared however in the most general of senses. For instance,it can be noted that in both China and Central Asia it is accepted that the key instruments in social transformation are held by the state and not by society. “A strong state”  A  It is known that Chiang Kai-Shek was approving the development of economic theory in China in Zhou time. According to Mr. Chiang Kai-Shek, since then within longer than two thousand years that theory had been remaining the only scientific basis to manage Chinese society.

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14  Central Asian Countries and China: Managing the Transition  /  285 and “a weak society” can be considered as one of the basic peculiarities of an Eastern type of society. A The postulate about “delaying political reforms” is one of the consequences of that peculiarity, appearing to be adopted in varied societies from Japan across to Turkmenistan. Nevertheless it can also be noted that “one of the problems of the transitional period in (Central Asian) countries is the different interpretations of what a ‘strong state’ is and what should be the basis of that state and its power” B. In China the postulate about the primary importance of economic reforms and the secondary importance of political ones appears to work well too. But transit is never easy in Central Asia. First there was civil war in Tajikistan in the early 1990s, and at present it is Kyrgyzstan where state power appears vulnerable after the overthrow of the legitimate president Askar Akayev. C Most of the Central Asian states struggle to become superpresidential republics. It can be questioned which precisely of the Central Asian states are examples of strong states and which are examples where the strength of the state has been lost. It is suggested that no state has succeeded in allowing for economic reforms whilst maintaining easy-going state power. Fight for political power is not considered as a necessity in political life in Central Asian republics meantime, and actually as a rule fight for political power goes at the expense of economic progress. The current economic and political climate in Central Asian countries and in China remains intense not only through inner transition processes but due to global trends as well. There is much to do to complete the transition and  A  “When people are weak, the State is strong; when the State is strong, people are weak. That is why a fair State aspires to weaken its people”. Book of the Shang region Governor, Moscow, 1968, p.219.  B  Alikhan Baimenov, “Peculiarities of Political Transit in Eurasia” (Байменов А.М. Особенности политического транзита в Евразии. // Статья опубликована в сборнике материалов международной научной конференции [Опыт демократических реформ на евразийском пространстве: сравнительные модели и практические механизмы]-Алматы: Казахстанский институт стратегических исследований при Президенте РК, 28 сентября 2006 г. или на сайте http://www.kisi. kz/site.html?id=4378).  C  Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan can both be characterised as small territories covering broken terrain with small regions separated by clan and ethnicity (as well as frequent abject poverty).

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286  /  Making New Partnership formation of efficient systems of states and societies in China and Central Asia. Modernisation from within will inevitably be accompanied and complemented by a parallel process of modernisation in the role that states play within a global community. From this arises another important consideration: the transition in foreign policy and geopolitics and it is this that is the main focus of discussion in this chapter. It is not surprising to find that Central Asia is becoming an area of intense economic and political interest worldwide. It can be considered for its part in a renaissance in Islam, or as an area often criticised by the West for authoritarianism and the abuse of human rights and freedoms. It is seen as a potential area for small but influential extremist movements, or as a place of political tension and “coloured revolutions”. It is still only gradually opening up to the rest of the world and yet is an area with huge opportunities for investing in the extraction and export of hydrocarbons, minerals and other primary resources. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, new military strategic alliances have also become available to the rest of the world. Above all this fight for influence in the region has left Central Asia known as the areas of a new great game. The power vacuum left after the sudden collapse of the Soviet Union necessitated a readiness amongst the newly formed Central Asian states for international cooperation. Such a vacuum,however,meant that many in the international community had little desire to reciprocate such ideals. It would be enough to have only one of the following, but the fact that the geopolitical location makes Central Asian countries strategically important for the world community’s dealings with Russia and China, as well as the fact that the possession of rich oil and gas resources makes Central Asia of interest to industrialised nations as a strategic area for diversifying their hydrocarbons supply, defines how the Central Asian region has treated by the international community. Geopolitical competition has become a factor directly affecting the internal evolution of the countries, creating both advantages and risks in its influence. It is suggested that a paradoxical situation is created by the interests of so many powers: All involved are eager to contribute in international cooperation and the opening and development of Central Asia, yet in fighting to exclude the rest of the competitors from the region, opening and development have been

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14  Central Asian Countries and China: Managing the Transition  /  287 stifled. Unfortunately,this fight is perhaps unavoidable as long as the great powers find Central Asia an area of their strategic interest. The existence of those interests makes Central Asia a “battle field”for outside interests and they will continue to affect the transition process. China is not outside the influence of such interests. Though in the “great Central Asian game”China acts as a player, in the long term it is inevitably an object of geopolitical transformation itself, managing its own transition whilst acting and finding its place within a global community. China however risks less in competing with such influences, and with the exception of the Taiwan issue, is far less dependent on the influence of outside interests than any of the Central Asian states. From its position in the world community as an “outcast” country in the 1970s, China is becoming a new great power. Unsurprisingly, some in the West consider even recent changes in the People’s Republic of China as “providing bigger consequences than Iraq or terrorism”  A. China’s new diplomacy  B presupposes the country’s new role in dealing with neighbours, participating in regional security systems and economical alliances. For Central Asian countries, their answer to the geopolitical challenge was a multivectoral foreign policy; trying to manoeuvre between different powers without giving preferences to any of them, solving Central Asia’s problems with the help of different interests C. It is suggested here that this policy was an attempt to suspend transit geopolitical processes which appeared to be happening too fast or with too little control; avoiding influence from outside interests becoming too well established within a country. At present,however,the situation is changing, as multivectoral foreign policy has become too successful: ceasing to allow further progress within countries. On the basis of the transformation of regional powers structures China  A  Muazzam Gill,“Outside View: China’s Asian Muscle”,The Washington Times, November 10, 2004.  B  Evan S. Medeiros and M. Taylor Fravel, “China’s New Diplomacy”,Foreign Affairs, November/December 2003. pp. 22-35.  C  As a basic principle of foreign policy,“multidirectionality” (мультивекторная политика) was firstly officially declared in president Nursultan Nazarbayev’s strategy for Kazakhstan’s long-term development “Kazakhstan——2030” in 1997. At the moment all Central Asian republics except Turkmenistan follow similar diplomatic lines of diversification.

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288  /  Making New Partnership and Central Asia appear to be being drawn together tightly in a common transformation. The security and development of the region lies in the planning of vital common interests. It is believed that the current transition in the geopolitical configuration in Central Asia will lead to significant changes not only for the individual countries themselves but for the region as a whole and moreover will affect the global distribution power. In context of this current geopolitical transition, Central Asian states of course consider their prospects of developing as independent countries. For China, however, the transition is similarly important as part of a planned development strategy for its society and state. Central Asia is apparently the only neighbouring region for China understood to be so strongly linked with its prospects. Already intimate commercial ties with South and Southeast Asia hardly allow for relations between China and the regions to deteriorate even if such incidents occurred,there are many mechanisms with which to repair any damage. For Central Asia,however, relations are not established and any hypothetical cooling could provide farreaching consequences.

Ⅰ. Overview of Central Asia-China Relations The present relationship between Central Asian countries and China can be regarded in a general point of view from the context of the regional situation that has always been of influence. Firstly,a main platform for systematic contacts of party officials has been disputes over border areas. Three Central Asian countries have common borders with the PRC (Kazakhstan—1740 km, Kyrgyzstan—963 km, Tajikistan—500 km), and areas along all these borders have been disputed during and even before the Soviet era. Secondly,following the end of the Soviet era, the dearth of consumer goods in Central Asia allowed for a spontaneous boom in trade with China. Thirdly, relations were developed through the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (the SCO); originating from the presence of a perceived threat of terrorism in the region, arising from a continuing power vacuum and a region of poorly institutionalised economic and political space. This “Shanghai dialogue” has made the SCO the most efficient international organisation in the region. This background has had crucial significance for

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14  Central Asian Countries and China: Managing the Transition  /  289 contemporary multilateral partnerships with China. By the late 19 th century the Russian and British Empires were trying to disentangle themselves from the long-playing intrigue of Central Asian geopolitics——the so-called “web of Eurasia”. Ending this “final round” of the great game a relatively stable geopolitical configuration settled across the region. However, it appears that the sole reputation of a post-Soviet Russia has not been enough to sustain that configuration and with the fall of the “iron-curtain” in the last decade of the 20th century the region has become out of balance with the configuration facing radical changes. At the end of the 19th century with China divided into zones of influence for different powers, it had to reconcile itself to the fact that its province of Xinjiang was involved in the great Central Asian game of Moscow and London. After some strong-willed action on the part of China’s government, as well as some portion of political “good fortune”, China managed to move the game field line away from Xinjiang and out its territory. We can see attempts to draw Xinjiang back on to the field of play through the assistance that was rendered by certain parties to the “separatist movement of Uigur nationalists” in the 1990s. Such attempts failed, and China returned to the Central Asian region by the beginning of the 21st century no longer as an object to be claimed by outsiders, but rather as a self-confident geopolitical player itself. Its experience and familiarity with the region and even more significantly its strong focus on developing strategies for foreign policy gives China an important advantage over many its rivals in developing its influence. Russia may have more experience than any; however,China is free of many political legacies that Russia inevitably faces in the region. With the noted exception of concerns regarding China’s demography, China can be perceived as the most sensible and efficient power to be of influence in Central Asia. However, within recent years the available conditions have not really been that easy for China to maintain a course of active cooperation with Central Asia. In particular there has been one large obstacle that China has had to deal with: a wide-spread“phobia”prevalent in both the elite and the population as a whole. It has to be considered that this phobia has not solely arisen internally but has been “nurtured” from outside by those who do not want to see a growing Chinese

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290  /  Making New Partnership influence in Central Asia. It is suggested that such a phobia had been quite powerful in Central Asian societies, especially in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. In fact,every successful business-action of Chinese companies in the region appears to provide material for a series of “Chinese Expansionism” publications in local mass media. Perhaps such attitudes are softening lately,however, both amongst the general population and particularly amongst the elite. This should not be surprising: it is difficult to resist a healthy intention to cooperate, particularly if you do not have any equivalent strategy for the region that can complement and correspond to the region’s interests as much as China’s strategy for a “secure and wealthy neighbourhood”. In a press conference in Beijing on May 30, 2006, Mr. Hu Jintao, President of the PRC, said that “Within the last few years our relationship with (Central Asian countries) has undergone a process of severe examination in conjunction with other changes in international relations. Our connections are growing and becoming tighter”  A. The “conjunction with other changes in international relations” refers to some arguably less than sensible policies of certain outside powers toward Central Asia that have led to undesirable consequences for the regional inhabitants. Perhaps one of the most undesirable actions was placing foreign military bases in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. It becomes routine for mass media and indeed for academics to write about “the great geopolitical game” of Central Asia. But what is perhaps remarkable is that most define the boundaries of such a game as a question of the competition for natural resources. It is suggested here that such an approach is in fact misleading observers and that the diversity of natural resources in the region is only one part of strategic interest. The impulsive cause for the activity of powers across the globe is to prepare for the new challenges of globalisation through participating in international regionalisation. Globalisation should not be perceived as a universal process advancing through a “swallowing of countries”; binding them to greater powers through transnational ties. One of the forms of globalisation is “regionalisation” or “regional integration”. We witness integration in different regions of the world and every case is of course as specific as every region is, however, the EU and ASEAN are probably the brightest examples. Thus  A  Interfax Agency.

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14  Central Asian Countries and China: Managing the Transition  /  291 regionalisation is not the opposite of globalisation but an integral part of it A . Thus the main outcome of the regional geopolitical transformation that we are all witnessing at the moment in Central Asia is expected to be new international regionalisation. At present,the international regionalisation in Central Asia is expected to be the process of creating and deepening new systematic connections between countries of the region and one (or several) outside powers. The region could develop several different close partnerships in different spheres, for example,Russia in energy, China in commerce and NATO in its military security. However,since to keep a triangular or even quadrate of different interests balanced is rather difficult to say the least, a multi-centred regionalisation in Central Asia is not the most likely scenario. It is suggested here that Central Asia is about to turn into a new regional body with an international structure unified around one powerful centre with common economical, political and security interests. In fact the focus for modern Central Asia should be the formation of a new region with new relationships and with a new (or renewed) leader B. It is argued that the crucial condition for a successful regionalisation is for the leader or leading country to be strategically powerful enough to maintain a sustainable development of all participants without being easily threatened by challenges to security. Both Central Asia and this leading power will benefit from such cooperation. At present,however it appears that most of outside powers continue to involve themselves in the affairs of Central Asian countries only to persuade them to “face the right direction”. Investment strategies are still mostly used as sticks and carrots: instruments to help achieve these main goals. The notorious great game continues and it is a game for the leadership of the Central Asian region. Whether from the outset of independence or more recently it can be argued that all Central Asian countries have started moving in the expecting direction and have geared themselves towards their favoured potential regional leader. Regionalisation is certainly gathering pace and geopolitical transition is soon to  A  Салицкий А., Салыкова А. Экономическая регионализация и проблемы ШОС (тезисы) , ШОС: становление и перспективы развития. Алматы, ИМЭП, 2005.с. 93.  B  Buzan, Barry and Ole Wæver, Regions and Powers: the Structure of International Security, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003. p.564.

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292  /  Making New Partnership occur A. There is no choice for Central Asia but regionalisation; however,who leads such a region can to some extent be chosen. So far Russia and China have the best prospects in order to lead the new international regionalisation of Central Asia. A number of large infrastructure projects (pipelines, transportation links…) now promote Central Asia, championing and encouraging a new regionalisation. China and Kazakhstan are developing a completely new medium for commercial and economical cooperation through the China-Kazakhstan International Centre for Border Trade at the old crossing of Khorgos. Opened in 2006, after 5 years of preparation work, this trade centre and free trade zone on the border clearly complements the concept of regionalisation. As such new developments continue, there has so far been little questioning of the sincerity of appeals by Chinese rulers that China has no desire to achieve hegemony in the region. As contemporary China is wholly concerned about its own economic development, there is little concern that it has major interests in participating destructively in the internal affairs of the region to widen the territory under its geopolitical influence. At the same time it cannot be passive of circumstances and developments existing in Central Asia and must be wary of losing out to competitors who will be less than sympathetic in dealing with China’s own needs in the Central Asian region. Central Asia may at the moment be comprised of five countries that share many natural, social and cultural characteristic. Integrated into the Soviet Union as a whole, the republics remain mutually dependent on one another in terms of  A  There are some academics who take a similar approach to the issue, for example,Murat Laumulin: “There is a thought being stated in some geo-economical circles recently, a thought about Central Asia becoming a part of a new economical and geopolitical order that is forming in Eurasia. This process is characterized by widening markets reaching into Southeast Asia, China, Korea, India, Turkey, and Russia, and a slowing down (or even a stagnation) of economic development in Europe that was previously an orienteer for most of the post-Soviet countries following Russia at their head. If integration projects with Russia and Central Asia succeed, and there is a reinforcement of an ‘Asian paradigm’ with the strengthening of Eurasian economic independence, there can be far reaching consequences”. Лаумулин М. ШОС, “грандиозный геополитический блеф”? Взгляд из Казахстана,Июль 2006. Russie.Nei.Visions.#12. Материал на вэбсайте, www.ifri.org.

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14  Central Asian Countries and China: Managing the Transition  /  293 water, energy and other resources. As newly independent states however, there existed a desire for autonomy and a desire to reduce interdependency. This is one of the reasons why multilateral cooperation through the SCO in commercial and economic spheres can still struggle to truly move forward. Even ignoring the regional energy reserves, during the early 1990s it was clear that the combined economic potential of Central Asian countries was strong and that a new post-Soviet format of cooperation could be implemented based on the principle of a common market. All the necessary preconditions for such a market were clearly in place following the experience of joint economic activities during the Soviet era and only few adjustments were needed in adapting to the new conditions. Unfortunately however,destructive trends came to the forefront. Individual republics did face their own problems after becoming independent, but in particular the emphasis of the period now summarised as the time of the “sovereignty parades” created internal barriers for any hope of regional cooperation. Since the creation of these barriers, each republic has been struggling individually to develop its own future and build up relations with other foreign countries. At this point in time Central Asian countries have now achieved different results, diverging in the characteristics of their economic systems. This diversity has become a huge obstacle for trade, for the growth of financial services and for the movement of labour. This has effected both regional growth and the possibilities of cooperation with neighbouring countries like China. Why has integration not worked in Central Asia even though it was clearly announced as a common goal since the early 1990s? Why is there now the need to widen the meaning of “the Central Asian region” to include a new external regional power, and what is the role that China will play in this region? It is perceived here that the current situation in Central Asia has been wholly shaped by a changing world order. After the difficult period of independence the new Central Asian republics soon found themselves also facing the challenges of globalisation and facing new rules in international relations. And although by all criteria the republics already had the formation of a self-sufficient region, they were deprived of this historical chance for valuable regional integration by the distractions of globalisation. Instead of completing the steps necessary for nation building inside their countries, leaders found themselves caught up in

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294  /  Making New Partnership the dealings of other global concerns. Despite the fact that regional integration has been deemed a priority on the agendas of all sensible politicians in Central Asian republics, 15 years after independence there is little such progress to show with the countries of the region probably never so far apart from each other as they are now. Taking this current situation into account, it unfortunately has to be confessed that the historical opportunity for the Central Asian region to develop independently has been missed and the future of Central Asian politics now requires an active interest from external powers. If the consolidating trends of globalisation are the reality of today, regionalisation in Central Asia will be only accomplished through a “Chinese”,“Russian”,“Western”or“South-Asian” scenario, and it is suggested here that it is China that presently demonstrates the most sophisticated and adequate strategy in its policy towards the region. In 2006, the 15th anniversary of diplomatic relations between China and Central Asian countries was celebrated. In terms of world history this may appear an insignificant period, however,for the newly independent states it was an epoch where a huge amount of work has been achieved in developing new Sinologists and Ministries of Foreign affairs that had to be created from practically nothing. In developing relations with China it has to be remembered that in Soviet times there was only one institute in whole Central Asian region situated in Tashkent (Uzbekistan) that was preparing Sinologists and other Orientalists. The newly created republic of Kazakhstan had some fortune with its personal, as a promising young diplomat Kasymzhomart Tokayev working for the soviet MFA in Moscow found himself working in the Embassy in Beijing in the very last years of the USSR. Afterwards he became Minister of foreign affairs for the Republic and has since been able to influence Kazakhstan’s perception of China. As with the other republics, there are many older Kazakh citizens whose life has been dominated by the Soviet era and it is still too difficult for them to accept a partnership with China, when until recently they had only known all spheres of their country’s life under Russian influence. A new generation of people is growing up in Central Asia however for whom relations with China can seem absolutely normal, in fact sometimes probably more normal than to see the remaining influences of Russia. Today China is one of the most important partners of region’s countries

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14  Central Asian Countries and China: Managing the Transition  /  295 both in terms of economy and of security. In discussion with Chinese social and political circles in Beijing in 2006, Mr. Kasymzhomart Tokayev (see above) said that “China is our strategic partner with whom we conduct complex, mutual beneficial cooperation and intense political dialogue. We take the fact that we managed to build up trustful and predictable relationships with the PRC as one of our biggest achievements in the policy of an independent Kazakhstan” A. In regard to Kazakh-Chinese relationships in his annual appeal to people of Kazakhstan in 2006, president Nursultan Nazarbaev remarked on the potential role for China in the region quite clearly: “In terms of economical and political cooperation for Kazakhstan there is no alternatives than mutual beneficial links with China.” B Within 15 years Central Asian countries and China have achieved really remarkable progress in dealing with each other. Border issues have been solved and China has become an important element of regional security system. Beijing has demonstrated that it can be considered as one of the most reliable partners of the states of Central Asia in maintaining their political security. Cooperation through the framework of the SCO is finally proceeding with cooperation going so well as to cause confusion amongst Western observers. In 2006 construction of the first ever oil pipeline into China was built from Kazakhstan. Further projects in transportation infrastructure and pipelines are also progressing well. Evidentially both China and Central Asian countries are now showing their readiness to move on to the next stage of cooperation. A turning-point in the relationship of China and Central Asian countries was perhaps caused in reaction to the events of 2001-2002. At this time cooperation with US and NATO in “counter-terror” strategies strengthened the interests of Western powers with security policies in Central Asian countries supporting stronger Western ties. There was soon call for a withdrawal of the growing Western military presence in the region however, and policies were developed with a desire to look elsewhere for security. The strategies and policies of these new Western partners were apparently not convincing enough, leading to an increased interest in other directions such a China.  A  News agency, April 13, 2006.  B  The text of the Appeal on the web-site, www. akorda. kz.

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296  /  Making New Partnership It is significant that Central Asia has developed a well fortified place for China’s foreign policy. It is no simple coincidence that in 2003 President Hu Jintao began his first foreign journey as a leader of China by visiting Kazakhstan. Importantly, current cooperation with China is primarily economic and commercial, with the role of political dialogue being to maintain such development. This is a reversal of the situation only a few years ago when economic and commercial concerns were secondary; surviving largely through independent free enterprise. Basic security problems related to border issues and separatist movements were still the concern of governments on both sides, and providing adequate safeguards for such matters left the governments of both sides with a perception that it was secondary or premature to be establishing proper economic relations. Today following a declaration in 2005, Kazakhstan and China are strategic partners. Kyrgyzstan has signed a treaty with China on “Good-Neighbourly Friendship and Cooperation” and has recently started a 10-year Cooperation Program. Since 2005 Uzbekistan-China relations have progressed under the Agreement on Friendship and Cooperative Partnership. In 2007 Tajikistan and China also signed “Good-Neighbourly Friendship” treaty. Finally, the most closed country of the region Turkmenistan now cooperates with China almost as closely as with Russia. Chinese companies are active in the country’s gas fields and a gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to China has been agreed. What importantly distinguishes these recent treaties from those signed in the early 1990s is that diplomatic rhetoric is no longer separated from actual practice.

Ⅱ. Central Asian Views on a Rising China The huge complex potential of contemporary China is now established and is readily being demonstrated. In observing such significant development, neighbouring countries inevitably harbour hard to hide fears. All Asian countries face a deepening economical integration with China and expect new radical changes in its regional policy to complement this integration. However, the large scale changes that have happened in China during last 25 years leave Central Asian countries in a more ambiguous situation than most. On the one hand, deeper cooperation with China appears to correspond with the region’s

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14  Central Asian Countries and China: Managing the Transition  /  297 interests and to have China as a neighbour may be geopolitically fortunate. As an increasingly powerful international authority, it may be quite a comfort to be able to develop under the aegis of a China that can act as a counterbalance to the power of the USA. On the other hand, Central Asian counties greatly lack experience in dealing with China. Official relations between China and Central Asian countries were completely interrupted after the creation of the Soviet Union, leaving all forms of communication between China and the region existent only in as much as any dialogue via Moscow. Finally as China’s neighbours, Central Asian countries must also consider China’s demography, with the continuing expansion of its population into the Russian Far East a cause for concern. There are two main perceptions of China in Central Asian countries today. There are concerns and fears with the unprecedented rise of their large eastern neighbour. Fears are compounded by a comprehension of the current weakness of Central Asian states and the unavoidable necessity of involvement with China as an economic power. This negative perception of China is supported by local traditional views. China has no role in the local historical memories of peoples, and such prejudice is evident in the local mass media, where fears over China’s international, economic and demographic changes are if anything encouraged. The other perception of China however arises from the realisation that cooperation with a successful China will be beneficial (profitable), and so a rising China will mean further benefits for its neighbours. These views are no longer just shared by a growing body of Central Asian businessmen emerging as a middle class, but are also shared by some in the more powerful class of ruling elites. It is suggested that fears over China dominate perceptions in Kyrgyzstan. This is due firstly to the country’s clear economic weakness, but as an “island of democracy” in Central Asia with many NGOs sponsored by foreign foundations in the country, it is perhaps also due to influence from many external interests. Concerns over and ratification of national borders was also far more prolonged in Kyrgyzstan compared to other Central Asian countries. Following its economic breakaway from the rest of the region, it is argued that a far more positive perception of China is growing in Kazakhstan. With strong economic

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298  /  Making New Partnership achievements and a growing self-confidence, Kazakhstan took changes in China’s foreign policy announced by the 16th National Congress of the Communist Party of the PRC in 2002 as sign of growing benefit for China’s neighbours A. Perhaps differences in the perception of China across Central Asia can be expressed through the observation of a well-known strategist from Tajikistan: “In seeing the current positive changes in relations between Tajikistan and China, some local experts have become alarmed that China’s influence in our republic is getting stronger, and is becoming a significant danger. Some of them highlight the issue of a closer relationship with China harming Tajikistan’s relationship with Russia. This is a completely wrong approach to the issue with the matter being that China predominantly finances areas of the Tajik economic that Russia has not even shown interest to look into.” B In Central Asia, China is seen to be emerging as a new world superpower. This is understood not just from an economic perspective, but also in terms of politics and security. The growing interest in “the dragon’s rise” is of course not just observed in Central Asia, and perceptions of China are also changing throughout the world. With China’s economic potential, discussion has moved beyond talk of any collapse of a Chinese social-economic model, and now rather focuses on analysing its perceived strengths and weaknesses. The now irreversible opening up to the rest of the world provides a certain level of stability in the Chinese economy with its interdependence on international economic institutions. However, as its economic processes become further enmeshed in the global market, the question remains open as to how much China may itself become vulnerable to the manipulation of the market and its regulators by the US or EU. China’s economic rise itself was never the main concern for Washington and other global powers. Western strategists used to discuss China’s emergence in  A  Liu Huaqiu,“Gong tong tuijin shijie heping yu fazhan de gao shiye”,Shi liu da baogao fudao duben, 2002. p. 374. Saifullo Safarov from centre for strategic studies under the president of the Republic  B  of Tajikistan (Сафаров С. Эксперт Центра стратегических исследований при Президенте Таджикистана. Итоги визита Эмомали Рахмонова в Китай), http:// www.eurasianhome.org/xml/t/expert.xml?lang=ru&nic=expert&pid=937&qmonth=0 &qyear=0.

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14  Central Asian Countries and China: Managing the Transition  /  299 the context of specific risks; of technological and military advances, its attitude towards Taiwan or its dealings with North Korea. Accordingly the counteractions prepared tended to be rather traditional, with talk of “checks and balances” and international obligations. With the new millennium,however, China has been treated by The West and Russia in different context as a more direct global challenge with a number of risks and threats. Yet amongst them economic risks have continued to play only a minor part. It is interesting to compare the case of China with that of another promising pretender to the rank of superpower: India. In contrast to China, the growing influence of India in global affairs does not appear to cause large concern. Though possessing rather similar socialeconomic and demographic features, the rest of the world’s perception of their potential for geopolitical power differs significantly. It is supposed that in emerging as economic superpowers, these two countries will play different roles on the global political stage. There appears to be an expectation that due to its specific political system, China could become an aggressive and threatening world player. In maintaining dialogue with Western interests, the perception of China amongst Central Asian elites will surely be influenced and shaped indirectly or directly by such views. For the rulers of Central Asia, it may also be apparent that with China they face a country on a potently nationalistic rise A. Many recent political decisions in China have been made in the context of the “rebirth of great China” B. That slogan represents a core idea of national ideology. It is not by accident that China has become one of the most active participants in any international event (the Olympics are of course no exception) where the prestige of China can be triumphed. China’s gradual rise in power can be expected to continue for at least the next 15 years. During that period many crises are of  A  “The Chinese people today have reached that level of nationalistic self-consciousness where practically everyone realises——we need to go on”. Interview with former Ambassador of USSR for China, V.Fedotov, “China will not seek for hegemony” (《Сегодня китайцы находятся на такой стадии национального самосознания, когда практически все понимают: надо идти вперед》), Zavtra. No. 12, 21.03. 2006 or on the web-site: http://www.centrasia.ru/newsA.php4? st=1143262380.  B  Speech of Jiang Zemin at the Sixteenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China in 2002.

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300  /  Making New Partnership course possible, but it is suggested that the sense of national identity will be a powerful force in countering any problems with Chinese society. It can be argued that the current world political climate leaves little opportunity for any concerned powers to attempt to forestall any continued growth in the rise of China. Any realistic opportunity to do so (whatever that may be) is soon to be countered anyhow by the very growth in China’s power. In general there is confidence that China will increase its economic influence throughout the corners of the planet, gaining further political influence in its foreign affairs. These changes in China will influence neighbouring countries first, and evidence of beneficial changes in the economic, political and humanitarian aspects of its neighbouring countries will be one of the best indicators of its own strength. The fact that in 2005 China accounted for 13% of the world’s economic growth (and the USA 2%) is not evidence enough for its emergence as a superpower. It is only when it has created its own area of influence in surrounding regions that its new status will be recognised. This does not mean that China should become a hegemony, but rather that its influence in surrounding regions will provide it with favourable surroundings for mutual development. In creating vital commercial and security links with its neighbours, China has to be involved in international competition. As a region,Central Asia has been included in China’s zone of strategic interests, and within recent years this has started to be seen as a message to its geopolitical competitors. The role of Central Asia in China’s strategic policies needs to be researched carefully by Central Asian countries. The intention should be not only to use China as a counter balance to various external risks and threats to the region, but to create a strategy for the development of the region that can in return further stimulate the development of China’s policies to the region. In Central Asian countries, there is an understanding that to realise its plans for the region in the coming years China intends to: ● contribute to stability ● prevent any strengthening of the existing influence of other powers including that of NATO ● develop an efficient model of economic cooperation both with China and amongst the regional countries

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14  Central Asian Countries and China: Managing the Transition  /  301 ● continue to consolidate security systems predominately through the mechanism of the SCO ● promote humanitarian contact with the regional countries But with any renewed foreign policy of China there is one particular difficulty for observers: its unpredictability. Despite a stable format for succession in policies from one leader to the next, modern China is still a new player in global and regional affairs. The country continues to adapt and “modernise”, leaving its policies rather flexible. Both Russia and the USA, who have signed agreements of strategic partnership with China, are not immune from the question of “what to expect from the PRC”. The view therefore of China in Central Asian countries is determined by the changing role of China at both regional and global scales and by its renewed strategies in its foreign policy. For instance,in Kazakhstan it is considered that China’s strategy in the international arena has now changed and become more assertive: in the economic sphere there has been a shift in policy from one of “openness and interaction” with world economy to a more proactive policy of integration with the global market;in its foreign policy,a shift has been seen from the“promoting of international conditions for reforms and development” to the more assertive role of creating a new architecture for international security A. Although there may be no direct threats posed by China towards the regional republics, a comparison of some basic parameters in the development China and Central Asia reveals contrasts that may be considered unbalanced, with a potential for conflict if the region develops a dependency upon China. The increasingly disproportionate development of the two both in terms of the quality of development as well as in terms of the quantity of development in China must add to any existing tension between areas. It  A  Konstantin Syroejkin,“The China Vector in the Foreign Policy of Kazakhstan” (Сыроежкин К.Л. Китайский вектор во внешней политике Республики Казахстан). Kazakhstan:Статья опубликована в сборнике материалов научнопрактической конференции “Республике Казахстан 15 лет: достижения и перспективы”. Алматы: КИСИ при Президенте РК, 28 ноября 2006 г. или на сайте. http://www.kisi.kz/site.html?id=4496.

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302  /  Making New Partnership may be argued that current economic cooperation between Central Asia and China already exists in an unbalanced relationship with the sheer weight if the Chinese economy already leaving many Central Asian markets dependent on supply from China. Central Asia is a sparsely populated region with a demographic in huge contrast to the population concerns in China. Central Asian countries bordering China will inevitably come into conflict with China over ultimately finite natural resources used in these areas (the management of transnational rivers between Kazakhstan and China’s Xinjiang province is already a source of conflict). It should generally be accepted that the current objectives for China in the Central Asian region concern energy, commerce and continued assurances of security through the SCO. The growing energy needs of China in contrast to worldwide availability of energy resources makes accessibility to Central Asian energy resources a leading factor of Chinese policy in the region at the moment. As a consequence, China’s energy policy in the region is subject to particularly scrupulous analysis at the moment. However, it is suggested that China’s counterparts can find little in this area at present to claim that China is risking the security or development of any of the regional countries. For example, Chinese oil companies at the moment control about 28% of oil production in Kazakhstan. In comparison to the percentage of the mining sector currently controlled by Western companies, such a figure looks poor. Moreover it can be argued that the conditions of contract signed with Chinese companies for subsurface management are far more beneficial for Kazakhstan than those signed with Western companies. Chinese oil production in Kazakhstan will also benefit the republic through profits gained in its transportation via a new pipeline A . In general, the main concerns of the Central Asian republics in China’s growth arise from an expectation that the current changes in China’s strategy  A  Konstantin Syroejkin,“The China Vector in the Foreign Policy of Kazakhstan” (Сыроежкин К.Л. Китайский вектор во внешней политике Республики Казахстан). Kazakhstan:Статья опубликована в сборнике материалов научнопрактической конференции “Республике Казахстан 15 лет: достижения и перспективы”. Алматы: КИСИ при Президенте РК, 28 ноября 2006 г. или на сайте http://www.kisi.kz/site.html? id=4496.

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14  Central Asian Countries and China: Managing the Transition  /  303 for the region will lead to a far wider and more assertive approach, and that the regional countries have too little real power to counter any expansion of China’ s influence. Public opinion in Central Asia is still centred on the fear that as neighbouring countries the region is the most at risk from continuing growth in China. In accepting the rise of China as inevitable, some activists in the region now urge the leaders of Central Asia to act decisively to both accommodate and counter the growing influence of China, otherwise it is feared that the region will soon have no control over potential areas of risk. There is evidence in its emerging policies that Kazakhstan appears to be showing a readiness to answer such challenges. With the new China-Kazakhstan free trade zone, and with bold new suggestions for international cooperation such as a “Central Asian integration union”, Kazakhstan’s foreign policy is looking as confident and assertive as China’s. Again this can be seen as due to the continuing economic success of Kazakhstan A. In having one of the most detailed and open long-term development strategies (a strategy whose policies have been restated year on year through the annual president’s address to the country), Kazakhstan has had to set goals in building practical and efficient relations with foreign counterparts. Such relations with China and other countries have allowed Kazakhstan’s leaders to move quickly from a dialogue of risk to one of cooperation. China’s strategy has assisted in facilitating such changes and it can be expected that the current diversity of relations in Central Asian diplomacy will become more cohesive and complementary. Most of the elites in Central Asia have started to realise that it is in their national interest to start actively shaping their relationships with China. The assertive strategies now seen in China towards the region cannot be ignored, and permanent dialogue is necessary. Though diverse risks and threats posed to the region by China are still discussed intensively in the local media, they have yet to be realised. As leaders start to both accommodate China and try to counter  A  During the last 4 years, GDP average growth has been 9% annually. In the first quarter of 2007,GDP was more than 10% (11% in manufacturing with 20% in machinery equipment). Within the last 3 years,615 new factories have opened and it is intended that the country’s economy will triple in the 10 years leading up to 2015.

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304  /  Making New Partnership potential risks, China itself continues to promote itself as the most reliable and efficient partner for the Central Asian region.

Ⅲ. Emerging Interests between Central Asia and China Natural interests toward each other have always existed between Central Asia and China, however,geographical circumstances have not always been favourable to their realisation. By 1991 when the regional republics gained independence, they found a “giant awakening”  A across their borders with China already gaining a reputation as an emerging superpower. At this point, however,China still remained a “closed book” with little hint of well-intentioned principles for any renewed diplomacy. This clearly did not contribute to the fostering of close relationships between China and the regional countries, and issues of security became the first item on the agenda for policies towards China. Dialogue therefore between Central Asian countries and China began within the context of security issues; however,this also gave opportunity for confidential discussion amongst all countries involved. For China, to implement its huge development and modernisation aims in the 1990s, it needed to be confident of long-term stability in its international environment. A stable and secure environment was similarly important to the new republics of Central Asia. The newly found independence in Central Asia,however,crucially affected China’s Xinjiang region inspiring separatist movements, with terrorist activities reaching a peak in that period. Illegal activities of Uigur nationalist groups in the region were the principal concern for China in those years. Cooperation in the prevention and countering of terrorist activity and similar threats emerged as one of the core strategic interests for creating partnership between Central Asian countries and China, and it is one of the pillars on which the SCO is founded. It can be said that following the disintegration of the Soviet Union,the future stability of the Central Asian region was uncertain with China concerned if not expectant of deterioration in the region. With close proximity to Afghanistan,  A  Awakening of the Giant (Essay on China’s Reforms), by the ex-Ambassador of Kazakhstan for China, Kanysh Sultanov (published 1999).

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14  Central Asian Countries and China: Managing the Transition  /  305 Mesopotamia, and the Caucasus, the geopolitical characteristics of Central Asia were not deemed favourable by China, encouraging the worst of expectations. It is no coincidence that all Central Asian countries were eagerly enrolling in a variety of different international alliances for security, with specific NATO programmes and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIC) establishing a Collective Security Treaty Organisation and in 2001 the SCO finally emerged in its current framework. These institutions were non-binding in their agreements, allowing the Central Asian states to both add new elements to their national security as members and yet also continue with a multidirectional foreign policy. It is in consequence of the openness of these early organisations that China has been able to become an important current element of regional security. There were some mutual security concerns that encouraged Central Asian countries and China to cooperate militarily from early times. Amongst other agreements signed by the president of Kazakhstan in a visit to China in 1995 was the “memorandum for cooperation between Defence Ministries”. Such frameworks contribute to the technical development of Kazakhstan’s armed forces (there were precedents to this framework with Kazakhstan having previously sold arms to China). One of the first security issues to concern Kazakhstan and China was the question of the Soviet Union’s nuclear legacy. After Kazakhstan’s leaders rejected the idea of a national nuclear potential,the county proceeded to remove its vast stockpile (the last nuclear armaments were removed from the country’s territory in 1995). It was a decision that radically changed the potential military situation in the region. Also of great concern to Kazakhstan however was its proximity to China’s own nuclear testing. China continued its testing of nuclear bombs between 1994 and 1996 at its polygon in Lobnor. In June 1996, Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs continued to express serious concern over these tests, and on July 30, 1996, the Chinese government announced a temporary suspension of nuclear testing. This was followed by the announcement on that China will never use nuclear armament first nor attempt to use such weapons as a threat against non-nuclear countries. Tension over nuclear weapons between China and its neighbours in Central Asia was further removed after amongst other nuclear powers, China signed a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

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306  /  Making New Partnership (though the US refused to ratify this treaty, China still ratified it in 1999). Following meetings held in Shanghai in 1996 and in Moscow in 1997, confidence was further enhanced by agreements for the reduction of military forces across the Chinese borders with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,Tajikistan and Russia. These long negotiations on borders issues helped change the relationship of Central Asian countries with China,no longer seeing each other as potential threats but rather as potential partners. Central Asian countries and China have furthered their military cooperation through joint military exercises. The first country to do so was Kyrgyzstan when in 2002 on Kyrgyz territory; China’s military forces took part in joint anti-terrorist command post exercise. Following this, joint military exercises with China have occurred regularly with the participation (to a greater or lesser extent) of all Central Asian countries’ forces under the auspices of the SCO. Standard international analysis of China’s security policies in Central Asia sees China’s manoeuvres in Central Asia as only serving itself, with the main interest in the region being that of creating military and political security to counter regional terrorism. However,discussion at the 16th National Congress of the Communist Party in China in 2002 makes the simplicity of such an analysis evidential. Along with other neighbouring countries, Central Asia appeared in the Party’s program for foreign policy as important strategic interest of the PRC across many social and political arenas. China officially announced that the interaction and cooperation with neighbouring and developing countries are as important for its sustainable and secure development as cooperation with world’s superpowers. Recent issues of security have demonstrated the crucial new importance of Chinese and Central Asian cooperation. Following the initiation of an antiterrorist war with operations against the Taliban in Afghanistan, the US military and NATO have become active in the Central Asian region. Though it appears so far not to have succeeded in doing so, this can potentially change the geopolitical map of the region radically, and presents challenges to the regional countries. This has encouraged a new impulse for further progress in dialogue between Central Asia and China. It is suggested that China has found its strategies in the region in concordance with the vital interests of many Central Asian republics whilst Western policies

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14  Central Asian Countries and China: Managing the Transition  /  307 have been not necessarily in opposition, but often unclear in their intentions. For instance, Beijing can be seen as a keen adept for regional stability due to its security policies being complemented by its policies for regional economic integration. Meanwhile some ideas and actions of the US, EU and others thoughtlessly risk the stability and prospects for the region. It can be argued that ideas like integrating Afghanistan into regional activities and encouraging and assisting in“coloured revolutions”, have threatened the stability of the whole region. It is no wonder that following the events of 2005: Kyrgyzstan’s “tulip revolution” and the revolt in Uzbekistan’s Andijon region, there was an address from the SCO countries to the US requesting a clearer rationale and time frame for the growing number of military bases located in the region. The fact that this requested under the auspices of the SCO again demonstrates the growing importance of the dialogue between China and Central Asia. For the foreseeable future, it is the SCO that will act as the medium for dialogue in matters of security both between Central Asia and China and within Central Asia alone. At present there is no mechanism for Central Asian countries to react to and address together any potential threats if they arise inside one of their countries. Under the current framework of the SCO, any joint action by its members against an internal threat would be defined by international community as interference in the internal affairs of a specific country, even if it were a potential threat to the whole region’s stability. To act in such a role therefore, there is a need to develop additional mechanisms for the organisation to let the state-members interact efficiently in emergencies. It is therefore expected that such mechanisms will soon be introduced, and within the last two years the institutional pre-work has already been completed and the post of a General Secretary established. In context of emerging interests, one of the biggest problems from intercountry relationships until recently was the use of water from trans-border rivers. Like the rest of the world, in Central Asia the question of access to water resources will increasingly become an issue of national security. So far this has mainly been an issue for Kazakhstan and China who have 24 rivers crossing their borders, the biggest being the Irtysh. However, the issue does not just relate to the two countries, with any outcome affecting

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308  /  Making New Partnership the perception of China throughout the Central Asian region. After declarations that Kazakhstan had become a “strategic partner with China”, it still appeared to face many difficulties in solving an issue that it deemed vital. Within the last year however there appeared to be more positive moves occurring in negotiations. Whilst on a recent visit to China (the end of 2006), a Kazakhstan delegation headed by Nursultan Nazarbaev signed two inter-government agreements on the issue. One of them established that joint control points will be set on the rivers to observe water conditions and prevent ecological problems, the other states a scientific cooperation between Chinese and Kazakh hydrologists to research the problems of both sides. An important step forward may have been made in this trans-river issue, however,the negotiation process was seemingly unnecessarily delayed by China and this has presumably affected China’s image in the region. The other security issue existing between China and Central Asia to influence public opinion most is the question of a hypothetical threat of large-scale migration of the Chinese population into the region resulting in a demographic disaster for Central Asian countries. Certainly, China does everything possible to prevent the realisation of such a risk and more importantly the spreading of such expectations A. Actually within last 15 years there has been no justification for considering this a threat to the region. The Ministry of Inner affairs of Kazakhstan has released data showing that in 2006 only 3140 citizens of the PRC were permanently living in the country (of these 2595 were ethnically Kazakh, 356 Han, 40 Russian and 126 Uigur). There are similarly low numbers of Chinese citizens in the other countries of the region. It needs to be confessed that this fear of Chinese migration appears constant in the general Central Asia population; it is something “subconscious” that is almost impossible to correct. Such sentiment however means that caution must be used in any proposals for the use of Chinese labour in the region. In medium term any migrations from China should be strongly restricted. Aside from security issues there is a mutual interest emerging between Central Asia and China in terms of trade and commercial cooperation, and the question  A  Ronald Skeldon,“China: From Exceptional Case to Global Participant”,Migration Policy Institute,www.migrationinformation.org.

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14  Central Asian Countries and China: Managing the Transition  /  309 of energy resources. Central Asia is situated on the junction of Eurasian transport corridors, though its transport and communication infrastructure needs much development. There are significant human, natural and industrial resources in the region: with 55 million people Central Asia can function as a self-sufficient regional market. Known reserves of oil and gas in Central Asia consist of more than 33 billion barrels (equal to 3% of world reserves), and 260 trillion cubic meters (equal to about 7% of world reserves) respectively (about half of Central Asia’s known reserves and about 80% of expected reserves are located in Kazak territory) A. For comparison, known oil reserves in the Middle East compose 55% of world resources and in South America 8%. Oil production in Central Asia is still relatively small, however it is can be seen as one of the most significant oil-gas regions in the world. Despite the regional potential, China has not become the biggest economic partner of all Central Asian countries. A number of explanations can be considered with China’s economic interests still focused on the established economies of the Asia-Pacific ASEAN regions. Central Asia only has a common border with the most western provinces of China. These are considered to be the most economically undeveloped areas in China’s growing economy, and the majority of trade (about 70%) between Central Asia and China is solely through Xinjiang. Initial trade between the two regions did not produce favourable environment for further development. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, there was a demand for cheap goods across the Central Asian region. Flexible, market-orientated small factories in China were quick to set up production of cheap poor quality goods to be sold in Central Asian markets. Such spontaneous trade produced minimal economic benefits for China, and moreover gave the Chinese a reputation in the region for producing poor quality goods. Whilst China continues to try and improve its reputation as a producer in the region, this has given less incentive to administrators to press for any  A  Sabira Shemenova, Institute of Economy,The Academy of Sciences of Kazakhstan (Шеменова С. Некоторые аспекты инвестиционного сотрудничества Казахстана с Китаем в рамках ШОС // Статья предоставлена автором для www.kisi.kz).http:// www.kisi.kz/site.html?id=4672.

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310  /  Making New Partnership commercial investment in the region’s production of consumer goods. However, the growth of producers in western China itself is simultaneous to the current growth of consumer markets in Central Asia. Rather than compete for a share of developed markets in the Asia-Pacific region, these Central Asian markets are ideal to develop, and western Chinese companies need to find their niche within the region. Despite the problems discussed above, many Chinese products have now established a hold in Central Asian markets. Some products (for example,household and office furniture, and electrical appliances) are simply sold as “non-Chinese” goods, whilst more basic products (for example, construction supplies) are now successfully imported from China openly. Kazakhstan now imports 44% of its televisions and 99% of its footwear from China. China is also now the main player in Central Asia’s rapidly growing telecommunications market. Central Asia is attractive to China in offering several resources necessary for its growing economy. Rich deposits of aluminium in Kazakhstan for example are important to a country lacking any known deposits of its own. But such resources are not the only thing attractive to the Chinese economy. Central Asia is potentially a large market for Chinese products and there exist possibilities in transportation to connect with the European markets. At present Kazakhstan has the most intense trade and commerce relations with China with exports of primary resources from Kazakhstan now driven almost entirely by China: raw steel and iron exports (100%), aluminum (97%), waste copper (97%), waste aluminum (96%), other waste metal (90%), and unprocessed animal hides (62%). Kazakhstan is the second largest trading partner in CIC after Russia, with $7 billion in trade in 2005, and more than $10 billion in 2006. A Still, the structure of this dual commerce lacks any sophistication, with mainly raw materials exported from Kazakhstan, and consumer goods exported from China. China has been one of the five biggest investors in Kazakhstan, but majority of these investments (82%) is in the petroleum industry. B Over the  A  The official data of the Chinese authorities. Kazakh authorities report trade growth as (in billions) 2001—$0.832; 2002—$1.34; 2003—$2.2; 2004—$2.74; 2005—$3.7. Kazakhstan’s official statistics from 2006.  B 

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14  Central Asian Countries and China: Managing the Transition  /  311 whole period of its independence Kazakhstan has attracted about $50 billion of investments from abroad, with only $1.8 billion of this coming from China. A By the end of 2006, Kazakhstan had registered 2378 Chinese private enterprises (only 180 of these were actually in operation). Of these, 32.5% were trading companies for consumers goods, 6.5% trading companies for manufacturing supplies and raw materials, 22.8% in manufacturing and production, and 38.2% in the services sector. At the same time, there were 568 joint Sino-Kazakh companies registered, with the three largest of these companies employing more than 1000 workers (all sold services in the oil and gas producing sector) B. In 2006 volume of trade between Kyrgyzstan and China was $1.6 billion. In relation with 2005 statistics ($972 million) huge growth can be fixed. Despite small size of its economy this country now is the fourth by volume of trade partner of China in CIC. In 2006 trade between Uzbekistan and China reached a volume of $1 billion. Trade has been helped since 2005 by the transportation of goods by rail via Kazakhstan. Until this time goods such as cotton were transported via a land route through Iran and then shipped to China taking over two months. The benefits of closer economic cooperation between Central Asian countries are evident. It was only in May 2004 after an agreement was signed between the governments of Tajikistan and China that the first crossing check point on their borders was opened at Karasu. One month later the first international bus shuttle from Kashi (Xinjiang, China) to Tajikistan was launched. Thus Tajikistan became the fifth country after Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia and Pakistan to establish regular transportation routes for passengers.  C Expecting to be completed by the end of 2009, in 2006 Tajikistan and China began construction of what will become the largest transportation link in Tajikistan: a road crossing  A  Said by the president of Kazakhstan in a speech during his visit in China in 2006, Information Agencies, Dec.21, 2006.  B  Sabira Shemenova, said by the president of Kazakhstan in a speech during his visit in China in 2006, Information Agencies, Dec.21, 2006. By Xinhua Agency Information.  C 

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312  /  Making New Partnership the whole of Tajikistan’s territory from China to Uzbekistan. Transportation and communication sectors are the most promising areas for development by Chinese companies. According to Tajikistan’s Ministry of Economy and Commerce, trade with China increased by 44.3% and comprised of $43.6 million for the first half of 2005 alone. In 2004, trade between Turkmenistan and China stood at $98.74 million,19.1% higher than the previous year. In Turkmenistan 10 Chinese companies are represented, involved with projects such as the complete overhaul of all oil and gas wells in the country, providing and maintaining the rail service with dieselelectric locomotives and carriages, and telecommunications. Chinese engineers have been actively involved in repairing oil wells here since 1997. Within 5 years Chinese specialists have rehabilitated more than 300 oil wells helping to produce more than 2 million tons of oil. In 2004 Turkmenistan’s state oil company extended an agreement with Chinese oil companies for another 5 years. It has already been a couple of years since economic cooperation between Central Asia and China was declared as a primary purpose of bilateral relations with China under the framework of SCO. It certainly seems unlikely that any alternative to the increasing involvement of China in the economic development of Central Asia will be found in the near future, and the volume of trade between China and the region will only continue to expand. At present Central Asian countries are working on creating a free trade zone again through the auspices of SCO. For such a zone to succeed, cooperation between countries needs to lead investments not in specific countries but across the region as a whole. Trade needs to be diversified away from a reliance on the export of primary materials, with the production of new goods and the creation of new markets. Doubtlessly China will be able to play a role of leading the Central Asian region and become a locomotive for its economic development. The geographical location and the potential of China push it to the central position of Asia as a whole, but China’s economic power alone is not able to solve all the problems in commerce and trade relations with its neighbouring countries. With its emphasis on raw materials, the unbalanced trade structure of the Central Asian republics will only be improved through strategies developed from within the region.

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14  Central Asian Countries and China: Managing the Transition  /  313 The largest sphere of interest in Central Asian and Chinese cooperation is energy. A key part of this is the development of pipelines and in 2006 the first oil pipeline to link China with Central Asia was completed from the oil-loading station of Atasu in Kazakhstan to Alashankou across the border. When further sections are completed in the next few years, the pipeline will extend back to Kazakhstan’s Caspian oil basin and will be capable of transporting 20 million tons of oil annually. In cooperation with China, work has also begun on a gas line in Turkmenistan with its completion expected by the start of 2009. This gas line is expected to connect with further pipelines into Uzbekistan, with Uzbekistan and China currently planning its construction (however,with a new president in Turkmenistan, the transnational plan for the pipeline is still to be ratified). Maximum annual capacity is expected to exceed 30 billion cubic metres. With the Atasu-Alashankou pipeline already in place, a further gas line between Kazakhstan and China is in the last stage of planning. China is demonstrating its success and efficiency in cooperating with Central Asian countries whilst similar plans for transnational pipelines suggested by Western powers, have yet to become a reality. With around 10% of national production, CNPC (China National Petroleum Corporation) is the third largest oil producer in Kazakhstan. Through shares in other oil companies, CNPC also shows interests in production in Uzbekistan. It is clear that China will play an increasing role in production of oil and gas in the Central Asian region. Following the collapse of a Soviet structure, Kazakhstan has reformed its economy more than any other Central Asian republic. With many long-term plans for the transformation of its economy, a closer target is to become one of the 50 most competitive countries in the world in the next 10 years (at the moment the republic is the 61st by the report of World Economic Forum). To achieve that goal, Kazakhstan’s government has produced an industrial and innovative policy to transform the country’s economy from its present primary position into a more technologically advanced and knowledge-based one. As part of this policy,the country aims to alter the structure of its growing economic relations with China. Kazakhstan was the first Central Asian state to promote more equal

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314  /  Making New Partnership trade relations with China. In line with this, one of the most important results of president Nazarbaev’s latest visit to China was a joint agreement on upgrading the quality of the current economic relations between the two countries. According to the agreement, it is intended that the percentage of trade between the countries comprising of high value-added and high technology products is to increase. There are other practical results of Kazakhstan’s new politics and its interactions with China. In 2006 construction on the Moinak hydro-electrical project was started. It will be the first new hydro-electrical station in Kazakhstan since gaining independence and its first joint project with China outside of mining and petroleum. Seven banking corporations from Europe, Japan and China competed to finance the project. The Bank of China will not only finance the initial construction, but also won the right for Chinese companies to construct the station.

Ⅳ. The Role of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization With the development of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) in Central Asia, it has become possible for each of its six members——China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan——to communicate and cooperate with one another with greater ease. The SCO, however, would probably never have turned into such an influential international institution as it is now perceived in the region, if it were not for particular conditions surrounding Central Asia during the 1990s. As newly independent states in the 1990s, the Central Asian republics needed foreign partners who could both guarantee their security and assist in stimulating the development of their post-Soviet economies. Such needs persisted into the late 1990s when it became clear that despite active cooperation with several foreign interests, security concerns remained and economic development progressed dangerously slowly. At this time other events favouring the creation of an organisation like the SCO were developing not in Central Asia, but within China. The speed and success of the comprehensive modernisation that was taking place in China led Central Asian countries (and Russia) to find hope in allying their plans to the rise of that country. China itself was calling for deeper

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14  Central Asian Countries and China: Managing the Transition  /  315 cooperation with neighbouring countries, and the transition of Beijing’s foreign policy to a “new diplomacy” made the formation of the SCO all the more possible. The quick-paced evolution of the SCO since its formation supports the notion that China was indeed the most promising candidate to assist Central Asia at the end of the 1990s. Only big changes in the bilateral and multilateral relations between Central Asian countries and between Russia and China made it possible for the creation of an organisation that may be perceived from outside as “anti-NATO” bloc. The evolution of diplomacy and institutional organisation of regional cooperation has shown great diversity and unpredictability. With the formation of the SCO however, it is suggested that such evolution is now more stable and predictable. It was not long after the collapse of USSR when in China agreed with the other future members of the SCO that a forum was needed to help resolve border issues in the region. In 1996, following the signing of an agreement on the need to consolidate border issues, the “Shanghai Five” was formed as such a forum, an negotiation on border disputes began. It was logical that such a forum should have been created to discuss crucial border issues. The shape that such a forum finally took, and its development thereafter however is rather more remarkable; at the time hardly anyone could believe that China would enter into a joint organisation with Central Asian countries. The SCO is unprecedented in terms of Chinese political history. Before the SCO, China had never joined any international political union. This fact alone allows us to conclude that the event signified a huge change in Chinese diplomacy. The SCO continues to evolve as an international organisation for security and economic integration. China continues to become more involved in the regional affairs of Central Asia and Central Asian countries continue to strengthen their links with China. Even the most long-sighted of strategists could hardly have predicted the role of the “Shanghai Five” for Central Asia today. Evidently without a clear strategy for its newly independent western neighbours in Central Asia, China was first concerned by potential geopolitical importance of the region for both the world and for its own stability and development. One of the biggest concerns of China at that time was the violent activities of “Uigur separatists” in Xinjiang who could use an unstable neighbouring Central Asia as a logistical platform. Thus along

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316  /  Making New Partnership with initial border issues, countering international terrorism, ethnic separatism and political extremism (known as the “three evils” at the SCO) became the core targets for the organisation. With the joining of Uzbekistan in June 2001, the “Shanghai five” reformed itself, the SCO was established. The organisation was formalised when the SCO Charter was adopted and ratified in 2003, and the SCO Secretariat began operating at the beginning of 2004. To maintain stability in the region was the main concern for all “Shanghai process” members. The elimination of security threats has become an absolute prior agenda due to the Batken events of 1999 and 2000, when terrorists penetrated Kyrgyzstan. It is no accident that Uzbekistan, which shares no border with China, took a close interest in the activities of the organization: it also suffers from the problem of illegal armed groups. Only after a while the member-countries raised all-round cooperation as a subject for their interactions in “Shanghai process”. The idea to form a space of common interests diversifying from security to trade on our opinion closely related to the idea of regional integration. From its beginnings, the SCO had not any integration ideas designed for Central Asia. And some progresses China, Russia and Central Asia achieved managing their joint activities showed them big prospects of in-depth cooperation both in security and economic areas. The idea to provide regional integration became obvious later in 2003,when the free trade SCO zone was agreed to be built by 2020, and currently the full meaning of SCO for the Central Asia is opening with that. It was clear that an organisation formed of such an asymmetric body of countries would have some difficulties in its operation; both strategic and technical. To build an organisation that would be efficient and mutually beneficial with such misbalance was not going to be an easy task. Many analysts——especially Western, were initially sceptical of the prospects for an efficient and lasting SCO. It was expected that eventually a “leader” would assert itself in the Central Asian region and, whether this turned out to be China, Russia or another power, multilateral cooperation through the SCO would lose impetus and relevance. However,such assessments of the SCO have diminished and it continues to prove itself a relevant and efficient organisation. As foreign researchers have now noticed, the SCO is no longer limited in its

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14  Central Asian Countries and China: Managing the Transition  /  317 activities to security issues, and its competence now benefits members in many other areas A. Through its charter, the organisation has set itself a wide spectrum of long term targets for cooperation in “enhancing peace, security and stability in the region in conditions of political multipolarity, and economic and informational globalisation”. According to the charter and the declaration on establishing the SCO, it tasks are to: build confidence, strengthen friendly and neighbourly relations among participants, develop effective cooperation in the spheres of politics, trade and the economy, scientific research, education, energy, transport, and the environment. It aims to maintain security and stability in the region, and facilitate the establishment of a democratic, fair, and rational political and economic order. Its practical results so far, however, still lie largely within its anti-terrorist activities, and this does not always emphasise the organisation’s declared objectives. Ensuring security is just one task among many others and holds no priority in its charter. However, counter-terrorism appears to have remained a concern for all members, and security still remains first on recent agendas at the SCO. Military cooperation was never the intended priority in founding the SCO, and since the first meeting of its governments’ heads in Almaty in 2001,its economic cooperation has been defined as the core direction of SCO activities. The organisation continues to show itself as the most efficient form of international cooperation in the region at the moment and it should only be a matter of time therefore, until the huge potential of the organisation in assisting in the economic development of the region is discovered. In Central Asian countries, the SCO is viewed positively as an instrument to help them meet possible risks and threats, managing globalisation and enhancing measures in a potentially complex region of security. Continued long term success of the SCO perhaps now lies in its potential as a medium through which to establish an economic free trade zone, further endorsing it as the most powerful organisation in the region. Trying to maintain integration whilst promoting independence has been a  A  The Shanghai Cooperation Or ganisation: Background,“The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Summit”,The Bulletin of the SAPRA India Foundation,August 2005,p.4.

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318  /  Making New Partnership significant balancing act for the leaders of the Central Asian republics ever since their creation. During this time a few joint regional organisations have been founded, with the intention of helping individual economic development through integration. Though similar organisations created to maintain security in the region have been operational (mainly due to their inclusion of Russia), purely economic institutions have not been efficient at all and with the exception of the SCO, by now none survive. In a diversity of newly created international organisations, the SCO has taken a special position. Firstly,it was the only organisation in Eurasia which included China as a member. Secondly,in its formation, it passed through a long period of change, adapting to its members’ emerging interests. It has now established itself further by achieving some impressive results: all border problems between China and four of the post-Soviet countries were solved smoothly; after the launch of the SCO’s regional anti-terrorist structure, terrorist risks in the region were perceived to diminished significantly; close military cooperations including joint military exercises were established; dialogue was formed with the Collective Security Treaty Organisation, ASEAN, and the UN; and since 2003 practical projects for economic cooperation including SCO’s 2020 Program for Economic Cooperation are being realised. Another new initiative——the“Energy Club of the SCO”——has recently been proposed by Russia, and is currently in the process of realisation. The SCO’s confidence and ambitions are growing, and it is now beginning to extend its interest beyond its accepted regional framework: the Afghanistan issue is a potential concern for Central Asian security and is now being considered as another focus for the work of the SCO. It is not just the larger members of the organisation——China and Russia—— that are promoting its significance, even Uzbekistan; the most cautious in its foreign policy has accepted the significance and benefits of its membership. With a multi-directional approach still at the forefront of many Central Asia republics’ strategies, it is suggested that the SCO has taken a especially important place. With the 10th anniversary of the organisation celebrated in 2006, the short history of the SCO shows that with common risks removed and common interests emphasised, it can become the most powerful and efficient organisation for

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14  Central Asian Countries and China: Managing the Transition  /  319 Central Asia. With the significance of China growing globally, the prospects for the SCO in the region and in wider international relations are in some ways largely determined by China. Being a significant and influential actor in global political and economic processes, China doubtlessly is a locomotive power in the SCO, and has huge potential to influence Central Asian countries and the region as a whole. It will not be a mistake to say that most members of the SCO will now accept that China has become a core part of the political life of the region, and will soon be a core part of its economic sphere as well. Apart from allowing changing relations between Central Asian countries, the SCO can significantly be seen to have now placed China in Central Asia as an inherent element of regional economic and political systems. With the continuing ambitions of the SCO as an international organisation, it will likely become the main instrument for China to maintain its interests in Central Asia and sustain its regional role. In other words, the SCO is becoming the main channel for providing China’s interests in Central Asia, and the organisation as a whole can be seen by some as mainly a “project of China” A. Yet the current role of the SCO can only be seen in light of its formation out of the region’s security situation in the late 1990s. The turmoil that led to the collapse of the Soviet Union left Russia without the power to maintain its leading role in Central Asia (as well other of the ex-Soviet regions), and showed little capability of maintaining such a role in the region throughout the 1990s. Still concerned with the potential might of Russia, and tentative of its continuing influence in the region, certain members of NATO were keen to involve Central Asian countries in the alliance. Such inclusion in its alliance has remained remote, however, and there has been little attempt to implement an explicit security system for the region. This lack of any clear power for the region was the precondition for a quick evolution of the SCO. Regional countries faced a need to create a structure where they all could be presented and could discuss and manage emerging risks and interests with the two biggest non-regional players in  A  Interview with Konstantin Syroejkin (К.Л. Сыроежкина “Для Китая ШОСинструмент, позволяющий 《сидеть на двух стульях》”).March 14,2007,Радиоинтервью на вэб-сайте,www.inkar.info.

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320  /  Making New Partnership Central Asia——Russia and China. China and Russia graced the SCO institution turning into the main element of a security system for Central Asia. In general, cooperation within the SCO evolved gradually from one of political, diplomatic, military, and anti-terrorist to that of economic partnership. As an initiator of the SCO, China endeavours to retain its leadership of the economic partnerships. The organisation is now becoming more cohesive in its functions and mechanisms, trying to include multilateral frameworks for all the key spheres of its member states. At present, more specific planning is still needed, and it is challenging its members to be more explicit in their wishes, consolidating measures to develop a paradigm for regional policies. Surely the two core issues of security and multilateral cooperation in the region would be less organised if the SCO had not been established. Meanwhile the international “weight” of the Central Asian republics is growing and with progress through the SCO, the stability of the region has strengthened, developing its immunity to an increasingly changing world. The creation of the SCO can be considered a real revolution amongst the geopolitical upheavals of Central Asia. In placing China as one of the most important partners for Central Asia, even more significant economic results of the organisation’s activities are still to come. There are still further chances for the SCO to make big changes in terms of the region’s inter-country relations, continuing to influence the development of security, change political configurations, and develop new fundamentals for economic integration. New mechanisms for interactions between SCO members will affect their relations with the rest of the world, and these further consequences should also be taken into account. There are still difficulties that can affect SCO’s progress in the near future, and there remain concerns about its future role. Since the organisation has largely been preoccupied with solving core security problems in the region, its member have yet had to face the realities of its other core objectives. As the SCO gains strength and purpose, more and more preconditions are appearing, intended for protecting apparent national interests of particular states. Not all Central Asian countries feel prepared for closer cooperation through the SCO instead of under their own national institutions. Kazakhstan is perhaps the most eager to build

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14  Central Asian Countries and China: Managing the Transition  /  321 up deeper all-round relations with China and Russia including free trade and economic zone, but the rest of the republics have more concerns. It has correctly been remarked that “economic integration through SCO frameworks cannot be implemented only by providing a free trade zone… it must also be maintained by the coordination of economic interests of countries through unification in the production and the science and technology sectors of national economies for implementation of joint international projects” A. In conclusion, looking at the future role of the SCO, we cannot say that any geopolitical changes in Central Asia or in the continent as a whole will be likely to stop the enhancement of the organisation’s role in the region. It is suggested that any possible future tensions between different members of the organisation will not alter the further functioning of the SCO’s actual frameworks. Similarly,therefore, any possible regional tensions are unlikely to affect the furthering of involvement in the region as security and economic power.

Ⅴ. Future Perspective The future perspective of relations between Central Asia and China can be considered in light of the short history of their recent development. At the creation of the new republics, a neighbouring China was considered a serious challenge and even the most daring of analysts would not have predicted that within fifteen years, the geopolitical balance of the region would have changed to place China as a key regional power not through any use of strength, but through cooperation. Russia still maintains some of its role as a traditional regional power, maintaining partnerships with most of the republics; however, it is China that is gradually taking the lead in regional economic and security cooperation. China has shown remarkable diplomacy in genial tactics; gaining important strategic victories whilst avoiding accusations or exacerbating relations with other actors  A  Y. Buleshova. Булешова Н.Ю. Проблемы экономического взаимодействия в рамках ШОС; Статья опубликована в сборнике материалов международной научно-практической конференции 《Проблемы экономического и финансового сотрудничества в рамках ШОС》.Алматы: КИСИ при Президенте РК, 31 мая 2006 г.

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322  /  Making New Partnership considered to be involved in a renewed “great game”. Many well Sinologists agree in the success of China’s policies in Central Asia: Lyle Goldstein has accused the US of failing in its own strategies for the region and calls on the US to now assist a clearly more beneficial China A. In general, the political frivolity and weak instrumental assistance from Western powers and the inertness of Russia left a power vacuum in the region that has pushed China into an active role. At the moment China is discussing daring integration projects with its Central Asian partners. With its own relations with Central Asian countries not always smooth, Russia has shown its allegiance to China’s policy in the region in supporting the “Shanghai process”. In comparing the potential of the SCO to other political instruments for regionalisation, it is clear that the interests of China will be of more influence in the region than that of its competitors. For a successful development of international regionalisation as a way of transition for Central Asia in its future, it is clear that it cannot continue to try and simultaneously progress in several directions: if NATO succeeded in involving regional countries in closer cooperation, it is probable that the SCO and Collective Security Treaty Organisation would gradually withdraw from the security sphere of Central Asia. Similarly, if infrastructure built for oil and gas resources starts flowing in one particular direction, other “directions” will lose influence over the development of the regional energy resources. All current geopolitical movements in Central Asia indicate that the transition of the region is progressing, and that the region is becoming integrated in a global economy as a closely linked unit. One of the most important preconditions for completion of regional transition is the completion of individual country’s geopolitical transition. The point of that transition is to replace the initial multidirectional diplomatic courses by new ones; highlighting particular directions as a priority in their foreign policy. Attempting to maintain the status quo between the interests of outsiders in the distribution of power in the region is no longer meeting the interests of Central Asian republics. Their policies towards external powers are still determined by the need to be prepared for new risks and threats: “globalisation”, changing heads of government and  A  Lyle Goldstein,“China in the New Central Asia: the Fen (RMB) is Mightier Than the Sword”, The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, Winter 2005,pp.13-34.

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14  Central Asian Countries and China: Managing the Transition  /  323 increasingly self-determined populations are all realities for the region today. A new order for the region’s security and economic development will push the geopolitical transition of the region to its completion, and this is now the motivation for countries to finalise their foreign courses. Along with the task of sorting out bilateral and multilateral relations for a more efficient security system and better conditions for economic development, Central Asia will have a new regionalisation. The present situation is the most favourable for implementing closer and more efficient cooperation in the last 15 years. This cooperation will assist Central Asian countries in completing their own transformations. Perhaps with the end of the Soviet Union, Russia or the US had better prospects for implementing a successful international regionalisation in Central Asia. Despite the use of both hard and soft tactics by these powers in the region since then, however, it appears that they have handed their advantages in the region over to China. For China, it appears that it is following a very efficient comprehensive strategy which will make it complete its own transition and take a significant place in the global economy and global policy. A part of these strategies has been changes to its relationship with its neighbours. Good conditions for even deeper cooperation in Central Asia now exist with the potential for a new paradigm in Central Asian countries’ relationships with China. Through the medium of the SCO, China has already become a key element of a regional security system, and a huge potential remains for its role in economic cooperation. Meanwhile further tensions and developments are possible in relations between the Central Asian states, however, such issues will hardly affect the relations of these countries with China, and China’s continuing importance in the region. Close cooperation with China in all areas of interest will help shape a new image of Central Asia for the foreseeable future.

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Cataloguing in Publication Data Making New Partnership Edited by Zhang Yunling —March 2008 ISBN 978-7-5097-0041-9/D·0018 Published by Social Sciences Academic Press (China) 13F, 15F, A/B Tower of Hua Long Plaza, Bldg 3, Jia No.29, Beisanhuan Zhonglu, Xicheng District, Beijing, China Postcode: 100029 ISBN 978-1-84464-051-5 Distributed by Paths International Ltd. (UK) PO Box 4083 Reading RG8 8ZN UK ©2008 by Social Sciences Academic Press (China) Editor: Hu Yali Cover designer: Cui Zhenjiang Printed in Beijing, China All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced by any means without written permission from the publisher.