Can Less Be More? Leftist Deliberative Democrats' Critique of Participatory Democracy

Can Less Be More? Leftist Deliberative Democrats' Critique of Participatory Democracy Author(s): Emily Hauptmann Source: Polity, Vol. 33, No. 3 (Spring, 2001), pp. 397-421 Published by: Palgrave Macmillan Journals Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3235441 Accessed: 09/08/2009 12:07 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=pal. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit organization founded in 1995 to build trusted digital archives for scholarship. We work with the scholarly community to preserve their work and the materials they rely upon, and to build a common research platform that promotes the discovery and use of these resources. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

Palgrave Macmillan Journals is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Polity.

http://www.jstor.org

Polity * VolumeXXXIII,Number 3 * Spring 2001

Can Less Be More? Leftist Deliberative Democrats' Critique of Participatory Democracy* Emily Hauptmann Western MichiganUniversity Many contemporarydemocratictheorists now base their conceptions of democracynot on the value of citizenparticipationbut on deliberationinstead. Thisapparentlyslightshiftin emphasismarksan importantchange in the critical projectof democratictheory.Althoughparticipatoryand deliberativedemocratic theoryare in some ways similar,close readingsof the recentworkof a numberof leftistdeliberativedemocratsreveal not only fundamentalcriticismsof theirparticipatorypredecessorsbut a strikinglydifferentassessmentof the politicalworld as well. Deliberativedemocratsstriveto avoid the chargeof utopianismso often leveled againstparticipatory theorists;in doingso, however,they lose the power to distinguishcriticallybetween the potentialfor democracyand its realization. Deliberativedemocratictheory,therefore,shouldnot be understoodas a revision of the participatory project,but ratheras an independentand, for now, underdevelopedtheoryof democracy. In Emily Hauptmann teachespoliticaltheoryat WesternMichiganUniversity. additionto her interestin contemporarydemocratictheory,she also writesabout the recent history of political theory as an academic discipline. E-mail: [email protected]. Democratictheoryhas changedits focus.Bythe beginningof the 1980s,participatorydemocracyappeared,even to its defenders,to be losingits gripon political theorists'attention.In 1982,CarolePatemanremarkedthat"formanypeople in the 1980s 'participation' and 'participatory democracy'are merelyechoes of a time past."'Bookswrittenaboutparticipatory democracyduringthe 1980sand 1990s, like PhilipGreen'sRetrievingDemocracyand Meta Mendel-Reyes's Reclaiming Democracy,announcedits waning in theirtitles.2Mostrecently,Jane Mansbridge noted ruefullythat participatory theoriesof democracyhad begun "fadingfrom *Mythanksto DanAalbers,PaulClements,TimGaffaney, John Medearis,AndrewRehfeld,and the anonymousreviewersforPolityfortheirhelpfulcommentson earlierdraftsof thisessay. 1. CarolePateman,introduction to Participatory and Workplace Democracy:A Theoretical Developmentin Critiqueof Liberalism, IL:SouthernIllinoisUniversity by R.Mason(Carbondale, Press,1982),xiii. 2. PhilipGreen,Retrieving InSearchof CivicEquality(Totowa,N.J.:RowmanandAllanDemocracy: held,1985)andMetaMendel-Reyes, Reclaiming Democracy:TheSixtiesin PoliticsandMemory(NewYork: Routledge,1995).

398 CANLESSBE MORE?

view" in the 1980sand that theiradvocates,along with otherswho "careabout holding making[the UnitedStates]more democratic"are stuckin an "intellectual Politicaltheoristsnow oftenspeakof participatory theoriesof democracy pattern."3 in the pasttense, as ideasthatgrew out of the politicaland intellectualfermentof the 1960sand then subsidedwith it. A new groupof democratictheoristsnow claimsthe placeparticipatory theorists once held as the envisionersof a more inclusive,vibrantdemocracy.Deliberative democratsof the left arguethattheirtheorieshelp us imaginea more democratic thepolitics,albeitone thatstopswell shortof the sweepingchangesparticipatory Ratherthanfocusing oristsbelievedmustbe partof the processof democratization. of societyas a whole or on the recastingof its majorinstituon the transformation tions,deliberativedemocratsurgethatwe attendinsteadto how to make current proceduresmore open to the publicor how to fosterdemocratic decision-making the state.4 initiatives"apartfrom"or "against" and deliberdifferencesbetweenparticipatory the I to focus on intend Although ativedemocratictheory,theirsimilaritiesare both numerousand important.Good of democraticpolitics,accordingto bothviews,givespeoplea betterunderstanding theirown interestsand the interestsof othersand, in some cases, bringsthem to see what would be best for an entiregroup.Theoristswritingfromboth perspectivescontrasttheirviewsof whatgood democraticpoliticsshouldbe with "aggregaviews of democracy,in which politicalelitesand electoralmechtive"or "pluralist" anisms make policy on the basis of the "revealedpreferences"of citizens.5By theoristsbelievemostcitizenscan conandleftistdeliberative contrast,participatory and reasonablyto politics,especiallywhen theyknowtheircontributeintelligently tributionsmatter.And most believe that citizensshould be able to contributeto thantheycan now. more areasof decision-making theoristsspelledout a visionof democratic in the 1960s,participatory Beginning citizens that on the based participatingin collectivedecisionpremise politics MakeBetterCitizens?" "DoesParticipation [documenton-line],TheGoodSociety 3. JaneMansbridge, 5 (spring 1995);availablefrom http://www.cpn.org/sections/new_citizenship/theory/mansbridgel.html; PoliticalTheory27 (1999):706. "TheHoldingPattern," Internet;Mansbridge, to the public,see James Bohman,PublicDeliberation:Pluralism, 4. Foropeningdecision-making M.I.T.Press,1996),187-91;fora discussionof democracy"apart and Democracy(Cambridge: Complexity, from" or "against"the state, see John S. Dryzek,Democracy in Capitalist Times: Ideals, Limits, and Strug-

Press,1996),46-58. gles (Oxford:OxfordUniversity in in NomosXVI:Participation andDemocratic Theory," 5. See PeterBachrach,"Interest, Participation, "A 1975);JackL.Walker, Politics,ed.J. RolandPennockandJohnW.Chapman(NewYork:Lieber-Atherton, AmericanPoliticalScienceReview60 (1966):285-95;ArnoldS. of the ElitistTheoryof Democracy," Critique Kaufman, The Radical Liberal. The New Politics: Theory and Practice (New York:Atherton, 1968); Arnold

in TheBias of Pluralism,ed. WilliamE.ConDemocracy," S. Kaufman,"HumanNatureand Participatory CamandDemocraticTheory(Cambridge: Atherton,1969);CarolePateman,Participation nolly(NewYork: Democracyand MarkWarren,"Deliberative Press,1970);Bohman,PublicDeliberation; bridgeUniversity AmericanPoliticalScienceReview90 (1996):46-60;JamesJohnsonandJackKnight,"AggregaAuthority," PoliticalTheory22 (1994):277-96. of Democratic Onthe Possibility Legitimacy," tionandDeliberation:

Emily Hauptmann 399

makingon mattersthataffecttheirlivesshouldbe an "integralmoralvalueof conIntheiremphasison the importanceof widespread temporarydemocratictheory."6 citizendeliberationabout politicalmatters,manycontemporarydeliberativetheoristsappearto takethisbasicpremiseof participatory theoryforgranted.Butwhile theoristssaw a politicsthatmovedpeople to reflectabouttheirinterparticipatory ests as thoroughlytransformative, changingnot only people'ssense of theirown interestsbut ultimatelythe structureof society itself,leftistdeliberativetheorists drawmoremodestconclusionsfromthe same premise.Forone, deliberativetheoristsdo not believea politicsthatinvitespeopleto reflectabouttheirparticular interests need bringabout any fundamentalsocial or personaltransformation; "social facts,"most notablythe "fact"of social complexity,constrainthe scope and the power of the achievementsof democraticpolitics.7Also, deliberativetheorists attendmoreto how democraciescan legitimately justifynon-unanimousdecisions to and impose them on those who do not approveof them ratherthan to how democraciescan developconsensus. Well aware of how they have partedcompanywith participatory theory,a numberof leftistdeliberative theoristsseek to justifytheirdisagreements with it.The most basiccriticismthese theoristsmakeof participatory theoryis thatit is unrealistic,both in its conceptionof modernsocietiesand in its visionof theirtransformation.Whiletherearesome deliberative theoristswho claimno strongintellectual connectionto participatory there are theory, manyon the leftwho do;amongthese, manysee theirconceptionsof deliberative democracyas continuationsof the theoreticalprojectparticipatory theoristsbegan. Leftistdeliberativetheoristsseek to strikea delicatebalance,then, in explainingtheirrelationto participatory theory; theymustshow thattheirthoroughcritiquesof participatory theory,ratherthanguttingthe oldertheorybeyondrepair,shore it up instead. Whilesocialand politicaltransformation was the aim of participatory theorists, deliberative theoristsaspireto justifysome reformsalongwitha new way of understandingthe legitimacyof representative democracy.Iconcludethat,inspiteof their statementsto the contrary,the leftistdeliberativetheoristswho havecriticizedparticipatorytheoryhavedone so in sucha fundamental way thattheirprojectscannot be properlyunderstoodas continuationsof it. Deliberative theoristshaveidentified a numberof the weaknesses of the participatory such as its majoritarian view, biases and lapses into nostalgiafor simplersocieties,and have shown how their own theoriesare immuneto such weaknesses.What leftistdeliberativetheorists currentlylack,however,is a powerfulcriticalvisionof theirown. Thisis especially significantsince a numberof deliberativetheoristsclaimthatthose theoristsfrom

6. PeterBachrach,"Interest, andDemocratic 52. Participation, Theory," 7. JurgenHabermas, BetweenFactsand Norms,trans.WilliamRehg(Cambridge: M.I.T. Press,1996), 315-28;371-73.

400 CANLESSBE MORE?

whom they take theirbearingswere themselvesineptor unsubtlecritics.In their the criticalmechanismof democratictheory,however,deliberdesireto recalibrate ativetheoristshaveonlydulledits criticaledge.

I. The Deliberative Critique of Participatory Democracy Letus now considerboth aspectsof what deliberativetheoristssay about participatorytheory:whattheyclaimto havenoticedaboutthe politicalworldthatjusview and how manystillreaffirmtheircontifiestheirrevisionsof the participatory nection to participatorytheory in spite of their criticismsof it. Althoughthey disagreeabout how to conceptualizeand evaluateit, deliberativedemocratsall theoristsfailto place the complexityof the sharethe convictionthatparticipatory contemporaryworld at the center of their theoriesof democracy.8As a consequence, deliberativedemocrats argue, participatorytheorists'ideal of "more democracy"acrossall majorsocial institutionsis not only unrealisticbut, in some cases, even downrightdangerousto pursue. The analyticweight deliberativedemocratsassign to the idea of social complexityis a powerfulindicatorof how stronglytheirwork is influencedby Jurgen Habermasand, to a lesser degree, John Rawls.9Deliberativedemocratsdiffer, however,when it comes to understandingand assessingwhat complexitymight mean for theoriesof democracy.Some theorists,like James Bohmanand Mark Warren,urge thatwe not respondtoo pessimisticallyto the complex social and politicalworldin which we findourselves.Evenif its complexityfrustratesdemocraticmovementswith broadsets of aims, a complexworlddoes not activelydiscourage deliberative"publicspheres"formingaround particulargovernmental institutions.Others,like Jane Mansbridge,Seyla Benhabiband Joshua Cohen, claimthatthe best sites fordeliberationin a complexsocietymustbe locatedoutside the immediatereachof the state,be theyin civilsociety,social movementsor voluntaryassociations.'?On thisview,the stateand those institutionscloselyconnected to it make too littleroom in theirown workingsto be originalsites for public deliberation;what deliberationoccurs in a complex society, therefore, must often begin "apartfrom"or "against"the state. Let us considernow how these theoristsuse theirvaryingideas of complexityto groundtheircritiquesof theory. participatory

8. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, 326-28; 372.

of howconhisrecentelaboration 9. AlthoughRawlsdoesnotexplicitlyemploytheideaof complexity, doctrines("thefactof reasonable comprehensive societyis markedby peopleholdingdiffering temporary (New SeeJohnRawls,PoliticalLiberalism, ideasaboutsocialcomplexity. parallelsHabermas's pluralism") Press,1993and 1996),63-65. York:ColumbiaUniversity 10. See also Dryzek,Democracyin CapitalistTimes,especiallychapter3, and Jean L. Cohenand M.I.T. Press,1992),xii; 19-20. AndrewArato,CivilSocietyand PoliticalTheory(Cambridge:

Emily Hauptmann 401

TheorizingPoliticsin a Complex World MarkWarrencentershis critiqueof participatory theoriesof democracyon the claimthatsocialcomplexitymakesthe idealsthatanimatethesetheoriesimpossible to realizeand dangerousto pursue:"[Thetransformative idealsof radicaldemocof comracy]oftenseem besetbya fuzzyutopianismthatfailsto confrontlimitations plexity,size and scale of advancedindustrialsocieties.""Fundamentally, participatory theoriesof democracyrelytoo heavilyon the mistakennotion that people in politics:"radical democratsalmostwithoutexception generallyenjoyparticipating holdthatdemocraticparticipation is attractiveactivity,one thatpeoplewould naturallychoose if onlytheyhadthe opportunity. Theyshoulddispensewith thisromanticdogma."'2 Andbecauseparticipatory theoriesbothexpecttoo muchof individual people and acknowledgetoo littleaboutthe complexityof contemporarypolities, Warrenargues that any democracybased on participatory principleswould be arelikelyto finddecisionmakingso burdensome "likelyto be unstable.""Individuals and inefficientthat most will withdrawinto a cynicalapathy.Thiswill leave most decisionsto an activistfew who will,ironically, makedecisionsbasedon the authorderive from a For theoitythey participatory process."'3 Warren,since participatory ristswere blindto the realitiesof contemporary to realize their ideal society,attempts mustfail-most dramatically theorists' own standards. by participatory By contrast,a deliberativedemocracyneitherexpects too much of individual the complexityof contemporarysocieties.InWarren's people nor underestimates view, deliberativedemocracyis a more realizableand stable democraticideal with a conceptionof democraticauthoritythat largelyby virtueof its compatibility takes social complexity seriously.Warrenexplains why democratictheorists "shouldthinkaboutauthority" sociby focusingon thecomplexityof contemporary eties,theirrelianceon expertise,and how "specializeddiscourses"areinhospitable to "broadparticipation."14 Hethenarguesthatalthoughcomplexsocietiesmustrely on authority,this does not necessarilycompromisetheircapacityfor democracy. Accordingto Warren,a deliberative conceptionof democracyprovidesthe best theoreticalfoundationfor conceivingof the kindof authorityexercisedin complex societiesin democraticterms. citizensin a deliberative in politics Undoubtedly, theoryof democracyparticipate farless thantheywould in a participatory one. ButWarrenarguesthat,in thiscase, less is more, and in severalways. Forone, citizensin a deliberativedemocracy would not be expectedor requiredto get involvedin politicalissues that do not

11. Warren,"WhatShouldWe ExpectfromMoreDemocracy? Democratic Radically Responsesto Politics,"PoliticalTheory24 (1996):242. 12. MarkWarren,"WhatShouldWe ExpectfromMoreDemocracy?," 243. 13. Warren,"Deliberative 58. DemocracyandAuthority," 14. Warren,"Deliberative 46-47. DemocracyandAuthority,"

402 CANLESSBE MORE?

most of the time, interestthem:"whenmost decisionscan be made authoritatively individuals can focus their time, energy, knowledge and attention ...

on those

issues and conteststhatmatterforthem. Forindividuals,authorityallowsdeliberativedemocracyto be less burdensomeand morefocused."'5This,he argues,helps environmentin which publicofficialscan easilybe called reenforcean institutional upon to justifythe authoritythey exercise:"Byallocatingdeliberativeresourcesto the spheres most salient, this model maximizes the adversarialrelationship thatis, the ways in which democracycontains, betweendemocracyand authority, checks, and chastens authority.As a consequence, the discursiverelationship between democracyand authorityis enhanced,that is, the pressuresincreasefor authoritiesto justifytheirdecisionsin termsof publicreasonsif calledupon to do so."16Warren'sversionof a deliberativedemocracyis characterizedas much by of opportunitiesfor challenge-multiple publicspheres, not "institutionalization within governmentbut also in the institutionsof the economyand society"'7 only as it is by the actual"deliberative participation"'8of citizens. of deliberativedemocracy,meaningfulpolitical to this understanding According its deliberative (in guise) neitherpresumesnor promisesany sweepparticipation a deliberative transformation. institutional Furthermore, democracy,in Warren's ing either.Warrencriticizes transformation not need view, promisesweepingpersonal democratsforoveremcalls sometimes he as them, "expansive") (or, participatory interestsat the transform can democratic how people's politics good phasizing Warren There of individual contends, many the are, of persons. integrity expense kindsof goods individualpeople legitimatelyvaluethatdo not "dependon social and do not "requirecommondeliberationand action" interactionand recognition" fortheirachievement.19 Allowingpoliticsto intrudetoo farintopeople'sinterestsin the them) is likelyto spoil those goods or such goods (in hopes of transforming between worsenconflicts people. JamesBohman,in PublicDeliberation,arguesthatthe factsof pluralSimilarly, ism and socialcomplexityshouldconvincedemocratictheoriststo paredown parschool"were so criticalof existing ticipatoryideals."Marxand the earlyFrankfurt idealstoo high:"Theirskepdemocratic their that formsof democracy theypitched to impracticalattemptsto led has of forms all ticismtoward existing democracy of social life and has lent a area in of forms participation every applydemanding one's idealstoo highis, ideals."20 democratic their Pitching positive utopiancast to of critical the standards failure a theory itself;parain Bohman'sjudgment, by

47. 15. Warren,"Deliberative DemocracyandAuthority," 58. 16. Warren,"Deliberative DemocracyandAuthority," 57. 17. Warren,"Deliberative DemocracyandAuthority," 57. 18. Warren,"Deliberative DemocracyandAuthority," 19. 19. Warren,"Democratic TheoryandSelf-Transformation," 20. Bohman, Public Deliberation, 9.

Emily Hauptmann 403

definitionof criticaltheory,Bohmanemphasizesthatcritical phrasingHorkheimer's of the cirtheory"mustalso be practical,in thatitcan show how the transformation cumstancesit criticizesis possible."2'By this standard,the more robustidealsof radicalor participatory democracyaresterile,the moremodestones of deliberative democracy"possible":"ifsuch [democratic]idealsare not to lose theirnormative force, they must at least be possible;as Kantputs it, 'oughtimpliescan'."22 One demonstratesthe possibilityof deliberativedemocracy,Bohmanclaims,by showing thatpluralismand socialcomplexity"promote"ratherthanobstructa society's movementtowardsdeliberativedemocraticideals.23 In offeringsuch a hopefulassessmentof the relationbetween democracyand complexity,Bohmanconsciouslypartscompanywith many deliberativetheorists who see complexityas an obstacle to democraticpolitics.Bohmanarguesthat those theoristswho believethatdemocraticdeliberationis most likelyto takeplace in civilsocietyor in "weakpublics"havetakena wrongturn.Deliberative democracy,accordingto Bohman,must involvepeople being "theauthorsof theirdecisions";regardlessof how authenticand democraticthe workingsof groupsin civil societymaybe, theirpowerto influencedecisionstakenby stateauthoritiesis, even Bohmanarguesthatif we accept by the admissionof theirchampions,minimal.24 thatlargeportionsof the socialand politicalworldcannotthemselvesbe subjectto democraticoversight,then we must also accept thatthe chances thatdemocratic movementsor weak publicswill be able to mount an effectivechallengeagainst even a few stateinstitutionsare not good. In a subtleshiftof emphasisfromWarren'sand Bohman'sinsistencethat participatorytheoristsadvanceunrealisticideals,other deliberativetheoristscriticize theoristsmore for slightingimportantpoliticalissues like individual participatory rights,coercion and legitimacy.These criticisms,though differentin focus than Warren'sand Bohman's,also stem fromthe morebasicview thatparticipatory theoristshaveunderestimated socialcomplexity.Forexample,JaneMansbridge argues that some of the most importantpoliticaltheoristsassociatedwith participatory theoryof the 1960s,'70sand'80s (theoristsuponwhom she neverthelessplacesthe failedto thinkenoughaboutauthorityor coercontemporarylabel "deliberative") cion, an omissionshe maintainsthe most recentformsof a deliberativetheoryof democracycan correct:"Manyof the bestcontemporarypoliticaltheoristshavenot faced squarelythe role of conflictinginterests,and consequentlycoercion,in any democraticpolity."25 Insteadof applyingthe simple standardthatcoercionought 21. Bohman, Public Deliberation, 11. 22. Bohman, Public Deliberation, 21. 23. Bohman, Public Deliberation, 21. 24. Bohman, PublicDeliberation, 153-54;177;237-38.See also Dryzek,Democracyin CapitalistTimes, 70. 25. Jane Mansbridge, "Using Power/FightingPower: The Polity,"in Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political, ed. Seyla Benhabib (Princeton: Princeton UniversityPress, 1996), 48. Mansbridgerefers to Hannah Arendt,Sheldon Wolin, MichaelWalzerand Jurgen Habermas to illustrateher

404 CAN LESS BE MORE?

only be considered legitimate when everyone subject to it has "equal power in the decision to coerce," Mansbridge suggests that we accept a less sweeping, more nuanced standard for legitimate coercion: "I will assume here that most acts of democratic coercion in modern Western democracies are sufficiently procedurally fair and their outcomes sufficiently just 'under the circumstances' to disallow, in most cases, large-scale civil disobedience, individual major acts of civil disobedience, and even minor individualbreaches of either the law or public spirit,such as small-scale cheating on income tax .... Democracies need ways short of civil disobedience and the breakdown of normatively based mutual cooperation to recognize and fight the ongoing injustice of their procedures and their outcomes."26 Instead of arguing that a politically involved citizenry could minimize the need for coercion (as she believes earlier theorists did), Mansbridge believes politically involved citizens learn to "fightthe very coercion that they need."27 Such oppositional deliberation takes place in a variety of venues, from political parties to interest groups, workplaces, and consciousness-raising groups. Various though these venues may be, Mansbridge insists they all be understood as "protected enclaves ... in which members legitimately consider in their deliberations not only what is good for the whole polity but also what is good for themselves individually... and for their group."28Although she criticizes those theorists who discount the importance of mainstream groups to fostering a deliberative democracy, Mansbridgeclearly thinks that the "enclaves"most important to fightingcoercion are precisely those that are marginal or oppositional. It is there that new understandings of "what is just and unjust" develop; therefore, any good democracy, Mansbridge believes, ought to encourage and subsidize those deliberative enclaves outside its core.29Because she believes the sites for deliberation are both so various and so numerous, Mansbridgecriticizes what she takes to be the onesize-fits-allsimplicity of the principles of participatorytheory, such as the principle that coercion can only be legitimate if all have equal power to coerce. By ignoring the complex context in which political activitytakes place, Mansbridgeargues, participatory theorists inevitablycome up with unhelpful standards by which to judge vital political matters. LikeMansbridge,Seyla Benhabib also wishes to show that coming to terms with social complexity helps deliberative theorists overcome some of the criticisms to which participatorytheorists remain vulnerable. Forinstance, Benhabib argues that "most versions of radical participatorydemocratic theories" do not do enough to

ConstelCoercionSeriously," "Taking point.Foran extensionof thisargument,see alsoJaneMansbridge, lations3 (1997):407-16. 26. Mansbridge, "UsingPower,"55. 27. Mansbridge, "UsingPower,"56. 28. Mansbridge, "UsingPower,"57. 29. Mansbridge, "UsingPower,"59.

Emily Hauptmann 405

Deliberative protectindividual people'srightsfromthe tyrannyof the majority.30 theories, thoughsimilarto radicalparticipatory theoryin manyways, take sufficient accountof social complexitynot to shareparticipatory theorists'desireto pursue or consensus-drivenpoliticsat the expense of protectingindividual majoritarian theorists,Benhabibargues,in theirenthusiasmfor comingto rights.Participatory consensus,failedto appreciatethatindividual people'srightscouldstillbe protected by a politicallyengagedcitizenry.31 Farfrombeing inapplicableto "complex,modernsocieties,"Benhabibargues, deliberativemodels of democracylend themselvesmuch betterthando theirparticipatorypredecessorsto discovering"theinstitutionalpossibilitiesof realizinga democracycenteredarounda procedureof free, public discussion."32 Because deliberativedemocratsconceive of the public as a complex networkof groups ratherthanas one huge,undifferentiated deliberativebody,theirconceptionof citizen participation in politicsis scaleddown to focuson specificsites in the complex networkthat makes up the public:"Adeliberativeand proceduralistmodel of democracy... privilegels]a pluralityof modes of associationin which all affected can have the rightto articulatetheirpointof view.These can rangefrompolitical parties,to citizens'initiatives,to social movements,to voluntaryassociations,to net of these consciousness-raising groups,andthe like.Itis throughthe interlocking forms of multiple associations,networks,and organizationsthat an anonymous 'publicconversation'results.It is centralto the model of deliberativedemocracy thatitprivilegessuch a publicsphereof mutuallyinterlocking and overlappingnetworks and associationsof deliberation,contestation,and argumentation."33 On sucha view (andBenhabib'sis sharedby mostleftistdeliberative democrats),deliberationis not incompatiblewithwidespreadpoliticalparticipation, butis ratherthe species of it most at home in complexsocieties.34 Inan articlepublishedin 1989,JoshuaCohenadvancesa conceptionof deliberativedemocracythatat firstappearsmoreambitiousthanparticipatory democracy, one he arguesprovidesa "moreabstractand comprehensivepointof view"of the necessaryconnectionbetweendemocracyand socialism.35 Cohencriticizesparticipatorytheory,along with otherargumentsfor democraticsocialism,for offering only a partialdiagnosisof how capitalismfrustratesa commitmentto democracy 30. SeylaBenhabib,"Toward a Deliberative Modelof DemocraticLegitimacy," in Democracyand Difference:Contestingthe Boundariesof the Political,ed. SeylaBenhabib(Princeton:PrincetonUniversity Press,1996),77. 31. Benhabib,"Toward a Deliberative Model,"note41, 93. 32. Benhabib,"Toward a Deliberative Model,"85; emphasisin original. 33. Benhabib,"Toward a Deliberative Model,"73-74;emphasisin original. 34. Benhabib,"Toward a Deliberative Model,"84-87. 35. Cohen,"TheEconomicBasisof Deliberative 30. Thisarticlealso containsa section Democracy," entitled"Deliberative whichcloselyfollowsCohen'smorewidelycitedarticle,"Deliberation Democracy," andDemocraticLegitimacy," in TheGoodPolity,ed. AlanHamlinand PhillipPettit,(NewYork:Blackwell, 1989).

406 CANLESSBE MORE?

and thereforefor offeringunsatisfyingprescriptionsfor how people ought to go He thereforeproposeshis deliberativeconaboutthe "extensionof democracy."36 view,but ratheras ceptionof democracynot as a replacementof the participatory a unificationof it alongwithothervalidbut partialtheoreticalperspectivesintoone "comprehensive pointof view."37 Cohenarguesthathisconceptionof deliberativedemocracyprovidesa stronger philosophicalfoundationforthe publiccontrolof investmentandworkerself-mandemocratsby agement than did, among others, the argumentsof participatory showinghow currentsystemsof privatecontrolof investmentand capitalistmanconception'scommitmentto autonomyand agementclearlyviolatehisdeliberative Not onlydoes his conceptionof deliberativedemocracygo farmaterialequality.38 definitepathsforthe extensionof democracy;Cohenarguesthat therin prescribing it is less vulnerableto the criticismthatit is utopiantoo. He explainsthata deliberativedemocracywouldnot dependuponanysweepingrevolutionestablishing"the collectiveownershipof the meansof production." Rather,since it is alreadythe case that "theownershipatom is split,with decisionsabout the use of resourcesand deliberative decisionaboutthe controlof investmentfallingintoseparatehands,"39 democratsshould merelyseek to directalreadyexistingtrendsinto democratic directions:"Ihavesuggestedthata centralnormativeidealin the socialisttradition is the idealof a democraticassociation,andthatthe concentrationof the powersof Althoughhe ownershipin a singleinstitutiondoes not accommodatethatideal."40 his justificabases Cohen of the "fact" invoke not does clearly complexity, explicitly that rejects relations of economic a on tion of deliberativedemocracy conception market. versus of state the primaryopposition and Democracy," Ina 1993article,"Associations Cohen,alongwithJoel Rogers, association" democratic of a sets out to specify"theideal by explaining"theconstructiverole that 'secondary'associations-labor unions,employerassociations, and otherpricitizenlobbiesand advocacygroups,privateserviceorganizations, and Cohen Their vate groups-can playin a democracy."41 project, Rogersargue, theorists"'"neglectof how [demostands in contrastto "egalitarian-democratic cratic]valuesmightbe implemented,"a neglectwhich exposes these theorists"to theorists"say Because "egalitarian-democratic the chargeof being unrealistic."42

27. 36. Cohen,"TheEconomicBasisof Deliberative Democracy," 29-30. 37. Cohen,"TheEconomicBasisof Deliberative Democracy," 40-41,46-47. Democracy," 38. Cohen,"TheEconomicBasisof Deliberative 49. 39. Cohen,"TheEconomicBasisof Deliberative Democracy," 49-50. 40. Cohen,"TheEconomicBasisof Deliberative Democracy," SocialPhilosophyand Policy10 and Democracy," 41. JoshuaCohenandJoel Rogers,"Associations (1993):283.A longerversionof thisarticle,alongwith a numberof responsesto it, appearsin ErikOlin Wright,ed. Associationsand Democracy:TheRealUtopiasProject,Vol.I (Londonand New York:Verso, 1995). 282-83. and Democracy," 42. CohenandRogers,"Associations

Emily Hauptmann 407

little about the institutionalmedia throughwhich their egalitarian,participatory idealsmightbe realized,Cohenand Rogerscharge,theyshrinkfromofferinga complete theoryof democracy.Cohenand Rogersseek to remedythis deficiencyby placinga wide rangeof secondaryassociationsat the centerof theirthinkingabout how to putthevaluesof equalityanddistributive justiceintopractice.Althoughthey do not explicitlyrely on the vocabularyof complexityto justifytheirapproach, Cohenand Rogersagreewith otherdeliberativedemocratsthatparticipatory theories of democracypay too littleattentionto the institutionalpluralitythat marks In much the same spiritin which Benhabib mass democracies."43 "contemporary and Mansbridge invokethe richlyvariegatedpatternsof civilsocietyto criticizeparticipatorytheorists'simplerapproachto theorizingsocial and politicallife, Cohen and Rogerspresenttheirfocuson associationsas if it opens up a richer,morecomplextheoreticalpaththanthosecurrentlyon offer:"Inmanyareasof economicand socialconcern... egalitarian aimsare badlyservedby the state-market dichotomy thatstilldominatesmainstreamdebatesabouthow thoseaimsshouldbe pursued. Often,the rightanswerto the question'shouldthe statetakecare of the problem, or shouldit be leftto the market?'is a doublenegative."44 In one of his most recent discussions,Cohen again advocates"associative democracy"as the best approachto realizinga deliberativedemocracy;but rather than being the focus of a programof institutionalreformthatCohenand Rogers outlinedin 1993,Cohen now emphasizeshow associationscan teach people to make trulycollectivejudgmentseven in a complex, pluralistsociety.When the makingof collectivejudgmentsis mediatedbyassociations,Cohenargues,no one's doctrine"is imposedon everyone.45 rightsareviolatedandno one "comprehensive Butthe factof reasonablepluralismforcesassociationsto proceedgingerlytowards agreement,so muchso thatCohenadvocatestheirvirtuesas "'schoolsof deliberative democracy"'ratherthan as entitieswith any significantpower to transform socialand politicallife.46 Althoughtheirapproachesto theorizingcomplexityor pluralismvary,all of the theoristsdiscussedso far use these ideas to set theirconceptionsof democracy theorists.If,as Bohmanand Warren apartfromthose advocatedby participatory argue,democracycan be deepened even in a complexsociety,democraticinitiativesmustworkwith thatcomplexityby focusingtheirambitionson specificissues or directingtheirenergiesto forming"publicspheres"aroundexistinghierarchical institutions.If,however,socialcomplexityis conceivedas an obstructionto democraticinitiatives, as Benhabib,Mansbridge and Cohenargue,informalassociations

43. Cohenand Rogers,"Associations and Democracy," 284-86. 44. Cohenand Rogers,"Associations and Democracy," 287. 45. JoshuaCohen,"Procedure and Substancein Deliberative in SeylaBenhabib,ed., Democracy," Democracyand Difference,96. 46. Cohen,"Procedure andSubstance,"113.

408 CANLESSBE MORE?

of civilsocietybeyondthe reachof the stateand the marketseem the best sites for democraticpolitics.Whethertheyspeak fromthe firstor the second of these perspectives,deliberativedemocratsagreethatthe sortof politicsadvocatedby participatorytheoristsis unrealisticin its ambitionto transformcomplex societiesand dangerousto the extent that its pursuitmakes its advocatesdisregardindividual rights,differencesand society'sneed for legitimateauthority.Focusingon this line democratswish to cut of critiquewould leadone to the conclusionthatdeliberative theoriesof democracyforgood. theirties with participatory Reestablishingthe Connectionbetween Deliberativeand ParticipatoryTheoriesof Democracy democratsmakea pointof distancingthemselves Aswe haveseen, deliberative theoristsof democracy,arguingthatthese theorists'conceptions fromparticipatory of how to extenddemocracydo not take sufficientaccountof the complexityof contemporarysocieties. Nevertheless,most theoristsof deliberativedemocracy, view,stillinsistthatdelibdespitesuch fundamentalcriticismsof the participatory or somehow essentialto it. Thisview is so wideerationis a kindof participation spreadthatit appearsnot onlyin the workof those theoristswho explicitlysee their theory,but also, for example,in Amy Gutprojectsas extensionsof participatory Gutmannand Dennis mann and Thompson'sDemocracyand Disagreement.47 of in wide a deliberate that citizens variety settingsand (oughtto) Thompsonargue in poliof extension a natural is so thatvaluingtheirdoing valuing"participation valua is and Gutmann to tics."48Deliberation,according Thompson, particularly discover can becauseonlyby deliberating able kindof participation together people mutuallyacceptableways of resolvingor learningto livewith theirmoraldisagreements.Toinvitepeopleto deliberatemoreoften,GutmannandThompsonrecommend thatnot only governmentalinstitutionsbut also a wide rangeof "intermediary"institutions"shouldbe arrangedso as to provideopportunitiesand incentives shouldalso be for officialsand citizensto engage in moralreasoning.Institutions theirpubwith coincide should in the sense thattheiractualpurposes transparent and as Gutmann ThompAlthoughdeliberation, liclyacknowledgedpurposes."49 it requiresonlymodestinstitutional son conceiveof it,is a kindof civicparticipation, reformratherthanfundamentaltransformation. democrats,Warrenexplainshisrelationto participatory Amongleftistdeliberative of the generalpatternIwish to highlighthere; theoryin termsthatarecharacteristic the47. On the pointof how a fullassessmentof socialcomplexityleadsone to see thatparticipatory in A Companionto Consee AmyGutmann'sentryfor"Democracy," oriesof democracyare unrealistic, temporaryPoliticalPhilosophy,ed. RobertGoodinandPhillipPettit(Oxford:Blackwell,1993),415-16,418. MA:Harvard 48. AmyGutmannand DennisThompson,Democracyand Disagreement(Cambridge, Press,1996),13,37. University 49. GutmannandThompson,Democracyand Disagreement,358-59.

Emily Hauptmann 409

thatis, while his critiqueof the oldertheoryis a fundamental one, Warrenstillpresents his own conceptionof democracyas no morethana qualification of the view he has so thoroughlycriticized.Forinstance,whileWarrenwarnsagainstembracing the ideathatdemocraticpoliticscan transformpeople'sinterests,hisdoingso serves as prefaceto his more cautiousversionof the idea. Not all goods and interests, Warrenargues,ought to be thoughteasily "transformable" throughpolitics-in manycases, publicdialogueaboutpotentiallydivisiveissues (likeculturaland religious differences)may only "heightenconflict"if distributive injusticesthat mark relationsbetweenthe groupsin questionarenot also addressed.50 Warrenalso suggests thatalthoughdeliberativedemocratssharethe beliefof "radical" democrats that"morebroadlyempowered"people"wouldbecomemorepublicspirited,more tolerant,more knowledgeable,more attentiveto the interestsof others,and more probingof theirown interests,"deliberativedemocratstemperthis beliefwith the realizationthat"intoday'ssocietiesthe domainof democracyis narrow,empowermentis limited,and opportunities to makea differencein the courseof everydaylife are rare."5' Severethoughsuch a qualification of radicaldemocraticidealsmaybe, Warrenneverthelessmaintainsthatdeliberative democratscan remaintrueto their spiritwhiletreatingthemwith the appropriate skepticism. Likemanydeliberativetheorists,Bohmanalternateshow he characterizeshis relationto participatory theory,sometimessayinghe is defendingit or even conto other times it, at one tributing criticizingits ideals,even callingthem "quixotic" point.52Forall of his criticismof radicaland participatory theory,Bohmannevertheless insiststhat his conceptionof deliberativedemocracyis its legitimateheir, since the parenthas lost touchwith socialreality(or,perhaps,was neverin touch with it to beginwith):"Thiseffortto rethinkthe potentialfordemocracyin termsof publicdeliberationclearlycontinuesthe legacyof the Frankfurt School.... Radical of society;rather,it means a democracyno longermeans the totaltransformation piecemealprojectof reformthat buildsupon the constitutionaland institutional achievementsof the past.Inthisreformistdemocracy,the roleof the socialcriticis to show the potentialsandthe limitsof the publicandautonomousemploymentof practicalreason.... Tothe extentthatdeliberative democracyis definedby its link to radicaldemocraticand reformistpolitics,its practicalaim is a more extensive formof democracy-thatis, one withgreaterscope forpublicdecisionmakingand self-rule."53 Andin his firstchapter,Bohmanpresentshis projectnot as a revisionof participatory democracy,but as a "defense"of it;54in his conclusion,he describes his argumentas one that"triesto save the core of... egalitarian and participatory

50. Warren,"Democratic 21. TheoryandSelf-Transformation," 51. Warren,"WhatShouldWe ExpectfromMoreDemocracy?," 241,266.

52. Bohman, Public Deliberation, 34. 53. Bohman, Public Deliberation, 20-21. 54. Bohman, Public Deliberation, 29, 30.

410 CANLESSBE MORE?

Butlaterin the conclusion,he returnsto (if not radical)theoriesof democracy."55 callinghis projecta revision:"Manyof the utopianhopes of radicaldemocratic transformation haveto be revisedonce the manydilemmasof pluralismand complexityare facedmoresquarely."56 Forthe most part,though,Bohmandrawsa strongconnectionbetween deliberationand participation:for instance, he says a sound theory of deliberative democracymust "providebothan epistemicand a moralbasisfordemocraticparand show thatit can be made "consistentwith ticipationin complex societies,"57 in his conclusion,Bohmanevencalls his delibIndeed, democracy."58 participatory The close connection erativeapproacha "view of participatorydemocracy."59 Bohman establishesbetween deliberationand participationhas two effects: it an eminentlyrealizableidealand deliberationan activitypossimakesparticipation of ble on a largescale:"Thepositiveideal[of Bohman'stheory]is the participation all citizensin decisionmaking,widelydispersingpowerin society.Evenif deliberation takesplace in representative bodies, it stillinvolvesthe deliberationof all citizens. Suchbodiesremaindeliberativeonlyif citizensvote forand choose theirrepresentativeson the basis of participationin public debate and discussion of democidealscan be foldedintoa deliberative ForBohman,participatory issues."60 transforsocial of from the vision them once one complete separates racy,but only mationinwhichtheyhadbeen embeddedandplacesthemfirmlyon a deliberative and since lots of base.6'On Bohman'saccount,people participate by deliberating; of a deliberative vision Bohman's people do that sort of participatingalready, democracyis hardlya radicalor a utopianone. view that Albeitindirectly,Mansbridgealso takes issue with the participatory occurs when widespreadparticipationbecomes sweeping social transformation theoristswho "excoriate" manyof the deliberativearenascurpossible.Criticizing rentlyavailablein contemporarydemocracies(like politicalpartiesand interest groups), Mansbridgeargues that these structurescan be catalystsfor a better democracyratherthan impedimentsto it.62To make this point, Mansbridgealso and deliberation:"Forparticiestablishesa close connectionbetweenparticipation pation to help people understandtheir interestsbetter,participantsoften need issues on which they havedirectexperience.Theyalso often need a varietyof difforthe best kind ferentarenasfordeliberation."63 Here,deliberationis a prerequisite

55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63.

Bohman, Public Deliberation, 238. Bohman, Public Deliberation, 246. Bohman, Public Deliberation, 27. Bohman, Public Deliberation, 27-28. Bohman, Public Deliberation, 241. Bohman, Public Deliberation, 29. Bohman, Public Deliberation, 247. Mansbridge,"Using Power,"56-57. Mansbridge,"Using Power,"57.

Emily Hauptmann 411

of participation-thatin which participants understandtheirinterests.Butalthough reinforce Mansbridgeexpressesthe wish thatgood deliberationand participation one another,she also sees deliberativetheoryas a moredefensiveexercisethanits predecessor.Deliberative theorytakesstock of democraticpossibilitieswithinthe existingorder at a time when "the pace of politicalchange began to slow"; although Mansbridgetries to make the most of these possibilities,she also expressesregretover the waningof what she acknowledgeswas the more ambitiouspoliticalvisionof participatory theory.64 Whilehe wishes to show thathis conceptionof deliberative democracyis more completethanparticipatory theoretically theoryandalsotakesindividual rightsseriof parously,Cohenalso insiststhatit is neverthelesscompatiblewiththe "principle Heconcedes,however,thatthereis no inherentreasonwhy a deliberticipation."65 ativeconceptionof politicshas to value citizenparticipation; indeed,manywho have advocateda "discussion-based" politicshave thoughtit incompatiblewith "modernmass democracy."66 ButCohenmaintainsthathis conceptionof deliberative democracyis compatiblewith participatory idealsif only for the negativereasons thatit forbidsexcludinganyoneor anygroupfromequalconsiderationin and equalinfluenceuponpolitics.AlthoughCohenalso notesthatmanycitizensmaybe movedby theirmoralor religiousprinciples"toshape our political-social environhe presentspoliticalparticipation as somethingcitizensmightdo if it suits ment,"67 them ratherthanas an activityon which the politicalsystemoughtto rely. To be sure, Cohen also wishes to arguethatan associativedemocracymight "blunt"the conflictbetween the principleof participation, individualrightsand a of its common Even a deliberative community'spursuit good. though conception of politicsneed not placeany inherentvalueon citizenparticipation, Cohenshows how citizen participationin associationsis vital to the health of a deliberative identitiesand democracy.Whilesome associationsmightformoverlyparticularistic the to its common therebydamage community'sability pursue good, Cohenargues thatotherswould be "'schoolsof deliberative Theassociationsbest democracy'."68 suitedto performthis educativefunctionare those thatcoordinatethe effortsof people "acrossquitedifferentinstitutionsand groups... operatingwhollyor subIn such ventures,Cohen expects that those stantiallyoutside the state itself."69 involvedwould "tendto be more other-regarding in their outlook"and "more reflectivein theirdefinitionof problemsand proposedstrategiesforsolution."70 In 64. Mansbridge, "DoesParticipation MakeBetterCitizens?" 65. Cohen,"Procedure andSubstancein Deliberative 106. Democracy," 66. Cohen, "Procedureand Substancein DeliberativeDemocracy,"107; in note 31, Cohen cites Schmitt'sstatementof thispoint,117. 67. Cohen,"Procedure andSubstancein Deliberative 107. Democracy," 68. Cohen,"Procedure andSubstancein Deliberative 113. Democracy," 69. Cohen,"Procedure andSubstancein Deliberative 112. Democracy," 70. Cohen,"Procedure andSubstancein Deliberative 113. Democracy,"

412 CANLESSBE MORE?

this account of associativedemocracy,Cohen emphasizeshow "coordinating" associationswould orienttheirmemberstowardsthe pursuitof a commongooda cautiousview in which deliberationas participationappearsvaluablemainly becauseit helpsminimizesocialconflict. All of the theoristsdiscussedso farsee themselvesto be closely enough connectedto participatory theoryto presenttheircriticismsof the oldertheoryas revisions or extensionsof it ratherthanas sweepingrejections.Not everyoneadvocating deliberativedemocracy, however, claims such a strong connection to theory.Indeed,a few prominenttheoristsof deliberativedemocracy, participatory such as James Fishkinand Joseph Bessette,arguethatthe valuesof participation and deliberationare mostlyincompatible;attemptsto realizeone underminethe recother.71Thesetheoristsecho the Federalists' suspicionof popularparticipation, ommendingsmall-scaledeliberativeforumsor insulatedCongressionaldeliberationsto correctits excesses.The kindof deliberationthese theoristsvalueis incomfromtheirperspective,a deliberative patiblewithwidespreadpopularparticipation; a few allow to (be they randomlyselected citizensor people democracyought membersof Congress)to deliberateon politicalmattersforthe benefitof the rest. as these theoristsunderstandit,cannotbe done well on a largescale. Deliberation, Those who believe that emphases on deliberationand participationpull in oppositepoliticaldirections,however,arein a minorityamongcontemporarydeliberativedemocrats.Muchmore common are the views that are the focus of this essay,whose defenderspresentdeliberativedemocracyas a more realistic,less sweepingvisionof democracycriticalof but stillcloselyalliedwith its participatory predecessor.Thereis, however,no easyway to reconcilethe tensionsbetweenthe criticaland the affinitivevoices in which manydeliberativedemocratsspeakwhen theoriesof democracy.Are leftist they speak about theirrelationto participatory deliberativedemocratsindeedthe legitimateheirsto the legacyof radical,particitheorytoo fundamentalfor patorydemocracy?Oraretheirrevisionsof participatory their work to be understoodas its continuation?How deliberativedemocrats developand employthe criticalpower of theirperspective,I believe,is centralto addressingthese questions.

II. Deliberative Democracy: A Critical Perspective? is possiblewithinmoderncomplex democratsarguethatdeliberation Deliberative envisionedby democratictheoristsa few societiesin ways that the participation should thosetheoristswho believedeliberation decadesago is not.Mostimportantly,

71. See James Fishkin, Democracy and Deliberation: New Directions in Democratic Reform (New

Haven:YaleUniversity Press,1991);JamesFishkin,TheVoiceof thePeople.PublicOpinionandDemocracy Press,1995);JosephM. Bessette,The MildVoiceof Reason:Deliberative (New Haven:YaleUniversity of ChicagoPress,1994). DemocracyandAmericanNationalGovernment(Chicago:University

Emily Hauptmann 413

be at the heartof democraticpracticegenerallybelievethatthisneitherrequiresnor institutional transformations. Unlikeparticipatory presagesanyfundamental theorists, who imaginedhow a participatory democracywould entailthoroughrestructurings of the workplace,the family,the university and the mass media,72 deliberative theoristsmaintainthatcitizensalreadyhaveat leastpotentialdeliberative forumsin their neighborhoods,politicalparties,consciousness-raising groups,etc. Althoughsome deliberative theoristsarguethata democracycannotbe fullydeliberative unlessthe stateprovidessubsidiesforcitizens'associations,73 othersseem to believethatexisting associationsarealreadyfertilegroundenoughforcitizens'deliberations.74 Deliberativetheoristsbelieve,at the very least, that the constitutional, institutional and associationalbases for a deliberativedemocracyare nearlysecure;the practiceof deliberation, therefore,need promiseonlyreformsbuilton thatbase, not sweeping change. The benefitsof a deliberativedemocracy,accordingto its advocates,are steadybutincremental; theyrangefrommakingpublicofficialsmoreaccountableto theirconstituentsto developinggood reasonsforpeopleto continuecooperatingin collectivedecisionslegitimate. spiteof theirdifferencesto makingnon-unanimous Deliberative theoristshave pareddown participatory visionsof democracyby arguingthattheytaketoo littleaccountof the complexitiesof contemporary society and thereforeend up expectingtoo much of people,endangeringindividualrights and shunningthe legitimateexerciseof authority. Butat the same time,manydeliberativetheoristsreaffirmtheirconnectionto participatory theoryby arguingthat whattheymeanbydeliberationis, afterall,a kindof participation oran essentialprerequisiteto it. Inmakingbothof these moves,deliberative theoristsclaimto be reinthe idealtheoryof democracyby offeringa morerealisticvisionof a sound vigorating democracythan did their predecessors.On its face, this aim is worthwhile;for instance,Bohmanis surelyrightto say thatmanifestlyunattainable politicalvisions can become sterileand uninspiring.75 But by makingone's visionof the political futuremorerealistic,one risks(as Bohmanacknowledges76) dullingandevenlosing one's criticalperspectiveon the worldas it is and,consequently,one'ssense of how it mightbe made better.Deliberative democratshave made the lattererror;while theirtheoriescannotbe criticizedforthe weaknessescharacteristic of utopianpoliticalvisions,theircriticalperspectiveon the worldis too blurredto be useful.

72. See ArnoldS. Kaufman,"HumanNatureand Participatory in TheBiasof Pluralism, Democracy," ed. WilliamE.Connolly(NewYork: Atherton,1969);CarolePateman,Participation andDemocraticTheory; Philip Green, Retrieving Democracy: In Search of Civic Equality; Bachrach, "Interest,Participation,and

Democratic Theory." 73. Cohen,"Procedure and Substancein Deliberative Cohenand Rogers,"Assocations Democracy";

and Democracy"; Mansbridge,"Using Power." 74. Benhabib, "Towarda DeliberativeModelof Democratic Legitimacy";Warren,"DeliberativeDemocracy and Authority";Warren,"What Should We Expect from More Democracy?" 75. Bohman, Public Deliberation, 21. 76. Bohman, Public Deliberation, 8.

414 CANLESSBE MORE?

Atfirst,thisseems a surprisingresult,especiallysince the deliberative democrats on whom I have focused pridethemselveson theirwell-articulated, fine-grained conceptionsof social and politicallife. How could such nuancedconceptionsbe Partof the explanationhas to do withthe role partof a blurredcriticalperspective?77 ideasof social complexityplayin deliberativetheoriesof democracy.As I suggest above,deliberativedemocratsemploythe idea of socialcomplexitylargelyto disideasof what "moredemocracy"oughtto mean. creditthe sweep of participatory Thatis, even when theydo not understandit simplyas an obstacleto democracy, deliberativedemocratsstilluse the idea of socialcomplexityto explainwhy only andwhy theseinitiatives specificvenuescan be viablesitesfordemocraticinitiatives are likelyto be weak.78The primaryfunctionof the idea of social complexityin deliberativedemocratictheories,then, is to restrainand focus democraticambitions. The deliberativedemocratsdiscussedin this essay use the "fact"of social complexitynot so muchto directcriticismtowardsthe complexstructurestheysay arenow givenpartsof ourworldbutto show how criticismcan surviveevenwhen Butgivenhow muchof theirrhetoricalenergy it is embeddedin those structures.79 democraticambitionswill necessarilybe frusthat excessive theyexpendshowing tratedby socialcomplexity,deliberativedemocratscannotmaketheircelebrations of the remainingdemocraticpossibilitieswithina complexsocietysoundcredible. I do not mean to suggestthatany theoryof democracyoughtto offera critical standardor perspectivebywhich to judgethe currentstateof politicallife.Theorists or representsome forsome politicalarrangements may insteadofferjustifications ifwe different that Nevertheless, politicalsystemsembody. generalprinciples many criticalproject.How takedeliberativedemocratsat theirword,theirsis a primarily else is one to read Habermas'scall to arms in the prefaceto Between Factsand Normsthat,difficultthoughthe contemporarypoliticalsituationmay be, its difficultydoes not justify"thedefeatistsurrenderof the radicalcontentof democratic How else the claims of Bohman,Benhabib,Warren,Mansbridgeand ideals"?80 theoristswhile Cohenthattheirworkcontinueson the pathtakenby participatory mistakes? for their correcting Tobe sure,criticalperspectivesvarywidely,as do the ways in whichcriticismis practiced.But to be recognizableas a critic,one must give voice to what one

77. On the pointof how theoriesfocusedon civilsociety"occlude"otherformsof analysis(suchas andOcclusion thosebaseduponclassand the state,see TerrellCarver,"CivilSocietyandClass:Centrality PoliticalSciWorldCongressof the International in Discourseand Practice"(paperpresentedat the XVIII ence Association,QuebecCity,Quebec,August2000). BetweenFactsand Norms,307-8. 78. On theweaknessof the publicsphere,see Habermas, the relationbetweenthe criticalpowerexercisedby groupsin 79. Theproblemof how to understand chapter8 of BetweenFactsand Norms. the publicsphereanda complexsocietyis centralto Habermas's socialcritics,"PublicDeliberaSee especially372.See also Bohman'sdiscussionof the roleof "disclosive tion, 197-236. BetweenFactsand Norms,xlii-xliii. 80. Habermas,

Emily Hauptmann 415

believesis lacking,distorted,unjust,etc., aboutthe objectof one's criticism.Criticism, then, mustbe informedby some standardsforjudgment,some ways to distinguishthe justfromthe unjust,the partialfromthe complete. Itis difficult,however,to ferretout such standardsof judgmentfromthe workof the deliberativedemocratson whom I havefocusedhere.Whatstandardsarewe to use to tellwhethera democraticsystemis moreor less deliberative? Whilemost deliberative democratsareclearenoughaboutwhatsortsof institutionsand norms haveto be presentbeforea deliberative democracycan be possible,theytellus little abouthow to distinguishbetweenthosesystemsinwhicha deliberative democracy is possiblebut non-existent,those in which it existsbutworksbadlyand those in which it workswell. Habermascomes closest to offeringsuch standards,linking "thesuccess of deliberativepolitics"to the healthof civilsocietyand its abilityto influence"institutionalized deliberativeprocesses."Not only must civilsocietybe able to "developthroughwidelydiversifiedand more or less autonomouspublic spheres";"itshould [also] be able to hold its own againstthe two othermechanismsof socialintegration,moneyand administrative power."8' Promisingthoughsuch a standardmayappearto be, Habermas'sapproach(as well as the approachesof those deliberative democratsinfluencedby him) never bringsit to life.Habermaswishesto arguethatthe promiseof democracyin theconworldliesnot solelyin the originalspontaneity of the publicspherebutin temporary andthe institutionalized preservingthe tensionbetweenthisspontaneity procedures thatare necessaryto the liberaldemocraticorder.Buthow is one to tellthata successful balancehas been struck?Specifyingthe standardsby which to judgethe meritsof theproceduresthatareto structure a deliberative democracyis considerably less elusivethantryingto assesswhetherpeoplearemakinguse of themto createa "success[ful]deliberativepolitics."82 Perhapspartiallybecause of the difficultyof assessingthe politicalactivityand influenceexercisedby civilsocietyin the public democratsmakeit seem as if the potentialforsuch activityand sphere,deliberative influenceis nearlyindistinguishable fromitsactualexistence.Inmergingthe potential withthe actualactivityand influenceof civilsocietyin the publicsphere,deliberative democratsblurthe standardsthatinformtheirtheoryof democracy.Howdo we tell a potentially deliberative democracyfroman actuallydeliberative democracy? SeylaBenhabib'sdiscussionof deliberative democracyis a good exampleof this problem.Benhabibfocuseson showinghow "thedeliberative theoryof democracy is nota theoryinsearchof a practice;ratheritis a theorythatclaimsto elucidatesome aspectsof the logicof existingdemocraticpracticesbetterthanothers."83 A deliberativetheoryof democracy,Benhabibargues,allowsone to makesense of the political 81. Habermas,Between Facts and Norms, 298-99.

82. Cohen's"Deliberation and DemocraticLegitimacy" is a good exampleof how earlydeliberative theoryfocusedheavilyon specifyingidealproceduresfordeliberation. 83. Benhabib,"Toward a Deliberative Model,"84.

416 CANLESSBE MORE?

worldas it is andsee whatis mostvaluablein it.WhatBenhabibsees in the contemof modesof assoporarypoliticalworldarea numberof differentgroups,"aplurality "84 andoverlap" to form"ananonymouspublicconversation. ciation,"that"interlock No one would disputethatcontemporarysocietiescontaina numberof different parties,.. . citizens'inigroups;butare the connectionsbetweendifferent"political tiatives... socialmovements,... voluntaryassociations... [and]consciousness-raisstrongand pervasiveenoughto supportan "anonymouspublicconing groups"85 One could perhapsassess the latterclaim if Benhabib'sconceptionof versation"? activdeliberative democracycontaineda standardbywhichto gaugethedeliberative forlegitimatecolThestandards ityof a public;butBenhabiboffersno suchstandard. to all.86 lectivedecisionsarebasedonlyon thosedecisionsbeingopen "inprinciple" Yetsurelya societyin which there is an actual"anonymouspublicconversation" is notoccurringbut fromone inwhichsucha conversation woulddifferconsiderably could "inprinciple"take place. Benhabib'sconceptionof deliberativedemocracy, however,does not offera criticalperspectivefromwhichto see thatdistinction. LikeBenhabib,Jane Mansbridgearguesthata vibrantdeliberativedemocracy arenas"bothinsideandout of its politmustcontaina largenumberof "deliberative is clearlynot satisfiedwiththe currentstateof WhileMansbridge icalmainstream.87 such deliberativearenasin contemporarydemocracies,she believesthat a good numberalreadyexist. She thereforecalls for publicsubsidiesto supportexisting arenasas well as to assistthe emergenceof new ones.88Eachof these deliberative enclaves,Mansbridge argues,shouldbe seen as the placewhere citizens"struggle and also as the source of theirpower to to understandwhat is just and unjust"89 resist"thevery coercionthey need."90But again,like Benhabib,Mansbridgeprovidesno criticaltoolsthatwouldallowus to discernwhether,as theycurrentlyexist, deliberativeenclaves (and the connectionsbetween them) are strongenough to supportthe functionsshe hopes theymightperform. This problem comes up again in MarkWarren'sconceptualizationof how authoritycan be exercisedbut also containedin a deliberativedemocracy.Warren arguesthatbecause a deliberativedemocracyallows individualsto "allocatetheir deliberativeresourcesto the issues and spheres they find relativelyimportant," publicofficialswill findthemselveschallenged,theirexerciseof authoritycalledto accountby peoplewho aretrulyinterestedin the areasa rangeof officialsoversee.91 But like both Benhabiband Mansbridge,Warrenprovidesno means for distin-

a Deliberative Model,"73-74;emphasisin original. 84. Benhabib,"Toward a Deliberative Model,"73. 85. Benhabib,"Toward a Deliberative Model,"69-70. 86. Benhabib,"Toward 87. Mansbridge, "UsingPower,"56-57. 88. Mansbridge, "UsingPower,"59. 89. Mansbridge, "UsingPower,"59. 90. Mansbridge, "UsingPower,"56. 58. 91. Warren,"Deliberative DemocracyandAuthority,"

Emily Hauptmann 417

guishinga societyin which the potentialforchallengeexistsfromone in which it is exercisedin a way thateffectivelysubjectsauthoritiesto democraticcontrols.Fora deliberativedemocracyof the kind conceived by Warrento begin to "contain, there must be a significantnumberof people check, and chasten authority,"92 keenlyinterestedin a wide varietyof issues over a long periodof time. Warren's own formulationimplies,however,that for every "interesting" issue, there are a numberof othersthatarethatmuchmorethe provinceof expertsbecauseno significantnumberof people findsthem consistentlycompelling.To show that the focusedinterestof citizenscan containauthorityin theway he claims,Warrenmust firstdemonstrateboththatcitizeninterestwill indeedspringup in mostof the areas in which authorityis exercisedand what sortsof conditions(its modes of expression, intensity,etc.) citizeninterestmustmeet to be an effectivechastenerof public Butas is the case with otherdeliberative authority. democrats,Warrenblursthe distinctionbetweenthe conditionssufficientforhisvisionof a deliberative democracy and those merelynecessaryto it. WhileCohen'searliestdiscussionsof deliberative democracyexplicitlyarticulated what conditionswould haveto be met forhis visionof a deliberative democracyto be realized,hismorerecentworkretreatsfromoccupyingsucha criticalperspective. Thevisionof the politicalfutureCohenandRogerscall"associative democracy"is in its self-proclaimed a more modest one than the socialistvisionCohen practicality arguedin 1989followedfromhis conceptionof a deliberative democracy.Forone, Cohenand Rogersmaintainthateven in the UnitedStateswithits "strongly anti-collectivistpoliticalculture,... weak state,and ... civilsocietydominatedby (relatively disorganized)businessinterests,"one findsclearsignsof associativedemocracy,if not itsfullrealization.93 Evenforthe UnitedStates,then,an associativedemocracyis fartherwithin the realmof politicalpossibilitythan was Cohen'searliersocialist vision.Andwhen Cohenand Rogersturnto explicatingwhat some elementsof a fullyrealizedassociativedemocracywouldlooklike,it is alsoclearthattheirvisionis a decidedlymoremodestone thanthe one Cohenarticulated in 1989.Forexample, they arguethat in an associativedemocracy,the organizationof workerswould Whilethe typesof improvement CohenandRogersspellout (likelow"improve."94 eringthe barriersto unionizationand increasingthe socialwage) would be significant departuresfromcurrentpracticein the UnitedStates,their1993visionis considerablymore modest than Cohen's 1989 vision of how a commitmentto deliberative democracyentaileda commitmentto workerself-management. AlthoughCohenhas continuedto be morespecificthanotherleftistdeliberative democratsaboutthe powersthatassociationsin a deliberativedemocracyshould be allowedto exercise (and the extentto which associationsin the UnitedStates 92. Warren,"Deliberative 58. DemocracyandAuthority," 93. Cohenand Rogers,"Associations and Democracy," 301-3. 94. Cohenand Rogers,"Associations andDemocracy," 303-6.

418 CANLESSBE MORE?

currentlylacksuch powers),associationalreformno longerplaysso centrala part in Cohen'sconception of deliberativedemocracy.Whereas Cohen and Rogers arguedin 1993that the realizationof a deliberativedemocracydependedupon a markedincreasein associationalpower,Cohenhas morerecentlyemphasizedhow strongerassociationscould help reconcilethe tensionamongthe valuesdemocrathe pursuitof thecommongood and individualliberty.95 cies placeon participation, Thismost recentelaborationof Cohen'sconceptionof deliberativedemocracy is also his mostcautious.A deliberative democracy,in Cohen's1996view,is a politwithinlocal associations;the ical systemstructuredto fostercitizenparticipation deliberationsof these local associationsare then to be tappedto providethe substance of nationalpolicy and to secure its legitimacyas a collectivedecision. conon the deliberative view,is a frameworkof socialandinstitutional "Democracy, ditionsthatfacilitatesfreediscussionamongequalcitizens-by providingfavorable conditionsforparticipation, association,andexpression-and ties the authorization to exercisepublicpower (andthe exerciseitself)to such discussion-by establishof politicalpower ing a frameworkensuringthe responsivenessand accountability to it throughregularcompetitiveelections,conditionsof publicity,legislativeoverportionof Cohen'sconceptionis how the sight,and so on."96The undertheorized to exercisepublicpower (andthe exerciseitself)"is indeedtied "to "authorization such discussion";the responsibilitiesCohenthinksassociationsshould take over fromgovernmentaremuchtoo limitedin scope to be the sourceof the exerciseof all publicpower.97Ratherthan a philosophicaljustificationfor socialismor even institutional reform,Cohen'sconceptionof deliberativedemocracyhas become a In this latestaccount,the of theory legitimacywith limitedreformistprescriptions. an describe to come has term "deliberative apparentlylargeclass of democracy" the common to balance good with individualliberty politicalsystemsattempting moreor less successfully,ratherthana specificset of criticismsof the politicalpresent or a visionforthe politicalfuture. Thereis more criticalpower in Bohman'saccountof deliberativedemocracy, but it is cautiouslypresentedand difficultto apply.Forinstance,Bohmanoften favorsa "reconstructive" approachto explaininghis conceptionof deliberation, doing retrospectiveanalysesof eventsin Americanhistoryto emphasizeits pracBohmanjustifiesthis approachby sayingthat he means to "providea ticality.98 about improvingactual deliberativepractices as they currently to think way Ratherthan seeing than a utopia projectedinto the future."99 "rather exist," modernsocieties as a set of nearlyinsurmountableobstaclesto the achievement

andSubstancein Deliberative Democracy." 95. See Cohen,"Procedure 99. andSubstancein Deliberative Democracy," 96. Cohen,"Procedure 111-12. andSubstancein Deliberative Democracy," 97. Cohen,"Procedure 241;67-69. 98. Bohman,PublicDeliberation, 241. 99. Bohman,PublicDeliberation,

Emily Hauptmann 419

of democratic ideals, Bohman maintains that "these ideals should now be locatedwithinmoderninstitutionsand theirpublics,ratherthanoutsideof them and opposed to them. Once we look to already-existingpractices and their potentialfor deliberation,we can see that increasingthe scope of democratic participationand equalityin decision makingis still an indispensablegoal for pluralisticand complex societies."100 ButalthoughBohmanis determinedto set eminentlyachievablestandardsfor deliberationandshow how currentpracticeshaveat leastthe potentialformeeting them, he also shows how his conceptionof deliberationgeneratesspecificrecommendationsforpoliticalchange.Forexample,Bohmanspecifiesa numberof "diakindsof situationsor aboutparlogicalmechanisms"for deliberatingin particular ticularclasses of problems.'10 Bohmandescribeseach mechanismonly in general terms;but his doing so shows how deliberationcould be understoodas a set of related,context-specificinteractionsratherthan,as is morecommonlythe case, as the broadestof labelsformanykindsof politicalactivity.Thespecificityof Bohman's concept of deliberationmakes it a promisingcriticaltool; it might,for instance, allow one to distinguishbetween conditionsthatare only potentiallydeliberative and those thathavefulfilledtheirpotential. Togroundhis conceptionof deliberationfurther,Bohmanarguesthatinsteadof relyingon an abstractstandardof publicor reasonablejustification,deliberation oughtto be judgedsuccessfulinsofaras those involvedcontinueto cooperate,even when some havenot gottentheirway: "Whenit succeeds,deliberationproducesa sharedintentionthatis acceptableto a plurality of the agentswho participatein the activityof formingit. ... Eachamonga pluralityof deliberatingagentscan accept such a goal or outcome to the extentthathe can recognizehis own intentionsas partof the deliberativeactivity,even if it is not directlya partof its specificoutcome."'02Here,Bohmanappearsto be movingtowardsa criticalstandardof the kinddescribedabove;to what degreecan peoplecurrently"recognize[their]own intentionsas partof the deliberativeactivity"? Bohmananswers,"Ina deliberative could be citizens as a method for formingjoint democracy,voting regardedby intentions."'03 Butapparently the dominantelectoralsystemin the U.S.fallsshortby this standard;as Bohmannotes in his conclusion,"winner-take-all, one-personone-voteelectionswill producepermanentminoritiesin the absenceof institutional reformsand changes in votingprocedures."'04 Inthis case, Bohman'sdeliberative idealdirectsone to rejectan existingpracticein favorof another;indeed,any practice thatdoes not take politicalinequalitiessufficientlyinto accountand does not

100. 101. 102. 103. 104.

Bohman, Public Deliberation, 247. Bohman, Public Deliberation, 59-65. Bohman, Public Deliberation, 56. Bohman, Public Deliberation, 56. Bohman, Public Deliberation, 243. See also the longer discussion of this issue, 96-99.

420 CANLESSBE MORE?

striveto ensurecontinuedparticipation amongall affectedgroupsought,Bohman suggests,to be rejectedor seriouslyrevised.'05 BecauseBohmanbelievesthatpublicdeliberationcan occurand thrivein pluthe focusedcriticalpowerof his ralistic,complexsocieties,however,demonstrating conceptionof deliberationis not his overridingconcern.Rather,Bohmanis more intenton demonstrating thatthe publicin a contemporarydemocracycan potentiallybe flexibleandreasonableenoughto adoptnew practicesthatmorefullyrealize deliberativeideals.'06 Butas with otherdeliberative theoristsof the left,Bohman providesonlyoccasionalhintsas to how a communitythatdid indeedfullyrealize these idealswould differfromour own and consequently,only partialassurance that"improving actualdeliberativepracticesas theycurrentlyexist"is the best way to extendand deependemocracy.

III. Conclusion Leftistdeliberativedemocratsstandin a difficultrelationto participatory theory. Theircriticismsof theirpredecessorsarethorough,evenfundamental; yet the deliberativedemocratsI havediscussedhere stillclaima strongconnectionto the radical visionof a participatory democracytheycriticize.Tobe sure,all criticismis not critic a disavowal; thorough maywish to reviveratherthandestroythe objectof her criticism.Leftistdeliberativedemocrats,however,paredown the idealstheyclaim democratsso thoroughlythattheircriticismsof themdo to sharewith participatory not revivethose ideals, even in an alteredform. Deliberativedemocratictheory shouldthereforebe understoodas a significantdeparturefromparticipatory theory ratherthanan updatedrestatementof it. theorybutto Myconcernherehas not been to defendthe tenetsof participatory democratshaverejectedthosetenetsin orderto begin show how leftistdeliberative democratsdrawattention constructinga distincttheoryof democracy.Deliberative to a numberof the weaknessesof participatory theory,rangingfromits tendency towardsnostalgiafor simplersocieties to its incompletetreatmentsof individual rightsand authority.Theirown theoriesof democracyaim to show how deliberaof is the keyto the fulfillment tion,as a morefocusedformof politicalparticipation, set a more realistic to In their desire societies. in ideals democratic present complex of democraticidealsand a more practicalprogramfor theirfulfillment,however, leftistdeliberativedemocratshavefashioneda theoryof democracylackingcritical theoristsof democracyare notable perspective.As I haveshown, leftistdeliberative to tell us muchaboutwhat is wrongwiththe politicalworldand,consequently,can tell us littleabouthow we mightmakeit better.

105. Bohman, Public Deliberation, 96. 106. See Bohman, Public Deliberation, chap. 5.

Emily Hauptmann 421

Theseare not justminorshortcomings.Ifthe workof deliberativedemocratsis theory,then deliberative widely seen as continuingthe projectof participatory democratswill be able to define the boundariesof radicaldemocracywithout admittingthatthese boundarieshaveshrunk.Tomany,the cautiousnessof deliberativedemocratictheorymayseem justified;nevertheless,cautiousnessit is-and a cautiousnessthatdullsthe theory'scriticaledge. Deliberative democratsarguethat a markedlyless sweepingapproachto realizingdemocraticidealsthanthose advocatedby participatory democratsis morerealisticandultimatelybetterat achieving "more democracy." Once one sees, however, how deliberative democrats use the

idea of socialcomplexityto restraindemocraticambitionsand thata potentialfor deliberativedemocracycannoteasilybe distinguishedfromits realization,the paradox disappears;less is stillless.