Chapter 17

17 WhereAm I?

Now that I 've won my suit under the Freedom of Information Act , I am at liberty to reveal for the first time a curious episode in my life that may be of interest not only to those engaged in research in the philosophy of mind , artificial intelligence and neuroscience but also to the general public . Several years ago I was approached by Pentagon officials who asked me to volunteer for a highly dangerous and secret mission . In collab oration with NASA and Howard Hughes, the Department of Defense was spending billions to develop a Supersonic Tunneling Underground Device , or STUD . It was supposed to tunnel through the earth 's core at great speed and deliver a specially designed atomic warhead ' 'right up the Red's missile silos," as one of the Pentagon brass put it . The problem was that in an early test they had succeeded in lodging a warhead about a mile deep under Tulsa , Oklahoma , and they wanted me to retrieve it for them . " Why me? " I asked. Well , the mission involved some pioneering applications of current brain research, and they had heard of my interest in brains and of course my Faustian curiosity and great courage and so forth . . . . Well , how could I refuse? The difficulty that brought the Pentagon to my door was that the device I 'd been asked to recover was fiercely radioactive , in a new way . According to monitoring instruments , something about the nature of the device and its complex interactions with pockets of material deep in the earth had produced radiation that could cause severe abnormalities in certain tissues of the brain . No way had been found to shield the brain from these deadly rays, which were appar-

Where Am I ?

311

ently harmless to other tissues and organs of the body . So it had been decided that the person sent to recover the device should leave his brain behind . It would be kept in a safe place where it could execute its normal control functions by elaborate radio links . Would 1 submit to a surgical procedure that would completely remove my brain , which would then be placed in a life -support system at the Manned Spacecraft Center in Houston ? Each input and output pathway , as it was severed, would be restored by a pair of microminiaturized radio transceivers , one attached precisely to the brain , the other to the nerve stumps in the empty cranium . No information would be lost , all the connectivity would be preserved. At first I was a bit reluctant . Would it really work ? The Houston brain surgeons encouraged me. " Think of it ," they said, ''as a mere stretching of the nerves. If your brain were just moved over an inch in your skull , that would not alter or impair your mind . We're simply going to make the nerves indefi nitely elastic by splicing radio links into them ." I was shown around the life -support lab in Houston and saw the sparkling new vat in which my brain would be placed , were I to agree. I met the large and brilliant support team of neurologists , hematolo gists, biophysicists , and electrical engineers, and after several days of discussions and demonstrations , I agreed to give it a try . I was subjected to an enormous array of blood tests, brain scans, experiments , interviews , and the like . They took down my autobiography at great length , recorded tedious lists of my beliefs , hopes, fears, and tastes. They even listed my favorite stereo recordings and gave me a crash session of psychoanalysis . The day for surgery arrived at last and of course I was anesthetized and remember nothing of the operation itself . When I came out of anesthesia, I opened my eyes, looked around , and asked the inevitable , the traditional , the lamentably hackneyed post -operative question : " Where am I ?" The nurse smiled down at me. " You 're in Houston ," she said, and I reflected that this still had a good chance of being the truth one way or another . She handed me a mirror . Sure enough, there were the tiny antennae poking up through their titanium ports cemented into my skull . " I gather the operation was a success," 1 said, " I want to go see my brain ." They led me (I was a bit dizzy and unsteady ) down a long corridor and into the life -support lab . A cheer went up from the assembled support team , and I responded with what I hoped was a jaunty salute . Still feeling lightheaded , I was helped over to the life -

312

BRAINSTORMS

support vat . I peered through the glass . There , floating in what looked like ginger -ale , was undeniably a human brain , though it was almost covered with printed circuit chips , plastic tubules , electrodes , and other paraphernalia . " Is that mine ?" I asked . " Hit the output trans mitter switch there on the side of the vat and see for yourself ," the project director replied . I moved the switch to OFF , and immediately slumped , groggy and nauseated , into the arms of the technicians , one of whom kindly restored the switch to its ON position . While I recov ered my equilibrium and composure , I thought to myself : " Well , here I am , sitting on a folding chair , staring through a piece of plate glass at my own brain . . . . But wait ," I said to myself , " shouldn 't I have thought , 'Here I am , suspended in a bubbling fluid , being stared at by my own eyes ' ?" I tried to think this latter thought . I tried to project it into the tank , offering it hopefully to my brain , but I failed to carry off the exercise with any conviction . I tried again . " Here am I , Daniel Dennett , suspended in a bubbling fluid , being stared at by my own eyes ." No , it just didn 't work . Most puzzling and confusing . Being a philosopher of firm physicalist conviction , I believed unswervingly that the tokening of my thoughts was occurring somewhere in my brain : yet , when I thought " Here I am ," where the thought occurred to me was here , outside the vat , where I , Dennett , was standing staring at my brain . I tried and tried to think myself into the vat , but to no avail . I tried to build up to the task by doing mental exercises . I thought to myself , " The sun is shining over there ," five times in rapid successi
" here in this part

of the lab , " but

" here in the vat "

always seemed merely an unmeant mental mouthing . I tried closing my eyes while thinking it . This seemed to help , but still I couldn 't manage to pull it off , except perhaps for a fleeting instant . I couldn 't be sure . The discovery that I couldn 't be sure was also unsettling . How did I know where I meant by " here " when I thought " here " ? Could I think I meant one place when in fact I meant another ? I didn 't see

WhereAm I ?

313

how that could be admitted without untying the few bonds of inti macy between a person and his own mental life that had survived the onslaught of the brain scientists and philosophers , the physicalists and behaviorists . Perhaps I was incorrigible about where I meant when I said " here." But in my present circumstances it seemed that either I was doomed by sheer force of mental habit to thinking systematically false indexical thoughts , or where a person is (and hence where his thoughts are tokened for purposes of semantic analysis) is not necessarily where his brain , the physical seat of his soul , resides. Nagged by confusion , I attempted to orient myself by falling back on a favorite philosopher 's ploy . I began naming things . " Yorick ," I said aloud to my brain , " you are my brain . The rest of my body , seated in this chair , I dub 'Hamlet .' " So here we all are: Yorick 's my brain , Hamlet 's my body , and I am Dennett . Now , where am I ? And when I think " where am I ?" where 's that thought tokened ? Is it tokened in my brain , lounging about in the vat , or right here between my ears where it seems to be tokened ? Or nowhere ? Its tem poral coordinates give me no trouble ; must it not have spatial coordi nates as well ? I began making a list of the alternatives . (1) Where Hamlet goes, there goes Dennett . This principle was easily refuted by appeal to the familiar brain transplant thought experiments so enjoyed by philosophers . If Tom and Dick switch brains , Tom is the fellow with Dick 's former body - just ask him ; he'll claim to be Tom , and tell you the most intimate details of Tom 's autobiography . It was clear enough , then , that my current body and I could part company , but not likely that I could be separated from my brain . The rule of thumb that emerged so plainly from the thought experiments was that in a brain -transplant operation , one wanted to be the donor , not the recipient . Better to call such an operation a body -transplant , in fact . So perhaps the truth was, (2) Where Yorick goes, there goes Dennett . This was not at all appealing , however . How could I be in the vat and not about to go anywhere , when I was so obviously outside the vat looking in and beginning to make guilty plans to return to my room for a substantial lunch ? This begged the question I realized , but it still seemed to be getting at something important . Casting about for some support for my intuition , I hit upon a legalistic sort of argument that might have appealed to Locke . Suppose, I argued to myself , I were now to fly to California , rob a bank , and be apprehended . In which state would I be tried : In

314

BRAINSTORMS

California , where the robbery took place, or in Texas, where the brains of the outfit were located ? Would I be a California felon with an out -of -state brain , or a Texas felon remotely controlling an accomplice of sorts in California ? It seemed possible that I might beat such a rap just on the undecidability of that jurisdictional question , though perhaps it would be deemed an inter -state, and hence Federal , offense . In any event , suppose I were convicted . Was it likely that California would be satisfied to throw Hamlet into the brig , knowing that Yorick was living the good life and luxuriously taking the waters in Texas? Would Texas incarcerate Yorick , leaving Hamlet free to take the next boat to Rio ? This alternative appealed to me. Barring capital punishment or other cruel and unusual punishment , the state would be obliged to maintain the life -support system for Yorick though they might move him from Houston to Leavenworth , and aside from the unpleasantness of the opprobrium , I , for one, would not mind at all and would consider myself a free man under those circumstances . If the state has an interest in forcibly relocating persons in institutions , it would fail to relocate me in any institu tion by locating Yorick there . If this were true , it suggested a third alternative . (3) Dennett is wherever he thinks he is. Generalized , the claim was as follows : At any given time a person has a point of view , and the location of the point of view (which is determined internally by the content of the point of view ) is also the location of the person . Such a proposition is not without its perplexities , but to me it seemed a step in the right direction . The only trouble was that it seemed to place one in a heads-I -win /tails -you -lose situation of unlikely infallibility as regards location . Hadn 't I myself often been wrong about where I was, and at least as often uncertain ? Couldn 't one get lost ? Of course, but getting lost geographically is not the only way one might get lost . If one were lost in the woods one could attempt to reassure oneself with the consolation that at least one knew where one was: one was right here in the familiar surroundings of one 's own body . Perhaps in this case one would not have drawn one 's attention to much to be thankful for . Still , there were worse plights imaginable , and I wasn't sure I wasn't in such a plight right now . Point of view clearly had something to do with personal location , but it was itself an unclear notion . It was obvious that the content of one 's point of view was not the same as or determined by the content of one 's beliefs or thoughts . For example , what should we say about the point of view of the Cinerama viewer who shrieks and twists in

WhereAm 11

315

his seat as the roller -coaster footage overcomes his psychic distancing ? Has he forgotten that he is safely seated in the theater ? Here I was inclined to say that the person is experiencing an illusory shift in point of view . In other cases, my inclination to call such shifts illusory was less strong . The workers in laboratories and plants who handle dangerous materials by operating feedback -controlled mechanical arms and hands undergo a shift in point of view that is crisper and more pro nounced than anything Cinerama can provoke . They can feel the heft and slipperiness of the containers they manipulate with their metal fingers . They know perfectly well where they are and are not fooled into false beliefs by the experience , yet it is as if they were inside the isolation chamber they are peering into . With mental effort , they can manage to shift their point of view back and forth , rather like making a transparent Neckar cube or an Escher drawing change orientation before one 's eyes. It does seem extravagant to suppose that in performing this bit of mental gymnastics , they are transporting them selues back and forth . Still their example gave me hope . If I was in fact in the vat in spite of my intuitions , I might be able to train myself to adopt that point of view even as a matter of habit . I should dwell on images of myself comfortably floating in my vat , beaming volitions to that familiar body out there . I reflected that the ease or difficulty of this task was presumably independent of the truth about the location of one 's brain . Had I been practicing before the operation , I might now be finding it second nature . You might now yourself try such a tromp I 'oeil . Imagine you have written an inflammatory letter which has been published in the Times, the result of which is that the Govern ment has chosen to impound your brain for a probationary period of three years in its Dangerous Brain Clinic in Bethesda, Maryland . Your body of course is allowed freedom to earn a salary and thus to con tinue its function of laying up income to be taxed . At this moment , however , your body is seated in an auditorium listening to a peculiar account by Daniel Dennett of his own similar experience . Try it . Think yourself to Bethesda, and then hark back longingly to your body , far away , and yet seeming so near . It is only with long-distance restraint (yours ? the Government 's?) that you can control your im pulse to get those hands clapping in polite applause before navigating the old body to the rest room and a well -deserved glass of evening sherry in the lounge . The task of imagination is certainly difficult , but if you achieve your goal the results might be consoling . Anyway , there I was in Houston , lost in thought as one might say, but not for long . My speculations were soon interrupted by the

316 BRAINSTORMS Houston doctors , who wished to test out my new prosthetic nervous system before sending me off on my hazardous mission . As I mentioned before , I was a bit dizzy at first , and not surprisingly , although I soon habituated myself to my new circumstances (which were, after all , well nigh indistinguishable from myoid circumstances ). My accommodation was not perfect , however , and to this day I continue to be plagued by minor coordination difficulties . The speed of light is fast , but finite , and as my brain and body move farther and farther apart , the delicate interaction of my feedback systems is thrown into disarray by the time lags. Just as one is rendered close to speechlessby a delayed or echoic hearing of one 's speaking voice so, for instance , I am virtually unable to track a moving object with my eyes whenever my brain and my body are more than a few miles apart . In most mat ters my impairment is scarcely detectable , though I can no longer hit a slow curve ball with the authority of yore . There are some compen sations of course. Though liquor tastes as good as ever, and warms my gullet while corroding my liver , I can drink it in any quantity I please, without becoming the slightest bit inebriated , a curiosity some of my close friends may have noticed (though I occasionally have feigned inebriation , so as not to draw attention to my unusual circumstances ). For similar reasons, I take aspirin orally for a sprained wrist , but if the pain persists I ask Houston to administer codeine to me in vitro . In times of illness the phone bill can be staggering. But to return to my adventure . At length , both the doctors and I were satisfied that I was ready to undertake my subterranean mission . And so I left my brain in Houston and headed by helicopter for Tulsa . Well , in any case, that 's the way it seemed to me. That 's how I would put it , just off the top of my head as it were. On the trip I reflected further about my earlier anxieties and decided that my first post operative speculations had been tinged with panic . The matter was not nearly as strange or metaphysical as I had been supposing. Where was I ? In two places, clearly : both inside the vat and outside it . Just as one can stand with one foot in Connecticut and the other in Rhode Island , 1 was in two places at once. I had become one of those scattered individuals we used to hear so much about . The more I considered this answer, the more obviously true it appeared. But , strange to say, the more true it appeared, the less important the question to which it could be the true answer seemed. A sad, but not unprecedented , fate for a philosophical question to suffer . This answer did not completely satisfy me, of course. There lingered some question to which I should have liked an answer, which was neither " Where are all my various and sundry parts?" nor " What is my current point of view ?" Or at least

WhereAm I ?

317

there seemed to be such a question . For it did seem undeniable that in some sense I and not merely most of me was descending into the earth under Tulsa in search of an atomic warhead . When I found the warhead , I was certainly glad I had left my brain behind , for the pointer on the specially built Geiger counter I had brought with me was off the dial . I called Houston on my ordinary radio and told the operation control center of my position and my progress. In return , they gave me instructions for dismantling the vehicle , based upon my on-site observations . I had set to work with my cutting torch when all of a sudden a terrible thing happened . I went stone deaf . At first I thought it was only my radio earphones that had broken , but when I tapped on my helmet , I heard nothing . Apparently the auditory transceivers had gone on the fritz . I could no longer hear Houston or my own voice , but I could speak, so I started telling them what had happened . In mid -sentence, I knew something else had gone wrong . My vocal apparatus had become paralyzed . Then my right hand went limp - another transceiver had gone. I was truly in deep trouble . But worse was to follow . After a few more minutes , I went blind . I cursed my luck , and then I cursed the scientists who had led me into this grave peril . There I was, deaf , dumb , and blind , in a radioactive hole more than a mile under Tulsa . Then the last of my cerebral radio links broke , and suddenly I was faced with a new and even more shocking problem : whereas an instant before I had been buried alive in Oklahoma , now I was disembodied in Houston . My recognition of my new status was not immediate . It took me several very anxious minutes before it dawned on me that my poor body lay several hundred miles away , with heart pulsing and lungs respirating , but otherwise as dead as the body of any heart transplant donor , its skull packed with useless, broken electronic gear. The shift in perspective I had earlier found well nigh impossible now seemed quite natural . Though I could think myself back into my body in the tunnel under Tulsa , it took some effort to sustain the illusion . For surely it was an illusion to suppose I was still in Oklahoma : I had lost all contact with that body . It occurred to me then , with one of those rushes of revelation of which we should be suspicious , that I had stumbled upon an impres sive demonstration of the immateriality of the soul based upon physi calist principles and premises. For as the last radio signal between Tulsa and Houston died away , had I not changed location from Tulsa to Houston at the speed of light ? And had I not accomplished this without any increase in mass? What moved from A to B at such speed was surely myself , or at any rate my soul or mind - the masslesscenter

318

BRAINSTORMS

of my being and home of my consciousness . My point of view had lagged somewhat behind , but I had already noted the indirect bearing of point of view on personal location . I could not see how a physical ist philosopher could quarrel with this except by taking the dire and counter -intuitive route of banishing all talk of persons . Yet the notion of personhood was so well entrenched in everyone 's world view , or so it seemed to me , that any denial would be as curiously unconvincing , as systematically disingenuous , as the Cartesian negation , " non sum .,,1 The joy of philosophic discovery thus tided me over some very bad minutes or perhaps hours as the helplessness and hopelessness of my situation became more apparent to me . Waves of panic and even nau sea swept over me , made all the more horrible by the absence of their normal body - dependent phenomenology . No adrenalin rush of tingles in the arms , no pounding heart , no premonitory salivation . I did feel a dread sinking feeling in my bowels at one point , and this tricked me momentarily into the false hope that I was undergoing a reversal of the process that landed me in this fix - a gradual undisembodiment . But the isolation and uniqueness of that twinge soon convinced me that it was simply the first of a plague of phantom body hallucinations that I , like any other amputee , would be all too likely to suffer . My mood then was chaotic . On the one hand , I was fired up with elation at my philosophic discovery and was wracking my brain (one of the few familiar things I could still do ) , trying to figure out how to communicate my discovery to the journals ; while on the other , I was

bitter , lonely , and filled with dread and uncertainty . Fortunately , this did not last long , for my technical support team sedated me into a dreamless sleep from which I awoke , hearing with magnificent fidelity the familiar opening strains of my favorite Brahms piano trio . So that was why they had wanted a list of my favorite recordings ! It did not take me long to realize that I was hearing the music without ears . The output from the stereo stylus was being fed through some fancy rec tification circuitry directly into my auditory nerve . I was mainlining Brahms , an unforgettable experience for any stereo buff . At the end of the record it did not surprise me to hear the reassuring voice of the project director speaking into a microphone that was now my pros thetic ear . He confirmed my analysis of what had gone wrong and a. ured me that steps were being taken to re -embody me . He did not elaborate , and after a few more recordings , I found myself drifting off to sleep . My sleep lasted , I later learned , for the better part of a year , and when I awoke , it was to find myself fully restored to my senses. When I looked into the mirror , though , I was a bit startled to see an unfamiliar face . Bearded and a bit heavier , bearing no doubt a family

Where Am I ? 319 resemblance to my former face, and with the same look of spritely intelligence and resolute character , but definitely a new face. Further self-explorations of an intimate nature left me no doubt that this was a new body and the project director confirmed my conclusions . He did not volunteer any information on the past history of my new body and I decided (wisely , I think in retrospect ) not to pry . As many philosophers unfamiliar with my ordeal have more recently speculated , the acquisition of a new body leaves one 's person intact . And after a period of adjustment to a new voice , new muscular strengths and weaknesses, and so forth , one 's personality is by and large also preserved. More dramatic changes in personality have been routinely observed in people who have undergone extensive plastic surgery , to say nothing of sex change operations , and I think no one contests the survival of the person in such cases. In any event I soon accommodated to my new body , to the point of being unable to recover any of its novelties to my consciousness or even memory . The view in the mirror soon became utterly familiar . That view , by the way , still revealed antennae, and so I was not surprised to learn that my brain had not been moved from its haven in the life -support lab . I decided that good old Yorick deserved a visit . I and my new body , whom we might as well call Fortinbras , strode into the familiar lab to another round of applause from the technicians , who were of course congratulating themselves, not me. Once more I stood before the vat and contemplated poor Yorick , and on a whim I once again cavalierly flicked off the output transmitter switch . Imagine my surprise when nothing unusual happened . No fainting spell , no nausea, no noticeable change. A technician hurried to restore the switch to ON , but still I felt nothing . I demanded an explanation , which the project director hastened to provide . It seems that before they had even operated on the first occasion , they had constructed a computer duplicate of my brain , reproducing both the complete information processing structure and the computational speed of my brain in a giant computer program . After the operation , but before they had dared to send me off on my mission to Oklahoma , they had run this computer system and Yorick side by side. The incoming signals from Hamlet were sent simultaneously to Yorick 's transceivers and to the computer 's array of inputs . And the out puts from Yorick were not only beamed back to Hamlet , my body ; they were recorded and checked against the simultaneous output of the computer program , which was called " Hubert " for reasons obscure to me. Over days and even weeks, the outputs were iden tical and synchronous , which of course did not prove that they

320

BRAINSTORMS

had succeeded in copying the brain 's functional structure , but the empirical support was greatly encouraging . Hubert 's input , and hence activity , had been kept parallel with Yorick 's during my disembodied days . And now , to demonstrate this , they had actually thrown the master switch that put Hubert for the first time in on-line control of my body - not Hamlet , of course, but Fortinbras . (Hamlet , I learned , had never been recovered from its underground tomb and could be assumed by this time to have largely returned to the dust . At the head of my grave still lay the magnificent bulk of the abandoned device , with the word STUD emblazoned on its side in large letters - a circumstance which may provide archeologists of the next century with a curious insight into the burial rites of their ancestors.) The laboratory technicians now showed me the master switch , which had two positions , labeled B , for Brain (they didn 't know my brain 's name was Yorick ) and H , for Hubert . The switch did indeed point to H , and they explained to me that if I wished , I could switch it back to B . With my heart in my mouth (and my brain in its vat ), I did this . Nothing happened . A click , that was all . To test their claim , and with the master switch now set at B , I hit Yorick 's output trans mitter switch on the vat and sure enough , I began to faint . Once the output switch was turned back on and I had recovered my wits , so to speak, I continued to play with the master switch , flipping it back and forth . I found that with the exception of the transitional click , I could detect no trace of a difference . I could switch in mid -utterance , and the sentence I had begun speaking under the control of Yorick was finished without a pause or hitch of any kind under the control of Hubert . I had a spare brain , a prosthetic device which might some day stand me in very good stead, were some mishap to befall Yorick . Or alternatively , I could keep Yorick as a spare and use Hubert . It didn 't seem to make any difference which I chose, for the wear and tear and fatigue on my body did not have any debilitating effect on either brain , whether or not it was actually causing the motions of my body , or merely spilling its output into thin air . The one truly unsettling aspect of this new development was the prospect , which was not long in dawning on me, of someone detaching the spare- Hubert or Yorick , as the case might be- from Fortinbras and hitching it to yet another body - some Johnny -come-lately Rosencrantz or Guildenstern . Then (if not before ) there would be two people , that much was clear . One would be me, and the other would be a sort of super-twin brother . If there were two bodies , one under the control of Hubert and the other being controlled by Yorick , then

WhereAm I ?

321

which would the world recognize as the true Dennett ? And whatever the rest of the world decided , which one would be me? Would I be the Yorick -brained one , in virtue of Yorick 's causal priority and for mer intimate relationship with the original Dennett body , Hamlet ? That seemed a bit legalistic , a bit too redolent of the arbitrariness of consanguinity and legal possession, to be convincing at the metaphysi cal level . For , suppose that before the arrival of the second body on the scene, I had been keeping Yorick as the spare for years, and letting Hubert 's output drive my body - that is, Fortinbras - all that time . The Hubert -Fortinbras couple would seem then by squatter 's rights (to combat one legal intuition with another ) to be the true Dennett and the lawful inheritor of everything that was Dennett 's. This was an interesting question , certainly , but not nearly so pressing as another question that bothered me. My strongest intuition was that in such an eventuality I would survive so long as either brain -body couple remained intact , but I had mixed emotions about whether I should want both to survive . I discussed my worries with the technicians and the project direc tor . The prospect of two Dennetts was abhorrent to me, I explained , largely for social reasons. I didn 't want to be my own rival for the affections of my wife , nor did I like the prospect of the two Dennetts sharing my modest professor 's salary . Still more vertiginous and distasteful , though , was the idea of knowing that much about another person , while he had the very same goods on me . How could we ever face each other ? My colleagues in the lab argued that I was ignoring the bright side of the matter . Weren't there many things I wanted to do but , being only one person, had been unable to do ? Now one Dennett could stay at home and be the professor and family man , while the other could strike out on a life of travel and adventure missing the family of course, but happy in the knowledge that the other Dennett was keeping the home fires burning . I could be faithful and adulterous at the same time . I could even cuckold myself - to say nothing of other more lurid possibilities my colleagues were all too ready to force upon my overtaxed imagination . But my ordeal in Oklahoma (or was it Houston ?) had made me less adventurous , and I shrank from this opportunity that was being offered (though of course I was never quite sure it was being offered to me in the first place). There was another prospect even more disagreeable- that the spare, Hubert or Yorick as the case might be, would be detached from any input from Fortinbras and just left detached . Then , as in the other case, there would be two Dennetts , or at least two claimants to my name and possessions, one embodied in Fortinbras , and the other

322

BRAINSTORMS

~adly , miserably disembodied . Both selfishness and altruism bade me take steps to prevent this from happening . So I asked that measures be taken

to

ensure

that

no

one

could

ever

tamper

with

the transceiver

connections or the master switch without my (our ? no , my ) knowl edge and consent . Since I had no desire to spend my life guarding the equipment in Houston , it was mutually decided that all the electronic connections in the lab would be carefully locked : both those that con trolled

the

life -support

system

for

Yorick

and

those

that

controlled

the power supply for Hubert would be guarded with fail -safe devices , and I would take the only master switch , outfitted for radio remote control , with me wherever I went . I carry it strapped around my waist and - wait a moment - here it is. Every few months I reconnoiter the situation by switching channels . I do this only in the presence of friends

of

course

, for

if

the

other

channel

were

, heaven

forbid

, either

dead or otherwise occupied , there would have to be somebody who had my interests at heart to switch it back , to bring me back from the void

. For

while

I

could

feel , see , hear

and

otherwise

sense

whatever

befell my body , subsequent to such a switch , I 'd be unable to con trol it . By the way , the two positions on the switch are intentionally unmarked , so I never have the faintest idea whether I am switching from Hubert to Yorick or vice versa . (Some of you may think that in this case I really don 't know who I am , let alone where I am . But such reflections no longer make much of a dent on my essential Dennett ness , on

my

own

sense

of

who

I am . If

it

is true

that

in

one

sense

I

don 't know who I am then that 's another one of your philosophical truths of underwhelming significance .) In any case, every time I 've flipped the switch so far , nothing has happened . So let 's give it a try . . . . " THANK

GOD ! I THOUGHT

YOU 'D NEVER

FLIP

THAT

SWITCH

!

You can 't imagine how horrible it 's been these last two weeks - but now you know , it 's your turn in purgatory . How I 've longed for this moment ! You see, about two weeks ago- excuse me , ladies and gentle men , but I 've got to explain this to my . . . um , brother , I guess you could say , but he 's just told you the facts , so you 'll understand about two weeks ago our two brains drifted just a bit out of synch . I don

than

't

know

you

whether

do , but

my

in any

brain

is now

case , the

two

Hubert

brains

or

Yorick

drifted

, any

more

apart , and

of

course once the process started , it snowballed , for I was in a slightly different receptive state for the input we both received , a difference that was soon magnified . In no time at all the illusion that I was in control of my body - our body - was completely dissipated . There was nothing I could do - no way to call you . YOU DIDN 'T EVEN KNOW

WhereAm I ?

323

I EXISTED ! It 's been 1ike being carried around in a cage, or better , like being possessed- hearing my own voice say things I didn 't mean to say, watching in frustration as my own hands performed deeds I hadn 't intended . You 'd scratch our itches , but not the way I would have, and you kept me awake, with your tossing and turning . I 've been totally exhausted , on the verge of a nervous breakdown , carried around helplessly by your frantic round of activities , sustained only by the knowledge that some day you 'd throw the switch . " Now it 's your turn , but at least you 'll have the comfort of know ing I know you 're in there . Like an expectant mother , I 'm eating- or at any rate tasting , smelling , seeing- for two now , and I 'll try to make it easy for you . Don 't worry . Just as soon as this colloquium is over , you and I will fly to Houston , and we'll see what can be done to get one of us another body . You can have a female body - your body could be any color you like . But let 's think it over . I tell you what - to be fair , if we both want this body , I promise I '11let the project direc tor flip a coin to settle which of us gets to keep it and which then gets to choose a new body . That should guarantee justice , shouldn 't it ? In any case, I 'll take care of you , I promise . These people are my wit nesses. " Ladies and gentlemen , this talk we have just heard is not exactly the talk I would have given, but I assure you that everything he said was perfectly true . And now if you 'll excuse me, I think ! 'd- we'dbetter sit down .,,2

Notes

Introduction 1. See my " Current Issu~ in the Philosophy of Mind " , in A merican Philosophi cal Quarterly , October , 1978. 2 . See Jerry

Fodor , The Language of Thought

Chapter

account

1 , for a vigorous

of what

( New York : Crowell , 1975 ) :

is wrong

with

type

identity

theory

.

3 . See also Jerry Fodor and Ned Block , " What Psychological States are Not " , Philosophical Review , LXXXI ( 1972 ), and Ned Block , " Troubles with Func tionalism " in C. W . Savage, ed ., Perception and Cognition : Issues in the Foundations of Psychology , Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science , vol . IX ( 1978 ) . 4 . Cf . Fodor

, op . cit . , " Introduction

Putnam , " Reductionism

: Two

Kinds

of Reductionism

" , and Hilary

and the Nature of Psychology " ~Cognition , II ( 1973 ) :

131 - 46 .

5 . See Richard Aquila , Intentionality : A Study of Mental Acts (University Park : Pennsylvania State University , 1977 ), especially Chapter 1 , for a sounder

conception

of Brentano

's sense of the thesis .

6 . W . G . Lycan and G . Pappas , Materialism Chapter

( forthcoming

) : Chapter 4 .

1

1 . I am indebted to Peter Woodruff chapter

prior

to its initial

for making extensive improvements

publication

. Since

it appeared

, I have found

in this antici -

pations and developments of similar or supporting themes in a variety of writers , most notably Carl Hempel , " Rational Action " , Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association , XXXV ( 1962 ), re printed Action

in N . S. Care and C . Landesman ( Bloomington , Indiana : University

" Teleological 51 ) , and

, eds ., Readings in the Theory of Press , 1968 ) ; L . Jonathan Cohen ,

Explanation " , Proceedings of the Aristotelian

" Can

there

be Artificial

Minds ? " , Analysis

Society ( 1950 -

( 1954 - 55 ) ; B . A . O .

Williams , " Deciding to Believe " , in H . E. Kiefer and M . K . Munitz , eds., Language , Belief , and Metaphysics (Albany : SUNY Press, 1970 ), and David Lewis , " Radical Interpretation " , Synthese , III , IV ( 1974 ) : 331 - 44 ; 2 . For a lucid introduction to the concept and its history , see the entry on " intentionality " by Roderick Chisholm in P. Edwards , ed ., The Encyclopedia

326

BRAINSTORMS

of

Philosophy

3 .

Content

4 .

The

( New and

term

it

develop

the

5 .

notes rationality

have

in " ,

both

,

,

. A .

ter

H .

W .

Their

and

with

an

See

I

) :

use

is

this

an

like

his

use

does

not

introduction

to

presupposi

volume

( Ithaca

of its

Taylor

. For

of

).

Explanation

philosophical

14

Belief

, 1969

p . 62 , where

it , but

fewer

theory

and

Phillips

Griffiths

and

'

-

.

epistemic

, N . Y . : Cornell

penetrating

Society

Constraint

Griffiths

,

,

" ,

, ed . ,

" Belief

,

and

XXVIII

logic

in

, 1962

) :

discussion

LXIII

ibid

.,

Knowledge

),

: Harper

&

" Unconscious

) : 667

Will

( 1954

York

Collins

- 80

( 1962

LXIV

( 1964

and

" On

/ 3 ) :

167

- 86

) : 139

Belief

( New

;

- 56 , York

:

" ,

Proceedings

reprinted

Row

in

, 1966

Belief

of

S.

the

Aristotelian

Hampshire

, ed . , Philos

-

).

" , Journal

of

Philosophy

,

LXVI

, 20

.

, " Consciousness

) , for years

ago

In

of

this

',

of

, 1972

" What

is

- 445

See

John

Way

of

Ryle

of

Language

" , and

" , were

PhilosophYt

" Con

published

LXIXt

in

L .

of

Massachusetts

is

Foster

18

( October

, Comput

made

of

'ers

it

in

and

the

Thought

field

today

,

eds

.,

of

Philosophy

( New

Yorkt

( 1978

) than

Content

it

and

J .

W .

Press

and

Swanson

, 1970

Consciousness

Experience

and

).

, Journal

,

LXIX

). and

Machines

Consciousnesst like

to

Vickers Doing

,

be

a

pp

. 118

Bat

? '"

" Judgment

Things

makes

( Doubleday

Anchor

, 1971

).

- 19 . Philosophical

Reviewt

LXXXIII

( 1974

this

and

( New

point

Haven

in

" A

, ed . , Studies

in

Belief : Yale

Puzzling

the

" ,

in

, 1969

Content

Chapter

K . Lambertt

Element

Philosophy

ed . , The

Logical

of

in Thought

the

Notion and

of

Thinking

Action

( Oxford

and

Consciousness

, pp

. 8 - 15 .

3 See ( New

,

in

) :

).

).

See

-

, along

.

Strawson

1968

of

Problem

Journal

F . Feldman . Less

Mentality

and

435

in

Role

- Body

.

review

Content

Secondary

Mind

essaYt

and

( University

12

the

the

.

distinction

Eventst

his

: and

- 604

this

K . Gundersont

1 .

.

E . A . Feigenbaum

5 .

.

Price

vol

- abstract

6 .

10

game

1964

p . 58ff

and

Aristotelian

" Belief

Consciousness

" Mental

in

H .

) : 579

( April

9 .

the

Phillips

( New

papers

tent

Theory

8 .

as

with

Paul ' s The

2

ten

7 .

's

in

. 16 , 1969

1963

4 .

that

,

, his

12

Kegan

Taylor

).

Mind

5 , 1972

3 .

term

Chapters

A .

of

supple

of

( Oct

2 .

Paul

, however

Knowledge

especially

Mayo

e .g . ,

ophy

1 .

mind

, 1967

Society

Chap

of

pa ~ ing

Proceedings

reprinted

. oxford

Cf

Kegan

system

sections

, in

Charles

the

. See

intentional

in

Bernard

See

&

&

in

.

and

8 .

first

Hintikka

Belief

7 .

the

occurs

with

depth

).

: Routledge

Routledge

in an

assuming

I

"

co - extensive

of

, see

:

notion

concept

p . 38 6 .

is

, 1967

( London system

( London

suggests

tions

: MacMillan

" intentional

Behaviour

the

York

Consciousness

another

York

context

: Humanities

,

A .

, 1961

I .

Melden

) : pp . 211

's

use

- 15 .

of

the

notion

in

Free

Action

't ,

Notes

327

2 . G . E . M . Anscombe , Intention ( 2nd ed . ; Oxford : Blackwell , 1963 ) . 3 . G . Harman , " Language Learning " , Nous , IV ( 1970 ) : 35 . See also his " Three

Levels of Meaningttt Journal of Philosophy , LXV ( 1968 ) : 590 - 602t especially p . 598

.

4 . See Donald Davidson , " Theories of Meaning and Learnable Languages " , in Y . Bar -Hillel , ed ., Logic , Methodology , and Philosophy of Science (Amster dam : North

-Holland

, 1965 ) : 383 - 94 .

5 . M . L . Minsky , ed ., Semantic

Information

Processing (Cambridge : M .I .T .

Press , 1968 ) : 26 .

6 . Mind Logic

( 1895 ), reprinted ( New

York

" Psychological XLIV

in I . M . Copi and J. A . Gould , eds., Readings on

: Macmillan

, 1964 ) . Harman

Aspects of .the Theory

offers

a similar

of Syntax " , Journal

argument

( 1967 ) : 75 - 87 .

7 . H . von Foerster , A . Inselberg , and P. Weston , " Memory and Inductive ence " , in

Bionics

in

of Philosophy ,

H . L . Oestreicher

( New York

: Gordon

and

D . R . Moore

, eds ., C ) Jbernetic

Problems

Infer in

and Breach , 1968 ) .

8 . See G . E. M . Anscombe , " The Intentionality of Sensation : A Grammatical Feature " , in R . J. Butler , ed ., Analytical Philosophy , Second Series ( Oxford : Blackwell , 1965 ) . 9 . G . Harman , " Language

Learning

10 . See John Vickers , " Judgment Way of Doing

Things

( New

".

and Belief " , in K . Lambert , ed ., The Logical

Haven : Yale

University

Press , 1969 ) , and A . W .

Collins , " Unconscious Belief " , Journal of Philosophy , LXVI

( 1969 ) : 667 - 80 .

Chapter 4

1. Beyond Freedom and Dignity (New York : Knopf , 1971), p. 11. See also Skinner 's About Behaviorism (New York : Random House, 1974): p. 31 : " Almost all versions (of mentalism) contend that the mind is a non-physical space in which events obey non-physical laws" . 2. Beyond Freedom and Dignity , pp. 12 and 191. 3. In the film , Behavior Control : Freedom and Morality (Open University Film Series). This is a conversation between Skinner and Geoffrey Warnock, reviewed by me in Teaching Philosophy , I , 2 (Fall , 1975 ) : 175- 7. See also A bout Behaviorism, p. 121 : " By attempting to move human behavior into a world of non-physical dimensions, mentalistic or cognitivistic psychologists have cast the basic issuesin insoluble form . " Note that here he countenances no exceptions to the cognitivist -dualist equation . 4. Beyond Freedom and Dignity , p. 191. Seealso Skinner 's Science and Human Behavior (Free Presspaperback edition , 1953) : p. 285 and 82. 5. " Behaviorism at Fiftytt , in T. W. Wannt ed.t Behaviorism and Phenomenology (Un iversity of Chicago Press, 1964 ) : 84. 6. Beyond Freedom and Dignity : pp. 1, 14 and 193. In About Behaviorism Skinner countenances covert behavior (p. 26) and " private consequences" as reinforcers (p. 106)t but on other pages insists " the environment stays where it is and where it has always been- outside the bodytt (p. 75)t and " Neither the stimulus nor the response is ever in the body in any literal sense" (p. 148). See also " Why Look Insidett, About Behaviorism, 165- 69. 7. Beyond Freedom and Dignity , p. 14. 8. "The Case Against B. F. Skinner 't, New York Review of Books (December

328

BRAINSTORMS

30 , 1971 ). 9 . " Behaviorism at Fifty " , p . 84 . 10 . Beyond Freedom and Dignity , p . 195 ; see also pp . 8 and 10 . About Behavior ism , p . 18 and 170 ; Cumulative Record ( 1961 ) : pp . 274 - 75 . 11 . In " Operant Behavior " , in W. K . Honig , ed ., Operant Behavior : Areas of Research and Application (New York : Appleton Century Crofts , 1966 ), Skinner disparages theories that attempt to order the behavioral chaos by positing " some mental , physiological or merely conceptual inner system which by its nature is neither directly observed in nor accurately represented on any occasion by , the performance of an organism . There is no comparable inner system in an operant analysis " ( p. 16 ). Here sheer internality is appar ently the bogy . See also Science and Human Behavior , p . 32ff . 12 . He could hardly deny this , but he comes perilously close to it in A bout Behaviorism , where a particularly virulent attack of operationalism tempts him to challenge the credentials of such innocuous " scientific " concepts as the tensile strength of rope and the viscosity of fluids (pp . 165 - 66 ). Before philosophers scoff at this , they should remind themselves where psycholo gists caught this disease. A few pages later ( p. 169 ) Skinner grants that a molecular explanation of viscosity is " a step forward " and so are physiologi cal explanations of behavior . In " What is Psychotic Behavior ?" ( in Cumulative Record ) he disparages " potential energy " and " magnetic field " 13 . Beyond Freedom and Dignity , pp . 9 and 23 ; Cumulative Record , pp . 283 - 84 ; " Behaviorism at Fifty " . 14 . A patient and exhaustive review of these issues in Skinner 's writings up to 1972 can be found in Russell Keat , " A Critical Examination of B . F . Skin ner 's Objections to Mentalism " , Behaviorism , vol . I ( Fall ,- 1972 ). 15 . " Behaviorism at Fifty " , p . 80 ; Beyond Freedom and Dignity , Chapter 1 , and p . 160 . 16 . Beyond Freedom and Dignity , p . 195 . 17 . New Essays on the Understanding ( 1704 ) : Preface . See also Leibniz ' Dis course on Metaphysics , X . 18 . Skinner finds a passage in Newton to much the same effect as Leibniz : Beyond Freedom and Dignity , p . 9 . 19 . Ibid

. , p . 14 .

20 . Ibid ., p . 200 . 21 . In About Behaviorism , ( pp . 213 - 14 ) Skinner provides a marvelous list of the cognitivistic horrors - together with the hint that they are all equally bad , and that the use of one implicates one in the countenancing of all the others : " . . . sensations . . . intelligence . . . decisions . . . beliefs . . . a death instinct . . . sublimation . . . an id . . . a sense of shame . . . reaction formations . . . psychic energy . . . consciousness . . . mental illnesses . . ." 22 . " Behaviorism at Fifty " , p . 80 . 23 . See Content and Consciousness ( 1969 ), and Chapter 1 of this volume , where I argue at length for this claim . 24 . " Behaviorism at Fifty " , p. 80 . 25 . See, e.g., Roderick Chisholm , Perceiving . A Philosophical Study ( 1957 ), and numerous articles since then ; also Quine , Word and Object ( 1960 ) ; W. G. Lycan , " On Intentionality and the Psychological " , American Philosophical Quarterly (October , 1969 ). 26 . There is a great deal of literature to suggest , however , that specifying the

Notes

329

logicalmarksof intentionalidiomsis hardlyuncontroversial . See , e.g., Lycan, Opecite 27. WordandObject,p. 221. 28. Quinehasrecentlyconfirmedto me in conversation that he hasbeenunsuc cessfulin attemptsto conveythis portionof the Quineancreedto hisclose friendin WilliamJames Hall. 29. Seeespecially BeyondFreedomandDignity, pp. 24and72. 30. A carefulreadingof these"translations " shoulddo morethanreadingthe combinedworksof Chisholmand Quineto convincethe readerthat translatingthe intentionalin behavioral termsis impossible . 31. "Behaviorism at Fifty", p. 93. 32. BeyondFreedom andDignity, p. 93. 33. SeealsoBeyondFreedomandDignity, p. 118. 34. A defenderof Skinner , in response to this sentence , soughtto explainand justify thiscuriousbehavior of Skinner's by suggesting thatthereasonSkinner overlookedthis crucialvacillationis that he hadno ideahe wasconducting any suchargument . Accordingto this apologist , Skinner 's entirecaseagainst freedomand dignity boils down to an uncomplicated allegianceto hard determinism . If so, I 've vastlyoverestimated Skinner . However , if I understand the principlesof the new hermeneutics (a dubiousantecedent !), I am entitled to ignorerefractorybiographicaldetailslike theseand press aheadwith my interpretation of thetexts. 35. TheMachinery of theBrain(NewYork: McGrawHill, 1963): p. 82. 36. In "Behaviorism at Fifty" Skinnerdiscusses Lloyd Morgan 's Canonof Parsi mony, whichis a specialcase , in a way, of Occam 's Razor: neverassume any more intellector powersof rationality than are requiredto explainthe behavior . He seemsin the endto think this groundshisconvictionthat " it is in the natureof scientificinquiry" that ascriptions of rationalitymustall in theendbefalsified. 37. True or false - I am not preparedto concedethe truth of hisoperantconditioningtheory, evenfor pigeons . 38. But we shouldn 't. SeeW. F. Brewer , "Thereis No Convincing Evidence for Operantor Classical Conditioningin Adult Humans ", in W. B. Weimer , ed., Cognitionand the SymbolicProcesses (Hillsdale , New Jersey : Erlbaum , 1974). 39. SeeScienceandHulnanBehavior , p. 177, andChomsky 's amusing reductio ad absurdum of Skinner's analysis of " yourmoneyor yourlife" in hisreview of VerbalBehavior , in Language (1959), reprintedin J. FodorandJ. Katz, ed., The Structureof Language , Readingsin the Philosophyof Language (NewYork: PrenticeHall, 1964). 40. R. J. Nelson , "Behaviorism is False", Journalof Philosophy (July 24, 1969); seealsoMichaelArbib, "MemoryLimitationsof Stimulus -Response Models ", PsychologicalReview , LXXVI, 5 (1969): 507-11, and Patrick Suppes , "Stimulus -Response Theoryof AutomataandTOTEHierarchies : A Replyto Arbib", Psychological Review , LXXVI, 5 (1969): 511-14. 41. In A bout Behaviorism , Skinnersays: "When. . . historiesareout of reach, very little predictionandcontrol is possible , but a behavioristic accountis still moreusefulthana mentalisticonein interpretingwhata personisdoing and why. . . . [If ] we aregoingto guess , it is morehelpfulto guessabout geneticendowment andenvironmental historythanaboutthefeelingswhich

330

BRAINSTORMS

have resulted from them " ( pp . 2 and 5 - 6 ) . Here again we see Skinner 's failure of stimulus discrimination betraying him . He speaks of the feelings which

hav~ resulted . Feelings are a wishy -washy , unpredictive use to the cognitive instance ( or better

lot , no doubt , of scant

psychologist , but beliefs , expectations and intentions , for still , their theoretical counterparts ) are much more power -

fully organizable into predictive and explanatory

structures .

Chapter 5 1 . Quoted matical 2 . Herbert

by Jacques Hadamardt in The Psychology of Inventing Field ( Princeton University Presst 1949 ) : p . 30 . Simont The Sciences of the Artificial ( M .I .T . ) : p . 97 .

in the Mathe -

3 . D . E . Broadbentt Behaviour ( University Paperbacks edn ., 1961 ) : p . 75 . 4 . Clark Hull , Principles of Behavior ( 1943 ) : p . 19 . 5 . Cf . also B . F . Skinner

, " Behaviorism

ism and Phenomenology 6 . Broadbent

at Fifty

(University

' tt in T . W . Wann , ed .t Behavior

-

of Chicago Presst 1969 ) : 80 .

, op . cit . , p . 56 .

7 . Cf . , e.g . , Charles Taylor , The Explanation of Behaviour ( 1964 ) ; Chomsky 's reviews of Skinner 's Verbal Behavior , in Language ( 1959 ) ; and Beyond Free dom and Dignity , in New York Review of Books ( Dec . 30 , 1971 ) ; Broad bent

, op . cit .

8 . Science

and

Human

Behavior

, p . 55 .

9 . " Behaviorism at Fifty " , in Wann , op . cit . , p . 84 . 10 . See , for instance , the computer -copy of a particular

stockbroker

in E . A .

Feigenbauln & J . Feldman , eds., Computers and Thought ( New York : McGraw Hill , 1964 ) . 11 . Quoted in Hadamard , op . cit . , p . 16 , italics added . 12 . Quoted in Hadamard , op . cit ., p . 14 . 13 . Arthur Koestler , The Act of Creation ( New York : Dell , 1964 ) : p . 164 .

Chapter

7

1 . J . Weizenbaum , Computer man , 1976 ) : p . 179 , credits 2 . Cf . also

Content

and

Power and Human Reason Louis Fein with this term .

Consciousness

3 . Cf . Zenon Pylyshyn , " Complexity Intelligence Intelligence

" , in Martin ( Humanities

good elaboration tive

psychology

( San Francisco

: Free -

.

and the Study of Artificial

Ringle , ed ., Philosophical Perspectives Press and Harvester Press , 1978 ) , for

and Human on Artificial a particularly

of the top -down strategy , a familiar theme in AI and cogni . Moore

Lee W . Gregg , Knowledge

and

Newell

's " How

and Cognition

is the most clear and self -conscious

can MERLIN

Understand

? " in

(New York : Academic Press, 1974 ) ,

employment

of this strategy

I have found .

4 . See also Judson Webb , " Godel 's Theorem and Church 's Thesis : A Prologue to Mechanism " , Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science , XXXI ( Reidel , 1976 ) . 5 . Wilfrid Sellars , Science . Perception and Reality ( London : Routledge & Kegan Paul , 1963 ) : pp . 182ff . 6 . Terry Winograd , Understanding Natural Language ( New York : Academic Press , 1972 ) , pp . 12ff .

Notes 7

.

331

cr

.

Correspondence

between

Association

for

1974

)

:

XVIII

baum

8

.

J

9

10

)

.

Cf

.

cr

.

-

,

claim

.

"

,

.

e

. g

. ,

"

.

.

,

,

e

Artifical

A

. ,

,

;

Chapter

. g

:

362

,

543

Feb

;

.

XVII

,

McLeod

1976

:

108

the

7

,

)

(

July

CACM

;

,

Weizen

-

.

Computers

"

Reason

,

CACM

,

X

,

8

.

Reason

,

.

. ,

"

,

in

,

"

Dimensions

in

1968

)

Sensory

;

F

.

for

detailed

support

Psychological

Explana

Attneave

,

Communication

"

California

Synthese

,

,

in

A

Press

XXXIII

(

of

"

(

Homunculi

a

Link

,

1976

In

-

Defense

of

Cambridge

.

:

Rorty

1976

)

)

,

;

ed

MIT

. ,

Elliot

The

Sober

,

.

Representation

"

Understanding

Study

(

"

1972

Ope

Ope

;

and

Newell

and

Consciousness

.

cit

:

.

and

,

the

,

in

New

D

.

Bobrow

York

and

:

Academic

(

cite

,

Wade

)

cit

ed

,

.

.

,

and

,

1975

)

,

in

P

Z

.

Pyly

-

Pylyshyn

"

"

;

Minnesota

Intelligence

York

of

.

,

forthcoming

Artificial

New

op

Savage

Knowledge

Pylyshyn

' s

.

,

,

op

.

Winston

cit

,

.

ed

;

. ,

.

declarative

,

Eye

.

cit

;

Minsky

.

"

Tells

literature

Ope

IX

Collins

.

representations

in

.

and

op

,

C

and

(

Mind

paper

in

benefits

188

the

' s

and

,

,

Human

and

cit

What

)

Bobrow

Science

Vision

costs

,

;

in

Representing

Computer

the

.

"

"

of

for

,

cit

?

Intelligence

of

Pylyshyn

Moore

Knowledge

of

Framework

Winston

op

(

e

(

Human

Rational

University

In

the

Collins

Bulletin

See

cite

;

Imagery

and

the

Mind

referenced

in

Winograd

in

,

Ope

cit

' s

these

Artificial

Intelli

Brain

"

papers

,

-

Psychologi

-

.

Bobrow

and

Collins

,

op

.

.

8

1

.

Norman

2

.

In

Malcolm

3

.

Dreaming

4

.

David

5

.

See

Norman

LXV

(

6

.

7

.

"

,

Content

,

op

8

.

9

.

.

1956

)

Dreaming

and

.

M

.

p

.

82

-

:

Yost

4

~

37

of

,

1958

-

51

"

What

&

Kegan

.

A

.

,

loco

)

:

Is

cit

It

.

,

to

-

"

Like

,

53

York

VIII

Wolpert

543

New

,

Paul

,

Scribners

"

1959

)

:

p

.

4

.

,

,

1966

)

Philosophical

.

Reuiew

,

.

section

~ '

:

Skepticism

section

"

E

(

and

Stimuli

(

Routledge

Sleep

Dreaming

Skepticism

,

5

"

especially

External

LV

:

.

Skepticism

Nagel

London

.

,

14

and

Thomas

R

:

,

)

(

Psychology

and

Dreaming

1974

,

The

and

Motility

Philosophical

.

Dreaming

Malcolm

Dement

(

cit

,

William

~ '

.

Foulkes

Psychology

10

' s

and

of

. g

:

Human

and

What

on

"

cal

.

"

and

,

"

Philosophy

Winograd

gence

16

"

the

Minsky

See

)

2

of

CACM

.

Imagery

Bobrow

15

)

,

by

(

Representation

and

.

Communications

1974

XIX

1976

Tacit

,

,

(

Psychology

Cf

June

LXV

Rosenblith

Bobrow

in

.

.

,

and

to

,

DeSousa

. ,

Complexity

The

14

.

.

eds

)

Studies

M

W

R

Woods

,

(

in

,

Sept

and

Appeal

Persons

1975

.

shyn

"

;

,

,

A

6

Power

Philosophy

Daniel

Collins

.

,

(

CACM

Power

Representations

See

XIX

9

ale

Understanding

" The

in

)

Mental

W

,

1960

of

Press

.

,

,

Computer

of

Identities

13

CACM

,

Wilks

Computer

,

Journal

,

XVII

;

et

Weizenbaum

cite

Fodor

,

546

Contextual

also

Ope

,

:

;

.

Jerry

"

A

;

,

Homunculi

.

80

Pylyshyn

Press

12

"

Weizenbaum

tion

)

,

464

CACM

1975

McLeod

:

this

Cf

"

,

.

,

Machinery

Arbib

Sept

,

1967

.

.

(

Weizenbaum

of

11

;

9

and

.

(

425

,

Weizenbaum

Computing

VIII

The

,

especially

Relation

Dream

of

Content

"

,

p

Eye

.

30

.

Movements

Journal

,

of

Bodily

Experimental

.

loco

cit

to

.

Be

,

p

a

.

31

Bat

.

?

"

,

-

24

Philosophical

Review

,

LXXXIII

.

and

Donald

Quarterly

Kalish

(

April

,

"

1955

Miss

MacDonald

)

:

109

on

.

Malcolm

Sleeping

and

discusses

Waking

this

"

claim

,

332

BRAINSTORMS

in Dreaming

, op . cit .

11 . C. B . Martin LXXV

Chapter

and Max Deutschert

Nagel

( 1974

Minsky

Memo ogy

, " What , " A

to

Framework

# 306 , 1974 of

Be a Bat ? " Philosophical

4 . John

Review

, LXXXIII

( New of

Representing

published York

Knowledge

in

P . Winston

: Academic

Cyclopean

Press , 1975

Vision

( Chicago

" , MIT

AI

, ed . , The

Lab

Psychol

-

).

: University

of

Chicago

).

Rawls

1971

Vision

, Foundations

Press , 1971

for

, subsequently

Computer

3 . B . Julesz

, A

Theory

of

Justice

( Cambridge

: Harvard

University

Press ,

).

5 . Lawrence

Davis

phy

Psychology

and

6 . See

also

Studies

, unpublished

Sydney

Shoemaker

, XXVII

tions

of

( 1978

).

7 . Ulric

( 1975

tance

in

Francisco

as to

deny

8 . Neisser

theory

Fodor

, The

and

in the

Unattended

, and

in

the

and

Qualia

" , Philosophical

, " Troubles : Issues

Philoso

-

- see

his

convinced

Century

Cognition

it is not

Crofts

,

impor

-

of and

Reality

he can

important

-

, vol . IX

a position

see that

-

Founda

of Science

from

I cannot

Functional

in the

: Appleton

memory

) - but

with

Philosophy

York

iconic

not

for

Cognition

processes

I am

Association

go so far

.

. Ope cite

Language

M . Garrett

of

Thought

, " Resolving

Ear " , Cognition

10 . D . E . Broadbent

and

, 1976

Psychology

Block

( New

banish

perceptual

its existence

Lackner

1958

of

to

the

.

Ned

Studies

: W . H . Freeman

, Cognitive

9 . Jerry

; and

Psychology

wishes

to

, 1974

C' Functionalism

. Minnesota

now

the

( San

delivered

, ed . , Perception

, Cognitive

) . Neisser

,

) : 291 - 315

Savage

Psychology

Neisser

1967

paper

, M .I . T . , October

ism " , in C . Wade

, Perception

( New

, I ( 1973

and

York

Ambiguity

: Crowell

: Effects

, 1975

of

) ; J. R .

Biasing

Context

) : 359 - 72 .

Communication

( Oxford

: Pergamon

Press ,

).

11 . William

James

York

: Dover

12 . The

, The

clearest

the

's Brain

LXXXVI Forms

. A

( 1973 " ,

in

of

be

steps

in

Zenon

Critique

Theoretical

of

and

functional

Pylyshyn

Mental

in

; edition

cited

, " Mental

the

to

Mind

( New

structural

's Eye

" , Psychological

of

Knowledge

Language

( 1975

( 1971 ) : 701 - 3 . to Michael Hooker

premises

, " What

Imagery

Natural

Preprint

J . Metzler

jects " , Science , CLXXI 14 . I owe this observation

from

" Representation

Issues

Linguistics

, vol . 1 , 1890

) : 251 - 52 .

false

found

) : 1 - 24 , and

Computational

13 . R . N . Shepard

of Ps )' cho logy

, 1950

account is to

Mind

Principles

Publications

conclusions

1 . The

is it Like

) : 435 - 51 .

2 . Marvin

Chapter

Review ,

9

1 . Thomas

for

" Remembering " , Philosophical

( 1969 ) : 189 .

: Non

Processing

Tells

Bulletin

,

- linguistic

, Association

).

Rotation

of

Three

- Dimensional

Ob -

.

10 psychological

tion

of

current

new

journal

, the

literature work

will

Journal

on be out of

mental of

Mental

date

images

is growing

before

Imagery

the . A

few

ink

so fast

that

is dry . There

cla . ic

papers

a cita is even

are

a

R . N .

333

Notes

Shepard and J. Metzler , " Mental Rotation of Three -Dimensional Objects " , Science , CLXXI ( 1971 ) : 701 - 3 ; L . A . Cooper and R . N . Shepard , " Chrono metric Studies of the Rotation of Mental Images " , in W . G . Chase , ed ., Visual Information Processing ( 1973 ) : 75 - 115 ; Allan Paivio , Imagery and Verbal

Processes (New York : Holt Rinehart and Winston , 1971 ) ; Zenon Pylyshyn , " What the Mind 's Eye Tells the Mind 's Brain : a Critique of Mental Imagery " , Psychological Bulletin ( 1972 ) and " Imagery and Artificial Intelligence " , forthcoming in C. Wade Savage, ed ., Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science , vol . IX , and M . Kosslyn , " Information Representation in Visual Images " , Cognitive Psychology ( 1975 ), vol . 7 : 341 - 70 . 2 . D . M . Armstrong , Belief , Truth and Knowledge (Cambridge University Press , 1971 ) . 3 . Cf . my " Geach and Intentional ( 1968 ) : 335 - 41 . 4 . I find support for my reading

Identity of

" , Journal

Husserl

of Philosophy

in Richard

Schacht

LXV , 11

's excellently

lucid article , " Husserlian and Heideggerian Phenomenology " , Philosophical Studies , XXIII ( 1972 ) : 293 - 314 . Schacht proposed there to distinguish what he calls phenomenography from phenomenology . In the terms of this chap ter , phenomenography would be the mere gathering and catalog ~ ing of pro tocols ( one 's own , not others ' ) without attempting the further extrapolation of intentional objects from them - which is phenomenology . 5 . I find support especially in Alastair Hannay 's ' 'Sartre 's Illusion of Transcen dence " , Chapter 5 of Mental Images - A Defence ( London : Allen and Unwin 1971 ) . "The term ' image ' itself should be used to refer to the way the object appears , or rather , to the way in which an imaging -consciousness 'gives itself

-

,

an object '." ( p . 99 ). 6 . Husserl speaks of the hyle or hyletic phase , and I am tempted to claim that the occupants of the Q-role are Husserl 's hyle , but perhaps the hyle are only some

constituents

of or raw material

Phases as Real , the Noematic

for

the Q. See " The Hyletic

and Noetic

as Non -real Phases of Experience " , Section 97

of Husserl 's Ideas , W . R . Bryce Gibson , trans . ( London : George Allen and Unwin , 1931 ) . Bo Dahlbom has both clarified and complicated my thinking on 7 . Cf .

this

issue .

also

Content

and

Consciousness

, and

for

an

account

of

the

relation

between such utterances and the " propositional .episodes" that evince them , see my " On the Absence

of Phenomenology

" ( forthcoming

in B . L . Tapscott

,D .

Gustafson , eds ., Body , Mind and Method : Essays in Honor of Virgil Aldrich , Dordrecht

: Reidel ) .

8 . Cf . Strawson 's insightful discussions of the dangers and prospects of con ceiving of ( without believing in ) " phenomenal figures " , in " Physical and Phenomenal Geometry " , in The Bounds 0 ' Sense ( London : Methuen , 1966 ) : pp . 281 - 92 . "The problem is whether the nature of phenomenal geometry can be described without a dangerous reliance on the possibly dubious con cept of the phenomenal figure - a concept which , though dubious , is satisfying to one 's simple -minded wish for a set of objects to be the peculiar matter of

the study ." ( p . 288 )

Chapter11 1. Keith Gunderson,Mentality and Machines(1971).