Capital & Class. - 1985. - Issue 25 issue 25

DexterWhitfield

3 s

Coal : a privatisation postponed? Apart from their manifesto, the Conservatives have published no overall plan for privatisation . The first indication that a nationalised industry is under threat usually comes when one or other senior party ideologue floats a proposal . In this article, Dexter Whitfield documents the indications that the National Coal Board, or its more profitable parts, is amongst the industries that the government plans to privatise - but only if the power of the National Union of Mineworkers can be broken . has been on a hidden agenda throughout the miners strike . `Private funds may be sought for NCB expansion' (The Times 5 May 1984) and `Coal mines for the miner' (Financial Times 17 September 1984) are two recent headlines concerning the threat of privatisation of the National Coal Board (NCB). However, there has been very little public comment by either the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM), the NCB, or the government on plans to privatise the pits, nor has there been much media discussion . This lack of discussion could later have catastrophic results both for the miners and other public sector workers . It also disguises the fact that 15% of coal production is already privately owned PRIVATISATION

CO

5

Capital & Class

6 (opencast sites and licenced private pits) and that under the NCB's current programme of asset sales several subsidiaries, land and property have been sold . State secrets In May 1984 The Times reported that a Cabinet subcommittee had agreed to allow the NCB to seek private capital to develop a new generation of highly profitable pits . `It is felt that the part privatisation policy could well aggravate the pit strike and stiffen the miners resolve . But it must also be a prerequisite of the plan that the political power of Mr Arthur Scargill and the National Union of Mineworkers should be broken . It is unlikely that private investment could be attracted if Mr Scargill were able to stop the current programme of pit closures . If he won that battle, he could prevent privatisation' . (The Times 5 May 1984) . Strenuous efforts were apparently made to keep this from being reported more widely. The information reportedly came for John Moore, Financial Secretary to the Treasury and responsible for coordinating the government's privatisation programme . In autumn 1983 he had declared `No state monopoly is sacrosanct' to a gathering of stockbrokers. He specifically mentioned coal, gas, electricity, bus transport, telecommunications, sewerage treatment and disposal . Moore was previously at the Department of Industry and responsible for the coal industry . Replying to rumours in 1981 about the imminent sale of opencast sites he said the government thought of opencast mining `as more akin to quarrying, a privatelyowned industry, than to deep mining' . He refused to confirm or deny the rumours, leaving the distinct impression that the matter was under consideration but no detailed plans had been drawn up . Shortly after the miners strike started Norman Tebbitt, Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, hinted that privatisa-

tion of the pits was on the government's agenda . Addressing a House of Commons press luncheon he said `I just wonder whether we could have a coal mining dispute if we had denationalised the coal industry 10 or 20 years ago. I fancy we would probably have cheaper coal, cheaper electricity, better paid miners and a more efficient economy today . Its a thought is it not, for the future' . Ian MacGregor, NCB chairperson, is clearly in favour of privatisation . Speaking on the future of the coal industry immediately after his appointment he said he hoped that miners would eventually be able to become shareholders in the pits and stated `Any time you can tap private capital you have some kind of understanding that pretty savvy people are interested . That indicates the industry has a future' . (Financial Times, 30 March 1984) MacGregor built his ruthless business reputation in the USA as chairperson, chief executive and shareholder of Amax, a multinational mining conglomerate . It was MacGregor who steered the company into coal mining becoming one of the largest US coal producers acquiring mid-west mining companies and launching numerous antiunion activities against the United Mine Workers of America . In December 1984 MacGregor again raised the possibility of privatising the mines claiming that it would be `wonderful' to sell the 'uneconomic' pits to miners . He stated that `over the long term, there is no question about it, opportunities like this will arise as they have done in other industries' . The NCB has already attempted to set up a futures market for coal . In May 1982 the board announced that merchant bankers S G Warburg had been appointed to examine different options . The NCB were concerned at the escalating costs of maintaining coal stocks, estimated at £125m annually for stocks then standing at 24m tonnes. A futures market would have



Coal privatisation

Table 1 UpforSale: TheMulti-Billion TransferList Estimated Potential Market Value £ millions 1000 British Airways British Gas 7800 300 British Airports Authority Royal Ordnance Factories 350 British Shipbuilders warship yards 200 200 repair yards 350 National Bus Company Post Office 1200 National Girobank 200 British Leyland inc Land Rover and Unipart 1150 British Rail assets incl . Property Board 735 British Nuclear Fuels 250 English Water Authorities 750 Rolls Royce Ltd 350 Electricity 4500 British Steel subsidiaries ? National Coal Board ? British Technology Group shareholdings 50 Government shareholdings British Aerospace 480 BP 2300 Britoil 505 300 Cable and Wireless

Total

£22,970 million

Source : Stockbrokers reports, etc . The sale of British Airways, British Shipbuilders warship yards, and the Royal Ordnance Factories is already underway. Stockbrokers have `valued' many of these services but none has yet put a figure on the potential `market value' of the NCB .

guaranteed the advance sale of most of 7 these stocks . The board considered setting up a separate coal trading company with private shareholders which would have made deals with banks to finance an agreed level of coal stocks . The scheme foundered on Treasury opposition to the NCB using a backdoor method of increasing borrowing without government sanction . Sale lists The full or partial privatisation of the NCB is usually included in lists drawn up by the financial institutions of nationalised industry and public services being considered or prepared for sale (see Table 1) . NUM tactics The NUMS tactics have been to keep the strike centred on pit closures . During the first nine months of the strike there was no serious attempt to nationally and publicly counter the government's or the NCB's apparent privatisation plans . Yet the NUM were not unaware of the threat of privatisation . The second of a series of briefing booklets `Hands off the pits - no privatisation of coal' issued by the union as part of its Campaign for Coal succinctly explained why the government was imposing privatisation and its effects on workers and users . `There is already disturbing talk of the peripheral coal fields being allowed to go to the wall with private capital invited for stakes in the lucrative central coalfield . It is not at all inconceivable that Selby, paid for and developed at tremendous cost to the taxpayer, could be sold off at a knockdown price to private buyers' . The not so reticent right The privatisation of coal mining is on the political agenda of a number of right wing organisations . They are advocating acceleration of the government's asset sales

Capital & Class

8

together with statutory contracting out of local government services and parts of the National Health Service. The Adam Smith Institute's (ASI) Energy Policy report produced as part of its Omega Project to `create and develop new policy initiatives' calls for the NCB's area management units to be formed into separate business units . If these proved to be profitable the equity would be sold to the workforce and new investors . All new pits would be sold individually or in groups to private operators . The ASI's solution to `uneconomic pits' is to lower the costs of coal extraction . `For example, a mine that is judged to be uneconomic under present practices might still be a viable proposition for a number of years if managed by a new private company or a cooperative of existing workers : by extending the life of the pit, the new methods and new management would provide some breathing-space for the community to adjust.' The humane touch-wage cuts now would presumably ease temporarily the otherwise abrupt redundancy and dependency of low employment benefits . The ASI also calls for changes in regulations under the Coal Industry Nationalisation Act 1946 to permit private opencast contractors to sell their coal directly on the market instead of delivering it to the NCB . Restrictions limiting private deep mines to not more than thirty workers undeground would also be lifted . Coal would be imported freely . The editorial in Economic Affairs, journal of the Institute for Economic Affairs recently argued that the government should sell the coal mines to `other owners' . It claims that the `flaw of nationalisation' has created conflict between running the industry `in the public interest' and the government's first priority - a'defence of the realm against external enemies and defence of the innocent

citizen against internal law-breakers' .' The theme of selling `coal mines to the miner' through buy-outs and share ownership, the closure of `unprofitable' and `uneconomic' pits, splitting the NCB into smaller competing private coal supply companies, and lifting all restrictions on coal imports has been emphasized by many other right wing economists .' A paper on the coal industry at an `Incentives for Minerals Development' conference held by the Royal Institute of Chartered Surveyors in June 1984 called for contract mining in Britain's deep mines on a similar basis to the present system of open cast mining by private contractors .' Opencast mining would be fully privatised . A new national coal authority, 'supported' by the government, would also encourage consortia of mining equipment manufacturers, contractors, consulting engineers and surveyors, and bankers to invest directly in coal production . It would also directly build new coal fired power stations near to larger coal reserves and sell electricity as well as developing new oil and gas production plants from coal . The Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC) investigation into the coal industry in 1983 recommended that NCB area management units should be operated as `separate business units' with more 'value-for-money' audits . The MMC also called for the present statutory limit on individual opencast licences should be raised from 25,000 tonnes to 100,000 tonnes . The NCB responded by commissioning multinational management consultants McKinsey and Co . to undertake a major organisational review . What has already been privatised The discussion on the threat of privatisation tends to obscure the scale of existing



Coal privatisation private production of coal and the current sale of assets by the NCB. Firstly, private coal production accounted for 14 .4 per cent of the total 105 .3m tonne output in 1983/84. All 55 opencast sites in Britain, producing 14 .1m tonnes last year, are owned by the NCB but are operated by private contractors. There are already 155 licenced private pits which produced 1 .4m tonnes in 1983/84 . The annual production of opencast and private pits

Table 2 NCB Subsidiaries, shareholdings and turnover 1984 NCB (Coal Products) Ltd

Subsidiaries National Smokeless Fuels - fuel manufacture Thomas Ness Ltd - chemical processing

Shareholdings Pitch Polymer Products Ltd (50%) Staveley Chemicals Ltd (45 %) benzole and chemical refining Coal Processing Consultants Ltd (50%) - consultancy services NCB

(Ancilliaries) Ltd

Scottish Brick Corporation Ltd (50%) - brick manufacture Horizon Exploration (Holdings) Ltd seismic surveying EMS Thermoplant Ltd (50%) industrial boiler design and operation Other subsidiaries Coal Developments (Queensland) Ltd (89%) - joint venture in Capricorn Coal Development Australia Heather Minerals Ltd

Turnover 1984 Mining activities

Subsidiaries Southern Depot Co Ltd - solid fuel distribution National Fuel Distributors Ltd solid fuel distribution Compower Ltd - computer services Tredowen Engineering Ltd engineering Coal Industry Estates Ltd - estates management

Partnerships andshareholdings British Fuel Co (49%) Gwent Coal Distribution Centre (20%) Liverpool Fuel Co (60%) British Mining Consultants (50%)

has not significantly changed since 1947 . Opencast production declined in the mid-1960s to about half its current output but has remained relatively constant since 1977/78 . Private pit production has varied between 0 .9m and 2.3m tonnes since nationalisation . Output has increased 55% in the last six years. The significant change has been NCB annual colliery output which has more than halved from over two hundred million

solid fuel distribution

Mining related activities Manufacture of coke and smokeless fuels Chemicals and secondary by products Distribution of solid fuel Distribution of heating appliances Estates and Land Engineering Computer services Total of mining related activities

£m 4,551

239 30 209 113 2 12 28 633

Ltd Source : NCB Annual Report 1983/84 .

9

Capital E5 Class

10 tonnes in the 1950s to 90 .1m tonnes in 1983/84 . In 1955 private coal output was only 6 .2 percent of total production . Private pits are relatively small operations often exploiting pits and faces closed by the NCB. The pits are licenced by the NCB and the board purchases their coal output . Secondly, the NCB is selling profitable subsidiary companies and shareholdings in other firms . These are controlled by two holding companies, NCB (Coal Products) Ltd and NCB (Ancilliaries) Ltd (see Table 2) . Subsidiary companies have a combined book value of £118m in 1983/ 84 and shareholdings in other firms were valued at £58 .7m . Turnover in the NCB's mining-related activities was £633m in 1983/84 - 13 .6 per cent of total turnover . In November 1983 the NCB sold its 30% stake in Associated Heat Services (AHS) which designs, installs and operates boiler and air-conditioning plant for £7 .5m. The NCB was one of the founders of the firm in 1966 . AHS had pre-tax profits of £3 .3m on turnover of £35m in 1983 . J H Sankey Ltd, an NCB heating equipment and building material supplier was sold in 1984 . The government has demanded that the NCB raise £10m in 1984/85 from the sale of activities `unrelated to the Board's mainstream activities' and in addition to its normal planned sale of land, buildings and vehicles . More subsidiary companies and shareholdings are likely to be sold . Thirdly, the NCB sold a further 4,000 houses in 1983/84 bringing total sales to 51,000 since 1976 . Two thirds of these houses have been sold to sitting tenants, the remainder to local authorities, housing associations or on the open market. The remaining stock of 32,000 houses will continue to be sold-off. Fourthly, the NCB spent £328m on mining and civil engineering contract work in 1983/84 and a further £63m on plant hire - 7 .2 per cent of expenditure. It

is not possible to identify further contract work in the NCB's accounts . However, the NCB employes 16,500 workers in colliery workshops and other services such as cleaning and catering . These services, as in other parts of the public sector, are under threat of being contracted out . Initial Ltd already have a large NCB workwear laundry contract as well as NHS laundry and school cleaning contracts . Finally, the government could restrict the NCB to concentrate solely on coal mining leaving the processing of coal, for example, washing plant and other activities to private firms. Contractors have already made inroads into coke production .

Privatising the profits Despite deep mining operational losses which rose from £26m in 1979 to £595m in 1983/84 other NCB activities are highly profitable . The Board made £211 m profit on opencast operations with £577m turnover last year - a 117 .5 per cent rise in six years . Computer services, distribution of solid fuel and heating appliances are profitable mining-related activities . NCB subsidiaries and shareholdings had operating profits of about £20m up to 1981 although small losses have occurred in the past two years . It is the opencast and profitable mining-related activities which are under immediate threat of privatisation.

Multinational control Attempting to convert miners into worker shareholders and/or encouraging buyouts or co-operatives to take over'unprofitable' pits is more connected to political objectives than economic ones . The stark reality is that large multinational companies control most of the opencast contractors together with other mining interests in Britain and overseas . The NCB

Coal privatisation is an integral part of British Coal International which co-ordinates and promotes the overseas interests of the mining industry . Exports of mining equipment were valued at £175m in 1983/84 together with £15m in consultancy services and £224m of coal, coke and coal product exports . Mining is big business . These companies can readily finance new private coal mining ventures in Britain and will ensure that they reap the benefits of privatisation . Table 3 identifies the parent companies of the main opencast contractors in Britain at April 1984 . Seven companies operate half the opencast sites with 71 .4% of total site production. At least two new opencast contracts have been let since April . Derek Crouch Plc have started a new site with 2.9m tonnes of coal in South West Scotland . Northern Strip Mining (Burnett Hallamshire Holdings Plc) started work on a large Northern Ireland site with 450m reserves . Opencast sites continued to operate during the miners strike . The NCB paid for the coal mined although it did not leave the sites . Amec Plc is a civil engineering and buiding contractor with interests in the

Table 3 The Main Opencast Contractors Firm French Kier Construction Fairclough Parkinson Mining Northern Strip Mining McErlain Plant Ltd Taylor Woodrow Construction Wimpey Construction Ltd Lehane, MacKenzie & Shand Ltd Derek Crouch (contractors) Ltd Murphy Brothers Ltd W .J . Simms, Sons & Cooke Ltd ARc Ltd Lomount Construction A.F . Budge (Contractors) Ltd James Miller & Partners Ltd

No of sites 2 3 1 2 2 6 4 5 3 2 1 2 5 5

energy and process industries . It was formed by the recent merger of Fairclough Construction Group and William Press. Turnover was £715 .3m in 1983 . Charter Consolidated is a diversified group in which the mining of coal, tin, potash and wolfram in Britain, Portugal, USA, and Africa represents only 11 % of its £614m turnover in 1984 . Pretax profits were £38 .2m . Its subsidiaries also manufacture building products (Cape Industries), railway track components, heating, refridgeration and catering products . It owns important mining equipment firms Anderson Strathclyde (whose takeover was investigated by the Monopolies and Mergers Commission) and Perard Torque Tension . Charter Consolidated own a third of the shareholding in the troubled Johnson Matthey Plc metal refining and general financial and investment services . It has a 29 .9% shareholding in stockbrokers Rowe and Pitman, now part of the new Mercury Securities financial group . The Minerals and Resources Corporation Ltd, part of Harry Oppenheimer's South African mineral empire has a 35 .7% stake in Charter Consolidated . The rapidly expanding Hanson Trust has recently acquired 3%

Total tonnes at sites (million) 6 .13m 7 .08 2 .70 2 .96 13 .61 6 .74 12 .03 12 .47 6 .45 0 .90 0 .75 2 .01 7.86 10.74

Parent Amec Plc Amec Plc Burnett Hallamshire Holdings Plc Burnett Hallamshire Holdings Plc Taylor Woodrow George Wimpey Plc Charter Consolidated Plc Derek Crouch Plc BET Group Trafalgar House Consolidated Gold Fields Plc SGB Group Plc (parent) (parent)

11

Capital & Class 12 of Charter shares. Mining represents less than half the 1984 turnover of £232 .2m for Sheffieldbased Burnett Hallamshire Holdings . It was however quite profitable producing £7 .8m pretax on £98 .1m mining turnover. Its subsidiaries include civil engineering and property development companies and the Mineral Investment Corporation which finances the mining, trading and processing of coal and other minerals. Burnett Hallamshire also owns mining companies in South Africa, Chile, Belgium and the USA. The diversified BET Group (£1,269m turnover in 1984) not only own Murphy Brothers which has three opencast contracts in Britain and one in America, but also the laundry and cleaning firm Initial Ltd noted earlier . BET's full bid for Initial is now being investigated by the Monopolies and Mergers Commission. Other parent companies identified in Table 3 have wide ranging construction and civil engineering interests, eg . Taylor Woodrow, George Wimpey, Trafalgar House . Several have expanding subsidiaries in finance and investment, transport and other energy developments . Many mining contractors operate opencast sites or strip mines in Appalachia, Indiana, Kentucky and other sites in America . These include Derek Crouch (Power Inc), Charter Consolidated (Alexander Shand Holdings and the mining equipment firm National Mine Service), Burnett Hallamshire (three US mining companies) . The civil engineering and construction group, Richard Costain, have several coalmining operations in Australia . The NCB's £26m stake in the vast Capricorn Coal Development Joint Venture in Queensland, Australia indicates the international scale of operations . The NCB's joint shareholders in this project are the Commercial Union Assurance

Company, Inter-Continental Fuels, Austen and Butta - an Australian mining firm, and Rhurkohle - West Germany's largest coal producer which also operates mines in West Virginia and Kentucky . American mine companies like Amax, MacGregors previous company, and the large expanding private utility companies with extensive mining, energy, and telecommunications interests could be tempted by the privatisation of Britain's mining assets . However, much depends on the outcome of the miners strike and the strength of the NUM . New business links may be forged within Britain . Taylor Woodrow has already investigated, and rejected at least temporarily, the possibility of taking over two power stations to generate electricty . The next step would be to own nearby mines to supply coal .

Coal has a future Britain has coal reserves estimated at 4,223m tonnes, enough for over 300 years at the present rate of mining . Most are good quality bitumonous coals with high carbon, low volatiles and little ash . Unlike the USA where 60 per cent of reserves can be strip mined most of Britain's coal extraction requires deep mining. Despite the use of more nuclear power, coal will remain the main fuel used for electricity generation at least for several decades. With full implementation of the Plan for Coal and the development of new markets coal output could be greatly expanded . The future for coal is bright. `Coal will have new uses. The most obvious is as the raw material for synthetic natural gas (SNG) . British Gas and the National Coal Board are already developing the technology to turn coal into SNG to replace North Sea gas . Further ahead, coal will take over oil's role as the main raw material for the petrochemicals industry, and (after liquefaction) as a fuel for transport' .'

Coal privatisation

Asset Stripping The NCB's coal mining assets are likely to be treated by the government in the same way as other public services and assets have been dealt with . Nationalised industries and publicly owned firms have been sold at knockdown prices . The sale of shares in Amersham International, Cable & Wireless, BP, Britoil, Associated British Ports, British Aerospace, Enterprise Oil and Jaguar Cars totalled £2870.8m, less nearly £100m fees . Assuming a market valuation and based on the highest 1984 share price the eleven public asset sales have been sold at a £1,235m discount an average 43 per cent reduction . The partly paid British Telecom shares were trading at double their initial price within weeks of the £3 .9billion sale . Public investment has been written off-£215m in British Aerospace and Associated British Ports alone . The pre-sale preparations at British Airways not only involved mass redundancies but it seems inevitable that the government will inject new equity to reduce BA's `unattractive' £770m debt burden . It is forseeable that the £l,500m public investment in the new Selby, Yorkshire and Ashfordby, Leceistershire mines could be partially written-off and sold at knockdown prices. The more profitable pits in other coalfields could treated in a similar manner, leaving the 'uneconomic' pits to be sold to the miners .

Tactics The threat of further privatisation of coal mining is an immediate and important political issue for the labour movement . Some form of privatisation is likely to proceed irrespective of the outcome of the miners strike . It is highly unlikely that the NCB will be sold off as a whole like British Telecom . Instead the profitable sections will be parcelled up separately for sale . The remainder will be run even

more rigidly along business lines with stringent financial controls and increasing use of contracting out work . For many people the idea of reviving private coal companies raises immediate fears of a return to ruthless exploitation, mining accidents, poor working conditions and constant health and safety dangers . Many people identify privatising coal with the perils of returning to a private health `service' . There is probably more support for publicly controlled coal mining than there is for other nationalised industries which people use and experience daily . However, one of the fundamental lessons learnt from the privatisation of other public services is that to wait to take action until there are specific proposals is often too late .

Alternative Strategy In September last year, seven months into the miners strike, Roy Hattersley, Shadow Chancellor of the Exchequer and Deputy Leader of the Labour Party, called for a re-examination of public ownership and a new drive for social ownership . Wider share ownership, worker buy-outs, co-operatives and further investment in firms by local authorities `to extend power by distributing it more widely'. In another initiative, the TUC have recently issued a discussion paper on the future of the nationalised industries .' Five years into the Tories' privatisation drive the TUC want to 'institute a thorough review of the kind of public ownership programme that unions and the TUC want a future Government to implement' . The paper recognises many of the problems of the nationalised industries - and poses a number of questions for debate and discussion prior to a report and debate at the TUC Congress 1985 . Both these initiatives will be grasped by right wing factions in the trade union

13

Capital f5 Class 14 movement and the Labour Party to try to water down existing public ownership policies . Alternative strategies to develop new forms of workers and users control in an expanding public sector will be given short shrift . `Mines for the Miners' and similar slogans will only further obscure the fundamental issues . What is needed is to develop effective alternative strategies to improve and expand the public sector. For the current struggle in the mines is not just about pit closures, its about the future of the National Union of Mineworkers, the future of the mining industry, and ultimately about whether the labour movement is able to defend public ownership against the ideological and economic attacks of current Tory policy.

References 1 . Editorial, Economic Affairs, Oct-Dec 1984, Institute for Economic Affairs . 2 . See WhatFutureforBritish Coal Policy, C . Robinson and E . Marshall, University of Surrey, 1983 . `Mines to the Miner', Economist, 12 March 1983 . 'Privatisation', Michael Beesley and Stephen Littlechild, Lloyds Bank Review, July 1983 . 3 . `Coal Production : the role of the private sector', E. Hassall, LandandMinerals Surveying, September 1984, pages 484491 . 4. `Coal has a future', Michael Cross, New Scientist, 6 September 1984 . 5 . The Future of Nationalised Industries, TUC Discussion Paper, December 1984 .

Paul Gilroyand Joe Simm

Law, order and the state of the left Contrary to a now widespread illusion, it does not follow that modern power and domination are no longer grounded on physical violence . Even if violence is not concretised in the daily exercise of power as it used to be, it still, and indeed more than ever occupies a determining position . For its very monopolization by the state induces forms of domination in which the numerous methods of establishing consent play the key role . In order to grasp this point, we must go beyond the notion of simple complementarity of violence and consent modelled on Machiavelli's image of the Centaur that is half-human, half-beast . Physical violence and consent do not exist side by side like two calculable homogeneous magnitudes, related in such a way that more consent corresponds to less violence . Violence-terror always occupies a determining place not merely because it remains in reserve, coming out into the open only in critical situations . State monopolised physical violence permanently underlies the techniques of power and mechanisms of consent : it is inscribed in the web of disciplinary and ideological devices ; and even when not directly exercised, it shapes the materiality of the social body on which domination is brought to bear . Nicos

Poulantzas To understand the police, is to understand society . Geoffrey Dear, Assistant Commissioner, Metropolitan Police . One sign of the success in the fight for law and order is that more people are in prison. Merlyn Rees, Labour Home Secretary

15

Capital & Class • THIS PAPER looks at the Left's orientation to law and order

16

issues and challenges it on the basis of historical evidence . The concept of 'Thatcherism' and its attendant view of the authoritarian state is heavily criticised for obscuring important continuities which bind the practice of this government to that of previous administrations . It is argued that an adequate account of Britain's increasing authoritarianism must include reference to the war in Northern Ireland, the junction of race and crime themes and most importantly, the autonomy of the police service which has generated distinct and consistent patterns of political intervention . We suggest that socialists make a fundamental mistake in falsely trying to separate policing from consideration of the criminal justice system as a whole . The political effects of legality, the way that legal ideology shapes police activity and the gap between the rhetoric and the actual practice of justice are all examined in a way which highlights some problems in current socialist initiatives around police accountability . We argue that the left undermines its own position by colluding in the idea that policing is primarily concerned with the prevention and detection of crime . An alternative approach, premised on the idea that policing is an essentially symbolic rather than instrumental activity is outlined as part of our argument that for police, the maintenance of social order has always taken priority over the pursuit of criminals . Finally, we locate concern about crime, law and policing at the core of political conflicts which express important changes in the division of labour and in civil society itself. These struggles reflect not only the management of national crisis, but the development of a post-industrial state . In these circumstances, lawbreaking is central to processes of class formation and decomposition, and lines of legality differentiate the fractions of a heterogeneous, non working class .

The limits of 'Thatcherism'

Like the riots of 1981, the 1984 miners' strike, which is in its seventh month as we write, confirms the centrality of law and policing to contemporary British politics . On the left, it has become commonplace to identify this situation as a novel aspect of unfolding, authoritarian, 'neo-liberal' statism . Or at least as a rightward drift in national politics . As the crises deepen, so the drift accelerates . This fashionable view is often supported by a concept of 'Thatcherism' which dates the arrival of authoritarianism and its new right forces in the Spring of 1979 . There is more than a suggestion that it is the dead hand of monetarism which rests on the throttle of statism . The balmy days of post-war consensus have been lost in the autumn mist of economic recession . A winter of

Law and Order

repression awaits us . Britain, so the argument continues, is under the heel of its most vicious and repressive government . The Thatcher record on law and order is revealed to be a series of signposts on the road to a police state . The administration and practice of the criminal justice system has certainly seen changes which have been designed to strengthen the coercive power of the forces and institutions of law and order. New Acts and Bills covering police powers in Scotland, England and Wales, picketing practices, juvenile justice, Contempt of Court, and Prevention of Terrorism have been introduced . In July 1984 the juries Disqualification Act was passed which debars from jury service anyone who has served any period of imprisonment during the previous 10 years, or who has received a suspended sentence or has had a community service order . In addition, anyone who has been placed on probation will be debarred for five years . The amount of money spent on the criminal justice system has increased to the point where the police's budget in England and Wales alone was £2 .5 billion in 1983/4 . The force has been increased by some 9,000 officers since 1979 and riot equipment such as Cs gas and plastic bullets have been made available . Fourteeen new prisons are to be built, parole has been effectively abolished for certain categories of long term prisoners and changes have been proposed in the Public Order Act which could result in the jailing of individuals for up to 10 years . In Northern Ireland, in addition to the use of supergrasses and Diplock Courts, a shoot to kill policy is said to be in operation by the security forces . Furthermore, the amount of money spent on the police service there increased from over £124 million in 1979/ 80 to nearly £218 million in 1982/3, while in 1983 there were 655 full-time police officers per 100,000 of the population .' This compared with 255 officers per 100,000 of the population in Scotland' and 241 per 100,000 of the population in England and Wales .' There has also been increased activity by the Special Branch ranging from the use of technology such as the Police National Computer to store information on individuals and groups to the arrests and trials of women at Greenham Common with scant regard to any due process of law. The increase in the number and activities of Specialist Claims Control Units at the DHSS and the criminalisation of the claims of welfare recipients and the six-month jail sentence given to Sarah Tisdall are all part of a tendency to define those who challenge the legitimacy of either government or state practices to be striking at the heart of democracy itself . In other words, as subversive . This view was expressed by Harold Salisbury, the former Chief Constable of York, North East Yorkshire, who in 1981 defined subversives as :

17

Capital & Class

18

Anyone who shows affinity towards communism, thats common sense, the iRA, the PLO and I would say anyone who's decrying marriage, family life, trying to break it up, pushing drugs, homosexuality, indiscipline in schools, weak penalties for anti-social crimes . . . a whole gamut of things that could be pecking away at the foundations of our society and weakening it.' Against this, the policing of crimes committed by the more powerful has become even more curtailed in recent years . The number of Factory Inspectors fell from 978 in 1979 to 833 in 1983 while the number of prosecutions for contraventions of the Health and Safety at Work Act fell from 2,127 to 2,022 in the same period . The average penalty for prosecutions under the Act was £205 . In addition, the number of workplaces inspected fell from 22 .5% in 1979 to 15 .5% in 1983 . In the mining industry there were 1 .03 people killed or seriously injured per 100,000 shifts in 1979 and `by 1983 it had gone up to 1 .96 . . . in other words there has been a 12% increase in the number of poeople killed or seriously injured in the mines even in the last year 15 . Without wishing to minimise the seriousness of the situation which confronts us, nor to play down the signficance of these changes in the criminal justice and welfare state systems, we want to challenge this framework of analysis . We will examine some of the errors and misconceptions regarding law, policing and the state itself on which the authoritarian drift thesis depends . We do not however intend to abandon the idea of authoritarian statism which does have an important place in understanding the formation of the post-industrial state in Britain . It is essential though to qualify and restrict the looseness with which the concept has been used in the past . This lack of rigour may be rooted in the desire to emphasise the horrors of 'Thatcherism' and demonstrate the extent to which it marks a departure from the fudged social democracy of the Wilson, Heath and Callaghan years . Yet as far as law and order, policing and criminal justice matters are concerned, the Thatcher governments do not represent a decisive break with patterns set in preceding years . The centralisation and militarisation of policing and the growth of repressive legal regulation have longer histories than most advocates of the Thatcherism concept would like to admit . This is principally because they are histories in which the Labour party at every level has been extensively and intimately involved . Thus the horrors of `Thatcherism' are only half the story . They are balanced by an idealised view of the post-war period, particularly the 1945-51 years when Labour took power. This moment is judged to be something of a golden age for socialist thought and radical policy. The strands in social democracy which link the



Law and Order immediate post-war phase, `Butskellism' and the emergence of popular authoritarianism during the 1970s are ignored, and the name of democracy is invoked as part of a plea to return to the spirit of progressive reform which these Labour governments embody . However, careful consideration of policing and criminal justice policies completely disrupts this revisionist history .

1945 - 1951 : The golden age In the arena of law, order and criminal justice, the post-war Labour government was hardly a reforming one . Indeed, in some areas it was more authoritarian than its pre-war Conservative predecessor. In others, it either laid the foundations for, or gave support to, policies and practices which increased the power of the criminal justice system to punish, discipline and maintain order by force . James Chuter Ede who became Labour Home Secretary on August 3rd, 1945 was an ex-schoolmaster and infantry sergeant . While he had been an MP intermittently between the wars, his `only experience of government had been Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Education from 1940 to 1945' .6 Under Ede's regime police practices and procedures were left intact. Under pressure from the Police Federation the old police training college was not re-established `while the fabric of local government was left undisturbed as it had been since created by the government of the Marques of Salisbury in 1888' . He also introduced a Criminal Justice Bill in 1948, which in some of its recommendations was more conservative than its 1939 predecessor which fell with the outbreak of war . For example, proposals for community-based hostels, to be known as Howard Hostels, were jettisoned and replaced by the introduction of detention centres whose `regime was to be deliberately deterrent in nature so as to provide sentencers with the option of imposing a "short, sharp, shock"'! While the 1939 Bill had banned the imprisonment of offenders under the age of 16, Ede's Bill lowered this age to 15 for higher courts . It also raised the maximum period of preventative detention from 10 to 14 years . Finally, the Bill contained no commitment to the abolition of capital punishment despite the fact that `the 1934 Conference had passed an abolitionist motion and the 1945 Parliamentary Party contained many abolitionists' . Ede himself had been in favour of abolition at one time but by 1947 was set against it, `having been influenced in this direction by Senior Home Office Civil Servants, particularly Sir Frank Newsam . In short there was a departmental view against abolition and Ede had been persuaded to accept it' ." Ede's time at the Home Office was given the seal of approval by Sir Harold Scott, the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police from 1945 to 1953 . In

19

Labour and state power

Capital & Class

20

his account of Scotland Yard during these years Scott pointed out that : `During my eight years at Scotland Yard there were never any serious differences of opinion between myself and Mr . Chuter Ede or Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe (his Conservative successor) . Their different political views were never allowed to influence their approach to police questions . . . ."' In other areas the government was not slow to act against disorder. Within a month of taking office, troops were used at Surrey Docks in London to break up a dockers strike which had been in progress for 10 weeks . This pattern was to be repeated throughout their term of office . Troops were sent to Smithfield market in April 1946, to Avonmouth in May 1949, to Belfast in September 1949, to the Royal Group of Docks in London in March 1950 and to Smithfield again in June 1950 . 12 It is also worth noting that while it proved difficult to enforce the law regarding strikes and while there was widespread rank and file resistance to the use of law in the arena of industrial relations, `virtually every strike between 1940 and 1951 was a criminal offence' ." Strikes by the dockers, and others, motivated Atlee's government to pursue a policy of emergency planning which among other things involved re-constituting an Emergencies Committee in April 1947 . The remit of this committee was to supervise plans for providing and maintaining supplies and services in any emergency and to coordinate action for just such a purpose . This Emergencies Committee has `remained a standing Committee of the Cabinet ever since' ." The apparent threat of domestic subversion and communism lay behind the government's enthusiasm for the Committee : After five years in power Attlee's Cabinet, which began its emergency planning with such careful deliberation, had convinced itself that virtually all industrial unrest stemmed from a subversive challenge to established order . In these circumstances, detailed and systematic emergency planning seemed both necessary and desirable . Ironically, fear of revolution, or at least subversion, which had been the initial stimulant for the establishment of a strike-breaking machine after the First World War, did much to sustain the development of a similar organisation after the second ." The Special Branch and other detectives were integral to the government's strategy during these strikes . At first reluctant to use secret state agencies, their use blossomed from October 1945, as they exercised surveillance on `unofficial strike leaders as a matter of course' ." According to Ellen, this practice had been a regular feature of Bevan's regime at the Ministry of Labour during the Second World War." Labour's nostalgia for 1945-51 is also important because it

Law and Order

locates the past golden age of `consensus policing' against which contemporary Thatcherite horrors are to be measured and found wanting. The resulting Dixon of Dock Green view of history suggests that the police, if they were not actually loved, were respected and supported and that officers kept a paternalistic eye on the people that they policed . Occasionally, those who stepped out of line, usually young people, would be given a `clip round the ear' and sent on their way . Crime was therefore held in check, kept under control by the activities of the police who were usually bobbies on the beat . This mythology remains potent. Time and again during the 1983 General Election Campaign, spokespeople for the party, especially Roy Hattersley, referred back to pre-war days as a response to the Conservative party's tough line on the law and order issue . Yet, this version of the history of policing has been discredited by the work of historians such as Robert Storch, 18 John Field, 19 Barbara Weinberger20 and Phil Cohen . 21 Their work shows that throughout the nineteenth century the police were not accepted in many communities, that there was widespread resistance to and conflict between the force and local people, and that these conflicts could spill over into serious disorder at any time . This conflict continued into the twentieth century . Jerry White's desciption of Campbell Bunk, a community in Finsbury Park between the wars, captures what was happening between the police and the policed. When in the area the police would often attempt to crack down on gambling in the street or other recreational activities . It was then that trouble would erupt . In the summer of 1930, two police officers attempted to arrest a gambler named Musgrove : He resisted and threw the arresting officer to the ground . A crowd estimated at 200 surrounded the police, urged on by another Bunk character well-known to the police, called Bill Hagger . He kicked a PC in the back and Musgrove escaped into a house where he was later arrested . . . . Similar collective efforts were made when the police tried to arrest either of the street bookmakers . . . . The police had similar trouble breaking up fights in Campbell Road and risked a serious assault if they tried to do so . 22 The question of police powers to stop and search people in the Metropolitan area, was also a matter of controversy at this time . The Report of the Commissioner for 1935 devoted two and a half pages to discussing the fact that `a good deal of attention has been given in the press during the year to the use by the police of their powers to stop, search and detain persons suspected of carrying stolen property . . . . ' 23 According to the Report, Met officers were stopping 1,000 people a week . Without giving figures, the Commissioner intimated that `a very considerable number of thieves are

21

Capital f5 Class

22

caught in this way 12' but conceded that there would always be a certain number who resented the police engaging in such behaviour . The Report goes on to discuss the problem of arresting individuals who were loitering with intent to commit a felony and points out that in the light of a number of these cases being dismissed `the suggestion has been made that police are employing their powers with an excess of zeal or even oppressively' ." The Commissioner concluded that : Put shortly, the position is that complete freedom for the individual is not compatible with adequate protection for the community . The police do their best to maintain the one without infringing the other . It is not an easy task and a reasonable amount of criticism is to be expected and is indeed helpful ." Two pages of the 1937 Report address a similar theme, indicating that `thousands of. . . persons are "stopped" every year' ." The Commissioner tried to allay the fears of the public by arguing that these powers were necessary if crime was to be held in check : if the liberty of the subject is to be regarded as so sacred that no one can be asked a reasonable question regarding his movements or anything he happens to be carrying, criminals must perforce have their share of such liberty ." Two other ideas are central to Labour's mythology of policing . First, the notion that the police were under some sort of local control in times past . This control, so the argument goes, was eroded and finally destroyed with the increasing centralisation of the police from the 1960's onwards . Again, during the 1983 General Election campaign Roy Hattersley held up local watch committees as an example of the kind of police accountability to which the country should be directed . While much historical work remains to be done on the issue, a major piece of research by Mike Brogden 29 has shown that in Liverpool at least, the police were never under the control of the local authority. When it comes to major policy decisions, the police are, and have always been, their own bosses . The second idea, is that crime in the past, was not the problem that it is today . This idea, was central to major changes in sentencing and penal policy announced by Leon Brittan at the Conservative Party Cr nference in October, 1983 . We do not wish at this point to enter into a debate about the complexities of criminal statistics . What we do wish to point out however, is that Labour's continuing reliance on the statistical evidence of a rising crime rate does not take into account the fact, that `criminal statistics are notoriously unreliable as measures of the actual extent of criminal activity, to such a degree that it is not unknown for historians to discount them altogether' ." Rather than being `cast in

Law and Order the historical idiom of change . . . the facts of crime and disorder must be re-allocated within the idiom of continuity'." Geoff Pearson's work shows that the popular concern, indeed obsession, with crime and disorder has a history which can be traced back to the nineteenth century. He situates this concern in a wider, political context where crime is seen as a metaphor for a more general feeling of social apprehension . The preoccupation with mounting disorder seems to serve a specific ideological function within British public life, as a convenient metaphor for wider social tensions which attend the advance of democratisation . . . this preoccupation returns to a cluster of themes bearing on the production and reproduction of consent and social discipline among the working class - and more particularly among the rising generation, the bearers of the future ." 1951 - 1979 : consolidating thepast The tendencies within government to either strengthen the various arms of the criminal justice system or to turn a benevolent blind eye to their activities have not spared post '51 Labour administrations . It was during the Wilson government of 19641970 that the Special Patrol Group was first deployed in London . In 1967, the Government introduced its Criminal Justice Act which allowed jurors to convict or acquit by a majority of ten to two, whereas until then juries had to consider a case until all of them agreed . Within the prisons, as a result of the Mountbatten and Razinowicz Committees, regimes for long-term prisoners were tightened, security and control massively increased and prisoners increasingly classified and segregated . The number of warrants which allowed telephones to be tapped increased from 253 in 1964 to 395 by the end of the first Wilson government . The Wilson and Callaghan administration from 1974-1979 was also important in the drive towards giving more power to the criminal justice system . Roy Jenkins, as Home Secretary, introduced the 1974 Prevention of Terrorism Act, which was augmented by its 1976 successor . The Atomic Energy (Special Constables) Act 1976 gave the Atomic Energy police new and exceptional powers including the power to carry arms at all times, the right to enter premises at will and the power to arrest on suspicion . The Special Branch continued to increase both its numbers and its activities ; it numbered 1,180 by 1977, a rise from around 200 in the early 1960s. There was continued militarisation of the police including greater training in the use of firearms and public order duties. In 1976-7 new technology was introduced in the form of a computer in C Department of the Metropolitan police which had the capacity to store information on 1,300,000

23

Capital & Class 24

people; half this space was allocated to the Special Branch . The 1977 Criminal Law Bill reduced the right of peremptory challenges by defence lawyers at jury trials to three and removed a number of offences from courts with juries, allowing them to be tried only before magistrates . The Act also removed the requirement for a Coroner to summon a jury in cases of sudden or violent death. This subsequently allowed the High Court to allow the holding of the inquest on Blair Peach without a jury . September 1977 saw the use of the Official Secrets Act in the notorious ABC trial and the subsequent vetting of the jury . The introduction of the Minimum Use of Force Tactical Intervention Squad (MUFTI) into the prison system in the late 1970's meant that prison officers, like the police, were trained in riot control techniques . Part 1 of the Criminal Law Act (1977) rendered it an indictable offence, punishable with a fine or imprisonment, for trade unionists to plan `intimidatry' mass picketing . The Labour Scottish Criminal Justice Bill which fell at the 1979 General Election was similar in scope and design to the one that became law under the Tories in 1981 . In Northern Ireland, amongst other things, both Amnesty International and the Bennett Committee found that confessions made to the RUC by detainees were obtained by violence and intimidation. Complaints against the police there increased rapidly in 1976 and 1977, principally under the stewardship of Roy Mason at the Northern Ireland office ." Finally, as Jimmy Boyle has recently indicated," an important prison reform, the Barlinnie Special Unit, was continually undermined and criticised by both the Labour Secretary of State for Scotland, Bruce Millan, and Harry Ewing, the Minister in charge of the Scottish Prison system . This is not a complete list of the changes made under the two most recent Labour administrations or under the 1945-51 `reforming' Labour government . It is sufficient though to move the debate away from the continued concentration on Thatcherism as the instrument which has ushered in a newly authoritarian state . The emergence of these tendencies within the state has a much longer history in which the socialist movement has been deeply implicated .

Policing and politics

Crisis management and the ruleoflaw Policing is a profoundly political process . Police work entails the use, often in a very arbitrary way, of violence and coercion . It is important for the left to come to terms with this aspect of police power and the complex inter-relationships between the force and other sectors of the criminal justice system as well as other state agencies, welfare services, and the media. As Michael Brown has pointed out :

Law and Order

It is a fundamental misunderstanding of what the police do to evaluate them as just another municipal agency delivering services . To be overly-preoccupied with whether or not patrolmen respond as quickly as they should to calls for service, with the efficiency of the police in allocating resources, or with their effectiveness in dealing with crime whether that is measured by crime rates, clearance rates or victimisation studies - is only to perpetuate, albeit in a far more sophisticated way, the flawed vision of the Progressive Reformers . The important question is whom the police serve and how they serve them . Even the most obtuse patrolmen understand that they deal, day in and day out, with the primordial political issues-justice, equality, liberty - that their decisions have momentous consequences for the fate of groups and individuals . The police may be nonpartisan in some sense but they are not apolitical ." Before an alternative periodisation of authoritarian development can be built up, it is important to register that we also dispute the idea that these processes are best understood as a drift . This notion is useful in suggesting a steady and sometimes imperceptible rate of change, but is misleading in that it tends to obscure the struggles and resistances which have challenged, blocked and diverted the designs of authoritarian planning at every turn . These struggles have occurred inside and outside state institutions and they will continue wherever DHSS staff refuse to co-operate with the snoopers, welfare state professionals deny police interventions the stamp of professional authenticity and people on the receiving end organise to reject the positions of subordination to which the law assigns them . A full periodisation of Britain's authoritarian state has been attempted by other authors and cannot be repeated here ." It is possible however to identify several key factors which combine to undermine the view of 1979 as a watershed . For example, a more adequate account ought to register the significance of the expansion of police autonomy which followed the Royal Commission of 1962 and the relationship between police professionalisation and politicisation . Many of the indications of authoritarian policing can also be interpreted as byproducts of the creation of police professionalism and of the bureaucratisation of police work . Similarly, the despatch of troops to the 6 counties of Northern Ireland triggered not only profound changes in the strategies and goals of the police but in the legal procedures of the country as a whole . Finally, the association of race and crime which followed Enoch Powell's populist pronouncements on the subject of race and nation and which identified black settlement as a threatening, alien presence has made an important contribution towards securing the popularity of authoritarian criminal justice

25

Capital & Class

26

policies . It has also justified an elaborate system of internal control and surveillance on the black settler populations on whom the labels of illegal immigrant and street criminal are equally burdensome . Each of these headings : politicisation/professionalisation, the impact of conflict in Northern Ireland and the race/crime couplet refers to a history of struggle with its own pace and characteristics . Considered together, these histories can be used to illustrate that the anxieties, themes and values identified as 'Thatcherism', its techniques of policing and judicial reasoning and its recruitment of the law into political conflict are not exceptional but normal events . In each of these areas the practice of post '79 governments has a degree of continuity with the practice of previous governments of varying political hues . This suggests that there is scope within the overall framework of liberal democracy for authoritarian policy and practice to germinate . Adherents of the drift scenario have been generally uninterested in exploring the fundamental ambiguities in the post-war British state on which its authoritarian features can be shown to operate . These ambiguities are displayed with special clarity in legal processes . The specificity of law is in part its ability to reconcile the potential contradictions between liberal-democratic and repressive orders of public authority . However, any strategic decision to use formal legal rationality in an instrumentally repressive manner is likely to make the reconciliation of the competing demands for order and legitimacy very difficult . State theorists and intellectuals charged with the task of planning to combat the civil disorder which they see as the inevitable counterpart to recession and deindustrialisation appreciate these points . Both are central to understanding the British post-internment strategy in Northern Ireland . In his book `Peace Keeping in a Democratic Society - The Lessons of Northern Ireland"' Colonel Robin Evelegh, an excommander of troops in Belfast outlines the legal obstacles to successful policing of the province . His view of the law's shortcomings regarding the detection of crime foreshadows the government's rationalisation of the Police and Criminal Evidence Bill and the views of Sir Kenneth Newman . He argues forcefully for the creation of a legal and constitutional structure which would legalise and therefore legitimate the requirements of the security forces . His critique and revision of Frank Kitson's better known theories can be identified as the inspiration behind many current `security' initiatives . For example, Evelegh theorises the value of informers at great length and outlines a plan for developing them out of terrorist or criminal organisations . He also proposes the preparation of `dormant emergency legislation for combatting disorder and terrorism, that can be invoked when the need arises' . His



27

proposals are not limited by the Northern Ireland situation but offer a general theory of `the constitutional framework and operational laws that are necessary to make the military and to some extent the police, effective in countering rioting and terrorism in any democratic society that finds itself in a situation similar to that in Northern Ireland' . His conflation of terrorism and rioting is also significant, particularly if placed in the context of the Met Commissioner's recent remarks . . . . There are two particular problems in Western societies which have the potential to affect the balance between order and freedom . The first is concerned with the growth of multi-ethnic communities. The second is related to indigenous terrorist movements ." Unlike many on the left, these thinkers appreciate that public disorder is becoming a routine expression of profound changes in civil society and the division of labour. They correctly recognise that police and the rule of law are central to the practice of contemporary crisis management. The tactics and strategy being used by police in this series of struggles are again informed by longer histories than the concept 'Thatcherism' allows . The miners' dispute, which has focused attention on the suggestion that police have abused their powers, needs to be seen in the context of earlier patterns of public order policing . The issue of police violence and the question of their surveillance of strikers and demonstrators reveal a remarkable degree of continuity with police practice in previous eras .

From theSuffragettes to Grunwick-viaHarmworth Colliery Surveillance by both Special Branch and ordinary police officers has been an integral element in policing industrial disputes since the turn of the century, if not before . During the 1910 South Wales Coal Strike, plainclothes police officers, in this case officers from the CID at Scotland Yard, attended a miners' meeting and recorded statements made by members of the strike committee . Both officers could speak Welsh and had knowledge of the local community . A Home Office official was posted to the strike area and he sent 13 of his own reports and assessments back to the Home Office. Metropolitan police officers were also sent to the area. Home Office intervention, however `was not simply limited to sending police . The assumption of overall control of both police and the military was a major policy innovation which markedly contrasted with the purely local control exercised during earlier disputes'.39 Tony Bunyan has made it clear that this surveillance continued over the next six decades into the 1970's . 40 In September 1974, for example, the magazine Time Out published extracts

Policing disorder

Capital & Class

28

from general orders for London police which related to `Public and other events', `these extracts confirmed that the Branch is informed in advance of all political meetings known to the local police, and that - should Branch officers not attend - a report on all meetings is forwarded to them'." If state violence on picket lines is considered historically, a different emphasis emerges . For example, condemnation of the violence on the picket lines has usually had cross-party agreement while individual police officers were condemned by Labour Party spokespersons. The party has drawn back from the suggestion that violence might be institutionalised within the police force in Britain . A brief glimpse at some of the major public order confrontations this century indicates both that violence by the state is not unique either to Thatcherism or to the aberrations of individual police officers overcome by the tension of the situation provoked by protesters . The history of the Suffragette Movement is rich with personal accounts of the treatment that women received at the hands of police and prison officials . For example, on November 18th 1910, the Suffragettes sent deputations from Caxton Hall to see the Prime Minister Asquith . When they approached Parliament Square, they were confronted by police who according to Hertha Ayrton, one of the marchers, made them : All run the gauntlet of organised gangs of policemen in plain clothes, dressed like roughs who nearly squeezed the breath out of our bodies, the policeman in official clothes helping them . . . . Women were thrown from policemen in uniform to policemen in plain clothes literally till they fainted ." Ada Wright, another marcher told a similar story about police behaviour and pointed out the inter-relationship between government and media when it came to censorship : When we reached Parliament Square, plain-clothes men mingling with the crowds kicked us, and added to the horror and anguish of the day by dragging some of our women down side-streets . There were many attempts of indecent assault . The police rode at us with their horses so I caught hold of one of the horses and would not let go . A policeman grabbed my arm and twisted it round and round until I felt the bone almost breaking and I sank to the pavement helpless . . . . The next morning I found I had been photographed lying on the ground where I had been flung, and the photograph occupied the front page of the Daily Mirror . As soon as this became known to the Government, an order to have the picture suppressed was sent to the office of the newspapers, but they could not suppress the copies which had been sold. . . ."' The marchers also indicated that it was the old, the frail and

Law and Order

the weak who came in for particular attention from the police . May Bellingham, a disabled woman who was confined to an invalid tricycle provided a moving account of her experience : At first the police threw me out of the machine on to the ground in a very brutal manner . Secondly when on the machine again, they tried to push me along with my arms twisted behind me in a very painful position. . . . Thirdly they took me down a side road and left me in the middle of a hooligan crowd, first taking all the valves out of the wheels and pocketing them, so that I could not move the machine . . . ." Two deaths were attributed to the violence which the women experienced that day . Twenty years later, the Hunger marchers in Hyde Park also felt the blunt force of police violence . On 5th November 1932, the New Statesman and Nation carried a story concerning police behaviour towards the Hunger March demonstration in London : Suddenly for no apparent reason, the mounted police, accompanied by foot police, began to charge the crowd right and left. . . both unemployed and innocent spectators and passers-by. . . . The next performance of these riders was to charge into the peaceful groups standing around the meetings . People were forced to run for their lives in order to escape being trampled upon by the police horses or beaten by staves . There was no kind of disorder at any of these meetings, and no reason at all for the police to charge into them in the wanton way they did ." Five years after this incident a similar story was told to the National Council for Civil Liberties by striking miners and their families in the pit village of Harmworth in Nottinghamshire . Their accounts are similar to the present miners' dispute . In March 1937 the newly formed National Council for Civil Liberties produced a report by Ronald Kidd, the Secretary of the organisation . Kidd had been sent to Harmworth Colliery to investigate `the situation in relation to allegations made to the National Council for Civil Liberties of the infringements of civil rights in the trade dispute now taking place' ." The dispute centred around the dismissal of the miners who refused to accept a modification in their `snap' time . On September 2nd 1936, the miners at the colliery downed tools in support of their sacked comrades . From there, the dispute widened into a conflict between the Notts Miners Association, which was affiliated to the Miners Federation of Great Britain and the Spencer Union which many of those involved felt was a company union . The police were at the centre of the dispute . Between 100 and 150 of them were drafted into the village from every part of the County at an average extra charge on police funds

29

Capital & Class

30

of £1 20 a week . According to Kidd : I received a large number of complaints that the police have exceeded their authority in ordering law-abiding men and women not to be seen in the streets at certain times . . . the police have adopted a threatening attitude to persons who are not in any way disorderly, and it is widely believed that this threatening attitude is an attempt to interfere with the rights of assembly and to render it difficult for peaceful picketing to be carried out ." First hand accounts provide graphic illustrations of the role that the police were playing . Mr . B . was told by a Superintendent that he `was not going to allow our men to walk the streets at night when the other men were going back to work . He was going to make it hot for anyone who followed the crowd' ." Mr . R. was told that he and a group of other men walking at 10 .15 in the evening were to stop parading the street and the best thing that they could do was to `clear out of the village' ." Mr. B . made the following statement to Kidd : On December the 13th 1936 I was turning into the Crescent when a police oficer stopped me . I told the officer I lived along the Crescent and was going home . The officer replied, "you'll f well go where I want you to go' .' o Mrs. S . a 25 year old Salvation Army Officer told her story : On December 16th 1936, three police officers were round inside my house on my return from fetching fish and chips from a motor van which stopped at the top of the road . I had to wait some little time at the van for a second frying . During my absence my husband, who was emptying a teapot in the outside lavatory, returned to find two police officers standing inside the passage where it leads into the sitting room . He expressed surprise at their presence and they followed him into the sitting room uninvited . Later, a third officer entered . All three officers were interviewing my husband when I returned . Next morning a large number of footprints of police boots were visible in the garden and a number of cabbage plants had been destroyed by being trampled on. On December 26th 1936, at 11 .30 pm. Sergeant Weaver and Inspector Eyley and a constable came to my house and told me I must not be seen on the streets when the men are coming from and going to works" Kidd listed a whole series of other `irregularities' in the administration of justice during this dispute . These included a marked partiality on the part of the police towards those still at work ; the wrongful detention of individuals while the police made up their mind which charges to bring (an illegal practice according to the 1929 Royal Commission on Police Powers and Procedures) ;

Law and Order

abuse of the power to stop and search ; summoning individuals to appear in court 10 miles away, 12 or 36 hours after an incident thereby rendering it very difficult both in terms of time and distance to collect witnesses ; the class background of the local magistrates bench being the same as the mine-owners themselves ; and the use of the new Public Order Act whereby individuals were charged under the section of the Act which dealt with the offence of using insulting words and behaviour, this section itself having been extended from London to apply to the rest of England with a simultaneous increase in penalties . Kidd concluded his report thus : Whatever the cause, there can be no reasonable doubt, I think, that there have been serious irregularities in the conduct of the police during the dispute and this, coupled with the attitude and composition of the local Bench and with the methods of serving summonses and making charges, has led to a feeling throughout the district that the general administration of law and order in the County is being used in a manner which must do infinite harm to a belief in the traditions of public administration and justice ." The NCCL's enthusiasm for inquiries resulted in the organisation's setting up another in connection with the disorders in Thurloe Square in London on March 22nd 1936 . The disturbances were a result of clashes between anti-Fascist and British Union of Fascist supporters . The BUF had announced that they intended to hold a demonstration in the Albert Hall . Anti-Fascist supporters called for a mass mobilisation and were met by 2,500 police who also had 400 men and women in reserve . When the anti-Fascist group moved to Thurloe Square and the speeches started `the police assembled and without warning forced their way into the crowd' ." One of those involved later wrote : As soon as the mounted police were well inside the crowd, they drew their staves and began beating all those members of the public who were within their reach upon the head and shoulders . It was then observed that the foot police had also drawn their staves and were also using them on those members of the public whom they could reach . The crowd dispersed very rapidly making no resistance whatever to the police ." At Tonypandy, in Wales, the same year, the police were in action again at an anti-Fascist meeting . They arrested 36 people who were charged with riot, incitement to riot, unlawful assembly and breaches of the peace . Police evidence to the court described one of the accused as `a most violent man and extremely lawless in outlook' and another as `the most subversive agitator in the Rhondda, with a fanatical outlook on life' ." In a letter to the

31

Capital E5 Class

32

Guardian, Harold Laski made a number of points again concerning the question of police neutrality and the court procedures involved : He queried whether thirty people accused of different offences and tried simultaneously could lead to a "sense of discrimination" by the jury, especially over six days of conflicting evidence . He also criticised the length of the judge's summing up . He expressed concern on these points for this had been the third "mass" trial in Wales in recent years . Laski pointed out that the police denied that they could hear the provocative remarks attributed to Moran (one of the Fascist speakers) although he had the use of loudspeakers . Yet, they were able to detail what the accused were doing and saying . Laski also criticised the police for drawing attention to the political views of the accused, which were not a crime, and suggested that the police differentiated between the "extreme" views of the left and the views of the right. Professor Laski felt that it was dangerous to convict accused persons on the evidence of police, who assume that certain political beliefs make a man a bad citizen. He called for an inquiry into the habits of the police in these matters." During the 1950's the police were again involved in a number of industrial disputes which included `a tendency to declare that more than two pickets are illegal' . 57 In June 1959 during the printing strike, 50 pickets gathered to demonstrate against the use of scab labour in the printing of the South London Press . The police, who numbered about 70, used dogs to clear the path for a lorry loaded with newspapers . The appearance of the dogs : at once incensed them (the pickets) and turned an orderly crowd into an ugly scene with the possibility of a serious clash with the police . The atmosphere was so charged that I am sure that if the van and lorry had come out there would have been casualties ." A year earlier, during a strike at the Levine Manufacturing Company's factory in Cricklewood Lane, police officers were again asking strikers to reduce the number of pickets `in order to ensure compliance with the law and peaceful picketing' ." The strike also saw the use of plain clothes officers on the picket lines . One of the pickets described the following incident : My attention was drawn to an incident at the gate involving a fellow picket who was attacked by two men dressed in civilian clothes leaving the factory with the rest of the workers . I immediately appealed to the uniformed police on duty to apprehend the said assailants who were forcibly marching the picket past us . The police informed me that the `civilians' were police officers . I then asked for their warrants

Law and Order and authority for such action but I was ignored and brushed aside. The wife of the arrested picket throughout the entire event was pleading for their warrant to be shown, but she received the same treatment as myself i .e . no satisfactory reply and contemptuous evasions . Another picket made the appeal for authority but with the same success .' During the Grunwick dispute in 1976/77, the striking workers told of how they had been continuously harassed by the police and how the force behaved in a manner that was partial to the employer . As Phil Scraton has commented : What angered the pickets . . . was the `special relationship' which appeared to exist between Grunwick management and the police on duty at the picket . The police were seen to be on "first name terms" with management staff, drink tea in the Grunwick canteen and refuse to act on threats or "accidents" involving management staff. Yet at the same time they tried to limit the pickets to six strikers and they arrested pickets for obstruction ."

Legal process in practice This is not a complete account of the police in public order situations nor of their involvement in industrial disputes . Yet even this history can provide evidence that the authoritarian tendencies within the British state go beyond the period of Margaret Thatcher's administrations . These examples also suggest that the notion of civil liberties, and the related belief that police violence, surveillance and manipulation of the law can be explained by the deviancy of individual officers, are not adequate to the scale of the problem . It is important to avoid the implication that policing has not changed in the years since the struggle for women's suffrage . Police practices have been modified and rationalised to take account of contemporary problems . However, it does seem worth pointing out that that the repertoire of police strategies appears small, and that the number of permutations in the way that crime is presented is inherently limited . Rather than marking a qualitative change, the developments misrecognised as Thatcherism merely intensify tendencies which pre-date Mrs Thatcher's premiership . The modern force is still marked by its origins and by the complex processes of state formation and consolidation in which it assumed recognisable modern shape and duties . If we are to argue that a post-industrial state is emerging, we cannot afford to retreat from detailed exmaination of its legal system, particularly the extent of its continuity with the past . As Anderson and Greenberg correctly point out, `There have been several capitalist state forms, not one . These variations have had major ramifications both for the substance of legal codes and their social effects' ." It is possible to

33

The Politics of legality

Capital & Class

34

identify the coercive power of legal procedures which rely on a gap between the democratic rhetoric of law and the actual practice of justice as one important site of this continuity . This gap is expressed day by day in the manner that for example, the right to silence is not a right at all and judges' Rules are not in a meaningful sense rules . It is re-inforced and reproduced in police and courtroom cultures which treat suspects, formally innocent until proven otherwise - as prisoners, and in the routine brutality and machismo in the work of police and prison officers which also preceded 'Thatcherism' . This violence is not a simple matter of deviancy . We must begin to address the question of why behaviour of this type has become congruent with the job of imposing order and control . State brutality provides the perfect example of how, even under liberal democracy, legality and illegality become part of the same institutional structure . It is worth studying because it confirms that violence continues to occupy a determining position in the exercise of state power . The complexity of judicial structures and procedures, particularly the law's bureaucratic and theatrical elements, can obscure the simple fact that the production, preparation and presentation of evidence does not match up to the rhetoric of justice . This rhetoric is routinely undermined by the operation of the legal system . The point bears repetition because it indicates that socialists must move beyond the superficial view that bad or repressive laws are essentially different from laws of which they approve . Specific laws to which leftists tend to object, governing pickets or demonstrations for example, should not be isolated from consideration of processes of legality in general ." Doreen McBarnett has correctly castigated radicals for their reluctance to look at the legal process as an integrated system and the consequent inability to appreciate that the problems of capitalist legality consist of more than occasional deviations from an otherwise acceptable legal or constitutional standard . Her approach demonstrates the false nature of distinctions between crime control and due process models of law enforcement . Due process, she rightly argues, is for crime control and rather than inhibiting the prosecution, legal rules are legitimately used to secure convictions . Law expressed in rules and codified by textbooks is not necessarily at odds with its summary expression in the magistrate's court . The frameworks and techniques of legality are therefore neither a mere backdrop nor a simple instrument of political struggle . Our starting point is that the legal form must be seen as a problem in itself . In political terms, this is not an argument for retreat from conflicts in and around the courts . To the contrary, it is a plea that such struggles are conducted in a spirit which demands more of justice than an apparent fairness rooted in the internal coherence

Law and Order

of legal procedures . The recent history of black community struggles, of the Greenham women and of prisoners offers important points towards how extra-legal and legal elements in a political campaign can be balanced and blended in new ways which exploit any residual contradictions in legal rights and dramatise the power relations involved. E .P . Thompson's 64 well-known suggestion that the rule of law is an `unqualified human good' is echoed by many on the left inside and outside Parliament . It should be challenged not only because the level of abstraction at which it functions makes its kernal of truth banal . Like many left thinkers, Thompson over-empasises the significance of formal legal rationality and as a result ends up taking existing legality on trust . The recent use of bail procedures during the miners's strike is an example of how readily formal legal rationality can be qualified by the need to maintain order and control the accused . This points to the wisdom of considering law and policing together as intermeshing aspects of a complex and sometimes contradictory bureaucratic system . The price of falsely separating law from police and court practice is that it ascends to abstract philosophical heights from which it is unlikely to return ." It makes better sense to develop a view of legality as a process made up of different elements . Police are therefore only one part of the overall pattern and it should not be assumed that they are able or wish to achieve complete control over the others . Looking at law in this way must also reckon with the relationship between trial procedures and the actual events which lead to arrest in the first place . Police officers, giving evidence or prosecuting, reconstruct events so that their actions are seen to be consistent with police regulations, legal rules, the occupational cultures of both police and court officers and judicial discourse . Their accounts and definitions are accorded a special, privileged status . It is with this reconstructed reality that the defence must take issue ; `attempts by defendants to discuss what really happened . . . miss what the court regards as the point' . This is part of the explanation of how legal processes routinely support and endorse outcomes favoured by the police . Rather than guaranteeing space in which the defence can manoeuvre, formal legal rationality can itself become another obstacle to the realisation of the rhetoric of justice. The riots of 1981 kindled an interest in policing and legality among many activists whose campaigning work had not previously recognised these issues . The growth of the peace movement, and consequent interest in various forms of direct action strengthened this concern. The political value of symbolic, illegal actions was highlighted simultaneously with a sense that the police were developing a better organized, more flexible and inevitably more ruthless response to disorderly protest . If policing has become a

35

Capital f5 Class

36

familiar problem for inner city dwellers, peace activists, animal rights groups and trades union militants, this has not been reflected in the analytical writings of the socialist movement in either its labour or non-labour incarnations . These remain dominated by the belief that the real problems with police originate from outside their ranks, specifically in the role which they have been given in the enforcement of 'Thatcherite' government policy . In the words of Robert Reiner It is heightened political conflict which contains the dangers of a police state, rather than developments within the police force itself." This basic proposition is expanded by the equally erroneous belief that police misdeeds are not only rare but also technically illegal . The problem of police reform is then reduced to the complex task of creating a framework of legal safeguards capable of inhibiting the deviant urges of the force's bad apples . This perspective acknowledges the basic problem as it is defined by senior policemen who have attacked the restrictive effect of the existing legal framework which forces police to operate outside the law if they are to be effective." The coercive force of common law powers and of the case law systems are thus glossed over . The impact of police professionalism which has specifically encouraged the development of an `informed discretion' in the way officers use their powers at street level is minimised . This legalistic approach is locked in place by a definition of `police accountability' as an exclusively administrative and institutional issue . Yet it is precisely the exercise of flexible, discretionary power by police which reveals the limitations of the idea that police are directly accountable to the law . It demonstrates that the effect of law on police practice at street level is permissive rather than restrictive . Law in general offers no formula for calculating police priorities or practical guidelines as to what, for example, patrolling officers ought to do . Instead, legal powers which were framed with the control of particular street populations in mind, become a unified resource with which officers are able to legitimate any course of action they engage in . This is vividly conveyed in ethnographies of police work and by officers who boast `Whatever (powers) they give us, it doesn't really matter we'll find a way round it' or `Believe me, from experience there is a statute to fit almost every situation encountered by the police' ." This confidence originates in far more than just the lower ranks' moulding of official policy around the alternative priorities of their occupational culture . In organisational terms, the balance of power in the force inverts its military hierarchy. In a discussion of new management initiatives, a constable from the North Wales force spells out the importance of organisational factors in determing the eventual shape of police practice .



Law and Order 37

Information is passed up not down . Police management must control the flow because this increases its capacity to regulate those being controlled (the junior ranks) . . . . The greatest amount of discretionary decision making is practised at the lowest level . . . police management leads from behind or does not lead at all . Police leaders lack a comprehensive appreciation of what is really happening on the streets . The higher the rank, the less is known ." Myths and misconceptions

Thompson's work typified other problems in how socialists approach the role of the police in society . These run parallel with his tendency to idealise legality and become mesmerised by constitutional anarchisms . In an important, and highly influential piece, written in 1978 he attacked those on the left who took the position that all law and all police are bad and saw crime as some sort of displaced revolutionary activity . Without naming individuals or groups he went on to argue that 'there are half-truths which have a continual tendency to degenerate into rubbish, and moreover, into rubbish which has a particular appeal to a certain kind of elitist bourgeois intellectual' . 71 Citing the case of the police in particular, Thompson pointed out that: In any known society, some of the functions of the police are necessary and legitimate as those of firemen and of ambulance-men; and these legitimate functions include not only helping old ladies across the road (which I do not often notice them doing during the day) but enforcing the law and protecting citizens against offenders ." The piece described his participation in street demonstrations over the last 30 years . He often found his companion to be a police officer who, after a few grumpy exchanges, was found to be 'seriously interested in the issue of the march, nuclear disarmament, or the Vietnam War or even racialism itself' 73 While pointing out that this is a sentimental picture and that Grunwicks showed the police up in a less endearing light, Thompson maintained that : a wholly indiscriminate attitude of "bash the fuzz" is very much more sentiment, more self-indulgent and counterproductive . 74 Thompson's support for the police, particularly in the fight against rising crime has been reiterated continuously in broadcasts, statements, speeches, debates and books by supporters, thinkers and politicians in and around the Labour Party . This approach to crime control and the police has been advocated by Neil Kinnock in an article in the Daily Mirror in January 1984. He uncritically accepted official Home Office statistics about the risE .P.

The `left' response

Capital E5 Class

38

ing crime rate despite the major methodological and theoretical weaknesses which can be identified in the use of such statistics . He accused the Thatcher government of presiding over major percentage increases in violent offences, criminal damage, burglary and robbery . Kinnock, finally, resurrected his youth in the 1950's when `everybody shared the duty of keeping an eye on the kids and on each others' homes' ." What we need, he concluded, was `the police back on the beat in touch, in contact, not riding around in Panda cars'." This notion of getting back to how `things used to be' is underpinned by the idea that the police force is a fundamentally benevolent institution and that while there might be the odd abuse of power and the individual `bad apple', the barrel is sound . Police should therefore be supported across party lines . For example, in June 1983 in the debate on the Queen's Speech Roy Hattersley was quick to point to his Party's success in obtaining more resources for the force : Not only do I support the notion that more resources are necessary for the police and the police service . The increase in police pay, for which the previous Home Secretary took so much credit, was the direct result of an inquiry into police pay which I set up in the dying days of the Labour Government . If we want to take credit for these matters, I am prepared for the first time in three years to remind the House that that is what happened. The idea that the Edmund-Davies Committee should be set up and that its recommendations should be implemented was a matter not of party controversy but of agreement between the parties ." Cross party agreement extends beyond the issues of police pay and conditions . In February 1983, in the debate on the original Police and Criminal Evidence Bill in Standing Committee J of the House of Commons, while complaining about some of the clauses contained in the Bill, Roy Hattersley pointed out that, the committee was `one of the most tractable' that he could recall and that he had `never sat on a committee where the Opposition and the Government, over time have co-operated in such a friendly fashion' ." This view was supported by James Callaghan in the Home Office bicentenary lectures in 1982 . He argued that on issues of law and freedom : There had always to be some approach towards the centre because, whatever their politics, Home Secretaries sprang from the same culture, a culture it was their duty to preserve if the country was to remain a good place to live in ." The argument that more police are needed in order to combat crime wilfully ignores the proven inability of the police to detect, deter or solve crime . As far back as 1933, Lord Trenchard,

Law and Order

the Commissioner of Police in London pointed out in his yearly report that it was important to bear in mind the distinction between what he called 'preventable' crime and 'detectable' crime . Trenchard argues that : It is perhaps obvious that there are certain types of crime which cannot be prevented by any possible police action . They can be discouraged by good detection but no amount of police vigilance can prevent such crimes as murder, fraud, forgery, embezzlement or the various forms of theft (such as shoplifting) which occurs when no police are present. . . . On the other hand, there are types of crime which police vigilance can do much to keep in check . They include all kinds of "breakings" many kinds of larceny, such as bag-snatching, the picking of pockets, bicycle stealing and thefts from cars and telephone boxes and also r eceiving .BO Trenchard repeated his assertion in his 1935 Report arguing that 'certain types of crime cannot be prevented, obstructed or made more difficult of performance by police action' ." The Commissioner was even more forthright later in the report maintaining that the public were beginning to realise that police protection nowadays is not to be measured by the frequency (or infrequency) of the appearance of officers on foot . The idea of 'going out and finding a policeman should now be out of date' ." The Met discontinued these distinctions between different crimes in 1947 but by the late 1970's researchers at the Home Office Research Unit were again pointing to the inherent limitations in police capacity . Two of the Unit's researchers, Ron Clarke and Kevin Heal concluded that 'the crime prevention value of the police force rests less precisely on what it does than on the symbolic effect of its presence and public belief in its effectiveness' . 83 Three years later, Heal again surveyed approaches to crime control and highlighted the complexity of the issues involved . The Home Office has moved far beyond the over-simplified sloganeering of the left on the question of law and order: Over the last decade or so, research has called into question the effectiveness of conventional policing methods . This research does not indicate that patrolling and detective work are without impact, though it is sometimes construed to be so, both by critics and defenders of conventional policing . However it suggests that the marginal gains from additional deterrent policing will be negligible ." Heal argued that there were a number of possible reasons for this, including the fact that it was difficult to achieve significant increases in the chances of offenders being caught . He pointed out that deterrent policing itself may actually amplify criminal behaviour by :

39

Capital & Class

40

reducing the opportunities of convicted offenders for "going straight", by fuelling resentment against authority or by confirming people's conceptions of themselves as lawbreakers . It is also possible that extension of formal systems of social control may erode rather than supplement communities' informal self-policing mechanisms ." In 1984, Clarke and Hough reviewed much of the research evidence and indicated that while for the first-time in many years the police service was up to complement with the number of officers rising by 10% in the previous five years, `crime will not be significantly reduced simply by devoting more manpower to conventional police strategies ." The authors found that there was no evidence that either more patrol cars or officers on the beat could reduce crime . In fact, given the present rate of burglaries, the average officer patrolling on foot in London would expect to pass within 100 yards of a burglary once every eight years . Significantly, they also indicated this kind of research had influenced the thinking of senior police officers : many of whom have accepted the limited effectiveness of conventional deterrent policing - foot patrol, car patrol and criminal investigation - and are now devoting considerable effort to the search for new solutions ." Sir Robert Mark was one of these Chiefs of police who had accepted this view . He had this to say about crime in 1982 : A great deal of crime is simply not preventable . Even the biggest police force that society could want or afford to pay would be unlikely to have any significant effect on the numbers of thefts, burglaries or on crimes of violence between people who know each other ." Mark has also been very vocal about the `problem' of crime : `seen objectively against the background and problems of 50 million people it is not even amongst the more serious of our difficulties' ." This refrain has been taken up by other Chief constables to justify the police concern for public order and anti-subversion activities . But it is an insight which does not lead inevitably in this direction . It could, for example, inform left discourse on crime which recognises that public fear relates to the intermittent nature of social solidarity in some inner-city areas rather than to any risk of becoming a victim of crime . Its emphasis on the symbolic functions of routine police work is also important . It suggests that these fears may be reduced by other symbolic means . Similarly, the idea that policing ought not to be left to the police alone which has become a motto for intelligence gathering and surveillance, can be used to raise the question of self-policing . It contains an acknowledgement of popular capacity for mutual aid and protection which

Law and Order

might become the means to advocate credible self-policing schemes, divorced from police practice, in some neighbourhoods . A second misconception in the left's thinking about crime and the police, is the failure to acknowledge the crucial importance of the police sub-culture as the primary factor in deciding police priorities and practices . Power in the police force resides very much with the `canteen cowboys', the rank-and-file constables and sergeants. As the Policy Studies Institute Report on the police in London showed, it is these officers who are the driving force behind the nature and style of policing . The study revealed that violence, racism and sexism are institutionalised in the Met where officers prove themselves by drinking `large quantities of alcohol and recounting stories of violence conflict and physical prowess' ." The report cast grave doubts on the traditional view of detective work and confirmed that : Comparatively little time is spent on investigation and that a high proportion of offences do not require the deployment of detective skills . Secondly, the research shows how the police on occasion, use their powers not for investigation but for retribution. Thirdly, the report looks at investigation in practice and concludes that in most instances police hands are tied not by the judges' Rules which they ignore with impunity, but by their own incompetence and prejudices . Finally the researchers look at how the police use their position to persuade or intimidate people into creating evidence favourable to the prosecution ." The report's four volumes show that the `rights' of individuals are subservient to getting a `result' i .e . an arrest or a prosecution case that will stand up in court . Thus, the use of informal questioning, threats and inducements and the adjustment of statements are all part of a process which was regarded as necessary to obtain conviction ." One of those interviewed by the researchers described their experience in this way : They put me in a cell for two days . It only had a bench in it, no bed, no blankets . I claimed Habeus Corpus but they said they didn't understand Latin ." The report found that it was common practice to manipulate evidence or statements which would be to the prosecution's advantage . Suspects were informally questioned on the way to the police station, juveniles questioned without the presence of parent or another adult (as the law requires) and individuals only told at the beginning of the formal interview of their right to silence . Police would then suggest a form of words to the interviewee . Thus, as the researchers pointed out : While the officer takes a statement in good faith and with the intention of being fair, he will still tend to frame it in a way

41

Capital f5 Class

42

that is helpful to the prosecution and if he wishes to end the evidence to some extent, it is fairly easy for him to do so while drafting the statement in a form that the suspect will be ready to approve" The researchers found that very few people routinely come into contact with the police. The force orientate themselves towards policing what they see as the 'slags' of society, an `underclass' ofthe poor and rootless whom the police continually subject to harassment and arrest . They do not enforce the law impartially or without prejudice and officers sharply define who will be their target when on patrol according to : A special conception of social class, mixed with an idea of conventional or proper behaviour (which) is just as important to police officers as racial or ethnic groups . In this scale, the "respectable" working class and the suburban middle class stand highest while the "underclass" of the poor and rootless, together with groups regarded as deviant, such as homosexuals or hippies, stand lowest ." This police sub-culture is not confined to London . In 1983, Simon Holdaway an ex police sergeant, published Inside the British Police . The book was his accounts of policing `Hilton' sub-division, an area close to the centre of one of Britain's major cities which remained unamed throughout the book . His account confirms much of what the Psi found in London . Hilton had a police sub-culture in which power again lay at the bottom of the hierarchy with the constables and sergeants . Racism and sexism were institutionalised, force was often used both to retain control or to mete out retribution and 'verballing' remained an important strategy. Holdaway argues that tactics utilised in policing Hilton were supported by the view that the area was a place where the people were going to get `out of hand' unless the police did something about it. For the force, these strategies : emphasise control, hedonism, action and challenge - constituents of the occupational culture . These cultural strands of policing are woven together as practical skills employed on the streets . . . these strategies seem to distance Hilton's officers from the constraints of legal rules and force directives, from the criticisms of the public that is policed, from the influence of the least powerful groups living and working in Hilton . Hilton's rank-and-file officers are free to police in their own style, with their own strategies and assumptions intact ." The left's inability to come to terms with the power of police sub-culture confines their discussions of policing and law to either the abuse of civil liberties and prisoners' rights or to a demand for greater police accountability . They do not take account of the

Law and Order

police as an independent force within our society, nor of the complex interaction between individual officers, their particular force, the law and the criminal justice system in general . A third misconceptioon which often underpins left discussion about the police is the idea that they do a difficult and dangerous job . This is reiterated by the Police Federation, who argue that officers work on violent, mean streets at great risk to their personal safety . Yet, as both Holdaway and the PSI researchers show, police officers spend a great deal of their time doing nothing. As Holdaway put it : Contrary to what you may have gleaned from Sweeney and Operation Carter police work is really a very quiet occupation. . . . Long periods of walking around and waiting are interspersed with occasional incidents, usually mundane . The reality does not match the popular image of a world pulsating with action and excitement ." Even in police terms, the idea of policing dangerous streets is contradicted by the evidence . A study conducted in 1982, calculated that the risk of a police officer being murdered in England and Wales for the years 1970-1977 was 1 .4 per 100,000 of the population . This compared with 2 .5 per 100,000 for the Federal German Republic, 4 .5 for France, 6 .6 for Switzerland, 20 for Italy and 22 for America ." It should be noted that while 19 police officers were killed on duty between 1972 and 1982, between 1970 and 1980 at least 12 people have died in England and Wales as a result of force by police officers such as shootings and deaths on demonstrations ." Between 1972 and 1982 there were 411 deaths in police custody (or otherwise with the police) including 275 (67%) due to unnatural causes or suicide ." Finally, it is worth considering that in 1981, the year of summer disturbances, the number of days lost through officers being injured on and off duty in London were almost the same - some 59,000 days in each category . In terms of days lost through injuries sustained on duty, just over 4,000 were lost through officers being injured in public order situations (7% of the total) but 8,500 days were lost due to officers being involved in motor-cycle accidents (14% of the total) and a further 8,100 days were lost due to accidents when the injured officer was in a car (13% of the total) . Discussion of the left's orthodoxies is incomplete without consideration of the conspiratorial view which provides the main alternative to the dominant constitutional perspective . The conspiracy theory of police practice to which it refers has been given a boost by the policing of the miners' dispute which it is argued, confirms that Britain has acquired the characteristics of a `Police State' . As in the constitutional view, it is believed that until Mrs . Thatcher came on the scene, politics were somehow external to

43

Law and Order 45

policing . However, in this approach, the nub of the problem becomes the newly conspiratorial relationship between senior police, Home Office and government . This, it is argued, explains the recent militarisation of policing and the creation of repressive legislation such as the Police and Criminal Evidence Bill . This is presented as functional to the creation of a monetarist social order . The Bill tends to be understood as a clear and decisive break with the common law powers which preceded it . To the extent that police are identified as the junior partners in the conspiratorial partnership, this position lets them off the hook . Its advocates are spared the task of reckoning seriously with the politics of the force in either its ACPO or its Police Federation guide, let alone explaining the clear conflicts and contradictions which exist between these organisations and the Home Office . Though the variety of police responses to protest, demonstrations and campaigns - mass caution, mass arrest, mass violence - can sometimes suggest a political calculation, the level at which this takes place is hard to specify . Police refusal to charge peace demonstrators or enthusiasm for arresting and beating miners may be explained as much by the protestors' choice of tactics, the location of their action, or the presentation of their grievance and ideology as by tactical policing . In any case, the legal powers and organisational structure which encourage flexible, ad hoc police strategies are a more profound problem than nebulous conspiracies . Attention must therefore be paid to forms of political action which in themselves restrict the range of acceptable tactics open to police in public order situations . Non-violent direct action has a role to play here and is one issue where the trades union movement clearly has something to learn from activist women .

In practice, the left's orientation towards policing often depends on a distinct but thoroughly subjective assessment of the extent to which anti-police activity by individuals or groups expresses an identifiable class interest . Waged workers or strikers who engage in violence or sabotage in the course of Trades Union activity will be viewed more sympathetically than `marginalised' or `alienated' youth who do the same . The latter are widely condemned for their `nihilism' and their anti-social tendencies ."' This socialist perspective is weakened by the idea that policing is primarily about crime control . In turn, this becomes the rationale for confining police activity to areas which accord with the political priorities and calculations of the moment . Policing, already defined as an instrumental rather than symbolic activity is given still greater importance by the idea that there is a continual and inexorable rise in crime . In this atmosphere, the real complexity of crime is disre-

Conclusions

Capital & Class

46

garded by socialists who regard the Thatcherite monopoly of the law and order issue with near hysterical envy . Rather than reflecting any genuine interest, concern about crime has become more important as a talisman of populist politics . The issue of any relationship between recorded crime and unemployment rates suffers from the need to score vulgar political points . `Tough' police tactics which target `high crime' areas are welcomed if they can be balanced by the appropriate safeguards, though the vaguest familiarity with the workings of the police force make this suggestion laughable . The `New Realists' of Labour's criminological fraternity have made the slogan `heavy but accountable policing' their rallying cry ."' As with the right, much of the Labour left sees the issue of crime as a potent symbol of the degeneration of the inner cities . Pronouncements on crime tend to invoke an antiurbanism which sees the city itself as a stultifying brutal space in which fratricide and despair are more likely to develop than solidarity and community . The populist element in being seen to take crime seriously has been identified as the means to repair Labour's decaying relationship with its natural supporters - the respectable, white, productive working class . Thus the issues of policing, legality and criminal justice are being brought to the centre of Labour's organisational and ideological crises . This is being done without apparant consideration of where, when and why the crime issue acquires its awesome power to mobilise and animate . Addressing these questions is urgent lest the party slips into a deeper embrace with the right by seeking to daub the populist package a shabby shade of red . Rather than being accepted as a straightforward reflection of entropic inner city reality, public concern about crime must be understood as the outcome of a political process . This necessitates breaking down the abstract, general category `crime' into the particular experiences, images and fear which correspond to city life . Few urban residents worry about crime in general . Any anxiety they have is likely to specify the crimes which have become a focus of concern-burglary, rape, car theft or perhaps `mugging' . The easy resort to crime as an abstraction increases rather than diminishes the distance which the left has to travel if it is to articulate a credible politics of everyday life . Local factors are central to the pattern of fear about crime . This is always discontinuous, fluid and specific . Its unevenness points to another unevenness, in policing itself, which political organising around the law and order issues must begin to recognise . Apart from the effect of police interventions in local and national political life which have become routine, perceptions of police and the degree of support for them relate directly to the quality of contact (if any) which people have with them . The majority of citizens may never have an

Law and Order

unsatisfactory encounter with police while a large minority are the object of persistent police interest . In 1983, 1,25 7,000 people were arrested and 2,260,000 found guilty or cautioned in England and Wales . The success of local organising is likely to be dependent on local circumstances, police deployment and priorities . This ought to be a reminder that as far as `law and order' is concerned, there are no ready-made answers waiting to be produced from the socialist hat by skilled conjuring . Popular sentiment about crime which develops without the experience of being a victim and without any contact with the police is obviously prone to panic and manipulation which flow from the symbolism inherent in police activity . These problems are merely compounded by left writers whose simplistic, abstract view of crime is matched by a similarly crude portrait of the working class. The unevenness of experience and perception creates a wide variety of needs and expectations with regard to policing . There are for example substantive contradictions between the interests of men and women, young and old, black and white and employed and unemployed people . These differences cannot be banished by the refusal to accommodate the heterogeneity of the working class as presently constituted or by the reluctance to look at the way that law fractures and reproduces class relations . It is not only in the industrial disputes discussed above that police practice contributes to the meaning of class and plays a central role in complex processes of class formation and decomposition which have eclipsed the idea of a simple progression from class in itself to class for itself . In this context, the lines of legality and the sites of police activity often mark significant struggles over social space or resources and freedom to exist without being subjected to continual surveillance or intimidation . Even today, these struggles relate directly to the character and meaning of `working class' . Indeed, the political communities which emerge in the course of such struggles must be carefully evaluated and positioned . It is not sufficient to dismiss them under the heading of marginality. Socialists must remember not only that the processes which turn workers into a class are inextricably tied to the processes by which surplus labour is distributed and organised in politics ; but also that, throughout its short institutional life, policing has been preoccupied with divisions among people - the reproduction of class relations . The history of police differentiating between deserving and casual poor or between labouring and criminal classes makes their more modern attempts to sort reputable from slag citizenry appear less surprising . A left theory of policing will also have to content with the legacy of Victorian moralism expressed in socialist writing which regards the existence of surplus labour (the lumpen proletariat) as an embarassment to the idea of class

47

Capital E5 Class

48

analysis . The expansion of the state's role in the provision of income and changes in the division of labour precipitated by de-industrialisation and new technology have underlined this failure . The surplus increases but the political consciousness of the approved, "classically conceived" working class fails to match the predictive logic . Many of this group have articulated their interests in 'Thatcherite' terms . The urban phenomenon crudely caricatured as the lumpen proletariat must be studied on its own and in its relation to other more politically attractive class fractions . Both histories will be centrally concerned with policing . Socialists must also accept that the struggle to impose legal regulation on working class populations involves both criminalisation and de-politicisation . The years ahead are likely to witness many struggles to resist the imposition of criminal labels on individual and collective acts which have a normative and explicitly political though seldom revolutionary dimension . Working covertly while drawing the dole, drinking on unlicensed premises or harassing blacks for sport are as much a feature of this category as stoning police and burning their cars . The normative sanction of these acts is a reminder that the communities involved have their own sophisticated ideas about what justice and freedom consist of."' At times these norms may coincide with the priorities and sanctions of the police but recent history suggests that this is the exception rather than the rule . Authoritarian statism manifest in law and order politics may increase the extent to which officially defined crime, for example scrounging, picketing or mugging, is synonymous with crime as it is defined by the working and non-working classes . If this is so, it is not an inevitable or permanent state of affairs . There will also be wide variations in opinion and in levels of organisation around policing; these will be expressed geographically . The new initiatives organised by Sir Kenneth Newman at the Metropolitan police recognise the patchy and intermittent character of anti-police consciousness and resistance . Their overall context is a shift towards police strategies based on area rather than offence categories which heralds the creation of a 'multiagency' approach to crime prevention and control ." This sets out to synchronise a broad range of state agencies under police direction and co-ordinate their efforts towards the establishment of an `ethos in society which makes crime unacceptable .' Newman has identified the areas which gave his force the greatest concern : Throughout London there are locations where unemployed youth - often black youths - congregate ; where the sale and purchase of drugs, the exchange of stolen property and illegal drinking and gaming is not uncommon (sic) . The youths regard these locations as their territory . Police are

Law and Order

viewed as intruders, the symbol of authority - largely white authority - in a society that is responsible for all their grievances about unemployment, prejudice and discrimination. They equate closely with the criminal `rookeries' of Dickensian London . 105 The existence of these areas comprises a threat which is less to do with any immediate lawlessness they contain than with their capacity to convey the limitations of police power and to signify the fragility of the order which police are able to impose . If allowed to continue, locations with these characteristics assume symbolic importance - a negative symbolism of the inability of the police to maintain order . Their existence encourages law breaking elsewhere, affects public perceptions of police effectiveness, heightens fear of crime and reinforces the phenomenon of urban decay . 106 In earlier phases, the concept of `mugging' focused popular panic around the activities of first black youth and then youth in general . In Newman's discourse, the concept `street crime' is used to link street robberies with street riots and disorders so that each expresses the other and both become symptoms of the same criminal and environmental malaise . The development of the area-based notions of control and the resultant targetting of specific populations and groups is an important step towards the coordination of state interventions which Newman's Met has identified as the true practice of what it now calls `social control' . It is important to grasp that the 'multi-agency' initiative is only part of the Met's response to the challenge of policing the '80s . Its corporate approach is inseparable from, indeed relies on the existence of a ruthless militarised capability which has the primary function of `nipping disorder in the bud' . In October, Sir Kenneth told Westminster Chamber of Commerce : During the summer this year there were many mini-riots which had the potential to escalate to Brixton 1981 proportions . But they were quickly and effectively extinguished . So effectively indeed, that they hardly rated a mention in the press . 107 Rather than setting these twin strategies at opposite poles of the policing spectrum the left must accept their inter-relationship and examine how, in the present period, each has come to require the other . Both have profound implications for the police organisation as a whole and each expresses the lessons learned by the force in 1981 a bitter experience which Geoffrey Dear, Assistant Commissioner at the Met described as having `shaken the apathy out of the system'. The seamless integration of state agencies as diverse and contradictory as schools, housing departments, social services, c&c .,ws-i,

49

Capital & Class

50

probation and the youth service remains unlikely if not impossible . However, the forms of social and political planning which are aimed at have a genuine appeal to sections of the left . This is particularly true of currents in local government and social work bureaucracy where administrative and statist conceptions of socialism and social change have taken root . The idea that the relevant professionals should sit down together and unify their work is clearly congruent with elements of Fabian thought which are once again popular among the self-styled `new urban left' ." The idea that the transformation of society can be administered from above in this way stands in stark contradiction to approaches which emphasise its origins in long and complex processes of popular self-organisation . At this point, many who do not go all the way down the neo-Fabian road will want to argue that law and order is one area of life where orchestrated bureaucratic intervention is necessary to ensure the maximisation of justice, albeit in modified forms . We believe that this position is insufficiently radical and an inappropriate starting point for effective and meaninful political action . At best, such an approach is premature, at worst it leads to the cynical attempt to incorporate unmodified 'Thatcherite' law and order politics into the work of Labour parties at local level . As an alternative, we have pointed to the existence of normative conceptions of crime and wrongdoing which compete for popular allegiance with those which originate in police practice . It is important to apply this insight and identify where such norms connect with a capacity for self-policing . Police initiatives like `Neighbourhood Watch' schemes recognise this capacity but seek to subordinate it to the gathering of local intelligence and the obvious public relations value these schemes have for the force . Socialists must begin to affirm and extend the belief that people are able to regulate their own community space and protect their lives and property without lapsing into vigilantism . To be effective, the commitment to self-organisation must go hand in hand with a combination of making demands on the police and carefully documented criticism of their failures and political stances. Left writers who have suggested that this mixture of tactics amounts to schizophrenia are closing off the only route out of a situation in which socialists are being dragged - with varying degrees of reluctance - to the right by the attempt to even speak about policing and crime . The balance between the three essential components - organisation, demands and criticism will be determined by local circumstances and may vary widely across a city . If we are able to admit that `law and order' issues express regret at the collapse of social solidarity in some areas it also

Law and Order

follows that the re-creation of that solidarity will do something to decrease fear. We could do worse than follow Michael Ignatieff's advice : `(Labour) ought to talk less about prisons and policemen and more about rebuilding civic trust among strangers in public places - by giving tenants control over their estates ; by creating clubs, bars, gyms and small businesses where kids can create a civic space of their own between the institutions of home, school and dole office ; by creating parks, public monuments and estates which, as the Victorians had the confidence to do, have the kind of beauty and respect for human scale which demands pride and trust from those who use them.' 109 The political challenge posed by this is two-fold . The left must adapt itself so that it can correspond to the needs and aspirations of communities in which the police are a problem rather than a solution . The restriction of police autonomy and the reduction of their power must be brought to the centre of socialist organising .

We would like to thank Clare DeMuth, Phil Scraton, Paul Gordon, Vron Ware and Marcus Gilroy-Ware for their criticism, encouragement and support during the preparation of this article .

51



Capital E. Class 52

References

1. Hansard, 14 November 1983, Cols . 341-2 . 2. Hansard, 8 November 1983, Cols . 341-2. 3. Ibid, Col. 90 . 4. Cited in Sim, J . and Thomas, P ., `The Prevention of Terrorism Act: Normalising the Politics of Repression' in Journal ofLaw and Society, Summer 1983, p .80. See also Criminal Justice : A Working Paper, Home Office, 1984. 5. Hansard, 3 February 1984, Cols . 508-512. 6. Jeffrey, K . and Hennessy, P ., States of Emergency, Routledge and Kegan, Paul, 1983, p .150. 7. Morgan, K .O ., Labour in Power 1945-51, Clarendon Press, 1984, pp.55-6. 8. Rutherford, A ., Prisons and the Process of3ustice: The Reductionist Challenge, 1984, p.53 . 9. Ryan, M ., Politics ofPenal Reform, Longmans, 1983, pp . 10-11 . 10. Ibid . 11 . Scott, H ., Scotland Yard, Penguin, (1957) p . 22 . 12. Labour Government vs . the Dockers 1945-51, Solidarity Pamphlet 19, Summer 1966. 13 . Cited in Strinatti, D ., Capitalism the State and Industrial Relations, Groom-Helm, (1982) p .52 . 14. Jeffrey and Hennesey, op .cit ., p .180 . 15 . Ibid, p .220-1 . 16. Ellen, G ., `Labour and Strike Breaking' in International Socialist 24, Summer 1984, p.58 . 17. Ibid, footnote 99 . 18. Storch, R .D., `The Plague of the Blue Locusts : Police Reform and Popular Resistance in Northern England 1840-57' in International Review ofSocial History 20, 1975, pp .61-90 . 19 . Field, J., `Police Power and Community in a Provincial English Town' in Bailey, V. (ed), Policing and Punishment in Nineteenth Century Britain Groom-Helm, (1981) pp .42-64 . 20. Weinberger, B ., `The Police and the Public in Mid Nineteenth Century Warwickshire', in Bailey, V ., op .cit ., pp . 65-93 . 21 . Cohen, P ., `Policing the Working Class City' in NDC/CSE (eds), Capitalism and the Rule ofLaw, Hutchinson, 1979, pp . 120-36 . 22 . White, J ., `Campbell Bunk : A Lumpen Community in London Between the Wars' in History Workshop 8, Autumn 1979, p .33-4 . 23 . Report of the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, 1935, op.cit., p.8 . 24 . Ibid, p .9 . 25 . Ibid, p .10 . 26 . Ibid . Report of the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis 1937, p .8 . 27 . 28 . Ibid, p .9 . 29 . Brogden, M . The Police; Autonomy and Consent, Academic Press, 1983 . 30 . Pearson, G ., Hooligan : A History of Respectable Fears, Macmillan, 1983, p.213 . 31 . Ibid, p.212 (emphasis in the original) . 32 . Ibid, p.230 . 33 . For documentation of many of these changes see State Research, Review ofSecurity and the State, 3 volumes, Julian Friedman, 1978-1980.



Law and Order 34 . Boyle, J ., The Pain of Confinement, Cannongate Press, 1984 . 35 . Brown, M., Working The Street: Police Discretion and the Dilemmas of Reform, Russell Sage Foundation, 1981, p .283-4 . 36 . S . Hall et.al, Policing The Crisis, Macmillan, 1978, Anthony Barnett, `Fortress Thatcher' in P . Ayrton, T . Englehart and V. Ware (eds), World View 1985, Pluto Press, 1984 ; Colin Leys, 'Neo-Conservatism and the Organic Crisis in Britain; Studies In Political Economy, 4, 1980 . 37 . Robin Evelegh, Peace Keeping In A Democratic Society - The Lessons OfNorthern Ireland, C . Hurst and Co ., 1978 . Kenneth Newman, `Public Order In Free Societies', speech to The 38. European Atlantic Group, 24 .10.83 . 39 . Geary, R ., `From Battle to March: The Changing Nature of Industrial Confrontations' in The Police Journal, Vol . LV 11 No .2, April-June 1984, p .151 . Bunyan T ., The History and Practice of the Political Police in Britain, 40 . Julian Friedman, 1978 . 41 . Ibid, p .141 . 42 . Cited in Raeburn, A ., The Militant Suffragettes, Michael Joseph, 1973, p .153-5 . 43 . Ibid . 44 . Cited in Morrell, C ., Black Friday : Violence Against Women in the Suffragette Movement, Women's Research and Resource Centre, 1981, p .35 . 45 . Hutt . A, The Condition of Working Class in Britain . Martin Lawrence ltd ., 1933, p.244 . 46. NCCL (1937), The Harworth Colliery Strike : A Report to the Executive Committee of NCCL by the Secretary of the Council . Introduction. 47. Ibid, p .7 . Ibid, p .12 . 48 . 49 . Ibid, p .13 . Ibid, p .14. 50 . 51 . Ibid, p.13 . 52. Ibid, p.11 . Benewick, R ., Political Violence and Public Order, Allen Lane, 1969, 53 . p.205 . Cited in Ibid . 54 . 55 . Ibid,p .212 . 56 . Ibid, p .213 . NCCL, Minutes of Evidence Taken Before the Royal Commission 57 . on the Police, 24 January 1961, p .745 . 58 . Ibid. 59 . Ibid. 60. Ibid. 61 . Scraton, P ., (no date) 'Industrial Disputes, Picketing and Public Order' in `Decision Making In Britain' Open University Course D102, p.208 ; Block IV, Part 5, First Draft, p.47 . Nancy E . Anderson and David Greenberg, `The Legal Theories of 62 . Pashukanis and Edelman', Social Text 7, 1983 . 64 . E .P . Thompson, Whigs and Hunters, Allen Lane, 1975 . Doreen McBarnett, Conviction-Law, The State and the Construction 63 . ofjustice, Macmillan, 1981 . Bob Fine, Democracy and the Rule ofLaw, Pluto Press, 1984 . 65 .

53



Capital & Class 54

66 . M. and A . Brogden, `From Henry III to Liverpool 8-The Unity of Police Street Powers', International Journal Of The Sociology of Law 12, 1984. 67 . Robert Reiner, `Is Britain Turning Into A Police State?' New Society, 2 .8 .84. 68 . David McNee's evidence to The Royal Commission on Criminal procedure and David McNee, McNee's Law, Collins, 1983 . 69. John Smith, an ex-Met officer quoted in The Guardian, 28.1 .84 Interview with Martin Young in The Listener, 5 .7 .84 . 70. Harry Templeton, `Something Is Wrong, Do We Need Medicine or The Surgeon's Knife?' Police Vol. XVI, May 1984 . 71 . Thompson, E . P., `Introduction' in StateResearch, Review ofSecurity and the State, Julian Friedmann, 1978, p .XI . 72 . Ibid, p.XV 73 . Ibid. 74. Ibid. 75 . Daily Mirror, 26 January 1984. 76 . Ibid . 77 . Hansard, 23 June 1983, Col . 190. 78 . Hansard, 10 February 1983, Col . 601 79 . Cited in The Home Office Perspectives in Policy and Administration Bicentenary Lectures, 1982, RIPA, p .21 . 80 . Report of the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis for the year 1933, Cmmd 4562, pp .15-16 . 81 . Report of the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, 1935, Cmmd 5165, p .5 . 82 . Ibid,p .15 . 83 . PoliceJournal, Vol. LI I No.1 ., January/March 1979 . 84 . Hough, M . and Heal, K ., `Police Strategies of Crime Control' in Feldman, F. (ed.) Developments in the Study ofCriminalBehaviour Vol. L : The Prevention and Control of Offending, 1982, p .46. (Emphasis in the original.) 85 . Ibid . 86 . Clarke, R.V . and Hough, M ., Crime and Police Effectiveness, Home Office Research Study, No .79, 1984, p .1 . 87. Ibid . 88 . Cited in Gilroy, P ., `The Myth of Black Criminality' in Eve, M . and Musson, D. (eds), The Socialist Register 1982, Merlin Press, p .56 . 89 . Mark, R ., In the Office of Constable, Collins, 1978, p .24 . 90 . PolicingLondon, No . 11 ., p .35 . 91 . Ibid, p .44. 92 . Ibid, p .45 . 93 . Policy Studies Institute, Police and People in London, Volume 1, 1983, p .146 . 94 . Ibid, Volume IV, p .212 . 95 . Ibid, p .I 11 . 96 . Holdaway, S ., Inside the British Police, Basil Blackwell, 1983, pp .100-01 . 97 . Ibid, p .146. 98 . Cited in Lester, D ., `The Use of Deadly Force by Police' in Police Journal, Vol . LV 11 No .2, April-June 1984, p .170. 99 . Figures supplied by inquest cited in Policing London, No .10, December 1983, p.21 . 100 . Third Report From the Home Affairs Committee, 1980, H/C 631 :

Law and Order Home Office Statistical Bulletin, 9/83 . 101 . Ian Taylor, `Against Crime and For Socialism' Crime and Social justice, Winter, 1982 . 102 . Jock Young and Richard Kinsey, `Life and Crimes' New Statesman, 7 .10 .83 . 103 . S .D. Reicher, `The Bristol Riot : an explanation of the limits of crowd action in terms of a social identity model' European Journal ofSocial Psychology,14,1984 . 104 . See Lord Elton's introduction to `Crime Prevention : a coordinated approach' Home Office, 1983 . The Parliamentary All-Party Penal Affairs Group, `The Prevention of Crime Among Young People', Barry Rose, 1984. wvt[ of Schools Report, `Police Liaison with the Education Service', DES, 1983 . 105 . Kenneth Newman, `Policing London Post Scarman', Sir George Bean memorial lecture, 30 .10.83 . 106 . Ibid . 107 . The Guardian, 17 .10 .84 . 108 . Martin Boddy and Colin Fudge (eds), Local Socialism, Macmillan, 1984. 109. Michael Ignatieff, `Law and Order In a City Of Strangers' New Statesman, 27 .5 .83 .

55

Capital & Class

56

Accumulation Crisis JAMES O'CONNOR This important book attempts a synthesis of orthodox economic Marxist theory with the crisis theory of writers such as Habermas and Marcuse . James O'Connor does this by drawing on a wide range of materials from economics, sociology, politics, psychology and history . The result is a book that will be of crucial interest . 272 pages, £17 .50 (0 631 13552 9)

Capitalism, Value and Exploitation GEOFF HODGSON What are the essential differences between labour and capital? Geoff Hodgson's new approach to the issues of value and exploitation comes to terms with growing disenchantment with both orthodox and Marxist solutions to obvious and massive economic problems . 272 pages, hardback £25 .00 (0 85520 414 1) paperback £7 .50 (0855206942)

Contemporary Capitalism and Marxist Economics JACQUES GOUVERNEUR Jacques Gouverneur here shows how Marx's theory of exploitation applies both theoretically and in practice to present-day Western Europe . He concentrates on the problems of crises and price movements, and the causes of the current scourge of inflation, giving systematic definitions of all features of Marxian theory . 320 pages, hardback £19 .50 (0 85520 537 7) paperback £7 .95 (0 85520 538 5)

Uneven Development NEIL SMITH This is an examination of uneven development within and between capitalist countries from the standpoint of concepts of nature and space . The approach is interdisciplinary, constantly makes new connections between issues and theories, and will interest advanced undergraduates in economics . 216 pages, hardback £22 .50 (0 631 13564 2) paperback £7 .50 (0631136851)

The Myth of Free Trade H .D . SHUTT There is increasing concern about the growth of protectionism and the threat this poses to economic recovery . H .D . Shutt argues that this preoccupation is largely misplaced as it presupposes that the boom after World War II followed a general liberalization of trade under the auspices of GATT . He shows that such liberalization was always heavily qualified . 224 pages, £ 17 .50 (0 631 13997 4)

Basil Blackwell

Ephraim Nimni

Great historical failure : marxist theories of nationalism of national phenomena presents a series of difficulties and contradictions for modern social theories . Since the emergence of both marxism and sociology, the concern of theory has been to explain social phenomena by constantly refining a universal logic . Specific and localised problems that cannot be explained within this logical context become anomalies that have to be accounted for and pose obstacles to the efficient performance of the theories . The resilience of the national phenomenon is perhaps one of the most obstinate forms of social relativism : nationalism preaches the importance of the specific over the general, going into lengthy justifications as to why the national movement in question is so 'unique' that it should be considered as a special case . At the same time, attempts by both Marxism and classical sociology to explain the nature of the national phenomenon in universal terms clash with a diversified reality that resists such monoTHE CONCEPTUALISATION

58

causal explanations . It is therefore no coincidence that both theories are logically posed to reject the claims to specificity and uniqueness of nationalist ideologies . The national question did not disappear because Marxists wished it would do so . What really happened was the opening of an amazing theoretical gap in both disciplines, coupled with an avoidance of theoretical discussions of the nature of national phenomena. Marxist discussions of nationalism, with few and relatively unknown exceptions, attempt to explain concrete cases of nationalist agitation in terms of the class struggle, or of a pervasive `false consciousness' that distracted workers from their real aim, the destruction of the bourgeois order . The purpose of this article is to discuss the failure of classical Marxism to come to grips with the national phenomenon. In this sense, classical sociology has little to offer instead . If classical Marxism was severely limited by the pa-

Marxist theories ofnationalism radigmatic straitjacket of economism, classical sociology was no less limited by the universal laws of social evolution that it so proudly cherished . In the case of Marxism, the failure to adequately understand and conceptualise the national phenomenon has been widely acknowledged . The constant repetition of stereotyped formulas, and the impossibility of providing an adequate conceptual and theoretical understanding of the problem, moved Tom Nairn to open the theoretical section of his The Break Up of Britain with a statement of desperation : The theory of Nationalism represents Marxism's great historical failure . It may have others as well, and some of these have been more debated : Marxism's shortcomings over imperialism, the state, the falling rate of profit and the immiseration of the masses are certainly old battlefields . Yet none of these is as important, as fundamental, as the problem of nationalism, either in theory or in political practice .' This failure is highlighted by the fact that when Marxism produced a more sensitive and imaginative perception of the national question, in the work of Otto Bauer, the author was ideologically 'excommunicated' and his work declared `heretic' by the high priests of the Second and Third Internationals . Before going on to discuss the Marxist theory, it is necessary to briefly discuss some terminological problems, since the sociological and Marxist terminology of `nations' and `nationalism' belongs to a highly contested field . Classical Marxists referred to the National Question as the totality of political, ideological, economic and legal relations between national communities. I shall continue using this term, which is interchangeable with the national phenomenon . Nations are for classical Marxists fully formed national communities, usually in possession of a national state. Nationalities are national communi-

ties not fully developed as nations . The distinction between these two concepts is ambivalent and unclear, so the term national communities will be used instead to cover both cases . This term highlights the communitarian aspect of the national phenomenon . A national state is the ideal, and often unobtainable symbiosis between a complete nation and a complete state . Whenever the term `nation' is used it will denote a closer connection with the national state rather than with the national community. Nationalism is a political and ideological movement whose main concern is the wellbeing of the national community, be it real or fictitious . Sometimes nationalisms `make' national communities . Nationalism was unanimously defined by classical Marxists as a bourgeois phenomenon alien to Marxism .

Marx and Engels on the national question It has been argued that Marx and Engels did not have a theoretically coherent approach to the national question . It is widely believed that they approached every national movement on an ad hoc basis, their position often dictated by their attitude to circumstantial political events such as the emergence of a democratic movement (the Polish case) or their opposition to a despotic ruler (such as the Russian Czar) .' It will be argued that this approach is incorrect : Marx and Engels had a coherent perception of the national question even if there is no single corpus of literature that explicitly presents their views . A form of economic reductionism combined with a universal socialevolutionary paradigm provides a coherent basis for formulating a theory, which is compatible with the apparently contradictory positions held by Marx and Engels . It will also be argued that this unwritten perception provided the intellec-

59

Capital E5 Class

60

tual basis for the understanding of the national question by subsequent generations, as well as many of today's generally accepted political and strategical considerations on the nature of national communities . Above all, two considerations appear to be crucial: the formation of a universal and at the same time historically located model for national development (the model 'State-Language-Nation') ; and the capacity or incapacity of given national communities to evolve from a `lower' to a'higher' form of social organisation (the theory of `historical' vs . 'non-historical' nations) .

The pattern state-language-nation For Marx and Engels, what they call `the modern nation' is the direct result of the process by which the feudal mode of production was replaced by the capitalist mode . `Modern nations' could exist only in the context of a capitalist economy, and originated in the process of transition from feudalism to capitalism .' One of the most important features of this transition is that the fragmented feudal society was slowly united under the tutelage of an embryonic modern state . This caused the destruction of local peculiarities and indicated a process of standardisation of populations which was for Engels an essential condition for the formation of markets, and hence necessary to the capitalist system . A strong empirical indicator of this process was the formation of modern West European languages. The capitalist mode of production requires both an intensification of the division of labour and a growing interdependence of the different units of production . Marx and Engels argued that modern Western European languages emerged to consolidate recognisable cultural and political units that ensure the interdependence of the various units of production and con-

stitute a recognisable market: all under the tutelage of the emerging state . These distinct and recognisable culturalpolitical units, delimited by the territorial area of influence of the emerging absolutist states, were for Marx and Engels the `modern nations' .' From the above it follows that a nation exists if it has : a) a large enough population to allow for the internal division of labour that characterises a capitalist society with its competing classes; and b) a cohesive and sufficiently large territorial space that provides the basis for a feasible state . This pattern of national formation is clearly derived from Marx' and Engels' observation of the process in Western Europe, particularly in England and France . It was above all the revolutionary ideals of the French Revolution which inspired Marx' and Engels' understanding of the process of national formation in Europe . The process of national consolidation that followed the French Revolution was regarded as a model for national formation in other less advanced areas of the world, and much of their discussion of the national question, particularly their discussion of the situation in Eastern Europe, appears to be an implicit attempt to formulate a model of `national development' derived from the principal features of the French case . Since French national consolidation appears to have influenced Marx' and Engels' thought, it may be useful to discuss briefly its main features . The Jacobins and other French revolutionaries believed that the best way to proceed to the formation of a democratic state was to follow a path of tight centralisation and linguistic standardisation . It has been widely argued that the mobilising effect of the revolutionary ideology assisted the formation of the first modern nationalist movement creating the unity of the

Marxist theories of nationalism

French people (nation) . Sieyes and Jacobins firmly believed that the third estate was the French Nation . However, all this belongs to the revolutionary mythology. The geographical area occupied by the French absolutist state was in fact inhabited during the best part of the period preceding the Revolution by a conglomerate of linguistic communities, some of which spoke neo-Latin languages (Langue D'Oc, Langue D'Oil, Catalan), others celtic languages (Breton) and others ancient pre-Latin languages (Basque) . In reality, the language of the court of Versailles, which subsequently became `French', was spoken only by a minority of the population of the state . Pierre Giraud argues that `During the Middle Ages there was not one French language but several French languages . Each province spoke and wrote its own dialect' .' But in the period immediately preceding the Revolution, the language of Paris began to exercise its definitive supremacy, eventually converting itself into the official language of the State .' After the Revolution, this process was greatly accelerated by the policies of the revolutionary government, anxious to create a uniform national state with one language for all its citizens . The French language penetrated the family structure of the other national communities via the state educational system .' But, given that a substantial number of citizens of the state were unable to speak Parisian French, the 1791 constitutional convention decided to intensify its use . Two closely connected reasons account for this : the revolutionaries wished to create a democratic and tightly centralised state, and to ensure the hegemony of the Parisian bourgeoisie against pockets of aristocratic resistance . Given the close association between Parisian French and revolutionary aims, it is hardly surprising that the counterrevolution was stronger in those areas

where it was hardly spoken . A tighly cen- 61 tralised state was bound to destroy the administrative and cultural autonomy of the non-French national communities . This combination of cultural imperialism coupled with tight administrative centralisation led to an almost complete destruction of the culture and language of the non-Parisian French national communities. As the animosity of the oppressed national communities towards the Parisian bourgeoisie grew, they became the rallying point for counterrevolutionary activities . The response of the Jacobins was to equate the national identity of these unfortunate peoples with counterrevolutionary forces, without realising that it was their own lack of sensitivity towards their cultural aspirations that was pushing them into the arms of reaction . Deputies Barrere and Gregoire presented a report to the 1794 Assembly with a very revealing title : `Report on the need to destroy rural dialects (patois) and universalise the use of the French language' . Rosdolsky quotes a revealing passage : Federalism and superstitution speak low Breton, the Emigration and hatred to the Republic speak German, the counter revolution speaks Italian and fanaticism speaks Basque . . . . It is necessary to popularise the (French) language ; it is necessary to stop this linguistic aristocracy that seems to have established a civilised nation in the midst of barbaric ones .' It is perhaps interesting to note that this tendency to use the French language as the cultural medium for the advancement of revolutionary goals was noted by Marx in his famous refutation of Lafargue's attempt to declare the abolution of all national differences : . . . The English laughed very much when I began my speech by saying that our friend Lafargue and others had spoken `en francais' to us, i .e . a language that nine tenths of the audience

Capital E5 Class

62

did not understand . I also suggested that by the negation of nationalities, he appeared quite unconsciously to understand their absorption by the

model French nation . However, Marx did not draw any theoretical conclusion from this incident and continued all his life to believe that the `French Model' was the universal path for national development . Marx and Engels believed that state centralisation and national unification with the consequent assimilation of small national communities was the only viable path of social progress . Their preference for large centralised states was not only a strategic consideration, but also the basis of their unwritten conceptualisation of the national phenomenon . The reasons for this could be ascertained in their discussion of the civil society, the national state, and what they called the `historical' national communities. Marx redefined the Hegelian notion of `civil society' by locating the emergence of civil society within a specific stage of development of the productive forces, inheriting in this way the universalevolutionist view of Hegel but rejecting its idealistic base . The bourgeois state overcomes the contradictions of the civil society by granting political emancipation, and by establishing that every member of society is an equal partner in popular sovereignty. But, according to Marx, crucial differences still remain since the state leaves intact the world of private interest, and from this he concludes that the state cannot overcome the contradictions that exist within civil society and becomes the reflection of its dominant forces . Since the general form of civil society is present in the specific forms `state' and `nation', and civil society is nothing but the reflection of the dominant forces within it, it follows that in the capitalist mode of production, the hegemonic class (bourgeoisie) is the class that

determines the form and content of civil society. For Marx and Engels, the `modern nation' is an historical phenomenon that has to be located in a precise historical period, the period of the ascendance of the bourgeoisie as an hegemonic class, which at the same time is the period of consolidation of the capitalist mode of production . Thus modern nations are mere epiphenomena of the development of the bourgeoisie, and the former should be judged on the merits of the latter . If nationalist agitation leads to a `higher' state in the development of productive forces, then the nationalist movement deserves support. But, on the other hand, if nationalist movements emerge among `historyless' peoples - national communities based on peasant-feudal social organisation, incapable of surviving the transformations and upheavals caused by the universalisation of capitalism - these must disappear as separate entities . This vision of the emergence and development of national communities, presented in a social-evolutionist and epiphenomenal way, is coherent with practically every analysis or discussion of specific national communities in the works of Marx and Engels . It constitutes the essence of their theories of national development, even if not explicitly discussed in any specific work .

The 'historyless' peoples The way in which Marx and Engels related to certain non-European, stateless or small national communities has been a matter for considerable disquiet among sympathetic commentators since the days of the Second International . However, there have been relatively few attempts to understand the reasons behind their positions on the subject and to relate them to their overall theory . In what follows, an attempt will be made to provide

Marxist theories of nationalism

such a link . The idea of progressive centralisation as the economy evolves from a lower to a higher stage is at the heart of the Marxist analysis of the national question . This premise, as Ian Cummings rightly argues, `runs like a thread through Marx's writings' ." An important consequence of this point of departure was that Marx and Engels regarded every form of nationalist agitation as aimed at the formation and consolidation of states, and therefore they dramatically underestimated the ethnic and cultural dimensions of nationalist agitation . For Marx and Engels then, nationalist ideologies are mere epiphenomena of the growth of nations ." One initial difficulty with this approach is that it leads on the one hand to an overestimation of the needs of the bourgeoisie to build a national state, and on the other to a serious underestimation of ethnicity . The problem here is not so much the indiscriminate use of Western European models, but rather a `capitalocentric" Z emphasis in the discussion of national phenomena. Nationalist movements and national communities are always defined in terms of their position in the capitalist system . As the growth of the nation heralds the formation of a national state to help the bourgeoisie develop to a higher stage of production, the inescapable logic behind this analysis dictates that national communities that are incapable of constituting themselves into national states are acting against the `tide of history' . Such national communities are `functionally reactionary' because they cannot develop a healthy bourgeoisie, and `intrinsically reactionary' because their mere social existence defies modernity . In this case, their existence in a capitalist environment is a hindrance to social progress, and they must therefore assimilate to more `vital' neighbours . But if these unfortunate communities insist on following a path of

national revival, they will become `socially regressive' since they cannot survive under capitalist conditions and must regress to a feudal system . These feudal enclaves will have no other choice but to associate with reactionary forces that oppose the progressive unifying role of the bourgeoisie . These national communities ('ethnographic monuments', in Engels' words) must culturally and politically perish to pave the way for the unifying leadership of the bourgeoisie . Following one of the most metaphysical notions of Hegelian political philosophy, Marx and Engels called these national communities 'non-historical nations' (Geschichtslose Volker) . The central idea behind this dubious concept of'nonhistorical nations' is that communities that have proved unable to build a national state over a period of time will not be able to do so in the future ." Hegel, unlike Marx, makes a sharp distinction between a nation and a state . For Hegel a group of people may exist as a national community, but in that condition are unable to contribute to the unfolding of world history . A nation, according to Hegel, will only fulfil its historical role if it is capable of building a state ." It is not an accident therefore that what Hegel calls `uncivilised' peoples have no history, since they have been proved `incapable' of having a state . It is from the Hegelian conceptualisation of history that Marx and Engels draw the nucleus of their evolutionary paradigm . Hegel argued that history cannot be conceived as a mere recording of change, but must be first and foremost considered in terms of the unfolding of the human agency . This is a process of evolution towards an a prioristically defined state of freedom. Thus, earlier or less developed civilisations must give way to more advanced forms of social organisation that will result in a superior state . Freedom is embodied in the state, and the state in turn is the expression of the particular

63

Capital ES Class

64 spiritual values (Geist) of the people in question . Given this situation, Hegel argues that those peoples who have proved themselves unable to build a state will never be able to build one and are condemned to perish in the stream of history. While Hegel makes a clear distinction between a state and a nation, he argues that the supporting base for a state is the nation. While the nation is held together by ties of kinship and language, the state is derived from the ethical ideals derived from the spirit of the national community in question (Volkgeist) . This `communal spirit of the people' takes an objective form and creates the state and its institutions, but this is only possible when the quality of the Volkgeist in question allows for a significant contribution to the unfolding of freedom . National communities incapable of developing a national state are not the bearers of the `World Spirit' . These peoples are without rights and 'count no longer in history' ." The rights of 'barbarian' nations are for Hegel unequal to those of 'civilised nations' which are the true bearers of the spirit of freedom ." These idealistic speculations are perhaps one of the weakest features of Hegel's political philosophy and directly opposed to an historical materialist conception of history. It is thus enigmatic to find this conceptualisation echoed in the works of Marx and Engels . The use of Hegelian terminology, particularly in the context of the 1848 revolution, was coupled with increasing abusiveness towards communities that did not conform with the path to national development discussed above . Some examples follow : a) Spaniards and Mexicans . . . The Spaniards are indeed degenerate . But a degenerate Spaniard, a Mexican that is the ideal . All vices of the Spaniards - Boastfulness, Grandiloquence, and Quixoticism - are found in

the Mexicans raised to the third power . . ." b) Scandinavians . . . Scandinavism is enthusiasm for the brutal, sordid, piratical old norse national traits, for the deep inner life which is unable to express its exhuberant ideas and sentiments in words, but can express them in deeds, namely in rudeness towards women, perpetual drunkeness and wild berserk frenzy alternating with tearful sentimentality. . . . Obviously, the more primitive a nation is, the more closely its customs and way of life resemble those of the old norse people, the more 'scandinavian' it must be ." c) Chinese It is almost needless to observe that, in the same measure in which opium has obtained the sovereignty over the Chinese, the Emperor and his staff of pedantic mandarins have become disposed of their own sovereignty. It would seem as though history had first to make this whole people drunk before it could raise them out of their hereditary stupidity ." The d) North African Bedouins . . . struggle of the Bedouins was a hopeless one, and though the manner in which brutal soldiers like Bugeaud have carried on the war is highly blameworthy, the conquest of Algeria is an important and fortunate fact for the progress of civilisation . . . and if we may regret that the liberty of the Bedouins of the desert has been destroyed, we must not forget that these same Bedouins were a nation of robbers, whose principal means of living consisted in making excursions upon each other, or upon settled villagers . . ." Marx and Engels were, to put it mildly, impatient with and intolerant of ethnic minorities . Further confirmation comes from their private correspondence, where

Marxist theories ofnationalism

the most famous example is the characterisation of Lasalle as aJewish Nigger' ." The dichotomy of 'historical'/'nonhistorical' nations was revived by Marx and Engels in the context of the 1848 revolution while discussing the revival to national life of the Czechs, Slovaks, Ukrainians, Serbs, etc ., all of whom were Eastern European national communities that spoke Slavonic-related languages . These diverse national communities were imaginarily constituted into a fictitious unit called `the Southern Slavs' . The reasons for this become clear if Marx' and Engels' model of national formation, discussed above, is taken into consideration . If the conditions of a national community do not allow for the formation of a `viable' state, this national community has to `assimilate' to a larger state and a more viable national community, with `democracy as compensation'." For Marx and Engels, the metaphysical notion of Volkgeist was replaced by `the capacity to enter capitalist relations of production' as the criterion determining historicity, but keeping intact the social-evolutionist logic of this analysis . Engels presents the argument very clearly: There is no country in Europe which does not have in some corner or other one or several fragments of peoples, the remnant of a former population that was suppressed and held in bondage by the nation which later became the main vehicle of historical development. These relics of a nation, mercilessly trampled under the course of history, as Hegel says, these residual fragments of peoples (Volkerabfalle) always become fanatical standard bearers of counter revolution and remain so until their complete extirpation or loss of their national character, just as their whole existence in general is itself a protest against a great historical revolution.

Such in Scotland are the Gaels, the 65 supporters of the Stuarts from 1640 to 1745 . Such in France are the Bretons, the supporters of the Bourbons from 1742 to 1800 . Such in Spain are the Basques, the supporters of Don Carlos . Such in Austria are the panslavist Southern Slavs, who are nothing but the residual fragments ofpeoples, resulting from an extremely confused thousand years of development. This residual fragment, which is likewise extremely confused sees its salvation only in the reversal of the whole European movement, which in its view ought to go not from west to east, but from east to west . . . 23 Here we have, as Rosdolsky correctly points out, the repetition and universalisation of a pattern which first emerged with the French Revolution, and constitutes the theoretical basis of Marx' and Engels' analysis of the national question . The Revolution will destroy the particularisms of the small national communities incorporating them to the `higher' and ,more advanced' national communities, and being thereby a vehicle for emancipation from feudalism and superstitution . German is the `language of liberty' for the Czechs, as French was for the Basques, Bretons and Catalans. The Jacobins perceived the non-French national communities in their area of influence as reactionary, and Marx and Engels saw the `South Slavs' as similarly reactionary. The same argument that so strongly denies the right of self-determination and historical continuity to the 'nonhistorical' nations also sustains a strong justification for the emancipation and state independence of the so-called 'historical nations' . These are national communities capable of being agents of historical transformation, that with the formation of separate national states, will,

Capital & Class

66 in the judgement of Marx and Engels, further the formation of a strong capitalist economy . Marx and Engels strongly supported the right to state independence of the Irish and Poles, since they were historical nations that did not then possess an independent state . In this sense, the right to self-determination (meaning state independence) was only the right of the `historical' nations, because by becoming independent they also become agents of social transformation for themselves, and for the states that hold them in subjection . Marx argued that England could not embark on a revolutionary path until `it got rid' of Ireland . In Capital, Marx shows persuasively that the British occupation of Ireland had the role of 'underdeveloping' the Irish economy . Thus Irish independence was supposed to be highly beneficial for the British working class : `A nation that oppresses another forges its own chains' . But this celebrated slogan is not applicable to the non-historical nations . Thus it has been argued that Marx and Engels had, on the whole, a coherent analysis of the national phenomenon, even if it is not explicitly presented over a single corpus of literature . The theory of the 'non-historical' nations is not a curiosity, a slip of the tongue, an ad hoc argument or regrettable mishap . It is the result of the formulation of rigid laws of social evolution, which results in the epiphenomenalist equation Nation = Bourgeoisie = National State, an unfortunate formula which obscures the full complexity of national phenomena . A detailed analysis of the somewhat dated ideas of Marx and Engels on the national question was required here not so much because of their contemporary relevance, but because these ideas and parameters of analysis have, with a few exceptions, deeply permeated the whole body of Marxist literature on the national question, laying the basis for the rigidities and

insensitivities of subsequent marxist discussions . The failures of Kautsky, Lenin, Stalin and Luxemburg (among others) to deal adequately with the national phenomenon are the result of the paradigms first systematised by the founding fathers of historical materialism. The development of a model that decisively breaks with such formulations of the national question must begin by re-examining rigid and unilinear interpretations of social evolution, and by questioning the universality of certain models . This means a theory that recognises the causal plurality of historically determined human agents, that decisively breaks with mechanical evolutionism, and perhaps above all, that fully appreciates the fundamental importance of the logical, cultural and philosophical diversity of the human species, in the analysis of the processes of social transformation and change . Among the classical marxists, only Otto Bauer managed partially to achieve this break .

Kautsky and the National Question The positions of Karl Kautsky and Rosa Luxemburg represented different and often contradictory positions and political strategies in the Second International immediately preceding World War I . Luxemburg was the most important leader of the radical left, and Kautsky the unquestionable leader of the so-called `centrist faction' . But, in spite of the strong political and tactical differences between the two positions, it is possible to detect a common, axiomatic point of departure in their analysis of the national question . This is the rigid epiphenomenalist thought that argues that there is a direct equation between political and social institutions and most meaningful features of the economic order . Every social institution is functional to the requirements

Marxist theories of nationalism

of the class struggle, and capitalism will evolve to socialism much in the same way as feudalism evolved into capitalism . Kautsky, strongly influenced by earlier forms of social darwinism, constructed his analysis in terms of the 'natural necessities' of the capitalist mode of production . He perceived history as a succession of interrelated stages, and the iron laws of social evolution as leading to the inevitable goal: the socialist transformation of society . Luxemburg also confidently predicted the unavoidable collapse of capitalism : `Though imperialism is the historical method for prolonging the career of capitalism, it is also a sure means to bring it to a swift conclusion . . . ."' This apocalyptic perception of the collapse of the capitalist system was perhaps the most striking characteristic of the mechanistic marxism of the Second International, and had a direct influence on the ways in which the national phenomenon was conceptualised over this period . For Kautsky, as for Marx, the origin of the modern nation was unequivocally located in the period leading to the consolidation of the capitalist system . He also argued that the basis of a national community is to be found in the development of national languages, evolved from the idioms used by traders . With the creation of internal markets and the formation of a free labour force, the modern nation emerges, embracing all classes of society . For Kautsky, nationalism is the expression of the interests of commercial capitalism and a cover for `the most sordid profiteering' ." Since the modern capitalist economy shapes and consolidates new markets, the need of all those who speak a common language to be united in a common state becomes all the more evident .26 Languages, according to Kautsky, play the role of `barometers' in the development of modern nations . He argues that the process of development and con-

solidation of common languages is by no 67 means abrupt . It is a slow process and sometimes painful for the small national communities who are reluctant to give up their languages or dialects . The fate of modern nations is linked with the fate of capitalism, and this is reflected in the fate of languages : `To the extent that international communications expand, the need is felt for a medium of international communication, for a universal language ."' This `universal' language will not be an artificial language like Esperanto . It will be the product of a process of assimilation and integration of the most important modern languages, as the process of economic development brings the different national economies within a single system ." However, Kautsky argues that linguistic assimilation in itself is not the solution to the problem . Linguistic difference is a symptom rather than the cause of national differences, which have always to be located at the level of the economy . To make his point clear he refers to the Irish question: The Irish case is a clear proof that the solution to the `linguistic question' would not be enough to suppress a national antagonism, while the economic conditions that created this antagonism in the first place still persist ." Thus Kautsky argues that after centuries of British colonisation of Ireland, and the subsequent loss of Gaelic as the national language, Ireland did not become a part of Britain . This was because this country was exploited and colonised rather than integrated and assimilated into the British economy . For Kautsky, then, amalgamation and assimilation of nations is an unavoidable process, but a process that cannot be implemented by political decree . The assimilation of nations into one supranational entity will be the result of the integration of nations into one world system, rather than the result of the political activities of

Capital & Class

68

states and governments . Following this line of argument Kautsky argues that the small national communities of the Czarist and Austro-Hungarian empires will not, like the Irish, be assimilated out of political compulsion . But like Gaelic, the languages of the small national communities of the multinational empires have little, if any, political future . The process of assimilation of all nations into an international community will necessarily mean the early vanishing of small national communities . At most, Kautsky argues, their national languages will remain for 'domestic use', in the same way as useless pieces of old furniture are kept for family veneration, but with little, if any, practical use .'" They will be replaced by the languages spoken in 'the centres of world communication', such as London, Paris, New York and Berlin . Eventually these languages too will disappear, giving way to a new supranational language . In concrete terms, this means that for Kautsky only the most 'advanced' and 'developed' nations will survive ; small national communities, like the Czechs (Kautsky's own) are bound to disappear in the near future ." To the extent that capitalism develops in Bohemia, the importance of the Czech language decreases, and the importance of German increases . Kautsky advises the Czechs to find consolation in the fact that the same fate awaits 'larger' and 'more advanced' national communities . Kautsky's position on the national question remained unchanged through his long and prolific political life . Twenty years after Die Moderne Nationalitdt, Kautsky wrote a polemic in which he tried to refute Bauer's contention that national communities will survive capitalism . He insists again that Once we have achieved the state in which the bulk of the population of our advanced nations speak one or more world languages besides their

own national language, there will be a basis for a gradual reduction leading to the total disappearance of languages of minor nations, and finally, to the uniting of all civilised humanity into one language and one nationality ."

Rosa Luxemburg and the National Question Luxemburg always took a most uncompromising position on the national question . She became involved in countless discussions and debates on the subject, particularly in relation to Poland, and this led one of her most important biographers to argue that she had an 'insatiable appetite for public polemics on the subject' ." Her uncompromising opposition to any concession to nationalism or the widely accepted 'right of nations to self determination' must be understood in the context of her discussion of the Polish situation : she was in principle opposed to the creation of a separate Polish state . Around the turn of the century, the demand for the liberation of Poland was one of the most important demands of the newly formed socialist parties . This followed a long tradition dating from the works of Marx and Engels in which Polish independence was considered to be of paramount importance for the revolution in Europe . Luxemburg challenged this interpretation of events ; she argued that the Polish working class in the areas of occupation should join forces with their respective fellow workers in their respective multinational states, rather than joining forces with the Polish petty bourgeoisie and intellectuals for what she regarded as the 'utopian' liberation of Poland . In her article 'Social Patriotism in Poland', 34 she argued that industry had 'mushroomed' in Congress Poland (the area under Russian occupation), with the

Marxist theories ofnationalism effect of tying it to Russia on which it depended for its markets . In her doctoral thesis for the University of Zurich, 35 Luxemburg presents a substantial amount of data on the link between the Russian and Polish economies, and particularly on how the Russian occupation boosted Polish industry . The independence of Poland would therefore be a retrograde step, producing a tariff barrier which would halt Polish industrial development . The revolution would occur sooner if Polish industrial development continued to flourish in a Russian context . These arguments aroused bitter controversies in the Socialist International as well as among Polish socialists . The discussion created a split in the ranks of the Poles over the wider issues of whether social liberation precedes national liberation or vice versa. Luxemburg left the Polish Socialist Party (PPS) and created the Social Democratic Party of the Kingdom of Poland (SKDPiL) . She accused the leadership of the PPS of being `Social Patriots' (a phrase that she introduced) . One of the results of this split was that Luxemburg developed a theoretical and political animosity towards the liberation movements of small national communities, adopting uncompromising positions which puzzled some observers ." She discussed the situation of the small communities in Czarist Russia with the same lack of sympathy that was characteristic of Marx and Engels on the `Southern Slavs' . In an article published in Die Neue Zeit, the theoretical journal of the German Social Democratic Party, 37 Luxemburg argued that the Russian middle class was `immature' ; it sat and watched the freedom of Russia being destroyed because of the conflicts between the various national groups . The many Kirgiz, Baschirs, Lapps and others, the remainders and ruins of former nations had no more to say in the social and political life of Russia

than the Basques in France and the Wends in Germany." She then rhetorically asked how these numerous nationalities could constitute a parliament and concluded that in two days `they will tear each others hair out' ." Clearly the model that emerged from her doctoral thesis, of the lack of viability of small economic units, was the basis for her political analysis . The only `healthy objective criterion' to judge a nation's performance was its capacity to develop productive forces that would help it to evolve towards socialism . But it was only in 1908, when she wrote the article `The question of nationality and autonomy', that her ideas on the national question were presented in a systematic way . In this article Luxemburg argues that the very concept of nation is `temporary' ; it is not an absolute and permanent standard of measurement, it is no more than the particular way in which bourgeois society encapsulates its structural arrangement, and this will wither away at the end of the capitalist period .' In other words, the nation is nothing else but the ideology of the bourgeoisie `in disguise' and will vanish with class society . Luxemburg argues that the concept of self determination is `abstract' and `metaphysical', because notions of rights and ethics are themselves the outcome of idealist philosophy and therefore alien to historical materialism . To talk about the right of nations to self determination is for Luxemburg like arguing that the working class has the right to eat off `golden plates' - an irrelevant metaphysical assertion . The problem of national oppression will be solved with the problems of oppression in general, and not by engaging in discussions about the `rights of nations' . The essential part of this argument is the idea that a nation as a transcendental entity simply does not exist : . . . In a society based on classes, the nation as a uniform social and political

69

Capital E5 Class

70

whole simply does not exist . Instead there are within nations classes with antagonistic interests and "rights" . There is literally no social arena, from the strongest material relationship to the most subtle moral one, in which the possessing classes and the selfconscious proletariat could take one and the same position as an undifferentiated national whole ." Since the nation as a uniform entity does not exist, support for the right of nations to self-determination invariably means support for the `rights' of the bourgeoisie . For both Kautsky and Luxemburg, the nation is a passing phenomenon closely related to the fate of class society which will inevitably collapse as productive forces develop towards their teleological end. This epiphenomenal analysis was the paradigmatic trap that greatly impoverished the capacity of historical materialism to correctly perceive the real dimensions of the national phenomenon and helped lead to the resounding Marxist defeats of the World Wars and the rise of fascism.

The Bolsheviks and the National Question The social and political structure of Czarist Russia defied attempts to extrapolate rigid Western models of development . Located on the physical and political periphery of Europe, inhabited by more than one hundred national communities, Czarist Russia's social and political order was visibly different from that of Central and Western Europe . This difference was certainly a major factor in the transformation experienced by Marxism in Russia and in the originality of Lenin's work . Above all, three aspects of Lenin's innovations in the theory and practice of Marxism have a direct bearing on the Marxist-Leninist analysis of the

national question : Lenin's perception of the revolution, his emphasis on the political dimension, and his theories of imperialism. In direct opposition to the belief that the revolution would take place as a result of the inescapable tide of history, Lenin stressed the revolutionary importance of a properly organised party of the working class with a correct theoretical analysis of the situation . Classical Marxists predicted that the revolution would take place in advanced capitalist societies ; Lenin argued that bourgeois-democratic revolutions in less advanced societies could eventually be transformed into fully fledged socialist revolutions . The third Leninist innovation was the reformulation of the previously developed theory of imperialism into a theoretical analysis that articulates the social contradictions of the class struggle with the national contradictions of imperialist domination . The innovations introduced by Lenin resulted in an intense politicisation of the national question, for it was above all at the political level that the Bolsheviks made their most important contributions to the discussion of the national phenomenon. By the turn of the century the socialist reference point on the national question was the resolution passed at the London meeting of the Second International, calling for the right of nations to self determination ." The specific meaning of this resolution is rather vague, for self determination could mean different things (autonomy, independence, etc .), and it could also be implemented in different ways . However, `self determination' had for Lenin a clear and unambiguous meaning : `We must inevitably reach the conclusion that self determination of nations means the political separation of nations from alien bodies, and the formation of independent national states' ." National self determination meant for

Marxist theories ofnationalism Lenin the exclusive right to separation in the political sense . In order to explain the reasons behind this position, he draws upon Kautsky's analysis and argues that throughout the world, the period of final victory of capitalism over feudalism has been linked with the development of national movements . In The Right of Nations to Self Determination, Lenin repeats Kautsky's fundamental assertions on the centrality of language for the development of nations." According to Lenin, unity of language is one of the most important conditions for genuinely free and extensive commercial intercourse, to the extent needed for the development of capitalism, for a free and broad grouping of the population in its different classes and for the establishment of a close connection between the market and each proprietor and between seller and buyer . Consequently the tendency of every national movement is towards the formation of national states, under which the requirements of modern capitalism can be best satisfied . The economic logic of capitalism drives towards this goal . Therefore, according to Lenin, the `typical', `normal' state is a national state ." So far, Lenin's theoretical analysis appears to be almost identical to the one sustained by Kautsky . Both refer to the nation as the outcome of the emerging capitalist system, and as an expression of bourgeois hegemony . Both give crucial importance to language as the nucleus of the national community, and both conspicuously fail to distinguish theoretically between the capitalist state and the nation . Both exhibit the main features of class reductionist analysis : the bourgeoisie and the nation are closely connected in a relation of causality from the former to the latter . It is from this assertion, that the national state is the `typical' state under capitalism, that Lenin derives his most

original contribution to the debate, the theory of the `right of nations to self determination' . While this theory accepts the basic theoretical premises of the Marx-Kautsky position, it differs from the former analysis on the principled application of the concept of 'selfdetermination' to every national community. Lenin asserts that self determination means only the right to political separation of oppressed national communities, and the constitution of separate national states . It means neither 'federation' nor `autonomy' : . . . Self Determination of Nations in the Marxist programme cannot from a historico-economic point of view have any other meaning than political self determination, state independence and the formation of a national state . For Lenin, then, the right to self determination means only the right to state independence in the political sense ." Lenin justifies the right of nations to self determination by arguing that this is a way of ensuring the development of productive forces under capitalism . In this sense, for Lenin, the national question must be looked upon within `definitive' historical limits, namely the development of capitalist relations of production . This means that a clear distinction must be drawn between two historically different periods . The first is that of the collapse of feudalism and absolutism in which the 'bourgeois- democratic' state is formed and the national movement becomes a mass movement under the leadership of the bourgeoisie . The national struggle in this case deserves to be supported because it is part and parcel of the struggle for civil and political liberties and for democracy . The second is the period of fully formed capitalist states, with long established constitutional regimes and above all a highly developed antagonism between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie . In this case support for

71

Capital f5 Class

72

national movements is like supporting the bourgeoisie's consolidating power at the expense of the proletariat . From this analysis he draws the conclusion that national movements should be supported if their aim is to build a 'bourgeoisdemocratic' national state, but not when the 'bourgeois-democratic' state achieves its maturity. It is very interesting to note that Lenin argued that bourgeois-democratic revolutions in Eastern Europe did not begin until 1905 while in Western Europe they were completed by 1871 .' $ This rigid and formalistic presentation of a universal path of social evolution leads Lenin to argue that in Western Europe nationally uniform states became `the rule', and that to seek the right to self-determination in Western Europe was to ignore the `ABC of Marxism' ." Lenin's theory of the right of nations to self determination achieves its greatest impact when it is connected with his theory of imperialism . One of the most important implications of this theory is that imperialism transforms capitalism into an interconnected world system in which a `central' group of nation-states oppresses a majority of peripheral countries . In this situation the contradiction between the oppressed national communities of the periphery and the oppressor national states belonging to the centre constitutes one of the main contradictions of the imperialist system . The national movements of the colonial and oppressed national communities are 'always progressive' in relation to the oppressor national states, because they represent a rupture in the `weakest link' of the imperialist chain . Lenin's most important and original contribution to the Marxian discussion of the national question was his articulation of the inherent class conflict of the imperialist system . Stalin in The Foundations of Leninism summarises the differences

between the classical orthodox approach of the Second International and the innovations introduced by Lenin : Formerly the national question was usually confined to a narrow circle of questions concerning primarily civilised nationalities : the Irish, the Hungarians, the Poles, the Finns, the Serbs and several other European nationalities . This was the circle of unequal peoples in whose destinies the leaders of the Second International were interested . The scores and hundreds of millions of Asiatic and African peoples who are suffering national oppression in the most savage and cruel form usually remained outside their field of vision ." Lenin's break with the epiphenomenalist ideas of the Second International in the fields of political struggle, imperialism and revolution had a direct effect on his perception of the national question . It enlarged the concept of self determination in a way in which it became articulated into the anti-imperialist struggle . The politicisation of the national question, to the extent that it became in the work of Lenin one of the main contradictions of the imperialist world, is both the main advantage and weakness of Leninist theory, as we shall see .

Stalin and the Bolshevik strategy Contemporary discussions of MarxistLeninist theories, particularly sympathetic ones, 51 tend to diminish Stalin's contribution. If Stalin is the 'enfant terrible' of the Bolsheviks, then he should be detached as much as possible from Lenin . But whatever crimes were committed by Stalin in his leadership of the Soviet Union cannot refute the fact that he was regarded in the early years of the Bolshevik movement as the highest party authority on the national question . In 1913 he left for Vienna, possibly sent by

Marxist theories of nationalism Lenin,52 to study the theories of the Austro-Marxists and to produce a monograph on the Bolshevik theoretical position on the national question . The `marvellous Georgian who sat down to produce an article 753 in fact produced a mediocre monograph, which engaged in a discussion of Bauer's theories without seeming to understand them properly . However, Lenin at the time believed that the essay was a `very good one' ." In `Marxism and the National Question', Stalin defines the principal task of Social Democracy as protecting the peoples against an `epidemic' of militant nationalism, which however he fails to define . But without any doubt the most important part of this essay is Stalin's additive definition : `A nation is an historically evolved, stable community of language, territory, economic life and psychological make-up manifested in a community of culture ."' Language and community of economic life were already in Kautsky's and Lenin's discussions on the subject . Community of territories is a derivative category of Lenin's theory of the right of nations to self determination ; for if self determination means secession and the formation of separate states, the territorial component is essential . The concept of `psychological make-up manifested in a community of culture' is derived directly from Bauer's definition of nations as communities of destiny formed into communities of character (see next section) . By integrating this element into his definition of nations, Stalin is implicitly accepting Bauer's main contention that the nation is a historical community which is created through a common cultural, social and historical experience . The problem for Stalin was that this last argument was precisely the point of contention between Bolsheviks and AustroMarxists . Lenin never accepted the cultural unity of the nation ." Lowy and Davies rightly argue that the concept of

`psychological make-up' is not at all 73 Leninist, because Lenin's argument is exclusively political . At least Stalin was aware of the one-sidedness of the exclusive emphasis on the political level . It is possible to see in Stalin's work an implicit acknowledgement that national communities are multi-faceted phenomena, which cannot be satisfactorily explained by only taking into account political and economic development . The main problem with Stalin's definition of nations is that it excludes a large number of modern national communities . If Stalin's definition is accepted, the Germans would have been two nations, Italy would have only become a nation in the nineteenth century, the Puerto Ricans in New York and Puerto Rico would have been two nations, etc . Stalin's understanding of the right of nations to self determination appears to differ from that of Lenin : The right of self determination means that a nation can arrange its life according to its own will. It has the right to enter into federal relations with other nations, it has the right to complete secession." Lenin, in the same year in which Stalin's article was published, wrote to the Armenian Bolshevik Schaoumian : The right to self determination is an exception to our general premise of centralisation . This exception is absolutely essential in view of reactionary Great Russian nationalism, and any rejection of this exception is opportunism (as in the case of Rosa Luxemburg), it means foolishly playing into the hands of reactionary Great Russian nationalism . But exceptions must not be too broadly interpreted . In this case there is not, and must not be anything more, than the right to secede ." In theory Stalin's version of the right of nations to self determination is far less rigid than Lenin's version ; in practice

Capital f5 Class

74

Stalin was much less prepared to compromise his wish to achieve the highest possible centralisation of the Soviet State . In the same article Stalin gives a clue as to what his behaviour would be ten years later as a Commissar of Nationalities : The National problem in the Caucasus can be solved only by drawing the backward nations and peoples into the common stream of higher culture ." The main achievement of Lenin and Stalin is their successful articulation of national and colonial questions, thereby breaking the eurocentric bias of the Second International. `Putting politics in command' is both the strength of the Bolshevik approach, because it politicised the national question to the point where it required a separate solution, an improvement on the Second International's understanding of national oppression as part of `oppression in general' ; and its weakness because in his interpretation of the right of nations to self determination as meaning only the right to secession, Lenin failed to grasp the ethnocultural aspects . This point is further clarified by discussing his understanding of the All Russian situation . Lenin believed that the `centrifugal forces' operating in Russia were `psychological in origin', a consequence of national oppression. As long as national oppression was allowed to exist, Lenin believed that the victimised national community was receptive to national agitation ; once repression ceases, the psychological basis for nationalism and separatism will vanish. What better way could there be of striking at the very root of national oppression than to guarantee to every nation the right to political independence? 60 Obviously Lenin was wrong . There is more than mere reaction to oppression in nationalist ideologies . He believed that `national culture is a divisible unit : each class in the nation has a different culture .

While Lenin was wrong in denying the cultural unity of a nation, he was not entirely mistaken in his equation of a hegemonic national culture and major aspects of ruling class ideology . It was in fact a regrettable irony that the only theoretical analysis of the national question that could have provided Lenin and Stalin with useful insight into those areas that they neglected in their analysis, was precisely the theory that they set out to criticise fiercely, with the self-righteousness characteristic of the polemical discussions of the Bolsheviks : the theory of Otto Bauer .

A new non-economistic contribution : the theory of Otto Bauer The nationalities theory of Otto Bauer has been unjustifiably omitted from many contemporary discussions of the theoretical and empirical aspects of the process of national formation . In the English speaking world he has been virtually ignored. His monumental work Die Nationalitaten Frage and die Sozialdemokratie61 has not yet been translated into English, except for some subsections of paragraphs 10 and 30 .62 Moreover, not only is Bauer's work unavailable in English or French '13 but a number of important works on nationalism make only passing references to it, 64 which are not always very accurate . This is not surprising given the difficulties in reading the original work and the unjustified distortions that it suffered in the hands of its Leninist critics ." This omission is all the more puzzling when his prominent role in the Marxist debates around the turn of the century is taken into account .' Kolakowski considers that Bauer's work is ' . . . the best treatise on nationality problems to be found in Marxist literature and one of the most significant products of Marxist theory in general, 67 while H .B . Davies argues that

Marxist theories ofnationalism Bauer's book remains to this day, `the most pretentious Marxist treatise in the field' ." So why was Bauer's work forgotten? This form of `Marxist amnesia' seems to have three related causes . Firstly, a substantial number of commentators argue that Bauer's work was primarily devoted to a discussion of the nationalities problem in the context of the AustroHungarian empire, in this multinational state . Consequently, it has been argued that with the collapse of the Habsburg Empire, Bauer's analysis ceased to have any relevance to contemporary national movements . While it is true that the empirical case study of Bauer's work dies with the development of the German, and to a certain extent, the Czech nation, the theoretical contribution of this work certainly goes beyond the empirical examples . Secondly, Bauer's main programmatic proposals in the context of the Habsburg State (the notion of 'culturalnational' autonomy) are confused with his theoretical analysis, to the point that the failure of the programme of nationalcultural autonomy is considered as tantamount to the failure of Bauer's theory . This is the line of argument taken by most Leninist critics of Bauer, who were very anxious to criticise the notion of'culturalnational autonomy' since it contradicted the Leninist notions of both `democratic centralism' and the national question . The Jewish 'Bund' and other Social Democratic parties of the oppressed national communities of the Czarist Empire were inspired by the programme of national-cultural autonomy in their demands for self rule in the context of Russia ; since the Bolsheviks opposed these demands, it was a matter of great political urgency for them to refute Bauer's argument." Their argument was inaccurate in a number of ways . The programme of national-cultural auton-

omy was not `invented' by Bauer ; it was 75 first discussed in the congress of the Austrian Socialist Party held in Brno (Brunn) in 1899, and Bauer was then too young to attend this meeting. Secondly, the project for national cultural autonomy is not a theoretical discussion, but a programmatic political position taken by socialists when confronted with specific political issues in the context of pre-1914 Austria. Bauer himself was critical of some aspects of this programme, and as Lenin was always quick to quote, Bauer also supported state independence on a number of occasions . The third element that contributed to this form of amnesia is perhaps the most important : the unchallenged influence of the economism of the Second and Third Internationals, which took two forms `epiphenomenality' and 'classreductionism' ." The first form characterises the thought of the most important figures of the Second International, including Kautsky and Luxemburg on the national question . The second is best exemplified by Lenin's and Stalin's work on the national question . While the first form of economism has been much criticised in the contemporary literature on the subject, the second continues to be the dominant form of Marxist analysis, until very recently ." Bauer's discussion on the nature of national communities did not fit into the prevailing Marxist orthodoxy and it was therefore excluded as `idealistic' and 'non-marxist' and consigned to oblivion . In his discussion of the nature of nations, Bauer incorporates a number of ideas taken directly from mainstream German sociology, in particular Ferdinand Tonnies' Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft . In sharp distinction to previous analyses of the national question, Bauer does not begin from the role of the bourgeoisie, nor from the mode of production, nor even from the point of view

Capital E5 Class

76

of class struggle, but from what he calls `national character' : The question of the nation could only be developed from the concept of `national character' . Let us take the first German we come across to a foreign country, for example among the English. He will immediately perceive the change . They are other people, with a different way of thinking, of feeling, people who when confronted with the same external stimuli will react differently from the average German. Provisionally, we shall call the set of physical and spiritual connotations which distinguish one nation from another its `national character' ." Bauer acknowledges that groups of people who share occupations or belong to the same social class are bound to have common elements that transcend national differences . Also as an internationalist, he acknowledges the ties of solidarity that unite workers of different nations, but carefully differentiates this solidarity from `national character' . The intensity of cultural bonds between proletariat and the bourgeoisie has nothing to do with the question of the attitude of the workers to their own bourgeoisie, or to workers of other nationalities . The question of solidarity between workers is ethical and political, and has nothing to do with the intensity of a community of character . Bauer is also aware that the notion of `national character' has been often monopolised by idealistic and transhistorical theories, which try to present the national character as a metaphysical essentiality from which causal explanations about the behaviour of nations are derived . To counteract idealistic distortion Bauer locates the national character in a historical perspective . While the Germans at the time of Tacitus had a common culture that distinguished them from the Romans, it cannot be denied that contem-

porary Germans have more culturally in common with other European national communities than with their early forebears . For Bauer national character is being constantly modified by the forces of history : the community of character links the members of a nation only for a limited historical period ." The national character is only a descriptive category . To acknowledge that there are different national characters is not an explanation, but something to be explained : `By acknowledging the differences between national characters, Science has simply enunciated, not solved the problem ."' The common national character does not constitute the nation but it is its concrete expression . Once the community of character has been identified, the task of the researcher is to explain the sociological and historical conditions for its emergence . Bauer provides a first approximation to this discussion : national character is a determining factor in the sphere of `will', which, for Bauer, is a process of subjective selectivity ." National character thus ceases to be a descriptive observation of cultural behaviour and becomes a form of socialised subjectivity . Different national communities have different perceptive criteria of morality, justice etc . The diversity of orientation and of what it is possible to call today `cultural characteristics of nations' are the result of the different historical experiences of these national communities, and the result of the diverse conditions, material and spiritual, that shaped the nation in its struggle for existence . The diversity of historical conditions and experience, the different forms of social organisation, as well as the diversity of geographical and physical conditions, is what determines the specificity of each national community . For Bauer, the nation is not only the result of the historical determination of material conditions of existence ; it is also a form of



Marxist theories ofnationalism

communal life, emanating from the latter . The nation is in Bauer's words a 'community of fate'." Bauer distinguishes two related concepts, `community', and `homogeneity' and to illustrate the difference he provides an historical example . Britain and Germany faced in the nineteenth century a similar process of capitalist development . The same historical forces decisively influenced both national communities, but despite these similar experiences Britain and Germany didn't constitute one nation . This is because, according to Bauer, `community of fate' is not the same as being subjected to the same fate . A `community of fate' signifies not only the experience of the same historical circumstances which Bauer distinguishes as a `homogeneity of fate', but the common experience of these circumstances . The term `community of fate' is defined by Bauer in Kantian terms, 78 meaning a process of `reciprocal common interaction' . It is only the historical experience (fate) lived in a situation of common and reciprocal interaction, which generates a national community . The fact that this is not only the product of similar historical circumstances, but also of their common experience, is what distinguishes it from other forms of 'communities of character' such as the working class, etc. The common experiences of the working class are of a different order from the communal experiences of the nations . Thus, 'communitarian' relations exist between the German workers and the German bourgeoisie, the British workers and the British bourgeoisie, etc . The experience of the German and the British workers is not a joint `communitarian' experience, only a common experience, in different situations, of the capitalist system . Communitarian relations could indeed by asymmetrical and exploitative . A communitarian experience indicates the fact that the lived social ex-

periences interact with each other, and 77 this interaction may shape the participants' perception of reality . The communal ties that connect the members of the nation are the result of common interaction . In this sense Bauer resorts to sociological theory to make his argument explicit . He uses Tonnies' concept of `community' and `society' .79 Community is the bond resulting from the process of common interaction whereby the characteristics and identity of the members is the result of this process of interaction. In this sense the individual national subject does not preexist the national community ; he or she is constructed by it . The national identity and culture of each member of the nation is the result of his/her socialised existence . For us society is not a mere addition of individuals, but each individual is the product of society . In the same way, the nation is not a mere addition of individuals that interact through a common language . The individual himself is the product of the nation, his (her) individual character does not emerge in other form but through his (her) interaction with other individuals.80 It is this communality of socialised experience which determines many of the cultural, moral, aesthetic, etc . forms of the national community . The bond of communication, which according to Bauer is crucial for the formation of the national community, does not occur in a `face to face' interaction with other members of the community . It is rather the result of what we may call today the use of a common medium of `code' of communication . This is often a national language, but there is no intrinsic need for this code to take a linguistic form ." Bauer argues that fellow nationals are often affected by the same `channels' of communication : workers and bourgeois of the same national community often live in the

Capital & Class

78

same city, read similar newspapers, and (it will be possible to add with the hindsight of contemporary experiences) are subjected to the same media, see similar TV programmes, take part in the same elections, and are subjected to the same forms of propaganda . In this sense, an aspect neglected by Bauer is the growing influence of the state apparatus and dominant ideologies in shaping the national culture over a given historical period . Certainly the enormous expansion of mass communications validates Bauer's argument on the interaction between members of national communities, though the term `interaction' is not perhaps the most adequate way of describing the effects of the very complex networks of communications that shape contemporary societies . Bauer neglected the role of the state in the formation of national communities : contemporary states almost always take this form and where a community does not exist, the state creates one in the long run . Bauer's theory of the national community is a clear example of a successful interaction between sociology and Marxism . The result was a more complex and sophisticated theory than the previously discussed economistic paradigms . This theory was not universally accepted by Bauer's contemporaries, nor will it be universally accepted today, but it is a bold and thought-provoking investigation into a subject that defies the validity of unidimensional theories .

The contemporary scene The interwar period saw very little change in the terms of the discussion of the national question, and this at a time when a correct understanding of national phenomena was a matter of the utmost political and ideological urgency . It is then not surprising that the emergence of fascist movements caught Marxists off

guard . Perhaps the only exception in this period of rigidity and dogmatism is the work of Antonio Gramsci, whose view of national culture comes close to the one advanced by Bauer . Culture for Gramsci unifies a series of social strata, to the extent that they understand each others' mode of expression : . . . From this, one can deduce the importance of the cultural aspect, even in practical (collective) activity . An historical act can be only performed by a collective man, and this presupposes the attainment of a 'cultural- social' unity through which a multiplicity of dispersed wills, with heterogeneous aims are welded together with a single aim, on the basis of an equal and common perception of the world ." Gramsci agrees with Bauer that common culture is an important aspect in the crystallisation process of the national community . No hegemonic class can emerge in society without having a claim to represent society as a whole . National culture becomes then, a'contested' field between the fundamental classes in society . Gramsci urges the working class to monopolise the national culture by becoming the `national class' much in the same way as the bourgeoisie became the national class during the French Revolution ." A more recent attempt to provide a fresh insight into the national question is the `internal colonialism' thesis, strongly inspired by the so-called `dependency' theories of A . Gunder Frank and his disciples . The dependency model first emerged as a critique of `modernisation' theories in Latin America . Gunder Frank argued that the strong North American and European economies had been built on the structural underdevelopment of peripheral areas such as Latin America ." The theories of `internal colonialism' try to apply the same model of analysis to

Marxist theories ofnationalism relatively deprived areas of Western Europe . This theory argues that the great colonial powers such as Great Britain and France, and to a certain extent Spain, not only expanded by acquiring overseas colonies, but through the relative underdevelopment of certain areas within those states . Michael Hechter wrote a very detailed study of the development and consolidation of the British state, concluding that British capitalism developed through the exploitation not only of external colonial resources, but also of its celtic peripheral national communities, creating `internal colonies' within the British State." From the point of view of our discussion, the main argument that emerges here is that the ethno-national identities persisted because of uneven economic development and relative deprivation . The re-emergence of nationalistic movements in peripheral areas of European and North American states is therefore explained in terms of `unequal development' . The argument that nationalism and the persistence of national identities are the result of the persistence of economic inequalities is familiar . Here we have again an attempt to explain the existence of nations and nationalism in terms of economic inequalities . As A D Smith argues, this model will be hard put to explain the resurgence of the national identity of Euzkadi and Catalonia within the Spanish state, since the areas inhabited by Basques and Catalans are not more `economically advanced' in industrial terms than the Castillian centre ." Tom Nairn's celebrated work, The Break Up of Britain represents a more complex attempt to reformulate the same theoretical analysis with the aid of a number of case studies from the British Isles . While Nairn is generally right when he argues that classical Marxism had underestimated the force and vitality of nationalism, he is less convincing when

he argues that the `real origins' of nation alism are to be located in the machinery of world political economy. Nationalism is not the result of the quest for national identity or culture, but it is the result of the uneven development of history since the eighteenth century . This uneveness is for Nairn a material fact : This statement allows us to reach a satisfying and near paradoxical conclusion. The most notoriously subjective ideal of historical phenomena is in fact a by-product of the most brutally hopelessly material side of the history of the last two centuries ." Here again nationalism and nations are explained in terms of the world economy . A more original analysis is to be found in Nicos Poulantzas' State, Power, Socialism, which argues that the state exhibits the historical tendency to encompass a single, constant nation, and at the same time, modern nations exhibit the tendency to form their own states ." Poulantzas argues that the failure to explain this connection constitutes the most important failure of previous Marxist investigation on this subject . Poulantzas goes on to argue that the generalisation of commodity exchange cannot adequately account for the creation of the modern nation,B9 that there is no logical connection between the state and the nation at this level, and that any theory attempting to explain the formation of national states, and the tendency of nations to form states needs to provide a convincing explanation of this conneciton. However Poulantzas' own explanation is less convincing : he does not enter into the origins and dynamics of nations, but is only interested in the nation insofar it provides useful insights into the nature of modern states . The modern nation appears as a product of the state, since its constitutive elements (economic unity, territy, tradition) are modified through the state's direct activity in the material

79

Capital & Class 80

organisation of space and time . The modern nation further tends to coincide with the state since it is actually incorporated by the state and acquires flesh and blood in the state apparatuses : it becomes the anchorage of state power in society and maps out its contours . The capitalist state is functional to the nation .' Poulantzas is right in stressing the important role of the state in shaping and restructuring modern nations . It is also possible to safely argue that the modern state creates nations where they have previously not existed as in the case of Latin America . However this is not the whole story . As Walker Connor shows, only about 10% of modern states encompass a single national community ." In most European and North American states it is possible to find ethnic and national communities that desperately cling to their ethnocultural identities in spite of covert and overt efforts by the state to assimilate them into the hegemonic nation . This phenomenon is not only European ; many nonEuropean states face increasing militancy by ethno-national minorities, in spite of ruthless efforts to eradicate their separate existence . Poulantzas' analysis scores an important point in that it emphasises the role of the state in the formation of modern nations, and this is certainly one of the weakest points in the theories of Bauer and Lenin . But there are signs that Poulantzas might be falling into the trap of a form of `political reductionism' by overemphasising the role of the state . Nevertheless, his work exhibits the first signs of a long-awaited break with economic reductionism in the theoretical discussion of the national question . The recent book by Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, 92 continues and develops this new direction . He argues that a nation is an `imagined political community' ; imagined as inherently

limited (there are always `other' nations) and sovereign in the political sense . It is an `imagined' community because even the members of the smallest nation will never meet most of their fellow members, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion ." The constitution of these `imagined communities' was caused by the collapse of the old aristocratic religions that concentrated knowledge of the written word in the hands of a few, and the collapse of universal `high centres' of human loyalties, in the form of dynastic rulers and capitals of empires . Anderson argues further that the convergence of capitalism and print technology, together with the `fatality' of linguistic diversity made it possible to create an imagined community which would herald the modern nation ." For Anderson then, the nation is an `ideological' phenomenon in which each individual member is conscious of belonging to the community and has a sense of imagined solidarity with its other members . While Anderson has pointed to a very important dimension of the national phenomenon, this dimension is incomplete. The sense of belonging and the sentiment of national solidarity do not in themselves constitute national communities . An English person, before being conscious of belonging to England (and not to France) and of his/her sense of solidarity with fellow English people, is a social being whose social character has been constructed to communicate and perceive reality in a certain codified manner . The `ideological' approach of Anderson underemphasises the socialised nature of the human agency, a point that has been convincingly developed by Bauer. Anderson appears therefore to imply a form of `ideological reductionism', which defies the complexity of national phenomena . The theory of nationism then, has been Marxism's great historical failure



Marxist theories of nationalism because of the manifest incapacity of its classical theory to encompass the different dimensions of this highly complex question . Epiphenomenal and economic reductionist analyses have impoverished the capacity of historical materialism to come to grips with national phenomena. Bauer's theory stands alone and unfortunately ostracised, in the midst of monocausal and unidimensional analyses . Recent breaks with economism like those of Poulantzas and Anderson have paved the way for more sensitive analyses, but these are just the beginnings of discussions that need to be taken up and developed . This is an abridged version of an article in Martin Shaw, ed, Marxist Sociology Revisited, MacMillan, 1985 .

Notes MEOW denotes reference to Marx and Engels Collected Works, London, Lawrence & Wishart . 1. Tom Nairn, The Break-up of Britain, New Left Books, London, 1977, p . 329 . 2. See H . B. Davis, Socialism and Nationalism, Monthly Review Press, London, 1967 ; M . Lowy, `Marxists and the National Question', New Left Review 96, March-April 1976 . 3. F. Engels, Uber den Verfall das Feudalismus and das Aufkommen der Bourgeoisie, MarxEngels Werke, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1969, Band . 21, pp . 393-97 . 4. Ibid. This definition is similar to what we call today a `nation state' . 5. Pierre Giraud, Patois et les dialectes Francais, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1968, p. 27. 6. Albert Doujot, LePatois, Librairie Delagrave, Paris, 1946. Sergio Salvi, Le Nazione Proibite, Val7. lese Ed ., Florence, 1976, p . 477 . 8. R . Fosdolsky, 'Frederich Engels and Das Problem der "Geschichtslosen" Volker', Archiv fur Sozialgeschichte, Vol . IV, 1964, translated by present writer . C &C :"3/9 .. . .

9.

K. Marx to F. Engels, 20 June 1866, Vol . XXI, pp. 288-89 . 10 . Ian Cummings, Marx and Engels and National Movements, Croom Helm, London, 1980, p . 31 . 11 . See A . D . Smith, "'Ideas" and "Structure in the formation of independent ideas', Philosophy of the Social Sciences, Vol . 3, 1973, p . 21 . 12 . R . Gallisot, 'Nazione e Nazionalita nei Dibattiti del Movimento Operaio', Storia des Marxismo, progetto di E . Hobsbawn, G. Haput, F. Marek, E. Ragionieri, Einaudi Editore, Turin, 1979, Vol. 2, p. 809 . 13 . Davis, op. cit., p . 2. 14. Ibid. 15 . Hegel, Philosophy of Right, paragraph 347, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1945, pp . 217218. 16. Ibid., paragraph 351 . 17 . Marx' and Engels' correspondence, December 2 1847, quoted by L . Aguilar, Marxism in Latin America, W. Knopf, New York, 1968, p. 67 . 18 . MEOW, Vol . 7, p . 422 . 19 . Quoted in S. Avineri, ed ., KarlMarx on Colonialism and Modernisation, Anchor Books, New York, 1969, p . 68 . 20 . Quoted by Cummings, op . cit., p . 64. 21 . `It is now perfectly clear to me that, as testified by his craneal formation and hair growth, he is descended from the negroes who joined Moses' exodus from Egypt (unless his paternal mother or grandmother was crossed with a nigger) . Well this combination of Jewish and Germanic stock with the negroid basic substance is bound to yield a strange product .' K . Marx to F . Engels, 30 July 1862, in Raddatz, ed ., Marx and Engels Personal Letters, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1951 . 22 . F . Engels, `The democratic Panslavism', pp . 362-6, and `The Magyar Struggle', p . 227, in MEOW, Vol . 8 . 23 . F. Engels, `The Magyar Struggle', in MECW, Vol. 8, pp . 234-34 . Quoted by Cummings, op. cit., p . 38 . 24 . This deterministic understanding of the development of capitalism contradicts Luxemburg's emphasis on political activism and radical action by the workers . This contradiction in Luxemburg's work has been discussed by some of her biographers, e .g. J . P . Nettl, Rosa Luxemburg, abridged edition, Oxford MEOW,

81



Capital & Class 82

University Press, 1969, and P . Frolich, Rosa Luxemburg, Pluto Press, London, 1972 . 25 . K. Kautsky, 'Die Moderne Nationalitat', Neue Zeit, V, 1887, quoted and translated by H . Momsen and A . Martiny in 'Nationalism, Nationalities question', Encyclopaedia of Marxism, Communism and Western Society, op . cit., p . 42 . 26 . K . Kautsky, 'Die Moderne Nationalitat', extracts translated into French in G . Haupt, M . Lowy, C . Weill, Les Marxistes et la question nationale, Maspero, Paris, 1974, p . 119 . 27 . Ibid., p . 121 . English translation by the editor . 28 . Ibid., p . 122 . 29 . Ibid., p . 117 . 30 . Ibid., p . 118 . 31 . Ibid., p . 121 . 32 . K . Kautsky,'Nationalitat and Internalitat', in H . Momsen, op. cit., p . 43 . 33 . J . P . Nettl, op. cit., p . 505 . 34 . Die NeueZeit, 2, 14 . 'The Industrial Development of Poland', 35 . Spanish translation, Mexico, Pasado y Presente, 1980. 36 . Nettl, op. cit., p . 505 . R. Luxemburg, 'The problem of the 37 . hundred nationalities', quoted in C . Herod, The Nation in the History of Marxian Thought, M . Nijhoff, The Hague, 1976 . 38 . Herod, ibid. 39 . Ibid. 40. Nettl, op. cit., p. 506; Lowy, op. cit., p . 86 . For an English version of 'The Question of nationalities and autonomy' see H . B. Davis, ed ., The National Question, selected writings ofR. Luxemburg, M . R. Press, London, 1976. 41 . Ibid. 42 . The official report of the London congress, quoted by Lenin, 'The Right of Nations to Self Determination', in Questions ofNational Policy and Proletarian Internationalism, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1970, p . 80 . 43 . Lenin, 'The Right of Nations to Self Determination', in ibid., p . 47 . 44 . Lenin, Collected Works, Vol . 20, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1970, pp . 393-454, reprinted in ibid. 45 . Ibid. 46 . Lenin, 'What is meant by Self Determination?' in Questions of national policy . . ., op. cit., p . 50

47 . Lenin, `Thesis on the Socialist Revolution and the Right of Nations to Self Determination', Collected Works, Vol. 22, p . 324 . 48 . Lenin, 'The Right of Nations to Self Determination', op. cit., p . 51 . 49 . Ibid., p. 56. The theoretical rigidity of Lenin's analyses led him to overestimate the national cohesiveness of Western European states . 50 . Stalin, Works, Vol . 6, Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1953, p . 443. 51 . See, for example, M . Lowy, 'Marxists and the National Question', op. cit. 52 . Ibid., p . 95 . 53 . Lenin, Collected Works, Vol . 5, p . 84 . The article in question is 'Marxism and the National Question', Stalin's 'magnum opus' . 54 . Quoted by Davis, op . cit., p . 81 . 55 . Stalin, Marxism and the National Question, Martin Lawrence, London, 1951, p. 8 . 56 . See Lenin, 'Critical Remarks on the National Question', especially the section on national culture, in Questions of National Policy . . . , op. cit., pp. 16-19 . 57 . Stalin, op. cit., p . 19 . 58 . Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 19, p. 501 . 59 . Stalin, op. cit., p . 49 . 60 . Lenin, quoted by S . Shaheen, The communist theory of national self determination, The Hague, 1956, p. 103 . 61 . Vienna, Volksbuchandlung 1907 (Marx-Studien Vol . II) ; second edition with a new introduction by the author, 1924 . I know only of translations into Hebrew, Hashels Haleumit, Sifriat Hapoalim, 1941, and into Spanish, La cuestion de las nacionalidades y la social democracia, Siglo XXI Editores, Mexico, 1979. 62 . In T . Bottomore and P. Goode, eds ., Austro-Marxism, Oxford University Press, 1978. 63 . Except for a chapter in Haupt, Lowy, and Weill's excellent reader Les Marxistes et la Question Nationale, op. cit., pp . 233-72 . For example in his stimulating book 64. Theories of Nationalism, Duckworth, London, 1971, A . D . Smith has only a passing reference to Bauer, and in a recent article Smith wrongly equates Bauer with Renan ('Nationalism and Classical Social Theory', British Journal of Sociology, Vol . 34, No. 1, March 1983, p . 23) . On the same misinterpretation of Bauer see Davis, op . cit., p . 151 .



Marxist theories ofnationalism 65 . Lowy, op. cit. 66 . Kautsky wrote an article in Die Neue Zeit to criticise Bauer's work : 'Nationalitat and Internationalitat', op . cit., to which Bauer wrote a rejoinder, 'Bemerkungen zur Nationalitatenfrage', Die Neue Zeit, March 1908 . Stalin's monograph, `Marxism and the National Question', was mainly written to criticise Bauer's work. Lenin also takes issue with some of Bauer's arguments in `Critical Remarks on the National Question', op . cit. 67 . L. Kolakowsky, Main Currents ofMarxism, Vol . II, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1978, p . 255 . 68 . Davis, op. cit., p . 149. 69 . See Lenin, `The Right of Nations to Self Determination' and `Critical Remarks on the National Question', op . cit. ; on the Jewish Bund, see H. Tobias, The Jewish Bund in Russiafrom its origins to 1905, Stanford University Press, 1965 . 70 . For the original elaboration of these concepts see C . Mouffe's excellent article `Hegemony and Ideology in Gramsci', in Mouffe, Gramsci and the Marxist Theory, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1979, p .168 .1 wish also to thank E . Laclau for a number of stimulating observations on an earlier version of this paper at the Hegemony Research Group . 71 . In recent years a number of works have criticised the class reductionist approach via the `rediscovery' of the work ofA . Gramsci and the formulation ofnon-economistic theories of ideology. See E . Laclau, Politics and Ideology in the Marxist Theory, New Left Books, London, 1977 ; C . Buci-Glucksmann, Gramsci and the State, London, Lawrence and Wishart, 1980 ; C . Mouffe, op . cit. ; B . Jessop, The Capitalist State, M. Robertson, Oxford, 1982; A . Sassoon, Approaches to Gramsci, Writers and Readers Publishing Cooperative, London, 1982 . 72 . O . Bauer, La cuestion de las nacionalidades . . ., Spanish translation from Die Nationalitatenfrage . . ., op . cit., p . 24. My own translation from Spanish .

73 . 74 . 75 .

Ibid., p . 25 . Ibid., p . 27 . Ibid., p . 119 . 76 . The Bauerian concept of Schicksalgemeinschaft is difficult to translate into English . Bottomore translates it as `Community of Destiny'; it has also been translated into Italian as `Common Destiny' (Gallisot, op. cit.) . `Community of Fate' seems to me more appropriate. 77 . Bauer, op. cit., p. 123 . 78 . Third analogy of experience, the principle of community; ibid, p . 122 . 79 . Ibid., p . 134. 80 . Ibid., p . 135 . 81 . Kautsky and Gauer polemicised over this issue in Neue Zeit; see footnote 69 . 82 . A. Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1971, p. 344 . 83 . A . Gramsci, Letteratura e Vita Nazionale, Einaudi Editore, Turin, pp . 105 and 107. 84. See A . Gunder Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America, Monthly Review Press, 1967 . A good discussion on dependency theories could be found in I . Oxaal, A . Barnett, D . Booth, eds., Beyond the Sociology of Development, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975 . 85 . M . Hechter, Internal Colonialism : the Celtic Fringe in British National Development, London, Routledge and Kegan, 1975. 86. See A . D . Smith, The Ethnic Revival, Cambridge University Press, 1981, pp . 26-44 . 87 . Ibid., pp. 335-36. N. Poulantzas, State Power Socialism, 88 . New Left Books, London, 1978, p . 95 . 89 . Ibid., p. 96 . 90. Ibid., p. 99 . 91 . W . Connor, `Nation Building or Nation Destroying?', World Politics, 24, 1972, pp . 319-55 . 92 . Ben Anderson, Imagined Communities, Verso, London, 1983 . 93 . Ibid., p. 15 . 94. Ibid., p. 46 and p. 49.

83

Capital & Class

As the author of this article demonstrates, much of the work on nationalism of the Austro-Marxist Otto Bauer is best understood in relation to its historical context, but his theory of nationalism remains an essential starting point in the development of a non-reductionist theory of nationalism today .

Ronnie Munck Otto Bauer : towards a marxist theory of nationalism MOST SOCIALISTS will have heard of

Bauer's theory of nationalism, if at all, through a few cutting remarks directed against it by Lenin and, particularly, Stalin . Bauer's forgotten classic, The Nationalities Question and Social Democracy, was first published in 1907 and is still not translated into English. Yet Kolakowski's encycopaedic history of Marxism describes Bauer's study of nationalism as "the best treatise on nationality problems to be found in Marxist literature and one of the most significant products of Marxist theory in general" (Kolakowski, 1982 : 255) . In wideranging debates with his contemporaries, such as Karl Kautsky and the 'radicalleft' of Strasser and Pannekoek, Bauer 84 developed the first systematic Marxist theory of nationalism which recognized fully its "relative autonomy" . Though Bauer does not provide us with a fully articulated non-reductionist theory of nationalism, his work is a required starting point for this endeavour one which

contemporary Marxism has persistently avoided . The purpose of this article is therefore to outline the main lines of Bauer's thought. These I first present in relation to the historical context in which they were developed . I also discuss some of the counter-arguments of Bauer's critics, many of whom I would argue grossly distorted his perspective . In the final section I offer an assessment of Bauer's contribution towards a Marxist theory of nationalism . Bauer played a central role in the `centrist' political current known as Austro-Marxism. However, it is worth warning at the outset against premature assessment of his work based on his involvement in social democratic politics .

Marx and Engels : 1848 In the widespread revolutions in Europe of 1848, new ideas of liberalism, democracy, socialism and nationalism burst onto the revolutionary scene at the same time . The February revolution in Paris

Otto Bauer detonated a popular uprising in Vienna in March and it in turn spread to Berlin, Prague and Budapest . Italians and Hungarians pressed their claims for national independence . The great Habsburg Empire seemed on the point of disintegration . This was truly an international revolution, embracing the central and peripheral nations of Europe . Yet within a year it had been defeated and counter-revolutionary forces were restored . The revolution had lasted longest in Italy and Hungary, where the crucial issue of national liberation had required the continued mobilisation of the masses by otherwise lukewarm moderates . Elsewhere, national impulses clashed with other goals . Slav national aspirations, for instance, were feared by `revolutionary' nations such as the Germans and the Magyars (Hungarians), while the Czech left regarded the Habsburg Empire as a protection against absorption into a national Germany . In 1848 socialism and the working class played key roles but they failed to integrate the democratic aspirations of the national movements . The 1848 revolutions failed mainly because the democratic, liberal and socialist forces did not maintain unity against the old regime . But the radical division between all these forces and nationalist aspirations played an important negative role . This includes also the lack of sympathy towards nationalism of the most advanced contingent around Karl Marx . The revolutions of 1848 allowed Marx and Engels to become practical revolutionaries . Their intervention in the revolutions of 1848 can be traced through the pages of the Neue Rheinische Zeitung, of which Marx was editor (Marx and Engels 1977) Marx and Engels argued that with the overthrow of absolutism the formation of strong national states was necessary : the `great historic nations' of Germany, Poland, Hungary and Italy fulfilled the criteria for viable national states .

These people had gained this right 85 through their previous struggles for unity and independence . Other smaller, less dynamic nationalities were deemed'nonhistoric' and undeserving of working class support. In their general analysis of the national question, Marx and Engels turned to Hegel's distinction between the `historic' and the 'historyless' peoples (see Herod, 1976) . There was an element of metaphor in this, and indeed Marx preferred the more political categories of `revolutionary' and 'non-revolutionary' nations . Still, these categories, which were employed by Engels right up until his death in 1895, cannot really be said to found a Marxist analysis of the national question . Essentially, they reflect a form of social Darwinism, presuming the survival of the fittest peoples and the condemnation of the losers to oblivion (see Rosdolsky, 1980) . It is true that Engels later revised his 1848 condemnation of the Slavs and agreed that they could redeem themselves if they entered the flow of history. But the whole principle underlying this schema is a metaphysical one and one which is far from meeting Marx and Engels' own insistence on a class perspective .

The National Question and Social Democracy The immediate context of Bauer's writing on nationalism was set by Austrian social democracy, which had to operate within a multinational state . Otto Bauer formed part of the political current known as Austro-Marxism, which describes a number of theorists active in the Austrian socialist movement at the turn of the century (see Bottomore and Goode, eds, 1978) . They belonged to a tendency within the social democratic movement, `The Marxist Centre', led by Kautsky, and after World War I they sought a third

Capital & Class

86 alternative between bankrupt social democracy and the new communist current. National tensions in the Habsburg Empire posed an obvious threat to the unity of the working class movement . Until nearly the turn of the century the German-speaking social democrats of Austria had professed what Bauer called a `naive cosmopolitanism', which simply rejected nationalism as diversionary and preached a humanist message of fraternization (Bauer, 1979: 298) . The Czech workers' movement on the other hand was under considerable nationalist influence, not surprisingly given the predominant role of the Germans in the Austrian part of the Hapsburg Empire . As one critic points out, `what this meant politically was, above all, that the Social Democratic Party lacked any common analysis of national conflicts within the multinational state, and could offer no united guidelines beyond an abstract profession of internationalism' (Loew 1979 : 19) . Support for nationalism was limited because Austrian social democrats wanted to preserve the Empire, rather than see it break up into its national components . The centrifugal tendencies of the national movements were opposed in the name of a reformist political project within the whole state . For this the Austrian social democrats were sometimes referred to as the 'K .U.K' Social Democrats (Kaiserlich and K6niglich: `imperial and royal'), a reference to the official designation of the Austrian crown (Loew 1979 :20)

The Briinn Programme of 1899 With the exception of Marx and Engels, the first and most systematic attempt to provide the socialist movement with a national policy was the Briinn programme of 1899 . Growing national tensions

within the Austrian Empire had forced the Austrian social democrats to face the national question. This was against the better judgement of their leader, Victor Adler, who considered the question too explosive (see Kogan 1969) . Largely inspired by Karl Kautsky, the Briinn programme sought to resolve national tensions by allowing each national component of social democracy to present their own cultural demands, while the economic struggle would be waged at the level of the supranational state . Kautsky proposed the democratic transformation of the Austrian state along the lines of the federal structure of six national parties, which the socialist movement had adopted at its 1897 Congress . The Briinn resolution advocated the restructuring of Austria along language divisions, against a minority who called for extra-territorial cultural autonomy . Because it was often misrepresented, not least by Stalin, its main points are worth quoting in full : `1 . Austria is to be transformed into a democratic federation of nationalities (Nationalitatenbundesstat) . 2 . The historic Crown lands are robe replaced by nationally homogeneous selfruling bodies, whose legislation and administration shall be in the hands of national chambers, elected on the basis of universal, equal and direct franchise . 3 . All self-governing regions of one and the same nation are to form together a nationally distinct union, which shall take care of this union's affairs autonomously. 4 . A special law should be adopted by the parliament to safeguard the rights of national minorities . 5 . We do not recognise any national privilege ; therefore we reject the demand for a state language . Whether a common language is needed, a federal parliament can decide . The party congress, as the organ of international social democracy in Austria,

Otto Bauer expresses its conviction that on the basis of these guiding principles, understanding among peoples is possible . It solemnly declares that it recognises the right of each nationality to national existence and national development . Peoples can advance their culture only in close solidarity with one another, not in petty quarrels ; particularly the working class of all nations must, in the interest of the individual nationalities and in the general interest, maintain international cooperation and fraternity in its struggle and must conduct its political and economic struggle in closely united ranks' . (Bernstein etal, 1978) . The debate at the Briinn Congress displayed clearly the varying conceptions of nationalism within the social-democrat ranks . Seliger introduced the debate by saying it was ironic that those who were accused of being nationally neutral should be resolving the national problem . He stressed that `above all, the question of the nationalities should not be seen as a question of power, but as a cultural question' (Bernstein et al, 1978 : 187) . Delegate Daszynski disputed this view, arguing that `there is no national question without an economic base' (Ibid : 195) . The Ruthenian socialists pledged their support but reminded the Congress that part of their people lived outside Austria in the Russian-dominated Ukraine : `We are convinced that the international power of the proletariat will only be developed when each nation can decide its history. We know that social and political liberation also presuppose national liberation' (Ibid : 198) . In attempting to resolve the problem posed by the intersection of national and social struggles most delegates to the Congress emphasized that national disputes had to be resolved as a precondition for the advance of the labour movement . A minority argued on the contrary that

`our activity is taken up too much by the national question' and that they had recruited workers often precisely because they did not raise the national question (Ibid : 208) . The problem was best addressed by the Polish delegation : Polish socialists would act within Austrian workers' organisations but they would also `act incessantly within the whole Polish people to eliminate the grave national injustice exercised against the Polish people' . (Ibid: 216) . The struggle of the proletariat could not ignore brutal national oppression and the partition of their country. Mere cultural autonomy could not suffice . Even Party leader Victor Adler, who had preferred to ignore the national question, got round the dilemma by saying that internationalists could also be good national patriots . Thus the early abstract stand for internationalism gave way to a limited support for nationalism. Otto Bauer and Karl Rennes' went beyond the Briinn resolutions in arguing that the concept of national-cultural autonomy was based on the principle of personality rather than the territorial determinations accepted at that Congress (cf Tiffani Orsini, 1978) . They proposed that all the various nationalities of the state should administer their own cultural affairs regardless of territory, thus ensuring the integrity of the multinational Austrian state . The tensions between German and Czech workers, in particular, led Bauer into further intervention into the debate on the national question, one which he had previously ignored in his research in various areas of political economy.

Nation and history Bauer himself saw as the main strength of his work his description of the derivation of nationalism from the process of economic development, changes in the social

87

Capital f5 Class

88

structure and the articulation of classes in society (Bauer 1979 :19) . However, much of his work, and the debates to which it gave rise, centred around the definition of nation which he advanced . In a nutshell this was that `The nation is the totality of human beings bound together through a common destiny into a community of character' (Bauer, 1979 : 142) . The nation was seen as a `community of fate' whose character resulted from the long history of the conditions under which people laboured to survive, and divided the products of this labour (the social division of labour) . Before deriding this conception as a form of idealism, we should note that Bauer repeatedly criticized `national spiritualism (which) saw the nation as a mysterious spirit of the people . . . ' (Bauer, 1979 : 130) . He also explicitly rejected psychological theories of the nation. His working definition of the nation was rather a methodological postulate which posed `the task of understanding the phenomenon of the nation, explaining on the basis of the uniqueness of its history all that constitutes the peculiarity, the individuality of each nation, and which differentiates it from other nations, that is, showing the nationality of each individual as the historical with respect to him, and the historical within him' (Bauer, 1979 :14) . Only by pursuing this task of uncovering the national components within ourselves from a Marxist perspective can we dissolve the false appearance of the substantiality of the nation, to which nationalist conceptions of history always succumb, he concludes . For Bauer, above all, the nation is a product of history . This is true in two respects : firstly, `in terms of its material content it is a historical phenomenon, since the living national character which operates in every one of its members is the residue of a historical development . . .' and secondly, ' . . . from the point of view of its formal structure it is a historical

phenomenon, because diverse broad circles are bound together in a nation by different means and in different ways at the various stages of historical development' (Bauer, 1979 : 144) . In short, the way in which the `community of character' is engendered is historically conditioned . It follows that this `community of character' is not a timeless abstraction, but is modified over time . Bauer refers to national character as something specific to a particular decade and not something which can be traced back to the origins of history . Nor is it seen as an explanation in itself but as something which needs to be explained . Internationalism cannot simply ignore national characteristics, but must show how they are the result of historical processes . In the 1924 preface to the second edition of his book, Bauer recognised that after the orgy of chauvinism of the First World War any mention of `national character' aroused deep suspicions (Bauer, 1979 :7) . But he argued that the special national configurations of socialist movements had to be acknowledged . For example, the bourgeois revolution in Austria was also a national revolution, and now the resolution of national antagonisms was also a task for the proletariat . Another of Bauer's major innovations was to openly reject Engels' assessment of the 'non-historic' nature of the Czechs and Slavs . Bauer agreed that there were peoples in Central Europe who might be referred to as 'non-historic' but disagreed on their future prospects . For him `the nations without history are revolutionary, they also struggle for constitutional rights and for their independence, for peasant emancipation : the revolution of 1848 is also their revolution . . .' (Bauer, 1979 :266) . For Bauer the category of nation `without history' did not refer to a structural incapacity of the nation to develop . Rather, it referred to a particular situation in which a people which had lost

Otto Bauer its ruling class in a previous phase had therefore not experienced its own cultural and historical development, . He showed in detail how the `awakening of the nations without history' was one of the major revolutionary changes at the turn of the century . It was the progressive features of capitalist development which had re-awakened the national selfconsciousness of these peoples, and faced the state with the national question . What Bauer saw occuring at the beginning of the twentieth century was that peoples such as the Czechs were going through a process of capitalist and state development, which in turn led to the emergence of a cultural community, in which the ties of a once omnipotent traditional society were broken. The masses were thus being called on to collaborate in the transformation of the national culture .

Nations under socialism Bauer also advanced a novel perspective on the future of nations under socialism . For Marx and Engels, `national differences and antagonisms between peoples are daily more and more vanishing . . . The supremacy of the proletariat will cause them to vanish still faster' (Marx and Engels, 1976 : 503) . For Bauer, however, socialism would lead to `a growing differentiation of nations . . . a sharper relief of their peculiarities, a sharper distinction of their characteristics' (Bauer, 1979 : 116) Socialism for Bauer would lead to the genuine autonomy of nations, the masses would be integrated into the national cultural community, and therefore the `spiritual' differentiation of nations would flourish freely. The cultural history of the nation, hitherto the history of the ruling classes, would henceforth be appropriated by the masses, who could give free rein to their national characteristics . This meant that `the task of the International can and should be, not the levelling of

national particularities, but the en- 89 gendering of international unity in national multiplicity' (Bauer, 1979 : 21) . The workers' international should not dictate methods of struggle without considering national diversity and the uniqueness of cultural traditions . Whereas Kautsky meekly lamented that the Second International was an instrument for peace time, Bauer more realistically recognised that even in peacetime it was not an effective instrument for internationalism when the vested interests of the big states were at stake . Bauer certainly sought the international unity of the working class but he argued that `we can only defeat bourgeois nationalism . . . when we discover the national substance of the international class struggle . . . We must defeat nationalism on its own ground' (Bauer, 1978a : 184) . Though today Bauer's theory of nationalism suffers from almost total oblivion (an exception is Agnelli, 1969), in its day it was a subject of intense polemics . Karl Kautsky was the recognised `expert' on the national question in the Second International, and it was his task to reassert orthodoxy . Kautsky argued firstly that 'Bauer has not taken sufficiently into account the importance of language both for the nation and the state' (Kautsky, 1978 : 149) . For Kautsky language was the foremost constant in the historic development of the nation . Bauer responded, quite persuasively, that he fully recognised the nation as a'community of language' but that he sought the `community of culture' which lay behind the generation, transformations and limits of language (Bauer 1978 : 176) . Kautsky went on to argue, more generally, that the main weakness of Bauer's work was `its enormous exaggeration of the national factor' (Kautsky, 1978 : 166) . For Kautsky it was simply a question of Bauer not understanding that the proletariat was predominantly international

Capital & Class 90

in orientation rather than national . Kautsky saw the proletariat aspiring towards an international rather than national culture, especially as international trade was leading to a world-wide language . To these abstractions, Bauer counterposed a more realistic appraisal of the meshing of class and national struggles . As we have seen above, Bauer sought to confront nationalism on its own ground : `the art of war teaches us not to avoid the adversary but to take the war to his own country' (Bauer, 1978 : 184) . This seems a more fruitful strategy than the development of Esperanto as the key to workers' international solidarity .

The relation between nationalism and class struggle Perhaps the most relevant part of Bauer's work today is his consideration of the relation between class struggle and nationalism . In a striking phrase he wrote that `nationalist hatred is a transformed class hatred' (Bauer, 1979 : 259) . Bauer was referring specifically to the petty bourgeoisie of the oppressed nation affected by shifts in population and other convulsions engendered by capitalist development . But the point is a more general one, and Bauer shows clearly how class and national struggles were intertwined. For example, in the case of the Czech worker : `the state which enslaved him [sic] was German ; German too were the courts which protected property owners and threw the dispossessed into jail; each death sentence was written in German ; and orders in the army sent against each strike of the hungry and defenceless workers were given in German' (Bauer, 1979 : 296) . The workers of the 'nonhistoric' nations adopted in the first instance a `naive nationalism' to match the `naive cosmopolitanism' of the big nation proletariat . Only gradually does a genuinely international policy develop

which overcomes both `deviations' and recognises the particularity of the proletariat of all nations . Although Bauer preached the need for morkingclass autonomy in the struggle for the socialist form of production as the best means for seizing power, he argued that `within capitalist society, national autonomy is, however, the indispensable revindication of a working class which is obliged to carry out its class struggle in a state of (different) nationalities' (Bauer, 1979 : 314) . This was not a state -preserving' response, argued Bauer, but was a necessary aim for a proletariat which sought to make the whole people into a nation . Even prior to the First World War, Bauer had advanced a non-economistic conception of the class struggle appropriate to the age of imperialism . The old bourgeois principle of nationality had been replaced by an imperialistnationalist principle of state organisation -'the ideal of late capitalism is no longer the freedom, unity and state independence of each nation, but the submission of millions of other peoples to the domination of one's own nation . . .' (Bauer, 1979 : 465) . As capitalist expansion creates internal antagonisms with the nation, the struggle against imperialism becomes a struggle . Betrayed by the class bourgeoisie, the `principle of nationality' (or the right of nations to selfdetermination) becomes the secure property of the working class . In the struggle against imperialism the internationalism of the big power proletariat gains precision and relevance . In the oppressed nations, on the other hand, the masses achieve consciousness through national contradictions ; `all the social contradictions of the country appear as national ones . . .' (Bauer, 1979 : 228) . Bauer thus highlights the great complexity of the relation between national and class phenomena . On the one hand, we must `discover the social roots ofnation-

Otto Bauer al struggles showing how the property owning classes mask their class struggles and competition in the form of national struggles for power' (Bauer, 1979 : 549) . On the other hand, we must `show the national content of the class struggle by demonstrating that only the class struggle of the proletariat can gain the right of free administrative autonomy for all nations . . .' (Bauer, 1979 : 549) . It was up to the German workers' movement to recognise the first point, and for their Czech counterparts to accept the second . The theoretical implications of this point are well worth developing today .

Cultural autonomy? Many of the distinctive features of Bauer's theory of nationalism were misrepresented by his critics . For example, Stalin's 1913 essay on `Marxism and the National Question' had Otto Bauer as one of its main targets. Stalin argued that 'Bauer's point of view, which identifies a nation with its national character, divorces the nation from its soil and converts it into an invisible self-contained force' (Stalin, 1945 : 15) . In fact Bauer had explicitly argued against such metaphysical conceptions of a mystical `national spirit' . Following Kautsky, Stalin also criticised Bauer's definition of the nation as a `community of fate' because it could be confused with the ethnographic category of tribe . Ironically, Stalin's own definition of a nation as `a historically evolved, stable community of language, territory, economic life and psychological make-up manifested in a community of culture' (Stalin, 1945 : 11) was clearly indebted to Bauer's work . It was even weaker insofar as it fell into Bauer's category of `Jmpirical theories of the nation, which are content to enumerate the essential "elements" of the nation' (Bauer, 1979 : 175) . Stalin's main concern was the political

use of Bauer's strategy of `national autonomy' by Russian political currents such as the Jewish workers' organisation, the Bund. He argued that `national autonomy is no solution for the national problem' (Stalin, 1945 : 43) citing precisely the break-up of Austrian social democracy . In fact, argued Stalin, 'Bauer's national autonomy is a subtle form of nationalism' (Stalin, 1945 : 41) . Two points can be made here : 1) it cannot be said that Bauer `overestimated' or `capitulated' to nationalism simply because he took it seriously and 2) Bauer's `socialist principle of nationality' was in some ways a forerunner of the Leninist principle of `the right of nations to self determination' which Bauer adopted explicitly during the First World War . Lenin also polemicized against Bauer but his conclusions were more nuanced than those of Stalin . He recognised in 1913 for example that Bauer `argues quite correctly on a large number of the most important questions', such as the use of national ideology to cover up imperialist policies (Lenin, 1974 : 116) . This positive assessment did not prevent him from using Bauer to criticise internal currents within the Bolshevik party . Referring to Bauer's concept of cultural autonomy, Lenin wrote that `so-called socialist groups have adopted it in order to spread ideas of bourgeois nationalism among the working class in a refined form' (Lenin, 1974 : 26) . Lenin drew analogies between Bauer's approach to the national question and Proudhon's idea that capitalism could be purged of its abuses, and argued that `Marxism cannot be reconciled with nationalism, be it even of the "most just", "purest", most refined and civilised brand' (Lenin, 1974 : 22) . Yet Lenin must have known that by 1909 Bauer had rejected his earlier hope that the nationality problem could be solved under capitalism . In his polemic against Bauer, Lenin was actually attacking the Bund, as earlier

91

Capital £5 Class

92 in attacking Luxemburg he was really aiming at Bukharin and Piatakov, who opposed the concept of national selfdetermination with the Bolshevik party (see Davis : 1976) . Lenin was not interested in `resolving' the national question in the Russian Empire, but in `using' the national contradictions to the benefit of the workers' movement. Bauer was concerned with the quite specific problem of maintaining a socialist and trade union movement in a multinational empire . Lenin's response to this latter type of issue was rigid centralism for the workers' party . The need to maintain centralism over all centrifugal tendencies was the main concern of Lenin in his polemic against Bauer . In fact, in his 1924 preface Bauer recognised that after the First World War his strategy of cultural-national autonomy for the peoples of the Austrian Empire was a dead letter . Lenin's concept of `the right of nations to self-determination' was not a better theory of nationalism, but a much clearer weapon in the new conjuncture . Lenin was critical of Bauer's and others' definitions of the nation, but he was careful never to advance an alternative himself. He in fact followed Kautsky's orthodox position on the nation fairly closely, seeing the nation as essentially a product of the rising bourgeoisie . He said that a Marxist theory of the national question should examine it `within definite historical limits, and, if it refers to a particular country (e .g. the national programme for a given country), that account be taken of the specific features distinguishing that country from others in the same historical epoch' (Lenin, 1974 : 44) . This describes precisely Bauer's endeavour : Lenin's objection was that it was generalised beyond its particular context, as were Luxemburg's views on Poland (see Luxemburg 1976) which Lenin accepted for her country but not for his . A more cogent criticism made by Lenin was directed

against Bauer's tendency towards 'psychologism' in his emphasis on personality and national character. In breaking with economism, Bauer undoubtedly `bent the stick in the other direction' (as Lenin himself did on several issues) and placed perhaps too much emphasis on the cultural dimension .

National opportunism? After the 1907 elections for the Austrian Reichsrat, the pan-national trade union movement, and later the socialdemocratic party, began to break up under the onslaught of a nationalist revival . The Czech trade unions took the first step, demanding the independence of the Prague confederation from the Vienna centre, which they accused of `pan Germanism' . It was in this context that Joseph Strasser, editor of Vorwkrts in Bohemia, published The Worker and the Nation in 1912 . His main concern was Otto Bauer's strategy of national autonomy within the Austrian social democratic party as the best way to combat nationalism . To this, Strasser counterposed a frontal attack on nationalism as an ideology foreign to the working class . Strasser argued that Czech and Slovak social democracy had `fallen under the spell' of nationalist conceptions . (Strasser 1979 : 193) . Nationalist demagogy had drawn back the proletariat to its mythical `national duty' . Strasser went through the nationalist arguments one by one to demonstrate that the proletariat had essentially different interests from those of the `nation' . The working class had different cultural interests from those of the bourgeoisie, for example : even the language question should not give rise to dissension if treated from a `proletarian perspective' (Ibid : 205) . Even if the national territory was attacked, worker and bourgeois would defend it for different reasons . National character

Otto Bauer

was not an ahistorical homogeneous entity; rather it could change and the division of the nation into classes made Bauer's `community of interests' a myth . Workers mocked nationalism and its mean reactionary politics : `for the worker, the world of nationalism is too narrow . . . he is a born internationalist. . .' (Ibid : 221) . Socialists could only recognise one source of sovereignty, the social whole, and they were opposed to any form of national autonomy. The separation of Czech workers from the central trade union body could lead only to a decline in their wages and a worsening of working conditions . For Strasser, the relation of socialists to the nation was analogous to the relation of socialists to religion and the church : it was no use counterposing the internationalism of the revisionists, as this was merely a `morally purified nationalism, the supreme perfection and superlative of nationalism' . (Ibid : 231) . Rather, nationalism should be treated like any other non-proletarian ideology, and socialists should only 'counterpose to nationalist ideology the ideology of intransigent internationalism' (Ibid : 237) . This would not be difficult, Strasser argued, because the class conscious workers always judged things from a class perspective, and not as a German, a Catholic or whatever . In fact, `if a person's national and economic interests enter into contradiction, economic interests prove to be stronger' (Ibid : 230) . Strasser's arguments were taken up and generalised by Pannekoek, who stressed that the nation-state was simply a combat organisation of the rising bourgeoisie, destined to disappear under socialism . Accusing Bauer of `national opportunism', Pannekoek argued that nationalism `as any bourgeois ideology, constitutes a brake in the class struggle, whose prejudicial effect must be eliminated as far as possible . . . ' (Pannekoek,

1978 : 290) . Otto Bauer was to write a spirited reply to Strasser's radical-left redefinition of the national question . (Bauer 1978b) . He reiterated the importance of the nation and national struggles, which he argued could not be assessed from a 'shopkeeper's perspective' . That was a reference to Strasser's economism and his point that the good German-Austrian patriot would shop in Czech stores if they were cheaper . Nor was proletarian internationalism indifferent to the destiny of the nation, so long as the expansion of one nation was not at the expense of another . A vital point he made was that the liberation of the working class `is the liberation of the human species, and its particular interest is the true common interest of all individuals and of all peoples' (Ibid : 253) . Though sympathetic to Strasser's attack on German chauvinism he argued that a lack of understanding of the national question on the part of socialists would only push workers into the hands of the bourgeois nationalists . Strasser appealed to Kautsky's orthodoxy in replying to Bauer's attack. He argued that the idealism implicit in nationalism always had material roots - `any cultural question is in the last instance an economic question' (Strasser 1978 : 239) . Class interests and nationalism were basically incompatible . For Strasser internationalism was basically incompatible with any form of nationalism; rather `one language, one nation, one humanity : that is the ideal of internationalism' (Ibid : 241) . Social democracy, argued Strasser, did not represent `nations' nor even the `mass of the people', but only the proletariat . Although Strasser quoted the Communist Manifesto in his support, it should be pointed out that Marx also wrote of the proletariat as the `national class' which would lead the whole nation forward (Marx and Engels, 1976 : 503) . From the latter one can derive a Gramscian strategy

93

Capital & Class

94

of `hegemony', with which Bauer's work is quite compatible .

Assessment and perspectives Our contemporary assessment of Bauer's contribution to a Marxist theory of nationalism must abstract somewhat from the particular polemics and debates which framed its development . Current views vary considerably . H .B . Davis is typical of a negative approach to his work, referring to `the somewhat limited scope of Bauer's interests' and to his `circularity of reasoning' which meant that `he defined nationality in terms of itself' (Davis, 1973 :151) . This type of critique, however, is based largely on Stalin's assessment of Bauer which was not only partial, but also distorted his perspective on a number of issues . More positive views are now emerging . For G . Haupt, for instance, Bauer's work is marked by its breadth, the novelty of its propositions and its theoretical ambitions, as compared to preceding work on the national question (Haupt, 1974: 46) . This `audacious and anticipatory study', according to Haupt, helped broaden out and make more complex the Marxist problematic of the `national question' . M . Lowy too, while criticising the `purely metaphysical' neo-Kantian concept of `national characteristics' adopted by Bauer, recognises that 'Bauer's work had an undeniable theoretical value, particularly with regard to the historicist nature of its method' (Lowy, 1976 : 94) . In this concluding section we aim to develop some points from this apparently contradictory legacy. In terms of method, Bauer's work represents a major break with economism : politics and ideology are no longer viewed as mere `reflections' of rigid economic processes . The very context in which Austrian social democracy operated made it particularly sensitive to cultural diversity and to the complex social process of eco-

nomic development . The economic determinism and basic evolutionism of Second International Marxism was implicitly rejected in Bauer's treatise on the national question . In terms of its substantial contribution, Bauer advanced a concept of the nation as historical process, in pages of rich and subtle historical analysis . The nation was no longer seen as a natural phenomenon, but a relative and historical one. This allowed Bauer to break decisively with the Marx-Engels position on 'non-historic' nations, a category still employed by most contemporary Marxists . In terms of political strategy, Bauer's work was conditioned by the Austrian experience, and he later abandoned his position on 'nationalcultural' autonomy . Contrary to his critics he never advocated that the proletariat should fight under the banners of national separatism, although there was an element of reformism in his earlier hopes that `national evolution' would overcome the national problem under capitalism . It is now widely accepted that in analysing ideologies such as nationalism `class reductionism' should be avoided (cf. Laclau, 1979 : 158-162) . Bauer anticipates this critique of mechanistic Marism . For Bauer, nationalism is not linked as a Siamese twin to the rising bourgeoisie, but rather has a relative autonomy . It can be progressive or reactionary, as when it is used as a justification for imperialist expansion . Linked to this is Bauer's refusal to see culture as a mere product of economic conditions, an epiphenomenon of capitalist development . Today it is no longer a heresy to stress, as Bauer did, that the socialist project involves the working class gaining access to the `national cultural community' . Given his extensive consideration of the subject it is hard to see how Lowy can conclude that 'Bauer has almost totally excluded classes and the class struggle from the sphere of national culture'

Otto Bauer (Lowy, 1976 : 93) . More to the point perhaps is Lowy's argument that Bauer `seemed to consider cultural values to be absolutely neutral and devoid of class content' (Lowy, 1976: 93) . This is indeed a problem for current advocates of a nonreductionist analysis of nationalism and democracy. These are not simply freefloating ideologies up for grabs by any class, and `socialist populism' is a real danger . On the question of culture specifically, we can recall Lenin's position that `There are two nations in every modern nation - we say to all nationalistsocialists . There are two national cultures in every national culture' (Lenin, 1974 : 20) . But this need not mean that we have to relapse into the arbitrary distinction between `bourgeois culture' and 'proletarian culture' to match that between proletarian and bourgeois democracy . Bauer simply argued that the socialist movement should struggle for the full participation of all social classes in the national culture, which had hitherto been the patrimony solely of the propertied classes . The cultural arena is only now becoming a central element for Marxists, and Bauer's attack on economic determinism and stress on the importance of the cultural, can only be welcome . As Bauer wrote, `only with socialism will the vast masses of the working people be able to articulate with the national cultural community . But it will also modify the essence of that cultural community, because it will give to the nation the autonomy, the self determination with respect to the future development of its culture, which the nation lacks in the era of mercantile production . . .' (Bauer, 1979 :114) . To return to politics, can we say that Bauer's perspective implies an insidious infiltration of subtle nationalism into the pristine internationalist consciousness of the proletariat? Following the First World War, Bauer referred to the general in-

effectiveness of the Second International 95 which had led the Czechs, Poles and South Slavs to turn away from it to achieve their national goals (cited in Herod, 1976: 97) . National unification and liberation were seen to come not from the class struggle of proletarians of all lands, but from uniting with their own national bourgeoisie and waging an armed struggle for complete independence . In 1848 and later, international socialism largely failed to uphold the democratic rights of oppressed nationalities . It was hardly surprising that they should turn to their national bourgeois class, and to the method of armed struggle to achieve these ends . In this sense, Bauer does not differ at all from Lenin, for whom `The bourgeois nationalism of any oppressed nation has a general democratic content that is directed against oppression, and it is this content that we unconditionally support' (Lenin, 1974 : 56) . It is in this context that Bauer's analysis has a contemporary ring, because it provides a subtle methodology which reaches beyond Lenin's general principles, one which recognises how social contradictions may appear as national ones, and how there is a national content to the class struggle . In conclusion, Bauer may help us in the task of reinserting the national question firmly within historical materialism, rather than perceiving it to be only an uneasy `practical' adjunct . The purpose of this article has been simply an exposition of Bauer's contribution towards a Marxist theory of nationalism . This basic task is an essential preliminary to any discussion of its possible political implications today . I believe such essential tasks of clarification are also necessary for Marx and Engels, Luxemburg and Lenin and, indeed, for less wellknown socialist writers on nationalism such as the Irish socialist-Republican James Connolly (1973) and the socialistZionist Ber Borochov (1973) . At present

Capital & Class 96

the Marxist debate on nationalism operates with selected and simplified readings of the `classics', usually torn out of their historical context . In the task of elaborating a serious Marxist theory of nationalism the translation of Bauer's work could play a role comparable to that which the rediscovery of Eugeni Pashukanis (1978) has had on Marxist debates on law .

References Agnelli, A (1969) Questione Nazionale e Socialismo. Contributo allo studio del pensiero di KRenner e O Bauer, Bologno, Il Mulino .

Bauer, 0 (1978a) 'Observaciones sobre la cuestion de las nacionalidades' (Bemerkungen zur Nationalitatenfrage, Die Neue Zeit, 1908) (1978b) `El obrero y la nation' (Der Arbeiter and die Nation, Der Kampf, 1912) in R Calwer et al La Segunda Internacional y el Problema Nacionaly Colonial (segunda parte) .

1 Karl Renner's work on nationalism is often referred to as if it simply complemented Bauer's . In fact it is quite distinctive, even though their political recommendations were similar . Renner criticised the Briinn programme for, in his mind, not resolving the fundamental contradiction between historic rights and national rights . His own juridical approach to the nationality problem in the Austrian state attributed a major role to the state as a regulating instance . He wrote that: Aside from Austria-Hungary the great states of Europe are nation states : consequently with them nation and state coincide, and for that very reason the national idea, in the last generation, has been totally inspired by the needs of statehood and the economic requirements of the state (Bottomore and Goode, eds, 1978 :123) . Renner's adaptation to nationalism went much further than Bauer's : the nation was seen practically as a `natural' pre-given data . He put forward a detailed legal blueprint to reorganise the multinational Austria into a supranational state, which could even be a model for the socialist future . Not surprisingly, when the First World War broke out in 1914, Renner became the leader of the `social patriotic' faction of his party, and after the war he became the first chancellor of the new Austrian Republic . Nevertheless, his early work State and Nation (Renner, 1978) written before he became a Reichsrat deputy in 1907, is an important contribution to the more specialised question of the constitutional and legal regulation of the nationalities .

Cuardernos de Pasada y Presence 74, Mexico, Siglo XXI . (1979) La Cuesti6n de la Nacionalidades y la Socialdemocracia (Die Nationalitaten en frago and die Socialdemokratie, 1907) . Mexico, Siglo XXI . Bernstein, E, Belfort Bax, E, Kautsky, K and Renner, K, (1978) La Segunda International y el Problema National y Colonial (primera pane). Cuardernos de Pasado y Presente

73, Mexico, Siglo XXI . Borochov, B (1973) Nationalism and the Class Struggle . A Marxian Approach to the Jewish Problem (1937) Westport, Greenwood

Press . Bottomore, T and Goode, P eds (1978) Austro-Marxism Oxford, Clarendon Press . Connolly, J (1973) Selected Writings Edited by P Beresford Ellis . Harmondsworth, Penguin . Davis, H B (1973) Nationalism and Socialism . Marxist and Labor Theories ofNationalism to

1917 New York, Monthly Review Press . Haupt, G (1974) `Les Marxistes face a la question nationale : 1'histoire du probleme', in G Haupt, Marxistes et la Questione National 1848-1914 Paris, Maspero . Herod, C (1976) The Nation in the History of Marxian Thought The Hague Martinus Nijhoff. Kautsky, K (1978) 'Nacionalidad e internacionalidad' (Nationalitat and Internationalitat, ErgknzungsheftezurNeuen Zeit, 1908) in R Calwer, et al . La Segunda International y el problema National y Colonial (segunda pane), Cuardernes de Pasado y Presente

74, Mexico, Siglo XXI . Kogan, C (1949) `The Social Democrats and the Conflict of Nationalities in the Hapsburg Monarchy' Journal ofModern History,

Otto Bauer

No 3 . Kolakowski, L (1982) Main Currents ofMarxism, Vol 2 . The Golden Age Oxford, Oxford University Press . Laclau, E (1979) Politics andldeology in Marxist Theory, London, New Left Books. Lenin, V 1 (1974) Critical Remarks on the National Question . The Right of Nations to Self-Determination, Moscow, Progress Publishers Loew, R (1979) `The Politics of AustroMarxism' New Left Review 118 . Lowy, M (1976) `Marxists and the National Question' New Left Review 96 . Luxemburg, R (1978) The National Question . Selected Writings by Rosa Luxemburg, Edited by H B Davis. New York, Monthly Review Press . Marx K, and Engels, F (1976) Collected Works. Vol 6, London (Lawrence and Wishart) (1977) Collected Works, Vol 7. London (Lawrence and Wishart) (1977) Collected Works, Vol 8. London (Lawrence and Wishart) . Pannekoek, A (1978) 'Lucha de clases y naci6n' (Klassenkampf and Nation, 1912) in R Calwer, et al La Segunda Internacional y el

C9,C

;25/S-S

Problema Nacionaly Colonial (segunda parte). Cuardemos de Pasado y Presente 74, Mexico, Siglo XXI . Pashukanis, E (1978) Law and Marxism : A General Theory London, Ink Links . Renner, K (1978) `Estado y Naci6n' (Staat and Nation, 1899) in E Bernstein et al . La Segunda Internacional y elProblema Nacional y Colonial (primera pane) Cuardernos Pasado y Presente 73, Mexico, Siglo XXI . Rosdolosky, R (1980) Friedrich Engelsy el Problema de los Pueblos `Sin Historic, (Friedrich Engels and das Problem der 'geschichtslosen' V61ker, Arch iv fur Sozialgeschichte, Vol IV, 1964) Cuardemos de Pasado y Presente 88 . Mexico, Siglo XXI . Stalin, J (1945) Marxism and the National Question, Moscow, Foreign Languages Publishing House . Strasser, J (1978) `El obrero y la naci6n' (Der Arbeiter and die Nation, 1912), in R Calwer et al, La Segunda Internacional y el Problema Nacionaly Colonial (segunda parte), Cuardenos de Pasado y Presente 74, Mexico, Siglo XXI . Tiffani, P and Orsini, A (1975) 'Le congres de Briinn, une interpretation', Pluriel No 4 .

97

Capital F5 Class

Marxists and Communist parties have had difficulty understanding nationalism and dealing with nationalist movements . Neither they, nor Weberian theorists, have been able to understand the `passion' engendered by nationalism - a passion which drives people to die for their nation . In this review of two books on nationalism, one by a Weberian, the other within the Marxist tradition, Gavin Kitching identifies the beginnings of a materialist theory of consciousness which partially explains the power of nationalist passions . The two books are : Imagined communities : reflections on the origin and spread ofnationalism by Benedict Anderson (London, Verso, 1983) and Nations and nationalism by Ernest Gellner (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1983) .

Gavin Kitching Nationalism : the instrumental passion

98

RONALD MEEK once remarked of Sir James Steuart that he `was surely the unluckiest of men : seldom has one great work been so completely and so soon eclipsed by another as Stueuart's Inquiry into the Principles ofPolitical Oeconomy was by Smith's Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations' (Meek, 1967, p6) . I suspect I may have found another equally unlucky in Professor Ernest Gellner . For he has produced a fine book on nationalism almost simultaneously with the appearance of a quite brilliant book on nationalism . However, the sheer scale of the publishing industry in the late twentieth century as compared with the late eighteenth perhaps means that he will not suffer an eclipse nearly so

total as Stueuart's . Also, though I think it perfectly proper to call Imagined Communities a brilliant book, in that it does completely reilluminate this tantalising topic by the light of a rare originality, it is not without its shortcomings, and some of those shortcomings might have been remedied by Anderson's taking something from Gellner. It should also be said that Gellner's is a much more accessible book . Imagined Communities is a beautifully, almost preciously written book, but its prose style is dense, and it makes formidable intellectual demands . This review will trade on Gellner's clarity, since the essential simplicity of the thesis which he presents, and the trenchant clarity with which he presents it,

Nationalism : the instrumentalpassion allow it to be easily summarised, and also allow particular criticisms to be made which can in their turn provide points of entry for Anderson's alternative perspective .

Marxists have difficulties with nationalism However, before commencing on a detailed analysis of these two books, it is necessary to situate them in a somewhat broader context. That Marxists have always had difficulties with nationalism is almost universally admitted . Those difficulties have been both theoretical and political. From the time of Marx and Engels themselves Marxists have struggled to explain and categorise nationalism . Is it to be regarded purely as a species of `false consciousness', by which the international proletariat is `diverted' (presumably by some ruling class ploy) from its duty toward the international revolution? Or if this is regarded as too simple, if classes and class struggle are regarded as constituted initially within nation states created by the bourgeoisie (so that national working classes must first `settle accounts' with their `own' national bourgeoisies), how then do such national class struggles relate to the international construction of socialism? Must the latter await the day of universal (national) triumphs? And leaving aside the question of a proper Marxist explanation of the nature of nationalism, real Marxist and Communist parties, from the 1st International to the 3rd and 4th, have had to make strategic decisions on positions which have varied from out and out condemnation (vide Marx and Engels on the 'reactionary' `slave' nationalist movements against the Austro-Hungarian Empire) to a more or less uncritical suport (for anticolonial nationalist movements by the Comintern) . Of course such strategic and tactical issues have never been totally di-

vorced from broader theoretical concerns, based as they have been upon estimates of 'progressiveness' of this or that nationalist movement and of the classes composing them or leading them . But at the heart of these difficulties, both theoretical and political, has been the Enlightenment rationalism of which classical Marxism was both the heir and (in the mid-nineteenth century) the principal intellectual and political development . For, thinking within that tradition, it has always been difficult for Marxist intellectuals to explain satisfactorily to themselves, let alone to others, how loyalty to a nation, and particularly the placing of national identity above a class identity, can be a rational thing to do . Marxists acknowledge, because observation forces them to it, that people (including workers) do act in this way, but since within the Marxist problematic such action cannot rest on a rational, defensible basis of material interest, the `reasons' for it must be of another type -'psychological', 'emotional' and above all `ideological' (where `ideological' is being used with a particular irrationalist connotation) . What is perhaps less well recognised is that this `rationalist' puzzlement about nationalism is not restricted to the Marxist tradition. The first book considered below, by Ernest Gellner, whilst in fact violently anti-Marxist in its theoretical orientation, manifests, from a Weberian viewpoint, very much the same kind of puzzlement about nationalism as is found for example in some of the writings of Marx and Engels, in Rosa Luxemburg, in some of the work of Leon Trotsky, and (more recently) in the writings of Eric Hobsbawm and Bill Warren . In Gellner's case the `tension' produced by that puzzlement and exasperation is diffused by the familiar device of irony and cynicism . Gellner thinks he has found an 'explanation' for nationalism - an explanation which is `rational' in his own terms, and

99

Capital & Class 100

which reveals nationalism as a pretty seedy phenomenon (see below) . Benedict Anderson, however, writing within, or at least in direct address to the Marxist tradition, suggests that the `problem' lies not with nationalism and nationalists, but with the far too narrow and instrumental cannons of `reason' to which the Marxist tradition (like the Weberian and other `Enlightenment' traditions) is heir . For Anderson there are good human reasons for nationalism, but this can only be grasped if those reasons are related to a much richer anthropology, to a much wider concept of the `human condition' than the Marxist tradition has, at least dominantly, embraced . Seen in this context, Anderson's attempt to explain what I have termed the `passion' of nationalism is in line with that tradition within Marxism, of which perhaps the Frankfurt School has been the dominant representative, which seeks to deepen and broaden the Marxist concept of `ideology' . The essence of this deepening is an attempt to locate the cannons of `reason' and `rationality' situationally, that is, to show that once a context of life and human praxis is grasped, behaviour and values which might otherwise seem irrational can be seen as wholly reasonable for the groups and classes involved, where `reasonable' means `based on correct induction and deduction from the situation as confronted by such groups or classes' . Anderson's analysis of the group 'journeys' or `pilgrimages' through which the boundaries of `imagined communitues' are constituted (see below), is thus at once a deepening of the Marxist concept of ideology and a contribution to a materialist theory of consciousness, that is to an explanation of ideas as an integral part of a defined, material human praxis . And so to the books .

Gellner-Weberians have difficulties too In the best traditions of his mentor, Max Weber, Gellner's exposition all revolves around an ideal typical contrast between what he terms `Agrarian Society' and'Industrial Society', and the essential meassage is, Industrial Society is nationalist, Agrarian Society, its predominant historical predecessor, is not . In Agrarian Society state and culture (and for Gellner the core of culture is language) are incongruent, in Industrial Society they are congruent . Indeed it is the essence of nationalism that a state which is not congruent with culture (which is not a `nation state') is eo ipso illegitimate, and must be reformed or overthrown in the name of that congruence . In Agrarian Society state and culture are incongruent because the rulers (emperors, empresses, kings, queens, shahs, sultans and princes) and the ruling classes (aristocrats, priests, scholarly literati) manipulate a `high culture' enshrined in a written language (which may or may not be spoken even by the rulers) and which is both incomprehensible to, and transcends the many particularistic `folk' or `low' cultures of which the state is composed. Hence, variously, the Roman and Chinese Empires, the empires and states of Islam and of medieval Christendom etc . In all these state forms, the boundaries of folk or popular cultures (i .e . of effective oral communication) are much smaller than those of states (that is, they are the boundaries or village, clan or tribe) and thus nearly all states are bewilderingly, and happily, 'multi-cultural', indeed multi-linguistic at the popular level . Moreover, both geographical and social mobility is very limited, and effectively absent across the boundaries between the `folk' and `high' cultures, i .e . across the boundary between the ruling classes and the rest . Thus, for Gellner, Agrarian Society was the most completely and en-

Nationalism : the instrumental passion closedly class society in world history to date, and certainly its stratification was much more petrified than was that of Industrial Society. Among the ruling classes, however, `vertical' stratification (differences between priests, warrior aristocrats, and rulers and their immediate followers) was marked, and produced the bulk of the social and political conflict which occurred. The majority of the subjects of such states were peasants and to that extent the development of the division of labour was limited, but economic and social specialisation did occur, and when it did it tended to be aligned with ethnic and cultural boundaries, within which specialisms were inherited . Hence, Agrarian Society tended to be distinguished by closed, self-recruiting groups of merchants, money lenders, artisans, priests, literati, warriors etc. In a distinguished tradition descending from Adam Smith, Gellner isolates the division of labour as the central characteristic setting Industrial Society apart from its Agrarian predecessor . The complex division of labour in Industrial Society requires a population which is both socially and occupationally mobile, and effectively ends the monopolisation of specialisms by closed or endogamous groups -'equality of opportunity' becomes the demand and, to a large degree, the reality . However, this can only happen if all the members of an Industrial Society can manipulate a single language with equal facility, and through it can acquire both the social and occupational skills necessary for mobility. This in turn means that the degree of cultural and linguistic plurality which distinguished Agrarian Society is no longer possible or tolerable and one of those languages must be taken up by the State and universalised as the sole currency of literacy through a state education system (Gellner suggests that the sheer cost and scale of such education systems means that they must

be state monopolies) . Very often one of 101 the `high cultures' of a preceding Agrarian Society is simply universalised (thus English, French, Castillian Spanish, Arabic, Mandarin Chinese, Russian), but whether this happens or not, the harsh fact is that the `choice' of one of the languages of multi-linguistic Agrarian Society to be the `state' and universal/ dominant language of Industrial Society is a process which leaves far more linguistic and cultural groups `out in the cold' than it accommodates (Gellner suggests that the ratio of `actual' to `possible' nations on the planet might be about 1 to 10) . Hence, and this is the central point, it is historically a process fraught with conflict, and Gellner suggests that this conflict is likely to be particularly acute if, in the process of the creation of `Industrial Society', groups in a subordinated or impoverished position are groups speaking a language or manipulating a `folk' culture different from the one `chosen' for universalisation . For such groups have two `choices' . They can either abandon their original language and culture and throw in their lot with the emerging national industrial culture, or they can use their earlier `Agrarian' folk culture and language as the basis for a claim for a `nation state' of their own . Gellner suggests that which of these two choices they will take depends largely upon the extent of the resistance which they encounter to upward social mobility and cultural incorporation . It will also be easier for such groups to operate the latter `choice' if they are (a) relatively numerous, compared with the group in whose language they are trying to operate, and (b) they `happen' to occupy a contiguous piece of the earth's surface . Groups who possess particular `counter entropic' characteristics (and Gellner mainly, and unexplainedly concentrates on skin pigmentation) which make their acceptance into the dominant culture almost impossible,

Capital ES Class 102

are particularly likely to opt for their `own' nationalism . Any group which `happens' to be both counter entropic and incapable of `opting out' (perhaps because it has lost or never had a single `homeland') is in a particularly unfortunate position and these sort of groups provide one of the most potent causes of conflict in modern industrial societies . So there we have it, the central demand of nationalism (the congruity of state and culture) is a necessary concomitant of `industrial society' (principally because of the latter's need for a universally literate and highly mobile population) . The strains and tensions produced in the transition from Agrarian to Industrial Society are precisely what turn some `Agrarian' high and folk cultures into national cultures, and result in the subordination and disappearance of yet others as they are defeated or absorbed by the successful . Problems with Gellner's thesis Now there seem to me to be two (at least) major problems with this thesis . The first might be described as its instrumentalism . Gellner's theory of nationalism is instrumental at two levels. In the first place nationalism is seen as appearing in the world because `Industrial Society' requires it, could not function without it . Clearly there is an everpresent risk of teleology in this . Nationalism is `explained' by reference to an historical outcome (the emergence of Industrial Society) which chronologically follows it, a classical case of the abuse of hindsight . As I will say shortly, I do not think Gellner's thesis should be interpreted in this way, and I don't therefore think he deserves to be convicted of teleology . But certainly it is a possible interpretation, and he is not as careful as he should be to see this danger and guard against it . The second level of instrumentalism in Gellner's account lies in

the persistent link he makes between nationalism and the varied `mobility situations' of different cultural groups caught in the transition from Agrarian to Industrial Society . The thesis is, as I have said, that if the group has 'entropic' characteristics which make it acceptable (albeit with initial difficulties) within the emerging dominant culture, it will adopt that culture and (slowly) abandon its own . If however it is getting a raw deal in the early industrial phase (is occupying the lowest strata of the proletariat for example) and it has considerable difficulty in rectifying this state of affairs and getting its due share of the industrial goodies, it will opt for `nationalising' its own folk culture and claiming a separate state . And as the above precis itself tries to suggest, this instrumentalism in Gellner is one of expression as well as substance . Gellner's account has more than a touch of scepticism, even cynicism, about nationalism . He simply refuses to take at least the most extravagant of its pretensions seriously, and certainly he thinks that if you wish to understand what nations and nationalism are, the last thing you should do is to ask a nationalist. For s/he is bound to give you a great deal of profoundly ahistorical mythology (most notably the idea that nations are somehow both primordial and `natural' forms of social organisation, whereas they are, as Gellner insists, historical products, and there were ages of human history when human beings lived perfectly naturally and happily without them) . As will appear, I have some sympathy with this scepticism, and I think that Anderson could have done with a little of it in constructing his own account. But for the moment I think it is important to get a `feel' for Gellner's scepticism and instrumentalism through some quotation :' A characteristic scenario of the evolution of nationalism . . . ran something like this .



Nationalism : the instrumentalpassion

The Ruritanians were a peasant population speaking a group of related and more or less mutually intelligible dialects, and inhabiting a series of discontinuous pockets within the lands of the Empire of Megalomania . The Ruritanian language, or rather the dialects which could be said to compose it, were not really spoken by anyone other than these peasants. The aristocracy and officialdom spoke the language of the Megalomanian court, which happened to belong to a language group different from the one of which the Ruritanian dialects were an offshoot. Most, but not all, Ruritanian peasants belonged to a church whose liturgy was taken from another linguistic group again, and many of the priests, especially higher up in the hierarchy, spoke a language which was a modern vernacular version of the liturgical language of this creed, and which was far removed from Ruritanian. The petty traders of the small towns serving the Ruritanian countryside were drawn from a different ethnic group and religion still, and one heartily detested by the Ruritanian peasantry . In the past the Ruritanian peasants had many griefs, movingly . . . recorded in their lament songs (painstakingly collected by village schoolmasters late in the nineteenth century, and made well known to the international musical public by the compositions of the great Ruritanian national composer L .) . The pitiful oppression of the Ruritanian peasantry provoked, in the eighteenth century, the guerilla resistance led by the famous Ruritanian social bandit K . whose deeds are said still to persist in the local folk memory, not to mention several novels and two films, one of them produced by the national artist Z ., under highest auspices, soon after the promulgation of the Popular Socialist Republic of Ruritania . Honesty compels one to admit that the

social bandit was captured by his own compatriots, and that the tribunal which condemned him to a painful death had as its president another compatriot. Furthermore shortly after Ruritania first attained independence, a circular passed between its Ministries of the Interior, Justice and Education, considering whether it might not now be more politic to celebrate the village defence units which had opposed the social bandit and his gangs, rather than the said social bandit himself, in the interests of not encouraging opposition to the police . A careful analysis of the folk songs so painstakingly collected in the nineteenth century, and now incorporated in the repertoire of the Ruritanian youth, camping and sports movement, does not disclose much evidence of any serious discontent on the part of the peasantry with their linguistic and cultural situation however grieved they were by other, more earthy matters . On the contrary, such awareness as there is of linguistic pluralism within the lyrics of the songs is ironic, jocular and good humoured, and consists in part of bilingual puns, sometimes in questionable taste . It must also be admitted that one of the most moving of these songs - I often sang it by the camp fire at the holiday camp to which I was sent during the summer vacationcelebrates the fate of a shepherd boy, grazing three bullocks on the seigneurial clover near the woods, who was surprised by a group of social bandits, requiring him to surrender his overcoat . Combining reckless folly with lack of political awareness, the shepherd boy refused and was killed . I do not know whether this song has been suitably rewritten since Ruritania went socialist . Anyway, to return to my main theme : though the songs do often contain complaints about the condition of the peasantry, they do not raise the issue of cultural nationalism.

103

Capital E5 Class

104 That was yet to come, and presumably post-dates the composition of the said songs . In the nineteenth century a population explosion occurred at the same time as certain other areas of the Empire of Megalomania - but not Ruritania- rapidly industrialized . The Ruritanian peasants were drawn to seek work in the industrially more developed areas, and some secured it, on the dreadful terms prevailing at the time . As backward rustics speaking an obscure and seldom written or taught language, they had a particularly rough deal in the towns to whose slums they had moved . At the same time some Ruritanian lads destined for the church, and educated in both the court and the liturgical languages, became influenced by the new liberal ideas in the course of their secondary schooling, and shifted to a secular training at the university, ending not as priests but as journalists, teachers and professors . They received encouragement from a few foreign, nonRuritanian ethnographers, musicologists and historians who had come to explore Ruritania. The continuing labour migration, increasingly widespread elementary education and conscription provided these Ruritanian awakeners with a growing audience . Of course, it was perfectly possible for the Ruritanians, if they wished to do so (and many did), to assimilate into the dominant culture of Megalomania . No genetically transmitted trait, no deep religious custom, differentiated an educated Ruritanian from a similar Megalomanian . In fact, many did assimilate, often without bothering to change their names, and how the telephone directory of the old capital of Megalomania (now the Federal Republic of Megalomania) is quite full of Ruritanian names, though often rather comically spelt in the Megalomanian manner, and adapted to Megalomanian

phonetic expectations . The point is that after a rather harsh and painful start in the first generation, the life chances of the offspring of the Ruritanian labour migrant were not unduly bad, and probably at least as good (given his willingness to work hard) as those of his non-Ruritanian Megalomanian fellow citizens . So these offspring shared in the eventually growing prosperity and general embourgeoisment of the region . Hence, as far as individual life chances went, there was perhaps no need for a virulent Ruritanian nationalism . Nonetheless something of this kind did occur . It would . . . be quite wrong to attribute conscious calculation to the participants in the movement . Subjectively, one must suppose that they had the motives and feelings which are so vigorously expressed in the literature of the national revival . They deplored the squalor and neglect of their home valleys, while yet also seeing the rustic virtues still to be found in them ; they deplored the discrimination to which their conationals were subject, and the alienation from their native culture to which they were doomed in the proletarian suburbs of the industrial towns . They preached against these ills, and had the hearing of at least many of their fellows . The manner in which, when the international political situation came to favour it, Ruritania eventually attained independence, is now part of the historical record and need not be repeated here . (Gellner, pp . 58-61) I enjoyed reproducing these pages . I hope the reader will agree that they are funny (rare enough in social science), and that they do `capture' truthfully some things - some important things - about nationalism . Also in fact they express Gellner's particular theory of nationalism rather better than the presentation of it, in earlier chapters, by avoiding some of the



Nationalism : the instrumentalpassion difficulties posed by ideal types . Nonetheless, nobody who writes about it like this can capture what I might call the passion of nationalism . Professor Gellner cannot tell us, because he cannotfeel why anyone should die for a nationalist cause . He cannot enable us to understand why Ruritanian (actually Ukrainian, or Serbian, or Greek or Czech) peasants should be willing to sally forth and die in a hail of Megalomanian (actually Russian, Austrian, Magyar, Ottoman) bullets, or why nationalist intellectuals should be willing to `risk life, freedom, domestic happiness - all of which is most dear to our common nature - in the effort to free their country from a government which is the main spring of all their woes' (Stepniak, 1888, p. 70) . He himself has obviously never felt such things, and equally obviously would never wish to, but precisely because of that all his attempts to deny the blatant instrumentalism of his account fall flat . He may say The nationalist intellectuals were full of warmth and generous ardour on behalf of their fellow co-nationals . When they donned folk costume and trekked over the hills, composing poems in the forest clearings, they did not dream of one day becoming bureaucrats ambassadors and ministers (p. 61). He may complain that The present theory is sometimes travestied as a reduction of national sentiment to a calculation of prospects for social promotion. But this is a misrepresentation . In the old days it made no sense to ask whether the peasants loved their own culture : they took it for granted, like the air they breathed, and were not conscious of it either . But when labour migration and bureaucratic employment became prominent features within their social horizon, they soon learned the difference between dealing with a co-national, one understanding and sympathising with their culture, and

someone hostile to it. This very concrete experience taught them to be aware of their culture, and to love it (or, indeed, to wish to be rid of it) without any conscious calculation of advantages and prospects of social mobility (p . 61) . But all this does is to `excuse' nationalists from conscious hypocrisy on grounds of their self-delusion . It empties the terms `warmth and generous ardour' and above all `love' of any meaning . Professor Gellner is formalistically willing to allow that nationalists `love' their nation, but he really hasn't got a clue what this might feel like, or even how (except by self-delusion) it might be explained . And it is precisely here that we need to turn to Anderson, for he can help us to understand some of the roots, and some of the quality, of nationalist sentiment, and indeed it is in this that the brilliance of his book resides. But before coming to that, I wish to examine the second major weakness in Gellner's theory of nationalism, the explanatory ambiguity at its core . I have already noted that Gellner's account hovers preciously close to teleology at times, since several of his formulations tend to leave the impression that nationalism `had' to happen if `Industrial Society' was going to happen. But even this is ambiguous . Because, looked at historically, this can be taken to mean either that (a) you first have nationalism and then `Industrial Society' develops, or (b) you first have `Industrial Society' and then `nationalism' is, as it were, `called forth' . Now when the matter is posed like this (and it is an almost invariant concomitant of the using the kind of static ideal types which Gellner favours that it will seem, even to him, that there is such a choice to be made), Gellner is pretty unambiguous in opting for the second (see for example pages 46, 83, 91, and above all his remark on page 111, and his footnoted comments on Kedourie's objections to his thesis on pp . 108-9) . But in fact, as may be clear

105

Capital E5 Class 106

from the 'Ruritania' story, his theory is actually more sophisticated than either of these alternatives . His theory is that nationalism `happens' when `agrarian' or 'pre-industrial' societies and areas are being penetrated by an `industrial' mode of production (this is one Marxist concept Gellner seems to have no objection to, see pp . 116-22), i .e ., nationalism happens at the stage of `early industrialism' as he calls it . Thus, seen historically, nationalism is a product of the transition from `Agrarian' to `Industrial' society, and in particular as a direct product ofwhat Parvus and Trotsky called the `combined and uneven development' characteristic of early industrialism . Now the problem with this theory is that, though it fits a good deal of central and eastern European history (and indeed the history of the Balkans) very well, there seem to be two historical cases which it fits much less well . These are (a) The British case, where it may be argued that the emergence of nationalism and a national culture preceded even early industrialism by 150-200 years (say early seventeenth century to mark the beginnings of the former and late eighteenth century the beginnings of the latter), and (b) The case ofcolonial nationalism, where, certainly in the case of Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa, and large chunks of South-East Asia (India and China are more debateable) it would be difficult to discern even the beginnings of'industrialism' when nationalist movements took root in these countries . How does Gellner deal with this problem? Essentially by shifting or stretching his concept of `industrial society' to refer to something far broader . Consider this for example : The Europeans in Africa, though occasionally respectful of local custom and endorsing its authority, were there to set up a market- and trade-oriented, educated (`civilised) and eventually

industrial type ofsociety . But for reasons which we have stressed at length and need not now repeat, industrial or industrializingsociety is profoundly allergic to counter entropic institutions . Here there was an outstandingly clear, conspicuous example of just that! This was not a case . . . of a category of `blues' being statistically too frequently located in the lower layers of society, as in the European irredentist nationalisms . Here there was a case of a small number of whites ruling large, occasionally enormous, black populations . The nationalism which this engendered was simply the summation of all the blacks, the non-whites of a given historically accidental territory, now unified by the new administrative machinery. The adherents of the new nationalism did not necessarily share any positive traits (Gellner, pp . 82-3, emphasis added) . I hardly need to do more than point to the slipperiness of the phrases italicized (note also that there is blatant teleology in this case -'eventually industrial') . Essentially Gellner is expanding `Industrial Society' to embrace any form of economic penetration involving commodity production, trade and changes in education, and he has to do this (see also page 91 for the identical trick used in another explanatory context), because he will not have any truck with a concept of capitalism . Indeed he quite explicitly disavows it (see page 97) as part of what seems to be a general paranoia about Marxism . But the costs of this for Gellner's theory of nationalism are considerable . For it is one of the strengths both of Marx's own work, and of the Marxist tradition generally, that it does not equate capitalism with industrial capitalism, but on the contrary identifies earlier periods of `merchant' and `manufacturing' capitalism, both in Britain, and in the world in general . Moreover it is possible (as in Kay, 1975, for example) to show how even in the

Nationalism: the instrumentalpassion

period of the dominance of industrial capital in Europe and North America, capitalist penetration of the nonEuropean world often took primarily `merchant' or `trading' forms rather than directly industrial forms . I do not think I need to elaborate much further on the undoubted advantages of this set of concepts for explaining, for example, the emergence of British national culture in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, or the particularities of Latin American, African and South-East Asian colonization, as compared with Gellner's trundling tank of `Industrial Society' . Their advantages undoubtedly lie in their much sounder basis in historical periodization . If I were to take this criticism wider I would wish to argue that Gellner, rather like Max Weber in fact, is a much better comparative historian than he is a theorist, and indeed that his capacity for astute historical generalization tends to triumph despite the ponderous and static conceptual apparatus in which it is enthralled . But this is to raise wider issues than are called for in this review . For now, in this pursuit of a richer theory of nationalism, I must turn to Benedict Anderson .

Anderson - explaining the `passion' By dint of what may seem like a fortunate miracle, but may in fact be something far deeper, Anderson concentrates on those dimensions of nationalism which are precisely those about which Gellner's book tells us least . These are firstly what I have called the passion of nationalism (Anderson wants to explain, especially to Marxists, what this passion is, and why it must be taken seriously), and secondly the particular genesis of colonial nationalism (though the book does also make reference to European nationalist movements) . Like Gellner, Anderson stresses that the historical emergence of nationalism is

intimately bound up with the spread of literacy and education, and he would probably not take issue with Gellner's view that languages become `national' languages only when state machines take them up and make them vehicles of a mass (rather than elite) education system . Like Gellner, Anderson notes the central importance of books and book production ('print capitalism') to nationalism . Unlike Gellner, however, Anderson goes `deep' into this process, asking about changes in forms of consciousness which accompany the slow transition from a world of multilingual high religious cultures, to a world of mono-glot national states (with various kinds of `Absolutist' states providing the link between them) . Anderson points out that medieval christendom, early Islam, Confucian China, even classical Buddhism were `communities', `imagined communities' not of language speakers, but of readers, and moreover of readers of texts in which the signs themselves were sacred : Take only the example of Islam : if Maguindanao met Berbers in Mecca, knowing nothing of each others languages, incapable of communicating orally, they nonetheless understood each others ideographs, because the sacred texts they shared existed only in classical Arabic . In this sense, written Arabic functioned like Chinese characters to create a community out of signs, not sounds . . . All the great classical communities conceived of themselves as cosmically central, through the medium of a sacred language linked to a superterrestrial order of power . Accordingly, the stretch of written Latin, Pali, Arabic or Chinese was, in theory, unlimited. (In fact, the deader the written language, the farther it was from speech the better : in principle everyone has access to a pure world of signs .) This conception of a `community of believers', in theory universal, linked together by a sacred written text, also

107

Capital & Class 108 involved a particular cosmology, and a certain `apprehension of time' . Anderson quotes a passage from Erich Auerbach's

Mimesis : The Representation of Reality in Western Literature to capture this conception of time and of causality : If an occurence like the sacrifice of Isaac is interpreted as prefiguring the sacrifice of Christ, so that the former is as itwere announced and promised and the latter "fulfills" . . . the former, then a connection is established between two events which are linked neither temporally nor causally - a connection which it is impossible to establish by reason in the horizontal dimension . . . It can be established only if both occurences are vertically linked to Divine Providence, which alone is able to devise such a plan of history and supply the key to its understanding . . . the here and now is no longer a mere link in an earthly chain of events, it is simultaneously something which has always been, and will be fulfilled in the future ; and strictly, in the eyes of God, it is something eternal, something omnitemporal, something already consummated in the realm of fragmentary earthly event (quoted Anderson, pp . 29-30) . Here then is a world in which a sense of community is neither primarily geographical nor social, but involves the 'vertical' linking together of all `believers' through as it were a common `pinnacle' of sacred belief (as the bands of a maypole and thus all the dancers - are linked to its summit) . In that linking, a written script, itself conceived as sacred, and known either directly, or through a priestly class, plays a central role . Moreover, the very sequence of temporal events is seen as the revelation of divine Providence, and thus the history, through which these religious `imagined communities' have moved and will move, is not conceived as occuring in any `empty' temporal space, but as prescribed in the cannons of a divine will already revealed . Even with the fragment-

ing of such universal communities into Absolute monarchies ofvarious sorts, this essentially `vertical' rather than horizontal notion of community is maintained, with the king/emperor as the focal point both of all his subjects and indeed of the state, and conceived in fact simply as a `sub pinnacle', as it were, to the divine edifice (the longest lasting of this kind of State was of course the Chinese Empire) . Thus nationalism and the construction of nation states involves (1) The substitution in written script of live, vernacular languages, languages of sounds (with a necessarily exclusivist rather than universalistic aspiration) for `dead' sacred languages of signs. (2) A total change on conceptions of time and of causality, in which the community of believers living out and indeed living in God's will, are substituted by imagined communities of fellow `nationals' living together `simultaneously' in time . For time is now conceived essentially as an empty space through which `the nation' moves in the course of constructing `its' own history. And this means that all of `us' in `the same' nation/society, can have, at least in many respects, `the same' history, simply because `we' are living together simultaneously `at the same time' . Anderson suggests that this conception of simultaneity - so obvious to us that anything else is difficult even to conceive would have been literally incomprehensible to the inhabitants of (e .g.) medieval christendom. Because for them the `mere fact' that one's life was lived in physical proximity to others or `in the same days' as others, would tell one literally nothing about one's own past or future, that being inscribed in God's will . Thus in short, nationalism transforms not only our imagined commnity (who we cound as `we'), it also transforms our notions of what `past', `present' and `future' are . And this brings Anderson to what I take to be the most brilliant insight of his

Nationalism : the instrumentalpassion

book . For he suggests that nationalism at once abolishes or dilutes one notion of immortality - the notion which is based upon a single `Kingdom of God', present at once on earth and in heaven - for a `secularized' notion in which, though the `community of believers' may not live forever in God's will, `we', `the Nation' do so because `it' came before any of `us' (individually), and `it' can proceed endlessly through time, to live on after `us' . He says : The century of the Enlightenment, of rationalist secularism brought with it its own modern darkness . With the ebbing of religious belief, the suffering which belief in part composed did not disappear. Disintegration of paradise : nothing makes fatality more arbitrary . Absurdity of salvation : nothing makes another style of continuity more necessary . What then was required was a secular transformation of fatality into continuity, contingency into meaning . As we shall see, few things were (are) better suited to this end than an idea of nation . If nation states are widely conceded to be "new" and "historical", the nations to which they gave political expression always loom out of an immemorial past, and, still more important, glide into a limitless future. It is the magic of nationalism to turn chance into destiny . With Debray we might say, `Yes, it is quite accidental that a I am born French ; but after all France is eternal' (Anderson, p . 19, emphasis added) . But he also adds : I am not claiming that the appearance of nationalism towards the end of the eighteenth century was `produced' by the erosion of religious certainties, or that this erosion does not itself require a complex explanation . Nor am I suggesting that somehow nationalism historically `supersedes' religion . What I am proposing is that nationalism has to be understood, by aligning it not with self

consciously heldpolitical ideologies, but with the lage cultural systems that preceded it, out ofwhich as well as against which it came into being. (ibid, emphasis added)

And here we do have, surely, at least the beginnings of an explanation ofwhat I have called the passion of nationalism, of the heroism, self-sacrifice and sense of righteousness which it can provoke . For if, as Anderson suggests (p . 183), the facts of death and suffering ('disease, mutilation, grief, age and death . Why was I born blind? Why is my best friend paralysed? Why is my daughter retarded?'), are the constants of the human condition, of the `human fix', as Stanley Cavell (1976) puts it, then any sets of beliefs which can anchor itself in these constants, and which can provide explanations (or if not explanations, at least comforts) for such constants, is likely to strike deep emotional roots . Anderson suggests that this is precisely what nationalism does, both by providing an `imagined community' within which the `combinations of necessity and chance . . . contingency and ineluctability' in human life are shared, and by providing an entity transcendent of the individual both in space and (more importantly) in time, in the name ofwhich sacrifices (including `the ultimate' sacrifice) can be made . Anderson points out the central symbolic role of Tombs of Unknown Soldiers in virtually all nationalisms and says The cultural significance of such monuments becomes . . . clearer if one tries to imagine, say, a Tomb of the Unknown Marxist or a cenotaph for fallen Liberals . Is a sense of absurdity avoidable? The reason is that neither Marxism nor Liberalism are much concerned with death and immortality . If the nationalist imagining is so concerned, this suggests a strong affinity with religious imaginings (Anderson, p . 18) . This religious caste to nationalism also helps to explain why, psychologically, na-

109

Capital f5 Class 110 tions always have to `loom out of an immemorial past' (Anderson is just as aware as Gellner of how spurious such `pasts' often are, but unlike Gellner he does not stop there) . And it also suggests of course that, far from nationalisms having to directly substitute for previous 'universalistic' religious communities, they can benefit from merging with (suitably modified) versions of them, to create emotionally powerful trinities of God, King and Country, or Allah, Ayatollah and Jihad ('holy' war for national ends) . In fact Anderson has some superb insights into the way in which the `domestication' of the universal religions in the long era of Absolutist monarchy paved the way for just such a synthesis of nationalist and religious symbolism .

Nationalist opposition to colonial rule We can now turn to Anderson's explanation of colonial nationalist movements, in Latin America, Africa and South-East Asia (especially Indonesia, and in Laos, Vietnam and Cambodia, i .e ., Indo-China) . In commencing his discussion of Latin American nationalist movements, Anderson explicitly notes that the kind of model which Gellner offers, andwhich is also broadly reproduced by Tom Nairn, seems not to fit the Latin American case at all . In the first place, in Latin America (but also, later, in Africa), nationalist movements did not differentiate themselves linguistically from the imperial power (as happened in Europe for example) . On the contrary in these cases the Imperial language became itself the language of nationalism . In the second place, in Latin America at least, nationalism does not fit Nairn's generalisation that `The arrival of nationalism in a distinctively modern sense was tied to the political baptism of the lower classes . . . . Although sometimes hostile to democracy, nationalist movements have been invariably populist in outlook and sought to

instruct the lower classes in political life' (Nairn, The Break Up of Britain, p . 41, quoted in Anderson, p . 50) . In Latin America, says Anderson, `European style "middle classes" were still insignificant at the end of the eighteenth century. Nor was there much in the way of an "intelligentsia" . . . The evidence clearly suggests that leadership was held by substantial landowners, allied with a much smaller group of merchants, and various types of professional (lawyers, military men, local and provincial functionaries) .' Moreover, `far from seeking to "induct the lower classes into political life", one key factor initially spurring the drive for independence from Madrid, in such . . . cases as Venezuela, Mexico and Peru, was the fear of"lower class" political mobilizations : to wit, Indian or Negro slave uprisings' (Anderson, pp . 50-1) . Nor, needless to say, was there much evidence of the emergence of `industrial society', Gellner (non-extended) style, in late eighteenth and early nineteenth century Latin America . What then is Anderson's explanation of the rise of national consciousness in this context? Essentially it rests on a theory of the effect of creating colonial administrative hierarchies in overseas territories which are staffed at all levels up to but not including (significantly) the very highest level (the metropole itself) by 'indigenes' . In the Latin American case these functionaries were mainly 'creoles', i .e . `Peninsula born' Spanish speakers, but elsewhere they might be `mestizos' of various kinds, or (in Africa or South-East Asia) 'indigenes' in a total sense . However, in all cases, Anderson argues, the limits of these functionaries' geographical and social mobility become, slowly, both the limits of their world (i.e . the colonial territory becomes for them a `homeland', since they are trapped in it by imperial policy), and a framework in which they can construct both a real and imagined community of all those who share

Nationalism: the instrumentalpassion

their situation . And that `situation' crucially includes their use, indeed command, of the `imperial' language, as a language of administration, a language which, being now, for them, restricted in use to the territorial state apparatus, is `ready made' for conversion into a language of nationalism. This explanatory complex, of the limits of the 'journeys' made (and possible) for functionaries, of the central role of the written language of colonial administration, and the consequent construction of real and imagined communities of colonial functionaries (which thenn flower into colonial nationalisms) constitutes, in my view, one of Anderson's most brilliant insights, especially when the same complex is used to draw a vivid contrast with the prenationalist world of antiquity . I think it worth quoting these pages in full : For our purposes here, the modal journey is the pilgrimage . It is not simply that in the minds of Christians, Muslims or Hindus the cities of Rome, Mecca or Benares were the centres of sacred geographies, but that their centrality was experienced and `realized' . . . by the constant flow of pilgrims moving towards them from remote and otherwise unrelated localities . Indeed, in some sense the outer limits of the old religious communities of the imagination were determined by which pilgrimages people made . . . The Berber encountering the Malay before the Ka'bah must, as it were, ask himself : `Why is this man doing what I am doing, uttering the same words that I am uttering, even though we cannot talk to one another?' There is only one answer, once one has learnt it : `Because we . . . are Muslims' . There was, to be sure, always a double aspect to the choreography of the great religious pilgrimages : a vast horde of illiterate vernacular speakers provided the dense, physical reality of the ceremonial passage ; while a small

segment of literate bilingual adepts drawn from each vernacular community performed the unifying rites, interpreting to their respective followings the meaning of their collective notion . In a pre-print age, the reality of the imagined religious community depended profoundly on countless, ceaseless travels . Nothing more impresses one about Western Christendom in its heyday than the uncoerced flow of faithful seekers from all over Europe, through the celebrated `regional centres' of monastic learning, to Rome . These great Latin speaking institutions drew together what today we would perhaps regard as Irishmen, Danes, Portuguese, Germans and so forth, in communities whose sacred meaning was every day deciphered from their members' otherwise inexplicable juxtaposition in the refectory . Though the religious pilgrimages were probably the most touching and grandiose journeys of the imagination, they had, and have, more modest and limited secular counterparts . For our present purposes, the most important were the differing passages created by the rise of absolutizing monarchies, and, eventually, Europe-centred worldimperial states . The inner thrust of absolutism was to create a unified apparatus of power, controlled directly by, and loyal to, a ruler over against a decentralised, particularistic feudal nobility . Unification meant internal interchangeability of men and documents . . . . Absolutist functionaries thus undertook journeys which were basically different from those of feudal nobles . The difference can be represented schematically as follows : In the modal feudal journey, the heir of Noble A, on his father's death, moves up one step to take that father's place . This ascension requires a round trip, to the centre for investiture, and then back to the ancestral

111

Capital E5 Class

112 demesne . For the new functionary, however, things are more complex . Talent, not death, charts his course . He sees before him a summit rather than a centre . He travels up its corniches in a series of looping arcs which, he hopes, will become smaller and tighter as he nears the top. Sent out to township A at rank V, he may return to the capital at rank W ; proceed to province B at rank X ; continue to vice royalty C at rank Y ; and end his pilgrimage in the capital at rank Z . On this journey there is no assured resting place ; every pause is provisional. The last thing the functionary wants is to return home ; for he has no home with any intrisic value. And this ; on his upward spiralling road he encounters as eager fellow pilgrims his functionary colleagues, from places and families he has scarcely heard of and surely hopes never to have to see . But in experiencing them as travelling companions, a consciousness of connectedness (`Why are we . . . here. . . together?') emerges, above all when all share a common language of state . Then, if official A from province B administers province C, while official D from province C administers province B - a situation that absolutism begins to make likely-that experience of interchangeability requires its own explanation : the ideology of absolutism, which the new men themselves, as much as the sovereign, elaborate (Anderson, pp . 55-7) . And as with absolutism, so with colonial nationalism . Here too there are functionary `pilgrims' recruited from various parts of the territory, but the `shape' of their journey is determined by the boundaries of that territory since, for a variety of reasons, the metropole is closed to them (at least as part of a career ladder, as against the example the `one off educational visit) . Hence a different shared situation (a situation distinguished both

from the vernacular speakers from whom one has been recruited but subsequently insulated, and from the uppermost imperial bureaucrats in whose grander journeys one cannot share), and with it a different imagined `we', a different `here', in which to be `together' . And thus the emergence of a `territorial' loyalty and consciousness ready made to become a `national' loyalty and consciousness . Once Anderson has elaborated this model for Latin America he can and does apply it to later colonial nationalisms, with case studies of the administrative pilgrimages of young men centred on Batavia in the Dutch East Indies (i .e . the origins of Indonesian nationalism), of educational pilgrimages of other young men to the Ecole Normal William Ponty in Dakar, and the administrative journeys of yet other young men to Hanoi and Saigon from the various parts of French IndoChina . And each of these case studies in modern `pilgrimage' and the consciousness which it forms, is paralleled by a discussion of the administrative languages which both distinguished and bound together these young men . Sometimes (as in Africa) they were the metropolitan languages themselves, sometimes (as in the Dutch East Indies and French Indo-China) they were 'romanised' versions of much older local languages of administration (quoc ngu in Indochina, dienstmaleisch in the Dutch East Indies) adapted for use by the imperialists . They could all serve equally well as national languages and as the languages of nationalism, just because (as Gellner insists and Anderson echoes) they had acquired a formalised lexicography and an associated `literature', which could allow them to be both adopted and universalised by state education systems (colonial and post-colonial) . As Anderson says, thelanguage itself does not, contrary to much nationalist assertion, matter very much :

Nationalism : the instrumentalpassion

Nothing suggests that Ghanaian nationalism is any less real than Indonesian simply because its national language is English rather than Ashanti . It is always a mistake to treat languages in the way that certain nationalist ideologues treat them - as emblems ofnation-ness like flags, costumes, folk dances, and the rest . Much the most important thing about language is its capacity for generating imagined communities, building in effect, particular solidarities . After all, imperial languages are still vernaculars, and thus particular vernaculars among many . If radical Mozambique speaks Portuguese, the significance of this is that Portuguese is the medium through which Mozambique is imagined (and at the same time limits its stretch into Tanzania and Zambia) . Seen from this perspective the use of Portuguese in Mozambique (or English in India) is basically no different from the use of English in Australia or Portuguese in Brazil . Language is not an instrument ofexclusion : in principle, anyone can learn any language . On the contrary, it is fundamentally inclusive, limited only by the fatality ofBabel : no one lives long enough to learn all languages . Print-language is what invents nationalism, not a particular language per se' (Anderson, p . 122) . Though his name is never mentioned, one can feel lurking behind all this, behind the concept of `imagined community' itself, the haunting figure of Ludwig Wittgenstein -'the limits of my language are the limits of my world' . But in linking language to a sense of community through `print capitalism', through social and geographic mobility, and (in the colonial context), through the `shape' of administrative and educational pyramids, what Anderson provides is the essence of

a materialist theory of nationalist consciousness, and it is in this that the brilliance of

his account resides . It may be clear too that these elements

of Anderson's theory can be used to sup- 113 plement Gellner's account, as well as (in the specific area of colonial nationalisms) provide an alternative to it . Thus, the `journeys' of Czech peasants from their valleys to the new German-dominated industrial towns of Bohemia in the late nineteenth century (as well as their frequent return migrations) can also be seen as experiences constituting a new 'imagined community' in the face of considerable linguistic barriers to upward mobility . Indeed, it must be clear that Anderson's theory of colonial nationalism also incorporates a strong element of thwarted ambition in the restriction of `indigenous' colonial bureaucrats to the territory . But, as I have already said, and as I hope now to have demonstrated, what Anderson gives us, which Gellner does not, is a sense of how such experiences, by contributing to the construction ofnew imagined and transcendent communities, could create a collective passion as well as an instrumental means to enhanced individual mobility . But there is nonetheless a qualification to be entered and an unease to be expressed about Anderson's thesis, or at least about where it finally leads him (in his penultimate chapter on `Patriotism and Racism') . For here, it seems to me, understanding and brilliantly imaginative empathy become apologetics. Understanding all (or a great deal) does bring the temptation to forgive all . In essence the thrust of this chapter is to attempt a complete exculpation of nationalism for any responsibility for contemporary racism . `The dreams of racism' according to Anderson, `have their origin in ideologies of class rather than in those of nation : above all in claims to divinity among rulers and to `blue' or `white' blood and breeding among aristocracies . No surprise then that the putative sire of modern racism should be, not some petty bourgeois nationalist, but Joseph Arthur,

Capital & Class 114 Comte de Gobineau. Nor that, on the whole, racism and anti-semitism manifest themselves, not across national boundaries, but within them . In other words, they justify not so much foreign wars as domestic repression and domination' (p . 136) . In fact however he no sooner offers this last generalisation when he is forced to qualify it to deal with the manifest role played by racism in European Imperialism. This is `got round' by noting the close connection between aristocratic 'official nationalism' and the roots of Imperialism. But quite apart from the fact that, whatever one makes of say German or Russian imperialism, this hardly fits the British or (arguably) French cases, Anderson has to keep his argument intact by indulging in a bit of distinctly Gellnerian slipperiness . ' . . . colonial empire . . . permitted sizeable numbers of bourgeois and petty bourgeois to play aristocrat off centre court, i .e . anywhere in the empire except at home' (p .137) . Well yes, but the fact remains that the vast majority of Kenyan settlers, Ceylonese tea planters and Malayan rubber growers were not aristocrats, but many were most certainly racists . Also the whole discussion of colonial racism proceeds with the, to say the least, somewhat surprising omission of something that is usually, and in my view rightly, referred to as Aftikaaner Nationalism (a nationalism which in fact fits Gellner's industrial, or rather `industrialising' society model very well) . No; it may well be, as Anderson asserts earlier in the same chapter, that nationalism can and has invoked self sacrifice and love, partly because national identity is for most people unchosen, has an element of fatality and (therefore) of destiny . It may also be that because `from the start the nation was conceived in language not in blood', the link to parentage and therefore to (among other things) skin colour, is contingent, not essential

('the most insular nations accept the principle of naturalization' (p . 133)) . But it is surely here, at this point, that Anderson could do with a little of Gellner's scepticism, a little more attention to what nations and nationalists typically do and rather less to what they say . And in fact a route into that scepticism is Anderson's own definition of the nation : the nation . . . is an imagined political community-and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign . . . . It is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion' (p .15). But the point of `community' whether imagined or `face to face' is that it generates its own internal warmth partly through an external frigidity. Those within the imagined community have their humanity recognised, even celebrated, but most importantly they have that humanity felt. Those who live in `our' time machine, who move `together' with `us' through history, the history of `our' nation, these are people to us, in the way in which `outsiders' never can be . Of course nationalists formally recognise, formally attest the humanity of others . They may even (in these days) assert the equal rights of all nations to live together in peace and harmony. But the point is that 'recognising', `asserting' is all they do . They do not feel a broader humanity in the same way as they feel that of their co-nationals, and indeed if Anderson's theory does capture the `heart' of nationalism (and I think it does) it is impossible that nationalists should feel those bonds outside the boundaries of their `imagined community' . And moreover, whilst it may be formally true that `all nations accept the principle of naturalization', we are surely very aware that that is all they do, they `accept' it . And the reason for this of



Nationalism : the instrumental passion course is that a part of the emotive power, of the `fatality' of a national identity, is precisely that one is born to it, and arguably no world of nation states could survive a volume of `international' mobility which made `naturalization' the norm rather than the occasional (and reluctant) exception . What price `destiny' if you carry it in six different passports? Thus, I would argue that place and parentage of birth are essential, not peripheral, to the emotive power of nationalism, and since they are also central to the emotive power of racism (after all membership of the master race is the most `fatal' of all 'destinies'), then translation of the former into the latter is not at all difficult . Particular circumstances are of course required for such a translation to occur, but it occurs far more frequently than Anderson appears to think . I should also add here that the mere fact (if it is a fact) that anti-colonial nationalist movements had no explicitly racist epithets to describe imperialists does not mean that such movements were entirely free from racist dimensions either during the Independence struggle or later. What, after all, are we to call Idi Amin if we are not to call him a racist (among other things)? The bouncing cheques of Marxism and Nationalism In short, if the international proletariat, `the class without a country', is one element of classical Marxism which nobody can now believe in, if this, as it were, is the Marxist cheque which always bounces, it is important to remember that nationalists too have their species of funny money . This is the promissory note which reads `Family of Nations' . The most intelligent and optimistic of nationalist ideologues (Friedrich List is a particularly good case) have always promised that: As the individual chiefly obtains by means of the nation and in the nation, mental

115 culture, power of production, security and prosperity, so is the civilization of the human race only conceivable and possible by means of the civilization and development of the individual nations (List, 1904, p . 174) . But the problem is that nationalists have no affective, felt, `working' concept of the human race . Indeed it is the humanism of nationalism which is most to be doubted. Hence there was not in List's time, and there is not now, a `Family of Nations', or if there is, it is a family whose quality of warmth and fellow-feeling is only equalled by that of the Borgias . Indeed, despite Leagues of them and Uniteds of them, nations continue in practice to conduct their relations on the best Hobbesian (pre-Leviathan) principles . And surely in this context it is significant that when either individuals or whole groups of people have had the opportunity (voluntary or forced) to genuinely transcend national cultures, which means to master and to live happily in at least two of them, the net effect of that experience, of that `journey', that `pilgrimage', has been to weaken the hold of nationalism and to innoculate such people from at least its most virulent and chauvinistic expressions . Coming (half) from a people who major historical experience has been a continuing journey, I do not think it any coincidence that some of the greatest contributions to the attempt to build a politics and a culture transcending nationalism, a culture and politics of humanity, came from the ranks of a privileged (and atypical) section of nineteenth-century European Jewry. And despite the holocaust, and best Israeli propaganda, I am not disposed to think that those attempts were either in vain, or simply a species of self delusion . On the contrary, the fate of contemporary Israel is one of the best modern testimonies to their validity. The alternative which classical Marx-

116

ism offered to nationalism proved to be no alternative at all . That cannot be denied. But Marxism's underlying suspicion of the humanity of nationalism, the suspicion that it buys its love with hate, its solidarity with exclusiveness, and its intensity of feeling with a narrowness of sympathy and understanding, that was not mistaken . That socialism must be a humanism, not a nationalism, that was not mistaken. So even if the proletariat does indeed have a country, Lenin's injunction not to `paint nationalism red' still holds good (would that he had always abided by it) . Or, as an old comrade once said to me, `Son, when they raise your flag, raise your eyebrow .' References R . Meek, 1967, `The Rehabilitation of Sir James Steuart', in his Economics and Ideology and Other Essays, London, Chapman and Hall .

'Stepniak' (Sergius Kravchinsky), 1888, The Russian Peasantry : Their Agrarian Conditions, Social Life and Religion, New York,

Harper & Brothers . Geoffrey Kay, 1975, Development and Underdevelopment : A Marxist Analysis, London, Macmillan . Stanley Cavell, 1976, Must we Mean what we Say?, Chapter 2, Cambridge University Press. Friedrich List, 1904, The National System of Political Economy, translated by Sampson Lloyd, London, Longman .

' Editors 'Note: This quote and another later in the article are longer than Capital and Class usually carries . Gavin Kitching insists that such lengthy quotation is necessary in this case because the way they are written (its form) cannot be distinguished from what they are writing about (its content) .

Martin Spence

Imperialism and decline : Britain in the 1980s

Home truths THE CUMULATIVE disaster of industrial decline and mass unemployment, plus the political disaster of the Tories' reelection after four years of Thatcherism, has given rise to a series of major debates on the British left . In the eyes of one foreign observer, the British left is in fact very lively and dynamic in the quality of its ideas and discussions (Therborn 1984) . And yet there is a constant theme running through these debates which needs to be questioned : the theme of `Britain as Victim' . According to this perspective, British capital is acting `unfairly' or `unpatriotically' when it invests `British money' abroad ; a major cause of the country's problems lies with the EEC ; and a strategy for socialism consists of policies implemented at national level (CSE London Working Group, 1980). There is a danger of forgetting something which is central to any understanding of British history over the past 150 years, a home-truth which may be painful but must be faced . Britain is an imperialist power . The very structure of British capital is founded upon its imperialist status . Britain is, in fact, the second most important imperialist power in the world, after the USA . Any analysis of this country's economic crisis, and of the options facing the working-class movement, must start from this obvious, but apparently easily-forgotten, fact . This is not the place to rehearse the long debate within the Marxist tradition about the nature and structures of imperialism a debate resumed recently in the pages of Capital & Class .' But it

This article examines the international movement of British capital in an attempt to assess the strengths and weaknesses of Britain as an imperialist power. Based on a Leninist concept of imperialism as the capital export phase of capitalism, it argues that the decline in the UK's

industrial base, the flight of British capital to Europe and the United States and the involvement of foreign investment in the restructuring of the u economy are all facets of the continuing imperialist role of British capital and the British state. The response of the labour movement and socialists should be premised on a recognition of how the working 117 class is also being restructured, and strategies and policies should be reformulated to encompass the changing reality, both internally and internationally .

Capital & Class

118

may be useful to refer to Lenin, whose concepts set the parameters of that debate, and to take note of the essential point in his analysis (Lenin, 1968) . For Lenin, imperialism is obviously not defined by the phenomenon of a formal, political `Empire' . Imperialism is characteristic of the `monopoly stage' of capitalism and is marked by the export of capital from the advanced capitalist to `backward' countries, capital which he describes as `overripe', accumulated domestically but unable to find sufficiently profitable outlets in the domestic economy. There are many specific points on which Lenin's analysis could be faulted . Its crude underconsumptionism, and its related assumption that capital must be exported to 'backward' countries, are significant weaknesses . But in pinpointing the phenomenon of capital export, the analysis still retains its essential value . Capital export, investment in productive activities abroad, is qualitatively different from mere trade, the mere export of goods . The export of capital involves the export of capitalist relations of production . It implies a vested interest on the part of the capitalist in the maintenance of these relations, and therefore in the maintenance of appropriate social and political institutions, in the recipient country . It implies a much greater and quite different commitment on the part of the capitalist from the commitment involved in a trade agreement. Imperialism is therefore an enormous extension of the sphere of operation of capital, an enormous extension of capitalist relations, institutions and priorities throughout the world . At the same time, Lenin saw that it created a whole new set of problems for capital, generating new class forces, creating new opportunities for social progress, and contributing to possible stagnation and decay in the imperialist metropolis . In placing this emphasis upon the phenomenon of capital export, we are admittedly losing sight of the full scope of Lenin's analysis. But this is quite deliberate . By taking this stance, and by concentrating not upon capital's organisational form but upon movements of capital, we can best understand the role of British imperialism within the world economy.

The post-war imperialist system

The crucial point about post-war capital flows is that they have not been primarily from advanced capitalist countries to underdeveloped countries, but have rather moved between the advanced capitalist countries . A complex network of cross-investment has been set up, between the major capital-exporting (i .e . imperialist) countries, and this network has been established in very specific conditions : conditions of effective domination of the capitalist world, economically, politically and militarily, by the USA. Despite continuing contradictions and rivalries we can therefore identify

Imperialism and decline an emerging `imperialist system' in the 1950s and 1960s, under us tutelage . In terms of classical Marxist polemics this was perhaps closer to Kautsky's vision of 'ultra-imperialism' than to Lenin's understanding of imperialism as synonomous with conflict and war . (Kautsky, 1970) . The emergence of this `imperialist system' can be traced from 1950, at which time the bulk of Us foreign investments were in oil and minerals, mostly concentrated in the Middle East . By 1965, us overseas investments had increased five-fold, and were mostly in manufacturing and trade in Western Europe (Toffler, 1975 :12) . With the recovery of West European capital, a European 'counter-attack' saw reciprocal large-scale investments in the USA ; and much more recently Japanese capital has complemented its strategy of aggressive commodity-export with a drive for capitalexport to the USA and Western Europe . By 1975, 75% of all foreign-owned capital had been invested by one advanced capitalist country in another (Sutcliffe, 1983 : 20) . Andreff points out that cross-investment should be viewed primarily as a process whereby capital is redeployed into profitable sectors (Andreff, 1984 : 60), but this sectoral redeployment nevertheless has a clear geographical logic . The primary agents of this capital mobility are the multinational companies (MNCs) or transnational companies, which dominate primary production, manufacturing industry and commerce . Each MNC necessarily has a specific national base, and may take advantage of certain services provided by `its own' State, but its primary orientation must be to the world market and its primary loyalty must be to its own growth and profitability . It is well known that multinational industrial enterprises, with capital invested in many countries, are able to take advantage of specific local conditions at each site, achieve a drastic division of labour within their own production processes and largely insure themselves against unwelcome isolated actions by workers or radical governments . Furthermore, through their own internal transfers and capital movements, they are able to exert influence over national economic programmes, currency stability and balances of trade . It is estimated that between 25 % and 40% of all world trade consists of purely internal transfers between subsidiaries or MNCs (Sutcliffe, 1983 :19) . It is quite clear, therefore, that the success and profitability of a particular MNC tells us nothing, in itself, about the economic health of the country in which that MNC happens to be based . Although a dense lattice of cross-investment forms the core of the post-war imperialist system, significant investment has also taken place in the Newly Industrialising Countries (NICs) ; countries such as Brazil, Singapore, Mexico, South Korea . The adv-

119

Capital & Class 120

anced capitalist countries and the NICS, taken together, account for over 90% of the overseas activities of MNCs (Andreff, 1984 : 61) . Investment in OPEC countries, in some members of COMECON, and now, on a potentially much larger scale, in China, should not be overlooked . Here we have a pattern of capitalist movements which gives the structure of the world imperialist system as it has developed since the Second World War . But the system cannot be static, and from the early 1970s there have been clear signs of its transformation into someting rather different . One of these signs has been a shift in the nature of capital export from the imperialist countries : a shift from direct investment, to international lending by banks . Underdeveloped countries' external debts leapt from $64 billion in 1974 to $600 billion in 1982 (Sutcliffe, 1983 : 68) but the bulk of these debts is concentrated in the NICs, whose industrialisation prospects obviously make them more credit-worthy than the poor countries of the Third World . Just as significant as the scale of this global lending spree is its origin . Money was lent throughout the 1970s and into the 1980s, not by central banks or international credit agencies, but increasingly by private banks, and increasingly by private banks with limited experience of international markets . In 1970 45 % of underdeveloped countries' debt was with private creditors ; by 1982 this had risen to 65% (Sutcliffe 1983 :68) . The international exposure of these private banks has recently led to a series of financial `scares', such as that at Continental Illinois in the USA, and has created a global credit system which is permanently on the verge of collapse . The consequence of this boom in international lending is, therefore, a new structural fragility in the post-war imperialist system . But its significance goes deeper than that . The lending spree both sprang from, and confirmed, the breakdown of postwar Western currency stability, based on the key status of the US dollar . It followed on from the rise of the `offshore' Eurodollar markets from the mid- 1960s, from the devaluation of the dollar in 1971, and was fuelled by the advent of OPEC depostis in Western banks after the oil price rise of 1973 . In other words, the explosion of international lending represents a major weakening of the USA's hegemonic position in the world imperialist system . There is, in addition, a clear trend for US companies to slip from their previous domination of world markets . As measured by sales, the USA had 74 of the world's top industrial companies in 1957 ; 69 in 1967 ; and 48 in 1977 . Japan's rating rose spectacularly between 1957 and 1967, while major West European companies (especially from West Germany and France) improved their standing between 1967 and 1977 (Drancopoulos 1981 : 38) . Growth rates of US firms, taken overall, were significantly lower than that of



Imperialism and decline

non-US firms (Droncopoulos 1981 :37) during the same period . It would be premature to claim that the post-war imperialist system, as established under the aegis of the USA, is disintegrating. But there are clear points of strain, the system as a whole is increasingly fragile, and there is an identifiable tendency for the system to splinter and take on a more polycentric character . The question is, where does Britain fit into the post-war imperialist system, and how does it relate to these more recent developments? The crucial point about the development of British capitalism is that is has been committed to an imperialist orientation from a very early point . In Lenin's analysis, which leans heavily on Bukharin and Hilferding, the implied `normal' sequence of development is for capital to seek to develop the domestic market, for industrial and banking capital to merge into finance capital, and for finance capital then to seek further security and higher profits through foreign investment . But this model does not `fit' in Britain's case . British imperialism - which must always be distinguished from colonialism - was launched in earnest in the 1840s, associated with the `Second Industrial Revolution' based on coal, iron and railways . The railway boom in the UK, both cause and consequence of accumulated domestic capital, led quickly to an international railway boom based on British technology and financed by British money . By 1870 £700m was invested abroad, most of it in the form of loans, most of it associated with railways, and most of it in Europe and in the USA (Hobsbawm, 1968 : 93, 96, 113) . In the mid-C19th, the UK basked in a reputation as the `Workshop of the World' . But this must be put in perspective. At no time in the C19th did Britain export more goods than it imported (Hobsbawm 1968 : 119) . From a very early date invisible exports were crucial to the balance of trade - interest and dividends on foreign investments, and earnings from shipping, trade, and a range of foreign services . From the mid-C 19th national prosperity was based upon an imperialist strategy, upon the benefits accruing from capital export, and upon the country's dominant position in banking, finance and trade . The favoured position which British capital enjoyed at this time allowed it another luxury : its alreadyestablished global hegemony meant that it could retain a relatively fragmented structure, with industrial companies and banks retaining their own integrity and specialisms . This option was not open to the UK's emerging rivals, Germany and the USA, and throught the `Great Depression' from the £870s to the 1890s capital in these countries was restructured and modernised . Britain meanwhile held to its imperialist policy, formalising and strengthening its global reach through the acquisition of colonies, and by the early C20th it had become Lenin's

121

Britain's place in the system

Capital & Class

122

`creditor State' (Lenin 1968 : 242) . Between 1911 and 1913 foreign investment by British capital was running at twice the rate of domestic investment (Hobsbawm 1968 : 161), and in 1913 the UK alone held £4 billion abroad, while its four leading rivals combined held only £5 1/2 billion (Hobsbawm, 1968 : 125) . But the price of this was that in key industrial sectors Britain had been overtaken by Germany and the USA. By the early C20th, the direction of UK capital export had shifted towards the colonies (especially the White Dominions), and politically-independent developing countries (especially in Latin America) . This trend resumed after the First World War, but was cut short by the Depression . The '1930s and 1940s saw British capital forced into an uncharacteristic period of restructuring and concentration, based upon new technologies and on the domestic market . However, with the re-opening of the world market under us hegemony, old patterns started to reassert themselves, and foreign investment gathered pace from the 1950s . In the early 1970s UK capital export was running at £0 .6£0 .7 billion per annum, and by the end of the decade it had reached £2 billion per annum (Harris, 1983 : 124) . Following the abolition of exchange controls in 1979 the floodgates were opened : in 1979 over £6 1/2 billion was invested abroad, followed by £8 billion in 190 and £10.7 billion in 1981 (Harris 1983 :124) . In each of these years the bulk of the capital outflow was accounted for not by direct investment, but by portfolio investments placed by financial institutions . On the face of it, it would appear that British capital is slipping back into the habits of the late C19th and early C20th but there are crucial differences. The banks and financial institutions certainly play a key role . Financial services continue to make a crucial contribution to the balance of payments, earning £2 .1 billion in 1982 and £2.6 billion in 1983 (FT 9/8/84), and the City continues to be regarded as the world-leader in financial experience and expertise . However, the great difference is that the City no longer acts as a conduit for specifically British capital . In 1982, 27% of all international lending took place from London, making it far and away the most important single international centre (Coakley, 1983 :26), but the biggest London-based lenders were Japanese b anks . U K bamks came second, just ahead of Londonbased us banks (Coakley, 1983 : 26) . The City's role in the 1980s is not so much about servicing British capital in particular, but rather about servicing the imperialist world system in general . But at the same time, the City's earnings are crucial to the viability of the UK national economy. The role of the City should not be allowed to obscure the continuing importance of direct foreign investment, by British-

Imperialism and decline

based industrial MNCs . Although they have lost ground relative to other West European and Japanese firms, and althought they have experienced lower growth than these rivals, UK industrial companies continue to figure among the largest and most profitable in the world . Of the top 500 West European industrial and commercial companies, as measured by market capitalisation, 46% are British-based . The next ranking is West Germany with 15%, France with 8% and Switzerland with 7% (FT 50 survey, 1984) . This continuing strength of UK capital is closely associated with its global reach . Direct foreign investment stood at £2 billion in 1979 and £5 billion in 1981 (ST 2/6/82), and the leading 50 British manufacturing companies now produce 44% of their output from overseas subsidiaries (Labour Research, May 1983) . The massive and continuing fact of UK capital export, of the UK's imperialist status, can hardly be doubted, but what is its significance for the national economy? In recent years British balance of trade figures have shown consistent and apparently `healthy' surpluses : £5 .8 billion in 1982, £2 .9 billion in 1983 . But when North Sea oil earnings are removed the picture changes . In 1982, a visible surplus of£2 .4 billion would become a visible deficit of £2.2 billion ; in 1983 the visible deficit would increase from £0 .7 billion to £7 .6 billion (FT 25/10/84) . In other words, the only thing which is keeping the visible balance of trade anywhere near the black is North Sea oil . The crucial importance of invisible exports is therefore quite clear : the UK registered an invisibles surplus of £3 .6 billion in 1983 (FT 25/10/84) . The general expectation is that North Sea oil earnings will decline from the late 1980s . In the absence of a major and unprecedented programme of reindustrialisation, the burden of maintaining national economic solvency will fall upon the invisible exporters, the suppliers of tradable services such as construction and engineering consultancy, education, civil aviation, freight and shipping, TV and films, and legal services (FT 6/6/84) . But the biggest invisible earners are the financial services : banking above all, but also insurance, brokerage, and pension fund earnings (FT 2/8/84) . As North Sea oil output declines, so will the economic and therefore political power of the financial institutions increase . Their influence will be felt not only in the economy at large, but specifically in the finances of the State . At present, about 13 of all tax revenues comes from North Sea oil (FT 18/10/83), a timely subsidy which allows the Government to pretend that it has public borrowing under control . When these oil revenues decline, however, public borrowing must inevitably increase . The vast bulk of the Public Sector Borrowing Requirement (PSBR), around 93 %, comes from the non-bank financial sector, and especially the pension funds (Labour Party Financial Institutions Study Group,

123

Capital & Class

124

1982 : 68) . But pension fund assets are managed by a small number of very powerful merchant banks which are among the most enthusiastic advocates of foreign investment . They have orchestrated the recent outflow of pension fund money, at the direct expense of Government securities (FT 14/9/83) . And they are deeply involved in the current series of mergers and alliances which is breaking down traditional boundaries between the City's different categories of financial institution (Coakley, 1984b) . By the late 1980s, the major lenders to Government will be thoroughly enmeshed with a complex financial establishment, whose own interests and orientation will be overwhelmingly towards the world market. Any Government seeking to borrow money, whatever its political complexion, would find itself forced to guarantee and protect the global interests of UK capital. Britain is therefore thoroughly integrated into the imperialist system, in a way which feeds back into the structure of the domestic economy, and which restricts or pre-empts the options open to Government . It is obviously important to register exactly where UK capital is now being invested . Investment in Western Europe has risen steadily, from about 13%u of all direct foreign investment in 1962, to over 27% in 1976 (Aaronovitch, 1981 : 261) . Much of this was directed at the `Golden Triangle' of West European economic growth, the area roughly bounded by Paris, Milan and the Ruhr (Bunkina 1976 : 47) . Entry into the EEC in 1973 merely symbolised a trend which was clearly already underway. However, more significant that British capital's interest in Europe is its continuing commitment to North America, and specifically the USA. The UK has long held the largest single accumulation of foreign investment in the USA (Harris, 1983 :129), and throughout the 1960s and early 1970s over 20% of all direct foreign investment went to North America (Aaronovitch, 1981 : 209) . In 1981, 75% of British capital export went to the USA (Harris, 1983 : 124), and in 1982 North America received seven times as much UK direct investment as did Western Europe (FT 4/6/84) . British companies have also been active in the series of mergers and takeovers which have swept the us economy recently . In a survey of 25 recent takeovers, 12 of the acquisitions were by UK firms. The next highest `score' was 5, by Canada (FT 4/6/84) . The overall picture is that, upon a pre-existing base of large investments, British capital is steadily and increasingly committing itself to the US economy as its favourite destination . It is worth noting that this faith is touchingly reciprocated . Although the UK is a net capital exporter, it continues to receive significant foreign investment . From the early 1960s the West European share has risen steadily - but in 1976 over 60% of all

Imperialism and decline

125

capital import was still coming from North America (Aaronovitch, 1981 : 209) . This position has been maintained into the late 1970s and early 1980s (FT 10/4/84) . In 1982 and 1983 Britain received over half of all US investmenr in Europe (FT 24/4/84) . Just as the UK is the biggest single European investor in the USA, so is it the biggest single European recipient of US investment. Where does all this leave us? British capitalism is imperialist to its very core, its very roots . It has been committed to, and structured around, an imperialist strategy for 140 years, with a single quite brief respite in the 1930s and 1940s . Today, UK industrial capital continues to seek profitable outlets abroad, but the financial institutions are even more important : firstly, because of the scale of foreign investments which they control, because of the scale of foreign earnings which they generate, and because of the growing political power which they will wield from the late 1980s ; and secondly, because the City no longer services British capital in particular, but the world imperialist system in general . This means that capital throughout the world has a vested interest in British `stability', while British capital has an equal interest in the growth and profitability of the us economy . We have already seen that the US-dominated post-war imperialist system is in a process of transformation as US capital slowly gives way to challenges from Japan and Western Europe . Within this process, it now becomes clear that the interest of UK capital lies in sustaining the USA, supporting the imperialist status quo, and minimising or opposing the new challenges .

The global orientation of British-based capital, and Britain's developing function of servicing the imperialist system as a whole, are closely linked to chronic under-investment in the domestic economy, compared to other advanced capitalist countries . This trend has led in recent years to apocalyptic talk of 'deindustrialisation', but this can be a misleading term unless defined carefully .' It is more useful to refer to a process of industrial restructuring, within the context of a shrinking industrial base . Some idea of the nature of this restructuring can be obtained by comparing the sectors represented by the top 20 UK companies of the mid- 1960s with those of the mid-1980s . Sectors which, twenty years ago, were highly significant, have now disappeared from the top flight (Metals, Mechanical Engineering, Textiles, Shipping, Motors), or have slipped well down (Tobacco, Brewers, Food Manufacturers) . In their place are major new forces in new sectors : in Electrical Engineering (where output was 20% lower than Mechanical Engineering as recently as 1979, but is now 15 % higher (FT 9/8/84)), in Health and Household Goods,

The domestic economy : imperial decay

Capital & Class 126

and in Retail and Distribution (Times Books 1965 and FT 500 Survey 1984) . The biggest companies of all, the oil companies, are of course still there at the top . Overall, it is quite clear that the UK is not 'deindustrialising' in some absolute sense . Instead, capital is regrouping around a new set of key industries (oil, chemicals, and high technology advanced engineering), and services (consumer goods and services) . But it is not enough merely to observe this process of restructuring: we need to understand what it represents, and how it is associated with Britain's imperialist status . Imperialism involves, first of all, the export of capital in search of higher profits than can be realised through further domestic investment .' But this has an immediate impact on the domestic economy . It implies the existence of capitalist institutions to orchestrate and service foreign investment, institutions which themselves employ large numbers of workers, often highly-skilled and therefore highly-paid, creating demand for consumer goods, property services, further financial services, etc . It also implies the existence of a State machine which is able to offer some protection to foreign investments . This need not imply independent military muscle : effective influence through diplomatic contacts, or through membership of a powerful bloc or alliance, may be sufficient . In Britain's case, it must be remembered that until 1914, this was the leading imperialist power in the world : an imperialist power which also possessed an enormous colonial Empire, and which had built up an appropriate military strength . Within the State, powerful military institutions existed, inevitably intent on their own aggrandisement, which enjoyed close links with the industries which supplied their hardware . A military-industrial momentum was thus created in the C19th, which has been sustained into the C20th, leading to levels of military spending by the State which have been consistently high, and indeed 'unreasonably' high by capitalism's own standards (Smith, 1977) . The roots of the UK's persistent militarism lie not in `national psychology', not in some national identity-crisis over `virility' or `loss of Empire', but in the historical dynamics of bureaucratic momentum and capital accumulation .' The inevitably close relationships which develop between State military institutions and their industrial suppliers, have a profound effect upon those suppliers . In modern conditions, suppliers are increasingly concentrated in the advanced electrical engineering sector, linking into electronics, computers, information technology in general, and aerospace . The companies involved - companies such as GEC, Plessey, Racal, Thorn-EMI, Ferranti, as well as public corporations such as British Aerospace and British Shipbuilders - all supply civilian as well as military

Imperialism and decline

markets. But the long-term trend is not only for military spending to rise as a whole, but for the procurement budget to rise within that overall figure : in the 1950s and 1960s procurement accounted for about 30% of the military budget, but in 1983/4 it accounted for nearly 50%, (FT 10/10/83) . When it is remembered that military spending rose by over 23% in real terms between 1979 and 1984, it becomes clear that military contracts represent a steadily-increasing percentage of the total business of companies in advanced engineering and electronics - and of course, this is one of the major growth sectors in the national economy, as we have seen. The long-term effect upon such companies is, of course, that they orient themselves increasingly towards military markets . New processes and technologies are adopted - or abandoned with military priorities in mind . And as they become increasingly wedded to military production, such companies inevitably pressure the State to continue to place orders ; to continue to fund military R&D (representing 50% of all State-funded R&D in 1981/2, compared with 27% for education and 15% for inustry, trade, energy & employment combined (FT 21/1/84) ; and to help in actively marketing their products abroad . A vicious circle is established, leading to chronic underinvestment in new technologies with civilian applications - for military innovation does not regularly lead to useful civilian `spin-offs', as is sometimes spuriously claimed (Chalmers, 1983 : 33-35) . The end result is that military production is by far the most profitable area of work in aerospace (FT 28/8/84) and by the 1990s is expected to be the main growth area in electronics (FT 14/11/83) . Here then is one dimension of the impact of imperialism upon the domestic economy . The persistence of powerful military institutions within the State, and the persistence of high military spending, is imposing a profoundly warped structure upon one of the domestic economy's few industrial growth sectors . However, there are other characteristics of the new growth sectors which should also be taken into account . Firstly, the key areas of industrial growth - oil, and advanced engineering and electronics - are among the areas in which foreign capital is most powerfully represented within the UK. One us oil company alone, Exxon, holds 16% of North Sea oil reserves (FT 9/3/84) . In electronics and computers, the US company IBM is well-enough established in the UK to be a major exporter in its own right (FT 9/12/82), and Japanese investment is increasingly rapidly in this field (FT 23/12/83) . The merger of ICL with STC has knocked out any hope of an `independent' British presence in computers . The UK's industrial growth sectors are growing partly as a result of incoming foreign capital, and, therefore, as a reflec-

127



Capital & Class 128

tion of the UK's established place within the imperialist world system . Secondly, capital's shift from the `old' industrial sectors to the `new' has a major geographical impact . Within England and Wales, sectoral change has encouraged increasing use of relatively small workplaces, and allowed a relocation of industrial and related activities - a drift, very broadly, from town to country, and from north to south (Lane, 1982) . The `declining areas' now include not only such traditionally-declining areas as the North-east, but also regions such as the West Midlands, which in the inter-war and post-war period was synonymous with boom and a new workingclass prosperity (Gaffikin and Nickson, 1984) . In Southern England meanwhile, a `sunbelt' has emerged as the favoured location for executive, administrative and R&D functions in the new industries, centring on electronics, advanced engineering, and pharmaceutical and health products (Massey, 1983) . The South's relative prosperity is obviously encouraged by its proximity to the vast financial and Governmental magnet of London, which it serves as a residential and infrastructural hinterland . Overall, the slow trend towards equality between the regions, which was evident in the 1970s, has been sharply reversed . The South-east is by far the most prosperous region, and the South-west, East Anglia and Scotland are all improving . But the North, Yorkshire/Humberside, North-west, West Midlands, East Midlands, and Wales have all fallen back since 1976 (FT 22/3/84) . To sum up, the industrial restructuring of Britain is integrally related to this country's imperialist past and continuing imperialist status, and it is contributing to new regional inequalities within the country . Some new `growth sectors' are furthermore insecure and unstable, in that they are considerably dominated by foreign capital, and (in the case of advanced engineering and electronics) increasingly dependent on military contracts which, may not be maintained at present levels (Labour Party, 1984 : 73) . However, there are other growth sectors which have not yet been discussed : Health products, Household Goods and Retail and Distribution . The rise of these consumer-oriented sectors is closely associated with the changing structure of the British working-class. Imperialism and the working class

The basic facts on mass unemployment hardly require re-stating . Geographically, the pattern of unemployment reflects the processes discussed above, the worst-hit regions in Great Britain being the North, Wales and the North-west. But it is important to identify where the redundancies are coming from . Despite rhetoric about spending cuts, job losses have not come mainly from the public service sector (FT 7/10/83) . Instead, they have come over-

Imperialism and decline

whelmingly from nationalised industries, and from private manufacturing companies . Between 1973 and 1981 the biggest job-cutting firms were concentrated in a predictable group of sectors : Motors, Heavy and Mechanical Engineering, and Textiles (FT 9/12/83) . Many redundancies occurred as a result of the wave of company failures which has hit small- and medium-sized capital since 1979, reaching a record 13,400 in 1983 (FT 28/1/84). But this isn't the whole story. Leading successful companies, in growth sectors, have taken advantage of the prevailing conditions to institute a major labour 'shake-out' often reducing employment while shifting plant within the UK, or out of the country . Between 1978 and 1981, Britain's leading 55 exporting firms shed 250,000 jobs between them, and in 1981-2 they cut a further 200,000 (FT 9/12/82) . The UK has seen a long-term drift, in the structure of the workforce, from `Industry' to `Services' . The manufacturing collapse since 1979 has accelerated this trend, to the point where `Services' now account for a higher proportion of the workforce than ever . But this broad trend needs to be analysed . Firstly, in the context of a declining overall workforce, a proportional rise in service jobs can mask an absolute decline - and this is the case in transport, communications, retail and distribution. The service jobs which are increasing are those associated with internationally tradable services, invisible exports oriented towards the world market. By 1983, tradable services employed 8 .7m, 42% of the workforce (Gdn 28/7/83) . The area which is currently seeing real growth in employment is the area of financial, business and professional services, and especially the banks (FT 26/4/83) . There is of course a question mark over the long-term security of these jobs : BIFU predicts that 45,000 jobs might be threatened in the next few years as a result of mergers and new technology (FT 1/8/84) . But the immediate trend is clear . To see Britain as a country of mass unemployment is to see less than half the picture . Within the growth sectors in both industry and services, and indeed within large parts of the public service sector, millions of workers retain relatively well-paid jobs, which they perceive to be relatively secure . They are not threatened by the existence of a `reserve army of labour' : there is instead a growing gulf between the profiles of the `typical employed' and `typical unemployed' person, because the `typical employed' person has a work-record, and an accumulation of skills and experience, which an unemployed rival is unlikely to match (Knight 1984 : 79) . Upon the continuing prosperity of these workers rests the profits of the new consumer-oriented growth-sectors in health products, household goods, and the big relatively 'upmarket' retail chains of Marks & Spencer, Great Universal Stores, C &C '25/8--I

129

Capital ES Class

130

and Sainsburys . Upon their prosperity also rests the rise of the pension funds, the expansion of home-wonership, and a whole battery of private services in health, education, insurance, security and so on . What is also crucial about many of these workers, of course, is that the industries and services in which they are employed are integrally related to Britain's imperialist role and status . They are dependent upon foreign capital, coming into Britain because it is a convenient base for penetrating West European markets, or because it has a unique concentration of financial influence and expertise ; they are dependent upon British capital's own orientation towards the world market, and toward capital export ; and they are dependent upon the persistence of British militarism . Nearly 70 years ago, Lenin wrote that `Imperialism has the tendency to create privileged sections even amongst the workers, and to detach them from the main proletatian masses' . He quoted Engels' scornful accusation that' . . . the workers merrily devour . . . the fruits of the British colonial monopoly and of the British monopoly of the world market' ; and Hobson's observations on' . . . the imperialism of the metal and shipbuilding centres' (Lenin, 1968 : 242, 245-6) . Today's labour aristocracy is rather different from that of the early C20th . It is not longer rooted among skilled-and craft-workers in heavy engineering, but rather among workers in the financial sector, in other tradable services, in advanced engineering and electronics, and to an extent in the consumer-oriented activities which depend upon these sectors . There is a large and growing gulf between these privileged workers, and the rest of the working class . Offically, there are about three million unemployed : in reality, there are probably four million or more . However, these bare figures need interpretation . Within the mass of the unemployed, there are two trends at work . Firstly, there is a steady increase in the average duration of unemployment . In 1975, the average was 11 .2 weeks ; in 1979, 17 .7 weeks ; in 1983, 41 weeks . The number of long-term, and very long-term unemployed is rising disproportionately within the overall total (FT 14/8/84) . Secondly, an increasing number of workers face recurring periods of unemployment, alternating with periods in work - work which tends of course to be insecure, part-time or temporary, and often badly paid . Over 25 % of all jobs in the `service sector' (which, as we have seen, covers a multitude of sins) are part-time women's jobs (FT 26/4/83) . This dimension, the dimension of chronic insecurity which characterises more and more workers' lives, tends to be missed in the unemployment figures, which represent crude snapshots . In 1982, for instance, the national unemployment rate was around 12% at any one time . But it was found that 25% of the working population had been

Imperialism and decline

131

unemployed at some time during the year (Gaffikin & Nickson, 1984 :14) . It would be too crude to divide the working-class into the `Employed' and the `Unemployed' . That would be to mistake statistics for reality . But there does seem to be an emerging distinction between a relatively-secure and relatively-prosperous layer of workers in certain growing industrial and service sectors ; and a relatively-insecure, relatively-poor layer, characterised by long-term unemployment or by an unreliable alternation of work and dole . This is the pattern of imperial decay, feeding back into the structure of the British working-class. To summarise the arguments above : the UK in 1985 retains its character as a major imperialist metropolis . It is, furthermore, integrated into the imperialist world system in such a way as to tie it closely to the USA, and to commit it to the maintenance of the system as it has emerged under us hegemony . British capital's overseas orientation, exacerbated by Government policies since 1979, have led to a dramatic decline and restructuring of the industrial base . The new growth industries are largely dependent on the country's imperialist status, either in the form of a continued high level of military expenditure ; or in the form of consumer demand, generated by services to imperialism in general . There may seem, at first sight, to be a contradiction between Britain's industrial decline and its continuing importance as an imperialist centre . But, as was stressed above, the issue becomes clearer if we refer to industrial restructuring rather than to `decline' or `deindustrialisation' . What is happening is that the UK economy, both industry and services, is being progressively reorganised around the imperialist, overseas orientation of British capital . Industrial `decline', and continuing influence, are two sides of the same coin . The oil industry, itself thoroughly penetrated by foreign capital, currently provides a level of cushioning which prevents the full implications of Britain's position from emerging . But once North Sea oil earnings decline, the full scope ofthe gathering crisis will become clear . The UK, already more integrated into the world economy than any other imperialist country will then be dependent upon, and vulnerable to, world market forces to an extreme degree . The ability of any government to pursue autonomous policies will be severely compromised, and the power of the financial institutions to dictate Government policy will be greatly increased, as will the power of foreign, especially US, capital . As socialists, our responses must be grounded in these hard realities . This section is certainly not intended as a comprehensive programme, but merely as a pointer to some of the priorities and

Socialist

responses

Capital C

132

Class possibilities facing the left in the years ahead . The first priority must be to face up to the changing structure of the working-class, and to the problems which this poses for the organised labour movement .

The future ofthe labour movement The effect of mass unemployment on the trade unions is, of course, to reduce their membership, income, and industrial strength. During the early 1980s the membership of TUCaffiliated unions was falling by half a million each year : by the end of 1983 it stood at just over 10 million, compared with over 12 million in the mid-1970s (FT 20/8/84). But as we have seen, the situation is more complex than this . It is a matter not just of falling unions, but of structural change, and of a widening gulf between a relatively-secure and permanently-employed layer of workers, and a chronically-insecure layer whose experience of work is transient and intermittent . How is the trade union movement responding to this situation? The tradition of the movement, for obvious reasons, is to organise full-time workers in relatively large workplaces . But in the conditions of the 1980s this tradition is increasingly inadequate . The trend to small workplaces, in new industries and services, often in new locations, and often with active employer hostility to trade unionism, all make it difficult to recruit and retain members . One response is to campaign actively, advertising the advantages of union membership to workers in the new industries : both ASTMS and EETPU run such `campaigns' in the southern `sunbelt' (FT 15/5/84) . Another approach is to win recognition from employers, in exchange for `sweetheart' or `no strike' deals . These deals are being struck not only on 'greenfield' sites (FT 9/1/84), but also in workplaces where workers were already unionised, so that the `sweetheart' union achieves sole recognition at the expense of the others . The EETPU is notoriously leading the way in such arrangements, and has poached other unions' members at the Hitachi plant in Hirwaun, South Wales . It has also launched a pre-emptive bid for further recognition agreements, by flying its General Secretary Designate out to Japan, to sell the union's `package' to future prospective Japanese investors in Britain - all this with the British Government's endorsement (FT 19/7/84) . Unfortunately, the EETPU is not alone in seeking arrangements of this sort . With less enthusiasm, the AUEW, GMBATU and TGWU are following in its wake (FT 22/5/84) . `Sweetheart' deals may be obnoxious, but they do in a sense represent a `natural' development, a course of least resistance, given the prevailing conditions . If trade unions continue to base themselves on full-time employment; if the balance of industrial

Imperialism and decline power remains basically unfavourable ; and if workers in the new industries tend to see unions as irrelevant or inimical to their own job security ; then union recognition may only be won at a high price, if at all . The long-term implication, however, is that the trade union movement may gradually restructure itself around a very specific layer of the working-class : workers in the growth industries and tradable services associated with the UK's imperialist role, and in the consumer-oriented sectors depend upon these . The movement would be associated with those workers who had the most immediate material interests in upholding existing industrial priorities, financial priorities, and a continuing commitment to the world imperialist system . The trade unions would, at that point, become the organised voice of a new sort of labour aristocracy. . A counterbalancing strategy is required, if the labour movement is to maintain and extend its character as a democratic movement of the whole working-class . We have seen that a growing section of workers has no access to full-time employment, and therefore to trade union membership or experience . This is the world not only of the long-term dole, but also of temporary and part-time work, homeworking and outworking, freelance and franchise, low pay, small employers, the grey economy and the black economy . The millions of workers who inhabit this world include disproportionate numbers of women, blacks and youth . If the labour movement cannot reach these workers and offer practical support, the consequences will be serious . In particular, its failure to reach young workers will allow them to grow up indifferent or hostile to the movement, identifying it with a privileged few . A practical response means a new emphasis on the geographical dimension of trade union organisation, based perhaps on the Trades Councils, and a new preparedness to open up the definition of `trade unionism' from its traditional concern with full-time employment. It means a willingness not only to retain, but to recruit unemployed and casually-employed members ; to campaign actively around unemployment ; to take on board welfare rights alongside traditional concern with employment rights ; to help organise out-of-work services which can make a real difference to workers' lives, such as communal child-minding/creche facilities, social/cultural events, self defence arrangements for women or black workers and so on ; and to help organise educational and training facilities for young workers . The organisational framework for these activities would vary from area to area : in many of the towns and cities where they are most desperately needed, they could be organised jointly with progressive Labourcontrolled Councils . But the overall orientation should be clear . If the labour movement is not to lose touch with the most disadvan-

133

Capital & Class 134

taged, but potentially the most radical section of the working-class, it must move beyond its traditional concerns, and take on the character of a broader `social movement', involved in the many issues which touch working peoples' lives outside the institution of full-time employment. It's a tall order - but the alternative is an increasingly dangerous form of isolation and emerging elitism .

The European option The existence of an independent, representative and democratic labour movement is a necessary condition for keeping open the socialist option, but not a sufficient one . It must never be forgotten that Britain occupies a particular place in the world economy, British capital plays a particular role in the imperialist system, and any strategy for socialism must take this into account . We have seen that UK capital is especially closely tied to the USA ; that it is committed to the maintenance of the US-dominated post-war imperialist system, in the face of challenges from resurgent imperialist centres in Western Europe and Japan ; and that financial capital is especially important in the UK context . This last factor is very important in appreciating the full significance of Britain's imperialist role . Financial capital - which is not to be confused with finance capital - is not an autonomous or selfsufficient faction of capital . It is entirely dependent, parasitic upon industrial or productive capital, and its `profits' represent part of the surplus-value generated in production . This is not to say it is unnecessary: as the most abstract and mobile form of value, money is essential to launch, lubricate and complete the circulation of capital . Some forms of financial institution, of financial and professional services and specialisms, are essential for the functioning of capitalism. But they are not ultimately essential for production itself to continue, they are essential only for the capitalist mode of production . British capital must therefore set itself against socialist advance in any of the countries in which it has a stake - and, perhaps more important in this context, other imperialist countries must set themselves against any socialist advance in Britain, which threatens the financial and other services provided by British capital . The UK matters within the world imperialist system . The domestic economy may be in decline, but the role of British capital is too important for the country to be discarded or written off as a irrelevant backwater . As socialists, we have to face the reality that nothing recognisable as `socialism' can be on the agenda in the UK, in the foreseeable future . The development of a highly complex, interdependent, volatile world economy makes this problematic in any country - but especially so in Britain, deeply-integrated and deeply-dependent as it is on the world market . We have to recog-

Imperialism and decline nise also that the specific orientation of UK capital makes it especially dependent on the USA, and especially resistant to challenges to US dominance of the capitalist world . This is not only because of British investment in the USA itself, but also because of the USA's `policing' role . UK banks, for instance, are more exposed than are US banks in Latin America (FT 31/5/84), and therefore especially interested in the activities of the us-funded and -dominated IMF . The slowly-developing challenge to the USA, from West European and Japanese capital, has already been discussed . The ultimate direction of this trend is not clear : one new global alignment has been suggested, in which the capitalist world is carved up three ways (US-South America, Japan-East Asia, Western Europe-Africa), while an alternative model sees an intermeshing of capitalist and non-capitalist countries (a Paris-Bonn-Moscow axis confronting a Washington-Tokyo-Beijing axis) (Amin, 1982) . What is clear is that a trend exists, and the US-dominated post-war imperialist world order is changing . What should also be clear is that this is a good thing, in that it opens up opportunities for progressive social change at the points of fracture . The success of national liberation movements in past years, in south-east Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America, has been a crucial contributing factor to the breakdown of US hegemony, and as the breakdown proceeds, further opportunities for advance are opened up . We should not labour under the illusion that these represent, in themselves, major socialist breakthroughs . They are significant advances for working people, within the framework of a capitalist world economy, because the possibility of a single country 'breaking out' of that framework does not exist in the 1980s . 5 The task for socialists in any particular locality is to work for those local advances which best contribute to this global process, which contribute to the emergence of socialist options at a global level . In other words, the priority for British socialists is not to set out a `British Strategy for Socialism', but to identify the specific contribution which we can make to the class struggle on a world level. And we should do this in full recognition of the fact that our contribution may not be directly to confront capital itself, but rather to add weight to a shift within the framework of capitalism, which opens up new possibilities . Capitalism is not, after all, a conscious conspiracy, bent on preserving itself by constantly outwitting the opposition . It is a dynamic and resilient, but ultimately blind and chaotic, system ofproduction . It continually throws up options and possibilities which are incompatible with its own logic . Socialists must be able to identify, analyse, and choose between these alternatives . For the UK, there are two possible orientations . The first, the course of least resistance, is for British capital and the British

135

Capital & Class

136

state to continue propping up the US-dominated world order, servicing the world imperialist system in general . The alternative is a definite orientation towards Western Europe . This is still a `capitalist option' of course, but it is significantly preferable - not because West European capital is `more progressivbe' than us capital, but because the West European challenge to US hegemony is contributing to the breakdown of the post-war imperialist system, and this breakdown is in itselfto be welcomed . There are other advantages, however, which might flow from the European option, and which might help us, as British socialists, to tackle our specifically British problems . The power of the UK financial institutions has been discussed at some length . It is difficult to see how a purely national strategy can approach this problem : money-capital, by virtue of its abstract nature, cannot be expropriated in the same way as productive plant . The French Socialist Government found this, even in a country with a long tradition of active State involvement in banking; and even in the weeks before the 1983 General Election, an estimated £100m per week was leaving Britain, as insurance against the unlikely event of a Labour victory (Gdn 26/7/83) . Forcing financial capital to invest in a declining UK domestic economy would be a major task . At West European level, however, things look different . Despite high current levels of unemployment, West Europe as a whole remains a core area in the global process of capital accumulation, from which investing institutions would not wish to be excluded . Strategies for the control of investment at this level, therefore, hold out much better hopes of success . The problems of the UK's `declining regions' are not unique, but are shared with other areas of Europe : for all of them, the solution must lie in joint action rather than competition . What this means above all is joint action by socialist organisations and labour movements . It is obvious in principle that, if capital is increasingly organised at a global level, labour must follow suit or face defeat . In practice, however, the bodies which make up. the `international labour movement' have tended to be structured on ideological Cold War lines, unaccountable to workers, and penetrated by the agents of national governments and security services (Thompson and Larson, 1978) . Nevertheless, there have been more progressive developments recently, many of them based in Western Europe . From the late 1960s and early 1970s, international shop stewards combine committees have been formed at European level, to confront certain MNCs : Dunlop-Pirelli was an early example, with a 'Euro-strike' called in 1972 . Solvay, Michelin, Kodak, Unilever, Ford, Continental Can and ITT have all seen international shop steward committees formed, and recently the Labour

Imperialism and decline

137

has assisted international meetings for workers in Ford, Kodak (GLC, 1984) and Unilever (ILR, July-Aug 1984) . In 1973 the European Trades Union Confederation was formed, initially emerging out of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU, the Western-oriented trade union international, traditionally anti-communist) . Despite its own origins, and despite its continued involvement in the complex and byzantine world of international trade unionism, the ETUC has succeeded in drawing together unions from previously-distinct strands : communist, anti-communist, and Christian . It has also laid the ground for alternatives to the traditional sectoral and industrial trade union structures, many of which were dominated by the fiercely reactionary us trade union centre, the AFL-CIO (Busch, 1981 : 219 ;25) . The picture is certainly patchy, but it is possible that the outlines of a new European trade union internationalism is emerging, capable of meeting and resisting capital at a European level. Finally, there is the vexed question of the EEC . The EEC itself is a secondary, institutional phenomenon : it gives legal and organisational form to a process of capitalist integration which is occurring in any case . We have already seen that West European capital is contributing to the slow breakdown of the US-dominated world imperialist system ; and that a European orientation offers the possibility of a developing working-class internationalism, and of more effective anti-capitalist policies than could be implemented at national level (Holland, 1983) . In this context, the argument over EEC membership appears rather overblown . In current circumstances, membership follows inevitably from the wider strategy, and should be seen as a tactical question rather than a point of principle . Certainly - since the crucial issue is to develop international strategies - it would be absurd to oppose EEC membership for the reasons advanced by some in the Labour Party, with their unhealthy mix of chauvinism, legalism, and bad history . GLC

All options in the late C20th are dangerous . The domestic strategy proposed here runs the risk of overstretching and diluting the labour movement's resources . The international strategy runs the risk of contributing to a new `European nationalism', and sharpening inter-imperialist rivalries with the ultimate possibility of war . For having started with Lenin, and having reached an understanding of the postwar imperialist system which was perhaps closer to Kautsky, we now see that the system is splintering again into a pattern which Lenin would have recognised . It is our responsibility, as socialists in Britain, to analyse this country's place in the emerging pattern, and to formulate and judge our domestic strategies in the light of global trends .

Conclusions



Capital E5 Class

138

Notes

1 See Andreff, 1984 ; Coakley, 1984a; Jenkins, 1984; Lipietz, 1984 ; and Roddick, 1984 . 2 For a discussion on the definition of 'deindustrialisation', see Cairncross, 1978 . 3 This is an important point . Barratt-Brown (Barratt-Brown, 1972 : 54) argues that the rate of return on British overseas investment in the early C20th was not markedly higher than the rate of return on domestic investment . But as Magdoff (Magdoff, 1972) points out, the important thing is not the absolute rate of return, but relative rates of return on marginal or additional investment . 4 For `explanations' along these lines, see Smith & Smith, 1980 . Also, on BBC TV in August 1980, E P Thompson sought to `explain' the Trident missile system as a `virility symbol' for an `ageing and impotent British imperialism' . Not only are examples of `radical self-sufficiency' unattractive - cf. 5 Albania, Kampuchea under the Khmer Rouge, North Korea - but it is highly significant that the largest non-capitalist states are going in the opposite direction, towards increased integration with the capitalist world market. This is true of the USSR and, even more dramatically, of China.

References

Aaronovitch, S . (1981) ThePoliticalEconomy ofBritish Capitalism, (McGraw Hill) . Amin, S . (1982) Dynamics of Global Crisis, (Macmillan) . Andreff, W. (1984) `The international centralization of capital and the re-ordering of world capitalism', in Capital & Class 22, Spring 1984. Barratt-Brown, M . (1972) `Critique of Marxist theories of imperialism', in Owen R . & Sutcliffe, B . (eds.) Studies in the theory of imperialism, (Longman) . Bunkina, M .K. (1976), USA versus Western Europe: New Trends, (Progress, Moscow) . Busch, G .K . (1981) The Political Role of International Trade Unions, Macmillan . Cairncross, A. (1978) `What is deindustrialisation?' in Blackaby F. (ed.), Deindustrialisation, (Heinemann) . Chalmers, M . (1983) The cost ofBritain's defence, (Bradford School of Peace Studies). Coakley, J . (1983) `Banker to the world', in CSE Conference Papers 1983, (CSE) .

Coakley, J . (1984a) `The internationalisation of bank capital', in Capital & Class 23, Summer 1984 . Coakley, J (1984b) `Restructuring the London Stock Exchange' in CSE Conference Papers 1984, (CSE) . CSE London Working Group (1980), TheAlternativeEconomicStrategy, (CSE Books) . Droucopoulous, V . (1981) `The Non-American Challenge: a report on the size and growth of the world's largest firms', in Capital & Class 14, Summer 1981 . Gaffikin F. and Nickson A . (1984) Jobs Crisis and the Multinationals, (Birmingham Trade Union Group for World Development/ Birmingham Trade Union Resource Centre) .

Imperialism and decline Greater London Council (1984) Striking back at the Empires, (film) . Harris, N. (1983) OfBreadand Guns, (Penguin) . Hobsbawm, E j . (1968), Industry and Empire, (Weidenfeld & Nicholson) . Holland, S. (ed) (1983) Out ofcrisis (Spokesman) . Jenkins, R . (1984) `Divisions over the international division of labour', in Capital & Class 22, Spring 1984 . Kautsky, K (1970) 'Ultra-imperialism', in New Left Review 59, Jan-Feb . 1970. Knight, K .G. (1984) `Investment profits and unemployment ; the prospects for capitalist recovery', in Cowling, K. et al., Out of Work: Perspectives on Mass Unemployment, (University of Warwick) . Labour Party Financial Institutions Study Group (1982) The City (Labour Party) . Labour Party (1984) Thatcher's Britain, (Labour Party) . Lane, T . (1982) `The unions : caught on the ebb tide', in Marxism Today, Sept '82. Lenin, VI. (1968) 'Imperialism, the highest stage of capitalism, in Lenin: Selected Works (Progress, Moscow) . Lipietz, A . (1984) `Imperialism or the beast of the apocalypse', in Capital & Class 22, Spring 1984 . Magdoff, H . (1972) `Imperialism without colonies', in Owen, R . & Sutcliffe, B ., (eds) Studies in the Theory ofImperialism, (Longman) . Massey, D . (1983) `The shape of things to come', in Marxism Today, Apr 1983 . Roddick, J . (1984) `Crisis, "seignorage" and the modern world system : rising third world power or declining us hegemony?', in Capital & Class 23, Summer 1984. Smith, R . (1977) `Military expenditure and the economy' in Alternative Work forMilitary Industries, (Richardson Institute) . Smith D . & Smith R. (1980) `British military expenditure in the 1980s', in Thompson E .P . & Smith D . (eds.), Protest and Survive, (Penguin) . Sutcliffe, B . (1983) Hard Times, (Pluto) . Therborn, G. (1984) `Britain left out?' in New Socialist 17, May-June 1984. Thompson, D . & Larson, R . (1978) Where were you Brother?, (War on Want) . Times Books (1965) Times 3001965, (Times Books) Toffler, A . (1975) The eco-spasm report, (Bantam) .

139

AI Rainnie

Small firms, big problems : the political economy of small businesses article in this journal (Rainnie 1984) 1 argued that the uneven development that capitalism exhibits means that it would be mistaken to view its development either as the straightforward result of the working out of tendencies immanent within it or as a process involving the destruction of all seemingly `outdated' forms of production . In particular, I argued, using the clothing industry as an example, that it would be impossible to understand the operation and development of giants, such as Marks and Spencer, unless their relationship with a whole host of utterly dependent small scale suppliers was understood . In other words, small firms should not be viewed as anachronistic survivors of a bygone age, destined for destruction . They have a role to play in the advanced, though crisis ridden economies of the late twentieth century . Bollard (1983) acknowledges that large firms determine the state of play for their small scale counterparts . Furthermore, crisis has forced a period of experimentation in large firms that has helped foster the growth of small firms . It has been argued that `large firms confronted with the problems of increasing demand, innovation risks and control over the labour process are resorting to various strategies of fragIN A PREVIOUS

Al Rainnie's paper is an attempt to understand the role and importance of small businesses in advanced capitalism. Arguing against widely held myths about small businesses, he claims they should not be viewed as 140 anachronistic survivors of a bygone age destined for destruction. He suggests rather they are an integral part of Thatcher's Britain .

Small Firms 141

mentation, decentralisation, detachment or disintegration . These fragmentation strategies simply shift responsibility and employment from large firms and plants to small firms and plants' (Schutt and Whittington, 1984, p . 17) . It will be the aim of this article to develop and generalise some of these points, to locate the role and importance of the small business in Thatcher's Britain . The hope is to go some way towards developing a political economy of small businesses . There is an urgent need for an examination of small businesses for (at least) two reasons . Firstly, small firms within Tory policy have been entrusted with part of the burden of resuscitating the crisis wracked British economy . Not that the Labour Party is immune from the effects of small business hero worship . Neil Kinnock, in the same week that he was distancing himself and the Party from the NUM picket lines, was placating a Small Business Conference . He told these unlikely recruits to the socialist cause that he, like them, was anti-bureaucratic . Whether he and they are anti the same bureaucracy was left unsaid . The rationale behind this move, as one Party research worker put it, was that `taking a greater interest in small businesses is all part of getting back in touch with the people, realizing that they no longer just wear cloth caps, but go to work in small businesses (Financial Times 27 .3 .84) . Thank you Gorz, goodbye miners, hello small businesses! It is true that some left Labour councils have been critical of small businesses and have argued that job creating initiatives should be aimed at medium/large scale firms . However, even these critical analyses have been confused, confusing and often totally contradictory. A classic example of this is the GLC Economic Policy Group's document on small firms (GLC 1983a), which will be examined in some detail towards the end of this article . It is this confusion that provides the second reason for attempting an analysis of the location of small businesses in late twentieth-century Britain . It is worthwhile examining the reality of the small business* in the economy, firstly, because in doing so some of the `banal attitudes and exaggerated claims' (Financial Times 12 .1 .84) that plague the small business bandwagon can be swept away ; secondly, because `there is no doubting that the small man commands the centre of the stage . No longer reviled as a tax dodger or exploiter of cheap labour, small business exemplifies most of the current Government's ideals, whether small shop (thrift, independence) or fast *Note - the definition of small is that adopted by the Bolton Report (1971) unless otherwise stated .

The small firm in the 80's



Capital & Class 142

expanding Thames Valley electronics concern (risk taking, ambitious, profit orientated)' (Financial Times 12 .6.84) . How far image and reality are related, though, is open to doubt . In 1976 the Business Statistics Office identified 1 .3 million small businesses in Britain, constituting 96 per cent of all firms . Furthermore, as can be seen from Table 1, small firms accounted for nearly one third of employment in the private sector, a not inconsiderable proportion . However, it should be noted that of the 1 .3 million small businesses only 100,000 were in manufacturing (Storey, 1982, p . 7), accounting for only slightly over a quarter of the total employment in small firms . It is worth bearing in mind that there were over a million people employed in small retailing establishments in the early'70s (CBI, 1977, p .9) . This was the reality that allowed Ralph Miliband to argue in the early '70s, at the end of one of the largest merger booms that British capitalism had ever witnessed, that there continued to exist a `vast scatter' of small and medium sized enterprises that profoundly affected the social and political landscape of all advanced capitalist countries . He concluded that, though economic trends were running against small firms, `their importance in the life of

Table 1 Numbers Employed in Small Firms (UK, mid 1976)

Total 000's

As % of total employment in private sector

Manufacturing Distribution Trades Construction Agriculture Transport and Utilities 5 . Miscellaneous 6. Professional and Scientific Services 7 . Financial Services

1,549 1,236 732 335

22 39 49 27

28 22 13 6

1,101 373

43 48

20 7

231

20

4

ALL SMALL FIRMS

5,557

32

100

1. 2. 3. 4.

As % of total employment in small firms

Source : Allard 1983,21 Table 2 Manufacturing Employment in Firms Employing less than 200(%)

Year

1958 24 .0

1963 21 .3

Source : Allard, 1983, 21 .

1968

1970

1972

1974

1976

1978

1979

20 .8

21 .3

21 .5

21 .5

22 .6

22 .8

23 .1

Small Firms

these societies remains considerable and ought not, whether from an economic, social or political point of view be obscured by the ever greater importance of the giant corporation' (Miliband, 1973, p .12) . However, Table 2 would seem to suggest that Miliband was wrong when he concluded that economic trends were running against small firms . It was certainly true that the small firms' share of the total employment in manufacturing fell during the '50s and '60s ; however, during the 1970's a small but perceptible rise is evident . It is likely that the trend has continued in the '80s given that business births rose from 157,000 in 1980 to 168,400 in 1983, and deaths had fallen, giving a net surplus of 120,000 over the four years 1980-83 (Financial Times 12 .6 .84) . This is the empirical reality upon which small business mythology, the `banal platitudes and exaggerated claims', has been based . And according to the philosophy, small businesses are supposed to fulfill a variety of functions (despite the heterogeneity of the population) : 1) provide a source of competition to large firms 2) create new jobs 3) provide the seedcorn from which giant corporations will grow 4) provide a harmonious working environment, thus reducing strikes and absenteeism 5) aid in the regeneration of inner cities 6) provide a source of innovation. We will examine the empirical and theoretical background to some of the claims in a later section ; first it is necessary to examine just how small firms have come to find themselves cast as the great hope of the late twentieth century .

The dispute in late 1983 between the National Graphical Association and the Messenger group of newspapers threw into stark relief many of the attitudes, and some prejudices, that now surround small businessmen . Eddie Shah, cast as freedom fighter and hero, was pictured as fighting a lone battle against the might of the NGA . In a slightly hysterical lead article, the Sunday Times commented that : If decent and industrious entrepreneurs such as Mr Eddie Shah cannot survive and prosper in Mrs Thatcher's Britain then there is little hope for the country, and even less for the government. All over the Western world the jobs of tomorrow are being created by the Shahs of today . In the United States, where the information revolution is most advanced, the dole queues are declining because millions of new jobs

143

Economic crisis and the rise of small businesses

Capital & Class 144

are being generated by small firms, usually non-union, grasping the potential of the new information technology . In Britain, unemployment is still stuck over 3 million partly because enterprising spirits who try to do the same are blocked by the job destroying power of certain unions' (Sunday Times 4.12 .83) . Here we have the beginning of the answer to the question, why small businesses . They are the homes of `decent and industrious entrepreneurs' who are `going to create jobs' . This can best be described as an example of the `small furry animal' approach to small business . On the one hand they have to be protected from marauding predators, particularly the trade unions, and on the other hand they are viewed as the small successors to outdated large institutions. Or, as the Guardian argued:As the Industrial Counter-Revolution destroys what is left of the workshop of the world, it may provoke varied responses . . . Social Darwinists, however, may draw solace from the fashionable description of our traditional industries as industrial dinosaurs . They will recall that when the dinosaurs departed, small proved not only beautiful, but better. (Guardian Finance, 10 .10 .81) . In other words, the rise of small businesses is to be located in the relative failure of the British merger/reconstruction movement of the 'S0s and '60s to stand the test of economic crisis . It was in this climate that both industry and bourgeois economists who theorised the diseconomies of scale started to find a more receptive audience . Small business theorists picked up on the same trend . For example, Dewhurst and Burns (1983) developed a neat theory as to why the British economy suffered more than its West European counterparts in the present crisis . The theory was summarised in four points : `1) Small businesses are distinctive in that they require the owner to possess many skills, and that there is a perceived lack of suitable funding arrangements . 2) Notwithstanding this, small firms in the United Kingdom, broadly, still manage to make a materially better financial contribution to the economy than do large firms . 3) The small-business sector in the United Kingdom is smaller than in any other comparable country . 4) The UK economy is in a worse state than that of almost any comparable, Western country' (ibid, p .9). The logic is inescapable . The state and finance institutions have failed small businesses, which have nevertheless battled on bravely in the face of adversity . The failure of the small business sector to develop (through no fault of its own) compared to the UK's competitors, is the prime cause of Britain's relatively more

Small Firms

severe experience of recession . The prescription is obvious : protect and encourage the small furry animals. However, this explanation is not enough in itself. It does not really account for why small businesses should be the focus of attention. The next clue lies in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries . Peter Mathias (1969) has described the industrial entrepreneur of the late eighteenth century as `the shock troops of economic change' (ibid, p .13), and their late twentieth century counterparts are supposed to fulfill the self-same role . Once again the roots of this school of thought can be traced to the economic and political convulsions that the collapse of the post-war book engendered . Hyman (1979) has analysed the'material context' of the collapse of pluralistic industrialism, the postwar consensus on tripartism, the ideology that gave birth to such constructs as `the affluent society', `the end of ideology' and so on . The long post-war boom allowed theory to assume `the timelessness of the conditions which were specific' (ibid, p .4) . Crisis changed all that, and Hyman traces the resurgence of interest in Marxism as a response to that crisis . However, there was an equally important school of thought gaining ground - that of the New Right. Hayek, Milton Friedman and the Chicago School, being perhaps the best known, advocating a return to a nineteenthcentury laissez faire philosophy, tailored to the needs of the late twentieth century. Margaret Thatcher has talked of her Victorian Values, values that echo those now attributed to small businesses : `We were taught to work jolly hard . We were taught to prove yourself; we were taught self-reliance ; we were taught to live within our income' (quoted in Samuel, 1983) . This Smilesian image of self help has little to do with Victorian reality . Samuel (1983) has commented that `men grew rich in the nineteenth century not by self help but by hustling' (ibid, p.iii). This, however, is not the point ; it is the image of Victorian Values, not the reality, that counts, which brings us right back to the `shock troops of economic change' theory . In this light Nigel Harris (1983) is correct when he argues that the increased interest in small businesses is a fashion, `a periodic one promoted - like a return to Christianity - by the anxieties of troubled times, prompting people to reach back for earlier verities, when capitalism was recognisably capitalist and the "individual" had a will and a way' (ibid, p .140) . But there is more to small businesses revivalism than simply reactionary daydreams of bygone halcyon days . The dream is getting backing from state, finance and industrial sources . The pamphlet Small Business, Big Future summed up the Conservative approach :It has rarely been as difficult to start or expand a business or to hand it on to one's children as a going concern . For many, C&C 25/9P--J

145



Capital & Class

146

the pressure of bureaucracy and the growth of controls have made their once prized independence a burden too heavy to be worth carrying on for much longer . . . Hope is being strangled and as a result those indispensable qualities of imagination, enterprise and drive are being stifled, . . . The aim must be to change the atmosphere and environment for the business community, to create new conditions in which men and women of independent spirit will see it as worth their while to use their skill and enthusiasm to start or expand profitable enterprise . (Conservative Central Office, n.d p . 3) . The move toward positive discrimination in favour of small businesses (relaxing or abolishing labour legislation, changing laws on insolvency, providing finance, etc .) has more to it than simply a belief in the necessity of a return to the crisis-solving individual drive of entrepreneurs . Scase and Goffee (1980) have argued that `this same entrepreneurship would contribute to a culture emphasising self-reliance and personal responsibility such that governments could increasingly withdraw from economic management and the provision of a wide range of personal, social and welfare services . For many then the example set by entrepreneurs offers a solution to the institutional, attitudinal and cultural ills of presentday Western societies . Thus, it is necessary to return to the core values of Western capitalism, represented as they are by these people' (Scase and Goffee, 1980, p .11) . Members of the Conservative Party are also well aware that small business could play a role far more important than simply job creation and economic resuscitation . Edward Du Cann commented at the 1975 Tory Party Conference that small businesses are `seedcorn of our future prosperity, lively, ingenious, selfreliant, the anti-Marxist barrier, Conservatism in practice and the true picture of free enterprise, honourable, patriotic and acceptable' (quoted in Jones, 1980, p .130) . Here we are getting closer to the ideological baggage that the small business bandwagon carries with it . There are, however, a number of questions that arise at this point. Firstly, just what are the `institutional, attitudinal and cultural ills' that small businesses are supposed to cure? Secondly, what is it about small businesses in particular that they can be cast as a miracle cure-all.

Small businesses and the myth of job creation

We have already alluded, briefly, to the heterogeneity of the small firm sector ; it runs from the corner shop, through the sweat shop, to the new high technology companies of the M4 corridor and `Silicon Glen' . And yet, taking the mythology at face value, simply

Small Firms their smallness gives all these various forms of the firm unique and exceptional characteristics . However, as with a lot of mythology, although based loosely on reality, the degree of connectedness can be very slim indeed . Reality is usually hammered into shape to fit the myth, and so it is with the small businesses . Thus the image of the small business is the dynamic new thrusting company, probably at the forefront of the technology frontier . The reality is somewhat different . Howell has argued from a position close to the Thatcher clan that `there may now be better opportunities for small enterprises in the tax and financial systems . But for many small businesses the reality is grim' (Howell, 1984, p .6) . Nor should it be assumed that all the small firms facing this grim reality are real, or even potential, job creators, for, as the Financial Times has commented, `for every small firm that is innovative and adaptable to change there is another stuck in its ways, poorly managed and unresponsive to new ideas' (Financial Times 12.1 .84) . However, even if we take a rather misty-eyed view through rose-tinted spectacles of the employment prospects of new small firms in favourable areas and industries, there are problems . Storey (1984) has argued that there still exists a gap between the wild and unsubstantiated claims by leading British politicians about the small firm sector and the results of research on that sector. For example, he demands that the following statement made by Gould and Keeble (1984) should be drawn to the attention of every politician tempted to extol the merits of small businesses in creating employment : If this is all (8,500 jobs in a decade) that can be achieved in a region (East Anglia) with one of the highest rates of manufacturing firm formation in Britain, national level new firm policies seem likely to be of only strictly limited significance, at least for the medium term, for industrial restructuring and job creation. (quoted in Storey, 1984, p .187) . Furthermore, even if we restrict our view to the `high tech' messiahs, the prospects don't get much better . Gould and Keeble go on to note that even in the highly successful Cambridge region in the 1971 to 1981 period, high tech manufacturing firms created only about 800 jobs . The Financial Times concluded, rather gloomily, that `it will be years before Britain's new high technology firms replace the jobs lost from older, larger companies . The jobs created by Britain's fastest growing computer manufacturers, Sinclair Research, Systime, ACT, Acorn, Panorama and Torch are dwarfed by about 10,000 redundancies at ICL (Britain's biggest computer company) in the past three years (Financial Times 23 .6 .84) . So small firms may not be the answer to Britain's unemploy-

147

Capital & Class 148

ment, but there is far more to the small business bandwagon than simply job creation . The major part of the small business myth is derived (and distorted) from Schumacher's (1974) catchphrase `small is beautiful' . Widely accepted, largely unresearched but now extremely powerful, this new `conventional wisdom' has important practical implications for the nature of work emanating from small business revivalism

Constructing a modern myth

According to the Conservative Party `working relationships are easier and happier in small companies . Many of the problems that arise in large enterprises are unknown in firms where the owner manager is known to all his employees' (Conservative Central Office, op cit, 4) . But it is not just the Tory Party that espouses the belief that ease of communications and close personal relationships, supposedly generated by small firms, lead to `harmony' . The Guardian's small business page, mostly concerned with the setup and survival of firms, rather than the nature of work in these firms, has argued that `repeatedly owner managers stressed how dependent they were upon the "trust" of their employees, in the sense of doing a "fair day's work for a fair day's pay" . In the absence of managerial and supervisory systems, employees are largely left to get on with the jobs! . . . Small businesses, then, are usually organised on the basis of flexible personal relationships. This often makes them attractive as places of employment' (Guardian 19 .4 .80) . The idea that small is beautiful, that somehow small firms can overcome the inherent antagonism between capital and labour, has sunk deep into the consciousness of academics, government and media . Indeed, the Royal Family, in the shape of Prince Charles, has seen fit to put its weight behind the theory and in doing so the heir to the throne provided another reason why small businesses are so popular in certain quarters . Prefacing his comments with the statement that `rather like Dr Schumacher I think that smallness is considerably more beautiful than bigness', the Prince concluded that: Trade Unions arose in the first place - quite rightly through combinations of people because managements didn't show enough concern . Then it was a case of exploiting the labour. But if you don't exploit people, if you bring them in and make them feel part of things, there is less need for the extra layer of trade union organisation within an institution to reflect the workforce's views, because you're working with them . This is another argument for doing things on a small scale (Sunday Times 22 .11 .81) . Presumably it is now treason to disagree with the `harmony'

Small Firms

149

mythology ; however, the practical consequences of this view are important . In promoting small businesses the small is beautiful myth ensures that the promoters do not have to worry about the nature of the work created. Everything, after all, is sweetness and light within the firms' four walls However, the material base for the resurgence of interest is highly political and is partly, as the Prince of Wales intimated, motivated by the desire to do away with the power of trade unionism. As Scase and Goffee have pointed out : `in a nutshell, it (the government's) small business strategy offers a solution to one of the major problems confronting industry as diagnosed by employers, managers and politicians : that is the management of labour' (Scase and Goffee, 1980, p .16) . The `informal' system of industrial relations abhorred by the Donovan Commission in the late '60s provoked a number of responses . Workplace trade union organisation, weakened by mass unemployment, has been under attack from both state and management ever since . The move towards small businesses fits neatly into this scenario . As can be seen from Table 3, trade union recognition is far higher in large establishments than it is in small . Table 4 shows

Table 3 Proportion ofEstablishments that recognised (percentages)

manual unions

(Private Sector only) Number of manual workers employed 50-99 100-199 200+ 1-24 25-49

Total 50 31 58

All Establishments Independent Establishments Establishments that were part of a group

in relation to independence

25 16 28

43 24 55

63 50 68

78 66 81

91 67 92

Source : W Daniel and W Millward `Workplace Industrial Relations in Britain' Heinemann 1983 p .25

Table 4 Establishments experiencing any type of industrial action - by number of manual workers

Size age experiencing any form of industrial action Source: ibid . p . 12

1-9 2

10-24 25-49 50-99 100-199 200-499 500-999 8

13

27

33

50

74

1000+ 77

Capital C5 Class 150

that strike activity tends to decrease as establishments get smaller, a finding in line with the tendency for unionisation to decrease in line with size . The importance of these figures is that they are used to provide an empirical background to the small is beautiful hypothesis . Small businesses have low levels of trade unionism and industrial action, and this can only be because small is beautiful . Margaret Thatcher, on a recent visit to the north east of England, provided the link between harmonious and flexible working relationships, small businesses and traditional trade union strength . Some of the workers in the small firm Thatcher visited had been made redundant by a large firm making exactly the same products . Thatcher firstly asked `how did the small firm seize the opportunities which the large firm missed?' She answered her own question by arguing that the small succeeds `by taking decisions quickly, by keeping overheads low and by abandoning restrictive practices . There is no room for demarcation disputes in the small firm' (Newcastle Evening Chronicle 8 .2 .84) . Thatcher went on to argue that `them and us' did not exist in a small firm and that everyone within it would pull together as a team . The small business, `blessed' with the absence of the workplace trade union organisation, deemed to be one of the major sources of British uncompetitiveness on an international scale, can seize the moment and prosper as a consequence . What is now necessary is to locate the role of the small firm in capitalism in crisis and, therefore, to examine just what part, beyond simply getting rid of powerful shop stewards' organisations, that smallness has to play in restructuring .

Crisis, restructuring and the small firm

The ideology of decentralisation (centrally controlled decentralisation), coupled with increase of aid to small businesses, is not a purely British phenomenon . The Japanese dual economy is perhaps the best known example, but different countries faced with similar problems have come up with similar remedies . Yugoslavia is currently promoting small business in an attempt to soak up unemployment and, faced with declining industrial production, believes that the small firm could produce exportable goods and substitute for imports. Furthermore, the Yugoslav Government recognises `large volume production requires a broad spectrum of complementary production which could be organised in small and medium sized manufacturing units' (Financial Times 7 .9 .83) . The Italian experience is, in some respects, similar and has been picked up in the United States . Mattera (1980) has cited both Business Week's and the New York Times' enthusiasm for the role of the small business in the Italian economy . Business Week went as far

Small Firms

as to argue that `small industrial entrepreneurs and their hardworking labour force are the engines that drive the country's troubled economy' (ibid, p .67) . Furthermore, Mattera goes on to locate the move to decentralization in the `hot autumn' of 1969) . He argues that :It is no surprise that at the heart of Italian capital's restructuring there should be the aim of increasing the hours of work. For it was precisely the struggle for reductions in hours - as well as other aspects of what was known as the refusal of work - that generated the crises of Italian industry, especially after the `hot autumn' of 1969 . The process of decentralisation must be seen primarily as a direct political response by capital to the success of that struggle . By dispersing workers from the large factories where the struggle had taken place to situations in which the gains were in effect nullified, business had hoped to slash labour costs, stabilize class relations, and achieve a much greater flexibility in production, especially in industries vulnerable to international competition . (ibid, p .71) . Murray (1983) argues that decentralisation can take different forms, putting out or the splitting up of production between factories of the same firm being just two variations on a similar theme . He does, however, go further than Mattera in analysing the reasons for these trends . Whilst agreeing that labour militancy was the initial impetus, he argues that increased competition in world markets and the slump of 1974 provided the impetus behind a second and equally important drive to decentralisation . Decentralisation was then grasped on initially as a short term strategy aimed at evading the labour movement's advances, in that it attempted to compensate high labour costs and low flexibility in the large and medium factories by directly creating or putting work out to small production units, artisans and domestic workers, where the influence of the unions was minimal . . . it has been used in conjunction with automation to begin to dismember the large factory proletariat through the increasing division and dispersion of production into small plants and into the sweatshop where accumulation is unrestrained by organised labour . (ibid, p .92-3) . Poulantzas (1975) extends the argument, claiming that small firms in the modern economy can fulfill a number of functions . They operate in low profit/high risk sectors, thus acting as service agents for large corporations . They can function, as Murray argues, as part of the process of subjecting labour power to monopoly capital. In general this calls into question the supposed independence of the small business owner . Scase and Goffee

151

Capital C5 Class 152

(1982) quote Bechhofer and Elliott (1981) as arguing that `small capital is menaced from above and below . . . in all circumstances it is a dependent stratum, dependent first and foremost on the dominant groups and institutions . It is their decisions, their interests that do most to affect the size and circumstances of the stratum' . And Birley agrees, arguing that `there are very few independent small industrial firms : independent in the sense of being able to determine their own destiny' (Birley, 1980, p .23) . However, these are only partial explanations . The most consistent analysis of the role of the small business in restructuring has been presented by Schutt and Whittington (1984) . They argue that small businesses can fit (roughly) under one of three classifications (a) dependent - complementary and servicing the activities of large firms . (b) independent (i) - competing with large firms often on the basis of intense exploitation of labour on antiquated equipment . (c) - independent (ii) - operating in niches that consist of small local/specialised markets ignored by large firms . Atkinson (1984a, p .6) has argued that `in order to reduce the more damaging adjustment mechanisms necessitated by recession, UK employers are beginning to implement manpower strategies which are predicated on the achievement of flexibility both in the level of employment and the deployment of the workforce' (Atkinson, 1984b, p .l) . Schutt and Whittington concur, believing that large firms are responding to crisis-induced increases in demand and innovation risk, as well as to contest over the control of the labour process by resorting to fragmentation . This takes one of three forms : decentralisation, detachment and disintegration (Schutt and Whittington, 1984, pp . 14-16) . 1) decentralisation of production : large plants are broken up, but retained under the same ownership, by hiving off into smaller plants or by creating new subsidiary companies . 2) detachment : large firms cease directly to own units but retain revenue links with them, i .e., licensing or franchising (see Curran and Stanworth 1984) . 3) disintegration of production and innovation . Large firms cease to own units of production and innovation, but retain control through market power . . . or latently through the power to repurchase the units. This form includes the current trend toward management/worker buyouts (Upton 1984) . Schutt and Whittington emphasise that these are only elements within a process of experimentation and which (if any) will predominate is, as yet, unclear. However, one conclusion that can be drawn is that, to some extent, small businesses are not a source of new employment, but constitute a transfer of employment from

Small Firms

153

large to small firms, and the characteristics of those firms and jobs with them being important in determining that shift .

Capital has been able, periodically, to bypass the tendency of the rate of profit to fall by the bankruptcy of individual capitals . Or, as Marx put it, `crises are always but momentary and forcible solutions of the existing contradictions . They are violent eruptions which for a time restore the disturbed equilibrium' (Marx, 1976, p.244). Harman explains part of the mechanism whereby this system operates : The crisis means that chunks of capital lose their value machines rust, goods are unsold or only sold at greatly reduced prices, large amounts of credit have to be written off. If this process were distributed evenly over all the capitals, it is difficult to see how they would ever recover from the crisis . But, in fact, because some capitals go out of business, those that remain are able to avoid having to pay for the devalued capital . Not only do they succeed in passing the costs of the crisis onto the other deceased capitals, they also often succeed in enhancing the value of their own capital by buying up the means and materials of production on the cheap (ie at less than their current value in terms of labour time) (Harman, 1981, p .44) . Mass unemployment has also, in crisis, played a part in the process of resuscitation, reducing the power and thus the price of the labour . The destruction of value in crisis includes a destruction of some of the total surplus value, the outcome being, as a byproduct, a reduction in the upward pressure on the organic composition of capital. `Under such circumstances a quite modest rise in the rate of exploitation may be sufficient to offset the downward tendency of the rate of profit' (ibid p .46) - such a modest rise in the rate of exploitation being possible due to the weakness of the labour movement . The death of individual capitals was of central importance in revivifying capitalism in crisis . However, capitalism is not a static system and from its inception crisis has also played a role in forcing two more tendencies inherent in capitalism : firstly that towards increasing concentration of capital, and secondly towards the increasing centralization of capital . These two tendencies have important effects on the ability of crisis to play its classical role in the conditions of the 1980s . Harman argues `while there were a large number of relatively small firms, some could go bust without damaging others . But with few very large firms, the destruction of any of them can do immense damage to the operations' (ibid p .47) . Small firms could, however, play a role in alleviating this tendency .

Small firms and the nature of work

Capital E5 Class

154

The first important point to be recognised is that the climate within which small firms are being fostered is very different from the one in which they were supposedly `shock troops' of the industrial revolution . Not only is the British economy now an integral part of a world economy dominated by giant capitals, but those very capitals are playing an active part in generating the small business revival . Shell UK, for example, had argued that they `believe that the best business environment for big companies includes a thriving small business sector' (Sunday Times 12 .11 .78) . Part of the reason for this can be gleaned from a comment made by the Chairman of ICI in 1979 and takes us back to the question of union power and the value of labour :When somebody says la, people tend to think of a chemical plant run by half-a-dozen people . But it is equally true to think of rows and rows of little girls in Macclesfield packing pharmaceutical products, or in Ardeseir boxing up ammunition . (CDPPEC, 1979, p .14) . In other words, what the links between small and large firms can do, and what decentralisation is partially aimed at doing, is, as Murray argues, to draw `attention to the fact that an abundant, potentially cheap and well disciplined labour force is also available within some advanced capitalist countries . In addition, decentralisation reveals how capital gained access to that labour, while at the same time attempting to run down the large factory proletariat in an effort to restore the competitiveness of mature technology commodities in European markets' (Murray, 1983, p .19) . John Atkinson (1984a), from the Institute of Manpower Studies, has argued that the search is now on for labour flexibility . This flexibility is to take three forms : numerical, financial and functional . Numerical, so headcount can be increased or decreased quickly and easily . Functional, so that workers can be shifted between activities. Financial, so that pay should more adequately reflect supply and demand . Atkinson continues, arguing that `the most common form of this reorganisation involves the break-up of the labour force into increasingly peripheral, and therefore numerically flexible, groups of workers, clustered about a numerically stable core group which will conduct the organisation's key, firm specific activities . . . . Where jobs are not all firm specific . . . firms are increasingly likely to resource them outside, through the use of sub-contracting, self-employed jobbers, temporary agencies etc . This not only permits great numerical flexibility (the firm reading precisely how much of a particular service it may need at any time), but it also encourages greater functional flexibility than direct employment (as a result of the greater commitment of the self-employed to getting the job done, the greater specialisation of sub-contractors,

Small Firms

or the relative powerlessness of the worker in this context, according to your taste)' (Atkinson, 1984a) . It is, therefore, no surprise to discover women, unskilled and young workers are disproportionately over-represented in small firms . Wage levels tend to be lower in the small firm, for an equivalent job compared to large firms (Bolton, 1971) . The Low Pay Unit looking at the characteristics of low paying industries argued that they are normally dominated by small firms. The report concluded that `because firms are small and facing fierce competition, having little or no control over what happens in the market for their goods, employers are poorly organised . Most firms are too small to be able to make decisions about their long term investment and employment . . . Similarly, trade unions find it difficult to gain a foothold because of the scattered nature of the workplaces and the frequent hostility of small firm employers to "outside interference" (Low Pay Review 16 .12 .83) . The outcome is that low paying Wages Council sectors are dominated by small firms (Duncan, 1981) . Hardly the image of small firms that the Thatcher revolution is trying to foster, but one that has a number of advantages for large firms . Firstly the effect on wage levels, if part of production can be sub-contracted out to this small-scale sector . There is the obvious effect in that wage levels tend to be lower in small firms and the weakness of trade unionism, reflected in the institutionalisation of low pay under the Wages Council system, does little to challenge this . There is another effect, that is `by indirectly tapping through its small firm partners the supply of cheap labour in the inner city, the big corporations can effectively undermine wage rates negotiated internally with its own unions' (CDPPEC, 1979, p.14) . The state is taking a direct hand in the process of driving down wage levels, even within the already low paid small firm sector through three mechanisms . Firstly, the proposed abolition of Wages Councils would drive down wage levels even further (although a high proportion of underpaying of Wages Council minima exists already) . Secondly, through the Young Workers Scheme, which, in effect, tells employers that the less they are willing to pay a young worker, the bigger will be the subsidy the state will award them . The effects of the scheme have been felt differently in large and small firms . In large firms (employing over 501 people) Allum and Quigley (1983) argue that over 90 per cent of the places created were `dead weight'- that is subsidising jobs that would have existed anyway . Whilst in firms employing between 1 and 10 people 56 per cent of places had a net incremental effect - that is young workers' jobs actually created . But that is desperately low paid jobs created within an already low paying

155

Capital & Class 156

sector. Thirdly through privatisation which paves the way for competitive tendering from small firms, casting them in the role of the vultures hovering around the carcase of organised labour . There is, however, far more to the relationship between small and large firms than simply yet one more prong in the multi-forked attack on the cost of labour in general and trade unionism in particular . A case in point are the new tech companies . Not low paid as the majority of their counterparts and far closer, at least superficially, to the image of the new firm, they exhibit another way in which death has been rediscovered . Even the high tech sector has not been able to escape the realities of living in a world dominated by giant corporations . Clive Sinclair, for example, utilises the services of Timex in Dundee to construct his computers . But on a wider level the first rush of enthusiasm is dying down and the big battalions are taking over . The Sunday Times has reported `Silicon Valley is beginning to resemble Death Valley . The death as yet might not be too numerous . . . . But the list of walking wounded is growing longer' (Sunday Times) . And the reason, according to the managing director of Acorn Computers, is that `price cutting is going to wipe out a lot of the smaller suppliers' (Financial Times 12 .9.83) . Acorn have survived because they were chosen by the Government as approved manufacturers of computers for classroom use . Survival is dependent on links with the derided giant institutions, and in more ways than one . The sleeping giant of IBM has woken up to the potential of micro computers and is stamping its mark on the market . Computer Weekly has commented that "'enough is enough" seems to be the message from IBM to the world's micro-makers . The 20 per cent price cut on its PC announced in the UK last week is further evidence that IBM is getting tough with small fry . . . the aim of the men from Armonk is to initiate a price war against the ever growing number of IBM-like micros on the market . There can be only one winner of such a contest now that the IBM machinery is well and truly rolling' (Computer Weekly, 8.3 .84) . In other words IBM allowed the new high tech companies to go through the painful (and often deadly) process of researching and developing personal computers, then simply muscled in . The new price war has forced small suppliers to run to the giants for survival . IBM has broken with tradition and published detailed specifications of new machines, effectively trying to establish these specifications as de facto standards for the industry . The outcome being, according to the Financial Times, that `at least a dozen us companies have sprung up to cash in on the shortage by making compatible machines which can use IBM software . . . smaller American manufacturers which do not meet the IBM standard are rushing to conform' (ibid) .

Small Firms In other words IBM has been able to achieve a high profile in the market by taking advantage of the existence of and vulnerability of the small scale, new, high tech firms . Other sectors have responded in a similar way ; for example, the opening up of British Telecom monopoly to privatisation and competition forced it to consider manufacturing electronic equipment. However, it was not keen to shoulder the extra costs and management responsibility . There was another alternative . BT seems certain to remain the dominant distribution channel for subscriber equipment and services for many years to come . Senior managers claim that its enormous buying power will enable it to foster the development by British companies of new products and services which can be sold internationally . They argue that it can play a similar role to Marks and Spencer, the British retailing chain which has established close links with a wide range of UK manufacturers . (Financial Times 27 .9 .83) . The Marks and Spencer comparison holds the key to the question (Rainnie 1984) . Briefly, the advantages to companies like Marks and Spencer of formally independent, but in reality utterly dependent small suppliers, are enormous and can be summed up as cheap flexibility, crucial at a time of increased competition . The existence of the individual small firm is not important, the continued existence of a number of them is vital . For example, the effects of Marks and Spencer's disastrous 'up-market' move to higher quality, higher priced goods in the late 70's was borne partly by their suppliers . Marks and Spencer slashed £11 million off their prices in their first unscheduled sale for 20 years, accompanying this with a promise to keep price rises for the following year down to 5 per cent, despite an expected 12 per cent increase in general clothing prices . The effect of this was a `thinning' of their suppliers' ranks, and even where orders were retained, margins came under pressure due to Marks and Spencer's demanding that their suppliers bear half the burden of the price cuts . The small firm can only survive by gaining long predictable runs from the retailers, but this locks the small firm into what has been described as `the Western world's most tightly controlled factory-to-shop system' (Sunday Times 19.6.83) . The advantages of the system are manifold to the central large firm concentrating on `core' activities : the costs of a change in policy, in terms of closure, reundancy etc . are not borne by the large firm. Small firms are notoriously unstable in the first few years of their existence anyway . One third of start-up small businesses fail within the first three years of their lives (Financial Times 4 .10.83) .

157

Capital E5 Class

158

In the cases outlined, life is guaranteed by losing independence and being absorbed into the survival patterns of the large institutions berated in small business mythology. But the competition between the small suppliers makes even this existence tenuous, as the Marks and Spencer example illustrates . The trend towards demerger, management buy-out, small firm revivalism, worker co-operative formation, should firstly not be overstressed and secondly, not be counterposed to increased concentration. The trend is simply one of a number of experiments attempted in the search of a cure for crisis . However, although not all firms are concerned with demerger, the Institute of Manpower Studies has argued that this move constitutes `less a new orthodoxy than a pragmatic and opportunistic shift towards these more flexible forms of manning, but one being made by many thousands of employers' (Atkinson 1984a) . (My emphasis) And the reasons outlined as to why this process is taking place, the process of decentralisation, detachment and disintegration of large firms as well as `straightforward' small business revivalism, should have given the left pause for thought . Unfortunately, the Labour Party at a national level have contented themselves, in Parliamentary debates, with accusing the Tories of not doing enough for small firms. The response at local council level, although not quite so straightforward, has been equally unsatisfactory .

Labour councils and the smallfirm In general, most councils, Labour included, have opened up their arms and welcomed small business . For example, Newcastle Council's policy was outlined in a document (Newcastle Council 1981) called `Newcastle - Small Firms Profit from our Experience'. In this inspiring piece, the Chairman of the Council's Economic Development Committee announced that : `Everyone with a small business has ideas for expanding and improving it . However much their enthusiasm, it can often be difficult to obtain finance, get advice and find premises . Starting a new firm from scratch is likely to be even more full of problems . The City Council want to help small firms, particularly in these `problem' areas . Because we think that it is important, we have been working and creating the right sort of environment in which small business can prosper, even in these difficult times' (ibid p. 1) . The document then goes on to list the kinds of finance and property available . There are a couple of uplifting success stories to inspire the new entrepreneur, and that's just about it . From a Labour council, not a whiff of caution, never mind criticism . In many ways this is unsurprising. Labour councils in the `depressed areas' have been clutching onto any straw in a desperate attempt to

Small Firms cope with what is variously described as the `regional problem' and more particularly `inner city crisis' (Cochrane 1983) . In other words, they have been searching for immediate palliatives to what is a long-term problem, namely the restructuring of capital on a national and international scale, one symptom of this being the flight of capital from inner cities . Labour councils are once again blindly trying to deal with the problems created by capital, rather than dealing with capital itself (Hudson, 1984) . The `inner city problem' then becomes isolated from the factors that cause it . Thus small business becomes `almost seen as social policy' (CDPPEC, 1979, p .42) in that it is promoted to soak up the unacceptable employment levels in the problem areas, with no questioning of the nature of the jobs created . Furthermore, as Schutt (1984) has pointed out in relation to the operation of enterprise zones, the rates relief element, so important in small firm subsidy, has eased the way for a wider acceptance of the notion that rates for all industry are in general too high . Schutt concludes that the rate relief element in enterprise zones :has established the legitimacy of attacking the right of the local authorities to raise local finance, and created the conditions by which the Thatcher administration can force through its rate capping legislation . (Schutt, 1984, p .32) . It is hard not to conclude that the scramble to subsidise the birth and survival of small firms has had exactly the same effect . In other words, Labour councils are effectively helping to cut their own throats . The GLC and smallfirms There are exceptions to the rule ; not all Labour councils are joining the legions of lemmings . The GLC in an Economic Policy Group Document (GLC 1983a) distanced itself from the small business fan club . The document argued that : Given the Council's general objective of restructuring the London economy in the interests and not at the expense of labour, it will be clear that the Council will wish to have no part in promoting the small business lobby' (GLC, 1983a, p .16) . The reasons given for this stance were clear and unequivocal. Confronting the claims made for small business, particularly by the Bolton Report (1971), the strategy suggested that : Small firms have contributed a minor share to new gross employment. Their employment impact is confined to a few sectors . Their contribution to be re-investable surplus is less than large firms . Not surprisingly, therefore, small firms exhibited lower growth rates in the 1970s than large ones . . .

159



Capital & Class They have high death rates and growth that does take place in new and small establishments is much less than expansion within existing small firms . . . Even if we include expansion, firms with between 11 and 20 workers contributed only 6 per cent of total new employment in that period, as against 30 per cent by plants with more than 500 workers . This is a measure of the insignificance of small firms (ibid p.12) (My emphasis, A .R .) The report went on to note that, not only were the claims regarding small firms dubious, but also that the interests of small firms were antithetical to those of labour . Trade unionism hardly existed, claims for unfair dismissal were concentrated in small firms, wages were low . Small firms, the report concluded, `in short are a way of dividing up labour' (ibid, p .13) . In many ways the report produces a detailed, well argued, analytical case for providing no support whatsoever for small firms . Indeed the conclusions go so far as to acknowledge the ideological importance to the Right of the small business bandwagon . . . . in all the small firm promotions, particularly as part of a more general monetarist policy, there is a strong ideological element (small scale enterprise as a solution to unemployment and British economic decline), a conviction that labour is weaker in small firms than in large, and a concern to strengthen a class of small proprietors for social and political and not just economic reasons . In short, the small business strategy must be seen as much in political as in economic terms . It is a class strategy designed to weaken organised labour in large enterprises and to strengthen a petit bourgeoisie which had been in long term decline (ibid p .15-16) . Clear, concise and to the point, and yet, the last two pages of the report contain a minor bombshell, one that undermines the good work of the previous eighteen pages . There are apparently to be three areas of partial exemption to the policy of not supporting small businesses .

160

When is a small business not a small business?

Firstly, apparently, when it is an ethnic minority enterprise. The report ties itself up in little semantic knots over this one . It is argued that the Council wants nothing to do with establishing black capitalism a la Scarman. However, it also argues that, although `the Council's industrial interventions in medium size firms have had a major impact on ethnic minority employment, already much larger than a small firm policy could create' (ibid p .19), particularly as far as the Asian community is concerned,

Small Firms

`support of small scale initiatives is difficult to withhold until wider opportunities can be created' (ibid p .19) . However, this is not as straightforward as it seems . Wilson and Stanworth (1984) have argued that for Afro-Caribbean groups, lack of opportunity in labour markets does not tend to push these groups into self employment. Furthermore, they argue that for those groups who do tend to move into business :mere presence in business does not indicate success in business - ownership of small, undercapitalised, badly located, low order retailing and services activities may indicate a'second-class' self employment status no better than being employed on low wages (ibid, p .3) . This is not, given their previous critique of small business, what the GLC is aiming for . In this case quite what the difference is between black capitalism and ethnic minority enterprise is not at all clear, but one apparently is to be supported, whilst the other is not . Experience of the clothing industry will attest that the ethnic minority enterprise in this area, for example, exhibits all the worst traits that the GLC's report attributed to small business . And yet such establishments are to be supported? This leads us onto the second area where small firms suddenly become acceptable, and that is in sectors where smallfirms play a major part .

These turn out to be clothing, printing and the software sectors, for example. This just seems to be a case of `pragmatic' acceptance of what is, rather than a position based on any form of analysis, least of all an analysis of small firms in these sectors . The report acknowledges that there are about 50,000 or so people employed in computer software in London, approximately half of whom are employed in small firms . Anyone concerned with resurrecting employment in central London from its present dire situation is not going to throw out one of the newest, most flourishing arrivals . The GLC won't challenge this sector, despite the fact that Labour Research concluded that : The new companies in the micro and software areas are almost totally unorganised and unions have faced fierce resistance to recruiting membership often from hardened managements . Where there has been unionisation, in companies like Inmos, it has often been on terms very different from traditional practices, with controversial no-strike clauses and the acceptance of non-union representatives involved in bargaining procedure (Labour Research, Vol 72, No 11, p .297) . The same pragmatism rules in the case of the printing industry. There are 118,000 print workers in London, and it was one of the industries, in employment terms, least affected by the C&C 25/S - .b:

161

Capital F5 Class

162

recession . Once again, employment of such significance that it cannot be ignored, and yet there are problems . A GLC report on printing in London (GLC 1983b) acknowledges that there are contradictory trends at play within the general print sector (where most small businesses are concentrated) . On the one hand there are moves toward concentration of ownership and also moves towards fragmentation in production . In arguing this, the report does little more than repeat the analysis presented in earlier works (Bollard 1983, Marshall 1983) . However, the report ignores the state of union organisation in small print units, preferring to rely on the common image of printing's industrial relations, derived from the well-developed unionisation of the newspaper sector . There are hints that all may not be well in the small sector. The report argues that general print firms have restricted their size at least partly `to avoid having a larger and possibly more militant workforce' (ibid, p .10) . But neither the report on printing, nor the report on small firms, accepts that the fragmentation of the labour process may be at least partly motivated by a desire to seek out areas of relatively weak union organisation. The only intensive investigation of industrial relations in small print firms to date (Craig et al, 1982) shows quite clearly that the very sort of union organisation that the GLC is trying to defend, and indeed extend in the printing industry, is largely absent from small firms. Wage levels are low, control over the labour process is largely in the hands of management, traditional craft demarcation does not exist . Yet this problem is not confronted in either report . One is left with the feeling that the clothing and printing sectors are to be defended simply because the GLC couldn't afford not to . The implications of such a `pragmatic' policy are potentially dire . To take an extreme example, if we ally the GLC's desire to defend `ethnic minority enterprise' with their desire to help small businesses in printing, does this mean that the GLC could be Eddie Shah's best friend? The third and final area where small businesses are transformed into something else is that of the worker co-operatives . This will have to be investigated in some detail, as a lot of hackles tend to rise when co-operatives come under any sort of attack . The GLC's report does not recognise any similarity between the two forms . `In this case the support is not for small firms, but the co-operative movement' (ibid, p .19) . Not all commentators draw the same distinction; the Financial Times, for example, argued that : 'Cooperatives and franchising - both primarily forms of small scale enterprise - have proved . . . increasingly popular' (Financial Times 12 .6 .84). And they have proved increasingly popular with some of the

Small Firms

most surprising people . Norman Tebbit has emphasised the Government's support for co-operatives and David Trippier, the small business Minister, announced that funds would be available to guarantee the existence of the Co-operative Development Agency for another six years (Financial Times 12.6 .84) . One reason for this rather unusual return from condemnation to cold outer reaches of the alternative society is that co-operatives themselves have changed . The Financial Times went on to note that:The important difference behind the resurgence of co-op ventures in Britain is that the `alternative lifestyle' approach of the '70s which led to many ventures in craft areas, has given way to the more basic desire for employment by people made redundant (ibid) . It is worth bearing in mind that the upsurge in cooperatives, to a situation where there are now around 1,000 employing about 7,000 people (Stirling and Mellor 1984), runs almost parallel to the resurgence of small business in general . Thornley (1982) points out that producer co-operatives have usually arisen out of the conditions of hardship and disillusion that capitalism's periodic crises produce . In other words, they have usually been viewed as alternatives to unemployment within capitalism . Armstrong (1983) concludes that within this context cooperatives do not challenge the capitalist mode of production . `In fact they are inextricably caught up in a web of capitalist economic relations' (Armstrong, 1983, p .35) . This is hardly surprising . Co-operatives exist in the same economy as other small businesses and are subject to the same rules . In the final analysis they have to compete to survive . And they have to survive in a world that is not of their own making . In other words, they have to live in a world dominated by large capital and therefore must fit into one or other of the three categories Schutt and Whittington (op cit) devised for all small businesses . Cooperatives have no choice about this . Alternative internal management structures do not affect this position . In fact Thornley (1982) would seem to suggest that most co-operatives fit into the independent and competitive category . The basic need has been to increase productivity in line with other firms . With less money at their disposal, co-operatives must often buy inferior machinery and accept poor quality premises . To remain competitive they must then reduce the costs of labour to a greater extent than other firms and work more effectively' (Quoted in Armstrong 1983) . Armstrong argues that supporters of the co-operative movement only look at questions of internal structure and ignore the realities and pressures of the world outside of the four walls of the co-operative . This is not quite fair ; there are those involved

163

Capital & Class

164

with co-operatives who have acknowledged some of the problems facing them. Hannah and O'Toole (1984) argue that the government is trying to implicate co-operatives in its plans to privatise municipal services . They point out that George Jones, Chief Executive of the National Co-operative Development Agency, has argued that `the co-operative way of running a business coincides in many ways with the present Government's philosophies' (Business News, Autumn 1983) ; the idea being that a co-operative is just another way of extending the Tory philosophy of creating a job owning democracy. People then are realistic and responsive to market focus according to this theory, take wage cuts when necessary and don't go on strike. Therefore, because co-operatives are so responsive to the hard winds of competition, they should be encouraged to compete for contracts from privatised services (Hannah and O'Toole, 1984) . Furthermore, George Jones of the CDA argues that `trade union hostility to privatisation could be deflected by using worker co-operatives' (ibid) . Hannah and O'Toole claim that the characteristics, produced under pressure, that allow co-operatives to be co-opted into Tory philosophy represent a `selective interpretation of worker co-operatives' that `is inaccurate and misleading' (ibid) . And yet they put forward no consistent alternative picture . Nowhere do they attempt to locate the position of the new small co-operative in Thatcher's Britain . In the same way that small business mythology rests on an ignorance of reality, the lack of analysis relating to the role and function of co-operatives in a crisis-ridden, restructuring economic formation lends an air of total unreality to all discussion of those worker co-operatives . If it is accepted that co-operatives are going to have to conform to the Schutt and Whittington form of analysis, then two things become obvious, firstly that competition is going to intensify and secondly the claim that 'co-operatives now have a momentum which is creating a new sector of industrial society' (Guardian 28 .9.84) is clearly built on shaky foundations . The outcome of all this is that the GLC's hopes regarding their policy towards co-operatives tends to look pious and unreal . The report argues that :One of the express policies of the Council is that small co-operatives .. . should seek to establish links between themselves and to encourage their members to belong to trade unions . In short, the Council supports co-operatives as a means of strengthening labour's control of the economy, and would not wish to support those which (through undercutting direct labour organisations, for example) had the opposite effect (GLC, 1983a, p .19) . Unfortunately, given the position that most co-operatives find themselves in, their ability to aid the process of strengthening

Small Firms 165

labour's control of the economy is going to be strictly limited, if not entirely non-existent .

Examination of the GLC's small firm strategy has shown the necessity of producing a political economy of small businesses . Without such an analysis the confusion and contradictions embodied in the GLC report can arise all too easily . The acknowledgement that in all cases (if in a variety of ways) large capital determines not only the field of play, but also the rules of the game that small firms are engaged in, is vital to any understanding of the role of small business in the 1980s. It means, for instance, that one cannot readily produce `exceptions' to the general theory, as the GLC has attempted to do . Furthermore, analysis of the role of small firms in the anti-labour drive should avoid the sort of picture presented by Jack Straw MP, wherein small businesses are viewed as the new oppressed minority . Much radical activity in the last century was led and organised by small businessmen . Small businessmen are in truth

even more the pawns of the great multinational corporations and of the vagaries of the economy than those on a wage; since they lack even the elementary security of those who are employed. Their financial interest in their firms is much more akin to industrial property than it is to capital, with their houses and their life savings often mortgaged to the banks on usurious terms . (Guardian 21 .9 .81) (My emphasis, A .R .) . One caveat should be put to the analysis presented in this paper . It is not meant to be the last word on the location of small business in ailing late capitalism . Far from it! The analysis is exploratory and in many ways simply extends a lot of the points developed by Schutt and Whittington (1984) . However, as the authors point out, as yet it is not possible to determine how important the fragmentation policies of large capital are . Indeed it is impossible, as yet, to tell whether this is simply a temporary phenomenon. If this be the case then many small firms are in for a very short, if floodlit, life . The point is that capital, motivated by the urgency of economic crisis, is experimenting . Two years ago, The Economist argued that `to restore the share of profits of the national income in the five biggest Western economies to 30 per cent, the average for the five countries in the 1960s would involve enormous cuts in real wages 19 per cent in Britain, 15 per cent in the United States, 13 per cent in Germany, 7 per cent in Japan' (Economist 27 .11 .82) . There has been little success in achieving this massive increase in the rate of

Conclusions

Capital C5 Class

166

exploitation, but that does not stop the continuing search for means of securing it . If anything the urgency is increased . The fragmentation of the firm, and small business revivalism, fit into this context . Both correspond to a searching out of areas of low pay and low union organisation, a strategy which, if successful, would obviously feed back into the remaining areas of strong union organisation. In some ways this argument would seem to fly in the face of theories that stress the inevitability of the increasing concentration and centralisation of capital . Yet, as Poulantzas (1975) has argued :I should like to recall here that the concentration and centralisation of capital should in no way be seen, in its real historical development, as a gradual, unilinear and homogeneous process . In certain periods, generally brief, this process can even undergo relative retreats (ibid, p .145) . All that this paper has attempted to do is to provide an explanation as to why the process of concentration and centralisation, within limited sectors, has apparently gone into relative retreat. I emphasise the apparently, because it should be clear from Schutt and Whittington's classification of small firms, along with their fragmentation analysis, that, although large firms may not own all their small counterparts, to all intents and purposes they control them . Therefore, the relative retreat of the process of concentration and centralisation is more apparent than real, formal rather than actual. This should not blind us to the actual effects that such a strategy could have on the labour movement, if successfully carried out. We cannot afford to ignore small business revivalism .

Acknowledgements: I would like to thank John Ritchie, John Stirling, Doug Miller and Janet Hannah, as well as `Capital and Class' referees Carol Wolkowitz and Sonia Liff for comment and criticism on previous drafts of this paper .

Small Firms R Allard (1983) `The Importance and Position of Small Firms', The Economic Review, November . C Allum and J Quigley (1983) `Bricks in the Wall : The Youth Training Scheme', Capital and Class 21 . M Armstrong (1983) `Worker Exploit Thyself, Socialist Review, 57 . J Atkinson 1984(a) `Flexible Firm Takes Shape', Guardian Finance, 18 .4 .84. J Atkinson 1984(b) `New Patterns of Working Relationships', Paper for 1984 Conference of the Manpower Society . F Bechhoffer and B Elliot (eds .) (1981) `The Petit Bourgeoisie: Comparative Studies of the Uneasy Stratum', Macmillan . S Birley `The Large Firm, Small Firm Interface', London Business School Journal, Winter. A Bollard (1983) `Small Beginnings : New Roles for British Businesses', Intermediate Technology Publications . J Bolton (1971) Report of the Committee of Enquiry on Small Firms (Bolton Report), Cmnd 4811, HMSO . A Cochrane (1983) `Local Economic Policies: Trying to Drain an Ocean with a Teaspoon' in J Anderson (ed), `Redundant Spaces in Cities and Regions', Academic Press . Community Development Project PEC (1979) `The State and the Local Economy', Final Report . Computer Weekly (various) . C Craig (et al (1982)) `The Determinants of Non Job-Evaluated Payment Structures', Industrial Working Papers No .1 - The Printing Industry, Cambridge University, Department of Applied Economics, Labour Studies Group, Unpublished Report . Conservative Central Office (n .d) `Small Business, Big Future' . Confederation of British Industry (1977) `Enterprise into the Eighties', CBI.

J Curran and J Stanworth (1984) `Protecting Your Franchise -and Yourself, Guardian 28 .9 .84 . W Daniel and W Millward (1983) `Workplace Industrial Relations in Britain', Heinemann . J Dewhurst and P Burns (1983) `Small Business : Finance and Control', Macmillan. C Duncan (1981) `Low Pay, Its Causes and the Post War Trade Union Response', Research Studies Press . Financial Times (various) . GLC Economic Policy Group (1983a) `Small Firms and the London Industrial Strategy', GLC . GLC Economic Policy Group (1983b) `Printing in London', GLC. A Gould and D Keeble (1984) `New Firms and Rural Industrialization in East Anglia', Regional Studies, Vol 18, No 3 . Guardian (various) . J Hannah and M O'Toole (1984) `A Wolf in Sheep's Clothing?', Cooperation, 3, Summer. D Howell (1984) `The Conservative Future : Getting it Right', Crossbow 24, 90. C Harman (1981) `Marx's Theory of Crisis and its Crisis', International Socialism, 11 . N Harris (1983) `Of Bread and Guns', Pelican . R Hudson (1984) `Small Firms and Regional and National Development' in R Hudson (ed), `Small Firms and Regional Development',

References

167

Capital E5 Class

168

Copenhagen School of Economics . R Hyman (1979) `Theory in Industrial Relations - Towards a Materialist Analysis' . Paper presented to 19th German Soziologentag, Berlin . P Jones (1980) `The Thatcher Experiment; Tensions and Contradictions in the First Year', in `Politics and Power II : Problems in Labour Politics', Routledge and Kegan Paul . Labour Research (various) . Low Pay Unit Review 16 .12 .83 . A Marshall (1983) `Changing the Word - The Printing Industry in Transition', Comedia. K Marx (1981) `Capital Vol III', Penguin . P Mattera (1980) `Small is not Beautiful : Decentralised Production and the Underground Economy in Italy', Radical America, Sept/Oct . R Miliband (1983) `The State in Capitalist Society', Quartet . F Murray (1983) `The Decentralization of Production - The Decline of the Mass Collective Worker', Capital and Class 19 . Newcastle Council (1981) `Newcastle - Small Firms Profit from our Experience', City of Newcastle upon Tyne . N Poulantzas (1975) `Classes in Contemporary Capitalism', New Left Books . A Rainnie (1984) `Combined and Uneven Development in the Clothing Industry : The Effects of Competition on Accumulation', Capital and Class 22 . J Richie (1984) `Small Business Revival as Cultural Play and Spectacle', Unpublished mimeo, Newcastle Polytechnic . R Samuel (1977) `Workshop of the World', History Workshop journal, 3 . R Scase (1982) `The Petit Bourgeoisie and Modern Capitalism', in A Giddens and G Mackenzie (eds.), `Social Class and the Division of Labour', Cambridge University Press . R Scase and R Goffee (1980) `The Real World of the Small Business Owner', Croom Helm . E Schumacher (1973) `Small is Beautiful', Bland and Briggs . J Schutt (1984) `Tory Enterprise Zones and the Labour Movement', Capital and Class 23 . J Schutt and R Whittington (1984) `Large Firms and the Rise of Small Units', Paper presented to Small Firms Research Conference, Nottingham. D Storey (1982) 'Entrepreneurship and the New Firm', Croom Helm . D Storey (1984a) `Business Competitiveness : The Role of Small Firms', Paper presented to ESRC/CURDS Workshop, Newcastle . D . Storey (1984b) Editorial, Regional Studies, Vol 18, No 3 . Sunday Times (various) . J Stirling and M Mellor (1984) `Worker Co-Operatives - Self Exploitation or Self-Realisation', Paper presented to 1984 BSA Conference, Bradford . J Thornley (1981) `Worker Co-operatives : Jobs and Dreams', Heinemann . R Upton (1984) `Britain's Buy-Out Boom', Personnel Management, March.

Capital f5 Class

172

CSE 1VIEMERSBIP 25 HORSELL ROAD, LONDON N5 CAPITAL AND CLASS Please start/continue my subscription from number : I enclose: UK Overseas Full £ 9.00 £10.00 Reduced £ 6.00 £ 6.00 (student, unemployed) Supporting £20.00 £20.00 Airmail £20.00 BEAD AND BAND I would like to subscribe for 3 issues from current/next issue. I enclose: D UK £3 .50 0 Overseas £4 .50 D Institutions £6 .00 C&C BACK ISSUES : Please send the following issues

D Numbers 4-8 (£ 1 .50 each or 3 for £4.00) D Numbers 9, 11, 12 (£ 1 .50 each) D Numbers 13, 14, 15 (£ 1 .80 each) D Numbers 10, 16, 17, 18 (£2 .00 each) D Numbers 19 and 20 (£2.50 each) D Number 21 and subsequent issues) (£3.00 to members; otherwise £3 .50) Cheques : Payable to CSEMembership and kept separate from CSE Books . Non-sterling cheques: Please add bank clearance charge of £ 1 .00. In all correspondence, including subscription renewal, please quote reference number from address label. Change of address: I have changed my address from

Name Address

Please complete : Job/activities Subjects ofinterest Institutions ifany Region