Building Rules
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Building Rules
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ding Ru How Local Controls Shape Community Environments and Economies
Kee Warner and Harvey Molotch
A Member of the Pcneus Books Group
Some of the materials included in this book were publislned in eartier forms by tlw Catfortzriil &/icy Srrninllr (Warner and MoXotcl-t, 1992) and the Urbbin q f a i r s R P U ~(Warner ~ U ~ and Molotch, 1995). Pho2ograplns are by Kee Warner, All rights reserved, Printed in tlne United States of America. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmined in any form or by any means, electronic or mecl~anical,including photocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from tlne publisher, Co)pyxlight O 2000 by Wwtview Press, A Member of tlw Perseus Books Grotip Publislned in 2200 in the United States of Amex-icaby Westview Press, 5500 Central Avenue, Boulder, Colorado 80301-2877, and in the United Kingdom by Mieswiew Press, 12 Hid's Coyse Road, Cumnor Hill, Oxford. OX2 9Jf Find us o n the Wc'trfd Wide Web at www~w~tvie-~rpress.com A CE' catalog record f o r this book is available from the Libray of Cc~ngress.
The paper used in this ptiblication meets the rquirements of tlne American National Standard for Pemanence of Paper for P ~ n t e dLibrary Materials 239.48-19%.
For Katy and Eua Rose S!zana and N o ~ h
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Contents
1
The Relevmce of Regulation
Environmmtalism as Local Urge, 4 The Critique: Stranglers of the Economy 7 Economy Versus t h Ewironment: Some Past Findings, 12 Local Regulation and Urban meory, 46 Assessing I<eguiat-ion,21) Flan of the Book, 21; 2
Sites Idearningfrom Southern Cdifomia, 23 Selectkg Study Sites, 25 Identi.Eying h w t h Controls, 2% Smta Basbara South Coast, 30 Santa Manica, 36 The Riverside Area, 44 Growth Controls in Piace: A. Summary, 50
3
Ilas Growth Been Stopped? Not Much First Findings: Rates of Crowth, 52 Testing the Power of Growth Restrictions, 56 An Alternative Testing Strategy, 57
4
Power to Build: How Cities Grow Under Growth Control
59
Growth mrough Symbolic Growth Control, 60 Growth mrough Episodic Growth Control, 62 Growth n r o u g h Counterwaihg Policies, 64 Growth mrough Developer Initiatives, 64 The Context of Control: Comparatke Power Ahmtages, 69 The Wys of Growth, 23 viz
5
Project Peddling: m a t Gets Approved and FXow Pedd1in.g Around with Our Projects, 80 What Gets Approved and How 80 Project Environmental Reviews, 95 Local &owledge Base for Planning Decisions, 100 Resisting Growth: A Matter cJf Degree, 101
6
Endirect EHects: How Buil.ding Rules Make Growth Different Traffic, 105 Natural Limits, 108 Mordable Housing, 109 Srrxliaf Eyuity, 112 Urban Spatial Form, 117 Project Aesthetics, 120 Exactions on the Gromd: A Tally Between Places, 122
7
Building the Rules
E~&mcingthe Quality sl:Public Decisio~~s, 130 Regulation as Economic Boon, 132 Grounding Sustainabifity, 133 M o W;uls WatN135 Makbg Markets Slnarter, 141 Valuing Land alld Community 143 Balmcing Commercial m d Public hterests, 145 ? B h g Stock of Local Contmk, 146 Appendix A : hleasurz'n'q Growth Control fsuzpacts Notes to Apel~dIXA Appendix B: Chmologies of Grtlritlh Cor-lfml Appendix C: Commercial Val~iatz'on Data, 197&3 990 Appendix D: Resz'de~tialBrrildi-rzg Rates Appefl'itx E; Case S t ~ l d yDetails Appendix F: Itzterviezu Schedule Xeferetzct. Lfsi fE ~ P X
104
Tables and Illustrations
Ttrbkes
2.1
Profile of major cities
3.1
Percent hcrease hretail sales, 1971-1989
5.1 Project descriptions 5.2 Responses to routine and best-case projects proposed to each city 5.3 Routine use of environmental review 6.1 Case-by-case use of exactions 5.2 Use of exactions by praject m d by type
A.l Predicting local residential building rates: coefficients and f t-ratios)
Fig~tres 2.1 Map of study sites 3.1 Commercial development trends, 1970-1990 3.2 Residential bui1dhg rates, 1971-1990 A.1 A.2. A.3 A.4 A.5
Growth control measures Ideal model Model one Model two Model three
Smta Barbara city view
Smta Barbasa beachfront an Cabrillo Arvenue
Pacific Caast Highway in Smta Monica Smta Monica Place Mall hlmd Empire? National Bank sign Teenagers in downtown Riverside Mormo Valley sprawl Shgle-family areas in Santa Monica Parkhg at Barbara Plaza and Monirra Tawer Barbara Plaza Monica Tower Everside Arms Rmcho"**Barbara Monica*"*Centre Everside***Placemdeveloped site Undergraund garlcing at Monki-i***Gentre Houskng constructio~~ in Santa Barbara %-site child case at MonicaX.**Centre Homeless man in front sf Monica Tower Smta Monica of,llce construction Smta Ballbara i-nfiil development Downtown Smta Barbara architectural style
Acknowledgments We are grateful for the support of the California Policy Seminar, which funded our field ~searclhand published our initial report. We dscr apprcciate Che ongoing szlpport of colleaglles and staff of the departments of sociology and the li:brasies of t h University of Colorado at Colorado Springs and the University of CaIifomia, Santa Barhara. W had excellent help from a nurnber of =search assistants: Qista Paulsen, A. R. Idategala, Nancy Uesser, Cathy Oakes, M a y Rxiera, Caroline White, :Rebecca Wypseck, and Ruth Jackscm M a y crrleagues contributed comments, critiques, and suggestions, incIudi,ng Richard Appelbaum, Hal h n s o n , Williarn Bielby, Rob Nuster, David Daz, 7: Rykm Grattet, Bob Hughes, Rub411 Martillez, Joseph Martorana, h4a-x:Neiman, Sergio Key Jr., Robert Sollen, and Mark Shibley. Wr;. bellefiled as weil from the comments of reviewers frnm the Culfarlrin Policy Review, the Urban Aflairs Xeviezu, and Westview Press. We appmciate fie professionalism of the Westview staff m d their enthusiasm for this book. Thank you to our local informants FR the Santa Barbara, Santa Monica, and Kiversicitz area who provided extraordinary commibent to this endtavor. We hope this book will be of value to them and to the many peaplc working to build quality in cornunities and to pmtect natural: envirrmments. Deepest thanks go to our families for suppcrrtinl; this project from beghning to end.
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The Relevance of Regulation
111 the United States and much of the industrial world, business leaders, politicians, and large seg~aentsof the pubIic question etforts to regulate economic actkities for the pmtection of natural environments. Even though some environmentalists thnlink the protections that have been enacted fall, woefully short of crea.t.jngsustahable human settlcms~b,regulation critics attack the programs and policies that have been implemented as unjustified interfercmce in the ways people produce and consume. Land usc? regulation-h particular the rules governing urban growth and develrzpment-is one particularly tangible terrain on which this battle is being fout;ht. This book reports (m just how this highly ccmtroversid form of intervention in the economy has operated in terms of either enhancing iocal communities and their environments or undermining their economies. Writh~gat a time when rczgutation is seen as the encmy of economies, we specify withi,n the realm, oC land usc and in the delmited but important region of the world we study-Southern Catifomia-just how r e d a t i o n and markets have operated together. We illustrate what happens h e n the regulation of city building increases and the effects of this regulation on an economic sphere with major stakes for wedth creation and potential h r far-reaching social and enwironmental consequences. The creation of wealth in regulated contexts is, of course, not neweither im lmd use or any other realm. :Marketspresuppose the basic social order that guarantees property t-hrough contract; i,n thc case of real estate, cmrnescial value requires not only deeds backed by g o v e r n & force but also the i~~frt-tstructure of roads and other foms of access that create economic utiljty. Going one step farther down the slippery but inevitable road of regulation, deeds and access mean nothing if their value can be destroyed by the acts of others, as when an upstream user diverts a common waterway or a neighbor p e r d o m xtivities so noxious that they seriously cornproHlise the ability to use and enjoy one" own property.
2
The Relevance of ReguIalio:orz
:In the economists"ems, actors in the marketplace can generate externalities, neighbarhood effects, or spil1owrs.l To preserve trhe very orcier of the market, these oftenses must be publicly controlled, either by preventing them in the first place or by otherwise providing relief for the victim+this is the ""cMltra1 pmblem of land use lawf"(Platt, 1996: 40). 'The U.S. Supreme Court sustained aonhg laws originally in order to prevent a slaughteshouse from damagixlg the neighbors' land values. From the reascming of that case, the way was cleared for a wide range of interventions whenever private lmd use had negative impacts on neighboring uses and, by further extension, on the community good. Beyond the immecfiate stench of the dau@terhouse, we know that virtuaXly all uses of lmd generate spitlover effects, good and bad, near and far, complexly ecological or merely annoying to other human beings. These effects intersect in multiple and synergistic ways, over time and over distmces great and small. If a homeowner cuts down a tree, the immediate neighbors have a poorer (or better) view; a landowner who dear-cuts can stimulate soif erosion that buries the neig:hbor"s house under an eroded hillside. 'The loss of a u1?iqzte lncal habitat can set in motion far-reaching ecologicd consequences. :For example, Ellwood Grove, north of Santa BaTbara, is one of a few overwintering sites for mcmarch butterflies that xnigrate thousands of miles thr0uglnou.t. the western United States-a rallying point for environmentalists concerned with nearby development glms. No actor or even set of actors produces smog; it rclsdts when &verse people take actions that lend to the elnission of specific chemicals that come together with sunshhe and other natural. elements to produce a qualitathely differat phenomenon-a negative synergy occws. These m the dramatic realities of Ecolngy 101. But virtually any human actiun on the land., mundme or spectacular, yields consequences that cmly our ignorance keps from view. Even with the field still. hits hlancy; ecological analysts are co~~stmtly uncovering the complex range of potential external effects-aesthetic, culturat, wonornic, and ecotogical-of human actions, and these ecrrlogical discoveries lead environme~~talists to advocate new restraints on development. The "perpetual crisis," as Wendell Berry (1945: 65) puts it, caused by "'our p s e n c e in this varied and fertile w d d ... foxes u p m us constmt.ly a virtual cwricuhm o( urgent questio~zs,"'The ongoing and inkterminate character of understanding environnnental impacts frustrates the hear-minded, wbo think that policy should be '"done,'"hat constraints on the economy &odd be mhimat and =Bled, or that environnnental protection should be, once and for all, accompljskd. By requiring a specifie enviro ental fmpact review (E",) before individual projects involving federal lands or federal funding couXd be built, the 1970 National Environmental Policy Act f NEPA) institutionalizecS. this
indeterminacy, at least for certain developments. ETRs have become a tool for the continuous m d contentious development of additional enwir0mem.t.d h w l e d g e , whereby the ul-rfolding ol answers c m e s .from experts in various realms, but also from ordjnary people directly understanding their environments by adopting scientific metl.iods-""popular epidemiology," as it has been called in the case of residentsydiag~~oses of local environmental health hazards (Szasz, 1994). Growth contml has become a mechanism, perhaps a crude one, to eteat with the perceived negative spiJLovers of urban growth. In its most sjmple and, as we will see, rare configuration growth control attempts simply to freeze the action. Developers lken this to pulling up the drawbridge. Stopping development, even cofd and altogether, becomes one understandable alternative, especially when people do not randerstmd the ecological consevences of development or when they have little faith that. govemcmts will properly mitigate the effects that urir known.The more common variations of growth control we describe in coming chapters embody a skepticism toward the development process and a break with past na"ivet4 about spillaver potentials. Connpared with the public sentiment about other topics, the concern mtal effects of develqmmt is not shaflw. Surveys cJf American public opinion show continued widespread concern &out pollution problems and the belief that government h u l d , play an active role (Ernes Ml'mr, 1990, 1994). According to the 3998 Mtional Envircmof m e ~ ~ tEducation al and Training Fau~zdation/RoperSurvey; 62 perce~~t h r i r a n s believe that environmental pmtection m d economic development can go hmd in hand. If f o ~ e d to choose one or the other, 21 percent would choose the enviro ent (Coyle, 1998: 2). Majorities of p e q l e m willing to see more federal funding for control mechmisxns (Emm Mirrclq 1990) m d arc. willhg to pay mortr for goods to better serve envimm e ~ ~ tgoals a l (Times Mz'mv, 1994). Almost u ~ ~ i q u arna e based issues of the last decades, suppwt for the envir bomdaries of race, class, and gender and persists, even as support for other cwses of both left and right (e.g., civil rights, balanced budgets) come and go (Van Liere and Dunlap, 1980). In a rare display of personal commftment, people also have chmged some of their own habits, sorthg garbage h t o separate containers, sometimes taking it on their own to recycling centers, and recycling enough waste to substmtial.lyrcduce p ~ s sures on landfills (now agproaching a one-t-hird reductim in some communities). In, no other realm of public life havc indjviduals changed their behavior like this-usually for no reason beyond wanting to do the right thing. 011e of the first realms where ccrnserwatiw Republicans were forced to backtrack h their mid-1998s ""Contract with Ameriea'bas h their efforts to roll. back environmentd pmtection.
4
The Relevance of ReguIalio:orz
Growth rightfully takes the blame fur mundane local difficulties, like efkcts on air quaiity a d traffic congestion c ~ just r changing the "feel" or ""character"of comunities. People also perceive other problem, like crime, to be caused by growth; even though research does not support such reasoning, tbe belid belps build the movements against developm e ~ ~Cb t . more subtle ground, publks grow in their u~~derstandbg that what were once taken as "acts of God" involve acts of development, Forest fires cltestmy homes built in the paths of what we n w know to be events of natural regeneration; "out of control"" water sweeps away whole towns built h flaod plains by professional developers; in the arid West, overlnuflding cltrains local water supplies creating 'Qroutrgts" wit-;hinthe normal precipitation cycle, leadkg to the imposition of water conservation measures m d to the high costs of securing alternate sources of water. fncreasingI?I,these difficulties raise the possibility- that to make development more harmonious with nature the^ should be changes in the way cities grow. For all sorts of Easms, then, some profound and sorne trivial, some quite correct and others off the mark, s m e wged by nationaf experts and some dcrived from local experience, enviromental awareness has filtered into public consciousness. Although suspicions abound that intervention hurts society and ecmonnies, there is parallel suspicion that life, community, and earth can not be left merely to markets, We suspect that these two perspectives, h o w w r paradoxical, coexist not only h the m e cities and communities but w i t h m n y individuals. CIarif@g the effects of regulation may help assuage dilemmas at both the levels of policy and individual consciousness.
Environmentalism as LocaZ Urge 'The masures we deal with are locaf-those who focus on glob& crises might say "merely local." But local policies have impacts on larger realms. Macro-economies, of course, result from concrete economic activities that must occur somewhere. The cumulative effects of local regulation add up to impacts for the economy overall, a point obviously not lust m the critics oE regulation. But the same is true for cumulative ecological effects. 'The way cities grow determines, for example, the need for cars, "nw much they are driven, m d the specific meteorological environments into vvhich their exhaust will flow-including the amount of ""grecnbottsegasses'produced and their effecb on global warming. The form, settlements take shapes the use of all sorts of environmental resolarces, not only fossil fuels but land, habitatrs, water, air, a d , on the other end, the produ,di,on m d disposal of the array of h m a n "wastes." The particu%arsof settlement shape consumption of all sorts, including
the very need. for such durable goods as cars, lawnmowers, and air c d i tiowrs, and the capacity of land-fib to absorb the aftermath of conszxmpli.on. The size, configmation, and political organization of cities influence the capacity for regicznalism; the ability of particular mgiond settlements to be more self-sufficient dhinishes broader environmental impacts. Local development-its overall scale, the materials used, the amount of energy required, the waste produced-reverberates throllgh m d around fie earth. The local scene is also an. important settkg for action and social change that can redirect these development processes; it makes sense that environrnental pohtics begins 117 the backyard. Locality is the learnhi; site and, by necesgty, the place where new ways of life can. be tnied and witnessed. At the same time, the social, pditical, and econmic osganizatjon of urban growth offers people a m d e l for relations with nature more (jenerdy. True, distant catastrophic environmentd threats to human life-like the nuclear crisis at Tl~reeMile Island and the poisonjng at BhopaI, hdia--also teach and inspire action. But such stclricts7mpact c m e s not just from the fact that an agitated world press tells what happened, but horn local populatims~imaginhgsthat such tragedies could happen "right here at home.'" NeMIs of wars among distant peoples, imagiz~edas driven by primordial hatreds or schemes of tyrannical regimes, has only weak implications for those who think they live h staZlle democracies among more or less masonable people. But people take djstixnt human-madc envirnnmmtal crises to be appljcable to their own communities, Chernohyl set back nuclear development across the democratic world, even where the technology was far more soyhisticated and the monitoring systems more competent. Risk assessment studies show repeatedly that people fear most that which they can not control-for example, their airplane's safety compared to slipping in the shower (see, for exmple, Starr, 1969). 'They have special concern and anger ovcr those risks they think others could m d should have controlled-adding still another dimension to trouhles perceived as coming from human-made develoipment. The local also matters, both as a force and site of environmental study, because it is the cauldron where diverse constituencies negotiate their competing needs and form coalitions. Race and class divisinns create a challenge for any type of social movemnt, especially those without resources of great weaith and corporate power. A =form movement like environxnenlalism, wl.rich chalfe~zgesmajor econolnic interests and those who depend m their campaign contributions, can afford to alienate few other constibencies. By embracing fie concerns of low-income and minority populations, urban enviro entalists can bolster "e~zvironmental ental quality more effectively. justice" and address commmity envir
Q
The Relevance of ReguIalio:orz
Inner city communities do bear the biggest urban environmental impacts; they are disproportionately bisected by freewayt;, built on land permeated by poisonous byproducts of industrializat-ion,arid more likely to be adjacent to locations chosen for garbage dumps and incinerators." By defending inner cities as a vital part of the urhan ecosystem, envircmmelntal organizations broaden, their base. By preventing (or rernediating) these hot spots of mvim entaX degraclation, they also control pollution mom efficienCLy by a d k s s i n g the problem dose to its source. This is still anothcr result of envirnnmentd h o d e d g e : Source reductim protects those, human and otherwise, more distant. Naive and sentimental "Rambi projects'" tbat securcz the woods around a manor house do not become the prinzary focus of enviromentd reform. Responding to the needs of diverse local usban groups not d y wards off a triiiial environmentalism, but aiso helps build larger coalitions that go beymd envizonmelntal issues. The most intense and rclpeated citizen resistance comes in reaction to specific devebpmc.nts+ften duht7ed LtiLUs tl,ocally Undesira:ble Lmd Uses). But the Z,UL"U category has become more inclusive over the past generation (Rlumberg and Gottlieb, 1989; Hamilton, 3990; Filler, 1991.). Newly wakened constituencies t h a t plans not only for toxic dumps and prisms but also for wfiat were once llCterly uncontested types of development, like university campuses, private =search faciIities, luxury homes, and sports facilities. M e t h e r as a cover for m m selfish motives or because of an authentic vision (or both), cri.tizens fight to keep wetlands htact or an endangemd species-habitat undisturbed. .A millionaire%house on wetlands becows as much an offender as a publjc housing project in a single-family zone. The array of LU'IdU'sthus grocvs as communities define and defend a range of valued local qualities, including nabral ecologies, In ou,s most immediate experience, Chc "envirorlment" is in the breath of air we take, the view before our eyes, the nuise that enters our ears, and the odors that reach our nostrils. Despite envircrnnlental organizations' ambitious involvement in national. and international policy making, localities are where we sense the environment. When people are suspected of reacting to these smsate impulses, t h y can be accused by mom practical business people (and even some environmentalists) of "ernotiondism" or of not seeing '"he big picture." halternative is to view the quality of these experiences as the wry essence of life, certainly as c w i a l in practice as any of thc mtificial products that c o m fmm defihg these experiences or ixnitating them thmugh anerchandise m d commercial entertainments. These intrinsically local connections with "naturerff whether based in wason, emotion, or both, offer fertile grolmds for ekallenging conventiond methods of building urban environments,
Wendell Berry-poet, farmer, and social commentator-warns that the celebrated bumper sticker 'Think Globally, Act Locallyf3s too mechanical in its local-global split. It may di,stract envirclnmentalists from the need to think a~zdact locally in order to create necessar). changes in the local and ~ g i o n aamnas l where they can and should be effective (Creedon, 1,993).The ifnmensity of glob& issues can leave reformrs defeated or can become a form. of m r e symbolic politics, waged through the convenience of bumper stickers, Sierra Club dues, and platitudes. Growth controt groups, allhough typicatly short of Berry5 depth of understanding, are-whatever els focused on the local in both their thinking and their acting. The results of such local. thin:king and doing have gone beyond any particular locality by dint of their volume. As early as 19721,over ,2QO U.S. jurisdictions had adopted some form of growth control (Logan and Zhott, 1989: 461,; C o h , 1,979). By 1988,150 localities in Ca1ifomia done had enact& control measures (Glickfeld and Levine, 1990: 5). By mother count, environmental groups were sufficiently organized in about one foutth of ail, Californja crjties to make significarrt irnpacts on growth policies (Clask and Goetz, 1994). The costtent of local, policies ranged considerably in restrictiveness and scope, but, by one indic.ator, 10 percent of Cafgornia jurisdjctions had adapted explicit population growth caps by 1990 (Glickfeld and Levine, 1990: 23). Altbuugh exclusive subusbs have long engaged in some f o m of density and growth limits (indeed such was their raison d'etse), this new wave of lmd-use cmtrol involves a far more diverse array of communj.ties: old towns and new, central cities and fringe, white and minority, s m d and very lafge, Even where envirmmentalists did not take control-and this was certainly the case in the great majority oi U.S. localities-til;htened proceduses did at least gain twholds in many plaes, and with them c m e new types of orientatims. The fight for local clmtrols has been a proving gromd for people who then move on to state and natimaI policy reahs, both. as activists in national g m u p m d as members of state legislames and federai agencies. 'The grow& contml movemcnt thus not only has the potential for thanging local policy but fos alterhg the ideological stripe of state and national civic life. W r e m , then, to the issue of scale: By virtut-, of their content, repetition, and sponsors, the potential impacts of local controls become large-not always global but certainly well beyond mere pmchjal interest.
The Cxitique: GtrangXexs af the Econmy 'The perception that controls were hdeed becomhg cornmo~~place, moving beymd. the traditional suburbs of the exclusionary rich to a more
8
The Relevance of ReguIalio:orz
general urban ordelr, helped bring m the mid-1990s reaction of deregulation and government downsking. In the United States, a need to build the economy dnmjnated the news, particularly in prjor high-growth zones like Ga1iforni.a-also the leader of the country" eenvirmmentajist r e h m . . Followkg an incmasingly pe"va"ive ecmomistic logic, some deduced that whezz localities limit either the amount or the conditions af development, some bushesses may be killed off Atogether-taking with them jobs and needed housing. By t-he s m e ~asoning,if enviro rulcs raise production costs at hctories, t-hc goods will be priced hjgbes and markczts will be lost to pIaces Labmad with more favorable busir~ess cfimates. Jobs and corporate tax dollars will evaporate, leaving unemployment, wellare costs, and homelessness in their wake. So runs the newly invigorated artgument for being up the hidden hands to have their way with the social and physical landscape. Even jn the former strongholds of elzvi,ronmentalis1n,the language of '"rebuil.ding the local economy" ccame to replace, or at least overlap, the exprc-rssed concctm for quality of life and environmental protection. "Business""became the buzzword for political candidates of virtualty any str;tpe; in the 1994 California elections, nearly five times as mmy candidates listed their occupations with business desipations (e.g., "usinesswoman, busiaessnnan"")illn the next largest occupatiorz being teacher or school official.$Desipations like ""attorney" and "public officiaX" "(much less ""environmentalist" or "activist'" fell from usage, as pcrli~ciane;leamed. to play up eve13 marghd busincss roles as the best identiy for a ballot victory; ing with President Bush but including California's Governor Pete Wilson and other leading Republicans, competed in denouncing government" stranglehold on private cmterprise. Even Wilson" Democratic opponent for govenlor, Kathtem Brown, ran on the platform that WiSson" r d e was responsible for California havilng "the country" s m s t economyu-a very dubious claim but evidently one that her strategists thought wodd be effective (Stall, 1994: A3). Bluc-ribbon cmmissions cautioned that ""o~rerregulation"" stymies urban economies (Advisory Commission on Regulatory Barriers to Affordable Housing, 1991: 1). They denomced lmd-use and envircmmental controls, in particular, for their nefarious effects on local m d national economies as well as on th chance for the middle class to have jobs and the poor to survive, On the consumption side, critics biamed regulation for raising housing costs, especidy in places like the coastal Catifornia, cities that experienced radical price inflation beginnjng in the mid-1970s. By curtailing the supply of land available for housing, the argument went, the. price of the housjng Chat rc~najnswould go up. This price effect on workers' honsing, as well as the gcneral drag on the economy caused Galifomjds "Ueberroth
Commissionm-the group appointed by the governor to bolster the state's flagging fortunes-to echo the same refrain against: "excessive rules, rclgdation, and red tape." Peter Ueberroth, a travel agerlcy business magnate, had. gained celebrity through headjng up the Los Angeles Otympirs, the games that came in with a profit as well as fie usual basket of medals for the American teams. In later appointkg Peter Ueberroth as head of ""Rebuild-L.A,"-the blue-ribbon organization that was supposed to deal with the prolnlems the city faced in the walce of the post-Roclney I(ing insurrectilms-'nemocrat may or I'om Bradley received the now usual prescription: a recommendation for "clearing away"' unnecessary regulations to stimulate development: in the city's most deprived zoncs. h this way the poor would get jobs and the city would have its peace. Such reasoning has widesprt-ad appeal, even within groups like professional plmncrs who have long complained of developers' influence. Planners can c o r n to resent the comparatively privileged middle-class rrei&borkocld residents who cry ""Not in my baekyard" (hence, "NXMBY") as they use larger planning and emvironmemtal talk to protect their aXlegedly narrow turf. As with the developers, these gmups ma)i also interfere with professional planning goals (such as increasing b u i l d i ~ ~ g densities around transportation nodes) and hence irk those who otherwise mi&t be in their alliance. Citizen grczups also can fall into class and racial exclusivity, ssometimes leadillg them to oppose projects that provide jobs and housing h s people of lower social standing. In a mnve linked to the &publicads 19% "Contract with Americaf'' sorne in Congress proposed government compensation to any private property owner whose land or building values were lowered by regulation (no mention was made of special paymmtspom o m e r s whose values were raised by public regulation-likely to be a frequent occur~nce). Although unattained at this writ.ing, such a measu the courts have c m e increasingly close to enacting through judickl rulings-would radically curtai even zoning contmls, not to menl-ion the k h d of project hpact ret~ediationsthat have become increasingly commonplace. As with the Ueberroth reports, the case for deregulating land. development is usually made on the basis of the jobs it supposedly brings, the costs of housing it presumably lo\vers, and the strctngthening of the tax base it putatively engenders. These are the up-front, manifest reasons. But belnind such high-soundillg concerns are the pecuniary interests of particular gmups who gain returns from, real pmperty Grow'Eh is theis bread and butter; the more intense d e v e l o p m t can becom, the greater the fortunes fiey can make. 'l'he stakes can be huge; whereas =turns on some other types of: business ventures may be on the order of 10 or 15 percent, the successful approval of an office development on, say, an
10
The Relevance of ReguIalio:orz
agricultural parcel can generate a h e , ten, or even 100-fold increase in market value just because a mom intensive use is being atlclwed. Ef specdators buy property on the assumption that local oEfjcials will approve a higher use, a project denial can be devastatixzg. No wonder they devote such time and sources toward affecting regulatory environments and the daily operations of lcxal government When it comes to particular prol'ects, people in the growth business find restrictions of any sort a pain in the neck, at best, and, at worst, a potential source of business crisis. Auxi,lia.ry professionals such as the lawyers, architects, accountants, civil eng4neers, and others who specialize in real estate development provide sympathetic a d often detaiIed backing. Supported politicians express the public-spirikd version of developerskoncerns as do the local media (whu rely on aggregate local growth for profits). To various degrees, other types of business owners come on board, some because-like the media-they perceive future pmfits as tied to aggregate local growth, and others tkmugh bonds of social a d ideological solidarity. This cumulative set of forces that pokvered h c d grokvth maelnines in most of the United States before the envir mtal era helps explain why there has been such inconsistent enforcement of zoning laws in U.S. cities over the years (except in the richest residentia1 areas). Fislding more lucrative uses of property was usually suffjcient reason fnr changing the zoning (&&cock, 1969)-sometimes, of ccrlarse, such changes required that developers make a well-placed campaigm~contribution or simple bribe (wkat the Italian developers call bustnrella-literallyI ""small mvelope'"). These cumulative forces also explain how "farmer-developersf" converted rural lands to suburi7an uses so easily, regardiess of the eco-. logical waste and fiscal inefficiency of the resulting sprawl (Rudel, 1989, Markusen, 197H). In a far-reaching version, the swag" of growth promoters helps explain even the collapse of South American rain forests (along with the Florida everglades), as state actim and the dcmands of local lartd speculators for h i g h a y s and p o k e protection push the development boundary outward into wilderness (Rude m d Richards, 1990; Rudel and Hnrowitz, 1993). Forest protection, as is often the case with conservation goals more gmerally =quires understanding the networks and coalitions Chat promote growth-the sllpply side, if you will-ralher than simply the demand forces-whether these be peasants seeking su:bsistence plots, or buyers for new slrburban housing. Whether in tropical rain forests or the dties and suburbs of ifidustrialized nations, investments in land and.buildlings give certain actors both the motivation and msources to dominate the prclductim of places. At least in the U.S. co~~text., the leadership of these actors rests on a bias built into civic culture, legal precedents, and economic ixrstitutims. As a resullt,
cities have operated as "growth machinest'' with lmal governments serving a h s t r u m e n t s to facilikte still more de~elopment,~ Governmental capacity a h a y s opemtes as part of a particula "regime," wfiich includes the surrounding economic and ideological context that sustains formal authority."I'he growth machine system is a partjcular kind of local regime, one that robustly characterizes Americm cities throughout their histories. One obvious caveat is that the pro-growth coalitiions, as with their adversaries, are not themselves utterly coherent; and,altho~tghovlr point of: departure has been to stress their inherent advantages, they do bave various fault-lines that weakcm t k i r ellfectiveness alld help provide slack withjn wh,ich ewiromentalists can operate. Sometimes, for example, land-use elites may quarrel over the costs and benefits of inhastructure (e.g., dams and higlnways)-just who will pay the dotlar costs, who will gain the building co~~tracts, or who will prosper by floating the finance bonds. The more usual conflicts, quite tellingiy, center m the location rather than the amount: of growth: VVhose property will gain by being n (Banfield, 1961)?C)r \zrhirh land renear the airport or t ~ w e ~ z t i ocenter gion will gaixl water rights from some far-away source (HundXey, 3.992)? At~ough land-use elites may share a desire to ""g& the community as of growth-determined by infrastrwmuch as possi:ble, the distrib~~tio~z ture location-becomes the bone of contention, in some cases, propedy interests may turn agai~~st a development proC j3 d that- undermines a fav0rcl.d growth scenario. For example, local elites of central and northern California cities opposed oil production oifshore as threats to tourism and related development. Casino and resort owners hz Lake Tahoe have allkd with environmezztalists to p r o ~ ~ odevelopment te that will not muddy T&oe% ccrystal waters quite so quickly-provoking the rage of ""dirtier"tourist concerns (Christensen, 1997). Lmd-use elites in Orlando, Florida, locked horns with Disney World for hogging too many of the spillover money benefits of the amusement center-that is, hotel, retail, and resictentid development (Foglesong, 1990). Lcrcai businesses have even urged a form, of growth management as a means of Ernithg the scale of Disney operations so as to gab greater access to the park's side-bounties for local enterprises. Although rare on the scene, some businesses may have opposed additional growth because they fearrzd, introduction of new competitms. At one time, elites involved in manufacbre (as opposed to real estate) may have thwarted new factories that wnuld, compete for local labor (Smith and Keller, 1983). Allthough the historic evidence is scant that this practice was w i d e s p ~ a dor elIfective (see Scheiber, 3973), some contemporary real estate operators do, on occasion, try to blwk additiozzal projects that would cmpete with them for tenants or buyers. h Ventura Comty, California,
12
The Relevance of ReguIalio:orz
the owners of a regional shvpping center tried to block construction of a competiti\re mall by bankrolling a refercsndum to eliminate the local gouent subsidies behhd the project (as well as all other such subsidies). AIthough d o m e d to failure through stiff opposi"ton frm local government and business groups who feared for ""the city's ability to compete with o&er dties," the effort does si.gnal the kind of tension that can occw even within the world of local real estate (Weiss, 1996: As). h o t h e r bone of contation has arisen wbrn a city singles out certain devebpers or corporations for special abatemmts; those lefi out have litigated with the result that procedures are esthlislned.to provide the abatcments to all who meet standard threshold criteria (Wolkof; 1983, as cited in Eisinger, 198K: 152). But the criteria inevitably favor some busimsses (usually the largest corporations, which have in fact gained the most subsidies) at the expense of others.7 As usual, then, politics can make for strmge bedfellows when the occasional dissension within the growth grouys takes hold. But the historic record, we emphasize, shows this to be the rare event. Busjness operatres with remarkable consensus on the growth issue, and environmental groups ordharily operate in opposition to the goals oi business. "Ecmm y versus enuironmentf%has hecow the gemric frame,with the two sides dear enough on most: every battle and dispute,
Economy Versus the Environment: Some Past Findings We R-, then, to a centraf focus of this inyuiry: Mlhat is the n a m e of cmSfici-between e~~vironment and economy? Rather than acceptkg m y narrow usage of these terms, some thinkers, like Wendell Berry and Wes Jackson, lay out the utter confusion of ewer regarding economies and environments as being in contradiction. The real, ernnomy or what Karl Polanyi early in this century called the ""ennpirical ecmomy," c m never be if7 connict with quality oE life; indeed if we put aside the models deduced from conventio1zal microeconomicsl quality of life, including enviental benefits for future generations, becomes the kcy indicator of eccmomk well-being. On intelrectual gromds, an increasing number of writers (for exafngle, Bea.t.ley and Manning, 1997; Daly and Cobb, 1,989; Hawken, 1993; Shiva, 1988) thus reject the dichotomization of environment and economy and suggest these realms must he reintegrated to build sustainable communities. Such organizations as Redefining Progwss are attempting to replace traditional ecmomic measures such as the Grass Uomstic. Product with more subtle and comprehensive hdicat-ors of economic health and commw~ityquaiity (Cobb, Halstead, and &we, 1995). Although these approaches are gaining momentum, they
still have had limit.ed impact on local discourse regarding development and growth. Envirmmental activists often argue their case within conventional fpamings, but ironically this is precisely where the evidence of a codict between the econmy and the environment is far more ambiguous than a l presumes. 'There are good reasons to doubt the intrirrsic the u s ~ ~talk econmic benefits of urban growth, even in the narrow sense of improving such standard econcrmic indicators as unemployment rates, puhlic b u d e t viabi.lity, or Ievels of =tail sales. Business groups argue that cornmunilies should accept a certain level of environmental damage as a necessary byproduct of urhan grwth; such damage is simply the price of maintaining a healthy ecrollorny. But there are reasons to doubt whether there truly is a payoff, even in economic terms, Despite the drumbeat of enthusiam flrr gmwth by politicians and cmszxltants and m occasional study showing its benefits (see Mwller, SZ), the great thrust of research questions whether local economic development strategies actuatly yield jobs or deliver any other net bendit: Is the ""creation"of jobs offset by the influx of new job-scekers and / or the costs of the local incentives that have been paid, out? According to one series of studies, localities with rapid development m a s u r e d in a variety of ways) experience m lower rates of ul-rennplayment Chan locaiitks that grow more slowly (Appelbaum et d., 1976; see also Sternlieb and Hughes, 1983; Fasenfest, 1986). Some evidence suggests an arc-shaped curvilinear relationship between econol-nie vitality and the rate of population change. Communities with the highest rates of poputation change, whether growing or shrinking, are at the tails of the curwe and have tke worst ecmmies. The strongest economies exist in localities toward the top of the curve that are the m s t stable in terms of population size. Studies of prominent cases tend to present a critic& view of growth and its net benefits. Thcre is the case of Atlantic City, New Jersey: a dream scenario of robust redevelopmnt under the aegis of the g a d l i n g industry, but with the jobs capbred by n-tigrants and suburbanites, not the struggling residel-rts in whose name the casino projects had been launched (Sternlieb m d Hughes, 3983; Wlliams, 1995). In terms of the fiscal advantages of growth far local governments, the data are consistently negdive (Appelbaum, 197%; Dmielson and Doig, 1982; Eisinger, 1988:44): Growth tends to generate costs that exceed increases in local revenues, dthough the kind of growth matters (rich rczsidents pay more in property taxes than Chc poor because the horns of the rich have higher market value; some industries generate higher costs than do others). In reviewing three major studies of the fiscal impact of sprawl versus mnaged grokvPh, Bmhell (1997: 171) reports the efeas fiscal benefits in terms of road and utjliw inhastructure of managed growth
l4
The Relevance of ReguIalio:orz
versus unregulated sprawl, with more "modest3avjngs on school construction. Of course, local goverrunents may pmfit in fiscal terms if they can attract high yieldhg enterprise with workers who live in a different jurisdictim (though this hardly increases the general community or env i r o m n t a l good). The careful andyses of specific projects that envircmmezntal impact revi,ew may entaiS often reveal that new developments do not pay their own way. The costs t h y generate in road maintenance, trat" fir management, and schoot services outwigh the taxes they generate. 'The new projects offer no real solution to local unemplopent, either because the skills needed are not local., or because high profile economic development efforts motivate more. people to move into tke community than there arc new opeznings in the labor xnarket. Our point here is not to provide a single bottom-fine from the research literature but to show agah that scientific =search does not demofistrate growth to be of net economic benefit. This murkizlress of economic consequence contrasts with the more clear-cut iindhgs on the envim ental m d quality of life costs of development. At a more basic level, it is uncertah whether efforts to lure development pay off in the still morc confined sense of attracthg new projects at all. It may be that efforts to create a ""good business climate'ht thc? expense of environmental quality and social equity actually do not work: Places that attempt to create such a d i m t e merely establish, subsidies for phantom developments that never materialize, or underwrite ventures that wodd have happened on trhejr okvn. Several careful studies exarnhe the fate of those localities with the best ""bushess climatesH-low taxes, low spending, weaker environmental controls, fast growth rates, probusiness ""rceptivityU-based primarily on standard rankizng sources fPom within the business world such as IEC, magazine, Fantus, and Grant. :111 comparing stateskconomic performance, Freudmburg (1993) determined that, if anytlrting, a good bushess clirnde predicted bad economic outcomes in subsequent years. A comparable study by Skom (1988: 151) concluded that busk~essctimate indkators "are useless as predictors ... [and] worse than usdd as guides to state and local government action." After conducting still another comparison, Meyer (1993, forthconning), concludes that states with more intense environmental s t d a r d s , by most ilndicators, performed better econnmically in successi\re periods than states with weaker standards, At misrirnum, says Meyer (1993: 10), "we can conctude that shifts in environmental policy, whether intended to exteznd environmental co~ntrolor reduce it, have no discernible effect on state economic performmcc,"" Using very diffewnt methodologies, economists have tried to discern impacts on manufacturing and trade caused by ewironmentd reseictions in various countries-that is, they have tried to track whether or not
industries, especially poiluting ones, escape to "pollution havens." The repeated finding is that costs of complying with envim arc si.mply not consequenlial tmough to have any detectable effect on corparations3ehavior (Leonard, 1988; Tobey, 1989, 1990). Such costs as labor and raw materials overshadow environmental considerations, which m a n s , according to still additjonal studies (h/lcConnel:I and Schwab, 1990; Bartik, 1988) that firmsqocation decisions likely have little to do with levels of emironmental controls. Economists Cropper and Qates (1992: 699) summarize the policy implications: "There is little force to the argument that we need to relax environmental policies to px.eserve international competitivenessS'' Some studies use corporate ofillcials' own survey responses to specify whether or not pollution abatements, mgulatory relief, and, o t k r forms of assistance m& a diffe~ncein their locaticm decisirms. Some reports amount to little more than journalistic collections of ""harror stories" (Frieden, 1980; Plotkh, 1987), but some have been conceived more carefully. Given corporations' ongoing idedogical commitment: to minimal rclgulation and their fondness for local "incentives"' that subsidize development, this method intrlnsicatly biases msults in favor of luw regulation. Nevertheless, even these findings are mixed. Eisillger (1988: 220) summarizes Che findings regarding tax and fhancial incent.ivcs-ofen thought to be the mnst powerful form of inducement-by sayhg there is "lit& warrant in these vwious studies to argue that [these incentive4 play a role of much, if anyp sigrlificance in plant-location decisions," although '"ozne evidence" k e s suggest that a favorable overall tax s t m ture on bushess may have some effect. Other studies using towns as the m~itsof malysis (hstead of states or nations) indicate that local governments%fforts to attract projects are usually ineective ( H u m p b y and Krannich, 1980; Summers, 19%). Either the plants the towns get would have come anyway, or local governments spent money and effort to woo projects t h y never really had a chance of lmding. Bwen when towns do win projects, the victory can be costly. Case studies of particular projects-like the city of Detroit's suhsidies of Gmeral Motors to create the '"Polletown" "project (Fasenfest, 1986), and Hint, Michigan's, public-priwate investments in convention and amuselncnt facifities (its "AuCo World." poject)-providc examples that show unfiappy financial results for some cities (for a series of cases, see Squires, 1989). Evidence suggests t enterprise zones-which free up targeted urbm areas horn envir ental and other restrictions through tax abatements, pollution control relief, public subsidies of new hires, and loosening up zoning and buildi-ng restrictions-do not fure new business or generate new jobs. The trivial numbers of jobs such zones do create are
I6
The Relevance of ReguIalio:orz
seldom taken up by local residents (Battle and Underhill, 1986; Eisinger, 1988: 194-199; Dowall, Beyeler, and Wong, 1994). To put it in its most: foreboding form, localities merely compete with one another.in a ""rizc to the bottom;""nverall social and environmmtal welfare is sacrificed without even mhhnal local economic gail~s. The fact that local efforts to simulate developme~~t generate so little positive econonnic impact suggests that local policies, wbether pro- or anti-developwnt, may have little hnpact m what goes on-in either direction. In one landrnark study, f,ogan and Z h u (1989)found that growth rates of cities with growth controls we= no lower than those without them. Molotch and Louch (1994) compared Southern California counties and metropolitan m a s b r i n g the rczcession of the early 1490s and found that localities with strict mgulations did no worse (peshags even better) than localities with more. open policies; at least during recesimpact, In his search sion, the regulatory environment had no appare~~t for irnpacts of growth cmtmlis on housing costs, Landis (1932) found that a group of CaliEornia growth control cities had no higher rates oE housing ~ price hflai-ion than did otherwise "matched" "ties that lacked S L E C controls-implykg perhaps that the cmtrds had not, in fact, lessened supplies. There arc., in these cases as well as in certain other studies with &ferenl. rcls~dts(e.g., Feiock, 19941, particular technical issues that may fie@ exglah the discrepant findings (see Appendix A). Our point here is that the researtlh, taken as a wMe, provides good =ason to questim some of the common assumptions about the economic impacts of either promoting or limiting local development. There may be impacts, but to find them will revire more subtle analysis of how regulation works.
Local lRegulalioln and Urban Theory. Understanding the forces that determine local policies and their outcomes has been a long-standjng focus of scholarly research and dcbate. The domillant 1950s and 1460s debate pitted "elite" v\iersus"pluralist" interpretdions of power. 'The former construed cities as doxninated by a shgle, coherent corporate-based elite, whereas the latter portrayed u h a n power as shared witl-tin a coalilicm of interest groups, suffitimtly diverse in medershjp to rerlcct a form, of democratically dispersed participation.9 The contest ended not so much with a victory of one side over the other as with the growing malization that the study ~ s u l t were s primarily an artifact of the met-hod and the discipli.ne of the researchet=Sociologists typically confirmed domination by something like a power elite, whereas political scientists learned that power was plural (Walton, 1946). In reviewhg this result, Walton concluded (1976) that the w y to escape the stalemate was to look beyond the sfrtrcture of communi.ty power to its
tangible consequences, like social inequalq and who gets what out oi particular gowemance processes, A generagon of new urban scholars moved beyond the simple dichotomization of plural politics versus a single economir elite (for reviews, see Zukin, l".)@ Walton, 1992; Gottdiener and R q h , 1988). In the "City as a Growth Machine," Molotch (1976: 310) posited that growth pmvides, in substantive terms, the central unifying political agenda for local elites in the United States, however divided they might be on other issues, 'This fact skews puhlic benefits irr the direction of local elites and affects the life chances of others, usually hindering them, Under elite dominance, growth promoticm becomes the critical function of locaf govent, and because it so dominates agendas, it operates as a key "constraint on initiatives for sociail and.economic =form" (310). Logan and Mdotch (1987) elaborated by describing h o ~ those t principaily concerned with irrmasing the value of their investments in real estate tend to overwhelm those oriented toward use values of the city, values stemming, for exam*, h m attachments to community or from just striving to fllnd a place to live. A stream ol research and cmmelrtary explored these issues in larger detail (for overviews see Logm, Whley, and Growder, 1997; Jonas and Wilson, forthcoming). Although also highly suspicious of the pluralist conception of the city, other refinements of the elitist paradigm have been less catered on growth elites compared to other groups in the polity. Urban "regime theoryf' takes local government institutions as sufficiently important and. complex- to force elite accommodation with at least some other types of actors. Hence athough business intewsts, both corporate- and real estate-based, are central-maybe even the most important-they must have coalition support from at least some other groups to move their projects forward. Thus, an urban rr.gime must contain a coalition of groups contrdi,ng different types of Rsnurces in order to advance a particular agenda (see Elkin, 1987). Trade-offs are made between those who have access tcr different types oE ortganizations, to differat ways of adding to the tax base, and to ways of gaining votes of differelrt constjtucmdes, and so iorth. Stone (1989), for example, shows how Atlanta." downtown business inf;erestsfacilitated the incorporation of African-American leaders into the governhg coalition, albeit within a development agenda that favored downtown interests, Although urban r e g h e theorists stress the need for coalitions, thry stop short of depictirrg them as pluralistic gatherings of ""eqaisat the tableef31rrdeedWin (1987: %-37) suggests that efforts to prmote economic growth are one of the three defining axes of local politics. He goes on to say that "promoting eccrnomic growth in the city has c m e to mem view e city as a pattern of land usef>this way of putting it comes very cl espite the emphasis on coditims-
to matching the assumption of growth machine theory (see also, Logan, Whalm, m d Crowder, 1992 60q. Still anothes variation of the local power debate comes from those who emphasize the farger national and global contexts within which m y local power can be exercised (see, for example, Lauria, 1997; Feagin, 1998; Sites, 1997). Under this vie\% localities must contend with the broader transformations that switch economk activities on or off (e.g., mmufacturing versus service economies) and, irt so doing, create the conditions for local governance. 'This m a n s some areas undergo deprivations that may feed disruptions if not handled or "regulated."" smne way. This may mean police craclcdowns or m e combination of social programming to stave off electord u p r i s a s or protests in the streets. With varying degrees of success and in?agination, repression or ent~preneurial spirit, localities strive to find a viable niche. At the same time, these outward-looEng strategies shape the conditions for local regime-building and substantive policy Given the steady expansion of globalizing trends, some argue that local leaders have less and less room ta maneuver (Gottdiener, 1987; Zukisr, 1991; but see Cox, 1"3232),C h the other hand, highly localized surges of mligictus natimalism and/or place-based identity Euel resistance to globalizati.on in djverse spots around l.he world. mese surges suggest that locality is a persistcntly autonomous realm of action. Local insurgencies are causing lager units to collapse, national boundaries to be redrawn, old patterns of governance and trade to be modified, As Gjddens (1.985)' among others, pojnts out, the traditional nation-state has lost out, both as a center of power ""d as a sensible unit of analysis. Neighborhoods, towns, and regions are the mare tmgible loci of human. action that are directly wwen into globalked, institutions. Globalization may even heighten the importance of locality as this becomes the @ace where alf the global interco~~nections are given form and dcfjne sites of investment, spaces for political action, and stages for cultural transformation. Mlhe&er im the former Vugoslwia, the villages of Chiapas, the disputed boundaries between Israelis and Palestinians, or in the deindustrialized urbm economies of the United States, the combatants (on all sides) wear the marks of global culture and trade: They turn tkeir faces to the global television networks wearirrg the latest youth fashion, ""tiibalf" tattoos, and other appurtenances of global consumption and taste systems. Lefebvre" formulation seems radically apt: "bki space disappears in the course of growth and development: the worldcvidc does not aholish the local" "efebvrc, 1991: 330). fn the W.S. context, although localism may not take the form of sustained violent insurgency, the country"^ particularly ¢ralized systern ol &-use controi m y offer specjai opportunities for local initiative.
But even if local constituencies demand cmtml of growth and if g w emments have the technical means to accomplish such purposes, does this override the traditional hcgemony of grokvth asld bushess elites? Within. localities and across a wider terrah, economic, state, and culturaZ. institutions offer power advantages to those best situated, and so p o w r grows on itself, influenchg the zlrba,n ecology. But dvantages do not always translate into outcomes, and certainly not always smoothly. Hegemony, as Stuart Wall has remarked, t a k s work, and the process can be complex. Findkg that work in real contexts that matter, like land development, becomes a means for understanding power and cmtingency more generally, We see the iocality as the smallend of a lcxdiglobal linkage. Here new powers are claimed and even =invented, as evidenced by locally based social movements around the world organizing for the environment, democracy, and cultural autonomy (Esteva and Praleash, 1W88).h explalnjng the g r d e s t transdormatim of our time, Feshbach and Friendly (1992) say local environmental movements were a key source of the undoing of the Soviet Union. Eve11 in &at severely constrained context, localities appamtly contained the potentials to reorder politiral economiespotentials stirred up by people's desires to better cmtrol their pbysical enviroment and routine way of life. We recognize the rci.evance of all these theoretical concerns, but joining an effort to find the fine lines that discriminate among them wollld not advance our present goals. We can acki2owledge that, in addition to growth elites, others play important local roles and still maintain our focus on growth processes as crucial. We can see that global trmsformations influence local possibilities, even as we examine the consequences local policies actually have. Mie can ask whether policies intended to protect local qualities and citizen interests are economically disastrous within a global context..If they are, it will be more djfficult to withstand new external pressure$ otherwise the potential for local actiosl and polovation may he much broader. Growth machine theory which we continue to find useful, is m analytic tool. It is not a deterministic doctrine in which growth is a preordajned Zlicrtic or political imperative driwn by the smooth clperasion of I d markets or the unassailable power of an elite group. It is a "'more or less" and somewhat cmtingmt set of propositions, The pojnt of this study is not to prove or disprove its central hypotheses, nor to re-specify who maltes up growth dikes or hokv those elites c m e to powcr and relate to other gmups".That is work for other projects, Here we are focused on what follows the winning of elections, the adoption of voter initiatives, and the ideological combat associated with such events. We ask hokv political shifts on the growth control front play out in th project-by-project
20
The Relevance of ReguIalio:orz
and,mk-by-rule regulation of development, and with. what consequences, This focus provieies a glimpe of pivotal urban processes and, we hope, contrihiutes to a more sopktisticlated and debiled understmdbg of how regulation works in its political-economic context,
Assessing Regulation Past research surely suggests that whatever community and environare created with growth controls are not attained in a mental 'be~~efits direct trade-off for a dysfuncticmal economy But does all of this buffing and puffhg about grcrw&-policy making, voting, regulating, deregulating, and project reviecv ome down to noth-ing at all? Obviously we need sustained. =search on the effects of the last generation" regdatory efforts on land use as well as other fronts. Beyond the issues of whether growlh control ruins economies or not, we need to uslderstand precjsely how new sets of building rules work and.in what ways they help or hinder local clrmmunity goals-eccmornic and otherwise, 'The overall amount of new development may not si,pificantly change, but the character of growth may shift in important ways, with controls actually hindering some k h d s cJf development but stimulatirng others. Or, it may be that controls really do temper the pace of grnwlh in s o m communities, but that other policies that are thought of as growth controls accelerate development in d i f f e ~ n places, t or in the same community at a diflerel~ttime, By focusing our attention m a specific set of case studks drawn from Southern Caigomia, we are able to address these questirms usmg a variety of methods and encolnpassistg a diverse range of control measures. We hope to trmscend prior work, however valuable, that has relied on hdividual case studies (e.g., DeLem, 1992b; Pincet, 1992), on quantitative comparisons, as welI as mare anecdotd comparative work. In presenting our findings, we hope to lend insight and build the substance of broader public debates about how to mix private market mechanisms and pubEc cmtrols effectively Were "private'~developmemtm r k t s simply overridden by public controls, or was there a more "balmced" hteractim of public and private? What would such a balmce look like? W ~ awas t the impact on local econol-nies inthese parficlliar cases? Are they less efficient, or can cities thrive econmicaIly under ""geener""egimes? Did communities g r w &re,@ tbr ""lopholees"' in public policy, or wa~; development manreaged through deliberate puhlic trade-offs? Judging from the co~~crete sults of local regulation, did local cantrols create a new era of citizen power over long-standing economic i n t e ~ s t s ?Did the growth machine grind to a halt or just change gears? Did developers and lheir allies dig deeper into their "systemic power'2based on ideological advantages
m d instihztional resources (Stone, 1981; Alford and Friedlmd, 1985)-to co-opt or otherwise derail their opponents' efforttj? If citizen resistmcc restdts, in fact, in effclctive and ecmornicalfy viable controls, this suggests the gotmtial benefits of other political innovations that might seem to "hterfere" with markets. Almost any effort to ~ g u late on behaXIF of:quality of life and e n v i r o ~ ~ mise likely ~ ~ t to he attacked as countermanding the wisdom of the market. E~~vironmentalism at any level must respond to these charges: The successes of urban envirfmmentalists may offer a model.
Plan of the Book Now that we have presented the questions that drive our research, we wilt go on (in Chapter 2) to describe our study sites and the actuai content of their grokvth control measures. Chapter 3 present.^ (in qraantified terms) the impacts of these measures on buildLng activity levels across our sites; that is, it answers the guestim of trYhe@~er or not: growth was ""stopped,""We then go on, in Chapter 4, to explain how developers and other growth interests function under growth control; we cmsidcr their strategjes to overcome the impediments placed in their path-in other words, we look at how cities grow under growth cmtrol, In Chapter 5, we simullate a developer" efforts to build actual projects across our sites and thus begin the work of laying out the ways new regulations have indeed affected the contel~tof growth. Chapter 6 cmtinues this work of specifying the effects of gmwth control by andyzing the k n d of growth localities experienced in relation to tbr kinds of development their civic traditions and plmning policies tried to foster. Finally; we use Chapter 7 to sum up by assessing wins and losses, pointing to the ways intervmtiun in land markets-and by hnplication other spheres as w e l k a n impmve the quality of life without sacrificing economic vitality$even in the narrow sense of the term.
Motes 1. Economists have often studied these "externalities" by prc>xy,assuming that all the pertinent negative spillovers and positive amnities are built into housing prices (see Fischel, 1990; Mark and Goldberg, 1983; IJiand Brown, 1988). 2. Such influential environmentalists as Donella Meadows and her colieagues (1992) make a distinction between grow-th (which means getting quantitatively bigger) and development (which means getting qualitatively better by building local capacities). Although this is a valuable analytic distinction, in this book we use development in the more vernacular sense of what real estate developers do. 3. Fur evidence that low-incame people bear the biggest pollution brunt, see Berry 1977; Buttet and FXinn, 197%;Bullard, 1990,1993,1994.
22
The Relevance of RegziInlio:orz
4. "3usiness7s New Buzzword h r Candidates" Los A~gelesErnes, May 23, 1994, A3. 5. Fur more detail and related treatments, see Molotch, 1976; Logan and Moloteh, 1987; Feagin, 1983; Krannich and Humphries, 1983; Lyon et al., 1983; Domhoff' 11983; Swanstrom, 1985; Etkin, 1987; Whitt, 1982; Vc~geland Swansc~n, 19853; Vc~gel,1992; Jonas and Witson, forthcoming. 6. Our simplfication of the term "regime" does not cmEc>rmprecisely to traditional wage. See Elkin, 1987; Stone, 1989 for more definitive and elaborated statements. 7, See Eisinger 'S (1988: 152) summary discussion. 8. We finit saw the phrase used by Brecher and Costello (19941, but the idea that gavmments are under pressure to price themselves below an appropriate level has been around for a number of years among economists, sodstogists, and political scientists (see Cumberland, 1981; Molotch, 1976). 9. The classic studies are by Floyd Hunter (1953) and Robert Daht (1961).
Sites Learning from Sout)-remCalifornia W i t h the region of SouChcrn Califmja, so f m e d for spravling growth, we focus m a diverse array of localities and a variety of measures aimed at growth cmtrol. We have no illusion that these localities and their regzllations provi,de either random smgles or '"typical instances" from a nationwide perspective. Instead., our sites provide a test case of growth control with implications fur other locafities throughout the cowtry. The sites in quest.ion are in a rclgional setting with both robust (jrocvth and widespread. resistance to growth-apparently a twin dynamic. Research indicates that places ercperiencing rapid growth are mow likely tcr turn to grow& controls (Baldassare and Protash, f,982),1 Southcr~nCdifomia tends to be the '"poster cbild" for environmentalists and business leaders alike, repsenting, respecthely, the epitome of irresponsible development and the "exccsses'kof local regulation. We reason that if controls over urban development have had important impacts anywhere, they wodd likely show in these settings. Becarnse of thcir rcllatively long experience with grocvth controls, ou,r study sites should show some sophistication in desiping statutes and enforcing their implemmtation. Co~~trols should have been fn phce htng enough to have measzlrable impacts. fn contrast, new and tentalive regulations would have undetectable effects. If little has changed in our study sites, the impact i" m.""y other cornunities and r e g i o ~ ~ issprobably even smaller; either their cmtrols are mhimal irn real, terms, or, given the lack of growth h their region, they were not needed in the first place, h d the impacts of g r w t h control that we observe at our sites may sagg s t future possibilities for commmnities t-hat are just beghning to manage growth. Studying the actuai practices of groclith rczgulations in California has a research advantage specific to the special qualities of the state. Large and culturally distinctive, Cdifornia often gives momentum to broader
national trends-as has happened with air quality standarcis, coastal protections, and, emerging from different parts of the political spectrum, voter initiatives against &firmdive action, and the taxpayers' revolt that yidbed Proposition 13. In the case of enviro ental issues, there is a firm economic basis for effect," The vast California consulBer market h~duces the ""C'alifor~nization manufacturers to develop technologies to meet state mvironmental standards and cmsumption patterns-in pmducts liice cars, construction materials, pollution sesubbers, leaf blowers, aerosol sprays, waste system, plumbing fixtures, and furniture-more readily than they would for other states or world ~ g i o n sSometimes . manufactllrers change thrir entire production just to accommoda.t.ethe California market. 011ce &is accommodation occurs, other states, even nations, can follow with similar standards m m easily a d ride the wake of California's rules because manufacturer's hiwe already made the technolo&ical investmem.t.to produce envircznmentally superior products. In this way, as well as in the force of its culhtral and political winds, CaliEornia's envircmmental politics and patterns of life hR1ue11ce global economies, tending to set de faeto standards, As we wi31 show, growth controls somethes Involve effiscts, direct a d indirt.ct, on technologies that have the potential to irnpact othe r s h o d e s of life. It is a clichk to identify Southern Cdifornia as a cultural: forerunner, a basis for imitatim because of its glamour and &an. But in regard to land use iss~~es, this emulation has bee11 much documented. 'The California bungalow of the 1920s and 1930s (Gebhard and Writer, 1977: 18), the ""ranch house" of the 1950s and 1 9 6 0 ~as~we11 as other residential and commercial foms (the fast food of McDonald's and many chains) began in Southern California-making it the most influential force in domestic architecture and ""thecenter of contemporary restaurant innovation"' (Pillsbury; l99Q), with all that implies for resource use. The freeway and the hegemony of the American car probably owe more-economically, stylistically, and e n v i r o n m t l l - t o the Southern California landscape than to any othcr region. 'Thus, the sta:kes oE what goes on in "1occaX California" "land use, as with most everythhg dse, am high. We could have used other parts of the United States in addition to Southern California, pet-haps developi,ng a broadcr cornparathe frame. But an anlalytic advantage of staying within a single rcgion is that many of the economic, historical, and cultural factors are constmt. For example, Souther11 California's economy; as measured by unemployment, wage structures, and properv values, tends to rise and fall as a single unit (Levy, 1994).Hence differences that emerge among our commlanities over time cannot be at-tributedto divergent regional ecmomic trends that would have to be considered were our cases drawn nationally.
Withh the limits of the U.S. Constitution, state lawmakers have a great deal of leeway in setting the p a r w t e r s fnr how local gave ulate land use. 1x1practice, mmy states adopted the Standard Zoning Enabling Act of 1926 and the State Planning Enabllng Act of 1927, which were developed by m advisory committee on zoning within t-he U.S. Uepastment of Commerce (Piatt, 1996: 234). More recentiy, the Model IJand Development Code of the American Land Institute pmvided a template for updating enablirrg legislaticm, including provisions that same states used to adopt stdewide land-rase controls (Platt, 1996: Cajfornia has not gone as far FR this direction as the excqtional cases of Hawaii, Oregon, Vermont, Maine, and Florida; but lawmakers have created a ranging from coastal protections, to agriculttrrd preental review to deal with land use and.growth management (Platt, 39%: 365). Within our California study sites we encounter a single frmework of state law, yet the fomda,t.ionsof this framework are enough in the national mainstream that we can provide analytic benchmarks for other parts of the country.
Selecting Study Sites Restricting our study sites to the Southern Caljfornja, region was also practical, We could not settle for off-the-shelf databases; close and frequent on-site observations were needed to understand what an envircmmelltal control really meant and haw it worked as implemented. Our work thus involved n u m m u s site visits to carry out interviews, gather data, inspect archive materials, visit actual building prcrjects, cmss-check information, m d attend dozelns of pzlblic meetings. The two of us were able to carry out the work directII).at every site with the support of several able assistants performing specific tasks. A broader geographical scope would have required more researchers and Ihe kind of: "hired-hmdffcoordination difficulties that create special, challenges for qualitative work. :111 any event, employing staff and payhg for air fares and extensive hotel st..ayskvollld simply have broken our small research budget. Tn selecting our study sites, we worked our way south from our University of California, Santa Barbara base, gathering up localities until our malytic needs were met. This method yielded three study areas, two of which contain an amalgam of disthct towns and cities that entered the case base in their own right. Our first study area is the S a ~ t aBahara South Coast, consisthg, in turn, of two incorporated cities and an array of unincorporated and quzte diverse communities. The second study area is an even more varied set of co unities that make up western Riwerside County. Our third study area is the singe city of Santa, Monica, part and parcel of the surrounding city of Los Angeles in every way but its
legal independence. Our study time frame is 1970-1990, the years that approxirnak the country's g ~ a environmental t awakening and the era when growth-control measures were enacted. Besides starting early enough to catch later effects, this time frame gives us some opportuniw to follow controls in a @en locatity as they work themselves out sequentially. h short, we have a variety of times' a variety of locdities, and-as we will show-a variety of regulations upon which to build comparisms, In terms of standard socio-demqraphic "predictors" of environmentalist sentiment, our sites appear to be a rough cross-section of Catilornia cities and towns. Some evidence indicates high-income and higheduca~onpopulations are the most rclceptive to environmmtal sentkirnents and poliry enactment, with working-class groups less orient-ed toward such issues (Dunlap, 1975; huber, 1978; Dowall, 1980; Protash and Baldassare, 1983; Ctark and Goetz, 1994; but see Logan and Zhou, 1990). Our study encompasses places reprclsenting, if not the extremes, at least a reasonably wide socio-dennographic variation (see Table 2.1 for the basic descriptions).
Xdentifying Growth Controls Our list of what: constitutes growth control i,n each locaXjty includes measures that arc not a h a y s put under that form1 rubric. We relied on local understandings (using methods to be described) of the purpose and impact of a particular measure. Utitity hookup bans,for example, are sometimes on the list and sometimes not, based on local perceptions. En some cases, we learned from informants on both sides that such moratoria wcre used to curtail developnnemt-evm Chough the pro-growth activists were the only ones interested in pmclaixning this pubiicIy. We g a t h e ~ dthis information in the course of interviews (last@ as long as three hours, a h o s t never less than one) that were designed to learn not mly which controls were perceived to be mast important but aIso how these controls impacted the community anci h w the implementdion process worked w t . We also prObed for relevant historical information, includjng how the lmai political system had evolved and its implicatilrns for enforcemnt of restrictions. Mle exalnined specific projects and hterviebved those responsible for their cmstruction and oversight. En all our study areas, we intcrrviewed planIling officials (usually ineluding the planning director), the mayor, and prominent developers. In each study area and in ~rirtuallyall towns and cities, we also interentalists, news reporters, m d political activists on both sides of the development divide. In aff, we interviewed ninetytl~reepwple- The largest nurnber (forty-eight) c m e .from the Riverside area because of the larger number of separate municipalities in this study arca.
TABLE 2.1 Profile of Major Cities
Santa Barbara
Santa Mmica
Riverside
Population White Hispanic College Educated (over 25). Median Family Income Families in Povertyb
Housing Units % Owner Occupied
Median House Value Median Gross Rent Riverside County, 1970-1989; Santa Barbara County, 19704989; U.S.Census, 1970-1990; and U.S.Census, 1972,1983,1994. 1980 figures are for % ' with 16 or more years of education 1970 figures are families below low-income lwel
SOURCES: a
The remaining interviews were dkibed fairly evenly between Santa Barbara (twenty-five) and Smta Monica ('twenty).These numbers do not inc l ~ ~call-backs de for information checks and briefer conversations (at least equal in nunnber) that took place with assistants and others who were able to provide specific forms of infornation (dates cJf projects, meanings of specific conditions, etc.). We used semi-structured interviews tajlored to the position of informants and to the kind of research issue for which their h o d e d g e was most rdwant. At each step, we asked informants to idmtify other kcy people invo(ved wjth local grokvth and developmetnt issues, building our information sources in snowball Ifashion. With the permissim of the respondents, we took erctemive notes during tbr interviews, at tirnes pausing to transcribe dired qztotes. AAerward, we wrote up sumaries, usualb witihin a dayf and catalsgued interviews by the respondent" name, role, and study area. ?i> asswe confidentiality w e assigned each intemiew a nurnber lor refe~ncepurposes. Our interviews were, in turn, supplemented by our scmtjny of docruments, including the lists of conditions impclsed on actual pro~ects,the content of city and,county plans, and records of regtxldions assembled by others. FNc subscribed to daily newspapers in all three areas m d maixztained clipping files on develogmmt issues generally as well as on specific projects. Some people have made much of the difference between the terms ""growah cmtml" and ""growthmanagement," arguing that they are not the s m e thing. Hence a study of one would be dilfercnt from a study of the other. Growth control, under this understanding, kpties sharp limits, whereas growth management merely indicates mitigation of growah consequences.2 But Chis distinction is less obvious in actual practice, as our findings will, show. Legislation that looks like ""control" may turn out to be more like "mmagernent"~rowthis indeed allowed but only after the developer sweetens the deal with public betnefits. Simi,larlJr,measures offjciarty classified as "mnagement" in fact '"antsol" wwhen administration is strict and backed by an anti-development political regime.. The terms are themsel,ves tools of local rhetoric as much as policy intent. Environmentalist policy makers sometimes use "'manage" because they fear the word "controlf%wifl put pwple off; and deveioper groups sometimes dub mild managhg devices "control" in order to paint their opponents as extreme. Our rule was to include measures that both sides seemed to think had the strongest impact, regardless of Gvhether the measures were deemed "'management'kr "control.'" Our study sites ehibit the h d s of diBerences thought to create favorable conditions for effecfive grow& controls, middling conditions, and mfavorable conditions for effective regulation, in terms of socio-economic standing, geqraphic circumstance, and, political-cultural histories. These
FIGURE 2.1 Map of Study Sites
. Studv Sites
v///. Santa Barbara 4p!!l.j!~p!iil h ..... . . .,.:.I
60 miles
20
0
0 20
40
60
80 km
Santa Monica Riverside
.,.,,,1.1..
sovnc~:University of Colorado at Colorado Springs, Sheryl Giglia, cartographer.
tu
m
places also differ in the type and apparent intmsity of their contrds, as we now elaborate through a description of each study area and its cmstituent locales..
Sanb Barbaxa Sauth Coast, The Smta Barbara South Coast study area is optinnally suited for growth control implementatim. h geographic terms (see Figure 2.11, it if rather self-contained as a narrow shelf of lmd between the Pacific Ocean and the Santa Ynez Mountains. 'This portion of the Pacific coaslhe runs east and west m d is located just beyond easy ~ a c of b Los Angeles (about a two-hour drive). Compaativel,t; it had more than the usual capacity to , as well as in other ways, withdetermine its own h t u ~emvimnmenta:[fy out significant spillover comp2icatims arishg from inter-local c o m u t e s or neighborhood effects from adjoining zones." The Santa Barbara area was a distinctive settleme~nteven before the Spanish conquest. Along with the Gabnelho people to the south, the indigenous Chumash people have been cailed "the wealthfest, most populous, and most powerful ethnic nationality in aboriginal southern C a b fornia" @em and Smith, 1982: 538; see also Qoeber, 1925: 550, all as cited in McEvoy 1386: 27,28), with an advanced state of craft and artistic work (as evid,enced jn swviving basketry and cave paintj,ngs). In the d e r n epoch, special wealth and artistic assets mark the locale, and th area is sustained economically by agriculture, research/development, retirement, and tourism. The city of Santa Bcnrbara (population about 85,000) has been the center for comerce, finance, gave ent, and media. Alfthough legendary for the riches of its upper crust, Santa Barbara is diverse: 30 percent of the core city population is Latino, and the median filmil:y income (within the city) is below the overall state level (although above medians of Californians living in other cities in the statc3). To the west, Gdeta is an unincorynra.t.edarea of thc cottnty adjacent to the Uni:versity of California, Santa Barbara" student dormitories and apartment blocks, otherwiz h i l t of tract homes and m array of research and development and light industrial activities. To the east ir; the exclusive suburb of Monkcito, the world-class resjdentiai zone of imprclssive homes and estates that is actually the primary s o m e of the locale's reputation for spletndid afflumce. Further east is the largely residentid unincorporated beach community of Summedanb. The cmly other incorporated city along the South Coast is Carphteria (pophtion 13,747);a substantial portiorn of its population is workjng class andior Latino. En years past, it served as the commercial sub-center for
neaiby h m s and was home to working people employed elsewhere inthe local region. Only at the end of our sbdy period (in 1990) was its trraditionally pro-grokvth city council replaced by an envi The city of Santa Basbara has long been the centes of planning and land-use politics-not only for the region but in some ~ s p e c t sfor the state and the nation. S m e say the 1969 Santa Barbara oil spill not only stimulated local enviro ental protection ( m d the enactment of what an oil official called "&a Xly excessive" demands; see Homer, 19510: 4), but sparked the global e~~vironmental nrroveme~~t (Easton, 1972). In fact, such concerns go back at least as far as the 1925 earthytlake and fire; the city was rebuilt under the supervision of the country's first architectural rclview board. A homegrocvn versi.on of the Andalusjan Spanish achitectural style (which became the city" trademark and inspired its many grand and notewor&y ofiicial buildings and co ercial stmctures) was explicitly promoted by local government under the influence of citizen activists (similar to the invention of the ""Santa Fe" "style, see Vilson 1997). At the county level, Santa Barbara also became the first irr California to require architectural review (Gebhard 1990: 7 ) . FIistorically, city government leaders were drawn mstly from '"Main Street" business gmups, typical of small-town America. But on certain issues and projects, the oMicial lcadcrship deferred to a crjvie-miaded dite who used their prestige and purses to block development-for example, Zly buying land for public open space along the beachhont until the city could be kduced to pay for it. Athough this state of affairs was no doubt tense at tjmes, there was a modus vivendi in which citizens"groups "watched over" a growth-oriented local government and controlled, at least in terms of the aesthetics, how development occurred. This proved a workable trute as long as growth pressures remavled mnderatc. These conditions began changing in the late 1960%particuiarty with the dramdic growth ol the University of California's ncw campus in Goleta (officially the Universiity of California, Smta Bahasa). Count-y voters set a new prtrcedent in 1970 by mrtuming their elccted officials' appmval of a development-a 1,535-m2 "l,eapfmgttluxury housjng prcrject north of Goleta by the famous "E'l Cnpitm" wsurfhg beach (Craves and Sirnon, 1980). h a similar 1972 action, Sat~taKarbara city vokrs stopped an eight-story rclsidential condo ""inwer," later city officials wrote a permanent citywidc four-story b i g h t limit into the city charter. "hall ten Santa Barbara-ama referenda irrvolving environment artd growth issues between 1967 and 1983, the e~zvironmentalist: positio~~ prevailed" pollen, l963f3). Certain elements of the community-notably the Citizen's Planning Associatbn, with its roots extending to the post-quakez rebuilding period-had long promoted ""god planning." m e plamkg advocates hduded. retirees and the weailthJr, bolstered, by two other groups: (1) those
Snrttn Barbarn beactzfi.ont on CabrBIIo Avenue
who were buffered from the local growth economy by working for large, nm-local public and private organizations-particularly the uniwersity and the high tech industries; (2) those whose business was Smta Barbara's scenic character, namely tourism (this g r o q provided less consistent support). By 1990, the most importmt elected bodies at both city and coulzty levels were controlled by people who won ofice as environmentalists, some of them ari; long as twenty years earlier. The environmentalist rise to power was not a steady prog~ssionbut a back and forth contest for political position, especially at the county level. The cmvironmentalist &minance achieved by 1990 was, in fact, shcrrt-lived, as evidmced by elections after our study period that turned control ol s m e jllrisdjctions to the pro-growth camp. But the array of elected posts rander environmentalist control at so many levels (city county, water boards, and other sgecial districts) and for such an extensive period (most of the twenty years) may have been unique in Amerira.4 ental groups in the city of Santa Barbara, in particular, institutionalized t-heir prc.sence to a high degree, Thc Citizenfs F"l sociation (with a countywide reach from its city base) maintained a downtown headquarters and employed a p1 er to assist with lobbying and dcvelnpment monitoring. Network, a left-oricnt.ed citizens' action lobby, sustajned an office at tirnes and usually employed at least a parttime staff person. Other such organizations came and went, a later example being the Santa BaTbara Alljance, which raised money for political candidates and monitored. the development pmcess on a daily basis. Grclups such as the Citizc;ns fnr G&ta Valley proved eyually effective, though they were f u l y volmeer. The Envil-onmental Defense Center (with four hXl-time staff lawyers, plus paid support staff, interns, and volunteers) wwed litigation wars on land-use issues. The Community Environmental Council, f-aulzdedin 1969 as an enviro research center, developed a wide array of programs with a paid staff that grew evemally tcr sixty persms (including reeyclhg center workers). The coulzcil, came to have its own showplace buildbg funded by a local philanthmpist. Beyond these genclrat-purpose and bcalv autonomous groups, Santa Barbara had e x t m e l y active ehapters oE national t?ssodatj,ons, especidy those with strong environmental concerns (e.g., the Sierra Club, the League oE Women Wters). The local Audubm Society, at the time of the 1969 Smta Barbara oil spill, had a remarhbly high number of members, with 7150 in the local cbapler (Molotch, Freudenburg, and Paulsen, 3.399). There w a atso groups oriented toward more particutar fnterests, like maintenance of horse trails in the adjacent national forests, support for bicycle transportation, surfctr's rights to unpolluted ocean waters, and ongoirrg el"forts tcr block expansion oE the offshcrre oil industry (e.g., Get
Oil Out!). Still other groups sprang up in reriponse to specific projects. These groups often functioned in coalition, and Santa Barttara was regarded by developers and e17vironmentalists alike as a strong bastion of environmentalist smtiment and organization, By the mid-1970s the region had become what the Miufl Street fazrr~zal called ""a major proving ground for various masurcs that have held back residential, commercial and industrial development" (Hillf 1978: 1,271.
Growth Controls: Santa Barhfc1.1.Sozitlz Coast Across the variety of localities making up the South Coast, a dlrierse array of co~~trols had been enacted over time, through voters' initiatives, board. and council actions, commission implementations, and administrative policies (Appendix R lists controls for each locality in chroncrlogical ordcr). hlmod every cmtrol was controversial, usually with intense public M a t e and often with great acrlmnny. As is true throughout the arid West, water is the mother's milk of Southern California's growth. The first move toward growth control on. the South Coast was the 1972 Goleta Water Board decision to grant no new water hcrokups in what had been the county's fastest grcrwir-rg and largest suburban area, Voters ratified thjs decision by popular rclferemdum and installed an envimnmentalist majority on the water board in 1973. In 1979, county voters elected not to tap Cdifornia" state water system (the only California county to do so). Two smaller water districts (Nontecito and Summerbnd) imposed their own (less skingent) moratoria and rationing limits (in 1973 and 1974, respectively). In 1974., thinking ambitiously about future politics, the city of Santa Barbara commissioned a group of local academics and envim volunteers to determine how different levels of future populat would impact the city. In effect this was a giant enviro port on the effects various growth scenarios would have m alX aspects of fiscal hralth and city services. Based on the Shree-volume report (Appelb a m , et ale, 1976), Ihe city colmci:l selected the f i g ~ ~of r e 85,000 as the city" final capacity (10,000 more than were present at the time) and downzcmed virbally all multi-family ~sidentialareas to approximately Xn the face of legd challenge, voters half their prior allokvable de~~sities. then (in 1977) endorsed both the population limit and the downzoning. The same measure advised that all chmges to the city's gmeral plan be submitted to a vote of the people, Taking it a step further, a 1,982 vote added to the city charter the prhciple that the city was to " h e within local resourcesm-a not so veiled proviso intmded to discourage any hture commitment to the state water project. Still another provision requircd that five council votes would be needed for any future rezonjng (a "slaper-majority'kf the sevm council members).
In a move that seems incredible given the discourse that followed in the 1 9 9 0 ~ the ~ city acted to ""balance""its housing and jobs by decreasing the nu~nberof jobs it wndd potentidy attract. Cowlcil action and a subsequent citywide vote (Measure ""E" h 1989) sharply limited future commexial building (mtail, office, and manufactufing) to a total of three million square feet over the followhg twenty years, Commercial buildbgs could. have a floor area-""footprintu-equal to only one quarter of the land upon which they were built; small additions (under 3,1100 squart. feet) could be made to exisling structures, but any larger projects had to compete fnr the rclmahing cmmercid space not allocated to projects in the pipeline (approved or pending) or to "community priorities.'XS~ce two and one-half:mi1lion sqLlare feet was already set aside for such uses, only one-half million square feet remained to accommodate new proposals (a figure that translates roughly as a two-department-store shopping mall available for all future colnmercial fulletions including office buildings, manufactuw, and so forth). On the water sup& front, in 19% a long drought caused the city to disallow commerciat developments that r e q u i ~ dany water beyond a parcel" historic use, with subsequent mstrictior-rs requiring net water savings for all projects. 'The city limited new residential hookups to &out fiity per year (allwa.t.ed on a lottery basis). Mnre or less keeping pace with city residents, in 19713county voters approved a 0.9 percent annual poplafaticrn growth limit for the unincorporated areas of the Santa, Barbara South Coast. The 1,989 county grokvth management ordinance limited the Goleta area to 280 new housing units and 80,000 square feet of ccrmn-tercial development each year (a very small increment, given the appmxjl3nate 75,000 person popdation base). The small city of Caryinteria remained a relatively unregulated. zone throughout this period, with growth resistance taking hold only in 1990, when voters rejected city plans to establish a redevelopment agency that was perceived as a tool for growth promotion. Under the rallying cry to ""saveCa~interia'ssmall town character,'" large beachfront, mixed-use complex was turned down by l.he freshly elected environmentalist city council, Santa Monica
Smta Monica approximates Santa Barbam in population size (86,905)but was our mid& case in t e r m of the potential far effective growth cmtrcrl
implementation, Compared to Santa Barbara, its optiolls were stro~~gly constrairred by its lmatim at the seasidtl edge of the great L.A. metropoZis.
Beyond the city line to the north are aMuent L.A. suburbs; to the east and south, Santa Monica is wowen tightly into the W s t Side of Los Angeles, its borders indistinguisfiable from adjacent L.A. What goes on in the giant metropolis feeds in as traffic cmgestion, busing pressure, homelessness, crirne, and housing price innation. began as one of the first Southern It was not always so. Smta Mo~~ica California coastal resort towns; tmvelers making a two-day wagon trip from downtown Los Angeles wouid camp on its broad beach (Ranham, 1,971).It grew along with the L.A. region during and just after World War :I1as mili.tary production (Douglas Airrrait h particular) became a center for local employment. 7'he populatictn was heavily working class, living in modest bungalows. 'The fj*al linkr wit-h the metropolis c m e cvith c m pfction of the Santa Mmica Freeway in 1966. As integration with the rest of L.A. proceeded, Santa Monica's population beeme more socially heterogcmcous, with African-Americans and Latinos ta.king up residence, particularly h the southern portion. The summer beach homes and aparments in the Ocean Park area attracted a more settled community than before, at once bohmian m d pditically progressive (Shearer, 1982), h n t e r s became an ever larger and more vocal proportjcrn of the city's population, reaching 28 percent in 1980 (Clmel, 1986: 141). Tfne city also becme home to high-rise residentid, hotel, and office structures, with a particularly strong buildting boom in the 1984-1989 period. Pressures mounted for a massive intensification of eltisting land uses and the gentrification of much of the housing stock. Somd and substantial single-family homes were bought (at prices in the me-ME million dollar rmge) as "tear downs" and replaced by much larger singlc-family structures crowded onto ordinary sized city lots. SiimilarXy, low-rise apartmnt bfocrks and commesciaf structures became marketable fnr the value of their land alone. Santa Monfca's relatively clean air, its proximity to beach recreation, m d its easy access to iJ.A-'s important business and cultural centers together sparked. intmse growth prtrssum (Fulton, 1985: 63). %rough most of the 1,960~~ civic life in Santa Monica was co~~trolled by the hometown elite of the Chamber of Commerce and the sewice clubs (Condefli, 3980). These gmups were subsequently challenged in succmslve waves. The first sig11 of challenge c m e in response to a 1979 city council plan to tear down the Santa Monica pier; the grand vision included an ocean causeway arcing north hrough tbe Pacific a e a n to link the city to Malibu, with an mtifidal island fos kigh-rise development built on hay landfill as an additional feature, Citizen protest stopped the project, with even the normally pro-growth local newpaper, the ClzltlonFr, ~ I Iopposition.. Several of the liberal Republicans who led the fight to save the pier we= subsequently dccted to the city council, Alithough not opposed to
the underlying premises of growth, they rejected this project as at best impractical and at worst disastrous for thr city's character. The first effective challenge to grokvth its& was a cifize~~ laws~1j.tto block public fjnanchg of a proposed downtown shopphg mall ("Smta Monica Placef")on the grounds that the prt!ject would not benefit neighborhoods. Though fhancjng for the project was initially qproved by voters in 1975, the city ended up settlhg with the plaintiffs in 1978. The settlement provided that a portion of the prclject's parking revenues be chamekd to low-income housing rehabilitation, plxket parks, =cycling, child care, and a wnmen" center. This development agrcemnt became a model for how the city would later negoliate with devetopt?rs." By late 7,978, several renter groups banded together to form the Santa Monj.ca Rcnter" s g h t s g m p (SMRR). SMRK won rent control with the city's highest voter turnout in its history Over the next few years, STUIRI.: gaincd control of the newly established rent control board and the city council (control of the latter was to be lost for a five-yeas interrepurn). Because of both its strong ~ g d a t i o nover rental markets and the level of citizen a c t h i m across many fronts, including land use intervention, Santa Mmica became one of California." most prominent examples of proactive local g w e ent. Atthough rent control was the e%ectoralissue that first transformd Santa Monica poitics, it was delivered within a broader chilllenge to the power of Xacrdlords and developers over civic dfairs (Carnoy and Shearer, 1980; Shearele, 1982). The liberal and radical leadership gave the city a reputation for severely curtaifhg private property rights in favor of citizen and nei&borhood interests (conserva";vc groups cailed it, derisively the "People's Republic of Santa Mo~Itica'"). 'The city was the laboratory; activist base, and m a h constituency for the Torn Hayden and Jane Fonda" Citizen" for Economic ¯acy (CED), as well as the district represmted by Hayden durirrg his career in the California State Legislature. Compared to activists in Santa Barbara, Santa Monicans were concerned not only with preserving the physical envircmment but also with a strmg commitment to a social justice agenda (Heskin, 7,983; Carnay and S h e a ~ r19811; , Capek and Gitderhlom, 1,992).
Groruth Cu~zlrols:Santa M m ~ i c n When the SIVLRR rent-control challengers gained a council majority in 1981, they stopped issuing ccmstructicm permits hnmediately, even for projects already approved. h r i n g a six-monlfn permjt m~ratol"j,m, new city 1ea.dess assessed how much development should be allowed and what social benefits should come from it. Projects '"stuck in the pipelime" were allowed to proceed d y after new terms wcre negotiated, with extra benefits for the city under case-by-case "developer agreements,"
San tm Monim Place lLlnll
During t h initial moratorium, the council-along with citizen committees-kvised stricter = v i m , new development guidelines, and m m development fees-iincluding fees for ixnpxts on traffic and schools, and to provi$e affordable housing, The city negotiated exactions on a projectZly-project basis and, later on, with the grridmce of revised land-use standards developed in the comprchcnsi.ve plan of 1963.13,. Tn May 1989, a newly installed S M M rn4orit.y m the city council imposed another permit moratrorium to stall the boom in commercial development pelrding development of a growth managemnt st..rateu.This action came mly nine months after the city adopted a new camprehensive zonk~gordinmce, which reduced total allowable commercial/hdustrial developmernt in the city bp two-thirds. Meanwlnile, (jrokvth critics we= able to block several lart;e-scale new developments, even ones that promised direct revenues to the city and special social b e f i t s , such as rcldevelupme~ntol the city airpmt and construction of a heaehfront hotel on the publicly owned site of an existing private club. Santa :Monica"s tight ~stricticmsgrew tighter still.
The Kivlsrside Area Western Rvcrside County, the most far-flung and fastest grocving o.E ottr study sites, represents the stereotypically least conducive scenario for effective growth control. :Its prcrximity to the spreading metropolis pulls development its way, and local gr0kvt.h boosters refer grandiy to this interior regim east of Los Angeles as the ""lnlan d v i r e . " The area" heavily working-class population base and weak organizational i~~frastructurc also imply more? tetltative grocvth resistance.
Background Our study area includes not only the city of Riverside but those county portions that stretch from tl-te L.A. County border on the west, to Ormge County on the south, to adjacent San Bernadho County on. the north, and forty miles east into Rjverside CounV(roughly, oour area is a fortymile-hy-forty-milt-,square). Hemmed by mountains on all sides (some rising above 10,I)CIO feet), the enclosed valleys me studded with rocky outcrops and edged by bmkm badlands that carve them into smaller sett l a e n t pockets of distinct natural character. The fact &at anyone could consider all of this part of the same urban region refleds the magnitude of development pressures spilling into Rverside from the coastall amas, Riverside's natural environment (hatter in summer, colder in whter, drier year round, and without access to the sea) was less hospitable than Santa Barbards to people who lived without extensive public water
works and interstate freeways. At th time of European arrival, what is now Rverside County bad a population of 4,C)Of)-5,000 Cahuilla people (Stanlon, f 98%). 7'heSpaniards and Mexicrans made few land grants, m d settlement remained sparse under their rule, Interest in the area was sparked mly durir-tg the railroad era of the late nineteenth century. The city of Riverside w s established in 1870 by educated abolitionists, mostly from Iowa and Michigan (Patterson, 1971), with other hvestment groupdbuying land tracts nearby. "These piomers introduced irrigation systems and the orange groves that were later to cover large expanses" Early city leaders did take an interest in formal plmning, hiring Chclrles H. Clheney (following his work in Santa Barbara) in 1927 to create a master plan fnr a graceful city of broad, tree-lined avemes and a high level of amenities (Patterson, 1971: 294). Along with much of Southern California, the fiverside area grew steadjly, though by 1,950 it was still largely agricultural. In trhat year,lcss than 50,000 people lived in the city of Riverside, and Corona was the only other town with mcrw than 10,000 (and just barely). It was m t until the late 1920s and especially the 1980s that the larger Riverside area ""tok off" as past of the thrust of LA. expansion. Developers constructed large tracts of inexpensive homes, a pattern still ewident years later. The median sale price of a RiversidelSan Bernadino house in 1989 was $129,920, compared with $222,842 h Los .Angeles and $253,034 h Ormge County (Kristof, 1989). Although the stereotype has been that fiverside growth comes from LJ.i?r. people "moving out'9o fjnd affordable housing, a f 989 poll by the Riverside Press E~lteryrisefound that 68 pescmt of those surveyed were either longer-time ~ s i d e n t s(31 percent), had moved from other areas of the state (16 percent), or were from out of state (21 perce~~t) (Stantm, 1989a). If there was a large ""silllloer" from the urbanjzed counties, it was probahiy not people moving out to f i e r s i d e but mostly a displacemelrt of people that may havc otherwise moved to Los h g e l e s or Orange counties, All of western Riverside County experienced gmwth pressure, but the effeds on each jzzrisdiction were somewhat different-as were the reactions of each. The county government, the jurisdiction that could reasonably give the great growth spurt m overall d i ~ c t i o nand control, was not @merally activist, evcn by the standards of the earlier 1970s period. Most noticeably, thlere was little effortl or even awarcnesr; that it might be a wcrrthy goal, to coordinate planning eft'crrts with adjacent San Bernadino County, with whieh Riverside County shares important transportation corridors as well as common problems of rapid growth and air quality deterioration. C)ur interviews with local planners in both counties, people who by profession are usually highly committed to regional perspectives, revealed that even they thought about the two cwnties separately,
Teenagers i1.1down tow12Rr'uerside
which implie"that the cities of the rcgim were left to lead efforts to control devebpwnt. The dty of Riverside is the largest: and most influetztial &an center of the Idand Empire, with a 1990 population approaching one-ytlarter million people. Its original citrus industry still wisualZy dominates much of the landscape. Over the years, Riversidess bstered a reputation for a certain level of sophistication and ur't7anim especially compared with adjacent rough-and-tumble Sm Bernadino just across the county line, which housed more of the railroad workers and other working-class people, The county of :Riverside was created in part to break the city of Riverside away from San Bernadino (Stanton, 1989b).The city of Everside became the home of the county government, and FTiversiders continue to develop and support cultural msources, includillg an orchestra and a museum. The city led efforts to turn an agricultural research station into the University of Cdifornia, Rverside. Thc earnpus is an impeks for lwal growth and a focal point for regionwide cultural activity. Ringed by shopping malls both within its own boundaries and in adjacent jurisdictions, the downtowiz languished far several decades. Its grand old hotel, the Mission I m (site of the Nixm hmeymom, as well as cJf other historic events) stcrcrd forlorn and deserted in the city center during ou,r &udy period, despite large infusions of capitd to rclvive it as a downtown cdtural anchor. The city abounds in buildings of aschitectural interest, including pleasant ~sidentiafdistricts of classic California bungalows and mission-style buildbgs. Corona (population 76,095; fifteen dies southwest of Riverside on Highway 91) was founded in 1886by its own core OE speculators and citrus farmers in rivalfy with the city of Riverside. It took about 1100 years for the grmd vision to begin to bear fmit.. Adjacent to regional freeways, Corona was a fast growing boomtown of co uter-oriented reside11l;ial tract development by the late 1980s; by 11987 it had surpassed the city of :Riverside in the amount of amual commercial space approved for development. Towarcf the end of our study period, it was m o n g t-he state's fastest growing cities, providing moderate- and low-cost homes and modern retail settirrgs for a vast new population. By other lights, it is an ecoiogiealiy wastefial pmtotype of msidentiat and retail sprawt with no cohmnt culi-urd center, strcet life, or employment base. Hemet (popuktion 36,094; thirty-three miles southeast of Riverside and thirteen miles fmm the nearest freeway) is a retirc.mt.nt center and has grown steadily but slowly since the 1960s. It is also something of a satellite agricultural center, but it was dwarfed in the 1980s by the booming towns around it. I_.,akeElsinore (population 118,285; :ifteen miles snuth of Corona) swvived for many years as a predominately work@-class resort town by
exploiting its natural reservoir. Tn the early 1900s a train line brought vacationers from Los Angeles to this "clean air" "desert community The lake brhging in jet skiers that gives the town its name rernaiins m attractio~~, and ski boats. h 1988 the state completed the final link connecting the city into the LA. freeway system,A putthg Lake E I s h m within commute range (by regional standards) not only of Los Angeles but of Orange County and.San Diego as well (fifty miles to the south). By the end of 3989, some 25,0011 units of new housing were approved but not yet built wilbin the city limits, potentially adding m estimated 75,000 to t%le 1989 population of 15,000, The k p m d i n g residential,boom promised to transform Lake Elsinore into another suburban bedroom communiv. Norco (population 23,302; just north of Corona) w s established in the 1%0s as a bedroom suburb for horse enthusiasts. Cansistent half-acre, lawdensiv zoning includes r i m trails that comeet all houses; there are no curhs or s t ~ elights. t The town has little land left for dwelopment within the city limits, but Norco officjals had scant interest in amexing new territorks (they even gave up a little land to Corona in one case). Ch-t tfie other hand, the city actively joined the comercial development g m e , promoting the Norca Auto Mdl, with other potential projects in the wings. Perris (population 21,460; seventeen miles southeast of Rkerside) was knocvn as the rclgion's "welfare town,'%mo~~g all the places in our shady amas, it has the lowest median income and hig.hest proportion of people receiving government assistance. Several recreational vehicle factories provide some jobs, as does nearby March Air Farce Base. In the 1 9 8 0 ~ ~ residential growth began to take off, with the construction of lower-cost housing within the city limits. The town has tried to encourage co ciallindustrial developme~~t as well, Sun City (populal-im 14,930; about five miles south of Perris) is a prototypic retirement community. Built by developer Del Webb after his hugely successful retirement Mecca of the same name in Arizona, u ~ ~ h corporated. Sun City has a limited degree of self-governance through a county-approved Community Service Area (CSA) status. This allows the collection and use of fees for some services, Moreno Valley (five miles east of Riverside on Highway 215) grew "overnight" from a popdation of 8,WO in 4980 to a c i v of almost IZC),OO all over th.e state..Initial ten years later-hawing boomtown recog~~ition growth was driven by huge residential developments approved by the county-some at extra high density under a county pmgram to encourage "'afEordable" b u s h g . M e r two ~ n s ~ c c e s stries, h l citizens' groups led the successful effort to incorporate the city of Moreno Valley h 19M-in part as a first step toward gaining some cmtrol over the rate oE rclsidential cmstrwction. Consjsting of adjacent subdjvisions, &ere is no visual, cultural, or business center to this city, nor any apparent physical relationship to the adjacent strips of commercial development.
Once hcorpmated, the town tried to improve a fiscal situation made desperate by so mmy tracts of modestly priced suburban houses. It battles for more commercid devclopnte~~t, prjmarily to ga.in sales tax revenues (cities get a piece of the action in Californja; the rest goes to the state). Its major shopping complex W& into head-to-head competition witb another regional mall pl ed literally next door in the city of Riverside. As was common in the Inland Empire, two local econorrric development agmcks are pitted against each other in seeking tmants and offering deals. Temecztlta (papulatio~~ 27,099; n h e t e e ~miles ~ south of Lake Elshore) is in the southemost part of our study area. Althougtn incorporated only in 1989, it kad some coherent idmtity prior to this time because it was originally a master-planned community rather than just a collection of subdivisions. The project was taken over as "Rancho Caliifornia" by Kaiser Aluminum, which later sold the remai~~ing vacant acreage to another large developer. Although thc nnaster plan includes a rat-bcr baXanced mix of residential and comelrcial develspment, infrastructure and services am woefully i n a d e ~ a t eUnder . county buildirrg standards, the road system was only built to meet rural standards, resulthg in intense traffic congestion once the population grew in the 1980s. During our study period, the cities in the Riverside area varied from one another in m n y regards and encapsulated a number of development conditions found among growing localities throughout California, Only fie city of I(iversiete had anythifig approachfng a study p1 tradition..Across the xgion, at least c o q a r e d to Santa Barbara and Smta Monj.ca, government intervention-when it did, take plac+occurred in the context of developer pressure and in fie absence oE sustained citizen mobilization..Nevertheless, local governments throughout this area did create some furm of growth control in virtually eveq jurisdktiosl.
Growth Controls: Riverside Area The Rversiclte area controls were srtfficiclmtly numerous and well-known to ""countf% the listhgs that hearten environmentalists and dismay developers. Rather than imposhg aggregate growth caps, the most notorious (or appreciated) restrictions in the Riverside ama generaily protected special sllbareas and specific mtwal rclsnurces, alCfiough there were exceptions like the tight f d m o horse zoning and the Sun City build-out. In 1979, voters in fie city of fCiversiete created an agricultural zme to preserve citrus groves within the city; the graves were hcreashgly app ~ c i a t e dnot only as '"open space" but for the nostdgie beauty they lent the palm-lined drives through which they were rouf;inelyviewed by residents. Housing in the citrus belt was held to one house per five acres (Proposition R)-a ratio that precludes tract-style houstng but would not
qualifii as '%agricultural" at all. in some localities. The measure also decreased the density allowed in hirlside developments. In 1987 voters C), makhg it more. difficult for a city tightened the rclstrietinn (Mea.s~l,re council to dilute the earlier downzoning, and blocking a blue-ribbon gmupfumcommendation to facilitate cluster development in the citrus zone, Sometimes favored by ernvjromntalists because it encourages open space, cluster housing allows developers to corrrbine allowable units over a l q e r tract into a sillgle dense complex; it would have created, in efiEect, higher overall densities by lowering development costs and by allowing land difficult to develop to "count" as acreage. In this case, environment&ists w ould not accept the trade-offs. An earlier precedent for citrus protectim was the city of Corona's 1977 downzoning of 5,000 acrcs of citrus trees to preserve agricultural use. The ""horsey town" of Norco fallowed Everside in downzoning hillsides, reqrairing a full acre oE land for every home site (Nctrcds hunding half-acre minimum in tthe rest of town could. be thuught of as itself a strong form of growth cmtrol). fn h e southwestern part of h e county e m i r m e n talists raised funds to esta:blish the Santa Rosa I'1a.t.e~grasslands as a nature preserve. Swers were also a limi_tingfactor. Beg ing in 1982, the city of Riverside, though exempting annexations and redevelopment projects, restricted the number of new waste water hookups. h Esponse to inadequate sewer and flood control capacity, Cnrona enacted a building moratorium in 1976, limiting ~sidential permits to 450 per year. 'This was extended thmugh 1977 when the city, while successfully tapping into regirmal sewer lines, adopted a point system for new projects to encourage more e&cier.ntland-use patterns. M e n voters in the city of Riverside strengthened Proposition R in 1987, they also forbade annexing any more lands unless adeyuate infrwtructurc was available (failed growth management measures for the county and for FJIoreno Valley had hcluded similar: provisions). A general initiative did pass in the city of Hemet, ~ q u i r i n ladequate ; infrastmcbre before devdopment approval, Other cities have council-approved ordinances requiring advance adequate infrastructure, particularly for commercial and industrial developments. In Corona, mfnimum lot sizes were nearly doubled (to 7,200 square feet) by popular vote in l986 because of the same h ~ d ofs infrastructure concerns, Although not ordinarily considewd an aspect of grflwth control, and indeed more usually motivakd by Ihe opposite goal (see Moch, 19%), a number of city incorporations had environmental concern as a background motivation*Thus, h e impetus for incorpcrratra Moreno ViltlIey was to ensure mare stsinge~ztreview of development stmdards. Temecd a incorporated for similar reasons.
Among the most important development constrahts in the region was one that came not fmm local policy but from a kderal mandate implemented by the U.S. Fish and Game Departme~zt.The listing of the Stevcn's Kmgamo :Rat as an endantgered species put the brakes on a number of projeds-hchding those proposed by local gave ents. Other federal agezzcies were involved in the protectio~zof wetlands-the dried up gullies of the desert are also part of the waters of the United States. The most ambitious effort to deal with all these problems, and more, was the countywide growth cmtrol initiative that went down to defeat at the polls in 1.988.As is usual with such endeavors, the envir wew badly outspent, and deleat was urged by virtudly every mediia outlet in the county But the fact that 41) percent of the voters supported such a masure was motivation enough for c w n v officials to try to "do something" about rapid growth. At the combined request of the local building industry asscxjation and the Sierra Club, a growth mnagement element was developed for Riverside County" comprehensive plan. The f i n d document ccrntained a range of policies concerning growth (inchxding some preservation measures), though it did not define how much grow& should be allowed inthe end or how quickly that growth should happen, delineating irrstead w h e growth ~ should occur.7 The documcmt made the news as actim on growth control and joins the inventories of lists of government measures taken to deal with development problems.
Erorvth Controts in Place: A Summary Our review of enacted policies across the jurisdictions in our study areas incticates trhat communities took a wide variety o( farmaX actions, which together appear as a more or less continuws s t r e m of efiorts to intervene in the development process during &is time period. There are differe type of controls, Rverences between localities, both in the d e g ~ and side arca jurisdictions emphasized the preservation of certain zones and used utility bookup mstrictions to deal with infrastructure shortages but mostly desisted from settjng total holdhg capacities or limiting rates of growth. The city of Santa Barhara had a long-standing cap on residential build-out, with a more recent limit on co ercial development. Santa Monica relied morc heavily on project-by-projed regddion as a means of contrui. The abundance of growth contP.ol techniques in place poses the powibiiity that overall development was stymied across our study area, the problem to which we now turn. Let" look at the numbers.
4, For mare analysis of which localities tend I-0 adopt growth controls, see Dt~walf,1980; Glickfeld, Graymer, and Mc)rrison, 398%and Donovan and Nieman,
1992, Although these findings were important to us in choosing our sites, we cmtrol" regrew increasingly concerned that their dependent variable "gr~>wth lied too heavily on formal governmnt statements and rules rather than substantive implementation (see also tojgan and Zhou, 1990). 2. Fctr alternative discussions of this distinction see Gottdiener (1983). 3, Atthough the extent of commuting, especially from Xower-housing-cost north county locations, increased during our study period, the significant Qistance of the city from adjoining urban areas gives it a level of autonomy (in regard, for example, to traffic planning and air quality maintenance) not fc>undat our other sites. Median 19% commute time was sixteen minutes for city of Santa Bahara residents (I2.S.Census, 1994). 4. "i draw a California contrast, Beskeley has also had strict environmental policies, but the surrc>unding territories have not; pro-growth regimes have Largely cmtrolled the Alameda County government. 5. Rcjbert Myers, the legal aid lawyer that represented the plaintiffs, was later appointed city attormy* 6. Via Interstate 2 5 to the San Bernadinv Freeway. 7 . Orange County" experience in the Late 4980s ran parallel to Riverside County". In Orange County's case, a county-wide growth control ordinance (with real teeth), fat~oredby a wide majority according to preelection surveys, was defeated after development interests put together a $2.5 million campaign against the ordinance; grcjwth controllers supporting the ordinance spent $106,000. Nevertheless, developers led by the Irvine Ranch Company were frightened into generating certain mitigations, incXuding means to finance road cmstrudim and initiatives for a program of open-space presrvation to accompany future development (Pincetl, fodhcoming).
Has Growth Been Stopped? Not Much
l[i, assess
the inrpact of controls that our iTtformants identified as most important in limitint; development, we gathered building and grcrwth data, from eleven jurisdictions in our study m a s . In this chapter, we fist show general trends for commrcial dcvelopmmt, retail sales, and residential cmstruction in our study areas. Then, focusing specifically on rclsidential construction, we test statistically whether or not: grocvth controIs did, in fact, impact housing construction. First Findings: Rates aE Grawth
In a nutshell, we found scant evidence that controls had much of m effect, particdarly on Ihc supfly of new housing-the kind ol construction most controls had been aimed at curtailing. First we will look at commercial growth rates, including retail sales, m d then turn to housing.
Even though most growth controls focus specifically on residential development, they are often portrayed as posing a general threat to the local e c o n o q Increased ~ g u l a t i o nis said to create m "anti-business" climate Chat sliRes grokvth. More spceificalIyI increased housistg cosls, allegedly caused by new regulalions, make it harder to attract workers to the area and to get them to stay* Commercial develoipment trends in these growth-managed commw~ities did not conform with these representations. Instead, commercial buildix~gin each area increased dramatically over the twenty-year period. Camparing local trends with state asld national patterns (Figure
FIGURE 3.1 Commercial Development Trends, 1970-4990
*Santa Barbara Stzrdy Area Calilornla (~10,000,000)
Ritrersidc Study Area (XI 0,000)
SC7l;RCFS: C~nstmctionT n d ~ ~ sResearch tq Board, 1971-1990; Rverside Co~xnty,19Ti"a-1989; Santa Barbara Counv, 1970-1985); U.S, Department: of Commerce, 1970-1989.
XI),we see that lcxal iwestment, rather than responding to local growth controls, followed the broader economir dynamic. In 1,990, the value of ncw comercial development for the nation as a whole was 253 percent higher than the value of new development h 197&much of this due to sheer idation.1 Commercial developmat in the Santa Rarbara, Santa Mo~zica,and Riverside areas rose significantly more than this over the period, though. local development activity is mom volatile from year to year. Some places far outpaced even the robust four-fold statewide increase in commercial development valuations during the two decades; for example, Santa Monj.ca commercial development valuations grew 1,WO percctnt, and Riverside study area g r w t h was close to double that. Commercial development was more moderate in the Santa B a h r a study arca, hut vaiuations still inercased a strong 341 percent in the same pe"icd-dy somev\rhat less tban t-he state overall increase and greater than the corntry's (see Appendix C, Cornnercial Valuation Data). Expanding municipalities and the prdiferation of "greenfield'" development in unincorporated suburban tracts drove the fast-paced growth in the Riverside study area, Overall, these areas, each with growth cmtrols of some sort, kept up with, and even exceeded, b a d e r trends; in particular, the Everside and Santa Monica study areas (two very Merent business climates) did extraordin,arj,lywell.
TABLE 3.1 Percent Increase in Retail Sales, llli3"i7-11989
Percent of Incrmse City of Santa Bahara City of Santa Moniela
320
City of Riverside State of Califc~rnja sou~czi:California Departineat of Rmenue.
325 31'7
3f;8
Growth in Refail Sales Retail bushess, mother measure of economic vitality, alsa thrived aver the period. In the t h e e largest cities h our study arcas, retail sales (indexed by sales tax rt.vmue) equaled or surpassed the stakwide level, as indicated by Table 3.1, which shows the percel~tincrease in per capita retail sales over the 1971-1989 period: Growth rates in these central cities are especialty impmsive cmsidering that traditional urban centers t-hroughout-tlnc state and nation were losing retail activit.y to mgimal m l l s and suburban business strips. The vitality of the retail sector in the study sites would be even more strikjng had we been able to gather sates data for unincorporated areas, whm most of the commercial growth almost certahly took place; buildrng permit data shoMied that these unincorporated areas had the most new c m merciail cmslructio~~, but we were un;rble to break out retail sales for unincorporated communities because of the way the state collects this data, Growth in Residential Developfnent Significant numbers of new residences were also built aver the two decades, Between 1970 and 1998,17,298 housing u11ii-s were approved in. the Santa Barbara study area (adding 37 percent to the existing housiPlg stock); 11,293 in Smta Monica (a 27 percent rise); and a l m s t 3KC1,01)0 in the Riverside study area (a 151 percent gain). Although there are significant differences inbuilding activiw across our area, the overall ebb m d ROW OE rclsidmtial building usually fdbwed the broader state trend. Figure 3.2 compares residential construction in the study areas with the statewide and national pattern (see Appendix D for detailed residential buiZding rates for al:I thc. study sites). In the early phase, around 1971, house brtiXding rates in all our study areas clustered cioselp with the state's overall rate but then fell off in Santa Monira and Smta Barbara, while rising well above the state in the Everside study area. The fast m d erratically growing Riverside study area is the deviant case in this =gad, greatly outstripping state levels, especialily h the 19t30s.
FIGURE 3.2 Residential Building Rates, 49m-1990
- Santa Barbara Study Area
+
Santa Mtmca
+
kverslde Study Area
19m-1989; Santa Darbara Counq, 197&1989; and U.S. Deparbnent.of Commerce, 1970-1989,
SCIG'RCFS:Riverside Corrnty,
The major drops in all areas came with the 197'4 recession, brief in the fiverside residmtial building case, but more persistent in the other two areas (and in the state overall). The mid-1WOs was also a period of tightening controls in Santa. Barbara, suggesting that growth regulation slowed ~sidentialbuilding. But in Santa Monica this major drop in ~ s i dentiaf cmstruction occurred before growth control (or rent cmtrol) became m element of local policy The overall pattern is thus ambiguous, at least if we use the kind of crude scan that Figure 3.2 allows. We are thus left with Chc overdl observation €%atstate and national tren& are important factors but that local growth controls might have had some effects. Below, we discuss more refined techniyues we used to measure precisely the ixnpacts of growth cmtrof as compared to the gencrd trends. Althou@ growth was robust both in terms of commercial and residential growth in all our s b d y areas, we notice that residential building rates arc much higher in the Riverside area, though the rate of comerciaf development in this area (whether in terms of retail sales or commercial building) does not stmd out from the ather study sites. Compared to the other study areas, Riverside" ddevelicrpment has been skewed sharply toward residential construction, despjte local efforts to bolster the city's
and county" fiscal and employment base, and despite the residential focus of most growth control in this artra. Testing the Power of Growth Kestnrictions
'The growth in retail, sales, commercial construction, m d residential development does not demonstrate that growth controls have no bearing on rates of development. Such a demonstration requires more p r i s e methods. Past studies, trying to p h p o b t growth control impacts on such characteristics as population growth, rates of constmction, and the cost of housing (or some combi~~aticm of these) yield mixt.d results. Early studies tended to shnw that there were indeed ifngacts, findings quite opposite to the more recent m l y s e s that fail to detect much by way of consequence-2 Reasons for the inconsi.stencies are the varying methods and difierent levels of precision used by researchers. An old standby method if; to focus on a single locality, or a group of localities, and observe that growth deelined ""after" new conkols were enacted."~vcn when presented in a somewhat refined manner, these longitudinal studies run the ubvious risk of attributing changes to growth control that may have occurred across various loea(ities-inclding those without controls. Econarnies do go down as well as up, and all ships may define together on the common sea. Cross-sectional studies, which compare places with and without growth control at a single time point, may attribute effects to growth control that are due to some other unmeasured characteristic shared by places that have adopted grokvth contrds-for exaxnple, their regional geographic location,
national study considered five distimt sorts of growth control, Still, it is the precise content of policies and implementation pmcedures that determine whet-her or not places "reallyf' have growth coakols. For exarnple, s m e of Logm and Zhou" gmwth control policies (such as requiring env i r o m n t a l impact =ports) are mandatory in some states but are locally ellforced in ways that vary widely. Sorne localities merely "go along"" with formal procedural requirements (and thus have all the right rules on their books), whereas others comply enthusiastically with the intent of state regulation. The distinction mems a great deal both for developers m d environmentalists. m e r =searchers have scaled the degree of p w t h conbol based on survey rclspmses that report the nzlmber of ~strictivepolicies that have been adopted (Baldassare and Protash, 1.982; Glickfeld and Levine, 1990; Neimm, 1990). Such ""cunts'kf controls do not solve the prcrblem of implemetntation differences. Passing nunerous measttres does not ensure their intensity or effectiveness. City councils c m enact lists of measures with a single vote, simply inccnporating items borrowed from another area"s (jenerd plan or frols a e o ~ n s u l ~ tonff-fie-shelf 's inveintory In these casa, the pm1,iferatim of new policies may be morc symbolic than substantive. b r example, boomtown Corona would seem to have a highrr level of growth co~ntmlthan the city oE Santa Barbara, judghrg strictly drom a tally of growth restrictions based on city officiaI.s"responses to a California kague of Cities surwy (reported in Glickleld and Levkte, 1990). 'This finding contradicts not only our field observations but the ju,dl;m,ent of virhally any infomed observer from either side of the growth dhate. An Alternative Testing Strategy
Miherttas other studies supplemclmt vantitative anaiysis with mme descriptive case ma.t.eria,l(see t,ogan and Zhou, 1,990;Neiman, 1,991)),we reversed priorities and used. our knowledge of the local contexts to pick the pokies we would take as the most important growth measms. &&er than treati~nggrowth conh.ol as a policy that can he read off frnm a questiomaire or comty plan-as a uniform or clearly scaled phenomenonour strategy was tcr use the field interviews (combi~~ed with plans and to rjnd out indega~deintvariabk. By interviewing other legal doeunte~nts) a diverse set of local in.fommts we were able to use agreement from political opposites as a signal of meaninghl gmwth controls. AlPhough the ffeem measures wc ide~ntifiedscemed to vary in comprehensiveness, techniyue, and rigor, we made the assumption that those most involved in the local scene would have the best seme of which regrrlations mattered. Having gelnerated our "bindependent variable'' i,n this way, we entered these diverse regulations into an apprclpriate model (cross-sectional time
series) to discern the local impacts of specific measures on residential buildirtg activity. We developed a techiyue to separate growth cmtml impacts from thc cvhole range of other local variati.uns in development activity caused by social, economic, historical, geographic, and cultural differences. We also accounted statisticdly for statevvide changes in building activiv in order to separate out the affects of broad shifts in the business cycle or macrueconodc factors such as interest rate fluctuation (see Appendix A for details and cornplete resrtlts)." Contrary to the idea that new development reglllations had stifled rcsidential building, we h m d that in all but two hstances-both of which took place in the early 1970s in the Santa Barbara study ama-growth controls did nothing to slow residential growth. Commercial development was dso quite rubust, thollgb we did not perform coqarable statistical testing. It appears from our combirred findings (and t h e of others)-and this is a consermtive way to put it-that fat more comercial growth occurred. under growth control than local controversies suggested, OUTnext task is to try to learn why so much developmmt took place in the face of so many rcgulatims presunted to curtail it-a topic to which we now turn*
Motes 1. Expressed in terms of the value of permitted constructic>n.Data collection was facilitated by the gwernment publications staff of the UCSB library and through the cooperation of the Construction Industry Research Board. 2. For early studies, see Dowall and Landis, 4982; I(a;tz and Rosen, 4980; Urban Idandinstitute and Gruen, Gruen, and Assodates, 1977; see Fiischel(199Q)for a review of the literature on price effects. 3. See, for example, Frech and Lafferty, 19%; Urban Land Institute and Gruen, Gruen, and Assaciates, 497; Mercer and Morgan, 1982, 4. For examples of cross-sectional studies, see Bowall and Landis 1982; Elliot, 1983; Katz and Rasen 1980,19817; Wolch and Gabriet, 1983). 5. We used dummy variables to capture these broader sources of variation, as described in Appendix A.
Power to Build: How Cities Grow Under Growth Control
Growth control is apparently not afi its cracked up to be, eitber by critics or supporters; formal policies have not pulled up the drawbridge, A. generation of political science studies have taught that succcsshl implementation of any sort of public policy can not be taken for granted.1 Since land development is such a highly contested and complex operation with, well-organized spmsors, regulatory outcomes am especially uncertain, Drawing upon various literatures on power, policy, and organizations, we offer four explan&ions for why prescribed growth limits might not take huld.. We then pmvide more sgecif c examples horn ollr case studies, indicating how lmd-use ~ g i m e can s function, rasing one broad mechanism or mather* 3. Symbolic Politics. Growth control may be another arena in
which policy makers, u ~ ~ dcor~stituents' er demand to "do something," create formal rules and a lot of talk about regulation, but without reat enou$ teeth to have material consequmce (Edetman, l9M; see also Rubin, 1989). 2. Episodic Intervention. A policy may be applied only sporadically; with land dewelopment pafticularl~~ new poiicies must be consistently applied to produce inte~ldedresults. The physical construction that may happen during "opedhrmoents can hardly be repealed to ~ s t o r cprior . landscapes. :lf developers slip through periodic windokvs of opportu"ity controls only skft the distribution of approvals aver time but do not reduce overall grtrwth (see Janzcyk and Constance, 3980). Some rules are designed to be short term, often in resporlse to some immedjde crisis or shortage. O t k r s turn w t to be temporary because of shifts in potitical control or administrative practice." 59
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3, Cotlntervailing Policies, Cosnplex organizations, whether private or government units, have contradictory htemal tendencies; some theorists conceive orgmizations as anarchies, with a "garbage can" of goals and strategies (March and Olsen 1976: 175; Scott 1981: 270-275). Cities may be restraining developmetnt with some policies (picked up as growth controls by analysts, developers, and envimnmentalists) and simultaneously encouraging it with others (not on the analysts9istsf not complained about by developers, although possibly a grievance ammg environmentalists). 4. hitiatives of the f\tegulated..We know from past cases of regulation (Huntington 1952; towi, 1969; McComell, 1966) that the regulated have been able to function well and.have even succeeded in turning their rqulators into advocates for their industry (e.g., farm programs, the TVA, and meat inspection). As in these other realms, regulated dcvelupers are nut passive in the face of k c d growth cox~kol.Developers may take advmtage of unforeseen slack, loopholes, or opprhnities in the rules in order to get around them, Certainly, cr~ativeresistance and agency, which scholars now recopize ammg marginalized groups, are well with& the repertoire of those accustomed to power.
We now draw on our case materids to show how these possibilities work out in practice.
Growth Through Symbolic Growth Control Political leadcrs often make general stateznents favoring some form of either "control" or ""management""of growth, even when their policies favor virtuaily t?ll develnpment initiatives. "'Taking actionf"y adding a '"growth control element'9o a locality" ggcneral plan opens a whole episode of study reports, public hearings, and discussim. But, in the United States, generd plans are not binding in the hsence of implemmtation measures, such as zoning (Popper, 1981; Rose, 1979: 53). In the 5mta Barbara County case (but not the city's), growth manqement implementation lagged efevm years behind the adoption of gmw& management planning goals. The county" ""plan" for growth managemnt gave the impression of a control regime, but trYithout implementation procedures it was largely symbolic. Plms o k n list community growth management ""visions" as a substitute for strictures. A Santa Barbara County planner noted that transiating gmeral "'shouldsf"o specjfic "shallsf%was a large part of a revision of that county's general plan,Vut switching verb f o r m is not always enough.
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For example, rather than litnitkg growth or gmwlh rates, the Riverside County Growth Managemat Element did little except use a tough v&: 'The Cotxnty Adminidrator si"lrrll inventory and quantify current and anticipated socriat and economic needs in the County for 20 and.5 year periods. The Goad of Supervisors, with appropriate public. input shall be oriented to meet those needs" "iverside County Planning Department ing standards are set, they may still be inccmsequential. The Santa Barbara Cou~ztygelzeral plm update of 1980 was concrete enou* to define specific thresholds of adverx traffic impacts that would be used to deny projects. But the county supervisors approved offendir?g projects anyway citing "overriding considemtions" of jobs or housing+i+.cr one or the other is avaiIable In virtually all focalities, given chrcmic shortages. Approwing more jobs-prodLtci11g projects then leads to a fioushg shortage; getting h e a d on housing would (and does) lead to claims that more job-rich projects are needed to provide local emplftymmt to residents (the need f o f ""jabs-housirrg balance"). Even the establishment of what appear to be "hard" population lixnits can turn out to he essentially symbolic. The city of Corona (inRiverside County) set a yearly limit of 450 housing units, a figclre that exceeded the annual abrerage over the previous five years of rapid growth. Corona exempted annexed land. from its increased lot-size reqrrirements, providing still another growth avenue. The city of &erside's sewer limits also excluded annexed land, thus allowhg an annual average of 2,309 new units to be approved instead of the 1,208-.4,500 hookups per year under the rules. Santa Monica lowered its zoning (h1988) to permit no mare than 70 million squarc feet oi rrew commercial development, but that was still,the equivalent of about fifty rczgiclmal hopping malls and an amount tcn-fold Almost 6 millicrn square its previous 1984 build-out planning prctjectio~~. feet had been approved by 1983, far surpassing prior expectations, but still not coming near the development cap. The boom led to later moratoria, which stiH excrnpted many projects. In Smta Barbaafs case, the commercial build-out cap was low but did not restrain build-out in the near term. Durhg this early phase, growth control was not really controlling; if later city councils were to relax the holdhg capacity to let development have another run, no real c m t d wwld. occur over the longer term. Some of the new rules that appear to hinder growth in fact pave its way. For exmple, there can be measurcs that d o w development onl,y when fees are established to offset specific project costs. Such policies, as well as the fees that follotv; may be loudly conde ed as h~terferencein k e markets. But land development always presupposes government intervention (for infsastmcture and basic services); when tax revenues are
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inadequate for the purpose, special fees and exactions facilitate rather &an hinder growth (see Bauman and Ethier, 1985 Nelson, 1986; Snycler and Steg~aan,1988). Responding to environmental groups' complaints of "unregulated, growth," "developers may also welcome such growthfie market is strong and when stanenabling regulation, especially dardized kes allow sci&ively simple development review (Deaki.n, 19%; Alterman, 1.988). As a prominent Riverside land-use and development lawyer said, ""Developers may not like (impact fees), but they know they are rational. mey figure in a boom, why argue"?" It is no surprise that these measures, sometimes castigated naively as ""socialistic" ar '"confiscatim," are unlikely to fnhibit growth.
Growth Through Episodic Growth Control Even a short lapse in growth cro~~trol alllows developers not only to satisfy pent-up demand but to build in anticipation of future regulation, Limits based cm shortfalls irr utility- capacities are one type of control that tends to be temporary. AltboLtgh eantrol dvocates may hope the infrastructure shortages will never be redressed, they ofim are. Water policy in the Santa Barbara South Coast area seemed a deliberate use of i x l f r a t r u c e regddion to erea.t.elong-term gcokvth crmtrols. Smta Barbara was the only county in the state whose voters had rejected. the state water option (in 197(3),in part because of thr perceived negative enviromental effects for northern California, h part for 'ear of how new water sources would stimulate local growth. Local growth interests, incflading a forceful local daily newspaper, had backed the measure strongly But in 1991, after five years of drought, with brown l w n s and short showers, citizens in a h o s t every local water district voted to join the state water prclject (md, in a number of cases, to participate irr desalination). The area" water districts developed vast amounts of co~~trizcted supplyfelimhating any envim entalist litigation against projects based. on their potential for draining this local resource. Thus, one of the fw growth eontrol measures we hund to have had a maszxsable ixnpact on housing production (the water moratorlium in the Santa Barbara suburb of Goleta) turned out to be temporary, albeit t w n t y years h duration. Even in a strong vccsion and in an envjronmentaist locale, resourcebased growth constrahts do not necessarily endure, h the more pro-growth fiverside area, the city of Corona abandoned residential eanstruction limits whe11 it became passfile to hoak h t o a regional. sewer line. In part because of the absence of infrastructure constraktt;, the s m e city dropped its citrus grove protection pmgram eleven years after enactmemt, allowir\g developers to construct 12,500 houses on the desigated land, a 66 percent boost in the city" total housing stock,
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Another way growth continues afier it has been "stopped" is through the ""vesthg" of rights to build projects that are "hprocess." Liberal interpretati.on of vcsting extends weak regulation into the periods covercd by tighter cmtrds. Wth a 1988 Santa Fvlonica commercial downzoning, developers were given ten days to complete applications under the old rules, creating a standing inventory of vested development rights. Goleta's gmwth management ordinance and the city of Santa Barbara" 11989 commercial growth ordinance limited vesting to those commercial projects already under review (but not yet approved)."Developers mticipai-e changes in regulation md tq- to '"et vested" before a new regim takes over. Local lore had it that Santa Monica cmtractors were pourhg foundations by lamplight (to meet the local vesting criterion) on the eve of the 1981 election that would bring an environmentalist slate into power.6 Ancrther way sf extending we& cmtmls forward into future regkes is through development agreements-a mechanism created by the California legislature in 1979 that allowed locdities to specify conditions for particular prr,jects, specificatims that could remain in force for up to thirty yearst durjng which time the prftject could be built, remain on hold, or sold as a ""currency" to other entrepreneurs who wwld buy the agreement when they bought the vacant lmd (Porter and Marsh, 1989; I'hcetl, forthcoming). Once entered into, the agreements would bind Ihe jurisdjction to the deveIopefs plans (and the developer to the jurisdiction's conditions) s n matters such as allowable densities, fee stmctures, m d exactions. Projects were often set up to be built in stages over lo11g periods (a decade or more; state law all.ows as much as thirty years). The absence of the kind of expiration date that orifinarily accompanies a planning approval shelters developcrs from changing politirsaj winds (and evolving ecological knowledge of their projectsYmpacts), BuiIders in Riwerside County mshed to get under the wire in the months b e f m the countywide growth cmtrol initiative (defeated, as it turned out) and secured developmnt agreements for 100,000 future housing ranitse7 Under thjs same mechanism, Smta Monica approved an upscale 1.3milljon-square-foot staged oftice development becaux of t%re ncw exactions the city was able to negotiate (opposed by s o m activists as part of a continuing "devils bargain'" with developers).Another case was a progrowth Santa Barbara County Board of Super\ii,sorstapproval of a "timerelease" expansion plan for a Goleta research and development park that future slow-growth boards would be powerless to curtail. The nnagnihde of development "in the pipeline" thmugh clne mechanism or another was often vast, making the effects of m w growth controls a distmt prospect. The 100,0110 units approved by developer agreements in liiversi.de County werc? only a portion of some 150,000 housjng units that, in 1989, were pmding in the cities and ranillcorporated portions of
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western Riverside County-a number larger than the 102,000 houses existjng in all the cities of this study site in 1980, Likewise, the 2.5 millim square feet of retail space approved or under hvay in the city ol Corma would have doubled the existing stock.8 At the level of individuai projects, pmposals for a given parcel or provariatio~~s until the ject werc typically sulclmitted repeatedy in differe~~t circumstances, incfudjng the pof itical ones, allowed appmval. A proposed seaside hotel development west of Santa Barbara, beycrnd the county's designated &an limit Line, was twice h i e d under two separate ownerships but approved after the Hyatt Hotel Corporation entered the picture, beefh~gup mitigations and investw heavily in an unparalleled puhlic relations blitz. In tlbc case of another repeatedly rejected S m t , Bahasa area beachfront project, the Hyatt Corporation was tmsuccessful in its efforts to win approval (this time for a project clearly within the llrbanized area); instend, local developer-actor Fess Parker (of Davey Crockett fame) eventualXy mounted the successful campaign, Still another example from Smta Barbara was voters-ejection of a redevelopmelnt subsid,y to construct a downtown degartmeml store. The city council subsequently moved the project four blocks south and mote than doubled both the project's size and tl-te amount of the city's subsidy. They clahed the new site, which was redeveloiped to incll~~de two depart~aent stores and connecting shups, better accomplished the city" 'kevitalizat i d pwposes. The new location spared the locd bookstore, whose owners had put up Che majority of fttnding (abont: $26,000 out of their nondeep pockets) to defeat the first scenario.
Erorvth Through Cnuntervailing Policies Localities often limit growth in one realm but promote it in another. At the level of discourse, it is a difference between promothg growth (bad) and supparting ""economk vitality!" """redevelopment,"or 'kevitalization" (all good). Developers can gain special treatment by connecting their activities to the good-sounding phases and keeping distance from words that would imply they are doing something that might be '"growth inducing.'"anta Barbara pursued downtown ""rtvitalization'" usiw taxil~crementfinancing (a $31 million public snbs-idy), despite a study's findhgs that the city already had California" second most prosperous retailing center-a fact that the study's UCSB professor authors (an ecmomist and a sociologist) could barely get: into public discussim (Appelbaum and Shapiro, 1983).Using the same rcdevellrzpment funding source, the city itself paid, m behalf of the department stows, the hefty traffic fees that it ordinarily charges for downtown projects ($2,000 for every peak-hour trip generated), The city was promoting development by giving back with one hand what was exacted by the other.
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Playing a similar game, Santa Monica expedited project rcview for devebpments in its Third Street Redevelopment District (the Trcrmenade""), investing in streetscape improvements (paving, lamps, sculpture) and promoting new business with entrepreneurial zeal-id2 with great success, as it was to h;lm o u t e r n e~ s u lwas t a "lourishint;"' cltowntom cenl point and a national modcl ter Ihat was to become "a ~ g i o n adestination for downtown revitalization" (%hey m d Moore, 1996: B6). One reason for the high-level ecommic achievement of the city's ""anti-business" city council is perhaps that its left-intelligentsia leadersf tastes led thern to pmmote the kixrds of facilities (theaters, restaurants, markets, boutiques, gdieries) that woUld transform the city into an up-scaie shopping and entertahment- zo1Ie. It would not be the first time that- left-wing intelligentsia set consurrrption patterns h r those of different ideological leanings (the Bauhatxs school of modernism was a pmmhent case). Far mom than the tradjtional business leadership, this putatively mi-business group bad. the kind of cultural capital that woulld, iron.icall~r,yield the richest economic outccrme. This city of left activists saw its credit rmking rise, hecolning o11e of d y two Califomja citks to earn a Triple-A bond rating (Rainey and Moore, 1996: B6). A political asset of using the redevelopment mechanism in any California cityf but especially anti-growth cities, is its relative invisibility, Technically, decisions are made by a special authority (the ""rebevelopment agency"-often the city council wearing a difirent hat for the meetings). Its funds come from an earmarked p o r t j o ~of~the property tax that is set up to be out of reach for m y other type of expenditure. So it appears to the public to be spending found mcmey; local mediia simply report that- a give11 prctjwt or subsidy i s being accomplished "with redevelopment funds" or "by the redevelopment agency." The process obscures true casts and insulates against altemtiwe spending demmds (see Friedland, Piven, m d AlEord, 1978). Santa Barbara" severe tiightening on c m m r c i a l b d d i n g was accompanied by a program to dlow a transfer of development rights (7'UR) from parcels outside the docvntown core to the city center. Athough this innovation did, not fmmally increase the total amount of sq_uare footage that could be built, it could bave that effect, because it pcmits owners of less desirable commercial locatio~~s to trmsfer their allowed densities to prime sites. Marginal commrcial, structures that otherwise mjght be cieared or converted to other uses (e.g., recreation, religious, educational) might he "reborn" in another locale and expmdcd to thc limits of the law, thus increasing aggregate comerciai development. Even as we write, we c m report that the co e ~ i acap l policies are being fur&er liberalked through other thkerjngs Local gvvernmmts promote growth thrclugh their tourist and convention promotions, partly using hotel bed taxes-the toll that visitors pay
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as a sort of special sales tax on motel/hotel charges (ordmarily between 7 and 10 percmt). &in, by earnarking revenues for these purposes and (e.g., the local Chamber turning the money over to a private organizatio~~ of Commerce), growth subsidies are insulated. At a more subtle level, governments promote local business tbrough festivals, parades, and f h company shoots; these activities and expenditures arc r a ~ l yconsidered part of any local growth policy.
Growth Through Developer ZnifiaCives Mihen gmwth interests do run up against rules that Hock their path, they often litigate. .h group oE landowners denied hvater hookups under the Goleta moratorium sued the slow-growth water district; with the help of a newly elected pro-gmwth majority on the district board and after sixteen years of court wrmgling, the litigants gained a rich settlement. 'The district was obligated to provide water (even under the moratorium) or buy their lands at the witfi-water market value, an anamount that would have bat-tkrupted the district (Darton, 1989: AI). Litigation and the prospect of litigation can indeed work to slow down a slow-growth regime. A carpentersknion suit ~ a i ~Santa ~ s tMonicds artdsncial services fee (ultimately droppen) caused the city to negotiate its exactions project-by-prgect, rather &an through blanket fees, Similarly, instead. of risking court challenge, Santa Monica officids negotiated an office mitiga.t.ionfee for parks and housjng that developers "codd live with,"lQLegat worries can dso delay implementation for years as localities mind the procedural details, in the meanthe providing for various exceptions to policies on the books- Proposed zonkg crihanges in Santa Monj.ca were postponed for seven years while the city" ggrowlln management plan was being =worked to make it more '%ulletpr~of.~~ In still another legal strategy, growth interests wed the very tools dcsigned to restrain development in osder to help their projects. L d o w n e r s in the city of Everside challmged citrus-belt protections on the gromds that: thc city's general plan was inade9a.t.e. They cited such problems as its lack of dmsity standards for commercial development-a claim that contracficts their usuai ~ s i s t m c eto such regulation. Likewix, the local Realtor asscrciation s ~ ~ to e dblock the l989 Smta Barbara cmmercial cap on the groul-tds that the city had not conducted. adequate envim review. Litigaticm drains the p"b1ic budt;et and makes local politicians vulnerable to the claim they are "bankrupthg" the city with their fights against pmperty rights. D e v e l o p e r ~ r g u e dfrequently that new regulations made projects unfeasi:ble and unfairly deprived the develnpes of their assets. They relied on the legal principle that land-use laws must permit some viable
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econmic use of land or they are m unconstitutional '"ahg" of property. Decision makers often responded sympathetically to these claims m d wmted to be '"eason&le" in the face of developers' hardsh* pleas. Since locd governments rarely had independent analyses to evaluate whether a project really needed to be as l q e as developers clahned, h e y rcllied on developers' calculation^^^^ Hardship clajms related not just to prOject size but also to the allowed uses of land. Some claimed that current uses were no longer economically viable. Landowners in the Riverside arca complained that cities we= creating "brown belts" not grcen belts with citrus downzonbg because the orchards were not e c o m i c d y wiable, The same rttasoning was used inSanta Barbara County to argw &at flower farmrs should be allowed to sell out to developers, or at least bolster their profits ("save agriculture'" by subdividing a portion of their lmd. fn these cases, kasibility andyses are usually based on an inflated estimate of land valm that prcsumes a mlaxation of plaming restrictions. Policy makers often then ccmclude that lower density development is not feasihlc because t-he land values are too fiigh to support lower-sealed projects. But values are inflated because of investors"perceptims that deveilopmnt rules will be relaxed. Weak enforcemmt in the past '"ends a message" to t-he market, drivjng up costs of land that would otherwise be cheqer, The poticy makers themselves create the value of the land, which they then feel obliged to treat as a ""cnditim of the markeplace"' to which they must rclspond with a policy exemption for the developcc The more-. they do it, the mom they feel a need to continue doing it. A choreography of size negotiation is common as projects move through different stages of gaining approval, at least in the tougher jurisdictions. Almost as a routine, develope~sinitial@ propose projects they prtrsume will be too large to gain approval, even testifying that anything less would be econasnically unfeasible. But whe~z"stmtixrg wiCh big numbers" is only a bargaining strategy, the formal ""sa1in.g down"' that follows is not necessarily evidence of gave ent-imposed limits, since t-he higher dmsity project was something of a fiction h the first place. Even under the relatiwly tight restrictions of Santa Barhara, s o m of the projects that gain approval never do get built. This is another indication that szxpply has not been choked off: The market cannot support what is already approved. Developes ooflen use the issw of economic feasibility to leverage approval ol those elements most objectionable to decision makers. In Moreno Valley wbem the purported ""jobs-houshg imbalance" m a n s mom jobs are needed to balance ""to much" housing, t-he clteveloper of a mixed-use praject said he needed to develop housing, and to provide it first, so there would be customers for the commercid/in.dustriaZ portion
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of the project that the city did in fact desire.12 Alternatively, when cities want to encourage housjng (for example, to achieve a "twenty-four-hour downtown," as was Santa Monica's goal), developers argtte they must be allowed more commercial construction to support the less profitable housing. The doctrine of jobs-housing balance thus operates as an all-purpose palliative. Business expansion remedies long commutes in the Riverside area; those sorts of projects not only gain easy approval but can leverage the housing constructio~~ that the city does not want but the developer does. In Santa Barbara and Santa Monica, housing moves most easily through the pmcess (even with highrr housing densities than are ordinarily allowed) because it means homes for ford workers- And, once again, a developer can somethes use the busing, especially if "affordablef"see Chapter et), to induce permits for other types of construction as past of a mixed-use deal. In all areas, developers sell projects on the negative argument that, whatever their disadvantages, if they are not appmved they will be ""lost"to a different jurjsdicrtim; the Riverside m a has been an especially fierce site of such competitions. Sometimes the claim is made, perhaps appropriately, that: if the prc?ject goes next door tbe disadvantages of pollution and traffic will be felt, but the tax dollars will be lost, Beyond generic claims, m ative entrepreneurs find ranf oreseen oppostunitiet; to buiId within the envebpe of new ~ g u l a t i m sGrowth . grows in the legal and institutional cracks. To get around the Goleta water moratorium, devellopers argued, with some success, that the private wells they could drill would not tap puhlic ground water basi~~s. Tl~en when a pro-growth majority won temporary control of the water board, the owners were aIlowed to tu,m t h i r private wells over to the district in reh;lm for permanent: water meters-a two-step process that bypassed the moratoriunn. Developers adapted to the city of Santa, Barbarb ban on increased water use by usillg new water-savhg techniques like indigenous landscape materids, low-flow shower heads, and toilets that flush with less watec 'They buitt pmjects using less water than the uses they =placed. In this case, a rule that otherurise could bave stopped development instead albwed the city to cmserve a resource. A less constructive h r m of developer activism is simply to start project S illegally. Some abversi.de County developers have allegedly plowed their l a d s under to elbnir~atediscovery of an endmgered species or of arclkaeologicd remains.lWliVhen the Santa Barbara Fire Departmnt ordered developer Fess Parker to clear fifteen feet of weeds along the boundary of his land, he took the c~pportunityto bulldoze another five acres of wetlmds and to relnnve illegdly two acres of trees 811 his protected ten-acre parcel (Weston, 1998: 131).
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Another pattern is to agrce to development conditions but not fulfill them. 5hce public agencies can inspect only gross violatiom, end-users can easily avoid honoring project conditions (e.g., employers may not follow througfn with the ride-sharing programs promised by the developer who sold them their building). A Santa Barbara study ~ v e d e d that ers consistently rtnderestinnated negative irnpacts of appmved projects, the conditions they imposed. were often iporcd in practice (Community E~~vironmental Council, 1987). C>ne telling incident occzrrrcd in rclation to an auto dedership development in Goleta. The project faced denial on the grounds of traffic problems and other aspects of over-urbanization at its site. To win approval, the property developer pledged to adjust hours of operation to ntitigate traffic problems and agreed to pay the county to monitor compliance with the condition. But the car dealer who eventually moved into the structure (a Merent party than the dewloper) cornpained bitterly that the county's hyper-regulations were costing him business. The local newspaper ran a photograph of a county employee observing the building w:hi.le morlitoring coqliance, galerating negative editorid comment and angry letters to the editor about taxpayers' dollars paying for a county emphyee to "stand around.'" Lost in the controversy was the fact that the cotmty created the arsmgement to facilitate a project that otherwise codd. not bave been built m d that the bapless employee's time was not being paid for by the public. The monitoring was dropped by a county plannhg dc-partment in hasty rctrcat, rendering moot a series of imposed, restrictions. I'his is an example of how enforcing developmmt cmtfition cially complex and intmsive one an become difficult, especially in the face of an unsympathetic press and business communjty. Such cmditions, even if potential@ expensive, will not irrhibit growth if develfrlners szxspect that they (or their tenants) will never pay for them. Even in Santa Barbara, many projects were insufficiently mitigated, either because impacts were unde~stirnatedat t-he time of approval or because h a d e ~ a t e monitoring had taken place (Commm~ityEnvironmental Caulzcil, 1987)" This is but a symptom, of the larger tmth that implementation depends on consistent decisim of the ""line'~epartments (e.g., public works, waste water managemnt, public safety) as well as sustai,ned political support and adequate monitoring budgets, a combination difficult to come by even in environmentalistjurisdictions. The Context of Cmtml: Comparative Power Advaa(ap;es
'The systemic nature of growth advocateskterest in land-use outcomes guarantees that under virbally any local circumstances they will remain
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involved on a continuous basis (see Alford and Friedland, 1985; Stone, 1976, 1981). Here, we discuss the general features cJf growth-cdition power that: operate under the adverse circumstances of grow& control. The larger development companies have staff committed to achieving political gods. A successful development team now may include planners, environmental. analysts, land-use attorneys, public relations experts, variolls engineers (i.e., soils, structural#and, traffic), and sometimes other specialized consultants (hotel experts, etc.). E~~virrmmentalists may have been the source of the original rtlgulatjons (altfiotrgh see Wrlker and Heiman, 1981), but developers have effectively mObilized m o r ~than matching expertise. Smaller development firms anci their cmsultants are active in support organizations such as the buildi-ng industry associations, chambers of commerce, llocaI development authorities, boards of Realtors, and ad hoc associatic,ns. In part thrcrugh tbese groups, these firms gain appointments to varintts commissions and task foxes that also help fashion local attitudes m d policies. The rep~sentativeof a large development firm fn Moreno Valley described fiis frall-time job as "keeping touch with the pulse of the c o m u nity" and. clahed to be the only person other than city employees to attend all of the meetings cJf the city council. and planning commission. C)ne of fiis slow-grokvth oppments said, ""He's paid to be there, f-ie sits i,n the front row every we& and is up there pinning the corsages on the women council mernbers when they win an ward so that they won't be able to look him in the face m d say no to hjs project." A projct pi for a development company described, his jab by sayjng, "'I go to all of the people that say no and get them to say yes." Such developer participation pays off. W e n a $7,100-pepunit irnpact fee was proposed for Moreno Valley, the buildilrg industry association respcmded with a white paper by its own expert. The 4,0110 housing units that were approved whilc the issue was being dehakd paid only $1,200 per w i t in, impact fees-$23.6 rrrillion below true public costs as estimated by the city. Eventually, the fees were raised to $3,1(111, but meanrnill-lo~~. while, developers saved $7~3 Development proponents may h o w the city" lland-use rules better than the city staff itself Zly virtue of their long inwolvemcmt; sometimes, their own staff m e ~ ~ b ehad r s written tlte gover~~ment's they weR on the public payroll. We werc told that from out of town or heading new pI several ol trhe Riverside Conl-rty cities) somtimes defer to developers' seasmed veterans, who can claim knowledge of policy ixrtents and imgementation traditions. Former city attorneys have become leading land-use lawyers in some cities (e.g., Santa Barbara); the former city manager of Santa Monica (chosen by the leftist majosily) became a consultant for the most controversial development proposals hsuhseyuent years.
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On some xcasims, growth opponents are abfe to hire t h i r own experts; Smta Barbards long-established Enviro ental Defense Center is the most prominent case in point, f17 an unusual Santa Monica case, a developer gave $2,500 so that a neighboshood group opposed to his project coufd hire its own traffic consultant (Fulton 1985, 1CIEi). Usually, citizen p u p s lean on cvhatever nonprolit groups may exist for techicd and legal assistance, suck as Legal Aid, the Sierra Club, the Tmst for Public Lands, c ~ ron the plannjng organizations in place for this purpose. Wctmen's groups, particuiarly the League of Wornen Vnters and the h r i r a n Association of University Women, play roles not only in their analyses of proposed policies, but also in acthg as a proving gmund for future public leaders, Sustained volunteer e ise varies among the areas and over time, but across all areas, envi talists" participation is episcrdir compared to their opponents* Sometimes developers can win out against prevailhg policies by making a separate peace with particular subgroups that see special benfits from prcjects. These can he specific hemfits like promises of aid for the homeless to placate social hvelfare advocates or a Santa Monica hotel developer" promise to fund beach patrols. Hyatt Rcgency gained support for its Goleta hotel from a surrounding t h y special district that wodd gain a tax bonanza. .A 5ant.a Mo~~ica office developer, using "consemsual plannhg" (Los Angeles nmes, April 22, 1990: K1) and offering various project amenities, wlrn over the i m e d i a t e neighbors, who then were less concerned with more remote difficulties (e-g., jncreased fmeway system traffic). More generaliy, grow& adwocates are find% ways to neutralize at least pastidy the "motherJhoodf>ppeal of ewiso entalism, cmstructkg a political middle ground w d e r the banner of prudent plannjng and growth management. The ""moderatef"developer position is usually marketed through grassroots organizations l-hat developers crede m d sustain with names such as Citizens for a Balanced Communit)l (Santa Barbara), Citizens for Reasonable Plaming (Riverside County), Taxpayers for a Better Mare110 Valley; and Santa Manicans for a Livable Enviro11mmt (Clean Up Our Bay Beach and Parks Committee was another Santa Monica developmat organization). It is an open secret among all relwant players that the organizatinnal irnpetus and most of the f ulnding for these gmugs come from development interests. Despite claiming the middle gmrmd, there w r e virbally no irrstmces of any such ad hoc groups-or eloper association, local chnmber of commerce, or posing m y development project or measure. 11%elections w e r land-use issues, growth forces usually wtspcnd their opponents (Gliekfeld, G a p e r , and Morrison, 1,987)on cmpaign literature, professional signatum gatherers, market research, and campaign workers, both to oppose growth control initiatives and to elect
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sympathetic officials. Campaign experts advising developers recommend that they be prepared to outsgmd the oppo&tion and to obscure contrihiution sources through MCs and finisleading occupationat designations. An article in NzliEder magazine (a developer trade journal) entiilng at the Pollsf"laid these strategies out expticitly (German, 1990).Among the recommendations to cou~ztercitizen initiatives was one that called for mounting competing, but much weaker, measures m the same ballot, usuaily under the grow& management, rather than g m t h control, rubric. These weaker measures (sometiznes dubbed "the evil twinm")re structured so that if passed by a larger majority, they take precedence (as was the case with a set of =erside city ballot measures). Once voters are confused about which is which, an elevezzth hour call may be made by pm-growth advocates to vote no on both, simply, as one informant said, "because the baUot is so confushgef' Some developers are careful to avoid an oppctsi.eional stance, tailoring their projects to local priorities and traditionesigns, perhaps, of a new modus vivendi. As a developer in the elite Santa Barbara subrtrb of Montecito observed, "Private property rights are no longer what they were, Uou cannot operate without sensitivity to the environment. Any landowner, developer, or builder who doem%ununderstmd that is going to S February IQ,1990: B1). He took be left t:ehkd.'"(Santa Barbara N ~ DPress, it in stride as the number of units irz his latest project was cut by 20 percent and as forty acres were exacted as a nature preserve. Another Santa Barbara developer was at one time virulently against growth control, but later came to feel that "fights are never worth it." He decided, to build his office m d industrial ccmlplex around a historic stmcbre rather than risk the wrath of :local historims by demolishg; it (Sarlta Barhura News Pn?ss, January 26,1990: El), In Santa Monica, the entrepreneur behind a proposed beachfront hotel offczred an on-site community center, public lockers, a ban on Styrofoarn, and permanent funding for beach mahtenance.i"n a populist voice, he asked for a public vote: "The project and the people of Santa Molica will benefit when the narrow-minded, prkileged special-interest groups which uppose this project are silenced by the people" (Santa Monica Clzrtbok, May S, 1990: AI). He and his consultants, former staff members of the progressive Campt?ign for Economic Democracy (Tom Maydcds organization), enlisted the support of school board members and social service providers. Badly split, Santa Monicans for Renters' liights was unable to agree 011a position. When countywide growth contsol was defeated at the palls in Riverside, the heads of the Sierra Club and the local building industry association jointly requested some form of growth management program. 'The result was a plan that dropped the environmentalist-favored limits on
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the county growth rate and the general protection of agricultural lands but gained developersf support for development fees to fund a multihabitat conservation area. 'Thus some enviro entalists agreed to massive new growth in return for a modest set-aside fee. I'ubtic officials and planners attend to lieveloper preferences and are rclady, indeed, to meet them at Least halfway. The Santa Monica mayor, fearing his city" reputation mi#t endanger financing of otherwise viable private prcjects, met with Los Angeles lenders to assure them their projects would be treated fairly- At the same time, an aggressive city manager recruited business leaders to help promote publicly oriented new growth (Clavel, 1986). This created a special opportunity h r a t r e preneurs not affiliated with the mti-rent-control interests to join policymaking comdtteer; and to participate in the more palatable development proposals, in some cases by tackling city-sponsmd venturczs. In Santa Monica and Santa Sarbara-and, to a degree, in the Kvcrside jurisdictions-the nature of growth control is one of negotiation and compromise, with even environmentalist officials keepfng an eye on what growth hterests will find rcasonable, wfiat they c o d litigate, and what they might seriously protest. This stance encourages adoption of mechanisms tike caps tbat permit lievelopment to proceed without overt confrontation. Shilarly, liberal hterprehtims of vcsting spares those in authority the full ire of developers who can proceed wit-h projects at hand. By making special allowances for prfliects that will employ people, officids can avoid the political fallout-of employers Chreatening to move away if refused, permission to expand. At a human level, there is a felt need to be mspmsive to those who, often graciously and massuringly, m& developme~~t requests day after day. Over time, the din of potential and experienced developer rationality, charm, litigation, and protest affects officials"policies and their implementation.
Looking across cases, we HIld that the elngjne of"growth, &though &Stinctive in each locality is a steady political. and economic force; growth interests play a part at every point, creatively resisting and ~ d e f h ~ i reng strictions. Where pro-growth sentiments are historically strong and appositional organizations are weak, as in the k e r s i d c area, growth controls leave roam for development through their largely symbolie road proclmations and generd goals. When specific standards am set, they agah leave room for much development and, hs o m cases, give way under developer prc?ssure+Utility access mcrratoria redly are temporary, e l h h a t e d as soon as sought after supplies are gained. Local plmners accept the need to compete with other communities near anit
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far to attract and subsidirz;e bushess investment. Citizens ~ s i sthe t consequences of rapid growth but may settle for set-asides of conserved open space. It is no wonder that-despite developers' complaints of over-regufation-littlie happens in the way of aggregate limit.s. This less ambitious regdation of land devdopme~~t is not easily explained by reside~~ts' class &atus. In the case of the city of Rherside, household income virtually matches that of Santa Barbara (see Table 2.1). But irm Santa Barbara, there is a citizen activist tradition that, as sometimes occurs in even madem communities, carries across ge~zerationsas '"enduring difference" p u b a m , 1993: 130-137; see also Mialton, 1992a). Related perl-raps to this difference in citizen activism are contrasting levels of education; the propmtion of residents with college degrees in Santa Barbara (33percent) m d Santa Monica (43 percent) is much fiigkr than in liiverside (11perilent). These figures imply strcmgly that distinctions in poljtical culture and organjzali.ona1 iife betwee11 locdities in our study areas are more likely significant than family incomes in explaining p o k y variatiom. m e of these distinctions is the capacity to orgmize and fund election campaigns. Local, regulations turn on election outcomes, both in terms of referenda tkat enact cmtrcrls and in terms of elccting pditicims who will pass the regulations and see to their enfarcennent. lnJe studied a series of elections in all three of the central cities to determine where campaign money came from and how it was liistributed. The results, outlined in more detail elsewhere (fi,ategola, 1992), show that in Santa Monica m d Smta Barbara the growth-control sides were able to raise serious money. :In Santa Monica they were still outspent by a better than two-to-one ratio, but. the apprnximate $10(3,000 they rajsed in the 1990 elections, for example, permitted a sophisticated campaign, In Santa Barbara, the growth-control side raised about the same arnomt, but in this case it was a told that actuafly surpassed the fund raising capacities far their advcrsaries. Riverside environmentalists, in contrast, ran shoestring campajgns; even when they won, their opponents outspent them by ratios of seven. to one-not very differ& kom the usual eight-to-one ratios in such pso-growth versus slow-growth contests in California during this era (Glicueld, Craymer, and Morrison, 198"i"125). Over the years of fights over land use fand rent control in Santa Monica), the total amount of money spent on local elections for cwncil and county supervisor seats rose slnarply. F~osexample, contributions rose 314 percent in Santa Barbara betwee11 city elections held in 1977-1978 and those held in 1989-1990; for Santa Monica the rise was over 1,000 percent (Lategala, 1992). These totafs greatly exceed camp";p cost inflatim for seats in the Carifornia State Assembly, wkich grew by a more mndest E 0 percent over the same period." City of Everside campaign contributians
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grew not only at a lower rate than in the other two cities but also at only about half the rate (at 83 percent) of the cost increases for seats in the state assembly 'The Riverside ernvironmentalish in particular, appeared mable to increase their fund raising capacity over t k e . Whereas their opponmts increased h d s by 347 percent hatching the statewidc standard) between the two time periods, the s101.v-gowthers'total campt?ign spendhg slightly dedilred. U17f.ike Santa Barlnara and Santa b i c a activists, those in Riverside were unable, for one reason or another, to mount increasingly expensive campaigns. Without money, a political group must fall. back on s m e other extraordmary resource, like grassroots organizational strength, a historic tradition of loyalty to a particuIar party or cause, or perhaps strong backing frm local mel-tia. None of these was present in Riverside, One posible explanath that will tzd work to expfain different election and p&cy outcomes amnng t-he three cities is the role of Chc local media, at least the daily press. In all three cities, the local daily paper strcmgly supported growth, both in terms of backing particular projects as well as in terms of opposing regulations that would curtail development, in gmeral." This sympathetic stance toward development was reAected in editorial positions; no growth cmtrol measure wap; suppcrrted, nor was any particdar project opposed by any of the three papers over the course of &e study period, as indicated both by our hformants at the papers and by our own checking of newspaper micrcrfilm on specific cases. Further, our own systematic examhations (Mrner and Mslotch, 3992 301.-102) of "straight news" average of particular projects showed a comistent tilt toward favoring the pro-development side (for example, by using pro-project sources in the n e w story but not envir~nmcntalists). Allkough there were some diflerences in media coverage between the localities in our study area+specially in regard to how much detail was published from environmental review documents (see Chapter S), it is safe to condude that when environmenta.lism did. prevail in one of ollr cities, it did so in spite of the local paper, not because of it. Atthough we are reticent to overgeneralize kom case studies, it does appear that certain types of government actions are more effectjve than others in n-taking growth control count. Symbolic commitments to (jrowth control through gencral plan amendmernts or new wording in city charters clearly have weak impacts. On the other hand, controls based on concrete but intrusive and idiosyncratic. monitorhg, as in the auto dealership case, risk p21bliC djsappmval and m y damage the ~ p u tation of a whole reghen of envim ental controls. hfrastrrxcture constraints am also unlikely to be effective; expmded capacities can be developed, sometimes through demands from a public that, however initially opposed to development, comes to suffer when water (or mad)
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capacity shortages hinder their life routines, Growth caps may also not be very effective, given the tendency (as is clear from experience in many areas) to "adjustf' them when development starts bumping against imposed, ceilings, or t h y m y be circumvented. in still other ways, Alllnough the caps used in our case cities were not raised sipificantly durirrg our from other places suggests that they likely will study period, evide~~ce be. Most cities in California" Ventura County have officially capped the m u d number of ~sidctntialbuilding permits, but these limits are cmsistently exceeded, with as mmy as fourteen times morc permits being issued than allowed (Mart;in, 1991). What, then, can work? Although we hawe less mlevant data on this issue than for some of our other conclusions, it is liEcely that a combhation of downzonjng and a change in Legislative votirtg requirements (a super-majority for upzcrning) may have strong consequences. Such a conrtbinatio~~ helps institutionalize a fundmental condition for effective cmtmts: a favorhle political envirmment sustained over time. The p ~ s ence of such poiitjcal circumstances-much more than the number, type, or title of controls (indeed, wfiether the words "grwth contro" are used at all)-dctermjnes whetker regulations matter in the way places grow.
Motes 1. Atthough the usual approach to the implementation problem i s to look within bureaucracies for the dynamics that decoupte legislative intent from poficy outcome (see, e.g., Mazmanian and Sabatier; 1983; Pressman and Wildavsky lli373), tzre include the surrounding ""sacial palitics""Brcldkin, 1990; Freuclenburg and Gramling, 19941, involving those outside the officiaX realm. 2, Besides the political transformations we observed at our study sites, Calavita (1992) reports that San Dic?ga, a city once led into g o w t h control by then ma yor Pete Wilstjn, retui-ned to growth machine dominance. 3. htemiew 012. We refer to informants by interview numbers to assure confidentiality. 4. Tntemiew 053. 5. It can also go the other way; certain of Santa Montca's 1988 commercial downzcming measures tzrere applied to prc~jeetsthat had beaten the vesting deadline, generating threats of legal action. 6. Inteiview 026. 7. Although a source of pride for local planning officials, the agreed-upon $4,000 per unit impact fee built into these developments was relatively low; a Santa Barbara County planner-informant dismissed it as enough "to pay far the curbs" "flntemiew 084). 8. The reference year is 1991. See "City Focus, Inland Empire: Corona,'" I n l ~ n d Empiw Bt.tsifzess lozarnnl, January 1991: 54. 3. Inteiview 030. 10. Interview 029 (also see, Hamifton, Rabino>vitz,and Szantojn, Inc., 1982).
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11. Santa Barbara County" Hyatt Hotel project is one instance where a study was required. See '"tudy Says 400 Rooms Needed for Hyatt prc)fit," %nln Bnrbara News Press, July 7, 1988: A8. 12. interview 007. 43, Interview 006. 14. The relative environmental costs of Styrofc2arn versus the a tternatives have since come under much greater scrutiny (Hocking; 4991). 15. We used these t i m points far comparison became the California Fair Political Practices Commissictn did not provide data for earlier periods. 16. The local dailies are the Santa Rarbnm Nezus Press, the Santa Monicn Outlook, and the Riz~ersidePress Ente~~rise, These were not the only m d i a in the three areas, but on local issues they were the must important. Santa Barbara was also served by at least one weekly '%Iternative" "paper ower the era, primarily the Santa Barb~m Nezos alzd Revkzul which toc~ka consistently pro-environment stance. Santa Monica war; also sewed by the Los Angekc2sTinfes, but this paper gave less co>verageto Local Santa Monica affairs than did the Ozlttouk. To a degree we have not determined, the Santa Monica-basd pubtic radio station, KCRW, played an important role in local cc>ntroversiesand was a Liberal-left, pro-environmentalist outlet.
ect Peddling: What Gets Approved and How
Cantsois do not, by m y means, stop growth m d in most cases are likely to have no effect on its aggregate amount, but this does not mean they simply have no collsequellce apart from el~cauraghggrumblhg by developers and some satisfaction for envim entalists, h this chapter and the next we assess how new regulations altered development pracn so doing, we will provide a better understanding, in quite precise tices, X tems, of the nature of the development process under ti#tened building ntlcs. In the last chapter we W t-he ways developers move around in this rclguiat.ory context..Now we wmt to understand thc colltext itself. To do this, we idmtifti what local governments gain from developers as they shape their prcrjects to win governmental approval. ists of:fc'rrmalized development rcquiremenks ts shape devrslopmnt (this we learned in to mderstmd ho prtrvious chapter must take seriously and delve still mom deeply into the implernelrtation process-t-hc way a particular project gets changed, modified, or subverted. as it moves thmutgh to approval. Our orighal goal was to create standad m e a s w s of the public benefits ga,ined from development approvals that could, be wp1,ied a m s s localities, something like the dollar a m m t of public funds gcrnerated per T a r e foot oE construction--perhaps broken down by tbe type of developmellt (e.g., office versus malls versus residential). Such, jndicators would allow us to compare the intensity and Ihc content of mgulation from one site to another. This type of calculatim proved to be impossible. For one thlng, local gover ents do not keep track of the totd fees they collect per project or on a citywide basis. This is partly because some of the fees are imposed ad hoc in the form of mitigations required on specific projects (they are site specific, rather than coming from a uniform
Project Pcddlilzg: Ink!fat Ge& Appruzled and How
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schedule of fees). There are d s o a wide array of agmcies and special districts that collect fees and/or impose their own development requiremelnts (e.g., schod districts, sewer districts, building depart~nents,park boards, redevelopment authontics, etc.), Mart. important-ly, collectllmg fees is only one way localities offset the costs of p w t h . They may instead limit the scale of a project or redirect it to a location that reduces its major cost innpacts. h effect, they may g"in mcrw in cases wherc. they collect no fees. Further, developers themselves may be required to remedy adverse effects-for example, by providing mass transit passes to their workers to r e h c e traffic congestion (as opposed to the city collecting fees to widen roads for them tie drive on). They may be asked to fund low-income hausing that their project displaces or, as an alternatiw, to build aifordable housing on site. Developers can be asked to pay m e y toward an open-space fund or can be barred from using (jrading practices that wnuld harm wetlands. In fact, various mixes of mitigation and regulation may coexist withixr the same locality and be applied differently from year to year or from project to project. Even the most mundane exactions-say, traific irnpact fees charged on the same type of project-may differ in haw they are assessed (per square foot, per housing unit, per average daily trip), where they are applied. (incertajn districts, for certain land uses), and how they are triggered (by wrtain size &=holds, by whether or not full enviro rclview takes place). Past swveys have helped sfiocv the range of development exactions and are us&l ior comparing places that am similar on specific dimensions (e.g., traffic or park land fees in two booming residential suhurbs that use the s m e techiques of"lmd use contro%).lBut in most instances, comparisons between places are difficult without knowledge of actud project circumstances. If we sifnply count up the number of exactions or their recmmelnded dollar value, we might co~ncludeerroneously that the places with the greatest number of fees are also the toughest cm development. This runs counter to the perceptions of local officials, s w h as a S m a Barbara planner who remarked, 'We don't have irnpact fees, we m not into growth here."" The different elements of a project also interact with one another: A project may benefit the community by providing low-income housing and also reduce the public burden of heavier traffic congestion by hinging workers closer to downtown jobs. So the project's net contributim to local welfare has to be judged in combination, To try to total local gains using lists of policy exactions hides the variety of factors at play and risks s w i n g incommensurate and sometimes i m e a s u r able items.
80
Project Peddling: WI~aitlGets Approved w~zdkioro
Peddling Around with Our Projects To address this methodological problem we decided to compare how the same ""actual" pmjects would be dealt with across localities. Sb accomplish his, we asked veteran city planners in the three main cities (Santa Bashara, Smta Monica, and Riverside) to review projects approved in the other two jurisdictions as though they were being proposed for their own locality. We gmerated the prrrjects by asking each planner to choose two develoipments that had been approved in their city recently- One was to be ""routine," representirrg a common form of development (in scale, locatim, and type of use) and with cmditions of approval that were at the norm in terms of type and level. The routine case front Riverside was an apartment project; the cases from Santa Basbara and Santa Mmica were office/retail mixes. We refer to these routine projects throughout this text by fictitious n m e s to make them easier to recall-Barbara Plaza, Moslica Tower, and Riverside Arms (see Photos on pagedG88, 91,93,94)." er ncrmir~ateda ""best--casef"prclject For the other selection, each pl wfiere the locality securcd maxjmuxn concessions from the devdoper.4 Compared. to the rnutine prc?jects, these best cases were larger and mixed. various cornbinations of office, retail, and residential devebpment. 'l'o inem' ~riewpoints,of these prjects, dicate the special quaii,ty#from the pl we use three stars wifiin each of their designated names: Rmcho"""Barbara, iWonica"**Centre, fiver~ide***Place.~ Brief descriptions of our project cases are contained in Table 5.1 m d further detailed Appendix E, We then f w a r d e d project descriptions m d conditions of approval (the actual text that conveyed official action as well as our summaries of these k g deparme11t.s"We took the path of a deactio~~s) to the other two pl veloper looking for a building site, peddling the pr,jects from one place to mother. After each official had examined the materials (in one city with a full staff meeting) we rehr,med fos extended inl.ervjewswith each planner, We asked them how each proposal would be received by their jurisdiction, whet-her it would be approved, in what form, and with what additional (or febver) condilims attached. We also asked the p1 scrj.be what might keep them from asking for more restrictions (political prc.ssure, economic interp~taticm,technicd preference); this informaticm was often volw~teeredby ou,r hformants, a highly articulate and thoughtful group. Mre also asked &out the conditions imposed m similar prOjects approved in their city (see Appendix F for our interview schedule),
What Gets Approved and Haw 'The first Ching we leaxned w s which cities would approve which, prctjwt as proposed. Xn &erside, all of the proposed projects would have been
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81
TABLE 5.1 Project Descriptiom
Barbara Plaza (Santa Barbara) 801 Rancho"**8araa (Santa Barbara)Chapala-officelretail project one two-story mixed-use project incfudlalcxk from the main street, 6,000ing commercial (auto dealerships, 32,653 square feet on 291,852 squaw-fc~ot,thee-story building on a 15,000-square-foot lot. square feet of land) and residential Monica Tawer (Santa Monica), 4250 (96 one- and two-story residential Fourth Street-office/rel.ail comunits on 9.65 acres+20,354 square plex downtown; "3t451-square-f~~t, feet). six-story building on a 30,000Monica*""Centre (Santa Monica)-sixstory?mixed-use project including square-foo>tlot. Riverside Arms (Riverside), Spruce 165,000 square feet of retail and Apartment-102-unit, mo-story 3,094,577 square feet of office on 17.1 acres of land (744,&ii76square apartment cl-rmplex m 4.5 acres feet). (1"3,020 square feet). Riverside*""Place (Riverside)-mixeduse prcjjwf:with a maximum of six stories, including commercial (500,000 square feet of office, 260,000 q u a r e feet of retail, 300,000 square feet-of hdel/conference center on 55.3 acres, 2.4 million square feet) and residential (570 units on 42 acres-1 ,829,520 square feet).
approved for construction. Santa Monica would have accepted t-he Smta Barbara projects but denied those that origir\ated hRiverside. Santa Barbara would not have accepted any of the projects from the other two cities as originally proposed. Thus, we found an ordinal scate of regulatory rigor: Tc, some degree, €-his fbnding confirmed that the city of Rvcrside was weaker in its controls c o q a r e d to the other two places. :It also cfarified the more ambiguous comparison of Santa Monica and Santa Barbara, eaeh of wfiich could, in its own way, vie for being the more stringent. The exercise provided us with a gross measure of how strict cities were =lathe to each other based on &:he binding public decisions that implement planning policies. Table 5 2 summarizes these results, distilrguishixlg between the routine and. best-case px^ojects.
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82
TABLE 5.2 Kespc~nsesto Routine and Best-Case Projeds Prapc~sedtcr Each City
Bahara Plaza Munica Tower Riverside Arms
approve deny deny
apprc>ve approve deny&
approve approve approve
Rancho***Barbara approve Monicae**Centre deny Riverside***Place deny
approveb approve deny
approve approve approve
a
"n
A zone change from single- to multi-family residential would be mlikely. exception would have to be made to the current commercial moratorium.
This comparism tells " h a t " is approved m d denied but does not tell "whyY""lb learn how and why decisions differed from one place to the next we questioned the senior planners, studied the official docu,ments carefully, tafked wiCh other city staff8and ~ v i c w e dlocal media coverage of relevant developwnt decisions. First, we will compare the ~acticms to "roulinefAevelopments. Then we will turn to the best-case projeds.
Routine Projects Riverside Arms, Riversidds routine case, rewired a zone change f r m single-family to multi-family residential. =is kind of ""upzoning,'%hich increases the level of development a1.Iowcd on a site, used to be so c m m m in U.S. cities that zoning was q&e mlleable (Babcock, 1969). Even though Riverside community groups often resisted such c h q e s whether they increased density or intensified the type ol land use (e.g., from residential to commercial or industrial)-upzoning was common enou@ that this project could be regarded as "routine." It would have been denied on the basis of the zone change alone in the other two cities. Thusl one 'knew" cchallenge to developer power i s for governments simply to abide by existing zoning and approved plans rather than to grant exceptions easily F d o w i n g the rules a k a d y in place is a powerful form of growth regulation that is nut represented, on lists of growth controls. Santa Monica officials came to consider sirrtgle-family zones as a ki.ad of "sacred land"-appmving higher densities would be considered a "sacrilege" "(see Photo on page 83).
Sz'lzgle-flnmily areas ir-z San tn Munica
84
Project Peddling: WI~aitlGets Approved w~zdkioro
Tndeed, in Santa Monica, zoning reflected ""the basic land-use pattern of the city'>nd was a l t e ~ donly by "a little tweak here and there ... for very unique reasons,'kcletainly not as a routine matter.6 Similarly; the Smta Barbam planner, speaking in 1989 of both zoning and the general plan, said, ""Until the major general plan amcmdment last year we didn't process any general plan amendments since 7,984, except to fine-tune s m e language in the different sections,"T n e s e comments indicate how rare it would have been to =zone land for any routine development project. Itesidenljal developmnts in Santa Monica and Smta Barbara either met existing zoning requirements or were part of a mixed-use project in a non-residential area. It is not surprising that the '"routitle'kcrffice and commercial projects, BaCbara Plaza and Monica Tower, both conformed with existing zoning. Santa Monica would have accepted Santa Barb.ara%routine office/retail project, and then some. Projects like the Smta Barbara project, wif-;h less than 15,000 sytlare feet oi floor area, were unaffected by any of Santa Monka's commercial g r w t h controls, incluliing the temporary moratorium of May 1989. Indeed, a structure thme times as large as Basbara Plaza, could have been built on a comparable site in Santa Monica and still have been exempt from the moratorium, Mo~~ica Tower was built on a lot twice as big as that of Baibara Plaza, but the Santa Mmica px^oject had sixken tirnes more floor area, was more than twice as tall, virbally filled its site, and provided parking for 321 cars, compared to the 24 parking spaces at Barbara Plaza (see Photos on page 85). The dramatic density difference reflects the different scales of development allowed in these two cities, not a grea.t.ercvilliagncss to make exceptions to the rules, Even before implementation of the city" 11989 commercial restrictions, 5mta Barbara wodd not have appmved the routine Santa Monica project. The city's plami,ng commission exescised considerable discretion on all commrcial projects, guided in part by the size of any preexisting structures (the m r e already present, the more that could he built to Eplace it) and by the history of water use for the site (wilh nt:,net increases in water allowed), If these conditions were met, a developer in the post1989 era might have been allowed an 13,000- to 12,000-syuare-footbuilding (about twice as big as Barbara Plaza, see Photo on page 86) on a 30,00Q-s~are-footsite, rather than the 93,000 square feet approved for Monica Tower (see Photo on page 87). Riverside's routhe residential projed, which covered 4.5 acres, would have been an unlikely prt>yosal in the other two cities because of the shortage of large devebpaklle parcels. But if spread across a number of different sites, its densi.ty wndd have rclsernbled exjsting zonhg in both places. Rjverside Arms included 23.3 housing units per acre; Santa Rarbara
I;3al"kr'i.~gat Barbam Plaza and Illonim Tozuer
Riverside Arms
Project Pcddlilzg: Ink!fat Ge& Appruzled and How
89
permitted 20 units per acre and Santa Monica 30 (see Photo on page 88). But a developer wodd have to provide affordable houshg in order to build at this density in Santa SaTbara, and to build at all in Santa Moslica (these affordability requirements will be detailed in the next chapter). Santa Barbara and Santa Monica thus pcrmitted the same rt~sidential densiv (or morc) lhan Riverside, but only if the cities' affodability stipulations were met," I'he amount of buildk~gallowed on a site c m aiso be affected by other desig~vegulations,such as buildbg set-back requi~mcnts.Under Santa Barbara design mview, multi-story buildings are usually stepped back from tloor to floor so that third and four& floors are only a third as large as lower floors, with four stories beiing t-he seldom-perdted maximm set in the city charter. En comparison, Santa Moni.ca ofiicials reduced the top fltlcrr of Monica Tower by less tkm 30 percent. Kiverside would have made revi,sjons of a si.milarly minor order on a project of this scale.
Compared to the routine projects, the best-case developments hinged much m m on case-by-case negotiations betwet-m city pl vate developers. 'This is where policy priorities were trmslated into specific developent requirements, All of the three-star projects rewired. land-use desipations that were custom desit;ned for their sites. When the eity of Santa Barbara approved Rnncho"""Barbara for construction, planners maintahed the same overall mix of land uses (commercial, residentiai, etc.) permitted on the site but mcrdified the existing zoning to rearrange their distribution within the land parcel. 'The plamer said, "the (zoning) line went one dirczctim and we switched it to run the other direction,'" 111 Santa Monica, the mixture of uses included in Monica"**Gentre also conformed with existing zonjng but was confirmed and speeidied through a customized development agreement between the city and the developer; this agreement: allowed the project to proceed. The project was in a special office &strict the eity had recently crclated to upgrade a semdisrdustrial area of town, in contrast with these two cases, Rlverside"**l"lace ~ q u i r e dmore fundamental rezoning from the city; c m c r c i a l . and multhfmily development was allowed in what had been a sisrgle-fmily residential zone. The fiverside City Council justiEied rezcming on the grounds that part of the development would address community educational needs. The Riverside general plan of 1969 designated the site as the new campus for fiverside Community College. 'lbgetkr with a private developer, the cotlege, as the landowner, was propoSiTtf: the new development. Actually, unly 5 percent of the proposed cmstructim wodd have provided public educatimal space; the other 95 percent was given over to other
90
Pro;iecf Peddling: WI~aitlGets Approved w~zdkioro
uses, including more than one mill.ion squarc feet of commercial develc~pment.Almost any =zoning from residential to comme~ial,much less of this mag~~itude, would be highly unlikely in the other cities.10 Santa Barbara officials thought they could accomplish a combination of g a l s Zly approving the hous% and auto center that made up RanchoeeeBarbara(see I"hoto on page 41). They could retain sales tax revenues fnr the city (by preventkg a threatened exodus of car dealerslnips from the city limits, and even adding more dealerships) and improve the traffic system at the developer's expense (by havhg developers fhmcc a new freeway off-ramp m d h k two important traffic arterials). The city also gained needed affordable housing by granting '%"bonus density" so that the developer codd buiid more housing units on the site (as a resU,lt, the housing densit-y exceeded that of river side"^ routine project)." The site was an undeveloped parcel within the uptown urbanized area, bufiered from nearby residential areas by the freeway m existing shopp h g mall, m d a retail. strip. At this location, the project codd. address the three different problems simultaneousiy: keeping sales tax rt;vmue, improving traffic cjsculation, and p r o v i h g affordable housing. Although still. contruversial (in part because of possible noise from the dealershlps and high h m i n g densities), its precise cmfiguratrim and siting ~ n d e r e d the project relatively inoffensive. Development was permitted only after about five years of negotiation and the rejection of two earlier proposals. The developer wanted originally to build only o f ices, then proposed a hotel,/convention centersomething favored in the general plm (but downtown, not at this uptown sik)-and finally came around to the auto center/housirrg concept. In effect, plaming reguiatims that strictly lintited the densjty of housing, especialIy if it was not "affordable," and a climate that made any zoning change difficult (wen the internal rearangemeat of zoning tines reqrairt.d for the project) pushed the developer to focus 811 the slnbstancc of the city's plmnjng goals. As with Santa Barbara, Santa Monica also approved its best-case project because of its fit with overall city planning strategies. n e vast: M m ica*"*Centre commercial project would enhance public revenues and support the social services high on the city's agenda (see Photo on page "33).The praject was h an area where plamers welcomed development that would yield such revenues; few existing housing units woutd be displaced; no architecturaily sipificant buildings were ill its path; and ~ l a tivcly few nearby neighbors would be disturbed. Besides a p e i n g to a wide array of exactions, the owner consulted the city m d neighbors regmding the kinds of menities and uses to indude in the project. The m e approach was rcpljcated and refined by later developers, with the advice of the former city manager (part of the earlier left regime), now act@ as a private land-use cmsdtant.12
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Project Peddling: WI~aitlGets Approved w~zdkioro
Despite the fact that Santa Monica was becomjng more w a v of largescale development, both the Santa Rarhara and &erside projects would have been considered attractive if appropriately zoncd sites were available, Because its commercial densities and scale were relatively low for Santa Manica, Riverside***Plac3r;would have fit well into Santa Monicafs cjty-owned ajrport: site fsee Chapter 6 for details on this project). 'The eity w d d have welcomed the housing component if it included a defiined portion of subsidized units. Santa M~nicawollld have also encouraged hncho***Barbara because of the &fordable housixlg component and its auto dealerships (anachowledgeb source of tax revenue). In Santa Mmica, such a project probably would have been allowed at higher densities, since Santa Monica allows both larger scale residential and (especially) comme~ialdevelopment. Rkerside would have welcomed any of the best-case projects because of their con?merc.ial corngonents. In fact, the projects could have been purely commercial-and housing, if included, would nut have had to meet any affsrdability tests. fiverside" sown best-case project met neighborhood opposgion, but not because of the awttnf m irrtenSity of cornmercial development. Instead, neighbors objected to the proposed apartments that would abut their sin&-family neighbcrrhood. In fact, the eity ing staff had rclcommetnded against such high residential dcnsities but were ignorcd by the project sponsors who gained plmning commission approval for twice the residential density recommended by staff. 'The neighhorhood qpositior? spurred the city council to approbre 40 percent fewer apartments. After our hterviews werc completed, the newly elected slow-growth mayor vetoed the prt!ject because of neighbcrrhood concerns*The developer dropped thc apartmetnt cornponetnt altogether to get final approval. Although cornmereid densities tended to be lower in Riwerside than in Smta Manica, this did not reflect a limit on commercial de~nsitiesbut a limi"t the market for commescial space. hdeed, &c Riverside***Place project was the one case study that was approved but m t built because of weak m r k e t demand (see (?hotos on page 94). (It is kteresthg to note that the only px^oject of our sample that was shelved came from a less: regulated context.) Officiais had d o w e d projects for the downtown area that were similar to Monica***Cetntrein ktensity m d scale-According to a Rjverside planner, referrirrg to commescial space in generd, 'WOone is trying to scale the pmjec"townI on city ccrmcil, in the neighborhood, in downto\vn."~~ Riverside was even more eager to attract an auto center like Rancho***&arbara.Rather than restricting the size (or asking for affordable housing as part of the project), the city would have wanted the auto complex as big as possible, Auto malls in the broader Riverside region were
Riz~erside"*""i"Iace u ndezleloped site
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the abjects of fierce competition between the various localities (Sunderland, 19H: 14-16) and were six to seven tirnes l q e r than Rancho***Barbara, covering as much as seventy-five acres. To accommodate one proposed auto mall, Riverside City Council unanimously rezoned 1.50 acres of land to a general comercial zone. In the process tbe council threw out all, the des-ign and landscaping standards planners had previously crafted for the site. The lone voice in opposition was the neighboring city of Moreno Valley, which was trying to launch an auto mall of its own. 'This Riverside auto center was never built, but the owner rebined the relaxed zonhg for the site, As a result, Ihe lost auto mall project becanne the vehicle for a permanent change in land-use designation; ""theycould bujld the world's largest open-air flea market,""the Riverside planner lamented.14 In contrast to Riverside's welcoming of best-case projects from the other two areas, Smta Barbara probably would not even have approved :Rancko"*"Barbara in later years because of its size and because of higher standards for project mitigations. Under S m a Barbara" 11989 clamp-dum on commercial, growth it would have been innpossible, :Riverside*""Place would use up more than a fourth of the total cornmertlial space available under Santa Barbara's g r w t h cap through the year 2009-hardly a reason to grant it: special eeatment. Santa, Monica might have been interested in Riverside"*"Place, but only with measures to build the local stock of affordable housing and mitigations of other sorts. Project Environmentat Reviews
Che of the important aspects of regulation is the way locali"riescarry out environmental rewiew as mandated by the California Environmental a1alit.y Act of 1,971 (CEQcZ), the slate's adaptation of the National Enviental Policy Act (NEPA) of the prior year.1' For developers, such redekrmine how much money they will have to put up for studks, the costs that may c m e to t-hern as a result of the studies' findings, and the degree to which study fjndings stir up publicity m d public opposition to cause tbem trouble. The review process has the potential to bring authoritative evidernce before the public both on the substance of the project and the adequacy of the environmental analysis itself. Through mandated hearing%it c m provide opporh;lnities for public testimony the ~gistrationof diverse perspectives, and mecaia &tention. Accosding to state law any project proposal that deviates from current rules-such as existing zoning or a development cap-has to go hrough ental review The s m e is true for any prnjed repiring "discretionary" approval (i.e., anything beyond routine staff administrative
Project Peddling: WI~aitlGets Approved w~zdkioro
96
approval, whether by board, commission, or council). CEQA also req u i ~ environmental s review Mlhemver a project provokes significant "controversy." Once CEQA is triggered, local officials have three options according to Calif ornia law: Issue a "negative BecXaration," meaning that the city deems that the propc~salhas no significant environmental impacts and can thus prc~ceed 2. Issue a ""negative declaration'' h t with curtditions, meaning that the project can go f o m a d if the developer mitigates certain environmrtntal impacts 3. Require a full environmental impact repc~rt(EIR) either to define the conditions for approval or, if mitigations are not feasible, to justit"y the disapproval of the projed 2.
These statewide criteria give localities leeway to determine the kinds of prrrjects that would trigger CEQA review as well as the kind of rt.wiew that would take place under the law (i.e., which of the three review options would be taken). Local governments set the threshold of what: can be appmved administratively and, through zoning, establish the envelope of currently allowed construction. If the ernvelope is big enough, there would setdom be a need to "break" rules and hence to trigger CEQA review 'I'herc. is dso obvious r o m for local i n t e r p ~ t a t i mof what constitutes ""controversy"in a give13 situation. The realms of discsrrtion interact, in that places with large zmjsrg envelopes and permissive general plans create less need for specid action and also dampen ccrntraversy by creatkg the attitude that appmvals are hevitable. Tn our study areas, the delineation of what is administrative versus discretionary action d i e r e d across places in quite ohvious ways. In Santa Barbara, for example, decisions by the Architectwal Board of Review (requircd for a wide variety of projects) were defined as discretionary, triggering environmental review. Santa Monica and Riverside were less likely to require architecturai review on a given project; they defined these reviews as administrative, nut triggering environmental review under CEQA. We see that wit%linthe same regime of state law, local interpretation can be critical. Tn Riverside, projects of whatever scale couXd be approved administratively as long as thry ccmbrmed with cmrmt zcming.Given &versidefs large envelope of unused zonjng rights, this meant that CEQA environmental review was invoked rarely. As late as 1980, Smta Monica had a similar policy artd appmved a 1.3-million-square-foot project '"over-thecountertf-that is, wjthout any public hearings, planning comrnissinn consideration, or envim ental study. Such a project would fater =quire
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TABLE 5.3 Routine Use of Environmental Review
Sn~ttnBnrbnrn
SlaPI&Mozz ica
Riverside
Barbara Plaza
ND
none
none
Monica Tawer
EXK
EXR
none
Kverside Arms
EIR
NL)
NL)
NOIF:
ND=Megative Deciaration, EIR=EnvironmentalImpact Report.
traffic studies, architectural design review, and a series of public approvais. Santa Monica came to requirt? environmental review 011 all of its larger projects (regasbless of zoning conformance) but exempted many more from GEQA review than Santa Barbara, Santa Barbara had long used a strict hterpretation of CEQA, excrnpting o d y residential projects of fewer than six mits. Nrhally all commercial, or industrial projects required review for one reason or anothrr.16 By htroducing necv limits and expmding the dornaiin of discretionary action, grow& conk-ols bring mvir~nmentalmviczw to bear m more development projects. This tends to happen precisely in those places where environmentalists are prepared to engage seriously in the review process. Competent environmental review provides more complete information and better understmding of prcljed impacts. This process then can kick off all sorts of media coverage, stimulating still more public controversy and demmds for mitigations horn developers, fn alf three cities, the best-case projects required environmental review because they involved s o m discsct.jonary xtion (e,g., approvi,ng a specific plan mendmmt to the general plan, a zoning change, or a development agreement), but the typicd use of envimnmental review clearly d i f k ~ from d place to place (see Talnle 5.3). Riversid.e%requirement of envirmmntaj review for its ruutincl Riverside hm?s project came about only because a z m change was involved. Even so, they issued a negative declaration, specifyi,ng only minor modificaticms of the physical desip. If the project had been proposed in an existhg multi-family zone, no review would have been necessary at all. Likewise, the Barbara Plaza pmject and Mo~~ica Tocver would have been approved in Eversi.de with no review. The Riverside planner could thhk of only one project w i ~ i l lthe ; city that had r e q u i ~ da full EIR when there was not a zone chmge: the doubling of a regional mall (to 1.5 million squarc feet), As our informmt told us, "If t h y have the zoning, all theyke
98
Project Peddling: WI~aitlGets Approved w~zdkioro
really doing is going for a building permit." Still the city of Riverside considers itself ~strictivecompared with neighboring jurisdictions. Our Riversjde phnning informant commented, "Most of the places around here say, Tnvirmmentd revicw? Yeah, I think we have a stamp around here for thatSfff Santa Monica required a full EZR for its own routine project but did not demand mitigations beyond the city% standard exactions, If Barbara Plaza were proposed in Santa Monica it would have been "ppoved "over the caunterf3ecause it was beneai-h the size threshold for CEQA review Riverside Arms would have been reviewed (because of the zone change, not the project size) but then probably would have received a negative declaration in Santa Manica. Santa Barbara required CEQA =view of its own routine project, just as it would have of the other two routine developments.l7 After =view, little Barbara Z31a;za was givcn a negative &clmation bttt with conditions pert&hg to traffic mitigations. Riverside Arms would have been reviwed. because of its size and would have been sut7ject to tough traffic mitigation measures, dependhg on its exact location. Monica Tower, on the other hand, if it had been approved in Smta Baibara (which it wodd d E R and extemive mitigations. not have been), wodd have ~ ~ i r aefull Even when CEQA was invoked, the local ixnplemeMation differed, as did aI1 the other regulatory mechanisms we have discussed, For example, when Riverside officials rezoned 150 acres to accommodate the elusive auto mall described above, the city, though requiring certain traffjc improvements, issued a negative declaration, They reasoned that an auto mall would not he any worse envizonmmtally than the industrial uses already allowed on that site. Even though the environmental impact of existing industrial zonixrg was never evaluated, it was taken as the ground Actor for loosely judging thr impact of alternate uses. In cmtrast Santa mit-igaicms for its RmchoX""E;arbaraauto Barbara rclquired sig~~ificant center. For such a large project in Santa Monira, mitigations would likely be secured throul;h a developent agreement. The reliabaity and usefulness of EIRs also varied. Until 1990, Riverside developers were allowed to hire their own cmsdtmts to do the reports, with the city providing oversight. Smta Barbara and Santa Mftnica had. long sevcred this patron/cliezzt tie betwell developers m d experts by directly contracting consultants to prepare ElRs (at the developers%expease). R