British Foreign Policy under New Labour, 1997–2005 Paul D. Williams
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British Foreign Policy under New Labour, 1997–2005 Paul D. Williams
British Foreign Policy under New Labour, 1997–2005
Also by Paul D. Williams UNDERSTANDING PEACEKEEPING (co-author with A.J. Bellamy and S. Griffin) AFRICA IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: External Involvement on the Continent (co-edited with I. Taylor) PEACE OPERATIONS AND GLOBAL ORDER (co-edited with A.J. Bellamy)
British Foreign Policy under New Labour, 1997–2005
Paul D. Williams Senior Lecturer in Security Studies University of Birmingham, UK
© Paul D. Williams 2005 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, 90 Tottenham Court Road, London W1T 4LP. Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The author has asserted his right to be identified as the author of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First published in 2005 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS and 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010 Companies and representatives throughout the world. PALGRAVE MACMILLAN is the global academic imprint of the Palgrave Macmillan division of St. Martin’s Press, LLC and of Palgrave Macmillan Ltd. Macmillan® is a registered trademark in the United States, United Kingdom and other countries. Palgrave is a registered trademark in the European Union and other countries. ISBN-13: 978–1–4039–1321–0 hardback ISBN-10: 1–4039–1321–8 hardback This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Williams, Paul, 1975– British foreign policy under New Labour, 1997–2005 / Paul D. Williams. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 1–4039–1321–8 1. Great Britain—Foreign relations––1979–1997. 2. Labour Party (Great Britain) I. Title. DA589.8.W55 2005 327.41⬘009⬘049—dc22 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 14 13 12 11 10 09 08 07 06 05 Printed and bound in Great Britain by Antony Rowe Ltd, Chippenham and Eastbourne
2005051389
To my parents, Carole and David Williams
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Contents List of Tables
viii
List of Abbreviations
ix
Acknowledgements
xii
Introduction
1
Part I
Commitments
1 Understanding Labour’s Foreign Policy
Part II
Relationships
13 15
33
2 The Closest Ally
35
3 Living in (and with) Europe
56
4 Healing a Scar on the World’s Conscience?
75
Part III
Issues
5 Navigating in the Global Economy
97 99
6 Defending the Realm … and the Defence Industry
120
7 The Right (and Prudent) Thing To Do
141
8 Other People’s Wars
164
9 Iraq and Labour’s Moment in the Middle East
185
Conclusions
207
Notes
213
Index
253
vii
List of Tables 4.1 5.1 5.2 6.1 6.2
UK trade relations with Sub-Saharan Africa Discourses of globalisation UK Government’s appeal to globalisation since 1997 Strategic effects of UK military operations UK arms exports and global market share, 1997–2003
viii
89 107 107 126 136
List of Abbreviations ABM ACTSA AMIB ANC BMATT BTI CBBC CDC CFSP CJTF CPA DDR DESO DFID DRC DTI ECOMOG ECOWAS ESDI ESDP ETA EU EUPM FAC FCO FDI G-7 G-8 GCHQ GNI HIPC ICC ICISS ICJ IDP
Anti-Ballistic Missile Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 African Union Mission in Burundi African National Congress (South Africa) British Military Advisory and Training Team British Trade International China-Britain Business Council Commonwealth Development Corporation EU Common Foreign and Security Policy NATO’s Combined Joint Task Forces Coalition Provisional Authority (Iraq) Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Defence Export Services Organisation Department for International Development Democratic Republic of Congo Department for Trade and Industry ECOWAS Monitoring Group Economic Community of West African States NATO’s European Security and Defence Identity European Security and Defence Policy (EU) Basque Homeland and Freedom European Union EU Police Mission Foreign Affairs Committee Foreign and Commonwealth Office Foreign Direct Investment Group of 7 Industrialised Nations Group of 8 Industrialised Nations Government Communications Headquarters Gross National Income World Bank’s Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative International Criminal Court International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty International Court of Justice Internally Displaced Persons ix
x
List of Abbreviations
IICK IMF ISAF JIC KFOR KLA MAI MOD MONUC NAC NATO NEC NEPAD NGO NMD NPT NRF NWS ODA OECD OSCE POW PRT PSC RAF RRF RUF SDR SHAPE SPLM/A START TNC UN UNAMSIL UNCHR UNESCO UNFICYP UNITA UNMIBH UNMIK
Independent International Commission on Kosovo International Monetary Fund International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan Joint Intelligence Committee NATO’s Kosovo Force Kosovo Liberation Army Multilateral Agreement on Investment Ministry of Defence UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo NATO’s North Atlantic Council North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Network-Enabled Capability New Partnership for Africa’s Development Non-governmental Organisation US National Missile Defence Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons NATO Response Force Nuclear Weapons States under the NPT Overseas Development Administration Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe Prisoner of War Provincial Reconstruction Team, Afghanistan Private Security Company Royal Air Force EU Rapid Reaction Force Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone Strategic Defence Review NATO’s Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army Strategic Arms Reduction Talks Transnational Corporation United Nations UN Mission in Sierra Leone UN Commission on Human Rights UN Education, Scientific and Cultural Organisation UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus National Union for Total Independence of Angola UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina UN Mission in Kosovo
List of Abbreviations xi
UNMIL UNMIS UNMOVIC UNSCOM WEU WMD WTO WWF
UN Mission in Liberia UN Mission in Sudan UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (Iraq) UN Special Commission (Iraq) Western European Union Weapons of Mass Destruction World Trade Organisation World Wide Fund for Nature
Acknowledgements Many people have helped make this book possible and I am pleased to acknowledge them here. First of all, I would like to thank my friends and colleagues who generously gave up their time to answer my questions, offer assistance or comment on various parts of the manuscript: Shaun Breslin Robert Falkner, Colin Hay, Rosemary Hollis, Donna Lee, Matt McDonald, Gerd Nonneman Jason Ralph, Joanna Spear, Ian Taylor, Matthew Watson and Natalie Williams. Special thanks go to Alex Bellamy, Stuart Croft, Tim Dunne and Sally Morphet who offered many valuable comments on the entire manuscript. The book is undoubtedly better than it would have been without their expert advice. I owe an additional debt of appreciation to Rita Abrahamsen, Rob Dixon and Ian Taylor. We have co-authored several publications on UK foreign policy under new Labour and I have learnt a great deal from them in the process. I have referenced our joint work in the appropriate places in the book. I would also like to thank the politicians and government officials from the UK and abroad who have shared with me their thoughts on various aspects of British foreign policy. My appreciation also goes to the staff at the Labour party resource centre in Milton Keynes for helping me obtain a variety of official documents. I must also thank Alison Howson at Palgrave for being a patient editor and accommodating both academic and electoral timetables. In addition, Mike Brown and the Center for Peace and Security Studies at Georgetown University provided the perfect environment in which to complete the first draft of the manuscript. Finally, I come to my two biggest debts of gratitude. My parents, Carole and David, have taken a passionate interest in the issues that lie at the heart of this book for as long as I can remember. They have been a constant source of love, support and newspaper clippings, and I am deeply grateful to them both. Last of all I want to express my thanks to Ariela Blätter for her love, encouragement and advice. I would also like to thank Taylor & Francis Ltd for permission to reproduce Tables 5.1 and 5.2 from Colin Hay and Nicola J. Smith, ‘Horses for Courses? The Political Discourse of Globalisation and European Integration in the UK and Ireland’, West European Politics, Vol. 28 (2005), pp. 124–158. xii
Acknowledgements xiii
In addition, parts of the text draw upon and develop some of my own work published previously as: ‘Who’s making UK foreign policy?’ International Affairs, 80:5 (2004), pp. 911–29; ‘The Rise and Fall of the ‘Ethical Dimension’: Presentation and practice in New Labour’s foreign policy’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 15:1 (2002), pp. 53–63; ‘Fighting for Freetown: British Military Intervention in Sierra Leone’, Contemporary Security Policy, 22:3 (2001), pp. 140–68; ‘La Grand-Bretagne de Tony Blair et L’Afrique’, Politique Africaine, No. 94 (June 2004), pp. 105–27; and ‘Britain and Africa after the Cold War: Beyond damage limitation?’, in Ian Taylor and Paul Williams (eds), Africa in International Politics (London: Routledge, 2004), pp. 41–60. Paul D. Williams May 2005
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Introduction The events of 11 September 2001 (hereafter 9/11) intensified debates about the UK’s role in global politics. To what extent had UK foreign policy helped shape a world order that could produce such acts of terrorism? How closely should the UK align itself with the US in their aftermath? What roles should the UK play on the world stage and what values should guide it? What and who was UK foreign policy for? This study aims to contribute to these debates by offering a critical analysis of the foreign policies pursued by Tony Blair’s Labour government during its first two terms in office between May 1997 and May 2005. During this period, Blair’s government set out a wide variety of ambitious roles for UK foreign policy. Before its 1997 election victory, the Labour party had suggested that some new directions in foreign policy were likely.1 After nearly two decades in opposition, the party caucus was weary of Britain’s traditional pragmatism in foreign policy and saw the development of a more principled approach as one area where it could clearly differentiate itself from the Conservatives and gain an electoral advantage into the bargain. For Tony Blair, it seemed clear that although the UK could no longer aspire to superpower status in a military sense, it was in a position to play a pivotal role on the world stage and to make Britain’s presence felt on a variety of important issues. First and foremost, Blair’s government sought to act as a bridge between the US and Europe.2 In Whitehall, key figures in the new government also adjusted the course of their ministries. The new Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook, keen to enhance his radical credentials within the party, began reforming what he considered the conservative, ‘stuffy’ and opaque culture within the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO).3 In a similar fashion, Defence Secretary George Robertson declared that the UK’s armed forces would act as a ‘force for good’, while Clare Short’s new Department for International Development (DFID) set out to alleviate world poverty and ensure that Britain did not forget its obligations to the planet’s poorest citizens. During its first two terms, Blair’s government touted itself as being many things, not least a force for good, a friend of democracy and at the heart of Europe. It also suggested it would reject the crude realpolitik pursued by the previous Conservative government; it would put the promotion of human rights at the heart of its diplomacy; and it would find 1
2 British Foreign Policy under New Labour
a third way between capitalism and socialism. In addition, it claimed it would place stricter limits upon arms exports; eliminate world poverty (or, rather halve the number living in absolute poverty by 2015); make globalisation work for the poor; be a pivotal power and a bridge-builder between the US and Europe; champion a new doctrine of international community; fight wars for values not territory; cancel the debts owed to it by the world’s poorest countries; be strong in the world; actively engage with and reorder the world around it as a way of winning a ‘war’ against terrorism; take steps to improve Africa’s shameful predicament and, most recently, fight the forces of evil and barbarism and prevent hypothetical problems becoming imminent threats. Of course, beneath the hype and from the vantage point of May 2005, this list remained primarily one of aspiration rather than achievement. It had also quickly attracted criticism on four main grounds. First, most of these commitments were not as novel as Blair’s government portrayed them. Winston Churchill had spoken of Britain being at the intersection between the three ‘majestic circles’ of the Commonwealth, the English-speaking world and a united Europe; Harold Macmillan had suggested the UK could become the world’s ‘chief source of inspiration’, and James Callaghan had claimed for Britain the role of international bridge-builder.4 Moreover, especially after the end of the Cold War, most liberal democracies, including Britain, adopted similar positions on the major international issues of the day relating to the promotion of democracy, good governance, free markets, sustainable development and human rights.5 A second strand of criticism argued that Labour’s statements of intent were far too grandiose. Not only did this set the government up for a fall when it failed to achieve its objectives but for some commentators it reflected a certain naivety about the ‘hard reality’ of international affairs and the structural constraints upon foreign policy.6 Arguably this tendency reached its zenith in Blair’s speech to Labour’s annual conference in October 2001, which according to one journalist in The Times, ‘left Kipling looking wimpish’.7 In one sense, Labour’s ambitious objectives simply reflected a widespread and deep-seated desire for the UK to – in Douglas Hurd’s famous phrase – ‘punch above its weight’ in world politics. According to one former British ambassador, Brian Barder, Labour’s objectives revealed the extent to which the government, its opposition and the domestic media remained ‘addicted’ to pursuing an unrealistic ‘leadership role’ in international affairs regardless of whether the UK retained either the requisite capabilities or, just as importantly, followers.8 This mindset was not unique to Blair’s government: delusions of
Introduction 3
grandeur were a common theme in UK foreign policy throughout the twentieth century and doubtless before that as well.9 Barder’s proposed solution was to ‘scale down’ the UK’s world role to a level more in tune with its vital interests and capabilities. Instead, especially after 9/11, Labour ‘scaled up’ its international commitments. A third set of criticisms noted that for all its long lists of objectives, Labour failed to engage in serious reflection about the conceptual rationale underpinning its foreign policies and how it would choose between competing priorities and interests.10 Indeed, despite some early attempts, there was little serious engagement between British academia and Blair’s government on this issue.11 Arguably, at least part of the explanation for this state of affairs lies in the fact that the UK did not fit neatly into the conventional categories of international theory. As Steve Smith observed in the late 1980s, There is simply no convenient classification within which Britain fits: it is not a superpower, nor a middle power; it has aspects of a great power, but is caught up in a very complex set of interdependencies; it has to be involved in bargaining with defence and economic alliances and organisations, yet it is not a small power. No other country has quite this profile. Yet exactly because Britain slips between conceptual categories, it offers a very real challenge to international relations theory.12 This challenge remains today. But precisely because the UK is difficult to classify, perhaps more than most states, its role in world politics remains open for debate. A fourth set of critics dismissed Labour’s stated objectives as little more than propaganda designed to obscure the real impact of its foreign policies. These commentators challenged the assumption that the UK played a generally benign, even benevolent role in world politics. Instead, they saw the UK as an ‘outlaw state’.13 As the main proponent of this approach, Mark Curtis, put it, Blair’s Britain. is a systematic violator of international law and ethical standards in its foreign policy – in effect, an outlaw state. … Britain’s role remains an essentially imperial one: to act as junior partner to US global power; to help organise the global economy to benefit Western corporations; and to maximise Britain’s (that is British elites’) independent political standing in the world and thus remain a ‘great power’. … the Blair government is seriously out of control – an
4 British Foreign Policy under New Labour
outlaw state, undertaking its foreign policy in open contempt for international ethical standards, including riding roughshod over the United Nations. … If we were honest, we would see Britain’s role in the world to a large extent as a story of crimes against humanity.14 In sum, although the UK had lost its empire it retained its imperial mindset, helped manage an unjust world order, protected the fundamentals of that world order through coercion and sometimes military force and privileged the narrow interests of its elites over international legal considerations and the development and welfare of a significant proportion of the planet’s population. For Curtis, Blair’s government simply represented the most recent phase of this long and scandalous British tradition. Indeed, he thought Labour was worse than its Conservative predecessors because it explicitly claimed to put human rights at the heart of its foreign policy but failed to do so in practice, especially in places such as Iraq, Kosovo, Diego Garcia, Chechnya, Indonesia, Afghanistan and the Middle East.
A critical analysis of UK foreign policies This book aims to provide a critical analysis of UK foreign policies under Labour. It is therefore necessary to define both ‘foreign policy’ and ‘critical analysis’, neither of which have obvious or neutral definitions. In a recent overview of the secondary literature, Walter Carlsnaes defined foreign policy as those actions which, expressed in the form of explicitly stated goals, commitments and/or directives, and pursued by governmental representatives acting on behalf of their sovereign communities, are directed toward objectives, conditions and actors – both governmental and non-governmental – which they want to affect and which lie beyond their territorial legitimacy.15 This provides a useful starting point. However, Carlsnaes ignores the fact that it is not only states and governments that conduct foreign policies. Consequently, Christopher Hill’s definition of foreign policy as ‘the sum of official external relations conducted by an independent actor (usually a state) in international relations’ is more useful.16 This recognises that a wide variety of actors including states, transnational corporations (TNCs), churches, dispossessed peoples, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), insurgencies and international organisations such as the
Introduction 5
European Union (EU) can all conduct foreign policies. The focus here is thus the sum of the UK’s official external relations between May 1997 and May 2005, especially those actions undertaken to affect certain stated objectives, conditions and actors that lie beyond its territorial legitimacy. In defining ‘critical analysis’, Colin Hay’s work provides a useful starting point. According to Hay, critical political analysis entails five commitments.17 First, it should be empirical without being empiricist, that is, it should use empirical description as a starting point from which to build interpretations and explanations but should recognise that empirical evidence alone cannot adjudicate between competing interpretations and explanations of political processes and events. As a result, the normative assumptions and commitments of the analyst invariably find their way into the final product. In places throughout the book I make ethical judgements about Labour’s foreign policies based primarily upon whether Blair’s government lived up to its statements of intent. As well as being difficult if not impossible to avoid, making ethics a central part of the debate about UK foreign policy is something that the Labour government encouraged both its supporters and its critics to do, especially during Robin Cook’s period as Foreign Secretary (1997–2001). A second component of critical analysis is that it should include a balanced conception of the relationship between structures and agents, an issue traditionally central to the study of foreign policy. Within the academic literature on foreign policy analysis two conventional traditions are commonly identified: realpolitik and innenpolitik.18 The realpolitik tradition suggests that the course of a state’s foreign policy is largely dictated by its material capabilities and relative position within international society. From this perspective it is the structures of international politics that dictate foreign policy and it is of little consequence which political party or prime minister is at the helm of the good ship Britannia. In contrast, the innenpolitik tradition allocates political actors a significant role in deciding the sort of foreign policy their state will pursue. Different sorts of regimes and governments will thus conduct different types of foreign policies. Both these traditions, however, rely upon problematic distinctions between structures and actors as well as a clear boundary between the domestic and the international that is untenable in practice. Real diplomatic games always involve both purposive action and structural constraints. Similarly, political analysis has long since moved beyond dichotomous thinking about the relationship between actors and structures. Following Hay, I find the ‘strategic– relational’ approach useful.19 Put simply, this involves analysing the
6 British Foreign Policy under New Labour
dialectical relationship between the choices made by conscious, reflexive and strategic actors within the ‘strategically selective contexts’ – contexts that favour certain strategies over others as a means to realise an actor’s intentions or preferences – in which they find themselves. Ultimately, therefore, although UK representatives may often feel constrained to a greater or lesser degree by their environment, choices will always exist.20 The focus here is how the British state (as a conscious, reflexive, strategic and collective actor) conducted itself within the strategic contexts of the global economy and what English School theorists call ‘international’ and ‘world’ society.21 One problem with analysing the role of a single state within such diverse and constantly developing contexts is that it is often exceedingly difficult to disentangle UK foreign policy from the morass of processes and events in world politics. At issue here is the extent to which (in a world characterised by (uneven) political interdependence) events and processes can realistically be labelled ‘the outcome’ of UK foreign policy. In short, unravelling how and when UK foreign policy is ‘responsible for X’ or ‘to blame for Y’ or, indeed, ‘successful in achieving Z’ is difficult, if it is possible at all. Generalisations and the attribution of blame, responsibility and success must be made cautiously and remain sensitive to the contingencies of the specific issue under examination. Third, critical analysis rejects a narrow and exclusive definition of politics as the interplay of governmental variables and instead takes into account the activities of NGOs, individuals and the influence exerted by transnational norms, ideas and values. Defined in this manner, critical analysis is synonymous with analysing ‘the distribution, exercise and consequences of power’.22 In this case, it involves analysing the consequences of UK foreign policy and determining the individuals and groups that benefited from it and those that lost out. Fourth, a critical analysis should remain sensitive to the potential causal and constitutive role of ideas in UK foreign policy. What UK representatives think about the contexts in which they find themselves has important effects upon their behaviour. This raises difficult epistemological and methodological issues about the extent to which it is possible to know precisely what motivations and ideas are guiding UK foreign policy-makers. This study analyses and evaluates Labour’s foreign policy behaviour, in part at least, in light of its own justifications.23 This exercise resembles what the Critical Theory tradition calls ‘immanent critique’, that is, examining discrepancies between words and deeds and evaluating the outcomes of Labour’s foreign policies in light of the justifications given for undertaking them.24 Analysed in these terms, a more
Introduction 7
progressive foreign policy would entail closing the gap between Labour’s statements of intent and the actual policy outcomes that emerge. However, critical analysis also entails highlighting tensions between incompatible objectives and contradictions that may exist between the stated means and ends of Labour’s foreign policy. Locating tensions and contradictions can help explain the gaps between words and deeds. It also provides the necessary first step for resolving them. Finally, critical analysis recognises the contingency and inherent unpredictability of political processes, including UK foreign policy. There is nothing natural or inevitable about Labour’s foreign policy commitments. Where one commitment took precedence over others this resulted from deliberate choices and decisions being made. In UK foreign policy, as in politics more generally, things could always have been different.
Overview of the book Between 1997 and 2005, Blair’s administration exhibited elements of both continuity with, and change from, Labour’s traditional approach to international affairs. Four main foreign policy commitments can be identified within the various threads that made up the Blair government’s brand of liberal internationalism. The first was to multilateralism, that is, the commitment to finding shared solutions to common international problems and avoiding unilateral action wherever possible. The second commitment was the government’s desire to be considered America’s closest ally; what I refer to as Atlanticism. The third was strong although not unconditional support for neoliberal principles of political economy. The fourth was an explicit rejection of realpolitik and a concomitant commitment to pursue foreign policies based on more cosmopolitan (but unfortunately usually vague and unarticulated) ethical foundations. I refer to this as moralism. These foreign policy commitments did not exist in a rigid or static hierarchy. Rather at different times and with regard to different issues some took precedence over the others. Similarly, while these commitments were not necessarily contradictory, tensions between all four arose at various times between 1997 and 2005, particularly when US foreign policy moved in a more unilateral direction. One volume cannot possibly provide an exhaustive survey of Labour’s foreign policies. Consequently, choices had to be made about which issues, relationships, processes and events could illuminate the fundamental characteristics of UK foreign policy under Labour. This
8 British Foreign Policy under New Labour
book focuses on three aspects: its underlying commitments, its key relationships and its central issue areas. Part 1 (Chapter 1) provides an overview of Labour’s key statements of intent during its first two terms in office and an assessment of what was ‘new’ about it compared with previous Labour governments. It then outlines what I consider to have been the Blair government’s four underlying foreign policy commitments, namely, Atlanticism, multilateralism, neoliberalism and moralism. Part 2 (Chapters 2–4) explores three of the UK’s key foreign relationships, namely, those with the US, the EU and Africa. Chapter 2 examines the basis of Labour’s Atlanticism and its decision to remain the closest ally of the world’s sole superpower. In particular, it discusses the foundations of the US–UK ‘special relationship’ and the impact the 9/11 terrorist attacks had upon Labour’s foreign policy. The first military consequence of 9/11 was Britain’s participation in the US-led invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001, which is analysed in the latter part of the chapter. Before, but especially after 9/11, Blair’s government achieved its objective of remaining America’s closest ally. Signing up to a ‘war on terrorism’, however, generated several problems, as did the lacklustre international attempts to build a stable and democratic Afghanistan. Chapter 3 explores Labour’s relationship with the EU through an analysis of its stance on the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). It does so by investigating how Blair’s government approached this issue both before and after the watershed event of NATO’s intervention in Kosovo in 1999. I suggest that Labour consistently and successfully promoted an Atlanticist version of ESDP that sought to ensure the EU’s military capacity would complement rather than replace the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). In Chapter 4 I analyse the UK’s relationship with sub-Saharan Africa. After decades of neglect at the hands of successive UK governments, between 1997 and 2005 Blair’s government consistently devoted greater attention to African affairs than its predecessors. In many respects, the UK’s record on Africa became an important barometer of the depth of Labour’s moralism and its commitment to liberal internationalist values. In Africa, the government’s stated objectives were to promote peace, prosperity and democracy. Consequently, the chapter provides a critical analysis of its policies in these three areas before examining the UK’s support for the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). As Blair suggested in his speech to Labour’s annual conference in the aftermath of 9/11, ‘The state of Africa is a scar on the conscience of the world. But if the world as a community focused on it, we could heal it.
Introduction 9
And if we don’t, it will become deeper and angrier.’25 Such sentiments encouraged Blair to set up a Commission for Africa that issued its report on 11 March 2005. Despite some successes, most obviously in Sierra Leone, Labour failed to resolve some of the tensions within its liberal internationalism and did not alter the fundamentals of UK–Africa relations such as over terms of trade. Part 3 (Chapters 5–9) analyses five consistently important issues between 1997 and 2005, namely, political economy, defence, international development and global justice, intervention and Iraq. Chapter 5 examines the economic dimensions of Labour’s foreign policy focusing particularly on its attempts to find a third way between capitalism and socialism in an interdependent and globalising world. In practice, the Blair government’s political economy both at home and abroad was heavily influenced by its understanding of neoliberalism and globalisation. Nevertheless, its commitment to neoliberalism was not unconditional and a heavy dose of mercantilism was always evident in its relationship with UK corporations and with regard to so-called commercial diplomacy. The chapter explores how Blair’s government thought about these issues and analyses its stance on the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI), international trade, the reform of the international financial architecture and commercial diplomacy towards China. Chapter 6 explores the elements of continuity and change in UK defence policy during Labour’s first two terms. It begins by analysing the 1998 Strategic Defence Review and suggesting that Labour’s defence policies emphasised four issues in particular: the importance of flexibility, power projection, operations other than war and achieving political effect with its armed forces. Changes of direction were also evident in the UK’s approach to NATO where emphasis was placed on the need to transform the Alliance to meet the challenges of a globalising and post9/11 world. In other areas, however, Labour’s approach deviated little from the policies of the previous Conservative government. Arguably the two most important examples were Labour’s policies on nuclear weapons and arms exports. Both generated considerable controversy and are analysed in the final two sections of the chapter. Chapter 7 analyses Labour’s policies on international development and global justice. After highlighting the highly iniquitous and fundamentally unjust nature of the current world order, I explore how DFID sought to address these issues through the strategies outlined in its 1997 and 2000 White Papers. Here Labour’s approach involved four central objectives: to raise the profile of international development issues, to develop an agenda focused on reducing poverty, to implement
10 British Foreign Policy under New Labour
that agenda by pursuing a joined-up approach across the relevant departments in Whitehall and to build partnerships for development with foreign governments, multilateral agencies, UK firms and NGOs. The chapter then provides a critical analysis of Labour’s policies in relation to the economic, criminal and environmental dimensions of global justice with reference to the issues of debt relief, the Pinochet case and the establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC), and climate change. Chapter 8 analyses Labour’s engagement with what Blair referred to as ‘other people’s conflicts’, including the issue of military intervention. It does so by asking what factors drove Blair’s government to become so actively engaged in other people’s wars and what forms that engagement took? The UK, like most powerful liberal democracies, was inclined to argue that the norm of non-intervention should be conditional upon governments not systematically abusing their populations. This inclination was augmented by the powerful lead given by Blair’s executive on issues of humanitarian intervention. However, while Labour proposed some sophisticated criteria on when to use force to protect human rights and participated in some important enforcement operations, it was more common for the UK to engage with other people’s wars through diplomatic means. The rest of the chapter therefore analyses how Blair’s government responded politically to the wars in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Chechnya, as well as its initiatives designed to regulate the trade in ‘conflict goods’ and the activities of private military companies. Chapter 9 analyses arguably the defining issue of UK foreign policy: Iraq. It is organised around my contention that the 9/11 terrorist attacks represented a turning point in the way Blair’s government thought about Iraq. Consequently, the first section investigates the UK’s Iraq policy before 9/11, focusing on its most controversial aspects, namely, the effects of economic sanctions and the use of military force in numerous operations such as Desert Fox in December 1998. During this period, I characterise the UK’s strategy towards Iraq as one of ‘contain and punish’. After 9/11, however, the government’s strategy towards Saddam Hussein’s regime shifted to one of ‘punish and remove’. As a result, three questions became central: why did the UK invade Iraq in March 2003, was the invasion legal and was it effective? The final section analyses the invasion’s impact on three important aspects of Labour’s foreign policy: the war on terrorism, the Middle East peace process and transatlantic relations.
Introduction 11
The Conclusion reflects upon the ways in which Labour’s underlying commitments affected its foreign policies before highlighting some of the main contradictions within them. Under Blair’s leadership the UK played a variety of roles in global politics. Although at times some of these roles were contradictory, none of them were inevitable. Rather, they resulted from conscious choices taken by Blair’s government. Like all choices, they could have been made differently.
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Part I Commitments
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1 Understanding Labour’s Foreign Policy
This chapter explores the main objectives, assumptions and commitments that guided Labour’s foreign policy during its first two terms. To do so, it proceeds in three parts. The first section provides an overview of four of Labour’s most important attempts to publicly articulate its foreign policy objectives. This is followed by a discussion of the constitutive elements of the Blair government’s foreign policies in light of the Labour party’s tradition of liberal internationalism. Put another way, it asks what was new about ‘new’ Labour’s foreign policies? Not surprisingly, I suggest that Blair’s administration exhibited elements of both continuity and change with old Labour’s liberal internationalism. The final section suggests that the main constitutive themes of UK foreign policy under new Labour can be understood as multilateralism, Atlanticism, neoliberalism and moralism.
What is foreign policy for? Several years after its 1997 general election campaign, Labour altered the way in which it presented its foreign policy objectives to the public. Four documents in particular stood out as being indicative of what Labour thought its foreign policy was for. These were the party’s 1997 and 2001 election manifestos, the FCO’s Mission Statement of May 1997, and the FCO strategy document, UK International Priorities, released in December 2003. The 1997 general election manifesto: Because Britain Deserves Better Like all manifestos, Labour’s was designed to highlight the differences between itself and its political opponents. It was thus guilty of 15
16 British Foreign Policy under New Labour
exaggerating the elements of proposed change over those of continuity. Although foreign policy did not figure prominently in the 1997 general election, considerable political space had opened up to criticise the Conservatives, especially over their handling of the wars of Yugoslav succession and their divisions over the UK’s relationship with the EU. Nevertheless, the manifesto was careful to reassure voters that certain aspects of foreign policy would not change under Labour. The document thus represented an important early indicator of those foreign policy issues Labour would take in new directions and those where it would continue business as usual. The largest portion of the manifesto’s international section was devoted to European affairs. This emphasised Labour’s desire to be at the heart of European decision-making, that a Labour government would not join the single currency without a public referendum, and that defence policy would continue to be founded upon the twin planks of NATO and Trident. Electoral concerns probably accounted for the manifesto’s lack of discussion about Labour’s position on reinvigorating the EU’s common foreign and security policy. After the election, however, Labour’s activism during its EU presidency ( January–June 1998) and its signing of the St Malo declaration in December 1998 signalled its desire to move towards the heart of EU decision-making in this area (see Chapter 3). The manifesto also promised that Labour would conduct a strategic defence review that would be led by foreign policy rather than financial concerns. Arguably among the most significant new directions in defence and security policy were Labour’s commitments to ban all forms of anti-personnel landmines and to devise new regulations for Britain’s arms exports. As the manifesto put it, Labour will not permit the sale of arms to regimes that might use them for internal repression or international aggression. We will increase the transparency and accountability of decisions on export licences for arms. And we will support an EU code of conduct governing arms sales. In relation to the non-military dimensions of foreign policy, the manifesto vaguely pledged to reform the United Nations (UN) and to give a renewed priority to Commonwealth affairs in the UK’s international relations, neither of which made much practical headway. Labour also pledged to continue its habit (since 1964) of creating a separate ministry for international development (in contrast to the Conservatives’ preference for running an Overseas Development
Understanding Labour’s Foreign Policy 17
Administration (ODA) as a functional wing of the FCO). This reflected its claims to have a far stronger commitment than the Conservatives to international development and eradicating global poverty. To this end, the manifesto stated Labour would reverse the decline in Britain’s aid spending under the Conservatives and was committed to reaching the UN’s recommended target of spending 0.7 per cent of GNI on overseas aid. With regard to human rights, Labour promised to make their ‘protection and promotion … a central part of … foreign policy’ and ‘work for the creation of a permanent international criminal court to investigate genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity’ (see Chapter 7). But it neither specified which human rights would be given priority (Blair’s government did not, for example, ratify the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women until mid-2004), nor how such concerns would be balanced with other commitments. In practice, the focus was often on civil and political rights with questions of cultural, social and economic rights pushed to the sidelines. The document’s final sections addressed global climate change, pledged Britain would reduce its carbon dioxide emissions by 20 per cent by 2010 and suggested that a Labour government would use its influence to act ‘as a leading force for good in the world’. The FCO Mission Statement Building on the manifesto’s commitments, on 12 May 1997, Foreign Secretary Robin Cook declared his party would bring a ‘businesslike approach to Government’ by launching a new mission statement for the FCO.1 This defined the four primary goals of UK foreign policy as security, prosperity, quality of life and mutual respect. In his multimedia presentation, Cook emphasised that the mission statement was designed for an interdependent world where foreign policy could not remain ‘divorced from domestic policy’ but instead had to be seen as ‘a central part’ of Labour’s political programme. NATO was to remain the foundation of Britain’s security and defence policies while Cook signalled the commercial elements of diplomacy and the environment were to be pushed higher up the foreign policy agenda in order to ensure British prosperity and the quality of life of its citizens. The most controversial aspect of the mission statement was the final goal, mutual respect. As Cook put it, Security, prosperity and quality of life are all clear national interests. Britain also has a national interest in the promotion of our values and
18 British Foreign Policy under New Labour
confidence in our identity. That is why the fourth goal of our foreign policy is to secure the respect of other nations for Britain’s contribution to keeping the peace of the world and promoting democracy around the world. The Labour Government does not accept that political values can be left behind when we check in our passports to travel on diplomatic business. Our foreign policy must have an ethical dimension and must support the demands of other peoples for the democratic rights on which we insist for ourselves. The Labour Government will put human rights at the heart of our foreign policy and will publish an annual report on our work in promoting human rights abroad. … [This mission statement] supplies an ethical content to foreign policy and recognises that the national interest cannot be defined only by narrow realpolitik. Like any sensible business proposal, the mission statement then outlined a series of benchmarks to measure Labour’s progress during its first term in office. It was, however, vague about substance and specifics. How, for instance, would the four goals interrelate? Were they mutually exclusive? Which human rights would be prioritised? What criteria would be used to adjudicate between competing commitments? Despite the media hype and party spin, the document was actually unremarkable in several respects.2 Not only were the goals of security, prosperity and quality of life traditional objectives of British foreign policy, even the idea of mutual respect as Labour defined it had been articulated by successive British governments since the dismantling of the Empire began in earnest. Nor did Cook’s claim that ‘foreign policy must have an ethical dimension’ imply a radical break with the past. Although Cook may well have meant to imply that the previous Conservative governments had pursued unethical foreign policies, in reality, foreign policies are never ‘morality-free’.3 The conduct of foreign affairs always rests upon a variety of ethical commitments and assumptions, whether or not officials recognise or acknowledge it. In this sense, what was really at stake in the mission statement was the particular code of ethics that would inform UK foreign policy. According to Cook, the choice was between Conservative realpolitik and Labour’s more cosmopolitan brand of liberal internationalism. It was also hardly surprising that the major practical elements implied by the mission statement and Cook’s presentation included a greater emphasis on human rights and the tighter regulation of UK arms exports, as these had been party policy for some time.4 The mission
Understanding Labour’s Foreign Policy 19
statement’s novelty came in elevating the ethical considerations inherent in foreign policy far higher up the agenda and giving them an unprecedented public profile. Two factors in particular help explain this document. First, it allowed the incoming government to present ‘clear blue water’ between itself and the previous Conservative administration, although the differences between ‘new’ and ‘old’ Labour, and Labour and the Conservatives were often overplayed.5 The emphasis on ethics and specifically human rights had traditionally been a feature of Labour governments. Since 1945, for instance, it was Labour rather than Conservative governments that introduced most human-rights-related initiatives (though they were subsequently accepted by the Conservatives).6 On the other hand, since the late 1970s, there had been a number of initiatives by ministers of both parties as well as officials calling for greater emphasis to be given to the human rights dimensions of UK foreign policies.7 In addition, the need for Labour to differentiate itself from the Conservatives was, of course, connected to the search for electoral dividends. In short, Labour believed that their emphasis on human rights and ethics would strike a chord with the British electorate. This belief was borne out by opinion poll evidence which suggested that by the late 1990s Labour’s stance on foreign, security and defence policy was proving popular with the voters.8 An alternative explanation centred on Cook’s position within the Labour party. Between Labour’s 1992 general election defeat and John Smith’s death in May 1994, Cook had been entrusted with the trade and industry portfolio in the shadow cabinet. He was moved to foreign affairs in the shadow cabinet reshuffle following Tony Blair’s election as leader of the party in July 1994. At the time, Cook was clearly unhappy with this move and took some time to develop an interest in foreign affairs.9 His primary frustration was that his new brief gradually reduced him to ‘little more than a bit-part player’ on domestic (especially economic) policy.10 Cook’s personal political journey generated speculation that the ‘ethical initiative’ derived, at least in part, from ‘intra-party dynamics’. According to Mark Wickham-Jones, Having been given the foreign affairs portfolio, a politically low-profile though prestigious job, Cook needed to develop a distinctive approach in order to demonstrate his own left-wing credentials. The ethical dimension did just that: it raised Cook’s profile both in the party and in the country generally through the articulation of a new and potentially radical policy.11
20 British Foreign Policy under New Labour
However, the emphasis on Cook’s personal journey should not be overstated. First, the document did have civil service input. As the head of the diplomatic service, John Coles acknowledged, he ‘was closely consulted in the drafting of the statement’.12 Second, it is unlikely that the Mission Statement could have been launched without the approval of either Blair or his political office.13 On the other hand, the fact that Cook’s presentation at the launch placed a greater emphasis on human rights promotion than the mission statement itself suggests he was keen to put his personal stamp on the role of Foreign Secretary. The 2001 general election manifesto: Ambitions for Britain By the time of the 2001 general election campaign, Labour had altered the way in which it presented its foreign policy objectives to the public. By early September 2000, Labour ministers were publicly distancing themselves from Cook’s ‘ethical dimension’ after a number of controversies, notably over Iraq (both sanctions and air-strikes), arms exports to Indonesia, and the so-called ‘arms-to-Africa’ scandal over Sierra Leone. Foreign Office Minister, Peter Hain, for example, suggested Cook’s phrase had become ‘a hook on which we found ourselves, and I think it obscured the very big advances we have made’.14 Within Blair’s government, talk of an ethical dimension was commonly perceived to have become a ‘millstone’ around the Foreign Secretary’s neck.15 Some commentators enamoured with the theories of political realism were quick to suggest that Labour’s change of tactics was evidence that the party had finally woken up to the reality that foreign policy could never promote the sort of values Cook had espoused when launching the FCO mission statement. Such commentators labelled Cook a ‘buffoon’ and declared his policies a ‘farce’ that had left Britain an international ‘laughing stock’.16 Whatever the reasons behind Labour’s decision to change the way it presented its foreign policies to the public, the shift was confirmed in May 2001 with the publication of the party’s general election manifesto, Ambitions for Britain. In terms of substance, the document contained more detail than its predecessor but it broke little new ground (although it did include an explicit commitment to develop the EU’s military capabilities) and generally up-dated or reconfirmed the party’s previous international commitments. The five main international targets were defined as leading economic reform in Europe, working to restart talks on world trade, building strong, effective and responsive armed forces, raising international aid towards the UN target, and introducing greenhouse gas trading permits to cut pollution. The manifesto’s significance
Understanding Labour’s Foreign Policy 21
lay in the way these objectives were presented. Instead of depicting Britain as a force for good, Labour reverted to the more traditional foreign policy message that active international engagement was the key to making ‘Britain strong in the world’. UK International Priorities Four months after Labour set out its Ambitions for Britain, the events of what is now known simply as 9/11 marked a watershed in UK foreign policy. Not only was the importance of foreign policy made abundantly clear but politicians, pundits and the public alike also engaged in arguably the most intense period of debate about Britain’s role in world politics since the retreat from east of Suez in 1967–68.17 On 2 October 2001, the Defence Secretary, Geoff Hoon announced that his ministry would evaluate whether the 1998 Strategic Defence Review (SDR) was still adequate ‘to cope with the new threats we face’.18 He suggested that while ‘military action alone is not the answer … there may not be an answer where military action does not play a vital part’. The result of his ministry’s reflection was a new chapter of the SDR focused on how the UK could best counter terrorism abroad.19 It concluded that security policy should aim to engage its enemies as far from the UK as possible. Consequently, the UK needed to augment its force projection capabilities to ‘prevent, deter, coerce, disrupt or destroy’ opponents and the regimes that harboured them.20 In order to succeed, however, the operations outlined in the New Chapter would have to form part of a broader political strategy aimed at ensuring ‘knowledge superiority’ over its opponents. The clearest indication of what this broader political strategy would look like emerged from the process of reflection initiated within the FCO by the new Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw. Straw’s remit was to clarify Britain’s strategic priorities for the forthcoming decade. With 9/11, Blair’s government claimed that UK foreign policy had entered a new and unprecedented era. Before 9/11, Britain’s major foreign policy challenge had been achieving stability in Europe in the aftermath of the Balkan wars. After 9/11, the most devastating potential threats to Britain’s security emerged from the nexus between radicalism and technology, especially weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Of course, the potential links between radicalism and technology were not new but 9/11 significantly altered threat perceptions within Whitehall and, crucially, the level of threats that would be tolerated without an active response. This new era was said to require a more proactive and engaged foreign policy across a broad agenda. It also brought challenges that
22 British Foreign Policy under New Labour
would require the UK to work with a wide range of alliances and institutions, the most important being the EU, the US, NATO, the UN and the G-7/8. The UK International Priorities document suggested that ‘Strengthening commitment on both sides of the Atlantic to a global partnership between Europe and America will be the single most important goal for the decade ahead, because only through such a partnership will we be able to achieve our policy priorities around the world’ (p. 26). Beyond relations with the US and the EU, the document identified Russia, China, Japan and India as important global players with whom the UK must develop constructive relationships both bilaterally and through the EU. It went on to outline eight strategic international priorities: 1. A world safer from global terrorism and WMD 2. Protection of the UK from illegal immigration, drug trafficking and other international crime 3. An international system based on the rule of law, which is better able to resolve disputes and prevent conflicts 4. An effective EU in a secure neighbourhood 5. Promotion of UK economic interests in an open and expanding global economy 6. Sustainable development, underpinned by democracy, good governance and human rights 7. Security of UK global energy supplies 8. Security and good governance of the UK’s Overseas Territories (p. 30). Among the many foreign policy instruments that would be necessary to achieve these objectives, the ability to project armed force, managing relations with the Islamic world, and the ability to boost exports and attract investment through commercial diplomacy were identified as crucial. While the document represented a welcome attempt to clarify Britain’s future foreign policy priorities, it was not without its problems and limitations. First, it attempted to court audiences in both Washington and Brussels but skirted around the major points of disagreement between the two such as the debate about the preventive use of military force, the relationship between security and development, or whether foreign policy should be more concerned with ‘rogue’ states or ‘failed’ states. Second, perhaps in an attempt to appease Washington, the document drew no explicit conclusions about the fact that although the UK chose to align its future strategic choices primarily with the US, its economic
Understanding Labour’s Foreign Policy 23
future remained firmly tied to Europe.21 Third, the document did not spell out what constructive engagement with the Islamic world would entail. Finally, it was marked by several ‘evasions’. In particular, whether, without significant change, the Blair government’s strategy of ‘co-binding’ to the US during a second George W. Bush administration would damage the UK’s other key international relationships; and to what extent the UK could continue its ostensible ‘bridge-building’ role between the US and Europe after the Iraq war?22
The constitutive elements of Labour’s foreign policy Alongside these documents, Labour ministers also provided a plethora of speeches, statements, interviews and articles adding flesh to the thematic skeleton sketched above. What common themes and commitments, if any, can be distilled from this mass of statements? A useful place to begin is by evaluating the extent to which the Blair government’s foreign policies were different from previous Labour administrations. As Rhiannon Vickers noted, liberal internationalism has long provided the foundations of the Labour party’s worldview and foreign policy.23 In particular, Labour’s brand of liberal internationalism traditionally incorporated six distinctive aspects. First, states were believed to share certain common interests and values in mitigating the worst effects of international anarchy by building international institutions to regulate state interaction. Second, all states had an obligation to forego the pursuit of narrow national interests and work towards a common international good. In short, states should construct an international community. The third aspect of Labour’s liberal internationalism was that foreign policy should be based on democratic principles and universal moral norms. As a consequence, secret diplomacy was rejected and peace between states was believed to rest upon achieving social justice both at home and abroad. Fourth, the Labour party believed that collective security systems offered a more stable and constructive approach to international affairs than a reliance on balance of power theories, which were rejected as being likely to provoke rather than eliminate international conflict. The fifth aspect was anti-militarism. This manifested itself in various periods as the pursuit of collective security, arms control and disarmament, regulation of the arms trade, and a suspicion of the use of military force as an instrument of foreign policy. Finally, Labour’s socialist ideology prompted a belief in solidarity between the workers of the world. In practice, such sentiments were never strong enough to withstand the pull of nationalism or British
24 British Foreign Policy under New Labour
imperialism. Consequently, as Vickers pointed out, they produced a consistently confused and incoherent colonial policy. Labour party members thus constantly disagreed over how these different strands of liberal internationalism should be interpreted, which should be prioritised in a given context, and whether they were actually achievable in the real world. These debates continued under Blair’s leadership with Labour developing its traditional liberal internationalism in some important respects. First, Blair’s government did not dissent from the idea that UK foreign policy should work to construct an international community designed to mitigate the worst effects of anarchy and develop common solutions to the most pressing transnational problems. It was, however, more explicit than previous governments in arguing that the construction of a genuine international community required significant changes. In particular, Blair’s government suggested that membership of the international community required states to reject realpolitik and make stronger commitments to a more cosmopolitan brand of ethics. This meant that Labour’s foreign policy often challenged one of the founding norms of Westphalian international society: non-intervention. For Blair, sovereignty was conditional upon the exercise of certain responsibilities, most fundamentally, the responsibility of states to refrain from systematically abusing their citizens. ‘It may well be’, he acknowledged, ‘that under international law as presently constituted, a regime can systematically brutalise and oppress its people and there is nothing anyone can do. … This may be the law, but should it be?’24 Blair’s government also continued Labour’s tradition of promoting what it saw as universal moral norms and values such as human rights and democratic government. This stance generated the usual controversies in international relations, primarily because calls for genuine international dialogue (that is, where all participants in a discussion are willing to change their own position in light of the force of the better argument) often sat uncomfortably with a belief in the universality of one’s own moral values. For example, Blair’s government held a firm belief in the moral and practical superiority of liberal market democracy over other forms of socio-political organisation.25 In this sense, the party’s elite articulated (consciously or otherwise) the Fukuyaman argument that liberal capitalist ideas represented ‘the end of history’.26 Labour’s foreign policy discourse contained none of the uncertainties and fallibilities present in Winston Churchill’s famous description of liberal democracy as the worst form of government except for all the others human beings had tried. Instead, Blair’s administration
Understanding Labour’s Foreign Policy 25
seemed certain that market democracy represented the apotheosis of socio-political organisation. This faith in market democracy had three main effects. First, it downplayed the contested and inherently political nature of the concept of democracy. Second, promoting market democracies abroad often translated into prioritising the struggle for civil and political rights over demands for social, cultural and economic rights. In sub-Saharan Africa, for instance, this sometimes had the perverse effect of recycling old authoritarian elites into the supposedly accountable politicians of newly created ‘democracies’.27 Third, Labour’s commitment to exporting market democracy left it open to the charge of ‘liberal imperialism’, albeit usually of an informal kind. This charge was given added weight when one of Blair’s senior foreign policy advisers, Robert Cooper, publicly advocated precisely that (although his preferred label was ‘postmodern imperialism’).28 Like its predecessors, Blair’s Labour party also promoted a variety of collective security systems, especially the UN, not least because of the UK’s permanent seat in the Security Council. However, it also argued that the UN system did not have a monopoly of authority on issues of international peace and security. In Blair’s words, ‘our worry is that if the UN – because of a political disagreement in its Councils – is paralysed, then a threat we believe is real will go unchallenged’.29 Particularly in relation to so-called ‘humanitarian crises’ (aside from natural disasters, they are always political and usually result from war or authoritarian government), Labour suggested that in certain circumstances coalitions of states and/or other institutions such as NATO or the EU might be required to act to preserve international peace and security. Since 1997, the most controversial examples of the UK’s armed forces acting without explicit UN Security Council authorisation while claiming to uphold the will of the Security Council came in Kosovo (1999) and Iraq (1998–2004). The Prime Minister also suggested that international society’s collective failure to prevent or stop the 1994 Rwandan genocide added further weight to the argument that in extreme circumstances, the UN system may not be enough to ensure international peace and security (see Chapter 8).30 Labour’s tradition of anti-militarism, that is, the privileging of civilian over military values within society, was also maintained under Blair’s leadership. However, compared to previous Labour governments, Blair’s exhibited a far stronger faith that military force could promote humanitarian purposes. This resulted in Labour resorting to force with a remarkable degree of frequency. In particular, while employing
26 British Foreign Policy under New Labour
humanitarian justifications, Blair’s government deployed its armed forces on seven major enforcement or war-fighting operations in Iraq (1998), Kosovo, (1999), East Timor (1999), Sierra Leone (2000), Afghanistan (2001), Iraq (2003) and the Democratic Republic of Congo (2003). Finally, in relation to Vickers’ list, socialist principles occupied an ambiguous position within Labour’s foreign policy. While several aspects of Blair’s philosophical worldview sprung directly from the Christian socialist tradition, in many other ways, Labour explicitly downgraded the place of socialist ideas in its foreign policy. Blair’s supporters inside the party claimed that they had simply modernised socialist principles to fit the contemporary era. In contrast, their critics saw the rejection of working class solidarity (most clearly reflected in the rewriting of Clause IV of the party’s constitution) as a betrayal of Labour’s traditional socialist values.31 However, it is important to recall that Labour’s traditional liberal internationalism was never wholly socialist. Rather, the left-wing of the party consistently struggled to get the rest to take socialist principles (particularly anti-capitalism) more seriously in foreign policy.32 In this sense, Blair’s position was not fundamentally different. Moreover, while new Labour rejected working class solidarity as one of its founding principles, it continued to articulate the ideal of constructing an international community around values that protected the world’s most vulnerable groups.33 Arguably its most novel departure from socialist principles was its close relationship with the world of private business, most controversially perhaps with BAE Systems (see Chapter 6). This took several forms. First, through institutions like UK Trade and Investment, Blair’s government brought more medium-sized private firms into the process of making UK foreign policy. Second, not only were such firms given a central role in ensuring the health of the UK economy, they also became agents of constructive engagement to inculcate liberal values into illiberal societies such as China and Libya (see Chapter 5). Arguably new Labour’s most significant departure from the party’s traditional liberal internationalism was its emphasis on the concept of globalisation (see Chapter 5). This entered popular usage within Labour’s elite around 1995. Strictly speaking, it has been possible to identify almost as many different discourses on globalisation within the party as there are Labour ministers. Indeed, individual ministers regularly altered their interpretation of this slippery concept to suit their target audiences. That said, globalisation was most commonly conceived in broadly liberal terms as consisting of both the spread of liberal
Understanding Labour’s Foreign Policy 27
political and economic values and the intensification of linkages between the world’s actors to create a situation of interdependence where (economic, political and sometimes moral) shocks in one part of the world stimulated ripple effects that crossed political borders. This understanding of globalisation closely resembled the much older concept of interdependence. Blair, for instance, suggested ‘interdependence defines the new world we live in’ on more than one occasion.34 This is particularly interesting because academic definitions of interdependence have long identified its three core characteristics as: ●
●
●
increasing density, that is, the intensity of interaction within the international system; mutual sensitivity and vulnerability to events generated elsewhere in the international system; and the capitalist construction of the international economy.35
Consciously or otherwise, Labour’s understanding of globalisation echoed these three meanings. Labour’s leadership deployed the concept of globalisation (often as synonymous with interdependence) for three primary purposes. First, as a source of discipline within the party, setting the parameters of what was considered politically and economically possible, and providing one of the central rationales for the party’s modernisation process.36 Second, globalisation was used as a tool to combat parochialism within the UK public by demonstrating the connections between local and international issues, the need to expand their political horizons, and the importance of reorienting political priorities to pay greater attention to issues of common international concern.37 Third, and most controversially, Labour suggested that globalisation offered the potential to end wars and build stable peace. In particular, Labour’s conception of globalisation shared the principal assumptions of the liberal-democratic peace thesis. This argues that not only are liberal democracies the type of state least likely to descend into civil war, they are also the least likely to go to war with other states they consider to be liberal democracies. Encouraging further liberal globalisation thus provided a potential antidote to wars both within states and between them. This conception of the relationship between globalisation, democracy and peace was particularly evident within the UK’s approach to conflict resolution in Africa (see Chapter 4).38 Globalisation clearly brought new opportunities but it also intensified conflict between and within communities and generated novel political
28 British Foreign Policy under New Labour
challenges and risks, not least through crime, environmental degradation and increasing the gap between the rich and poor.39 To deal with these risks, Labour pursued two interrelated strategies. First, it sought to build a society of states based on liberal rules and norms that would allow the UK to reap the benefits of globalisation while avoiding its dangers. To this end the party supported the development of regimes in a variety of sectors from the international financial and trading systems to outlining guidelines for when and how to use military force to protect human rights. Second, far from signalling the end of the state, globalisation necessitated a more proactive UK foreign policy. As Blair put it with reference to Kosovo, ‘We cannot turn our backs on conflicts and violations of human rights within other countries if we want still to be secure’.40 In military terms this put a premium on developing armed forces capable of ‘force projection’ to enable Britain ‘to go to the crisis rather than have the crisis come to us’ (see Chapter 6).41 Together, these two strategies can be understood as new Labour’s attempt to adapt the party’s traditional liberal internationalism to a globalising and interdependent world.
Commitments How did this understanding of liberal internationalism translate into specific foreign policy commitments? Despite Labour’s considerable attempts to emphasise its radicalism and novelty, its foreign policies were based on four rather traditional commitments. The first was to multilateralism. The second was the desire to be America’s closest ally (what I refer to as Atlanticism). The third was support for neoliberal principles of political economy. The fourth was an explicit commitment to alter the ethical foundations of UK foreign policy (what I refer to as moralism). Multilateralism and Atlanticism were staple commitments of UK foreign policy since 1945. Neoliberalism has occupied a similar position since 1979. It is only Labour’s moralism that represents a more novel departure. Although not necessarily contradictory, at times, these commitments were in tension with one another, especially when US foreign policy veered towards unilateralism. Multilateralism Blair’s ministers consistently emphasised the ways in which globalisation and interdependence placed many issues beyond the control of national governments acting alone, even ones as powerful as the US. In foreign policy terms, this rendered isolationism anachronistic and
Understanding Labour’s Foreign Policy 29
highlighted the extent to which, as Blair put it, ‘our self-interest and our mutual-interests are today inextricably woven together’.42 Consequently, only an internationalist perspective and multilateral policies that recognised the ways in which UK interests were increasingly bound up with the maintenance of international peace and security would be able to resolve contemporary political problems. Multilateralism was thus necessary to achieve Labour’s foreign policy objectives and provided the central rationale behind the UK’s membership of approximately 120 international institutions.43 However, as disagreements emerged within several multilateral institutions, notably the UN over Kosovo and the UN, NATO and the EU over Iraq, Blair in particular increasingly emphasised the need for effective multilateralism and the looser, less institutionalised notion of partnerships in foreign policy. The latter included those between business and government, the G-8 and certain African leaders, the ‘coalition of the willing’ in Afghanistan, or between the West and reform-minded governments in the Middle East.44 Atlanticism Labour’s commitment to Atlanticism also emerged from the current structure of world politics, specifically the question of how the UK should relate to the sole remaining superpower. Like many of its predecessors, Blair’s government decided that UK interests were best served by remaining America’s closest ally and encouraging ‘effective US leadership’ to strengthen international institutions.45 It sought to do this by becoming a trusted voice within Washington politics. The underlying rationale was clear well before 9/11. As Blair put it, the UK would be stronger with the US if it was at the heart of European decision-making, and it would be stronger in Europe because of the special relationship with the US.46 This strategic alignment culminated in Blair’s announcement in the aftermath of 9/11 that the UK would ‘stand shoulder to shoulder’ with the US.47 At times, this strategic orientation sat uncomfortably with the idea that political interdependence required multilateral solutions to the UK’s major foreign policy challenges. For example, critics argued that for all the talk of a ‘special relationship’ on the eastern side of the Atlantic, evidence from the Iraq war suggested that Blair’s government was clinging to the illusion of such a relationship.48 In Blair’s defence, Chris Brown suggested that ‘given the disparity in capabilities between the US and the rest, managing the consequences of US hyperpower is best done by attempting to influence the way in which America defines its responsibilities to the world rather than by striking poses in the Security Council’.49 This issue is explored in more
30 British Foreign Policy under New Labour
detail in Chapter 2 but it is hard to avoid the conclusion that Blair’s government held an exaggerated view of its ability to change the course of US foreign policy during both Clinton’s but especially Bush’s administrations. Neoliberalism As Chapter 5 demonstrates, the economic dimensions of Labour’s foreign policies were characterised by two contradictory claims. On the one hand, Blair’s government initially claimed to be bringing ‘third way’ thinking into the heart of policy-making.50 Despite the initial statements of intent, however, Labour’s attempts to produce third way foreign policies proved largely vacuous. Beyond ill-defined notions about developing a political economy somewhere between the dirigiste continental and free-market models, the third way quickly fell by the political wayside after it proved difficult to integrate into areas of government outside No. 10 Downing Street. On the other hand, Labour continued to support the Thatcherite legacy of political economy that had heavily influenced the party’s modernisation process. It also persuaded a variety of audiences (at home and abroad) of its commitment to depoliticise macroeconomic policy-making in line with the principles of the so-called post-Washington consensus.51 In this sense, after an initial flirtation with third way thinking, Labour’s third foreign policy commitment involved support for the neoliberalism associated with the post-Washington consensus. Labour’s support for neoliberal ideas was evident in several areas. First, it helped define the acceptable limits of ‘credible’ policy on a range of issues both at home and abroad, including Labour’s decision to grant the Bank of England operational autonomy and its approach to Third World debt relief (see Chapters 5 and 7). Second, it provided the conceptual rationale for Labour’s ideas about the appropriate relationship between business and government, including a justification for why private firms should play greater roles in UK foreign policy. In conjunction with wider demands for government to be transparent and accountable to the public, Labour’s neoliberalism also encouraged a greater emphasis on management, decentralisation and operational efficiency. As a result, the government borrowed heavily from new public management theories with their emphasis on decentralisation and the need to ‘managerialize’ decisions.52 The resulting management mentality was evident not only within HM Treasury but also in other departments, including the FCO and MOD.53 This encouraged a policy-making process increasingly concerned with managing UK Inc. One obvious problem, as former head
Understanding Labour’s Foreign Policy 31
of the diplomatic service, John Coles observed, was that the priority accorded to issues of management and administration detracted from the time ministers and civil servants had to engage in strategic reflection about foreign policy.54 Moralism In many respects, Labour’s most radical initiative upon assuming office was its willingness to emphasise the ethical dimensions of its foreign policies and to reject traditional British pragmatism and (albeit enlightened) realpolitik. Although the phrase ‘ethical dimension’ was dropped as a way of presenting foreign policy to the public, this did not suddenly render UK foreign policy an ethics-free zone. Labour’s commitment to reject realpolitik in favour of a more cosmopolitan brand of liberal internationalism spawned a variety of policy initiatives, including its stated objectives of being ‘a force for good’ in the world, promoting human rights, relieving the debts owed to it by the world’s poorest states, not exporting arms to oppressive or aggressive regimes, and establishing an International Criminal Court to try those charged with committing war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. Labour’s moralism was bolstered by its faith in the universality of its values. At times, this encouraged Blair’s government to adopt what Martin Ceadel described as a crusading mentality, especially in relation to the use of force. This can be characterised as the government’s willingness – in what it considers exceptional circumstances – to unilaterally suspend the usual rules of international politics (non-intervention) and resort to coercion in the interests of what it considers either order or justice.55 It is important to recognise that moralism and crusading are not necessarily negative attributes. Indeed, as a member of an international society that stood by while approximately one million Rwandans were slaughtered in 1994, a willingness to suspend the conventional procedures in ‘supreme humanitarian emergencies’ could be a constructive development.56 Similarly, by drawing attention to the ethical foundations of foreign policy, Labour’s moralism was largely responsible for reinvigorating debates about the UK’s role in world politics. Cook’s memorable phrase released a cosmopolitan genie from the official UK foreign policy bottle and no matter how hard subsequent foreign secretaries may try they are unlikely to succeed in putting it back. That Blair’s government fell short of its more grandiose statements of intent does not negate the fact that it provided friends and foes alike with an important yardstick by which to evaluate its foreign policy record. The rest of the book is an attempt to provide a critical analysis of that record.
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Part II Relationships
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2 The Closest Ally
Since the end of the Cold War, a central question – arguably the central question – for any state’s foreign policy is how it should relate to the world’s only remaining superpower. For the incoming Labour government the answer was consistently clear. As Blair put it in January 2003, the first principle of UK foreign policy was to ‘remain the closest ally of the US, and as allies influence them to continue broadening their agenda’. The UK was ‘an ally of the US’, Blair continued, ‘not because they are powerful, but because we share their values’.1 Indeed, Blair seemed to share the values of both the Clinton and Bush administrations, forging Labour in the same mould as Clinton’s new Democrats, and sharing enough of the Bush administration’s crusading values to be described as a ‘neo-conservative’.2 For the government’s critics, Labour was simply following in the footsteps of successive post-war UK governments that had been little more than lap dogs to American power.3 For the government’s supporters, its approach was simply the most prudent way to try and influence the White House in an era of unprecedented US strength.4 Arguably Labour’s central problem was that in many respects it had to deal with two different Americas. Although core ‘American values’ and objectives did not alter radically between 1997 and 2005, the Clinton and Bush administrations chose very different means to pursue them. With Clinton at the helm, US foreign policy focused on using geoeconomics to ‘create an environment in which democratic capitalism can flourish in a world in which the US still remains the dominant actor’.5 In this sense, Labour’s foreign economic agenda was largely compatible with Clinton’s (see Chapter 5). Furthermore, Blair’s strategic vision of playing a pivotal role to keep the US and Europe together seemed plausible. And although George W. Bush’s arrival in the White 35
36 British Foreign Policy under New Labour
House caused some significant teething problems, the strategy seemed to be holding. After 9/11, however, Bush’s America found a new mission that centred on waging a ‘war against terrorism’ and involved bypassing international institutions that it felt constrained US power.6 Blair’s attempts to prevent the US and Europe drifting apart in this tense political atmosphere proved difficult.7 In particular, his government’s desire to be both America’s closest ally and promote a liberal international order based on strong multilateral institutions and the rule of law looked less and less plausible. This chapter explores some of these issues by providing a critical analysis of the government’s relationship with the US. The first section focuses upon the ‘special relationship’ and the shared sets of expectations that have become institutionalised between the two states. In particular, I suggest that Blair’s government enjoyed something of a ‘special’ special relationship with the Clinton administration and, albeit it in different ways and at different levels, with the Bush administration as well. Blair’s own special relationship with Bush was cemented by the dramatic attacks on New York and Washington DC of 11 September 2001. The second section therefore explores 9/11’s impact upon UK foreign and security policy. These attacks prompted a process of reflection within the UK’s foreign policy community that in several respects mirrored the rise of the so-called ‘Bush Doctrine’ in the US. The main practical effect was that the UK, like the US, declared a ‘war on terrorism’ and redesigned its foreign policy instruments accordingly. The first battle of the war was fought in Afghanistan, which is the subject of the final section. Here, as in other military campaigns, Blair’s government achieved its strategic objective of being America’s closest ally but was guilty of leaving much of Afghanistan in a state of shameful neglect. Labour’s relationship with the US reveals several things about its four general foreign policy commitments identified in Chapter 1. In many respects, this chapter represents an investigation into the form of Labour’s Atlanticism. Moralism was also a constant theme of the relationship. In large part, this was based on the liberal self-images held by both states. It also played an important role in justifying the use of military force since 1997 (see Chapter 8). Nevertheless, moralism came to play an even more prominent role after 9/11 with the themes of ‘good versus evil’, ‘chaos versus stability’ and ‘barbarism versus civilization’ peppering the speeches of UK and US officials alike. Neoliberal ideas about political economy were also central to the US–UK relationship. Despite some well-reported disputes over bananas, beef and steel, the US and UK remained tightly integrated in economic terms and among the
The Closest Ally 37
strongest advocates of the further liberalisation of the international trading and financial orders (see Chapter 5).8 In relation to multilateralism, an emphasis was placed upon the construction of ad hoc coalitions at the expense of more established institutions. This was particularly noticeable with regard to the strategic dimensions of foreign policy. Indeed, with George W. Bush in the White House, Labour’s commitment to Atlanticism was often in tension with its desire to build strong multilateral institutions.
A ‘special’ special relationship? In one sense, all bilateral relationships between states and their populations are unique, special. Nevertheless, in 2000, Richard HodderWilliams suggested that with the Blair and Clinton administrations in power ‘a “special” special relationship’ had developed between the US and UK.9 Discussions of the ‘special relationship’ from the Atlantic’s east coast have often compared it to Washington’s other special relationships, notably those with Canada, Israel, Mexico and Japan. They have also tried to identify the substantive issues that make US–UK relations special. Chief among these were the institutionalised intelligence sharing and military collaboration between the two states, especially over nuclear issues, and the dense web of societal and cultural links between large segments of the populations and official bureaucracies of both states.10 Many words have thus been written in an attempt to define what the ‘special relationship’ is and who benefits from it most. On the UK side, former chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee ( JIC), Rodric Braithwaite, for instance, described the special relationship as ‘an emotional comfort blanket for a declining power’ that had been especially beneficial to UK Prime Ministers, submariners and codebreakers.11 In contrast to this approach, Hodder-Williams suggested that it was more helpful to understand the special relationship as shorthand for the fact that US–UK relations involved three sets of shared expectations. First, there were unique expectations – higher than for any other US ally – about policy agreement. Rooted in the experience of war (both hot and cold), these expectations reflected the idea that as advanced industrial and liberal democratic states, the US and UK shared some fundamental values about the nature and purpose of foreign policy. Of course, they sometimes disagreed about the best strategies and tactics for achieving particular objectives but a special relationship did not require ‘unanimity of policy positions’. Indeed, as Hodder-Williams suggested, the importance of these expectations lay in the fact that it was often
38 British Foreign Policy under New Labour
policy divergence, not agreement that ‘causes raised eyebrows’. Second, although secrets remained, there were expectations that considerable amounts of sensitive information would be exchanged through the unique sets of institutionalised structures that have developed between the two states, perhaps most remarkably in the military and intelligence fields. The third set of expectations involved the presumption of friendship, not solely at the highest levels of government but also at many levels of state and societal structures lower down the official hierarchy. At times, these collegial and often friendly relationships kept US–UK relations special even when the respective leaders had fallen out. Understood in this fashion, the pertinent question was not whether such a relationship existed (it clearly did) but what form it assumed at any given moment. For Hodder-Williams, the first three years of Blair’s government represented something of a high watermark, a ‘special’ special relationship.12 Labour governments have not always enjoyed such cosy relations with the White House. As Alan Dobson observed, since 1945 three issues in particular caused tension between Labour governments and Washington. First, successive US administrations exhibited an enduring suspicion of Labour’s socialism – although as noted in Chapter 1, Labour’s foreign policies only rarely, if ever, involved the application of socialist principles. Tensions also frequently arose over the Labour party’s stance on nuclear weapons, especially its flirtations with unilateralism. Finally, Labour’s economic policies historically stood in stark contrast to the US free-market model of capitalism. Labour’s traditional emphasis on domestic health, welfare and education at the expense of defence expenditure often generated consternation within Washington.13 At times, these sources of tension resulted in US administrations openly supporting the Conservative party, as happened in 1962 and 1987. On each occasion Washington invoked the ‘spectre’ of a Labour government to justify its policy decisions, as President Kennedy did at the 1962 Nassau conference over the issue of whether to sell the Polaris nuclear system to the UK as a replacement for its Skybolt missiles. Although Dobson cautioned against drawing rigid generalisations, he concluded, ‘It seems fairly clear that US administrations have looked on Labour domestic policies with a critical eye, much more so than on Conservative.’14 Against this historical background, the ‘special’ special relationship between the Blair and Clinton governments was more remarkable. It was also noticeable that it was Blair’s Labour party rather than Clinton’s new Democrats that changed its position on the three sources of tension
The Closest Ally 39
identified by Dobson. With the end of the Cold War and the implosion of the Soviet Union the grand struggle between capitalism and communism was quickly replaced by narrower arguments about the merits of different varieties of liberal democratic capitalism. Similarly, Labour’s economic policies (both at home and abroad) gave Washington little cause for concern. Indeed, as discussed in Chapter 5, with few exceptions, Labour’s leadership staunchly supported the US model – or what Blair and Clinton started referring to as the Anglo-American model15 – of capitalism in the international realm. And in another attempt to appeal to the British middle-class and despite the fact that the UK has never possessed a completely independent nuclear deterrent, Labour quickly dispelled any reservations the party had once held about the UK’s nuclear weapons. Moreover, within a few years of assuming office, Blair’s government became one of the staunchest supporters of US plans to construct a missile defence system against nuclear weapons launched from rogue states (see Chapter 6). In sum, Labour’s policies on nuclear weapons and its approach to political economy removed the three main sources of potential tension between itself and Washington. It was thus not a total surprise that a ‘special’ special relationship developed. How far were the shared expectations identified by Hodder-Williams fulfilled during Labour’s first two terms? In terms of policy agreement, the record during Clinton’s administration is mixed. Ideologically, there was clearly an important meeting of minds between Blair’s new Labourites and Clinton’s new Democrats, especially between 1994 and 1998. In addition, much of Labour’s electoral strategy mimicked Clinton’s practice of ‘triangulation’ whereby Blair attacked both the Conservatives and ‘old’ Labour.16 After Labour’s election Clinton’s influence could still be detected. Blair’s influential Fabian Society pamphlet on the third way, for instance, was a direct product of a seminar held with Clinton and a ‘veritable gaggle of gurus’ in February 1998.17 But ideological convergence between new Labour and the new Democrats did not prevent them disagreeing over certain policies. While the Blair and Clinton governments consistently ploughed a lonely furrow in the Security Council over Iraq (see Chapter 9) and led the way in using force against Slobodan Milosevic, there were also significant areas where expectations differed. Even on these two issues disagreements emerged over the emphasis placed on regime change in Iraq, and Blair and Clinton had a particularly heated telephone call in May 1999 over how best to intervene in Kosovo.18 There were also clear disagreements with Washington over anti-personnel landmines, the establishment of the ICC, the scientific basis of the Kyoto Protocol, and British disappointment
40 British Foreign Policy under New Labour
over Clinton’s reluctance to put more effort into the implementation of the Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland. Nevertheless, in retrospect, expectations of agreement between the two governments remained high during the Clinton years. This was helped by the fact that Clinton’s Democrats spoke a language familiar to Labour supporters that emphasised the need for multilateralism, albeit of the ‘assertive’ kind. In comparison, George W. Bush’s Republicans entered the White House under a cloud of electoral controversy and speaking of the need to withdraw US troops from crucial peace operations in the Balkans. In early 2001, the issues atop the US–UK diplomatic agenda were Russia, National Missile Defence (NMD), the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, and the European security and defence initiative.19 Disagreements were evident over all of them. Before 9/11, the main areas where expectations diverged were Bush’s continued intransigence over the ICC and the banning of anti-personnel landmines, his administration’s rejection of the Kyoto Protocol on the grounds that it adversely affected US economic interests, the Republican’s acceleration of NMD and their lacklustre efforts to push the Israel–Palestine peace process forward. After 9/11, policy expectations about the strategic dimensions of foreign policy converged around the need to fight a ‘war on terrorism’ and were reinforced over Iraq. In one sense, this merely continued the trend of Labour playing the supporting role in US-led military operations as it had in Desert Fox (1998) and Allied Force (1999), and would later play in Enduring Freedom (2001) and Iraqi Freedom (2003). In the process, however, the growing technology gap between the US armed forces and those of its allies become increasingly evident. But the UK’s support was not only military. Diplomatically, Blair’s government was at the forefront of building multilateral coalitions to legitimise these military operations, especially in relation to Iraq. In other areas of foreign policy, however, such as Kyoto, steel tariffs, the detainees at Guantanamo Bay (discussed below) and the ‘road map’ to Middle East peace, Blair’s government was consistently at odds with Washington. Expectations that unique amounts of potentially sensitive military and intelligence information will be exchanged between the US and the UK were central to the special relationship. Although some have suggested that the special relationship had become a liability and the quality of information was declining, I found no evidence to suggest that the expectation of information sharing weakened after 1997.20 In the important area of intelligence, for instance, the origins of the special relationship date back to the exchanges of naval intelligence in
The Closest Ally 41
the late 1930s. It was later institutionalised by the UK–USA agreement of 1946 and remains unusually intimate today. The relationship was definitely not one between equals and the UK benefited enormously from piggybacking on Washington’s massive capabilities. Indeed, it was recently reported that American taxpayers paid for over half of GCHQ’s budget.21 According to Sir Stephen Lander, former Director General of the UK Security Service, there were several reasons for the special intelligence relationship. Most fundamentally, both states felt it was needed. This was helped by a long history of shared experiences at a personal operational level: being ‘friends in adversity’ against the Soviets and more recently in Afghanistan and Iraq mattered. Secondly, the respective intelligence services were able to complement one another in significant ways. While the sheer scale of Washington’s resources made it a valuable partner, the UK services also had their uses, not least their longstanding practical experience of dealing with Northern Ireland, their network of outposts in the UK’s Dependent Territories, and their language expertise on Africa, parts of Asia (notably Afghanistan) and the Middle East that the US lacked. In addition, the intelligence services occupied a similar place in the structures of both states’ governments. As a result, a great deal of intelligence is shared with the result that, as Lander put it, ‘the UK Weekly Survey of Intelligence and the Presidential Intelligence Brief probably look very similar most weeks and that tends to reinforce the closeness of the world view of the two governments’.22 But it is important to remember that signals intelligence (sigint) cooperation was not an exclusively transatlantic affair.23 For instance, the so-called Five Eyes allies (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, UK and US) have intelligence-sharing agreements dating back to 1947–48. These agreements cover such issues as the Echelon intelligence network established in the 1980s and extend the UK’s Anglo-Saxon allies the exclusive prerogative to attend one of the two categories of meeting held by the JIC (the other category is where Britons meet alone). In addition, by 2004, the so-called Berne Group could boast 17 member states, including Britain, and representatives from 19 organisations whose heads of the security services met twice a year for formal security summits. Importantly, before 9/11 the US was not a member. After 9/11, however, the Berne states established a Counterterrorist Group with a wider EU membership together with the US, Switzerland and Norway. To date, this Group has focused on the threat from Islamic terrorism. This trend mirrors developments in the UK’s intelligence services where in addition to the creation of a new Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre, the total effort
42 British Foreign Policy under New Labour
allocated to counter (Irish and international) terrorism activities rose from 57 per cent in 2001–02 to 61 per cent in 2002–03.24 During Blair’s government, two intelligence-related issues became particularly politically charged and impacted upon expectations about what intelligence was supposed to help achieve. The first involved questions about how US–UK and Anglo-Saxon intelligence sharing impacted upon the EU’s attempts to construct common foreign and security policies.25 Although the 1998 St Malo Declaration called for the EU to have its own ‘sources of intelligence’ the UK and French governments interpreted this phrase in different ways with the former envisaging a bigger role for US networks than the latter. It will be harder for the EU to run either coherent foreign policies or military operations if its members receive different intelligence assessments. Second, the debates surrounding the Iraq war produced evidence – discussed in most detail in the so-called Butler Report26 – that suggest Blair’s government was content to erode the distinction between intelligence and political advice. The issue is in part institutional since according to one leading authority, ‘the JIC’s composition [a mix of civil servants and policy advisers] would still seem purpose-designed to promote groupthink and reinforce prevailing wisdom; it is indeed the Whitehall consensus incarnate’.27 However, it was also partly about the influence of personality. Here, as Percy Cradock warned, the key problem was that intelligence analysts must avoid becoming ‘courtiers’ of the government of the day.28 This required a quid pro quo between analysts and their political masters: the analysts must report what they find not what the politicians want to hear, while the politicians must give the analysts the necessary resources and institutional breathing space to conduct their operations effectively. The evidence suggests that Blair’s government and the intelligence services failed to find the appropriate balance particularly over the issue of developing policy towards so-called rogue states.29 Like the role of the intelligence services, expectations of friendship are difficult to quantify. Nevertheless, an exceptional rapport clearly developed between Blair and Clinton even while the Labour party was in opposition. Reportedly, for Blair, the only incidents that ‘took the shine off their rapport’ were the Lewinksy scandal in late 1998 and their May 1999 telephone call about the use of ground troops in Kosovo.30 Furthermore, the respective party caucuses enjoyed good relations and close links existed between Labour and Democrat officials, a prime example being Gordon Brown’s adviser Ed Balls and Clinton’s Secretary of Labour, Robert Reich.31 Expectations of friendship with the Bush
The Closest Ally 43
administration were more ambiguous. At the highest levels, the informal and direct style of meetings between Bush and Blair quickly established a strong relationship that ‘really accelerated’ after 9/11.32 Lower down the diplomatic hierarchy however expectations began to diverge, at times quite dramatically. Key figures in the Bush administration such as Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz and John Bolton spoke a language of unilateralism and preventive military action that did not sit comfortably with many in Whitehall or the Labour party. As a result, a broad stream of opinion emerged within the UK and the Labour party that suggested Blair’s government – and Blair in particular – had become too supportive of the Bush administration on several important foreign policy issues.33 These included unconditional acceptance of the label ‘war on terrorism’ (see the following section), the idea of preventive war, and a shifting of international attention away from Afghanistan towards Iraq (leaving most of the former country in a state of shameful neglect). In sum, the expectation that Whitehall, the Labour party and UK voters would automatically be friends with Bush’s Republicans significantly diminished, especially after mid-2002. Looking back, feelings of solidarity and friendship with Americans reached their zenith immediately after the terrorist attacks of 9/11.
9/11 and the ‘war on terrorism’ Upon seeing the second plane hit the south tower of the World Trade Centre, Jack Straw reportedly remarked, ‘That’s it. The world will never be the same again.’34 Blair made a slightly different point that 9/11 ‘changed the psychology of America’ whereas he felt ‘it should have changed the psychology of the world’.35 But what exactly changed after 9/11 and what impact did the attacks have on UK foreign policy? For Blair, 9/11 had two main effects. First, it ‘marked a turning point in history’ that signalled the destructive potential of ‘a wholly new phenomenon, worldwide global terrorism based on a perversion of the true, peaceful and honourable faith of Islam’.36 This was not really accurate: not only was such terrorism not a new phenomenon, the World Trade Centre had been attacked by Islamic terrorists back in 1993. Blair’s second effect was correct: the attacks altered the mindset in the White House. When Blair declared that the UK would stand ‘should to shoulder’ with the US in a television broadcast on the evening of 11 September, it was clear the attacks had produced a similar effect within No. 10 Downing Street. The following day this declaration was slightly tempered by a five-page memo from Blair to Bush noting London’s
44 British Foreign Policy under New Labour
concern about what the Home Secretary David Blunkett called an ‘immediate, inappropriate and indiscriminate’ US response to 9/11.37 Three days after the attacks, Blair set out the UK’s immediate objectives. These were bringing to justice those responsible, including those who harbour terrorists; building a wide international coalition to act against terrorism; and rethinking ‘dramatically the scale and nature of the action that the world takes to combat terrorism’.38 The last objective included a reassessment of domestic and international legislation on powers of detention, extradition and the financing of terrorist groups via money laundering. More generally, 9/11 came as both a shock and a warning. It was shocking inasmuch as the means of attack had not been seriously contemplated – and hence planned for – by any Western authorities. It constituted a warning in that even if the actual casualty figures (just under 3000, including 67 UK citizens) were substantially lower than initially feared, the attacks highlighted the potential for destruction possible if the nightmare scenario of terrorists armed with WMD and capable of delivering them to Western cities came to pass. Blair summed up the UK government’s thinking succinctly in a statement to the House of Commons: We know that these groups are fanatics, capable of killing without discrimination. The limits on the numbers that they kill and their methods of killing are not governed by any sense of morality. The limits are only practical and technical. We know, that they would, if they could, go further and use chemical, biological, or even nuclear weapons of mass destruction. We know, also, that there are groups of people, occasionally states, who will trade the technology and capability of such weapons. It is time that this trade was exposed, disrupted, and stamped out. We have been warned by the events of 11 September, and we should act on the warning.39 In short, the attacks prompted a collective reflection upon the assumptions underpinning UK foreign, security and defence policies (see also Chapters 1 and 6). In large part, this reflection took its cue from developments in Washington where 9/11 was widely credited with creating a new US mindset, especially in relation to foreign and security policy.40 But the need to adopt a more forceful and proactive stance to combat ‘terrorist acts’ was also endorsed by the UN Security Council.41 In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, President Bush ignored the right of sovereign states to
The Closest Ally 45
remain neutral in international disputes and demanded a loyalty test of the rest of the world to side either with the US or ‘the terrorists’. It was also quickly apparent that the subsequent ‘war on terrorism’ would be conducted on US terms. One year later, Washington’s new mindset was codified in the 2002 National Security Strategy. The ‘Bush Doctrine’ outlined within this document revolved around the three concepts of unilateralism (if necessary), pre-emption (when required) and pre-eminence (forever?). The first was a familiar feature of US foreign policy. The second was more controversial. After 9/11, a right to engage in pre-emptive self-defence had a strong if not uncontested basis in international law. The trouble was that especially after spring 2002, the Bush administration’s notion of pre-emption began to look far more like prevention, which was clearly illegal in international law.42 The third concept of pre-eminence, especially with regard to US military hegemony, was unremarkable as a statement of fact: the US was clearly the world’s pre-eminent actor. But as a political aspiration that the US would work to maintain this state of affairs indefinitely, employing military force as it saw fit, it was difficult to interpret this as anything other than an offensive stance. The net effect of the Bush Doctrine was to signal to the rest of the world that America would not be bound by international norms, conventions and institutions that it perceived as being contrary to its best interests.43 This included the Bush administration’s rejection of NATO’s offer of military assistance to conduct Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan.44 For Blair, this political atmosphere presented the UK with a stark choice. ‘There is no compromise possible with such people’, he argued, ‘no meeting of minds, no point of understanding with such terror. Just a choice: defeat it or be defeated by it. And defeat it we must.’45 As a result, counter-terrorism was elevated to the primary objective of UK foreign policy. Blair’s government made this public in a document published in mid-October 2001. It stated that the UK’s ‘overall objective is to eliminate terrorism as a force in international affairs. There are immediate objectives relating to UBL [Usama bin Laden], his organisation and Afghanistan and wider objectives relating principally to the campaign against international terrorism more generally.’46 This objective, in turn, had two immediate consequences for UK foreign and security policy. First, it signalled a realignment of geographical priorities because to combat terrorism, Blair’s government had to be prepared to project military force anywhere in the world, not just within its own neighbourhood (see Chapter 6). Second, the new, lower levels of acceptable threat meant that deterrence and containment were no longer considered a
46 British Foreign Policy under New Labour
sufficient basis for dealing with so-called ‘rogue’ regimes. Inevitably, this led the UK to support pre-emption more strongly and to move further down the road towards endorsing preventive military action. Of course, military action formed only one part of the UK’s response to 9/11. Indeed, it was seen as crucial that military power should be used to promote a broader political strategy that included winning hearts and minds as well as capturing or killing known terrorists; strengthening international law; and altering the political climate in which groups like al-Qa’ida operated by engaging more positively with the Islamic and Arab worlds.47 In Blair’s words, UK foreign policy must promote international justice from Africa ‘to the slums of Gaza, to the mountain ranges of Afghanistan’ as a necessary part of defeating international terrorism (on which see Chapters 4 and 7).48 Action was also taken in the economic realm to stop terrorist finances and freeze bank accounts, most notably under Security Council resolution 1373. At home, a variety of changes occurred within the police and intelligence services, as well as new legislation, most importantly perhaps the introduction of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (ACTSA). This provided for among other things the implementation of the Terrorism Financing Convention and action against terrorist property, including freezing orders, extending police powers, regulating and criminalising certain matters relating to WMD, securing pathogens and toxins, and implementing criminal cooperation measures under the EU’s Third Pillar.49 The major problem for Blair’s government came in December 2004 when the House of Lords ruled that the indefinite detention of suspected foreign international terrorists under Part 4 of the ACTSA was unlawful because it was disproportionate and discriminatory. In response, the Home Secretary, Charles Clarke, constructed a new mechanism of ‘control orders’ to contain UK and foreign citizens suspected of terrorism but whom the government claimed it could neither prosecute nor deport. After a series of acrimonious debates and compromises in both Houses, the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 was finally passed with the orders subject to some judicial oversight. Shortly thereafter, the Home Secretary applied the control orders to ten men certified under the ACTSA as terrorism suspects. Some of these men had been detained since December 2001. Under the new legislation the government could detain a suspect for seven days during which time the High Court must determine whether there was sufficient evidence to justify the imposition of a control order. The new law drew major criticism from human rights groups such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International
The Closest Ally 47
most of which pointed to the fundamentally problematic nature of condoning punishment without trial. While all these institutional changes had important practical repercussions they occurred within a political context defined by Labour’s strategic approach to countering terrorism. This was articulated on 16 September when, speaking from the Cabinet Room within No. 10 Downing Street, Blair declared that the UK was ‘at war with terrorism’. In this way, and with only minimal dissent from within the Cabinet, Blair’s government bought into Washington’s analogy that it was leading a ‘war on terrorism’.50 This had several predictable effects. Perhaps most fundamentally, once war was declared, attempts to remain neutral quickly invited charges of appeasement, antiAmericanism and consorting with the enemy.51 Second, waging war is best done with a clear understanding of the enemy. In this case, the enemy was terrorism, defined broadly by the UK government as the threat or use of action ‘to influence the government or to intimidate the public or a section of the public … for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause’.52 Defined in this manner as a method of political action, the government effectively declared war upon a tactic. The problem, as Lawrence Freedman put it, was that ‘Wars are fought between opposing political entities not against tactics.’53 For many Westerners, the third effect of declaring ‘war on terrorism’ was that it elevated criminal activities to acts of war (the 9/11 attacks were clearly illegal under both US and international law). This gave the attacks and their perpetrators, so the argument went, an unwarranted degree of dignity and political status. While many Westerners were uncomfortable thinking of 9/11 as an act of war, al-Qa’ida clearly saw itself as being at war with the West in general and the US in particular for many years. Unsurprisingly, it sought to exploit asymmetric methods of warfare against its enemies.54 Consequently, as Freedman suggested, ‘after an attack on such a scale, mounted by a political entity based in a distant country, war was not a matter of choice but a strategic imperative’.55 It was therefore arguably necessary for Western governments to engage in a war against al-Qa’ida and to take its potential to inflict suffering more seriously than had been the case before 9/11. But it did not follow that it was sensible to engage in a war against terrorism in general. A fourth problem was that as a label the ‘war on terrorism’ was inaccurate. Most obviously, the West in general and the UK in particular appeared primarily interested in ending terrorism against Western interests rather than terrorism in general. Moreover, ‘the terrorists’ were
48 British Foreign Policy under New Labour
overwhelmingly described as non-state actors. States became targets in the ‘war’ only when they harboured and/or supported (non-state, antiWestern) terrorists. This ignored the fact that terrorism by states continues to dwarf that conducted by non-state groups. Rather predictably, therefore, the ‘war on terrorism’ quickly attracted some unsavoury allies who saw the instrumental value in signing up to the Bush administration’s discourse. After 9/11, the incentives were quickly apparent in a wide variety of states that frequently engaged in terrorism against their own citizens, including most notably perhaps Russia, Pakistan, Sudan, Kenya and Uzbekistan. Despite the fact that the use of violence against oppressors is legitimate under the Geneva Conventions, the context of a ‘war on terrorism’ increased the likelihood that any groups attempting to alter the status quo by resorting to violence would be labelled terrorists by default. Another effect of declaring a ‘war on terrorism’ was that the objectives were often cast in terms of military victory rather than in terms of law enforcement and the successful prosecution of the perpetrators.56 The fundamental problem lay in the impossibility of determining when the last act of terrorism had taken place. A war on terrorism was thus a war without end. In this sense, the UK’s stated objective of eliminating terrorism as a force in international affairs was unrealistic since its achievement could never be verified. Finally, as noted above, waging war had effects at home as well as abroad. In wartime the official gloves often come off and governments find it easier to engage in activities that are proscribed in times of peace. For example, governments are likely to curtail civil liberties in the name of state security and look for ways to bypass the rights of those they suspect of being implicated in terrorism. In addition, power within government is likely to shift towards the centre, diplomacy is likely to be shelved before it has been exhausted in favour of more militaristic policies, and emphasis is likely to be placed on dealing with the symptoms of terrorism rather than the conditions that spawn it. In the UK, 9/11 prompted increased spending on defence, intelligence and diplomacy. But it also stimulated one of the largest relative increases in UK overseas development aid, which in the 2004 Comprehensive Spending Review was set at 0.47 per cent of GNI. Among the most significant institutional changes were the creation of a Cabinet Committee on International Terrorism, a security and intelligence coordinator within the Cabinet Office, and an Islamic Media Unit within the FCO. The first test of the government’s new policies and institutions came in Afghanistan where, once again, the UK was Washington’s closest ally.
The Closest Ally 49
Bringing freedom and assistance to Afghanistan? Although the Bush administration had provided covert aid to antiTaliban groups from late September 2001, the invasion of Afghanistan on 7 October was the first military response to 9/11.57 It is still too early to offer definitive judgements on several contentious issues relating to the war, including the extent to which it was conducted in accordance with international humanitarian law (see later in chapter). Other issues, however, including the war’s legal basis, are clearer. Within three months, UK personnel were simultaneously engaged in three types of operation in Afghanistan: the hunt for the remnants of al-Qa’ida and Taliban forces, the construction of a new political order, and the alleviation of the humanitarian crisis. In the build-up to Operation Enduring Freedom58 it was clear that in military terms the UK would play a junior role to Washington’s lead. Politically, however, the UK helped smooth the ground for the invasion. This was done through two mechanisms: Blair’s shuttle diplomacy in the aftermath of 9/11, notably with presidents Putin and Musharraf, and the UK government’s dossier, Responsibility for the Terrorist Atrocities in the United States (4 October 2001).59 The dossier pointed the finger of blame firmly in al-Qa’ida’s direction but crucially also implicated the Taliban regime in the 9/11 attacks. This made it easier for the US-led coalition to justify Enduring Freedom as an act of self-defence (see later in chapter). The invasion began after more than three years of (failed) coercive diplomacy to get the Taliban regime to surrender Usama bin Laden for his part in the destruction of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 and the attack on the USS Cole in 2000.60 Bush’s reiteration of this ultimatum after 9/11 was not met although there were reports that the Taliban had tried to avert the US-led operations.61 It was thus clear from the outset that Enduring Freedom would be conducted on US terms and with the intent of removing rather than merely punishing the Taliban. Nevertheless, the military campaign began rather slowly with the US Central Intelligence Agency taking a leading role in identifying targets for bombardment and the most appropriate proxy ground troops who would work with US forces. However, after initially experiencing disappointing results (intensified by media pressure for a quick and clean war), by the end of October the US shifted to a strategy of ‘brute force’.62 This new approach included a wider range of targets and the increased use of carpet-bombing, cluster bombs and so-called daisy-cutters against Taliban positions. Inevitably, this generated criticisms about the numbers of civilian deaths.63 By mid-November the shift in tactics had produced
50 British Foreign Policy under New Labour
the desired effects. Between 9 and 12 November a series of strategic towns, including Mazar-I-Sharif and Kabul, fell in a cascade that toppled the Taliban regime and forced the retreat of al-Qa’ida forces.64 Throughout the conflict, the coalition forces relied upon a combination of airpower, intelligence, special forces and proxy foot-soldiers in the form of the United Front (which included the Northern Alliance forces).65 As one of the UK’s senior military commanders put it, ‘It was all about Special Forces, intelligence and suitcases of money.’66 After the fall of Kabul, the remainder of operations involved dealing with the remnants of the Taliban and al-Qa’ida forces still in Afghanistan. Since the coalition’s proxy forces became less and less effective at dislodging pockets of al-Qa’ida/Taliban resistance, these operations saw a significant increase in the numbers of US ground troops deployed to Afghanistan (approximately 4000 by January 2002). Blair had offered to commit 6000 additional British troops for these operations but Washington rejected this suggestion.67 UK troops participated in Operation Enduring Freedom from the beginning.68 The decision to deploy them was taken after only two post9/11 Cabinet meetings, both of which were reportedly devoid of relevant debate.69 In military terms the UK’s contribution involved assigning over 4000 troops to support the US-led operations (most of which were redeployed from military exercises in Oman), the military base in Diego Garcia, nuclear submarines capable of launching cruise missiles, airpower, intelligence and special forces. Until its withdrawal by the end of July 2002, task force Jacana, as the UK contribution was known, engaged in a variety of operations, most notably Operations Ptarmigan, Snipe, Condor and Buzzard conducted by 45 Commando Group.70 Its military commander was Brigadier Roger Lane while senior FCO diplomat Robert Cooper was named as Blair’s special representative to Afghanistan, reportedly because of his Asian expertise and his efficiency in getting things done.71 Alongside the humanitarian effects of the war, two other issues proved particularly contentious: the legal basis for Enduring Freedom and Washington’s decision to detain some of its prisoners in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Out of a variety of possible justifications for invading Afghanistan, the US and UK settled for self-defence.72 In international law, self-defence must be in response to an ‘armed attack’ and it must be both necessary and proportionate. Self-defence can be collective if the victim invites other states to join a coalition and it can be superseded when the UN Security Council takes measures to maintain international peace and security. In the event, and contrary to what Blair implied in
The Closest Ally 51
retrospect, Enduring Freedom was not authorised by the Security Council in the same way that resolution 678 (1990) had authorised Desert Storm.73 Instead, the coalition relied upon the customary right of self-defence, which in this particular case the US argued included both al-Qa’ida forces and the state of Afghanistan (referring here to the Taliban regime). The UK shared this position, justifying its intervention to the UN Security Council in the following terms: These forces have now been employed in the exercise of the inherent right of individual and collective self-defence, recognized in Article 51, following the terrorist outrage of 11 September, to avert the continuing threat of attacks from the same source. My Government presented information to the United Kingdom Parliament on 4 October which showed Usama bin Laden and his Al-Qa’ida terrorist organization have the capability to execute major terrorist attacks, claimed credit for past attacks on the United States targets, and have been engaged in a concerted campaign against the United States and its allies. One of the stated aims is the murder of United States citizens and attacks on the allies of the United States. This military action has been carefully planned and directed against Usama bin Laden’s Al-Qa’ida terrorist organization and the Taliban regime that is supporting it. Targets have been selected with extreme care to minimise the risk to civilians.74 As Michael Byers has pointed out, US legal strategies, NATO’s application of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, the contested nature of the right to self-defence in international law and the post-9/11 concern about international terrorism all combined to produce a situation where ‘the right of self-defence now includes military responses against States which actively support or willingly harbour terrorist groups who have already attacked the responding State’.75 The US-led coalition was thus able to claim it was acting in self-defence yet still use military force against al-Qa’ida and the Taliban to pre-empt further attacks like those which occurred on 11 September 2001. In this sense, Enduring Freedom did not constitute a reprisal, which is illegal under international law.76 The UK government shared this view as reflected in its use of the phrase ‘to avert the continuing threat of attacks from the same source’.77 It was thus clear from Enduring Freedom that 9/11 had ‘set in motion a significant loosening of the legal constraints on the use of force, and this in turn will lead to changes across the international legal system’.78
52 British Foreign Policy under New Labour
The other major source of legal contention, this time between the US and UK, was Washington’s treatment of detainees at Guantanamo Bay.79 On 11 January 2002, the US government announced that it was moving the first of 20 al-Qa’ida and Taliban prisoners captured during Operation Enduring Freedom to camp X-Ray, a detention facility at the US naval base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. By April, the number of detainees was approximately 300 (by the end of 2004 the number had apparently risen to c.600). Initially, the US claimed these prisoners were ‘unlawful combatants’ and therefore not entitled to prisoner of war (POW) status. On 7 February, however, the US altered its position, saying that captured Taliban forces would be treated in accordance with the Third Geneva Convention but they did not meet the requirements of POW status laid down in the convention because they were not under responsible command, they did not conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war, nor did they have fixed distinctive signs from a distance.80 Al-Qa’ida prisoners, the US claimed, were not regarded as falling within the scope of the convention at all. While the US position may have some legal merit in terms of the status of the prisoners, whatever the captives’ status, they were entitled not to be held in ‘legal limbo’ and receive humane treatment as set out in Article 75 of the First Additional Protocol.81 As a result, the US said it would try the prisoners under military commissions or detain them during the pendency of the ‘war on terrorism’. Washington’s position attracted scathing criticism from a variety of sources in the UK. For instance, in November 2002 the English Court of Appeal said it was ‘legally objectionable’ to hold the Guantanamo detainees in ‘a legal black hole’, while Amnesty International made the important point that the detainees were entitled to the presumption of POW status unless a competent tribunal determined otherwise.82 Since several of the detainees were UK citizens, Blair’s government sought (and apparently obtained) assurances from the US that they would be treated humanely. However, the UK government also recognised the right of the US, as the detaining power, to decide on when and whether to prosecute the detainees.83 It was not until January 2005 that the four UK citizens held at Camp X-Ray were permitted to return to Britain. Upon arrival they were released but monitored by UK authorities. Two of the four men were subsequently denied UK passports under the Royal Prerogative. After the Taliban’s collapse, Blair’s government turned its attention to the tasks of reconstruction and stabilisation. This came in the rather limited form of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).
The Closest Ally 53
Deployed to help the Afghanistan Interim Administration provide security and law and order throughout the country, ISAF operated separately from both the ongoing Enduring Freedom operations and the UN Special Mission for Afghanistan led by Lakhdar Brahimi. The idea for such a force was raised in the Bonn Agreement of 5 December 2001. This proposed that an interim administration led by Hamid Karzai should assume political authority on 22 December and run the country for six months until the loya jirga (a traditional Afghanistan national decisionmaking process) was convened to define the exact terms of the new government. On 19 December, and following a conference hosted by the UK government to hear the views of potential troop contributors, Jack Straw wrote to Kofi Annan stating that Britain was prepared to lead the ISAF. The same day, Geoff Hoon reiterated the UK’s willingness and ability to lead the force. He also stressed the government’s commitment was ‘limited in numbers – up to 1,500 troops – and duration, which will be up to three months. After three months, we will hand over lead nation status to one of our partners.’84 The following day, the Security Council passed resolution 1386 under Chapter VII, in which it took up the UK’s offer. The details of ISAF’s deployment were worked out in the Bonn Agreement and a subsequent Military Technical Agreement ( January 2002) between the ISAF commander, Major-General John McColl, and the Afghanistan Interim Administration. Although the US did not contribute personnel to ISAF it did provide crucial help to deploy and sustain it. By mid-February, ISAF reached its full operating capacity of approximately 5000 personnel from 18 states. This included some 1800 British troops. As it turned out, the UK remained the lead state within ISAF until Turkey took over the role on 20 June 2002.85 By mid-2004, while ISAF numbers had increased to approximately 6500 the UK contingent had been reduced to 315 troops.86 Initially, ISAF’s area of operations was limited to Kabul and its environs, extending at its farthest reach to the Bagram airbase. These limits stemmed from two compromises. First, while the UK emphasised that political and social reconstruction should form a crucial component of post-war operations in Afghanistan, the Bush administration preferred to concentrate on training a new national army rather than keeping the peace in Kabul.87 The compromise involved the UK leading what was in effect a city-building operation in Kabul but ignoring reconstruction tasks in the rest of the country. The second compromise was between the ISAF contributors and the Northern Alliance. While the UK suggested ISAF should consist of some 8000 troops the Northern Alliance argued for a maximum of 1000.88 As noted above, a force of 5000 was agreed.
54 British Foreign Policy under New Labour
Within these limited terms of reference, ISAF did bring a significant measure of stability to Kabul and created space for the Interim Administration to get to work. Specifically, under UK command, ISAF mounted 2185 joint patrols with Afghan security forces in and around Kabul, disposed of nearly three million munitions, 80 per cent of which were anti-personnel landmines, trained the 1st Battalion of the new Afghan National Guard, which subsequently played an important role in ensuring the security of the loya jirga, and completed some 200 humanitarian aid projects.89 On the negative side, ISAF failed to make serious progress on issues of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) and the UK-led efforts to reduce Afghanistan’s drug trade also made little headway.90 As the FAC concluded in mid-2004, ‘there is little, if any sign of the war on drugs being won and every indication that the situation is likely to deteriorate, at least in the short term’.91 By spring 2002, two main areas of controversy were evident. The first revolved around the UK’s decision to deploy a 1700-strong commando battlegroup to fight alongside US troops against the remnants of the Taliban regime and suspected al-Qa’ida forces. Announced by Hoon on 18 March 2002, this had come in response to a formal request for troops from Washington. Nevertheless, it generated angry comments from the Conservative party not only because little advance notice of the deployment was given to Parliament but also because the presence of British troops in a war-fighting role in Afghanistan increased the likelihood that ISAF could become a target for reprisals.92 In addition, ISAF came under repeated criticism for being woefully under ambitious and refusing to expand beyond Kabul.93 The US and UK governments were reportedly divided on the issue with the State Department and the FCO favouring ISAF’s expansion and the Pentagon and the MOD opposed.94 While ISAF remained tied to Kabul it had virtually no impact upon the security situation elsewhere in the country, where warlordism, heroin production and banditry continued largely unabated. The most persuasive explanation for ISAF’s limited focus was that its contributors lacked the political will to engage in serious state-building in Afghanistan.95 As a result they were unwilling to provide ISAF with the extra resources necessary to take on a role beyond Kabul.96 As John Kampfner suggested, it quickly became clear that while Afghanistan had become ‘nothing more than an encumbrance to the US’, European states lacked the political will and the relevant capabilities to engage in a serious effort at reconstructing an entire state rather than just its capital city.97 The compromise over expanding ISAF outside Kabul came in November 2002 in the form of Provincial Reconstruction
The Closest Ally 55
Teams (PRTs) – small groups of military and civilian personnel intended to extend the authority of the Afghan central government beyond the capital. By autumn 2004, 19 PRTs had been established throughout the country. US personnel led most of them but NATO ISAF forces led three, two of which were under UK control in Meymana (approximately 70 personnel) and Mazar-e Sharif (involving a military component of about 130 troops). The Foreign Affairs Committee praised the PRTs as ‘one of the success stories of international engagement in Afghanistan’.98 However, the Committee also reiterated that their success should be judged against the backdrop that ISAF ‘has been consistently underresourced and overstretched’.99 As this discussion suggests, Blair’s government achieved its objective of becoming Washington’s closest ally during both the Clinton and Bush administrations. The bonds of the special relationship remained solid over fundamental issues such as Kosovo, Iraq, the war on terrorism, the invasion of Afghanistan, and the sharing of military technology and intelligence. This stance was not without its problems, not least the unresolved dilemmas of trying to fight a war on terrorism and the failure to consolidate a liberal political order in post-Taliban Afghanistan. In some other areas, however, such as the timing of ground troops for Kosovo, the ICC and the Kyoto Protocol (see also Chapter 7), Blair’s government disagreed with Washington. In addition, after Bush’s Republicans took office there were signs that a significant number of Labour MPs and large sections of the UK public were deeply uncomfortable with the Bush doctrine. In this sense there was a slight watering down of Labour’s Atlanticism, especially after 2002. But this was evident in some of the UK’s foreign relationships more than others. While Blair’s government decided to engage far more proactively than Washington in African affairs (see Chapter 4), as the next chapter argues, Atlanticism remained central to its approach to the EU’s common foreign and security policy and its decision to give the Union its own military capabilities.
3 Living in (and with) Europe
Labour’s decision to develop a military capacity for the EU as part of the Union’s common foreign and security policy (CFSP) has been described as ‘perhaps the most remarkable, if not vote-catching, policy’ of Blair’s first term in office.1 Contrary to claims that the ESDP had been dealt a fatal blow by the Iraq crisis it weathered the storm.2 Although the Union’s members fell short of meeting their own optimistic targets, in 2003 ESDP took its first practical steps in Bosnia, Macedonia and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). That the UK played a backseat role to France in these operations was indicative of the lower priority Whitehall gave to the ESDP project after 9/11. However, events since 1997 can also be interpreted as a victory for the UK’s vision of ESDP as a necessary tactical instrument to reinvigorate its preferred Atlanticist strategy toward European security. This view was given added credibility when in December 2004, the Union established EUFOR, a 7000 strong peace operation designed to take over from NATO’s Stabilisation Force in Bosnia. EUFOR involved troops from 33 states and was led by the UK, which also contributed approximately 1000 soldiers. It also provided more evidence that the UK was prepared to support an ESDP that was complementary to NATO. To analyse these developments this chapter begins with a discussion of Labour’s approach to European security paying particular attention to why Blair’s government broke with the UK’s traditional reluctance to develop a military capacity for the EU. The evidence suggests that the shift in policy represented a change of tactics rather than a rejection of the UK’s traditional Atlanticist strategy. In many respects the wars in the former Yugoslavia in general and the Kosovo crisis of 1998–99 in particular provided the main impetus for accelerating ESDP’s development. The second section thus reflects upon the UK’s role in the Kosovo crisis 56
Living in (and with) Europe 57
and the controversies that were generated by it. NATO’s Operation Allied Force had important repercussions not only for European security but also for questions about the relationship between sovereignty, selfdetermination and human rights more generally (see Chapter 8). The final section analyses the UK’s position towards the ESDP after Kosovo paying particular attention to the impact of 9/11 and the war in Iraq. The evidence presented in this chapter also reveals something about Labour’s four foreign policy commitments. One conclusion is that Blair’s government exhibited a flexible but still Atlanticist approach to European security that emphasised the importance of achieving practical results. In this sense, Labour proved willing to experiment with different forms of multilateralism for different issues: NATO for highend military tasks and ESDP for operations lower down the military scale. Labour’s moralism and its commitment to neoliberalism were also evident inasmuch as the whole purpose of adding a military dimension to the CFSP was to project the Union’s liberal values beyond its borders. In addition, the enlargement of both the EU and NATO was viewed as a means of expanding the liberal democratic zone of peace.
Labour and European security before Kosovo Since at least 1949, successive UK government’s looked at European security issues through an Atlanticist prism wherein defence was (and should remain) primarily dealt with in NATO.3 This was partly because they had a higher degree of ‘confidence in (and closeness to) the American hegemon’ and a relative ‘lack of confidence in (and relative distance from) the European pretender’.4 It was also partly out of a fear that creating a credible EU military capability may jeopardise NATO by encouraging US isolationism. Nevertheless, Atlanticism was not synonymous with unquestioning support for US foreign policy: even British governments grumbled about US hegemony, particularly during Reagan’s presidency. This approach persisted with surprisingly few changes after the Cold War with Atlanticism and inter-governmentalism remaining the central themes.5 This was reflected by the fact that between 1994 and 1996 the UK was quite content to develop a European security and defence identity (ESDI) within the NATO framework but was reluctant to pursue any similar plans within the EU.6 These traditional assumptions continued throughout Labour’s initial months in office with Blair’s government vetoing a 10-state proposal to merge the EU with the Western European Union (WEU) at the Amsterdam summit in June 1997. But Labour’s refusal to scrap the WEU was only temporary
58 British Foreign Policy under New Labour
and Blair subsequently put the Amsterdam veto down to the lack of time available for his administration to consider the proposal.7 So although Labour’s 1997 manifesto clearly identified its desire to play a leadership role at the heart of Europe, it was not immediately obvious that this would involve championing the development of ESDP. By the end of 1997, however, Blair was giving the European dimension pride of place in his statements on UK foreign policy. In a keynote speech in November 1997, he suggested that the first ‘guiding light’ principle of UK foreign policy was to ‘end the isolation of the last 20 years and be a leading partner in Europe’. His second principle was: ‘Strong in Europe and strong with the US. There is no choice between the two. Stronger with one means stronger with the other. Our aim should be to deepen our relationship with the US at all levels. We are the bridge between the US and Europe. Let us use it.’8 These aspirations raised two main questions: where exactly was Labour going to lead Europe, and who would follow it? Blair’s favoured analogy of the UK acting as a bridge between Europe and the US painted a rather unbelievable picture that implied other European states lacked the ability to effectively communicate with the US. In contrast, especially during Clinton’s drive on geo-economics, Washington often suggested that Germany was among its most important bilateral relationships in Europe. Blair’s speeches and Labour’s intimate relationship with Clinton’s new Democrats also often gave the distinct impression that his bridge more closely resembled a conveyerbelt heading towards the US rather than a highway with the traffic flowing equally in both directions.9 In other words, Blair’s bridge was widely perceived as leading to an Atlanticist conception of European security issues. While this may not have seemed such an appalling prospect during Clinton’s administration, George W. Bush’s arrival in the White House left some EU members (notably France and Germany) feeling distinctly queasy at the prospect of such a journey.10 The type of leadership on offer from Labour thus affected its ability to attract followers. But this was not the only relevant factor. During Labour’s first few months in office it proved easy to win plaudits from European leaders who had experienced nearly two decades of frosty relations with the previous Thatcher and Major governments. However, as Brian Barder observed, despite Labour’s statements of intent, in several respects, the UK remained uniquely unsuited to playing a leading role in EU-affairs.11 First, Britain remained outside the single currency and was deeply ambiguous about the possibility of joining it in the future. Second, public opinion remained sceptical of the EU and its institutions
Living in (and with) Europe 59
with very few Britons sharing the vision evident on the continent of a more deeply integrated Union. Finally, Barder argued that despite Labour’s appeals to project a new identity for the UK, its public and officials found it difficult to shake off their traditionally inflated sense of national superiority. Despite these problems, during 1998 Blair’s government clearly shifted its position on the potential role the EU could play within the security realm. In two important senses, however, the EU already played security roles even while it remained a civilian power. First, the process of European integration helped fulfil the crucial security function of avoiding a return to Europe’s past history of war and conflict.12 Second, because the process of European integration was founded upon liberal economic and political values, the EU functioned as a mature pluralistic security community whose members had learned to conduct relations with one another without resorting to the threat or use of military force.13 And because of the liberal economic and political credentials required to meet the acquis communautaire, EU enlargement by definition expanded the zone of liberal democratic peace. These factors suggest that Blair’s government was not attempting to create a security role for an organisation that previously had none. Rather, it was keen to develop the EU’s military capacity as one of a range of instruments it could deploy in pursuit of its values. These factors also highlight the extent to which the public debate and official conception of ESDP has framed security in largely military terms. The roots of Labour’s shift reportedly lay in a confidential memorandum written by a senior FCO diplomat, Robert Cooper, in May 1998 and the work of a small community of fewer than two-dozen officials advocating the reform of Britain’s traditional Atlanticist approach.14 The memo apparently set out the case for developing the EU’s military capacity separate from the WEU but so as to complement NATO structures.15 Blair’s first public indication that the deadlock on European security issues needed to be broken appears to have come at the informal Pörtschach summit in Austria, 24–25 October 1998. At this stage, however, the details of his preferred position remained unclear. On 4 November in Vienna, at the first informal meeting of EU Defence Ministers, George Robertson reiterated his government’s desire to develop a new approach to these issues and called for a simplification of the current institutional procedures governing the EU’s use of military force. The UK’s shift was formalised shortly afterwards at the Franco-British summit at St Malo, 3–4 December. Since then, Howorth’s claim (made in 2000) that the UK had played a leading role
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in all the EU’s major security initiatives remains accurate five years later.16 The St Malo declaration was described by one respected commentator as ‘a diplomatic bombshell’ and ‘a leap in the dark’ which broke the ‘taboo on military action by the EU’.17 What the declaration did not do was indicate where the ESDP process might end, or even lead.18 It did, however, confirm at least five main areas of Franco-British agreement. First, that the EU must have the capacity to decide when to conduct ‘autonomous action’ and the ability to act in situations requiring the use of military force. Second, NATO would remain the foundation for Europe’s collective defence. In addition, the relevant EU decisionmaking structures should remain inter-governmental and the Union required access to the intelligence and other technical capabilities necessary to facilitate military action without involving the whole of NATO. Finally, the Union needed to create the armed forces necessary for the envisaged operations.19 Such commitments were notably different from Labour’s Strategic Defence Review (July 1998), which had suggested that European defence would be conducted through NATO, ESDI and the WEU (see Chapter 6). Nor could these areas of Franco-British convergence conceal some important differences, particularly over ESDP’s scale, future direction, and its relationship to NATO. The French view emphasised that the EU was always an autonomous organisation with the right to develop ESDP as it saw fit and which would seek the most appropriate synergies with NATO. ESDP thus represented a mechanism designed to develop European capacity albeit by initially making use of NATO structures and assets. The UK, on the other hand, saw ESDP as relying upon NATO’s structures and planning procedures and as a way of maintaining NATO credibility.20 St Malo’s ‘constructive ambiguity’21 also meant it was particularly important for Blair’s government to ‘sell’ the declaration to at least four different audiences, each of which had very different expectations about what it did – and should – signal: Blair’s EU partners wanted confirmation that the UK’s shift was genuine; Washington seemed to want both confirmation that the Union was serious about taking responsibility for European security but not serious enough to dislodge the US from its position as first among equals in NATO;22 the small number of UK elites interested in such issues needed reassurance about how exactly this new Euro-Atlantic balancing act would work; and the British public needed clarification of why such a shift was necessary at all.23 The result was a mixture of rather ambiguous signals and the UK opting to define ‘autonomous action’ in such a way as to ensure the EU was able to act
Living in (and with) Europe 61
when NATO, which retained the right of first refusal, decided not to become fully engaged. What, then, explains Labour’s shift in policy? Not surprisingly, several factors contributed to the decision. First, in contrast to the previous Conservative government, Labour had clearly articulated a different UK identity that involved being at the heart of Europe. Since the UK remained outside European monetary union and on the edge of justice and home affairs issues, foreign and security policy was one of the few areas in which Blair could plausibly claim a leading role.24 Second, Europe’s weak response to earlier crises in the region highlighted the EU’s lack of an effective mechanism for formulating – let alone implementing – an agreed crisis management policy on anything but the smallest military scale. The memory of the Bosnian war (1992–95) was particularly important.25 This reminded UK officials that not only should they avoid putting forces that were not strong enough to look after themselves into a war-zone but that the EU’s two main military powers, the UK and France, were likely to end up working closely together in any regional crisis. It also left a powerful reminder that, as Lawrence Freedman put it, ‘there is damn all we can do as Europeans alone, or what we can do is just inadequate without the United States’.26 The point was emphatically hammered home in late 1998 when the crisis that had been brewing in Kosovo since 1989 started to boil. Blair, for one, was apparently appalled by the state of EU capacity to respond when he was first briefed on Kosovo in mid-1998.27 However, arguably the most important reason for Labour’s shift was the belief in Whitehall that developing a military capacity for the EU would actually help strengthen NATO. By late 1997, Washington was signalling that far from undermining NATO’s cohesion, developing a European military capacity was instead becoming a precondition for its survival as a viable alliance. Whitehall apparently took these signals seriously and began to see the development of ESDP as a way of re-invigorating NATO. It also provided an opportunity to convince some American isolationists that Europe was serious about taking more responsibility for its own security. St Malo thus formalised the UK’s shift towards placing greater tactical emphasis on ESDP as an instrument to maintain its Atlanticist strategy.28 From the UK perspective, ESDP and NATO were thus perfectly compatible: NATO would deal with high-end operations while the EU could conduct smaller, Petersburg Task (June 1992) operations with the help of the Alliance’s structures if NATO as a whole did not want to participate. In this sense, the UK’s emphasis was on pragmatism, that is, while institutional reform was thought
62 British Foreign Policy under New Labour
necessary, it was not seen as sufficient. As Robertson quipped in March 1999, ‘Institutional reengineering alone will solve little – you can’t send a wiring diagram to a crisis’.29 The fact that these debates took place while Kosovo was descending into civil war reinforced Robertson’s point and highlighted how far the EU still had to go.
The Kosovo crisis, 1998–99 On 24 March 1999, NATO embarked on what turned out to be a 78-day air campaign known as Operation Allied Force. Its objective was ‘to attack Yugoslav military and security forces and associated facilities with sufficient effect to downgrade its capacity to continue repression of the civilian population’.30 After nearly a decade of avoiding the question of ethnic tension in Kosovo, in 1998 the UK became involved in various diplomatic and coercive initiatives (primarily as part of the International Contact Group with the US, Russia, Germany, France and Italy) to end the escalating conflict between the Serbian government and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). After long negotiations, in October 1998, Belgrade agreed that an international presence could monitor the return of refugees and the implementation of its ceasefire with the KLA. In retrospect, NATO leaders unwisely allowed the agreement to be monitored by an OSCE mission rather than a more robust peacekeeping force.31 Faced with Serbian non-compliance, the OSCE monitors were – not surprisingly – unable to ensure the terms of the agreement and were subsequently withdrawn on the eve of the bombings. On 18 March 1999, the collapse of the negotiations chaired by France and the UK at Rambouillet, Paris, convinced NATO leaders that diplomatic efforts to resolve the conflict had been exhausted. According to the US State Department, the triggers for the bombing campaign were Milosevic’s failure to accept a political settlement and breaches of the ceasefire.32 NATO’s decision to go to war was fuelled by a combination of humanitarianism, national interests and geopolitical concerns, which Alex Bellamy has dubbed the ‘Srebrenica’, ‘refugees’ and ‘Balkan wars’ syndromes.33 The first syndrome reflected NATO leaders’ desire to avoid a repeat of the Srebrenica massacre that had occurred in Bosnia in July 1995. In Blair’s terms, unless Milosevic ‘was stopped, Kosovo would share Bosnia’s fate’.34 In contrast, critics of the bombings suggested that any feelings of collective shame NATO states might have possessed about their previous failings in Bosnia manifested into an unhealthy desire to punish the Milosevic regime for its continued misbehaviour.35 The ‘refugees syndrome’ reflected the barely concealed reluctance of
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most NATO states to accept large numbers of Kosovan refugees on a potentially long-term basis (Albania and Macedonia bore the brunt of the refugee problem). In comparison to other NATO states, however, the UK proved particularly reluctant to welcome Kosovan refugees.36 Indeed, there was significant tension between Blair’s claims about providing asylum and the Asylum and Immigration Bill that Labour was simultaneously proposing, under the terms of which Kosovans would have been ineligible to come to the UK. The ‘Balkan wars’ syndrome reflected Western geopolitical concerns that the crisis in Kosovo was a threat to international peace and security which was likely to spill across Serbia’s borders into other parts of the Balkans, especially Albania and Macedonia.37 This syndrome helps explain the West’s initial attempts to contain rather than resolve the crisis. With these syndromes in mind, Western governments – with UK spokespersons to the fore – offered four rationales to justify NATO’s intervention. The first was the urgency of the situation. NATO leaders claimed intervention was required immediately to stop Serbian ethnic cleansing and avert an impending humanitarian catastrophe. As George Robertson told MPs, ‘action is taken on behalf of all NATO allies with the aim – the clear, and I believe, justified aim – of averting a humanitarian disaster. … It is to use strategic precision bombing on military targets to reduce his [Milosevic] ability to order the kind of ethnic cleansing that we have seen up to now.’38 A second rationale was said to concern NATO’s credibility. Given NATO’s prior involvement in Bosnia (through Operation Deliberate Force, and its Implementation and Stabilisation Forces) and its attempts to coerce Belgrade during 1998 and early 1999, Alliance credibility was clearly at stake. With Kosovo’s crisis coinciding with NATO’s Fiftieth anniversary and much talk about the Alliance’s future role this issue was given special prominence. Blair made the point explicitly when he suggested, If NATO succeeds, the next time someone tries such a policy and we make a threat it will be credible. Were we to fail – which we will not and must not – the opposite would happen: people would know that, when NATO threatened, it would not be a threat to be taken seriously. That is why people do not talk about NATO’s credibility in some abstract sense; it is a necessary part of building peace and security for the long term.39 A third rationale appealed to the need to stop ethnic cleansing because it constituted an unacceptable affront to Europe’s collective self-image
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as a civilised continent. In Blair’s words, NATO’s intervention was ‘a just war, based not on any territorial ambitions but on values. We cannot let the evil of ethnic cleansing stand. We must not rest until it is reversed.’40 Finally, although NATO used force without explicit UN Security Council authorisation, its leaders argued their actions were in conformity with existing resolutions passed under chapter VII (especially numbers 1160, 1199 and 1203). As Blair noted retrospectively, there had been ‘72 UN resolutions against Milosevic. He will not accept any resolution from anyone unless he knows that the alternative is force.’41 This rationale was subsequently given extra credence by two developments. First, on 26 March a Russian-tabled draft resolution condemning NATO’s intervention and demanding its immediate cessation was rejected by twelve votes to three (Russia, China, Namibia). Although five of the voters were NATO members, seven were not and chose to actively cast their vote in support of its actions.42 Second, under Security Council resolution 1244, the UN was given the leading role in overseeing the administration and reconstruction of the province after the bombing campaign. On the basis of these justifications, NATO embarked on an air campaign designed to achieve three objectives: to reduce Serbia’s military capacity in Kosovo, put pressure on Milosevic to modify or abandon his policies there, and to minimise collateral damage and allied casualties.43 In military terms, the UK played the most important role after the US. As well as providing important air-to-air refuelling facilities, the UK contributed 48 out of 829 aircraft that performed 1618 of the total of 38,004 sorties and released 1011 weapons (including Cruise Missiles, cluster bombs, precision guided munitions and gravity bombs).44 Initially, however, UK contributions were rarely effective: the first four of the Royal Navy’s $1 million cruise missiles missed their targets, apparently because they had been ‘overprogrammed’ and many of the Royal Air Force’s sorties proved ineffective because of engine trouble, low cloud cover, and the inability to find certain targets.45 The UK fared better after the bombing campaign, supplying approximately 10,500 troops to KFOR – including the first commander, General Michael Jackson – and AFOR forces in Macedonia and Albania. In political terms, the UK was also at the forefront of the international campaign to win the propaganda war. UK officials quickly criticised the Clinton administration for explicitly ruling out the use of ground troops at the start of the campaign. This was apparently considered a foolish waste of an important psychological element of the campaign that
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would only reinforce Milosevic’s suspicions that NATO could not stomach a protracted campaign or casualties.46 Such criticisms were rather hypocritical, however, given that at the start of the campaign Blair told parliament, ‘We do not plan to use ground troops in order to fight our way into Kosovo … it would take a huge commitment – possibly more than 100,000 ground troops – and that is why we have said that that is not our plan.’47 Moreover, the initial ruling out of a land invasion had been necessary to persuade both reluctant NATO governments (notably Greece and Italy) and a reluctant US Congress to support the air campaign.48 Blair’s government was also unhappy with NATO’s media management of the war. Like its own election campaign, Labour fought the Kosovo war with one eye constantly on public opinion polls both at home and – by late April 1999 – in the US and NATO states more broadly.49 The war saw ministers engaged in a flurry of press conferences and television interviews, writing numerous newspaper articles and making an unusual number of statements in parliament. However, NATO lacked Labour’s well-oiled media machine and was soon struggling to win the propaganda war after a number of mistakes and incoherent statements. On 16 April Blair sent Alastair Campbell, his Director of Communications and Strategy, and a team from the Downing Street press office to NATO to help smarten up its public presentation of the war. Campbell called on his counterparts in Bonn, Paris and Washington to do likewise. The result was the setting up of NATO’s Media Operations Centre and a new regime of twice-daily conference calls for NATO leaders and press spokespersons to coordinate their public messages. This was all done on the assumption that the way the war was presented mattered almost as much as the way it was actually being conducted. As it turned out, this change in process had the desired effect, and support for Blair’s position rose in the domestic opinion polls. Domestically, the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats both endorsed the need for NATO action in Kosovo, although as the air campaign proceeded growing dissent could be detected from individual MPs, notably within Labour from Tony Benn, Tam Dalyell and George Galloway.50 Within the UK, two main points of contention emerged about NATO’s decision to go to war. First, the marginalisation of the House of Commons, evident in the fact that as Jeremy Corbyn observed, 60 days into the bombing campaign the government had failed to secure a substantive parliamentary vote authorising the air strikes.51
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The second major concern was over the legal basis of NATO action. The government’s legal position was summarised by George Robertson in the following terms: We are in no doubt that NATO is acting within international law. Our legal justification rests upon the accepted principle that force may be used in extreme circumstances to avert a humanitarian catastrophe. These circumstances clearly exist in Kosovo. The use of force … can be justified as an exceptional measure in support of the purposes laid down by the UN Security Council, but without the Council’s express authorisation when that is the only means to avert an immediate and overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe.52 The UK’s argument hinged on its claim that states had a limited right to enforce existing UN Security Council resolutions authorised under chapter VII in cases where the use of force was necessary to avert an imminent humanitarian catastrophe. This argument was not accepted by Russia, China or India. As noted above, however, Russia’s attempt to pass a Council resolution calling for the immediate cessation of the bombing failed to secure the requisite votes. The government’s legal case was also rather ambiguously rejected by the Foreign Affairs Committee, which suggested that although NATO states had done ‘all that they could to make the military intervention in Kosovo as compliant with the tenets of international law as possible’, and had made a persuasive moral argument, ‘Operation Allied Force was contrary to the specific terms of what might be termed the basic law of the international community – the UN Charter, although this might have been avoided if the Allies had attempted to use the Uniting for Peace procedures.’ Overall, the Committee concluded that NATO’s actions were of ‘dubious legality in the current state of international law’.53 This position was subsequently echoed by the Independent International Commission on Kosovo (IICK), which concluded that while NATO’s recourse to force was ‘illegal’ it was widely considered morally legitimate within the court of international opinion.54 During the course of Allied Force, NATO was also criticised for the way it conducted the campaign. One set of prudential criticisms challenged the effectiveness of NATO’s bombing. For a start, NATO actually destroyed very little of Serbia’s military machine in Kosovo although it did render a significant number of vehicles inactive by cutting off their fuel supplies.55 It also started to run out of targets, prompting General Charles Guthrie’s warning that NATO’s bombs were ‘turning big craters
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into bigger craters and rubble into smaller pieces of rubble’.56 As a result, the type of targets was widened and this, in turn, caused what many felt was excessive damage to Serbia’s industrial, trade and communications infrastructure. In addition, NATO suffered from a number of unintended consequences, not least it significantly underestimated the numbers of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) that would be generated by the combination of the bombing campaign and continued ethnic cleansing by the Serbs.57 A second criticism highlighted the poor correlation between NATO’s high-altitude bombing and its stated humanitarian motives. NATO’s selection of air power as its preferred instrument of armed rescue can be explained by two main factors. First, air power avoids the costs and the risks of committing ground troops; the rationale being that NATO body bags would have rapidly eroded domestic support for the action against Milosevic. Second, NATO’s leaders displayed overconfidence in the ability of air power alone to quickly compel the Milosevic regime to change its behaviour on this important issue. This was partly because they drew the unwarranted conclusion from Operation Deliberate Force in Bosnia in 1995 that Milosevic would back down after only a few days of sustained bombing. This conclusion ignored the considerable role that advances by both the Croat and Bosnian armed forces were making at the same time as Deliberate Force. As a result, critics have pointed out that while NATO was not to blame for ethnic cleansing, it provided ‘the cover of war for the ethnic cleansers’ and inflamed their ‘desire to extract revenge against the defenceless Albanians they despised – people who, unlike NATO’s warplanes, were accessible targets’.58 NATO’s air campaign thus failed to deliver the means to protect the Kosovar Albanians on the ground and left NATO leaders open to the charge of exacerbating the very humanitarian disaster that their actions were justified as averting. In sum, NATO faced a series of difficult and imperfect choices given that (1) there was no evidence that the Serbs would have ended the killings and ethnic cleansing in Kosovo without bombing, (2) bombing alone could not protect the local population, and (3) the use of ground troops would in all likelihood result in greater loss of life overall and was considered politically unacceptable by several NATO governments. A third set of complaints focused on NATO’s targeting procedures.59 In particular, critics pointed to ‘collateral damage’ including passenger trains and buses that were hit while crossing bridges and the fact that probably between 400 and 600 civilians were killed and more wounded. Errors were also made in identifying targets, such as the Chinese
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embassy, and some weapons went astray (although very few in percentage terms compared to previous bombing campaigns). The situation was not helped by the discovery that the US had been drawing up a second set of targets without telling any of its alliance partners.60 A final cluster of criticisms questioned the actions of NATO states after the war, specifically their failure to prevent the expulsion of Kosovo’s Serbian minority and the way in which the territory’s future status was left in ‘political limbo’.61 Despite these problems opinion polls suggested that overall, NATO’s case for war, if not its methods, proved persuasive with the British public.62 By early June, several factors were increasing the pressure on Milosevic’s regime to sue for peace. First, the air campaign eventually had a significant effect on Belgrade’s calculations. The problem for self-styled humanitarian warriors was what Adam Roberts called the ‘disturbing lesson’ that Allied Force’s ‘most effective aspect involved hurting Serbia proper (including its population and government) rather than directly attacking Serb forces in Kosovo and protecting the Kosovars’.63 Second, by late May, Blair and Robertson had helped convince the Clinton administration that it was necessary to demonstrate ground intervention was a distinct possibility.64 Third, under the cover of NATO bombing, the KLA had been gaining in strength and inflicted a number of damaging attacks upon Milosevic’s forces.65 Finally, Belgrade was waking up to the fact that Russia would not actively support it against NATO but would instead be content to play a political and military role in Kosovo after the war.66 Overall, then, Allied Force generated some very different reactions. For some, NATO’s decision to use force when faced with a Security Council unwilling to enforce its own resolutions declaring the situation in Kosovo a threat to international peace and security met the requirements of ‘good international citizenship’. However, NATO’s use of cluster bombs, its reluctance to use ground troops or conduct operations below 15,000 feet undermined its humanitarian credentials and the effectiveness of its air-strikes against Serbia’s armed forces.67 In contrast, those who view the UK as an ‘outlaw state’ remained convinced that NATO had fought an illegal war, engaged in war crimes and violations of international humanitarian law, and precipitated rather than prevented a humanitarian catastrophe. From this perspective, NATO’s real motives had nothing to do with protecting human rights and everything to do with bolstering its credibility in the post-Cold War era; the related objective of ensuring NATO’s eastward expansion; and the need to organise eastern European economies to benefit Western business. Consequently,
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the collapse of the Rambouillet negotiations was entirely predictable as they were little more than a device to legitimise the recourse to war.68 In terms of Labour’s underlying foreign policy commitments, Atlanticism was clearly evident in the strong support for the US-led action. Indeed, at times watching, reading and listening to the media coverage it felt like the UK was playing the lead rather than the supporting role. Kosovo also confirmed Labour’s belief that NATO should remain the premier institution of European security. Consequently, whatever the more ambitious advocates of ESDP might claim, at least for the foreseeable future, it remained reliant upon NATO in general and the US in particular. Multilateralism was also evident. However, NATO’s decision to intervene without explicit Security Council authorisation exemplified Blair’s crusading tendencies and his emphasis on effective multilateralism. Moralism also played a major part in Labour’s response to Kosovo with Blair using the conflict as the springboard to articulate a more general set of criteria for evaluating whether or not the UK should engage in military intervention in what he called ‘other people’s conflicts’ (see Chapter 8). In this sense, Kosovo proved a watershed in Blair’s understanding of the appropriate relationship between the norm of non-intervention and the responsibility of states to protect their own populations. It also had important repercussions for debates about European security.
European security after Kosovo The Kosovo crisis has been described as ‘the critical turning point in post-Cold War European security’.69 However, in some senses, rather than pushing Labour’s foreign policy in dramatically new directions, it confirmed the importance of several choices Blair’s government had already taken, not least the SDR’s call for the UK to develop more force projection and crisis management capabilities. After Kosovo’s crisis, debates about the UK’s approach to European security revolved around three interrelated questions: What lessons should be drawn from Operation Allied Force? And what impact did, first, 9/11 and then the war in Iraq have upon the EU’s attempts to forge a common foreign and security policy complete with military capabilities? Blair’s government appeared to draw at least five lessons for European security from Kosovo’s crisis. First, the EU’s velvet diplomacy required an iron fist capable of coercing opponents such as the Milosevic regime.70 Second, while the tactical use of air power may sometimes be able to deliver immediate objectives, used alone it had considerable
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limitations, especially its inability to address underlying political problems.71 This required a political strategy in which ground forces would not just win the war but also ensure the peace afterwards. The third conclusion was that for all the advances on paper, the EU was still reliant upon the US to conduct anything other than minute enforcement operations and for most stability and reconstruction missions. Moreover, even if the EU did not require US troops, it would probably need NATO’s structures and certain US assets, notably intelligence and strategic lift. The fourth conclusion was particularly worrying given the third, namely, as the ground troops issue hinted, US and EU security agendas would not always converge. Finally, events in Kosovo after Allied Force highlighted that despite the considerable investment of resources by NATO, the EU, the UN and the OSCE, constructing and maintaining the sort of liberal, multi-ethnic states favoured by Western governments was a difficult, slow, contested and costly business. Given the Balkans’ historic habit of shaping Europe’s collective destiny Blair’s government judged that stabilising the region was worth the costs. But by mid-1999, it was already clear that the UK was unlikely to devote such significant resources to other parts of the world. Kosovo’s crisis thus added a considerable sense of urgency to developing ESDP. During the final stages of Allied Force, at the Cologne summit of 3–4 June 1999, EU leaders suggested that ESDP should be able to organise and conduct operations for the purposes set out in the St Petersburg Declaration of June 1992, namely, humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping and crisis management. More specific suggestions followed in December 1999 in the form of the Helsinki ‘Headline Goal’. This declared that by 2003 the EU should be capable of deploying a Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) of up to 50,000–60,000 troops to a crisis zone at 60 days notice and have the force remain in theatre for up to one year (once the rotation of personnel was taken into account, this would require a pool of approximately 180,000 soldiers). For some the goal was too conservative, while for others, it was so ambitious as to invite a predictable failure the EU could ill afford.72 Despite being enshrined at the EU Council meeting in Nice in December 2000, and despite having some 1.7 million uniformed personnel, the EU’s 15 members pledged just 67,100 troops (the UK pledged 12,500 ground troops, at that time equivalent to 5.9 per cent of its total ground forces).73 Little had changed by December 2001 when at Laeken, Belgium the Union declared its military capacity ‘operational’. By 2001, therefore, the balance sheet on the Union’s ostensibly common foreign and security policy was distinctly mixed. While the EU’s
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members had built up a reasonable track-record of common positions on such issues as the Israel–Palestine conflict or India–Pakistan relations, in other areas, common positions were notable for their absence. Several African issues, for instance, highlighted the lack of common ground within the Union (see Chapter 4). In 2000, France declined the UK’s request for assistance in Sierra Leone and three years later, France was working alone on the ground to stabilise Côte d’Ivoire. Similarly, between 1998 and 2001, the UK and France spent much time arguing over the appropriate way to treat Charles Taylor’s regime in Liberia. And then came 9/11. In responding to the initial shock of the attacks, the EU displayed some ‘striking solidarity’, especially in its ability to link foreign policy, anti-terrorist measures and Justice and Home Affairs issues.74 However, while both the CFSP and ESDP survived the political fallout from 9/11, they were influenced by it. Above all, 9/11 ensured that defeating terrorism became the UK’s number one foreign policy priority – although at times it seemed like the UK was more concerned with killing or capturing terrorists than reducing the likelihood of future terrorism (see Chapters 2 and 6). Consequently, although Blair’s government remained supportive of ESDP, the post-9/11 broadening of its foreign policy horizons beyond Europe meant that it slipped down the list of priorities. This, in turn, made the ‘constructive ambiguity’ evident at St Malo harder to sustain, especially as the UK quickly indicated that NATO not the EU would serve as the primary military instrument in the ‘war on terrorism’. This was confirmed at the Prague Summit in November 2002 when the Alliance announced it would establish a Response Force (NRF).75 This stance also provided a rationale for UK support for further NATO enlargement since candidate states could bolster its political, if not its military, credentials (see also Chapter 6).76 The major initial difficulty with this approach was Washington’s sidelining of NATO in the campaign to dislodge the Taliban/al-Qa’ida regime in Afghanistan. In Washington’s own version of effective multilateralism, the US Secretary of Defence declared his preference for fighting terrorism using ad hoc coalitions of the willing defined by the specific mission at hand.77 Compared to NATO, the EU remained untested in the military sphere and certainly incapable of conducting the sort of enforcement operations required in Afghanistan. For the UK, the EU’s role in the ‘war on terrorism’ should concentrate on its relative strengths in development aid and diplomacy to prevent so-called ‘failed states’ becoming havens for terrorists.78 Nevertheless, the Union’s ‘big three’ (UK, France, Germany) quickly began formulating their own response rather than waiting for the Belgian Presidency to respond on their
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behalf.79 This convergence came under severe strain, however, as the issue of Iraq climbed higher up the UK’s foreign policy agenda. The EU could not plausibly claim to have forged a CFSP on Iraq since France withdrew from the northern and southern no-fly-zones in 1996 and 1998 respectively. Indeed, despite holding the EU presidency at the time, Blair’s government barely consulted the EU over the decision to launch Operation Desert Fox in December 1998. Yet for several reasons, the diplomatic tensions over the Iraq war had a more cathartic effect on ESDP.80 First, the combined effects of 9/11 and the Iraq war convinced some previously sceptical states (including Norway, Sweden and Finland) of the merits of ESDP.81 Second, the crisis helped resolve some of the ambiguities over ESDP in the UK’s favour by discrediting ‘some of the more unrealistic ambitions held for it’.82 Just over a month after the invasion of Iraq, Belgium, France, Germany and Luxembourg held what was cruelly dubbed the ‘chocolate summit’ to reinvigorate ESDP.83 They proposed that within a year the EU should establish a permanent military planning headquarters at Tervuren, Brussels. By September 2003, Blair had agreed to the principle if not the detail, prompting an angry response from the US ambassador to NATO, Nicholas Burns, who suggested such developments represented the ‘most serious threat to the future of NATO’.84 Burns’ comment revealed how Washington’s view of ESDP had changed from (Clinton’s administration) seeing it as a way of reviving NATO to (Bush’s administration) suggesting it posed a threat to the Alliance. Despite Washington’s reservations, at the Naples summit (28–29 November 2003), the EU agreed to establish a permanent strategic planning cell in Brussels. This would have a staff of about 30 personnel and – in a victory for the UK vision of ESDP – a SHAPE liaison mission attached to it. It thus resembled a capacity to generate an operations centre for a specific task rather than the more ambitious permanent headquarters planned at the ‘chocolate summit’.85 The favourable reactions to the battle-group concept first raised in the Franco-British summit in London on 24 November 2003 also suggested the downsizing of (especially French) expectations about ESDP. Battle-groups would consist of some 1500 troops capable of being deployed within 15 days on missions of up to a month, and of operating under a UN mandate. The plan was to have them operational by 2007. The third effect of the Iraq crisis was to highlight that in several respects the key difference between the UK and France was over means not ends, namely, how best to engage with and potentially influence US power in the tense political atmosphere post-9/11. Here both the UK and France drew criticism: at times, Blair’s attempt at partnership with
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the US looked like sycophancy, while Chirac’s ostensibly principled position in the Security Council only served to divide the EU into largely superficial pro- and anti-US camps.86 As in Bosnia where the UK and France ended up working closely together, the Bush administration’s apparent desire to downsize its troop commitments to Europe in light of the war in Iraq made the EU’s contribution in the Balkans more important than ever.87 Despite NATO’s status as the most favoured organisation in the ‘war on terrorism’ and the tensions over Iraq, by the end of 2002 there was also good reason to expect that ESDP would soon show some concrete results. Most notably, perhaps, the EU and NATO resolved the objections made by first Turkey and then Greece over the ‘Berlin-plus’ arrangements whereby the Union would be able to borrow assets from the US in order to conduct its own operations. Consequently, during 2003 ESDP took its first practical steps. The UK, preoccupied with Iraq, did not play a leading role in any of these. The first operation was the EU Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia, which focused on refugee return, security and combating organised crime. Deployed in January 2003 with a three-year mandate this operation involved some 500 international police officers and is widely considered a modest success.88 The second operation, in Macedonia, proved more controversial.89 The EU had announced its willingness to take over from the 800-strong NATO mission in Macedonia in June 2002 at the Seville European Council meeting. However, despite French and Belgium enthusiasm for a quick changeover, at the European Council meeting of 24–25 October the UK initially vetoed any EU deployment arguing that the Union was not ready for such a potentially difficult operation. This prompted a failed attempt by President Chirac to block the extension of the NATO force’s mandate. With France acting as Framework Nation, the EU’s Operation Concordia finally deployed approximately 250 troops from 27 states to Macedonia on 31 March. No British troops participated although three UK personnel were seconded to its headquarters. Concordia subsequently withdrew on 15 December 2003 to be replaced by the Union’s civilian police mission, Operation Proxima. Meanwhile, between June and September 2003, the French-led Operation Artemis deployed approximately 1500 troops (including just under 100 British military engineers) to eastern DRC. Although it provided little more than a temporary palliative for the residents of the stricken town of Bunia, this was the first EU mission deployed outside Europe and the first to operate without NATO assets. In January 2005, the EU sent a small civilian police force to the DRC’s capital, Kinshasa to
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help train local security personnel to guard the state installations. In this sense, ESDP’s first significant steps were made during (and immediately after) the Iraq crisis. The need to build on these advances – and to prove to Washington that the EU was capable of projecting military power beyond its borders – was formalised in December 2003 with the publication of the European Security Strategy, A Secure Europe in a Better World.90 This document confirmed the victory of the UK’s vision of ESDP, particularly in the greater emphasis placed on NATO and the relationship with the US between the document’s first and final drafts.91 In short, while ESDP had its uses, as Chapter 6 confirms, defending the realm was not one of them. Instead, for Labour, ESDP was a shift in tactics rather than strategy. In particular, the emphasis was on developing flexible multilateral mechanisms that would allow the EU to effectively respond to mediumto small-scale crises in its own backyard. The process had begun before Kosovo’s crisis erupted and in this sense the ethnic cleansing did not require a completely new way of thinking. Rather it added a greater sense of urgency to Labour’s ongoing diplomacy. But ESDP was not solely fixated with Europe. As part of a wider debate about foreign policy, especially how to relate the UK’s security and defence policies to the projection of the EU’s values, it was not surprising that ESDP began to look beyond Europe’s borders. Perhaps given Blair’s developing interest in Africa and a long history of French military operations on the continent, it was not surprising that the two leading players in ESDP began to see its potential in that part of the world and to plan operational scenarios accordingly. But as the following chapter demonstrates, ESDP was to play only a bit part in Labour’s relationship with Africa.
4 Healing a Scar on the World’s Conscience?
With Labour’s election to office, African affairs rose considerably higher up the UK’s list of foreign policy priorities.1 This trend was reinforced in the aftermath of 9/11 when Blair signalled his support for the NEPAD and argued that something had to be done to heal a continent that had become ‘a scar on the conscience of the world’.2 In economic terms, after the G-8 summit in Kananaskis in June 2002, Blair committed his government to spending £1 billion on development aid to Africa by 2006. Nearly two years later, in February 2004, Blair launched a 17 member Commission for Africa tasked with taking ‘a fresh look at Africa’s past and present, and the international community’s role, in order to agree clear recommendations for the future’. The Commission published its report, Our Common Interest in March 2005. Why Labour devoted so much attention to Africa was the source of considerable debate. One suggestion was that as a prime minister relatively inexperienced in foreign affairs, Blair’s most trusted foreign policy advisers, especially Jonathan Powell and David Manning, were instrumental in shaping his priorities to include Africa.3 Others saw political opportunism at work: after initially paying scant attention to Africa, Blair began taking an interest in the continent’s woes after hearing persistent praise for the work of Clare Short and DFID on the international conference circuit. A third explanation emphasised the advice US President Bill Clinton had offered Blair over dinner at Chequers in December 2000. Bill apparently advised Tony to make Africa a bigger priority and build a strong relationship with George W. Bush’s incoming administration.4 Then there were events in Africa themselves. Wars, famine, poverty, debt, disease and dictatorship were widespread in Africa at the turn of the millennium and the continent stood out as arguably the single most important crucible for testing Labour’s 75
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commitment to its stated ethical priorities. Blair’s decision to devote more attention to Africa was also made easier by the series of initiatives put forward by a small group of African leaders that culminated in the NEPAD. These projects signalled to Blair that there were like-minded African statesmen with whom he could work to achieve their shared objectives. But for all the talk of commitment, the UK’s engagement with Africa remained selective and sometimes selfish, based on similar principles to the previous Conservative governments, and often wrapped rather unconvincingly in the language of security threats rather than human solidarity and development.5 This is not to ignore some constructive developments but to paraphrase Blair, while a good deal was achieved much more remained to be done. Labour’s attempts to achieve its foreign policy objectives in Africa need to be understood within the wider political and economic trends that have shaped the continent’s international relations over the last 25 years. Four factors were particularly important.6 First, since the introduction of structural adjustment policies (usually thought to coincide with the release of the World Bank’s report, Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa, in 1981), most African governments have not had complete control of their national economies. Although not the only cause of problems, most African economies have been in a state of ‘permanent crisis’ ever since.7 Second, after the Cold War, Western states and the international financial institutions they dominate also imposed more explicitly political conditionalities that required African regimes to conform to the World Bank’s standard of ‘good governance’ (roughly synonymous with the elements necessary to build liberal market democracies). Because of their dependency upon foreign sources of finance, many African regimes responded by adopting (often largely cosmetic)8 multiparty constitutions and holding elections that were monitored to greater or lesser degrees by a variety of external actors and institutions.9 The third important factor was the neopatrimonial nature of many African regimes. As Nicolas van de Walle, amongst others, has persuasively shown, the story of most African states can be interpreted as revolving around a struggle for power and survival that marginalised all other concerns, including national development.10 Neopatrimonial regimes commonly exhibit four characteristics. First, they display ‘the more or less systematic resort to clientalism to gain and maintain political support’. In other words, ‘political authority in Africa is [often] based on the giving and gaining of favors in an endless series of dyadic exchanges that go from the village level to the highest reaches of the central state’.11 Second, this clientalism is ‘largely based on privileged
Healing a Scar on the World’s Conscience? 77
access to state resources, rationed by leaders following a strict political logic’. As a result, the boundary between the public and private spheres is extremely blurred. Within this context, the third characteristic is the centralisation of power usually around the presidency, which, in turn, is usually located within the capital city. Finally, neopatrimonial states house hybrid regimes wherein the informal mechanisms of political authority ‘coexist with the formal trappings of the modern state’ such as a bureaucracy, written laws and the institutions of a Weberian legalrational system. These regimes are hybrids because the governing elites rely upon the trappings of a rational-legal order even as they consistently subvert it for their own advantage. Daily government thus resembles a balancing act to maintain a degree of political stability by satiating the regime’s supporters and weakening its opponents. Since the end of the Cold War, those regimes that failed to persuade their external creditors of their committment to democratic reform saw their external funding channels dry up, making their balancing act even harder. The final contextual factor is that the political actors prominent in Africa’s international relations do not always conform to the conventional distinctions between state and non-state actors that form one of the foundations of the academic discipline of International Relations.12 As Christopher Clapham has pointed out, in a continent where some socalled ‘states’ have consistently behaved like warlords, while some insurgencies have exhibited the attributes of statehood, ‘the dividing line between “states” and “non-states” has become so blurred as to be virtually imperceptible’.13 As a result, perhaps more than any other continent, Africa consists ‘of a mass of power structures which, regardless of formal designation, enjoy greater or lesser degrees of statehood’.14 Within this context, Labour’s attempts to promote its three key objectives of peace, prosperity and democracy must be seen as an incredibly complex and difficult – even naïve – undertaking. Accordingly, the majority of this chapter analyses Labour’s efforts to promote these values in Africa. The final section discusses the UK’s approach to the NEPAD as the current framework within which Blair’s government engaged with African issues. Not surprisingly, I suggest that Labour’s Africa policies met with mixed results and were plagued by several tensions and contradictions. First, while Labour’s strategy was based on persuading African states to adopt ‘good governance’ policies, it underestimated the extent to which the continent’s states had collapsed leaving few, if any, institutions able to implement such policies. The problem was therefore not one of persuading states to adopt ‘good governance’ but the far bigger proposition of creating effective modern
78 British Foreign Policy under New Labour
states, often from scratch.15 Second, by relying upon African elites to implement reform in a top-down manner, Labour underestimated the power of neopatrimonial logic and structures. Instead, arguably the best chance of constructing effective and responsible states will come from the bottom-up, although this will require outsiders to channel more resources to support groups within civil society committed to human rights, participatory democracy and the rule of law. Third, by persisting in pushing neopatrimonial regimes to adopt neoliberal economic policies, Labour helped produce some very illiberal results.16 Finally, while in military terms and at least in the short-term, Labour was able to affect the course of some of Africa’s smaller wars, as demonstrated by the case of Sierra Leone, politically, it remained relatively powerless to reform neopatrimonial regimes, as demonstrated by its inability to change Mugabe’s policies in Zimbabwe. Less than a year into Labour’s first term, Christopher Clapham concluded that this lack of leverage, combined with the West’s unwillingness to allocate the necessary levels of resources and its underlying uneasiness about the ethical implications of trying to remake Africa according to its own blueprints, meant that the central objectives of the project to reconstruct the continent from outside ‘have not been, and cannot be, achieved’.17 Seven years on, arguably little had changed. All Labour’s foreign policy commitments were evident in its Africa policies. In contrast to several other parts of the world, however, Atlanticism exerted little effect upon the UK’s Africa policies. While the UK and US shared broadly similar diagnoses of Africa’s predicament and generally agreed on the most appropriate prescriptions, Blair’s government consistently pushed first Clinton and then Bush to accord African issues greater attention and resources. Multilateralism was also evident, although, once again, Labour was pragmatic, promoting what it saw as the most effective forms of multilateralism for the issue in question. The UK thus looked to a variety of institutions (especially the UN, EU, G-7/8 and the Commonwealth) as well as to more informal partnerships (exemplified by the NEPAD) to gain leverage for its preferred policies. Until 2003 and Operation Artemis (see Chapter 3), it was noticeable how little impact the EU’s CFSP had upon the African policies of the UK and France with the two states adopting very different policies on several issues. Neoliberalism was also clearly apparent, particularly in Labour’s policies on debt relief and its desire to promote ‘good governance’, which was defined in broadly neoliberal terms. But liberal commitments also implicitly underpinned the UK’s approach to peacebuilding and conflict resolution. In relation to African affairs, Labour’s neoliberalism
Healing a Scar on the World’s Conscience? 79
sat uncomfortably with neopatrimonial regimes and its unwillingness to substantially alter the international terms of trade and open up the UK’s own markets to African traders. Finally, moralism played a crucial role in Labour’s Africa policies, not least because its commitment to ‘healing’ the continent represented arguably the acid test of its liberal internationalist values. After 9/11, however, the government rather unconvincingly wrapped its reasons for engaging in Africa in the language of security and preventing terrorism and ‘failed states’.
Promoting peace? Conflict management, resolution and prevention were the stated priorities of Labour’s Africa policies. Like its predecessors, however, Blair’s government was predominantly reactive although more attention was devoted to preventing future wars via the Conflict Prevention Pools established in 2001 (see later in the chapter). Labour’s approach was also highly selective both in its attempts to support peacekeeping in Africa and in the wars it sought to help manage. Far more attention and resources were devoted to the wars in Angola, Sierra Leone, and the Sudan than those in, for instance, Algeria, Burundi, the Central African Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, the DRC and Somalia.18 The Labour government’s understanding of the continent’s wars was most clearly set out in a 2001 document entitled The Causes of Conflict in Africa, co-written by DFID, the FCO and the MOD. This defined the root causes of post-Cold War African conflicts as inequality between groups, economic decline, state collapse and a history of resolving problems violently. However, the government’s analysis drew criticism for containing little that was innovative; ignoring the globalised nature of war in Africa; analysing the continent as if it was somehow disconnected from the rest of the world and in a permanent state of crisis; and for generating inflated expectations about what the UK could ‘deliver’.19 Nevertheless, the document made the important point that ending Africa’s wars would require policies operative on several levels and across multiple sectors, including small arms and light weapons controls; security sector reform; responsible investment practices in conflict zones; reducing mineral exploitation for the purposes of war; promoting inclusive forms of government; assisting Africa’s regional organisations, especially in relation to peacekeeping capacity (see later in the chapter); and using targeted sanctions regimes, including travel bans, financial sanctions against elites fuelling conflicts and boycotts of conflict trade goods such as oil, timber and diamonds. An important example of such
80 British Foreign Policy under New Labour
sanctions came in Liberia when evidence presented by Robin Cook of Charles Taylor’s support for the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) of Sierra Leone and other insurgent groups in the region was instrumental in getting EU ministers to agree to freeze a two-year development aid programme for Liberia in 1998. Later, the UK was instrumental in imposing UN sanctions on Taylor’s regime, which included a ban on the import of rough diamonds from the country. Although authorised in March 2001, France and several West African states delayed their imposition for two months until May, much to the British government’s annoyance.20 With regard to peacekeeping, the UK concentrated on funding, training and equipping African peacekeepers rather than committing its own soldiers to operations on the continent. In 1996, the UK had established the African Peacekeeping Training Support Programme with an annual budget of roughly $4 million.21 In late May 1997, the Programme was integrated into the so-called P3 initiative (with the US and France). This aimed to coordinate external attempts to enhance African peacekeeping capabilities and promote ‘interoperable capacity’ to conduct peace support operations. The UK’s component focused primarily on officer level ‘training the trainer’ programmes, through the British Military Advisory and Training Team (BMATT) West Africa (based in Ghana), BMATT Southern Africa (originally based in Zimbabwe but subsequently withdrawn in protest at President Mugabe’s policies), and BMATT East Africa (based in Uganda). The UK also had military liaison officers based in Angola, Ethiopia and Mauritius. According to one UK diplomat involved in the P3 initiative, it was not ‘a prelude to Western disengagement from African peacekeeping’.22 This is precisely what happened, however, with the UK providing only symbolic contingents for UN peace operations on the continent. By March 2005, for instance, only 29 UK soldiers were serving in the UN’s eight peace operations in Africa: five in the UN Mission in the DRC (MONUC), three in UNMIL in Liberia, 19 in UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone, and two in UNMIS in Sudan. Instead of troops, the UK focused on providing infrastructural support, equipment and training.23 This included £3.7 million to fund Mozambique’s contingent to the African Union’s Mission in Burundi (AMIB) for its first 60 days during 2003 (plus a further £2 million to the AU administered Trust Fund), and approximately £2 million and £1 million to the UN peace operations in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) and Liberia (UNMIL) respectively. This approach was consistent with EU, US and French policy and at a time when the latter two states were accused of cutting their engagement
Healing a Scar on the World’s Conscience? 81
with Africa, Labour increased the relevant budgets, most notably DFID’s security sector reform programme and the MOD’s defence diplomacy activities. When UK troops were deployed to Africa they usually operated outside formal UN command structures as in both Sierra Leone (2000) and the DRC as part of the French-led Operation Artemis (2003).24 The problem was that this approach ran contrary to the UN Charter’s spirit of finding internationalist as opposed to regional solutions to the breakdown of peace and security and was tantamount to leaving the continent most plagued by war but equipped with only modest peacekeeping capabilities to fend largely for itself. As well as peacekeeping, Labour also engaged in several different approaches to conflict resolution ranging from diplomatic mediation to unilateral intervention (see also Chapter 8). These differences were evident in UK policies towards the wars in Sudan, Angola and Sierra Leone. In Sudan, the UK engaged in diplomatic mediation, in part through the negotiating secretariat in Nairobi it helped fund. Rather unusually, the government endorsed the idea of a referendum on southern selfdetermination as a way of resolving the war between the government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). However, despite the work of the UK’s Special Representative Alan Goulty (as part of the informal Troika with the US and Norway), the UK had only a limited impact on the course of the war. Although Britain had potentially significant economic (oil) and strategic (terrorism) interests in Sudan, it was US carrots and sticks that pushed the Machakos/ Naivasha peace process forward.25 On the positive side, the UK recognised the limits of paper agreements and that neither the government of Sudan nor the SPLM/A could achieve all their demands. In addition, by 2004, the US and UK had prepared the diplomatic ground within the UN Security Council for a possible peacekeeping force to monitor the envisaged Naivasha agreement26 in southern Sudan. This was subsequently established in March 2005 under Security Council resolution 1590. Yet significant obstacles to stable peace remained. Above all, the Machakos/Naivasha process was predicated on a simplistic north–south dichotomy that obscured the complexity of Sudan’s multiple, interlocking civil wars. This became dramatically apparent in the western province of Darfur where in response to an insurgency by two rebel groups in February 2003, President al-Bashir’s government armed the socalled janjaweed militias and engaged in a brutal campaign against both the rebels and local civilians. Although accurate statistics were impossible to compile, the UK International Development Committee
82 British Foreign Policy under New Labour
estimated that by March 2005 the conflict was responsible for around 300,000 deaths, 1.84 million internally displaced persons, 200,000 refugees, and for rendering some 2.4 million people dependent upon humanitarian assistance.27 Despite having available capacity, Blair’s government was not prepared to intervene militarily in Darfur’s crisis.28 Other sticking points included the lack of civil society input into the Machakos/Naivasha peace process, power-sharing structures proved difficult to clarify, and the status of the disputed areas of Abyei, the Nuba mountains and southern Blue Nile. In Sudan, therefore, the UK’s mediation had little serious leverage over the belligerents. In contrast, after years of the Conservatives adopting a neutral stance towards the two sides in Angola’s civil war and turning a blind eye to Jonas Savimbi’s close relations to the head of Lonrho, Tiny Rowland, Blair’s government was keen to isolate and defeat Savimbi’s National Union for Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) movement. This included vocal denunciations – usually from FCO minister Peter Hain – depicting Savimbi as a war criminal who was ‘as slippery as a snake’, expelling UNITA’s representative from the UK, supporting Namibia’s role against UNITA, and pushing for sanctions that would restrict Savimbi’s ability to finance his war effort by exporting oil and diamonds.29 While Savimbi’s UNITA deserved the criticism, the UK’s stance left little room to point out the significant shortcomings of President Dos Santos’ corrupt and authoritarian regime. As Angola’s civil war ground to a halt after Savimbi’s death in February 2002, the country slipped down the UK’s list of priorities.30 Labour’s most sustained attempts to promote peace in Africa came in Sierra Leone where the UK eventually played a crucial role in ending the civil war that erupted in 1991. In 1997–98 Blair’s government was embroiled in controversy over the so-called ‘Arms-to-Africa’ affair in which the FCO colluded with the military consultancy firm Sandline International to bring 30 tonnes of arms and ammunition into Sierra Leone in contravention of a UN arms embargo which the UK had drafted.31 Annoyed at Cook’s inability to limit the negative publicity, Blair sought to defuse what he called ‘an overblown hoo-hah’ by giving deposed President Kabbah his unequivocal support.32 Blair also suggested that the ends (returning an elected president to power) justified the means (turning a blind eye to private efforts to supply Kabbah’s forces with the arms necessary to defeat the murderous rebels).33 Although the UK – along with the US and EU – had backed President Kabbah, it was initially unwilling to ensure the military defeat of the RUF rebels. Instead, the UK helped persuade Kabbah to sign the Lomé
Healing a Scar on the World’s Conscience? 83
Accord on 7 July 1999 – the tragically flawed result of failing to defeat the RUF militarily. The Accord sacrificed justice on the altar of (temporary) peace and treated the RUF leaders as partners in a coalition government rather than as the primary obstacle to long-term peace in the country. When in early 2000, Nigerian forces that had been in the country as part of the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) since 1997 were replaced by UN peacekeepers, the RUF renewed their march towards Freetown, murdered several UN soldiers and kidnapped approximately 500 others. In response, from early May 2000, Blair’s government deployed approximately 1300 troops to Sierra Leone as part of Operation Palliser. Within six weeks the majority of these soldiers were withdrawn and a smaller contingent of approximately 200 left behind to train an accountable and effective Sierra Leone army. In tandem with the UN peacekeeping force UNAMSIL, the new army would help restore order to the country. In October, the UK deployed another naval task force (comprising approximately 650 personnel) to Sierra Leone to bolster the beleaguered UN force and signalled its commitment to deploy a further rapid reaction force of up to 5000 troops if required.34 The immediate justification for the intervention was military intelligence from the UK’s 15-man ‘technical assistance’ team in Sierra Leone and what The Guardian newspaper described as a ‘panic-stricken report’ from the UN claiming that the capital, Freetown, was once again poised to fall to rebel RUF forces as it had in January 1999.35 However, the underlying motives behind the intervention were mixed and more complex and reflected Blair’s developing thoughts on the issue of humanitarian intervention (see Chapter 8). They included the protection of UK citizens, averting a humanitarian crisis, defending democracy, supporting President Kabbah (especially after the ‘Arms-to-Africa’ affair) and supporting UNAMSIL and the future credibility of UN peace operations, particularly in Africa.36 The operation also served as a good example of the kind of focused, expeditionary intervention envisaged in the SDR (see Chapter 6). Initially, Operation Palliser went smoothly with the troops securing Lungi airport and evacuating UK citizens and others to whom Britain had consular responsibility. On 17 May, however, British and Nigerian troops killed an undisclosed number of rebels about 20 miles from Lungi airport. This incident sparked a series of debates not only about the risk to British soldiers but also about the nature of their mandate in Sierra Leone.37 The next serious incident concerned the capture of 11 British soldiers and a Sierra Leonean liaison officer by a group calling itself the
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West Side Boys. After negotiations to release the captive troops collapsed, a rescue mission, Operation Barras, was launched on 10 September. This succeeded in rescuing the hostages but resulted in the death of one British soldier and many rebels.38 Although there were calls, most notably from the Conservative party, for British troops to withdraw following this incident, the contingent was instead scaled down as the situation in and around Freetown stabilised. Crucially, Operation Barras signalled that British troops could not be treated with the same degree of contempt as UN personnel and arguably represented the crucial turning point in the civil war where the combined government, UN and British forces gained the psychological upper hand over the rebels. In terms of operational effectiveness, the UK achieved its stated objectives. The initial goal of evacuating approximately 500 UK citizens was achieved by securing the area around Freetown, including Lungi airport. The mission was then broadened to include assisting the deployment of further UNAMSIL personnel. This was also achieved with only minor instances of actual combat. The UK’s broader political strategy had three elements: to train and equip the government of Sierra Leone with an effective and accountable army; to restore momentum to the peace process, specifically by supporting an expanded UNAMSIL and funding the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration process; and to reduce the incentives that the illicit trade in diamonds had provided for the violence. Significant progress was made in all these areas. Crucially, the RUF was first contained and then, following Operation Barras, significantly weakened as a military force; in May 2001 UN sanctions were imposed on Charles Taylor’s regime in Liberia to prevent the RUF funding its activities through illicit diamond trading; and the war was declared officially over in January 2002. Arguably the major difficulty was trying to build stable peace in Sierra Leone amidst what The Economist described as ‘a region in flames’.39 Apart from efforts to curb the trade in conflict diamonds, British operations paid little attention to violence beyond Sierra Leone – stoked in significant part by Taylor’s forces – which engulfed Liberia, Guinea and Côte d’Ivoire. After the war, Sierra Leone became a laboratory for a variety of peacebuilding techniques, most notably, security sector reform (where the UK was instrumental in training and equipping the new army and police force), judicial reform (including the establishment of a reconciliation commission and special court, largely under US auspices), and building governance structures to address people’s basic needs (with DFID playing the leading role). While generally welcomed by most observers, the
Healing a Scar on the World’s Conscience? 85
UK’s peacebuilding efforts were criticised on several counts. First, questions were raised about whether Sierra Leone really needed a professional army and whether overseeing two–three years of national service might produce better long-term results.40 Second, doubts were raised about the importance of, and the amount of money being spent on, the reconciliation commission and special court (which indicted only 13 individuals, two of whom died before they could be tried) rather than fulfilling the basic needs of the local population, especially those living outside Freetown.41 Third, the UK – unlike the US – proved reluctant to speak out against Kabbah’s own rather poor record on human rights and corruption with critics questioning his ability and desire to dismantle the patronage networks upon which his own power rested.42 The final element of the UK’s attempts to promote peace in Africa was to prevent violent conflict before it broke out. Here, Labour emphasised five areas for action: addressing the root causes of conflict by fighting poverty and promoting sustainable development; supporting forms of governance that had the consent of local people; curbing the flow of small arms and light weapons; preventing the trade of conflict goods; and countering the ‘culture of impunity’ for those who break international humanitarian law.43 DFID played a particularly important part in developing this approach and also had significant input into the wider OECD strategies for preventing violent conflict (see Chapter 7). In practical terms, the culmination of Labour’s efforts in this area was the creation of the Africa Conflict Prevention Pool. A fund of approximately £50 million per annum drawn from the budgets of the FCO, MOD and DFID, this became formally active in spring 2001 and was initially set to operate until 2004.44 The Africa Pool emerged from a DFID initiative to improve the effectiveness and value for money of the government’s approach to conflict prevention in Africa. However, although the proposal secured Treasury approval, it generated considerable resentment within the FCO, which promptly argued for a second pool to be established covering the rest of the world. Despite these early squabbles and some other shortcomings, the Africa Pool did enhance the UK’s capability to help prevent conflicts on the continent, notably in Sierra Leone and Sudan.45 In addition, in early 2003, four regional conflict advisers (paid for out of the Pool’s budget) were created. Operating out of Pretoria (southern), Addis Ababa (eastern), Nairobi (central) and Abuja (western), they monitored their region, provided London with up-to-date analysis of events in states where there was no official UK presence, and helped regional teams enhance their conflict prevention activities. Although they reportedly
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encountered some difficulties in transcending the different bureaucratic cultures in DFID, the FCO and the MOD, the advisers were a concrete, if relatively minor, example of the government’s recognition that African conflicts were transnational and often required regional rather than just national solutions. Arguably the major contradiction in Labour’s attempts to promote peace was its own record on exporting arms to Africa (see also Chapter 6). In 1999, for instance, the Campaign Against the Arms Trade pointed to 970 individual export licenses the UK government granted in the Small Arms category, including exports to Kenya, Nigeria and Zimbabwe.46 The same organisation also claimed that between 1997 and 2001, Labour licensed arms and military equipment to several African states engaged in conflict, including Algeria, Angola, Burundi, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Uganda and Zimbabwe.47 Similarly, like its predecessors, Blair’s government continued to aggressively court South African arms contracts;48 BAE Systems and other UK businessmen were alleged to have supplied spare parts for Zimbabwe’s fleet of Hawk jets and other material while over 12,000 of Mugabe’s troops waged war (and consolidated substantial business interests) in the DRC;49 and UKmade weapons found their way (albeit indirectly) into the hands of child soldiers fighting in Sierra Leone’s war.50
Promoting prosperity? Like its Conservative predecessors, and despite claims it had adopted a third way between old-style socialism and new right economics, Labour subscribed to liberal assumptions about the relationship between economics and politics, and the ostensibly mutually beneficial nature of international trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) (see Chapter 5). Blair’s government promoted these principles in Africa by working in tandem with some of the UK’s major corporations conducting business on the continent, including Unilever, ICI, British Petroleum, Marconi, and UK banks such as Standard Chartered and Barclays. After June 1999, these activities were coordinated through British Trade International, renamed UK Trade and Investment in late 2003 (see Chapter 5). However, endorsing liberal diagnoses of and prescriptions for Africa’s underdevelopment left Labour with little space to criticise the negative social consequences of economic liberalism (rising unemployment, job insecurity, inequality and poverty levels) in states such as Zambia and South Africa.51 Indeed, Blair was so impressed with South Africa’s controversial and fervently neoliberal Growth, Employment and
Healing a Scar on the World’s Conscience? 87
Redistribution policy that he dubbed it the ‘Third Way, South Africa style’.52 Similarly, Labour’s support for privatisation as part of restructuring African economies often encouraged corrupt elites to buy state companies – many of which they had already plundered – for ludicrously small prices and further reduced the scope for neopatrimonial regimes to provide jobs for their supporters within the civil service. The main planks of Labour’s policy involved providing development aid, promoting free trade, encouraging profitable FDI, and reducing the burden of debt. In contrast to wider international trends, Labour steadily increased the volume of UK development aid to Africa.53 With few exceptions, however, UK aid continued to flow to traditional recipients and came with liberal strings attached (a trend that NEPAD’s concept of enhanced partnership states looks set to continue, see later in the chapter). In Africa, with the blessing of both Blair and Gordon Brown, DFID prioritised increasing the quantity and quality of UK development aid and improving policy coherence. And perhaps surprisingly given that most of the world’s poor people live in Asia, between 1998 and 2003 DFID consistently spent approximately 50 per cent of its increasing budget on Africa, more than any other single region. In statistical terms, whereas in 1998–99 DFID spent £446 million out of a total of £958 million allocable by region on Africa, by 2002–03 the figure had risen to £750 million out of a total of £1493 million.54 In addition, the 2002 Comprehensive Spending Review approved the extra funds required to achieve Blair’s commitment of spending £1 billion on Africa by 2006. Currently, DFID’s programmes are focused on 16 African states, the largest five recipients in 2002–03 being Tanzania (£96 million), Ghana (£56 million), Uganda (£55 million), Malawi (£52 million), and Kenya (£45 million) – none of which could be classed as among Africa’s poorest states.55 After initially distributing significant portions of aid through nongovernmental channels, Labour subsequently reverted to disbursing aid through African states. Several justifications were given for this approach. First, Clare Short frequently criticised NGOs as being unelected and economically illiterate whingers.56 Second, DFID was apparently unable to find enough NGO projects worthy of funding. In 2000–01, for instance, £18 million of DFID’s Africa budget was unallocated.57 Third, Short complained that even worthy projects could provide only short-term palliatives in areas without competent states. ‘It’s pointless’, Short argued, ‘pouring money into a local project in a state that is going the wrong way. … Let’s stop using aid for nice wellmeaning projects and let’s use it to create a competent state.’58 Since
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then, most government funding of NGOs was given to short-term emergency projects. But the states-first approach was not without its problems. First, the UK’s selectivity meant the amount of aid going to the states most in need was often very small. For example, in 2002–03 DFID gave more money to the Adam Smith Institute in London (£8.8 million) than to Burundi (£1.9 million), Côte d’Ivoire (£1.2 million), Liberia (£1.7 million) and Somalia (£3.1 million) combined.59 Second, even those African regimes that Labour saw as enlightened – including those in Ethiopia, Uganda and Rwanda – displayed neopatrimonial tendencies, questionable priorities in their allocation of state resources and scant regard for the human rights of their internal opponents. Third, most of the poverty alleviation projects receiving DFID funding were written by the international financial institutions and suffered from many of the shortcomings of the previous structural adjustment programmes, including that African states still do not ‘own’ their national development policies.60 Admittedly when dealing with neopatrimonial regimes, ‘ownership’ of supposedly national development policy was unlikely to produce benefits for all citizens but helping states to become liberal market democracies is a very different project than leaving them no choice in the matter. In sum, UK aid did not reach many of Africa’s poorest citizens and remained susceptible to familiar commercial and political considerations. As noted below, there was also evidence that following liberal principles might not offer the best antidote to poverty and underdevelopment (see also Chapter 7). In spite of frequent statements espousing the virtues of international free trade, in relation to Africa the G-8 states rarely practiced what they preached. Not surprisingly, this stance generated persistent criticism from a variety of African leaders, including Nelson Mandela who argued strongly for fairer – rather than freer – structures of international trade.61 This problem was eventually recognised in the G-8’s response to the NEPAD (discussed later in the chapter). On the other hand, the African leaders who established the NEPAD themselves acknowledged that the status quo was not generating investment, and that in the longer term it was investment not aid that was required to generate sustainable economic growth on the continent. The key will lie in adopting policies that allow Africans – albeit with outside help – to increase their endogenous capacity to stimulate growth and production. Blair’s government argued that private investors were a crucial part of the solution and consequently encouraged African states to sign up to the World Bank’s principles of ‘good governance’ and implement neoliberal
Healing a Scar on the World’s Conscience? 89 Table 4.1 UK trade relations with Sub-Saharan Africa (in £ millions)
Exports Imports
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
3,574 2,840
3,312 2,865
2,961 3,242
3,170 4,201
3,466 5,669
Source: Adapted from UK Trade Statistics. http://www.uktradeinfo.com Accessed March 2003.
economic reforms. To this end, by January 1999 the UK had signed 18 bilateral investment treaties and 29 double taxation treaties with African states in an attempt to build environments conducive for FDI by UK companies.62 UK firms certainly accrued significant profits as a result of these initiatives but their benefits to ordinary Africans were much less obvious. Although under Labour, the UK’s economic relationship with Africa was less concentrated upon South Africa than it once was, it remained the only African state among the UK’s top 20 countries for imports. By 2001 the five biggest African states exporting goods to the UK were (in descending order) South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya, Ghana and Angola (the UK’s largest non-Commonwealth African market). The largest importers of UK goods were (again in descending order) South Africa, Botswana, Mauritius, Namibia and Kenya. UK exporters to Africa received state support from a variety of mechanisms including Commonwealth Development Corporation (CDC) Capital Partners and UK Trade and Investment (see Table 4.1). UK businesses were particularly active in seeking openings in the oil, gas and other natural resources sectors. Along with the larger markets, for instance, there was heightened activity in Congo-Brazzaville’s oil sector and there were prospects of much more to come with offshore discoveries all along the Gulf of Guinea. In 2003, for instance, British Petroleum invested in prospecting for gas in Mozambique and saw its profits there increase fivefold over the last three years. At that time, the company had operations in 13 African states mainly in southern Africa, employed about 1,300 people in South Africa alone and expected to invest approximately $7 billion in Angola before 2010.63 In other sectors, UK firms, usually supported by the British state, looked to so-called ‘gateway economies’. The largest and most trusted gateway into southern Africa’s market of 185 million people was South Africa. Here the UK–South Africa Partnership Programme helped to build partnerships between companies in the two states. In July 2002, the two states signed a new double taxation agreement to give business
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and investors what Britain’s Paymaster General described as ‘a greater measure of certainty and stability’. Since the end of apartheid, however, South African firms launched increasingly successful ventures throughout the continent, often at the expense of UK businesses as happened in Kenya and Uganda. Partly as a result of this UK firms started to look for gateways into francophone West Africa. Traditionally, Ghana fulfilled this role but more recently Cameroon, Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire were also actively courted. In Côte d’Ivoire, for example, Blair’s government and private business worked in tandem to win the first major contract for a UK company, TCI, in francophone Africa in 2000. TCI is part of an Anglo-Dutch consortium that won a £130 million contract to extend the Port of Abidjan. Similarly, in Cameroon, a variety of companies including Guinness, Shell, Standard Chartered Bank and British American Tobacco sought to use the country as a gateway into West Africa. The final plank of Labour’s policy, debt relief for African states, became a major British political issue at the turn of the millennium. This was largely due to the extraordinary public activism organised under the umbrella of the Jubilee 2000 Coalition, which succeeded in shaming UK politicians into pushing for greater levels of debt relief (see Chapter 7). Despite grabbing the headlines with promises of total debt cancellation, the UK initiatives championed by Clare Short and Gordon Brown ran into problems in their implementation phase. Consequently, most African states eligible to receive relief under either the World Bank’s Enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative or the G-7’s Cologne Initiative of 1999 did not receive the implied benefits. For instance, by September 2003 only eight HIPC states had reached their ‘Completion Point’ (seven of which are African)64 and only 19 per cent of eligible debt stocks had been cancelled.65 In addition, some African states actually saw their position worsen under these schemes. For example, the first African state to be relieved, Uganda, whose debt in 2001 stood at approximately $3409 million, initially saw its terms of relief persistently altered by its creditors until it was actually worse off than before.66 Similarly, in 2003, Ethiopia, Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia had to pay approximately $325 million to the IMF, World Bank and Paris Club states even as they were experiencing famines.67 The problem Blair’s government faced was that despite all the initiatives only a very small minority of Africans were prosperous, and many of those quickly invested their wealth outside the continent. As Gordon Brown summed it up in 2004, ‘on current progress, we will not only fail to meet the Millennium Development Goals in Africa in ten years time – we will fail to meet them in one hundred years time’.68 The prospects
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were not quite as gloomy in relation to Labour’s third objective of promoting democracy. Here again, however, there were problems.
Promoting democracy? Since the World Bank’s 1989 report Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth, democracy or ‘good governance’ became the buzzword of development discourse. Consequently, Labour quickly declared it was – in Cook’s phrase – a ‘friend of democracy’ in Africa.69 For Blair’s government, like the World Bank, ‘good governance’ was defined as virtually synonymous with creating liberal market democracies. In this way, Labour glossed over the ways in which democracy was an inherently contested and controversial concept that in Africa, as elsewhere, meant very different things to different people.70 Like their Conservative predecessors, Labour advocated a particular form of multiparty, liberal democracy that was said to be compatible with economic liberalisation. This conception of democracy appealed to many African elites, not least because they often successfully manipulated elections and any ‘reforms’ without handing over the levers of state power. Consequently, this approach to democratisation often simply ‘recycled elites’.71 In other words, Labour underestimated the ability of neopatrimonial regimes to take on the trappings of democratisation, including holding elections and creating multiparty constitutions, without significantly altering the configurations of political power within the state. As Richard Dowden correctly observed, coming runner-up in an African election often meant ‘poverty, exile or death’.72 In contrast, the continent’s poorest people usually defined democracy as including the provision of social and economic rights as well as civil and political ones. In fact, the brand of liberal market democracy promoted in Africa bore little resemblance to the popular democracy that emerged in Europe during the eighteenth century, which was associated with empowering the mass of society and loosening the grip of a small group of elites over the polity.73 Arguably the biggest test of Labour’s efforts to promote democracy in Africa came in Zimbabwe.74 Again, however, it is important to note that the UK’s focus on Zimbabwe was highly selective. Mugabe was clearly no democrat and deserved criticism but Blair’s government paid far less attention to the continent’s other undemocratic regimes like those in Eritrea, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea or Swaziland, and had relatively little to say about other dubious elections like those in Cameroon and Madagascar. Nevertheless, spurred on by a vocal UK domestic lobby
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with links to Zimbabwe’s white population, Blair’s government adopted a policy aimed at pressurising Mugabe’s government ‘to bring about a return to respect for human rights and the rule of law in the country’.75 In practice, however, despite trying to gain political leverage through both the EU and Commonwealth, and imposing a range of targeted sanctions against Mugabe’s regime, Blair’s government ‘was shown up as having responsibility but not power’.76 Labour was not helped by its initial use of ‘megaphone diplomacy’, which did little more than fuel Mugabe’s ability to depict the situation in black and white terms, and the UK as an overbearing imperial power. Blair’s government also became increasingly frustrated with the lacklustre efforts to condemn Mugabe’s behaviour by South Africa and a large number of other African states in the Southern African Development Community, the African Union and the Commonwealth. As one commentator correctly noted, in Zimbabwe, solidarity among Africa rulers prevailed ‘over democracy and human rights’.77 The issue of how to treat President Mugabe also soured Anglo-French relations. From the UK perspective, Mugabe was best handled through isolation rather than the kind of engagement offered by President Chirac at the Franco-African summit in Paris in February 2003. Chirac’s invitation to Mugabe fuelled UK perceptions that the French government was too forgiving of the poor governance of its African friends more generally, such as the presidents of Gabon and the Republic of Congo. While this was correct, the UK also had its friends on the continent and was widely seen – especially by the French government and the NGO International Alert – as being too lenient towards Paul Kagame’s regime in Rwanda over its human rights abuses at home and its post-1998 operations in the DRC. The limits of Anglo-French cooperation set out in the 1998 St Malo declaration were also apparent over Sierra Leone when France, along with other European states, refused UK requests for military assistance on the grounds that Sierra Leone was a UK problem.78 Between 1998 and 2001, the UK was also unhappy about French relations with Liberian President Charles Taylor, specifically delaying UN sanctions against Taylor and arguing against the inclusion of tropical timber in the package (timber was not included until May 2003). The UK government apparently felt somewhat vindicated after it perceived a shift in the French approach to Taylor after his support for the Mouvement Patriotique du Grand-Ouest (MPIGO) and the Mouvement pour la Justice et la Paix (MJP) in western Côte d’Ivoire. That said, especially after the Cahors (February 2001) and Le Touquet (February 2003) summits, Anglo-French differences in Africa were minor compared to
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the similarities. Operation Artemis in the DRC, for instance, highlighted a more collaborative approach towards the war than was evident a few years earlier.
The UK and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development In October 2001, after several years of negotiations and initiatives, the NEPAD was launched in Abuja, Nigeria. Among a long list of objectives, the document committed African states to better governance and human rights promotion, ending the continent’s wars, fighting corruption, spending more money on education and health, and adopting neoliberal economic policies. The ‘partnership’ in the NEPAD was to be between African states and international institutions in general. In practice, however, it was the G-8’s reaction on aid, debt relief and terms of trade that NEPAD’s architects were primarily looking to for assistance. As Blair made clear on his tour of four West African states in February 2002, he was an enthusiastic supporter of NEPAD for several reasons.79 First, the UK had a ‘discreet’ hand in drafting it, working closely with South Africa.80 Second, Blair saw NEPAD as an ambitious but comprehensive framework for addressing the entire gambit of African affairs. Third, NEPAD represented an example of African-led partnership not of Western states imposing their agendas upon the continent. Fourth, NEPAD made it clear that the type of leadership in Africa matters. Blair used this to emphasise that Africa was not a hopeless continent. It did, however, need committed leaders accountable to their citizens whom he could work with to achieve their shared objectives. The UK’s view of the required agenda for action was most clearly set out by Clare Short in April 2002. The six most urgent issues were said to be ending Africa’s wars, increasing current levels of economic growth, granting the continent fairer terms of trade, attracting the investment necessary to build effective infrastructure, promoting human development by investing in education and effective healthcare systems, and increasing the quantity and quality of aid.81 In short, Labour saw NEPAD as the vehicle through which Africa could achieve the Millennium Development Goals. One of the problems, however, was that NEPAD was a vehicle driven by a small group of African leaders who chose their destination without consulting their own citizens. It was also noticeable that the vehicle was built according to the specifications of Western development consultants. Despite these problems, NEPAD energised a variety of multilateral forums concerned about Africa’s problems. Perhaps the most notable
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response came in the form of the G-8’s Africa Action Plan, which in the context of the US-led ‘war on terrorism’ was noticeably focused on development. Drawn up from scratch, this outlined a new agenda for G-8/Africa relations and marked a new commitment to addressing the continent’s problems. Crucially, the Action Plan recognised the need for the G-8 states to change their behaviour, especially by giving Africa fairer terms of international trade; treating trade as a development issue; taking further steps towards debt cancellation; helping to build the continent’s infrastructure; and building a new aid relationship based on notions of local ownership and reversing cuts in aid flows to Africa. On the negative side, despite an infusion of some additional funds, little practical headway was made on altering the terms of international trade. In addition, in light of international responses to Zimbabwe’s crisis, the G-8 plan arguably placed too much faith in Africa’s leaders while underplaying the significance of neopatrimonialism on the continent.82 Third, several G-8 states (not including the UK) failed to deliver the promised resources. Even if they did arrive they would go to those African treasuries that persuaded their Western creditors they were following the good governance rules (so-called enhanced-partnership countries) rather than to Africa’s poorest people. Finally, NEPAD remained couched within a familiar market-led approach to development. This was particularly problematic given that after nearly 25 years liberal approaches to development struggled to produce any genuine success stories on the continent. Clare Short acknowledged as much by frequently noting that on current trends Africa would not halve poverty by 2015 but would actually get poorer.83 Gordon Brown also noted that based on current trends, the promise of primary education for all set out in the Millennium Development Goals would not be delivered until 2130, 115 years too late; the promise of halving poverty levels not until 2150, 135 years too late; and the promise of cutting infant deaths not until 2165, 150 years too late.84 The UN Development Programme’s Human Development Report 2003 echoed these conclusions when it labelled the 1990s ‘a decade of despair’ in which many of the world’s poorest states had suffered historically unprecedented reversals in key indicators of development (discussed in Chapter 7).85 Whether the NEPAD can produce positive results remains to be seen but to do so its proponents must reform Africa’s neopatrimonial regimes and look beyond market-led approaches to peace, prosperity and democracy. But as Clapham’s warning at the start of this chapter
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indicated, ‘outside tinkering’ will achieve little if Africa’s elites fail to adopt policies that give peace, prosperity and democracy a genuine chance. From the vantage point of spring 2005, talk about NEPAD’s potential had produced few concrete results that ordinary Africans and outside observers could appreciate. At that point, the media’s attention switched to the publication of the Commission for Africa’s report, Our Common Interest. The document itself was relatively well received in the press as ‘realistic’, ‘eloquent, structured, wide-ranging, well-argued, passionate and committed’.86 Less attention was paid to Clapham’s observations that the Commission’s ‘thoroughly muddled membership and agenda’ meant it was ‘unlikely to make much impact’ and that it was ‘far too dominated by the British government to have any credibility as an independent assessment of Africa’s needs’.87 Clapham’s concerns were supported by commissioner Bob Geldoff’s acknowledgment ‘that the final few drafting days were marked by huge rows, as the government started to have cold feet about some of the recommendations and some of the language’.88 Nevertheless, the report claimed to offer ‘a coherent package for Africa’ that addressed the continent’s interlocking problems related to peace and security, governance and prosperity. It made recommendations on a wide range of issues, concluding that if the world wanted to heal this scar on its conscience, Africa would require some $75 billion of extra resources for 2010 (p. 353). This included more aid, more and fairer trade, more debt cancellation, less arms deals, more resources ploughed into education (at primary, secondary and higher levels), more money spent on healthcare, technology and infrastructure, more stringent rules on transparency and corporate responsibility, and for the world to pay more attention to Africa’s diversity and cultures. The major stumbling blocks came in three main areas. First, there was a distinctly lukewarm response from the other G-8 states. Second, despite the Commission’s emphasis on the need to stamp out corruption within African governments and prevent Western banks from harbouring funds stolen from Africa by corrupt leaders, Blair’s government had failed to ratify the UN Convention Against Corruption (it became a signatory on 9 December 2003). Third, the traditional obstacles in agricultural trade remained, especially European and North American policies designed to protect their farmers from foreign competition. This issue exemplified some of the central tensions in Labour’s economic liberalism. In particular, while Blair’s government was a strong supporter of neoliberal economic principles it was content to maintain protectionist policies when trying to
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gain the support of important domestic constituencies such as farmers or arms dealers. To account for these tensions, it is important to look beyond Africa and instead examine the political economy of Blair’s project more generally. Consequently, the following chapter explores the first of the five central issues that occupy Part III of this book, namely, the economic dimensions of Labour’s foreign policies.
Part III Issues
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5 Navigating in the Global Economy
Debates about the economic dimensions of Labour’s foreign policies revolved in large part around the meaning and impact of neoliberalism and globalisation. For Blair’s government, neoliberal globalisation – appropriately managed to mitigate its negative consequences – was seen as having the potential to bring unprecedented prosperity and development to both Britain and the wider world. Like their Conservative predecessors, Labour continued to promote neoliberal globalisation as a central plank of its international economic agenda.1 As Blair put it, in the aftermath of 9/11, ‘globalisation is a fact. ... The issue is not how to stop globalisation. The issue is how we use the power of community to combine it with justice’.2 For the government’s most strident critics, however, this agenda of promoting economic liberalisation globally fundamentally failed to combine globalisation with justice. According to Mark Curtis, for instance, Labour’s international economic agenda represented a ‘very frightening’ attempt to break into foreign markets and organise the global economy in ways that would benefit large TNCs and a transnational business elite, and deepen poverty and inequality across the planet.3 These competing positions embody very different understandings of the meaning and limits of neoliberal globalisation. They also disagree about how the economic dimensions of Labour’s foreign policies evolved – and should evolve – in practice. Since the distinction between ‘economics’ and ‘politics’ – so clear and important in neoliberal theory – is difficult if not impossible to pin down in practice, my preference throughout is to talk about Labour’s international political economy rather than its foreign economic policy. The difficulty of establishing a clear division of ‘political’ and ‘economic’ labour is also reflected within the machinery of UK government itself since the Treasury, No. 10, the 99
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Department for Trade and Industry (DTI), DFID, FCO and MOD amongst other departments are all heavily involved in both. As this chapter demonstrates, several themes were apparent in Labour’s international political economy. First, it intensified the relationships – what ministers usually referred to as partnerships – between the state and the private sector (in the form of the City, TNCs and NGOs). During Labour’s period in office, the hand of private interests and actors in these ‘partnerships’ was strengthened. In foreign policy, this was particularly evident in the sphere of commercial diplomacy. Second, Blair’s government pursued the traditional objective of helping UK business secure contracts abroad. It did so in two main ways: first, by helping to liberalise the rules governing the international trading and financial systems, thereby supporting the logic that political barriers should not impede legitimate commercial pursuits and second, by putting the collective weight of the UK’s diplomatic corps behind the search for contracts in so-called gateway economies and big emerging markets. Third, as these two strategies suggest, Labour’s international political economy was marked by a central tension inasmuch as the professed desire for liberalisation and free markets was consistently tempered by traditional mercantilist concerns to support UK business. Also, as discussed in Chapter 6 with reference to the UK’s defence industrial base, some sectors of British business enjoyed considerably more government support than others. What I refer to as the limits of Labour’s neoliberalism was evident in a variety of different issues, not least the UK’s commercial diplomacy, its refusal to sign up to the MAI and its efforts to construct a new system of international finance by reforming the Bretton Woods institutions. This chapter thus offers a critical analysis of the contradictory mix of neoliberalism and mercantilism that constituted Labour’s international political economy. The contradictions stemmed primarily from the government’s desire to portray itself as pursuing different priorities to different target audiences and constituencies. Hence, Labour simultaneously pushed for both the further liberalisation of the international financial system and for stronger powers of regulation for the International Monetary Fund (IMF). It called for international free trade but failed to alter the protectionist barriers that insulated the EU’s markets from truly global competition or make changes to the subsidies that support the UK’s defence industrial complex (see Chapter 6). In addition it spoke about freeing firms from government interference while simultaneously ensuring that the UK’s diplomats spent a significant proportion of their time engaged in commercial diplomacy to distort international
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markets in order to help UK firms win contracts abroad. Despite these contradictions, the primary beneficiaries of these policies were large Western TNCs and UK business elites, notably those in the City. To explore these issues, the chapter proceeds in four parts. The first section discusses how Labour’s commitment to neoliberalism emerged and what it entailed. In light of this commitment, the second section analyses how this affected the party’s understanding of globalisation and interdependence. It then reflects upon what this reveals about Blair’s claims that his party had adopted a third way between old-left and new-right thinking. I suggest that in the international realm there is more evidence that Labour signed up to the so-called ‘post-Washington consensus’ than there is to suggest it forged a third way. The third section examines how these commitments influenced Labour’s policies in three practical issue areas: its attempts to promote and then reform the MAI, its approach to reforming the international financial system and its stance on international trade. The final section discusses Labour’s mercantilist approach to commercial diplomacy and examines the roles that UK firms played in the government’s policy of ‘constructive engagement’ with China. In terms of Labour’s four underlying foreign policy commitments, the majority of the chapter is devoted to understanding the party’s relationship with neoliberal theory. However, Atlanticism is also evident in Labour’s international political economy. With a few exceptions (such as the MAI negotiations), Blair’s government supported the agendas of successive US administrations with regard to the international financial institutions. In this sense Blair’s government did not challenge the fundamental organising principles of the global economy and the hegemony of US power within it. In relation to multilateralism Labour’s international political economy was notable in two respects. First, it made increasing use of non-state forms of multilateralism in the form of public–private ‘partnerships’. Second, it sought to promote its approach to political economy in a wide variety of international organisations including the EU and the Commonwealth. Finally, Blair and other Labour ministers explicitly justified their commitments to free trade and increased capital liberalisation by referring to these developments as ‘moral’ – not just technical – ‘imperatives’.4
New Labour’s new liberalism Several studies have suggested that Blair’s Labour party promoted a neoliberal brand of political economy both at home and abroad.5 This
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conclusion, which I find persuasive, raises two questions. First, how did an ostensibly social democratic and left of centre party come to adopt policies traditionally associated with the new right? Second, what did new Labour’s commitment to neoliberalism entail in relation to foreign policy? The answer to the first question is inextricably bound up with the Labour party’s modernisation process and its metamorphosis from ‘old’ to ‘new’ Labour.6 Indeed, one study suggested that for Blair’s party the ‘core meaning’ of ‘modernization’ was ‘that social institutions must be reshaped to meet the imperatives of the free market’.7 The primary purpose of Labour’s modernisation was to ensure that the party was publicly perceived as being more in tune with voters’ preferences. In this sense, the goal was to shake off the tag of ‘the party of opposition’ and instead remake Labour’s image as ‘the natural party of government’. A particularly important part of this process was transforming Labour ‘From being the party not trusted with the economy’ to ‘the only party trusted with the economy’.8 To do this, Labour leaders set out to persuade four important audiences – UK voters, the UK labour movement, UK business leaders and overseas business and financial institutions – that they had adopted credible policies that would allow Britain to compete effectively within an increasingly global economy. Without such reassurances, the UK electorate might not vote for Labour and overseas investors might move their investments elsewhere. At home, therefore, Labour emphasised schemes promoting ‘labour market flexibility’, ‘welfare reform’ and ‘welfare to work’, while abroad it sought to remake the European and ‘global economic order in the image of their internal settlement’.9 The latter was clearly evident in the economic reform initiative launched at a meeting of European leaders in Cardiff and hosted by Blair. In essence, this aimed to persuade Europe to embrace the American tradition of capitalism. The initiative was formalised at a subsequent summit in Lisbon where Blair suggested the so-called Lisbon process heralded a welcome ‘sea change in Europe’s economic thinking’.10 As Colin Hay has persuasively argued, Labour’s understanding of the global economy played a crucial role in justifying, indeed, necessitating its modernisation process. In particular, advocates for ‘new’ Labour suggested that, because the contemporary era was characterised by a qualitatively novel set of circumstances and processes, this necessitated a break with Labour’s traditional social democratic principles at home and liberal internationalism abroad. From this perspective, new Labourites distilled the history of the post-1945 global economy down to two main
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developments: the move from a Fordist to post-Fordist stage of capitalist development via the crisis of the mid-1970s and the acceleration of contemporary globalisation (see later).11 The implication of this analysis was straightforward: ‘new times’ dictated a new approach to politics. Hence, in much the same way as neorealists in International Relations maintain that international anarchy necessitates foreign policies based on realpolitik, new Labourites claimed that global economic reality necessitated neoliberal responses. Blair’s supporters were hardly alone in promoting the virtues of neoliberalism. Since the early 1980s, a wide array of think-tanks, periodicals and organic intellectuals in North America and Western Europe had expounded the virtues of neoliberal ideas. Indeed, they have yet to relinquish the intellectual high ground to more left-wing challengers.12 Nevertheless, Labour’s preference for neoliberalism was surprising. Although Blair’s government rejected the structurally determinist idea that international anarchy necessitated a foreign policy based on realpolitik, in the economic realm new Labourites adopted precisely the opposite logic and argued that a liberal global economy necessitated a neoliberal response. The problem was that this interpretation of global economic realities smacked of an ‘empirically suspect, theoretically flawed and politically dangerous’ strain of economic determinism.13 The most persuasive explanation for why Labour adopted this stance was that it fitted its chosen electoral strategy during both the 1997 and 2001 general elections.14 In doing so, Labour accepted a large part of the legacy of Thatcherism and sought only to reform rather than transform its fundamentals in a more social democratic direction. In short, by the time Labour arrived in office it conceived ‘neither of the need for, nor indeed the possibility of, ... an alternative to the ascendant neoliberalism of the times’.15 Labour’s commitment to neoliberalism entailed several theoretical assumptions (only some of which were usually made explicit). These, in turn, influenced the parameters of policy debates although it is fair to say that they did not necessarily dictate specific policies. This is because neoliberalism, at least as I refer to it here, does not comprise of a distinct set of policy options. Rather, it represents a tradition of thought wherein several related but distinct theories co-exist and even conflict over certain issues. Crucially, however, despite their differences, these theories share certain family resemblances. Neoliberalism thus exerts a gravitational pull on actors that helps legitimise certain collective understandings of economic and political ‘reality’ and de-legitimise others. Importantly, it is only since the early 1980s that neoliberalism
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assumed an ascendant position within UK governments and became the intellectual gold standard against which other views are evaluated.16 Neoliberal theories share four family resemblances, all of which were evident in Labour’s international political economy. First, neoliberals believe that a natural, long-term harmony of interests exists within the framework of a free market, whereby national and international economic activity is viewed as mutually beneficial to participants. In sum, the global economy (and commercial exchange) is viewed as a non-zero-sum situation in which conflict can be managed and bargains struck on the basis that everyone could gain (although in practice actors are likely to benefit unequally). This logic was perhaps most clearly visible in the government’s two White Papers on international development (analysed in more detail in Chapter 7) and in the DTI’s White Paper of July 2004, Making Globalisation a Force for Good. It was also apparent in Labour’s stance on international trade and investment practices. As Blair suggested, ‘free trade is not a zero sum game ... in the end actually it benefits us all’.17 A second shared characteristic is that economics and politics exist, at least ideally, in autonomous spheres. Crucially, this distinction is not neutral: economics is understood as conforming to a superior, more technical, rationality than the inherently conflictual political sphere. From this perspective, politics should be shaped by the needs of the economic structure. An example of this type of thinking at work is Labour’s decision to hand over control of an inherently political institution like the Bank of England to technocrats rather than democratically elected representatives (discussed later in the chapter). Third, following from the presumed superiority of economic logic, the political borders erected by states should not be allowed to obstruct the spread of market logic. In Labour’s case, this translated into support for the liberalisation of both the international trading and financial regimes and avoiding capital market segmentation. As Blair consistently repeated, his government was ‘an unashamed champion of free trade’, and ‘capital liberalisation is right’.18 Finally, neoliberals make the explicitly normative claim that the role of the state should be confined to the limited (but important) functions of providing defence against external threats and maintaining law and order at home, in sum, the conditions for efficient and predictable commerce. The Blair government’s support for public–private partnerships – with greater proportions of formerly public services being run by private actors – was indicative of this mode of thinking. Although it is claimed that state intervention in the market should be kept to a
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minimum, this assumption ignores the amount of state power required to provide the conditions necessary for markets to function freely. It also ignores Karl Polanyi’s famous warnings about the inherent political dangers involved in allowing the marketisation of society to proceed without ensuring that sufficiently robust mechanisms are in place to ensure that all citizens can enjoy basic standards of welfare provision.19
Globalisation and the limits of Labour’s ‘third way’ These neoliberal assumptions fed directly into Labour’s foreign policy in several ways. In relation to the government’s international political economy however, it is the dominant understanding of globalisation and interdependence that had the most important effects. Of these two concepts the former was responsible for doing most of the theoretical and practical work. As noted in Chapter 1, Labour understood political interdependence as the condition brought about by the processes of globalisation whereby actors become acutely sensitive and vulnerable to events initiated elsewhere in the international system. This notion of interdependence became particularly important in Labour’s security and defence discourses, especially with regard to the nexus between technology, radicalism and WMD (see Chapters 2 and 6). The way in which Labour elites understood globalisation is altogether more complicated and requires more detailed elaboration. In particular, how did Labour’s leadership conceptualise globalisation? How did this affect UK foreign policy? And what does this reveal about the Blair government’s stated intention of charting a third way in the global economy between oldstyle socialism and new-right capitalism? According to Watson and Hay, the most important developments in Labour’s discourse of globalisation occurred primarily between 1995 and 1997 when a series of high profile speeches drew on several traditions of economic thought to send one simple political message. In the contemporary era, the processes of globalisation had rendered the policies that had sustained the ‘embedded liberalism’ of the post-war period neither feasible nor desirable.20 Labour’s discourse of globalisation invoked three themes in particular based on its interpretation of global economic realities. First, Labour signed up to the so-called business school globalisation thesis whereby faced with the global diffusion of a neoliberal macroeconomic orthodoxy, Britain, like other structurally weakened states needed to transfer economic power to ‘the market’. Second, Labour invoked the ‘structural dependence thesis’ to argue that in an era of heightened capital mobility,
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political parties had little option but to adopt policies that persuaded capital and investors to remain within the UK. Third, in line with orthodox economic theories of macroeconomic policy-making, Blair’s party argued that a single global capital market was increasingly capable of ‘policing’ governments that did not adopt credible counter-inflationary targets. Ideally, such targets should be institutionalised to insulate them from party-political pressures. This was designed to have two effects: to depoliticise economic choices and enable the path-dependent effects of institutionalisation to entrench one particular set of policy preferences. A clear example of Labour’s commitment to these assumptions was its decision to grant operational autonomy to the Bank of England within a week of taking office. Although justified by Labour’s