Building Rules: How Local Controls Shape Community Environments and Economies

Building Rules

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ding Ru How Local Controls Shape Community Environments and Economies

Kee Warner and Harvey Molotch

A Member of the Pcneus Books Group

Some of the materials included in this book were publislned in eartier forms by tlw Catfortzriil &/icy Srrninllr (Warner and MoXotcl-t, 1992) and the Urbbin q f a i r s R P U ~(Warner ~ U ~ and Molotch, 1995). Pho2ograplns are by Kee Warner, All rights reserved, Printed in tlne United States of America. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmined in any form or by any means, electronic or mecl~anical,including photocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from tlne publisher, Co)pyxlight O 2000 by Wwtview Press, A Member of tlw Perseus Books Grotip Publislned in 2200 in the United States of Amex-icaby Westview Press, 5500 Central Avenue, Boulder, Colorado 80301-2877, and in the United Kingdom by Mieswiew Press, 12 Hid's Coyse Road, Cumnor Hill, Oxford. OX2 9Jf Find us o n the Wc'trfd Wide Web at www~w~tvie-~rpress.com A CE' catalog record f o r this book is available from the Libray of Cc~ngress.

The paper used in this ptiblication meets the rquirements of tlne American National Standard for Pemanence of Paper for P ~ n t e dLibrary Materials 239.48-19%.

For Katy and Eua Rose S!zana and N o ~ h

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Contents

1

The Relevmce of Regulation

Environmmtalism as Local Urge, 4 The Critique: Stranglers of the Economy 7 Economy Versus t h Ewironment: Some Past Findings, 12 Local Regulation and Urban meory, 46 Assessing I<eguiat-ion,21) Flan of the Book, 21; 2

Sites Idearningfrom Southern Cdifomia, 23 Selectkg Study Sites, 25 Identi.Eying h w t h Controls, 2% Smta Basbara South Coast, 30 Santa Manica, 36 The Riverside Area, 44 Growth Controls in Piace: A. Summary, 50

3

Ilas Growth Been Stopped? Not Much First Findings: Rates of Crowth, 52 Testing the Power of Growth Restrictions, 56 An Alternative Testing Strategy, 57

4

Power to Build: How Cities Grow Under Growth Control

59

Growth mrough Symbolic Growth Control, 60 Growth mrough Episodic Growth Control, 62 Growth n r o u g h Counterwaihg Policies, 64 Growth mrough Developer Initiatives, 64 The Context of Control: Comparatke Power Ahmtages, 69 The Wys of Growth, 23 viz

5

Project Peddling: m a t Gets Approved and FXow Pedd1in.g Around with Our Projects, 80 What Gets Approved and How 80 Project Environmental Reviews, 95 Local &owledge Base for Planning Decisions, 100 Resisting Growth: A Matter cJf Degree, 101

6

Endirect EHects: How Buil.ding Rules Make Growth Different Traffic, 105 Natural Limits, 108 Mordable Housing, 109 Srrxliaf Eyuity, 112 Urban Spatial Form, 117 Project Aesthetics, 120 Exactions on the Gromd: A Tally Between Places, 122

7

Building the Rules

E~&mcingthe Quality sl:Public Decisio~~s, 130 Regulation as Economic Boon, 132 Grounding Sustainabifity, 133 M o W;uls WatN135 Makbg Markets Slnarter, 141 Valuing Land alld Community 143 Balmcing Commercial m d Public hterests, 145 ? B h g Stock of Local Contmk, 146 Appendix A : hleasurz'n'q Growth Control fsuzpacts Notes to Apel~dIXA Appendix B: Chmologies of Grtlritlh Cor-lfml Appendix C: Commercial Val~iatz'on Data, 197&3 990 Appendix D: Resz'de~tialBrrildi-rzg Rates Appefl'itx E; Case S t ~ l d yDetails Appendix F: Itzterviezu Schedule Xeferetzct. Lfsi fE ~ P X

104

Tables and Illustrations

Ttrbkes

2.1

Profile of major cities

3.1

Percent hcrease hretail sales, 1971-1989

5.1 Project descriptions 5.2 Responses to routine and best-case projects proposed to each city 5.3 Routine use of environmental review 6.1 Case-by-case use of exactions 5.2 Use of exactions by praject m d by type

A.l Predicting local residential building rates: coefficients and f t-ratios)

Fig~tres 2.1 Map of study sites 3.1 Commercial development trends, 1970-1990 3.2 Residential bui1dhg rates, 1971-1990 A.1 A.2. A.3 A.4 A.5

Growth control measures Ideal model Model one Model two Model three

Smta Barbara city view

Smta Barbasa beachfront an Cabrillo Arvenue

Pacific Caast Highway in Smta Monica Smta Monica Place Mall hlmd Empire? National Bank sign Teenagers in downtown Riverside Mormo Valley sprawl Shgle-family areas in Santa Monica Parkhg at Barbara Plaza and Monirra Tawer Barbara Plaza Monica Tower Everside Arms Rmcho"**Barbara Monica*"*Centre Everside***Placemdeveloped site Undergraund garlcing at Monki-i***Gentre Houskng constructio~~ in Santa Barbara %-site child case at MonicaX.**Centre Homeless man in front sf Monica Tower Smta Monica of,llce construction Smta Ballbara i-nfiil development Downtown Smta Barbara architectural style

Acknowledgments We are grateful for the support of the California Policy Seminar, which funded our field ~searclhand published our initial report. We dscr apprcciate Che ongoing szlpport of colleaglles and staff of the departments of sociology and the li:brasies of t h University of Colorado at Colorado Springs and the University of CaIifomia, Santa Barhara. W had excellent help from a nurnber of =search assistants: Qista Paulsen, A. R. Idategala, Nancy Uesser, Cathy Oakes, M a y Rxiera, Caroline White, :Rebecca Wypseck, and Ruth Jackscm M a y crrleagues contributed comments, critiques, and suggestions, incIudi,ng Richard Appelbaum, Hal h n s o n , Williarn Bielby, Rob Nuster, David Daz, 7: Rykm Grattet, Bob Hughes, Rub411 Martillez, Joseph Martorana, h4a-x:Neiman, Sergio Key Jr., Robert Sollen, and Mark Shibley. Wr;. bellefiled as weil from the comments of reviewers frnm the Culfarlrin Policy Review, the Urban Aflairs Xeviezu, and Westview Press. We appmciate fie professionalism of the Westview staff m d their enthusiasm for this book. Thank you to our local informants FR the Santa Barbara, Santa Monica, and Kiversicitz area who provided extraordinary commibent to this endtavor. We hope this book will be of value to them and to the many peaplc working to build quality in cornunities and to pmtect natural: envirrmments. Deepest thanks go to our families for suppcrrtinl; this project from beghning to end.

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The Relevance of Regulation

111 the United States and much of the industrial world, business leaders, politicians, and large seg~aentsof the pubIic question etforts to regulate economic actkities for the pmtection of natural environments. Even though some environmentalists thnlink the protections that have been enacted fall, woefully short of crea.t.jngsustahable human settlcms~b,regulation critics attack the programs and policies that have been implemented as unjustified interfercmce in the ways people produce and consume. Land usc? regulation-h particular the rules governing urban growth and develrzpment-is one particularly tangible terrain on which this battle is being fout;ht. This book reports (m just how this highly ccmtroversid form of intervention in the economy has operated in terms of either enhancing iocal communities and their environments or undermining their economies. Writh~gat a time when rczgutation is seen as the encmy of economies, we specify withi,n the realm, oC land usc and in the delmited but important region of the world we study-Southern Catifomia-just how r e d a t i o n and markets have operated together. We illustrate what happens h e n the regulation of city building increases and the effects of this regulation on an economic sphere with major stakes for wedth creation and potential h r far-reaching social and enwironmental consequences. The creation of wealth in regulated contexts is, of course, not neweither im lmd use or any other realm. :Marketspresuppose the basic social order that guarantees property t-hrough contract; i,n thc case of real estate, cmrnescial value requires not only deeds backed by g o v e r n & force but also the i~~frt-tstructure of roads and other foms of access that create economic utiljty. Going one step farther down the slippery but inevitable road of regulation, deeds and access mean nothing if their value can be destroyed by the acts of others, as when an upstream user diverts a common waterway or a neighbor p e r d o m xtivities so noxious that they seriously cornproHlise the ability to use and enjoy one" own property.

2

The Relevance of ReguIalio:orz

:In the economists"ems, actors in the marketplace can generate externalities, neighbarhood effects, or spil1owrs.l To preserve trhe very orcier of the market, these oftenses must be publicly controlled, either by preventing them in the first place or by otherwise providing relief for the victim+this is the ""cMltra1 pmblem of land use lawf"(Platt, 1996: 40). 'The U.S. Supreme Court sustained aonhg laws originally in order to prevent a slaughteshouse from damagixlg the neighbors' land values. From the reascming of that case, the way was cleared for a wide range of interventions whenever private lmd use had negative impacts on neighboring uses and, by further extension, on the community good. Beyond the immecfiate stench of the dau@terhouse, we know that virtuaXly all uses of lmd generate spitlover effects, good and bad, near and far, complexly ecological or merely annoying to other human beings. These effects intersect in multiple and synergistic ways, over time and over distmces great and small. If a homeowner cuts down a tree, the immediate neighbors have a poorer (or better) view; a landowner who dear-cuts can stimulate soif erosion that buries the neig:hbor"s house under an eroded hillside. 'The loss of a u1?iqzte lncal habitat can set in motion far-reaching ecologicd consequences. :For example, Ellwood Grove, north of Santa BaTbara, is one of a few overwintering sites for mcmarch butterflies that xnigrate thousands of miles thr0uglnou.t. the western United States-a rallying point for environmentalists concerned with nearby development glms. No actor or even set of actors produces smog; it rclsdts when &verse people take actions that lend to the elnission of specific chemicals that come together with sunshhe and other natural. elements to produce a qualitathely differat phenomenon-a negative synergy occws. These m the dramatic realities of Ecolngy 101. But virtually any human actiun on the land., mundme or spectacular, yields consequences that cmly our ignorance keps from view. Even with the field still. hits hlancy; ecological analysts are co~~stmtly uncovering the complex range of potential external effects-aesthetic, culturat, wonornic, and ecotogical-of human actions, and these ecrrlogical discoveries lead environme~~talists to advocate new restraints on development. The "perpetual crisis," as Wendell Berry (1945: 65) puts it, caused by "'our p s e n c e in this varied and fertile w d d ... foxes u p m us constmt.ly a virtual cwricuhm o( urgent questio~zs,"'The ongoing and inkterminate character of understanding environnnental impacts frustrates the hear-minded, wbo think that policy should be '"done,'"hat constraints on the economy &odd be mhimat and =Bled, or that environnnental protection should be, once and for all, accompljskd. By requiring a specifie enviro ental fmpact review (E",) before individual projects involving federal lands or federal funding couXd be built, the 1970 National Environmental Policy Act f NEPA) institutionalizecS. this

indeterminacy, at least for certain developments. ETRs have become a tool for the continuous m d contentious development of additional enwir0mem.t.d h w l e d g e , whereby the ul-rfolding ol answers c m e s .from experts in various realms, but also from ordjnary people directly understanding their environments by adopting scientific metl.iods-""popular epidemiology," as it has been called in the case of residentsydiag~~oses of local environmental health hazards (Szasz, 1994). Growth contml has become a mechanism, perhaps a crude one, to eteat with the perceived negative spiJLovers of urban growth. In its most sjmple and, as we will see, rare configuration growth control attempts simply to freeze the action. Developers lken this to pulling up the drawbridge. Stopping development, even cofd and altogether, becomes one understandable alternative, especially when people do not randerstmd the ecological consevences of development or when they have little faith that. govemcmts will properly mitigate the effects that urir known.The more common variations of growth control we describe in coming chapters embody a skepticism toward the development process and a break with past na"ivet4 about spillaver potentials. Connpared with the public sentiment about other topics, the concern mtal effects of develqmmt is not shaflw. Surveys cJf American public opinion show continued widespread concern &out pollution problems and the belief that government h u l d , play an active role (Ernes Ml'mr, 1990, 1994). According to the 3998 Mtional Envircmof m e ~ ~ tEducation al and Training Fau~zdation/RoperSurvey; 62 perce~~t h r i r a n s believe that environmental pmtection m d economic development can go hmd in hand. If f o ~ e d to choose one or the other, 21 percent would choose the enviro ent (Coyle, 1998: 2). Majorities of p e q l e m willing to see more federal funding for control mechmisxns (Emm Mirrclq 1990) m d arc. willhg to pay mortr for goods to better serve envimm e ~ ~ tgoals a l (Times Mz'mv, 1994). Almost u ~ ~ i q u arna e based issues of the last decades, suppwt for the envir bomdaries of race, class, and gender and persists, even as support for other cwses of both left and right (e.g., civil rights, balanced budgets) come and go (Van Liere and Dunlap, 1980). In a rare display of personal commftment, people also have chmged some of their own habits, sorthg garbage h t o separate containers, sometimes taking it on their own to recycling centers, and recycling enough waste to substmtial.lyrcduce p ~ s sures on landfills (now agproaching a one-t-hird reductim in some communities). In, no other realm of public life havc indjviduals changed their behavior like this-usually for no reason beyond wanting to do the right thing. 011e of the first realms where ccrnserwatiw Republicans were forced to backtrack h their mid-1998s ""Contract with Ameriea'bas h their efforts to roll. back environmentd pmtection.

4

The Relevance of ReguIalio:orz

Growth rightfully takes the blame fur mundane local difficulties, like efkcts on air quaiity a d traffic congestion c ~ just r changing the "feel" or ""character"of comunities. People also perceive other problem, like crime, to be caused by growth; even though research does not support such reasoning, tbe belid belps build the movements against developm e ~ ~Cb t . more subtle ground, publks grow in their u~~derstandbg that what were once taken as "acts of God" involve acts of development, Forest fires cltestmy homes built in the paths of what we n w know to be events of natural regeneration; "out of control"" water sweeps away whole towns built h flaod plains by professional developers; in the arid West, overlnuflding cltrains local water supplies creating 'Qroutrgts" wit-;hinthe normal precipitation cycle, leadkg to the imposition of water conservation measures m d to the high costs of securing alternate sources of water. fncreasingI?I,these difficulties raise the possibility- that to make development more harmonious with nature the^ should be changes in the way cities grow. For all sorts of Easms, then, some profound and sorne trivial, some quite correct and others off the mark, s m e wged by nationaf experts and some dcrived from local experience, enviromental awareness has filtered into public consciousness. Although suspicions abound that intervention hurts society and ecmonnies, there is parallel suspicion that life, community, and earth can not be left merely to markets, We suspect that these two perspectives, h o w w r paradoxical, coexist not only h the m e cities and communities but w i t h m n y individuals. CIarif@g the effects of regulation may help assuage dilemmas at both the levels of policy and individual consciousness.

Environmentalism as LocaZ Urge 'The masures we deal with are locaf-those who focus on glob& crises might say "merely local." But local policies have impacts on larger realms. Macro-economies, of course, result from concrete economic activities that must occur somewhere. The cumulative effects of local regulation add up to impacts for the economy overall, a point obviously not lust m the critics oE regulation. But the same is true for cumulative ecological effects. 'The way cities grow determines, for example, the need for cars, "nw much they are driven, m d the specific meteorological environments into vvhich their exhaust will flow-including the amount of ""grecnbottsegasses'produced and their effecb on global warming. The form, settlements take shapes the use of all sorts of environmental resolarces, not only fossil fuels but land, habitatrs, water, air, a d , on the other end, the produ,di,on m d disposal of the array of h m a n "wastes." The particu%arsof settlement shape consumption of all sorts, including

the very need. for such durable goods as cars, lawnmowers, and air c d i tiowrs, and the capacity of land-fib to absorb the aftermath of conszxmpli.on. The size, configmation, and political organization of cities influence the capacity for regicznalism; the ability of particular mgiond settlements to be more self-sufficient dhinishes broader environmental impacts. Local development-its overall scale, the materials used, the amount of energy required, the waste produced-reverberates throllgh m d around fie earth. The local scene is also an. important settkg for action and social change that can redirect these development processes; it makes sense that environrnental pohtics begins 117 the backyard. Locality is the learnhi; site and, by necesgty, the place where new ways of life can. be tnied and witnessed. At the same time, the social, pditical, and econmic osganizatjon of urban growth offers people a m d e l for relations with nature more (jenerdy. True, distant catastrophic environmentd threats to human life-like the nuclear crisis at Tl~reeMile Island and the poisonjng at BhopaI, hdia--also teach and inspire action. But such stclricts7mpact c m e s not just from the fact that an agitated world press tells what happened, but horn local populatims~imaginhgsthat such tragedies could happen "right here at home.'" NeMIs of wars among distant peoples, imagiz~edas driven by primordial hatreds or schemes of tyrannical regimes, has only weak implications for those who think they live h staZlle democracies among more or less masonable people. But people take djstixnt human-madc envirnnmmtal crises to be appljcable to their own communities, Chernohyl set back nuclear development across the democratic world, even where the technology was far more soyhisticated and the monitoring systems more competent. Risk assessment studies show repeatedly that people fear most that which they can not control-for example, their airplane's safety compared to slipping in the shower (see, for exmple, Starr, 1969). 'They have special concern and anger ovcr those risks they think others could m d should have controlled-adding still another dimension to trouhles perceived as coming from human-made develoipment. The local also matters, both as a force and site of environmental study, because it is the cauldron where diverse constituencies negotiate their competing needs and form coalitions. Race and class divisinns create a challenge for any type of social movemnt, especially those without resources of great weaith and corporate power. A =form movement like environxnenlalism, wl.rich chalfe~zgesmajor econolnic interests and those who depend m their campaign contributions, can afford to alienate few other constibencies. By embracing fie concerns of low-income and minority populations, urban enviro entalists can bolster "e~zvironmental ental quality more effectively. justice" and address commmity envir

Q

The Relevance of ReguIalio:orz

Inner city communities do bear the biggest urban environmental impacts; they are disproportionately bisected by freewayt;, built on land permeated by poisonous byproducts of industrializat-ion,arid more likely to be adjacent to locations chosen for garbage dumps and incinerators." By defending inner cities as a vital part of the urhan ecosystem, envircmmelntal organizations broaden, their base. By preventing (or rernediating) these hot spots of mvim entaX degraclation, they also control pollution mom efficienCLy by a d k s s i n g the problem dose to its source. This is still anothcr result of envirnnmentd h o d e d g e : Source reductim protects those, human and otherwise, more distant. Naive and sentimental "Rambi projects'" tbat securcz the woods around a manor house do not become the prinzary focus of enviromentd reform. Responding to the needs of diverse local usban groups not d y wards off a triiiial environmentalism, but aiso helps build larger coalitions that go beymd envizonmelntal issues. The most intense and rclpeated citizen resistance comes in reaction to specific devebpmc.nts+ften duht7ed LtiLUs tl,ocally Undesira:ble Lmd Uses). But the Z,UL"U category has become more inclusive over the past generation (Rlumberg and Gottlieb, 1989; Hamilton, 3990; Filler, 1991.). Newly wakened constituencies t h a t plans not only for toxic dumps and prisms but also for wfiat were once llCterly uncontested types of development, like university campuses, private =search faciIities, luxury homes, and sports facilities. M e t h e r as a cover for m m selfish motives or because of an authentic vision (or both), cri.tizens fight to keep wetlands htact or an endangemd species-habitat undisturbed. .A millionaire%house on wetlands becows as much an offender as a publjc housing project in a single-family zone. The array of LU'IdU'sthus grocvs as communities define and defend a range of valued local qualities, including nabral ecologies, In ou,s most immediate experience, Chc "envirorlment" is in the breath of air we take, the view before our eyes, the nuise that enters our ears, and the odors that reach our nostrils. Despite envircrnnlental organizations' ambitious involvement in national. and international policy making, localities are where we sense the environment. When people are suspected of reacting to these smsate impulses, t h y can be accused by mom practical business people (and even some environmentalists) of "ernotiondism" or of not seeing '"he big picture." halternative is to view the quality of these experiences as the wry essence of life, certainly as c w i a l in practice as any of thc mtificial products that c o m fmm defihg these experiences or ixnitating them thmugh anerchandise m d commercial entertainments. These intrinsically local connections with "naturerff whether based in wason, emotion, or both, offer fertile grolmds for ekallenging conventiond methods of building urban environments,

Wendell Berry-poet, farmer, and social commentator-warns that the celebrated bumper sticker 'Think Globally, Act Locallyf3s too mechanical in its local-global split. It may di,stract envirclnmentalists from the need to think a~zdact locally in order to create necessar). changes in the local and ~ g i o n aamnas l where they can and should be effective (Creedon, 1,993).The ifnmensity of glob& issues can leave reformrs defeated or can become a form. of m r e symbolic politics, waged through the convenience of bumper stickers, Sierra Club dues, and platitudes. Growth controt groups, allhough typicatly short of Berry5 depth of understanding, are-whatever els focused on the local in both their thinking and their acting. The results of such local. thin:king and doing have gone beyond any particular locality by dint of their volume. As early as 19721,over ,2QO U.S. jurisdictions had adopted some form of growth control (Logan and Zhott, 1989: 461,; C o h , 1,979). By 1988,150 localities in Ca1ifomia done had enact& control measures (Glickfeld and Levine, 1990: 5). By mother count, environmental groups were sufficiently organized in about one foutth of ail, Californja crjties to make significarrt irnpacts on growth policies (Clask and Goetz, 1994). The costtent of local, policies ranged considerably in restrictiveness and scope, but, by one indic.ator, 10 percent of Cafgornia jurisdjctions had adapted explicit population growth caps by 1990 (Glickfeld and Levine, 1990: 23). Altbuugh exclusive subusbs have long engaged in some f o m of density and growth limits (indeed such was their raison d'etse), this new wave of lmd-use cmtrol involves a far more diverse array of communj.ties: old towns and new, central cities and fringe, white and minority, s m d and very lafge, Even where envirmmentalists did not take control-and this was certainly the case in the great majority oi U.S. localities-til;htened proceduses did at least gain twholds in many plaes, and with them c m e new types of orientatims. The fight for local clmtrols has been a proving gromd for people who then move on to state and natimaI policy reahs, both. as activists in national g m u p m d as members of state legislames and federai agencies. 'The grow& contml movemcnt thus not only has the potential for thanging local policy but fos alterhg the ideological stripe of state and national civic life. W r e m , then, to the issue of scale: By virtut-, of their content, repetition, and sponsors, the potential impacts of local controls become large-not always global but certainly well beyond mere pmchjal interest.

The Cxitique: GtrangXexs af the Econmy 'The perception that controls were hdeed becomhg cornmo~~place, moving beymd. the traditional suburbs of the exclusionary rich to a more

8

The Relevance of ReguIalio:orz

general urban ordelr, helped bring m the mid-1990s reaction of deregulation and government downsking. In the United States, a need to build the economy dnmjnated the news, particularly in prjor high-growth zones like Ga1iforni.a-also the leader of the country" eenvirmmentajist r e h m . . Followkg an incmasingly pe"va"ive ecmomistic logic, some deduced that whezz localities limit either the amount or the conditions af development, some bushesses may be killed off Atogether-taking with them jobs and needed housing. By t-he s m e ~asoning,if enviro rulcs raise production costs at hctories, t-hc goods will be priced hjgbes and markczts will be lost to pIaces Labmad with more favorable busir~ess cfimates. Jobs and corporate tax dollars will evaporate, leaving unemployment, wellare costs, and homelessness in their wake. So runs the newly invigorated artgument for being up the hidden hands to have their way with the social and physical landscape. Even jn the former strongholds of elzvi,ronmentalis1n,the language of '"rebuil.ding the local economy" ccame to replace, or at least overlap, the exprc-rssed concctm for quality of life and environmental protection. "Business""became the buzzword for political candidates of virtualty any str;tpe; in the 1994 California elections, nearly five times as mmy candidates listed their occupations with business desipations (e.g., "usinesswoman, busiaessnnan"")illn the next largest occupatiorz being teacher or school official.$Desipations like ""attorney" and "public officiaX" "(much less ""environmentalist" or "activist'" fell from usage, as pcrli~ciane;leamed. to play up eve13 marghd busincss roles as the best identiy for a ballot victory; ing with President Bush but including California's Governor Pete Wilson and other leading Republicans, competed in denouncing government" stranglehold on private cmterprise. Even Wilson" Democratic opponent for govenlor, Kathtem Brown, ran on the platform that WiSson" r d e was responsible for California havilng "the country" s m s t economyu-a very dubious claim but evidently one that her strategists thought wodd be effective (Stall, 1994: A3). Bluc-ribbon cmmissions cautioned that ""o~rerregulation"" stymies urban economies (Advisory Commission on Regulatory Barriers to Affordable Housing, 1991: 1). They denomced lmd-use and envircmmental controls, in particular, for their nefarious effects on local m d national economies as well as on th chance for the middle class to have jobs and the poor to survive, On the consumption side, critics biamed regulation for raising housing costs, especidy in places like the coastal Catifornia, cities that experienced radical price inflation beginnjng in the mid-1970s. By curtailing the supply of land available for housing, the argument went, the. price of the housjng Chat rc~najnswould go up. This price effect on workers' honsing, as well as the gcneral drag on the economy caused Galifomjds "Ueberroth

Commissionm-the group appointed by the governor to bolster the state's flagging fortunes-to echo the same refrain against: "excessive rules, rclgdation, and red tape." Peter Ueberroth, a travel agerlcy business magnate, had. gained celebrity through headjng up the Los Angeles Otympirs, the games that came in with a profit as well as fie usual basket of medals for the American teams. In later appointkg Peter Ueberroth as head of ""Rebuild-L.A,"-the blue-ribbon organization that was supposed to deal with the prolnlems the city faced in the walce of the post-Roclney I(ing insurrectilms-'nemocrat may or I'om Bradley received the now usual prescription: a recommendation for "clearing away"' unnecessary regulations to stimulate development: in the city's most deprived zoncs. h this way the poor would get jobs and the city would have its peace. Such reasoning has widesprt-ad appeal, even within groups like professional plmncrs who have long complained of developers' influence. Planners can c o r n to resent the comparatively privileged middle-class rrei&borkocld residents who cry ""Not in my baekyard" (hence, "NXMBY") as they use larger planning and emvironmemtal talk to protect their aXlegedly narrow turf. As with the developers, these gmups ma)i also interfere with professional planning goals (such as increasing b u i l d i ~ ~ g densities around transportation nodes) and hence irk those who otherwise mi&t be in their alliance. Citizen grczups also can fall into class and racial exclusivity, ssometimes leadillg them to oppose projects that provide jobs and housing h s people of lower social standing. In a mnve linked to the &publicads 19% "Contract with Americaf'' sorne in Congress proposed government compensation to any private property owner whose land or building values were lowered by regulation (no mention was made of special paymmtspom o m e r s whose values were raised by public regulation-likely to be a frequent occur~nce). Although unattained at this writ.ing, such a measu the courts have c m e increasingly close to enacting through judickl rulings-would radically curtai even zoning contmls, not to menl-ion the k h d of project hpact ret~ediationsthat have become increasingly commonplace. As with the Ueberroth reports, the case for deregulating land. development is usually made on the basis of the jobs it supposedly brings, the costs of housing it presumably lo\vers, and the strctngthening of the tax base it putatively engenders. These are the up-front, manifest reasons. But belnind such high-soundillg concerns are the pecuniary interests of particular gmups who gain returns from, real pmperty Grow'Eh is theis bread and butter; the more intense d e v e l o p m t can becom, the greater the fortunes fiey can make. 'l'he stakes can be huge; whereas =turns on some other types of: business ventures may be on the order of 10 or 15 percent, the successful approval of an office development on, say, an

10

The Relevance of ReguIalio:orz

agricultural parcel can generate a h e , ten, or even 100-fold increase in market value just because a mom intensive use is being atlclwed. Ef specdators buy property on the assumption that local oEfjcials will approve a higher use, a project denial can be devastatixzg. No wonder they devote such time and sources toward affecting regulatory environments and the daily operations of lcxal government When it comes to particular prol'ects, people in the growth business find restrictions of any sort a pain in the neck, at best, and, at worst, a potential source of business crisis. Auxi,lia.ry professionals such as the lawyers, architects, accountants, civil eng4neers, and others who specialize in real estate development provide sympathetic a d often detaiIed backing. Supported politicians express the public-spirikd version of developerskoncerns as do the local media (whu rely on aggregate local growth for profits). To various degrees, other types of business owners come on board, some because-like the media-they perceive future pmfits as tied to aggregate local growth, and others tkmugh bonds of social a d ideological solidarity. This cumulative set of forces that pokvered h c d grokvth maelnines in most of the United States before the envir mtal era helps explain why there has been such inconsistent enforcement of zoning laws in U.S. cities over the years (except in the richest residentia1 areas). Fislding more lucrative uses of property was usually suffjcient reason fnr changing the zoning (&&cock, 1969)-sometimes, of ccrlarse, such changes required that developers make a well-placed campaigm~contribution or simple bribe (wkat the Italian developers call bustnrella-literallyI ""small mvelope'"). These cumulative forces also explain how "farmer-developersf" converted rural lands to suburi7an uses so easily, regardiess of the eco-. logical waste and fiscal inefficiency of the resulting sprawl (Rudel, 1989, Markusen, 197H). In a far-reaching version, the swag" of growth promoters helps explain even the collapse of South American rain forests (along with the Florida everglades), as state actim and the dcmands of local lartd speculators for h i g h a y s and p o k e protection push the development boundary outward into wilderness (Rude m d Richards, 1990; Rudel and Hnrowitz, 1993). Forest protection, as is often the case with conservation goals more gmerally =quires understanding the networks and coalitions Chat promote growth-the sllpply side, if you will-ralher than simply the demand forces-whether these be peasants seeking su:bsistence plots, or buyers for new slrburban housing. Whether in tropical rain forests or the dties and suburbs of ifidustrialized nations, investments in land and.buildlings give certain actors both the motivation and msources to dominate the prclductim of places. At least in the U.S. co~~text., the leadership of these actors rests on a bias built into civic culture, legal precedents, and economic ixrstitutims. As a resullt,

cities have operated as "growth machinest'' with lmal governments serving a h s t r u m e n t s to facilikte still more de~elopment,~ Governmental capacity a h a y s opemtes as part of a particula "regime," wfiich includes the surrounding economic and ideological context that sustains formal authority."I'he growth machine system is a partjcular kind of local regime, one that robustly characterizes Americm cities throughout their histories. One obvious caveat is that the pro-growth coalitiions, as with their adversaries, are not themselves utterly coherent; and,altho~tghovlr point of: departure has been to stress their inherent advantages, they do bave various fault-lines that weakcm t k i r ellfectiveness alld help provide slack withjn wh,ich ewiromentalists can operate. Sometimes, for example, land-use elites may quarrel over the costs and benefits of inhastructure (e.g., dams and higlnways)-just who will pay the dotlar costs, who will gain the building co~~tracts, or who will prosper by floating the finance bonds. The more usual conflicts, quite tellingiy, center m the location rather than the amount: of growth: VVhose property will gain by being n (Banfield, 1961)?C)r \zrhirh land renear the airport or t ~ w e ~ z t i ocenter gion will gaixl water rights from some far-away source (HundXey, 3.992)? At~ough land-use elites may share a desire to ""g& the community as of growth-determined by infrastrwmuch as possi:ble, the distrib~~tio~z ture location-becomes the bone of contention, in some cases, propedy interests may turn agai~~st a development proC j3 d that- undermines a fav0rcl.d growth scenario. For example, local elites of central and northern California cities opposed oil production oifshore as threats to tourism and related development. Casino and resort owners hz Lake Tahoe have allkd with environmezztalists to p r o ~ ~ odevelopment te that will not muddy T&oe% ccrystal waters quite so quickly-provoking the rage of ""dirtier"tourist concerns (Christensen, 1997). Lmd-use elites in Orlando, Florida, locked horns with Disney World for hogging too many of the spillover money benefits of the amusement center-that is, hotel, retail, and resictentid development (Foglesong, 1990). Lcrcai businesses have even urged a form, of growth management as a means of Ernithg the scale of Disney operations so as to gab greater access to the park's side-bounties for local enterprises. Although rare on the scene, some businesses may have opposed additional growth because they fearrzd, introduction of new competitms. At one time, elites involved in manufacbre (as opposed to real estate) may have thwarted new factories that wnuld, compete for local labor (Smith and Keller, 1983). Allthough the historic evidence is scant that this practice was w i d e s p ~ a dor elIfective (see Scheiber, 3973), some contemporary real estate operators do, on occasion, try to blwk additiozzal projects that would cmpete with them for tenants or buyers. h Ventura Comty, California,

12

The Relevance of ReguIalio:orz

the owners of a regional shvpping center tried to block construction of a competiti\re mall by bankrolling a refercsndum to eliminate the local gouent subsidies behhd the project (as well as all other such subsidies). AIthough d o m e d to failure through stiff opposi"ton frm local government and business groups who feared for ""the city's ability to compete with o&er dties," the effort does si.gnal the kind of tension that can occw even within the world of local real estate (Weiss, 1996: As). h o t h e r bone of contation has arisen wbrn a city singles out certain devebpers or corporations for special abatemmts; those lefi out have litigated with the result that procedures are esthlislned.to provide the abatcments to all who meet standard threshold criteria (Wolkof; 1983, as cited in Eisinger, 198K: 152). But the criteria inevitably favor some busimsses (usually the largest corporations, which have in fact gained the most subsidies) at the expense of others.7 As usual, then, politics can make for strmge bedfellows when the occasional dissension within the growth grouys takes hold. But the historic record, we emphasize, shows this to be the rare event. Busjness operatres with remarkable consensus on the growth issue, and environmental groups ordharily operate in opposition to the goals oi business. "Ecmm y versus enuironmentf%has hecow the gemric frame,with the two sides dear enough on most: every battle and dispute,

Economy Versus the Environment: Some Past Findings We R-, then, to a centraf focus of this inyuiry: Mlhat is the n a m e of cmSfici-between e~~vironment and economy? Rather than acceptkg m y narrow usage of these terms, some thinkers, like Wendell Berry and Wes Jackson, lay out the utter confusion of ewer regarding economies and environments as being in contradiction. The real, ernnomy or what Karl Polanyi early in this century called the ""ennpirical ecmomy," c m never be if7 connict with quality oE life; indeed if we put aside the models deduced from conventio1zal microeconomicsl quality of life, including enviental benefits for future generations, becomes the kcy indicator of eccmomk well-being. On intelrectual gromds, an increasing number of writers (for exafngle, Bea.t.ley and Manning, 1997; Daly and Cobb, 1,989; Hawken, 1993; Shiva, 1988) thus reject the dichotomization of environment and economy and suggest these realms must he reintegrated to build sustainable communities. Such organizations as Redefining Progwss are attempting to replace traditional ecmomic measures such as the Grass Uomstic. Product with more subtle and comprehensive hdicat-ors of economic health and commw~ityquaiity (Cobb, Halstead, and &we, 1995). Although these approaches are gaining momentum, they

still have had limit.ed impact on local discourse regarding development and growth. Envirmmental activists often argue their case within conventional fpamings, but ironically this is precisely where the evidence of a codict between the econmy and the environment is far more ambiguous than a l presumes. 'There are good reasons to doubt the intrirrsic the u s ~ ~talk econmic benefits of urban growth, even in the narrow sense of improving such standard econcrmic indicators as unemployment rates, puhlic b u d e t viabi.lity, or Ievels of =tail sales. Business groups argue that cornmunilies should accept a certain level of environmental damage as a necessary byproduct of urhan grwth; such damage is simply the price of maintaining a healthy ecrollorny. But there are reasons to doubt whether there truly is a payoff, even in economic terms, Despite the drumbeat of enthusiam flrr gmwth by politicians and cmszxltants and m occasional study showing its benefits (see Mwller, SZ), the great thrust of research questions whether local economic development strategies actuatly yield jobs or deliver any other net bendit: Is the ""creation"of jobs offset by the influx of new job-scekers and / or the costs of the local incentives that have been paid, out? According to one series of studies, localities with rapid development m a s u r e d in a variety of ways) experience m lower rates of ul-rennplayment Chan locaiitks that grow more slowly (Appelbaum et d., 1976; see also Sternlieb and Hughes, 1983; Fasenfest, 1986). Some evidence suggests an arc-shaped curvilinear relationship between econol-nie vitality and the rate of population change. Communities with the highest rates of poputation change, whether growing or shrinking, are at the tails of the curwe and have tke worst ecmmies. The strongest economies exist in localities toward the top of the curve that are the m s t stable in terms of population size. Studies of prominent cases tend to present a critic& view of growth and its net benefits. Thcre is the case of Atlantic City, New Jersey: a dream scenario of robust redevelopmnt under the aegis of the g a d l i n g industry, but with the jobs capbred by n-tigrants and suburbanites, not the struggling residel-rts in whose name the casino projects had been launched (Sternlieb m d Hughes, 3983; Wlliams, 1995). In terms of the fiscal advantages of growth far local governments, the data are consistently negdive (Appelbaum, 197%; Dmielson and Doig, 1982; Eisinger, 1988:44): Growth tends to generate costs that exceed increases in local revenues, dthough the kind of growth matters (rich rczsidents pay more in property taxes than Chc poor because the horns of the rich have higher market value; some industries generate higher costs than do others). In reviewing three major studies of the fiscal impact of sprawl versus mnaged grokvPh, Bmhell (1997: 171) reports the efeas fiscal benefits in terms of road and utjliw inhastructure of managed growth

l4

The Relevance of ReguIalio:orz

versus unregulated sprawl, with more "modest3avjngs on school construction. Of course, local goverrunents may pmfit in fiscal terms if they can attract high yieldhg enterprise with workers who live in a different jurisdictim (though this hardly increases the general community or env i r o m n t a l good). The careful andyses of specific projects that envircmmezntal impact revi,ew may entaiS often reveal that new developments do not pay their own way. The costs t h y generate in road maintenance, trat" fir management, and schoot services outwigh the taxes they generate. 'The new projects offer no real solution to local unemplopent, either because the skills needed are not local., or because high profile economic development efforts motivate more. people to move into tke community than there arc new opeznings in the labor xnarket. Our point here is not to provide a single bottom-fine from the research literature but to show agah that scientific =search does not demofistrate growth to be of net economic benefit. This murkizlress of economic consequence contrasts with the more clear-cut iindhgs on the envim ental m d quality of life costs of development. At a more basic level, it is uncertah whether efforts to lure development pay off in the still morc confined sense of attracthg new projects at all. It may be that efforts to create a ""good business climate'ht thc? expense of environmental quality and social equity actually do not work: Places that attempt to create such a d i m t e merely establish, subsidies for phantom developments that never materialize, or underwrite ventures that wodd have happened on trhejr okvn. Several careful studies exarnhe the fate of those localities with the best ""bushess climatesH-low taxes, low spending, weaker environmental controls, fast growth rates, probusiness ""rceptivityU-based primarily on standard rankizng sources fPom within the business world such as IEC, magazine, Fantus, and Grant. :111 comparing stateskconomic performance, Freudmburg (1993) determined that, if anytlrting, a good bushess clirnde predicted bad economic outcomes in subsequent years. A comparable study by Skom (1988: 151) concluded that busk~essctimate indkators "are useless as predictors ... [and] worse than usdd as guides to state and local government action." After conducting still another comparison, Meyer (1993, forthconning), concludes that states with more intense environmental s t d a r d s , by most ilndicators, performed better econnmically in successi\re periods than states with weaker standards, At misrirnum, says Meyer (1993: 10), "we can conctude that shifts in environmental policy, whether intended to exteznd environmental co~ntrolor reduce it, have no discernible effect on state economic performmcc,"" Using very diffewnt methodologies, economists have tried to discern impacts on manufacturing and trade caused by ewironmentd reseictions in various countries-that is, they have tried to track whether or not

industries, especially poiluting ones, escape to "pollution havens." The repeated finding is that costs of complying with envim arc si.mply not consequenlial tmough to have any detectable effect on corparations3ehavior (Leonard, 1988; Tobey, 1989, 1990). Such costs as labor and raw materials overshadow environmental considerations, which m a n s , according to still additjonal studies (h/lcConnel:I and Schwab, 1990; Bartik, 1988) that firmsqocation decisions likely have little to do with levels of emironmental controls. Economists Cropper and Qates (1992: 699) summarize the policy implications: "There is little force to the argument that we need to relax environmental policies to px.eserve international competitivenessS'' Some studies use corporate ofillcials' own survey responses to specify whether or not pollution abatements, mgulatory relief, and, o t k r forms of assistance m& a diffe~ncein their locaticm decisirms. Some reports amount to little more than journalistic collections of ""harror stories" (Frieden, 1980; Plotkh, 1987), but some have been conceived more carefully. Given corporations' ongoing idedogical commitment: to minimal rclgulation and their fondness for local "incentives"' that subsidize development, this method intrlnsicatly biases msults in favor of luw regulation. Nevertheless, even these findings are mixed. Eisillger (1988: 220) summarizes Che findings regarding tax and fhancial incent.ivcs-ofen thought to be the mnst powerful form of inducement-by sayhg there is "lit& warrant in these vwious studies to argue that [these incentive4 play a role of much, if anyp sigrlificance in plant-location decisions," although '"ozne evidence" k e s suggest that a favorable overall tax s t m ture on bushess may have some effect. Other studies using towns as the m~itsof malysis (hstead of states or nations) indicate that local governments%fforts to attract projects are usually ineective ( H u m p b y and Krannich, 1980; Summers, 19%). Either the plants the towns get would have come anyway, or local governments spent money and effort to woo projects t h y never really had a chance of lmding. Bwen when towns do win projects, the victory can be costly. Case studies of particular projects-like the city of Detroit's suhsidies of Gmeral Motors to create the '"Polletown" "project (Fasenfest, 1986), and Hint, Michigan's, public-priwate investments in convention and amuselncnt facifities (its "AuCo World." poject)-providc examples that show unfiappy financial results for some cities (for a series of cases, see Squires, 1989). Evidence suggests t enterprise zones-which free up targeted urbm areas horn envir ental and other restrictions through tax abatements, pollution control relief, public subsidies of new hires, and loosening up zoning and buildi-ng restrictions-do not fure new business or generate new jobs. The trivial numbers of jobs such zones do create are

I6

The Relevance of ReguIalio:orz

seldom taken up by local residents (Battle and Underhill, 1986; Eisinger, 1988: 194-199; Dowall, Beyeler, and Wong, 1994). To put it in its most: foreboding form, localities merely compete with one another.in a ""rizc to the bottom;""nverall social and environmmtal welfare is sacrificed without even mhhnal local economic gail~s. The fact that local efforts to simulate developme~~t generate so little positive econonnic impact suggests that local policies, wbether pro- or anti-developwnt, may have little hnpact m what goes on-in either direction. In one landrnark study, f,ogan and Z h u (1989)found that growth rates of cities with growth controls we= no lower than those without them. Molotch and Louch (1994) compared Southern California counties and metropolitan m a s b r i n g the rczcession of the early 1490s and found that localities with strict mgulations did no worse (peshags even better) than localities with more. open policies; at least during recesimpact, In his search sion, the regulatory environment had no appare~~t for irnpacts of growth cmtmlis on housing costs, Landis (1932) found that a group of CaliEornia growth control cities had no higher rates oE housing ~ price hflai-ion than did otherwise "matched" "ties that lacked S L E C controls-implykg perhaps that the cmtrds had not, in fact, lessened supplies. There arc., in these cases as well as in certain other studies with &ferenl. rcls~dts(e.g., Feiock, 19941, particular technical issues that may fie@ exglah the discrepant findings (see Appendix A). Our point here is that the researtlh, taken as a wMe, provides good =ason to questim some of the common assumptions about the economic impacts of either promoting or limiting local development. There may be impacts, but to find them will revire more subtle analysis of how regulation works.

Local lRegulalioln and Urban Theory. Understanding the forces that determine local policies and their outcomes has been a long-standjng focus of scholarly research and dcbate. The domillant 1950s and 1460s debate pitted "elite" v\iersus"pluralist" interpretdions of power. 'The former construed cities as doxninated by a shgle, coherent corporate-based elite, whereas the latter portrayed u h a n power as shared witl-tin a coalilicm of interest groups, suffitimtly diverse in medershjp to rerlcct a form, of democratically dispersed participation.9 The contest ended not so much with a victory of one side over the other as with the growing malization that the study ~ s u l t were s primarily an artifact of the met-hod and the discipli.ne of the researchet=Sociologists typically confirmed domination by something like a power elite, whereas political scientists learned that power was plural (Walton, 1946). In reviewhg this result, Walton concluded (1976) that the w y to escape the stalemate was to look beyond the sfrtrcture of communi.ty power to its

tangible consequences, like social inequalq and who gets what out oi particular gowemance processes, A generagon of new urban scholars moved beyond the simple dichotomization of plural politics versus a single economir elite (for reviews, see Zukin, l".)@ Walton, 1992; Gottdiener and R q h , 1988). In the "City as a Growth Machine," Molotch (1976: 310) posited that growth pmvides, in substantive terms, the central unifying political agenda for local elites in the United States, however divided they might be on other issues, 'This fact skews puhlic benefits irr the direction of local elites and affects the life chances of others, usually hindering them, Under elite dominance, growth promoticm becomes the critical function of locaf govent, and because it so dominates agendas, it operates as a key "constraint on initiatives for sociail and.economic =form" (310). Logan and Mdotch (1987) elaborated by describing h o ~ those t principaily concerned with irrmasing the value of their investments in real estate tend to overwhelm those oriented toward use values of the city, values stemming, for exam*, h m attachments to community or from just striving to fllnd a place to live. A stream ol research and cmmelrtary explored these issues in larger detail (for overviews see Logm, Whley, and Growder, 1997; Jonas and Wilson, forthcoming). Although also highly suspicious of the pluralist conception of the city, other refinements of the elitist paradigm have been less catered on growth elites compared to other groups in the polity. Urban "regime theoryf' takes local government institutions as sufficiently important and. complex- to force elite accommodation with at least some other types of actors. Hence athough business intewsts, both corporate- and real estate-based, are central-maybe even the most important-they must have coalition support from at least some other groups to move their projects forward. Thus, an urban rr.gime must contain a coalition of groups contrdi,ng different types of Rsnurces in order to advance a particular agenda (see Elkin, 1987). Trade-offs are made between those who have access tcr different types oE ortganizations, to differat ways of adding to the tax base, and to ways of gaining votes of differelrt constjtucmdes, and so iorth. Stone (1989), for example, shows how Atlanta." downtown business inf;erestsfacilitated the incorporation of African-American leaders into the governhg coalition, albeit within a development agenda that favored downtown interests, Although urban r e g h e theorists stress the need for coalitions, thry stop short of depictirrg them as pluralistic gatherings of ""eqaisat the tableef31rrdeedWin (1987: %-37) suggests that efforts to prmote economic growth are one of the three defining axes of local politics. He goes on to say that "promoting eccrnomic growth in the city has c m e to mem view e city as a pattern of land usef>this way of putting it comes very cl espite the emphasis on coditims-

to matching the assumption of growth machine theory (see also, Logan, Whalm, m d Crowder, 1992 60q. Still anothes variation of the local power debate comes from those who emphasize the farger national and global contexts within which m y local power can be exercised (see, for example, Lauria, 1997; Feagin, 1998; Sites, 1997). Under this vie\% localities must contend with the broader transformations that switch economk activities on or off (e.g., mmufacturing versus service economies) and, irt so doing, create the conditions for local governance. 'This m a n s some areas undergo deprivations that may feed disruptions if not handled or "regulated."" smne way. This may mean police craclcdowns or m e combination of social programming to stave off electord u p r i s a s or protests in the streets. With varying degrees of success and in?agination, repression or ent~preneurial spirit, localities strive to find a viable niche. At the same time, these outward-looEng strategies shape the conditions for local regime-building and substantive policy Given the steady expansion of globalizing trends, some argue that local leaders have less and less room ta maneuver (Gottdiener, 1987; Zukisr, 1991; but see Cox, 1"3232),C h the other hand, highly localized surges of mligictus natimalism and/or place-based identity Euel resistance to globalizati.on in djverse spots around l.he world. mese surges suggest that locality is a persistcntly autonomous realm of action. Local insurgencies are causing lager units to collapse, national boundaries to be redrawn, old patterns of governance and trade to be modified, As Gjddens (1.985)' among others, pojnts out, the traditional nation-state has lost out, both as a center of power ""d as a sensible unit of analysis. Neighborhoods, towns, and regions are the mare tmgible loci of human. action that are directly wwen into globalked, institutions. Globalization may even heighten the importance of locality as this becomes the @ace where alf the global interco~~nections are given form and dcfjne sites of investment, spaces for political action, and stages for cultural transformation. Mlhe&er im the former Vugoslwia, the villages of Chiapas, the disputed boundaries between Israelis and Palestinians, or in the deindustrialized urbm economies of the United States, the combatants (on all sides) wear the marks of global culture and trade: They turn tkeir faces to the global television networks wearirrg the latest youth fashion, ""tiibalf" tattoos, and other appurtenances of global consumption and taste systems. Lefebvre" formulation seems radically apt: "bki space disappears in the course of growth and development: the worldcvidc does not aholish the local" "efebvrc, 1991: 330). fn the W.S. context, although localism may not take the form of sustained violent insurgency, the country"^ particularly ¢ralized systern ol &-use controi m y offer specjai opportunities for local initiative.

But even if local constituencies demand cmtml of growth and if g w emments have the technical means to accomplish such purposes, does this override the traditional hcgemony of grokvth asld bushess elites? Within. localities and across a wider terrah, economic, state, and culturaZ. institutions offer power advantages to those best situated, and so p o w r grows on itself, influenchg the zlrba,n ecology. But dvantages do not always translate into outcomes, and certainly not always smoothly. Hegemony, as Stuart Wall has remarked, t a k s work, and the process can be complex. Findkg that work in real contexts that matter, like land development, becomes a means for understanding power and cmtingency more generally, We see the iocality as the smallend of a lcxdiglobal linkage. Here new powers are claimed and even =invented, as evidenced by locally based social movements around the world organizing for the environment, democracy, and cultural autonomy (Esteva and Praleash, 1W88).h explalnjng the g r d e s t transdormatim of our time, Feshbach and Friendly (1992) say local environmental movements were a key source of the undoing of the Soviet Union. Eve11 in &at severely constrained context, localities appamtly contained the potentials to reorder politiral economiespotentials stirred up by people's desires to better cmtrol their pbysical enviroment and routine way of life. We recognize the rci.evance of all these theoretical concerns, but joining an effort to find the fine lines that discriminate among them wollld not advance our present goals. We can acki2owledge that, in addition to growth elites, others play important local roles and still maintain our focus on growth processes as crucial. We can see that global trmsformations influence local possibilities, even as we examine the consequences local policies actually have. Mie can ask whether policies intended to protect local qualities and citizen interests are economically disastrous within a global context..If they are, it will be more djfficult to withstand new external pressure$ otherwise the potential for local actiosl and polovation may he much broader. Growth machine theory which we continue to find useful, is m analytic tool. It is not a deterministic doctrine in which growth is a preordajned Zlicrtic or political imperative driwn by the smooth clperasion of I d markets or the unassailable power of an elite group. It is a "'more or less" and somewhat cmtingmt set of propositions, The pojnt of this study is not to prove or disprove its central hypotheses, nor to re-specify who maltes up growth dikes or hokv those elites c m e to powcr and relate to other gmups".That is work for other projects, Here we are focused on what follows the winning of elections, the adoption of voter initiatives, and the ideological combat associated with such events. We ask hokv political shifts on the growth control front play out in th project-by-project

20

The Relevance of ReguIalio:orz

and,mk-by-rule regulation of development, and with. what consequences, This focus provieies a glimpe of pivotal urban processes and, we hope, contrihiutes to a more sopktisticlated and debiled understmdbg of how regulation works in its political-economic context,

Assessing Regulation Past research surely suggests that whatever community and environare created with growth controls are not attained in a mental 'be~~efits direct trade-off for a dysfuncticmal economy But does all of this buffing and puffhg about grcrw&-policy making, voting, regulating, deregulating, and project reviecv ome down to noth-ing at all? Obviously we need sustained. =search on the effects of the last generation" regdatory efforts on land use as well as other fronts. Beyond the issues of whether growlh control ruins economies or not, we need to uslderstand precjsely how new sets of building rules work and.in what ways they help or hinder local clrmmunity goals-eccmornic and otherwise, 'The overall amount of new development may not si,pificantly change, but the character of growth may shift in important ways, with controls actually hindering some k h d s cJf development but stimulatirng others. Or, it may be that controls really do temper the pace of grnwlh in s o m communities, but that other policies that are thought of as growth controls accelerate development in d i f f e ~ n places, t or in the same community at a diflerel~ttime, By focusing our attention m a specific set of case studks drawn from Southern Caigomia, we are able to address these questirms usmg a variety of methods and encolnpassistg a diverse range of control measures. We hope to trmscend prior work, however valuable, that has relied on hdividual case studies (e.g., DeLem, 1992b; Pincet, 1992), on quantitative comparisons, as welI as mare anecdotd comparative work. In presenting our findings, we hope to lend insight and build the substance of broader public debates about how to mix private market mechanisms and pubEc cmtrols effectively Were "private'~developmemtm r k t s simply overridden by public controls, or was there a more "balmced" hteractim of public and private? What would such a balmce look like? W ~ awas t the impact on local econol-nies inthese parficlliar cases? Are they less efficient, or can cities thrive econmicaIly under ""geener""egimes? Did communities g r w &re,@ tbr ""lopholees"' in public policy, or wa~; development manreaged through deliberate puhlic trade-offs? Judging from the co~~crete sults of local regulation, did local cantrols create a new era of citizen power over long-standing economic i n t e ~ s t s ?Did the growth machine grind to a halt or just change gears? Did developers and lheir allies dig deeper into their "systemic power'2based on ideological advantages

m d instihztional resources (Stone, 1981; Alford and Friedlmd, 1985)-to co-opt or otherwise derail their opponents' efforttj? If citizen resistmcc restdts, in fact, in effclctive and ecmornicalfy viable controls, this suggests the gotmtial benefits of other political innovations that might seem to "hterfere" with markets. Almost any effort to ~ g u late on behaXIF of:quality of life and e n v i r o ~ ~ mise likely ~ ~ t to he attacked as countermanding the wisdom of the market. E~~vironmentalism at any level must respond to these charges: The successes of urban envirfmmentalists may offer a model.

Plan of the Book Now that we have presented the questions that drive our research, we wilt go on (in Chapter 2) to describe our study sites and the actuai content of their grokvth control measures. Chapter 3 present.^ (in qraantified terms) the impacts of these measures on buildLng activity levels across our sites; that is, it answers the guestim of trYhe@~er or not: growth was ""stopped,""We then go on, in Chapter 4, to explain how developers and other growth interests function under growth control; we cmsidcr their strategjes to overcome the impediments placed in their path-in other words, we look at how cities grow under growth cmtrol, In Chapter 5, we simullate a developer" efforts to build actual projects across our sites and thus begin the work of laying out the ways new regulations have indeed affected the contel~tof growth. Chapter 6 cmtinues this work of specifying the effects of gmwth control by andyzing the k n d of growth localities experienced in relation to tbr kinds of development their civic traditions and plmning policies tried to foster. Finally; we use Chapter 7 to sum up by assessing wins and losses, pointing to the ways intervmtiun in land markets-and by hnplication other spheres as w e l k a n impmve the quality of life without sacrificing economic vitality$even in the narrow sense of the term.

Motes 1. Economists have often studied these "externalities" by prc>xy,assuming that all the pertinent negative spillovers and positive amnities are built into housing prices (see Fischel, 1990; Mark and Goldberg, 1983; IJiand Brown, 1988). 2. Such influential environmentalists as Donella Meadows and her colieagues (1992) make a distinction between grow-th (which means getting quantitatively bigger) and development (which means getting qualitatively better by building local capacities). Although this is a valuable analytic distinction, in this book we use development in the more vernacular sense of what real estate developers do. 3. Fur evidence that low-incame people bear the biggest pollution brunt, see Berry 1977; Buttet and FXinn, 197%;Bullard, 1990,1993,1994.

22

The Relevance of RegziInlio:orz

4. "3usiness7s New Buzzword h r Candidates" Los A~gelesErnes, May 23, 1994, A3. 5. Fur more detail and related treatments, see Molotch, 1976; Logan and Moloteh, 1987; Feagin, 1983; Krannich and Humphries, 1983; Lyon et al., 1983; Domhoff' 11983; Swanstrom, 1985; Etkin, 1987; Whitt, 1982; Vc~geland Swansc~n, 19853; Vc~gel,1992; Jonas and Witson, forthcoming. 6. Our simplfication of the term "regime" does not cmEc>rmprecisely to traditional wage. See Elkin, 1987; Stone, 1989 for more definitive and elaborated statements. 7, See Eisinger 'S (1988: 152) summary discussion. 8. We finit saw the phrase used by Brecher and Costello (19941, but the idea that gavmments are under pressure to price themselves below an appropriate level has been around for a number of years among economists, sodstogists, and political scientists (see Cumberland, 1981; Molotch, 1976). 9. The classic studies are by Floyd Hunter (1953) and Robert Daht (1961).

Sites Learning from Sout)-remCalifornia W i t h the region of SouChcrn Califmja, so f m e d for spravling growth, we focus m a diverse array of localities and a variety of measures aimed at growth cmtrol. We have no illusion that these localities and their regzllations provi,de either random smgles or '"typical instances" from a nationwide perspective. Instead., our sites provide a test case of growth control with implications fur other locafities throughout the cowtry. The sites in quest.ion are in a rclgional setting with both robust (jrocvth and widespread. resistance to growth-apparently a twin dynamic. Research indicates that places ercperiencing rapid growth are mow likely tcr turn to grow& controls (Baldassare and Protash, f,982),1 Southcr~nCdifomia tends to be the '"poster cbild" for environmentalists and business leaders alike, repsenting, respecthely, the epitome of irresponsible development and the "exccsses'kof local regulation. We reason that if controls over urban development have had important impacts anywhere, they wodd likely show in these settings. Becarnse of thcir rcllatively long experience with grocvth controls, ou,r study sites should show some sophistication in desiping statutes and enforcing their implemmtation. Co~~trols should have been fn phce htng enough to have measzlrable impacts. fn contrast, new and tentalive regulations would have undetectable effects. If little has changed in our study sites, the impact i" m.""y other cornunities and r e g i o ~ ~ issprobably even smaller; either their cmtrols are mhimal irn real, terms, or, given the lack of growth h their region, they were not needed in the first place, h d the impacts of g r w t h control that we observe at our sites may sagg s t future possibilities for commmnities t-hat are just beghning to manage growth. Studying the actuai practices of groclith rczgulations in California has a research advantage specific to the special qualities of the state. Large and culturally distinctive, Cdifornia often gives momentum to broader

national trends-as has happened with air quality standarcis, coastal protections, and, emerging from different parts of the political spectrum, voter initiatives against &firmdive action, and the taxpayers' revolt that yidbed Proposition 13. In the case of enviro ental issues, there is a firm economic basis for effect," The vast California consulBer market h~duces the ""C'alifor~nization manufacturers to develop technologies to meet state mvironmental standards and cmsumption patterns-in pmducts liice cars, construction materials, pollution sesubbers, leaf blowers, aerosol sprays, waste system, plumbing fixtures, and furniture-more readily than they would for other states or world ~ g i o n sSometimes . manufactllrers change thrir entire production just to accommoda.t.ethe California market. 011ce &is accommodation occurs, other states, even nations, can follow with similar standards m m easily a d ride the wake of California's rules because manufacturer's hiwe already made the technolo&ical investmem.t.to produce envircznmentally superior products. In this way, as well as in the force of its culhtral and political winds, CaliEornia's envircmmental politics and patterns of life hR1ue11ce global economies, tending to set de faeto standards, As we wi31 show, growth controls somethes Involve effiscts, direct a d indirt.ct, on technologies that have the potential to irnpact othe r s h o d e s of life. It is a clichk to identify Southern Cdifornia as a cultural: forerunner, a basis for imitatim because of its glamour and &an. But in regard to land use iss~~es, this emulation has bee11 much documented. 'The California bungalow of the 1920s and 1930s (Gebhard and Writer, 1977: 18), the ""ranch house" of the 1950s and 1 9 6 0 ~as~we11 as other residential and commercial foms (the fast food of McDonald's and many chains) began in Southern California-making it the most influential force in domestic architecture and ""thecenter of contemporary restaurant innovation"' (Pillsbury; l99Q), with all that implies for resource use. The freeway and the hegemony of the American car probably owe more-economically, stylistically, and e n v i r o n m t l l - t o the Southern California landscape than to any othcr region. 'Thus, the sta:kes oE what goes on in "1occaX California" "land use, as with most everythhg dse, am high. We could have used other parts of the United States in addition to Southern California, pet-haps developi,ng a broadcr cornparathe frame. But an anlalytic advantage of staying within a single rcgion is that many of the economic, historical, and cultural factors are constmt. For example, Souther11 California's economy; as measured by unemployment, wage structures, and properv values, tends to rise and fall as a single unit (Levy, 1994).Hence differences that emerge among our commlanities over time cannot be at-tributedto divergent regional ecmomic trends that would have to be considered were our cases drawn nationally.

Withh the limits of the U.S. Constitution, state lawmakers have a great deal of leeway in setting the p a r w t e r s fnr how local gave ulate land use. 1x1practice, mmy states adopted the Standard Zoning Enabling Act of 1926 and the State Planning Enabllng Act of 1927, which were developed by m advisory committee on zoning within t-he U.S. Uepastment of Commerce (Piatt, 1996: 234). More recentiy, the Model IJand Development Code of the American Land Institute pmvided a template for updating enablirrg legislaticm, including provisions that same states used to adopt stdewide land-rase controls (Platt, 1996: Cajfornia has not gone as far FR this direction as the excqtional cases of Hawaii, Oregon, Vermont, Maine, and Florida; but lawmakers have created a ranging from coastal protections, to agriculttrrd preental review to deal with land use and.growth management (Platt, 39%: 365). Within our California study sites we encounter a single frmework of state law, yet the fomda,t.ionsof this framework are enough in the national mainstream that we can provide analytic benchmarks for other parts of the country.

Selecting Study Sites Restricting our study sites to the Southern Caljfornja, region was also practical, We could not settle for off-the-shelf databases; close and frequent on-site observations were needed to understand what an envircmmelltal control really meant and haw it worked as implemented. Our work thus involved n u m m u s site visits to carry out interviews, gather data, inspect archive materials, visit actual building prcrjects, cmss-check information, m d attend dozelns of pzlblic meetings. The two of us were able to carry out the work directII).at every site with the support of several able assistants performing specific tasks. A broader geographical scope would have required more researchers and Ihe kind of: "hired-hmdffcoordination difficulties that create special, challenges for qualitative work. :111 any event, employing staff and payhg for air fares and extensive hotel st..ayskvollld simply have broken our small research budget. Tn selecting our study sites, we worked our way south from our University of California, Santa Barbara base, gathering up localities until our malytic needs were met. This method yielded three study areas, two of which contain an amalgam of disthct towns and cities that entered the case base in their own right. Our first study area is the S a ~ t aBahara South Coast, consisthg, in turn, of two incorporated cities and an array of unincorporated and quzte diverse communities. The second study area is an even more varied set of co unities that make up western Riwerside County. Our third study area is the singe city of Santa, Monica, part and parcel of the surrounding city of Los Angeles in every way but its

legal independence. Our study time frame is 1970-1990, the years that approxirnak the country's g ~ a environmental t awakening and the era when growth-control measures were enacted. Besides starting early enough to catch later effects, this time frame gives us some opportuniw to follow controls in a @en locatity as they work themselves out sequentially. h short, we have a variety of times' a variety of locdities, and-as we will show-a variety of regulations upon which to build comparisms, In terms of standard socio-demqraphic "predictors" of environmentalist sentiment, our sites appear to be a rough cross-section of Catilornia cities and towns. Some evidence indicates high-income and higheduca~onpopulations are the most rclceptive to environmmtal sentkirnents and poliry enactment, with working-class groups less orient-ed toward such issues (Dunlap, 1975; huber, 1978; Dowall, 1980; Protash and Baldassare, 1983; Ctark and Goetz, 1994; but see Logan and Zhou, 1990). Our study encompasses places reprclsenting, if not the extremes, at least a reasonably wide socio-dennographic variation (see Table 2.1 for the basic descriptions).

Xdentifying Growth Controls Our list of what: constitutes growth control i,n each locaXjty includes measures that arc not a h a y s put under that form1 rubric. We relied on local understandings (using methods to be described) of the purpose and impact of a particular measure. Utitity hookup bans,for example, are sometimes on the list and sometimes not, based on local perceptions. En some cases, we learned from informants on both sides that such moratoria wcre used to curtail developnnemt-evm Chough the pro-growth activists were the only ones interested in pmclaixning this pubiicIy. We g a t h e ~ dthis information in the course of interviews (last@ as long as three hours, a h o s t never less than one) that were designed to learn not mly which controls were perceived to be mast important but aIso how these controls impacted the community anci h w the implementdion process worked w t . We also prObed for relevant historical information, includjng how the lmai political system had evolved and its implicatilrns for enforcemnt of restrictions. Mle exalnined specific projects and hterviebved those responsible for their cmstruction and oversight. En all our study areas, we intcrrviewed planIling officials (usually ineluding the planning director), the mayor, and prominent developers. In each study area and in ~rirtuallyall towns and cities, we also interentalists, news reporters, m d political activists on both sides of the development divide. In aff, we interviewed ninetytl~reepwple- The largest nurnber (forty-eight) c m e .from the Riverside area because of the larger number of separate municipalities in this study arca.

TABLE 2.1 Profile of Major Cities

Santa Barbara

Santa Mmica

Riverside

Population White Hispanic College Educated (over 25). Median Family Income Families in Povertyb

Housing Units % Owner Occupied

Median House Value Median Gross Rent Riverside County, 1970-1989; Santa Barbara County, 19704989; U.S.Census, 1970-1990; and U.S.Census, 1972,1983,1994. 1980 figures are for % ' with 16 or more years of education 1970 figures are families below low-income lwel

SOURCES: a

The remaining interviews were dkibed fairly evenly between Santa Barbara (twenty-five) and Smta Monica ('twenty).These numbers do not inc l ~ ~call-backs de for information checks and briefer conversations (at least equal in nunnber) that took place with assistants and others who were able to provide specific forms of infornation (dates cJf projects, meanings of specific conditions, etc.). We used semi-structured interviews tajlored to the position of informants and to the kind of research issue for which their h o d e d g e was most rdwant. At each step, we asked informants to idmtify other kcy people invo(ved wjth local grokvth and developmetnt issues, building our information sources in snowball Ifashion. With the permissim of the respondents, we took erctemive notes during tbr interviews, at tirnes pausing to transcribe dired qztotes. AAerward, we wrote up sumaries, usualb witihin a dayf and catalsgued interviews by the respondent" name, role, and study area. ?i> asswe confidentiality w e assigned each intemiew a nurnber lor refe~ncepurposes. Our interviews were, in turn, supplemented by our scmtjny of docruments, including the lists of conditions impclsed on actual pro~ects,the content of city and,county plans, and records of regtxldions assembled by others. FNc subscribed to daily newspapers in all three areas m d maixztained clipping files on develogmmt issues generally as well as on specific projects. Some people have made much of the difference between the terms ""growah cmtml" and ""growthmanagement," arguing that they are not the s m e thing. Hence a study of one would be dilfercnt from a study of the other. Growth control, under this understanding, kpties sharp limits, whereas growth management merely indicates mitigation of growah consequences.2 But Chis distinction is less obvious in actual practice, as our findings will, show. Legislation that looks like ""control" may turn out to be more like "mmagernent"~rowthis indeed allowed but only after the developer sweetens the deal with public betnefits. Simi,larlJr,measures offjciarty classified as "mnagement" in fact '"antsol" wwhen administration is strict and backed by an anti-development political regime.. The terms are themsel,ves tools of local rhetoric as much as policy intent. Environmentalist policy makers sometimes use "'manage" because they fear the word "controlf%wifl put pwple off; and deveioper groups sometimes dub mild managhg devices "control" in order to paint their opponents as extreme. Our rule was to include measures that both sides seemed to think had the strongest impact, regardless of Gvhether the measures were deemed "'management'kr "control.'" Our study sites ehibit the h d s of diBerences thought to create favorable conditions for effecfive grow& controls, middling conditions, and mfavorable conditions for effective regulation, in terms of socio-economic standing, geqraphic circumstance, and, political-cultural histories. These

FIGURE 2.1 Map of Study Sites

. Studv Sites

v///. Santa Barbara 4p!!l.j!~p!iil h ..... . . .,.:.I

60 miles

20

0

0 20

40

60

80 km

Santa Monica Riverside

.,.,,,1.1..

sovnc~:University of Colorado at Colorado Springs, Sheryl Giglia, cartographer.

tu

m

places also differ in the type and apparent intmsity of their contrds, as we now elaborate through a description of each study area and its cmstituent locales..

Sanb Barbaxa Sauth Coast, The Smta Barbara South Coast study area is optinnally suited for growth control implementatim. h geographic terms (see Figure 2.11, it if rather self-contained as a narrow shelf of lmd between the Pacific Ocean and the Santa Ynez Mountains. 'This portion of the Pacific coaslhe runs east and west m d is located just beyond easy ~ a c of b Los Angeles (about a two-hour drive). Compaativel,t; it had more than the usual capacity to , as well as in other ways, withdetermine its own h t u ~emvimnmenta:[fy out significant spillover comp2icatims arishg from inter-local c o m u t e s or neighborhood effects from adjoining zones." The Santa Barbara area was a distinctive settleme~nteven before the Spanish conquest. Along with the Gabnelho people to the south, the indigenous Chumash people have been cailed "the wealthfest, most populous, and most powerful ethnic nationality in aboriginal southern C a b fornia" @em and Smith, 1982: 538; see also Qoeber, 1925: 550, all as cited in McEvoy 1386: 27,28), with an advanced state of craft and artistic work (as evid,enced jn swviving basketry and cave paintj,ngs). In the d e r n epoch, special wealth and artistic assets mark the locale, and th area is sustained economically by agriculture, research/development, retirement, and tourism. The city of Santa Bcnrbara (population about 85,000) has been the center for comerce, finance, gave ent, and media. Alfthough legendary for the riches of its upper crust, Santa Barbara is diverse: 30 percent of the core city population is Latino, and the median filmil:y income (within the city) is below the overall state level (although above medians of Californians living in other cities in the statc3). To the west, Gdeta is an unincorynra.t.edarea of thc cottnty adjacent to the Uni:versity of California, Santa Barbara" student dormitories and apartment blocks, otherwiz h i l t of tract homes and m array of research and development and light industrial activities. To the east ir; the exclusive suburb of Monkcito, the world-class resjdentiai zone of imprclssive homes and estates that is actually the primary s o m e of the locale's reputation for spletndid afflumce. Further east is the largely residentid unincorporated beach community of Summedanb. The cmly other incorporated city along the South Coast is Carphteria (pophtion 13,747);a substantial portiorn of its population is workjng class andior Latino. En years past, it served as the commercial sub-center for

neaiby h m s and was home to working people employed elsewhere inthe local region. Only at the end of our sbdy period (in 1990) was its trraditionally pro-grokvth city council replaced by an envi The city of Santa Basbara has long been the centes of planning and land-use politics-not only for the region but in some ~ s p e c t sfor the state and the nation. S m e say the 1969 Santa Barbara oil spill not only stimulated local enviro ental protection ( m d the enactment of what an oil official called "&a Xly excessive" demands; see Homer, 19510: 4), but sparked the global e~~vironmental nrroveme~~t (Easton, 1972). In fact, such concerns go back at least as far as the 1925 earthytlake and fire; the city was rebuilt under the supervision of the country's first architectural rclview board. A homegrocvn versi.on of the Andalusjan Spanish achitectural style (which became the city" trademark and inspired its many grand and notewor&y ofiicial buildings and co ercial stmctures) was explicitly promoted by local government under the influence of citizen activists (similar to the invention of the ""Santa Fe" "style, see Vilson 1997). At the county level, Santa Barbara also became the first irr California to require architectural review (Gebhard 1990: 7 ) . FIistorically, city government leaders were drawn mstly from '"Main Street" business gmups, typical of small-town America. But on certain issues and projects, the oMicial lcadcrship deferred to a crjvie-miaded dite who used their prestige and purses to block development-for example, Zly buying land for public open space along the beachhont until the city could be kduced to pay for it. Athough this state of affairs was no doubt tense at tjmes, there was a modus vivendi in which citizens"groups "watched over" a growth-oriented local government and controlled, at least in terms of the aesthetics, how development occurred. This proved a workable trute as long as growth pressures remavled mnderatc. These conditions began changing in the late 1960%particuiarty with the dramdic growth ol the University of California's ncw campus in Goleta (officially the Universiity of California, Smta Bahasa). Count-y voters set a new prtrcedent in 1970 by mrtuming their elccted officials' appmval of a development-a 1,535-m2 "l,eapfmgttluxury housjng prcrject north of Goleta by the famous "E'l Cnpitm" wsurfhg beach (Craves and Sirnon, 1980). h a similar 1972 action, Sat~taKarbara city vokrs stopped an eight-story rclsidential condo ""inwer," later city officials wrote a permanent citywidc four-story b i g h t limit into the city charter. "hall ten Santa Barbara-ama referenda irrvolving environment artd growth issues between 1967 and 1983, the e~zvironmentalist: positio~~ prevailed" pollen, l963f3). Certain elements of the community-notably the Citizen's Planning Associatbn, with its roots extending to the post-quakez rebuilding period-had long promoted ""god planning." m e plamkg advocates hduded. retirees and the weailthJr, bolstered, by two other groups: (1) those

Snrttn Barbarn beactzfi.ont on CabrBIIo Avenue

who were buffered from the local growth economy by working for large, nm-local public and private organizations-particularly the uniwersity and the high tech industries; (2) those whose business was Smta Barbara's scenic character, namely tourism (this g r o q provided less consistent support). By 1990, the most importmt elected bodies at both city and coulzty levels were controlled by people who won ofice as environmentalists, some of them ari; long as twenty years earlier. The environmentalist rise to power was not a steady prog~ssionbut a back and forth contest for political position, especially at the county level. The cmvironmentalist &minance achieved by 1990 was, in fact, shcrrt-lived, as evidmced by elections after our study period that turned control ol s m e jllrisdjctions to the pro-growth camp. But the array of elected posts rander environmentalist control at so many levels (city county, water boards, and other sgecial districts) and for such an extensive period (most of the twenty years) may have been unique in Amerira.4 ental groups in the city of Santa Barbara, in particular, institutionalized t-heir prc.sence to a high degree, Thc Citizenfs F"l sociation (with a countywide reach from its city base) maintained a downtown headquarters and employed a p1 er to assist with lobbying and dcvelnpment monitoring. Network, a left-oricnt.ed citizens' action lobby, sustajned an office at tirnes and usually employed at least a parttime staff person. Other such organizations came and went, a later example being the Santa BaTbara Alljance, which raised money for political candidates and monitored. the development pmcess on a daily basis. Grclups such as the Citizc;ns fnr G&ta Valley proved eyually effective, though they were f u l y volmeer. The Envil-onmental Defense Center (with four hXl-time staff lawyers, plus paid support staff, interns, and volunteers) wwed litigation wars on land-use issues. The Community Environmental Council, f-aulzdedin 1969 as an enviro research center, developed a wide array of programs with a paid staff that grew evemally tcr sixty persms (including reeyclhg center workers). The coulzcil, came to have its own showplace buildbg funded by a local philanthmpist. Beyond these genclrat-purpose and bcalv autonomous groups, Santa Barbara had e x t m e l y active ehapters oE national t?ssodatj,ons, especidy those with strong environmental concerns (e.g., the Sierra Club, the League oE Women Wters). The local Audubm Society, at the time of the 1969 Smta Barbara oil spill, had a remarhbly high number of members, with 7150 in the local cbapler (Molotch, Freudenburg, and Paulsen, 3.399). There w a atso groups oriented toward more particutar fnterests, like maintenance of horse trails in the adjacent national forests, support for bicycle transportation, surfctr's rights to unpolluted ocean waters, and ongoirrg el"forts tcr block expansion oE the offshcrre oil industry (e.g., Get

Oil Out!). Still other groups sprang up in reriponse to specific projects. These groups often functioned in coalition, and Santa Barttara was regarded by developers and e17vironmentalists alike as a strong bastion of environmentalist smtiment and organization, By the mid-1970s the region had become what the Miufl Street fazrr~zal called ""a major proving ground for various masurcs that have held back residential, commercial and industrial development" (Hillf 1978: 1,271.

Growth Controls: Santa Barhfc1.1.Sozitlz Coast Across the variety of localities making up the South Coast, a dlrierse array of co~~trols had been enacted over time, through voters' initiatives, board. and council actions, commission implementations, and administrative policies (Appendix R lists controls for each locality in chroncrlogical ordcr). hlmod every cmtrol was controversial, usually with intense public M a t e and often with great acrlmnny. As is true throughout the arid West, water is the mother's milk of Southern California's growth. The first move toward growth control on. the South Coast was the 1972 Goleta Water Board decision to grant no new water hcrokups in what had been the county's fastest grcrwir-rg and largest suburban area, Voters ratified thjs decision by popular rclferemdum and installed an envimnmentalist majority on the water board in 1973. In 1979, county voters elected not to tap Cdifornia" state water system (the only California county to do so). Two smaller water districts (Nontecito and Summerbnd) imposed their own (less skingent) moratoria and rationing limits (in 1973 and 1974, respectively). In 1974., thinking ambitiously about future politics, the city of Santa Barbara commissioned a group of local academics and envim volunteers to determine how different levels of future populat would impact the city. In effect this was a giant enviro port on the effects various growth scenarios would have m alX aspects of fiscal hralth and city services. Based on the Shree-volume report (Appelb a m , et ale, 1976), Ihe city colmci:l selected the f i g ~ ~of r e 85,000 as the city" final capacity (10,000 more than were present at the time) and downzcmed virbally all multi-family ~sidentialareas to approximately Xn the face of legd challenge, voters half their prior allokvable de~~sities. then (in 1977) endorsed both the population limit and the downzoning. The same measure advised that all chmges to the city's gmeral plan be submitted to a vote of the people, Taking it a step further, a 1,982 vote added to the city charter the prhciple that the city was to " h e within local resourcesm-a not so veiled proviso intmded to discourage any hture commitment to the state water project. Still another provision requircd that five council votes would be needed for any future rezonjng (a "slaper-majority'kf the sevm council members).

In a move that seems incredible given the discourse that followed in the 1 9 9 0 ~ the ~ city acted to ""balance""its housing and jobs by decreasing the nu~nberof jobs it wndd potentidy attract. Cowlcil action and a subsequent citywide vote (Measure ""E" h 1989) sharply limited future commexial building (mtail, office, and manufactufing) to a total of three million square feet over the followhg twenty years, Commercial buildbgs could. have a floor area-""footprintu-equal to only one quarter of the land upon which they were built; small additions (under 3,1100 squart. feet) could be made to exisling structures, but any larger projects had to compete fnr the rclmahing cmmercid space not allocated to projects in the pipeline (approved or pending) or to "community priorities.'XS~ce two and one-half:mi1lion sqLlare feet was already set aside for such uses, only one-half million square feet remained to accommodate new proposals (a figure that translates roughly as a two-department-store shopping mall available for all future colnmercial fulletions including office buildings, manufactuw, and so forth). On the water sup& front, in 19% a long drought caused the city to disallow commerciat developments that r e q u i ~ dany water beyond a parcel" historic use, with subsequent mstrictior-rs requiring net water savings for all projects. 'The city limited new residential hookups to &out fiity per year (allwa.t.ed on a lottery basis). Mnre or less keeping pace with city residents, in 19713county voters approved a 0.9 percent annual poplafaticrn growth limit for the unincorporated areas of the Santa, Barbara South Coast. The 1,989 county grokvth management ordinance limited the Goleta area to 280 new housing units and 80,000 square feet of ccrmn-tercial development each year (a very small increment, given the appmxjl3nate 75,000 person popdation base). The small city of Caryinteria remained a relatively unregulated. zone throughout this period, with growth resistance taking hold only in 1990, when voters rejected city plans to establish a redevelopment agency that was perceived as a tool for growth promotion. Under the rallying cry to ""saveCa~interia'ssmall town character,'" large beachfront, mixed-use complex was turned down by l.he freshly elected environmentalist city council, Santa Monica

Smta Monica approximates Santa Barbam in population size (86,905)but was our mid& case in t e r m of the potential far effective growth cmtrcrl

implementation, Compared to Santa Barbara, its optiolls were stro~~gly constrairred by its lmatim at the seasidtl edge of the great L.A. metropoZis.

Beyond the city line to the north are aMuent L.A. suburbs; to the east and south, Santa Monica is wowen tightly into the W s t Side of Los Angeles, its borders indistinguisfiable from adjacent L.A. What goes on in the giant metropolis feeds in as traffic cmgestion, busing pressure, homelessness, crirne, and housing price innation. began as one of the first Southern It was not always so. Smta Mo~~ica California coastal resort towns; tmvelers making a two-day wagon trip from downtown Los Angeles wouid camp on its broad beach (Ranham, 1,971).It grew along with the L.A. region during and just after World War :I1as mili.tary production (Douglas Airrrait h particular) became a center for local employment. 7'he populatictn was heavily working class, living in modest bungalows. 'The fj*al linkr wit-h the metropolis c m e cvith c m pfction of the Santa Mmica Freeway in 1966. As integration with the rest of L.A. proceeded, Santa Monica's population beeme more socially heterogcmcous, with African-Americans and Latinos ta.king up residence, particularly h the southern portion. The summer beach homes and aparments in the Ocean Park area attracted a more settled community than before, at once bohmian m d pditically progressive (Shearer, 1982), h n t e r s became an ever larger and more vocal proportjcrn of the city's population, reaching 28 percent in 1980 (Clmel, 1986: 141). Tfne city also becme home to high-rise residentid, hotel, and office structures, with a particularly strong buildting boom in the 1984-1989 period. Pressures mounted for a massive intensification of eltisting land uses and the gentrification of much of the housing stock. Somd and substantial single-family homes were bought (at prices in the me-ME million dollar rmge) as "tear downs" and replaced by much larger singlc-family structures crowded onto ordinary sized city lots. SiimilarXy, low-rise apartmnt bfocrks and commesciaf structures became marketable fnr the value of their land alone. Santa Monfca's relatively clean air, its proximity to beach recreation, m d its easy access to iJ.A-'s important business and cultural centers together sparked. intmse growth prtrssum (Fulton, 1985: 63). %rough most of the 1,960~~ civic life in Santa Monica was co~~trolled by the hometown elite of the Chamber of Commerce and the sewice clubs (Condefli, 3980). These gmups were subsequently challenged in succmslve waves. The first sig11 of challenge c m e in response to a 1979 city council plan to tear down the Santa Monica pier; the grand vision included an ocean causeway arcing north hrough tbe Pacific a e a n to link the city to Malibu, with an mtifidal island fos kigh-rise development built on hay landfill as an additional feature, Citizen protest stopped the project, with even the normally pro-growth local newpaper, the ClzltlonFr, ~ I Iopposition.. Several of the liberal Republicans who led the fight to save the pier we= subsequently dccted to the city council, Alithough not opposed to

the underlying premises of growth, they rejected this project as at best impractical and at worst disastrous for thr city's character. The first effective challenge to grokvth its& was a cifize~~ laws~1j.tto block public fjnanchg of a proposed downtown shopphg mall ("Smta Monica Placef")on the grounds that the prt!ject would not benefit neighborhoods. Though fhancjng for the project was initially qproved by voters in 1975, the city ended up settlhg with the plaintiffs in 1978. The settlement provided that a portion of the prclject's parking revenues be chamekd to low-income housing rehabilitation, plxket parks, =cycling, child care, and a wnmen" center. This development agrcemnt became a model for how the city would later negoliate with devetopt?rs." By late 7,978, several renter groups banded together to form the Santa Monj.ca Rcnter" s g h t s g m p (SMRR). SMRK won rent control with the city's highest voter turnout in its history Over the next few years, STUIRI.: gaincd control of the newly established rent control board and the city council (control of the latter was to be lost for a five-yeas interrepurn). Because of both its strong ~ g d a t i o nover rental markets and the level of citizen a c t h i m across many fronts, including land use intervention, Santa Mmica became one of California." most prominent examples of proactive local g w e ent. Atthough rent control was the e%ectoralissue that first transformd Santa Monica poitics, it was delivered within a broader chilllenge to the power of Xacrdlords and developers over civic dfairs (Carnoy and Shearer, 1980; Shearele, 1982). The liberal and radical leadership gave the city a reputation for severely curtaifhg private property rights in favor of citizen and nei&borhood interests (conserva";vc groups cailed it, derisively the "People's Republic of Santa Mo~Itica'"). 'The city was the laboratory; activist base, and m a h constituency for the Torn Hayden and Jane Fonda" Citizen" for Economic ¯acy (CED), as well as the district represmted by Hayden durirrg his career in the California State Legislature. Compared to activists in Santa Barbara, Santa Monicans were concerned not only with preserving the physical envircmment but also with a strmg commitment to a social justice agenda (Heskin, 7,983; Carnay and S h e a ~ r19811; , Capek and Gitderhlom, 1,992).

Groruth Cu~zlrols:Santa M m ~ i c n When the SIVLRR rent-control challengers gained a council majority in 1981, they stopped issuing ccmstructicm permits hnmediately, even for projects already approved. h r i n g a six-monlfn permjt m~ratol"j,m, new city 1ea.dess assessed how much development should be allowed and what social benefits should come from it. Projects '"stuck in the pipelime" were allowed to proceed d y after new terms wcre negotiated, with extra benefits for the city under case-by-case "developer agreements,"

San tm Monim Place lLlnll

During t h initial moratorium, the council-along with citizen committees-kvised stricter = v i m , new development guidelines, and m m development fees-iincluding fees for ixnpxts on traffic and schools, and to provi$e affordable housing, The city negotiated exactions on a projectZly-project basis and, later on, with the grridmce of revised land-use standards developed in the comprchcnsi.ve plan of 1963.13,. Tn May 1989, a newly installed S M M rn4orit.y m the city council imposed another permit moratrorium to stall the boom in commercial development pelrding development of a growth managemnt st..rateu.This action came mly nine months after the city adopted a new camprehensive zonk~gordinmce, which reduced total allowable commercial/hdustrial developmernt in the city bp two-thirds. Meanwlnile, (jrokvth critics we= able to block several lart;e-scale new developments, even ones that promised direct revenues to the city and special social b e f i t s , such as rcldevelupme~ntol the city airpmt and construction of a heaehfront hotel on the publicly owned site of an existing private club. Santa :Monica"s tight ~stricticmsgrew tighter still.

The Kivlsrside Area Western Rvcrside County, the most far-flung and fastest grocving o.E ottr study sites, represents the stereotypically least conducive scenario for effective growth control. :Its prcrximity to the spreading metropolis pulls development its way, and local gr0kvt.h boosters refer grandiy to this interior regim east of Los Angeles as the ""lnlan d v i r e . " The area" heavily working-class population base and weak organizational i~~frastructurc also imply more? tetltative grocvth resistance.

Background Our study area includes not only the city of Riverside but those county portions that stretch from tl-te L.A. County border on the west, to Ormge County on the south, to adjacent San Bernadho County on. the north, and forty miles east into Rjverside CounV(roughly, oour area is a fortymile-hy-forty-milt-,square). Hemmed by mountains on all sides (some rising above 10,I)CIO feet), the enclosed valleys me studded with rocky outcrops and edged by bmkm badlands that carve them into smaller sett l a e n t pockets of distinct natural character. The fact &at anyone could consider all of this part of the same urban region refleds the magnitude of development pressures spilling into Rverside from the coastall amas, Riverside's natural environment (hatter in summer, colder in whter, drier year round, and without access to the sea) was less hospitable than Santa Barbards to people who lived without extensive public water

works and interstate freeways. At th time of European arrival, what is now Rverside County bad a population of 4,C)Of)-5,000 Cahuilla people (Stanlon, f 98%). 7'heSpaniards and Mexicrans made few land grants, m d settlement remained sparse under their rule, Interest in the area was sparked mly durir-tg the railroad era of the late nineteenth century. The city of Riverside w s established in 1870 by educated abolitionists, mostly from Iowa and Michigan (Patterson, 1971), with other hvestment groupdbuying land tracts nearby. "These piomers introduced irrigation systems and the orange groves that were later to cover large expanses" Early city leaders did take an interest in formal plmning, hiring Chclrles H. Clheney (following his work in Santa Barbara) in 1927 to create a master plan fnr a graceful city of broad, tree-lined avemes and a high level of amenities (Patterson, 1971: 294). Along with much of Southern California, the fiverside area grew steadjly, though by 1,950 it was still largely agricultural. In trhat year,lcss than 50,000 people lived in the city of Riverside, and Corona was the only other town with mcrw than 10,000 (and just barely). It was m t until the late 1920s and especially the 1980s that the larger Riverside area ""tok off" as past of the thrust of LA. expansion. Developers constructed large tracts of inexpensive homes, a pattern still ewident years later. The median sale price of a RiversidelSan Bernadino house in 1989 was $129,920, compared with $222,842 h Los .Angeles and $253,034 h Ormge County (Kristof, 1989). Although the stereotype has been that fiverside growth comes from LJ.i?r. people "moving out'9o fjnd affordable housing, a f 989 poll by the Riverside Press E~lteryrisefound that 68 pescmt of those surveyed were either longer-time ~ s i d e n t s(31 percent), had moved from other areas of the state (16 percent), or were from out of state (21 perce~~t) (Stantm, 1989a). If there was a large ""silllloer" from the urbanjzed counties, it was probahiy not people moving out to f i e r s i d e but mostly a displacemelrt of people that may havc otherwise moved to Los h g e l e s or Orange counties, All of western Riverside County experienced gmwth pressure, but the effeds on each jzzrisdiction were somewhat different-as were the reactions of each. The county government, the jurisdiction that could reasonably give the great growth spurt m overall d i ~ c t i o nand control, was not @merally activist, evcn by the standards of the earlier 1970s period. Most noticeably, thlere was little effortl or even awarcnesr; that it might be a wcrrthy goal, to coordinate planning eft'crrts with adjacent San Bernadino County, with whieh Riverside County shares important transportation corridors as well as common problems of rapid growth and air quality deterioration. C)ur interviews with local planners in both counties, people who by profession are usually highly committed to regional perspectives, revealed that even they thought about the two cwnties separately,

Teenagers i1.1down tow12Rr'uerside

which implie"that the cities of the rcgim were left to lead efforts to control devebpwnt. The dty of Riverside is the largest: and most influetztial &an center of the Idand Empire, with a 1990 population approaching one-ytlarter million people. Its original citrus industry still wisualZy dominates much of the landscape. Over the years, Riversidess bstered a reputation for a certain level of sophistication and ur't7anim especially compared with adjacent rough-and-tumble Sm Bernadino just across the county line, which housed more of the railroad workers and other working-class people, The county of :Riverside was created in part to break the city of Riverside away from San Bernadino (Stanton, 1989b).The city of Everside became the home of the county government, and FTiversiders continue to develop and support cultural msources, includillg an orchestra and a museum. The city led efforts to turn an agricultural research station into the University of Cdifornia, Rverside. Thc earnpus is an impeks for lwal growth and a focal point for regionwide cultural activity. Ringed by shopping malls both within its own boundaries and in adjacent jurisdictions, the downtowiz languished far several decades. Its grand old hotel, the Mission I m (site of the Nixm hmeymom, as well as cJf other historic events) stcrcrd forlorn and deserted in the city center during ou,r &udy period, despite large infusions of capitd to rclvive it as a downtown cdtural anchor. The city abounds in buildings of aschitectural interest, including pleasant ~sidentiafdistricts of classic California bungalows and mission-style buildbgs. Corona (population 76,095; fifteen dies southwest of Riverside on Highway 91) was founded in 1886by its own core OE speculators and citrus farmers in rivalfy with the city of Riverside. It took about 1100 years for the grmd vision to begin to bear fmit.. Adjacent to regional freeways, Corona was a fast growing boomtown of co uter-oriented reside11l;ial tract development by the late 1980s; by 11987 it had surpassed the city of :Riverside in the amount of amual commercial space approved for development. Towarcf the end of our study period, it was m o n g t-he state's fastest growing cities, providing moderate- and low-cost homes and modern retail settirrgs for a vast new population. By other lights, it is an ecoiogiealiy wastefial pmtotype of msidentiat and retail sprawt with no cohmnt culi-urd center, strcet life, or employment base. Hemet (popuktion 36,094; thirty-three miles southeast of Riverside and thirteen miles fmm the nearest freeway) is a retirc.mt.nt center and has grown steadily but slowly since the 1960s. It is also something of a satellite agricultural center, but it was dwarfed in the 1980s by the booming towns around it. I_.,akeElsinore (population 118,285; :ifteen miles snuth of Corona) swvived for many years as a predominately work@-class resort town by

exploiting its natural reservoir. Tn the early 1900s a train line brought vacationers from Los Angeles to this "clean air" "desert community The lake brhging in jet skiers that gives the town its name rernaiins m attractio~~, and ski boats. h 1988 the state completed the final link connecting the city into the LA. freeway system,A putthg Lake E I s h m within commute range (by regional standards) not only of Los Angeles but of Orange County and.San Diego as well (fifty miles to the south). By the end of 3989, some 25,0011 units of new housing were approved but not yet built wilbin the city limits, potentially adding m estimated 75,000 to t%le 1989 population of 15,000, The k p m d i n g residential,boom promised to transform Lake Elsinore into another suburban bedroom communiv. Norco (population 23,302; just north of Corona) w s established in the 1%0s as a bedroom suburb for horse enthusiasts. Cansistent half-acre, lawdensiv zoning includes r i m trails that comeet all houses; there are no curhs or s t ~ elights. t The town has little land left for dwelopment within the city limits, but Norco officjals had scant interest in amexing new territorks (they even gave up a little land to Corona in one case). Ch-t tfie other hand, the city actively joined the comercial development g m e , promoting the Norca Auto Mdl, with other potential projects in the wings. Perris (population 21,460; seventeen miles southeast of Rkerside) was knocvn as the rclgion's "welfare town,'%mo~~g all the places in our shady amas, it has the lowest median income and hig.hest proportion of people receiving government assistance. Several recreational vehicle factories provide some jobs, as does nearby March Air Farce Base. In the 1 9 8 0 ~ ~ residential growth began to take off, with the construction of lower-cost housing within the city limits. The town has tried to encourage co ciallindustrial developme~~t as well, Sun City (populal-im 14,930; about five miles south of Perris) is a prototypic retirement community. Built by developer Del Webb after his hugely successful retirement Mecca of the same name in Arizona, u ~ ~ h corporated. Sun City has a limited degree of self-governance through a county-approved Community Service Area (CSA) status. This allows the collection and use of fees for some services, Moreno Valley (five miles east of Riverside on Highway 215) grew "overnight" from a popdation of 8,WO in 4980 to a c i v of almost IZC),OO all over th.e state..Initial ten years later-hawing boomtown recog~~ition growth was driven by huge residential developments approved by the county-some at extra high density under a county pmgram to encourage "'afEordable" b u s h g . M e r two ~ n s ~ c c e s stries, h l citizens' groups led the successful effort to incorporate the city of Moreno Valley h 19M-in part as a first step toward gaining some cmtrol over the rate oE rclsidential cmstrwction. Consjsting of adjacent subdjvisions, &ere is no visual, cultural, or business center to this city, nor any apparent physical relationship to the adjacent strips of commercial development.

Once hcorpmated, the town tried to improve a fiscal situation made desperate by so mmy tracts of modestly priced suburban houses. It battles for more commercid devclopnte~~t, prjmarily to ga.in sales tax revenues (cities get a piece of the action in Californja; the rest goes to the state). Its major shopping complex W& into head-to-head competition witb another regional mall pl ed literally next door in the city of Riverside. As was common in the Inland Empire, two local econorrric development agmcks are pitted against each other in seeking tmants and offering deals. Temecztlta (papulatio~~ 27,099; n h e t e e ~miles ~ south of Lake Elshore) is in the southemost part of our study area. Althougtn incorporated only in 1989, it kad some coherent idmtity prior to this time because it was originally a master-planned community rather than just a collection of subdivisions. The project was taken over as "Rancho Caliifornia" by Kaiser Aluminum, which later sold the remai~~ing vacant acreage to another large developer. Although thc nnaster plan includes a rat-bcr baXanced mix of residential and comelrcial develspment, infrastructure and services am woefully i n a d e ~ a t eUnder . county buildirrg standards, the road system was only built to meet rural standards, resulthg in intense traffic congestion once the population grew in the 1980s. During our study period, the cities in the Riverside area varied from one another in m n y regards and encapsulated a number of development conditions found among growing localities throughout California, Only fie city of I(iversiete had anythifig approachfng a study p1 tradition..Across the xgion, at least c o q a r e d to Santa Barbara and Smta Monj.ca, government intervention-when it did, take plac+occurred in the context of developer pressure and in fie absence oE sustained citizen mobilization..Nevertheless, local governments throughout this area did create some furm of growth control in virtually eveq jurisdktiosl.

Growth Controls: Riverside Area The Rversiclte area controls were srtfficiclmtly numerous and well-known to ""countf% the listhgs that hearten environmentalists and dismay developers. Rather than imposhg aggregate growth caps, the most notorious (or appreciated) restrictions in the Riverside ama generaily protected special sllbareas and specific mtwal rclsnurces, alCfiough there were exceptions like the tight f d m o horse zoning and the Sun City build-out. In 1979, voters in fie city of fCiversiete created an agricultural zme to preserve citrus groves within the city; the graves were hcreashgly app ~ c i a t e dnot only as '"open space" but for the nostdgie beauty they lent the palm-lined drives through which they were rouf;inelyviewed by residents. Housing in the citrus belt was held to one house per five acres (Proposition R)-a ratio that precludes tract-style houstng but would not

qualifii as '%agricultural" at all. in some localities. The measure also decreased the density allowed in hirlside developments. In 1987 voters C), makhg it more. difficult for a city tightened the rclstrietinn (Mea.s~l,re council to dilute the earlier downzoning, and blocking a blue-ribbon gmupfumcommendation to facilitate cluster development in the citrus zone, Sometimes favored by ernvjromntalists because it encourages open space, cluster housing allows developers to corrrbine allowable units over a l q e r tract into a sillgle dense complex; it would have created, in efiEect, higher overall densities by lowering development costs and by allowing land difficult to develop to "count" as acreage. In this case, environment&ists w ould not accept the trade-offs. An earlier precedent for citrus protectim was the city of Corona's 1977 downzoning of 5,000 acrcs of citrus trees to preserve agricultural use. The ""horsey town" of Norco fallowed Everside in downzoning hillsides, reqrairing a full acre oE land for every home site (Nctrcds hunding half-acre minimum in tthe rest of town could. be thuught of as itself a strong form of growth cmtrol). fn h e southwestern part of h e county e m i r m e n talists raised funds to esta:blish the Santa Rosa I'1a.t.e~grasslands as a nature preserve. Swers were also a limi_tingfactor. Beg ing in 1982, the city of Riverside, though exempting annexations and redevelopment projects, restricted the number of new waste water hookups. h Esponse to inadequate sewer and flood control capacity, Cnrona enacted a building moratorium in 1976, limiting ~sidential permits to 450 per year. 'This was extended thmugh 1977 when the city, while successfully tapping into regirmal sewer lines, adopted a point system for new projects to encourage more e&cier.ntland-use patterns. M e n voters in the city of Riverside strengthened Proposition R in 1987, they also forbade annexing any more lands unless adeyuate infrwtructurc was available (failed growth management measures for the county and for FJIoreno Valley had hcluded similar: provisions). A general initiative did pass in the city of Hemet, ~ q u i r i n ladequate ; infrastmcbre before devdopment approval, Other cities have council-approved ordinances requiring advance adequate infrastructure, particularly for commercial and industrial developments. In Corona, mfnimum lot sizes were nearly doubled (to 7,200 square feet) by popular vote in l986 because of the same h ~ d ofs infrastructure concerns, Although not ordinarily considewd an aspect of grflwth control, and indeed more usually motivakd by Ihe opposite goal (see Moch, 19%), a number of city incorporations had environmental concern as a background motivation*Thus, h e impetus for incorpcrratra Moreno ViltlIey was to ensure mare stsinge~ztreview of development stmdards. Temecd a incorporated for similar reasons.

Among the most important development constrahts in the region was one that came not fmm local policy but from a kderal mandate implemented by the U.S. Fish and Game Departme~zt.The listing of the Stevcn's Kmgamo :Rat as an endantgered species put the brakes on a number of projeds-hchding those proposed by local gave ents. Other federal agezzcies were involved in the protectio~zof wetlands-the dried up gullies of the desert are also part of the waters of the United States. The most ambitious effort to deal with all these problems, and more, was the countywide growth cmtrol initiative that went down to defeat at the polls in 1.988.As is usual with such endeavors, the envir wew badly outspent, and deleat was urged by virtudly every mediia outlet in the county But the fact that 41) percent of the voters supported such a masure was motivation enough for c w n v officials to try to "do something" about rapid growth. At the combined request of the local building industry asscxjation and the Sierra Club, a growth mnagement element was developed for Riverside County" comprehensive plan. The f i n d document ccrntained a range of policies concerning growth (inchxding some preservation measures), though it did not define how much grow& should be allowed inthe end or how quickly that growth should happen, delineating irrstead w h e growth ~ should occur.7 The documcmt made the news as actim on growth control and joins the inventories of lists of government measures taken to deal with development problems.

Erorvth Controts in Place: A Summary Our review of enacted policies across the jurisdictions in our study areas incticates trhat communities took a wide variety o( farmaX actions, which together appear as a more or less continuws s t r e m of efiorts to intervene in the development process during &is time period. There are differe type of controls, Rverences between localities, both in the d e g ~ and side arca jurisdictions emphasized the preservation of certain zones and used utility bookup mstrictions to deal with infrastructure shortages but mostly desisted from settjng total holdhg capacities or limiting rates of growth. The city of Santa Barhara had a long-standing cap on residential build-out, with a more recent limit on co ercial development. Santa Monica relied morc heavily on project-by-projed regddion as a means of contrui. The abundance of growth contP.ol techniques in place poses the powibiiity that overall development was stymied across our study area, the problem to which we now turn. Let" look at the numbers.

4, For mare analysis of which localities tend I-0 adopt growth controls, see Dt~walf,1980; Glickfeld, Graymer, and Mc)rrison, 398%and Donovan and Nieman,

1992, Although these findings were important to us in choosing our sites, we cmtrol" regrew increasingly concerned that their dependent variable "gr~>wth lied too heavily on formal governmnt statements and rules rather than substantive implementation (see also tojgan and Zhou, 1990). 2. Fctr alternative discussions of this distinction see Gottdiener (1983). 3, Atthough the extent of commuting, especially from Xower-housing-cost north county locations, increased during our study period, the significant Qistance of the city from adjoining urban areas gives it a level of autonomy (in regard, for example, to traffic planning and air quality maintenance) not fc>undat our other sites. Median 19% commute time was sixteen minutes for city of Santa Bahara residents (I2.S.Census, 1994). 4. "i draw a California contrast, Beskeley has also had strict environmental policies, but the surrc>unding territories have not; pro-growth regimes have Largely cmtrolled the Alameda County government. 5. Rcjbert Myers, the legal aid lawyer that represented the plaintiffs, was later appointed city attormy* 6. Via Interstate 2 5 to the San Bernadinv Freeway. 7 . Orange County" experience in the Late 4980s ran parallel to Riverside County". In Orange County's case, a county-wide growth control ordinance (with real teeth), fat~oredby a wide majority according to preelection surveys, was defeated after development interests put together a $2.5 million campaign against the ordinance; grcjwth controllers supporting the ordinance spent $106,000. Nevertheless, developers led by the Irvine Ranch Company were frightened into generating certain mitigations, incXuding means to finance road cmstrudim and initiatives for a program of open-space presrvation to accompany future development (Pincetl, fodhcoming).

Has Growth Been Stopped? Not Much

l[i, assess

the inrpact of controls that our iTtformants identified as most important in limitint; development, we gathered building and grcrwth data, from eleven jurisdictions in our study m a s . In this chapter, we fist show general trends for commrcial dcvelopmmt, retail sales, and residential cmstruction in our study areas. Then, focusing specifically on rclsidential construction, we test statistically whether or not: grocvth controIs did, in fact, impact housing construction. First Findings: Rates aE Grawth

In a nutshell, we found scant evidence that controls had much of m effect, particdarly on Ihc supfly of new housing-the kind ol construction most controls had been aimed at curtailing. First we will look at commercial growth rates, including retail sales, m d then turn to housing.

Even though most growth controls focus specifically on residential development, they are often portrayed as posing a general threat to the local e c o n o q Increased ~ g u l a t i o nis said to create m "anti-business" climate Chat sliRes grokvth. More spceificalIyI increased housistg cosls, allegedly caused by new regulalions, make it harder to attract workers to the area and to get them to stay* Commercial develoipment trends in these growth-managed commw~ities did not conform with these representations. Instead, commercial buildix~gin each area increased dramatically over the twenty-year period. Camparing local trends with state asld national patterns (Figure

FIGURE 3.1 Commercial Development Trends, 1970-4990

*Santa Barbara Stzrdy Area Calilornla (~10,000,000)

Ritrersidc Study Area (XI 0,000)

SC7l;RCFS: C~nstmctionT n d ~ ~ sResearch tq Board, 1971-1990; Rverside Co~xnty,19Ti"a-1989; Santa Barbara Counv, 1970-1985); U.S, Department: of Commerce, 1970-1989.

XI),we see that lcxal iwestment, rather than responding to local growth controls, followed the broader economir dynamic. In 1,990, the value of ncw comercial development for the nation as a whole was 253 percent higher than the value of new development h 197&much of this due to sheer idation.1 Commercial developmat in the Santa Rarbara, Santa Mo~zica,and Riverside areas rose significantly more than this over the period, though. local development activity is mom volatile from year to year. Some places far outpaced even the robust four-fold statewide increase in commercial development valuations during the two decades; for example, Santa Monj.ca commercial development valuations grew 1,WO percctnt, and Riverside study area g r w t h was close to double that. Commercial development was more moderate in the Santa B a h r a study arca, hut vaiuations still inercased a strong 341 percent in the same pe"icd-dy somev\rhat less tban t-he state overall increase and greater than the corntry's (see Appendix C, Cornnercial Valuation Data). Expanding municipalities and the prdiferation of "greenfield'" development in unincorporated suburban tracts drove the fast-paced growth in the Riverside study area, Overall, these areas, each with growth cmtrols of some sort, kept up with, and even exceeded, b a d e r trends; in particular, the Everside and Santa Monica study areas (two very Merent business climates) did extraordin,arj,lywell.

TABLE 3.1 Percent Increase in Retail Sales, llli3"i7-11989

Percent of Incrmse City of Santa Bahara City of Santa Moniela

320

City of Riverside State of Califc~rnja sou~czi:California Departineat of Rmenue.

325 31'7

3f;8

Growth in Refail Sales Retail bushess, mother measure of economic vitality, alsa thrived aver the period. In the t h e e largest cities h our study arcas, retail sales (indexed by sales tax rt.vmue) equaled or surpassed the stakwide level, as indicated by Table 3.1, which shows the percel~tincrease in per capita retail sales over the 1971-1989 period: Growth rates in these central cities are especialty impmsive cmsidering that traditional urban centers t-hroughout-tlnc state and nation were losing retail activit.y to mgimal m l l s and suburban business strips. The vitality of the retail sector in the study sites would be even more strikjng had we been able to gather sates data for unincorporated areas, whm most of the commercial growth almost certahly took place; buildrng permit data shoMied that these unincorporated areas had the most new c m merciail cmslructio~~, but we were un;rble to break out retail sales for unincorporated communities because of the way the state collects this data, Growth in Residential Developfnent Significant numbers of new residences were also built aver the two decades, Between 1970 and 1998,17,298 housing u11ii-s were approved in. the Santa Barbara study area (adding 37 percent to the existing housiPlg stock); 11,293 in Smta Monica (a 27 percent rise); and a l m s t 3KC1,01)0 in the Riverside study area (a 151 percent gain). Although there are significant differences inbuilding activiw across our area, the overall ebb m d ROW OE rclsidmtial building usually fdbwed the broader state trend. Figure 3.2 compares residential construction in the study areas with the statewide and national pattern (see Appendix D for detailed residential buiZding rates for al:I thc. study sites). In the early phase, around 1971, house brtiXding rates in all our study areas clustered cioselp with the state's overall rate but then fell off in Santa Monira and Smta Barbara, while rising well above the state in the Everside study area. The fast m d erratically growing Riverside study area is the deviant case in this =gad, greatly outstripping state levels, especialily h the 19t30s.

FIGURE 3.2 Residential Building Rates, 49m-1990

- Santa Barbara Study Area

+

Santa Mtmca

+

kverslde Study Area

19m-1989; Santa Darbara Counq, 197&1989; and U.S. Deparbnent.of Commerce, 1970-1989,

SCIG'RCFS:Riverside Corrnty,

The major drops in all areas came with the 197'4 recession, brief in the fiverside residmtial building case, but more persistent in the other two areas (and in the state overall). The mid-1WOs was also a period of tightening controls in Santa. Barbara, suggesting that growth regulation slowed ~sidentialbuilding. But in Santa Monica this major drop in ~ s i dentiaf cmstruction occurred before growth control (or rent cmtrol) became m element of local policy The overall pattern is thus ambiguous, at least if we use the kind of crude scan that Figure 3.2 allows. We are thus left with Chc overdl observation €%atstate and national tren& are important factors but that local growth controls might have had some effects. Below, we discuss more refined techniyues we used to measure precisely the ixnpacts of growth cmtrof as compared to the gencrd trends. Althou@ growth was robust both in terms of commercial and residential growth in all our s b d y areas, we notice that residential building rates arc much higher in the Riverside area, though the rate of comerciaf development in this area (whether in terms of retail sales or commercial building) does not stmd out from the ather study sites. Compared to the other study areas, Riverside" ddevelicrpment has been skewed sharply toward residential construction, despjte local efforts to bolster the city's

and county" fiscal and employment base, and despite the residential focus of most growth control in this artra. Testing the Power of Growth Kestnrictions

'The growth in retail, sales, commercial construction, m d residential development does not demonstrate that growth controls have no bearing on rates of development. Such a demonstration requires more p r i s e methods. Past studies, trying to p h p o b t growth control impacts on such characteristics as population growth, rates of constmction, and the cost of housing (or some combi~~aticm of these) yield mixt.d results. Early studies tended to shnw that there were indeed ifngacts, findings quite opposite to the more recent m l y s e s that fail to detect much by way of consequence-2 Reasons for the inconsi.stencies are the varying methods and difierent levels of precision used by researchers. An old standby method if; to focus on a single locality, or a group of localities, and observe that growth deelined ""after" new conkols were enacted."~vcn when presented in a somewhat refined manner, these longitudinal studies run the ubvious risk of attributing changes to growth control that may have occurred across various loea(ities-inclding those without controls. Econarnies do go down as well as up, and all ships may define together on the common sea. Cross-sectional studies, which compare places with and without growth control at a single time point, may attribute effects to growth control that are due to some other unmeasured characteristic shared by places that have adopted grokvth contrds-for exaxnple, their regional geographic location,
national study considered five distimt sorts of growth control, Still, it is the precise content of policies and implementation pmcedures that determine whet-her or not places "reallyf' have growth coakols. For exarnple, s m e of Logm and Zhou" gmwth control policies (such as requiring env i r o m n t a l impact =ports) are mandatory in some states but are locally ellforced in ways that vary widely. Sorne localities merely "go along"" with formal procedural requirements (and thus have all the right rules on their books), whereas others comply enthusiastically with the intent of state regulation. The distinction mems a great deal both for developers m d environmentalists. m e r =searchers have scaled the degree of p w t h conbol based on survey rclspmses that report the nzlmber of ~strictivepolicies that have been adopted (Baldassare and Protash, 1.982; Glickfeld and Levine, 1990; Neimm, 1990). Such ""cunts'kf controls do not solve the prcrblem of implemetntation differences. Passing nunerous measttres does not ensure their intensity or effectiveness. City councils c m enact lists of measures with a single vote, simply inccnporating items borrowed from another area"s (jenerd plan or frols a e o ~ n s u l ~ tonff-fie-shelf 's inveintory In these casa, the pm1,iferatim of new policies may be morc symbolic than substantive. b r example, boomtown Corona would seem to have a highrr level of growth co~ntmlthan the city oE Santa Barbara, judghrg strictly drom a tally of growth restrictions based on city officiaI.s"responses to a California kague of Cities surwy (reported in Glickleld and Levkte, 1990). 'This finding contradicts not only our field observations but the ju,dl;m,ent of virhally any infomed observer from either side of the growth dhate. An Alternative Testing Strategy

Miherttas other studies supplemclmt vantitative anaiysis with mme descriptive case ma.t.eria,l(see t,ogan and Zhou, 1,990;Neiman, 1,991)),we reversed priorities and used. our knowledge of the local contexts to pick the pokies we would take as the most important growth measms. &&er than treati~nggrowth conh.ol as a policy that can he read off frnm a questiomaire or comty plan-as a uniform or clearly scaled phenomenonour strategy was tcr use the field interviews (combi~~ed with plans and to rjnd out indega~deintvariabk. By interviewing other legal doeunte~nts) a diverse set of local in.fommts we were able to use agreement from political opposites as a signal of meaninghl gmwth controls. AlPhough the ffeem measures wc ide~ntifiedscemed to vary in comprehensiveness, techniyue, and rigor, we made the assumption that those most involved in the local scene would have the best seme of which regrrlations mattered. Having gelnerated our "bindependent variable'' i,n this way, we entered these diverse regulations into an apprclpriate model (cross-sectional time

series) to discern the local impacts of specific measures on residential buildirtg activity. We developed a techiyue to separate growth cmtml impacts from thc cvhole range of other local variati.uns in development activity caused by social, economic, historical, geographic, and cultural differences. We also accounted statisticdly for statevvide changes in building activiv in order to separate out the affects of broad shifts in the business cycle or macrueconodc factors such as interest rate fluctuation (see Appendix A for details and cornplete resrtlts)." Contrary to the idea that new development reglllations had stifled rcsidential building, we h m d that in all but two hstances-both of which took place in the early 1970s in the Santa Barbara study ama-growth controls did nothing to slow residential growth. Commercial development was dso quite rubust, thollgb we did not perform coqarable statistical testing. It appears from our combirred findings (and t h e of others)-and this is a consermtive way to put it-that fat more comercial growth occurred. under growth control than local controversies suggested, OUTnext task is to try to learn why so much developmmt took place in the face of so many rcgulatims presunted to curtail it-a topic to which we now turn*

Motes 1. Expressed in terms of the value of permitted constructic>n.Data collection was facilitated by the gwernment publications staff of the UCSB library and through the cooperation of the Construction Industry Research Board. 2. For early studies, see Dowall and Landis, 4982; I(a;tz and Rosen, 4980; Urban Idandinstitute and Gruen, Gruen, and Assodates, 1977; see Fiischel(199Q)for a review of the literature on price effects. 3. See, for example, Frech and Lafferty, 19%; Urban Land Institute and Gruen, Gruen, and Assaciates, 497; Mercer and Morgan, 1982, 4. For examples of cross-sectional studies, see Bowall and Landis 1982; Elliot, 1983; Katz and Rasen 1980,19817; Wolch and Gabriet, 1983). 5. We used dummy variables to capture these broader sources of variation, as described in Appendix A.

Power to Build: How Cities Grow Under Growth Control

Growth control is apparently not afi its cracked up to be, eitber by critics or supporters; formal policies have not pulled up the drawbridge, A. generation of political science studies have taught that succcsshl implementation of any sort of public policy can not be taken for granted.1 Since land development is such a highly contested and complex operation with, well-organized spmsors, regulatory outcomes am especially uncertain, Drawing upon various literatures on power, policy, and organizations, we offer four explan&ions for why prescribed growth limits might not take huld.. We then pmvide more sgecif c examples horn ollr case studies, indicating how lmd-use ~ g i m e can s function, rasing one broad mechanism or mather* 3. Symbolic Politics. Growth control may be another arena in

which policy makers, u ~ ~ dcor~stituents' er demand to "do something," create formal rules and a lot of talk about regulation, but without reat enou$ teeth to have material consequmce (Edetman, l9M; see also Rubin, 1989). 2. Episodic Intervention. A policy may be applied only sporadically; with land dewelopment pafticularl~~ new poiicies must be consistently applied to produce inte~ldedresults. The physical construction that may happen during "opedhrmoents can hardly be repealed to ~ s t o r cprior . landscapes. :lf developers slip through periodic windokvs of opportu"ity controls only skft the distribution of approvals aver time but do not reduce overall grtrwth (see Janzcyk and Constance, 3980). Some rules are designed to be short term, often in resporlse to some immedjde crisis or shortage. O t k r s turn w t to be temporary because of shifts in potitical control or administrative practice." 59

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3, Cotlntervailing Policies, Cosnplex organizations, whether private or government units, have contradictory htemal tendencies; some theorists conceive orgmizations as anarchies, with a "garbage can" of goals and strategies (March and Olsen 1976: 175; Scott 1981: 270-275). Cities may be restraining developmetnt with some policies (picked up as growth controls by analysts, developers, and envimnmentalists) and simultaneously encouraging it with others (not on the analysts9istsf not complained about by developers, although possibly a grievance ammg environmentalists). 4. hitiatives of the f\tegulated..We know from past cases of regulation (Huntington 1952; towi, 1969; McComell, 1966) that the regulated have been able to function well and.have even succeeded in turning their rqulators into advocates for their industry (e.g., farm programs, the TVA, and meat inspection). As in these other realms, regulated dcvelupers are nut passive in the face of k c d growth cox~kol.Developers may take advmtage of unforeseen slack, loopholes, or opprhnities in the rules in order to get around them, Certainly, cr~ativeresistance and agency, which scholars now recopize ammg marginalized groups, are well with& the repertoire of those accustomed to power.

We now draw on our case materids to show how these possibilities work out in practice.

Growth Through Symbolic Growth Control Political leadcrs often make general stateznents favoring some form of either "control" or ""management""of growth, even when their policies favor virtuaily t?ll develnpment initiatives. "'Taking actionf"y adding a '"growth control element'9o a locality" ggcneral plan opens a whole episode of study reports, public hearings, and discussim. But, in the United States, generd plans are not binding in the hsence of implemmtation measures, such as zoning (Popper, 1981; Rose, 1979: 53). In the 5mta Barbara County case (but not the city's), growth manqement implementation lagged efevm years behind the adoption of gmw& management planning goals. The county" ""plan" for growth managemnt gave the impression of a control regime, but trYithout implementation procedures it was largely symbolic. Plms o k n list community growth management ""visions" as a substitute for strictures. A Santa Barbara County planner noted that transiating gmeral "'shouldsf"o specjfic "shallsf%was a large part of a revision of that county's general plan,Vut switching verb f o r m is not always enough.

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For example, rather than litnitkg growth or gmwlh rates, the Riverside County Growth Managemat Element did little except use a tough v&: 'The Cotxnty Adminidrator si"lrrll inventory and quantify current and anticipated socriat and economic needs in the County for 20 and.5 year periods. The Goad of Supervisors, with appropriate public. input shall be oriented to meet those needs" "iverside County Planning Department ing standards are set, they may still be inccmsequential. The Santa Barbara Cou~ztygelzeral plm update of 1980 was concrete enou* to define specific thresholds of adverx traffic impacts that would be used to deny projects. But the county supervisors approved offendir?g projects anyway citing "overriding considemtions" of jobs or housing+i+.cr one or the other is avaiIable In virtually all focalities, given chrcmic shortages. Approwing more jobs-prodLtci11g projects then leads to a fioushg shortage; getting h e a d on housing would (and does) lead to claims that more job-rich projects are needed to provide local emplftymmt to residents (the need f o f ""jabs-housirrg balance"). Even the establishment of what appear to be "hard" population lixnits can turn out to he essentially symbolic. The city of Corona (inRiverside County) set a yearly limit of 450 housing units, a figclre that exceeded the annual abrerage over the previous five years of rapid growth. Corona exempted annexed land. from its increased lot-size reqrrirements, providing still another growth avenue. The city of &erside's sewer limits also excluded annexed land, thus allowhg an annual average of 2,309 new units to be approved instead of the 1,208-.4,500 hookups per year under the rules. Santa Monica lowered its zoning (h1988) to permit no mare than 70 million squarc feet oi rrew commercial development, but that was still,the equivalent of about fifty rczgiclmal hopping malls and an amount tcn-fold Almost 6 millicrn square its previous 1984 build-out planning prctjectio~~. feet had been approved by 1983, far surpassing prior expectations, but still not coming near the development cap. The boom led to later moratoria, which stiH excrnpted many projects. In Smta Barbaafs case, the commercial build-out cap was low but did not restrain build-out in the near term. Durhg this early phase, growth control was not really controlling; if later city councils were to relax the holdhg capacity to let development have another run, no real c m t d wwld. occur over the longer term. Some of the new rules that appear to hinder growth in fact pave its way. For exmple, there can be measurcs that d o w development onl,y when fees are established to offset specific project costs. Such policies, as well as the fees that follotv; may be loudly conde ed as h~terferencein k e markets. But land development always presupposes government intervention (for infsastmcture and basic services); when tax revenues are

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inadequate for the purpose, special fees and exactions facilitate rather &an hinder growth (see Bauman and Ethier, 1985 Nelson, 1986; Snycler and Steg~aan,1988). Responding to environmental groups' complaints of "unregulated, growth," "developers may also welcome such growthfie market is strong and when stanenabling regulation, especially dardized kes allow sci&ively simple development review (Deaki.n, 19%; Alterman, 1.988). As a prominent Riverside land-use and development lawyer said, ""Developers may not like (impact fees), but they know they are rational. mey figure in a boom, why argue"?" It is no surprise that these measures, sometimes castigated naively as ""socialistic" ar '"confiscatim," are unlikely to fnhibit growth.

Growth Through Episodic Growth Control Even a short lapse in growth cro~~trol alllows developers not only to satisfy pent-up demand but to build in anticipation of future regulation, Limits based cm shortfalls irr utility- capacities are one type of control that tends to be temporary. AltboLtgh eantrol dvocates may hope the infrastructure shortages will never be redressed, they ofim are. Water policy in the Santa Barbara South Coast area seemed a deliberate use of i x l f r a t r u c e regddion to erea.t.elong-term gcokvth crmtrols. Smta Barbara was the only county in the state whose voters had rejected. the state water option (in 197(3),in part because of thr perceived negative enviromental effects for northern California, h part for 'ear of how new water sources would stimulate local growth. Local growth interests, incflading a forceful local daily newspaper, had backed the measure strongly But in 1991, after five years of drought, with brown l w n s and short showers, citizens in a h o s t every local water district voted to join the state water prclject (md, in a number of cases, to participate irr desalination). The area" water districts developed vast amounts of co~~trizcted supplyfelimhating any envim entalist litigation against projects based. on their potential for draining this local resource. Thus, one of the fw growth eontrol measures we hund to have had a maszxsable ixnpact on housing production (the water moratorlium in the Santa Barbara suburb of Goleta) turned out to be temporary, albeit t w n t y years h duration. Even in a strong vccsion and in an envjronmentaist locale, resourcebased growth constrahts do not necessarily endure, h the more pro-growth fiverside area, the city of Corona abandoned residential eanstruction limits whe11 it became passfile to hoak h t o a regional. sewer line. In part because of the absence of infrastructure constraktt;, the s m e city dropped its citrus grove protection pmgram eleven years after enactmemt, allowir\g developers to construct 12,500 houses on the desigated land, a 66 percent boost in the city" total housing stock,

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Another way growth continues afier it has been "stopped" is through the ""vesthg" of rights to build projects that are "hprocess." Liberal interpretati.on of vcsting extends weak regulation into the periods covercd by tighter cmtrds. Wth a 1988 Santa Fvlonica commercial downzoning, developers were given ten days to complete applications under the old rules, creating a standing inventory of vested development rights. Goleta's gmwth management ordinance and the city of Santa Barbara" 11989 commercial growth ordinance limited vesting to those commercial projects already under review (but not yet approved)."Developers mticipai-e changes in regulation md tq- to '"et vested" before a new regim takes over. Local lore had it that Santa Monica cmtractors were pourhg foundations by lamplight (to meet the local vesting criterion) on the eve of the 1981 election that would bring an environmentalist slate into power.6 Ancrther way sf extending we& cmtmls forward into future regkes is through development agreements-a mechanism created by the California legislature in 1979 that allowed locdities to specify conditions for particular prr,jects, specificatims that could remain in force for up to thirty yearst durjng which time the prftject could be built, remain on hold, or sold as a ""currency" to other entrepreneurs who wwld buy the agreement when they bought the vacant lmd (Porter and Marsh, 1989; I'hcetl, forthcoming). Once entered into, the agreements would bind Ihe jurisdjction to the deveIopefs plans (and the developer to the jurisdiction's conditions) s n matters such as allowable densities, fee stmctures, m d exactions. Projects were often set up to be built in stages over lo11g periods (a decade or more; state law all.ows as much as thirty years). The absence of the kind of expiration date that orifinarily accompanies a planning approval shelters developcrs from changing politirsaj winds (and evolving ecological knowledge of their projectsYmpacts), BuiIders in Riwerside County mshed to get under the wire in the months b e f m the countywide growth cmtrol initiative (defeated, as it turned out) and secured developmnt agreements for 100,000 future housing ranitse7 Under thjs same mechanism, Smta Monica approved an upscale 1.3milljon-square-foot staged oftice development becaux of t%re ncw exactions the city was able to negotiate (opposed by s o m activists as part of a continuing "devils bargain'" with developers).Another case was a progrowth Santa Barbara County Board of Super\ii,sorstapproval of a "timerelease" expansion plan for a Goleta research and development park that future slow-growth boards would be powerless to curtail. The nnagnihde of development "in the pipeline" thmugh clne mechanism or another was often vast, making the effects of m w growth controls a distmt prospect. The 100,0110 units approved by developer agreements in liiversi.de County werc? only a portion of some 150,000 housjng units that, in 1989, were pmding in the cities and ranillcorporated portions of

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western Riverside County-a number larger than the 102,000 houses existjng in all the cities of this study site in 1980, Likewise, the 2.5 millim square feet of retail space approved or under hvay in the city ol Corma would have doubled the existing stock.8 At the level of individuai projects, pmposals for a given parcel or provariatio~~s until the ject werc typically sulclmitted repeatedy in differe~~t circumstances, incfudjng the pof itical ones, allowed appmval. A proposed seaside hotel development west of Santa Barbara, beycrnd the county's designated &an limit Line, was twice h i e d under two separate ownerships but approved after the Hyatt Hotel Corporation entered the picture, beefh~gup mitigations and investw heavily in an unparalleled puhlic relations blitz. In tlbc case of another repeatedly rejected S m t , Bahasa area beachfront project, the Hyatt Corporation was tmsuccessful in its efforts to win approval (this time for a project clearly within the llrbanized area); instend, local developer-actor Fess Parker (of Davey Crockett fame) eventualXy mounted the successful campaign, Still another example from Smta Barbara was voters-ejection of a redevelopmelnt subsid,y to construct a downtown degartmeml store. The city council subsequently moved the project four blocks south and mote than doubled both the project's size and tl-te amount of the city's subsidy. They clahed the new site, which was redeveloiped to incll~~de two depart~aent stores and connecting shups, better accomplished the city" 'kevitalizat i d pwposes. The new location spared the locd bookstore, whose owners had put up Che majority of fttnding (abont: $26,000 out of their nondeep pockets) to defeat the first scenario.

Erorvth Through Cnuntervailing Policies Localities often limit growth in one realm but promote it in another. At the level of discourse, it is a difference between promothg growth (bad) and supparting ""economk vitality!" """redevelopment,"or 'kevitalization" (all good). Developers can gain special treatment by connecting their activities to the good-sounding phases and keeping distance from words that would imply they are doing something that might be '"growth inducing.'"anta Barbara pursued downtown ""rtvitalization'" usiw taxil~crementfinancing (a $31 million public snbs-idy), despite a study's findhgs that the city already had California" second most prosperous retailing center-a fact that the study's UCSB professor authors (an ecmomist and a sociologist) could barely get: into public discussim (Appelbaum and Shapiro, 1983).Using the same rcdevellrzpment funding source, the city itself paid, m behalf of the department stows, the hefty traffic fees that it ordinarily charges for downtown projects ($2,000 for every peak-hour trip generated), The city was promoting development by giving back with one hand what was exacted by the other.

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Playing a similar game, Santa Monica expedited project rcview for devebpments in its Third Street Redevelopment District (the Trcrmenade""), investing in streetscape improvements (paving, lamps, sculpture) and promoting new business with entrepreneurial zeal-id2 with great success, as it was to h;lm o u t e r n e~ s u lwas t a "lourishint;"' cltowntom cenl point and a national modcl ter Ihat was to become "a ~ g i o n adestination for downtown revitalization" (%hey m d Moore, 1996: B6). One reason for the high-level ecommic achievement of the city's ""anti-business" city council is perhaps that its left-intelligentsia leadersf tastes led thern to pmmote the kixrds of facilities (theaters, restaurants, markets, boutiques, gdieries) that woUld transform the city into an up-scaie shopping and entertahment- zo1Ie. It would not be the first time that- left-wing intelligentsia set consurrrption patterns h r those of different ideological leanings (the Bauhatxs school of modernism was a pmmhent case). Far mom than the tradjtional business leadership, this putatively mi-business group bad. the kind of cultural capital that woulld, iron.icall~r,yield the richest economic outccrme. This city of left activists saw its credit rmking rise, hecolning o11e of d y two Califomja citks to earn a Triple-A bond rating (Rainey and Moore, 1996: B6). A political asset of using the redevelopment mechanism in any California cityf but especially anti-growth cities, is its relative invisibility, Technically, decisions are made by a special authority (the ""rebevelopment agency"-often the city council wearing a difirent hat for the meetings). Its funds come from an earmarked p o r t j o ~of~the property tax that is set up to be out of reach for m y other type of expenditure. So it appears to the public to be spending found mcmey; local mediia simply report that- a give11 prctjwt or subsidy i s being accomplished "with redevelopment funds" or "by the redevelopment agency." The process obscures true casts and insulates against altemtiwe spending demmds (see Friedland, Piven, m d AlEord, 1978). Santa Barbara" severe tiightening on c m m r c i a l b d d i n g was accompanied by a program to dlow a transfer of development rights (7'UR) from parcels outside the docvntown core to the city center. Athough this innovation did, not fmmally increase the total amount of sq_uare footage that could be built, it could bave that effect, because it pcmits owners of less desirable commercial locatio~~s to trmsfer their allowed densities to prime sites. Marginal commrcial, structures that otherwise mjght be cieared or converted to other uses (e.g., recreation, religious, educational) might he "reborn" in another locale and expmdcd to thc limits of the law, thus increasing aggregate comerciai development. Even as we write, we c m report that the co e ~ i acap l policies are being fur&er liberalked through other thkerjngs Local gvvernmmts promote growth thrclugh their tourist and convention promotions, partly using hotel bed taxes-the toll that visitors pay

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as a sort of special sales tax on motel/hotel charges (ordmarily between 7 and 10 percmt). &in, by earnarking revenues for these purposes and (e.g., the local Chamber turning the money over to a private organizatio~~ of Commerce), growth subsidies are insulated. At a more subtle level, governments promote local business tbrough festivals, parades, and f h company shoots; these activities and expenditures arc r a ~ l yconsidered part of any local growth policy.

Growth Through Developer ZnifiaCives Mihen gmwth interests do run up against rules that Hock their path, they often litigate. .h group oE landowners denied hvater hookups under the Goleta moratorium sued the slow-growth water district; with the help of a newly elected pro-gmwth majority on the district board and after sixteen years of court wrmgling, the litigants gained a rich settlement. 'The district was obligated to provide water (even under the moratorium) or buy their lands at the witfi-water market value, an anamount that would have bat-tkrupted the district (Darton, 1989: AI). Litigation and the prospect of litigation can indeed work to slow down a slow-growth regime. A carpentersknion suit ~ a i ~Santa ~ s tMonicds artdsncial services fee (ultimately droppen) caused the city to negotiate its exactions project-by-prgect, rather &an through blanket fees, Similarly, instead. of risking court challenge, Santa Monica officids negotiated an office mitiga.t.ionfee for parks and housjng that developers "codd live with,"lQLegat worries can dso delay implementation for years as localities mind the procedural details, in the meanthe providing for various exceptions to policies on the books- Proposed zonkg crihanges in Santa Monj.ca were postponed for seven years while the city" ggrowlln management plan was being =worked to make it more '%ulletpr~of.~~ In still another legal strategy, growth interests wed the very tools dcsigned to restrain development in osder to help their projects. L d o w n e r s in the city of Everside challmged citrus-belt protections on the gromds that: thc city's general plan was inade9a.t.e. They cited such problems as its lack of dmsity standards for commercial development-a claim that contracficts their usuai ~ s i s t m c eto such regulation. Likewix, the local Realtor asscrciation s ~ ~ to e dblock the l989 Smta Barbara cmmercial cap on the groul-tds that the city had not conducted. adequate envim review. Litigaticm drains the p"b1ic budt;et and makes local politicians vulnerable to the claim they are "bankrupthg" the city with their fights against pmperty rights. D e v e l o p e r ~ r g u e dfrequently that new regulations made projects unfeasi:ble and unfairly deprived the develnpes of their assets. They relied on the legal principle that land-use laws must permit some viable

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econmic use of land or they are m unconstitutional '"ahg" of property. Decision makers often responded sympathetically to these claims m d wmted to be '"eason&le" in the face of developers' hardsh* pleas. Since locd governments rarely had independent analyses to evaluate whether a project really needed to be as l q e as developers clahned, h e y rcllied on developers' calculation^^^^ Hardship clajms related not just to prOject size but also to the allowed uses of land. Some claimed that current uses were no longer economically viable. Landowners in the Riverside arca complained that cities we= creating "brown belts" not grcen belts with citrus downzonbg because the orchards were not e c o m i c d y wiable, The same rttasoning was used inSanta Barbara County to argw &at flower farmrs should be allowed to sell out to developers, or at least bolster their profits ("save agriculture'" by subdividing a portion of their lmd. fn these cases, kasibility andyses are usually based on an inflated estimate of land valm that prcsumes a mlaxation of plaming restrictions. Policy makers often then ccmclude that lower density development is not feasihlc because t-he land values are too fiigh to support lower-sealed projects. But values are inflated because of investors"perceptims that deveilopmnt rules will be relaxed. Weak enforcemmt in the past '"ends a message" to t-he market, drivjng up costs of land that would otherwise be cheqer, The poticy makers themselves create the value of the land, which they then feel obliged to treat as a ""cnditim of the markeplace"' to which they must rclspond with a policy exemption for the developcc The more-. they do it, the mom they feel a need to continue doing it. A choreography of size negotiation is common as projects move through different stages of gaining approval, at least in the tougher jurisdictions. Almost as a routine, develope~sinitial@ propose projects they prtrsume will be too large to gain approval, even testifying that anything less would be econasnically unfeasible. But whe~z"stmtixrg wiCh big numbers" is only a bargaining strategy, the formal ""sa1in.g down"' that follows is not necessarily evidence of gave ent-imposed limits, since t-he higher dmsity project was something of a fiction h the first place. Even under the relatiwly tight restrictions of Santa Barhara, s o m of the projects that gain approval never do get built. This is another indication that szxpply has not been choked off: The market cannot support what is already approved. Developes ooflen use the issw of economic feasibility to leverage approval ol those elements most objectionable to decision makers. In Moreno Valley wbem the purported ""jobs-houshg imbalance" m a n s mom jobs are needed to balance ""to much" housing, t-he clteveloper of a mixed-use praject said he needed to develop housing, and to provide it first, so there would be customers for the commercid/in.dustriaZ portion

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of the project that the city did in fact desire.12 Alternatively, when cities want to encourage housjng (for example, to achieve a "twenty-four-hour downtown," as was Santa Monica's goal), developers argtte they must be allowed more commercial construction to support the less profitable housing. The doctrine of jobs-housing balance thus operates as an all-purpose palliative. Business expansion remedies long commutes in the Riverside area; those sorts of projects not only gain easy approval but can leverage the housing constructio~~ that the city does not want but the developer does. In Santa Barbara and Santa Monica, housing moves most easily through the pmcess (even with highrr housing densities than are ordinarily allowed) because it means homes for ford workers- And, once again, a developer can somethes use the busing, especially if "affordablef"see Chapter et), to induce permits for other types of construction as past of a mixed-use deal. In all areas, developers sell projects on the negative argument that, whatever their disadvantages, if they are not appmved they will be ""lost"to a different jurjsdicrtim; the Riverside m a has been an especially fierce site of such competitions. Sometimes the claim is made, perhaps appropriately, that: if the prc?ject goes next door tbe disadvantages of pollution and traffic will be felt, but the tax dollars will be lost, Beyond generic claims, m ative entrepreneurs find ranf oreseen oppostunitiet; to buiId within the envebpe of new ~ g u l a t i m sGrowth . grows in the legal and institutional cracks. To get around the Goleta water moratorium, devellopers argued, with some success, that the private wells they could drill would not tap puhlic ground water basi~~s. Tl~en when a pro-growth majority won temporary control of the water board, the owners were aIlowed to tu,m t h i r private wells over to the district in reh;lm for permanent: water meters-a two-step process that bypassed the moratoriunn. Developers adapted to the city of Santa, Barbarb ban on increased water use by usillg new water-savhg techniques like indigenous landscape materids, low-flow shower heads, and toilets that flush with less watec 'They buitt pmjects using less water than the uses they =placed. In this case, a rule that otherurise could bave stopped development instead albwed the city to cmserve a resource. A less constructive h r m of developer activism is simply to start project S illegally. Some abversi.de County developers have allegedly plowed their l a d s under to elbnir~atediscovery of an endmgered species or of arclkaeologicd remains.lWliVhen the Santa Barbara Fire Departmnt ordered developer Fess Parker to clear fifteen feet of weeds along the boundary of his land, he took the c~pportunityto bulldoze another five acres of wetlmds and to relnnve illegdly two acres of trees 811 his protected ten-acre parcel (Weston, 1998: 131).

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Another pattern is to agrce to development conditions but not fulfill them. 5hce public agencies can inspect only gross violatiom, end-users can easily avoid honoring project conditions (e.g., employers may not follow througfn with the ride-sharing programs promised by the developer who sold them their building). A Santa Barbara study ~ v e d e d that ers consistently rtnderestinnated negative irnpacts of appmved projects, the conditions they imposed. were often iporcd in practice (Community E~~vironmental Council, 1987). C>ne telling incident occzrrrcd in rclation to an auto dedership development in Goleta. The project faced denial on the grounds of traffic problems and other aspects of over-urbanization at its site. To win approval, the property developer pledged to adjust hours of operation to ntitigate traffic problems and agreed to pay the county to monitor compliance with the condition. But the car dealer who eventually moved into the structure (a Merent party than the dewloper) cornpained bitterly that the county's hyper-regulations were costing him business. The local newspaper ran a photograph of a county employee observing the building w:hi.le morlitoring coqliance, galerating negative editorid comment and angry letters to the editor about taxpayers' dollars paying for a county emphyee to "stand around.'" Lost in the controversy was the fact that the cotmty created the arsmgement to facilitate a project that otherwise codd. not bave been built m d that the bapless employee's time was not being paid for by the public. The monitoring was dropped by a county plannhg dc-partment in hasty rctrcat, rendering moot a series of imposed, restrictions. I'his is an example of how enforcing developmmt cmtfition cially complex and intmsive one an become difficult, especially in the face of an unsympathetic press and business communjty. Such cmditions, even if potential@ expensive, will not irrhibit growth if develfrlners szxspect that they (or their tenants) will never pay for them. Even in Santa Barbara, many projects were insufficiently mitigated, either because impacts were unde~stirnatedat t-he time of approval or because h a d e ~ a t e monitoring had taken place (Commm~ityEnvironmental Caulzcil, 1987)" This is but a symptom, of the larger tmth that implementation depends on consistent decisim of the ""line'~epartments (e.g., public works, waste water managemnt, public safety) as well as sustai,ned political support and adequate monitoring budgets, a combination difficult to come by even in environmentalistjurisdictions. The Context of Cmtml: Comparative Power Advaa(ap;es

'The systemic nature of growth advocateskterest in land-use outcomes guarantees that under virbally any local circumstances they will remain

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involved on a continuous basis (see Alford and Friedland, 1985; Stone, 1976, 1981). Here, we discuss the general features cJf growth-cdition power that: operate under the adverse circumstances of grow& control. The larger development companies have staff committed to achieving political gods. A successful development team now may include planners, environmental. analysts, land-use attorneys, public relations experts, variolls engineers (i.e., soils, structural#and, traffic), and sometimes other specialized consultants (hotel experts, etc.). E~~virrmmentalists may have been the source of the original rtlgulatjons (altfiotrgh see Wrlker and Heiman, 1981), but developers have effectively mObilized m o r ~than matching expertise. Smaller development firms anci their cmsultants are active in support organizations such as the buildi-ng industry associations, chambers of commerce, llocaI development authorities, boards of Realtors, and ad hoc associatic,ns. In part thrcrugh tbese groups, these firms gain appointments to varintts commissions and task foxes that also help fashion local attitudes m d policies. The rep~sentativeof a large development firm fn Moreno Valley described fiis frall-time job as "keeping touch with the pulse of the c o m u nity" and. clahed to be the only person other than city employees to attend all of the meetings cJf the city council. and planning commission. C)ne of fiis slow-grokvth oppments said, ""He's paid to be there, f-ie sits i,n the front row every we& and is up there pinning the corsages on the women council mernbers when they win an ward so that they won't be able to look him in the face m d say no to hjs project." A projct pi for a development company described, his jab by sayjng, "'I go to all of the people that say no and get them to say yes." Such developer participation pays off. W e n a $7,100-pepunit irnpact fee was proposed for Moreno Valley, the buildilrg industry association respcmded with a white paper by its own expert. The 4,0110 housing units that were approved whilc the issue was being dehakd paid only $1,200 per w i t in, impact fees-$23.6 rrrillion below true public costs as estimated by the city. Eventually, the fees were raised to $3,1(111, but meanrnill-lo~~. while, developers saved $7~3 Development proponents may h o w the city" lland-use rules better than the city staff itself Zly virtue of their long inwolvemcmt; sometimes, their own staff m e ~ ~ b ehad r s written tlte gover~~ment's they weR on the public payroll. We werc told that from out of town or heading new pI several ol trhe Riverside Conl-rty cities) somtimes defer to developers' seasmed veterans, who can claim knowledge of policy ixrtents and imgementation traditions. Former city attorneys have become leading land-use lawyers in some cities (e.g., Santa Barbara); the former city manager of Santa Monica (chosen by the leftist majosily) became a consultant for the most controversial development proposals hsuhseyuent years.

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On some xcasims, growth opponents are abfe to hire t h i r own experts; Smta Barbards long-established Enviro ental Defense Center is the most prominent case in point, f17 an unusual Santa Monica case, a developer gave $2,500 so that a neighboshood group opposed to his project coufd hire its own traffic consultant (Fulton 1985, 1CIEi). Usually, citizen p u p s lean on cvhatever nonprolit groups may exist for techicd and legal assistance, suck as Legal Aid, the Sierra Club, the Tmst for Public Lands, c ~ ron the plannjng organizations in place for this purpose. Wctmen's groups, particuiarly the League of Wornen Vnters and the h r i r a n Association of University Women, play roles not only in their analyses of proposed policies, but also in acthg as a proving gmund for future public leaders, Sustained volunteer e ise varies among the areas and over time, but across all areas, envi talists" participation is episcrdir compared to their opponents* Sometimes developers can win out against prevailhg policies by making a separate peace with particular subgroups that see special benfits from prcjects. These can he specific hemfits like promises of aid for the homeless to placate social hvelfare advocates or a Santa Monica hotel developer" promise to fund beach patrols. Hyatt Rcgency gained support for its Goleta hotel from a surrounding t h y special district that wodd gain a tax bonanza. .A 5ant.a Mo~~ica office developer, using "consemsual plannhg" (Los Angeles nmes, April 22, 1990: K1) and offering various project amenities, wlrn over the i m e d i a t e neighbors, who then were less concerned with more remote difficulties (e-g., jncreased fmeway system traffic). More generaliy, grow& adwocates are find% ways to neutralize at least pastidy the "motherJhoodf>ppeal of ewiso entalism, cmstructkg a political middle ground w d e r the banner of prudent plannjng and growth management. The ""moderatef"developer position is usually marketed through grassroots organizations l-hat developers crede m d sustain with names such as Citizens for a Balanced Communit)l (Santa Barbara), Citizens for Reasonable Plaming (Riverside County), Taxpayers for a Better Mare110 Valley; and Santa Manicans for a Livable Enviro11mmt (Clean Up Our Bay Beach and Parks Committee was another Santa Monica developmat organization). It is an open secret among all relwant players that the organizatinnal irnpetus and most of the f ulnding for these gmugs come from development interests. Despite claiming the middle gmrmd, there w r e virbally no irrstmces of any such ad hoc groups-or eloper association, local chnmber of commerce, or posing m y development project or measure. 11%elections w e r land-use issues, growth forces usually wtspcnd their opponents (Gliekfeld, G a p e r , and Morrison, 1,987)on cmpaign literature, professional signatum gatherers, market research, and campaign workers, both to oppose growth control initiatives and to elect

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sympathetic officials. Campaign experts advising developers recommend that they be prepared to outsgmd the oppo&tion and to obscure contrihiution sources through MCs and finisleading occupationat designations. An article in NzliEder magazine (a developer trade journal) entiilng at the Pollsf"laid these strategies out expticitly (German, 1990).Among the recommendations to cou~ztercitizen initiatives was one that called for mounting competing, but much weaker, measures m the same ballot, usuaily under the grow& management, rather than g m t h control, rubric. These weaker measures (sometiznes dubbed "the evil twinm")re structured so that if passed by a larger majority, they take precedence (as was the case with a set of =erside city ballot measures). Once voters are confused about which is which, an elevezzth hour call may be made by pm-growth advocates to vote no on both, simply, as one informant said, "because the baUot is so confushgef' Some developers are careful to avoid an oppctsi.eional stance, tailoring their projects to local priorities and traditionesigns, perhaps, of a new modus vivendi. As a developer in the elite Santa Barbara subrtrb of Montecito observed, "Private property rights are no longer what they were, Uou cannot operate without sensitivity to the environment. Any landowner, developer, or builder who doem%ununderstmd that is going to S February IQ,1990: B1). He took be left t:ehkd.'"(Santa Barbara N ~ DPress, it in stride as the number of units irz his latest project was cut by 20 percent and as forty acres were exacted as a nature preserve. Another Santa Barbara developer was at one time virulently against growth control, but later came to feel that "fights are never worth it." He decided, to build his office m d industrial ccmlplex around a historic stmcbre rather than risk the wrath of :local historims by demolishg; it (Sarlta Barhura News Pn?ss, January 26,1990: El), In Santa Monica, the entrepreneur behind a proposed beachfront hotel offczred an on-site community center, public lockers, a ban on Styrofoarn, and permanent funding for beach mahtenance.i"n a populist voice, he asked for a public vote: "The project and the people of Santa Molica will benefit when the narrow-minded, prkileged special-interest groups which uppose this project are silenced by the people" (Santa Monica Clzrtbok, May S, 1990: AI). He and his consultants, former staff members of the progressive Campt?ign for Economic Democracy (Tom Maydcds organization), enlisted the support of school board members and social service providers. Badly split, Santa Monicans for Renters' liights was unable to agree 011a position. When countywide growth contsol was defeated at the palls in Riverside, the heads of the Sierra Club and the local building industry association jointly requested some form of growth management program. 'The result was a plan that dropped the environmentalist-favored limits on

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the county growth rate and the general protection of agricultural lands but gained developersf support for development fees to fund a multihabitat conservation area. 'Thus some enviro entalists agreed to massive new growth in return for a modest set-aside fee. I'ubtic officials and planners attend to lieveloper preferences and are rclady, indeed, to meet them at Least halfway. The Santa Monica mayor, fearing his city" reputation mi#t endanger financing of otherwise viable private prcjects, met with Los Angeles lenders to assure them their projects would be treated fairly- At the same time, an aggressive city manager recruited business leaders to help promote publicly oriented new growth (Clavel, 1986). This created a special opportunity h r a t r e preneurs not affiliated with the mti-rent-control interests to join policymaking comdtteer; and to participate in the more palatable development proposals, in some cases by tackling city-sponsmd venturczs. In Santa Monica and Santa Sarbara-and, to a degree, in the Kvcrside jurisdictions-the nature of growth control is one of negotiation and compromise, with even environmentalist officials keepfng an eye on what growth hterests will find rcasonable, wfiat they c o d litigate, and what they might seriously protest. This stance encourages adoption of mechanisms tike caps tbat permit lievelopment to proceed without overt confrontation. Shilarly, liberal hterprehtims of vcsting spares those in authority the full ire of developers who can proceed wit-h projects at hand. By making special allowances for prfliects that will employ people, officids can avoid the political fallout-of employers Chreatening to move away if refused, permission to expand. At a human level, there is a felt need to be mspmsive to those who, often graciously and massuringly, m& developme~~t requests day after day. Over time, the din of potential and experienced developer rationality, charm, litigation, and protest affects officials"policies and their implementation.

Looking across cases, we HIld that the elngjne of"growth, &though &Stinctive in each locality is a steady political. and economic force; growth interests play a part at every point, creatively resisting and ~ d e f h ~ i reng strictions. Where pro-growth sentiments are historically strong and appositional organizations are weak, as in the k e r s i d c area, growth controls leave roam for development through their largely symbolie road proclmations and generd goals. When specific standards am set, they agah leave room for much development and, hs o m cases, give way under developer prc?ssure+Utility access mcrratoria redly are temporary, e l h h a t e d as soon as sought after supplies are gained. Local plmners accept the need to compete with other communities near anit

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far to attract and subsidirz;e bushess investment. Citizens ~ s i sthe t consequences of rapid growth but may settle for set-asides of conserved open space. It is no wonder that-despite developers' complaints of over-regufation-littlie happens in the way of aggregate limit.s. This less ambitious regdation of land devdopme~~t is not easily explained by reside~~ts' class &atus. In the case of the city of Rherside, household income virtually matches that of Santa Barbara (see Table 2.1). But irm Santa Barbara, there is a citizen activist tradition that, as sometimes occurs in even madem communities, carries across ge~zerationsas '"enduring difference" p u b a m , 1993: 130-137; see also Mialton, 1992a). Related perl-raps to this difference in citizen activism are contrasting levels of education; the propmtion of residents with college degrees in Santa Barbara (33percent) m d Santa Monica (43 percent) is much fiigkr than in liiverside (11perilent). These figures imply strcmgly that distinctions in poljtical culture and organjzali.ona1 iife betwee11 locdities in our study areas are more likely significant than family incomes in explaining p o k y variatiom. m e of these distinctions is the capacity to orgmize and fund election campaigns. Local, regulations turn on election outcomes, both in terms of referenda tkat enact cmtrcrls and in terms of elccting pditicims who will pass the regulations and see to their enfarcennent. lnJe studied a series of elections in all three of the central cities to determine where campaign money came from and how it was liistributed. The results, outlined in more detail elsewhere (fi,ategola, 1992), show that in Santa Monica m d Smta Barbara the growth-control sides were able to raise serious money. :In Santa Monica they were still outspent by a better than two-to-one ratio, but. the apprnximate $10(3,000 they rajsed in the 1990 elections, for example, permitted a sophisticated campaign, In Santa Barbara, the growth-control side raised about the same arnomt, but in this case it was a told that actuafly surpassed the fund raising capacities far their advcrsaries. Riverside environmentalists, in contrast, ran shoestring campajgns; even when they won, their opponents outspent them by ratios of seven. to one-not very differ& kom the usual eight-to-one ratios in such pso-growth versus slow-growth contests in California during this era (Glicueld, Craymer, and Morrison, 198"i"125). Over the years of fights over land use fand rent control in Santa Monica), the total amount of money spent on local elections for cwncil and county supervisor seats rose slnarply. F~osexample, contributions rose 314 percent in Santa Barbara betwee11 city elections held in 1977-1978 and those held in 1989-1990; for Santa Monica the rise was over 1,000 percent (Lategala, 1992). These totafs greatly exceed camp";p cost inflatim for seats in the Carifornia State Assembly, wkich grew by a more mndest E 0 percent over the same period." City of Everside campaign contributians

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grew not only at a lower rate than in the other two cities but also at only about half the rate (at 83 percent) of the cost increases for seats in the state assembly 'The Riverside ernvironmentalish in particular, appeared mable to increase their fund raising capacity over t k e . Whereas their opponmts increased h d s by 347 percent hatching the statewidc standard) between the two time periods, the s101.v-gowthers'total campt?ign spendhg slightly dedilred. U17f.ike Santa Barlnara and Santa b i c a activists, those in Riverside were unable, for one reason or another, to mount increasingly expensive campaigns. Without money, a political group must fall. back on s m e other extraordmary resource, like grassroots organizational strength, a historic tradition of loyalty to a particuIar party or cause, or perhaps strong backing frm local mel-tia. None of these was present in Riverside, One posible explanath that will tzd work to expfain different election and p&cy outcomes amnng t-he three cities is the role of Chc local media, at least the daily press. In all three cities, the local daily paper strcmgly supported growth, both in terms of backing particular projects as well as in terms of opposing regulations that would curtail development, in gmeral." This sympathetic stance toward development was reAected in editorial positions; no growth cmtrol measure wap; suppcrrted, nor was any particdar project opposed by any of the three papers over the course of &e study period, as indicated both by our hformants at the papers and by our own checking of newspaper micrcrfilm on specific cases. Further, our own systematic examhations (Mrner and Mslotch, 3992 301.-102) of "straight news" average of particular projects showed a comistent tilt toward favoring the pro-development side (for example, by using pro-project sources in the n e w story but not envir~nmcntalists). Allkough there were some diflerences in media coverage between the localities in our study area+specially in regard to how much detail was published from environmental review documents (see Chapter S), it is safe to condude that when environmenta.lism did. prevail in one of ollr cities, it did so in spite of the local paper, not because of it. Atthough we are reticent to overgeneralize kom case studies, it does appear that certain types of government actions are more effectjve than others in n-taking growth control count. Symbolic commitments to (jrowth control through gencral plan amendmernts or new wording in city charters clearly have weak impacts. On the other hand, controls based on concrete but intrusive and idiosyncratic. monitorhg, as in the auto dealership case, risk p21bliC djsappmval and m y damage the ~ p u tation of a whole reghen of envim ental controls. hfrastrrxcture constraints am also unlikely to be effective; expmded capacities can be developed, sometimes through demands from a public that, however initially opposed to development, comes to suffer when water (or mad)

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capacity shortages hinder their life routines, Growth caps may also not be very effective, given the tendency (as is clear from experience in many areas) to "adjustf' them when development starts bumping against imposed, ceilings, or t h y m y be circumvented. in still other ways, Alllnough the caps used in our case cities were not raised sipificantly durirrg our from other places suggests that they likely will study period, evide~~ce be. Most cities in California" Ventura County have officially capped the m u d number of ~sidctntialbuilding permits, but these limits are cmsistently exceeded, with as mmy as fourteen times morc permits being issued than allowed (Mart;in, 1991). What, then, can work? Although we hawe less mlevant data on this issue than for some of our other conclusions, it is liEcely that a combhation of downzonjng and a change in Legislative votirtg requirements (a super-majority for upzcrning) may have strong consequences. Such a conrtbinatio~~ helps institutionalize a fundmental condition for effective cmtmts: a favorhle political envirmment sustained over time. The p ~ s ence of such poiitjcal circumstances-much more than the number, type, or title of controls (indeed, wfiether the words "grwth contro" are used at all)-dctermjnes whetker regulations matter in the way places grow.

Motes 1. Atthough the usual approach to the implementation problem i s to look within bureaucracies for the dynamics that decoupte legislative intent from poficy outcome (see, e.g., Mazmanian and Sabatier; 1983; Pressman and Wildavsky lli373), tzre include the surrounding ""sacial palitics""Brcldkin, 1990; Freuclenburg and Gramling, 19941, involving those outside the officiaX realm. 2, Besides the political transformations we observed at our study sites, Calavita (1992) reports that San Dic?ga, a city once led into g o w t h control by then ma yor Pete Wilstjn, retui-ned to growth machine dominance. 3. htemiew 012. We refer to informants by interview numbers to assure confidentiality. 4. Tntemiew 053. 5. It can also go the other way; certain of Santa Montca's 1988 commercial downzcming measures tzrere applied to prc~jeetsthat had beaten the vesting deadline, generating threats of legal action. 6. Inteiview 026. 7. Although a source of pride for local planning officials, the agreed-upon $4,000 per unit impact fee built into these developments was relatively low; a Santa Barbara County planner-informant dismissed it as enough "to pay far the curbs" "flntemiew 084). 8. The reference year is 1991. See "City Focus, Inland Empire: Corona,'" I n l ~ n d Empiw Bt.tsifzess lozarnnl, January 1991: 54. 3. Inteiview 030. 10. Interview 029 (also see, Hamifton, Rabino>vitz,and Szantojn, Inc., 1982).

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11. Santa Barbara County" Hyatt Hotel project is one instance where a study was required. See '"tudy Says 400 Rooms Needed for Hyatt prc)fit," %nln Bnrbara News Press, July 7, 1988: A8. 12. interview 007. 43, Interview 006. 14. The relative environmental costs of Styrofc2arn versus the a tternatives have since come under much greater scrutiny (Hocking; 4991). 15. We used these t i m points far comparison became the California Fair Political Practices Commissictn did not provide data for earlier periods. 16. The local dailies are the Santa Rarbnm Nezus Press, the Santa Monicn Outlook, and the Riz~ersidePress Ente~~rise, These were not the only m d i a in the three areas, but on local issues they were the must important. Santa Barbara was also served by at least one weekly '%Iternative" "paper ower the era, primarily the Santa Barb~m Nezos alzd Revkzul which toc~ka consistently pro-environment stance. Santa Monica war; also sewed by the Los Angekc2sTinfes, but this paper gave less co>verageto Local Santa Monica affairs than did the Ozlttouk. To a degree we have not determined, the Santa Monica-basd pubtic radio station, KCRW, played an important role in local cc>ntroversiesand was a Liberal-left, pro-environmentalist outlet.

ect Peddling: What Gets Approved and How

Cantsois do not, by m y means, stop growth m d in most cases are likely to have no effect on its aggregate amount, but this does not mean they simply have no collsequellce apart from el~cauraghggrumblhg by developers and some satisfaction for envim entalists, h this chapter and the next we assess how new regulations altered development pracn so doing, we will provide a better understanding, in quite precise tices, X tems, of the nature of the development process under ti#tened building ntlcs. In the last chapter we W t-he ways developers move around in this rclguiat.ory context..Now we wmt to understand thc colltext itself. To do this, we idmtifti what local governments gain from developers as they shape their prcrjects to win governmental approval. ists of:fc'rrmalized development rcquiremenks ts shape devrslopmnt (this we learned in to mderstmd ho prtrvious chapter must take seriously and delve still mom deeply into the implernelrtation process-t-hc way a particular project gets changed, modified, or subverted. as it moves thmutgh to approval. Our orighal goal was to create standad m e a s w s of the public benefits ga,ined from development approvals that could, be wp1,ied a m s s localities, something like the dollar a m m t of public funds gcrnerated per T a r e foot oE construction--perhaps broken down by tbe type of developmellt (e.g., office versus malls versus residential). Such, jndicators would allow us to compare the intensity and Ihc content of mgulation from one site to another. This type of calculatim proved to be impossible. For one thlng, local gover ents do not keep track of the totd fees they collect per project or on a citywide basis. This is partly because some of the fees are imposed ad hoc in the form of mitigations required on specific projects (they are site specific, rather than coming from a uniform

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schedule of fees). There are d s o a wide array of agmcies and special districts that collect fees and/or impose their own development requiremelnts (e.g., schod districts, sewer districts, building depart~nents,park boards, redevelopment authontics, etc.), Mart. important-ly, collectllmg fees is only one way localities offset the costs of p w t h . They may instead limit the scale of a project or redirect it to a location that reduces its major cost innpacts. h effect, they may g"in mcrw in cases wherc. they collect no fees. Further, developers themselves may be required to remedy adverse effects-for example, by providing mass transit passes to their workers to r e h c e traffic congestion (as opposed to the city collecting fees to widen roads for them tie drive on). They may be asked to fund low-income hausing that their project displaces or, as an alternatiw, to build aifordable housing on site. Developers can be asked to pay m e y toward an open-space fund or can be barred from using (jrading practices that wnuld harm wetlands. In fact, various mixes of mitigation and regulation may coexist withixr the same locality and be applied differently from year to year or from project to project. Even the most mundane exactions-say, traific irnpact fees charged on the same type of project-may differ in haw they are assessed (per square foot, per housing unit, per average daily trip), where they are applied. (incertajn districts, for certain land uses), and how they are triggered (by wrtain size &=holds, by whether or not full enviro rclview takes place). Past swveys have helped sfiocv the range of development exactions and are us&l ior comparing places that am similar on specific dimensions (e.g., traffic or park land fees in two booming residential suhurbs that use the s m e techiques of"lmd use contro%).lBut in most instances, comparisons between places are difficult without knowledge of actud project circumstances. If we sifnply count up the number of exactions or their recmmelnded dollar value, we might co~ncludeerroneously that the places with the greatest number of fees are also the toughest cm development. This runs counter to the perceptions of local officials, s w h as a S m a Barbara planner who remarked, 'We don't have irnpact fees, we m not into growth here."" The different elements of a project also interact with one another: A project may benefit the community by providing low-income housing and also reduce the public burden of heavier traffic congestion by hinging workers closer to downtown jobs. So the project's net contributim to local welfare has to be judged in combination, To try to total local gains using lists of policy exactions hides the variety of factors at play and risks s w i n g incommensurate and sometimes i m e a s u r able items.

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Project Peddling: WI~aitlGets Approved w~zdkioro

Peddling Around with Our Projects To address this methodological problem we decided to compare how the same ""actual" pmjects would be dealt with across localities. Sb accomplish his, we asked veteran city planners in the three main cities (Santa Bashara, Smta Monica, and Riverside) to review projects approved in the other two jurisdictions as though they were being proposed for their own locality. We gmerated the prrrjects by asking each planner to choose two develoipments that had been approved in their city recently- One was to be ""routine," representirrg a common form of development (in scale, locatim, and type of use) and with cmditions of approval that were at the norm in terms of type and level. The routine case front Riverside was an apartment project; the cases from Santa Basbara and Santa Mmica were office/retail mixes. We refer to these routine projects throughout this text by fictitious n m e s to make them easier to recall-Barbara Plaza, Moslica Tower, and Riverside Arms (see Photos on pagedG88, 91,93,94)." er ncrmir~ateda ""best--casef"prclject For the other selection, each pl wfiere the locality securcd maxjmuxn concessions from the devdoper.4 Compared. to the rnutine prc?jects, these best cases were larger and mixed. various cornbinations of office, retail, and residential devebpment. 'l'o inem' ~riewpoints,of these prjects, dicate the special quaii,ty#from the pl we use three stars wifiin each of their designated names: Rmcho"""Barbara, iWonica"**Centre, fiver~ide***Place.~ Brief descriptions of our project cases are contained in Table 5.1 m d further detailed Appendix E, We then f w a r d e d project descriptions m d conditions of approval (the actual text that conveyed official action as well as our summaries of these k g deparme11t.s"We took the path of a deactio~~s) to the other two pl veloper looking for a building site, peddling the pr,jects from one place to mother. After each official had examined the materials (in one city with a full staff meeting) we rehr,med fos extended inl.ervjewswith each planner, We asked them how each proposal would be received by their jurisdiction, whet-her it would be approved, in what form, and with what additional (or febver) condilims attached. We also asked the p1 scrj.be what might keep them from asking for more restrictions (political prc.ssure, economic interp~taticm,technicd preference); this informaticm was often volw~teeredby ou,r hformants, a highly articulate and thoughtful group. Mre also asked &out the conditions imposed m similar prOjects approved in their city (see Appendix F for our interview schedule),

What Gets Approved and Haw 'The first Ching we leaxned w s which cities would approve which, prctjwt as proposed. Xn &erside, all of the proposed projects would have been

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TABLE 5.1 Project Descriptiom

Barbara Plaza (Santa Barbara) 801 Rancho"**8araa (Santa Barbara)Chapala-officelretail project one two-story mixed-use project incfudlalcxk from the main street, 6,000ing commercial (auto dealerships, 32,653 square feet on 291,852 squaw-fc~ot,thee-story building on a 15,000-square-foot lot. square feet of land) and residential Monica Tawer (Santa Monica), 4250 (96 one- and two-story residential Fourth Street-office/rel.ail comunits on 9.65 acres+20,354 square plex downtown; "3t451-square-f~~t, feet). six-story building on a 30,000Monica*""Centre (Santa Monica)-sixstory?mixed-use project including square-foo>tlot. Riverside Arms (Riverside), Spruce 165,000 square feet of retail and Apartment-102-unit, mo-story 3,094,577 square feet of office on 17.1 acres of land (744,&ii76square apartment cl-rmplex m 4.5 acres feet). (1"3,020 square feet). Riverside*""Place (Riverside)-mixeduse prcjjwf:with a maximum of six stories, including commercial (500,000 square feet of office, 260,000 q u a r e feet of retail, 300,000 square feet-of hdel/conference center on 55.3 acres, 2.4 million square feet) and residential (570 units on 42 acres-1 ,829,520 square feet).

approved for construction. Santa Monica would have accepted t-he Smta Barbara projects but denied those that origir\ated hRiverside. Santa Barbara would not have accepted any of the projects from the other two cities as originally proposed. Thus, we found an ordinal scate of regulatory rigor: Tc, some degree, €-his fbnding confirmed that the city of Rvcrside was weaker in its controls c o q a r e d to the other two places. :It also cfarified the more ambiguous comparison of Santa Monica and Santa Barbara, eaeh of wfiich could, in its own way, vie for being the more stringent. The exercise provided us with a gross measure of how strict cities were =lathe to each other based on &:he binding public decisions that implement planning policies. Table 5 2 summarizes these results, distilrguishixlg between the routine and. best-case px^ojects.

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TABLE 5.2 Kespc~nsesto Routine and Best-Case Projeds Prapc~sedtcr Each City

Bahara Plaza Munica Tower Riverside Arms

approve deny deny

apprc>ve approve deny&

approve approve approve

Rancho***Barbara approve Monicae**Centre deny Riverside***Place deny

approveb approve deny

approve approve approve

a

"n

A zone change from single- to multi-family residential would be mlikely. exception would have to be made to the current commercial moratorium.

This comparism tells " h a t " is approved m d denied but does not tell "whyY""lb learn how and why decisions differed from one place to the next we questioned the senior planners, studied the official docu,ments carefully, tafked wiCh other city staff8and ~ v i c w e dlocal media coverage of relevant developwnt decisions. First, we will compare the ~acticms to "roulinefAevelopments. Then we will turn to the best-case projeds.

Routine Projects Riverside Arms, Riversidds routine case, rewired a zone change f r m single-family to multi-family residential. =is kind of ""upzoning,'%hich increases the level of development a1.Iowcd on a site, used to be so c m m m in U.S. cities that zoning was q&e mlleable (Babcock, 1969). Even though Riverside community groups often resisted such c h q e s whether they increased density or intensified the type ol land use (e.g., from residential to commercial or industrial)-upzoning was common enou@ that this project could be regarded as "routine." It would have been denied on the basis of the zone change alone in the other two cities. Thusl one 'knew" cchallenge to developer power i s for governments simply to abide by existing zoning and approved plans rather than to grant exceptions easily F d o w i n g the rules a k a d y in place is a powerful form of growth regulation that is nut represented, on lists of growth controls. Santa Monica officials came to consider sirrtgle-family zones as a ki.ad of "sacred land"-appmving higher densities would be considered a "sacrilege" "(see Photo on page 83).

Sz'lzgle-flnmily areas ir-z San tn Munica

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Project Peddling: WI~aitlGets Approved w~zdkioro

Tndeed, in Santa Monica, zoning reflected ""the basic land-use pattern of the city'>nd was a l t e ~ donly by "a little tweak here and there ... for very unique reasons,'kcletainly not as a routine matter.6 Similarly; the Smta Barbam planner, speaking in 1989 of both zoning and the general plan, said, ""Until the major general plan amcmdment last year we didn't process any general plan amendments since 7,984, except to fine-tune s m e language in the different sections,"T n e s e comments indicate how rare it would have been to =zone land for any routine development project. Itesidenljal developmnts in Santa Monica and Smta Barbara either met existing zoning requirements or were part of a mixed-use project in a non-residential area. It is not surprising that the '"routitle'kcrffice and commercial projects, BaCbara Plaza and Monica Tower, both conformed with existing zoning. Santa Monica would have accepted Santa Barb.ara%routine office/retail project, and then some. Projects like the Smta Barbara project, wif-;h less than 15,000 sytlare feet oi floor area, were unaffected by any of Santa Monka's commercial g r w t h controls, incluliing the temporary moratorium of May 1989. Indeed, a structure thme times as large as Basbara Plaza, could have been built on a comparable site in Santa Monica and still have been exempt from the moratorium, Mo~~ica Tower was built on a lot twice as big as that of Baibara Plaza, but the Santa Mmica px^oject had sixken tirnes more floor area, was more than twice as tall, virbally filled its site, and provided parking for 321 cars, compared to the 24 parking spaces at Barbara Plaza (see Photos on page 85). The dramatic density difference reflects the different scales of development allowed in these two cities, not a grea.t.ercvilliagncss to make exceptions to the rules, Even before implementation of the city" 11989 commercial restrictions, 5mta Barbara wodd not have appmved the routine Santa Monica project. The city's plami,ng commission exescised considerable discretion on all commrcial projects, guided in part by the size of any preexisting structures (the m r e already present, the more that could he built to Eplace it) and by the history of water use for the site (wilh nt:,net increases in water allowed), If these conditions were met, a developer in the post1989 era might have been allowed an 13,000- to 12,000-syuare-footbuilding (about twice as big as Barbara Plaza, see Photo on page 86) on a 30,00Q-s~are-footsite, rather than the 93,000 square feet approved for Monica Tower (see Photo on page 87). Riverside's routhe residential projed, which covered 4.5 acres, would have been an unlikely prt>yosal in the other two cities because of the shortage of large devebpaklle parcels. But if spread across a number of different sites, its densi.ty wndd have rclsernbled exjsting zonhg in both places. Rjverside Arms included 23.3 housing units per acre; Santa Rarbara

I;3al"kr'i.~gat Barbam Plaza and Illonim Tozuer

Riverside Arms

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permitted 20 units per acre and Santa Monica 30 (see Photo on page 88). But a developer wodd have to provide affordable houshg in order to build at this density in Santa SaTbara, and to build at all in Santa Moslica (these affordability requirements will be detailed in the next chapter). Santa Barbara and Santa Monica thus pcrmitted the same rt~sidential densiv (or morc) lhan Riverside, but only if the cities' affodability stipulations were met," I'he amount of buildk~gallowed on a site c m aiso be affected by other desig~vegulations,such as buildbg set-back requi~mcnts.Under Santa Barbara design mview, multi-story buildings are usually stepped back from tloor to floor so that third and four& floors are only a third as large as lower floors, with four stories beiing t-he seldom-perdted maximm set in the city charter. En comparison, Santa Moni.ca ofiicials reduced the top fltlcrr of Monica Tower by less tkm 30 percent. Kiverside would have made revi,sjons of a si.milarly minor order on a project of this scale.

Compared to the routine projects, the best-case developments hinged much m m on case-by-case negotiations betwet-m city pl vate developers. 'This is where policy priorities were trmslated into specific developent requirements, All of the three-star projects rewired. land-use desipations that were custom desit;ned for their sites. When the eity of Santa Barbara approved Rnncho"""Barbara for construction, planners maintahed the same overall mix of land uses (commercial, residentiai, etc.) permitted on the site but mcrdified the existing zoning to rearrange their distribution within the land parcel. 'The plamer said, "the (zoning) line went one dirczctim and we switched it to run the other direction,'" 111 Santa Monica, the mixture of uses included in Monica"**Gentre also conformed with existing zonjng but was confirmed and speeidied through a customized development agreement between the city and the developer; this agreement: allowed the project to proceed. The project was in a special office &strict the eity had recently crclated to upgrade a semdisrdustrial area of town, in contrast with these two cases, Rlverside"**l"lace ~ q u i r e dmore fundamental rezoning from the city; c m c r c i a l . and multhfmily development was allowed in what had been a sisrgle-fmily residential zone. The fiverside City Council justiEied rezcming on the grounds that part of the development would address community educational needs. The Riverside general plan of 1969 designated the site as the new campus for fiverside Community College. 'lbgetkr with a private developer, the cotlege, as the landowner, was propoSiTtf: the new development. Actually, unly 5 percent of the proposed cmstructim wodd have provided public educatimal space; the other 95 percent was given over to other

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Pro;iecf Peddling: WI~aitlGets Approved w~zdkioro

uses, including more than one mill.ion squarc feet of commercial develc~pment.Almost any =zoning from residential to comme~ial,much less of this mag~~itude, would be highly unlikely in the other cities.10 Santa Barbara officials thought they could accomplish a combination of g a l s Zly approving the hous% and auto center that made up RanchoeeeBarbara(see I"hoto on page 41). They could retain sales tax revenues fnr the city (by preventkg a threatened exodus of car dealerslnips from the city limits, and even adding more dealerships) and improve the traffic system at the developer's expense (by havhg developers fhmcc a new freeway off-ramp m d h k two important traffic arterials). The city also gained needed affordable housing by granting '%"bonus density" so that the developer codd buiid more housing units on the site (as a resU,lt, the housing densit-y exceeded that of river side"^ routine project)." The site was an undeveloped parcel within the uptown urbanized area, bufiered from nearby residential areas by the freeway m existing shopp h g mall, m d a retail. strip. At this location, the project codd. address the three different problems simultaneousiy: keeping sales tax rt;vmue, improving traffic cjsculation, and p r o v i h g affordable housing. Although still. contruversial (in part because of possible noise from the dealershlps and high h m i n g densities), its precise cmfiguratrim and siting ~ n d e r e d the project relatively inoffensive. Development was permitted only after about five years of negotiation and the rejection of two earlier proposals. The developer wanted originally to build only o f ices, then proposed a hotel,/convention centersomething favored in the general plm (but downtown, not at this uptown sik)-and finally came around to the auto center/housirrg concept. In effect, plaming reguiatims that strictly lintited the densjty of housing, especialIy if it was not "affordable," and a climate that made any zoning change difficult (wen the internal rearangemeat of zoning tines reqrairt.d for the project) pushed the developer to focus 811 the slnbstancc of the city's plmnjng goals. As with Santa Barbara, Santa Monica also approved its best-case project because of its fit with overall city planning strategies. n e vast: M m ica*"*Centre commercial project would enhance public revenues and support the social services high on the city's agenda (see Photo on page "33).The praject was h an area where plamers welcomed development that would yield such revenues; few existing housing units woutd be displaced; no architecturaily sipificant buildings were ill its path; and ~ l a tivcly few nearby neighbors would be disturbed. Besides a p e i n g to a wide array of exactions, the owner consulted the city m d neighbors regmding the kinds of menities and uses to indude in the project. The m e approach was rcpljcated and refined by later developers, with the advice of the former city manager (part of the earlier left regime), now act@ as a private land-use cmsdtant.12

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Project Peddling: WI~aitlGets Approved w~zdkioro

Despite the fact that Santa Monica was becomjng more w a v of largescale development, both the Santa Rarhara and &erside projects would have been considered attractive if appropriately zoncd sites were available, Because its commercial densities and scale were relatively low for Santa Manica, Riverside***Plac3r;would have fit well into Santa Monicafs cjty-owned ajrport: site fsee Chapter 6 for details on this project). 'The eity w d d have welcomed the housing component if it included a defiined portion of subsidized units. Santa M~nicawollld have also encouraged hncho***Barbara because of the &fordable housixlg component and its auto dealerships (anachowledgeb source of tax revenue). In Santa Mmica, such a project probably would have been allowed at higher densities, since Santa Monica allows both larger scale residential and (especially) comme~ialdevelopment. Rkerside would have welcomed any of the best-case projects because of their con?merc.ial corngonents. In fact, the projects could have been purely commercial-and housing, if included, would nut have had to meet any affsrdability tests. fiverside" sown best-case project met neighborhood opposgion, but not because of the awttnf m irrtenSity of cornmercial development. Instead, neighbors objected to the proposed apartments that would abut their sin&-family neighbcrrhood. In fact, the eity ing staff had rclcommetnded against such high residential dcnsities but were ignorcd by the project sponsors who gained plmning commission approval for twice the residential density recommended by staff. 'The neighhorhood qpositior? spurred the city council to approbre 40 percent fewer apartments. After our hterviews werc completed, the newly elected slow-growth mayor vetoed the prt!ject because of neighbcrrhood concerns*The developer dropped thc apartmetnt cornponetnt altogether to get final approval. Although cornmereid densities tended to be lower in Riwerside than in Smta Manica, this did not reflect a limit on commercial de~nsitiesbut a limi"t the market for commescial space. hdeed, &c Riverside***Place project was the one case study that was approved but m t built because of weak m r k e t demand (see (?hotos on page 94). (It is kteresthg to note that the only px^oject of our sample that was shelved came from a less: regulated context.) Officiais had d o w e d projects for the downtown area that were similar to Monica***Cetntrein ktensity m d scale-According to a Rjverside planner, referrirrg to commescial space in generd, 'WOone is trying to scale the pmjec"townI on city ccrmcil, in the neighborhood, in downto\vn."~~ Riverside was even more eager to attract an auto center like Rancho***&arbara.Rather than restricting the size (or asking for affordable housing as part of the project), the city would have wanted the auto complex as big as possible, Auto malls in the broader Riverside region were

Riz~erside"*""i"Iace u ndezleloped site

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the abjects of fierce competition between the various localities (Sunderland, 19H: 14-16) and were six to seven tirnes l q e r than Rancho***Barbara, covering as much as seventy-five acres. To accommodate one proposed auto mall, Riverside City Council unanimously rezoned 1.50 acres of land to a general comercial zone. In the process tbe council threw out all, the des-ign and landscaping standards planners had previously crafted for the site. The lone voice in opposition was the neighboring city of Moreno Valley, which was trying to launch an auto mall of its own. 'This Riverside auto center was never built, but the owner rebined the relaxed zonhg for the site, As a result, Ihe lost auto mall project becanne the vehicle for a permanent change in land-use designation; ""theycould bujld the world's largest open-air flea market,""the Riverside planner lamented.14 In contrast to Riverside's welcoming of best-case projects from the other two areas, Smta Barbara probably would not even have approved :Rancko"*"Barbara in later years because of its size and because of higher standards for project mitigations. Under S m a Barbara" 11989 clamp-dum on commercial, growth it would have been innpossible, :Riverside*""Place would use up more than a fourth of the total cornmertlial space available under Santa Barbara's g r w t h cap through the year 2009-hardly a reason to grant it: special eeatment. Santa, Monica might have been interested in Riverside"*"Place, but only with measures to build the local stock of affordable housing and mitigations of other sorts. Project Environmentat Reviews

Che of the important aspects of regulation is the way locali"riescarry out environmental rewiew as mandated by the California Environmental a1alit.y Act of 1,971 (CEQcZ), the slate's adaptation of the National Enviental Policy Act (NEPA) of the prior year.1' For developers, such redekrmine how much money they will have to put up for studks, the costs that may c m e to t-hern as a result of the studies' findings, and the degree to which study fjndings stir up publicity m d public opposition to cause tbem trouble. The review process has the potential to bring authoritative evidernce before the public both on the substance of the project and the adequacy of the environmental analysis itself. Through mandated hearing%it c m provide opporh;lnities for public testimony the ~gistrationof diverse perspectives, and mecaia &tention. Accosding to state law any project proposal that deviates from current rules-such as existing zoning or a development cap-has to go hrough ental review The s m e is true for any prnjed repiring "discretionary" approval (i.e., anything beyond routine staff administrative

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approval, whether by board, commission, or council). CEQA also req u i ~ environmental s review Mlhemver a project provokes significant "controversy." Once CEQA is triggered, local officials have three options according to Calif ornia law: Issue a "negative BecXaration," meaning that the city deems that the propc~salhas no significant environmental impacts and can thus prc~ceed 2. Issue a ""negative declaration'' h t with curtditions, meaning that the project can go f o m a d if the developer mitigates certain environmrtntal impacts 3. Require a full environmental impact repc~rt(EIR) either to define the conditions for approval or, if mitigations are not feasible, to justit"y the disapproval of the projed 2.

These statewide criteria give localities leeway to determine the kinds of prrrjects that would trigger CEQA review as well as the kind of rt.wiew that would take place under the law (i.e., which of the three review options would be taken). Local governments set the threshold of what: can be appmved administratively and, through zoning, establish the envelope of currently allowed construction. If the ernvelope is big enough, there would setdom be a need to "break" rules and hence to trigger CEQA review 'I'herc. is dso obvious r o m for local i n t e r p ~ t a t i mof what constitutes ""controversy"in a give13 situation. The realms of discsrrtion interact, in that places with large zmjsrg envelopes and permissive general plans create less need for specid action and also dampen ccrntraversy by creatkg the attitude that appmvals are hevitable. Tn our study areas, the delineation of what is administrative versus discretionary action d i e r e d across places in quite ohvious ways. In Santa Barbara, for example, decisions by the Architectwal Board of Review (requircd for a wide variety of projects) were defined as discretionary, triggering environmental review. Santa Monica and Riverside were less likely to require architecturai review on a given project; they defined these reviews as administrative, nut triggering environmental review under CEQA. We see that wit%linthe same regime of state law, local interpretation can be critical. Tn Riverside, projects of whatever scale couXd be approved administratively as long as thry ccmbrmed with cmrmt zcming.Given &versidefs large envelope of unused zonjng rights, this meant that CEQA environmental review was invoked rarely. As late as 1980, Smta Monica had a similar policy artd appmved a 1.3-million-square-foot project '"over-thecountertf-that is, wjthout any public hearings, planning comrnissinn consideration, or envim ental study. Such a project would fater =quire

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TABLE 5.3 Routine Use of Environmental Review

Sn~ttnBnrbnrn

SlaPI&Mozz ica

Riverside

Barbara Plaza

ND

none

none

Monica Tawer

EXK

EXR

none

Kverside Arms

EIR

NL)

NL)

NOIF:

ND=Megative Deciaration, EIR=EnvironmentalImpact Report.

traffic studies, architectural design review, and a series of public approvais. Santa Monica came to requirt? environmental review 011 all of its larger projects (regasbless of zoning conformance) but exempted many more from GEQA review than Santa Barbara, Santa Barbara had long used a strict hterpretation of CEQA, excrnpting o d y residential projects of fewer than six mits. Nrhally all commercial, or industrial projects required review for one reason or anothrr.16 By htroducing necv limits and expmding the dornaiin of discretionary action, grow& conk-ols bring mvir~nmentalmviczw to bear m more development projects. This tends to happen precisely in those places where environmentalists are prepared to engage seriously in the review process. Competent environmental review provides more complete information and better understmding of prcljed impacts. This process then can kick off all sorts of media coverage, stimulating still more public controversy and demmds for mitigations horn developers, fn alf three cities, the best-case projects required environmental review because they involved s o m discsct.jonary xtion (e,g., approvi,ng a specific plan mendmmt to the general plan, a zoning change, or a development agreement), but the typicd use of envimnmental review clearly d i f k ~ from d place to place (see Talnle 5.3). Riversid.e%requirement of envirmmntaj review for its ruutincl Riverside hm?s project came about only because a z m change was involved. Even so, they issued a negative declaration, specifyi,ng only minor modificaticms of the physical desip. If the project had been proposed in an existhg multi-family zone, no review would have been necessary at all. Likewise, the Barbara Plaza pmject and Mo~~ica Tocver would have been approved in Eversi.de with no review. The Riverside planner could thhk of only one project w i ~ i l lthe ; city that had r e q u i ~ da full EIR when there was not a zone chmge: the doubling of a regional mall (to 1.5 million squarc feet), As our informmt told us, "If t h y have the zoning, all theyke

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really doing is going for a building permit." Still the city of Riverside considers itself ~strictivecompared with neighboring jurisdictions. Our Riversjde phnning informant commented, "Most of the places around here say, Tnvirmmentd revicw? Yeah, I think we have a stamp around here for thatSfff Santa Monica required a full EZR for its own routine project but did not demand mitigations beyond the city% standard exactions, If Barbara Plaza were proposed in Santa Monica it would have been "ppoved "over the caunterf3ecause it was beneai-h the size threshold for CEQA review Riverside Arms would have been reviewed (because of the zone change, not the project size) but then probably would have received a negative declaration in Santa Manica. Santa Barbara required CEQA =view of its own routine project, just as it would have of the other two routine developments.l7 After =view, little Barbara Z31a;za was givcn a negative &clmation bttt with conditions pert&hg to traffic mitigations. Riverside Arms would have been reviwed. because of its size and would have been sut7ject to tough traffic mitigation measures, dependhg on its exact location. Monica Tower, on the other hand, if it had been approved in Smta Baibara (which it wodd d E R and extemive mitigations. not have been), wodd have ~ ~ i r aefull Even when CEQA was invoked, the local ixnplemeMation differed, as did aI1 the other regulatory mechanisms we have discussed, For example, when Riverside officials rezoned 150 acres to accommodate the elusive auto mall described above, the city, though requiring certain traffjc improvements, issued a negative declaration, They reasoned that an auto mall would not he any worse envizonmmtally than the industrial uses already allowed on that site. Even though the environmental impact of existing industrial zonixrg was never evaluated, it was taken as the ground Actor for loosely judging thr impact of alternate uses. In cmtrast Santa mit-igaicms for its RmchoX""E;arbaraauto Barbara rclquired sig~~ificant center. For such a large project in Santa Monira, mitigations would likely be secured throul;h a developent agreement. The reliabaity and usefulness of EIRs also varied. Until 1990, Riverside developers were allowed to hire their own cmsdtmts to do the reports, with the city providing oversight. Smta Barbara and Santa Mftnica had. long sevcred this patron/cliezzt tie betwell developers m d experts by directly contracting consultants to prepare ElRs (at the developers%expease). Rverside changed its approach only under pressure from citizens who opposed Riverside"""Place and threatened to sue the city; cithg a Los 4 e l e s County court case where environmental documents prepartrd under cmtract with the developer were nullified.18 h o t h e r variation in environmental review was the way gover notified citizens of pending development decisio-ns. CEQA review requires

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that neighbors affected dlmctly by a project be notified of all public hearings, either by posting signs at: tbr building site, by giwing them written notice fby flier or mail), or by publishing newspaper announcements. Shce routine projects in Rkersi.de received no public review, there was virtudly no occasion for notification; the first anycme wollld know of a project would be Ml)nen construction begm. Santa Monica applied E R processes to a larger proportion of projects than Riverside, using both mail and newspaper publication, with selective posting. Santa Barbara exceeded Che basic CEQA requirements and the other lwales, using all three methods of public notice as a matter of course. ProhabIy mom import& than meChods of notifying neighbors was the ki.nd of treatment m d i a gave to the substance of EflCs. Our cities differed, even though a11 their major papers were pro-development. The 5mta Barhara newspaper gwe consistent and detailed coverage to the content of environmental studjes, specifying such mtters as the nurnber of car trips a project would, generate, effects on air quality, and expected congestion at particular intersections. -The paper aclvised its readers to inspect the EIRs, i,n orle case editoriaiizing that an EIR for a cor~troversjal downtown department store project (which i"ttrongIy supported.) contained ""information vital to a decision an the ... issue" (Santa Barbara News Press, October 9, 19883: D1). C h this project alone, the paper provided inbrrnation on the EIR contmt (much of it damaging to the project) in fourken separate stories and also indicated time, date, a d piace of upcoming hearjngs and meetjngs rcllated to the develnpment. These stories were all played pmminentty; three of them (two of which focused solely an the EIR) wew front page, in one case just below the day's lead. story: "U.S. Troops Preparing for Grenada Witbdracval" (Santa Narbnlzx Rle~usPress, November 3, 1983: AI). Five other articIes appeared on the front page of other sections. In regard to an equally contentious and large-scale Santa Monica project (a proposed beach hotel that was eventually defeated at the polls), only-t w articles in the Oz~flrrokmade dirc?ctmentim of the project EIR"s content. In, one of these hstances the paper merely paraphrased the project ~ppclnents'use of the EIR" ffindings on air quality kpacts. The Ri~ersikPR% El?teuyrisefscoverage o f the city's hest-case project barely mentioned the pmject's E R (oneof the relatively rare? instances i,n which there was one in Riverside), Of twenty-two news articles on the projed, only one even menticmed the existence of an EIR (Riverside Press Enle~rise,Aprjlt 3, f 991: 83), saying that the city coulncil would cmsidcr the f,al compromise m the project at a June 4, 1991, meeting, "after development p h s and an environmental impact report are rr.vised.'%n "a consultant's study" on traMic impacts, but eadier article rne~~tioned this appeared in connection with one of the developer" justifications for

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higher densities, rather than as m element of environmental review. This coverage by the &=side paper was not due to some thoroughgoing lack of fairlzess toward environmental review; indeed we have documented elsewhere that when it came to election contests the Kverside paper showed less evidence of systemtic pm-growth news bias than the other two papers (Warner and Malotch, 1992: 101,102). Ra.t;her, the coverage suggests a difference in local plaming culturcs and practices. Our comparison tells us that Santa Barbara's coverage alnne was extensive and jnformative, alheit somtimes critical of what the paper regarded as overly strict methodologies for assessislg impacts. Nevertheless, its extensive news treatment surely extended consideration of substmtive environmental information to a broader public. Santa Barbara news coverage likely helped mlce the substance of EIRs m intrinsic part of public perception and action.

Local Knowledge Base far Planning Decisions Effective growth cmtrol and meanhgful enviro ental review depend in part on the. qualitJi of local planning knowledge, Otherwise, there are few bencharks for judging particular preect propasale; and the associated envirorlmelrtal rev j,ew documnts. To know there will be a given irnpact, people in a locality must first understand such things as the infrastructure holding capacities, the nature of cumulative impacts, and the fiscal m d em\riJ-onmntd costs and benefits of adding to the built envient, No single study can do this; rather, a base of knowledge must already be in place. Orrr cities were different in the degree to which they had this information at hmd. Santa Mmica had made serious efforts to determjne the fiscal impacts of growth by land-use type. In 1982, the city assembled information on the fiscal costs and benefi-ts of office uses in the city. Consu,ltants calculated the revenues generated by offices and comparcd this to the public costs (hctudhg general fund expenditures) attributable tc:,these landuses (Mamiltoa, Rabinovi,t.z,and Szmton, Inc., 1982). They figured office workers (and clientek) as one portion of the total number of people ushg everyday city services and keilities (e.g., s t ~ e t sparks, , police protection). 'This kaction of the total publ.c costs was assigned to office uses and compared to revenue generated by office buildings (using a r a n d m sample of huildillgs stratified by building size). At the same time, surveys of oMice employees were used to estiznatc?the aflfordablc housing demand generated by office uses, Based on the assembled information, 5mta Monica" pparkdhousing fee for office development was assessed to offset the proportima.t.ecosts to the city of this form of growth. In 1990 the city calculated the net public costs oi all nm-residential.development,

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using the 19% study as base information, and found that, with the exception of hot&, c o m m e ~ i ddevelopmentdid not generate revenues beyond their costs to the city (Economic Research Associates, 1990).Development opponmts frequently cited chapter and verse from the city's own studies and database to argue agak~stfur&er commerilial developme~ztand public/ private vezztures. Santa Baibara seemed to have even more cornplete self-knowledge. Using the information assembled through past pi ing efforts fincludilzg a study by Che consultaMs who assessed fiscal jlnpacts for Santa Monica-see Economic &search Associates, 19861, Santa Barbara plarzners wew able to judge projects in terms of their impacts on carrying capacities and the types of mitigations that might offset negat-ive efiects. Because they knew a project" pprirna facie impacts, city officials we= able to know in advance wbat kinds of impact reports (contaitling what sorts of specific in:ormation) to requirf-?,Politicd leaders might not albvays make use of the best informaticzn available, but plaming informtion was a resource that could be mobiljzed by gmwth opponmts, just as it was a constant source of informat.ion for project: sponsors, Santa Barbara's effort to link plamhg ana1ysisf h f o m a t i m bases, and long-term policy to population goals rendered plaming information a more potent political =source. When Santa Barbara planned for the future, it plmned with an end state in mind (a glvm level of population, types of physical configurations, and level of infrastmcture quaiity) and could evaluate any project in terms of its eMects on that end state, Riverside had a weaker base of pl ing knowledge. Enformation on gm"& impacts was focused narrowly m d prc.parc.d mostly under the patronag of project spctnsors. Public leaders stil assumed, without evidence, that increased commercial growth would solve their "growth problemffof too much hcrusing and too few jobs, rather than aggravate it by generating still more of both. In the words of the Rj.versjd,e planner, '"There is just a general assumption that office, commercial, and industrial are good.'"g Even the slow-growth officials supported new commercial/indu,stria.l development wjthout bowing whet-her it solved or created fiscal (or other) difficulties.

Resisting Gruwth: A Matter of Degree Projects that were approved and built in the t h e e study mas reflected, in physical form, the degree of gsowth coaiiLion influence. Rverside planners might have iiked to do morc but ended up accepting most of what developers pmpoxd-including the size, density, and design--cm all but the exceptinnnl project. Little was done to extcnd em\riJ-onmntdrevkw beyond state mandated requirements or to enhance cihizen hvolvement.

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S m t , Barbasa, on the other end of the scale, set the tightest physical lirn-

its on developments a d extertded environmental review to even the smallest:commercial,projects. Santa Monica permitted mwh more physical development but steered projects strongly toward communit)r plann w and "revitalizaticmmpals. Wi&h tbis populist political context, citizen involvement was promoted heavily (including city funding of land-use watchdog organizations), but environmental review was less universally apy>lied than in Santa Barbara. The different Local pl ing cmtext.s shnyed the negotiakg stmce of city planners vis-8-vis developers, as we see in the Santa Barbara and fiverside msponses to proposed auto malls. Smta Rarbara officials saw good reasons to approve (and even promote) m auto mil at t-hat site but were unwillirrg to concede pliamhg standards or other communi.ty goals (e.g., affordable housfng) in order to get it. Riverside officials, on the other hand, we= so anxious to Land another auto ma11 that they rushed through a full package of concessions for the developes. Mrhm planners had the political and administrative suppcrrt to say "m," as in Santa Barbara, they were in a posi.dinn to force negotiation. Otherwise, as in the :Riverside example, public concessions were made up-fmnt, leaving developers maximlam ftertibility over the content of their projects, with little or no accomtabiLity for negative ixnpacts and public costs. Ironically, this situation seemed to provide a context in wfirich projects were more likely to be approved but were then Left unbuilt-financial gains may have been made by speculating o~zproperty values, but profits were not pmduced by physically developing the land. On the whote, however, and compared to past eras, growth i n t e ~ s t s did not go unchalle~zgedin m y of our study sites. Property rights were still accorded deference in alf places, but officials included a wider range oE cornstituencies and issues in the process tban they wollld have in any of thcse cities in the prc-environmental era. Still, the Lewl of chauenge was, as we now have documented, very different across our three "growth-control'kities. In the next chapter we will lay out the resdts in terms ol specif2 sorts of public bemefits ga,i,ned by each approah to ~ g ulating development.

Motes 1. For examples of past surveys, see Assodation of Bay Area Governments, 1980, 1984; Construction Industry Federation, 1988; Cervero, 2 988; Frank and Dt~w-ning19138; Kaiser, Burby and Moreau 1988. 2. Interview 015. Far explanation of interviews, see Chapter 2. 3. The actual pro>jects are: Santa Barbara, 801 Chapala Street, mixed-use office/retail; Santa Monica, 1250 Fourth Street mixed-us office/retail; Riverside, Spruce Apartments, 2000 Spruce Street.

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4. We excluded redevelopment or revitalization projects because the proactive go>vernmentinvolvement muddles the distinction between developer and regulator. 5. The actual best case prc)jects are: Santa Barbara" "Ranchu Arroyo" mixed use residentiallauto mall, Hope Avenue and Hitchcock M y ; Santa Monica's "Water Garden" "mixed use office-retail, bordered by 26th Street, CoXctrado, Cloverfield, and Olympic; Riverside" ''La Sierrap%ixeb Use Development, indiana & La Sierra Streets. The "La Sierra" project ended up not being built under the cmditions specified in the initial planning documents because of rmanticipate8 neighbarhood protest, circumstances we describe in the text below. 6. intewiew 834. 7, Tntemiew 015. 8. Santa Barbara also allctws even higher densities (up to 127 unttslacre) fc)r studio apartments in the "transiticmal" zones around downtown tcr encourage housing there, ano>therplanning goal. 9. Inleiview 015. 10. In XGverside, rezoning to allow apartments is what generates most ogposition (seebelow). 11. The Riverside planner indicated that Riverside would also not rule out higher housing densities, if pmpc~sedby the developer. 12. Interview 036. 13. interview 040. 44. Interview 040, 15. For description and analysis, see Office of Planning and Research, 1986; Duggan, Moc~se,and Thornas, 1988, l et. Interview 082, 47, The rules in surrounding Santa Barbara were also stringent. in a comparison of fou&een cases throughout California, researchers found that Santa Barbara County required EIXZt; on the highest prc>portionof prc)jects flandis, Penclall, 01shantiky, and Huang, 1995). 18. See Torres, 1990, for coverage of the Los Angeles case. 49. Interview 040.

Indirect Effects: How Building Rules Make Growth Different

The rules developers m s t navigate to get their projects approved clearly affects the type m d size of developvary across our cases. This variatio~~ ments that authorities allow Different approaches to growth control guide developers toward satisfying particular local pbnning goals; we realized this as planners gave e x m p k s of the kinds of prqects they would approve (and had already approved.). Here we systematically compare the ~lationsbipsbetween buiiding d c s and the achievement of larger policy goals. Growth ~ g u l a t i o n sprwide local regulators with opportunities to control the kin& of spillovers that most concern them-or, to take the mirror intage, to engender the kinds of eornmu~~ities they most wish to sustain.. Recall the local planning ""agendas" we described in, our presentatim of the study sites (Chapter 2). Santa Monica placed high priority on social equit;v but &so on the scale ol development and on environmental impacts*Santa Basbara's central concern was the texture of the physicral city and its natural environment, with secondary put:still substantial) attention to social equity. Riverside aimed to build the local ecmorny and job base, with a lesser, but still present, FRterest in environmental pmservatilm. Altfiotrgh we rejected the idea of using a sistgte rneaszlrc for the clegxc of growth control (as explained h Chapter 3), we found it usehl to compare t-he implementation of particdaf types of ~gulation-like the fees charged for traffic mi.ligation or affordable housing contributions requircd of commrcial develspment projects. We compIement our yualitative comparisons Zly cclntrastitlg the fees that wew collected for particular purposes: rnitigaling traffic, preserving xlatural environments, maintaining affordable housing, providing social equjty, improving

Indirect Efiects: How Biiildi~zgRU~LTS n/lake Growlfr.Dtflerer~C

105

urbm spatial, form, and chancing project aesthetics. Again, we use the six project proposals as cmcrete ~fertmcepoillts to compare the prcrjects" pubjic benefits.

Ili-affic shapes the everyday experience of getting around and being in a place, afkcting safety and giving localities their mny variations of small-town, big-dty, or suburban kel. Maxraghg these circulatory systems also affects land-use patterns, including tlne orientation and design of all other land uses. Road access distr;ibutes rents and nuisances in modern cities. At an ecological. level, the astmishhg amount of spac oftcn close to one-third-devoted to paved streets, sidewalks, driveways, garage" a d htercbanges impacts ground water valily, the recharging of aquifers, erosion, m d coastal outfdls, as well as wil,dl.jfehabitds. In fiscal terms, soking traffic overloads c m be extremely expensive, since solutions are usually implemented after the fact. Cities may be faced with buying developed properties at prohibitive costs to expand old roadways or build new ones, The alternative is to limit traffic demand (a ct,mmon and powerful impet-us for gmwth controls) or arrange land uses to reduce trmsportatian needs or at least mhimize chaotic outcomes, A sirnple reyuirement that a road entry be moved from one side of a prcjed to another can kave sipificant preventive impacts. Gaining initid cmlrol over how much traffic a project w311 geinerate c m minimize a wide variev of impacts. At the broadest level,, each city had some form of policy aimed at controlljng traffic eMects. Santa Baibara's transpmtation requ2emem.t.swere the tightest and wese applied most consistently. The city charged developers $2,000 for each peak-hour trip generated by even routine prcljeets, at least in the dowintown area. Riverside never charged this type of fee under any ci~urrrstance.Santa Monica had no standard. trafEic fee and often kvied none, even on larger projects. For example, neither the mut h e Santa,lMolnica prnject (which included 321 parkkg spaccs) nor a hotel with 221, parking spaces that was approved. the same year required any traffic fees. But the city did levy a hefty $3,900 per generated trip on Mmica"*"Centrt~,its best-case project. The amou1nt of parking provi,ded in this project (see mota on page 106) gives one a feel for the traffic it generated, ers in virtuaq every jurisdiction we shtdied rttgarcied traffic as a major problem affecting local residents. In revkwing each of their bestcase projects, planners in our three principal cities weighed trafific impacts heavily, Santa Barbara clairned to have improved traffic conditicms by alllowkg the Rmcho"""Barbara praject because the required road impmvements enhanced th "level of service" at surrwnding ixrtersections;

Indirect Efiects: How Biiildi~zgRU~LTS n/lake Growlfr.Dtflerer~C in their best-case projects, Santa.Monica and Riverside both secured more traffic improvements or fees than ever before. The Santa Barbara and Riversi,de project a p p r o v d ~ a l l e dfor Che develnper to make about $3 miflion in direct traffjcimprovemnts. In aiverside this amnunted to onethird of fie total costs for needed improvements, whereas t.he Santa Barbara develoiper shouldered all costs. h other words, Rverside developers paid $4.00 per square h o t of cmmercid/retail Boor space, compared. to thr whopping $92.00 per square foot paid by developers in Santa Barbara."e dcveloger of the Santa Monica best-case pMcct paid $6.4 million up-front for traffic improvements-$5.00 per square foot of floor area, an amount augmented, on this particular project, by a $200,000 annual transportatim-demand management fee. Stilf, even after thirty years the total. trafiic mitigations per s p a r e foot of floor area would be lower in Smta Monica than in Santa Barbara, C)n the bigger prctjects, Santa Esarbara officials collected strikingly morc at the outset for traffic improvements than either of the other study sites. But they also required traffic mitigations on small prcjects like Barbara I'lacc (including free employee bus passes and shokvers for those cornmuting by foot, bike, roller-blade, or other form, oi self-prclpulsion), The three cities also differed in their follow-firough on traffic reductions. C h its best-case projed, Riverside imposed a laundry list of recarnmended mitigations (e.g., van pool incentives, preferential parking for ridesharers, bikeways, and bike parking) but estaMished no mechanism to assure that any of them wouM be implemented. Monica""*Centrc, on the other hand, offered an incentive for follow-through: .Any traffic reductions accomplished after construction would be counted directly as a credi,t against the annual. traffic fee. 'This was an exeeptiond case for Santa Mmica, however. Up to 1990, the city had done less than Santa Bahara to evaluate traffic impacts comprehensively and to n-titigate new development. Fol,lctw-upin Santa Monica m d in Santa Baibara, dthougb certainly mart. consistent than in Riverside, was problemtic, in that even a substantial city staff and watrch-dog citizenry could not make sure that every stipulation was obeyed. 'The Smta Barbara County auto dealership fiasco (across the city lisle h neal-by Goleta) illustrates a larger class of follow-up difficulties (see Cl~apter4). In Smta Barbara, any project: that sent as much as one new peak-hour auto trip through an "impacted, intersection"' (one Lalrrady operating dose to capacity) had to prowide mitigation. Public officials would not allow much widening of roadways (becausc of issues of commmity character)-even if developers were willing to pay for them, Limits on road expansion, fiat;, becamc. a potmtially effective growth limit, independent of the land-use restrictions at.tached to any given parcel, Although we found. no evidence that traffic design had reduced aggregate levels of development, we observed instances where traffic standards

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guided projects toward one site over another, thus Laltering the geography of development. This was clearly a stmnger possibility in Santa Barbara than in the other two jufisdictions; and wf7en it occurred, it was regarded by planners as a superior method compared to requiring complex mitigatims at a bad site.

Natural Limits .h lack of wder is the chrnnic problem for % a t k m Caiifornia dcvelopm a t , solved. over the years only through extraordinary feats of engineering and politics, and by grossly disturbing natural Imdscapes, near and far. Santa Barbara and Santa Mollica commercid developers had to oMset new demands for water by achieving conservation at the site or elsewhere in the city. Santa Monica introduced this ~ q u i w m e nbecause of t Ii-mited wastewater capadty, hvhereas Smta Barbara was conservi,ng local water supplies. The five-year California drought of the late 1980s brought mom stringent standards; botSl cities ~ q u i r e d of new development that it produce water savhgs equal to half the previous on-site water use. To appreciate this in real terms, developers of a 100,000-square-foot office building in Santa Monica had to ~ t r o f ian t elementary school with mom water-efficient toilets and plmbjng at a cost of about $35,1101). Our "project-peddling'" with plaslners did not include a detailed analysis of the nabral characteristics of each site or of how approvals dealt with e~~vimnmental spiJlovers, a fact that limits o~trcomparisons. Some entaI rcquiremmts made in Santa Barbara-for example, the protection of creek drainage at Kancho"**Barbara-may have been due to unique characteristics of a particular site more than to a difference behnieen localities. Still, we c m draw some conclusions about how our study sites managed natural impacts. Mlowing only smaller scale development, as in Smta Bar'oara, creates less traffic congestion, which has positive air quality outccrmes. S m a Monica" restrictions on wastewater production helped stave off expenditures for new groundwater control systems, while also limiting, to some degree, pollution in Smta Monica Bay. Santa Barbara found some ways to reduce solid w a s t e f o r example, by requiring that the local newspaper .facili,ty use =cycled pulp in its daily editions as a condltim for expansion of its production. Fkally, policies g w eming ianliscapiq, ~vegetatic-tn,and graeting had direct conseyucnces for plants and wildljfe. Santa Rarbara Cowlty rclquired developers not just to plmt sonnething but to pl.esenie the mix of local vegetation, This requirement helped sustain ertisting ecosystems by blocking exotic species and fostering critical nnasses of native habitats. Such requirements can also give wildlife corridors some chance of remaining htact-all of these

Indirect Efiects: How Biiildi~zgRU~LTS n/lake Growlfr.Dtflerer~C

considerations were often on the table h Smta Barbara (both city and county) negotiations with developers.

In terms of houshg aid,, no exactions k m new development in Santa Monica could rival the massive effects of rent control. Nevertheless, Smta h/tonica used the development process to =cure still more affordable housing. Characteristic of Santa Monica's poljtical style, a planner put it bluntly: 'Troviding more huusing is much more important than prowidhg new o f k e space for accountants or somehodSr,""" Santa Karbara's housing exactions rivaled Santa Monica's in ways we did nut expect, Indeed, it is something of a challenge to determine which city had the tou@est ~guiations(putting aside Santa :Monicafsrent conh e much trol law). Bath cities had estabjished methods to d e t e r ~ ~ how developers t;hould contribute toward affordable housing, Smta b i c a used a fee per squartr foot on office projects m as a set portion of new residential units. h Santa BaThara, planners ca:lculated the increased demand for Lafiordahle housing caused by each comercial or industrial. project (wsidential prcrjects had no afSordable housing mquirements unless the developer wmted bonus densities)" Using the Monica Tower project as a basis for comparison, Santa Monica collected $1.63 per square foot for housirrg, a total of $152,325.Vanta Barbara planners estimated such a project would generate demand for thirty-six aifordable housing units, requiring a houshg payment of $2.4 million, or $15 per square foot (amounting to a $39,000 srtbsidy per housing unit), nnakhg the Santa Monica kc appear very low. Ratlncr than paying fees of this kind, Santa Barbara develogers had elected the other options of build@ affordable hcrusing m-site or ofhite, or oE slrbsidizing eltisting housing to an aMordable level. In the two years the housing fce had been in effect (since 1988) no builders had. achaally paid the in-lieu fee for affclrclablc hcrusing-choosing to provide comparable housing in some other way. Another way to compare the gains in lower cost housing is to figure the rent or sales revenue that developers lose over fie long term in meeting housing requirements. Santa Barbara developers had to guarantee that rents would be affordable to moderate income families for seven years-for example, a family earning 80 percent of median income would spend a maximm of 30 percent of thcir earnings on rclmt."~anta Monica required that housing remain affordable to moderate income families for a period cJf fifty-five years. Because of the longer term, Santa Monica's requirements seem more stringent than Santa Karbara's, but Smta Monica r e q u i ~ da much lower number of on-site affordable units.'

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The number of affosdabfe units and the term of affordability both figured into the cost of hcrusing mitigatims in "lost rentaff For rents to meet a%orda,hilitystandards in Santa, Barbara in 1,991)they couXd not exceed $862 per month, The ""lost rent""would then be the difference betwen this figure and market rent. Since data on market rent for these units were not a~railhle,we estimated conservatively the total subsidy that developers put into affbrdable housing. For this exercise, we assumed that market rents equaled 30 pereent of tke earnings of a fanlily at median income (probably an underestimate given the amount families spent on rents in the late 1980s). The '"ost rent" was then the difference between affordable rent for a median income household (30 percent of median income) and affordable rent for a moderate income household (30 percent of moderate income, where moderate income is 80 percent of medim).A Using C%le "lost rmt" formula, W compnred the houshg subsidies in Santa Barbara and Smta Monica based on the case of Monica Tower. ldnder Santa Barbara review, the project developers would have had to provide thirty-&Xaffordable housil~gunits for sevm years, entailing a subsidy of $651,672. Had Santa Monica required developers to build affordable housing rather than pay the housing fee, they would have asked for five affordable units fnr fi,fty-fiveyears, The subs-idy would have equal& $513,480. This amount far exceeds the $152,325 they did collect but still falls short of the Santa Barlnara subsidy. Because developers in Smta Monica had a clear financial incentive to pay the hotrs-ing fee rather than build afforbable units, the Santa Barbara housing exactions turn out to be far more stringent.7 For every square foot of t m e r c i a l developmalt allowed, Santa Barbara demanded more investment in afforda.ble housing. But in absolute terms, one might expect Santa Mmica to lead in affordable housing gains since it had more techniques fos gencra.t.jng aMordable hotlsinp, through development approvals, including inclusionary zoning (stigulating that all residentiai prrrjects must include affordable units), bonus del~sities,ofrequirements, m d development agreements.8 Santa Barfice mitigatio~~ bara did, not have inclusionary zoning, and housing mitigation for commexid dewelopment was not r e q u i ~ duntil 1988. f4ut it turned out that of affordthe variety of exactions did not necessarily predict the arnou~~t able housing produced.. mmugh 199@Smta Nonica had gained sevrsntysix affordable housing units tbrclugh inclusionary zoning ~ q u i w m n t s . 'The city did not tmck the amount of aMordaMe housing gained through bonus density allowances, but housing staff estimated a totai of no more than fifty units t h r o w 1990. During the s m e periictd, Santa Wfonica collected more than $11.26 million from a comt?innl-iornof office mitigation fees, in-lieu fees for inclusionary zoning, and hollsing exactions h l u d e d

Housing ee3nslt.rucCion ir-z Santn Bnrbnm

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in large-scale development agreements, By 1990,162 unib of affordable housing had been produced with the help of these funds (leaving a balance d approxjmately $5.2 nnillion). At that rate of s~lbsidy,the city codd. potentiallqi assist mother 140 units. In Smta Rarbara, the housi~~g mitigation progrm had produced meager results, only seven units bp 1,990. But 354 bonus density units had been built, The total of all the exaction programs suggested that more housing was on-line in Santa Barbara tban in Santa Monica (361 versus 238 housing units). If we included Santa Monica" surplus housing funds, Santa Barbara fell somewhat behind, but this comparison did not account for the subsidized units in the p i p e h there, whjch woUld again place it in the lead. If we were to add further refinemetnts to reRcct Santa Barbara" ssmaller popuXation size, lower levels of poverty, and more modest commercial expansion, its relative performance would appear still stronger (again,however, ornitting consideration of the crucidy in?portant Santa Monica rent control program). Although Santa. Rarbara may have constrained new housing supplies &rough its zonhg and other cmtrol regulalions, it set the pace in producing affordable housinge9 In addition to addirtg affordable housing stock, Santa Barbara and S m t a Monica have guarded existing supplies. In both cities, developers were required to replace my affordable housing units that they might destroy. Santa Monica extended, the same logic to ]low-costhotel lodgings as a way to prcltect single-occupancy dtvellings that sheltered people who othervvise might be homeless-10 In aiversi.de, neither commercjd nos residential, developers were required to provide housing mitigation. One might argue that this was justified because the primte market provided lower houshg costs rclative to the Los Angeles region, But rents that seemed low from a regional perspective were beyond the reach of lower income Riversiders because their incomes were also lower, Xn 1990, a moderate-incomc family of two could afforcf onfy $433 per month, compared to the $545 per-month market rent a&ed at the mutine project, &erside Arms. For the low-income segmnt of Che community, earning less than 50 percent of median income (the population targeted for affordable housing in Santa Monica being in 3990), the rents at fiersiclte Arms would have to have been slashed to $271 per month. In relative terms, growth in Riverside was not addressing u m e t local b u s i n g needs, though it may have provided some needed supplies fnr the b a d e r region.

Social Equit.y. Santa Monicds e~nphasison social ewity took the form of a wide array of '"hkages" h which developers wese asked to deaX with social problems

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that only indirectly, at best, wese created by the htrusion of their projects. This required not only a particlaiar brand of local poli~calwill but also a good mowzt of legal h c s s e that might not have occurrcjd in places with less ingenious m d tenacious leadership, The city crrdd not ""take'banything from kvelopers without facing litigatim The key test of exactions ul-rdcr thc taking doctrine was whel"ner or not a city" demands were linked dimctly to problems caused by the projed itself. There had tcr be a "nexus," in the legal language, between a problem creat-ed by the prnjed and the mitigatio~zthat was required. 'The naturc of local social protzlems, as opposed to issues like traffic c ~ a t i o n , made them hard tcr pin to any speccific p'oject, or indeed to any projects at all. Sometimes, as when a given development eliminated poor peaplc" housing, a case codd be made that aid to the homeless should be provided to deal with t e potential efkcts of the development. But to provide still additional aid to the homeless \zrhen the project did, not destroy housixrg was quite another matter. Santa ikfonica bypassed the nexus test by using devebper agreements, transforxning an instrunnemt colrrmonly used to buffer developers Erom future environmental regulation or political interference into a tool for ovation. Under such agreements, specific conditions (which can be more or less slringent than prtlvailing policy) are worked out wilh the developer on a case-by-case basis. Far Monj.ca*""Centre, the developer a g ~ e d to put up $300,000 for homeless services a d $150,000 for public art and on-site child castl (see Photo on page 7,1,3). In other projects, Santa Monica required job trahing and affirmative action programs. One prospective developer responded to neighhorhocld demands by offering a straight 6 percent of the $43 million dolllar project costs to the local neigmorhood group to use as it saw ft (Fulton, 1985: 138). Developers went along with such exactions, quite w a r e of the det o m $ nexus test, wh.cn t-hcy betjeved that their projects were still profitable, Some resented the method, but strident opposition and the legal hassles were not worth a fight-so long as agig~gatecosts were =asonable, givezz patelztial returns. Such social welfare gains were not a standard feature of building rules h other locali~es,ncrt just because of the legal issues but also because the necessary underlying political p ~ s s u r e swere just not. stro~zgenough in any place besides Santa Monica. The larger ideological.stmckrms inplay in this city during our stucly period d o w d a new arena-the development process-to broaden toward scxial welfare issues. Development became another site oi the city3 ddisthctive social welfae stance, evidenced. as well by its prcrgram of free daily meals cm the front lawn of city hall and by m zlnwillinpess to prosecute peaple for sleeping out Altlrrough the city's policies were not accepted by all segments of the c m i v , and although

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they were altered, substantially h later years, Smta Monica had come to an uneasy peace with its visible homekss population (see Photo on page 115). In Santa Karbara, social missions were ncver as important a part of city programs as they became in Santa Monica. The community was divided on aid to the homeless. Some perceived the highy visible homeless population as a visual blight on. the handsomely tended environment and as a rude detraction from the tourist economy. The city approved oceanfront developments that wiped out thr town's established "hobo junglc"" and in one instance wantonly cleared vegetation that otherwise shielded homeless encampments from public view and in public official surveillance. h 3991) city crrdjnance prohibited sleepi~~g places. R-ie ordinmce was aimed at the homeless and drew nationwide publiciQ induding a running commentary by Gary Rudeau in his syndicated Duoaesbzlry comic strip, It also generated local demonstrations led by national advocates of the hornless, further complicating local political dynamics on the issue. Even so, advocates for the city" aLaffordable housing programs used the prospect of still more homeless as a talking poiM to safeguard and expand rnitigaG0n.s for any redevelopment effort that might destroy hexpensive units. hyuiring direct aid to hornless people f m developers, however, was not in the realm of political possibility. Even on less controversial social issues like child care, Smta Barbara was agai11 less motivated than Santa Monica, partly because its leaders did not want to be seen as sponsoring dcvelopmemt specifically to gain the social payoffs. Comment@ on Santa Barbara's only development agreewnt, our plmner infomant said: "Pl ing commissioners weren't hterested in pursuhg this approach on other projects; it was a little too much like behg inbed with the developer, approving samet2ling because of trhe money the city wodd make. The city it; pretty camfortable working with either the nexus they can estabfish on project i budget process for improvcsnents.""""From an envi the, taking cash to allow dwelopwnt was scmletlmes considwd a "'sellout"-whe'ther to gain mmey for sociai, causes or any other sort of communit_tigoal (e.g., aid to the art museum or symphony). Rkerside, although arguabty in a regim with the most severcr.emironmelntd diificz11ties and with social problcms of poverty and high welfare needs, had an even narrower range of exactions than Santa Bahara. At least in part this lack of exacticms was due to the diff;crmt political priorities of its leaders. But it was d s o due to pllblic officials' sense that they could. never get away with asking for much, lest developers simply abandon their pmposals. As the fiverside plamer commented when looking over the case studies: "It looks like people would give their grmdmother away to get something approved in Santa Mmica.. .. The traffic-demand

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management fee, art fee, hmeless fee, these would all be w d e r u l to try to get, but we would never get them out here. The developers woufd probably turn away and say, Totx are kiddbg.""" Urban Spatial Fom Growth controls can shape the particular configuration of the city-for example, by cmtralizing certah fmctions or dispersing others, by building a critical m s s of a particular type of urban agglornera.t.ionor serving to discourage it. In Santa Monica, regulations that discouraged office dcvelopment at the expense of housirrg, particularly along the oceanfront, stinnulated office construction in the areas plamcrs favored fnr the purpose (the eastern zone, made up psedominately of warehouses and ofierwise underutilized acreage). Developers built not only offices in this zone (see Photo on page 118)but also an entircly new lcind of city district with related support bushesses (ofice equipmnt, restaurants, etc.). In Santa Barbara, the only way to make it through the increasingly tight commercial developme~~t rules was to cmstruct low-profile stmctures, as exemplified by Barbara Plaza. The effect was to fill in the urban fabric rather tkan to spread it outward or to cause high-rise "bumps"' on tl-te horizon or traffic hot spots in the road system. Barbara Plaza m d e partial re-use of an existirrg but undemtilized structure, as per city preferences for rehabilitation of such buildings. The photo cm page 119 shows ancrther exarnple of this type of infill on Smta Barbam's main downtown street.. The process for gaining exemptions under Santa Barbards 1989 commercial cap also had the potential to fur&er city goals. Under the rules, developers conld replace any size structure with one of the s m e size (plus 3,000 square feet allowed as an addition to any building). This rule increased the attractiveness of =placing marginal structws, especially in the valuable downtown core (though the tough landmarks protection system pmserves old buildings of special merit). The commercial redeveloper could ascl tap the water that had been used historically on that site, thus getthg around the city's ban on necv hvater hookups. A Smta Barbara planner gave an example of t:he good fortune of one property owner who owned a large, industrial, a i r p o r t - h a - p building: ""Theyhave a significant amount of squarc footas, which was a detriment to that property two years ago. I talked to the guy today, and he has had people comfng out 05 the woodV\Iork asking llow much hr-. wants for the property, and everybody he talks to, it just keeps gojng up."= This combination of incentives reordered land markets in Smta Barbara by favoring existing density patterns across the city- and, especiallyf downtown redevelopment, a long-term planni,ng aim, Of cowse, this development connlcted somwhat with the overall goal of limiting

Santa Monicn ofice cnnslrricliltn

San tm Barbar@l'~~Fll develoklment-

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growth and further helps explain the otherwise curbus finding of so much growth under growth control (see Cl~apter12).

Architecture, lmdscape, and other aspects of tbc built environment he@ define the character of a community Every building, every tree, every sign has meaningful implications for character of place, Improvirrg the aesthetics of a place m y be a god in itself, but such ixnprovements have much broader local impacts, induding the kind of economy a place can sustain (Lash and Urry 3994; Zukin, 3996; Molotch, 3945). Locdities trYith high aesthetic resources have better opportunities to create tourist and retirement economies, particularly afnuent ones, High aesthetic accomplishments in the public envirmmmt attract cutting-edge, high valueadded industries from, for exmple, the developmmt, design, and fnance sectors, Good-looking public environments, as defined by thvse with the resources to take themelves and their industries to places that please them, attxact jndjviduais MIith advilnced tastes who then construct and demand other facilities (e.g., private homes, restaurants, boutiwes) that f u r ~ ereinforce r the ""virtuous circle'kf high amenities, high private expenditures, and betnign fiscal effect, Not only individuals have cultural capital; so do places, and with substantial consequence, Of all our study sites, Santa Barbara had the :!kid of economy most driven by aesthetics-tourism m d high-end retirement, as well as research and development, It also had the longest history of aesthetic activism and design regrrlation. This is not to say that economic interests singzllarly determined local culture. Indeed, early erforts to protect the beauty of Santa Rarbara by citizens who had made vast fortunes elsewhere created the oppcrrbnity for an aesthetics-based ecclnomy fnr later getzeriztians of fortune builders. R e city required archikctural review for every structure (it had, recall, the country's first such architectural review bomd), down to the color schetnes for exterior paint; paint cEps had to be s~~bmitted with arhitectural p h s , Many projects werc deemed to have historical or architectural impacts, especially those built in the downtown core, and therefore had to (jo before the city's official I^,andmarksCO issio~z,which provided a secand level of design review, where many cities have none. All downtown projeds must adhere strictly to the Mission Revival architectural theme that has been etched into Santa Sarbara's urban form for gnerations (see Photo on page 121); this them Includes red tile roofs (an expensive material) and, at timc.s, extensive exkrior use of wrought iron trellis and railing material (mother somewhat costly element). But-side the central core, the city foll.owed diffemt, but still relatively tight, aesthetic guidelhes.

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Design review FR Riverside and Santa Monica was generally more concerned with how a project '"it" within the irnmecjiate neighborlncrod; ers left such things as architectufal style to the developers' discretion. Tn Santa Monica, scale and compatibi.lity with immediate surroundings loom large in the approval process, often because of neighborfsfears that a project might block views or sunlight, or cllash with prevailing neigfiiborhood desip. Standards for Santa Monica" Oman Park neighborhood encouraged new development to respect the "underlying patterns and construction techniques & diverse existing architectural styles: craftsman bungaluw, Spanish co1oni.a.lrt.vival/Mediterraneanpand intctrnational styldmodern (Sedway Cook Associates, 1989: W-5). But even here, and certainly in Riverside, a far smaller proportion of projects go through architectural or landmark review than in Santa Rarbara.13

Exactions on the Ground: A Tally Between Places We have emphasized that the simple pre"nw of growth controi measzxres on the books is at best a cmde i,ndicator of wfiat goes on at ground level. Similarly, counting numbers of controls h place, including the numbers or types oE fees collected, leaves out a lot of important information, such as the actual content and appl-icationof s~tchfees and how they are triggered and calculated. High fees may indeed stymie growth, or they may instead deflect development to other parts of tkc. city with lower fees, or they may even accelerate gmwth by providhg critical public infrastmcture. High fees may create standardized costs in ways that spare developers more costly and contentious ad hoc assessments of specific project impacts. Wth all our caveats in mind, our project peddljng gives us a way to cornpaw places syskmatically in terms of the fee struckres that count most-the ones actually exercised in particular situations. We now offer a summary, based un ollr project case studics, of how exactions are used in pradice. Table 6.3 summarizes the number and t-he type-traffic, housing, parks, and sncial services-of exaclions that hvnuld be applied for the case studies in each locale, We do not include improvments at the ediate viciniy, such as upgrading adjacent intersections or viaducts, or dedicating land for paks, fire statims, or schools. We also exclude school fees from this cornparism because they were mandated in specific ways by state laws. A place that irnposed every type of fee exaction on every project wodd have a total of twenv-four exactions (four types of exactions on each of the six prcljects). We see that Santa Monjca would have cokcted the (jscatest nulnbcr of fees: sixtee11 out of: a possible twnty-four (67 percent), versus eleven that would have been collected in Smta Barbasa (46

TABLE 6.3 Case-by-Cax Use of Exactions Traific

kiousiing

Parks

Social Services

Santa Barbara Barbara Plaza Moniea Tower Riverside Arms

yes yeSA yes*

Ranchue""Barbara hlXc~nica***Centre Rii~erside"~"Place

yes yes yes

no no no

no yes

Yes

no no no

yet;

Yes yet;

no no no

Santa Monica Barbara Plaza Moniea Tower Riverside Arms

no no no

I%anch~***BaY;bara yesb yes M~nica""*C-entre yesh Riverside***X31ace

no yes yet;

no yes yet;

yes yes

)res yes

Yes

Yes Riverside

Barbara Plaza Moniea Tower Riverside Arms

no no no

no na no

yet;

Rancho"""Barbara M~nica***Centre Riverside**"Place

no no no

na no no

yes

in designated traffic impact area

" i f approved by developer agreement

Yes yet;

Yes yet;

yes yes yes

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TABLE 6.2 Use crf Exactions by Projed and by Type

Land Use Residential Kverside Arms OfficeIRetail Barbara Plaza Monica p~ower Monica***Centre Of-flceIRetail/Residen tial Ra nchc>***Ba rbm Kverside***B1ace Routine versus Best Case Routine ProjectS Best Case I""rojecfs Exactions by Type Traffic Housing Parks Social Welfare

percent) artd six in &erside (25 percmt). W can anaiyze these exacticms ftdrt%ler,in terms of project type, rotltjnc versus best cases, and exaction type, as h Table 6.2. Park fees were the only type of consistent exaction that applied in Riverside but not in eirher of thc other cities; 17iverside colected park fees on all new construction projects. In this regard Riverside seemed to "an at Barhara, wbich does not coliect the stmdard park fee ausuvasS thorized by "tat" law However, as a Santa Barbara plmner explalirned, it is unlikely that Riverside had a higher prioriw for parks than Santa Barbara. Rather, the state limits the use of these f m d s to land acquisition (versus park developmetnt or maintenme). Shce the city of Santa Rarbara a l ~ a d yowned thousands of acres of undeveloped park land (acquired in part through land gifts to the city), the city did not collect the state authorized feef which only would have added to the task of developing and mahtahing the lands they owned. r Compared to Everside, the other two cities imposed a far g ~ a t evariety of exactians. Santa Rarbara cotlected the most exactions on routine projects, always assessirmg developers for off-site traffic impacts, But Santa

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Monica was the only city that colkcted every klnd of exaction on at least sow of the cases, and it was also the only city to fund specific social services from development fees. Smta Mmica collected especially on bestcase projects, Althougk fee djfferences cmform somewhat to expectations, some things are "'off," such as Riversi.dets spark fees. Nor do .fee schedules provide a clear undcrstandjng of diffesences between Santa Monica (which collected the largest number of fees) and Santa Barbara (which collected them on a wider range of pmjects). Most intportant, and returnkg to ottr larger &erne, any fomalized method of fee counting does not capturn the far-reaching changes in devebpmmt mview practices that can incorporate regula.trian into the very desip, cmtent, m d scale of develoipment* fn Smta Barbara and Smta Monica, land policy and rule implementation gained a certain autonorny frorn market impulse alld became an arena for more conscious m d pmticipatory decisionmaking. .A general policy such as Santa Bart7ara"s commitment to neighborhood compatibility was invoked rather consistently to pmduw conforming building usages, hejght Ijmitations, oftsets, and aesthetics. .A 5ant.a Karbara plmner compared the city with other places he had. worked: "":fave seen a gwater tendency here to want to live within the regdations. Even down to signs.. .. This commw~itytakes every square inch oE sign surface seriously.""Through the overall politics in place and the ""wall of no" that developers might face, Santa Barbara and, to some extent, Santa Monica were able to advance their own plmning goals &rough the ahinistration of project approvals, Building rules helped Santa Barbara push environmentai quality-extending from the aes~~etics of particular builcjings and €%coverau uibm form to traffic impact and the consumption of natural: resources (particularly water and open space). Santa Barbara also leveraged the rules to gain agordable housing, in part by gmtFr~gexcess densities fnr developers cvho would provj,de it. In Santa Monica, resistance to growth distinctiveXy leveraged some social service gains (inaddition to other benefits), including protection fnr those most threatened by gentrification and redevelopment, like renters in the path of high density comme~ialventures. Santa Barbara and Santa Monica had different priorities but also different routes for gaining their particular mix of physical and social gains. Santa Barbara stressed limiting dcvelopmnt altogether m d then used those limits, sometimes urnittin& to shape prcjccts so as to least harm the physical envil-onme~~t and the supply of affordable housing. Santa Monica continued to allow high levels of development but relied on a strcmg left politicai base in addition to ertactims and pioneered a variety of scxjal benefits. Both cities pmticipated in ad hoc exactions, but Santa Barbara bad m o r ~standardl,zed modes for handling its developmnt

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linkages, whemas Santa Monica relied more thoroughliy on developer agreements. Although this "flexibility'" enabled these two cities to gemrate higher henefts from devdopers, the s m e type of flexibility codd generak the opposite results in Riverside, as when a zoning change or a developer agreement (especially in unincorporated areas) led to staged projects hsulated from fut-ure review. From this broadcr perspective, we can see that in places like Riverside land-use policy cmthues to be led by developers, with minimal changes in the way things are done. In IXiverside, even long-stmdislg land-use controls, like znning rules, were altercld routinely to accommodate the requeds of developers. The innovations &erside htroduced in a best case were routine in communities with strmger growth controls. Even the most direct impacts of deveiupment-on traific and public infrastmcturn-were assessed in n m r w terms-aIculated as though the fiscal cost of each unit of additional growth would be the same as the avemge cost of public infrastructure and services overall, This methodology ignortrs the acceleratkg maqinal costs of development as communities are rfr"qui~d to expmd overall, syskm capacities for road networks, hvater supply wastewater, sewer, and so forth. Riversih was probably not collecting enough to offset: the stream of presmt and fukre public costs associated with nekv development-tl?& was certainly the view of planners in the other jurisdictions, VViZchh its ediate geographical context, Riverside was fairly advanced in its gmwth management techniques, but these hnovations were not strong e ~ ~ a u gtohcrihange the heart of the process. This situation was probably fairly typicd of the new wave of growth contml localities in California, like Riverside" nneighbor Corona, Mxhich had adopted e ~ ~ o u new g h development regulations to exceed-by at least one counting-Santa Narbara as a "growth control" site (see Chapter 3), but where, nonetheless, growth was nejfher slowed nor "c~ntrolled.~~ Kiverside's gains, however small in comparison to our other study amas, did mean s o m additional traffic mitigations, at least in regard to its best-case project. The city also secured protection for its citms beltalthough the htegrity of this protection was trhrcatemed bp city comcil exemptions (especially before 1987, when voters trimmed the comcilfs ability to grant such exceptbn" and by thl;sustained efforts of frustrated 1and:hnlders who used the am:biguity of the city's generai plan to legai,ly chdlenge the citrus downzonjng that was based on that plan. At the same time, the city approved a massive amount oE development not subject to any extraordinary limitations or exactions, nor even to re~riew under CEQA. Beyond the issue of not recouping costs, Riverside lacked. the strcmg cmtrols necessary to effectively generate t-he kind of growth it wanted; it wanted to increase cmmercial developmmt and retail, sales for fiscal gains, but the rate of gain did, not approach the rate of residential building, which was we13 above robust state averages.

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127

The cities in our study areas made gahs from development through the suhstmce ( a d politics) of implementation, not just through formal rules or abstract statements (Riverside Conl-rty sounded good in these tems). All locditics had general plans aimed, at gmwth cmtrd, but they differed in content. Even more important, they dififered in their application, and in hvhether they would he used as a legd basis for limiting development or, as in the Riverside case, for increasing it. Flexible structures sometimes worked to increase demnds on developers, sometimes to decrease them. Gncrali plms and zonhg laws were monjtomd carefully at tirnes but tmated as mere paperwork on other occasions, All ollr ental rwiew programs; and following CE(ZA requirements, Chey all had sirn,ibr overall statements of i,ntent and policy. But again, local rneming was quite different, In two of our study sites, and less so in the third, growth control did change the way growth occurred. Even in Riverside, particular c m m u nity gods were enhanced by making developnnent respond to the needs and desires of citizens and local government. But the ability of jurisdictions to act consistently in the face of developer power dcpended on the surroundjng idedogical and political context, Local cilizen organization and power w r e the key to altering the terms of growth.

1. One might argue that Santa Barbara fees should be higher, since when an area is mare built out it costs more tcr mitigate an equivalent increase in traffic. But this argument presumes that the Riverside site won't eventual1y be built out, in which case the prcjject impact would be comparable in the end. Tt might be most equitable to assess project costs according to their share of ultimate buildout (where communities are willing to commit to such a limit). 2. Inteiview 034, 3. By way of general comparison, San Francisco's phonering housing exaction in the early 1980s was set at $5.00 per square foot of commercial space (Keating, 1986;).This was about half the amount the city's consultants (Rechl; Hausratfi, and bsociates, 4984) had said was necessary to mitigate the effects of office development on hausing (see Keating, 2 986: 138). 4. Unless the developer was tapping public housing funds, which had their own set of incame and rent requiremnts. 5. Instead of directly estimating the housing demand generated by a particular project, Santa Monica planners based on-site requirements on how much could be built with the $l .h3 per square foot housing fee (calculated at $30,060 per unit). 6. The amormt of annual subsidy per unit is 30 percent of the difference between median incame and 80 percent of median income ((median income x 20 percent x 30 percent, or median incc~mex .06). Far Santa Barbara-$43,100 x .06 =r $2,586; in Santa Monica-$31,120 x .Q6= $1,867.20. The income figures were provided by housing officiats in each d t y based on 3990 median incomes for a family of two.

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7. A 1991 Santa Monica initiative requiring that affordability be targeted to those below 50 percent of the median income increased the amount of subsidy in that city 8. We exdude from these totals any non-city funding prcjvided under various affclrdable housing programs (including federal, state, and nonprofit initiatives). 9. Glickfeld and tevlne fc~undthat "~risdjctionswith more growth contrc.>l measures tend to enact other measures wbch are designed to encourage the development of low-income housing" 0990: $Q); however, they did not determine tzrhetl-rer the existence of these growth control prclgrams ccjrrelates directly with the actual constructiron of more affclrdabte units, According to a 1989 study by the California Coalition for Rural Housing (CCRH), the city of Santa Barbara met with greater success than Santa Monica or XGversicteor, indeed, than the vast majority of localities in the $tat-in providing its "hir share" of affc3rdabte hc>using. This estimate hatds even after correcting for the fact that Santa Barbara" figures are inflated by the inclusion of various housing assistance prc>gramsnot included in other places" tcltafs, Santa Barbara provided 83 percent of its fair share, compared with 50 percent for Santa Monica and 37 percent for Riverside, The figures look even better for Santa Barbara when we compare the city" 'kfficial" fair share needs with data that we collected directly on the number of affordable housing units generated by development exactions, linkages, and incentives. By this measure, the city provided almost twice its fair share of housing. We caution, however, that the entire "fair share" metric is methodolctgically suspect, Under the statewide program, regions (counties and combinations of camties) determine regionwide needs and then allc>cateto sub-units (e.g., cities) their share af those needs. No standard procedure exists for either operatic~n,Leading to prima facie irraticjnatities in the data, such as the fact that small population XocaXities Like Santa C ~ MCounty Z shaw aggregate needs appmximately the same as Los Angeles County If places like Santa Cruz end up with particuijarly high needs, reRecting internal political and organl"zatic>nalprcxedures ratl~erthan housing conditions, they will appear to be fess successful in meeting those "needs*'' IQ.Jencks (1994) a-rgues that the destruct.ic>nof single-room-o~ccupancyhc>tels is the single largest cmtributor to hamelessness in America. I l . Interview 015 . 42. Interview 045. 13, A more complete comparison of design restrictions beween the three cities tzrould require peddling the projects through the architectural review process, where details such as landscaping, awnings, window and door treatments, exterior color, and. so on are hammered out. We did not do tl~js,but by reputation Santa Barbara certain1y exercises the must detailed and demanding control.

Building the Rules

h 1957, local offiicials and gmwth boosters lamched a campaign to promote hdustrial development in a l"i",QQO-acre chmk of high desert in the Antelope Valiley north of Los Angeles-not far lrom w r Riverside c m governor and the area" U.S. munities. ""Iwas a gala occasion. . . . Represe~~tative were there, as were Miss Antelope Valley Industry and M i s Goodwill Ambassador to Industry, The day of speechmaking, terming the Wlley the ""aigge" inindustrial Emp2e in the West,' was topped. by a snnic boom and the b y p i n g of a bomb. . . to make the Hrst excavation for the hdustrial park"' (Fellmeth, 497'3: 301). Today it is doubtful that local officials anywhere. in Califon-tia could open such an expmse of land to development without some form of e~~vironmental, review m d prsbably some extmsive assurmces that environmental effects were taken into account. 'There would surely be no desert bombing as a publicity girnmick, m c h lcss with t-he impl,ied sanction of state gover Beneath the nurnbers and strategies we bave been describing lies m e of the dramas of the contemporary Unjted State itizen action at the local level, rclpeated again m d again in Cdifornia and in many ot.her parts of the country over the decades since bombs were dropped on Western deserts for grand openings. In a political landscape characterized wiously as apathetic, nonparticipatory and quiescent, this is a realm where people see things they don't like m d take collecthe action. These actions are not just pubtic grousing, name-callh~g,or other personal &tacks. They take organizational life and are poljcy oriented. They are not "outbursts" ht-in the main-considered and deliberate attempts to reorganize the way community is put together. Quite beyond ""not-in-my-backyard" opposition to a specific toxic dump, highway, apartment building, or bombing, these citizm actions can have a broad conceph;lal and geographir reach [Szasz, 1994: 165-466). Although not as encompassing as Marxian or Christian utopias, urban environmentalism is mcharacteristically broad by Americm stmdards,

=(;

As is evident by the range of exactions, linkages, and programs that bave made them up, growth control and related urban environmentat programs bring into play a wide variety of social and enviro We are not arguing that aI1 growth control programs are optimal. in either a social or environmental sense. Inc~asingthe amount of land required for building lots without limiting demand for t b s c lots (e.g., through controls on job-producing office employment) may o d y spread. the s p r w l a little &inner, using up more undeveloped and agricultural land, This pseudo-control is a time-wor13 practice all over suburban h r i r a , and in our study we observed it h Comna and other parts of fiverside County, Likewise, creating wildiEe protectior7 zones in the midst of unlimited growth h surromdhg areas does not protect nature as a living system but only as an exhibit for '"outdoor education," if at all, Natufal syskms require greater spaces to reach critical ecological masses. But even though growth conml poljcies contain s m e counterproductive elements, the evidence we have gathered indicates that the net consequencewk controls have been positive. If: "all politics is local""(in the phrase of former Home Speaker, Tip ONejXI), and if the dynamics of growth control have been so important a part of local politics, then they are-potentially at least-at the heart of all politics. Any set of dynamics that stimulates n w colnmunity orga,nizations, produces additional public infornation about the social and physicd environment, and enhances the participatory level of citizens deserves a careful lnok by those seeking elms to building movements for reform in the United States, Making the s a m point in even stronger terms, Daniel :Kemmis suggests that ""puhlie life can orzly be reclaimed by understanding, asld then psacticing its connecgon to real, identifiable placesf"C19'30: 6).

Enhancing the Quality af Public Decisions Local environmcmtalism has increased howledge, not only through the prodigious research that activists sometimes carry out but also through the mvironmental:reviews that myuire gatherixrg and publicizing h i o r maticm, Atthou* our shtety sites differed sipificantly in the frrtquency and thoroughmss of their =views, as well as in the prtblicity gjven to their findings, there is no question that the amount of information available to citizens was higher in all our sites than it would have been a generatim earlier. Cities with more intensc growth controls had a more c m p ~ h e n s i v eand precise view oi the costs of development, in part because their rdi-ngs were likely to rest m full-scale environmental rcviw. Officials could make more inforl~eddecisions because the information shared, discussed, and debated had gmwn in breadth and depth.

Beycmd making individual pdicy makers, ddcelopers, and citjzens more knowledgeable of gmw* impacts, the changing knovvledge base creates a greater capacity to sdve problems co:ilectively. lhis impmves what EIkin calls "social intelligenw""(1987; foflowhg &wey 1954; and tindblom 1965, 1977). W ~ e r eviewpoinf;~are excluded, options arc. ~strirted-"problem solving is . . . likely to be ineffective simply because some desirable alternatives will. go wnexplored""(Elkh, 198T:95). Ratlnes than tallying efficiency in terns of total economic acgvity one can evaluate efficiency as the capacity for h~formedcitizenship+ome&ing that leads, says this credo, to both more sensible and more democratic decisionmak;ing. In our study areas, local envimnmental controls bmu$t a g ~ a t e dir versity of perspectives and information into the process of land regulation; not all the new input was necessarily accurate or wise, but it was unargmbiy broadening. In addition to ever-present desires of developers and (jsowth boosters, decision malters are now rnore likely to consider the concerns of other parties in the community (local residents, environmentalists, disadvantaged sociat groups); these parties often care not only &out the di,rect and imntedjate effects of development on the human community but also about the ixnyacts on the natural envirmment itserf. These shifs in concem are apparent in formal rules; more hportantly, we encomterd them in the reports of h f ~ r m a n t sand in o w observations on tfie implementathn process. New viewpoints provide a more complex calculus oE co terest and take the place of the simplislic "trade-off" between regulation, on the one hand, and economic productivity or ""effjciency"" on the other. Contrary to the standard advice that has been pushed by intluential acadelnics (e.g., Peterson, 19811, it is silly to w a s u r c local egiciency by the abiliSy of a communi.ty to attract investment. If a transaction in bushess is conducted at a loss, Fncreasing the volume of those transactions brings ruin, not solvency 'The same is true in the public sphere, Based on our evidence, slower-growth communities did not hurt themseIves by "interfering" in the capacity of developers to make their investments wherr;, and how they wanted. CiLies with tight controls still attracted investi~ent of all types and, virtually all our evidence suggests, with far more positive effects than would otherwise have hem the case. By designing p w poseful barriers to entw cornunities experie~lcedbelt= grokvth than what was otherwise in store. Drvelvpers sometimes call such barriers Hackmail, but they could also be ~ g a r c i e das merely hcrlding out for the best deal, as bushess people h o w to do. Beyond our own efforts, skrdies mount, showing that in terms of memployment, fiscal. heal-ch, crilne rates, and other indicators of social or economic well-being growth heks little-Zndeed, there is reasoil to believe that fast-growing localjties are more vuherable during economic dovvnturns,

The Inland Empirt. surroundjng &erside was the fastest growing and most loosely regulated of our study areas during the 1980s but was hit particularly hard by defense industry restructuring in the early 1990s. UnempLoyment rose to 11pescent by 1992, well above the Southern Califurnia average (Jonas, 1997: 216). This set of macro-findings further strengthells the view that Localities must scrzltjnize the hvay the market comes to visit them, m d that forgoing certain projects in certain places and time+'"oshgu them altogether-may do mortr to develop the local ecollomy than pursuing growth itself,

Regulation as Economic Boon Besides the cleverness of developers and the willirrgness oi growth controllers to ct,mpro"ise, there is another clatis of explanatim for the robust economic grow& that took place in our study areas: It may be that regulation fosters certajn kinds of development that otherwise would not take place, and thus even if some projects are lost to the locality completely (something we did not see, but m y have missed), other projects-better ones-are gahed as substitutes. More speeifirally, ccluntless commentators now urge that quality of life matters in creatjng economic growth (e.g., Porter, 1998)-Businesses in the advanced, high value-added sectors of finance and technology-those sectors that rely the most cm human capitd-want to do their thing in a place with the kind of lifestyle resources that attract the kinds of employees they need-a place with high cultural capitd and envim benefits. Technical inventions in, say, ccomputing rely on imaginative software creators, up-to-the n?inukz industrid designers, kip marketing consultants, and advanced local markrets where protovpes and early production runs can he tested. This kind of pcrstfndustriai agglomeration differs in obvious ways from a prior era's less cmplex reliance on a good port meeting up with a source of raw materials to produce, say steel b e m s (see, for example, Duncan and Lieberson, 1970; Noyelle and Stanback, 1,984; Castells, 1985). Under the new economic rclgirnes, environmental protection-at least in some hrm-can promote just those types of economic devetopment that have the best f u t u ~ (Power, 1992). Efforts to preserve open space or historical architecture can easily end up as economjc gain, even if an alternative opportunity (like an oil refinery) is "sacrificed'" in the pmcess. We have seen a n m b e r of cases hvherc regdation supports speciiic forms of economic expansion. For instance, beymd the obvious examples of to-urism and ret~ement,air ~ l i t regulations y can lead to eccmomic expansion. The first places to enact tougher standards for ajr qrxaliv emissions induce local firms in related sectors to imovate, Given broader

tsends of tightening emission c o n t d s spmadjng to other places, these same local firms hawe a first-mover advantage in competirng in an expanding market. They may even lock in a long-term advantage if the specifications of their technology define regulatory standards and if their technology becomes the basis far the manufacturing of related equipnrte11t (e.g., the pipes that lack into a filtratio~~ mechanism)"As wi& the creation of the now standad ' Q W E R P " "typewriter keyboard., m y conpetitive way of doing things must cclntend with establihed cmention and with the inertia that comes when diverse producers, users, jnspectors, governments, and firms find a solugon tlnat satisfies everyone mutually.1 Santa Rarbara's effort to cmtrtll oil projects prouides some wideace for haw regulation creates new technologies and business opportunities, Some of Santa Barbara County" strongest controls were developed specificaliy with the offshore oil industry in mind, particularly the largescale support facilities (e.g., processing plants) built on land. Tight inspection requirements gave rise, for example, to new local technologies for underwater inspection of pipelines, underwater communication devices to service the hspectors, and a new type of underwater helizet design. The local firm making the h e b e t s now has the standard. design for all underwater uses and has emerged as a significant global company after beghning as a two-person operation at the fou,nders%h.ome gaage. The underwater radio company now is a global, operator in communications, with little of its business related anymarc eirher to oil or to local development. The technologies created for undenrrrater scanning are now applied. to all m n n e r of submerged pipelines, includmg municipal outfalls. Although a search for such hmovations a d their business careers was not a subject of this research (but see Molotch, Woolley, and Jori, 19Y8), we suspect that other examples like this would be found in the 5mta Rarbara study area, in Santa Monica, a d in other places that drive hard development bargains.2

Grounding Sustainability Concrete local envim entalt policies produced the pmcticalt gains that most affected outco across our study areas. These gains were not based cm some kegfable vision oE love for Mother Earth but on a simple and pragmatic approach to mgulating development, If we were to provide one succinct su ary statement to characterize these measures it would be that they wen. &forts to prjce projects at their real valzze, setting prices to rekct spillover or neighborhood externalities as well as the informed eye could see (Navarro and Carsan, 199U.n As enviro leader Dennis Hay t it, " m e of the cltearest lessons of the last quarter century of envi ntalisrn . . . is that if you get the price wrong, any

other cure is only second best" (Hayes, 1995: 1).We have no quarrel at all with the cmgressimal Republicans' 1996 effort to require ecmomic impacts @em&-cost analyses) of any kderal pollutim rules so that regulations can be set to preserve economic vitality Rut our guess is that if such accounting were done properly-and included putting realistic prices on public assets lost to future gemerations-cfeve10per exactions would increase vastly, rather than decrease, Even within the most narrow economistric reasonhg, the expctation that development should ""pay its m way" "proves rather than distorts the market as an infarmal.ion system. The vast miqjority of regulations that we have observed across our study sites, and that we suspect make up the emironmental regulatory ~ g i m e more gelzerally, are of this sort. The irnpacts of growth controf go beymd local, economies, of course. Mihen localities take action to &crease water use, for example, they not only save groundwater supplies and protect local wildlife but also avoid, importing water from faraway places whose ecology can be spared. Such was thc; effect when Santa Barbara Colanty refrained from participath~g in the California state water project, When a Santa Monica developer pmmises that, if his hotel is approved, he will alllow no use of Styrobam, the earth will experience that much Iess of tbe material. By rewarding such offers, the city facilitates more ecologically minded approaches to doing business-yuite beyond the Styrofoam issue itself. More gmerallv, the politic& mocrd in Iocalities with growah control encourages various initiatives having to do with elzergy conservation, waste management, and pestjcide use that lead not only to b e n i p local pdicics but enhance the earth in more basic ways, Beyond being bandied about as a moral prirrciple, sustahability must be ixrcorporated into everyday experience and the built environment h order to rnattec The local constmc.tion af buildings and the configuration of settlements creates cities and societies that do or do not take more fmm the earth than the. earth can regenerate. If, as Dani.el Chiras (1995: 205) argues, ""sustainabilityis not just mother enwirclnmental issue, [but] fhcr issue of ous times,'~lhenlocal practices are a crucial focus of =form. There is at least a chance that people may extend their concerns from. their own backyard tclward the needs and problems of community, reginn, and nat.ion-kvitlh djfferent individwls reachiag farthcr, a c c o r h g to their own sensibilities and to the nature of the issues that first brought them into the public realm. Rather than being inspiwd by national c m pajgns or mobilized by the "big ten"" national environmental organizations, people start where they are at and work outward to larger issues and higher scales of governance. National envirt,nmental leaders such as L,ou,ise Hicks, Lois Gibbs, and Richard More have c o m up from Ihe grassroots and have exnesed from local concerns over the specific conditions

of life (Almeida, 1994; Aronson, 1993; Mrauss, 1989; Sziasz, 1994: 89-99),

h d even if people who get invotved initially at the local level do not go on to become national leaders themelves, they often depend on such leaders for aid heven mhor skirmishes and thus come into contact with people who have a larger perspective.

Wha Wins What?

Growth Control and Social Jzlsfz'ce Mihat do the kinds of controls we have ewaluated fmply for social justice, for extendi,ng the benefits oE life to those traditionally left out? I-lowevcr entaIism and, more specificany, growth control may be, it is w m g to think of them as detrimental to the lives of low-income people, ZJong before the modern growth-control movements, low-income people suffcred the worst environnnents, with telling effects on their heath and well-being. The vast slums of the great cities were an effluent controls. The record shows that of growth rather &an of enviror~me~ntal unplanned development yields vast degradation. And the United. Sates, a rich country built under weak controls, has long been a country Mlhose cjties m the most re~narkdblefor their high levels of segregation, privatization, and violence. In contrast, the folks "on the hill" have always known the most about what their factories spew into natum and have had the means, through spatial location and the capacity to litigate, to avoid the worst excesses of industrial activiq, as well as to secure themselves from the social effects of incquaiity. M a t is new is that wit;h growing dem~cratizatioof land regulation, marginalized communities have gained tools for resistkg effectjvely the sitirrgs of undesirable land uses in their midst. h t h e r than dividing the regurich from the poor and wl.rites from people of color, e~~vimnmental lation follows from common interests, &ring our study period, low-income communities and mvircmmentalists in both Smta Manica m d Smta Barbara tei~dedto vote together i,n local elections; bofi sides assumed that environmentalists gained their strongest majorities in working-class precincts and in those with the slrongest participation of African-Americans and Lathos (aibeit with low rates of voter tumout, which envhnmentallist campaigners tried to ralse). :111 some other cities, the formal leaders of poor and minority neighborhoods have apparentb allied themelves with growth interests (Stone, 1%8), but such coalitions were not evident h our study sites (or, irrdeed, in o&ers; see, for example, UeLeon, 1992a, 3992b). fnstead, symbolic efforts by business groups to bring i,n unions and xninorities had little success, at l a s t at Ihe bailot box. True, most environmental or;ganizations h

our study areas werc led overwhelmingly by middle- and upper-middleclass white people-with high numbers of women serving as volunteers and providing a g ~ adeal t ol the money and the skills. But this middeclass profile paralleIs the leadership of virtuallJi a l voluntary associations: These are the people with the fime and =sources to participate (Milhirath, 1965; Verba and Nie, 1972; Warren, 1963). Middle-class organizations should consciously du morc to reflect m d =present the underlying coaliticms that f o m their base of support. At: the same time, leaders of mortr traditional urban constituencies, such as minority and workislg-class neighborhoods, w0ul.d be wise to link revitalization and equity initiatives to gmwth issues in ways that parallel enwim ental justice movements (War~~er, 1997). By enacthg limits on develczpment, locdities are genuinely in a position to choose the kind of development that will do their citizens the most good-wl.ret-her in t e r m of jobs or housing or rclcreation or s o m other valued outcome. Both Santa Barbara and Santa :Wloni.caplaced high priorities on generating affoda:ble housing. Santa Barbara's control over the developme~~t process pmvi,ded a major snurce of such housing; in o ~ ex~ e ample, developers were enticed to include affordable b u s i n g by the prospect of doubling the aIZftwed densities (densities, in this case, that were higher than wodd have been allowed in Riwrsjde). Such incentives hinged on alseady established, lixnits to growth, wifiout which-it is safe to say-much less new affordable housing would have been built. fndeed, California data indicate that the cities of S a ~ t Barbara, a Santa Monica, m d :Riverside provided more than their "fair sham" of low-hcome housQ (California Coalition for Rural Housing, 3984). Perhaps this provision ol low-income housing is the result of taking planning more seriously: correlates with strong concern for meeting local housing aps, as we have implied, strong development cclntrols g m e leverage needed to gain the houskg. Our study sites do not exhaust the variety of community agendas that might orient local land developent rttgdation. For exmple, growth cmtrol in Santa Fe, New Mexico, came to emphasize the preservation of Chicano community and culture against a tide of artsy investors, newagers, telecommuters, and ~ t i r e e (?8h;lm, s 1995). WIto Can FIamess Growth?

'The successe~of Smta Barbara m d Santa Monica (campared to less evident gaixrs in the Riverside study area) arc not u t k l y random-folks in any old place are not as likely as any other to have such achievewnts. 'The stereotype has it that rich people are key. But it is not clear that wealth drove strict growth control jryt our study areas, Santa Monica was

a h i e l y diverse city and even the mem income in posh Santa. Barbara was below the state mean-altl-rough the story here is complex, since, as we indicated earlier; a si.gnificmt number of extselncly hvealthy persons did play an important fjnancial role in the city's development, Still, even in the case of Santa Barbara, it is not just wealth that explains the successes of growth control but also a robust tradition of activism and civic organization-it is in part a land-use civic tradition that directed Smta Barhara's historic spin. And, later, Santa Barbara became a university ciicy, which not only a%ected the voting base but spacvned educated activists from student, facull@ staff, and spousal, ranks (inthis, events in Santa Barhara ran parallel to ewents in places like growth-control oriented Boulder, Colorado). 'Then there was the environment-oriented tourist economy, which spun its own allies, however strategic and narrow hfocus. Santa Monica-with its weaker civic tradition, its lack of a super wealthy cllass, the absence of a major universiv, and its htercomectedness with Los Angeles-was the less obvious site for reform. And because a miljsrity of residents rented rather than owlzed their homes, Smt, Monica was also deprived of the kind of large-scale home ownership that is ordk~arilyassociated with s t r a e n t growth cmtrols (Protash and Baldassare, IS83 Yet Smta Manica, in part via the tenants' rights movemnt, did adopt siwificant. growth control measures, which highliglxts the likelihood that m m than one kind of place profile can yield land-use reform. In spite of the differences between Santa Barbara and Smta. Moni.ca, the two cities do have a commonality that we would like to advmce as something that should be considered in large-scaled analyses of grocvth-control across Zscalities, Santa Barbara and Smta Monica were localities in demand. Investors very much wiinted to develop land and to brtild buildings withh the boundaries of these cities..Santa Manica became a center of commercial expansion and, increasjngly, a place where higher-ups in the service a d entertainment hdustries wished to live. As with Santa Barbara, this demand both fueled rapid growth and roused citizens to think they might be "overmn"Yif they did not begixl to guide development, if not curtail it altogether. In this case, the common denominator was not the hcome of citizezzs but the comparative advantages of these places over others as places to live and as places to own a piece of. Given the presence of investors who wmted to come into these dties, those who regdated dcvelopms~tcodd pick and cfnoose, or at least redirect projects in d e s k d dircctbns. Agah, we are m t pmposing Chat demand is a simple explanation; many places with this profile have not resjsted grocvth at all-thd's mostly why urban h e r i c a has the f o m it now does. But it seems that investmmt dernmd,

in the recent era, has been a common characteristic of places that have been led to make the most noticeable moves towad shaping their grow6 (Boulder, again, is a consistent example). Comparative advantage is one of the ways that local changes may be ""located" m d understood within broader contexts sf economic restmctllring and ginhalization. At the samc time, we should examine how other historical conditions figure into transforming the local conditions of growth. Ferman (1996) argws that local imtikticmal and cultural factors distinguished challenges to the growth machine Pittsburgh and Chicago. Waiton (1992a: 226) s h w s how local environmental successes in the Qwens Valley of California were built not o d y on local traditicms of resistmce but on the cztltture and hstitutional structures of national environmentalism, specifically NEPA and CEQA,

Mihat about phces lower on the invesmmt-site scalwplaces whert? people of lower h c o m do unglamomus work and hvhere, most cmcially, hvestms have m l y lukewarm interest? Are these places not left out? As priviteged localities g"ifmmo mamties, don't they distance themselves h r n poor lclcaljties? W,n"t this "stratificdion of places" (Logan, 1,978) just grow more intense, creating even more unequal life chances among Americans-based m where they happm to live rather than what they do for a living? Actually, we fnund that the emeqence of growth control created cmtain posithe spillcrvers far less advantqed localities, a point sometinres noted by planners and envirometntalis& h such, places. In any ordinary competition bemeen focalities, the advantaged camunities can afford. incentkes to draw investment their way leaving their neighbors with less desirable uses. Brat in our s t d y areas, we found that under growth restrictions advantaged places djd not merely take everything; their choosiness w r k e d to their less well-fixed neighbcrrsbadvantage. First, the front-runrrers instigated s o m cmtrols that affected atl lncalities: For exarmple, the requirements that all cities m d counties have general plans, that there be environmental impact =ports, coastai protections, and cmtrols over air emissions and toxic disposal aX1 tended to emerge .from the more environmentally oriented, localities, places whose representatives in Congress and in the legislature pushed for general protections as well as pmtectims specific to their constituencies, To pick a more? specidic example, the California coastal initiative, passed at the polls by the largest majorities in the environmental bastions, applied to the Mthole state, including its disadvantaged seaside cmmunities-of which there were a good number (e.g., Eureka in the north, Long Beach in Southern California, and Avila Beach in the state" md-coast).

entalists in places like Santa Barbara were not onliy acthe on e but also plqed key roles in national enviro nizations like the Audutlon Society and Che Sirzrra Club (one of the local activists, for example, had. been conservation cbair of the nationd Sierra Club under David Brower); these n a t i d organizations pressed for statewide and national rules. Congressional representatives and those ejected to the state legislature from such places tended. to push for envt ronmentd protections, even if they otherwise took politicaliy cmservative stands. In order to gain their constituents the protection they demanded, the politicians ended up championing legislation that had much wider impacts. For example, the primary rules affecting offshorl, drilling in the United States were a response to Santa Barbara's demands, which, in turn, werc pushed by tkeir Democratic Party representatives in the state government and by their highly cmservative Republican representative (Robert Lag0marsi.n~)in t-he Hollse of Representatives, These priviIeged localities also served as litigation "kst sites." They wew the first to face court challenges from development interests. By financing and fighting t k s e kgal battles, these locatjties refjned rules and legal theories and made them increasingly bulletproof. With the legal prtrcedents already set, such measures could then be taken ""off the shelf"' by other jurisdictions. Over the longer term., less advantaged groups may also benefit from envirmmentd contrd, as neighborhood succession kings them better places than they would ot:herwise tnherit. MistoricalLy, the poor and minorities have been relegated ts those areas that were outdated, if not defiled. Industries have dumped toxirrs h t o their soils; governments have built freeways near l-heir 1mgs; their building walls kave had the most layers of lead paint. However, elevated standards of mvi sign produce places that are of higher quafity for those lowest buying pocver. It i s over the long term &at m n y em\rirnn,meWd controls have their most important benefits. Indetld, sometinnes the difference between strict rules and weaker ones is the time frame, a d the u~~anticipated future use of a given land parcel or structure, Scruthizhg projects in what are today" aaMaent areas may well protect against the risks and the negative spillovers that would come to light in the future, and especially in the Lhes of the poor (for discussjon of relakd issues, see Piller, 1991: 158-172). Finally in orgmizational behwior generally a d , we presrtme, in envir0mem.t.d policy ma3cing specifically (Dimaggio and I)owell, 1,983; Scott, 1987; Tolbert and Zucker, 19831, the simple fact of imitation is an imporovation. 01ce a number of localities estabfish tant element in policy new rules, especially places regarded as "Leading,""olfner localities follow suit. Planning professionals in the less advanced zones can point to what other places haw done. More than fostering mindlrss imitation, these

pxlecedents serve to up the ante for what is considered '*decentf'or "reasonable."' Many pbces can then get on the bandwagon, as the norm shifts toward preservkg local commw~ityand environmental qualities. m e of the reasons tl-tese new n o m s may a c t m y take hold is that when developers have been krmed down in one place, their bargaining position is wealcened vis-8-vis thcir second-choice locality. In, this way, if:localities at the top of the desira:bilit.y scale stand tough, otfier places are h a position to get more than usual from developers. As with other ejiynamics we have djscussed-technological innovat-ions, organizational acu,n?en-this rebalancing oi bargaining power operates at the global scale as well. Anything that curtails the site options of polluters may help spare goor people some of the horrors of runway shops that pokon. To return to an earlier thme, action at the local level-in this case in tbe more privileged placeehas impacts on the global system, even in localities at the opposite end of the vu111erizbiliCy. spectrum.

Cutfi~scythe Costs of I~zkrlacalColrrpefitiol~ Wi.thout toughenhg regulations at the top, every place is in a competition for lhnited amomts of devebpment-a dynarnic that, despite the loud worries about growth controls, is still far more evident and robust than the opposite tcndency of: places blocking development, In the competition to attract prcljects, places with lower comparative advantage are also li-mited in how much they can rca:lfy afford to give back, intheir in-house capacity to evaluate true costs and benefits, and in their ability to withstand the pditical pressures to settle for bad bargains. They are most likely to do thcmsdves in. Withixl o w study areas, the real pay& from these dcals was an opm question, as it is elsewhere. Smta Barbara and 5mta Monica offered "'incentives" to developers, and even though they could choose to do so for only those the projects they thought would be most desjrhle (e.g., tax-rich retailing or high-wage of"ficefunctions), they had only approximate howledge of benefits. The subsicjies they offered were probably due as mwh to the dmmroll of buskesses' demands to '"do somethhg abwt the economy" as to a dispassionate economic analysis of project consequences. h other words, these cities were able to avoid the worst kind oE bargains that play out in other plxes, but that doesn? mean t h y made optirnum deals, For ordinary places, investment chasing comes at much g ~ a t e risk. r Commenting m the United Kingdom, Swagt3 and Warde 0993: 172) say: At present Ic~calauthorities dare not cease to advertise their attractiomt cajole mobile capital and prc3vide limited incentives, Xargely because other places are doing these things, The result is probably rtxpensive, essentially futile, competition, as the Icxation deciuiom of capital are not much influace8

(most accounts of regional economic policy suggest this) and anyway success mastly meam taking investment that waltId have gone samewhere else in the [country].

Missirrg from the ordinary calculus is a cornideration that should be celntrat to regionat, state, and national pldnning policies: the net e.ffect of interlocal competil-ion on overall well-bein.g. If San Antoni.0 gabs a wonderful cmention center, some othrr city-maybe one that has already built its come~~tjon celnter and must pay off its bonds-will gain, 'ewer conventions, The dmger at the broader level is an irrational overbuil.ding of certain kinds of infrastnrcbre, m oversubsidy of growth projects, and a ratcheting down of cvhat the genccal p h l i c gains from the country's total development activity. Especially in an anti-tax period, about the only way to support public ser~icesis tl'r get that support out of projects ""upfront'" if that moment slips by, the chance may well be forever lost. Gve-backs to developers, in the form of subsidies or a relaxatiosl of standards, only exacerbate an already losing situatim. M d e r such ccrnditions, large v o l ~ ~ ~ o nfedevelopmelnt s create o d y large volumes of longterm loss, This problem can be solved in the arena of naticlnal pcricy. The U.S. governmem.t.c d d stop providjng grants for pmjects that feed int.eclocal competition, More ambitiously the federal government could eliminate tax exemption for bonds that help fh~ancethese schemes. More radically, the mtional government could., even if it took a constitutional amendment, iorbid the use of special deals to support poachirrg across jurisdiction borders. Sad to say, the substitution of a Uemocratic president (Clintm) for a Republicacr one (Bush) did little at th federal I.eveI to alter this way of doing business. b t h e r than taking an interest in the overall economic: and environmntal well-being of the country, urban po(icy-such as it has beernhas championed still more private-public partnerships in which localities are, at best, merely trading oft' losses and bmefits with one ancrther. The celebrakd secremy of the Department of Mctushng and Uhan Uevelopm a t (MUD), FXenry Cisnems, was sekcted in the first place for his success in ""bilding" San Antonio, Texas, in just this manner during his tenure as mayor. Cisncros wged all cities to be like San Antonio, disregarding th zem SW natu.re oi this competition bemeen places and the tendency to lower standards on all urban fronts. Together, Clintm and Cisneros mintaincd the casualty-strebvn urban war of atl against all. Making Markets Smarter Gsezlter local political involvement and better knowledge of the stakes of the development process inhait growth giveaways and also hold out

hope for the larger community of national intermts. Localities gain not so much from a particular rule or zonhg change or utility cmtrtll but from a gelzeral politics that is skeptical toward development. Developers cornplain bitterly, but the "wall of no" pushes them toward th kirrds of projects that satisfy local p ~ f e r e n c e m dhence toward a different kind of ""yes."Developers bear the cost of often vague m d changhg standards, to be surc, but all this is a sort of proxy for market uncertainties, h t h e r than localities competing to sell tkmselves to developers, the developers arc competing fnr pu&lic favor. The ""c~stomers"kcvhose prrzkrences must be 'fulfilfed are not just the individual end users (such as home or business omers) but the broader community as it seeks to manage and minimize darnaghg spilfover*The cmmunity or neighborhood or local govt, iP1effect, shops for the most appmprlate projects, The developer's job is to cater to the end users but also to all the "neighborsf9hat will endure the collective costs and benefits. The job of sel1;ing a project becomes more complex and demanding, but nobody ever said it was going to be easy It is a way to think about how markets a d regulation can work in tandem. In creating a private development, the entrepreneur rnust sell it twice: first as a public goad, and then to the individual end user as a private good. The free marketeers underestimate the market.. Markets can handle regulationf at least when citizens accept the basic legitimacy of the state and of the markets it mgdates. On the other hand,corruption can permeate both sphescs, with government corrupting Ihe market as l.he market corrupts the government. Conterrrpurary Russia, China, and the Italian building industry (Molotch and Vicari, 1989), to select some well-known examples, have had such a corruption symbiosis, When urban regimes are honest-and we believe that in most Localities they are-governmez~t can ehance rather than corrupt market efficiency. The market in turn, can respond to ralher than. corrupt pllblie goals. Our studies of the practice of growth control reveal how powerful interests adjusted to a new, ewrging instihttional hitmework. The shift in power created a djlferent "mvelope" within which the market worked, an envelope that induded various political, lcgd, and financial resources that were available to the growth advocates as well as to the environmentalists. The developers' lawsuits and legal strategies were just as much a part of the regulatory reality as the laws they challenged, so were their omnipresent campaign contributims, shavly increasing over time, as well as the pm-growth ed-itorializing of the dairy newspapers in every town and city we investigated, includjng the most antj-growth locales. Developmmt i n t e ~ s t did s not lose all tbejr powa, by any means, as evidenced by t-he robust growth we observed in all our areas. The onthe-ground. result shows that rather than stopping or, in most cases, even curtailing development, envimnmental reform-when it had any

effects-incorporated new envimmmtal and social consideratlions into the gmwth that took place. fn other words, the market persists as a cmcial kstitution, but now within a different sort of local framework. 'The market" rrobustness is demonstrated by the way entrepreneurs suck up opportunities left open, includillg a number of opportunities unanticipated by the regutators- More profoundly, the power of the market shows itself in the way regulation converts the city into a customer that entrepreneurs seek to satis* 'They do satisfy this customer; projects are built; and builders make money

Valuing Land and Community Clearly, the analytic division between use and exchange values does not equal a simple bounclary between c o r r e s p d i n g politicaf intcrttsts on the local scenc. Political mothations m d power-hiding ,?re much more cmplcx and contradictor).than that. The path for land development and growth has worn a clear groove t b r o q h the ine;tituticmal practices that ing in the United States, Even under the tightshape land use and pl est sets of building rules, developers make the most of a continuing systemic bias that favors growth-as described in Chapter 4 and as posited by growth machhe .crheary m d urban regime theory. Developers also tap structural resources such as mmey, access to media, and organizational capacity As we have also seen, the terns of gmwth can be shifted, bringprocess and producing a range ing new stakehoders into the regulatio~~ of distinct environmental, social, and economic results lfor communities. Building does not ntle by fiat but continues to be a centrd dynamic for cmmunities, shaping local power m d the built e n v i r o ~ ~ m e ~ ~ t . In the political push and pull of phnning for communities and dealing with daily decisions on project proposals, new combinations of exchange and use values emerge-"enlighte~~ed" &developers work with environmentalists and affordable housing advocates, builders deliver anti-goverment and anti-elitist appeals to homeowners and labor u~~ions. Against this backdrop, policy makers m d plmners are not simpIy agents of gmwth interests, but also people who advance their visions ing within their definition of goliGcal and institutional limits. h h e s of Land are beiag contbined in different ways, but the distinction and the tension between use and exchange orientatians remain embedded deeply in mainstream culture, in institutionai practices in the United States, m d , in djffemnt hvays, xross the modernized world. As long as this is true, growth machine theory will be a powerful ma1ytic tool (see also Molotch, forthcoming). I:.,ocdpolitics is the arena for this tra~sformedrelationship between state and,market. This claim runs against arguments that local politics have only declined in significance, as evidenced by dependence on national and

glabal economic forces and as marked by declines hvoting, by weakening of party machinery and by pdbacks in social provisions, Vtdhen localities step out of the )innits that go with chasing invest~~ent, they can be a meacrhgful force as a customer and proactive in influencing the very market that otherwise domb~atesthem. Il-tdeed, under the U.5. system of land-uw home rulc, they have the most pditical m d legal Ieecvay to set the terns of iPlvestment-made even more necessary by state and federal cutbacks, which have removed the subsidies that fnrmerly offset some of the costs of local development." Treating the communit)i as customer may seem an analytic sleigtnt of hmd. Ordblarily,only individuals (hcluding c o ~ o r a ~ onow n s ccmceived of as akin to a person) are thtfght of as consmers. Tn the hard-tleaded world af markets, '"community" uusualfy takes on a soft, wishy-washy status, one that developers invoke only when tbey appeal to civic pride to build support for their pmjects. When environmentalists resist on grounds that the costs of the new uses will hurt, and that marghal costs should be borne by those who will benefit, they are accused of being ""selfish," of '"pu11in.g up the drawbridge.'' h @effect,devdopess invoke community to support the idea that everyone should share the costs of gnrwth. They hold implicitly a model of a three-way cclmmunal bond among those already i,n flare, those sponsming the necv projects, and new users who will be served, Jdealf~from develrzpers"perspective, community is a mutual s u p p ~ rsystem. t OtherMJise from these quarters, community has meaning only as a '"seXXing ieature," rather t:han as an animated, active force in the world that has its own inf;erestri: a shared set of sensibilities that can, through the political process, have a palicy expression. h Paul peter so^^" ((1981) s y q a t h t i c acadernic formulalion (followhg Rebout, 1956),individuals shop for place the way they shop for trinkets and laundry soap. The place that most. satisfies pctpdar taste will attract them the best; hence laissez-fairc h land-use matters is pmbably the best policy for optimum land-use results. Although it wodd take us far beyond the focus of this book to arp;txe the point fully (but see f,ogan and Mootch, 11987), W conceive of c m m m i t y as something in which people have deep personaj and practical investments. By virtue of fowthought or accident or some cmbhation of the two, residents are not "free" to substitute one sort of city for another; they are bound to the place where they are or to the place they must move by complex, owerlapping, m d intersecting needs of love and work. The likening oE e o m w ~ i t yto ordjnary commodities that can be selected or discarded by simplc preference goes against all we h o w about the comglexity of people's daily struggles and about the way their inskumental routines, affiliations with one another, and affections toward. their physical envim ent prwide meming to life.

Balancing Commercial and Public Interests Taken singly or as a group, developers20 not usually make it their business to understand much less enhance the collective life of urbm citizens, Developers vvho embrace this sort of role, whetber im pursuit of neotraditional neighborhoads or some other valued community; are a rare exception, Indeed, the buil.ding industry does not d.o so well at protectin.g its own ""selfish"interests (they often soil their cdlective nests). If not Leviathan, then some other mechanism must come forth to coardirrate for the commonwealth+ven of the developers themselves, 7i, take the most mundane issues, government uses taxes to creak an infrastructure of roads and utilities that make real estate value possible- Zoning keeps the foulest of uses from minhg market values for everyone else. According to E h (1987), the founders of the American republic gave cclmmercial interests a special stake, but they did so not simply to further their own class i n t e ~ s t sThey , thought the business sector could provide the prosperity to sustain a democratic citizenry, but of equal i~npcrrtance, cmmercial interests could cou~zterbalanceideological "tyramies of the majority." The role of government soon became one ""notjust of securlng g socitlty""(ELkin, W87: 116). But property but of p m ~ ~ o f ai ~commercial promoting commerce is not the same as catering to business interests: "The 'founders . . . thought that businessmen" views were likely to be narrow and self--interc.sted when it came to ftrndamental questions such as hokv economic growth should be pronnoted and hocv wealCh and property in society ought to be djstributed" elkin, 1987: 1.18).For the system. to work, Citizens need to hterpret a d advcrcate public interests effectively in order to coulzteract cancentrated business power. Gaining and using this capacity is the fornative dimension of politi.cs that mattered to such classic pditicd theorists as Tocqueville (1945) and Mill (1974) (for a contentporary version, see G m n i s , f 990: 119)but that is so often forgotten today. In debating local land-use policies, citizens grapple with the commercial and public interests in quite tangible terms, irt part because they have to live wi& the results. Political and civic lcadcrs appear inc~asinglyready to sacrifice local communities and natural environments on the altar of economfc prductivity and competitiveness. Bzrsiness leaders sound the siren "wake-up cal1" for deregulation and privatization. They ask that "governments be run like a business," by which they usually mean that governments should compete against one another for the sake of their business. But ing government ""Zikt a business" would really require that governments get the most for their ""share. holders," the citizens. It would mean, as we hiwe suggested, holding out for maxirnm dvantages in the development process, rafier than nixlimizhg them. It would mean forgojng

transactions that would fail to show a net pu:blic gain, The regulatory regimes that we have described signify a generation of intervention into the urban and natural e w i s o m n t s m d show the value of just this appmach. This era of land-use intervation has worked-and should be remembered as having worked-not because it has destroyed markets but because it has challneled them by making the community itself into customer. The m a h difficulty has not been that interventions have gone too far but that they have been applied so unevenly across localities. Growth controls-and by extension, other forms of emvimnmentd rt?form-hdd out new possibilities for h e - t m i n g markets and bettering life, especially if the lesson is learned and applied mow widely.

Taking Stock of Local ContmZs Over the span of the years we studied, this ""glden age" of environmental, regulation, the inlage of local mIe-making shifted, Regulation becanne a scapegoat for other problems in the political economy hlehough the dynmics of global and national productiviq are beyond the scope of this book, we can say that in the case of California the state's especially steep job declines duritlg the recession of the early 3991)s have been quite simply explajned. Notwithstanding the cairns of busjness asld of the politicians, losses in deknse contracts, a worldwide decline in aircraft orders, and falls in construction (based, in turn, on the defense-aircraft sector drop) account for virtually atl the djfference between CaMornia and the rest of the country durir\g this period (for compelling documentation, see Levy, 1994: 5-14, 3-16, pas"im). California's sharp economic drrcli~~e was not likely a result of conspiracy-environ.me~,~taIistspulling off a land-use coup-but more a consequence of the complex political and economic forces that brought an end to the cold war. The thrust of our argument has been to deny that growth cmtrol has stopped economies or even done much to s b w them down. Hawever, we have also argued that these controls have had the real-md, in our view ffect of movj,ng developmmt that does take place in djrections that enhance both the environment and social equity These are substantive issws that can take us beyond arid debate to the fertile gromds of cmrnunity building. We arc not sayhg that these controls have been revolutionar). or that they have solved t-he relevant problems even where they have been applied most completely, Santa Moniea's use of development to aid the homeless, an ad hoc remedy dependent on the right projects coming along and on a tolerance of panhandling, has m t elinrinated homelessness, nor tfne underlying problems of poverty substance abuscz, and mental distusbance that put needy people on the streets, Despite its ambitious

housing focus, Santa Barbara still has affordability prohlemti, creatixzg a substantial number of homeless who sirnply lack tbe whe~withatto buy shelter (Rosefihal, 1,994).Wc also dottbt that Santa Barbara's rigorous exactions have improved the local environment, c o q a r e d to the options of no prqects at ail or the widespread adoption of grr_.enertechnologies. Nor do we presume that these prajects pay their own way hfiscal,terms. But we do think that these modes of development are surely improvements over what otherwise might take place and that they poifit to the kinds of solutions that might work on a larger scale and over a longer t h e Ifsame, We am arguing that tbr diwctioa of impacts was positive, not that d l problems were solved. We m k e &is case for the record because Che way these programs are remembered, the manner in which this regulatory moment is recalled, will likly have an enduring impact on fuhre possibilities. Eco~zonnicdownturns have a specik discourse that can set political and. economic trends for years to come, Amerirans who remember the Great Depressinn emisicm unfeeling plutocrats who miscalculated economic forces, were incompetent at altering the nation's course, and we= i_nsensiti\reto good people" suffering, Something like this orientation gave not only Franklin Roosevelt his first term as president but also the United States whatevcr it was to have in the way of a welfare state over the next fifty years. If public memory of p""-19Mls lad-use regulation is that jobs were lost economies were destroyed, and the poor were done h, the13 there can be almost no hope of taking advantage of the actual experience. But if these programs arc. rt.mernberc.d as useful works in progress, they can point to new ways to develop-in a full sense of the term-political econmks of place that incorporate naturc as well as the quality of fife into their social intelligmce. The largest impact of these growth control progrms, ther-efosc., might not be the wethnds saved, nor the housing built, but the realization that it is worth it to try to pursue agendas of public benefit thrclugh the devebpwnt process.

1. This use of the idea of "inertia" comes from kcker, 1995; tatour (1Cd87)discusses the ""lashing" together of complexly differentiated activities; organizational propensities to ""satisfice" rather than ogtimize is a key idea in March and 81sen, 1976. 2. Environmental businesses have reached a point where they can constitute their c>wnindustrial districts. For example, the envirc3nmental technology cornplex of Ncjrth-Rhine Westphalia in Germany is said to have grown to more than 600 Arms accounting for around 100,OCf0jobs (Crabher; 1990, as cited in Lash and Urry, 1994: 921,

3. Navarro and Carson (1992) argue that a full range of enviranmrtntal costs and benefits, rather than the narrc>wstudies of housing prices, should be considered in evaluating growth-control reforms that have dominated policy research. They offer some ""guesstimates" of the tremendous impact of environmental consequences tvhm translated into dollars and cents and suggest techniques of measurement and quantification for further research. 4. As our cl-rlleague Richard Box pointed out, these circumstances set Paul Peterson" (1982) ideas of "city limits" on their head, with localities having as much or even more room to innovate as state or federal officials,

Appendix A: Measuring Growth Control Impacts Many peopXe have assumed that grc~wthcontrols have direct impacts on the amount and the pace of grow&. After all, this was the explicit intent of some of the new regulations. Those who worry most about the intrusion of new rufes into the "free market" have extended this logic to the range of growth management practices, Academic researchers, gadicularly economists, have devoted much attention to this question-with mixed results, as described in Chapter 3. To assess the consequences of growth controfs, we developed an approach that considers the impact of a range clf measures within our study areas. In this appendix tzre lay out this method in some detail and p ~ s e nour t complete results. The dependent variable is the yearly Xevel of residential construction. This variable is measured by considering the number of new housing permits issued in a locality in a year. To compare this number acrclss Iwalities, we create a ratio of the number of new permits as a fraction of the total ex&ting housing stack in each place. A value of O would indicate no new residential development; a value of 400 tzrould signify a doubling of the local housing stock in one year. We compiled data on eleven jurisdictions; nine were municipalities that existed thraughout the twenty-year study period, and two were suburban areas within unincorporated county bnd h r which continuous data was also available6olet.a in Santa Efahara County and the unincorpc~ratedparts of western Riverside C3ounty.l Rather than trying to specify wery factor that might determine building act.iviV#we held these other factors constant with several broad variables to isolate the impacts of growth contrals, We madeled a regression curve for our crolis-section of jurisdictions from 1971-2990 and tested the significance of each grc~wthcontrol compared to the effects of statewide trends and other local characteristics. The primary independent variables in our analysis are the new growth controls that might impact residential building activity. Our intesviews and related documents yielded fifteen distinct policies thought to control or manage growth (primarily residential, as it turned out). Drawn from four cities (Corona, Santa Bahara, Santa Mt)nica, and Riverside) and one unincorporated county area (GoLeta in Santa Barbara County), these contmls tzrere high profile within their respective jurjsdictions. The fifteen policies incXuded moratoria, population Iirnits, downzcmings, and infrastrudure requirements (see Figure A,I). The control variables in our analysis were the statewide building rate and the other mique chracteristics of each place that tzrere captured in a dummy variable

FIGURE A,I Growth Control Measures Generic Growth Co~ntrol This variabte encompasses at1 of the below measures. It is scored as 1 if any of these specific controls are in efkct, City sf Santa Bahara Santa Barbara 1 (1973) Dciwnzoning of residential areas-cjty council. reduces the maximum residential bt~ild-c?utin the dty by lotve~ngthe allowabIe building densities in the residential zones. This was passed first as an interim measure but was later ratified by pc)ptrlar vote in 1975. Santa Barbara 2 (1977) Po1pulatic3n goal-voters adopt a population goal of 85,000 for the city and at the same time ~yrxirerthat amendments to the general plan be approved by pc?pularvote, Santa Barbara 3 (1986) Interim water controls-new residential permits were restricted to fifty per year; allocated by lottery. No new wafer use was allowed for commercial development. Goleta (Smta Barbara Crjunty) Goiteta 1 (1972) Goleta water moratorium-the water board ruled that no new water hookups should be granted, This measure was later st~pportedby ballot initiative. Go1et-a 2 (1978) Pt3ptrlation goat-oun ty voters passed an advisov measure for popu tatian grclwth to be held at .9%per year, Goleta 3 (1986) Coleta residential limits-ounty supervisors pass a resolution for an overlay zone in Goleta, holding residential growth to 1.2% per year (roughly 200 units). This later became the basis of the Coleta grciwtlt management plan in 2989. The City of Riverside Riverside I (1979) Proposition R--creates citrus belts and hillsides zones allowing only very tow-densip residential construction. Riverside 2 (1982)Sewer limits-the city limits the number of new residentiat hookups to 2,200 to 1,-W per year (later converted to 2.5% per year). Riverside 3 (1987) Measure C-voters reduce city council%ability to make exemptions to the citrus and hillside prc>tections(requiring a supermajority council vote on such decisions) and require tlw city to manage growth in annexed lands. The City of Corcjna Corona 1 (23761977)Building pennit moratorium-the city caps residential building permits to n per year for two years, because of inadeqtlate sewer capacity infrastrtlcture limitations. (This variable was not lagged since i t directly effects the number of building permits isst~ed,) Crjrona 2 (1979) Permit point system-city council introdrxces a point system for granting building permits to encourage contiguous rather tlwn teapfrclg de'c?elc)pment, Corona 3 (1986) Minimum lot size initiative-voters increase the miinirnum size for a rwidential building lot in tlw city by iniliative, The City of Santa Mania Santa Ms~nica1 (1981)Building moratodum-city council passer; residential and commercial building moratorium then requires a11 larger projecQ to be approved by the planning commission regardfws cif zoning. adapQ a new housing element, including a Santa Monica 2 (1983) Housing element-ity requirement that 25% of a11 residential developments be affordable. Santa Monica 3 (1987) Rmidential moratoslia and downzonings-the city passes a permit moratorium for the Ocean Park, pending a downzoning. This is l'oliowed in l489 by sirnilar action in tlne Willshire to Montma neighborhood,

FIGURE A.2 Ideal Model Local Building Activiv = Statewide Building Activity -t- lEJocalCharacteristicls -t- Local Crwt11 Controls -t- Unexplained Variation

for each locality. By including a dummy variable for each jurisdiction, tzre controifed the local variation in building rates that was mrelated to specific controls. These "'place variabtes" "capture the range of local characteristics (scxiaX, economic, political, spatial, and cufturaf) that may impinge on building rates independcmtly of the enactment of specific growth controls. We controlled for brc3ader economic factors by emsidering the rate of residential building activity across the state as a posglbEe determinant of local grctwth and as a proxy for pertinent statewide economic trends (e.g., business cycles, interest rates, tax Law changes), The state building rate was measured in the same way as the local residential building rate-residential units permittealexisting and previously approved housing. We evaluated policy conxquences by comparing the level of residential building in situations where policies were and were not in effect. Dummy variables for each g r w t h control assumed a value of 1 Ear the locality affected for each year the policy was in effect and O in all other cases. We needed also to cmsider the delay or fag time befc3r-e enacted policies really take hold; impads are often not felt until sorne time afier they are first instituted. This degree of tag may vary from place to place and among regulations. To cover the reasonable possibilities, we carried out analyses using one-, two-, and three-year lag times from date of enactment.2 Because of the sirn;ilarityof results, and to simplify exposition, tzre report detailed analysis based only on the two-year time lag,;,Jnoting sipificant differences using the other lags when they are relevant. Statistical. Techniques 'To avoid sorne of the methodological weaknesses of earlier research, we col-

lected data that are both cross-sectictnal and longitudinal (technically, pooled, cross-sectional data). This sclrt of data, however, requires mare compIex techniquefiof statistical analysis. IdeaX1y we would have liked to consider a singie model that tested the effeds of each of the fifteen growth controls on residential construction, while controlling for the unique characteristics of each place and holding the state building rate constant (see Figure A.2). Pooftsct cross-sectional data, however, often violate certain assumptions of the standard Ordinary Least %uares (OLS) regression mcjdels, as we confirmed in this case thmugh diapostic testing. With pooled cross-sectional data one must consider possible violations of the standard QLS regression model, as the error terms may be serially correlated, heteroskedastic, or both, as they tzrere in this case. SeriaX correlation ooccurs when sclme unmeasured factor (say the 17olatiXity of Local development approval practices) links what happens one year with what

happened the previous year (in either a positive or inverse fashion). Heteroskedasticity occurs when the variance of the error terms differ across the cross-section of localities. For example, some jurisdictions (measured by the place dummy t~ariabte)may have much greater t~ariationin building activity than 0thers (for discussion of these issuesf see Pindyck and Rrxbinfeld, 1981). These violations of OLS assumptions flaw the significance tests, as we disco~veredin this instance thrc5ugL.t wnsitivity analysis, We therefore w e d the Sf-IAZAM computes program (M. White, 1988) to produce regression estimates suited to this type of data, using a General Least Squares (GLS) model as described by Kmenta (1986). The estimated effects of each potential determinant of building activity and tests of statisticat signifkcance (coefficients and t-ratios) can be interpreted in the same way as OtS regression statistics. Tb carry out this more compfc?x,but more appropriate, statistical analysis we were not able to include all of the variables in one model. Instead, we ran three separate regressions, including a simplified mc>deland two more compla variations. We ccjnsidered the results of each in reaching our cmclusiom about the relationship beween growth controls and residential building. First, we consiclel-ed the effed of simply having any growth c m t r ~at l all (i.e., the fifteen distinct growth controls were lumped together within a ""generic grc~wthcontrol" ?~ariable),cmtrc)Xling for the state build tng rate and other distinguishing characteristics of the three study areas (Model One-see Figure A.3). The generic growth cmtrc)X variable assumes a value of l far each place and each year in which any growth control is in effect and a value of O for all other cases. Next, we took into account further variation beh-een lojcatities by including at1 the place variables instead of grr~upingthem by study area, In this secmd model, we still considered only the generic grwtf-r control variable rather than the specific measuws. Again, we controlled far the state building rate (Model Two-see Figure A.$). This model tests the s i p i f cance of having any growth control at all, but controls more specifkalf y for other unique differences betw-een jurisdictions, including variations within each study area. FinalXy; we intrcd uced the fifteen distinct grc>wthcontrol measures as possible predictars of buildirrg activity in place of the generic growth cctrttwl variable, hotding constant the differences between the study areas and the state building rate (Model Thre-see Figure A.5). At each step along the way we tested the statistical sipificance of including or excludhg variables. We b u n 8 that including all of the place variables rather than just grouping them by study area as in the previous m d e f s did not increase the explained variance si@&cantly, thou& it clarified the sc:,urces of van"atiom. Tncf uding the distinct growth cc>ntroIsfikewiw did not significantly increase the amount of vahance mplained but showed w h w gowth controls have diverse impacts. Tn Mcdei Three, we no Xonger contrc>ifar l~ariationbetween places within the study areas, but this mc~delprovides a superic~rtest of grc>wthcontrc>ls,since it measures the impact of each distinct r e g u l a t o ~measure.

The Substantive Significance The overall pattern is quite clear: Broad business trends, as reELected in statewide building rates, are a far more important determinant of Iocali building rates than

FIGURE A,3 Model One lEJocal Building Activity = Statewide Building Activiq -t- Study Area Clwractesistics -t- Generic Growth Control -tUnexplained Variation Study Area Characteristics = Local Characteristics Grouped by Study Area Generic Growth Cc3ntrol =r Cases Where Any Growth Control is in Effect

FIGURE A.4 Model Tw-o lEJocal Building Activity = Statewide Building Activiq -t- lEJocalCharacteristics -tGeneric Growth Controls ( h y Growth Contr~~l) -IUnexplained Variation

FIGURE A.5 Model Three Local Building Activity = Statewide Building Activity -t- Study Area Characteristics + Local Grclwth Cantmls -I-Unexplained Variation

the enactment of guwth controls. This held true far all of the models we considered and for all lag times we intrc3duced. For every percentage point change up or down at the state level, local building rates change almost a full point Q.85)in the same direction (pc.01). The estimated effect of state building rates varies slightly between our varic~usregression equatiom; see Table A.1 for coefficients and t-ratio>$for each of the models. Again, the data we report here are for a twoyear lag. Only three of the fifteen grov(r.th controls had a significant impact on subsequent building activity, and one of these was in the tzrrong directim. Residential building rose a significant 6 percent (pc.05)in Corona after a 1986 voter initiative increased the minimum residential lot. The h - oother statistically signjfkant controls were the earliest measures in the Santa Barbara study area: a 3.7 percent decrease in building activity followed the 1972 Gcrleta water moratorium (p<.91), and a 1.6 percent decrease fc~llowedthe 1973 Santa Barbara city dotzrnzoning (pc.05). These data confirm some earlier research on the Santa Barbara case, tzrhich suggested that these strong measuws did indeed have a detectable effect on homing construction." To walk through this step-by-step, our simplistic statistical mc~del(Mo~delOne) suggested that having nny growth measure at all reduced local building activity regardless of the broader development trends within the state. But when we introduce, as is appropriate, more specific local differences (Model Two), the "generic" impact of growth control disappears. What appeared to be a dampening in building activity produced by having any growth control policy was instead a sign of overarching differences between the particular jurisdictions. Tn Model Three, we tested the effects of specific growth cmtrclls on building activity and learned that few have any significmt bearing on subsequent building activity.When we measured the impact of growth emtrots using a three-year lag, all the results were virtually identical with a two-year bg,Wth a single-year lag, none of the grc>wth,controls significant]y decrease the amount of dwelopment. Only the acceleration of building activity that followed the 1986 Corona regulatory change (mentioned abc>ve)remains significant in this case. When we use a fine-grained analysis that distinguishes the impact of specific measures on Xcrcai residential building rates and apply appropriate statistical tests, we find that the dampening effects of growth controls have been exaggerated greatly,

155 TABLE A.1 Predicting Local Residential Building Rates: Coefficients and (t-ratios) Model One

Model Itc#,

Model Three

Places Santa Barbara (default) Carpinten'a GoIeta Santa Monica City of Riverside Corona Hemet Lake EIsinore Norco Perris Western Riverside County Study Areas Santa Barbara (default) Riverside Study Area Santa Monica Study Area Growth Controls Santa Barbara 1 Santa Barbara 2 Santa Barbara 3 Goleta l Goleta 2 Goleta 3 Santa Monica 1 Santa Monica 2 Santa Monica 3 Riverside 1 Riverside 2 Riverside 3 Corona 1 Corona 2 Corona 3 Generic Growth Control State Building Rate Log Likelihood Ratio Model 1 lncludes study areas and generic growth control; Model 2 includes all places and generic growth control; Model 3 includes study areas and specific growth control; All models calculated with two-year lags. Significant at .OS. Significant at .01. NOTE

Notes to Appendix A 1. W were fc>rcedto excXude Moreno Valley because it was incorporated in 1986; construction data thus does not exist far the prior period. Likewise TemecuXa, not incorpc~rateduntil 1989, is excluded. 2. Initially we used a lag time of one year, following prior research and in accord with the Califc~rniaPermit Streamlining Act of 15380, which requires Xocalities to process development applications within one year or to automatically grant approval, In response to reviewerskomments, we performed addifionaf analyses for two- and three-year lag periods. General results of all three time lags will be discussed below, 3. An exception was made for one restriction, the 1977 Gorc3na buiiXding permit moratorium, which we presumed would have an immediate effect. 4. Prior investigations that attribute significance to the GoXeta water moratorium are Apgelbaum, 197%;Mercer and Morgan, 1982; and Key, 1988. Rey (1988) found the Santa Barbara clc>wnzoningsignificant, but Appelbaurn (l"386)fc3und it insignificant. 5. Even here, it may be that specific growth controls appear significant onXy because of loeal differences within the study areas. After all, the ""genric" "significance of growth control washed out when we moved fram Model One to Modet 'Two and. replaced the study area variables with the specific glace variables.

Appendix B: Chronologies of Growth Control Santa Barbara Chronnfagy 'The City of Sn~2i.nBra rbnra May: Harbor Exparzsion-City voters turn down $1.5 million band issue to expand the city harbor. Vote 12,310 to 5,036. Cl'lizerts Getferal Plwrt, Gods Cofnmittce Report-Coals are adopted as part of the city" gmeral plan recognizing that all major elements of the community" eeelonomic base (pension and property income, tourism, R&B) depend directly on maintaining and enhancing the quality and character of Santa Barbara. The goals call for a study of the impacts of growth. Trrzpncts of Crowtlz Slzldy-A planning task force prcjvides research for commrmity analysis and discussion of clptimum popttlaGon size, The studies idcsntify the ideal city size as 50,W&100,000, emphasizing that the1-e must be a balance betwen residential and nanraidential gawth. November: Wilmx Property-City residmts vote 13,422 to 11,041 to support city purchase of seventy-acre Wileox ocean bluff-top property for cjpm space or park to preclude the construction of eightythree homes on the site. Vc>tewar; advisory; and the city deciines to purchase the prc~perty, Residential Downzonir-zg-The city amends the general plan and zoning to reduce allowable densities in residential areas and to set a papulation goal of 85,000, March: 85,000City Population CciEitzg-Voters endorse 85,000 limit stated in the pneral plan; this passes with a vote of 11,734 to 7,110, A second measure, requiring that changes to the general plan and zoning ordinance be approved by the voters, passes with a vote of 10,950 to '7,330. March: City Park Lnnds4ity residents vote against disposing of certain city park lands. Bzilloek3 Dllfepnrtme~tlStore-City residents defeat a measure that would have permitted a Bullocks department store to replace several existing local establishments on State Street. November: Living Witlfin Our Resozirccs4ity residents vote in favor of a charter amendment (Measure K) that requires that the city's

""land development shall not exceed its public services and physical and natural resources," The measure stipulates that future rezonings require a ""supermajority"" (five of seven votes) for city council approval. Revisiotzs to Dez7eloj~menfPlan Reviezu-The city institutes a new approval process for nonresidential projects larger than IO,OUO, They are to be approved at the discretion of the planning commission according to the prc>jects' coni'c3rmance with ""sound comrnunily planningt'' compatibility with *'neighborh~odaesthetics/character," and impact on the availability of housing. March: R d Lio~zI n r z x i t y ucjters apprclve a permit to ccjnstruct Fess Parker" Hotel on the city's waterfront. Nclvember: Wilcox Property-More than 60 percent of Santa Barbara voters favor public purchase of the property, but the measure falls short of the two-thirds majority required to pass the bond issue. The vote is 63.4 percent to 36.6 percent. 17lrz~sesI and II of fhe Cesze~~l Plnn Ulydafe-Technlcd studies are done to evaluate the apprqriate balance between residential and nonresidential growth. fqlorkshop~are held to involve the community in designing longer term limits on growth-specifically nonresidential growth-. Itzterim Water Moratorium-An interim ordinance is passed barring the city from approving new development projects that require new water, The city is charged with seeking out new water sources. Jme: Wilcox Property-A second attempt to apprwe a bond issue to buy the property fails, falling short of the required Mo-thirds majority of city voters. The vote is 60.5 percent in favor and 39.5 percent oppc~sed. December: Long-Term Water Ordinrir~ce-The city continues the suspension of development permits requiring new water. At the same time, the city establishes a program tcr allocate fifty acre feet per year for residential development, human services, pvernment, and hardship cases. Housing Mitigation Program-A housing mitigation program is enacted, requiring developers to replace any housing units that they demolish and to prwide for the "new demand units" created by a project through direct constructic~nor in-lieu fees. November: Commcrci~lGrowth Limit-Ballot Measure E passes, limiting commercial development to 3 million square feet over the next twenty years*The measuw passes with a vote of 11,784 tcr gt285. February: Stage 111 Drotight-me city declares a Stage 111 drought, putting sever-e restridicms on water use and introducing a tiered pricing system. Snntn Bnrbnra Cc~zinfy 1970

November: Voters deny El Cnpihn Rnnclt Szzbdit~isioion-Vc)ters rescind approval of the subdivision of 3,638 acres next tcr El Capitan State

Beach with a vote of 46,861 to 33,822. The plan, which would have alIcwed, 1,535 homes, had the unanimous suppc~l"cand approval of the county planning commission and the board of supervisors, Golcrfn Water Moraforitnm-Board passes a water moratorium denying new hookups tzrithin their district, tzrhich covers the western suburban areas of the South Coast. May: Voters S~tpportflze Cslefa WaferMoratorizrm-Tw-o measures concerning the water moratorium are considered by Goleta voters. The measure to continue the moratorium passes by 13,107 to 5,006, while an oppasing measure to rescind the moratorium is defeated 12,220 to 3,791. February: Colanfy Esta-abll't;hcsOfice of- E~virurzmerttat Qlialify (OEQ)The task of this office is to carry out initial environmrtntal assessments and prepare EXRs. The county abandons the practice of accepting EXRs prepared by developers. The OEQ is @ven the final word on mvironmental review-. -1976 Pro-Growflz G m ~ Jury d Slams trlte OEQ and Xts Director-Growth advocates suggest that OEQ be merged with planning and that the board of supervisors oversee the EXR process. Supelwisur Inifinfes Gunsiderafion.of Gr(?wl.r"zManapntenl. Ordinance for Colem-Supervisor Yager forms a citizen committee to design a grow& management ordinance. The ordinance aims at limiting residential permits tcr a yearly rate of 1.2 percent. June: Cc~zintyVoters Approzle Popzlilafion Cmwtrlt Rlafesfor Sozl flz CoastCounty voters pass two advisory measures (0 and F) prc3posjng a population growth rate of .9 percent per year, Planning stag recommends a point allocation system but puts off decisions, pending study of the impacts of commercial growth on poputation. November: Coz4nlt.y CrenCes D~.pardnteszfof Envire~nmenlnfResnznrcesThe supervisars elevate the OEQ to full department status, maintaining the autonomy of environmental review, but also making the department head a palitical appointment, rather than civil service. The past director is kept on but later fired by the board of sugemisors. March: Cozrnfy Vt?ters Rejeef State Water-Voters turn down a bond proposal to finance a pipeline for importing water from Northern ~ to 17,302. Califc~miaby a vote C J 43,@6 Cour?dy Completes Sludy of Commercial Gruauth 1fnpncts-The cclunty completes a Regional Growth impact Study(RCIS).Staff recommends a permit allocation system to control grclwth and achieve a jobs/housing balance, Stxpeuvimrs propose that housing permits be granted at an annual rate of 4.8 percent to ac&eve a .9 percent pclpulation grclwth rate. They target a maximum of 279,500 square feet of nonresidential apprc~vaXsfor the first year, including commercial, industrial, and government (CXG). Coztivlfy Szrpervisurs Decide to 1~rcorporaI.eCrowfrll.M~lnagenzetztinto the Cumprehetzsive Pfra~z-Tl~e supervisars delay action on a growth management ordinance with the idea that it should be incorporated into a revised comprehensive plan,

December: County StaR Remrtmends Cl~ngesto Cornyrehensive Plal.2The staff prrlposes policy changes for adding growth management to the comprehensive plan. " f ~ esupervisors approve three of the five golides but "have the teeth out" by not setting a cap on the number of residential approvals. Crc?r~1~tl~. Itrz;nncC Stzrdy Updated-The county updates research on the impacts of commercial growth {1G1%4), November: RemlE of Slow-Growill Water Boad Ftzils-An attempt to recall the slc3w-growth majority of the Gctleta Water Board fails. Hyait t-fotel Project Approz?edwthrate of .9 percent. Despite their stated intention to limit hc~using approvals to 280 units, the board approves twice that number in the follawing eleven months. Buard Approve Residefztial Restrictiorzsfir Cotefa-The supervisors approve an overlay zone for Goleta by resolution. The Restricted Resources O\~erlayDistrict includes a point system for prioritizing project approval. Overall ayprovats are targeted at 2.2 percent per year to achieve desired population grc>wthrate. November: Slow Growlti Candidates Captzirr"Wafer B a r d Majority-Goleta voters elect a trio of candidates on a slc>w-grc>wthticket, shifting the majority. Baard Decides to Irrclude Nonreside??tial Development i j z the Groi-0th Mnnraiyemc~tlE1X-Public hearings are held in the early months of 1989. December: Court of Appmls Rules Hyaf l EIX Invalid-The court ruler; that Hyatt needs to consider alternate sites and sizing of the hotel to satisfy CEQA requirements. Hyatt later appealed to the state supreme court and lost. February: I-Iyntt Project Approved by Ctw Plannirzg Gour~~rtission-The planning commission votes 4-0 to approve a reworked project including 400 rooms. July: Eco~zomicAnalysis o?f-FiyattFirzds Tlznf. 400 Rootns Are Neccrssnrp to Project Feasibility-An indvendent economic analyst hired by the county finds that 408 rooms are needed to make the prc>jectviable.

1989 1989

1989 1989

November: Slozu-Gmzut!~C~ndidates?sake Over the Baad c?fSuyeruisorsIncumbents are defeated in two districts by slow-growth rivals. The entire board is composed of slow-growth representatives. September: Ventztm Court Rufrs Cfle FjTynC1 H@sNot Gonsidert?a Adequate Rltcrr-zativeSifes-This project is again appealed by the Hyatt with the assistance of the Pacific legal Foundation-a nonprofit grc~upthat defends pririate property rights Games Watt). November: Board Ptasses Galefa Crawt!~Man~genzenfOrdi~fance-Ordinance limits housing approvals to 200 per year and nonresidential approvals to 80,000 square feet per year. Supervisors Tnitiale Comprelte1zsilcic Plan Revicro for Mon teez'to-Tk county begins a review of the area plan for Montecitu that will include a grc)wth management element.

Santa Monica Chronology 1945

Rental market builds because of Douglas Aircraft employment and war work, 1960 Santa Monica is 69 percent renter. 1966 Santa Monica Freeway is completed. Demolitian of the Santa Monica 13ier is opposed by citizen goups. 1970 1973-1975 Liberal Rqz-lblica~ts Elected to Council and r\Jew Con~nlzinityOrg~nizafions Are F"urmed4hristine Reed and Peter 'Wanden Steenhc3ven are elected to the city council, and the Ocean Park Community Organization (OPCO) and the Santa Monica Democratic Club (SMDC) are fc3rmed. 1975 Band for Shoylling Cenfer Is kzssed-Citizens sue the city over this project, claiming that it does not return benefits equitably to the community, 1978 January: Citizen Lawsuit Agair-zst Santa Monz'cn Place Settled-Citizens ~pos"ingthe development of a publicly assisted commercial mall settle their lawsuit in return for a t~arietyof communiiv benefits to be funded with parking revenues and assisted by a $100,000 contribution by the developer, the Rouse Company. Community benefits include: 20 percent of excess parking revenues, two packet parks, ten recycling centers, $$tIiOQ,000of current CUBG funds for housing rehabilitation, $50,000 for child care over five years, $50,000 for women" shelter over five years, and a commitment to obtain CETA staffkg .tor the shelter, June: Rent-Control 1nz'ili;rtiveFnils-A rent-control measure is spear1978 headed by Sid Rose, former Xabor organizer, and sponsored by the Santa Monica Fair Housing AlfiancefSMFHA)on behalf of a senior citizen constituency (Campaign for Economic Democracy-CEDwas not invofved). The measure was defeated 54-46 percent. After the elections Santa Monicans for Renter's sights($MnR) is formed by Santa Monica Democratic Club, Campaign .far Economic Bemocrac3r, and SMFHA. 1979 April: S M R R Rent-Control 1~zitz'atbe Wilts at Polls-The initiative gasses with the city's highest voter turnout yet.

1979

1979

lli380 1981

June: SMRR Wins All Scats an Rent-Control Board-And two SMRR members (Ruth Goldway and Bill Jexznings) are elected t c ~the city council. Nc~vember:Apartnzcszl Qwnets Lose n Coun ter Reszl-Cunlrol InitiativeAnother SMRR candidate (Cheryl Rhoden) is elected to the city council. S M R R Consulidales-SMRR is joined by the Ocean Park Electoral Network; Bill Jennings r e s i p s from SMKR and denounces the organization. April: SMRR Slate S w q s City EEectl;Ozs-SMRR candidates win a 5-2 majority on the city council; the candidates include: Denny Zane (CED), firn Conn (minister of the church at Ocean Park), Bolores Press funion organizer), and Ken Edwards (Santa Monica Demo>cratic Club), The new council immediately passes Ordinmce 1207; calling a six month moratorium on new commerciat and residential building in the city (exempting single-family and multi-family projects with 25 percent affordable units, as well as some small-scale commercial in the C-3 zme), Summer: Conzlrrercial and X~zdustrialTizsk Fom Begi~zsNegotiatirzg-The task force negotiates developer agreements on major prc~jectsthat are already "hthe pipeline." The job is finiished by the city council, with Zane playing a prc>minentrole. The city exacts a variety of soJciat benefits from the Wefton Beckett Prr~ject(which Later became Colorado Place), inci uding funding for parks, day care, and on-site afEcYrdable housing, September: Council kzrtially Lqls the Devetqment Momtorium-The city council passes Ordinance 1220, partially lifting the development moratorium and requiring that all larger projects be reviewed by the planning commission. The planning commission is authorized to be more strict than the current zoning. October: New Zoning "6-trideli-rtcs"Are Establislled-Tk city council passes Resolution 6385, revising what should be allowed in a zone district and essentially reducing the amount of office and commercial space that can be built in the city by 54.5 percent. Mitigation fees, scaled by project size, are established for commercial projects to support arts and sacial service, affcjrdable housing, traffic and emission abatement, day care and open space, November: Iokzn AEsclaller Hired ns City M~nager-Atschuler; who had worked under progressive Mayor Carbone of Hartlord, pushes the city to take a proactive attitude toward development, trading new development, particularly hotel development, for such community benefits as jobs and increased tax revenues. December: Santa Morzica Is Enjoi~cdfrom Collecting thc Mifigntit~n Fees-Because of suit by the Brotherhood of Carpenters, the city is fc~rbiddenfrom collecting the mitigation fees established in interim procedures. This causes the city to back off on planned zoning changes so that the city's comprehensive plan can first be revised-

thus establishing firm legal grounding for the zone changes. This suit is eventually settfed out of court. June: lfvtferi~~ Develaynzent Reviei-u Procedures Extelzded-To allow time fc7r the city to revise the generat plan, the city council passes Ordinance 1251, extending the review prc~cedursthat had been adopted in Sqternber. January: Nuusing Elrrnctzt Adopted-The city adopts a housing element requiring that housing developments of five and more units include 25 percent affordable units (inclusionary zoning)-this is later reduced to 15 percent. The option of paying "in lieu" fees rather than building affc~rdableunits was added in the revised zoning ordinance of 1988. Spring: SMXR Loses Majority on City Council-SMRR loses one seat and fails to unseat two incumbents on the city council. 0ctr)ber: Land Use and Circzlfntion Elenzent(LUCE) Adopted-Revision for the comprehensive plan is approved by the city cormcil. The plan was developed with the involvemnt of community residents and the business communit y. LZJCE reduces the allowable commercial r~ffice square footage by 561 percent. Interim development review procedures are extend& again until a new zoning odinance can be passed. December: Cazt~rcilPasses Ordinnnce 3323-Tile city council passes a new zoning ordinance, replacing the interim review pmcedures. December: Fi~znlEll? Completed for Reztised Zotzing-The scenarios for future development are less restrictive than the earlier proposal far commercial office development, but industrial building potmtial is radically reduced (by 9696 percent). September: Residential Pennif Moratorium Enacted-The city council passes Ordinance 1416, a moratorium on residential projects in Ocean Park, pending revision of the neigbborhood land-use plan. March/May: City Council Revises the Foz-lrfh Drap I?( the Reviised Zoning Orditztllzce-In Mal-eh, the city council passes interim zoning, pending approval of the new zoning ordinance, to prevent a rush of last minute -\restingattempts. In M a 5 the coundl passes Ordinance 1441. June: Final Suppleme~titirlEIX Cotnpefed for Zctnz'tzg Ordi~za~lce-InEIR commercial and office space is again reduced by about one third (31.2-378 percent) from the last EIR, though industrial space is increased at the same time (47.5-71.3 percent). The net effect on nonresidential q u a r e fc~c~tage is a decrease of 25-32 percent. Zonilzg Ordz'rzanee Is Adopted, Aup": New ComprelfZ4~tsi~f(? FalX: Crnwf Managenfen t Proposed for the Ballot-A growth management ballot issue is proposed but is dismissed on a techicality, November: SMRR Cgndidafes Regain Council Majority-SMRR candidates are elected to the city council; one of the new council members is Ken Genzer, one of the authors of the Flawed growth management initiative, May: Corrtnzercr'nlMorator.z't-lrrrAdai:rfed-The city council adopts Ordinance 1481, a moratorium on commerciaX development, because the

city is rapidly approaching levels of commercial development that had been prc3jected far the year 2000 in the LUCE. This ordinance is adopted as an emergency measure for ten and one-half months. June: Residcnfiaf Permif h4lamforizim El-lacfed-The city council passes Ordinance 1484, a moratorium on residcsntial building for the area from Willshire to Montana, pending passage of new development standards. to Bn7.z F~lrtherHotel Det~elopment on the Beach QtraliAup": X~zili~fiz~e f k s f i r the Fall Electiorzs-The sponsoring organization, Save Our Beach, fails to force a special election, falling 300 signaturw short of the 8,420 required, but the initiative is slated for the next general elections in November 1990. An alternate initiative is sponsored by the c>wnersof h - o hotel prc?jects on the beach, the Sand and Sea Projwt and the MacGuire Thornas project.. Augu&t:City Coznncz'l Appratres EIR fit M1;1eCztire Thontns Hotel Dezlekopmezzl. January: Airport Redeveloptr~enfThwarted-The city" plans to redevelop airport land in a public/pririate venture are stopped by inten* neighborhood vposition. The city reverses its October 23 approval of the agreement with a private developer, the Reliance Corporation, to complete a 875,000-square-foot: office complex on city-owned Xand, The gmup opposing the airport, Santa Monicans for the Public: Trust, gathered 9,000 signatuws to qualify a referendum putting the prc~ject to a public vote. Ncrvember: City-Sponsored kiotet Developme~ttDefea fed at Polls-The city's ppln to allow redevelopment of the Sand and Sea Club is defea ted in city elections.

Riverside Study Area Chronology Lurnfion of l~?fers.stnte I 5 4 i t i z e n s in the city of Riverside o p p o the ~ construdion of an interstate highway through the city citing environmental and preservation concerns. The highway is lojcated to the west of the city limits. Growtkt Illa~lzgenw~ztSyste~rz:Discussed-The Corona city council considers a growth management system, The two supporters gameson and Rust) are subequently defeated in their re-eledion bids, Bzrildirzg Pemzz'i. Mountorz'um in Garonana enacts an emergency measux to only issue 450 residential permits for the year, due to limited capacity of sewer and flc>c~dcontrc>liinfrastructure. The moratorium is extended thrc~ragh4977, Downzoning cf Cilrus Latzd-The city of Corona downzones 5,000 acres of citrus land sauth of Ontario Avenue. This fc~rmalizedwhat had been an informal policy of the city council, even thou* the general plan of 1964 slated this area for development. Rez7r'sl'an of Deztelopment Review 12roeess-Corona adopts a dwelopment review process that uses a point system to encourage devetopment adjacent to existing infrastructure,

November: Riverside City Growill Manngeme~zt X1.ritliafive F ~ i l s Mamwly-A ballot initiative (Measure B) to require the city to adhere to its general plan fails by 722 votes. Prot~fionof Citnrs Grnvcs and Hillsides-Vc~ters in the city of Riverside pass a ballot measuw (Proposition R) to reduce the building densities allc>wdwitl-tjn agricultural, areas of the city and on the hlXlsides. This proposition responded to city council plans tcr allow residential development of Wo-thirds of the citrus area. The measure passes with 66 percent of the vote. Four candidates suppc~rtingPropc~sitionR are elected to city council. Incouporatio~a;rzc$ Moreno V~lley-The voters of Mcjreno Valley elect to incorporate as a city. Che of the main motivations is dissatisfaction with county land-use decisions far the area. October: Xiversa City Council E ~ d e Grmnbett s for Park L a ~ dCo~ztribzition-The city council approves a residential project at: eleven times the densiity allowed in the greenbelt in exchange for donation of land for Sycamore Canyon Park, November: Cororza Voters Increase t h Mi~?imzlmLot Size-Voters pass Measure H, which increases the minimum tot size to 7,200 square feet fc~rsingle-family residences. This does not apply to developments that are done through specific plans, which includes most of the major subdik~isions(Sierra de Ort., South Corona, etc.). More~toL*nlEcy filers Recall Pm-Devel~~pme~zt Cozincil Members-Three of the original members of the city council are recatled because they are doing too much fc~rdevelopers (E-lorspool makes use of a legal Xovhole to get re-elected fram a district at the same time as he is recalled from his at-large council seat). Moreno Valley Btaildii~zg Moratorium-An eighteen-month building moratorium is imposed on the eastern portion of Moreno VaXXey- Tn part this moratorium was imposed to block the private development of an airport and adjacent cornmerciat space by Bengivi-Cohen. Tile developer tzrithdraws this project when faced with the oppasi"ran af all surrounding airports and the FAA. March: TIte Ciky of Riverside Proposes Relaxing Greenbelt and Citrzis Restrictions and Grants Exemption to Proposition R-In the face of landowner prc~testover Proposition R, the city appoints a blue-ribbon committee and hires a consultant, Peter Dangermond, to study the citrus areas. The consultant: suggests that half the area be opened to development-but in a way that woutd preserve the character of the citrus belt. The city exempts Iand within the Sycamore Canyon Business Park from Proposititic~nR in return for the dc5na"tion of fifty acres to the Sycamore Canyon Park. TIze Riverside Voters Stre~zgthe~z ProtecGl"orzof the Citrzis Bctt-Riversiders pass a measure to strengthen Proposition R, Measure C requires a two-thirds majority an the ccluncit in arder to make exceptions tcr Proposition R. Controls are also extended to annexed land, and the city is required to evaluate annexations in terms of whether they pay their own way. Measure C passes with 52 percent of the vote, an

alternative proposed by the city council (Measure G) is rejected by 62 percent of the voters. May: ILk7ren0 KZ/@ Establishes Design Guidelirzes and a Rezjiezu Board. November: Cozrivllly Grozull~Manlzgenzcszl M c a s u ~Fails ( M M S M EA)-This measuw would have limited population growth in the county to that of the state, required that loxat go3vernment be able to provide adequate services before approving development, and that open space and agricultural lands be protected, March: Riz~ersideCity I"ofcrs D~fcatMeasure lu Repeal PmtecGkn of Citrus Groz~esand Hillsides-A proposition (Measure E ) to repeal growth controls is defeated by a landslide-76 percent of the vtgers oppose the xneasuE, despite the over $500,000 spent by the measure's supporters fa city record). September: Riwrside City Crc~zuthCo~ttrotsRzdted Inztnfid-judge rules Prc>positlonR and Measure C invalid on the grounds that the city8s general plan is inadequate. The ruling does not take immediate effect and is appealed by the city of IGverside, March-December: County Desigj~tsGrowtti Matagemetz t EIc~mctzt-In response to the widespread support for the failed growth control initiative for the countyf the cuunv undertakes a planning process to develop growth management policies. September: Southwesl. Arm Plnn-The county adctpts a community plan for the southwest area. The plan downzcmes same Limited areas on the Santa Rosa plateau but still allc>wsenough development potential for an eventual population af 404,246, They project a population of 120,810 for the year 2018. November: City of %rn(..czkln Voles to Incorporate-Vijters in the Temecula valley elect to incorporate as a city n a m d Temecub, partly in response to lax county development standards. June: Moreno ValIq Grorvtlt Managenwnf Measzire Fails (Propositiorz JIA city grc>wthcc>ntroXinitiative designed after the earlier county measure is defeated at the ballot box, thou& it gains 42 percent of the vote.

APPENDIX C Commercial Valuation Data, 1970-1990 Total Nonresidnrhl Valuntion (in tftorr~ndsof dollars) Santa h h r a

WPM

as1

S

$

Goleta South Gmt Balance Santa b h r a Study Area

W7R7

1

~,514

$ 7 , ~

$14274

@.,l49 ~ l u . 7 ~ SIJ.!!

Santa Monim

$11,117

510,970

$531

City d Riverside C m

Hmet Lake Elsinore M n m w Valley Norco Perris W e t e m Uninrotp. County Study ArPa

$M $845 510LW fl7M

$tlH

2

%8,!!1 $1-

$PR3

$

5

M,W

55,705 $7,125 s14.m liB.101

57b55 5 4 , ~

~12.49

B&?

$10,270

111,9?7

$16~43

$12~40

511,442

s1l.m

$17,436

$10.153

$m.w

$EAT

SWMA

515214

$lob46

fl7,Wf

53fIA63

%.m

$10.7~ ~s,408 $11,619

$;11.135

$23241

$tOS,W4

Bdt8

APPENDIX C Commercial Valuation Data, 1970-1990 (continued) Total Nonresidential Valuation (in thousands of dollars) 1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

Carpinterfa Santa Barbara Goleta South Coast Balance Santa Barbara Study Area

$10,967 $21,614 $22251 $37,290

$706 $13274 $14,532 $16,200 $30,180

$1,239 $15309 $20,558 $23,848

W3%

$5,920 $40377 $32,482 $33,144 $79,441

$3,532 $25,958 $13,081 $27,130 $56,620

$2,403 $26327 $44,646 $4734 $76,494

$3,851 $23,046 $28,104 $32,774 $59,671

$5,639 $21,194 $29,663 $32,760 $59393

$4,113 $42,076 $21,111 $21,719 $67,908

$3,815 $16,676 $18,%8 $42,514 $63,005

Santa Monica

$80787

$21,181

$49,W

$57,258

$95,358

$48,284

$127,752

$142,869

$123,070

%m

City of Riverside Corona Hemet Lake Elsinore Moreno Valley Norco $1324 Perris $584 Western Unincorp. County $80,968 Study Area $111,186 California U.S. SOURCES:Construction Industry Research Board, 1971-1990; Riverside County, 1970-1989; Santa Barbara County, 1970-1989; and U.S.Department of

Commerce, 1970-1989.

Avmndix D Residential Building Rates

New Permits/Exisfing Housing (%) Carpinterfa Santa Barbara Goleta South Coast Balance Santa Barbara Study Area Santa Monica

1971 7.81 2.00 6.49 7.82 4.18

1972 17.73 2.46 7.46 9.11 5.49

1973 10.49 2.39 7.39 9.43 5.31

1974 2.75 0.73 0.47 1.67 120

3.64 4.34 4.87 1.11

1975 1976 1.40 1.49 0.75 1.14 0.09 0.13 0.56 0.80 0.72 1.04

1977 3.16 1.21 0.25 0.97 1.25

0.56

0.67 1.45

0.78

1978 1979 5.40 1.12 0.98 0.74 0.18 0.24 0.70 0.48 1.17 0.67 1.15

1980 1981 0.68 0.13 0.90 0.54 0.18 0.18 0.48 2.25 0.73 1.12

1982 1983 0.98 0.20 0.50 0.45 0.73 1.38 0.76 1.37 0.63 0.76

1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 220 1.98 5.38 1.26 0.91 1.08 0.89 1.12 1.61 0.31 1.24 1.81 0.93 0.99 0.73 1.23 1.80 1.43 1.45 1.13 121 1.29 152 1.53 0.65

1989 0.42 0.15 0.98 1.46 0.65

1990 151 0.16 057 0.93 0.54

0.94

0.44

0.04

039

0.10

0.49

0.29

0.65 0.87

0.72

0.58

3.67 3.87 2.88 1.66 1.66 2.75 3.29 2.88 2.42 1.62 1.15 .Q93 1.86 2.38 2.80 California U.S. 2.79 3.11 2.46 1.42 1.21 1.67 2.13 2.22 1.87 1.41 1.15 1.15 1.83 1.88 1.91 SOURCES: Riverside County, 1970-1989; Santa Barbara County, 1970-1989; U.S. Department of Commerce, 1970-1989.

3.16 1.90

245 2.40 1.63 1.52

2.20 1.37

1.47 1.12

City of Riverside Corona Hemet Lake Elsinore Moreno Valley Norco Pems Western Unincorp. County Riverside Study Area

This page intentionally left blank

Appendix E: Case Study Details In thls appendix we present the standards, mitigations, ccmditions, and fees applied to these projects upon formal approval. We recopize that formal requirements are not always fully enforced (see Chapter 4), but these snapshots provide a basis for comparing Ic~calpractices.

Santa Ban;bara Routine Cas Project Cunfexf Bate. September 1990. Site Dcseripfiolz. This was a 14,044-square-foot site in dc>wntc~wnSanta Barbara, p ~ v i o u s l yused as a used-car sales lot (with a 2,220-square-foot office). It was one block off of the main street of dc>wntownand across the street from the Paseo Nuevc), a downtown mall redevelopment prc~ject, hckgrozind. This was one of the first new co ercial prC?fwtsto come h u g h since the city enaclted commel-cial growth Limits by balkat irritiative, The planning depadment selwted t h s project as an example of what routine commer&alprojects would be like after Measure E-.The immediate effect of the measure was to stop erciaX development p ~ o s a l sexcept , those that were already in process or were sc>melnc~w exempted from the Xirnits. This measure was enforced immediately by city staff under the direction of the city attorney, becatts it was a charter amendment, w e n though it had nclr yet been translated into zo>ninglaw. The size of this projwt (and its related impacts) were therefom constrained before projed review, because only certain types of projects could even be cornidered. This project was proceeding under an exemption that allowed for building additions under 3,800 square feet The owners could demolish the existing building and retain the right to rebuild this square fa~tage.Combining the original fc~otagewith the atlowed 3,000-square-foot addition, they ended up with a new building of 5,600 q u a r e feet. h addition to thls squaw fc3otage limitation, project sponsors could use no new watex; nor create significant traffic impacts. The developers reduced the size of the project slightly to keep traffic impacts below the threshold of impact. For water, the project tapped the historic water uses on the site and the historic water uses transferred from anotl~ersite displaced by gr~vernmentaction, the Paseo Nuevo redeveltopment.

Appendix E: Case Study Defnils

172

Rez~iezuProcess. The projwt was smaller than what would have been typical before Measure E. Because it was Xess than 30,000 square feet, it did not trigger automatic review by the planning commission, though it would have if an environmental impact report had been requj red. Tt was stilt review4 by the Environmental Review Committee and the Landmarks Committe ( d e s i p review).

A Wo-story commercial building

Building fc~c~tprint: Paving coverage: Landscaped area: First-floor retail: Second-floor office:

5,975 square feet 6,343 square feet 2,7753 square feet 4,700 square feet 900 square feet

Design, The city imposed restrictions on future uses (particularly such traffic generators as restaurants and fast food) that went beyond the zoning definition; city officials required that changes in future uses be reviewed by city staff to assess traffic impacts, All plumbing fixtures had to be ultra-Low flc~w.The Landmarks Committee made some specific suggestions regarding materials and project design, to which the developer agreed.

Trafic Impacfs, The developer was required to develop a transportation management plan and to incorporate vehicle-use disincentives into building leases. Requirements included the provision of an employee lunchroom with minimum equipment; bus passes for employees; the submission of an annual transpc~rtatim report to the city; the assignment of an alternative tranliportation coordinator. Sireet nlzd Gztfter I m p r e The developer was to make improvements to the streets and gutters adjacent to the site, including handicap access, as approved by the city engneeu: Gonslrricfion Conditions. Cc>nstructiontraffic was limited and parking was to be provided to workers. Dust was to be controlfed by watering during grading. Arctmeol~~gicnI Monz'torz'zzg. The developer had to cmtract with a qualified archaeologist and a Native American to monitor grading and demlition to assure the protection of cultural resources.

Dozotzfawi~tRarzspurfalit~nImproveme~zfFee. trips; $2,350 per daily trip = $15,65)8.

A fee based on 6.68 peak daily

Aflordabb Housil-zg. Because of the smaller size of this project, it did not have to mitigate impact on new housing demand; it tvas not deemed to have a sipifiEE,at about twice the cant impact. The typical commercjal prcjject prior ~c"M"~"u

R p p n d h E: Case Sfzrda, D e f ~ i l s

173

size, would have (since 1989) been required to provide approximately 4 units of affctrdable housing.

Santa Barbam Best Case-Kan~ho"""fZarbara F"rojt3el.Con fexf h t e . May 1986 (as amended). Site Desc1"Z'gtion. This was a 28-acre site beween the freeway and a major arteriai, and adjacent to a shopping mall. It was divided into three development sites, an 8.5-acre site that fronted the freeway and buffered the other two sites of 9.6 acres and 6.9 acres. Part of the site development included bisecting the original parcel of land with a sheet to ccjnnect two major arterials.

B~ckgrozind. Prior to the adoption of the Rancho Arrayo specific plan in November 1984, the area was used for avocadn and citrus grovesf though zoned for lower density residential (5 units per acre). The specific plan allowed the construction of auto dealerships along the highway plus higher densitrJr housing on the interior parcel n the condition that a portion of the housing be affordable. In 1986, the pro>jectowner got these conditions amended to increase the total number of housing units that would be built.

Site 1 Pmjeei: DescrI'pfit?:ltn:,414 tontobile Agencies Agency l Building size 16,207 sq. ft (for showrooms, offices, and service facilities) tandscapirrg/eawment 39.46% 50.28% Paving Parking required 65 spaces Parking provided 168 spaces (W-ithoutdoor display area)

Agency 2 16,446 t;q, ft 30.13% 57.51% 66 spaces 175 spaces

Wader iistr, A total of 65 acre-het per year (AFY) was allowed in the specific plan for the entire project. This portion of the project would use 3 AFY,

n ~ f i i c . Average daily trips (ADTs) set at 936 (6.126 usable acres x 152.8 ABT /acre). Oflzer Shndards Textured or ccjlored pavement thmughout the prc~ject Aesthetically pleasing exterior lighting Plumbing fixtul-es had to be tvater-conserving 13rohibitc?duse of herbicides and fertilizer within creek drainage

Appendix E: Case Study Defnils

174

C~anditio~~s/I\/titigation Lnndsmpi~zg, Required to maintain a landscaping plan approved by the Architectural Board of Review, The owner had to provide a performance bond to assure completion of landscaping portion of the plans.

Transportntiotz. Caryml parking Free employee bus passes Employee lunchroom, showers, and lockers Variable work hours (if feasible) Customer shuttle service Gonslrricfion Conference. Limitations on impacts of construction traffic, parking, and dust.

Fees. The project was to pay traffic mitigation fees for "36 ADT tcr two existing traff;Icimprovement districts. Site 2 Project Descripfiot~:Aflordable Sekzior Apartmezt Project 112 units of housing on 3.5 acres, including four three-story buildings and nine two-story buildings, with a 1,000-square-foot recreation building and a swimming pool. Building Coverage, 2 9% Paving, 26%

tandscaping/Oyen Space, 55% Parking, 56 spaces required, 78 prc>vidd

Standards W . The specific plan allowed 63 AI? far the entire project. This portion af the project was to use 27.2 AFY. Underground Utilifies. Utilities had to be underground within the prc~ject. De~sity, Housing density was 31.9 units per acre. This exceeded the general plan standard far this area of 12 units per acre but was in line with densities approved h r other affordable housing projects within the city, The project was eligible to tap the city's density reserve that was set aside for affordable housing.

Gonditit~ctns/MitigaCion Landscaping, Required to maintain a landscaping plan approved by the Architectural Board of Review. The owner had t s prc>videa perfc~rmancebond to assure completion of landscaping pa&ion af the plans.

Affordabr'lify AXX units were required to be affordable for thirty years, as described in the specific pXan for thirty years. Use was restricted to senior citizens (over 62 years of age) and the number of motor veI~icXeswas restricted,

R p p n d h E: Case Sfzrda, D e f ~ i l s

175

If the project was not used for srzniars, the number of units was to be reduced to comply with city parking requirements. 012-SiteRecycXiltzg Bins. Letter ~fAgl.e~;r7~e.rzt/PerJor1rtn~ce Bond, The owner had to submit a letter of agreement ensuring the enforcement of affcjrdability restrietic~ns.Landscaping was to be assured with a performance bond.

Fees. The project had to pay traffic mitigation fees for traffic imprc~vement districts based on 351. ADT (112 units x 3.3 AD7 x .95). Site 3 Project Descripf1'011: Mult ip?l(?-Fa;r~zilyCondominium Project The projwt inctudd 96 cc>ndominjumson 9.65 acres of vacant land. 46 units were affordable and 50 were market rate. There were eighteen one-story and WO-story buildings, with clusteni of 5 4 units, as weXl as three free-standing units and one duplex. A small cabana and swi ing pool and W o tennis courts were provided. Building Coverage, 24% Paving, 17%

Landxaping/Open Space, 62% 13arking,215 spaces (192 covered)

S tal~dclrds Density. The o>veralldensiv war; 9.9 unib per acre, less than the general plan designation of 42 units per acre. Setbacks of twenty to thirty feet were grc>vided along the west grc>perty line, thirty to forty feet along the south property line, and forty to sixty feet along the east property line. Otlzer Standads. Existing trees on the property were to be preserved, grc>tected,and maintained.. Textured or ec>lowdpavement Undergro~undutilities within project site Plumbing had to be tvater-cmserving

Gonditit?ctns/MitigaCion Landscayi~zg. The developer had to maintain a landscaping plan approved by the Architedural Board of Review and had to provide a performance bond to assure completion of the landscaping portion of the plans.

Aflordabilify. 46 three-bedroom units were to be sold at prices affordable to low-moderate income households. Resale prices were contrcllled through recorded documrtnts to maintain affodability far thirty years. On-Site Recycling B ~ I Z S . Letter of Agreemclzt. The owner had to submit a Letter of agreement emuring the enforcement of affordabiliQ restrictions.

176

Rpp~ndixE: Cast Study D ~ f ~ r ' l s

Fees, "fe project had to pay traffic mitigation fees for traffic improvement districts based on 499 ADT ((36, units x 5.2, APT).

Santa Monica Routine Case-Monica

Tawer

Project cC?ftex zt Date. November 1988. Site Dcscriplr'un. The project was located an the edge of downtown Santa Munica on the corner of two major arterials. "Te site was approximately 30,CfOO square feet. Proj;ect Descripfisn, The project was a six-story, 93,451-square-fwt retaril/bank/office development including 312 parking spaces in a fc3ur-level subterranean garage. Apprt3ximately 80 percent of the proposed building area was offices and 20 percent was Ecw retail and a bank. The pro)jed design conformed with the specifications of the Third Street Specific Plan in terms af height, bulk, use, and urban d e s i p policies.

Design, The maximum buiXding height-was 80 feet, 6 inches, but the building stepped back a n the upper floc~rsto reduce the overall mass and bulk. The developer was required to reduce each of the top floors by 1,000 square feet to reduce bulk. Other design features such as awnings and inset tzrindows tzrere intended to break up the scale of the building. There was a landscaped public courtyard on the g r o u d level. The devebper was required to use nonreflective glass. The overall floor area ratio was 3.11. Trafic The grc3ject prcjvided enough parking on-site that it did not affect the availability of downtown parking. The project alone did nst significantly impact the level of service at any of the eight intersections analyzed in the EIR.

n~nspoufalion. Owners were required to encourage public transit usage, provide bicycle parking, and construct a bus shelter. 17nl"kir-zg. The c>wnerwas atlc>wed to charge for parking but had to prc3vide free valet parking during all hours of operation. Wastezvclter, Developers had to retrofit existing Santa Monica residences with ultra-low flow pXumbing so that the new development would not increase wastewater flows (maximum cost, $30,000). Ultra low-flow plumbing fixtures were required throughout.

Lnndsmping, The public caurtyard had to include 60 percent plant materials. Cc~fzsfruction.The developer was required to try to reduce dust by watering and so on, but there were no specifk limits on when construction activities could take place.

R p p n d h E: Case Sfzrda, D e f ~ i l s

Fees Pnrks/Hoz~sirq. The developer had to gay a housingiparks mitigation fee of $2.25 per square font for the first 15,000 square feet of net rentable office floor area and, $5.00 per square foot for the remaining office space, adjusted for inflation. The unadjusted fee for this project based on an office flclor area of 76,025 square feet was $338,875. The developer could elect to provide housing and parks diredly. Transportation. Tranvurtation fees could be imposed at some later date.

Santa Molnira Best Case-Monira***Centre Project Context Bate. March 1988, Site Description. The pr0pert.y war; in a semi-industriat area of Santa Monica, just north of the Santa Monica Freeway, The total area was 740,"32 square feet (17.1 acres) within the Special Office District. Project Deseri~ttion. This was a mixed-use commercial project that included fcmr major buildings (referred to as North, West, Sc>rxth,and East), each with 324,8534 square feet and with a maximum height of six stories (eighty-four feet). The project included undergrc>und parking of 3,652 parking spaces (2.9 spaces per 1,000 square feet of floor area). The development was to be built in two phases but was submieed as one package to lock in development rights,

Fluor Arm. The total flr~orarea was not to exceed 1,259,577 square feet, 4.7 times the area of the prqerty. Btlildirzg Setbach. The buildings had to be set back from the street as follows: Nctrth-30 to 103 feet; W e s t 4 5 to 103 feet; South-20 to 101 feet; East-35 to 90 feet.

Design, The design was to be approved by the city's Architectural Board, except for those issues such as building height and floor area that were specifically addressed in the development ageement. Uses. Land uses tzrere allowed according to the Special Office District but with these maximum limits (which could be appealed): Restauranl; 50,000 square feet Medical office, 20,000 square feet Retail serving the project itself, 40,000 square feet Health cXub, 25,C10Qsquare feet Banks and savings and loamI 30,000 square feet General commercial office, the remainder of the allowable floor area for the prc5jec.t

178

Rpp~ndixE: Case Study Defnils

Open S p ~ c e . The project was to include "ample'" open space and landscaping as specified in the landscaping plan, including a large artificial lake. Wafer Cuplservati4)n. The project included water saving measures, such as watering at night, using lc>w-flc>wfixtures, and drc~ughtresistant plantings. The goal tvas to reduce water use by one-third,

Plznsirzg. The project had to be built in no more than two phases, The first phase was to include Sc~uth,East, and the lake, The second phase of the prcjjwt had to begin within twelve years of the agreement. On-Site CGllild Care. The developer was required to prc>videa faciliq for child and infant care including 3,500 square feet of interior space and 3,500 square feet of exterior space (not by a public street). The city retained the right to approve the child care prc3vider and to require that the provider be a nctnprc~fitorganization. Ten percent of the chiId care capacity was t c ~be resewed for people in the immediate neighbarhood with demnsbated finmcial need at 60 percent of the market rate.

Transporfntiarz. The developer had tcr submit a traffic demand management (TDM) program and designate a full-time employee to prc>mo>teand manage this program. The goal of the prclgram was to reduce auto trips by 20 percent. The project" yearly traffic mitigation fee was to be reduced to the degree that the TDM goals were achieved. The TDM programs had to be written into leases on the building to promote tenant invcltlvernrtnt. The TfZ.iV program was apected to incXude: Flex-time Car-pc101 parking 50 percent discount tokens for public tramportation Vans and employee shuttles

College Pnrkiq. The developer agreed to prc)vide c>verfluwparking far Santa Monica Community College for a fee and to the degree this was feasible,

Emplmjntenl.. The developer committed to design and promojte job training programs ttlr meet the needs of surrounding neighbarhac~ds. Wastewter, The development agreement did not override sewer moratoria. Pr@rentzikZ F"rarkirzg Stzrdy. If the city deemed it necessary the developer tvouLd be required to finance a study to see whether preferential parking tvas needed in the immediate viciniq. Fees Fee. The developer had to gay a mitigation fee based on Housing and $2.25 per quaw foot for the first 15,000 square feet of net rentable flcmr area and

R p p n d h E: Case Sfzrda, Def~ils

179

$5.27 per square foot far everything above, indexed for infiation. The total fee, not adjusting for inflation and assuming that the maximum amount of retail. space ended up being built, would have been $5,828,520. The developer was required to pay at tea" $3.5 million of this fee before commencing Phase 1.

Traifie Demnand Mntzagonc~~C Fee. The devebper had to pay $200,000 per year adjusted by inflation. This was reduced to the extent that traffic demand was reduced by more than the goal of 20 percent in a year. The developer was required to pay for ;a traffic engineer to prepare an annual analysis of actual traffic so that TDM goals could be evaluated-. Traifie Improvement Fee. The developer had to pay a total fee of $6,408,486 for traffic imprc3vemen-t..$3,950,000 had to be paid prior to receiving the building permit for Phase 4, and the balance before Phase 2. These funds tzrere tcr be used to reduce traffic levels, including up to $5a0,000 far staff costs.

Art. The developer had to pay $150,000 to the Santa Monica Arts Foundation for artwork to be placed in public places in Santa Monica. Homeless Services. The developer had to pay the city $300,080 to be used for sei-vices to homeless persom or far the operatictn of shelters,

Riverside Routine Case-Riverside A m s F"rojt3cl.Confexf h t e . June 4990. Site Descriptio~. A 4.5-acre site, a portion of which was p ~ v i o w l ydeveloped with single-family residences (prc~posedfor remval). Zoned K-4, single-family, with proposed zone change to 8-3, multi-family, with thirty-foot height limit.

Project. Description. Apartment complex with 102 units: 46 one-bedroom and 56 two-bedroom rmit-22.6 units per acre. Reviezu Pmmss. Recommended by planning staff with conditions; the design review bc~ard looked at building and landscaping plans. The planning commissian approved the project with a vote of 7-1.

S ka~dlards Project Design. Variances allowed reduction of the required setbacks from side property tines from fifty to forty feet, to make the rear yards smaller than zoning code, to eliminate the requirement for recreational vehicle parking, and to reduce the neighborhood common space. No exposed mechanical systems (e*g., heating and cooling) were a l l w e d on the pitched roofs.

Co~zdif io"us/Mitiptio:on Street trees and parkway landscaping specificatirons to screen parking area Trash enclosures of masonry btock with stucco finish to match the building

Rpp~ndixE: Case Study Defnils

l80

Curbs and gutters Landscape easement for ten-foc>tplanter on street frontage that was to be maintained by applicant Deed to alXc3w the city to widen adjacent street Aplprc~valdid not guarantee sewer availability Off-site imprc>vementsto be specified by Public Works Department

Fees. Not specified in this document.

Riverside Best Gase-Rivesside***P1a~:e Project CL??$ text

Date. October 1990. Site Description, This tvas a 421-acre site bordering a freeway The site tvas undeveloped except for one single-family residence. It was surrounded by singleFamily residential zones on three sides, which were partial1y developed, and on one corner abutted a residential-agriculture zone. "fo the northwest it bordered commercial zoning along the railrc~adright-of-way and the freeway Project Background a ~ Descripfion. d The land was owned by the community college, which had planned to build a new campus. Instead, they teamed up with a private developer who planned to build a cmfel-ence center for the college and a mixture of office, hotet, and apartments. The developer originally proposed 1,050 apartmmts; the planning department =cornmended 517. The flaming cornrnissian approved the project '7-1 on October 4, 1990, reducing the housing units to 756. Eigl~t:hundred pwple attended the cornmlssion hearing, mostly opponents; this tvas the largest turn-nut commissioners could remember in recent history Skalzdards Cfromplart~lit~g d q a r t mert t recumme.tdatiotzs) 570 rmidences 1. 53 units on '7.5 acres at '7 dwelling units per acre 2. 517 units on 27 acres at 45 dwelling units per acre with thirty- to forty-foot height limits 400,000 square feet of offices on twenty acres with six-story height limit (seventy feet) 1Cf0,000 square feet of offices on 6.5 acres with twc~stc~ry height limit (thirty feet) 260,OQO square feet of comrnercial/retailt on twmty acres with two-story height limit (thirty feet) 250,000 square feet of hotel and a 50,000-square-foot conference center on 8.8 acres with Wo~storyheight Xirnit (thirty Feet)

R p p n d h E: Case Sfzrda, D e f ~ i l s

Bufflering from neighboring residential areas to the northwest, including fvventy-five feet of landscaping then a six-foot wall; a fifty-hot building setback from the street; and a two-story height Xirnit (thirty feet) within one hundred feet of the street. The rest of the high-density area would be Iimited to three stories (forty feet) Eighty-fool- htlilding setback ior commerda~afficearea on street frontage with fifteen feet of landscaping Lower-dentiity homing to abut the residential areas to the south and the greenbett (floodptain), or eliminate vehicular access and impose twentyfmt height limit

Developer had to piay full cost of traffic improvements adjacmt to the site, including street widening and signalling. Developer was to pay one-third of the approximately $40 million cost of widening the bridge aver the freeway 200-space park and ride within commercial area Dedication of streets and a bus stop Creation af a landscape maintenance assessment district instead of deeding Xandxaped areas to the city Transportation management plan, included measures such as carpcml preferential parking, bikeways, and van pool incentives, to mitigate air pollution Solar pclwer for water heating Research on the historic ranch complex was to be presented to the Historic Resources Department Cultural resources monitor to be hired by the devefopeu; with the power to halt grading for archaeolc>gicatevaluation Developer required to pay pro rata share af new fire station W t e r consenratian measures-a number of conservation techniques were recommended, including uit-ra-tow-Rush toilets

Park fees Library fees

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Appendix F: Interview Schedule These are some areas we would like to discuss for each prc3ject: Is it likely that this prcljt3.c.t would be approved in your city? If not, how would it have to be altered in order to be approved? Tf likely, is this a typical project? Which of the conditions jmposd would not be imposed on this prcjject in your city? Are these conditions imposed on any projects? What projects? How tzrould you explain the difference? What other conditions would you require of this project? W u l d you implement cmditions differently? Why? How? How would the project revim differ? W u t d the proiject go to the city council? Planning cl-rmmission? How do the development impact fees compare? Mlorald you assess different kinds of fees? Different amounts?

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Index Afbrdable housing, 79,89,92,1053--112, 135,136 girnerican Association of University Women, 71 American Land fnstittlte, 25 Antelope Valley, Calif~?n~ia, 129 Arcl~itecturalreview, See Enviro~nmental impact =view; Prc3jetl.t-aesthetics Atlantic City, New jersey, 113 Audobon %cieq, X, 139 AviIa Beach, California, 138 Barbara Plaza, 80'82, M, 97. SW also Santa Barbara %)utt-rCoast Berry, WendeH, 2,7,12 Bhopal disader, 5 Borrlder, Cotorado, 137' Bradley, Tom, 9 Brower, David, 139 Brow, Katkleen, 8 Builder, 72 Building rates, 152-154. Sec also Grc?wth control; Bush, George, 8,141 Cahklilla people, 43 California Environmental QualiQ Act of 1371 (CEQA), 9599,138, See also Envirnmental impact review California League of Cities, 57 Califomization effec"c,24 Campaign for Economic Democracy 72 Carpjnteria, California, 29-30,36. 5~ also Santa Barbara %uth Coast Ckeney Charles, 43 Chemc3byl disaster, 5 Clrtlmash people, 30 Cisnertls, Henry, 141 Citizen's for Ecclnomic Democracy (CED), 35,

Citizms for a Balanced Commlxnity, 71 Citizens for Goleta VaXle)r,34 Cit-izmsfor Reasonable Planning, 71

Citizens Pbnning Associatic>n(Santa Barbara), 32-34 City plaming, 9, 24, 80, 1C)tl-101, 102, 243-144. 5ce also Grc~wthccontro-oii Class stattrs, 7-8,7475, 238-140 Clinton, Wilfiarn, 141 Commtnlity Envirc~nmentalCc~uncil,X Competition, interlocal, 1411-141 Corona, Califc>n~ia, 43,45,49,57, 61, 62, 130, 149, Sep also Riverside County Comption, 142 Countervailing polidesflM,65 f and Urban Department c ~ Hotlsing Development (HUD), 141 De'creloper initiated grovdt-11conlccIl, 60, 4569 De'crelopment and dty planning, 9,143--144 and comparative power advantages, 69-73 and deregulation, 8-12 and growth control, 2-2, 12-16, 141-143,146147 and incentives, 141 and knowfedge, 141-143 and public iinterests, 14&%146 residentiat 84 SWalso Growth control Developmmt agreements, 43 De'crelt~pment: exactions, 122-127,134. Sec als17 Growth control Disney Wc~rld,l1 Douglas Aircraft Corporation, 38 Econornic development See De'crelc>pment; Growth control ELwood Grove, California, 2 Enterprise zones, 15-16 Ex-rvirc~ment, See E~~~~ironmental impact review; Environmentalism; Grc?wth control

Environmenhl Defense Center, 34,71 Environmental impact review (EIR),2-3, 12-1 6 , 9 5 100,101, 302. See also Growth controt Environmmtalism and class status, 6 and gmwth, 1-3,12-16 and grc>wthcontrol, 2-3,4-7; 12-16, 95100,10Z,lf)2 and public dismssion, 131-132 in Santa Barbara, 30-35,136-138 in %>vie6Ul~ion,19 Episodic grc3wth contrc)f, 59,62-M. See also Gmwtk contro~l Equity, social, 112-117. See also Growt1.r control Eureka, California, 138 Exadion, de~Telc3pmentSee Development exactic~ns;Growth contrc~f

and develc>pment,1-2,12-16,20-21,78, 141-143,146-347 and de\relc>pmentexactions, 122-127 as economic benefit, 132-233 as economic strangler, 7-1 2 and elect-ions,71-72 and environmental review, 2-3,4-7, 12-16,95-1 00 episcIdic, 59, 5 2 4 and grcjwth rates, 52-58 identification of, 26-30 impac"ceasurement of, 149-154 and focal pla~l~ling knowledge, l0&102 and prcj-growt11 interests, 73-76 and social equity 104,112-117,135-136 symbolic, 59, 66142 Sec also Crc>wth;Regulation, ent~ironmen tal Growth machine tt~crory19-20 Fees, 78-79, 122-127. SLY also De'c~elc>pment Growth rates, 52-58. SLY also Building rates; Grtlwth; Crtlwt-Lr control exactions Flint, Michigan, 15 Florida, 25 Hall, Stuart, 29 E-lawaii, 25 Fmda, Jane, 39 Wayden, Tcm, 39,72 Cabrieiino people, 30 Hayes, Dennis, 133-13.6. Hem&, California, 45. SLY also Riverside General Motors, 15 Cibbs, Lois, 134 County Globalizalion, 18-20 E-licks, Louise, 134 Goleta, Califc)mia, 62, 66, 68, 6gP71, 149. See Wyatt Corporation, 6diiZ, 71 also Santa Barbara South Coast Inc., 14 Goleta Water Boa&, 35 Indirwt effects. SLY Grt>wth Grt>wth and affordable housingl 79, 109-112, 135, Israel, 18 136 econono?miccosts of, 22-1 6 Jackson, Wes, 12 and enviramental review, 2-3,4-7, Kaiser Alrrminurn, 48 12-1 6 , 9 5 100 King, Rc>dney,9 indirect effects of, 2 4 natural limits ofE108-l@ and project aesth~eics,220-122 Lagornarsino, Robert, 139 and regulation, 1-3, 12-16, 20-25, 78, Lake Elsinore, Califorr~ia,45-46. 141-343,146-147 SLY also Rivenide County and social equity, 104,112-127,135-136 Lake %hoe, California, 21 and traffic effects, 105-108 League of Wc>menVc~ters,34, 71. Legal Aid, 71 and urban spatial form, 117-120 See also Gro~r.l.11 control Localism, 4-7, 18-20, SW also Grc3wth Grt>wthcontrol control and building rater;, 152-154 Locally Untlesiralole Land Use JLULU), 6 Long Beach, Califcjmia, 138 and class status, 7-8, 74-75, 13&14(1 and comparative power advantages, Los Angeles, CaXilornia, 25-26 69-73 and countemailing policiw, 60,64-66 Maine, 25 ~leveloperinitiated, 60,6$69 Malibu, California, 38

Marcl-rAir Force Base, California, 46 Media, 75 Mill, JcrRn Stuart, 145 Modet Land Development Code, 25 Monicae**Centre,13,80, 82, 89, 90,105,107. Sclc also Santa Monica, California Monica. Tower, 841,82, 84/89, 9 7 98, 109, 110. Sec also Santa Monica, Califontia Montecito, Califc~mia,30 Monlecito water district, 35 More, Richard, 134 Morencl Valley, Cafi%t?mia, 46--48,49, 70, 95, SPC~ J S DRiverside CounLy National Envimnmentat Education and Training Foundation, 3 National Envimnmenlal Policy Act (NEFA), 2-3,%,138 Natural growth limits, 108-1W Norco, California, 46,49. See also Riverside County Ocean Park, 38 Uil i~~dustry, 32, 13 O"Neill, Tl~orrzas,130 Oregon, 25 Urlando, Florida, 11 Palestine, 18 Parker, Fess, 68 PerrisoCalifornia, 46. SCealso Everside County Planning, city See City planning; Gr0wG.r controf Polymi, Karli, 12 Power, 16,18-19,69-73 Project aestl~etics,120-122. SE also Gmwth Project approval, 82-89, W , 92-95. SLYalso Growth. controf Public interest 14,5146.See also Grc3tvth control Rain forest deptdion, 10 Rancho""*Barbara,80,82,89,90,92-95,98, 105106. See also Santa Barbara South. Cc>ast Redefining Prt~gress,12 Regulation, environrnental asscrssment of, 20-21 and gmwt"IZ. 1-3, 12-1 6,241-21, 78, 141-143,146-147 and sustaimbitity, 133-135 and urban theory, 16-20 St-.ealso Grclwt11 control

Riverside Ams, 8-0,82,84-85,97,98. SE raku Riverside County Rivenide Commrrniv College, 89 130, 149 Rt~ersideC o ~ ~ n72-73, e, and afhrdable housing, 112,136 bizckgrotm~lof study, 41-48 and ctass status, 74-75 and de~~eloper initiated growth control, G6,67-68 and development exacticms, 123-123 and enviro~~mental review %,g?-98, 99-100, l(11, 102 and episo~dicgrowth control, 62,6344 grc>wthrate of, 53-56 and politicaf grc~wtlzcclntrofs, 48-5tI and project aesth&ics, 122 and prtrjeet approval, 84-86,92-95 and social equiw, 101,115--117 and symbolic growth contrd, 61/62? and traffic effects, 105108 and rrnernployxnmt; 132. See also Corona, California; I-Iemel, California; Lake Elsinure, Califc3:cnia; Moreno Valley, California; Norco, Catiforr~ia;Perris, Califc~rnia;Sun City California; Temecula, California Rt~ersideCounq Crowtls Management Element; 61 Rtrersidek"*Place,80,82,89,92,9&. Sty also Riverside Cotmty Xit*crsid~ Ifress Erzferprise, 43, 99 Roosevett, Franklin flelano, 147 San Antunio, Texas, 141 San Bernadina Crtunty Califcjmia, 43/ 444: Santa Barbara Alliance, 34 Sutzta Burbavu Netus Prccss, 7 2 , B Santa Barbara South Coast, 25-26,28,50, 72,73,84f104, 134, 139, 1247,149, 1250 and affordable housing, 89,109-1 12, 135, 136 bizckgrotmd of study, 30-35 and ctass status, 74-75 and countemailing poficis, 64,65 and develc3per initiated growth control, 66, 67,68, 69 and develo~pmentexactions, 122-127 and de\ielopment inccmtives, 140 and environmental activism, 30-35, 136-1 38 and enviranmental review, 98, W-100, 101,102 and episodic grcjwth control, 42, 63, 64 grwt-l1rate of, 53-56,57 ancl natural growth limits, 10SIQ9

and oil ind~~str?vf, 32, 233 and poli~calgmwth controls, 35-36 and prc>jwtaeslhdics, 220 and project approval, &89,92,95 and social eqrjity, 104,115 and symbolic growth control, 6041 and traffic effects, 105-108 and urban spatial form, 117-120 St-.ealso Carpinteria, California; GoIeta, Calift3rnia Santa Fe, New Mexico, 136 Santa Monica, California, 25,28,50, 70, 71, 72,73,134,146,149 and afffordable housing, 89,92,109-2 t 2, 135,136 backgro~tndof study, 35-39 and dass status, 74-75 and countemailing policiw, 65 and developer ininitiated grc>wtltcontrol, 66,6X and develc~pmentexactions, 122-127 and dwelopment incentives, 140 and envirt>nmentalactivism, 136-138 and envirc~mentalreview 9698, 1otb-101, 102 and episc>dicgrc>wthcontrol, 63 grcwth rate of, 5%56 and natural growth limits, 108-109 and polilical p w t h controls, 3941 and prajwt aesthetics, 222 and prc>jectapproval, 82-84,89,90,92, 95 and social equity, 104,112-116 and symbolic growth control, 61 and traffic effects, 205-108 and urban spatial form, 217 Santa Monica Chamber of Cc~mmerce, 3&39 Santa Monica Freeway, 38 Santa Monicans for a Livable Envimnment, 71 Santa Monicans for Renters-Rights (SMm), 39,72 Santa rklatzim Outloolk; 38, 7 2 , s Santa Rosa Plateau, 49

SHMAM, 152 Sierra Club, 7,%, 50,71,72-73,139 %>cialeqrrityf 104,112-117. See also Growth control Soviet Union, 19 Spatial form, urban, l t 7-120 Standard Zoning Enabfing Act of 1926, 25 State Planing Exlabling Act of 1927,25 S.ummerland water distrid, 35 Sun City; California, 46. SE ulso Riverside County Sustainabilily, 133-1 35 Symboolxc growtln control, 60-62. Srre ulso Grt~wthcontrol Taxpayers for a Better Morcmo Valley, 71 Temecula, California, 48,S9. S ~ also P Riverside County Third Stre& Redevelopment District, 65 Three Mile Island, 5 Tocquevilfe, AIexis de, 145 Traffic effects, 105-1 08 Tmdeau, Cary, 126 Tmst for Public Lands, 71 Uebemotl-t, Peter, 9 Uerberroth Commision, 8-9 University of California, Santa Barbara, 30, 32 Urban spatial form, 117-120. SLY also Growth control Urban thwry, 16-20 Venl-ixra County, California, 11-12,76 Vermont 25 Webb, Del, 46 Witson, Pete, 8 World W;ar 11, 38